Introduction

It is no accident that the 1990s, the decade in which postcolonial critical studies began to thrive institutionally in countries across the globe, coincided with a time of massive economic, political and technological trans-nationalism worldwide. The internationalization of literature and literary studies was in many ways a parallel development with, while also being informed by, the international mobility of capital, including the shift of manufacturing industry from the west to contractors in developing countries, and the unprecedented levels of economic migration this occasioned. Postcolonial texts, which typically deal in cross-border situations and multi-layered social languages, offered vocabularies through which to conceptualize these and related changes - such as the globalization of communications technologies. Writers more than ever before, to quote the Caribbean-born, British Caryl Phillips, travel ‘furiously across borders and boundaries’, within a new, almost anarchically fluid world order.

It is a world order which Phillips incidentally sees as ‘post-postcolonial’, his accumulation of ‘post-s’ demonstrating that he is defining it for himself, from beyond what he regards as the (perhaps more immediately or chronologically) postcolonial.\textsuperscript{1} The postcolonial novel, as Salman Rushdie has said, in particular the ‘migrant’s eye’ novel, helps us to see this
world anew, at once from the outside and from within. His determination in writing (in this case) *The Satanic Verses*, Rushdie further, and famously, comments:

> was to create a literary language and literary forms in which the experience of formerly colonized, still-disadvantaged peoples might find full expression. [The novel] is written from the very experience of uprooting, disjuncture and metamorphosis … that is the migrant condition, and from which, I believe, can be derived a metaphor for all humanity.²

The characterization of postcolonial writing and reading as related, whether uncritically or not, to capitalist multi-nationalism, has for some time of course played into the hands of postcolonialism’s influential critics, such as Aijaz Ahmad and Arif Dirlik. Characterizing postcolonial critical discourse in particular as a-historical and universalist, these theorists set it up in effect as collusive with global capital — as virtually co-operating, at worst, with corporate business and western world leaders.³ They suggest that third world fictions and careers in third world fictions present us with the old scenario of the centre empowering a comprador non-western elite at the expense of the true inhabitants of the margin, or importing spectacles of ‘otherworldly’ pain for its particular edification. As Timothy Brennan suggests, cosmopolitanism, which arguably embraces current postcolonial perspectives and readings, equates with a ‘specious mastery of the whole’: it is branded for the first world.⁴ Such views have fed into the disillusioned postcolonialism of a critic like Graham Huggan, who argues that the marketing of postcolonial fiction promotes nothing less than a literary tourism.⁵ Extravagantly plotted, lushly written, the canonical postcolonial book whether by Rushdie, Ben Okri or Arundhati Roy, at once offers a commodification of the exotic, and has itself become an exotic commodity.

The criticisms of Dirlik *et al* are important and in many ways valid. With that acknowledged, however, it must also be recognized that the reading of postcolonial books
need not consist only in a fetishism of the exotic, or a commodified cross-border armchair travel comfortably positioned in the west. Like postcolonial novels, poems and plays themselves, criticism, wherever located, ideally represents a serious attempt to comprehend the textualized dimensions (at least) of an expanded post- or neo-colonial world. What is involved at base is a politics of engaging with the historical consequences of colonialism, which is closely bound up with a politics of reading otherwise. Even if only in theory, postcolonial critique draws on anti-colonial strategies of resistance, on established intellectual traditions of crosscutting authoritative meaning. These extend back across the twentieth century, as I will later show, and, since the 1960s, have unfolded in historical parallel with developments in women’s and gender studies. Many postcolonial readers and critics today would probably at least still identify with, even if they do not actively work within, such politics. They would probably agree with the African American critic bell hooks when she writes that cultural criticism is necessarily linked with a desire for social change.

Postcolonial critiques therefore may present as acts of readerly radicalism, yet (to turn the situation around again) such acts are even so wired up and networked with the globalized world – via the publishing market, sponsorship of institutions, the internet, etc. - in ways that may admittedly both encourage and stymie radicalism. In Douglas Coupland’s All Families are Psychotic, a portrait of American domestic life at the end of the twentieth century, the middle-class housewife and PWA Janet observes that the Web ‘makes her feel connected in a way that TV [in the 1950s] never did’. (In her case however, indicatively, this sense of connectedness alone does not help resolve her health problems or disagreements within her family.) We are everywhere drawn into, perforce bombarded by, to quote Caryl Phillips again, a new ‘global conversational babble’, where it may happen, as he narrates, that Nigerian hotel workers console black British writers about the death of ‘their’ Princess Diana.
within hours of the Paris accident in 1997. As the past master of global networking Bill Clinton once appropriately acknowledged: ‘We live in a world where we have torn down walls, collapsed distances and spread information’. Indeed, when he became president in January 1993, there were only 50 sites on the World Wide Web; when he left office eight years later there were 350m.

To offer a symptomatic characterization, if not necessarily to state anything completely new: a transnational – or is it post-postcolonial? - flow of capital and information, commodities and labour thus defines twenty-first-century western societies. In Naomi Klein’s influential if here somewhat upbeat description, a ‘web of fabrics, shoelaces, franchises, teddy bears and brand names wrap[s] around the planet’ - a web for which the internet is at once of course electronic engine, potential watchdog, and metaphor. Yet the underside of this web, as Klein has noted, and as the 2002 Earth Summit in Johannesburg again showed, is the corporate abuse of workers and consumers, and the continuing, and intensified, exploitation of the non-west. To the new gurus of our post 9/11 reality Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, the world has willy-nilly been subsumed into an entirely new decentred and deterritorialized form of global sovereignty, ‘Empire’, which is to be distinguished from the nation-based imperialism of the past. ‘Empire manages hybrid identities, flexible hierarchies, and plural exchanges through modulating networks of command’. Empire of this sort is all-consuming, all-inclusive, everywhere, sustaining itself by ceaselessly staging, policing and commodifying forms of dissent – including, presumably, postcolonial critique itself.

As Hardt and Negri imply, what is particularly alarming about the new ‘Empire’ is that it may not be possible fully to represent it to ourselves in order to engage with it; society and consciousness are interpenetrated by its diffuse power. And if we are unable to engage with it intellectually, what becomes of the politics of reading - reading for social change? As
the world is networked like never before, such agency as we might exercise is always already part of a far wider field of electronically powered, deregulated force. The immaterial nexuses of communications, as Hardt and Negri write, both express and organize the movement of globalization. They create subjectivities, generate and distribute meaning, and, by their very operation, legitimate the working of the whole.

Dense interconnection, therefore; and inevitable co-optation and collusion. And yet, to ask an intentionally traditional question, was it not so to some considerable extent before? The world of British Empire one hundred years ago, too, was wired like never before – at that time by telegraph cables, and, more metaphorically, by railway networks and steamship travel. Moreover, British and colonial subjects at the time imagined themselves in this way, as interconnected, cross-cabled, while many of their activities and aspirations were informed by the existence of cross-empire networks. The world order may not have been as saturated with communications nexuses as now, but, significantly, looking from the point of view of then, it was saturated as never before. On the occasion of her Diamond Jubilee in 1897 Queen Victoria was able to send a message of greeting to her four hundred million subjects (one-third of the world’s population) which was relayed across the globe in a number of hours. As regards authority, if we confine ourselves only to the operations of British international power, Empire then used drastic, often indiscriminate force against dissent. Agency, too, whether on the side of authority or resistance, was always already subsumed into some far wider network of command.

One way of getting a conceptual grip on our ‘new’ world order and, moreover, of exploring the dimensions of resistance to it, therefore, may be by historicizing some of its key features: its rhizomic capital flows, its ‘spaghetti’ organizations, its comparatively easy international travel. What this essay wants to ask, essentially, is whether colonial
interconnections, and colonial and anti-colonial texts marking those interconnections, can be read in such a way as to give us a critical comparative - and also postcolonial - purchase on globalized realities now. Looking at the global in an elongated historical vista, this essay therefore joins the critical ‘discourse about the postcolonial’ but does so not by questioning ‘its conceptual framework [or] its institutional locale’ (as have some of the critics mentioned above)\(^{14}\) - but by first exploring and interrogating its conventional historical time-frame. It seeks to investigate therefore that ameliorative chronology which extends from the era of Great Nations imperialism, leads up to a liberationist phase in which the small nation is triumphant, and ends in an entirely new, unprecedented phase of economic globalization. In place of this I will posit a more expanded phase of incremental but ever more extended and ramified globalization which takes in most of the twentieth century. This concept of a historized global I believe holds out important implications for our understanding of the postcolonial today, and in particular of the possibilities of politicizing the postcolonial, including postcolonial readings, for the new twenty-first century.

The historical framework of the essay has taken a century’s span because it was around one hundred years ago that Empire reached its widest, most ‘globalized’ extent ever.\(^{15}\) From the latter part of the nineteenth century until 1914 imperial trade was free and unfettered as never before, and as never since, until the mid-1990s.\(^{16}\) One hundred years ago, thousands of African males in the southern African sub-continent, and indentured Asians worldwide, both Indians and Chinese, had already become what we now call migrant workers, and were directly and indirectly implicated as such in imperial relations. (In all likelihood they did not however feel globalized, much as migrant workers and asylum seekers today have little reason for feeling so.) By 1900, just over one hundred years ago, with the laying of the cross-Pacific
cable between Australia and Canada, the imperial communications network in fact went global. This cable was the farthest extension of a web that had begun to weave itself from the 1850s, with the overhead telegraph cabling of London, and the laying of several trans-Atlantic cables in the 1860s. In 1864 Bombay and London had been linked, the first instance of a cable being a lasting success, and from 1868 the Caribbean was woven into the wider network.

About one hundred years ago, too, Britain was involved in the ferocious end game of the Anglo-Boer War which in many ways was the precursor of the world wars to come. At a time of British-manufactured crisis in the Transvaal, an international defence was rallied, in the sense of involving colonial troops from India as well as Australia and Canada, as Kipling recorded in ‘A Sahib’s War’, against what rapidly became an internationalized opposition. As an anonymous Liberal pamphleteer prophetically commented, in ways not unreminiscent of Hardt and Negri, Empire at this time was expanding rapidly and ‘unreasoningly’ through the channels or networks of violence, war, and a pernicious and ubiquitous jingoism. By way of setting up a metaphorical underpinning for this essay, it is possible therefore to see the transnational networks of circa 1900 as almost literally overlaid by those of today. So engineers laying fibre optic cables along the streets of London or New York are reported to find as they dig down the pneumatic tubes along which telegrams were sent about a hundred years ago. Communication networks have thus traditionally always piggy-backed on an older communications infrastructure, ‘where a right of way has already been established’.

**Ages of Empire**

A 2001 characterization of the postcolonial present by John and Jean Comaroff will help to establish some of the key issues grounding the century-long comparative framework that this
essay posits. The Comaroffs observe that the ‘post-independence’ age has moved through two epochal phases, the first extending from 1947, the year of Indian independence, to 1989. It is the second post-1989 (post-postcolonial?) phase, they suggest, that has involved the morphing of the old system of sovereign nation states into

a more market-driven, electronically articulated universe: a universe in which supranational institutions burgeon, in which space and time are radically recalibrated; in which geography is perforce being rewritten, in which transnational identities, diasporic connections, ecological disasters, and the mobility of human populations challenge both the nature of sovereignty and the sovereignty of nature; in which ‘the network’ returns as the dominant metaphor of social connectedness.

But returns from where? – we might interrupt to ask. From a pastoral, pre-industrial world? Or from somewhere more familiar? Their admission of return represents a significant slash cutting through the Comaroffs’ picture of overwhelming newness. How new is all this in fact? What of the ‘more market-driven’ universe? To the West African traveller (and late Cobdenite) Mary Kingsley in the 1890s the world was agreeably market- and trade-driven and should become even more so: free trade, she believed, was a leveling force amongst the races. And how about recalibrated time and space? Late Victorian popular and occasional verse is dotted with elated cries from telegraph fans celebrating how the trans-Atlantic and other cables shrink space and compress time.

For Daniel West in The Atlantic Cable (1860), for example, the new cable network like the Web today allows a thrilling near-simultaneity of international communication: ‘Heart throbs with heart, and thought to thought replies;/ Instant response each present want supplies’. He was not merely overexcited: a message from Jamaica that in 1870 took three weeks to reach London, by the 1890s in fact took less than a day. As West continues, ‘To the remotest parts of Earth, Word shall fly, ere Time has birth’. Kipling, hymning the telegraph cable and English colonial brotherhood some decades later, in ‘The Deep-Sea
Cables’ (part of the poem series, ‘A Song of the English’), adds his own excitement and a deeper metaphoric texture to West’s enthusiasm:

They have wakened the timeless Things; they have killed their father Time;  
Joining hands in the gloom, a league from the last of the sun.  
Hush! Men talk today o’er the waste of the ultimate slime  
And a new Word runs between: whispering, “Let us be one!”

True, electr(on)ic cable linkups and commodity movements then may have been more state-regulated than they are today. Yet, due to the effects of colonial expansion, when it came to colonial spaces, state power was dispersed in some of the ways that the Comaroffs attach to the present-day. Then as now, systems of rule were articulated horizontally, as Hardt and Negri describe (for example, through chartered companies), and war, that is, skirmishes with ‘natives’, often generated out of boundary anxieties, were carried out and justified as police action. Then as now, capital, commodities, and communications moved easily across borders: Dadabhai Naoroji’s and R. C. Dutt’s late nineteenth-century thesis of the drain of wealth from India to Britain criticized precisely this.

Along with such intensely modern disintegrations also came, then as now, the refiguration of identities due to migration, travel, and the intermingling of communities which thus ensued (my terms continue to derive from the Comaroffs’ characterization). Moreover, around 1900, much like today, cross-border or cross-cultural connections appeared to blur but rarely transcended enormous inequalities of wealth and power. In 1900, like today, the seemingly democratic spread of communications networks was also geographically uneven. The internet now like the old cable network then is perceived as being everywhere at once, but in reality is concentrated in urbanized areas. Although by citing him I would not want to endorse his enthusiastic, polemical belief in a deregulated market, the economic historian
Harold James nonetheless offers a neat summary of the situation for the sake of clarifying the exposition here:

What is now referred to as globalization is simply a belated and interrupted continuation of a process which swept the world [a century ago]… The years before 1914 saw a free international movement of capital (the proportion of British capital invested overseas was roughly what it is now) and increasing ease in the movement of goods. There was even an information revolution: the transatlantic cable radically … integrated new markets. 30

In the following sections of the essay, in order to explicate more fully this proposed globalization-as-it-was-then, three representative instances of cross-continental or globalized contact circa 1900 will be examined, as well as the political, cultural and metaphoric exchanges if any constituted through them. The examples will therefore offer a closer look at the material, political and interpersonal make-up of the pre-1914 world’s international networks – networks created through contacts between imperial and native colonial elites, which were themselves facilitated by the cross-hatched, cable-linked communication, military and administrative grids of the empire. Importantly, too, subsisting within these networks, and imaginatively reinforcing them, there were the nets or ‘webs of language’, intertextual webs of common metaphors and shared images, including the webs of interrelationship with which both fictional and non-fictional writings self-consciously themselves registered the operations of the imperial networks.

So it is worth noting that both imperial and colonial nationalist élites at this time self-represented via predominantly familial and nexus images, as at once extended families and/or brotherhoods. As for the vast, layered system of shared and restlessly mobile signs which constituted the Empire itself, this was unsurprisingly often conceived of using metaphors of filiation and circulation. In Kipling’s work, which might be said to feature more than an
everyday share of railway journeys, telegraphs, wireless, and spy networks (and indeed he was one of Britain’s first car-owning writers), the Raj is famously described as a Great Knowability. British India comprised for Kipling what was in effect an intertextuality, a massive system of knowledge-production, -gathering and -exchange, as is clearly seen in *Kim*.

Yet the detective stories of Conan Doyle, too, vividly dramatize the diffused operations of intelligence and power in a globalized society as seemingly disparate phenomena are reliably strung together by means of the ‘webs’ of Holmes’s crime-solving analyses.

As regards the postcolonial texts which formed the original subject of this discussion, a pressing question which will again be posed towards the end of the essay is whether, when compared with the ‘networked’ writings of *circa* 1900, present-day texts and readings offer comparable levels of critical diagnosis. Do globally intertextual postcolonial texts help us to unravel the operations of neocolonial power and resistance now? Or do readers and critics perhaps need to contextualize more critically and creatively, in terms of a more diversified and recalcitrant postcoloniality, when explicating such texts?

As the foregoing suggested, an important element of the networked empire is that cross-continental contacts, although dominated by European power, were not exclusive to colonials or imperialists. Nationalist anti-colonialism in several cases demonstrated an elaborated international dimension. Middle-class, western-educated native élites drew inspiration, example, and the strength of solidarity from other privileged and yet oppressed groups, whether in Calcutta or Kimberley, like themselves. They bought into, and built onto, existing modern systems of cultural and political interaction but in order to achieve very different goals: self-representation, a platform for protest, the remaking of tradition – that is, a lived, politicized intertextuality with their nationalist ‘brothers’ elsewhere.
Imperial brotherhood

In Cape Town in 1900, fresh from his exploits as hero of the Boer War siege of Mafeking, Robert Baden-Powell, soon-to-be Founder of the Boy Scout Movement, was offered rest and recuperation at the residence of Cecil John Rhodes, mining magnate and empire-builder. ‘B-P’ had first encountered Rhodes when he was assisting with the ‘pacification’ of the Matabele in 1896, and had met him again on board ship to London in 1897. At Groote Schuur in 1900 B-P is on record for having spent some of his leisure time practising animal cries. These noises anticipated the animal calls he would introduce to the Boy Scouts, and later, in 1916, the Cubs, as identification markers for patrols, calls that he modelled on the howls and cries of Kipling’s *Jungle Books* (1896-7).

Kipling himself of course was not far out of this picture. A close friend of Rhodes since 1896, he would within months become Rhodes’s neighbour, in a house, the Woolsack, Rhodes himself had Herbert Baker build, and would there help Rhodes, a famously inarticulate man, give shape to his imperial ideas. Kipling spent the English winters in Cape Town with his family until 1910, years after Rhodes’s death, believing that it remained his duty to oversee the outcomes of his imperial schemes.

To complete this relationship triangle, Baden-Powell, who probably first met Kipling in Lahore in the early 1880s, became a regular house guest at the Woolsack in 1901 and may there have discussed with him the development of civilian scouting. The two men never quite lost touch again, although Kipling would always admire scouting in a one-sided way, as military preparedness training. As for B-P’s scouting schemes and texts, these would be scored across by Kipling’s ideas and images, of the Law, of secret brotherhoods, of fending for yourself.
What were the feelings and beliefs in common that drew these three men together? What were the networks operating through them? Firstly, most obviously, as well as being themselves well networked, they jointly believed in the development of the ‘Empire across the seas’. The spread of Anglo-Saxon civilization across the world, they felt, was beneficial for all colonial and subject peoples, including the ‘soft’ English themselves. Secondly, their mutual intimacy was, without a doubt, founded on their appreciation of ‘boy men’ (to use B-P’s phrase for Scout instructors), an appreciation which can be seen as one of the motor forces of the British Empire. In the cases of Rhodes and Baden-Powell, as is increasingly widely discussed, this appreciation had repressed queer or homoerotic qualities.

Thirdly, here reasons one and two intersect, all three cherished the motivating ideal of colonial brotherhood, the growth of constructive relations between peoples of British descent. As part of this ideal, the three also shared a strong sense of the imaginative and heroic possibilities of the Empire. Kipling’s Indian stories of colonial resilience under pressure find an echo in some of Rhodes’s exploits, and Baden-Powell, whose own story in Mafeking rested on fantasy and self-invention, exploited in his writing for boys the Empire’s potential for hosting heroic fantasies.

Expanding on the ideal of Anglo-Saxon alliance, a short time after Rhodes’s death, the Rhodes Scholarships endowed by the mining magnate were established. And a mere four years later Baden-Powell organized the first experimental Boy Scout camp at Brownsea Island in Poole Harbour. Both Rhodes and B-P evidently believed that networks based on shared beliefs in service and masculine Anglo-Saxon superiority would facilitate Britannia’s global rule and withstand decline. Significantly, men who were well networked across the Empire, established and promoted networks to perpetuate the Empire (while Kipling emblematized them in his writing). Lest the focus on personalities obscure the fact: imperial
networks were, in a sense, both operating through and constituting these men as imperial agents.

The nexus that is Kipling, Rhodes, B-P, can thus be viewed as an image of the interconnected imperial world and the circuits through which it operated. It illustrates how global networks depended on the movement of people and ideas as well as commodities and capital. As can be seen from the way in which the three kept bumping into one another, the entire empire formed a loose administrative, commercial, and military circuit of exchange reinforced by networks of interpersonal linkages. And these linkages in turn rested on old-school tie loyalties, clubland fraternities, and, in some cases, Freemasonry and the Theosophical Society, and were confirmed by shipboard journeys in one another’s company. Hob-nobbing together in the great houses of London, in hotels on the Imperial Grand Tour, or Government House tea parties, it was small wonder that the globally-stretched, imperial elite experienced itself and the world as globalized.

But the sheer tightness of the Kipling-BP-Rhodes triangle also speaks eloquently of the imaginative power of the beliefs that sustained those networks, which were beliefs in interconnection, in strategic brotherhood. All three had been directly or indirectly inspired by John Ruskin’s call in his Inaugural lecture at Oxford for England to ‘found colonies … formed of her most energetic and worthiest men’. All three subscribed to the idea of an interconnected Anglo-Saxon global diaspora or brotherhood. This vast network would, it was hoped, through its shared language and social institutions, form an integrated entity for military and economic purposes, where power, in the terms of Hardt and Negri, would be both unitary and dispersed. Imperial brotherhood, or, in its political incarnation, imperial federation, an exclusive white network backed by tariff reform, stimulated an outpouring of urgent enthusiasm from its supporters which repeatedly crystallized in images of
interconnection, as in these lines of Henry Newbolt quoted in Baden-Powell’s *Scouting for Boys*:

Unite the Empire; make it stand compact,
Shoulder to shoulder let its members feel
The touch of British brotherhood, and act
As one great nation – strong and true as steel.43

**London 1900**

The second representative instance of imperial networking is dated 23 July 1900, and set in Westminster Town Hall, London. Here delegates from the U.S.A. and four African countries, including the Gold Coast and Sierra Leone, as well as ten West Indian representatives, came together to hold the world’s first Pan-African Conference.44 The Second Congress would be held at Versailles, in 1919, to plead for African self-determination. Delegates at the 1900 conference did not rock the boat to that extent, calling rather for equal rights for Africans under the crown. It was the Congress proclamation, therefore, which formed its most rousing utterance, in which the rhetoric of the African American W. E. B. Du Bois can be clearly distinguished, announcing that ‘problem of the twentieth century is the problem of the colour line’, and condemning European imperialism. Concluding by urging black people to take heart from Africa’s past history, the proclamation also, significantly, invites them to embrace their membership of the ‘great brotherhood of mankind [my emphasis]’.45

The First Pan-African Congress is central to the picture of a globalized world one hundred years ago because its make-up and focus were international from its very inception. It was organized by the London-based African Association (established in 1897) piloted by the Trinidadian Henry Sylvester Williams, which brought together a number of Africans from across the Diaspora. More broadly speaking, it was made possible by the existence of a cross-
national network of intellectuals, activists and evangelists located in Britain, America, and the Caribbean during this period. Its politics was also intricately interlaced with other contemporary forms of anti-imperial agitation, and as such it was a product of cosmopolitan London. For example, it borrowed some of its lobbying tactics from the British Committee of the Indian National Congress (est. 1889), the offices of which were located in the same building as its own. Like the BCINC it looked forward to an independent political life for colonized people, yet one that would emerge within the framework of the Empire.

Cosmopolitan as it was, however, the London location should not tempt one into thinking that such cross-nationalist contacts were exclusive to the metropolis, far from it. As already suggested, between colonial spaces within the British Empire, and between this Empire and other colonized places, anti-colonialists and nationalists borrowed, adapted and exchanged ideas of self-realization and strategies of resistance. Swadeshi ideas in Bengal, for example, developed in partial conjunction with the Irish formation of Sinn Fein. So it happened that anti-colonial networks linking London with Calcutta, or Johannesburg with Dublin, were already creating in and around 1900 a subversive syncretism of cultural and political ideas – something that we might now term characteristically postcolonial. Activists, nationalist intellectuals, and writers were marrying notions of home rule and self-help (notions that were themselves therefore at once home-grown and imported). They were juxtaposing, collage-like, celebrations of inter-racial harmony with assertions of race pride. They saw that both actual and rhetorical handholding with other nationalist élites could be of practical mutual benefit.

There are many fascinating aspects to this scenario of what might be termed a constellated – as opposed to an atomized - anti-colonialism. To select only two: it is noteworthy that such cross-nationalist interrelations adapted for their own uses the colonial
communications networks traced earlier. Anti-colonial élites interacted with one another through borrowing and swapping, for example, radical newspapers, in particular those with already diasporic readerships such as the *Gaelic American*. As Paul Gilroy points out in relation to the Black Atlantic, but it is an observation that applies far more widely, the steamship also encouraged creative, intensely modern, transnational exchanges. A significant number of the early twentieth century’s important anti-colonial texts – Sister Nivedita’s *Kali, the Mother* (1900), Gandhi’s *Hind Swaraj* (1909), Plaatje’s *Native Life* (1916) - were written on board ship, usually on political missions to and from London.

The second aspect worth highlighting is the fact that anti-colonial, nationalist networks, too, were animated and reinforced by ideals of brotherhood. As with the imperialists, such ideals were, paradoxically, often bound up with the inspiration of Ruskin, though the Ruskin of *Unto this Last* rather than the Inaugural Lecture. Naoroji, Gandhi, and Annie Besant at different times added impact to their political demands by pointed reference to the imperial citizenship promised Indians by Queen Victoria’s Proclamation of 1858. They spoke of loyalty to the crown in terms that suggest underlying images of the Empire as a great family. Naoroji held membership of London’s Society for the Recognition of the Brotherhood of Man. Besant, President of the Indian National Congress in 1917, saw her ideal commonwealth of nations as an expansion of an idealized Britain into the far corners of the world. The Irish-born Bengali activist Margaret Noble or Sister Nivedita, also a reader of Ruskin, was politicized from around 1897 by her guru’s idea of the world unity or brotherhood of religions. The African nationalist Solomon Plaatje, like Gandhi a reader of Ruskin, became during his time in London in the 1910s a member of the Interdenominational Brotherhood movement. ‘There was a great resemblance between Brotherhood and Empire’, he wrote. As with the imperialists, what drew many of the anti-imperialists of this time to
ideas of fraternal interconnection was an underlying faith in empire as furnishing the basis for
a commonwealth of nations within which self-determination could take place.50

A rich miscellany of examples from across the colonial world could be cited to
demonstrate the diversity and depth of anticolonialist cross-border contacts. The Bengali
élite, for example, was reading Mazzini, Kropotkin and Mill during its radical period of 1902-
10. In her fiery Kali, the Mother Nivedita intersected Russian anarchist theory with militant
Hinduism. Gandhi in an editorial for Indian Opinion of September 1907 recommended the
Sinn Fein strategy of passive resistance for India. Aurobindo Ghose, also writing in 1907,
drew Bengalis’ attention to the military and political self-determination of Japan. For all such
figures drawing inspiration from like-minded contexts elsewhere, the world looked, as it did
to the imperialists, globally cross-connected.51 A dramatic point of intersection between the
imperial and anti-imperial networks outlined here, demonstrates the extent to which this was
so.

In 1921 in India, the radical feminist and Theosophist Annie Besant, leader of the
Home Rule tendency in the Indian National Congress, made the Scouting oath of loyalty
before Baden-Powell himself at a huge rally in Madras.52 She took this step in order to give
her sanction to the Indian Boy Scouts’ incorporation into the worldwide movement. Her
dress was appropriate to the occasion: green turban, purple scarf, and a khaki-coloured sari
with emerald borders (Scouting colours – which were also of course subversively suggestive
of the Suffragette Movement). By way of this gesture, therefore, Besant performatively
intercut, or even chiastically collided, several fraternities, that of Theosophy, that of the
Scouting Movement, and, arguably, that of Congress also. Apparently overriding her own
gender identity, at least in the eyes of the majority of her audience, she demonstrated
momentarily the fragile, though always compromising, perfection of the ideal of international brotherhood.

**Kim’s networks**

The third representative scene is drawn from the great arterial system of communication links running across northern India that Kipling unfolds for us almost from the first page of *Kim* (1901), his extraordinary study of the workings of the imperial machine. To adapt again the words of Hardt and Negri, Kipling demonstrates in *Kim* that the successful Empire must fully express, organize and even justify itself through an extensive, deeply integrated communications network. The communications grid of Empire produces and sustains ‘its own [widely ramified] image of authority’.

In *Kim* the system famously comprises, primarily, the huge railway grid with the dipping and rising telegraph wires running alongside it that so alarm the Lama, as well as the Grand Trunk Road. Both are threaded through with thousands upon thousands of daily journeys, and traversed by letters, spoken messages, and pilgrimages. But these great intersecting networks are themselves again criss-crossed by rivers great and small, one of which is theoretically the Lama’s own holy River. At every point of crossing on this vast grid different peoples, languages and religions are brought into contact: the ‘babble’ of India breaks out again and again (p. 80).

The railway most recently, but also the Grand Trunk Road, are both definitively pictured in the novel as creations of the Raj. *Kim* gives us an Indian reality that is penetrated through and through by an imperial power which is gangliar and all-enveloping, unitary and yet diffuse. But, as Kipling convincingly dramatizes in the many scenes of conversation on rail and Road, the imperial communications grid has at the same time been thoroughly
Indianized. The unworldly lama, significantly, is said to talk at ‘railway speed’ when
inspired. A British construction interpenetrates, yet is itself fully interpenetrated by, the
surrounding Indian reality.

Kim the carrier of message is of course at home within both Raj system and Indian
reality in the manner of a true native: although of Irish parentage, he is indeed native-born,
and speaks or understands several of the northern vernaculars. He has also, we are told, spent
much of his toddlerhood riding trains with his father (p 1). The Grand Trunk Road, ‘the
backbone of all Hind’ (p. 105), is less familiar terrain, but this, too, he approaches with his
habitual curious self-confidence. Though the novel’s most detailed descriptions of the Road
are authorial, its decodings can be read as the boy’s (‘Kim knew that walk well’ (p. 109)).
Within a day of travel along the Road not only is Kim pictured as delighting in seeing all
India spread out around him (p 111), but as imaginatively in command of it. ‘India was
awake, and Kim was in the middle of it, more awake and more excited than anyone (p 121).

Not long after setting out on his journey with the lama Kim is enlisted for training in
the Indian Secret Service, another network, though an underground one, which has perceived
how his many talents might be put to good use. The Friend of all the World becomes the all-
seeing but invisible eye of all the world. Like a true Boy Scout, for whom he was a primary
model – Sherlock Holmes was another – all information, all observation is useful to Kim, and
may be worked into an understanding of the plots against the colonial state. Kim the spy, at
once British yet not British, the child with an adult’s understanding, thus becomes at once the
agent and the embodiment of the power that controls, and ramifies through India, and
perpetuates itself by means of that control and those ramifying networks.

But *Kim* as text is not unique in paying attention to the networks of colonial control, or
in demonstrating how texts themselves are caught up within and express such networks. The
Edwardian imperialist collage text, *Scouting for Boys* (1908), compiled in parts out of fragments torn from Conan Doyle and Fenimore Cooper, is in a sense also interpenetrated by the centred yet decentring forces of Empire. (In this it pre-empted *The Waste Land* by over a decade.) Its fragmentariness, its multifarious borrowings, and prepackaged advice, as well as its praise for a dispersed British brotherhood, conceptualized the giddingly diversified world of Empire even as it registered its anxieties. Yet, interestingly, to pick a very different kind of text, Plaatje’s work of anticolonial protest, *Native Life in South Africa*, too, is a fragmented collage text, juxtaposing rural scene-painting with songs in different languages and subtly extracted quotations from newspapers. As was Plaatje’s intention, *Native Life* manages to address not only different audiences, at home and abroad, but also the different interpenetrating levels of imperial power, in London and in Pretoria.

**Conclusion**

What might the parallels between the globalized world then and now then be construed as telling us? What does the historized global add to our understanding of the postcolonial? And, conversely, does the postcolonial in its expanded and more mobile historical dimension have anything to tell us about resistances, in particular readerly resistances, to the global today? (At this stage my responses to these questions will necessarily be notational: I register them however as having important implications for some of the central critical paradigms within the postcolonial studies field.)

To see empire as globalizing in its effects right the way across the twentieth century is first of all to draw attention not merely to the ramifications of imperial power, but to the exemplary resistances which were always-already operating within its grids, appropriating and subverting their transnational forms of operation. So, even while empire’s networks
ceaselessly worked simultaneously to disperse and regroup imperial power, at the same time those networks were riddled with interstices of resistance made possible precisely by the networks’ own ramifying structures, and by the willingness of native élites seemingly to cooperate with them. That the Bengal Resistance of 1905-8 cited at once Irish Sinn Fein and the British Victorian virtue of self-help in developing its strategies of self-reliance, eloquently demonstrates how the manipulation of networks might be at once compliant and yet rebellious. Borrowed ideas of self-help were used to generate new resistant selves. Under ‘Empire’, as has been seen, resistance is reduced to a corroborative function of a restlessly unravelling yet reconsolidating power. However native appropriations under empire in the past suggest that even so interconnected ‘cells’ of opposition cannot always be successfully circumscribed – especially those that structurally appear fully co-operative with its networks of control.

Secondly, looking at the global in a deeper historical perspective suggests that the national narrative with its onwards-and-upwards chronology of ever greater self-realization on which much postcolonial criticism has been predicated, needs to be radically modified. The era of post-colonial national independence 1947 to around 1989, instead of being a point of culmination, in this view appears as a historically aberrant period, or at least a digression from the increasingly more globalized phase in which we again find ourselves. In this interpretation, postcolonial nationalism manifests as a deeply compromised product of transnational political and economic exchange (and so as intensively modern), rather than as, say, cultural self-expression ‘from within’ (or as tradition). As a further consequence of this historical reassessment, the conflictual or polar models on which postcolonial theory has tended to rely, that is, of nation v empire, and even of history v discourse, too, need to be thoroughly reassessed.
Finally, as has been implied all along, the concept of an always already complicit, yet always opportunist resistance, complicates many of the paradigms through which postcolonial and especially migrant texts have conventionally been read – in particular that of hybridity. In order to revise such paradigms it is instructive to consider as has been done here both the connectivity and the collusions of postcolonial writings: to explore how, for example, the postcolonial novel at once participates in and critically reflects on the global world, the uneven spread of its networks of authority, as well as the modes of survival and making do that are possible within it.55

Any number of postcolonial texts may be cited which point the way towards such a critical reassessment of postcolonialism’s central interpretative metaphors. (My examples here are relatively random.) Think for example of the weird (always advancing, always repeated) currents of goods flowing through the markets in Ben Okri’s *The Famished Road*, managed by sinister compound chiefs who answer to no visible master. Or of the unpredictable emotional disturbances caused by illegal migration in Gordimer’s *The Pick-up*, Edward Said’s book of 2001. Then there are also the non-western, ‘discrepant’ cosmopolitanisms of Amitav Ghosh’s *In an Antique Land*, or the highly compromised educational pilgrimages in Manju Kapur’s *Difficult Daughters*: both texts trace incomplete, unresolved, and often painful trans-cultural pathways.56 Criticism has perhaps to catch up with the dimensions of pain, compromise and recalcitrance mapped in these writings. In so doing it may be possible to reawaken, in Kwame Appiah’s phrase, the instructive ‘pessimism of the postcolonial’.57

This revisionary article interrogates the commonly held assumption that the world has never been as globally interlinked as it is at present. By looking at a variety of global linkups - transnational friendships, cross-border collaborations, intercontinental communication networks, cross-cultural exchanges – the essay will paint a
picture of the British Empire around and about 1900 as an intensively interconnected and networked system, indeed as globalized. This globalized system was represented in the writing of the time – both imperial and anti-imperial - as a nexus, a family, and a brotherhood, as a vast system of shared and circulating signs. With this in mind, the essay also asks what an expanded and historicized view of the global adds to our understanding of the postcolonial now – especially of its central interpretative metaphors of hybridity and reading for resistance.

Notes

6 See the first chapter of Robert Young, *Postcolonialism: An Historical Introduction*, Oxford: Blackwell, 2001, pp 1-11, which represents an overt change of ideological focus within his own work.
10 Peter Preston, ‘All Domestic Policy Now has an International Dimension’, *The Guardian*, 7 January 2002, p 16, goes on to quote Tony Blair: ‘there’s no “domestic” policy now – against terrorism, for a buoyant economy, for health, education or racial harmony - that doesn’t have a foreign dimension’.
13 This may in fact be a fundamental difference between Empire now and then (c. say 1900): disciplinary control has been completely supplanted by a society of control, by biopower. See Hardt and Negri, *Empire*, pp 23-4.
15 It is of course possible to extrapolate forms of ‘globalization’ far further back. A.G. Hopkins, ed., *Globalization in World History*, London: Pimlico, 2002, for example, provides a history of the world’s increasing interconnectedness from 1600.
26 Hardt and Negri, *Empire*, pp 13-17.
29 A fairly obvious point, but see Klein, *No Logo*, p xvii in support.
37 For Kipling’s meditations on this ideal, see ‘The Native Born’ and ‘A Song of the White Men’, *Verses*, pp 192, 282.
38 Of course many other interpersonal networks of the time can be traced: consider only the Macaulay-Trevelyan genealogy, or the network of colonial government officials but in place by Benjamin Jowett, Master of Balliol, from the 1880s.
39 See S. B. Cook, *Imperial Affinities*, New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1993. When in January 1897 BP shared a ship with Rhodes, Olive Schreiner, admired by Kipling, too, was on board. Rhodes was to face questions from a House of Commons Select Committee concerning his part in the Jameson Raid. Schreiner was to seek publication of *Trooper Peter*, her parable indictment of Rhodes’s imperial policies in South Africa. She did not speak to either man.
40 The experience of deep interconnection may have been partly exclusive to an elite, but this was not consistently the case. Within the free trade British empire economies were globalized, and those who participated in these, wherever located, experienced the world to some extent as globalized. Moreover, British army regulars were regularly sent abroad to fight colonial wars, and colonial immigration schemes gave many a literally once-in-a-lifetime experience of ‘seeing the world’. It was an imperial world moreover which was repeatedly involved in staging and displaying its global reach – to its admirers and enemies, but primarily to itself, in Colonial Exhibitions, in Jubilee celebrations.


Such transnational and anti-colonial contacts have continued into the present. Here one thinks of Pan-Islamic networks, Pan-African calls for reparations for slavery, or for the crime against humanity of apartheid, and the Provisional IRA’s links with Colombia’s dissident rebels (*Observer*, 19 August 2001, pp 12-13) as well as, less controversially, Sinn Fein’s friendship with the ANC. See Gerry Adams’s speech requesting IRA disarmament, ‘Our Aim is to Save the Good Friday Agreement’, *The Guardian*, 23 October 2001, p 2.


In a short epilogue section in their new edition of *The Empire Writes Back*, London: Routledge, 2002, Ashcroft, Griffiths and Tiffin observe, though without illustration, that postcolonial literatures offer useful models of agency under globalization. They also helpfully argue that our understanding of a generally static imperialism obscure the continuities between it and neocolonialism.
