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What are desires good for? Towards a coherent endorsement theory

Abstract:

Desire-based theories of well-being are often said to accept (G), x is good for a person just in case he wants it, and (B), x is better for a person than y just in case he prefers x to y. I shall argue that (G) and (B) are inconsistent, and this inconsistency resists any plausible refinement of these principles. The inconsistency is brought out by cases in which our wants and preferences for certain life-options are contingent on which life-option we realize. My argument can be generalized to...

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Publication status:
Published

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Authors


Bykvist, K More by this author
Journal:
RATIO
Volume:
19
Issue:
3
Pages:
286-304
Publication date:
2006-09-05
DOI:
EISSN:
1467-9329
ISSN:
0034-0006
URN:
uuid:8db3bc78-f29e-474a-bffd-041191fad74a
Source identifiers:
144509
Local pid:
pubs:144509
Language:
English

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