Regularity and robustness in monotone Bayesian games

Journal article

This paper defines regular and weakly regular equilibria for monotone Bayesian games with one-dimensional actions and types. It analyzes the robustness of equilibria with respect to perturbations. It also proves an index theorem and provides applications to uniqueness of equilibrium.

Authors: Beggs, A

• Publication status: Published
• Peer review status: Peer reviewed
• Publisher: Elsevier Publisher's website
• Journal: Journal of Mathematical Economics Journal website
• Volume: 60
• Pages: 145-158
• Publication date: 2015-07-13
• Acceptance date: 2015-07-01
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2015.07.002
• EISSN: 1873-1538
• ISSN: 0304-4068
• Language: English
• Keywords: index theory; robustness; monotone strategies; uniqueness; Bayesian games; regularity