

Social Policy Preferences in South Korea:

Individual and Family-related Perspectives

Minho Lee

Department of Social Policy and Intervention

Wolfson College

University of Oxford

A thesis submitted for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

Trinity 2019

Abstract

East-Asia-specific institutional characteristics, especially family-related and cultural contexts, raise a question regarding the 'political terrain' in the region – whether a certain section of the population is clearly supportive of a particular social policy, while others are not. East Asian societies including Korea are characterised by the Confucian culture and experiences with developmental welfare states, both of which emphasise the role of family in welfare provision. From the perspectives of new institutionalism, such contexts may create distinctive reasoning patterns in relation to social policy preferences. In this regard, this thesis investigates social policy preference formation of individuals in Korea, with a particular research question of how policy preferences of a particular social group - female labour market outsiders - are shaped by family-related and cultural contexts.

This study employs a mixed-methods approach that collects and analyses data using both quantitative and qualitative methods. The quantitative analysis tests the validity of existing theories on welfare attitudes, using individual-level data of '2013 Public Attitudes towards Welfare Policy Survey'. In the light of quantitative analysis, the subsequent qualitative analysis interrogates about how social policy preferences of female labour market outsiders are affected by family-related and cultural contexts. Specifically, semi-structured interviews with 27 female labour market outsiders were carried out from June to December 2016, and the data were analysed using thematic analysis.

The overall argument of the thesis is that in Korea, family welfare and prevailing ideas of a desirable society play a significant role in shaping social policy preferences of individuals, particularly female labour market outsiders. Family welfare is found to motivate research

participants to share reinterpreted problem recognition within the family, which eventually encourages them to assess social policy for the sake of maximum utility for the family, not for themselves. Prevailing ideas of a desirable society, notably selective compassion for the deserving poor and pro-developmental view, appear to increase individuals' preferences for the selective provision of social welfare. These findings can be understood as suggesting that in Korea, social policy preferences of women in the labour market outsider position could be different from what is expected by the individualist self-interest-based assumptions. Also, it is likely that social cleavages between female labour market outsiders and other socioeconomic groups on the issues of redistribution are less likely to be generated in Korea, relative to countries with individualist culture.

The thesis makes three original contributions to knowledge. Firstly, this thesis extends the regional coverage of welfare attitude study beyond Western countries by shifting scholarly attention to Korea. Secondly, the thesis theorises social policy preference formation in Korea through new institutionalism that mediates the relationship between institutions and individuals' self-interest and value-orientation. Lastly, the thesis moves beyond a quantitative analysis by employing a mixed-methods approach.

Table of Contents

Tables viii

1. Introduction 1

1.1. Research Design 5

1.2. Central Findings 8

1.3. The Contribution of the Thesis 10

1.4. Thesis Outline 11

2. Literature Review and Theoretical Background 15

2.1. Literature Review 15

2.1.1. Studies on Factors Shaping Individuals' Preferences for Social Policy 15

2.1.2. Social Policy Preferences in South Korea 27

2.1.3. Limitation of Previous Studies 30

2.2. Theoretical Background 34

2.2.1. Social Policy Preferences and Dimensions 34

2.2.2. Factors Shaping Social Policy Preferences 36

2.2.3. Analytical Framework 50

3. Methodology 53

3.1. Research Design: A Mixed Methods Approach 53

3.2. The Quantitative Analysis 55

3.2.1. Analytical Framework for the Quantitative Analysis 56

3.2.2. Data and Measurements 58

3.2.3. Dependent Variables 60

3.2.4. Independent Variables: Characteristics of Individual Actors 61

3.3. The Qualitative Analysis 68

3.3.1. Data Collection 68

3.3.2. Interview Questions 70

3.3.3. Method of Analysis: Thematic Analysis 72

3.3.4. Data Management 76

3.3.5. Ethical Issues 76

3.3.6. Trustworthiness 80
3.4. Conclusion 82
4. Understanding the Context and Characteristics of Social Policy Development in South Korea 83
4.1. Developmental Welfare State (from the 1960s to the mid-1990s) 84
4.2. Social Policy Reform since Democratisation 90
4.3. Conclusion 105
5. Social Policy Attitudes in South Korea – A Quantitative Survey Analysis 107
5.1. Descriptive Statistics 109
5.1.1. Descriptive Statistics for Independent Variables: Characteristics of the Samples 109
5.1.2. Descriptive Statistics for Dependent Variables 119
5.2. Multivariate Analysis 123
5.2.1. Correlation Analysis 123
5.2.2. Results of Generalised Ordered Logit Analyses 123
5.3. Conclusion 161
6. Social Policy Attitudes in Korea – A Qualitative Analysis 1: Effects of Family-related and Cultural Contexts on Recognition of Problems 164
6.1. Research Findings 165
6.1.1. Themes and Codes 165
6.1.2. Participants' Problem Recognition in Relation to the Four Given Situations 168
6.1.3. The Influences of Family-related and Cultural Contexts on Recognition of Problems 192
6.2. Conclusion 209
7. A Qualitative Analysis 2: Effects of Family-related and Cultural Contexts on Shaping Preferred Solutions 211
7.1. Research Findings 212
7.1.1. Themes and Codes 212
7.1.2. The Influences of Family Welfare and Prevailing Ideas of a Desirable Society on Shaping Preferred Solutions 216
7.2. Conclusion 232
8. Conclusion 234

8.1. Key Findings 235
8.2. Implications 238
8.3. Contributions to Knowledge 243
8.4. Limitations 245
8.5. Opportunities for Future Research 247
References 249
Appendix 265

Figures

Figure 1. Analytical Framework 52

Figure 2. Analytical Framework for the Quantitative Analysis 57

Figure 3. Government Spending, by Policy Area, in 2014 (%) 101

Figure 4. Trend in Public Social Expenditure by Policy Type (1990-2014) (%) 102

Figure 5. The Distributions of Responses: Respondents' Attitudes towards General Welfare Aims and Means (N=number of respondents) 120

Figure 6. The Distributions of Responses: Respondents' Preferences on Social Policy Areas for Risk Groups 121

Tables

Table 1. The Number of Observation and Cases with Missing Values, by Item 59

Table 2. Dependent Variables 61

Table 3. Expected Probability of Continued Employment, Share by Labour Market Segment (N) 65

Table 4. Independent Variables 67

Table 5. Outline of the Participants 70

Table 6. Distribution of Respondents by Socioeconomic and Demographic Characteristics 111

Table 7. Personal and Equivalised Disposable Household Income 112

Table 8. Distribution of Respondents by Ideological Orientation and Levels of Interest in Politics 113

Table 9. ANOVA 118

Table 10. Descriptive Statistics for Dependent Variables 122

Table 11. Item: Respondents' Support for Social Policy in Relation to Redistribution - "It Is the Responsibility of the Government to Reduce Differences in Income Levels" 128

Table 12. Item: Tax Increase for Welfare Expansion - "Tax Should Be Increased in Order to Expand the Welfare State" 132

Table 13. Item: Universalism – "Social Welfare Should be Offered to All by Right, Not Only to Specific Groups of Deserving Poor" 136

Table 14. Item: Financial Support for the Unemployed 139

Table 15. Item: Financial Support for the Sick 143

Table 16. Item: Financial Support for the Elderly 146

Table 17. Item: Financial Support for Families with Children 150

Table 18. Effects of Independent Variables across the Analyses 152

Table 19. Effects of Independent Variables across the Analyses 157

Table 20. Codes, Sub-themes and Main Themes by Each Given Situation 167

Table 21. Dominant Views of Labour Market Outsider Position, by Marital Status 208

Table 22. Social Policy Mentioned by Participants as Potential Solutions to Their Recognised Problems 213

Table 23. Codes, Sub-themes and Main Themes by Each Given Situation 215

1. Introduction

Social policy preference formation in South Korea (hereafter, Korea) has become a more important topic than ever due to democratic consolidation and significant socioeconomic changes. The post-industrial transition in Korea has been accompanied by the emergence of groups of individuals being closely associated with so-called 'new social risks' such as growing employment instability, rising earning inequality or difficulty in reconciling work and caring responsibilities. The problems vary, but have two things in common: they tend to be more prevalent among certain social groups, especially the youth, women and the low-skilled, and they are not effectively dealt with by the existing welfare state (Bonoli, 2006). In the sense that policy-making in democratic societies is often a process of responding to public demands, such shifts can be important drivers of social policy development. Vote-seeking political parties or politicians may be motivated to target growing numbers of new social risk groups in order to claim credit for improvement. In fact, Korea has undergone an impressive welfare state transformation since the late 1990s. The productivist characteristics of the Korean welfare state have much weakened mainly by the introduction of more universalistic and redistributive social welfare provisions (Hong, et al., 2003; Yang, 2003; Peng and Wong, 2008; Hwang, 2011; Kim, 2009a; Lee, 2011; Peng, 2012; Fleckenstein and Lee, 2017a). Accordingly, there has been a steady rise in the share of public social expenditure in the GDP of Korea, from 3% to 11% since the late 1990s (Statistics Korea, 2019). When it comes to the details, however, the way the welfare state in Korea has evolved still raises questions. On the one hand, a remarkable policy expansion in universalistic services and subsidies for the elderly and families with children has been observed since the mid-2000s. On the other, social policy development for those who are adversely affected by the unstable labour market, often labelled ′labour market outsiders′, has

been relatively underdeveloped. Social policy in Korea is still favourable to (male) labour market insiders, the traditional clientele of the welfare state in Korea, due to its highly contributory nature, which eventually leaves the outsiders excluded from social welfare protection. In this regard, a question is raised: does this reflect the preferences of the population, particularly excluded groups such as female labour market outsiders, or is this simply a result of politics disregarding the preferences of excluded groups that seek policies compensating labour market risks since they have little political influence? This question is basically requiring clear ideas about social policy preference formation in Korea, especially what the population in general and particular social groups, such as female labour market outsiders, want from the government in Korea.

Borrowing from the rational choice theory, it is unlikely that the welfare state in Korea reflects the preferences of female labour market outsiders. In a large number of the literature, socioeconomic and demographic characteristics, especially gender and labour market status, are argued to be major sources of social cleavages and conflicts. Specifically, due to the fact that both women and labour outsiders are more likely to be exposed to a range of labour market risks such as unemployment than their counterparts, they are assumed to have stronger support for redistribution (Svallfors, 1997; Bonoli, 2006; Rueda, 2006; Svallfors, 2008; Bonoli and Häusemann, 2009; Burgoon and Dekker, 2010; Häusemann and Schwander, 2011; Lindvall, et al., 2013) Subsequently, female labour market outsiders who feature both factors are suspected to be more in favour of redistributive measures compensating labour market risks than other parts of the population, which suggests that there could be significant differences between female labour market outsiders and their counterparts in terms of welfare attitudes.

Despite the empirical basis that the previous studies have, there is still the empirical question of whether female labour market outsiders in Korea are actually strong supporters for

redistribution, such as unemployment benefits. The literature on welfare attitude formation is likely to be limited in explaining social policy preferences of individuals in Korea, due to some of their inherent limitations. Firstly, most of these studies rely on data from advanced industrialised economies in the West, while being indifferent to other regions with different institutional contexts. In addition to individual-level self-interest variables (as well as ideological orientation), institutions, which is a society-level variable, can be a factor that influences individuals' social policy preferences. Various branches in the new institutionalism commonly highlight, often with different nuances, that both formal and informal institutions may shape individuals' goals, preferences, and behaviours by constraining individuals to comply with given rules of appropriate or standardised behaviours within those institutions (Hall, 1986; Steinmo, 1989; North, 1991; Thelen and Steinmo, 1992; Krasner, 1988; Immergut, 1998; Vickers and Isaac, 2012). In the sense that institutions, especially informal ones such as culture, are often region-specific, the findings of studies working on cases of Western societies could be insufficient explanations for welfare attitudes in non-Western societies, such as Korea.

Differences between Western and East Asian societies are noticeable in the two following ways. First, the former is generally understood to have individualist culture, while the latter is characterised by its collectivist culture that prioritises the goals and needs of groups, such as family and workgroups over those of individuals. As noted by many scholars, countries in East Asia share common Confucian values that place great emphasis on filial piety, individuals' sacrifices for their families, a strong work ethic and division of gender roles (Jones, 1990; Jones, 1993; Goodman and Peng, 1996; White and Goodman, 1998; Sung, 2003). They were also labelled 'developmental welfare states' in which social policy was strictly minimised, being incorporated into state-led macroeconomic planning, for the purpose of the nations' economic growth (Jones, 1993; Goodman and Peng, 1996; Campos et al., 1996; Goodman and White,

1998; Doner, et al., 2005; Holiday, 2005; Kwon, 2005; Cho, 2010; Hwang, 2011; Ringen et al., 2011, Park, 2012). Second, mainly because of the aforementioned reasons, the family has been playing a more significant role in welfare provision in East Asian societies, compared with the West. From the perspectives of new institutionalism, such contexts in East Asian societies may contribute to distinctive patterns of reasoning regarding social policy in this region, which makes the East-Asia-specific institutional context a worthwhile object for in-depth analyses.

Secondly, previous studies on welfare attitudes tend to rely on a crude assumption of a direct relationship between a given factor and preferences, which often materialises into quantitative research methods, notably regression analysis. However, one's preference for social policy could be an outcome of a complex process involving several stages. We may think of two basic stages that lead individuals to their preferences for social policy: recognition of problems and shaping preferred solutions. For example, having a preference for social policy means that an individual recognises a problem, then considers a policy as the best or the most acceptable among possible solutions. In the sense that each stage can be affected by various, possibly unidentified or non-quantifiable, factors or context, a more detailed investigation and analysis of the whole process should be carried out with a qualitative approach in order to have an in-depth understanding of social policy preference formation, especially in unstudied regions.

In these respects, this thesis interrogates about social policy preference formation of individuals in general, and also of a specific group (female labour market outsiders) in Korea, with a research question of how policy preferences of individuals and a particular social group - female labour market outsiders - are shaped by family-related and cultural contexts. In addition, this study employs a mixed-methods approach to achieve both breadth and depth of understanding of preference formation in Korea.

Analysing the social policy preferences of female labour market outsiders in Korea has

importance in two particular aspects. Firstly, this matters theoretically. The existing literature on welfare attitudes are based on the expectations for Western nations. It pays particular attention to rationality assumption and egalitarian values, while being relatively inattentive to the effect of collectivist culture, such as familialism, on welfare attitudes. In this regard, investigating how family-related and cultural contexts shape social policy preferences of female labour market outsiders in Korea, who are most likely case for pro-social welfare, may bring us to new insight into social policy preference formation, especially in relation to societies with culture emphasising family obligation and support, such as East Asian countries, Southern European welfare regimes, and/or countries in Latin America.

Secondly, this research is also of relevance in understanding the welfare politics in East Asia. Given the growing number of labour market outsiders, and also the fact that atypical employment and unemployment are more likely to be distributed to women, social policy preferences of female labour market outsiders could be a significant driver of social welfare development in democratic societies in East Asia including Korea. By interrogating about the 'political terrain' in the region, especially whether women in the outsider position are clearly supportive or critical of a particular social policy while others are not, we may better understand the politics of social welfare provision in East Asia, which has great relevance in changes and continuities of the welfare states in the region.

1.1. Research Design

The thesis has two groups of questions designed to lead the readers to certain arguments, findings, and conclusions.

(1) Do individual self-interest or culture-related factors explain social policy preferences in the Korean public opinion?
(2) How are social policy views of a particular group (i.e. interviewed female labour market outsiders) shaped by their family-related and cultural contexts?

In order to answer the questions, this thesis employs a mixed-methods approach that integrates quantitative and qualitative data collection and analysis. More specifically, this research takes a sequential explanatory design which involves quantitative data collection and analysis, followed by qualitative data collection and analysis. The quantitative analysis, which is performed to answer the first question, reveals that most individual-level self-interest variables, including labour market status, do not have a robust relationship with individuals' welfare attitudes, which contradicts previous studies that find support for the self-interest theories. Gender matters for welfare attitudes, but goes against the self-interest expectations: women are either similar to, or even more conservative than, men in their attitudes towards individual social policies. Also, the interaction effects of gender and having dependent children suggest that social policy preferences of individuals, particularly women, are likely to be affected by the conventional male breadwinner/female homemaker family model. Unlike the individual-level self-interest variables, equivalised disposable household income, which represents the welfare capacity of a household, appears to have a robust relationship with individuals' preferences for individual social policies. Given the findings, it is reasonable to speculate that informal institutions, such as culture and family-related contexts, may play a more decisive role than individual-level self-interest variables in shaping one's views on social policy, and therefore that social policy preferences of female labour market outsiders are unlikely to make the self-interest assumption that they are more in favour of redistributive measures than other

parts of the population.

In this regard, the subsequent qualitative analysis aims to carry out in-depth investigation into how welfare attitudes of female labour market outsiders are shaped by family-related and cultural contexts, having a particular interest in non-quantitative data, namely, female labour market outsiders' experiences, thoughts, feelings, beliefs and motives, as well as social structures, cultural values or social interaction between individuals. Such mixed-methods research design is expected to lead us to both breadth and depth in understanding the patterns of reasoning of individuals as well as the key determinants of social policy preferences in Korea.

The Quantitative Analysis

The quantitative analysis is carried out to test a range of major explanatory variables of welfare attitudes, using individual-level data of '2013 Public Attitudes towards Welfare Policy Survey[1]'. The data are analysed by using Generalised Ordered Logit (also known as Partial Proportional Odds Model), which is suitable for cases where dependent variables are ordinal, but the proportional odds/parallel lines assumption on the data is violated. The key dependent variables are respondents' answers to a range of questions which capture respondents' attitudes towards general welfare aims and means, as well as government spending on four individual social policies targeting different risk groups, respectively.

For the first type of dependent variables, respondents were asked how much they agreed or disagreed with the statements given above. For the second type of dependent variables, respondents were asked to show their preferences for government spending on the four

[1] This survey was conducted by the Korea Institute for Health and Social Affairs and the Institute for Social Welfare, Seoul National University.

individual policies. In both types, respondents were offered five possible options from one extreme attitude to another, like strongly disagree/much less to strongly agree/much more.

The independent variables are selected to represent the effects of personal self-interest, ideological disposition, and informal welfare institution (intra-household transfer). They include gender, age, education, labour market status, household type, personal income, equivalised disposable household income, left-right ideological orientation, and levels of interest in politics.

The Qualitative Analysis

With particular interest in the role of family-related and cultural contexts in shaping welfare attitudes of women in the labour market outsider position, semi-structured interviews with 27 female labour market outsiders (either temporarily unemployed persons, or employees with temporary contracts with low pay and little opportunities for personal development, aged between 19 and 64) were carried out over six months, from June to December 2016. The participants recruited in cooperation with relevant organizations were carefully selected to ensure the most relevant respondents and the safety for both sides of the interviews. The researcher analysed the interview transcripts by using thematic analysis, devoting particular attention to two main stages of the decision-making process: individuals' problem recognition and shaping preferred solutions.

1.2. Central Findings

The overall argument of the thesis is that family-related and cultural contexts, notably family

welfare and prevailing ideas of a desirable society, matter for social policy preferences of individuals in Korea, particularly female labour market outsiders. Firstly, family welfare, where the members commit their resources and services for each other, are found to play a decisive role in shaping one's social policy preferences. The quantitative analyses indicate that individual-level self-interest variables do not provide sufficient explanation for social policy preferences of individuals in Korea, while equivalised disposable household income, which represents the degree of intra-household transfer, show negative relationship with one's attitude towards individual social policies. The following qualitative analyses give corroborating evidence for such results of quantitative analyses: family welfare tended to motivate participants to share reinterpreted recognition of problem within the family, which eventually leads the individuals to evaluate social policy for the sake of maximum utility for the family. These findings can be understood as suggesting that the social cleavages in Korea may reflect the context of family welfare, rather than individuals' interests based on their own socioeconomic or demographic characteristics.

Secondly, prevalent ideas of a desirable society, notably selective compassion for the deserving poor and pro-developmental view, may increase individuals' preferences for the residual model of social welfare. The qualitative analysis shows that those ideas tended to extend participants' problem recognition to the economic hardship of others or national issues, but at the same time, they also tended to limit the role of social welfare to the last resort for those in absolute and inevitable need, or as a tool for economic growth, which eventually reinforces one's preferences for selective provision of social welfare.

1.3. The Contribution of the Thesis

The thesis makes some original contributions to the overall research about social policy preference formation. Firstly, this thesis makes empirical contribution by extending the regional coverage beyond Western countries by bringing Korea into focus. The existing studies on welfare attitudes have a tendency to rely on data from Western countries, being almost indifferent to non-Western societies, such as East Asian countries. From the perspectives of new institutionalism, it is still inconclusive whether current theories built upon Western cases can adequately explain social policy preference formation in these understudied regions. In this regard, this thesis contributes to knowledge by testing the validity of existing theories with data from Korea, and also by investigating the impacts of informal institutions, particularly family-related and cultural contexts, on individuals' attitudes towards social policy in Korea.

Secondly, this study matters theoretically. The thesis theorises social policy preference formation in Korea through the lens of new institutionalism that explains how institutions interact with individuals' self-interest and value-orientation. Unlike the existing literature that pays attention mainly to rationality assumption, this study helps develop theoretical linkages between institutions and social policy preferences formation by using the cases in Korea, and also helps identify specific institutional factors, notably family welfare and prevailing ideas of a desirable society, which mediate the relationships between personal motivations and social policy preferences of individuals.

Lastly, the thesis moves beyond a quantitative analysis by employing a mixed-methods approach. Combining quantitative and qualitative methods adds value to the study in various ways. The mixed-methods research enables a richer description and a more meaningful interpretation of quantitative findings on the causal relationship between individual-level

variables and social policy preferences of individuals by exploring beyond what is encoded in a variable. Also, the researcher and readers can be more confident in the qualitative findings with corroborating evidence provided by the quantitative results. In addition to these confirmatory purposes, mixed-methods research also provides a more complete understanding of social policy preference formation in Korea, especially on how individuals, female labour market outsiders in particular, arrive at certain social policy preferences in family-related and cultural contexts in Korea.

1.4. Thesis Outline

The rest of the thesis proceeds as follows. Chapter 2 provides a literature review and also the theoretical background for the study. The early part of the chapter reviews the literature mainly on determinants of social policy preference of individuals in order to understand more of the scholarly context in which the research question lies, and also to identify deficiencies or limitations of the existing literature. In light of the literature review, the latter part provides a theoretical background that underlies the thesis. It firstly discusses the definition and dimensions of social policy preferences. Then, it debates on how self-interest and ideology work at the individual level, how self-interests are embedded in institutions, and how ideology is institutionalised. Lastly, it presents an analytical framework which enables us to understand how we should approach the research question theoretically, and analyse social policy preference formation of individuals in relation to institutional contexts.

Chapter 3 dedicates itself to the research methodology. The first section of the chapter discusses a mixed-methods research design which integrates quantitative and qualitative approaches. Next, the second section outlines each approach, presenting objectives, methods of data

collection and analysis of both methods, as well as data management, ethical consideration, trustworthiness which are particularly relevant to the qualitative part of the thesis.

Chapter 4 provides the institutional context and the characteristics of social policy development in Korea since the 1960s, which can be the background for the quantitative and qualitative analyses. This chapter first delineates the social, economic, and cultural contexts in which the authoritarian regime in Korea established a residual welfare state from the 1960s to 1990s. Then, it discusses how democratisation, socioeconomic changes, and cultural contexts have contributed to the changes and continuity of the social welfare system in Korea since the late 1990s, and also discusses the role of the family in welfare provision.

Chapter 5 examines the effects of a range of explanatory variables (economic self-interest, political ideology and informal welfare provision within a household) that are known to affect individuals' social policy preferences. This chapter analyses individual-level survey data collected in Korea, using Generalised Ordered Logit (also known as Partial Proportional Odds Model). The results do not find strong empirical support for the self-interest theories: most of the individual-level self-interest variables – such as education, labour market status, household type, and personal income – do not influence individuals' views on social policy in a statistically significant way. Of the individual-level self-interest variables, only age is found to meet the self-interest expectation, suggesting that individuals tend to pursue the material interest based on their own stage of life-cycle. Gender creates impacts too, but generally works opposite to the self-interest expectation: women are more critical of the welfare state in general as well as individual social policies. On top of that, equivalised disposable household income (representing intra-household transfer) and political ideology are found to be factors that explain individuals' social policy preferences in Korea. Overall, such findings can be understood as indicating that informal institutions, such as traditional gender roles or informal

welfare provision within the household, have great importance in shaping welfare attitudes in Korea.

Chapter 6 is the first part of the qualitative analysis that investigates how family-related and cultural contexts shape social policy preferences of female labour market outsiders. This chapter is particularly devoted to participants' recognition of problems, the initial stage of decision-making. It argues that culture, namely family welfare and prevailing ideas of a desirable society, matter for problem recognition of individuals, women in labour market outsiders in particular. Family welfare, in which the members assist each other with resources and services, tended to motivate participants to share collective and reinterpreted problem recognition within the family, based on a strong sense of family belonging. In such a context, family income was likely to play a decisive role than individuals' own socioeconomic and demographic characteristics in shaping one's problem recognition. Prevailing ideas of a desirable society, such as selective compassion and the pro-developmental view, tended to extend participants' problem recognition beyond the boundary of personal or family-related issues. However, at the same time, these ideas were found to limit the objects of concern or attention to specific groups of individuals, often those who were in absolute need, or national crises.

Chapter 7 pays attention to the stage of shaping preferred solutions, which follows problem recognition. The chapter reveals that the influences of family welfare and prevailing ideas of a desirable society continue in the subsequent stage of shaping preferred solutions. The family-centred problem recognition of participants naturally flowed into family-centred social policy evaluation. Participants in family welfare tended to evaluate social policy from the perspective of family economy. In this stage, family income matters again, having a negative relationship with individuals' support for social welfare in general. It also generates various patterns of

social policy preferences with regard to different types of policies. Those from high-income families were characterised by a relatively low level of support for social welfare, while those from low-income families were characterised by high-level of support for social welfare, regardless of types of social policy. Those from middle-income families tended to take an eclectic approach for the sake of family interest: they tended to be inattentive to selective social assistance programmes (unemployment benefits in particular) as they rarely found a use for such policies thanks to their decent family welfare. On the other hand, they tended to be enthusiastic supporters for universalistic social programmes subsidising regular or occasional family expenses, which in effect supplement the family income. Prevailing ideas of a desirable society tended to strengthen the combination of residual social welfare and relatively large family welfare in Korea by defining social welfare as emergency relief of absolute and inevitable poverty, or as a tool for economic growth.

Chapter 8 provides an overview and discussion of the key research findings. The roles of family welfare and prevailing ideas of a desirable society in shaping social policy preference of individuals in Korea, particularly for female labour market outsiders, are highlighted as the key findings of the thesis in the early part of the chapter. Given the findings, it discusses the societal impact of family-related and cultural contexts as well as the relevance for future social policy development. Next, it juxtaposes the contributions of the thesis, which are empirical, theoretical, and methodological, respectively. Lastly, this chapter also discusses the limitations of the study as well as opportunities for future research.

2. Literature Review and Theoretical Background

2.1. Literature Review

2.1.1. Studies on Factors Shaping Individuals' Preferences for Social Policy

Studies on social policy preference formation tend to explain individual-level variations in welfare attitudes with three broad explanatory factors: economic self-interest, ideology and institutions.

Economic Self-interest

Borrowing from the rational choice theories, a large number of recent studies dedicate their attention to how individuals' socioeconomic and demographic characteristics, based on which individuals measure their structural locations in society, affect welfare attitudes. Presumably, the most attention-grabbing factor is employment status. The idea is that those with higher probabilities of being exposed to labour market risks should be more supportive of government interventions targeted for the disadvantaged in order to protect themselves from adverse labour market conditions. Given that one of the primary purposes of the welfare state is to respond to labour market risks, it is convincing to claim that the degree to which individuals are exposed to such risks affect individuals' social welfare preferences. The validity of such an idea has been tested by various scholars. Iversen and Soskice (2001) analyse data collected from 11 Western societies[2] (the International Social Survey Program, 1999, 2000), and claim that those with specific skills are more prone to demand social policy that protects them against such risks,

[2] The countries are Australia, Britain, Canada, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and the United States.

relative to those with general skills, because their specificity, which is often coupled with low-levels of transferability of skills, is likely to be an obstacle to re-employment in the event of job loss. Cusack, Iversen, and Rehm (2005) and Rehm (2009) examine the effects of income and uncertainty of future income on individuals' support for redistribution through a series of empirical studies analysing data from multiple countries[3]. They find evidence that people with low income and also people with high probabilities of unemployment, measured by occupational unemployment rates and skill-specificity, are more likely to demand redistribution from the government. According to the studies, even high-income earners could possibly prefer redistributive social security policies, if they are exposed to high levels of employment uncertainty. This means that redistributive policies may meet urgent basic needs of the unemployed at present, but can also function as insurance against labour market risks.

Some scholars related social policy preferences to labour market dualism, which divides workers into two groups in terms of employment contract: insiders and outsiders in the labour market. By definition, a key difference between insiders and outsiders is the level of exposure to labour market risks, notably job loss as well as consequent income loss. Insiders are generally defined as employees who are employed full-time, with an open-ended job, while outsiders are either the unemployed or those who experience unstable employment, such as temporary or part-time jobs. In addition, different status in the labour market often relates to different levels of income, employee benefits, and a range of social/private/occupational

[3] Cusack, Iversen, and Rehm (2005) analyse data from 18 countries, using the public opinion data from several waves of the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP, 1985-2000). The countries include USA, Canada, United Kingdom, Ireland, the Netherlands, France, Switzerland, Spain, Portugal, West Germany, East Germany, Austria, Finland, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Australia, New Zealand. Rehm (2009) analyses data from 17 countries, using the European Social Survey (ESS, 2002-2003, and 2004-2005). The countries analysed are Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and the UK.

protection, in which insiders are generally much more advantaged (Seeleib-Kaiser et al, 2012; Vlandas, 2013). Such divergences in the risk profiles between insiders and outsiders suggest that social welfare programmes, redistributive measures in particular, are not their immediate needs of insiders but of outsiders. On the other hand, it is insiders, rather than outsiders, who are more likely to be the main tax-payers funding social welfare due to their secure employment and superior financial situations. In other words, social welfare, notably redistribution, extracts resources from insiders and distributes them to outsiders. In this regard, many scholars argue that insiders and outsiders have fundamentally different preferences for social policy: insiders are argued to be less supportive of social welfare policies, redistributive measures in particular, while outsiders are expected to be more in favour of them. More specifically, Rueda (2005; 2006) hypothesises that insiders are less supportive than outsiders of active labour market policies (ALMPs) because such policies generally benefit outsiders at the expense of insiders, notably due to higher taxes and low-wage competition. He examines the idea by analysing Eurobarometer data collected from 16 European countries[4] (February-April 1996) and finds that there is a statistically significant relationship between the insider-outsider divide and individuals' preferences for employment promotion. As expected, outsiderness spurs individuals' support for activation policy. Burgoon and Dekker (2010) also test whether insiders and outsiders differ in terms of their views on redistribution by analysing individual-level survey data collected in 15 EU member states[5] (Eurobarometer, 2002). They find evidence that flexible employment, which is often coupled with a higher level of uncertainty of future income, increases the demand for social assistance targeted for the unemployed.

[4] The countries are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the UK, and the USA

[5] The countries are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the UK

Meanwhile, Schwander and Häusermann (2011) attempt to have a more comprehensive understanding of the relationship between the insider-outsider divide and individuals' welfare preferences, by looking at a wider range of social welfare programmes. They analyse data from the European Social Survey 4 (2008) including 13 countries[6], and conclude that outsiders are more likely to be in favour of redistribution, job creation policy, and social investment (childcare services) than insiders. Insiders, in contrast, turn out to have stronger preferences than outsiders for social insurance and labour market rewarding for performance, both of which highlight the importance of contribution rather than needs in terms of resource allocation.

In contrast to previous literature that tends to pay attention to either occupational exposure to unemployment or labour market dualism, Vlandas (2018) uses both to explain social policy preferences of individuals. He contends that the two conceptualisations of labour market vulnerability - occupational unemployment and labour market status - are associated with different types of inequality, being complementary to each other. He tests his idea by analysing data from the International Social Survey Program (ISSP) covering 17 countries at four points of time (1985, 1990, 1996 and 2006), and finds that both approaches are empirically supported.

It should be noted that not all studies find evidences advocating the insider-outsider divide. Emmenegger (2009), for instance, examines the insider-outsider theory, especially whether labour market insiders are different from outsiders in their views on job security regulation which benefits mainly insiders. By analysing data from International Social Survey Programme (1996, 1997) which include 12 and 14 countries[7], respectively, he finds that both insiders and

[6] The countries are Belgium, Switzerland, Germany, Denmark, Spain, Finland, France, Greece, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, and the UK.

[7] ISSP 1996: Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Great Britain, Ireland, Italy, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and the USA. ISSP 1997: Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the USA.

outsiders are equally in favour of job security regulation. In this regard, he suggests three possible explanations. Firstly, the insider-outsider theory tends to rely on too demanding rationality assumption. Secondly, the theory does not reflect electoral politics and also the fact that political parties often promise social policies in package. Lastly, insiders and outsiders may share similar interests regarding job security regulations within a household, in a coalition against the capitalist, or the case where one is expecting possible shift of labour market status.

Emmenegger's work is partially supported by Guillaud and Marx (2013). Guillaud and Marx pay their attention to both individuals' support for employment protection and unemployment benefits, namely unemployment insurance and job training for the unemployed. Through an analysis of survey data collected in France, they find no support for the argument that insiders and outsiders differ in their views on employment protection. On the other hand, the authors reaffirm the theoretical expectation that outsiders have stronger preferences for policies targeted for the unemployed. With regard to the moderating effect of the household that Emmenegger (2009) suggests, Häusermann, Kurer, and Schwander (2016) test whether or not the household neutralises the link between labour market status and social policy preferences, and therefore alleviates or even eradicates the insider-outsider divide. They analyse data from the European Social Survey (ESS) round 4 (2008)[8] and conclude that labour market status is clearly related to social policy preferences, even when the economic context of the household are taken into account. They also add that the moderating effect of the household situation on individuals' social policy preferences is significant only when a woman's partner is a clear insider, and that men's preferences for social policy are unlikely to be affected by their partner's labour market status. Such findings can be understood as suggesting that the insider-outsider

[8] This research includes 13 Western countries: Belgium, Switzerland, Germany, Denmark, Spain, Finland, France, Greece, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.

theory still valid in predicting social policy preferences of the majority of the population in Western societies, especially in relation to redistributive issues, even if we consider the household effects.

Age is also argued to affect individuals' attitudes towards social welfare, generating a conflict of interest between the elderly population and the working-age population. The elderly in general tend not to earn their income in the labour market, but to rely on their own savings or social security policies for daily life. Moreover, their dependency on state welfare provisions is generally increasing with the weakening caring function of the family in elderly care, which is commonly observed in post-industrial societies. In this regard, it is expected that the elderly are more supportive of policies like old-age social security programmes and healthcare while being more critical of policies that benefit the young, compared to younger people. Svallfors (2008) tests the idea by analysing data from Swedish Welfare State Survey (1986, 1992, 1997, and 2002). He finds support for the expectations, showing that the elderly (aged from 65 to 74) are more in favour of support for older people than the young (aged from 18 to 29). By contrast, the young have more approving attitudes towards support for families with children than the elderly. Bonoli and Häusermann (2009) examine the effects of individuals' socioeconomic and demographic characteristics on preferences for a range of policy reforms (regarding public pension, labour market policy, maternity insurance), using survey data from Switzerland, and assert that age is more important in explaining individuals' attitudes towards most distributional issues, relative to other factors such as material resources (income and educational stratification) and gender. Other studies that employ age as a control also tend to find support for the effect of age on individuals' views on various distributional issues (Iversen and Soskice, 2001; Burgoon and Dekker, 2010). Unlike those studies finding empirical support for the assumption about the age effect, Rehm (2009) finds that age does not generate any statistically significant

impacts on individuals' attitudes towards redistribution, while uncertainty of future income, household income, educational stratification, gender, and union membership turn out to be significant predictors of re-distributional preferences.

Gender has also gained much attention in the context of growing female labour participation and the decline in household size. In many studies, women are expected to be more in favour of social protection and institutionalised care services than their male counterparts, mainly because they are generally more vulnerable to a range of social risks. Female workers are more inclined to have precarious labour market positions such as low-paid, temporary jobs. In addition, female employment is still more likely to be interrupted than male employment when encountering caregiving issues in relation to young children or the elderly, who were conventionally cared for by women within a household (Pettersen, 1995; Svallfors, 1997; Bonoli and Häusemann, 2009). Apart from protecting women against a range of social risks, it is argued that the welfare state may benefit women by providing more employment opportunities for women than men in the public sector (Pettersen, 1995). These ideas have been tested in various studies on welfare attitudes in which gender serves as either the main or control variable. For instance, Svallfors (1997) finds that gender, together with labour market segmentation[9] and status[10], is a relevant predictor of individuals' view on government redistribution. He analyses data from the International Social Survey Program (ISSP) including eight Western countries[11], and reveals that women in all the countries are more supportive of redistribution and less favourable towards income differences than males. Iversen and Soskice

[9] He includes various types of labour market segments (skilled worker, unskilled workers, routine non-manual employees, service workers, and the self-employed) as an explanatory variable in his analysis, calling it "class".

[10] He uses the term "labour market status" but does not differentiate insiders and outsiders.

[11] The countries are: Australia, Austria, Canada, Germany, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, and the US.

(2001) use gender as one of the control variables in their research on the relationship between skill-specificity and preferences for social spending in 11 Western societies, and find that gender is the most significant predictor among the controls including gender, age, union membership, labour market status and ideology. By contrast, Bonoli and Häusermann (2009), in the aforementioned study that presents the significance of age on individuals' attitudes towards social policy reforms, argue that gender and material resources appear to be less important or insignificant. Burgoon and Dekker (2010), Guillaud, and Marx (2013), in their works highlighting the insider-outsider divide regarding social welfare preferences, also find little support for the theoretical expectation that women have stronger preferences for protection and redistribution than males.

There are many other socioeconomic or demographic factors than those discussed above that potentially create a structural cleavage. For example, human capital, namely education attainment or skills, is known to have an influence on one's probability of employment and therefore, poverty. When other variables are held constant, those with superior human capital are considered to be more competitive in the labour market, and therefore more likely to enjoy a higher level of employment security and a better wage (Wilensky, 1975). The household type could also matter for welfare attitudes in the sense that it is closely linked to the level of household income and the cost of living. A household comprising two income earners would generally be less vulnerable to income loss and its consequent poverty. By contrast, single parents, who find it difficult to juggle their work and child-rearing, may have a higher probability of falling into poverty (Tomlinson and Walker, 2012). In this regard, studies in public opinion tend to employ a standard set of control variables including human capital and household type (Iversen and Soskice, 2001; Bonoli and Häusermann, 2009; Rehm, 2009; Burgoon and Dekker, 2010; Tomlinson and Walker, 2012; Guillaud and Marx, 2013).

Ideology

Another group of researchers brings the key assumption of self-interest into question, highlighting the impact of ideology on social policy preferences. Lynch and Myrskylä (2009), for example, in their comparative study on pension income and policy preferences in 11 European countries[12], suggest that individuals' policy preferences are more likely to be shaped by pro-welfare values, partisan loyalties, or the domestic political and policy environment, rather than their beneficiary status. In a similar vein, Breznau (2010), presenting a statistical analysis of data collected in five European nations[13], argues that people's preferences for a range of social policy issues (government control of social services, price controls for basic needs, and subsidies for basic needs) are more likely to be influenced by egalitarian values than self-interest. From a slightly different angle, Fong (2000) analyses data from the US (the 1998 Gallup Poll Social Audit Survey) and finds that individuals' socioeconomic and demographic characteristics are insufficient predictors of individuals' preferences for redistribution. Instead, she reveals strong supporting evidence that individuals' beliefs about the roles of effort and luck in shaping personal economic circumstances, and the perceived opportunities to succeed in life have a significant relationship with individuals' support for redistribution. Other studies that employ ideological dispositions as control also tend to find statistically significant impacts of both the self-interest variables and ideological dispositions on individuals' preferences for redistribution (Iversen and Soskice, 2001; Burgoon and Dekker, 2010; Guillaud, and Marx, 2013).

These studies treat self-interest and individuals' ideological orientation as separate, mutually

[12] Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and the UK

[13] Australia, Bulgaria, the Netherlands, Finland, and Poland

exclusive influences, and tend to highlight that these two are potentially contradicting each other to some extent. For instance, material self-interest of those higher on the socioeconomic ladder may conflict with ideology, such as economic egalitarian values, if they are not interlinked. However, it should be noted that the demarcation between the two is not clear in the sense that individuals' basic value predispositions could be outcomes of self-interest based on personal economic circumstances, rather than ones formed through the specific process of socialisation or by psychological characteristics of individuals (Breznau, 2010; Margalit, 2013). This proposes more accurate and careful approaches when dealing with those two in studies on social policy preference formation.

Institutions

Though relatively few in number, some scholars pay their attention to the impact of institutions on individuals' preferences for social policy. They often explain cross-national differences in welfare attitudes with either/both the calculous approach or/and the cultural approach. The former is often associated with Esping-Andersen's hypothesis about regime-specific interest effects: that is, each welfare state regime has specific social cleavages and conflicts regarding redistributive policies, which are created by the interaction between rational actors and regime-specific institutional arrangements (Esping-Andersen, 1990). The latter, by contrast, assumes that predominant cultural values in a given region may affect the aggregate-level of support for the welfare state, regardless of individuals' structural locations. Svallfors (1997) tests both. He performs multiple regression analyses (Ordinary least squares: OLS) of data from eight Western countries in four regime types including the liberal (US/Canada), the conservative (Germany/Austria), the social-democratic (Sweden/Norway), and the radical (Australia/New Zealand), and investigates the relationship between regime types and attitudes to redistribution

at both aggregate- and individual-levels. The results reveal that different regime types create significant differences in aggregated levels of public support for redistribution, but when it comes to the individual-level, the way attitudes are structured by class and gender are rather similar across the welfare regimes. In this regard, Svallfors highlights the cultural influence, arguing that each regime has a distinct political culture, especially views on what the welfare state should be like. Andreß and Heien (2001) also adhere to the same research questions, but differentiate their research from the Svallfors's work by employing different analysing techniques (Structural equation models: SEM) as well as different regime-type configurations - the liberal (US), the conservative (West Germany), the social-democratic (Norway) and former communist (East Germany). As a result, they find support for the cultural influences of national institutions (regimes) on attitudes towards the range of governmental action. By comparing East Germany and West Germany in the levels of public support for government actions, they show that the communist ideal of social welfare remains even after reunification, the end of the communist regime. What is more, they also find the statistically significant impact of calculative responses of individuals to specific institutional structures. Such results can be understood as supporting both the cultural approach and the calculous approach. The impact of cultural differences between the capitalist nations and the former communist nations on welfare attitudes is tested once again by Breznau (2010). He examines the impacts of self-interest, ideas and national institutions, culture in particular, on policy preferences by using data from five nations, which can be categorised into two: traditionally capitalistic nations (Australia, the Netherlands, and Finland) and the former communist nations (Bulgaria and Poland). He shows that citizens of former Communist nations are much more supportive than their counterparts from traditionally capitalistic nations on the range of social policies including government control of social services, price controls for basic needs, and subsidies for basic needs. These findings are consistent in part with the work of Andreß and Heien (2001), in that

culture is found to play a role in shaping individuals' attitudes towards social policy even after the dissolution of formal institutions associated with culture. Blekesaune & Quadagno (2003) also carry out a comparative study on public opinion but examine the impact of the nation-level characteristics, such as unemployment rates and dominant political ideologies in a given country, rather than sticking to Esping-Andersen's three welfare regime types or cultural categories. They analyse data from 24 nations[14], and find that both individual-level and national-level characteristics have impact on individuals' preferences for policies targeted for the sick and the old, and also for the unemployed. They conclude that the nation-level economic situation as well as "public beliefs about national social problems and about the relationship between individuals, the state, and other institutions", are of importance in shaping one's views on to whom and what policies should be implemented by the state. This shows that the cultural approach may apply to a nation-level analysis of preferences for social policy.

Unlike the aforementioned studies concerned with statistical differences between regions with different institutional characteristics in public opinions towards the welfare state, Oorschot (2006) examines his idea about deservingness criteria. He analyses data from 23 European countries[15] and confirms that the same deservingness rank order of different groups of individuals in need is shared among all the selected countries as well as various groups with different socioeconomic, demographic, religious characteristics. Simultaneously, he also finds some variation in national-levels of conditionality of solidarity, which is the degree to which people distinguish themselves from different groups of people in need. Conditionality of

[14] The countries included are Austria, Bulgaria, New Zealand, Canada, Czech Republic, Cyprus, France, Germany (the former East and West), Great Britain, Hungary, Ireland, Israel (Jews and Arabs), Italy, Japan, Latvia, Norway, Poland, Russia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and the US.

[15] Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and the UK.

solidarity tends to be higher in countries with lower economic development, lower unemployment, lower levels of trust in other people as well as state institutions, and more negative public perception of immigrants. These results may suggest that people in European countries share the same logic of deservingness that has "deep roots in popular welfare culture", but the degree to which people make a distinction towards others can vary based on the economic context in a given country (Oorschot, 2006, p. 37). Being inspired by the literature on the deservingness criteria, Larsen (2008) links Esping-Andersen's welfare regime theory with the public perception of welfare deservingness in order to develop a more detailed explanation for cross-regime differences in welfare attitudes. He analyses data from 16 countries that represent Esping-Andersen's three welfare regime types[16], and contends that the institutional structure of different welfare regimes shape individuals' ideas of who deserves to be cared by the state or who do not, especially with regard to the poor and unemployed, and therefore, individual support for welfare policy. This study differs from the previous ones in that it adheres to neither the calculous approach nor the cultural approach, but sees cultural characteristics as an intervenor between the formal structures and policy preferences of individuals.

2.1.2. Social Policy Preferences in South Korea

While much of scholarly attention is still paid to social policy preferences in Western societies, some recent studies attempt to explore factors affecting welfare attitudes in Korea, paying attention to Korea-specific socioeconomic and institutional contexts. For instance, studies,

[16] The 16 available countries are grouped to represent three welfare regimes: the liberal (the US, Canada, the UK, and Ireland), the conservative (Germany (West), France, Belgium, Austria, Spain, Portugal, and Italy), and the social democratic (Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Finland, and the Netherlands).

especially before 2010s, tend to argue that policy preferences in Korea are by and large independent of individuals' socioeconomic status not least because of underdeveloped welfare politics in Korea (Ryu, 2004; Baek and Ju, 2007). More recently, Yeo and Kim (2015) argue that social policy preference formation in Korea is being normalised, showing that the effect of household income on individuals' welfare attitudes is getting more evident over time in Korea. By analysing data collected by the 'Public Attitudes towards Welfare Policy' survey (2007, 2012), they find that those from middle-income households are clearly more supportive of government intervention in reducing income inequality, compared to those from higher-income households, but are also less supportive of it, relative to those from lower-income households. Such findings clearly show the link between self-interest based on income-class and social policy preferences in Korea. However, it is also worth noting that household income is not an individual-level variable, but a household-level one. Other variables representing socioeconomic characteristics of individuals, such as employment status, age, and education, are still found not to create statistically significant impacts on welfare attitudes. This can be understood as suggesting that household income matters more than individuals' socioeconomic characteristics for social policy preference formation in Korea.

Considering the social welfare development in Korea which was delayed under the developmental state, Hong and Kim (2018) pay their attention to the role of the means of living security in shaping one's social policy preferences. They argue that in Korea individuals' risk status is not simply determined by the degree of labour market vulnerability, but is more likely to be determined by a range of means of living security, such as individuals' entitlement to state welfare benefits, private welfare benefits, and housing assets. In this regard, they hypothesise that such risk status reflecting various means of living security each individual owns plays a greater role than labour market status in shaping one's social policy preferences. By analysing

data of ‘2013 survey on Seo-min (working class)’, they find support for their hypothesis.

A group of scholars explore how social policy preferences are affected by individuals’ perceptions. Jong Ye Kum and Hyunsub Kum (2017) examine how tax-payers’ perceptions of their tax burden shape individuals’ attitudes towards welfare expansion. By analysing data of ‘2014 survey on the role of the government’, they find that support for social welfare expansion tends to decrease with perceived level of tax burden only when tax increase is clearly stated. They also show that preferences for progressive taxation has a positive impact on welfare preferences, regardless of whether tax increase is informed. In a similar vein, Lim (2018) tests the impact of individuals’ perceptions of unfairness on welfare attitudes. She argues that perceived unfairness of the tax and transfer systems plays an important role in shaping social policy preferences, decreasing individuals’ willingness to contribute to welfare state expansion. She also adds that a wide spread of such perceptions of unfairness in Korea may create discrepancy in welfare attitudes across all economic classes: the public is in favour of welfare state expansion, but they are still reluctant to increase their contribution. More recently, Lim and Tanaka (2019) investigate how work disincentive perceptions (whether and to what extent social welfare policy generates moral hazard) affect welfare attitudes. They find that moral hazard information given to individuals decreases the support for universal income transfer among the lower-income group, but has no meaningful impact on the attitudes of the higher-income group. In contrast, moral hazard information works in the opposite way when it comes to a means-tested transfer: it decreases the higher-income groups’ support, while showing no effect on the lower-income group’s support. Such findings about the effects of perceptions on welfare attitudes can be understood as suggesting that perceptions of various aspects may intervein the process of instrumental calculation of personal well-being, and therefore affect social policy preferences of individuals in Korea.

2.1.3. Limitation of Previous Studies

Despite the accumulated empirical evidence the previous studies find in relation to the three aforementioned factors, we may identify two major limitations. Firstly, most studies on welfare attitudes still rely on data from Western countries. As reviewed above, institutions could be particularly important in studying social policy preferences of individuals in a certain region, for they are often region-specific and affect the majority of the population in terms of welfare attitudes. Given the varying institutional influences (cultural influences in particular) on welfare state attitudes, findings of a certain country or region may not apply to others with different institutional environments. It is even probable that the impacts of self-interest or ideational variables could go against the general expectations discussed above, if the way institutions mediate individuals' calculous strategy is significantly different, or institutions yield unstudied patterns of interaction with individuals. In this regard, the existing studies that analyse data from Western societies may not be able to explain social policy preference formation in non-Western countries, particularly East Asian societies that are characterised by distinctive institutional factors, such as the Confucian culture and developmentalism. Many commentators argue that Confucianism is of importance in understanding the welfare state development in East Asia. Confucianism is a system of thought and behaviour that has shaped the East Asian societies for centuries in various aspects, from a way of governing to a way of life. The Confucian culture is characterised by a great emphasis on the family cohesion, with a strong belief that welfare protection is best provided by families. Confucianism also encourages a strict gender division of labour, the male breadwinner and female homemaker model in particular (Jones, 1993; Goodman and Peng, 1996; Goodman and White, 1998; Fleckenstein and Lee, 2017a). Developmentalism is another key feature of East Asian societies. In the East Asian context, developmentalism often refers to a governing philosophy that prioritises

economic growth over social protection. Developmental states, such as Korea, Japan, Taiwan and Singapore, tended to mobilise all the national resources for economic development for rapid industrialisation, often by strictly minimising government spending on social welfare provision (Kwon, 2005; Ringen et al., 2011; Fleckenstein and Lee, 2017a).

With regard to social policy preference formation in East Asia, the Confucian culture and the developmental logic have prime importance in two ways. First of all, both Confucianism and developmentalism have contributed to the development of the small (residual) welfare state and big family welfare model. As a result of the minimised social welfare provision under the developmental state, family had to play a role as a main welfare provider. The Confucian ethos also justified such a model by placing a great emphasis on individuals' commitment to the family and traditional gender roles. It is worth noting that informal welfare provision within family in Korea is not just culture that is based on family obligation and affection, but is better understood as a well-established informal welfare system which provides substantial amount of transfers and services for its members against a range of social risks in a predictable manner. As an alternative to social welfare, family welfare provision can be a factor that individuals may consider when they estimate the costs and benefits of each possible welfare system they may choose. In this regard, this study deliberately uses a term 'family welfare' as a correspondence of social welfare, avoiding using familialism which has been widely used in the literature to describe a range of ideas and culture emphasising family obligation and family support. Second, both Confucianism and developmentalism provide normative ideas of a desirable society, which may constrain individuals to comply with certain given goals or cultural expectations of the society, rather than pursuing their own individualistic goals or interests. This may moderate the link between individuals' self-interest motivation and social policy preferences, and therefore contribute to shaping certain distinct characteristics of the

public in terms of welfare attitudes.

Secondly, previous studies of individuals' preferences for social policy tend to oversimplify the whole process in which individuals recognise a problem and come to prefer a particular social policy as a solution. Having a preference for social policy would mean that an individual has a problem that he or she wants to overcome, and considers a policy as a better option among potential solutions for the problem. The fact that a problem is a condition requiring solutions shows that there could be multiple or at least two stages in relation to one's social policy preferences: recognition of problems and shaping preferred solutions. Problem recognition is understood to happen when a person sees significant differences between his or her actual state and ideal state. To be more specific, a problem is likely to be recognised when either an actual state or a desired state changes, moving away from one another (Dewey, 1910; Bruber II and Pomazal, 1988). An actual state is the way an individual perceives his/her feelings and situation to be at the present time, and may change when one encounters an event that challenges the status quo. Various social risks, such as interrupted employment, the onset of old age, illness, or industrial accidents, could be good examples. In this regard, an individual's socioeconomic and demographic characteristics, which are closely related to a range of social risks an individual is exposed to, may have a significant influence on one's actual state. On the other hand, an ideal state is the way an individual wants to feel or be at the present time. An ideal state can be affected by internal factors, such as personal expectations, aspirations, or beliefs, and also external factors, such as culture or customs. The fact that problem recognition is not a simple outcome of a certain actual state, but the result of a difference between an ideal state and an actual state can be understood as suggesting that a problem is not an objective reality existing independent of our minds, but rather a subjective view that individuals have regarding a certain situation. In addition, having a problem does not necessarily mean that the person will

demand that the government address the problem. In fact, government intervention may be only one of many solutions to a problem. Individuals may evaluate all the potential alternatives they are aware of and choose a better or more acceptable solution than social welfare to the problems they recognise. In other words, social policy can be preferred only when a person is aware that the policy is a potential solution, and considers it to be better than others in terms of individuals' various criteria including costs and benefits. They may consider the probability of a change in their actual state, or whether their solution is socially desirable or at least acceptable. The two stages in preference formation can be the arenas in which the explanatory variables discussed above intervene. The variables may differ in terms of which stage they affect, and how, which could make the equation regarding individual preferences more complicated than expected.

The tendency to oversimplify the preference formation process is reflected in previous studies employing quantitative research methods, notably regression analysis. Quantitative research methods, which rely on large-scale surveys with a standardised set of questions, have been particularly useful to test a causal relationship between concerned factors, but are disadvantageous in gathering an in-depth understanding of people's behaviour and their motives. In this regard, further research using a qualitative research method is expected to allow a more in-depth exploration of both stages of the preference formation process, and therefore enhance our knowledge of individuals' preferences for social policy.

2.2. Theoretical Background

2.2.1. Social Policy Preferences and Dimensions

In the literature, the term 'social policy preferences' is often used interchangeably with 'welfare attitudes' or 'opinions/views on social welfare', despite the differences between them in nuance. Regardless of which terms are used, studies employing those concepts tend to have common interest in identifying factors affecting individuals' attitudes towards either the welfare state in general or individual social welfare programmes (Iversen and Soskice, 2001; Cusack, et al., 2005; Rueda, 2006; Svallfors, 2008; Bonoli and Häusermann, 2009; Breznau, 2010; Guillaud and Marx, 2013). However, the term 'preferences' is differentiated from the others, and also sounds more fit for the purpose of those studies, in that it explicitly emphasises 'choice' of individuals (or voters) in democratic societies: voters are given multiple policy options, and they may choose one thing in preference to the others. It also implies more strongly that there could be cleavages and conflicts between people with different preferences in relation to the issues of redistribution.

The complex nature of the welfare state implies that there are multiple dimensions in terms of individual attitudes towards social policy. We may find two widely-used dimensions in the literature: the range and the degree of government action (Huseby, 1995; Pettersen, 1995; Ebbinghaus and Naumann, 2018, p. 160). Firstly, social policy preferences could be about the range of welfare state activities. The primary goals of the welfare state, which is to ensure socioeconomic security and equality, can be accomplished in various ways, but each individual actor may have specific ideas of which policy areas the government should be responsible for or which functions. For instance, individual opinions may vary with regard to whether it is the responsibility of the government to guarantee its citizens certain transfers or services such as a

basic income, job opportunities, healthcare services or education. More fundamentally, individuals may differ in their views on whether the government should be responsible for reducing income differences between the rich and the poor, which is a principle that can be applied to all social policy areas. Studies concerning these aspects tend to measure individual social policy preferences by asking to what extent an individual actor agrees with a given idea/or statement about government responsibility in the provision of social welfare (Svallfors, 1997; Andreß and Heien, 2001; Blekesaune & Quadagno, 2003; Cusack, et al., 2005; Rehm, 2009; Breznau, 2010).

Secondly, social policy preferences could also be about one's ideas of the desirable degree of government involvement. Individual actors may have a certain idea of how much public resource should be dedicated to a given social policy. Studies with this approach usually covers a range of popular social policies that are targeted for a specific group of individuals in need – such as the unemployed, the sick, the elderly and families with children –, and use individuals' views on government spending on a given social policy as a barometer for level of preferences (Iversen and Soskice, 2001; Rueda, 2005; 2006; Svallfors, 2008; Bonoli and Häusermann, 2009; Lynch and Myrskylä, 2009; Guillaud and Marx, 2013).

Apart from these two dimensions, others could be considered as well. Once individuals approve a given function of the welfare state, for example, further questions may follow up with regard to details such as eligibility criteria or the financing of relevant programmes. In terms of eligibility, for example, some people are in favour of universal provision of social welfare, while the others are supportive of selective one. People may have different ideas of who should pay for the welfare state and to what extent. However, these sub-questions tend to be considered less fundamental than the questions concerning the responsibility of government, not least because they could be neglected if an actor does not see any government responsibility for

either a given policy area or overall social welfare provision, and also because the means of the welfare state are usually country-specific (Roller, 1999; Andreß and Heien, 2001).

2.2.2. Factors Shaping Social Policy Preferences

2.2.2.1. Individual-level: Economic Self-interest versus Values

There has been a long-standing assumption that self-interest is the basic drive of individuals' preferences and behaviours (Marx, 1887; Downs, 1957; Wilensky, 1975; Rose & Peters, 1978; Pöntinen & Uusitalo, 1986). This explanation focuses its attention on the egoistic nature of a human being: individual actors are argued to make a rational choice to maximise their utility. It is hypothesised that individual actors analyse given options in terms of cost-benefit and decide their own preferences. Applying to individuals' social policy preferences, the self-interest theory suggests that individuals will support the welfare state or a given social policy only when they expect personal gain, and also that people with more to gain will be more supportive of them. If the welfare state or a given policy is found not to be advantageous for their own interests, they will disapprove of it (Svallfors, 1997; Iversen and Soskice 2001; Rueda, 2005; Cusack et al.2006; Rehm 2009, 2011; Burgoon, et al., 2010;).

In this regard, individuals' socioeconomic and demographic characteristics, which represent individuals' structural locations in society, are considered to be important determinants of individuals' social policy preferences. In capitalist societies, the degree to which resources (such as income, qualifications or skills) and risks (such as unemployment, poverty, or illness) are distributed to individuals is systematically associated with individuals' socioeconomic and demographic characteristics. Thus, each individual actor is expected to decide whether or not to support the welfare state or a given policy after estimating the costs and benefits of it, based

on the measure of their socioeconomic and demographic characteristics. In terms of costs, those who contribute to the welfare state as tax-payers – such as the capitalist class or people with superior positions in the labour market – are expected to be more critical of social policy, relative to those who do not. With regard to the benefits, those who have more to gain from social welfare – such as the working class, people with a low income, the unemployed, those with low educational attainment, women, the elderly, or families with children – are assumed to be more supportive of social welfare, relative to those who are not, since they are either beneficiaries now or more likely to be future beneficiaries of welfare transfers and services (Lipset, 1981; Korpi, 1983; Esping-Andersen, 1990; Svallfors, 1997; Iversen and Soskice 2001; Rueda, 2005; Cusack et al.2006; Burgoon, et al., 2010; Rehm 2009, 2011). Such an idea is well epitomised by the Class theory: class plays the most dominant role in shaping the political attitudes of individuals. According to the power resource theory, which offers the most convincing explanation as to why and how Western welfare states have developed since World War II, the welfare state is a product of class conflict, particularly in terms of the relations between workers and capitalists. It argues that the working class have been supportive of the welfare state which guarantees them right to a certain level of livelihood, general welfare, and protection against a range of social risks, while the capitalist class have had more critical attitudes towards it (Lipset, 1981; Korpi, 1983; Esping-Andersen, 1990). Such a dichotomy could be criticised for providing an insufficient explanation for preference formation since those who pay taxes for the welfare state can also be beneficiaries as well in some cases. Middle-class in universalistic welfare states, for instance, are assumed to have a high degree of support for social welfare, despite their status as tax-payers, since they benefit from the universal provision of social programmes such as health and education services (Papadakis and Bean, 1993). However, it is still consistent with the idea that individuals act rationally to maximise their utility, which maps the preferences of individuals into certain outcomes.

Another important assumption of policy preferences formation highlights value-oriented human behaviour. This approach is to a large extent an antithesis of the self-interest theory, suggesting that individuals are not (only) motivated by their own material interest, but (also) by certain ideas, values or beliefs they hold. From this perspective, people would support what is consistent with their goal even if it violates their own self-interest. In such cases, individuals' attitudes towards social policy could be better understood with their ideological dispositions, namely the Left-Right ideological spectrum. Concerning the question of what distribution of resources and goods in society should be like, for instance, those with greater egalitarian values may prioritise equality for all people, being more in favour of redistributive policies. This approach is supported by a number of empirical cases of value-driven behaviour, but the question of how commitment to a certain value arises still remains inconclusive. Defenders of the approach tend to contend that individual variation in ideological inclination results from specific socialisation experience or psychological characteristics of individuals. However, one may argue that different ideological dispositions across individuals are simply reflections of different material circumstances. That is, those further up the socioeconomic ladder, such high-income groups, are argued to be more critical of egalitarian-based government actions. It is also probable that changes in one's economic standing promote an updating of individual beliefs through a process of learning (Breznau, 2010; Margalit, 2013). Of course, there could be various versions of altruism between the pure self-interest and the pure normative model. Dimick, Rueda, and Stegmueller (2018), for instance, discuss two theoretical approaches to altruism which are characterised by mixed motives. The first one is called 'income-dependent altruism': individuals can be motivated by both their own material interest and overall level of welfare in the society. In this case, the balance between self-interest and public welfare is determined by the weight individuals give to the society's welfare. If no weight is given to the society's side, then the person is concerned only about his or her own utility, having no support

for redistribution. If infinite weight given to the society's side, in contrast, the person is caring almost only about society's welfare. When the weight is held constant, individuals' support for redistribution may decrease with their own income, and increase with the level of inequality. This model, moreover, supposes that those from higher-income group is more easily motivated by inequality, relative to those from lower-income group, mainly because of the diminishing marginal utility of income and wealth. The second one is called 'difference aversion'. In this model, individuals' policy preferences are driven by both self-interest and other-regarding concerns, but for the latter part, they consider their relative position or rank in the distribution of income, instead of overall social welfare. In other words, this model considers not only altruism but also envy which could be caused by disadvantageous inequality. Like the previous one, this model also assumes that individuals' preferences for redistribution has a negative relationship with their own income, and a positive relationship with the level of inequality. However, it expects that those from lower-income group are more sensitive to inequality issue, relative to those from higher-income group, since envy gains more weight than altruism. These two theoretical approaches to altruism differ in terms of the implications, but both suggest that self-interest and value-orientation, two seemingly contrasting positions, may possibly coexist.

2.2.2.2. Interaction of Individual-level Motives and Institutions

From the post-World War II to 1970s, theories in political science were characterised by behaviouralism and rational choice approaches. That is, individuals make their own choices autonomously as individuals, and that their behaviours are outcomes of either calculated self-interest or socio-psychological characteristics, rather than the characteristics of institutions. Theories based on such individualistic assumptions, therefore, considered the observed behaviour of individuals as a sufficient condition that explains all political phenomena or

formally organised social institutions. In the 1980s, however, a range of new approaches, so-called the new-institutionalism, emerged in various fields of study – such as economics and sociology – with a revived focus on the impact of institutions. It comprises various branches which are not only different but also often inconsistent with each other in their understanding of institutions as well as human nature, but shares within institutionalism a common idea that the behaviour of individuals is shaped by institutions (March and Olsen, 1984; Immergut, 1988; Hall and Taylor, 1996; Peters, 1999).

Institutions and Self-interest

With regard to the question of how institutions affect the behaviour of individual actors, self-interest, which has been regarded as one of the key motives of human behaviour, is a worthy object of new-institutionalism. Borrowing mainly from economics and mathematics, rational choice institutionalism assumes that individuals are entirely rational, self-interested, utility-maximising actors, and therefore behave strategically based on a set of fixed, exogenously given preferences. In this view, institutions are understood as "arrangements of rules and incentives of institutional structure" that shape the interaction between the members (Peters, 2000, p. 3; North, 1990). North, who is frequently associated with rational choice institutionalism, defines institutions as "the rules of the game for society" (North, 1990, p.3), or more formally "humanly devised constraints that structure political, economic, and social interaction", and argues that institutions are made of "both informal constraints (sanctions, taboos, customs, traditions, and codes of conduct) and "formal rules (constitutions, laws, property rights)" (1991: 97-112). What institutions do is to provide the members with information - such as benefits and costs of compliance with/defection from institutions and a probable range of behaviours of others in an organisation or society –based on which

individuals reach particular calculations and consequential behaviour for the sake of maximum utility. This suggests that individual behaviour is constrained within institutions that they agree to follow in expectation of benefits they can gain from membership (Hall and Taylor, 1996; Immergut, 1998; Peters, 1999; Sanders, 2008; Fioretos, et al., 2016).

From the perspective of such a calculous approach, individual behaviours are characterised by a high degree of predictability and regularity due to the limited range of options a self-interested individual may choose in a given institutional context. This can also be understood as suggesting that institutional differences across societies may produce cross-societal differences in patterns of thoughts and behaviour (North, 1990; Hall and Taylor, 1996; Huck, 1997; Peters, 1999; Duma, 2013). Based on these assumptions, scholars working in comparative social policy tend to relate each welfare regime to specific social cleavages and conflicts. For example, Esping-Andersen (1990) suggests that different types of welfare regimes are associated with specific social cleavages and conflicts on issues of redistribution. According to him, the liberal regime, where the market plays the primary role in resource distribution, is likely to be an arena of class cleavages and conflicts that dominate other cleavages, especially between sexes and races. In the conservative regime, in which welfare provisions are earnings-related and the preservation of family-hood is highly emphasised, it is rather the insider-outsider divide that creates strong conflicts in society. Lastly, the social-democratic regime, where income-related social benefits exist on top of citizenship-based welfare provisions, is characterised by gender-sectoral conflict, particularly between men in the private sector and female in the public sector. Some scholars associate the welfare regime theory with cross-sectional differences in the level of public support for social welfare, often with reference to the power resource theory. It is argued that the middle-class in universalistic welfare states have been enthusiastic supporters for the welfare state because the universal provision of high-quality social programmes has

provided incentives for them to support the welfare state. Thus, they are understood to form a welfare coalition with the working class with whom they have shared interests regarding the welfare state. In contrast, the middle-class in residual welfare states, where those benefiting and those not receiving are separated by a poverty line, are argued to have favoured welfare state retrenchment, as they are not willing to pay taxes to finance social welfare programmes from which they are very unlikely to benefit. In such cases, the middle-class rather share interests with the upper class and are assumed to form an anti-welfare coalition with them (Korpi, 1980; King, 1987; Svallfors, 1999). In a similar vein, Pierson (2001) argues that the degree to which the public supports social welfare increases in line with the relative size of the "welfare clientele", who receive welfare benefits or are employed in the public sector.

Institutions and Values

While rational choice institutionalism explains how rational choice is mediated by institutions, those that have their roots in sociology, in particular normative institutionalism and sociological institutionalism, investigate how institutions shape value-orientation of individual actors, with scepticism towards rational actor models. Normative institutionalism emphasises the inclination to conform to institutions, in particular, norms, values and cultural expectations. March and Olsen (1989, p. 21-66) provide a definition of institutions as "collections of interrelated rules and routines that define appropriate actions in terms of relations between roles and situations". This perspective holds that institutions claim the individual commitment to a 'logic of appropriateness' even in cases where individual self-interest is violated. Such behavioural expectations can be understood as roles. Some roles may be position-specific, while others may be applicable to all members of a group or society.

The mechanism of how institutions relate to individuals in this approach is characterised by some sort of enforcement, as indicated by its name. This process may involve an external enforcement mechanism that forces (or persuades) an actor to conform to what is considered appropriate: a person who violates values or norms of an organisation where he/she belongs may risk suffering a punishment. The penalties may impose definite economic costs, but may also cause losses of something non-material, personally meaningful – such as a sense of belonging, personal reputation or opportunity of participating in religious services or practices. In effective and long-standing institutions, however, individual actors are argued to internalise the norms or values associated with an organisation or society through socialisation, rather than an external sanctioning procedure. For example, children gradually learn values, norms and standards of proper behaviour throughout their childhood, and become grown-ups who are able and willing to commit themselves to given roles. In terms of preference formation, this can be understood as suggesting that rather than individual-specific socialisation experience or instrumental calculation of personal utility, the values of the institutions shape preferences of individual actors who have the membership (March & Olsen, 1989; Hall and Taylor, 1996; Peters, 1999).

One may argue that normative institutionalism is just another version of rational choice institutionalism, especially in cases where economic losses are expected as a result of the violation of group norms or values. The existence of means leading to conformity with norms could be understood as indicating that institutionalised acts may not be the most preferred option. For instance, individual actors may face a conflict between the logic of appropriateness and the logic of consequentiality. In such cases, the imposition of penalties on defection from institutions may be perceived as costs, and therefore makes rational actors conclude that conforming with group norms and values is a way that maximise their utility. In fact, it could

be difficult to identify whether an actor is committed to the logic of appropriateness or the logic of consequentiality by analysing one's observed behaviour in ordinary situations. For instance, both a strong work ethic and intention to claim credit (or to avoid blame) may explain a civil servant who endeavours to deliver customer service as excellent as possible. However, empirical cases where individual actors sacrifice their obvious self-interest – such as soldiers or firemen who play their given roles despite the imminent danger – can be better explained by the logic of appropriateness (Peters, 1999).

Normative institutionalism places a strong emphasis on culture in which the value-orientation of individual actors is generated and reinforced (March & Olsen, 1989; Hall and Taylor, 1996; Peters, 1999). In this regard, Oorschot (2000, 2006) associates such normative dimensions of culture with public support for welfare policies in a more systematic way. He maintains that there are common deservingness criteria that people in European countries use to determine who deserve relief and why. Referring to Coughlin (1980) and Pettersen (1995), who identified the same deservingness rank ordering of groups with different socioeconomic characteristics across the European welfare states[17], he suggests five criteria: control, need, identity, attitude, and reciprocity. The idea is that the degree of deservingness of a given group of needy people increases when they are perceived to have less control of neediness, have greater level of need, be considered closer to 'us', be more compliant, and be more reciprocal, and that such criteria and subsequent deservingness rank order determine the levels of public support for individual social policies targeting specific groups of people in need. From the normative perspective, such criteria can be understood as the crystallisation of a set of cultural expectations shared by

[17] It is found that in Western welfare states, almost invariably, elderly people are considered as most deserving of relief, followed by the sick and disabled, poor family with children and the unemployed. Immigrants are seen as least deserving among the all groups.

the members of society. For example, a criterion 'control of neediness' may reflect the idea that young and healthy people should participate in the labour market for their own income, not being supposed to rely on welfare benefits. Another criterion 'Reciprocity' implies that the right to social welfare should be earned by contributing to society. Most importantly, such deservingness criteria themselves mean that the society and its members are obliged to provide relief for those who appear to be deserving. In a similar vein, Pfau-Effinger (2005) uses a more welfare-specific concept 'welfare culture', which is defined as "the relevant ideas in a given society surrounding the welfare state and the way it is embedded in society." She suggests six key elements of welfare culture including: ideas about waged work and the labour market, ideas about solidarity and social integration, perceptions of justice in relation to redistribution, understanding of poverty, ideas about the state-market relationship, and ideas about the roles of the state, the market and the family in welfare provision. These elements overlap partially with the five deservingness criteria suggested by Oorschot, in that they both have ideas of who are deserving of social welfare and why, but represent a wider range of cultural values and ideals surrounding the society and relevant actors (Pfau-Effinger, 2005).

While normative institutionalism is mainly concerned with the normative dimension of institutions, sociological institutionalism tends to place a strong emphasis on the 'cognitive dimension' of institutions, paying close attention to the role of culture in generating meaning (Zucker, 1977, 1983; DiMaggio and Powell, 1991; Hall and Tylor, 1996; Peters, 1999). In sociological institutionalism, an action is inseparable with interpretation: individual actors do not simply conform to their self-interest, or what norms specify, but choose their action purposively based on their interpretation of the situation, oneself, and behaviour of others. Sociological institutionalists tend to argue that institutions, notably established routines, symbol systems or scripts, intervene in this process by providing cognitive templates for

interpretation. It is worth noting that such a cognitive process influences individuals' basic preferences as well as identity. From the sociological perspective, individuals are depicted as ones "seeking to define and express their identity in socially appropriate ways" (Hall and Tylor, 1996, p.16). Individuals are argued to engage in acts which they interpret as socially meaningful, and simultaneously recognise themselves as social actors when acting as institutions prescribe (Hall and Tylor, 1996). This may suggest that controls – such as incentives, sanctioning processes, or internalisation of norms suggested by other institutionalisms – may not be very useful in explaining one's conformity to institutions. In this regard, sociological institutionalists pay attention to the relationship between "taken-for-granted aspects of everyday life" and the cognitive process (Zucker, 1983, p. 5). Zucker contends that institutionalisation itself is "a phenomenological process by which certain social relationships and actions come to be taken for granted, that is part of the 'objective situation', while at the same time it is the structure of reality defining what has meaning and what actions are possible" (Zucker, 1983, p. 2). In support of Zucker's argument, DiMaggio and Powell (1991, p.15) even stress that "not norms and values but taken-for-granted scripts, rules, and classifications are the stuff of which institutions are made."

Comparing Institutionalisms

As discussed above, the new institutionalism consists of several branches, each of which is based on distinctive presumptions of human nature, the definition of an institution, and how individuals interact with institutions. The key difference to which we should pay attention with regard to this study is the source of preferences. The literature suggests two broad positions, which lead us to different predictions about behaviour, respectively. Firstly, rational choice institutionalism assumes that individuals have fixed, exogenous, clearly ordered preferences,

which remain largely unchanged in response to any institutional involvement. This calculous approach suggests that institutions, namely rules and incentives of institutional structure, can be simply treated as external factors that individuals take into account for a cost-benefit analysis, and therefore that preferences of an actor are easily predictable once the mathematic equation of preferences and relevant variables are identified. However, such an idea based on a simple image of human motivation can be criticised for missing many other important dimensions of human behaviour. Empirical cases show that instrumental calculation of personal utility does not explain all aspects of individual behaviour, and that preferences are often multidimensional and/or ambiguous. In this regard, normative and sociological versions of institutionalism, which could be labelled as cultural approaches, provide better explanations for preference formation. Scholars working in these schools argue that preferences of individual actors are endogenous and changeable in accordance with individuals' experiences with the institutions, notably culture. From these perspectives, discrete cultural differences across societies and how they interact with individuals are of serious concern to the theorists. Since cultural aspects cover a wide range of the population with the membership regardless of individual-level characteristics, moreover, institutions are argued to increase the uniformity among the members (Hall and Taylor, 1996; Peters, 1999; 2000).

It is worth noting that the latter approaches do not deny the instrumental or purposive aspects of human behaviour. Normative institutionalists admit that both the logic of appropriateness and the logic of consequentiality are able to drive individuals' behaviour. However, they also emphasise that when it comes to a conflict between the two inconsistent goals, the former, which has inherent legitimacy, may influence behaviour more than the latter, even if it violates personal interests. In this approach, the degree to which individual actors to conform with institutions depends on how effective the enforcement mechanisms – such as socialisation

(internal) or sanctioning processes (external) – are (Hall and Tylor, 1996; Peters, 1999). This may indicate that deviation from institutions is probable if those enforcement mechanisms are less persuasive than self-interest. Unlike the normative version of institutionalism, sociological institutionalism argues that conformity to institutions is engendered by interpretation, and that even what is considered as 'rational action' is socially constituted. From their perspectives, one's instrumental action is likely to be done in ways that are socially appropriate and consistent with his/her identity (Hall and Tylor, 1996; Peters, 1999).

These varieties of approaches to institutions do not necessarily mean that one approach should be chosen at the expense of the others since all approaches have a reasonable empirical basis. It seems reasonable to assume that each school of thought captures different dimensions of institutional impact and human behaviour (Hall and Tylor, 1996). In the sense that an individual could be motivated by both personal self-interest and ideology which might contradict each other, we may think about two different, potentially conflicting, institutional outcomes existing within one individual: individual social preferences based on instrumental calculation of institutional incentives and penalties, and worldviews/perspectives of social welfare which are culturally constructed and shared by the public. Further, we may speculate that the former could be a source of cleavages and conflicts between different social groups on the issues of redistribution, while the latter may promote uniformity of welfare attitudes across various social groups holding the same membership.

Despite theoretical problems due to the contradiction between the branches, moreover, we may also find some features that bind all different approaches with one label, 'the new institutionalism'. Most obviously and importantly, these various institutional approaches commonly emphasise the capacity of institutions to influence behaviour and preferences of individuals. Institutions are defined in various ways by different approaches, covering a wide

range of meanings from formal to informal structures, and from ideational aspects to routines in ordinary everyday activities. However, all the variations of the new institutionalism commonly point out that institutions are structures that have a causal impact on individuals' behaviour and preferences (March and Olsen, 1989; Hall and Taylor, 1996; Peters, 1999; North, 1991; Zucker, 1983; DiMaggio and Powell, 1991).

Another important feature of institutions is their durability. Zucker (1977, p. 726) in effort to explain cultural persistence, argues that institutionalisation increases "generational uniformity of cultural understandings, maintenance of these understandings, and resistance of these understanding to change." With regard to such persistence, normative institutionalism assumes that institutions may persist for generations by socialising newcomers into the norms and values of the institutions. Sociological institutionalism, in contrast, highlights the interactive and mutually-constitutive relationship between individuals and institutions. Institutions specify what one can do in a given situation, but individuals themselves also reinforce those institutions that are perceived to be socially meaningful. Also, institutionalised acts are often considered so taken-for-granted, that they may avoid direct scrutiny (Hall and Taylor, 1996; Peters, 1999; 2000; Zucker, 1983). Compared with these two approaches, rational choice institutionalism seems to be more open to institutional change. Given the perspective of this approach, individual actors, who are fully-rational and strategic, adhere to institutions in exchange for certain benefits. Institutions can be further reinforced if they contribute to collective utility and welfare. If the outcome is unsatisfactory, or there are other attractive alternatives, however, individuals may attempt to deviate from, or manipulate, the rules in order to fulfil their goals (Immergut, 1998). Even in such cases, however, it is likely that reformists will be frustrated by those who want to maintain the status quo for the sake of their interest unless they somehow convince (or defeat) the others.

Lastly, institutions increase the regularity of human behaviour. All the approaches to institutions discussed above indicate that individuals are expected to show a stable pattern of behaviour in response to a given institution. This signifies two things. Firstly, institutions are independent variables: behaviour and preferences of individual actors can be explained and also predicted by institutions to a large extent. Secondly, institutional differences across societies may contribute to cross-national differences in individuals' behaviour and preferences (Hall and Taylor, 1996; Peters, 1999; 2000; Pfau-Effinger, 2005).

2.2.3. Analytical Framework


According to previous studies, individual preferences for social policy are likely to be affected by three major factors: self-interest, values, and institutions (see Figure 1). At the individual-level, actors are understood to be motivated by material self-interest, on the one hand, and values, on the other. With regard to self-interest motivation, individuals are expected to calculate their personal utility based on their structural locations in society, and then finally decide their social policy preferences in a way that maximises the material interest (the arrow departing from the grey box on the upper centre arrives at the dark grey box on the top right). Values may also matter for individuals' welfare attitudes. Individuals with greater egalitarian values tend to be more in favour of social welfare programmes in an effort to pursue more equal society rather than self-interest, relative to the others (the arrow departing from the grey box on the bottom centre arrives at the dark grey box on the bottom right).

Institutions, as societal or national-level sources of influence, may affect both/either self-interest and/or value orientation. The mechanisms in which institutions shape individuals' preferences could vary, but three major approaches are identified. Firstly, rational choice

institutionalism suggests that institutions, such as the rules and incentives, may mediate rational choice by providing information for instrumental calculation of personal interest (the arrow departing from the light grey box on the top left arrives at the grey box on the upper centre). Secondly, normative institutionalism argues that institutions, such as social norms and values, may claim individuals' commitment to a set of institutionalised values and standardised behaviours, by defining what is appropriate/or inappropriate in a given circumstance (the arrow departing from the light grey box on the middle-left arrives at the grey box on the bottom centre). Lastly, sociological institutionalism highlights the cognitive dimension of institutions: institutions, such as established routines, symbols or scripts, may provide individuals with cognitive templates for interpretation, which eventually drives individuals to certain socially meaningful actions (the arrow departing from the light grey box on the bottom left arrives at the grey box on the bottom centre).

When combined, three institutional approaches are associated with two outcomes. Regarding the first approach to institutions (rational choice institutionalism), the outcome of institutional influence is likely to be individuals' preferences which best serve the material interest of atomised actors or specific social groups. With regard to the second and third approaches (normative and sociological institutions), the outcomes are likely to be worldviews/perspectives which reflect institutionalised values or taken-for-granted cultural aspects, and therefore to be the public opinion which a large proportion of the population share regardless of their personal interests. The process of social policy preference formation and relevant sources of influences are epitomised in the following analytical framework. (see Figure 1).

Figure 1. Analytical Framework



3. Methodology

3.1. Research Design: A Mixed Methods Approach

This thesis employs a mixed-methods approach that collects and analyses data using both quantitative and qualitative methods to best serve the purposes of the thesis. The thesis has two research questions which neither quantitative nor qualitative methods may answer alone. According to institutional theories, institutions may shape social policy preferences of individual actors by affecting the way individuals pursue their self-interest and ideological orientation. Given the institutional differences across societies, it can be argued that many of the expectations for Western nations regarding welfare attitudes would not apply to non-Western countries such as Korea. It is probable that people in Korea are characterised by different patterns of reasoning regarding their preferences, not least because of their cultural contexts. In this regard, the quantitative analysis is performed in order to answer the first research question of whether individual self-interest or cultural-related factors explain social policy preferences in Korea. By examining the validity of predominant assumptions of welfare attitudes with survey data from Korea, the quantitative analysis helps ascertain causal relationships between key variables and social policy preferences of individuals in the country, as well as the general characteristics of the population. Given the results of the quantitative analysis, the qualitative analysis is conducted to answer the second research question of how social policy preferences of a particular group of individuals (female labour market outsiders) in Korea are shaped by their family-related and cultural contexts. The qualitative analysis interrogates the relationships identified in the quantitative analysis by exploring individual experiences in which qualitative approaches specialise. It should be note that the use of quantitative method within a single country case cannot easily validate or falsify the role of

normative or sociological institutions because there is no variation in these institutions which can be captured in a single country-wave survey. The quantitative method in this study only serves to show that self-interest factors are not - in many instances - systematically related to social policy preferences in Korea. The quantitative method can then document how and why family-related and cultural factors influence the social policy preferences of female labour market outsiders.

Such mixed-methods research is believed to add more values to this study in various aspects, relative to studies with a single research method. The mixed-methods approach is a strategy that combines the specific strengths of each method and minimises the weaknesses. Quantitative research approach is characterised by a high likelihood of establishing generalisation, high reliability and simple and effective delivery of complicated research findings, on the one hand. However, it is on the other hand disadvantaged in that use of quantitative approach is strictly limited to cases where information is measurable and tangible, and also that it suffers a limited description and interpretation of how people experience a given issue (Toomela, 2008). By contrast, qualitative research approach claims advantages such as its ability to provide complex textual descriptions of a phenomenon as well as high flexibility. It also specialises in identifying nonquantifiable intangible factors such as emotions, opinions, beliefs, contradictory behaviours as well as social norms and cultural values. However, simultaneously, it could be criticised for lacking objectivity and generalisability (Nagel, 1986; Gelo et al., 2008). By choosing a mixed-methods research, we may take advantages of both approaches, namely breadth, depth, and richness of understanding (Creswell et al., 2007; O'Cathain et al., 2007; Yeasmin et al., 2012).

Such integration of multiple research methods offers two distinctive benefits to the thesis. Firstly, it serves for confirmatory purpose. The mixed-methods approach can be "a process of

verification that increases validity by incorporating several viewpoints and methods" (Yeasmin et al., 2012, p.156). To be specific, quantitative results can be better interpreted by qualitative research instruments, especially when the research phenomenon lacks theoretical underpinnings. Social policy preference formation in Korea has been almost unstudied, and therefore existing theories have trouble explaining. In such a case, the qualitative approach may provide an in-depth explanation of the phenomenon under investigation, by looking at the world beyond what is encoded in a variable. Qualitative results, which can be criticised for lacking objectivity and generalisability, can also be validated by quantitative studies. The researcher and also readers may gain more confidence in their qualitative results and the conclusion when quantitative results find support for qualitative results. Secondly, it may also serve completeness purposes. The mixed-methods research may provide a more meaningful and comprehensive interpretation. In a study of a phenomenon, one method may inform the other, which contribute to recognising multiple realities and also to enhancing one's understanding in both depth and breadth (Babbie, 2007; Greene, 2007; Kim, 2008a; Yeasmin et al., 2012; Yu et al., 2013; McKim, 2017).

3.2. The Quantitative Analysis

The quantitative research is designed to grasp the characteristics of the population in Korea in term of their welfare attitudes, and also to examine the impacts of explanatory factors that have been considered by literature as determinants of individuals' social policy preferences. This research uses the data of 'Public Attitudes towards Welfare Policy' survey, which has been conducted in 2013 by the Korea Institute for Health and Social Affairs, together with the Institute for Social Welfare, Seoul National University. The surveys were conducted with 4,185

respondents in the Republic of Korea, using ‘stratified sampling’.


3.2.1. Analytical Framework for the Quantitative Analysis

The key dependent variables of this study are responses to a range of questions that are designed to capture respondents’ attitudes towards social policy. Of the various types of questions in this survey, two types have been selected for analysis. The first looks at the respondents’ preferences on general welfare aims and means, including levels of respondents’ support for government action aiming to reduce income inequality, respondents’ attitudes towards a tax increase for welfare expansion in the provision of social welfare, and respondents’ preferences for/against universalism/selectivism. The second type of question measures respondents’ preferences on social policy areas supporting four different risk groups. These areas include support for the unemployed, support for the sick (public healthcare), support for the elderly (old-age income supplement), and support for families with children.

Reflecting previous studies on the formation of public opinion, nine factors that have been considered to be determinants of individuals’ social policy preferences are selected as independent variables. They include gender, age, education, labour market status, household type, personal income, equivalised disposable household income, left-right ideological orientation, and levels of interest in politics. Of the nine, the first seven variables were chosen to see whether or not groups with different socioeconomic structural locations show statistically significant differences in terms of their views on social policy. Ideological orientation was selected to test whether or how actors are ideologically motivated in formulating their opinions towards social policy. It is worth noting that equivalised disposable household income and levels of interest in politics are rarely observed in studies on social

policy preference formation. In this study, they have been chosen as independent variables in consideration of the institutional context of Korea, where family plays an important role as the informal provider of welfare while social welfare has been relatively underdeveloped compared to that of Western societies. In such situations, intra-household transfers, often from earners to dependents, could be more influential than personal income in terms of people's standard of living. Also, some individuals may be relatively less interested in politics, especially in relation to social welfare, since they have rarely benefited from social welfare while being more economically dependent on the labour market and family welfare.

Figure 2. Analytical Framework for the Quantitative Analysis



It is worth noting that individuals' ideological orientation or interest in politics may possibly be reflective of individuals' rational choice based on their socioeconomic and demographic characteristics. For more accurate analysis and in-depth understanding of factors shaping individuals' attitudes towards the welfare state in general and each social policy, the analysis will be performed with two different models: one excluding these two, and the other including them.

3.2.2. Data and Measurements

This chapter analyses data collected by the '2013 Public Attitudes towards Welfare Policy' survey. The survey is a supplementary survey to the 'Korea Welfare Panel Study'[18] and has been conducted every three years from 2007 onwards. The 2013 survey was conducted with 4185 respondents in the Republic of Korea who had been recruited using proportional stratified sampling. This supplementary survey is suitable for this research since it provides information about various characteristics of respondents and their households, as well as their attitudes towards welfare policy. In this chapter, the responses of 3,696 respondents are analysed, excluding those containing at least one missing value. The percentage of cases with missing values is 11.7%, which can be considered high. Such a high proportion is partly be attributed to survey items asking for respondents' household type and ideological orientation. These items have relatively high proportions of cases with missing values, which are 3.6% and 5.8% respectively. This may imply that a significant proportion of respondents found these questions

[18] The 'Korea Welfare Panel Study' has been conducted every year from 2006 by the Korea Institute for Health and Social Affairs, in collaboration with the Institute for Social Welfare, Seoul National University. Of the surveys, those in 2007, 2010 and 2013 had their own supplementary studies.

difficult or uncomfortable to answer. Nevertheless, such a high percentage is better understood by the fact that the research includes 16 items for analysis. In fact, each item generally has either no or an only small number of cases with missing values, but as a whole, the accumulated number of respondents who have not answered at least one question out of the 16 reaches 489 (see Table 1).

Table 1. The Number of Observation and Cases with Missing Values, by Item

Item	Observation	Missing (%)
Gender	4185	0 (0.0)
Age group	4185	0 (0.0)
Education	4185	0 (0.0)
Household type	4033	152 (3.6)
Labour market status	4128	57 (1.3)
Personal income	4185	0 (0.0)
Equivalised disposable household income	4173	12 (0.2)
Ideological orientation	3943	242 (5.8)
Level of interest in politics	4165	20 (0.5)
“It is the responsibility of the government to reduce differences in income levels.”	4174	11 (0.2)
“Tax should be increased in order to expand the welfare state.”	4185	0 (0.0)
“Social welfare should be offered to all by right, not only to specific groups of deserving poor”	4185	0 (0.0)
Financial support for the unemployed	4161	24 (0.5)
Financial support for the sick	4178	7 (0.1)
Financial support for the elderly	4158	27 (0.6)
Financial support for families with children	4173	12 (0.3)

3.2.3. Dependent Variables

a) Respondents' attitudes towards general welfare aims and means

Of the various questions in the '2013 Public Attitudes towards Welfare Policy' survey, three questions were selected in order to construct the first type of dependent variables, which investigate respondents' views on the welfare state from various angles. Respondents were asked how much they agreed or disagreed with the following statements:

- *It is the responsibility of the government to reduce differences in income levels*
- *Tax should be increased in order to expand the welfare state.*
- *Social welfare should be offered to all by right, not only to specific groups of deserving poor.*

Respondents were offered five possible answers from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree).

b) Respondents' preferences for social policy areas for risk groups

The second type of dependent variables in the analyses is respondents' answers to questions asking for respondents' preferences for government spending on four social policies areas. While the first type of the questions focuses on the attitudes of respondents towards various aspects of social policy, the second type of questions is expected to ascertain individuals' actual levels of demand for four individual social policy areas including financial support for the unemployed, the sick, the elderly, and families with children. Respondents were informed in advance that an increase in government spending would be likely to lead to a tax increase. They could give their opinions on each policy, from 1 (much less) to 5 (much more).

Table 2. Dependent Variables

Type of questions	Item	Options from 1 to 5
Respondents' preferences on general welfare aims and means	• It is the responsibility of the government to reduce differences in income levels. • Tax should be increased in order to expand the welfare state. • Social welfare should be offered to all by right, not only to specific groups of deserving poor.	1. Strongly disagree 2. Disagree 3. Neither agree nor disagree 4. Agree 5. Strongly agree
Respondents' preferences on social policy areas for risk groups	Government spending on • Financial support for the unemployed (employment promotion and unemployment benefits) should • Financial support for the sick (public healthcare) should • Financial support for the elderly should • Financial support for families with children should	1. Decrease greatly 2. Decrease slightly 3. Stay the same 4. Increase slightly 5. Increase greatly

3.2.4. Independent Variables: Characteristics of Individual Actors

The independent variables mostly represent individuals' distinctive socioeconomic and demographic characteristics that are assumed by previous studies to be factors shaping individuals' attitudes towards social policy. In terms of gender, women are often perceived to be more supportive of the welfare state, relative to their male counterparts, since in many societies, they are more likely to be exposed to labour market risks, such as unemployment or low-pay (Svallfors, 1997; Svallfors, 2008; Bonoli and Häusemann, 2009). By setting male

respondents as a reference, we will see whether or not gender has a statistically significant impact on social policy preferences when other variables are held constant.

Age, which represents one's current stage in the life-cycle, is often argued to generate an axis of conflict between generations. The youth and the retired are generally assumed to be more vulnerable to poverty because of their low income, relative to the other age groups, and therefore, these age groups are expected to have more approving attitudes towards redistributive social policies, compared to the others. In the sense that chances of getting ill also increase with age, the elderly are expected to be more supportive of public healthcare. In a similar way, it is also anticipated that those who are currently in or approaching their parenting period are strong supporters for child-benefits (Weaver, 2003; Svallfors, 2008; Bonoli and Häusemann, 2009). In this study, youth are defined as individuals aged 19 to 24, while senior citizens, who are often retirees, refer to those aged 65 or over. The youngest age group excludes those who were aged 18 or under because the survey respondents were all aged 19 or over. The age groups of the population between the youth and the elderly are divided into four sub-groups (25–34, 35–44, 45–54, and 55–64). By setting age 35-44, those who are most likely to be labour market insiders and the top-earning group, as a reference group, moreover, we will see whether or not they have different social policy preferences from the other age groups, displaying the conflict of interest against other age groups.

It should be noted that age may also capture generational differences (Inglehart, 1977), that is, the older generation in Korea who were socialised during the authoritarian regime could be characterised by collectivist views on the society, which can be associated with the residual view of social welfare. However, it is difficult to separate the generation-specific characteristics from the effects of self-interest with the age variable used for the quantitative analysis here.

Educational attainment is included in the model as a variable that represents one's market value

of human capital. When other variables are held constant, those with higher educational attainment are generally considered to be more competitive in the labour market, and are therefore more likely to obtain better job security and income (Tomlinson and Walker, 2012). If so, they may have less to gain from redistributive measures, but rather more to lose, and therefore could be more critical of social welfare. It is worth noting that educational attainment in Korea has increased from cohort to cohort, as older age groups tend to have less education. The fact that the elderly are generally less competitive than younger age groups in the labour market is partly attributed to such difference in educational attainment. The '2013 Public Attitudes towards Welfare Policy' survey divides respondents' education levels into seven groups: primary education or below, lower secondary education, upper secondary education, short-cycle tertiary education, bachelor or equivalent level, master or equivalent level, and doctoral or equivalent level. In this study, respondents' education levels are re-located on a five-point scale rank: 1. basic education, which includes primary education and lower secondary education; 2. (upper) secondary education; 3. short-cycle tertiary education; 4. bachelor or equivalent level; and 5. master or higher level.

Household type may also be a factor that affects individuals' views on social policy. This variable is closely associated with household income and expenses in relation to a given type of household. One may argue that having dependent children may increase the chances of falling into poverty due to child-related expenses that parents pay. Or, this could be true only in the case of single parents who find it difficult to juggle their work and child-rearing (Tomlinson and Walker, 2012). In a similar way, having another earner in a household would also reduce the risk of poverty if one's income is shared within the household. To test these, a single adult is defined as the reference, and the others are categorised into four groups: married couple with no dependent children, married couple with dependent children (under 18), adult-

only-household and single parent. Adult-only-household may include multi-generational households, such as a household consisting of a married couple and their elderly parents. It is worth noting that household type hardly tells us about transfers and services within an extended family-kin network consisting of multiple households, which is a limitation of the analysis associated with the nature of the data focusing on individual- and household-level information.

Labour market segmentation, particularly divided by permanent versus temporary employment contracts, represent different individual exposure to labour market risks. Many studies assume that those with higher probabilities of being unemployed (also known as labour market 'outsiders') are likely to be in favour of redistribution, relative to those with securer employment relations ('insiders') (Rueda, 2005; Burgoon and Dekker, 2010; Häusemann and Schwander, 2011; Lindvall, et al., 2013). The '2013 Public Attitudes towards Welfare Policy' survey classifies people into six categories: standard workers, temporary workers[19], day labourers, the unemployed[20], the self-employed[21], and the non-employed[22]. In this study, considering different levels of job security individuals may have in their jobs, these employment segments are re-categorised into four groups: labour market insiders, labour market outsiders, the self-employed, and the non-employed. Of the employment segments, standard workers alone can be considered to be labour market insiders who enjoy secure, often permanent, employment. Temporary workers, day labourers, and the unemployed can be re-classified as labour market outsiders, who are unlikely to enjoy the employment protection and

[19] Temporary workers are employees whose contracts last less than a year.
[20] The unemployed are those who have been seeking work for the past four weeks.
[21] The self-employed are individuals who earn their income from a trade or business that they operate. They have their own business but are different from business owners, as they operate their business as a primary or sole operator.
[22] The non-employed are defined as individuals who are 15 or over, and neither employed nor actively seeking employment, usually because of education, retirement, housekeeping, disability or military service.

work-related benefits that insiders do. The unemployed can be differentiated from others in the outsider group in the sense that temporary workers and day labourers at least remain in paid employment. However, the researcher has deliberately clustered them as the same group, mainly because the great majority of respondents with the employed outsider status reported a lack of job security (see Table 3), and also because the number of unemployed respondents is only 37, which is not considered to be large enough to be a separate group for analyses. The non-employed such as housewives are differentiated from the unemployed in the sense that they deliberately choose not to participate in the labour market[23]. Among the four groups, insiders are set as a reference.

Table 3. Expected Probability of Continued Employment, Share by Labour Market Segment (N)

Labour market status	Probability of continued employment	
	My employment can easily be terminated for business reasons, regardless of my will	**I expect my employment to continue until my retirement, unless any serious business slow-down occurs**
Insiders	1.7% (44)	98.3% (2,597)
Outsiders (employed)	77.1% (2,043)	22.9% (607)

Source: 2013 Public Attitudes towards Welfare Policy

Personal income and equivalised disposable household income are included to consider individuals' financial situation. It is assumed by the self-interest theory that the higher the income, there is less support for redistribution. Personal income is defined as the sum of earnings that an individual receives in one year from employment, self-employment or

[23] Such definitions of each segmentation are consistent throughout the thesis.

investment before taxes. The equivalised disposable income of a household, which represents the family welfare capacity, is calculated by dividing the disposable household income by the square root of the number of household members following common convention. For the final analysis, the logarithmic values are used.

The impacts of ideological inclination on individuals' preferences for social policy has been well-recognised in social science literature (Blekesaune & Quadagno, 2003; Linos & West, 2003; Mau, 2004; Breznau, 2010), while the influences of individuals' degree of interest in politics has not attracted much attention from social scientists working on individuals' social policy preferences. However, the latter might also have significance in countries with a relatively shorter history of democracy and social welfare. Due to low level of understanding of, and experience with, social welfare, for example, a large proportion of the population in Korea may not relate politics to their own interest, which may eventually decrease the demand for social welfare. To test these, both ideological orientation and the level of interest in politics are included in the model. Respondents to the '2013 Public Attitudes towards Welfare Policy' survey were asked to identify their political ideology on a five-point scale: 1. very conservative; 2. conservative; 3. moderate; 4. progressive; and 5. very progressive. They were also asked to locate their levels of interest in politics on a five-point scale: 1. not at all interested; 2. slightly interested; 3. moderately interested; 4. very interested; and 5. extremely interested. As mentioned above, these two factors can be not only independent causes of one's attitudes towards social policy, but also the outcomes reflecting individuals' pursuit of interest based on their socioeconomic or demographic characteristics. To have a more precise analysis, the study is performed with two separate models: one with these variables, and the other without.

Table 4. Independent Variables

Item	Operational definition
Gender	Male (Reference) = 1, Female = 2
Age	Age 35-44 (Reference) = 1, Age 19-24 = 2, Age 25-34 = 3, Age 45-54 = 4, Age 55-64 = 5, Age 65 or over = 6
Education	5 point-scale ordered from 1 to 5 1. Basic education (primary education and lower secondary education) 2. (Upper) Secondary education 3. Short-cycle tertiary education 4. Bachelor or equivalent level 5. Master or higher level
Household type	Single adult (Reference) = 1, Married couple with no dependent children = 2, Married couple with dependent children = 3, Adult-only-households = 4, Single parent = 5
Labour market status	Insider (Reference) = 1, Outsider = 2, Self-employed = 3. Non-employed = 4
Personal income	ln(personal income)
Equivalised disposable household income	ln(disposable household income per year/$\sqrt{}$number of household members)
Ideological orientation	5 point-scale ordered from 1 to 5 1. Very conservative 2. Conservative 3. Moderate 4. Progressive 5. Very progressive
Interest in politics	5 point-scale ordered from 1 to 5 1. Not at all interested 2. Slightly interested 3. Moderately interested 4. Very interested 5. Extremely interested

3.3. The Qualitative Analysis

The qualitative part of the research is to investigate how social policy preferences of a specific socioeconomic group, female labour market outsiders in Korea, are shaped by family-related and cultural contexts in Korea. Specifically, it aims to understand how such culture-related factors influence problem recognition and shaping the preferred solution of women in the labour market outsider position.

3.3.1. Data Collection

Data collection for the qualitative analysis involved semi-structured interviews with 27 female labour market outsiders (aged between 19 and 64) who reside in Seoul and its satellite cities in South Korea. The participants were either temporarily unemployed persons, or employees with temporary contracts, with low pay and little opportunities for personal development. The interviews were carried out over six months, from June to December 2016 (see Table 5 and Appendix 1 for details).

Interviewees were selected and approached with the assistance of relevant organisations. These were non-governmental and non-profit organisations with an in-depth understanding of potential participants, and also that had no probability of exercising any negative influence or control over the participants. This recruiting process benefited the research in two ways. Firstly, the organisations assisted the researcher in selecting interviewees with the most relevant and the highest quality information. This process also involved screening potentially vulnerable people from the recruitment process. Female labour market outsiders are more likely to be exposed to certain events which cause serious harm, distress or exploitation than their male counterparts. Some of them might be unable to protect their rights, interests or well-being due

to their vulnerable positions. In extreme cases, therefore, interviews with such people may provoke negative emotions or even dangerous behaviours by the participants. By recruiting participants in cooperation with related organisations, people with the potential for such risks were identified and excluded from participation in the research project. Secondly, this process was intended to ensure that all participants were able to give free and informed consent. If participants were recruited in association with organisations to which they were subordinate or too closely related, they might have been unable to provide free, informed consent or might have hesitated to speak frankly due to their vulnerable positions. By working with organisations which were selected with careful consideration, the researcher was able to make sure that participation in the research was voluntary, and also that all participants felt free to state their own views.

Each interview was carried out for three hours, on average, in public but quiet places, such as coffee shops or public parks, in order to prevent the participants from feeling uncomfortable or embarrassed. The researcher behaved responsibly by seeking informed consent from all participants before they took part in the research, and provided them with sufficient information on all aspects of participation and data use, such as the purpose of the research, why they were selected, how the data would be stored, preserved and used, and also how confidentiality and anonymity would be maintained. Furthermore, they were advised that they could withdraw their participation at any time if they thought that their interests were not being protected. All the information and advice were provided in Korean. Interviews were recorded and transcribed with the permission of the participants.

Table 5. Outline of the Participants

Age cohort	Number of participants	Industry (Business/Service)	Marital status (Married)	Education (college graduate)	Having dependent children or grandchildren under 6
20s	8	3/2	0	7	0
30s	7	0/6	6	5	5
40s	6	2/3	3	4	0
50s or over	6	1/5	5	1	2
Total	**27**	6/16	14	17	7

3.3.2. Interview Questions

The questionnaire was designed to obtain a detailed and in-depth understanding of the reasoning patterns of participants in relation to their social policy preferences. The questions were divided into two parts in consideration of two stages of the decision-making process: problem recognition and shaping preferred solutions. The first part asks mainly what participants recognise as problems and why. The second part asks what solutions they prefer in response to the problems they recognise, and why. In order to make the questions more relevant to the research purpose, the questions were refined through pilot interviews with four acquaintances of the researcher before the actual interviews. As semi-structured, the interviews had pre-established questions and a pre-planned order, but the alteration of these and follow-up questions was allowed. The list of the pre-defined questions is as follows.

A. Recognition of problems (for Chapter 6)

a) What comes to mind when you think of four given situations (including having labour market outsider status, child-rearing, old-age income reduction, and contracting a disease)? Please explain your answers.

b) If you recognise some problems in relation to the situations, please rank how serious a problem each situation would be for you. Please explain your answers.

B. Shaping preferred solutions (for Chapter 7)

a) What potential solutions are you aware of in relation to the problem you recognise?

b) What solution do you prefer for the problems you recognise? Please explain your answers.

c) You have 100 points, which are equivalent to 100% of public social expenditure. You are then supposed to allocate the budget to four different social policies, each of which aims to address four potentially problematic situations (including issues related to labour market outsider status, child-rearing-related difficulties, old-age income reduction, and contracting a disease). How would you allocate the points? Please explain your answers.

Frequently asked follow-up questions are as follows.

- Why did you choose temporary contract?
- Did you choose temporary contract voluntarily?
- Why are you concerned about a problem that is not directly relevant to you?
- Why are you not concerned about a problem that seems relevant to you?
- What support do you expect from the family or relatives in cases in which you find yourself in need?
- Are you supported by your family or relative occasionally or daily?
- Do you feel obligated to support your family or relatives in need?
- Do you support your family or relatives in need, occasionally or daily?
- Should adult children provide income support for their aging parents?

- How do your elderly parents manage to earn their income?
- Do you think that marriage may give you income security?
- Do you think that income security could be one of the reasons for marriage?
- Do you think that you may give up your career after you get married or give birth to a child?
- Why do you prefer the male breadwinner/female homemaker family model?
- Why did you choose your child over a career, even though you had access to day-care?
- Would you choose your child over a career, even though you have access to day-care?
- Who should take care of a child?
- What is your opinion about a family model in which a husband raises his child as a full-time carer and the wife earns the majority of the household income in the labour market?
- What is the reason of your strong commitment to family?
- What does a low birth rate mean to you?
- Why are you supportive of a policy for risk group A, while being conservative of a policy for risk group B?
- Why are you critical of social welfare in general?
- Why are you critical of a given social policy area?
- When the government decides if a person should benefit from social welfare, should the government only consider the level of income the person has, or also the level of income his/her families have?
- Would you be willing to give up some of the social benefits you are eligible for in order to provide more benefits for those who are more deserving?

3.3.3. Method of Analysis: Thematic Analysis

The qualitative data obtained by interviews were analysed with thematic analysis. Borrowing from Braun and Clarke (2006, p.78), thematic analysis is "a foundational method for qualitative

analysis." This analysis approach is widely used in various disciplines as "a method for identifying, analysing and reporting patterns (themes) within data" (Braun and Clarke, 2006, p. 79). Themes refer to patterned responses or meanings the researcher has identified within the data set. They may describe and organise the data set at minimum, but often go to further the interpretation of various aspects of the phenomenon under investigation (Boyatzis, 1998).

Thematic analysis has two particular strengths. Firstly, it is relatively simple and easy to use. It does not require a high level of theoretical and technical knowledge, and therefore is easily accessible even for researchers who are less experienced with qualitative techniques. Secondly, thematic analysis is characterised by flexibility. It is compatible with any theory or epistemological approach that the researcher chooses, being independent of certain specific theories or epistemology. Given its theoretical freedom, the researcher may enjoy the rich, detailed and complex account of data (Braun and Clarke, 2006)

Types of Thematic Analysis Used for the Study

Given the flexibility that thematic analysis offers, the researcher should determine the type and characteristics of the analysis in a way that best serves the purpose of the study. First of all, this thesis aims to provide a rich description of the whole data set, rather than looking at specific aspects of one particular theme, not least because this is useful in investigating an under-researched area or participants. For the same reason, themes are searched in an inductive (or bottom-up) manner. Codes are identified directly from the data, being independent of a pre-existing template of codes or the researchers' presumptions. However, it does not necessarily mean that the researcher is free of his/her theoretical commitments.

At the level where themes are developed, this study takes a semantic approach looking for the

explicit or surface meanings of the data. The analytic process may progress to a discussion of significance or broader meanings of the themes, but searching for themes itself does not involve interpretative work. The semantic approach is used for two main reasons. Firstly, this approach is more compatible than the latent theme approach with the purpose of qualitative analysis that looks for meanings across the whole data set. Themes that are identified at the latent level are usually more appropriate for studies that go deep into one particular aspect within the data. Secondly, the themes identified at the semantic level can be better compared/integrated with the findings from quantitative analysis in terms of the level of abstraction.

Lastly, in terms of epistemology, this thematic analysis is conducted within essentialist/realist paradigm, in which "a simple, largely unidirectional relationship is assumed between meaning and experience and language" (Braun and Clarke, 2006, p. 85). In this approach, individuals' "motivations, experience and meaning" can be theorised in a straightforward way.

Process of Thematic Analysis

In order to improve rigour in thematic analysis, six steps suggested by Braun and Clarke (2006) were followed. Step 1 is familiarising with the data. Once interview recordings were transcribed, the material was read and re-read to familiarize the data. Notes were taken on the initial ideas while reading through the entire data before coding took place. Step 2 is generating initial codes for the data. Based on the first step, words or short phrases (codes) which provide adequate examples from the data were identified and labelled. This process enabled the researcher to see the prevalence of codes and to discover the similarity, differences, or the relationship between them. The coding process required rechecking and modifying throughout the whole analysis. Constant efforts were made to ensure that coding was carried out

systematically. With coding complete, step 3 was taken, which is searching for themes. By interrogating the relationship between codes and themes, different codes into overarching themes were sorted. This stage was characterised by constant reviewing as well as abstract reasoning to develop a theme that describes various codes to the best effect. Prevalence was considered as a condition, but a theme with higher frequency was not necessarily perceived as more important than others in terms of understanding the data. It was regarded that a theme was crucial when it provides an adequate example from the data (Rice et al. 1999). Visual representation, such as tables, was used to help with this work. Step 4 is reviewing themes. At this stage, some candidate themes collapsed into other themes, while some were broken down into smaller separate ones. If enough data did not support certain themes, they were discarded. The reviewing process involved two levels. Firstly, at the level of coded data, it was ensured that all codes within a theme form a coherent pattern. If not, they were revised which often involved creating a new theme, moving codes to another existing theme, or even discarding them. Secondly, at the level of themes, the validity of each was reviewed, and it was checked to see if whole data sets represent the themes accurately. On top of such efforts, colleagues who are knowledgeable in qualitative research critically questioned the analysis, in order to limit any bias in interpretation. ‘Member checking’ was also carried out to increase the validity of the work. Several, randomly selected participants were given the development and interpretation of the codes and themes, and were asked to check whether their description was well represented. When satisfied, step 5 was conducted, which is the last step in producing the report. Each theme was finally defined and named in the way that best demonstrates it, and themes that made meaningful contributions to understanding the data were eventually recognised for the final report. Attempts were made not only to articulate the merit and validity of the analysis, but also to describe the data and make arguments on the research question.

3.3.4. Data Management

Throughout the whole process, NVivo 11 was used in gathering codes and themes in order to organise the data for more efficient analysis. Data generated in the course of the research will be kept securely in electronic format by the researcher for a minimum of five years after the public release of the work of the research. According to the University of Oxford Policy on the Management of Research Data and Records, the minimum retention period for research data and record is three years after publication. However, the researcher will keep the records for a longer period than the minimum requirement, mainly because the records are expected to have continuing value to the researcher. The researcher has articulated the retention policy in the consent form, so that the participants would agree to it. If one objects to the retention of his or her record, the individual's record will not be stored. All the records are stored digitally on encrypted USB drives which have duplicate drives for backup purpose. All the drives will be physically destroyed after the defined retention period, with records stating what records were destroyed, and when and how the researcher did so. All participants will be clearly informed of the process, and will also be provided with prescribed information including the name of the data controller, the purpose for which the data are intended to be processed, and who are intended to be or might be recipients of the data.

3.3.5. Ethical Issues

Qualitative research methods, and interviewing in particular, are more likely to be connected with various ethical issues. Interviewing is not a simple process in which the interviewer asks a question and the interviewee answers. It is a process in which an interviewer actively interacts with interviewees and also participates in the information-generating process. Therefore, if

interviews are not designed and conducted without care and ethical consideration, the interviews could eventually turn into a painful experience for both participants and the researcher.

Three potential ethical issues are mainly identified in relation to the research. Firstly, interviewing with participants of a marginalised background may evoke a sense of pessimism or resentment over their situations within those being interviewed. The interview questions may touch on concepts which might possibly be sensitive or intrusive issues for certain people, such as job insecurity, income loss, poverty or social welfare provision. This may notably be the case for those with unstable employment status. Some may possibly perceive their unwanted status as a result of their indolence, irresponsibility or incapability, given that the Korean society praises diligence and sacrifice for one's family. Also, the researcher's educational attainment as well as the reputation of the affiliated University, may lead them to feel inferior. Such participants' unpleasant emotions may cause them to suffer from psychological pain during and/or after their participation. In extreme cases, a precarious state of mental health of participants could possibly threaten not only participants' but also the researcher's physical safety. It is probably unlikely, but in the sense that the research project involves interviews with female labour market outsiders, who are more likely to experience job loss as well as accompanying income loss in Korean society, the research project is not completely free of such risks. To minimise the potential for such negative events, first of all, those who had been considered to be vulnerable to sensitive issues were excluded in advance from participant recruitment in consultation with relevant organisations. Also, a great emphasis was placed on the contents of the questionnaire and the way the questions were asked. In this regard, the researcher distinguished between public and private information and attempted not to make a beeline for in-depth, sensitive questions. It was made sure that the participants were

comfortable and willing to answer the questions and continue with the interview, and they did not have to answer certain questions if they wished not to. Moreover, the researcher was an attentive listener, and acted with good manners, respect and a genuine interest in the participants in order to make the participants feel respected and aware that they are contributing to advancing academic knowledge by taking part in the research. In order to respond to any potential difficulties arousing in relation to participants' mental or physical health, the researcher had contact details of appropriate support services, such as clinics nearby.

Secondly, interviewees may feel vulnerable to potential harm or exploitation, especially when a third party could punish them for their answer. In order to avoid such incidents, confidentiality and anonymity were strictly secured as the top priority throughout the research. The researcher behaved responsibly by seeking informed consent from all participants before they took part in the research, and provided them with sufficient information on all aspects of participation and data use, such as the purpose of the research, why they were selected, how the data would be stored, preserved and used, and also how confidentiality and anonymity would be maintained. Furthermore, they were advised to withdraw their participation at any time if they thought that their interests were not being protected. All the information and advice were provided in Korean. On top of this, a recording device was used only with the permission of participants. Even when recording is permitted, any personal data which could be used to identify the participants were not recorded, transcribed or stored. All participants were given a randomly allocated number before they took part in the research, so that data could be continuously collected about the same individual without recording his or her identity. A combination of details (e.g. age, gender, region of residence, etc.) on a categorical level may be used as an identifier if one attempts to recognise a participant by narrowing down the group to which the participant belongs. However, the probability of such cases seems to be very low, as multiple

individuals with similar status or backgrounds were interviewed. After interviews, no one except for the researcher has/or will have access to the interview materials and personal information. Any organisation or individual to which potential participants consider themselves to be subordinate was not involved at any point of the research project. Such efforts were expected to make participants aware of the voluntary nature of participating, and also ensure that their rights and safety were fully protected.

Lastly, both the researcher and participants may have biased attitudes towards the opposite sex. As a Korean male, it was probable for the researcher to involuntarily express a preference for certain answers that were culturally more accepted or perceived as desirable. Also, some participants might feel pressed to provide a culturally appropriate answer rather than their own straight one in order to keep the conversation with the researcher pleasant. In order to minimise problems raised by these issues, the researcher attempted to be an attentive audience, keeping in mind that everyone was an expert in their own lives. In addition, the researcher made sure that all participants clearly understood all necessary information including the purpose of research, confidentiality and anonymity policy, actors and organisations involved in the research, so that they felt respected, having no concerns about their interest being violated. Due to the gender difference between the researcher and participants, moreover, it was also probable that female participants find it uncomfortable, embarrassed or potentially dangerous to sit in company with the male researcher. Thus, the importance of the place and time for interviews was emphasised throughout the research. Participants chose where and when the interview was conducted, and all interviews were carried out during the day in public yet quiet and comfortable places, such as coffee shops or public parks.

3.3.6. Trustworthiness

Validity

Establishing validity (or internal validity) is of great importance in both quantitative and qualitative research in terms of scientific rigour, but the meaning of validity could be different in both approaches due to the inherent differences between them. In quantitative research, validity refers to "the precision in which the findings accurately reflect the data" (Noble and Smith, 2015, p. 3). In qualitative research, validity can be defined as "how accurately the account represents participants' realities of the social phenomena and is credible to them" (Creswell and Miller, 2000, p. 124). Validity can be negatively affected when the qualitative researcher's personal experiences or viewpoints result in a bias in relation to the research process as well as the outcome, or when participants do not provide their own candid answers often because of their interaction with the researcher. Many commentators argue that it is impossible for qualitative researchers to be completely free of those problems, but they also recommend common procedures that improve validity in the qualitative research (Creswell and Miller, 2000; O'Leary, 2004; Babbie, 2007; Maxwell, 2005; Yeasmin and Rahman, 2012; Anney, 2014; Noble and Smith, 2015). The strategies adopted to ensure the validity of the qualitative findings are as follows. Firstly, member checking was carried out: the researcher randomly chose several participants, and invited them to comment on the transcript and development and interpretation of the codes and themes. Secondly, peer examination was used: some colleagues who carried out qualitative research for their doctoral degrees were invited to code the transcript. The results of theirs and the researcher's were compared and discussed for better representation of the data. Thirdly, it was attempted to minimise the researcher's personal bias and unintentional influence during the interviews, but at the same time it was also noted in previous section that the researcher's socioeconomic and demographic characteristics,

education attainment and gender in particular may affect the research process as well as the findings. Fourthly, negative cases that contradict the researcher's interpretation were searched with thorough investigation. This process was to ensure that any perspectives or data which were inconsistent with the interpretation were not simply ignored or amended for the sake of the researcher's convenience but thoroughly investigated. Fifthly, combining quantitative approach with qualitative approach is expected to increase validity by serving for both confirmatory and completeness purposes.

Generalisability (external validity)

Generalisability (also known as external validity) usually refers to the extent to which research findings in a study can be applied to settings of others. In the sense that the qualitative work of this thesis is set to seek an in-depth understanding of a particular group of individuals (female labour market outsiders), the generalisability of the findings to other settings is not a matter of concern for the qualitative analysis (Maxwell, 2005). Thus, female labour market outsiders are not generalised to the population as a whole, based on the findings from qualitative work. Findings from the interviewed group may suggest a social phenomenon that is applicable to other groups of individuals or the entire population. However, only modest generalisations would be made by contrasting the qualitative data with quantitative data, which includes a large number of individuals with various socioeconomic and demographic characteristics.

Reliability

In quantitative approach, reliability generally signifies the consistency of a measurement instrument: reliability is considered high when a measure gives the same or similar results each

time that it is used. Given that it is almost impossible to repeat a research procedure and outcomes in qualitative research, however, it is argued that such a definition cannot be applied to qualitative approach. Instead, reliability in qualitative approach can be understood as "consistency within the employed analytical procedures" (Noble and Smith, 2015, p. 2). Consistency is high if the findings are repeatable with the same or similar participants in the same context, and can be better ensured when the researcher makes decisions in a clear and transparent manner (Yu et al., 2012; Noble and Smith, 2015). In this regard, it attempted to provide rich, detailed description of research design, methods, context, and the analysis and interpretation processes. Also, several colleagues with expertise in qualitative research were invited to identify and discuss the codes and themes in an open process.

3.4. Conclusion

The thesis aims to enhance the understanding of social policy preferences of individuals in Korea by combining quantitative and qualitative methods. The quantitative method is used to examine the impact of individual self-interest or culture-related factors on individuals' welfare attitudes with survey data from Korea, while the qualitative method is used to interrogate about how social policy preferences of female labour market outsiders are shaped in family-related and cultural contexts in Korea. Such mixed-methods approach is expected to bring both breadth and depth of understanding of social policy preference formation in Korea. To be specific, this approach may serve two purposes: confirmatory and completeness purposes. Firstly, both quantitative and qualitative methods can be used for validating each other. Secondly, the integration of two methods allows the synergy effect, namely a more meaningful understanding and interpretation of a social phenomenon that each method alone is unlikely to achieve.

4. Understanding the Context and Characteristics of Social Policy Development in South Korea

The purpose of this chapter is to provide the institutional context of social policy development in South Korea since the 1960s. Korea is one of typical example of developmental states and also a country with a long history of Confucianism. The country is analogous to a large extent to other East Asian societies as well as emerging market economies in Latin America and Southern European countries in the sense that these countries tend to be characterised by the significant role of the family in welfare provision. However, Korea is also a country where social welfare has been dynamically expanding due to democratic consolidation and socioeconomic changes since the 1990s. In this regard, Korea can be a case that provides a great opportunity to explore how family-related cultural contexts shape social policy preferences of individuals in the era of post-industrial shifts.

The early stage of social policy development in South Korea (hereafter Korea) is well epitomised by a term 'developmental state', in which government spending on social welfare was strictly minimised by the authoritarian government in order to mobilise all the national resources for economic growth. Confucian culture, which shaped East Asian societies for a long time, supported such developmental logic by highlighting the role of the family in welfare provision. During this period, therefore, individual experience of social welfare was likely to be very limited, while the family played a key role in welfare provision (Jones, 1993; Goodman and Peng, 1996; Goodman and White, 1998; Chung, 2007; Ringen et al., 2011; Ji, 2013). Since the late 1990s, the welfare state in Korea has expanded continuously, becoming more redistributive and inclusive, not least because of the consolidation of democracy and the transition to a post-industrial society (Hong, et al., 2003; Yang, et al. 2005; Peng, 2012; Ji,

2013; Fleckenstein and Lee, 2017a). The welfare expansion shows both path-dependent and path-breaking characteristics. One the one hand, residualism has remained in that social insurance still plays a key role in the social security system, whereas social assistance, especially for workers in the labour market outsider position, is underdeveloped. On the other hand, there has been a significant development in income supplement and services for families with children and for the elderly, to which the welfare state under the authoritarian government did not pay attention. Considering the growing public influence on policy-making, such changes may indicate that in Korea, a new relationship has been established between the public and the welfare state in the way that the welfare state shares the responsibility for welfare provision with the family, especially in relation to caring for children and the elderly, whereas the family maintains its position as the main income provider for those in times of need.

4.1. Developmental Welfare State (from the 1960s to the mid-1990s)

The developmental state in South Korea (hereafter Korea) began in the early 1960s when general Park Chung-hee ascended to office in a military coup. At the time Korea was devastated after the Korean War (1950–53), and its economy was largely dependent on foreign aid, especially from the U.S.[24]. Right after general Park Chung-hee became an undisputed leader of the new regime, the military government legitimised itself by its strong commitment to economic development and anti-communism in response to contentious and often combative civil societies. The government claimed the unchallenged authority and power to plan the country's future, as well as to protect it from North Korea, pledging that it would lead the

[24] According to Wootaek Rhee (1995), 40–60% of the total government budget in the early 1960s was raised by selling U.S. aid goods.

society to the modernisation, industrialisation, and economic growth the nation desired mainly by pursuing export-oriented growth (Kwon, 2005; Cho, 2010; Ringen et al., 2011). In this context, the top priority of the government's policy-making lied with economic efficiency. In order to assist the export business, the government placed financial and production markets under government control. The labour movement, industrial capital, and political parties were all regulated by the government. Social policy was strictly restrained, to prevent a tax increase, and therefore the labour costs which often coupled with a degree of taxation (Yang, 2003; Kwon, 2005; Chung, 2007; Ringen et al., 2011; Jeong, 2013).

From the 1970s, the government turned towards the promotion of heavy industries[25]. This was a strategic response to changes in both domestic and international circumstances. First of all, labour-intensive light industry, which drove export-led industrialisation in Korea in the 1960s, was no longer as competitive as it had been in the world market, due to increased wage levels. Secondly, there was an increasing need to promote the defense industry due to the growing military threat from North Korea (Chung, 2007; Cho, 2010; Ringen et al., 2011). In response to large-scale enterprises which were hesitant about investing in the development of heavy industries due to the enormous expense required, all macroeconomic policies of the government were designed to encourage enterprises to take part in the industrial transition. Firstly, the government provided export businesses with huge subsidies, in the form of tax privileges and preferential loans. For example, corporate tax rates were significantly reduced, and the coverage of the investment tax credit was expanded. Also, the interest rate for savings accounts remained consistently high to ensure the accumulation of capital by increasing people's savings, while preferential loans were introduced for enterprises to promote their

[25] In particular, the auto industry, the shipbuilding industry, the iron industry, and the petrochemical industry.

investment in heavy industry (Chung, 2007; Yang, et al., 2013). Secondly, the wage level was strictly restrained by the government in order to diminish production cost. As the state lacked technology and capital, Korea's exports relied on price-competitiveness. Thus, the government attempted to minimise labour costs by imposing low wages and long working hours, even on employees of large-scale export businesses (Chung, 2007; Yang, 2012). In 1975, for instance, the average income of industrial workers in Korea was only 75% of that in Taiwan, and 65% of that in Hong Kong (Park, 2011). In the same vein, income tax rates continuously declined throughout the 1970s, from 3.90% in 1970 to 2.49 in 1980, as income tax was deemed to increase labour costs indirectly (Yang, et al., 2013). Lastly, the exchange rate became fixed at a low level to support export businesses, while tariff walls were raised against foreign goods to protect domestic goods which were not as competitive as their international counterparts (Chung, 2007; Yang, et al., 2013).

Due to the total mobilisation of resources for the heavy industries, as well as the low level of taxation, the state could not afford expenditure on state welfare provision. In those days, the government considered state welfare programmes to be an unproductive and unprofitable source of expenditure. Yang and Min (2013) point out that unlike Keynesian welfare states, which intervened in the demand-side by increasing tax and public expenditure, the South Korean government promoted the profit and investment of export businesses, as well as workers' motivation to work hard, by decreasing tax – even from the early 1970s. Instead, the government placed a great emphasis on employment protection. Employment protection legislation was very strictly implemented, and the use of atypical employment relationships was restricted even in less productive industries. It is argued that employment protection during the era of the developmental state was a functional equivalence of social welfare provisions until the labour market was deregulated in the late 1990s (Yang, 2003; 2008; Peng, 2012).

But at the same time, the government came to be interested in the welfare system, in particular, social insurance schemes, in response to the industrial transition. Firstly, the government aimed to accumulate capital by introducing a national pension system. The idea was that the pension fund could be diverted to investment in infrastructure[26]. In a contributory pension system where the insured are supposed to make a long period of contributions, the revenue is likely to exceed the expenditure in the early stage[27]. Thus, the government expected to mobilise domestic capital by introducing the 'National Welfare Pension System' which obliges workers to contribute to the fund for at least 20 years (Park et al., 2007).

Secondly, it was becoming more important for both the state and for enterprises to prevent a loss of human resources and also to reduce medical expenses. The industrial transition to heavy industries was accompanied by a proliferating demand for sustainable labour as well as an increase in labour costs, including medical expenses. Thus, the introduction of contributory health-care programmes was planned to be implemented (Chung, 2007).

Lastly, the expansion of welfare also aimed to relieve social unrest that had begun to increase. The rapid industrialisation and economic growth were accompanied by widened income disparity. Also, labour-management disputes increased greatly from the late 1970s. In response, the government attempted to reassure its supporters, industrial workers in particular, and also to quench the anti-government movement, by providing welfare programmes.

Consequently, a compulsory health insurance scheme, which was fit for those purposes, was

---

[26] Previously, Japan – a typical model of an East Asian developmental state as well as the model South Korea pursed – had introduced a pension scheme in order to use the pension fund for industrial capital (Manow, 2001; Chung, 2007).

[27] The 'National Welfare Pension Law' was enacted in 1973, but the law could not be implemented until 1988, being postponed mainly due to the 1973 oil shock and the following economic plight.

introduced in 1977. At first, in consideration of the ability to pay contributions, membership was given only to regular workers in large companies with 500 workers or more, but the coverage widened continuously afterward to regular workers of medium-sized companies (Goodman, et al., 1998; Kwon, 1997; 2005). By incorporating such social insurance schemes in the state developmental strategy, the government tried to secure the most valuable resources for production, capital and labour, by minimal government spending on social welfare. On the other hand, social assistance and social service programmes, which required an increase in government spending on social welfare, were deliberately neglected.

While the state welfare provision remained austere, occupational welfare significantly expanded. Along with the rapid industrialisation, there was a sharp rise in the demand for workers – particularly male workers with general skills. To secure quality and dependable labour, large-scale industrial companies offered their workers full-time, permanent employment, better wages and welfare provision (Chung, 2007; Ringen et al., 2011). On top of this, the government-led repression of the labour movement also contributed to the expansion of occupational welfare. The government did not allow nationwide or industrial-level trade unions, but only enterprise-based unions, which eventually led to the labour movement in Korea being organised and mobilised within each firm (particularly large-scale enterprises). As a result, the wage and working conditions gap widened between large-scale enterprises and small-medium-sized ones. Employees of large-scale enterprises enjoyed a range of benefits, such as employment security, a higher level of wage, and welfare provisions from both the state and their companies, none of which were usually applicable to employees of small-medium-sized businesses (Chung, 2007).

Social and Cultural Contexts

Such a selective welfare system in Korea means that a large proportion of the population was excluded from social protection, and that social assistance remained as the very last resort for those without the ability to work. Social and economic inequality was not a matter of concern for policy-makers. However, such a growth-oriented welfare system seems to have obtained the people's consent to a large extent. It is argued that individual contribution/sacrifice for economic catch-up was readily accepted by the public that experienced the colonial period under Japanese rule as well as the Korean war, and soon became a hegemonic force unifying and mobilising the nation throughout the authoritarian period (Campos, et al., 1996; Goodman and Peng, 1996; Doner, et al., 2005; Cho, 2010; Park, 2012). As the government promised, furthermore, people were actually becoming better-off without relying on a welfare state, thanks to full employment caused by the miraculous economic growth from the 1970s to the 1990s. Working conditions improved during the period of industrialisation and there was a continuous increase in living standards. Such experiences might have served as a lesson to the Korean public that sacrifice for the state would return with economic growth.

On top of that, the developmental logic was highly compatible with the Confucian culture which had shaped East Asian societies[28] for centuries, in the sense that both emphasised the role of the family in welfare provision. Confucian values, such as ideals of filial piety, individuals' sacrifices for their families, a strong work ethic and traditional gender roles, framed the minimised effort for social welfare in Korea, justifying self-reliance and responsibility for family members both of which the authoritarian government constantly accentuated to minimise government spending on social welfare (Jones, 1990; 1993; Goodman

[28] They often refer to Hong Kong, Taiwan, Singapore, Japan and South Korea.

and Peng, 1996; White and Goodman, 1998; Rieger and Leibfried, 2003; Sung, 2003; Fleckenstein and Lee, 2017a). For instance, highly limited provision of family policy to low-income families until the late 1990s was justified by the social perceptions that a mother's labour market participation could risk the well-being of children, and that women taking maternity leaves may burden the employers and colleagues (S. C. Lee, 2017). At the same time, it is also probable that the developmental state reinforced the Confucian culture, especially the traditional gender roles, by demotivating women from labour market participation. The main beneficiaries of the developmental welfare state in Korea were male workers in the labour market insider position who were able to pay their contributions to social insurance schemes. Given the conventional male breadwinner/female homemaker model, social protection of these male workers against various social risks, especially income loss, equated to the protection of others who were financially supported by the male workers within the family. In this regard, it can be argued that the developmental welfare state decreased the incentives for women to get paid work, or achieve the insider position in the labour market, but rather encouraged them to stick to domesticity as the gender roles specified. Borrowing from S. C. Lee (2017, p. 6), "developmentalism and Confucianism were complementary to each other". Considering such cultural context, it was natural for the family to play a primary role in welfare provision. Also, it was likely that one's demand for social welfare was criticised for traitorous conduct that harmed the national interest, and also for violating traditional social values.

4.2. Social Policy Reform since Democratisation

The Asian Financial Crisis Period

Throughout the 1980s and the 1990s, Korea encountered two significant changes. First, the

country was democratised in 1987. In the mid-1980s, the military regime faced a serious political crisis caused by the explosive democratisation movement. This movement was first led by students but middle-class, white-collar workers, who had been the core supporters of the military regime, soon participated. As a result, the military regime finally ended in 1987 when the government accepted the demand for a direct presidential election system. The restoration of democracy meant that the government was no longer able to exercise its power in oppressive and authoritarian ways. Now people were able to directly claim actual distribution of economic growth, as well as justice and political and economic reforms. The government consequently came to pursue the goal of legitimacy, which could only be attained by providing more substantial and more direct benefits to the electorate (Hong, et al., 2003; Ji, 2013). Second, economic liberalisation and globalisation were enthusiastically pursued by the government from the 1990s onwards. Under the Kim Young-sam administration (1993-1997), protective trade policies and the capital markets were deregulated and as a result domestic companies became unable to count on the state as much as they had done previously (Yang, et al., 2005). Once they encountered global market competition directly, they found it difficult to guarantee their workers full employment and occupational welfare. This trend has accelerated since the Asian financial crisis in 1998. The financial crisis caused the bankruptcy of a large number of businesses, and therefore produced massive unemployment. Also, a new government[29], which came into power in 1998, took over a huge amount of debt, as well as exhausted foreign-exchange reserves, from the former government. Consequently, the government eventually asked the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for a loan, and in return, it accepted the imposition of a range of conditionality, including the further pursuit of a free market, privatisation of public enterprises, a tighter financing policy, and an increase in the interest rate.

[29] Kim Dae-jung Administration

Such reform programmes had a harsh impact on the state. For example, the increased interest rate first discouraged domestic investment and raised the burden placed not only on enterprises but also on households. The reforms were followed by a chain reaction of bankruptcies as well as by massive layoffs. People suffered a significant increase in poverty as well as unprecedented income disparity.

The economic crisis and the need for labour market flexibility further promoted democracy in Korea further. In fact, authoritarianism continued for a while even after democratisation. The president Roh Tae-woo, who was elected in the first democratic presidential election after democratisation, was actually former President Chun's hand-picked successor, and therefore was under the influence of the former administration. The next president, Kim Young-sam, was also not free from ties to the military regime. He had been a leader of the 'Peaceful Democracy Party' as well as one of the major figures of the democratisation movement. However, he became the candidate of the governing party by merging his party with Roh's ruling 'Democratic Justice Party' in order to defeat Kim Dae-jung – another major figure of the democratisation movement and his most powerful rival – in the 1992 presidential election. In short, the democratisation did not mean a turn-over of political power (Chung, 2007; Park, et al., 2007; Ji, 2013). After the crisis, however, the electorate attributed the crisis to the conservative government and its ruling party, and then chose Kim Dae-jung, who had no debt to pay to the authoritarian regime, as the new president in the 1997 presidential election. It was remarkable that his winning the election was the first horizontal power shift since democratisation in 1987. Such disconnection from the authoritarian regime meant that democracy in South Korea had reached a certain mature level.

In such contexts in the late 1990s, the government pursued labour market deregulation, which was considered to be an inevitable condition for the quick recovery of the national economy.

Unlike the authoritarian period, however, one-sided pursuit of labour market flexibility was likely to cause huge political opposition from the public in Korea. The democratic government, therefore, introduced a corporatist decision-making process, the Tripartite committee, engaging businesses and trade unions in the policymaking process. A consensus among the parties was not difficult to reach. Firms that survived the crisis sought more flexibility in their relations with workers in order to reduce production costs. The trade unions also had to accept flexibilsation, or they would lose their jobs in the continuing times of economic difficulty. Moreover, it was an opportunity for the unions to participate in the policymaking process as a new governing institution (Lee, 2011; Peng, 2012; Fleckenstein and Lee, 2017b). The Tripartite committee finally reached an agreement in 1998[30] that allowed layoffs in the case of managerial difficulties as well as the increasing use of non-standard employment for greater flexibility. In 1996 non-standard employees[31] accounted for 43.1% of total employees, but by 2000 they accounted for 52.1%. This trend was apparent across all types of industries and businesses, but was more apparent in the service sector and in small-medium-sized businesses (Kim, 2013b; Statistics Korea, 2019).

In response, a challenge arose for social policy in Korea to play a more active and comprehensive role in social protection for so-called 'labour market outsiders'[32]. The Kim Dae-jung administration established social welfare reform as a key policy agenda and implemented it (Hong, et al., 2003). The most noteworthy change in the welfare state was the eligibility extension of social insurance schemes. Four major social insurance programmes in Korea (the Unemployment Insurance, Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance, and the National

[30] The New Labour Standard Act, 1998.
[31] Temporary workers and day labourers.
[32] Lindvall and Rueda (2013, p. 2) define insiders as "wage earners with protected jobs and outsiders as individuals who are either unemployed or hold jobs with low levels of protection and employment rights."

Pension) became open to the entire population living in the country, including non-standard employees (Chung, 2002; Yang, 2003; Hong et al., 2003; Peng, 2012). First of all, from 1998 to 2000, the eligibility of the unemployment insurance was broadened by stages, to include those working for small businesses, and also atypical workers. Moreover, the paying period was extended from 60 days to 120 days. The National Pension system was revised to cover the self-employed in urban areas in 1999 and then widened its eligibility to include all businesses, regardless of the number of employees in 2003. In 2006, the system eventually broadened its eligibility to include the whole working population in the country. Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance also became more inclusive. Previously it had applied only to businesses with five employees or more, but now it applied to all businesses. Lastly, three separate healthcare insurance systems were unified, becoming the National Health Insurance. Previously, there had been independent healthcare systems that covered enterprises' employees, government employees, and the rest of the population, respectively. These three systems had been pointed to cause social inequality as well as inefficiency, as the levels of benefits of each system were strongly linked to the level of funds they accumulated. Thanks to the reform, the healthcare service in Korea became more inclusive and generous to those who were economically disadvantaged (Chung, 2002). In addition to these social insurance schemes, social assistance programmes were also reformed, becoming more inclusive and generous. In 1999, the National Basic Living Security Act was enacted, with the purpose of providing basic services and social protection for those who are in need but who are excluded from social insurance. Previously, even a household below the poverty line was not eligible for social assistance benefits if at least one of the members was of working-age (18 to 64 years of age). Now, however, under the Act, such age restriction was abolished (Chung, 2002; Yang, 2003; Hong et al., 2003). As a result of the welfare expansion, public social expenditure as a share of gross domestic product (GDP) has also increased from 3.5% in 1997 to 5.1 in 2003 (KOSIS,

2018). In this regard, many commentators argue that South Korea eventually met the basic conditions to be designated a welfare state in this period. Many also consider the reform a fundamental reconfiguration of the social policy system in Korea in that the range of welfare reforms not only expanded public social expenditure, but also acted as a turning point that determined the direction of social policy (Hong, et al., 2003; Chung, 2007; Kim, 2009b). According to Yeonmyung Kim (2002), the state has become more responsible for people's well-being, and social policy eventually came to ensure social solidarity, thanks to the welfare reform. In terms of comparative social policy, such an expansion of the welfare state in Korea has drawn much attention. While Western advanced economies usually pursued cost containment in response to fiscal strains on the welfare state, Korea took the reverse course – even immediately after being seriously affected by the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997 (Hong, et al., 2003). As Kwon notes, the case of South Korea may contradict the neo-liberal argument that the welfare state is likely to roll back due to globalisation (Kwon, 2005).

There are doubts, however, as to whether or not the reform in effect strayed away from its old developmental features. Many scholars point out that the newly reformed welfare system still strongly emphasised self-reliance and responsibilities for the family in the sense that the social welfare system was still heavily social insurance-centred, disadvantaging labour market outsiders and the non-employed who were likely to be disadvantaged in many aspects. First of all, workers with a high risk of job loss, such as those with short-term contracts and part-time workers, were much less likely to achieve membership of social insurance schemes, due to recurrent unemployment or the low pay they receive which made it difficult for those workers to pay their contributions steadily (Chai, 2011; Lee, 2013; Jung, 2013; Seong, 2007; Kim, 2009a; Lee, et al. 2013). Forms of pay also mattered. As social insurance contributions were generally paid on a monthly basis, those who were not paid monthly, or workers whose wage

level was not stable throughout the year, might have found it difficult to pay the contributions (Seong, 2007). Secondly, it was difficult for those with short-term contracts to have a history of contributions long enough for social insurance benefits, even if they hold membership. In Korea, for example, eligibility for unemployment benefit was granted only to workers with a history of employment of at least six months straight (Seong, 2007). Such a situation was even harsher for the young unemployed, such as school and college graduates, who did not have an employment history yet. In fact, social insurance was barely accessible for those who had failed to enter the labour market (Lee, 2013; Lee, et al., 2013). Lastly, income inequality in the labour market was mirrored by inequality in earnings-related social insurance benefits, which means the less one contributes today, the less one will be paid in the future (Seong, 2007). The National Basic Livelihood Security Act was enacted in 1999 in order to support those who are not covered by social insurance schemes. However, the effect was limited as the Act was designed to provide a minimum level of income and services to those living below the poverty level, meaning that people were not assisted by the social security policy until they fell into poverty. Moreover, the conditions for obtaining social assistance benefits were still too hard to meet. For instance, people who experience poverty are not eligible for social assistance benefits if at least one of their family members is capable of working, or if they have a property which can be sold to produce disposable capital (Kim, 2009c). This means that in the era of a flexible labour market, a wide range of people with unstable employment relationships and low pay were pushed aside the social safety net, being forced to locate sources of welfare by themselves, or through the assistance of others, especially their family.

It should be noted that the welfare expansion itself was hardly the prime objective for the policymakers. Democratisation and economic liberalisation meant that the two axes of the developmental welfare - the authoritarian government and full employment - were abolished.

However, such changes did not necessarily mean that the developmental logic that had shaped the Korean society for a long time disappeared or weakened. Rather, economic growth was emphasised more than ever in the context of the Asian financial crisis. The Kim Dae-jung government, which was often classified as left-progressive, did not actually differ greatly from the conservative party in terms of macroeconomic. The government and its party in effect pursued neoliberal economic policies, giving top priority to overcoming the financial crisis. The main objective of the welfare expansion was to minimise the adverse reaction of economic liberalisation and labour market flexibilisation, and also to activate the unemployed (Chung; 2002; Sonn, 2005; Kim, 2011). In this regard, Choi (2010) attributes such characteristics to the fact that the Kim Dae-jung administration and the government party were originally organised around, and fought for, democratisation during the military regime, not for the representation of the working class or the pursuit of equality. This signifies that all the major political parties were driven by conservative ideas, according to a strict definition of the term, while progressive political parties did not obtain a footing in the society yet[33]. In other words, even after democratisation, the growth-oriented logic was strongly maintained among the policy-makers in the context of financial crisis.

The Post-crisis Period

The Kim Dae-jung administration and their political legacy were succeeded by the Roh Moo-hyun administration (2003-08). Like the previous government, this administration pursued both economic growth through a neo-liberal macroeconomic strategy and promoting social solidarity through welfare expansion. The underlying principles of welfare expansion were the

[33] No left-wing party was represented in the National Assembly in Korean until 2003.

same as that of the previous administration. The government and its party made a continuous effort, such as subsidising both small businesses and their workers, to incorporate employees of small-scale businesses (and non-standard workers in particular) into social insurance systems (Kim, 2008b; Kim, 2009c). As a result, the share of workers who were covered by each insurance scheme increased by more than 10%. During the period 2002 to 2007 the coverage ratio of non-standard workers increased from 21.6% to 33.3% for the National Pension System, 24.9% to 35% for the National Health Insurance[34], and 23.2% to 32.2% for the Unemployment Insurance (KOSIS, 2019). Social assistance programmes were also revised to be more generous and inclusive. The conditions for the National Basic Living Security benefits were eased to widen the eligibility. Thanks to the revision, the number of beneficiaries grew from 1.35 million in 2002 to 1.67 million in 2007, and the budget was also increased twice (KOSIS, 2019). The 'Basic Old-age Pension' was introduced in 2008, mainly to cover those who were not insured enough by the National Pension scheme. Since this time, Korea has had in place a multi-pillar pension system, which consists of a contributory, earnings-related pension and a non-contributory, flat-rate pension. The 'Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC)' was introduced in 2008 to support the increasing number of working poor (Joo, 2009).

A significant difference between Roh's administration and Kim's administration is found in relation to personal social services, care services for children and the elderly in particular (Joo, 2009; Ko et al, 2011; Peng, 2012; Lee, 2013b). Roh's administration eagerly pursued the expansion of public social services with the intention of promoting female labour participation by providing such care services for women, and also by creating jobs in the public sector (Kang, 2008; Kim, 2008b; Kim, 2009b, Kim, 2009c; Joo, 2009; Lee, 2013). The budget for childcare

[34] In the case of the National Health Insurance, dependents of the insured are also entitled to benefits, which means practically most people with a right of residence in the country are covered.

services quadrupled during the administration, and as a result, both childcare facilities as well as the number of children who used the services proliferated. The number of childcare facilities increased from 22,147 in 2002 to 33,499 in 2008, and the number of children that were accommodated in childcare facilities also rose, from 800,991 to 1,135,502 in the same period of time (Kim, 2009c; Ko, et al., 2011; Kwon et al., 2012). 'Long-term Care Insurance for the Elderly' was also introduced in 2008 in order to provide movement support for those aged 65 or over suffering from senile diseases. This is basically a contributory scheme, but nearly the entire population are entitled to the benefits as eligibility is granted to those who are covered by the National Health Insurance. Consequently, public spending on social services programmes increased by 36.6% each year on average for the period from 2002 to 2007, while public social expenditure grew by 12.5% each year (Kang, 2008).

This trend continued even under the Lee Myung-bak administration (2008-13), a conservative government, but with a stronger emphasis on economic growth. In the context of the 2008 financial crisis, the government articulated that the purpose of social welfare was to help one's return to the labour market participation and promote economic growth[35]. Specifically, it stressed a greater role of the market in welfare provision, job creation in the public sector, and more targeted provision of social welfare (Kim, et al., 2011; Kim, et al., 2012). Because of this neo-liberal perspective on the welfare state, with a strong emphasis on market principles as regards welfare provision, many commentators expected that the welfare state would stop expanding, or even possibly be rolled back. However, social policy remained more or less the same during this period, but rather showed gradual expansion in spending: in terms of the share of GDP, the spending reached 11.5%, the highest ever, in 2009 and then was maintained at around 10.5% thereafter (KOSIS, 2019). Also, the government reinforced social service

[35] The government named its approach to social policy the 'active welfare state'.

programmes even further. Previously, for instance, childcare benefits were given only to those who were socially and economically disadvantaged. This selective and gradational approach was revised each year towards a more inclusive provision, and eventually, all families with children became entitled to the benefit from 2013 onwards (Lee, 2013b).


It is safe to conclude that the welfare expansion since the early 2000s has been characterised by the impressive development of family-related policies. In 2014, for instance, the expenditure on family appeared to be the largest proportion (28.7%) of the total government spending[36], being followed by health (19.5%), old-age pension (14.5), and active labour market policies (9.7%) (see Figure 3). When it comes to social services only, the expenditure on support for family even accounts for 49%, overwhelming those on active labour market policies and health which constitute 16.5% and 13.7%, respectively. The growth of old-age income supplement is also worth paying attention to. Since the Basic Old-age Pension began to be implemented in 2010, the expenditure increased by 16% every year and reached 14.5% of the total government spending, and 29.3% of the total government spending on social assistance in 2014 (Ko, et al., 2016) (see Figure 3). It can be argued that newly introduced universal (or quasi-universal) social services – such as childcare service and Long-term Care Insurance for the Elderly – and income supplement policies – such as the basic old-age pension – has lightened the welfare burden imposed on the family in relation to caring for dependent children and the elderly. This can be considered as a significant deviation from the developmental welfare state in the sense that the state is now taking care of non-productive parts of the population for which previously the family took the primary responsibility (Fleckenstein and Lee, 2017a).

In contrast, the welfare state in Korea can be argued to be still indifferent to social security for

[36] Government spending is part of public social expenditure. It includes social assistance and social services which are tax-funded, but does not include social insurance.


those in the labour market outsider positions in the sense that labour market outsiders have hardly benefited from the expansion of social assistance and services, except for Active Labour Market Policies (see Figure 3), and that the overall social welfare system is still highly social insurance-centred (see Figure 4). Given the current social welfare system in Korea, those who are unable to satisfy the conditions required for insurance benefits should commodify themselves, often by accepting a job they do not want, or they have to locate other sources of welfare such as family assistance in case of need. In this regard, the family still plays an important role in welfare provision, especially in terms of income security for labour market outsiders.

Figure 3. Government Spending, by Policy Area, in 2014 (%)



Source: Ko, et al., 2016

Figure 4. Trend in Public Social Expenditure by Policy Type (1990-2014) (%)



Source: Ko, et al., 2016

The fact that social welfare in Korea has benefited the population disproportionately is to a large extent attributed to party politics that has been promoted more than ever since the early 2000s. Regardless of the reasons, welfare state expansion has been a core policy agenda in response to both growing old and new social risks[37], and therefore all of the country's political parties and the government have actively participated in a series of debates on social policy reforms. Literally, all newly introduced social policies since the early 2000s resulted from active competition, negotiation, and compromises among the parties and government (often under the leadership of centre-left). The relationship between policymakers and citizens has

[37] Bonoli (2006, p. 5) defines 'New social risks' as "situations in which individuals experience welfare losses and which have arisen as a result of the socioeconomic transformations that have taken place over the past three to four decades and are generally subsumed under the heading of post-industrialisation." The concept often includes "instability of family structures and the destandardisation of employment."

changed too. Political parties and the government were not free of their original ideological orientations, but actively revise their election strategies by claiming to stand for the interests of all different classes and groups, moving their positions beyond the boundary of ideologies, classes and regions in order to win in the scramble for political power (Ko, 2008; Choi, 2010; Kim and Nam, 2011; Kim, 2013a; Hyun, 2013; Yang, 2013; S. C. Lee, 2017). In other words, the political influence of elite bureaucrats or ideologies of political parties has become less relevant to policymaking, while social policy preferences of the electorate have become a key variable in policymaking. In this regard, it can be argued that the majority of the electorates have approved of the new state role in providing support for families with children and for the elderly.

However, it is still unclear whether such welfare state expansion in Korea reflects the preferences of the population, particularly the excluded groups such as labour market outsiders. From the perspective of rational choice theory, those in the labour market outsider position are likely to be critical of the current welfare state in Korea, since they are assumed to be strong supporters for social policies targeting the unemployed. If that is the case, their preferences might have been ignored by policy-makers not least because they have been a minority. The proportion of labour market outsiders in Korea dramatically increased up to 52.1 percent of the total employees in 2000, and maintained at a level much higher than 40 percent throughout the 2000s. However, when it comes to the proportion of them to the whole working population including self-employed, labour market outsiders have accounted for approximately 30 to 32 percent throughout the 2000s, which was insufficient to overpower the other social groups, namely labour market insiders and the self-employed (KOSIS, 2019). In such a circumstance, vote-seeking politicians might have avoided proposing policies that benefit outsiders, not risking losing support from insiders. On the other hand, politicians might have found incentives

to promise family policies, which could be supported by a wide range of individuals including both current and potential beneficiaries regardless of labour market status.

From family-related perspectives, however, the assumption of conflicts of interests between labour market insiders and outsiders could be challenged. Considering the significant role that the family has played in welfare provision in Korea, individuals, regardless of their labour market status, may decide their social policy preferences based on the levels of welfare capability of their own families. It is probable that the public including labour market outsiders may consider that their families are still capable of addressing temporary income loss due to unstable employment, but also find that their families are becoming vulnerable to the caregiving issues given the decline of the traditional Confucian model of the family. In a similar vein, S. C. Lee (2017) also contends that a range of post-industrial shifts – such as increase in female labour market participation, divorce rates, lone parents, and dual-earner households with dependent children – have weakened the caring function of the family in Korea, and therefore have led to the expansion of non-family care service in those countries.

The normative dimension of the developmental logic and Confucian culture might have played a role. Even after democratisation as discussed above, social welfare expansion tended to be justified when it was perceived to either promote or at least be compatible with economic growth. In response to the low fertility rates in Korea and the slowed economic growth, the public in Korea might have narrowly accepted universal provision of social welfare for the elderly and families with children as a strategy for economic growth, while adhering to the residual welfare model highlighting self-reliance and family assistance in terms of income security for the working-age population.

4.3. Conclusion

The initial stage of the welfare state in Korea was characterised by its pro-developmental nature in which social policy was subordinated to economic policy – the latter being set as the fundamental goal of the nation. The authoritarian government in Korea strictly minimised government spending on social assistance and services in order to mobilise all the national resources for economic growth. Instead, they established a social-insurance-centred social welfare system, which was used to accumulate capital and also to protect industrial workers of large enterprises from injury and illness. Confucian culture that shaped the Korean society for centuries provided justification for such a growth-oriented social welfare system by accentuating self-sufficiency and family responsibility. In this period in Korea, most people did not experience social welfare and had to rely on their own efforts or family assistance in times of needs.

Such a developmental welfare state in Korea was seriously challenged by democratic consolidation and socioeconomic changes caused by economic liberalisation and post-industrial shifts. A series of welfare reform has been carried out since the late 1990s, and as a result, the welfare state in Korea has come to share the responsibility for significant parts of everyday life – such as childcare and elderly care – with the family, which could be considered as a deviation from the developmental state. On the other hand, however, the essential nature of the developmental state remains unchanged in the sense that the social insurance programmes still play the major role in social security, which signifies that responsibility for income security, especially for those with precarious jobs, rests firmly with the family.

Considering the democratic consolidation in Korea, such a result could be an outcome of the politics that reflects the preferences of the public as a whole who are supportive of family

policies on the one hand, but are critical of social policies that benefit labour market outsiders on the other hand. However, it is still an empirical question whether or not labour market outsiders, who are seemingly excluded from social welfare, are actually different from the other social groups in terms of social policy preferences, as suggested by rational choice theory. Given the role of the family in welfare provision, individuals may decide their social policy preferences in efforts to supplement the family welfare, considering the welfare capability of their own families, rather than their socioeconomic or demographic characteristics. It is also probable that the public attitudes towards social policy are still shaped by dominant culture such as the developmental logic and Confucian values which generally promote conservative attitudes towards social policies supporting labour market outsiders, but which could be favourable to policies for children and the elderly in the context of low fertility and the slowed economic growth.

5. Social Policy Attitudes in South Korea – A Quantitative Survey Analysis

The purpose of this chapter is to examine the factors shaping individuals' attitudes towards social policy using a survey in the Republic of Korea. Studies on social policy preferences have tended to pay particular attention to three broad factors: economic self-interest, political ideology and institutions. For ages, self-interest has been emphasised as the basic drive of human action in the work of many economists and rational choice scholars. According to the self-interest theory, individuals, who are assumed to be fundamentally atomised and self-interested rational actors, estimate the costs and benefits of given social programmes, based on their socioeconomic situation and demographic background, and only support one that maximises their personal material interests. Ideology has also been highlighted as the main source of individuals' support for social policy. This is associated with a claim that individuals' preferences for social policies are shaped not only by self-interest, but also by ideas or values each individual holds. In this regard, individuals' attitudes towards social policy could be better understood with the Left-Right ideological spectrum. Lastly, scholars working on new institutionalism argue that institutions shape individuals' interests and preferences by constraining them to comply with institutionalised acts, such as certain norms, rules, or appropriate behaviours. This factor can be differentiated from the former two individual-level variables in the sense that institutions are often region-specific, long-lasting and influential over the majority of the population. In other words, members of a certain society may share a tendency reflective of the institutions to a certain extent.

These three explanations, each of which is based on different understandings of the motives behind human behaviour, are potentially either complementing or contradicting each other.

Which one best explains the public attitudes towards social policy in South Korea and why are still empirical questions. In pursuing these questions, a range of quantitative analyses are performed in this chapter to assess the validity of these explanations, and also to gather background information for the following qualitative research. This quantitative research tests the effects of explanatory variables on individuals' social policy preferences in Korea by analysing individual-level survey data collected by the '2013 Public Attitudes towards Welfare Policy' survey, which was conducted by the Korea Institute for Health and Social Affairs, together with the Institute for Social Welfare, Seoul National University. The survey data are analysed by using Generalised Ordered Logit/Partial Proportional Odds Model.

According to the results, many variables representing individuals' current/prospective location in the labour market and levels of job security - such as education, household type (in relation to work-life conflict single parents are likely to suffer), labour market status, and personal income - do not show robust relationships with individuals' attitudes towards social policy. Of the individual-level self-interest variables, only age and gender appear to create statistically significant outcomes. The way age influences individuals' social policy preferences indicates that individuals' preferences for social policies tend to reflect the material interest based on their own current stage in the life-cycle. In contrast, the effects of gender seem to go against the self-interest expectation: women are found to be less in favour of the welfare state in general as well as individual social policies despite of their current or prospective levels of risk exposure in the labour market. Unlike many individual-level self-interest variables that provide insufficient explanations for social policy preferences, equivalised disposable household income, which represents intra-household transfer, turns out to be an important determinant of individuals' views on social welfare, especially in relation to individual social welfare programmes. In addition, ideological orientation and interest in politics are also found to create

statistically significant impacts on individuals' views on social welfare characteristics in particular. Overall, such findings suggest that family-related culture and ideology may play a more important role than individuals' socioeconomic characteristics in shaping individuals' welfare attitudes in Korea, and therefore that in Korea structural cleavages based on individuals' socioeconomic characteristics are less likely to happen on the issues of redistribution.

5.1. Descriptive Statistics

Before performing the main analyses, descriptive statistics for both independent and dependent variables will be presented to provide basic information about variables in the dataset, and also to explore potential relationships between variables.

5.1.1. Descriptive Statistics for Independent Variables: Characteristics of the Samples

This chapter analyses the responses of 3,696 respondents collected by the '2013 Public Attitudes towards Welfare Policy' survey with regard to their attitudes towards social policy. The independent variables of the analyses include respondents' distinguishing features or qualities, such as their socioeconomic, demographic, and ideological characteristics. Therefore, descriptive statistics for independent variables provides basic information about the sample, in terms of their characteristics (see Table 6).

Regarding gender, female respondents comprise 56.4% of total respondents, while their male counterparts make up 43.6% of total respondents.

In terms of age group, those who are aged 65 or over appear to be the largest proportion,

accounting for 33.7% of total respondents. This oldest group is followed by those aged from 35 to 44, 45 to 54, 55 to 64, and 25 to 34, who constitute 18.1%, 16.7%, 16.2% and 11.7%, respectively. Those who are aged from 19 to 24, the youngest group, make up 3.6% of the total respondents. The low proportion of the youngest group in total respondents results partly from the narrow range of age.

With regard to education, those with a basic education certificate outnumber the others, accounting for 44.7% of total respondents. They are then followed by groups with a secondary certificate, college degree, or short-cycle tertiary education, which constitute 30.0%, 15.5%, and 7.8%, respectively. Those with a master's degree or higher make up only 2.1% of total respondents.

In relation to household type, adult-only households turn out to be the largest group, consisting of 43.3% of total respondents. Those who belong to the 'married couple with no dependent children' or 'married couple with dependent children' groups account for 27.7% and 25.0%, respectively. Those who identified themselves as single adults or single parents appear to be much smaller in number, accounting for only 2.3% and 1.7%, respectively.

Regarding labour market status, those who are identified as the non-employed form the largest group, consisting of 39.5% of total respondents. Those who belong to insider, outsider, or the self-employed groups are all similar in size, accounting for approximately 20.0% each. If we divide the unemployed from the others in the outsider group, they comprise only 1.0% of total respondents.

Table 6. Distribution of Respondents by Socioeconomic and Demographic Characteristics

Variable		Observation (%)		
		Non-weighted	Weighted	Ratio of over/underrepresentation
Gender	Male	1613 (43.6)	1712 (47.0)	0.93
	Female	2083 (56.4)	1933 (53.0)	1.06
Age group	19-24	134 (3.6)	235 (6.4)	0.56
	25-34	433 (11.7)	716 (19.6)	0.60
	35-44	669 (18.1)	838 (23.0)	0.79
	45-54	617 (16.7)	807 (22.1)	0.76
	55-64	597 (16.2)	516 (14.2)	1.14
	65+	1246 (33.7)	532 (14.6)	2.31
Education	Basic education or below	1653 (44.7)	895 (24.5)	1.82
	Secondary education	1107 (30.0)	1278 (35.1)	0.86
	Short-cycle tertiary education	287 (7.8)	401 (11.0)	0.71
	College degree	572 (15.5)	954 (26.2)	0.59
	Master's degree or higher	77 (2.1)	117 (3.2)	0.66
Household type	Single adult	84 (2.3)	107 (2.9)	0.79
	Married couple with no dependent children	1025 (27.7)	639 (17.5)	1.58
	Married couple with dependent children	925 (25.0)	1290 (35.4)	0.71
	Adult-only-household	1599 (43.3)	1560 (42.8)	1.01
	Single parent	63 (1.7)	48 (1.3)	1.31
Labour market status	Insider	750 (20.3)	1157 (31.7)	0.64
	Outsider	725 (19.6)	783 (21.5)	0.91
	Unemployed	37 (1.0)	50 (1.4)	0.71
	The self-employed	725 (19.6)	483 (13.3)	1.47
	The non-employed	1459 (39.5)	1171 (32.1)	1.23
Sum		3696 (100.0)	3645 (100.0)	1.00

In terms of personal income, the mean is 1350.08. (1=10,000 KRW, approximately equivalent to US$10) The minimum and the maximum are -2393.00, and 72430.00, respectively. The standard deviation is 2326.41. When it comes to equivalised disposable household income, which assumes the effect of intra-household transfer, the values change significantly. The mean is 2237.69. The minimum and the maximum are -1046.62 and 31054.96, respectively. The standard deviation is 1691.26. We may see that the mean significantly increases, by approximately 60%, and also that the gap between the minimum and the maximum is much narrower when moving from personal income to equivalised disposable household income. This may suggest a significant effect of redistribution within a household (see Table 7). It is worth noting that there are significant differences between non-weighted and weighted data in terms of both personal income and equivalised disposable household income. This may indicate that people with lower income are underrepresented in the survey, or probably underreport their income.

Table 7. Personal and Equivalised Disposable Household Income

		Observation	Mean (Ratio of over/underrepresentation)	Standard deviation	Min	Max
Personal annual income	**Non-weighted**	3696	1978.69 (1.466)	2934.97	-2393.00	72430.00
	Weighted	3645	1350.08	2326.41	-2393.00	72430.00
Equivalised disposable household income	**Non-weighted**	3696	2814.92 (1.258)	1920.96	-1046.62	31054.96
	Weighted	3645	2237.69	1691.26	-1046.62	31054.96

Table 8. Distribution of Respondents by Ideological Orientation and Levels of Interest in Politics

Variable		Observation (%)		
		Non-weighted	**Weighted**	**Ratio of over/underrepresentation**
Ideological orientation	Very conservative	346 (9.4)	257 (7.0)	1.34
	Conservative	1014 (27.4)	986 (27.1)	1.01
	Moderate	1575 (42.6)	1486 (40.8)	1.04
	Progressive	669 (18.1)	797 (21.9)	0.83
	Very Progressive	92 (2.5)	119 (3.3)	0.76
Interest in politics	Not at all interested	469 (12.7)	351 (9.6)	1.32
	Slightly interested	1426 (38.6)	1433 (39.3)	0.98
	Moderately interested	1206 (32.6)	1241 (34.0)	0.96
	Very interested	455 (12.3)	461 (12.6)	0.98
	Extremely interested	140 (3.8)	159 (4.4)	0.86
Sum		3696 (100.0)	3645 (100.0)	1.00

With regard to respondents' ideological orientation, 42.6% of total respondents place themselves in the 'moderate' category. Those who locate their political ideology as 'conservative' or 'very conservative' account for 27.4% and 9.4%, respectively. Those who report that they are 'progressive' or 'very progressive' constitute 18.1% and 2.5%, respectively. While the moderate forms the largest group, the conservative outnumbers the progressive (see Table 8).

In terms of respondents' interest in politics, 38.6% of total respondents replied that they are slightly interested in politics, forming the largest group. 32.6% of total respondents, the second largest group, report that they are moderately interested in politics. Those who place themselves

in the ‘not at all interested’ or ‘very interested’ comprise 12.7% and 12.3%, respectively. Lastly, those who claim that they are extremely interested in politics do not form a significant proportion of total respondents, accounting for only 3.8% of total respondents (see Table 8).

Such descriptive statistics are not taken from a weighted data set. When weighting is applied to the data, some changes are made in terms of the number of respondents and the share of each category within the variables (see Table 6, 7, and 8).

Of the independent variables, age, gender, education, labour market status and household type are categorical (education levels are redefined as an ordinal variable for analyses), assigning each respondent to a particular socioeconomic or demographic group. It is likely that these variables have a relationship with the other ordinal or continuous variables. Analysis of variance (ANOVA) is performed to check if there are any statistically significant differences between different socioeconomic or demographic groups in relation to these ordinal or continuous variables (see Table 9).

Personal income appears to be one variable that most clearly shows the differences between various socioeconomic and demographic groups. All the categorical variables generate a statistically significant impact on personal income. In terms of gender, male respondents earn three times as much as female respondents, on average. Regarding age, those who aged from 35 to 44 appear to be the top-earning group. They are closely followed by those aged from 45 to 54 and those aged from 25 to 34. Those aged from 55 to 64, and those 19 to 24 are characterised by a much lower level of personal income, which is less than 50% of that of the top-earning group. Those aged 65 or over, who are likely to be approaching retirement or to have already retired, show the lowest level of personal income, which is only approximately 10% of that of the first rank group. Education pays off: those who are more educated earn more than those who are less.

Household type is associated with household income and expenditure, rather than one's level of income obtained from the labour market. Thus, although there seems to be a statistically significant relationship between household type and personal income, it should not be easily concluded that household type itself has contributed to such differences in personal income. The relationship between household type and personal income can be better understood when interpreted with regard to stages of life-cycle, which usually change with the age of the main household earner or adult couple. Of the sub-categories, married couples with a child under 18, whose average age is 41.65, appear to be the top-earning group. They are being followed by single, whose average age is 39.69. Single parent and adult-only-household, whose average ages are 53.5 and 56.4, respectively, form the third and fourth rank groups, showing relatively large differences from the first and second rank groups. Married couple only, who are aged 66.55, on average, have the lowest level of personal income which turns out to earn only 25% of that of the top-earning group. These results can be understood as corroborating the strong influence of age on personal income.

Regarding labour market status, insiders appeared to be the top-earning group. Outsiders earn only about 37% of what insiders earn, on average. If we look at the employed outsiders only, excluding the unemployed, the average personal income slightly increases, from 1434.19 to 1448.21. The self-employed appear to earn even less than outsiders, unless they have underreported their income.

If we consider an individual's income in relation to intra-household transfer, we see a different picture. In terms of equivalised disposable household income, all socioeconomic and demographic groups, except for labour market insiders, turn out to have much more increased income than their personal income. Also, the income gaps between the sub-groups within a categorical variable are reduced significantly. In the case of age group, education, and

household type, the ranks within a categorical variable even change slightly. This result could be understood as suggesting that personal income is redistributed within a household, from labour market insiders to the others, and also that the effects of intra-household transfers on the economic condition that individuals experience on a daily basis can be very significant.

In terms of ideological orientation, age, education, household type and labour market status show statistically significant differences between their sub-groups, while gender does not. The results suggest that older people are more likely to be conservative. With regard to education, those with degrees from the short-cycle tertiary education appear to be the most left-progressive, being closely followed by those with college degrees. Those with basic education or below are most conservative. Those who have finished secondary education or postgraduate studies are located in the middle. Regarding household types, those who belong to the single adult category appear to be most left-progressive, showing very little differences from those who are classified as married couples with dependent children, or single parent. Those who belong to adult-only-household and married couple with no dependent children categories are more conservative compared to the others. Of the labour market segments, labour market insiders are most left-progressive, being followed by outsiders. The self-employed and the non-employed are relatively more conservative than the others. It is intriguing that this ranking is exactly correlated with the ranking for personal income. If we compare those who participate in the labour market only, insiders, who enjoy higher levels of job security as well as better wages than outsiders, are more likely to be progressive than outsiders. Women appear to be more progressive than males, but the differences are not statistically significant.

Regarding respondents' interest in politics, statistically significant differences are found in relation to gender, education, household type and labour market status. Male respondents tend to be more interested in politics than their female counterparts. Those who are more educated

are generally more interested in politics. Married couples with dependent children appear to be most interested in politics, while single parents are least interested. Those who belong to adult-only-household, married couple with no dependent children, and single adult categories are located in the middle, ranking from the second to the fourth in the order. Labour market insiders rank first, being followed by the others, who show similar levels of interest in politics. Unlike the former variables, age does not create any statistically significant differences between the cohorts.

Table 9. ANOVA

		Personal income	Equivalised disposable household income	Ideological orientation	Interest in politics
Gender	**Male**	2196.44 (3045.82)	2324.12 (1682.24)	2.75 (1.02)	2.81 (1.01)
	Female	694.69 (1199.06)	2170.76 (1695.59)	2.78 (0.87)	2.37 (0.93)
p.		0.000	0.006	0.292	0.000
Age group	**19-24**	817.13 (1021.07)	2632.89 (1165.32)	3.09 (0.78)	2.66 (0.87)
	25-34	1964.55 (1614.63)	3028.89 (1693.01)	3.11 (0.84)	2.60 (0.87)
	35-44	2491.87 (2388.40)	2759.80 (1481.91)	3.08 (0.93)	2.59 (0.90)
	45-54	2290.56 (3836.16)	2808.50 (2287.73)	2.85 (0.88)	2.58 (0.97)
	55-64	1206.56 (2005.21)	2283.71 (1541.30)	2.59 (0.91)	2.59 (1.02)
	65+	257.97 (627.78)	1409.65 (1111.94)	2.52 (0.93)	2.50 (1.06)
p.		0.000	0.000	0.000	0.148
Education	**Basic education or below**	504.77 (988.07)	1514.92 (1081.17)	2.57 (0.87)	2.39 (1.01)
	Secondary education	1595.55 (2878.56)	2582.08 (1976.63)	2.83 (0.92)	2.63 (0.94)
	Short-cycle tertiary education	2010.16 (1884.80)	2550.82 (1099.26)	3.13 (0.92)	2.66 (0.88)
	College degree	2695.65 (2821.36)	3291.99 (1809.74)	3.05 (0.99)	2.80 (0.98)
	Master's degree or higher	3511.79 (3424.55)	3803.43 (1826.48)	2.86 (1.06)	2.97 (0.97)
p.		0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Household type	**Single**	1954.14 (1551.28)	2142.59 (1276.89)	3.05 (0.85)	2.46 (0.95)
	Married couple only	642.36 (1207.80)	1731.67 (1195.48)	2.57 (0.93)	2.54 (1.03)
	Married couple with a child under 18	2566.93 (3536.50)	2839.82 (1957.01)	3.03 (0.91)	2.63 (0.90)
	Adult-only-household	1072.59 (1684.80)	2249.86 (1725.12)	2.73 (0.92)	2.55 (1.00)
	Single parent	1235.78 (1677.84)	1447.55 (778.27)	2.95 (0.91)	2.17 (1.04)
p.		0.000	0.000	0.000	0.004
Labour market status	**Insider**	3813.47 (3375.98)	3318.39 (1867.28)	3.02 (0.99)	2.73 (0.96)
	Outsider	1434.19 (1059.21)	2215.60 (1241.76)	2.83 (0.91)	2.56 (0.97)
	The self-employed	1268.68 (2212.81)	2021.85 (1471.49)	2.67 (0.89)	2.48 (0.99)
	The non-employed	80.30 (319.55)	1800.94 (1662.13)	2.66 (0.94)	2.51 (1.00)
p.		0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000

Note: ( ) = Standard deviation


5.1.2. Descriptive Statistics for Dependent Variables

In this research, dependent variables are divided into two groups: respondents' preferences for general welfare aims and means, and respondents' preferences on four social policy areas for risk groups. The former measures respondents' support for social policy in favour of redistribution, respondents' attitudes towards a tax increase for welfare expansion in the provision of social welfare, and respondents' preferences for/against universalism/selectivism. The latter measures respondents' support for government spending on four social policy areas, including support for the unemployed, public healthcare, old-age income supplement, and support for families with children. These areas do not refer to specific policies, but can be better understood as a range of policies each of which has distinctive beneficiaries. For instance, the question regarding support for the unemployed explicitly refers to both employment promotion and unemployment benefits, which represent active labour market policies (ALMPs) and passive labour market policies (PLMPs), respectively. Old-age income supplement also consists of two different pension schemes: the National Pension (contributory, partially tax-funded) and the Basic Pension (social assistance, fully tax-funded). Regarding public healthcare and support for families with children, the corresponding questions do not specify any policies.

Graphs provide us with a detailed understanding of the public attitudes and preferences towards general welfare aims and means (see Figure 5). Regarding respondents' support for social policy in favour of redistribution and tax increase for welfare state expansion, the distributions of responses are left-skewed, suggesting that respondents are inclined to be supportive of welfare state expansion and its accompanying tax-increase. When it comes to their preferences for/against universalism/selectivism, we may see the "M" shaped distribution of responses denoting that there is a conflict of ideas in respect to welfare deservingness among the

respondents (Oorschot, 2000; 2006).

Figure 5. The Distributions of Responses: Respondents' Attitudes towards General Welfare Aims and Means (N=number of respondents)



When we look at government spending on four social policy areas, the distributions of responses are also all left-skewed with regard to all social policy areas, showing that the majority of the respondents are demanding more government spending on the policies than the current levels (see Figure 6).

Figure 6. The Distributions of Responses: Respondents' Preferences on Social Policy Areas for Risk Groups




Table 10. Descriptive Statistics for Dependent Variables

		Descriptive statistics			Options from 1 to 5 (%)				
Variable		**Observation**	**Mean**	**Standard deviation**	**1. Strongly disagree**	**2. Disagree**	**3. Neither agree nor disagree**	**4. Agree**	**5. Strongly agree**
Respondents' preferences on general welfare aims and means	**It is the responsibility of the government to reduce differences in income levels**	3696	3.72	0.88	60 (1.6)	352 (9.5)	681 (18.4)	2080 (56.3)	523 (14.2)
		3645 (weighted)	3.74	0.87	44 (1.2)	348 (9.6)	646 (17.7)	2064 (56.6)	543 (14.9)
	Tax should be increased in order to expand the welfare state	3696	3.20	0.91	71 (1.9)	917 (24.8)	1044 (28.2)	1544 (41.8)	120 (3.2)
		3645 (weighted)	3.18	0.92	75 (2.1)	908 (24.9)	1054 (28.9)	1485 (40.7)	123 (3.4)
	Social welfare should be offered to all by right, not only to specific groups of deserving poor	3696	2.77	1.07	317 (8.6)	1553 (42.0)	616 (16.7)	1090 (29.5)	120 (3.2)
		3645 (weighted)	2.91	1.08	259 (7.1)	1362 (37.4)	637 (17.5)	1234 (33.9)	153 (4.2)
Variable		**Observation**	**Mean**	**Standard deviation**	**1. Decrease greatly**	**2. Decrease slightly**	**3. Stay the same**	**4. Increase slightly**	**5. Increase greatly**
Respondents' preferences on social policy areas for risk groups	**Financial support for the unemployed**	3696	3.50	0.77	55 (1.5)	245 (6.6)	1423 (38.4)	1733 (46.9)	240 (6.5)
		3645 (weighted)	3.49	0.82	71 (1.9)	281 (7.7)	1371 (37.6)	1650 (45.2)	272 (7.4)
	Financial support for the sick	3696	3.55	0.74	31 (0.8)	232 (6.3)	1333 (36.1)	1858 (50.3)	242 (6.5)
		3645 (weighted)	3.51	0.78	34 (0.9)	276 (7.6)	1379 (37.8)	1693 (46.5)	263 (7.2)
	Financial support for the elderly	3696	3.50	0.81	77 (2.1)	266 (7.2)	1321 (35.7)	1787 (48.3)	245 (6.6)
		3645 (weighted)	3.41	0.86	100 (2.7)	358 (9.8)	1405 (38.5)	1532 (42.0)	251 (6.9)
	Financial support for families with children	3696	3.59	0.77	56 (1.5)	194 (5.2)	1237 (33.5)	1918 (51.9)	291 (7.9)
		3645 (weighted)	3.57	0.84	80 (2.2)	249 (6.8)	1206 (33.1)	1749 (48.0)	360 (9.9)

In order to have more descriptive statistics for the social policy preferences of men versus women, and labour market insiders versus outsiders, please see the Appendix 2, 3, 4 and 5.

5.2. Multivariate Analysis

5.2.1. Correlation Analysis

In this section, the Pearson correlation analysis is performed to investigate the potential relationship between independent variables. This is to avoid multicollinearity, which may lead to unreliable and unstable estimates of the multiple regression coefficients. Multicollinearity may exist if two or more of the independent variables in a regression model are closely correlated. According to the result, statistically significant correlation is observed between most of independent variables at the 0.01 level (see Appendix 6). However, the variance inflation factors (VIFs) of the independent variables are all lower than 10, which can be interpreted as suggesting that multicollinearity does not exist (see Appendix 7).

5.2.2. Results of Generalised Ordered Logit Analyses

5.2.2.1. Respondents' Attitudes towards General Welfare Aims and Means

The first part of the analyses examines the relationship between the independent variables and respondents' attitudes towards general welfare aims and means, including levels of respondents' support for social policy in favour of redistribution, respondents' attitudes towards a tax increase for welfare expansion in the provision of social welfare, and respondents' preferences for/against universalism/selectivism. As individuals' attitudes are measured and recoded as ordinal-level dependent variables (the five answer categories), one may consider using the

Ordered Logit Model which is also known as the Proportional Odds Model. However, the use of the Ordered Logit Model would possibly lead to serious errors especially when the proportional odds/parallel lines assumption[38] on the data is violated. In such cases, a good alternative is the Generalised Ordered Logit Model. With this model, the proportional odds/parallel lines assumption can be relaxed only for those independent variables where it is violated. In return, the interpretation becomes less straightforward than it is for the ordered logit model, especially for those variables that do not meet the assumptions. For estimation, the model collapses the original ordinal variable into two categories and runs a series of binary logistic regression. For example, a four-point Likert item can be redefined as three dichotomisations, such as 1 versus 2, 3, 4; 1, 2 versus 3, 4; 1, 2, 3 versus 4. If the assumption does not hold, which is the case in this research, the model may generate multiple parameters for each dichotomisation (In this research, each corresponding coefficient is located in separate columns named ß1, ß2, ß3 and ß4). In this case, all coefficients in each dichotomisation should be then interpreted separately as a coefficient from binary logit models. For instance, the first coefficient is interpreted as one from a binary logit regression where the outcome variable is recoded as 1 versus 2, 3, 4. Then, the second, third and last coefficients are interpreted respectively as ones from a different binary logit regression, but with different dichotomisations. If the assumption holds, all corresponding coefficients estimated by each collapsed logistic regression should be the same (In such cases, the coefficient will appear only in column ß1). This also means that the odds ratios will be the same across the different logistic regressions. This model is less restrictive than the Ordered Logit Model/Proportional Odds Model, but still more parsimonious and interpretable than non-ordinal methods. By examining

[38] The assumption means that the effects of any independent variables included in a ordinal regression model are consistent or proportional across the different thresholds.

the patterns of coefficients, moreover, we may gain detailed information and insights that would not be provided by the ordered logit model (Williams, 2005; Williams, 2016).

Respondents' Support for Social Policy in Relation to Redistribution

The first question asks respondents about their preferences for social policy in relation to redistribution (see Table 11). It is important to remind ourselves of the fact that the majority 70.5% are in favour of redistribution (either 4: agree or 5: strongly agree), which indicates that there are not many variations among individuals with different socioeconomic or demographic characteristics. As expected, both model 1 and 2 display that not many individual-level self-interest variables create statistically significant impacts.

The analysis of model 1, in which ideological orientation and interest in politics are not held constant, shows statistically significant effects of the independent variables on the responses in relation to age and household type.

In terms of age, those who are aged from 45 to 54 and those who are aged 65 or over are found to be less likely to be in favour of redistribution through social welfare, compared to those who are aged 35 to 44, the reference group. The former has a negative coefficient only on β2, indicating that they are more likely to choose the strongly disagree or disagree categories, relative to the reference group. The latter group leads us to a straightforward interpretation that they are less supportive of government actions for reducing income differences. The other age groups, including those who are aged 19 to 24, do not show any statistically significant differences from the reference group.

Regarding the household type, only couples with dependent children are found to be more supportive of the government action aiming to reduce income inequality, relative to single

adults, the reference group, but the difference between them is statistically significant only on β1. This means that couples with dependent children are less likely to select the strongly disagree category, compared to the reference group.

The other independent variables, including gender, education, labour market status, personal income, and equivalised disposable income of a household, do not generate any statistically significant impacts.

The results of the analysis of model 2 are not significantly different from those of the former. First of all, ideological orientation and interest in politics, the newly controlled variables, appear to be statistically significant. The coefficients for ideological orientation are consistently positive, but decline across cut-points. This means that those who are more left-progressive tend to be more supportive of government actions that aim to reduce the differences in income levels, with the greatest differences being that they are less likely to select the strongly disagree category. Such a result is consistent with the expectation about the impact of ideology. Interest in politics has statistically significant effects on β2 and β4, showing a negative coefficient and a positive coefficient, respectively. The coefficient on β2 suggests that interest in politics has a negative association with individuals' support for social policy in relation to redistribution. The coefficient on β4, however, also suggests that the association can be positive as well. Such results may imply that an increase in interest in politics does not generate preferences for a certain option, but strengthens the degree of preferences that individuals already have.

Age still matters despite the new controls for the ideology and political interest, but shows some changes. Those who are aged from 45 to 54 is now no longer different from the reference group, while those who are aged from 19 to 24 newly appear to have a statistically significant difference from the reference group, being less supportive of income redistribution. The fact that both the youngest group and the oldest group are found to be less favourable to

redistribution is seemingly inconsistent with the self-interest hypothesis in the sense that they are most likely to be beneficiaries of redistributive policies, given their higher probabilities of being exposed to labour market risks. This may indicate that there are certain structures individuals take into account for the strategic calculation of their personal utility.

The impacts of household type wither away when the ideology and political interest are held constant: couples with dependent children, the only group that differs from the reference group, are no longer different from single adults in their preferences for income redistribution in model 2.

The other independent variables, including gender, education, labour market status, personal income, and equivalised disposable household income remain the same, showing no statistically significant effects on the responses.

Overall, it seems to be safe to say that most socioeconomic or demographic characteristics, except for age, do not play an important a role in shaping individuals' views on redistribution. Moreover, even age runs counter to the expectation that the youth and the elderly are more supportive of redistributive measures, suggesting that there could be certain structures or factors that affect the instrumental calculation of individuals. Ideology, in contrast, shows relatively stronger impacts, being consistent with the expectation.

Table 11. Item: Respondents' Support for Social Policy in Relation to Redistribution - "It Is the Responsibility of the Government to Reduce Differences in Income Levels"

Variable		Model 1				Model 2			
		β1 (SD vs D,N,A,SA)	β2 (SD ,D vs N,A,SA)	β3 (SD,D,N vs A,SA)	β4 (SD,D,N,A vs SA)	β1 (SD vs D,N,A,SA)	β2 (SD ,D vs N,A,SA)	β3 (SD,D,N vs A,SA)	β4 (SD,D,N,A vs SA)
Female		0.289869	0.093784	-0.04604	-0.30212	-0.10236			
Age group	**35-44 ®**								
	19-24	-0.42574				-0.55026*			
	25-34	-0.07782				-0.04189			
	45-54	-0.35243	-0.36194*	-0.01701	-0.04118	0.015425			
	55-64	-0.24222				-0.19001			
	65+	-0.39746**				-0.32235*			
Education		0.001968				-.0233808			
Household type	**Single adult ®**								
	Couple with no dependent children	-0.19753				-0.14146			
	Couple with dependent children	1.026552*	0.149852	-0.22955	-0.30612	-0.18305			
	Adult-only household	-0.2252				-0.1966			
	Single parent	-0.45672				-0.49783			
Labour market status	**Insider ®**								
	Outsider	-0.00602				0.038271			
	Self-employed	-0.14601				-0.10695			
	Non-employed	-0.19219				-0.11182			
Personal income		-0.01745				-0.01215			
Equivalised disposable household income		-0.0366				-0.04626			
Ideological orientation						0.802319***	0.463216***	0.32284***	0.101711*
Level of interest in politics						-0.11156	-0.13699*	0.048236	0.210217***
Number of observations		3,696				3,696			
Log likelihood		-4769.2196				-4421.7776			
Sig.		0.0000				0.0000			
Pseudo R2		0.0077				0.0191			

Note1: (***) p-value < 0.001, (**) p-value < 0.01, (*) p-value < 0.05

2: Only one set of coefficients is presented for independent variables that meet the proportional odds assumption.

3. SD: Strongly disagree, D: Disagree, N: Neither agree nor disagree, A: Agree, SA: Strongly agree

Respondents' Support for a Tax Increase for Welfare Expansion

The second question is about individuals' attitudes towards a tax increase for welfare expansion (see Table 12). According to the descriptive statistics presented above, this item shows more variations, relative to the previous one. However, not many self-interest variables are found to be statistically significant. According to the results of model 1, gender, age, and education turn out to be statistically significant in relation to this question.

First of all, gender shows a clear relationship to respondents' attitudes towards a tax increase for welfare expansion: women are likely to show lower levels of approval than males.

In terms of age groups, those who are aged from 55 to 64 are more inclined to support a tax increase for welfare expansion, compared to those aged from 35 to 44, the reference group. There are no statistically significant differences between the reference group and the other age groups.

With regard to education, statistically significant effects are observed only on β3 with a positive coefficient. This suggests that those who are more educated tend to be more sympathetic towards a tax increase for welfare expansion, being more likely to select the agree or strongly agree categories.

Unlike the variables above, labour market status, household type, personal income, and equivalised disposable income of a household do not generate any statistically significant effects.

The analysis of model 2 presents analogous results with some minor changes. First of all, the impact of ideological orientation on respondents' attitudes towards a tax increase for welfare expansion is straightforward. Those who are more left-progressive tend to be more sympathetic towards a tax increase for welfare expansion. An interest in politics appears to be statistically

significant on β3 and β4, with positive coefficients that grow across cut-points. This means that those who are more interested in politics are more favourable towards a tax increase for welfare expansion, with the greatest difference being that they are more likely to choose the strongly agree category.

Changes occur in relation to education and household type when ideology and political interest are controlled. The ideology/political interest absorbs the effects of education, indicating that education attainment is not only linked to one's competitiveness in the labour market, but also to one's ideological orientation and/or political interest. It is probable that individuals internalise certain values or ideas, and/or become more interested in politics, through education. This may explain why those with higher educational attainment in model 1 are having more approving attitudes towards tax increase, which is likely to be inconsistent with their material interest. In terms of household type, adult-only households newly appear to have statistically significant differences from single adults, the reference group, but only on β2. Its positive coefficient means they are less likely to select the strongly disagree or disagree categories, compared to single adults.

The outcomes of gender and age remain the same. It is interesting that women are still more critical of tax increase for welfare expansion even after controlling ideological orientation and interest in politics. Such results are contradicting the expectation that women are strong supporters for more generous welfare state, given that women tend to pay less taxes than men due to the inferior positions and wages that they are likely to have in the labour market, and also that they are more likely to benefit from the welfare state, especially from universal benefits. This may indicate that in Korea there are certain structures in which women find a better-funded welfare state not profiting them. Given the highly social-insurance-centred welfare system in Korea, it is probable that women, especially those with labour market

outsider status, may find paying social security contributions (which could be easily perceived as taxes) more burdensome than men may feel, and also that the anticipated levels of protection and benefits would not surpass the anticipated tax burden.

The other independent variables are still statistically insignificant.

Based on these results, it seems that individuals' attitudes towards tax increase for the welfare expansion are likely to be affected by gender, age, ideological orientation and political interest. In addition, the impact of gender also suggests that the social context or welfare institutions might also matter.

Table 12. Item: Tax Increase for Welfare Expansion - "Tax Should Be Increased in Order to Expand the Welfare State"

Variable		Model 1				Model 2			
		β1 (SD vs D,N,A,SA)	β2 (SD ,D vs N,A,SA)	β3 (SD,D,N vs A,SA)	β4 (SD,D,N,A vs SA)	β1 (SD vs D,N,A,SA)	β2 (SD ,D vs N,A,SA)	β3 (SD,D,N vs A,SA)	β4 (SD,D,N,A vs SA)
Female		-0.36363***				-0.33101***			
Age group	**35-44 ®**								
	19-24	-0.32815				-0.38877			
	25-34	-0.11156				-0.08642			
	45-54	0.135516				0.133529			
	55-64	0.474523***				0.496111***			
	65+	0.182154				0.188264			
Education		-0.08644	-0.00096	0.118995**	0.155099	-0.14576	-0.03051	0.073929	0.100261
Household type	**Single adult ®**								
	Couple with no dependent children	0.242581				-0.88417	0.420041	0.226757	-0.48092
	Couple with dependent children	0.442063	0.285991	0.055262	-0.37584	-0.42479	0.384362	0.053127	-0.98171
	Adult-only household	0.591925	0.379758	0.089197	0.118532	-0.3043	0.506286*	0.050086	-0.61229
	Single parent	-0.1485				-0.17818			
Labour market status	**Insider ®**								
	Outsider	0.012314				0.026491			
	Self-employed	-0.17798				-0.19191			
	Non-employed	-0.44271	0.101038	0.010594	-0.15713	0.008415			
Personal income		-0.00288				-0.00431			
Equivalised disposable household income		-0.0048				0.01745			
Ideological orientation						0.127362***			
Level of interest in politics						0.025849	0.054917	0.113089**	0.37955***
Number of observations		3,696				3,696			
Log likelihood		-4943.9727				-4618.1798			
Sig.		0.0000				0.0000			
Pseudo R2		0.0127				0.0169			

Note1: (***) p-value < 0.001, (**) p-value < 0.01, (*) p-value < 0.05

2: Only one set of coefficients is presented for independent variables that meet the proportional odds assumption.

3. SD: Strongly disagree, D: Disagree, N: Neither agree nor disagree, A: Agree, SA: Strongly agree

Respondents' Attitudes towards Universalism/Selectivism

Respondents' preferences for/against universalism/selectivism can be seen in Table 13. It is generally assumed that selective provision of social welfare is more likely to be welcomed by those who are economically disadvantaged, since they could enjoy benefits that are more targeted and dedicated to them. In contrast, well-to-do groups, the middle class in particular, are argued to be in favour of universal provision of welfare, which does not exclude them from a range of social services and benefits (Korpi, 1980; King, 1987; Svallfors, 1999). On top of that, other socioeconomic and demographic characteristics may matter too. For instance, women and young people would have more to gain from universal benefits, whereas older people and the employed would support more selective contributory earnings-related benefits. In this section, therefore, we may expect multiple cleavages among different socioeconomic groups each of which pursues their own material interest. In addition, given the M-shaped distribution of responses presented above, we may expect to observe some ideological difference between pro/anti-universalism.

In the analysis of model 1, gender, age, and education have statistically significant results. With regard to gender, it is clear that women are more favourable towards universalism.

In terms of age, those who are aged from 45 to 54, those who are aged from 55 to 64 and those who are aged 65 or over are more critical of universal welfare provision, relative to those who are aged from 35 to 44, the reference group. Based on the self-interest theory, the older groups' lower levels of support for universalism can be interpreted as suggesting that they have preferences for selective provision of social welfare from which they may receive exclusive, maximised benefits.

Education shows statistically significant impacts on β2, and β3, with consistently positive

coefficients that get slightly bigger across cut-points. This means that those with higher educational attainment have more favourable attitudes towards universalism, being more likely to select the strongly agree or agree categories. This result seems to be consistent with the self-interest theory, as education generally increases the chances of having a higher position on the socioeconomic ladder, and therefore decreases the chances of getting benefits from the selective provision of social welfare.

The results of the analysis of model 2 do not differ greatly from those of model 1. First of all, the impact of ideological inclination is straightforward: those who are more left-progressive have a tendency to support universalism. In contrast, an increase in the interest in politics does not encourage respondents to prefer a certain alternative, but leads them to be more determined with regard to their own preferences. To be specific, the impacts of political interest are statistically significant on β1 and β4, showing a negative and a positive coefficient, respectively. The coefficient on β1 can be interpreted as suggesting that interest in politics has a negative impact on individuals' preferences for universalism. However, in the same way, the coefficient on β4 can be understood as implying that the variable may also have a positive impact as well.

The inclusion of these two variables causes some changes in relation to gender and equivalised disposable household income. To be specific, gender loses its effects on individuals' views on universalism/selectivism. This implies that there is a link between gender and ideology: that women are more for universalism than men in model 1 might be because women have a higher proportion of population subscribing to left-progressive ideas, regardless of how much they would gain from universal benefits.

By contrast, equivalised disposable household income newly appears to generate statistically significant impacts on the views, showing that those from richer households are more supportive of universalism. The variable has a positive coefficient only on β3, suggesting that

those from richer households are more likely to choose the agree or strongly agree categories.

The effects of the other variables on the responses remain unchanged. Respondents are not distinguished by their household type or labour market status in terms of their preferences for/against universalism/selectivism. The personal income also has no statistically significant impacts on the responses.

Table 13. Item: Universalism – "Social Welfare Should be Offered to All by Right, Not Only to Specific Groups of Deserving Poor"

Variable		Model 1				Model 2			
		β1 (SD vs D,N,A,SA)	β2 (SD ,D vs N,A,SA)	β3 (SD,D,N vs A,SA)	β4 (SD,D,N,A vs SA)	β1 (SD vs D,N,A,SA)	β2 (SD ,D vs N,A,SA)	β3 (SD,D,N vs A,SA)	β4 (SD,D,N,A vs SA)
Female		0.14894*				0.101884			
Age group	**35-44 ®**								
	19-24	0.03982				-0.02946			
	25-34	0.562963	0.123084	-0.0738	-0.46635	0.021963			
	45-54	-0.22777*				-0.22908*			
	55-64	-0.63378***				-0.63571***			
	65+	-0.58667***				-0.56624***			
Education		-0.04957	0.133351***	0.133975***	0.116833	-0.03421	0.132816***	0.124029**	0.08991
Household type	**Single adult ®**								
	Couple with no dependent children	-0.12798				-0.08658			
	Couple with dependent children	0.251355				0.266843			
	Adult-only household	0.00529				0.050344			
	Single parent	0.161891				0.222534			
Labour market status	**Insider ®**								
	Outsider	-0.09247				-0.09342			
	Self-employed	-0.07112				-0.31676	-0.07583	0.066935	0.167276
	Non-employed	-0.04606				-0.03294			
Personal income		0.012641				0.014689			
Equivalised disposable household income		0.076983	-0.01546	0.09393	0.133282	0.119415	0.002211	0.112246*	0.091985
Ideological orientation						0.140878***			
Level of interest in politics						-0.18177**	-0.04725	0.017968	0.268272**
Number of observation		3,696				3,696			
Log likelihood		-5201.1112				-4854.1235			
Sig.		0.0000				0.0000			
Pseudo R2		0.0300				0.0355			

Note1: (***) p-value < 0.001, (**) p-value < 0.01, (*) p-value < 0.05

2: Only one set of coefficients is presented for independent variables that meet the proportional odds assumption.

3. SD: Strongly disagree, D: Disagree, N: Neither agree nor disagree, A: Agree, SA: Strongly agree

5.2.2.2. Respondents' Preferences on Social Policy Areas for Risk Groups

The second part of the multivariate analyses tests the relationship between the independent variables and respondents' preferences for government spending on four different social policy areas targeting different risk groups. Respondents were asked about their levels of demand for government spending on each relevant policy areas, having been informed in advance that a great increase in spending would be likely to be accompanied by a tax increase. It is worth noting that the responses cannot be used as an absolute yardstick, since these items capture the degree to which respondents demand social spending on each policy, relative to the current level of spending.

Respondents' Preferences for Financial Support for the Unemployed

Respondents' attitudes towards government spending on financial support for the unemployed such as unemployment benefits can be seen in Table 14. According to insider-outsider theory, labour market status is expected to generate a significant impact on individuals' attitudes towards support for the unemployed, creating an axis of conflict between insiders and outsiders. Such reasoning can be applied to other variables too. For instance, certain groups, such as women, the youth, or the less educated, are generally more vulnerable to a range of labour market risks, and therefore are expected to be more in favour of government actions supporting the unemployed.

However, the results are generally at odds with the expectations. First of all, labour market status does not show any statistically significant association with individuals' support for the unemployed: the insider group is not distinguished from other groups including outsiders. Gender creates statistically significant outcomes but works contrary to the expectation: women

have a statistically significant outcome on β4 with a negative coefficient, which means they are less favourable to support for the unemployed, relative to men, with the greatest differences being that they are less likely to choose the increase greatly category.

In contrast to these two variables, age and education appear to be consistent with the self-interest-based expectations. With regard to age, those who are aged from 19 to 24 appear to be more supportive of support for the unemployed, relative to those aged 35 to 44, the reference group. By contrast, those who are aged 65 or over are found to less favourable towards support for the unemployed, relative to the reference group, with the greatest differences being that they are less likely to place themselves in the increase greatly category. The other sub-age groups do not show statistically significant differences from the reference group. Education brings us to more straightforward interpretation: those who are more educated tend to be more critical of support for the unemployed.

The other variables including household type, personal income, and equivalised disposable household income do not show a link to individuals' support for employment promotion and unemployment benefits.

The analysis of model 2 shows almost the same results with some minor changes. In this model, gender, age, education and household type are found to have statistically significant impacts. It is worth noting that unlike the previous analyses, ideological inclination and interest in politics do not create any statistically significant outcomes. Changes due to the controls for these variables are also limited to household type, where couples without dependent children become more critical of support for the unemployed, compared with single adults. Such results may suggest that support for the unemployed is a policy area where individuals' preferences are driven mainly by economic self-interest.

Table 14. Item: Financial Support for the Unemployed

Variable		Model 1				Model 2			
		β1 (DG vs DS,S,IS,IG)	β2 (DG ,DS vs S,IS,IG)	β3 (DG,DS,S vs IS,IG)	β4 (DG,DS,S,IS vs IG)	β1 (DG vs DS,S,IS,IG)	β2 (DG ,DS vs S,IS,IG)	β3 (DG,DS,S vs IS,IG)	β4 (DG,DS,S,IS vs IG)
Female		-0.1348094	-0.0079948	-0.1172237	-0.6083842***	-0.1274394	0.001193	-0.0756631	-0.6043071***
Age group	**35-44 ®**								
	19-24	0.7139419**				0.653048**			
	25-34	0.0927825				0.1093854			
	45-54	-0.034739				0.0320261			
	55-64	-0.0887721				-0.0280922			
	65+	0.4061012	-0.0845981	-0.2459248	-0.8041574***	0.45663	-0.03226	-0.1896461	-0.8265015***
Education		-0.0724854*				-0.0880491*			
Household type	**Single adult ®**								
	Couple with no dependent children	-0.4200205				-0.4535033*			
	Couple with dependent children	-0.3369037	0.149852	-0.22955	-0.30612	-0.3615036			
	Adult-only household	-0.2120936				-0.2404449			
	Single parent	-0.3691337				-0.4112628			
Labour market status	**Insider ®**								
	Outsider	0.1192291				0.0989899			
	Self-employed	-0.1049768				-0.0645554			
	Non-employed	0.0561631				0.1356702			
Personal income		-0.0039624				0.0042673			
Equivalised disposable household income		-0.0703488				-0.0677725			
Ideological orientation						0.038667			
Level of interest in politics						0.0499584			
Number of observation		3696				3,696			
Log likelihood		-4499.4567				-4217.298			
Sig.		0.0000				0.0000			
Pseudo R2		0.0108				0.0111			

Note1: (***) p-value < 0.001, (**) p-value < 0.01, (*) p-value < 0.05

2: Only one set of coefficients is presented for independent variables that meet the proportional odds assumption.

3. DG: Decrease greatly, DS: Decrease slightly, S: Stay at the same, IS: Increase slightly, IG: Increase greatly

Respondents' Preferences for Financial Support for the Sick

The next question asks respondents about their preferences for government spending on financial support for the sick such as public healthcare. Individuals' support for public healthcare is expected to increase particularly with age because the elderly are characterised by higher probabilities of contracting a disease.

However, the analysis of model 1 does not find any support for expectation: age does not generate any statistically significant influences on the responses (see Table 15). Rather, statistically significant outcomes are observed in relation to other five independent variables, including gender, education, labour market status, personal income, and equivalised disposable household income. With regard to gender, women show statistically significant results in β2 and β4, with consistently negative coefficients that grow across cut-points. This is interpreted as suggesting that women are less favourable towards financial support for the sick, relative to men, with the greatest differences being that they are less likely to choose the increase greatly category.

In terms of education, statistically significant coefficients are observed on β2 and β4, which has both a negative coefficient and a positive coefficient, respectively. The coefficient on β2 means that those who are more educated tend to choose the decrease greatly or decrease slightly categories. The coefficient on β4 suggests, however, that they are more likely to select the increase greatly category. Such results can be interpreted as suggesting that those with higher educational attainment tend to take a firmer stance in terms of their view on financial support for the sick, regardless of the direction of preferences.

Regarding labour market status, the self-employed tend to have less favourable attitudes towards financial support for the sick, relative to insiders, the reference group. The non-

employed show statistically significant differences compared to the reference group only on β1 with a positive coefficient. This means that they are less likely to put themselves in the decrease greatly category, relative to insiders. The outsiders are not distinguished from the insiders in terms of their attitudes towards financial support for the sick.

The outcomes of personal income are statistically significant on β1, β2 and β4. β1 has a positive coefficient, while β2 and β4 have negative ones. This shows that when personal income increases, individuals are less likely to put themselves in the decrease greatly category, but at the same time they are also less likely to choose the stay the same, increase slightly, or increase greatly categories. Such results may be interpreted as suggesting that an increase in personal income encourages individuals to converge on the decrease slightly category.

The equivalised disposable household income has statistically significant results on β1 and β3, with all consistently negative coefficients that decline across the cut-points. This means that an increase in the equivalised disposable income of a household has a negative relationship with respondents' support for financial assistance for the sick, encouraging respondents to choose the decrease greatly category, and also not to choose the increase slightly or increase greatly categories.

Unlike the variables mentioned above, household type, together with age, appears not to generate any statistically significant impact on respondents' attitudes towards public healthcare.

In the analysis of model 2, two more variables including ideological inclination and age newly appear to have statistically significant outcomes, on top of the variables identified in model 1. Of the two newly controlled variables, ideological orientation only shows statistically significant impacts: those who are more left-progressive are more inclined to endorse generous spending on financial support for the sick. Age turns out to generate statistically significant

influences on the responses: Those who are aged from 55 to 64, and those who are aged 65 or over display statistically significant positive coefficients on β2 and β3, and β2, respectively. This means that these two age groups are more supportive of government spending on financial support for the sick, relative to those who are aged from 35 to 44, the reference group, with the greatest differences being that they are all less likely to choose the decrease greatly. The differences between the reference group and the other age groups are not statistically significant. These results can be understood as corroborating evidence for the self-interest expectation about the influence of age. That the expectation that individuals' support for public healthcare grow with age is only supported in model 2, where ideology and political interest are controlled, indicate that the impacts of self-interest are somewhat neutralised by the impacts of ideology or political interest: it is probable that some older citizens refrain from adhering to a policy that promises more benefits, because of the conservative ideas they subscribe to.

Education still shows statistically significant outcomes but only on β4, with a positive coefficient. This means that those who are more educated are more inclined to choose the increase greatly category.

The outcomes of the other independent variables are the same as those of model 1.

Overall, individuals' preferences for support for the sick are affected by a wide range of factors. The age hypothesis gains support from model 2, where the ideology and political interest are held constant. However, many self-interest variables – such as gender, education, and labour market status - are found to be against the self-interest-based expectations in the sense that women, those with low educational attainment, or labour market outsiders, who are all characterised by higher levels of exposure to social risks, turn out to be less supportive of social welfare, compared to their counterparts.

Table 15. Item: Financial Support for the Sick

Variable		Model 1				Model 2			
		β1 (DG vs DS,S,IS,IG)	β2 (DG ,DS vs S,IS,IG)	β3 (DG,DS,S vs IS,IG)	β4 (DG,DS,S,IS vs IG)	β1 (DG vs DS,S,IS,IG)	β2 (DG ,DS vs S,IS,IG)	β3 (DG,DS,S vs IS,IG)	β4 (DG,DS,S,IS vs IG)
Female		0.468565	-0.3064*	-0.09119	-0.40606**	0.433296	-0.30183*	-0.17813*	-0.52073***
Age group	**35-44 ®**								
	19-24	-0.05972				0.02825			
	25-34	0.095746				0.150005			
	45-54	0.024369				0.07255			
	55-64	0.153829				0.400999	0.595368*	0.298191*	-0.26573
	65+	0.166791				0.556059	0.67742**	0.259091	-0.04894
Education		0.197564	-0.14339*	-0.04593	0.199595**	0.245053	-0.09529	-0.04558	0.151584*
Household type	**Single adult ®**								
	Couple with no dependent children	-0.06139				-0.00093			
	Couple with dependent children	0.001741				0.079397			
	Adult-only household	0.056018				0.121525			
	Single parent	0.242919				0.272062			
Labour market status	**Insider ®**								
	Outsider	-0.07624				-0.04776			
	Self-employed	-0.27209*				-0.25163*			
	Non-employed	1.380221**	-0.22676	-0.08442	-0.48427	1.41719*	-0.24812	-0.0715	-0.39628
Personal income		0.204324**	-0.09976**	-0.01101	-0.09084**	0.216381**	-0.08357*	-0.01243	-0.08914*
Equivalised disposable household income		-2.03806***	-0.11756	-0.13699**	-0.01927	-1.99876***	-0.09965	-0.15531**	-0.09127
Ideological orientation						0.187826***			
Level of interest in politics						-0.03255			
Number of observation		3,696				3,696			
Log likelihood		-4310.5085				-4040.0356			
Sig.		0.0000				0.0000			
Pseudo R2		0.0158				0.0214			

Note1: (***) p-value < 0.001, (**) p-value < 0.01, (*) p-value < 0.05

2: Only one set of coefficients is presented for independent variables that meet the proportional odds assumption.

3. DG: Decrease greatly, DS: Decrease slightly, S: Stay at the same, IS: Increase slightly, IG: Increase greatly

Respondents' Preferences for Financial Support for the Elderly

Old-age income supplement is another policy area where a conflict between different socioeconomic and demographic groups, especially between the young and old generations, is expected. The young would be less supportive of old-age income supplement as they are paying for the schemes without profiting immediately, while the old may prefer rising expenditure, seeking more material interest.

According to the analysis of model 1 (see Table 16), the results are generally in accordance with the expectation. First of all, all older age groups are found to be more supportive of old-age income supplement, relative to those who are aged from 35 to 44, the reference group. Moreover, those who are aged from 25 to 34, a younger age group, shows a negative coefficient on β2, suggesting that they are more likely to choose the decrease greatly, or decrease slightly categories, compared to the reference group. One exception is those who are aged from 19 to 24, the youngest group. They have more approving attitudes towards the policy, compared to the reference group, with the greatest differences being that they are more likely to choose the increase greatly (the coefficients are statistically significant only on β4). Based on the self-interest assumption, the similar patterns of preferences between the youngest and those who are approaching retirement/have retired may result from the distinctive economic circumstances of the young generation. Given the excessively high entrance rate to university in Korea, the majority of the youngster might not be paying taxes yet, feeling free of paying contribution to support for the elderly. Even if participating the labour market, they are more likely to be exposed to low-pay and job insecurity, which may raise issues of saving for their old-age income. Lastly, as dependent children, they might be concerned about household income decreasing with their parents' retirement. They may see old-age income supplement as positive not only for their parents' well-being, but also for their own.

In addition to age, education, labour market status, personal income, and equivalised disposable household income show statistically significant outcomes. The impacts of education are statistically significant on β1 and β4, with negative and positive coefficients, respectively. Such results can be interpreted as suggesting that the impacts of education on individuals' preferences for old-age income supplement are not consistent, but could possible enhance both approving and disapproving positions. With regard to labour market segments, statistically significant differences are observed only between insiders and the self-employed: the self-employed are more likely to be critical of old-age income supplement, relative to labour market insiders. When it comes to income, both personal income and equivalised disposable household income show negative relationships to individuals' support for old-age income supplement. This may suggest that those who are economically advantaged prefer their own savings or private pension schemes to public pension schemes.

The other independent variables, including gender and household type, do not show any robust association with respondents' views on old-age income supplement.

The analysis of model 2 produces more or less similar results as those of model 1. The newly added variables, ideology and political interest, are found not to make a statistically significant impact on individuals' attitudes towards support for the elderly, indicating that support for the elderly is a policy area where self-interest-oriented cleavages are particularly salient.

Some changes are observed in relation to age, labour market status, and personal income. Firstly, the statistically significant difference between those who are aged from 25 to 34 and those who are aged from 35 to 44, the reference group, also disappears. Secondly, the impacts of labour market status and personal income wither away. This suggests that age and equivalised disposable household income is the most significant socioeconomic predictor among the selected self-interest variables, and therefore that cleavages are expected to be formed based on age and household income.

Table 16. Item: Financial Support for the Elderly

Variable		Model 1				Model 2			
		β1 (DG vs DS,S,IS,IG)	β2 (DG ,DS vs S,IS,IG)	β3 (DG,DS,S vs IS,IG)	β4 (DG,DS,S,IS vs IG)	β1 (DG vs DS,S,IS,IG)	β2 (DG ,DS vs S,IS,IG)	β3 (DG,DS,S vs IS,IG)	β4 (DG,DS,S,IS vs IG)
Female		-0.0431				-0.06675			
Age group	**35-44 ®**								
	19-24	-0.01687	-0.06249	-0.18317	1.358434***	-0.23698	-0.25452	-0.23782	1.374437***
	25-34	-0.05308	-0.32125*	-0.23939	0.420238	-0.08068	-0.30934	-0.16024	0.43713
	45-54	0.260344*				0.266049*			
	55-64	0.501404***				0.488304***			
	65+	1.352517***	1.032016***	0.597128***	0.596371**	1.166061**	1.033298***	0.555208***	0.547865**
Education		-0.18351	-0.11148*	0.002036	0.169545**	-0.22879*	-0.13756*	-0.00175	0.181897**
Household type	**Single adult ®**								
	Couple with no dependent children	0.062462				0.123554			
	Couple with dependent children	0.121404				0.102306			
	Adult-only household	0.197548				0.208539			
	Single parent	-0.0687				-0.11031			
Labour market status	**Insider ®**								
	Outsider	-0.02275				-0.03337			
	Self-employed	-0.24089*				-0.2243			
	Non-employed	-0.09139				-0.06743			
Personal income		-0.03175*				-0.02124			
Equivalised disposable household income		-0.20149***				-0.22468***			
Ideological orientation						0.044507			
Level of interest in politics						-0.05818			
Number of observation		3,696				3,696			
Log likelihood		-4528.6513				-4232.4062			
Sig.		0.0000				0.0000			
Pseudo R2		0.0289				0.0285			

Note1: (***) p-value < 0.001, (**) p-value < 0.01, (*) p-value < 0.05

2: Only one set of coefficients is presented for independent variables that meet the proportional odds assumption.

3. DG: Decrease greatly, DS: Decrease slightly, S: Stay at the same, IS: Increase slightly, IG: Increase greatly

Respondents' Preferences for Financial Support for Families with Children

Individuals' attitudes towards government spending on support for families with children are expected to be influenced by a range of life-cycle-related variables, such as household type, or age. The main beneficiaries of the spending are obviously households with dependent children. Thus, household type, especially whether or not a household has dependent children, could be a major determinant of individuals' preferences regarding support for families with children. In a similar sense, age may have an association with people's views on policy related to children, as those who may benefit from support for families with children tend to be young parents (in particular, those in their 20s, 30s and 40s). Gender would matter too in a sense that public childcare can help working mothers cope with both work and child-rearing.

According to the model 1, however, the results generally go against the expectation. First of all, household type does not create statistically significant impacts on individuals' preferences for support for families with children. Even couples with dependent children appear not to be more favourable to support for families with children, relative to single adults, the reference group. Gender does not matter either.

What appears to be consistent with the expectation is the effects of age. Relative to those who are aged 35 to 44, the reference group, all the older age groups appear to be less supportive of support for families with children. Those who are aged from 55 to 64, and those who are aged 65 or over, both show statistically significant outcomes on $\beta 3$ and $\beta 4$, with all negative coefficients growing bigger across the cut-points. This means that these two age groups are less in favour of support for families with children, relative to those who are aged from 35 to 44, the reference group, with the greatest differences being that they are all less likely to choose the increase greatly category, relative to the reference group. Unlike the older age groups, those who are aged from 25 to 34 are found to have more favourable attitudes towards support for

families with children, relative to the reference group. The differences between the reference group and those who are aged from 19 to 24 are not statistically significant. Such results are largely in line with the expectation that individuals' support for families with children decreases with age.

Education matters too. The impacts of education are statistically significant on β1, β2 and β2, with all negative coefficients that decrease across the cut-points. This can be understood as suggesting that those who are more educated tend to be more critical of support for families with children, being more likely to choose the decrease greatly category.

The other independent variables including labour market status, personal income and equivalised disposable household income do not create any statistically significant impact on respondents' attitudes towards support for families with children.

The analyses of model 2 reveals somewhat different outcomes. Of the two newly controlled variables, first of all, political interest only turns out to be statistically significant, with a negative coefficient on β1. This signifies that an increased interest in politics may increase the probabilities of choosing the decrease greatly category. In contrast, ideology does not show any statistically significant relationship with individuals' preferences for support for families with children.

The key differences are found with regard to gender, education, and equivalised disposable household income: the effects of gender and equivalised disposable household income become statistically significant while the effects of education wither away. The effects of gender provide straightforward interpretation: women are less likely to be supportive of support for families with children compared to men, when the ideology and political interest are held constant. Together with the results regarding gender in model 1, this can be understood as being

contrary to the self-interest expectation.

The equivalised disposable household income generates statistically significant outcomes on β2, with a negative coefficient. This can be interpreted as suggesting that equivalised disposable household income has a negative relationship to individuals' demand for support for families with children, being more likely to encourage individuals to choose the decrease greatly or decrease slightly categories.

The results of other independent variables including age, household type, labour market status, and personal income remain almost unchanged. Age still matters, showing that those who are older tend to be less in favour of support for families with children. The other independent variables including labour market status, and personal income, still do not create any statistically significant effects regarding individuals' preferences for support for families with children.

Table 17. Item: Financial Support for Families with Children

Variable		Model 1				Model 2			
		β1 (DG vs DS,S,IS,IG)	β2 (DG ,DS vs S,IS,IG)	β3 (DG,DS,S vs IS,IG)	β4 (DG,DS,S,IS vs IG)	β1 (DG vs DS,S,IS,IG)	β2 (DG ,DS vs S,IS,IG)	β3 (DG,DS,S vs IS,IG)	β4 (DG,DS,S,IS vs IG)
Female		-0.127841				-0.14543*			
Age group	**35-44 ®**								
	19-24	0.298967				0.254667			
	25-34	0.297622*				0.293236*			
	45-54	-0.424647***				-0.40567***			
	55-64	-0.152919	-0.085464	-0.316436*	-1.020692***	0.024092	0.003676	-0.27181	-1.04678***
	65+	0.337323	0.288661	-0.283638*	-1.034779***	0.351628	0.22761	-0.22544	-1.04403***
Education		-0.405058*	-0.164449**	-0.07632*	-0.00787	-0.06305			
Household type	**Single adult ®**								
	Couple with no dependent children	-0.138615				-0.11019			
	Couple with dependent children	-0.012814				0.013102			
	Adult-only household	-0.23971				-0.21493			
	Single parent	0.44258				0.48439			
Labour market status	**Insider ®**								
	Outsider	-0.02679				-0.04033			
	Self-employed	0.156341				0.146085			
	Non-employed	0.101254				0.122901			
Personal income		-0.001072				0.001343			
Equivalised disposable household income		-0.018543				-0.45217	-0.28875**	-0.02382	0.083262
Ideological orientation						0.054731			
Level of interest in politics						-0.3969**	-0.12466	-0.05002	0.121988
Number of observation		3,696				3,696			
Log likelihood		-4408.9898				-4116.6959			
Sig.		0.0000				0.0000			
Pseudo R2		0.0185				0.0211			

Note1: (***) p-value < 0.001, (**) p-value < 0.01, (*) p-value < 0.05

2: Only one set of coefficients is presented for independent variables that meet the proportional odds assumption.

3. DG: Decrease greatly, DS: Decrease slightly, S: Stay at the same, IS: Increase slightly, IG: Increase greatly

Discussion (I): Comparison between General Welfare Items (see Table 18)

Looking at the results across the three general welfare items, we can see that age is one of the most influential factors regarding respondents' attitudes towards the three aspects of social welfare. Age generates statistically significant impacts on respondents' views in all the three analyses. In model 1, in which ideological orientation and interest in politics are not controlled, age creates a clear distinction between those who are aged from 35 to 44, the reference group, and the older groups in relation to their attitude towards universalism. Relative to the reference group, all the older groups appear to be less supportive of universal provision of social welfare. In other aspects, however, the older age groups are rather heterogeneous in their patterns of preferences. Two of the older age groups, namely those who are aged from 45 to 54 and those who are aged 65 or over, are found to be less supportive of government's policy aiming to reduce differences in income levels, while showing no statistically significant differences from the reference group in terms of tax increase for welfare state expansion. In contrast, those who are aged from 55 to 64 are not distinguished from the reference group with regard to their views on redistribution, while having rather positive views on tax increase for welfare state expansion.

In the analyses of model 2, where ideology and political interest are held constant, statistically significant differences are still salient between the reference group and the older age groups in relation to their attitudes towards universal provision of social welfare: all the older groups tend to be more critical of universalism, relative to the reference group. When it comes to the other two aspects, however, it is difficult to infer how age works in shaping one's preference formation, since each older age group reveals distinctive patterns of preferences. Most of younger age groups do not display statistically significant differences from the reference group in terms of their attitudes towards the three aspects of social welfare, with the exception of those who are aged from 19 to 24 who turn out to be less supportive of income redistribution. Such results can be understood as suggesting that cleavages and conflicts between different age groups are likely to be created regarding the issues of universalism/selectivism.

Table 18. Effects of Independent Variables across the Analyses

Variable		Respondents' attitudes towards various aspects of social welfare					
		Social policy in relation to redistribution		Tax increase		Universalism vs. Selectivism	
		Model 1	Model 2	Model 1	Model 2	Model 1	Model 2
Female				—	—	+	
Age cohort	35-44 ®						
	19-24		—				
	25-34						
	45-54	—				—	—
	55-64			+	+	—	—
	65+	—	—			—	—
Education				+		+	+
Household type	Single adult ®						
	Couple with no dependent children						
	Couple with dependent children	+					
	Adult-only household				+		
	Single parent						
Labour market status	Insider ®						
	Outsider						
	Self-employed						
	Non-employed						
Personal annual income							
Equivalised disposable household income							+
Ideological orientation			+		+		+
Level of interest in politics			—/ +		+		—/ +

Note: +: Positive relationship, —: Negative relationship
Note: ® = Reference group
Note: Grey shade means results which are inconsistent with expectations.

Gender is found to be a statistically significant factor in relation to individuals' views on tax increase (in both model 1 and 2) and the universal provision of social welfare (in model 1 only). In both model 1 and 2, women appear to be consistently less supportive of a tax increase for welfare state expansion, while showing no statistically significant differences from men in terms of their views on government's action reducing income differences. They are found to be more supportive of universal provision of social welfare, but only in model 1. The finding that women tend to be more conservative on the welfare state is striking, given the opposite expectation for Western nations that women are more likely to be supportive of redistributive social policy than men due to a range of labour market disadvantages given to female workers as well as women-specific socialisation process. Given the long history of Confucianism in Korea, however, this finding may reflect the impact of the Confucian culture that strongly emphasises the gender division of labour. If a woman specialises more in child-rearing, being financially dependent on her spouse who takes responsibility for household income, her preferences for social policy might not reflect her structural location in the labour market, but her position in the household.

Education shows a positive association with support for a tax increase for welfare expansion, but only in model 1. The fact that ideology/political interest absorbs the effect of education in model 2 indicates that the impact of education in model 1 is likely to be a reflection of ideology/political interest. Education also has a positive relationship with support for universalism in both model 1 and 2. Given that education generally pays off in better jobs higher salaries, the finding that education does not create statistically significant impacts on individuals' views on tax increase seemingly contradicts the self-interest hypothesis. However, such results can also be understood as supporting the argument that those who are (likely to be) economically advantaged can be supporters of social welfare, those being universally provided

in particular, which may provide them with quality social services at reasonable prices. On the other hand, education has no statistically significant impacts on respondents' attitudes towards income redistribution through social policy. Such results do not give support to the expectations that there are cleavages between the more educated and the less educated on the issues of income redistribution. Along with the results regarding age as well as gender*dependent children, this also suggests that individuals' self-interest based on one's degree of education attainment are likely to be reflected in their views on universalism/selectivism.

The other self-interest variables show either a relatively less robust or no association with respondents' attitudes towards the three aspects of social welfare. Household type generates statistically significant impacts, but cannot draw clear distinction between single adults and the other sub-groups. This makes the causal relationship between household type and individuals' attitudes towards social welfare still inconclusive. Equivalised disposable household income in model 1 is found to be statistically insignificant across all three aspects. In model 2, the predictor turns out to be statistically significant in relation to individuals' views on universalism, while showing no relationship with the others. Labour market status and personal income, which represent individuals' own economic circumstances, appear to be statistically insignificant with regard to their views in all three aspects, in both model 1 and 2. It is still a question of why age and education are found to be consistent with the assumption of self-interest, while the other self-interest variables are not. Again, this may suggest that the social context or institutions of society may play a role in shaping individuals' attitudes towards the welfare state.

The analyses of model 2 reveal that ideological orientation and interest in politics are also key predictors regarding the three aspects of social welfare. Interpretations in relation to ideological orientation are straightforward. Those who are more progressive tend to be more favourable

towards a government commitment to redistribution, a tax increase for welfare expansion, and universal welfare provision. Interest in politics works in a rather complex way. In relation to respondents' support for a government commitment to redistribution and universal welfare provision, it does not seem to encourage respondents to prefer a certain alternative, but leads them to increase the strength of their opinion. In contrast, interest in politics shows a positive relationship to respondents' support for a tax increase for welfare expansion. It is worth noting that overall, the results in both the model 1 and 2 do not show huge differences. This may suggest that ideology and political interest are somewhat independent sources of policy preferences, rather than outcomes of self-interest.

Discussion (II): Comparing the Four Social Policy Areas (see Table 19)

In relation to respondents' preferences for the four social policy areas, age again appears to be the most significant predictor. Each age group has their own specific policy preferences that seem to reflect their own stage of life-cycle and accompanying material interests. It is worth noting that the distinction between those who are aged from 35 to 44, the reference group, and older age groups, notably those who are aged 65 or over, is particularly salient. The analyses of model 1 show that relative to the reference group, all the older age groups appear to have more approving attitudes towards old-age income supplement. Those who are aged 65 or over are also less supportive of spending for the unemployed, relative to the reference group. Regarding support for families with children, all the older generations tend to have more critical attitudes, compared to the reference group. Exceptionally, no statistically significant differences are observed between the reference group and the older age groups with regard to their preferences for support for the sick.

The analyses of model 2 also present similar results, with even clearer distinctions between the older age groups and the reference group. Older respondents, especially those who are aged 55 or over, are more supportive of public healthcare and old-age income supplement, while being less favourable towards support for families with children. With regard to support for the elderly and support for families with children, those who are aged 45 to 54 show the same patterns of reasoning as the older groups. These results are understood to be in line with the expectations that age creates cleavages between generations on issues of redistribution. However, there are some seemingly exceptional cases: the 19 to 24 age group are more supportive of old-age income supplement (in both the model 1 and 2). Their greater demand for spending for the elderly could be explained by the fact that they are less likely to be tax-payers, relative to the prime working-age groups. It is also probable that they might find old-age income supplement advantageous not only to their parents, but also to themselves as dependent children.

Gender seems to be also important factors shaping individuals' preferences for social policy in Korea, but is found to work opposite to the expectation. Women are more critical of support for the unemployed, support for the sick and support for families with children than their male counterparts in both model 1 and 2. An exception is observed with regard to support for the elderly where there are no statistically significant differences between men and women in both model 1 and 2. The traditional gender division of labour may provide a partial explanation as to why women are found to be less in favour of a range of social policy, notably support for the unemployed. However, it is difficult to explain why women tend to be more critical of spending for families with children.

Table 19. Effects of Independent Variables across the Analyses

Variable		Respondents' preferences on the funding of government welfare programmes							
		Support for the unemployed		Support for the sick		Support for the elderly		Support for families with children	
		Model 1	Model 2	Model 1	Model 2	Model 1	Model 2	Model 1	Model 2
Female		—	—	—	—				—
Age cohort	35-44 ®								
	19-24	+	+			+	+		
	25-34					—			+
	45-54					+	+	—	—
	55-64				+	+	+	—	—
	65+	—	—		+	+	+	—	—
Education		—	—	—/ +	+	—/ +	—/ +	—	
Household type	Single adult ®								
	Couple with no dependent children		—						
	Couple with dependent children								
	Adult-only household								
	Single parent								
Labour market status	Insider ®								
	Outsider								
	Self-employed			—	—	—			
	Non-employed			+	+				
Personal annual income				+ /—	+ /—	—			
Equivalised disposable household income				—	—	—	—		—
Ideological orientation					+				
Level of interest in politics									—

Note: +: Positive relationship, —: Negative relationship
Note: ® = Reference group
Note: Grey shade means results which are inconsistent with expectations.

In terms of income, the effects of equivalised disposable household income are much more noticeable than those of personal income. Equivalised disposable income of a household generally shows negative relationships with individuals' preferences for social policies (support for the sick and support for the elderly in the model 1; support for the sick, support for the elderly, and support for families with children in model 2). On the other hand, in the model 1, personal income shows a negative impact on individuals' support for the elderly and a mix of both positive and negative impacts on individuals' demand for support for the sick. In model 2, the impact of personal income on individuals' preferences for old-age income supplement even disappears. That equivalised disposable income of a household produces more significant and consistent impacts than personal income may reflect the institutional context in Korea, where redistribution within a household works as an important informal sector of welfare, and therefore intra-household transfer are more influential than their personal income in terms of personal economic well-being.

Education is characterised by an inconsistent relationship with individuals' support for four individual social policies. Educational attainment turns out to have a negative association with support for the unemployed in both model 1 and 2. However, when it comes to support for the sick, education turns out to have a positive association in model 1, and also appear to have both positive and negative impacts simultaneously in model 2. In terms of support for the elderly, the effects of education are found to enhance both approving and disapproving positions in model 1 and 2. Lastly, education shows no sign of impact on support for families with children. Except for support for the unemployed, none of the cases can be understood as providing evidence for the self-interest-based expectation that those with higher educational attainment are less supportive of redistribution through social welfare.

Household type shows almost no meaningful outcomes in relation to individuals' attitudes

towards four social policy areas. Given the significant effects of the equivalised disposable income of a household mentioned above, this may suggest that it is not the type of household, but the level of resources available to each individual within a household, that matters to individuals in shaping their social policy preferences.

Labour market status makes differences in relation to respondents' support for social policies (support for the sick in both model 1 and 2, and support for the elderly in model 1), but only between insiders and the self-employed, and between insiders and the non-employed. It is worth noting that labour market insiders and outsiders, who are substantially different in terms of levels of job security, do not show any statistically significant differences between them across the analyses in both models. Together with the results of the former analyses regarding three aspects of social welfare, such results contradict the insider-outsider theory, which highlights the potential conflict of interest between them.

According to the analyses of model 2, ideological orientation turns out to have positive associations with individuals' support for public healthcare, while showing no sign of relationship with individuals' preferences for the other social policy areas. Interest in politics shows a negative relationship with respondents' preferences for support for families with children. In relation to the other policies, the effects of the level of interest in politics appear to be statistically insignificant.

General Discussion

Overall, it is safe to conclude that the quantitative analyses of the '2013 Public Attitudes towards Welfare Policy' survey find limited support for the self-interest expectations. Many individual-level variables that represent one's current/prospective location in the labour market

– such as education, household type (in relation to work-life conflict single parents are likely to experience), labour market status, and personal income – do not show robust association with individuals' preferences in terms of both general attitudes towards the welfare state and individual social policies. Statistically significant outcomes are observed in relation to gender and age. Regarding gender, women tend to be more critical of tax increase for welfare expansion as well as individual social policies except for support for the elderly, relative to men. Age turns out to be most frequently observed and influential factor across the two different types of analyses, showing that individuals in Korea tend to pursue their self-interest based on their stage of life-cycle.

In contrast to individual-level self-interest variables whose impacts are less noticeable than expected, equivalised disposable household income, which represents intra-household transfer, exercise significant influence over respondents' support for individual social policies, except for support for the unemployed. These results may imply that in Korea informal welfare institutions, such as intra-household transfer, play a more important role than many of individual-level variables in shaping one's attitudes towards individual social policies. However, it should not be understood as suggesting that equivalised disposable household income is totally unrelated to self-interest. The fact that equivalised disposable household income matter more than personal income for individuals' welfare attitudes can be understood as suggesting that social policy preference formation in Korea takes place at the family level rather than individual level.

In addition, ideological orientation and interest in politics appear to be closely connected with individuals' attitude towards social policy. Ideology creates a consistent relationship with individuals' support for social welfare, suggesting that individuals' welfare attitudes are shaped to a certain extent by the Left-Right ideological spectrum. In contrast, political interest tends

not to motivate individuals to have a certain direction of preferences, but tend to enhance both approving and disapproving positions. It is worthy of noticing that ideological orientation matters particularly in relation to individuals' views on the features of social welfare in general, while equivalised disposable household income exercises significant influences mainly over individuals' preferences on the funding of each government programme. This can be understood as suggesting that individuals may have dual, possibly inconsistent attitudes towards social policy, due to the contradiction between how they feel about social welfare in general and how they feel about individual social policies.

The finding that individual-level socioeconomic variables tend not to have statistically significant impacts on individuals' social policy preferences implies that social cleavages between groups of individuals with different socioeconomic characteristics on the issues of redistribution are less likely to occur in Korea. On the other hand, gender, generations, levels of household income, and ideology may contribute to forming social cleavages in Korea. In this regard, it seems to be reasonable to argue that even those who are excluded from the welfare state expansion in Korea since the late 1990s, notably those who are/or likely to be labour market outsider, would not differ from the rest of the population in terms of their welfare attitudes.

5.3. Conclusion

In this chapter, we have examined the effects of a range of explanatory variables on individuals' social policy preference formation by analysing the '2013 Public Attitudes towards Welfare Policy' survey. Taken as a whole, the results to a large extent do not find strong support for the self-interest-based expectations. Many of individual-level self-interest variables that represent

individuals' position in the labour market, such as education, household type (in relation to single parents who find it difficult to juggle their work and child-rearing), labour market status, and personal income, do not generate statistically significant and consistent impacts on individuals' attitude towards both general welfare items as well as four social policy areas. What appears to matter for welfare attitudes are gender and age. Unlike the self-interest expectation, women are found to be more conservative on the issues of redistribution, suggesting that local institutions, especially traditional gender roles, might matter for individuals' welfare attitudes. Age, in contrast, is generally consistent with the self-interest theory, showing that each age group has distinctive patterns of preferences based on their own stage in the life-cycle.

Apart from such individual-level self-interest variables, equivalised disposable household income, which represent the degree of informal welfare provision within a household, is found to affect individuals' attitudes towards social welfare significantly, especially in relation to individuals' support for each social policy areas. Given the findings above, it can be speculated that the effects of individual-level self-interest variables are neutralised or distorted by the social context or informal welfare institutions that encourage individuals to evaluate social policy in the context of family economy. On top of that, ideology and political interest also affect individuals' attitudes towards social welfare significantly, playing a role as somewhat independent sources of policy preferences. As expected, ideology is found to induce individuals to certain policy preferences: those who are left-progressive tend to be more in favour of the welfare state in general, relative to those who are right-conservative. Unlike ideology, interest in politics generally does not lead individuals to a certain direction, but motivates individuals' standpoints even clearer.

It is worth noting that ideological orientation matters mainly in relation to individuals'

preferences for the features of social welfare in general, while equivalised disposable income of a household has more noticeable and consistent relationships with individuals' support for each social policy. This may signify that individuals in Korea could experience contradiction between how they felt about social welfare in general and how they felt about individual policies: ideology could be a more dominant factor in shaping individuals' general ideas of social policy, but when it comes to each social welfare programme, equivalised disposable income of a household could be more influential than individuals' ideological positions.

The finding that individual actors tend not to be influenced by their socioeconomic characteristics in terms of their preferences for social policy may signify that social cleavages based on individuals' socioeconomic characteristics are unlikely to be observed in Korea. Instead, gender, generations, household income and ideology can be the foundation of cleavages and conflicts on the issues of redistribution in the country.

6. Social Policy Attitudes in Korea – A Qualitative Analysis 1: Effects of Family-related and Cultural Contexts on Recognition of Problems

The quantitative analyses in chapter 5 present that the self-interest theory provides insufficient explanation for individuals' attitudes towards social policy in Korea. Instead, the results indicate that traditional gender division of labour and the context of household economy may play a more decisive role in determining individuals' views on social welfare in Korea. As discussed in chapter 3, it is probable that informal institutions, especially family-related or cultural context, shape social policy preference formation in Korea. Such findings can be understood as suggesting that individuals' socioeconomic and demographic characteristics are unlikely to be sources of social cleavages and conflicts in Korea, and therefore that even particularly excluded groups, such as female workers in the labour market outsider position, would not be different from the others in terms of their welfare attitudes. In this regard, this chapter investigates how family-related and cultural factors shape social policy preferences of female labour market outsiders, with particular focus on problem recognition.

The key finding of the chapter is that family welfare culture and prevailing ideas of a desirable society tended to create distinguishing patterns of problem recognition among participants, which were reflective of the interest of family or society more than personal interest. In family welfare – an informal network in which family members provide assistance (resources or services) for each other either occasionally or daily – participants were inclined to define themselves as part of their family, and therefore to share collective, reinterpreted, recognition of problems. In this process, the degree of resources (both financial and services) available within a family appeared to be a key determinant of levels of well-being of individual

participants as well as their family, and therefore had great relevance to problem recognition. On top of that, prevalent ideas of a desirable society, selective compassion for the economically disadvantaged and pro-developmental attitude in particular, tended to extend one's problem recognition from their own material interests to hardship of others or social issues, but also to narrowly define the deserving beneficiaries of social welfare to those in absolute need or those who are expected to contribute to the society in a certain way.

The rest of the chapter proceeds as follows. The first section juxtaposes the themes and codes that have been identified by the researcher using thematic analysis. The following section explores participants' problem recognition in relation to four given prompts, including labour market outsider status, child-rearing, old-age income reduction, and contracting a disease, and searches for certain patterns of reasoning. The last section carries out more in-depth analysis of how family-related and cultural contexts affecting participants' recognition of problems, and discusses the significance of the findings with regard to individuals' preferences for social policy in Korea.

6.1. Research Findings

6.1.1. Themes and Codes

Participants were asked to state the first thing that came to their minds regarding four given prompts, including labour market outsider status, child-rearing, old-age income reduction, and contracting a disease, and were also asked to explain their responses to the researcher.

The researcher analysed the transcripts of the interviews using thematic analysis and identified 27 codes, which were eventually categorised into three main themes including 'influences of socioeconomic and demographic characteristics', 'family welfare', and 'prevailing ideas of a

desirable society' (see Table 20). In order to investigate if stages of life-cycle generate any differences in individuals' problem recognition (as suggested in the quantitative analysis), the codes and sub-themes have been re-arranged in accordance with the participants' different age groups (see Appendix 8).

Of the three main themes, the most frequently and commonly appearing ones are 'influences of individuals' socioeconomic and demographic characteristics', and 'family welfare'. This may be understood as suggesting that these two factors most commonly affected participants' problem recognition. The former has two sub-themes including 'influences of socioeconomic and demographic characteristics on individuals' actual state', and 'negative emotions caused by the outsider position', suggesting that outsider status can be associated with negative impacts on individuals' living standard as well as emotional status. 'Family welfare' has two sub-themes, including 'collective recognition of problems' and 'reinterpretation of problems in the context of the family'. The theme 'family welfare' and its sub-themes suggest that in Korea, the family plays an important role in welfare provision, and may condition/or influence how people understand their own socioeconomic and demographic characteristics, and accompanying social risks. This theme has particular importance in that family welfare appears to diminish the impacts of individuals' socioeconomic and demographic characteristics on problem recognition. 'Prevailing ideas of a desirable society', the last theme, has two sub-themes including 'selective compassion' and 'pro-developmental attitude'. The former sub-theme was observed in relation to 'old-age income reduction' and 'contracting a disease', while the latter was observed only in relation to 'child-rearing'. The last theme and its accompanying sub-themes indicate that individuals' recognition of problems may not be limited to themselves or their family, but could be extended to others' economic hardship or a national crisis.

Table 20. Codes, Sub-themes and Main Themes by Each Given Situation

Situation	Code	Sub-theme	Main theme
Labour marker outsider status	Lower job security	Influences of socioeconomic and demographic characteristics on individuals' actual state	Influences of socioeconomic and demographic characteristics
	Lower income security		
	Low pay		
	A sense of inferiority	Negative emotions caused outsider position	
	A sense of frustration		
	A sense of shame		
	Low self-esteem		
	Lack of a sense of belonging		
	Coping with financial issues thanks to transfers from family (parents, husband)	Collective recognition of problems	Family welfare
	Increase in financial stress due to family responsibility to support family		
	Emphasis on the division of labour within the family	Reinterpretation of problems in the context of family welfare	
	Financial capability of family welfare matters		
Child-rearing	Work–family conflict	Influences of socioeconomic and demographic characteristics on individuals' actual state	Influences of socioeconomic and demographic characteristics
	Career interruption		
	Coping with work–family conflict through child-care provided by family	Collective recognition of problems	Family welfare
	Grandparents providing child-care for an adult child who works		
	Emphasis on the division of labour within the family	Reinterpretation of problems in the context of family welfare	
	Financial capability of family welfare matters		
	Excessive expenses for child-rearing		
	A concern that the trend in low birth rates is a serious threat to economic growth or the survival of the nation	Pro-developmental attitude	Prevailing ideas of a desirable society
Old-age income reduction	Income loss due to retirement	Influences of socioeconomic and demographic characteristics on individuals' actual state	Influences of socioeconomic and demographic characteristics
	Difficulty in saving for old-age due to labour market outsider status		
	Increase in financial stress due to family responsibility (towards parents)	Collective recognition of problems	Family welfare
	Coping with financial issues thanks to transfers from family (adult children, husband)		
	Difficulty in saving for old-age due to excessive expenses for child-rearing	Reinterpretation of problems in the context of family welfare	
	Financial capability of family welfare matters		
	Compassion for the elderly experiencing poverty	Selective compassion	Prevailing ideas of a desirable society

Contracting a disease	Health issues and health-associated financial burden that grow with age	Influences of socioeconomic and demographic characteristics on individuals' actual state	Influences of socioeconomic and demographic characteristics
	Difficulty in saving for potential medical expenses due to labour market outsider status		
	Coping with financial issues through support from family	Collective recognition of problems	Family welfare
	Increase in financial stress due to family responsibility to support family		
	Difficulty in saving for potential medical expenses due to excessive expenses for child-rearing	Reinterpretation of problems in the context of family welfare	
	Compassion for those who cannot afford medical treatments	Selective compassion	Prevailing ideas of a desirable society

6.1.2. Participants' Problem Recognition in Relation to the Four Given Situations

This section is to provide an in-depth and rich description of the context in which participants perceive their everyday lives and recognise problems in relation to four given situations including labour market outsider status, child-rearing, old-age income reduction, and contracting a disease.

Labour Market Outsider Status

In the existing literature, a labour market outsider generally refers to a labour market participant who is exposed to a high probability of being unemployed or is already unemployed (Rueda, 2005; Burgoon and Dekker, 2010; Häusemann and Schwander, 2011; Lindvall, et al., 2013). In the sense that the primary motive for participation in the labour market is earning an income, a high probability of job loss could equate to a high probability of income loss. In fact, most of the participants interviewed in this study claimed they were exposed to a higher risk of wage cut-off due to employment instability compared to labour market insiders (those with permanent employment). Most of the participants also considered that their contract renewal

was unilaterally decided by employers, regardless of their intentions or the quality of work performance. Some reported that their contracts even had clauses allowing employer to dismiss workers during the term of the contract.

Such an unbalanced power relationship between employers and employees with outsider status may make participants highly vulnerable to dismissal, forcing the employees to accept unfavourable working conditions to gain or maintain their employment. Participants commonly perceived that standard workers and contract workers differed, not only in their level of job security but also in terms of their working conditions. Low pay is the most common feature of atypical workers in Korea. Most participants in employment commonly reported being paid significantly less than labour market insiders[39]. On top of this, the annual pay rises (from which most standard workers expect to benefit) hardly apply to workers with outsider status, even if they manage to renew their fixed-term contracts.

A restricted wage level together with low levels of job security appear not only to prevent participants from enjoying average standards of living in society, but also to lead them to social exclusion. Some of the participants claimed that they were unable to afford a hobby or an activity for self-development. They also found it difficult to plan their futures because of the difficulty of predicting their future income, and they did not expect their situations to improve (Participant 10, 12). Participant 10, for example, referred to herself as a member of the 'Opo-generation', a compound word meaning the generation that has renounced five things: romantic relationships, marriage, childbirth, buying a home, and social relationships. This word shows

[39] These statements are corroborated by statistics. According to the Korea Labor and Society Institute (Kim, 2017), atypical workers in the country earn 50.1% of standard workers on average. The wage differentials even increase when applying the gender pay gap in Korea. The average wage of female atypical workers accounted for only 37.7% of that of male standard workers, which means they are likely to receive just as much as (or even less than) the amount required by minimum wage law.

how various parts of life can be negatively affected by the labour market outsider status. Participant 12 is also quoted as saying that she had been experiencing difficulties in participating social activities due to uncertainty being caused by unstable employment.

> I consider myself as one of the Opo-generation. I can hardly afford anything like hanging out with friends, eating out, or a hobby. The average standard of living has suddenly become too luxurious after I got unemployed. Regular savings is no more possible. (Participant 10)

> Friends of mine suggest that we make a trip abroad together someday soon, but I cannot say 'yes' since I would be still job-seeking that time. Actually, I feel as if I live in a different world. (Participant 12)

On top of such hardships, some participants reported suffering from society's perceptions of outsiders and comparisons with insiders. They shared that Korean society had a tendency to perceive that an adult with a decent job (that is, not an atypical job) was economically competent, responsible, and able to undertake given roles and duties in family or society, because having a decent job usually means a superior wage level, employment stability, and enough corporate welfare to take care of themselves and those around them, especially family. Outsiders, in contrast, were likely to be regarded as people who failed to become insiders, and who were incompetent and inferior, not least because of their current/or potential economic dependency on the family. Such negative social perception of outsiders seems to work as a sort of enforcement mechanism that motivates individuals to seek/maintain the labour market insider position. Some participants reported that they often felt a range of negative emotions, such as a sense of inferiority, shame, frustration, and low self-esteem, particularly when they were compared with insiders. Some participants said they were reluctant to maintain a social life because they did not want to feel they were inferior to their acquaintances, especially those

who had achieved labour market insider status (Participant 1, 2, 10, 12, 24). The following quotes show that individuals' problem recognition regarding labour market status is associated, not only with financial or physical difficulties but also with society's general perceptions of what is desirable and what is not.

> I hate it when my friends ask me what I have been doing after graduation because it makes me feel depressed and have low self-esteem. So I hardly get in touch with them, thinking that I will not meet them until I get a proper job. (Participant 1)

> I believe it is very important for individuals to perform his or her part as a member of society, regardless of how much he or she earns. Money is just an immediate reward. What comes next is more important to me. (Participant 2)

Interestingly, the negative emotions attached to labour market outsider status were most strongly and frequently expressed by young unmarried participants, mostly those in their 20s (Participant 1, 2, 9, 10, 11, 12). These participants tended to have a stronger desire for the labour market insider status, reflecting a significant amount of time, money, and effort they had invested for decent jobs. In fact, participants in their 20s were generally much better educated or trained than older generations. Most of them tended to have a bachelor's degree or higher, and some had even experienced years of overseas training. Regarding their outsider status, these participants tended to express mixed and often contradictory emotions. They understood their outsider status as an outcome of the unfavourable labour market condition, on the one hand, but could not help feeling inferior to others who climbed the socioeconomic ladder higher than they did, on the other hand. Because outsider status was highly unlikely to satisfy their expectations, they tended to see it as much more problematic than the other participants.

Considering such unsatisfactory working conditions or perceptions, it seems natural to assume that those participants would perceive these difficulties as problems, and therefore seek relevant solutions, such as protection, compensation, or transition in their status to an insider. However, not all such difficulties experienced by participants were identified as problems to solve. The cases explored in this study revealed that family welfare, which protects the great majority of the participants against various labour market risks, may have significantly influenced individuals' recognition of problems. Family welfare can be defined as an informal support structure in which family members commit resources and services to each other. Within the structure, family members assist each other occasionally or daily. As implied by the word 'family', such intra-family transfers are not limited to the boundary of a household, but are frequently carried out between multiple households which are tied as a family. Due to the precarious nature of outsider status, participants were generally in a position where they received assistance from their family. Most young single/unmarried participants in their 20s were financially supported by their parents when they were unemployed or suffered from insufficient income (Participant 1, 2, 3, 4, 9, 10, 11, 12). Most married participants reported they could rely on their husbands in case of unemployment or being low paid (Participant 6, 5, 7, 8, 14, 15, 19, 20, 22, 24, 25). Although they were relatively few, some participants in their 50s or 60s anticipated assistance from their adult children in case of losing their income (Participant 20, 22). Thanks to such intra-family transfers, it was very unlikely that these participants would fall into poverty or recognise job loss as an imminent problem. In other words, at least financial hardships could be addressed by family welfare, while the emotional difficulties may remain.

Despite the fact that family welfare tended to cover the majority of the participants, it should be noted that there were groups of individuals who were not able to benefit from, or had very

limited access to, family welfare. Single/unmarried participants in their 30s or over, for instance, tended to enjoy relatively less amount of family assistance not least because their parents were unlikely to be economically active, often due to retirement, or because they rather had family members to take care of (Participant 13, 16, 18, 21, 25). Although they were relatively few in number, some of married participants reported that their concern about income security was not allayed by family welfare since their husbands were also atypical workers. The following quotes display a clear contrast between two groups of female labour market outsiders in terms of their attitudes towards low-pay and job insecurity. These participants are analogous in labour market status, age and marital status, but the main differences between the two groups lie in the labour market status and wage levels of their husbands, which represent the levels of family support they may enjoy. We can see that one group of individuals anticipating decent family support thanks to their husbands with a stable, well-paid job (Participant 5, 15) were much less concerned about their current employment situations, compared to the other group (Participant 17, 27).

> I have been exposed to both low job security and low pay, but I am not concerned much about them because my husband is the primary earner in the household, and he has a stable job. Even if I get fired, my household economy would not be hard hit (Participant 5).
>
> I am able to work part-time, spending significant amount of time taking care of my children, mainly because my husband has a full-time permanent job. I am not concerned about job security (Participant 15).

> I do not think my concern about insecure employment is relieved much by the fact we [she and her husband] are a dual-earner couple, because both of us are temporary workers and also low-paid (Participant 17).
>
> My husband and I are both atypical workers. So, it seems to me highly probable that we would encounter the worst-case scenario, in which we both lose our jobs. This worries me. (Participant 27)

Family welfare could even work in the opposite way because the direction of economic support within a family is multilateral in principle. Within a family, individuals can be both a welfare provider and receiver according to their role and circumstances. Although they were relatively few in number, some of the participants were either fully or partially taking responsibility to maintain their family members who had no or low income, despite their outsider status and its accompanying low job security and low pay. In such cases, participants identified their family members' financial problems as their own, feeling a serious economic burden as well as concerns about future income (Particpant 8, 18, 24, 25). The following quote from participant 8 shows that parents and adult children are closely tied up as a single-family welfare network, and therefore share their problems even if they are living as separate households.

> My son [in his late 20s, living as a separate household] worked as a part-time worker for a year, preparing to apply for a position with permanent employment. As he was low-paid and was not able to live on his income, we [she and her husband] provided him with part of his living expenses until he became a regular employee. I thought that the support was necessary for his better career, but was also concerned that the economic burden could be too heavy if the situation lasts longer. (Participant 8)

In terms of cost-benefit, such a reciprocal relationship between family members can be understood as suggesting that individuals may gain some benefits (such as income security and care) from membership of their family welfare network, and are therefore willing to sacrifice their immediate material interests to a certain extent to receive those benefits. For instance, some participants in their 50s or over anticipated financial support or physical care from their adult children in their old age as a reward for past assistance (Participant 22). However, what motivated participants more to make sacrifices for their family seemed to be moral obligations and a sense of belonging to the family rather than material interest. Most participants strongly

emphasised that, regardless of whether they had benefited from their family, it is of prime importance to take care of their family members. Prioritising one's own interests over the wellbeing of one's family was highly criticised as irresponsible, selfish behaviour. In fact, some participants supported family members who were expected to be unemployed for good due to old age or illness, without anticipation of any reward for doing so (Participant 18, 25). A case of participant 25 (a single woman in her 50s) is a good example. She claimed that she inevitably submitted herself to dissatisfactory working conditions including low-pay (only a quarter as much as standard male workers for the same work in the same office), since she found no other means of livelihood, and also had to support multiple family members who were incapable of work. Her case is also significant as a case showing that the probabilities of being exposed to unfavourable work conditions may increase, if one's family welfare does not function well enough to guarantee a certain level of income.

> Such a large pay gap is very annoying indeed, but I have to accept such a condition to make a living for myself and my family. I would never be an atypical worker if I had other means of livelihood. (Participant 25).

In such a deeply interdependent and committed relationship, family members are almost inseparable in terms of their material interest. Each family member's financial difficulties mean something to the other members who care about them, and are therefore interpreted in the context of family welfare. Consequently in such a context, participants were inclined to have collective recognition of problems within their family, being relatively independent of the influences of their own labour market status. What tended to matter more to participants was the welfare capacity of the family. If a family has capacity enough to address its members' difficulties, one member would not be much concerned about their own issues as well as those

of the other members. If not, in contrast, all members would suffer together and share the burden. In this regard, the welfare capacity of the family can be synonymous with the socioeconomic status of the income providers in the family, because a family needs at least one member to be capable of providing a secure income for all to keep the family welfare functioning properly and consistently. As the role of primary earner in the family, for example, labour market status is a matter of great importance not only to the individual but also to family members who live on the income. If the members are dependent, the primary earner's labour market status could be more influential than their own status in determining the level of wellbeing. Such findings can be related to the finding of quantitative analyses in chapter 5, in that most individual-level variables representing one's current/prospective location in the labour market do not explain individuals' preferences for social policy, while equivalised disposable household income representing intra-household transfer does (see chapter 5). Also, these findings may explain the negative perception of labour market outsiders described above. Family welfare could be vulnerable to long-term family dependency, which would have a negative impact on the family economy in the long-run. In this regard, being in the labour market outsider position without any good reasons might be considered undesirable or non-contributing.

Intra-family transfer does not just refer to allocating resources from those with a higher income to those with low or no income within the family. It is better understood as a division of labour within the family, in which each family member is endowed with distinctive (often exclusive) roles and duties and cooperates with the other family members for their common interests. In most cases explored in this study, it was men, notably fathers and husbands, who played the role of primary earner in the family. These male earners, often the family heads, redistributed their wage to other family members who were labour market outsiders or unemployed, while

wives devoted themselves to maintaining the family, sacrificing their career to a certain extent. The key reason for such a division of labour, particularly the male breadwinner/female homemaker model, appeared to be child-rearing. Most participants, regardless of marital status or age, tended to highlight the great importance of the presence of the parents, the mother in particular, during the first three or four years of a baby's life regarding the child's emotional, intellectual, and physical development and familiarity with the parents. Some participants attributed a range of social issues (such as increasing domestic violence, antisocial behaviour, depression, or suicide) partially to unhealthy early childhood relationships with parents, especially their mothers (Participant 5, 7). They consequently tended to contend that it was a mother's responsibility to play the role of primary carer until the child reached a certain age. This did not necessarily mean that mothers should not participate in the labour market during the child's early childhood, but they considered that their responsibility in looking after their children as well as the long-term benefits of a mother's emotional and physical presence are much more important than their careers or immediate economic rewards so long as the husbands guaranteed their household income. In her interviews, participant 7 articulated that she prioritised a mother's presence for the better emotional and physical development of her kids over economic interest, even though childcare service was available for her as an alternative. Similar attitudes were also frequently observed among unmarried participants such as participant 1.

> Children should be with their mothers until they reach the age of four. I notice significant differences between those who were cared for by their mothers and those who were not. Although we participate in economic activities for the children, we should not miss the most important thing, the emotional and physical development of my kids. In my opinion, leaving a child at a day-care centre and going back to work is not desirable. (Participant 7)

> I think it should be me who takes care of my baby, otherwise he or she would not grow up physically and emotionally healthy. In order to fulfil my responsibilities as a mother towards my child, I am willing to sacrifice my career until he or she becomes a middle school student. My attitude towards child upbringing will not be changed. (Participant 1)

Such an idea about gender roles seems to be rooted in the general, taken-for-granted, perception that a man is more competitive in the labour market and that the mother is more fit to care for a child. When asked their opinions about the opposite model, in which a husband raises his child as a full-time carer and the wife earns the majority of the household income in the labour market, many of the participants answered that it would be possible if the husband wanted to and were able to look after the child, but that would be inefficient and unnatural (Participant 1, 10, 12, 13, 15, 16, 19). Participant 10 and 16 are quoted as showing that the conventional gender division of labour is a taken-for-granted part of life.

> I do not approve of situations where children are cared in facilities, being physically disconnected from their mothers. Perhaps it is because of my childhood experience. I rarely experienced my mother's absence when I was a kid (Participant 10).

> We Korean people have lived that way. Because we are so familiar with such a gender division of labour, we cannot change it in a day. (Participant 16)

It is important to note that such a social perception may have a significant impact on women's recognition of the problem in relation to their outsider status. Many participants including participant 15 who is quoted below considered that employment under a temporary contract, especially part-time, could be desirable for handling both career and childcare since such a job

generally required relatively less work responsibility and time at work. They also tended to add that atypical jobs could also increase the chances of getting a permanent job after their children would go to the nursery (Participant 5, 6, 7, 12, 14, 15, 16, 19).

> Most female atypical workers I know are working mothers. They prefer part-time jobs that allow them to take care of their children and also to contribute to their household economy. (Participant 15)

Negative feelings attached to the labour market outsider status were also much less expressed by married participants. They thought that, for mothers, having outsider status signified either self-sacrifice or a deliberate, responsible action taken for the interest of the family (or both), not failure (Participant 1, 5, 6, 7, 14, 15, 16, 17, 19, 27). Such cases provide us with an interesting comparison with those of young, single participants. In most of the latter cases, income loss was not the most imminent issue because they were able to rely on their parents in case of insecure employment status and low-pay; however, they were much more likely to suffer from a range of negative emotions than those who were married, not least because they identified themselves as workers, not homemakers (Participant 1, 2, 9, 10, 11, 12). Such cases show that individuals' ideal state may significantly differ in accordance with their position and role within a family, and therefore their labour market status and corresponding risks can also be interpreted differently.

Child-rearing

Parenting is the process of bringing up and looking after children until they are old enough to take care of themselves. This process requires the parents' full attention, affection, and

energetic devotion to their children, and therefore may mean, not only physical and emotional burden, but also the difficult task of balancing work and parental responsibilities. Since pregnancy and childbirth are exclusive to women, they are more likely to be exposed to such a situation. To prevent parenting-related career interruptions, therefore, either/both a parent-friendly work environment and culture, or/and childcare services should be provided. Regarding the former, Korean firms in general, unfortunately, do not seem committed to family-friendly working conditions. Participants tended to share that employers required complete devotion from their regular employees in terms of time and energy, which might prevent parents from spending a sufficient amount of time with their child. They also added that holidays or early leaving hours to care for sick children were not easy to claim as in the Korean workplace, such behaviour tended to be considered as a disloyalty to the firms as well as shifting tasks onto other co-workers. Some participants even argued that Korean companies often disapproved of their female employees having children, implicitly coaxing them into leaving the company. In such situations, it would be challenging for dual working parents to remain together in full-time employment unless they have someone to look after their child while they are at work (Participant 5, 6, 7, 12).

In cases where both parents have to stay in the labour market, they may leave their child at the nursery during work hours. This option enables both the father and mother to earn an income, but at the same time may cost them a significant amount of money. In Korea, thanks to the Free Childcare Policy, all households with children up to five years old have been eligible for free childcare services since 2013, but childcare facilities often suggest various extracurricular activities outside regular business hours at the cost of parents[40]. Most participants experiencing

[40] According to the Korea Institute of Child Care and Education (2016), a household with children under five pays approximately US $255 on average per child for such programmes (Choi, Kim, Lee, and Lim, 2016).

childcare services found the cost of additional programmes overly excessive for their level of household income, but they tended not to refuse participation mainly because they were concerned their children would be neglected or lag behind (Participant 5, 6, 7, 19, 27). It should be noted that parenting generally requires constant expenses for children's essentials (such as food and clothing) on top of the expense of nursery services. One participant reported she had to call on domestic help once or twice a week, paying extra, to manage their household affairs while they were at work (Participant 7). Consequently, most participants, especially those who felt their household income was not high enough, tended to consider the expenses for childcare and accompanying necessities and services as one of the major issues associated with child-rearing.

Some participants addressed this issue through assistance from their family, especially by entrusting someone close with the childcare, such as the children's grandparents. Those participants preferred grandparenting to leaving their children at day-care centres since this alternative cost them less, but was also believed to be more reliable in terms of quality foster care. In these cases, working parents tended to take the work–family conflict issue as well as the cost of childcare less seriously thanks to family assistance (Participant 26, 27). Most participants in their 50s or over were also concerned about their adult children struggling to reconcile work with child-raising, and were therefore either willing to nurse or had already nursed their grandchildren to help their daughters or daughters-in-law participate in the labour market (Participant 8, 22, 23, 24).

Such family assistance in the form of services (such as grandparenting) seems common in Korean society, but not everyone can benefit from it because grandparenting is generally only possible when the parents and children reside near to the carer, and therefore have easy and quick access to the service. If parents have no one around to entrust with childcare and cannot

bear the expenses for nursery service and other necessities, they lose the incentive to maintain a double-income family. As quoted below, participants in such circumstances shared that they either deliberately chose to leave the labour market to bring up their children or moved to the secondary labour market (especially part-time jobs) to minimise the use of nursery service as well as the childcare-related expenses (Participant 5, 6, 7, 14, 15). It should be noted that it is much more likely to be wives that give up their full-time jobs for parenting, given that female workers are generally paid much less than their male counterparts.

> Let's suppose that I work and earn 2,000,000 KRW (approximately 2,000 US dollars) a month. I might have to entrust my kids to private classes while working. I might also need to use domestic help services once or twice a week as I might not be able to do housework properly. My family might eat dinner out more often if I had no time to cook. They all would cost me a lot. Perhaps I would spend as much as I earn. If so, why should I have a job, feeling sorry for my kids being left at a day-care centre? (participant 7)

One may argue that the circumstances compelling mothers to sacrifice their career for child-rearing should be identified as a problem. Participants, especially those in their 40s or younger, were inclined to express their regret that they could not make full use of what they had learned or trained for their career. They nevertheless tended to consider child-related employment interruption as inevitable, not problematic. As described in the previous section, this is not least because these participants defined themselves as mothers, rather than workers, and therefore valued a mother's presence in promoting the physical, emotional, social, and intellectual development of a child more than economic gains from labour market participation. There was a consensus among these participants that it could be much more important, and also rational, to raise their children as healthy, upright persons than to pursue a career and earn money. A mother's sacrifice of her full-time employment for parenting and homemaking was also

considered to help the father bend all his energy to his career without worrying about household affairs (Participant 1, 5, 6, 7, 8, 12, 14, 15, 17, 27).

What those participants were more concerned about was their household income and expenditure, which acted as an indication of the living standard of their household. Their complete devotion to childcare and homemaking, including leaving her job, was possible because their husbands were in charge of the household income. In this regard, the level of their husbands' income and its security were of prime importance in terms of not only child-rearing, but also day-to-day household operations. If a husband's income were not regular or large enough to cover the expenses needed to financially support family members, the gender division of labour would become unable to function properly. Although there were few in number, some participants claimed that they had either postponed having a child because both the couples were atypical workers with low and unstable income (Participant 17, 18).

> As you know, raising a child requires a lot of money, while it may prevent me from participating in the labour market. I am reluctant to have a child because I do not think I can possibly bear this economic burden. If I were better off, or my husband had a stable employment, I would not hesitate. (Participant 17)

> My ex-husband and I found it difficult to have a child because we both were in precarious employment. We agreed to postpone having a baby until he would become a permanent employee, which eventually ended up in failure after four years of marriage. I badly wanted to have a child. (Participant 18)

Furthermore, many married participants claimed it was gradually becoming an arduous task for a standard family composed of three to four members (the average household size in Korea) to live solely on the income earned by the husband even if he was a labour market insider, because of stagnant incomes and the rapid rise in prices that threaten the participants' family

economies.

In addition, the majority of participants had a tendency to see childcare-related issues in relation to the trend in low birth rates. They tended to understand that the challenges of childcare, especially its excessive expense, had led to the ultra-low fertility, which would negatively affect the state's economy and security. When asked about what a low birth rate meant for them, many of them answered they feared an economic crisis might be caused by population decline. They were disposed to say that the economic issue was not an immediate problem to them, but they would not be free of the negative consequences the state would face. Although they were relatively few in number, some expressed their concern about Korea being occupied by so-called 'non-Korean people', which may result from the increased immigration and low birth rates among the native Korean people. They even considered the potential situation 'Korea without Korean people' as the extinction of the nation. Such an idea does not necessarily mean that those participants had ethnic hatred, but seems to reflect a commonly shared belief that Koreans are a single ethnic group that shares the same bloodline and a distinct culture, forming a natural community with a common destiny. It is worth noting that such recognition of problems was shared and strongly expressed by most participants, regardless of individuals' involvement in child-rearing, and that addressing the problem – maintaining the prosperity of the country by promoting birth rate among the native Korean population – tended to be considered having almost unchallenged legitimacy and priority over personal interest. For instance, participant 16 (single, in her 40s) and 20 (married, in her 60s) stated that they prioritised the low birth rate issue over their immediate income issue, making claims:

> The low birth rates is a very serious issue in Korea as it threatens not only the prosperity of the nation, but also its survival. We would have no future if there were no children. That is not a right way to go. Although I do not have a child now and it seems very unlikely that I have one in the future, I believe that there should be some sort of action at the national level immediately to address the problem. (Participant 16)

> I am concerned about the low birth rate issue more than my old-age income. To be honest, I have anxiety about the fact that too many foreigners are coming to Korea to work and live, while young Korean people are so reluctant to have children. If this trend continues, the country will be overwhelmed by foreigners. Maybe in 50 years' time, Korea would disappear. So I think the government should do something to boost the birth rate (Participant 20)

Old-age Income Reduction

Old age generally means losing one's income from the labour market with retirement, and consequently experiencing a declining standard of life. Thus, one may speculate that concerns about old-age income reduction will grow as people age. This was in fact the case: participants in their 50s or over tended to be more worried about old-age income compared with younger participants. Concerns about old-age income might also be closely related to the levels of property in the sense that after retiring, personal savings or pensions could be the main source of income. Participants who lacked savings for their old age tended to express their worries about old-age income more strongly than others. Many of the participants in their 50s or over, who had stopped working after marriage and lived as housewives for about 20 years, returned to the labour market (taking low-skill and low-pay jobs) mainly because of such concerns (Participant 8, 20, 22, 23, 24). In this way, for those who are not sufficiently prepared for old age, continuing to work in old age can be perceived not as an option but as a necessity. Most participants in their 50s and over wished to continue working as long as their health would

permit them to do so. This situation seems to be becoming more serious due to the rising life expectancy in Korea.

It is intriguing that family welfare, especially long-term and often excessive expenses for children, was frequently pointed out as one of the major causes of insufficient old-age income. Many participants in their 50s or over commonly shared that they could not afford savings or private pensions for old-age because they had to pay heavy expenses for their children, even after their children became adults (Participant 8, 20, 22, 23, 24). It should be noted that in Korea, parents generally finance not only their children's education until college graduation, but also job-seeking activities, weddings and even house purchases. Recently, with the rise of youth unemployment, cases of children delaying their employment are increasing, adding to their parents' economic burden. Such worries were ongoing issues for most of the participants in their 50s or over, but were not limited to older generations. Although the concern about old-age income tended to be more serious with age, younger generations (especially those with dependent children) also worried about insufficient savings for retirement, mainly due to the excessive expenses they were paying for childcare services, education, and other necessities (Participant 6, 7, 14, 15, 26, 27). The following quotes show that the excessive expenses for children could be a serious problem to both young and old generations, especially in relation to savings for old-age income.

> I was not able to afford any savings or private pensions for old age because the expenses for my (adult) children are overly excessive. I thought I could end the support to the kids when they graduate the college, but further expenses were required for him to build a good curriculum vitae. (Participant 24)

> The expenses for the children, especially education fees, are costly, while household income is relatively low. My two kids are still pre-schoolers, but I spend on average 500,000 KRW (approximately 500 USD) a month for their education. The burden will grow a lot when they begin primary school. Naturally, it is very difficult for us to save enough for old age. (Participant 7)

The strong emphasis given on the expenses for children does not necessarily mean that expenses for other aspects of family welfare are insignificant, but can be understood as indicating that in Korea, child-related expenses generally have higher priority among the necessary household spendings, and also are more likely to be long-term and excessive than others.

Of course, old-age income issues caused by a lack of personal savings or pensions can be relieved by family welfare as well. Like other East Asian countries sharing Confucian culture, looking after parents in their old age is considered to be one of the most important moral values in Korea. Some of the participants in their 50s or over anticipated that their adult children would provide them with financial support in their old age (Participant 20, 22). Most of the younger participants also recognised their responsibility in supporting old-age parents. Because a considerable amount of resources that were being/expected to be devoted to their parents on top of other necessary expenses, however, they also felt a significant economic burden as well as difficulty in saving for their old-age (Participant 8, 14, 25).

> We (a participant and her husband) have been supporting my parents-in-law who do not live with us. We have provided them with all the living expenses and additional costs. Although we are not old persons and both have jobs, the lack of old-age income that my parents are experiencing equates to our economic burden. I cannot afford to take care of my kids, or do anything else. (Participant 14)

In such cases, the old-age income issue was not only their worry about future income, but also an ongoing problem caused by the responsibility for their parents. Such cases where addressing one issue through family welfare could be a cause of another problem suggest that seemingly separate issues, often of different individuals, can be closely inter-related within the family economy, and therefore that individuals are likely to recognise problems in the context of family welfare.

On top of such personal concerns about old age income, participants tended to express their compassion for senior citizens suffering from poverty. They frequently expressed regret at the realities whereby a large proportion of the elderly population in Korea lacked appropriate support from family or society, being driven to low-skilled and low-paid jobs. Such problem recognition might have resulted from their concerns about income security in old age. Some participants in their 40s or over were concerned about being placed in such miserable situations in their old age when things go wrong (Participant 13, 18, 24). However, participants' responses seemed to an extent reflect a normative idea that no one should be left in such a situation, especially when they were unable to address their economic hardship by themselves or through family welfare. They tended to stress that senior citizens should be cared for by their family first, but if this somehow turned out to be difficult, they deserved assistance from society since they were generally less capable of getting themselves out of poverty without assistance. Regarding poverty among young people, however, participants were disposed to be relatively unsympathetic, arguing that young people were more capable of overcoming economic difficulties unless they were seriously handicapped (Participant 1, 8, 18, 22, 24). Such a rank order in deservingness of relief shows that participants' sympathy tended to be evoked in consideration of one's responsibility for as well as ability to address certain problems, and participants would also give priority to old-age poverty particularly among those who are

unable to locate any assistances from family.

Contracting a Disease

Concerning health issues, the ideal state is for individuals to be in good health and not have to pay for health treatment. However, illness is randomly and often unexpectedly distributed through the population, and once it comes to a situation where medical treatment is required, an individual is likely to encounter urgent medical expenses. In fact, participants commonly expressed their worries about excessive medical expenses to a certain extent, even when they did not have any major health issues. Such worries were based on the participants' perceptions that while severe diseases could threaten their lives and might require great expenses for treatment, it was difficult for them to prepare for such expenses. Although most medical services in Korea are private, the National Health Insurance covers most of the population[41], and also pays on average 60 percent of treatment fees, leaving the remaining 40 percent at the individuals' charge. Consequently, individuals consider the remaining 40 percent as medical expenses, which could be a serious financial burden for those who have not saved enough for such cases. In addition, aside from treatment fees, individuals have to pay the costs for hired caregivers or new medicines and medical equipment not covered by health insurance. In the case of hospital wards, health insurance only covers the basic six-people room: individuals have to pay extra when they use rooms that admit fewer people, which cannot be helped at times. The fact that a patient cannot fully participate in the labour market is another reason that

[41] Although having no contribution record, individuals are eligible to claim the benefits from the National Health Insurance as a dependent, if one of their family members in a direct line pays contribution to the system. Thanks to such a policy, 97% of the population residing in the country are insured by the system.

exacerbates financial difficulty. The patient may experience income loss on top of expenses for treatment.

As the participants mostly worried about health-related medical expenses, individual level of financial resources appears to be a very important factor affecting their concerns. Obviously, those who lacked personal savings or coverage tended to take this issue more seriously than those who were insured by private health insurance. In this regard, senior citizens, women, youth, and those in the secondary labour market are likely to be at a disadvantage in receiving medical services, since they tend to be characterised by low pay and low job security. On top of that, women are more inclined to experience career interruption due to parenting. In other words, these groups may find it more difficult to save up or pay the contribution to social insurance systems for future income or potential risks. Age can also affect problem recognition regarding medical expenses in another way. Participants' concerns about medical expenses were likely to be greater if they were older since the probability of contracting a disease increases with age, while income tends to decrease. Most participants in their 50s or over anticipated growing medical expenses in the near future, and pointed out that excessive expenses for medical treatment could be a major cause of deterioration of living standards in their old age.

Of course, family welfare may play a significant role not only in relieving the financial burden but also in caregiving. Many participants reported their experience of being financially supported by family members with regard to medical expenses, and were also willing to support their family members in need of medical treatment. As having a disease could be a critical problem related to one's health, family welfare for medical issues could possibly cover not only close family members but also distant relatives. At the same time, however, participants were also disposed to feel burdened with such responsibility. In the context of a household

economy in which most participants were already struggling to manage its expenses, giving financial support to a family member in need could be an extra burden. This went together with the previously discussed fact that it was difficult to save for old age, given the current household income and expenses. Participant 18 shared how her responsibility for family members' medical expenses negatively affected her personal economy.

> My mother had a stroke 10 years ago. She was hospitalised for about two months, which cost approximately 100,000,000 KRW (approximately 100,000 USD) even after the National Health Insurance covered some of the expenses. Recently, I have eventually managed to pay all the medical bills, but I used up all my savings, lent money at high interest, and even went into bankruptcy. I am no longer eligible for a debit card because my credit is damaged. (Participant 18)

Some participants expressed sympathy for unrelated others who were suffering from unbearable health expenses, without being appropriately assisted by family in terms of both financial and physical care. They tended to insist that it was the family's responsibility to take care of its members, but excessive medical expenses beyond the capability of individuals and families should be addressed by the state's action so that no one should have to die without access to medical treatment (Participant 8, 17, 18, 22). This pattern of reasoning seems analogous to the selective compassion shown by participants regarding old-age poverty, in the sense that they prioritised the responsibilities and capability of individuals and family in the provision of welfare, while emphasising the importance of state welfare as a supporting actor or as a last resort.

6.1.3. The Influences of Family-related and Cultural Contexts on Recognition of Problems

The previous section explored how participants recognised problems arising from four troublesome situations, and what factors and contexts were involved in the process. This section will present a more in-depth analysis of how factors identified by thematic analysis work in shaping individuals' problem recognition, focusing particularly on family-related and cultural contexts. The analysis finds that family welfare and prevailing ideas of a desirable society tended to shape participants' recognition of problems to a large extent, playing a more important role than individuals' socioeconomic and demographic characteristics in establishing social policy preferences.

6.1.3.1. Family Welfare

As expected by a range of self-interest hypotheses, individuals' socioeconomic and demographic characteristics appeared to affect the participants' recognition of problems to a certain extent. The most frequently observed factors were their labour market status, gender, and age. Such factors appeared to be associated with a person's probability of being exposed to certain problems, such as labour market risks, childcare issues, old age income, and medical expenses. Most of the participants expressed their concerns about the difficulties they currently or will likely experience, in relation to their socioeconomic and demographic factors. Evaluating the perceived level of problem severity, there was a tendency for participants to consider problem as highly severe if closely related to them. On the other hand, there was less worry about issues that were irrelevant to them or their family. For instance, those in their 20s and 30s tended to be more concerned about parenting-related issues, while those in their 50s or over were inclined to express worries about old age income and medical expenses than

younger participants. This does not necessarily mean that the participants were not motivated by ideology (such as egalitarianism), or that they had no interest in collective solutions, but it suggests that self-interest is one of the major motivations behind individual action.

However, a number of cases explored in this study suggest that participants' recognition of problems was more likely to be shaped by the context of family welfare than their own socioeconomic and demographic characteristics. Family played the role as an informal but the most significant welfare provider for most of the participants. Within a family welfare network, the members protected each other from a wide range of social risks, occasionally or daily. This consequently affects one's recognition of problems in two ways. Firstly, family welfare may strongly motivate individuals to have common problem recognition within the family. As a part of the family, one can be both the informal welfare provider and receiver, according to their position and role. Most participants reported receiving immediate and appropriate support from their family in response to overall difficulties caused by socioeconomic or demographic characteristics, and therefore their worries about those issues were allayed. On the other hand, they were also under the obligation to provide support for other family members in need, which often felt like a financial and physical burden. In such cases, the participants therefore considered other family member's issues as their own. In other words, family as a solid economic unit made it likely to identify other members' problems as their own and address those issues through mutual assistance. It is as though different ingredients from every family member were boiled together into a single pot to share.

For most participants, the most basic and important unit of family welfare was their household, but that usually covered immediate family members such as parents, siblings, adult children, regardless of whether they belong to the same household or not. Also, it occasionally covered some extended family members such as grandparents or other close relatives, especially when

emergency assistance was needed. In other words, family welfare in Korea is based on kinship relationships, and therefore resources may be transferred beyond the boundary of a household economy. Consequently, this welfare network tended to consist of a relatively large number of people (often more than two generations) and several households. This implies that the extent to which people share their recognition of problems could be as large as the size of a family welfare network. In addition to width, we may look at the depth. It seems that the degree to which certain problem recognition is shared within a given family welfare network tends to be determined by the degree to which resources are shared. In most cases explored in this study, problem recognition was most strongly shared within a household (such as a married couple and their children), less strongly among immediate family members, and then the least strongly among extended family members.

Secondly, the burden felt about a problem is likely to be re-measured in the context of family welfare. As problems were dealt with in cooperation within the family, participants tended to reinterpret their problems in this context. Participants in the process of reinterpretation generally considered two factors. The first is the capacity of family welfare, namely the degree of resources (both financial and services) available within the family. Participants from relatively affluent families had a tendency not to be concerned much about the overall issues facing them and their family because they were able to solve a wide range of problems through family welfare. In contrast, participants whose families lacked resources tended to report that they were less likely to receive appropriate assistance from their family, while instead bearing heavier family economic responsibilities. The weight of each individual problem may also be re-evaluated in consideration of the capacity of family welfare. A certain problem may require a greater amount of family resources for a longer period than others, and therefore might be considered more serious. For example, many participants, especially those who were married,

were inclined to perceive the excessive expenses for childcare as being more serious than their temporary unemployment, not least because they could rely on the income of their husbands who are often the primary earners in the households. In contrast, childcare was a long-term issue demanding excessive expenses that could reduce other areas of consumption, as well as savings for old age or potential medical treatment. In the sense that the capacity of family welfare influences the members' recognition of problems, the socioeconomic characteristics of income providers in the family could have great importance. In most cases explored in this study, a well-functioning network of family welfare contained at least one member who earned enough to take care of others. If that person lost their job or experienced an income reduction, this could be devastating for the family.

Another important family-related factor that participants tended to consider in this stage was the traditional division of labour within the family. Resource sharing was basically reciprocal, but the directions and types of sharing were likely to be determined by one's position and given role within the family. Three major types of transfer were observed throughout the interviews: horizontal transfers between husband and wife, downward transfers from parents to adult children (who are often in a transitional phase, or who are working mothers), and upward transfers from adult children to parents (who are usually economically non-active). In all types, the support provided and for whom were clearly defined, not only by the degree of resources one had but also by age, generation, and gender. Among them, gender seems to be the most prominent. In all three types of intra-family transfer, men were more likely to take responsibility to provide financial assistance for the other family members, while women, those married in particular, were more likely to be in charge of household management and child-rearing in particular. This does not necessarily mean that mothers do not/or should not earn their income from work, but shows there is relatively clear gender division of roles and

responsibilities within the family. Such gender roles could be normative in the sense that deviators may be blamed for their 'irresponsible acts'. However, participants tended to consider gender roles to be more or less a given part of life, hardly thinking of other acts. Such gender division of labour within the family was found to motivate individual participants to define themselves as a specifically given/expected position, required to play a corresponding role. For instance, married participants often perceived themselves as homemakers rather than as breadwinners, and as mothers of their children rather than as atomised individuals, which eventually led them not to recognise their actual state (low job security, or work and childcare being incompatible) as a problem. Instead, they were inclined to be more sensitive to their household income and expenditure, as they were supposed to manage household affairs, including parenting, within the budget of their husbands' income.

The two factors (the capacity of family welfare and gender division of labour within the family) overlap each other in that the male breadwinner/female homemaker model is only possible when the male earners of the family secure a sufficient amount of income. If they fail, the division of labour will not work properly, and family welfare will be unsustainable and ineffective. Consequently, within a family welfare network, the members' problems are likely to be reinterpreted in consideration of socioeconomic characteristics of male earners.

Institutional Explanations for Individuals' Adherence to Family Welfare

The finding that individuals may have collective, reinterpreted recognition of problems within the family seems to contradict a range of self-interest theories assuming that individuals seek to maximise their material interest based on socioeconomic and demographic characteristics. The cases explored in this study reveal that in Korea, individuals' socioeconomic and

demographic characteristics are unlikely to be as influential as expected, at least at the stage of recognising problems. Instead, the cases manifest the strong influence of family welfare on individuals' recognition of problems. What then motivates a person to recognise themselves as part of the family, rather than as an atomistic individual?

Firstly, family-related social norms, values, cultural expectations may play a role. As March and Olsen argue (1989) institutions such as social norms and rules may constrain individuals to a course of action by specifying what is appropriate or inappropriate in a given situation. In fact, most participants were highly sensible of their positions in the family and accompanying responsibilities. The importance of family responsibility and individual obligations to assist family members in need were frequently articulated by participants throughout the interviews, receiving an almost inherent legitimacy. Such a strong sense of family responsibility is understood to be associated with a range of family-related Confucian norms and values, which have been taken for granted in Korea. When asked the reason for their strong commitment to family, the participants tended to express their belief that indifference to other family members' hardship or prioritising personal over collective family interest were immoral and irresponsible, regardless of whether they had benefited from the family. In this regard, a quote from participant 27 has significance, which shows that taking responsibility for and identifying with the family are frequently emphasised in everyday life, especially by titles bestowed upon family members. She claimed that:

> In Korea, we are hardly called our own names, but with our titles, such as one's mother, father, daughter, or son. I think such titles always remind us of our positions and responsibilities in the family. I cannot possibly be indifferent to other members' problems. (Participant 27)

Such a tendency can be understood as suggesting that the Confucian culture that claims individuals' commitment to the family persists and shapes the ways people think, even in the era of welfare state expansion in Korea. The compliance with family-related norms and values is understood as a voluntary action resulting from socialisation, but the quote from participant 8 shows that the cultural expectation may work as an external enforcement mechanism. The participant said that she could not share with others the dissatisfaction of bearing the heavy economic burden to support her parents-in-law, mainly because she feared being reproached for undutiful action. Such a case shows that there could be serious inner-conflict between the logic of appropriateness and consequences, and in such cases, social pressure may accompany social norms in order to claim the individual commitment to 'logic of appropriateness'.

> My parents-in-law consider us (she and her husband) as a sort of old-age pension, taking our financial support for granted. It is a heavy burden indeed, but I cannot talk about this problem to others. If so, I would be perceived to be an undutiful person. (Participant 8)

Secondly, despite the possible contradiction, the pursuit of utility in service of the family can be another driver of individuals' adherence to family welfare. Many cases explored in this study reveal that participants tended to recognise the rationality of being part of the family. The most obvious material benefit of this belonging is the long-term security provided to the members. As discussed in the previous section, family welfare could be a solution for a problem one incurs, but also a cause of another problem mainly due to its excessive expenses relative to the given limited budget. Theoretically, individuals would be able to consume or save more money for themselves if they choose to opt-out of family welfare. However, most participant recognised that family welfare is provided almost permanently and not as a one-off or fixed-

term basis, which made family welfare more trustworthy than other sectors of welfare. As family-related norms and rules defined the roles and responsibilities individuals ought to comply with, many participants tended to predict with confidence that they would surely be supported and cared for by other members whenever they were in trouble. These benefits have greater importance in Korea, where the labour market is to a large extent discriminative toward certain socioeconomic and demographic groups (such as women labour market outsiders), and social policy hardly compensates for the disadvantages compared to Western countries. One may gain immediate personal interest by opting out of family welfare in the short term being exempts from family responsibilities, but this also means losing security and care that would have a higher economic value in the long term. This can be understood as the supporting evidence for rational choice institutionalism in the sense that individual actors deliberately conformed to institutions in order to receive benefits from family membership (see Chapter 2).

It is worth noting that participants generally perceived the benefits of family welfare as one of the outcomes of fulfilling family responsibility, rather than the prime goal that individuals pursue in service of the family. In this regard, the logic of appropriateness usually seems to take precedence over the logic of consequentiality. Exceptionally, the anticipation of welfare benefits appeared to be the prime motive for certain individuals, notably those who sought to obtain new membership or to extend the existing one through relationships of affinity, notably marriage. Some single participants, for example, shared that their uncertainty about income security and the accompanying difficulties had been stimulating them to marry someone with a permanent job to achieve financial stability. They called it ‘Chuijip’, a compound of the words ‘chuijik (employment)’ and ‘sijip (marriage)’, considering it as a strategic decision to avoid demanding and low-reward jobs (Participant 1, 2, 16, 18). In a similar vein, some participants who did not expect marriage expressed concern about being left alone in old age, as they

anticipated no economic, physical, and emotional support from family in their later years. They also shared that unmarried women were disadvantaged compared to married women in preparing for retirement because they had to on their own, while their employment security and income level were lower than that of men's in the Korean labour market, especially in the case of female atypical workers (Participant 13, 16, 18, 21). Such cases provide a convincing explanation as to why the participants were highly motivated not only to maintain their family welfare, but also to establish a new one, mainly through marriage in the sense that individuals are unlikely to be loyal supporters of certain systems that do not serve their interests. In this regard, it can be thought that individuals' adherence to family welfare may be a natural outcome of instrumental calculation of personal interest, given the residual welfare system in Korea.

Lastly, a strong sense of identifying oneself with the family may matter. One of the important differences between self-interest theories and what the observation suggests is the way in which individual actors perceive themselves. Under the influence of family welfare, participants tended to strongly identify themselves as part of the family, considering family interests as their own. They were unlikely to be fully autonomous as utility-maximising actors as assumed by rational choice. This was particularly noticeable when it comes to participants' attitudes toward the division of labour within the family. Married participants, for instance, tended to point out that the conventional gender roles enabled their families to address multiple issues of their members, child-rearing and earning family income in particular, more effectively and simultaneously. They commonly stated that given the highly demanding working conditions in Korea, parents were required to sacrifice their significant time with children and to accept excessive childcare expenses in order for both parents to work. In such contexts, unless the amount of their earnings is significantly higher than childcare expenses, mothers may deliberately give up their full-time jobs and choose to raise the children

themselves in expectation of some benefits – such as minimised childcare expenses, maximised contact with their children, and higher productivity arising from specialising each parent more in labour market and household activities, respectively. Grandparenting can be understood in the same way. Thanks to grandparents who help with childcare, both the mother and father are able to participate in the labour market, achieving maximised household income and minimised childcare expenses, without being concerned about their children being cared for inappropriately. In other words, the division of labour within the family, notably specialising a family member with the lowest wage expectancy in child-rearing while the others take charge of the family income, is considered as a way that increases productivity as well as economic gain for household or family economy in Korea.

It is worth noting that such a division of labour is perceived to be beneficial only when all family members share common goals based on a strong sense of identification with the family. An efficient division of labour within the family is accomplished inevitably at each member's sacrifice of latitude of action. Women in particular often give up some or whole part of their career in order to specialise in care activities at home. When it comes to personal economic interest, therefore, individual actors may have more to lose from division of labour in the family. However, many participants tended to perceive themselves as mothers/or future mothers, perceiving child-related employment interruptions as a deliberate choice other than inevitable sacrifice for more important goals, namely the decent emotional and physical development of a child as well as the efficient use of household resources. Such reinterpreted rationality is found to relieve the conflict between the logic of appropriateness and consequentiality, and therefore lead individuals to a more spontaneous commitment to institutionalised acts. Borrowing from the sociological institutionalist perspective, this can be understood as suggesting that family-related culture provides cognitive frames through which

individual actors redefine themselves as part of the family, and interpret their situations based on family identity (see Chapter 2). The following quote from participant 6 shows that she defined herself as a mother and assigned a positive meaning to child-rearing.

> Because raising a child is an important and valuable thing to pursue as a mother, I would not consider it as a great loss even if I have to quit my job for my child. I would not be very happy with that, but I think it is just changing direction, rather than giving up something. (Participant 6)

It is important to note that these approaches should not be understood as being mutually exclusive. Just because one of them appears to be particularly true for a person in a given situation, it does not mean the others are substantially untrue. These approaches can be understood as representing various aspects of the relationship that individuals form with family welfare. Of the three, however, sociological institutionalism seems to explain the participants' family-centred problem recognition the best, given the finding that most of them showed a strong sense of family identity. In most case studies in this research, participants tended to display multiple motives on top of their strong sense of identification with the family.

6.1.3.2. Prevailing Ideas of a Desirable Society

The problem recognition of individuals is not limited to the boundary of personal or family affairs. Participants often expressed their ideas about what society should be like or how people ought to behave, and tended to perceive the gap between their ideals and reality as a problem. In this regard, two patterns of attitudes were frequently observed among the participants. Firstly, participants tended to be characterised by selective compassion for the deserving poor. Most participants recognised the difficulties experienced by others to whom they were not

emotionally or economically attached to as problems, not least because of their sympathy for others. They wished to personally help those in financial difficulties and/or hoped there were certain forms of assistance for people experiencing such piteous plight or even threat to survival. One may speculate that such altruistic attitudes toward the economically underprivileged can result from an inclination for economic egalitarianism, which aims to eliminate the gap between the rich and poor. However, the participants rarely recognised economic inequality in itself as a problem. What they cared about was the moral responsibility of individuals and society. They tended to be oriented toward the idea that assistance from society should be offered to specific groups of the deserving poor, especially those without family assistance, and unable to help themselves often due to illness, disability or old age. On the other hand, such compassion was likely excluded in those who had access to family support or were young and healthy enough to work, even if they were in need because they regarded the hardship as self-inflicted. Participant 18 is quoted as showing that her understanding of who is deserving of relief is conditioned/influenced by a set of normative ideas accentuating self-sufficiency.

> To be honest, I do not sympathise with young unemployed people complaining that they could not get a job despite their excellent curriculum vitae. It seems that they only want to work for large firms, spending several years on employment preparation and application. They lack the hungry spirit. (Participant 18).

Secondly, participants tended to show a pro-developmental attitude, particularly in response to childcare-related difficulties. They tended to perceive the low birth-rate trend in Korea resulted from excessive childcare expenses and work-life conflict, and that it would lead to population decline and threaten the state's economic growth (or even survival). Such attitudes do not simply mean that the participants were very patriotic, but reflect the widely shared perception

that living standards or even the survival of individuals largely depend on the destiny of the group to which they belong. Many participants argued that people and their country are strongly tied as a single body with a common destiny, frequently referring to the history of Korea (such as the Japanese colonial rule of Korea, the Korean War, the miraculous economic growth from the 1960s to 1990s and the Asian Financial Crisis in the late 1990s) as well as the ongoing military tension with North Korea. In this regard, promoting and giving priority to national interests may have unchallenged legitimacy, and therefore, those with individualistic views (such as prioritising the rights of individuals to freedom over any widely perceived national interests) can be blamed for defection.

It is worth noting that the pro-developmental attitude explains to some extent the participants' clear criteria of who deserved to be sympathised with, and therefore to be helped. As much as prioritising national interests, the participants were inclined to argue for the government's strong commitment to economic growth and national defense, but not its commitment to social welfare protecting individuals against income loss. Individual actors or the family, not the government, were supposed to be responsible for their own wellbeing. Claiming welfare benefits from the state without any effort to be self-sufficient was frequently criticised as an egotistical free-ride and national betrayal, which would eventually impede national economic growth.

These findings can be understood as suggesting that Confucian culture and the developmental logic, both of which emphasise self-sufficiency and family responsibility, still persist in Korea to shape the public perception of welfare deservingness of particular groups of individuals. Borrowing from Van Oorschot's work on deservingness (2000), the participants tended to consider 'control over neediness' and 'level of need' (after family assistance) as the most important criteria when assessing individual or group deservingness.

Discussion: Effects of Family Welfare and Dominant Ideas of a Desirable Society on Problems Recognition of Female Labour Market Outsiders

The findings above suggest that in Korea, family welfare culture and prevailing ideas of a desirable society have greater importance than individuals' socioeconomic and demographic characteristics in shaping the problem recognition of female labour market outsiders. These informal institutions may intervene in the process of problem recognition in the two following ways. First, family welfare changes the actual state of individuals through intra-family transfer and services, often in a way that provides significant economic value to those who belong. Linking back to the analytical framework, this can be understood as suggesting that family welfare mediates rational choice by providing additional information (on top of social risks linked to their socioeconomic and demographic characteristics) that individuals consider when they assess situations for instrumental calculation of their personal interest. Second, both family welfare and prevailing ideas shape individuals' ideal state. They both may offer the logic of appropriateness, which encourages individuals to prioritise family or social interests over personal interests. Moreover, family welfare may provide an interpretive frame in which individuals define themselves as part of the family and assess what is appropriate or rational in a given situation based on their family identity. Relating to the analytical framework, this means that family welfare and the ideas engender individuals' conformity to certain values, which the majority of the people in the society have agreed with.

In the event that a problem arises from a significant gap between the ideal and actual state, such shifts in both states can be understood as suggesting that women in the labour market outsider position do not necessarily have problem recognition that reflects their socioeconomic and demographic characteristics. It is rather likely that they recognise a problem in relation to either/both the context of their family economy or/and prevailing ideas of a desirable society,

which may eventually diminish the impacts of such individual characteristics on problem recognition.

In this regard, we may expect some differences between married female labour market outsiders and single female labour market outsiders in terms of problem recognition. In dual-earner households, married female labour market outsiders are likely to be assisted by their husbands in case of unemployment. Moreover, they could detach themselves to a certain extent from responsibility for household income, as they are in general expected to play a role as homemakers. Single female labour market outsiders could also benefit from family welfare, often from their parents, but the chances of benefiting from family welfare could be limited to the cases where their family, especially their parents, are still engaged in income-generating activities and therefore capable of providing financial support for their children. Once the parents lose their capability to earn their own income, often because of retirement, single female labour market outsiders could become unable to locate sources of assistance within the family. As mentioned above, we have observed that many unmarried participants, except for those who were protected by their parents (mostly those in their 20s), tended to be more concerned about labour market risks, income loss in particular, relative to those who were married, not least because, regardless of whether they had chosen it or not, they were almost out of the family welfare context. All the four single participants in their 30s or over, whose parents were already retired and therefore unable to fully support their children experiencing unemployment, commonly pointed the income security as their biggest concern (Participant 13, 16, 18, 21).

Unlike women's cases, the family welfare context and cultural expectation that men experience could be significantly different. Of course, men could also be under the protection of the family, especially from their parents or spouses. Considering that women are more likely to be

employed on a temporary contract and low-paid job, compared to men, and that their career is more easily interrupted by childbirth and child-rearing, however, the degree to which male labour market outsiders, especially those who are married, are assisted within a household could be lower. On top of that, normative ideas and cultural expectation based on the traditional gender role may intensify men's problem recognition of labour market outsider position. As men are more likely to be expected to play a role as a protector of the family, they could be more sensitive to a range of labour market risks, relative to women. In this regard, we may expect that male labour market outsiders are more likely to be concerned about labour market risks caused by their own outsider position, relative to female labour market outsiders, even if they are married. In other words, the impact of family welfare on individuals' recognition of problem, especially in relation to labour market risks, could be less conspicuous among male labour market outsiders.

It should be noted that informal institutions, especially family welfare, do not apply to everyone in the country. The growing number of single-person households in Korea would signify that the number of people outside family welfare is also on the rise. Thus, personal context, namely whether an actor belongs to family welfare, should be considered as an important explanatory variable in the social policy preference formation in Korea.

Table 21. Dominant Views of Labour Market Outsider Position, by Marital Status

Marital status (Frequency)	Views
Unmarried (13)	- Temporary work is a result of inevitable choice to avoid unemployment - Having a contract work is better than being unemployed because it offers you work experience which is essential for a good-looking curriculum vitae - Contract work is associated with income insecurity - Feeling inferior/frustrated/ashamed/excluded from social activities
Married (10)	- A career (with permanent contract) could be sacrificed for the sake of a child's emotional development - Work-related expenses include babysitting, childcare, or eating out demotivate mothers from pursuing permanent jobs - Part-time helps mothers juggle child-rearing and careers - Temporary work is a way to participate in the society (often after children become grown up enough) - Temporary work is a way to make extra income for savings or recreation
Married with a husband in the outsider position (4)	- A concern about job insecurity is hardly relieved by intra-household transfer, especially from husband - Economic hardship could become even more serious if both husband and wife lose their jobs

6.2. Conclusion

The qualitative analysis of the interviews finds that problem recognition of female labour market outsiders in Korea was more likely to be affected by informal institutions, namely family welfare and prevailing ideas of a desirable society, than by individuals' socioeconomic and demographic characteristics. Most participants were concerned to some extent about the hardships they experienced or anticipated in relation to their socioeconomic and demographic features. However, the impacts of individuals' socioeconomic and demographic characteristics were found to be limited, usually in the cases where participants were relatively independent of other influential factors, notably family welfare. Family welfare tended to change the actual state of participants by providing services and financial transfer occasionally or daily, and tended to shape the ideal state with normative ideas of family responsibility as well as the cognitive frame through which participants establish their family identity. As a result, participants under family welfare were disposed to share collective and reinterpreted problem recognition within the family, reflecting the context of family economy rather than personal socioeconomic and demographic characteristics. In addition, prevalent ideas of a desirable society - selective compassion for the economically disadvantaged and the pro-developmental attitude - tended to affect the participants' problem recognition by working as normative standards. These ideas were likely to extend the recognition of problems, from personal issues to hardships of unrelated others and social issues, but at the same time, they were likely to limit the concerning cases to those in absolute need or facing economic-growth-related issues, notably low birth-rates, prioritising individuals' efforts and family responsibility over social intervention. Given the findings, we may speculate that female labour market outsiders in Korea, especially those who are covered by their family welfare, may not be significantly different from other groups of individuals with different socioeconomic or demographic

characteristics in terms of problem recognition.

7. A Qualitative Analysis 2: Effects of Family-related and Cultural Contexts on Shaping Preferred Solutions

The previous chapter shows that informal institutions in Korea, namely family welfare and dominant ideas of a desirable society, have greater influence than individuals' socioeconomic and demographic characteristics in shaping individuals' recognition of problems, and therefore lead to distinctive patterns of problem recognition oriented more toward family or social interest than personal interest. Following the previous chapter, this chapter aims to explore how such problem recognition is transferred to a preferred solution.

The key findings of the second part of the qualitative analysis are as follows. Firstly, family welfare motivates individuals to assess the possible solutions and recognise problems for the sake of family interest. The family-oriented problem recognition naturally flows into family-centred social policy evaluation, which eventually generates social policy preferences of individuals in accordance with the levels of family income. Secondly, prevailing ideas that emphasise self-sufficiency and family responsibility serve as social norms, and therefore promote individuals' inclination for selectivism in the provision of social welfare. These two factors are generally compatible with each other, but could also contradict the other in case the pursuit of family interest through universal provision of social welfare goes against social norms emphasising the residual model of social welfare. When it comes to such a case, however, participants tended to defend their attitude seeking family interest by highlighting the inevitability of relying on social welfare, as well as the government role in supplementing family welfare provision. Given the significant impact of family welfare in shaping individuals' problem recognition, such a priority order suggests that their pursuit of family interest largely explains individuals' preferences for social policy in Korea. This chapter is structured as

follows. The first section delineates the themes and codes the researcher has identified using a thematic analysis. The second section then analyses how family welfare and prevailing ideas of a desirable society affect the process of shaping preferred solutions, and discusses what significance the findings have in forming social policy preferences.

7.1. Research Findings

7.1.1. Themes and Codes

Following the questions about individuals' problem recognition, participants were asked what potential solutions they were aware of regarding their problems. The participants said they were aware of three broadly categorised categories: Individuals' efforts, support from family, and social welfare. More specifically, social welfare includes different welfare benefits and services, each of which corresponds to the four given problematic situations. A few participants mentioned that civil society or local communities may possibly play a role as alternatives, but no serious consideration was given to these options. In relation to the given situations, at least one solution was preferred. When more than one solution was chosen, the participants were asked to provide the priority order. See Table 22 for details of the potential solutions participants mentioned.

Table 22. Social Policy Mentioned by Participants as Potential Solutions to Their Recognised Problems

Situation	Social policy mentioned by participants
Labour market outsider status	Unemployment benefits
	Job creation policy
	Employment promotion programmes (such as vocational training or job information services)
Child-rearing	Subsidy for families with children
Old-age income reduction	The National Pension Service (contributory)
	The Basic Old-age Pension (non-contributory, means-tested)
Contracting a disease	National Health Insurance
	Subsidy for the sick

Once the participants answered the first question, they were asked which of the solutions they preferred and why. They were also asked how they would like the allocation of public social expenditure. The transcripts of the responses were carefully analysed by the researcher, using a thematic analysis.

As a result, the research has found 12 codes which have been eventually categorised into two main themes, including 'family welfare' and 'prevailing ideas of a desirable society' (see Table 23). In this stage, 'family welfare' has only one sub-theme named 'family-centred social policy evaluation'. The second main theme, 'prevailing ideas of a desirable society', has three sub-themes which include 'attitudes emphasising self-sufficiency and family responsibility', 'selective compassion', and 'pro-developmental attitude'. These findings suggest that problem recognition which is shaped by either/both family welfare or/and prevailing ideas of a desirable society is likely to flow into certain reasoning patterns in the stage of shaping preferred solution. The codes and themes have been rearranged in order to see if participants show any particular

patterns in accordance with their age groups (see Appendix 9). In general, participants of different age groups look generally similar in terms of their motives for having preferences for certain solutions.

Table 23. Codes, Sub-themes and Main Themes by Each Given Situation

Situation	Code	Sub-theme	Main theme
Labour market outsider status	Having low preference for welfare benefits, which may increase the tax their family pays for what they would not benefit from much	Family-centred social policy evaluation	Family welfare
	Having low preference for social assistance that requires too many conditions and a complicated process for welfare benefits while offering insufficient benefit for family		
	Having a preference for social assistance as one expects no support from family		
	Considering job creation policy or employment promotion programmes better than welfare benefits in securing family income		
	A belief that individuals are responsible for their own lives	Attitudes emphasising self-sufficiency and family responsibility	Prevailing ideas of a desirable society
	A belief that people are under an obligation to take care of their own family members		
	Concerns about one's tax being used for undeserving people who avoid work and rely on welfare benefits	Selective compassion	
	A belief that government budget should be used to promote economic growth and national security, not to guarantee the unemployed income security	Pro-developmental attitude	
Child-rearing	Having a preference for social policies as associated expenses are often too much for a family to bear	Family-centred social policy evaluation	Family welfare
	Having a preference for welfare benefits as one expects no support from family		
	A belief that child-raising is mainly family's, especially parents', responsibility, not the government's	Attitudes emphasising self-sufficiency and family responsibility	Prevailing ideas of a desirable society
	Having a preference for social policy as associated difficulties cause the low birth-rate issue, which is a serious threat to state economic growth or national security	Pro-developmental attitude	
Old-age income reduction	Having low preference for welfare benefits, which may increase the tax their family pays for what they would not benefit from much	Family-centred social policy evaluation	Family welfare
	Having a preference for welfare benefits as one expects no support from family		
	Having a preference for social policies as associated expenses are often too much for a family to bear		
	A belief that individuals are responsible for their own lives	Attitudes emphasising self-sufficiency and family responsibility	Prevailing ideas of a desirable society
	A belief that people are under an obligation to take care of their own family members		
	A belief that the government should step in (only) when individuals are unable to deal with their economic hardship	Selective compassion	
Contracting a disease	Having a preference for social policies as associated expenses often are too much for a family to bear	Family-centred social policy evaluation	Family welfare
	A belief that individuals are responsible for their own lives	Attitudes emphasising self-sufficiency and family responsibility	Prevailing ideas of a desirable society
	A belief that people are under an obligation to take care of their own family members		
	A belief that the government should step in (only) when individuals are unable to deal with their economic hardship	Selective compassion	

7.1.2. The Influences of Family Welfare and Prevailing Ideas of a Desirable Society on Shaping Preferred Solutions

This section aims to do an in-depth analysis of how participants' problem recognition is transferred to social policy preferences in family-related and cultural contexts, with a particular focus on family welfare and prevailing ideas of a desirable society.

7.1.2.1. Family welfare

From the previous chapter, family welfare, which protects the members against a range of social risks, appears to be a major factor that affects participants' recognition of problems. Under the influences of family welfare, participants had a tendency to define themselves as part of their family rather than atomised individuals, and to have collective and reinterpreted recognition of problems within the family. In this process, individuals' perceived seriousness of overall difficulty as well as each individual problem tended to be determined by the financial capacity of family welfare, rather than their own socioeconomic and demographic characteristics.

Further analysis reveals that such family-oriented problem recognition of participants tended to arrive at family-centred social policy evaluation naturally. Participants in family welfare had a tendency to evaluate identified possible solutions including social policy in terms of family economy, and to decide their preferences for/against them in the way that maximises the financial capacity of family welfare. Participants tended to attempt minimising the family expenditure on daily or occasional issues with social welfare, rather than seeking social protection against a particular risk to which they were exposed. In this process, social welfare provisions were often perceived as likely alternatives to benefits or services provided by the market or the family, since their recognition of problems reflected their dissatisfaction with

these previously adopted solutions: finding the market and family welfare (considered as the most economical solutions for regular problems) less valid than before, they identified social policy as potential alternatives.

Across the interviews, such a tendency prevailed more among participants from low- to middle-income families, as they were relatively less capable of addressing their issues within the market or their family welfare network. For instance, participants who could not anticipate enough support from their family for various reasons tended to consider various social risks as posing an imminent threat to their living, and were likely to be supportive of overall social welfare programmes (Participant 1, 16, 18, 21). By contrast, those from high-income families were likely to be capable of addressing most problems within their family network, and therefore had a relatively low level of demand for overall social policy (Participant 12, 15, 26). In addition, how much they (or their family) would pay for social welfare was also an important question for the participants to consider. Most participants did recognise a potential increase in taxes (either paid by themselves or their family) in return for an increase in the welfare provision. In this regard, those from richer families tended to be more conservative on welfare expansion, being often concerned about paying more than they would receive.

These findings can be understood as indicating that what and how much participants wanted from the state tended to be shaped by the context of family economy, rather than their own socioeconomic or demographic characteristics. Especially, the degree of family welfare capacity appears to be a key variable affecting one's support for social welfare: those from poorer families (having more to gain) could be more supportive of social welfare provision, relative to those from richer families. This is consistent with the quantitative analyses of chapter 5 where the equivalent disposable household income shows notable impact on welfare attitudes towards individual social policy areas, while most other individual-level self-interest variables

appear to be insignificant.

Such a family-centred policy evaluation may become complicated when it comes to cases of participants from families with middle-income, where members are protected by the family from a range of social risks, but are still struggling to manage the expenses. They were distinguished from the others in that the degrees to which these participants support individual social policies could vary according to the type of social policy. Firstly, they were usually less supportive of social assistance programmes (unemployment benefits in particular) providing financial assistance to people experiencing temporary income loss, relative to those from low-income families. This was not least because these participants hardly felt the need for social assistance, thanks to intra-family transfer provided in the case of income loss. In most cases, these participants tended to report that they had at least one member within their family who specialised in paid-work. In such context, if the primary earner of a family (often husband or father) is employed with a permeant contract, the temporary income loss of another member of the family can be easily addressed by intra-family transfer, and therefore the complete loss of family income is unlikely to happen. On the other hand, the primary earner losing work or undergoing income reduction can result in devastating situations that may interrupt intra-family transfer, and therefore the whole function of family welfare. As family welfare constantly requires sufficient financial resources, such problems cannot be resolved by unemployment benefits with a limited payment designed only to cover the person concerned. When unemployment of the primary earner was supposed, participants tended to prefer a job creation policy or employment promotion programmes, which were believed to be better in restoring sufficient and secure family income, to unemployment benefits.

Secondly, by contrast, these participants were inclined to have more approving attitudes toward a range of social policies that subsidise regular or occasional family expenses, often on the

basis of social rights. As explored in the previous chapter, the majority of the participants frequently reported that expenses for essential activities or services such as child-rearing and medical treatment were growing in excessive due to stagnant income growth and a galloping rise in prices. Given the limited household income, the increasing cost of such minimum living equated to a reduction in the consumption of other components or a reduction in savings, and therefore the quality of life. The national statistics well reflect such situations. According to the OECD (2018), household debts as a percentage of disposable income in Korea have risen constantly from 143.3% in 2008 to 170.0% in 2015, the ninth highest percentage among OECD member states. Given the fact that those above or near Korea on this list are mostly institutionalised welfare states (such as Denmark, Norway, Sweden, and Canada), and that social welfare in Korea is less generous than in most OECD member states, the financial capacity of general households in Korea could be considered to be significantly weakened. Under such circumstances, social policies (social services in particular) which in effect reduced the prices of such necessary activities and services by subsidising the beneficiaries, were usually regarded by participants to be highly beneficial for the family economy. They expected social services to supplement family welfare and improve the standard of living, or at least prevent it from deteriorating.

Family-centred social policy evaluation also appears to affect participants' attitudes towards universalism/selectivism in the provision of welfare state benefits. Participants from low-income families in general were inclined to prefer selectivism to universalism since they perceived it to give more advantage in the selective provision of social welfare in terms of the degree of benefits. Individuals from high-income families were also likely to be in favour of selectively provided welfare benefits, partly because they were less likely to recognise the need for public welfare provision, and because they were concerned about taxes increasing more in

the universal welfare system. In contrast to these two groups of individuals, those from middle-income families tended to have a dual, eclectic approach to universalism/selectivism in accordance with the type of social policy. They were in favour of universalism or wider coverage of welfare provision in relation to policies subsidising family welfare expenses, since means-tested benefits were unlikely to be available to them, but only to those in proven need. On the other hand, they were likely to prefer selectivism with regard to temporary financial assistance to people experiencing income loss in reflection of their low levels of demand for those policies. Such findings may indicate that support for universalism is likely to be exceptionally high among those from middle-income families, with particular regard to social policy subsidising regular/occasional family expenses, while the public is generally in favour of selectivism in provision of social welfare. Participant 19 can be an example of the dual attitude:

> [With regard to social security benefits] I believe that benefits should be available only for those whose income or property are below a certain level [because] it is individuals and the family, not the government, who should take the primary responsibility for their living.

> We are feeling the pinch more than ever. I often tell my children [who are expected to get married in the near future] not to have more than one baby, otherwise they would easily get pinched economically. […] I support the universal childcare subsidy the government has been providing, for the sake of my [adult] children. The policy is financed by our taxes anyway. (Participant 19)

Overall, these findings suggest that family welfare may play a dominant role in shaping social policy preferences of female labour market outsiders in Korea. Linking back to the institutional discussion in the previous chapter, the finding that participants tended to recognise problems

and evaluate social policy based on their strong sense of identification with the family can be associated with sociological institutionalism: individuals define themselves as part of the family and interpret given issues through a cognitive template provided by the family.

This is of importance in that rational choice is not limited to a decision made by atomised self-interested individuals, but can be made for the interest of a group, family in particular. The differences between the findings of this thesis and those of other studies emphasising the impact of individual-level determinants of welfare attitudes may come from the differences between the East and West cultures in which individuals build their identity and interpret the world. For instance, actors in a society emphasising individualistic practices and values are likely to define themselves as atomised individuals, and therefore make the rational choice in pursuit of their goals and desires based on their current or prospective location in society, having no or low-level of expectation of assistance from, or obligation for, the family. By contrast, actors in a collectivist culture, such as Korea, are likely to perceive themselves as part of the family, and therefore consider it not only appropriate but also rational to prioritise the needs or goals of the family over individual needs or desires, in consideration of their family economy.

7.1.2.2. Prevailing Ideas of a Desirable Society

As observed in the previous chapter, a large proportion of participants shared a common, normative view of the welfare state that defines the role of social welfare and those who deserve to be beneficiaries: they had a basic set of ideas that individuals and families should be responsible for their own lives, and that the primary role of the government is to promote economic growth and national security, not to guarantee social security for all. According to these ideas, social welfare is not what people might claim based on their social rights, but a form of favour the government bestows on specific groups of the deserving poor who are

unable to maintain basic necessities on their own or through family assistance.

These normative ideas play a role as the ideological basis of family welfare and are used by participants as the criteria to assess their welfare deservingness. Some participants were experiencing income loss and had minimal access to family support, but still felt reluctant to rely on social welfare (and unemployment benefits in particular). This was not least because they perceived it shameful or nonconformist to receive unemployment benefits before making best efforts to address the problem themselves (including getting a job with unfavourable working conditions), and because they did not think they crossed a certain accepted 'floor' level in terms of standard of living (which often referred to minimum conditions for survival) (Participant 10, 13, 18, 24, 25). For example, participant 10 showed that her negative feeling towards welfare benefits had its root in the social norm emphasising self-sufficiency.

> Throughout life, I have tried to fulfil social requirements or regulations. […] As a citizen, I would feel ashamed of claiming more benefits. (Participant 10)

Such a strong emphasis on self-reliance was even observed in relation to participants' attitudes toward the old-age income supplements. Most participants, even those in their 50s and over, stressed that participating in the labour market is in itself a matter of great importance to them. They tended to display this strong desire to work, not only for their livelihood but also for social engagement and self-actualisation. Such a tendency seems to be reinforced by the fact that people now live much longer lives and are healthier. Most participants stated it would be too early to retire in their 60s, and expected to work till their 70s. Such ideas seem to lower the preference for social security policies such as Basic Old-age Pension to a certain extent, motivating individuals not to rely on social welfare.

Due to its normative aspect, such attitudes were often associated with negative perceptions of welfare beneficiaries and social welfare. Some participants blamed welfare beneficiaries, especially those who received unemployment benefits, for lacking a sense of responsibility in taking care of themselves. Long-term unemployment was often perceived as a result of indolence or unrealistic aspiration, on the assumption that most people who are healthy and sincere were able to help themselves through the market mechanism of work. Although they were relatively few in number, some participants even claimed that people who demanded government welfare benefits should be blamed for their egoistic and traitorous act that impeded economic growth and national security. They often justified their preferences for strong selectivism by arguing that, given the limited government budget, an increase in welfare provision equated to a decrease in government capability to promote economic growth that would eventually bring prosperity and security to everyone in the country. Such negative feelings were particularly strong regarding unemployment benefits which was considered to promote moral hazard by encouraging people to be dependent on social welfare benefits (Participant 10, 12, 15, 18, 19, 20, 23, 24, 25).

It is worth noting that participants did not criticise social welfare itself, but welfare benefits paid to people who are capable of working. In many cases explored in this study, those who received unemployment benefits were more likely to be a target of blame, compared to beneficiaries of other welfare benefits or services. Considering that they were all labour market outsiders who were more likely to experience unwanted unemployment, such conservative attitudes toward unemployment benefits might have reflected the strong influence of normative ideas on the participants' welfare attitudes. The following quote shows that participant 25 associated her negative perception of social welfare beneficiaries with nonworkingness and their dependency without contribution.

> I hate it when people are happy with social welfare obtained without cost. I do not understand why some people claim social welfare. If they are healthy, they can do anything to make a living. I believe that people ought to contribute to the country by working and paying taxes, not relying on it. (Participant 25)

As mentioned above, this view defines deserving welfare beneficiaries as specific groups of people who can prove they are in hopeless and unavoidable circumstances. However, sharing such an attitude did not necessarily mean the participants were reluctant to help others or were wholly self-interested. In tandem with the selective compassion discussed in the previous chapter, many participants called for a more active role from the government in assisting deserving people, in particular those with serious illnesses or disabilities. They expressed a sense of emotional connection with such people, and voiced the normative idea that people should not have to live in poverty or die without receiving adequate medical treatment. They often added that they were willing to pay more taxes or give up their share of social welfare to maximise the benefits provided to deserving people (Participant 8, 20, 22). It is nevertheless worth noting that even those who felt sympathy for the poor tended to emphasise the importance of state welfare as the last resort, rather than calling for universal provision of welfare services based on social rights. They still held the residual view of social welfare as a safety net confined to the deserving poor, who are unable to address their problems through their efforts or family assistance. Relating to Van Oorschot (2000), such cases indicate that 'control over the needy situation' and 'level of need (often after family assistance if applicable)' were used as the dominant criteria when participants considered who were deserving of state assistance. According to the observations from the interviews, it is still inconclusive how the residual view of social welfare influences the degree of support for the welfare state in general or individual social policies. On the one hand, the view could diminish demand for social policy, motivating the individual to refrain from seeking personal material interest with social welfare.

On the other hand, the view could also raise support for social policy, appealing to the sympathy for the deserving poor. Given the prevalence and the normative aspect of the residual view of social welfare in Korea, however, it is probable that selectivism is more easily justified as a standard than, and therefore preferred to, universalism.

A noticeable exception is supporting families with children. While preferring the marginalist model of social welfare, participants were almost invariably in favour of support for families with children, with explicit/implicit approval of universal provision or at least much wider in beneficiary coverage. As explored in the previous chapter, most participants tended to consider low birth-rates to be a serious obstacle to economic growth and national security, which individuals and families were unable to solve. They, therefore, claimed that the government should actively step in through social policy, in order to reverse the trend for the sake of national prosperity. Some participants uninvolved in child-rearing even recognised the low birth-rate issue as a more pressing and important than their personal problems. This could be understood as suggesting that in the context of a rapidly aging population, which was widely perceived as a cause of national crisis, participants happened to regard social welfare for families with children not only as a social policy, but also as an economic policy to strengthen the national economy, and therefore gave strong support. A quote by participant 12 shows that support for families with children is seen as a common good, while support for the unemployed is seen as a targeted policy for specific groups.

> I think the trend in low birth-rates is a serious social issue, which threatens the national economy and security, while unemployment is basically a personal issue. The state should intervene to stop population aging and decline. (Participant 12)

In sum, it is still a question whether the dominant ideas of a desirable society affect the levels of support for social policy, but it seems reasonable to say that such normative ideas tend to promote individuals' preferences for selectivism, with the exception of support for families with children.

Discussion (I): Contradiction between Family Interest and Social Norms Emphasising Self-reliance and Family Responsibility

The previous chapter argues that the motives behind the participants' adherence to family welfare culture can be explained by various institutional approaches, including normative, rational choice, and sociological institutionalism. However, this chapter reveals that participants tended to have a rational decision-making approach to problem-solving, once a problem is recognised based on their given family welfare. Family-centred problem recognition and subsequent family-centred social policy evaluation clearly involve individuals' instrumental calculation for maximising their material interest under given family identities: participants showed strategic approaches to social policies for the sake of maximum utility of the family in consideration of their family economy.

Such a calculous approach to social policy at the stage of shaping preference seems to be consistent with rational choice and sociological institutionalism, both of which provide explanations for individuals seeking material interest within an institution. However, it could be incompatible with normative institutionalism, in that participants' preferences for a specific type of social policy could be considered contradictory to social norms emphasising self-reliance and family responsibility. As previously explored, such family-related social norms play a role as an important ideational basis of family welfare and also are used to assess the

welfare deservingness of particular groups of individuals in need. Considering the strict welfare deservingness criteria shared by participants, the majority of the participants were not eligible for social benefits in the sense that they were unlikely to suffer poverty thanks to family welfare and their work capabilities. As described above, however, these participants were inclined to be in favour of social policy supplementing household expenditure if they found it beneficial to their household economy.

One may attribute the discrepancy between the normative ideas to which participants subscribed and their final preferences for social policy to dominance of self-interested human nature over the logic of appropriateness: that is, participants might have encountered inner conflicts between personal interest and family values, but have eventually arrived at the policy preferences aiming to shift their family responsibility onto the state. If this is the case, it can be speculated that those from middle-income families are more likely to suffer such inner conflict, relative to those from low-income families since they are unlikely to be perceived as deserving welfare benefits due to their low levels of neediness. In this regard, however, even participants from middle-income families tended to justify their preference especially for a range of subsidies for families by arguing that without social welfare that supplements the family income, their family welfare, namely intra-family transfer and services, would soon be unsustainable. In other words, they wanted social policies to help them maintain the existing family welfare, not desiring to flee from that family responsibility. They perceived that the main responsibility for income still firmly rests with individuals and families, but given the situation that it was increasingly difficult for standard families to manage a family economy due to skyrocketing prices and stagnant household income, the government could assist them by subsidising household expenses with cash transfer or offering a range of essential services at competitive prices.

The finding that participants with a residual view of social welfare were also inclined to consider social welfare as a supplement to family welfare could be better understood in the context of standard families under stress in Korea. As discussed in Chapter 4, the conventional concept of family welfare in Korea worked well with the rapid economic growth from the 1960s to 1990s, which provided strong job security and rising incomes for male breadwinners. However, family welfare in the post-industrial society is becoming less capable of protecting its members from social risks due to changes in family structure, less employment protection, and the increase in the cost of living, while still being pressured by existing family-related norms, values and cultural expectations. In this context, social policy preferences of participants can be considered as individuals' desire to expand the welfare capability of the family to a prior higher level, rather than the pursuit of protection against various social risks associated with individual actors.

The fact that participants narrowly accepted social welfare within the larger frame of family welfare does not necessarily mean that the rational choice is restricted with normative limits, since participants' low levels of preference for policies targeting the unemployed were not only consistent with social norms, but also with strategic calculations for utility maximisation given to family welfare. Rather, it can be reasonable to conclude that participants find justification for their pursuit of family interest by limiting the role of the government to supplementing the family income. In this regard, it is probable that the residual view of social welfare likely shaped the participants' general attitude towards the welfare state, but when it comes to preferences for individual social policies, they tended to consider the family economy. Such speculation seems to be consistent with the quantitative findings of chapter 5, which reveals that individuals may have dual attitudes towards social policy, experiencing inconsistency between how they felt about the welfare state in general and how they felt about individual

policies. With regard to the welfare state in general, individuals tend to be more motivated by ideological orientation than equivalised disposable household income: ideological orientation creates statistically significant impact across all three general welfare items, including individuals' preferences for redistribution, tax increase, and universalism, while equivalised disposable household income is found to make significant differences only in relation to individuals' preferences for universalism. When it comes to welfare attitudes toward each specific policy area, however, equivalised disposable household income plays a more dominant role than ideological inclination.

Discussion (II): Dominant Influence of Family Welfare and Prevailing Ideas of a Desirable Society on Social Policy Preferences

In light of the findings of chapter 6 and 7, it can be concluded that family-related and cultural contexts matter for social policy preferences of individuals, particularly female labour market outsiders. Family welfare motivated a large proportion of the participants to have family-oriented problem recognition by changing both their actual and ideal states, and also led them to evaluate social policy from the perspective of family economy. In addition, social norms and values that emphasise self-reliance and family responsibility provided not only the fundamental justification for the family welfare culture, but also the normative model of a desirable society that strongly encourages participants to have residual views of social welfare. As a result, family welfare and family-related social norms in Korea could significantly reduce the impact of individuals' socioeconomic and demographic characteristics on welfare attitudes, and therefore social policy preferences of female labour market outsiders could deviate from individualistic self-interest expectations in such contexts.

This may indicate that the social cleavage and conflict between female labour market outsiders and other groups of individuals with different socioeconomic or demographic characteristics on the issues of redistribution are less likely to be generated in Korea, relative to countries with individualist culture due to the dominant influences of family welfare and family-related social norms in Korea. Given that family welfare and family-related social norms in Korea are based on the traditional male breadwinner/female homemaker family model, it is rather likely that men and women, those in marital relationships in particular, have common interests about redistribution, regardless of their socioeconomic and demographic characteristics. Rather, a social cleavage could be generated between single female labour market outsiders and the others. Single female outsiders could be more supportive of a range of social welfare, relative to married female outsiders, as they are less likely to be benefit from intra-household transfer especially when there is no support from other family members such as parents. In other words, the link between individuals' socioeconomic/demographic characteristics and social policy preferences could be more conspicuous among single female labour market outsiders, which is a minority of the population.

Linking back to the question of whether the residual welfare state in Korea reflects the preferences of particularly excluded groups, such as female labour market outsiders, the answer could be positive. According to study findings, it can be argued that the Korean welfare state that has been particularly advantageous to male labour market insiders and families with children is likely to be supported by the majority of female labour market outsiders as well. It is worth noting that the cases of female labour market outsiders analysed in this study cannot be generalised to the whole female labour market outsider group in Korea, or the population as a whole since the qualitative work is not set up to generalise. However, the qualitative findings are meaningful in the sense that they suggest some particular processes that help shed new light

on the quantitative findings indicating that female labour market outsiders in Korea are not significantly different from the rest of the population in terms of social policy preferences.

What about the social policy preferences of male labour market outsiders, then? Would they also be in favour of the current welfare state too? Two possibilities can be discussed. First, male labour market outsiders could be more supportive of government actions compensating their labour market vulnerability, compared to male labour market insiders, even if they are married. In the sense that family welfare applies to both men and women, the link between male outsiders' labour market vulnerability and their social policy preferences could be also moderated to a certain extent. However, the degree to which social policy preferences of male outsiders are blurred or neutralised by their family welfare could be lower compared to the case of their female counterparts due to the strong emphasis on the gender division of labour in Korea which expects men to play a role as income-earners of the family. This may create some meaningful gap between male outsiders and male insiders in their views on social policy, making male outsiders more supportive of welfare provision, compared to male insiders. Second, it is also probable that male labour market outsiders seek transition to insiders, often through personal efforts or collective actions, rather than demanding more redistribution. This is because the level of income transfer, such as unemployment benefits, are generally insufficient to cover the living expenses of a standard household in Korea, and also because the benefit is paid for a limited period of time. If male labour market outsiders do not expect considerable welfare expansion in the near future, the effect of labour market status on welfare attitudes could possibly be insignificant for men. How social policy preferences of male labour market participants are shaped in Korea is still an empirical question, but the second scenario seems to be more consistent with the findings of the quantitative analysis in the chapter 5 which finds no support for the impact of the insider-outsider divide on welfare attitudes.

7.2. Conclusion

Following the analysis of individuals' problem recognition, further study has been carried out with regard to shaping preferred solutions. The key finding is that family welfare and prevailing ideas of a desirable society that shaped problem recognition of participants tended to continue to influence shaping preferred solutions. Firstly, family-oriented problem recognition of participants was likely to flow into family-centred social policy evaluation: participants in family welfare were inclined to assess individual social policies from the perspective of family economy, which eventually generates characteristic patterns of social policy preferences reflecting family interest. Those from high-income families were likely to be critical of social welfare, while those from low-income families had a tendency to be favourable. Those from middle-income families show dual attitudes: they tend to be conservative on social policies providing emergency help to people experiencing income loss (such as unemployment benefits), while being supportive of a range of social services that subsidise the beneficiaries with regard to regular or occasional family expenses. Secondly, the dominant ideas of a desirable society tended to motivate participants to support the residual model of the welfare state, serving as a moral standard emphasising self-sufficiency and family responsibility as well as criteria to assess deservingness of their own and also other people in need.

Family welfare and the ideas of a desirable society are complementary to each other, but there could be a potential contradiction between them in the sense that these two factors are characterised by two different motivations – the pursuit of family interest and compliance with social norms, respectively. In such cases, participants were disposed to prioritise the family interest over the adherence to the marginalist model of the welfare state. They tended to justify their preferences by emphasising the inevitability of their dependency on social welfare from the perspective of family economy, and also by limiting the role of social welfare to specific

supplements for their family welfare.

Overall, the findings of the qualitative analyses across chapter 6 and 7 indicate that family-related and cultural contexts, notably family welfare and prevailing ideas of a desirable society, may play a significant role in shaping social policy preferences of individuals, female labour market outsiders in particular. These institutional factors may lead women in the labour market outsider position to have preferences for/against social policy for the sake of family or society interest rather than their personal interest, by weakening the influences of individuals' socioeconomic and demographic characteristics on social policy preferences. This can be understood as contradicting the individualistic assumption that female labour market outsiders should be different from other groups of individuals with different socioeconomic and demographic characteristics in terms of social policy preferences. Given the findings, it is rather probable that they share common social policy preferences with others from similar family economy context, regardless of their gender and labour market status.

8. Conclusion

The welfare state expansion in Korea for the last two decades can be depicted as disproportionate development. On the one hand, social welfare in Korea has continuously expanded its role in supporting the elderly and families with dependent children. However, on the other hand, it has been relatively indifferent to those with higher levels of job insecurity (also known as labour market outsiders). From the perspective of rational choice theory, it can be argued that there are cleavages and conflicts between groups of individuals with different socioeconomic or demographic characteristics in terms of their social policy preferences, and the excluded groups, particularly labour market outsiders, have not managed to reflect their preferences in the welfare state. However, such an individualist assumption that demarcates winners and losers in the political games is brought into question by new institutionalism that highlights the impact of institution on individuals' preferences. Given the collectivist culture and distinct social and political contexts of Korea, it is still an empirical question whether the particularly excluded groups in Korea, such as female labour market outsiders, are clearly supportive of social policies targeting themselves while others are not. In order to answer the question, this thesis investigates how cultural factors shape individuals' preferences for social policy in Korea, paying particular attention to the preference formation of female labour market outsiders. The empirical analyses include both quantitative and qualitative research methods. The quantitative analysis tests the validity of explanatory variables (self-interest, ideological orientation, and informal welfare provision within a household) using individual-level data of '2013 Public Attitudes towards Welfare Policy Survey'. In light of quantitative analysis results, the qualitative analysis carries out an in-depth investigation into how family-related and cultural contexts shape social policy preferences of women in the labour market outsider position.

The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. In the first part, the chapter summarises the key research findings and discusses policy and academic implications. Next, it spells out the contribution to knowledge and also the limitations. Lastly, it discusses opportunities for future research.

8.1. Key Findings

Given the findings of the preceding analyses, this thesis argues that family welfare and prevailing ideas of a desirable society play an important role in shaping social policy preference of individuals in Korea, particularly for female labour market outsiders. Family welfare culture and the ideas of a desirable society define not only what is considered 'appropriate' but also 'rational' in a given circumstance, which eventually affects both individuals' problem recognition and shaping of preferred solutions. These findings challenge the assumption of atomised self-interested individuals and the accompanying causal mechanism that connects individual socioeconomic and demographic characteristics with personal preferences for social policy, finding support for a range of branches of new-institutionalism.

Family Welfare

The quantitative analysis presents that in Korea, equivalised disposable household income, which represents the degree of intra-household transfer per person, is found to play a significant role, showing a negative relationship with individuals' support for each welfare policies (except for support for the unemployed). In contrast, most of the self-interest variables appear not to be meaningful predictors of welfare attitudes. Of such individual-level self-interest variables, only age comes up to the self-interest-based expectations, implying that individuals in Korea

tend to seek self-interest based on their stage in the life-cycle, notably parenting and old-age. Gender matters for individuals' social policy preferences too, but tends to go against the general expectation that women are more supportive of social policy. Given the highly limited impact of individual-level self-interest variables, equivalised disposable household income having impact on welfare attitudes of individuals indicates the informal welfare within a household, (or a family) may play a more significant role than individuals' socioeconomic characteristics in forming welfare attitudes.

Such results are supported by the findings of the following qualitative analysis. The qualitative analysis reveals that family welfare in which the members protect each other against various social risks appears to be the key determinant of welfare attitudes. Family welfare appeared to motivate women in the labour market outsider position to recognise problems from the perspective of their family economy, and therefore lead them to evaluate social policy for the sake of family interest. In this process, participants were inclined to show distinct patterns of social policy preferences in accordance with the levels of their family income. Those from high-income families tended to be the least supportive of social welfare, while those from low-income families tended to be the most supportive, regardless of types of welfare programmes. The preference patterns of those from middle-income families were often eclectic. On the one hand, they usually showed low levels of support for social assistance programmes (unemployment benefits in particular) providing selective financial support for people experiencing temporary income loss, not least because they did not find such policies serviceable to them thanks to their decent family welfare. On the other hand, they showed high levels of support for a range of social policies which in effect top-up the family income by subsidising regular or occasional family expenses, often on the basis of universal provision. Such family-oriented welfare attitudes were prevailing among most participants but tended to

be stronger among the married which is consistent with the interaction effects of gender and having dependent children found in the quantitative analysis.

The finding that even female labour market outsiders could be conservative on social policies providing protection against labour market risks, while being supportive of policies supplementing family economy shows that family welfare is likely to be considered as a taken-for-granted part of life when female labour market outsiders make an instrumental calculation of their personal wellbeing in relation to social policy. In addition, we may speculate that the social cleavage structure in Korea could be different from what is expected by the individualist self-interest-based assumptions. Considering the substantial impact of family welfare, it is probable that female labour market outsiders share similar preferences for social policy even with their counterparts, such as male labour market insiders, if they are in similar family economic contexts.

Prevailing Ideas of a Desirable Society

Prevailing ideas of a desirable society are another key institutional factor that matters in individuals' social policy preferences. The qualitative analysis reveals that dominant ideas, such as selective compassion for the deserving poor and pro-developmental view, tended to extend one's problem recognition to unrelated others suffering economic hardships, or economic issues facing the nation. However, at the same time, these ideas appeared to promote residual views of social welfare among the participants, by defining social welfare as a last resort for specific groups of the deserving poor, often those in absolute poverty without assistance from family, or as a sort of policy tool for economic growth. This finding can be particularly associated with normative institutionalism, in that, the social norms that emphasise

self-sufficiency and family responsibility may constrain individuals to a residual view of social welfare by providing a range of normative criteria which individuals use to assess others' welfare deservingness as well as their own.

Family welfare and the residual view of social welfare generally work as a pair, in that, both complement each other but may possibly contradict each other, especially in cases where a residual view of social welfare may conflict with one's endeavour to maximise their family utility through social welfare. However, the cases explored in this study reveal that most research participants who belong to such cases tended to well justify their pursuit of economic interest through social policy by defining the role of the welfare state as a subordinate position to family welfare. This may explain the quantitative finding that individuals may have dual, inconsistent views on social policy, with regard to how they feel about social welfare in general and how they feel about individual social policy. It is probable that individuals' general attitudes towards the welfare state can be more influenced by the normative ideas of a desirable society, while their preferences for individual policies can be more affected by family-oriented problem recognition and social policy evaluation.

8.2. Implications

Based on these findings, we may consider some policy and academic implications.

Impacts of Family Welfare and the Prevailing Ideas of a Desirable Society on the Welfare State in Korea

The finding that the social cleavage structure in Korea could be different from those in more

individualistic societies may explain why the welfare state in Korea has been particularly indifferent to certain social groups, notably labour market outsiders, despite the democratisation and significant increase in precarious workers, especially among women. If female labour market outsiders, who are probably the most disadvantaged in both the labour market and the welfare state in Korea, are similar to the rest of the population in terms of social policy preferences, vote-seeking policy-makers might lose incentives to propose social policies that protect labour market outsiders against certain associated social risks.

The prevailing ideas of a desirable society may also matter for electoral politics. As discussed above, the cultural norms and values that emphasise self-reliance and family responsibility provide justification for and reinforce the conventional small (residual) welfare state and big family welfare model. They tend to encourage individuals to seek protection by climbing up the socioeconomic ladder or by maintaining/extending existing family welfare or establishing new ones, often through marriage with those with higher socioeconomic status. This may decrease the level of public support for certain types of social policy, especially the range of social assistance programmes for labour market outsiders. On the other hand, the pro-developmental logic may increase the level of public support for families with dependent children, which are considered to help reverse the trend in low fertility.

In this regard, it can be argued that family welfare and the prevailing ideas of a desirable society are likely to play a role in maintaining/reinforcing the residual characteristics of the welfare state in Korea in terms of social protection for those who are vulnerable to employment instability. However, at the same time, these factors may also promote the public support for social policies that provide services or subsidies for families, especially for those with dependent children, in response to the weakening welfare function of the family in Korea. In the long-run, moreover, such a tendency may lead to distinctive characteristics of the welfare

state in Korea, that is, a residual welfare system combined with universal social welfare supplementing the family economy.

Of course, such a prospect is based on the assumption that the traditional family-related culture in Korea will persist. If the decline of the Confucian family model further continues due to changes in family structure - such as the increase in divorce, lone parenthood, and single-person households -, however, the way in which individuals recognise problems and estimate social policy would change, and therefore, social policy preferences of individuals in Korea could shape into more individualistic ways.

Social Protection for Labour Market Outsiders

As suggested by the findings on family welfare in Korea, being excluded from social welfare does not necessarily mean that people are left in miserable circumstances without any protection. Even female labour market outsiders who are often excluded from both employment protection and social welfare may enjoy a decent level of protection and well-being thanks to family assistance. This study finds that women engaged in precarious work may not recognise job instability as a problem, and therefore have positive views on such a highly residual model of social welfare, especially when they are able to locate sources of assistance within family welfare networks.

However, this finding may also equate that such excluded groups could be directly exposed to labour market risks without any decent protection unless they belong to family welfare networks or have family welfare with sufficient financial capability. Moreover, it should be noted that we are observing changes in family structures, such as steady growth of single-person households, single parenthood, cohabitation, and same-sex families, all of which may

undermine the traditional model of family welfare in Korea and therefore challenge the welfare state. In this regard, more active roles and generous provision of social welfare are required to protect those who are not covered by both family and social welfare. Given that social insurance schemes usually do not fit the labour market outsider position, the role of social assistance and services, especially tax-funded unemployment benefits, seems to be of particular importance in protecting excluded groups against a range of social risks.

What may concern policy-makers in this regard could be public attitudes. Considering the social cleavage structure in Korea discussed above, it could be difficult for social policies targeting labour market outsiders to gain popular public support in the near future. Due to the social norms highlighting self-sufficiency and family responsibility, people in general could be critical of any efforts to introduce tax-funded social benefits, unemployment benefits in particular, which are likely considered to promote dependency on social welfare among ′irresponsible, selfish people′.

In order to address this issue, especially in relation to unemployment benefits, policy-makers may consider the transition to a two-pillar-system combining a contributory, earnings-related, unemployment benefit scheme with a universal, flat-rate, unemployment benefit system for all the unemployed. Such a system may appeal to the majority of the population, especially from low-income to middle-income families, in the sense that the universal unemployment benefits support not only those in the labour market outsider position, but also their families that have assisted the outsiders within their family welfare. Also, such a two-pillar system may be free of criticism that unemployment benefits may promote moral hazard because the contributory earnings-related benefit still gives incentives to work for the recipients.

Promoting Fertility in Korea

As described in the qualitative chapters, the services and transfers within a family often go beyond the boundary of a household and may cover multiple generations. Such big family welfare coupled with small welfare state means that the financial burden that primary earners of a family in Korea should bear can be much heavier than that of earners in countries with more generous social welfare provision. If their incomes are sufficient to cover the whole family, family welfare may function well: otherwise, it is difficult to expect the quality provision of services and transfer within the family. This is particularly the case for the majority of families in Korea which face sluggish economic growth and stagnating incomes.

Such a situation may explain the super-low birth rates in Korea (and other East Asian societies). Given the high expense of family welfare, it is probable that parents in a standard family in Korea find it challenging to afford the cost of raising more than one child. As described in the qualitative chapters, those who are of working age in Korea often bear the double burden of raising a child and supporting their elderly parents. In such cases, the financial burden of the latter could be their reason for hesitating to have more children. If so, the decline in new-borns in Korea would not be reversed only by one or two specific policies targeting families with children, such as policies that enable reconciliation of family and work life, or child benefit. The problem could be addressed when the state actively expands its role in providing a wide range of services and transfers for which the family has been solely responsible.

Importance of Culture in Understanding Social Policy Preference Formation

New institutionalist explanations for the effects of family welfare and prevailing ideas of a desirable society on social policy preferences indicate that these informal institutions are likely

to have causal impacts on social policy preferences of individuals, especially female labour market outsiders in Korea, based on their durability and capability to increase the regularity of human behaviour. Such informal institutions may mediate rational choice or ideological orientation of individuals and therefore may lead to distinct social policy preferences. In this regard, it can be argued that the effects of individual-level self-interest variables (namely, socioeconomic and demographic characteristics) or ideological orientation on social policy preferences should not be generalised without consideration of institutions, especially culture, of a given society. Findings of a study that examines the link between individual-level variables and welfare attitudes in one society may only apply to another with a similar institutional background. Inappropriate application of findings of a study focused on one region to another could lead to wrong interpretation or prediction.

8.3. Contributions to Knowledge

The thesis contributes to the scholarship of social policy preference formation in the following ways. Firstly, the thesis contributes to knowledge by shifting scholarly attention to Korea. Previous studies on individuals' welfare attitudes are characterised by high dependency on data from Western countries, almost unconcerned with non-Western countries, especially East Asian societies, including Korea. According to new institutionalism, the existing theories built upon Western cases were expected to be limited in providing an adequate explanation for social policy preference formation in Korea due to the different social and cultural contexts. In this regard, the thesis makes an empirical contribution to knowledge by testing existing theories with data from Korea, and also by identifying new explanatory variables, namely family welfare and prevailing ideas of a desirable society, and the way they work in shaping

individuals' social policy preferences.

Secondly, the thesis theorises social policy preference formation in Korea through new institutionalism that explains how institutions affect individuals and society. This permits theoretical linkages between institutions and welfare attitudes of individuals in Korea and its accompanying rationale. This also provides in-depth explanations of how family welfare and prevailing ideas of a desirable society shape social policy preferences of individuals, female labour market outsiders in particular. Such theoretical contribution could be relevant not only to social policy preference formation in Korea, but also to those in other countries where the family plays an important role in welfare provision (e.g. other East Asian societies, countries in Latin America and Southern Europe). Furthermore, the way Confucian values constrain individuals to comply with family obligation and self-reliance may also provide insight into the role of religions in social preference formation in other regions (e.g. Catholicism in Europe).

Lastly, the thesis makes a methodological contribution by employing the mixed-methods approach. Previous studies on individuals' social policy preferences tend to attach weight to quantitative research. On the one hand, the quantitative approach has particular strength in examining statistical differences between different socioeconomic or demographic groups or between countries with different cultural backgrounds. On the other hand, the method lacks the capability to generate unexpected findings as well as the capability to capture non-quantitative data. By combining quantitative and qualitative approaches, the thesis takes advantage of these strengths of qualitative research. The qualitative analysis of the thesis enabled a much more detailed investigation into the process through which individuals arrive at certain policy preferences, and therefore have an in-depth understanding of how cultural factors shape individuals' social policy preferences, with a particular focus on two stages of the decision-making process: problem recognition and shaping preferred solutions. This enhances the

quality of the thesis in the two following ways. Firstly, the two different methods complement each other. Specifically, the quantitative results are better interpreted with the qualitative findings. The quantitative analysis helps us ascertain relationships between independent and dependent variables, but is limited in providing information beyond what is encoded in a variable by itself. The qualitative research interrogates those relationships and provides detailed explanations of what is discovered by the quantitative analysis. The qualitative findings also earn more credits thanks to the quantitative analysis that provides corroborating evidence. Secondly, mixing two different research methods yields a more meaningful and comprehensive interpretation. By comparing quantitative and qualitative findings, we may arrive at the modest generalisation of cases of interviewed female labour market outsiders to the female labour market outsider population as a whole, which eventually enhances our understanding of the social cleavage structure in Korea.

8.4. Limitations

Although the thesis yields meaningful findings in terms of social policy preference formation in Korea, it is subject to some limitations.

Age and Generation Problem

The effects of age are interpreted throughout the quantitative analysis as individuals' pursuit of self-interest based on their stages of life-cycle, but the effects of age may also reflect generational (cohort-specific) characteristics. For instance, older people, who were socialised during the authoritarian regime, could be more oriented towards collectivist views about society, prioritising values and goals of society over their personal interests. Given the age variable of the one-time survey used for the analysis, however, it is not possible to create a clear

demarcation between generational differences and individuals' pursuit of personal interest.

Limited Household Unit of the Survey in East Asian Context

As described in the qualitative chapters, family welfare networks in Korea often include multiple households and generations bound with obligation for kin. However, the individual survey hardly reflects such a context, limited to capturing individual or household data. As a result, in the quantitative analysis, the degree of family welfare was operationalised as equivalised disposable household income, which is the minimum unit of family welfare. This is beyond the capability of the thesis, but if more precise measurements of the level of family welfare are obtained for future research, it will yield a better understanding of the impact of family welfare on individuals' attitudes towards social policy.

The Time Limitation of the Survey Data

The quantitative analysis only covers the survey data collected in 2013 in consideration of the poor-quality data collected in the earlier years. This could raise a question about bias in the sense that public opinions of social policy in a given year could be affected by certain nationwide events or major political or economic issues. Thanks to the mixed-methods element of the study, however, some of this issue is mitigated: the data collection for the qualitative research was carried out in 2016, and period-specific effects on welfare attitudes could be identified through the in-depth qualitative investigation.

Limited Sampling of the Qualitative Analysis

In the light of quantitative analysis, qualitative research deliberately limited research participants only to female labour market outsiders, since they turn out to be significantly deviated from the expectations of the self-interest theory in terms of their social policy preferences, despite the fact that they are particularly excluded from the social welfare system in Korea. Also, the qualitative analysis does not sample those aged 65 or over included in the quantitative analysis, since the elderly population are likely to be supported by either/both family or/and social welfare, and therefore do not fit the purpose of the sampling. However, such a purposeful selection of participants could be criticised for missing meaningful information about other groups of individuals with different socioeconomic or demographic characteristics. In this regard, the mixed-methods elements of the study address the issue to some extent by covering various individual-level socioeconomic and demographic variables.

8.5. Opportunities for Future Research

The theoretical insight gained from the in-depth exploration of preference formation in Korea suggests some areas of future research. First, we may contribute to knowledge by applying the overall research design of the thesis, qualitative analysis in particular, to the investigation of social policy preference of other socioeconomic groups. Given the quantitative results implying the significant role of the social context or informal institutions in shaping individuals' welfare attitudes in Korea, it is probable that family welfare and family-related social norms and values apply not only to female labour market outsiders, but also to the majority of the population in Korea. By exploring the social policy preference formation of individuals with different socioeconomic characteristics, we may gain a more comprehensive understanding of social policy preference formation as well as social cleavage structure in Korea. Second, the role of

the interaction between gender, labour market status, and marital status in shaping welfare attitudes could be further investigated by future research. Last, the distinguishing impact of cultural and ideational factors in East Asia can be further examined by carrying out a comparative analysis including Korea and other East Asian countries such as Japan, Taiwan, Hongkong and Singapore, and also another analysis including both East Asian countries and their Western counterparts. These analyses would tell us whether East Asian societies are all characterised by culture and ideas emphasising the role of the family in the provision of welfare, and also whether they all differ from Western countries.

References

Andreß, H., and Thorsten, H., 2001, 'Four Worlds of Welfare State Attitudes?: A Comparison of Germany, Norway, and the United States', European Sociological Review, Vol. 17., No. 4, pp. 337-356.

Babbie, Earl R., 2007, *The Practice of Social Research*, 11th Edition, transl. Ko, Sungho, Kwangki Kim, Sangwook Kim, Yonggab Moon, Suhong Min, Hongjun Yu, Sungyong Lee, Junghwan Lee, Juno Jang, Kisun Jung, and Taein Jung, Seoul: Cengage Learning Korea Ltd.

Baumol, William J., 1967, 'The Macroeconomics of Unbalanced Growth', *American Economic Review*, 52(3), pp. 415-26

Blekesaune, M., & Quadagno, J., 2003, 'Public Attitudes towards Welfare State Policies: A Comparative Analysis of 24 Nations'. *European Sociological Review*, 19, pp. 415-427.

Bonoli, Giuliano, 2006, 'New Social Risks and the Politics of Post-industrial Social Policies', in Klaus Armingeon and Giuliano Bonoli (eds.), *The Politics of Post-industrial Welfare States: Adapting Post-war Social Policies to New Social Risks*, Oxon: Routledge.

Bonoli, Giuliano, and Silja, Häusemann, 2009, 'Who Wants What from the Welfare State?', *European Societies*, 11:2, pp. 211-232

Boyatzis, R. E. (1998). *Transforming Qualitative Information: Thematic Analysis and Code Development*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

Braun, V. and Clarke, V., 2006, 'Using Thematic Analysis in Psychology', *Qualitative Research in Psychology*, 3 (2). pp. 77-101.

Breznau, Nate, 2010, 'Economic Equality and Social Welfare: Policy Preferences in Five Nations', *Journal of Public Opinion Research*. Vol. 22, No. 4, pp. 458-484.

Bruner II, G. C., and Richard J. Pomazal, 1988, 'Problem Recognition: the Crucial First State of the Consumer Decision Process'. *The Journal of Services Marketing*, Vol. 2. No. 3. Summer, 1998

Burgoon, Brian, and Fabian Dekker, 2010, 'Flexible Employment, Economic Insecurity and Social Policy Preferences in Europe', *Journal of European Social Policy*, Vol. 20(2), pp. 126-141

Campos, Jose Edgardo, and Hilton L. Root, 1996, *The Key to the Asian Miracle: Making Share Growth Credible*. Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution.

Chai, Goo-Mook, 2011, 'A Comparison of Unemployment Benefit Systems by Type in OECD Countries', *한국사회학(Hankook Sahwehak)*, Vol. 45 (1), pp. 1-36.

Cho, Heeyoen, 2010, *Mobilized Modernization*, Seoul: Hunamitas.

Choi, Jangjip, 2010, *Democracy after Democratisation: Conservative Origin of Democracy in Korea and its Crisis*, Seoul: Humanitasbooks. (Title translated from Korean into English).

Choi, Hyomi., Kim, Gilsuk., Lee, Dongha., and Lim, Junbum. 2016, 'An Estimation of Childcare and Education Expenses (IV)', 2016-28, Korea Institute of Child Care and Education.

Chung, Mookwon, 2002, 'An Analysis of the Main Characteristics of the Kim Dae-Jung Government's Welfare Reforms: With a Focus on the Welfare Regime Types', *Journal of Critical Social Welfare*. Vol. 11. pp. 109-161.

Chung, Mookwon, 2007, 'The Historical Foundation of the Developmental Production and Welfare Regimes in Korea', *Korean Social Policy Review*, Vol. 14.

Coughlin, R.M., 1980, *Ideology, Public Opinion and Welfare Policy: Attitudes towards Taxes and Spending in Industrial Societies*, Institute of International Studies, Research Series No. 42, Berkeley, CA: University of California.

Creswell, J. W., & Plano Clark, V. L., 2007, *Designing and Conducting Mixed Methods Research*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

Cusack, Thomas, Torben Iversen, and Philipp Rehm, 2005, 'Risks at Work: the Demand and Supply Sides of Government Redistribution', Discussion Paper SP II 2005 – 15, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin, 2005.

Deway, John, 1910, *How We Think*. Boston: D. C. Health and Company

Doner, Richard F., Bryan K. Ritchie, and Slater Dan, 2005, 'Systemic Vulnerability and the Origins of Developmental States: Northeast and Southeast Asia in Comparative Perspective', *International Organization*, 59(2), pp. 327-61.

Downs, Anthony, 1957, *An Economic Theory of Democracy*. New York: Rinehart

Ebbinghaus, Bernhard, and Elias Naumann, 2018, 'The Popularity of Pension and Unemployment Policies Revisited: The Erosion of Public Support in Britain and Germany', in Ebbinghaus, Bernhard, and Elias Naumann (eds.), *Welfare State Reforms Seen From Below: Comparing Public Attitudes and Organized Interests in Britain and Germany*, Palgrave Macmillan

Esping-Andersen, Gøsta, 1990, *The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism*. Cambridge, MA: Polity Press.

Fioretos, Orfeo., Tulia G. Falleti, and Adam Sheingate, 2016, 'Historical Institutionalism in Political Science', in Fioretos, Orfeo., Tulia G. Falleti, and Adam Sheingate (eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Historical Institutionalism*, Oxford University Press.

Fleckenstein, T., & Lee, S. C., 2017a, 'Democratization, Post-industrialization, and East Asian Welfare Capitalism: The Politics of Welfare State Reform in Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan', *Journal of International and Comparative Social Policy*, Volume 33, Issue 1., pp. 26-54

Fleckenstein, T., & Lee, S. C., 2017b, 'The Politics of Labor Reform in Coordinated Welfare Capitalism: Comparing Sweden, Germany, and South Korea', *World Politics*, 69(1), pp. 144-183

Fong, C., 2001, 'Social Preferences, Self-interest, and the Demand for Redistribution', *Journal of Public Economics*, 82, pp. 225-246.

The Politics of Investing in Families: Comparing Family Policy Expansion in Japan and South Korea', *Social Politics*, 24(1), pp. 1-28.

Garrett, Geoffrey, 1998, 'Global Markets and National Politics: Collision Course or Virtuous Circle?'. *International Organization*, 52(4), pp. 787-824.

Gelo, O., Braakmann, D., & Benetka, G., 2008, 'Quantitative and Qualitative Research: Beyond the Debate', *Integrative Psychological & Behavioural Science*, 42, pp.

266-290

Integrative Psychological & Behavioral Science, 42, pp. 266-290.

Genschel, Phillip, 2002, 'Globalization, Tax Competition and the Welfare State', *Politics and Society*, 30(2), pp. 245~275.

Goodman, Roger, and Gordon White, 1998, 'Welfare Orientalism and the Search for and East Asian Welfare Model', in Roger Goodman, Gordon White, and Huck-ju Kwon (eds.), *The East Asian Welfare Model: Welfare Orientalism and the State*. London: Routledge.

Goodman, Roger, and Ito Peng, 1996, 'East Asian Welfare States', in Gøsta Esping-Anderson (eds), Welfare States in Transition, London: Sage.

Gough, I. 2000. 'Welfare Regimes in East Asia and Europe: Comparisons and Lessons'. In Annual World Bank Conference on Development Economics. Paris.

Gough, Ian, 2001, 'Globalization and Regional Welfare Regions: The East Asian case'. *Global Social Policy*, 1(2), pp. 163-189.

Greene, J. C, 2007, *Mixed Methods in Social Inquiry*. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.

Guillaud, Elvire, and Paul Marx, 2013, 'Preferences for Employment Protection and the Insider-Outsider Divide', IZA Discussion Paper, No. 7569, August 2013.

Hall, P. A. 1986, *Governing the Economy: The Politics of State Intervention in Britain and France.* New York: Oxford University Press

Hall, P. A. and R. R. Taylor, 1996, 'Political Science and the Three New Institutionalism', Political Studies. 1996; XLIV, pp. 936-957.

Hay, Colin and Daniel Wincott, 2012, *The Political Economy of European Welfare Capitalism*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Holiday, Ian, 2000, 'Productivist Welfare Capitalism: Social Policy in East Asia', *Political Studies*, 48, pp. 706-23.

Holiday, Ian, 2005, 'East Asian Social Policy in the Wake of the Financial Crisis: Farewell to Productivism?', *Policy and Politics*, 33, pp. 145-162

Hong, Kyung-zoon, and Hokeun Song, 2003, ‘Continuity and Change in Korean Welfare Regime: After 1990’, *Korean Journal of Social Welfare*, Vol. 55, 2003. 11. pp. 205-230.

Hong, Kyung-Zoon, and Sahyun Kim, 2018, 'Divided Working People: Focusing on Risk Status and Welfare Attitude in Korean', *Social Welfare Policy*, Vol. 45, No. 2, pp. 67-94

Häusemann, Silja, and Hanna Schwander, 2011, ‘Who Are the Outsiders and What Do They Want? Welfare State Preferences in Dualized Societies’, *Les Cahiers européens de Sciences Po* - n° 01/2011

Hyun, Oye-sung, 2013, ‘A Study on the Recent Welfare Controversy and Future Orientation of Korean Welfare State’, Journal of Social Science Research, Vol. 22, pp. 256-280.

Immergut, E. M., 1998, ‘The Theoretical Core of the New Institutionalism’ *Politics & Society,* 26(1), pp. 5-34.

Inglehart, R., 1977, *The Silent Revolution: Changing Values and Political Styles among Western Publics*. Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ.

Iversen, Torben, and David Soskice, 2001, ‘An Asset Theory of Social Policy Preferences’, *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. 95, No. 4, pp. 875-893.

Jeong, Han-beom, 2013, ‘The Impact of Economic Globalization and Political Development on the Welfare System in Korea: From Efficiency to Compensation’. *Journal of Northeast Asia Research*, Vol. 28 (1), pp. 189-223.

Ji, Juhyung, 2013, *The Origin and Formation of Neo-liberalism in Korea*, Seoul: Checsaesang (Title Translated from Korean to English)

Jones, Catherine, 1990, ‘Hongkong, Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan: Oikonomic Welfare States’, *Government and Opposition,* 25. Autumn, pp. 446-62.

Jones, Catherine, 1993, ‘The Pacific Challenge: Confucian Welfare State’, in C. Jones (ed.), *New Perspectives on the Welfare State in Europe*, London: Routledge

Joo, Eun-sun, 2009, ‘The Development of Social Welfare Policy since Economic Crisis: Focus on Relationship of Welfare and Labor’, *Journal of Critical Social Welfare*, Vol. 28.

2009.8, pp. 143-185.

Joo, Eun-sun and Jung-mi Beak, 'Class, Public Welfare Experience and Welfare Attitudes in Korea, *Korea Journal of Social Welfare Studies*, 34. pp. 203-225.

Jung, Sung-Gug, 2013, 'Labour Market Flexibility and Unemployment Benefits Homogenization: A Comparative Study of Netherlands, Germany and France', *Social Welfare Policy*, Vol. 40 (4), pp. 293-318.

Kaltenthaler, Karl C., and Stephan J. Ceccoli, 2008, 'Explaining Patterns of Support for the Provision of Citizen Welfare', *Journal of European Public Policy*, 15:7 October 2008, pp. 1041-1068

Kang, Hyegyu, 2008, 'Employment Policy in the Social Service Sector' *Forum of Health and Welfare.* 10, pp. 34-54. (Title translated from Korean to English).

Kim, Byungseop, 2008, *Reducing Bias and Error: The Logics and Techniques of Social Research*, Paju: Bobmunsa.

Kim, Kyo-Seong, and Seong-Wook Kim, 2012, 'Quantitative Welfare Expansion and Systemic Retrenchment: An Evolution of Welfare Policy in the MB Administration', Social Welfare Policy, Vol. 39, No. 3, pp. 117-149.

Kim, Sunghee, 2009, 'A Study on the Alternatives for the Precarious Working Populations about the Enhancement of the Employment Insurance System and the Newly Introduction of the Employment Assistance System', *Studies of Social Security Law*, 2009. 6, pp. 81-121.

Kim, Yeonmyung (eds.), 2002, *Debates on the Characteristics of Korean Welfare State I*, Seoul: Ingankwa Bokji. (Title translated from Korean to English)

Kim, Yeonmyung, 2008, ''A Feast of Languages' Roh Moo Hyun Government's Welfare Discourse, Wounded 'Progressive Welfare'', *Shin Dong-A*. Vol. 581. 2008. 2. (Title translated from Korean to English)

Kim, Yeonmyung (eds.), 2009, Social Investment and the Future of Social Policy in Korea: Debate on the Validity and Feasibility of Social Investment Perspective. Seoul: Nanumei Jip.

Kim, Young-soon, 2009, ‘The Assessment of the Social Welfare Policies in Roh Moo-hyun Government: Focusing on the Formation of the Institutional and Political Bases for the Welfare State’, *Economy and Society*, Vol. 82. pp. 161-185. (Title translated from Korean to English)

Kim, Young-soon, 2013, ‘Who Makes What Kind of Welfare State?: The Implications of the Developmental Process of the West European Welfare States for the Discussion of Universalism in Korea’, *Economy and Society*, Vol. 93, 2013. 3, pp. 192-225.

Kim, Yusun, 2013, ‘2013 The Size and the Nature of Nonstandard employment’. *Labour Society*. 171. 2013. 7.8. (Title Translated from Korean to English)

Kim, Yusun, 2017, ‘The Size and Reality of Atypical Workers’ KLSI Issue Paper, 2017.12.12. Korea Labor and Society Institute.

Kim, Wonseop, and Wonchol Nam, 2011, ‘The development of social policy under Lee Myung-bak government - Is Korean welfare expansion at end?’, *The Journal of Asiatic Studies*, Vol. 143, 2011. 3, pp. 119-152.

King, Desmond S., 1987, ‘The State and the Social Structures of Welfare in Advanced Industrial Democracies’, *Theory and Society*, Vol. 16, No.6 (Nov., 1987), pp. 841-868

Kirchheimer, Otto, 1966, ‘The Transformation of Western European Party Systems’, in Joseph LaPalombara and Myron Weiner (eds.), *Political Parties and Political Development*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Kobayasi, Yoshiaki, 1997, *Public Choice Theory*, Translated by Hodong Lee, Seoul: Oreum,

Ko, Kyunghwan, Youngsik Jang, Jiwon Kang, Jinwook Kim, Seongyong Choi, and Youngae Jung, 2011, ‘Social Expenditure of Korea in 2009 and International Comparison of Disability benefits among OECD Member states (Title translated from Korean to English)’ Policy Report 2011-17. Korea Institute for Health and Social Affairs.

Ko, Kyunghwan, Youngsik Jang, Jungwoo Shin, Yohan Choi, and Youngae Jung, 2015, ‘Social Expenditure of Korea in 2014’ (Title translated from Korean to English)’, Policy Report 2015-103. Korea Institute for Health and Social Affairs.

Ko, Kyungmin, 2008, *The Dynamics of the Contemporary Political Process*, Goyang:

Ingansarang.

Korpi, Walter, 1980, ‘Social Policy and Distributional Conflict in the Capitalist Democracies. A Preliminary Comparative Framework’, *West European Politics,* 3(3), pp. 296-316

Korpi, Walter, 1983, *The Democratic Class Struggle*, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul

Krasner, S., 1988, ‘Sovereignty: An Institutional Perspective’, *Comparative Political Studies*; Apr 1, 1988; 21(1).

Krouwl, Andre, 2003, ‘Otto Kirchheimer and the Catch-all Party’, *West European Politics*, 26(2), pp. 23-40.

Kum, Jong-ye and Hyunsub Kum, 2017, ‘Tax Perception Matters: Preferences for Welfare Policy Expansion with Tax Increase’, *Korean Public Administration Review*, 51(1), pp.1-29.

Kwon, Huck-ju, 1997, ‘Beyond European Welfare Regimes: Comparative Perspectives on East Asian Welfare Systems’, *Journal of Social Policy*, 26, pp. 467-84.

Kwon, Huck-ju, 2005, ‘Reform of the Developmental Welfare State in Korea: Advocacy Coalitions and Health Politics’, in Huck-ju Kwon (eds.), *Transforming the Developmental Welfare State in East Asia*. Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan.

Kwon, Soonman, and Ian Holiday, 2007, ‘The Korean Welfare State: A Paradox of Expansion in an Era of Globalisation and Economic Crisis’, *International Journal of Social Welfare*, 16, pp. 242-248.

Larsen, C. A., 2008, ‘The Institutional Logic of Welfare Attitudes: How Welfare Regimes Influence Public Support’, *Comparative Political Studies*, Vol. 41, No. 2, February, pp. 145-168.

Lee, Byung-Hee, 2013, ‘Policy Tasks for Activation-based Unemployment Assistance’, *Korea Social Policy Review*, Vol. 20, No. 1., pp. 123-144.

Lee, Jaemo, and Sojung Shin, 2013, ‘Improvement on the Employment Insurance Poverty’, *한국사회혁신학회보(Hankook Sahwe Hyuksin hakhwebo)*, Vol. 4 (1), pp. 145-173.

Lee, Suyun, 2011, 'The Study on the Nature of the Welfare State under the Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo Hyun Regime: Focusing on Civic Participation in the Policy Decision Making Procedure for the National Health Insurance', *Korean Journal of Social Welfare Studies*, Vol. 42(1), 2011, Spring, pp. 31-54.

Lee, S. C., 2017, 'Democratization, Political Parties and Korean Welfare Politics: Korean Family Policy Reforms in Comparative Perspective', *Government and Opposition*, pp. 1-24

Lim, Sijeong, 2018, 'Perceptions of Unfairness and a Weak Universal Welfare State in South Korea', *Japanese Journal of Political Science*, 19, pp. 376-396.

Lim, Sijeong and Seiki Tanaka, 2019, 'Work Disincentive Perceptions and Welfare State Attitudes: A Survey Experiment in South Korea', *Governance*, 32(3), pp. 457-473.

Lindvall, Johannes, and David Rueda, 2013, 'The Insider-Outsider Dilemma', *British Journal of Political Science*, March 2013, pp. 1-16.

Linos, K., & West, M., 2003, 'Self-interest, Social beliefs, and Attitudes to Redistribution: Re-addressing the issue of cross-national variation'. *European Sociological Review*, 19, pp. 393-409

Lipset, S.M., 1981, *Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics*, Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Lipset, S. M., 1990, 'The Centrality of Political Culture'. *Journal of Democracy*, Vol.1, No.4, Fall 1990, pp. 80-83

Lynch, Julia, and Mikko Myrskylä, 2009, 'Always the Third Rail?', *Comparative Political Studies*, Vol. 42, Issue 8, pp. 1068-1097

Manow, Philip, 2001, 'Welfare State Building and Coordinated Capitalism in Japan and Germany', in Wolfgang Streek and Kozo Yamamura (eds.), *The Origins of Nonliberal Capitalism: Germany and Japan in Comparison*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

March, J. G. and J. P. Olsen, 1989, *Recovering Institutions*, New York: Free Press

Margalit, Y., 2013, 'Explaining Social Policy Preferences: Evidence from the Great Recession',

American Political Science Review, Vol. 107, No. 1. February.

Marx, K., 1887, *Capital: A Critique of Political Economy. Volume 1, The Process of Production Capital*.

Mau, S., 2004, 'Welfare Regimes and the Norms of Social Exchange'. *Current Sociology*, 52, pp. 53-74.

Maxwell, J. A., 2013, Qualitative Research Design: An Integrative Approach (3nd ed.), Los Angeles: SAGE Publications, Inc.

McKIM, A., Courtney, 2017, 'The Value of Mixed Methods Research: A Mixed Methods Study', Journal of Mixed Method Research, Vol. 11(2), pp. 202-222

Ministry of Health and Welfare, 2012, *Childcare Statistics 2011*. (Title Translated from Korea into English).

Nagel, T., 1986, *The View from Nowhere*. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.

Nam, Chanseop, 2002, 'Discussion Points on the Welfare Reform and its Characteristics', *Journal of Social Welfare Policy*, Vol. 14, 2002, 6, pp. 9~25. (Title Translated from Korean to English).

Namgung, Geun, 2008, *Public Policy: Empirical Studies*, Paju: Bubmunsa. (Title Translated from Korean to English).

North, D. C., 1991, 'Institutions', *The Journal of Economic Perspectives*, Vol. 5, No. 1. (Winter, 1991), pp. 97-112.

OECD, 2017, 'OECD Employment Outlook 2017', OECD Publishing, Paris.

O'Cathain, A., Murphy, E., & Nicholl, J., 2007, 'Why, and How, Mixed Methods Research is Undertaken in Health Services Research in England: A Mixed Methods Study'. *BMC Health Services Research*, 7:85.

O'Leary, Zina, 2004, *The Essential Guide to Doing Research*, London: Sage Publications.

Oorschot, W., 2000, 'Who Should Get What, and Why? On Deservingness Criteria and the Conditionality of Solidarity among the Public', *Policy & Politics*, Vol. 28, No. 1, pp. 33-48

Oorschot, W., 2006, 'Making the Difference in Social Europe: Deservingness Perceptions among Citizens of European Welfare States', *Journal of European Social Policy* 0958-9287; Vol 16(1), pp. 23–42

Orum, Anthony M., Joe R. Feagin, and Gideon Sjoberg, 1991, 'Introduction: The Nature of the Case Study', in Feagin, Joe R., Anthony M, Orum, and Gideon Sjoberg (eds.), *A Case for the Case Study*, The University of North Carolina Press.

Papadakis, E. & Bean, C., 1993, 'Popular Support for the Welfare State: A Comparison between Institutional Regimes', *Journal of Public Policy*, 13, pp. 227-254

Park, Byung-hyun, Song-sik Choi, and Boram Hwang, 2007, 'The Analysis of Change Process of Korean Social Welfare Policy: Social Progress Perspective verse Social Control Perspective', *Social Welfare Policy*, Vol. 29, 2007, 4. pp. 169-194.

Park, Sang-young, 2012, 'Exploring Korea's Emerging 'Post-Developmental' State: Research Trends and Agenda since the 1990s', *Contemporary Politics*, Vol. 5. No. 1.

Park, Seop, 2011, 'Industrial Policy, from Cooperation to Resistance', Jongil Yu (eds.), Naked Face of Park, Jung-hee. Seoul: SisaIN book. (Title Translated from Korean to English).

Peng, I., 2008, 'Welfare Policy Reforms in Japan and Korea: Cultural and Institutional Factors' in Oorschot, W., M. Opielka, and B. Pfau-Effinger. eds., *Culture and Welfare State: Values and Social Policy in Comparative Perspective*, Cheltenham, UK; Northampton, MA : Edward Elgar

Peng, Ito, 2012, 'Economic Dualization in Japan and South Korea', in Emmenegger, Patrick, Silja Hausemann, Bruno Palier, and Martin Seeleib-Kaiser (eds.) *The Age of Dualization: The Changing Face of Inequality in Deindustrializing Societies*. Oxford : Oxford University Press.

Peters, B., 1999, *Institutional Theory in Political Science: the 'New Institutionalism'*, London: Continuum.

Pettersen, P.A., 1995, 'The Welfare State: the Security Dimension', in O. Borre and E. Scarbrough (eds) *The Scope of Government*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Pfau-Effinger, B., 2005, Culture and Welfare State Policies: Reflections on a Complex

Interrelation', *Journal of Social Policy*, Volume 34, Issue 1, January, pp. 3-20

Pierson, Paul, 1996, 'The New Politics of the Welfare State', *World Politics*, Vol. 48, No. 2 (Jan., 1996), pp. 143~179.

Pierson, Paul, 2001, 'Post-industrial Pressures on the Mature Welfare States', in Pierson, Paul (eds.), *The New Politics of the Welfare State*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Rehm, Philipp, 2009, 'Risks and Redistribution: An Individual-Level Analysis', *Comparative Political Studies*, 2009, 42: 855

Rhee, Wootaek, 1995, 'A Review on Tax Administration and Policy Problems', *Development of Taxation and Financial Policies for the Last 50 Years after Independence and Policy Suggestions*. Korea Institute of Public Finance Three Year-Anniversary Symposium.

Rieger, E. and Leibfried, S., 2003, *Limits to Globalization: Welfare States and the World Economy*, Cambridge: Polity Press

Ringen, Stein, Huck-ju Kwon, Ilcheong Yi, Taekyoon Kim, and Jooha Lee, 2011, *The Korean State and Social Policy: How South Korea Lifted Itself from Poverty and Dictatorship to Affluence and Democracy*. NY: Oxford University Press.

Rodrik, Dani, 1998, 'Why Do More Open Economies Have Bigger Governments?'. *Journal of Political Economy*, Vol. 106, No. 5, 1998

Rueda, David, 2005, 'Insider-Outsider Politics in Industrialized Democracies: the Challenge to Social Democratic Parties', *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 99, No.1

Rueda, David, 2006, 'Social Democratic and Active Labour-market Policies: Insiders, Outsiders and the Politics of Employment Promotion', *British Journal of Political Science*, 36, pp. 385-406

Ryu, Jin-Seok, 2004, 'The Characteristics and Determinants of Welfare Attitudes', Korean Journal of Social Welfare, 56(4), pp. 79-101.

Scharpf, Fritz W., 1991, *Crisis and Choice in European Social Democracy*, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Seeleib-Kaiser, Martin, Adam Saunders, and Marek Naczyk, 2012, 'Shift the Public and Private

Mix' in Patrick Emmenegger, Silja Häusemann, Bruno Palier, and Martin Seeleib-Kaiser (eds.), *The Age of Dualization: The Changing Face of Inequality in Deindustrializing Societies*. New York: Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Seong, Eun-mi, 2007, 'The Study of Benefits Rate of Nonstandard Worker in the Pension and the Unemployment Insurance', *Social Welfare Policy*, Vol. 29 (4), pp. 95-120.

Song, Hokeun, 2001, 'Globalization and Social Policy', in Hokeun Song (eds.), *Globalization and the Welfare State: Social Policy in Transition*. Seoul: Nanam (Title translated from Korean to English)

Sonn, Hochul, 2005, 'Characteristics of Kim Dae Jung Government's Welfare Reform', *Korean Political Science Review*, Vol. 39 (1), pp. 213-231

Statistics Korea, 2013, 'Active Economic Population Survey'.

Steinmo, S., 1989, 'Political Institutions and Tax Policy in the United States, Sweden, and Britain.' *World Politics.* 41, pp. 500-535

Stephens, John D., 1996, 'The Scandinavian Welfare States: Achievements, Crisis and Prospects', in Gøsta Esping-Andersen (eds.), *Welfare States in Transition*, pp. 32-65.

Sung, S., 2003, 'Women Reconciling Paid and Unpaid Work in a Confucian Welfare State: The Case of South Korea', *Social Policy & Administration*, Vol. 37, No. 4, August, pp. 342-360.

Svallfors, Stefan, 1997, 'Worlds of Welfare and Attitudes to Redistribution: A Comparision of Eight Western Nations', *European Sociological Review*, Vol. 13, No.3 (Dec., 1997), pp. 283-304.

Svallfors, Stefan, 1999, 'The Middle Class and Welfare State Retrenchment: Attitudes to Swedish Welfare Policies', in Svallfors, S. and Peter, Taylor-Gooby (eds), *The End of the Welfare State?: Reponses to State Retrenchment,* London: Routledge

Svallfors, Stefan, 2008, 'The Generational Contract in Sweden: Age-specific Attitudes to Age-related Policies', *Policy and Politics*, Vol. 36, No.3, pp. 381-396

Swank, Duane, 2000, 'Social Democratic Welfare States in a Global Economy: Scandinavia in

Comparative Perspective', in Robert Geyer, Christine Ingebritsen, and Jonathan Moses (eds.), *Globalization, Europeanization, and the End of Scandinavian Social Democracy?* London: Macmillan.

Swank, Duane, 2001, 'Political Institutions and Welfare State Restructuring: The Impact of Institutions on Social Policy Change in Developed Democracies', in Paul Pierson (eds.), *The New Politics of the Welfare State*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Tomlison, Mark, and Robert Walker, 2012, 'Labour Market Disadvantage and the Experience of Recurrent Poverty' in Emmenegger, Patrick., Silja Häusemann, Bruno Palier, and Martin Seeleib-Kaiser (edit.), (2012), *The Age of Dualization: the Changing Face of Inequality in Deindustrializing Societies*, New York; Oxford: Oxford University Press

Thelen, K. and S. Steinmo, 1992, 'Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics, In Sven Steinmo, Kathleen Thelen and Frank Longstreth eds., *Structuring Politics: Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

Tullock, Gordon, 2006, *The Vote Motive*, London: Institute of Economic Affairs.

Uttam, Jitendra, 2014, 'Situating Korea's Political Economy under Twin Transitions' in *The Political Economy of Korea: Transition, Transformation and Turnaround*, Palgrave Macmillan

Vickers, J. and Isaac, A., 2012, *The Politics of Race: Canada, the United States, and Australia*, University of Toronto Press.

Vlandas, T., 2013, 'The Politics of Temporary Work Deregulation in Europe: Solving the French Puzzle', *Politics & Society*, 41(3), pp. 425-60

Vlandas, T., 2018, 'The Political Consequences of Labour Market Dualization: Labour Market Status, Occupational Unemployment and Policy Preferences', *Political Science Research and Methods,* accepted version – 17 August 2018, (PDF available at https://vlandas.files.wordpress.com/2018/08/psrm_vlandas_2018.pdf)

Weaver, R. Kent, 2003, 'The Politics of Public Pension Reform' (Working Paper No. 2003-06). Boston: Center for Retirement Research

White, G. and Goodman, R., 1998, 'Welfare Orientalism and the Search for an East Asian Welfare Model', in R. Goodman, G. White and Huck-ju Kwon (eds), *The East Asian Welfare Model: Welfare Orientalism and the State,* London: Routledge

Williams, Richard, 2005, 'Gologit2: A Program for Generalized Logistic Regression/Partial Proportional Odds Models for Ordinal Dependent Variables (Last revised May 12, 2005)

Williams, Richard, 2016, 'Understanding and Interpreting Generalized Ordered Logit Models', *The Journal of Mathematical Sociology,* 40:1, pp. 7-20

Won, Seokjo, 2002, *Social Welfare Policy*, Seoul: Yangseowon Publication.

Yang, Jae-jin, 2003, 'Labour Market Flexibility and the Choice of Korea Welfare State', *The Journal of Korean Political Science*, Vol. 37 (3).

Yang, Jae-jin, 2005, 'Developmentalism after Development: The Growth, Crisis, and Future of the Korean Developmental State'*, Korean Public Administration Review*, Vol. 39, No. 1, (2005. 3). pp. 1~18.

Yang, Jae-jin, 2011, 'A Deductive Reasoning about the Diversity of Welfare State Building: An Institutional Power Resources Model', *Korean Social Policy Review*, Vol. 18 (4), pp. 113-134.

Yang, Jae-jin, 2012, 'Political Economy of Promotion and Discipline behind Successful Export-Oriented Industrialization in Korea', *Journal of East and West Studies*. Vol. 24, (3), pp. 5-28.

Yang, Jae-jin, 2013, 'An Empirical study on Institutional Power Resources Model and Welfare Policy Preferences of Labour, Businesses, and Politicians in Korea', *한국정책학회 춘계학술발표논문집(A Collection of articles submitted to the Korean Association for Policy Studies, Spring, 2013)*, pp. 277-299. (Title translated from Korean into English).

Yang, Jae-jin, and Chung-in Moon, 2005, 'South Korea: Globalization, Neoliberal Labor Reform, and the Trilemma of an Emerging Welfare State', in Joseph S. Tulchin and Gary Bland (eds.), *Getting Globalization Right*. Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner, Inc.

Yang, Jae-jin, and Hyo-sang Min, 2013, 'The Political Economy of the Low Tax Regime and Tax Increase in the Korean Welfare State', *Trends and Prospects*, Vol. 88. (Title Translated from Korean to English).

Yeasmin, S., & Khan, F., Rahman, 2012, 'Triangulation' Research Method as the Tool of Social Science Research', *BUP Journal*, Vol. 1., Issue 1, September 2012.

Yeo, Eugene and Yeong-soon Kim, 2015, 'What Welfare State does Korean Middle Class Want? - The Welfare Attitude of the Middle Class and Its Implications for the Prospect of the Welfare State in Korea', *Korean Political Science Review*, 49(4), pp.335-362.

Website

KOSIS, http://kosis.kr/

OECD Data, https://data.oecd.org/

Statistics Korea, http://kostat.go.kr

Appendix

Appendix 1. Profile of Participants

Participants No.	Age cohort	Labour market status	Industry	Education	Marital status	Having dependent children or grandchildren
1	20s	Contract worker	Business	College graduate	Single	
2	20s	Contract worker	Business	College graduate	Single	
3	20s	Part-timer	Service	High school graduate or less	Single	
4	20s	Freelancer	Service	College graduate	Single	
5	30s	Part-timer	Service	College graduate	Married	√ (U6)
6	30s	Part-timer	Service	College graduate	Married	√ (U6)
7	30s	Unemployed	n/a	High school graduate or less	Married	√ (U6)
8	50s	Part-timer	Service	College graduate	Married	√ (A)
9	20s	Unemployed	n/a	College graduate	Single	
10	20s	Unemployed	n/a	College graduate	Single	
11	20s	Contract worker	Business	College graduate	Single	
12	20s	Unemployed	n/a	College graduate	Single	
13	40s	Unemployed	n/a	College graduate	Single	
14	30s	Part-timer	Service	College graduate	Married	√ (U6)
15	30s	Part-timer	Service	High school graduate or less	Married	√ (U6)
16	40s	Freelancer	Service	College graduate	Single	
17	30s	Contract worker	Service	College graduate	Married	
18	40s	Freelancer	Service	High school graduate or less	Single	
19	40s	Contract worker	Business	College graduate	Married	√ (A)
20	60s	Contract worker	Service	High school graduate or less	Married	√ (A/G)
21	30s	Freelancer	Service	College graduate	Single	
22	60s	Contract worker	Service	High school graduate or less	Married	√ (A/G)
23	50s	Contract worker	Service	High school graduate or less	Married	√ (A)
24	50s	Contract worker	Service	High school graduate or less	Married	√ (A)
25	60s	Contract worker	Business	High school graduate or less	Single	
26	40s	Contract worker	Business	High school graduate or less	Married	√ (U19)
27	40s	Part-timer	Service	College graduate	Married	√ (U19)

* Note: U6: Aged under 6, U19: Aged between 7 and 19, A: Aged 20 or over, G: Grandchildren under 6

Appendix 2. Respondents′ Preferences on General Welfare Aims and Means, Men versus Women

Variable			Descriptive statistics			Options from 1 to 5 (%)				
			Observation	Mean	Standard deviation	1. Strongly disagree	2. Disagree	3. Neither agree nor disagree	4. Agree	5. Strongly agree
Respondents' preferences on general welfare aims and means	It is the responsibility of the government to reduce differences in income levels	Male	1613	3.75	0.91	30 (1.9)	154 (9.5)	278 (17.2)	885 (54.9)	266 (16.5)
			1712 (weighted)	3.76	0.87	16 (0.9)	169 (9.9)	304 (17.8)	947 (55.3)	276 (16.1)
		Female	2083	3.67	0.86	30 (1.4)	198 (9.5)	403 (19.3)	1195 (57.4)	257 (12.3)
			1933 (weighted)	3.73	0.86	28 (1.4)	179 (9.3)	342 (17.7)	1117 (57.8)	267 (13.8)
	Tax should be increased in order to expand the welfare state	Male	1613	3.30	0.92	25 (1.5)	369 (22.9)	400 (24.8)	743 (46.1)	76 (4.7)
			1712 (weighted)	3.30	0.91	27 (1.6)	378 (22.1)	439 (25.6)	792 (46.2)	76 (4.4)
		Female	2083	3.12	0.90	46 (2.2)	548 (26.3)	644 (30.9)	801 (38.5)	44 (2.1)
			1933 (weighted)	3.08	0.91	48 (2.5)	530 (27.4)	615 (31.8)	693 (35.9)	47 (2.4)
	Social welfare should be offered to all by right, not only to specific groups of deserving poor	Male	1613	2.77	1.07	144 (8.9)	675 (41.8)	266 (16.5)	471 (29.2)	57 (3.5)
			1712 (weighted)	2.89	1.07	119 (6.9)	654 (38.2)	316 (18.5)	549 (32.1)	73 (4.3)
		Female	2083	2.77	1.06	173 (8.3)	878 (42.2)	350 (16.8)	619 (29.7)	63 (3.0)
			1933 (weighted)	2.93	1.08	140 (7.2)	707 (36.6)	321 (16.6)	685 (35.4)	80 (4.1)

Appendix 3. Respondents′ Preferences on Social Policy Areas for Risk Groups, Men versus Women

Variable			Descriptive statistics			Options from 1 to 5 (%)				
			Observation	Mean	Standard deviation	1. Decrease greatly	2. Decrease slightly	3. Stay the same	4. Increase slightly	5. Increase greatly
Respondents' preferences on social policy areas for risk groups	Financial support for the unemployed	Male	1613	3.52	0.80	24 (1.5)	112 (6.9)	614 (38.1)	729 (45.1)	134 (8.3)
			1712 (weighted)	3.49	0.85	36 (2.1)	134 (7.8)	659 (38.5)	726 (42.4)	156 (9.1)
		Female	2083	3.49	0.75	30 (1.4)	132 (6.3)	807 (38.7)	1003 (48.2)	105 (5.0)
			1933 (weighted)	3.49	0.79	34 (1.7)	147 (7.6)	711 (36.8)	925 (47.9)	117 (6.0)
	Financial support for the sick	Male	1613	3.58	0.76	14 (0.9)	98 (6.1)	566 (35.1)	806 (50.0)	129 (8.0)
			1712 (weighted)	3.55	0.79	13 (0.8)	132 (7.7)	613 (35.8)	803 (46.9)	151 (8.8)
		Female	2083	3.53	0.73	17 (0.8)	134 (6.4)	767 (36.8)	1052 (50.5)	113 (5.4)
			1933 (weighted)	3.48	0.76	21 (1.1)	144 (7.5)	766 (39.6)	890 (46.0)	112 (5.8)
	Financial support for the elderly	Male	1613	3.49	0.82	36 (2.2)	122 (7.6)	585 (36.3)	755 (46.8)	115 (7.1)
			1712 (weighted)	3.42	0.86	47 (2.7)	162 (9.5)	663 (38.7)	712 (41.6)	129 (7.5)
		Female	2083	3.51	0.79	41 (2.0)	144 (6.9)	736 (35.3)	1032 (49.5)	130 (6.2)
			1933 (weighted)	3.40	0.86	53 (2.7)	195 (10.1)	742 (38.4)	821 (42.5)	122 (6.3)
	Financial support for families with children	Male	1613	3.62	0.78	22 (1.4)	84 (5.2)	534 (33.1)	818 (50.7)	155 (9.6)
			1712 (weighted)	3.59	0.85	36 (2.1)	114 (6.7)	560 (32.7)	812 (47.4)	191 (11.1)
		Female	2083	3.57	0.76	34 (1.6)	110 (5.3)	703 (33.7)	1100 (52.8)	136 (6.5)
			1933 (weighted)	3.54	0.84	44 (2.3)	135 (7.0)	647 (33.5)	937 (48.5)	169 (8.8)

Appendix 4. Respondents′ Preferences on General Welfare Aims and Means, Labour Market Insiders and Outsiders

Variable			Descriptive statistics			Options from 1 to 5 (%)				
			Observation	Mean	Standard deviation	1. Strongly disagree	2. Disagree	3. Neither agree nor disagree	4. Agree	5. Strongly agree
Respondents' preferences on general welfare aims and means	It is the responsibility of the government to reduce differences in income levels	Insiders	750	3.81	0.83	6 (0.8)	60 (8.0)	130 (17.3)	430 (57.3)	124 (16.5)
			1157 (weighted)	3.80	0.84	7 (0.6)	97 (8.4)	204 (17.7)	654 (56.6)	194 (16.8)
		Outsiders	762	3.77	0.86	10 (1.3)	65 (8.5)	132 (17.3)	438 (57.5)	117 (15.4)
			833 (weighted)	3.77	0.84	8 (0.9)	73 (8.8)	138 (16.6)	492 (59.1)	121 (14.6)
	Tax should be increased in order to expand the welfare state	Insiders	750	3.21	0.93	10 (1.3)	200 (26.7)	193 (25.7)	315 (42.0)	32 (4.3)
			1157 (weighted)	3.22	0.93	18 (1.6)	293 (25.3)	309 (26.7)	488 (42.2)	48 (4.2)
		Outsiders	762	3.22	0.92	16 (2.1)	184 (24.1)	206 (27.0)	331 (43.4)	25 (3.3)
			833 (weighted)	3.18	0.90	17 (2.0)	200 (24.0)	257 (30.9)	334 (40.1)	25 (3.0)
	Social welfare should be offered to all by right, not only to specific groups of deserving poor	Insiders	750	3.09	1.06	35 (4.7)	245 (32.7)	128 (17.1)	303 (40.4)	39 (5.2)
			1157 (weighted)	3.10	1.05	51 (4.4)	375 (32.4)	199 (17.2)	474 (41.0)	57 (4.9)
		Outsiders	762	2.79	1.08	68 (8.9)	304 (39.9)	140 (18.4)	220 (28.9)	30 (3.9)
			833 (weighted)	2.95	1.08	53 (6.3)	300 (36.0)	166 (19.9)	267 (32.1)	47 (5.6)

Appendix 5. Respondents′ Preferences on Social Policy Areas for Risk Groups, Labour Market Insiders and Outsiders

Variable			Descriptive statistics			Options from 1 to 5 (%)				
			Observation	Mean	Standard deviation	1. Decrease greatly	2. Decrease slightly	3. Stay the same	4. Increase slightly	5. Increase greatly
Respondents' preferences on social policy areas for risk groups	Financial support for the unemployed	Insiders	750	3.49	0.85	17 (2.3)	55 (7.3)	292 (38.9)	313 (41.6)	73 (9.7)
			1157 (weighted)	3.45	0.90	30 (2.6)	113 (9.8)	431 (37.2)	465 (40.1)	118 (10.2)
		Outsiders	762	3.54	0.79	12 (1.6)	50 (6.6)	271 (35.6)	370 (48.6)	59 (7.7)
			833 (weighted)	3.53	0.78	12 (1.5)	54 (6.4)	310 (37.2)	396 (47.6)	61 (7.3)
	Financial support for the sick	Insiders	750	3.51	0.83	10 (1.3)	68 (9.1)	265 (35.3)	340 (45.3)	67 (8.9)
			1157 (weighted)	3.51	0.84	13 (1.1)	114 (9.9)	409 (35.4)	512 (44.3)	109 (9.4)
		Outsiders	762	3.55	0.73	4 (0.5)	51 (6.7)	274 (36.0)	390 (51.2)	43 (5.6)
			833 (weighted)	3.54	0.75	4 (0.4)	63 (7.6)	302 (36.3)	408 (48.9)	56 (6.7)
	Financial support for the elderly	Insiders	750	3.34	0.90	28 (3.7)	86 (11.5)	292 (38.9)	292 (38.9)	52 (6.9)
			1157 (weighted)	3.30	0.94	45 (3.9)	162 (14.0)	437 (37.7)	426 (36.9)	87 (7.5)
		Outsiders	762	3.48	0.80	14 (1.8)	58 (7.6)	285 (37.4)	359 (47.1)	46 (6.0)
			833 (weighted)	3.44	0.81	15 (1.8)	71 (8.6)	333 (40.0)	360 (43.2)	54 (6.5)
	Financial support for families with children	Insiders	750	3.61	0.88	18 (2.4)	52 (6.9)	230 (30.7)	354 (47.2)	96 (12.8)
			1157 (weighted)	3.56	0.93	35 (3.0)	93 (8.0)	345 (29.8)	526 (45.4)	159 (13.7)
		Outsiders	762	3.55	0.80	13 (1.7)	46 (6.0)	272 (35.7)	369 (48.4)	62 (8.1)
			833 (weighted)	3.54	0.80	12 (1.4)	61 (7.3)	299 (35.8)	394 (47.2)	69 (8.3)

Appendix 6. Correlation between Independent Variables

		Gender	Age	Education	Household type	Labour market status	Personal income	Equivalised disposable household income	Ideological orientation	Interest in politics
Gender	Pearson Correlation	1								
	Sig. (2-tailed)									
	N	3696								
Age	Pearson Correlation	.013	1							
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.416								
	N	3696	3696							
Education	Pearson Correlation	-.164**	-.569**	1						
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000							
	N	3696	3696	3696						
Household type	Pearson Correlation	.145**	-.150**	.027	1					
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.105						
	N	3696	3696	3696	3696					
Labour market status	Pearson Correlation	.228**	.455**	-.388**	-.028	1				
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000	.095					
	N	3696	3696	3696	3696	3696				
Personal income	Pearson Correlation	-.324**	-.391**	.320**	.042*	-.803**	1			
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000	.011	.000				
	N	3696	3696	3696	3696	3696	3696			
Equivalised disposable household income	Pearson Correlation	-.080**	-.473**	.476**	.073**	-.409**	.383**	1		
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000			
	N	3688	3688	3688	3688	3688	3688	3688		
Ideological orientation	Pearson Correlation	.017	-.258**	.194**	.035*	-.141**	.122**	.140**	1	
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.292	.000	.000	.031	.000	.000	.000		
	N	3696	3696	3696	3696	3696	3696	3688	3696	
Interest in politics	Pearson Correlation	-.221**	-.040*	.162**	-.006	-.075**	.086**	.127**	-.002	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.015	.000	.738	.000	.000	.000	.887	
	N	3696	3696	3696	3696	3696	3696	3688	3696	3696

Note: **. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed)

Appendix 7. The Variance Inflation Factors (VIFs) of the Independent Variables

	Respondents′ preferences on general welfare aims and means						Respondents′ preferences on social policy areas for risk groups							
	It is the responsibility of the government to reduce differences in income levels		Tax should be increased in order to expand the welfare state		Social welfare should be offered to all by right, not only to specific groups of deserving poor		Financial support for the unemployed		Financial support for the sick		Financial support for the elderly		Financial support for families with children	
	VIF	1/VIF	VIF	1/VIF	VIF	1/VIF	VIF	1/VIF	VIF	1/VIF	VIF	1/VIF	VIF	1/VIF
Gender	1.258	0.795	1.258	0.795	1.258	0.795	1.258	0.795	1.258	0.795	1.258	0.795	1.258	0.795
Age	1.985	0.504	1.985	0.504	1.985	0.504	1.985	0.504	1.985	0.504	1.985	0.504	1.985	0.504
Education	1.756	0.569	1.756	0.569	1.756	0.569	1.757	0.569	1.756	0.569	1.756	0.569	1.756	0.569
Household type	1.044	0.958	1.044	0.958	1.044	0.958	1.044	0.958	1.044	0.958	1.044	0.958	1.044	0.958
Labour market status	3.172	0.315	3.172	0.315	3.172	0.315	3.175	0.315	3.172	0.315	3.172	0.315	3.172	0.315
Personal income	3.104	0.322	3.104	0.322	3.104	0.322	3.103	0.322	3.104	0.322	3.104	0.322	3.104	0.322
Equivalised disposable household income	1.503	0.665	1.503	0.665	1.503	0.665	1.505	0.664	1.503	0.665	1.503	0.665	1.503	0.665
Ideological orientation	1.076	0.929	1.076	0.929	1.076	0.929	1.077	0.929	1.076	0.929	1.076	0.929	1.076	0.929
Interest in politics	1.085	0.922	1.085	0.922	1.085	0.922	1.085	0.922	1.085	0.922	1.085	0.922	1.085	0.922

Appendix 8. Codes and Themes by Each Situation and Age Groups (Chapter 6)

Given situation	Sub-theme	Participants in their 20s	Participants in their 30s	Participants in their 40s	Participants in their 50s or over
Labour marker outsider status	Influences of socioeconomic and demographic characteristics on individuals' actual state	- Low pay - Being discriminated against at work	- Lower job security - Low pay	- Lower job security - Lower income security - Low pay	- Lower job security - Low pay
	Negative emotions caused outsider position	- A sense of inferiority - A sense of frustration - A sense of shame - Low self-esteem - Lack of a sense of belonging	- A sense of frustration - Low self-esteem		
	Collective recognition of problems	- Coping with financial issues thanks to transfer from family (parents) - Increase in financial stress due to family responsibility to support family	- Coping with financial issues thanks to transfer from family (husband)	- Coping with financial issues thanks to transfer from family (husband) - Increase in financial stress due to family responsibility to support family	- Coping with financial issues thanks to transfer from family (husband) - Increase in financial stress due to family responsibility to support family
	Reinterpretation of problems in the context of family welfare	- Anticipating so as to cope with financial issues in the near future through financial transfer in married state - Emphasis on the division of labour within the family - Financial capability of family welfare matters	- Emphasis on the division of labour within the family - Financial capability of family welfare matters	- Anticipating so as to cope with financial issues in the near future through financial transfer in married state - Emphasis on the division of labour within the family - Financial capability of family welfare matters	- Emphasis on the division of labour within the family - Financial capability of family welfare matters

Child-rearing	Influences of socioeconomic and demographic characteristics on individuals' actual state	- Work-family conflict - Career interruption	- Work-family conflict - Career interruption	- Work-family conflict - Career interruption	
	Collective recognition of problems	- Coping with work-family conflict through child-care provided by family	- Coping with work-family conflict through child-care provided by family	- Grandparents providing child-care for an adult child who works	- Grandparents providing child-care for an adult child who works
	Reinterpretation of problems in the context of family welfare	- Emphasis on the division of labour within the family - Financial capability of family welfare matters - Excessive expenses for child-rearing	- Emphasis on the division of labour within the family - Financial capability of family welfare matters - Excessive expenses for child-rearing	- Emphasis on the division of labour within the family - Financial capability of family welfare matters - Excessive expenses for child-rearing	- Excessive expenses for child-rearing
	Pro-developmental attitude	- A concern that the trend in low birth rates is a serious threat to economic growth or the survival of the nation	- A concern that the trend in low birth rates is a serious threat to economic growth or the survival of the nation	- A concern that the trend in low birth rates is a serious threat to economic growth or the survival of the nation	- A concern that the trend in low birth rates is a serious threat to economic growth or the survival of the nation
Old-age income reduction	Influences of socioeconomic and demographic characteristics on individuals' actual state	- Difficulty in saving for old-age due to labour market outsider status	- Difficulty in saving for old-age due to labour market outsider status	- Difficulty in saving for old-age due to labour market outsider status Income loss due to retirement	- Income loss due to retirement
	Collective recognition of problems	- Increase in financial stress due to family responsibility (towards parents)	- Increase in financial stress due to family responsibility (towards parents)	- Coping with financial issues thanks to transfer from husband - Increase in financial stress due to family responsibility (towards parents	- Coping with financial issues thanks to transfer from husband - Increase in financial stress due to family responsibility (towards parents

	Reinterpretation of problems in the context of family welfare	- Difficulty in saving for old-age due to excessive expenses for child-rearing	- Difficulty in saving for old-age due to excessive expenses for child-rearing	- Difficulty in saving for old-age due to excessive expenses for child-rearing - Financial capability of family welfare matters	- Difficulty in saving for old-age due to excessive expenses for child-rearing - Financial capability of family welfare matters
	Selective compassion	- Compassion for the elderly experiencing poverty	- Compassion for the elderly experiencing poverty	- Compassion for the elderly experiencing poverty	- Compassion for the elderly experiencing poverty
Contracting a disease	Influences of socioeconomic and demographic characteristics on individuals' actual state	- Difficulty in saving enough for potential medical expenses due to labour market outsider status	- Difficulty in saving enough for potential medical expenses due to labour market outsider status	- Difficulty in saving enough for potential medical expenses due to labour market outsider status	- Difficulty in saving enough for potential medical expenses due to labour market outsider status - Health issues and health-associated financial burden that grow with age
	Collective recognition of problems	- Coping with financial issues through support from family - Increase in financial stress due to family responsibility (towards ill family members)	- Coping with financial issues through support from family - Increase in financial stress due to family responsibility (towards ill family members)	- Coping with financial issues through support from family - Increase in financial stress due to family responsibility (towards ill family members)	- Coping with financial issues through support from family
	Reinterpretation of problems in the context of family welfare	-	- Difficulty in saving for potential medical expenses due to excessive expenses for child-rearing	- Difficulty in saving for potential medical expenses due to excessive expenses for child-rearing	- Difficulty in saving for potential medical expenses due to excessive expenses for child-rearing
	Selective compassion	- Compassion for those who cannot afford medical treatments	- Compassion for those who cannot afford medical treatments	- Compassion for those who cannot afford medical treatments	- Compassion for those who cannot afford medical treatments

Appendix 9. Codes and Themes by Each Situation and Age Groups (Chapter 7)

Related situation	Sub-theme	Participants in their 20s	Participants in their 30s	Participants in their 40s	Participants in their 50s or over
Labour marker outsider status	Family-centred social policy evaluation	- Having a preference for social assistance as one expects no support from family - Having low preference for welfare benefits, which may increase the tax their family pays for what they would not benefit from much - Considering job creation policy or employment promotion programmes better than welfare benefits in securing family income	- Having a preference for social assistance as one expects no support from family - Having low preference for welfare benefits, which may increase the tax their family pays for what they would not benefit from much - Having low preference for social assistance that requires too many conditions and a complicated process for welfare benefits while offering insufficient benefit for family - Considering job creation policy or employment promotion programmes better than welfare benefits in securing family income	- Having a preference for social assistance as one expects no support from family - Having no preference for welfare benefits as it may increase the tax one's family pays - Having no preference for social welfare as too many conditions and complicated process required for welfare benefits - Considering job creation policy or employment promotion programmes better than welfare benefits in securing family income	- Having no preference for welfare benefits as it may increase the tax one's family pays - Considering job creation policy or employment promotion programmes better than welfare benefits in securing family income

	Attitudes emphasising self-sufficiency and family responsibility	- Concerns about one's tax being used for undeserving people who avoid work and rely on welfare benefits - A belief that individuals are responsible for their own lives - A belief that people are under obligation to take care of their own family members	- Concerns about one's tax being used for undeserving people who avoid work and rely on welfare benefits - A belief that individuals are responsible for their own lives	- Concerns about one's tax being used for undeserving people who avoid work and rely on welfare benefits	- Concerns about one's tax being used for undeserving people who avoid work and rely on welfare benefits - A belief that individuals are responsible for their own lives - A belief that people are under obligation to take care of their own family members - A belief that government budget should be used to promote economic growth and national security, not to guarantee the unemployed income security
Child rearing	Family-centred social policy evaluation	- Having a preference for social service as one expects no support from family - Having a preference for social policies as associated expenses are often too much for a family to bear	- Having a preference for social policies as associated expenses are often too much for a family to bear	- Having a preference for social policies as associated expenses are often too much for a family to bear	- Having a preference for social policies as associated expenses are often too much for a family to bear
	Attitudes emphasising self-sufficiency and family responsibility		- A belief that child-raising is mainly family's, especially parents', responsibility, not the government's	- Willingness to support family members to reduce the economic or physical burden one's family bears	- A belief that child-raising is mainly family's, especially parents', responsibility, not the government's

					- Willingness to support family members to reduce the economic or physical burden one's family bears
	Pro-developmental attitude	- Having a preference for social policy as associated difficulties cause the low birth-rate issue, which is a serious threat to state economic growth or national security	- Having a preference for social policy as associated difficulties cause the low birth-rate issue, which is a serious threat to state economic growth or national security	- Having a preference for social policy as associated difficulties cause the low birth-rate issue, which is a serious threat to state economic growth or national security	- Having a preference for social policy as associated difficulties cause the low birth-rate issue, which is a serious threat to state economic growth or national security
Old-age income reduction	Family-centred social policy evaluation	- Having low preference for welfare benefits, which may increase the tax their family pays for what they would not benefit from much - Having a preference for social policies as associated expenses are often too much for a family to bear	- Having a preference for social policies as associated expenses are often too much for a family to bear	- Having low preference for welfare benefits, which may increase the tax their family pays for what they would not benefit from much - Having a preference for welfare benefits as one expects no support from family - Having a preference for social policies as associated expenses are often too much for a family to bear	- Having low preference for welfare benefits, which may increase the tax their family pays for what they would not benefit from much - Having a preference for welfare benefits as one expects no support from family
	Attitudes emphasising self-sufficiency and family responsibility	- A belief that individuals are responsible for their own lives - A belief that people are under obligation to take care of their own family members		- A belief that individuals are responsible for their own lives - A belief that people are under obligation to take care of their own family members	- A belief that individuals are responsible for their own lives - A belief that people are under obligation to take care of their own family members

	Selective compassion		- A belief that the government should step in (only) when individuals are unable to deal with their economic hardship		- A belief that the government should step in (only) when individuals are unable to deal with their economic hardship
Contracting a disease	Family-centred social policy evaluation	- Having a preference for social policies as associated expenses often are too much for a family to bear	- Having a preference for social policies as associated expenses often are too much for a family to bear	- Having a preference for social policies as associated expenses often are too much for a family to bear	- Having a preference for social policies as associated expenses often are too much for a family to bear
	Attitudes emphasising self-sufficiency and family responsibility	- A belief that individuals are responsible for their own lives	- A belief that individuals are responsible for their own lives - A belief that people are under obligation to take care of their own family members	- A belief that people are under obligation to take care of their own family members	
	Selective compassion		- A belief that the government should step in (only) when individuals are unable to deal with their economic hardship		- A belief that the government should step in (only) when individuals are unable to deal with their economic hardship