Migrant Regional Allegiances in Homeland Elections:
Survey Evidence on Vote Choices of Polish and Ukrainian Migrant Electorates

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Abstract

We examine the salience among migrants of a pervasive type of political identity neglected in the interdisciplinary scholarship on transnationalism and migrant political behavior – homeland regional identities. Using migrants' regional background in their homelands as a proxy for their regional political identities, we estimate its effect on migrants' vote choice in homeland elections using original survey data on Polish and Ukrainian migrants. Contrary to some studies’ expectations, in both cases the migrant electorates exhibit the same salient regional divisions found in domestic voting and the individual vote choice is strongly predicted by migrant voters’ regional background. While being carriers of new political views that can make them into agents of change in countries of origin in some ways, transnationally active migrants can also help reproduce salient - and sometimes divisive - homeland political identities. The results also shed light on the role of other identities and factors in migrant vote choice.

Keywords: migrant voters, homeland elections, extra-territorial voting, political remittances, transnationalism
The nascent interdisciplinary scholarship on transnationalism and the civic and political engagement of migrants offers opposing perspectives on migrants’ political identities and attitudes vis-à-vis their homelands. Some studies on transnational migrant behavior see migrants as carriers of political outlooks that are systematically different from those of their compatriots in the sending country and point to the migration experience as a critical factor explaining these differences (Alba 1985; Foner 1994; Levitt 1998, 2001; Levitz and Pop-Eleches 2010; Pérez-Armendáriz and Crow 2010). Others find that homeland political outlooks are prevalent among migrants due to the strength of early socialization in the sending country, the fragmentation in diaspora networks that mirrors cleavages in the homeland, and the cultural and institutional barriers in receiving countries that limit migrant socialization into civic norms and institutional practices of host societies (Dahl 1961; Parenti 1967; Guarnizo et al. 2003; Careja and Emmenegger 2011). However, the two views discussed above may not be incompatible: migrants’ political outlooks can differ from those of their non-migrant compatriots in some respects, while closely resembling them in others. A nuanced understanding of migrant political outlooks and behavior and their congruence with those of their non-migrant compatriots calls for careful micro-level empirical studies of specific identities.

We examine the salience among migrants of one particular, pervasive type of political identity neglected in the existing scholarship – regional identities in the home country. We use migrants’ regional background in their countries of origin as a proxy for their regional political identities and estimate its effect on migrants’ vote choice in homeland elections. If migration experience in general, and in more developed democracies in particular, is associated with less salience in these divisive homeland identities, we would expect that the vote choice patterns
displayed by migrant electorates from countries with salient regional cleavages would not exhibit the strong regional divisions found in the homeland electorates.

We test this hypothesis with original survey data on Ukrainian migrant voters in fifteen countries across three continents and Polish migrant voters in the United Kingdom (see Appendix). We use the cases of vote choice of migrant electorates from these two countries because, along with similarities, such as the experience of imperial domination, socialist legacies, cultural traits, and migration history, both display strong, but varying degrees of regional political identities. The inclusion of countries that vary with regard to the complexity of the regional cleavages helps to probe the strengths of the migrants’ regional allegiances on vote choice. Our focus on presidential elections to assess the salience of regional political cleavages is motivated by the observation that in these cases they tend to be more polarized nationwide than parliamentary elections.

To our knowledge, this is the first comparative study using empirical evidence from large surveys on two migrant groups that shows that the vote choice of migrant electorates exhibits the same salient regional divisions found in domestic voting and that individual vote choice is strongly predicted by the migrants’ regional background. The results are robust after controlling for the effects of potentially important covariates, such as age, time in migration, socioeconomic profile, and motivations for emigration. The findings also suggest that the strength of regional divisions in countries of origin corresponds to the strength of regional divisions in the migrant vote. Our findings shed light on the role of other identities and factors in migrant vote choice. We are careful throughout the paper to avoid a common pitfall, namely verbal or analytical slippage with regard to the ‘change’ in migrant perceptions or behavior when we only have cross-sectional
rather than panel data on individuals before and after they emigrate (see Appendix for discussion).

These findings contribute to the nascent literature on migrant transnational political engagement. The study of migrant political attitudes and behavior has primarily focused on the migrants’ destination countries and the factors helping or hindering the integration of migrants. We know much less about migrants’ homeland political identities and their influence on countries of origin. While the potential developmental role of economic remittances and the influence of diaspora groups on ethnic conflicts is recognized, we have little understanding of the significance of a wider range of political and social remittances (Goldring 2003; Lieber 2008). As the number of countries extending voting rights to their diaspora communities and the number of migrants making use of these rights are increasing, understanding extra-territorial voting is becoming important for both theoretical and practical reasons (Collyer and Vathi 2007; Gamlen 2008; Collyer, 2014). Political theorists have raised the concern that migrant voters potentially undermine the principle of sovereignty (Bauböck 2003). In terms of the practical implications, migrant vote choice can have an effect on the outcome of closely fought elections.²

**Hypotheses on Homeland Political Identities among Migrant Voters**

Some studies argue that migrants, particularly those who come to industrialized Western countries from less developed democratic and non-democratic countries, are likely to depart from their homeland cultural practices, attitudes and loyalties as they assimilate into the host society’s social, cultural and economic systems (Gordon 1964; Alba 1985; Foner 1994; Levitt 1998). As a result, migrants are expected to differ from their non-migrant co-nationals in terms of political identities and attitudes after some time spent in migration. A corollary argument
states that alongside sending economic remittances, investing in their countries of origin, and engaging in homeland civic and political activities, migrants also send ‘social remittances’ - ideas, practices, and identities, thus acting as agents of change (Levitt 1998, 2001; Glick Schiller et al. 1992; Itzigsohn et al. 1999). Some maintain that the transnationally active migrants from the global South are prone to seek to replicate in their home countries the discourses and institutional practices prevalent in their host countries (Diamond 1994; Glick Schiller et al. 1992; Levitt 2001).

A specific strand of research holds that migration experience helps explain the variation in democratic attitudes and behavior among citizens of non-democratic or newly democratic countries. Survey evidence from Bulgaria, for example, suggests that exposure to political practices and public administration in advanced democratic countries deepens migrants’ understanding of democracy and good governance, thus raising their policy expectations vis-à-vis governments in their home countries (Levizt and Pop-Eleches 2010, 475-79). Booth and Seligson maintain that ‘heavy migration of Mexicans to their northern neighbour’ may help explain ‘the emergence of democratic values among urban Mexicans in spite of their authoritarian polity’ (1994, 123). Pérez-Armendáriz and Crow argue that ‘migrants are vectors of […] mass-level type of democratic diffusion’ (Pérez-Armendáriz and Crow 2010, 122).

Others have argued that pre-migration political socialization in the countries of origin has a more lasting effect on migrants’ political identity than socialization into host country norms and practices. Some studies find that ethnic voting patterns persist and do so in spite of assimilation as well as because of a lack of it (Dahl 1961; Wolfinger 1965). Acculturation does not eradicate pre-migration cultural attitudes, a parallel social and institutional life along ethnic lines, and internalized minority group identification (Parenti 1967, 724). Other aspects of pre-
migration socialization can also be resilient. Bilodeau (2008) shows that Canadian and Australian immigrants from countries with repressive regimes abstain more from protest than immigrants from countries with non-repressive regimes. One recent study is closely related to the argument put forward here: based on a survey of about 300 Bolivian external voters across four cities in four countries, Lafleur and Sánchez-Domínguez find that pre-migration socialization in particular geographical areas determines external vote choice (forthcoming).

Some studies find that diaspora networks help reproduce the norms and rituals underpinning migrants’ homeland political identities because such networks are often fragmented along the lines that correspond to cleavages in the countries of origin (Guarnizo and Diaz 1999). Many migrants live in communities clustered by ethnic background or other sub-national territorial divisions (Bauer, Epstein and Gang, 2002; Cognilio, 2003).

Finally, migrant socialization into civic norms and institutional practices of host countries can be limited by cultural and institutional barriers. Many migrants preserve their cultural identities through practicing cultural norms and rituals in their families and communities abroad, particularly when migrant inflows are channeled through family and community networks (Careja and Emmenegger 2011). These cultural identities and networks can discourage migrants from engaging in different civic and political practices. Many countries’ institutional frameworks allow only limited access for migrants to engage in civic and political practices, such as voting (Careja and Emmenegger 2011; Vogel and Ossietzky 2005). Escobar, Arana and McCann, (forthcoming) highlight the importance of Colombian migrants’ place of settlement in the host countries (rather than socio-economic status, age, time spent in migration, or neighbourhood networks) for transnational electoral participation.
Unlike the scholars on both sides of the question of whether or not migrants’ political identities change through the experience of migration, we do not see their findings as necessarily irreconcilable. The perceived incompatibility stems from two tendencies. The first is to treat migrant outlooks as holistic, without sufficient attention to the complexity of individual identities or to the multifarious nature of identity construction. The second tendency is to make generalizations across different identities.

However, migrants may display a striking resemblance to their non-migrant compatriots in some aspects of their political outlook, while having different identities and attitudes in other respects. The important question may not be whether migrants are different from their non-migrant compatriots in their political views in general, but which of their political identities and attitudes are similar or different, in what way, and what helps explain these similarities and differences.

Our study contributes to filling this gap by examining the salience of regional identities in the home country among current migrants. Regional identities can serve as an important basis for political mobilization (Bourdieu 1977; Brancati 2008; Keating 2000; Lieberman 2003; Rokkan and Urwin 1983). Regional political allegiances, understood as composites of ethnic, linguistic, religious and socio-economic identities and interests, represent one potentially stable cleavage in a fluid political environment (Sasse 2010). This phenomenon is not circumscribed to developing countries: regions have re-emerged as reconfigured principles of organization and markers of political preferences in many post-World War II European countries (Keating 2000; Knutsen 2010).

While studies offer insights into the causes and consequences of regionalism within nation states, surprisingly little attention has been paid to whether it travels beyond state borders.
Our research aims to shed light on this by answering two related questions. First, are regional political identities strong among migrants from countries with strong regional cleavages? Second, how does the effect of regional identities on the migrants’ political preferences compare to that of their other identities and additional factors? If we translate the logic inherent in the two main strands of the literature discussed above, it would follow either that migrants from countries with salient divisive regional cleavages would display weaker regional identities relative to their other identities or, on the contrary, that homeland regional identities would be a strong marker of the migrants’ political outlook and behavior.

A number of important studies trace the political views and attitudes of migrants through survey data (Careja and Emmenegger 2011; Levitz and Pop-Eleches 2010; Pérez-Armendáriz and Crow 2010). However, reported views may not necessarily translate into political action and a reported change in political attitudes may not be equivalent to a genuine change in political behavior. Among the various ways in which political identities can be expressed, vote choice is arguably one of the most indicative and consequential as it is more directly relevant to the voting individual’s outlook and interests. Reported vote choice preserves the element of self-identification, while providing a more precise focal point than a general self-placement on a political spectrum. We apply this logic to the analysis of migrant political identities.

If homeland regional political identities among migrant electorates from countries with salient regional cleavages are weak, then the extra-territorial vote choice should show weak regional alignments, if any. Factors other than regional background should explain the migrant electorates’ vote choice. Conversely, if the vote choice patterns displayed by migrant electorates from countries with salient regional cleavages exhibit the same regional divisions found among domestic electorates and the vote choice of individual migrants is predicted by their regional
background, controlling for important covariates, this would indicate the salience of homeland regional political identities among migrants. In addition, if we compare migrant electorates from two countries with salient regional political cleavages, the vote choice patterns of those from countries with stronger cleavages would be more likely to be aligned along these regional divisions. One might speculate that from the outset migrants may have had weaker political identities tied to their countries of origin, including regional identities. Thus, our analysis is tackling ‘hard’ cases, where evidence of strong regional identities in homeland elections adds weight. By definition, migrant voters are likely to represent those migrants with stronger political identities, but which identities are being expressed and how strong they are is far from clear, thereby limiting a potential selection bias.

Research Design

Our study subjects are transnationally active migrants from Ukraine and Poland. Domestic voting preferences in both Poland and Ukraine are shaped significantly by regional political identities. In Poland, the main regional cleavage in recent elections has been a north-west versus south-east split. While the north-west vacillates between center-left and center-right, the south-east tends to vote between center-right and right-wing parties. The political divide has been rooted in a combination of attitudes towards the communist regime, cultural-religious and socio-economic issues (Bell 1997; Powers and Cox 1997; Shabad and Slomczynski 1999). In Ukraine, the south-east vs. west political divide (with the center having repeatedly been the swing region) is more complex and more pronounced than in the Polish case. It includes ethnic, linguistic, historical and socio-economic cleavages – including a higher share of ethnic Russians and Russian-speakers and a concentration of heavy industry in the south-east. Similar to Poland,
regional identity in Ukraine is primarily a political concept that cannot be reduced to any one ethnic, cultural or economic marker, and has remained consistently salient in elections and public opinion since independence in 1991 (Birch, 2000; Kubicek 2000; Sasse 2010).

Presidential elections in Ukraine and Poland have a record of being closely contested – particularly in the second rounds, – thereby making the 2010 presidential elections in both countries valid for assessing the salience of regional political cleavages. Ukraine and Poland already had a track record of migrant voting by 2010, thereby limiting the ‘first time’ or ‘only time’ effect likely to occur after a recent extension of external voting rights. Voting in Ukraine and Poland is not mandatory and neither country requires migrant voters to return home in person to vote on election day. Polling stations open in embassies, consulates, community centers, etc. abroad. Both the Ukrainian and Polish external vote in presidential elections gets amalgamated into a global extra-territorial district.

**Data and Models**

We use data from our two original surveys of Ukrainian migrant voters in fifteen countries and Polish migrant voters in the United Kingdom during the 2010 Ukrainian and Polish presidential elections.

*Dependent Variable.* Our dependent variable is the vote choice for one of two candidates in the second round of each election. We code one indicator variable for each case. In the Polish case, our dependent variable is the vote choice for Komorowski (the candidate of the western regions) – it takes the value of 1 if the respondent reports voting for Komorowski (and 0 for Kaczyński, the candidate of the east and south). In the Ukrainian case, our dependent variable is the vote choice for Tymoshenko (the candidate of the western regions) – it takes the value of 1 if
the respondent reports voting for Tymoshenko (and 0 for Yanukovych, the candidate of the south-east).

Since these are dichotomous variables and we intend to estimate the effect of several predictors, we use multiple logistic regression. We start with a basic model that includes key variables and then enter groups of explanatory variables sequentially and separately to avoid collinearity and retain degrees of freedom. As in the Ukrainian case the data span fifteen countries, we group observations by country and estimate multilevel mixed-effects logistic regression models. Thus, we are able to isolate potential effects of country-specific factors on migrants’ vote choice and measure the impact of several country-level variables hypothesized to have an effect on migrants’ political preferences.

**Explanatory Variable.** Our explanatory variable of interest is the respondent’s home region. For most respondents in our datasets, we have data on their home province. In the Polish case, these are the 16 voivodships (województwo); in the Ukrainian case, 24 regions (oblasti), the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, and the cities of Kyiv and Sevastopol. In each case, we group these administrative units into three broad historical regions - western, eastern, and southern in the case of Poland and western, central, and eastern in the case of Ukraine.

Therefore, for Ukraine, we use two indicator variables for two regions – *West Ukraine* and *East Ukraine* if the respondent is from Western or Eastern oblasti of Ukraine, respectively. Respondents from Central Ukraine are used as a reference group. For Poland, we use one indicator variable – West Poland, which takes the value of 1 if the respondent is from a Western voivodship and 0 otherwise.

Following the domestic pattern in Poland, we expect Polish migrants from the north-west to be more likely to vote for Komorowski and migrants from the south-east, for Kaczyński.
Similarly, in the Ukrainian case, we expect migrants from Central and particularly Western Ukraine to be more likely to vote for Tymoshenko and migrants from Eastern Ukraine, for Yanukovych.

**Control Variables**

*Time in Migration.* Migrants are expected to gradually assimilate into the host society and cast off their homeland cultural practices and political identities (Gordon 1964; Alba 1985). Therefore, the longer the *Time in Migration* (measured in years), the weaker their expected homeland political identities should become. We also include interaction terms between region and time in migration to explore whether the effect of regional background on vote choice depends on time in migration. *Time in Migration* spans over 60 years as our sample covers individuals who have migrated as far back as 1948. As migrants who left Ukraine and Poland during the socialist era could be very different in their backgrounds and views from those who emigrated after 1991, we also include a *Cold War Immigrant* variable to account for these differences. It takes the value of 1 if the respondent emigrated before 1992 and 0 otherwise.

*Age.* *Time in Migration* may contain information about a migrant’s age, which in turn can be an important factor affecting vote choice. Younger age, for example, has been shown to encourage political participation in destination countries (Messina 2006). Therefore, we control for respondents’ *Age* to examine whether it weakens the effect of migration time or regional background on vote choice and to measure its individual effect on the voting for a specific candidate.

*Gender.* Some studies find that men and women can have different attitudes towards their countries of origin as well as their host societies (Hondagneu-Sotelo 1994). Male migrants from countries where politics has traditionally been dominated by men can have stronger political
views (Jones-Correa 1998). Men and women can also prefer a certain candidate because of their gender. In our Ukrainian case, the choice was between Yulia Tymoshenko (female) and Viktor Yanukovych (male). We examine whether Male migrants are more likely to vote for either candidate.

*Socioeconomic Profile.* Differences in vote choice may also be explained by the socioeconomic profiles of the respondents as the candidates in both cases are associated with different political and economic platforms. As mentioned above, regional divisions in both Poland and Ukraine broadly match socio-economic differences. Higher education can weaken homeland political identities and ties because it may facilitate integration into the host society (Gordon 1964; Pickus 1998). We capture the effect of respondent’s current occupation on vote choice by using four indicator variables – Manager, White-Collar, Blue-Collar, and Unemployed.\(^5\) We use Blue-Collar as a reference group as it provides a useful comparison to all three other groups, is well-defined, and has a relatively similar number of observations. In the Polish case, we also control for whether a respondent is from an Urban Background. Finally, Education measures the respondent’s highest educational attainment.

*Push and Pull Factors.* People migrate for different reasons and these reasons may be associated with their political preferences. Their motivations can indicate not only the nature, but also the likely duration of their stay in the host country. Seasonal labor migrants are likely to stay for a significantly shorter period than migrants who have migrated to join their partners or family members and both groups may vote differently depending on their plans to return home. We control for the potential effect of these different motivations for migration using five variables. Labor Migrants report migrating primarily in search of jobs and Family Migrants, to join their partners. Some migrants report Bad Home Politics or Bad Home Economy as motivations behind
their immigration. Finally, some individuals migrate in pursuit of learning or training (*Pursued Education*).

*Ties to Homeland.* Political theorists have actively debated the right to political participation via voting by non-resident citizens as this breaks the link between citizenship and territory and migrants do not have to live with the consequences of their electoral choice (Barry 2006; Bauböck 2005, 2007; Lopez-Guerra 2005; Vertovec, 2004). Migrants in frequent contact with family and friends in their countries of origin and intending to return can be different in their views, identities and political behavior from those with less contact. They may have a lot at stake at home and therefore could be expected to take voting in homeland elections more seriously than others. In particular, *Frequency of Family Contact*, whether a migrant *Sends Money Home* and *Plans to Stay under 5 years* can sustain or otherwise affect migrants’ allegiances in their country of origin.

*Socio-political Engagement.* First, as some studies argue that migrant transnational civic and political engagement in host countries affects their attitudes and identities, we estimate the effect of whether a respondent *Voted in Host Country* on his or her vote choice. Second, among the arguments against extra-territorial voting rights is the suggestion that non-resident citizens are less informed about the developments in their home country (Bauböck 2005; Lopez-Guerra 2005). Guarnizo et al., for example, find that contrary to expectations, the length of stay in the US does not decrease but rather increases the interest and involvement in homeland politics, as does a higher education level (Guarnizo et al. 2003, 1238). Therefore, we measure whether the extent to which the respondents *Followed the Campaign, Follow Developments at Home* and their level of *Homeland Political Participation* affect their vote choice. The latter variable is an index that ranges from 0 (no participation) to 10 (very active participation) and combines values
of variables that indicate whether the respondent has been voting in presidential, parliamentary and local elections at home, has been a member of any political party, has campaigned for a party or a candidate during elections, has given money to support a party or a candidate, has given money to support specific local political or economic initiatives, has stood as a candidate in elections, regularly discusses politics with friends and family, or has lobbied on his or her country’s behalf in their current country of residence.

_Diaspora Networks._ Higher levels of ethnic concentration and mobilization through ethnic associations are generally thought to increase the likelihood of immigrant political participation in host countries, including voting, through building trust and providing resources (Fennema and Tillie 1999; Østergaard-Nielsen 2003). We could therefore expect a weakening in political engagement with the homeland and the political identities expressed in the country of origin among migrants actively involved in co-ethnic networks in their destination country. However, the alternative hypothesis, drawn from the literature on long-existing diaspora groups such as the Jews or the Armenians, is just as plausible: frequent interaction with fellow migrants in the host country is likely to maintain engagement and identification with the homeland (Cohen 2008; Esman 2009; Sheffer 2003). The question is whether this identity link exists in more recent migrant communities and whether it reinforces or redefines political identities expressed through vote choice in homeland elections.

We control for such effects by including a measure of respondents’ _Engagement in Diaspora._ This composite variable ranges from 0 to 3 by combining the values on three variables: whether migrants report having been helped by migrants from their home country when they arrived in their current country of residence, whether they regularly mix with members of the established diaspora, and whether they have relied on the support and advice of
members of their diaspora. Thus, our research also establishes the relevance of the much-theorized migrant networks to contemporary migrants.

*Host Country Characteristics.* De Rooij finds that on balance the factors related to the destination country explain more of the variation in migrant political participation rates in destination countries than the factors related to their home countries (De Rooij 2012). Extending this logic, we could either hypothesize that factors related to the country of origin should be critical for the participation in and identification with homeland politics, or that the characteristics of the destination country outweigh the significance of homeland factors.

In the Ukrainian case, we capitalize on the fact that the survey draws on a cross-national sample from fifteen countries, which allows capturing country-level differences that may affect respondents’ views and vote choice. *Distance to Ukraine* estimates the effect of host country proximity to Ukraine using capital-to-capital distance (Gleditsch 2012). To measure the potential effect of the host country’s political system, we use *Host Country Polity* scores in 2009 for each of the fifteen countries (Marshall and Jaggers 2010). In addition, we include *Host Country Income* expressed in logged average GDP per capita between 2000 and 2008 to explore whether economic conditions in the host country affect vote choice. Unlike some other studies, however, we do not construe these two variables – democracy level and income in the host country - as exogenous to migrants’ political attitudes or voting preferences. Rather, causal arrows may run in the opposite direction as migrants possessing certain characteristics and predisposed to certain political views may be more likely to migrate and be able to stay in a country that best suits their skills or political outlook.
Explaining the Vote Choice among Ukrainian and Polish Migrant Voters

Our results indicate strong and consistent evidence that vote choice among Ukrainian and Polish migrant voters is significantly influenced by their regional identities in their countries of origin. We draw a simple cross-tabulation which shows that patterns of vote choice along regional lines in our sample of migrant voters are similar to the patterns of vote choice found among domestic voters, particularly in the Ukrainian case (Table 1). The strength of regional divisions in the domestic vote in the Ukrainian case roughly predicts the salience of regional divisions in the migrant electorate’s voting preferences. In the Polish case, while the Kaczyński vote among migrants from western Poland is 16.5 percent, it increases to 25.7 percent among voters from the east and south, suggesting the regional division in voting is taking place. However, while domestic divisions are less pronounced than in the Ukrainian case, the migrant sample’s vote is more skewed towards voting for Komorowski in both regions.

[Table 1 about here]

A significantly larger percentage of votes for Komorowski across regions in our sample may be partly explained by the overall UK-based migrant voting. Of a total of 43,979 Polish migrant voters in the second round of elections in the UK, 28 percent voted for Kaczyński and 72 percent for Komorowski. In our sample 22 percent voted for Kaczyński and 78 percent for Komorowski. This suggests that Polish migrants in the UK may be different from the domestic constituency in Poland in some way, such as age or socio-economic profile, that may be associated with vote choice, which we would take as a caveat when drawing conclusions until we have cross-national Polish migrant data. However, it may also suggest that migration experience in a liberal democratic country predisposes migrants to vote for a candidate with a liberal platform.
We next estimate the impact of the respondents’ regional background on vote choice by fitting logistic regression models that control for a number of covariates. The analysis confirms that regional background is a strong marker of vote choice among migrant electorates, even after controlling for a battery of other factors identified in the literature (Tables 2 and 3). Regional background variables in both cases have pronounced and statistically significant odds ratios. Specifically, holding all else constant at central values, if the migrant voter is from western Poland, she is almost twice more likely to vote for Komorowski. Given the dichotomous nature of vote choice and region variables, this implies that if the respondent is from eastern or southern Poland, she is twice less likely to cast her vote for Komorowski (Table 2) and twice more likely to vote for Kaczyński (results available from the authors).

In the Ukrainian case the regional cleavage in migrant vote choice is even stronger. If the respondent is from western Ukraine as opposed to central Ukraine, there is an increase in the odds of voting for Tymoshenko, but its statistical significance is not consistent across all models. This reflects the fact that in this election Tymoshenko dominated a swing central vote, which we use as a reference group in our sample. However, if the migrant voter is from eastern Ukraine as opposed to central Ukraine, the estimated odds of voting for Tymoshenko decrease by around 78 percent or more. This result remains statistically significant throughout all specifications. Thus, the most consistent and politically salient regional cleavage in voting patterns is the east-west cleavage: Yanukovych was the candidate of the east; and Tymoshenko the candidate of the (centre-)west. The fraction of observations correctly predicted by our models exceeds 80 percent in the Polish and 75 percent in the Ukrainian case. In the Ukrainian case, the intraclass
correlations across models indicate a relatively weak correlation of observations in the 15 country clusters, suggesting that most observations provide unique information.

To ensure that the effect of regional background on vote choice is not driven by recent migrants whose allegiances, according to the literature, are more likely to resemble those at home, all specifications include the Time in Migration. In both cases, there is some evidence, although not conclusive, that longer time in migration negatively affects the odds of voting for Komorowski and Tymoshenko, respectively, controlling for regional background and other factors. In addition, we ran the analysis with interaction terms between region and time in migration to examine whether how long respondents have been away from their homeland affects the strength of the effect of regional background (Models 2 in both tables). The interaction terms in neither case are statistically significant and the effect of regional background remains strong and statistically significant, suggesting that the effect of region on vote choice does not depend on time in migration. Finally, while in the Polish case we find no evidence of differences in vote choice between respondents who left during and those who left after the Cold War, we find such evidence in the Ukrainian case.

There is consistent evidence in the Polish case and weak evidence in the Ukranian case that age is associated with vote choice. Older respondents are less likely to vote for Komorowski - with an additional year in Age, the odds of voting for Komorowski falls by around 3 percent. This might explain the pro-Komorowski bias in the UK vote that is incongruent with the domestic vote choice pattern in that Polish respondents in our sample are generally younger, with an average age of 32 and a median of 30. Younger people may be more likely to have views that are consonant with Komorowski’s liberal platform, regardless of their regional background. We find weak evidence of such effect of Age in the Ukrainian case. This is not to say that age does
not matter in the case of Ukrainian migrant voters in particular countries, but it does not seem to be a cross-nationally valid phenomenon, once the effects of other factors are controlled for. We find no evidence of gender differences in vote choice in either the Ukrainian or Polish case.

In both Ukraine and Poland, regional divisions broadly capture socio-economic differences. To see whether socio-economic profile reduces the effect of region and to measure their individual effect on vote choice, we run the analysis after accounting for such differences. There is little sign that the migrant voters’ socioeconomic profile affects their vote choice in a direct way. In the Ukrainian case there is some evidence that white-collar migrants were more than 30 percent less likely to vote for Tymoshenko, controlling for other covariates, including region and host country. In the Polish case, the respondents’ urban background does not have an effect on whom they choose to vote for, controlling for their regional background and other factors. Critical for our analysis, however, is that the effect of regional background stays substantively large and statistically significant.

Migrant voters who left Poland because of the bad economic situation were more than 59 percent more likely to vote for Komorowski, controlling for regional background, socio-economic profile and other factors. This result might be driven by the migrant voters who left Poland during the tenure of Kaczyński’s twin brother (from 2006 to 2010) and might have been more likely to vote for the challenger, Komorowski. Other push and pull factors do not predispose migrant voters to voting for any particular candidate. Among ties to the homeland – whether the respondent plans to stay less than 5 years, sends money home, and frequently contacts family – only the latter seems to affect vote choice in both cases.7

The two cases differ in terms of the effect of political engagement in the host country on vote choice. In the Polish case, there is a sign that those who report having voted in elections in
their host country (UK) had 65 percent higher odds of voting for Komorowski. It is possible that Komorowski supporters were simply more likely to vote in the host country for some other reason. But this result might also suggest that engagement in civic practices in an advanced democracy affects migrant voters’ political views on homeland politics – for example, predisposing them to vote for a more liberal candidate, like Komorowski, or at least reinforcing this vote. There is no evidence in the Ukrainian case that voting in the host country affects vote choice in homeland elections.

The level of information about the election campaign and developments in their countries of origin do not affect the respondents’ vote choice in either case. However, a unit increase in the political participation index is associated with a 21 percent decrease in the odds of voting for Komorowski, indicating that politically more active Polish migrant voters were less likely to vote for Komorowski, controlling for regional background, age, education, and other factors. In the Ukrainian case, we do not find similar evidence, but there is an indication that the level of engagement in diaspora networks increases the odds of voting for Tymoshenko by around 44 percent, controlling for regional background and other factors. This may suggest either that the Tymoshenko campaign was more successful via diaspora networks or that Tymoshenko supporters are more engaged in such networks, regardless of their regional background, time in migration, age and other factors.

Finally, in the Ukrainian case, we run the analysis with three host country variables. The host country’s distance to Ukraine and level of economic development do not predict vote choice, controlling for other factors, and do not weaken the effect of regional background. Model 8, on the other hand, suggests that Ukrainian migrant voters in more democratic countries were more likely to vote for Tymoshenko – a unit increase in the Polity IV score increased the odds of
voting for Tymoshenko by 15 percent. However, we need to make sure that this result is not
driven by the fact that ethnically Russian or Russophone Ukrainian citizens, who could be expected to vote for Yanukovych regardless of their regional origins, reside in relatively larger numbers in the former Soviet republics, which in our country sample are less democratic than the rest of the countries included in the survey. As Model 9 (Table 3) shows, the effect of the Polity score disappears when we control for Host Country in FSU, i.e. whether the migrant has emigrated to the former Soviet Union (FSU). It also confirms that those who moved to the FSU were very unlikely to vote for Tymoshenko, controlling for regional background. The effect of regional background, however, remains substantively large and statistically significant.

To investigate potential differences in vote choice across respondent groups in different countries and thus further address the issue of data asymmetry between our Ukrainian and Polish cases, we estimate a logistic regression model with dummy variables for each host country in the Ukrainian respondent data. Given the geographic scope of the Polish data, we use the UK group as a reference category to see how the Ukrainian respondents based elsewhere vote compared to their compatriots residing in the UK. Apart from host country dummies, the model includes regional background and other statistically significant variables from the previous analysis. The results presented in Table 4 reveal three patterns. First, while the vote choice of respondents based in the rest of the European Union, North America, and Turkey are less inclined toward Tymoshenko than the vote choice of the UK-based respondents, these differences are not statistically significant. However, with the exception of respondents in Kazakhstan, respondents based in the FSU are significantly less likely to vote for Tymoshenko than their compatriots in the UK, with the vote choice of respondents in Belarus and Russia showing the most dramatic difference. Finally, the behavior of the regional background variables remains unchanged, with
respondents from East Ukraine highly unlikely to vote for Tymoshenko, regardless of their country of residence.

[Table 4 about here]

**Conclusion**

Our analysis documents that a pervasive type of political identity neglected in the literature on transnationalism and migration can be a strong marker of the migrant electorate’s political outlook and behavior. It finds that the vote choice of individual migrant voters from Ukraine and Poland is strongly predicted by their regional background in the countries of origin and that the vote choice patterns displayed by migrant electorates exhibit the same regional divisions found among domestic electorates. Thus, a strong predictor of domestic vote patterns in Poland and Ukraine – regional political identities – extends to the external vote. The results also suggest that the vote choice patterns of migrant electorates from countries with relatively stronger regional political cleavages (Ukraine) are more aligned along these regional divisions than those of migrant voters from countries with relatively weaker regional divisions (Poland). While such identities can be strong among migrant electorates, factors that reflect other identities, such as age, occupation, and motivations for emigration, also help explain the variation in political preferences, differently in the Ukrainian and Polish cases.

Our findings have three major theoretical implications. First, they challenge the thesis that migration experience in general or in advanced Western democracies in particular results in divergences of political outlooks of migrant electorates from those documented for their
respective home country electorates. While being carriers of new political views that can make them agents of change in their countries of origin in some ways, migrant voters – one type of politically active transnational migrants – can also reproduce salient homeland political identities.

Second, our finding of continued political divisions among migrant electorates also cautions us against the notion of a group identity, as suggested by some studies of transnationalism and diasporas. Here we do not exclude the possibility that the smaller proportion of old diaspora members in our samples might have left the effect of much longer periods in migration unaccounted for, but by going beyond only the most recent arrival years we know at least that a shared identity takes a long time to emerge.

Finally, contrary to the concerns of political theorists that external voting breaks the link between sovereignty and territory and gives the less informed extraterritorial citizens, i.e. migrants, a disproportionate influence on domestic affairs in their countries of origin, our analysis suggests that the external vote by migrants can maintain the predominant domestic voting cleavages and thereby reinforce rather than redefine the existing polity. Some political identities can be bundled up in ‘suitcases’ and reasserted away from the homeland, such as during polarized presidential elections.

The findings suggest that future research should be more wide-ranging in identifying the political, economic and institutional factors underpinning migrant’s political behavior, and ideally incorporate more country-level variables than regime type and income per capita. A sending country with domestically salient regional identities (or another type of political identity) and migrant electorates diverging from these identities would make for a useful extension of our
research, if such a case can be found. More research is required also to better distinguish migration effects from migrants’ choices of Western destinations. Our evidence of domestic political allegiances transcending national boundaries suggests an important research agenda at the intersection of international relations and comparative politics to further test the scope of what one could call 'internationalized domestic politics'.
References


Appendix: Description of Sampling and Data

The Polish survey used cluster sampling by identifying polling stations in the UK and selecting migrant voters at each station in the second round of the presidential elections using simple random sampling. The Ukrainian survey used multistage cluster sampling. First, major Ukrainian migrant destination countries were selected. Then other countries with Ukrainian migrant populations were sampled randomly to reflect the varying numbers of hosted Ukrainian migrants and the characteristics of host societies. Third, polling stations in each country were chosen randomly if more than one existed. Finally, respondents were selected through simple random sampling. The questions which this article is based on are identical across the two surveys.

Existing empirical studies of migrant political behavior, including ours, face two limitations – the absence of data on non-voting migrants and the cross-sectional research design (for an acknowledgement of this problem, see Careja and Emmenegger (2011); Levitz and Pop-Eleches (2010)). Both problems stem from the notorious difficulty of sampling migrants that arises because of the migrants’ mobility, the lack of official registration, the inherent biases associated with migrant organizations, and the resulting lack of sampling frames.

While the focus on migrant voters allowed for a random sample of at least a politically active sub-group of migrants, the absence of data in our surveys on non-voting migrants prevents generalizations to political identities of migrant populations and comparisons of voting to non-voting migrants. However, this does not undermine the validity of our study because we aim to assess a hypothesis on the strength of homeland political identities among actors who are seen as likely to be different in their political outlooks from their non-migrant compatriots. Since the samples we analyze include infrequent voters, our results may also be partly applicable to other migrants. Only about half of Polish and Ukrainian migrant voters in our sample indicated that
they always vote in homeland elections. And only around 39 percent of the Polish and 40 percent of the Ukrainian migrant voters in our sample indicated that they vote in this election because it is of particular importance. This means that our sample captures individuals beyond the core of transnationally active migrants.

The second potential problem is the cross-sectional setup. As Levitz and Pop-Eleches note, a panel setup would be ideal for measuring the impact of Western exposure on individuals’ attitudes because it would enable comparing the same individuals before and after they or their family member traveled to or worked in a Western country (Levitz and Pop-Eleches 2010, 476). But since such panel data are not available, Levitz and Pop-Eleches (2010) and Careja and Emmenegger (2011) control for several observable characteristics of respondents that may affect their decision and resources to work or travel abroad, such as age, education, settlement type, and income. However, this strategy still leaves us unable to establish to what extent migrants selected destination countries to suit their pre-existing attitudes on issues such as corruption or democracy or whether the migration experience affected a change in their views.

Similarly, Pérez-Armendáriz and Crow (2010) use a cross-sectional design that compares groups of Mexican citizens with different exposures to migration: return migrants, individuals from families or communities of current migrants, and individuals with no personal and little, if any, experience of migration in their social networks. Unlike others, Pérez-Armendáriz and Crow try to tackle potential selection bias and do so by leveraging Heckman’s two-stage estimator (Heckman 1978). They treat negative views of democracy in Mexico as potential causes for the decision to migrate and find no evidence of endogeneity. However, this technique hardly addresses the selection bias and endogeneity issues. First, as the authors admit, attitudes reported at the time of the survey can hardly be taken as legitimate proxies for the attitudes at the
time of migration, especially if migration took place a long time ago. Second, despite its
consistency, the Heckman two-stage estimator is known for inefficiency, the procedure it uses
introduces a measurement error problem and, as some Monte Carlo studies find, it does not
perform well under a variety of conditions (Kennedy 2008, 270-1).

Our study offers an alternative way to tackle endogeneity issues and alleviate the migrant
selection issues as regional identity can hardly be construed to directly affect the choice of
destination in terms of the destination country’s democracy, governance or economic
development appeal to migrants.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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* Average across oblasts in the region.
**TABLE 2. Logistic Models of Voting for Komorowski**

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<tr>
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<td><strong>Follows Developments at Home</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Homeland Political Participation</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Engagement in Diaspora</strong></td>
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<td>7.870***</td>
<td>8.277***</td>
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<td>4.180**</td>
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<td>Log pseudolikelihood</td>
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<td>-414.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>% correctly predicted</td>
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<td>81.8</td>
<td>81.8</td>
<td>81.9</td>
<td>81.8</td>
<td>81.9</td>
<td>80.8</td>
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</table>

*Notes: Reported are odds ratios, with robust standard errors in parentheses. ***, ** and * correspond to p<0.01, p<0.05, and p<0.10.*
### TABLE 3. Multilevel Mixed-Effects Logistic Models of Voting for Tymoshenko

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<th>Variables</th>
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<th>6</th>
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<td><strong>West Ukraine</strong></td>
<td>1.647**</td>
<td>1.211</td>
<td>1.575*</td>
<td>1.611**</td>
<td>1.590*</td>
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<td>0.210***</td>
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**Constant**

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**Observations**

| 704 | 704 | 704 | 702 | 701 | 697 | 682 | 697 | 697 |

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<th><strong>% correctly predicted</strong></th>
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*Notes: Reported are odds ratios, with standard errors in parentheses. Intercepts are random to account for intraclass correlation. ***, ** and * correspond to p<0.01, p<0.05, and p<0.10.*
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Observations       | 699
Log pseudolikelihood | -332.9
% correctly predicted | 79.40

Notes: The reference country (base category for country dummies) is the UK. Variables included in the model, but not reported: Time in Migration, Age, Manager, White-Collar, Unemployed, Frequency of Family Contact. Reported are odds ratios, with robust standard errors in parentheses. ***, ** and * correspond to p<0.01, p<0.05, and p<0.10.
Our sample includes several generations of migrants rather than only recent arrivals. For post-2004 migrants, the right to move, work and reside freely within the EU marks a difference between Polish and Ukrainian migrants and accounts for an increase in Polish migrants in (some) EU countries.

Collyer and Vathi (2007) discuss 115 countries that have extended voting rights; the overall number is likely to be higher.

While some studies (e.g., Bauer, Epstein and Gang (2002)) acknowledge the role of home country cleavages, they do not disentangle and measure their effect on migrant political behaviour. Lafleur and Sánchez-Domínguez (forthcoming 2014) are an exception in this respect.

The countries are the UK and those listed in Table 4.

We exclude respondents who are currently students and retired because their significantly smaller numbers entail multicollinearity in regressions.

The regional cleavage remains distinctive from a linguistic one. The inclusion of a dummy as a proxy for ‘native language’ – whether the survey was taken in Ukrainian or not – does not yield significant results.

The interaction term between region and family contact was not statistically significant.

We are grateful to an anonymous referee for this useful suggestion.