Organizational Choices and Organizational Adaptability in Political Parties. The Case of Western European Christian Democracy

Matthias Dilling
Nuffield College
University of Oxford

Thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of DPhil in Politics in the
Department of Politics and International Relations
at the University of Oxford
Michaelmas 2017
Word count: 99,722 (excluding Appendix)

January 3, 2018

Organizational Choices and Organizational Adaptability in Political Parties. The Case of Western European Christian Democracy

Matthias Dilling, Nuffield College, DPhil thesis, Department of Politics and International Relations, University of Oxford, Michaelmas Term 2017

Abstract

While political parties in Europe are incredibly adaptable organizations, they have varied in the extent to which they are able to adapt to social and political transformations.

I explain parties' adaptability in two steps. 1) Adaptability depends on factionalism in a nonlinear way. Giving too much room and no room at all to factions undermines a party's ability to adapt. 2) Factionalism depends on early organizational characteristics. The more centralized the initially introduced leadership selection process is, the more party elites will be incentivized to form factions. This argument applies to political parties that allow for internal competition and elect their leaders according to formal rules.

I use statistical tools, a medium- and small-N analysis and systematic process tracing to test my framework against competing explanations. I focus on Christian democracy to use a most-similar system design. The main empirical part of the thesis relies on a structured focused comparison of the Italian DC, Austrian ÖVP and German CDU. It is guided by a nested analysis and builds on a large amount of primary data which has not been analyzed before. I test my theory on the additional cases of the Portuguese, Dutch and Luxembourgian Christian Democrats and the French MRP.

My main finding is that early organizational choices matter. The initial form the leadership selection process takes has a decisive impact on the incentives of intra-party actors to form factions. The initial level of factionalism becomes deeply entrenched in the party's organization and internal code of practice. This explains why party elites are unlikely to change it when they realize that their party's level of factionalism undermines its adaptability. Moving beyond the focus of path dependence on a single level has thus important implications for the literature on party politics, factionalism, party organizations and institutional development.

Table of Contents

Abstract 1

List of figures and tables 7

Acknowledgments 9

Part I: Problem and theory

1. The end of an era or a new horizon? 11

1.1. The puzzle of party adaptability 11

1.2. Why Christian democracy? 17

1.3. Previous research 20

1.3.1. Studies of organizational adaptability 21

1.3.2. Studies of factionalism 29

1.4. The argument 32

1.5. Conceptualization 34

1.5.1. Organizational adaptability 34

1.5.2. Factions and factionalism 36

1.5.3. Centralization of leadership selection 37

1.6. Research design 39

1.7. Outline of the thesis 44

2. Explaining the development of party organization: A theory of multi-level path dependence 45

2.1. Introduction 45

2.2. The politics of leadership selection 47

2.2.1. Structure, agency and the origins of party organizations 47

2.2.2. From leadership selection to factionalism 49

2.3. Reinforcing factionalism 56

2.3.1. The resource feedback effect 57

2.3.2. The organizational feedback effect 59

2.4. Party-level effects: Reinforcing or undermining adaptability 63

2.5. Conclusion and observable implications 68

Part II: The main cases

3. The DC: Centralized leadership selection and centrifugal pressure **74**

3.1. Introduction 74

3.2. The origins and consequences of a centralized leadership selection 76

3.2.1. From the end of Fascism to party leadership elections 76

3.2.2. From a centralized leadership selection to factionalism 82

3.3. Reinforcing competitive factionalism before 1990 86

3.3.1. Intra-party power, clientelism and the electoral system 86

3.3.2. Factions and organizational change 91

3.4. Undermining party adaptability before 1990 99

3.4.1. Factionalism and the base of the DC's dominance 99

3.4.2. A party drowning in factionalism 100

3.4.3. Gridlock in the face of a changing society 101

3.5. Organizational paralysis and the demise of the DC 106

3.5.1. The end of the Cold War 106

3.5.2. *Mani pulite* and the end of an era 113

3.6. Conclusion 116

4. The ÖVP: Decentralized leadership selection and organizational rigidity **118**

4.1. Introduction 118

4.2. The origins and consequences of a decentralized leadership selection 120

4.2.1. From illegality to the party of League and Land organizations 120

4.2.2. From a decentralized leadership selection to low factionalism 129

4.3. Reinforcement of low levels of factionalism 135

4.3.1. Länder, Leagues and the Austrian state 135

4.3.2. Organizational reinforcement before 1990 139

4.4. Undermining party adaptability before 1990 149

4.4.1. Failed integration of minority elites 149

4.4.2. Mediation problems between entrenched groups 151

4.4.3. The failure to integrate new social groups 153

4.5. Organizational rigidity and the fall of the ÖVP 157
4.5.1. Weak appeal to new constituencies and electoral decline 157
4.5.2. Lack of leadership renewal 159
4.5.3. Losing party cadres and members 160
4.6. Conclusion 162

5. The CDU: Mixed leadership selection and organizational adaptability 164
5.1. Introduction 164
5.2. The origins and consequences of a mixed leadership selection process 166
5.2.1. Structural divisions, political entrepreneurship and the formation of a national organization 166
5.2.2. From mixed leadership selection to moderate factionalism 175
5.3. Reinforcing a moderate level of factionalism 184
5.3.1. Adenauer and informal leadership quota 184
5.3.2. Formal and informal institutional change 185
5.4. Reinforcing party adaptability before 1990 192
5.4.1. Absorbing rival parties and their voters 192
5.4.2. Preventing splits in the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s 198
5.4.3. Party renewal in a transforming society 200
5.5. German reunification and the new CDU 202
5.5.1. Integrating intra-party diversity in the reform process 204
5.5.2. Preventing factional splits and defection of minority elites 208
5.5.3. Keeping its voters 210
5.6. Conclusion 211

Part III: Christian Democratic adaptability beyond Italy, Austria and Germany

6. After 1990: The Portuguese, Dutch and Luxembourgian Christian Democrats **214**

6.1. Introduction 214

6.2. Centralized selection procedure and lack of unity: The Portuguese CDS-PP 216

6.2.1. Introduction of a centralized leadership selection process 216

6.2.2. High factionalism 217

6.2.3. Weak adaptability 219

6.3. Decentralized selection procedure and the lack of flexibility: The Dutch CDA 222

6.3.1. Introduction of a decentralized leadership selection process 222

6.3.2. Low factionalism 223

6.3.3. Weak adaptability 225

6.4. Mixed selection procedure and successful adaptation: The Luxembourgian CSV 228

6.4.1. Introduction of a mixed leadership selection process 229

6.4.2. Moderate factionalism 230

6.4.3. High adaptability 232

6.5. Conclusion 235

7. Before 1990: The French MRP **238**

7.1. Introduction 238

7.2. The establishment of leadership selection rules 240

7.2.1. Party federation or mass party? 240

7.2.2. From decentralized leadership selection to low factionalism 247

7.3. Reinforcing low factionalism 253

7.3.1. Resource reinforcement 253

7.3.2. Organizational reinforcement 254

7.4. Undermining party adaptability before 1958 262

7.4.1. The electoral breakdown of 1951 263

7.4.2. Lack of factions, lack of intra-party integration 265

7.4.3. Disagreement among party leaders and unclear party profile 270

7.5. The Algerian crisis and the disintegration of French Christian democracy 272
7.5.1. Bidault's break-away and the Rally of Democratic Forces 273
7.5.2. A party without followers 273
7.5.3. Divided leadership and party collapse 274
7.6. Conclusion 276

Part IV: Conclusion

8. Conclusion 278
8.1. Introduction 278
8.2. Implications for the study of party adaptability 281
8.2.1. Limitations of previous approaches 281
8.2.2. Curvilinear relationship between factionalism and party adaptability 282
8.3. Implications for the study of factionalism 285
8.3.1. Party organization: The forgotten variable 285
8.3.2. Getting the causal sequence right: Distinguishing between initiating and reinforcing factors 288
8.4. Implications for the study of party organizations 294
8.4.1. Origins of organizational characteristics 294
8.4.2. Party organization, incentives and resources 297
8.4.3. Organizational development and multi-level path dependence 297
8.5. Christian democracy and beyond? The importance of rules and democratic competition 301
8.6. Final remarks 304

Appendix 305
References 335

List of figures and tables

	Page
Figure 1.1: Christian democratic parties' vote share before and after 1990	13
Figure 1.2: Unemployment rates in Western Europe, 1960 to 2013	21
Figure 1.3: Party system polarization and Christian democratic vote share	22
Figure 1.4: Party system polarization, expert survey data	26
Figure 1.5: Factionalism in the CDU and DC, 1945 to 1969	31
Figure 1.6: A centralized and decentralized leadership selection process	38
Figure 1.7: Initial leadership selection and relative change in vote share	41
Figure 2.1: Party organization, factionalism and organizational adaptability	46
Figure 2.2: A centralized and decentralized leadership selection process	48
Figure 2.3: Centralized and decentralized selection process of the party leadership	50
Figure 2.4: A party with a mixed leadership selection process	54
Figure 2.5: From organizational choices to factionalism	56
Figure 2.6: Emergence and reinforcement of factionalism	63
Figure 3.1: Allied liberation of Italy	77
Figure 3.2: Party organization of the DC, September 1946	82
Figure 3.3: Factionalism in the DC, 1947 to 1993	90
Figure 3.4: The DC drowning in factionalism, caricature	101
Figure 3.5: Re-arrangement of factional coalitions in 1975	103
Figure 3.6: Religion and traditional values in DC election manifestos, CMP data	103
Figure 3.7: Factional divisions, 1947 to 1989	104
Figure 3.8: Attachment to Italian parties, 1980s	105
Figure 4.1: Austrian occupation zones in 1945	125
Figure 4.2: Occupational structure in Austria	153
Figure 4.3: Identification with ÖVP, 1969 to 1990	156
Figure 4.4: ÖVP relative to SPÖ and FPÖ in terms of seat and vote share	156
Figure 4.5: ÖVP vote share, 1945 to 2017	157
Figure 5.1: German occupation zones in 1945	167
Figure 5.2: Selection process of CDU national leadership, 1950	175
Figure 5.3: CDU vote share in 1949 national election by Land	178
Figure 5.4: Proportion of expellees among resident population by Land	180
Figure 5.5: Denominational structure in Germany	203
Figure 5.6: Unemployment rate in Germany	204
Figure 5.7: CDU election results since 1949	207
Figure 6.1: Leadership selection and relative change in vote share (from Chapter 1.6)	215
Figure 6.2: CDS vote share, 1975 to 2015	222
Figure 6.3: CDA vote share, 1977 to 2017	227
Figure 6.4: CSV vote share, 1945 to 2013	234
Table 1.1: Christian democratic parties competing elections before and after 1990	20
Table 1.2: Descriptive statistics of within- and between-party variation	24

Table 1.3: Anti-incumbency, polarization and Christian democratic vote share 25
Table 1.4: Institutionalization of Christian democratic parties, 1989 28
Table 1.5: Types of intra-party groups 36
Table 1.6: Initial leadership selection, factionalism and adaptability 40
Table 1.7: Case selection 42
Table 2.1: Predicted effect of levels of factionalism on party adaptability 67
Table 2.2: Theoretical framework and observable implications 69
Table 2.3: Theoretical framework against alternative theories for each causal step 70

Table 3.1: Fractionalization of the party council and party executive 79
Table 3.2: National party executive, April 1946 81
Table 3.3: Strength of multi-faction coalitions, 1964, 1973 and 1989 91
Table 3.4: Main statutory modifications 92
Table 4.1: Composition of national party executive (*Bundesparteileitung*) in 1945/6 129
Table 4.2: ÖVP participation in government, 1945 to 1970 137
Table 4.3: Preference voting in Austrian Lower Chamber elections, 1947 to 1986 138
Table 4.4: Main proposals and modifications of ÖVP party statutes, 1947 to 1967 142
Table 4.5: Statutory modifications in 1969 143
Table 4.6: Main statutory modifications between 1970 and 1978 145
Table 4.7: Statutory modifications in 1980 147
Table 4.8: Statutory amendments, 1981-89 148
Table 4.9: Occupational structure, Austrian population and ÖVP in 1969 154
Table 4.10: Composition NEOS membership 161
Table 4.11: NEOS gains from other parties 162
Table 5.1: Party council delegates by Land branch, 1951 177
Table 5.2: Associations and special organizations in the CDU 183
Table 5.3: CDU executive committee in 1960 187
Table 5.4: CDU party presidium in 1962 188
Table 5.5: Main statutory reforms within the CDU until 1966 190
Table 5.6: Election results of CDU, Center, DP and BHE between 1945 and 1957 194
Table 5.7: CDU national executive in 1950 197
Table 5.8: Election results, AfD 209
Table 5.9: Percent of voters lost to the AfD by party 211

Table 7.1: Composition of the MRP's first national executive 246
Table 7.2: Main statutory reforms within the MRP in the 1940s 258
Table 7.3: MRP statutory reform proposals in the early 1950s 260
Table 7.4: Statutory reforms, 1958 to 1962 262
Table 7.5: MRP election results during the Fourth Republic 263
Table 7.6: Minority elites leaving the MRP 269
Table 7.7: Seat share anti-system parties in the National Assembly, 1947 to 1967 272
Table 7.8: Difference between vote and seat share, 1958 and 1962 274

Table 8.1: Explanatory power of my and different theories of party adaptability 282
Table 8.2: Factionalism and party adaptability 284
Table 8.3: Leadership selection process and factionalism 287
Table 8.4: Explanatory power of my and competing theories of factionalism 293
Table 8.5: Comparative summary, origins of leadership selection process 296

Acknowledgments

This thesis would not have been possible without the generous financial support and the outstanding academic environment provided by Nuffield College and the Department of Politics and International Relations of the University of Oxford. They gave me the opportunity to embark on this intellectual journey for which I am deeply grateful.

In particular, I like to express my sincere gratitude to my supervisor, Prof. Giovanni Capoccia. The time he invested in our supervision meetings and the reading of earlier drafts of my work, the level of detail and nuance of his feedback and the continuous encouragement and support have gone far beyond what I could have wished for. He taught me how to develop an idea into a coherent, well-structured and rigorous analysis and never lost his head when I had lost mine. Moreover, his knowledge on Western European politics, comparative-historical analysis and institutional development have been an invaluable source of guidance and inspiration. I could not have imagined having a better advisor and mentor.

Besides my supervisor, I am indebted to my examiners, Prof. Ben W. Ansell and Prof. Wolfgang C. Müller and to Prof. Elias Dinas and Prof. David Hine who assessed my Confirmation of Status. Their comments, encouragement and challenging questions have been highly valuable for the development of my research.

Similarly, my profound gratitude goes to Prof. Stathis Kalyvas for so generously hosting me at Yale University. His support during my time in New Haven and thereafter has been so much more than I could have hoped for. I also like to thank wholeheartedly Prof. Nancy Bermeo for her tireless encouragement as my college advisor and for directing me in my efforts to gather the data on the Portuguese Christian Democrats. I also thank sincerely Prof. Peter Pulzer for his very helpful comments in the run-up to my archival work on the Austrian ÖVP.

Moreover, I am thankful to Prof. Urs Altermatt, Dr. Gabriela Borz, Prof. João Carlos Espada, Luís Gouveia Fernandes, Dr. Tim Frey, Prof. Magnus Hagevi, Prof. Hanspeter Kriesi, Prof. Wolfgang C. Müller, Prof. Jon Pierre and Dr. Anders Widfeldt for their help in accessing data on a number of parties discussed in this thesis.

Like many research projects, this thesis has benefited enormously from the feedback kindly shared at academic conferences, workshops and numerous conversations. I particularly thank Prof. David Art, Prof. Amel Ahmed, Prof. Michael Bernhard, Dr. Alexandra Cirone, Prof. Marcus Kreuzer, Prof. Jørgen Møller, Prof. Laura Morales, Prof. Mona Morgan-Collins, Prof. Thomas Poguntke, Prof. Marla Stone, Prof. Tariq Thachil and Dr. Emilie van Haute as well as the participants at the CES workshop on Comparative-Historical Analysis (2016), APSA (2016, 2015), ECPR (2017, 2015), the Nuffield graduate conference (2015) and the Düsseldorf conference on party research (2015). Furthermore, I am grateful to Prof. Stephen Whitefield, Prof. Sukriti Issar, Dr. Félix Krawatzek, Dr. Richard Johnson and Dr. Barry Maydom for uncountable words of encouragement and advice.

For their help, patience and expertise, I thank the archivists at the *Archiv für Christlich-Demokratische Politik* in Sankt-Augustin, the *Archives Nationales* in Pierrefitte-sur-Seine, the *Archivio Giulio Andreotti* and the *Archivio della Democrazia Cristiana* of the *Istituto Luigi Sturzo* in Rome and the *Karl von Vogelsang-Institut* in Vienna. I am also thankful to the Austrian ÖVP, Luxembourgian CSV, Portuguese CDS and Swedish KD, the Austrian *Bundesanstalt Statistik*, the Belgian *Centre Permanent pour la Citoyenneté et la Participation*, the Portuguese *Instituto Amaro da Costa*, the Swedish *Riksarkivet* and the Swiss *Bundesarchiv* for kindly scanning some archival documents and sending them via email. Furthermore, I like to give special thanks to Diogo Freitas do Amaral for his comments and insights on the Portuguese CDS.

Last but not least, I like to express my personal gratitude to my wife, Tabea, for her selfless support during the challenging moments of the DPhil, to my parents, sister and parents in law for always believing in me and to God. This thesis is dedicated to them.

Chapter 1

The end of an era or a new horizon?

'I believe that dangers await only those that do not react to life' (Mikhail Gorbachev, 1989).

1.1 The puzzle of party adaptability

Peter Mair's (1997) verdict still holds that political parties in Europe are incredibly adaptable organizations. It is surely impressive that 'old parties which were around well before Rokkan elaborated his freezing proposition are still around today' given the extent of societal and political change (Mair, 1997: 90). On the demand side, we have noticed the erosion of traditional working-class, Catholic and rural constituencies. Social mobility, education and media access have substantively increased and new issues, like environmental protection, women's rights, mass migration, international cooperation and transnational terrorism, have become important (Inglehart and Rabier, 1986; Kiras, 2001; Thomasson, 2005; Dalton, 2006; Kriesi et al., 2008). On the supply side, we have observed the emergence of new political parties and movements (Poguntke, 1987; Kitschelt, 1988; Kitschelt and McGann, 1995). The very fact that many of the old Christian democratic, conservative, social democratic and liberal parties still persist underlines that parties can adapt to a changing environment.

However, these parties have displayed substantive variation in the extent to which they have been able to adapt to the transformations in European societies. This is particularly well-illustrated by short periods of profound political change, like the rapidly unfolding collapse

of the Communist regimes in Eastern Europe, as they entail immediate pressure for political parties to get their act together. They need to decide on which issues to campaign, how to campaign, which voters to target and, last but surely not least, who should lead the party into battle.

The 1990s and early 2000s were a series of short episodes of profound change, often described as exogenous shocks (Pierson, 2000a: 264; Greif and Laitin, 2004: 634), for an entire party family: Western European Christian democracy. At that time, as we know, these parties had already been challenged by the gradual erosion of their core constituency. The share of voters living in rural areas, working in agriculture and attending church at least once per week had been declining massively since the 1960s due to the urbanization, modernization and secularization of Western European societies (e.g. Mackie and Franklin, 1992: 39–40; Dalton, 2006: 158–65; Magone, 2011: 95-136). Christian democratic parties had thus been required to adapt to a world in which religion was losing its importance as driving force of people's vote choice. Overall, these parties had been coping fairly well with these changes until the late 1980s. After 1990, however, many of them could not compensate anymore when confronted with three additional challenges:

(1) The disappearance of the Communist threat deprived them of one of their key mobilizing issues. While the end of the Cold War might be interpreted as the Christian democratic victory in a more than 40-years-long battle of ideas, the old antagonism suddenly decreased in salience for future elections.
(2) Relatedly, promoting Western (European) integration, which Christian democratic parties had championed as the way toward security, prosperity, freedom and peace, became a less promising strategy to gain electoral support (Granieri, 2003; 2009). The end of the Cold War had put an end to the almost permanent threat of a nuclear conflict in Europe and thus deprived the issue of Western integration partially of its ideational foundation. It did not appear to be necessary any longer in order to ensure security and peace in Europe. Moreover, the path toward a more integrated European Union, including an economic and monetary union, exposed economic difficulties rather than prosperity in many countries (e.g. Ginsborg, 1996: 35–6).
(3) These economic difficulties, finally, undermined the ability of Christian democratic parties

to maintain the type of welfare regime and thus the social coalition they had been associated with for decades (Van Kersbergen, 1999: 361-6).

Christian democratic parties have varied importantly in their ability to adapt to the new conditions, as illustrated by their divergent electoral development since 1990 (Figure 1.1). Looking at the development of a party's vote share over time is surely only one possible indicator of its adaptability, and I will name other indicators later in this chapter, to measure how well a party adapts to a changing environment. Yet, while parties may pursue different goals (Harmel and Janda, 1994: 269–71), votes are a valuable resource – whether the party is vote-, office- or policy-seeking. Even if it focuses on the realization of policies, a strong vote share can provide a party with important bargaining potential. Obviously, in the short-term, parties lose votes for a number of reasons, including candidate- or campaign-related factors (see the seminal work by Campbell et al., 1960). But plotting a party's vote share over time allows us to see patterns of how well a party has been able to mobilize support under changing political and societal conditions.

Figure 1.1: Christian democratic parties' vote share before and after 1990



Data: Armingeon et al., 2015a.[1]

[1]As Armingeon et al. (2015a) do not report results under two percent, data on such results has been taken from Nordsieck (2017).

As we can see, Christian democratic parties have considerably declined in Austria, the Netherlands, Belgium and Switzerland, whereas their losses have been much less severe in Germany, Luxembourg and Norway. The Austrian ÖVP scored only 32.1 percent in the 1990 general elections in comparison to 41.3 percent four years earlier and shrank to a mere 24.0 percent in 2013. The Dutch CDA lost 13.1 percent in the first post-Cold War election in 1994 which put an end to the almost continuous Christian democratic and confessional parties' participation in government since 1917 (Lucardie and ten Napel, 1994: 66-7). Similar to the ÖVP, a short recovery in the early 2000s was not enough to revert this trend (Duncan, 2006; 2007a; Bale and Krouwel, 2013). In the recent 2017 election, the CDA only obtained 12.4 percent of the votes. The Belgian CVP's vote share dropped by over a third when comparing its average performance before and after 1990. The eight years in opposition between 1999 and 2007 were thereby the longest time the Belgian government did not include a Christian democratic or Catholic party since 1884 (Lucardie and ten Napel, 1994: 52, 65; Beke, 2004). And while the party returned to power in 2008 as part of an alliance with the nationalist N-VA, its decline continued – winning only 11.6 percent of the votes in 2014. The Italian DC, in turn, disappeared completely. Splitting four times in less than four years over the extent and direction of reform, the party massively declined in the 1993 local elections and was dissolved just three months before the 1994 general election (Wertman, 1995; Leonardi and Alberti, 2004: 121). In sharp contrast, the losses of the German CDU have been much more moderate (Walter, Werwath and D'Antonio, 2014: 170-84). Christian democratic vote share has also remained relatively stable in Luxembourg and Norway.

Despite an increase in academic interest,[2] we still lack an explanation for this cross-national variation (Kalyavs and Van Kersbergen, 2010: 183). In other words, *why have Christian democratic parties differed in their ability to adapt to radically changing external conditions?*

The interplay between profound transformations that unfold over a relatively short period of time and parties' ability to cope with these changes points toward a broader puzzle in the literature on party politics in general and spatial and party organization theory in particular.

[2]For instance, Van Kemseke (2006), Kaiser (2007), Frey (2009) and the edited volumes by Kselman and Buttigieg (2003), Gehler and Kaiser (2004) and Gerard and Van Hecke (2004).

(1) Spatial models of party competition postulate a dynamic view of parties by expecting them to adapt in order to match voter preferences (Downs, 1957; Laver and Hunt, 1992; Kitschelt, 1994; Adams, Merrill and Grofman, 2005; see Lupu, 2016: 1). Excellent contributions to this literature have analyzed parties' electoral prospects depending on the strategies they adopt (Bale, 2003; Frey, 2009; Gidron, 2016; Lupu, 2016). Yet, their work has left under-explored why some parties, like the DC, have struggled to agree on a reform strategy in the first place.

My study adds to this literature not by explaining whether a party's decisions with regard to its policies, leaders and campaign and coalition strategy will be successful or not but by theorizing the extent to which parties will be able to formulate such decisions. Thus, by *organizational adaptability*, I mean a party's capability of integrating competing preferences into a single reform strategy. I will provide a rigorous conceptualization and operationalization in Section 1.5 below.

(2) The party organization literature has tried to solve the puzzle of parties' adaptability by theorizing the organizational evolution of political parties from the initial cadre to the mass party (Duverger, 1951), catch-all party (Kirchheimer, 1966) and electoral-professional (Panebianco, 1988) or cartel party (Katz and Mair, 1995; 1997). The emergence of the cartel party was assumed to 'afford political leaderships more room for maneuver and, eventually, greater success' by increasing party leaders' autonomy from social groups and ordinary rank-and-files (Mair, 1997: 11-3).

However, while I agree that organization is a crucially important variable to explain parties' ability to adapt, the cartel party theory does not solve the puzzle of party adaptability. Many Christian democratic parties, like in Austria, Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands, have been associated with the rise of the cartel party (see the chapters in Katz and Mair, 1994). If the emergence of the cartel party provided party leaders with more flexibility to adapt their organization to changing conditions, why have these parties displayed such variation in terms of adaptability as shown above? Relatedly, if, as Pizzorno (1981: 272) and recently Wills-Otero (2016) have suggested, the type of organizational format explained the level of adaptability, why do not all parties adopt the more promising organization? Instead,

we still observe substantive variation in party organizations as the Political Party Database Project has recently outlined (Poguntke et al., 2016). Moreover, we see aborted organizational reforms, like in the Italian DC (Wertman, 1995), and lengthy and inefficient reforms as in the case of the Austrian ÖVP (Müller, Plasser and Ulram, 2004: 154-61).

I thus agree with Mair (1997: 44) that we 'need to move beyond the crude classification of party organization' in terms of mass, catch-all or cartel party. We are required to develop a series of empirically valid indicators concerning the internal life of modern parties, to specify the causes and effects of organizational change and to develop and test hypotheses which might account both for the diversity of and change within party organizations (Mair, 1997: 42-3).

In this thesis, I add to this research agenda by analyzing the relationship between party organization, intra-party competition and party adaptability. To adapt to profound exogenous transformations, parties need to get their act together. How well they are able to do so depends on the history of their organization. When political elites with often divergent ideas and preferences decide to come together within a single platform, they are required to make organizational choices that place them in a dilemma: While the organization has to provide party elites with the flexibility to pursue their preferences within the party, the party requires organizational mechanisms to aggregate competing preferences into a single manifesto and leadership structure. It is important for actors to get these organizational decisions right because they influence patterns of intra-party competition, conceptualized as the level of factionalism, which ultimately affect a party's level of organizational adaptability. Giving factions no room, on the one hand, is likely to undermine the party's ability to attract and integrate (new) voters and cadres. On the other hand, providing factions with too much room risks undermining a party's decision-making ability by leading to cycling majorities and highly unstable leadership coalitions (Coppedge, 1994; Boucek, 2009). In other words, not only extreme organizational rigidity[3] but also extreme flexibility weakens a party's organizational adaptability. My study aims to show why and how.

[3] See Crisp (1996; 2000), McCoy (1999), Burgess and Levitsky (2003) and Levitsky (2003).

1.2 Why Christian democracy?

The puzzle motivating my thesis could, in principle, go beyond Christian democracy. When thinking about a set of parties whose roots in society have been severally challenged, one could think of social democracy as an additional party family of interest. Economic modernization, the increase in the service relative to the industrial sector and the rise of so-called post-materialist politics have put immense pressure on social democratic parties to reform (Kitschelt, 1994: 2-3; Walter, 2010: 7; Butzlaff, Micus and Walter, 2011: 7-8; Karreth, Pol and Allen, 2012: 792, 797).

However, I focus on Western European Christian democracy because of the advantages of a most similar system design. I thereby follow the rich tradition of studies that are interested in party families. In fact, we find a large number of studies on social democratic and socialist parties,[4] communist and post-communist parties[5] and radical right-wing parties.[6] When looking at this list, the limited attention devoted to Christian democracy is striking (Hanley, 1994: 1; Van Kersbergen, 1995: ix; Kalyvas, 1996: 1; Gerard and Van Hecke, 2004: 10; Frey, 2009: 19-20). This is problematic because Christian democratic parties are crucially important to understanding Western European politics after World War II.

More specifically, Christian democratic parties are similar on a set of theoretically relevant factors. This helps control for alternative explanations (Przeworski and Teune, 1970; George, 1979: 60; Collier, Mahoney and Seawright, 2004: 101). The reasoning is that if cases share a specific factor, while differing in the outcome of interest, this factor cannot be a sufficient cause of Y. This is not to say that the cases are identical in every respect except for the independent and dependent variable. Instead, they are better considered as providing actors with a 'similar strategic setting' (Kalyvas, 2000: 381).

[4] Przeworksi and Sprague (1986), Piven (1992), Kitschelt (1994), Pennings (1999), Glyn (2001), Martell and Van der Anker (2001), Piazza (2001), Moschonas (2002), Berman (2006), Walter (2010), Hough and Sloam (2007), Rueda (2007), Butzlaff, Micus and Walter (2011) and Kareth et al. (2012).

[5] McInnes (1978), Bull and Heywood (1994), Waller (1989; 1995), Ishiyama (1995; 1999), Ziblatt (1998), Bozoki and Ishiyama (2002), Grzymala-Busse (2002, 2006) and Hough (2005).

[6] Ignazi (1992), Kitschelt and McGann (1995), Hainsworth (2000), Lubbers et al. (2002), Minkenberg (2002), Golder (2003), Weinberg and Merkl (2003), Carter (2005), Norris (2005), Rydgren (2005; 2012), Veugelers and Magnan (2005), Schain (2006), Williams (2006), Mudde (2007), Arzheimer (2009), Ellinas (2010), Art (2011) and Dinas et al. (2016).

Thus, the fact that I only look at Christian democratic parties allows me to control for party family-specific factors (i.e. origins, ideology, social composition of the party and the electorate). Unlike sometimes suggested in the past,[7] Christian democratic parties are a distinct party family. They emerged in Europe as a result of the political bargaining related to the religious cleavage (Kalyvas, 1996). They differ from denominational or confessional parties[8] through their rejection of a too close attachment to the clergy and their openness to different denominations and secular influences (Van Kersbergen, 1999: 352).[9] Their religious inspiration, in turn, has demarcated them from conservative,[10] secular-centrist,[11] liberal and social democratic parties. This distinctiveness has usually been expressed in their positions on issues concerning 'private morality', such as divorce, abortion, and euthanasia (Van Kersbergen, 1999: 352). Inspired by Catholic social teaching, Christian democratic parties have usually supported European integration as well as subsidiarity and have combined their support for capitalism with a sense of social responsibility. In their view, society is neither based on the individual nor on the collective but on various social groups between whom politics needs to mediate. This has encouraged Christian democratic parties to endorse a cross-class, ideologically catch-all mobilization strategy (Van Kersbergen, 1994: 35-42; 1995: 2–4; 1999: 352–9, Frey, 2009: 27–55; Kalyvas and Van Kersbergen, 2010: 186-91). Christian democratic parties thus share many important characteristics.

In turn, they have varied substantially in terms of how well they have coped with the new political context, as shown above, and I will show below that they also vary with regard to important organizational choices. They are thus very suitable for a most-similar system design.

Moreover, Christian democratic parties are an ideal set of cases to study organizational adaptability. Such a study benefits from a research design which analyzes the trajectory of parties that have experienced the same or very similar moments of profound exogenous change. This would allow holding the type of change and the time period of observation relatively constant

[7]See the otherwise excellent volumes by Katz and Crotty (2006) and Kriesi et al. (2008).

[8]For instance, the Reformed State Party in the Netherlands and the Catholic German Center Party.

[9]On Christian democratic parties' relationships with confessional parties, see Fogarty (1957), Conway (1996; 2001; 2003) and Evans (1999). See Warner (2000) on their ties with the Catholic Church.

[10]For example, the British Tories and French Republicans.

[11]For example, the Swedish Center Party.

across cases. Both aspects are helpful to control for potentially confounding factors. Christian democracy offers such a set of cases. Fourteen of them have competed elections before and after the transformations of the early 1990s (Table 1.1).[12]

The varying development of these cases has not been subject of systematic research (Kalyvas and Van Kersbergen, 2010: 203). In fact, we find very few comparative studies at all (see Duncan, 2006; Van Kemseke, 2006; Frey, 2009).

This relative neglect is consequential because 'it is impossible to understand contemporary Europe without taking into account Christian democracy' (Kalyvas and Van Kersbergen, 2010: 184). Indeed, 'Christian democracy, with social democracy, forms the "political family" that has decisively shaped post-war European politics and society' (ibid.).[13] As the pivotal governmental parties in many countries, Christian democratic parties have played a crucial role in nearly all socioeconomic and political reforms in Western Europe since 1945. They had a substantial influence on establishing and consolidating constitutional democracies by bringing together a set of highly diverse actors, ranging from the conservative right to social-Catholic, left-wing groups. They played an essential role in implementing a moderate version of market economy (Van Kersbergen, 1994: 31; 1999: 352–3; Gehler, Kaiser and Wohnout, 2001: 10). Furthermore, European integration would have been unthinkable without them (Kemseke, 2006; Kaiser, 2007; Granieri, 2009).

[12]While Table 1.1 mainly follows the coding by Frey (2009: 48–55) and Kalyvas and Van Kersbergen (2010: 190), I do not include the Irish Fine Gael. Admittedly, Fine Gael has sometimes referred to itself as Christian democratic and is a member of the European People's Party and the Centrist Democrat International (Gallagher and Marsh, 2002: 11; Frey, 2009: 49). These organizations, however, also include non-Christian democratic parties, such as the French Republicans, the Greek New Democracy and the Hungarian FIDESZ. More importantly, Fine Gael's social roots differ strongly from continental Christian democracy (Mair, 1979: 445; Sinnott, 1995: 24-5, 280, 284; McBride, 2006: 235; Liam, 2010: 142). Irish parties formed over the question on whether to support or reject the peace treaty with the United Kingdom (Mair, 1979: 445; Gallagher and Marsh, 2002: 13–6; McBride, 2006: 235–6). The religious cleavage, in contrast, has been quasi non-existent in independent Ireland (McBride, 2006: 241). Fine Gael's ideology has thus not been bound to continental patterns of party competition. Overall, the party has switched four times between the social-democratic left and the conservative right (Gallagher, 1985: 52-8, 64–5; Sinnott, 1995: 47-8, 50-2; O'Malley and Kerby, 2004: 44-5; Liam, 2010: 142-3; McBride, 2006: 237, 239–1). Such ideological vicissitude has cast serious doubts on Fine Gael's coding as Christian democratic and fed into debates on whether continental categories of party competition apply to Ireland (Whyte, 1974: 648; Gallagher, 1976: 5; 1981: 279; Mair, 1979: 445, 461; 1987: 7–11, 178–97, 202-5; 1997: 14–5; Carty, 1981: 6, 43; Sinnott, 1995: 270-87; McBride, 2006: 242–3; Liam, 2010: 142).

[13]See also Lynch (2006) and Müller (2011) on the post-war political development in Europe.

Table 1.1: Christian democratic parties competing elections before and after 1990

Country	Parties
Austria	Austrian People's Party (ÖVP)
Belgium	Christian People's Party (CVP), Social-Christian Party (PSC)[14]
Denmark	Christian People's Party (KRF)[15]
Finland	Finnish Christian League (SKL)[16]
Germany	Christian Democratic Union (CDU), Christian Social Union (CSU)
Italy	Christian Democracy (DC)
Luxembourg	Christian-Social People's Party (CSV)
Netherlands	Christian Democratic Appeal (CDA)
Norway	Christian People's Party (KRF)
Portugal	Democratic and Social Center (CDS)[17]
Sweden	Christian Democratic Unity (KDS)[18]
Switzerland	Swiss Conservative People's Party (KVP)[19]

1.3 Previous research

As my framework, as stated above, suggests a two-step argument (i.e. organizational choices cause factionalism, factionalism causes organizational adaptability), it is important to consider what lessons we can draw from previous work on both organizational adaptability and factionalism.

[14]The CVP has been called Christian Democratic and Flemish since 2001. The PSC has changed its name to Humanist Democratic Center in 2002.

[15]Including the four Scandinavian parties is controversial. Given their emergence as 'moral', Eurosceptic and non-conformist protest parties, Karvonen (1993) has emphasized their Christian rather than Christian democratic identity. Yet, I follow recent studies that have considered them as Christian democratic (Hanley, 1994; Van Hecke and Gerard, 2004; Frey, 2009; Kalyvas and Van Kersbergen, 2010).

[16]Called Christian Democrats since 2001.

[17]Called People's Party since 1992. Including the CDS is contentious, but I agree with Frey (2009: 49) and Kalyvas and Van Kersbergen (2010: 190) that it is correct. The party emerged as a Christian democratic party during the Portuguese transition period, promoted a (though conservative) version of Christian democracy, referred to itself and was referred to as Christian democratic and only adopted a more right-wing profile during the six years of Manuel Monteiro's leadership in the 1990s (Frain, 1997: 79–92, 108–9; Magone, 1999: 240, 244-53; Freire, 2006: 384-5; Chapter 6.2).

[18]Since 1996, the party is named Christian Democrats.

[19]Called Christian Democratic People's Party of Switzerland since 1970.

1.3.1 Studies of organizational adaptability

By a party's level of adaptability, I mean its ability to get its act together when it is suddenly required to respond to social and political transformations. This involves agreeing on crucial decisions like who should lead the party, which issues to campaign on and which voters to target. The concrete operationalization is provided in Section 1.5.1 below.

Previous studies of voting behavior, party systems, party institutionalization and party organization have been essential for a better understanding of party politics. Yet, when applied to Christian democratic parties, they do not sufficiently account for cross-national variation.

Anti-incumbency and party system polarization: Some authors have linked Christian democratic parties' varying electoral performance to economic and anti-incumbency voting (e.g. Van Kersbergen, 1995: 5; 1999: 361–6). As a major governmental player in many countries, Christian democracy was suggested to be particularly vulnerable to the economic recession of the early 1990s which led to an increase in unemployment in many European countries (Figure 1.2).

Figure 1.2: Unemployment rates in Western Europe, 1960 to 2013



Data: Armingeon et al., 2015a.

In turn, another set of important studies has emphasized the importance of the party system in explaining Christian democratic strength, while making diametral predictions. Sartori's (1966: 45–96; 1976: 131–45) work implies that Christian democratic parties, typically holding a centrist position in the party system, would risk declining if persistently competing in a polarized party system. In contrast, Hazan (1997: 158) has noted that polarization might actually help center parties to maintain their strength. As an in-/decrease in extreme parties' vote share would contribute to an in-/decrease in party system polarization, one could expect that the sudden decline of previously strong Communist parties, such as in Italy and Portugal, would affect Christian democratic parties. Yet, already when using the standard deviation of a party system's left-right position as the first of several indicators for polarization (Evans and De Graaf, 2013: 41), there seems to be no obvious relationship between party system polarization and Christian democratic vote share (Figure 1.3).

Figure 1.3: Party system polarization and Christian democratic vote share



Data: Armingeon et al., 2015a.; Volkens et al., 2016; Italy 1994: Italian People's Party (PPI).[20]

To assess the explanatory power of anti-incumbency and party system polarization more rigorously for the 14 parties included in Table 1.1, I use data on vote share, unemployment rate

[20]The PPI was the largest party that emerged out of the disintegrated DC.

and incumbency status from the Comparative Political Data Set (CPDS) and its supplement on government composition between 1960 and 2013 (Armingeon et al., 2015a; 2015b). I also use data from the Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP; Volkens et al., 2016) to calculate Dalton's (2008: 906) party system polarization index. Dalton's measure offers the advantage that it takes into account both the relative position of each party along the left-right dimension as well as each party's size by weighting its position according to its vote share.[21] The index 'has a value of 0 when all parties occupy the same position on the Left-Right scale and 10 when all the parties are split between the two extremes of the scale' (Dalton, 2008: 906).

I estimate a fixed-effects regression which estimates a separate intercept for each party.[22] The model can be written as:

$$Y_{it} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 I_{it} + \beta_2 U_{it-1} + \beta_3 I_{it} * U_{it-1} + \beta_4 P_{it} + \delta_1 T_1 + ...\delta_t T_t + \alpha_i + \epsilon_{it}$$

and regresses a Christian democratic party i's vote share at election t on whether it is running in this election as an incumbent party (I), on the unemployment rate (U) (lagged by one year), an interaction term of both variables (assuming that a high unemployment rate is more damaging for governing than opposition parties) and the polarization of the party system (P). The model also includes the unknown intercept for each party i (α) and time

[21] The polarization index is calculated as:
$PI = SQRT(\sum[\text{party vote share}_i * ([\text{party L/R score}_i - \text{party system average L/R score}]/5)^2])$; where i represents an individual party (Dalton, 2006: 906). To compute the PI with the CMP data, I used the CMP's (2016) Election Level do-file in Stata, while replacing the weighted party system mean with the unweighted party system mean as in Dalton's original formula (cf. Lupu, 2015: 339; Matakos et al., 2015: 344). This, however, does not substantially alter the results. Comparing the results using either the weighted or unweighted party system mean, I find that they are, unsurprisingly, highly correlated (Pearson's r= 0.987). The (significant) difference in mean is very small ($\mu_D = 0.072$) given the scale from 0 to 10.

[22] I choose a fixed-effects regression over a pooled OLS. The Hausman test supports this choice ($Prob > chi2 = 0.000$). Also, as a party's vote can hardly be considered to be independent of its previous results, we would expect the standard errors to be serially correlated (Beck and Katz, 1995: 636; Andreß et al. 2013: 109). I would thus need to cluster the standard errors by party if I wanted to run an OLS model. Yet, clustering with such a small number of clusters ($n = 14$) is controversial. On the one hand, some scholars have run similar models with fewer or a similar number of clusters (e.g. Garrett, 1998; Iversen, 1999; Beck, 2001). Others, on the other hand, have warned that clustering with a small number of clusters would lead to downward-biased cluster-robust variance matrix estimates and thus to an increased risk of over-rejecting the null (Cameron and Miller, 2015: 341–2; see also Wooldridge, 2003). Including a lagged dependent variable, as suggested by Beck and Katz (1995) and Beck (2001), to correct for serial correlation is not advisable given the problems described by Achen (2001) in the presence of serial correlation and heavily trended variables.

dummies to control for election year-specific unobserved heterogeneity (Allison, 2009: 10). As Dalton's polarization index is weighted by a party's vote share, I lag this variable by one election to avoid endogeneity. Following Evans and De Graaf (2013: 41), I also run the same model with the standard deviation of the general CMP left-right measure for a given election in a given country. It allows me to capture the level of polarization closer to election t and to completely eliminate the influence of vote share on the right-hand side.

Thus, by controlling for all between-party time-invariant variability (Stock and Watson, 2003: 289-90), I test whether changes in unemployment, incumbency status and party system polarization affect a party's vote share across time. The data provides sufficient within-panel (i.e. party) variation over time as can be seen in Table 1.2.

Table 1.2: Descriptive statistics of within- and between-party variation

Variable	Level	Mean	SD	Observations
Vote share	Overall	17.118	13.264	188 (N)
	Between		12.904	14 (n)
	Within		4.411	13.427 (T-bar)
Dalton's PI (lagged)	Overall	1.695	0.735	186 (N)
	Between		0.413	14 (n)
	Within		0.619	13.286 (T-bar)
Standard deviation L/R position party system	Overall	19.102	7.642	190 (N)
	Between		4.842	14 (n)
	Within		5.964	13.571 (T-bar)
Unemployment rate (lagged)	Overall	4.857	3.099	192 (N)
	Between		1.875	14 (n)
	Within		2.546	13.714 (T-bar)

Table 1.3 presents the results of the multivariate analysis. They seem to justify doubts with regard to the comparative strength of the anti-incumbency and the polarization hypothesis. The anti-incumbency coefficient has the expected sign, and the sign of the polarization variable, whether operationalized by Dalton's index or the standard deviation of the general left-right measure, seems to lend some support to Sartori's (1966; 1976) argument regarding the negative effect of polarization. However, neither of them is significant when controlling for between-party and election year-specific unobserved heterogeneity. In turn, an increase in unemployment seems to help Christian democratic parties when they are in opposition. The

effect is statistically significant but relatively small (around 0.6 percent).

Table 1.3: Anti-incumbency, polarization and Christian democratic vote share

Variable	Model 1	Model 2
Incumbency	2.663 (1.684)	2.936 (1.570)
Unemployment (lagged)	0.590* (0.239)	0.657** (0.223)
Incumbency*Unemployment	-0.149 (0.256)	-0.232 (0.231)
Polarization (lagged Dalton's PI)	-0.735 (0.617)	
Polarization (SD Left-Right Party System)		-0.081 (0.058)
Time-controls	Yes	Yes
Constant	17.976*** (3.414)	16.840*** (2.667)
N	182	184
$Prob > F$	0.001	0.000
R^2	0.527	0.542
Adj. R^2	0.249	0.278

The dependent variable is a Christian democratic party i's vote share at election t. Dalton's PI on a 0 to 10 scale, SD of CMP general L-R measure on -100 to 100 scale, unemployment rate in percent of civilian labor force. Models are fixed-effects regressions with party as panel variable and election year-controls. SE in parentheses, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

With regard to the operationalization of party system polarization, there have, however, been some justified concerns concerning the validity of the CMP methodology given its measurement strategy and focus on the salience of issues rather than party positions (Janda et al., 1995: 177; Gabel and Huber, 2000; Laver and Garry, 2000; Dinas and Gemenis, 2010). I thus use the Ray-Marks-Steenbergen expert survey data set and the 1999-2014 Chapel Hill Expert Survey as an alternative data source to calculate Dalton's index (Ray, 1999; Steenbergen and Marks, 2007; Bakker et al., 2015).[23] Unfortunately, expert surveys are only available for eight countries with a Christian democratic party and nine years between 1984 and 2014.[24] They

[23]For further discussion on the two measures, see Benoit and Laver (2006: 96–8) and Pontusson and Rueda (2008: 327–30).

[24]Data for 1984: Castles and Mair (1984), for 1996: Hix and Lord (1997) and for 1999, 2002, 2006, 2010 and 2014: the 1999-2014 Chapel Hill Expert Survey. 1988 and 1992 are linear interpolations. I

have thus not been included in the regression analysis but are presented as descriptive statistics. The descriptive results underscore the limitations of the polarization hypothesis (Figure 1.4). The disintegration of the Italian DC/PPI seems to support the reading of Sartori (1966; 1976) regarding the negative effect of polarization on Christian democratic strength. Yet, the ÖVP started declining when the Austrian party system was the least polarized of all eight systems presented in Figure 1.4. Similarly, the decrease of electoral support for the Dutch CDA from 35.3 percent in 1989 to 22.2 in 1994 and 18.4 percent in 1998 was accompanied by an initially moderate increase and then a sharp decrease in the level of party system polarization. Almost more importantly, we observe relatively little variation across party systems. A small standard deviation underlines that the data is not particularly spread out on the 0-10 scale ($SD_{min} = 0.396$ in 1992; $SD_{max} = 0.681$ in 1996). Obviously, it is important not to overstate these trends given the small number of observations. Yet, they illustrate that focusing on party system polarization alone yields, from a comparative perspective, ambiguous conclusions.

Figure 1.4: Party system polarization, expert survey data



Data: Dalton (2008) based on Ray (1999), Steenbergen and Marks (2007) and Bakker et al. (2015).

Thus, while these tests are surely mainly indicative, doubts seem justified with regard to whether theories of anti-incumbency and party system polarization unequivocally account

rescaled the LR-GEN variable to make it compatible with Dalton's (2008) 0-10 scale.

for Christian democratic parties' changing vote share over time. We are thus encouraged to investigate the explanatory power of other variables.

Other studies have attempted to solve the puzzle of parties' varying adaptability by theorizing the strategic interaction between actors under the institutional constraints imposed by intra-party politics.

Party institutionalization: Latin Americanists have argued that highly institutionalized parties lacked the flexibility to respond to transforming economic and political conditions (Barr, 2005; Coppedge, 2005). These organizationally entrenched parties, some authors have noted, continued to privilege existing interest groups, while failing to integrate new actors (Coppedge, 1994; Crisp, 1996; 2000; Crisp and Levine, 1998; McCoy, 1999; Burgess and Levitsky, 2003; Levitsky, 2003; cf. Lupu, 2016: 17-20). Similarly, Kitschelt (1994) has highlighted party institutionalization as an important variable in explaining social democracy's ability to respond to a gradually changing electoral environment in Europe.

Decentralization of power: Moreover, Wills-Otero's (2016) recent findings suggest that the extent to which power is decentralized within a party might affect its adaptability. By giving more power to the subnational party level, a party is expected to be more responsive to the demands of diverse constituencies.

I use the institutionalization index developed by Kitschelt (1994: 221-4) to assess whether organizational rigidity or decentralization of power helps explain Christian democracy's varying development since 1990. Kitschelt's (1994) concept of institutionalization includes both the level of organizational entrenchment[25] and the extent to which power is decentralized within a party (coined leadership accountability). The results presented in Table 1.4 are my scoring on both dimensions for the late 1980s. The end of the 1980s is a suitable point in time for such an analysis because it gives us a fair idea of parties' level of organizational entrenchment and decentralization before they were required to adapt to the post-Cold War environment.

[25]Seawright (2012: 9) has rightly noted that Kitschelt's concept of organizational entrenchment is more inclusive than Levitsky's (2003) focus on the de facto importance of rules and bureaucracies. To assess the importance of Levitsky's argument for explaining the adaptability of Christian democratic parties, more in-depth qualitative work is required. It will be assessed in Chapters 3 through 7.

Table 1.4: Institutionalization of Christian democratic parties, 1989

Variable	CDA	CSU	CDU	PSC	DC	CVP	ÖVP
(1) Member/voter ratio	0.0	0.0	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	1.0
(2) Importance of patronage	0.0	1.0	0.5	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0
(3) Size of the party's middle apparatus	1.0	1.0	1.0	0.5	1.0	1.0	1.0
(4) Institutionalization of intra-party pluralism	0.0	0.5	0.5	0.5	1.0	1.0	1.0
(5) Local control over candidate recruitment	0.5	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	0.5	0.5
(6) Control of party conference	0.5	0.5	1.0	no data	0.0	0.5	0.0
(7) Dominance of party executive over parliamentary leadership	0.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0
(8) Dependence on external groups	0.5	0.0	0.0	0.5	0.5	1.0	1.0
Summary (1)–(4): Organizational entrenchment	1.0	2.5	2.5	2.5	3.5	3.5	4.0
Summary (5)–(8): Leadership accountability	1.5	2.5	3.0	2.5-3.5	2.5	3.0	2.5
Summary (1)–(8): Institutionalization	2.5	5.0	5.5	5.0-6.0	6.0	6.5	6.5
Relative change in average electoral results before and after 1990	-38.93	-24.43	-14.09	-28.21	-23.39	-34.93	-31.58

Row (1): Member/voter ratio$\geq 20\% = 1.0$; m/v$\geq 5\% = 0.5$; m/v$< 5\% = 0.0$. Rows (2) to (8) my scoring following Kitschelt (1994: 221–5). I rescaled Kitschelt's leadership accountability variable so that higher values indicate higher organizational entrenchment and leadership accountability. Data: De Winter (1990), country chapters in Katz and Mair (1992), Bille (1994: 140–51), Deschouwer (1994: 96–104) and Koole (1994: 282–95). See Appendix A for more information.

While the table only reports results for seven parties due to limited data availability and quality, I find no clear cross-national correlation between either variable and Christian democratic parties' electoral performance since 1990. Individual cases, like the Austrian ÖVP and the Belgian CVP, might lend some support to the arguments discussed above. Major losses, however, occurred at nearly all degrees of organizational entrenchment and leadership autonomy.

In sum, studies focusing on party system polarization, anti-incumbency and party institutionalization and organization have essentially improved our understanding of party competition and made valuable contributions to concept and theory building in comparative politics. Yet, when applied to the development of European Christian democracy, they underscore rather than solve the cross-national puzzle.

However, it is not sufficient to assess alternative theories of adaptability because I suggest a two-step argument linking organizational choices to factionalism and factionalism to organizational adaptability. Thus, previous theories could provide important insights in how different levels of factionalism emerge which then, as I claim, can affect a party's level of adaptability.

1.3.2 Studies of factionalism

A comparative theory of factionalism, however, has been missing for four reasons. First, previous studies have almost exclusively looked at highly factionalized parties and party systems, like Italy,[26] Japan,[27] the United States,[28] and India.[29] They have thus neglected a large set of negative cases that is important for theory building and testing (Mahoney and Goertz, 2004; Mikkelsen, 2015). Second, the literature is highly fragmented. Coppedge (1994: 95) counts 34 variables which the literature has suggested to correlate with high levels of factionalism. Third, these 34 variables have not been systematically tested across a larger set of cases. In fact, I count only three cross-national studies (Bettcher, 2005; Boucek, 2012; Borz, 2017) and

[26] For instance, Zariski (1960; 1965), Sartori (1971), Zuckerman (1979), Leonardi and Wertman (1989), Mershon (2001), Capperucci (2010) and Ceron (2012a; b).

[27] Leierson (1968), Baerwald (1986), Cox and Rosenbluth (1993), Cox, Rosenbluth and Thies (1999) and Bouissou (2001).

[28] Key (1949), Sindler (1955), Black (1983) and DiSalvo (2012).

[29] Kothari (1964), Carras (1971) and Kochanek (2015).

two edited volumes (Belloni and Beller, 1978; Basedau, Erdmann and Köllner, 2006) on the emergence of factionalism since Key's (1949) seminal book on factionalism in the American South. Finally, previous theories have mainly explored correlation rather than causation. Without clarifying the direction of the causal process, previous approaches risk remaining ahistorical at best and ambiguous at worst. Some accounts have, for instance, highlighted the association between high levels of factionalism and inclusive internal systems to select the party leader and parliamentary candidates (Sartori, 1971; 1976; Zariski, 1978). These institutions, however, have often been the result rather than the cause of factional competition (Leonardi and Wertman, 1989). Timing and sequence are also essential when assessing other approaches: It has been suggested that a party will become highly factionalized once it has established a dominant position in the party system (Key, 1949; Zariski, 1965; Arian and Barnes, 1974; Boucek, 2012). Yet, if factionalism was endogenous to a party's long-term continuity in office, we would expect competitive factions to emerge once the party has assumed such a dominant position. The first faction within the Italian DC, however, emerged before the first post-war elections in 1946.[30] Factionalism even increased after the DC had lost on average 14.1 percent in the 1946 local elections and before the party secured an absolute majority in the 1948 general election (Capperucci, 2010: 140). Moreover, we would expect a similar level of factionalism across dominant parties. However, while both the German CDU and the DC were continuously in office until 1969, factionalism was much lower in the CDU (Figure 1.5).

Moreover, the competition between different groups during the process of party formation has encouraged some scholars to explain factionalism by the extent to which a party's founding groups were divided (Magri, 1954; Galli and Facchi, 1962; Panebianco, 1988; Capperucci, 2010). But the origins of Christian democratic parties have always involved different groups without necessarily leading to high factionalism (Irving, 1979; Van Kersbergen, 1994; 1999; Kalyvas and Van Kersbergen, 2010). For example, when forming the CDU, the German Christian democrats did not only differ in their social class but also denominational background (Bösch, 2001). Yet, the CDU has been substantially less factionalized than the DC.

[30]Grandi, A.: *Saluto al Congresso.* 21.04.1946, Gronchi Primo Parte, Sc. 11 Fasc. 41, ILS. Primary data on the DC are taken from the *Archivio della Democrazia Cristiana* (ILS) and the *Archivio Giulio Andreotti* (AGA) of the *Istituto Luigi Sturzo*, Franco Salvi's (1959) *Atti e Documenti della Democrazia Cristiana* and diverse online collections.

Figure 1.5: Factionalism in the CDU and DC, 1945 to 1969



Data on the DC: Boucek (2012: 148 – 171), data on the CDU: original research.

Clientelism, federalism, and an electoral system that allows for competition between candidates of the same party have been proposed to explain such cross-national variation. Clientelism[31] and an open-list electoral system,[32] scholars have claimed, would encourage factional activities, whereas the effects of federalism on factionalism has been contested.[33] However, these factors hardly vary within a single country, while parties of the same country differ in the level of factionalism. The German CDU and CSU illustrate this. Both parties should be similarly factionalized. They have always entered together into the federal government which guaranteed similar access to public resources. Moreover, Germany is a federal country which does not use an open-list electoral system. However, while the CDU has experienced several factions, as shown above, the first and only faction within the CSU emerged in 2014.[34]

To be clear, the factors I have just discussed can correlate with factionalism. In fact, studies have presented evidence that clientelism in combination with an open-list electoral system is correlated with high levels of factional competition (Ames, 1995; Carey and Shugart, 1995;

[31]Chalmers (1972), Zuckerman (1979) and Golden and Chang (2001).

[32]Zariski (1978), Cox and Rosenbluth (1993), Cox, Rosenbluth and Thies (1999), Morgenstern (2001).

[33]Coppedge (1994), Filippov et al. (2004) and Carty (2010).

[34]Meister, A. 2014. 'Warum die CSU noch konservativer werden soll.' *Die Welt*, 13.07.2014, URL: http://www.welt.de/regionales/muenchen/article130053232/Warum-die-CSU-noch-konservativer-werden-soll.html [16.08.2016].

Morgenstern, 1996). However, it has remained unclear whether clientelism and the electoral system trigger factionalism or whether the causal relationship is reversed. Thus, while they may have importance in directing agency, their exact causal role has not been sufficiently explored and requires systematic historical research.

Hence, while previous theories have added substantially to our understanding of adaptability and factionalism, they do not fully explain the development of Christian democratic parties. When tested systematically, theories of anti-incumbency, party system polarization, party institutionalization and organizational decentralization do not account for Christian democracy's varying electoral fate. Previous research on factionalism has highlighted a series of factors which seem to correlate with high levels of factionalism. These studies, however, have often focused on highly factionalized parties, thereby neglecting an important set of negative cases in which only few or no factions emerged. Moreover, little has been done in terms of specifying at which point of the causal process the suggested variables play a role. By not differentiating between factors initiating and reinforcing different levels of factionalism, these studies risk being ahistorical. Finally, when applied in a historically sensitive manner to the development of factionalism in Christian democratic parties, these arguments are revealed to have important empirical limitations.

1.4 The argument

My argument proceeds in two steps:

(1) Organizational adaptability depends on factionalism in a nonlinear way. Giving too much room to factions risks unleashing centrifugal forces that can paralyze the internal decision-making process. Highly factionalized parties are not only likely to struggle to maintain an appearance of unity when voting in parliament and making public statements. They are also likely to agonize over decisions which are crucial to adapt to a changing environment: on which issues to campaign, which groups of voters to target, who should be leading the party and with whom to form a coalition. In turn, giving no room to factions risks preventing the integration of important intra-party and social groups. It therefore undermines the possibility

of new leaders to emerge and a party's ability to attract new constituencies and party cadres. But what explains factionalism?

(2) Factionalism depends on organizational characteristics. Among the many choices party elites make when forming their organization, the decision on rules and procedures that structure the selection of the party leadership is likely to be of particular importance. They affect how party elites will try to assume leadership positions. I aim to show that the extent to which the initially adopted leadership selection procedure is centralized drives party elites' incentives to create and entrench different levels of factionalism in the mid- and long-run.

In principle applicable beyond Christian democratic parties, my argument is based on two scope conditions: Political parties need to have a formal organization that structures the selection process of the party leadership and allows for internal competition. Personalistic parties in which the party leader can simply bypass internal rules as well as communist, sectarian and other parties which suppress intra-party bargaining are therefore not part of my universe of cases.

More specifically, my argument is that two types of organizational structure might impair organizational adaptability: An initially extremely centralized or decentralized selection process of the party leadership risks undermining a party's ability to adapt to profound exogenous changes by giving factional activities either too much room or no room at all. Of course, one could ask why party elites do not change their organization once they realize that it entails negative consequences. I give the precise theoretical underpinning in the next chapter where I show that the time horizon of party elites can make their preferences to maintain intra-party power beat their preferences to make their organization successful. But, before that, we need to clarify some key concepts.

1.5 Conceptualization

1.5.1 Organizational adaptability

A party's organizational adaptability refers to its ability to adjust its activities to the new environment created by social and political transformations. A dependent variable that is not intuitively captured entails the question: 'How do we know it when we see it' (Gerring, 2001: 43)? When there are pressing incentives for a party to adapt, we can assess its adaptability on the following five indicators.

(1) Electoral trends: As discussed above, a good starting point is to look at electoral trends. For this indicator, I follow Kitschelt's (1994) empirical strategy. To measure how well social democratic parties adapted to changes in European societies, Kitschelt (1994: 3–4) has used the change rate between the average electoral performance in the 1970s and the average performance in the 1980s as a dependent variable. While building on his operationalization, I use, similar to Lupu (2016: 5–6), the relative (RC_i) rather than the absolute change in mean (Δy_i) of a party's vote share in national elections before (y_{it-1}) and after (y_{it+1}) exogenous transformations at time t. I thereby account for the fact that parties differ in their baseline performance (i.e. parties vary in their electoral strength before the external change).

$$\Delta y_i = y_{it+1} - y_{it-1}$$
$$RC_i = (\Delta y_i / y_{it-1}) * 100$$

As discussed above, comparing the mean of electoral performance before and after profound exogenous transformations also helps to observe general trends rather than mere snapshots. While party breakdown may seem to be an alternative measure as a party that is unable to adapt to the new context might seem likely to break down (Lupu, 2016: 4–6), 'survival' does not equate to 'adaptability'. A party may be able to prevent collapse but can still struggle to adapt and thus performs at a substantially lower level than before. This points to the importance of a continuous rather than binary measure (e.g. survival vs. breakdown). Breakdown or collapse can be seen as indicating an extreme lack of adaptability which manifests in the milder form in the fact that parties suffer electoral decline. Comparing the relative change in a party's average vote share before and after exogenous transformations seems therefore

to be a more accurate operationalization – especially when complemented with a continuous description of the party's electoral results to check for outliers (as done in Figure 1.1 above).

(2) The possibility of new leaders to emerge: We know that leadership change is an important tool for parties to send a signal of reform and renewal to voters and other parties. It is also important to allow for generational and political change within the party leadership (Harmel and Janda, 1994: 266–8). I measure the possibility of new leaders to emerge by looking at (a) the replacement rate of party leadership positions (i.e. party leader, deputy party leader, general secretary, members of the party executive) and (b) the process behind such renewal. If a party's ability to renew its leadership is high, this party is more adaptable.

(3) A party's capability of attracting new constituencies: Profound exogenous change can alter the extent to which voters see different issues as salient. The part of the electorate that upholds preferences on which a party had previously campaigned might now be too small for the party to maintain its vote share. The party is thus required to update its positions and campaign on new issues to appeal to new parts of the electorate (Mair, 1997: 23). To measure this, I use manifesto data to trace the extent to which a party's manifesto content changes when the party is pressured to update its positions. I complement this measure through a qualitative analysis of a party's decision-making regarding its campaign strategy, preferred coalitions and electoral alliances. This is important because changes in a party's coalitions and alliances can be an important signal to voters that a party has changed its affiliation with, for instance, the right- or left-wing bloc of the party system. If a party's capability of attracting new constituencies is high, it is more adaptable.

(4) A party's capability of keeping its traditional constituencies: Related to (3), a party needs to be careful that the potential benefits of attracting new voters are not outweighed by losing its traditional constituencies. I use data on party identification to measure changes in the extent to which parts of the electorate feel attached to a particular party over time and, where available, data on voter shifts between elections.

(5) A party's capability of avoiding splits: The breakaway of party cadres, intra-party groups or factions can signal to parts of the electorate that a particular party does not represent their

interests anymore. These voters may thus defect and support other parties. Party exits and fissions also convey an image of disunity which usually hurts a party in election campaigns (Ceron, 2015). I thus measure whether a party suffers fissions and whether these fissions involve scattered individuals or entire groups (e.g. factions) leaving the party.

Another important aspect of adaptability would be to absorb new elites - either from other parties or civil society. This is an important dimension because absorbing such actors can generate support from new parts of the electorate (Coppedge, 1994; Levitsky, 2003). While I account for it in the narrative, the lack of available data makes it impossible for me to provide a consistent measure.

1.5.2 Factions and factionalism

Factionalism refers to the level of intra-party competition between factions which I measure by the number of factions (Boucek, 2009: 468). By *faction*, I mean an intra-party group that is (1) highly organized, (2) pursues a set of common political goals, (3) is reproduced at all levels of the party organization and (4) can form without formal approval by the party. This definition allows demarcating factions from other intra-party groups, like tendencies and ancillary organizations (e.g. youth movements), as shown in Table 1.5.

Table 1.5: Types of intra-party groups

Intra-party groups	Organization	Set of political goals	Organizational reproduction at all party levels	Unrestricted group formation
Factions	**Yes**	**Yes**	**Yes**	**Yes**
Ancillary organizations	Yes	some	some	no
Tendencies	no	Yes	no	no

Organization refers to factions, unlike tendencies, possessing formalized interactions, structural coherence and a relatively stable and cohesive personal over time (Rose, 1964; Hine, 1982; DiSalvo, 2012: 5). The name and the leader(s) of the faction are recognized within the party and the faction holds formalized meetings. The existence of a set of common political

goals implies that factions promote their interests via party congress speeches and motions, media releases or even manifestos (Bettcher, 2005: 340-1; DiSalvo, 2012: 5). Organizational reproduction at all intra-party levels implies that factional structures and members can be found in national and subnational party bodies and parliaments as well as local governments (Eldersveld, 1964). Finally, the establishment of ancillary organizations, like youth or women's movements, often depends on a formal decision by the party's decision-making authorities. Factions, in contrast, do not face such constraints.

1.5.3 Centralization of leadership selection

While numerous studies have focused on the selection of the party leader (e.g. Kenig, 2008; Hazan and Rahat, 2010; Fabre, 2011), the leadership in most political parties in consolidated democracies is a collective rather than a single actor (Poguntke, 1998; 2000). This leadership board, or national executive, is the supreme governing body which holds the effective decision-making authority within the party (Poguntke, 2000: 105–10, 126).

To understand how this leadership board can be selected, we need to remember that parties are not unitary actors but complex systems (Katz, 2002: 87). They comprise a set of organizational *party branches*. Party branches refer to a party's organization in different territorial and political arenas. Katz and Mair (1992: 4-6; see also Mair, 1994: 4) have traditionally distinguished between three arenas: (1) The 'party as a membership organization' includes subnational party branches, like the CDU's organization in the different German Länder, and ancillary party branches, such as the party's youth or women's movement (Katz, 2002: 98). (2) The 'party as a governing organization' covers the party's group in the national parliament and government (i.e. the party in public office). And (3) the party as central or bureaucratic organization which in 'the simplest terms' can be understood as 'the national headquarters of the party' (Katz, 2002: 98). In each of these branches, the party includes a set of elites who are opinion leaders of particular intra-party groups.

These different organizational branches need to be integrated in the selection process of the party leadership. While the rules and regulations according to which parties choose their lead-

ers can be diverse, the selection process has traditionally varied in its level of centralization (e.g. Kenig, 2008). Under a *centralized* procedure, different branches of the party (e.g. the party in public office, subnational branches, ancillary organizations) come together in a single central assembly (e.g. the national party congress) to elect the party leadership. The selection process is thus centralized in a single election in which delegates from different party branches participate. In contrast, this intermediate, centralized step is absent under a *decentralized* selection process. Instead, a large number of party branches sends their delegates directly to the national executive (Figure 1.6).[35]

Figure 1.6: A centralized and decentralized leadership selection process



I operationalize the level of centralization as the number of party bodies sending representatives to the national leadership and the relative equality of their seat shares in the national leadership.[36] I therefore adapt Rae's (1967: 53–8, 62) fractionalization index. The degree of centralization equals $F = 1 - \sum (S_i)^2$, where S_i refers to the proportion of seats each party branch *is entitled to fill* in the national executive. It ranges from 0 to 1. Higher values express a higher degree of decentralization of the selection process.

[35]Another way of describing a centralized and decentralized selection process would be in terms of indirect (i.e. centralized) and direct (i.e. decentralized) leadership election. Yet, this would risk causing confusion with the terminology used by Hazan and Rahat (2010). They have described leadership or candidate primaries, in which party or even non-party members are allowed to vote, in terms of direct and inclusive selection procedures.

[36]I focus on executive members with voting rights because members with a consultative vote do not have decision-making authority.

To identify the same unit of analysis across parties, I follow Poguntke (1998: 161–4). He has defined a party's national executive as a board that has the formal function to lead the party between the meetings of its deliberative bodies. It is smaller (i.e. fewer than 75 members) and meets more often (i.e. usually once per month) than deliberative party bodies like the national congress or the party council. Some parties have an additional, smaller leadership board which meets between the national executive meetings and is often called executive committee or presidium. I focus on the larger national executive because the executive committee is usually only a sub-committee of the national executive and I want to focus on where the formal decision-making power is. Moreover, as the executive committee is usually chosen from the midst of the national executive, it is at the level of the latter that I expect substantive variation in terms of the selection process. Finally, many parties do not have an executive committee (Poguntke, 2000: 107–10).

I rely on party statutes to derive data on the composition of the party leadership. Party elites are surely reluctant to follow institutions that do not suit their interests (Duverger, 1951: 76; Sartori, 1976: 84; Panebianco, 1988: 35). Yet, the formalized structures, rules and procedures organizing the selection of the party leadership can hardly be ignored completely – especially since party elites have an incentive to detect rivals who are not playing by the rules (Katz and Mair, 1992: 6).[37]

1.6 Research design

I hypothesize that the more centralized the initial leadership selection procedure, the higher the level of factionalism will be. Parties with too much factional competition and parties with no factional competition are likely to be less able to adapt to exogenous transformations than moderately factionalized parties (Table 1.6).

[37] While party elites may settle controversial decisions informally before the national executive meets (Kriechbaumer, 1995: 34; Bösch, 2001: 266–7), their decisions would still need to be accepted by the party's national executive. Moreover, the way the latter is selected is likely to influence who will be included in such informal networks.

Table 1.6: Initial leadership selection, factionalism and adaptability

Initial leadership selection	**Factionalism**	**Adaptability**
Decentralized	Low	Low
Mixed	Moderate	High
Centralized	High	Low

While the 14 cases listed in Table 1.1 offer the analytical advantage that they have been challenged by similar societal and political changes, the relatively small number of cases prevents a polynomial regression analysis to test the predicted curvilinear relationship. Moreover, data availability has seriously constrained the possibility to test quantitatively whether the centralization of the leadership selection process correlates with the level of factionalism. The two existing cross-national quantitative studies have tried to circumvent this problem by defining factions in a way that does not clearly distinguish between different types of intra-party groups. Yet, they have thereby risked not identifying the same unit of analysis across cases (Janda, 1980: 119; Borz, 2017: 3; see Section 1.5.2). Moreover, their studies have been limited to single snapshots of parties' development which has seriously constrained efforts to distinguish between factors initiating factionalism and those helping reinforce it over time. The data collection effort that would be necessary for a valid coding of intra-party groups in all Western European Christian democratic parties over the several decades spanned by my analysis would go beyond the resources available for a doctoral thesis. Indeed, most existing studies of factional politics have focused on individual or few cases (e.g. Boucek, 2012; DiSalvo, 2012; Verge and Gomze, 2012). Also, many of these studies have usually included fewer cases than my thesis (e.g. Zariski, 1965; Zuckerman, 1979; Leonardi and Wertman, 1989).

A better and more promising strategy is that of a structured-focused comparison guided by a nested analysis (George, 1979; Hall, 2003; Lieberman, 2005; Slater and Ziblatt, 2013). Therefore, my empirical strategy is threefold. As a first step, I calculate the level of centralization of the leadership selection process as adopted in the first party statutes and the relative change in mean of the party's vote share for 13 Christian democratic parties which have competed elections before and after 1990.[38] The results are plotted in Figure 1.7. Even

[38]More precisely, I calculate the relative change in the average vote share at legislative elections between 1945 and 1989 and since 1990. I have also calculated the relative change with the CPDS

though the small number of cases prohibits the usual significance tests, the graphical evidence displayed in Figure 1.7 indicate the plausibility of my argument. The predicted curvilinear relationship is supported by 12 out of 13 parties for which data has been available.[39] This encourages in-depth testing of selected cases.

Figure 1.7: Initial leadership selection and relative change in vote share



Electoral performance: Relative change in average vote share between 1945 and 1989 and since 1990 (see Section 1.5.1); data: Nordsieck (2017). Centralization: Rae's fractionalization index (see Section 1.5.3); data: see Appendix B.

I thus choose, as a second step, three typical cases for a structured focused comparison (George, 1979; Slater and Ziblatt, 2013) and systematic process analysis (Hall, 2003).

data for 1960 to 2013. The curvilinear pattern shown in Figure 1.7 persists. The respective figure and details on the primary data can be found in Appendix B. Data on the Finnish case has been missing.

[39]The only complete outlier is the Swedish KDS. The latter was a very small party before 1990 and has, since then, more than tripled its pre-1990 performance. Its average vote share increased from 1.83 to 7.38 percent. As a complete outlier, it is not included in Figure 1.7.

As in all small-N designs, testing does not principally happen based on the co-variation of X and Y but most importantly by systematic process analysis (Campbell, 1975; Hall, 2003: 383). The use of process tracing allows testing each step of the process of organizational development that is posited by my framework. It also helps reconstruct the complex feedback effects between variables over time. The use of systematic process analysis thus helps me to assess the impact of confounding factors which cannot be eliminated through case selection.

I build my analysis on original primary data. This has hardly been done in the party organization literature even though it is important. It allows using solid historical evidence when I assess the observable implications of my theory and competing explanations for each step of the causal process both within each and across all three cases. The argument is only supported if all intervening steps linking the selection process of the party leadership to factionalism and adaptability are supported for all cases (George, 1979; 57; George and Bennett, 2005: 207; Collier, Brady and Seawright, 2010: 508).

For this purpose, I select the Italian DC, the German CDU and the Austrian ÖVP. They provide me with variation on my key variables of interest (Table 1.7).

Table 1.7: Case selection

Variable	Indicator	ÖVP	CDU	DC
Initial centralization of leadership selection	Rae's fractionalization index	0.89	0.40	0.22
Factionalism	Number of factions (annual average)	0.01	4.00	6.73
Organizational adaptability	Relative change in average vote share before and since 1990	-31.58	-14.09	-23.39

ÖVP: 1945 to 2017; CDU: 1950 to 2017; DC: 1946 to 1994.

The selection of the DC and ÖVP deserves further comment. The ÖVP has no factions but is organized along different Land organizations and along professional groups. The latter are called *Bünde* which can be translated as associations or leagues. They include the Austrian farmers', business and employees' association. These groups are better conceptualized as associated organizations rather than factions since they are not intra-party groups but have maintained a separate organization outside the ÖVP. Moreover, any changes of the ÖVP's

Bünde structure would require a formal organizational change of the party organization, which underlines that the criteria of unconstrained group formation outlined in Section 1.5.2 above is not met. Furthermore, the Bünde already existed before the ÖVP was founded and even played an important role in the process of party formation (see Chapter 4.2 and Ableitinger, 1995). Thus, the ÖVP's organization did not incentivize the formation of any factions.

In turn, the DC was much more factionalized than the average number of factions in a given year might suggest. It has not always been possible to identify the number of factions that participated in the same coalition for internal elections. Also, while factions and the party's organizational branches in the German Länder have been important actors within the CDU, factions were the exclusive organizational unit of intra-party competition within the DC. Moreover, the DC did much worse than losing 23.39 percent compared to its average vote share before 1990. In fact, the DC only competed in one election after 1990 when its vote share dropped below 30 percent for the first time in its history. Because the DC was so deeply divided over questions of party reform, it split several times, massively declined in the 1993 local elections and was ultimately dissolved in 1994 (Wertman, 1995). I thus use the other indicators presented above to present a more comprehensive picture of the DC's low level of organizational adaptability. Despite these minor challenges, the DC is a more suitable case than the Danish, Portuguese and Swiss Christian Democrats. The latter have been much less important in their respective countries, which entails problems in terms of data availability.

The DC, ÖVP and CDU are the best cases of this sample because they allow me to keep even more important variables relatively constant in comparison to the other Christian democratic parties in Figure 1.7. As will be shown in Chapters 3 to 5, the DC, ÖVP and CDU emerged in the aftermath of World War II and in countries where pre-war democracy had been replaced by an authoritarian system in the run-up to the war. The DC, ÖVP and CDU brought together a highly diverse set of actors who came from the social-Catholic working class, the liberal middle class and the discredited conservative right. They followed strong Catholic predecessor parties, could build on the infrastructure of the Church and quickly assumed a dominant position in their respective party system for the first decades after 1945. They thereby had access to a set of resources (e.g. offices, public contracts, funds) which they could use to reward their supporters. Moreover, they were all in government when the key

transformations described in Section 1.1 occurred. The other Christian democratic parties do not display such characteristics. The effects of other variables, like federalism, the electoral system and the system used to select parliamentary candidates, will be assessed in the case study chapters. For instance, I will use process tracing to evaluate to what extent the structure of the political system (i.e. unitary vs. federal state) predetermined the organizational structure of the three cases.

Finally, I assess the external validity of my results in two steps. (1) Following the strategies adopted by Kitschelt (1994: 287-95), Levitsky (2003: 232-45) and Thachil (2014: 233-62), I build on secondary literature to discuss the validity of my argument for further cases that have been close to the fitted line in Figure 1.7 above and provide fruitful conditions for a most-similar design. (2) I test the suggested causal process for a case of the same party family that has experienced a different exogenous shock. The French Popular Republican Movement (MRP) was one of the major Christian democratic parties in the first years after World War II. It was a dominant governing party in the French Fourth Republic before the Algerian crisis of 1958 unsettled the existing political order. Failing to find a place in the newly established Fifth Republic, the MRP ultimately disappeared from the political stage in 1967 (Frey, 2009: 51). The turmoil in French politics at the time provides good conditions to test my theory in a different context, while holding many party family-related characteristics constant. This test also builds on original primary data.

1.7 Outline of the thesis

Chapter 2 introduces my theory of organizational choices and organizational adaptability. I outline how choices actors make when forming their party are linked to the level of factionalism, and how the latter affects a party's adaptability. I spell out the causal mechanisms and derive observable implications for each step of the causal process. I then compare the Italian DC (Chapter 3), the Austrian ÖVP (Chapter 4) and the German CDU (Chapter 5). Chapter 6 tests my argument for further cases included in my sample. Chapter 7 looks at the French MRP to assess the strength of my theory for a case of party adaptability before 1990. My conclusion summarizes my findings and discusses their implications for future research.

Chapter 2

Explaining the development of party organization: A theory of multi-level path dependence

'The same word... leaves in different directions, taking different paths' (Dejan Stojanovic, 2012).

2.1 Introduction

Drawing on the critical juncture and path dependence literature,[1] I present in this chapter a new theory of why political parties differ in their ability to adapt to episodes of profound exogenous change. To adapt to a transformed environment, political parties need, on the one hand, to allow actors to promote their preferences within the organization. On the other hand, these different preferences need to be aggregated into a single set of answers to essential questions: Which constituencies should the party try to mobilize? Which social groups should be represented among the party's rank-and-file, candidates and leaders? How should these

[1]See for work on path dependence in economics North (1990), Arthur (1994), David (1985; 2007), Greif and Laitin (2004) and Greif (2006). Important studies have been conducted by Pierson (1993; 2000a; 2000b; 2004), Mahoney (2001) and Page (2006) in political science and Goldstone (1998) and Mahoney (2000) in sociology. Contributions in the field of critical junctures include Collier and Collier (1991), Capoccia (2015), Capoccia and Kelemen (2007) and Capoccia and Ziblatt (2010).

groups be mobilized? What does the party stand for? Who should lead the party? And with whom, if necessary, should the party form a coalition? These are difficult questions to answer for any party. Yet, a party's level of factionalism can make the decision-making process even more, sometimes even substantially more difficult. The extent to which a party is factionalized is influenced by how the party selects its leaders. The more leadership positions are elected by a central assembly which brings together delegates from different organizational branches of the party, the more important alliances between party elites[2] from different organizational branches of the party and the higher the level of factionalism will be.

By giving no room for factions, a decentralized leadership selection process is likely to result in organizational rigidity which undermines the party's integrative strength. A centralized selection process will give too much room for factional competition and thus unleash centrifugal forces that paralyze the internal decision-making process with regard to the essential questions stated above. In contrast, a moderately centralized process is more likely to strike the balance between preference aggregation and centrifugal pressure.

Figure 2.1: Party organization, factionalism and organizational adaptability



I outline my theoretical framework throughout this chapter which is organized around a set of questions: (1) How do we get to an initial leadership selection procedure? (2) Why is this particular institution so important for factionalism? (3) Why does the level of factionalism persist over time even though party elites realize how damaging it is for the party? (4) Why does factionalism affect organizational adaptability?

[2]'Party elites' refers to key actors in intra-party bargaining, in contrast to the ordinary rank-and-file. To avoid repetition, I use party elites and actors interchangeable throughout this dissertation.

2.2 The politics of leadership selection

2.2.1 Structure, agency and the origins of party organizations

Before I start outlining the effects of particular organizational characteristics, we need to make sure that these characteristics have not been endogenous to something else. Otherwise, party organization should be considered as an intervening rather than independent variable causing the outcome. Critical juncture theory provides a powerful toolkit for such tests (Capoccia and Kelemen, 2007; Capoccia, 2015: 167-9). If an institutional selection process is a critical juncture, I will expect to observe (1) an uncertain institutional outcome, (2) the availability of different options, (3) the translation of actors' ultimate choice into the institutional outcome and (4) the initiation of a relatively long-lasting process of institutional path dependence (Capoccia and Kelemen, 2007: 349; Capoccia, 2015: 148). I will come back to the last point (i.e. initiation of a path-dependent process) in the next section. For the time being, let us focus on the 'juncture'- rather than the 'critical'-part of critical junctures.

The key question for institutional selection during critical junctures is: Can actors choose which way to go? Do they have a choice when discussing the organizational format of their party? The competing view would be that structural antecedents either closed off alternative options or determined actors' preferences in a way that one, and only one, option seemed to be the natural way to go (Capoccia, 2015: 167-9). If this were true, choices, as Collier and Collier (1991:27) described them, would only be 'presumed' rather than real (see Capoccia, 2015: 168). To determine whether agency or structure drives institutional selection, it is not sufficient to look at pre-existing conditions and the institutional outcome because, for agency to matter, the latter does not need to diverge from what we would expect given the structural context. After all, this may be one of the options actors can choose from in times of institutional uncertainty. We therefore need to look at the decision-making process leading to the institutional outcome of interest (Capoccia and Kelemen, 2007: 352; Capoccia, 2015: 165-6).

Terms such as 'choice', 'options' and 'discussions' or simply 'politics' describe well the process of party formation in general and of specifying the organizational structure of a new party in particular. The process usually starts when actors, often elites representing particular

social or political groups, begin negotiating about coming together in a political party and ends with the ratification of the first national party statute. The party statute establishes '[f]ormalized structures, rules and procedures[. They] constitute one of the principal ways in which the internal struggles of parties are channeled, constrained, and even preempted' (Katz and Mair, 1992: 6). Such a set of rules is important because, without institutional constraints, self-interested behavior will foreclose collective action due to the uncertainty that some political elites will find it in their interest to live up to the agreement (North, 1990: 33). These formal rules are often accompanied by informal extensions and elaborations, socially sanctioned norms of behavior and internally enforced standards of conduct (North, 1990: 4, 40, 46).

The endorsement of the first party statute is often the result of a bargaining process between political elites. They seek to implement the institutional arrangements that they expect to enhance their power within the future party. Actors may, for instance, have different preferences regarding the leadership selection process. Some may prefer a decentralized procedure. The different organizational branches of a party, like the party's parliamentary group or subnational organizations in regions or provinces, then delegate their representatives directly to the national leadership. Others, in contrast, may advocate a centralized selection process whereby the delegates of the different organizational party branches meet at a central assembly and elect the party leadership out of representatives of all branches (Figure 2.2).

Figure 2.2: A centralized and decentralized leadership selection process



Obviously, political bargaining implies the possibility that no decision is reached. In fact, many attempts to form a party have failed in Western European politics and often organizational questions were the subject of controversy. For instance, French Catholics negotiated the formation of a single Christian democratic party in the 1940s. Disagreement over the leadership selection process played an important role in the failure of the negotiations and the emergence of three independent parties (Democratic People's Party, Popular Republican Movement, Young Republic; Bazin, 1981: 158–238). Yet, many negotiations have come to an agreement (as in the case of the 13 parties discussed in this dissertation).

2.2.2 From leadership selection to factionalism

It is now time to bring in the 'critical'-part of the critical juncture definition above. Institutional theorists have highlighted that the choices made during a critical juncture need to be pivotal for future institutional development (Capoccia and Kelemen, 2007: 360–3; Capoccia, 2015: 169-70; see also Bernhard, 2015). It needs to set 'an institution on a certain path of development, a path which then persists over time' (Capoccia, 2015: 148).

Among the many choices party elites make, one decision is likely to have a long-lasting impact on patterns of intra-party competition: the decision on how the party chooses its leaders. Why should the selection procedure of the national leadership be important? Because it affects where party elites look for support in their struggle for power.

Factions are more likely under a centralized than under a decentralized leadership selection process because cooperation between actors coming from different organizational branches of the party is more beneficial to assume leadership positions.

To see why this is the case, let us assume that we have two parties P1 and P2. Both parties are

(1) led by a national executive (NE).

(2) use the NE as the key decision-making party body.

(3) have N branches (A, B, C, D,. . . N). These branches can, among others, be the party's

organizational branches in regions, Länder or states, the party's parliamentary group at the national level or ancillary branches like the youth and women's movement.

While P1 and P2 are similar with regard to these three points, they differ in how they select NE. On the one hand, P1 has a centralized selection process. A, B, C, D,...N send their delegates to a central deliberative assembly (NC, for national congress or national council) which then elects the NE members out of all delegates. On the other hand, P2 has a decentralized selection process. A, B, C, D,...N send their delegates directly to the NE (Figure 2.3).

Figure 2.3: Centralized and decentralized selection process of the party leadership



Let us now assess whether cooperation between members of A, B, C, D,...N would be beneficial for gaining seats in NE (i.e. cross-branch cooperation). It is thereby important to identify who these members are. In other words: Who are the actors in my theoretical framework? I focus on the strategic interaction between party elites. This is a better approach to the study of many European parties, which have a collective leadership, than to focus on the interaction between a single party leader and second-rank elites.[3] Moreover, as stated in Chapter 1.5.3, parties include a set of leaders of different political and social groups. They aggregate and represent the preferences of different parts of the party membership. Their interaction is thus important and contributes to previous studies which have focused on the interaction between party members and party elites.[4]

[3]See, for instance, Lupu's (2016) and Levitksy's (2003) on Latin American parties.
[4]See, for instance, Michels (1962) and Kitschelt (1994).

As these party elites have their own power base in different organizational branches of the party, I distinguish between two groups of party elites:

(1) Majority elites. They are defined as holding power in their party branch. I understand holding power as being supported, at least at the time of the previous branch leadership election, by a majority within their respective party branch. This group thus includes the party branch leader and his allies. I use M+ to refer to majority elites in all branches. I refer to majority elites in a certain branch by indexing this branch (e.g. $M+_A$, $M+_B$, ... $M+_N$). When referring to majority elites within an unspecified party branch, I use the index *i* (i.e. $M+_i$).

(2) Minority elites. They are defined as not holding power within their respective party branch. They thus do not include the branch leader or his allies.[5] I use M- to refer to minority elites in all branches, $M-_A$, ... $M-_N$ to refer to minority elites in a specific party branch and $M-_i$ to refer to minority elites within an unspecified party branch.

While M+'s and M-'s individual motivation may be diverse (Strom, 1990), they seek power within the party as it is beneficial for both office- and policy-related goals (Schlesinger, 1984: 381–9; Elster, 2007: 193). They will therefore choose the behavior that they expect to be the most promising in order to access the party leadership given the playing field imposed by the party statute (Arthur, 1994: 112; Greif, 2006: 165; Capoccia and Ziblatt, 2010: 936).

Let us now turn to the benefits of cross-branch cooperation (between e.g. $M+_A$, $M-_B$, $M-_C$ and $M-_D$ or between $M+_B$ and $M+_C$). The total number of delegates sent to NC and NE differs. This has to do with the way political parties in European democracies are structured: The number of seats at central party assemblies or committees decrease the more one approaches the top level of the party hierarchy (e.g. the number of seats decreases when moving from the national congress to the national executive; Poguntke, 1998). Thus, while the few delegates a

[5] I do not consider the case in which a party branch does not have a leader. While leadership struggles in subnational party branches or the party's parliamentary group are surely important and interesting, my focus is on the interaction between party elites coming from different organizational branches at the national level. I thus assume that organizational branches which are involved in the leadership selection at the national level have a leader. This is a plausible assumption for the parties belonging to my set of cases.

branch (N) may directly send to the NE usually represent the majority elites of the respective branch ($M+_N$), the delegates party branches send to the NC are more numerous and usually include $M+_i$ and $M-_i$.

If the selection process of the national leadership (NE) is *centralized* (P1), cross-branch cooperation is beneficial for both majority ($M+_i$) and minority elites ($M-_i$). We can easily see why. To win a majority at the NC, and thus to proceed to the NE, $M+_i$ and $M-_i$ would need $Maj. = \frac{D_A+D_B+D_C+D_D+\ldots D_N}{2} + 1$ votes.[6] Thinking about the delegates from party branch N, it is obvious that $M+_N$ need support from the delegates coming from other branches to win a majority in order to gain seats in the NE. Minority elites ($M-_N$) can compensate for the lack of support in N by cooperating with delegates from other branches. Both $M+_N$ and $M-_N$ can engage in backroom deals or horse trading with $M+_{\text{non-N}}$ and $M-_{\text{non-N}}$ to organize the required number of votes or present a joint candidate slate at the NC. Thus, cross-branch cooperation is highly beneficial for both $M+_N$ and $M-_N$. This also applies to $M+_{\text{non-N}}$ and $M-_{\text{non-N}}$. We can thus say that cross-branch cooperation is highly beneficial for $M+_i$ and $M-_i$. In fact, it is a *sine qua non* for obtaining seats in the NE.

By contrast, if the selection process of the NE is fully *decentralized* (P2), cross-branch cooperation is beneficial neither for $M+_i$ nor $M-_i$. As the selection process of NE happens within A, B, C, D…N (and not at NC), $M+_N$'s access to the NE is guaranteed as they are backed by the majority of their respective party branch. Thus, they do not need cross-branch cooperation to proceed to the NE. In turn, while $M-_N$ are in a minority position in their party branch, they would not gain by cooperating with actors from other party branches. For

[6] $D_A, \ldots D_N$ denotes the total number of delegates party branch A … N sends to the NC. It does not need to be an absolute majority system for my model to work. The election system used for NE elections simply affects the threshold $M+_i$ and $M-_i$ are required to overcome to gain representation in the NE. Also, I do not assume that the number of delegates sent to the NC is constant across party branches. In fact, this is not the case in many political parties where the number of delegates depends on, for instance, the membership size or the electoral performance of the delegating party branch N. My model yields unambiguous predictions regardless of whether the number of delegates is constant across party branches. If the share of delegates varies across party branches to such an extent that a single party branch N sends a majority of delegates to the NC, which is a very unlikely scenario, then my model would predict that $M+_N$ would focus on building a strong network among the delegates from their own party branch, whereas $M+_{\text{non-N}}$ and $M-_i$ would try to break $M+_N$'s network and gain support among N's delegates. If $M+_{\text{non-N}}$ and $M-_i$ manage to do this, $M+_N$ are expected to try to gain support from delegates from other party branches. The reasoning behind these predictions will be outlined in the following sections in the main text.

instance, support from $M+_B$ or $M-_C$ does not help $M-_A$ in the selection process taking place within A. In other words, and in contrast to a centralized selection process, the location of support within a particular party branch rather than its overall amount within the party is essential under a decentralized selection process.

Under a centralized selection process, majority and minority elites thus benefit more from building networks across party branches than under a decentralized process. These networks are likely to solidify as factions. The number of factions is therefore expected to be higher in parties with a centralized leadership selection process than in parties with a decentralized one.

In parties with a centralized leadership selection process, it is likely that actors start building and sustaining alliances across party branches who are concerned about not having enough support from delegates from other party branches when the central assembly (NC) is electing the NE. This can be the case for majority elites ($M+_i$) who have a regionally concentrated power base, while not enjoying much support beyond their territorial base. It can also describe the situation of minority elites ($M-_i$) who seek to become a noticeable force at the NC by joining forces with minority elites from other party branches. By contrast, majority elites who have played an important role during the party formation process are likely to have assumed important positions (e.g. in public office, the preparing steering committee of the party). As they are likely to be well-known across party branches and may enjoy wide-spread support within the party, they are less incentivized to initiate the factional game as their election to the NE is likely. They are likely even to oppose factionalism as the latter risks weakening their dominant position. Yet, the formation of the first factions risks increasing the influence of their rivals. Thus, with the emergence of the first factions, even those actors who were initially reluctant to form factions start engaging in factional activities to avoid falling behind in the competition for intra-party power. As a result, factions are a valuable way of building support across party branches. They are likely to become the key organizational unit of intra-party competition.

In contrast, in parties with a decentralized procedure to select the NE, networks within rather than between party branches are the dominant resource. As they have allowed majority elites ($M+_i$) to access the national party leadership, they have little incentive to give any room

for the emergence of factions. Instead, they are likely to try to suppress any attempts by minority elites ($M\text{-}_i$) to coordinate their activities. Such attempts are unlikely anyway given the low benefits of factional activities. Competition is thus likely to unfold mainly within the organizational branches of the party and between these branches.

Let us now consider the case of a party with a *mixed leadership selection process* (2.4).

Figure 2.4: A party with a mixed leadership selection process



In the example presented in Figure 2.4, we can see that it includes elements of a centralized and decentralized selection procedure. Some party branches (A and B) send delegates directly to the NE, while other party branches send delegates to the NC which also selects some NE positions (C, D and E). We thus have some majority elites whose respective party branch directly sends delegates to the NE (i.e. $M+_A$ and $M+_B$), while other majority elites need to compete for NE seats at the NC (i.e. $M+_C$, $M+_D$ and $M+_E$). We can easily see how this creates an incentive structure which combines aspects of the centralized and decentralized selection process described above.

Like under a decentralized selection process, $M+_A$ and $M+_B$ hardly benefit from engaging in collective action. Their access to the NE is ensured as long as they maintain their power base within their respective party branch. In turn, $M\text{-}_A$ and $M\text{-}_B$ would not benefit from support by majority or minority elites from other party branches (i.e. $M+_{\text{non-A}}$, $M+_{\text{non-B}}$, $M\text{-}_{\text{non-A}}$,

$M-_{non-B}$) in their efforts to get elected to the NE. $M+_A$, $M+_B$ as well as $M-_A$ and $M-_B$ are thus not expected to be involved in the formation of factions but to focus on their network within their own party branch. By contrast, minority elites and majority elites from party branches that do not directly send delegates to the NE benefit from cross-branch cooperation to pick up the seats elected at NC (i.e. $M+_C$, $M-_C$, $M+_D$, $M-_D$, $M+_E$, $M-_E$). Hence, I expect them to form networks across party branches which are likely to develop into factions.

Consequently, networks across and within party branches characterize the decision-making process within moderately factionalized parties. The leaders of party branches that directly send delegates to the national leadership are likely to focus on maintaining their strong network within their respective branch. After all, the support of the majority of their party branch ensures their seat in the national leadership. This is different for minority elites or majority elites from branches that do not send delegates directly to the party leadership. For them, cooperating with actors from different branches is crucial to avoid marginalization in intra-party politics. They are thus incentivized to sustain their factional networks. Such a mixed set of incentives across the key actors of intra-party politics results in a moderate level of factionalism.

Of course, for this moderate level of factionalism to emerge, the share of NE seats autonomously filled by party branches relative to those elected by NC needs to be sufficient to counter-act the incentives to form factions. If, to give a numerical example, only one NE position was filled by a party branch autonomously, while all other party branches sent their delegates to the NC which elected 29 NE positions, the incentives to form factions would prevail. In other words, for parties with a mixed leadership selection process, my model predicts a dual logic for $M+_i$ and $M-_i$ to get elected to the NE. For this dual logic to influence a party's initial level of factionalism, a similar share of NE seats needs to be filled by party branches autonomously and by the NC.

Figure 2.5 summarizes the process outlined so far.

Figure 2.5: From organizational choices to factionalism



2.3 Reinforcing factionalism

To theorize the development of factionalism over time and how it affects party development, I build my framework on Greif's (2006) concepts of self-enforcing, self-reinforcing[7] and self-undermining processes in institutional development. They help us to capture the complex interrelationship between agency, institutional stability and change. Self-enforcement refers to the confirmation or reproduction of an institution. Actors are endogenously motivated to keep behaving according to the institution in place because they have observed other actors behaving according to the existing institution and they expect them to maintain this behavior. Their behavior, in turn, contributes to motivate other actors to behave in the manner that had been associated with the institution to begin with (Greif, 2006: 15-6, 161-2). The self-reinforcement of an institution enforces the behavior associated with it in more situations (e.g. factions becoming the key organizational unit in intra-party decision-making at the national and subnational level) and for more actors (e.g. a new generation of party elites being socialized into the existing institutional playing field). In contrast, self-undermining enforces the behavior associated with it in fewer situations and for fewer actors (Greif, 2006: 17). Consequently, when an institution is reinforced or undermined, the behavior associated with

[7] Also labeled positive feedback or increasing returns processes (Pierson 2000b: 74).

it does not change. But the institution becomes more (in the case of reinforcement) or less (in the case of undermining) robust to exogenous shocks (Greif, 2006: 168). I am thus talking about an incentive-based feedback process which confirms and reproduces the initial level of factionalism.

The initial level of factionalism incentivizes actors to reinforce it over time by determining which resources are valuable to assume positions within the national leadership. This is done in two ways:

(1) Actors try to increase their resources. They try to find ways that help them to build the type of networks valuable under the initial level of factionalism. Such ways may include, for instance, campaigning and ideological appeals but also clientelism and patronage.

(2) Actors try to increase the value of their resources. They modify the party organization in a way that is likely to increase their influence given the resources they have. This might include changes in the electoral system used for internal elections or the formalization of previously informal institutions.

2.3.1 The resource feedback effect

In *highly factionalized parties*, as shown above, minority elites and those majority elites with weak cross-branch support need to increase their vote share at the central party assembly (NC) to become an option for a change in the majority coalition. They thus need to create incentives for delegates at the NC to support their (minority) factions. We can distinguish between non-material and material incentives. Non-material incentives include aspects like charismatic or ideological appeals and social pressure that minority factions can use to increase and consolidate their share of delegates at the NC. Material incentives include bribes and patronage. Majority factions are likely to respond to minority factions' efforts by offering similar incentives to the NC delegates. By trying to strengthen their factions, minority and majority factions confirm and reinforce networks across party branches as the key resource in intra-party politics because they create incentives for NC delegates to endorse a specific

faction at the NE elections. This makes it increasingly unlikely that candidate slates that are not endorsed by a faction stand a chance in these leadership elections. Over time, this leads to an increasing share of NC delegates being split into different factional blocs. Delegates coming to the NC for the first time and a new generation of party elites would be socialized into this logic of high factional competition.

The point on material incentives relates to the literature discussed in Chapter 1.3.2 which links clientelism to high factionalism (e.g. Chalmers, 1974; Zuckerman, 1979; Golden and Chang, 2001). Two points need to be made with regard to the value of this literature for my model. First, while clientelism has been primarily theorized in terms of voter-party linkages (compare Kitschelt and Wilkinson, 2007), there is no theoretical reason why the material reward of individuals or entire constituencies in exchange for their vote cannot take place at elections taking place within a political party. Minority factions can incentivize national congress delegates to support their candidate slate by offering them financial rewards or party positions once they would have won the party leadership election. Second, I hope to show in the empirical chapters of this thesis that clientelism is a reinforcing rather than causing factor of high factionalism.[8] It provides already existing factions with a strategy to enlarge their share of supporters.

In *weakly factionalized parties*, the location rather than the overall support within the party is the decisive resource. Majority elites need to ensure the loyalty of the majority within their own party branch. While they do not need the support of the entire branch, it is crucial that minority elites do not succeed in undermining their leadership. I therefore expect majority elites to create incentives for those members who are involved in the leadership election in their respective branches to continue to support them. This may include strengthening their personal links to these members by, for instance, participating in branch-specific events, building a public image that is ideologically or personally appealing to these members or providing pork (compare Stokes, 2011: 649). These are also likely strategies for minority elites to enhance their chances at the branch leadership elections. Yet, they are at a competitive

[8] I aim to show that this is also applies to an electoral system that allows for competition between candidates from the same party and the availability of resources through governmental participation which have both been linked to high factionalism (Cox and Rosenbluth, 1993; Cox, Rosenbluth and Thies, 1999; Boucek, 2012).

disadvantage. Majority elites have access to both the national executive and the leadership committee of their specific party branch. They are thus likely to be more present in the media which provides them with a tool to simultaneously address many members of their respective branch. Moreover, their leadership position is likely to entail the chance of taking part in important decisions regarding the allocation of party funds which makes them more likely than minority elites to gain benefits for their party branch. The resource feedback effect can thus contribute to the long-term survival of majority elites in office. Similar to the reinforcement of highly factionalized parties, the more and the longer majority and minority elites invest in a specific type of intra-party resource, the more entrenched existing patterns of intra-party competition become. They are thereby reinforced over time. Newly emerging party elites who seek to gain representation in the national party leadership are socialized into a weakly factionalized parties.

Finally, a combination of both resource feedback processes described above is expected to be present in *moderately factionalized parties*. On the one hand, majority and minority elites from branches that directly send delegates to the national executive are incentivized to follow similar strategies as described for weakly factionalized parties. On the other hand, majority and minority elites from branches with no direct representation in the national party leadership depend on support at the central party assembly which entails strategies similar to those described for highly factionalized parties. As both (i.e. within-branch and across-branch) resource feedback effects exist, neither becomes predominant.

2.3.2 The organizational feedback effect

In addition to reinforcing the key resources to gain representation in the national party leadership, party elites also reinforce the initial set of institutions structuring intra-party competition in their attempt to increase the value of their existing resources.

In parties with an initially *high level of factionalism*, minority factions try to increase their power and by doing so reinforce the importance of factions in intra-party politics. As outlined above, $M+_i$ and $M-_i$ are likely to form factions to increase their vote share at central party

assemblies (NC). Yet, despite factional activities, they might still fall short in comparison to popular majority elites. These minority factions are therefore likely to seek changes in the organizational structure that alter the institutional playing field of the party. This can include, for instance, the introduction of a different electoral system. If the party had initially used a majority system, the shift toward a system of proportional representation might help minority factions to better translate their vote share at the NC into seats in the party leadership (NE). Another example is the introduction of quotas that ensure the representation of minority factions in the NE.

Yet, this raises a problem. Minority factions only represent a minority at the NC, but changes in the party statutes usually require a simple majority (and often more) of the NC delegates. Minority factions are therefore likely to try to shift the majority coalition in their favor.[9] As minority elites face majority elites who have benefited from the party's organizational structure in place, the former have better chances of splitting the majority coalition if they compromise (Greif, 2006: 200). Minority elites thus propose modifications that confirm the behavior associated with the initial institutions that have allowed majority elites to assume power, while including deals that promise to increase their influence. Yet, to be even considered as a potential partner for majority elites, minority factions have to gain some influence within the organization. They need to strengthen their factional networks in order to make a strong showing at the NC (compare Pierson, 1993: 603, 607). By becoming a potential option for a minimum winning coalition, minority factions can hope to split the existing majority coalition and to become part of a new coalition. They could then include their organizational preferences into any deal or agreement on which this coalition would be based. An alternative strategy for minority factions is to shift the majority coalition by applying pressure on the majority factions in a different organizational branch of the party. For instance, while they

[9]This point is consistent with the coalition shifting described by the literature on endogenous institutional change (compare Thelen, 2004: 33, 295; Streeck and Thelen, 2005: 9, 19; Mahoney and Thelen, 2010: 10; Culpepper, 2011: 194-7; see also the recent discussion by Capoccia, 2016: 1101). Of course, minority factions could also simply leave the party. Indeed, threatening to leave might be part of minority factions' bargaining strategy to increase their influence in the party leadership. Yet, defection usually implies costs. Actors face, for instance, the uncertainty costs of being potentially worse off by leaving the party. While Ceron (2015) has provided further theoretical underpinning for the likelihood of factional splits, for my model, it suffices to say that if minority factions leave the party, the party's institutional playing field is unlikely to change in a path-reversing manner. Indeed, there is likely to be even less opposition to majority factions seeking to organizationally reinforce their dominant position.

may have lost the party leadership election, they can still try to pressure the leadership into specific statutory modifications by, for example, threatening to sabotage parliamentary votes. Minority elites' networks across party branches are therefore likely to be reproduced within the party's parliamentary group. This contributes to factions being organizationally waved into all levels of the party organization and to the party's parliamentary group becoming an arena of factional conflict (McAllister, 1991: 206).

Once minority elites have managed to gain the influence within the party to realize the two strategies outlined above, they have increased the strength of their factions. Their proposed organizational modifications are thus unlikely to seek the elimination of factionalism. In other words, successful minority elites, who have assumed leadership positions, are likely to reinforce the initial path of institutional development (Greif, 2006: 195, 197, 204–5).

As outlined above, majority elites are likely to counter the emergence of minority factions by forming their own factions. This implies that they also are unlikely to prefer the complete elimination of factionalism. Instead, I expect them to prefer organizational change that reduces the influence of small factions without jeopardizing the influence of their own factions. Such changes may include the introduction of a majority bonus for the strongest faction at NE elections and the introduction of an electoral threshold that factions need to overcome to gain representation at the NC or NE. Both majority and minority factions thereby make the party organization increasingly accommodating for factional activities. Such changes are unlikely to be restricted to the national level. The introduction of thresholds or the organization of internal elections based on factions' candidate slates can also be introduced at the subnational or even local level.

In parties with an initially *low level of factionalism*, majority elites (M+) have few incentives to shift the election of the national executive (NE) from the different organizational branches to a central assembly (NC). While this might be preferred by minority elites, their opportunities to influence institutional development are restricted. Similar to minority factions in highly factionalized parties, minority elites can try to shift the majority coalition. They are more likely to succeed in doing so, if they propose compromises that confirm the basic logic of the selection process in place, while improving their own chances of gaining

representation in the NE. As a result, statutory modifications are likely to continue to give little room for factional activities and mainly address the seat shares to which party branches are entitled in the NE. This reinforces low levels of factionalism.[10]

This confirms that the majority coalition that minority elites would need to split exists within minority elites' own party branch rather than at the NC. They therefore focus their efforts on gaining influence within their own branch. Yet, once they have assumed power within their respective branch, thereby becoming majority elites ($M+_i$), they have successfully adapted to the system in place and are unlikely to push for a fundamental re-organization of the party.

Finally, networks across and within party branches characterize the decision-making process within *moderately factionalized parties*. Majority elites whose party branch directly sends delegates to the national executive are likely to oppose a more centralized selection process of the party leadership as this would risk undermining their power base in intra-party politics. By contrast, minority elites refuse a complete decentralization of the leadership selection. Finally, leaders of party branches that do not send delegates directly to the national executive would only be likely to accept a further decentralization if this would guarantee their representation in the national executive. This, however, might risk reducing the influence of majority elites whose representation in the party leadership has already been secured. Statutory modifications are thus likely to reinforce the existence of both strategies to gain influence, and a moderate level of factionalism prevails. Figure 2.6 illustrates the reinforcement of factionalism.

By being reinforced over time, as stated at the beginning of this section, the level of factionalism becomes more robust to exogenous shocks (Greif, 2006: 168). An event that might have initiated a different path of development, if it had occurred at an earlier point in time, is therefore likely not to have the same effect if it occurs at a later moment in the institutional development (Pierson, 2000a: 263). This means that a dramatic change in the party's organization, which could, for instance, be imposed by a change in the legal infrastructure at the polity level, becomes increasingly unlikely to alter fundamentally the level of factionalism the later it occurs in the reinforcing process of the level of factionalism. Years, potentially

[10]While minority elites can also threaten to defect in parliament to put pressure on the majority coalition, such rebellion is unlikely to develop into high factionalism given the low benefits of cross-branch networks to assume power within the party.

decades, of internal practices, norms and networks are not gone overnight simply because party elites have been forced to alter their party's organization. They are thus likely to have the incentives and resources to maintain patterns of internal competition.

Figure 2.6: Emergence and reinforcement of factionalism



2.4 Party-level effects: Reinforcing or undermining adaptability

To show how factionalism affects party adaptability, we need to move beyond the focus on path dependence on a single level because the emergence of an initial level of factionalism initiates two potentially divergent feedback effects on *two different units*. The first feedback effect affects factions and factionalism and has just been described above. The second feedback effect helps describe how different levels of factionalism may reinforce or undermine the adaptability of the party. The interplay between both offers a potential explanation for why actors do not change the level of factionalism once they realize its negative consequences for

the party. I outline the two last points in the remainder of this chapter.

I suggest that the relationship between levels of factionalism and party adaptability is non-linear. Highly factionalized parties undermine the party's ability to aggregate competing preferences into a single set of decisions regarding, among others, the party's preferred policies, coalition and leadership. A party that does not give factions any room to breathe, in turn, undermines its ability to maintain the loyalty of minority elites and to attract new party cadres. Both are thus less likely to adapt well to profound exogenous changes than moderately factionalized parties. Moderately factionalized parties, in contrast, are more likely to integrate a wide range of minority and majority elites within the decision-making process without unleashing the centrifugal forces that characterize highly factionalized parties.

In *highly factionalized parties*, minority elites and majority elites form factions. Over time, as outlined above, this has led to a situation where delegates at virtually all meetings of the party at the national, subnational and local level can be classified according to their affiliation with a particular faction. Large and small factions rather than party branches are the main actors of intra-party politics. This has implications for internal decision-making. At internal elections, for instance at the central party assembly that elects the party leadership, there is, in principle, a nearly infinite number of factional alliances to win power because there is almost no limit to divide and rearrange delegates into different factional blocks. The institutional constraints that would keep factions together prove to be weak as soon as disagreement emerges. They can simply split and look for an alternative coalition. I expect the number of factions but also the level of fractionalization (i.e. the number of factions and their respective seat share in party committees, see Chapter 1.5.3) to increase over time.

This flexibility undermines the party's decision-making ability. During coalition talks before and after internal elections, small and large factions, and the different party elites affiliated with them, can often play off competing coalition offers against each other. Negotiations are thus tedious and likely to involve gridlocks. Moreover, decisions, once taken, are often subject to renegotiations when a faction participating in the current leadership coalition sees an opportunity to maximize its interests (e.g. funds, positions, policies) by threatening to defect to an alternative coalition. This highly flexible and volatile intra-party bargaining system

can make the party's positions so erratic that it fails to occupy an ideological space which weakens its ability to create stable linkages with voters. The overly flexible bargaining system can also weaken the integrative role ideology can play altogether because factions can always try to go for an even better offer. Policies simply become part of the usual horse trading. Over time, the difference between trading policies, offices and funds becomes blurry. Highly factionalized parties are thus better described as systems of competing factions rather than as a single party (Belloni, 1978: 88). This entails all the problems we know from competition and negotiations between political parties: divisions over who should lead, who gets which portfolio, with whom to form a coalition – divisions over practically everything related to politics. These divisions, as outlined above, are likely to spill over to the party's parliamentary group and undermine, visible to other parties and the public, party unity.

As such, highly factionalized parties are ill-equipped to speak with one voice when exogenous change requires them to adapt. I expect them to delay leadership renewal due to factional gridlocks. Moreover, a new party leader can only emerge if s/he has factional support which means that s/he is likely to come out of the circle of factional leaders that has led the party. Thus, replacing the party leader does not automatically mean a renewal of the leadership. The latter, in fact, is quite unlikely. Moreover, highly factionalized parties struggle to attract new voters and party cadres by failing to update their manifesto and coalition strategy. In consequence, their vote share is likely to decrease and reform-oriented factions are likely to leave the party which also weakens the party's ability to keep its traditional constituencies. Highly factionalized parties are therefore expected to score low on the indicators of party adaptability introduced in Chapter 1.5.1 (Table 2.1).

The organizational rigidity of *weakly factionalized parties* makes them likely to lose minority elites and parts of their traditional constituencies, while struggling to attract new voters and cadres. To understand why this is the case, we may think of party branches in terms of electoral constituencies under majority rule. The competition for the party leadership is closed off for actors who are not supported by a majority of their respective party branch (compare Kitschelt and Kselman, 2010: 12). Power is centralized in a set of majority elites who, while being backed by the majority of their respective party branch, might not represent the interests or positions of the majority of party elites across the organizational branches of

the party. The opposition, however, is fragmented across different, for instance, subnational (i.e. provincial, Land, departmental) branches. Minority elites, of course, may succeed in replacing the leadership coalition in their own party branch. Yet, they would need to succeed in doing this across the majority of branches in order to realize a turnover of the national leadership coalition.

In episodes of profound exogenous change, I expect leadership renewal to happen very slowly and to see the long-term dominance of a relatively well-defined leadership group. Moreover, reform-oriented majority and minority elites are likely to defect. Unlike in highly factionalized parties, such defections are individual- rather than faction-based. They also undermine the party's standing among its traditional supporters. Finally, a party with such a rigid leadership structure is unlikely to attract new voters or representatives of new social movements, another party or professional associations to whom the party might want to appeal (Coppedge, 1994; Crisp, 1996: 43; Barr, 2005: 77–9). As a result, weakly factionalized parties are likely to suffer electoral decline.

Both sets of problems described for highly and weakly factionalized parties are less likely to occur to the same extent in *moderately factionalized parties*. On the one hand, cooperation across party branches is more beneficial for minority elites and majority elites whose respective branch is not entitled to seats in the national executive. They can thus more easily influence national intra-party decision-making than minority elites in weakly factionalized parties. On the other hand, majority elites whose party branches are directly represented in the national leadership are not incentivized to join the factional game. We are therefore likely to observe a relatively constant number of factions over time which allow minority elites and majority elites from branches with no direct representation in the national leadership to make their voice heard. I expect the party neither to be paralyzed by factional activities nor to yield a fragmented and marginalized intra-party opposition.

When facing the same exogenous transformations, moderately factionalized parties are more likely to integrate minority and majority elites from a wide range of party branches within the reform process than parties with no factions. At the same time, they are less likely to suffer from the gridlocks that are unleashed by the highly flexible negotiations, re-negotiations

and re-arrangements of multi-faction coalitions than highly factionalized parties. Moderately factionalized parties are thus more likely to pass crucial reforms on who should lead, what issues to campaign on, which voters to target. Consequently, they are less likely to suffer electoral decline.

Table 2.1: Predicted effect of levels of factionalism on party adaptability

Indicator for party adaptability	High factionalism	Moderate factionalism	Low factionalism
Leadership renewal	Low	High	Low
Attracting new constituencies	Low	High	Low
Keeping traditional constituencies	Low	High	Low
Avoiding splits	Low	High	Low
Electoral resilience	Low	High	Low

While we might expect party elites to abandon a high/low level of factionalism once they realize its negative implications for the party, such path-reversing change is unlikely. The level of factionalism has been deeply entrenched within the party's organization and history. As outlined above, it refers to a decades-long code of practice and a record of organizational modifications to accommodate specific types of intra-party networks and relationships between party elites. In other words, the institutional playing field guiding party elites' initial strategic interaction has kept evolving endogenously, thereby increasing the costs of setting up alternative strategies to gain representation within the national party leadership (Greif and Laitin, 2004: 633-4; Greif, 2006: 18, 159).[11] This has made it increasingly unlikely that party elites would change their type of intra-party networks.

Moreover, the potential gains of changing the level of factionalism are uncertain and relatively far in time, while the losses are immediate and quite likely.[12] Changing the level of factionalism may help the party to solve factional gridlocks, to integrate reform-oriented minority and majority elites and/or to attract new political actors. Yet, it remains uncertain when and to what extent the strategies that emerge out of this reform process will actually

[11]This makes processes of self-reinforcement that unfold over a long period of time less suitable for a formalization in game theoretic terms (Greif and Laitin, 2004: 633-4).

[12]See Lupu's (2016: 60–4) distinction between party leaders and party elites in terms of their time horizon.

pay off (compare Bale, 2003; Meguid 2008; Gidron, 2016). Instead, an immediate and likely outcome would be that party elites who have benefited from the existing level of factionalism would see their power base jeopardized. Party elites who have benefited from the existing level of factionalism are likely to have veto power over organizational party change. These actors are majority elites in weakly factionalized parties and factions that are relevant for a minimum winning coalition in highly factionalized parties. In fact, changing the level of factionalism might not only erode their power base. It might also help their intra-party opponents, with whom these party elites might disagree on the direction and extent of party reform, to gain influence. They are thus unlikely to agree to changes that might put at risk their intra-party influence. The immediate gain of keeping intra-party power is preferred over agreeing to reforms that would undermine their influence and may or may not end up helping the party to adapt. Fundamental changes in the level of factionalism are therefore unlikely. This does not mean that change will never happen. Path dependence simply increases the costs of such reforms. After a shuttering electoral defeat, reform-hostile actors might have no choice but to resign. At this stage, however, they would have seriously harmed the party.

2.5 Conclusion and observable implications

In conclusion, I have outlined why organizational adaptability is affected by the level of factionalism in a nonlinear way. Giving factions no room or too much room, in contrast to a moderate level of factionalism, is likely to undermine a party's ability to get its act together when facing profound exogenous change. The level of factionalism is influenced by how a party chooses its national leaders. The more leadership positions are elected by a central party assembly, the more party elites will be incentivized to form factions.

Before moving to the empirical part, I link my theory to my research design which I outlined in Chapter 1.6. In this thesis, I assess not only how my independent variable covaries with my dependent variable (Collier, Mahoney and Seawright, 2004: 96). The analysis of a few cases also allows me to derive a set of distinct observable implications (summarized in Table 2.2) to test my theory against alternative explanations at each step of the causal process (Collier, 2011: 823).

Table 2.2: Theoretical framework and observable implications

Causal step	Observable implications		
	Decentralized leadership selection	Mixed leadership selection	Centralized leadership selection
X= Centralization of leadership after critical juncture	Low • High value of Rae's fractionalization index	Intermediate • Intermediate value of Rae's fractionalization index	High • Low value of Rae's fractionalization index
Resources and incentives	Importance of networks within party branch • Minority and majority elites focus their struggle for power on bargaining within their respective organizational branch	Importance of networks within and between party branches • Minority elites and majority elites with no guaranteed access to party leadership form factions • Majority elites with ex-officio leadership positions do not form factions	Importance of networks across party branches • Minority elites and majority elites whose power base is restricted to one or few branches form factions • Majority elites with widespread power base respond by also forming factions
Level of factionalism	Low number of factions	Intermediate number of factions	High number of factions
Path-dependent self-reinforcement of initial level of factionalism (unit: factions)	• Statutory modifications (e.g. intra-party electoral system) reproducing patterns of internal competition • Socializing new generations of party elites into existing patterns of intra-party competition		
Consequences for party adaptability	Self-undermining • Excluding minority elites • Dominance of a set of majority elites	Self-reinforcement • Integration of a wide range of actors in the party leadership	Self-undermining • Instable leadership coalitions • High level of fractionalization
Y= Long-term organizational adaptability	Low • Circle of majority elites continues to control leadership • Exit of minority elites • Loss of core supporters • Weak programmatic renewal to attract new voters • Electoral decline	High • Leadership renewal • No break-aways • Keeping traditional constituencies • Programmatic renewal to attract new voters • No electoral decline	Low • Set of factional leaders continues to control leadership • Splits of factions • Loss of core supporters • Factional gridlock over programmatic renewal • Electoral decline

Yet, process tracing and the study of causal mechanisms entails challenging questions: 'When does inquiry into such mechanisms stop? How micro should we go?' (Checkel, 2006: 368). By focusing on theoretically meaningful steps, meaningful in terms of my own and competing theories, I aim to prevent my analysis from degenerating into a mere narrative. Therefore, my empirical chapters seek to assess whether my theoretical framework can answer the following questions better than the theories discussed in Chapter 1.3 and summarized in Table 2.3.

Table 2.3: Theoretical framework against alternative theories for each causal step

Causal step	My theory	Alternative theories
Origins of leadership selection	Choice between historically available options	Antecedent factors
Emergence of the initial level of factionalism	Incentives and resources under the leadership selection process	Legacy of pre-existing groups Federalism Party dominance Clientelism Electoral system Intra-party PR Centralization of power
Development of factionalism	Self-reinforcement	Not self-reinforcing development
Party adaptability	Curvilinear impact of factionalism	Linear impact of factionalism Party institutionalization Party decentralization Party system polarization

(1) Why did actors adopt a specific leadership selection process?

My framework would be supported if they were free to choose between several options.

The competing explanation would be that structural antecedents provided actors with only one way to go, thereby predetermining the institutional outcome.

(2) Why did parties experience different levels of factionalism?

My framework would be supported if actors' decision to form factions can be derived from the resources that were required to assume party leadership positions.

Alternative theories:

- *Legacy of pre-existing groups:* If, in contrast, factions were the legacy of different groups coming together in a single party (e.g. Galli and Facchi, 1962; Capperucci, 2010), we would expect the number of factions to be linked to the number of pre-existing groups. Moreover, factional structures should spread across party levels as party formation progresses.

- *Federalism:* If the structure of the political system (i.e. federal vs. unitary) determined the level of factionalism (Carty, 2010), we would expect to see a similar level of factionalism in parties operating under the same political system. Relatedly, if the level of subnational autonomy drove the level of factionalism, we would expect to see fewer factions, the more decentralized power is across subnational units in federal states.

- *Party dominance:* If factions emerged as a substitute for inter-party competition (e.g. Key, 1949; Arian and Barnes, 1974; Boucek, 2012), we would expect factionalism to increase once a party's dominant position in government has been established. Relatedly, we would expect to observe a similar number of factions across dominant parties.

- *Clientelism:* If high factionalism was endogenous to the availability of means of patronage and clientelism (e.g. Chalmers, 1972; Zuckerman, 1979), we would expect a similar number of factions across cases where such means are available. Relatedly, if factions developed out of pre-existing local clientelist networks, we would expect factions to be established bottom-up rather than top-down.

- *Electoral system:* If a preferential voting system triggered the emergence of factions (e.g. Cox and Rosenbluth, 1993; Ames, 1995), we would expect constituency candidates to support their campaigns for preference votes by forming factions. Alternatively, if factions emerged because national party elites wanted their supporters to get elected to parliament, we would expect factions to be formed in the run-up to parliamentary elections. In contrast, a closed-list PR system should discourage the formation of factions.

- *Intra-party PR:* If factions were the result of using a PR system for internal elections (Sartori, 1971; 1976), we would expect factions to emerge after such a system has been introduced.

- *Centralization of power:* If the centralization of power within the hands of the party leadership deterred the formation of factions (Borz, 2017), we would expect fewer factions

the more control the party leadership has over policy making, the allocation of party funds and candidate selection.

(3) What explains the development of factionalism over time?

3.1 My theory would be supported if party elites reproduced the level of factional activities initiated by their opponents in the short-run, while reinforcing it in the long-run. The reinforcement of the initial level of factionalism is expected to include changes in the party organization which confirm the logic of intra-party competition, as described above, and reproduce it at different organizational levels of the party. Moreover, we can observe new generations of party elites adopting the existing patterns of intra-party competition. Finally, if the initial level of factionalism has been low/moderate/high, it is expected to remain low/moderate/high respectively.

3.2 Non-reinforcing development: The alternative view would be that the initial level of factionalism is not reinforced over time. Organizational changes would not be driven by party elites' attempts to increase the value of their existing networks. Moreover, there are no stable patterns of intra-party competition which would guide the socialization of newly emerging party elites. Finally, we would expect the level of factionalism not to persist but to fluctuate.

(4) Is factionalism linked to party adaptability in a curvilinear way?

4.1 My theory: This final link is supported if the data evidence that weakly and strongly factionalized parties struggle more to adapt than parties with a moderate level of factionalism. This will be observed through the indicators for party adaptability discussed above (i.e. leadership renewal, attracting new constituencies, keeping traditional constituencies, avoiding splits, electoral trend).

Alternative theories:

- *Linear impact of factionalism:* A competing view would be that high factionalism indeed hurts party adaptability but a party's ability to respond to changing external conditions improves as factionalism decreases (e.g. Katz, 1980: 3; Druckman, 1996; Chambers, 2008; Pedersen, 2010).

- *Party institutionalization:* The autonomy of the party leader(s) relative to second-rank elites and rank-and-file has been suggested to drive a party adaptability (Kitschelt, 1994;

Levitsky, 2003). We would thus expect those parties to be more adaptable which have no or weak institutional mechanisms by which second-rank elites and the rank-and-file can hold their leaders accountable (e.g. lack of frequently meeting national party meetings, formal centralization of power).

- *Party decentralization:* Wills-Otero (2016: 760) has proposed that the decentralization of power to the subnational party level improves adaptability by improving the party's responsiveness to demands of diverse constituencies. Decentralized parties are therefore expected to be more adaptable than centralized parties. Moreover, there should be little conflict at the national level as subnational leaders have the freedom to adapt the party according to the challenges in their own environment.
- *Party system polarization:* If the strength of anti-system parties either hurts (Sartori, 1976) or helps (Hazan, 1997) parties that are located around the political center, we would expect changes in their adaptability to be linked to changes in the strength of anti-system parties.

I test my framework and these competing theories in the next five chapters. The case studies will follow the four causal steps summarized in Table 2.3. I start with an analysis of the Italian DC.

Chapter 3

The DC: Centralized leadership selection and centrifugal pressure

'If it must break apart, the DC will not do so in two but in a thousand pieces, like a crystal.' (Giulio Andreotti, quoted in Damato, 1979: 5)

3.1 Introduction

When election results started coming in on 27 March 1994, it became clear that this was the end of an era. People would later describe it as 'the Great Transformation' (Bardi and Morlino, 1994) and the beginning of a 'New Italian Republic' (Gundle and Parker, 1996). Forty-six years of continuous Christian democratic dominance in government had come to an end. In fact, Italy's previously strongest party, *Democrazia Cristiana* (Christian Democracy, DC), had not even competed in this election. It had disintegrated over the direction and extent of reform in the face of the profound transformations unfolding in Italian politics between 1990 and 1994.

In this chapter, I aim to show why the DC had failed so miserably to reform, why previous explanations, though important, have not comprehensively explored the factors leading to the party's high level of factionalism and highlight an important, yet under-explored, variable: the impact of the DC's leadership selection process. I argue that the initial choice in

favor of a centralized selection process of the party leadership contributed to the unfolding of centrifugal forces which ultimately blocked necessary reforms in the 1990s. My argument proceeds in two steps. 1) The initial choice in favor of a centralized selection process of the party leadership triggered factionalism. In 1946, party elites settled on a set of rules according to which intra-party power depended on the electoral support at a single party assembly. This assembly brought together delegates from different organizational branches of the party. The support of a single, for instance, provincial party branch was thus not enough to get elected to the party leadership. Therefore, party elites started forming factions to increase their support among delegates from different organizational branches of the party. The resulting system of factions became entrenched and reinforced over time. 2) The high level of factionalism undermined the party's adaptability. It made internal coalitions highly volatile and unstable and often resulted in gridlock. Factional competition paralyzed internal decision-making when the party was required to adapt to the end of the Cold War, a severe economic recession and an escalating corruption scandal in the early 1990s. In abstract terms, the case of the Italian DC illustrates how a single institutional choice (i.e. centralized leadership selection) can initiate both a self-reinforcing (high factionalism) and self-undermining (adaptability) process of institutional development.

To outline this process, I begin by analyzing the political interactions leading to the choice of a centralized leadership selection and its effects on actors' incentives to form factions. I then trace the development of factionalism and show that clientelism and the Italian electoral system, while not being the cause of factionalism, were important reinforcing factors. I explain how factionalism drove party elites' incentives to change the DC's organization which contributed to the reinforcement of the factional system over time. I then outline how factionalism already impaired internal decision-making and organizational adaptability before 1990. The Christian Democrats were thus ill-equipped to adapt when facing profound transformations in Italian politics.

3.2 The origins and consequences of a centralized leadership selection

3.2.1 From the end of Fascism to party leadership elections

Before outlining why and how the DC's leadership selection process affected its level of factionalism, it needs to be assessed whether these rules were preordained by antecedent factors. Did, for instance, the legacy of regional conflicts in Italy, the context of World War II and the Allied liberation strategy impose a particular organization as the natural option (see Capoccia, 2015: 168)?

No, the choice in favor of a centralized leadership selection which the Italian Christian Democrats made in 1946 was a critical juncture: They could choose among different options, the period of uncertainty regarding the institutional outcome was short and their initial choice was momentous for the party's level of factionalism and adaptability in the medium and long run (see Capoccia, 2015: 195).

Their ultimate decision was the result of political bargaining between different groups: 1) moderate members of the pre-war Italian People's Party (PPI) around Alcide De Gasperi, 2) Christian trade unionists, like Giovanni Gronchi and Achille Grandi, 3) a group of young Romans around Domenico Ravaioli, 4) Catholic resistance partisans and academics, including Giuseppe Dossetti, from Northern Italy and, ultimately, 5) conservative and monarchist Catholics, such as Stefano Jacini, from the Italian South (Magri, 1954: 221-4; Webster, 1961: 129-70; Chassériaud, 1964: 272-3; Capperucci, 2010: 26-7, 45).

Toward the end of Fascism, these groups faced a well-organized and popular political left and liberal elites who sought to recover their pre-war dominance (Galli and Facchi, 1962: 38; Smith, 1997: 417-8). This and De Gasperi's close ties with the Vatican and his integrationist maneuvering prevented a fragmented political Catholicism (Donovan, 1994: 75-6). Starting party building in October 1942,[1] the Christian Democrats benefited from the social infras-

[1] On political Catholicism before 1942, see Godechot (1964: 7-73).

tructure of the Catholic Church, while the Church did not intervene in the organization of the party leadership (Galli and Facchi, 1962: 33-5, Malgeri, 1987: 7; Capperucci, 2009: 449).

If the DC's organization had been predetermined by structural conditions, we would expect these actors to adopt a regionally decentralized leadership selection where the different party branches in the Italian provinces or regions would have been guaranteed a fixed seat share in the national party executive. The Allied landing in continental Italy in September 1943 separated the process of party formation in the liberated Southern territories from that in the still Fascist North (Galli and Facchi, 1962: 35; Figure 3.1).

Figure 3.1: Allied liberation of Italy

Data: Stamp World History.[2]

While the Northern group needed to act clandestinely and was involved in partisan activities, De Gasperi and other actors in Southern and Central Italy used the regained freedom in June

[2]http://www.stampworldhistory.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/Italy-1941-1945.pdf [02.02.2017].

1944 to advance party formation (Chassériaud, 1965: 27-8; Leonardi and Wertman, 1989: 35, 125-6). By July 1944, they had elected a party council (*Consiglio Nazionale*) and executive (*Direzione Nazionale*) (Capperucci, 2010: 59-61).[3] When the Northern Christian Democrats could finally act freely after the liberation in April 1945, their compliance with the programmatic and organizational decisions taken by the Southern groups was far from obvious. Even though Mussolini's Fascist state had been highly centralized, regionalist identities had traditionally been strong in Northern Italy (Smith, 1997: 1-10). Moreover, the Northern Christian Democrats, who defended the radical-democratic ideas of the *Movimento guelfo d'azione*, were ideologically quite different from the more moderate groups in Central Italy and the conservative Catholics in the South (Capperucci, 2010: 61-2). As party formation had been cut off from the rest of Italy, the Northern group had developed their own leadership structure (i.e. *Consiglio Direttivo per l'Italia settentrionale*).[4] This 'Christian democratic federalism' (Capperucci, 2010: 69) continued at the first meetings after the liberation when the Northern delegates were organized as a distinct group (*Comitato D.C. Alta Italia*).[5]

Despite these structural conditions, the Christian Democrats debated for two years different ways of integrating the diverse groups in the party leadership (Table 3.1). To recap, I operationalize the level of centralization of the leadership selection process as the number of party bodies sending full members (i.e. those with voting rights) to the national party executive and their respective seat share in this leadership committee. I adapt Rae's (1967: 53–8, 62) fractionalization index to measure the degree of centralization: $F = 1 - \sum (S_i)^2$, where S_i refers to the proportion of seats each party branch is entitled to fill in the national executive. It ranges from 0 to 1, with higher values expressing a higher degree of decentralization (Rae, 1967: 58).

[3] *Congresso Interregionale* 29.–30.07.1944, p. 49, in *Atti e Documenti della Democrazia Cristiana, 1943–1959*, ed. Franco Salvi. Rome: Cinque Lune. Primary data is referenced as follows: *Title.* date, origin of the source (e.g. newspaper), page(s), archival box and folder, archive, URL [date of access].

[4] *Letter Direzione Provvisora del Partito to Comitati Regionali di Milano, Torino Genova, Bologna, Venezia, Ugo Architetto and Pero.* 29.04.1944, Spataro, Sc. 9 Fasc. 41, Archivio della Democrazia Cristiana of the Istituto Luigo Sturzo (appreviated: ILS); *Mozione della Direzione Centrale.* 28.04.1945, in Salvi (1959: 119-20).

[5] *O.d.g. della Direzione Centrale.* 30.05.1945; *Direzione Centrale. 09.06.1945*, in Salvi (1959: 126-7).

Table 3.1: Fractionalization of the party council and party executive

Time	Executive	Council	Comments
January 1919 (PPI)	0.00	0.58	4 of the 20 party council seats elected by the national congress reserved for minority slate
July 1944	0.00	0.29	Used at the interregional congress on 30 July and at the party council on 31 July
April 1946	0.00	0.17	Decided by party executive on 17 April and proposed at first national congress on 24 April
April 1946	0.33	0.17	Election of national party executive by party council on 29 April
September 1946	0.22	0.69	Ratified by party council; 32 out of 59 party council seats elected by the national congress in a single election

Data: *Partito Popolare Italiano, Statuto.* 18.01.1919; *Lo Statuto*, 1945; *Progetto di Statuto.* 1946, DC Statuti, ILS; *Il Consiglio Nazionale eletto dal I Congresso Nazionale*; *Consiglio Nazionale della D.C.* 29.04.1946, pp. 215–8, both Atti e Documenti; *Statuto del Partito.* 1947, DC Statuti, ILS.

For the DC's first inter-regional congress in July 1944, De Gasperi proposed that the organizational branches of the party in Italy's different provinces should send delegates to the national party congress. The national party congress should elect nearly all members of the party council (fractionalization index: 0.29) which, subsequently, selected the party leadership (fractionalization: 0.00) (Webster, 1961: 173-5; Capperucci, 2010: 66-7, 113). While his proposal resembled the basic structure of the pre-war PPI,[6] it differed from the latter's organization by suggesting an even more centralized structure. This and the political bargaining process that followed illustrate that the DC's rules to select its leaders were not a mere legacy of the PPI (cf. Chassériaud, 1965: 37–8, 46).

The suggested leadership selection process did not guarantee the representation of any specific group, like party elites from a particular province or region, in the national leadership body. Instead, it advantaged actors with wide-spread support among the national congress and party council delegates. De Gasperi could surely build on such a support as his opposition

[6] *Partito Popolare Italiano, Statuto.* 18.01.1919, URL: http://www.altavillahistorica.it/vita-civile/amministrazione/amministratori/propaganda-e-risultati-elettorali/241-partito-popolare-iatliano [01.10.2015].

to fascism had made him widely popular among many Catholics. He had been the leader of the anti-fascist *popolari* after the split of the PPI. When the party was ultimately dissolved as a result of Mussolini's terror regime, De Gasperi went into exile in the Vatican before becoming the leading voice in the formation of the DC (Capperucci, 2009: 443). He also represented the Christian democrats in Ivanoe Bonomi's transitional government (Smith, 1997: 418).[7] De Gasperi's influence therefore did not depend on any guaranteed representation in the party leadership. In turn, the other three groups, like Dossetti and the Northern Christian Democrats, would have benefited from a selection process that would have guaranteed the representation of particular regions or provinces. Yet, De Gasperi managed to convince the delegates that the elected party council needed to be carefully balanced along regional lines without relying on a formal quota. Eight seats each were accorded to the Southern and Central provinces, while eight seats were reserved for the still occupied Northern territories (Capperucci, 2010: 81).[8] As Northern representatives were immediately integrated in the party executive after the liberation of Northern Italy in late April 1945,[9] they had little reason to oppose De Gasperi's centralized leadership selection process.

In 1946, the provisory party executive, led by De Gasperi, proposed an even more centralized selection process than in 1944. While the party executive should still be entirely elected by the party council, 90.9 percent of the latter, compared to 66.7 percent in 1944, should henceforth be elected by the national congress.[10] Their proposal, however, faced opposition at the first national congress. An association of Roman Christian democrats behind Domenico Ravaioli argued that representatives of the DC's group in the future Italian parliament, the party's youth, women and other ancillary organizations should be entitled to representatives in the national executive (Chassériaud, 1965: 272; Capperucci, 2010: 83-7, 111). If this proposal had been adopted, the selection process would have been more decentralized. Yet, De Gasperi succeeded in negotiating the merger of the eight competing slates for the party council into a single list (Capperucci, 2010: 110, 113).[11] A centralized leadership selection process thus

[7] *Commissione direttiva del Partito.* 08.06.1944, Direzione Nazionale, Sc. 1, Fasc. 1, ILS.

[8] *Congresso Interregionale.* 29.–30.07.1944, in Salvi (1959: 49); *Verbale.* 31.07.1944, Consiglio Nazionale, Sc. 1 Fasc. 1, ILS; *Lo Statuto.* 1945, Art. 14, 16, DC Statuti, ILS.

[9] For instance, Dossetti was elected deputy party leader. See *Direzione Centrale.* 04.08.1945, in Salvi (1959: 117–8, 136).

[10] *Lo Statuto.* 1945, DC Statuti, Art. 16; *Progetto di Statuto.* 1946, DC Statuti, Art. 98, ILS; *Direzione Centrale.* 17.04.1946, in Salvi (1959: 177–8).

[11] *Scheda.* 24.-28.04.1946, DC Congresso Nazionale, Sc. 1, ILS.

prevailed (Chassériaud, 1965: 38). 13 of 16 executive seats were elected by the party council which was nearly entirely elected by the national congress.[12]

The final party statute was ultimately ratified by the party council in September 1946.[13] At this meeting, De Gasperi and his supporters, who had won the first national leadership election (Table 3.2), had a majority.[14] In contrast, all other regional groups were in a minority position in the party leadership. Fearing that they may lose further ground relative to De Gasperi, they argued that the party leadership should reflect intra-party diversity and tried to change the proposed party statute in order to guarantee the representation of minority slates in the national executive. Their attempt, however, was foiled by the majority around De Gasperi. The latter insisted that 'no representation of the minority [*minoranza*] will be guaranteed' because 'the *Direzione Nazionale* is an executive [rather than a representative] party body'.[15]

Table 3.2: National party executive, April 1946

Groups	Seats	Representatives
Moderates	9	De Gasperi, Piccioni, Gonella, Restagno, Matarella, Andreotti, Cingolani-Guidi, Vanoni, Jervolino
Northern Left	4	Dossetti, Fanfani, Lazzati, Brusaca
Trade unionists	2	Grandi, Pastore
Southern Right	1	Petrone

Data: *Consiglio Nazionale della D.C.* 29.04.1946, pp. 217-8, Atti e Documenti.

In its first national party statute, Italy's Christian Democrats thus established a centralized selection process of the party leadership with two main consecutive arenas of intra-party competition: The national party congress elected the majority of the party council (54.2 percent)[16] which, in turn, elected 15 of the 17 members of the national party leadership (fractionaliza-

[12] *Il Consiglio Nazionale eletto dal I Congresso Nazionale.* 24.-27.04.1946; *Consiglio Nazionale.* 29.04.1946, in Salvi (1959: 215-8).

[13] *Statuto del Partito.* 1947, p. 3, DC Statuti, ILS.

[14] *Consiglio Nazionale.* 18.-22.09.1946, in Salvi (1959: 239).

[15] Ibid.

[16] The selection process taking place within the different organizational branches of the party only accounted for a small part of the seats. Each regional and ancillary branch was entitled to one seat (1.7 percent) and the party's parliamentary group chose five delegates (8.5 percent).

tion: 0.22) (Figure 3.2).[17]

Figure 3.2: Party organization of the DC, September 1946



Data: *Statuto del Partito.* 1947, Art. 61-78, DC Statuti, ILS.

3.2.2 From a centralized leadership selection to factionalism

The competition between different groups during the process of party formation encouraged some scholars to consider factionalism as a legacy of pre-existing groups (Magri, 1954; Galli and Facchi, 1962; Capperucci, 2010). Admittedly, some minority elites, like Ravaioli, promoted the idea of an organizational manifestation of the regional and ideological divisions within the party (*tendenze*) during the two years of negotiating the DC's first statute (Capperucci, 2010: 84-6). This, however, mainly referred to regionally concentrated opinion groups (e.g. the group from Northern Italy, Ravaioli's group from Rome). Surely, factions in the mature DC also had a regional stronghold and the pre-war network of the Catholic trade unions helped Gronchi to re-establish contact with allies across Italy (Galli and Facchi, 1962: 33-5). Yet, neither these regional divisions nor the legacy of informal and clientelistic networks within political movements, known as *trasformismo* (Smith, 1997: 103-7), explain why and when party elites began expanding their networks across regions and to wave them into all levels of the party organization (McAllister, 1991: 209; Parisella, 1997: 204).

[17]Only the leader of the party's parliamentary group and a representative of the Italian General Confederation of Labor (CGIL) were granted ex-officio membership.

Instead, I argue that the organizational characteristics structuring the selection of the party leadership drove party elites' incentives to form factions. Given the centralized leadership selection, actors' chances to assume intra-party power depended on their ability to mobilize support at the national congress. As the national congress brought together delegates from different organizational branches of the party, the support of a single branch did not suffice to get elected to the party council (and subsequently to the national executive). It was thus vital for party elites to expand their power base beyond particular provinces and build a broad support network within the DC. My model predicts that party elites who initially lacked such a network would try to build one by forming a faction.

This theoretical expectation is supported by the historical evidence around the formation of the DC's first faction, called *Politica Sociale* (Social Politics), by Gronchi, Grandi and other trade unionists in early March 1946 (Galli and Facchi, 1962: 46). While the emergence of the first faction preceded the ultimate decision regarding the DC's first statute, I claim that it was, nevertheless, driven by the institutional constraints structuring the access to intra-party power. Gronchi had experienced the negative consequences of the provisional centralized selection procedure which had been adopted at the interregional congress in July 1944. It had left the trade unionists with only one seat in the provisory party leadership.[18] Moreover, they had not received any of the two newly created vice-secretary positions in August 1945.[19] Although Gronchi held a ministerial portfolio in the transitional government, the trade unionists had to fear that their influence within the DC would decrease if they were unable to make a strong showing at the first national party congress in April 1946 (Galli and Facchi, 1962: 34–46). They most likely knew that De Gasperi did not plan on substantially changing the centralized selection process. Both Gronchi and Grandi had participated in several meetings of the provisory party leadership at which the DC's organization was discussed in the run-up to the national congress.[20] Their faction was an attempt to mobilize support from left-leaning congress delegates. Only three days before the national congress, *Politica Sociale* addressed the delegates via its factional newspaper:

[18] *Consiglio Nazionale.* 31.07.1944, in Salvi (1959: 52).

[19] Vice Segretari Politici della Democrazia Cristiana, URL: http://www.storiadc.it/partito/vicesegr_politici.html [16.02.2017].

[20] *Riunione della Commissione direttiva.* 08.06.1944, Direzione Nazionale Sc. 1 Fasc. 1, ILS; *Commissione Direttiva Centrale.* 12.06.1944; *Commissione Direttiva Centrale.* 29.06.1944; *Consiglio Nazionale.* 06.-09.01.1946, in Salvi (1959: 38-9, 41, 158-9).

> ‘The leaders and friends of *Politica Sociale* ... are greeting the national congress delegates who are coming from all parts of Italy ... *Politica Sociale* wants to be a ... voice for all those friends who share the same religious, political and social beliefs within the DC but also within the Italian General Confederation of Labor and for the leaders of all united trade unionist movements in Italy. Those who have followed our first issues and the new members we have been admitting bear witness that we neither lack loyalty nor clarity. ... Today, we inform the leaders of the *Democrazia Cristiana* and the upcoming party congress about the positions presented in our motion *Politica Sociale*.’[21]

Other party elites whose influence did not go beyond some few provincial party branches followed Gronchi’s example once they experienced the negative implications of the DC’s leadership selection process. For instance, even though the Northern Christian Democrats had been the second largest group, holding four seats in the first national party leadership (Table 3.2 above), they had no formal power given De Gasperi’s majority. Dossetti ultimately decided to organize his followers in his *Cronache Sociali* (Social Chronicles) faction in spring 1947. Dossetti sought to increase pressure on De Gasperi to accept a debate on the DC’s ideology and internal procedures. At that time, the ongoing conflict within the DC-led provisory government had just led to the second coalition reshuffle in less than a year (Chassériaud, 1965: 280; Capperucci, 2010: 169-70).[22] Another group of party elites that responded to the emergence of factions was the intra-party right. As their influence hardly reached beyond the Italian South, they had failed to prevent the national congress delegates from endorsing the abolition of the Italian monarchy and the coalition with the Communists and the Socialists in June 1946 (Galli and Fancchi, 1962: 44). After the DC lost ground against the two left-wing parties in the local elections in November 1946, Jacini formed the right-wing faction *Parola Nuova* (New Word) (Capperucci, 2010: 119-26).[23]

The centralized leadership selection, in combination with party elites’ ambition to gain intra-party power, drove these factional activities. While many of these minority elites, like Dossetti, had initially preferred the guaranteed representation of minority groups within the party leadership, they lacked the power to change the DC’s organization accordingly. To translate

[21] Grandi, Achille: *Saluto al Congresso.* 21.04.1946, Politica Sociale, p. 1, Gronchi Primo Parte, Sc. 11 Fasc. 41, ILS.

[22] *Politica Interna.* 30.05.1947, Cronache Sociali, 1(1), pp. 1-3, URL: http://amshistorica.unibo.it/173 [30.09.2015].

[23] *Lettera del Segretario Politico Piccioni ai Dirigenti del Partito.* 15.11.1946, in Salvi (1959: 251-4).

their strength at future national congresses more adequately into their seat share at the party council and, subsequently, the party leadership, minority elites tried to replace the majority system that had been used for internal elections with a system of proportional representation (PR). The first attempt had already been made by Dossetti and his supporters at the party council meeting in September 1946 but was voted down by the majority around De Gasperi.[24] A second attempt was made by Jacini's *Parola Nuova* at the national congress in November 1947. Jacini confirmed the dominant role the DC's organizational structure played in the formation of factions by demanding via his faction's newspaper: 'To win the battle in the country, it is essential that PR will be applied within the party and that all internal groups find representation within the party's leadership and parliamentary group.'[25] His attempt, however, failed as the upcoming general election convinced most delegates to comply with De Gasperi's appeal to demonstrate unity (Capperucci, 2010: 177-9).[26] Yet, it illustrates that the use of PR for internal elections, ultimately adopted in 1964, was not the cause but the result of factionalism (Leonardi and Wertman, 1989: 110; cf. Sartori, 1971; 1976; Zariski, 1978).

Minority factions even started forming coalitions to increase their influence at party congresses, as predicted by my theoretical framework. For instance, Gronchi and Dossetti's factions formed an alliance at the party council and party congress in 1949 in another (failed) attempt to introduce PR for internal elections (Boucek, 2012: 147).[27]

In contrast to these minority groups, De Gasperi had shown to have the required support across the organizational branches of the DC. As predicted, there were initially few incentives for him to form a faction. Instead, De Gasperi sought to suppress the factional activities of minority elites by accusing them of violating the party statutes which implied the threat of party expulsion.[28] Yet, the formal prohibition of factions failed to prevent factionalism be-

[24] *Consiglio Nazionale.* 18.-22.09.1946, in Salvi (1959: 239).

[25] *Parola Nuova: La Nostra Battaglia.* 02.03.1947, quoted in Capperucci (2010: 139).

[26] The beginning of the Cold War made the election in April 1948 a critical moment for Italy. The DC promoted the integration with the West and Italy's entry into the NATO, whereas the Socialists and Communists advocated an opening toward the Soviet bloc. As the latter formed an electoral alliance, De Gasperi and the Vatican urged all Catholics to stay united. Eventually, the DC won with 48.5 percent, compared to 31.0 for the PCI-PSI alliance (Capperucci, 2010: 169-209).

[27] *Seduta Antimeridiana.* 27.04.1949, pp. 7-9; *Seduta Pomeridiana.* 28.04.1949, p. 7, Consiglio Nazionale, Sc. 5 Fasc. 14, ILS.

[28] *Statuto del Partito.* 1947, Art. 89, DC Statuti; *Verbale.* 14.03.1947, Direzione Nazionale, Sc. 1 Fasc. 4, ILS.

cause networks across party branches were crucial for party elites to gain power. The threat of party expulsion ultimately lost its credibility when Gronchi's *Politica Sociale* organized the first publicly noticed factional caucus in November 1948 and the party leadership decided against enforcing any sanctions as they feared party fissions.[29] Majority elites could no longer remain uninvolved in factional competition if they wanted to prevent minority elites from undermining their dominant influence. By mobilizing for his positions, De Gasperi's supporters became known as *Centristi* within the DC which pointed toward a developing organizational structure of this group.

Institutional factors structuring the selection of the party leadership were decisive in triggering factionalism within the DC. The centralized leadership selection process incentivized minority elites and party elites whose power was constrained to particular, for instance, provincial party branches to form factions in order to increase their intra-party influence. In contrast, actors, like De Gasperi, who enjoyed wide-spread popularity across different party branches did not initiate factionalism. Yet, the activities of their intra-party rivals required them to enter the factional game eventually.

3.3 Reinforcing competitive factionalism before 1990

3.3.1 Intra-party power, clientelism and the electoral system

The DC's initial system of factions had emerged even before a preferential voting system was introduced for Lower Chamber elections in January 1948. The electoral system was thus not the cause of factionalism (cf. Pasquino, 1972; Golden and Chang, 2001; Ceron, 2012, 2015).[30] In fact, Gronchi's *Politica Sociale* faction even predated all post-war elections in Italy, including the local elections in mid- and late March and the Constituent Assembly election in June 1946. While Gronchi probably knew that a preference vote mechanism had

[29] *Il Discorso di Gronchi, Pesaro.* 21.11.1948, Gronchi Primo Parte, Sc. 14 Fasc. 64; *Appunto I and Appunto II con riferimento i Gruppi di Studio di 'Politica Sociale' e del Convegno di Pesaro.* 17.11.1948; *Dichiarazione della Direzione Nazionale.* 18.11.1948, Direzione Nazionale, Sc. 3 Fasc. 23; *Verbale Seduta Serale.* 20.12.1948, Consiglio Nazionale Sc. 4 Fasc. 11, ILS.

[30] *Legge n. 6, Norme per l'elezione della Camera dei Deputati.* 20.01.1948, Art. 18, URL: http://www.normattiva.it/uri-res/N2Ls?urn:nir:stato:Legge:1948;6 [01.10.2015].

been introduced for the 1946 elections,[31] I have only found evidence that the electoral system was used to advance factional interests in the run-up to the 1948 general election.[32] The uncertainty regarding the electoral outcome appeared to have actually tempered Gronchi's factional activities prior to the election in 1946 (Smith, 1997: 423).[33]

The fact that factionalism in the DC predated Italy's PR system which allowed voters to express multiple preference votes[34] also helps understand why clientelism did not initiate factionalism in the DC. Clientelism on its own would not explain why party elites started moving beyond their local networks to build factions which operated at all party levels. Previous studies have, rightly, theorized the relationship between clientelism and factionalism as dependent on specific institutional settings, such as electoral systems which allow for competition between candidates of the same party (Ames, 1995; Carey and Shugart, 1995; Golden and Chang, 2001). I have just established that factionalism preceded such a system in post-war Italy.

However, the electoral system and clientelism were important reinforcing factors of factional competition – together with the incentives and resources feedback effect generated by the initially adopted centralized leadership selection and party elites' drive to gain power within the party. Clientelism and patronage, in addition to campaigning and ideological appeals, helped factions to incentivize delegates to support them at the party congress. Over time, this contributed to factionalism spilling over from the national to the local party level because

[31] *Ricostituzione delle Amministrazioni comunali su base elettiva*, n.1. 07.01.1946, Art. 59, URL: http://www.personalweb.unito.it/roberto.cavalloperin/diramm/materiali/d.%20lgs.%20lgt.n.%201_1946.pdf [01.10.2015]; *Atti della Commissione per la Elaborazione della Legge Elettorale Politica per l'Assemblea Costituente*, pp. 65-73, 119, URL: http://legislature.camera.it/_dati/costituente/documenti/ministerocostituente/p3_Vol1.pdf [30.09.2015]; *Disegno di legge N. 56, Legge Elettorale Politica per l'Assemblea costituente.* 25.02.1946, URL: http://archivio.camera.it/resources/atc02/pdf/CD1400000091.pdf [01.10.2015].

[32] *Letter Renzo Ascani to Battistini and Gronchi.* 02.02.1948, Gronchi Primo Parte, Sc. 14 Fasc. 64, ILS.

[33] *Letter Samartino Salvatore to Gronchi.* 27.07.1946, Gronchi Primo Parte, Sc. 11 Fasc. 41, ILS. Moreover, it seems unconvincing that actors' experiences under the truncated form of pre-war parliamentary democracy could have helped them to anticipate the dynamics of an open-list PR system with regard to intra-party competition. PR was only used for the last two free elections before the advent of Fascism. Furthermore, the system used in 1919 and 1921 allowed allocating preference votes across party lists – an aspect which encouraged candidate-centered rather intra-party competition and which was not restored in 1946. *Leggi e Decreti.* Gazzetta Ufficiale del Regno d'Italia, 16.08.1919, Art. 7, p. 2364, URL: http://augusto.agid.gov.it/#giorno=16&mese=08&anno=1919 [01.10.2015].

[34] Between three and four preference votes, depending on district size (D'Alimonte, 2005: 254).

the number of congress delegates ultimately depended on the number of party members in each local branch of the DC (Godechot, 1964: 118-26). Local party cadres offered factional leaders to increase the number of their supporters at the subnational and national party congresses in return for some payoffs (Donovan, 1994: 77). They inflated the membership figures by retaining members who had died, quit, moved or had been recorded without their knowledge and by recruiting family members, friends or employees (Pridham, 1979: 78; Hine, 1993: 118). The recruited members were rewarded for endorsing a particular faction, while their remaining level of participation in party life was basically nil (Leonardi and Wertman, 1989: 151; Hine, 1993: 118). Such clientelistic linkages reinforced the importance of factions in intra-party politics by providing them with strong local roots.

Clientelism and patronage in combination with the electoral system were also useful for minority factions to increase their bargaining power independently from their seat share in the party leadership. As outlined in Chapter 2.3.2, minority factions can still try to make their voice heard even if they performed poorly at party leadership elections. One of their potential strategies is to increase pressure on the party leadership by threatening to defect in parliament (Boucek, 2012: 133). Italy's parliamentary system, where governmental survival depended on support in the legislature, and the open-list electoral system helped to realize this strategy. Factions could increase their parliamentary seat share, and thus their blackmail potential, by accumulating preference votes (Chassériaud, 1965: 81-3). For this purpose, factional elites cooperated with local actors who provided votes in exchange for money, public contracts or other benefits. Such corrupt networks also included criminal organizations, like the Mafia (Bufacchi and Burgess, 1998: 119).

The pursuit of preference votes did not only enhance minority factions' influence within the DC's parliamentary group but also emphasized the value of factional networks within the party hierarchy. The most available source of preference votes was party members along with their families and friends. This increased the importance for factional leaders to control the party membership (Hine, 1993: 131). Moreover, voters in the North tended less to state their preferences for individual candidates than in the South which made the place on the party list crucial for a candidate's success (Hine, 1993: 131; Boucek, 2012: 125). Factions' attempts to increase their seat share in parliament therefore also reinforced factionalism at the intra-party

level because the DC leadership had decided that they would have the final word regarding the composition of the party's electoral lists (Chassériaud, 1965: 78–83; Leonardi and Wertman, 1989: 157).[35]

Thus, the DC had become highly factionalized although the national leadership controlled candidate selection and party financing which allows refuting Borz's (2017: 9-10) centralization of power thesis.

As a faction's strength was affected by its ability to reward supporters (Zuckerman, 1979: 158; Hine, 1993: 131), factional leaders built strong ties with state and civil society organizations and exploited public resources. This did not only help to make the factional system persist over time but also prepared the way for the corruption scandal threatening the DC many years later. Benefiting from its permanent position in office,[36] the DC built close links with the Christian Association of Italian Workers (ACLI), the Italian Confederation of Workers' Unions (CISL), Catholic Action, the National Confederation of Direct Cultivators (*Coldiretti*) and other organizations (Zariski, 1965: 26; Belloni 1978: 80-2). They provided factional leaders with funds for their patronage system and facilitated the penetration in social milieus which helped factional elites to build a set of local clients (Zuckerman 1979: 123–5; Parisella 1997: 202–3). These ties encouraged Amintore Fanfani to develop a system of sub-governments (*sottogoverno*) which were directly controlled by a national factional leader or one of his allies (Boucek, 2012: 29, 125). They organized the exchange of private goods for votes and of public contracts for money which went directly into the accounts of particular factions (Zuckerman, 1979: 120; Della Porta and Vannucci, 1994: 236; Golden and Chang, 2001: 596). Departments, like Post and Telecommunications and the Fund for the South (*Cassa per il Mezzogiorno*), which controlled numerous public projects were highly popular among factional leaders and usually held by the DC (Leonardi and Wertman, 1989: 94). This reinforced actors' incentives to engage in factional activities. They were not only useful to increase intra-party influence but also to make money (Zuckerman, 1979: 108).

[35] *Direzione Centrale*. 08.03.1946, in Salvi (1959: 171).

[36] Between 1946 and 1992, the DC won a plurality in all general elections and participated in every government.

Hence, clientelism and an electoral system which allows for competition between candidates from the same party correlate with a high level of factionalism. The latter, however, was endogenous to the choice in favor of a centralized leadership selection in 1946 (compare Lieberman, 2003: 22-32). This decision had led to a system of competitive factions which was reinforced over time as factions' interests affected the recruitment of party members, the parliamentary decision-making and the allocation of funds (Boucek, 2012: 135). Factionalism's reinforcement can be illustrated by the development of the number of factions (Figure 3.3).

Figure 3.3: Factionalism in the DC, 1947 to 1993



Data: Boucek (2012: 148–71).

Brief moments in which the number of factions decreased, like in 1964, 1973 and 1989 must not be misinterpreted as a decrease in factional competition. Small factions had, as expected by my theoretical framework, formed coalitions to increase their chances at elections taking place at the national congress. These coalitions were often very similar in strength. They also encompassed nearly all delegates at the national congress which is illustrated by the fact that the reported results in Table 3.3 add up to 100 percent. Factional competition remained high.

Table 3.3: Strength of multi-faction coalitions, 1964, 1973 and 1989

1964		1973		1989	
Coalition	%	Coalition	%	Coalition	%
Impegno Democratico	46.5	Iniziativa Popolare	34.2	Azione Popolare	37
Nuove Cronache	21.3	Nuove Cronache	19.8	Area del Confronto	35
Forze Nuove and Base	20.7	Impegno Democratico	16.5	Andreotti	17.8
Centrismo Popolare	11.5	Base	10.8	Forze Nuove	7.0
		Forze Nuove	10.0	Fanfani	3.2
		Morotei	8.7		
SUM	100	SUM	100	SUM	100

Data: Boucek (2012: 154, 159, 171).

While the clientelistic activities described above helped factional elites to gain the resources which were valuable for assuming intra-party power given the playing field established by the first party statute, they also tried to modify this playing field in their favor.

3.3.2 Factions and organizational change

By trying to modify the party statutes to their advantage, factional elites reinforced the incentives to form factions. These institutional change attempts did not only confirm and reinforce the importance of factional competition at the national level but also reproduced it at the regional and local party level.

I follow Capoccia and Ziblatt (2010: 943-5) by analyzing such institutional change attempts as important episodes in the DC's organizational development. Similar to their work on democratization, we can also clearly identify the moments in which actors made a formal attempt to change the institutions in place at the intra-party level. Such attempts usually took place at the party council which prepared the national congress and at the national congress itself. The latter was empowered to change the party statute, unless it outsourced this power to the party council. The key episodes are summarized in Table 3.4. Analyzing them allows tracing the path-dependent development of the DC's organization over the long run without getting lost in historical details. Episodes are analyzed together when they encompass the same actors and are close in time.

Table 3.4: Main statutory modifications

Year	Modifications	Attempt...	Proposal backed by ...	Effects
1946/47/49	Introduction of PR	Failed	Left- and right-wing minority factions	The debate on PR was framed. Minority factions advocated it for representing intra-party diversity, while majority factions rejected it for encouraging disunity.
1952	Plurality slate at party council elections awarded four-fifths of the seats; remaining one-fifths split among minority candidates	Successful	De Gasperi wanted to increase intra-party cooperation.	Actors were incentivized to develop factions. Winning a plurality at the national congress provided de facto a majority at the party council.
1954/56	Introduction of PR	Failed	Left-wing minority factions	As the changes in 1952 had further weakened the representation of intra-party diversity, the campaign for PR gained legitimacy.
1956	Decrease in majority seat bonus from four-fifths to two-thirds	Successful	Concession by party leader Fanfani	Minority factions had reached the first concession from majority elites.
1962	Ex-officio membership in the party leadership for former party leaders and DC prime ministers	Successful	Leaders of large factions	Leaders of large factions gained guaranteed membership in the party leaderships.
1964	Introduction of PR based on vote shares of factions' manifesto motion at the provincial and national congresses	Successful	Small factions hoped to increase their influence, while large factions wanted to contain factional defections in parliament.	Factional competition expanded to the local level. New factions emerged which made factional coalitions necessary.

Year	Modifications	Attempt...	Proposal backed by ...	Effects
1965	Increase in the number of deputy party leader positions from one to four	Successful	Factional leaders	It facilitated multi-faction coalitions.
1967	Allocation of party and governmental positions proportional to factional strength	Successful	Massimiliano Cencelli and his *pontieri* faction	Distribution of offices completely depended on factional strength
	Abolishment of factional manifesto motions	Successful	Large factions wanted to encourage coalitions to reduce fragmentation.	The reform failed to reduce factional fragmentation.
1969	Introduction of a preference vote component within the bounds of a single faction slate	Successful	Large factions hoped the preference vote mechanism would trigger tensions between small factions.	
1970	Three percent threshold for national congress	Successful	Large factions sought to reduce the influence of small factions.	
1972	15 percent threshold for party council	Successful		
1973	Any faction gaining 54 percent at the party congress was awarded 64 percent of the party council seats; remaining 36 percent distributed proportionally among minority lists; reduction of electoral threshold to three percent; introduction of factional lists at the local level	Successful		
1976	Party leader directly elected by national congress	Successful	Party leader Zaccagnini tried to democratize the DC.	No effect on the factional system.
1978	Reintroduction of OLPR	Successful	Factional leaders	Fragmentation increased.
1984	Election of national congress delegates by regional lists instead of bottom-up PR	Successful	Party leader De Mita wanted to reduce the number of small factions.	Factional coalitions formed.

Following minority factions' attempts to introduce PR, as described above, De Gasperi wanted to reduce the influence of small factions and to encourage them to cooperate with his majority group. Benefiting from Dossetti's unexpected resignation from politics which had left the left-wing factions in disarray in 1952, De Gasperi succeeded in changing the existing majority system to a combination of majority and preference voting across lists (Leonardi and Wertman, 1989: 104-5, 111). The plurality slate at the national congress gained four-fifths of the party council seats, while the remaining one-fifths were split among the minority candidates according to their number of preference votes.[37] Against De Gasperi's intentions, this modification incentivized party elites to strengthen their factional ties because a faction only needed to win a narrow plurality at the national congress to gain a substantial seat share at the party council. This improved its prospects for the election of the national executive. While some party elites sought power through their own factions (e.g. Pastore's *Forze Soziali* [Social Force], Andreotti's *Primavera* [Spring]), Fanfani, who had initially been close to Dossetti's faction, tried to unite all left-leaning groups within his faction *Inizitative Democratica* (Democratic Initiative). He eventually succeeded in taking over the party leadership in 1954 (Webster, 1961: 183; Zariski, 1965: 8–9; Leonardi and Wertman, 1989: 105–8; Boucek, 2012: 147).

As the electoral system adopted in 1952 had even undercut the extent to which the party leadership reflected the diversity of groups in the DC, minority factions' campaign for PR gained legitimacy. Their motion to introduce PR was defeated by only two percent in 1954.[38] While another attempt failed in 1956, minority factions obtained the first concession from Fanfani's majority faction (Leonardi and Wertman, 1989: 110–2). Fanfani wanted to finally settle the conflict around the electoral system.[39] The plurality faction's seat share in the party council was reduced from four-fifths to two-thirds. The minority slates would henceforth hold 20 of the 60 party council seats which were elected by the national congress (Boucek, 2012: 150).[40]

[37] *Seduta Notturna.* 25.11.1952, Congresso Nazionale, Sc. 3, ILS.

[38] *Proposta di Modifica dello Statuto*; *Seduta Notturna.* 28.06.1954, pp. 3–5; *Seduta Antimeridiana.* 29.06.1954, p. 1, Congresso Nazionale, Sc. 5 Fasc. 6, ILS.

[39] *Seduta Pomeridiana.* 15.10.1956; *Seduta Antimeridiana.* 16.10.1956, Congresso Nazionale, Sc. 6 Fasc. 7 Sottofasc. 1, ILS.

[40] *Statuto del Partito.* 1957, Art. 72, DC Statuti, ILS.

The reform episodes discussed so far confirm two points: 1) Factions had become the dominant actors in intra-party politics. 2) The statutory modifications that factional leaders promoted kept confirming the primacy of the centralized leadership selection process as the driving force of factional activities. Factional leaders tried to change the translation of support at the national party congress into party council and, ultimately, party leadership seats in favor of their respective faction. They, however, did not question the central role the national congress played in the selection of the party leadership. This is in line with the theoretical framework in Chapter 2.4. It predicts that with increasing investments in their factional networks, party elites will become increasingly unlikely to endorse path-reversing change (i.e. the decentralization of the leadership process) (Greif, 2006: 195–205).

In 1962, the leaders of large factions pushed a statutory reform which made all former party leaders and prime ministers who were members of the DC ex-officio members of the party leadership.[41] This might seem to go against my argument as the reform formally implied a slight decentralization of the leadership selection by increasing the number of ex-officio members. However, this episode corresponds to my theoretical prediction that factional leaders would pursue statutory reforms that aim to secure their influence vis-a-vis intra-party rivals without, however, eroding the factional playing field. In fact, the 1962 statutory reform ensured the influence of factional leaders, such as Fanfani and Andreotti, for decades as the leaders of large factions usually held the positions of party leader and prime minister. Moreover, the supremacy of central party bodies, like the party congress, in the election of the party leadership remained untouched.

The role of the party congress and party council as the two main arenas of intra-party competition was also confirmed by the introduction of PR in 1964. For almost 20 years, large factions had been rejecting PR for being 'a fatal instrument of division.'[42] Their argument, however, had become absurd since factionalism had emerged despite the use of a majority system for internal elections. Instead, small factions' previous framing of PR as a tool to better reflect intra-party pluralism[43] made it suddenly appear as a potential solution to the ongoing conflict

[41] *Statuto del Partito.* 1962, Art. 68, DC Statuti, ILS.

[42] *Seduta Antimeridiana.* 27.04.1949, p. 7, Consiglio Nazionale, Sc. 5 Fasc. 14, ILS.

[43] *Seduta Antimeridiana.* 27.04.1949, pp. 8-9; *Seduta Pomeridiana.* 28.04.1949, p. 7, Consiglio Nazionale, Sc. 5 Fasc. 14, ILS.

over the coalition formula for the national government. If PR allowed for a better translation of factions' strength within the party into factions' seat share in the party leadership, the latter's decisions regarding the coalition format might be less subject to intra-party conflict and defection in parliament. Large factions finally agreed to introduce PR in 1964.[44] Each faction presented a party manifesto motion at the provincial and national party congresses. They were then entitled to a proportional representation at the national congress and party council respectively according to their motion's vote share (Leonardi and Wertman, 1989: 113).[45] Factional competition thereby organizationally expanded to the provincial level and put an end to the influence of local notables because it was no longer possible to run for the national executive without factional affiliation (Belloni, 1978: 86). Moreover, PR improved the seat share of small factions which incentivized new factions to emerge and reinforced the necessity of factional coalitions (Boucek, 2012: 152–3).

The following episodes of institutional change were characterized by the leaders of large factions trying to prevent their factions from splitting and to encourage coalitions between factions. To facilitate coalitions, the number of deputy party leaders was increased from one to four in 1965 (Belloni, 1978: 95). The largest faction received the position of the party leader and each coalition partner was provided with a deputy position (Boucek, 2012: 153–5). Moreover, the practice to link a manifesto proposal to the factional slate presented at the party congress was abandoned in 1967 to encourage coalitions despite ideological differences (Leonardi and Wertman, 1989: 116).[46] Yet, the leaders of large factions did not want these new coalitions to challenge their influence. They introduced the reform that preference votes could be cast within the bounds of a slate of candidates. This fostered tensions between small factions that were running on a joint candidate slate to increase their prospects in national leadership elections (Leonardi and Wertman, 1989: 117).[47]

The leaders of large factions continued their efforts to reduce the influence of small factions without, however, questioning the importance of factionalism in intra-party politics. In 1970,

[44] *Verbale.* 24.01.1964, pp. 10–2; *Verbale.* 25.01.1964, pp. 104–7, Consiglio Nazionale, Sc. 51 Fasc. 73 Sottofasc. 1, ILS.

[45] *Nuovi Articoli dello Statuto.* Art. 5, 1966, DC Statuti, ILS.

[46] *Statuto del Partito.* 1968, Art. 14–6, 95, 99, DC Statuti, ILS.

[47] *Statuto del Partito.* 1970, Art, 83, DC Statuti, ILS.

the new party leader, Arnaldo Forlani, successfully proposed a three percent threshold which factions had to overcome in order to be represented at the national congress.[48] A 15 percent threshold for representation at the party council was added in 1972.[49] Moreover, any faction that gained 54 percent of the vote would be awarded 64 percent of the seats and the remaining 36 percent would be distributed proportionally among the minority lists.[50] Concessions, however, had to be made to appease minority factions which threatened to defect in parliament. The party council threshold was reduced from 15 to three percent (Belloni, 1978: 84). At the same time, modifications to the party organization to accommodate factional competition 'penetrated down to the basic building block of the party organization' as factional lists were introduced at the local level to elect the provincial congress delegates (Leonardi and Wertman, 1989: 119).

Moreover, factions' strength in internal elections was formally translated into the allocation of public offices. After his faction had secured 12 percent of the votes at the 1967 congress, Massimiliano Cencelli suggested: 'If we have 12 percent, similar to the executive board of a company where positions are divided according to the shares held by the different stockholders, positions in the party and the government should be allocated proportionally according to the support by the party membership.'[51] Following the *Manuale Cencelli* (Cencelli's Manual), the number and type of positions each faction received depended on its strength at the national congress. The different ministerial departments were ranked in relation to their importance (and access to public funds). Ministerial portfolios were worth more (three points) than the prime ministership (two points) and under-secretaries of state (one point) (Boucek, 2012: 129). The distribution of offices became a mathematical problem: If one out of two factions of equal strength received a portfolio of the first category, it would only receive two under-secretary positions, whereas the second faction, if receiving a portfolio of the second category, was compensated by a larger number of under-secretary positions.[52] This system contributed to 'increasingly unconstrained feuding between factions' (Furlong, 1996: 61).

[48] *Statuto del Partito*. 1970, Art. 83, DC Statuti, ILS.
[49] *Statuto del Partito*. 1972, Art. 89, DC Statuti, ILS.
[50] *Statuto del Partito*. 1974, Art. 89, DC Statuti, ILS.
[51] Quoted in *Che cos'é il "manuale Cencelli"*. 18.02.2014, Il Post, URL: http://www.ilpost.it/2014/02/18/manuale-cencelli/ [10.10.2015].
[52] *Fanfani contro i dosaggi dc*. 23.10.1974, La Stampa, 106 (239), p. 7, URL: http://www.archiviolastampa.it/component/option,com lastampa/task,search/mod,libera/action,viewer/Itemid,3/page,7/articleid,1502 02 1974 0239 0007 21251783/ [10.10.2015].

Factions thereby persisted as the dominant actors of intra-party politics despite individual promises to reduce their influence. Even so-called modernizers, like Benigno Zaccagnini and Ciriaco De Mita, owed their influence to factional support. They were not willing to undermine their own power base (Hine, 1993: 139–49). Summits where alternative ways of organizing the party should be discussed, like the national assembly in November 1981, thus passed without major results (Leonardi and Wertman, 1989: 120, 133–5). The introduction of the direct election of the party leader by the national congress was supposed to provide the party with a more democratic appearance.[53] Yet, Zaccagnini's re-election as party leader in 1976 still depended on a coalition of five factions (Pridham, 1979: 76–8; Boucek, 2012: 158–60). As the number of factions had even increased since the introduction of the majority bonus in 1973, an open-list PR system was restored in 1978.[54] Factionalism ultimately peaked at the 1982 party congress with 12 factions grouped in three coalitions (Boucek, 2012: 166). When the new party leader Ciriaco De Mita tried to reduce the influence of small factions by changing the selection of the national congress delegates from bottom-up PR to regional lists,[55] small factions simply countered by forming coalitions.

In short, driven by the ambition to gain power within the DC, the leaders of large and small factions pushed for statutory reforms which (1) underlined the importance of the national party congress and, subsequently, the party council as the main arenas of leadership competition. By doing so, they (2) reinforced the importance of mobilizing support among delegates from different organizational branches of the party as the key resource to assume intra-party power. Finally, their statutory modifications (3) entrenched factions as primary organizational units of intra-party competition.

[53] *Statuto del Partito*. 1976, Art. 86, DC Statuti, ILS.
[54] *Statuto del Partito*. 1978, Art. 61–5, 68, DC Statuti, ILS.
[55] *Statuto del Partito*. 1984, Art. 20, 74, DC Statuti, ILS.

3.4 Undermining party adaptability before 1990

3.4.1 Factionalism and the base of the DC's dominance

Factionalism was not an important condition for the DC's dominant position in government between 1946 and 1993. It was neither linked to the number of interest groups within the DC nor to the number of social groups within the electorate (Pridham, 1979; Zuckerman, 1979; cf. Zariski, 1965).

Instead, the DC's permanent position in power was based on anti-communism, the Catholic Church and female suffrage (Hine, 1993: 85; Bardi and Morlino, 1994: 245–50). A strong communist party, building on its record in the resistance, had emerged after World War II. With the beginning of the Cold War, the *Partito Comunista Italiano* (PCI) became the Christian Democrats' 'natural antagonist' (Capperucci, 2010: 168).[56] Both the United States and the Catholic Church wanted to avoid a communist takeover and therefore supported the DC. The United States entrusted it with important financial resources for Italian reconstruction. The Vatican used its influence in Italian society to urge all Catholics to vote for the DC (Hine, 1993: 84, 90–4; Capperucci, 2010: 168–71). With one parish for every 1,800 to 1,900 inhabitants, the local presence of the Church must not be under-estimated and Pope Pius XII even excommunicated the millions of PCI voters and members in 1949 (Ignazi and Welhofer, 2012: 38). For both the Church and the US government, the DC was the only available partner against the Communists. The Italian Socialist Party (PSI) had initially been quite Marxist itself (Smith, 1997: 437). The remaining political center, in turn, was fragmented into the center-left Republicans (PRI) and the center-right Liberals (PLI). The latter were, in addition, discredited due to their role in the advent of Fascism. As a result, no minimum-winning coalition was possible during the Cold War which excluded both the PCI and the DC (D'Alimonte, 2005: 253–4). The DC would have benefited from anti-communism and the initially strong influence of the Catholic Church even if it had been much less factionalized. Similarly, factionalism was not linked to the DC becoming the main beneficiary of the enfranchisement of women in 1945 (Doria, 1996).

[56] The PCI was the second strongest party in Italy during the Cold War with a national vote share between 22.6 and 34.4 percent.

In contrast, factionalism was not only self-reinforcing but also undermined the party's organizational adaptability long before the dramatic changes of the early 1990s (Hine, 1993: 135; Boucek, 2012: 165; Ceron, 2012; 2015).

3.4.2 A party drowning in factionalism

Factionalism undermined the party's parliamentary operability. As predicted by my framework, factionalism spilled over from the intra-party to the parliamentary level (Zuckerman, 1979: 158). Factions that were dissatisfied with their share of power or benefits could sabotage legislative votes in order to pressure the party leadership into responding to their demands. Benefiting from the institution of the secret ballot in the Italian parliament, these so-called *franchi tiratori* (snipers) contributed to the dramatic number of 52 governments between 1946 and 1994 and paralyzed the DC's actions in government (Zariski, 1965: 14; Bardi and Morlino, 1994: 265).

Trying to separate internal power struggles from the business of running the government, factional leaders adopted a code of practice in 1969, known as the Pact of San Ginesio. Forlani, De Mita and others agreed that 'internal shifts in the balance of power within the DC would result from time to time in changes in the choice of coalition partner but would not be allowed to affect the external unity of the DC' (Furlong, 1996: 61).

However, by detaching internal competition from governmental responsibility, the pact encouraged further factional splits (Boucek, 2012: 156). At the same time, it failed to improve ministerial stability as five different governments between 1969 and the end of the legislative period in 1972 illustrated. It could be said that the DC's coalition partners might also be blamed for the breakdown of multi-party governments. Yet, the 1971 presidential election underlined that frictions within the DC were largely responsible for this instability. Ten Christian Democrats tried to obtain support from other parties for their own candidacy. For an entire year, this rivalry prevented a decision until, after 23 failed ballots, Giovanni Leone was elected (Smith, 1997: 458). The magazine *Tribuna Italiana* rightly illustrated that the DC was drowning in a sea of factions and factional elites (Figure 3.4).

Figure 3.4: The DC drowning in factionalism, caricature



Data: Tribuna Italiana, 09.10.1971, Archivio Giulio Andreotti (AGA).

3.4.3 Gridlock in the face of a changing society

The centrifugal pressure from competing factions kept party leaders from adapting to the social and political changes unfolding in Italy between the 1960s and late 1980s. (1) Italian society was becoming increasingly secular. Weekly church attendance decreased from around 50 percent in 1968 to less than 35 percent in the early 1980s (Vezzoni and Biolcati-Rinaldi, 2015: 103–9). This is a conservative estimate as survey data usually over-report church attendance (Rossi and Scappini, 2012; Vezzoni and Biolcati-Rinaldi, 2015). In addition, Ignazi and Welhofer (2012: 35–7) have observed a dramatic decline in agricultural-sector employment and an increase in civil marriages, education, service-sector employment and urbanization. These changes eroded the DC's rural-Catholic base as their defeat in the divorce and abortion referendum in 1974 and 1981 indicated. (2) The rise of the Communists from 22.6 percent in 1953 to 34.4 percent in 1976 seemed to point toward an increasing salience of socio-economic issues (Pridham, 1979; Boucek, 2012: 157, 163). (3) The DC came under pressure when a series of scandals revealed the party's corrupt and illicit activities in the early 1980s (Hine, 1993: 139; Smith, 1997: 466-71).

Surely, these social and political changes did not put as much pressure on the DC to adapt as the profound transformations of the early 1990s. While the PCI had moderated its positions and wanted to prove its ability to govern (Hine, 1993; Agosti, 1999; Fanti and Ferri, 2001), Italy was deeply rooted in the Western bloc. Moreover, the PCI failed to convince other parties and large parts of the electorate that it had wholeheartedly endorsed parliamentary democracy. The death of PCI-leader Enrico Berlinguer, who had credibly tried to open his

party toward Western democracy, and the subsequent restoration of good relations with the Soviet Union and China fostered this impression by the mid-1980s (Bufacchi and Burgess, 1998: 19). The Communists were not an option to lead the government which kept the Christian Democrats in office during the Cold War (Leonardi and Wertman, 1989: 179; Smith, 1997: 457).

Still, the Christian Democrats had widely acknowledged by the mid-1970s that factionalism prevented the necessary modernization of the DC.[57] While the party's organization allowed for factions to serve as 'promoters of special interests', it provided too much room for such groups which severely limited the 'capacity of the DC [. . .] to aggregate interests, and to make clear choices' (Hine, 1993: 135). As the high level of factionalism encouraged party elites to form their own factions and/or to look for alternative coalitions in case of disagreement, decisions by the party leadership were frequently contested and renegotiated (Hine, 1993: 135). The importance of clientelism and patronage in the reinforcement of factionalism meant that ideological differences played an increasingly minor role in these conflicts which were mostly rent-seeking in nature. Factional leaders were thus less constrained by policy positions or ideology. They could simply play off competing factions against each other and defect whenever a more lucrative offer came up. Under the headline 'The DC in search of a new equilibrium', the newspaper *La Stampa* illustrated this nearly continuous re-arrangement of factional coalitions which made intra-party majorities inherently unstable. Figure 3.5 shows the names of the different factions and factional elites and whether the latter had already defected (i.e. solid line) or were suspected to defect (i.e. dotted line) to another faction in the run-up to the party council in October 1975.

[57]For instance, *Resoluzione Ravaioli*, 20.12.1974, Consiglio Nazionale Sc. 56, Fasc. 104; *Relazione del Segretario Politico.* 06.–07.12.1980, Consiglio Nazionale, Sc. 62 Fasc. 132; *Verbale.* 31.07.1981, pp. 1–2, Consiglio Nazionale, Sc. 64 Fasc. 139 Sottofasc. 1, ILS.

Figure 3.5: Re-arrangement of factional coalitions in 1975



Data: La Stampa, 26.10.1975, AGA.

Consequently, the DC failed to update its positions on religious issues despite increasing secularization. Figure 3.6 plots the salience of religion and traditional values in the DC's manifesto between the early 1960s and 1990s.

Figure 3.6: Religion and traditional values in DC election manifestos, CMP data



Data: Volkens et al. (2016).

While the fairly flat line seems to suggest that traditional Catholic positions had simply not played an important role in the DC's previous manifestos, the party was actually highly divided between two potential strategies: either endorsing socioculturally progressive positions to signal that the party was moving with the times or emphasizing its Catholic identity to

appeal to its core constituency. The severe internal divisions over the divorce question illustrate this.[58]

Factional conflicts discarded ‘a model of catch-all parties completely free to move in policy space’ (Ceron, 2012a: 700). In fact, the party leadership itself often struggled to make a decision at all as no single faction succeeded in winning a majority of party council seats after 1959 (Figure 3.7a). Coalitions between several factions were thus necessary to form a majority. Forming a stable and coherent party leadership was further complicated by an increasing level of fractionalization. Using Rae’s (1967) fractionalization index, we can see that an increasing number of factions had an increasingly similar seat share at the party council (Figure 3.7b). As a result, negotiations between factions often ended in gridlocks and ‘[c]ycling majorities from excessive factionalism’ paralyzed the party (Boucek, 2012: 165).

Figure 3.7: Factional divisions, 1947 to 1989



(a) Plurality list at party congresses

(b) Fractionalization of the party council

Data: Boucek (2012: 148–71).

Instead of reforming the party, however, the Christian Democrats relied on bribes and clientelism in their attempt to link party elites and voters to the party (Warner, 1996: 134–5; Smith, 1997: 475; Boucek, 2012: 171).

Factionalism also continued to divide the DC within parliament despite the rise of an electoral competitor. The 1976 general election had left the party only with a 4.3 percent margin ahead of the Communists. Even though Italy had been shattered by a series of terrorist attacks,

[58]See the collection in DC Segretaria Politica, Sc. 188, Fasc. 12, Sottofasc. 1. Forlani, ILS.

Aldo Moro only gained the support of his factional rivals for a government of national solidarity, which was also backed by the PCI, by giving all DC factions governmental positions. The result was a 69-member Christian Democratic minority cabinet. And still, 100 out of 263 DC parliamentarians dissented at the investiture of this so-called *Compromesso storico* (Historical Compromise) (Pridham, 1979: 83; Smith, 1997: 448–56; Boucek, 2012: 161–2).

In consequence, voters started distancing themselves from the DC, as a decline by more than ten percent in the proportion of voters expressing an attachment to the DC in the 1980s illustrated (Figure 3.8). The party needed to give up the position of prime minister for the first time, lost markedly in the 1983 election (-5.37 percent) and its survival in office increasingly depended on Bettino Craxi's Socialist Party.

Figure 3.8: Attachment to Italian parties, 1980s



Data: Katz and Mair (1992).

Hence, the DC was poorly equipped to cope with the profound transformations that hit the party in the early 1990s.

3.5 Organizational paralysis and the demise of the DC

3.5.1 The end of the Cold War

When the party council met around a week after the fall of the Berlin Wall had illustrated the disintegration of the communist regimes in Eastern Europe, the DC's plan for the future equalled the well-known agenda of the past: European integration, a social-Catholic version of market economy and the continuation of the *Pentapartito*.[59] The latter referred to the coalition between Christian Democrats, Socialists, Social Democrats, Liberals and Republicans that had governed Italy for most of the 1980s to keep the Communists out of office. According to party leader Forlani, there was little reason for change. While the Italian Communist Party 'had lost its battle',[60] it was not expected to disappear soon. Giulio Andreotti concluded with regard to the extent to which the DC was required to change: 'If they [the PCI] change their name, we will need to call anti-communism differently. I don't know, anti-something else.'[61]

Forlani and Andreotti had clear incentives to avoid any debate about party reforms. It would have only risked jeopardizing the precarious internal balance of power that had been established following the 1989 national congress.[62] In February 1989, Forlani's and Andreotti's factions had defeated Ciriaco de Mita's left-wing bloc. While Forlani had regained the party leadership and Andreotti got in return the position of prime minister, the left had been appeased by making De Mita president of the party council.

However, Forlani's hope that by doing business as usual the Christian Democrats would prevent factional conflicts proved to be flawed. Already in January 1990, a conflict erupted

[59] *Intervento del Presidente del Consiglio Giulio Andreotti al Consiglio Nazionale della DC.* 18.11.1989, pp. 3–22, Democrazia Cristiana, Busta 1038, AGA.

[60] *Sintesi della Relazione del Segretario Politico Arnaldo Forlani. Consiglio Nazionale* 17.–18. 11.1989, pp. 3-4, 6, Democrazia Cristiana, Busta 1038, AGA.

[61] Proietti, Fernando: 'Andreotti: il Pci non mi pare in liquidazione.' *Corriere della Sera*, 19.11.1989, p. 2, Democrazia Cristiana, Busta 1038, AGA.

[62] *Sintesi della Relazione del Segretario Politico Arnaldo Forlani. Consiglio Nazionale.* 17.–18.11.1989, p. 8., Democrazia Cristiana, Busta 1038, AGA.

between De Mita's left-wing coalition and Forlani and Andreotti's factions. The official occasion was disagreement over a series of policies on local autonomy, the media, immigration and privatization, but different policy positions hardly played a role in this quarrel. Instead, it was, once again, predominantly a struggle for power as De Mita was challenged to demonstrate strength in order to withstand criticism from within his faction.[63] The dispute ultimately led to the resignation of De Mita as president of the party council.[64] Well-documented by the media, which reinforced the DC's public image of a deeply divided party,[65] the alliance between the three main factional leaders had fallen apart — hardly a year after it had been forged and even without trying to respond to the changes in Italian politics.

In the post-Cold War environment, it was highly uncertain to what extent the politicization of the old DC–PCI antagonism would suffice to mobilize the level of support that the Christian Democrats had enjoyed previously. This was particularly questionable after an orthodox-Marxist faction had broken away from the PCI and the latter had been transformed into the Social Democratic Party of the Left (PDS) (Bufacchi and Burgess, 1998: 19-20).

Agreeing on new issues (and positions) to campaign on seemed even more urgent as voters had started to move away from the DC toward regionalist parties. The Northern Leagues had been campaigning on greater autonomy (sometimes including separatist claims) for the economically advanced North relative to Rome and the less developed South.[66] While their results had been hardly impressive in the 1980s, they experienced a substantive rise in the regional elections in May 1990 (i.e. +5.2 percent in Liguria, + 3.5 percent in Veneto and +18.4 percent in Lombardy). They did so by drawing considerable support from the DC (Diamanti, 1996: 117).[67]

[63] 'Non sara una vera spaccatura'. *Il Tempo*, 21.02.1990, p. 2, Democrazia Cristiana, Busta 1038, AGA. See also Padovani (2005: 43).

[64] Summonte, F. 1990. 'Un interrogative. Quale riflesso a Palazzo Chigi?' *Il Tempo*, 21.02.1990. p. 2, Democrazia Cristiana, Busta 1038, AGA.

[65] Minzolini, A. 1990. 'De Mita lascia: non e piu la mia dc.' *La Stampa*, 21.02.1990, p. 3; Damato, F. 1990. "Anche il governo rischia la cinese." *Il Giornale*, 21.02.1990, p. 1; 'Andreotti deluso. Non Vedo proprio motivi insuperabili di divisione.' *Il Mattino*, 21.02.1990, p. 2; Compagna, G. 1990. "Dc, lascia De Mita Governo piu debole." *Il Sole 24 Ore*, 21.02.1990, p. 1, Democrazia Cristiana, Busta 1038, AGA.

[66] In 1991, this group of regionalist parties formed a joint federation called *Lega Nord* (Northern League).

[67] Spini, V. 1990. "Il Terremoto del 6 Maggio". *La Repubblica*, 22.05.1990, URL: http://ricerca.repubblica.it/repubblica/archivio/repubblica/1990/05/22/il-terremoto-del-

Solving some of the urgent problems facing the country could have been a way for the DC of ensuring ongoing electoral support. Three issues were particularly important: 1) the fight against the mafia, 2) a reform of the widely unpopular electoral system and 3) improving the state of the Italian economy.

Since the late 1970s/early 1980s, Italy had witnessed an escalation of organized crime (Smith, 1997: 468). By the late 1980s, the southern third of Italy, according to a judge in charge of the anti-mafia campaign, was under '"absolute control" of the criminal underworld' (Smith, 1997: 472). Solving the mafia crisis would have allowed the DC to enhance its record in office and to increase their chances of keeping their position as the predominant governing party (in addition to saving the country from a severe domestic problem).

However, while effective antimafia policies would have required time and did not guarantee ongoing electoral support, they would have entailed the serious risk for many Christian Democratic factions of facing undesirable consequences in the short run. Many major factional leaders with a power base in the South, like Andreotti (Sicily) and Antonio Gava (Naples), heavily depended on votes provided by the mafia (Smith, 1997: 468, 472-4). Consequently, they repeatedly used their influence in public office to pressure prosecutors and courts, and even threatened the local authorities that they would lose financial grants from Rome if they did not go easy on some investigations (Smith, 1997: 472). Uncooperative investigators, like Giovanni Falcone, were simply transferred from Sicily to other posts (ibid.: 472-4). As predicted by my theoretical framework, factional leaders had a quite short time horizon. Preferring the avoidance of immediate costs over potential benefits in the medium and long run, they rejected any serious anti-mafia policies as they would have risked weakening their intra-party power base.

A reform of the electoral system was a second issue that illustrated how factional interests prevented the DC from modernizing. The old open-list PR system was (rightly) perceived as one of the key institutional features that had eroded party unity, undermined governmental stability and nurtured clientelism and corruption (D'Alimonte, 2005: 254).

---

maggio.html [04.12.2016].

Yet, as outlined above, the electoral system had helped reinforce factions' influence. By accumulating preference votes, they could increase their parliamentary seat share and thereby their blackmail potential toward the government and the party leadership. An abolishment of preferential voting would have seriously threatened their power, while it was uncertain to what extent such a reform would help the DC as a party. Consequently, Forlani and Andreotti rejected any reform of the electoral system. In contrast, De Mita, who was under pressure from some reform-willing second-rank elites from the DC's left-wing factions (e.g. Mario Segni, Mino Martinazzoli), at least formally demanded institutional change.[68] The conflict led to the resignation of those affiliated with De Mita's faction from the Andreotti government.[69] Yet, two months later, De Mita suddenly returned as president of the party council. Officially, he had managed to obtain Andreotti and Forlani's agreement to put the reform of the electoral system on the party's agenda – without, however, entailing any concrete plans.[70] De Mita's comeback was criticized by Carlo Donat Cattin's *Forze Nuove* (New Forces) faction and reform-oriented members within De Mita's own faction as yet another internal deal that came at the expense of modernization.[71]

Reform pressure continued to augment when the negotiations about a common European currency increased the salience of the poor state of Italy's economy. The DC-led government wanted to enter this currency union and had agreed to a set of fiscal conditions which were specified by the Maastricht Treaty. When it became publicly known in early 1992 that Italy was nearly certain to miss these conditions, it 'forced into every home an awareness of the mismanagement' in the country (Ginsborg, 1996: 35–6). Leading businessmen and industrialists, like Gianni Agnelli who was the president of the Italian automobile manufacturer *Fiat*, came out strongly against the DC and its handling of the ineffective and inflated public sector which was blamed as one of the reasons for Italy's difficulties.[72] It is well-understood that

[68]Scalfari, E. 1990. 'Il ritorno di De Mita.' *La Repubblica*, 27.11.1990, p. 12, Democrazia Cristiana, Busta 1038, AGA.

[69]'La dc si ricuce sula Riforma.' *Il Giorno*, 07.09.1990. p. 2, Democrazia Cristiana, Busta. 990, AGA.

[70]In addition to the factions' interest in keeping the preference vote component, Andreotti and Forlani were also unwilling to break with the PSI which opposed any changes to the electoral system. See Scalfari, E. 1990. 'Il ritorno di De Mita.' *La Republblica*, 27.11.1990, p. 12, Democrazia Cristiana, Busta 1038, AGA.

[71]Franco, M. 1990. 'Il santo di Ciriaco.' *Panorama*, 03.12.1990, p. 46, Democrazia Cristiana, Busta 1038, AGA.

[72]Geremicca, F. 1992. 'Andreotti consuma la sua vendetta'. *La Republica*, 11.01.1992, p. 3,

many of the economic actors who criticized the DC had heavily benefited from the system of patronage in place. However, the pool of spoils was exhausted and the complex patronage and clientelism network increasingly caused delays in payment. This frustrated some businessmen and industrialists who were eager to teach the DC a lesson (Bufacchi and Burgess, 1998: 100–1). Moreover, with economic growth in decline,[73] it had become obvious that the system that had allowed so many political and economic elites to enrich themselves had become unsustainable. Having to choose between their own profit and loyalty to the DC, many businessmen chose the former. The social coalition which had tied the Christian Democrats to Italy's large industrial and business associations had begun disintegrating (Van Kersbergen, 1999: 362–3).

However, instead of suggesting a reform program, Andreotti told his critics to mind their own business and blamed them for the poor state of the Italian economy.[74] Indeed, a reform of the public sector was undesirable (and probably also unfeasible) for Andreotti and other factional leaders. It would have required reducing the state bureaucracy and cutting down offices and positions which factional leaders needed to pay their supporters and to have something to offer to rival factions in the process of party leadership and government formation (Smith, 1997: 471).

The *vecchi capicorrente* (established factional leaders) therefore blocked reform-willing party elites who, as a result, started breaking away from the DC. For instance, Leoluca Orlando, mayor of Palermo and frustrated by the high levels of clientelism and organized crime in Sicily, had been promoting a reform of the DC's factional system, an end of the coalition with the similarly corrupt PSI and an opening toward the reformist wing of the Communists.[75] He was, however, fiercely opposed by the DC's factional elites and ultimately forced out of office (Smith, 1997: 476).[76] Consequently, he left the DC together with his Sicilian support group

Democrazia Cristiana, Busta 1038, AGA.

[73] The World Bank: *GDP growth (annual in percent). Italy.* URL: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG?locations=IT [13.12.2016].

[74] Geremicca, F. 1992. 'Andreotti consuma la sua vendetta'. *La Republica*, 11.01.1992, p. 3, Democrazia Cristiana, Busta 1038, AGA.

[75] Marroni, S. 1990. 'Sinistra Dc. Ascoltiami o Morrai.' *La Repubblica*, 26.08.1990, URL: http://ricerca.repubblica.it/repubblica/archivio/repubblica/1990/08/26/sinistra-dc-ascoltami-morrai.html [04.12.2016].

[76] Spini, V. 1990. 'Il Terremoto del 6 Maggio'. *La Repubblica*, 22.05.1990, URL:

and formed the party *La Rete* (The Network) (Bufacchi and Burgess, 1998: 29–30; Leonardi and Alberti, 2004: 111–3).[77]

Similarly, since Andreotti, Forlani and De Mita were eager to preserve the existing electoral system, some reform-oriented Christian Democrats chose to pursue their agenda publicly rather than within the DC. For instance, Mario Segni, a previously rather unknown parliamentarian, became the leading voice of the electoral reform movement. His campaign ultimately succeeded in pushing through a referendum which reduced the number of preference votes from three to one in June 1991 (Bufacchi and Burgess, 1998: 26, 66, 152). This was a serious blow against the factional system and increased the pressure on the DC leadership to reform the party (Ginsborg, 1996: 25–6).[78]

Moreover, the Christian Democrat Francesco Cossiga, former prime minister and then President of the Republic, publicly blamed Andreotti, De Mita and Forlani for the governmental instability and for sabotaging essential reforms of the political system. He ultimately left the DC in January 1992 (Bufacchi and Burgess, 1998: 34, 63). The Christian Democrats thus appeared highly divided at a time when contextual changes would have required a united response.

Still, factional leaders made only minor changes to the party's internal bargaining system. At the party council in January 1992, they agreed to reduce the power of the *padroni delle tessere* who were local party bosses providing factional leaders with members and votes at internal elections in exchange for money, offices and/or public contracts. While the factions' national leaders had a joint interest in reducing their dependence on these local brokers, factions remained the key organizational unit of intra-party politics. Their decision that delegates who were elected by lower-level organizational strata of the DC should henceforth only repre-

http://ricerca.repubblica.it/repubblica/archivio/repubblica/1990/05/22/il-terremoto-del-maggio.html [04.12.2016].

[77]Ziniti, A. 1990. 'Orlando ha deciso.' *La Repubblica*, 06.11.1990, URL: http://ricerca.repubblica.it/repubblica/archivio/repubblica/1990/11/06/orlando-ha-deciso-ora-lascio-la-dc.html [04.12.2016].

[78]Following another referendum 1993 against the use of PR for Senate elections, a new electoral law was passed in August 1993. 75 percent of the seats would be elected in single-member districts, while a PR system was used for the remaining seats (Bufacchi and Burgess, 1998: 152; D'Alimonte, 2005: 255–6). The DC, however, collapsed three months before the first election under the new system.

sent 50 percent of the party congress delegates was far from being a revolution of intra-party decision-making.[79] The remaining 50 percent (i.e. delegates from the DC's parliamentary groups and representatives from Catholic civil society organizations) still reflected factional conflict lines.

A second statutory reform of early 1992 focused on the electoral system. To facilitate internal decision-making, the party council members decided that the factional slate that would win between 45 and 60 percent of the votes at party council elections would get a majority bonus of 10 percent.[80] This, however, was unlikely to change anything. As shown in Figure 3.7a above, the plurality slate at national party congresses had only been able twice in the previous 30 years to win more than 45 percent of the votes.

As the Christian Democrats had been neither able nor willing to send a sign of renewal, the DC experienced a painful decline in the 1992 election. While the DC still managed to win a plurality, the fact that the DC's vote share fell under 30 percent for the first time in history was a serious wake-up call for a party that liked to portray itself as a people's party. It was particularly concerning for the Christian Democrats that they had substantially lost ground in its former strongholds. The DC lost most of its voters to the *Lega Nord* and Orlando's *La Rete*.[81] The *Lega Nord* won up to 29 percent and even became the strongest party in several Northern constituencies, whereas *La Rete* won 7.8 percent of the votes in Sicily (and no less than 25.8 percent in Palermo) (Bufacchi and Burgess, 1998: 30). The DC's losses were at least partially due to voters perceiving the Christian Democrats as an 'inadequate party to govern the changes' that had been unfolding in Italy and Europe.[82] It is fair to say that the factional conflicts within the DC had contributed to this negative public image.

---

[79] *Modifiche allo Statuto approvate dal Consiglio Nazionale.* Consiglio Nazionale, 09.-10.01.1992, p. 61, Art. 17, Democrazia Cristiana, Busta 1038, AGA.

[80] *Modifiche allo Statuto approvate dal Consiglio Nazionale.* Consiglio Nazionale, 09.-10.01.1992, pp. 61, Art. 20, Democrazia Cristiana, Busta 1038, AGA. The same rule also applied to the local, communal, provincial and regional party level.

[81] *Relazione del responsabile organizzativo sull'analisi del voto del 5-6 Aprile, Luigi Baruffi.* Consiglio Nazionale, 14./15.04.1992, p. 24, Democrazia Cristiana, Busta 1038, AGA.

[82] Ibid.: 24.

3.5.2 *Mani pulite* and the end of an era

In addition to the disappointing election results, the worsening economic situation and the escalation of Italy's most severe corruption scandal made clear that party reform was unavoidable. The economic problems exacerbated over the summer of 1992 and it was undeniable that Italy was now paying the price for decades of people entering politics 'because it was a financially rewarding profession' (Smith, 1997: 471).[83] There was increasing confirmation that the Christian Democrats, and the Socialist Party, had not only been involved in corruption and patronage but had completely lost control of the system they had created. Andreotti, who had been forced to cede the prime ministership to the Socialist Giuliano Amato after the election, confessed: 'For many things we did in the past, we deserve hell. May the Lord forgive us [...].'[84]

The extent to which the old factional leaders in the DC (and PSI) required forgiveness was revealed by the *Mani pulite*[85] or *Tangentopoli*[86] scandal (Wertman, 1995: 136; Smith, 1997: 483-5). While Andreotti and PSI-leader Bettino Craxi had been working together for years to resist prosecution, the prosecutors now possessed enough public support to act (Smith, 1997: 474). The investigations had initially been concentrated on Socialist wrongdoings in Northern Italy after Mario Chiesa, a Socialist from Milan, had been arrested while concluding a bribery deal. Yet, when Craxi, under pressure from the investigators, tried to put all the blame on Chiesa, the latter started to share his insights with the magistrates. In June 1992, the scandal reached the top-level of the Christian Democratic hierarchy when Giovanni Prandini, the DC's former minister of public work, and Severino Citaristi, the party's administrative secretary, were notified to be under investigations for charges of corruption (Furlong, 1996: 65).[87]

While it became clear that the old factional system was irreconcilable with ongoing party

[83] Even though most of the illicit profits went toward paying for elections, political favors and party administration (Smith, 1997: 471).

[84] D'Avanzo, G. 1992. 'E Andreotti ammette: Meritiamo l'inferno.' *La Repubblica*, 12.05.1992, Democrazia Cristiana, Busta. 990, AGA.

[85] Italian for 'clean hands'.

[86] An Italian neologism which can be translated as 'bribecity'.

[87] The investigations led to the arrests of around 500 Christian Democrats between 1992 and 1995, including Andreotti and Forlani (Wertman, 1995: 136; Ginsborg, 1996: 24–5; Smith, 1997: 483–5). See for more detail, Waters (1994), Della Porta and Vannucci (1994) and Di Nicola (2003).

success, factional leaders were unwilling to sacrifice their own influence. Abandoning factionalism would have meant demolishing their own power base within the DC. Suggestions, like the 'regionalization' of the party, which would have given more power to the DC's organizational branches in the Italian regions and made them, rather than factions, the key players in intra-party politics,[88] were not followed by concrete actions.

Instead, factionalism delayed a generational renewal that would have allowed the DC to show its willingness to cut ties with the corrupt past. When party leader Forlani offered his resignation at the first party council after the election,[89] he was immediately asked to continue to serve in this function because the other factional leaders were unable to agree on a successor.[90] The question who should lead the DC split almost all factions: De Mita was challenged in his faction by Mino Martinazzoli's Group of 40 (*I Quaranta*). The conflict between Franco Marini and Sandro Fontana divided the *Forze Nuove* faction. Scotti abandoned Gava's *Grande Centro*. Andreotti was challenged by the *andreottiani rebelli* behind Sbardella and Segni organized his followers as *trasversali* [transverse] (Leonardi and Alberti, 2004: 113).[91] As a result, the DC leadership canceled and postponed the next meeting of the party council and national congress as they wanted to avoid a public demonstration of their inability to elect a new leader. The national congress had last met in 1989 and was long overdue in mid-1992. The party council was postponed several times and, as a result, did not meet for six months (Furlong, 1996: 66).[92]

The fact that the party leadership could substantially delay party council and party congress meetings shows that it was not a high level of party institutionalization that undermined the DC's adaptability (cf. Kitschelt, 1994; Levitsky, 2003). In fact, the power to prevent delib-

[88] *Relazione del responsabile organizzativo sull'analisi del voto del 5-6 Aprile, Luigi Baruffi.* Consiglio Nazionale, 14.-15.04.1992, p. 26, Democrazia Cristiana, Busta 1038, AGA.

[89] *Relazione del Segretario Politico Arnaldo Forlani.* Consiglio Nazionale, 14./15.04.1992, p. 16, Democrazia Cristiana, Busta 1038, AGA.

[90] *Seduta del 14 Aprile 1992. Interventi.* p. 29; *Il document approvato.* p. 67, Consiglio Nazionale, 14.-15.04.1992, Democrazia Cristiana, Busta 1038, AGA.

[91] 'Gli uomini della Balena Bianca'. *L'Unita*, 18.04.1992. p. 4, Democrazia Cristiana, Busta. 990, AGA.

[92] 'Dc Consiglio il 10. Sinistra divisa.' *Corriere della Sera*, 05.06.1992, Democrazia Cristiana, Busta 1038, AGA; Fuccaro: 'De Mita Evita lo scontro e parla solo del governo.' *Corriere della Sera*, 21.09.1992; 'Il segretario dc: Perdo la pazienza'. *Corriere della Sera*, 24.09.1992, Segretaria Politica Sc. 240, ILS.

erative party bodies from meeting provided the party leadership with quite some autonomy. Its inability to translate this autonomy into party reforms was due to the entrenched level of factionalism in the party which emerged as a result of the dynamics predicted by my model.

When the Lega Nord replaced the DC as the largest party in Mantua in September 1992, factional leaders finally compromised on Martinazzoli as new party leader.[93] He had not been discredited by the corruption scandal and his power base in Northern Italy seemed useful to win back voters from the Lega Nord (Bufacchi and Burgess, 1998: 109; Leonardi and Alberti, 2004: 116).

The election of Martinazzoli, however, did not mean that a renewal of the party was now under way because the old factional leaders were not willing to step aside and accept reforms that jeopardized their influence. Andreotti, for instance, simply noted that the election of a new party leader did not mean that 'we all need to retire now.'[94] The old guard still had sufficient power to block, for instance, the regionalization of the party organization which, Martinazzoli hoped, would diminish factional power (Furlong, 1996: 66–7; Leonardi and Alberti, 2004: 111, 116). Moreover, when Martinazzoli tried reduce the size of the party executive from 48 to around 15 at the party council in March 1993, the established factional cadres made sure that their representation at the highest levels of the DC remained secure (Donovan, 1994: 79; Wertman, 1995: 144).[95]

While the Christian Democrats under legal investigation were ultimately excluded from internal deliberations, factional competition continued to block reforms (Wertman, 1995: 135). The long-awaited meeting of the Constituent Assembly in July 1993, the 'single most important effort to propel reform' (Wertman, 1995: 141), nearly ended in a complete disaster. Martinazzoli barely managed to keep the DC from splitting between modernizers and traditional factional elites (ibid.). Moreover, factional divisions crystallized among the reformists.

[93] Minzolini. 1992. 'Salta il triumvirato Forlani–Gava–De Mita.' *La Stampa*, 25.09.1992, Segretaria Politica, Sc. 240, ILS.

[94] Geremiccal. F. 1992. 'Sipario su notabili e rampanti'. *La Repubblica*, 14.10.1992, Segretaria Politica, Sc. 240, ILS.

[95] They ensured that the new rules still guaranteed that the leaders of the party's parliamentary group (e.g. Gava) and all former party leaders (e.g. De Mita, Fanfani) would remain ex-officio members of the national party executive. See Drioli, I. 1993. 'Martinazzoli prova a liquidare la vecchia Dc.' *La Nazione*, 23.03.1993. p.2, Democrazia Cristiana, Busta. 990, AGA.

Martinazzoli preferred a left-leaning course, whereas Clemente Mastella promoted a center-right coalition. Factional struggles prevented an agreement on electoral alliances for the local elections in November-December 1993 which was one of the key factors for the DC's vote share dropping to 11 percent (Wertman, 1995: 136–8, 144; Bufacchi and Burgess, 1998: 155).

With the old factional cadres preventing any serious change, there was little that had held reform-oriented Christian democrats within the DC. Segni had ultimately formed his own party in March 1993 and Ermanno Gorrieri left some months later to help found the Social Christians Party (Wertman, 1995: 138, 142, 147; Furlong, 1996: 68–9; Ginsborg, 1996: 32; Leonardi and Alberti, 2004: 114–7).

In short, factionalism continued to undermine the party's adaptability. In January 1994, when a general election was announced to be held in March, the DC was a mere shadow of its former self. Andreotti and other traditional leaders had left politics for good due to the investigations against them. Yet, they had been holding on long enough to block party renewal and to encourage reform-oriented groups to depart. In early 1994, the DC only included the two factions around Martinazzoli and Mastella. As the electoral system which had finally been passed in August 1993 encouraged parties to run as cartels, they ultimately split over the coalition strategy for the upcoming election. Mastella and his supporters left the party to form the Christian Democratic Center (*Centro Cristiano Democratico*, CCD). Martinazzoli transformed the remaining DC into the Italian People's Party (*Partito Popolare Italiano*, PPI) (Bufacchi and Burgess, 1998: 167–8; Leonardi and Alberti, 2004: 118; D'Alimonte, 2005: 257). However, this did not happen because the dynamics of the electoral competition made it impossible to hold the party together but because there was nothing left worth to be held together.

3.6 Conclusion

In conclusion, political actors were free to decide on the DC's organization in 1946 and they made what a posteriori might be considered the wrong choice for the organizational adaptabil-

ity of the party. The existence of ideologically and regionally distinct Catholic groups and the territorial decentralization of party formation imposed by the Allied liberation strategy had pushed for a regionally decentralized leadership selection. Actors, however, chose a centralized selection process. Party elites thus depended on networks across different organizational branches of the DC to get elected to the party leadership. This incentivized them to form factions. The first faction emerged in 1946 when Giovanni Gronchi and his allies tried to increase their chances at the upcoming party congress. Other minority elites followed their example once the centralized leadership selection had left them without influence. The resulting high level of factionalism was reinforced over time as factional leaders tried to change the internal playing field in their favor. While leaders of large factions tried to dump small factions, the latter sought to increase their influence by introducing PR for internal elections. The value of factional networks also encouraged party elites to engage in clientelism and patronage in order to incentivize party members and voters to support their faction. As factionalism thereby became not only useful to assume power within the DC but also to make money, factional competition became increasingly detached from ideology. Eventually, competitive factionalism spilled over from the national to the local party level and from intra-party to electoral and parliamentary politics as well as Italy's economy and civil society.

The high level of factional competition undermined the party's adaptability. It complicated intra-party decision-making, eroded parliamentary unity, contributed to governmental instability and made clientelism the dominant way of linking people to the party. Factional competition was therefore linked to the corruption scandal that discredited the DC in the early 1990s. When the transformations of the early 1990s challenged the DC to adapt, factional leaders were unwilling to accept any immediate compromises on their own power for the sake of party reforms. They delayed the urgent personal renewal, opposed any essential changes to the party's internal procedures and kept the DC from agreeing on electoral alliances which were essential under the new electoral system. As the DC's stasis made ongoing electoral success increasingly unlikely, reform-oriented party elites had little reason to stay. Splitting five times in three years, the DC ultimately ceased existing in 1994. Andreotti's prediction proved to be right: 'If it must break apart, the DC will not do so in two but in a thousand pieces, like a crystal' (quoted in Damato, 1979: 5).

Chapter 4

The ÖVP: Decentralized leadership selection and organizational rigidity

'... it is about cutting back the influence of the three previously dominant Leagues ... and the Land organizations .... Interests of less noted groups ... must be emphasized more within a new ÖVP*.' (Harry Himmer, 1990)*

4.1 Introduction

While the previous chapter has shown how a centralized leadership selection can undermine a party's adaptability by allowing for too much factional competition, the case of the Austrian ÖVP illustrates that giving no room to factions also weakens a party's ability to adapt to changing conditions. Facing changes in the social structure of the electorate and the rise of a right-wing competitor, the ÖVP's vote share declined from around 43 percent until the mid-1980s to 32 percent in 1990, 26.9 percent in 1999 and 24 percent in 2013.

Many scholars have highlighted the importance of organizational factors in accounting for the ÖVP's weak adaptability (e.g. Khol, 1980; Stirnemann, 1980; Müller and Steininger, 1994b; Ableitinger, 1995; Müller et al. 2004). My theory of organizational choices and adaptability adds to this research by embedding the Austrian case in a systematic comparative framework and by highlighting the party's decentralized leadership selection process as a key variable in explaining the development of the ÖVP. As in the previous chapter, my argument

proceeds in two steps. 1) The initially chosen decentralized leadership selection process did not incentivize party elites to form factions. In September 1945, party elites agreed that a large number of groups would enjoy ex-officio representation within the national party leadership. This included, among others, special interest groups, so-called Leagues (*Bünde*) which represented the interests of particular occupational groups, and of the party's organizational branches in the Austrian states (*Länder*). These groups autonomously selected their leaders who then took up their seats in the national leadership. Competition for leadership positions mainly took place within rather than across these groups. Consequently, party elites were not incentivized to build networks across party branches.

2) The low level of factionalism undermined the party's adaptability. Minority elites (i.e. those who did not have a power base within one of the League or Land branches) were excluded from intra-party decision-making. This alienated minority elites and their supporters from the party. Moreover, the guaranteed representation of majority elites from different organizational branches in the national leadership often entailed conflicts between them. This complicated the decision-making process and conveyed an image of disunity. Finally, its low level of factionalism deprived the ÖVP of the flexibility to appeal to voters and political cadres who reflected the diversification of occupations and political attitudes.

The chapter begins by showing why the ÖVP's organizational structure was neither a legacy of pre-war politics nor the result of the political structure in post-World War II Austria. I then outline why the ÖVP's rules to select its national leaders disincentivized majority and minority elites to form factions. I explain why the Leagues are not adequately conceptualized as factions and why the choice in favor of a decentralized leadership selection rather than choices regarding candidate recruitment and internal party financing explains best the low level of factionalism. I proceed by showing how majority elites benefited from structural factors, like the institutionalized cooperation between politics and the employer and labor associations, to reinforce the initial patterns of internal competition. I then outline how these patterns drove party elites' decisions to modify the party's organizational structure before specifying how the low level of factionalism undermined the party's ability to adapt to a changing environment.

4.2 The origins and consequences of a decentralized leadership selection

4.2.1 From illegality to the party of League and Land organizations

Tracing the decision-making process leading to the ÖVP's decentralized leadership selection process underlines that actors' pre-war experiences and the structural conditions under which party formation took place did not 'map unequivocally onto' the party's organizational format (Capoccia, 2015: 212). Negotiations and deals were needed to engineer a coalition in support of the ÖVP's League structure which only prevailed once all Land leaders also gained ex-officio representation in the national executive. Restricting our analysis to structural variables would leave us blind to these key episodes in the ÖVP's development and the remarkable skills of political entrepreneurs, like Leopold Figl and Lois Weinberger. The ÖVP is thus a good case to illustrate the analytical value the critical juncture framework has to offer in the analysis of political parties' organizational origins.

Felix Hurdes' idea to form a catch-all party which mediated between different social and political interests was surely inspired by his pre-war and war-time experience. Hurdes had been politically socialized in the Catholic youth movement during the 1920s in Vienna where he had experienced the tensions between the Marxist Socialists, the increasingly authoritarian Christian Social Party and the para-military Home Guard. These tensions had eventually culminated in violence, the replacement of democracy with an authoritarian-corporatist system (*Ständestaat*) and Austria's annexation by Nazi Germany in 1938 (Reichhold, 1975: 54, 62-3; Bruckmüller, 1995: 286-94). Hurdes wanted to save Austria from a similar fate after the war by forming a political party that should go beyond the Christian-Social Party's confessional appeal and integrate blue- and white-collar workers, farmers and the middle class (Reichhold, 1975: 32; Kriechbaumer, 1995a: 13-5).[1]

[1] Hämmerle, W. 2001. 'Der Letzte der Generation 1945'. *Wiener Zeitung*, 24.12.2001, URL: https://web.archive.org/web/20011224235210/http://www.wienerzeitung.at/linkmap/personen/hurdes.htm [30.04.2017].

Hurdes' organizational concept for his envisioned catch-all party, however, differed markedly from the ÖVP's ultimate structure. He had initially planned only to set up working committees for agricultural, labor and economic policy which would aggregate the interests of their respective constituency without interfering too much in the party's decision-making (Reichhold, 1975: 77). While they should be 'represented' within the national leadership (Reichhold, 1975: 77), it is unclear whether Hurdes was thinking about ex-officio members with full voting or only advisory rights (Ableitinger, 1995: 142-4). However, he sought a party 'which was to be represented by central [party] bodies' (Reichhold, 1975: 77) and not 'constituted along League (bündisch) lines' (Kriechbaumer, 1985: 146). This might indicate that Hurdes was planning on making central party assemblies, like the national congress, key arenas in the selection of the party leadership. The historical data, unfortunately, does not permit less speculation.

Hurdes' organizational concept started to be amended in 1939/40[2] when he presented it to his old friend Lois Weinberger (Weinberger, 1948: 92-3; Reichhold, 1975: 32). By that time, Weinberger was leading a group of former trade unionists (Weinberger, 1948: 94; Kriechbaumer, 1985: 50).

While Weinberger quickly endorsed Hurdes' idea, he expected labor leader Leopold Kunschak to 'gently show him the door' when he brought up the choice to either reach out to the socialists or the farmers and the middle class (Weinberger, 1948: 110). The reason was that, before the war, Kunschak had suffered under the dominance of agrarian and middle-class interests in the Christian Social Party.

While Kunschak agreed, to Weinberger's surprise, to turn toward groups situated at the political right rather than the left, he insisted that the influence of the different occupational groups should be formally built into the organization of the new party. This differed from the loose organization of the Christian Social Party. While the party had maintained ties to the farmers', Christian trade unionist and tradespersons' associations (Gottweis, 1983: 55; Ableitinger, 1995: 149; Bruckmüller, 1995: 228-9), their equal say had not been ensured in

[2]Kriechbaumer (1995a: 14) dates the first meeting in mid-1939, whereas Weinberger (1948: 87) recalled that it happened 'at some point after 1940.'

the party's decision-making bodies (Boyer, 1981: 351; 2010: 323-4; Müller, 1994: 56). This had led to the marginalization of labor interests which Kunschak wanted to avoid in the new party (Kriechbaumer, 1985: 52).

Thus, plans for organizing occupational groups at all levels of the ÖVP originated from political calculations by Weinberger and Kunschak before they had even contacted representatives of the farmers and the middle class (Weinberger, 1948: 112; Kriechbaumer, 1985: 52). The ÖVP's League structure had therefore neither been an institutional legacy of the Christian Social Party nor been imposed by the context of party formation (compare Capoccia, 2015: 206-8; 219-20).

Gaining the support of the farmers for this project, however, proved to be difficult. Their most obvious spokesman, Josef Reither who had been president of the Chamber of Agriculture before Austria's annexation, was under nearly permanent observation by the Nazi secret police (Weinberger, 1948: 95-6; Kriechbaumer, 1985: 54-5). Prospects improved when Leopold Figl was released from Dachau in May 1943. Figl, who had been director of the farmers' association in Lower Austria (Kriechbaumer, 1985: 55), had some freedom to travel thanks to his job as a road engineer (Kriechbaumer, 1985: 55-6).[3] This allowed Weinberger and Hurdes to meet Figl (ibid.: 57). At Easter 1944, they agreed to 1) re-establish the farmers' association and 2) to integrate it within the structure of a new people's party (Reichhold, 1975: 59).

To improve the chances of their new party, Figl, Weinberger and Hurdes wanted to prevent the re-emergence of the Rural Federation Party (*Landbund*) (Kriechbaumer, 1995a: 20; 1995b: 87). Figl managed to convince its former leader, Vinzenz Schumy, to join their party and to accept Figl's farmers' association as the only representation of agricultural interests within the new organization (Kriechbaumer, 1985: 143; 1995a: 20).

This left the middle class as the only targeted group whose support had not yet been ensured. A potential representative of this group was Julius Raab who had been a member of the Federal Economic Council (Kriechbaumer, 1985: 55). Hurdes and Weinberger had initial

[3]'Die Konstituierung als gesamtösterreichische Partei.' In *Von der Lagerstraße zum Ballhausplatz. Quellen zur Gründungs- und Frühgeschichte der ÖVP 1938-1949*, ed. Robert Kriechbaumer, 1995b, Salzburg: IT-Verlag, pp. 114-6.

reservations about Raab given the latter's political career in the authoritarian *Ständestaat* (Kriechbaumer, 1985: 56, 60-2). Raab's network and reputation, however, was important for the new party. While Raab kept his distance from Weinberger and Hurdes' activities in the Resistance (Kriechbaumer (1985: 55-6, 60; 1995a: 15-6), he agreed that the different groups would need to cooperate in order to defeat the Socialists (Kriechbaumer, 1985: 60).

Aware of the preparations to formally organize labour and agricultural interests within the new party, Raab began preparing an organization representing employers' interests. This differed from Raab's efforts before the war when he had aimed to integrate both employees and employers from the same occupational branch into a single association (Kriechbaumer, 1985: 62).

Consequently, when the ÖVP was constituted on 17 April 1945, its first leadership committee included representatives from all groups which the new party aimed to integrate: Kunschak, Hans Pernter and Weinberger for the Workers and Employees' League (ÖAAB), Figl for the farmers (ÖBB), Raab to represent business interests (ÖWB).[4] Raoul Bumballa, representing the liberal part of the Austrian resistance,[5] and Hurdes were the only members of the leadership board without a power base in the Leagues. Hurdes was thus relatively isolated with his hope to minimize the influence of the Leagues within the party leadership (Gottweis, 1983: 56; Ableitinger, 1995: 143).

The ÖVP's League structure therefore predated the re-establishment of a neo-corporatist structure for the Austrian state which underlines that the ÖVP did not adapt it to align its organization with the structure of the political system (cf. Bruckmüller, 1995: 286-94). In fact, the re-establishment of the Austrian Chamber of Labor, Chamber of Agriculture and Federal Economic Chamber in August 1945 and 1946 followed intense pressure from the ÖVP's Farmers' (i.e. Leopold Figl) and Business League (i.e. Julius Raab) (Talos, 1985: 60-6; Kriechbaumer, 1995a: 29). Rather than causing the ÖVP's League structure, the occupational Chambers in 1945/6 were thus, at least partially, endogenous to the Leagues' interests. Re-

[4]The ÖAAB, ÖBB and ÖWB were founded on 09 and 12 April and 08 May 1945 respectively (Kriechbaumer, 1995a: 18).

[5]The group around Bumballa had joined the ÖVP shortly before the latter's constitution (Kriechbaumer, 1995b: 87). On the Austrian resistance, see Rauchensteiner (1979: 58-70) and Kriechbaumer (1985: 118-42).

establishing the occupational Chambers, in turn, was the foundation for the development of the neo-corporatist system in the 1950s and 1960s (Talos, 1985: 60-6; Kriechbaumer, 1995a: 18).

The ÖVP founding fathers' willingness to accept a party that was organized along occupational Leagues was likely inspired by their personal background (Reichhold, 1975: 61; Ableitinger, 1995: 142). Figl's and Raab's former involvement in the farmers' association and the Federal Economic Council respectively has already been mentioned (Kriechbaumer, 1985: 55, 62). Kunschak had been leader of the workers' association (Blenk, 1966). Weinberger had worked as secretary of the employees' association and, from 1934 to 1938, as chairman of the trade union for employees in the banking and insurance sector (Weinberger, 1948: 88). In their view, a corporatist organizational structure was not discredited by its integration into the authoritarian Ständestaat (Weinberger, 1948: 52-69, 88; Reichhold, 1975: 52-4, 62-3). Instead, it was in line with Catholic teaching, like in *Quadragesimo anno* (1931), which had influenced their political socialization (Weinberger, 1948: 92-3; Reichhold, 1975: 32; Bruchkmüller, 1995: 290).

However, this does not explain why the League structure remained a constituent part of the ÖVP's organization when the party organizationally expanded to the entire Austrian territory. The Allied powers (i.e. Soviet Union, United States, United Kingdom and France) had divided Austria into four occupation zones (Rauchensteiner, 1979: 24-41; Figure 4.1). All decisions regarding the ÖVP's organizational format were therefore initially restricted to Vienna and Northeastern Austria which had come under Soviet control (Reichhold, 1975: 93).

The Christian democrats in the Soviet zone could not be certain that their idea to form the ÖVP, not to speak of their organizational choices, would be accepted nationwide. Contact with the Western Länder had stopped with the imprisonment of Hurdes, Figl and Weinberger in July 1944 and, once the war had ended, the Allies strictly prevented any traveling or communication between occupation zones (Reichhold, 1975: 100; Kriechbaumer, 1985: 62, 109-11, 144). The formation of competing parties in the Western zones was a serious risk for the Viennese ÖVP. Moreover, rumors were spreading that the Western Allies were considering establishing a provisory government and maybe even a separate state in the Western Länder

(Rauchensteiner, 1979: 66-7, 73-4; Kriechbaumer, 1985: 142-4; 1995a: 23-5; 1995b: 87-8).[6]

Figure 4.1: Austrian occupation zones in 1945

Data: World Stamp History[7]

After Raab had tried in vain to pass from the Soviet to the American zone, the ÖVP elites agreed on more dramatic measures to promote their organization. They chose Herbert Braunsteiner, the physically fittest member of their group, to swim the river Enns which formed the zone border.[8]

Braunsteiner had been equipped with a letter from Cardinal Innitzer asking the clergy in the Western Länder to help Braunsteiner. It was at this stage that the Church played an important role. While it upheld its decision from 1933 not to participate in party politics (Reichhold, 1975: 74), Innitzer's letter proved to be essential for Braunsteiner. Bishop Fliesser in Upper Austria and Bishop Rusch in Tirol importantly mediated between Braunsteiner and the local political elites (Kriechbaumer, 1985: 145-6).[9]

[6]They distrusted the provisory government set up by the Soviets because it did not include any representatives from their occupation zones and was based on a two-thirds majority for the Communist (KPÖ) and Socialist Party (SPÖ) (Kriechbaumer, 1995a: 23).

[7]URL: http://www.stampworldhistory.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/Austria-1945-Present.pdf [29.09.2017].

[8]Braunsteiner, H. 1997. 'So blieb mir nichts anderes uebrig, als die Enns zu durchschwimmen.' In *Demokratie und Geschichte*, ed. H. Wohnout, Vienna: Böhlau, pp. 80-6.

[9]Ibid.

Braunsteiner's report from his journey bears witness to how uncertain it was whether the Western groups would follow the leadership of the Viennese ÖVP. This underlines that the experience of corporatism and Catholic teaching did not have an unequivocal effect on the preferences of all actors involved in the process of constituting the ÖVP's organization.[10] As feared in Vienna, Western political elites had already started establishing their own organizations. In Tirol, former resistance partisans and members of the Christian Social Party had formed the Democratic Austrian State Party (Reichhold, 1975: 99).[11] Moreover, the Tirol People's Party, which was the name of the Christian Social Party in Tirol, discussed maintaining their political and organizational independence.[12] The Christian workers' association also expressed their reservations against joining the ÖVP.[13] In Salzburg, political elites had formally re-constituted the Christian Social Party and the Democratic Party had been formed in Carinthia (Reichhold, 1975: 96-7; Kriechbaumer, 1985: 145). In contrast to the ÖVP's Leagues, many Western organizations, like in Salzburg and Upper Austria, only included occupational working committees which did not participate in the decision-making at the leadership level (Reichhold, 1975: 94, 96).[14]

While the occupation zones and Austria's tradition of federalism[15] had surely encouraged such scattered power centers prior to the creation of a national party (Panebianco, 1988: 50-65), they did not automatically translate into the Land and League organizations gaining the right to autonomously select seats in the party leadership. Instead, it required four federal conferences between 23 June and 23 September 1945 for these groups to agree on a national party organization (Reichhold, 1975: 115; Kriechbaumer, 1995a: 24; 1995b: 89).

1) The first attempt to unite the different groups within the ÖVP failed on 23 June 1945 (Kriechbaumer, 1995a: 25). Many Western representatives feared that by joining the ÖVP,

[10]Ibid.

[11]*Programm der Demokratischen Österreichischen Staatspartei in Tirol. 15.05.1945*, in *Karl Gruber. Reden und Dokumente 1945-1953*, ed. M. Gehler, 1994, Vienna: Böhlau, pp. 38-40; *Quelle 84*, in Kriechbaumer (1995b: 140).

[12]*Major political developments*, in Kriechbaumer (1995b: 118-21).

[13]Ibid.: 119.

[14]*Bericht der Salzburger Volkszeitung vom 29.Oktober 1945 über den 1. Landesparteitag der Salzburger ÖVP*, in Kriechbaumer (1995b: 132).

[15]Bock, F. 1945. 'Das Problem des Bundesstaates.' In *Österreichische Monatshefte* (henceforth: ÖMH), December 1945, p. 97, KVV.

they would surrender themselves to Soviet control since the ÖVP was participating in the predominantly Marxist provisory government in the Soviet zone. Moreover, communication between the zones remained difficult.[16] The conference resulted in the establishment of a separate head office for the Western Länder.[17] It remained uncertain whether this would be the first step toward merging the Western organizations into the ÖVP or toward a separate political party (Kriechbaumer, 1985: 89).

2) Important progress had been made toward party unification when the Land representatives from Western and Southern Austria met on 29 July 1945. The Democratic Austrian State Party behind Karl Gruber had agreed to merge with the ÖVP on the condition that Gruber would become Foreign Minister after the first national election (Reichhold, 1975: 115-6).[18] Moreover, the Tirol workers' association had decided to join the new party after their leader Hans Gamper had negotiated the guaranteed representation of his group in the Land leadership of the ÖVP.[19]

However, it was still contested whether the representation of occupational groups should be organizationally entrenched at all party levels (including the party leadership). Salzburg's party secretary August Trummer wanted to integrate such special interests as mere expert committees rather than constituent pillars of the party organization (Reichhold, 1975: 97; Ableitinger, 1995: 146). It is likely that the delegations from Upper Austria, Lower Austria, Vienna, Burgenland and Tirol, which also included League representatives, foiled Salzburg's initiative.[20]

3) Yet, in the run-up to the third conference on 19 August 1945, Salzburg's position had won support among the Western delegates (Gehler, 1994: 75; Ableitinger, 1995: 146).[21]

---

[16] *Brief des OSS-Mitglieds Leutnant Lorenz Eitner vom 11. September 1945*, in Kriechbaumer (1995b: 154-5).

[17] *Quelle 86*, in Kriechbaumer (1995b: 141).

[18] *Quelle 84*, in Kriechbaumer (1995b: 140); *Protokoll über die Bundesländerkonferenz der Vertreter der ÖVP in Salzburg.* 29.07.1945, in Gehler (1994: 63).

[19] *Die Volkspartei*, in Kriechbaumer (1995b: 125-6).

[20] *Protokoll über die Bundesländerkonferenz der Vertreter der ÖVP in Salzburg.* 29.07.1945, in Gehler (1994: 60-1, 65-6).

[21] *Protokoll über die zweite Bundesländerkonferenz der ÖVP in Salzburg.* 19.08.1945, in Gehler (1994: 69-71).

4) To turn things around, leading representatives from the Viennese ÖVP (e.g. Figl, Raab, Weinberger) visited the Western Länder between 20 and 22 September 1945 to promote the League structure and organizational unity (Ableitinger, 1995: 147; Kriechbaumer, 1995a: 25). Their efforts benefited from the Allies' decision on 11 September to allow the nation-wide operation of political parties. They also invited representatives from SPÖ, ÖVP and KPÖ from all Länder to meet on 24 September to discuss the integration of the Western Länder into the provisory government and the date for the first national elections (Reichhold, 1975: 107).

As a result, the Land representatives chose to show unity at the fourth Länder conference on 23 September 1945 (Kriechbaumer, 1995a: 25). All Land organizations acknowledged the ÖVP leadership in Vienna around Figl and the representation of the Leagues in the national executive. In return, all Land leaders also became ex-officio members in the party leadership (Reichhold, 1975: 116).[22]

As the national party leadership ratified the ÖVP's first party statute in early 1946,[23] it is not surprising that the decentralized selection process changed only marginally. The leader of the women's movement became an ex-officio member of the national executive probably toward the end of 1945.[24] The fact that seven seats (i.e. 24 percent) were elected by the national party congress was presumably an attempt to appease Hurdes who still favored a stronger role for central party bodies. The data is not good enough to say this with certainty.

The key decision, however, remained that the selection of the party leadership would mainly take place within the different party branches (Table 4.1). 1) The party congress (*Bundesparteitag*) elected the party leader, party secretary, treasurer, an administrator for organizational development and two policy spokesmen as members of the national executive. 2) The three Leagues, 3) the women's movement and 4) the nine Land organizations autonomously elected their respective leaders who were ex-officio members of the national executive. The leadership selection was thus highly decentralized (Rae's fractionalization index: 0.89).[25]

[22] *ÖVP-Pressedienst 24.09.1945*, in Kriechbaumer (1995b: 157-8).

[23] 'Aus dem Leben der Partei.' *ÖMH*, February 1946, p. 208; Hurdes, F. 1946. 'Ein Jahr Österreichische Volkspartei.' *ÖMH*, April 1946, p. 269, both KVV.

[24] 'Aus dem Leben der Partei.' *ÖMH*, Dezember 1945, p. 129, KVV.

[25] The decentralized selection process was also reflected in the executive committee. It included, in addition to the party chairman and party secretary, the leaders of the Leagues and the women's

Table 4.1: Composition of national party executive (*Bundesparteileitung*) in 1945/6

Party branch	National executive seats
National congress	7
Leagues	3x1
Women's movement	1
Land organizations	9x2
TOTAL	29
Rae's fractionalization index	**0.89**

Data: Müller (1992: 76). As in the previous chapter, I adapt Rae's (1967) fractionalization index to measure how centralized the leadership selection process is. It ranges from 0 to 1, with higher values expressing a higher degree of decentralization (Rae, 1967: 58).

4.2.2 From a decentralized leadership selection to low factionalism

The rules that regulated the ÖVP's leadership selection established two essential arenas of intra-party politics: the party's Land and League organizations.

This entailed important dynamics for the two sets of party elites introduced in Chapter 2:
1) Majority elites: Actors who managed to assume leadership positions within their Land or League branch enjoyed guaranteed access to the party leadership. As they could take part in all important intra-party decisions, they had few incentives to form factions.

2) Minority elites: Actors who were not elected to leadership positions within their party branch did not have direct access to the party leadership. Their minority status would not have changed if they had cooperated with actors from other Land branches.

One qualification must be made in the case of the ÖVP which still corresponds to the dynamics predicted by my model. Party members were usually members of both a Land and a League organization. Being backed by, for instance, the Farmers' League in Lower Austria would have

movement.

thus helped minority and majority elites in Lower Austria in their efforts to assume/maintain the Land leadership. Consequently, majority elites, like Raab (ÖWB and Lower Austria) and Weinberger (ÖAAB and Vienna), built a power base within both a League and Land organization (Kriechbaumer, 1995a: 29).[26] This, however, did not encourage factional activities because forming networks that were organizationally reproduced across Land branches would not have been beneficial to assume leadership positions within their own Land branch.

Yet, one caveat needs to be discussed. The ÖVP corresponds closely but not perfectly to the ideal type of a party with a decentralized leadership selection process described in Chapter 2. While the vast majority of leadership positions were elected autonomously by the different Land and League branches, around 24 percent of the positions (seven out of 29 seats) were elected by the national party congress.[27] According to my model, we may thus expect minority elites to form factions in their attempt to win these seven seats.

Two points can be made in response to this. First, as predicted, minority elites tried to form factions. While Bumballa had been included in the national executive in April 1945 to attract former members of the resistance movement (Kriechbaumer, 1995b: 87), his future representation in the party leadership was not guaranteed as he lacked a power base within one of the Land or League branches. He tried to organize support by forming the 'Democratic Union' which can be considered the first step toward forming a faction.[28] The ÖVP's leadership selection process, however, made Bumballa's efforts likely to fail. To see why, let us recall, as outlined in Chapter 2, that the party congress included majority and minority elites from different party branches. To win the seats elected by the party congress, Bumballa's group would have needed to unite a share of minority elites across party branches and also win the support of some majority elites and their followers.

[26]'Aus dem Leben der Partei.' *ÖMH*, October 1945, p. 43, KVV.

[27]The de facto role of the party congress in selecting the party leadership was lower. While the party leader and the general secretary were important positions, the remaining five positions were mainly administrative in nature. However, I do not pursue this reasoning any further because my model presented in Chapter 2 does not distinguish between more and less 'important' members of the national executive but only focusses on whether they are entitled to vote.

[28]'Memorandum von Martin F. Herz vom 14. Dezember 1945 über die Österreichische Volkspartei'; 'Bericht des amerikanischen Geheimdienstes OSS vom 21. November 1945'; 'Bericht des amerikanischen Geheimdienstes OSS vom 03. Dezember 1945', all in Kriechbaumer (1995b: 351-3).

This brings me to my second point. As predicted by my model, majority elites were not incentivized to support factional activities because they enjoyed ex-officio membership in the party leadership. Even if supporting a faction had helped them to win the seven seats elected by the national congress, it would not have got them even close to a majority in the national executive. Moreover, engaging in factional activities would not have directly helped them to strengthen the network within their respective party branch. Such a network, however, was their power base and key resource in intra-party politics. Majority elites were encouraged to focus on strengthening their network within their own party branch rather than institutionalizing networks across party branches.

Consequently, an intra-party bargaining system which was not based on factional competition began taking shape which points toward the last requirement of a critical juncture. The choice in favor of a decentralized leadership selection was momentous for the low level of factionalism that followed. Party elites who wanted to gain influence within the ÖVP were required to build a power base within a Land or League organization. Viktor Müllner, for instance, who was, like Bumballa, a former member of the resistance movement, succeeded in gaining influence within the ÖVP by building a strong network within the ÖAAB and Lower Austria (Kriechbaumer, 1995b: 334).

The Land and League majority elites quickly established an organizational structure that allowed to communicate their positions to lower-ranked elites and the party's rank-and-file.[29] They thereby developed an organizational advantage that helped them to consolidate their influence relative to potential competitors. By October 1945, Land majority elites had formalized their influence by constituting leadership committees for the ÖVP's Land branches.[30] By the same time, the Farmers' League (ÖBB) had established a head office with different departments for organization, policy, media and culture as well as administration.[31] The Workers' and Employees' League (ÖAAB) and the Business League (ÖWB) followed suit.[32]

[29]'Die Bünde.' *ÖMH*, October 1945, pp. 43-5, KVV.

[30]'Aus dem Leben der Partei.' *ÖMH*, October 1945, p. 43, KVV.

[31]Ibid., p. 44.

[32]'Die Bünde.' *ÖMH*, November 1945, p. 28-9; 'Die Bünde.' *ÖMH*, February 1946, p. 208; 'Die Bünde.' *ÖMH*, August, 1946, pp. 500-1, KVV.

The ÖVP's high level of organizational entrenchment (Table 1.4) might thus have been at least partially driven by the initial intra-party playing field. It might be argued that the Austrian Christian Democrats did not have much of a choice than quickly to build a highly organized party if they wanted to prevent the SPÖ from winning the national election in November 1945. The so-called 'red threat', however, was not less pressing in the Italian context (Costalli and Ruggeri, 2016). Still, the Italian Christian Democrats built their organization at the subnational level much more slowly than the ÖVP (Panebianco, 1988: 123-30). My theory helps explain the different tempi of party formation. Unlike in the DC, majority elites in the ÖVP were incentivized to invest in and consolidate their network within their party branch in order to ensure their representation in the national party leadership.

My argument that the ÖVP has been characterized by a low level of factionalism starkly differs from previous studies which have considered the Leagues as factions (Müller and Meth-Cohn, 1991: 60; Müller and Steininger, 1994a: 89; 1994b: 2; Van Kersbergen, 1995: 28-9). I argue that the Leagues are not factions. First, the Leagues do not meet the conceptual criterion of a faction being an intra-party group which I have derived from the literature in Chapter 1 because they have maintained an autonomous legal status outside of the party. Second, the Leagues lack the flexibility that characterizes the establishment and rearrangement of factions and factional coalitions. Contrasting the ÖVP with the highly factionalized DC helps illustrate this point. The DC's branches at the town, municipal, provincial and regional level were the basic building blocks of the party organization. Factions were actors within and across these different arenas. As such, they could form, merge, split and disappear according to whatever alliance party elites were willing and able to form (Figure 3.5). The ÖVP's Leagues, in contrast, have not had this flexibility. Instead, they are more accurately described as basic building blocks of the ÖVP's organization. Any merger, split or formation of a League would have involved a substantive organizational reform of the entire party structure.

Even if we accepted the conceptually flawed view that the Leagues were factions, my model would still hold. It predicts that the initial rules for selecting the party leadership affect how likely factions are to emerge. In accordance with my model, no faction has been established in the ÖVP since the party introduced a decentralized leadership selection process in September 1945.

Factionalism has thus been low even though power in the ÖVP has been decentralized (Stirnemann, 1980; Gottweis, 1983; Kriechbaumer, 1995a; Müller and Steininger, 1994b; Müller et al. 2004; cf. Ceron, 2012: 110; Borz, 2017: 9). Candidate selection for parliamentary elections was initially controlled by the ÖVP's Land organizations (Müller, 1992: 102-3). Moreover, the national party organization initially depended on financial transfers from the League branches at the Land level. The latter also controlled the recruitment of party members who almost exclusively joined the ÖVP indirectly by becoming member of one of its Leagues (Müller, 1992: 46-8; Müller and Steininger, 1994b: 11-13). The national party, finally, was understaffed and under-resourced in comparison to the League and Land organizations (Kriechbaumer, 1995a: 29).

While it could be suggested that party elites did not form factions because there was nothing worth competing for at the national level, there is evidence that the decentralization of power in the ÖVP was endogenous to the incentive structure created by a decentralized leadership selection. By 23 September 1945, it had been decided that the party's national executive would mainly be composed of the Land and League leaders. This decision predated the discussion between the political parties and the Allies about the first post-war election, the candidate selection for this election and the ratification of the ÖVP's first party statute in early 1946. The party statute was ratified by the national executive where the ÖVP's Land and League leaders had a solid majority. While no minutes of the national executive meetings in 1945/46 are available,[33] it is plausible that the decision to provide the Land and League organizations with substantive powers was the result of their majority elites' attempt to consolidate their influence. This view is supported by Hurdes' comment in April 1946 that the ÖVP's statute 'had found a prosperous unity of healthy federalism and necessary central power, of an adequate independence of the Leagues and the clearly acknowledged primacy of the central party.'[34] The statement indicates that the balance of power between the Leagues, Länder and the central party had been a point of contention in the process of formulating the statute (Kriechbaumer, 1985: 146-7).

[33]It is only mentioned that a draft of the statute was discussed in February 1946. See 'Aus dem Leben der Partei.' *ÖMH*, February 1946, p. 208, KVV.

[34]Hurdes, F. 1946. 'Ein Jahr Österreichische Volkspartei.' *ÖMH*, April 1946, p. 269, KVV.

Moreover, theorizing the supremacy of the Land and League organizations relative to the poor material and personal equipment of the national party organization risks being misleading. It implies that the national leadership, on the one hand, and the Land and League organizations, on the other hand, were mutually distinct actors in intra-party politics (compare Kriechbaumer, 1985: 147; 1995a: 29). This, however, does not adequately reflect decision-making within the ÖVP. The same people who were leading the Land and League organizations were ex-officio members of the national party executive. We should therefore theorize the national party leadership not as an actor but as an arena within the ÖVP. The rules structuring the access to this important committee were an essential factor in intra-party politics.

The ÖVP's internal bargaining system started consolidating when conflicts manifested themselves along Land and League lines. For instance, when discussing the law on the formation and influence of works councils, Eugen Margaretha, a leading figure of the early ÖWB, noted in his diary: 'We had maybe ten rounds of negotiations and in-between again and again discussions between the ÖAAB and ÖWB. The latter were even fiercer than those with the ... SPÖ and KPÖ' (quoted in Bruckmüller, 1995: 297). The topic of controversy between the Leagues was not limited to the policy areas concerning their respective occupational groups, as already noticed at the 1947 party congress.[35] The influence of the Land organizations in intra-party conflicts should also not be underestimated since they filled 18 out of 29 national executive positions.

The need to reconcile between the different League and Land branches became a persistent feature of the ÖVP which indicates that the initial patterns of internal competition have persisted over time. The dominant role of the League and Land branches in internal decision-making was, for instance, debated at the national party congresses in 1951,[36] 1963,[37] 1972,[38] 1979,[39] 1980,[40] and 1995.[41] It also was at the core of the reform initiatives in the 1990s[42] and

[35] *Bundesparteitag*. 1947, p. 19/11,55/Mo/2 and 19 1220 kn1-2, KVV.
[36] *Bundesparteitag*. 1951, p. 84; 03.03.1951, pp. 109-39, KVV.
[37] *Bundesparteitag*. 1963, pp. 61-2, 135-6, 162-66; 20.09.1963, pp. 213-59, KVV.
[38] *Bundesparteitag*. 1972, pp. 27-41, 342-435, KVV.
[39] *Bundesparteitag*. 1979, pp. 11-25, 54-66, 93-5, 101-32, 139-40, 172-3, 195-212, KVV.
[40] *Bundesparteitag*. 1980, pp. 105-69, KVV.
[41] *Speech Wolfgang Schüssel*. 22.04.1995, p. 5, KVV.
[42] Himmer, H. 1990. 'Zeit und Mut zur Reform.' *ÖMH* 7, pp. 16-8; Wilfing, K. 1990. 'ÖVP-Reform an Haupt und Gliedern.' *ÖMH* 7, pp. 23-7, KVV.

2000s (Stirnemann, 1993; Müller et al., 2004).

4.3 Reinforcement of low levels of factionalism

4.3.1 Länder, Leagues and the Austrian state

As predicted, the status of the Land and League branches as dominant actors of intra-party competition incentivized party elites to strengthen their networks within their respective party branch by using the resources available to them. The initial patterns of intra-party competition thereby became deeply entrenched within the ÖVP and guided the experiences of new generations of party elites.

The Leagues strengthened their status within the ÖVP by becoming important links between the ÖVP and civil society. The aforementioned Austrian Chamber of Labor, Chamber of Agriculture and Federal Economic Chamber have served the purpose of representing occupational groups in the policy-making process. To determine the latter's interests, the Chambers have held elections. The campaigns and slates for the Christian Democrats have been organized by the Leagues.

Moreover, since membership within their respective Chamber has been compulsory for all working adults,[43] the Chambers provided the Leagues with an exclusive access to a large pool of potential members. This further strengthened their influence within the ÖVP because the Leagues' membership size affected their number of delegates at party meetings, like the national congress (Ableitinger, 1995: 157). Moreover, the more members a League had, the more legitimately it could demand more seats in the party leadership. An increase in their membership also provided the Leagues with more financial resources as the Leagues kept 90 percent of the membership fees (Müller and Steininger, 1994b: 13). All this confirmed the value of building a strong network within one of the League branches and helped introduce new members into the ÖVP's internal bargaining system.

[43]Except for civil servants.

Finally, the Austrian Chambers system has allowed the Leagues to gain political influence independent of their position within the ÖVP. In particular, the Farmers' and Business League benefited from the ÖVP's strength in rural Austria and among employers and businessmen to gain a dominant position in the Chamber of Agriculture and the Federal Economic Chamber (Gottweis, 1983: 56-7; Krammer, 1991: 373). It allowed them to influence policy-making even when they did not find much support for their positions within the ÖVP and even when the ÖVP was in opposition. This was due to the institutionalized consultations over economic and social policies between the three Chambers, the Trade Union Confederation and the government.[44]

Moreover, League and Land majority elites strengthened their intra-party network by rewarding new members[45] and supporters with titles[46] and jobs. The practice of allocating jobs has profited from many public companies, banks and insurance trusts being close to a political party in general and to a specific party branch in particular (Müller, 2000: 148; also Treib, 2012).[47] Majority elites also used their access to public resources to siphon off money for their own party branches which has been revealed by Land- and League-related scandals over the misappropriation of public funds, like the scandal around Viktor Müllner and the ÖAAB and ÖVP's Land branch in Lower Austria in 1966.[48]

The access to such sources of patronage and clientelism was enhanced by the system of power- and rent-sharing, known as *Proporz*, which the Christian Democrats and Social Democrats had introduced in December 1945. Governmental, administrative and other public-sector

[44]See Engelmann (1962: 657, 661), Talos (1982: 274-6), Müller (1985: 165), Pelinka (2009: 628-30) and Schambeck (2013: 34) on the so-called *Sozialpartnerschaft* system.

[45]Compare Silberbauer (1968: 23) and Müller (1989b: 337-41).

[46]Titles have been held in high esteem in Austria. It is not rare for a farmer to hold the title of a 'Councilor of the Economy', for businessmen to be called 'Councilor of Commerce' and 'Professor' is often used for all kinds of intellectuals and artists. These titles have usually been awarded by the relevant cabinet minister after conferring with the occupational associations (Müller, 2000: 148).

[47]For instance, the Raiffeisen banking group has had close ties with the ÖVP's Farmers' League and the Newag (i.e. Lower Austrian Electricity Corporation) has been close to the ÖVP's Land branch in Lower Austria (Müller, 2000: 148).

[48]*Biographisches Handbuch des NÖ Landtages und der NÖ Landesregierung*. p. 88, URL: http://www.landtag-noe.at/images/personen_ausschuesse/1921.pdf [24.02.2017]; 'Aufstieg und Fall des Viktor Müllner.' *Die Presse*, 05.02.2010, URL: http://diepresse.com/home/innenpolitik/zeitgeschichte/537896/Spendenaffaere_Aufstieg-und-Fall-des-Viktor-Muellner?_vl_backlink=/home/politik/zeitgeschichte/index.do [24.02.2017].

positions were allocated in proportion to the ÖVP's and SPÖ's vote share (Rauchensteiner, 1987: 539). Even after the ÖVP was ousted from the national government in 1970 (Table 4.2), the system prevailed at the Land level until the late 1990s. Seven of the nine Länder constitutions even included an article requiring that each political party, if it so desired (and it usually did), was included in the government proportional to its electoral strength (Fallend, 1997: 23, 25; 1999: 85). This system helped the Christian Democrats to remain almost permanently in government in eight of nine Länder and thereby provided them with contacts and resources (Fallend, 1997: 28).

Table 4.2: ÖVP participation in government, 1945 to 1970

Parties	Period	Cabinets
ÖVP, SPÖ, KPÖ	20 Dec 1945 to 24 Nov 1947	Figl I
ÖVP, SPÖ	24 Nov 1947 to 19 Apr 1966	Figl II and III, Raab I to IV, Gorbach I and II, Klaus I
ÖVP	19 Apr 1966 to 21 Apr 1970	Klaus II

Data: *Federal Chancellery*, URL: https://www.bka.gv.at/regierungen-seit-1945 [27.03.2017].

Hence, while close links between a dominant political party and the public and private sector helped to reinforce high levels of factionalism in the DC, similar structural conditions contributed to the reinforcement of low levels of factionalism within the ÖVP.

Similarly, while preferential voting played an important role in reinforcing the DC's high level of factionalism, no factions emerged in the ÖVP despite a similar electoral system (Müller, 1984: 84-5).[49] In fact, unlike in Italy, preference votes have played a negligible role in Austria (Table 4.3). Furthermore, while the ÖVP usually gained the highest share of preference votes relative to the remaining parties, preference vote campaigns were local, autonomous and short-lived endeavors which focused on an individual candidate in a specific constituency and election (Müller, 1989a: 684). In other words, they looked nothing like the factional machines organizing preference votes in the Italian DC.

[49]In addition to expressing a party vote, voters could rank or strike off some or all candidates on this party's list and thereby change the rank-order of the list (Müller, 1984: 85). In 1971, the option to rank and strike off candidates was replaced with voters having one preference vote (ibid.: 88-90).

Table 4.3: Preference voting in Austrian Lower Chamber elections, 1947 to 1986

Year	Share of valid votes in %	Party share of total PV in %			Share of party votes in %			Mandates allocated through preferential voting
		ÖVP	SPÖ	FPÖ	ÖVP	SPÖ	FPÖ	
1949	3.0	91.0	3.0	6.0	6.3	0.2	1.5	1
1953	4.2	93.1	2.3	4.6	9.5	0.2	1.8	1
1956	3.8	54.0	14.0	27.0	4.4	1.7	15.6	2
1959	0.2	72.6	21.0	6.4	0.3	0.1	0.1	0
1962	0.2	76.3	17.5	5.9	0.4	0.1	0.2	0
1966	0.5	79.0	18.0	2.9	0.9	0.2	0.3	0
1970	1.7	55.8	44.2	.	2.1	1.5	.	0
1971	1.1	48.3	46.7	5.0	1.3	1.1	1.0	0
1975	0.1	49.7	40.5	9.8	0.2	0.1	0.2	0
1979	0.1	44.9	45.1	7.6	0.1	0.1	0.1	0
1983	2.5	19.8	64.9	11.9	1.1	3.4	6.0	1
1986	2.7	37.5	32.6	19.6	2.5	2.1	5.5	0

Data: Müller (1989a: 675). 1959, 1971 and 1975: Only including ÖVP, SPÖ and FPÖ; 1970: Only ÖVP and SPÖ, excluding repeated elections in the Viennese constituencies.

To understand these different patterns of intra-party competition despite a similar electoral system, we need to look at the incentive structure created by the initial intra-party playing field. To recap, in the DC, factions' competition for preference votes started as a reaction to their lack of power in the party leadership. By contrast, majority elites in the ÖVP did not need this because their seat share in the party's national executive was guaranteed. As expected, they thus only occasionally campaigned for preference votes to correct for ill-designed party lists (Müller, 1989a: 678; Müller and Steininger, 1994b: 14). Minority party elites, in contrast, did not have ex-officio membership in the national executive and could have been incentivized to use the preference vote component to make their voice heard through the party's parliamentary group. Some of the cases where local notables ran a preference vote campaign may fit this pattern. However, as shown above, League and Land majority elites had benefited from their guaranteed representation in the national executive to introduce a decentralized selection process for parliamentary candidates. This reinforced the value of strong networks within party elites' own party branch as they were not only a prerequisite to assume leadership positions but also to be nominated as parliamentary candidate. This underlines that preferential voting is not unequivocally linked to high levels of factionalism

but depends on a party's pre-existing level of factional activities (cf. Cox and Rosenbluth, 1993; Cox, Rosenbluth and Thies, 1999; Morgenstern, 2001).

4.3.2 Organizational reinforcement before 1990

The low level of factionalism was also reinforced over time through modifications to the party organization. Like in Chapter 3, I use Capoccia and Ziblatt's (2010) episode analysis approach to study how and why party elites modified the ÖVP's organization and how this reinforced a low level of factionalism.

At the 1947 national congress, the party leadership succeeded in responding to criticism raised against the influence of the Leagues by delegating the deliberation over organizational reforms to a separate committee.[50] It was composed of majority elites from the League, Land and ancillary organizations and the national executive which also was the party body ratifying the new party statute.[51] In other words, those who had benefited from the organizational structure in place controlled the statutory modifications.

The new party statutes confirmed the existing playing field. 1) The few changes made to the composition of the national executive confirmed and even increased the level of decentralization. The party's parliamentary groups in the Lower and Upper House gained guaranteed representation in the national executive. In addition, the influence of the Leagues relative to the Land organizations was strengthened by granting the ÖAAB and ÖWB an additional seat each. The ÖBB even received four additional seats which reflected its initial importance for recruiting members, mobilizing voters and running the party (Reichhold, 1975: 172-4; Kriechbaumer, 1995: 18, 21). The Land organizations, in return, lost one seat each (Müller, 1992: 76). 2) Yet, the importance of networks within the Land organizations was confirmed by adding the Land party chairmen as ex-officio members to the executive committee (ibid.: 80).[52] 3) Moreover, the Land branches maintained control over the candidate selection pro-

[50] *Bundesparteitag.* 1947, pp. 19 1150kn1-19 1230 A2, 21 1220 A1, KVV.

[51] *Bericht des Ausschusses für Organisation, Finanzen und Personalpolitik.* Bundesparteitag 1947, pp. Mo 1-3, KVV.

[52] They were again excluded in 1951 before Land representatives were again included in 1958 (Müller, 1992: 80).

cess. While the national executive gained the right to veto the Land organizations' selected candidate slates, this veto could be overridden by a two-thirds majority of the Land branch executive (ibid.: 107).[53] 4) The Land organizations' influence in the party's decision-making was also accounted for by the introduction of the Land council. It was a coordinating committee that included the party leader, Land party chairmen and the highest ÖVP member in each Land government (ibid.: 84).

The importance of ties within one's own organizational branch was also confirmed at the 1951 national congress. While a motion suggested cutting the Leagues' power and another motion even demanded their disbandment, majority elites succeeded in getting these motions rejected.[54] The main controversy that emerged concerned the influence of the ÖAAB which underlined the importance of the Leagues within the ÖVP and the value of intra-branch networks. Lois Weinberger and others criticized the marginal role of the ÖAAB. They successfully demanded that the ÖVP representative in the Austrian Trade Union Federation, who was obviously a member of the ÖAAB, could be co-opted to the national executive.[55]

Moreover, by presenting it as a simplification and professionalization of the party's organization, Weinmayer gained support for reducing the number of executive positions elected by the national congress.[56] This meant a further decentralization of the leadership selection process. Also, the frequency of national congress meetings was reduced from annually to every two years and, in 1958, to once every three years (Müller, 1992: 96-7).

Additional statutory changes in 1958 even further disincentivized party elites from forming networks across different branches of the ÖVP. While a group of 50 congress delegates had previously been allowed to propose a motion at the national congress, this right was now reserved to the national executive and the Land, League and ancillary organizations (ibid.). Also, a party council was introduced which included majority elites from the different party branches (ibid.: 85). While its influence was negligible, it confirmed that the members of the national party bodies were predominantly chosen within rather than across party branches.

[53]It was reduced to a simple majority in 1964 (Müller, 1992: 107).
[54]*Bundesparteitag.* 1951, pp. 121-2, KVV.
[55]Ibid.: 114-5, 135.
[56]Ibid.: 111.

In 1959, it was proposed to reduce the Leagues' influence on the party's decision-making when the ÖVP received for the second time fewer votes, though not fewer seats, than the SPÖ (Müller and Steininger, 1994b: 14). However, the central party leadership continued to include League majority elites. Moreover, the suggestion to reduce the influence of the Leagues on the ÖVP's policy positions by introducing a party committee for each of the government departments was not realized (ibid.: 15). While the decision to put the League organizations in charge of collecting the ÖVP membership fees was aimed at improving the financial situation of the federal party organization, the latter continued to depend on transfers from its constituent organizations (ibid.: 14).

While the Land council was abolished in 1960 (Müller, 1992: 84), the Land chairmen had not needed it to influence intra-party decision-making as they had been ex-officio members of the national executive. Moreover, it was re-introduced that a group of around 40 delegates (i.e. ten percent of the delegates) could propose a motion at the national congress (ibid.: 97).[57] This, however, did not significantly incentivize party elites to form networks with actors from other party branches as the national congress elected only three positions of the national executive. Moreover, majority elites had hardly an interest in engaging in cross-branch networks because the members of the leading party bodies were still primarily selected within the ÖVP's Land and League branches.

Land and League majority elites continued to defend their conquered sphere of influence. In 1966, they fought off an attempt by some federal party leaders to grant the national leadership the right to nominate a proportion of parliamentary candidates in electable positions (Müller and Steininger 1994b: 16; Table 4.4).

Pressure to reform the party organization, however, increased as the ÖVP's electoral fortunes declined (Müller and Steininger, 1994b: 15). In 1967, the SPÖ became the strongest party in the ÖVP's stronghold of Upper Austria and opinion polls were indicating that the ÖVP was likely to lose the 1970 general election. At that time, Peter Diem and Heinrich Neisser (1969: 22-53), two party hopefuls, proposed far-reaching reforms.

[57] *Bundesparteitag.* 1963, p. 214, KVV.

Table 4.4: Main proposals and modifications of ÖVP party statutes, 1947 to 1967

Year	Modifications	Attempt	Proposal backed by	Effects
1947, 51, 58, 60, 63	Composition of the national executive and executive committee	Succeeded	Majority elites	Decentralized selection process and thus the value of intra-branch networks confirmed
1947	Land party executives could override newly introduced veto of the national executive over candidate selection Introduction of Land council Representation at national congress depended on Leagues paying membership fees to federal party office	Succeeded	Statutory committee	Land organizations kept controlling candidate selection Platform for Land majority elites to coordinate Attempt to improve financial situation of the federal party office failed
1951	National congress meets every two years instead of annually	Succeeded	Majority elites	Disincentivizing networks across party branches
	Abolishment of Leagues Decreasing autonomy of Leagues	Failed	Minority elites	Value of intra-branch networks confirmed
1958	National congress meets every three years and motions could only be proposed by national executive, Land, League and ancillary branches Introduction of party council	Succeeded	Majority elites	Discouraging networks across party branches No substantive effect
1960	Abolishment of Land council Leagues in charge of collecting fees	Succeeded	Majority elites Central party officials	No substantive effect
1963	Representation at national congress depended on Land branches paying fees	Succeeded	Central party officials	Financial situation of the federal party office improved slightly
1965	Ten percent of delegates could submit a motion at the national congress	Succeeded	Majority elites	Appeasing minority elites
1966	National executive nominates a share of candidates in electable positions	Failed	Central party leaders	League and Land branches continued to control candidate selection

However, majority elites within the Land and League organizations prevented any substantive changes. While an age limit on the holding of party and public office was adopted (Diem and Neisser, 1969: 39-40), a special majority was introduced to override it (Müller, 1992: 70). Moreover, Diem and Neisser's (1969: 51-2) suggestion to make the Leagues' seat share in the party's committees and parliamentary groups depend on the relative size of their respective occupational group in society was not realized. Diem and Neisser's (1969: 52-3) idea to explore organizational units that went beyond the territorial and occupational party structure was also not followed.

Table 4.5: Statutory modifications in 1969

Year	Modifications
1969	• Age limit for party and public office and special majority to override it • Increased representation of Land branches in the national executive and executive committee • Increased power of executive committee

Overall, the only noteworthy modification was an increase in the power of the executive committee as the national executive had grown to 57 members which made it difficult to yield decisions (Table 4.5). The executive committee, however, was enlarged from 19 to 24 members to guarantee the representation of all Land chairmen (Müller, 1992: 78, 81). A strong network within their respective Land branch thus allowed Land majority elites not only to gain representation in the national executive but also the executive committee.

Party reform returned to the intra-party agenda when the ÖVP was ousted from government in 1970 and the SPÖ won an absolute majority in 1971. Yet, while the programmatic reform process was based on mass participation by the party membership and resulted in a new manifesto in 1972, majority elites maintained a tight grip the organizational development (Müller and Steininger, 1994b: 17). The statutory committee, which assessed the different motions, integrated them into a set of suggestions for the national congress and had the right to speak last before the vote,[58] included majority elites from the different organizational branches of the ÖVP.[59] Consequently, profound reform proposals, like transforming

[58] *Bundesparteitag.* 1972, pp. 339-40, 418-33, KVV.

[59] *Referat des Generalsekretärs NR Dr. Hermbert Kohlmaier.* Bundesparteitag 1972, pp. 31-3, KVV.

the membership system (i.e. members would join the ÖVP directly and not via joining one of the Leagues), had no chance of being realized (ibid.: 17).[60]

Instead, the groups which the party had identified as playing an increasing role in deciding elections (i.e. youth, women and the elderly) were integrated into the existing League system (Müller and Steininger, 1994b: 17). The party's youth and women movement and the organization for the elderly received the same formal status as the Leagues in 1972 and 1977 respectively.[61] Their leaders thereby automatically became deputy party leaders and were, together with their general secretaries, included in the national executive and executive committee (Müller, 1992: 78; Ableitinger, 1995: 160). The internal power distribution, however, did not change significantly. The youth and women's movement had already been integrated in the national executive. The traditionally dominant Leagues (i.e. ÖBB, ÖWB and ÖAAB) even gained an additional seat in the national executive (Müller, 1992: 78). More importantly, the principle of gaining access to intra-party power by building networks within rather than across party branches was not put into question (Stirnemann, 1980: 397; Müller and Steininger, 1994b: 17-8).

The remaining modifications did not change the importance of forming networks within party branches. While primaries to select parliamentary candidates, initially proposed by Diem and Neisser (1969: 22-31), were introduced on a voluntary basis, the Leagues and Land branches ensured that this instrument never became very relevant (Müller and Steininger, 1994b: 18). Moreover, 15 policy committees were introduced which reflected in their composition the ÖVP's Land and League organizations. In practice, the need to compromise 'made decision-making extremely time-consuming' and often resulted 'in rather unattractive proposals' (ibid.: 19). Finally, while the number of ex-officio members in the executive committee decreased,[62] this did not change the incentive structure motivating the existing low level of factionalism because it was accompanied by a power shift back from the executive committee to the national executive (Table 4.6).

[60]Ibid.: 31. Also, *Bundesparteitag.* 1972, pp. 342-8, 353-60, KVV.
[61]Re-named constituent organizations (*Teilorganisationen*).
[62]*Bundesparteitag.* 1972, p. 361, KVV.

Table 4.6: Main statutory modifications between 1970 and 1978

Year	**Modifications**	**Attempt**	**Proposal backed by**	**Effects**
1972	Replacing indirect with direct membership system	Failed	Minority and some majority elites	Leagues confirmed as key actors
	Youth and women's organization given League status (i.e. their leaders and secretaries included in national executive and executive committee) ÖBB, ÖAAB and ÖWB gaining one seat in the national executive	Succeeded	Statutory committee	
	Land and League organizations published membership list New membership cards certified ÖVP besides League membership Membership fees collected by Land branches			Attempt to reduce importance of Leagues failed
	More centralized selection process of the executive committee			Unchanged incentives as power shifted back to national executive
	Formal increase in power of the national executive over party finances and candidate selection Possibility to conduct primaries to select parliamentary candidates			No substantive effect on intra-party politics
	Special majority for fourth/fifth reelection of party leader/MP			Attempt to encourage generational renewal with no substantive effect
	Introducing 15 policy committees which reflected in their composition the ÖVP's constituent organizations			Difficulty to reach compromise between the Leagues; often resulted in unattractive policy proposals
1977	Organization for the elderly granted League status	Succeeded	Ancillary branch for the elderly	Value of intra-branch networks reinforced

After the SPÖ's third consecutive absolute majority, ÖVP leader Josef Taus demanded a fundamental re-organization of the party in 1979 (Müller and Steininger, 1994b: 19). His proposal included:

1) Complete centralization of the leadership selection process at all party levels

2) The replacement of the Leagues with policy-specific working groups

3) Expanding the powers of the national executive

4) Replacement of the indirect with a direct membership system

5) Financial centralization

6) Nomination of 20 percent of the parliamentary candidates in electable positions by the national executive (Khol, 1980: 442; Müller and Steininger, 1994b: 20).[63]

While Taus' proposals were supported by many minority elites and by public opinion, they were rejected by the Land and League majority elites (Khol, 1980: 442).[64] Consequently, the proposals did not get enough support in the national executive and Taus resigned (ibid.: 443-5; Müller and Meth-Cohn, 1991: 52).

Alois Mock, leader of the ÖAAB and the party's parliamentary group in the Lower Chamber, took over the party leadership but attached conditions to his acceptance of the new role which resembled many of Taus' initial suggestions. Unlike Taus, Mock was 'willing to operate within the given party structure, maintaining strong contact with the heads of the Leagues and the regional [i.e. Land] party organizations' (Müller and Meth-Cohn, 1991: 52). He managed to convince the League and Land leaders to accept that the party members would be invited to express themselves on the most pressing reform questions (Khol, 1980: 443-53).[65] The ÖVP's first internal referendum provided Mock with such a strong mandate for most of his ideas that the League and Land majority elites could not resist (ibid.: 453).[66]

While the Leagues were so deeply entrenched in the ÖVP's organization that the referendum yielded a clear majority in favor of keeping them (79.65 percent; ibid.: 453),[67] the

[63] *Rede Bundesparteiobmann Dr. Josef Taus.* Bundesparteitag 1979, pp. 8-25, KVV.
[64] Ibid.: 12, also *Bundesparteitag.* 1979, p. 120, KVV.
[65] *Bundesparteitag.* 1979, pp. 55-6, KVV.
[66] *Bundesparteitag.* 1980, pp. 105-6, 115-69, KVV.
[67] *Bundesparteitag.* 1979, pp. 61-2, 93-5, 101, 115-7, 172-3, KVV.

adopted reforms seemed far-reaching at first glance (Table 4.7).

Table 4.7: Statutory modifications in 1980

Year	Modifications
1980	• Centralization of leadership election, while the internal structure of the party must remain respected • Introduction of an extended executive committee which includes, in addition to the executive committee, the Land party leaders • Abolishment of the party council • Possibility of holding intra-party referendums • All party members first join the party and then one of the constituent organizations • Introduction of a central membership register • National executive allowed to nominate ten percent of parliamentary candidates in electable positions • Introduction of an economic policy section in the party headquarters

Data: Khol (1980: 453); Müller (1992: 79, 82, 83, 85); Müller and Steininger (1994b: 19-21).

While my theoretical framework would predict the emergence of factions had the decision to centralize the leadership selection process been taken at the moment of party formation, it did not incentivize party elites to form factions in 1980. For 35 years, party elites had been incentivized to build strong networks within their organizational branch. These networks were not gone overnight. Majority elites could rely on their contacts, popularity and ties to woo the national congress delegates to support their candidacy. Moreover, they could support their leadership bid by referring to the entrenched practice of ensuring the representation of all Land and League leaders in the national executive.[68] Minority elites, by contrast, were required to establish alternative networks, i.e. factions, from scratch. This supports my theoretical prediction that timing and sequence matter in the path-dependent development of institutions. An event that would have initiated a different incentive structure if it had occurred at an early point on the path did not have such an effect at a later part of the sequence (compare Pierson, 2000: 263; Greif, 2006: 190).

In fact, the Land and League majority elites managed to introduce institutional precautions to prevent the importance of intra-branch networks from abating. The electoral committee

[68]Compare ibid.: 150-1.

that prepared and presided over the leadership elections was required to follow the proposals of the Land organizations for nine and of the League organizations for 12 of the 47 national executive seats elected by the party congress (Müller, 1992: 79). In practice, this guaranteed, at least, one executive seat for each of the nine Land organizations and two seats for each of the six Leagues.[69] Moreover, an extended executive committee was established which was placed in the party hierarchy between the national executive and the executive committee. The 24-member body included, in addition to the executive committee, all Land leaders and assumed the function of deciding 'questions of particular importance' (ibid.: 83). Moreover, while all members de jure first joined the party and then one of the constituent organizations, recruiting and maintaining regular contact with party members remained in the hands of the Leagues (Müller and Steininger, 1994b: 19).

Table 4.8: Statutory amendments, 1981-89

Year	Modifications
1986	Increase in the number of deputy party leaders from four to six
1989	Shift of power from national executive and executive committee to extended executive committee which was selected in a decentralized way

Data: Müller (1992: 76, 82, 93).

The continuing importance of strong networks within the Land and League organizations was also reflected in the statutory development until the end of the 1980s (Table 4.8). It was intra-party practice that the deputy party leader positions were held by the leaders of the constituent organizations. The decision to increase the number of deputy party leaders from four to six in 1986 thus further strengthened the representation of majority elites in the national executive and executive committee (Müller, 1992: 76, 82). Finally, the extended executive committee which was chosen in a decentralized way was practically transformed into the most important executive board in 1989. Substantive powers in terms of deciding on the party's strategies, finances, personal appointments, candidate selections and preparations for the national congress were shifted from the national executive to the extended executive committee. The latter, moreover, henceforth included ex-officio both the Land and League leaders (Müller, 1992: 76, 83).

[69] Ibid.: 148-49.

In sum, changes in the ÖVP's organization between 1947 and 1989 reinforced the importance of networks within rather than across party branches to gain representation in the party leadership. The ÖVP's organization thereby left little room for factional activities which undermined the party's adaptability.

4.4 Undermining party adaptability before 1990

4.4.1 Failed integration of minority elites

There was basically no alternative way for party elites to access party positions of influence than through building a strong support network within their respective Land or League branch. This pushed those out of the party who did not have such a power base. Bumballa and many of his resistance supporters, for instance, left the ÖVP in late 1945 to form their own party (Kriechbaumer, 1985: 161).[70]

Minority elites tried in vain to improve their situation by pushing for the institutionalization of new League organizations. In 1947, right-wing activists promoted the introduction of a separate League for the veterans after around 500,000 people whose involvement in the NS regime was judged as minor had been granted the right to vote in 1947.[71] Their attempt, however, failed due to opposition by majority elites.[72] Another attempt to introduce a right-wing League was made in 1949 when Ernst Strachwitz, who was the leader of the party's youth movement in Styria, and others formed the Young Front (Höbelt, 1999: 87-8). The ÖVP leadership initially supported Strachwitz' initiative and co-opted representatives of the Young Front to the party leadership because the veterans and NS sympathizers were also wooed by a new party, the Federation of Independents (VdU) (Reichhold, 1975: 190; Höbelt, 1999: 87). The ÖVP leaders' stance changed, however, because they realized that

[70] *Memorandum von Martin F. Herz vom 14 Dezember über die Österreichische Volkspartei*; *Bericht des amerikanischen Geheimdienstes OSS vom 21 November 1945*; *Bericht des amerikanischen Geheimdienstes OSS vom 03 Dezember 1945*; *Aus einem Schreiben des amerikanischen Gesandten in Wien, John G. Erhardt, vom 06 Oktober 1948*, in Kriechbaumer (1995b: 351-3).

[71] 'Bundesverfassungsgesetz vom 6. Feburar 1947 uber die Behandlung der Nationalsozialisten (Nationalsozialistengesetz).' *Bundesgesetzblatt für die Republik Österreich*, 17.02.1947, pp. 277-303, URL: http://www.ris.bka.gv.at/Dokumente/BgblPdf/1947_25_0/1947_25_0.pdf [17.03.2017].

[72] *Speech by Staatssekretar Graf, 19.04.1947.* Bundesparteitag 1947, p. 19 1230 A1, KVV.

the VdU was a similar threat to both the SPÖ and the ÖVP and did not challenge the ÖVP's dominant position (Reichhold, 1975: 190-1; Höbelt, 1999: 89, 95). Moreover, the Land and League leaders rejected the Young Front's attempt to downplay the ÖVP's Christian-social tradition (Reichhold, 1975: 190-1). Increasingly dissatisfied with its small share of influence, the Young Front broke with the ÖVP and formed its own organization in 1951 (Höbelt, 1999: 152; 2000: 125).

Minority elites continued to be side-lined. Majority elites, like Grete Rehor who was a leading member of the ÖAAB, warned that the ÖVP must not 'disintegrate into umpteen constituent organizations.'[73] While the Youth and Women's organization were granted League status in 1972, the leaders of both organizations had already been part of the national executive since the party's first congress. The ÖVP's organization for the elderly benefited from this decision and became a League in 1977 because majority elites could not make a convincing case for why the youth and women would gain League status but not the elderly.[74] However, subsequent attempts by associations like the Association of Austrian Academics (ÖAKB) and the Catastrophe Fund for Austrian Women (KÖF) to gain League status failed.[75]

Leadership changes were usually the result of shifting majority elite alliances (Reichhold, 1975: 210). For instance, when a new leader was to be elected by the national congress, majority elites tried to agree on a common solution during the meetings of the national executive. The meetings would be interrupted for talks among the delegates from the same League or Land to agree on their strategy. This is well-illustrated by the minutes of the national executive meeting on 14 June 1951. The Leagues were unable to agree on a successor for Leopold Figl. After Weinberger requested several breaks to consult with his colleagues from the ÖAAB, they finally settled on Julius Raab (ÖWB) as new party leader – on the condition that the ÖAAB would be allowed to nominate the party secretary candidate.[76]

Majority elites fostered this uneven playing field at the national congress. For instance, minority elites were not provided with a printout of the proposed changes to the party statutes

[73] *Bundesparteitag.* 1972, p. 400, KVV.
[74] Ibid.: 416-7, 420.
[75] *Bundesparteitag.* 1979, pp. 132, 135-93, KVV.
[76] *Bundesparteileitung.* 14.06.1951, KVV.

but needed to purchase a copy if they wanted to read the motions before the vote in 1963.[77] Important votes, like on the new party statute in 1972, were scheduled late in the evening which meant that many delegates did not attend the session.[78] Their alienation was summarized by Bernd Schlicher, an MP in the Styrian Land parliament, who exclaimed that 'a few other people . . . , very few, . . . still live in "democratic niches" within the party. . . . [O]nly when equality is established, it will be possible to identify with the party.'[79]

The ÖVP's decentralized leadership structure and resulting low level of factionalism was translated into a very exclusive leadership structure. Decisions were made by a closed circle of majority party elites without serious prospects for minority elites to participate.

4.4.2 Mediation problems between entrenched groups

The ÖVP's oligarchic leadership structure shows the ambiguity of the institutionalization approach (Kitschelt, 1994; Katz and Mair, 1995; Levitsky, 2003). On the one hand, the ÖVP has indeed been characterized by a high degree of organizational entrenchment which, as mentioned above, seems to have been, at least partially, driven by the type of resources that were valuable given the decentralized leadership selection. Moreover, party leaders were highly dependent on the support of their respective Land or League branch (Müller and Steininger, 1994: 24). On the other hand, party members and minority elites had few means to hold the leadership accountable. Moreover, the institutionalization thesis underestimates the extent to which the composition of the party leadership entailed problems for party adaptability. The ÖVP's decentralized leadership selection granted groups with quite different preferences guaranteed representation in the party leadership. Since their seat share was not up for grabs at national congress elections, like in the Italian DC, the competition between alternative views was replaced with the inherent necessity to compromise. My framework thus refines what the institutionalization approach would reveal about the ÖVP's internal dynamics.

The negotiations between Land and League majority elites were tedious and often did not

[77] *Bundesparteitag.* 1963, p. 153, KVV.
[78] *Bundesparteitag.* 1972, pp. 364, 377-8, 381, KVV.
[79] *Bundesparteitag.* 1979, pp. 110-1, KVV.

result in an agreement. Consequently, the ÖVP often conveyed the image of a divided party. Already in 1947, it was considered necessary to reiterate that 'public statements, also by League representatives, can only occur under the condition that they follow the premise of party unity.'[80]

While skillful leaders, like Julius Raab during the 1950s, managed temporarily to appease the tensions between League and Land organizations, such tensions were institutionally built into the way the ÖVP chose its national leadership. By granting similar representation in the party's highest committees to groups with often opposing preferences, a confrontation between them was inevitable. Indeed, conflicts between the ÖAAB and ÖWB has often characterized intra-party politics (Reichhold, 1975: 151-2, 195). Similarly, differences between majority elites from the ÖVP's Land branches in Vienna and Lower Austria, on the one hand, and those from the Western and Southern Länder, on the other hand, became a recurring conflict line within the party leadership (Reichhold, 1975: 208-9; Stirnemann, 1981: 436-42).

Conflicts between League and Land majority elites prevailed over time. Frustrated, Hermann Withalm, party secretary from 1960 to 1970, urged: '. . . I also need to say quite frankly that the party secretary cannot constrain his activities on simply adding the wishes of the constituent organizations and Leagues and on presenting the mere sum of th[eir] opinions. This would mean to confuse integration with summation.'[81] When discussing the same problem in 1979, MP Wolfang Blenk reminded that this was not only due to the behavior of the League leadership but also due to a lack of solidarity of the party's Land branches.[82] While party elites acknowledged that the failed integration of competing positions within the party contributed to the series of electoral defeats in the 1970s,[83] the Land and League leaders were not willing to compromise on their influence. The same problems that had been discussed at the beginning of the 1960s continued to exist.[84]

[80] *Hurdes, F.: Resolution des Ausschusses für politische Angelegenheiten zum Verhältnis von Bünden und Partei, 21.04.1947.* Bundesparteitag 1947, p. A3, KVV.
[81] *Organisatorischer Rechenschaftsbericht.* Bundesparteitag 1963, pp. 61-2, KVV.
[82] *Bundesparteitag.* 1979, pp. 94-5, KVV.
[83] Knafl, S. 1979. 'Primat der Partei – kein Lippenbekenntnis.' *ÖMH*, July/August, p. 36, KVV.
[84] *Bundesparteitag.* 1979, p. 93, KVV.

These conflicts occurred even though Land and League branches enjoyed far-reaching decision-making autonomy. This shows that decentralizing power in favor of subnational party elites does not necessarily make a party more adaptable if the institutional playing field does not solve the problem of aggregating their competing interests (cf. Wills-Otero, 2016).

4.4.3 The failure to integrate new social groups

By giving no room to factional activities, its rigid organization also undermined the ÖVP's ability to adapt to social change. In the first years after the war, including representatives of agricultural, business and labor interests in the leading party bodies might have enhanced the ÖVP's integrative power (Reichhold, 1975: 172; Gottweis, 1983: 57-9). Over time, however, the intra-party principle to grant a roughly similar seat share in all decision-making party bodies to each of the three Leagues failed to correspond to the declining proportion of farmers and self-employed people and the growing share of employees in society (Figure 4.2).

Figure 4.2: Occupational structure in Austria



Data: 1961: Statistics Austria (1964); since 1970: Statistics Austria (1995). Percent of working population. Self-employed and farmers including family workers.

Farmers and self-employed people were highly over-represented among the ÖVP representatives holding party or public positions, while blue- and white-collar workers were under-represented (Table 4.9; also Stirnemann, 1981: 418-25).

Table 4.9: Occupational structure, Austrian population and ÖVP in 1969

	Self-employed	Farmers	Blue-/White-collar workers
Population	5.5	10.0	44.2
ÖVP voters	8.0	22.0	32.0
ÖVP members	18.0	39.3	42.7
ÖVP party groups	23.4	35.7	35.7

Data: Deim and Neisser (1969: 44-9); Müller (1992: 46-8). Population and ÖVP voters missing to 100 percent: Unemployed or household; ÖVP members and party groups: Not including family members (ÖBB) and associate members (ÖWB) because they could be affiliated with several organizations (Deim and Neisser, 1969: 49; Müller and Ulram, 1995: 150-4).

Majority elites acknowledged that the under-representation of workers and employees was the party's 'death coming in small steps' and, as a result, increased the OAAB influence in the national leadership (Stirnemann, 1981: 433).[85]

However, the ÖVP's League system was ill-suited to capture the social diversification of the Austrian electorate.

1) The system of ÖAAB, ÖBB and ÖWB was built on the assumption of group homogeneity which did not adequately reflect the increasing heterogeneity among employees, farmers and employers. In other words, 'the Austrian population cannot simply be split into thirds.'[86] The ÖAAB was required to integrate civil servants, executive staff as well as white- and blue-collar workers. The ÖWB included entrepreneurs and representatives of multi-national corporations as well as local innkeepers and grocers. The ÖBB, finally, encompassed traditional farmers, alpine farmers, part-time farmers and smallholders.[87]

2) The power structure within the Leagues did not reflect the proportion of these groups in society. The interests of civil servants rather than white-collar workers dominated the decision-making within the ÖAAB (Müller, 1991: 236). Part-time and alpine farmers were marginalized relative to large- and medium-scale farmers in the ÖBB and the ÖWB predominantly represented the interests of self-employed people (Gottweis, 1983: 61, 65).

[85]Schutzenhofer, H. 1979. 'Praktische Politik fur den Nächsten.' *ÖMH*, September, p. 25, KVV.
[86]*Bundesparteitag.* 1979, p. 132, KVV.
[87]Ibid.

3) The classification of voters and party members in one of the three traditional Leagues became decreasingly clear-cut. Alois Mock acknowledged in 1979:

> 'Today, many farmers do not work anymore exclusively on their farm. For two, five, ten years, they have [also] worked in a factory .... To what extent are they still farmers? When should they be considered employees? Many employees ... engage in entrepreneurial activities. How should they be classified?'[88]

4) Moreover, the proportion of regular church-goers, one of the ÖVP's core constituencies, dropped from 30 percent in 1951 to 18 percent in 1989 (Müller and Steininger, 1994b: 6). In contrast, the ÖVP's League structure was not suited to appeal to the growing proportion of so-called post-materialists and progressive liberals (Gottweis, 1983: 65-6).[89]

Giving more room for factional activities seemed to be a necessity for the party to adapt. Analyzing the ÖVP's defeat in 1979, Ludwig Reichhold criticized the organizational rigidity of the ÖVP's League structure and noted that the ÖVP suffered from 'a lack of political dynamics.'[90] Peter Ulram recommended a 'strengthened manifestation of intra-party positions which should crystallize around political elites but not stick to the Leagues' limits of thought and actions.'[91]

However, attempts to abolish the Leagues or indeed create new formations that reflected more adequately the changes in the electorate failed, as discussed above. As Kurt Jungwirth, member of the Styrian Land government, acknowledged in his desperate pledge for reform: The Leagues 'are not abolishable.'[92] Proposals to make the Leagues' influence reflect the composition of the population, like by Diem and Neisser (1969: 50-1), were not pursued.

[88] *Bundesparteitag.* 1979, pp. 57-8, KVV.
[89] Wilfinger, G. 1979. 'Techbokratischer Zentralismus.' *ÖMH* May/June, p. 21; Jungwirth, K. 1979. 'Die Chancen der ÖVP.' Ibid., pp. 24-5, KVV.
[90] Reichhold, L. 1979. 'Krise und Chance der ÖVP.' *ÖMH* July/August, p. 23, KVV.
[91] Ulram, P. 1979. 'Progressive Mitte oder programmatische Mittelmäßigkeit.' *ÖMH*, May/June, pp. 28-9, KVV.
[92] Jungwirth, K. 1979. 'Die Chancen der ÖVP.' Ibid., pp. 24-5, KVV.

Figure 4.3: Identification with ÖVP, 1969 to 1990



Data: Müller (1992: 39)

The ÖVP's inability to give room for new intra-party groups championing the interests of relevant parts of the electorate contributed to cutting the share of voters identifying with the ÖVP almost in half between 1969 and 1990 (Figure 4.3).

It also contributed to an electoral decline relative to its political opponents (Figure 4.4). This impression was reinforced by a series of poor performances at Land elections between 1987 and 1989 (Müller et al., 2004: 147).[93]

Figure 4.4: ÖVP relative to SPÖ and FPÖ in terms of seat and vote share



Data: Federal Ministry of the Interior

[93]Exceptions include the successful presidential election in 1986.

Hence, by giving no room for factions, the party's decentralized leadership selection had alienated minority elites, given way to gridlocks between majority elites and failed to keep up with the changing social structure of the Austrian electorate. This culminated in a series of electoral disasters in the 1990s and 2000s.

4.5 Organizational rigidity and the fall of the ÖVP

4.5.1 Weak appeal to new constituencies and electoral decline

In 1990, the ÖVP lost more than nine percent and dropped for the first time in its history under 40 and almost even under 30 percent. The decline continued in 1994 (-4.4 percent) and, in 1999, the party fell to third place – behind the Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ; i.e. renamed VdU). While the ÖVP celebrated a vigorous comeback in 2002, this did not reverse the trend. Following dramatic losses in 2006, it declined to 24 percent of the votes in 2013 (Figure 4.5).

Figure 4.5: ÖVP vote share, 1945 to 2017



Data: Federal Ministry of the Interior

Of course, election outcomes are often influenced by short-term factors (compare Campbell et al., 1960). The popularity of SPÖ-candidate Vranitzky contributed to the magnitude of ÖVP-losses in 1990 (Müller, 1990; Plasser et al., 1991; Müller and Plasser, 1992). Moreover,

the ÖVP made mistakes in the 1990 and 1995 campaign (Ogris, 1991; Sully, 1995: 221; Hofinger and Ogris, 1996). In 2002, the Christian Democrats benefited from the implosion of its coalition partner (Luther, 2003: 139-44; Müller et al., 2004: 173). Finally, its recent comeback in 2017 might be largely due to the appeal of foreign minister Sebastian Kurz. Kurz became ÖVP leader after the party had polled under 20 percent in early 2017, was given full autonomy to select its national candidates and to run with his slate under the label 'List of Sebastian Kurz – the New People's Party (ÖVP)'.[94] While this strategy helped the party to win the election, the influential position of Land and League majority elites have remained entrenched within the ÖVP's organization.[95] It is thus not unlikely that the problems associated with the Land and League organizations will re-emerge now the election is over.

Short-term factors, however, are not sufficient to explain the long-term trend shown in Figure 4.5. This becomes particularly striking when contrasting the ÖVP's decline with the rise of the FPÖ. The FPÖ attracted large parts of the Christian Democrats' previous electorate throughout the 1990s (i.e. net shifts of 23 percent in 1990, 7.4 percent in 1994 and 10 percent in 1999).[96] The ÖVP had failed to build a stronghold among the new middle class. Not giving space for intra-party groups representing this growing and highly heterogeneous set of voters surely played a role in this (Plasser et al., 1991: 124; Sully, 1991: 77, 79).[97] Clemens Auer, head of the ÖVP's political strategy committee, admitted that new constituencies would have no reason to vote ÖVP.[98] In contrast, the FPÖ did not only manage to attract these constituencies but also gained among the ÖVP's core groups of shopkeepers and other self-employed (Müller et al., 2004: 149). Finally, the FPÖ's right-wing populist strategy, adopted under Jörg Haider's leadership, thrived on voters' dissatisfaction with the oligarchic structure and nepotism of Austrian politics to which, as outlined above, the ÖVP and its internal bargaining system had importantly contributed (Sully, 1995: 220-1; Müller, 2000b: 198; Müller

[94] Statista, URL: https://de.statista.com/statistik/daten/studie/288503/umfrage/sonntagsfrage-zur-nationalratswahl-in-oesterreich-nach-einzelnen-instituten/ [26.01.2017]; 'Steht mit Kurz der einzige Politiker auf der ÖVP-Bundesliste?', URL: http://diepresse.com/home/innenpolitik/5245487/Steht-mit-Kurz-der-einzige-Politiker-auf-der-OeVPBundesliste [12.09.2017].

[95] *Bundesparteiorganisationsstatut.* 02.07.2017, Art. 30-1, ÖVP head quarters.

[96] Data 1990: Plasser et al. (1991: 106, 127); 1994: URL: http://sunsite.univie.ac.at/Austria/elections/nrw94e.html; 1999: URL: http://www.sora.at/themen/wahlverhalten/wahlanalysen/nrw99.html [14.10.2017].

[97] Wilfing, K. 1990. 'ÖVP-Reform an Haupt und Gliedern.' *ÖMH*, 7, p. 25; Gatner, A. 1990. '7. Oktober 1990.' *ÖMH*, 8, p. 12, KVV.

[98] Auer, C. 1990. 'ÖVP neu?' *ÖMH*, 8, p. 13, KVV.

et al., 2004: 153-4, 157; Duncan, 2007b: 14; Luther, 2009: 1052-5).

4.5.2 Lack of leadership renewal

The ÖVP has suffered from being an 'oligarchy' in which 'several elites reign simultaneously' who 'do not want to win together but each for themselves.'[99] For instance, the ÖVP's 'attempts to attract voters from the large constituency of employees increasingly frustrated' the ÖWB (Müller et al., 2004: 160). For a while, it publicly contemplated splitting from the party, but the newly introduced four-percent threshold discouraged them from pursuing this plan (ibid.). The leaders of the ÖVP's Land organizations also increasingly emphasized their own agenda (ibid.: 160-1). The notorious conflict between the League and Land leaders often sent out contradictory signals to its various target groups which, as a result, were not well-received by any of them (Müller et al., 2004: 163-4).[100]

The ÖVP's oligarchic structure contributed to a lack of true leadership renewal. Surely, the Christian Democrats replaced their party leader seven times since 1989. Yet, most of the ÖVP leaders have been chosen as compromise candidates to satisfy the different Land and League leaders (Müller and Meth-Cohn, 1991: 60; Müller et al., 2004: 167). As the balance of power between the party's majority elites thus guided the selection of the party chairmen, a change in the person of the party leader did not entail the dynamic often associated with leadership change (cf. Harmel and Janda, 1994). Only occasionally, the Land and League leaders accepted the negative media coverage associated with a contested leadership election. When this happened, as in 1995 when Wolfgang Schüssel succeeded Erhard Busek, personal renewal was more substantive – also thanks to Schüssel's talent for mediating between the competing preferences (Ennser-Jedenastik and Müller, 2014: 72). Still, Schüssel was part of the same circle of majority elites. The same can be said about Schüssel's successors Wilhelm Molterer, Josef Pröll, Michael Spindelegger, Reinhold Mitterlehner and even Sebastian Kurz. All of them had had a power base in one of the Leagues. The ÖVP's oligarchic leadership structure thus persisted.

[99]Wilfing, K. 1990. 'ÖVP-Reform an Haupt und Gliedern.' *ÖMH*, 7, pp. 25-6, KVV.
[100]Gatner, A. 1990. '7. Oktober 1990.' *ÖMH*, 8, p. 12, KVV.

While political parties may initiate generational change at the level of cabinet ministers or MPs (Müller et al., 2004: 168), the ÖVP's record in this regard is also rather poor. One of the very few notable exceptions was the 1996 European election when the Christian Democrats nominated a popular TV journalist as their top candidate (Müller et al., 2004: 168). In general, however, the League and Land organizations continued to control the candidate selection (Müller et al., 2004: 159-60). Consequently, the ÖVP's parliamentary candidates continued to represent the entrenched distribution of power (Bruckmüller, 1995: 314; Ogris, 1995).

4.5.3 Losing party cadres and members

The ÖVP's weak adaptability has also been revealed by the party's failure to prevent the breakaway of minority elites. Repeating proposals discussed since the late 1960s, minority elites criticized the League and Land organizations' dominant influence and the ÖVP's failure to appeal to new constituencies. They presented the formation of factions as a way of integrating interests that had not been captured by the existing Leagues.[101]

While some majority elites agreed on the necessity of reform, they faced traditionalists who rejected any changes to the intra-party distribution of power. The federal deputy leader of the ÖAAB, Bertram Jäger, for instance, cautioned against the disintegrating potential of factionalism.[102] The supporters of the existing intra-party playing field ultimately won (Müller et al., 2004: 163-4). The selection process of the national executive was again decentralized in 1991 and the League and Land leader continued to dominate the party's decision-making process (Stirnemann, 1993; Bruckmüller, 1995: 314).[103]

Disillusioned by the ÖVP's failure to reform and the continuing dominance of the Farmers' League in his Land, Fritz Dinkhauser, who had been a leading figure of the ÖABB in Tirol, decided to leave the ÖVP and to form his own party.[104] While his List FRITZ failed

[101]Wilfing, K. 1990. 'ÖVP-Reform an Haupt und Gliedern.' *ÖMH*, 7, pp. 26-7; Himmer, H. 1990. 'Zeit und Mut zur Reform.' *ÖMH*, 7, pp. 16-8, KVV.

[102]Jäger, B. 1990. 'Reform der ÖVP.' *ÖMH*, 8, p. 17, KVV.

[103]*Bundesparteiorganisationsstatut.* 28.06.1991, Art. 27.1, ÖVP federal party office.

[104]See URL: https://listefritz.at/buergerforum [12.10.2017].

to make an electoral breakthrough at the national level, it gained 18.35 percent in the Land election in the ÖVP's former stronghold of Tirol (Luther, 2009: 1052).

The NEOS (i.e. The New Austria) were another party that emerged out of a group of discontent minority elites of the ÖVP and its Leagues.[105] The dissidents included Matthias Strolz who had worked for the ÖWB secretary Karlheinz Kopf, had been close to former ÖVP leader Busek and was one of the political hopefuls of the ÖWB. He was joined by, among others, Beate Meinl-Reisinger, a former staffer of ÖVP undersecretary Christine Marek and one of the initiators of a working group exploring an ÖVP-Green coalition.[106] The NEOS quickly became the focal point for many former members of the ÖVP, like for Nikola Dunig who had previously been spokesman of ÖVP leader Schüssel and is now the NEOS' party secretary.[107] Also below the leadership level, former ÖVP members are notably represented within the NEOS (Table 4.10).

Table 4.10: Composition NEOS membership

Former party membership	N	Percent
None	288	69.90
Liberal Forum	40	9.71
ÖVP	34	8.25
SPÖ	15	3.64
Greens	4	0.97
FPÖ/BZÖ	4	0.97
Others, several parties, no answers	27	6.56
TOTAL	412	100.00

Data: Bodlos and Ennser-Jedenastik (2017).

[105] Linsinger, E. 2013. 'Warum die ÖVP sich zu Recht vor den Neos fürchtet.' *Profil*, 11.02.2013, URL: https://www.profil.at/oesterreich/parteigruendung-warum-oevp-recht-neos-352329 [24.03.2017]; n.a. 2012. 'Neue Partei NEOS hielt Grundungskonvent ab.' *Die Presse*, 27.10.2012, URL: http://diepresse.com/home/innenpolitik/1306081/Neue-Partei-NEOS-hielt-Gruendungskonvent-ab [24.03.2017]; n.d. 2014. 'Nach dem Spindelegger-Abgang will sich die ÖVP erneuern wieder einmal.' 06.09.2014, URL: https://www.profil.at/oesterreich/nach-spindelegger-abgang-oevp-377869 [24.03.2017].

[106] See https://www.parlament.gv.at/WWER/PAD_83122/index.shtml and http://tools.neos.eu/vorwahl/beate-meinl-reisinger/ [24.03.2017].

[107] Pink, O. 2017. 'Von der ÖVP zu den Neos.' *Die Presse*, 19.08.2017, URL: http://diepresse.com/home/innenpolitik/5271430/Die-Menschen-hinter-den-Kampagnen_Von-der-OeVP-zu-den-Neos_Die [11.10.2017].

Losing parts of its liberal-progressive wing hurt the ÖVP in elections when these voters have mattered. For example, the ÖVP lost 21 percent of the voters who had voted for them in the 2009 European election to the NEOS in 2014 (Table 4.11).

Table 4.11: NEOS gains from other parties

Year	Election	ÖVP	SPÖ	FPÖ/BZÖ	Greens	Others	Non-voters
2013	Federal	5	2	2	2	12	2
2014	EU	21	6	13	15	26	18
	Voralberg	4	2	3	8	3	6
2015	Styria	2	1	1	5	5	2
	Burgenland	2	1	1	7	3	2
	Upper Austria	2	2	5	12	8	3
	Vienna	18	1	2	11	16	3
AVERAGE		7.71	2.14	3.86	8.57	10.43	5.14

Data: Sora. The NEOS ran for the first time in these elections and thus could not lose voters.

4.6 Conclusion

At first glance, dividing a party into different organizational branches and giving each branch a similar seat share in the national leadership might appear as a promising strategy to integrate all groups in the decision-making process and help the party adapt when political and social conditions change. My analysis of the Austrian ÖVP has shown that this is not the case. The Christian Democrats had decided to select their national leaders by primarily co-opting the leading elites of their Land and League branches. This decision entailed that intra-party competition has predominantly taken place within these branches and between the branches themselves. Under this system, factions, the flexible tool which party elites relied on too much in the DC to attract and coordinate supporters across party branches, were not useful. The resulting low level of factionalism was reinforced over time as majority elites who had benefited from the system in place dominated the process of organizational development. In the attempt to strengthen their network within their party branch, they also benefited from structural conditions, like the Austrian (neo-)corporatist system, the ÖVP's long-standing participation in federal and Land cabinets as well as available means of patron-

age and clientelism. Because similar factors have contributed to the reinforcement of high levels of factional competition in the case of the Italian DC, they seem to be better theorized as reinforcing rather than causal factors in theories of intra-party competition.

The complete absence of factions undermined the ÖVP's adaptability when the social structure of the Austrian electorate changed. Its organizational rigidity divided the party into winners (i.e. those who had a strong network within their party branch) and losers (i.e. those who did not). The ÖVP usually failed to integrate the latter in its decision-making which alienated many minority elites. Moreover, this oligarchic leadership structure often entailed conflicts between majority elites which could only be resolved by summing up rather than integrating competing positions. It also made the party highly static when the structure of the Austrian electorate changed.

Consequently, the ÖVP scored low on the indicators that I have established in Chapter 1 to measure adaptability. 1) It suffered a substantive electoral decline – a trend which the party has not been able to reverse yet. 2) For most of the past 70 years, the ÖVP has been ruled by leaders who depended on a power base in a Land or League branch. This tended not only to contribute to the reinforcement of existing patterns of intra-party competition but also prevented the extent of innovation usually associated with changes in the person of the party leader (cf. Harmel and Janda, 1994). 3) The absence of factions made the integration of groups that did not fall within one of the ÖVP's traditional Leagues ill-fated. Consequently, the ÖVP struggled to respond to its shrinking core constituencies by appealing to new constituencies. 4) The lack of reform also alienated former core supporters and even pushed dissatisfied members and minority elites out of the party.

Chapter 5

The CDU: Mixed leadership selection and organizational adaptability.

'Its European sister parties have often worked themselves into the ground over the consequences of secularization, scandals or the resignation of their great party leaders. Not so the CDU: So far the CDU has succeeded in coping with social change as well as scandals or leadership changes.' (Bösch, 2001: 7)

5.1 Introduction

As shown in the preceding chapters, a centralized leadership selection can undermine a party's adaptability by giving too much room for factional competition, whereas a decentralized leadership selection process can weaken a party's adaptability by allowing for no factions at all. This suggests that a mix of both procedures could yield the necessary balance between flexibility and rigidity in intra-party politics to help a party adapt to a changing environment. The case of the German CDU supports this.

The CDU successfully adapted to the profound transformations taking place in German politics in the early 1990s. After more than 40 years, the accession of the German Democratic Republic (GDR) to the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) suddenly entailed the challenge of integrating over 16 million new citizens and the remnants of an ailing planned economy into

a different economic and political system. While the CDU was ousted from government in 1998 mostly for failing to resolve the problems associated with reunification (Schmid, 1999), the party prevented a meltdown as experienced by the Christian Democrats in Austria and Italy. Following a reform of its positions and public image, the CDU has been again Germany's leading governing party since 2005 (Clemens, 2009; Debus and Müller, 2013).

As in the previous chapters, my argument to explain party adaptability proceeds in two steps:
1) The introduction of a mixed leadership selection process in 1950 initiated a moderate level of factionalism. Brought together by the constraints imposed by the Allies' occupation policies, it took the Christian Democrats five years to agree on how to organize their party. The national party leadership was ultimately selected by two party bodies: a) the national party congress, which brought together minority and majority elites from the party's parliamentary, Land and ancillary branches, and b) the smaller party council. The latter was primarily a meeting of majority elites delegated by the CDU branches in the German Länder. This system de facto provided majority elites from large Land branches with a secured access to the party leadership, while incentivizing majority elites from smaller Land branches and minority elites to forge alliances across party branches. The result was a level of factionalism that was higher than in the ÖVP with its decentralized leadership selection but lower than in the centralized DC. The CDU's moderate level of factionalism was reinforced over time.

2) The moderate level of factionalism reinforced the party's adaptability. Unlike the ÖVP, the CDU's internal bargaining system proved sufficiently flexible to integrate new groups of political cadres and voters. Relatedly, it allowed both majority and minority elites to make their voice heard within the party without degenerating into the DC's excessive factional competition. The CDU was thus well-equipped to respond to the rise of right-wing rivals, prevent party disintegration along denominational lines and adapt to the social transformations following the 1968 student protests and national reunification in 1990.

Following the structure of the previous chapters, I begin by showing why the CDU's rules to select its national leadership were not predetermined by Germany's division into occupation zones or its tradition of federalism. I then outline the link between a mixed leadership selec-

tion process and moderate factionalism. I specify why this link provides a better explanation for the CDU's level of factionalism than the focus on federalism or the Land branches' high level of autonomy. I demonstrate how the initial internal playing field guided party elites in their efforts to increase their intra-party influence which reinforced the moderate level of factionalism over time. Moderate factionalism rather than the decentralization of power or the CDU's initially weak institutionalization is essential to understand the party's high degree of adaptability.

5.2 The origins and consequences of a mixed leadership selection process

5.2.1 Structural divisions, political entrepreneurship and the formation of a national organization

Like in mid-1945 Austria, the Allies' decision to divide the country into four occupation zones encouraged the emergence of territorially scattered power centers which entailed the challenge of integrating them into a national organization (Figure 5.1; Kaack, 1974: 159; Panebianco, 1988: 116).

Moreover, the restrictions which the Allies imposed on the re-emergence of political parties influenced the range of actors coming together in the CDU. In the first five years after the war, party formation depended on the Allies' approval which was granted in the form of a license.[1] Party licensing began on 10 June 1945 in the Soviet occupation zone[2] and the other zones followed until the end of 1945.[3] The decision to license initially only one

[1]Forming a party without a license could entail capital punishment. See *Verordnung Nr. 12 vom 15. September 1945 der Militärregierung in Deutschland, Britisches Kontrollgebiet. 15.09.1945, Art. VI.*, in Flechtheimer (1962: 111-2). Full details of the primary data used in this chapter are provided in Appendix E.

[2]*Befehl Nr. 2 des Obersten Chefs der Sowjetischen Militärischen Administration, 10.06.1945*, in Flechtheimer (1962: 108-9).

[3]*Das Potsdamer Abkommen von 02. August 1945. III. Über Deutschland. A. Politische Grundsätze, Punkt 9, Abs. I–III. 02.08.1945*; *Verordnung Nr. 12 vom 15. September 1945 der Militärregierung in Deutschland, Britisches Kontrollgebiet, 15.09.1945*; *Verordnung Nr. 23 des Commandant en Chef*

Christian-conservative party incentivized many Catholics, Protestants, and conservatives[4] to overcome their pre-war fragmentation into separate parties (Ritter, 1990: 34-46; Kleinmann, 1997: 123-4).[5] While the joint trauma of Fascism may have further encouraged cooperation (Buchstab, Kaff and Kleinmann, 2004; Buchstab, 2005; Koecke and Sieben, 2010: 21; Walter, Werwath, and D'Antonio, 2011), it was the licensing procedure that closed off the formation of competing parties (Bösch, 2001: 52).

Figure 5.1: German occupation zones in 1945

Data: World Stamp History.[6] [31.07.2017].

Focusing on the Allied occupation policy, however, does not help much to understand the conflict lines that emerged within the CDU. The Allies had focused on their military, politi-

betreffend Gründung politischer Parteien demokratischer und anti-nationalsozialistischer Richtung im französischen Besatzungsgebiet. 12.12.1945, all in Flechtheimer (1962: 107-13).

[4]The British occupation authorities, however, quickly allowed the (re-)emergence of the Catholic Center Party and the German Party (DP) (Bösch, 2001: 52-3).

[5]While some liberals also joined the CDU (Kleinmann, 1997: 123-4), their anti-clericalism encouraged most of them to affiliate with the FDP (Bösch, 2001).

[6]URL: http://www.stampworldhistory.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/Germany-1945-Present2.pdf

cal and material interests rather than Germany's traditional administrative boundaries when deciding on the shape of the occupation zones and the re-established Länder (Mosley, 1950: 590-600; Sharp, 1975: 1). Quite different social and denominational groups thereby ended up in the same territorial unit (Schmid, 1990: 55; Bösch, 2001: 21-2).

Instead, the lines of conflict can be explained by the social, denominational and political background of the CDU's founding groups (Kaack, 1974: 177, 222; Bösch, 2001: 56; Von Alemann, 2010: 54).

1) Catholic and Protestant trade unionists, including Andreas Hermes and Jakob Kaiser, founded the CDU in Berlin and the Soviet zone in June 1945.[7] Their vision for the new party entailed the idea of 'socialism based on Christian responsibility' (Schwarz, 1995: 346). They found support among Catholic trade unionists behind Karl Arnold from the Rhineland (UK zone; Rovan 1956: 268-9; Kaack 1974: 171-2; Bösch 2002: 13). Their positions were also echoed by the founding circles in Württemberg and by Werner Hilpert's group in Hesse (both US zone) (Rovan, 1956: 274; Gurland, 1980: 40-6).

2) By contrast, middle-class and conservative Protestants in Northern Germany and Westphalia (UK zone) designed the CDU as an anti-Marxist union of the political right. They were led by Hans Schlange-Schöningen and Friedrich Holzapfel, both former members of the national-conservative DNVP (Rovan 1956: 272; Bösch, 2001: 40-5; 2002: 13).

3) In addition to Arnold's trade unionists, the Rhineland was also home to the centrist group around Konrad Adenauer, Léo Schwering and Robert Pferdemenges who had their roots in the pre-war Catholic Center Party. They asserted the creation of an inter-denominational catch-all party (Rovan, 1956: 268; Bösch, 2001: 22-34).[8]

[7] *Aufruf der Christlich-Demokratischen Union Deutschlands (CDU), 1945*, in Mahler (1945: 11-5).

[8] Initially, a founding group also existed in Bavaria. The Bavarian Christian democrats, however, ultimately formed their own party, the Christian Social Union in Bavaria (CSU). See *Note by Dr. A. Zimmer*, 09.10.1949, 07-001-3201, KAS/ACDP. While forming an electoral alliance and a joint parliamentary group with the CDU since 1949, the CSU is an independent party with a distinct organization and internal bargaining system. Further on the CSU, see Mintzel (1977), Becker (1987), Schlemmer (1998) and Balcar and Schlemmer (2007).

However, while structural antecedents account for why the party was formed by a set of territorially dispersed actors, who these actors were and what they wanted, they do not explain why the leadership selection process was more centralized in the CDU than in the ÖVP. In fact, the occupation zones existed longer in Germany than in Austria and the German, unlike the Austrian, Christian Democrats differed not only in terms of their class but also their denominational background.

Instead, the influence actors expected to have in the new party drove the bargaining process and political maneuvering over the formation of a national party organization. We need to look at this process to make sense of the choice in favor of a mixed leadership selection process.

Having been the first to start party formation, Kaiser's left-leaning group made a bid for the party leadership (Schwarz, 1995: 346). They set up a national head office and invited representatives from the other zones to a national party meeting in December 1945 (Bösch, 2001: 61; 2002: 74). This meeting seemed to confirm their growing influence. An inter-zone committee was set up which was controlled by Kaiser's group and was meant to prepare the creation of a national organization (Kaack, 1974: 170).

The left initially benefited from the CDU in the British zone being divided. The latter included the left-wing group around Arnold and Hermes (who had moved to the British zone after conflicts with the Soviets; Schwarz, 1995 345), conservatives like Holzapfel and two opposing centrist camps behind Schwering and Adenauer (Rovan, 1956: 272).

Adenauer eventually emerged as the key challenger of the left.[9] Adenauer's rise was not to be expected in late 1945. In October, the British occupation authorities had released him as major of Cologne after only five months in office and even banned him from all political activities (Schwarz, 1995: 318-26). Yet, although the British occupation authorities, representing a Labour government in London, were more supportive of the CDU's left wing (Strauss, 1989: 107; Schwarz, 1995: 363, 367), they readopted a positive attitude toward Adenauer. This had to do with Adenauer not pursuing the territorial integration of all occupation zones because

[9]For detailed accounts of Adenauer's rise to power, see Weymar (1957), Putz (1975), Morsey (1971; 1979), Rovan (1987), Schwarz (1995), Bösch (2001) and Mitchell (2012).

he accepted, unlike Kaiser and Hermes, that the Soviet occupation zone was likely to take a separate path of development (ibid.: 319-20, 366). The British also valued Adenauer for his anti-Nazi past and his anti-communism (Foschepoth, 1986: 410-1; Schwarz, 1995: 293, 326-8; Bösch, 2001: 75, 193). The British change of heart entailed lifting of the ban on political activities which came just in time for party leadership elections at the Land and zone level.

At the Land level, Pferdemenges was working behind the scenes to strengthen Adenauer's position vis-à-vis Schwering who had been the Rhenish CDU leader. Considering Schwering unfit to lead, Karl Arnold was willing to back Adenauer. This alliance was confirmed when Adenauer invited all those whom he expected to support his leadership bid to his home for the occasion of his 70th birthday (Schwarz, 1995: 343, 347). Following further maneuvering to split Schwering's supporters, Adenauer became chairman of the CDU branch in Rhineland in early February 1946 (ibid.: 351).

Similar political maneuverings helped Adenauer to become the CDU leader in the British zone. His main challengers were Hermes from the left and Holzapfel from the right (Schwarz, 1995: 344, 348). Even before the decisive zone meeting in late January 1946 began, Adenauer had succeeded in excluding Hermes from the deliberations by maintaining that he and those who had left Berlin were not CDU members of the British zone (ibid: 349). Adenauer also outmaneuvered Holzapfel. As leader of the hosting Land branch (i.e. Westphalia), Holzapfel might have expected to preside over the meeting. Yet, just when the meeting was about to start, Adenauer walked up to the podium, sat in the seat of the chair and declared: 'I was born in 1876 so I am probably the oldest person here. If no-one contradicts, I will regard myself as president by seniority' (quoted in ibid.: 348-9). By chairing the meeting, Adenauer had room to outline why he was the ideal compromise candidate. His roots in political Catholicism appealed to the social-Catholic left, whereas his anti-communism and pro-capitalism made him acceptable for many conservatives. Also, Adenauer remarked that his advanced age would only allow him to assume the leadership temporarily (Bösch, 2001: 59). His strategy played out and he was elected CDU chairman in the British zone (Holzapfel becoming his first deputy) (Schwarz, 1995: 349; Bösch, 2001: 58).

He succeeded in consolidating his power by integrating the mutually opposing ideas of the

CDU groups in the British zone into a single program (i.e. the so-called Ahlen manifesto). He thereby satisfied his own supporters, while also increasing his popularity among workers and conservatives (Kaack 1974: 177; Schwarz, 1995: 368-75; Bösch 2001: 61-2; 2002: 18).

His power base in the British zone helped Adenauer to assume a leading position in the organizational development of the CDU at the national level (Bösch, 2002: 74-6). When the working committee of the CDU/CSU, which had replaced the inter-zone committee in August 1946, met some days after the proclamation of the Ahlen manifesto, Adenauer was elected as its provisory leader. While the leadership board also included Holzapfel and Kaiser,[10] Adenauer had succeeded in maneuvering himself in a powerful position regarding the formation of a national party organization.

A national organization seemed imminent in 1948 when, following intense negotiations,[11] the working committee adopted a formal set of rules. Its statute included a congress (*Hauptausschuss*) which brought together delegates from the Land branches. Their number of delegates depended on their vote share at the most recent Land election and was not, as initially discussed, the same for all Land branches.[12] The congress should meet at least annually and elect the national executive.[13]

If the statute of the working committee had guided the national organization of the CDU, the party's leadership selection process would have been highly centralized.[14]

Yet, as long as Adenauer had not secured his leadership and enforced his political views, creating a national organization with a central leadership entailed the risk of his opponents

[10] *Arbeitsgemeinschaft der CDU/CSU.* 05.-06.02.1947, pp. 3-4, 01-021, KAS/ACDP.

[11] *Protokoll der Sitzung des Organisations-Ausschusses.* 12.10.1948, p. 2; *Vertrauliche Informationen Nr. 12. Auszug aus dem Protokoll über die Sitzung des Vorstandes der Arbeitsgemeinschaft vom 24. September 1948.* 24.09.1948; *Letter from Dr. Lenz*, 13.11.1948; *Letter from Dörpinghaus*, 13.11.1948, all 01-021, KAS/ACDP.

[12] *Statut des Arbeitskreises der Landesverbände des westlichen Besatzungsgebietes und Berlins in der Arbeitsgemeinschaft CDU/CSU.* September 1948, Art. 3, 07-001-14001, KAS/ACDP.

[13] *Statut der Arbeitsgemeinschaft der CDU/CSU Deutschlands.* October 1948, Art. 2-6, 07-001-14001, KAS/ACDP.

[14] Rae's fractionalization index: 0.00. To recap, I adapt Rae's (1967: 58) fractionalization index to measure how centralized the leadership selection process is. It ranges from 0 to 1. Higher values express a higher degree of decentralization.

gaining control. While Holzapfel was initially a loyal deputy to Adenauer in the British zone (Schwarz, 1995: 437), the left around Kaiser, Arnold and the trade unionist Johannes Albers remained a powerful rival. They enjoyed support among the occupation authorities, the CSU behind Josef Müller and the CDU's Land branch in Hesse (Schwarz, 1995: 362, 367).

However, Adenauer used his influence to delay the formation of a national organization and thus also the decision on how the CDU leadership should be selected (Bösch, 2001: 237-8). For this purpose, he forged an alliance with the CDU Land leaders from the Southwest (Bösch, 2001: 67). While they were skeptical toward Adenauer's own ambitions, they shared his skepticism toward a central party organization (Strauß, 1989: 104; Bösch, 2001: 68-71; 2002: 74-6).

Adenauer used the delay in national party building to promote his views on German reunification,[15] the CDU's economic program, the coalition format for the federal government and on who should become federal president and chancellor (Rovan, 1956: 264, 267; Schwarz, 1995: 369, 420-2, 437-44). While the Allies ultimately decided that the three Western zones and the Soviet zone would go separate ways (Schwarz, 1995: 369, 420-1), Adenauer enforced his position on all other conflicts through impressive political talent. 1) He gained influential allies, like Ludwig Erhard regarding the CDU's economic policies.[16] 2) Adenauer split rival coalitions by only inviting some of his rivals to informal meetings. For example, he only invited some supporters of a coalition with the SPD (e.g. Peter Altmaier,[17] Gebhard Müller,[18] and Werner Hilpert[19]) but not others (e.g. Karl Arnold) to the well-known Rhöndorf conference (Strauß, 1989: 111; Bösch, 2001: 91). 3) Adenauer was also very persuasive. He convinced Albers to accept a social market economy program on the ground that it was only a temporary response to current needs (Schwarz, 1995: 374). 4) Finally, Adenauer understood when it was necessary to compromise for the sake of his greater goals. He accepted, for example, Gustav Heinemann as minister of the interior to ensure the support of leading Protestants for his bid for the chancellorship.[20]

[15] Referring to the territorial integration of the occupation zones.

[16] Erhard was the popular Director of Economics of the Bi-zone (i.e. merger of the American and British zone in 1947).

[17] CDU leader in Rhineland-Palatinate.

[18] CDU leader in Württemberg-Hohenzollern.

[19] CDU leader in Hesse.

[20] For a detailed account, see Schwarz (1995: 352-448).

Once Adenauer had won on all these issues, he shifted from delaying to promoting the formation of a national party organization (Bösch, 2001: 253-4).

Adenauer's efforts to reach an agreement over the CDU's organization were supported by the fact that although the Christian Democrats had won the first national election in 1949, the result had been much closer than expected. This had to a large extent been attributed to the lack of a national organization (Kleinmann, 1993: 122-5).[21]

While this convinced many Land leaders, especially in the Southwest, finally to accept a central party leadership, they succeeded in partially decentralizing the leadership selection process (Kleinmann, 1993: 125). Consequently, the statutory draft proposed in October 1949 differed markedly from the one introduced for the working committee a year earlier. The election of the national executive was divided between two party bodies: 1) The newly created party council was suggested to elect seven executive members. The party council was mainly composed of Land majority elites whose influence in the leadership selection process it should guarantee. Each Land branch was entitled to two to eight seats depending on its electoral strength at the most recent Bundestag election.[22] 2) The national congress was proposed to elect the party leader and deputy leaders. Adenauer wanted to introduce three deputy party leaders to have an additional ally in the national executive because the left and right were likely to receive a deputy position each (fractionalization index: 0.42).[23] Moreover, Adenauer sought to introduce the position of a party secretary who would oversee the activities of the Land branches (Bösch, 2001: 254).

Kaiser and Albers responded to Adenauer's advances by trying to include a representative of their group as ex-officio member in the national executive. Adenauer managed to foil this by convincing the Land leaders who voted on the statutory draft that the party's youth and women's movement would also not gain ex-officio membership in the national executive.[24]

[21] *Konferenz der Landesverbandsvorsitzenden und Landesverbandsvertreter der CDU/CSU.* 11.05.1950, p. 2; *Deutschland-Union-Dienst. Gründung der Gesamtdeutschen CDU.* 11.05.1950, 07-001-3204, KAS/ACDP.

[22] A membership-based allocation system would have marginalized the CDU branches in Protestant Länder.

[23] *Statutenentwurf der CDU Deutschland.* 09.10.1949, 07-001-14001, Art. 9, KAS/ACDP.

[24] *Konferenz der Landesverbandsvorsitzenden und Landesverbandsvertreter der CDU/CSU.* 11.05.1950, p. 3; *Konferenz der Landesverbandsvorsitzenden und Landesverbandsvertreter der*

This, however, backfired because the youth and women's movement then also demanded ex-officio membership which Adenauer's ally, Alois Zimmer, prevented by reassuring that the representation of both groups would be informally guaranteed.[25]

Land majority elites also tried to increase their influence in the leadership, as illustrated by the large number of proposed amendments to the initial draft.[26] The CDU branch in Hamburg, for instance, wanted to increase the number of executive seats elected by the party council from seven to ten.[27]

Given the pressure from the left and the Land majority elites, Adenauer accepted three modifications to his proposal. Firstly, he renounced his plan to introduce a party secretary. Second, the national executive would count 16 rather than only ten members and the party council would elect 12 instead of seven executive seats.[28] Finally, there would only be two deputy leader positions for which Kaiser and Holzapfel were nominated. Still, with his two main rivals becoming deputy leaders, Adenauer had cleared his path toward the party leadership (Bösch, 2001: 246).[29]

Thus, tedious negotiations rather than structural factors led to the procedure to select the CDU's national leadership. It combined elements from a centralized and decentralized selection process. On the one hand, the party congress (*Bundesparteitag*) elected the party leader and the two deputy leaders (Bösch 2001: 239-42). On the other hand, 12 executive positions were elected by the party council (*Bundesparteiausschuss*).[30] The party council was composed of the national executive and two to eight delegates per Land branch.[31] The Land delegates included the respective Land party and PPG leaders.[32] The leader of the party's national

CDU/CSU. 11.09.1950, pp. 3-4, 07-001-3204, KAS/ACDP.

[25] *Konferenz der Landesverbandsvorsitzenden und Landesverbandsvertreter der CDU/CSU*. 31.07.1950, pp. 2-7, 07-001-3204, KAS/ACDP.

[26] See the letters in 07-001-3204, KAS/ACDP. Also, *Protokoll der Besprechung des vorbereitenden Ausschusses der CDU/CSU*. 21.07.1950, ibid.

[27] *Letter Land branch Hamburg*, 20.06.1950, 07-001-3204, KAS/ACDP.

[28] *Konferenz der Landesvorsitzenden der CDU gemeinsam mit dem Vorbereitenden Ausschuss*. 13.10.1950, pp. 2-3, 07-001-3204, KAS/ACDP.

[29] Ibid.: 9-12.

[30] *Statut der CDU*. 21.10.1950, Art. 5, 7, KAS/ACDP.

[31] Ibid.: Art. 4.

[32] Ibid.: Art. 6.

parliamentary group (PPG) was an ex-officio member of the national executive (Figure 5.2).[33]

Figure 5.2: Selection process of CDU national leadership, 1950



The German Basic Law, adopted in May 1949, had not affected the decision-making process. It only required political parties to be democratically organized without specifying further organizational details.[34]

5.2.2 From mixed leadership selection to moderate factionalism

If federalism unequivocally dampened factionalism (Haungs, 1983: 49; Carty, 2010: 142-3), we would expect to see no difference in the level of factionalism between the ÖVP, where no faction has been established (Chapter 4), and the CDU because both Germany and Austria have been federal polities.[35]

We would also expect a similar level of factionalism if the extent to which control over candidate selection and party funds is (de-)centralized (Borz, 2017). The national party leadership had little influence on these matters in both the ÖVP and the CDU (Pridham, 1977: 246; see Chapter 4.2.2).

[33]Ibid.: Art. 9.
[34]*Grundgesetz der Bundesrepublik Deutschland.* 23/24.05.1949, Art. 21(1).
[35]In fact, if the federalism argument were accurate, the Austrian Christian Democrats should have been more incentivized to form factions because the level of subnational autonomy has been relatively weak in Austria (Erk, 2004; Obinger, 2005; Gamper and Koch, 2014; cf. Karlhofer and Pallaver, 2013).

In contrast to the ÖVP, however, several factions have emerged in the CDU and my model explains why.

My model makes two predictions about party elites' incentives under a mixed leadership selection process. Majority elites from branches whose representation in the national executive is secured will be incentivized to invest in strengthening networks within their party branch. In contrast, majority elites whose party branch does not control a guaranteed seat share in the national executive and minority elites are likely to form support networks across party branches. This incentive structure is likely to result in a number of factions that is higher than in a party with a decentralized selection process (e.g. the ÖVP) but lower than in a party with a centralized selection process (e.g. DC).

The CDU's process to select its national leadership yielded a very similar incentive structure:

1) The leader of the CDU's parliamentary group was ex-officio member of the national executive. Building a strong network within the PPG thus ensured representation in the party leadership. Moreover, the party council ensured the influence of Land majority elites in the selection of the national party leadership. Ties within party elites' own Land branch were therefore a valuable resource.

Yet, no formal guarantees existed in 1950 that ensured Land majority elites were represented in the national executive. Furthermore, the maximum number of delegates per Land branch was limited to eight which meant that no Land branch had a majority in the party council.

The extent to which this incentivized majority elites to form factions was influenced by how far majority elites could go by building on their intra-branch network. This depended on their bargaining position in the party council. The Land branches' number of seats mostly corresponded to their electoral strength in the most recent Bundestag election (Table 5.1 and Figure 5.3).[36]

[36] *Statut der CDU.* 21.10.1950, Art. 6, KAS/ACDP.

Table 5.1: Party council delegates by Land branch, 1951

Land branch	Number of seats	Land branch	Number of seats
Rhineland	8	North-Württemberg	4
Westphalia	8	Württemberg-Hohenzollern	3
Rhineland-Palatinate	8	North-Baden	3
Exile-CDU	8	South-Baden	3
Berlin	6	Brunswick	2
Schleswig-Holstein	5	Oldenburg	2
Hesse	5	Bremen	2
Hanover	5	Hamburg	2
Oder-Neiße	5		

Data: *Mitglieder des Parteiausschusses.* 01.10.1951, 07-001-703, KAS/ACDP.

Their impact on the CDU's performance in national elections did not only provide the (South-)Western Land branches with an edge in terms of party council seats but also made them such heavy weights that their majority elites were practically ensured representation in the party leadership. Their electoral strength also helped legitimize the claim of representatives from Baden-Württemberg to be represented in the party leadership.[37]

Consequently, their majority elites were incentivized to concentrate on strengthening their power base within their Land branch. They were thus unlikely to form factions.

This did not mean that they would not cooperate with other majority elites. Like in the ÖVP, majority elites talked to each other. These contacts, however, were not formally institutionalized. Majority elites from large Land branches mainly relied on informal rules, flexible networks and unofficial meetings when coordination was necessary to ensure their influence (Bösch 2001: 257, 262-7, 282; Hornig 2013: 90).

[37]Land branch boundaries have not always corresponded to the administrative Land boundaries due to regional conflicts. The Land branches of Rhineland and Westphalia-Lippe existed in North Rhine-Westphalia until 1982, the Land branches of North-Baden, South-Baden, North-Württemberg and Württemberg-Hohenzollern existed in Baden-Württemberg until 1972 and Hanover, Brunswick and Oldenburg continue to have separate Land branches in Lower Saxony (Kaack, 1974: 375; Schmid, 1990: 55; Bösch, 2001: 269-74).

Figure 5.3: CDU vote share in 1949 national election by Land



Data: Federal Returning Officer (*Bundeswahlleiter*).

2) The situation was different for the majority elites from the North(-western) Land branches, like Bremen, Hamburg, Hanover, Oldenburg, and Brunswick. While their majority position within their party branch guaranteed access to the party council, they had fewer delegates in this committee and could not build on a strong electoral record to justify their bids for national leadership positions.

Their incentives were mixed. In addition to maintaining a strong network within their Land branch which guaranteed their representation in the party council, they were incentivized to build networks with other party branches to make their voice heard. As predicted by my theory, they institutionalized this cooperation by forming the Soltau group (*Soltauer Kreis*). The Soltau group held formal meetings, had a spokesman and was generally more institutionalized and long-lived than the networks occasionally formed by majority elites from the

(South-)West.[38] It was, however, restricted to the six[39] Northern Land branches and consequently organizationally less reproduced at different party levels than the groups formed by minority elites.[40]

3) Minority elites could not be certain to be among the Land delegates to the party council at all. Their prospects of getting elected to the national executive depended on them either becoming majority elites in their respective party branch or building networks across party branches to pick up seats at the national congress. Attempts to establish factions were less ill-omened than in the ÖVP because, unlike in the ÖVP, majority elites from smaller Land branches were also incentivized to form, join or support factions.

As a result, four factions were established in the early CDU.

1) Linus Kather aimed to champion the interests of those who fled or had been expelled from the territories Germany had lost as a result of the war. While he was only supported by a minority in his Land branch in Schleswig-Holstein (Stickler, 2004: 212), the expellees and displaced people were an important minority group in the CDU's branches in the North- and Southwest (Figure 5.4).

In April 1948, he organized a nationwide meeting of his faction's Land committees and set up national headquarters. Soon, his group appeared like a 'party within the party' (Kleinmann, 1993: 110; Stickler, 2004: 212).[41] At the first party congress in 1950, the CDU recognized Kather's faction as the Land branch for the territories east of the rivers Oder and Neiße (later: OMV) and granted it five seats in the party council (Stickler, 2004: 212).[42] Kather

[38]Weger, E. 1969. 'Nach bayrischem Muster.' *Donauer Kurier*, 27.08.1969, press archives, KAS/ACDP.

[39]Hanover, Brunswick, Oldenburg, Hamburg, Bremen, Schleswig-Holstein (and later Berlin).

[40]'Verstarkte Zusammenarbeit.' *Union in Deutschland*, Nr. 38, 26.09.1968; Horch, R. 1969. 'In und um Soltau.' *Rheinischer Merkur*, 7.2.1969; 'Keine Landesgruppe Norddeutschland der CDU.' *Hamburger Abendblatt*, 15.08.1969; Weger, E. 1969. 'Der Traum von der norddeutschen CSU.' *Handelsblatt*, 20.08.1969; Weger, E. 1969. 'Nach bayrischem Muster.' *Donauer Kurier*, 27.08.1969; press archives, KAS/ACDP.

[41]The OMV is classified as a faction even though it is not present in the CDU's branch in the Saarland for historical reasons. When Kather formed the faction, the Saarland was not part of Germany as a consequence of World War II.

[42]*Statut der CDU Deutschlands*. 1950, Art. 6, KAS/ACDP.

was elected to the national executive.[43]

Figure 5.4: Proportion of expellees among resident population by Land



Data: Besser (2007).

2) Kaiser and Arnold can also be considered minority elites within the early CDU. Kaiser lost his intra-party power base after the Soviet authorities had dismissed him as CDU zone leader in December 1947 (Kaack, 1974: 177). Arnold had been elected governor of North Rhine-Westphalia in 1947 and was surely part of the CDU leadership circle in this Land. However, the CDU in North Rhine-Westphalia was divided into two Land branches. Conservative Protestants, like Holzapfel, were influential in Westphalia. The Rhenish CDU was led by Adenauer. Arnold's social-Catholic positions did not have a clear majority in either of the two branches.

As predicted, Arnold together with Albers formed a faction (called: Social Committees; later: Christian Democratic Employees, CDA) (Kleinmann, 1993: 97-8).[44] It had already been formed in 1946 when Adenauer's centrists and Holzapfel's conservatives had become the main representatives of the CDU in the British zone at the inter-zone level (Kleinmann, 1993:

[43] *Bundesvorstandsmitglieder 1950-1966*, URL: http://www.kas.de/wf/de/71.8954/ [05.08.2017].

[44] *Josef Block: Deutschlandtagung der Sozialausschüsse der CDU/CSU.* 03.-05.02.1950, press archives, KAS/ACDP. See Bock (1976) for more detail.

99-100).[45] Kaiser joined this faction shortly after its formation. He may have anticipated the development in the Soviet zone which put his intra-party influence in jeopardy. The CDA helped Arnold, Kaiser and Albers to mobilize support across CDU branches. National headquarters were established in Cologne and a group within the Christian Democratic parliamentary group was formed.

Even though their efforts to gain ex-officio representation in the national executive failed in 1950 (section 5.2.1 above), their factional activities entailed some important successes. First, Kaiser was elected as one of the two deputy party leaders.[46] Moreover, in the run-up to the first national CDU congress in 1950, the Land leaders around Adenauer agreed to recognize the old CDU leadership from the Soviet zone around Kaiser as the Exile-CDU and treated it as a Land branch of the party which was entitled to eight seats in the party council.

While the Exile-CDU was influential in the early CDU, it was a much less secure power base than Land branches with a similar seat share in the party council. The Exile-CDU was mainly a Land branch on paper. Its members were scattered across the Western Länder and also members of the CDU branch in the Land they physically lived in. Moreover, the number of people fleeing from the Soviet zone dropped dramatically over the years which entailed a problem of obsolescence and declining membership. Finally, the Exile-CDU did not compete in elections. Consequently, its number of national congress and party council delegates was, unlike for other Land branches, not based on public support which entailed legitimacy problems (Kleinmann, 1993: 235-7).[47]

Thus, Kaiser's influence within the CDU relied importantly on his network across party branches for which the CDA was essential.

3) A market-liberal faction (*Mittelstandsvereinigung*; MIT) emerged in 1956 behind Kurt Schmücker to support Erhard's social market economy against the CDA (Höfling, 1980a: 129-31; Haungs, 1983: 57-61; Bösch, 2001: 295-6; Dümig, Trefs and Zohlnhöfer: 2006: 110).

[45]'Zwischen Katzer und Gerstenmaier.' *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 24.03.1960, press archives; 'Hinter den Kulissen der CDU.' *National-Zeitung*, 04.02.1948, 01-021, KAS/ACDP.
[46]*Bundesparteitag der CDU.* 1950, p. 24, KAS/ACDP.
[47]*Bundesvorstand*, 03.06.1955, pp. 535-6, 543-9.

4) Furthermore, Catholic dominance in the allocation of party and cabinet positions and the formulation of policy positions frustrated many Protestants in the CDU. Building on informal meetings which had started in 1945, the Protestant Working Group faction (*Evangelische Arbeitskreis*, EAK) emerged in 1951 (Bösch, 2001: 320-1; Dümig, Trefs and Zohlnhöfer, 2006: 111).[48] The EAK successfully pressured to increase the proportion of Protestants in the party leadership (Bösch, 2001: 329).

At the same time, Land majority elites ensured that factional activities would not undermine their influence. When Kather sought to portray his faction as the sole intra-party representative of expellee interests, he was opposed by Land majority elites from the North- and Southwest where many expellees had settled because they feared for their sphere of influence. Their opposition helped to contain Kather's urge for expansion. While this ultimately pushed Kather to leave the party in 1953, his faction had been considered in the selection of the national executive. The established power base incentivized the factions' second-rank elites and most members to stay. They assumed the factional leadership and accepted their place within the CDU (Stickler, 2004: 212-35).

Moreover, while the driving force behind the emergence of factions was to gain representation in the national party leadership, majority elites also tried to control factions' expansionism. Policy fields were assigned to intra-party groups, like expellee policy to the expellee faction and social and labor policy to the CDA (Schmid 1990: 263-4; Bösch, 2001: 288). This also included some decision-making authority over the allocation of offices and portfolios. The employment minister has, for instance, traditionally been a representative of the CDA (Dümig, Trefs and Zohlnhöfer, 2006: 107).

In sum, as predicted, minority elites made their voice heard through factional activities and majority elites from smaller party branches also institutionalized cross-party branch networks. In contrast, networks within their own party branch were more valuable for majority elites from big Land branches than joining the factional game. The result was a moderate level of factionalism.

[48] *1. Tagung des Evangelischen Arbeitskreises der CDU/CSU*. 14.-16.03.1952, KAS/ACDP.

The CDU also included other organized groups, summarized as so-called associations (*Vereinigungen*) and special organizations (Table 5.2).[49] When applying the conceptual criteria of a faction outlined in Chapter 1.5.2, however, we see that only those mentioned above are factions (cf. Merkl, 1978; Dümig, Trefs, Zohlnhöfer, 2006).

Table 5.2: Associations and special organizations in the CDU

Name	Dimensions				Classified as
	Organization	Set of political goals	Reproduction at all intra-party levels	Unrestricted group formation	
CDA	YES	YES	YES	YES	Faction
MIT	YES	YES	YES	YES	Faction
OMV	YES	YES	YES	YES	Faction
EAK	YES	YES	YES	YES	Faction
JU	YES	YES	YES	no	Ancillary organization
FU	YES	no	YES	no	Ancillary organization
KPV	YES	no	no	no	Ancillary organization
SU	YES	no	no	no	Ancillary organization
RCDS	YES	YES	no	no	Ancillary organization
Pupils' Union	YES	no	no	no	Ancillary organization

JU: Youth movement; FU: Women's movement; KPV: local politics unit; SU: organization for the elderly; RCDS: university students' association; Pupils' Union: High school students' association. Data: Kleinmann (1993: 96-147, 208-17, 273-88); URL: http://www.cdu.de/partei/vereinigungen [13.04.2015].

[49]The CDU is also associated with the Federal Working Group of Christian Democratic Jurists, Christian Democrats pro Life, German-Turkish Forum, Lesbians and Gays in the Union, the Economic Council of Germany and the Health Care Policy Working Group of the CDU in North Rhine-Westphalia. Their insignificance in intra-party politics makes them negligible for the current study.

5.3 Reinforcing a moderate level of factionalism

5.3.1 Adenauer and informal leadership quota

Political entrepreneurship is undoubtedly important but its scope of action should be theorized within the institutional constraints under which leaders act. The creation of such a leadership space has been the main outcome of the process outlined so far.

The CDU's moderate level of factionalism had provided each set of party elites with a way of gaining power. 1) Majority elites from (South-)Western Germany could rely on the powerful position of their Land branches to access the national executive. 2) Majority elites from the Land branches in the Northwest benefited from their majority status to be delegated to the party council. If they were dissatisfied with their share of national executive seats they received via the party council, they could rely on factional activities. 3) This also provided minority elites with some potential coalition partners at the national party congress in their attempts to gain leadership positions.

This institutional playing field set the stage for Adenauer's skillful leadership. He saw that it would be almost impossible to ignore the different social and denominational groups when forming the national leadership. Adenauer thus often sought to strike deals before the party council and national congress meetings (Bösch, 2001: 239). He thereby promoted a well-balanced concordance system where positions were informally apportioned based on class, region and denomination (Bösch, 2001: 116, 245, 328-32). This was, for instance, reflected when the national executive granted a more elevated status to three executive members (i.e. *geschäftsführende Vorstandsmitglieder*) in late 1951: 1) Kurt Georg Kiesinger represented the Southern Land branches; 2) Robert Tillmanns was nominated for the Protestants and Northwestern Land branches and 3) Franz-Josef Wuermeling represented the Catholic Land branches in the Southwest (Kleinmann, 1993: 198).[50]

Adenauer's informal quota system helped to reinforce the CDU's moderate level of factionalism because it confirmed that majority and minority elites could gain influence thanks to

[50] The Western Länder were represented by Adenauer.

their respective networks. This underlines that the CDU's 'corporatist catch-all' party structure (Wiliarty, 2013: 174) cannot be explained without keeping in mind that there was the institutional space for that structure to be put in place by Adenauer's leadership skills (cf. Höfling, 1980a; b; Schmid, 1990: 256-88; Clemens, 2009: 123-4; Turner, 2013: 115-8; Wiliarty, 2013: 174).

Analyzing the incentive structure created by the rules to select the party leadership also clarifies why Adenauer's integration strategy prevailed, while De Gasperi's similar approach failed to prevent the DC from becoming highly factionalized (see Chapter 3.2). In contrast to the CDU, networks with national congress delegates from different party branches was the key resource for both majority and minority elites in the DC to get elected to the party leadership. The congress delegates could be divided, arranged and re-arranged into numerous potential coalitions. This incentivized party elites to institutionalize their networks and create incentives (e.g. pork) for party congress delegates to support their coalition. This gave rise to the DC's high level of factionalism and made De Gasperi's strategy to informally integrate all competing groups within his candidate slate likely to fail.

Hence, scholars of German, Austrian and Italian Christian democracy have rightly highlighted the impressive leadership skills of Adenauer, Raab and De Gasperi (e.g. Bösch, 2001; Kriechbaumer, 1995; Capperucci, 2009; 2010). Yet, the ÖVP and DC's limitations in integrating the diverse groups coming together within the newly formed parties already became manifest under Raab and De Gasperi's leadership. This was not because both had necessarily been less talented leaders than Adenauer but because their parties had adopted an institutional design that created a specific incentive structure for party elites. It thereby constrained the lasting impact individual leaders could have on party development.

5.3.2 Formal and informal institutional change

Party elites' incentive structure guided their attempts to modify the party organization which contributed to reinforcing the CDU's moderate level of factionalism. Like in the previous two chapters, Capoccia and Ziblatt's (2010) episode analysis helps trace the organizational feedback effect.

While the leadership selection process was increasingly decentralized between 1950 and 1966, this was rebalanced by incentives of factionalism. Thus, my predicted dual logic continues. While the CDA had failed to gain ex-officio membership in the national executive in 1950, it realized this in 1956. The CDA benefited from many majority elites from smaller Land branches also seeking to formalize their influence. Together, they succeeded in making all factional and Land leaders ex-officio members of the national executive.

The smaller Land branches had previously fought hard to keep a vote-based component in the allocation of party council and national party congress seats. They could, however, not prevent the (South-)Western Land branches from adding a membership-based component.[51] The new system provided the Rhenish and Westphalian Land branch with more than twice as many party council seats than most other branches.[52]

In return, the Rhenish and Westphalian majority elites cooperated with the smaller Protestant Land branches, the EAK and the CDA to increase the number of deputy party leaders from two to four. They thereby wanted to provide Karl Arnold, whose Land government had been overthrown in early 1956, with a position at the national level and gained Protestant support for this by emphasizing that half of the deputy leaders needed to be Protestants (Kleinmann, 1993: 198; Bösch 2001: 294).[53] This alliance led to Kaiser (CDA), Arnold (Westphalia, Rhineland, CDA), von Hassel (Protestant Land branch of Schleswig-Holstein) and Gerstenmaier (EAK) becoming Adenauer's deputies (Kleinmann, 1993: 198).

Adenauer, who had been the federal chancellor since 1949, and PPG leader Heinrich von Brentano, countered these changed by also increasing their share of executive seats. Moreover, they used the increased size of the national executive resulting from the ex-officio membership of the Land and factional leaders to justify the introduction of an executive committee.[54] Its 12 members mostly consisted of delegates from the party in public office.[55] Their attempt also to make the governors of the CDU-led Land governments and all federal ministers ex-officio

[51] *Bundesvorstand.* 03.06.1955, pp. 535-6, 546-50, KAS/ACDP.

[52] *Mitglieder des Bundesparteiausschusses*, 07-001-703, KAS/ACDP.

[53] *Bundesvorstand.* 26.04.1956, pp. 908-14; *Bundesparteitag der CDU.* 1956, pp. 112-35; *Statut der CDU.* 1956, Art. 9, KAS/ACDP.

[54] *Statut der CDU.* 1956, Art. 9, KAS/ACDP.

[55] *Bundesvorstand.* 03.06.1955, pp. 553-4; *Bundesvorstand.* 10.11.1955, pp. 691-2, KAS/ACDP.

members of the national executive was, however, repelled by the Land leaders.[56]

The Land majority elites struck back at the 1958 party congress. They gained authorization to elaborate on reforms to the CDU's national leadership.[57] As a result of these deliberations, the executive committee board no longer primarily included members of the party in public office but was elected by the national executive. This helped the Land branches and factions to ensure their representation (Table 5.3).[58] The national executive even elected 19 executive committee members, in addition to Adenauer as party leader, because the 16 seats designated by the party statutes proved to be insufficient to grant comprehensive representation.[59]

Table 5.3: CDU executive committee in 1960

Name	National PPG	Land branch	OMV	CDA	MIT	EAK	FU	JU
Konrad Adenauer	X							
Heinrich von Brentano	X							
Ludwig Erhard	X				X	X		
Franz Etzel	X				X	X		
Gerhard Schröder	X					X		
Peter Altmeier		X						
Kurt Georg Kiesinger		X						
Franz Meyers		X						
Franz-Josef Röder		X						
Erik Blumenfeld		X				X		
Josef Hermann Dufhues		X						
Wilhelm Fay		X						
Otto Fricke		X				X		
Wilhelm Johnen		X						
Johann-Baptiste Gradl		X	X					
Klaus Scheufelen		X				X		
Hans Katzer				X				
Aenne Brauksiepe							X	
Luise Rehling						X	X	
Gerhard Stoltenberg		X				X		X

Data: *Bundesparteitag.* 1962, p. 311-4, KAS/ACDP.

[56]Similarly, Adenauer also failed to increase central control over the candidate selection process (Bösch, 2001: 268-9). *Bundesvorstand.* 03.06.1955, pp. 538-9; 26.04.1956, pp. 915-8, KAS/ACDP.
[57]*Bundesvorstand.* 10.05.1962, pp. 206-7, KAS/ACDP.
[58]*Statut der CDU.* 1956, Art. 9, KAS/ACDP.
[59]*Bundesvorstand.* 23.05.1960, p. 670-2, KAS/ACDP.

Adenauer only managed to partially counter this reform by making the CDU chancellor and the ministers in the federal government ex-officio members of the national executive.[60]

These changes occurred against the backdrop of public and internal concerns about Adenauer's age (Kleinmann, 1993: 181-6). Many party elites realized that the CDU was not prepared for the case of Adenauer's resignation or death.[61] The introduction of an acting party leader in 1962 can be interpreted as a step toward more organizational independence (Kleinmann, 1993: 189). To increase organizational independence, the executive committee was replaced with a smaller presidium in 1962 which included the party leader, the executive party leader, his deputies and four other members.[62] This reform was based on a proposal formulated by the Land leaders.[63]

Table 5.4: CDU party presidium in 1962

Name	Position	Power base
Konrad Adenauer	Party leader	Party in government, Rhineland
Josef-Hermann Dufhues	Acting party leader	Westphalia
Kai Uwe von Hassel*	Deputy party leader	Schleswig-Holstein
Theodor Blank	Ordinary member	Party in government, CDA
Ludwig Erhard*	Ordinary member	Party in government, MIT
Eugen Gerstenmaier*	Ordinary member	Party in parliament, EAK
Heinrich Krone	Ordinary member	Party in government, Exile-CDU

Members of Protestant denomination are marked with an asterisk.

While the absence of representatives from Rhineland-Palatinate and Baden-Württemberg is striking (Table 5.4), the presidium reflected the main internal conflict line at that time. The presidium seats were almost equally divided between those demanding a greater independence of the CDU from Adenauer and those rallying loyally behind the aging chancellor and party leader (Adenauer was 86 years old at that time). Erhard was talked about as Adenauer's likely successor. Krone was a loyal ally of Adenauer, whereas Dufhues was known for championing

[60] *Statut der CDU.* 1960, Art. 25, KAS/ACDP.

[61] *Confidential note, Adenauer, Globke, Krone, von Hassel.* 09.07.1959; *Bericht Dr. Konrad Kraskes an Adenauer über Zustand der Gesamtpartei.* 24.07.1959; *Meeting notes, Kraske und von Hassel.* 05.-06.08.1959, 01-157, KAS/ACDP.

[62] *Statut der CDU.* 1962, Art. 21, 25, 26, ACDP.

[63] *Bundesvorstand.* 10.05.1962, pp. 207-8; *Bundesparteitag.* 1962, pp. 310-4, 329-30, KAS/ACDP.

the interests of the Land branches against Adenauer's dominant leadership style.[64] Gersternmaier had a reputation of being able to work with Adenauer without being dominated by him (Morsey, 2006). A similar statement applied to von Hassel.

Blank's membership, finally, is likely to have been the result of the only controversy that emerged over the new presidium. The leader of the CDA, Hans Katzer, complained that the proposed composition of the presidium would not represent all intra-party groups (i.e. arguably referring to his CDA).[65] He proposed to keep the old executive committee in addition to the new presidium. However, his motion was opposed by Land leaders from the North (i.e. von Hassel), Northwest (i.e. Otto Fricke), West (i.e. Dufhues) and South (i.e. Klaus Scheufelen) and ultimately rejected.[66] It seems plausible that Theodor Blank who was a CDA member and on good terms with Adenauer was included in the presidium to appease Katzer and prevent him from bringing up the topic at the 1962 national congress.[67]

Table 5.5 summarizes these first episodes of organizational development. They illustrate that the different strategies party elites had been incentivized to adopt helped them to gain influence at the leadership level and had therefore little reason to change them. The fact that factional leaders had been given ex-officio membership in the national executive also incentivized factional elites, in addition to maintaining their network across party branches, to maintain a strong network within their own faction. This helped keep factionalism at a moderate level.

It underlines that the dominant party approach does not help explain the development of factionalism within the CDU. Even though the CDU was permanently in office and held the chancellorship for twenty years following its victory at the 1949 Bundestag election, including a period of CDU/CSU-only government in the early 1960s, the number of factions remained quite constant during that period (cf. Arian and Barnes, 1974; Boucek, 2012).

[64]See the biographical sketches at URL: http://www.kas.de/wf/de/194.5/ [06.08.2017].
[65]*Bundesvorstand.* 10.05.1962, p. 211, 213, KAS/ACDP.
[66]Ibid.: 212-4.
[67]*Bundesparteitag.* 1962, pp. 306-7, ACDP.

Table 5.5: Main statutory reforms within the CDU until 1966

Year	Proposal	Backed by	Effect
1956	• Land branch leaders ex-officio members of the national executive • Leaders of factions, youth and women's movement ex-officio members of the national executive	• Land majority elites and CDA	• Guarantee of Land and factional representation in the national executive • Increase of national executive from 15 to around 50 members
	• Adding a membership-based component to the allocation of party council and national congress seats	• Large Land branches	• Increased seat share of large Land branches
	• Introduction of an executive committee (12 members) • CDU members in government participate at party executive meetings	• Party in public office and Adenauer	• Ensuring his influence and the ongoing importance of the party in public office
1960	• Executive committee as sub-unit of national executive and expanded to 20 members	• Land majority elites	• Land majority elites regained influence at the national level
	• Chancellor and federal ministers (if CDU members) became ex-officio members of the national executive	• Adenauer	• Ensuring representation of party in public office

An acting party leader and a presidium were introduced in 1962. This reform was mainly driven by concerns regarding Adenauer's age.

These initial episodes were followed by the 'most far-reaching' statutory reform in the CDU's history (Poguntke, 1994: 190). It was triggered by a ruling of the Constitutional Court which was exogenous to the CDU's scope of action. While the parties controlled the process of selecting Constitutional Judges, candidates were required to be elected by a two-thirds majority. This forced the parties to agree on candidates who usually had a moderate political reputation. Partisan political jurisdiction did not play a major role (Pogunkte, 1994: 188). The Constitutional Court's ruling is thus rightly considered as an exogenous shock.

The ruling compelled the law-makers to devise a party law that ensured intra-party democracy. This entailed the substantive reduction of the share of ex-officio members in the national party executive.[68] The Court thereby importantly narrowed the set of options available to parties in the legislative process. The party law of 1967 demanded that parties' respective national executives were elected by the national party congress and restricted the percentage of ex-officio executive members to 20 percent.[69] These restrictions led to the CDU's statute of 1967 which cut the number of executive members nearly in half and eliminated the impact of the party council on the election of the party leadership. Since then, the party congress elected most seats in the national executive and presidium.[70]

However, while the Constitutional Court ruling and the ensuing party law imposed a centralization of the leadership selection process, this was absorbed by the self-reinforced intra-party bargaining system (compare Schönbohm, 1985: 218, 298). A committee including majority elites from the Land branches and the party in public office as well as factional leaders ensured that the internal balance of power would not be affected by the statutory modifications (ibid.: 260-2).[71] Moreover, the national executive usually kept inviting the Land and factional leaders to their meetings.[72] Furthermore, the number of deputy leader positions in the presidium was increased to reflect intra-party diversity.[73]

Consequently, majority and minority elites' incentive structures did not change markedly (compare Haungs, 1983: 69-70; Kleinmann, 1993: 264). Majority elites from the CDU's Land branches in the (South-)West and the party in public office focused on their power base within their party branch and only occasionally cooperated when they saw their influence at the national level at stake (Schmid, 1990: 175-6). The majority elites from the smaller

[68] *Bundesverfassungsgericht, Entscheidung 2 BvF 1/65.* 1965.

[69] *Bundesgesetzbuch BGBI IS. 773.* 1967, Art. 9.4, 11.2.

[70] *Statut der CDU.* 1967, Art. 29, 33, KAS/ACDP. At the same time, the position of a party secretary was finally established (Kleinmann, 1993: 265). This was part of the organizational professionalization process which had begun in the early 1960s (Kleinmann, 1993: 206; Poguntke, 1994: 192). Yet, this process did not substantially affect elite interaction and is not analyzed further in this study.

[71] See Hackel (1969), Pridham (1977), Kaltefleiter (1980), Haungs (1983), Schönbohm (1985), Czerwick (1987) and Schmid (1990).

[72] To guarantee the representation of the new Land branches from East Germany in 1990, this informal agreement was formalized. Land leaders who were not elected to the national executive became ex-officio members. *Statut der CDU.* 1990, Art. 33, KAS/ACDP.

[73] textitStatut der CDU. 1967, Art. 29, 33, KAS/ACDP.

Land branches in Northern Germany continued to rely on the Soltau group to make their voice heard.[74] Finally, factional activities remained the way to go for minority elites. The CDA and MIT, for example, continued to organize the CDU's left and middle-class wing respectively. They have kept their representation in the party leadership, parliamentary committees and ministerial departments (Haungs, 1995: 190; Bösch, 2001: 294; Dümig, Trefs and Zohlnhöfer, 2006: 108-11, 122). While their relative strength has varied over time, affected by the CDU's governmental status and actors' political skills (Poguntke, 1994: 208-9), the party in public office, the Land branches and factions have thus remained essential for inner-party decision-making (Haungs, 1995: 191).

This is in line with my theoretical framework. Like in the case of the ÖVP, a behavior associated with an initial institutional setting which is reinforced over time becomes increasingly robust toward exogenous shocks (Pierson, 2000a: 263; Greif, 2006: 190). We should therefore look at the behavior associated with an institution when studying path dependence and not only at the institution itself.

5.4 Reinforcing party adaptability before 1990

5.4.1 Absorbing rival parties and their voters

The often-cited dominant position of the CDU on the German political (center-)right was endogenous to the party's ability to attract new party cadres and voters (Niedermayer, 2006: 113; Bale and Krouwel, 2013: 18; Lees, 2013: 64-5).

When the Allies abolished the restrictions on the formation and activities of political parties in March 1950,[75] the CDU suddenly faced competition from other centrist and right-wing

[74]'Norddeutsche CDU-Politiker unzufrieden.' *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 15.01.1968; 'Der Soltauer Kreis tagt wieder.' *Hannoversche Allgemeine*, 01.07.1968. Weigert, P. 'Gipfeltreffen soll Zusammenarbeit zwischen Küstenländern stärken.' *Die Welt*, 12.03.1969; Weger, E. 'Der Traum von der norddeutschen CSU.' *Handelsblatt*, 20.08.1969; 'Eine norddeutsche CDU nach dem CSU-Vorbild in Bayern?' *Braunschweiger Zeitung*, 23.08.1969; Weger, E. 1969. 'Nach bayrischem Muster.' *Donauer Kurier*, 27.08.1969; 'CDU Spitzentreffen der CDU Norddeutschlands in Hamburg.' *Dpa*, 21.08.1981, press archives, KAS/ACDP.

[75]*Gesetz Nr. A-2. Aufhebung von Rechtsvorschriften über politische Parteien, Vereine nicht politischen Charakters, Versammlungen und Umzüge. 17.03.1950*, in Flechtheimer (1962: 114).

parties.[76] It allowed the German Party (DP) and the Catholic Center Party (Center) to expand their activities to the entire federal territory. They had previously been restricted to the British zone which had contributed to their weak results in the 1949 Bundestag election (4.0 and 3.1 percent). Yet, their notable successes in the Land elections had illustrated their potential (Table 5.6). Moreover, the end of the licensing requirement allowed for the emergence of the League of Expellees and Deprived of Rights (BHE) which aimed to represent the 12 million expellees (Beer, 1994: 13).

Challenged by these rivals, the CDU lost massively in numerous Land elections in the early 1950s. If we exclude the two Länder where it formed an electoral alliance with other parties (Lower Saxony 1951, Hamburg 1953), the CDU's vote share dropped by 12.9 percent on average. As most observers expected neither an imminent recovery of the CDU nor a disappearance of the DP, Center and BHE (Bösch, 2001: 139), the development pointed toward the resurrection of the highly fragmented political right of the Weimar Republic rather than toward the dominance of the CDU.

However, the Christian Democrats succeeded in fighting off their rivals until the end of the 1950s by integrating their party cadres and voters.

Their success in doing so was surely influenced by the new electoral law in 1953. Parties henceforth needed to win at least five percent of the valid party list votes in the entire federal territory rather than in a single Land in order to enter the Bundestag. They could only bypass the threshold by winning one constituency seat (Von Alemann, 2010: 60).[77] The law disadvantaged small parties – as the Christian Democrats, who promoted these changes, had intended (Bösch, 2001: 147-8).[78]

---

[76] I do not discuss the FDP here. Although Adenauer was hoping it might merge with the CDU, the anti-clerical FDP competed for a quite different electorate (Kaack, 1974: 239, 261-2; Bösch, 2001: 190-2).

[77] *Wahlgesetz zum zweiten Bundestag und zur Bundesversammlung.* 08.07.1953, BGBl. I p. 470. The number of constituency seats which a party needed to win to bypass the threshold was increased from one to three in 1956.

[78] *Bundesvorstand.* 26.01.1953, pp. 357; *Bundesvorstand.* 22.05.1953, pp. 531-66, KAS/ACDP.

Table 5.6: Election results of CDU, Center, DP and BHE between 1945 and 1957

Party	Baden-Württemberg					Bremen				Hamburg				Hesse		
	1946	1947	1950	1952	1956	1946	1947	1951	1955	1946	1949	1953	1957	1946	1950	1954
CDU	38.4	54.2	26.3	36.0	42.6	18.9	22.0	9.0	18.0	26.7	34.5	50.0	32.2	31.0	18.8	24.1
Center	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
DP	-	-	-	-	-	-	3.9	14.7	16.6	-	13.3	*	4.1	-	-	-
BHE	-	-	14.7	9.4	6.3	-	-	5.6	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	7.7

Party	Lower Saxony			N. R.-Westphalia			Rhineland-Palatinate			Schleswig-Holstein			National elections		
	1947	1951	1955	1947	1950	1954	1947	1951	1955	1947	1950	1954	1949	1953	1957
CDU	19.9	23.7	26.3	37.6	36.9	41.3	47.2	39.2	46.8	34.1	19.8	32.2	25.2	36.4	39.7
Center	4.1	3.3	-	9.8	7.5	4.0	-	-	-	-	-	-	3.1	0.8	-
DP	17.9	*	12.4	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	9.6	5.1	4.0	3.3	3.4
BHE	-	14.9	11.0	-	-	4.6	-	-	-	-	23.4	14.0	-	5.9	4.6

Data: Land Returning Officer (*Landeswahlleiter*) of the respective Land and *Bundeswahlleiter*. Hamburg 1949: CDU with FDP and German Conservative Party (DKP); Hamburg 1953: CDU with FDP, DKP and DP; Lower Saxony 1951: CDU together with DP; Schleswig-Holstein 1954: DP together with *Schleswig-Holstein Gemeinschaft*. I focus on the main threats to the CDU. I do not discuss the neo-Nazi Socialist Reich Party (SRP) which won 7.7 percent in Bremen and 11.0 percent in Lower Saxony in 1951 but was outlawed by the Constitutional Court in 1952.

Yet, the electoral system alone does not account for the full story. Deliberations on the new law started in the spring of 1953 and proved to be difficult. The CDU's initial draft was rejected and competing proposals were discussed. After tedious negotiations, a new law was passed on 26 June 1953 (Pollock, 1955: 107). Before all that, however, the Christian Democrats had already convinced many party elites from its rivals to switch sides. In January 1953, most MPs of the DP in Schleswig-Holstein, including its ministers in the Land government, joined the CDU. This contributed to the DP's disaster in its previous stronghold in the 1953 national election (Bösch, 2001: 144).

Moreover, merging with the CDU was not the only credible option for these parties. The left-leaning Center Party had socio-economically quite some common ground with the SPD. In fact, it formed a coalition with the SPD and FDP in North Rhine-Westphalia in 1956 (Schmidt, 1983: 1192-242; Nietfeld, 1985: 193-6; Hoyer, 2001: 13). Alternatively, the Center Party could have merged with the Bavarian Party (BP) into a Catholic-traditionalist party. The BP had gained 20.9 percent of Bavarian votes in 1949 and continued to have notable support in the Land in the 1950s. Indeed, both parties formed a joint parliamentary group in 1951 and an electoral alliance in 1957 (Strauß, 1989: 108).[79] Moreover, the BHE was wooed by the SPD who, like the CDU, had realized the relevance of the expellees as an electoral group (Stickler, 2004: 222-5). Finally, a cooperation between the DP and FDP, which was much more national-liberal than in later years, could have led to a renewal of the inter-war German National People's Party (Bösch, 2001: 159).

Previous research has outlined in depth how Adenauer's absorption strategy succeeded in preventing the smaller parties from turning to its political rivals (Kaack, 1974: 247; Bösch, 2001: 152; 2002: 205; also Bale and Krouwel, 2013). It usually began by forming an electoral alliance with the smaller parties. They benefited from the sharing of financial resources, the allocation of constituencies and concessions regarding the distribution of offices (Bösch, 2001: 146, 183-4). Yet, they increasingly struggled to differentiate themselves from the CDU (Bösch, 2001: 160; 2002: 205). When the smaller parties risked failing to re-enter parliament, the Christian Democrats asked their elites to change sides (Kaack, 1974: 223-4; Bösch, 2001:

[79]Hansmann, M., and D. Lindsay. n.d. 'Föderalistische Union.' URL: http://www.kas.de/wf/de/71.9161/ [07.08.2017].

172-6; Stickler, 2004: 211). Their reputation was then used to reach out to and finally incorporate their social networks and share of the electorate (Stickler, 2004: 232, 283-4), while the CDU stopped its initial support for the smaller parties (Kaack, 1974: 259).[80]

The flexibility to offer important positions to rival party elites without them having to climb the party hierarchy first seems to lend some support to the institutionalization argument (Kitschelt, 1994; Levitsky, 2003). This position has been backed by accounts highlighting the autonomy of Adenauer in taking positions and the irregular frequency of national executive and party council meetings (Heidenheimer, 1961; Bösch, 2001: 244, 247, 268).

However, this view underrates the extent to which Adenauer needed to take the demands and interests of Land, parliamentary and factional elites into account (Haungs, 1986: 48; Schmid, 1990: 56; Bösch, 2001: 105-6, 236-7, 268-9). Also, the institutionalization argument does not sufficiently appreciate the extent to which the CDU's moderate level of factionalism contributed to the success of Adenauer's absorption strategy.

1) The moderate level of factionalism, as outlined above, had helped party elites from Land branches where the CDU was challenged by the Center,[81] the BHE,[82] and the DP[83] to be represented in the CDU's national executive (Table 5.7). All relevant actors could thereby participate in the formulation of a common strategy.[84] It was therefore less likely to be internally contested which made it more difficult for rivals to drive a wedge between the CDU leaders.

While federalism and the Land branches' high autonomy surely helped party elites to tailor the strategy to the specific Land context (Bösch, 2001: 267-8; compare Wills-Otero, 2016), their integrationist claims gained in credibility by the fact that the targeted social groups were already part of the CDU leadership. This helped the CDU to respond to attacks by their rivals. In Northern Germany, the DP wooed conservative and Protestant voters by calling the

[80] *Bundesvorstand*. 30.09.1955, pp. 648-9, KAS/ACDP.
[81] Rhineland and Westphalia.
[82] Württemberg-Baden, Württemberg-Hohenzollern and Schleswig-Holstein.
[83] Schleswig-Holstein and Brunswick.
[84] For instance, *Bundesvorstand*. 26.01.1953, pp. 322-78, KAS/ACDP.

CDU a purely Catholic party (Bösch, 2001: 144-7; 2002: 206). While Catholics were surely the more powerful denominational group in the early CDU, the Christian Democrats could point to the fact that six of the 16 national executive members were of Protestant denomination (including one deputy party leader). The representation of conservative Protestants from North(-western) Germany, expellees and social-Catholics in the national executive, in turn, had been largely due to the party's moderate level of factionalism.

Table 5.7: CDU national executive in 1950

Position	Name	Power base
Chairman	Konrad Adenauer	Rhineland
Vice chairmen	Friedrich Holzapfel*	Westphalia
	Jakob Kaiser	CDA and Exile-CDU
Treasurer	Ernst Bach*	Rhineland
Further members	Anton Dichtel	South Baden
	Margarete Gröwel	Women movement, Hamburg
	Werner Hilpert	Hesse
	Linus Kather	OMV
	Kurt Georg Kiesinger	Württemberg-Hohenzollern
	Ernst Majonica	Youth movement
	Wilhelm Simpfendörfer*	Württemberg-Baden
	Walther Schreiber*	Berlin
	Carl Schröter*	Schleswig-Holstein
	Georg Strickrodt*	Brunswick
	Alois Zimmer	Rhineland-Palatinate
PPG leader	Heinrich von Brentano	PPG

Asterisks mark Protestant denomination which indicates support by the EAK.
Data: http://www.kas.de/upload/bilder/cdu_goslar1950/UID_vorstand.pdf [07.08.2017].

2) The fact that Land majority elites had been incentivized to build strong networks within their respective party branch helped to implement the adopted integrationist strategy (Bösch, 2001: 142-7).

3) The CDU's internal bargaining system also helped the CDU to reach out to their rivals' cadres and voters. For instance, the expellee faction organized meetings that helped establish a basis of trust between many expellees and the CDU and provided BHE elites with a potential power base in the CDU (Kaack, 1974: 222-3; Stickler, 2004: 226-30). The CDA around Kaiser, Arnold and Albers proved helpful in attracting party elites and sympathizers

of the Center, like Rainer Barzel (Lemke, 2002: 39-40; Lienenkamp, 2001: 211). Moreover, Adenauer urged the Land majority elites to use their influence within their respective party branch to include more expellees on the CDU's candidate slates (Stickler, 2004: 218).[85]

Hence, the CDU's moderate level of factionalism importantly contributed to the success of Adenauer's integration strategy and to the party adapting to the end of party licensing.

5.4.2 Preventing splits in the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s

Giving room to some factions also helped the CDU to prevent party splits.

The risk of a party split along denominational lines emerged during the conflict between Adenauer and Gustav Heinemann in the early 1950s. Heinemann was minister for the interior in Adenauer's cabinet and president of the Synod of the German Protestant Church (EKD). This made him an influential figure among Protestant Christians and important within the CDU as the party still struggled to gain traction in Protestant areas. Heinemann and Adenauer's disagreements escalated over Germany's integration into the Western defense alliance (Bösch, 2001: 119, 122; 2002: 23; Granieri, 2003: 43; Wyneken, 2012: 25). When Adenauer decided in favor of German rearmament, Heinemann left the CDU (Kleinmann, 1993: 135; Schwarz, 1995: 544-8; Bösch, 2001: 122). He formed the All-German People's Party (GVP) in late 1952 when it appeared that the CDU might lose the 1953 election. The GVP offered Protestant and pacifist Christian democrats an alternative to the CDU (Schwarz, 1995: 551-2; Bösch, 2001: 122-3).

At this moment, the CDU's moderate level of factionalism helped incentivize Protestants to remain loyal to the CDU. The EAK provided Protestant party elites, like Hermann Ehlers and Eugen Gerstenmaier, with a power base in the CDU. They had basically the right to select one of the two deputy party leaders. Moreover, almost half of the executive seats were held by Protestants (Table 5.7 above; Bösch, 2001: 123, 126, Granieri, 2003: 45). They had little incentive to leave and support Heinemann's GVP.

[85] *Kandidatenaufstellung zur Bundestagswahl.* 24.06.1953, 07-002-004/1, KAS/ACDP.

Ehlers and Gerstenmaier used the network of the EAK to promote Adenauer's support for German rearmament among Protestants. In its meetings, events and publications, the EAK accused Heinemann of provoking a schism in German Protestantism. The EAK's campaign contributed to the CDU preventing a disintegration along denominational lines (Kleinmann, 1993: 138-41; Bösch, 123-4; 240).[86]

Yet, the integration of intra-party groups was not only based on factional activities. This prevented factionalism in the CDU from degenerating into the cycling majorities and gridlocks that eventually pushed factions out of the Italian DC.

The risk of the emergence of a conservative party in the 1970s illustrates how the value of networks within a party branch also helped to keep party elites from leaving the CDU. After the SPD's landslide in 1972, the CSU started contemplate about expanding its activities beyond Bavaria (Kleinmann, 1993: 399). The tensions between CSU and CDU escalated when both parties failed to agree on an opposition strategy after narrowly failing to return to power in 1976 (Kleinmann, 1993: 400-1). As a result, the CSU's parliamentary leader Friedrich Zimmermann and party leader Franz Josef Strauß put an end to the joint parliamentary group with the CDU and announced that the CSU was considering competing elections outside of Bavaria (Kleinmann, 1993: 401-2). After attempts to mediate between both parties had failed by December 1976, the 'split of the Union seemed to be reality' (Kleinmann, 1993: 402-4).

The friction between both parties created an alternative option for conservatives within the CDU. They agreed with the CSU on a clear demarcation strategy vis-à-vis the SPD-FDP coalition (Granieri, 2009: 29). The formation of a conservative party together with the CSU was a potential way forward.

However, conservatives were integrated in the CDU leadership. Alfred Dregger, who was the figurehead of the national-conservative wing (Schaefer, 1985), was leader of the CDU

[86] The quelled uprisings in East Germany on 17.06.1953 had also helped to discredit the GVP's stance on foreign and all-German policy. In the 1953 election, the GVP only won 1.3 percent of the votes (Bösch, 2001: 152).

branch in Hesse.[87] His power base within one of the influential Land branches at that time had allowed Dregger to be a member of the national executive since 1969. Having the choice between his secured positions in the CDU leadership and the adventure of a conservative union between the CSU and other right-wing parties, Dregger opted for the former. The CSU thus failed to win support for their initiative beyond some dubious minor parties. As a result, it abandoned its plan of national expansion (Kleinmann, 1993: 400, 413-4).

In addition to showing how networks within a party branch helped integrate majority elites in a moderately factionalized party, this episode also underlines my prediction that such majority elites are not incentivized to invest in factional activities. Dregger did not further institutionalize the Stahlhem tendency which referred to the loosely connected conservatives within the CDU (Schaefer, 1985).

5.4.3 Party renewal in a transforming society

The moderate level of factionalism also played an important role in modernizing the CDU. The end of the post-war period began with the SPD's transformation from a socialist workers' party to a center-left catch all party at its Bad Godesberg congress in 1959. Pressure was also put on the CDU by the growing National Democratic Party of Germany (NPD) on the radical right and the rise of the extra-parliamentary opposition (APO) and the student rebellion of 1968 on the radical left (Kleinmann, 1993: 268). At the societal level, a new generation reached the voting age for whom individualism and self-fulfillment mattered more than religion (Kleinmann, 1993: 190).[88] As the electoral trend indicated that SPD and FDP seemed better suited for the transformed environment than the CDU (Kleinmann, 1993: 341), the Christian Democrats were under pressure to catch up (Kleinmann, 1993: 191).

Part of the CDU's response was the elaboration of its first basic program, known as the

[87] See URL: http://www.kas.de/wf/de/71.8521/ [25.04.2015].

[88] Compare Jagodzinksi and Dobbelaere (1993: 77-88), Pollack and Pickel (1999: 473-6; 2003: 457-60) and Lois (2011: 186-8).

Berlin manifesto (first draft in 1968,[89] second version in 1971[90]). Reform proposals and activities within the CDU came from both the party's Land and parliamentary branches and factions (Kleinmann, 1993: 273). Both majority and minority elites were thus integrated in the reform process which contributed to the CDU overcoming the image of an old-fashioned overly religious party (Kleinmann, 1993: 269).

While the CDU, like the ÖVP and DC, also responded to pressure to reform by changing its leader, the process behind leadership changes displayed a different dynamic which is in line with my theoretical predictions. While Land and League majority elites dominated the selection of a new ÖVP leader without minority elites having much to say, factions prevented an exclusion of minority elites in the CDU (Kleinmann, 1993: 273). Yet, majority elites from the strong Land branches (e.g. Helmut Kohl in Rhineland-Palatinate) continued to rely on their intra-branch network to make their voice heard. This prevented the split of national congress delegates into almost constantly re-arranging and inherently instable factional coalitions as observed in the DC.

Leadership changes were the result of an interplay between Land and factional interests. For example, meetings between Gerstenmaier (EAK and the CDU's parliamentary group), Bruno Heck (acting party leader), Dufhues (Westphalia) and Kohl (Rhineland-Palatinate) were important in resolving the conflicts over Erhard's succession as chancellor and party leader (Kleinmann, 1993: 251-8). Rainer Barzel's election as party leader in 1971 was based on a combination of support from Land branches (i.e. Westphalia, Rhineland), the PPG and the CDA (ibid.: 324). In 1973, Helmut Kohl's successful leadership bid was based on a threefold coalition including 1) his own network (Land branches in the Catholic Southwest, the party's youth movement and the MIT), 2) Karl Carstens (PPG-leader and with support in the Protestant Land branches) and 3) Kurt Biedenkopf who could build on his regional reputation in Westphalia – a stronghold of the CDA (Kleinmann, 1993: 353-5).

[89] *CDU Berliner Programm.* URL: http://www.kas.de/upload/ACDP/CDU/Programme_Beschluesse/1968_Berliner-Programm.pdf [25.05.2017].

[90] *Das Berliner Programm. 2. Fassung.* URL: http://www.kas.de/upload/ACDP/CDU/Programme_Beschluesse/1971_Berliner-Programm.pdf [25.05.2017]

Moreover, while the ÖVP's infamous 'Obmannschlachten'[91] (literal: party leader slaughter) did not result in a change in the distribution of intra-party power, the higher level of factionalism within the CDU helped to adapt the influence of intra-party groups to social changes. In contrast to the ÖVP's Leagues whose influence was formally guaranteed at each party level, factions' influence was less formalized in the CDU. A decline in the CDA's membership figures and party congress delegates reflected that the shift from blue- to white-collar workers undermined the appeal of its emphasis on Catholic social teaching and trade unionism (Kleinmann, 1993: 273-4; Dilling, 2017: 109-14). When politicizing the issue of worker participation in firms' executive boards did not reverse this trend and the CDA failed to get representatives elected to the party leadership in 1967 (Kleinmann, 1993: 281),[92] the necessity to reform was undeniable. As a result, the CDA extended its field of interest beyond welfare and trade union policy in order to appeal to white-collar workers and, subsequently, returned to the national executive and executive committee in 1969 (Baukloh 1967: 664-6; Kleinmann, 1993: 280, 307).[93] The growth of the German middle-class was also accompanied by a rise of the MIT within the CDU (Kleinmann, 1993: 273-4, 283-4). Finally, the shrinking number of people with an expellee background was reflected in a declining role of the expellee faction (Haungs, 1983: 52; Poguntke, 1994: 201; Dümig, Trefs and Zohlnhöfer, 2006: 109).

Hence, the CDU had demonstrated its ability to adapt to environmental changes long before the profound transformations of German society in the early 1990s.

5.5 German reunification and the new CDU

The collapse of European communism entailed far-reaching consequences for Germany. The CDU and, in particular, its leader and by then federal chancellor Helmut Kohl played an essential role in realizing the re-unification of the two German states. This provided the Christian

[91] Sprenger, M. 2017. 'Wer in der ÖVP das Sagen hat.' *Tiroler Tageszeitung*, 09.01.2017, URL: https://www.ots.at/presseaussendung/OTS_20170108_OTS0024/tiroler-tageszeitung-leitartikel-ausgabe-vom-9-jaenner-2017-von-michael-sprenger-wer-in-der-oevp-das-sagen-hat [25.05.2017].

[92] *Bundesparteitag der CDU*. 1967, p. 184, 192-4; 'Sozialausschüsse ringen um Einfluß.' *Badische Zeitung*, 04.07.1967, press archives, KAS/ACDP.

[93] *Offenburger Erklärung der Sozialausschüsse der CDA*. 07.-09.07.1967, 01-824-051/2; *Bundesparteitag der CDU*. 1969, p. 165, 187, KAS/ACDP.

Democrats with a wave of public support which was essential for their victory in 1990 and, combined with a weak SPD campaign, their re-election in 1994 (Pulzer, 1999: 135-7; Bösch, 2002: 270; 2007: 202-3).

However, national reunification meant that, practically overnight, more than 11.3 million voters from a very different and heterogeneous social and economic context needed to be considered in party competition (Turner, 2013: 119; Mannewitz, 2017: 221-32). Their integration intensified the already existing trend of secularization (Figure 5.5).

Figure 5.5: Denominational structure in Germany



Data: Eicken and Schmitz-Veltin (2010), Forschungsgruppe Weltanschauung (2012), Federal Statistical Office (2014).

Moreover, the integration of two completely different economic systems entailed high economic costs as the dramatic increase in unemployment illustrates (Figure 5.6).

Many voters associated what Federal President Herzog described as a 'loss of economic momentum' and a lack of 'willingness . . . to leave well-known paths' with the Christian Democrats under Kohl who had been in government for 16 years in 1998.[94] Consequently, they finished a distant second behind the Social Democrats and were ousted from government (Pulzer, 1999: 137-40).

[94]'Durch Deutschland muss ein Ruck gehen.' URL: http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/roman-herzog-die-ruck-rede-im-wortlaut-a-1129316.html [08.08.2017].

Figure 5.6: Unemployment rate in Germany



Data: Federal Employment Agency (2017).

5.5.1 Integrating intra-party diversity in the reform process

If the Christian Democrats wanted to prevent the fate experienced by their sister parties in Austria and Italy, modernizing the party was necessary (Clemens, 2007: 224). Yet, party elites disagreed on whether the CDU should follow an economically centrist and socially progressive, a market-liberal or a Christian-conservative course (Clemens, 2009; Granieri, 2009).

If the CDU's success in reforming despite such divergent interests was fully explained by the actions of its new leader Angela Merkel,[95] this would support Katz and Mair's (1995: 20-1) cartel party thesis or Kitschelt's (1994: 207-8, 212) and Levitsky's (2003: 24, 37, 79, 169-85) institutionalization argument. All of them have highlighted the link between leadership autonomy and party adaptability.

However, Clemens (2011: 475-7) has shown that neither Merkel's popularity nor a particularly noteworthy mastery of the party machine provided her with a free hand in her leadership. Moreover, Clemens' (2011: 477-82) view that Merkel enjoyed a substantial level of autonomy due to the absence of factional consensus misses the point because the DC was also charac-

[95]See on Merkel's rise within the CDU, Thompson and Lennartz (2006: 103-6), Wiliarty (2008: 90) and Clemens (2011: 473, 476).

terized by a lack of factional consensus without generating high leadership autonomy. Also, he does not sufficiently differentiate between the role of factions and Land branches in the reform process. Even more importantly, he himself shows how the different intra-party groups repeatedly managed to realize their preferences in the reform process which undermines the leadership autonomy thesis. Finally, the CDU's organization and internal practices starkly differ from the autonomy of the national leadership which characterizes cartel and weakly institutionalized parties. The Land and even local party levels have remained highly influential in party financing, staffing, membership administration, national campaigns and candidate selection (Turner, 2013: 120-2; cf. Jun, 2011: 217-8).

The decentralization of power in the CDU does also not account for its high adaptability (cf. Wills-Otero, 2016). First, it underrates the intense conflicts between CDU Land elites over how to position the national party platform in the transformed environment. Second, it does not specify why the CDU, in contrast to the similarly decentralized ÖVP, was able to resolve these conflicts.

Instead, the CDU's adaptability was rooted in its moderate level of factionalism which helped integrate opposing views in the decision-making process without leading to excessive factionalism.

In contrast to the ÖVP, minority elites were not excluded from the reform process. Factional activities allowed left-leaning minority elites, like CDA-leaders Karl-Josef Laumann, who has been member of the CDU presidium since 2004, to promote a socially progressive course. Economically liberal minority elites, like Peter Rauen, gained representation in the national executive and the executive committee thanks to the MIT faction. A conservative tendency emerged around Martin Lohmann in 2009 (Debus and Müller, 2013: 154). His 'Working group of dedicated Catholics', however, disintegrated quickly.[96] A more lasting conservative initiative emerged when minority elites, like Wolfgang Bosbach and Christean

[96]'Martin Lohmann tritt aus der CDU aus.' URL: http://www.kath.net/news/42929 [27.05.2017]; Their website has not been updated since 2010. See URL: 'http://www.aek-online.de/aktuelles.htm' [27.05.2017].

Wagner, formed the Berlin group faction (*Berliner Kreis*).[97] Bosbach has been a federal MP and expert in domestic security but without strong backing in his Land branch of North Rhine-Westphalia. Wagner had been increasingly sidelined within his Hessian Land branch since Volker Bouffier became party leader in 2010. They were joined by Erika Steinbach whose expellee faction had dramatically lost in influence.[98]

Their activities, however, did not escalate into the excessive factionalism we have observed in the DC because majority elites from big Land branches and the party in public office maintained their sphere of influence. Land leaders, like Roland Koch and Volker Bouffier (both Hesse) and Julia Klöckner (Rhineland-Palatinate), represented conservative positions in the CDU leadership. Friedrich Merz, benefiting from his support in the party's parliamentary group, was one of the advocates of market liberalism – similar to Christian Wulff who was the CDU leader in Lower Saxony.

The moderately factionalized CDU benefited from the stability of Land power centers and the flexibility of factional activities to integrate all three positions during the process of programmatic modernization (compare Clemens, 2009: 126).

As the CDU feared that the SPD's moderating stance on economic issues would make the CDU's conservative cultural profile appear as the main distinction between the two parties, the leadership identified family policy as a starting point for party modernization. Based on a coalition of the CDU's social-Catholics and market-liberals, Angela Merkel could move the party to a more progressive stance on family issues (e.g. including single parents and unmarried couples with children in the party's definition of the family). While this was opposed by the conservatives, they received concessions on immigration policy where the CDU adopted a less progressive position than initially proposed (Clemens, 2009: 127-8). Thus, although the CDU adopted more moderate positions on socio-cultural issues, the conservatives prevented the alleged 'social-democratization' of the party (Debus and Müller, 2013: 160-1; cf. Haas,

[97] See URL: 'http://www.berlinerkreisinderunion.de/' [14.04.2015]; 'Konservativer Kritiker auf verlorenem Posten', *Cicero*, n.d., URL: http://cicero.de/berliner-republik/konservativer-kritiker-auf-verlorenem-posten/42982 [27.05.2017].

[98] 'Ein konservatives Rebelliönchen.' *Die Zeit*, 02.11.2012, URL: http://www.zeit.de/politik/deutschland/2012-11/berliner-kreis-cdu-merkel-manifest [27.05.2017].

2009).

As a response to the SPD's Agenda 2010, which was a major reform of the German welfare state, Merkel proposed a more market-liberal program in the run-up to the 2003 party congress (Clemens, 2007: 224-6; Arzheimer, 2017: 51). Now, the market-liberals and conservatives thrived. While the CDA and other social-Catholic Christian Democrats initially opposed the manifesto, they were consulted on how to soften key parts of the new program (Clemens, 2007: 226-7, 231-3; 2009: 129-30).[99] The CDA and left-leaning Land leaders, like Jürgen Rüttgers, thereby prevented a drift toward neo-liberal policies. The shock of the nearly lost 2005 election helped them further to consolidate a centrist party stance on economic policies (Clemens, 2007: 233-8; 2009: 130-1; Krewel et al., 2011: 31; Debus and Müller, 2013: 162).

The CDU's reform process was thus one of gradual adaptation. This helped the CDU to maintain its stronghold among (the shrinking share of) churchgoing Catholics and Protestants (Debus and Müller, 2013: 155-6) while opening the party for new parts of the electorate. Consequently, while the party has lost in strength since 1990, as have all Christian Democratic parties (Figure 1.1), the CDU's losses were much more moderate compared to the Austrian and Italian Christian Democrats (Figure 5.7).

Figure 5.7: CDU election results since 1949



Data: Federal Returning Officer.

[99] *Bundesparteitag der CDU.* 2003, pp. 66-8, 106-9, KAS/ACDP.

5.5.2 Preventing factional splits and defection of minority elites

The party's moderate level of factionalism also helped to keep the party together during the recent financial and refugee crisis and the rise of the right-wing Alternative for Germany (AfD). The AfD was founded in 2013 as a reaction to the bailouts the Merkel government had pushed through parliament to support the Southern European countries affected by the financial crisis (Schmitt-Beck, 2014: 95). After narrowly missing entry into the Bundestag, the AfD won 7.1 percent in the 2014 European Parliament election. While initially promoting a primarily Eurosceptic image which also included anti-establishment, migration-skeptic and national-conservative elements (Schmitt-Beck, 2014), the AfD moved starkly to the far-right in 2015.[100] It has entered parliament (sometimes with startling results) in all Land elections since 2014 and became the first party to the right of the CDU and CSU to have entered the Bundestag since 1957 (Table 5.8).

The rise of a right-wing rival has encouraged some discontent conservative party elites to intensify their criticism against Merkel and provided CDU supporters and party elites with an alternative option. Tensions within the CDU continued to rise when over one million people sought refuge in Germany in 2015 and 2016.[101] Emphasizing the Christian responsibility to help those in need, Angela Merkel adopted a policy of open borders.[102] Her position was heavily criticized by conservatives and right-wing people both within and outside the CDU.

[100] 'Luckes Anhänger kündigen Gründung von neuer Partei an.' *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 13.07.2015, URL: http://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/inland/afd-abspaltung-luckes-anhaenger-kuendigen-gruendung-von-neuer-partei-an-13699629.html [27.05.2017]; Steppat, T. 2016. 'Petry spricht von Rückzug bei weiterem Rechtsruck.' *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 27.04.2016, URL: http://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/inland/bei-weiterem-afd-rechtsrutsch-frauke-petry-deutet-rueckzug-an-14202021.html [27.05.2017].

[101] 'Zahl der Neuankommlinge unterschreitet CSU-Obergrenze.' *Die Welt*, 28.12.2016, URL: https://www.welt.de/politik/deutschland/article160651528/Zahl-der-Neuankoemmlinge-unterschreitet-CSU-Obergrenze.html [27.05.2017].

[102] 'Merkel für Flüchtlingspolitik geehrt.' *Der Spiegel*, 01.02.2017, URL: http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/angela-merkel-auszeichnung-fuer-fluechtlingspolitik-a-1132769.html [02.06.2017]; 'Merkels Wende in der Fluchtlingspolitik.' *Tagesspiegel*, 20.09.2016, URL: http://www.tagesspiegel.de/politik/merkels-wende-in-der-fluechtlingspolitik-sie-hat-verstanden/14575962.html [02.06.2017].

Table 5.8: Election results, AfD

Year	Election	Vote share
2013	Federal	4.7
	Hesse	4.1
2014	European parliament	7.1
	Saxony	9.7
	Brandenburg	12.2
	Thuringia	10.6
2015	Hamburg	6.1
	Bremen	5.5
2016	Baden-Württemberg	15.1
	Rhineland-Palatinate	12.6
	Saxony-Anhalt	24.3
	Mecklenburg-Vorpommern	20.8
	Berlin	14.2
2017	Saarland	5.9
	Schleswig-Holstein	6.2
	North Rhine-Westphalia	7.4
	Federal	12.6

Data: Federal Returning Officer and Land Returning Officers.

Still, the CDU neither experienced factional splits, like the DC in the early 1990s, nor the exodus of minority party elites, like the ÖVP in 2012. The AfD initiators Bernd Lucke, Alexander Gauland and Konrad Adam had all a CDU background. However, they did not have an organized group of supporters with whom they had left the CDU, like Mario Segni when he and his *trasversali* faction abandoned the DC. It would also not be accurate to consider them as minority elites. Lucke and Adam were simply party members who, to my knowledge, had never held any noteworthy office within the CDU. While Gauland had been undersecretary under CDU governor Walter Wallmann in Hesse in the late 1980s, a patronage scandal had put an end to Gauland's career in the CDU more than 20 years ago. Admittedly, Gerd Robanus, who was among the founding members of the AfD, used to be part of the MIT leadership.[103] The CDU's middle-class faction, however, stayed within the CDU. The same applies to most conservative minority elites.

[103]Lachmann, G. 2012. 'Enttäuschte CDU-Politiker gründen Wahlalternative.' *Die Welt*, 04.10.2012, URL: https://www.welt.de/politik/deutschland/article109606449/Enttaeuschte-CDU-Politiker-gruenden-Wahlalternative.html [27.05.2017].

In contrast to the ÖVP, the CDU's moderate level of factionalism gave some room for minority elites to make their voice heard. Conservative critics of Merkel's EU and refugee policies formed the 'Liberal-Conservative Awakening' faction in March 2017, which also included the aforementioned Berlin group faction, to put pressure on the party leadership.[104]

Unlike the DC, however, factionalism remained moderate. As predicted, majority elites, like Julia Klöckner (Rhineland-Palatinate), Reiner Haseloff (Saxony-Anhalt) and Guido Wolf (Baden-Württemberg), used their power base within their Land branch instead of participating in factional activities to promote their critique of Merkel's policies.

5.5.3 Keeping its voters

The lack of splits has helped the CDU to prevent an electoral downfall like the ÖVP experienced with the rise of the FPÖ. To compare which party lost most of its electorate to the AfD, I calculated the relative losses of each party to the AfD in all elections since 2013 (Table 5.9). For example, the CDU lost two percent of the voters who had voted for them in the 2009 Bundestag election to the AfD in 2013.

The results underline that while the CDU lost a larger proportion of its previous electorate to the AfD than the SPD, the difference between both parties is often quite marginal. More importantly, the biggest relative shift (in bold in Table 5.9) occurred between other small parties, including the Pirates and the right-wing extremist NPD, and the AfD. Former voters of the socialist Left Party and the liberal FDP have also been more receptive to vote AfD than former CDU voters.

[104] 'Konservative aus Union schließen sich zusammen.' *Die Zeit*, 25.03.2017, URL: http://www.zeit.de/politik/deutschland/2017-03/cdu-csu-union-dachverband-freiheitlich-konservativ-aufbruch-alexander-mitsch [27.05.2017].

Table 5.9: Percent of voters lost to the AfD by party

Year	Territory	CDU to AfD	SPD to AfD	Green to AfD	FDP to AfD	Left to AfD	Others to AfD	Non-voters to AfD
2013	Federal	-2	-2	-2	**-7**	**-7**	.	-1
	Hesse	-2	-1	-3	-5	**-6**	**-20**	.
2014	Europe	**-6**	-3	-1	-2	**-6**	.	.
	Saxony	-5	-4	-3	**-10**	-4	**-23**	-1
	Brandenburg	-7	-3	-1	**-17**	-5	**-27**	-2
	Thuringia	-5	-6	-2	**-14**	-6	**-24**	-1
2015	Hamburg	-1	0	0	**-2**	0	**-5**	-1
2016	Baden-Württemberg	-10	-8	-6	-7	**-16**	**-55**	-8
	Rhineland-Palatinate	-8	-6	-2	-10	**-21**	**-38**	-7
	Saxony-Anhalt	-12	-9	-4	**-16**	-12	**-48**	-10
	Meckl.-Vorpommern	**-14**	-6	-5	.	-13	**-23**	-8
	Berlin	-11	-6	-2	**-15**	-7	**-23**	-7
2017	Saarland	-2	-2	0	.	**-5**	**-13**	-3
	Schleswig-Holstein	**-3**	-1	-1	**-3**	.	**-19**	-1
	N. Rhine-Westphalia	-2	-2	-1	-4	**-5**	**-32**	-4
	Federal	-5	-4	-1	-4	**-11**	**-21**	-7
	Lower Saxony	-3	-1	0	-2	**-9**	**-48**	-3
AVERAGE		-5.8	-3.8	-1.9	-7.8	**-8.3**	**-28.0**	-4.3

Data: Infratest dimap; Federal Returning Officer and Land Returning Officers. The data does not allow differentiation between CDU and CSU in nation-wide elections. These elections were the AfD's first elections in the respective territories. It could thus not lose voters to other parties. I have used the party-list vote. Bremen 2015 is not included because each voter has up to five votes which makes it impossible to derive a party's number of voters. Two largest losses in bold.

5.6 Conclusion

In conclusion, the CDU avoided many of the adaptability problems plaguing the Italian and Austrian Christian Democrats by giving way to a level of factionalism which was higher than in the ÖVP but lower than in the DC.

This moderate factionalism was to an important extent the legacy of organizational choices in 1950. The Allied licensing policy helps explain why Catholics, Protestants and Conservatives

negotiated the formation of a joint party. The division of Germany into four occupation zones and, more importantly, the history of denominational and social conflict lines in German politics help understand the emergence and preferences of regional power centers. However, these structural explanations do not account for why the CDU did not adopt a decentralized selection process as done by the Austrian Christian Democrats. Instead, the mixed leadership selection process resulted from five years of political bargaining.

The CDU's national leadership was mostly elected by two committees. The national party congress brought together majority and minority elites to elect the party leader and the two deputy leaders. The remaining leadership positions were elected by the party council which was primarily a meeting of majority elites from the CDU's Land branches. The latter provided majority elites from the strong Land branches in the (South-)West with a de facto guaranteed representation in the party leadership. Leaders of these Land branches and the PPG, whose leader was an ex-officio member of the national executive, were thus, unlike in the DC and similar to the ÖVP, incentivized to focus on strengthening their network within their party branch rather than forming factions. In contrast to the ÖVP, the incentives were more mixed for majority elites from the weaker Land branches in the North. While the support within their respective party branch guaranteed access to the party council, they could not build on a strong electoral record to justify their bids for national leadership positions. In addition to maintaining a strong network within their Land branch, they were thus incentivized to build networks across party branches. Finally, minority elites could not be certain to be represented at the party council. Their chance to influence the composition of the national leadership was to forge alliances across party branches at the national party congress.

The resulting moderate level of factionalism was reinforced over time by generating an incentive and resource feedback effect. The institutions in place set the stage for Konrad Adenauer's skillful leadership. He often managed to integrate all competing groups (Bösch, 2001: 239). This reinforced the moderate level of factionalism because it confirmed that majority and minority elites could gain influence by building the type of networks they had been building. This was further confirmed by the statutory modifications the Christian Democrats adopted. The reinforced bargaining system absorbed the exogenously imposed centralization of the leadership selection process in 1967. This illustrates, like in the case of the ÖVP, that

timing plays a crucial role in understanding processes of institutional development.

The CDU's moderate level of factionalism helped the party to adapt when challenged to do so. 1) By integrating both minority and majority elites without encouraging excessive factionalism, it allowed all relevant intra-party groups to participate in the necessary programmatic reforms without leading to the instability characterizing decision-making in the DC. This contributed importantly to preventing the break-away of factions and the exodus of minority elites. The moderate factionalism also helped to attract 2) new party cadres and 3) voters when threatened by right-wing competitors and changes in German society. 4) It facilitated adapting the power of intra-party groups according to changes in the population which made leadership changes more substantive than in the ÖVP and DC. 5) Finally, all of this contributed to an electoral trend which has been much more positive than in the case of the Austrian and Italian Christian Democrats.

Chapter 6

After 1990: The Portuguese, Dutch and Luxembourgian Christian Democrats

'Ultimately, political science needs to develop a comparative framework for explaining the historical development of Christian democracy and the cross-national variation in the movement's capacity to mobilize power.' (Van Kersbergen, 2008: 260)

6.1 Introduction

I have shown that my model accounts for the differences in factionalism and the varying adaptability of Christian Democratic parties in Italy, Austria and Germany. My analysis has covered the entire time span these parties have existed while building on original primary data. It has explained the trajectory of three cases which have been highly influential in the political development of their own countries and Western European politics at large.

While these are already important contributions in themselves, the fruitfulness of my theory of organizational choices and organizational adaptability is reinforced by its usefulness to account for the development of further cases. If I am right, and the initially adopted leadership selection process affects the level of factionalism which, in turn, guides party adaptability, my argument should be supported by other cases that are part of my sample. Ideally, I would

have liked to dedicate the same level of detail to the remaining parties presented in Figure 6.1 as I have done for the three parties analyzed in Chapters 3 through 5. Conducting archival research in nine additional countries, however, would have gone far beyond the space, time and resources of this doctoral thesis.

I thus follow seminal studies which have applied a research design similar to mine (Kitschelt, 1994: 287-95; Levitsky, 2003: 232-45; Thachil, 2014: 233-62). I provide an account of how my model might be fleshed out for the Portuguese, Dutch and Luxembourgian Christian Democrats.

Figure 6.1: Leadership selection and relative change in vote share (from Chapter 1.6)



Election data: Nordsieck (2017); centralization: see Appendix B

By choosing three cases which have been close to the fitted line, I follow again Lieberman's (2005) nested analysis approach. Moreover, when choosing among the cases close to a characteristic point of the regression line, I have, in accordance with the methodological approach presented in Chapter 1, selected the cases which provide the best conditions for a most-similar system design. All three parties are from unitary polities. Moreover, power has been firmly

centralized in the hands of the national leadership which helps to control for Borz's (2017) and Wills-Otero's (2016) argument regarding the link between power centralization and factionalism and adaptability respectively.[1] Furthermore, the Portuguese and Luxembourgian case have in common that the Christian Democrats formed their organization after party competition had been suspended (i.e. the Salazar-Caetano dictatorship in Portugal; German occupation of Luxembourg during World War II).

A final reason for choosing these three cases has to do with the importance of accessible secondary literature. This last point refers to the challenges entailed by language barriers but also to the general problem that studies on Christian democratic parties are relatively scarce compared to other party families (see Chapter 1.2).

6.2 Centralized selection procedure and lack of unity: The Portuguese CDS-PP

6.2.1 Introduction of a centralized leadership selection process

A group of political elites around Diogo Freitas do Amaral formed the Portuguese Democratic and Social Center (CDS) around three months after a military coup on 25 April 1974 and the outbreak of the so-called Carnation revolution had put an end to the authoritarian *Estado Novo* (Bruneau, 1997: 3-4; Bruneau and MacLeod, 1986: 3-4; Pappas, 2001: 259; Van Biezen, 2003: 61). They had been close to the late autocrat Marcelo Caetano and saw in the formation of a Christian democratic party a way of preventing the Socialists and Communists from assuming power (Bruneau and MacLeod, 1986: 78, 81; Bruneau, 1997: 4; Frain, 1997: 79, 83-4; Van Biezen, 2003: 58, 61).

The CDS's centralized procedure to select its national leaders was designed by the group

[1] On centralization of power in the CDS, see Bruneau and MacLeod (1986: 81), Frain (1997: 86), Van Biezen (2003: 61, 75) and Matuschek (2008: 85); in the CDA, see Krouwel (1993: 71-4), Koole (1994: 286, 299) and Duncan (2007a: 73-4); in the CSV, see Feltes (2008: 409-11, 420-1, 424, 441, 452), Grosbosch (2008: 333, 338-9, 349, 388), Kraemer (2008: 748, 750) and Schoentgen (2008: 261, 268, 316).

around Freitas do Amaral. It was accepted as part of their statutory proposal at the party's constituent congress in January 1975. The national leadership was, like in the Italian DC, primarily chosen by a central party assembly. The national congress elected 20 out of 23 members of the national executive (*Comissao Politica*). Only the presidents of the party's youth and trade unionist movement and the party's newspaper were ex-officio members (fractionalization index: 0.238).[2]

Structural or antecedent factors did not seem to have played a role in this process. The CDS did not have a predecessor party which could have served as organizational role model.[3] Moreover, it had adopted its initial statute before the party established formal relations with other Christian Democratic parties in Europe (Bruneau, 1997: 8; Frain, 1997: 80-1; Magone, 1999: 244). The Church had also not interfered in the process of party formation and, finally, the CDS had been founded before basic legislation was issued to regulate party activities (Bruneau, 1997: 4, 7).

6.2.2 High factionalism

Similar to the DC, the adopted centralized process to elect the national leaders of the CDS led to a high level of factionalism (Frain, 1997: 90-1).

The CDS became factionalized even though Portugal has used a closed-list PR system (Bruneau, 1997: 12; Magalhaes, 2012: 317). Such a system has been suggested to encourage party- rather than candidate-centered competition and to discourage factionalism (Borz, 2017: 7-8,13).

The closed-list PR system also underlines why the tradition of clientelism (*caciquismo*[4]) does not comprehensively explain factionalism in the CDS. As discussed in Chapters 1.3.2 and 3, clientelism has usually been theorized as encouraging the formation of factions when combined

[2] *Estutatos Partito do Centro Democratico Social*, Art. 84.

[3] The Salazar-Caetano dictatorship had suppressed all political parties (Bruneau, 1997: 1, 3). Only the Communist Party had existed clandestinely.

[4] Magone (1999: 233) explains: 'The cacique was the local boss . . . able, through his influence in the village, to offer a supply of votes . . . and to gain favors in return.' Also compare Fernandes, Meneses and Baioa (2003).

with an electoral system that allows for competition between candidates from the same party. Such a system, however, has not been present in Portugal.

Moreover, the dominant party approach cannot account for the CDS' high level of factionalism. Unlike the DC, the Portuguese Christian Democrats have spent, for various reasons, most of their existence in opposition (Bruneau and MacLeod, 1986: 78, 80, 89; Van Biezen, 2003: 57; Pappas, 2001: 259-60).

Furthermore, the tradition of factionalism under the First Republic (1910-1926) does not sufficiently explain the CDS's level of factionalism (compare Magone, 1999: 234). If such antecedent factors had destined Portuguese parties to be highly factionalized, we would not expect to observe the existing variation in factionalism between parties (Frain, 1997: 87, 90; Van Biezen, 2003: 56).

Finally, the CDS became highly factionalized even though it had been formed by a fairly homogeneous group around Freitas do Amaral (Matuschek, 2008: 88-9).

Instead, factions emerged, as predicted by my model, as a tool for party elites to mobilize support at national leadership elections. Freitas do Amaral's authority and the stark attacks by the far-left might have delayed the outbreak of factionalism in the CDS' early years. Yet, disagreements over the party's coalition strategy, personal quarrels between party elites and the extent to which Christian-centrist, market-liberal and national-conservative positions should dominate the CDS' rhetoric were translated into the formation of factions in the early 1980s (Frain, 1997: 90-1, 102; Bruneau and MacLeod, 1986: 89; Matuschek, 2008: 88-9).

The case of the Portuguese Christian Democrats also underlines the importance of a qualitative analysis of factional competition. The CDS has usually not included more than three to four major factions at a time (Bruneau and MacLeod, 1986: 89; Frain, 1997: 90-2; Van Biezen, 2003: 58). However, very much like the DC, factions rather than the party's parliamentary, ancillary and subnational branches have been the predominant unit of competition within the CDS since the early 1980s (ibid.; Matuschek, 2008: 84-98, 139-71, 204-16). The almost complete split of the national party into two factional blocs in 1990 illustrated the

high level of factionalism (Frain, 1997: 92).

The high level of factionalism was reinforced over time through a series of statutory modifications. This involved the acceptance of PR for internal elections as a concession to Freitas do Amaral's *freitistas* faction when Lucas Pires tried to consolidate his party leadership at the 1985 national congress (Frain, 1997: 86).[5] It also included attempts by the faction which had won a majority in the national executive to consolidate its control over the party by centralizing power in the hands of the national party leadership (Van Biezen, 2003: 65-6, 74). This was particularly obvious under the leadership of Monteiro who wanted to oust rival factions from party organs by abolishing the internal PR system (Frain, 1997: 86). Monteiro also continued the development toward an increased central control over the candidate selection process and the internal financial management of the party (Van Biezen, 2003: 74-6). When Monteiro was pushed out of the leadership, however, the internal balance of power tipped again towards a different faction (ibid.: 66). Moreover, the importance of factions as organizational units in intra-party politics was reinforced by reproducing the centralized selection process of the national leadership when electing the national congress delegates at the subnational level of the party (Bruneau and MacLeod, 1986: 81; Van Biezen, 2003: 66-70).

Consequently, factionalism persisted despite the enhanced political significance of the Portuguese regions in the 1990s (Magone, 1999: 245).

6.2.3 Weak adaptability

The Portuguese Christian Democrats have primarily faced two challenges to adapt. 1) The shrinking of its traditional stronghold in the conservative and Catholic Northern and North-eastern regions made it important to broaden the party's electoral appeal (Magone, 1999: 246-7). 2) The CDS was required to find a place in Portugal's party system following the tumultuous revolutionary years (Bruneau and MacLeod, 1986: 78).

[5] It is unclear whether PR had been used at some point before 1985. Matuschek (2008: 85) has been quite ambiguous regarding the precise format of the electoral system and the party statutes to which he is referring.

If a low level of institutionalization, in other words, a high level of leadership autonomy, enhanced party adaptability (Kitschelt, 1994; Levitsky, 2003), we would expect the CDS to be highly adaptable. The party lacked an extensive mass membership or deep roots within society due to the absence of historic parties and the fact that the CDS emerged shortly after the 1974 revolution (Freire, 2006: 375-6). The party leaders tried to make up for this by building on the pre-existing network of patron-client relations on the ground (Frain, 1997: 79). The CDS thereby developed only a weak organizational presence at the local level. Consequently, the national leadership was widely autonomous in its decision-making and the CDS acquired the reputation of 'a party with a head and no body' (Bruneau and MacLeod, 1986: 81; Frain, 1997: 86; Van Biezen, 2003: 61, 75; Matuschek, 2008: 85).

Yet, the CDS has experienced substantial difficulties in adapting to a changing environment because of its high level of factionalism.

Continuous factional disputes prevented the party from defining and capturing an ideological space as a way of strengthening its electoral appeal (Bruneau and MacLeod, 1986: 87). When Lucas Pires and his *pristas* faction assumed the party leadership in 1983, he markedly shifted the party from a centrist position to the neoliberal right which was criticized by the *freitistas* (Frain, 1997: 84). Freitas do Amaral returned to the party leadership in 1988, again moving the party to the center without, however, solving the factional conflicts (Frain, 1997: 91). After the 1991 election, the old factions had lost ground and Manuel Monteiro assumed the leadership. He managed to gain support for renaming the party into People's Party (PP) and positioning it on the (national-)right (Frain, 1997: 84, 92; Pappas, 2001: 262). Yet, even 'the charismatic and popular leadership of Monteiro could not quell internal divisions among PP elites' even though the PP more than doubled its vote share in 1995 (9.1 percent) and tripled its seat share (from five to 15) (Frain, 1997: 92; Magone, 1999: 244). Internal opposition to Monteiro's course led to a 'break-down in party discipline in Assembly votes' (Frain, 1997: 92). In 1998, Portas succeeded in replacing Monteiro as leader which meant a comeback of the party's centrist faction (Magone, 1999: 244; Van Biezen, 2003: 58). Thus, the CDS' attempts to find its place in the political spectrum were accompanied by a high level of internal problems between the different factions as well as strong personality clashes, which led former party leader Basillo Horta to coin the CDS as 'a group of friends who cordially hate each

other' (Van Biezen, 2003: 57).

This ideological instability due to factional disputes is also linked to the CDS' limited ability to renew its leadership. While the CDS was able to replace its party leaders quite frequently, which often resulted in the described shifts in the party's ideological position, the elected leaders depended on the support of their and often also other factions. These coalitions, similar to the DC, were inherently unstable and conflicts between factions often re-emerged shortly after the leadership election. They undermined the leaders' authority, limited their ability to reform the party and prepared the way for yet another replacement of the party's top level (Matuschek, 2008: 86, 88-9, 140, 142-8, 204, 206-10).

Conflicts between factions were often too intense for the CDS to keep opponents within the party. Consequently, it suffered several factional splits. For instance, the battles with the party's right-wing faction convinced moderate and pragmatic party elites, like Luis Barbosa, Sa Machado and Roberto Carneiro, to leave in the 1980s and set up the New Democracy Group (Frain, 1997: 91). In the mid-1980s, Freitas do Amaral and some of his *freitistas* temporarily withdrew from the party out of protest against the rising neo-conservative factions. In 1992, Freitas do Amaral left for good after Monteiro's right-wing faction had gained power. With one of its key founders leaving the party, the CDS lost a key identification figure for the party's centrist cadres and voters (Matuschek, 2008: 86-9, 146-8).

The CDS's inability to agree on a political strategy and to prevent groups the Christian Democrats wanted to appeal to from abandoning the party contributed to its mediocre electoral trend. The party declined from 16 percent in the parliamentary election in 1976 to 4.4 percent in the late 1980s and early 1990s after having temporarily tried to improve their prospects by forming an electoral alliance with the PSD (Frain, 1997: 102-3). After the party celebrated a strong comeback in 1995 (9.1 percent), the vote share again declined to 7.3 percent in 2005. Recently, the Christian Democrats again succeeded in winning over 10 (in 2009) and 11 percent (in 2011). However, while it is not possible to derive the CDS's vote share for the 2015 election as it had again entered an electoral alliance with the PSD, its loss of six seats seems to indicate that the Christian Democrats have not been able to reverse the trend and to fully recover their pre-1985 strength (cf. Magalhaes, 2012: 317).

Figure 6.2: CDS vote share, 1975 to 2015



Data: Nordsieck (2017).

Hence, the development of the CDS shows important parallels to the dynamics unfolded in the Italian DC (Chapter 3). A centralized leadership selection process is likely to initiate a high level of factionalism which, in turn, undermines a party's adaptability.

6.3 Decentralized selection procedures and the lack of flexibility: The Dutch CDA

6.3.1 Introduction of a decentralized leadership selection process

The CDA resulted from a merger of the Catholic People's Party (KVP) and two Protestant parties, the social-progressive Anti-Revolutionary Party (ARP) and the conservative Christian Historical Union (CHU) (Lepszy and Koecke, 2000: 124, 137). This merger had been encouraged by the decreasing importance of religion as the driving force of vote choice which had led to a dramatic electoral downfall of the three parties (Lepszy and Koecke, 2000: 142-3).[6]

[6] KVP, ARP and CHU had previously benefited from the division of society into a network of social organizations which were bound together by a common faith or ideology and of which political parties constituted the political expression (i.e. so-called pillarization; Bakvis, 1981: 1-4, 35; Koole, 1994: 278).

Yet, it took the three parties eight years to agree on entering a federation and another five years finally to merge into the CDA in 1980 (Bakvis, 1981: 2; Lucardie and ten Napel, 1994: 53; Evans, 1999: 242; Lepszy and Koecke, 2000: 143-8; Bosmans, 2004: 57; Duncan, 2007a: 72). With no legal requirements regarding the party's internal structure (Lepszy and Koecke, 2000: 154), party elites disagreed, among other things, on the extent to which the federative structure should give way to a single party platform. Especially the ARP leadership had reservations against abandoning the three parties as distinct organizational entities. It was the pressure from its own members who collected 80,000 signatures in favor of the merger that convinced the ARP leaders to give in (ibid.: 149).

The CDA ultimately adopted the model of a mass party with an influential national executive which was selected in a highly decentralized way (Koole, 1994: 280, 286, 299; Lepszy and Koecke, 2000: 160-1). It included: 1) the party leader and two deputy leaders who were elected by the CDA local branches in combination with the party council (and confirmed by the party congress), 2) 10 members elected by the party council, 3) between one and three delegates (depending on membership size) from each of the 19 district branches, 4) two delegates from the women's movement and 5) two delegates from the youth movement (fractionalization index: 0.922) (Lepszy and Koecke, 2000: 160).

6.3.2 Low factionalism

As predicted by my model, this discouraged party elites from forming factions. When compared to the Christian Democratic parties in Austria, Italy, Germany and Belgium, Van Kersbergen (1995: 28-9) has ranked the CDA as being the least factionalized party (also compare Lepszy and Koecke, 2000: 161-7).

This lends strong support to my theory because factionalism might have appeared to be quite likely given the existence of three predecessor organizations and the stark theological and political differences between them (Hoeckstra, 1968: 11; Nieboer and Lucardie, 1992: 149–67; Lepszy and Koecke, 2000: 141, 148; Duncan, 2007a: 85). Yet, while people's former party affiliation was considered when distributing offices, the importance of this quota system

decreased over time and has never resulted in factionalism (Lepszy and Koecke, 2000: 196-7, 208).

The CDA's low level of factionalism also echoes my finding in Chapter 3 and 4 that a preference vote component, which was included in the Dutch electoral system, does not unequivocally translate into a high level of factionalism (compare Koole, 1994: 283).

Another alternative explanation for the absence of factions refers to the incompatibility clause the CDA introduced with its first statute. Party elites were not allowed simultaneously to hold office in more than one of the following arenas: the extra-parliamentary party organization, the party's parliamentary group and the government (Lepszy and Koecke, 2000: 161, 169). The incompatibility rule has surely been one of the reasons why the CDA's parliamentary party leader and the prime minister, when the CDA was holding this position, have played a crucial role in intra-party politics (Lucardie and ten Napel, 1994: 57). It does not imply, however, that we did not see the emergence of factionalism because there was nothing to compete for within the CDA (ibid.: 157). In fact, the national executive and executive committee has held far-reaching powers over internal decision-making and the party's financial resources (Krouwel, 1993: 71-4; Koole, 1994: 286, 299; Duncan, 2007a: 74).

The absence of factions can also not be explained by a high level of party unity. Deep divisions have existed within the CDA (Lucardie and ten Napel, 1994: 53). Yet, conflicts were fought within the organizational branches of the party and between the branches themselves (Van Kersbergen, 1999: 368-9; Lepszy and Koecke, 2000: 186-93; Duncan, 2006: 485). This corresponds to the predictions my model makes for parties with a decentralized leadership selection process.

Although the decision-making process within the CDA was already criticized in the 1980s for being overly rigid (Lepszy and Koecke, 2000: 196), majority elites from its organizational branches prevented substantive changes to the intra-party playing field. They successfully opposed party leader Wim van Velzen who wanted to make the internal selection and decision-making process more inclusive and facilitate the internal rise of new groups (Lepszy and Koecke, 2000: 201-4). The initial patterns of intra-party competition thus persisted over

time.

6.3.3 Weak adaptability

The CDA initially appeared like a success in terms of stopping the decline of the confessional vote share (Bosman, 2004: 57). Under the popular and charismatic CDA prime minister Ruud Lubbers, the Dutch Christian Democrats became the largest party in terms of parliamentary seats and membership and the pivotal player in the coalition system (Lepszy and Koecke, 2000: 197-201; Van Kersbergen, 2008: 260-1). Lubbers' influence was also essential in 'integrating the still youthful party' and attracting 'a greater proportion of voters distant from the church' (Duncan, 2007a: 74).

Yet, it was rightly warned that Lubber's great popularity distracted from serious structural problems (Oostlander, 1986: 410-5; Lepszy and Koecke, 2000: 201). When Lubbers announced, after 12 years in office, that he would not run again in 1994, it had become clear that the CDA was in serious trouble. The extensive welfare regime for which the CDA had largely been responsible and which was the basis of the party's social support coalition had shown to be unsustainable (Van Kersbergen, 1999: 366; Lepszy and Koecke, 2000: 216). When the Christian Democrats announced that no social security scheme could be spared from retrenchments, two parties for the elderly formed which wooed parts of the CDA electorate (Van Kersbergen, 1999: 368-9; Duncan, 2007a: 75-6). Moreover, the issue of reforming the welfare state intensified tensions within the party's parliamentary group. Parliamentary party leader Elco Brinkman, who had succeeded Lubbers as the CDA's top candidate for the 1994 election, had proposed conservative policies which were heavily contested (Van Kersbergen, 1999: 368-9; Duncan, 2007a: 75-6). Furthermore, the CDA's advances in attracting new voters had shown to be fugitive and largely due to Lubbers' charisma. Consequently, the CDA was challenged to find a lasting way of mobilizing voters whose vote choice was driven by other factors than religion (Lepszy and Koecke, 2000: 180-6; Duncan, 2006: 471-82; Van Kersbergen, 2008: 263-4). Finally, the quarrels within the CDA facilitated the rapprochement of the liberal VVD and the Labour Party which deprived the Christian Democrats of their pivotal position in coalition formation (Van Kersbergen, 1999: 349; 2008: 262-3).

According to the institutionalization argument, we would expect the CDA to be highly adaptable to such changes because it was relatively weakly institutionalized which provided its leaders with an important level of autonomy. In fact, by the late 1980s, it was the least institutionalized party included in Table 1.4 above which underlines the limitations of Kitschelt's (1994) and Levitsky's (2003) argument for Western European Christian Democracy.

However, while the conservative leadership was replaced with social-Christian actors following the defeat in the 1994 election (Duncan, 2007a: 76, 82), this leadership change did not translate into a coherent strategy to win over new constituencies. Similar to the ÖVP, the new leaders were constrained in their reform attempts by competition within their own party branches and with majority elites from other organizational branches of the party. For instance, the new leader of the CDA's parliamentary group, Enneus Herma, faced intense opposition from within the parliamentary group (Duncan, 2007a: 76-7). Ultimately, he resigned and was replaced by the conservative Jaap de Hoop Scheffer who, however, struggled to assert himself against other majority elites behind the leader of the CDA group in the Upper Chamber and deputy party leader, Tineke Lodders (ibid.: 77).

The internal divisions paralyzed the organizational branches in the CDA which proved inadequate to aggregate competing interests (Metze, 1995: 154; Duncan, 2007a: 84). The new program 'New Ways, Firm Values' contained relatively little in terms of policy change and, in particular, maintained the party's strong commitment to its religious identity (Duncan, 2007a: 78-81).

The CDA's continuing emphasis on its religious identity was more a sign of the party's inability to pass substantive reforms than of internal agreement on endorsing a specific strategy. The CDA had always had a stronger programmatic emphasis on the Bible compared to other Christian democratic parties (Hanley, 1994: 5; Lane and Errson, 1994: 151; Duncan, 2007a: 73). Yet, there was clear evidence that this position would not be beneficial electorally as the share of religiously active voters was in long-term decline and the CDA's support among the non-religious was low (Van Kersbergen, 1994: 35; Duncan, 2007a: 83). Party elites were at least ambivalent about the option of chasing new voters (Duncan, 2007a: 73).

Duncan (2007a: 83) suggested that the CDA's holding on to its Christian identity might have been the only promising strategy since moving away from it might have caused serious problems to differentiate the party from the center-right VVD. Moreover, it would have entailed the risk of losing Christian core voters to the orthodox Calvinist parties.

However, the CDA tried to reach out to new voters, members and party cadres but its organization proved too rigid for succeeding in doing so. While it managed to increase the share of female and young MPs (de Boer et al., 1998: 26; Versteegh, 1999: 236; Duncan, 2007a: 81-3), these attempts were designed and dominated by the party leadership (Duncan, 2007a: 81). Real change in the patterns of intra-party competition did not occur. The rise of genuinely new actors who did not easily fit into the entrenched interests of the different organizational party branches remained difficult. Thus, the internal playing field proved too rigid for attracting new voters and party cadres in an environment characterized by a decline in stable collective identities (Van Kersbergen, 2008: 273). Consequently, the success of enhancing opportunities for participation and attracting new members was very limited. Membership figures continued to fall (ibid.: 83).

Consequently, the CDA's vote share declined from 35.3 percent in 1989 to 22.2 percent in 1994 and 18.4 percent in 1998 (Bosman, 2004: 57; Duncan, 2007a: 69; Figure 6.3).

Figure 6.3: CDA vote share, 1977 to 2017



Data: Nordsieck (2017).

This trend had already started before right-wing populist parties marked a noteworthy entry in the Dutch party system. The rise of the right-wing populist Pim Fortuyn, the assassination of Fortuyn shortly before the 2002 and the CDA's position in opposition surely helped the Christian Democrats to celebrate a remarkable electoral comeback in 2002 (27.9 percent) and to return to government. This comeback, however, was short-lived. The CDA's vote share dropped again dramatically in 2010 (-12.8 percent) and has remained relatively weak (i.e. 12.4 percent in the 2017 election).

Thus, although power has been similarly centralized in the CDA than in the highly factionalized CDS, the process leading to its weak adaptability has shown some important similarities to the development of the Austrian ÖVP in which power has been decentralized. This undermines the explanatory power of Wills-Otero's (2016) decentralization thesis while following the dynamics predicted by my model: A decentralized leadership selection process discouraged the formation of factions and led to a quite rigid structure of intra-party decision-making which made the party struggle to adapt to a changing environment.

6.4 Mixed selection procedure and successful adaptation: The Luxembourgian CSV

Despite the small size of Luxembourg's territory, administration and legislature (Fry and Raymond, 1980: 99; Schroen, 2000: 368-40), the Christian-Social People's Party (CSV) is a suitable comparative case. It has been the dominant governing party for most of Luxembourg's post-war history, built on a strong anti-communism during the Cold War, and emerged after party competition had been suppressed as a result of Nazi-German occupation (Schroen, 2000: 344-5, 368-9; Grosbusch, 2008: 332; Schoentgen, 2008: 214-5, 259).

6.4.1 Introduction of a mixed leadership selection process

The CSV resulted from the transformation of the pre-war Party of the Right (PdR) which shifted from conservatism and confessionalism to a catch-all appeal and introduced substantive organizational changes in 1945 (Janssen, 2006: 323-4).

The structural conditions under which party formation took place pointed toward a decentralized leadership selection process. Similar to Austria, Italy and Germany, ongoing military activities in 1944 and early 1945 restricted free movement and thus the ability to centrally direct party formation. This contributed to strong cross-regional differences in terms of party building (Schroen, 2000: 346; Schoentgen, 2008: 252). Moreover, given the country's small size, close contacts between national and subnational politics had been an inherent part of Luxembourgian politics. We might expect the leadership selection process mainly to take place within the party's four district branches.[7] Finally, the PdR had been a classic cadre party in which groups of notables representing Church, trade unionist or agricultural interests had substantive influence (ibid.: 247, 254).

The CSV's founding fathers, however, had a different vision for the party's organizational format (Schroen, 2000: 346; Schoentgen, 2008: 247). Pierre Dupong, Emile Reuter and Emile Schaus designed the CSV as a modern mass party whose rules to select its national leaders starkly differed from those of the PdR. The PdR's national leadership had included an unspecified number of delegates who were autonomously chosen from the party's parliamentary group and the press and civil associations that endorsed the PdR's principles (Schoentgen, 2008: 254, 260). Ex-officio membership in the CSV's national executive, by contrast, was restricted to the leader of the party's parliamentary group and the presidents of the four district branches of the party. The national congress, in turn, elected seven national executive positions. While these seven positions had to include two representatives each for the Southern, Northern and Central district and one representative for the Eastern district,[8] the national congress was sovereign in its choice whom to elect. Competitive elections for these positions were quite frequent (e.g. Feltes, 2008: 411-2). The elected national executive could

[7] Luxembourg has been divided into four electoral districts (i.e. South, Central, North and East) which very likely inspired the CSV's structure at the subnational level.

[8] *Statuten vun der Chrëschtlech-sozialer Volleksspartei, CSV*. 1946, Art. 13.3.

then co-opt five eminent party elites and elected, among its own ranks, the president of the national executive (Schoentgen, 2008: 261).[9] The CSV thus introduced a mixed leadership selection process which tried to strike the balance between guaranteed regional representation and a democratic leadership selection which gave a substantive say to a central party assembly (fractionalization index: 0.542).

6.4.2 Moderate factionalism

Two factors might make us expect a high level of factionalism in the CSV according to alternative approaches to factionalism. First, Luxembourg has used a PR system with a preferential voting component. Voters can cast as many votes as seats are available in their constituency (i.e. between seven and 23). These preference votes can be distributed among candidates of the same or from different parties and a maximum of two votes can be given to the same candidate (Fry and Raymond, 1980: 83; Schroen, 2000: 354-5; Fehlen, 2008: 479). Second, the CSV's almost permanent position in government guaranteed an almost constant access to influential positions and public funds.

While it could be replied that the consociational political system in Luxembourg and the outsourcing of contentious topics to referenda discouraged factionalism (Lijphart, 1999; Schroen, 2000: 338, 373), both factors do not pay sufficient attention to the substantive rivalries among the Christian Democrats. Already in the 1940s and 1950s, the CSV was characterized by fierce conflicts between party elites over the selection of parliamentary candidates, the allocation of offices and the direction of policies which often came into the open at the party's national congress (Schoentgen, 2008: 315-9). This has not changed much over the past decades as the detailed accounts of the party's trajectory have outlined (Fehltes, 2008; Grosbusch, 2008; Schoentgen, 2008).

My model helps explain why intra-party tensions have not been translated into a high level of factionalism, as observed in the Italian DC and the Portuguese CDS. Majority elites in the CSV's district branches and parliamentary group did not need to form factions because their

[9] Ibid.

guaranteed access to the national executive allowed them to promote their interests. Accordingly, the CSV's organizational branches in the districts and parliament became important actors in intra-party politics (Feltes, 2008: 453; Schoentgen, 2008: 265, 287-91, 327).

Yet, as predicted by my model, the CSV's mixed leadership selection process also provided opportunities to gain intra-party influence by forming ties across party branches. A left, an agricultural-conservative and a middle-class tendency became notable at the national congress which elected around half of the executive positions[10] shortly after the CSV had been formed (Schoentgen, 2008: 299-300). Actors from different party branches acted together by, for instance, presenting joint motions and supporting specific leadership candidates (Feltes, 2008: 411-2; Grosbusch, 2008: 362, 365; Schoentgen, 2008: 314, 317-9). Such networks were reproduced at different levels of the party organization and have persisted in recent intra-party politics (Felten, 2008: 449-50, 456; Grosbusch, 2008: 391).

While the available sources do not allow specifying the factions solidifying out of these conflicts, we know that factions have existed within the CSV. Janda (1980: 494) mentions factions which appeared after the CSV had gone into opposition in 1974. Moreover, the ongoing conflict between middle-class, conservative and left-leaning tendencies culminated in the formation of the socially conservative and economically liberal *Cercle Joseph Bech* faction in the late 1990 (Feltes, 2008: 448-9). Finally, in Borz and de Miguel's (2017) expert survey, the CSV has been assigned a score of 2.5, 2 and 2 on a scale from 1 to 5 for leadership, ideological and issue factionalism respectively.

The patterns of intra-party competition which have unfolded within the CSV thus correspond to the dynamic predicted by my model. The mixed selection process had created an internal playing field where both networks within and across party branches have been a valuable resource. Accordingly, the decision-making process was characterized by both 1) the party's district branches and the party in public office which enjoyed guaranteed representation in the national executive and 2) networks, like tendencies and factions, which have operated across party branches (Schoentgen, 2008: 321). This combination has kept factionalism at a moderate level (Schoentgen, 2008: 326).

[10]Excluding the five members co-opted by the elected national executive.

This intra-party playing field was organizationally reproduced over time. Statutory changes confirmed the co-existence of ex-officio members and centrally elected members of the national executive (Schoentgen, 2008: 261, 264, 266; Grosbusch, 2008: 338-9, 363). This contributed to the consolidation of intra-party practices (compare Kraemer, 2008: 746).

6.4.3 High adaptability

Although the Luxembourgian electorate is socially quite homogeneous and the country's economic development has been positive (Fry and Raymond, 1980: 69; Janssen, 2006: 321; Fehlen, 2008: 492-4), the CSV still faced important challenges which required the party to adapt (Feltes, 2008: 437-43). 1) The Christian Democrats' core constituencies have been shrinking dramatically (Schroen, 2000: 339, 354; Fehlen, 2008: 486; Feltes, 2008: 436). Both the share of churchgoing Catholics and the CSV's vote share decreased by 15 percent between 1954 and 1974 (Grosbusch, 2008: 370). Moreover, the proportion of people attending church at least once a week dropped from 42.8 percent in the 1970s to 24.6 percent in the second half of the 1990s (Fehlen, 2008: 48). Similarly, the number of farms in Luxembourg declined from 13,500 in 1950 to 5,200 in 1980 (Schroen, 2000: 358-9; Grosbusch, 2008: 370). 2) The political instability following the collapse of Eastern European communism intensified the fear in Luxembourg of being overwhelmed by immigrants (Feltes, 2008: 434). 3) This aggravated the challenges entailed by a right-wing rival. The Alternative Democratic Reform Party (ADR) experienced an electoral surge between 1989 and the late 1990s and thereby questioned the CSV's dominant position on the right of the political center (Schroen, 2000: 343, 359).

The CSV has succeeded in adapting to these challenges by reaching out to new constituencies. As, unlike in the ÖVP, agricultural interests did not enjoy a guaranteed representation in the CSV leadership, their influence within the party declined when their importance in society declined (Majerus, 2008: 664). While this surely triggered dissatisfaction and encouraged some party elites and voters from rural constituencies to turn their back on the CSV (Schroen, 2000: 359; Majerus, 2008: 637-73), it allowed the party to modernize its image and policies. Young party elites, socialized in a transformed Luxembourgian society and representing the

interests and values of a new generation, benefited from the elections taking place at the national congress to increase their influence in the party leadership (Schroen, 2000: 347-8; Grosbusch, 2008: 390). At the same time, the guaranteed influence of the district branches added an aspect of continuity. This helped the CSV to diversify its electoral basis by reaching out to young voters and women, while maintaining its traditional strongholds (Schroen, 2000: 351-2; Feltes, 2008: 445, 459, 491).

Moreover, the rise of new leaders has also underlined the CSV's adaptability. Like the ÖVP, leadership changes followed disappointing election results. Yet, unlike the ÖVP and similar to the CDU, changes in the person of the party leader reflected a shift in intra-party power (Schroen, 2000: 353; Feltes, 2008: 403; Schoentgen, 2008: 322). The leadership elections since 1979, for instance, have reflected the strength of the party's left wing (Feltes, 2008: 402, 455-6). The rise of new and young party elites might have contributed to the continuous increase in party membership which is particularly noteworthy at a time when political parties usually note a shrinking membership (Schroen, 2000: 353; Feltes, 2008: 419).

Despite the strength of social-Catholic positions in the recent history of the CSV, the party's moderate level of factionalism provided liberal-conservative party elites with influence which helped the CSV to prevent major splits. Admittedly, the CSV lost a number of party elites to the right-wing ADR due to policy disagreements and personal quarrels (Feltes, 2008: 431, 438-9; Majerus, 2008: 665-6). While the ADR thus benefited to some extent from conflicts within the CSV (Schroen, 2000: 358-9), it would be wrong to consider the ADR a split from the CSV (Majerus, 2008: 670). In fact, the CSV's internal playing field might have prevented a breakaway of its right wing as it gave room for the *Cercle Joseph Bech* faction (Feltes, 2008: 448-9).

This also shows the limitations of the institutionalization argument. It provides some insight into understanding the substantive level of autonomy the party leadership enjoyed. Yet, it does not explain why minority elites stayed in the party when the party leadership ignored positions taken at the party congress or ignored the deliberative party bodies when taking important decisions (Feltes, 2008: 409-11, 420-1, 424, 441, 452; Grosbosch, 2008: 333, 338-9, 349, 388; Kraemer, 2008: 748, 750; Schoentgen, 2008: 268, 316). My model links this to the party's moderate level of factionalism. It allowed, unlike in the ÖVP, all intra-party groups to

make their voice heard without giving way to the same level of paralyzing factionalism that we observed in the Italian DC.

All these factors contributed to an electoral trend that has been much more positive than for most Western European Christian Democratic parties despite repeated changes in the strength of right-wing populist and far-left parties. The aforementioned ADR has received between seven to 11.3 percent of the votes since 1989 and the Communists usually scored between five and 16 percent during the Cold War before disappearing from parliament in 1994.

The CSV's vote share has remained relatively stable. While the CSV is no exception to the observation that Christian Democracy has declined across the continent, its losses have been relatively moderate. The CSV has dropped on only one occasion under 30 percent of the votes (27.6 percent in 1974). While it recently declined from 38 to 33.7 percent in 2013 and, as a result, needed to give up power to a Social Democratic-Liberal-Green coalition, the CSV has remained Luxembourg's strongest party (i.e. 13.3 percent ahead of the Social Democrats). It also performed within its usual range. Since 1960, the party's vote share has usually oscillated between 30 and 35 percent.[11]

Figure 6.4: CSV vote share, 1945 to 2013



Data: Nordsieck (2017).

[11]The exceptions being: 35.3 percent in 1969, 27.6 percent in 1974, 36.1 percent in 2004 and 38 percent in 2009.

Hence, similar to the German CDU, the Luxembourgian Christian Democrats have updated their policies without, however, abandoning their core constituencies. Its intra-party bargaining system has played an important role in achieving this. It allowed, on the one hand, for substantive changes in the party's internal power structure and the rise of new leaders as well as for minority groups to influence the decision-making process. On the other hand, this did not degenerate into excessive factionalism as the CSV's district branches and parliamentary group have remained important intra-party actors (Janssen, 2006: 327). The result of this balancing of interests has been a party that 'moves ... between tradition and innovation' and thereby adopted quite successfully to social and political changes (Feltes, 2008: 457).

6.5 Conclusion

The discussion of the Christian Democrats in Portugal, the Netherlands and Luxembourg adds to the evidence presented in the three preceding chapters. Like in the case of the DC, ÖVP and CDU, actors had a choice when formulating the initial procedure to select their national party leaders and their choice proved to be consequential for their parties' level of factionalism and adaptability in the medium- and long-run.

The development of the Portuguese CDS supports my findings on the trajectory of the Italian DC. The decision to adopt a centralized leadership selection process at the moment of party formation in 1974 created an intra-party playing field that incentivized party elites to form factions. The resulting high level of factionalism provides strong support for my argument because competing approaches highlighting the role of the electoral system, the composition of founding groups and the extent to which power has been centralized in the hands of the party leadership would have predicted a low level of factionalism. Instead, and in line with my theoretical model, factions emerged as part of party elites' strategy to seize control over the party leadership. The importance of factions in struggles over the CDS' leadership became entrenched and reinforced over time. It undermined the party's ability to settle on a position in the Portuguese party system which sabotaged its attempts to expand its electoral appeal and attract new party cadres. Instead, the Portuguese Christian Democrats experienced the

break-away of factions, inherently unstable leadership coalitions and mediocre electoral development. This underlines the limited explanatory power of the institutionalization argument as the high level of leadership autonomy would have predicted the CDS to be a highly rather than weakly adaptable party.

The case of the Dutch CDA has revealed some important similarities to the trajectory of the Austrian ÖVP. The CDA adopted a highly decentralized process to select its national leaders which granted ex-officio membership in the national executive to a wide range of majority elites. As expected, this created an internal playing field that made the formation of factions an unbeneficial strategy to gain representation in the national party leadership. The resulting low level of factionalism cannot be sufficiently explained by competing explanations as the existence of three predecessor parties, intra-party conflicts, the party's long-term position in government and preferential voting would have predicted high factionalism. The low level of factionalism was reinforced over time. Attempts to 'democratize' the party's internal decision-making by giving more influence to central party assemblies were blocked. Similar to the ÖVP, the absence of factions made the CDA's internal decision-making overly rigid. An internal bargaining system in which group representation in the national executive was formally regulated through ex-officio memberships made it difficult for new groups to rise and gain access to the party leadership. This complicated the CDA's efforts to attract new voters and party cadres. With majority elites from the CDA's different district, parliamentary and ancillary branches enjoying guaranteed representation in the national executive, new party leaders were usually constrained in the extent to which they could yield renewal. The Dutch Christian Democrats thus struggled to provide answers to the pressing questions of the time which contributed to its vote share disintegrating compared to its pre-1990 strength.

Finally, the Luxembourgian CSV corresponds to what Chapter 5 has outlined for the case of the CDU. Adopting a mixed selection process, the CSV gave space to both ex-officio representation of party branches in the national executive and the election of party leaders by a central party assembly. The resulting incentive structure made both networks within and across party branches a valuable resource within the CSV. The party's moderate level of factionalism corresponds to the predictions by my model but is unexpected from the point of view of competing theories. In particular, Luxembourg's electoral system provides voters

with the most far-reaching influence to change the parties' lists relative to all other cases discussed in this dissertation. The electoral system perspective would have predicted a much higher level of factionalism than we actually observe. Also the CSV's long-standing position in government would have made us expect a high level of factional competition. Instead, the moderate degree of factionalism supported the party's efforts to adapt when challenged by a rising right-wing rival and changes in the social composition of the electorate. Minority groups enjoyed space to make their voice heard without entailing excessive factionalism. Moreover, moderate factionalism facilitated substantive changes in the party's internal power structure and the rise of new leaders. Consequently, the electoral performance of the Luxembourgian Christian Democrats has remained relatively consistent over time.

Hence, focusing on the dynamic triggered by a party's initial procedure to select its national leaders provides a more powerful explanation for its level of factionalism than accounts concentrating on, among other things, its internal heterogeneity, duration in government and the electoral system. The level of factionalism, in turn, offers a more comprehensive account of Christian Democracy's adaptability than theories of party system polarization, party institutionalization and the centralization of power.

Chapter 7

Before 1990: The French MRP.

'Neither the attacks ... of the political enemy, nor the most difficult situations destroy a political force but the ... suppression of its necessary and vital internal contradictions. Men need two legs to walk. And you only have one.' (Abbé Pierre, 14 May 1950)

7.1 Introduction

My argument that the initial set of rules parties adopted to select their national leaders drives their level of factionalism and adaptability in the medium- and long-run has been evidenced by an in-depth analysis of the Italian DC, Austrian ÖVP and German CDU, and has further been supported by the development of the Portuguese, Dutch and Luxembourgian Christian Democrats. All these cases have in common that they were challenged by social and political transformations in the early 1990s. This has allowed me to control for unobserved shock-related heterogeneity.

If I am right and the initial leadership selection process is momentous for a party's level of factionalism and adaptability, my argument should also be supported for a case that has been challenged by quite different developments as long as it meets the scope conditions of my model.[1]

[1] To recap, my model requires that a political party has a formal organization that allows for internal competition and structures the selection process of the party leadership (Chapter 1.4 and Chapter 2).

The Popular Republican Movement (MRP) offers such a case of Western European Christian democracy which allows me to study party adaptability before 1990, while keeping party family- and region-related factors constant. The MRP was founded after World War II and became one of the most important governing parties in the French Fourth Republic. Following the Algerian crisis and the establishment of the Fifth Republic, however, the MRP was unable to find its place in the new political system and ultimately disintegrated in 1967.

In this chapter, I show how the decision to adopt a decentralized leadership selection process in 1944 initiated the dynamics leading to the party's low level of factionalism and adaptability. This initial organizational choice was the result of the political bargaining between elites of the pre-war Popular Democratic Party (PDP) and a younger generation of political actors who had their roots in the lower ranks of the PDP, Catholic civil society and the French Resistance. The fact that the national party leadership was formed by members chosen autonomously by the party's organizational branches made networks within their respective branch the most valuable resource for actors to gain representation in the national leadership. This led, like in the case of the ÖVP and CDA, to a low level of factionalism. The latter became entrenched and reinforced over time as statutory modifications followed the path of a decentralized leadership selection process.

The low factionalism undermined party adaptability. As networks across party branches were not beneficial to help access the national party leadership, actors who were only supported by a minority in their respective party branch were de facto excluded from the MRP's national decision-making. They eventually left the party, taking with them their supporters and loyal voters. Moreover, the MRP's low level of factionalism made its efforts to appeal to new voters and party cadres ill-omened. It also blocked substantial leadership renewal and the resolving of gridlocks between majority elites. All of this was reflected by an electoral downfall. When the Algerian crisis of May 1958 initiated a fundamental transformation of the French political system, its weak adaptability proved fatal for the MRP.

I begin the remainder of this chapter by outlining the political interactions leading to the MRP's decentralized leadership selection. I then analyze the latter's effects on party elites' incentives and resources in intra-party politics. The chapter proceeds by showing how the

resulting low level of factionalism was reinforced over time and how it undermined the MRP's ability to adapt to a changing environment both before and after 1958. When discussing the relevant stage in the MRP's development, I also address the limitations of competing accounts which have overemphasized the role of Charles De Gaulle, the historic weakness of confessional parties in France, the party and electoral system as well as party institutionalization and decentralization of intra-party power.

7.2 The establishment of leadership selection rules

7.2.1 Party federation or mass party?

The structure of the political system (cf. Duverger, 1951) and the sequence of party formation (cf. Panebianco, 1988) do not explain the MRP's highly decentralized leadership selection. The party emerged in unitary France as a result of a process that was, unlike in the DC, ÖVP and CDU, centralized.

Moreover, the decentralized procedure to select the MRP leadership was not predetermined by the association law of 1901. It did not specify the rules parties were required to follow when selecting their national leadership.[2]

Also, the MRP did not simply copy the rules structuring internal decision-making in other parties. Whereas the French Socialist party (SFIO), which served as role model in other organizational fields (Bichet, 1980: 47), had a centralized leadership selection process, the MRP's was decentralized (cf. Bichet, 1980: 47).[3] Furthermore, the MRP's organization was not an institutional legacy of the PDP (cf. Delbreil, 1990; Letamendia, 1995). While the similar labels for the different party bodies suggest some organizational continuity, the MRP adopted a more decentralized process to select the party's national leaders than the PDP.[4] Unlike in

[2] *Loi du 1er Juillet 1901 relative au contrat d'association.* URL: http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=LEGITEXT000006069570 [28.01.2015].

[3] *Parti Socialiste/SFIO, Règlement du Parti.* 1905, Art. 30, 32-5, 39-42. URL: http://sebastien-chochois.over-blog.com/pages/Les_statuts_du_Parti_socialiste_SFIO_en_1905-809394.html [11.03.2015].

[4] *Albert Gortais, Note sur les objectes prochains de notre travail sur le plan national.* 23.09.1946, 350AP/6, Archives Nationales (AN).

the PDP, the MRP ministers would become ex-officio members of all important party bodies.[5] Furthermore, inspired by the diversity of ancillary branches of the Catholic association of the French youth (ACJF), the MRP included more ancillary organizations than the PDP. This increased the number of groups involved in the selection of the national executive (Bichet, 1980: 55; Bazin, 1981: 215; Delbreil, 1990: 49-60).

Tracing the process leading to the rules structuring the selection of the MRP leaders underlines that they were the outcome of a period of institutional uncertainty and politics. Building on pre-war ties and contacts that had been developed during the war (Plaza, 2008: 57-8),[6] three sets of actors started to work toward a Christian democratic party in early 1943: 1) Auguste Champetier de Ribes, Jean Raymond-Laurent, Paul Simon and other leaders of the Popular Democratic Party (PDP), which had been the main (but fairly unsuccessful) Catholic party before the war,[7] 2) a group with roots in the Catholic association of the French youth (ACJF) behind André Colin and Albert Gortais, and 3) the network of Georges Bidault (Callot, 1978: 95; Letamendia, 1995: 63). Deeply rooted in political Catholicism (Dalloz, 1993: 17-21), Bidault was one of the figure heads of the Catholic Resistance against the authoritarian Vichy regime and Nazi Germany.[8] In contrast to the Italian, Austrian and German case, the Catholic Church did not play an important role in the process of party formation. This was due to the role many bishops and priests played in the collapse of the Third Republic and, more generally, to the French tradition of laicism (Warner, 2000: 179-83).

The group of pre-war PDP elites wanted the new party to be a loose cartel or federation of pre- and post-war Catholic organizations which should remain identifiable entities within the new organization. The national party leadership would have been composed of represen-

[5] *Status Mouvement Républicain Populaire, 186 Rue de Rivoli.* 1944, 681AP/10-1 Art. 40, 46, AN.

[6] *Liste de partis politiques et mouvements de résistance.* 1944/1945, 350AP/1-1, AN.

[7] The PDP had never managed to win more than four percent of the votes (Biton, 1954: 59; Delbreil, 1990: 195-204). The left-wing *Jeune République* (JR) had been another, even less successful confessional party during the Third Republic. URL: http://www.france-politique.fr/wiki/Jeune_R%C3%A9publique_(JR) [06.05.2015]. On political Catholicism in France until 1945, see Dansette (1957) and Latreille et al. (1962).

[8] Similar to Italy, Austria and Germany, inter-war democracy had collapsed in France. Following attacks from the Catholic authoritarian right and the far-left and France's military defeat against Nazi Germany in 1940, democracy was replaced by a German occupation zone in Northwestern France and the authoritarian Vichy regime in the Southeast. The Vichy regime was a rightist and authoritarian system with support among traditionalist and reactionary Catholics. See also Fouilloux (1997) and Bédarida (1998).

tatives of the different member organizations. It is unclear whether the member organizations would have been granted a similar seat share in the national executive or whether their respective seat share would have been proportional to its membership size. However, it is likely that this organizational format would have allowed Champetier de Ribes and his group to maintain a leading position in the new formation since the PDP was relatively well organized and cohesive compared to the other groups (Bazin, 1981: 169; Delbreil, 1990: 428-9).

By contrast, Bidault wanted to establish an entirely new party in which previous political affiliations were not organizationally visible because they feared being overshadowed by the more experienced PDP leaders in a party cartel (Bazin, 1981: 169; 174; 181, 200-3; Delbreil, 1990: 428; Letamendia, 1995: 49). His network included young PDP elites who did not hold public office before the war (François de Menthon, Pierre-Henri Teitgen), a network behind the Catholic newspaper *L'Aube* (Louis Terrenoire, Francisque Gay, Stanislav Fumet) and other members of the Resistance (Charles d'Aragon) (Bazin, 1981: 158-70).[9]

While Bidault's group was initially in a weaker position compared to Champetier de Ribes' camp, this changed after Bidault's election to the presidency of the National Council of the Resistance in September 1943 encouraged Colin's ACJF group to enter the process of party formation (Callot, 1978: 97; Bazin, 1981: 171-9). While Bidault and Colin had already been friends for some time (Bazin, 1981: 180), Colin and his civil society organization had refused to take part in party politics before the war. Yet, the new prospects of a Catholic party after Fascism had changed their mind (Sa'adah, 1987: 46-7).

The alliance between Colin and Bidault was important enough to outweigh the strengths of the PDP group. The ACJF benefited from Bidault's experience in party politics as none of Colin's main followers had been member of a political party. In return, the coalition was good for Bidault because the ACJF provided him with the man power to set up a new party (Bazin, 1981: 181).

Together, the Bidault-Colin group gained momentum in the conflict over whether to form a party cartel or an entirely new organization (Bazin, 1981: 200-3). This encouraged ad-

[9]See Plaza (2008: 60-1) on the formation of this group.

ditional leaders of the Catholic Resistance, such as Maurice Schumann, and Catholic trade unionists, like Paul Bacon and Fernand Bouxom, to support Colin and Bidault (Vaussard, 1956; Callot, 1978: 95-6; Letamendia, 1995: 63; Plaza, 2008: 62, 65).

Yet, their coalition was fragile because they had quite different preferences regarding the political orientation of the new party. On the one hand, Bidault wanted to emphasize its confessional basis in order to cement the Catholic coalition of the Resistance. However, unlike in Italy, the idea of an explicitly Christian party was not popular. Colin and Gortais feared that the electorate of the new party would remain as restricted as that of the PDP (Plaza, 2008: 65). On the other hand, de Menthon advocated a labor party to reach out to Socialists and Radicals (Bazin, 1981: 161; Plaza, 2008: 64).[10] Yet, the idea of a labor party could not convince the majority of the group either because Colin, Gortais, Schumann and especially Bidault did not believe that a long-term cooperation with the Socialists and Radicals would work.

They ultimately compromised on a Christian democratic party with a secular name: Popular Republican Movement (*Mouvement Républicain Populaire*, MRP) (Sa'adah, 1987: 46-7; Delbreil, 1990: 431-2; Letamendia, 1995: 58; Plaza, 2008: 64-5). The term Movement was a strategic choice. It should imply a cartel character which they hoped would reduce the resistance of the PDP (Bazin, 1981: 204-5).

The choice between either forming a lose cartel of Catholic organizations or a mass party with territorial and ancillary branches was the main conflict at several meetings during the fall of 1944 (Bazin, 1981: 225; Delbreil, 1990: 432). They eventually agreed on 8 November 1944 to 'form a new and enlarged political formation' on 25 and 26 November.[11] The MRP group was satisfied with this outcome as they expected the PDP to dissolve and to join in constituting the MRP, whereas the formulation was sufficiently vague for the PDP to be still able to push for a party cartel (Bazin, 1981: 228). Two sub-committees were set up to elaborate on a party statute and manifesto.

[10] A third alternative, the formation of a Gaullist party was only shortly discussed.
[11] *Commissions P.D.P. et M.R.P.* 08.11.1944, 350AP/1-1/1 Dossier 1, AN.

It was probably during that period that additional organizational options were discussed. Albert Gortais, for instance, noted in 1946 that André Denis, a young activist from the Seine region, had suggested copying the structure of the ACJF: a loose association of mutually autonomous movements representing the different social and occupational groups.[12] If this proposal had been accepted, the MRP's leadership selection process would have been even more decentralized than it turned out to be.

The constitutive party congress was a veritable showdown with regard to the organizational question. Earlier on 25 November 1944, the PDP leadership had convinced the members of its party council that a dissolution of their party would be premature (Bazin, 1981: 228-32; Delbreil, 1990: 435). Instead of joining the MRP, a motion had been adopted that demanded the formation of a large democratic cartel under the label of the Democratic Party (*Parti Démocrate*) (Bazin, 1981: 228-32; Delbreil, 1990: 435).

MRP delegates had now to decide whether to pursue or postpone party formation. A group of delegates around Alphonse Juge and Marcel Poimboeuf urged postponing party formation in order to wait for the PDP (and the JR which had re-emerged in the meantime) to join (Bazin, 1981: 233). It seemed like the PDP leaders had landed a political coup and might succeed in realizing a party cartel.

However, Bidault and his allies managed to convince the delegates to go ahead with party formation. If the PDP and JR eventually joined the MRP, they would receive a small number of seats in the MRP's national executive (*Comité Directeur*) (Bazin, 1981: 234, 256). While this appeased Juge, Poimboeuf and other skeptics, the option to create a loose federation was finally off the table.[13]

While having settled on constituting a party that was organized along territorial lines and ancillary branches, the delegates at the constitutive congress had to determine the extent to

[12] *Albert Gortais, Note sur les objectes prochains de notre travail sur le plan national.* 23.09.1946, 350AP/6, AN.

[13] When the PDP leadership ultimately joined the MRP after the PDP's disastrous performance in the local elections in September 1945, they had substantially less bargaining power and only assumed less important positions in the MRP (Bazin, 1981: 236-53; Delbreil, 1990: 437-8).

which the national executive should be elected by a central assembly. While seeking to attract a mass membership to the new party,[14] the coalition around Bidault and Colin had so far made important decisions informally in the backrooms of Parisian cafés which had proven to be useful to maintain their control over the emerging party (Bichet, 1980: 52-4). They seem to have considered their leadership more at risk if too much influence was given to a central assembly as this might encourage the formation of a united opposition and dramatic leadership turnover than if the leadership selection was decentralized across a large number of party branches. This, at least, can be taken from the account of Robert Bichet (1980: 50) who was close to Bidault. Splitting the selection of the national party leadership across party branches was seen as 'an admirable means of banishing democracy while pretending to apply it' (Duverger cited by Bichet, 1980: 50). It is at this stage that the structure of the French state might have played a role in the institutional selection process but in a different way than we may expect. Instead of imposing a centralized leadership selection process, the unitary structure of France might have encouraged subnational party elites to welcome the right to send representatives to the party's national executive.

There was, however, disagreement over the level of decentralization. The coalition around Bidault and Colin preferred a selection process which granted ex-officio membership in the national executive to the MRP members holding positions in the French government. This would have allowed three prominent members of their group to assume party leadership positions.[15] This was rejected by some delegates representing the MRP in the French départements. Instead, they tried to expand the representation of departmental branches at the national party level.[16]

The Bidault-Colin coalition ultimately succeeded in making the MRP ministers ex-officio members of all national party bodies. They had ensured that the delegates representing the departmental branches at the constitutive party congress had to represent the diversity of political and civil society associations coming together in the MRP.[17] This fostered disagree-

[14] *Albert Gortais, Note sur les objectes prochains de notre travail sur le plan national.* 23.09.1946, 350AP/6, AN.

[15] Bidault, de Menthon and Teitgen held portfolios in de Gaulle's provisory government. *Assemblée constitutive du Mouvement Républicain Populaire.* 25.11.1944, pp. 27-8, 31-5, 350AP/12, AN.

[16] Ibid.

[17] Like all Christian democratic parties, the MRP mobilized members across class lines. *Participation*

ment among departmental delegates.[18] Moreover, Bidault and his allies could build on their popularity as heroes of the Resistance and as members of the provisory government.

Ultimately, a large number of party branches sent their representatives directly to the national executive (Table 7.1).[19]

Table 7.1: Composition of the MRP's first national executive

Party branch	Seats
Party in government	3
Party in parliament	3 (13 after the election in 1945)
Party branches in French départements	39 seats allocated across 21 regional councils (1 to 4 seats depending on regional membership size)
Party council	13 seats
Ancillary branches	7x1 seats
TOTAL:	65 members
Rae's fractionalization index:	0.919

Like in the previous chapters, I use Rae's (1967: 58) fractionalization index to measure how centralized the leadership selection process is (ranging from 0 to 1 with higher values indicating higher decentralization). Data: *Status Mouvement Républicain Populaire, 186 Rue de Rivoli.* 1944, 681AP/10-1, Art. 40, 42-48; and *Tableau des Conseils Régionaux* in the same document; *Bâtir la France avec le Peuple. Les organismes Directeurs.* 681AP/10-2; and 'Comité Directeur du MRP', *L'Aube*, 28, 1944, 457AP/166, AN.

The national executive included 1) the MRP ministers in the French government, 2) up to 10 delegates from the MRP's parliamentary group (and at least 20 percent of this group), 3) the respective leader of the party's ancillary branches,[20] 4) a number of positions determined and elected by the party council and 5) between one and four delegates for each regional council.[21] The regional councils, reflecting the administrative structure of post-war France

à l'Assemblée Constitutif des 25 et 26 Novembre. 1944, 350AP/12, AN.

[18] *Assemblée constitutive du Mouvement Républicain Populaire.* 25.11.1944, 350AP/12, pp. 27-8, 31-5, AN.

[19] Called *Comité Directeur* (1944-50) and then *Commission Exécutive* (Irving, 1973: 99). The national executive was the main leadership body of the early MRP. It met monthly and was, in-between its meetings, assisted by two smaller sub-committees, the Directory Office (*Bureau Directeur*; around 10 members) and the executive committee (*Commission exéecutive permanente*; around 30 members).

[20] The MRP included ancillary branches for women, young people, blue-collar workers, farmers, self-employed people and liberal professions (Irving, 1973: 98).

[21] The number of delegates was determined based on the membership size of its constituent branches.

(Masson, 1984), brought together between two and eight departmental branches to select their national executive representatives.

7.2.2 From decentralized leadership selection to low factionalism

If the level of social and political heterogeneity of the different actors coming together in a single party explained the latter's level of factionalism (Matuschek, 2008: 87-8; Capperucci, 2010),[22] we would expect to see the emergence of a high level of factional competition within the MRP. The MRP's first executive committee included Christian trade unionists (e.g. Paul Bacon, Fernand Bouxom), those identifying with the left-liberal ideas of the Sillon movement (e.g. Francisque Gay, Maurice Guerin), Catholic activists (e.g. André Colin) and former PDP partisans close to the political center (e.g. Georges Bidault) or center-right (e.g. Robert Schuman) (Irving, 1973: 77; Letamendia, 1995: 59-63). They often clashed over the extent to which the MRP should endorse 'a Christian working-class mystique' or 'an interclass paradigm of social solidarity' (Plaza, 2008: 82; also 9-13).

The electoral system used for intra-party elections might make us expect to see the translation of this internal diversity into the formation of factions. Admittedly, a PR system has usually been associated with the emergence of high factionalism (Sartori, 1971; 1976), while all elections were held under a two-round majority system within the MRP (Letamendia, 1995: 236). Such a system, however, has not been theorized to preclude the formation of factions.[23] In fact, when assessing the effects of a two-round majority system on the format of the party system, Elgie (2005) has suggested that it had been conducive to the consolidation of two main political blocs (i.e. a right- and left-wing bloc). Applying this reasoning to the intra-party level of the MRP, we may expect the consolidation of a left-wing and more right-leaning factional coalition.

[22] See also Barnes (1967) and Stern, Tarrow and Williams (1971).

[23] The DC and CDU have used a majority system for internal elections, while developing a high and moderate level of factionalism respectively.

However, no faction managed to establish itself within the MRP. In fact, in addition to a left-wing group around Joseph Dumas, André Denis, Francois Reille-Soult and Léon Robichez, of whom I will speak more below, we have only seen two short-lived and eventually failed attempts to establish factions in the MRP's entire history.

Jack Lanfranco and Félix Lacambre set up the Study and Action Group for a larger MRP (*Équipe d'Études et d'Action pour un plus grand M.R.P.*) as a response to France's economic difficulties and failing military endeavor to keep its colonies in Southeast Asia in the early 1950s. They sought to unite the anti-colonial left within the MRP and to reach out to other left-leaning groups.[24] While the Équipe managed to obtain some successes (Plaza, 2008: 470-1),[25] its failure to win widespread support within the party condemned it to be short-lived.[26] Isolated and mainly restricted to some few departmental branches, it started supporting a second, slightly more influential left-wing group in 1957: the Democratic Renovation faction (*Rénovation Démocratique*).[27]

Rénovation Démocratique operated between 1956 and 1961 under the leadership of Philippe Saint-Marc, Pierre-Marie Biarnès, Jean-Marie Daillet and Pierre Bergougnan as a reaction to the escalating decolonization crisis. They were all young activists of the *Fédération de la Seine* (Plaza, 2008: 129, 471). RD held formal meetings, had an address and published a journal to promote a set of political goals.[28] Yet, it also failed to generate widespread support (Plaza 2008: 472).[29] Eventually, the national executive prohibited the faction in 1958.[30] Threatened by potential expulsion from the party, RD was, in the end, nothing more than

[24] *L'événement de la semaine.* 457AP/167; *Compte-rendu de la journée d'étude.* 20.01.1957, pp. 1-4, 350AP/10, AN.

[25] They included a meeting with party secretary Maurice-René Simonnet, the passing of some social policy motions in some departmental branches and some nation-wide attention through a vigorous denunciation of Georges Bidault's colonial policy at the 1956 party congress. See *Compte-rendu de la journée d'étude.* 20.01.1957, p. 2, 350AP/10, AN.

[26] *Compte-rendu de la journée d'étude.* 20.01.1957, pp. 1-2, 350AP/10, AN.

[27] *La Voix du Militant. Organe de l'équipe d'étude et d'action pour un plus grand M.R.P. September 1957*; *Rénovation Démocratique.* 01.10.1957, 457AP/167, AN.

[28] *Letter from Pierre-Marie Biarnès to party secretary.* 25.09.1956, 350AP/10; *Note by M. Sunauel, La Rénovation Démocratique.* 05.02.1958, p. 3, 350AP/10; *Brochure des Équipes d'étude et d'action pour la rénovation de la démocratie chrétienne en France.* 1959; *Lettre ouverte de l'équipe de Rénovation Démocratique.* 05.05.1959, 457AP/168, AN.

[29] 'L'opposition désamorcée.' *Index quotidien de la presse*, 20.01.1958, 350AP/10, AN.

[30] *Open letter by Simonnet*, no date, 350AP/10; *Letter from Georges Delfosse to Jean-Marie Daillet*, 07.02.1958; *Letter from Georges Delfosse to Pierre-Marie Biarnes*, 07.02.1958, 350AP/10, AN.

another name for the Student Group of the MRP's departmental branch in Seine.[31]

The fact that the MRP, in contrast to the DC leadership, succeeded in enforcing the ban on factional activities, which was included in the statutes of both parties,[32] cannot be explained by the extent to which power was centralized in the national executive (cf. Borz, 2017). If the centralization of power argument were accurate, the highly factionalized DC should have been more successful in suppressing factionalism than the MRP. The national executive was the clear leadership body in both parties and had similar privileges and limitations regarding the selection of parliamentary candidates.[33] Yet, the DC leadership had more control over the party's finances because it received membership fees directly from the individual members, whereas the MRP leadership depended on remittances from the departmental branches (Irving, 1973: 102; Letamendia, 1995: 200-2).[34]

In contrast, my model helps explain the variation in party elites' incentives to pursue factional activities. Unlike in the DC, seats in the MRP's national leadership were primarily filled autonomously by the party's branches in public office (i.e. national legislatures and government), the départements and the party's ancillary branches. Majority elites from these branches enjoyed guaranteed representation in the national executive which would prevail as long as they maintained their network within their respective party branch. They were thus incentivized to consolidate this form of ties rather than set up factions. In turn, forming networks with members from other party branches would not have helped minority elites to gain the necessary votes in their own party branch in order to be elected to the national leadership. The decentralized leadership selection also incentivized them to focus on networks within rather than across party branches.

[31] *Letter from Teitgen to Simonnet*, 04.03.1958; *Letter from Biarnès to Daillet*; *Letter from Saint-Marc to Teitgen and Simonnet*, both 15.03.1958, all in 350AP/10; *Rapport sur la Rénovation Démocratique*. no date, 350AP/10, AN.

[32] *Status Mouvement Républicain Populaire, 186 Rue de Rivoli.* 1944, 681AP/10-1, Art. 15, 49-54, AN; *Statuto del Partito.* 1947, Art. 87, DC Statuti, ILS.

[33] *Status Mouvement Républicain Populaire, 186 Rue de Rivoli.* 1944, 681AP/10-1, Art. 14, 39 AN; *Direzione Centrale della D.C.* 08.03.1946, in Salvi (1959: 171); *Statuto del Partito.* 1947, Art. 71, DC Statuti, ILS.

[34] *Status Mouvement Républicain Populaire, 186 Rue de Rivoli.* 1944, 681AP/10-1, Art. 12, AN; *Statuto del Partito.* 1947, Art. 10, DC Statuti, ILS.

Similar to the ÖVP, two caveats need to be addressed as the MRP corresponds very closely but not perfectly to the ideal type of a party with a decentralized procedure to select its national leaders described in Chapter 2.

First, the national executive delegates representing the party's departmental branches were sent by one of 21 regional councils which brought together delegates from two to eight départements. While I focus my analysis, due to its scope, on intra-party politics at the national level, it is possible that some cross-branch cooperation took place between delegates coming together at the same regional council. The institutional set-up to select the national leadership, however, did not incentivize them to expand and develop such contacts into factions that were, as outlined in Chapter 1.5.2, organizationally reproduced at all intra-party levels.

Second, while a vast majority of national executive positions were elected autonomously by the MRP's organizational branches (i.e. 80 percent of the national executive seats in 1944/45), 12 positions were elected by the party council (called *Conseil National*) which was a deliberative, central party assembly. This might point toward the formation of factions as it could have helped minority elites to gain representation and majority elites to increase their seat share in the national executive.

Similar to the case of the ÖVP, three points can be made in reply to this:
First, the two attempts to establish a faction within the MRP outlined above show that, as predicted by my model, minority elites tried to form factions.

Second, their efforts were ill-omened given the MRP's decentralized leadership selection. While the party council surely included both majority and minority elites from different party branches, the seat share of minority elites was likely to be fairly small as the party council gathered only around 200 delegates (compared to around 1,000 delegates for the national congress) (Irving, 1973: 100).[35]

[35] *Status Mouvement Républicain Populaire, 186 Rue de Rivoli.* 1944, 681AP/10-1, Art. 24-26, 32-35, AN. For example, 1726 delegates participated at the 1947 party congress. *Évolution des effectifs.* No date, 350AP/3, AN.

Finally, to pick up any of the 12 executive seats elected by the party council, minority elites would have needed to gain the support of some majority elites. The latter, however, were, as predicted by my model, not incentivized to support factional activities because they enjoyed ex-officio membership in the party leadership. Even if supporting a faction had helped them to win all 12 seats, it would not have got them even close to a majority in the national executive. Each regional council and ancillary branch initially sent between one and four delegates to the national executive with its around 65 members.[36] While majority elites surely talked to each other and tried to make deals in order to forge a majority in the national executive, there was no need to develop such deals into factions. The latter would also not have directly helped them to strengthen the network within their respective party branch. The latter, however, was their power base and key resource in intra-party politics. Majority elites were thus encouraged to focus on strengthening their network within their party branch rather than institutionalizing networks across party branches.

Consequently, intra-party competition mainly occurred between party branches and within the branches themselves.

Among the MRP's organizational branches, the party in public office emerged as the largest single group in the national executive (Bouscaren, 1952: 104; Irving, 1973: 102). They had benefited from the use of a sliding scale in the allocation of national executive seats across regional councils and departmental branches which disadvantaged larger departmental branches (Irving, 1973: 102).[37] If such a sliding scale had not been used, the party in public office would have faced stronger opposition because the larger departmental branches would have increased their seat share in the national executive. Party leadership positions, however, would have continued to be primarily chosen within rather than across party branches. The level of factionalism would have thus remained low.

When thinking about the rise of the party in public office as the strongest actor within

[36] The party in public office was the largest single group in the national executive (16 seats after the 1945 election) and would have still fallen short of a majority if it had won all 12 seats elected by the party council. *Bâtir la France avec le Peuple. Les Organismes Directeurs.* 681AP/10-2; 'Comité Directeur du MRP', *L'Aube*, 28, 1944, 457AP/166, AN.

[37] *Status Mouvement Républicain Populaire, 186 Rue de Rivoli.* 1944, 681AP/10-1, Art. 40, AN.

the MRP, I am not denying that the parliamentary system of the Fourth Republic facilitated communication and coordination within the party in public office (Callot, 1978: 182, 238; Letamendia, 1995: 235). Moreover, many of the early parliamentarians shared common experiences in the Resistance and had known each other for a long time which added a personal component to their network (Irving, 1973: 105; Callot, 1982: 360; Letamendia, 1995: 238).

However, the fact that networks within the party in public office became so important to gain power in the MRP was endogenous to the way the national leadership selection was organized.

This also helps refine the suggestion that a group which has centrally controlled the process of party formation would also be likely to hold power and prevent factionalism within the established party (compare Panebianco, 1988: 50-1). The group around Bidault and Colin succeeded in translating their dominant role during the stage of party formation into a dominant position within the party (Letamendia, 1995: 233; Bazin, 1981).[38] Yet, they managed to do this because the MRP had adopted a leadership selection process that rewarded holding public office. Many members of the MRP's founding coalition had either already been part of de Gaulle's provisory government (e.g. Bidault, Teitgen, de Menthon) or were elected to the French constituent assembly and parliament in 1945/6 (e.g. André Colin). Of course, they may have had this scenario in mind in the run-up to the MRP's constituent congress when they promoted a decentralized leadership selection process which granted ex-officio membership to the party in public office. The adaptation of this procedure, however, was the result of politics, as shown above, and not the result of the structure of party formation.

Hence, the absence of factions within the MRP and the predominant influence of majority elites, in particular from the party's branch in public office, was the result of the decentralized procedure to select the national party leaders. Like in the previous cases, such characteristics of intra-party competition became reinforced over time through an incentives and resource feedback process.

[38] *L'Équipe d'Action dans l'organisation du secrétariat général.* No date. 350AP/7; the collection of guidelines and directives in 350AP/9, AN.

7.3 Reinforcing low factionalism

7.3.1 Resource reinforcement

Bidault, Teitgen, Schumann and other majority elites built on their popularity as former Resistance partisans, personal networks and ideological appeals to strengthen their control over the MRP's parliamentary group (Irving, 1973: 104-5). This entailed a remarkable level of parliamentary unity compared to the other parties during the Fourth Republic (Macrae, 1963: 196, 199; Irving, 1973: 104-5).

The importance of the party in public office was confirmed at the MRP's national congress and party council meetings which were usually led by the MRP's ministers and MPs (Irving, 1973: 102). Delegates to the national party bodies could see that getting elected to parliament and developing a strong presence in the MRP's parliamentary group was the way to intra-party power. As this was reproduced over the years, it became common knowledge and the code of practice within the party.

Moreover, given the absence of state funding for political parties, majority elites holding a ministerial portfolio benefited from access to the funds of their ministries as they provided them with means to support candidates' campaigns and pay party officials (Callot, 1978: 248; Letamendia, 1995: 220-2).

Majority elites from the MRP's département branches also invested in their intra-branch networks. The leaders of large departmental branches, like Nord, Seine, Pas-de-Calais and Finistère, developed a strong organization, organized grassroots activities, lobbied national leaders to implement the preferences of their département and invested in an ideological identity (Callot, 1978: 286-7; Plaza, 2008: 84). The departmental branch of Seine, for instance, gained the reputation of being the 'left-wing conscience' of the MRP and often criticized the party's parliamentary branch for being too moderate (Callot, 1978: 286-7). This helped reproduce the role of departmental branches, besides the party in public office, as main organizational units of intra-party politics.

Yet, the relative seat share of party branches in the national executive, as outlined in Chapter 2, should not be neglected. Many regional councils, like Languedoc, only sent one delegate.[39] In contrast to parties with a mixed leadership selection process, factional activities, as explained above, were unlikely to increase their seat share. Some majority elites from smaller departmental branches focused on striking deals with majority elites from other branches. For example, the majority elites of the party in public office were often popular in rural départements and, consequently, supported by their majority elites (Callot, 1978: 116). Others simply did not attend the national meetings (Callot, 1978: 117-8). Their branches often merely existed on paper (Irving, 1973: 91-8). Consequently, there was substantial cross-departmental variation in terms of size, activity and organization.[40]

Finally, the leaders of the ancillary organizations focused on their intra-branch networks to influence intra-party politics. The ancillary branches played a vital role in the MRP's election campaigns and were the backbone of the party's programmatic development by running inquiries and providing the party leadership with policy briefs (Irving, 1973: 99). The value of a strong network within one of the ancillary branches was confirmed over time and their leaders, like Paul Bacon from the blue-collar workers' branch, became often influential figures in the MRP's leadership.[41]

7.3.2 Organizational reinforcement

Majority elites used their influential position within the party to advance institutional change that reinforced the existing patterns of intra-party competition and, by doing so, also consolidated the powerful role of the party in public office. Similar to Chapters 3 to 5, I analyze together the institutional change attempts that involved the same physical actors and have been close in time. My findings confirm that the initial decision in favor of a decentralized

[39] *Status Mouvement Républicain Populaire, 186 Rue de Rivoli.* 1944, 681AP/10-1; *Tableau des Conseils Régionaux*, AN.

[40] *Situation du Mouvement en Septembre 1962.* 1962, 350AP/3, AN.

[41] Yet, the ancillary branches were under tight control by the national executive who set up these branches to begin with and often had close personal ties to the branch leaders (Plaza, 2008: 76, 87-8). *Commission de Coordination au 2ème Congrès National.* 1945, 350AP/13; *L'organisation du M.R.P.* no date, 350AP/6, AN.

leadership selection created an institutional playing field that was organizationally confirmed over time. Building networks within rather than across party branches thereby became deeply entrenched as the dominant resource to assume leading positions in the MRP.

Already at its second national congress, the MRP's statutes were modified in a way that confirmed how essential it was for party elites to build strong networks within their respective party branch if they wanted to assume leadership positions. By the end of 1945, the MRP had created 87 departmental branches (four of which were in the French colonies in northern Africa).[42] The party's founding elites continued to state that these departmental branches should be the basis of the MRP because the MRP had been designed and should operate as a veritable mass party.[43] Yet, their mass party rhetoric risked losing credibility given the stark over-representation of the party in public office as a single group in the national executive relative to the delegates sent from the regional councils. At the same time, they had few incentives to centralize the leadership selection process because this would have risked jeopardizing their dominant position. They agreed that the share of national executive delegates elected by the regional councils should represent two-thirds of the national executive. De facto, this meant doubling their seats from 39 to 78.[44] By increasing the number of seats filled by the regional councils, more departmental party elites had a chance of gaining representation in the national executive. The incentives to build a strong network within a departmental branch were thereby reinforced.

Moreover, to determine the number of seats for each regional council, not only the membership size of its constituent departmental branches but also the share of the population living in the region were taken into account.[45] The amended allocation procedure provided the Parisian (i.e. Seine, Seine-et-Oise and Seine-et-Marne) and northern départements (i.e. Nord, Pas-de-Calais) with almost as many national executive seats as the party in public office.[46] This set larger departmental branches on a more equal footing with the party in

[42] *2 ème Congrès National du M.R.P.* 13.-16.12.1945, p. 50, 350AP/12, AN.

[43] Ibid.

[44] *Tableau des Conseils Régionaux*, in *Status Mouvement Républicain Populaire, 7 Rue de Poissy.* 1944, 681AP/10-1, Art. 40, AN.

[45] *Statuts du Mouvement Républicain Populaire.* 1945. 350AP/5, AN, Art. 40.

[46] They received 12 and nine seats respectively in contrast to previously only four seats. The party in public office held 15 seats.

public office.

At the same time, the party in public office managed to introduce a clause which made it likely that it would remain the largest group in the national executive. It was henceforth allowed to send more than 10 MPs to the national executive, depending on its seat share in the French legislative chambers.[47]

Overall, by enlarging the set of party elites who could be delegated to the national executive, more actors became rewarded by building a strong network within their own party branch which reinforced a low level of factionalism.

In contrast, the influence of central assemblies remained marginal. The number of executive seats elected by the party council was now formally limited to 12 which meant that the share of executive seats elected by the party council dropped from 20 to around 12 percent. The national congress only gained the function of approving the final list of national executive members. This was a matter of formality as no procedure was foreseen in case the national congress did not approve the suggested list.[48]

Furthermore, the MRP's ancillary branches which the national executive had already set up at the national level and whose leaders were ex-officio members of the national executive would henceforth also be organized at the departmental level.[49] This was aimed at integrating different groups within the party, while discouraging the emergence of factions already at the departmental level.

Statutory modifications in 1947 reinforced the value of having a strong power base within a party branch even though it gave the impression of making the MRP's leadership selection more centralized by increasing the influence of central party assemblies. The national congress henceforth elected the positions of national party leader and party secretary. The national

[47]This included the Lower (*Assemblée Nationale*) and the Upper House (*Conseil de la République*) and the assembly of the overseas territories (*Assemblée de l'Union Française*). *Statuts du Mouvement Républicain Populaire.* 1945. 350AP/5, Art. 40, AN.

[48]Ibid.: Art. 20-29, 40.

[49]Ibid.: Art. 10.

leadership had an interest in this proposal because a Gaullist minority within the MRP's group in the French Assembly questioned its decision to continue the tripartite coalition with the SFIO and Communists (PCF) (Woloch, 2007: 101-2). Knowing that many minority elites on the ground were left-leaning, the central election of the party leader and party secretary allowed the leadership to gain legitimacy. The congress delegates re-elected Schumann and Colin with a landslide, thereby confirming their tripartite strategy.[50] Moreover, the party council elected (renamed: *Comité National*) the national executive (renamed *Commission exécutive*)[51] which subsequently elected most of the executive committee (now called *Bureau*).

However, these changes were countered by modifications which ensured that intra-party competition continued to take place within party branches and between these branches. Quotas were introduced to formalize the distinction between delegates representing the party in public office and those representing the departmental branches at the level of the national congress, party council, national executive and the executive committee. For instance, it was specified that the departmental delegates at the party council[52] were not allowed to be members of parliament, whereas one-third of the party council seats were granted to delegates from the MRP's parliamentary group.[53] The national executive had to include 18 departmental representatives who were not members of parliament and 14 MPs (12 from the Lower and Upper Chamber and two from the *Assemblée de l'Union Française*).[54] The 13 members of the executive committee included ex-officio the leaders of the MRP groups in the three French legislative chambers.[55] Thus, the organizational distinction between representatives of the party in public office and the departmental branches was officially introduced in all national party bodies (Table 7.2).

[50] *Congrès National du MRP*. 16.03.1947, pp. E/8-F/1, 350AP/15, AN.

[51] The old *Comité Directeur* had been abolished since it had become too large (i.e. around 100 members) to remain an operable leadership body.

[52] One delegate for every 4000 party members in the département.

[53] *Status du Mouvement Républicain Populaire*. 1949. 350AP/5, Art. 32; *Congrès National du MRP*. 16.03.1947, pp. E/8-F/1, 350AP/15, AN.

[54] The national executive, in addition, included the MRP ministers, the party leader, party secretary, treasurer and five co-opted members. If the MRP was not part of the government at the moment of the election, the PPG chose five previous party members in government. *Statuts du Mouvement Républicain Populaire*. 1949. 350AP/5, Art. 43, 44, AN.

[55] Ibid.: Art. 46.

Table 7.2: Main statutory reforms within the MRP in the 1940s

Year	Modifications	Attempt	Proposal backed by	Effects
1945	Expansion of seat share of departmental branches in the national executive (two-thirds of the seats, max. 78 seats); Allocation of national executive seats across regional councils not only based on membership size but also on share of the population living in the region; Abolishment of upper limit for number of MPs delegated to the national executive; Building ancillary branches for women, young people, blue-collar workers, farmers, self-employed people and liberal professions in all departmental branches	Succeeded	Majority elites from departmental branches and party in public office	Increase in the number of delegates sent by departmental and parliamentary party branches; Reinforcement of networks within party branches as key resource
1947	Party leader and party secretary elected by the party congress; Abolishing the *Comité Directeur*; Party council elected national executive; Departmental delegates at the party council had to be non-MPs and were replaceable only by members from their département; Quotas for the national executive (*Commission exécutive*): 18 departmental representatives who were not MPs and 14 MPs and MRP ministers; Ex-officio membership of the party in public office in the executive committee; Abolishing the regional councils			Reinforcement of organizational decentralization, the value of networks within party branches and of the dominance of the party in public office; Party in public office with de facto majority in the party council, national executive and executive committee; Increasingly difficult communication and coordination across subnational branches

The leaders of the party in public office benefited from the clause that departmental delegates who were unable to attend the party council meeting could only be replaced by members of their département who could be members of parliament.[56] As the party council met in Paris, many delegates from small and rural subnational branches transferred their mandate to the only representative of their branch living in Paris, their respective MPs.[57] Consequently, the party in public office often held a majority in the national executive (Bouscaren, 1952: 104; Callot, 1978: 117-8).

Hence, as long as the party in public office remained united, party elites were well protected against pressure from the departmental branches. This reinforced their incentives to invest in strong ties with the party members in parliament. This unity was not induced by similar political preferences: Bidault still understood the MRP as a predominantly Catholic party, while Bacon and Menthon defended the idea of a more left-wing party strategy. In addition, Robert Schuman, French Prime Minister from 1947 to 1948 and Foreign Minister between 1948 and 1953, continued to incline toward a more conservative party identity (Callot, 178: 274; Plaza, 2008: 94).

Following these initial modifications, summarized in Table 7.2 above, the majority elites from the MRP's departmental branches tried to counter in 1950 by succeeding in reducing the quota for departmental branches to gain an additional party council seat.[58] This led to a stronger representation of larger departmental branches and to an increase in size of the party council. Both were aimed at reducing the dominance of the party in public office.

Another attempt to reduce the power of the party in public office in the party leadership was made by the *Fédération de la Seine* in 1952, which proposed to make the position of the party secretary incompatible with a governmental position.[59] While this proposal did not gain the two-thirds majority at the national congress required for changes to the party statues, it illustrates again that intra-party competition was organized along the lines of the

[56]Ibid.: Art. 35.

[57]*Letter from M. Neuville to Albert Gortais.* 25.07.1948, 350AP/47; *Letter Albert Gortais to M. Neuville.* 15.09.1948, 350AP/47; *Compte-rendu de la commission d'organisation du Mouvement.* 14.11.1956, 350AP/5, AN.

[58]*Status du Mouvement Républicain Populaire.* 1950. 350AP/5, Art. 32, 35, AN.

[59]*Lettre du Secrétaire général André Colin aux Fédérations.* 04.03.1952, 350AP/5, AN.

MRP's organizational branches (Table 7.3).

Table 7.3: MRP statutory reform proposals in the early 1950s

Year	Modifications	Attempt	Proposal backed by	Effects
1950	Adjusted quota for additional seat for departmental branches in the party council	Succeeded	Majority elites from departmental branches	Increase in size of party council; Stronger representation of large departmental branches
1952	Incompatibility of party secretary position with holding office in the national government	Failed	MRP branch in Seine	Party in public office continued to hold party secretary post

These four episodes of institutional change confirmed that party elites were encouraged to build strong networks within their respective party branch to gain representation in the party leadership. The importance of such networks was reinforced by organizationally reproducing it for different party bodies at the national level of the MRP.

The reinforcing process of institutional development made the MRP's intra-party bargaining system persist even against the backdrop of massive changes in the political system. The establishment of the Fifth Republic in October 1958, which importantly challenged the MRP to adapt, as will be outlined below, replaced the old parliamentary system with a semi-presidential regime and the use of PR for parliamentary elections with a two-round majority system. It also led to a drop in the effective number of parliamentary parties from 5.73 to 3.45 (Gallagher, 2013). It shows that changes in the electoral system and the level of party system fragmentation are not unequivocally linked to the level of factionalism (cf. compare Zariski, 1965; 1978; Arian and Barnes, 1974; Sartori, 1976).

In fact, the attempt by the aforementioned *Rénovation Démocratique* faction to take hold within the party by giving more power to the national congress in the selection of the party leadership had failed in early 1958 (Plaza 2008: 472).[60]

[60]'L'opposition désamorcée.' *Index quotidien de la presse*, 20.01.1958, 350AP/10, AN.

Instead, the MRP adopted organizational changes at its national congress in January 1959 which confirmed the existing patterns of intra-party competition. While the national congress was convened in response to the changed political reality, its organizational measures continued in the well-known paths of the past.[61] The quotas specifying the composition of the national executive remained in place (i.e. 18 departmental delegates and five delegates usually representing the ancillary branches who could not simultaneously be members of parliament and 14 MPs). The party council henceforth elected the executive committee whose nine members were required to comprise three non-MPs and the two leaders of the MRP group in the Lower and Upper House.[62]

A final noteworthy statutory change was made in 1962 when 12 and six party members who were members of civil society organizations, like trade unions, and supported by the MRP's ancillary branches were co-opted to the party council and national executive respectively.[63] While the MRP leadership tried in this manner to improve the MRP's linkages with targeted parts of the electorate, it, again, confirmed that party branches (i.e. the ancillary branches in this case) delegated their majority elites directly to the national executive. Forming factions thus continued to be an unbeneficial strategy to assume leadership positions.

Table 7.4 summarizes this final series of institutional change episodes.

[61] *Lettre du Secrétaire Général du MRP Maurice-René Simonnet aux members du congrès extraordinaraire.* 30.12.1958, 350AP/5; *Simonnet, Rapport sur le Mouvement.* 31.01.-01.02.1959, pp. 12-9, 350AP/35, AN.

[62] The Assemblée de l'Union Française had been abolished. *Status du Mouvement Républicain Populaire.* 1959. 350AP/5, Art. 32, 34, 42, 44, AN.

[63] *Status du Mouvement Républicain Populaire.* 1962. 350AP/5, Art. 32. 42; *Lettre du Secrétaire Général Adoint Georges Delfosse.* 27.04.1962, 350AP/5; *Lettre du Secrétaire Général Adoint Georges Delfosse à M. Aumonier.* 11.07.1962, 350AP/5; *Lettre du Secrétaire Général Adoint Georges Delfosse à M. Bidegain.* 24.09.1962, 350AP/5; *Lettre du Secrétaire Général Adoint Georges Delfosse à M. Paul Noddings.* 25.05.1962, 350AP/5, all AN.

Table 7.4: Statutory reforms, 1958 to 1962

Year	Modifications	Attempt	Proposal backed by	Effects
1958	Increasing the power of the national congress in selecting the national executive	Failed	*Rénovation Démocratique* faction	Confirmation of the party in public office and departmental party branches as the main organizational units of intra-party competition
1959	Confirmation of quotas for departmental, parliamentary and ancillary branches' seat share in the national executive; Adjustment of guaranteed seat share in the executive committee according to departmental and parliamentary membership	Succeeded	Majority elites in the party leadership	
1962	12 and six party members of civil society organizations and supported by the MRP's ancillary branches were coopted to the party council and the national executive	Succeeded	Majority elites in the party leadership	Reinforcement of value of intra-branch networks to gain representation in the party leadership as ancillary branches gained in importance;

7.4 Undermining party adaptability before 1958

A low level of factionalism must not be misinterpreted as a high level of party unity. Tensions between an intra-party left, center and right characterized politics within the MRP's from its very early days. In the last part of this chapter, I will show that its low level of factionalism was detrimental to the MRP's ability to integrate this internal heterogeneity and thereby undermined its ability to respond to political transformations.

7.4.1 The electoral breakdown of 1951

As predicted by my framework, the MRP's election results went downhill prior to the end of the Fourth Republic in 1958 (Table 7.5). In particular, the MRP's breakdown in 1951 reduced the Christian Democrats from one of the strongest to a medium-sized party.

Table 7.5: MRP election results during the Fourth Republic

Election	Result in percent	Position in the party system (change in percent)
Constituent Assembly, 1945	24.91	2nd
Constituent Assembly, 1946	28.22	1nd (+3.31)
Parliament, 1946	25.96	2nd (-2.26)
Parliament, 1951	12.49	5th (-13.47)
Parliament, 1956	11.14	6th (-1.35)

Data: https://www.france-politique.fr/ [14.03.2015]

Before outlining how the MRP's low level of factionalism was linked to this downturn, two competing views must be discussed: the historical weakness of French Christian democracy and the rise of Gaullism in party politics.

It would be wrong to infer from the weakness of confessional parties before World War II that there was no electoral basis for the MRP (Sa'adah, 1987: 39; cf. Vinen, 1995: 164). The deep entrenchment of the religious cleavage as well as the diversity and richness of Catholic civil society organizations during the Third Republic underline that there was a social basis for Christian democracy (Dansette, 1957; Latreille et al., 1962; Irving, 1973; Kalyvas, 1996: 9, 14, 114). The latter's absence as a relevant force before 1945 resulted, as shown by Kalyvas (1996: 115-8), from the strategic interaction between the Church and liberal and conservative political elites. It incentivized the Church to enter an alliance with the conservative right in the late 19th century and parts of the clergy continued to have close ties to the conservative (and authoritarian) right until the 1930s and 1940s (Rémond, 1968: 310-2). This alliance, however, had been discredited by 1944/45 due to its role in the breakdown of democracy (Fouilloux, 1997: 103). The blame for the latter was also attributed to the centrist Radical Party which further improved the prospects of leaders from anti-Vichy Catholic organizations,

like Colin and Bidault, to assume political responsibility (Callot, 1978: 103; Sa'adah, 1987: 41). The MRP managed to occupy the political space abandoned by the pre-war parties in the first post-war elections and, like the DC, ÖVP and CDU, immediately assumed governmental power.

The fact that the MRP ended up being unable to sustain its initial strength has often been linked to the initial absence and subsequent rise of a Gaullist party (Vaussard, 1956: 109; Irving, 1978: 78; Vinen, 1995: 153). This view seems supported by the fact that the MRP's vote share decreased from 25.96 to 12.49 percent while de Gaulle's party won more than 20 percent in its first appearance in a National Assembly election.

Looking at the historical evidence in depth, however, reveals that the MRP's low level of factionalism played an essential role in this development.

The Christian Democrats did initially benefit from their connection with Charles de Gaulle. The leader of the exile government during the Vichy years (1940-44) and head of the provisory government (1944-46) was a highly popular political figure in post-war France. His announcement on 02 March 1945 not to form his own party made his approval a valuable good that promised to entail a strong electoral following for the (re-)emerging political parties (Bazin, 1980: 502). The MRP initially gained this asset. In the provisory government, they loyally endorsed positions close to those of de Gaulle and, in addition, gained the reputation of being the bulwark against the rising Communist Party (Bazin, 1981: 534-8; Rioux, 1987: 48-51, 56-9, 100-1). This and its roots in the resistance helped the MRP to become the second strongest party (narrowly behind the PCF) in the constituent assembly election of October 1945. The link to de Gaulle also persisted even though the MRP remained part of the provisory government after he had resigned in January 1946 (Letamendia, 1995: 81).[64]

After emerging as the strongest party out of the second constituent assembly election in June 1946, however, the Christian Democrats publicly broke with de Gaulle by accepting the

[64]It is not clear whether the MRP stayed with or without de Gaulle's approval (Letamendia, 1995: 81). For more detail, see Mauriac (1971), Rioux (1987: 45-102), Callot (1978: 253-9) and Letamendia (1995: 80-5).

only slightly modified second constitutional draft (Rioux, 1987: 100-1, 106-9).[65] They wanted to end the period of constitutional uncertainty and prevent the Socialists from entering too close an alliance with the Communists (ibid.: 100-6). As a result, de Gaulle came out strongly against the constitutional draft and the MRP (Bidault, 1967: 116-8, 121-2; Bazin, 1981: 534-5; Rioux, 1987: 104-6; Letamendia, 1995: 82-3; Woloch, 2007: 103).

If the MRP had only been a replacement for a Gaullist party, we would expect the party to lose ground quite substantially in the first parliamentary election in November 1946 following its public rupture with de Gaulle. This was expected by many political observers since Gaullist voters had the option to support René Capitant's *Union Gaulliste* and the numerous candidate slates of the Conservatives and Radicals that had added the adjective 'Gaullist' (Bazin, 1981: 512, 532-3; Rioux, 1987: 106-10; Letamendia, 1995: 83-4). However, the MRP won around 26 percent and roughly maintained its previous performance.

I suggest that the MRP managed to hold onto most of its electorate because it still included well-known Gaullists. Admittedly, de Gaulle's brother-in-law, Jacques Vendroux, had left the MRP before the election (Letamendia, 1995: 83). Yet, the Christian Democrats still counted, most notably, among its ranks Edmond Michelet, minister of defense, and Louis Terrenoire, editor of the Catholic newspaper *L'Aube* (Michelet, 1971: 150, 157-60).

The MRP's low level of factionalism, however, prevented the long-term integration of these actors which contributed to the electoral breakdown in 1951.

7.4.2 Lack of factions, lack of intra-party integration

The MRP lost large parts of its internal right due to the rigidity of its internal bargaining system which substantially constrained the right in promoting their interests within the party. In January 1947, the MRP's executive committee narrowly decided in favor of continuing the tripartite coalition with the SFIO and PCF (Woloch, 2007: 101-2). This frustrated right-wing party elites. Louis Terrenoire criticized his colleagues' working-class conformism and Edmond Michelet noted: 'Always among our friends, this same disruptive tendency. "The masses! The

[65] The accepted draft introduced a parliamentary system with a complex process of dissolution (Rioux, 1987: 106; Letamendia, 1995: 83).

working people!" An undeniable trick of Marxist vocabulary' (Michelet, 1971: 180).

While both Michelet and Terrenoire were part of the MRP's leadership at that time, they could not expect to reverse this decision in the near future. In fact, Michelet was no longer in charge of the ministry of defense and would not remain ex-officio member of the national executive after the national congress in March 1947. Terrenoire had been elected for one of the 13 seats filled by the party council.[66] Yet, even if they managed to secure all 13 seats elected by the party council for themselves and others sharing their views, they would have still been far from a majority in the national executive. Moreover, Michelet and Terrenoire were only supported by a minority of the MRP's branch in public office which sent the largest group to the national executive (i.e. 16 delegates in January 1947).[67] This was also true for their Gaullist sympathizers who had been directly delegated by the party in public office (i.e. Paul Coste-Floret, Marie Madeleine Dienesch).[68] Given the refusal of the majority elites of the party in public office (i.e. Bidault, Teitgen, Lecourt) to endorse a center-right strategy (compare Michelet, 1971: 182-3), their influence in the national executive was unlikely to improve in the foreseeable future.[69]

Their isolated situation in the MRP drove them out of the party. Shortly after the MRP's congress in March 1947, de Gaulle had announced the formation of his own party (Rally of the French People, RPF) (Callot, 1978: 263; Rioux, 1987: 112-24). Michelet, Terrenoire and other Gaullist MPs responded by creating, together with defectors from other parties, a Gaullist parliamentary group and finally leaving the MRP for the RPF (Letamendia, 1995: 99).[70]

It is noteworthy that the MRP lost large parts of its internal right before the local elections in October 1947. I do not argue that the defection of the Gaullist minority from the MRP's parliamentary group was the only reason why the RPF could win 38 percent of the votes, while the MRP performed poorly with only 10 percent. Yet, the sequence of events

[66] *Liste des membres du Comité Directeur.* 24.01.1947, 350AP/46, AN.

[67] Ibid.

[68] Ibid.

[69] Indeed, Dienesch was not re-nominated from the parliamentary group as member of the national executive. *Élection des membres de la commission exécutive.* 24.04.1947, 350AP/46, AN.

[70] See Michelet (1971: 182-91) for more details.

reveals that the RPF only celebrated this success after the exit of Michelet and other right-wing minority elites had discredited the MRP in the eyes of conservative voters. The rise of parties on the political right of the MRP was thus partially endogenous to the MRP's low level of factionalism which prevented a better integration of its Gaullist minority. The same can be said for its electoral downfall in the 1948 Senate elections (*Conseil de la République*) and the 1951 parliamentary election (Vaussard, 1956: 125; Vinen, 1995: 159).

The MRP also faced severe pressure from left-leaning minority elites in its departmental branches and parliamentary group when the MRP decided to stay in power after the PCF had withdrawn from the governing coalition in May 1947 (Sa'adah, 1987: 42-3). They demanded voluntary withdrawal from government in order for the MRP to clarify its political strategy. Yet, their proposal failed given their weak position in the party council (Callot, 1978: 273). Instead, the MRP even stayed in government after the Socialists had withdrawn from the cabinet in February 1950 and was now forming a coalition with only right-leaning parties.

The de facto exclusion from intra-party decision-making was criticized by many left-wing minority elites.[71] While some of them resigned, other left-leaning MPs (Joseph Dumas, André Denis, Francois Reille-Soult and Léon Robichez) tried to organize left-wing opposition within the MRP for the 1950 party congress (Sa'adah, 1987: 54; Letamendia, 1995: 22, 242). Yet, in contrast to the DC where the national congress elected a large number of high-level party positions which allowed even smaller factions to receive at least some seats, the MRP national congress only elected the party leader and the party secretary. Only large networks had a chance at these elections. Consequently, Joseph Dumas was not elected when he was running for party secretary against André Colin at the 1950 party congress.[72]

The fate of the intra-party left illustrates that attempts to establish factions in the MRP failed because the intra-party playing field made them unbeneficial in assuming leadership positions. The MRP's low level of factionalism is therefore not sufficiently explained by the

[71] *Congrès National du M.R.P. 04.05.1951*, pp. A/5-A/7; 'Au Congrès de Lyon. De nombreux militants M.R.P. se font l'echo de l'indication de la classe ouvrière.' *Humanité*, 05.05.1951, 350AP/21, AN.

[72] *Congrés National du M.R.P.* 18.-21.05.1950, p.A2, 350AP/21, AN.

Fourth Republic's closed-list PR system, which has been suggested to discourage factionalism (Ceron, 2012b: 110; Borz, 2017: 8, 13).[73]

Disillusioned by their failed efforts to win more intra-party support for their social policies, their incentives to remain within the MRP were undermined. When Édouard Mazé, a blue-collar worker and trade unionist, was shot by a policeman during a demonstration at Brest in April 1950, Abbé Pierre Groués, who was part of the left-wing minority group in the party in public office, exited the party. He criticized the MRP's firm anti-strikes stance as a betrayal to working people and as being partially responsible for the tragedy at Brest. Furthermore, after the MRP leadership had decided to expel Paul Boulet for refusing to support France's entry into NATO, Charles d'Aragon, deputy for Hautes-Pyrénées, also left the party in protest (Vaussard, 1956: 126).

Although the MRP had lost major identification figures of both its internal right and left within six years due to its low level of factionalism hindering the integration of minority elites, the party leadership rejected any centralization of the leadership selection procedure (Sa'adah, 1987: 54).[74]

Majority elites continued to have a tight control over the MRP's political strategy which entailed further defections from minority elites. When the center-right Laniel government fell over France's defeat in Indochina in June 1954, the MRP did not join the new center-left government under Pierre Mendès France (Callot, 1978: 292; Letamendia, 1995: 103). The MRP leaders feared that a coalition with Mendès France might ultimately put an end to their hopes of recovering at least parts of the Gaullist electorate and intensify conflicts within the party's parliamentary group which was the source of party leaders' authority (Macrae, 1963: 202; Callot, 1978: 289). However, some left-leaning party elites refused to follow the party leadership. When Mendès France invited the MRP to join his cabinet, three of its MPs accepted: Robert Buron, Andrè Monteil and Jean-Jacques Juglas (Callot, 1978: 293; Sa'adah, 1987: 56; Letamendia, 1995: 104). The three dissidents and other rebellious MPs were, in consequence, expelled from the MRP's parliamentary group (Sa'adah, 1987: 54-6; Plaza, 2008: 99).

[73] The electoral system approach is further undermined that the socialist SFIO was highly factionalized even though it competed under the same electoral system (Campbell and Charlton, 1978: 142).

[74] *Après le Congrès de Nantes.* 1950, 350AP/21, AN.

Table 7.6 summarizes how the MRP's low level of factionalism weakened its ability to integrate competing positions. This was highly problematic as it also increased the electoral pressure on the MRP. Whereas the loss of its conservative wing in 1947 and the overthrow of the Pinay government in 1952 had alienated the MRP from the voters right to the center, its decision not to support Mendès France had a similar effect on center-left voters (Letamendia, 1995: 106).

Table 7.6: Minority elites leaving the MRP

Date	Case
March 1947	Gaullist minority elites defected to de Gaulle's RPF.
April 1950	A left-wing group around Abbé Pierre Groués left after a failed attempt to capture the position of party secretary.
June 1950	The issue of France's membership in NATO led to the exit of Paul Boulet and Charles d'Aragon, two main representatives of the MRP's left wing.
May 1954	Pierre Mendès France offered ministerial portfolios to the Christian Democrats. While the MRP leadership rejected the offer, three members of the MRP's left-wing minority accepted and were subsequently expelled from the party.

Previous studies have rightly emphasized the negative effects of concentrating power in the hands of a small group of party elites (Irving, 1973: 97-9; Wills-Otero, 2016). The centralization of power in the MRP's majority elites (in particular in public office), however, had been the result of the decentralized process to select the national party leadership.

The marginalization of minority elites entailed rather limited renewals of the party leadership. While the party statutes ensured some generational renewal by limiting the party leader's tenure to three re-elections,[75] party leaders emerged out of the same closed circle of majority elites from the party in public office. After Maurice Schuman, who was elected the first party leader by the national executive in 1944,[76] all party leaders were or had previously been ministers and, apart from Paul Bacon, all of the later ministers had previously been MPs (Callot, 1978: 238; Letamendia, 1995: 238, 241, 247-50). Once the incumbent party leader

[75] *Status Mouvement Républicain Populaire, 186 Rue de Rivoli.* 1944, 681AP/10-1, Art. 42, AN.

[76] *Bâtir la France avec le Peuple. Les organismes Directeurs.* 681AP/10-2; 'Comité Directeur du MRP', *L'Aube*, 28, 1944, 457AP/166, AN.

had reached the term limit, majority elites usually decided informally who would succeed as party leader.[77] This explains the 'remarkable continuity' in the MRP's leadership structure that had started with the constitution of Bidault and Colin's alliance during the process of party formation in the 1940s (Plaza, 2008: 85).

7.4.3 Disagreement among party leaders and unclear party profile

When conflicts erupted between majority elites, they were often difficult to resolve as their influence was organizationally entrenched. Such conflicts increasingly added to a severe identity crisis of the MRP which sabotaged its attempt to attract new groups of voters and party cadres.

This also shows the limitations of the party institutionalization argument which has highlighted the role of leadership autonomy in a party's ability to adapt (Kitschelt, 1994; Levitsky, 2003). As just outlined, MRP leaders had substantial leeway in adopting the course they deemed best for the party. They, however, often strongly differed on which way to go. For example, the decision not to join the center-left government under Pierre Mendès France in 1954 had also provoked fierce criticism by leaders of the party branches in the département of Nord and Seine (Letamendia, 1995: 105). It added to the impression that the MRP was unable to settle on its position on the left-right dimension and sabotaged any attempts to reach out to voters on the right or the left.

Moreover, the outbreak of the Algerian War of Independence in November 1954 led to divisions among majority elites from the party in public office. On the political right, Bidault refused to abandon Algeria and to cooperate with the SFIO,[78] whereas Menthon promoted social and anti-colonial positions on the political left. Finally, Pierre Pflimlin took a moderate stance.[79] An open rupture could only be prevented in 1955 because Robert Schuman, François de Menthon and Pierre Pflimlin who each aimed for the position of party leader did

[77] *Congrès National du MRP*. 24.05.1952, 350AP/22; 'Le MRP pose trois conditions à son maintien au gouvernement.' *Combat*, 24.05.1952, 350AP/22, AN.

[78] 'Deux partis vont déliberer', *Lauren*, 27.05.1954, 350AP/28, AN.

[79] 'Duel Pflimlin-de Menthon sur les problèmes économiques au congrès M.R.P.' *France-Soir*, 12.05.1956, 350AP/30, AN.

not want to reveal their lack of unity. Menthon and Pflimlin met between the party congress sessions and agreed that Pierre-Henri Teitgen should run again, even though the statutory validity of a fourth consecutive term was contested.[80] This compromise, however, only lasted for one year. In 1956, the MRP experienced its only seriously contested party leader election which Pflimlin won with 71.9 percent against Menthon.[81] Pflimlin decided to join the Socialist government in 1956, promoting a reconciliation on colonial policies (Callot, 1986: 286, 304-5; Letamendia, 1995: 91). While this was supported by many departmental branches and accepted by his former rival Menthon, a conservative minority within the PPG, headed by Bidault, firmly rejected Pflimlin's liberal attitude toward the Algerian independence movement.[82] Although Bidault was still the MRP's honorary president and enjoyed support among a respectable number of MPs and party members, his nationalist positions had alienated most majority elites. Consequently, he failed in March and April 1958, though narrowly, to win the approval of the party council and the national executive for his proposition to create an anti-independence government (Callot, 1978: 307-8; 1986: 287, 289; Letamendia, 1995: 122). Instead, Pflimlin became the prime minister of a center-left government (Callot, 1986: 289).

These conflicts left the MRP with a deeply divided image over economic and colonial issues which were highly salient in France at that time.

By accounting for the MRP's patterns of internal competition, my framework helps understand why the party struggled so much to find its place in the highly polarized party system of the Fourth Republic. Polarization had been high since the establishment of the parliamentary intergroup of de Gaulle's RPF and the PCF's transformation into an anti-system party in 1947 (Bouscaren, 1952: 127; Rioux, 1987: 127-8).

By contrast, the high level of polarization on its own does not unequivocally account for the MRP's internal problems because the latter did not abate once polarization had dropped substantially following the establishment of the Fifth Republic (cf. Sartori, 1976; Hazan, 1997; Table 7.7).

[80] *Congrès National du MRP*. 21.05.1955, p. F/2, 350AP/29, AN.

[81] *Congrès National du MRP*. 12.05.1956, p. G/6, 350AP/30; 'Conclusion du Congrès M.R.P.' *Le Figaro*, 14.05.1956, 350AP/30, AN.

[82] *Congrès National de la Démocratie Chrétienne*. 1958. pp. 53-4, 457AP/168, AN.

Table 7.7: Seat share anti-system parties in the National Assembly, 1947 to 1967

Year	Seat share in percent	Anti-system parties (Seat share in percent)
1947	33.9	PCF (27.3), RPF (6.6)
1951	35.7	PCF (15.8), RPF (19.3)
1956	31.5	PCF (23.0), UFF (8.3)
Mid-1957	40.3	PCF (23.0), UFF (8.3), Mendésistes (ca. 9.0)
1958	1.7	PCF (1.7)
1962	8.5	PCF (8.5)

Data: http://www.france-politique.fr/ [14.03.2015] and Rioux (1987: 127-8). UFF: Pierre Pujade's right-wing populist movement. Mendésistes: A split of the Radical Party refusing any kind of constructive parliamentary work (Rioux, 1987: 289-98). Seat share in 1958: Under the Fifth Republic, the Gaullists turned from an anti-system party to the key pillar of the political order.

7.5 The Algerian crisis and the disintegration of French Christian democracy

The end of the Fourth Republic began almost the very moment the National Assembly in Paris was about to vote the investiture of Pflimlin's government on 13 May 1958. French anti-independence deputies and officers staged a coup against the new government and its liberal stance on colonial issues (Rioux, 1987: 301-2). The putsch brought France on the verge of a civil war and led to the political comeback of de Gaulle who was called by the political parties to help re-establish order and solve the colonial crisis (Callot, 1978: 313). De Gaulle accepted under the condition that parliamentarism and the PR electoral system was replaced with a semi-presidential system and a two-round majority voting procedure (Callot, 1978: 401-2).

The new constitution's entry into force in October 1958 entailed tremendous pressure for the MRP to get its act together. It had to adapt to a new political order after having been a key pillar of the late parliamentary system which is illustrated by the fact that the MRP had been in government for almost ten of the 12 years of the Fourth Republic (Callot, 1978: 248).

7.5.1 Bidault's break-away and the Rally of Democratic Forces

The MRP's entry into the new political era began with the break-away of one of its founding fathers. Georges Bidault had realized that the party's institutional playing field did not allow him to translate his level of support across party branches into a stronger seat share at the national executive. Following the Algerian putsch and the MRP's backing for de Gaulle's return to power, Bidault, who deeply hated de Gaulle, left. On 13 June 1958, he proclaimed the formation of his own party, called Christian Democracy in France. Many of Bidault's supporters in the MRP followed him into his new party (Callot, 1978: 312; Letamendia, 1995: 128).

Other dissident members of the MRP even tried to change the MRP's strategy by leaving the party, joining a new one and then seeking to merge with the MRP, as illustrated by the activities of the Rally of Demcoratic Forces (*Rassemblement des Forces Démocratiques*).[83]

7.5.2 A party without followers

Besides failing to keep their old supporters, the MRP also struggled to attract new voters and party cadres. Similar to the ÖVP, the MRP's system of ancillary branches (called *Équipe spéciales*) was criticized by party members for being too stiff.[84] While they formally represented the interests of the youth, women and different occupational groups, they were based on a schematic and static understanding of French society. They provided, for instance, blue-collar workers, farmers, self-employed people and liberal professions with a similar seat share in the national executive without taking into account their relative strength in the population. In addition, this structure was imposed on each departmental branch of the MRP (Bazin, 1981: 215; Plaza, 2008: 88). The ancillary branches were therefore not a flexible tool to integrate new social or political groups within the party (Callot, 1978: 114; Van Kemseke,

[83] *Letter Comité National provisoire du RFD*, 20.01.1959; 'Ne Recommencez pas le M.R.P.' *France Observateur*, 05.02.1959; *Document préparatoire au débat sur la vie du Mouvement*; *Compte-rendu de la réunion du RDF*. 22.-27.04.1959; *Letter Maurice-René Simonnet*, 20.05.1959, all 350AP/11 AN; 'Dans le vivier M.R.P.' *L'Aurore*, 08.05.1959; 'Le XVIe Congrès du M.R.P. a débattu de son élargissement.' *La Croix*, 09.05.1959, 350AP/36, AN.

[84] *Commission Exécutive*. 03.12.1958; *Comité Directeur*. 25.11.1959, 350AP/5, AN.

1997: 179; Plaza, 2008: 76). The 1962 statutory modification henceforth to co-opt representatives of civil society organizations into the party council and national executive did not solve this because, as mentioned above, these co-opted members had to be backed by the existing ancillary branches.

Given these problems, it is not surprising that the electoral difficulties of the MRP continued under the new regime.

The new electoral system cannot be blamed for the Christian Democrats' misery (cf. Manow and Palier, 2009: 160; compare also Elgie, 2005). Table 7.8 shows that the MRP's vote share in the first round of the two-round majority system ended up being fairly accurately translated into parliamentary seats.

Table 7.8: Difference between vote and seat share, 1958 and 1962

		PCF	SFIO	Radicals	MRP	CNIP and Moderates	Gaullistes
1958	Vote share	18.89	15.48	9.23	11.09	19.97	17.96
	Seat share	1.81	7.97	5.98	10.14	21.38	38.41
	Seats-votes	*-17.08*	*-7.51*	*-3.25*	*-0.95*	*1.41*	*20.45*
1962	Vote share	21.87	12.43	7.42	7.88	11.52	32.06
	Seat share	8.82	13.98	9.03	7.74	6.02	49.25
	Seats-votes	*-13.05*	*1.55*	*1.61*	*-0.14*	*-5.50*	*17.19*

Radicals including Socialist and Centrist Radicals. Data: France-politique.fr; http://www.lemonde.fr/societe/infographie/2002/06/17/la-composition-de-l-assemblee-nationale-depuis-1958_627922_3224.html [27.07.2017].

7.5.3 Divided leadership and party collapse

Furthermore, majority elites were deeply divided over how to position the MRP in the political context. Since the Christian Democrats and de Gaulle had been rivals since 1946, entering the Gaullist coalition in 1958 was a major u-turn which entailed fundamental internal conflicts (Callot, 1978: 310; Letamendia, 1995: 117, 122-4, 131, 136). The alliance with

de Gaulle finally broke on 04 October 1962 after he had expressed his distance from European integration – which was one of the very few issues the MRP majority elites still agreed on.

Given the MRP's difficulties, the delegates at the 1963 party congress decided to seek an alliance with other parties (Callot, 1978: 408). Yet, Gaston Defferre's (SFIO) surprising proposal to form a socialist-centrist party, which would exclude both the PCF and the Gaullists, revealed that the MRP's majority elites had very different preferences regarding the potential partners for such an alliance. Majority elites from Seine and the Parisian region, including Teitgen, Félix Lacambre and Francine Lefebvre (none of whom was a member of parliament at that time), demanded a fusion with the Socialists (SFIO).[85] By contrast, Maurice Schumann, who was still a highly influential member of the MRP's parliamentary group, continued pursuing the aim of finding a way to cooperate with de Gaulle. Pierre Pflimlin, who had been minister until the MRP's withdrawal from government in 1962 and still found considerable support among the MRP's MPs, promoted a conservative and non-Gaullist party.[86] Finally, Jean Lecanuet, who served as senator in the MRP's group in the French Upper Chamber and as the MRP's leader since 1963, aspired to form a party of the political center (Irving, 1973: 244-50).[87]

The representatives of each position could build on a power base in specific party branches. Similar to the majority elites in the ÖVP, their influence within the party was thus entrenched which made it difficult to encourage them to agree to a compromise.

When the negotiations with Defferre failed in June 1965 (Callot, 1978: 409), the MRP leadership decided to nominate its president Jean Lecanuet as the party's candidate for the 1965 presidential elections. Less than two months before the election, he suddenly resigned as party leader to run as the presidential candidate of all center-democrats (Callot, 1978: 409; Letamendia, 1995: 146). Lecanuet unexpectedly won 15.6 percent of the votes and finished

[85] Teitgen, Pierre-Henri: 'Sur le plan des principes, comme sur celui des réalités, nous devons dire "oui" à la Fédération.' *Forces Nouvelles*, 03.06.1965, 350AP/44, AN.

[86] *Congrès National du MRP*. 28.05.1965, pp. E1-E5, 350AP/43; Pflimlin, Pierre: 'La Fédération n'est pas la bonne solution pour renforcer la Démocratie.' *Forces Nouvelles*, 03.06.1965, 350AP/44, AN.

[87] *Congrès National du MRP*. 28.05.1965, pp. E5-J7, 350AP/43. Lecanuet, Jean: 'Comment pourrions-nous dire "non" à nous-mêmes?' *Forces Nouvelles*, 03.06.1950, p. 10, 350AP/44, AN.

third in the first round which forced de Gaulle in a second ballot against François Mitterand. Lecanuet's surprisingly strong performance seemed to give momentum to the formation of a new center party. He left the MRP and formed a new party, called Democratic Center, on 02 January 1966 (Letamendia, 1995: 146).

Lecanuet's party exit was the signal to other leading MRP elites that the battle was over. Many MRP members followed Lecanuet in the Democratic Center. The Gaullists around Schumann and Marie-Madeleine Dienesch joined de Gaulle's Union for the New Republic. Finally, numerous party elites, like Paul Bacon, joined left-wing parties (Mayeur, 1980: 172). The MRP itself ceased existing in 1967 (Callot, 1986: 368; Letamendia, 1995: 146).

7.6 Conclusion

In conclusion, Christian democracy had an actual chance in post-war France but the leadership selection process which was introduced in 1944 proved consequential for the MRP's inability to cope with the dramatic changes unfolding in French politics. Following a showdown at the MRP's constituent congress, a coalition of national party elites succeeded in implementing a decentralized leadership selection process. As most organizational branches of the party chose their representatives in the national leadership autonomously, party elites were incentivized to focus on building networks within their respective party branch. Similar to the ÖVP and CDA, forming factions was not a beneficial strategy to gain representation in the party leadership. Over time, party elites adapted to these institutional constraints. The low level of factionalism and the dominant role of the party's parliamentary, departmental and ancillary branches were reinforced and thereby persisted even against the massive political changes entailed by the establishment of the Fifth Republic.

The lack of factions, however, entailed serious problems for the party's adaptability. Minority elites, who represented groups of voters targeted by the MRP, had few prospects of assuming leadership positions. Consequently, they felt marginalized and abandoned the party. This was accompanied by the dominance by a small circle of majority elites who were often divided over the party's political strategy. Finally, by giving no room to factions, the Chris-

tian Democrats struggled to appeal to new voters and party cadres. The representation of social groups was based on a rigid system of ancillary branches which did not allow for the integration of groups not falling in the existing boxes. Unsurprisingly, the MRP's election results were in decline during most of its existence.

While still a major governing party during the Fourth Republic, the Algerian crisis and de Gaulle's return to power required the MRP to get its act together and position itself in the new political environment. Yet, its weaknesses which had already become evident before 1958 continued to undermine its adaptability. The MRP's continuous decline and eventual disintegration were the logical result of this development.

Chapter 8

Conclusion

'...under what conditions do Christian democratic parties adapt successfully to a new structural context increasingly affected by ongoing secularization and globalization? Under what conditions can Christian democratic parties adapt to new competitors such as populist parties?' (Kalyvas and Van Kersbergen, 2010: 203)

'Especially at the level of the individual parties, it is a constant phenomenon, an ongoing process of continuous adaptation to changing social, political, and policy circumstances.' (Mair, 1997: 16)

8.1 Introduction

The puzzle that motivated this study is embedded in the varying trajectory of Christian democratic parties. When European politics entered a period of profound changes in the early 1990s, Italy's previously dominant DC collapsed at a vigorous speed and the Portuguese CDS experienced the worst crisis of its existence. The losses of the German CDU and the Luxembourgian CSV, in contrast, have been relatively moderate, whereas the Austrian and Dutch Christian Democrats have suffered a substantive erosion of their vote share which was only interrupted by a short-lived comeback. Why did these parties take such highly divergent paths of development when facing societal and political transformations?

The case of the varying adaptability of Western European Christian democracy relates to a broader puzzle in the literature on party politics. Mair (1997: 16) has rightly highlighted that political parties are in a state of tension. They compete in a permanently changing world which requires them almost to continuously update their positions, strategies and rhetoric. Recent studies have assessed what set of strategic choices improves parties' electoral prospects (e.g. Bale, 2003; Adams and Somer-Topcu, 2009; Gidron, 2016; Lupu, 2016). While important, this work has left under-explored why some parties, like the DC, have been unable to endorse any kind of serious reform. The party organization literature has tried to explain this by suggesting that parties' ability to reform depended on organizational characteristics (Kitschelt, 1994; Katz and Mair, 1995; Levitsky, 2003; Bolleyer, 2009; Wills-Otero, 2016). Yet, this has left us with two questions. Why did parties adopt a particular organizational format in the first place? And why, once they realize its negative consequences, do they often fail to realize organizational reforms?

With these questions in mind, I have developed a theory of organizational choices and organizational adaptability of political parties. My central argument can be summarized in two steps. 1) Organizational adaptability, defined as a party's ability to pass crucial reforms when facing societal and political transformations, depends on factionalism in a nonlinear way. Both an extremely high and low level of factionalism undermines adaptability, whereas a moderate level of factionalism enhances it. 2) The level of factionalism depends on organizational choices made early in the party's history. Among the numerous decisions party elites need to make when forming their organization, the party's initial set of rules to select its national leaders is particularly relevant. The leadership selection process determines what selectorate party elites need to win over. It thereby drives the type of networks party elites are incentivized to form. The more centralized the leadership selection process, the more incentivized party elites are to form factions and, consequently, the higher the level of factionalism.

The case of Western European Christian democracy has been a fruitful starting point to test my argument against competing theories because it allowed me to use a most-similar system design. While social and political challenges are never identical across cases, this party family faced a similar strategic setting regarding the pressure to get their act together and agree on programmatic and organizational reforms, leadership renewals, campaign and

coalition strategies. Moreover, Christian democratic parties have shared a similar ideology, social composition of its membership and electorate and a similar position in their respective party system.

Christian democratic parties have also been a set of cases worth studying because, despite their importance in shaping Western European politics after World War II, they had previously not received their due academic attention in comparison to other party families. Previous accounts have primarily come in the form of single case studies.[1] They left us with numerous suggestions of why specific Christian democratic parties have developed as they did without rigorously testing them in a comparative manner.

This dissertation addresses this gap in the literature. In Chapter 1, I used quantitative and qualitative evidence to highlight the comparative limitations of previous theories of, among others, party system polarization, party institutionalization and party decentralization. Guided by a nested analysis of 14 Christian democratic parties, I then analyzed the Italian DC, Austrian ÖVP and German CDU as cases in a structured focused comparison. In Chapters 3, 4 and 5, I traced their trajectory from their beginnings in the 1940s until today (or until their collapse, as in the case of the DC) by using a rich record of primary data, gathered during several months of archival work. The evidence supports my theory, in contrast to competing explanations, for each step of the causal process both within and across cases. In Chapter 6, I have outlined that my argument provides important insights for understanding the varying adaptability of additional cases included in my sample. Chapter 7, finally, assessed the external validity of my argument by using the French MRP as a case of the same party family that has been challenged by different changing conditions.

The theoretical and empirical parts of my thesis have yielded important implications for the study of party adaptability, factionalism and party organizations. These implications will be discussed in the remainder of this concluding chapter.

[1] See, for instance, the chapters in the edited volumes by Hanley (1994), Buchanan and Conway (1996), Lamberts (1997), Kselman and Buttigieg (2003), Gehler and Kaiser (2004) and Van Hecke and Gerard (2004). Also, Callot (1978), Müller and Steininger (1994), Letamendia (1995), Wertman (1995), Duncan (2007a), Van Kersbergen (2008), Clemens (2009), Granieri (2009) and Debus and Müller (2013).

8.2 Implications for the study of party adaptability

8.2.1 Limitations of previous approaches

While providing insights into the understanding of individual cases, previous accounts face severe comparative limitations when trying to explain Christian democratic parties' varying level of adaptability.

The highly institutionalized ÖVP and MRP have experienced serious problems in adapting to a changing environment. The MRP leadership, however, enjoyed a high level of autonomy from second-rank elites and the rank-and-file which would make us expect this party to be highly adaptable, according to Kitschelt (1994) and Levitsky (2003). Moreover, Kitschelt's (1994) and Levitsky's (2003) framework does not account for other parties' varying ability to benefit from weak institutionalization. Decisions by the national party congress, the formally prescribed frequency of national party meetings and some internal rules (like the formal prohibition of factions in the Italian DC) were repeatedly ignored in the (early) CDU, CSV, DC and CDS. Yet, they starkly differed in their adaptability. Weak organizational entrenchment and leadership accountability have also not enhanced the CDA's adaptability (Table 1.4).

Wills-Otero's (2016) party decentralization argument does not explain the variation in adaptability of cases which have been similarly decentralized regarding the internal control over candidate selection and party finances (i.e. the CDU, ÖVP, CSV[2] and MRP). Moreover, power in the CDA has been similarly centralized as in the highly factionalized DC and CDS. Yet, the Dutch Christian Democrats have experienced the unfolding of internal dynamics and problems associated with low levels of factionalism which resembled those observed in the decentralized ÖVP and the formally decentralized MRP. Such differences in the observed causal process undermine the credibility of the decentralization argument.

Finally, in none of the cases has the development of adaptability covaried with changes in the level of party system polarization (see also Chapter 1.3.1).

[2]Schroen (2000: 372-3), Feltes (2008: 426-9), Grosbusch (2008: 358) and Schoentgen (2008: 306).

Table 8.1: Explanatory power of my and different theories of party adaptability

	Theory	DC (IT)	ÖVP (AT)	CDU (GE)	CDS (PT)	CDA (NL)	CSV (LU)	MRP (FR)	Cases
This study	*Curvilinear impact of factionalism*	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	7
Alternative theories	Linear impact of factionalism	✓	–	–	✓	–	–	–	2
	Party institutionalization	–	✓	–	–	–	✓	–	2
	Party decentralization	✓	–	–	✓	–	–	–	2
	Party system polarization	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	0

In contrast to these accounts, I have found consistent support for my argument (Table 8.1).

8.2.2 Curvilinear relationship between factionalism and party adaptability

While low and high factionalism undermine a party's ability to adapt to dramatically changing social and political conditions, a moderate level of factionalism enhances adaptability.

My case study of the Italian DC underlines that high factionalism weakens a party's adaptability. The high level of factionalism within the DC gave way to almost constantly forming, arranging and re-arranging factions and factional coalitions. 1) Consequently, while the DC repeatedly replaced its leaders, leadership changes were often the result of compromises between several factions. Leaders, like Moro and Zaccagnini, who were elected with an explicitly reformist agenda depended on broad factional backing which substantially constrained the amount of reform they could bring. 2) The cycling majorities and gridlocks resulting from high factionalism often complicated intra-party decision-making over programmatic and organizational reforms, electoral alliances and coalitions. They eroded parliamentary unity

and importantly contributed to governmental instability. All this made the DC a rather unappealing option for new voters and party cadres which 3) was problematic for the Christian Democrats once they were required to find support beyond its traditional anti-communist and Catholic electorate. 4) The party ultimately suffered from the break-away of several factions and 5) experienced a sharp electoral decline in the 1992 national and 1993 local elections before collapsing in 1994. These findings have been echoed by the development of the Portuguese CDS sketched in Chapter 6.

However, the DC would not have been better off by suppressing factionalism. The complete absence of factions led to a highly rigid intra-party bargaining system in the ÖVP. 1) Party elites who wanted to rise to the top of the party were required to build a strong power base within one of the organizational branches of the party. This prevented the extent of innovation usually associated with leadership changes as all new leaders came from the same closed circle of majority elites. Moreover, the ÖVP's rigid patterns of intra-party competition undermined its ability to integrate social and political groups which did not easily fall within their occupational and territorial organizations. The party therefore struggled to respond to changes in the social structure of the electorate by 2) appealing to new constituencies and 3) adjusting the representation of its core constituencies within the party. 4) The lack of factions also marginalized party elites who were in a minority position within their respective party branch and thereby set the path for minority elites leaving the party. 5) The ÖVP's electoral decline was thus hardly surprising. Hence, adaptability does not linearly increase as factionalism decreases. This conclusion has been supported by my discussion of the Dutch CDA in Chapter 6 and has been further tested by looking at the French MRP in Chapter 7.

Instead, the moderately factionalized CDU has been the most adaptable party included in the structured focused comparison above. 1) On the one hand, the importance of the CDU's Land branches constituted an important element of stability which was missing in the system of arranging and re-arranging factional alliances within the DC. On the other hand, the influence of some factions provided the CDU with more flexibility to adjust the allocation of power among intra-party actors according to societal changes. While farmers maintained a formally guaranteed powerful standing within the ÖVP even after their share in society had decreased markedly, the CDU's expellee faction declined when the issue of integrating the ex-

pellees from Germany's former territories became obsolete. Changes in the party leadership were consequently more likely to be accompanied by an actual change in the distribution of power within the moderately factionalized CDU than within the ÖVP and DC. Furthermore, the existence of some factions helped the CDU to integrate 2) new constituencies when the CDU, for instance, absorbed centrist and right-wing rivals in the 1950s. Its moderate level of factionalism also facilitated the integration of both minority and majority elites in intra-party decision-making without giving way to the cycling majorities characterizing the highly factionalized DC. This helped the party to 3) keep its traditional constituencies and 4) prevent both the break-away of factions and the exodus of minority elites, like in the ÖVP. 5) All this, finally, contributed to a more positive electoral trend than in the cases of the ÖVP and DC. The development of the Luxembourgian CSV has further supported the link between moderate factionalism and high adaptability.

Table 8.2 summarizes my comparative findings.

Table 8.2: Factionalism and party adaptability

	DC	CDU	ÖVP
Factionalism	*High*	*Moderate*	*Low*
Adaptability	*Low*	*High*	*Low*
1) Leadership renewal	Low	High	Low
2) Attracting new constituencies	Low	High	Low
3) Keeping traditional constituencies	Low	High	Low
4) Capability of avoiding splits	Low	High	Low
5) Electoral resilience	Low	High	Low
Further supported by	CDS	CSV	CDA, MRP

My results importantly refine what we know about the effects of factionalism since previous research has almost exclusively focused on the negative consequences of high levels of factional competition.[3] I have provided, to my knowledge, the first systematic theorization and testing of Boucek's (2009: 469-73) suggestion that factionalism, within limits, can be consensus-building. Moreover, while she concentrated on the dynamics within eventually highly factionalized parties, my work has included cases with no and only some factions and

[3] For instance, Kothari (1964), Carras (1971), Damato (1979), Cox and Rosenbluth (1993), Cox, Rosenbluth and Thies (1999), Bouissou (2001), Ceron (2012; 2015) and Kochanek (2015).

systematically traced the curvilinear relationship between different levels of factionalism and adaptability.

My results have also underlined the importance of the internal supply-side in theories of party competition (compare Mudde, 2007: 256). Changes in the social composition of the electorate and the salience of issues, the rise of new competitors and changes in the electoral system, among others, have caused intra-party debates about the party's response to these changes. The extent to which Christian democratic parties managed to get their act together in these debates depended on their level of factionalism. Analyzing intra-party politics, and thereby opening what has too often been treated as a black box, has shown to be crucial.

8.3 Implications for the study of factionalism

8.3.1 Party organization: The forgotten variable

The level of factionalism in the analysed cases depended on organizational choices. When forming their organizations, Christian democrats adopted a set of rules to select their national leaders which proved to be highly consequential for the patterns of intra-party competition.

The Italian Christian Democrats chose a centralized leadership selection process which led to a high level of factionalism. Delegates from the different provincial, parliamentary and ancillary branches of the DC came together at the national party congress to elect the majority of the party council which, subsequently, elected almost all positions of the party leadership. To get elected to the leadership, party elites depended on the support of delegates from different party branches. This incentivized party elites, like Gronchi, Dossetti and Jacini, who lacked such a broad support base within the DC, to form factions. By contrast, those who enjoyed sufficient support across party branches to be confident about assuming an influential role within the DC, like De Gasperi, had initially not been incentivized to form factions. Yet, the emergence of the first factions increased pressure on them and encouraged them to formally organize their supporters. The resulting high level of factionalism was reinforced over time, as will be discussed below. Factions thereby became deeply entrenched as the dominant or-

ganizational unit of intra-party politics. When compared with the DC, the emergence and development of factionalism in the CDS has shown important parallels.

The decentralized selection process of the ÖVP's national leadership yielded a very different incentive structure for intra-party competition. The Austrian Christian Democrats had decided to select their national leaders by mainly co-opting majority elites from their Land and League branches. This meant that party elites primarily depended on support within their own organizational branch. As a result, party elites were incentivized to concentrate on building strong networks with members from their respective party branch. Those who had such networks (i.e. majority elites) assumed national leadership positions, whereas those who did not (i.e. minority elites) had little to gain from forming networks with members from other party branches in their attempt to get elected to the national party leadership. Consequently, the level of factionalism remained low. I observed a similar process in the Dutch CDA and the French MRP.

While I have found that majority and minority elites had eventually a similar incentive structure under a very centralized and decentralized leadership selection process, incentives were more diverse in the case of the CDU. Most national leadership positions were elected by two committees.[4] Majority and minority elites came together at the national party congress to elect the party leader and the two deputy leaders. The remaining leadership positions were elected by the party council which was primarily a meeting of majority elites from the CDU's Land branches. The party council provided majority elites from the strong Land branches from (South-)Western Germany with a de facto secured representation in the party leadership. Leaders of these Land branches and the PPG were thus, unlike in the DC and similar to the ÖVP, incentivized to focus on strengthening their network within their respective party branch rather than to form factions. Yet unlike the ÖVP, the majority elites from the weaker Land branches in the North(-West) had a more diverse incentive structure. On the one hand, support within their party branch guaranteed access to the party council. On the other hand, they had fewer seats in this committee than majority elites from larger Land branches and could not build on a strong electoral record to justify their bids for national leadership po-

[4]Only the leader of the party's parliamentary group was an ex-officio member of the national leadership.

sitions. In addition to maintaining a strong network within their Land branch, they were therefore incentivized to build networks across party branches. Minority elites, finally, could not be certain to be represented at the party council at all. Their chance to influence the composition of the national leadership was to forge alliances across party branches at the national congress. Overall, this resulted in a moderate level of factionalism. A moderate level of factionalism was also observed in the Luxembourgian CSV with its mixed leadership selection process.

My findings regarding the link of the leadership selection process, party elites' incentive structure and the level of factionalism, summarized in Table 8.3, importantly contribute to the literature on intra-party politics and factionalism.

Table 8.3: Leadership selection process and factionalism

	DC	CDU	ÖVP
Centralization of leadership selection	Centralized (0.22)	Mixed system (0.398)	Decentralized (0.89)
Incentive structure			
• Minority elites	Cross-branch networks	Cross-branch networks	Within-branch networks
• Majority elites	Cross-branch networks	Within-branch networks (stronger Land branches); Within- and cross-branch networks (weaker Land branches)	Within-branch networks
Factionalism	High (6.73)	Medium (4.0)	Low (0.01)
Further supported by	CDS	CSV	CDA, MRP

Rae's fractionalization index as a measure of centralization and number of factions standardized by year as a measure of factionalism in parentheses.

1) I have formulated and tested my theoretical framework and competing arguments with regard to their power to explain different levels of factionalism. This is important as the focus on highly factionalized parties has meant not investigating the full variation of the variable of interest.

2) My results have highlighted how essential it is to base comparative analyses on a clear conceptualization of the phenomenon to be investigated in order to guarantee unit homogeneity across cases. In my comparison, some intra-party groups could have been misinterpreted as factions (e.g. the Leagues within the ÖVP, the specialized groups in the MRP and the associations in the CDU). I have revealed important differences between these groups and the factions observed in my case studies by building on the conceptualization provided in Chapter 1.5.2. Thus, a definition of factions in terms of an intra-party group that acts collectively to realize some joint goals risks being too broad to uncover important differences in patterns of intra-party competition and to provide valid estimates of what initiates different levels of factionalism (cf. Boucek, 2012; Ceron, 2012b; Borz, 2017).

3) Moreover, by revealing the rules and procedures a party uses to select its national leaders as an important variable, I have added to a better understanding of how a party's organizational set-up can affect its patterns of internal competition.

4) Furthermore, my analysis has provided important micro-foundations for a theory of factionalism. I have outlined how the rules structuring access to influential party positions guided party elites' strategies to gain power within their organization and thereby affected their incentives to form factions.

5) Finally, while Ceron's (2012b) and Borz's (2017) quantitative studies have assessed to what extent various factors correlate with factionalism, my comparative-historical analysis has identified *at what stage of the causal process* different factors played a role. This helps clarify some puzzling results Ceron (2012b) and Borz (2017) have found in their research, as will be summarized below.

8.3.2 Getting the causal sequence right: Distinguishing between initiating and reinforcing factors

My findings on the important role of initial organizational choices in accounting for different levels of factionalism help clarify why, when and how factors found to correlate with fac-

tionalism matter. Previous studies have rightly identified the electoral system, clientelism, governmental dominance and federalism as important variables. Yet, it is important to identify the correct stage of the causal sequence when these factors are influential. When building and testing theories, we are urged to differentiate between variables that initiate a causal process toward a particular outcome and variables that are important in reinforcing this outcome over time.

This helps understand why similar factors can help reinforce different levels of factionalism. My analysis has shown that a similar electoral system had quite different implications for the level of factionalism in the DC and ÖVP. Both Austria and Italy used a version of an open-list PR system. The preference vote component of the Italian electoral system proved to be an important tool for minority factions in the DC to put pressure on the factions controlling the party leadership. By accumulating preference votes, minority factions could increase their seat share in the DC's parliamentary group and threaten to sabotage parliamentary votes if their interests were not duly taken into account. An open-list PR system thus helped reinforce the value of factional networks and importantly contributed to factionalism spilling over from the competition for party leadership positions to the competition over parliamentary seats at the constituency level. In contrast, the preference vote component of the Austrian electoral system did not encourage ÖVP elites to engage in similar (factional) activities. As shown in Chapter 4.3.1, preference vote campaigns were rare, short-lived and predominantly autonomous endeavors run for a distinct candidate in a particular constituency. They looked nothing like the factional machines striving for preference votes in the DC.

To explain these differences despite a similar electoral system, we need to look at the incentive structure created by the party's leadership selection process and the resulting intra-party playing field. Unlike in the DC, majority elites in the ÖVP enjoyed guaranteed representation in the national party leadership. They were not incentivized to form factions. Instead, they only occasionally used preference vote campaigns to correct for ill-designed electoral lists (Müller, 1989a: 678). Minority elites, by contrast, were practically excluded from the ÖVP's leadership. They could have been incentivized to use the preference vote component to make their voice heard through the party's parliamentary group. Some of the cases where local notables staged a preference vote campaign could fit this pattern. However, as shown

in Chapter 4.2.2, League and Land majority elites had benefited from their influence within the ÖVP to introduce a decentralized selection process for parliamentary candidates. This reinforced the value of strong networks within actors' own party branches as they were not only a prerequisite to assume party leadership positions but also to be nominated as a parliamentary candidate. Factionalism was therefore not a valuable strategy for minority elites in the ÖVP.

These findings resonate with what I have found in other cases. The CSV's mixed leadership selection process gave way to a moderate level of factionalism despite Luxembourg having the most far-reaching preferential voting systems of all analyzed cases. The CDA, similar to the ÖVP, has been characterized by a low level of factionalism despite the Netherlands also using an open-list PR system. In contrast, the CDS' centralized procedure to select its national leaders triggered a high level of factionalism although the party competed under Portugal's closed-list PR system.

My results help make sense of ambiguous results from previous studies on the impact of the electoral system on factionalism. On the one hand, numerous scholars have highlighted an OLPR system as an important cause of factionalism (Pasquino, 1972; Katz and Bardi, 1980; Katz, 1986; Cox and Rosenbluth, 1993; Cox, Rosenbluth and Thies, 1999). Comparative studies, on the other hand, have either only found a statistically weak (Ceron, 2012b: 122, 125-6) or no significant relationship (Borz, 2017: 13) between preferential voting and factionalism. My analysis suggests that these results might only appear ambiguous at first glance. A party's organization, at least in the cases I looked at, had an important mediating impact on the link between the electoral system and factionalism. Future research would benefit from controlling for such interaction effects.

This has also implications for the conclusions we can draw with regard to the way party elites used available means of clientelism and patronage. These have usually been theorized to encourage factionalism when combined with an electoral system that allows for competition between candidates from the same party (Ames, 1995; Carey and Shugart, 1995; Morgenstern, 1996). Similar to the point made above about the reinforcing role of preferential voting, I have found that party elites can use clientelism and patronage to reinforce different levels

of factionalism. Sources of clientelism and patronage were, again, particularly present in the Italian and Austrian case (Müller, 2007: 252). Both the Austrian and Italian public sector and the type of links between politics and the economy provided the DC and ÖVP with access to a substantive amount of resources, like money, positions and public contracts. However, while the Italian Christian Democrats used these resources to create incentives for party members and voters to support their factions, clientelism and patronage were focused on strengthening party elites' position within their Land or League branch in the Austrian case. Thus, previous research has been right in saying that clientelism and patronage can matter a great deal for the development of intra-party competition (e.g. Zuckerman, 1979; Ames, 1995; Golden and Chang, 2001). Yet, party elites use such means to reinforce existing patterns of intra-party competition.

I have not found support for the dominant party approach which has suggested that factionalism in a governing party increases as the level of competitiveness of the party system decreases (e.g. Key, 1949; Arian and Barnes, 1974; Boucek, 2012). The Portuguese CDS became highly factionalized despite spending most of its existence in opposition. Moreover, all remaining cases have been major governing parties for a long period of time while starkly differing in their level of factionalism. In fact, Chapters 3 to 5 have specified that the ÖVP's, CDU's and DC's position in government was quite safe until the end of the 1960s, while no faction, four factions and more than seven factions were established in these cases respectively during that period. In addition, Chapter 3 showed that factionalism in the DC increased when the party's dominant position in the Italian party system was far from secure following its losses in the local elections in November 1946.

Instead, parties' participation in government seems to have primarily mattered for their internal bargaining system to the extent that it provided them with access to resources which party elites used to strengthen the type of networks that were valuable given the intra-party playing field.

While the absence of factions in the ÖVP seems to support the argument that federalism would dampen factionalism, several factions have been established in the CDU from federal Germany (cf. Carty, 2010: 142-3). Moreover, if the level of factionalism decreased as the

level of subnational autonomy increased, the ÖVP should have been more factionalized than the CDU given Austria's weakly federalized polity (Erk, 2004; Karlhofer and Pallaver, 2013). Furthermore, some cases from unitary polities (i.e. CDA, MRP) have been as weakly or even less factionalized than the ÖVP and CDU respectively. Differences in the structure of a polity therefore do not have an unequivocal effect on a party's level of factionalism.

Yet, this is not to say that federalism did not affect the development of intra-party competition within the analyzed cases. German federalism helped majority elites from Land branches to reinforce their influential position within the CDU (without, however, preventing majority elites from smaller Lander and minority elites from engaging in factional activities). In Austria, the Land level has substantial spending power (Müller, 2007: 261). This has helped the ÖVP Land majority elites to strengthen their power base by facilitating Land-specific clientelism and patronage (Chapter 4.3.1).

Furthermore, in almost all cases, party formation was the result of very different groups coming together in the same party without predetermining a high level of factionalism (cf. Capperucci, 2010). In fact, the CDS became highly factionalized even though it had been formed by a fairly homogeneous group (Matuschek, 2008: 88-9). Moreover, the DC's founding groups only started forming factions once the party's centralized leadership selection process had left many of them with very little influence in the national executive and their attempt to gain ex-officio membership in the national executive had failed.

Borz's (2017) argument that parties in which power is centralized in the hands of the party leadership would be more likely to suppress factionalism than decentralized parties finds little support when applied to Christian democracy. I have found high (DC, CDS) and low levels (CDA) of factionalism in centralized parties. Also, similarly decentralized parties have differed in their level of factionalism depending on the institutional playing field created by its initial leadership selection process (ÖVP, CDU, CSV and MRP).

Finally, I add to the studies that have investigated the role of the electoral system used for internal leadership and candidate selections (e.g. Sartori, 1971; 1976; Rahat and Hazan, 2001; Ceron, 2012b: 105-28). My results resonate with previous findings that the use of

intra-party PR for leadership elections within the DC was part of the reinforcement process through which factions tried to increase their influence and thus the result rather than the cause of high factionalism (Leonardi and Wertman, 1989: 109-10).[5]

In short, the study of factionalism requires a historically sensitive approach to differentiate between variables affecting the origins and those influencing the development of factionalism. My results underline that party elites can benefit from similar structural conditions to reinforce different levels of factionalism.

Consequently, while previous theories of factionalism might seem plausible for the trajectory of individual cases, they find substantially less empirical support than my framework when applied to Christian democratic parties (Table 8.4).

Table 8.4: Explanatory power of my and competing theories of factionalism

	Theory	DC	ÖVP	CDU	CDS	CDA	CSV	MRP	Cases
This study	*Leadership selection process*	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	7
Alternative theories	Pre-existing groups	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	0
	Federalism	.	✓	–	.	.	.	.	1
	Party dominance	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	0
	Party centralization	–	–	–	–	✓	–	–	1
	Clientelism	–	–	–	–	✓	–	–	1
	Electoral system	–	–	.	–	–	–	✓	1
	Intra-party PR	–	.	.	.	.	.	.	0

[5] As outlined in Chapter 6.2.2, a factional compromise in the CDS also led to the introduction of PR for internal elections in the early 1980s. I could, however, not determine whether this was the first time PR was used for internal elections.

8.4 Implications for the study of party organizations

Despite a recent interest in party organizations,[6] the most comprehensive efforts to integrate the origins, development and effects of party organizations within a single analytical framework still date from the seminal evolutionary approaches (Duverger, 1951; Kirchheimer, 1966; Panebianco, 1988; Katz and Mair, 1995). These studies have undoubtedly been path-breaking. However, the broad party types introduced by these studies[7] do not capture the persistent organizational variation between parties (Poguntke et al., 2016). While Panebianco's (1988) work on the structure of a party's formative process has moved the literature toward a more fine-grained analysis, the focus on structural variables leaves his framework blind for the role of actors and politics. Moreover, he has been concerned about the driving forces behind the general process of party institutionalization. Consequently, he does not explore the origins, development and effects of specific organizational characteristics.[8]

The previous chapters have been a step toward such a framework by bringing historical institutionalism, and here in particular theories of critical juncture and path dependence, into the study of party organizations. Strangely, this has been hardly done before even though theories of institutional change have been widely valued in comparative politics.[9]

8.4.1 Origins of organizational characteristics

Critical juncture theory helps to take issues of historical causality seriously. When analyzing the origins of the rules to select the party's national leaders, several competing explanations came to mind. These rules could have, for instance, been endogenous to Austria's tradition

[6]For instance, Hazan and Rahat (2010); Biezen and Piccio (2013), Chibber et al. (2014), Kernell (2015), Wills-Otero (2016) and Borz and de Miguel (2017).

[7]Cadre, mass, catch-all, electoral-professional and cartel party.

[8]A similar statement can be made about Kitschelt (1994) and Ishiyama's (2001) work on European parties and Coppedge (1994; 2005) and Levitsky's (2003) studies of Latin American parties.

[9]For example, in the study of political regimes (Mahoney, 2001; Capoccia and Ziblatt, 2010; Bernhard, 2015), public policy (Weaver, 2010) and political economy (Hacker and Pierson, 2002; Acharya and Lee, 2016).

of corporatism, the organization of predecessor parties or the territorial divisions imposed by the Allied liberation and occupation strategies. These antecedent factors could have closed off alternative options or determined actors' preferences in a way that one, and only one, option seemed to be the natural way to go (Collier and Collier, 1991: 27; Capoccia, 2015: 168-9). If this had been confirmed by the data, the leadership selection process would have been an intervening rather than independent variable and the true cause would have been the antecedent factors.

My analysis has systematically addressed such concerns by tracing the relevant decision-making process. I have followed what can be summarized in a set of questions which can also be used to study the origins of the same or different organizational characteristics in other parties.

1. What is the organizational variable that is hypothesized to do the causal work?
2. Who are the key actors whose preferences and choices are consequential for the institutional selection process?
3. What antecedent factors can constrain the set of options available to actors?
4. Are actors able to choose among different options when specifying the value of the variable of interest?

My results support the position that the Italian, Austrian and German Christian Democrats' initial leadership selection process was not endogenous to antecedent factors (Table 8.5). Analyzing the CDS, CDA, CSV and MRP has yielded further support for the importance of political choices in explaining the origins of the parties' procedure to select their national leaders.

Table 8.5: Comparative summary, origins of leadership selection process

	DC	ÖVP	CDU
Variable	Rules to select national party leaders		
Key actors	• Moderates in Southern and Central Italy (e.g. De Gasperi) • Catholic trade unionists (e.g. Gronchi) • Christian partisans and academics from Northern Italy (e.g. Dossetti) • Roman youth group (e.g. Ravaioli) • The Church	• Elites of pre-war Catholic trade unions (e.g. Kunschak, Weinberger) • Elites of pre-war farmer organizations (e.g. Figl) • Elites of pre-war business groups (e.g. Raab) • Political elites in Western Länder • The Church	• Conservative Protestants in Northern Germany (e.g. Schlange-Schönging) • Left-leaning Catholics in Berlin, Hesse and Rhineland (e.g. Kaiser, Arnold) • Centrist Catholics in Rhineland (e.g. Adenauer) • The Church
Potentially relevant antecedent factors	• Territorial divisions imposed by Allied liberation strategy • Organization of PPI • History of regional divisions and identities	• Allied occupation policy • Federalism • Elite continuity and pre-war experience • Austrian corporatism • Organization of Christian Social Party	• Allied licensing and occupation policy • Federalism • Regional, social and denominational conflicts • Legal structure • Organization of Center Party
Evidence for the importance of political choices	• Four different statutory proposals between 1944 and 1946 • Attempts to alter leadership selection process • Political entrepreneurship by De Gasperi	• League structure proposal as trade unionists' strategic choice • Divergence from structure of pre-war organizations • ÖVP's organization preceded resurrection of corporatism • Coalition engineering during four party conferences	• Competing proposals • Political entrepreneurship by Adenauer • Compromise solution after five years of bargaining

8.4.2 Party organization, incentives and resources

Institutional theories are based on the premise that institutions affect what strategies seem to be the most promising to achieve a predefined goal (compare Parsons, 2007: 67). When moving from the origins to the consequences of party organizations, we are thus required to spell out:

5. What goal do actors pursue?
6. What resources do actors need to achieve their goal given the institutional playing field?
7. How does the institutional playing field direct actors' strategies to obtain these resources?

In Chapter 2, I have assumed that party elites seek power within their organization. This seemed plausible because intra-party power has been theorized as being beneficial for achieving rent- and ideology-related goals (Schlesinger, 1984: 381-9; also Elster, 2007: 193). My findings back this initial assumption. I have found some conflicts between party elites having been primarily driven by ideological concerns, like between left-, right-wing and centrist groups in the early CDU, whereas other conflicts, like in the mature DC, were fueled by rent-seeking motivations. To achieve any of these goals, however, party elites tried to gain influence within their party. An important way of ensuring influence within the party was to be part of its national leadership. This made the selection process of the party leadership an important set of rules. It affected, as shown above, where party elites were required to look for support and what type of networks they were likely to build.

8.4.3 Organizational development and multi-level path dependence

If the level of factionalism undermines a party's adaptability, why do party elites not change it? To answer this question, I have suggested moving beyond the focus on path dependence on a single level.

As summarized above, actors' initial choice regarding the procedure to select their national

leaders set their party on a path toward a specific level of factionalism which affected its ability to adapt to changing societal and political conditions.

In addition, factionalism became deeply rooted within the party's internal practices and organization. This process was driven by actors trying to expand and strengthen the networks they had been incentivized to form. This entailed, for instance, campaigning, ideological appeals or clientelism whereby the party organization had determined which internal selectorate actors needed to woo. As mentioned above, it was at this stage that actors took advantage of structural conditions to gain the resources valuable under the internal bargaining system in place. For instance, the Italian and Austrian Christian Democrats used the funds made available by their parties' position in government to create incentives for party members to join their networks.

Moreover, party elites tried to increase the value of their networks. They did so by trying to modify the party organization in their favor. Since party organizations are modified all the time (Janda, 1980; Katz and Mair, 1992; Poguntke et al., 2016; cf. Wills-Otero, 2016: 762), I have built on Capoccia and Ziblatt's (2010) episode analysis to identify the relevant moments of actual and potential organizational changes. The key questions guiding my analysis were:

8. How does the party's initial internal playing field drive actors' attempts to modify the party organization?
9. How do these organizational modifications influence party elites' incentive structure?

I have found that organizational changes formally entrenched actors' incentive structure and the corresponding level of factionalism. In the DC, for instance, small factions successfully promoted the introduction of a PR system for internal elections not only at the national but also subnational level. Larger factions, in return, tried to dampen small factions by introducing an electoral threshold which factions needed to overcome in order to be represented at the national party congress and party council. Both statutory changes underlined the importance of factional ties in intra-party politics and even reproduced it at different levels of the party organization. In the Austrian ÖVP, majority elites succeeded in repeatedly modifying the seat

share majority elites from the different party branches were entitled to fill. This included the expansion of ex-officio membership in the national leadership to more majority elites from an increasing number of party branches which reinforced party elites' incentives to form networks within rather than across party branches. The case studies have thus underlined that a process of institutional (self-)reinforcement entailed behavioral rather than institutional stability (Greif, 2006: 168). The parties' organizations continued to be modified but thereby confirmed rather than altered the level of factionalism.

Earlier organizational changes were more momentous for party development than changes implemented at a later point in time which is in line with predictions from the path dependence literature (compare Pierson, 2000a: 263). This could be observed in the case of the ÖVP and CDU. As part of an attempt to reform the ÖVP, the Austrian Christian Democrats centralized the leadership selection process in 1980. Had this decision been taken at the moment of party formation, my theoretical framework would have predicted the emergence of factions. In 1980, however, party elites had been incentivized to build strong networks within their respective organizational branches for 35 years. These networks were not gone overnight. Majority elites could rely on their influence and contacts to counter this organizational reform. Similarly, CDU elites' incentive structure did not substantially change when the German Constitutional Court imposed a centralized procedure to select national leadership positions in political parties.

This second process of path dependence is important to understand why Christian democrats have been unable to change the level of factionalism when the latter jeopardized their electoral prospects. When facing pressure to adapt their organization, party elites could not be certain to what extent changing the level of factionalism would improve the party's immediate rather than only mid- or long-term electoral prospects and thus party elites' own payoffs. In contrast, the costs of having to build new internal networks were imminent for party elites. These costs of setting up alternative strategies to gain intra-party power had been increasing over time due to party elites acting under a specific code of practice and due to organizational modifications which accommodated specific types of networks. In other words, the strategic interaction between party elites had kept evolving endogenously, thereby affecting actors' subsequent payoffs and strategies (Greif and Laitin, 2004: 633-4; Greif, 2006: 18, 159). This

helps understand, for example, why so many majority elites in the ÖVP were unwilling to follow Mock's reform course in the late 1970s and early 1980s and why Mock himself did not substantially alter his own power base. Similarly, it underlines why Mario Segni and Mino Martinazzoli failed to encourage enough DC elites to move away from the existing system of factions. It was a classic collective action problem where changing patterns of intra-party competition was the collectively superior but individually inferior strategy.

My historical-institutional approach to analyzing the interaction between party elites importantly complements previous approaches that have aimed to explain the lack of party reforms. Following Tsebelis' (1990: 119-56) work on nested games, Koelble (1992) and Müller and Steininger (1994) have highlighted that party elites are restricted in their scope of action by their dependence on the support of particular intra-party groups. My analysis has added to this line of research by showing that the type of groups party elites rely on depends on the level of factionalism. In the DC, party elites depended on the support of factions, whereas the Austrian Christian Democrats were required to secure the support of Land or League branches. These groups often opposed party reforms that would have risked going against their interests (compare Müller and Steininger, 1994: 24-5). When leading Christian democrats had to decide on party reforms, they were thus required to assess the potential consequences of endorsing a specific strategy for the party and whether their intra-party support group was likely to punish or reward them for their choice (Tsebelis, 1990: 122-32). Koelble (1992) and Müller and Steininger (1994) explained the lack of reform by party elites' attempt to avoid punishment from their internal support group. My results underline that party elites were to some extent captives of their own power base. Reformers, like Aldo Moro and Benigno Zaccagnini in the DC, for example, were constrained in their leverage to change patterns of intra-party competition by their dependence on factional support.

Yet, while the nested game approach is helpful to understand the basic relationship between party elites and their intra-party power base (compare also Kitschelt, 1994; Levitsky, 2003), it does not account for the full picture of why party elites did not change the level of factionalism. In the discussion of the original game, Tsebelis (1990: 127-32) suggested that the intra-party group's decision to reward or sanction its elites would be affected by the party's chances at the next election. The closer the election, the more likely the intra-party group would be to not

punish their elites. This resonates with my finding that demands for changes to the intra-party bargaining system were primarily put forward by lower-rank party cadres, like party congress delegates in the case of the ÖVP. Moreover, Lupu (2016: 28-9) has shown that leading party elites tend to be driven more by expected immediate electoral payoffs and less by the mid- and long-term interests of particular groups than actors further down in the party hierarchy. Actors who were part of the party leadership would thus have been expected to push for the strategy that they anticipate will maximize the party's electoral prospects. In the DC and ÖVP, for instance, this would have included changing the patterns of intra-party competition.

Instead, I have found that these actors often opposed changes to the level of factionalism and the decade-long process of institutional reinforcement helps understand why.

8.5 Christian democracy and beyond? The importance of rules and democratic competition

This thesis is a study of one – very important and under-researched – party family. It has shown the theoretical and empirical efforts necessary to comprehensively explain the varying adaptability of a well-defined set of parties.

The importance of rules and procedures in my account of party adaptability has important implications for the scope of my model when thinking about its applicability beyond Western European Christian democracy. In particular, Christian democratic parties have two characteristics in common which are crucial for my model to work.

1) *Application of formal rules*: An organization needs to have a set of rules and procedures which actually structures the selection of its leadership in order to develop the dynamics I have described in this thesis. This usually involves the existence of a formal party statute and the general agreement that the specified rules will be applied and respected when choosing the national leaders. As admitted in Chapter 1.5.3, actors are reluctant to follow regulations that do not help their interests (Duverger, 1951: 76; Sartori, 1976: 84; Panebianco, 1988: 35).

Still, the formal procedures that organize how national party leaders are selected have been generally followed in Christian democratic parties, arguably, because party elites have been incentivized to detect rivals who are not playing by the rules (compare Katz and Mair, 1992: 6).

There are, however, parties where formal rules have less of an impact. In many personalistic parties, like Silvio Berlusconi's *Forza Italia*, leaders can often bypass formal rules – if the latter exist at all (McCarthy, 1996: 130; McDonnell, 2013: 220-4). Similarly, many parties in so-called developing democracies lack a formal set of internal rules. In Latin America, for instance, many parties, though not all, 'are characterized by informally structured and internally fluid organizations' (Levitsky, 2003: 3; see also Mainwaring and Scully, 1995: 1, 22; Huneeus, 2003: 126; Levitsky and Cameron, 2009: 339-42). Similar conclusions have been made about parties in other parts of the world (e.g. Randall and Svasand, 2002: 18-9, 24; Hale, 2006: 7; Wilkinson, 2015: 425). In these cases, intra-party politics is usually not particularly rule-bound. They, consequently, do not fall within my universe of cases.

2) *Democratic intra-party competition*: An organization needs to elect its national leadership in a democratic manner. Western European Christian democratic parties held internal elections to select their leaders and party elites who wanted to gain power were required to win over a particular selectorate. In my model, party elites' incentives to form factions have been driven by the variation of which selectorate they needed to win over.

However, many parties, especially in developing countries, do not hold democratic elections to select their leaders. Candidates for leadership positions or public offices are often not elected but appointed by a single party leader or a closed elite circle (Chandra, 2004: 246-61; Wills-Otero, 2016: 762, 766). We are thus unlikely to see similar dynamics as described in the previous chapters.[10]

Moreover, in Western European Christian democratic parties, party elites have been free

[10] Anecdotally, we can see some support for my model in cases of parties in developing countries which operate based on a set of formal rules and allow for democratic intra-party competition. The Chilean Christian Democrat Party (PDC) meets the two scope conditions and displays the characteristics predicted by my model. The PDC has used a centralized leadership selection process, has experienced intense factionalism and has shown a rather low level of adaptability (Huneeus, 2003).

to form and join factions if the latter were deemed useful to advance their interests. The existence and acknowledgment of different positions within the party has been an inherent characteristic of Christian democracy (Chapter 1.2; Van Kersbergen: 1994: 35-42; 1999: 352-9; Kalyvas and Van Kersbergen, 2010: 186-91).

Yet, this freedom to promote one's own interests, even when the latter goes against the position of the incumbent party leadership, is absent in some parties. Communist, socialist, sectarian and radical right parties are often based on a firm hierarchy. The leaders of these parties often give little room for dissent. This may be a formal part of the party organization. For instance, many communist and socialist parties applied the Leninist principle of democratic centralism. It prohibits any critic toward or defection from the party line once the latter has been established. While such rules may only be in place temporarily, like in the Italian PSI between 1949 and 1953 (Zariski, 1962: 374; Barnes, 1967: 45-8), they can entail an important legacy. The suppression of factionalism can also be based on informal institutions, like norms and socially acceptable conducts of behavior. Party discipline, for instance, was considered valuable in the German SPD after World War II. Despite the absence of formal democratic centralism, members of the party's left wing were expelled for opposing the SPD's transformation into a moderate center-left party in 1959 (Graf, 1976: 164). As such institutions restrict intra-party pluralism and constrain actors in their attempts to compete for their preferences within the party, such cases would not fulfill my scope conditions.

However, although my theoretical framework is not applicable to all party families, we would not expect it only to apply to Christian democratic parties as long as these two conditions are met. In fact, there is no reason to expect the dynamics predicted by my model to unfold only in political parties. Rule-based and competitive leadership elections also take place in other organizations, like NGOs and trade unions. While systematically assessing this point would go beyond the scope of this thesis, my model makes a quite general prediction which seems worth to be tested in the future beyond the realm of party politics. 1) The type of networks actors will build in their ambition to assume leadership positions in a specific organization will depend on whether positions on this leadership board are primarily elected either by an assembly which brings together delegates from different branches of the organization or by these branches autonomously. 2) The existence of a mix of networks both within and

across organizational branches enhances the organization's ability to respond to a changing environment.

8.6 Final remarks

In conclusion, historical institutionalism in general and theories of critical juncture and path dependence in particular have proven to provide a valuable toolkit for the analysis of party adaptability, factionalism and the study of party organizations. They are helpful to move 'beyond the crude classification of party organization' in terms of mass, catch-all or cartel party and to redress many of the challenges Mair (1997) identified 20 years ago: 1) focusing our analysis on a concrete organizational variable we expect to affect the internal life of parties, 2) specifying the causes and effects of organizational change and 3) developing and testing hypotheses which might account both for the diversity of and change within party organizations (Mair, 1997: 42-3).

My findings suggest a perspective on party adaptability that combines a focus on the demand- and supply-side-specific challenges to which political parties need to adapt with the entrenched institutional legacy which constrains their decision-makers when making strategic choices. It is only by disaggregating party organizations into specific institutional variables and by laying out how these variables drive actors' behavior that we can systematically understand what guides a party's ability to adapt to profound societal and political transformations.

Appendix

Appendix A: Coding scheme for Table 1.4

1 Organizational entrenchment:

1.1 Member/voter ratio: Kitschelt (1994: 221).

Member/voter ratio $\geq$ 20percent = 1.0; $\geq$ 5percent = 0,5; $<$ 5 percent = 0.0. In case a minimum/maximum party membership is provided I consistently use the maximum estimate (which, e.g. in the Austrian case, also includes family members).

Data: Katz and Mair (1992: 38, 46-7, 127, 132, 329, 332, 473, 483, 631, 640)

Case	Membership/voter ratio	Value
CDA	(125,033/3,140,502)*100= 3.98	0.0
CSU	(184,294/3,715,827)*100= 4.96	0.0
CDU	(705,821/13,045,745)*100= 5.41	0.5
PSC	(42,838/491,839)*100= 8.71	0.5
DC	(1,812201/13,252,866)*100= 13.67	0.5
CVP	(139,575/1,195,839)*100= 11.67	0.5
ÖVP	(695,000/2,003,663)*100= 34.69	1.0

1.2 Availability of patronage: Kitschelt (1994: 222).

The coding below is my qualitative assessment based on secondary literature. Patronage with no impact on the party= 0.0; patronage with moderate impact= 0.5; patronage with great impact= 1.0.

Case	Value
CDA	0.0
CSU	1.0
CDU	0.5
PSC	1.0
CVP	1.0
DC	1.0
ÖVP	1.0

1.3 Size of the party's middle-level apparatus: Kitschelt (1994: 222).

The coding is based on the number of professional party staff and basic units (De Winter, 1990: 9-11; Katz and Mair, 1992: 48, 58, 104, 333, 339, 483, 493, 640, 651). Large apparatus= 1.0; medium-sized apparatus= 0.5; small apparatus= 0.0.

Case	Professional party staff	Basic units	Value
CDA	153 (average: 1985-89)	743	1.0
CSU	1,309 for the CDU/CSU parliamentary group	2,893	1.0
CDU	196 for the central party, 1,309 for the CDU/CSU parliamentary group	9,500	1.0
PSC	One full-time assistant per MP in the Lower Chamber, one secretary for the PPG, one employee with an academic degree and one administrative employee for every 12 MPs in the Upper Chamber; Less present at the local level than CVP (De Winter, 1990: 9); no available data on party in central office	at least 262 (all Walloon communes)	0.5
DC	367 central party and 161 subnational party (missing data on parliamentary party)	13,137	1.0
CVP	described as Belgium's most professionally organized party (De Winter, 1990: 10-1); highly reputed research center (CEPESS) and Institute for Political Formation (IPOVO) for the party cadres, organization for elected office holders and a wide range of publications (including a weekly magazine); one full-time assistant per MP in the Lower Chamber, one secretary for the PPG, one employee with an academic degree and one administrative employee for every 12 MPs in the Upper Chamber	at least 308 (all Flemish communes)	1.0
ÖVP	155 (80 central party organization, 50 central League organizations, 25 for the PPG)	4,043	1.0

1.4 Institutionalization of intra-party pluralism: Entrenched internal conflict lines (e.g. between factions, territorial branches or ancillary organizations) indicate a high level of organizational entrenchment (compare Kitschelt (1994: 222-3).
No entrenched conflict lines= 0.0; Combination of continuity and fluidity= 0.5; Entrenchment of organized groups and their sphere of incluence= 1.0. The coding below is my qualitative assessment based on secondary literature.

Case	Value
CDA	0.0
CSU	0.5
CDU	0.5
PSC	0.5
DC	1.0
CVP	1.0
ÖVP	1.0

2 Leadership accountability

2.1 Local vs. central control of recruitment for national electoral office: Kitschelt (1994: 223) combines in this dimension his assessment of the extent to which the party on the ground controls candidate selection with an assessment of the 'nature of the grassroots organizations'. This, however, means combining parts of dimension 1.1, 1.3 and 2.1. I try to treat all conceptual dimensions as distinct and thus focus on the extent to which the national party leadership is free to select the party's candidates for national elections. Central party leadership decides= 0.0; combination of central and local control= 0.5; local control= 1.0. My coding relies on Katz and Mair (1992: 181-2, 589, 369-70, 697) and Gallagher and Marsh (1988).

Case	Recruitment for national electoral office	Value
CDA	Combination of the national executive and local control via representation in the party council and party congress	0.5
CSU	Constituency assemblies select their respective constituency candidate. Land list is selected by Land assembly. The executive committee or party leader can only veto their decisions if they are in violation with the electoral law.	1.0
CDU	Constituency assemblies has to have a secret vote on the constituency candidate. A Land assembly has to have a secret vote on the Land list. Land executive can veto the selection of a constituency candidate in which case the procedure has to be repeated and will be binding thereafter. The national party executive can only veto the selection of a constituency candidate in which case the procedure has to be repeated and will be binding thereafter.	1.0
PSC	Combination of membership poll system and constituency party branches; national executive can only intervene when the constituency branches are unable to agree on a slate	1.0
DC	Provincial committees propose nominees. Regional committees appoint candidates. National party council only issues the rules for the selection process.	1.0
CVP	Combination of membership poll system, constituency party branches and the national executive	0.5
ÖVP	Mostly controlled by Land and League organizations but national executive can nominate a share of candidates in electable positions (see also Chapter 4.3.2)	0.5

2.2 Control of party conference: Kitschelt (1994: 223-4).

I have given 0.5 if the party leadership has weak control over the agenda and motions for the party conference. I have given another 0.5 if the party leadership was formally required to convene a party conference at least or more often than every two years. The coding is based on Katz and Mair (1992: 97, 175-6, 364-6, 581-2, 688).

Case	Control of agenda and motions	Conference meeting	Value
CDA	The party leader presides over the conference. Local party branches can send motions to the national executive. The national executive advises the conference about these proposals.	Every two years and in election years	0.5
CSU	No rules about conference committee. Presidium, ancillary organizations, district and county party branches, working groups and Land leadership can propose motions. The deadline for proposals is six weeks before the conference. After discussion by a special motion committee, the final motions are sent at least three weeks before the conference to all delegates. Deadlines are irrelevant for emergency motions if they are sponsored by at least 50 conference delegates. The party leadership can propose emergency motions at any time during the conference.	Annually	0.5
CDU	The conference is opened by the chairman of the party or the party secretary. Before the discussion of the agenda starts, a conference presidium is elected. Its size and membership is the decision of the national party congress. Motions have to be sent to the party central office four weeks before the beginning of the party conference. Proposals delivered in time should be sent to all delegates before the beginning of the conference. If this is not possible, the proposals have to be presented as printouts at the conference. Motions can be proposed by the national executive, party committee, ancillary organizations and the Land and county party executives. Emergency motions can be proposed by at least 30 conference delegates.	Every two years	1.0
PSC	.	.	.

Case	Control of agenda and motions	Conference meeting	Value
DC	No data on conference committee; no data on proposal rights. The archival data indicates a high level of power of the party leadership (and here in particular of the different factional leaders) over the agenda and motions.	Infrequent	0.0
CVP	No data on conference committee. Agenda is set by the party executive. Any constituency executive or 20 local branches can suggest an item until 15 days before the conference (30 days for changes in the statutes). Motions are suggested by the national executive. It informs the local branches, the youth and women's movements, which have at least 4 weeks to propose changes. The constituency organizations aggregate the propositions of the local branches and decide the changes to be proposed by the constituency. Any local branch has the right to send its own propositions to the national executive. The national executive can change the proposals before submitting them to the conference. Except for very urgent political statements, no decision can be taken by the conference if the participants did not receive written information before the meeting.	Annually	0.5
ÖVP	The party leader is part of the conference committee. He nominates the remaining committee members who must be approved by the conference delegates. The national executive, Land party executives, the League executives and 50 conference delegates can propose motions.	Every three years	0.0

2.3 Domination of party executive over the parliamentary leadership: Kitschelt (1994: 224-5). The legislative leadership basically leads the party= 0.0; elements of dominance of the party in public office but also the existence of important countervailing forces (e.g. regional branches)= 0.5; party leadership is dominated by independently elected elites from regional branches, factions or other groups= 1.0. The coding below is my qualitative assessment based on secondary literature.

Case	Value
CDA	0.0
CSU	1.0
CDU	1.0
PSC	1.0
DC	1.0
CVP	1.0
ÖVP	1.0

2.4 Dependence on external groups: Kitschelt (1994: 225).

External groups, like Catholic or occupational associations, control key appointments for important executive and legislative party positions= 1.0; close communication between external groups and leading party positions but both sides are intent on some distance both in terms of overlapping leadership and strategic maneuverability=0.5; party leadership with complete independence from external groups. The coding below is my qualitative assessment based on secondary literature.

Case	Value
CDA	0.5
CSU	0.0
CDU	0.0
PSC	0.5
DC	0.5
CVP	1.0
ÖVP	1.0

Appendix B: Primary data for Figures 1.7, 1.7b and 6.1

Figure 1.7b: Christian democratic leadership selection and relative electoral change, 1960 to 2013



Election data: Armingeon et al. (2015a); centralization: see list below

Data on the first party statutes of the Austrian ÖVP, the Belgian CVP, the Danish KRF and Dutch CDA have been taken from the respective country chapters in : Katz, R. S., and P. Mair. 1992. *Party Organizations. A data handbook on party organizations in Western democracies, 1960-90.* Sage: London.

Electronic or printed copies of the first party statutes of the remaining parties have been kindly provided by: Belgian PSC: Belgian *Centre Permanent pour la Citoyenneté et la Participation* (CPCP); German CDU: *Archiv für Christlich-Demokratische Politik*; German CSU: Flechtheim, O. K. 1962. *Dokumente zur parteipolitischen Entwicklung in Deutschland seit 1945.* Berlin: Dokumenten-Verlag; Italian DC: *Archivio della Democrazia Cristiana* of the *Istituto Luigi Sturzo*; Luxembourgian CSV: Archives of the Christian-Social People's Party; Portuguese CDS: *Instituto Amaro da Costa* and the Portuguese People's Party (CDS-PP); Swiss CVP: *Schweizerisches Bundesarchiv*; Swedish KDS: private data collection of Magnus

Hagevi, Anders Widfeldt and the Swedish *Riksarkivet*.

Data on the Norwegian KRF have only been available since 1960 and have been taken from the chapter in Katz and Mair (1992). I am thankful to Urs Altermatt, Nancy Bermeo, João Carlos Espada, Tim Frey, Magnus Hagevi, Hanspeter Kriesi, Wolfgang C. Müller, Jon Pierre, Anders Widfeldt and the Swedish Christian Democratic Party for their support in gathering the data.

Appendix C: Primary data Chapter 3

The primary data for Chapter 3 has been collected at the *Archivio della Democrazia Cristiana* and the *Archivio Giulio Andreotti* of the *Istituto Luigo Sturzo* in Rome. For reasons of simplicity, the former has been abbreviated ‘ILS’ and the latter ‘AGA’ in the text above. Other material has been taken from Franco Salvi’s (1959) *Atti e Documenti della Democrazia Cristiana, 1943 – 1959* as well as newspaper, university, research institute and ministerial archives which are accessible online. The translations from Italian into English have been my own. The presentation of the data in the footnotes above follows the following scheme:

> Author : *Name of the source.* Information on the nature of the source, date, page(s), collection, box folder, archival code or source, URL [date of access].

In the following, the primary material is classified by location and collection.

Location: Archivio della Democrazia Cristiana of the Istituto Luigo Sturzo (ILS)

Collection: DC Congresso Nazionale

Bollettino Organizzativo, Secondo Congresso Nazionale, Regolamento. Organizational regulations for the 1947 party congress, 01.11.1947, Congresso Nazionale, Sc. 1 S.fasc.7, ILS.

Proposta di Modifica dello Statuto. Statutory proposal, 28.06.1954, Congresso Nazionale, Sc. 5 Fasc. 6, ILS.

Scheda. Voting card for internal elections at the 1946 party congress, 24. – 28.04.1946, DC Congresso Nazionale, Sc. 1, ILS.

Seduta Antimeridiana. Minutes, 29.06.1954, Congresso Nazionale, Sc. 5 Fasc. 6, ILS.

Seduta Antimeridiana. Minutes, 16.10.1956, Congresso Nazionale, Sc. 6 Fasc. 7 Sottofasc. 1, ILS.

Seduta Pomeridiana. Minutes, 15.10.1956, Congresso Nazionale, Sc. 6 Fasc. 7 Sottofasc. 1, ILS.

Seduta Notturna. Minutes, 25.11.1952, Congresso Nazionale, Sc. 3, ILS.

Seduta Notturna. Minutes, 28.06.1954, Congresso Nazionale, Sc. 5 Fasc. 6, ILS.

Collection : DC Consiglio Nazionale

Relazione del Segretario Politico on. Piccoli. In: Per una nuova Iniziativa della D.C. Speech at Consiglio Nazionale, 06. – 07.12.1980, Consiglio Nazionle, Sc. 62 Fasc. 132, ILS.

Resoluzione Ravaioli, Resolution by Ravaioli at the Consiglio Nazionale, 20.12.1974, Fondo Consiglio Nazionale Sc. 56, Fasc. 104, ILS.

Seduta Antimeridiana. Minutes, 27.04.1949, Consiglio Nazionale, Sc. 5 Fasc. 14, ILS.

Seduta Pomeridiana. Minutes, 28.04.1949, Consiglio Nazionale, Sc. 5 Fasc. 14, ILS.

Verbale. Minutes, 31.07.1944, Consiglio Nazionale, Sc. 1 Fasc. 1, ILS.

Verbale. Minutes, 24.01.1964, Consiglio Nazionale, Sc. 51 Fasc. 73 Sottofasc. 1, ILS.

Verbale. Minutes, 25.01.1964, Consiglio Nazionale, Sc. 51 Fasc. 73 Sottofasc. 1, ILS.

Verbale. Minutes, 31.07.1981, Consiglio Nazionale, Sc. 64 Fasc. 139 Sottofasc. 1, ILS.

Verbale Seduta Serale. Minutes, 20.12.1948, Consiglio Nazionale Sc. 4 Fasc. 11, ILS.

Collection : DC Direzione Nazionale

Appunto I and Appunto II con riferimento i Gruppi di Studio di 'Politica Sociale' e del Convegno di Pesaro. Declaration of the party leadership, 17.11.1948, Direzione Nazionale, Sc. 3 Fasc. 23, ILS.

Dichiarazione della Direzione Nazionale. Declaration of the party leadership, 18.11.1948, Direzione Nazionale, Sc. 3 Fasc. 23, ILS.

Riunione della Commissione direttiva del Partito. Minutes, 08.06.1944, Direzione Nazionale Sc. 1 Fasc. 1, ILS.

Verbale. Minutes, 14.03.1947, Direzione Nazionale, Sc. 1 Fasc. 4, ILS.

Collection : DC Segretaria Politica

Fuccaro, L.: *De Mita Evita lo scontro e parla solo del governo.* Newspaper article in Corriere della Sera, 21.09.1992, Segretaria Politica Sc. 240, ILS.

Geremiccal, F. 1992. *Sipario su notabili e rampanti.* Newspaper article in La Repubblica, 14.10.1992, Segretaria Politica, Sc. 240, ILS.

Il segretario dc: Perdo la pazienza. Newspaper article in Corriere della Sera, 24.09.1992, Segretaria Politica Sc. 240, ILS.

Minzolini, A.: *Salta il triumvirato Forlani – Gava – De Mita.* Newspaper article in La Stampa, 25.09.1992, Segretaria Politica, Sc. 240, ILS.

DC Segretaria Politica, Sc. 188, Fasc. 12, Sottofasc. 1. Forlani, ILS.

Collection : DC Statuti

Lo Statuto. 1945, DC Statuti, Fasc. 1, ILS Nuovi Articoli dello Statuto. 1966, DC Statuti, ILS.

Progetto di Statuto del Partito. 1946, DC Statuti, ILS.

Statuto del Partito. 1947, DC Statuti, ILS.

Statuto del Partito. 1957, DC Statuti, ILS.

Statuto del Partito. 1962, DC Statuti, ILS.

Statuto del Partito. 1968, DC Statuti, ILS.

Statuto del Partito. 1970, DC Statuti, ILS.

Statuto del Partito. 1972, DC Statuti, ILS.

Statuto del Partito. 1974, DC Statuti, ILS.

Statuto del Partito. 1976, DC Statuti, ILS.

Statuto del Partito. 1978, DC Statuti, ILS.

Statuto del Partito. 1984, DC Statuti, ILS.

Collection : Giudo Gonella

Stralcio dal Verbale della Seduta Direzione Nazionale. Summary minutes of party leadership meeting, 04.08.1949, Gonella, 9 Correnti Busta 36, ILS.

Collection: Giovanni Gronchi

Grandi, A.: *Saluto al Congresso.* Newspaper article in Politica Sociale, 1(8), p. 1, 21.04.1946, Gronchi Primo Parte, Sc. 11 Fasc. 41, ILS.

Il Discorso di Gronchi, Pesaro. Speech of Gronchi at factional congress published in factional newspaper, 21.11.1948, in Politica Sociale, Gronchi Primo Parte, Sc. 14 Fasc. 64, ILS.

Renzo Ascani to Battistini and Gronchi. Private letter, 02.02.1948, Gronchi Primo Parte, Sc. 14 Fasc. 64, ILS

Samartino Salvatore to Gronchi. Private letter, 27.07.1946, Gronchi Primo Parte, Sc. 11 Fasc. 41, ILS.

Collection: Giuseppe Spataro

Letter Direzione Provvisora del Partito to Comitati Regionali di Milano, Torino Genova, Bologna, Venezia, Ugo Architetto and Pero. Official letter, 29.04.1944, Spataro, Sc. 9 Fasc. 41, ILS.

Location: Archivio Giulio Andreotti (AGA)

Collection: Democrazia Cristiana. Sottoserie 10. Correnti, 1954-1995. Sottosottoserie 1. Problemi di corrente e vecchie correnti, 1957 – 1995. Busta. 990.

D'Avanzo, Giuseppe. 'E Andreotti ammette: "Meritiamo l'inferno."' *La Repubblica*, 12.05.1992, Democrazia Cristiana, Busta. 990, AGA.

Drioli, Itti: 'Martinazzoli prova a liquidare la vecchia Dc.' *La Nazione*, 23.03.1993. p.2, Democrazia Cristiana, Busta. 990, AGA.

'Gli uomini della Balena Bianca.' *L'Unita*, 18.04.1992. p. 4, Democrazia Cristiana, Busta. 990, AGA.

'La dc si ricuce sula Riforma.' *Il Giorno*, 07.09.1990. p. 2, Democrazia Cristiana, Busta. 990, AGA.

Collection: Democrazia Cristiana. Sottoserie 17 Consiglio Nazionale, 1945-1993. Sottoserie 14. 1969-1993, Busta 1038.

'Andreotti deluso. "Non Vedo proprio motivi insuperabili di divisione."' *Il Mattino*, 21.02.1990, p. 2, Democrazia Cristiana, Busta 1038, AGA.

Compagna, Guido: 'Dc, lascia De Mita Governo piu debole.' *Il Sole 24 Ore*, 21.02.1990, p. 1, Democrazia Cristiana, Busta 1038, AGA.

Damato, Francesco: 'Anche il governo rischia la cinese.' *Il Giornale*, 21.02.1990, p. 1. Democrazia Cristiana, Busta 1038, AGA.

'Dc Consiglio il 10. Sinistra divisa.' *Corriere della Sera*, 05.06.1992, Democrazia Cristiana, Busta 1038, AGA.

Franco, Massimo: ‘Il santo di Ciriaco.’ *Panorama*, 03.12.1990, p. 46, Democrazia Cristiana, Busta 1038, AGA.

Geremicca, Federico: ‘Andreotti consuma la sua vendetta.’ *La Republica*, 11.01.1992, p. 3, Democrazia Cristiana, Busta 1038, AGA.

Il document approvato. p. 67, Consiglio Nazionale, 14.-15.04.1992, Democrazia Cristiana, Busta 1038, AGA.

Intervento del Presidente del Consiglio Giulio Andreotti al Consiglio Nazionale della DC. 18.11.1989, pp. 3–22, Democrazia Cristiana, Busta 1038, AGA.

Minzolini, Augusto: ‘De Mita lascia: non e piu la mia dc.’ *La Stampa*, 21.02.1990, p. 3, Democrazia Cristiana, Busta 1038, AGA.

Modifiche allo Statuto approvate dal Consiglio Nazionale. Consiglio Nazionale, 09.-10.01.1992, p. 61, Art. 17, Democrazia Cristiana, Busta 1038, AGA.

‘Non sara una vera spaccatura.’ *Il Tempo*, 21.02.1990, p. 2, Democrazia Cristiana, Busta 1038, AGA.

Proietti, Fernando: ‘Andreotti: il Pci non mi pare in liquidazione.’ *Corriere della Sera*, 19.11.1989, p. 2, Democrazia Cristiana, Busta 1038, AGA.

Relazione del responsabile organizzativo sull’analisi del voto del 5-6 Aprile, Luigi Baruffi. Consiglio Nazionale, 14./15.04.1992, p. 24, Democrazia Cristiana, Busta 1038, AGA.

Relazione del Segretario Politico Arnaldo Forlani. Consiglio Nazionale, 14./15.04.1992, p. 16, Democrazia Cristiana, Busta 1038, AGA.

Scalfari, Eugenio: ‘Il ritorno di De Mita.’ *La Republblica*, 27.11.1990, p. 12, Democrazia Cristiana, Busta 1038, AGA.

Seduta del 14 Aprile 1992. Interventi. p. 29, Consiglio Nazionale, 14.-15.04.1992, Democrazia Cristiana, Busta 1038, AGA.

Sintesi della Relazione del Segretario Politico Arnaldo Forlani. Consiglio Nazionale 17.–18. 11.1989, pp. 3-4, 6, Democrazia Cristiana, Busta 1038, AGA.

Summonte, Fabrizio: “Un interrogative. Quale riflesso a Palazzo Chigi?” *Il Tempo*, 21.02.1990. p. 2, Democrazia Cristiana, Busta 1038, AGA.

Location: Salvi, Franco. 1959. *Atti e Documenti della Democrazia Cristiana, 1943 – 1959*. Rome: Edizioni Cinque Lune.

Commissione Direttiva Centrale della D.C. Summary minutes, 12.06.1944, Atti e Documenti, pp. 38 – 39.

Congresso Interregionale della D.C. Summary minutes, 29. – 30.07.1944, Atti e Documenti, p. 49.

Commissione Direttiva Centrale della D.C. Summary minutes, 29.06.1944, Atti e Documenti, p. 41.

Consiglio Nazionale della D.C. Summary minutes, 31.07.1944, Atti e Documenti, p. 52.

Consiglio Nazionale della D.C. Summary minutes, 29.04.1946, Atti e Documenti, pp. 217 – 218.

Consiglio Nazionale della D.C. Summary minutes, 06. – 09.01.1946, Atti e Documenti, pp. 158 – 159.

Consiglio Nazionale della D.C. Summary minutes, 29.04.1946, Atti e Documenti, pp. 217 – 218.

Consiglio Nazionale della D.C. Summary minutes, 18. – 22.09.1946, Atti e Documenti, pp. 236 – 241.

Direzione Centrale della D.C. Summary minutes, 09.06.1945, Atti e Documenti, pp. 126 – 127.

Direzione Centrale della D.C. Summary minutes, 04.08.1945, Atti e Documenti, p. 136.

Direzione Centrale della D.C. Summary minutes, 08.03.1946, Atti e Documenti, p. 171.

Direzione Centrale della D.C. Summary minutes, 17.04.1946, Atti e Documenti, pp. 177 – 178.

Il Consiglio Nazionale eletto dal I Congresso Nazionale. List of elected Consiglio Nazionale members, 24. – 27.04.1946, Atti e Documenti, pp. 215 – 217.

Mozione della Direzione Centrale della D.C. Motion, 28.04.1945, Atti e Documenti, pp. 119 – 121.

Lettera del Segretario Politico Piccioni ai Dirigenti del Partito. Official letter, 15.11.1946, Atti e Documenti, pp. 251 – 254.

O.d.g. della Direzione Centrale della D.C. Agenda of party leaderhsip meeting, 30.05.1945, Atti e Documenti, p. 126.

Location: Miscellaneous

Archivio Storico delle Elerzioni del Ministero dell'Interno. Election data Italy. http://elezionistorico.interno.it/index.php [16.09.2015].

Atti della Commissione per la Elaborazione della Legge Elettorale Politica per l'Assemblea Costituente. Minutes of the committee elaborating an electoral law for the Constituent Assembly 1946. http://legislature.camera.it/_dati/costituente/documenti/ministerocostituente/p3_Vol1.pdf [30.09.2015].

Boissieu, L. d.: *France Politique. Le site sur la vie politique francaise.* Election and parliamentary seat share data France. www.france-politique.fr [08.06.2015].

Che cos'è il "manuale Cencelli". 18.02.2014, newspaper article in Il Post. http://www.ilpost.it/2014/02/18/manuale-cencelli/ [10.10.2015].

Consiglio Comunale. Voti di lista elezioni dal 1975 – 1991. Election data Brescia 1991. http://www.comune.brescia.it/servizi/partecipazioneediritti/voto/Pagine/voti-di-lista-elezioni-Consiglio-Comunale–1975-1991.aspx [14.10.2015].

Disegno di legge N. 56, Legge Elettorale Politica per l'Assemblea costituente. Electoral law for the Constituent Assembly election in 1946, 25.02.1946. http://archivio.camera.it/resources/atc02/pdf/CD1400000091.pdf [01.10.2015].

Fanfani contro I dosaggi dc. Newspaper article in La Stampa 106 (239), 23.10.1974. http://www.archiviolastampa.it/component/option,com_lastampa/task,search/mod,libera/action,viewer/Itemid,3/page,7/articleid,1502_02_1974_0239_0007_21251783/ [10.10.2015].

Italy, 1941-1945. URL: http://www.stampworldhistory.com/maps/country-specific-maps/italy-1941-1945/ [02.02.2017].

Leggi e Decreti. Electoral law published in Gazzetta Ufficiale del Regno d'Italia, 16.08.1919. http://augusto.agid.gov.it/#giorno=16&mese=08&anno=1919 [01.10.2015].

Legge n. 6, Norme per l'elezione della Camera dei Deputati. Electoral law for Lower Chamber elections, 20.01.1948. http://www.normattiva.it/uri-res/N2Ls?urn:nir:stato:Legge:1948;6 [01.10.2015].

Marroni, S.: *Sinistra DC. Ascoltiami o Morrai*. Newspaper article in La Repubblica, 26.08.1990. http://ricerca.repubblica.it/repubblica/archivio/repubblica/1990/08/26/sinistra-dc-ascoltami-morrai.html [14.10.2015].

Parola Nuova: La Nostra Battaglia. 02.03.1947, quoted in Capperucci, V. 2010. *Il Partito Dei Cattolici. Dall' Italia Degasperiana Alle Correnti Democristiane*. Rome: Rubbettino. p. 139.

Partito Popolare Italiano, Statuto. Statute of the PPI, 18.01.1919. http://www.altavillahistorica.it/vita-civile/amministrazione/amministratori/propaganda-e-risultati-elettorali/241-partito-popolare-iatliano-programma-e-statuto-manifesto-del-1919 [01.10.2015.].

Politica Interna. Newspaper article in Cronache Sociali 1(1), pp. 1 – 3 provided by the University of Bologna, 30.05.1947. http://amshistorica.unibo.it/173 [30.09.2015].

Ricostituzione delle Amministrazioni comunali su base elettiva, n.1. Electoral law for the local elections in 1946, 07.01.1946. http://www.personalweb.unito.it/roberto.cavalloperin/diramm/materiali/d.%20lgs.%20lgt.n.%201_1946.pdf [01.10.2015].

Spini, V.: *Il Terremoto del 6 Maggio*. Newspaper article in La Repubblica, 22.05.1990. http://ricerca.repubblica.it/repubblica/archivio/repubblica/1990/05/22/il-terremoto-del-maggio.html [14.10.2015].

Testa, V.: *Berlusconi Pronto alla Corsa al Seggio*. Newspaper article in La Repubblica, 18.01.1994. http://ricerca.repubblica.it/repubblica/archivio/repubblica/1994/01/18/berlusconi-pronto-alla-corsa-al-seggio.html [14.10.2015].

The World Bank: GDP growth (annual in percent). Italy. URL: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG?locations=IT [13.12.2016].

Vice Segretari Politici della Democrazia Cristiana. List of DC vice-chairmen provided by the Istituto Renato Brandi in Florence. http://www.storiadc.it/partito/vicesegr_politici.html [28.09.2015].

Ziniti, A.: *Orlando ha deciso 'Ora lascio la DC'.* Newspaper article in La Repubblica, 06.11.1990. http://ricerca.repubblica.it/repubblica/archivio/repubblica/1990/11/06/orlando-ha-deciso-ora-lascio-la-dc.html [14.10.2015].

Appendix D: Primary data Chapter 4

The primary data for Chapter 4 has been collected at the archive of the *Karl von Vogelsang-Institut* in Vienna. The archive has been abbreviated 'KVV' in the text above. Other material has been taken from published collections of source material and a range of other sources which are accessible online. The translations from German into English have been my own. The presentation of the data in the footnotes above follows the following scheme:

> Author : *Name of the source.* Information on the nature of the source, date, page(s), collection, box folder, archival code or source, URL [date of access].

In the following, the primary material is classified by location and collection.

Location: Archive of the Karl von Vogelsang-Institut (KVV)
Collection: Österreichische Monatshefte (ÖMV)

Auer, C. 1990. 'ÖVP neu?' ÖMH, 8, p. 13, KVV.

'Aus dem Leben der Partei.' ÖMH, February 1946, p. 208, KVV.

'Aus dem Leben der Partei.' ÖMH, October 1945, p. 43, KVV.

Bock, F. 1945. 'Das Problem des Bundesstaates.' ÖMH, December 1945, p. 97, KVV.

'Die Bünde.' ÖMH, August, 1946, pp. 500-1, KVV.

'Die Bünde.' ÖMH, February 1946, p. 208, KVV.

'Die Bünde.' ÖMH, November 1945, p. 28-9, KVV.

'Die Bünde.' ÖMH, October 1945, pp. 43-5, KVV.

Gatner, A. 1990. '7. Oktober 1990.' ÖMH, 8, p. 12, KVV.

Himmer, H. 1990. 'Zeit und Mut zur Reform.' ÖMH 7, pp. 16-8, KVV.

Hurdes, F. 1946. 'Ein Jahr Österreichische Volkspartei.' ÖMH, April 1946, p. 269, KVV.

Jäger, B. 1990. 'Reform der ÖVP.' ÖMH, 8, p. 17, KVV.

Jungwirth, K. 1979. 'Die Chancen der ÖVP.' ÖMH, May/June, pp. 24-5, KVV.

Knafl, S. 1979. 'Primat der Partei – kein Lippenbekenntnis.' ÖMH, July/August, p. 36, KVV.

Reichhold, L. 1979. 'Krise und Chance der ÖVP.' ÖMH, July/August, p. 23, KVV.

Schutzenhofer, H. 1979. 'Praktische Politik für den Nächsten.' ÖMH, September, p. 25, KVV.

Ulram, P. 1979. 'Progressive Mitte oder programmatische Mittelmäßigkeit.' ÖMH, May/June, pp. 28-9, KVV.

Wilfing, K. 1990. 'ÖVP-Reform an Haupt und Gliedern.' ÖMH, 7, pp. 23-7, KVV.

Wilfinger, G. 1979. 'Techbokratischer Zentralismus.' ÖMH, May/June, p. 21, KVV.

Collection: Bundesparteitag

Bericht des Ausschusses für Organisation, Finanzen und Personalpolitik, Bundesparteitag 1947, pp. Mo 1-3, KVV.

Bundesparteitag 1947, minutes, KVV.

Bundesparteitag 1951, minutes, KVV.

Bundesparteitag 1963, minutes, KVV.

Bundesparteitag 1972, minutes, KVV.

Bundesparteitag 1979, minutes, KVV.

Bundesparteitag 1980, minutes, KVV.

Hurdes, F.: Resolution des Ausschusses für politische Angelegenheiten zum Verhältnis von Bünden und Partei, 21.04.1947, 1947 Bundesparteitag, p. A3, KVV.

Organisatorischer Rechenschaftsbericht, Bundesparteitag 1963, pp. 61-2, KVV.

Rede Bundesparteiobmann Dr. Josef Taus, Bundesparteitag 1979, pp. 8-25, KVV.

Referat des Generalsekretärs NR Dr. Hermbert Kohlmaier, Bundesparteitag 1972, pp. 31-3, KVV.

Rede des Staatssekretärs Graf, 19.04.1947, Bundesparteitag 1947, p. 19 1230 A1, KVV.

Speech Wolfgang Schüssel, 22.04.1995, Bundesparteitag 1995, p. 5, KVV.

Collection: Bundesparteileitung.

Bundesparteileitung, 14.06.1951, KVV.

Location: Gehler, M. 1994. *Karl Gruber. Reden und Dokumente 1945-1953.* Vienna: Böhlau.

'Programm der Demokratischen Österreichischen Staatspartei in Tirol. 15.05.1945.' In Gehler (1994: 38-40).

'Protokoll über die Bundesländerkonferenz der Vertreter der ÖVP in Salzburg. 29.07.1945.' In Gehler (1994: 60-6).

'Protokoll über die zweite Bundesländerkonferenz der ÖVP in Salzburg. 19.08.1945.' In Gehler (1994: 69-71).

Location: Kriechbaumer, R. 1995b. *Von der Lagerstraße zum Ballhausplatz. Quellen zur Gründungs- und Frühgeschichte der ÖVP 1938-1949.* Salzburg: IT-Verlag.

'Aus einem Schreiben des amerikanischen Gesandten in Wien, John G. Erhardt, vom 06 Oktober 1948.' In Kriechbaumer (1995b: 353).

'Bericht des amerikanischen Geheimdienstes OSS vom 21 November 1945.' In Kriechbaumer (1995b: 353.)

'Bericht des amerikanischen Geheimdienstes OSS vom 03 Dezember 1945.' In Kriechbaumer (1995b: 353).

'Bericht der Salzburger Volkszeitung vom 29.Oktober 1945 über den 1. Landesparteitag der Salzburger ÖVP.' In Kriechbaumer (1995b: 132).

'Bericht des amerikanischen Geheimdienstes OSS vom 03. Dezember 1945.' In Kriechbaumer (1995b: 351-3).

'Brief des OSS-Mitglieds Leutnant Lorenz Eitner vom 11. September 1945.' In Kriechbaumer (1995b: 154-5).

'Die Konstituierung als gesamtösterreichische Partei.' In (Kriechbaumer, 1995b: 114-6).

'Die Volkspartei.' In Kriechbaumer (1995b: 125-6).

'Memorandum von Martin F. Herz vom 14 Dezember über die Österreichische Volkspartei.' In Kriechbaumer (1995b: 351-2).

'ÖVP-Pressedienst 24.09.1945.' In Kriechbaumer (1995b: 157-8).

‘Quelle 84.’ In Kriechbaumer (1995b: 140).

‘Quelle 86.’ In Kriechbaumer (1995b: 141).

Location: Miscellaneous

‘Aufstieg und Fall des Viktor Müllner.’ *Die Presse*, 05.02.2010, URL: http://diepresse.com/home/innenpolitik/zeitgeschichte/537896/Spendenaffaere Aufstieg-und-Fall-des-Viktor-Muellner? vl backlink=/home/politik/zeitgeschichte/index.do [24.02.2017].

Austria 1945. URL: http://www.stampworldhistory.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/Austria-1945-Present.pdf [29.09.2017].

Beate Meinl-Reisinger. URL: https://www.parlament.gv.at/WWER/PAD83122/index.shtmlandhttp://tools.neos.eu/vorwahl/beate-meinl-reisinger/ [24.03.2017].

Biographisches Handbuch des Niederösterreichischen Landtages und der niederösterreichischen Landesregierung. p. 88, URL: http://www.landtag-noe.at/images/personen ausschuesse/1921.pdf [24.02.2017].

Braunsteiner, H. 1997. ‘So blieb mir nichts anderes uebrig, als die Enns zu durchschwimmen.’ In *Demokratie und Geschichte. Jahrbuch des Karl-von-Vogelsang-Instituts zur Erforschung der Geschichte der christlichen Demokratie in Österreich*, ed. Helmut Wohnout, Vienna: Böhlau, pp. 80-6.

Bundesparteiorganisationsstatut, 28.06.1991, ÖVP federal party office.

Bundesparteiorganisationsstatut, 02.07.2017, ÖVP federal party office.

‘Bundesverfassungsgesetz vom 6. Feburar 1947 über die Behandlung der Nationalsozialisten (Nationalsozialistengesetz).’ In *Bundesgesetzblatt für die Republik Österreich*, 17.02.1947, pp. 277-303, URL: http://www.ris.bka.gv.at/Dokumente/BgblPdf/1947250/1947250.pdf [17.03.2017].

Hämmerle, W. 2001. ‘Der Letzte der Generation 1945.’ *Wiener Zeitung*, 24.12.2001, URL: https://web.archive.org/web/20011224235210/http://www.wienerzeitung.at/linkmap/personen/hurdes.htm [30.04.2017].

Linsinger, E. 2012. ‘Neue Partei NEOS hielt Grundungskonvent ab.’ *Die Presse*, 27.10.2012, URL: http://diepresse.com/home/innenpolitik/1306081/Neue-Partei-NEOS-hielt-Gruendungskonvent-ab [24.03.2017].

Linsinger, E. 2013. ‘Warum die ÖVP sich zu Recht vor den Neos fürchtet.’ *Profil*, 11.02.2013, URL: https://www.profil.at/oesterreich/parteigruendung-warum-oevp-recht-neos-352329 [24.03.2017].

Linsinger, E. 2014. ‘Nach dem Spindelegger-Abgang will sich die ÖVP erneuern wieder einmal.’ 06.09.2014, URL: https://www.profil.at/oesterreich/nach-spindelegger-abgang-oevp-377869 [24.03.2017].

Liste Fritz. URL: https://listefritz.at/buergerforum [12.10.2017].

Pink, O. 2017. 'Von der ÖVP zu den Neos.' *Die Presse*, 19.08.2017, URL: http://diepresse.com/home/innenpolitik/5271430/Die-Menschen-hinter-den-Kampagnen Von-der-OeVP-zu-den-Neos Die [11.10.2017].

Sonntagsfrage Nationalratswahl. URL: https://de.statista.com/statistik/daten/studie/288503/umfrage/ sonntagsfrage-zur-nationalratswahl-in-oesterreich-nach-einzelnen-instituten/ [26.01.2017].

textitSora: Wählerströme Nationalratswahl 1999. URL: http://www.sora.at/themen/wahlverhalten/wahlanalysen/nrw99.html [14.10.2017].

'Steht mit Kurz der einzige Politiker auf der ÖVP-Bundesliste?' URL: http://diepresse.com/home/innenpolitik/5245487/Steht-mit-Kurz-der-einzige-Politiker-auf-\der-OeVPBundesliste [12.09.2017].

Wählerströme Nationalratswahl 1994. URL: http://sunsite.univie.ac.at/Austria/elections/nrw94e.html [15.10.2017].

Appendix E: Primary data Chapter 5

The primary data for Chapter 5 has been collected at the archive of the *Archiv für Christlich-Demokratische Politik* of the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung in Sankt-Augustin. The archive has been abbreviated 'ACDP/KAS' in the text above. Other material has been taken from published collections of source material and a range of other sources which are accessible online. The translations from German into English have been my own. The presentation of the data in the footnotes above follows the following scheme:

> Author : *Name of the source*. Information on the nature of the source, date, page(s), collection, box folder, archival code or source, URL [date of access].

In the following, the primary material is classified by location and collection.

Location: Archiv für Christlich-Demokratische Politik of the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung
Collection: Bundesparteiausschuss, 07-001-703

Mitglieder des Bundesparteiausschusses, 07-001-703, KAS/ACDP.

Collection: Arbeitsgemeinschaft der CDU/CSU, Protokolle, Statut 1946-1950, 07-001-3201

Note by Dr. A. Zimmer, 09.10.1949, 07-001-3201, KAS/ACDP.

Collection: Arbeitsgemeinschaft der CDU/CSU. Protokole, Statut 1949-1950, 07-001-3204

Deutschland-Union-Dienst. Gründung der Gesamtdeutschen CDU. 11.05.1950, 07-001-3204, KAS/ACDP.

Konferenz der Landesverbandsvorsitzenden und Landesverbandsvertreter der CDU/CSU. 11.05.1950, 07-001-3204, KAS/ACDP.

Konferenz der Landesvorsitzenden der CDU gemeinsam mit dem Vorbereitenden Ausschuss. 13.10.1950, 07-001-3204, KAS/ACDP.

Letter, Land branch Hamburg, 20.06.1950, 07-001-3204, KAS/ACDP.

Letters in 07-001-3204, KAS/ACDP.

Protokoll der Besprechung des vorbereitenden Ausschusses der CDU/CSU. 21.07.1950, 07-001-3204, KAS/ACDP.

Collection: Parteistatutute Arbeitsgemeinschaft der CDU/CSU, 07-001-14001

Statut der Arbeitsgemeinschaft der CDU/CSU Deutschlands. October 1948. 07-001-14001, KAS/ACDP.

Statut des Arbeitskreises der Landesverbande des westlichen Besatzungsgebietes und Berlins in der Arbeitsgemeinschaft CDU/CSU. September 1948. 07-001-14001, KAS/ACDP.

Statutenentwurf der CDU Deutschland. 09.10.1949. 07-001-14001, KAS/ACDP.

Collection: CDU-Bundespartei, 07-002-004/1

Kandidatenaufstellung zur Bundestagswahl. 24.06.1953, 07-002-004/1, KAS/ACDP.

Collection: Werner Hilpert, 01-021

Arbeitsgemeinschaft der CDU/CSU. 05.-06.02.1947, 01-021, KAS/ACDP.

'Hinter den Kulissen der CDU.' *National-Zeitung*, 04.02.1948, 01-021, KAS/ACDP.

Letter Dr. Lenz, 13.11.1948, 01-021, KAS/ACDP.

Letter Dorpinghaus, 13.11.1948, 01-021, KAS/ACDP.

Protokoll der Sitzung des Organisations-Ausschusses. 12.10.1948, 01-021, KAS/ACDP.

Vertrauliche Informationen Nr. 12. Auszug aus dem Protokoll über die Sitzung des Vorstandes der Arbeitsgemeinschaft vom 24. September 1948. 24.09.1948, 01-021, KAS/ACDP.

Collection: Kai-Uwe von Hassel, 01-157

Adenauer, Globke, Krone, von Hassel. 09.07.1959, 01-157, KAS/ACDP.

Bericht Dr. Konrad Kraskes an Adenauer über Zustand der Gesamtpartei. 24.07.1959, 01-157, KAS/ACDP.

Interne Informationen, No. 4(28). 15.07.1959, 01-157, KAS/ACDP.

Letter von Hassel to Fricke. 23.09.1959, 01-157, KAS/ACDP.

Kraske und von Hassel, meeting notes, 05.-06.08.1959, 01-157, KAS/ACDP.

Collection: Christian Schwarz-Schilling, 01-824-051/2

Offenburger Erklärung der Sozialausschüsse der CDA. 07.-09.07.1967, 01-824-051/2, KAS/ACDP.

Collection: Bundesparteitage, ACDP/KAS, URL: http://www.kas.de/wf/de/71.8935/ [21.10.2017].

Bundesparteitag der CDU. 1950, KAS/ACDP.

Bundesparteitag der CDU. 1956, KAS/ACDP.

Bundesparteitag der CDU. 1962, KAS/ACDP.

Bundesparteitag der CDU. 1967, KAS/ACDP.

Bundesparteitag der CDU. 1969, KAS/ACDP.

Bundesparteitag der CDU. 2003, KAS/ACDP.

Collection: Bundesvorstand, KAS/ACDP, URL: http://www.kas.de/wf/de/71.10320/ [22.10.2017].

Bundesvorstand, 26.01.1953, KAS/ACDP.

Bundesvorstand, 03.06.1955, KAS/ACDP.

Bundesvorstand, 30.09.1955, KAS/ACDP.

Bundesvorstand, 10.11.1955, KAS/ACDP.

Bundesvorstand, 26.04.1956, KAS/ACDP.

Bundesvorstand, 23.05.1960, KAS/ACDP.

Bundesvorstand, 10.05.1962, KAS/ACDP.

Collection: Statute, ACDP/KAS, URL: http://www.kas.de/wf/de/71.9267/ [21.10.2017].

Statut der CDU. 21.10.1950, KAS/ACDP.

Statut der CDU. 1956, KAS/ACDP.

Statut der CDU. 1960, KAS/ACDP.

Statut der CDU. 1962, KAS/ACDP.

Statut der CDU. 1967. KAS/ACDP.

Statut der CDU. 1990, KAS/ACDP.

Collection: Press archives, ACDP/KAS.

Block, Josef: 'Deutschlandtagung der Sozialausschüsse der CDU/CSU.' 03.-05.02.1950, press archives, KAS/ACDP.

'CDU Spitzentreffen der CDU Norddeutschlands in Hamburg.' *Dpa*, 21.08.1981, press archives, KAS/ACDP.

'Der Soltauer Kreis tagt wieder.' *Hannoversche Allgemeine*, 01.07.1968, press archives, KAS/ACDP.

'Eine norddeutsche CDU nach dem CSU-Vorbild in Bayern?' *Braunschweiger Zeitung*, 23.08.1969, press archives, KAS/ACDP.

Horch, Rudolf. 1969. 'In und um Soltau.' *Rheinischer Merkur*, 7.2.1969, press archives, KAS/ACDP.

'Keine Landesgruppe Norddeutschland der CDU.' *Hamburger Abendblatt*, 15.08.1969, press archives, KAS/ACDP.

'Norddeutsche CDU-Politiker unzufrieden.' *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 15.01.1968, press archives, KAS/ACDP.

'Sozialausschüsse ringen um Einfluß.' *Badische Zeitung*, 04.07.1967, press archives, KAS/ACDP.

'Verstärkte Zusammenarbeit.' *Union in Deutschland*, Nr. 38, 26.09.1968, press archives, KAS/ACDP.

Weger, Ernst. 1969. 'Der Traum von der norddeutschen CSU.' *Handelsblatt*, 20.08.1969, press archives, KAS/ACDP.

Weger, Ernst. 1969. “Nach bayrischem Muster.” *Donauer Kurier*, 27.08.1969; press archives, KAS/ACDP.

Weigert, Peter. “Gipfeltreffen soll Zusammenarbeit zwischen Küstenländern stärken.” *Die Welt*, 12.03.1969, press archives, KAS/ACDP.

‘Zwischen Katzer und Gerstenmaier.’ *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 24.03.1960, press archives, KAS/ACDP.

Location: Flechtheim, O. K. 1962. *Dokumente zur parteipolitischen Entwicklung in Deutschland seit 1945.* Berlin: Dokumenten-Verlag.

‘Befehl Nr. 2 des Obersten Chefs der Sowjetischen Militärischen Administration, 10.06.1945.’ In Flechtheimer (1962: 108-9).

‘Das Potsdamer Abkommen von 02. August 1945. III. Über Deutschland. A. Politische Grundsätze, Punkt 9, Abs. I–III. 02.08.1945.’ In Flechtheimer (1962: 107-13).

‘Gesetz Nr. A-2. Aufhebung von Rechtsvorschriften über politische Parteien, Vereine nicht politischen Charakters, Versammlungen und Umzüge. 17.03.1950.’ In Flechtheimer (1962: 114).

‘Verordnung Nr. 12 vom 15. September 1945 der Militärregierung in Deutschland, Britisches Kontrollgebiet. 15.09.1945, Art. VI.’ In Flechtheimer (1962: 111-2).

‘Verordnung Nr. 23 des Commandant en Chef betreffend Gründung politischer Parteien demokratischer und anti-nationalsozialistischer Richtung im französischen Besatzungsgebiet. 12.12.1945.’ In Flechtheimer (1962: 107-13).

Collection: Online sources

Alred Dregger, URL: URL:http://www.kas.de/wf/de/71.8521/ [25.04.2015].

Biographical database of the ACDP/KAS, URL: http://www.kas.de/wf/de/194.5/ [21.10.2017].

Bundesvorstandsmitglieder 1950-1966, URL: http://www.kas.de/wf/de/71.8954/ [05.08.2017].

CDU Berliner Programm, KAS/ACDP, URL: http://www.kas.de/upload/ACDP/CDU/Programme_Beschluesse/1968_Berliner-Programm.pdf [25.05.1950].

Das Berliner Programm. 2. Fassung, KAS/ACDP, URL: http://www.kas.de/upload/ACDP/CDU/Programme_Beschluesse/1971_Berliner-Programm.pdf [25.05.2017].

‘Durch Deutschland muss ein Ruck gehen.’ *Der Spiegel*, URL: http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/roman-herzog-die-ruck-rede-im-wortlaut-a-1129316.html [08.08.2017].

‘Ein konservatives Rebelliönchen.’ *Die Zeit*, 02.11.2012, URL: http://www.zeit.de/politik/deutschland/2012-11/berliner-kreis-cdu-merkel-manifest [27.05.2017].

Hansmann, M., and D. Lindsay. n.d. ‘Foderalistische Union.’ URL: http://www.kas.de/wf/de/71.9161/ [07.08.2017].

‘Konservative aus Union schließen sich zusammen.’ *Die Zeit*, 25.03.2017, URL: http://www.zeit.de/politik/deutschland/2017-03/cdu-csu-union-dachverband-freiheitlich-konservativ-aufbruch-alexander-mitsch [27.05.2017].

‘Konservativer Kritiker auf verlorenem Posten.’ *Cicero*, n.d., URL: http://cicero.de/berliner-republik/konservativer-kritiker-auf-verlorenem-posten/42982 [27.05.2017].

Lachmann, Günther. 2012. ‘Enttauschte CDU-Politiker gründen Wahlalternative.’ *Die Welt*, 04.10.2012, URL: https://www.welt.de/politik/deutschland/article109606449/Enttaeuschte-CDU-Politiker-gruenden-Wahlalternative.html [27.05.2017].

‘Luckes Anhänger kündigen Gründung von neuer Partei an.’ *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 13.07.2015, URL: http://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/inland/afd-abspaltung-luckes-anhaenger-kuendigen-gruendung-von-neuer-partei-an-13699629.html [27.05.2017].

‘Martin Lohmann tritt aus der CDU aus.’ URL: http://www.kath.net/news/42929 [27.05.2017].

‘Merkel für Flüchtlingspolitik geehrt.’ *Der Spiegel*, 01.02.2017, URL: http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/angela-merkel-auszeichnung-fuer-fluechtlingspolitik-a-1132769.html [02.06.2017].

‘Merkels Wende in der Flüchtlingspolitik.’ 20.09.2016, *Tagesspiegel*, URL: http://www.tagesspiegel.de/politik/merkels-wende-in-der-fluechtlingspolitik-sie-hat-verstanden/14575962.html [02.06.2017].

Sprenger, Michael. 2017. ‘Wer in der ÖVP das Sagen hat.’ *Tiroler Tageszeitung*, 09.01.2017, URL: https://www.ots.at/presseaussendung/OTS_20170108_OTS0024/tiroler-tageszeitung-leitartikel-ausgabe-vom-9-jaenner-2017-von-michael-sprenger-wer-in-der-oevp-das-sagen-hat [25.05.2017].

Steppat, Timo. 2016. ‘Petry spricht von Rückzug bei weiterem Rechtsruck.’ *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 27.04.2016, URL: http://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/inland/bei-weiterem-afd-rechtsrutsch-frauke-petry-deutet-rueckzug-an-14202021.html [27.05.2017].

Website of the Berlin Circle faction, URL: http://www.berlinerkreisinderunion.de/ [14.04.2015].

Website of the AEK, URL: http://www.aek-online.de/aktuelles.htm [27.05.2017].

‘Zahl der Neuankömmlinge unterschreitet CSU-Obergrenze.’ *Die Welt*, 28.12.2016, URL: https://www.welt.de/politik/deutschland/article160651528/Zahl-der-Neuankoemmlinge-unterschreitet-CSU-Obergrenze.html [27.05.2017].

Location: Miscellaneous

‘Aufruf der Christlich-Demokratischen Union Deutschlands (CDU) 1945’. In *Die Programme der politischen Parteien im neuen Deutschland und ihre Stellungnahme zu den wichtigsten Tagesfragen*, ed. K. Mahler. Berlin: Druckerei und Vertrieb. 11-5.

Grundgesetz der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. 23/24.05.1949, Art. 21(1).

Bundesgesetzbuch BGBI IS. 773. 1967, Art. 9.4, 11.2.

Wahlgesetz zum zweiten Bundestag und zur Bundesversammlung. 08.07.1953, BGBl. I p. 470.

Bundesverfassungsgericht, Entscheidung 2 BvF 1/65. 1965.

1. Tagung des Evangelischen Arbeitskreises der CDU/CSU. 14.-16.03.1952, KAS/ACDP.

Appendix F: Primary data Chapter 6

The primary data for Chapter 6 has been collected at the National Archives in Paris - Pierrefitte-sur-Seine. The archive has been abbreviated 'AN' in the text above. Other material has been taken from published collections of source material and a range of other sources which are accessible online. The translations from German into English have been my own. The presentation of the data in the footnotes above follows the following scheme:

> Author : *Name of the source.* Information on the nature of the source, date, page(s), collection, box folder, archival code or source, URL [date of access].

In the following, the primary material is classified by location and collection.

Location: National Archives Collection: MRP, 350 AP

Albert Gortais, Note sur les objectes prochains de notre travail sur le plan national. 23.09.1946, 350AP/6, AN.

Après le Congrès de Nantes. 1950, 350AP/21, AN.

Assemblée constitutive du Mouvement Républicain Populaire. 25.11.1944, 350AP/12, AN.

'Au Congrès de Lyon. De nombreux militants M.R.P. se font l'echo de l'indication de la classe ouvrière.' *Humanitè*, 05.05.1951, 350AP/21, AN.

Collection of guidelines and directives in 350AP/9, AN.

Commission de Coordination au 2ème Congrès National. 1945, 350AP/13, AN.

Commissions P.D.P. et M.R.P. 08.11.1944, 350AP/1-1/1 Dossier 1, AN.

Compte-rendu du Comité Directeur. 25.11.1959, 350AP/5, AN.

Compte-rendu de la Commission Exécutive. 03.12.1958, 350AP/5, AN.

Compte-rendu de la commission d'organisation du Mouvement. 14.11.1956, 350AP/5, AN.

Compte-rendu de la journée d'étude. 20.01.1957, 350AP/10, AN.

Compte-rendu de la réunion du RDF. 22.-27.04.1959, 350AP/11, AN.

'Conclusion du Congrès M.R.P.' *Le Figaro*, 14.05.1956, 350AP/30, AN.

Congrès National du MRP. 16.03.1947, 350AP/15, AN.

Congrès National du M.R.P. 18.-21.05.1950, 350AP/21, AN.

Congrès National du M.R.P. 04.05.1951, 350AP/21, AN.

Congrès National du M.R.P. 24.05.1952, 350AP/22, AN.

Congrès National du M.R.P. 21.05.1955, 350AP/29, AN.

Congrès National du M.R.P. 12.05.1956, 350AP/30, AN.

Congrès National du M.R.P. 28.05.1965, 350AP/43, AN.

'Dans le vivier M.R.P. M. Schumann propose de verser une eau nouvelle.' *L'Aurore*, 08.05.1959, 350AP/36, AN.

'Deux partis vont déliberer.' *Lauren*, 27.05.1954, 350AP/28, AN.

Document préparatoire au débat sur la vie du Mouvement au XVIème Congrès National. 350AP/11, AN.

'Duel Pflimlin-de Menthon sur les problèmes économiques au congrès M.R.P.' *France-Soir*, 12.05.1956, 350AP/30, AN.

Élection des membres de la commission exécutive. 24.04.1947, 350AP/46, AN.

Évolution des effectifs. No date, 350AP/3, AN.

L'Équipe d'Action dans l'organisation du secrétariat général. No date. 350AP/7, AN.

L'organisation du M.R.P. no date, 350AP/6, AN.

'Le MRP pose trois conditions à son maintien au gouvernement.' *Combat*, 24.05.1952, 350AP/22, AN.

'Le XVIe Congrès du M.R.P. a débattu de son élargissement.' *La Croix*, 09.05.1959, 350AP/36, AN.

Lecanuet, Jean: 'Comment pourrions-nous dire "non" à nous-mêmes?' *Forces Nouvelles*, 03.06.1950, p. 10, 350AP/44, AN.

Letter Albert Gortais to M. Neuville, 15.09.1948, 350AP/47, AN.

Letter from Biarnès to Daillet. 15.03.1958, 350AP/10, AN.

Letter from Georges Delfosse to Jean-Marie Daillet, 07.02.1958, 350AP/10, AN.

Letter from Georges Delfosse to Pierre-Marie Biarnès, 07.02.1958, 350AP/10, AN.

Letter from Maurice-René Simonnet to the secretary of the Comité National Provisoire pour le RDF, 20.05.1959, 350AP/11, AN.

Letter from MRP Party Leadership to the Comité National provisoire du Rassemblement des Forces Démocratiques, 20.01.1959, 350AP/11, AN.

Letter from M. Neuville to Albert Gortais, 25.07.1948, 350AP/47, AN.

Letter from Pierre-Marie Biarnès to party secretary. 25.09.1956, 350AP/10, AN.

Letter from Saint-Marc to Teitgen and Simonnet. 15.03.1958, 350AP/10, AN.

Letter from Teitgen to Simonnet, 04.03.1958, 350AP/10, AN.

Lettre du Secrétaire Général Adoint Georges Delfosse. 27.04.1962, 350AP/5, AN.

Lettre du Secrétaire Général Adoint Georges Delfosse à M. Aumonier. 11.07.1962, 350AP/5, AN.

Lettre du Secrétaire Général Adoint Georges Delfosse à M. Bidegain. 24.09.1962, 350AP/5, AN.

Lettre du Secrétaire Général Adoint Georges Delfosse à M. Paul Noddings. 25.05.1962, 350AP/5, AN.

Lettre du Secrétaire général André Colin aux Fédérations. 04.03.1952, 350AP/5, AN.

Lettre du Secrétaire Général du MRP Maurice-René Simonnet aux members du congrès extraordinaraire. 30.12.1958, 350AP/5, AN.

Participation à l'Assemblée Constitutif des 25 et 26 Novembre. 1944, 350AP/12, AN.

Liste des membres du Comité Directeur. 24.01.1947, 350AP/46, AN.

Liste de partis politiques et mouvements de résistance, 1944/1945. 350AP/1-1, AN.

'L'opposition désamorcée.' *Index quotidien de la presse*, 20.01.1958, 350AP/10, AN.

M. Sunauel, La Rénovation Démocratique. 05.02.1958, 350AP/10, AN.

'Ne Recommencez pas le M.R.P.' *France Observateur*, 05.02.1959, 350AP/11, AN.

Open letter by Simonnet. no date, 350AP/10, AN.

Pflimlin, Pierre: 'La Fédération n'est pas la bonne solution pour renforcer la Démocratie.' *Forces Nouvelles*, 03.06.1965, 350AP/44, AN.

Rapport sur la Rénovation Démocratique. no date, 350AP/10, AN.

Simonnet: Rapport sur le Mouvement. 31.01.-01.02.1959, 350AP/35, AN.

Situation du Mouvement en Septembre 1962. 1962, 350AP/3, AN.

Statuts du Mouvement Républicain Populaire. 1945. 350AP/5, AN.

Status du Mouvement Républicain Populaire. 1949. 350AP/5, AN.

Status du Mouvement Républicain Populaire. 1950. 350AP/5, AN.

Status du Mouvement Républicain Populaire. 1959. 350AP/5, AN.

Status du Mouvement Républicain Populaire. 1962. 350AP/5, AN.

Teitgen, Pierre-Henri: 'Sur le plan des principes, comme sur celui des réalités, nous devons dire "oui" à la Fédération.' *Forces Nouvelles*, 03.06.1965, 350AP/44, AN.

2èmeCongrès National du M.R.P. 13.-16.12.1945, 350AP/12, AN.

Collection: Georges Bidault (457 AP)

Brochure des Équipes d'étude et d'action pour la rénovation de la démocratie chrétienne en France. 1959, 457AP/168, AN.

'Comité Directeur du MRP.' *L'Aube*, 28, 1944, 457AP/166, AN.

Congrès National de la Démocratie Chrétienne. 1958. 457AP/168, AN.

L'év'enement de la semaine. 457AP/167, AN.

La Voix du Militant. Organe de l'équipe d'étude et d'action pour un plus grand M.R.P. September 1957, 457AP/167, AN.

Lettre ouverte de l'équipe de Rénovation Démocratique. 05.05.1959, 457AP/168, AN.

Rénovation Démocratique. 01.10.1957, 457AP/167, AN.

Collection: André Colin (681 AP)

Bâtir la France avec le Peuple. Les Organismes Directeurs. 681AP/10-2, AN.

Status Mouvement Républicain Populaire, 186 Rue de Rivoli. 1944, 681AP/10-1Art. AN.

Location: Miscellaneous (see Appendix C for more information)

Statuto del Partito. 1947, Art. 87, DC Statuti, ILS.

Direzione Centrale della D.C. 08.03.1946, in Salvi (1959: 171).

References

Ableitinger, A. 1995. "Partei- und Organisationsstruktur." In *Volkspartei - Anspruch und Realität. Zur Geschichte der ÖVP seit 1945*, eds. R. Kriechbaumer and F. Schausberger. Vienna: Böhlau. 137-61.

Acharya, A., and A. Lee. 2016. *Path Dependence in European Development. Medieval Politics, Conflict and State Building.* Paper presented at MacMillan Comparative Politics Workshop, Yale University.

Achen, C. H. 2001. "Why Lagged Dependent Variables Can Suppress the Explanatory Power of other Independent Variables." Paper presented at APSA Annual Meeting, Los Angeles.

Adams, J., S. Merrill, and B. Grofman. 2005. *A Unified Theory of Party Competition. A cross-national analysis integrating spatial and behavioral factors*. Cambridge: Cambridge UP.

Adams, J., and Z. Somer-Topcu. 2009. "Moderate Now, Win Voters Later. The Electoral Consequences of Parties' Policy Shifts in 25 Postwar Democracies". *Journal of Politics* 71: 678-92.

Agosti, A. 1999. *Storia del Partito comunista italiano*. Rome: Laterza.

Allison, P. D. 2009. *Fixed Effects Regression Models.* London: Sage.

Alkema, N. K. 2011. *A Historical-Institutionalist Explanation for Party Change. The Contingent Collapse of the Democrazia Cristiana and the Path-dependent Political Diaspora of Catholics in the Italian Party System.* DPhil thesis, University of Oxford.

Ames, B. 1995. "Electoral Strategy under Open-list Proportional Representation." *American Journal of Political Science* 39: 406-33.

Andreß, H.-J., K. Golsch and A. W. Schmidt. 2013. *Applied Panel Data Analysis for Economic and Social Surveys.* Heidelberg: Springer-Verlag.

Arian, A., and S. H. Barnes. 1974. "The Dominant Party System. A neglected model of democratic stability." *The Journal of Politics* 36: 592-614.

Armingeon, K. et al. 2015a. *Comparative Political Data Set 1960-2013.* Bern: Institute of Political Science, University of Bern.

Armingeon, K. et al. 2015b. *Supplement to the Comparative Political Data Set – Government Composition 1960-2014.* Bern: Institute of Political Science, University of Bern.

Art, D. 2011. *Inside the Radical Right: The development of anti-immigrant parties in Western Europe.* Cambridge: Cambridge UP.

Arthur, W. B. 1994. *Increasing Returns and Path Dependence in the Economy.* Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Arzheimer, K. 2009. "Contextual Factors and the Extreme Right Vote in Western Europe, 1980-2002." *American Journal of Political Science* 53: 259-75.

Arzheimer, K. 2017. "Another Dog that didn't Bark? Less Dealignment and more Partisanship in the 2013 Bundestag Election." *German Politics* 26: 49-64.

Baerwald, H. H. 1986. *Party Politics in Japan.* Boston: Allen and Unwin.

Bakker, R. et al. 2015. *1999-2014 Chapel Hill Expert Survey Trend File.* Version 1.1. Available on chesdata.eu. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina.

Bakvis, H. 1981. *Catholic Power in the Netherlands.* Kingston: McGill-Queen's UP.

Balcar, J., and T. Schlemmer. 2007. *An der Spitze der CSU. Die Führungsgremien der Christlich-Sozialen Union 1946 bis 1955.* Munich: Oldenbourg.

Bale, T. 2003. "Cinderella and her ugly sisters. The mainstream and extreme right in Europe's bipolarizing party systems." *West European Politics* 26: 67-90.

Bale, T., and A. Krouwel. 2013. "Down but Not Out. A comparison of Germany's CDU/CSU with Christian Democratic parties in Austria, Belgium, Italy and the Netherlands." *German Politics* 22: 16-45.

Bardi, L., and L. Morlino. 1994. "Italy. Tracing the Roots of the Great Transformation." In *How Parties Organize. Change and Adaptation in Party Organization in Western Democracies*, eds. R. S. Katz and P. Mair. London: Sage. 242-77.

Barnes, S. H. 1967. *Party Democracy. Politics in an Italian Socialist Federation.* New Haven: Yale.

Barr, R. R. 2005. "Bolivia. Another uncompleted revolution." *Latin American Politics and Society* 47: 69-90.

Basedau, M., G. Erdmann, and P. Köllner. 2006. *Innerparteiliche Machtgruppen. Faktionalismus im internationalen Vergleich.* Frankfurt am Main: Campus Verlag.

Baukloh, F. 1967. "Erfreuliche Initiative. Der Arbeitnehmer-Flügel der CDU aktiviert sich." *Frankfurter Hefte* 22: 664-6.

Bazin, F. 1981. *Les députés MRP élus les 21 octobre 1945, 2 juin et 10 novembre 1946. Itinéraire politique d'une génération catholique.* PhD dissertation, Paris, Institut d'Études Politiques.

Beck, N. 2001. "Time-Series-Cross-Section Data. What have we learned in the past few years?" *Annual Review of Political Science* 4: 271-93.

Beck, N., and J. N. Katz. 1995. "What to do (and not to do) with Time-Series Cross-Section Data." *The American Political Science Review* 89: 634-47.

Becker, W. 1987. *CDU und CSU 1945-1950. Vorläufer, Gründung und regionale Entwicklung bis zum Entstehen der CDU-Bundespartei.* Mainz: Hasse and Koehler.

Bédarida, R. *Les catholiques dans la guerre, 1939-1945.* Paris: Hachette.

Beke, W. 2004. "Living Apart Together. Christian Democracy in Belgium." In *Christian Democratic Parties in Europe since the End of the Cold War*, eds. S. Van Hecke and E. Gerard. Leuven: Leuven UP. 133-58.

Belloni, F. P. 1978. "Factionalism, the Party System, and Italian Politics." In *Faction Politics. Political Parties and Factionalism in Comparative Perspective*, eds. D. C. Beller and F. P. Belloni. Santa Barbara: ABC Clio. 72-108.

Belloni, F. P., and D. C. Beller. 1978. *Faction Politics. Political parties and factionalism in comparative perspective.* Santa Barbara: ABC Clio.

Benoit, K., and M. Laver. 2006. *Party Policy in Modern Democracies.* London: Routledge.

Berman, S. 2006. *The Primacy of Politics. Social Democracy and the Making of Europe's Twentieth Century.* Cambridge: Cambridge UP.

Bernhard, M. 2015. "Chronic Instability and the Limits of Path Dependence." *Perspectives on Politics* 13: 976-91.

Besser, C. 2007. *Die deutschen Vertriebenen in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland von 1945 bis 1969.* Cologne: GESIS.

Bettcher, K. E. 2005. "Factions of Interest in Japan and Italy. The organizational and motivational dimensions of factionalism." *Party Politics* 11: 339-58.

Bichet, R. 1980. *La Démocratie Chrétienne en France. Le Mouvement Républicain Populaire.* Besancon: Jacques et Demontrond.

Biezen, I. v., and D.R. Piccio. 2013. "Shaping Intra-Party Democracy. On the Legal Regulation of Internal Party Organizations." In *The Challenges of Intra-Party Democracy*, eds. W.P. Cross and R.S. Katz. Oxford: Oxford UP. 27-48.

Bille, L. 1994. "Denmark. The Decline of the Membership Party?" In *How Parties Organize. Change and Adaptation in Party Organizations in Western Democracies*, eds. R. S. Katz and P. Mair. London: Sage. 134-57.

Biton, L. 1954. *La Démocratie Chrétienne dans la Politique Française. Sa Grandeur, ses Servitudes.* Angers: Siraudeau et C1e.

Black, E. 1983. "A Theory of Southern Factionalism." *The Journal of Politics* 45: 594-614.

Blenk, G. 1966. *Leopold Kunschak und seine Zeit. Porträt eines christlichen Arbeiterführers.* Vienna: Europa-Verlag.

Bock, P. J. 1976. 'Die CDU und "ihre" Arbeitnehmer.' In *Im Prinzip sozial. Die großen Parteien und ihre Arbeitnehmer*, ed. P. J. Bock. Hanover: Fackelträger-Verlag. 50-84.

Bodlos, A., and L. Ennser-Jedenastik. 2017. "Liberal Parties in Austria." In *Liberal Parties in Europe*, eds. C. Close and E. van Haute. London: Routledge. forthcoming.

Bösch, F. 2001. *Die Adenauer-CDU. Gründung, Aufstieg und Krise einer Erfolgspartei. 1945-1969.* Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt.

Bösch, F. 2002. *Macht Und Machtverlust. Die Geschichte der CDU.* Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt.

Boer, B. de, et al. 1998. "Kroniek 1998. Overzicht van de partijpolitieke gebeurtnissen van het jaar 1998." In *Documentatiecentrum Nederlandse Politieke Partijen Jaarboek 1998*, ed. G. Voerman. Groningen: Documentatiecentrum Nederlandse Politieke Partijen. 14-94.

Bolleyer, N. 2009. "Inside the Cartel Party. Party Organization in Government and Opposition." *Political Studies* 57: 559-79.

Borz, G. 2017. "Explaining Varieties of Factionalism. A comparative European study." Paper presented at PSA Annual Conference, Glasgow.

Borz, G., and C. de Miguel. 2017. "Organizational and Ideological Strategies for Nationalization. Evidence from European Parties." *British Journal of Political Science*: 1-55, URL: https://pure.strath.ac.uk/portal/files/64333590/Borz_de_Miguel_BJPS_2017_Organizational_and_ideological_strategies_for_nationalization.pdf [27.09.2017].

Bosmans, J. 2004. "The Primacy of Domestic Politics. Christian Democracy in the Netherlands." In *Christian Democracy in Europe since 1945*, eds. M. Gehler and W. Kaiser. London: Routledge. 54-66.

Boucek, F. 2009. "Rethinking Factionalism. Typologies, intra-party dynamics and three faces of factionalism." *Party Politics* 15: 455-85.

Boucek, F. 2012. *Factional Politics. How Dominant Parties Implode or Stabilize.* London: Palgrave MacMillan.

Bouissou, J. 2001. "Party Factions and the Politics of Coalitin. Japanese politics under the 'system of 1955'." *Electoral Studies* 20: 581-602.

Bouscaren, A. T. 1952. "The MRP in French Government. 1948–1951." *Journal of Politics* 14: 104-31.

Bozoki, A., and J. T. Ishiyama. 2002. The communist successor parties of Central and Eastern Europe. Armonk, New York, London: Sharpe.

Bruneau, T. 1997. "Introduction." In *Political Parties and Demcoracy in Portugal. Organizations, Elections, and Public Opinion*, ed. T. Bruneau. Boulder: WestviewPress. 1-22.

Bruneau, T., and A. MacLeod. 1986. *Politics in Contemporary Portugal. Parties and the Consolidation of Democracy.* Boulder: Lynne Rienner.

Bruckmüller, E. 1995. "Die Ständische Tradition. ÖVP und Neokorporatismus." In *Volkspartei - Anspruch Und Realitat. Zur Geschichte Der ÖVP seit 1945*, eds. R. Kriechbaumer and F. Schausberger. Vienna: Böhlau. 281-316.

Buchanan, T., and M. Conway. 1996. *Political Catholicism in Europe. 1918-1965.* Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Buchstab, G. 2005. *Brücke in eine neue Zeit. 60 Jahre CDU.* Freiburg: Herder.

Buchstab, G., B. Klaff, and H.-O. Kleinmann. 2004. *Christliche Demokraten gegen Hitler. Aus Verfolgung und Widerstand zur Union.* Freiburg: Herder

Bufacchi, V., and S. Burgess. 1998. *Italy since 1989. Events and interpretations.* London: MacMillan.

Bull, M. J., and P. Heywood. 1994. *West European Communist Parties After the Revolutions of 1989.* Basingstoke: Macmillan.

Burgess, K., and S. Levitsky. 2003. "Explaining Populist Party Adaption in Latin America. Environmental and organizational determinants of party change in Argentina, Mexico, Peru, and Venezuela." *Comparative Political Studies* 36: 881-911.

Butzlaff, F., M. Micus, and F. Walter. 2011. *Genossen in der Krise? Europas Sozialdemokratie auf dem Prüfstand.* Göttingen: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht.

Callot, É.-F. 1978. *Le Mouvement Républicain Populaire. Origine, structure, doctrine, programme et action politique.* Paris: Éditions Marcel Rivière et C.

Callot, É.-F. 1986. *L'Action et l'Oeuvre Politique du Mouvement Républicain Populaire.* Paris: Champion.

Cameron, A.C., and D.L. Miller. 2015. "A Practitioner's Guide to Cluster-Robust Inference." *The Journal of Human Resources* 50: 317-72.

Campbell, B. A., and S. E. Charlton. 1978. "The Ambiguity of Faction. Fragmentation and bipolarization in France." In *Faction Politics. Political Parties and Factionalism in Comparative Perspective*, eds. F. P. Belloni and D. C. Beller. Santa Barbara: ABC Clio. 141-60.

Campbell, D. T. 1975. "Degrees of Freedom and the Case Study." *Comparative Political Studies* 8: 178-93.

Campbell, A. et al. 1960. *The American Voter.* New York: John Wiley & Sons.

Capoccia, G. 2015. "Critical Junctures and Institutional Change." In *Advances in Comparative Historical Analysis*, eds. J. Mahoney and K. Thelen. Cambridge: Cambridge UP. 147-79.

Capoccia, G. 2016. "When Do Institutions 'Bite'? Historical Institutionalism and the Politics of Institutional Change". *Comparative Political Studies* 49: 1095-1127.

Capoccia, G., and R. D. Kelemen. 2007. "The Study of Critical Junctures. Theory, narrative, and counterfactuals in historical institutionalism." *World Politics* 59: 341-69.

Capoccia, G., and D. Ziblatt. 2010. "The Historical Turn in Democratization Studies. A new research agenda for Europe and beyond." *Comparative Political Studies* 43: 931-69.

Capperucci, V. 2009. "Alcide De Gasperi and the Problem of Reconstruction." *Modern Italy* 14: 445-57.

Capperucci, V. 2010. *Il Partito Dei Cattolici. Dall' Italia Degasperiana Alle Correnti Democristiane.* Rome: Rubbettino.

Carey, J. M., and M. S. Shugart. 1995. "Incentives to Cultivate a Personal Vote: A Rank Ordering of Electoral Formulas." *Electoral Studies* 14: 417-39.

Carras, M. C. 1971. "Congress Factionalism at the State and District Level in Maharashtra. Some theories." *Economic & Political Weekly* 6: 325-40.

Carter, E. 2005. *The Extreme Right in Western Europe: Success or Failure?* Manchester: Manchester UP.

Carty, R. K. 1981. *Party and Parish Pump: Electoral Politics in Ireland.* Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier Press.

Carty, R. K. 2010. "Dominance without Factions. The Liberal Party of Canada." In *Dominant Political Parties and Democracy. Concepts, measures, cases and comparisons*, eds. M. Bogaards and F. Boucek. Abingdon: Routledge. 140-52.

Castles, F. G., and P. Mair. 1984. "Left-Right Political Scales: Some 'Expert' Judgments." *European Journal of Political Research* 12: 73-88.

Ceron, A. 2012a. "Bounded Oligarchy. How and When Factions Constrain Leaders in Party Position-Taking." *Electoral Studies* 21: 689-701.

Ceron, A. 2012b. *Intra-Party Politics and Party System Factional Conflict, Cooperation and Fission within Italian Parties.* Milan: Universita degli Studi di Milano.

Ceron, A. 2015. "The Politics of Fission. An Analysis of Faction Breakaways among Italian Parties (1946-2011)." *British Journal of Political Science* 45: 121-39.

Chalmers, D. A. 1972. "Parties and Society in Latin America." *Studies in Comparative International Development* 7: 102–28.

Chambers, P. 2008. "Factions, Parties and the Durability of Parliaments, Coalitions and Cabinets. The case of Thailand (1979-2001)." *Party Politics* 14: 299–323.

Chandra, K. 2004. *Why Ethnic Parties Succeed. Patronage and Ethnic Head Counts in India.* Cambridge: Cambridge UP.

Chassériaud, J.-P. 1965. *Le Parti Démocrate Chrétien en Italie.* Paris: Librarie Armand Colin.

Checkel, J. 2006. "Tracing Causal Mechanisms." *International Studies Review* 8: 362–70.

Chhibber, P. et al. 2014. "Party Organization and Party Proliferation in India." *Party Politics* 20: 489-505.

Clemens, C. 2007. "Two Steps Forward, One Step Back. Merkel's CDU/CSU and the Politics of Welfare State Reform." *German Politics* 16: 222-46.

Clemens, C. 2009. "Modernisation or Disorientation? Policy Change in Merkel's CDU." *German Politics* 18: 121-39.

Clemens, C. 2011. "Explaining Merkel's Autonomy in the Grand Coalition. Personalisation or Party Organisation?" *German Politics* 20: 469-85.

Collier, D. 2011. "Understanding Process Tracing." *PS: Political Science and Politics* 44: 823-30.

Collier, R. B., and D. Collier. 1991. *Shaping the Political Arena. Critical Junctures, the Labor movement, and regime dynamics in Latin America.* Princeton: Princeton UP.

Collier, D., H. E. Brady, and J. Seawright. 2010. "Outdated Views of Qualitative Methods. Time to move on." *Political Analysis* 18: 506-13.

Collier, D., J.E. Mahoney and J. Seawright. 2004. "Claiming Too Much. Warnings about selection bias." In *Rethinking Social Inquiry: Diverse tools, shared standards*, eds. H. E. Brady and D. Collier. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield. 85-102.

Conway, M. 1996. "Introduction." In *Political Catholicism in Europe, 1918 – 1965*, eds. T. Buchanan and M. Conway. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1-33.

Conway, M. 2001. "Catholic Politics or Christian Democracy? The evolution of inter-war political Catholicism." In *Christdemokratie in Europa im 20. Jahrhundert*, eds. M. Gehler, W. Kaiser and H. Wohnout. Vienna: Böhlau. 294-309.

Conway, M. 2003. "The Age of Christian Democracy. The Frontiers of Success and Failure." In *European Christian Democracy. The Historical Legacies and Comparative Perspectives*, eds. T. Kselman and J. A. Buttigieg. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press. 43-67.

Coppedge, M. 1994. *Strong Parties and Lame Ducks. Presidential Partyarchy and Factionalism in Venezuela.* Stanford: Stanford UP.

Coppedge, M. 2005. "Explaining Democratic Deterioration in Venezuela through Nested Inference." In *The Third Wave of Democratization in Latin America. Advances and Setbacks*, eds. F. Hagopian and S. Mainwaring. Cambridge: Cambridge UP. 289-318.

Costalli, S., and A. Ruggeri. 2017. "Forging Political Entrepreneurs. Civil War Effects on Post-Conflict Politics in Italy". *Political Geography*: forthcoming.

Cox, G. W., and F. M. Rosenbluth. 1993. "The Electoral Fortunes of Legislative Factions in Japan." *The American Political Science Review* 87: 577-89.

Cox, G. W., F. Rosenbluth and M. F. Thies. 1999. "Electoral Reform and the Fate of Factions. The case of Japan's Liberal Democratic Party." *British Journal of Political Science* 29: 33-56.

Crisp, B. F. 1996. "The Rigidity of Democratic Institutions and the Current Legitimacy Crisis in Venezuela." *Latin American Perspectives* 23: 30-49.

Crisp. B. F. 2000. *Democratic Institutional Design. The Powers and incentives of Venezuelan politicians and interest groups.* Stanford: Stanford UP.

Crisp, B. F., and D. H. Levine. 1998. "Democratizing the Democracy? Crisis and reform in Venezuela." *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs* 40: 27-61.

Culpepper, P. D. 2011. *Quiet Politics and Business Power. Corporate Control in Europe and Japan.* New York: Cambridge UP.

Czerwick, E. 1987. "Politikverflechtung, Ursachen, Formen, Aufgaben." In *Parteien in der Krise? In- und ausländische Perspektiven*, eds. P. Haungs and E. Jesse. Cologne: Verlag Wissenschaft und Politik. 248–54.

D'Alimonte, R. 2005. "Italy. A case of fragmented bipolarism." In *The Politics of Electoral Systems*, eds. M. Gallagher and P. Mitchell. Oxford: Oxford UP. 253-76.

Dalloz, J. 1993. *Georges Bidault. Biographie politique.* Paris: Éditions L'Harmattan.

Dalton, R. J. 2006. *Citizen Politics. Public opinion and political parties in advanced industrial democracies.* Washington: CQ Press.

Dalton, R. J. 2008. "The Quantity and the Quality of Party Systems. Party system polarization, its measurement, and its consequences." *Comparative Political Studies* 41: 899-920.

Damato, F. 1979. *Dc contro Dc. Splendori e miserie di un partito di gomma.* Milan: Nuove.

Dansette, A. 1957. *Destin du Catholicisme Français. 1926–1956.* Paris: Flammarion.

David, P. A. 1985. "Clio and the Economics of QWERTY." *American Economic Review* 75: 332-7.

David, P. A. 2007. "Path Dependence. A foundational concept for historical social science." *Cliometrica* 1: 91-114.

Debus, M., and J. Müller. 2013. "The Programmatic Development of CDU and CSU since Reunification. Incentives and Constraints for Changing Policy Positions in the German Multi-Level System." *German Politics* 22: 151-71.

Delbreil, J.-C. 1990. *Centrisme et Démocratie-Chrétienne en France.* Paris: Publications de la Sorbonne.

Della Porta, D., and A. Vannucci. 1994. *Corruzione politica e Amministrazione pubblica. Risorse, mecanismi, attori.* Bologna: Il Mulino.

Deschouwer, K. 1994. "The Decline of Consociationalism and the Reluctant Modernization of Belgian Mass Parties." In *How Parties Organize. Change and Adaptation in Party Organizations in Western Democracies*, eds. R. S. Katz and P. Mair. London: Sage. 80-108.

De Winter, L. 1990. *Christian Democratic Parties in Belgium.* Working paper, University of Leuven, URL: http://www.icps.cat/archivos/workingpapers/wp_i_13.pdf?noga=1 [19.02.2017].

Diamanti, I. 1996. "The Northern League. From Regional Party to Party in Government." In *The New Italian Republic. From the Fall of the Berlin Wall to Berlusconi*, eds. S. Gundle and S. Parker. London: Routledge. 114-29.

Dilling, M. 2017. "Die CDU. Repräsentationsgarantien und -defizite einer Volkspartei." In *Parteien und soziale Ungleichheit*, ed. E. Wiesendahl. Wiesbaden: Springer. 89–121.

Diem, P., and H. Neisser. 1969. *Zeit zur Reform. Parteireform, Parlamentsreform, Demokratiereform.* Vienna: Wedl.

Dinas, E. et al. 2016. "From Dusk to Dawn. Local party organization and party success of right-wing extremism". *Party Politics* 22: 80-92.

Dinas, E., and K. Gemenis. 2010. "Measuring Parties' Ideological Positions With Manifesto Data. A critical evaluation of the competing methods." *Party Politics* 16: 427-50.

DiSalvo, D. 2012. *Engines of Change. Party factions in American politics, 1868 – 2010.* Oxford: Oxford UP.

Donovan, M. 1994. "Democrazia Cristiana. Party of government." In *Christian Democracy in Europe. A comparative perspective*, ed. D. Hanley. London: Pinter. 71-85.

Doria, A. R. 1996. *Diventare Cittadine. Il voto alle donne in Italia.* Florence: Giunti.

Downs, A. 1957. *An Economic Theory of Democracy.* New York: HarperCollins.

Druckman, J. N. 1996. "Party Factionalism and Cabinet Durability." *Party Politics* 2: 397–407.

Dümig, K., M. Trefs, and R. Zohlnhöfer. 2006. "Die Faktionen der CDU. Bändigung durch institutionalisierte Einbindung." In *Innerparteiliche Machtgruppen. Faktionalismus im Internationalen Vergleich*, eds. M. Basedau, G. Erdman and P. Köllner. Frankfurt am Main: Campus. 99-129.

Duncan, F. 2006. "A Decade of Christian Democratic Decline. The dilemmas of the CDU, ÖVP and CDA in the 1990s." *Government and Opposition* 41: 469-90.

Duncan, F. 2007a. "Lately, Things just don't seem the same. External Shocks, Party Change and the Adaptation of the Dutch Christian Democrats during 'Purple Hague' 1994-8." *Party Politics* 13: 69-87.

Duncan, F. 2007b. "The end of the Wende? The 2006 Austrian Parliamentary Election." *Perspectives on European Politics and Society* 8: 13-30.

Duverger, M. 1951. *Les Parties Politiques.* Paris: Librairie Armand Colin.

Eicken, J., and A. Schmitz-Veltin. 2010. *Die Entwicklung der Kirchenmitglieder in Deutschland. Statistische Anmerkungen zu Umfang und Ursachen des Mitgliederrückgangs in den beiden christlichen Volkskirchen.* Wiesbaden: Statistisches Bundesamt. URL: https://www.destatis.de/DE/Publikationen/WirtschaftStatistik/Gastbeitraege/Entwicklung Kirchenmitglieder.pdf?__blob=publicationFile [18.01.2016].

Eldersveld, S. 1964. *Political Parties. A behavioral analysis.* Chicago: Rand McNally.

Elgie, R. 2005. "France. Stacking the Deck." In *The Politics of Electoral Systems*, eds. M. Gallagher and P. Mitchell. Oxford: Oxford UP. 119-36.

Elster, J. 2007. *Explaining Social Behavior. More nuts and bolts for the social sciences.* Cambridge: Cambridge UP.

Ellinas, A. A. 2010. *The Media and the Far Right in Western Europe: Playing the Nationalist Card.* New York: Cambridge UP.

Engelmann, F. C. 1962. "Haggling for the Equilibrium. The Renegotiation of the Austrian Coalition, 1959." *American Political Science Review* 56: 651-62.

Ennser-Jedenastik, La., and W. C. Müller. 2014. "The Selection of Party Leaders in Austria." In *The Selection of Political Party Leaders in Contemporary Parliamentary Democracies. A Comparative Study*, eds. J.-B. Pilet and W. P. Cross. London: Routledge. 62-76.

Erk, J. 2004. "Austria. A Federation without Federalism." *Publius* 34: 1-20.

Evans, E. L. 1999. *The Cross and the Ballot. Catholic political parties in Germany, Switzerland, Austria, Belgium and the Netherlands, 1785 – 1985.* Boston: Humanities Press.

Evans, G., and N. D. De Graaf. 2013. *Political Choice Matters. Explaining the Strength of Class and Religious Cleavages in Cross-National Perspective.* Oxford: Oxford UP.

Fabre, E. 2011. "Measuring Party Organization. The vertical dimension of the multi-level organization of state-wide parties in Spain and the UK." *Party Politics* 17: 343-63.

Fanti, G., and C. G. Ferri. 2001. *Cronache dall'Emilia rossa. L'impossibile riformismo del PCI.* Bologna: Pendragon.

Federal Employment Agency. 2017. *Arbeitslosigkeit im Zeitverlauf. Entwicklung der Arbeitslosenquote (Strukturmerkale).* Nürnberg: Bundesagentur für Arbeit.

Federal Statistical Office. 2014. *Statistisches Jahrbuch 2014.* Wiesbaden: Statistisches Bundesamt.

Fehlen, F. 2008. "Die Wählerschaft von CSV und Rechtspartei im Lichte der empirischen Wahlforschung." In *Spiegelbild eines Landes und seiner Politik? Geschichte der Christlich-Sozialen Volkspartei Luxemburgs im 20. Jahrhundert*, ed. G. Trausch. Luxembourg: Saint Paul. 461-501.

Feltes, P. 2008. "Modernisierung einer konservativen Volkspartei (1974/79-2004)". In *Spiegelbild eines Landes und seiner Politik? Geschichte der Christlich-Sozialen Volkspartei Luxemburgs im 20. Jahrhundert*, ed. G. Trausch. Luxembourg: Saint Paul. 399-460.

Fernandes, P. J., F. R. d. Meneses, and M. Baioa. 2003. "The Political History of Nineteenth Century Portugal." *Journal of Portuguese History* 1: 1-13.

Filippov, M. et al. 2004. *Designing Federalism. A theory of self-sustainable federal institutions.* Cambridge: Cambridge UP.

Flechtheim, O. K. 1962. *Dokumente zur parteipolitischen Entwicklung in Deutschland seit 1945.* Berlin: Dokumenten-Verlag.

Fogarty, M. P. 1957. *Christian Democracy in Western Europe. 1820–1953.* London: Routledge.

Forschungsgruppe Weltanschauung. 2012. *Entwicklung der Kirchenmitgliederzahlen. Katholiken, Evangelische, Deutschland 1950–2011.* URL: http://fowid.de/fileadmin/datenarchiv/Religionszugehoerigkeit/Anteil_der_Kirchenmitglied er_1950_2011.pdf [18.01.2016].

Foschepoth, J. 1986. "British Interest in the Division of Germany after the Second World War." *Journal of Contemporary History* 21: 391-411.

Fouilloux, É. 1997. *Les chrétiens français entre crise et libération. 1937–1947.* Paris: Seuil.

Frain, M. 1997. "The Right in Portugal: The PSD and CDS/PP." In *Political Parties and Democracy in Portugal: Organizations, Elections, and Public Opinion*, ed. T. Bruneau, ed. Boulder: Westview Press. 77-111.

Freire, A. 2006. "The Party System of Portugal". In *Die Parteiensysteme Westeuropas*, eds. O. Niedermayer, R. Stöss and M. Haas. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag. 373-96.

Frey, T. 2009. *Die Christdemokratie in Westeuropa. Der schmale Grat zum Erfolg.* Baden-Baden: Nomos.

Fry, E. H., and G. A. Raymond. 1980. *The Other Western Europe. A Political Analysis of the Smaller Democracies*. Santa Barbara: Clio.

Furlong, P. 1996. "Political Catholicism and the Strange Death of the Christian Democrats." In *The New Italian Republic. From the fall of the Berlin Wall to Berlusconi*, eds. S. Gundle and S. Parker. London: Routledge. 59-71.

Gabel, M., and J. Huber. 2000. "Putting Parties in their Place: Interring Party Left-Right Ideological Positions from Party Manifesto Data." *American Journal of Political Science* 44: 94-103.

Gallagher, M. 1976. *Electoral Support for Irish Political Parties, 1927-1973.* London: Sage.

Gallagher, M. 1981. "Societal Change and Party Adaptation in the Republic of Ireland 1960-1981." *European Journal of Political Research* 9: 269-95.

Gallagher, M. 1985. *Political Parties in the Republic of Ireland.* Manchester: Manchester UP.

Gallagher, M. 2013. *Election indices.* URL: http://www.tcd.ie/Political_Science/staff/michael_gallagher/ElSystems/Docts/ElectionIndices.pdf [17.04.2014].

Gallagher, M., and M. Marsh. 2002. *Days of Blue Loyalty. The politics of membership of the Fine Gael party.* Dublin: PSAI Press.

Galli, G., and P. Facchi. 1962. *La Sinistra Democristiana. Storia E Ideologia.* Milan: Feltrinelli.

Gamper, A., and B. Koch. 2014. "Federalism and Legal Unification in Austria". In *Federalism and Legal Unification*, eds. D. Halberstam and M. Reimann. 103-19. Wiesbaden: Springer.

Garrett, G. 1998. *Partisan Politics in the Global Economy.* New York: Cambridge UP.

Gehler, M. 1994. *Karl Gruber. Reden und Dokumente 1945–1953. Eine Auswahl.* Vienna: Böhlau.

Gehler, M., Kaiser, W., and Wohnout, H. 2001. "Einleitung." In *Christdemokratie in Europa im 20. Jahrhundert*, eds. M. Gehler, W. Kaiser and H. Wohnout. Vienna: Böhlau. 9-19.

Gehler, M. and Kaiser, W. 2004. *Christian Democracy in Europe since 1945. Volume 2.* London: Routledge.

George, A. L. 1979. "Case Studies and Theory Development. The method of structured, focused comparison." In *Diplomacy. New approaches in history, theory, and policy*, ed. P. G. Lauren. London: The Free Press. 43-68.

George, A. L., and A. Bennett. 2005. *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences.* Cambridge: MIT Press.

Gerard E., and S. Van Hecke. 2004. "European Christian democracy in the 1990s: towards a framework for analysis." In *Christian Democratic Parties in Europe since the End of the Cold War*, eds. S. Van Hecke and E. Gerard. Leuven: Leuven UP. 9-19.

Gerring, J. 2001. *Social Science Methodology. A criterial framework*. Cambridge: Cambridge UP.

Gidron, N. 2016. "Many Ways to be Right: The Unbundling of European Mass Attitudes and Partisan Asymmetries across the Ideological Divide." PhD Dissertation, Harvard University.

Ginsborg, P. 1996. "Explaining Italy's Crisis." In *The New Italian Republic. From the Fall of the Berlin Wall to Berlusconi*, eds. S. Gundle and S. Parker. London: Routledge. 19-39.

Glyn, A. 2001. "Social Democracy in Neoliberal Times: The Left and Economic Policy Since 1980". Oxford: Oxford UP.

Godechot, T. 1964. *Le parti Democrate-Chretien Italien.* Paris: Librairie Generale de Droit.

Golden, M. A., and E. C. C. Chang. 2001. "Competitive Corruption, Factional Conflict and Political Malfeasance in Postwar Italian Christian Democracy." *World Politics* 53: 588-622.

Golder, M. 2003. "Explaining Variation in the Success of Extreme Right Parties in Western Europe." *Comparative Political Studies* 36: 432-66.

Golden, M. A., and E. C. C. Chang. 2001. "Competitive Corruption, Factional Conflict and Political Malfeasance in Postwar Italian Christian Democracy." *World Politics* 53: 588-622.

Goldstone, J. A. 1998. "Initial Conditions, General Laws, Path Dependence, and Explanation in Historical Sociology." *The American Journal of Sociology* 104: 829-45.

Gottweis, H. 1983. "Zur Entwicklung der ÖVP. Zwischen Interessenpolitik und Massenintegration." In *Zwischen Koalition Und Konkurrenz. Österreichs Parteien seit 1945*, eds. P. Gerlich and W. C. Müller. Vienna: Braumüller. 53-68.

Graf, W. D. 1976. *The German Left since 1945.* Cambridge: Oleander.

Granieri, R. J. 2003. *The Ambivalent Alliance. Konrad Adenaur, the CDU/CSU, and the West, 1949–1966.* New York: Berghan.

Granieri, R. J. 2009. "Politics in C Minor. The CDU/CSU between Germany and Europe since the Secular Sixties." *Central European History* 42: 1-32.

Greif, Avner. 2006. *Institutions and the Path to the Modern Economy. Lessons from medieval trade.* New York: Cambridge UP.

Greif, A., and D. D. Laitin. 2004. "A Theory of Endogenous Institutional Change." *The American Political Science Review* 98: 633-52.

Grosbusch, A. 2008. "Bewährung, Abnutzung und Erneuerung. Die CSV der sechziger und siebziger Jahre." In *Spiegelbild eines Landes und seiner Politik? Geschichte der Christlich-Sozialen Volkspartei Luxemburgs im 20. Jahrhundert*, ed. G. Trausch. Luxembourg: Saint Paul. 329-98.

Grzymala-Busse, A. 2002. *Redeeming the Communist Past. The Regeneration of Communist Parties in East Central Europe.* Cambridge: Cambridge UP.

Grzymala-Busse, A. 2006. "Authoritarian Determinants of Democratic Party Competition. The Communist Successor Parties in East Central Europe." *Party Politics*: 12, 415-37.

Gundle, S. and S. Parker. 1996. *The New Italian Republic. From the fall of the Berlin Wall to Berlusconi*. London: Routledge.

Gurland, A. R. 1980. *Die CDU/CSU. Ursprünge und Entwicklungen bis 1953.* Frankfurt am Main: Europäische Verlagsanstalt.

Hackel, W. 1969. *Kann der Organisationsaufbau der CDU als föderalistisch charakterisiert werden?* Diploma thesis. Berlin, Freie Universität Berlin.

Hacker, J.S. and P. Pierson 2002. "Business Power and Social Policy: Employers and the Formation of the American Welfare State." Politics & Society 30: 277-325.

Hainsworth, P. 2000. *The Politics of the Extreme Rights: From the Margins to the Mainstream.* London: Pinter.

Hale, H. E. 2006. *Why not Parties in Russia? Democracy, Federalism, and the State.* Cambridge: Cambridge UP.

Hall, P. A. 2003. "Aligning Ontology and Methodology in Comparative Research." In *Comparative Historical Analysis in the Social Sciences*, eds. J. E. Mahon and D. Rueschemeyer. Cambridge: Cambridge UP. 373-404.

Hanley, D. 1994. "Introduction. Christian democracy as a political phenomenon." In *Christian Democracy in Europe. A comparative perspective*, ed. D. Hanley. London: Pinter. 1-13.

Harmel, R., and K. Janda, 1994. "An Integrated Theory of Party Goals and Party Change." *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 6: 259-87.

Haungs, P. 1986. "Kanzlerdemokratie in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland von Adenauer bis Kohl." *Zeitschrift für Politik* 33: 44-66.

Haungs, P. 1983. "Die Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands (CDU) und die Christlich Soziale Union in Bayern (CSU)." In *Christlich-Demokratische und Konservative Parteien in Westeuropa*, ed. H.-J. Veen. Paderborn: UTB. 9-194.

Haungs, P. 1995. "The CDU. Prototype of a people's party." In *Political Parties in Democracy. Role and function of political parties in the political system of the Federal Republic of Germany*, eds. J. Thesing and W. Hofmeister. Sankt Augustin: Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung. 168-217.

Haas, M. 2009. "Die CDU in der Großen Koalition zwischen 2005 und 2007." In *Zur Zukunft der Volksparteien, Das Parteiensystem unter den Bedingungen zunehmender Fragmentierung*, ed. R. T. Baus. Berlin: Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung. 19-32.

Hazan, R. Y. 1997. *Centre Parties. Polarization and competition in European parliamentary democracies*. London: Pinter.

Hazan, R. Y., and G. Rahat. 2010. *Democracy within Parties. Candidate selection methods and their political consequences*. Oxford: Oxford UP.

Heidenheimer, A. J. 1960. *Adenauer and the CDU. The Rise of the Leader and the Integration of the Party*. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.

Hine, D. 1982. "Factionalism in West European Parties. A framework for analysis." *West European Politics* 5: 36–53.

Hine, D. 1993. *Governing Italy. The politics of bargained pluralism.* Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Hix, S., and C. Lord. 1997. *Political Parties in the European Union.* New York: St Martin's Press.

Höbelt, L. 1999. *Von der vierten Partei zur dritten Kraft. Die Geschichte des VdU.* Graz: Stocker.

Höbelt, L. 2000. "The Prehistory of the Fourth Party Movement in Austria, 1947-1949." *Austrian History Yearbook* 31: 107-25.

Hoekstra, D. J. 1968. *Partijvernieuwing in politiek Nederland. Samenvatting en commentaar.*Alphen a. D. Rijn: Samson.

Höfling, W. 1980a. "Die Vereinigungen der CDU. Eine Bestandsaufnahme zu Organisationsstruktur, Finanzen und personeller Repräsentanz." In *Handbuch des deutschen Parteiensystems. Struktur und Politik in der Bundesrepublik zu Beginn der Achtziger Jahre*, eds. H. Kaack and R. Roth. Opladen: Leske und Budrich. 125-52.

Höfling, W. 1980b. "Funktionsprobleme des Vereinigungsystems der CDU." In *Handbuch des deutschen Parteiensystems. Struktur und Politik in der Bundesrepublik zu Beginn der Achtziger Jahre*, eds. H. Kaack and R. Roth. Opladen: Leske und Budrich. 153-73.

Hofinger, C., and G. Ogris. 1996. "Denn Erstens kommt es anders... Die Gründe f"ur das Überraschungsergebnis der Nationalratswahlen vom 17.Dezember 1995." In *Österreichisches Jahrbuch Fur Politik 1995*, eds. A. Khol, G. Ofner and A. Stirnemann. Munich: Oldenbourg. 55-71.

Hornig, E.-C. 2013. "The Genetic Origin of the CDU and its Developmental Path to a Catch-All Party." *German Politics* 22: 82-96.

Hough, D. 2005. "Third Ways or New Ways? The Post-Communist Left in Central Europe." *Political Quarterly* 76: 253-63.

Hough, D., and J. Sloam. 2007. "Different Road Maps, Similar Paths? Social Democratic Politics in the UK and Germany." In *Policy Convergence in the UK and Germany: Beyond the Third Way?*, eds. S. Green and E. Turner. London: Routledge. 26-38.

Hoyer, G. 2001. *Nichtetablierte christliche Parteien. Deutsche Zentrumspartei, Christliche Mitte, Christliche Partei Deutschlands und Partei Bibeltreuer Christen im Parteiensystem der Bundesrepublik Deutschland.* Frankfurt: Lang.

Huneeus, C. 2003. "A Highly Institutionalized Political Party. Christian Democracy in Chile." In *Christian Democracy in Latin America. Electoral Competition and Regime Conflicts*, eds. S. Mainwaring and T. R. Scully. Stanford: Stanford UP. 121-61.

Ignazi, P. 1992. "The Silent Counter-revolution: Hypotheses on the Emergence of Extreme Right Parties in Europe." *European Journal of Political Research* 22: 3-34.

Ignazi, P., and E. S. Welhofer. 2012. "Votes and Votive Candles. Modernization, secularization, Vatican II, and the decline of religious voting in Italy. 1953 – 1992." *Comparative Political Studies* 46: 31-62.

Inglehart, R., and J.-R. Rabier. 1986. "Political Realignment in Advanced Industrial Society: From Class-Based Politics to Quality-of-Life Politics." *Government and Opposition* 21: 456-79.

Irving, R.E.M. 1973. *Christian Democracy in France.* London: George Allen and Unwin.

Irving, R.E.M. 1979. *The Christian Democratic Parties of Western Europe.* London: Allen and Unwin.

Ishiyama, J. T. 1995. "Communist Parties in Transition: Structures, Leaders and Processes of Democratization in Eastern Europe." *Comparative Politics* 27: 146-77.

Ishiyama, J. T. 1999. "Sickles into Roses: The Communist Successor Parties and Democratic Consolidation in Comparative Perspective." *Democratization* 6: 52-73.

Ishiyama, J. T. 2001. "Party Organization and the Political Success of the Communist Successor Parties." *Social Science Quarterly* 82: 844-64.

Issar, S. and M. Dilling. 2016. *The Role of Failed, Fumbled or Foiled Plans in Institutional Change.* Workshop paper, Paris.

Iversen, T. 1999. *Contested Economic Institutions: The Politics of Macroeconomics and Wage Bargaining in Advanced Democracies.* New York: Cambridge UP.

Jackson, J. E., and K. Kollman. 2010. "A Formulation of Path Dependence with an Empirical Example." *Quarterly Journal of Political Science* 5: 257–89.

Jagodzinski, W., and K. Dobbelaere. 1993. "Der Wandel kirchlicher Religiösität in Westeuropa." In *Religion und Kultur*, eds. J. Bergmann, A. Hahn, and T. Luckmann. Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag. 68-91.

Janda, K. 1980. *Political Parties. A cross-national survey.* New York: Free Press.

Janda, K. et al. 1995. "Changes in Party Identity. Evidence from party manifestos." *Party Politics* 1: 171-96.

Janssen, S. M. 2006. "Das Parteiensystem Luxemburgs." In *Die Parteiensysteme Westeuropas*, eds. O. Niedermayer, R. Stöss and M. Haas. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag. 321-29.

Jun, U. 2011. "Volksparteien under Pressure. Challenges and Adaptation." *German Politics* 20: 200-22.

Kaack, H. 1974. *Geschichte und Struktur des deutschen Parteiensystems.* Opladen: Leske+Budrich.

Kaiser, W. 2007. *Christian Democracy and the Origins of European Union.* Cambridge: Cambridge UP.

Kaltefleiter, W. 1980. "Die Bedeutung der föderativen Ordnung für das Parteiensystem der Bundesrepublik Deutschland." In *Politik als gelebte Verfassung. Aktuelle Probleme des modernen Verfassungsstaates*, ed. J. Jekewitz et al. Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag. 210-8.

Kalyvas, S. N. 1996. *The Rise of Christian Democracy in Europe.* Ithaca: Cornell UP.

Kalyvas, S. N. 2000. "Commitment Problems in Emerging Democracies. The Case of Religious Parties." *Comparative Politics* 32: 379-99.

Kalyvas, S. N., and K. van Kersbergen. 2010. "Christian Democracy." *Annual Review of Political Science* 13: 183-209.

Karlhofer, F., and G. Pallaver. 2013. "Strength through Weakness. State Executive Power and Federal Reform in Austria." *Swiss Political Science Review* 19: 41-59.

Karreth, J., J. T. Polk and C. Allen. 2012. "Catchall or Catch and Release? The electoral consequences of Social Democratic parties' march to the middle in Western Europe." *Comparative Political Studies* 46: 791-822.

Karvonen, L. 1993. "In From the Cold? Christian Parties in Scandinavia." *Scandinavian Political Studies* 16: 25-48.

Katz, R. S. 1980. *A Theory of Parties and Electoral Systems.* Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP.

Katz, R. S. 1986. "Intraparty Preference Voting." In *Electoral Laws and Their Political Consequences*, eds. B. Grofman and A. Lijphart. New York: Agathon. 85-103.

Katz, R. S. 2002. "Political Parties in the New Europe. Political and analytical challenges." In *Political Parties in the New Europe. Political and Analytical Challenges*, eds. K. R. Luther and F. Müller-Rommel. Oxford. Oxford UP. 87-118.

Katz, R. S., and L. Bardi. 1980. "Preference Voting and Turnover in Italian Parliamentary Elections." *American Journal of Political Science* 24: 97-114.

Katz, R.S., and W. J. Crotty. 2006. *Handbook of Party Politics.* London: Sage.

Katz, R. S., and P. Mair. 1992. "Introduction. The Cross-National Study of Party Organizations." In *Party Organizations. A Data Handbook on Party Organizations in Western Democracies. 1960 – 1990*, eds. R. Katz and P. Mair. London: Sage. 1-20.

Katz, R. S., and P. Mair. 1994. *How Parties Organize. Change and adaptation in party organization in Western democracies.* London: Sage.

Katz, R. S., and P. Mair. 1995. "Changing Models of Party Organization and Party Democracy. The Emergence of the Cartel Party." *Party Politics* 1: 5-28.

Kemseke, P. v. 2006. *Towards an Era of Development. The globalization of Socialism and Christian Democracy.* Leuven: Leuven UP.

Kenig, O. 2008. "Democratization of Party Leadership Selection. Do wider selectorates produce more competitive contests?" *Electoral Studies* 28: 240-47.

Kernell, G. 2015. "Party Nomination Rules and Campaign Participation." *Comparative Political Studies* 48: 1814-43.

Key, V. O. 1949. *Southern Politics in State and Nation.* New York: Knopf.

Khol, A. 1980. "Zwischen Technokratie und Demokratie. Die Parteireform der ÖVP 1979/80." In *Österreichisches Jahrbuch Fuer Politik '79*, eds. A. Khol and A. Stirnemann. Vienna: Oldenbourg. 435-68.

Kiras, J. 2001. "Terrorism and Globalization." In *Globalization of World Politics*, eds. J. Baylis, S. Smith and P. Owens. Oxford: Oxford UP. 479-97.

Kirchheimer, O. 1966. “The Transformation of the Western European Party System.” In *Political Parties and Political Development*, eds. J. LaPalombara and M. Weiner. Princeton: Princeton UP. 177-200.

Kitschelt, H. 1988. “Left-Libertarian Parties: Explaining Innovation in Competitive Party Systems.” *World Politics* 40: 194-234.

Kitschelt, H. 1994. *The Transformation of European Social Democracy.* Cambridge: Cambridge UP.

Kitschelt, H. 1995. *The Radical Right in Western Europe.* Ann Arbor: Michigan University Press.

Kitschelt, H., and D. Kselman. 2010. *The Organizational Foundations of Democratic Accountability. Organizational form and the choice of electoral linkage strategy.* Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington.

Kitschelt, H., and A. J. McGann. 1995. *The Radical Right in Western Europe.* Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Kitschelt, H., and S. I. Wilkinson. 2007. “Citizen-politician Linkages. An Introduction.” In *Patrons, Clients and Policies. Patterns of Democratic Accountability and Political Competition*, eds. H. Kitschelt and S. I. Wilkinson. Cambridge: Cambridge UP. 1-49.

Kleinmann, H.-O. 1993. *Geschichte der CDU. 1945-1982.* Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt.

Kleinmann, H.-O. 1997. “Die gesellschaftliche Basis der CDU/CSU.” In *Christian Democracy in the European Union*, ed. E. Lamberts. Leuven: Leuven UP. 123-36.

Kochanek, S. A. 2015. *The Congress Party of India. The dynamics of a one-party democracy.* Princeton: Princeton UP.

Koecke, J. C., M. Sieben. 2010. *Die Christlich-Demokratische Union. Grundüberzeugungen, Geschichte, Organisation.* Sankt-Augustin: Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung.

Koelble, T. A. 1992. “Recasting Social Democracy in Europe. A Nested Game Explanation of Strategic Adjustment in Political Parties.” *Politics & Society* 20: 51-70.

Koole, R. A. 1994. “The Vulnerability of the Modern Cadre Party in the Netherlands.” In *How Parties Organize. Chance and Adaptation in Party Organizations in Western Democracies*, eds. R. S. Katz and P. Mair. London: Sage. 278-303.

Kothari, R. 1964. “The Congress Party in India.” *Asian Survey* 4: 1161-74.

Kraemer, J.-P. 2008. “Politische Kultur und Organisation der CSV.” In *Spiegelbild eines Landes und seiner Politik? Geschichte der Christlich-Sozialen Volkspartei Luxemburgs im 20. Jahrhundert*, ed. G. Trausch. Luxembourg: Saint Paul. 741-92.

Krammer, J. 1991. “Interessenorganisation der Landwirtschaft. Landwirtschaftskammern, Prasidentenkonferenz und Raiffeisenverband.” In *Handbuch des Politischen Systems Österreichs*, eds. H. Dachs et al. Vienna: Manzsche. 365-76.

Krewel, M., R. Schmitt-Beck, and A. Wolsing. 2011. "The Campaign and its Dynamics at the 2009 German General Election." *German Politics* 20: 28-50.

Kriechbaumer, R. 1985. *Von der Illegalität zur Legalität. Gründungsgeschichte der ÖVP.* Vienna: Multiplex Media Verlag.

Kriechbaumer, R. 1995a. "Geschichte der ÖVP." In *Volkspartei – Anspruch und Realität. Zur Geschichte der ÖVP seit 1945*, eds. R. Kriechbaumer and F. Schausberger. Vienna: Böhlau. 11-101.

Kriechbaumer, R. 1995b. *Von der Lagerstraße zum Ballhausplatz. Quellen zur Gründungs- und Frühgeschichte der ÖVP 1938–1949.* Salzburg: IT-Verlag.

Kriesi, H. et al., 2008. *West European Politics in the Age of Globalization.* Cambridge: Cambridge UP.

Krouwel, A. 1993. "Het CDA als catch-all partij." In *Geloven in macht, de christen democratie in Nederland*, eds. K. van Kersbergen, H. M. ten Napel, and P. Lucardie. Amsterdam: Spinhuis. 61-77.

Kselman, T., and J. A. Buttigieg. 2003. *European Christian Democracy. Historical legacies and comparative perspectives.* Notre-Dame: University of Notre-Dame Press.

Lamberts, E. 1997. *Christian Democracy in the European Union.* Leuven: Leuven UP. 210-21.

Lane, J.-E., and S. O. Errson. 1994. *Politics and Society in Western Europe.* London: Sage.

Latreille, A. et al. 1962. *Histoire du Catholicisme en France. La Période Contemporaine.* Paris: Spses.

Laver, M., and J. Garry. 2000. "Estimating Policy Positions from Political Texts." *American Journal of Political Science* 44: 619-34.

Laver, M., and W. Hunt.1992. *Policy and Party Competition.* New York: Routledge.

Leierson, M. 1968. "Factions and Coalitions in One-Party Japan. An interpretation based on the theory of games." *The American Political Science Review*, 62: 770-89.

Lemke, M. 2002. "Rainer Barzel." In *Biographisches Handbuch der Mitglieder des Deutschen Bundestages 1949–2002*, eds. R. Vierhaus et al. Munich: Saur. 39-40.

Leonardi, R., and P. Alberti. 2004. "The Dominance to Doom? Christian Democracy in Italy." In *Christian Democratic Parties in Europe since the End of the Cold War*, eds. S. van Hecke and E. Gerard. Leuven: Leuven UP. 105-31.

Leonardi, R., and D. A. Wertman. 1989. *Italian Christian Democracy. The Politics of Dominance.* London: MacMillan.

Lepszy, N., and C. Koecke. 2000. "Der Niederlandische Christlich-Demokratische Appell (CDA)." In *Christlich-Demokratische Und Konservative Parteien in Westeuropa 5. Schweiz, Niederlande, Belgien, Luxemburg, Europaische Demokratische Union (EDU), Europaische Volkspartei (EVP)*, ed. H.-J. Veen. Paderborn: Schoningh. 119-260.

Lees, C. 2013. "Christian Democracy is Dead, Long Live the Union Parties. Explaining CDU/CSU Dominance within the German Party System." *German Politics* 22: 64-81.

Letamendia, P. 1995. *Le Mouvement Républicain Populaire. Le MRP. Histoire d'un grand parti français*. Paris: Beauchesne.

Levitsky, S. 2003. *Transforming the Labor-Based Parties in Latin America. Argentine Peronism in comparative perspective*. Cambridge: Cambridge UP.

Levitsky, S., and M. A. Cameron. 2009. "Democracy without Parties? Political Parties and Regime Change in Fujimori's Peru." In *Latin American Transformations. Institutions, Actors, and Processes*, ed. W. C. Smith. Miami: Wiley-Blackwell. 339-63.

Liam, W. 2010. "Parties and the Party System." In *Politics in the Republic of Ireland*, eds. J. Coakley and M. Gallagher. London: Routledge. 137-67.

Lieberman, E. S. 2003. *Race and Regionalism in the Politics of Taxation in Brazil and South Africa*. Cambridge: Cambridge UP.

Lieberman, E. S. 2005. "Nested Analysis as a Mixed-Method Strategy for Comparative Research." *American Political Science Review* 99: 435-52.

Lienkamp, A. 2011. "Socialism out of Christian responsibility. The German Experiment of Left Catholicism (1945-1949)." In *Left Catholicism. Catholics and Society in Western Europe at the Point of Liberation. 1943–1955*, eds. G.-R. Horn and E. Gerard. Leuven: Leuven UP. 196-227.

Lijphart, A. 1999. *Patterns of Democracy. Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries*. New Haven: Yale UP.

Lois, D. "Church Membership and Church Attendance across Time. A Trend Analysis Considering Differences between East and West Germany." *Comparative Population Studies* 36: 161-92.

Lubbers, M., M. Gijsberts and P. Scheepers. 2002. "Extreme right-wing voting in Western Europe." *European Journal of Political Research* 41: 345-78.

Lucardie, P., and H.-M. ten Napel. 1994. "Between Confessionalism and Liberal Conservatism. The Christian Democratic parties of Belgium and the Netherlands." In *Christian Democracy in Europe. A comparative perspective*, ed. D. Hanley. London: Pinter. 51-70.

Lupu, N. 2015. "Party Polarization and Mass Partisanship: A comparative perspective". *Political Behavior* 37: 331-56.

Lupu, N. 2016. *Party Brands in Crisis: Partisanship, brand dilution, and the breakdown of political parties in Latin America*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Luther, K. R. 2003. "The Self-destruction of a Right-wing Populist Party? The Austrian Parliamentary Election of 2002". *West European Politics* 26: 136-52.

Luther, K. R. 2009. "The Revival of the Radical Right. The Austrian Parliamentary Election of 2008." *West European Politics* 32: 1049-61.

Lynch, J. 2006. *Age in the Welfare State. The origins of social spending on pensioners, workers and children.* Cambridge: Cambridge UP.

Mackie, T. T., and M. N. Franklin. 1992. "Electoral Change and Social Change." In *Electoral Change: Responses to Evolving Social and Attitudinal Structures in Western Countries*, eds. M. N. Franklin, T. T. Mackie and H. Valen. Cambridge: Cambridge UP. 43-68.

Macrae, D. Jr. 1963. "Intraparty Divisions and Cabinet Coalitions in the Fourth French Republic." *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 5: 164-211.

Magalhaes, P. C. 2012. "After the Bailout. Responsibility, Policy, and Valence in the Portuguese Legislative Election of June 2011." *South European Society and Politics* 17: 309-27.

Magone, J. M. 1999. "Portugal. Party system installation and consolidation." In *Changing Party Systems in Western Europe*, eds. D. Broughton and M. Donovan. London: Pinter. 232-54.

Magone, J. M. 1999. "Portugal. Party System Installation and Consolidation." In *Changing Party Systems in Western Europe*, eds. D. Broughton and M. Donovan. London: Pinter. 232-54.

Magone, J. M. 2011. *Contemporary European Politics. A comparative introduction.* London: Routledge.

Magri, F. 1954. *La Democrazia Cristiana in Italia.* Milan: La Flaccola.

Majerus, J.-M. 2008. "Die Partei und die Bauernorganisation." In *Spiegelbild eines Landes und seiner Politik? Geschichte der Christlich-Sozialen Volkspartei Luxemburgs im 20. Jahrhundert*, ed. G. Trausch. Luxembourg: Saint Paul. 627-73.

Malgeri, F. 1987. *Storia Della Democrazia Cristiana. 1943–1948.* Rome: Cinque Lune.

Mahoney, J. 2000. "Path Dependence in Historical Sociology." *Theory and Society* 29: 507-48.

Mahoney, J.E., and G. Goertz. 2004. "The Possibility Principle. Choosing Negative Cases in Comparative Research." *The American Political Science Review* 98: 653-69.

Mahoney, J. 2001. *Legacies of Liberalism. Path dependence and political regimes in Central America.* Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP.

Mahoney, J., and K. Thelen. 2010. *Explaining Institutional Change. Ambiguity, Agency, and Power.* Cambridge: Cambridge UP.

Mair, P. 1979. "The Autonomy of the Political. The development of the Irish party system." *Comparative Politics* 11: 445-65.

Mair, P. 1987. *The Changing Irish Party System. Organisation, Ideology and Electoral Competition.* London: Frances Pinter.

Mair, P. 1994. "Party Organizations. From civil society to the state." In *How Parties Organize. Change and adaptation in party organizations in Western Democracies*, eds. R. S. Katz and P. Mair. London: Sage. 1-22.

Mair, P. 1997. *Party System Change. Approaches and Interpretations.* Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Mainwaring, S., and T. R. Scully. 1995. “Introduction. Party Systems in Latin America.” In *Building Democratic Institutions. Party Systems in Latin America*, eds. S. Mainwaring and T. R. Scully. Stanford: Stanford UP. 1-34.

Manow, P., and B. Palier. 2009. “A Conservative Welfare State Regime without Christian Democracy? The French Etat-Providence, 1880-1960.” In *Religion, Class Coalitions and Welfare States*, eds. K. Van Kersbergen and P. Manow. Cambridge: Cambridge UP. 146-75.

Mannewitz, T. 2017. “Really ’Two Deeply Divided Electorates’? German Federal Elections 1990-2013.” *German Politics* 26: 219-34.

Martell, L., and C. Van Den Anker. 2001. *Social Democracy: Global and National Perspectives.* Basingstoke: Palgrave.

Massart, A. 2004. “The Impossible Resurrection. Christian Democracy in France.” In *Christian Democratic Parties in Europe since the End of the Cold War*, eds. S. Van Hecke and E. Gerard. Leuven: Leuven UP. 197-215.

Masson, J.-L. 1984. *Provinces, départements, régions. L’organisation administrative de la France d’hier à demain.* Paris: Éditions Fernand Lanore.

Matakos, K., O. Troumpounis, and D. Xefteris. 2015. “Turnout and Polarization under Alternative Electoral Systems.” In *The Political Economy of Governance. Institutions, political performance and elections.* Heidelberg: Springer. 335-62.

Matuschek, P. 2008. *Erfolg und Misserfolg konservativer Parteien. Die spanische AP-PP und das portugiesische CDS-PP im Vergleich.* Wiesbaden: VS Verlag.

Mauriac, C. 1971. *Un autre de Gaulle. 1944-1954.* Paris: Hachette.

Mayeur, J.-M. 1980. *Des Partis Catholiques à la Démocratie Chrétienne. XIXe–XXe siècles.* Paris: Colin.

McAllister, I. 1991. “Party Adaption and Factionalism within the Australian Party System.” *American Journal of Political Science* 35: 206-27.

McBride, J. P. 2006. “The Party System of Ireland.” In *Die Parteiensysteme Westeuropas*, eds. O. Niedermayer, R. Stöss and M. Haas. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag. 235-43.

McCarthy, P. 1996. “Forza Italia. The New Politics and Old Values of a Changing Italy.” In *The New Italian Republic. From the Fall of the Berlin Wall to Berlusconi*, eds. S. Gundle and P. Simon. London: Routledge. 130-46.

McCoy, J. L. 1999. “Chavez and the End of ’Partyarchy’ in Venezuela.” *Journal of Democracy* 10: 64-77.

McDonnell, D. 2013. “Silvio Berlusconi’s Personal Parties. From Forza Italia to the Popolo Della Liberta.” *Political Studies* 61: 217-33.

McInnes, N. 1978. “The Communist Parties of Western Europe.” *Studies in Soviet Thought* 18: 69-70.

Meguid, B. M. 2008. *Party Competition between Unequals. Strategies and Electoral Fortunes in Western Europe*. New York: Cambridge UP.

Merkl, P. H. 1978. "Factionalism. The Limits of the West German Party-State." In *Faction Politics. Political Parties and Factionalism in Comparative Perspective*, eds. F. P. Belloni and D. C. Beller. Santa Barbara: ABC Clio. 245-64.

Mershon, C. 2001. "Contending Models of Portfolio Allocation and Office Payoffs to Party Factions. Italy 1963-79." *American Journal of Political Science* 45: 277-93.

Metze, M. 1993. *De stranding. Het CDA van hoogtepunt naar catastrofe*. Nijmegen: SUN.

Michelet, C. 1971. *Mon père Edmond Michelet. D'après ses notes intimes*. Paris: Presses de la Cité.

Michels, R. 1962. *Political Parties. A Sociological Study of the Oligarchical Tendencies of Modern Democracies*. New York: Dover Publications.

Mikkelsen, K. S. 2015. "Negative Case Selection. Justifications and Consequences for Set-Theoretic Mmr." *Sociological Methods & Research*, 1-33,
URL: http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/0049124115591015 [18.02.2017].

Minkenberg, M. 2002. "The New Radical Right in the Political Process: Interaction Effects in France and Germany." In *Shadows Over Europe: The Development and Impact of the Extreme Right Wing in Western Europe*, eds. M. Schain, A. Zolberg and P. Hossay. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 245–68.

Mintzel, A. 1977. *Geschichte der CSU. Ein Überblick*. Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag.

Mitchell, M. 2012. *The Origins of Christian Democracy. Politics and Confession in Modern Germany*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Morgenstern, S. 1996. *The Electoral Connection and the Legislative Process in Latin America: Parties, Factions, and Alliances in Theory and Practice*. PhD dissertation. San Diego: University of California.

Morgenstern, S. 2001. "Organized Factions and Disorganized Parties. Electoral Incentives in Uruguay." *Party Politics* 7: 235-56.

Morsey, R. 1971. "Der politische Aufstieg Konrad Adenauers, 1945-1949." In *Adenauer-Studien I*, eds. R. Morsley and K. Repgen. Mainz: Matthias-Grünwald-Verlag.

Morsey, R. 1979. *Konrad Adenauer und die Gründung der Bundesrepublik Deutschlands*. Stuttgart: Belser.

Morsey, R. 2006. "Gerstenmaier und Adenauer." *Historisch-Politische Mitteilungen* 13: 257-70.

Mosely, P. 1950. "The Occupation of Germany. New Light on How the Zones Were Drawn." *Foreign Affairs* 28: 580-604.

Moschonas, G. 2002. *In the Name of Social Democracy–The Great Transformation: 1945 to the present*. London, New York: Verso.

Mudde, C. 2007. *Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe.* Cambridge: Cambridge UP.

Müller, J.-W. 2011. *Contesting Democracy. Political Ideas in Twentieth-Century Europe.* London: Yale UP.

Müller, W. C. 1984. "Direktwahl und Parteiensystem." In *Jahrbuch füer Politik 1983*, eds. A. Khol and A. Stirnemann. Vienna: Oldenbourg. 83-112.

Müller, W. C. 1985. "Die Rolle der Parteien bei Entstehung und Entwicklung der Sozialpartnerschaft." In *Sozialpartnerschaft in der Krise. Leistungen und Grenzen des Neokorporatismus in Österreich*, eds. P. Gerlich, E. Grande and W. C. Müller. Vienna: Böhlau. 135-224.

Müller, W. C. 1989a. "Neuere Entwicklungen der Persönlichkeitswahl in Österreich." In *Österreichisches Jahrbuch für Politik 1988. Sonderdruck*, eds. A. Khol, G. Ofner and A. Stirnemann. Vienna: Oldenbourg. 671-92.

Müller, W. C. 1989b. "Party Patronage in Austria. Theoretical Considerations and Empirical Findings." In *The Austrian Party System*, eds. A. Pelinka and F. Plasser. Boulder: Westview Press. 327-56.

Müller, W. C. 1991. "Die Österreichische Volkspartei." In *Handbuch des Politischen Systems Österreichs*, eds. H. Dachs et al. Vienna: Manzsche. 227-46.

Müller, W. C. 1992. "Austria. 1945-1990." In *Party Organizations. A Data Handbook*, eds. R. S. Katz and P. Mair. London: Sage. 21-120.

Müller, W. C. 1994. "The Development of Austrian Party Organization in the Post-War Period." In *How Parties Organize. Change and Adaptation in Party Organizations in Western Democracies*, eds. R. S. Katz and P. Mair. London: SAGE. 51-79.

Müller, W. C. 2000a. "Patronage by National Government." In *The Nature of Party Government. A Comparative European Perspective*, eds. J. Blondel and M. Cotta. New York: Palgrave. 141-60.

Müller, W. C. 2000b. "The Austrian Election of October 1999. A Shift to the Right." *West European Politics* 23: 191-200.

Müller, W. C. 2007. "Political Institutions and Linkage Strategies." In *Patrons, Clients and Policies. Patterns of Democratic Accountability and Political Competition*, eds. H. Kitschelt and S. Wilkinson. Cambridge: Cambridge UP. 251-75.

Müller, W. C., and D. Meth-Cohn. 1991. "The Selection of Party Chairmen in Austria. A Study in Intra-Party Decision-Making." *European Journal of Political Research* 20: 39-65.

Müller, W. C., F. Plasser, and P. A. Ulram. 2004. "Party Responses to the Erosion of Voter Loyalties in Austria. Weakness as an Advantage and Strength as a Handicap." In *Political Parties and Electoral Change. Party Responses to Electoral Markets*, eds. P. Mair, W. C. Müller and F. Plasser. London: SAGE. 145-78.

Müller, W. C., and B. Steininger. 1994a. "Christian Democracy in Austria. The Austrian People's Party." In *Christian Democracy in Europe. A Comparative Perspective*, ed. D. Hanley. London: Pinter. 87-100.

Müller, W. C., and B. Steininger. 1994b. "Party Organisation and Party Competitiveness. The Case of the Austrian People's Party, 1945-1992." *European Journal of Political Research* 26: 1-29.

Müller, W. C., and P. A. Ulram. 1995. "The Social and Demographic Structure of Austrian Parties, 1945-93." *Party Politics* 1: 145-60.

Nieboer, M., and P. Lucardie. 1992. "'Aanschuren tegen het CDA' of aansluiten bij klein links?" In *Jaarboek Documentatiecentrum Nederlandse Politieke Partijen 1992*, ed. G. Voerman. Groningen: Documentatiecentrum Nederlandse Politieke Partijen. 149-72.

Niedermayer, O. 2006. "Das Parteiensystem Deutschlands." In *Die Parteiensysteme Westeuropas*, eds. O. Niedermayer, R. Stöss and M. Haas. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag. 109-33.

Nietfeld, J. 1985. *Die Zentrumspartei. Geschichte und Struktur 1945–1958*. Doctoral thesis, Braunschweig, TU Braunschweig.

Nordsieck, W. 2017. *Parties & Elections. The database about parliamentary elections and political parties in Europe*. URL: http://parties-and-elections.eu/ [17.02.2017].

Norris, P. 2005. *Radical Right: Voters and Parties in the Electoral Market*. Cambridge: Cambridge UP.

North, D. C. 1990. *Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance.* Cambridge: Cambridge UP.

Obinger, H. 2005. "Austria. Strong Parties in a Weak Federal Polity." In *Federalism and the Welfare State. New World and European Experiences*, eds. H. Obinger, S. Leibfried and F. Castles. Cambridge: Cambridge UP. 181-221.

Ogris, G. 1991. "Ebenbild oder Kontrastprogramm. Eine Analyse des Wahlkampfes und des Wahlverhaltens bei der Nationalratswahl im Oktober 1990." In *Österreichisches Jahrbuch Fur Politik 1990*, eds. A. Khol, G. Ofner and A. Stirnemann. Munich: Oldenbourg. 151-70.

O'Malley, E., and M. Kerby. 2004. "Chronicle of a death foretold? Understanding the decline of Fine Gael." *Irish Political Studies* 19: 39-58.

Oostlander, A. M. 1986. 'Wat voor CDA wollen we?' *Christen-Democratische Verkenningen* 9: 410-5.

Page, S. 2006. "Path Dependence." *Quarterly Journal of Political Science* 1: 87-115.

Panebianco, A. 1988. *Political Parties. Organization and power.* Cambridge: Cambridge UP.

Pappas, T. S. 2001. "In Search of the Center. Conservative Parties, Electoral Competition, and Political Legitimacy in Southern Europe's New Democracies." In *Parties, Politics, and Democracy in the New Southern Europe*, eds. P. N. Diamandouros and R. Gunther. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP. 224-67.

Parisella, A. 1997. "La Base Sociale Della Democrazia Cristiana Italiana. Elettorato, iscrivitti e organizzazione." In *Christian Democracy in the European Union*, ed. E. Lamberts. Leuven: Leuven UP. 189-209.

Parsons, C. 2007. *How to Map Arguments in Political Science.* Oxford: Oxford UP.

Pasquino, G. 1972. "Le Radici del Frazionismo e il Voto di Preferenza." *Rivista Italiana di Scienza Politica.* 2: 353-68.

Pedersen, H.H. 2010. "How Intra-Party Power Relations Affect the Coalition Behavior of Political Parties." *Party Politics* 16: 737-54.

Pelinka, A. 2009. "Das politische System Osterreichs." In *Die politischen Systeme Westeuropas*, ed. W. Ismayr. Opladen: VS Verlag. 607-41.

Pennings, P. 1999. "European Social Democracy between Planning and Market: A Comparative Exploration of Trends and Variations." *Journal of European Public Policy* 6: 743-56.

Piazza, J. 2001. "De-Linking Labor: Labor Unions and Social Democratic Parties under Globalization." *Party Politics* 7: 413-35.

Pierson, P. 1993. "When Effect Becomes Cause. Policy feedback and political change." *World Politics* 45: 595-628.

Pierson, P. 2000a. "Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics." *The American Political Science Review* 94: 251-67.

Pierson, P. 2000b. "Not Just What, but When. Timing and sequence in political processes." *Studies in American Political Development* 14: 72-92.

Pierson, P. 2004. *Politics in Time. History, Institutions, and Social Analysis.* Princeton: Princeton UP.

Piven, F. F. 1992. *Labor Parties in Postindustrial Societies.* New York: Oxford UP.

Pizzorno, A. 1981. "Interests and Parties in Pluralism." In *Organizing Interests in Western Europe: Pluralism, Corporatism, and the Transformation of Politics*, ed. S. Berger. Cambridge: Cambridge UP. 249-84.

Plasser, F., F. Sommer, and P. Ulram. 1991. "Eine Kanzler- und Protestwahl. Wahlerverhalten und Wahlmotive bei der Nationalratswahl 1990." In *Österreichisches Jahrbuch Für Politik 1990*, eds. A. Khol, G. Ofner and A. Stirnemann. Munich: Oldenbourg. 95-147.

Plaza, A. 2008. *From Christian Militants to Republican Renovators. The third ralliement of Catholics in postwar France, 1944–1965.* Ph.D. thesis, New York, New York University.

Poguntke, T. 1987. "The Organization of a Participatory Party. The German Greens." *European Journal of Political Research* 15: 609-33.

Poguntke, T. 1994. "Parties in a Legalistic Culture. The case of Germany." In *How Parties Organize. Change and Adaptation in Party Organization in Western Democracies*, eds. R. S. Katz and P. Mair. London: Sage. 185–215.

Poguntke, T. 1998. "Party Organizations." In *Comparative Politics. The problem of equivalence*, ed. J. Van Deth. London: Routledge. 156-79.

Poguntke, T. 2000. *Parteiorganisation im Wandel. Gesellschaftliche Verankerung und organisatorische Anpassung im Europäischen Vergleich.* Wiesbaden: Westdeutscher Verlag.

Poguntke, T. et al. 2016. "Party Rules, Party Resources and the Politics of Parliamentary Democracies. How Parties Organize in the 21st Century". *Party Politics* 22: 661-78.

Pollack, D., and G. Pickel. 1999. "Individualisierung und religiöser Wandel in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland." *Zeitschrift für Soziologie* 28: 465-83.

Pollack, D., and G. Pickel. 2003. "Deinstitutionalisierung des Religiösen und religiöse Individualisierung in Ost- und Westdeutschland". *Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie* 55: 447-74.

Pollock, J. K. 1955. "The West German Electoral Law of 1953." *The American Political Science Review* 49: 107-30.

Pontusson, J., and D. Rueda 2008. "Inequality as a Source of Political Polarization. A comparative analysis of twelve OECD countries." In *Demcoracy, Inequality, and Representation in Comparative Perspective*, eds. P. Beramendi and C. J. Anderson. New York: Sage. 312-53.

Pridham, G. 1977. *Christian Democracy in Western Germany. The CDU/CSU in Government and Opposition. 1945-1976.* London: Croom Helm.

Pridham, G. 1979. "The Italian Christian Democrats after Moro. Crisis or compromise." *West European Politics* 2: 69-88.

Przeworski, A., and J. Sprague. 1986. *Paper Stones: A history of Electoral Socialism.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Przeworski, A., and H. Teune. 1970. *The Logic of Comparative Social Inquiry.* New York: Wiley-Interscience.

Pütz, H. 1975. *Konrad Adenauer und die CDU der britischen Besatzungszone, 1946–1949. Dokumente zur Gründungsgeschichte der CDU Deutschlands.* Bonn: Eicholz.

Pulzer, P. 1999. "Luck and Good Management. Helmut Kohl as Parliamentary and Electoral Strategist." *German Politics* 8: 126-40,

Rae, D. 1967. *The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws.* New Haven: Yale UP.

Rahat, G., and R. Hazan. 2001. "Candidate Selection Methods. An Analytical Framework." *Party Politics* 7: 297-322.

Randall, V., and L. Svasand. 2002. "Party Institutionalization in New Democracies." *Party Politics* 8: 5-29.

Rauchensteiner, M. 1979. *Der Sonderfall. Die Besatzungszeit in Österreich 1945 bis 1955.* Graz: Styria.

Ray, L. 1999. "Measuring Party Orientation towards European Integration: Results from an Expert Survey." *European Journal of Political Research* 36: 283-306.

Reichhold, L. 1975. *Geschichte der ÖVP.* Graz: Styria.

Rémond, R. 1968. *La droite en France. De la première restauration à la Ve République.* Paris: Aubier.

Rioux, J.-P. 1987. *The Fourth Republik. 1944–1958.* Cambridge: Cambridge UP.

Ritter, G. A. 1990. “The Social Bases of the German Political Parties. 1867-1920.” In *Elections, Parties and Political Traditions. Social Foundation of German Parties and Party Systems. 1867-1987*, ed. K. Rohe. Providence: Berg Publisher’s. 27-52.

Rixen, T., and L.A. Viola. 2015. “Putting Path Dependence in its Place. Toward a Taxonomy of Institutional Change”. *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 27: 301-23.

Rose, R. 1964. “Parties, Factions and Tendencies.” *Britain Political Studies* 12: 33-46.

Rossi, M., and E. Scappini. 2012. “How should Mass Attendance be measured? An Italian case study.” *Quality and Quantity* 46: 1897-916.

Rovan, J. 1956. *Le Catholicisme Politique en Allemagne.* Paris: Éditions du Seuil.

Rovan, J. 1987. *Konrad Adenauer.* Paris: Beauchesne.

Rueda, D. 2007. *Social Democracy Inside Out: Partisanship and Labor Market Policy in Advanced Industrialized Democracies.* Oxford: Oxford UP.

Rydgren, J. 2005. *Movements of Exclusion: Radical Right-Wing Populism in the Western World.* New York: Nova.

Rydgren, J. 2012. *Class Politics and the Radical Right.* London. New York: Routledge.

Sa’adah, A. 1987. “Le Mouvement Républicain Populaire et la Reconstitution du Système Partisan Français. 1944–1951.” *Revue Française de Science Politique* 37: 33–58.

Salvi, F. 1959. *Atti e Documenti della Democrazia Cristiana. 1943-1959.* Rome: Cinque Lune.

Sartori, G. 1966. “European Political Parties. The case of polarized pluralism.” In *Political Parties and Political Development*, eds. J. LaPalombara and M. Weiner. Princeton: Princeton UP. 137-76.

Sartori, G. 1971. “Proporzionalismo, Frazionismo e CrisideiPartiti.” *Rivista Italiana di Scienza Politica* 3: 629-55.

Sartori, G. 1976. *Parties and Party Systems. A framework for analysis.* Cambridge: Cambridge UP.

Schaefer, F. 1985. “Der Führer der ’Stahlhelm-Fraktion’. Ein Porträt des CDU-Fraktionschefs Alfred Dregger.” *Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik* 11: 1356-66.

Schain, M. 2006. “The Extreme-Right and Immigration Policy-Making: Measuring Direct and Indirect Effects.” *West European Politics* 29: 270–89.

Schlemmer, T. 1998. *Aufbruch, Krise und Erneuerung. Die Christlich-Soziale Union 1945 bis 1955.* Munich: Oldenbourg.

Schlesinger, J. A. 1984. “On the Theory of Party Organization.” *Journal of Politics* 46: 369-400.

Schmid, J. 1990. *Die CDU. Organisationsstrukturen, Politiken und Funktionsweisen einer Partei im Föderalismus.* Opladen: Leske + Budrich.

Schmid, J. 1999. "Die CDU/CSU nach dem September 1998. Von der Wende zum Ende?" In *Die Parteien nach der Bundestagswahl 1998*, ed. O. Niedermayer. Wiesbaden: Springer. 63-81.

Schmidt, U. 1983. "Die Deutsche Zentrums-Partei". In *Die Parteien der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1945–1980*, eds. R. Stöss et al. Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag. 1192–242.

Schmitt-Beck, R. 2014. "Euro-Kritik, Wirtschaftspessimissmus und Einwanderungsskepsis. Hintergründe des Beinah-Wahlerfolges der Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) bei der Bundestagswahl 2013." *Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen* 45: 94-112.

Schönbohm, W. 1985. *Die CDU wird moderne Volkspartei. Selbstverständnis, Mitglieder, Organisation und Apparat 1950-1980.* Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta.

Schoentgen, M. 2008. "Von der Rechtspartei zur CSV. Gründung, Konsolidierung und Generationswechsel (1940-1959)." In *Spiegelbild eines Landes und seiner Politik? Geschichte der Christlich-Sozialen Volkspartei Luxemburgs im 20. Jahrhundert*, ed. G. Trausch. Luxembourg: Saint Paul. 241-328.

Schroen, M. 2000. "Die Christlich-Soziale Volkspartei Luxemburgs". In *Christlich-demokratische und konservative Parteien in Westeuropa 5*, ed. H.-J. Veen. Paderborn: Schöningh Verlag. 337–404.

Schwarz, H.-P. 1995. *Konrad Adenauer. A German Politician and Statesman in a Period of War, Revolution and Reconstruction. Vol. 1, From the German Empire to the Federal Republic, 1876-1952.* Oxford: Berghan.

Seawright, J. 2012. *Party-System Collapse. The Roots of Crisis in Peru and Venezuela.* Stanford: Stanford UP.

Sharp, T. 1975. *The Wartime Alliance and the Zonal Division of Germany.* Oxford: Oxford UP.

Sindler, A. P. 1955. "Bifactional Rivalry as an Alternative to Two-Party Competition in Louisiana." *The American Political Science Review* 49: 641-62.

Sinnott, R. 1995. *Irish Voters Decide. Voting Behaviour in Elections and Referendums since 1918.* Manchester: Manchester UP.

Slater, D., and D. Ziblatt. 2013. "The Enduring Indispensability of the Controlled Comparison." *Comparative Political Studies* 46: 1301-27.

Smith, D. M. 1997. *Modern Italy. A political history.* New Haven: Yale UP.

Sully, M. 1991. "The Austrian Election of 1990". *Electoral Studies* 10: 77-80.

Sully, M. 1995. "The Austrian Election of 1994" *Electoral Studies* 14: 218-22.

Statistics Austria. 1964. *Ergebnisse der Volkszählung vom 21. März 1961.* Vienna: Bundesanstalt Statistik Österreich.

Statistics Austria. 1995. *Republik Österreich. 1945-1995.* Vienna: Österreichisches Statistisches Zentralamt.

Steenbergen, M., and G. Marks. 2007. "Evaluating Expert Judgments." *European Journal of Political Research* 46: 347-66.

Stern, A. J., S. Tarrow, and M. F. Williams. 1971. "Factions and Opinion Groups in European Mass Groups Parties. Some evidence from a study of Italian socialist activists." *Comparative Politics* 3: 529–59.

Stickler, M. 2004. *Ostdeutsch heißt gesamtdeutsch. Organisation, Selbstverständnis und heimatpolitische Zielsetzungen der deutschen Vertriebenenverbände 1949-1972.* Düsseldorf: Droste.

Stirnemann, A. 1980. "Innerparteiliche Demokratie in der ÖVP." In *Österreichisches Jahrbuch Fuer Politik '79*, eds. A. Stirnemann and A. Khol. Vienna: Oldenbourg. 391-433.

Stirnemann, A. 1981. "Innerparteiliche Gruppenbildung am Beispiel der ÖVP." In *Österreichisches Jahrbuch Fur Politik 1980*, eds. A. Khol and A. Stirnemann. Munich: Oldenbourg. 415-48.

Stirnemann, A. 1993. "Zwischen Zielgruppen- und Kommunikationsproblemen. Die Parteireform der ÖVP 1991." In *Österreichisches Jahrbuch Für Politik 1992*, eds. A. Khol, G. Ofner and A. Stirnemann. Munich: Oldenbourg. 669-93.

Stock, J., and M. W. Watson. 2003. *Introduction to Econometrics.* Boston, London: Addison-Wesley.

Stokes, S. C. 2011. 'Political Clientelism.' In *The Oxford Handbook of Political Science*, ed. R. E. Goodin. Oxford: Oxford UP. 648-72.

Streeck, W., and K. Thelen. 2005. *Beyond Continuity. Institutional change in advanced political economies.* Oxford: Oxford UP.

Strauß, F. J. 1989. *Die Erinnerungen.* Berlin: Siedler.

Strom, K. 1990. "A Behavioral Theory of Competitive Political Parties." *American Journal of Political Science* 34: 565-98.

Talos, E. 1985. "Sozialpartnerschaft. Zur Entwicklung und Entwicklungsdynamik kooperativ-konzentrierter Politik in Österreich." In *Sozialpartnerschaft in der Krise. Leistungen und Grenzen des Neokorporatismus in Österreich*, eds. P. Gerlich, E. Grande and W. C. Müller. Vienna: Böhlau. 41-83.

Thachil, Tariq. 2014. "Elite Parties, Poor Voters. How social services win votes in India." Cambridge: Cambridge UP.

Thelen, K. 2004. *How Institutions Evolve. The political economy of skills in Germany, Britain, the United States, and Japan.* New York: Cambridge UP.

Thomasson, J. 2005. *The European Voter. A comparative study of modern democracies.* Oxford: Oxford UP.

Thompson, M., and L. Lennartz. 2006. "The Making of Chancellor Merkel." *German Politics* 15: 99-110.

Treib, O. 2012. “Party Patronage in Austria. From Reward to Control.” In *Party Patronage and Party Government in European Democracies*, eds. P. Kopecky, P. Mair and M. Spirova. Oxford: Oxford UP. 31-53.

Tsebelis, G. 1990. *Nested Game. Rational Choice in Comparative Politics*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Turner, E. 2013. “The CDU and Party Organizational Change.” *German Politics* 22: 114-33.

Van Biezen, I. 2003. *Political Parties in New Democracies. Party Organization in Southern and East-Central Europe.* New York: Palgrave.

Van Hecke, S., and E. Gerard. 2004. *Christian Democratic Parties in Europe Since the End of the Cold War*. Leuven: Leuven UP.

Van Kemseke, P. 1997. “The Social Basis of Christian Democracy in France.” In *Christian Democracy in the European Union*, ed. E. Lamberts. Leuven: Leuven UP. 174-88.

Van Kemseke, P. 2006. *Towards an Era of Development. The Globalization of Socialism and Christian Democracy.* Leuven: Leuven UP.

Van Kersbergen, K. 1994. “The Distinctiveness of Christian Democracy.” In *Christian Democracy in Europe. A comparative perspective*, ed. D. Hanley, ed. London: Pinter. 31-47.

Van Kersbergen, K. 1995. *Social Capitalism. A study of Christian Democracy and the Welfare State*. London: Routledge.

Van Kersbergen, K. 1999. “Contemporary Christian Democracy and the Demise of the Politics of Mediation.” In *Continuity and Change in Contemporary Capitalism*, eds. H. Kitschelt et al. Cambridge: Cambridge UP. 346-70.

Van Kersbergen, K. 2008. “The Christian Democratic Phoenix and Modern Unsecular Politics.” *Party Politics* 14: 259-79.

Vaussard, M. 1956. *Histoire de la Démocratie Chrétienne. France, Belgique, Italie.* Paris: Éditions du Seuil.

Verge, T., and R. Gomez. 2012. “Factionalism in Multi-Level Contexts. When Party Organization Becomes a Device.” *Party Politics* 18: 667-85.

Versteegh, K. 1999. *De honden blaffen. Waarom de CDA geen oppositie kan voeren.* Amsterdam: Uigeverij Bert Bakker.

Veugelers, J., and A. Magnan. 2005. “Conditions of Far-Right Strength in Contemporary Western Europe: an Application of Kitschelt’s Theory.” *European Journal of Political Research* 44: 837-60.

Vezzoni, C., and F. Biolcati-Rinaldi. 2015. “Church Attendance and Religious Change in Italy, 1968–2010. A multilevel analysis of pooled datasets.” *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* 54: 100-18.

Vinen, R. 1995. *Bourgeois Politics in France. 1945-1951.* Cambridge: Cambridge UP.

Volkens, A. et al. 2016. *The Manifesto Data Collection. Manifesto Project (MRG/CMP/MARPOR). Version 2016.* Berlin: Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB).

Von Alemann, U. 2010. *Das Parteiensystem Der Bundesrepublik Deutschland.* Bonn: Bundeszentrale für Politische Bildung.

Waller, M. 1989. "The Radical Sources of the Crisis in West European Communist Parties." *Political Studies* 38: 39-61.

Waller, M. 1995. "Adaptation of the Former Communist Parties if East-Central Europe. A Case of Social-Democratization?" *Party Politics* 1: 473-90.

Walter, F. 2002. *Die SPD. Vom Proletariat zur neuen Mitte.* Berlin: Alexander Fest.

Walter, F. 2009. *Die SPD. Biographie einer Partei.* Reinbek: Rowohlt.

Walter, F. 2010. *Vorwärts oder abwärts? Zur Transformation der Sozialdemokratie. Berlin: Suhrkamp.*

Walter, F., C. Werwath, and O. D'Antonio. 2011. *Die CDU. Entstehung und Verfall christdemokratischer Geschlossenheit.* Baden-Baden: Nomos.

Warner, C. M. 1996. "The New Catholic Parties. The Popolari, Patto Segni and Ccd." In *Italy. Politics and Policy*, eds. R. Leonardi and R. Y. Nanetti. Aldershot: Dartmouth. 134-51.

Warner, C. M. 2000. *Confessions of an Interest Group. The Catholic Church and political parties in Europe.* Princeton: Princeton UP.

Weaver, K. 2010. "Paths and Forks or Chutes and Ladders? Negative Feedbacks and Policy Regime Change". *Journal of Public Policy* 30: 137-62.

Webster, R. A. 1961. *Christian Democracy in Italy. 1860–1960.* London: Hollis and Carter.

Weinberg L., and P. H. Merkl. 2003. *Right-wing Extremism in the Twenty-first Century.* London: Fank Cass.

Weinberger, L. 1948. *Tatsachen, Begegnungen und Gespräche. Ein Buch um Österreich.* Vienna: Österreichischer Verlag.

Wertman, D. A. 1995. "The Last Year of the Christian Democratic Party." In *Italian Politics. Ending the First Republic*, eds. C. Mershon and G. Pasquino. Boulder: Westview Press. 135-50.

Weymar, P. 1957. *Konrad Adenauer. The Authorized Biography.* London: Deutsch.

Whyte, J. 1974. "Ireland: Politics Without Social Bases." In *Electoral Behaviour: a Comparative Handbook*, ed. R. Rose. New York: Free Press. 619-51.

Wiliarty, S. 2008. "Angela Merkel's Path to Power. The Role of Internal Party Dynamics and Leadership." *German Politics* 17: 81-96.

Wiliarty, S. 2013. "Gender as a Modernising Force in the German CDU." *German Politics* 22: 172-90.

Williams, M. H. 2006. *The Impact of Radical Right-Wing Parties in Western Democracies.* New York: Palgrave.

Wills-Otero, L. 2016. “The Electoral Performance of Latin American Traditional Parties, 1978-2006. Does the Internal Structure Matter?” *Party Politics* 22: 758-72.

Wilkinson, S. 2015. “Where’s the Party? The Decline of Party Institutionalization and What (if Anything) that Means for Democracy.” *Government and Opposition* 50: 420-445.

Woloch, I. 2007. “Left, Right and Centre. The MRP and the post-War moment.” *French History* 21: 85–106.

Wooldridge, J. M. 2003. “Cluster-Sample Methods in Applied Econometrics.” *The American Economic Review* 93: 133-38.

Wyneken, J. 2012. “The Western Allies, German Churches, and the Emerging Cold War in Germany, 1948-1952.” In *Religion and the Cold War. A Global Perspective*, ed. P. Muehlenbeck. Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press. 18-43.

Zariski, R. 1960. “Party Factions and Comparative Politics. Some preliminary observations.” *Midwest Journal of Political Science* 4: 27–51.

Zariski, R. 1962. “The Italian Socialist Party. A Case Study in Factional Conflict.” *American Political Science Review* 56: 372-90.

Zariski, R. 1965. “Intra-Party Conflict in a Dominant Party. The Experience of Italian Christian Democracy.” *The Journal of Politics* 27: 3-34.

Zariski, R. 1978. “Party Factions and Comparative Politics. Some empirical findings.” In *Faction Politics. Political parties and factionalism in comparative perspective*, eds. D. C. Beller and F. P. Belloni. Santa Barbara: ABC Clio. 19–38.

Ziblatt D. F. 1998. “The Adaptation of Ex-Communist Parties to Post-Communist East Central Europe: A Comparative Study of the East German and Hungarian Ex-Communist Parties.” *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 31: 119-137.

Zuckerman, A. S. 1979. *The Politics of Faction. Christian Democratic Rule in Italy.* New Haven: Yale UP.