

Technological Change and Cross-Strait Dynamics in the 21st Century

Paul Irwin Crookes

This book has offered evidence to support the view that there are important changes taking place in the evolution of cross-Strait relations. The contributions in this volume have each presented different perspectives on how developments in, and use of, high technology in security, economic and cultural dimensions may be shaping trends on both sides of the Taiwan Strait.

This concluding chapter will return to these three policy dimensions. In so doing, this chapter will explore three key questions that overlap with these themes in important ways that may impact the future. First, to what extent has mainland China's innovation investment in its military and industrial sectors created a meaningful example of technology catch-up that could shift the balance of capabilities from Taiwan to the mainland? Second, does the OEM (Original Equipment Manufacturer) model of growth, fostered so successfully by Taiwanese business elites over the past three decades of investment in the mainland, represent a feasible future approach in the face of structural changes to mainland China's own economy as it seeks to move up the production value chain to directly compete with Taiwan? Third, is the cultural gap between the two communities on both sides of the Taiwan Strait being broken down or reinforced by new media developments in the internet era, and do such new communication channels represent an avenue of delivery for a distinctive cross-Strait dialogue that reduce or exacerbate tensions?

In seeking answers to these questions, the research presented in this volume offers a rich source of evidence to explain how changing power dynamics across the Taiwan Strait, fuelled by technological change, may already be altering the future direction of the relationship

between mainland China and Taiwan. The conclusion suggested here is that major changes are indeed taking place, but at a different pace and in different ways across each of the three dimensions under scrutiny. Whilst the balance of military capabilities may already be shifting in fundamental and irreversible ways in mainland China's favour, an examination of cross-Strait economic integration provides a more nuanced picture, wherein Taiwan's technology leadership appears to have remained strong in important sectors, at least for now. Cross-cultural ties have taken advantage of new modes of communication, but bridge-building between the two communities still needs to overcome the formidable obstacles posed by the mainland's continuing emphasis on tight control over media messages and internet discussion, which appear to be increasing under the new leadership of the People's Republic of China's (PRC). Moreover, the internet is used both as a constructive and a destructive force in the development of cross-Strait ties.

What seems clear from the different contributions in this book is that the significant progress achieved in fostering ever-closer economic ties between the two sides over recent years should not be allowed to mask the very real challenge of building a lasting political settlement to the tensions that remain in cross-Strait relations today.

Security dimensions: are mainland China's increasing technological capabilities a game changer?

The National Medium- and Long-Term Program for Science and Technology Development,¹ initiated by mainland China in 2006, has sought to transform the mainland's economy from one that is still largely production-led, achieving growth through offering highly competitive manufacturing assembly line and logistics capabilities, to one that could become knowledge-led and innovation oriented. The aim has been to propel the PRC to leadership in the field of science and high-technology by the mid-21st century. Evidence presented by contributors to

this book suggests that this strategy has two intersecting objectives: one involving military modernization, with a particular focus on improving mainland China's sea power capabilities,² and the other focusing on achieving economic transformation of domestic firms from manufacturers to inventors³.

Whilst it can certainly be argued that both of these factors have important ramifications for Taiwan, it appears evident that some of the most profound shifts in the balance of power between the two communities have taken place in the context of the mainland's *military* investment. The development of credible force projection across the Taiwan Strait has long been 'the fundamental driver of offensive capabilities in the PLA [People's Liberation Army] Navy'⁴ and preparation for a potential conflict 'has largely dominated China's military modernization program'.⁵

Elizabeth Freund Larus examines how the mainland has sought to achieve military modernization and why each of the avenues pursued has the potential to fundamentally alter the balance of military power in cross-Strait terms. First, Beijing has long sought acquisition of high-technology weaponry from overseas whilst at the same time advancing the development of domestically produced technology, including through partnerships of the military with universities, research institutes and industrial enterprises. Second, the mainland has become adept at the exploitation of dual-use products through nurturing the flow of information from civilian sources towards adaptation by military research and development centres. Third, as complement to the development of new technologies, there has been a concerted effort to invest in the professionalization of the human resources of its armed services, linked to the infusion of new ideas and best-practices ⁶. Whilst this three-pronged approach actually commenced under Deng Xiaoping's leadership, such strategies of technology adoption have significantly accelerated in recent years, with the underlying goal seeming to be the deterrence of any intervention in the Strait by the United States. The

acquisition of a combination of anti-access and area-denial (A2/AD) capabilities by the PRC would raise the potential costs of any such action by the United States beyond tolerable levels. In particular, the utilization of such capabilities at an early stage of a conflict situation would prevent the United States from fully leveraging its significant maritime power in aid of defending the island of Taiwan.⁷

However, there remain serious questions over mainland China's capabilities to exploit its growing superiority in hardware. Effective operational capabilities of the PRC military depend on more than just having reliable access to physical items of high technology. They also require soft skills at a human level and software at an information technology level to derive the most value from sophisticated weaponry.⁸ It is as yet unclear whether the mainland could actually deliver on its A2/AD objectives. Nevertheless, these developments appear to offer genuine risks to Taiwan as the asymmetry in conventional military capabilities between each side of the Strait looks set to expand and mainland China pushes on with its technology-led upgrade programme.

This analysis of the military dimension of cross-Strait relations compellingly illustrates why economics should not be the only lens through which future prospects for cooperation and long-term peace are considered. These security developments point to clear risks in Taiwan's capability to robustly counter military action by the mainland without a concomitant commitment to modernization by the island's government.⁹ Moreover, they highlight the real strategic challenges and higher costs that now exist for Taiwan's principal ally – the United States – to effectively offer operational support if conflict were actually to break out.¹⁰ These changes in the balance of *military* power also imply that, if these trends in defence capability are likely to persist, which is what current evidence presented here compellingly suggests, then Taiwan will need to focus more forcefully than may have been the case to date on finding further *political* ways in which to negotiate its future relationship

with the mainland. This implies tackling difficult and controversial concerns beyond economics that have so far made little or no progress.¹¹

Economic dimensions: can the Taiwanese sustain their success despite accelerating integration?

The foregoing implies that even the unprecedented pace of recent economic integration may not substantially alter the potential threat of a possible future military conflict from breaking out across the Strait – in short, a capitalist peace dividend is not by any means assured.¹² Yet, building on the in-depth examination of the nature of cross-Strait economic links offered by a number of authors in this volume, there may be cause for greater optimism. In specifically cross-Strait terms, it is the character of business-to-business cooperation that may actually help contribute to a reduction in cross-Strait tensions, diminishing, albeit not eliminating, the risks of an eventual conflict, irrespective of a persisting military imbalance. This is due largely because of mainland China's ongoing dependence on Taiwan for intangible resources that its own economy does not, at present, possess. In different ways, Shelley Rigger, Ching-Jung Tsai and Jan Knoerich all show that the mainland has a pressing need for a distinctly Taiwanese contribution: their tacit knowledge in corporate best-practice, their technical know-how in productising research-led innovation, and their willingness to collaborate in key commercial sectors in ways that overseas multinationals have been reluctant to emulate.

Thus, the observations on the economic dimensions in this book uncover more of a *mutual* interdependence rather than a one-sided, unstoppable trajectory of domination by mainland China and decline for Taiwan., Taiwan's industrial position may also be rather stronger than at first sight because of the tactical adaptability of their extensive *taishang* networks that extend across the mainland. These activities of Taiwanese businesses on the mainland appear to have significantly assisted in sustaining success for Taiwan's economy,

even in the face of substantive technological upgrading spearheaded by the mainland's S&T policies. The analyses put forward in this book therefore posit a persuasive message that some of the mainland's technological advances, wrought by a mainly state-led Chinese plan, may in time actually reinforce Taiwan's advantages as a nimble high-technology manufacturer.

A detailed case study from the mainland telecommunications sector presented by Tsai shows the paradox of how increased mainland investment in promoting indigenous innovation and domestic firm growth has led not to diminished commercial prospects for Taiwanese high technology suppliers, but in fact to a strengthened position for these enterprises.¹³ This has been the case because the import substitution strategy pursued by the mainland for this sector through the development of specialised domestic network standards, and the championing of mainly state-owned or state-supported enterprises, has been unable to replicate the high-end research capabilities of Taiwan's specialised chipset designer manufacturers. Moreover, at the same time, foreign multinational competitors have been reluctant to fully realign their global strategy with mainland Chinese policy priorities and consumer preferences. This confluence of conditions created a gap in the market that has been adeptly exploited by the Taiwanese, who utilised their operational flexibility and well-integrated supply chains to satisfy mainland requirements, creating the conditions for what Tsai characterises as a classic 'win-win' outcome.¹⁴ In this context, therefore, China's S&T strategy appears to be presenting rather less of a meaningful threat to Taiwan's high-tech firms than at first may have been expected. To the contrary, many Taiwanese firms have been able to continue to offer their mainland partners much sought-after professional capabilities.

Nor is it conceivable that the fairly modest amount of mainland direct investment into Taiwan observed to the present day poses a direct threat to Taiwan. Evidence examined by Knoerich shows how levels of investment flows from the mainland into Taiwan's economy

have increased in recent years, following the removal of some (though by far not all) legislative hurdles by Ma Ying-jeou's Kuomintang-led administration. Beyond the objective to enter the Taiwanese market, a number of mainland Chinese firms have now reached a level of evolution where their pursuit of technological upgrading leads them to explore strategic asset-seeking investments.¹⁵ This evolving interest of mainland firms in actively seeking technological capabilities and know-how in Taiwan is further evidence of a continuing competitive edge of Taiwanese firms vis-à-vis their mainland Chinese counterparts.

Taiwanese enterprises operating on the mainland also continue to exhibit strengths in product development, logistics networks and management capabilities that appear to be more than a match for mainland firms. Rigger offers a compelling assessment of Taiwan's corporate resilience in mainland China, despite concerns over competitive capabilities from mainland challengers, due in no small part to the ongoing strength of entrepreneurial *taishang*. A particularly interesting point uncovered by her research is the way that Taiwan's mainland-based firms have been so effective in competing head-on with mainland Chinese rivals.¹⁶ These commercially experienced operators continue to place emphasis on constructing effective clusters across networks of Taiwanese firms, whilst at the same time crafting efficient supply chains that can overlap mutual trust with development collaboration to engender a distinctive 'central and satellite' business model. This model has been used to good effect even as mainland Chinese companies have themselves sought to offer direct competition in domestic mainland markets.¹⁷

Despite this success, however, the outlook is not universally positive. Taiwan's original strategy of exploiting cost advantages on the mainland through labour arbitrage in coastal production centres is now being challenged in the face of the PRC's own initiatives to upgrade its technological capacities. This, coupled with the trend of rapidly rising labour costs in mainland China caused by emerging labour shortages and increasingly strident

demands for salary and benefits improvements by workers themselves, seems to indicate that the years of adhering to a low-cost OEM business model may be over. In response, there is evidence to suggest that Taiwanese entrepreneurs have sought to mitigate these risks through more effectively moving up the value chain than their mainland rivals. They have been able to take advantage of the more readily adaptable Taiwanese expertise and their greater understanding of international norms and best practices, to exercise a strategic move into the provision of high value services, such as brand marketing, finance and green-tech development as part of a ‘transformational upgrading’ process. .¹⁸

There is also, however, an underlying negative theme running through this economic analysis that may pose a greater cause for concern beyond sustaining business markets: that issue is the extent to which the Taiwanese *trust* the mainlanders. Rigger highlights that cooperation between Taiwanese and local PRC firms has so far been ‘unpromising’, mostly due to a lack of trust between the two sides.¹⁹ Knoerich points out how a climate of cross-Strait mistrust has led to the maintenance of regulatory restrictions in Taiwan that continue to limit the pace and extent of direct funding from the mainland.²⁰ Goldstein cautions that the economic achievements secured to date should in fact be seen as an example of elite actors solving the ‘relatively easy, negotiable issues first’, with the much harder political, social and cultural questions still remaining to be resolved.²¹ Perhaps this has been most sharply exhibited by the major demonstrations against the Cross-Strait Service Trade Agreement (CSSTA) in 2014, which has sparked opposition at many different levels of the Taiwanese community. Some elements on Taiwan even saw in the agreement that ‘a certain inevitability regarding eventual unification was being created, an inevitability that was quite disturbing to a populace that did not want unification.’²² These controversies show the potential obstacles in the way of further economic integration, which emerge at the juncture where the distinction between economics, politics and security becomes blurred and constituencies in

Taiwan begin to lose trust in the ‘good intentions’ behind the conclusion of additional cross-Strait economic agreements.

In summary, the message from an economic standpoint appears to be two-fold. Whilst there are many uncertainties about the future, there is at present no evidence to suggest that changes in mainland China’s economic profile and its heavy investments in technological upgrading, coupled with an accelerated pace of cross-Strait integration in a number of business sectors, are necessarily marginalising Taiwan. In some areas, quite the reverse seems to be the case.

Cultural dimensions: can new media offer ways to overcome conflicting visions of identity?

Technology is certainly inducing change in cross-Strait cultural communications. However, evidence put forward by authors in this volume questions whether such technical developments in the mobile and internet era have yet helped facilitate inter-community trust-building that could act as a major contributor to taking dialogue to the next level. Why might this be the case?

Different explanations are explored by each author, and the research presented here by Fang-Long Shih, Kelvin Cheung and Jens Damm helps to uncover reasons for this continuing trust deficit. On the one hand, there appears to be much about which to be positive. On both sides of the Strait, social media is leading to a growing participation in a broader range of cultural expressions than ever before, in ways that offer potential to overcome state-sponsored firewalls. On the other hand, there remain distinctive, and potentially divisive, differences in viewpoints on each side of the Taiwan Strait, over the construction of a shared identity, over the definition of social and political values that shape each community, and over the prospects for reunification itself. In particular, two aspects of recent cultural

developments stand out as examples which may be exacerbating existing tensions: the first is the evolution of new forms of ‘Taiwanization’ within the island’s community, and the second is the emergence of a distinctly Taiwanese response to the mainland vision of Chinese nationhood.²³

Shih makes clear that there is an underlying paradox which continues to blight cross-strait relations. Whilst technological changes may have prompted a global digital communications revolution elsewhere, relations between the mainland and Taiwan continue to be characterised by what she terms ‘cold’ networks. These networks have promoted a somewhat repetitive ‘circulatory dialogue’, which explores the potential for change under each new leadership transition on either side, but where no genuine ground-breaking transformation is delivered. This conundrum is exacerbated by an absence of any singular view, especially within Taiwan, on what is or is not an acceptable vision of unification or independence. Contested views on Taiwan date back to the era of martial law under the Kuomintang, when discourses over a self-other dichotomy of identity provoked sharp political divisions between different communities on the island.²⁴ Therefore, whilst the concept of what it means to be Taiwanese continues to be in dispute, creating a meaningful coalition of views on whether and how to join with the Chinese of the mainland remains an especially formidable challenge.

In these circumstances, new media is often seized on by different parts of Taiwan’s communities, in order to make distinct points about how they view current political conditions. It is the young who have been particularly empowered by such developments. This is illustrated in Shih’s chapter, which offers a case study of how young people from across Taiwan have seized on and reinterpreted the traditional story of Nazha the Third Prince for the digital and mobile era. In choosing this particular deity as a vehicle to project a message about contemporary Taiwanese society, the online protagonists of today appear to

be drawing a powerful analogy between the unruly young prince defying patriarchal authority and present-day conflicts in relations between Taiwan and mainland China, presenting an important new discourse in the evolution of Taiwan's identity.²⁵

Cheung's analysis develops this theme from a different but no less compelling angle, showing the extent to which 'the cultural and identity gap between mainland China and Taiwan' has yet to be bridged. Drawing on the writings of Lung Ying-tai as an illustration of this cross-Strait divergence, Cheung's analysis offers a fascinating discussion of how the state-centred vision of what it means to be Chinese, put forward by the mainland's Communist government and encapsulated by President Xi's 'China dream', has been robustly challenged by Taiwanese critical thinkers such as Lung.²⁶ Instead of the singular view of China's nation-building project that emphasises blood ties, common historical heritage and language, critical intellectual thinkers articulate a radical values-led alternative of life under a society led by democratically accountable institutions, in a way that directly addresses controversies on the criteria for reunification.

This analysis moves the debates beyond economics and the military capacities of each side, making the central question at issue to be the principles that should underpin the Chinese state. The mainland's reaction to this intellectual ferment has been somewhat predictable. In the case study explored by Cheung, the mainland Chinese authorities ordered the suspension of the means by which many of these ideas were being put forward for discussion across China, in this case by suspending publication of the journal *Freezing Point*, whilst at the same time censoring news of the suspension itself. Such a move, however, was far from successful, and Cheung charts how this one example rapidly morphed from being an issue of press freedom to one that spoke to the heart of the reunification debate in Taiwan and beyond. His research shows how, in an internet-enabled media age, messages that communicate new ideas across communities can transcend politically inspired regulations

and technical firewalls and evade the authority of government elites. This is shown by the extent to which the original articles, as well as associated supportive commentary in microblogs, were actively reposted online to sustain these ideas and project them back into the mainland. Cheung's conclusion remains inherently optimistic, maintaining that new media encounters such as this one could function as an empowering inspiration for individuals on both sides of the cultural divide to bridge the gap that currently exists. But the formidable obstacles that remain to be overcome in order to achieve that end also need to be acknowledged.²⁷

Damm reinforces the significance of these obstacles and offers another critical perspective on the prospects for creating a genuine public sphere between the two communities. Whilst acknowledging how the technological changes in cross-cultural communication that are offered by new media have introduced potential new avenues for progress between some civil society groups, the existence alone of such media is insufficient to fully bridge existing gaps. In his analysis, he counsels against taking too optimistic a view of the prospects for harnessing new technology to enhance trust-building across the Taiwan Strait. This is in no small part due to the growing nationalist edge in Chinese Communist Party-controlled rhetoric on the mainland, which continues to constrain the potential for creating a truly integrated cross-Strait dialogue. The result instead has been what Damm refers to as a 'cyberbalkanization' in the online sphere, where 'insulated groups of like-minded "interest-based communities"...know and care more and more about less and less'.²⁸

The conditions described by Damm illustrate two ongoing trends in cross-Strait cultural dialogue. First, strongly held nationalist sentiments characteristic of much of the discourse from the mainland divide the communities on each side of the Strait, whilst the pervasive media and internet controls mandated by the Chinese Communist Party's propaganda department constrain dissemination of alternative perspectives. Such censorship in itself

hinders debate and collaboration at an individual level. Second, the very nature of the specific media used on each side of the divide differ: The PRC does not just control the flow of ideas but also aims to restrict the software used as vehicles for transmitting such ideas, preventing mainland users from truly sharing their thoughts with others unless all parties to the debate are using specific mainland Chinese media tools. Whilst netizens in Taiwan readily install and use Facebook, Twitter, Google etc., they remain largely distrustful of mainland-hosted variants such as Weibo, where user accounts have been subject to scrutiny and censorship.²⁹

However, not all cross-Strait discussion is ‘balkanized’ in this way. Damm usefully discusses the examples of specific civil society groups that have been rather successful in using internet communication across the Strait. One explanation put forward is that in particular cases, for instance with the Chinese lesbian and gay rights group known as the ‘Lala Alliance’, the predominant means of intra-group communication is via so-called ‘offline networking’ in annual camps or conferences. In such cases the internet and its associated communications media are used predominantly as a convenient means of maintaining links and disseminating information to opted-in subscribers, rather than initiating first contact. Damm concludes that the circumstances of these specialist non-governmental organizations continue to be very different to the evolution of broader cross-community debates that occur predominantly online, and appear to reinforce evidence presented in other chapters of ongoing constraints in the creation of convergence in cross-Strait cultural collaboration where face-to-face contact is not a viable or cost-effective option.³⁰

Conclusion

This book has offered detailed insights on the impact that technological change can have in different dimensions of the relationship between mainland China and Taiwan. Individual chapters have analysed how the adoption of high technology is changing the character of

cross-Strait relations in different ways. In security terms, technology has been a military game changer that offers growing advantage to the PRC whilst posing serious dilemmas in defence strategy for both Taiwan and the United States. By contrast, technologically-induced shifts in the economics of production networks have been shown to actually reinforce Taiwan's advantages in exploiting knowledge-led business leadership in a number of industrial sectors. In cultural terms, however, the potential for harnessing the new media as a means of communication to effect change in thinking is being largely constrained by competing visions of identity. Beijing's continuing determination to control, for political reasons, both the internet's content and the use of utilities to create or view that content, further exacerbates such constraints.

Significant changes in cross-Strait relations have taken place since Ma Ying-jeou came to power, but these may represent just the tip of the policy iceberg – what Goldstein characterised as the easy policies centred on economics.³¹ In a democracy such as Taiwan, public opinion cannot be ignored without political consequences for the party in power, and impending local and presidential elections sharpen the salience of this factor and may make next stage negotiations all the more difficult.³² Formidable challenges remain to be overcome. The shifting position of military capabilities between Taiwan and the mainland may yet be a game changer, but for now, the impact of technology on cross-Strait relations offers a mixed picture.

Perhaps the most compelling conclusion to have been uncovered from each of the works in this volume is that the future of relations between the two communities of the Taiwan Strait is linked not just to the underlying adoption of different technologies, but also to the existence or absence of *trust* between human beings. Beyond military tactics, sophisticated weaponry, the investment strategies of successful firms, and the business dealings of

taishang, it is trust between people that will ultimately shape prospects for a successful future for both the mainland and Taiwan. Trust thus cuts across security, political, cultural and economic factors. It has rightly been touched on highlighted as a key element in many of the analyses put forward in this book, and it presents a particularly difficult issue to overcome in the present state of cross-Strait relations. The problem of trust may be at the foundation of the reasons why a long-term political solution to this unique relationship is so hard to achieve.

¹ Hereinafter referred to as ‘China’s S&T strategy’.

² E. Freund Larus, ‘Technological Change and China’s Naval Modernization: Security Implications for Taiwan’, chapter 3.

³ C. J. Tsai, ‘Do Mainland Chinese Firms Transform towards ‘Indigenous Innovation’? The Paradox of Increasing Economic Integration across the Taiwan Straits’, chapter 5.

⁴ C. A. Cooper, ‘The PLA Navy’s “New Historic Missions”: Expanding Capabilities for a Re-Emergent Maritime Power’, RAND Corporation (2009), 4.

⁵ ‘Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2013’, Office of the Secretary of Defense (2013).

⁶ Larus, chapter 3.

⁷ Ibid.; S. L. Kastner ‘Rethinking the Prospects for Conflict in the Taiwan Strait’, in: M. C. Chu and S. L. Kastner (eds.), *Globalization and Security Relations across the Taiwan Strait: In the Shadow of Power* (Routledge, 2014).

⁸ Larus, chapter 3.

⁹ W. Lowther, 'US Has Concerns over Taiwan's Defense: Report', *Taipei Times* (published online 22 June 2014)

<<http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2014/06/22/2003593394>> accessed 27 Sept. 2014.

¹⁰ Kastner, 'Rethinking the Prospects for Conflict in the Taiwan Strait'.

¹¹ Larus, chapter 3; S. M. Goldstein, 'The State of Cross-Strait Relations in 2013: High Hopes and Low Expectations', chapter 2.

¹² Kastner, 'Rethinking the Prospects for Conflict in the Taiwan Strait'; E. Gartzke, 'The Capitalist Peace', *American Journal of Political Science*, 51/1 (January 2007), 166-191; C. K. Ma, 'Comment on the Pentagon's Annual Report to Congress on Military and Security Development involving the People's Republic of China 2014', *Prospects and Perspectives* (Taiwan Prospect Foundation: 4 Aug. 2014).

¹³ Tsai, chapter 5.

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ J. Knoerich, 'The Role of High Technology in Mainland China's Outward Investment into Taiwan: Economic, Security and Cultural Dimensions, chapter 6.

¹⁶ S. Rigger, 'Taiwanese Business in Mainland China: From Domination to Marginalization?', chapter 4.

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ Knoerich, chapter 6.

²¹ Goldstein, chapter 2.

²² A. D. Romberg, 'Sunshine Heats Up Taiwan Politics, Affects PRC Tactics', *China Leadership Monitor*, No. 44, Hoover Institution (published online 28 July 2014)

<<http://www.hoover.org/research/sunshine-heats-taiwan-politics-affects-prc-tactics>> accessed 24 October 2014, 2.

²³ F. L. Shih, 'From Politics to Culture: Taiwanization Discourses and the Techno Prince Nezha', chapter 8; K. Cheung, 'Bridging the Cultural Gap across the Taiwan Strait: Lung Ying-tai and the Case of the Journal *Freezing Point*', chapter 9; J. Damm, 'Cross-Strait Cyberspace: Between Public Sphere and Nationalist Battleground', chapter 7.

²⁴ Shih, chapter 8.

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ Cheung, chapter 9.

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ Damm, chapter 7.

²⁹ Ibid

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ Goldstein, chapter 2.

³² Romberg, 'Sunshine Heats Up Taiwan Politics, Affects PRC Tactics'.