Working the Border – Contact and Cooperation in the Border Region, Ireland 1949-1972

Noga Zivan,
Wadham College.

Submitted in fulfilment of the requirements of the Degree of Doctorate of Philosophy in History.

Hilary Term 2007.

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The Irish border runs for 450 kilometres across a previously undifferentiated landscape. Along its length, two political entities struggled for political identity and recognition. Their national posturing reverberated at the local level, where residents continued to live, attempting both to maximise the advantages of their peripheral location and to minimise its disadvantages, while effectively carrying out their economic roles despite, around, and through the political divide.

The thesis examines the local contact networks which operated across the Irish border in the years between the declaration of the Republic in 1949 and the early years of the Northern Ireland Troubles. Focusing on the experiences of border communities and organisations which sought to deliver similar services on either sides of the divide, it aims to shed light on the reality of international frontiers for those living immediately around them.

The thesis focuses on five contexts of interaction: personal and economic; and professional contact between police, tourism, and local government authorities. Through these, the factors necessary for successful interaction across an international border are examined. Over the length of the period, the effects of different states of unrest or rapprochement at the national level on local and professional networks are examined.

The thesis makes extensive use of interview data with participants, both major and minor; published personal recollections; the local press; and local council reporting, in order to explore a border community within a cross-section of time. The focus is on local communities' own words and self-perceptions, in order to counteract top-down discussions of the frontier, to illuminate the effects of political decision-making on the ground and the local factors which help shape national policy.

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The Irish border, separating the twenty six counties of the Republic of Ireland from six counties of Northern Ireland, runs for 450 kilometres between the Irish Sea at Carlingford Lough and the North Sea at the Foyle estuary. The line of the border follows what had been, pre-1921, a nominal political division between purely administrative areas. Consequently, the new frontier cut across established settlement patterns and existing social and commercial networks. As Northern Ireland and the Republic sought to assert their independent standing, this administrative division became increasingly important, forcing changes in the patterns of life around it.

Traditional historiography has tended to consider individual jurisdictions as distinct entities, ending in clear frontiers, beyond which were separate social and political units. This has been partly the result of an overwhelming focus on diplomatic and governmental history, for which borders did indeed mark end-points in jurisdiction, and partly, in the Irish case, a reaction against the Northern Ireland Troubles, as Southern Irishmen sought to distance themselves from the increasing chaos beyond their borders. It is only recently, following developments in the fields of sociology and anthropology in particular, stimulated by an increasingly powerful supra-national European Union, that historians have begun to examine borders in terms of zones of contact, rather than division.

In applying this new approach to the Irish border, this study considers the effect of the political divide, and the changes it underwent, on the lives of those resident in its immediate vicinity. The study focuses upon the five northern counties which share a land or sea border with the Republic: Down, Armagh, Fermanagh, Tyrone and Derry/Londonderry; and the five Southern border counties of Donegal, Leitrim, Monaghan, Cavan and Louth. Using local source material, both published and unpublished, the local press, interviews and council records, the impact of the border and attitudes to the political 'other' are highlighted, as well as the extent to which that 'other' was known and interacted with. By focusing upon the impacts of the border on local communities, and on cross-border interaction and continuity, it is intended to counterbalance the prevailing image of the frontier as an end-point. The thesis goes on to examine the effect of ongoing contact upon the policies of the three governments concerned, both in how they sought to make use of it, to limit and to control it, and in terms of how border communities sought to use it in order to influence governmental

policies. In this, the thesis goes beyond the political rhetoric in order to establish the effective means whereby the international frontier operated.

The thesis considers five main areas of North-South interaction. The first two, social and economic, comprise a general study of cross-border contact networks among local residents, and how these affected policies at a national level. The thesis then examines in detail interaction and cooperation between the police forces, local authorities and the tourism industry. Though this examination, the thesis aims to establish the framework within which cross-border cooperative contacts were established and maintained, thus helping to illuminate the conditions necessary for such links to be fostered elsewhere. The period chosen, from the declaration of the Republic in 1949 until the accession of Ireland to the European Economic Community, encompasses a range of political conditions along the border, from times of relative peace to the disturbances of the border campaign; periods of economic tension, such as the enforcement of post-war rationing and the 1968 foot and mouth epidemic in Great Britain. This wide time-span allowed the cross-border networks to be observed through a range of conditions, and thus highlighted the effects of these different circumstances upon them.

The first broad context examined is the personal, familial and social, since these basic units formed the foundation upon which all inter-personal relations, whether inter-state or intra-community, were built. Social networks are examined in terms of their significance to the participants, and of their likely impact upon the wider interaction between the jurisdictions. The study examines what the border meant, in real terms, to the social aspects of the lives of local communities, and the multiple roles which it played at different periods. The chapter goes on to examine the attempts by one cross-border group, the United Societies of Castleblaney, to affect the national policies of London, Dublin and Belfast through the creation of an alternative 'parliament' within which constitutionally elected politicians from both sides were able to meet in order to discuss the issues facing border residents.

The second context examined is that of economic links. Beginning with a more general discussion of the extent of cross-border economic contact, the study goes on to discuss the effects which changing economic conditions, and the laws enacted to create or counteract them, had on border communities. The impact of customs patrols, differential subsidies, and the opening and blocking of cross-border routes is assessed. The chapter also discusses the ways in which communities sought to utilise their peripheral positions in order to further their own economic ends, through the use of both the formal and informal economies. Attempts to influence national policy in this context discussed with relation to a cross-border committee dedicated to the re-opening of the Carrickmacross to Crossmaglen road to motorised traffic, and a joint committee operated by the two chambers of commerce.

The three fields of cross-border professional interaction chosen for close study are united by their importance to Irish and Northern Irish images of self and of the 'other'. Each functioned separately in North and South, and proved controversial as regards cross-border cooperation. Thus the study is able to highlight the reasons why cooperative contacts were successfully established even in apparently unpromising fields. Each area is examined within its governmental, legal and national framework before the networks established within it are discussed, and the compromises

necessary in order for these to be maintained. Thus the interaction between local and national levels, their conflicts and how these were resolved or negotiated are highlighted. The fields chosen were intentionally six and twenty-six county in nature, since organisations which maintained their thirty-two county aspect post-1921 had no need to reach outside themselves in order to establish cross-order links, and were thus less useful in charting the creation and maintenance of cooperation networks.

The right to define and enforce laws is considered among the vital signs of effective state administration. This can be seen in the importance attached by the Irish independence movement to the establishment of an alternative legal system pre-1921, and in its ruthlessness, post-Independence, in suppressing those who refused to accept its writ. In Northern Ireland, the state judiciary and RUC formed one of the major focuses for those disputing the legality of the state. As such, cooperation between the RUC and Garda Síochána was controversial, both socially and politically. To individual policemen, however, seeking to carry out their function along a meandering border, within a profession which enjoyed extensive pre- and post-partition links, cooperation seemed a sensible means whereby to ensure effectiveness. Through a close study of the legal and constitutional framework within which the two police forces operated, and the evidence produced by the forces in terms of autobiographies, interview data and police magazines, the *Garda Review* and *Constabulary Gazette,* this chapter traces the presence and extent of cross-border contact and cooperation between the forces and the forums, professional and social, within which they took place.

Irish local government forms the fourth field examined by the thesis. While concerned primarily with the needs of a local electorate, County and District Councils were reliant on central government grants for an increasing proportion of their funding. Many councillors served on the fringes of national parties, through whom they sought advancement for both themselves and their electors, and whom they were consequently loath to criticise. As such, local councils formed an important link between the local and national political contexts. Important divergences had taken place post-1921 between the local administrations of the two jurisdictions with the introduction of the County and City Management system in the Republic. This chapter explores this divergence, and the effect which it had on inter-council cooperation. The ways in which the differing developments of the two systems affected their public image and effectiveness are analysed, as are the effects of the civil rights accusations upon the Northern Irish councils. The chapter then examines the areas of joint concern where councils on both sides of the border chose to cooperate in order to fulfil efficiently their various allotted roles.

The final field examined is that of tourism promotion. Central to international image-making and the perception of the state, and an economically vital industry, tourism formed a major concern for Stormont and Dublin, and an area in which economic need clashed with political ideology. As an industry easily transferable to otherwise underdeveloped areas, tourism also formed a major preoccupation for border communities. This was reflected in the level of scrutiny to which cooperative contacts in this field were subjected. Cooperation within tourism was largely delegated to the two tourist boards, which had an economic and professional interest in their success. This chapter examines the relationship between these multiple interest groups and their effect on cooperation initiatives. As an essentially public-relations based

industry, tourism also formed a sensitive barometer for perceived political instability, allowing the effects of changing political circumstances upon cooperation networks to be examined.

The thesis examines the effect of government policy upon local cooperation networks. The hypothesis was considered that increased government interest, and hence support and funding, would stimulate cross-border links. This did not, however, seem to be borne out by the evidence. Various groups expressed dissatisfaction with 'top down' or governmental interest, while in many cases the increased scrutiny which national interest brought was cited as an active hindrance to cooperative contact.

Through an examination of the contact and cooperation networks established in these five contexts, conclusions are suggested concerning the factors necessary for contact to be established and for active cooperation to be initiated and maintained. The framework establishes social and personal contact as the preliminary necessity for the formation of cooperation networks, onto which willingness to cooperate, motivation and opportunity for contact are grafted. As these three factors fluctuate, so the level of cooperation varies. The absence of any one factor causes networks to fail entirely. However, cooperation was not necessary in all linearly-connected agencies in order for one such agency to form successful cooperative networks. At the same time, all levels of contact, from the local to the national, are affected by universal factors such as morale and economic well-bring, so that contacts peaked during the early 1960s and fell away in the early 1970s. Since contact is not dependent upon cooperation, but rather the other way around, each falling off in cooperation which does not extinguish contact leaves the potential for future cooperation in place. It is theoretically possible, were contact to be entirely eliminated, that no new cross-border initiative would arise. Current academic thinking considers such a position untenable in the long term, however, and certainly so along a border as long and as open as that between the United Kingdom and Ireland.

Contents

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS **4**

1. ABBREVIATIONS **6**

2. INTRODUCTION **8**

3. IRISH BORDER IN EVERYDAY LIFE **24**

CROSS-BORDER POPULATION MOVEMENTS 25
KINSHIP, FAMILY AND CROSS-BORDER CONTACT 37
THE PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFECT OF THE PRESENCE OF THE POLITICAL 'OTHER' 46
SOCIAL INTERACTION ACROSS THE BORDER 54
THE BORDER AS A LEGAL FRONTIER 68
THE BORDER AS A MEANS OF ESCAPE 73
PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY AND THE CROSS-BORDER COMMUNITY - THE UNITED SOCIETIES OF CASTLEBLANEY 79
POLITICAL ALLEGIANCES AND LEADERSHIP WITHIN A CROSS-BORDER CONTEXT 87
PERSONAL CONTACT AND NATIONAL POLICY 93
CONCLUSION 96

4. CROSS-BORDER ECONOMICS - DIFFICULTIES AND OPPORTUNITIES 98

NORTH/SOUTH ECONOMIC ACTIVITY IN CONTEXT. 102
ECONOMIC BORDER LIFE - CONSOLIDATION AND PERIPHERALISATION 112
APPROVED ROADS AND THE CHANNELISATION OF CROSS-BORDER TRAFFIC 116
THE EFFECT OF PERIPHERALISATION ON BORDER COMMUNITIES 130
EASING THE BURDEN OF ISOLATION 134
SMUGGLING AND THE CROSS-BORDER ECONOMY 140
THE LEGITIMATE USE OF BORDER ECONOMICS 150
CROSS-BORDER BODIES AS A POLICY BRIDGE 153
CHANGES IN CROSS-BORDER ACCESS 156
CONCLUSION 159

5. CROSS BORDER POLICE INTERACTION 161

THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF CROSS-BORDER INTERACTION 169
PROFESSIONAL POLICE CONTACT 175
SOCIAL INTERACTION BETWEEN THE RUC AND GARDA 195
THE U.S.C. 210
CONCLUSION 211

6. ADMINISTERING THE BORDERLANDS – LOCAL AUTHORITIES AND THE IRISH BORDER 213

THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT SYSTEM IN IRELAND 214
POTENTIAL AREAS OF COOPERATION 228
Roads *229*
Transport *236*
Drainage *240*
Service Provision *248*
Information Exchange *257*
SOCIAL AND SEMI-SOCIAL CONTACT BETWEEN COUNCIL PERSONNEL 263
CONCLUSIONS 268

7. TOURISM - SUB NATIONAL AND LOCAL COOPERATION WITHIN A NATIONAL POLICY FRAMEWORK 271

THE STRUCTURE OF THE TOURISM INDUSTRY WITHIN IRELAND 272
THE IDEOLOGICAL BACKGROUND TO TOURISM COOPERATION 275

PERSONAL CONTACTS WITHIN TOURISM 285
THE ECONOMIC REALITIES OF CROSS-BORDER TOURISM 288
AREAS OF COOPERATION 290
NON-POLITICISATION AND THE MAINTENANCE OF 'GRAY' AREAS 298
LOCAL TOURISM COOPERATION 301
THE IMPACT OF POLITICAL CHANGE ON TOURISM 307
CONCLUSION 318

8. CONCLUSION 320

9. PLATES 325

10. BIBLIOGRAPHY 328

PRIMARY SOURCES 328
SECONDARY SOURCES 344

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1. Abbreviations

BBC	British Broadcasting Corporation
BTA	British Travel Association
CC	County Council
C.C.A.	Cavan County Archives
CCJ	Chamber of Commerce Journal
CCM	County Council Minutes
CG	Constabulary Gazette
CIE	Córas Iompair Éireann
C.S.O.	Central Statistics Office
C.T.H.	Carrickmacross Town Hall
C.U.D.C.O.	Castleblaney Urban District Council Offices
D.C.A.	Donegal County Archives
DEA	Department of External Affairs
DLG	Department of Local Government
DMD	Dublin Metropolitan Police
DTP	Department of Transport and Power
EEC	European Economic Community
EFTA	European Free Trade Association
EU	European Union
GAA	Gaelic Athletics Association
GNR	Great Northern Railway
GPO	General Post Office
GR	Garda Review
IPA	International Police Association
IRA	Irish Republican Army
ITA	Irish Tourism Association
IUOTO	International Union of Official Travel Organizations
L.C.A.	Louth County Archives
L.C.C.O.	Leitrim County Council Offices
M.C.C.O.	Monaghan County Council Offices
MP	Member of Parliament
NACA	Athletics Athletic and Cycling Association of Ireland
N.A.I.	National Archives of Ireland
N.A.L.	National Archives London
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NFA	National Farmers Association
NI	Northern Ireland
NIO	Northern Ireland Office
NIP	Northern Ireland Progress
NITB	Northern Ireland Tourist Board
NS	Northern Standard
OPW	Office of Public Works
PACE	Protestant and Catholic Encounters

PRONI	Public Records Office, Northern Ireland
PSNI	Police Service of northern Ireland
RAF	Royal Air Force
RDC	Rural District Council
RIC	Royal Irish Constabulary
RTE	Raidió Teilifís Éireann
RUC	Royal Ulster Constabulary
SDLP	Social and Democratic Labour Party
TD	Teachta Dála
TDA	Tourism Development Association
UCD	University College Dublin
UDC	Urban District Council
UDI	Unilateral Declaration of Independence
UDR	Ulster Defence Regiment
UFU	Ulster Farmers' Union
UG	Ulster Gazette
UK	United Kingdom
USA	United States of America
UTA	Ulster Transport Authority
UTDA	Ulster Tourism Development Association
USC	Ulster special Constabulary
VAT	Value Added Tax

2. Introduction

The Irish border, separating the twenty six counties of the Republic of Ireland from the six counties of Northern Ireland, runs for 450 kilometres between the Irish Sea at Carlingford Lough and the North Sea at the Foyle estuary.[1] The line it follows marks the county boundaries which had evolved in Ireland in the period between 1200 and 1716 AD, and which emerged as the pre-eminent unit of local administration under the 1898 Local Government Act (Ireland).[2] As the new districts had limited legal importance when first constituted, and despite claims that the area had been a frontier zone for hundreds of years previously, settlement patterns along the later frontier had grown up with no reference to it, creating a border 'dictated with a view to political pacification rather than administrative efficiency.'[3] Indeed, Professor Estyn Evans has argued that settlements were disproportionately likely to have been built across the later divide 'since in Ireland county boundaries frequently ran along rivers which later attracted urban settlements.'[4] As a result, at the time of partition, the border crossed 170 roads and divided 1,400

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[1] Liam O'Dowd, James Corrigan and Tim Moore, 'Borders, National Sovereignty and European Integration: the British-Irish case', *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research,* Vol. 19, No. 2, March 1995, p. 274. (Henceforth-*Urban Research*),

[2] Mary E. Daly, 'preface', p. x. and 'The County in Irish History', pp. 2-3 in Daly (ed.) *County and Town – One hundred Years of Local Government in Ireland* (Dublin, 2001), p. x. (Henceforth – *Country and Town*).

[3] Nicholas Mansergh, *The Government of Northern Ireland: A study in devolution* (London, 1936), p. 314. Arguments in favour of Ulster's distinctive identity pre - 1921 concentrate on its geographical isolation and history as a stronghold of the Celts, and later the Ulster Scots Planters. See, for example, Oliver MacDonagh, *States of Mind* (London, 1983), p. 19, Charles Brett, *Long Shadows Cast Before* (Edinburgh, 1978), p. 1, E. Estyn Evans, *Ulster – the Common Ground* (Mullingar, 1984), p. 8, Aidan Walsh, 'The Black Pig's Dyke: a forgotten border', in Brian S. Turner (ed.) *The Debateable Lands* (Downpatrick, Co. Down, 2002), pp. 31–7 and Alan Robinson, 'Londonderry, Northern Ireland: A Border Study', *Scottish Geographical Magazine,* Vol. 86, 1970, p. 208.

[4] E. Estyn Evans, 'The Personality of Ulster', *Institute of British Geographers- Transactions*, No. 51, Nov. 1970, p. 4.

agricultural holdings, running through villages, and even individual houses.[5] The Great Northern Railway (GNR) network alone crossed the border in no fewer than seventeen places.[6] At the same time, it cut off areas such as the Drummully peninsula, in County Monaghan, from road or rail link to the rest of Southern Ireland.[7] The rivers whose course the border followed, such as the Finn and Blackwater, were unstable geographical entities liable to change though flooding and drainage work.[8] Little consideration was given for the practical problems which such a frontier would pose. Efforts to lend it greater geographical coherence through the inclusion of Donegal in Northern Ireland, the utilisation of the Boundary Commission mechanism embodied in article 12 of the 1921 Anglo-Irish Treaty or through the Council of Ireland failed.[9]

In the vacuum created by the lack of government contact, informal and utilitarian cooperation networks were established. These allowed an effective operation of the functions of government, local and national, to take place along the political divide, and to minimise the effect of the frontier on those resident in its immediate vicinity. The source, extent, and changing nature of these cross-border links, and the impact which wider political and national circumstances had upon them, form the subject of this thesis.

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[5] Note on the ceasing of stamping of pass books and control forms, Jan. 1963, file S1955/63, *Boundary with Northern Ireland Customs Barrier General* (Henceforth – *Customs*), Dept. of Taoiseach, National Archives of Ireland (N.A.I.). O'Dowd, Corrigan and Moore, *Urban Research*, p. 274.

[6] Tom Ferris, *The Great Northern Railway* (Hinckley, Leicestershire, 2003), p. 9.

[7] Drummally's isolation remained controversial, particularly once the spiking of border roads had cut its direct links to the rest of County Monaghan. See file S1955/63 *Customs,* Dept. of Taoiseach, N.A.I..

[8] J. Mangelsdorf, K. Scheurmann and F.-H. Weiß, *River Morphology* (Berlin, Heidelberg, New York, 1980), p. 1.

[9] Anglo-Irish Treaty: Http://Cain.ulst.ac.uk/issues/politics/docs/ait192.htm. Geoffrey J. Hand, *Report of the Irish Boundary Commission 1925* (Shannon, 1969), p. xvii. MacDonagh argues that this failure resulted from the inability of the nationalist treaty negotiators to envisage the possibility of Ireland remaining partitioned. Cited in Oliver MacDonagh, *States of Mind* (London, 1983), pp. 23-25. See also John Bowman, *De Valera and the Ulster Question 1917-1973* (Oxford, 1989), pp. 12-16.

For the purposes of this research, the area under consideration is a slightly expanded definition of the 'border area' as employed by O'Dowd, Corrigan and Moore, 'including local authority areas contiguous to the land border', making up four of Northern Ireland's six counties, and five of the Republic's.[10] In consideration of the importance of sea routes to coastal communities, this definition has been broadened to include the County Down, which shares a water boundary, Carlingford Lough, with County Louth.[11] County Sligo, despite being defined for the purpose of EU funding as a border county has not been included since it shares no physical contact zone with any Northern Irish administrative area.

The period under discussion encompasses the years between the declaration of Ireland as a Republic by the Costello government of 1949, and the accession of both Northern Ireland, as part of the UK, and the Republic of Ireland to the European Economic Community (EEC, later European Union, EU,) on 1 January 1973. Though this period takes in the early years of the Northern Ireland Troubles, commonly accepted as having commenced in 1969, these form only one aspect of a varied national scene against which the contacts discussed took place.

In 1949 the Republic of Ireland was beginning to emerge from the international isolation created by its neutrality during World War II.[12] The repeal of the External Relations Act

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[10] O'Dowd, Corrigan and Moore, *Urban Research*, p. 272. A similar definition is used by Brian Harvey et. al., *The Emerald Curtain* (Carrickmacross, 2005), p. 7.

[11] Heslinga argues convincingly for the existence of two Irish borders, one the land border between Northern Ireland and the Republic, and one a sea border separating the Republic from Great Britain. See Marcus W. Heslinga, *The Irish Border as a Cultural Divide* (Assen, 1962), p. 8.

[12] Robert Fisk, *In Time of War* (London, 1983), p. 469. Paul Arthur, *Special Relationships* (Belfast, 2000), p. 71.

(1936) by the inter-party government of 1948 to 1951 took the Southern state out of the British Commonwealth and redefined it as a Republic. In reaction, the British government passed the 1949 Ireland Act, 'copper fastening … partition'.[13] The act, while not giving Northern Ireland's Prime Minister, Basil Brooke all he had hoped for, did guarantee to unionists that 'Northern Ireland remains part of His Majesty's dominions and … at no moment will Northern Ireland or any part thereof cease to be part of His Majesty's dominions and of the United Kingdom without the consent of the Parliament of Northern Ireland.'[14] In the decade which followed, the Republic of Ireland underwent a period of economic stagnation, resulting in the highest levels of emigration since the 1880s 'as thousands of young men and women voted with their feet against the conviction that they were uniquely favoured in their Western fastness, immune from a modern world closely identified with anglicanisation and with England.'[15] 'A staggering four out of every five children born in the 1930s left Ireland in the 1950s.'[16] The depression and lethargy which resulted, particularly among the young, led to 'a good deal of Irish heart-searching and concern about the future', and doubts about the Republic's very viability as a state.[17] Fears were expressed that the weakening of 'national pride and confidence' among those who remained 'of itself retard[ed] the efforts required for

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[13] J.J. Lee, *Ireland 1912 - 85* (Cambridge, 1989), p. 301.

[14] 'Chapter 41, Ireland Act, 1949', File HLOPPU194912, pp. 12 & 14 *Ireland Act*, House of Lords Archive, London. See also Ronan Fanning 'The Response of the London and Belfast Governments to the Declaration of the Republic of Ireland, 1948 - 49', *International Affairs,* Vol. 58, No. 1, Winter 1981-2, pp. 103-5. Nicholas Mansergh, *The Unresolved Question* (New Haven and London, 1991), p. 340.

[15] Terence Brown, *Ireland - A Social and Cultural History 1922-1985* (London, 1990), p. 215. (Henceforth – *Ireland*). See also Gerry O'Hanlon, 'Population Change in the 1950s: A Statistical Review', in Keogh, O'Shea and Quinlan (ed.), *Ireland in the 1950s* (Cork, 2004), p. 72.

[16] Senia Pašeta, *Modern Ireland* (Oxford, 2003), p. 131.

[17] Brown, *Ireland,* p. 212. (Henceforth- *Ireland*). See also Enda Delaney, 'The Vanishing Irish? The Exodus from Ireland in the 1950s' in Keogh, O'Shea and Quinlan (ed.), *Ireland in the 1950s* (Cork, 2004), p. 82.

national progress.'[18] This economic and social malaise was reflected in political instability, with the Republic of Ireland undergoing four changes of government between 1948 and 1957, and an unimaginative anti-Partitionist foreign policy.[19] Ideologically, 'the fires of economic nationalism and the quest for cultural self-sufficiency were waning, but as yet they had not been replaced by a coherent set of new values', leading to increased uncertainty and unease, and ultimately to the birth of new ideas, a 'watershed' period 'in which an entire epoch ended and the modern one began.'[20]

In the 1950s, Northern Ireland saw the continued dominance by the Unionist Party of the devolved parliament at Stormont under Prime Minister Sir Basil Brooke, first Viscount Brookeborough, and a remarkably small, and unvarying, number of cabinet colleagues.[21] While not suffering economic depression to the same extent as the Republic, the North also failed to experience a post-war boom comparable to that of other European economies.[22] Among continued high unemployment and fears regarding the impact of welfare state legislation on the unionist majority, the ruling elite within Northern Ireland continued to face questions regarding bias in the issuing of work and residence permits, and the allocation of housing.[23] At the same time, the implementation of early welfare legislation, in particular the extension of the 1944 Butler Education Act to Northern Ireland under Colonel Hall-Thompson's Education Act of 1947, and international trends

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[18] Commission on Emigration and other Population Problems, *Reports* (Dublin, 1954), p. 141.
[19] Brown, *Ireland*, p. 221.
[20] Ibid., p. 221. Brian Fallon, *An Age of Innocence* (Dublin, 1998), p. 257.
[21] Patrick Buckland, *The Factory of Grievances – Devolved Government in Northern Ireland 1921-1939* (Dublin and New York, 1979), p. 10.
[22] N.F.R. Crafts, 'The Golden Age of Economic Growth in Postwar Europe: Why did Northern Ireland Miss Out?', *Irish Economic and Social History,* Vol. XXII 1995, p. 5.
[23] David Harkness, *Ireland in the Twentieth Century – Divided Island* (Basingstoke and London, 1996), pp. 86-7. Patterson, 'Border Unionism', p. 514.

towards civil rights agitation, sowed the seeds of future unrest by providing education and direction to a new, expanded catholic middle class.[24]

Alongside the depressed economic conditions in both parts of Ireland and, indeed, partly as a result of these conditions, the 1950s also saw the launch of series of cross-border raids by the Irish Republican Army (IRA), codenamed 'Operation Harvest'.[25] This 'Border Campaign' continued sporadically from 1956 until 1962, and led, in total, to the deaths of eighteen people.[26] It was ultimately contained by the introduction in both North and South of internment without trial for suspected IRA members.[27]

After the hardships of the 1950s, the early 1960s constituted the beginning of a new phase of optimism in Ireland.[28] In the South, Kenneth Whitaker's *First Programme for Economic Expansion* was published in 1958, signalling a change in government attitudes towards the economy and planning.[29] As the economy grew, emigration declined, and the

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[24] John Hume, *A New Ireland* (Boulder, Colorado, 1996), pp. 23 and 36-7. Barry White, *John Hume – Statesman of the Troubles* (Belfast, 1984), p. 11. Richard Rose, 'Northern Ireland: the Irreducible Conflict', in J.V. Montville (ed.) *Conflict and Peacemaking in Multiethnic Societies* (Lexington, Massachusetts and Toronto, 1990), p. 141. Alvin Jackson, *Ireland 1798-1998* (Oxford, 1999), p. 366. (Henceforth –*Ireland*).

[25] Ian S. Wood 'The IRA's Border Campaign 1956-1962', in Anderson and Bort (ed.) *The Irish Border* (Liverpool, 1999), pp. 133-126. File HO/5/4/7, April 1958, PRONI, quoted in Ferriter, *The Transformation of Ireland, 1900 - 2000* (London, 2005), p. 461. Paul Arthur, *Special Relationships* (Belfast, 2000), p. 53.

[26] Boyer-Bell, *The Secret Army* (London, 1970), pp. 289–307 and 334, David Harkness' *Ireland in the Twentieth Century – Divided Island* (Basingstoke and London, 1996), p. 88.

[27] Jonathan Bardon, *A History of Ulster* (Belfast, 2001), pp. 607-8.

[28] Maurice Hayes, *Minority Verdict* (Belfast, 1995), p. 4. (Henceforth - *Minority Verdict*)

[29] See Brendan Walsh, 'Economic Growth and Development, 1945 - 70', in J. J. Lee (ed.), *Ireland 1945 - 70* (Cambridge, 1989), p. 31. Also Michael Kennedy 'Towards cooperation; Seán Lemass and North-South economic relations: 1956 - 65', *Irish Economic and Social History,* Vol. XXIV, 1997, p. 42. Not all commentators agree on the centrality of T. K. Whitaker's *Programme for Economic Expansion*. See, for example, Paul Bew and Henry Patterson, *Séan Lemass and the Making of Modern Ireland* (Dublin, 1982), pp. 194-5 and John A. Murphy, *Ireland in the 20th Century* (Dublin, 1975), p. 123.

new optimism resulted in a re-assessment of other urgent issues such as state welfare and education.[30]

In Northern Ireland, Lord Brookeborough was replaced as Prime Minister, after a tenure of twenty years, by the younger, more proactive and planning-orientated Terence O'Neill. The failure of the catholic minority to support the IRA during the border campaign led to new hopes for a stable future, and the emergence of hesitant voices advocating the full integration of the minority community into all aspects of the Northern state, including the Unionist Party itself.[31] The Matthew Plan for the future development of Belfast, completed in 1963, and the Wilson Report into *Economic Development in Northern Ireland*, submitted in 1964 and published in 1965 brought the concept of planning into the political language of Northern Ireland.[32]

This new-found optimism was reflected in improved relations between the two governments, culminating, in January 1965, in the visit of Taoiseach Séan Lemass to Stormont, home of the Northern Ireland Parliament, to meet Northern Premier Terence O'Neill. This was the first meeting between the heads of the two governments since April 1924, and was seen by many as ending the 'Cold War' which had existed between the

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[30] Liam Kennedy, *People and Population Change* (Dublin, Belfast, 1994), p. 21. Gerry O'Hanlon, 'Population Change in the 1950s: A Statistical Review', in Keogh, O'Shea and Quinlan (ed.), *Ireland in the 1950s* (Cork, 2004) pp. 72-3. Noël Browne, *Against the Tide* (Dublin 1987), p. 156. The Commission on Education in the Republic was appointed in 1962, its recommendations later implemented by energetic Education Secretary Donagh O'Malley. Ferriter, *Transformation of Ireland*, pp. 596–598, Brown, *Ireland*, p. 249. Jackson, *Ireland*, pp. 329-30.

[31] J. C. Beckett, 'Northern Ireland', *Journal of Contemporary History*, Vol. 6, No. 1, 1971, p. 133. Henry Patterson, *Ireland since 1939* (Dublin, 2006), p. 120. Marc Mulholland, *Northern Ireland at the Crossroads* (Basingstoke, 2000), pp. 8–9. (Henceforth – *Crossroads*)

[32] See Mulholland, *Crossroads*, pp. 22–3 and David Harkness' *Ireland in the Twentieth Century – Divided Island* (Basingstoke and London, 1996), pp. 92-3.

Republic and Northern Ireland, though in the long-term it helped to undermine O'Neill by convincing Loyalists of his untrustworthiness.[33] 'To an outsider', noted one commentator, 'the tension has lessened: the six and twenty-six counties may have begun a slow growing together.'[34] Insiders remained unsure, however, and in 1966 O'Neill faced a parliamentary rebellion.[35] The cross-border meetings continued under Lemass's successor Jack Lynch, but by then, civil rights agitation in Northern Ireland was beginning to lead to a rise in tensions both inside Northern Ireland and between the two jurisdictions.[36] It was against the background of these events that the presence and changes in cross-border contact and cooperation networks examined in this thesis took place.

'Humans have created borders to separate one group of people from another for a variety of reasons, apparently for thousands of years', noted social scientists Paul Ganser and David E. Lowry.[37] 'But the people who actually end up living at and along borders tend to ignore them when that serves their interests and to take advantage of them when that is more convenient.'[38] Academic work has traditionally tended to focus on the nature of borders as lines of division, end-points between distinct political units, rather than scenes

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[33] E. Doherty and D. J. Hickey, *A Chronology of Irish History Since 1500* (Dublin, 1989), pp. 207 – 8. See, for example, Donald S. Connery, *The Irish* (London, 1968), p. 116; Clare O'Halloran, *Partition and the Limits of Irish Nationalism* (Dublin, 1978), p. xvi and Coakley and O'Dowd, *The Irish border and North-South corporation - An Overview* (Dublin, 2005), p. 9. Feargal Cochrane, ''Meddling at the Crossroads': The Decline and Fall of Terence O'Neill within the Unionist Community', in Richard English and Graham Walker, *Unionism in Modern Ireland* (Basingstoke, 1996), p. 166. (Henceforth – 'Meddling at the Crossroads').

[34] Ian Nairn, *Britain's Changing Towns* (London, 1967), p. 123.

[35] Cochrane, 'Meddling at the Crossroads', pp. 161-2.

[36] Kenneth Bloomfield, *Stormont in Crisis* (Belfast, 1994), pp. 113-4.

[37] Paul Ganster and David E. Lorey, *Borders and Border Politics in a Globalizing World* (Wilmington, DE, c.2004), p. xiv.

[38] Ibid.

of important social and political negotiation, as implied by Ganser and Lowery.[39] However, more recently, developments in the fields of anthropology, sociology and geography have begun diverting attention away from this traditional discourse and towards an examination of borders as zones of contact.[40]

While different groups of individuals maintained a variety of political attitudes towards the Irish border, and towards the implications of interaction across it, there is strong evidence to suggest that, within certain parameters, the residents of the Irish borderlands were no exception to Ganser and Lowery's generalisation, outlined above. By tracing the networks created by different 'track 3' agencies, as defined by Murray and O'Neill, it is hoped to clarify what the parameters were within which contact across the Irish border was able to take place.[41] Where possible, an attempt was also made to establish to what extent Irish border residents gave any indication of a shared border mentality brought about by mutual experiences of peripheralisation and alienation from the centres of political power.[42]

The five areas chosen for focus comprise two areas of generalised contact; the personal and economic, and three areas of sub-governmental contact between specific interest

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[39] Hastings Donnan and Thomas M. Wilson, *Border Approaches – An Anthropology of Frontiers* (Lanham, London, c.1994), p. 1.

[40] In Ireland, this approach has been championed by Thomas M. Wilson and Hastings Donnan, James Anderson and Liam O'Dowd. See, for example, Thomas M. Wilson and Hastings Donnan, *Borders – Frontiers of Identity, Nation and State* (Oxford and New York, 1999), p. 9, and Liam O'Dowd and James Corrigan, 'Buffer Zone or Bridge: Local Responses to cross-border Economic Cooperation in the Irish Border region' (Henceforth – 'Buffer Zone or Bridge'), *Administration,* Vol. 42, No. 4, Winter 1994-95, p. 337.

[41] Dominic Murray and Jim O'Neill, *Peace Building in a Political Impasse* (University Of Ulster, 1991), p. 1. An attempt to examine such parameters with relation to business links was made by Joan Henderson and Paul Teague in *The Belfast Agreement and Cross-Border Economic Cooperation in the Tourism Industry* (Dublin, 2006), pp. 5-6. (Henceforth – *Economic Cooperation*).

[42] O'Dowd and Corrigan, 'Buffer Zone or Bridge', p. 337.

groups; the police forces, tourism interests, and the local authorities. Within each field, the genesis and operation of cooperation networks have been explored, with care taken to present a snapshot of the contact taking place at all levels, and to highlight the effect of one level upon another. The case-studies focus on areas which operated on a separate North-South basis, and which came under the aegis of a range of government departments, Justice, Local Government, and Transport and Power, later Transport, Power and Tourism, in the South and Home Affairs, Development and Commerce in the North. This was done so as to give breadth to the study, while excluding those organisations, such as the churches and the GAA, which had continued to operate post-partition on a thirty two county basis and which did not, as a result, need to venture outside of themselves to establish cross-border links. Where such thirty two county organisations played an important role in cross-border networks, however, their contribution has been discussed, particularly in relation to the two more generalised fields of contact, the economic and personal.

The border area cannot be seen exclusively in terms of cooperation and friendly contact. Dervla Murphy in her 1978 book, *A Place Apart*, noted the dichotomy of attitudes which she found when travelling towards the border: 'In these northern counties of the Republic it seems that more people are willing to look at the unionist viewpoint – though of course this is also the area where one finds the most active support for the Provos', who retained a substantial amount of local sympathy.[43] Former *Irish Times* deputy-editor James Downey noted that, in the early years of the Troubles, 'in border areas of the Republic timid and naïve young men [who] knocked at the doors of people who possessed or were

[43] Dervla Murphy, *A Place Apart* (Reading, 1978), p. 21.

believed to possess firearms, asking for "a lend of a gun" … received sympathy, if rarely cooperation.'[44] The border counties were not unique in displaying such contradictions, with John Horgan and John McGourty both noting that the Southern Irish television audience as a whole in the 1960s 'never found it difficult to combine a deeply rooted and at times even visceral Republicanism with a deep fascination with the activities of the House of Windsor.'[45] 'Jasus but we're quare people too', noted McGourty, 'leaving homes in the mountains of Northern Ireland and going into the Republic of Ireland to recognize, respect, relish and revere the Queen of England on her Coronation.'[46] Rosemary Harris, in her important study of protestant/catholic relations also noted the paradox that those protestants with the strongest anti-catholic attitudes were at the same time those who interacted most tolerantly with their catholic neighbours.[47]

Representations of the border area have often concentrated the area as a shatter zone, a 'nest of trouble where the rule of law must be imposed by an overwhelming military presence', a 'bandit country' whose residents lived in fear, or political subjugation, who 'suffered disproportionately' from attacks and were subject, debatably, to a form of 'ethnic cleansing' during the later Troubles period.[48] While it is impossible to ignore the presence of strong political affiliations, expressed both constitutionally and

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[44] James Downey, *Them and Us* (Dublin, 1983), p. 64.
[45] John Horgan, *Irish Media* (London and New York, 2001), p. 80. John McGourty, *We lived with a Mountain* (London, 2003), p. 111. (Henceforth – McGourty, *Mountain*).
[46] McGourty, *Mountain*, p. 111.
[47] Donnan and McFarlane discussion of Rosemary Harris *Prejudice and Tolerance in Ulster* (Manchester, 1972), in 'Informal Social Organisations', John Darby (ed.) *Northern Ireland – the Background to the Conflict* (Belfast, 1983), p. 111.
[48] Darch MacDonald, *The Chosen Fews* (Dublin and Cork, 2000), p. 30. Toby Harnden, *Bandit Country* (London, 2000), p. 14 and Henry Patterson, 'Border Killings, Liberation Struggle or Ethnic Cleansing?', 6th Conference of the Spanish Association for Irish Studies, Valladolid (Published by University of Ulster Press Office, 29 May 2006), pp. 1-2. See, for example, Mervyn Dane, *The Fermanagh "B" Specials* (Enniskillen 1970), p. 3, Steve Bruce, 'Unionism and the Border', in Anderson and Bort (ed.) *The Irish Border*, p. 130.

unconstitutionally, in areas such as Donegal, South Armagh, and Monaghan.[49] This has, however, occasionally been over-stated, with total IRA membership estimated at substantially fewer than 1,000 individuals for much of this period and dismissed even by a Stormont official in 1965 as 'no longer a matter of concern.'[50] For this reason, it is not proposed to concentrate on this aspect in the current narrative. This research should thus be seen as a discussion of one aspect of border life, rather than a complete and representative picture.

The developmental process undergone by Irish historiography since its emergence, post-independence, as a field distinct from British history, has worked against the development of a strong interest in cross-border topics. The increased availability of evidence in Belfast and Dublin has encouraged historians to focus their work on material available in the archival base more convenient to them while 'the development of separate institutions north and south of the border made it increasingly difficult for historians to treat developments in the two parts of Ireland in an integrated manner.'[51] A number of studies exist into attitudes towards the political 'other' in Ireland, including Claire O'Halloran's *Partition and the Limits of Irish Nationalism*, John Bowman's *De*

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[49] Donegal TD, Neil Blaney was a hard-line nationalist and was dismissed from the cabinet during the arms crisis, see Kenneth Bloomfield, *Stormont in Crisis* (Belfast, 1994), p. 83. South Armagh became infamous for the number of attacks carried out there during the Troubles, see Harnden, *Bandit Country*, p. 73. Monaghan Town hosted an important Provisional Sinn Fein conference in 1971, and was home to Fergal O'Hanlon, an IRA volunteer killed during the border campaign, see Maria McGuire, *To Take Arms – A year in the provisional IRA* (London, 1973), pp. 27-9 and Ian S. Wood 'The IRA's Border Campaign 1956-1962', in Anderson and Bort (ed.) *The Irish Border*, pp. 313-4.

[50] Stormont minister, quoted in Ferriter, *Transformation of Ireland*, p. 620.

[51] John Darby, *Intimidation and the control of conflict in Northern Ireland* (Dublin, 1986), pp. 18-9.

Valera and the Ulster Question, and Dennis Kennedy's *The Widening Gulf*.[52] All of these, however, examine attitudes from one side of the border only. Where historians have sought to cover both polities, they have tended to do so on a comparative basis, writing distinct, juxtaposed sections on North and South.[53] At other times, attempts to cover both polities have been, quite literally, an afterthought such as in J. J. Lee's edited collection, *Modern Ireland,* which, based on a series of Thomas Davis lectures for RTE, was re-written for publication, when 'an additional essay [was] included on Northern Ireland … which was specially commissioned' for the collection from Cornelius O'Leary.[54] In this context Diarmaid Ferriter's 2004 book, *The Transformation of Ireland* shows at least attempts an integrated assessment of Irish history, if as part of a book which is, again, largely Southern-centric.[55] In this respect, the Heath, Breen and Whelan edited *Ireland North and South – Perspectives from Social Science* is unique, in including a range of subject-specific articles, all either comparative or cross-border in basis.[56]

While this development makes sound historical and practical sense, it does threaten to obscure the existence of what Michael Kennedy has referred to as 'the secret history of cross-border cooperation', in treating North and South as hermetically sealed, separate

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[52] Clare O'Halloran, *Partition and the Limits of Irish Nationalism* (Dublin, 1987), John Bowman, *De Valera and the Ulster Question 1917-1973* (Oxford, 1989), and Dennis Kennedy, *The Widening Gulf* Belfast, 1988).

[53] See, for example, Roy Foster, *Modern Ireland, 1600-1972* (London, 1988), David Fitzpatrick *The Two Irelands, 1912-1939* (Oxford, New York, 1998) and John A. Murphy's *Ireland in the 20th century* (Dublin, 1975).

[54] J. J. Lee, *Ireland 1945 - 70* (Dublin, 1979),N. J. Gibson review of J. J. Lee, *Ireland 1945 - 70*, *Irish Social and Economic History,* Vol. VII, 1980, pp. 124-6.

[55] Ferriter, *The Transformation of Ireland, 1900-2000* (London, 2005). See, for example, pages 450 – 452 re: welfare provisions. The only study which consistently examines the effects of events on both sides of the border is David Harkness' *Ireland in the Twentieth Century – Divided Island* (Basingstoke and London, 1996).

[56] Anthony F. Heath, Richard Breen and Christopher T. Whelan (ed.), *Ireland North and South – Perspectives from Social Science* (Oxford, 1999).

units.[57] Indeed, Kennedy's book, *Division and Consensus,* is one of the few exceptions to the prevailing discourse and the first to deal comprehensively with contacts between the regions.[58] The other notable contributions in this field are provided by Liam O'Dowd, Professor of Sociology at Queens University, Belfast, and his colleagues, who, in a series of articles and books, discuss the effects of the Irish border, though largely within a post-1972 EEC/EU context.[59] Also important in this regard is Paddy Logue's *The Border - Reflections from North and South*, which reproduces a large number of individual reflections upon the Irish border, although without providing any analysis, context or commentary upon the material.[60]

The current study aims to build upon and complement the work already carried out by Michael Kennedy, in examining cooperation at a non-governmental level across a similar time span. Topics discussed in detail in *Division and Consensus,* therefore; the Erne Hydroelectric Dam, Foyle Fisheries, Great Northern Railway and so on, have been avoided, so as not to duplicate the little historical work that exists. As opposed to concentrating on the government contacts, as Kennedy does, the current work seeks to examine, on a thematic rather than chronological basis, contacts taking place at local levels, referring to government cooperation only where this has a bearing on the local networks under discussion.

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[57] Michael Kennedy, *Division and Consensus* (Dublin, 2000), p. 1.
[58] Ibid.
[59] See, for example, James Anderson, Liam O'Dowd and Thomas M. Wilson, *Culture and cooperation in Europe's borderlands* (Amsterdam, New York, 2003), John Coakley and Liam O'Dowd, *The Irish border and North-South Cooperation: An Overview* (Dublin, 2005), and O'Dowd and Corrigan 'Buffer Zone or Bridge', pp. 335-351.
[60] Paddy Logue (ed.), *The Border-Reflections from North and South* (Dublin, 1999). (Henceforth-*Reflections*).

Changes taking place in Ireland since the late 1960s have both encouraged and hampered attempts to understand the island of Ireland within a cross-border context. The outbreak of the Troubles, and the renewed interest which they encouraged in Irish problems, resulted, on the one hand, in the publication of a number of traditional retellings of Irish history (Nationalist, Unionist and Marxist), which sought, directly or indirectly, to place political developments in Northern Ireland within the context of an ongoing, all-Island or wider, context.[61] At the same time, an increasingly wide pool of literature was produced which sought to explain the conflict largely in terms of social and political tensions within Northern Ireland itself.[62]

European funding through the INTERREG program has encouraged a great deal of scholarship focused on the post-1972 period, and the role of European institutions in promoting cross-border projects; a good example of this trend is the research carried out under the auspices of the Armagh Centre for Cross-Border Studies.[63] This has encouraged what Anderson and O'Dowd refer to as 'some extreme variants of the 'Globalisation thesis' [which] rather exaggerate the degree of congruence that might have existed at some time in the past, thereby over-emphasising the novelty of recent

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[61] John Whyte, 'Interpretations of the Northern Ireland Problem' in Charles Townshend (ed.) *Consensus in Ireland* (Oxford 1988), p. 24. See, for example, Tim Pat Coogan, *The IRA* (London, 1980), Tom Nairn, *The Break-up of Britain* (London, 1977), p. 219, Paisley, Taylor and Robinson, *Ulster The Facts* (Belfast, 1982), p. 27 and H. Shearman, 'Conflict in Northern Ireland', *Year Book of World Affairs 1970* (London, 1970), p. 40.

[62] John Whyte, 'Interpretations of the Northern Ireland Problem' in Charles Townshend (ed.) *Consensus in Ireland* (Oxford 1988), p. 24. See, for example, John McGarry and Brendan O'Leary, *Explaining Northern Ireland* (Oxford, 1995), p. 171 - 265, Charles Richard Rose *Governing Without Consensus* (London, 1971), pp. 17-21 and Denis P. Barritt and Charles F. Carter, *The Northern Ireland Problem* (Oxford, 1962), p. 3.

[63] See: http://www.crossborder.ie/research/research.php. Accessed 28 Jan. 2007.

globalizing trends.'[64] In Ireland, in particular, this thesis has received widespread acceptance, even among those who had been involved in cross-border work pre-1972.[65] It is the aim of this thesis to undermine the false premise that cross-border cooperation was a direct result of EEC membership by exploring the underlying and pre-existing local networks onto which later European initiatives were grafted.

[64] James Anderson and Liam O'Dowd, 'Borders, border regions and territoriality: contradictory meanings, changing significance', *Regional Studies,* Vol. 33, No. 7, 1999, p. 599. (Henceforth – 'Territoriality')
[65] J. Anderson, and J. Goodman, 'Problems of North – South Economic Integration and Politics in Ireland – Southern Perspectives', *Irish Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 7, 1997, p. 41. (Henceforth – 'Problems of Integration).

3. Irish Border in Everyday Life

International borders exist, at the highest level, in the interrelation between independent sovereign states, marking the geographical boundary between the 'legally bonded space' within which a 'particular territorial group of people' is able to legislate and enforce laws.[1] In order to examine how such political contact zones affect the interaction networks which span them, it seems wise to begin with the experiences of individuals and kinship groups, since these form the basic primary units of socialisation, upon which other contacts then build.

When considering non-physical borders, the degree to which a boundary is overlaid by kinship groups is clearly affected by how closely its route coincides with 'the borders of nation, culture or ethnicity', by any previous re-drawings and consequent population movements it may have undergone, by the age of the frontier involved and by the degree to which contacts across it had been important previous to its existence.[2] As Paasi notes in the case of the Finnish-Russian border, contacts and attitudes are also influenced by generational differences, between those born before the division, and those born after.[3] In Ireland, where the border left sizable minorities in both states, and cut through previously

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[1] Kevin R. Cox, *Men, Location and Behaviour* (New York, London, Sydney and Toronto, 1972), p. 120. Marcus W. Heslinga *Geography and Nationalism* (Belfast, 1978) pp. 7–8.

[2] James Anderson and Liam O'Dowd, 'Territoriality', p. 596. See, for example, Rob Meijer, 'A Borderline Case' in Democratic Dialogue (ed.) *No Frontiers* (Belfast, 1999), p. 59, Anssi Paasi, 'Boundaries as social practice and discourse the Finnish-Russian border', in Paul Ganster and David E. Lorey, *Borders and Border Politics in a Globalizing World* (Wilmington, DE, C.2004), pp. 117–136 (Henceforth – 'Boundaries as Social Practice'), and Rumpf, quoted by Marcus W. Heslinga, *The Irish Border as a Cultural Divide* (Assen, 1962), p. 46.

[3] Paasi, 'Boundaries as social practice', p. 131.

undivided territories within living memory, a high level of pre-partition contact had existed, with Belfast acting as natural centre for counties Monaghan and Cavan in particular, and the 'characteristic [Ulster] modes of speech … [continuing to] make the Donegalman more at home in Belfast then in Dublin' as late as 1976.[4] It is the intention of this chapter to explore the nature of those personal contacts which survived the political upheavals of 1921, the changes which they underwent as the period progressed, and their importance in the formation of cooperation links between groups and individuals living along the frontier.

Cross-border population movements

The creation and alteration of international frontiers has normally led to readjustments among the population affected, as individuals move across the frontier to escape the rise of a regime perceived as unfriendly at home, or to access better conditions abroad.[5] Traditional historiography has tended to assume that such a population movement occurred in Ireland around the 1919-1921 revolutionary period, with a large-scale emigration of protestants, in particular, out of what became the Irish Free State.[6] In a

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[4] Paul Martin Sacks, *The Donegal Mafia* (London and New Haven, 1976), pp. 8-9. See also Terence Dooley 'Protestant Migration from the Irish Free State to Northern Ireland, 1920-5', *Clogher Historical Record*, Vol. XV, No. 3, 1996, p. 91. For the problems facing border counties see Brian Harvey et. al., *The Emerald Curtain* (Carrickmacross, 2005), pp. 110-1 and Robinson, 'Londonderry, Northern Ireland: A Border Study', p. 216.

[5] For the effect of political changes in Macedonia on the Dopioi minority see Ioannis Manos, 'Border Crossings: Dance Performance and identity politics in a border region in northern Greece', p. 136 and for border changes in Trieste see Bjørn Thomassen, 'Fidelity and Betrayal in Trieste: Locating the 'crisis of the State', pp. 41-2. Both in Thomas M. Wilson and Hastings Donnan (ed.) *Culture and Power at the Edge of the State* (Münster, 2005).

[6] See, for example, Peter Hart, *The I.R.A. at War 1916-1923* (Oxford, 2003), pp. 223 and 225, Ralaheen Ltd., *All Over the Place - Peoples Displaced to and from the Southern Border Counties as a Result of the Conflict 1969 to 1974* (Dublin, 2005) p. 82 (Henceforth – *All Over the Place*) and Peter Hart, 'The Protestant Experience of the Revolution in the South', in Richard English and Graham Walker, *Unionism in Modern Ireland* (Basingstoke, 1996), p. 83.

number of well-documented cases, such as those of the civil service and police services, this transfer was a direct North-South movement of personnel previously in the employ of the Dublin administration.[7] Patrick J. Duffy directly links 'the decline among the protestant population in 'Ulster (part of)' to their movement north into Northern Ireland.[8] The extent and religious homogeneity of this migration is, however, debatable. As 'more than 98 percent of the old British administration in Ireland transferred to the service of the Irish Free State in 1922', those who chose to leave were by far the minority.[9] And since the RIC, for example, had for many years served as 'the normal outlet for ambitious children of small [catholic] farmers' who formed 81 percent of its total force in 1914, this migration cannot be seen as an exclusively protestant one.[10] When these catholic officers moved north to join the newly-formed RUC, they accounted for the respectable percentage of catholics within that force at that stage, a percentage which dropped away as the old RIC generation came to retire, from a peak of 23 percent of the RUC total in 1923, to 17 percent in 1935, and 10 percent by 1966.[11]

The protestant population of Southern Ireland certainly declined during the first fifty years of independence, with numbers identifying as protestant falling by 182,900

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[7] John A. Oliver, *Working at Stormont* (Dublin, 1978), pp. 56-7, Jim Herlihy, interviewed by the author 13 Feb. 2006. Mary E. Daly, *The First Department* (Dublin, 2002), p. 96-7.
[8] Patrick J. Duffy, 'Continuity and Change in the Border Landscape' in Brian S. Turner (ed.) *The Debateable Lands* (Downpatrick, Co. Down, 2002), p. 25.
[9] Jackson, *Ireland*, p. 276.
[10] Patrick Shea, *Voices and the Sound of Drums* (Belfast, 1983), p. 2. Liam McNiffe, *A History of the Garda Síochána* (Dublin, 1997), p. 5.
[11] Sir Richard Pim, *Recollections* (Belfast, 1974. Unpublished), File T/3620/1 PRONI, p. 208. Chris Ryder, *The Fateful Split* (London, 2004), p. 71. For the experiences of a Catholic officer transferred from the RIC to RUC see Denis Donoghue, *Warrenpoint* (London, 1990), p. 7.

individuals, from 313,000 in 1911 to 130,100 in 1961.[12] This decline was extensively cited by Northern unionists as propaganda against the new state.[13] How and when such a decline occurred is more difficult to specify, 'because there are no census figures between 1911 and 1926 it is impossible to say whether the rate of decline became sharper after independence', and no convincing statistics have been formulated to establish the percentage of this decline which was accounted for by English, Welsh and Scottish personnel, who, following independence, returned home.[14] Kennedy's attempt to estimate these numbers according to arbitrary fractions of each Protestant denomination previously present seems to be at best crude and, at worse, unreliable.[15] Others offer even less explanation, stating simply, for example, that 'departing soldiers sailors, policemen and their families … account[ed] for about one-quarter of the emigrants', without discussing how such a figure was reached.[16] A large scale population transfer across the border would have widespread implications as regards cross-border personal and kinship networks. Using census data, therefore, it is proposed to examine the extent to which such movement took place along the border in the 1911 to 1980 period.

The overall population trends experienced by the border counties in the South were typical of the population of Southern Ireland as a whole, comprising a slow decline until

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[12] Robert E. Kennedy Jr., *The Irish - Emigration, Marriage and Fertility* (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London, 1973), Table 36, p. 112.
[13] Paul Arthur, *Special Relationships* (Belfast, 2000), pp. 12-13. For propaganda uses of this data see, for example, Loyalist Association of Workers, Colerain Branch, Letter to Jack Lynch, 25 July 1972. File S10585G 2003/16/81, *Partition*, Dept. of Taoiseach, N.A.I..
[14] Jack White, *Minority Report* (Dublin, 1975), p. 10. See also, Peter Hart, *The I.R.A. at War 1916-1923* (Oxford, 2003), p. 227.
[15] Kennedy, *The Irish*, pp. 19-21.
[16] Peter Hart, *The I.R.A. at War 1916-1923* (Oxford, 2003), p. 227.

1951, a sharper fall until 1961, and then a slow rise (See Fig. 3.1).[17] They were largely, however, among the counties which fared worse in this regard.[18] Louth and Leitrim were both atypical, Leitrim's continuing to fall post-1961, and Louth's beginning to rise, however slowly, from 1926. This corresponds to, and may well have been the result of, its relatively more prosperous economic status.[19] At the same time, however, the border counties did not seem to have experienced the 'particularly sharp dip between 1911 and 1926', which Liam Kennedy claims was brought on 'by civil conflict and disturbances on the island.'[20] This suggests that civil disturbances did not have a disproportionate impact on the border counties, despite Kennedy's assertion.[21]



Fig. 3.1. Source: Republic of Ireland Census.[22]

[17] Department of Industry and Commerce, *Census 1926*, *Preliminary Report* (Dublin, 1926), Table 3. Central Statistics Office (C.S.O.), *Census 1946 and 1951*, *Preliminary Report* (Dublin, 1958), Volume I, table 3. C.S.O., *Census 1971* (Dublin, 1972), Vol. I table 2. C.S.O., *Census 1979* (Dublin, 1980), Vol. I, Table 3. Kennedy, *People and Population Change*, p. 34.

[18] Enda Delaney, *Demography, State and Society* (Liverpool, 2000), p. 161.

[19] See page 132 below.

[20] Kennedy, *People and Population Change,* p. 4.

[21] Ibid.

[22] Department of Industry and Commerce, *Census 1926*, *Preliminary Report* (Dublin, 1926), Table 3. C.S.O., *Census 1946 and 1951*, *Preliminary Report* (Dublin, 1958), Volume I, table 3. C.S.O., *Census 1971* (Dublin, 1972), Vol. I table 2. C.S.O., *Census 1979* (Dublin, 1980), Vol. I, Table 3.

In Northern Ireland, the growth of population began earlier, around the 1937 census period, and continued upwards until the end of the period (See Fig. 3.2). The one exception appears to have been the Urban Borough of Belfast, whose population peaked in 1951, before declining.[23] This may well be linked to the increased movement, post-war, of Belfast's urban poor from the overcrowded slums of the city itself into newly constructed suburban housing estates in Counties Down and Armagh, as part of a generalised 'suburbanisation and growth on the urban fringes' taking place throughout the UK.[24] The refusal of the Stormont Government to allow the Belfast City Corporation to have the city boundaries extended to take in these the new estates was a point of ongoing contention between them, while the city's population was known to be more mobile than populations resident elsewhere.[25]

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[23] Northern Ireland, *Census 1926 – General Report* (Belfast, 1929), Table 3. Statistician and Registrar-General's Office, *Census 1937 – Preliminary Report* (Belfast, 1937), table 3. Northern Ireland General Register Office, *Census 1961 – Preliminary Report* (Belfast, 1961), table 3. Northern Ireland General Register Office, *Census 1971 – Preliminary Report* (Belfast, 1971), table 2.

[24] James Anderson, Ian Shuttleworth, Chris Lloyd and Owen McEldowney, *Political Demography : The Northern Ireland Census, Discourse and Territoriality* (Belfast 2004), p. 10.

[25] Oliver, *Working at Stormont,* pp. 79-81. Maurice Hayes, 'Local Government Northern Ireland – A Town Clerk'sPerspective' (Henceforth – A Town Clerk'sperspective), in Daly (ed.) *County and Town*, p. 72. David Fitzpatrick, *Irish Emigration 1801-1921* (Dundalk, 1984), p. 5.



Fig. 3.2. Source: Northern Irish Census.[26]

No attempt has been made to continue the Northern Irish population charts beyond 1971 since, while some intimidation marred the 1971 census, 'this non-cooperation was most clearly manifest in a relatively high non-response rate to the question of religious persuasion, but did not apparently result in significant under-enumeration of household or of population', while the 1981 census not only employed incompatible administrative units, but also suffered from widespread non-response, making it 'virtually unusable' from a statistical point of view.[27]

What is most noticeable in a comparison between the population trends North and South is that neither area experience population growths in the immediate period around Irish

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[26] Northern Ireland, *Census 1926 – General Report* (Belfast, 1929), Table 3. Northern Ireland Statistician and Registrar-General's Office, *Census 1937 – Preliminary Report* (Belfast, 1937), table 3. Northern Ireland General Register Office, *Census 1961 – Preliminary Report* (Belfast, 1961), table 3. Northern Ireland General Register Office, *Census 1971 – Preliminary Report* (Belfast, 1971), table 2.

[27] Paul A. Compton, '1981 Northern Ireland Census of Population - Estimate of Non-Enumerated Population', in Chris Morris, Paul Compton and Arthur Luke (ed.), *Non-enumeration in the 1981 Northern Ireland Census of Population* (Belfast, 1985), p. 24. James Anderson and Ian Shuttleworth, 'Sectarian readings of sectarianism: Interpreting the Northern Ireland Census', *Irish Review,* No. 16, 1994, p. 75.

independence, with the exception of Belfast and, to a small degree, Down. This implies that no large scale in-migration took place during this period, with the possible exception of the administrative immigration previously noted, or, if such emigration was taking place, that it was being more than matched by outward migration.[28] If the falling population was the result of a two-stage migration, into Northern Ireland from the South, say, and out from Northern Ireland to Britain, then the number of Southern-Irish born individuals resident in each Northern county would be expected to rise in the 1911-26 period.



Fig. 3.3. Source: Northern Irish Census.[29]

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[28] See page 26 in current work.

[29] Ireland Registrar General of Births, Deaths and Marriages, *Census 1911 – General Report* (London, 1913) table 24.Northern Ireland, *Census 1926 - County Reports* (Belfast, 1928), table 17. Northern Ireland Statistician and Registrar-General's Office, *Census 1937 – County Reports* (Belfast, 1938), table 18. Northern Ireland General Register Office, *Census 1951 – County Reports* (Belfast, 1954), table 14. Northern Ireland General Register Office, *Census 1961 – County Reports* (Belfast, 1964), table 15. Northern Ireland General Register Office, *Census 1971 – County Reports* (Belfast, c.1974), Table 7.

To a certain extent, this does appear to have been the case, with all Northern counties experiencing a slight rise in Southern-born individuals between 1911 and 1926, suggesting that this increase was being more than matched by migration away from Northern Ireland altogether (See. Fig. 3.2 and 3.3). The sharper rise experienced by Belfast (Fig. 3.3) suggests that the majority of this emigration was targeted at the main city and its employment opportunities, rather than an unplanned, panic movement to the nearest cross-frontier point. Since the religious imbalance in these counties does not appear to have altered greatly during this period, with County Fermanagh being 56.18 percent catholic in 1911 and 55.97 percent catholic in 1926, for example, it is possible to speculate that this in-coming population matched, to a large degree, the religious profile of the counties concerned, or that the higher percentage of protestants apparently being accommodated was counterbalanced by higher catholic birth-rates.[30] Out-of-country birthplace, not being a factor inherited in families, could be expected to drop slowly and consistently if left to the natural process of death. That it does not do so implies a certain constant level of emigration, over and above any rise in southern-born individuals.

The number of Southern born individuals in Northern Ireland dips during the 1930s before rising again in the later 1940s and 1950s in the four counties of Down, Tyrone, Antrim and Armagh, which then experience a further drop (Fig. 3.3). The decline in the total of Southern residents over the war years may have been tied to conscription threats, or the greater availability of work elsewhere in Britain. It would seem that this population

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[30] Ireland Registrar General of Births, Deaths and Marriages, *Census 1911 – General Report* (London, 1913), Table 121. Northern Ireland, *Census 1926 - County Report - Fermanagh* (Belfast, 1928), p. 63, Table 18. Peader Livingstone, *The Fermanagh Story* (Enniskillen, 1969) p. 367. Fermanagh Civil Rights Association, *Fermanagh Facts* (place unknown, c.1968), p. 21.

was less stable than the overall population of Northern Ireland, supporting the theory that individuals who migrate once were disproportionately likely to do so again.[31] Interestingly, only Louth and Monaghan experience a rise in their Northern-Irish born population in the 1911-1926 period, and the number of Northern-borns in the South remained much smaller than the number of Southern-borns in Northern Ireland, in keeping with the smaller total populations of Northern Ireland (see Fig. 3.1 and 2.4).



Fig. 3.4. Source: Republic of Ireland Census.[32]

All the Northern-born populations decrease until the 1970s, though in a less regular curve than the overall population numbers. A sharp rise then takes place from 1971 onwards,

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[31] Enda Delaney, *Demography, State and Society* (Liverpool, 2000), p. 163.

[32] Ireland Registrar General of Births, Deaths and Marriages, *Census 1911 – General Report* (London, 1913), table 24. Department of Industry and Commerce, *Census 1926* (Dublin, 1929), Vol. III, table 6a. Department of Industry and Commerce, *Census 1936* (Dublin, 1939), Vol. III, part II, Table 6a. C.S.O., *Census 1946* (Dublin, 1952), Volume III, part II, table 3. C.S.O., *Census 1961* (Dublin, 1965), Vol. VII, part II, table 2a. C.S.O., *Census 1971* (Dublin, 1978), Vol. XI, part II, table 2a. Central Statistics Office, *Census 1979* (Dublin, 1986), Vol. IX, part II, Table 2a.

supporting Ralaheen's findings that the early years of the Troubles signalled a substantial rise in Northern-Irish residents being displaced across the border.[33] Interestingly, this rise takes place against the background of an over all rising population (Fig. 3.1), yet a contemporaneous drop in the number of individuals enumerated in their birth county (See Fig. 3.5)



Fig. 3.5. Source: Republic of Ireland Census.[34]

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[33] Ralaheen Ltd., *All Over the Place*, p. 5.

[34] Ireland Registrar General of Births, Deaths and Marriages, *Census 1911 – General Report* (London, 1913), table 24. Department of Industry and Commerce, *Census 1926* (Dublin, 1929), Vol. III, Table 6a. Department of Industry and Commerce, *Census 1936* (Dublin, 1939), Vol. III, part II, table 6a. C.S.O., *Census 1946* (Dublin, 1952), Volume III, part II, table 3. C.S.O., *Census 1961* (Dublin, 1965), Vol. VII, part II, table 2a. C.S.O., *Census 1971* (Dublin, 1978), Vol. XI, part II, table 2a. Central Statistics Office, *Census 1979* (Dublin, 1986), Vol. IX, part II, Table 2a.

[34] Ralaheen Ltd., *All Over the Place*, p. 5.

This implies that a sufficient inflow was taking place from the North to more than compensate for an overall out-migration by county-born residents, although those born in-county remained the largest single group throughout. Altogether 11,000 individuals were estimated to have been displaced south during the years of the Northern Ireland Troubles.[35]

In considering these population patterns, it is important to remember that the cross-border migrant population, while not insignificant in number, formed only a small proportion of the overall populations of each border county. Individuals remained most likely to be enumerated in the county in which they were born. Nonetheless, 44,020 individuals born in Southern Ireland were resident in Northern Ireland in 1961, and a further 8,916 Northern-born individuals were resident in the border counties of the South. Overall, therefore, 52,936 individuals were resident in the part of Ireland in which they had not been born in 1961. They constitute a larger number of individuals than were resident in Counties Monaghan, Leitrim or Fermanagh. When considering the levels of contact and kinship which existed across the Irish border, these therefore form a substantial presence.

The census statistics strongly suggest that people were more likely to migrate within their own jurisdiction than to cross the border. In County Armagh, for example, the number of people enumerated who were born elsewhere in Northern Ireland consistently outstrips those enumerated as Southern-Irish born by over 4,000 individuals, rising to nearly

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[35] Ibid.

20,000 in 1971 (see Fig. 3.6).[36] It remained more common, however, for individuals to migrate into Armagh from the Republic than to do so from the rest of the UK until the 1960s, when this position was reversed.



Fig. 3.6. Source: Northern Irish Census[37]

'Because of the lack of frontier controls, no exact figures are available' to show how many individuals emigrated from Ireland to England, Scotland and Wales in this period.[38] Circumstantial evidence strongly suggests, however, that migration to the rest of the United Kingdom was far more common than inter-Ireland migration.[39] Indeed, Kennedy

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[36] Northern Ireland General Register Office, *Census 1971, Armagh Country Report* (Belfast, 1974), Table 7.

[37] Ireland Registrar General of Births, Deaths and Marriages, *Census 1911 – General Report* (London, 1913) table 24. Northern Ireland, *Census 1926 - County Reports* (Belfast, 1928), table 17. Northern Ireland Statistician and Registrar-General's Office, *Census 1937 – County Reports* (Belfast, 1938), table 18. Northern Ireland General Register Office, *Census 1951 – County Reports* (Belfast, 1954), table 14. Northern Ireland General Register Office, *Census 1961 – County Reports* (Belfast, 1964), table 15. Northern Ireland General Register Office, *Census 1971 – County Reports* (Belfast, c.1974), Table 7.

[38] Marcus W. Heslinga, *The Irish Border as a Cultural Divide* (Assen, 1962), p. 85.

[39] Ibid. p. 101.

estimates that the 1950s saw the first period in Irish history where Britain constituted a more common destination for Irish emigrants than the United States, or other Commonwealth counties such as Canada and Australia.[40] Many biographies subsequently written by former border residents end with, or contain a reference to, periods of residence in England, Scotland and Wales.[41] This flow was considerable enough to generate concern from public figures regarding the 'brain drain', in this period and beyond.[42]

Kinship, family and cross-border contact

Cross-border kinship ties affected not only the individual who formed them, the 'Clones bride [who married a] Tyrone groom', whose 'cross-border marriages created no sensation' or the family member who moved across the border for work, but all those directly related to them.[43] Cross-border marriages were not uncommon, particularly as important social and religious institutions such as the churches and sports organisations, through which young people could be expected to meet, operated on a cross-border basis. Since cross-border cooperation networks required, as a preliminary, the existence of some form of contact with the opposite jurisdiction, and since, for many, family links were the form in which these contacts took place, the extent to which kinship networks

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[40] Kennedy, *People and Population Change*, p. 18. See also Dermot Keogh, 'The Vanishing Irish' in Keogh, O'Shea and Quinlan (ed.), *Ireland in the 1950s* (Cork, 2004) p. 18.
[41] See for example, Eddie Murphy, *My return to Drumenagh* (Belfast, c.2000), Robert Harbinson, *Up Spake the Cabin Boy* (London, 1961), and Donall MacAmhleigh *An Irish Navvy*, translated by Valentin Iremonger (London, 1964).
[42] Charles E.B. Brett, *Long Shadows Cast Before* (Edinburgh, 1978), p. 127. Lady Sylvia Hermon, 'The St. Andrews Agreement and after', 31 Oct. 2006, 'The Hidden Borders', *Belfast Telegraph*, 19 April, 1993, p. 10 and 'Sad Legacy of Drift from the Farmland', *Irish News,* 12 June 1993, p. 19.
[43] 'Clones bride for Tyrone groom', *NS,* 24 May 1968, p. 5. Livingstone, *The Fermanagh Story*, p. 337. See also Kevin M. McDermott, *The Time of the Corncrake* (Henceforth – *Corncrake)* (Crewe, c.2004), p. 22.

spanned the jurisdictional divide had a direct bearing upon the likelihood of cooperative initiatives being established.

A considerable body of evidence exists to suggest that familial links were a major factor affecting the extent of an individual's experience of the opposite jurisdiction, and were seen to be so.[44] Accounts of, and by, people whose family networks spanned the border frequently make reference to the importance which this link had for their development and understanding. Alf McCreary, in his biography of Robin Eames, Church of Ireland Archbishop of Armagh and Primate of all Ireland from 1986, noted how the latter's family had left Cork during the Troubles of the 1920s, settling first in Dublin, from where his father continued on to the Ravenhill Theological College in Belfast, leaving the rest of Eames' family in Dublin.[45] This move was seen as important in allowing the future Archbishop a greater insight into the people and politics of the Republic which was 'for many Ulster protestants … a 'foreign country'', giving him 'exposure to another culture in the island of Ireland that many of his contemporaries were unable to share.'[46] With the decline of the Southern protestant community, fewer and fewer Northern protestants shared Eames' family links to the Republic and, as Steve Bruce noted, 'fewer relatives means even less reason to visit' and thus establish contacts.[47] Others who possessed a family across the border also felt that these links helped encourage their understanding of the other jurisdiction. Gerry Adams, who boasted an uncle and aunt in Dublin, recalled in

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[44] See, for example, Patrick J. Duffy, 'Continuity and Change in the Border Landscape', in Brian S. Turner (ed.), *The Debateable Lands* (Downpatrick, Co. Down, 2002), p. 25.
[45] Alf McCreary, *Nobody's fool – the Life of Archbishop Robin Eames* (London, 2004), pp. 5-6.
[46] Ibid., p. 9.
[47] Steve Bruce, 'Unionism and the Border', in Anderson and Bort (ed.) *The Irish Border*, p. 134.

his own highly sanitised autobiography the visits he undertook to his uncle's house in Dublin, and the effect which they had on his thinking.[48]

The experience of crossing the border as part of the family migration is captured vividly by a number of writers who later went on to records their experiences in autobiographical form. John McGourty, in his book *We Lived with a Mountain* recalls his own family's move North in order to take possession of a farm in County Fermanagh: 'All the family's possessions were loaded onto a horse-trap…the ground was rough and slippery. There were great banks and boulders we walked straight into in the dark… eventually we crossed what we later found out to be the border into Northern Ireland.'[49] The family was leaving behind grandparents, aunts, and uncles, whom they would frequently visit.[50] McGourty's story is of particular interest in that his family lived not only adjacent to the border, but very much astride it, owning a farm in County Leitrim as well as County Fermanagh.[51] As a result, his father spent much of his working life walking between the two farms and around the border area, buying sheep in the sales and fairs of counties Donegal, Leitrim, and Sligo.[52] On one occasion, having spent all of his money buying fifty ewe lambs in Sligo, the father proceeded to walk them back to their home in County Fermanagh, not having sufficient money left to transport them any other way.[53] Such a degree of mobility, and the lack of restrictions placed upon border crossings, allowed an individual living in the immediate vicinity to the border a high degree of interaction with

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[48] Gerry Adams, *Before the Dawn* (London, 1996), p. 42.
[49] McGourty, *Mountain* (London, 2003), p. 4.
[50] Ibid., p. 72.
[51] Ibid., p. 50.
[52] Ibid., pp. 17 and 27.
[53] Ibid., p. 27.

individuals, both family members, colleagues and neighbours, who lived under the other legal jurisdiction.

Human migratory patterns are defined more in terms of psychological than geographical distance. As a result, individuals are more likely to migrate to a destination in which they already have contacts, and hence support, than to a closer, equally economically promising destination, of which nothing is known. Perhaps the most illustrative example of this is the story of the Galway-born Garda, whose mother wrote to the Richard Mulcahy in the 1920s, 'begging him to use his influence to have her son … transferred from Letterkenny, County Donegal to a location closer to his home' as he was 'so unhappy in Letterkenny that he was threatening to emigrate to America if he could not live closer to home.'[54] 'While it might appear absurd that a young man would emigrate to America because he was homesick in County Donegal, the United States probably offered a community of neighbours and friends that was not available in Letterkenny.'[55] More migrants crossed the Irish Sea than moved county within Ireland, and far more crossed the Atlantic than the Irish Sea until the 1950s.[56] In this, they were reacting to what geographers have recently began to identify as relative, as opposed to geographical, distance, whereby 'the geographical scales of human activity are not neutral givens, not fixed universals of social experience [but] … products of economic, political and social activities and relationships.'[57]

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[54] Mary E. Daly, *The Buffer State* (Dublin, 1997), p. 535.
[55] Ibid.
[56] David Fitzpatrick, *Irish Emigration 1801-1921* (Dundalk, 1984), p. 5.
[57] Neil Smith, 'Remaking scale: competition and coordination in prenational and postnational Europe', in H. Eskelinen and F. Snickers eds. *Competitive European Peripheries* (Berlin, 1995), p. 60.

Emigration to an area in which members of established kinship and friendship groups were already present was considerably easier than migration into the unknown from both social and economic standpoints. Migrants helped each other, 'personal networks' acting as 'conduits of information and social and financial assistance', with some agents even returning to the same source area to recruit new migrant labour.[58] Within Ireland, from as early as the 1830s, distinct streams could be discerned which linked area of residence to probable area of migration.[59] This 'streaming' of migrants was caused by a process of chain migration, whereby whole families, communities or village groupings followed one another, settling in close proximity at their destination, creating origin-specific neighbourhood clusters in destination cities such as New York and London.[60] The Commission on Emigration, which reported in 1954, found 'family and kinship networks with people already living in Britain' to be a particularly important factor in accounting for County Leitrim's extremely high rates of emigration, alongside the lack of local employment opportunities.[61] This process was also a major factor behind the decline of the Belfast Jewish Congregation who, in the years following the beginning of the Northern Ireland Troubles, followed each other in ever increasing numbers to the larger Jewish centres in Manchester and Birmingham. Commenting on the state of the community in its internal magazine in 1979, one member noted sadly "on the social and

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[58] Monica Boyd, 'Family and Personal Networks in International Migration: Recent Developments and New Agendas', *International Migration Review,* Vol. 23, 1989, p. 639. See also Frank Thistlethwaite, 'Migration from Europe overseas in the Nineteenth and Twentieth centuries', in Herbert Moller (ed.) *Population Movements in Modern European History* (New York and Ontario, 1964), pp. 73-92. Louis Ginsburg, *Population Movements* (London, 1937), p. 7.

[59] David Fitzpatrick, *Irish Emigration 1801-1921* (Dundalk, 1984), p. 11.

[60] Thistlethwaite, 'Migration from Europe', pp. 73-92. David Fitzpatrick, *Irish Emigration 1801-1921* (Dundalk, 1984), p. 21. Tracey Connelly 'The Commission on Emigration, 1948 - 1954' in Keogh, O'Shea and Quinlan (ed.), *Ireland in the 1950s* (Cork, 2004) p. 211. Enda Delaney, *Demography, State and Society* (Liverpool, 2000), p. 206.

[61] Enda Delaney, *Demography, State and Society* (Liverpool, 2000), p. 171.

personal page this month," known jokingly as the hatch, match and dispatch column, "there's no hatch or match – only dispatch" as the community bid farewell to family after family.[62] In their 2005 report into persons displaced in the Border area by the Northern Ireland Troubles, Ralaheen Ltd. also noted that 'many described moving according to their kinship connections, close to where they had friends or relatives or where wives, husbands or brothers and sisters-in-law had contact or relatives.'[63]

The importance of chain migration to the movement of population out of the island of Ireland in the period under discussion was acknowledged in 1954 by the Commission on Emigration and Population Problems:

> For very many immigrants there was a traditional path "from the known to the known", that is to say, from areas where they lived to places where their friends and relations awaited them. This path they followed almost as a matter of course and without ever looking at suitable employment in this country. Such custom is kept alive by the connection which former emigrants retain with the home country and there is little doubt that these family connections will continue to exercise an influence, even if substantial improvements are affected in economic conditions and social amenities at home.[64]

As a result, the movement of one family member across the border proportionately increased the likelihood of others following, thereby strengthening the connections between the two jurisdictions.

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[62] Harold Ross, interviewed by author, 5 August 2004. 'Sign of the times?', *Belfast Jewish Record*, April 1979, p. 11. Editorial, *Belfast Jewish Record,* May 1977, p. 1.
[63] Ralaheen Ltd., *All Over the Place*, p. 64.
[64] Commission on Emigration and Other Population Problems, *Reports* (Dublin, 1954), p. 137.

The quality of transport links was one of the major factors defining subjective distance. A person could be resident geographically much closer to the border and yet require a longer time span in order to cross it than one who lives further away but on better transport routes. Families with private transport, or living in well-connected cities, were thus more likely to encounter their relatives living across the border than were those living in poorly-connected rural areas. One example of this is the relative experiences of Jim Barr, Unionist Councillor with Londonderry County Council (CC) and O'Neillite, candidate in the 1969 crossroads election, and Maryanne Kerr, who lived in rural County Londonderry, both of whom had relatives in County Donegal.[65] Barr's family, who owned a large farm outside Limavady, crossed to Donegal to visit their family on a regular basis, while Maryanne Kerr, whose father was a headmaster near Mullaghash in County Londonderry, recalled only one occasion on which she had visited her uncle, who was Father-Abbot of a monastery in County Donegal.[66] These two examples also illustrate the fact that political affiliation did not necessarily affect an individual's likelihood to have personal experience of the opposite jurisdiction. Indeed, Dominic Murray and Jim O'Neill noted that 'many people in Northern Ireland who could broadly be described as unionists, experienced absolutely no difficulty in getting involved in cross-border activities', a tendency particularly marked among the middle classes.[67] Paddy Devlin recalled how 'one of the most noisy unionists' whom he encountered at

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[65] Jim Barr, interviewed by author, 23 Oct. 2006. Maryanne Kerr, *Over the Mountain* (London, 1996), p. 70.

[66] Ibid.

[67] Dominic Murray and Jim O'Neill, *Peace Building in a Political Impasse* (Colerain, 1991), p. 30. See also John Sugden, 'Sport, Community Relations and Community conflict in Northern Ireland', in Seamus Dunn, *Facets of the Conflict in Northern Ireland* (Basingstoke and London, 1995), p. 205. (Henceforth, Sugden 'Sport in Northern Ireland'.) J. White, 'The Permeability of the United Kingdom-Irish Border: a Preliminary Reconnaissance', *Administration,* Vol. 31, No. 3, 1983, pp. 305-6.

Stormont had a house across the border in Donegal.[68] 'We used to refer to him as the honourable member for Burtonport, which usually shut him up.'[69]

The presence of good transport links encouraged residents to seek employment outside the jurisdiction, while not necessarily abandoning the jurisdiction in which they lived. While the Greenore line operated, for example, people from Dundalk were able to commute to Newry to work, and these formed a large enough group that their fate following the closure of the line was of concern to Louth County Council (CC).[70] In the opposite direction, September 1971 saw press reports of an attack on a Northern Irish postman who was tarred and feathered for allegedly spying against the IRA while on route to pick up his wife and 'other girls' who worked in Dundalk, from his home in Newry. [71] Council contractors in the North were reprimanded by their employers for bringing in labour from the South, in breach of the employment clause in their contracts.[72] In arguing for the opening of the Carrickmacross to Crossmaglen road, vice-Chairmen of cross border committee, Pat Sammon, complained of the difficulties caused to local girls in his Culloville constituency who worked in Dundalk by the ban on CIE vehicles stopping on concession roads within Northern Ireland.[73] For some, good transport links or access to personal transport allowed the maintenance of an economic presence in both jurisdictions simultaneously. Thus, for example, Irene Culvert, the first

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[68] Paddy Devlin, *Straight Left* (Belfast, 1993), p. 96.
[69] Ibid., pp. 96-7.
[70] Louth County Council Minutes (CCM), 22 Aug. 1955, Louth County Archives (L.C.A.), Dundalk. Louth CCM, 15 Jan. 1951, L.C.A..
[71] 'Postman tarred and feathered', *Irish Press,* 18 Sept. 1971 p. 13, in Northern Ireland Office (NIO) RUC Cuttings file. Political Collection, Linen Hall Library, Belfast.
[72] 'Another rap for council contractor', *UG*, 7 Jan. 1965, p. 1.
[73] 'Bid to open Border Road', *NS,* 9 Aug. 1963, p. 1. For details concerning Approved Roads, see pages 116-7 in current work.

female President of the Northern Ireland Chamber of Commerce and Industry, was able to make history by becoming the first sitting president to transfer their residence and employment across the border while still in office, moving from Belfast to Dublin in order to take charge of the Southern hotel group, using the Enterprise train services to maintain her position in the North.[74] Similarly, Seamus Keating recalled how, on one occasion, he had travelled in his role as Donegal County Secretary into Fermanagh in order to recruit a doctor for a temporary vacancy:

> We wanted him to come over and do some work around Pettigo because the doctor in the Pettigo area had retired and there was a time-lag before we could appoint a permanent [replacement] ... And I remember going across to Edmondstown and I met this doctor, made an arrangement with him and he came and provided services for some time … He was working in the Northern Irish health services and for some reason or another he had a certain amount of freedom that he could come over and do some work and he did it.[75]

Such arrangements ensured a maximisation of local potential, for both employers and employees, both of whom had an incentive to seek the cross-border link in preference to a more distant one within the same jurisdiction, with its attendant need for complete relocation.

Among the young, access to transport meant an immediate widening of both economic and social opportunities. Dr. Peter Kavanagh, in his short book on Inniskeen, the County Monaghan townland in which he and his poet brother grew up, remembered the importance of Patrick's first bicycle to his development; 'the bike made a big difference

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[74] 'Town Talk - Presidents who have crossed the border', *NIP,* Jan. 1966, pp. 23-7.
[75] Seamus Keating, interviewed by author, 8 Nov. 2005.

to Patrick - he could travel to Dundalk and events further away.'[76] Others recalled similarly that 'the bicycle allowed me to travel great distances, as well as allowing me to make new friends from all over the place.'[77] Since bicycles were relatively inexpensive, and could be freely used on unapproved roads, they were the most common form of transport available to Border residents. For those who did not possess personal means of transport, regular contact with the wider world was restricted by the timetables and reliability of public transport, and the services offered by travelling shops and tradesmen, who served as 'oor contact wi the ootside warld', according to Hugh Robinson, the Ulster-Scots writer and broadcaster.[78] 'It wus the briedman at arranged fer the doacter tae ca, paid the coal-bill in Donghadee, or jist delivered a message fae yin pairt o the country tae the tither.'[79] The importance of transport links as a component of subjective distance formed one of the major reasons behind the campaign against the blocking of cross-border roads.[80] Both from social and economic point of view, the increase in subjective distance caused by road blocking negatively affected residents.

The psychological effect of the presence of the political 'other'

A number of factors influenced how likely social and kinship links were to be translated into ongoing cross-order contact. The first of these was the degree of comfort and familiarity which an individual felt within the opposing jurisdiction. The border as a

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[76] Peter Kavanagh, *Patrick Kavanagh Country* (The Curragh, c.1978), p. 47.
[77] McGourty, *Mountain* (London, 2003), p. 158. Annie McGinnity, interviewed by author, 13 Oct. 2006. Sean McCreesh, interviewed by author, 10 May 2006.
[78] Hugh Robinson, *Across the Fields of Yesterday* (Belfast, 1999), p. 11.
[79] Ibid.
[80] See, for example, United Societies of Castleblaney, and Carrickmacross to Crossmaglen Road opening committee, pages 79-86 and 121-125 in current work.

geographical line meant different things to different individuals. For some, it represented a psychological line in the sand, marking the boundary between a collective 'us' and 'them', the known and the feared. Northerner Derek Reaney, for example, recalled a trip back to County Wicklow, from which his family had migrated upon his father's relocation from the RIC to the RUC, to visit the graves of his great-grandmother and two great uncles; 'we had planned to stay two weeks … but at the end of the first week … we left, wanting to get home after hearing the news of the Omagh bomb.'[81] Despite the objective security of their location, Wicklow formed an alien space in which the shock of the bombing had left Reaney and his wife feeling unsafe; 'as we crossed the Border at Aughnacloy at about 2 a.m. … still an hour and a half away from home, my wife said to me, "Thank God we are home."'[82] Equally, others found the crossing from Northern Ireland a psychologically liberating experience:

> From my youngest days, I can remember, I never could describe it, when I crossed that Border over there, when I got across it, I felt a shock, peacefulness, or happiness, or tranquillity that you couldn't have here, even before the Troubles started around here. I remember thinking once you got across the Border, you're in a different … you're in heaven, really. That's a fact. That's what I always felt crossing the Border. When I got across the Border, I felt I was free.[83]

The level of unease caused by the crossing of the border was itself variable, being dependent on a number of factors such as the political situation at the time, the familiarity of the individual with the area to which they were heading, and the position which they held. RUC men, for example, would justifiably feel more uneasy in the South at times of unrest than those who did not serve in the Northern Irish security forces. While for many

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[81] Derek Reaney, in Logue, *Reflections*, p. 174.
[82] Ibid.
[83] Peter John Caraher, interviewed by O'Brien. Brendan O'Brien, *The Long War* (Dublin, 1995), p. 63.

the 1950s border campaign had no direct impact upon their ability to access the opposite jurisdiction, one former RUC man talked of his concern, when, driving from one station to another via the Republic at this time, his car broke down in Carrickmacross and he was forced to spend the night at a bed and breakfast there; 'I was averse to staying in the South. My landlady heard me on the phone to the barracks, but she wouldn't have wanted anything to happen to me, staying in her establishment. But I'm sure she told the Guards.'[84] The same was true for members of the other security forces; the Ulster Special Constabulary (USC) and later the Ulster Defence Regiment (UDR):

> Although I was brought up and still live just nine miles from the Border… my family never crossed the Border for the simple reason of security. My father spent 30 years in uniform - 20 years in the "B" specials and 10 years in the UDR. It was simply too dangerous for him, and many others like him, across the border.[85]

Yet this was often, at least partially, a physiological, rather than objective concern. Even in the tense atmosphere surrounding the IRA's border campaign, a young RUC man could return home to Wexford, a 'strong IRA centre', go out dancing where everybody knew who and what he was, and encounter no problems.[86] That the caution was partly subjective can also be seen in the willingness of RUC personnel to contravene it in the service of practicality. Throughout the period, even once the risks became greater with the resurgence of the IRA during the late 1960s and early 1970s, Northern police officers continued to use roads via the South while off duty, though taking the precaution of

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[84] O.W., interviewed by author, 22 Oct 2006.
[85] Derek Reaney, in Logue, *Reflections*, pp. 172-3.
[86] W.G.A. Scott interviewed by author, 23 May 2006. John Banville, 'Memory and Forgetting: The Ireland of de Valera and Ó Faoláin' in Keogh, O'Shea and Quinlan (ed.), *Ireland in the 1950s* (Cork, 2004) p. 22.

varying their routes and travel times and travelling in mufti.[87] For young IRA men, crossing the border represented a similar element of risk, particularly at times when they were evading capture, such as during the internment campaign of 1972.[88] Even for these, however, the Irish border 'has remained very 'porous' by international standards.'[89]

The beginning of the Northern Troubles did lead in some ways to a greater division between North and South. Even among nationalist families, individuals became more careful about visiting Belfast and other perceived trouble spots, particularly with children.[90] This reduced the level of familiarity which many enjoyed with such places, undermining the personal contact networks with relatives residing there. Stories began to circulate of cars with Northern registration numbers being attacked in the Republic, reducing the willingness of Northerners to venture South. So widespread did these allegations become that Dr. Tim O'Driscoll, Managing Director of Bord Fáilte, went so far as to issue a public statement in the press, stating that the Garda had reported no cases of Northern cars having their tyres slashed during visits to the Republic.[91] This was particularly important as times of high tension in Northern Ireland were, in many ways, an economic boon for Southern resorts, with an increasing number of Northern individuals using the Republic as an escape, particularly in the lead up to the 12 of July celebrations, and during the marching season.[92] The *Northern Standard* noted one year

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[87] Stephan Crockard, interviewed by author, 15 Oct. 2006.
[88] See, for example, Adrian Healy in Brendan O'Brien, *The Long War* (Dublin, 1995), p. 54.
[89] J. Anderson and J. Goodman, 'Problems of Integration', p. 29 and J. White, 'The Permeability of the United Kingdom-Irish Border: a Preliminary Reconnaissance', *Administration,* Vol. 31, No. 3, 1983, p. 314.
[90] Christina McKenna, *My mother wore a Yellow Dress* (Glasgow, c.2004), p. 82.
[91] 'What Dr. Tim has to say about those Eire holiday rumours…', *Belfast Telegraph,* 25 Aug. 1970, p. 6. *Cross-Border Cooperation in Tourism,* File 98/3/35 D.T.P., N.A.I..
[92] See, for example, the Simon family of Belfast. Norma Simon, interviewed by author, 4 Aug. 2004.

'an almost continuous stream of cars [which] passed through Clones from the North en route to the West of Ireland.'[93] Many were going on holiday to the resorts of counties Galway, Cork and Kerry, while others left intending to remain away. 'Between 1969 and 1972, thousands of Northern Ireland residents fled across the border' in response to the escalating tensions and violence.[94] Most 'returned home when things appeared a little quieter', many complaining about the quality of accommodation and facilities provided for them by a government which consistently represented the arrival of refugees 'as a crisis [which] ... the state could devolve… to the voluntary sector.'[95] By December 1969, only one hundred of those who had originally fled the August riots remained in army camps in the South.[96]

At the outbreak of the Troubles, the Southern government and peoples prepared for the arrival of large numbers of refugees from the North. Civil Defence Committees gathered blankets, food, and clothing to help deal with the expected flood.[97] Army hospitals, sent to the border, aimed to treat those who feared prosecution if they attended hospital in the North.[98] In so doing, they acknowledged that some proportion of the Northern population looked to them for protection. While *The Northern Standard* noted the presence of some refugees, however, the numbers were far smaller than had been expected and, as noted

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[93] 'Northern Exodus', *Northern Standard,* 16 July 1971, p. 10. (Henceforth *NS*)
[94] Ralaheen Ltd., *All Over the Place*, p. 24.
[95] James Downey, *Them and Us* (Dublin, 1983), pp. 62-3. Ralaheen Ltd., *All Over the Place*, pp. 28-30. Bryan Fanning, 'Reluctant Hosts: refugee policy in Twentieth Century Ireland', *Administration,* Vol. 48, No. 4, 2000-1, p. 83.
[96] Ralaheen Ltd., *All Over the Place*, p. 25.
[97] 'Monaghan civil defence prepares for refugees', *NS,* 22 Aug. 1969, p. 2.
[98] Jack Lynch Speech 13 Aug. 1969, reproduced in *Speeches and Statements on Irish Unity, Northern Ireland, Anglo-Irish relations: August 1969-October 1971* (Dublin, 1971), p. 2.

earlier; many did not remain for long.[99] In meetings with the Diocesan Emergency Committee of the Diocese of Down and Connor a few years later, the Irish Minister for Defence 'intervened … to say that there had been trouble during some of the evacuations with people using the facilities in the South for holiday purposes rather than out of real need' and that ways had to be developed to prevent this.[100] What actually developed, alongside the emergency relief procedures, was a parallel movement to provide precisely this type of short-term respite holidays, particularly for young people from areas such as Belfast's Ballymurphy estate.[101] This acknowledged the reality that people did not wish to leave their homes, but did wish to escape for a while from abnormal conditions.

Refugees coming south did so, both in this period and beyond, either because they felt that the Republic was a safer place in which to weather the storm, or to escape consequences. The presence of the Republic led, indeed, to an exaggerated sense of security, with the nationalist community assuming that the Republic would intervene on their behalf in the event of 'an ultimate holocaust'.[102] Indeed, Jack Lynch's decision to send field hospitals to the border was greeted by some, on both sides, as cover for a full-scale intervention.[103] This helped to build nationalist faith in the state, if only to undermine it again, while re-confirming unionists' 'political fear regarding the intensions of the Republic of Ireland' which 'at times exaggerated quite understandable anxiety into a near-paranoid obsession', based upon a long tradition of attempted 'invasions',

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[99] 'Ordered out of Belfast', *NS,* 19 Sept. 1969, p. 2. 'Belfast refugees', *NS,* 14 July 1972, p. 7.
[100] Meeting in Department of Defence, 28 Aug. 1974, *Magill*, Nov. 2006, p. 16.
[101] 'Carrickmacross news - Belfast children's visit', *NS,* 16 March 1972, p. 7. 'Letters to the editor - holidays for Northern folk', *NS,* 21 April 1972, p. 1.
[102] Meeting in the Department of Defence, 28 Aug. 1974, *Magill* Nov. 2006, p. 16.
[103] Niall Ó Dochartaigh, *From Civil Rights to Armalites* (Basingstoke and New York, 2005), pp. 108-9. Eamonn McCann, *War and an Irish Town* (London, 1993), p. 116. See also Marc Mulholland, *The Longest War* (Oxford, 2002), p. 77 and Brendan O'Brien, *The Long War* (Dublin, 1995), p. 35.

including that by O'Connell in 1841 and Parnell in 1883.[104] The *Ulster Gazette*, for example, devoted considerable attention in 1950 to the actions of one Captain Peter Cowen who, they claimed, was recruiting a volunteer subsidiary to the Irish Army dedicated to an invasion of Ulster.[105] In fact, the Irish government 'was extremely reluctant to actually breach UK sovereignty' either at this, or any future point, emphasising to community leaders that they would be expected to fall back on their own resources in a conflict situation as 'even if there was a political will [to intervene] … the amount of troops that could be realised in such a situation was probably in the range of 2,000.'[106] Though 'to move troops into the North was not only out of the question politically, but militarily it would have been a hopeless exercise', there is evidence that nationalist faith was partially justified, with the Southern government putting plans in place in 1974, for example, 'to deal with situations in the North which would not give rise to wholesale flight of refugees … but rather to requests for the provision of material assistance.'[107] This sense of security, or insecurity, with regards to the opposite jurisdiction formed one of the major factors defining the extent to which an individual maintained contact with or rejected it.

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[104] Richard English 'The Growth of New Unionism', in John Coakley, *Changing Shades of Orange and Green: Redefining the Union and the Nation in Contemporary Ireland* (Dublin, 2002), p. 96. Clare O'Halloran, *Partition and the Limits of Irish Nationalism* (Dublin, 1978), p. 187.

[105] See for example, 'Threat to Invade Ulster', *Ulster Gazette* (Henceforth *UG*), 18 May 1950, p. 8. 'Answer to Capt. Cowen's Boasts', *UG,* 15 June 1950, p. 6. Curlough Orange Hall', *UG,* 22 June 1950, p. 1.

[106] Niall Ó Dochartaigh, *From Civil Rights to Armalites* (Basingstoke and New York, 2005), p. 114, Meeting in the Department of Defence, 28 Aug. 1974, *Magill* Nov. 2006, p. 16. See also James Downey, *Them and Us* (Dublin, 1983), p. 64.

[107] James Downey, *Them and Us* (Dublin, 1983), p. 62. Memorandum, Dept. of Taoiseach, 14 Oct. 1974, *Magill* Nov. 2006, p. 22.

Ignorance and knowledge appear to have been the second most important psychological factors at play in defining the extent to which an individual maintained contact with the opposite jurisdiction. Christina McKenna recalled, for example, how her mother's local Women's Institute near Draperstown in County Londonderry used to hold regular shopping days out to Ayr, in Scotland:

> There were much more accessible and varied places to visit across the border in the South of Ireland, but to stray into the foreign Republic was never an option. I can hear them discussing this possibility:
>
> 'You mean you want us to walk among those Gaelic paddies and spen' time and money bolstering the economy of tayy Provo Den? Are ye mental?'[108]

The trips to Scotland thus continued. Southern residents of the Republic were equally open to such fears. Cyril Coulter, Fermanagh County Council (CC) employee, again recalled the concerns expressed by a Dubliner from a Software firm which Fermanagh had commissioned.[109] 'One night he was working late, he was in terror of crossing the border … I remember, I said, 'I'll drive, you follow me down … but 'ah, no', he said, 'I'll chance it.'" I couldn't understand him … because I had no problems.'[110] For those who did cross the border, the contrast between myth and reality was considerable, amusing and bewildering in turn.[111] It is in this context that familial and social cross-border links helped to form the base from which knowledge could be gained, contact established, and thus and cooperation made possible.

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[108] Christina McKenna, *My Mother Wore a Yellow Dress* (Glasgow, c.2004), p. 96.
[109] Ibid.
[110] Ibid.
[111] Ibid. See also, Robert Harbison, *Song of Erne* (Belfast, 1960) p. 17.

Social interaction across the border

Outside of the family circle, interaction between individuals took place, and contacts were built up, through economic and social activity. The importance of each of these in establishing cross-border links shall be examined in turn.

While it is the intention of this research to focus on the interaction between distinct North and South bodies, it would be remiss to ignore entirely the impact of major thirty-two county bodies on the lives of border residents, particularly in the social sphere.

All three of Ireland's major churches, the Catholic Church in Ireland, the Presbyterian Church in Ireland and the Anglican Church of Ireland, continued post-1921 to operate on an all-island basis. Indeed, the only religious grouping to divide along the line of the new border in 1921 was the Jewish community of Ireland, whose Southern communities, Dublin and Cork, took themselves out of the control of the Chief Rabbinate of London.[112] The result of the churches' ongoing thirty-two county organisation was that parishes and bishopric boundaries continued to cut across what now became the political divide. The Church of Ireland Bishop of Clogher, for example, had been and remained in charge of a Diocesan area spanning most of Counties Fermanagh and Monaghan, as well as parts of Leitrim, Cavan and Donegal. This arrangement had a number of consequences for border residents as churchgoers, in a period when most would have attended regularly. A

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[112] Noga Zivan, 'Between A Rock and a Hard place –Belfast Jewry and the Northern Ireland Troubles', *Jewish Ireland Conference,* Belfast, 2 Sept. 2004.

family's parish church could be across the border from their residence, entailing a crossing every week. John McGourty, for example, recalled walking to attend Mass 'across the border in the 'Bar' chapel at Gowlan' each Sunday as a small child.[113] In this, his family was not unique, which led to difficulties once border roads were disrupted. In a letter to the Department of the Taoiseach in October 1971, one correspondent noted that 'road cratering is a particular problem [in her] area as Catholics have to cross to County Donegal to go to church and non-Catholics vice versa', while another lady correspondent begged Lynch to intervene with Faulkner and Wilson over the cratering of the only road between her County Tyrone home and the local chapel, located in County Monaghan.[114] Clergymen, too, could have their role divided between the two sides of the border, leading to complications with taxation, and necessitating the provision of special passes to cross unapproved road for pastoral work.[115] If for whatever reason such access was denied, unease resulted.[116]

The parish provided the primary forum for social interaction, particularly among the young. John McGourty, for example, recalled the visits to neighbours on the way back from Mass, as well as the walks to Mass with them, as a substantial part of the socialising of young people before they were able to roam the countryside on their own.[117] This meant that parishes, alongside schools, provided some of the primary social zones for

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[113] McGourty, *Mountain* (London, 2003), p. 33.
[114] Letter, Secretary, Committee of Action Against Road Cratering to Jack Lynch, file 2002/8/523 (S1955C) *Customs,* Dept. of Taoiseach, N.A.I.. Letter, Elizabeth McKenna to Jack Lynch, 27 Jan. 1971, File 2003/16/8 (S1955C) *Customs*, Dept. of Taoiseach, N.A.I.
[115] Rev. Dr. Andrew Rodgers, in Logue, *Reflections*, pp. 178-181.
[116] 'Bid to open Border road', *NS,* 9 Aug. 1963, p. 1.
[117] McGourty, *Mountain* (London, 2003), pp. 33-8.

young people growing up. Where the parish cut across the border, so did these areas of interaction.

While all three major churches spanned the border, religious rules concerning aspects of social life were not uniform throughout, nor evenly enforceable between the two jurisdictions. For example, in the Republic, dancing was forbidden by the Catholic Church during Lent, with the exception of St. Patrick's night, and this was enforced by the authorities charged with the issuing of licences to hold dances.[118] In Northern Ireland, this rule could be circumvented by attendance at non-catholic venues, and was not enforced via the licence system. As a consequence, the annual social calendars diverged somewhat, with Lent in the Republic being 'the time when most of the drama festivals and variety concerts took place' in lieu of dancing, which formed most people's contacts with the artistic revival of the 1950s.[119] This forced many people, particularly those whose income was derived in part from music-playing, to attend more dances in Northern Ireland during this period, regardless of their place of residence.[120] Variations in the rules between dioceses could also encourage cross-border attendance, with the ban on Saturday dancing within the Diocese of Clogher, for example, undermined by the proximity of the Diocese of Armagh, where no such ban existed, meaning that 'one could escape this 'reserved sin' by going over the Monaghan-Armagh border' to dance in the North.[121]

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[118] Kevin M. McDermott, *Corncrake*, p. 48.
[119] Ibid. Brown, *Ireland*, p. 236.
[120] Kevin M. McDermott, *Corncrake*, p. 95.
[121] Patrick J. Duffy, 'Continuity and Change in the Border Landscape' in Brian S. Turner (ed.) *The Debateable Lands* (Downpatrick, Co. Down, 2002), p. 22.

In a predominantly rural, agrarian society, the opportunity to meet people outside of the immediate family and neighbourhood circles was limited. For the young, this presented obvious problems in terms of socialising and encounters with potential future partners. While an extensive network of *ceilidhing* among neighbours existed, this was frequently limited only to male neighbours.[122] For women, the weekends were the main time for socialising, though this was also frequently limited to the immediate family circle.[123] Beginning in this period, and rising out of the tradition of home based dances, dance halls began to appear, where at first dance bands and traditional Irish musicians was performed, and later, with the arrival of Bill Haley and the Comets, rock and roll music was played.[124] From early 1950s onwards, the showbands toured Ireland, North and South, playing the new music to audiences of thousands in the big cities.[125] Particular bands could attract patrons from across a fairly wide area, with 'some dancers …prepared to travel twenty or thirty miles to a hall where their favourite band was playing.'[126] Ann McGeeney, who grew up near Crossmaglen, South Armagh, recalled 'Saturday night excursions to anywhere from Dundalk to 'Blaney to Carrickmacross - so long as Horslips were playing.'[127] Since the border did not limit travel by bicycle, which was the primary means of locomotion for the young, it failed to provide a barrier to dance attendance. Indeed dance halls actively advertised for cross-border patrons, using names like *Borderlight* to highlight their proximity, and thus accessibility, to the border.[128] The local

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[122] Harris, *Prejudice and Tolerance in Ulster*, p. 76. Robert Harbison, *Song of Erne* (Belfast, 1960), pp. 81-2.
[123] Harris, *Prejudice and Tolerance in Ulster*, p. 115.
[124] Brian Fallon, 'Reflecting on Ireland in the 1950s', in Keogh, O'Shea and Quinlan (ed.), *Ireland in the 1950s* (Cork, 2004) p. 40.
[125] Vincent Power, *Send 'Em Home Sweatin' – The Showband Story* (Cork, 2000), pp. 9-10.
[126] Peadar Livingstone, *The Monaghan Story* (Enniskillen, 1980), p. 465.
[127] Ann McGeeney, in Logue, *Reflections*, p. 107.
[128] 'New north Monaghan dance centre Borderlight opens in Emyvale' *NS,* 7 April 1967, p. 3.

press would also actively cover dance events within the opposite jurisdiction. The *Northern Standard,* for example, as part of its *Band-age* and *Come Dancing* columns reported major events, dances and dance-halls in Northern Ireland and discussed upcoming dances for which a large Northern following was expected.[129] These dance halls allowed young people access to communal gatherings which were not limited to their own social sphere or geographical location. The very fact that dances and dance bands were given a regular weekly column in the paper emphasises the importance which they played in the local social scene, an importance attested to by many contemporary commentators and border residents.[130]

The cross-border nature of the dance clientele, and the importance of dancing as a social activity, constituted one of the elements behind the relative fluidity of cross-border relations in terms of marriages and kinship links. An awareness of this fact led to a certain amount of opposition to mixed dance halls on the part of the clergy, who sought to control and ensure a single denominational aspect to the company.[131] The Catechism, the most basic formulisation of the Catholic faith, listed 'improper dances' as one of the greatest threats to chastity, alongside company keeping and idleness, and certain Catholic Bishops, most notably the Bishop of Clogher in the border area, sought rigidly to control

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[129] 'Come dancing with band-age', *NS,* 7 July 1967, p. 6. 'Come dancing with band-age', *NS,* 12 May 1967, p. 6. 'Come dancing with band-age', *NS,* 19 June 1967, p. 6. 'Come Dancing', *NS,* 19 Jan 1968, p. 7. 'Come dancing - two of Northern Ireland's noted musicians', *NS,* 23 May 1969, p. 7.

[130] Annie McGinnty, interviewed by author, 13 Oct. 2006. Kevin M. McDermott, *Corncrake*, pp. 75-80. Bryan Gallagher, *Barefoot in Mullyneeny* (London, 2005, 2006), pp. 167-9. Dervla Murphy, *A Place Apart* (London, 1978), p. 49.

[131] See, for example, Paisley on Protestants attending Catholic halls, 'Protestants who "sell their faith"', *UG,* 16 March 1950, p. 5.

when, how, and to what hours, dances could be held.[132] This was done both on a general basis, and for individual events. Macarten McCormack, a leading member of the Irish National Farmers' Association (NFA) in County Monaghan, recalled an occasion on which his organisation had invited their Ulster Farmers Union (UFU) compatriots to an Annual Dress Dance in the county:

> There was a bit of a to-do. The Catholic Bishop at the time, he didn't want dances after 12 o'clock and the Secretary of the Farmers Association that I was in was protestant, so he didn't know this, and he advertised the dance to two or something like that. Oh, sure I was summoned to the Bishop's palace and asked to explain ourselves. [And warned] that we were going to be denounced from the public pulpit the next day, so I explained that this man was a protestant, I said, and we're having the Ulster Farmer's Union as guests, and they had us as their guests. First of all, he objected to our being in dress. 'Keep your feet on the ground! Don't be getting above yourselves!' So I said that it was a national thing, and we were inviting them nationally, and they would come in dress, and we would like to honour them by being in dress suits ourselves, just the Officers. So I think that I fixed him all right![133]

Despite these difficulties, on at least three occasions within a decade McCormack recalled the Monaghan NFA travelling as the guests of their Ulster equivalents, or vice versa, to annual dances.[134] Policy discussions between the two groups, however, were limited to centrally organised talks in Dublin. Where the opinions of border residents were sought, they travelled to Dublin in order to deliver them.[135]

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[132] Question 256, quoted by Bryan MacMahan, 'Getting on the High road again', in John A. O'Brien (ed.) *The Vanishing Irish* (London, 1954), p. 211. Peadar Livingstone, *The Monaghan Story* (Enniskillen, 1980), pp. 444-5.
[133] Macaten McCormack, interviewed by author, 22 May 2006.
[134] Ibid.
[135] Ibid.

Attempts to separate the protestant and catholic dance scenes do not appear to have been uniformly successful, with 'the North's showband and ballroom scene seem[ing] to transcend sectarian hatreds.'[136] Maryanne Kerr, for example, remembered meeting a boy she later found out to have been a protestant at a dance in Derry City.[137] W. G. A. Scott, during his service as a catholic officer in the RUC, recalled attending dances in both protestant and catholic halls, including ones ran by the Orange Order and the Freemasons; 'I didn't care who ran the dance. I believed in enjoying myself!'[138] Friends from his service days in the RUC recalled, however, how they had used religion in order to prick the ego of their exuberant friend:

> Bill, he always fancied himself as a lady-killer you know … there was a catholic dancehall up here in Belfast … it was a bit snooty … and they used to have a dance on a Saturday night … Danny and his pal … they used to see Bill dancing with some of these girls, maybe dancing with the same girl once or twice. And Danny would go up to her, dance with her and say 'you want to watch that fellow Scott, he's no good.' She'd say 'Why? What do you mean?' 'Well, he's a protestant.' And the girl would drop Bill like a hot brick![139]

Kevin McDermott, in his own recollections of playing in a County Cavan dance band recalled that 'the fact that the brothers [who ran the band] were Protestants, was a great advantage ... they got us plenty of bookings in Protestant halls on both sides of the border.'[140] While emphasising that religion was not an issue inside the band, McDermott did recall that the mixture of halls in which they played could lead to complications for them:

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[136] Power, *Showband Story*, p. 270.
[137] Maryanne Kerr, *Over the Mountain* (London, 1996), p. 89 - 94.
[138] W.G.A. Scott, interview by author 23 May 2006.
[139] J.B., interviewed by author, 25 Oct 2006.
[140] Kevin M. McDermott, *Corncrake*, p. 95.

We would all decide as to which National Anthem we should play at the end of a dance. In the Orange halls north of the border we would be obliged to play *The Queen*, and in the Catholic halls it would be *The Soldiers' Song*. In the Orange halls in the Republic, although requested to play *The Queen* we would play *Auld Lang Syne* and leave it at that.[141]

The problems were not always so innocuous, however. Young people crossing the border to attend dances could find themselves in difficulties on occasion, particularly if belonging to certain high risk groups. Thus in 1971, for example, four RUC women attending a dance at the Four Seasons Hotel in Monaghan Town became the subject of an attempted IRA kidnapping.[142] Following the incident the force's orders were changed and RUC personnel were discouraged from crossing the border, even in a personal capacity. Arguably, it was the very flexibility of the showbands in crossing and re-crossing the border which made them a target for attack, most noticeably during the UVF massacre of members of the Miami Showband in County Down in 1975.[143]

On other occasions however, a cross-border aspect could prove an unexpected boon to the attendees or performers. Bryan Gallagher, in his biography *Barefoot in Mullyneeny* recalled how, while driving to play at a dance in Collooney, County Sligo, the band with whom he was playing lost their way, and were extremely late arriving at the venue.[144] In order to escape censure from an extremely irate organiser, the head of the band told him that they were lucky to have arrived at all, since they had been stopped by the B-specials attempting to leave Northern Ireland. 'The Priest … described us as 'the boys who had

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[141] Ibid., p. 96.
[142] 'I.R.A try to kidnap city policewomen', *UG,* 4 Nov. 1971, p. 2.
[143] Power, *Showband Story*, pp. 266-272.
[144] Bryan Gallagher, *Barefoot in Mullyneeny* (London, 2005, 2006).

broken out of the North' ... I am ashamed to say that we milked the situation unmercifully. It was one of the best nights we ever had', Gallagher recalled.[145]

Over time, the social scene around the border area evolved to accommodate its presence. This occurred both gradually, through the slow evolution of social habit, and as a result of individual events such as the cratering of roads or the Miami Showband massacre, which 'within days [caused the] cross-border links ... to snap.'[146] Charlie Cullen, long-time Councillor for Manorhamilton District, County Leitrim, recalled vividly in his own youth having to request late passage through customs, a privilege which required payment to the customs authorities, if intending to take out beyond midnight a girl from nearby County Fermanagh.[147] The need to make a prior decision as to whether one would return home before midnight, place a request for late passage, or find a place to sleep within the jurisdiction, remained a problem throughout this period and beyond. 'If going to a cross-border party,' recalled Ian McCracken, who, while living near St. Johnston, County Donegal, taught at Foyle College, in Derry, 'it was necessary either to be Cinderella and cross the Border before midnight or enter a request for a specified time. This involved skill in estimating how good the part [sic] would be and if one could leave at the chosen time.'[148] The blocking of many cross-border roads in the 1970s took even this decision away from young people. County Leitrim lost both of its access roads into

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[145] Ibid., pp. 194-5.
[146] Power, *Showband Story,* p. 270.
[147] Charlie Cullen, interviewed by author, 25 May 2006.
[148] Ian McCracken, in Logue, *Reflections*, p. 90.

Northern Ireland, causing the young to re-orientate their social life away from the border.[149]

Cross-border social contacts were maintained, in part, through membership of sporting, and other organisations which continued to operate on a thirty-two county basis post-1921. Prominent among them was the Gaelic Athletics Association (GAA) which, according to its own leadership 'did not recognise the border and therefore did not engage in any cross-border activities.'[150] Even within such organisations, however, there is evidence for the existence of a sense of regional and even North-South identity. Dundalk's success in the 1962/3 GAA championships was celebrated in one of their local papers, *The Argus,* under the banner headline; 'Dundalk almost there - league title for border team after 30 years.'[151] The success of County Down, meanwhile, in the 1960 all-Ireland final was celebrated not only by those most intimately involved with the team's success, such as future senator Maurice Hayes, nor only by Downsmen, but all over nationalist Northern Ireland.[152] 'Down winning the all Ireland made everyone in the 'North' feel special', noted John McGourty, while a young Gerry Adams remembers travelling back from the match chanting 'the cup's going over the border' along with the rest, without, he claimed, any clear awareness of what that meant, though his main concern remained 'to win an All-Ireland hurling or football medal with Antrim.'[153] It is important to remember that such organisations as the GAA, even when centrally

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[149] Charlie Cullen, interviewed by author, 25 May 2006.
[150] Dominic Murray and Jim O'Neill, *Peace Building in a Political Impasse* (Colerain, 1991), p. 30.
[151] *The Argus,* 13 April 1963, p. 8.
[152] Hayes *Minority Verdict*, pp. 50-6.
[153] McGourty, *Mountain* (London, 2003), p. 194. Gerry Adams, *Before the Dawn* (London, 1996), p. 33.

organised, were constructed of a large number of local teams, whose inter-rivalry formed as important a context to the individuals as the national organisation.

Fiercely nationalist sporting organisations such as GAA were not alone in continuing to operate on an all-Island basis. Although the Football Association, which later became strongly aligned with the Loyalist interest in Northern Ireland, for example, found the navigation of the cross-border mêlée more than it could manage, the traditionally unionist Irish Cricket Board, and the Irish Indoor Bowling Association continued to operate on a cross-border basis, providing individuals such as former Unionist Councillor Jim Barr with their own all-Ireland social context.[154] Such cross-border contexts could lead to a certain amount of tension. The Irish Rugby Football Union, for example, faced complaints in 1950 about the behaviour of fans travelling up to matches in Ravenhill, Belfast, which it had bought in 1923 as a sign of faith in its future as a thirty-two county sport.[155] Eventually, in 1954, matches at Ravenhill had to be abandoned altogether amid a threatened boycott by Southern players over the issue of flags and anthems at the games.[156] The rugby team continued to be selected on a 32 county basis, however, and provided many Northerners with their first point of contact with Dublin and the South.[157]

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[154] John Sugden, 'Sport in Northern Ireland', pp. 206-7. Jim Barr, interviewed by author, 23 Oct. 2006. Alf McCreary, 'Thon boy can bat - Is he an Indian?', *Belfast Telegraph,* 12 June 1980. Reprinted in Alf McCreary *the Good, the Bad and the Barmy* (Antrim, Northern Ireland, 1992), pp. 39-41. David Hassan, 'Sports and National Identity in Northern Ireland – the case of Northern Nationalism' (Henceforth – 'Sports and National Identity'), Ph.D. thesis, submitted September 2001, University of Ulster, p. 252 and David Harkness, *Ireland in the Twentieth Century – Divided Island* (Basingstoke and London, 1996), p. 116.

[155] Roamer '"The Bhoys Came North"', *UG,* 16 March 1950, p. 5. 'Triple Crown match at Ravenhill', *Belfast News-letter* 13 March 1950, p. 5. David Hassan, 'Sports and National Identity', p. 252.

[156] David Hassan, 'Sports and National Identity', pp. 260-1. See also Dominic Murray 'Tracking Progress' in Democratic Dialogue (ed.) *No Frontiers* (Belfast, 1999), p. 23.

[157] Alf McCreary, 'When Irish Eyes Aren't Smiling', *Belfast Telegraph,* 10 March 1988. Reprinted in *Princes, Presidents and Punters* (Antrim, Northern Ireland, 1988), pp. 133-5.

For those sports which had no formalised course, meetings held near the border could, and did, frequently cross the unseen divide, as well as attracting adherence from both sides. Hunting was one such sport, popular in the rural areas immediately surrounding the border. 'Not the posh hunting with horses' recalls Oliver McCaffrey, 'but the working man's hunting with hounds.'[158] Since the border could be crossed by foot, it could also be crossed by dog-packs.[159] Art P. O'Dálaigh, in his memories of growing up in County Tyrone, recalled his father's involvement in hunting, when he would take their dog Trimmer, as far away as County Cavan to attend hunts.[160] Such meets could face their own problems however. Michael Gorman, recalling his wife's involvement with the breeding of Irish Setters, remembered the challenges posed by field trials held periodically in the Mourne Mountains, County Down. 'On one occasion, one of the competitors was [an RUC] superintendent… [and] guards [had to be] provided for him, just in case.'[161]

Some sports existed which actively utilised the border's nature as the limiter of legal jurisdiction. Cockfighting, in particular, though outlawed in both Northern Ireland and the Republic, frequently utilised space within a few metres of the divide, with scout-cars posted as look-outs to warn participants of incoming police presence, and men travelling 'from as far west as Mayo' to attend.[162] Tommy McKearney recalled how as a boy he had been used as a runner by his uncles, who bred fighting Cocks. 'There are strange ways to

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[158] Oliver McCaffrey, interviewed by author, 13 Oct. 2006.
[159] 'Cross-border drag hunt', *The Argus,* 16 May 1964, p. 3.
[160] Art P. O'Dálaigh, *The Glow of the Oil Lamp* (Victoria, B.C., Trafford, c.2004), p. 49.
[161] Michael Gorman, interviewed by author, 20 Jan. 2004.
[162] 'Cockfighters elude Garda swoop', *UG,* 28 July 1966, p. 4. 'Cockfighting at Clones', *NS,* 13 June 1969, p. 10. 'Police swoop on cockfight', *Mid-Ulster Mail,* 23 June 1962, p. 1.

learn the idiosyncrasies of international boundaries, but fleeing breathlessly from the Gardaí with a rooster under your arm while looking desperately for sight of a red post-box has got to be one of the oddest', he noted.[163] Periods of tension and heightened security forced the cockfighters away from the area, towards Meath and the Midlands, though meets were still taking place in Northern Ireland as recently as the year 2000.[164]

Even those organisations most closely associated with loyalist Ulster, such as the Orange Order and the Ulster Special Constabulary, existed to a certain degree within a cross-border context. Shane Connaughton, in his semi-fictionalised account of childhood in a border Garda station, remembers a local protestant who 'twice a week … crossed into the Six Counties where he was a member of a part-time militia set up by the Belfast Government to defend themselves against the I.R.A.', the B-Specials.[165] County Monaghan, in particular, was said to have maintained strong residual links with the B-Specials in Northern Ireland.[166] Fears were expressed that this continued activity would lead to tensions in the South, providing an excuse for those wishing to attack members of the minority community.[167]

The Orange Order had, pre-partition, been an all-island organisation, and, if its Southern members were viewed post-partition 'in much the same way as Lodges from Ghana or the Mohawk Lodge from America', proximity to the border did at least ensure their

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[163] Tommy McKearney, in Logue., *Reflections*, pp. 124 -5.
[164] 'Round the counties, co. Tyrone Coalisland "mains"', *CG*, Aug. 1962, pp. 19-21. 'Cockfighters leave border area - helicopters too discerning', *UG,* 20 Aug 1970, p. 6. Martin Fletcher, *Silver Linings* (London, 2001), pp. 298 - 302.
[165] Shane Connaughton, *A Border Station* (London, 1989), pp. 133-4.
[166] John N. Young, *Erskine H. Childers – President of Ireland: A Biography* (Gerrards Cross, 1985), p. 126.
[167] 'Editorial-Rumour', *NS,* 28 Aug. 1969, p. 1. Ralaheen Ltd., *All Over the Place*, p. 84.

continued survival, and escape from the 'terminal decline' experienced elsewhere in the Republic.[168] In 1964, forty three lodges still operated in County Cavan, forty in Monaghan and sixteen in County Donegal.[169] The *Northern Standard* noted approvingly a number of occasions on which Monaghan Orangemen attended 12 July celebrations in Northern Ireland.[170] Parades in the Republic had to a large extent ceased after 1932, when Taoiseach Cosgrave admitted that he could not guarantee their safety after attacks on marches in Counties Leitrim and Cavan.[171] Rossnowlagh in County Donegal, however, maintained its Orange Order parade throughout this period and beyond.[172]

Any facility or event relying on a large catchment area had the potential to attract a cross-border clientele, including large or pleasant shopping areas, fairs and cinemas.[173] A former RUC officer recalled how Lifford, across the border from his own posting in Strabane, had a superior cinema to that available in the North; 'we used to ring the local [Garda] sergeant, telling him to keep us a seat.'[174] Cross-border crowds could also be expected at important events such as political meetings, commemorations, music festivals and country shows.[175] Such gatherings allowed like-minded individuals from a large area

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[168] Steve Bruce, 'Unionism and the Border', in Anderson and Bort (ed.) *The Irish Border*, p. 135. David Fitzpatrick, 'The Orange Order and the border', *Irish Historical Studies,* Vol. 33, No. 129, May 2002, p. 54.
[169] David Fitzpatrick, 'The Orange Order and the Border', *Irish Historical Studies*, Vol. 33, No. 129, May 2002, p. 66.
[170] See, for example, 'The Twelfth - Editorial', *NS,* 10 July 1970, p. 1.
[171] Aiken McClelland, 'Orangism in County Monaghan', *Clogher Record*, 1978, p. 402.
[172] Ruth Dudley Edwards, *The Faithful Tribe* (London, 2000), pp. 43-51.
[173] Arnold Marsh, 'Notes by the way - small towns and their shops', *Chamber of Commerce Journal* (*CCJ*) Jan. 1964, p. 21.
[174] J.B., interviewed by author, 25 Oct. 2006.
[175] Gerry Adams, *Before the Dawn* (London, 1996), p. 81. Peadar Livingstone, *The Monaghan Story* (Enniskillen, 1980), pp. 491-2 'Band festival 'Success of Clones Show'', *NS,* 30 Aug. 1968, p. 3. Jack Johnson, 'Building bridges on the Border' in Brian S. Turner (ed.) *The Debateable Lands* (Downpatrick, Co. Down, 2002), p. 84.

to meet and socialise, thus helping create new contact networks, as well as playing a part in maintaining pre-existing ones.

The border as a legal frontier

Cockfighters were not alone in realising, and utilising, the potential of residence close to the jurisdictional boundary, in financial and social terms. Over time, various groups of border residents found ways, legal and illegal, in which to exploit their residence near the divide for their own ends.

Northern Ireland and the Republic operated separate tax and benefits networks which could, in some circumstances, make it more cost-effective to live in one jurisdiction and work in another. Seamus Keating, former secretary of Donegal CC, recalled, for example, council employees living in Strabane and commuting the short distance across the river to Lifford to work, both for tax purposes and because Strabane offered residents a better range of facilities.[176] Such an employment strategy could lead to difficulties, however. Workers who contributed to National Insurance schemes in their jurisdiction of employment were not automatically entitled to have those payments recognised in the benefits they received within their jurisdiction of residence, for example. This problem was sufficiently widespread as to require a formal agreement to be negotiated in 1949 between William Norton, Minister for Labour and National Insurance in Dublin, and W. B. Maginness, Belfast Social Welfare Minister, to resolve it.[177] Historically, double

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[176] Seamus Keating, interviewed by author, 8 Nov. 2005.
[177] 'Civil insurance scheme agreement with Northern Ireland', *Irish Trade and Statistical Bulletin*, June 1949, p. 95.

taxation had also been a problem for such individuals, albeit one which was resolved early on, with the passing in Northern Ireland of the Double Taxation Relief Act (Northern Ireland) in 1923.[178] Southern workers wishing to work in Northern Ireland also continued to be required to apply for permits of residence, and work permits from the Ministry of Labour, under the 1947 Safeguarding of Employment Act unlike in the remainder of the UK, and a confessional award of such permits was strongly advocated by unionist lobbies.[179] 'In addition, even those on the Parliamentary register who had come from the Republic were precluded from voting in Stormont and council elections, whether householders or not.'[180] 'It [was] easier for a Finn to take a job in Denmark than…for an Irishmen from Donegal to work next door in Derry.'[181] Nonetheless, circumstantial evidence suggests that a substantial number continued to do so.[182] Proximity to the border also allowed access to employment opportunities further afield. Kevin McDermott recalled his own journey to Belfast as the first step in the process of enlistment in the RAF, in which his brother had already enlisted.[183] Coming back, a number of service personnel similarly used Northern Ireland as a convenient stepping stone towards employment closer to their Southern Irish families.[184]

The election of a Labour government to Westminster in 1945 heralded the beginning of a period of greater legislative involvement in aspects of Northern Irish social welfare,

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[178] Northern Ireland Ministry of Finance, *Ulster Yearbook and Diary 1966-8* (Belfast, 1966), p. 206.
[179] Paul Bew, Peter Gibbon and Henry Patterson, *Northern Ireland 1921 – 2001 Political Forces and Social Classes* (London, 2002), pp. 82-6 Henry Patterson, 'In the Land of King Canute: the Influence of Border Unionism on Ulster Unionist Politics, 1945 – 63', *Contemporary British History,* Vol. 20, No. 4, December 2006, pp. 521-7. Livingstone, *The Fermanagh Story,* pp. 366-7.
[180] Hayes, 'A Town Clerk'sPerspective', in *County and Town*, p. 70.
[181] Donald S. Connery, *The Irish* (London, 1968), p. 209.
[182] Marcus W. Heslinga, *The Irish Border as a Cultural Divide* (Assen, 1962), p. 15.
[183] Kevin M. McDermott, *Corncrake*, p. 99.
[184] D.J., interviewed by author, 20 Oct. 2006, W. G. A. Scott, interviewed by author, 23 May 2006.

under Labour's commitment to the implementation of the 1942 Beveridge Report.[185]

Under the principle of parity established in 1938:

> If … there were a deficit in the Northern Ireland budget which as not the result of a standard of social expenditure higher than that of Great Britain the United Kingdom Government agree[d] that it would be equitable that means should be found to make good this deficit in such a way as to ensure that Northern Ireland should be in a financial position to continue to enjoy the same social services and have the same standards as Great Britain.[186]

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This agreement meant that 'Northern Ireland agreed to bear the same burden as Great Britain, while expecting the same social benefits' as those available in the rest of the UK.[187] 'The concept of leeway, added to the concept of parity, provided a dynamic for high public expenditure which lasted until 1972', based 'much more on local expenditure needs than on local revenue' (emphasis in the original).[188] Successive Stormont governments passed welfare legislation similar in content to that passed at Westminster, backed up by centrally-provided funds, and built an infrastructure in excess of the capacity of local tax revenue. While providing many benefits for the people of Northern Ireland, this path locked the Stormont administration into a London-led legislative direction.[189] Any attempt to deviate from this step-by-step approach, for example over the issue of child benefits, was fiercely resisted, partly as it was seen as discriminatory, and

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[185] Keith Laybourn, *A Century of Labour – A History of the Labour Party* (Stroud, Gloucestershire, 2001), pp. 78-81.
[186] Columns 1708-9, Westminster House of Commons *Hansard,* 12 May 1938. Quoted in Arthur J. Green, *Devolution and Public Finance: Stormont from 1921 to 1972* (Glasgow 1979), p. 9. See also A.G. Donaldson, 'The Constitution of Northern Ireland: its origins and Development', *The University of Toronto Law Journal,* Vol. XI, No. 1, 1955, p. 19.
[187] Terence O'Neill speech to the Royal Commonwealth Society, London, reprinted in Terence O'Neill, *Ulster at the Crossroads* (London, 1969), p. 82. See also 'Parity vital foundation of our system, Kirk Explains', *Belfast Telegraph* 8 April 1968, p. 5.
[188] Arthur J. Green, *Devolution and Public Finance: Stormont from 1921 to 1972* (Glasgow 1979), p. 10. Emphasis in original.
[189] Patrick Shea, *Voices and the Sound of Drums* (Belfast, 1983), pp. 156-7.

partly as it seemed to undermine a concept highly beneficial to Northern Irish residents.[190] Without Westminster's hefty financial backing, the Republic was unable to offer the same level of support to its own citizens, which led to a certain amount of wistful jealousy on the part of those living in border areas of the Republic.[191] Nell McCafferty, in her recollections of weekend visits to Donegal from her home in Derry, recalled women there commenting to her mother on the free dental care, schools and unemployment benefits available to them, enquiring enviously 'what else we got for free in the North?'[192]

The welfare disparity thus created formed one aspect of Northern life which the Unionist government feared would attract Southerners to migrate there and thus undermine their control of the province, particularly as the 1945-60 period formed 'the high point of the Irish border as an economic divide when Northern living standards were some 30 percent higher than the South's.[193] There were also fears about the health and cost implication for the North of such a large-scale migration from the South.[194] Rules regarding welfare entitlement were thus made stricter for those coming from the Republic, for example, they were not entitled to apply for council housing for a number of years after arrival.[195]

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[190] James P. Condren, *Brian Faulkner – Ulster Unionist*, Ph.D. Thesis, 2005, University of Ulster, p. 74. (Henceforth, Condren, *Brian Faulkner,* 2005). Marc Mulholland, 'Why did Unionists discriminate?', in Sabine Wichert, *From the United Irishmen to Twentieth-Century Unionism* (Dublin, 2004), p. 200.
[191] Marc Mulholland, 'Assimilation versus Segregation: Unionist strategy in the 1960s', *Twentieth Century British History*, Vol. 11, No. 3, 2000, pp. 295-6.
[192] Nell McCafferty, in Logue, *Reflections*, pp. 80-1.
[193] James Anderson, and Liam O'Dowd, 'Contested Borders: Globalisation and Ethno-National Conflict in Ireland', *Regional Studies,* Vol. 33, No. 2, pp. 681-696. See also Anderson and O'Dowd, 'Territoriality', p. 686. Patterson, 'Border Unionism', p. 516. Alvin Jackson, 'Local Government in Northern Ireland, 1920-73', in Daly (ed.) *County and Town*, p. 58.
[194] 'T.B.', *UG,* 13 July 1951, p. 8. 'We pay for Eire medical benefits', *UG,* 24 Feb 1966, p. 11. Dr. J.S. Ditch, 'A View from the North', *Administration,* Vol. 34, No. 4, 1986, p. 430.
[195] Henry Patterson *Ireland since 1939* (Dublin, 2006), p. 118.

The legal disparities between the two jurisdictions allowed residents to circumvent a variety of laws, the enforcement of which varied between Britain and Ireland. The lack of coordination between the two welfare-provision administrations, for example, allowed some border residents to work in one jurisdiction while claiming benefits in the other.[196] While this practice was probably more widespread in belief than in reality, it certainly took place to some extent. Particularly in the early part of this period, while rationing was still in place in the UK, the laws most frequently breached were those governing the buying of food and its distribution. Throughout the period, laws concerning the import, export and customs dues were regularly breached. Smuggling, as the practice of circumventing customs regulations was called, will be dealt with more fully as an economic phenomenon in the second chapter of this work.

Though smuggling was the most frequent offence, it was not the only area where proximity to the legislative divide made circumvention possible. In her autobiography *Down Memory Lane - the autobiography of an Irish Baha'i*, Patricia Matchett recalled the adoption of her second daughter, after it appeared that she and her husband would be unable to have further children.[197] 'Adopting in Northern Ireland would have been a difficult and length process' she noted, 'so when we heard about this home in Dublin where we might get a child, we decided to try that.'[198] She and her sister took the morning train to Dublin, to a non-denominational home, as she did 'not think the Catholics would have allowed one of their children to be adopted into a Protestant

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[196] 'This youth worked in South - claimed unemployment in North', *UG,* 4 Sept 1969, p. 8.
[197] Patricia Matchett, *Down Memory Lane* (Bangor, County Down, 1999).
[198] Ibid., p. 74.

home.'[199] Indeed, under the 1952 Adoption Act in Ireland, children could only be placed with parents of the same religion.[200] The home which Mrs. Matchett tried had two young female babies 'on offer'.[201] The sisters chose one of the children, took tea with the ladies who ran the establishment, and then caught the afternoon train back to Belfast the same day.[202] While the family still had to undergo the legal procedures surrounding adoption, they had been able to circumvent the complex legal processes required for the adoption of a baby in the UK. Other parents wishing to acquire a child even went so far as to kidnap one, assuming that it would not be traced outside the jurisdiction. Such cases provided some of the most high-profile co-operative efforts between the Garda Síochána and RUC, the wish to recover the lost baby providing a powerful motivation for the two forces to interact.[203]

The border as a means of escape

The presence of the border allowed it to be used within certain circumstances as a means of escape, both legal and emotional. In this context, cross-border contact became less a matter of realistic interaction, and more of an idealisation, followed only later by genuine familiarisation. Nell McCafferty, in her discussion of her own childhood in Derry city, remembered day trips to Buncrana, land of 'sun, sea, sand and endless pleasure', an escape from 'Derry on a Protestant Sabbath, with everything closed and a walk up the

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[199] Ibid.
[200] John A. Murphy, *Ireland in the 20th Century* (Dublin, 1975), p. 136.
[201] Patricia Matchett, *Down Memory Lane* (Bangor, County Down, 1999), p. 75.
[202] Ibid.
[203] See pages 179-180 in current work.

cemetery the sole source of pleasure.'[204] The seaside town of Bundoran, in particular, was remembered by a number of border residents as the site of exciting and strange adventures, and actively advertised for a cross-border clientele.[205] Shane Connaughton, in his semi-autobiographical *A Border Station,* recalled stowing away in a neighbour's van in order to go there, lured by promises of 'great ice cream cones. And slab toffee … and … chair-o'-planes … and rocking horses.'[206] John McGourty also remembers trips in early adulthood by bicycle to Bundoran from his home in County Fermanagh, lured by the 'wonderful excitement to be had there.'[207] 'Everything about Bundoran on that day was magical. The sunshine … the colour and hue of the ocean … swarming crowds of people [and] the most wonderful wafting emanations of delicious meals being cooked, accompanied by the strong-scented aromatic smell of coffee.'[208] Indeed, since the rise of the bicycle in the inter-war period, 'a visit to the sea at Bundoran became a normal event' for Fermanagh people, and 'the famous 'Clery' Excursions' brought people to Dublin' from the county 'who in previous generations would never have dreamed of a visit' there.[209]

Particularly at times of tension, or deprivation, the geographical proximity of the border could provide welcome relief from difficult situations at home. During World War II, it provided an escape from the horrors of Blitz-time Belfast, while after the War the

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[204] Nell McCafferty, in Logue, *Reflections*, p. 80. See also Patrick Duffy, 'Continuity and Change in the Border Landscape' in Brian S. Turner (ed.) *The Debateable Lands* (Downpatrick, Co. Down, 2002), p. 25.
[205] Benedict Kiely, 'Approach to Donegal', *Ireland of the Welcomes,* May-June 1952, p. 4. Quoted in Michael Cronin, 'Next to Being there: Ireland of the Welcomes and Tourism of the Word', in Cronin and O'Connor (ed.), *Irish Tourism* (Clevedon, 2003), pp. 181-2.
[206] Shane Connaughton, *A Border Station* (London, 1989), p. 135.
[207] McGourty, *Mountain* (London, 2003), p. 134.
[208] Ibid. p. 135.
[209] Livingstone, *The Fermanagh Story*, p. 320.

Republic continued to provide the sort of plenty in matters of food which Northerners could then barely comprehend, inspiring a 'short term boom' in tourist numbers to the Republic 'because of the plentiful and superior quality of food':[210]

> My husband and I once went down for a long weekend … just to enjoy some good food in the hotels and restaurants down there … I remember we had a mid-day lunch in the Gresham Hotel in O'Connell Street and the food would have taken your breath away … I felt that to eat anything more would be sheer gluttony.[211]

The legal differences between North and South helped to encourage this form of escapist visiting. Northern Ireland's strict licensing laws, aided, it was rumoured, by strong anti-drink lobbies, were held responsible for encouraging individuals to cross the border in order to obtain drink on the Protestant Sabbath.[212] Not all who came with high expectations were pleased at what they found, or made to feel welcome upon arrival, however. Northerners, fleeing South in the early years of the trouble, spoke sadly about the misunderstanding and lack of sympathy they encountered in their new homes. '(There's) never a feeling that you belong … I was shocked at local people's attitude to me in my own country … local people resented people from the North getting housed, or getting work. Hence people from the North rarely got work', setting in motion processes of poverty and deprivation.[213]

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[210] James Deegan and Donel A. Dinnen, *Tourism Policy and Performance* (London, 1997), p. 14.
[211] Patricia Matchett, *Down Memory Lane* (Bangor, County Down, 1999), p. 6.
[212] D. Donoghue, *Warrenpoint* (London, 1990), p. 5. Patrick Shea, *Voices and the Sound of Drums* (Belfast, 1983), p. 124.
[213] Ralaheen Ltd., *All Over the Place*, pp. 69-70.

Early on during the period of unrest in the North, the border began to be utilised as a refuge in the more physical sense, with, for example, those injured in rioting in Derry choosing to be driven across the border to hospitals in the South, fearing discrimination or even arrest if they attended the city's own hospitals. 'I … never approved of this business of rushing casualties over the Border', noted one Red Cross organiser in the city; 'but one can understand the great fear of the rioter that he would be arrested if he was taken to hospital here.'[214] Southern Taoiseach Jack Lynch encouraged this movement in calling to the border field hospitals of the Irish Army to treat the injured.[215] 'The funny part was that some of the very serious casualties were brought back to the Border, transferred to hospital authority ambulances and taken to Northern Ireland hospitals.'[216] On occasion, the extra journey time involved could have serious consequences; Seamus Cusack, shot during a riot in the Old Bogside Road in Derry, died as a result of loss of blood on the way to hospital in Letterkenny.[217] It was widely believed that, had be been taken to a nearer hospital, he would not have died.[218]

Despite the unfriendliness and lack of understanding that some reported, fleeing Republicans continued to use the South's jurisdiction in order to avoid arrest in the North throughout this period. So many of these individuals took up quarters in Dundalk, for example, that the city became known as the 'El Paso' of Ireland, 'the frontier town that had been taken over by fugitives from the law', with areas of the town becoming

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[214] Aileen McCorkell, *A Red Cross In My Pocket* (Northern Ireland, c.1992), p. 59.
[215] Jack (John) Lynch Speech 13 Aug. 1969, reproduced in *Speeches and Statements on Irish Unity, Northern Ireland, Anglo-Irish Relations: August 1969-October 1971* (Dublin, 1971), p. 2.
[216] Aileen McCorkell, *A Red Cross In My Pocket* (Northern Ireland, c.1992), p. 27.
[217] McKittrick et al, *Lost Lives* (Edinburgh and London, 2001), p. 75.
[218] Aileen McCorkell, *A Red Cross In My Pocket* (Northern Ireland, c.1992), p. 59.

stigmatised as 'Provoland'.[219] Bombs could also be triggered using command wires leading into the opposite jurisdiction, encouraging the use of the border as a shelter. Once this tactic became known, however, both the Garda and RUC took to scouring fields on the lookout for it.[220]

The ability of the IRA to use the border as a legal haven was made effective by the definition of the charges which they faced as 'political', in line with international norms, thus effectively preventing their extradition under the 1965 Extradition Act.[221] The IRA had, to a certain degree, worked to establish the border as a safe-haven for itself by explicitly reducing the threat which its volunteers posed to the Dublin government. In a statement of policy made at Bodenstown in 1949, Christrar O'Neill, Sinn Féin vice-President, declared that, from then on, the movement would dedicate itself 'simply to drive the invader from the soil of Ireland', as opposed to confronting both illegitimate regimes, North and South.[222] This allowed the Irish Government greater scope to treat the IRA leniently, in line with any perceived latent support for them among the Irish electorate.

While some sought to cross the border due to their role in the Republican Movement, others were consciously sent there in order to avoid the possibility that they would join the movement. In 1972, with the IRA campaign well under way, the Department of the

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[219] Harnden, *Bandit Country*, p. 73. Ralaheen Ltd., *All Over the Place,* p. 73.
[220] 'Frontier posts', part 5 of RTE 'Recruit' series. RUC video collection 938, Political Collection, Linen Hall Library, Belfast.
[221] Paul O'Higgins, 'The Irish Extradition Act, 1965', *International and Comparative Law Quarterly,* Vol. 15, April 1966, p. 382.
[222] Caroline Kennedy-Pipe, *The Origins of the Present Troubles in Northern Ireland* (London and New York, 1997), p. 28.

Taoiseach in Dublin received a visit from a delegation of Derry women concerned, among other things, about the discharging of Derry boys from the Irish army without explanation.[223] More and more Derry boys, they claimed, were being turned down for service in the Irish army, where they were being sent by their families to prevent them falling into the arms of the Provisional IRA.

Political upheaval was not the only motive which encouraged individuals to escape across the political divide. Difficult home lives and economic conditions also acted as motivations for people to seek the anonymity of life outside their home jurisdiction. Maryanne Kerr, in her autobiography *Over the Mountain*, recalled how she took up work in a hotel in Bundoran to escape her family's disapproval over an illegitimate pregnancy. She had originally been sent to Ballyglass, County Donegal, to work as a postmistress when forced out of a job in Northern Ireland:

> I got the picture immediately; I was being banished. But perhaps that was unkind … We all knew how difficult it was for a Catholic – any Catholic, but especially one with little or no qualifications plus a track record so catastrophic … to get a job in the North.[224]

Living in close proximity to the border allowed individuals easy access to a place psychologically and physically 'other' from their own, which they could utilise as a means of escape for a variety of reasons and, in so doing, create new personal and social contacts which spanned across it.

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[223] Notes on meeting of the Taoiseach with Mrs. Doherty, Doyle, Hipoley, 14 Nov. 1972. File S10585G 2003/16/81, '*Partition; Statements, Resolutions, etc. by Northern Ireland groups and individuals*' (Henceforth – *Partition),* Dept. of Taoiseach, N.A.I..
[224] Maryanne Kerr, *Over the Mountain* (London, 1996), p. 120.

Personal responsibility and the cross-border community - the United Societies of Castleblaney

Residence close to the border was seen as a positive advantage by some members of the border community, who sought to use their proximity and access to local cross-border networks in order to further perceived mutual political and economic aims. The border area held many members of the minority community, and contact, it was felt, allowed both minority and majority communities, as well as the north-south communities, a better degree of understanding of each other than was possible in Belfast or Dublin.[225] In an attempt to utilise these perceived advantages and the very real interest of local people in cross-border issues, a group was established in 1963 based in the County Monaghan town of Castleblaney.

Known as the United Societies of Castleblaney, the group was founded by Martin Hanratty, a teacher at the Castleblaney Technical College, and Macarten McCormack, a fellow teacher, and a farmer and leader of the regional National Farmers' Association. Meeting together at the latter's farmhouse just outside Castleblaney, the two formulated a seven point programme for discussion by the group. 'There were originally nine points but two must have dropped along the way', recalled McCormack.[226] These points were:

1) European Common Market

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[225] See, for example, Dervla Murphy, *A Place Apart* (London, 1978), p. 21. See also Walter Pringle, interviewed by author, 19 Oct. 2006.
[226] Macarten McCormack, interviewed by author, 22 May 2006.

2) Unapproved Roads

3) Motor Traffic and Tourism

4) Conditions for Import and Export

5) Agriculture

6) Trans-Border Services

7) Local Authorities[227]

The two then approached various local organisations and branches of national organisations with this manifesto for discussion. Nine groups chose to join the new body: the local branches of the Irish Transport and General Workers' Union, the Irish National Union of Woodworkers, Castleblaney Chamber of Commerce, Castleblaney Tourist Development Association, Castleblaney Agriculture and Industrial Show Society, the National Farmers' Association, Macra na Feirme, Irish Countrywomen's Association Guild, and Macra na Tuaithe.[228] The United Societies, as the name suggests, thus formed a conglomeration of various independent organisations, rather than a new independent body.

The United Societies held a number of high-profile meetings at which issues relevant to the border population were discussed by politicians from a variety of backgrounds. Many of those who became actively involved with the group were involved in a range of political parties, and this was used in order to secure speakers. Bernard Geoghegan, who hosted the first major debate of the society at his Castleblaney Hotel, was a member of

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[227] 'United Societies of Castleblaney - First Conference on Trans-Border Cooperation', *Program*, 19 March 1964. Martin Hanratty Papers, Castleblaney. See plate 4 enclosed.
[228] Ibid.

the Fine Gael party in the Republic, for example, and it was through him that Fine Gael speakers were invited to attend.[229] Martin Hanratty himself was heavily involved with the Labour Party and trade union movements in Ireland, and would go on with his colleague Joe Kelly to establish the Monaghan Trades Council.[230] It was probably due to his interest that the upcoming membership of the EEC was given such a high profile within the United Societies' manifesto, at a time when the Labour Party was the only group actively campaigning against Irish accession to the EEC.[231]

Where no formal political links existed, personal contacts were utilised by the group in order to attract speakers. Richard Shannon, former Chairman of Carrickmacross Urban District Council (UDC) and leading local minority politician remembered how he had formed the contact between the Societies and the Young Unionists' John Taylor, later Lord Kilclooney of Armagh, against whom he 'used to play rugby … when he was at Portora Royal School.'[232] Not long after Taylor's appearance at the United Societies, his colleague in the Young Unionist movement, solicitor Robin Baillie, also came to address the group, which he did on more then one occasion.[233]

The United Societies group was historically significant for a number of reasons. Firstly, the manifesto produced by the group is one of the few documents surviving which formulate the political concerns of border residents in this period, in their own words and

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[229] Patsy McArdle, interviewed by author, 19 Oct. 2006.
[230] Joe Kelly, interviewed by author, 18 May 2006. Monaghan Trades Council minutes, Joe Kelly papers, Castleblaney, County Monaghan.
[231] Justin Keating, 'Irish Accession to the EEC, 1972-3', Trinity College Dublin, 3 Dec. 2003.
[232] Richard Shannon, interviewed by author, 25 Oct. 2006.
[233] 'Cross Border Talks', *The Argus*, 14 Nov. 1964, p. 3. 'Cross-Border Conference in Castleblaney', *The Argus,* 9 July 1966, p. 3.

in the contemporary context. Secondly, the group was also, as far as can be traced, the only one which succeeded in bringing together the representatives of all of the democratically-elected parties on the island of Ireland at that time, a feat not even accomplished by the Irish government when it sought to do so a few years later as part of the discussions of the New Ireland Forum.[234] At their March 1964 meeting, dubbed 'the Castleblaney Parliament', Northern Ireland was represented by the Rev. Albert McElroy of the Northern Ireland Liberal Party, Senator Albert Walmsley, who had been Lord Brookeborough's personal nominee for the Northern Ireland Senate, for the Ulster Unionist Party, and Eddie Richardson, MP for Armagh, of the Nationalist Party.[235] Thomas Boyd attended on behalf of the Northern Ireland Labour Party.[236] James Dillon, 'a marvellous orator, the best I ever heard', as one listener remembered, represented Fine Gael, local TD and Tánaiste Erskine Childers represented Fianna Fáil and James Tully the Irish Labour Party.[237] Each member of the panel gave a speech related to the United Societies manifesto, before the discussion was thrown open to the floor for questions and comments. Over three hundred people were believed to have attended this first meeting.[238]

Through the presence of so many and varied a range of speakers, the United Societies ensured the widest possible coverage for the opinions expressed. Erskine Childers, for

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[234] See plate 5 below. The Ulster Unionist Party refused to send a representative to the New Ireland Forum, which finally published its report in May 1984. See: Http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/issues/politics/nifr.htm, accessed 29 Dec. 2006.

[235] 'All-Ireland Parliament', *The Argus*, 28 March 1964, p. 1 and 3. 'United Societies of Castleblaney - First Conference on Trans-Border Cooperation', *Program*, 19 March 1964. Martin Hanratty Papers, Castleblaney. Albert J. Walmsley, *It was like this your Worship!* (Belfast?, 1988), pp. 81-2.

[236] 'United Societies of Castleblaney - First Conference on Trans-Border Cooperation', *Program*, 19 March 1964. Martin Hanratty Papers, Castleblaney.

[237] Ibid. Macarten McCormack, interviewed by author, 22 May 2006.

[238] 'All-Ireland Parliament', *The Argus*, 28 March 1964, p. 1

example, discussed his attendance with Taoiseach Seán Lemass, commenting on the 'friendly spirit' of the meeting, and the audiences' good behaviour.[239] When invited to address the group again, Childers was encouraged by the Taoiseach to do so, despite the fears that the meeting would be disrupted by protestors and that Richie Ryan, who was due to speak, may be provoked by the unionists to 'indulge in histrionics... which would get us nowhere.'[240] 'Meetings of this kind', noted Lemass, 'are useful' and, in that they provided a first point of encounter, could act as the initial stage of more extensive cooperative contact.[241]

The success of the 'Castleblaney Parliament' encouraged the group to go on and hold a series of smaller 'orange and green' meetings at which politicians from both sides of the border addressed the audience, frequently as part of mixed panels.[242] Ten such meetings can be traced in the local press as having taken place between March 1964 and July 1966, though contemporaries remembered between 12 and 20 such local meetings.[243] Those invited to address the audience included, among others, Ernest Blyth (Head of Dublin's Abbey Theatre, former TD for Monaghan and Minister of Finance in the first Cumann na nGaedhael government), Sir Tyrone Guthrie (leading Theatre Director, Chancellor of Queen's University and resident of Newbliss, County Monaghan), and Brian J. McRoberts, (Assistant Secretary of the Mid-Armagh Unionist Association and Unionist candidate in both the South Armagh and West Belfast parliamentary seats, where he was

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[239] Memorandum, Childers to Lemass, 7 Oct. 1965, file S16272 F/95, N.A.I.. Quoted in Robert J. Savage, *Seán Lemass* (Dundalk, 1999), pp. 47-8.
[240] Ibid.
[241] Ibid.
[242] 'All-Ireland Parliament', *The Argus*, 28 March 1964, pp. 1 and 3. 'Cross-Border talks in Castleblaney', *The Argus,* 7 Dec. 1964, p. 2.
[243] Patsy McArdle, Interviewed by author, 19 Oct. 2006.

to stand against Republican Labour's Gerry Fitt).[244] As well as these centrally organised meetings, each member-society was expected to discuss those aspects of the manifesto relevant to itself at its own regular meetings.[245]

The United Societies' importance rests not only in its achievements, but in the high profile which its activities generated at the time. As well as being extensively covered in the local press, the group was the subject of an RTE outside broadcast, a very unusual occurrence at time.[246] They were represented on the County Monaghan planning committee for the 1916 commemorations, and Martin Hanratty, in his capacity as Secretary of the Societies, communicated with the Department of the Taoiseach concerning this.[247] Arguments over the attitude to be adopted towards the United Societies caused a split in the local Sinn Féin movement, elements of which chose to boycott and picket the meetings, at a time when the Sinn Féin organisation as a whole was undergoing ideological stress, which would eventually cause it to split.[248] Recognition of the Societies' importance was also demonstrated by the choice of Martin Hanratty to be the first man to cross the border on the newly approved Castleblaney to

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[244] 'Speakers talk of religious and political unity', *The Argus,* 11 Dec. 1963, p. 7. 'Friendship move gathers impetus', *UG,* 21 Jan. 1965, p. 1. 'McRoberts in Goodwill Border meeting', *UG,* 2 Dec. 1965, p. 1. 'Ulster Will vote on Orange v Green lines', *The Times,* 20 May 1970, p. 10.

[245] Macarten McCormack, interviewed by author, 22 May 2006.

[246] Patsy McArdle, interviewed by author, 19 Oct. 2006.

[247] Macarten McCormack, interviewed by author, 22 May 2006. Letter, Secretary to the Taoiseach to Martin Hanratty, 18 Feb. 1966. Martin Hanratty papers, Castleblaney, County Monaghan.

[248] Francie O'Donaghue, interviewed by author, 8 May 2006. 'Picket at cross-border meeting', *NS,* 30 Oct. 1964, p. 1. Marc Mulholland, 'Irish Republican Politics and Violence before the Peace Process, 1956-1994', LSE Seminar paper, 28 Feb. 2007.

Newtownhamilton road, and in references made to its activities at local council meetings.[249]

It was the firm belief of United Societies' organisers, both at the time and in retrospect, that their actions had helped pave the way for the more high-profile meetings between the Southern and Northern Irish Premiers in January 1965. Macarten McCormack remarked that 'they considered the Lemass-O'Neill meeting as a very important beginning of a new era in cross-border cooperation … [and] felt pleased that United Societies had paved the way for such top-level talks.'[250] Martin Hanratty's widow reiterated the view of the United Societies as 'the forerunner of the Lemass-O'Neill meeting … if some breakthrough hadn't been made at some level it's likely that they would just have continued going on as before.'[251] Robert Savage, in his biography of Lemass, supports this claim, suggesting a direct policy link between the Taoiseach's interest in the United Societies, and his meeting with O'Neill.[252] The view is not, however, universal. T. K. Whitaker, who was instrumental in establishing the Lemass/O'Neill talks, noted that he had 'never had any contact with The United Societies of Castleblaney – indeed, [had] no recollection of their existence.'[253] Whether or not the United Societies did directly influenced government policy, they can be seen as forerunners to governmental contacts in so far as they formed a part of the same process of political détente of which the Young Unionist visit to Dublin in 1963, the Ancient Order of Hibernians and Orange

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[249] 'First Across new road', *The Argus,* 15 May 1965. Martin Hanratty papers, Castleblaney. 'Clones Urban Council Affairs', *NS,* 2 Aug. 1963, p. 2.
[250] ''Blaney Society Lauded', *The Democrat and People's Journal*, 23 Jan. 1965, p. 7.
[251] Anna Hanratty, interviewed by author, 18 May 2006.
[252] Robert Savage, *Seán Lemass* (Dundalk, 1999), pp. 47-8.
[253] T. K. Whitaker, communication with author, 23 Oct. 2006.

Order talks of 1962-3, and the Lemass-O'Neill meetings were more high-profile manifestations.[254]

The United Societies was representative of a period of political and economic development and optimism, when a 'steadily increasing urge towards an informed Irish self-understanding … critical concern for origins and for contemporary fact and … desire to comprehend and accept modern Ireland in its fullness' animated society, and North-South relations appeared to be finally making progress.[255] In their optimism, they were at times tragically wrong. In words whose irony would soon become apparent, one speaker at the January 1965 meeting on the topic of 'catholic/protestant relations 1970', expressed the opinion that he 'was inclined to agree … that nothing dramatic would happen in the next five years.'[256] In 1966, on the eve of the inception of the Free Trade Area with Britain, amid the celebrations of what was billed as Ireland's first joint Protestant/Catholic prayer meeting, the United Societies of Castleblaney disbanded, having achieved all of their local aims bar the drainage of the Fane River.[257] It is impossible to understand the shock and confusion of those caught up in the increasing spiral of civil disorder which engulfed Northern Ireland in the late 1960s without fully appreciating the sense of optimism which this increasing chaos replaced, optimism of which the United Societies was in many ways representative.[258]

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[254] Mulholland, *Crossroads*, pp. 9-10. Brendan Lynn, *Holding the Ground: the Nationalist Party in Northern Ireland, 1945-72* (Aldershot and Brookfield, Vermont, 1997), pp. 157-161. Marc Mulholland, '"We are unable to say '*apres-nous le deluge'.*" The Young Unionist Movement in the 1960s'. Unpublished.

[255] Brown, *Ireland*, p. 324.

[256] 'Friendship move gathers impetus', *UG,* 21 Jan. 1965, p. 1.

[257] 'Cross-Border Conference in Castleblaney', *The Argus,* 9 July 1966, p. 3.

[258] Paddy Devlin, *Straight Left* (Belfast, 1993), p. 80.

Political allegiances and leadership within a cross-border context

In each border area, a number of high-profile individuals would emerge with a particular interest in cross-border affairs. Perhaps the most obvious example of this is Armagh Nationalist Party MP Eddie Richardson, who, as well as appearing at public meetings concerning road openings, spoke at a United Societies of Castleblaney meeting in March 1964, and would go on to play a leading role in the organisation of the Lakelands Festival which Carrickmacross, Castleblaney and Crossmaglen would arrange in 1970.[259] Richardson was one of the new generation of Nationalist MPs who dissented from the Nationalist Party's abstentionist policy. He took his seat in 1958 as an Independent Nationalist, 'provid[ing] a South Armagh MP at Stormont … for the first time in 8 years', before contesting the 1965 election as the official Nationalist Party candidate.[260] This helped Richardson both to build up his local support base, by more effectively fulfilling the brokerage role which Irish electors expected of their representatives, and to transform 'the Stormont House of Commons from quiescent rubber stamp to cockpit of politicking awash with all-night sittings, censure motions and lengthy debates.'[261] Much of the work on the relations between politicians and their electorates in Ireland has focused on the South.[262] However, evidence suggests that Northern Irish residents shared a similar view of authority as something which 'can be successfully approached only through

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[259] 'Bid to open Border road', *NS,* 9 Aug. 1963, p. 1. 'Final plans for border meeting', *The Argus*, 14 March 1964, p. 1. 'Crossmaglen stages big attraction', *UG,* 23 July 1970, p. 3. 'Tourism Must Develop – MP', *UG,* 30 July 1970, p. 7.

[260] Mulholland, *Crossroads*, p. 2. For Richardson's electoral record, see Brendan Lynn, B., *Holding the Ground* (Aldershot and Brookfield, Vermont, 1997), appendix 5and 6.

[261] Mulholland, *Crossroads*, pp. 2-3. See also Mart Bax, *Harpstrings and Confessions* (Assen, Amsterdam, 1976), p. 45, Basil Chubb '"Going about persecuting civil servants": the role of the Irish Parliamentary Representative', *Political Studies*, Vol. 11, No. 3, 1963, pp. 273 and 276.

[262] See, for example, C. A. Collins, 'Local political leadership in England and Ireland', *Administration*, Vol. 28, No. 1, 1980, pp. 71-96 and Siobhan Carey, 'Role perceptions among County Councillors', *Administration*, Vol. 34, No. 3, 1986, pp. 302-16.

intermediaries of position or influence with whom one has direct, personal, face-to-face contact', and used their politicians accordingly.[263]

Eddie Richardson, as a Nationalist, could be expected to be interested in cross-border work. Interestingly, however, local unionists were also prominent in encouraging such interaction. Richard Shannon, former chairman of Carrickmacross UDC, recalled for example how two leading Unionist councillors, George Reed and Jim Revells, had been instrumental in the setting up of the Carrickmacross - Crossmaglen Road Opening Committee.[264] Typical of the difficulties indicated by Patterson of allocating 'labels' to unionist politicians was Brian McRoberts, Assistant Secretary of the Mid-Armagh Unionist Association, Unionist Party candidate in South Armagh and West Belfast.[265] McRoberts was widely involved with cross-border groups, addressing a United Societies of Castleblaney meeting in December 1965 as Unionist Party representative, and serving as the first unionist to chair a Societies' meeting.[266] In his younger years, McRoberts had been a member of the New Ireland Society at QUB, a group dedicated to 'bringing together all those interested in the eventual reunification of Ireland and the political, social, economic and cultural advancement of the country.'[267] Later on, he had debated with nationalists in London, proposing of the motion 'that the partition of Ireland is a necessary evil' at a 1961 United Law Debating Society meeting, and would go on to

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[263] Harris, *Prejudice and Tolerance in Ulster*, p. 130. See also Kenneth R. Carty, *Electoral Politics in Ireland – Party and Parish Pump* (Dingle, Co. Kerry, 1983), p. 129. Paddy Devlin, *Straight Left* (Belfast, 1993), p. 78-9.

[264] Richard Shannon, interviewed by author, 27 Oct. 2006.

[265] Henry Patterson, 'Brian Maginess and the Limits of Liberal Unionism', *The Irish Review*, No. 25, Winter-Spring 1999/2000, pp. 103-4.

[266] 'McRoberts in Goodwill Border meeting', *UG,* 2 Dec. 1965, p. 1. 'Castleblaney talks on cross-border cooperation Mr. Ernest Blythe suggests New constitution', *NS*, 17 Dec. 1965, p. 9. 'Unionist Chairman at Castleblaney meeting', *UG,* 9 Dec. 1965, p. 5.

[267] Austin Currie, *All Hell Will Break Loose* (Dublin, 2004), p. 40.

speak at a meeting jointly run by PACE, and the Alliance Party, or its forerunner, the New Ulster Movement, in the late 1960s, with Maurice Hayes and Austin Currie.[268] In November 1971, he addressed a cross-border Protestant-Catholic meeting in Monaghan.[269] Yet historians have tended to portray McRoberts as a right-wing, 'Reactionary Unionist', due largely to a speech in his support made by Bill Craig, dissident Home Affairs Minister, where Craig went further then 'was considered wise by Unionist moderates' in calling for a UDI for Northern Ireland.[270] McRoberts stood in Belfast as an anti-O'Neill candidate, despite having previously supported him.[271] Yet he was no darling of the right, coming under attack during the same election campaign from Paisley supporters during rioting in Armagh, while his candidature was supported by the Ulster Unionist Labour Association.[272] It is ironic, considering his record of cross-border work, that his main contribution to the civil rights debate was as the perceived "pull" behind the placing of 19-year old Emily Beattie, whom he employed, in a council bungalow in the village of Caledon, while he was 'perspective Unionist candidate for West Belfast', an allocation which sparked what became known as the 'Caledon Incident'.[273] Having never gained election to Stormont, he was found dead in suspicious circumstances in 1984, shot with his own gun near his home in County Armagh.[274]

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[268] 'Law Societies Debates Partition', *The Irish Democrat*, November 1961. Quoted in Tomás Finn 'Passionate Moderation': *Tuairim* and the Northern Ireland problem, 1954 – 75', unpublished. Hayes, *Minority Verdict*, p. 96

[269] 'Protestant and Catholic talk together', *NS,* 15 Oct. 1971, p. 11.

[270] Mulholland, *Crossroads*, pp. 167-8. Hayes, *Minority Verdict*, p. 96.

[271] 'Premier Should be Elected, says MP', *Belfast Telegraph,* 4 Feb. 1965, p. 3.

[272] 'Can't believe it…', *UG,* 5 Dec. 1968, p. 1. 'Further support for McRoberts', *Belfast Telegraph,* 8 April 1968, p. 3.

[273] 'Uproar in Stormont debate over Caledon eviction', *Irish News*, 30 June 1968, p. 6. Austin Currie, *All Hell Will Break Loose* (Dublin, 2004), p. 95.

[274] Jonathan Taylor, interviewed by author, 18 May 2006. Frank Connolly 'Iris Robinson set to lead DUP victories', *Sunday Business Post,* March 25, 2001, www.post.ie. Accessed 5 April 2007.

McRoberts was not the only unionist politician to have engaged in debate with nationalists on more than one occasion. Indeed, it would appear that unionists who were willing to do so would be asked multiple times, as volunteers for such debates were scarce.[275] John Taylor himself had led a Young Unionist delegation to Dublin, where they held meetings with Young Fine Gael.[276] In March 1965 he would represent the Unionist Party at the British National Council for Civil Liberties conference on Northern Ireland, and in 1970, while serving as Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister for Home Affairs, carry out a speaking tour including engagements at University College, Dublin, Sligo and Cork.[277] Unionist senator Albert Walmsley, who spoke as the Unionist Party representative at the 'Castleblaney Parliament', had also previously represented the party at a fiery debate at University College, Dublin, in February 1959.[278] 'It was one of the most stormy meetings I have ever had to address,' he recalled. 'It was very difficult to be heard above the din… Women were standing on chairs, screeching about my rehearsing dirty Protestant lies, and a number of gentlemen threatened to put me in the Liffey.'[279]

At a local level, perhaps the most prominent leader in this field was the Independent Chairman of Carrickmacross UDC, Richard Shannon. Like many local leaders, Shannon was involved in a number of cross-border activities, helping to found the Carrickmacross to Crossmaglen cross-border roads committee and chairing a United Societies of

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[275] Albert J. Walmsley, *It was like this your Worship!* (Belfast?, 1988), p. 92.
[276] See: Mulholland, *Crossroads*, p. 7 and Marc Mulholland, '"We are unable to say '*apres-nous le deluge'.*" The Young Unionist Movement in the 1960s'. Unpublished.
[277] Conn McCluskey, *Up off their Knees* (Ireland, 1989), pp. 24-5. 'Mr. Taylor to go South', *UG,* 5 Feb. 1970, p. 12. 'Pelted With Rotten Eggs and Flour', *UG,* 12 Feb. 1970, p. 7.
[278] 'All-Ireland Parliament', *The Argus*, 28 March 1964, p. 1 and 3. Albert J. Walmsley, *It was like this your Worship!* (Belfast?, 1988), pp. 92-93.
[279] Albert J. Walmsley, *It was like this your Worship!* (Belfast?, 1988), p. 92.

Castleblaney meeting.[280] In many ways, Shannon personified the wave of optimism which characterised the mid-1960s in Ireland, and its ending. In 1967 he left Carrickmacross to settle for a short time in Northern Ireland. 'Then a friend of mine, [Fine Gael, TD] Billy Fox, was shot … I'd sat beside him at school. And I thought to myself, I'd better stay, so I stayed.'[281] Shannon eventually married a Belfast girl, and remained to live in Northern Ireland, his career having followed a similar pattern to McRoberts', moving from youthful enthusiasm to disillusion.[282] At the 1969 election, Eddie Richardson lost his South Armagh seat to Independent Candidate P. M. (Paddy) O'Hanlon, who had emerged from within the civil rights movement and would go on to be a founder member of the social and Democratic Labour Party (SDLP).[283] The time of the optimists, and cultural integrationists, had come to an end.

In a political environment in which leaders were firmly rooted within their local constituency milieu, the political leadership provided by the local press was important in defining local attitudes, as well as providing 'the window through which the vast majority' viewed events in the opposite jurisdiction.[284] However, the precise political direction advocated by the press is as difficult to pin-down as that provided by individual politicians.[285] *The Northern Standard*, for example, published in Monaghan Town, began this period as a fairly middle-of-the-road nationalist publication. Towards the late 1960s

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[280] 'Cross-Border talks open in 'Blaney', *The Argus,* 31 Oct. 1964, p. 5. Richard Shannon, interviewed by author, 25 Oct. 2006.
[281] Richard Shannon, interviewed by author, 25 Oct. 2006.
[282] Ray Howell, interviewed by author, 8 May 2006. See page 88-89 in current work.
[283] Brendan Lynn, *Holding the Ground* (Aldershot and Brookfield, Vermont, 1997), p. 246. Gerard Murray, *John Hume and the SDLP* (Dublin, Portland, Oregon, 1998), p. 6.
[284] C. A. Collins, 'Local political leadership in England and Ireland', *Administration*, Vol. 28, No. 1, 1980, pp. 85-6 and 92. Dennis Kennedy, *The Widening Gulf* (Belfast, 1988), p. 6.
[285] See Patterson, 'Brian Maginess', pp. 109-10.

it was combining strong support for County Monaghan's Fine Gael TD Billy Fox (whom their editor, P.V. Turley accompanied to Stormont for talks in 1971), with support for the newly emergent Provisional IRA's Éire Nua policy, and its proposed nine-county Dáil Uladh, and a strong editorial line on the need to maintain community cohesiveness within County Monaghan.[286] That this could have seemed to Turley to form a consistent political platform is hard in hindsight to reconcile with Billy Fox's death at the hands of the IRA, and their subsequent role as one of the major destabilising influences on community cohesion. The *Northern Standard*'s evolution continued, and it ended this period as little more than a 'Provo propaganda sheet' according to its critics, covering in great detail the misdeeds of the British security forces and the confrontations surrounding the cratering of border roads.[287]

The *Ulster Gazette*, a weekly newspaper published in Armagh Town, underwent a similar transformation in this period, though in the opposite direction. From a quite partisan unionist newspaper in 1950, devoting large columns to speeches made on Twelfth July and at Orange Order meetings, and warning in dire tones that 'every person who marries a R.C. is bringing the curse of God not only on himself but on his people and nation', the publication moved slowly into the mainstream.[288] It began by publishing articles on Catholic Church events and concerns, and then progressed to cover subjects of nationalist

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[286] See for example, 'Mr. Fox at Stormont', *NS,* 10 Dec. 1971, p. 15. 'Meeting to explain Dail Uladh', *NS,* 15 Oct. 1971, p. 11. 'Dail Uladh Convention in Monaghan', *NS,* 3 Sept. 1971, p. 3. 'Editorial – Discretion', *NS,* 10 Jan. 1969, p. 1. 'Trouble in the North', *NS,* 15 Aug. 1969, p. 2. 'Editorial - Our responsibility', *NS,* 22 Aug. 1969, p. 1. For events surrounding Provisional Sinn Féin's development of the Dáil Uladh, see Maria McGuire, *To Take Arms* (London, 1973), pp. 27-9.

[287] Francie O'Donaghue interviewed by author, 8 May 2006. 'Emyvale jottings - that helicopter!', *NS,* 29 Aug. 1969, p. 4. 'Keeping an eye on Clones peeping toms!', *NS,* 26 March 1971, p. 10. 'British army tricked crater fillers', *NS,* 23 Dec. 1971, p. 4.

[288] See, for example, *UG,* 13 July 1950 edition, 'Romanism has bred communism', *UG,* 2 Nov. 1950, p. 5, and 'Unionism in County', *UG,* 5 Jan. 1950, p. 3.

interest, so that, by 1966, it could boast that it was the only newspaper represented at a meeting of the committee planning Armagh's Easter commemorations.[289] While generally impatient with the civil rights marches in the early period, *The Ulster Gazette* also became scathing of the counter-demonstrations of Dr. Ian Paisley. In a long front-page article following the Armagh march of 30 November 1968, the newspaper expressed disbelief 'that our city could have been victim of an invading army of Paisley supporters most of them flouting heavy sticks and sharply squared off cudgels, many with nails protruding - wicked weapons and with horrible intent' in the name of religion.[290] While also protesting at the civil rights marchers 'emulating the Paisley element by arming with sticks, piping, hurleys etc.,' the newspaper argued that the civil rights committee had lost control, and welcomed their decision to suspend marches.[291]

Personal Contact and national policy

Personal contact played an important role in establishing and maintaining cooperation networks at all levels. During the optimum period of government cooperation, between 1965 and 1969, for example, the majority of successful initiatives were operated through the Department of Commerce in the North, and Transport, Power and Tourism in the South. Not coincidently, both were headed at this time by politicians with an interest in, and extensive knowledge of, the opposite jurisdiction.

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[289] 'New Difficulties facing young priests - R.C. Primate at Maynooth', *UG*, 26 June 1951, p. 8 and 'City Committee announces 1916 celebration arrangements', *UG,* 20 Jan. 1966, p. 2.
[290] 'Can't believe it…', *UG,* 5 Dec. 1968, p. 1.
[291] Ibid., 'Have C.R. organisers lost control?', 'C.R. Appeals for Peace and Calm', *UG,* 5 Dec. 1968, p. 1.

Brian Faulkner, Northern Minister for Commerce, saw himself as a dynamic and hard-headed business realist. He was also seen as a political hard-liner, trusted by the 'orthodox or right wing unionists' who tended to regard most moderates 'as dupes or traitors.'[292] Faulkner had attended school at St. Columba's College in Rathfarnham, County Dublin, and was proud to boast in his autobiography, written shortly before his death in 1977, that 'in those days, before cross-border contacts became fashionable, I was one of the very few politicians in Ulster who had personal contacts with Dublin politicians, and a personal knowledge of the Republic', a claim supported by historians.[293] He professed to have met the future Irish Taoiseach Liam Cosgrave for a drink at Claremorris, County Kerry, and 'to have met and talked annually with most members of the Southern government in the President's box of the Royal Dublin Society's Horse Show' where Faulkner, a life-long horse enthusiast, acted as a judge.[294] At school, Faulkner developed a close friendship with Michael B. Yeats, Fianna Fáil politician and son of the poet W. B. Yeats, later distancing himself, allegedly due to political ambitions.[295]

Erskine Childers, Minister for Transport and Power in the Republic, was both a protestant and the Teachta Dála (TD) of a border constituency. He served as Tánaiste, deputy Taoiseach, and later as President of Ireland, despite professed fears that his protestantism prevented him from holding key government positions in Justice, Health and External

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[292] Letter, O'Brien to Boland, Department of Foreign Affairs, 24 Feb. 1958. Quoted in Kennedy, *Division and Consensus*, p. 170.
[293] B. Faulkner, *Memoirs of a Statesmen*, (ed.) John Houston (London, 1978), p. 21. Jonathan Bardon, *A History of Ulster* (Belfast, 2001), p. 630.
[294] B. Faulkner, *Memoirs of a Statesmen*, (ed.) John Houston (London, 1978), p. 21.
[295] Condren, *Brian Faulkner,* 2005, p. 24. See also Mulholland, *Crossroads*, pp. 8-9.

Affairs; he was seen by Lemass as his 'main emissary' to the North.[296] Childers' constituency, County Monaghan, had deep economic and social ties with Northern Ireland, with many residents possessing wide networks of 'kith and kin' there.[297] In a highly clientalist political culture, where 'the professional politician is a broker mainly between his voters and the various administrative units of local and central government', Childers was responsible directly to his constituents for resolving difficulties caused by the border, a responsibility which he took very seriously.[298]

On Lemass's accession to the office of Taoiseach in 1959, his old Department of Industry and Commerce was divided to create the new Departments of Commerce, and Transport and Power.[299] Heading the new department alongside Childers was Dr. Theclá Beere, the first woman ever to head an Irish government department.[300] A protestant, and the daughter of the Church of Ireland rector, Beere had been a friend of the Childers family for many years.[301] As assistant secretary at Industry and Commerce, Beere had already been involved in discussions with the Northern authorities over the joint acquisition of the Great Northern Railway, and she quickly developed a good working relationship with her opposite number, H.E. Jones, at the Department of Commerce.[302] It was their initial meetings which laid the groundwork for cooperation in electricity, as well as tourism, and

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[296] Richard Dunphy, *The Making of Fianna Fáil Power in Ireland 1923-1948* (Oxford, 1995), p. 130. See also Patterson, 'Sean Lemass', p. 148 and Paul Bew, Kenneth Darwin and Gordon Gillespie, *Passion and Prejudice: Nationalist-Unionist conflict in Ulster in the 1930s and the founding of the Irish Association* (Belfast, 1993), p. xiv.

[297] 'Editorial – Discretion', *NS,* 10 Jan. 1969, p. 1.

[298] Mart Bax, 'Patronage Irish style: Irish politicians as brokers', *Sociologische Gids*, Vol. 17, No. 3, 1970, p. 184. See discussions re: Drummully Peninsular, in File S1955/63 *Customs,* Dept. of Taoiseach, N.A.I..

[299] Anonymous, 'The Department of Transport Power', *Administration,* Vol. 13, No. 4, 1965, p. 296.

[300] For details of Beere's career, see O'Rourke, 'Dr. Thekla Beere', pp. 19-30.

[301] John N. Young, *Erskine H. Childers – President of Ireland: a Biography* (Gerrards Cross, 1985), p. 123.

[302] Frances O'Rourke, 'Dr. Thekla Beere - a profile', *Administration,* Vol. 23, No. 1, 1975, p. 24. For details of Jones and Beere's correspondence, see File 98/3/35, *Cross-Border Cooperation in Tourism,* (Henceforth – *Cross-border Tourism*) D.T.P., N.A.I.

which sustained the negotiations through several difficult situations.[303] Following Beere's retirement in 1966 and her replaced by D. Ó Riordáin, relations between the two departments deteriorated rapidly.[304]

The two heads of the civil service, Whitaker and Bateman, also enjoyed a good working relationship, which was brought to bear when it appeared that conflicts over map descriptions might jeopardise tourism cooperation between the two administrations, for example.[305] During a number of telephone conversation, the two heads attempted to formulate a description of the Irish border acceptable to both administrations, a task which had become more difficult since the arrival of the militant McCann and Aiken at External Affairs.[306] Whitaker's long-standing personal contacts with O'Neill and his private secretary Jim Malley were seen as vital in instigating the original Lemass-O'Neill meetings, indeed, historians have tended to assume that Whitaker's position as a County Down-born man was significant, a suggestion which he refutes.[307]

Conclusion

Kinship and social networks existed within a cross-border context in varying degrees for individual residents, dependent partly on geographical location, employment, family

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[303] See for example Letter, Jones to Beere, 20 Sept. 65. File 98/3/35, *Cross-Border Tourism,* D.T.P., N.A.I.
[304] O'Rourke, 'Dr. Thekla Beere', p. 19. Institute of Public Administration, *Administration Yearbook and Diary, 1967* (Dublin, 1967), p. 34. See File 98/3/35, *Cross-Border Tourism,* D.T.P., N.A.I..
[305] See Memorandum by Whitaker (?), 15 July 1965. Letter, Jones to Beere, 4 August 1965. File 98/3/35, *Cross-Border Tourism,* D.T.P., N.A.I.
[306] See, for example, McCann to Beere 14 June 1965 and 22 June 1965, File 98/3/35, *Cross-Border Tourism,* D.T.P., N.A.I.
[307] Kenneth Bloomfield, *Stormont in Crisis* (Belfast, 1994), p. 35, Terence O'Neill, *The Autobiography of Terence O'Neill* (London, 1972), p. 68, Ronan Fanning, *Independent Ireland* (Dublin, 1983), p. 206, Jackson, *Ireland*, p. 324 and T. K. Whitaker, interviewed by author, 13 Feb. 2006.

connections and group affiliation. The presence of the border, and of changing political conditions along it, altered the ways in which networks formed and evolved within their spatial environment. It did not, however, terminate those networks. Life along the border re-orientated itself over time in order to accommodate the changing social and political conditions. Even where resistance to the very concept of the border existed, reality dictated that compromise was necessary in order to minimise friction. This reality/ideology dichotomy was perhaps best illustrated by Armagh Nationalist MP Eddie Richardson. During a speech at a public meeting designed to put pressure on the British and Irish governments to re-open the road at Annaghad Bridge, Richardson admitted that 'it was somewhat funny for him to be advocating the establishment of a hut on the Border when it was his pronounced policy to abolish the border completely', but that he felt the area's claims for one were 'very sound'.[308] This contrast between stated position and the moderating effects of reality arises continually in the operation of cross-border networks. An awareness of this dynamic is thus vital to an understanding of conditions on the ground, despite the apparent intransigence of political statements.

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[308] 'Bid to open Border road', *NS,* 9 Aug. 1963, p. 1.

4. Cross-Border Economics - Difficulties and Opportunities

The twentieth century can be seen as a gradual moving away by Southern Ireland from the economic and political control of Westminster, and the consolidation by both regimes of their territorial integrity. At the cutting edge of these separatist policies, the Irish border evolved into an increasingly significant customs and subsidy boundary. Even while De Valera's first government spoke of ending partition, customs huts and patrols by enforcement agencies began formalising the divide for the first time. This logically-inconsistent position remained a source of bitterness among Northerners. 'The border was never intended, on our part, as a major international frontier, an emerald curtain,' insisted Northern Premier James Chichester-Clark, 'it was others who piled brick upon brick along that wall so we could scarcely see or comprehend one another.'[1] Even in the warm glow of the post-O'Neill-Lemass meeting, industrialists from the North continued to point out that 'it is the Republic whose tariff barriers are the main obstacle to cross-Border trade' and 'manufacturers in various sectors are itching to do more, but some of them are faced with heavy and often prohibitive tariffs,' a reality which was acknowledged in hindsight by Taoiseach Garret Fitzgerald.[2]

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[1] Attributed. Quoted in Brian Harvey et. al., *The Emerald Curtain* (Carrickmacross, 2005), p. 2.
[2] Terence O'Neill speech in Northern Ireland House of Commons, 3 Feb. 1965, reprinted in Terence O'Neill's *Ulster at the Crossroads* (London, 1969), p. 159. 'Tariffs Brake Cross-Border Trade', *Northern Ireland Progress* (Henceforth *NIP*), May 1968, p. 25. Garret Fitzgerald, 'Steps towards Reconciliation', *Fortnight*, No. 21, 9 July 1971, p. 11.

The accession of Lemass to the office of Taoiseach in 1959 signalled a change in the economic policies of Southern Ireland.[3] While Minister for Industry and Commerce, Lemass had been largely responsible for implementing De Valera's policy of tariff-based protectionism.[4] With possible EEC membership looming, and his mentor retired, Lemass now steered Ireland away from this policy, signing a trade agreement with Britain in 1960, followed by a more comprehensive Free Trade Agreement in 1965.[5] The agreement committed the two governments to the gradual removal of almost all tariff barriers between them over a period of ten years, with a review of the process scheduled for 1970, five years into the process.

As part of the negotiations for the Free Trade Agreement, the Southern government offered more favourable terms and a more rapid removal of tariffs to Northern Irish products. Such an offer had previously been made to, and rejected by, the Brookeborough regime, and its offer created a politically difficult situation for O'Neill's government.[6] Stormont had no powers for independent negotiation at international level. As such, and to assert their position as 'an undifferentiated part of the United kingdom', the Belfast cabinet had been reluctant to send a negotiating team to the free trade conference, or to

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[3] Jonathan Bardon, *A History of Ulster* (Belfast, 2001), p. 628. For details of Lemass's changing stand on Irish economic policy, see John Horgan's *Seán Lemass-the Enigmatic Patriot* (Dublin, 1997), p. 129 and Paul Bew and Henry Patterson, *Sean Lemass and the Making of Modern Ireland* (Dublin, 1982), pp. 12-15.
[4] Eamon De Valera, speech to Dáil Éireann, 29 April 1932. Reproduced in Maurice Moynihan, *Speeches and Statements by Eamon De Valera, 1917 - 1973* (Dublin and New York, 1980), p. 204.
[5] Jackson, *Ireland*, pp. 317 and 323. For a full text of the Anglo-Irish Free Trade Agreement, and details of the negotiations leading up to its signing, see files BT 11/6700 to BT 11/6706, Board of Trade, N.A.L..
[6] Patterson 'Séan Lemass', p. 151. 'North and South', *NIP*, Aug. 1965, pp. 5-6. 'Jobs- P.M. gets firm pledge from Macmillan', *Belfast Telegraph,* 18 Nov. 1960, p. 1. Reproduced in file PREM11/3897, Prime Minister's Office, N.A.L.. Brookeborough's attempts to ignore Southern offers of cooperation were not entirely successful. Indeed, Michael Kennedy argues that Brookeborough's refusal to negotiate with Dublin backfired, with Northern business interests establishing direct contact in order to win concessions. Kennedy, 'Towards cooperation', pp. 42-3.

accept more favourable terms for their goods than were on offer to the rest of the UK.[7] Their supporters believed, and with good reason, that the Irish government was encouraging economic cooperation as a stepping-stone towards political union.[8] Modernisation theory, which dominated the assumptions on which Anglo-Irish relations were based at the time, dictated that 'the spread of economic integration and interdependence between states creates common interests among different social groups. These common interests then transcend, erode and ultimately end national and communal identities'[9] While the unionists still hoped that it would be the nationalist identity which would become eroded, returning the Republic into some form of two-island government, this hope had taken a severe knock with the Declaration of the Republican in 1949, and they now feared it would be themselves who would be pressurised via economic links to join an all-Ireland state.[10] On the other hand, the Stormont government was under pressure both from the British government and the Northern Irish manufacturing sector, supported by Minister for Commerce Brian Faulkner, to accept preferential treatment for their goods.[11] Northern Ireland, as O'Neill continually emphasised, was heavily reliant upon an annual subvention of around £52 million from the Westminster Exchequer in order to maintain parity of social services in the province.[12] In these circumstances, its Cabinet could not be seen to be rejecting an economically advantageous offer, which

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[7] Mulholland, *Crossroads*, p. 87.
[8] Minister for External Affairs Sean McBride was open regarding his hopes in this respect. See Secretary of State – 'Notes on Meeting in Paris, 16 March 1948' and 'Notes on Meeting in Paris, 16 April 1958', File FO371/70175 *Eire General,* Foreign Office, N.A.L..
[9] Paul Dixon, *Northern Ireland - The Politics of War and Peace* (Basingstoke and New York), p. 47.
[10] Ibid., pp. 47, 54 and 61. 'Eire debate on links with Ulster', *Belfast Newsletter,* 30 Jan. 1958, p. 5.
[11] See Brian Faulkner speech reported in: 'Tariffs Brake Cross-Border trade', *NIP,* May 1968, p. 25. See also Mulholland, *Crossroads*, p. 87. Séan Lemass to Dáil, 27 Nov. 1959. File S16272B, *Northern Ireland: Social, Economic and Cultural Cooperation With*, Dept. of Taoiseach.
[12] Http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/ni/economy.htm#02. Accessed 19 Nov. 2006. Paul Dixon, *Northern Ireland - The Politics of War and Peace* (Basingstoke and New York), p. 59.

might lessen Northern Ireland's heavy unemployment and hence the tax burden on the rest of the United Kingdom.[13]

In dealing with these opposing pressures, the Northern Irish government employed a tactic it was later to use extensively elsewhere.[14] While maintaining a distance from the negotiations themselves, they authorised an external body, in this case the British Board of Trade, to negotiate as 'principal-agent', or proxy, on their behalf.[15] Such a policy contained certain risks, since the Board did not share the Unionist Government's sensitivity to possible constitutional implications. It had previously acted for Northern businessmen at the Supplementary Trade Agreement talks in 1960, however, and was thus well placed to fulfil this role.[16] A special concession for Northern Irish goods was agreed, with Southern duties on Northern goods being either abolished immediately or reduced more rapidly. At the same time, individual businesses remained free to approach the Southern government directly in order to request tariff reductions, as they had been advised to do since the issue of preferential treatment had first been broached.[17] In 1965, tariff reform still appeared at the top of the agenda to be discussed at the Lemass/O'Neill meetings.[18]

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[13] In 1966, 50,281 persons were registered as unemployed in Northern Ireland, 39,121 male and 11,160 female. See General Register Office, *Census, 1966 - General Report* (Belfast, 1967), Table 16.
[14] See, for example, the use of the NITB in tourism negotiations, pages 277-279 in current work.
[15] Mulholland, *Crossroads*, p. 87. Henderson and Teague, *Economic Cooperation*, p. 6.
[16] Henderson and Teague, *Economic Cooperation*, p. 6, 'Trade Agreement – U.K. and the Republic of Ireland', *NIP,* Nov. 1960, p. 20 and Kennedy, 'Towards cooperation', pp. 54-5.
[17] See, for example, the Ulster Furniture Federation in Kennedy, *Division and Consensus*, pp. 183-4 and 190.
[18] Ferriter, *Transformation of Ireland*, p. 618.

The Free Trade Agreement with the UK also led to concerns within the Republic, fuelling fears that embryonic local industry would be unable to compete with the more established industries of the North, and of the United Kingdom as a whole. A previous investigation into the possibility of tariff reductions on Northern Irish furniture, for example, an industry in which County Monaghan had a considerable interest, had warned that the damage to the South's industry caused by tariff reductions would be so severe that it 'could not be contemplated.'[19] Despite these warnings, reductions were made in response to a visit of an Ulster Furniture Federation delegation to Dublin in 1961.[20] Within Lemass' wider policy of moving Ireland towards EEC accession, concerns such as those of the furniture manufacturers were dismissed, Irish industry being warned by its Taoiseach that it would have to become efficient if it wished to survive.[21] In this way, North-South trade formed only one aspect of Lemass' wider national policies.

North/South Economic Activity in Context.

No definitive Northern Irish source exists to verify the volume of trade between Northern Ireland and the Republic in this period. As part of the UK, Northern Ireland's foreign trade statistics were subsumed into nationwide statistical surveys, produced by the C.S.O. in London on a monthly basis.[22] Fortunately, the Southern government produced detailed monthly reports of its own on both the nature and extent of its international commerce.[23]

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[19] Memo to the Taoiseach, undated, circa. 16 Oct. 1959. File S16272A – *Social, economic and Cultural Cooperation between 26 and 6 counties*, Dept. of Taoiseach, National Archives Ireland. Patterson 'Séan Lemass', p. 152.
[20] Kennedy 'Towards cooperation', p. 54. Patterson, 'Sean Lemass', p. 157.
[21] 'With the Junior Chamber - President's letter', *NIP,* Jan. 1960, p. 17.
[22] See *The Trade of the United Kingdom with Commonwealth Countries and Foreign Countries* (London, 1946-ongoing).
[23] C.S.O., *Trade Statistics of Ireland* (Dublin, 1925 - ongoing).

This information was used even by the Northern Irish business community when attempting to assess their own international position *vis-à-vis* the Republic.[24] Some Northern Irish statistics were made available in the shape of Censuses of Production, however, which began to be regularly taken by the Northern Irish government in 1930.[25] These censuses, which covered all production industries employing ten or more individuals until 1958 and twenty-five or more thereafter, are less accurate than complete trade statistics, but still a useful benchmark for the totality of the economy.[26]

From the sources available, it is clear that the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland formed important, but not primary, markets for each other. Australia, the USA, and even Norway, alongside whom Britain was a founder-member of the European Free Trade Area in 1960, form more important export markets in the Northern Irish census of production.[27] When set against total exports, exports to the South never formed more than 10 percent of Northern Ireland's total (Fig.3.1).

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[24] 'Trade Agreement –U.K. and the Republic of Ireland', *NIP*, Nov. 1960, p. 20.
[25] Ministry of Commerce, *Northern Ireland Census of Production* (Belfast, 1935), p. V.
[26] Ibid. Ministry of Commerce, *Northern Ireland Census of Production* (Belfast, 1958), p. IV.
[27] Department of Commerce, *Report on the Census of Production of Northern Ireland* (Belfast, 1953 to 1971). Todd Alan Good, *The Free Trade Area and the Construction of Great Britain's European Policy, 1952-1958* (Lewiston, Queenstown and Lampeter, 2003), p. 239. Newspaper extracts held by the British Government suggested that in 1965, the United Kingdom as a whole took 72 percent of the total and 79 percent of the agricultural exports of Ireland. 'No rushed decision on E.E.C.', *Irish Press*, 7 Jan. 1965, p. 1. File FO371/182405 'Irish Republic and the EEC, extracts from the Irish Press of January 7th 1965', Foreign Office, N.A.L..



Fig. 4.1. From: Ministry of Commerce, *Northern Ireland Census of Production*, (Belfast, 1953-1973).

Exports to the Republic of Ireland (Fig. 4.1) formed a higher percentage of Northern Ireland's export totals than Southern exports into Northern Ireland (Fig. 4.2), and continued to rise unsteadily throughout this period. The Republic's exports to Northern Ireland, in contrast, began to lose importance post 1958 (Fig. 4.2). When placed in comparison with the actual export figures (Fig. 4.3.), it becomes clear that the relative drop in Northern Ireland's importance to the South from 1959 was due not to a reduction in the trade with Northern Ireland, but to the accelerated growth of trade with other markets. The value of the trade between Northern Ireland and the Republic rises almost continually in this period (Fig. 4.3), from the starting value of £9,754,601 in 1947 to £91,731,515 in 1971.[28]

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[28] C.S.O., *Trade Statistics of Ireland* (Dublin, Dec. 1947), Table III, p. 4, and (Dublin, Dec. 1971), Table 2, p. 6.



Fig. 4.2. From: Central Statistics Office, *Trade Statistics of Ireland*, (Dublin, 1950-1973).



Fig. 4.3. From: Central Statistics Office, *Trade Statistics of Ireland*, (Dublin, 1950-1973).

The sharp rise in the Republic's total exports post-1959 can be linked to the adoption of the *First Program of Economic Expansion*, published in 1958, which began the South's post-war economic recovery. The relative fall in the North's importance at this time was not caused by a drop in exports there, but rather, by the sharper rise in the export totals. The rise in the Republic's trade importance for Northern Ireland begins earlier, around 1956. 1955-6 were perceived as years of 'deep recession' in the Republic, the ending of which was signalled by the beginning of export growth (Fig. 4.3).[29] The failure of cross-border trade to rise at the same rate as total trade (Fig. 4.3), suggests that this market was a relatively stable one, reliant upon a set number of items, and which was not, as a result, amenable to the same growth strategies employed elsewhere.

Northern Ireland Exports to The Republic of Ireland and Total Exports



Fig. 4.4. From Ministry of Commerce, *Northern Ireland Census of Production*, (Belfast, 1953-1973).

Examining cross-border trade, it is interesting to note that both charts (Fig. 4.3.and 4.4) show a sharp rise, beginning in the early 1960s and remaining fairly stable until the end

[29] Patrick Honohan and Cormac Ó Gráda, *The Irish Macroeconomic Crisis of 1955-56* (Dublin, 1998), p. 1.

of the period. This suggests that, quite apart from the Troubles having no marked impact upon trade by the end of this period, the 1968 foot and mouth crisis in the UK, and the only effective sealing of the border during this period, also did not impact heavily upon the trading relationship.

With agriculture forming the single most important foreign currency earner for the Republic, fears that the foot and mouth infection might spread South led to hundreds of Gardaí being sent to man road-blocks on all cross-border roads.[30] A complete ban on the import of British livestock was imposed and over £5,000 in fines charged to those convicted of breaching the emergency regulations, while newspapers emphasised the patriotic duty of those living along the border to obey the rules designed to keep the disease at bay.[31] That trade was still able to increase in value in these circumstances implies that livestock exports were not the sole influence on North-South trade, though they remained a commodity of considerable importance.[32] As both sets of data show a rise, despite one charting total exports and the other manufacturing exports, as revealed in the Census of Production, it would appear that it was in the manufacturing sector that the rise in the value of trade took place.

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[30] Ceanntar "C", 'Divisional news- the foot and mouth disease', *Garda Review* (Henceforth *GR)*, Jan. 1968, p. 95, 'Foot and mouth watch on the border to be maintained - Minister inspects border blockade', *NS*, 29 Dec. 1967, p. 1 and McNiffe, *A History of the Garda Síochána*, p. 163.

[31] Daly, *First Department*, p. 484, 'News round up-parking fines brought in £255,526', *GR*, July 1968, p. 4, and 'Editorial - Foot and Mouth', *NS*, 8 Dec. 1967, p. 1.

[32] For the on-going importance of livestock export, see John Bradley, 'The Island Economy: Past, Present and Future' in John Bradley and Esmond Birnie, *Can the Celtic Tiger cross the Irish Border?* (Cork, 2001), pp. 28-9.

Looking at the Republic's imports from Northern Ireland relative to its exports to it, (Fig. 4.5), it becomes clear that, not only did exports to the Republic form a higher percentage of Northern Ireland's total trade, it was also objectively a more valuable trade. Although the two trends mirror each other fairly closely in pattern, nowhere do the Republic's imports from Northern Ireland look to overtake their exports to it, except in 1961. This appears to have been due to the differentials existing between the import and export of cattle, the main commodity traded between the two markets in that year. While both imports and exports rose in the Republic *vis-à-vis* Northern Ireland, cattle exports rising from 136,169 to 162,874 units, and in value from £6,799,840 to £7,963,845, imports values rose much more sharply, from 44,731 units of cattle to 159,122 units, or £2,305,581 to £8,055,732, from 1960 to 1961.[33] In total, Southern Ireland exports to Northern Ireland increased by over £2.5 million, from £19,357,589 to £21,873,493, while imports increased by £6.3 million, from £7,380,688 to £13,727,656.

[33] C.S.O., *Trade Statistics of Ireland* (Dublin, December 1960 and 1961). Table XVI.



Fig. 4.5. From: Central Statistics Office, *Trade Statistics of Ireland*, (Dublin, 1950-1973.

[1] Figures for December 1964, *Irish Trade Statistics*, are missing. The November figure duplicated has been used, to create as close an estimate as possible.

That exports from Northern Ireland experienced a peak in 1961 suggests that the period of the border unrest did not unduly affect economic relations between the two states. The increase in imports from 1956, coinciding with the end of rationing in Britain, suggests that rationing led to an artificially low level of exports from Northern Ireland to the Republic.

A sharp rise in both exports and imports is visible in the year 1967. Allowing for the lag-time needed for business contacts to be made, and large-scale exports to begin to take place, it can be fairly safely concluded that the improved relations between the three governments of the two islands, including the Anglo-Irish free trade agreement and the

introduction of accelerated tariff reductions by the Southern government for Northern Irish produced goods, did lead to a considerable rise in the amount of cross-border trade. Mary Daly also noted that 1967 formed the first year when 'Ireland became the largest exporter of carcase beef to Britain … and imports of livestock from Northern Ireland rose sharply to meet part of the demand' and this undoubtedly affected the trade statistics.[34]

The Republic's export statistics dip in value in the early years of the Northern Irish Troubles as a percentage of total trade. While this could be the result of conscious choice by Southern consumers left otherwise helpless to affect their protest against political developments in the North, it is difficult to infer whether this was the beginning of a more permanent trend or simply a slowing down in the accelerated process of growth experienced since the mid 1960s. It is probable that the percentage of trade between North and South changed considerably in the years following 1972, due to the simultaneous accession of Southern Ireland and the U.K. to the EEC, which took place on 1 January 1973. This huge economic change means that any projection of the statistics into the later period is unlikely to yield conclusive results about the impact of political unrest upon economic contact. In the absence of the data, the experience of the early border campaign, in which no apparent down-turn in trade is visible, must be accepted as typical.

The disparity between imports and exports across the border did not pass unnoticed by unionist commentators and leaders during this period. Senator Albert J. Walmsley, speaking to the United Societies of Castleblaney in 1964, noted that 'while they bought

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[34] Daly, *First Department*, p. 484.

£28 million worth of goods from Eire they could only sell £18 million in return' and that 'it would be the first sign of goodwill on Eire's part … if the trade barriers were taken down.'[35] Brian Faulkner, as Minister for Commerce, carried this message south when he addressed the Dublin Society of Chartered Accountants in 1968:

> At present total cross-border trade was worth about £66 million a year and overall was very much in favour of the South. Much of this imbalance was accounted for by livestock, animal feeding stuffs, meat and dairy products, and certain well-known beverages, [all of which were exempt from fast-track tariff reductions under the Anglo-Irish Trade Agreement] … excluding the food and drink industries, trade in manufactured goods was just about in balance.[36]

The continued existence of tariff barriers between the two jurisdictions remained a source of unease, particularly as the first list of goods to benefit from accelerated reductions under the free trade agreement was considered an unimpressive one.[37] The *Northern Ireland Progress* of February 1965, commenting on the meeting in Dublin between Brian Faulkner and Jack Lynch, stated that 'Eire has virtual freedom of trade in the North, while there were prohibitions on Ulster goods entering Eire', and quoted Faulkner as saying that in the first nine months of 1964 'Ulster bought Eire goods worth £22 ½ million, as compared to the £36.9 million spent by seventy other countries.'[38] The statistics suggest that, despite these admonitions, while the amount which the Republic bought in Northern Ireland rose, the gap between imports and exports was never effectively closed. Indeed, it became wider as the rise in imports from Northern Ireland failed to keep pace with exports to it.

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[35] 'North - South meeting in Castleblaney - Politicians showed will to co-operate', *NS,* 26 March 1964, p. 3.
[36] 'Tariffs Brake Cross-Border trade', *NIP,* May 1968, p. 25.
[37] 'Town talk', *NIP*, July 1966, pp. 23-7.
[38] Ibid., Feb. 1965, p. 19.

In all of these trade figures, the rising value of trade should be seen in the light of a fairly regular inflation rate of between 3 and 5 percent, year upon year, rising sharply post-1969.[39] At the same time, both sets of statistics contain a margin of error created by goods imported only to be re-exported immediately, and by illegally traded goods. The sharp rise in the overall trade of the Republic in the early 1960s (Fig. 4.3) can be linked to the increased optimism, and the corresponding rise in cross-border interaction, highlighted in the previous chapter.[40] What Terence Brown referred to as 'the economic revival of the early 1960s' led to a drop in the rate of emigration, and was identified by Liam Kennedy as a major factor in increasing the morale of the Southern population.[41]

Economic border life - Consolidation and Peripheralisation

Despite the ongoing anti-partitionist rhetoric within sections of the Southern government, the two Irish administrations can be considered during this period, and in the period immediately preceding it, to have been engaged in a gradual campaign of consolidation of the territories under their control. This involved increasing moves towards economic integration of the new territorial units, the establishment of increasingly divergent economic policies, and the strengthening of government control over local administrations and security concerns. For border communities, this process created conditions of gradual peripheralisation within the national political sphere. As power became increasingly focused upon Dublin and Belfast, so the formerly central role of towns such as Clones began to decline. This was particularly so as, with the advent of

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[39] T. L. Whitaker, *Irish Inflation,* 2007, Unpublished.
[40] See page 86 of current work. See also Cormac O Grada, *The Economic Development of Ireland Since 1870* (Dublin, 1993), p. 12.
[41] Brown, *Ireland,* p. 9. Kennedy, *People and Population Change*, p. 21.

NATO, EFTA, and other international groupings, Ireland as a whole was undergoing a process of gradual peripheralisation within the post-War world 'its society seem[ingly] caught in a 'thirties' time warp.'[42]

Perhaps the most practically and psychologically important decisions in this process of peripheralisation was the decision taken to close many of the railway branch lines serving the north of Ireland. Beginning with the County Donegal Railway line in 1952, the network was slowly run down until only the main GNR line connecting Dublin and Belfast and the County Down commuter line remained.[43] While this process made sense in terms of an economy focused upon Belfast and Larne on the one hand, and Dublin on the other, for Donegal, Cavan, and Leitrim the closures meant the sealing off of their traditional markets in the North, already hard-hit by tariffs and customs regulations, before the infrastructure had been put in place to allow them to effectively re-orientate southwards. For example, the closure of the Leitrim to Enniskillen line closed off the traditional route whereby Western farmers exported their cattle for sale to English agents visiting the Northern market.[44]

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[42] Jonathan Bardon, *A History of Ulster* (Belfast, 2001), p. 588. See also N.F.R. Crafts, 'The Golden Age of Economic Growth in Post-war Europe: why did Northern Ireland Miss Out?', *Irish Economic and Social History,* Vol. XXII, 1995, p. 25, Robert Fisk, *In Time of War* (London, 1983), p. 469 and J. Anderson, and J. Goodman, 'Problems of Integration', p. 30.

[43] S.I. No. 133/1952: *County Donegal Railways (Stranorlar-Glenties) (Abandonment of Railway line) Order*, 1952. S.I. No. 397/1953, *Dundalk, Newry and Greenore Railway (Abandonment) warrant*, 1953. S.I. No. 181/1958: *Sligo, Leitrim and Northern Counties Railway (abandonment) Order*, 1958. S.I. No. 70/1958: *The Transport Tribunal, Great Northern Railway Board (Drogheda-Oldcastle Railway Line) (termination of passenger services) Order,* 1958. S.I. No. 188/1957: *The Transport Tribunal, Great Northern Railway Board (Dundalk-Clones, Glaslough-Cavan and Ballyhaise-Belturbet Railway Lines) (Termination of passenger services) Order*, 1957. Http://www.irishstatutebook.ie. Accessed 17 Nov. 2006.

[44] Leitrim CCM, Resolution 20 1954. L.C.C.O.

The road network which was intended to mitigate the effects of rail closures took many years to put in place, resulting, for much of this and the subsequent period, in the isolation of the north-western counties. In 1961, Louth had seventy-nine percent dust free roads, but it was the only border county which enjoyed more than fifty percent such roads.[45] The average across the country as a whole was only forty-five percent, with Leitrim having the lowest percentage of all, with 18.8 percent, and Donegal next with twenty four percent. As roads were a charge upon local finances, while the railways had been a private enterprise supported by central government funding, the financial implications of re-orientation were very visible at a local level. Roads had to compete directly in budgeting terms with the drainage of local rivers and the provision of housing and services. In this way, the poorest counties became trapped in a cycle of poverty, unable to fund the roads which would attract industry, and thus to collect sufficient rates to pay for better roads. Counties such as Leitrim and Monaghan argued in representations to the Ministry for Local Government that they deserved a greater proportion of transport provision in order to break this cycle of isolation, either through an extension of the road rail grant scheme or through their exemption from the payment of rail subsidies.[46] Since the funds available for road building were strictly limited, however, their representations went largely unheard in the distant centre.

The secondary effect of the closures was the increase of the physical distance between goods and markets and the time required for their transport. This in turn reduced the

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[45] M. Flannery, 'Some Current Road Problems', *Administration,* Vol. 10, No. 2, Summer 1962 p. 101.
[46] Monaghan CCM, 11 May 1964, 12 Oct. 1964 and 8 March 1965, Monaghan CC Offices (M.C.C.O.), Monaghan Town, Ireland. Donegal CCM, 7 Dec. 1959, Donegal County Archives (D.C.A.), Lifford, Ireland.

attractiveness of border markets and ports. Both Newry and Greenore Ports, major commercial enterprises pre-partition, were slowly wound down during this period.[47] Though Greenore Port continued to operate subsequent to the closing of its rail link, it never fully recovered, suffering a second blow with the ending of the containerisation dispute in Dublin Port in 1962, which allowed container lorries, previously limited to using Greenore, to begin using Dublin.[48] By 1974, however, traffic to the port was still sufficiently heavy that suggestions were seriously made of re-opening the railway line between it and Dundalk.[49]

While some nationalists continued to hope that 'one day, when economics becomes the principal controller of Irish destinies, and geographical and physical characteristics direct the Irish economy without interference from political demagoguism, the River Erne might be the jugular vein of the entire north-central portion of this island,' the majority of the border populations, alongside their governments, began to make the adjustments necessary for their new circumstances.[50] For many, this adjustment involved the abandonment of their traditional homes and emigration elsewhere. The direct correlation between the closure of transport links and emigration can be seen in the recollections of individuals such as Mamo McDonald who, looking back on the changes which she had witnessed in Clones during her lifetime, recalled:

> In 1957 ... a cortege passed down Fermanagh Street. It was the mass exodus of one extended family from the town ... A railway family, the closure of the Great

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[47] 'Newry seeks port conference', *CCJ*, March 1955, p. 5.
[48] Fergal Tobin, *The Best of Decades* (Dublin, 1984), p. 80.
[49] H.C. Casserley, *Outline of Irish Railway History* (London and Vancouver, 1974), pp. 193-4.
[50] Eughan O Bridaun, 'Cavan and Monaghan's economic progress', *CCJ*, Nov. 1969, p. 35.

> Northern lines meant emigration for them and many others. Ever since the creation of the Border, Clones had been diminishing; the closure of the railway was a severe body blow.[51]

In the 1951 Republic of Ireland census, four of the five border counties featured among the ten counties suffering the most serious fall in population, with Leitrim having 'lost nearly one-thirteenth part of its population in five years.'[52] What made this situation worse was that these same counties had already suffered the heaviest population loss in the previous inter-censual period, 1936 to 1946.[53] For those who did not emigrate, the focus of activity shifted towards attempting to minimise the effects of isolation and, wherever possible, to take advantage of their border location.

Approved Roads and the Channelisation of Cross-Border Traffic

Not all cross-border transport links were lost with the closure of the railways. The Irish border was crossed by 170 roads when it was first created, of which fifteen were designated 'approved roads'.[54] This meant that they were approved for the importing and exporting of goods, and provided with customs huts, one British, one Irish, at which goods could be cleared for transit. All other roads were known as 'unapproved' roads, and the transfer of goods along them was considered smuggling. Since goods included motor-vehicles for much of this period, approved roads formed the only routes through

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[51] Mamo McDonald, in Logue, *Reflections*, p. 95.
[52] C.S.O., *Census 1946 and 1951 - General Reports* (Dublin, 1958), p. 20.
[53] Department of Industry and Commerce, *Census, 1946 - Preliminary Report* (Dublin, 1946), Table B, p. 8.
[54] Note on the ceasing of stamping of pass books and control forms, Jan. 1963, file S1955/63, *Customs*, Dept. of Taoiseach, N.A.I..

which motorists, other then those provided with special passes, could cross the border.[55] 'As motor cars became common … [this] was found to be a real hardship.'[56] Until the relaxation of the rules governing the importation of motorcars across the border, on 1 May 1959, all drivers wishing to bring their own vehicle across the border had also to have it 'bonded' by a resident of the opposite jurisdiction, who would vouch that, should it not be re-exported, they would pay the duty on its permanent importation. Customs men, manning the border huts, stamped each vehicle's 'pass book' as it entered and left the jurisdiction.[57] If caught on the wrong side of the border, without an exit and entry stamp, having 'jump[ed] the border' illegally, a motorist was liable to a two pound fine, a hefty sum at a time when a labourer's wage could amount to only three or four pounds a week.[58] Since many unapproved roads meandered in and out of the two jurisdictions, occasionally, indeed, forming the border, making it was quite possible to 'come from the North, into the South, into the North again, and into the South once more without a single signpost or checkpoint,' mistaken crossings did occur, leading to confrontations between the customs authorities and lost motorists.[59] A simplification of this complex system was

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[55] Clergymen, veterinary surgeons and doctors had passes allowing them to cross the border via unapproved roads. Note on the ceasing of stamping of pass books and control forms, Jan. 1963, file S1955/63, *Customs*, Dept. of Taoiseach, N.A.I.. Some government ministers also had such passes, which were surrendered following election defeats and/or cabinet reshuffles. File 2005/23/165, *Land boundary passes for entry into Northern Ireland 1969 - 1973*, Department of Justice, N.A.I.. Milk suppliers to Southern creameries were also for a time provided with such passes, limited in time from 8am to 11am, in order to allow them to deliver milk. Daly, *First Department*, p. 202.

[56] Livingstone, *Fermanagh Story*, p. 337.

[57] Vehicle Pass Book, Rosslea Heritage Centre, Rosslea, County Fermanagh.

[58] Sean McCreesh, former councilor, Newry Number Two RDC, interviewed by author, 10 May 2006.

[59] Colm Tóibín, *Walking Along the Border* (Dublin, 1987), p. 31. See also Bert Henshaw in John Lindsay, *Brits Speak Out* (Londonderry, 1998), p. 14. 'To Eire, never again!', newspaper cutting enclosed with letter to Taoiseach, 3 Aug. 1970, file S10585C 2001/6/520 '*Partition; Statements, Resolutions, etc. by Northern Ireland groups and individuals*.', Letter, R. H. Hudson (Enniskillen) to the Taoiseach, 23 June 1963, File S1955/63 *Customs*, both Dept. of Taoiseach, N.A.I..

the aim of many who crossed the border regularly and those, such as Bord Fáilte, who had interests in cross-border travel.[60]

Bicycles and horse-drawn carts remained at all times exempt from the import restrictions placed upon motor-vehicles. Since these provided the main means of transport for many people, and as their presence on unapproved roads did not automatically arouse suspicion, many of those attempting to smuggle goods across the border used these rather then motorised vehicles in order to do so.[61]

The demarcation of approved and unapproved routes had the effect of channelling cross-border traffic into a limited number of approved routes. For border towns possessing such a crossing, this channelling effect proved an economic boon, making them more accessible to their markets than their local neighbours, and placing them firmly on long-distance bus and tourist routes. Since not all goods were dutiable, such towns could expect a considerable amount of cross-border shopping traffic, and, indeed, some towns such as Monaghan entered into special agreements with the Ulster Transport Authority to have shopping trips run to them as a tourist service.[62] For towns that did not possess such routes, however, the results were disastrous:

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[60] Bord Fáilte, *Annual Report* (Dublin, 1959), p. 26. 'Easing of Customs formalities welcome - Faulkner', *Irish Independent,* 6 Nov. 1963, p. 15. Reproduced in file S1955C/95 *Customs,* Dept. of Taoiseach, N.A.I.. 'New Border legislation - Greater Southern trade expected in Louth and Monaghan', *The Argus,* 9 Jan. 1965, p. 3.

[61] Nell McCafferty in Logue *Reflections*, p. 79. '"Bicycle Frame Hid Cigarettes"', *UG,* 18 Jan 1951, p. 2. 'Smuggler Dropped All and Ran', *UG,* 3 April 1952, p. 3.

[62] 'Monaghan to get 'bus tours', *NS,* 8 July 1966, p. 1. 'Dublin chamber of commerce council comments - cross-border chamber of commerce committee', *CCJ,* July 1968, p. 30.

> You had to go down the road to Newtownbutler to get to Clones, and [if] I live two mile down the road, no way am I going to drive into Newtownbutler and then on to Clones. I'm going to shop in Newtownbutler. So the … loyalty to Clones lessened progressively due to the overriding economics, common sense of the situation.[63]

This development was encouraged by the Economic War of the 1930s and the raising of cross-border tariff barriers.[64] The patterns of commerce, slowly readjusting to the new conditions, led to the closure of businesses thus left isolated, the newly-quiet conditions being blamed for a rise in depression and the rate of suicides in some areas.[65] In Clones, where most roads led via Northern Ireland, the tradition of going into town on a Saturday night, to walk up and down the streets, shopping and meeting friends, all but ceased as the rural population could not longer get into the town.[66] 'Clones, once a very big town, a lot of its own shops … they all closed down. Now we don't have a bakery. We don't have a resident Protestant minister … the pub is closed and for let.'[67] As the economy faltered, more people were forced to move away, 'eroded[ing] the vitality of rural services and [the] rural community,' leaving too few to support specialist services such as electrical stores, flower shops and even the local pharmacy, whose protestant owner sold up and moved away.[68] The channelling of traffic was thus a mixed blessing, economically advantageous to those towns which possessed approved roads, and a source of envy and economic hardship to those which did not.

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[63] Walter Pringle, interviewed by author, 19 Oct. 2006.
[64] Livingstone, *The Fermanagh Story*, p. 324.
[65] BBC Northern Ireland, *Home Truths: The Bridge*, 14 March 1995. RUC Press Office video collection, No. 1258, political collection, Linen Hall Library, Belfast.
[66] Walter Pringle interviewed by author, 19 Oct. 2006.
[67] Ibid.
[68] Ibid. Bill Bramwell, 'Rural Tourism and Sustainable Rural Tourism', in Bill Bramwell and Bernard Lane (ed.), *Rural Tourism and Sustainable Rural Development* (Clevedon, 1994), p. 2.

The desirability of possessing an approved road can be seen in the considerable effort expended by border towns in order to convince the British and Irish governments to open such routes through their villages. Letters were written, debates held, committees formed and delegations sent.[69] The Department of the Taoiseach files S1955 series contains a considerable volume of correspondence from towns such as Ballyconnell and Kiltyclogher, as well as parliamentary questions asked on their behalf.[70] These appeals cited, among other reasons, the need 'to alleviate hardship which is being caused locally and to assist the development of the tourist industry in an area,' noting the fact that 'in Co. Cavan, there are three customs posts on a fifty mile stretch of the border, whereas between Beleek and Blacklion, a thirty mile stretch, there is not one customs post. Kiltyclogher is the obvious choice as the ideal site to open up this area,' and insisting that as the roads under discussion are not used by commercial vehicles, they could be opened 'at no cost' were Dublin to give its approval.[71]

Such pressure was resisted strongly by the two governments on the basis of the cost of maintaining customs huts and full-time officials in order to man them, on both sides, as

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[69] 'Bid to open border road', *NS,* 9 Aug. 1963, p. 1. See, for example, government decision slip re: 'customs control of cross-border traffic', 10 Dec.1963. File S1955C/95 *Customs,* Dept. of Taoiseach, N.A.I. United Societies of Castleblaney', *Program* 19 March 1964, Martin Hanratty papers, Castleblaney.

[70] See, for example, acknowledgment slip to Edward Lafferty, Clady from the Secretary to the Taoiseach, 23 April 1968 re: his letter of 20 April 1968 re: Clady Bridge Road. File 99/1/5 (S1955C), *Customs*. Dept. of Taoiseach, N.A.I.. Parliamentary question Mr Harte to Dr. Ryan: *Cross-Border Road*. Extract from official reports of Dáil Debates, 12 March 1964, Vol. 208, No. 6, Cols. 923-4. Reproduced in file S1955C/95, *Customs,* Dept. of Taoiseach, N.A.I..

[71] Mr. McLaughlin to Dr. Ryan, *Parliamentary Question - County Sligo Cross-Border Traffic*, 11 Feb. 1964, Dáil Éireann debates Vol. 207. Reproduced in file S1955C/95 *Customs* Dept. of Taoiseach, N.A.I.. See also, deputation report, 5 July 1967, file S1955C – 97/6/6 *Customs* Dept. of Taoiseach, N.A.I., p. 1. Private letter from the Chairmen of cross-border roads committee and Ballyconnell waterways branch to the Taoiseach, 4 Feb. 1971, file 2002/8/523 (S1955C) *Customs* Dept. of Taoiseach, N.A.I..

compared to the levels of use which the proposed roads could expect.[72] There was also a suggestion that such moves were resisted by those towns already possessing a crossing, who did not wish to see their own business diverted. Nevertheless, in February 1965, Dr. James Ryan, Minister for Finance in the Republic, announced in the Dáil the opening of three new border roads, from Castlefin, County Donegal to Castlederg, County Tyrone; from Belturbet, County Cavan to Derrylin, County Fermanagh and from Carrickmacross, County Monaghan to Crossmaglen, County Armagh.[73] Far from easing the pressure upon the government, however, these concessions was seen as promising by other groups hoping to have such crossings established, who thus intensified their own campaigns.[74] In County Monaghan, for example, the success of a cross-border committee in having the Crossmaglen to Carrickmacross road approved led almost immediately to the beginning of a campaign concerning the Newtownhamilton to Castleblaney road, involving Castleblaney UDC and the United Societies of Castleblaney, supported by Newry Number Two Rural District Council (RDC) and South Armagh Nationalist MP Eddie Richardson.[75]

The Carrickmacross to Crossmaglen road opening campaign was interesting in that it was, from its inception, a cross-border affair. The issue was first raised in a telephone call by Pat Sammon, Newry Number Two Rural District Councillor, to Richard Shannon, then in his first term as vice-chairmen of Carrickmacross UDC, having previously served

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[72] Castleblaney UDC minutes, 25 Jan. 1955, Castleblaney UDC offices, Castleblaney (C.U.D.C.O.). Letter, J. M. Dillon, 27 March, 1956, in Castleblaney U.D.C. minutes, 24 April 1956, C.U.D.C.O..
[73] Dr. James Ryan to Dáil, 10 Feb 1965, *Dáil Éireann extract from official reports*, Vol. 214, No. 1 col. 31.
[74] Government decision slip re: 'customs control of cross-border traffic', 10 Dec.1963. File S1955C/95 *Customs,* Dept. of Taoiseach, N.A.I.
[75] 'Handshakes across the Border', *UG,* 6 May 1965, p. 12. 'Agreement on both sides of border', *NS,* 29 Sept. 1967, p. 2.

as its chair. 'Pat Sammon rang me up,' he recalled, 'and he told me how the people in Northern Ireland felt about it. Together we went to meet George Reid and Jim Revells, Unionist councillors on Newry Number Two Council.'[76] 'We were young then, and idealistic, and we thought we could change the world. That seemed a good way to change it, locally.'[77] The committee held its first public meeting on Annaghad Bridge, between Counties Armagh and Monaghan, where 'representatives from Monaghan and Armagh representing every shade of political and religious opinion on both sides of the Border' addressed an estimated crowd of 'close on 1000 people' from the back of a flat-base lorry which was parked half in the Republic, and half in Northern Ireland.[78] The speakers, who included local Protestant and Catholic clergy, national politicians and local council personnel, both Unionist and Nationalist, all called for the re-opening of the road as a convenience for local residents and a positive economic move for the towns on either side. 'As one person who had special permission to drive over the route,' noted the Canon J. McEvoy, 'he felt, with the interests of the parishioners of Upper Creggan at heart, that the official opening for cross-border traffic of the route would be very advantageous to the Border residents and people living along the frontier.'[79] At the end of the meeting, a committee was elected which included members from all three local council areas, Castleblaney and Carrickmacross in the South and Newry in the North.

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[76] Richard Shannon, interviewed by author, 27 Oct. 2006.
[77] Ibid.
[78] 'New Approved Road in South Monaghan', *NS,* 19 Feb. 1965, p. 1. 'Bid to open border road', *NS,* 9 Aug. 1963, p. 1. See also 'seeking end to border hardship', *UG,* 8 Aug. 1963, p. 2. 'Road at border may be re-opened', *UG,* 23 April 1964, p. 12.
[79] 'Bid to open Border road', *NS,* 9 Aug. 1963, p. 1.

This unusual make-up ensured that whenever the committee was subsequently referred to in the press, it was known as the 'cross border committee'.[80]

In its discussions concerning the opening of the Newtownhamilton to Castleblaney road in May 1968, Castleblaney UDC raised an important limiting factor upon local influence regarding the opening of cross-border roads. While the committee had the support of local Deputy P. Mooney, TD, 'they had also two Senators in the area as well as the Minister [Erskine Childers],' and hence, 'it should be possible [for them] to have sufficient influence exerted to get the road opened.'[81] On the North side of the border, however, even with the support of Stormont MP Eddie Richardson and the Newry Number Two RDC, the same level of local pressure was not possible, since decisions regarding customs continued to fall under the tax-raising aegis of the Treasury in London.[82] Westminster, as well as being physically more distant from the problem, was also politically more disengaged from it since, thanks to the vagaries of Northern Irish politics, no votes were at stake for any of the mainstream British parties in the border area.

Despite being made up predominantly of local councilmen, the cross-border committee did not form an official part of any of the constituent local councils, and its minutes do not appear in surviving minute books. Discussions concerning the opening of this road

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[80] 'Border Road to be opened?', *NS,* 1 May 1964, p. 3. 'Border Road to be opened?', *The Argus,* 2 May 1964, p. 5.
[81] Castleblaney UDC minutes May 1968, C.U.D.C.O.. 'Ratepayer attended Audit', *NS,* 31 May 1968 p. 2. See also Basil Chubb, '"Going about persecuting civil servants": the role of the Irish Parliamentary Representative', *Political Studies*, Vol. 11, No. 3, 1963, p. 280.
[82] Castleblaney UDC minutes May 1968, C.U.D.C.O..

were, however, held by all three councils, though Castleblaney were far more active regarding their own Newtownhamilton to Castleblaney road a few years previously than they were concerning the Carrickmacross to Crossmaglen road.[83] According to press reports from the period, the committee continued to meet for a number of years, formally and informally, at the home of Pat Sammon to lobby for the opening of the road.[84] It sent a delegation to the Southern Minister for Transport Erskine Childers, who was also Monaghan's TD, and, after suffering disappointment in December 1963, finally succeeded in 10 February 1965.[85] At this stage, Richard Shannon hoped to see the committee remain in existence to campaign on other cross-border issues, but there is no evidence that it did so.[86] In 1967 he left Carrickmacross for Northern Ireland, by which point the other central figure in the committee, Pat Sammon, was dead.

The eventual success of the road-opening committee served to highlight the different levels of peripheralisation experienced by communities even within a relatively small geographical area. In Crossmaglen, the announcement of the road's re-opening 'caused delight to the residents,' while 'in Carrickmacross the news … did not arouse much excitement.'[87] 'It was less important to Carrickmacross,' recalled Shannon, 'at the original changeover … Crossmaglen's natural hinterland was cut off and a lot of business

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[83] See, for example, Minutes of Castleblaney UDC 23 July 1963, Castleblaney U.D.C. Minutes, C.U.D.C.O., Castleblaney, Ireland. Letter, J. M. Dillon, 27 March, 1956, in Castleblaney U.D.C. minutes, 24 April 1956, C.U.D.C.O.. Minutes of Newry Number Two R.D.C., 11 Feb. 1965, PRONI. Minutes of Carrickmacross U.D.C., 13 Jan. 1964, Carrickmacross, County Monaghan.

[84] 'New Border Post?', *UG,* 1 Aug. 1963, p. 3. 'From Carrickmacross to Crossmaglen', *NS,* 16 Aug. 1963, p. 5. 'Refusal to open cross-border road', *NS,* 13 Dec. 1963, p. 7. 'Border Road to be opened?', *NS,* 1 May 1964, p. 3. 'New Border Road to open on Saturday', *NS,* 30 April 1965, p. 6.

[85] 'Refusal to open cross border road', *NS,* 13 Dec. 1963, p. 7. Dr. James Ryan to Dáil, 10 Feb 1965, *Dáil Éireann Extract from Official Reports*, Vol. 214, No. 1 col. 31. 'New Approved road in South Monaghan', *NS,* 19 Feb 1965, p. 1.

[86] 'New Approved Road in South Monaghan', *NS,* 19 Feb. 1965, p. 1. Richard Shannon, interviewed by author, 25 Oct. 2006.

[87] 'New Approved road in South Monaghan', *NS,* 19 Feb 1965, p. 1.

was lost. Carrickmacross was not in the same situation,' having kept its hinterland post-1921, making the road's opening economically less important for it.[88]

The channelling of border traffic through a limited number of crossing points led to certain difficulties for the towns at these transport nodes, as well as those circumvented by them. Congestion at crossings led to 'lines of lorries waiting every morning for the customs to open,' a problem worsened by the relatively limited period of time, originally only 9am to 5pm, during which crossing was possible.[89] Paddy McGinn, writing in Paddy Logue's *The Border,* remembered his father, a livestock haulier, waiting at the border crossing, and, if he was too late to cross, having to be picked up by his wife, or sleeping in the truck.[90] This made border crossings crowded and often noisy places; particularly as livestock awaiting clearance were not always adequately penned.[91]

Customs hours of operations tended also to influence the time in which individuals were able to socialise across the border. This had an economic impact on towns which relied on the cross-border catering trade such as Bundoran; 'a lot of people went down there and they had to cross the Free State border at nine o'clock, and a lot of people left at eight [in order to do so], and [Bundoran was] … very anxious to have that extended to later.'[92]

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[88] Richard Shannon, interviewed by author, 25 Oct. 2006.
[89] The Irish Revenue Commissioners, *Notice 18: Temporary importation and temporary exportation of motor vehicles* and *18A: Private motor vehicles imported temporarily under temporary importation permits*. Enclosed in File S1955/63 *Customs*, Dept. of Taoiseach, N.A.I..
[90] Paddy McGinn in Logue, *Reflections*, p. 12
[91] 'Better Customs Facilities for Cattle', *UG,* 16 April, 1970, p. 11. BBC Northern Ireland, *Home Truths: The Bridge*, RUC Press Office video collection, No. 1258.
[92] Cyril Coulter, interviewed by author, 10 May 2006

As a result, Bundoran UDC campaigned to have the hours of the customs post extended in 1968, seeking the support of Fermanagh CC.[93]

Along the main routes between the Republic and Northern Ireland, the problems created by the customs bottle-necks were naturally magnified. So great was the concern in Dundalk and Newry, whose customs facilities straddled the main road between Belfast and Dublin, that it formed the major *raison d'etre* behind the creation of a cross-border committee comprising representatives of the Chambers of Commerce of Dundalk, Dublin, Belfast and Newry, and representatives of the two central bodies of the Chambers of Commerce movement in Ireland, to campaign for improvements in the speed and efficiency of cross-border trade.[94]

The committee emerged formally in 1965, when it was first noted in the Republic's *Chambers of Commerce Journal,* though Gerry Murphy, who served on the Newry delegation, believed that informal contacts between Newry and Dundalk had been ongoing since partition.[95] In February 1965 the committee also appeared for the first time in the Belfast Chamber of Commerce magazine, *Northern Ireland Progress*, the President announcing 'that he hoped to be present at a meeting arranged in Dundalk by the Dundalk Chamber of Commerce, at which ways and means of fostering closer relations between North and South on economic grounds would be discussed.'[96] The Northern

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[93] Fermanagh CCM, 14 Feb. 1968, file LA4/2GA/8, PRONI.
[94] 'Council Comment - Best date for decimals', *CCJ*, Nov. 1967, p. 11. 'Chamber Wins Border Concession', *NIP,* March 1968, p. 9. 'Cross-border base in Dublin', *NIP,* July 1968, p. 23.
[95] 'Promote and Protect Local Interests', *CCJ,* May 1965, p. 13. Gerry Murphy, interviewed by author, 20 Oct. 2006.
[96] 'Belfast Chamber meeting-Wilson Report and Business Finance', *NIP,* Feb. 1965, p. 15.

chambers' official history ascribed the committee's existence to the greater degree of friendliness between the two jurisdictions which resulted from the Lemass-O'Neill meeting of January 1965 which, it claimed 'acted as a stimulus' to its creation.[97] Minutes for the group began to appear in the *Chamber of Commerce Journal* as of November 1967, and provide an invaluable insight into the issues raised by the border for the island's business community.[98]

Unlike many cross-border bodies, whose impact on the national agenda is hard to prove, the Chambers of Commerce committee and its concerns can be positively identified at the highest level of policy-making. Mention of its representations appear in notes concerning Lemass's visit to Stormont on 11 December 1967, compiled by Whitaker, suggesting that its concerns were influential in shaping the agenda of cross-border governmental discussion.[99] Later in the decade, its campaigns were directly responsible for the provision of bonded customs warehouses in both Belfast and Dublin, which allowed goods to be cleared for customs before physically reaching the border.[100] The Chamber of Commerce movement as a whole formed a high-profile pressure group within Ireland, frequently playing host to government ministers at its annual dinners, and being credited with a kingmaker role *vis-à-vis* the first Northern Irish cabinet of 1921.[101] Within this

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[97] Chambers, *Faces of Change*, p. 271.
[98] 'Council Comment - best date for decimals', *CCJ,* Nov. 1967, p. 11. 'Dublin Chamber of Commerce committee - Council notes', *CCJ,* Jan. 1970, p. 9. 'The spiral of rising prices', *CCJ*, Dec. 1972, p. 3. 'Ulster chamber activities, cross-border trade problems', *NIP,* April 1965, p. 21. 'Chamber news - cross-border trade, *NIP,* Dec. 1967, p. 10.
[99] Notes on the Taoiseach's visit to Stormont 11 Dec. 1967, Appendix C: Physical planning and construction (roads), 5 Jan. 1968, File 175(9), *T.K. Whitaker papers*, U.C.D..
[100] 'Chamber Wins Border Concession', *NIP,* March 1968, p. 9. 'Cross-border base in Dublin', *NIP,* July 1968, p. 23.
[101] George Chambers, *Faces of Change* (Belfast, c.1983), pp. 237-8. 'Dublin Chamber of Commerce Annual Dinner', *CCJ,* Nov. 1957, p. 12.

movement, the cross-border committee enjoyed a high status, being attended by presidents and executive members of each of its member bodies. The record of attendance noted in *Northern Ireland Progress* for the November/December meeting, 1969, for example, noted the presence of the president, vice president and secretary of the Northern Ireland and Newry chambers, the Dundalk-based president of the Association of Chambers of Commerce in Ireland, and the executive director and secretary of the Dublin chamber.[102] When in 1966 the Northern Ireland Chamber of Commerce and Industry replaced Belfast Chamber of Commerce as the senior establishment, representation on the cross-border committee was delegated to its most senior executive committee.[103] The high political standing of such delegates gave the cross-border committee access to many influential people within the two jurisdictions.

The cross-border committee campaigned on both issues of national cross-border trade and on local issues directly affecting the Newry-Dundalk Crossing. In May 1967, for example, the issues under discussion included the moves towards decimalisation, amid concerns that the proposed £1 was too large a denomination for effective trading, and the traffic bottle-neck caused by the customs clearance hut at Newry, which was blamed for slowing down the transportation of goods between the two jurisdictions.[104] These micro and macro interests did not always sit easily together, however, tension between the local and national elements within the committee coming to the fore as early as April 1965, during discussions concerning a proposed North-South motorway from Dublin to

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[102] 'Chamber News', *NIP,* Dec. 1969, p. 7.
[103] 'Annual report of Council 1968', *NIP,* Feb. 1969, p. 10.
[104] 'Council Comment - Employers hit back at Injuries Act', *CCJ,* May 1967, p. 17.

Belfast.[105] Despite the committee's recommendation that this motorway be built, Arnold Marsh, a leading member of the Dublin Chamber, in his *Journal* column of August 1965, was already dismissing calls for its construction south of the border:

> Dublin's business with the south is far more important at present, and likely to remain so for a good while, than its business with the north … The Dublin to Naas road is much more heavily loaded than the Dublin to Drogheda one … And we don't have to try to keep up with the six counties in inappropriate matters.[106]

At a time when Northern Ireland possessed more miles of motorway than any other area within the UK, such words of caution appear well founded.[107] Either this resistance from within the committee, or the realities of the economic situation, led to a toning down of the motorway campaign. By 1967, the committee was recommending improvements to the existing road instead of the building of an entirely new motorway.[108]

In some respects, the campaigning techniques employed by the Chamber of Commerce committee were similar to those used by the road opening committee and other local cross-border bodies. One such technique was the use of unfavourable comparisons between the two jurisdictions, intended to injure the pride of the regime to be influenced.[109] During discussions in May 1967 concerning the evidence to be presented to Stormont, for example, in order to convince the Northern government to ratify longer opening hours for the Newry border crossing, the committee resolved to emphasise the fact that the Southern authorities had already given permission and set in place a deadline

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[105] 'North/South Trade Expansion', *CCJ*, April 1965, pp. 9-11.
[106] Arnold Marsh, 'Notes by the way', *CCJ,* Aug. 1965, p. 12.
[107] Mulholland, *Crossroads*, p. 38.
[108] 'Council Comment - Best date for decimals', *CCJ*, Nov. 1967, p. 11.
[109] See, for example, government decision slip re: 'customs control of cross-border traffic', 10 Dec.1963. File S1955C/95 *Customs,* Dept. of Taoiseach, N.A.I. For discussions concerning the psychological basis of such techniques, see page 240-241 in current work.

for longer opening hours.[110] It is noticeable that it was only the Northern members of the committee who were to be sent on the delegation to Stormont, presumably in order to remove any suspicion that the motivation behind the request was anything other than purely economic and internal.[111]

The effect of peripheralisation on border communities

The political and administrative marginality of border counties made attracting industry to them difficult, particularly as in much of the border area no major population centres existed which could be used to form growth centres.[112] As a result, these areas, alongside the isolated counties of the Western seaboard, maintained a disproportionate reliance upon primary industries such as agriculture, and thus suffered from disproportionately high unemployment when agriculture dropped from providing 'one job in two in the 1940s [to] only one in four in 1971.'[113] Between 1951 and 1971, the number of individuals engaged in agriculture, forestry and fishing in Southern Ireland dropped by approximately forty-five percent, from 497,801 to 273,079.[114] Within the same twenty-year period, the number actively involved in agriculture within County Leitrim fell by sixty percent, from 16,302 to 6,615, and its total population fell by over a third, from 44,591 to 28,360 persons.[115] Unlike in Northern Ireland, where a twenty-seven percent decrease in agricultural employment was largely matched by increased availability of

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[110] 'Council Comment - Employers hit back at Injuries Act', *CCJ,* May 1967, p. 17.
[111] Ibid.
[112] James H. Johnson, 'Republic of Ireland', in Hugh D. Clout, *Regional Development in Western Europe* (London, 1987), pp. 294-5.
[113] Cormac Ó Gráda and Kevin H O'Rourke, *Living Standards and Growth* (Dublin 2000), p. 16.
[114] C.S.O., *Census 1971* (Dublin, 1974), Table 1, Vol. 3.
[115] Department of Industry and Commerce, *Ireland 1946* (Dublin, 1953) Tables 3 and 4, Vol. II. C.S.O., *Census 1971* (Dublin, 1975), tables 4b and 4c, Vol. IV.

industrial jobs, the failure of the more isolated Southern counties to attract industry was in large measure responsible for the high rates of emigration which they suffered, and for their high dependence on central government funds (calculated in 1960 to account for 11.7 percent of income in County Donegal).[116] In both the 1936 to 1946, and 1946 to 1951 inter-censual periods, all of the border counties bar Louth experienced higher then average population loss, with Leitrim consistently the most badly affected county.[117] Louth's immunity could be attributed to its strategic position close to Dublin and two major ports, and its heavier reliance on industry, rather than agriculture.

The political unrest within the border counties resulting from these high levels of unemployment and emigration, and a vague sense that 'the difficulty of agricultural communities attempting to come to terms with economic decline and emigration' were not being recognised by central government, were sharpened by the failure of the Irish government in 1962 to have Ireland admitted to the EEC, which would have given Irish farmers access to lucrative Common Agricultural Policy funds.[118] Tensions over the relative balance of the government's industrial and agricultural policy led to the resignation from the cabinet of the Cavan TD, Minister for Agriculture Patrick Smith and calls for a more coherent rural development programme for the Southern state.[119]

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[116] Sabine Wichert, *Northern Ireland since 1945* (London and New York, 1999), p. 59. Sacks, *The Donegal Mafia*, p. 41.
[117] C.S.O., *Census 1946 and 1951 - General Report* (Dublin, 1958) table 3.
[118] Virginia Crossman and Dympna McLoughlin, 'A Peculiar Eclipse: E . Estyn Evans and Irish studies', *Irish Review,* No. 15, 1994, p. 86. Jackson, *Ireland*, p. 322.
[119] Jackson, *Ireland*, p. 322. See also Sally Shortall, 'The Irish Rural Development Paradigm – an Explanatory Analysis', *Economic and Social Review,* Vol. 25, No. 3, 1994, p. 237.

The unspoilt countryside which resulted from minimal industrialisation did allow border areas to maintain the 'space and other physical resources' necessary for a thriving tourism industry, and agri-tourism was actively 'promoted as [an] important instrument of rural development.'[120] Governmental support for tourism did not reduce tensions, however, as the industry was seen 'to create primarily lowly paid work for local women,' thus failing to absorb the predominantly male unemployment created by increased farm mechanisation.[121] The fact that 'the lack of steady employment,' predominantly in industry, 'was a key determinant in the decision to migrate' made the failure of border areas to attract industry even more problematic.[122] New government policies aimed at tackling these issues saw the introduction of county development teams and regional development organisations to support rural areas in attracting industry.[123]

Not all border areas were thus equally affected by physical isolation. Those counties, such as Down and Louth, which enjoyed a relatively close proximity to the major urban centres of Belfast and Dublin, were better able to withstand economic shocks and to attract new industries. This is particularly visible in the case of Dundalk. In 1956, the closure of the majority of the Great Northern Railway network threatened around a thousand jobs in the engineering works in the town, whose total population was recorded

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[120] Agnes Gannon, 'Rural Tourism as a Factor in Rural Community Development for Economies in Transition', in Bill Bramwell and Bernard Lane (ed.), *Rural Tourism and Sustainable Rural Development* (Clevedon, 1994), pp. 51-2 and Sally Shortall, 'The Irish Rural Development Paradigm – an Explanatory Analysis', *Economic and Social Review,* Vol. 25, No. 3, 1994, p. 237.

[121] Ullrich Kockel, 'Culture, Tourism and Development: A View from the Periphery' in Ullrich Kockel (ed.), *Culture, Tourism and Development – the Case of Ireland* (Liverpool, 1994), p. 10. See also Fergul McElgunn, interviewed by author, 24 May 2006. Erskine Childers to Seán Lemass, 22 Jan. 1962. File S1955/63 *Customs,* Dept. of Taoiseach, N.A.I. For a fuller discussion of the tourism industry's role see Chapter 7 below.

[122] Enda Delaney, *Demography, State and Society* (Liverpool, 2000), pp. 173-4.

[123] Shortall, 'The Irish Rural Development Paradigm', p. 237.

at 19,661.[124] Yet by 1959, the *Chamber of Commerce Journal* was lauding Dundalk's success in withstanding the shock, partly through the use of its traditional industries, heavy engineering, cigarette manufacture, textiles, brewing and footwear, and partly through the attraction of new enterprises.[125] The economic difficulties experienced appear to have become became increasingly pronounced with distance from the major urban centres, with Counties Leitrim, Donegal and Fermanagh consistently achieving the lowest results in a range of economic indicators within their respective jurisdictions. Fermanagh was the only county in Northern Ireland with a lower rateable value then a Southern border county, being worth in 1946 only £274,012, less then counties Donegal, Cavan and Louth.[126] In the 1951 Census, County Leitrim was registered as suffering 9.8 percent male unemployment and 4.6 percent female unemployment, as compared to a national average of 6.9 percent and 3.2 percent.[127] Interestingly, County Donegal fared still worse, with 11.8 percent male and 4.3 percent female unemployment, despite its relative proximity to the urban centre at Derry/Londonderry, to which it had traditionally exported surplus labour.[128] This may be due, in part, to the effect of the border as an employment deterrent, though it never served as a complete block to employment, as noted previously.[129] It may also be due to Derry/Londonderry's own employment problems, which were themselves, in this period, severe.[130]

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[124] 'Dundalk - a thriving centre of industry', *CCJ,* Dec 1959, p. 14.
[125] Ibid., pp. 13-8.
[126] Northern Ireland Ministry of Finance, *Ulster Year Book*, 1946, p. 277. Department of Industry and Commerce, *Census 1946* (Dublin, 1950) Table 5, Vol. 1.
[127] C.S.O., *Ireland - Census, 1951* (Dublin, 1954), Table 17, Vol. III.
[128] Ibid. Londonderry Riots Report, 1889, p. 15. Quoted in John Darby, *Intimidation and the control of conflict in Northern Ireland* (Dublin, 1986), p. 11.
[129] See pages 68-9 in current work.
[130] Robinson, 'Londonderry, Northern Ireland: A Border Study', pp. 217-8. Ian Nairn, *Britain's Changing Towns* (London 1967), p. 115.

In the scramble to attract inward investment, border counties competed not only with their more accessible rivals to the south and north, but also among themselves. In the case of one factory, eventually located to Mullingar, P. Kennedy, secretary of the Clones Chamber of Commerce noted that they had fought with no fewer then 125 other towns for it before being unsuccessful.[131] Particularly fierce local battles were fought over the location of hospital facilities, once the new regional health boards were established in 1971, as these not only ensured heavy government investment, and the creation of highly-paid and stable employment, but also a healthy trickle-down effect for the town from those employed and those coming to use the facilities.[132]

Easing the burden of isolation

The economic vulnerability of outlying areas was acknowledged legislatively by both the Dublin and Westminster governments. Northern Irish pressure on the British government resulted in the area being awarded similar privileges to the development areas set up elsewhere in the United Kingdom under the Industries Development Act (NI) 1945, while all border counties bar Louth were eventually integrated into the Republic's own underdeveloped areas legislation.[133]

Full development area status was denied Northern Ireland, though it was still claimed by Terence O'Neill when emphasising Britain's generosity towards Northern Ireland to Seán

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[131] 'Clones Chamber is certainly trying hard!', *CCJ,* Jan. 1959, p. 33.
[132] See, for example, Monaghan CCM, 13 Jan. 1969, M.C.C.O.
[133] David Harkness, *Northern Ireland Since 1920* (Dublin, 1983), p. 112. Board of Trade, *Room to Expand* (London, 1963), p. 2. http://acts.oireachtas.ie – Underdeveloped Areas Act, 1952. Accessed 26 Nov. 2006

Lemass.[134] Publicity issued by the Board of Trade stated that 'Northern Ireland, which has its own separate legislation to deal with such problems, is not covered by the Local Employment Act' under which the development areas were established, but 'the prospects for industry there are similar to those offered by the development districts in Great Britain.'[135] This quasi-development area status provided higher grants for industrialists willing to locate in Northern Ireland, as well as advance factories, aid with removal costs and other incentives.[136] 'Other subsidies came in the form of reduced prices for coal.'[137] It also guaranteed the province's inclusion in the special 'development areas' literature issued by the British Board of Trade. These leaflets, entitled *Room to Expand*, were updated and re-issued no fewer than five times during this period, and supplied free to anyone considering locating to the UK, or expanding their interests there.[138]

As well as the British support which Northern Ireland enjoyed, it was also served by its own government and trade delegations, who travelled extensively, raising the province's profile among industrialists abroad. Senior civil servant Kenneth Bloomfield spent part of his apprenticeship in the Ministry of Commerce's New York offices, while Brian Faulkner, in his term as Minister of Commerce, was regularly absent for prolonged periods of time on such trade missions.[139] In his autobiography, Terence O'Neill emphasised the advantages which Northern Ireland enjoyed by virtue of being under the

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[134] Terence O'Neill, *The Autobiography of Terence O'Neill* (London, 1972), p. 72.
[135] Board of Trade, *Room to Expand* (London, 1963), p. 2.
[136] Terence O'Neill speech Guild of Freemen of the City of London, 4 Dec. 1963, reprinted in Terence O'Neill, *Ulster at the Crossroads* (London, 1969), p. 94. Board of Trade, *Room to Expand* (London, 1963).
[137] Sabine Wichert, *Northern Ireland since 1945* (London and New York, 1999), p. 65.
[138] Board of Trade, *Room to Expand* (London, 1963, 1964, 1965, 1970 and 1971).
[139] Kenneth Bloomfield, *Stormont in Crisis* (Belfast, 1994), p. 36. Condren, *Brian Faulkner*, 2005, p. 142.

control of its own parliament in this respect, in particular, the 'flexibility and … responsiveness to local conditions' which this allowed.[140] One example of this flexibility was the decision by Stormont to retain de-rating for industrial premises, even after it was abolished in England and Wales in 1963.[141] By 1962 the *Ulster Year Book* was reporting the provision of eighty-four advance factories and thirty assisted extensions in factories within Northern Ireland, amounting to some six and a half million square feet, and by 1966 the Department of Commerce could boast of 217 new factories in the province set up since 1945.[142] Companies such as Courtaulds, Du Pont and ICI had all been encouraged to set up in the province.[143] How far this publicity aided the outlying border areas was a point of controversy, with nationalists claiming that incoming industry was confined to the solidly unionist east of the province, rather than the more outlying border areas of Fermanagh and Derry which 'with a Catholic majority controlled by a Unionist council through gerrymandering, was … starved of investment and deprived of the new university.'[144] 'Of 74 advance factories in Northern Ireland,' complained one civil rights publication, 'only one is coming to Fermanagh,' and 'it was publicly admitted … [by] an official at the Ministry of Commerce that County Fermanagh lacked sufficient basic services to attract industry.'[145] 'Of the 217 new factories' which the Department of

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[140] Terence O'Neill speech at Luncheon for Secretary of State for Wales, 3 July 1967, reprinted in Terence O'Neill, *Ulster at the Crossroads* (London, 1969), p. 97

[141] Derek Birrell and Alan Murie, *Policy and Government in Northern Ireland: Lessons of Devolution* (Dublin, 1980), p. 162. (Henceforth – *Policy and Government*).

[142] Northern Ireland Ministry of Finance, *Ulster Year Book 1960-2* (Belfast, 1962), p. xxii. Ministry of Commerce, March 1966, quoted in Robinson, 'Londonderry, Northern Ireland: A Border Study', p. 211.

[143] David Harkness, *Northern Ireland since 1920* (Dublin 1983), p. 134. Robinson, 'Londonderry, Northern Ireland: A Border Study', p. 216. Jonathan Bardon, *A History of Ulster* (Belfast, 2001), pp. 626 -7.

[144] Mulholland, 'Assimilation versus Segregation', p. 301. See also David Harkness, *Northern Ireland since 1920* (Dublin 1983), p. 151 and Government of Northern Ireland, *Disturbances in Northern Ireland* (The Cameron Report) (Belfast, 1969), paragraph 142. (henceforth- Cameron Report).

[145] Fermanagh Civil Rights Association, *Fermanagh Facts* (place unknown, c.1968), p. 32. G. F. Loughran, 'The problem of Local Government in Northern Ireland', *Administration,* Vol. 13, No. 1, 1965, p. 35.

Commerce listed in 1966, 'only 31, or 14%, [were] located more than 30 miles from Belfast,' seven going to Londonderry, two of which were standing vacant by 1968.[146]

The support legislation enacted in the Republic, the Underdeveloped Areas Act, was first passed in 1952 and focused on the counties of the Irish western seaboard.[147] This legislation again offered grants, loans, and rates-relief to industry willing to locate in these areas of high unemployment and emigration. In 1959, in acknowledgement of the economic hardships being experienced by the border counties, this legislation was extended to cover Counties Monaghan and Cavan.[148] Since both Leitrim and Donegal had been included under the original legislation, this extension brought all counties bordering Northern Ireland bar Louth under the special provisions.[149] Pressure from Monaghan TD Erskine Childers and Cavan TD Patrick Smith, both Ministers in the Lemass government, also ensured the expansion to these counties of measures to aid small farmers originally intended for the Western Seaboard counties.[150]

The Industrial Development Act operated alongside locally-raised and administered grants and loans schemes, necessary due to the fierce competition for available industries noted earlier. In Clones, for example, the Junior Chamber of Commerce arranged in 1959 a £5,000 conditional grant to aid industry willing to locate in the town.[151] At this stage, Clones had a new felt factory, employing around fifteen young people, and new tile

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[146] Robinson, 'Londonderry, Northern Ireland: A Border Study', p. 211.
[147] http://acts.oireachtas.ie – Underdeveloped Areas Act, 1952. Accessed 26 Nov. 2006
[148] 'Monaghan', *CCJ,* Jan. 1962, pp. 31-4. Terence Dooley, 'The Plight of Monaghan Protestants, 1911 - 26', in Brian S. Turner (ed.) *The Debateable Lands* (Downpatrick, Co. Down, 2002), p. 75.
[149] See James H. Johnson, 'Republic of Ireland', in Hugh D. Clout, *Regional Development in Western Europe* (London, 1987), pp. 290-1.
[150] Daly, *First Department*, p. 426.
[151] 'Incentive to Industry', *CCJ*, Jan. 1959, p. 22.

factory, employing eight or nine men, which they hoped would grow to employ around thirty men.[152] However, what the town felt it needed was 'a factory that would keep between 150 and 200 people busy.'[153] Even with the £5,000 grant, the town was unable to win the factory it was seeking, which, as noted earlier, eventually located to Mullingar.[154] It was not alone. Despite the legislative help which they were given, and long, flowing, optimistic articles about the beauties of the Cavan/Monaghan countryside and the vibrancy of local industry, the *Chamber of Commerce Journal* was forced to admit that border towns continued to suffer economic hardships as a result of their isolation.[155]

The improvement of cross-border trade, which, it was hoped, would aid the economy of border towns formed an important motivation for potential cross-border cooperation at both the local and national levels. There is some suggestion that meetings on the commercial aspect of cross-border cooperation were in the pipeline before the Lemass/O'Neill meetings of 1965.[156] Certainly, Jack Lynch, the Minister of Commerce in the South, and Brian Faulkner, the Minister for Trade and Industry in the North, lost no time in arranging a meeting in Dublin following that of the two prime ministers.[157] Cross-border trade appeared on the very first list of proposals for potential areas of cooperation

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[152] 'Clones Chamber is certainly trying hard!' *CCJ*, Jan. 1959, p. 33.
[153] 'Incentive to Industry', *CCJ*, Jan. 1959, p. 22.
[154] 'Clones Chamber is certainly trying hard!', *CCJ*, Jan. 1959, p. 33.
[155] Anselm Lovett, 'Industrial Cavan today', *CCJ,* April 1962, p. 27 - 32. 'Cavan will meet the challenge', *CCJ,* Feb. 1963, pp. 43-47. Eughan O Bridaun, 'Cavan and Monaghan's economic progress', *CCJ*, Nov. 1969, p. 35.
[156] James Kelly 'I say: let everybody see Stormont on telly', *Sunday Independent,* 13 Dec. 1964. O'Neill papers. Quoted in Mulholland, *Crossroads* , p. 78.
[157] See Mulholland, *Crossroads*, p. 82. Indeed, Brian Faulkner, in his autobiography, *Memoirs of a Statesmen* (London, 1978), p. 29, stated that a meeting between himself and Erskine Childers had been agreed by the Northern Ireland cabinet a few days before the Lemass-O'Neill meeting.

provided by Whitaker to Lemass in the run-up to his first meeting with O'Neill.[158] This was done partly on the understanding that economics was an area in which the Ulster Unionist government would be interested, and partly as it was seen as an area where the British government could be relied upon to place pressure on the unionists to accept cooperation.[159]

Local communities remained unconvinced by government attempts to help them, which were seen as piecemeal and conflicting. The closure of the railways, in particular, left residents on both sides of the border extremely bitter; 'They didn't care about what happened to us,' noted one County Monaghan man.[160] 'We were told that the roads would be improved to make up for the loss of the railways,' noted another, in County Fermanagh, interviewed in the early 2000s, 'but parts of the Omagh to Enniskillen road show little improvement from the 1960s.'[161] Interestingly, attempts by both the Northern Irish and Republic of Ireland government to set up forestry industries in some border areas was viewed not only with impatience, but with actual anger by local rural communities. 'There was experts that said that all of County Leitrim should be planted, that it was only good for planting trees,' commented one local farmer 'but my family had always farmed here and I always believed that the change would come.'[162] In Northern Ireland, some nationalists saw the buying of land for forestry as part of a campaign to dispossess catholics of their land, which they reflected back as far as the Elizabethan

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[158] Notes on Meeting, File 175 (9) *T.K. Whitaker Papers*, University College Dublin (UCD) Archives.
[159] T. K. Whitaker, interviewed by author, 13 Feb. 2006.
[160] Patrick Boylan, interviewed by author, 19 Oct 2006.
[161] Ferris, *The Great Northern Railway*, p. 3. For Northern Ireland Government announcement re: Road fund for areas effected by rail closures, see File PREM11/4386, 'Correspondence and Papers, 1951 - 1964', Prime Minister's Office, N.A.I..
[162] Charlie Cullen, interviewed by author, 25 May 2006.

settlement, while 'particularly … rural Unionist MPs widely disliked government officiousness as an unfair barrier to profit.'[163] Where promised employment in the forests did not materialise, the low maintenance forestry industry was seen as contributing to high levels of emigration, whether as a deliberate plot or a careless consequence. 'Most farmers,' notes Rosemary Harris, 'believed that the Ministry of Agriculture was not merely occasionally unwise or genuinely mistaken but had no real desire to help them.'[164] Or, as one women from Carrickmacross noted to a Department of Local Government official in April 1955, 'When I want your opinion I'll ask for it. We want no dictation down here.'[165]

Smuggling and the cross-border economy

The difficulties created by the isolation and marginalisation of the border communities encouraged a level of economic pragmatism among residents. Politics did not, and was not expected to, interfere with the obtaining of the best possible prices for goods and services, nor from partaking in the informal economy of the area. Rosemary Harris noted that farmers would tend to patronise members of their own religious group, but would not pay a higher price, or accept a lower one, in order to do so.[166] Others asserted that 'customers of all faiths tend to shop where they can get the best value.'[167] Local interview evidence appears to back up this assertion:

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[163] Oliver McCaffrey, interviewed by author, 13 Oct. 2006. Mulholland, *Crossroads,* p. 121.
[164] Harris, *Prejudice and Tolerance in Ulster*, p. 18.
[165] Quoted in Diarmaid Ferriter, 'Local Government, Public Health and Welfare in Twentieth-Century Ireland' in Daly, (ed.) *County and Town*, p. 116.
[166] Harris, *Prejudice and Tolerance in Ulster*, p. 139.
[167] Livingstone, *The Fermanagh Story*, p. 370.

I've seen unionists, or people who would have been in the Orange Order buying cattle and sheep off Provos and Republicans here. And it was no odds, you know. And I seen them from the North, you know, the Sterling was worth more than our money, the Punts, a lot of, they didn't mind having the money into their pockets with the Queen's head on it, but they didn't believe in the Queen. When it came to money matters, everything else went out of the door. If there was money to be made, they'd forget about a lot of their beliefs, and that applied on both sides.[168]

An exception to this rule appears to have been made, however, both in this century and before, on the emotive subject of the selling of land, where efforts were made to keep holdings within confessional groups.[169] David Fitzpatrick, in discussing the Orange Order along the border, has presented evidence that member participation in the unpatriotic exercise of smuggling was sufficiently widespread so as to present a cause for concern among the Order's leadership.[170]

One means by which border communities sought to overcome the economic difficulties created by their position, and indeed take advantage of their proximity to the international divide, was through the medium of illegal cross-border trade. Goods which could be more cheaply obtained, or indeed obtained at all, within the opposing jurisdiction would be imported in a variety of ways which circumvented the official customs posts in order to avoid high levels of taxation. Smuggling was by no means confined to the border counties, but here as elsewhere accessibility proved vital. In Dublin, where frequent train services to the North were available, the Friday morning trains became known as 'the

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[168] Charlie Cullen, interviewed by author, 25 May 2006.
[169] Dervla Murphy, *A Place Apart* (Reading, 1978), p. 49. See also Brendan Murtagh study 'Community and Conflict in Rural Ulster', University of Ulster, 1996. Quoted in Ralaheen Ltd. *All Over the Place*, p. 85, Eugene McCabe's fictional, *Death and the Nightingales* (London, 1992), p. 19 and John Darby, *Intimidation and the Control of Conflict in Northern Ireland* (Dublin, 1986), p. 9. For schemes designed to support the continued confessional ownership of farms, see Livingstone, *The Fermanagh Story,* p. 366.
[170] David Fitzpatrick 'The Orange Order and the Border', *Irish Historical Studies,* Vol. 33, No. 129, May 2002, p. 60. D. S. Johnson, 'Cattle Smuggling on the Irish Border', *Irish Economic and Social History*, Vol. VI, 1979, pp. 46-7.

'Smugglers' Express' among the well-to-do Dublin ladies who used it in order to access Belfast, where luxury goods such as stockings and make-up were more readily and reasonably available.[171] This followed on from GNR's war-time practice of running 'special trains out of season … whose unwritten purpose was to enable Northerners to stock up on tea, sugar, butter and other essentials which were subject to strict rationing in the United Kingdom,' known to some as the 'sugar trains.'[172]

For some, smuggling formed a tradition going back many hundreds of years.[173] A certain mystique was attached to the trade, with 'stories and poems [abounding] … of the heroic battle of wits between the customs men and the smuggler men.'[174] Children like Paddy McGinn grew up 'envious of such fun times crossing the border,' 'the storyteller never question[ing] the morality or legality of the operation.'[175] For many, however, smuggling merely formed one way by which individuals could maintain a reasonable standard of living despite the difficult economic conditions, or 'mak[ing] the best of a bad lot' brought on them by partition.[176] There appears to have been no moral or practical censure of those involved in smuggling for personal use. Indeed, some commentators have suggested that it was an activity 'indulged in to a greater or lesser degree by the majority of the population in the border counties.'[177] In the early years, while rationing in Britain was still ongoing, it would seem that enforcement staff themselves were prepared to

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[171] Thea Anholt, interviewed by author, 25 April 2005.
[172] Ferris, *The Great Northern Railway,* p. 3. Benedict Kiely, 'Approach to Donegal', *Ireland of the Welcomes,* May-June 1952, 1952, p. 4.
[173] E. Estyn Evans, *Ireland and the Atlantic Heritage* (Dublin, 1996), pp. 156-7. [173] E. Estyn Evans, *The Mourne Country* (Dundalk, 1951), pp. 171-4.
[174] Ann McGeeney, in Logue, *Reflections*, p. 105. See also E. Estyn Evans, *Ireland and the Atlantic Heritage* (Dublin, 1996), p. 159.
[175] Paddy McGinn in Logue, *Reflections*, pp. 111-2.
[176] Darach MacDonald, *The Chosen Fews* (Dublin and Cork, 2000), p. 28.
[177] Johnson, 'Cattle Smuggling on the Irish Border', p. 42.

ignore a certain level of smuggling by Northern residents in order to supplement the narrow rations available.[178] Sean Connaughton, in his semi-fictionalised account of a border childhood, wrote of a trip to the seaside at Bundoran, stowing away at the back of a trailer.[179] The two boys discuss smuggling as they hide:

> "He can smuggle all he wants for all I care."
>
> "Well he only smuggles eggs. That's all. To help old ladies who can't afford them."[180]

Anne Hanratty, part-time teacher and mother of five recalled:

> At the first chill you'd take the children, barely dressed, to Belfast and they'd come back with big thick jumpers, tweed skirts, of course, there was no central heating then in the house, no central heating in the schools. And they'd get new duffel coats every year. You could dress your children very well living near the border. Everyone did it. There was no shame in it. There shouldn't have been a border there, after all, so there was no shame in it.[181]

In the realm of small-scale domestic smuggling, the nature of the smuggled articles depended on the relative cost and availability of goods on either side of the border, with cigarettes and tobacco, ladies' stockings, butter, bread and meat forming some of the major commodities exchanged.[182] Annie McGinnty recalls taking white bread to a neighbour across the border from her home in Rosslea, at a time when this luxury was unavailable in Southern shops.[183] Similarly, court reports dated 11 April 1968 refer to an

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[178] 'Streaming South for Meat', *UG,* 8 Feb. 1951, p. 2. Richard Hayworth, *Border Foray* (London, 1957), p. 31. John Hermon, *Holding the Line* (Dublin, 1997), p. 17.
[179] Shane Connaughton, *A Border Station* (London, 1989), pp. 113-149.
[180] Ibid., p. 133.
[181] Anna Hanratty, interviewed by author, 21 May 2006.
[182] Richard Hayworth, *Border Foray* (London, 1957), p. 31. 'Round the Counties - County Down', *Constabulary Gazette* (Henceforth *CG*), Jan. 1951, p. 19. 'Cigarette case', *UG*, 20 April 1967, p. 10.
[183] Annie McGinnty, interviewed by author, 13 Oct. 2006.

old lady stopped for smuggling cigarettes which, she claimed, were the favoured brand of her clergyman nephew, and unavailable in Scotland where he served.[184]

For the police authorities, low-level smuggling was tolerated as a means whereby more serious offences could be detected. 'Local people would go and do their weekly shopping or something like this … but they would tell the police something big in return … they would tell you so-and-so had a dozen of cattle over last week,' recalled one former RUC officer.[185] The smugglers were aided in their efforts by the geographical nature of the divide, 'a torturous border consisting of a string of anachronistic county boundaries' which made for 'a smuggler's paradise.'[186]

> It really was an impossible border to patrol, as the customs men knew. Particularly the parts of it I knew between Cavan and Fermanagh, because it coincides with Upper Lough Erne, which is a mixture of … it's not a plain open Lough, it's islands and landslides and lakes going in this way and that way, and some of it was in Fermanagh and some of it [in Cavan] … an island up there was in Cavan and an island up there [in Fermanagh] … the whole place was impossible to patrol.[187]

The British government was itself aware that 'no effective control over the border is possible, and [that] any attempt to control the main roads and the railways would cause great inconvenience to the inhabitants of Northern Ireland.'[188] As a result, the river boundaries were not patrolled at all by the customs services, while road transport was managed using a combination of mobile patrols and stationary personnel. For much of

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[184] 'Smuggled Cigarettes Were For Clergyman', *UG*, 11 April 1968 p. 12.
[185] J.B., interviewed by author, 25 Oct 2006.
[186] E. Estyn Evans, 'The Personality of Ulster', *Institute of British Geographers - Transactions*, No. 51, Nov. 1970, p. 2.
[187] Fergal McElgunn, interviewed by author, 24 May 2006.
[188] Cabinet secretariat, 'Memorandum on the possible consequences of Eire leaving the commonwealth' circa. 28 Sept. 1948, p. 8. File FO 371/70175, *Eire General*, Foreign Office, N.A.L..

this period, the Irish customs authorities focused their efforts on customs huts on approved roads, where staff checked for undeclared goods and stamped exit and entry documents.[189] British customs, having greater funding resources, were able to operate a greater number of mobile patrols concentrating on traffic using unapproved roads.[190] With the simplification of border regulations and the acquisition of further vehicles and staff in 1967, the Irish customs also moved to operating on a mobile basis, freed from what was disparagingly dismissed by staff as a largely ineffective, static role manning border posts.[191]

Early in this period, responsibility for the enforcement of customs regulations was transferred from the RUC in Northern Ireland into the hands of specialist Customs officials, recruited elsewhere in the United Kingdom. These moves were carried out amid apparently justifiable concerns that local men, recruited and living within the community, were allowing small-scale smuggling for personal consumption to go unchecked.[192] This re-allocation of responsibilities was resented both by members of the RUC, who saw the incoming customs men receiving reward money per seizure, while they remained purely on constable's pay, and the Stormont civil service, who resented the newcomers' insistence that they be treated as the senior service.[193]

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[189] 'New border regulations', *NS,* 12 May 1967, p. 7. Nell McCafferty in Logue, *Reflections*, p. 79
[190] 'New border regulations', *NS,* 12 May 1967, p. 7.
[191] Ibid.
[192] 'Streaming South for Meat ', *UG,* 8 Feb. 1951, p. 2. J.B., interviewed by author, 25 Oct 2006.
[193] J.B., interviewed by author, 25 Oct 2006. Patrick Shea, *Voices and the Sound of Drums* (Belfast, 1983), pp. 125-7.

As well as the smuggling of foodstuffs, the smuggling of cattle and livestock in order to take advantage of differential prices and subsidy rates was common, particularly as many farmers owned land in both jurisdictions.[194] 'I had a cousin,' remembered one Leitrim Councillor, 'and they had one united farm but it happened to be in two townlands, and one was in County Fermanagh and the other in County Cavan and suddenly they found this little drain that had been going along, was an international frontier.'[195] Officially, dutiable produce and livestock could not be transferred from one side of such farms to the other.[196] This was due partly to animal health reasons, and partly to the subsidies and price-controls in operation in the two jurisdictions, intended to balance the needs of farmers with the need for low-cost meat for consumers.[197] In the South, concern centred on the lower prices for which Northern farmers could afford to sell their pigs, for example, thanks to the subsidies they were paid for raising them, and their access to cheap feed illegal in the Republic.[198] With legitimately imported animals such discrepancies could be corrected using charges at the border. If a farmer succeeded in illegally exporting the animal, however, he was able to take advantage of differential prices, potentially claim a second subsidy, and avoid the re-payment of the subsidy which he had already been paid.[199]

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[194] O'Dowd, Corrigan and Moore, *Urban Research*, p. 274.
[195] Fergal McElgunn, interviewed by author, 24 May 2006.
[196] Ferriter, *Transformation of Ireland*, p. 444.
[197] 'Farming Affairs pig smuggling from North', *UG,* 1 Oct. 1965, p. 7. Northern Ireland Ministry of Finance, *Ulster Yearbook and Diary 1960-2* (Belfast, 1960), p. 97.
[198] At a meeting of County Monaghan Executive NFA, Mr. P McGeough (Oram) said that pork pigs were being smuggled in from Northern Ireland and it was having a serious effect on the farmers on this side.' 'Happenings in County Monaghan from July to December 1965', *NS,* 7 Jan. 1966, p. 2. See also 'Concerned about egg smuggling', *NS,* 15 Oct. 1971, p. 1 and 'Increase in grain smuggling', *NS,* 5 May 1972, p. 16.
[199] 'Ministry claming value of 6 cattle seized', *UG,* 8 Feb. 1951, p. 2.

Throughout the period, a low-level battle was waged between smugglers and the customs officials over the illegal importation of livestock. The feet of cattle would be muffled with sacks to make their passage across the border more silent, animals would be forced to swim rivers to avoid capture, and the punch holes used by the Department of Agriculture to mark an animal on which subsidy had already been paid would be filled in so as that subsidy could be claimed a second time on the far side.[200] Subsidies for the eradication of foxes, introduced in Counties Cavan, Donegal and Leitrim, and in the North, were claimed twice, since Southern authorities required the fox tails as proof, and Northern authorities, the tongues.[201] Where large-scale smuggling was suspected, the customs could on occasion spend three or even four days watching a property in an attempt to catch the perpetrators.[202] Lawyers acting for smugglers in court would attempt to argue against the customs authorities on the basis of the illegality of the seizure or incorrect interpretation of the laws.[203] On one occasion, Senator Lennon, acting on behalf of a man whose consignment of pigs had been seized, argued that, since the animals had subsequently been driven by the customs men through the Republic's territory on their way to their base, the illegal importer was no longer his client but the constables seizing the pigs, since their writ ceased to run as soon as they exited the jurisdiction, and thus the seizure warrant lapsed.[204] The judge decided in his favour, and the customs men were thus prevented from using concession roads to transport seized goods in the future.

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[200] Dr. D'Arcy talk to Rosslea Historical Society. Reproduced in Fermanagh Branch: Workers' Educational Association, *The Spark Review Magazine,* No. 2, Winter 1991/2. 'Ministry claiming value of 6 cattle seized', *UG,* 8 Feb. 1951, p. 2. 'Rustling on the border', *NS,* 24 Aug. 1972, p. 2.
[201] Daly, *First Department*, p. 206. 'Foxes being Smuggled?', *NS,* 26 March 1970, p. 5.
[202] 'Acquitted on smuggling charge', *NS, 22* Jan. 1971, p. 7.
[203] 'Customs May be Wrong for Nineteen Years', *UG,* 24 Jan. 1952, p. 6.
[204] '"Seized Pigs Re-Entered Eire"- Condemnation order refused', *UG,* 2 Feb. 1950 p. 7.

The prevention of smuggling, as with all forms of cross-border contact, required a certain common sense and sensitivity in enforcement in order to run smoothly. While loads of cattle driven along concession roads which wound in and out of the two jurisdictions were technically being smuggled, for example, RUC Sergeant W. G. A. Scott recalled that they were generally allowed to pass so long as they did not stop and unload their cargo within Northern Ireland.

> And we had a sergeant there, Mick McKellen, decided we weren't going to have this … so he found out there was a truck going on along the road one day and, a PC at the station had a motor bike, so the two of them jumped on this motor bike and away after him and he stopped him. And he sees this lorry-load of sheep. And he brought them back to the station, and the whole lot was put into the station yard and locked up. And them baa-ing and all, we cursed and we swore more about those bloody sheep! Because they weren't picked up by the customs until the following day. So we'd a whole night of sheep baa-ing in the station yard. And not only baa-ing but a whole lot of other things in the station yard that had to be cleaned up after they were gone! And none of us were very happy about it. He didn't do it again. [205]

Going up for a promotion interview some time later, Scott was questioned about this case. '"I'd be honest", I said "I wouldn't do it." I knew I'd said the right thing, because he smiled.' Scott was subsequently promoted.[206]

The complete sealing of the border to smugglers was possible, but exceptionally difficult. It required a vast expenditure in both manpower and finance in order to block all cross-border routes. This was successfully done on only one occasion during this period, when the foot and mouth epidemic in Britain in 1967 threatened the potential health of both the

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[205] W. G. A. Scott, interviewed by author, 23 May 2006.
[206] Ibid.

Republic's livestock and its economy, which relied heavily on them.[207] This was not, however, a long-term or sustainable option. A similar operation in 2001 was believed to have cost the Republic's exchequer around forty million punts.[208] As a result, smuggling continued to form the single most common form of cross-border crime.[209]

Community support for smuggling began to break down once the personal and low-level aspects of the trade began to be eclipsed by a more industrial, profit-orientated and ruthless enterprise. Smuggling activity had never been uniformly low-key across the entire divide, with Tyrone and South Armagh, due to their proximity to Belfast, for example, experiencing more organised, non-local smuggling by gangs from as far away as Tipperary, dealing in industrial quantities of goods.[210] Towards the end of this period, however, smuggling along the entire border took on a new, more professional, ruthless and violent aspect. Gangs probably linked to the increasingly prominent violent Republican movement in the area, used methods including decoy vehicles, weapons, kidnapping and extortion in order to fight the customs and police services.[211] On one occasion, John Browne, a Customs man living in Castleblaney, was kidnapped from his home and driven to Armagh, where he was held for five hours and forced to negotiate for the release of a tractor, trailer and 220 pigs, worth just over £600 profit to the smugglers.[212] As a reaction to this hijacking of the trade by external, large-scale profiteers, farmers affected by the lowering of pig prices arranged vigilante patrols along

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[207] See page 107 of current work.
[208] Patricia Clarke, *The Foot and Mouth Crisis and the Irish Border* (Armagh, 2002), p. 55.
[209] See, *UG,* various, 1965 - 1970.
[210] D. S. Johnson, 'Cattle Smuggling on the Irish Border', p. 49.
[211] Se, for example, 'Emyvale news hide and seek', *NS,* 13 Oct. 1967, p. 8. 'Crash cars used on border smuggling turns tough!', *NS,* 6 Dec.1968, p. 4. 'Border "Dodgems" - with real cars!', *NS,* 6 Dec. 1968, p. 2. 'Incident at Border', *UG,* 25 May 1972, p. 11. 'Held hostage for pigs', *UG,* 8 Sept. 1972, p. 1.
[212] 'Pig smuggling incident - Customs man forced to negotiate', *UG,* 14 Sept. 1972, p. 8.

the Northern Irish border in Counties Monaghan and Cavan, with neighbours helping out on farms whose owners were out on patrol.[213] The increased risk of violent attack led to the abandonment of these patrols fairly quickly however, as farmers were driven off the roads and on occasion run over or beaten by smugglers in their determination to get away.[214] By this stage, local support for the trade, previously seen as harmless, had disappeared. Over subsequent decades, vast fortunes were made through smuggling along the Irish border, which were subsequently used to fund much of the IRA's activity in the North.[215]

The legitimate use of border economics

Since not all goods were subject to customs tariffs, and since legitimate importation of goods from one jurisdiction to another was possible through the payment of customs dues, those towns with approved routes through them could use their accessibility to the border to their economic advantage. Such towns benefited not only from a greater flow of through-traffic, condensed from the whole of the available borderline into the fifteen approved routes, but, thanks to the price differentials between the two states, a certain amount of directed traffic by residents crossing specifically in order to make purchases.

The presence of shops and services in the immediate vicinity of the borderline testifies to the economic reality of cross-border trade. Nell McCafferty, in her childhood recollection

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[213] 'Farmers border patrol against pig smugglers', *UG,* 23 Oct. 1969, p. 9. 'N.F.A Border Vigilantes', *NS,* 17 Oct. 1969, p. 1. 'Help for N.F.A. Border Patrol', *NS,* 14 Nov. 1969, p. 9.
[214] 'Border Pig war hots up', *NS, 21* Nov. 1969, p. 1.
[215] Harnden, *Bandit Country*, pp. 34-6 and 249-50

of smuggling eggs across the border, remembered vividly the presence of a shop a few hundred yards beyond the border posts, to which she was sent in order to buy these for illegal export back into Northern Ireland, wrapped up individually in old copies of the *Derry Journal*.[216] Such retail services could be found located in rural areas with no obvious catchment area of their own, relying entirely on non-locals for their existence. The extent to which such businesses relied upon cross-border traffic could be seen in the speed with which places like Aghalane Bridge lost their shops and petrol stations following the closure of their cross-border road.[217]

Goods such as petrol, on which tariffs were high, were particularly lucrative for cross-border sale, with the Lifford-Strabane crossing, for example, having for many years a petrol station at each end of the dividing bridge, allowing residents to choose where to purchase supplies according to the prevailing economic conditions, and indeed continues to do so to this day. CIE and UTA both responded to the potentiality of cross-border trade by provided shopping trips from their respective jurisdictions.[218] The value of such tours was considerable, and towns actively canvassed for these services to be directed to their area.[219] As availability and taxes changed, so did the volume and direction of trade, a rise in VAT in the Republic in the early 1980s, for example, leading to a considerable growth in this type of tourism into Northern Ireland.[220]

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[216] Nell McCafferty in Logue, *Reflections*, p. 79.
[217] BBC Northern Ireland, *Home Truths: The Bridge*, RUC Press Office video collection No. 1258.
[218] Dublin Chamber of Commerce - council comments -cross-border chamber of commerce committee, *CCJ,* July 1968, p. 30. 'Monaghan to get 'bus tours'', *NS,* 8 July 1966, p. 1.
[219] 'Monaghan to get 'bus tours', *NS,* 8 July 1966, p. 1.
[220] Robert Griffith-Jones, 'Northern Ireland –putting the record straight', *Tourism Management,* Vol. 5, No. 2, 1984, p. 138.

The consolidation of two separate economic spheres within the island of Ireland made a commercial presence in both jurisdictions more necessary and worthwhile for businesses. Differential taxation and contractual arrangements made the export of goods and services more complex and provided a motivation for firms to establish bases across the border in order to take advantage of economic opportunities available there.[221] At the same time, increased travel made consumers more familiar with, and desirous of, goods available across the border. This encouraged companies to open separate production and distribution centres to cater for their cross-border clientele. Speaking at a press meeting in the Midland Hotel in Belfast in September 1963, D. F. MacKinnon, Director and General Manger of P. J. Carroll and Company Ltd., Dundalk, explained the motivation behind his company's decision to establish a Belfast base:

> My company manufactures cigarettes, tobacco, snuff and cigars and has been doing so for many years … These brands are at present on sale in a very limited way through a few wholesalers in Northern Ireland. Their success in the South plus the ever-growing volume of cross-Border tourists and business traffic has resulted in a greatly increased demand for them in Northern Ireland. We have therefore decided to set up an organisation in Northern Ireland to deal with this demand … The initial supplies will be imported from Dundalk but we intend that these cigarettes will be manufactured here as soon as possible.[222]

Increased familiarity can thus be seen as a major factor behind the growth of cross-border demand. W. and R. Jacob Ltd., the Dublin biscuit firm, followed Carroll's lead in 1967, enlarging their existing Belfast operation by opening a new warehouse, while Northern auctioneering firm Mid-Ulster Auctions, Ltd., moved in the opposite direction, setting up

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[221] Maurice Hayes, interviewed by author, 30 May 2006.
[222] 'Dundalk cigarette manufacturer to Ulster market', *NIP,* Oct. 1963, p. 20.

their first base south of the border in 1965.[223] Such legitimate cross-border traffic was a vital source of income for both governments. In an article published in *Progress Northern Ireland* in 1965 it was noted that the tax paid by the Guinness Company on goods sent north to be distributed from their Belfast centre provided the equivalent in revenue of nearly half the family allowance payable in Northern Ireland, some £3 million each year.[224]

Cross-border bodies as a policy bridge

Economically orientated pressure groups with strong cross-border ties served as useful links in this period between decision-makers on both sides of the border. This was particularly so in periods when direct communication between the two governments was not possible. The presence of a high ranking unionist such as Sir Graham Larmor, President of the Belfast Chamber of Commerce and of the Irish Association, at the annual dinner of the Dublin Chamber of Commerce in 1958, for example, allowed Minister for Industry and Commerce Lemass, who was acting as the principle speaker at the event, to expound his policy ideas in a context which he could be sure they would later be reported and discussed in Belfast. On this occasion, Lemass made explicit his use of the bridge offered by Sir Graham's presence by directing a considerable proportion of his speech directly to him, and noting:

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[223] 'Industrial Developments', *NIP,* July 1967, p. 11. 'Six-Co. Firm moves to Monaghan', *The Argus,* 7 Aug. 1965, p. 7.
[224] 'Northern Ireland Industry and Export', *NIP,* March 1965, p. 63.

> It is from those, perhaps not unselfish motives, I can convey to the business people of Belfast, through Sir Graham, our hope that their efforts to solve their problems, promote increased business activity, and end unemployment, will be successful.[225]

In his own speech, responding to the toast 'our guests' given by the Vice President of the Dublin Chamber of Commerce, Sir Graham Larmor in turn went to great lengths to emphasise that he believed, 'as possibly some of you know, that improved relationships between our people, North and South, not only in the sphere of commerce but in every possible direction, are essential to our physical, mental and moral well-being.'[226] This was in line with Larmor's well known position in the North as 'a leading industrialist, trying to improve cross-border relations,' though this in itself reduced his usefulness as an envoy, since it caused him to be regarded with suspicion at Stormont.[227] Extensive coverage was given to Larmor's short speech, which was reported verbatim in the Dublin *Chamber of Commerce Magazine*. No other speech, except Lemass's, was repeated in such detail, creating a sense in the resulting coverage of the evening of a dialogue between the two men.[228] Lemass would go on, in November 1965, to welcome Belfast President Mrs. Irene Culvert to the Dublin Chamber of Commerce annual dinner, which he was also addressing.[229] On a more informal basis, Mr. and Mrs. Lemass both joined the Junior Chambers of Commerce of Dublin and Belfast on a joint tour of Jacob's biscuit factory in Dublin in June 1962.[230]

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[225] 'Dublin Chamber of Commerce Annual Dinner', *CCJ,* Nov. 1957, p. 12.
[226] Ibid, p. 13.
[227] Bew, Darwin and Gillespie, *Passion and Prejudice,* p. xiii and 'Stormont 'shut the door' on Irish body', *Belfast Telegraph,* 1 Jan. 1991, p. 5.
[228] 'Dublin Chamber of Commerce Annual Dinner', *CCJ,* Nov. 1957, p. 13.
[229] 'Annual dinner of the Dublin Chamber of Commerce', *CCJ,* Nov. 1965, p. 27.
[230] 'Junior chamber news – visit to Jacob's biscuit factory', *NIP,* June 1962, p. 27.

The Belfast and Dublin chambers, founded in the same year, one as a reaction to the other, provided a cross-border forum for leading political figures on more than one occasion. Their own reports and those of their junior, affiliated chambers carry numerous observations on attendance at annual dinners across the border in Cork, Dublin, Dundalk and Belfast, and comments on the speeches made there by government ministers such as Lemass, Childers and Lynch.[231] What they heard was then discussed in the business community, and disseminated through the chambers' magazines. For example, as early as 1960, the President of the Belfast Junior Chamber of Commerce was highlighting the move away from protectionism which could be expected in the South under Lemass, having heard him speak at the Dublin Chamber's annual dinner.[232] 'I was interested to hear him stress time and time again the urgent necessity for Eire's local industries to become more efficient,' the president noted, 'as the government's policy of protection and tariffs to aid home manufacturers would have to be seriously reconsidered following the establishment of the two free trade areas in Europe.'[233] Leading politicians from the opposite jurisdiction could also be invited directly to address economic forums in order to elucidate their policies. Thus, for example, Brian Faulkner used his invitation to address the Dublin Society of Chartered Accountants in 1968 to voice his government's dissatisfaction with the list of products excluded from tariff reductions under the new trade agreement.[234]

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[231] 'With the Junior Chamber - President's letter', *NIP,* Dec. 1959, p. 10. 'Annual dinner of the Dublin Chamber of Commerce', *CCJ,* Nov. 1965, p. 27. 'Cross-Border Meetings', *NIP,* Dec. 1965, p. 25.
[232] 'With the Junior Chamber - President's letter', *NIP,* Jan. 1960, p. 17.
[233] Ibid.
[234] 'Tariffs Brake Cross-Border trade', *NIP,* May 1968, p. 25.

Leaders within the Chambers of Commerce movement were themselves on occasions asked to present the main address at a cross-border chamber's annual dinner. Members of the Dublin Junior Chamber, who had become regular attendees at the Lord Mayor's show banquet, organised by the Belfast Junior Chamber, were on a number of occasions invited to address the company, which included many leading Belfast men alongside the Lord and Lady Mayor.[235] Irene Culvert, President of the Belfast Chamber of Commerce, addressed the annual meeting of the Dundalk Chamber of Commerce in 1965, as well as hosting members of the Athlone Chamber when they made an official visit to the North.[236] The UFU also invited the President of their Southern counterparts, the NFA, to address their annual meeting in 1965, and from 1967 onwards held joint high-level discussions on issues such as smuggling and animal health which concerned them both equally.[237]

Changes in cross-border access

Levels of cross-border interaction and trade were dependent not only on motivation and familiarity with the opposite jurisdiction, as previously noted, but also to a large extent on the ease of access which existed at any given point. This level of access was not fixed, and economic conditions could thus fluctuate as a response to both government policy and the actions of non-state actors, such as the republican movement.

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[235] 'With the Junior Chamber - the Presidents letter', *NIP,* April 1960, p. 8. 'President's banquet', *NIP,* June 1963, p. 21.
[236] 'Cross-Border Meetings', *NIP,* Dec. 1965, p. 25.
[237] See, for example, 'Farming Affairs', *NS,* 26 March 1965, p. 7, 'U.F.U./N.F.A. Discussion in Dublin', *UG,* 14 Oct. 1965, p. 12 and 'North-South Farmers Get-Together', *UG,* 22 Aug. 1968, p. 2.

The launch of the IRA's 'Operation Harvest' in 1956 changed the dynamic along the Irish borderline. Faced with raiders attacking primarily from bases in the South, the Northern government took a decision to block many unapproved cross-border roads. The closures were a classic example of the needs of border residents being sacrificed for the security of the political unit as a whole. Since the I.R.A. could no longer drive deep into Northern Ireland, border unionists in areas such as Fermanagh and Tyrone became increasingly vulnerable to attacks reliant only on easy-to-carry firearms. At the same time, the closure of the roads, while failing to deter the potential attackers, caused considerable inconvenience for local farmers, who were less likely than town-dwellers to live near an approved crossing, and who relied on such roads in order to access markets, and transfer livestock.[238] In Castleblaney, for example, farmers were forced to stop their carts a few miles short of Crossmaglen market and walk the remainder of the way, leading to a decrease in that market's regional importance.[239]

The disruption caused by road closures to the local economy resulted in fierce resistance to the policy when it was re-introduced in the early 1970s, all the more so since the Special Powers Act permitted the police to carry out such work without warning.[240] For a number of weeks security forces clashed with protestors as one side sought to crater the roads and the other to stop them being cratered, or to re-fill them.[241] This resistance was organised partly on a local basis, by farmers whose tractors were used to haul material for

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[238] Cormac Boylan, interviewed by author, 21 May 2006. Anonymous, interviewed by author, 8 May 2006.
[239] Cormac Boylan, interviewed by author, 21 May 2006.
[240] File HA/32/1/30, *Civil Authorities of Northern Ireland (Special Powers) Act 1922, Instructions for Guidance of Police*, Department of Home Affairs, PRONI.
[241] *The Northern Standard* of the period carried almost weekly reports of the re-filling operations from 'Storm of protest over Stormont action border roads blasted', *NS,* 15 Oct. 1971 onwards. See also Michael Dewar, *The British Army in Northern Ireland* (London, 1996), p. 133. (First published London, 1985).

the refilling of craters, and partly by Sinn Fein, who brought bus-loads of volunteers up to the border from Dublin at the weekends to help.[242] Despite attempts by local leaders such as TD Billy Fox to defuse the situation, violence occurred.[243] Once this campaign had died down, after a number of weeks, the border returned to its continual process of re-adaptation, with local life re-orientating away from the cratered roads, and unofficial pathways growing up beside craters, via fields for example, in order to keep local access routes open.[244]

As well as the closure of roads by the Northern Irish security forces, the isolation of border communities was made worse by the IRA's own decision to attack 'economic targets' within Northern Ireland, including bridges, electricity substations and customs facilities. Aghalane Bridge, which was destroyed in 1972, and the Moy Bridge, which had been destroyed in the previous IRA campaign, both cut-off areas of the Republic from Northern Ireland.[245] In the case of Moy Bridge, threats were also made to prevent the bridge from being rebuilt.[246] While in both locations bailey bridges were provided, these in themselves proved problematic, being less stable and so unable to deal with the same weight of traffic as the original bridges. At Moy, the bailey bridge was more than once damage by heavy vehicles, while at Aghalane, insufficient barriers on the new

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[242] 'Dubliners help to open road', *NS,* 14 Jan. 1972, p. 5. 'Border Battle near Clones', *NS,* 24 March 1972, p. 1.
[243] See, for example, 'Border shooting incident', *NS,* 16 March 1972, p. 1. Richard Shannon, interviewed by author, 25 Oct. 2006. 'Chronicle of events in second half of 1971 - December', *NS,* 7 Jan. 1972, p. 2.
[244] Shane Connaughton, *A Border Station* (London, 1989), p. 5.
[245] BBC Northern Ireland, *Home Truths: The Bridge*, RUC Press Office video collection, No. 1258.
[246] 'Political Banalities', *NS*, 4 Oct. 1963, p. 1.

bridge were held partly responsible for the death of a Fermanagh man who fell into the water on returning from a night out in Cavan.[247]

The blocking of border roads was the most high-profile and immediately visible change to have affected accessibility along the Irish border. It is also one of the more obvious instances in which central government policy impacted directly on the quality of life in border areas. Just as the closing of roads led to detrimental economic effects, the reopening of roads such as those designated approved roads in 1965 could instantaneously lead to a renewal of economic life and vitality for the towns affected. Where access increased, so did legitimate economic activity, while smuggling activity decreased.[248]

Conclusion

For all its potentially useful aspects in terms of smuggling and the legitimate use of cross-border price differentials, the presence of the Irish border was primarily an economic hindrance for those populations adjacent to it, discouraging familiarity and increasing psychological distance for both men and goods. By cutting off established hinterlands from towns, and isolating them from potential markets, the border made the attraction of industry more difficult, particularly during periods when high tariff barriers made imports as well as exports difficult. The effect of national and international trends in agriculture and industry, which saw increased mechanisation drive rural populations increasingly

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[247] County Engineer to South of Ireland Public Works and Plant Hire co. Ltd., Bill for damage, 12 July 1968, file F2-5, Monaghan CC - Roads division, M.C.C.O.. BBC Northern Ireland, *Home Truths: The Bridge*, RUC Press Office video collection, No. 1258.
[248] Johnson, 'Cattle Smuggling on the Irish Border', p. 45.

towards large urban centres, left the predominantly rural populations of Ireland's border numerically depleted, and economically more vulnerable.

5. Cross Border Police Interaction

International borders are perceived in the modernist understanding as being demarcators of boundaries 'to be defended, to be crossed legally, or to be violated,' but non-negotiable and non-flexible, forming a definitive line between one independent political entity and its neighbour.[1] Intimately tied up with such concepts of territorial integrity and sovereignty is the right to define and enforce a code of law for the territory. In situations where, as in Ireland, the legitimacy of one political entity is long denied by the other, law-enforcement takes on a particularly symbolic role in terms of actualising the authority of the legislators. This makes the issue of cross-border law-enforcement controversial and any attempt to enforce a foreign legal code capable of interpretation as a direct attack upon the state. At the same time, crime and criminal behaviour are mobile, particularly across a relatively porous border, such as the Irish one. As a result, the enforcement of law requires a cross-border element in order to be effective. Thus police forces operating in border areas must find a balance between maintaining the inviolate sovereignty of the state that they are oath-bound to serve while ensuring that this sovereignty does not provide a shelter to precisely those elements whom the law wishes to see apprehended. As with tourism, police cooperation was to appear as a possible area for executive coordination at a fairly early stage, the Sunningdale Agreement of 1974 confirming its importance to effective state control of the border area.[2]

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[1] Hastings Donnan and Thomas M. Wilson, *Border Approaches - An Anthropology of Frontiers* (Lanham, London, c.1994), p. 1.
[2] Brendan O'Brien, *The Long War* (Dublin, 1995), p. 24.

The Irish border was patrolled during this period by a myriad of different law enforcement agencies: customs, the military, and the police. Each came complete with undercover units and special branches. This chapter will concentrate on the networks of contact established between the two police forces, An Garda Síochána (the Garda) and the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC).

The RUC (now Police Service of Northern Ireland - PSNI) was created in 1922 from the remnants of the old Royal Irish Constabulary (RIC) in the six north-eastern counties which remained under British sovereignty. Early generations of the force thus contained a high proportion of men of Southern origin, which helped to create the self-image of the RUC as the direct descendent of the old RIC. Although this force had for many years been seen as suspect by many unionists, following the first pioneer generation, recruitment to the RUC came predominantly from within Northern Ireland, and from the unionist community.[3] The force remained prepared to recruit candidates from the Republic, however, guidelines circulated in 1956 stipulating that 'candidates from Eire who are suitable and of undoubted loyalty will be considered by the force proved [sic] that sufficient Northern Ireland candidates are not immediately available for the vacancies,' and subject to appropriate 'character and loyalty' being proven.[4] Southerners who chose to join the force came disproportionately from the three Ulster counties which

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[3] John D. Brewer and Kathleen Magee, *Inside the RUC* (Oxford, 1991), p. 2. Arthur Hezlet, in his book on *The 'B' Specials* makes frequent references to the unreliability and suspect loyalties of the RIC as compared to the 'loyal' Special Constabulary. See, for example, Arthur Hezlet, *The 'B' Specials* (London, 1972), pp. 10, 21, 23, 31, 34 and 226. See also *Impartial Reporter* in Livingstone, *The Fermanagh Story,* p. 301, Michael Farrell, *Arming the Protestants* (London, 1983), pp. 13-14 and John Darby, *Intimidation and the control of conflict in Northern Ireland* (Dublin, 1986), p. 12.

[4] RUC Guidelines, quoted in Chris Ryder, *The RUC – a Force Under Fire* (London, 2000), p. 85.

had become a part of the Republic in 1920; Cavan, Monaghan and Donegal.[5] Indeed, in an informal survey into the locational origins of serving Gardaí conducted by the *Garda Review* in 1956, a Louth representative noted the presence of 'about 300 of your Cavan men … serving with the R.U.C..'[6] Nor was there any attempt by members of the two forces to block this cross-border movement. D.J., recalling her own application process to join the RUC, remembered, for example, the local Garda Sergeant in her home town filling in security forms on her behalf.[7]

With an original complement of 3,000 men, supported in times of need by members of the Ulster Special Constabulary and later their own RUC Reserve, the RUC was expected to be a self-sufficient, province-wide entity. Unlike other British police forces it had no mechanism whereby it could call upon support from neighbouring forces in times of high pressure until the passing of the Police Act in 1970.[8] Requests to British Home Secretary James Callaghan for support from other United Kingdom forces on 8 August 1968, for example, were rejected after opposition from these forces to serving under the Stormont Minister for Home Affairs while the Special Powers Act remained in force.[9] This anomalous situation was a direct result of the RUC's descent from the 'gendarmerie' style RIC, 'repugnant to the English public mind,' which left them, alongside British rule in Ireland, neither able to operate on 'English principles', because it did not have

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[5] See, for example, District Inspector C.H. Rodgers, native of Raphoe, Co. Donegal, in 'Round the Counties, Co. Fermanagh, Transfers', *CG,* Oct. 1963, p. 27. Also, Detective-Constable William Edmond Browne of Lisburn RUC, native of Cootehill, Co. Cavan. 'Round the counties, Antrim, Promotions', *CG,* April 1957, p. 13. See also D.J., interviewed by author, 20 Oct. 2006.

[6] 'Divisional News Dublin Metropolitan Division – If they ask you where you come from', *GR,* Oct. 1956, p. 927.

[7] D.J., interviewed by author, 20 Oct. 2006.

[8] James Callaghan, *A House Divided* (London, 1973), p. 132.

[9] Chris Ryder, *The RUC – A Force Under Fire* (London, 2000), p. 112. Callaghan, *A House Divided,* p. 19.

sufficient public cooperation, nor abandon these principles and govern by direct application of force.[10] The Hunt report of 1969 attempted to bring Northern Ireland policing into line with UK norms.[11] The re-arming of the RUC shortly after the report's implementation demonstrated how unsuitable either an English, or Southern Irish, style of policing remained for Northern Ireland.[12] This, and the risks involved in RUC service, ensured that the force continued to be staffed disproportionately by established police families from within Northern Ireland, 'peelers' pups', as they were called, following their fathers or other relatives into the force.[13] Despite the protestations of its former chief constable, it was predominantly a protestant force, a trend which became statistically more significant as the original RIC generation retired from active duty.[14] This led to allegations of discrimination and a 'worrying lack of public confidence' in the RUC and the system under which it operated.[15] Even those who served within the force, and who defended its record to a large degree, admitted that instances of discrimination did take place, while its detractors saw the force as a hopelessly partisan enforcer of discriminatory legislation, 'significantly mark[ed]' by its association with the entirely protestant USC.[16] The ban on RUC participation in GAA activities served further to

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[10] Paul Arthur, *Special Relationships* (Belfast, 2000), p. 13.
[11] Ibid. p. 57.
[12] Ibid.
[13] H. McCallion, *Killing Zone* (London, 1995), p. 215. Stephan Crockard, interviewed by author, 15 Oct. 2006.
[14] Sir Richard Pim, *Recollections* (Belfast, 1974, unpublished), file T/3620/1, PRONI, p. 208. Chris Ryder, *The Fateful Split* (London, 2004), p. 71.
[15] Maurice Hayes, *A police Ombudsman for Northern Ireland?* (Belfast, 1997), p. 1. Allegations against the RUC by the Nationalist community were encouraged by the political wing of militant Republicanism, who were even accused of enforcing such allegations by means of intimidation. See David Hassan, 'Sports and National Identity', pp. 232-5.
[16] W. G. A. Scott, interviewed by author, 23 May 2006 and 'Letter to the Editor – Memories of the RUC', *Irish Times,* 29 Sept. 1999, p. 15. Michael Farrell, *Arming the Protestants* (London, 1983), p. V. Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association, *How to Discredit the Police* (Place unknown, 1969), pp. 1-2. Andrew Hamilton and Linda Moore, 'Policing a Divided Society', in Seamus Dunn, *Facets of the Conflict in Northern Ireland* (Basingstoke and London, 1995), p. 188.

distanced them from the nationalist community, and from the Southern police, many of whom were GAA members, by emphasising their status as unacceptable outsiders.[17]

An Garda Síochána, the Civic Guards, set up in 1922 to police the incoming Irish Free State following disbandment of the RIC, was established as a demonstrably civilian force, unarmed and nationally-recruited.[18] Gardaí were centrally trained, first in Dublin, and later in Templemore, County Kildare, and could then serve anywhere throughout Southern Ireland, with the exception of their own home counties or those in which they had close relatives.[19] This was intended to minimise bias, knit the national community and the force together, and allow members of the force a certain 'mystique' in their areas of service, since, alongside the priest and potentially the national school teacher, they were frequently the only non-locals living in any given locale.[20] For much the same reasons, unmarried Gardaí were frequently moved between stations.[21] Prevented by law from becoming members of trade union organisations, disputes over pay and conditions proved a frequent source of tension between the force and its political masters, particularly as the gap between the Gardaí and the RUC and British police forces widened.[22]

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[17] John Sugden, 'Sport in Northern Ireland', pp. 202-3 David Hassan, 'Sports and National Identity', p. 168.
[18] Dermot P. J. Walsh, *The Irish Police* (Dublin, 1998), pp. 8-10
[19] McNiffe, *A History of the Garda Síochána*, p. 163.
[20] Ciarán Patten in Leo Regan, *Taken Down in Evidence* (Dublin, 1995), p. 93.
[21] Similar reasons are given for mobility in the senior public service. See Daly, 'Local Appointments', in Daly (ed.) *County and Town* (Dublin, 2001), pp. 54-5 and Neil Collins, *Local Government Managers at Work* (Dublin, 1987), p. 155.
[22] See, for example, 'The Pay Decision', *GR,* Jan. 1952, p. 155. Giblin and Tuttle, 'Why are they leaving?', *GR,* Aug. 1957, p. 739. 'Dáil Debate on Garda', *GR,* Jan. 1962, p. 165.

The mutual origins of the two police forces within the RIC created an automatic bond of shared experience between the early generations of post-partition Irish police officers. 1.9 percent of Guards recruited in the first ten years, and around one third of the original 3,000 RUC men, had previously served in the RIC.[23] The number of Southern men who travelled North to join the RUC, and the tendency of police service to run in families, ensured that early generations were frequently also linked by kinship ties. Dennis Donoghue, in his autobiography, *Warrenpoint*, discussed the relationship between his RUC father and his maternal uncle, a convinced nationalist who was serving with the Guards in Galway, and whose own father had been an RIC man.[24] It was common, he noted, for the sons of RIC men to join the Guards, though in his uncle's case, this had been done as a form of rebellion.

> Seamus's nationalism was not an embarrassment to us. My father liked him well enough and respected the range of his education. It was silently agreed that we would talk of domestic matters, not of politics … My mother, between policemen and a rebel brother, kept her own counsel. She was gifted in that respect.[25]

The obituary of former RIC and RUC man, Mr. C. Waters, who died in 1969, also mentioned that the deceased's brother-in-law, James McDinagh, was serving as Assistant Commissioner of the Garda in Dublin.[26] These family links began to lessen as the original generation of Garda and RUC men came towards retirement in the early 1950s, although they did not end. Natives of both jurisdictions continued to cross the border in order to join the opposite police force, leaving family and friendship connections on the

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[23] McNiffe, *A History of the Garda Síochána*, p. 35. Graham Ellison and Jim Smyth, *The Crowned Harp* (London, 2000), p. 18.
[24] Dennis Donoghue, *Warrenpoint* (London, 1990), p. 27.
[25] Ibid.
[26] 'Obituary, Mr. C. Waters', *CG,* April 1969, p. 110.

other side.[27] In 1956, the Dublin Metropolitan Police correspondent of the *Garda Review* sparked off a debate regarding the origins of individual Gardaí serving in each area. He noted that Counties Dublin, Cork and Kerry predominated among the origins of Dublin Metropolitan Division Gardaí, but that his division also included fifty-six Northern born Gardaí who 'led by their four Derrymen … say: "No surrender of our Northern twang."'[28] The following month, he provided a breakdown of these: ten men from Antrim; nine from Armagh; ten from Down; fourteen from Fermanagh and nine from Tyrone, as well as the four Derrymen.[29] Also, goaded by a Louth colleague, he volunteered the information that 300 Cavan men were at that stage serving in the RUC, though this may have been an exaggeration. In response to his earlier report, the correspondent for Carlow and Kildare, "An Neach", noted that they had three men from Antrim, the same as they had from Monaghan, and more than from Donegal, one from both Tyrone and Fermanagh and none at all from Armagh, Derry or Down.[30]

Direct family connections between the two forces also survived the retirement of the RIC generation, although in fairly rare cases. Sergeant W. G. F. Scott of the Civic Guards was mentioned in the *Garda Review* of August 1952 when his son, W. G. A. Scott, passed his sergeant's exams in the RUC.[31] The occasion was sufficiently unusual as to be also

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[27] See, for example, "Fearn Na Cathrach", 'Divisional news, Dublin Metropolitan Division, promotion', *GR,* July 1952, p. 641. 'Civic guard officer's transfer', *CG,* Feb. 1949, p. 31. Detective-constable Wm. Edmond Browne RUC Lisburn, promoted to sergeant. Native of Cootehill, Co. Cavan, 'Round the counties, Antrim, promotions', *CG,* April 1957, p. 13. Garda Michael McElroy, native of County Fermanagh, "The Quare fella", 'Divisional news, Howth, sentry, annual leave'', *GR*, March 1957, p. 367.

[28] 'Divisional News, D.M.D., The D.M.D. –Dublin, Cork and Kerry', *GR,* Sept. 1956, p. 845.

[29] 'Divisional news, D.M.D., If they ask you where you come from', *GR,* Oct. 1956, p. 927.

[30] "An Neach', 'Divisional News, Carlow and Kildare, our allegiance', *GR,* Oct. 1956, p. 931.

[31] "Cosmpopolite", 'Divisional news, Wexford notes, congratulations', *GR,* Aug. 1952, p. 741.

mentioned in the *Constabulary Gazette*.[32] RUC recruit Edgar Pratt, who joined the force in September 1956, meanwhile, was also mentioned as following in the footsteps of his uncle, John Leinster, who had only the previous month retired from the Garda, where he had been a clarinet player in the Garda band.[33] Joseph Campbell, the Donegal-born RUC sergeant shot while locking up the small police station in Cushendall, County Antrim, on 25 February 1977, was known to have been the son of the Garda Sergeant at Scotstown, County Monaghan.[34] The care with which the two police magazines continued to trace the movements of locally-born policemen serving across the border suggests that an ongoing interest existed in their careers within their native police communities.[35]

The retirement of the RIC generation, while removing some of the family links between the forces, signalled the distancing of the Garda Síochána from its origins in the Old-IRA, which may have helped relations between the two forces.[36] Almost two-thirds of the 10,135 men who joined the Garda in the 1922-52 period had had some experience of service in the IRA or the Republican Police, though this did not automatically lead to tensions with ex-members of the RIC.[37] Patrick Shea, in his autobiography, recalled a night on which his father, a sergeant in the RIC, had almost gotten caught in an IRA ambush:

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[32] 'Father –Sergt. In Civic Guards Son-Sergt. In RUC', *CG,* March 1955, p. 28.
[33] "Scéalaí", 'Divisional news, Cavan notes, joining RUC', *GR,* Sept. 1956, p. 853.
[34] C.M., interviewed by author, 22 May 2006. W. G. A. Scott interviewed by author, 23 May 2006.
[35] 'Civic guard officer's transfer', *CG,* Feb. 1949, p. 31. 'A real "Bog Station"', *CG,* Feb. 1953, p. 30. "Scéalaí", 'Divisional news, Cavan notes, joining RUC', *GR,* Sept. 1956, p. 853.
[36] McNiffe, *A History of the Garda Síochána*, pp. 14 and 47. Liam McNiffe, 'The Garda Síochána: a Social and Administrative History, 1922-52', *Irish Economic and Social Review,* Vol. XXIII, 1996, p. 128.
[37] McNiffe, *A History of the Garda Síochána*, p. 47. Dermot P. J. Walsh, *The Irish Police* (Dublin, 1998), p. 412.

> Years after the fighting had ended Father was on a visit to a southern town when the local head of the Civic Guards called at his hotel 'to shake hands with the man who had been "in charge of the RIC in Clones"' and during an evening's conversation revealed that he had been one of the party lying in ambush that night.[38]

How much these shared and opposing experiences helped or hindered contact between the two forces must necessarily remain speculative, but some tentative conclusions will be suggested. Before any discussion can take place into the nature of contacts between the two police forces, however, the legal framework within which they existed must be examined.

The legal framework of cross-border interaction

A state may, in some circumstances, claim legal jurisdiction over events occurring outside its geographical limits as, for example, Belgian legislation gives it rights to try all alleged human rights offences, wherever committed.[39] Its power to enforce these laws, however, is limited to its own territory.[40] Thus a criminal committing a crime in Britain can be tried there for that offence, even if he is a foreign national, but he cannot be returned to face trial if he has already quitted the jurisdiction, unless with the agreement of the state to which he has fled. Since Southern Ireland claimed territorial jurisdiction over the territory of Northern Ireland, its refusal to enter into formal extradition arrangements with the UK until relatively late on can be seen in terms of a refusal to recognise Westminster's right to sign on Northern Ireland's behalf. At the same time, the Irish Constitution of 1937 recognised that 'pending the re-integration of the national

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[38] Patrick Shea, *Voices and the Sound of Drums* (Belfast, 1983), p. 66.
[39] M. N. Shaw, *International Law* (Cambridge, 2003), p. 596 and p. 103n.
[40] Ibid., p. 572.

territory … the laws enacted by that Parliament shall have the like area and extent of application as the laws of Saorstát Éireann', the twenty-six counties.[41] Since 'no state may plead its municipal laws as a justification for the breach of an obligation of international law,' of which the Anglo-Irish treaty was an example, no legal case existed for the Republic to refuse to recognise British law in Northern Ireland.[42] In order to prevent complications, and the possibility of a Republican backlash at home, the issue of extradition was left undiscussed and unresolved at the time of partition.

At the beginning of this period, international law was still in its relative infancy, though it gained momentum following World War I and the development first of the League of Nations and its successor, the United Nations. The seminal work in this field was J. L. Brierly's 300-page book, *The Law of Nations*, published in various editions between 1928 and 1963.[43] Brierly's text was, however, a non-specific overview of the field, rather than a detailed study. Indeed, no major, up-to-date works existed in this period examining the procedures of extradition law, for example, though extradition agreements involving the UK had been in place with the United States since 1842, and the first treatise on the subject published as early as 1866 by Sir Edward Clarke.[44] In such an ill-defined field, pragmatic approaches to international obligations existed. Between Britain and Ireland, this meant the continuing in existence of the pre-Partition Backing of Warrants legislation, whereby warrants issued in one jurisdiction could be backed by a Justice of

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[41] Article 3, the 1937 Irish Constitution. See J. Anthony Foley and Stephen Lalor, *Gill and Macmillan Annotated Constitution of Ireland* (Dublin 1995), p. 27.
[42] Shaw, *International Law*, p. 575.
[43] Editions of *The Law of Nations* were published by Clarendon Press, Oxford, in 1928, 1936, 1942, 1949, 1955 and 1963. From here on, all references are to the 1949 forth edition.
[44] V.E. Heartly Booth, *British Extradition Law and Procedure* (Alphen aan der Rijn, the Netherlands, Germantown, Maryland, USA, 1980), Vol. I, pp. v and lvii. O'Higgins, 'Irish Extradition law and practice', pp. 274-311.

the Peace in the other and then enforced as a local warrant.[45] This was, argued O'Higgins, 'a kind of extradition which must surely be unique. There is virtually no judicial control over the surrender of persons between the two countries,' and the ordinary rules governing extradition elsewhere, rules of dual criminality, specialty and seriousness of offence did not apply.[46] There was no discretion for refusal in the cases of military or political crime, and no lower age limit on extraditions.[47] This system had, in theory, become illegal in 1922, but it was not until a court highlighted the fact in 1965 that legislative solutions were sought.[48] By this time, the Backing of Warrants legislation had all but ceased to function with regard to warrants issued in Northern Ireland.[49]

As a result of this ongoing situation, and 'in the belief that, apart from the Foyle Fisheries Acts, there is no statuary procedure existing for the surrender of fugitive criminals':

> There has grown up a working arrangement between the police forces of the two parts of Ireland whereby suspected criminals are taken into custody and "politely conducted to a convenient place on the Border and handed over to the corresponding authority."[50]

The British government was at least aware of this arrangement, as noted in a memorandum concerning the possible joint acquisition by Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland governments of the Foyle fisheries:

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[45] O'Higgins, 'Irish Extradition law and practice', p. 287.
[46] Ibid. p. 304.
[47] Ibid.
[48] R v. Metropolitan Police Commissioner ex parte Hammon (1964) 2 All E.R. 772, per Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest. See V.E. Heartly Booth, *British Extradition Law and Procedure*, Vol. I, 1980, p. 209. See also The State (Quinn)V Ryan in Dermot P. J. Walsh, *The Irish Police* (Dublin, 1998), p. 412
[49] Paul O'Higgins, 'Irish Extradition law and practice', pp. 292-3.
[50] Mr. William O'B Fitzgerald, S.C., speaking at the inaugural meeting of the 126 session of the Law Students' Debating Society of Ireland at King's Inn, Dublin. Quoted in: 'Handed over at "A Convenient place"', *Irish Times,* 3 Dec. 1955, p. 13.

> No public mention of the fact can be made but it is nevertheless true that in practice a good deal of handing over of offenders goes on along the border by both sides without any specific authority for it. Indeed it would be impossible to maintain law and order along the border without this.[51]

Effective though this arrangement was, it was illegal, since it prevented the person being able to apply for a writ of *habeas corpus* to prevent their detention and extradition.[52] Convenience being 'a sorry substitute for law' according to Justice Gavan Duffy, this situation was remedied by the passing of the Backing of Warrants At (1965) in Britain, and the Irish Extradition Act (1965), part III, in the Republic.[53] This agreement did not establish an extradition arrangement between the two countries, but instead formalised the practice already in place. Since Ireland had acceded to the European Extradition Convention in 1957, which bound it to extradite criminals to other signatory nations without calling for evidence of their guilt, this clause was also inserted into the legislation regarding Britain, which was not a signatory, since, had this not taken place, the ludicrous situation would have resulted of evidence having to be provided for British cases alone.[54] Since such cases were numbered in their hundreds annually, this would have created an impossible backlog within the two court systems. Despite the disapproval of legal personnel such as O'Higgins, however, there is evidence to suggest that the informal

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[51] 'Notes on the Northern Ireland (Foyle Fisheries) Bill', File HO45/25045 *Foyle Fisheries Bill,* Home Office, N.A.L., p. 3.
[52] Andrew Phelan, 'The Republic of Ireland and Extradition', *Law Journal*, Vol. 106, 1956, p. 39.
[53] The state (Dowling) v. Kingston p. 233 of trial notes. Quoted in O'Higgins ''Irish Extradition law and practice', p. 303. For the text of the British act, see House of Lords Archive HL/PO/PU/1/1965/C45 'Backing of Warrants (Republic of Ireland) Act'.
[54] European Convention on Extradition: http://conventions.coe.int/treaty/en/Treaties/Html/024.htm. Accessed 21 March 2007.

system remained in place alongside the new formal arrangements, at least to a certain extent, after the coming into force of the 1965 act. [55]

The new legislation brought into force within the British/Irish arrangements all the exceptions and limitations usually associated with extradition agreements.[56] Warrants would no longer be backed for cases that did not answer the dual criminality rule, nor for non-indictable offences, or those whose tariff was less than six months imprisonment. Imprisonment in lieu of fines, military offences, and offences against the customs were excluded, as were political offences.[57] Offenders were given fifteen days in which to apply for a writ of *habeas corpus* before being delivered to 'some convenient point of departure from the United Kingdom into the custody of a member of the police force (Garda Síochána) of the Republic.'[58]

A state's legal supremacy within its own territory indicates that only the laws of that state can be enforced within it, barring certain exceptions. As such, only UK (Northern Irish) law could be enforced within Northern Ireland and only Republic of Ireland law within

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[55] See, for example, 'Round the counties, Co, Fermanagh, fireside law', *CG,* Nov. 1966, p. 46. In the period between the passing of this act and the end of the period, only one case of a formal surrender of a prisoner can be found in the Armagh based *Ulster Gazette*. This was of a D'Alton Road, Armagh, man named Patrick Duffy. A warrant was issued for his arrest on a drink driving charge by the Gardaí. On the basis of this he was arrested in Armagh by Inspector S. Green. The newspaper reported his appearance at Armagh Petty Sessions, where 'Mr. J. R. Wilson, R.M., granted an order to have defendant delivered "to a convenient point of departure from the United Kingdom into the custody of a member of the Gardaí."' The defendant was released on a bail of £25 and ordered to report back to Armagh RUC station thirteen days later, to be surrendered to the Gardaí. 'Extradition warrant for D'Alton Road man', *UG,* 30 July 1970, p. 1. For other reports of formal extradition, see: 'Extradition order granted', *CG,* Feb. 1966, p. 189.

56 For a discussion of the two acts see: Paul O'Higgins, 'The Irish Extradition Act, 1965', *International and Comparative Law Quarterly*, Vol. 15, April 1966, 369 – 394 and Paul Jackson, 'Backing of Warrants (Republic of Ireland) Act 1965', *The Modern Law Review*, Vol. 29, No. 2 (Mar., 1966), pp. 186-190.

[57] Backing of Warrants (Republic of Ireland), Act, 1965. File: HL/PO/PU/1/1965/C45, House of Lords Archive.

[58] Ibid.

the Republic. While all citizens had a right to perform an arrest under the law, 'it is also contrary to international law for state agents to apprehend persons or property abroad.'[59] The Garda, therefore, were in theory powerless to act within Northern Ireland, as the RUC was to act within the Republic. When 'you got to the end of your territory,' recalled one former Gardaí, 'you had to stop,' even if in pursuit of a suspect.[60] This legal situation had important implications for law-enforcement in the border region, particularly as the line of the border was frequently unclear. While these rules were not always as strictly adhered to as this Gardaí suggested, in times of high tension the rule could be more rigidly enforced with perfect legality, since a law unobserved remains a law, and breaches of sovereignty, when they took place, did not validate future breaches.

One exception to the territoriality law which is important within the current context is that of objective territorial jurisdiction.[61] This allows a state to punish an offender who, through his actions, caused damage to an individual outside of the state. The example given by Brierly is that of a man shot from across an international frontier.[62] In such a situation, the state into which the shot was fired has a right to try the offender, as does the state in which the shot was fired. At the same time, a state could also breach territoriality if it was felt that one of its citizens had been harmed and no effective remedy had been offered by the state in which the harm had taken place.[63] In such a situation, the state of the harmed person could also demand restitution in consideration of the damage done to

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[59] Shaw, *International Law*, p. 577.
[60] Former Gardaí, name withheld. Interviewed by author, 27 Oct. 2004.
[61] J. L. Brierly, *The Law of Nations* (Oxford, 1949), p. 219.
[62] Ibid.
[63] Ibid., pp. 216-7.

its reputation through the harming of its citizen.[64] Within the Irish context, it is thus important to remember that both states had a responsibility to pursue those who had caused damage outside the state, and on its boundary.

Having examined the legal framework within which the RUC and Garda operated, this chapter will proceed to discuss how this system operated in practice, and the networks through which successful police work was pursued, both in accordance with, and outside, this legal framework.

Professional Police Contact

A legalistic definition of national territory viewed the Irish border as an inviolable barrier for the law-enforcement agencies concerned.[65] The nature of the border, which 'meanders through fields and hedgerows [so that] it is difficult to know where it runs let alone guard it or block it in any way,' made such a strict interpretation impossible to operate.[66] So confusing was the boundary that the incoming British military forces were believed to have violated it no fewer then twenty times during the first two years of their stay, resorting on occasion to the services of southern county engineers to advise them as to where their jurisdiction ended.[67] 'It would take defences such as those which exist between East and West Germany' argues one commentator 'to seal the border effectively.

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[64] Ibid.
[65] Shaw, *International Law*, p. 577.
[66] Michael Dewar, *The British Army in Northern Ireland* (London, 1996), p. 123.
[67] 'Markethill Based Soldier Killed in Border Battle', *UG,* 2 Sept. 1971, p. 1. Letter, Joe Meagher, Assistant County Engineer to P. S. Mahoney, County Engineer, County Monaghan, 28 Oct 1971. File F2-14, Roads Section, M.C.C.O..

Clearly this is not a practical or desirable solution between two democratic and friendly states.'[68] In place of such complete separation, surviving documentation and the testimonies of former police officers reveal the existence of a mesh of personal and professional contacts intended to ease the enforcement of law and order in the border counties.

Police officers serving along the border were concerned primarily with the delivery of information, suspects and evidence from the location in which they were found into the custody of investigating officers. The delivery of suspects, since it dealt the human beings likely to argue their case, was by far the most legally complex of these. Even before the coming into effect of the Backing of Warrants Act (1965), detailed instructions were provided in the *Garda Code*, the confidential manual covering all Gardaí duties and instructions, on the process to be followed in such cases, specifying even the formulae of words for the warrants to be written.[69] As noted earlier, however, this system had all but broken down as regards Northern Ireland by the mid-1960s. In its place had arisen an informal method of dubious legality relying on 'good sense, and a common desire to combat crime and carry out their duties as policemen.'[70] Perhaps the most detailed description of the use of this method was provided by RUC Chief Constable John Hermon, in his autobiography, *Holding the Line.*[71] In it, Hermon recalls an incident which took place in his early days in the force, while he was stationed in Londonderry's Victoria Barracks.

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[68] Michael Dewar, *The British Army in Northern Ireland* (London, 1996), p. 123.
[69] Garda Code (Dublin, 1965), Section 50.1, p. 432. For an illustration of such a formal hand-over from a British force, see Tim Leahy, *Memoirs of a Garda Superintendent* (Kilruch, Co. Clare, 1996), p. 89.
[70] 'Closing a two-way bolt-hole', Editorial Comment, *CG,* March 1965, p. 5.
[71] Hermon, *Holding the Line*, p. 37.

Two itinerants attempted to sell a couple of bicycles in the local shop. Suspecting that the machines were stolen, the proprietor quietly contacted the police, with the result that the itinerants, and the bicycles, were brought to Victoria. It was soon established that identical bicycles had been stolen only a few days earlier in Muff, a village across the border in County Donegal.

Since I happened to be on duty as assistant guard at the time, I donned a civilian raincoat over my uniform and set off. Constable Sam Lindsey, well known to the Gardaí, drove the prison van towards Muff with both the itinerants and the bicycles inside under my 'protective custody'. At the border customs post, we were waved through without any formalities whatsoever, and at Muff, two Gardaí, who were on patrol as arranged, took possession of all that was in my custody with scarcely a word spoken![72]

The transfer of information was altogether a simpler process, since it did not require positive identification of the individuals involved. At the same time, information transfer was seen as vital to successful police work. The *Garda Review* noted in 1953 that:

> The success or failure of a Police Force depends fundamentally on the information gleaned by the individual member … It is a matter of routine organisation to correlate this information and to use it to the best advantage. Similarly, this applies equally to different Police Forces where the information available to one force is, if and when required, readily given to sister forces.[73]

As a result, some officers preferred to provide tip-offs about to a suspect's movements, in place of taking them physically into custody. One RUC man, for example, recalled an occasion on which an allegation of sexual assault had been made by a woman living in the Republic against a lorry driver resident in Northern Ireland:

> On that particular night, we had a visit from the police in Monaghan, the Gardaí, … they came over … they told us about this girl, with this allegation … she had a description of the lorry, and a description of the man concerned, and the sergeant,

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[72] Ibid. This incident took place between 1951 and 1953.
[73] 'A case of c-operation', *GR,* Aug. 1953, pp. 645-7.

> who knew everybody, that time, said he was Bertie so-and-so. And … the next time … the Sergeant saw this fella, he rang the Gardaí to say, "this fellow is driving his lorry towards Monaghan on such a road" so Gardaí went out and arrested him.[74]

The dubious legality of divulging confidential information to the other force does not appear to have impinged heavily on the consciousness of serving policemen. For reasons of effectiveness, contact tended to be made with a known other and, occasionally, code names were used.[75] Informally, however, officers would expect to communicate by phone, radio and in person with those stations closest to them.[76]

The detail and range of the information available to the RUC on events inside the Republic, on arrests, the movement of suspects, and attempted escapes, as preserved in the weekly intelligence briefings produced by the RUC during the IRA's border campaign, strongly implies that a considerable number of highly placed officers took part in communicating intelligence across the border.[77] Indeed, so plentiful was the information being provided, that a separate section dealing specifically with events inside the Republic was inserted into every monthly briefing.[78] For example, the briefing for January 1962 included the information that on 10 January James McCabe, Richard Walsh and Michael J. Hennessy had been arrested in Kiltyclogher, County Leitrim, wearing 'battledress with yellow shoulder flashes.'[79] They appeared before a Special Criminal Court on 19 January charged with failing to account for their movements, and, having

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[74] J.B. interviewed by author, 25 Oct. 2006.
[75] J.C., interviewed by author, 19 Oct. 2006.
[76] Ibid.
[77] See file *Security Intelligence Reviews*, Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI) Museum and Archive, Belfast.
[78] See, for example, 'Security Intelligence Review, December 1961', in Ibid. pp. 1-3.
[79] 'Security Intelligence Review, January 1962', in Ibid, p. 1.

refused to recognise the court, were sentenced to four months' imprisonment. The report goes on to detail the content of two arms seizures made by the Garda on 14 and 17 January in Carrickmacross, County Monaghan, and in the Rialto District of Dublin. In each case, the report lists the names of the men arrested, their court appearances and their sentences.[80] Such detail about times and locations of arrests, exact natures of finds and uniforms worn and so on were unlikely to have been available though press reporting, and it is only through well-placed sources within the Garda that the RUC could have received them.

Other forces could, on occasion, also become involved in joint operations with the RUC and Garda. In 1972, for example, the *Ulster Gazette* reported the capture of a shipment of arms which was heading, via London, to Shannon.[81] The haul had been discovered when a false bottomed trunk had split in transit. 'After top-level consultations between Heathrow Police, British Special Branch and the Gardaí by phone' it was decided to allow the consignment on its way, in the hope of capturing the IRA personnel charged with its collection.[82] At other times, members of other branches of the security forces could also be asked to provide information. Again in 1972, for example, the *Ulster Gazette* reports that an Irish Army man had been called in by the RUC to formally identify a suspect arrested by the British Army in Armagh.[83] The prisoner had previously been an internee at the Republic's Curragh Camp, where the soldier had been serving,

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[80] Ibid.
[81] 'Gun Smuggling route', *UG,* 8 June 1972, p. 2.
[82] Ibid.
[83] 'Curragh Escapee arrested in city', *UG*, 16 Nov. 1972, p. 10.

and had escaped.[84] British army personnel were also known to liaise with the Gardaí along the border following their arrival in 1969.[85]

The exchange of information between the two police forces, and other interested parties, does not appear to have been limited to times of particular political upheaval. The records reveal a number of cases where information supplied by one force was instrumental in apprehending ordinary criminals as they attempted to make their escape by crossing the border. One example was the apprehension of a jewellery thief, captured in Belfast hours after his crime had been discovered in County Monaghan thanks to an alert sent out by the Monaghan force.[86] In another instance, a lorry stolen in Boyle, County Roscommon, was recovered in Portadown in what was heralded by the RUC as 'A fitting example of the long arm of the law!'[87] Security forces could also be called in to help with non-criminal emergencies. Seamus Keating, County Secretary in Donegal, recalled contacting Aughnacloy RUC when an old man, on transfer from Donegal to a medical specialist in Dublin, disappeared over lunch in Monaghan.[88] It was believed that, being confused, the man had headed towards homewards. 'It was going to be very serious if this man wasn't found and if he sort of died overnight in some countryside, in some ditch or something,' recalled Keating.[89] In this instance, the RUC's support proved crucial. 'They found him. They rang me back. And I was very relieved, I was very grateful to them' he

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[84] Ibid.
[85] Michael Dewar, *The British Army in Northern Ireland* (London, 1996), p. 125. John Chartres, Bert Henshaw and Michael Dewar, *Northern Ireland Scrapbook* (London, 1986), p. 71. Bert Henshaw in John Lindsay, *Brits Speak Out* (Londonderry, 1998), p. 22.
[86] 'Round the counties Belfast thieves caught as Gardaí and RUC co-operate', *CG,* Aug. 1968, p. 21.
[87] 'Round the Counties - County Armagh - Lurgan District Notes- Long Arm of the Law', *CG,* May 1967, p. 67.
[88] Seamus Keating, interviewed by author, 8 Nov. 2005.
[89] Ibid.

commented.[90] *The Garda Code* also contained detailed instructions on the situations in which it was permitted for a Garda to summon the fire service of Northern Ireland, with whom the Southern authorities had an arrangement of mutual support.[91]

Perhaps the most high-profile case of cross-border police cooperation to have taken place during this period concerned the kidnap of baby Patrick Berrigan, who disappeared from outside a toy shop in Dublin, 19 December 1954. Police personnel from the Garda Commissioner and the RUC Chief Constable down became involved in a case which captured the public's imagination and sympathy and even the attention of the Westminster House of Commons.[92] The day after the kidnapping was reported, the *Irish Times* quoted a Garda source saying that 'the RUC in Belfast and other parts of Northern Ireland have been asked to co-operate' in the search for the child.[93] The baby was eventually traced to the White City area of Belfast, as a result of a statement given to the RUC. At the home of Barbara McGeehan, who was later charged in connection with the case, RUC officers found another child, formerly known as Elizabeth Browne, who had been kidnapped from Dublin four and a half years previously.[94] Following the case, the Garda Commissioner, Daniel Costigan, wrote to his RUC opposite number, Richard Pim, asking him to thank the officers and men of the RUC for their help with the case.[95] Alongside such high-profile cases, many low-profile cases occurred, such as that of a

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[90] Ibid.
[91] *Garda Code* (Dublin, 1965), section 29.5, p. 196.
[92] 'The Berrigan baby - Civic Guard congratulations', *CG*, Jan. 1955, p. 22. Parliamentary Question by Mr H. Montgomery Hyde MP, File HO284/58 *Extradition*, Home Office, National Archives, London.
[93] 'Stolen baby may be still in Dublin', *Irish Times,* 21 Dec. 1954, p. 1.
[94] 'Search for third kidnapped baby spreads to England', *Irish Times,* 25-28 Dec. (Christmas Edition) 1954, p. 1.
[95] 'Parents and missing child are reunited - crowds welcome baby and parents', *Irish Times*, 24 Dec. 1954, p. 1. 'The Berrigan baby civic Guard congratulations', *CG*, Jan. 1955, p. 22.

fifteen-year-old itinerant girl reported missing in Northern Ireland in 1969, who was found and returned by Gardaí in 'Port Leish' (sic.) after her older companion gave himself up.[96] A study of the *Ulster Gazette* during this period reveals at least six cases in which the Garda and RUC cooperated operationally, ranging in severity from disturbances of the peace to armed robbery.[97]

A certain degree of official sanction existed for contacts between the two police forces, the contact details for which were provided within the officially published listings available to all officers. All ranks of RUC men down to District Inspector were included in the Garda's *Garda Directory*, of which each barracks had a copy, alongside full staff lists for the local force and for some other British forces.[98] The RUC *List and Directory* similarly included a contact list of the headquarters, reserves and depot staff of the Garda Síochána, as well as all Garda officers, superintendents and chief superintendents serving in Cavan and Monaghan, Donegal, Louth and Meath, and Sligo and Leitrim Districts, as well as the station in which they served.[99] Indeed, the *Garda Code* included instructions for divisional officers who wished to have the details of wanted men published in the RUC's *Constabulary Gazette,* as well as their own internal publications, to contact that force directly, while notifying Commissioner C.4 of their actions.[100] The careful filing of press reports concerning Garda and RUC joint operations by the Northern Ireland Office

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[96] 'Struggle Followed Itinerant's Remand', *UG,* 13 Feb. 1969, p. 1.
[97] 'Frontier police stations may re-open', *UG*, 24 Feb. 1966, p. 2. 'Ahorey man fined in Dundalk', *UG*, 7 April 1966, p. 4. Fined £25 for 'technical' smuggling', *UG*, 18 May 1967, p. 10. 'Gardaí, RUC Probe Fracas', *UG*, 31 Aug. 1967, p. 5. 'Army Cut Car "In Sections"', *UG*, 3 Sept. 1970, p. 8. 'Raiders Fire at Gardaí', *UG*, 31 Aug. 1972, p. 3.
[98] See for example *Garda Directory* (Dublin, 1950), p. 192 and *Garda Directory* (Dublin, 1957), p. 313.
[99] See for example *Royal Ulster Constabulary Directory and List* (Belfast, 1949), p. 109, and *Royal Ulster Constabulary Directory and List* (Belfast, 1971), p. 74.
[100] *Garda Code* (Dublin, 1965), Section 51.5, p. 438

also appears to lend credibility to the theory that joint work by the two forces was within limits welcomed by their political superiors.[101]

Though a member of the Garda had no official power in Northern Ireland, Garda officers could, and did, take part in joint investigations with RUC officers within Northern Ireland, and vice versa.[102] Garda Inspector John Deering and Detective-Sergeant Redmond O'Shea travelled up from Dublin to take part in the search for Patrick Berrigan, attending house-to-house enquiries conducted by the Northern force.[103] A Garda from Alt, Castefin, County Donegal, called on his RUC colleagues, with whom he went driving with them through Northern Ireland in an attempt to locate a thief whom he believed to have escaped to County Londonderry.[104] In an ultimately unsuccessful prosecution concerning a car stolen in County Monaghan, members of the Garda Síochána went to the garage at which the car was being dismantled with the RUC officers who had first raised the alarm concerning its true ownership.[105] On this occasion, the trial judge, though ruling that no charges could be brought, 'commented that he was very impressed by the police work on both sides of the border, which led to the recognition of the stolen car body.'[106]

Due to the legal complications surrounding the surrender of prisoners, it was frequently simpler to put a person on trial in the jurisdiction in which they had been arrested, rather

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[101] See Northern Ireland Office (N.I.O.) RUC Cuttings file *9 Oct. 1968 to 30 Jan. 1970.* Political Collection, Linen Hall Library, Belfast.
[102] See, for example, 'Border chase - constable's flying tackle', *CG,* March 1950, p. 23.
[103] 'Woman Claims Second Baby Was Given To Her', *Irish Times,* 11 Jan. 1955, p. 1.
[104] 'On the trail – A case of cooperation', *GR,* Aug. 1953, pp. 645-7.
[105] 'Portadown man returned for trail - Sequel to Monaghan car theft - RUC officers in Monaghan court', *NS,* 14 May 1965, p. 1. 'Judge Directs Acquittal', *NS,* 18 June 1965, pp. 5-6.
[106] 'Judge Directs Acquittal', *NS,* 18 June 1965, pp. 5-6.

than the one in which the original offence had taken place. In such cases a related charge was brought, for example, not 'theft' but 'possession of a vehicle knowing it to have been stolen.'[107] A high profile instance of this concerned the case of the Berrigan baby. Asked if the Northern Irish woman holding Patrick Berrigan would be extradited to face charges in Eire, an RUC spokesman admitted that this would be 'constitutionally difficult'.[108] She was eventually charged in Northern Ireland with 'unlawfully detaining the child with intent to deprive the parents of his possession.'[109] When such a mutually investigated case came to court, police officers from both jurisdictions would be called upon to testify.[110] In such circumstances they would appear in their official capacities as police officers, and be referred to by their rank, as they would within their own jurisdiction.[111] In one such case, that of R.U.C man, Sergeant William Smith of Keady, the officer concerned was commended highly for his 'very efficient work' both by Garda Superintendent J. Callery and the trial judge, Justice D. Dunleavy, when he came to testify before Ballybay District Court.[112] This willingness to testify can be seen as an extension of the information exchange taking place between the two forces. Since it identified individual officers in public, however, it can also be considered to be effective public recognition of each other's legitimacy.[113] Such recognition could also take place in more symbolic ways, for example, in the attendance by Justice John Feran at Dungiven

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[107] 'Monaghan District court arms charge remand', *NS,* 9 June 1972, p. 7. See also 'Judge Directs Acquittal', *NS,* 18 June 1965, pp. 5-6. 'Cars alleged to have been stolen in the North - 'Blany garage owner charged', *NS,* 11 Feb. 1966, p. 2.

[108] 'Parents and missing child are reunited - crowds welcome baby and parents', *Irish Times*, 24 Dec. 1954, p. 9.

[109] Ibid.

[110] 'Went over border to escape- fined £537 for potato smuggling', *UG,* 22 May 1969, p. 9.

[111] See, for example, 'Portadown man returned for trail - Sequel to Monaghan car theft - RUC officers in Monaghan court', *NS*, 14 May 1965, p. 1.

[112] 'Keady Sergeant commended for efficiency', *UG*, 17 Feb 1966, p. 4.

[113] Paul Mattessich and Barbara Monsey, *Collaboration: What makes it work* (St. Paul, Minnesota, 2001), pp. 14-5.

Court, where he was invited by the resident magistrate, J. M. Shearer, to accompany him in hearing cases from the bench.[114] Such statements of faith are particularly noteworthy when placed alongside the more extreme nationalist statements regarding the legitimacy of the two jurisdictions and their officers within the same period.[115] It was the shaking of this trust that undermined the ability of the two forces to cooperate successfully towards the early 1970s.[116] Despite David Harkness' assertion that 'the defeat of terrorism became an interest shared equally on both sides of the border' in the early 1970s, and the acknowledgement of even militant unionists that the IRA 'was not in any way patronised or encouraged by the southern government,' there was no coordinated move to enforce internment by that government, though Jack Lynch did apparently consider this possibility.[117] The Republic was seen as hesitant in enforcing measures which were perceived as 'unfair or oppressive' against Republicans 'because the state was created by armed revolt against the Crown, and because it shared with the IRA the goal of national unity,' which led to recrimination from unionists, who felt that the defeat of the IRA should be the first priority of both governments.[118] This both reduced the opportunity to cooperate and, in response to the prevalent critical mood, the will of the two forces to do so. As the world exploded around it, the RUC's official magazine, *The Constabulary*

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[114] 'D.J. sits in on Dungiven Court', *CG,* Nov. 1965, pp. 67-9.
[115] Brendan Anderson, *Joe Cahill – A Life in the IRA* (Dublin, 2004), p. 11. Seán MacStiofáin *Memoirs of a Revolutionary* (Edinburgh, 1975), p. 111.
[116] 'Confusion Over Border Smash', *NS,* 19 May 1972, p. 9. 'Clones bomb scare', *NS,* 16 June 1972, p. 5. 'Army crossed border to detonate "bomb"', *NS,* 1 Dec. 1972, p. 16.
[117] David Harkness, *Ireland in the Twentieth Century – Divided Island* (Basingstoke, 1996), p. 97. H. Shearman, 'Conflict in Northern Ireland', *Year Book of World Affairs 1970* (London, 1970), p. 44. See also Marcus W. Heslinga, *The Irish Border as a Cultural Divide* (Assen, 1962), p. 9, Caroline Kennedy-Pipe, *The Origins of the Present Troubles in Northern Ireland* (London and New York, 1997), p. 28 and Eunan O'Halpin, *Defending Ireland* (Oxford, 1999), p. 325.
[118] Richard Rose, 'Northern Ireland: the Irreducible Conflict', in J.V. Montville (ed.) *Conflict and Peacemaking in Multiethnic Societies* (Lexington, Massachusetts and Toronto, 1990), p. 136.

Gazette, withdrew further and further into itself, and into the problems facing its readers, reducing to almost nothing its coverage of their Southern colleagues.[119]

Interestingly, even when relations were at a low ebb, the two forces avoided openly criticising each other. Throughout the IRA's border campaign, for example, *The Constabulary Gazette* became more and more militantly unionist in its leanings, reducing its general coverage of Eire events and even ceasing, from sometime after 1957, to exchange magazines and articles with the editors of the *Garda Review*. [120] Throughout this period, however, the magazine never once implied that the Gardaí themselves were not doing enough to curb the IRA. Instead, the blame was placed on the Republic's government, for tying the Garda's hands, and with the Republic's population for not taking a stand against the IRA, whether through fear or latent solidarity.[121] This attitude allowed what ongoing work existed between the Garda and the RUC to continue, and for contacts to be widened again at a later period. Similarly, when civil disturbances began to disrupt Northern Ireland in the post-1968 period, the *Constabulary Gazette* laid the blame for it very firmly at the feet of international trends, rather than casting it in terms of a

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[119] See *CG,* 1972.

[120] The first 'our exchanges' column within the *Constabulary Gazette* from which the *GR* is absent is July 1957. No 'our exchanges' columns were published by the *Gazette* throughout the previous year and a half, and thus it is impossible to trace exactly when the exchange ceased, since the *Garda Review* itself did not have an equivalent column. The last article attributed to the *Garda Review to* appear in the *Constabulary Gazette* did so in March 1957, so it seems likely that the exchange ended between these dates. It may be worth noting that in December 1957 the *Garda Review's* long-term editor and contributor, P. J. Gallagher, passed away. Gallagher had a strong interest in the RUC, whom he mentioned frequently in his editorials and in his 'Without Prejudice' column, so that it is possible that his loss contributed the ending of the exchange between the two police magazines.

[121] See, for example, 'Trends in police work' editorial comment, *CG,* Sept. 1959, p. 5. 'Provocative outrages' editorial comment, *CG,* Nov. 1959, p. 5. 'Secret support' editorial comment, *CG,* June 1960, p. 5. 'Portents' editorial comment, *CG,* May 1961, p. 3. 'A new phase' editorial comment, *CG,* Dec. 1961, p. 3.

North/South problem in which Garda might be complicit.[122] This exclusion from blame of known elements of the political 'other' was a common occurrence in cross-border work, as it was in cross-community relations, whereby attitudes attributed to the whole were rapidly qualified when related to specific known individuals.[123] Such exclusions and qualifications were necessary in allowing individuals to continue cooperating despite political differences.

Just as political tensions could negatively affect contacts between the forces, positive political developments could also encourage such contact. Following the Lemass/O'Neill meeting of 1965, the spirit of O'Neillism was explicitly invoked by one Garda in an article entitled 'I visit the RUC - the social aspect':

> Now that Mr. Lemass has set an example in going into the North to see things for himself, to hold discussions, and to eventually work out a better standard of living for our people both North and South, would it be too much to hope that our R.B. [Representative Body] representatives would take a trip to their counterparts in the RUC to hold discussions and see for themselves?[124]

The article was one of two which Garda J. McGurk contributed. The second looked at the professional aspect of his visit to the RUC, in which he argued for closer professional links between the forces.[125]

> We send men to England and even America at times on study courses, why not send a few up North sometime and see what we can learn up there? And what the hell, anyway? Even if we never learn a thing, won't the fares be less expensive? If

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[122] '1959?' Editorial Comment, *CG,* Jan. 1959, p. 5. 'Terror groups in secret world link-up, says C.I.A.', *CG,* Sept. 1972, p. 44.
[123] Harold Jackson, *The Two Irelands: A dual study in inter-group tensions* (London, 1971), p. 9.
[124] J. McGurk, 'I visit the RUC the social aspect', *GR,* Oct. 1965, pp. 549-551
[125] J. McGurk, 'I visit the RUC part 2 the professional aspect', *GR,* Nov. 1965, pp. 623-5.

> that doesn't convince you, well, just remember that they still make better tea and serve stronger whiskey than the English do …[126]

McGurk describes his visit to the RUC's newly opened headquarters in Knock, the forensics laboratories and a number of stations. While admitting that the RUC still had much it could learn from the Garda, particularly in the field of public relations, he admired their superior equipment and operational support.[127] At the same time, the effects of positive political developments were not always so straightforwardly supportive of on-the-ground cooperation. The instigation of formal extradition, for example, put the transfer of prisoners into the political spot-light, leading to bitterness and recrimination when warrants were refused.[128] The instigation of top-level discussions between the heads of the two police forces also helped to strengthen the perception of information exchange as the legitimate business of senior officers, in which ordinary officers played no role.[129]

Effective delivery of law enforcement could require a sharing of resources as well as information. Here again, good interpersonal relations acted to ensure effective service delivery. 'A good working relationship existed,' for example, 'between the RUC in Strabane and the Gardaí in Lifford, Co Donegal.'[130] This encouraged the parties to support each other in practical ways. John Hermon, who was in charge at Strabane at this time, recalled:

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[126] Ibid., p. 625.
[127] Ibid., pp. 623-5.
[128] J.B. interviewed by author, 25 Oct. 2006.
[129] C.M., interviewed by author, 22 May 2006.
[130] Hermon, *Holding the Line*, p. 37 See also, J.B., interviewed by author, 25 Oct. 2006.

Sergeant McGowen and the four Gardaí there [in Lifford] relied on bicycle or foot patrols, since they had no vehicle transport. Occasionally, when Sergeant McGowan felt the need of a car, he would contact me, and one of our drivers, usually Constable J. T. Whiteside, would put on a civilian coat over his uniform and drive across the border. With a Garda member or the Sergeant himself, Constable Whiteside would drive around the area, enabling the other to serve summonses and execute warrants.[131]

At other locations, the Garda would reciprocate, J.C., for example, of the Garda detective branch, recalled driving Sergeant A, of Newtownbutler, around various itinerant camps in the South in search of copper wire stolen in the North.[132] Since Hermon had retired as a very senior officer, he may well have felt more at liberty to discuss these contacts, whose legality was dubious.[133] At the same time, Hermon's high profile in cross-border affairs highlight the importance of the willingness to co-operate on the part of individuals in ensuring effective cooperation.[134]

In his short story 'God's Children', published in the *Garda Review* of June 1963, Garda J. McGurk traces the changes of attitude of a young Gardaí posted to patrol an unapproved road in the hills above Newry towards the RUC men whom he encountered there.[135] 'That first night he had turned his back and stared woodenly towards the South until they had gone off again … an action he repeated many nights afterwards.'[136] As he spent more time on the border, and following a visit into Newry town one Sunday afternoon, where he encounters the Sergeant in charge of the RUC patrol, who greeted him 'as a friend -

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[131] Hermon, *Holding the Line*, pp. 37-8.
[132] J.C., interviewed by author, 19 Oct. 2006.
[133] C.M., interviewed by author, 22 May 2006.
[134] In contrast to this attitude, see, for example Sam Hayes, 'My thirty years policing', *CG*, July 1967, p. 34. Here Hayes recalled how, during a G.A.A. game taking place just outside the jurisdiction, he and his RUC colleagues stood and watched as a near riot broke out ten minutes into the game.
[135] J. McGurk, 'God's Children', *GR,* June 1963, pp. 493-5.
[136] Ibid., p. 493.

even as a close friend!', the Garda's attitude changed.[137] He began to look forward to the midnight meetings with the RUC border patrol, and eventually foiled the IRA ambush intended to kill them. While clearly fictional, this account is interesting in showing both the effects of political attitudes on the possibility of cooperation, and how social interaction and shared experience could serve to change those attitudes. The story is also noteworthy in that it was aimed at a readership with a high degree of personal knowledge of border conditions, and was thus constrained in how fantastic it could be without losing credibility. Indeed, officers who served along the border recalled such meetings with the opposite forces at the border, as did press reports from the time.[138]

The one concession which appears consistently in accounts of unofficial cooperation was the disguising of uniforms under civilian coats, or 'mufti'.[139] Indeed, the disguising of uniforms appears to have been a legal requirement, since:

> Under Section 317 of the Defence Act, 1954, it [was] an offence for any person … to enter or land or go into any public place in the State while wearing any foreign uniform. The expression "foreign uniform" means the uniform of any armed force (other than the Defence Forces) and includes any distinctive part of such a uniform.[140]

Dooley asserts that 'even to the present day there is no official concession for uniformed Gardaí to visit the Drummully area [for example]. The only route for armed Gardaí or army would appear to be by helicopter through a small salient of land in County

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[137] Ibid.
[138] J.C., interviewed by author, 19 Oct. 2006. See plate 2 below.
[139] See, for example, 'Man leaves Court with RUC', *UG*, 19 Aug. 1971, p. 2. Hermon, *Holding the Line*, p. 37.
[140] 'Wearing of uniform of foreign armed forces', *Garda Code*, 1965, section 63.3, p. 517.

Monaghan.'[141] This assertion appears, however, to be inaccurate. Early on in the state's existence, a pass-system was established whereby the Dublin Department of Justice could request permission from the Department of Home Affairs in Belfast for Gardaí to travel through Northern Ireland to stations in the Republic, and to do so in uniform. The department would then receive passes allowing their passage by specific trains, in specific numbers and at specific times.[142] Such cases can be found dated as late as 1959, when requests were made for Gardaí to cross to Donegal in connection with the presidential election then due, and similar passes were still being issued, for example to members of the Eire government, as late as 1973.[143] It does seem, however, possibly as a result of the Clones Massacre of 1922, that the crossing of the border in uniform remained a fairly unusual occurrence.[144]

One area in which the rules on civilian clothing were at times relaxed was in cases of 'hot pursuit'. As previously stated, the Irish border being a long and meandering one, it was not always clear where jurisdictional boundaries ended, and accidental border crossings were inevitable.[145] It also appears, however, that a patrol in pursuit could knowingly violate sovereignty, though this was legally dubious and controversial in times of high

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[141] Terence Dooley, 'From the Belfast Boycott to the Boundary Commission: Fears and hopes in County Monaghan, 1920-26', *Clogher Record,* Vol. XV, No.1, 1994, p. 97.
[142] *Movement of Civic Guard through Northern Ireland 1957*, file HA/32/1/164. Also *Movement of Civic Guards through Northern Ireland – permits to travel etc.* file Ha/32/1/163. Both Department of Home Affairs , PRONI.
[143] *Movement of Civic Guard through Northern Ireland 1957*, File HA/32/1/164 , Department of Home Affairs, PRONI. *Land boundary passes for entry into Northern Ireland 1969-1973*, File 2005/23/165, Dept. of Justice, N.A.I..
[144] Mervyn Dane, *The Fermanagh "B" Specials* (Enniskillen, 1970), pp. 28-30. Chris Ryder, *The Fateful Split* (London, 2004), p. 42. Livingstone, *The Fermanagh Story*, p. 303-4.
[145] O.W., interviewed by author, 22 Oct. 2006.

political tension.[146] Justice D. Dunleavy, sitting in Ballybay Circuit Court, was placed on record as commending RUC Sergeant William Smith of Keady, County Armagh, who followed a car into the Republic that was, on his evidence, 'driving erratically', and pursuing it until he could force it to stop 'thus preventing far graver damage.'[147] 'Hot pursuit' incursions were finally formally legalised in the 1980s.

In theory, the informal system of prisoner and information exchange was replaced in 1965 by the passing of the Backing of Warrants and Irish Extradition Acts, and by the institution, later on, of regular meetings between senior members of the two police forces.[148] The new system was bureaucratic and cumbersome, however, and covered only offences beyond a certain order of magnitude. It is unsurprising, therefore, that evidence suggests that the two systems, formal and informal, continued to exist side by side.[149] The institution of formal extradition, however, did provide another point of personal contact and knowledge, essential to the creation of successful cooperative interaction. Persons to be extradited would be delivered 'to a convenient point of departure from the United Kingdom into the custody of a member of the Gardaí,' or vice versa, in operations which required a certain amount of low-level coordination between the two forces, and which

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[146] See, for example, 'Men escape after 70 MPH border chase', *UG*, 29 April 1965 p. 10. The R.U.C was searching for suspects who 'escaped from a wrecked car on Saturday night after a 70 Kilometres per hour cross border chase by Civic Guards'. The suspects car had failed to stop in Castleblaney, and was chased for about 20 miles through both County Monaghan and Armagh by the Civic Guard. The chase came to an end when the car crashed in County Armagh, and the drivers escaped across the fields. See also 'Van incident over border', *UG,* 1 April 1971, p. 2. 'RUC Constables Arrested Man in Republic', *UG,* 12 Aug. 1971, p. 3.

[147] 'Keady Sergeant commended for efficiency', *UG*, 17 Feb. 1966, p. 4.

[148] 'Closing a two-way bolt-hole', Editorial Comment, *CG,* March 1965, pp. 5-6. Hermon, *Holding the Line*, p. 101.

[149] 'Round the counties - County Fermanagh - fireside law', *CG,* Nov. 1966, p. 46.

brought officers often stationed some way from the border into contact.[150] Escort duty for unusual loads or important individuals also provided this sort of low-key coordination experience. T. K. Whitaker, in his recollections of Lemass' visit to Stormont in 1965, recalled how 'we were escorted as far as Dundalk by the Gardaí, where the RUC took over and Jim Malley [O'Neill's private secretary] got into the car with us.'[151] On three occasions the *Constabulary Gazette,* documented 'mercy dashes' of organs for transplant, two from Belfast to Dublin's Jervis Street Hospital and one the other way, noting the speed and efficiency with which escorts had been changed at the border, allowing organs to be delivered in the shortest possible time.[152]

Opportunity and motive for cooperation were not in themselves sufficient to ensure that successful joint operations would take place. Individuals and police parties had to be willing to communicate information and support each other. Where this support was lacking, offenders were able to escape. The *Ulster Gazette*, reporting in 1966 on the illegal sport of cock-fighting, noted how 'mains', as the fights were known, were held near the border so that, 'the cockfighters had only to cross a narrow stream when the tip-off of the Garda raid came to place themselves "out of the jurisdiction",' where the RUC would not molest them.[153] Yet the RUC also prosecuted cockfighters, independently of the Gardaí. The Tyrone correspondent of the *Constabulary Gazette,* while discussing a

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[150] J. R. Wilson, R.M., quoted in 'Extradition warrant for D'Alton Road man' *UG,* 30 Jul. 1970, p. 1. 'Round the Counties, Co. Down, Garda's funeral', *CG*, Feb. 1968, p. 61. 'Round the counties, Belfast, woman prisoner handed over border', *CG*, April 1966, p. 37.
[151] T. K. Whitaker, interviewed by author 13 Feb. 2006.
[152] 'RUC and Civic Guard rush kidney Belfast to Dublin', *CG,* Jan. 1971, p. 102. 'N.I./Eire security forces co-operate in cross-border mercy dash', *CG,* July 1972, p. 48. 'Kidney by relay' *CG,* Oct. 1972, p. 42.
[153] Cockfighters elude Garda swoop', *UG,* 28 July 1966, p. 4.

Mid Ulster Mail report on the sport in 1962, gently mocking its fall in popularity under police pressure.[154]

Border crime was not static during this period and hence contacts between the police forces must be seen against the background of a changing criminal, as well as political, situation. The most obvious change, besides the introduction of the Extradition Act in 1965, was the large-scale introduction of firearms into the Irish criminal scene, which took place following the beginning of the Northern Ireland Troubles in 1968. Republican groups targeted banks and post offices in order to raise funds, leading to the shooting of the first Gardaí to die in the Troubles, Garda Fallon, in April 1970.[155] Along the border, Justice Dermot Dunleavy, sitting at Castleblaney District Court, made a very direct link between the rise in violence in the North and the rise of violent crimes, which had risen to encompass thirty percent of the list in front of him.[156] At the trial of a gang from Armagh and Crossmaglen accused of involvement in a fight in Castleblaney, '"he warned that in future he would deal very severely with such offences and would have no hesitation in imposing jail sentences".[157] '"This may be the rebound as a result of the violence in the

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[154] 'Police Swoop on cockfight', *Mid-Ulster Mail,* 23 June 1962, p. 1. 'Coalisland cockfight – Two Eire men sentenced', *Mid-Ulster Mail,* 7 July 1962, p. 1. 'Round the counties, co. Tyrone Coalisland "mains"', *CG*, Aug. 1962, pp. 19-21.

[155] 'Intensive Hunt for Garda's Killers', *Irish Times,* 4 April 1970, p. 1. See also 'Watch on the Border', *NS*, 5 Sept. 1969, p. 8. 'A triple tragedy', *GR*, April 1970, p. 3. 'Monaghan District Court arms charges', *NS,* 12 May 1971, p. 2. 'Blaney news Cullyhanna robbery', *NS*, 23 July 1971, p. 3. 'Extra Gardaí in Clones', *NS,* 1 Oct. 1971 p. 9. 'Blaney News daring robbery', *NS,* 21 Jan. 1972, p. 5. 'Two held for armed robbery', *UG,* 25 May 1972, p. 2. 'Clones News - Border Security', *NS*, 26 May 1972, p. 3. 'Charity concert proceeds go in two robberies', *NS,* 29 Sept. 1972, p. 1.

[156] 'D. J.'s warning at 'Blayney', *UG,* 28 Sept. 1972, p. 11. (Pages 2 and 11 in this edition are interchanged, so that page 11 appears in page 2 position).

[157] 'Justice's comment at 'Blaney District court spill-over of Northern violence', *NS,* 8 Sept. 1972, p. 2.

North – that is quite possible, but it will have to stop. It is only around the Border towns that this is happening,"' he noted.[158]

The increase in violence led to an entirely reconfiguration of the border crime-fighting scene. National Farmers' Union vigilante anti-smuggling patrols were discontinued amid concern for the safety of members.[159] Customs and policemen suffered kidnapping by armed gangs.[160] Most importantly of all, post-1968, both the Irish and the British armies arrived on the border, making breaches of sovereignty more controversial than ever before.[161] At the same time, the arrest of 'political' criminals led to tensions and protest.[162] Under intense scrutiny from both the Northern and Southern Irish parliaments, police cooperation became more politically controversial.[163] For the first time, Garda personnel began investigations into alleged 'hot pursuit' sovereignty violations by the RUC.[164] The very legitimacy of cross border operations was thus brought into question.

Social interaction between the RUC and Garda

Social interaction between individuals was instrumental in establishing personal contacts, and, by undermining the 'us' and 'them' dichotomy, contributed to the creation of new kinship and professional networks. Social networks played a vital role in encouraging

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[158] Ibid.
[159] The last report located on these patrols was 'Grain smuggling' in the *NS,* 21 Aug. 1970, p. 1.
[160] 'Pig smuggling incident Customs man forced to negotiate', *UG,* 14 Sept. 1972, p. 8. 'Round the counties Co. Tyrone terrorist gunmen kidnap RUC man', *CG,* Oct. 1971 p. 46.
[161] 'Markethill Based Soldier Killed in Border Battle', *UG,* 2 Sept 1971, p. 1.
[162] 'Escape from courthouse' *NS,* 14 Apr. 1972, p. 1.
[163] Neil Blaney, Dáil Éireann Debates - Volume 260 - 26 April, 1972, http://www.oireachtas-debates.gov.ie. Accessed 21 March 2007. 'Border no obstacle', *UG,* 22 Dec. 1971, p. 3.
[164] 'RUC Constables Arrested Man in Republic', *UG,* 12 Aug. 1971, p. 3.

goodwill, which was itself essential to the establishment of successful cooperative contact. As such, the existence of such links was both significant in its own right, and served to illustrate the means whereby cross-border contact networks were negotiated. Such networks, being by nature unofficial and private, are more difficult to trace through conventional source material. Fortunately, both police magazines produced on the Island of Ireland reserved a significant percentage of their copy to the sporting and social activities of their members, which allowed at least the formal aspects of such interaction to be traced, and its change over time noted.

The major centres of social interaction in a predominantly rural environment revolved around the public houses, country fairs, dances and sports clubs. Policemen, being a part of the cultural milieu in which they lived, could be expected to use these same, or similar, social poles. Such interaction can be divided into formal, set-piece occasions, and informal, ongoing contact.

Informal social interaction between the Garda Síochána and RUC is mentioned with a fair regularity by those who served a portion of their time along the Irish border. This covered a range of social forums, from the Garda Sergeant who would contact his friends in the RUC to place bets for him at Northern Irish book-makers, where the betting taxes were lower, to the RUC men who used their Garda contacts in order to reserve seats in Lifford Cinema.[165] Perhaps the anecdote which best illustrates the existence and consequences of ongoing contacts between the RUC and Garda appears, like much else, in the reminiscences of former RUC Chief Constable John Hermon. Discussing his time

[165] J.B., interviewed by author, 25 Oct. 2006.

at Victoria Barracks in Londonderry, Hermon told the story of Constable Sam Lindsey, who had driven him to Muff on the previously discussed occasion.[166] One night Constable Lindsey had become very intoxicated at the annual Garda dance at Buncrana.[167] He was driven back over the border in a Garda car and left propped up outside the door of Victoria RUC barracks, where he was serving. The bell was rung, the Gardaí drove off, and Lindsey fell in when the door was opened by the station sergeant. This anecdote illustrates not only the existence of social contact between the two forces, but also the jurisdictional flexibility which was occasionally required in order for such contact to take place, and the convivial relationships which existed between members of the two forces.[168]

Tourism provided one of the major forums within which cross-border social encounters occurred, both for the population as a whole and for members of the police forces in particular. The *Constabulary Gazette* and *Garda Review* contain numerous references to policemen taking annual leave in the other jurisdiction, as well as partaking in the 'holidays at home' campaigns of their respective tourist boards.[169] Adverts and holiday features in the police magazines extolled the virtues of the South and West of the

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[166] See pages 175-176 in current work, Hermon, *Holding the Line*, p. 37

[167] J. Hermon, Interview with Jason Lane, 16 April 1998. Source: J. Lane, *The Development of Irish Cross-Border Police Cooperation*, D.Phil diss. (unpublished), Queen's University, Belfast, 1999, p. 146.

[168] Hermon frequently discusses social contact between the forces both in interview and in his column 'depot notes' column in the *Constabulary Gazette*, which he wrote while stationed as the Deputy Commandant at the RUC depot. See, for example, 'Notes from the depot - rowing visitors', *CG.* June 1964, p. 101. The only other senior RUC man in this period for whom a considerable body of written recollections exists, Sir Richard Pim, does not mention Garda at all. See Sir Richard Pim, *Recollections* (Belfast, 1974. Unpublished), File T/3620/1 PRONI. This serves to further illustrate the importance of individual character and will in the creation and maintenance of cross-border networks.

[169] See, for example, 'Round the counties, Co. Armagh, Bessbrook district notes, holidays', *CG*, Sept. 1963, p. 31. 'All members have now returned from annual holidays...for those "see Ireland first" types, Killarney, Portrush, Bray, Dun Laoghaire, Galway and Fermanagh, were visited. The broadening of outlook achieved from visits to such places will, we hope, be of benefit'. 'Gazette holiday feature, spend your holiday in Ulster', May 1961, p. 55.

Republic, in particular, to RUC men, and it is noteworthy that honeymoons to the Republic, for example, continued throughout this period, although the rise in the popularity of overseas honeymoons, in Norway, Spain and Majorca for example, did reduce the numbers undertaking them.[170] The continued willingness of Northern policemen to travel south suggested that, until relatively late in this period, RUC men continued to feel safe there.

On a number of occasions, policemen report actively seeking out their cross-border colleagues while on annual leave, drawn to compare notes through a mixture of interest, curiosity, and fellow-feeling. Garda McGurk, for example, used his own holiday visit to the new RUC Headquarters in Knock in 1965 to produce two articles discussing existing and potential contacts between the two forces.[171] In December 1965, Constable Fleming of Armagh RUC, while on holiday in the West of Ireland, paid a courtesy call to Croom Garda station. 'He was welcomed and entertained by Sergeant Michael Dee, Croom, who showed him all the beauty spots in the area. He was very impressed with his visit and extended an invitation to all the members at Croom Station to pay him a visit whenever they cross the border.'[172] Similarly, in 1956, a Howth correspondent for the 'Divisional News' section noted that on holiday, 'Garda M. Daly was last seen in Bray comparing jobs with a few RUC men' then present at the resort.[173] Indeed, following the visit of the

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[170] See, for example, Advertisement - 'Where to stay have your holidays in Ireland', *CG,* April 1949, p. 24. 'Round the counties - County Tyrone Civil Servant and Constable Wed', *CG,* Dec. 1970, p. 43. 'Weddings, Reid-Easterbrook', *CG,* April 1965, p. 97. Spain. 'Weddings, McClelland-Graham', *CG,* Jan. 1967, p. 75. Norway. 'Weddings, Reilly-Lamont', *CG,* Sept. 1966, p. 83.
[171] J. McGurk, 'I visit the RUC, the social aspect', *GR,* Oct. 1965, pp. 549-551
[172] "Dan Dare", 'Divisional News, Mallow District, Northern Visitor', *GR,* Sept. 1964, pp. 809-11. "Trinitarian", 'Divisional News, Ceanntar Ath Dara, visitors', *GR,* Dec. 1965, p. 85.
[173] "Section 30 ", 'Divisional News, Howth, vacation', *GR,* Sept. 1956, p. 865.

Inspector General, Sir Richard Pim, to Garda Headquarters, the *Garda Review* went out of its way to note that:

> Every member of our sister Force in the North, from the Inspector General to the Constable, is always assured of a warm welcome from the Garda Síochána whenever they choose to pay us a visit either on business or pleasure. We have received so much cooperation and kindness from them that we find it difficult to express our gratitude in adequate fashion but as brother Irishmen and brother police men they will understand our sentiments.[174]

Such expressions of friendship, building upon shared experiences and encounters, helped to form the building blocks of active contact networks between the two forces.

The extensive coverage afforded by the police magazines to dances organised by the two forces allows an insight both into the variations in social contact over time, and into the adaptations required in order to maintain contacts. A dozen reports, in all, can be traced in the *Constabulary Gazette* of dances at which the presence of parties from the Republic are mentioned, without specifying whom those parties included.[175] More interestingly, nine cases exist where the presence of a party of Garda personnel, or even named members of that force are mentioned.[176] This is exclusive of the dance run in 1968 by Strabane RUC under the auspices of the International Police Association, which was specifically intended for the purpose of bringing RUC members into contact with members of the Gardaí.[177] That it is the Strabane party which is involved in this

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[174] "Fear Faire", 'Divisional news, Depot notes', *GR,* Oct. 1951, p. 901.
[175] See, for example, 'Round the counties, Co. Armagh', *CG*, Jan. 1949, p. 19. 'Round the counties, Armagh club dance', *CG,* Oct. 1956, p. 10. 'Co. Tyrone, make merry', *CG*, Jan. 1964, p. 39.
[176] See, for example, 'Round the counties, Co Tyrone', *CG*, Jan. 1951, p. 23. 'Round the counties, Fermanagh, Newtownbutler RUC Dance', *CG*, May 1958, p. 17. 'Round the counties, Co. Fermanagh, Kesh dance', *CG*, May 1968, p. 55.
[177] 'I.P.A. Dance', *CG*, Nov. 1968, p. 75.

endeavour, a group with considerable on-going cross-border links, demonstrates the importance of contact in fostering more extensive social interaction and professional contact.[178]

The dances at which Garda personnel are noted as having been present are clustered in two periods, five in the 1951 to 1959 period and five between 1968 and 1970.[179] Interestingly, this pattern is repeated among those dances whose Southern parties remain unspecified. Of these, ten fall between 1949 and 1958 and one in 1971, with the anomalous dance taking place in 1964.[180] The one Garda dance at which Northern Irish parties are noted as being present, run by Drogheda District, also fits into this pattern, being reported in October 1956.[181] Given the time required for mounting political tensions to alter established behaviour patterns, these date clusters imply that political tensions did discourage social interaction. This is supported by the known change in the orders given to the RUC following the attempted kidnapping of three RUC women constables while attending a dance in County Monaghan.[182] With the memory of the shooting of Constable Norman Anderson during the previous troubled period of the late 1950s and early 1960s still in mind, an RUC spokesman announced to the local press that 'there is no ban placed on police personnel crossing the border in a personal capacity but they are expected to exercise their own discretion. The question of further social excursions across the border will be considered by senior police officers in the light of

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[178] 'Notes from the Depot, Rugby', *CG*, April 1968, p. 123.
[179] See, for example, 'Round the Counties – County Tyrone', Jan. 1951, p. 23 and 'Round the counties - County Fermanagh dance', *CG,* April 1968, p. 63.
[180] See, for example, Jan 1949 'Round the Counties - Co. Armagh', *CG,* Jan. 1949, p. 19 and 'Enniskillen R.U.C. dinner dance', *CG,* March 1971, p. 35.
[181] "Boyneside II", 'Divisional News, Droichead Atha, garda dance', *GR,* Oct. 1956, p. 1017-9.
[182] 'I.R.A try to kidnap city policewomen', *UG,* 4 Nov. 1971, p. 2.

recent threats made against the police by the Provisional IRA.'[183] 'It was expected, however,' the newspaper reported, 'that the matter will still be left to the discretion of the individual members of the force.'[184] Discussing the effects of the security situation on interaction, one member of the Gardaí was emphatic in rejecting the theory that 'forces' orders' lay behind the ending of contact.[185] 'Because of the dangers then of them coming across the border … from a security point of view [joint sports matches] fell through. Only through a security point of view, nothing more. It had nothing politically; nobody said "you cannot do this or you cannot do that".'[186] This does not appear to have been universally the case, however, with the *Garda Review* reporting outright that 'the Club [Garda Rugby Club] were not allowed by the Commissioner to play the annual fixtures against the RUC because of the situation' in 1970.[187]

Perhaps the most noteworthy RUC dance in highlighting the adaptations required in order for successful cross-border interaction to take place was that run by Lurgan RUC in February 1955.[188] It was traditional, at all dances and other public events, to end the evening by playing the national anthem.[189] This could lead to tension when cross-border or cross-community groups met.[190] At this dance, run on behalf of County Armagh RUC,

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[183] "Murder most foul", editorial comment, *CG*, March 1961, p. 3. Livingstone, *The Fermanagh Story*, p. 387. 'I.R.A try to kidnap city policewomen', *UG,* 4 Nov. 1971, p. 2.
[184] 'I.R.A try to kidnap city policewomen', *UG,* 4 Nov. 1971, p. 2.
[185] Former Garda District officer, Interview with Jason Lane, 16 April 1998. Source: J. Lane, *The Development of Irish Cross- Border Police Cooperation*, D.Phil diss. (unpublished), Queen's University, Belfast, 1999.
[186] Ibid.
[187] 'RUC Athletics Association, rugby football, how police teams fared', *CG,* June 1970, p. 89. 'The sporting scheme request for new rugby round', *GR,* June 1970, p. 21.
[188] 'Round the Counties – County Armagh Successful Dance', *CG,* March 1955, p. 11.
[189] 'A Lesson in Good Manners', *NS*, 28 July, 1972, p. 15.
[190] Louis Marcus, interviewed by author, 22 April 2004. Bob Purdie, *Politics in the Street* (Belfast, 1990), p. 164.

patrons 'from all over Ulster and from South of the border' were in attendance.[191] The same month, an investigation was ordered by the Minister for Home Affairs G. B. Hanna, into 'why the national anthem … had not been played at the conclusion of a police dance in Lurgan.'[192] This implies that one way in which visitors were spared embarrassment was by the omission of the anthem ceremony.

One major area of social interaction between the RUC and Garda was the holding of inter-force sports fixtures. Between the years 1965 and 1970, RUC and RUC Depot teams played the Garda in golf, rugby, basketball and soccer.[193] In November 1966, four local Gardaí travelled up to Armagh to compete at road bowls against a team made up of members of the Armagh Bowling Club, 'which included a number of members of the RUC,' whose colleagues supervised the match and later provided a reception for both teams at Armagh RUC station.[194] There is evidence that sports fixtures between the two forces had taken place earlier in the century, with a 1952 *Garda Review* report concerning the promotion of Captain T. D. Morrison, O.B.E., to the rank of Deputy Inspector General of the RUC, noting that his promotion 'will evoke congratulatory feelings at Headquarters and in the D.M.D.' since:

> For twenty years Captain Morrison has been a familiar figure to the Garda by reason of his close and fruitful connection with the Irish Amateur Boxing Association. When the Garda Síochána held a commanding position in amateur boxing in the later twenties and early thirties he often brought teams of RUC

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[191] 'Round the Counties – County Armagh Successful Dance', *CG,* March 1955, p. 11.
[192] Chris Ryder, *The RUC – a Force Under Fire* (London, 2000), p. 82.
[193] See, for example, Ceantar "D" "Devenish", 'Rugby and Basketball v. R.U.C.', *GR,* April 1967, p. 273. 'Garda v R.U.C. on the Soccer field at Enniskillen', *GR,* June 1966, p. 475. 'Golf news R.U.C. v. Garda Síochána', *CG,* June 1967, pp. 129-131.
[194] "Trinitarian", 'Divisional news, Ceanntar Ath Dara, Bowling', *GR,* Nov. 1966, p. 800.

> boxers to Dublin to test our best … when our boys travelled North to take part in tournaments Captain Morrison was always there to see that they were well looked after.[195]

Although a hockey game between the two forces was claimed to be in the planning in January 1954, nothing appears to have come of the venture, and it is not mentioned again.[196] The first match known to have taken place during this period, therefore, was a rugby friendly between the RUC Depot and the Garda in May 1965.[197] Demographically, the instigation of new sports fixtures might have been expected to have taken place in the early 1950s, as a new generation of young men joined the two forces. It was noted by Liam McNiffe with regards to Irish language learning, that enthusiasm and energy tended to wane after the first ten years of an intake's existence, as marriage and family responsibilities reduced the time which the men had to spend on other activities.[198] That these new fixtures began fifteen years into the new intake's careers suggests that the change was fuelled by forces other than the demographic. 1965 was a pivotal date in relations between the two states, being in many ways the height of that phase of economic, social and political optimism which had been noted earlier and it is likely that those same trends played a role in the instigation of more frequent and overt social contact between the two police forces.[199]

One sporting field on which the RUC and Garda were not to meet throughout this period was that of Gaelic Sports. While many Gardaí took part in Gaelic football and hurling,

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[195] 'Divisional Notes, Depot Notes, congratulations', *GR,* June 1952, p. 563.
[196] 'RUC athletics association, hockey', *CG,* Jan. 1954, p. 22.
[197] 'Notes from the Depot, Civic Guards', *CG*, May 1965, p. 93.
[198] McNiffe, *A History of the Garda Síochána*, p. 128.
[199] See pages 85-86 of current work.

even competing at county level, the GAA, a nationalist, thirty-two county organisation, maintained throughout this period a ban on membership by British security personnel, including the RUC. The ban was not always strictly enforced, however. As D. Fahy observed, 'throughout the middle part of the last century it was a rule more breached then observed, and an administrative blind eye was turned to any transgression.'[200] This led to controversy in 1950, when a Belleek GAA representative at a Fermanagh County meeting raised the issue of two RUC men and one RAF man found to have taken part in a GAA-run competition in Northern Ireland.[201] In the resulting furore, three articles dealing with the controversy were included in the following month's *Constabulary Gazette.*[202] The GAA, claimed the editor, had made themselves 'a laughing stock before the rest of the world' by their attitude 'in matters of sport - which, the world over, knows no barriers.'[203] One former County Down all-Ireland winner, in discussing the sporting career he was forced to abandon on joining the RUC, commented that 'I've known policemen who did play Gaelic football before the bans were strictly adhered to and they spoke about it regularly to me.'[204] There is no doubt that the ban caused resentment within the RUC, particularly as, as David Hassan has pointed out, it encouraged an 'us' and 'them' divide between the RUC and the nationalist community.[205] The ban lasted until November 2001, before being finally lifted. In celebration, the by-then renamed

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[200] D. Fahy, *How the G.A.A. Survived the Troubles* (Dublin, 2001), p. 68.
[201] 'RUC-G.A.A.', Editorial Comment, *CG,* Feb. 1950, p. 7.
[202] Ibid. 'The RUC and G.A.A.', *CG,* Feb. 1950, p. 23. 'A catastrophe! How will they ever live it down!!', CG, Feb. 1950, p. 30.
[203] 'RUC-G.A.A.', Editorial Comment, *CG,* Feb. 1950, p. 7.
[204] Fahy, *How the G.A.A. Survived the Troubles*, p. 68.
[205] David Hassan, 'Sports and National Identity', p. 170.

PSNI and Garda challenged each other to a Gaelic football game, which took place on 30 October 2002, and which the vastly less experienced RUC team lost heavily.[206]

Sporting fixtures between the two forces appear to have been used by senior officers as a forum in which to meet in an informal way. On their first visit to Dublin, for example, the RUC rugby team was accompanied by both Deputy Inspector General J.A. Peacock and County Inspector, later Chief Inspector, Jamie Flanagan, and were welcomed at their destination by Garda Commissioner W.P. Quinn.[207] There was no need for such a high-profile following, except in that it gave the senior officers a chance to meet. Golf, in particular, provided an important point of contact, since it was frequently played by senior officers, and provided extensive opportunities for interaction and conversation. Four meetings between the Garda and RUC Golf societies were documented as having taken place between June 1967 and July 1968, the most senior officer present being RUC Inspector General Sir Albert Kennedy, who won the individual prize at the June 1968 event.[208] Interaction via sporting fixtures was not limited, however, to senior officers and the playing teams. Spectators travelling to fixtures often far outnumbered the playing personnel, with over one hundred individuals making the journey from the Republic, for example, to the RUC depot for a rugby and basketball match in March 1967.[209] Each visit included music and social evenings, one, or even two, meals, and a chance to explore the facilities, sporting, social and operational, available to the opposite force, which could

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[206] Http://www.garda.ie/angarda/majorevents/gardapsnimatch.html. Accessed 22 March 2006. Chris Ryder, *The Fateful Split* (London, 2004), p. 323.
[207] 'Devenish', 'Divisional News, Ceanntar "D", R. na C., GARDA v. RUC', *GR,* March 1966, p. 265.
[208] 'Round the counties, Belfast, Sir Albert wins as RUC beat Garda', *CG,* June 1968, p. 75. 'RUC Athletics Association, Golf, RUC golf champion, Begley cup: Garda Síochána guest of RUC', *CG,* July 1968, p. 117. 'RUC Athletics Association, golf, RUC v. Garda Síochána', *CG,* Nov. 1967, p. 101. 'RUC Athletics Association - Golf news - RUC v. Garda Síochána', *CG,* June 1967, pp. 129-131.
[209] 'Notes from the Depot, visit of Garda Síochána', *CG,* May 1967, pp. 149-152.

then be used to pressurise their own police authorities into providing comparable facilities.[210]

Many individual examples exist of friendly contact between RUC and Garda personnel.[211] Interestingly, participants often attributed better contacts to increased opportunities to meet, such as that presented by the decision to send large numbers of Gardaí to the border area during the foot and mouth epidemic in Britain in 1967-8.[212] In this way, politics could impact on border relations in unexpected ways. Policemen on the border joined sporting and social organisations with a cross-border aspect. For example, D. I. Sherrard of the RUC, was a member of the only cross-border Rotary Club in existence, Lifford-Strabane.[213] The two police magazines also formed an important social link in themselves between the forces. The *Constabulary Gazette* was very proud to report, at a number of points, the avidness with which it was read in the Republic.[214] Indeed, on occasion, reports in the *Constabulary Gazette* form the only evidence surviving for conditions and morale inside their sister force. For example, when discontent over pay broke out among the ranks of Gardaí in 1972, with the *Garda Review* out of publication from November 1970 to January 1973, the *Constabulary Gazette* provided the only published evidence for this dispute from the policemen's point of

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[210] S. Hays, 'My thirty years policing, immediate hush', *CG*, Jan. 1968, p. 11. 'Why not an RUC Crew or two?' *CG,* June 1970, p. 19. 'Dublin Metropolitan division, general', *GR,* Oct. 1951, p. 912.
[211] 'Round the Counties, Co. Fermanagh, Social, Etc.', *CG,* Feb. 1968, p. 71. 'Letters to the Editor', *Constabulary Review,* March 1968, p. 142.
[212] 'Round the Counties, Co. Fermanagh, Social, Etc.', *CG,* Feb. 1968, p. 71. 'Letters to the Editor', *CG, March* 1968, p. 142.
[213] 'Round the counties, Co. Armagh, D. I. Sherrard Promoted', *CG,* July 1968, p. 54.
[214] See, for example, 'The "dog-eared" Gazette', *CG,* June 1961, p. 4. 'Letters to the Editor', *CG, March* 1968, p. 142.

view.[215] These contacts, also, were subject to individual interest, with G. J. Gallagher, editor of the *Garda Review* until his death in 1957, frequently covering RUC issues in his editorial notes and 'Without Prejudice' column.[216]

With this cross-border readership in mind, it is interesting to note the exchange which took place within the *Garda Review* in the mid 1950's. As discussed in more detail later in relation to tourism, cooperation networks could only be maintained while a sufficient 'grey area' existed within which all participants felt comfortable.[217] This required that controversial and divisive topics be avoided. Since transgressions of this code could lead to the breakdown of relations, these had therefore to be rapidly disowned or silenced. Within the *Garda Review,* this process can be seen most clearly in the spirited debate which raged in 1954's 'Divisional News' section between Donegal's 'Cynic' and Dublin "C" Division's 'An Fear Fada' over the issue of potential Garda membership of the NACA, a thirty-two county athletics body.[218] There is a sense in this exchange that by asserting the hard-line nationalist stand which he feels the Garda should adopt on this issue, 'Cynic' offends the careful balance of non-political alignment which allowed contact with the RUC to take place. These nationalist assertions hence drew sharp

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[215] See, for example, 'Bitterness amongst "rebel" Civic Guards', *CG,* March 1972, p. 41. 'Garda body further apart from 'rebels'', *CG*, April 1972, p. 32. 'New deal for 6,700 Civic Guards', *CG,* May 1972, p. 24.

[216] McNiffe, *A History of the Garda Síochána*, p. 144. See, for example, P. J. G., 'Without Prejudice', *GR*, Nov. 1949, p. 931 and April 1950, p. 387.

[217] See page 295-297 incurrent work.

[218] "An Fear Fada", 'Divisional news, "C" district notes, athletics', *GR,* May 1954, p. 479. "The Cynic", 'Divisional news, Donegal notes, athletics', *GR,* June 1954, p. 567. "An Fear Fada", 'Divisional news, "C" district notes, athletics', *GR*, July 1954, p. 643. "The Cynic", 'Divisional news, Donegal notes, tomfoolery', *GR,* Aug. 1954 p. 723. "An Fear Fada", 'Divisional news, "C" district notes, tomfoolery', *GR,* Sept. 1954, pp. 797-9.

responses from 'Cynic's' colleague, who eventually closes the issue by dismissing it with a joke.[219]

The sense of camaraderie and shared duty which the two forces possessed was displayed in their treatment of police personnel killed while on duty. A representative of the opposite force was sent to each such funeral. Following the shooting of Garda Fallon, in Dublin in 1970, for example, County Inspector Shepherd represented the RUC at the funeral, while the 'Chairmen, [and] members, Northern Ireland region, International Police Association ... Inspector General and members, Royal Ulster Constabulary ... [and] Royal Ulster Constabulary, Central Representative Body' were all numbered among those who sent wreaths.[220] Garda Fallon, being Dublin based, was unlikely to have been known to the RUC, and hence representation at his funeral was less likely to have been a personal gesture, and more a collective one. The RUC is also noted as having been represented at the funeral of Garda Sergt. Michael Joyce who was killed in a car-crash on his way to collect a prisoner from the border.[221] The two men attending, Det. Sergt. James McCullan and Const. Sean Mooney, were the two officers who had been detailed to deliver the prisoner to Joyce.[222] The report makes clear, however, that the men were there representing Downpatrick RUC, rather than in a personal capacity.[223] The chairmen of the Police Federation in Northern Ireland also represented the RUC at the funeral of Inspector Donegan of the Garda Síochána who was killed by a terrorist bomb

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[219] "An Fear Fada", 'Divisional news, "C" district notes, tomfoolery', *GR,* Sept. 1954, pp. 797-9.
[220] 'Among the attendance ...', *GR,* May 1970, p. 33. 'They sent wreaths', *GR,* May 1970, p. 19.
[221] 'Round the Counties, Co. Down, Garda's funeral', *CG,* Feb. 1968, p. 61.
[222] Ibid.
[223] Ibid.

on the County Fermanagh border.[224] A Garda presence was similarly noted at the funerals of RUC Constables Miller and Donaldson who died in a booby-trap bombing near Crossmaglen on 12 August 1970 and Constable Cunningham and Haslett, shot in North Belfast on 15 October 1971.[225]

As well as their own networks, a range of professional international associations existed to provide policemen with opportunities to interact socially, with the understanding that social contacts would lead to professional cooperation and a more efficient delivery of policing services. Leading amongst these organisations was the International Police Association (IPA), formed in 1950. Its motto, 'Service through friendship,' highlighted the society's focus on the fostering of social contacts as a means of achieving closer police cooperation, which it did through encouraging international travel and joint cross-border visits and events. The RUC joined the IPA immediately upon its formation in 1950 as 'Region 2; Northern Ireland,' within the wider British membership, and the Garda joined four years later.[226] From then on, a number of cross-border events are mentioned as having taken place under the association's auspices.[227] The IPA was not alone in this field, however. Margaret Cameron, in her book *The Women in Green*, commented on the importance of both the IPA and the Women Police Association in maintaining links between RUC women and the Ban Gardaí, while for higher officers, the Association of Chief Police Officers, which was for many years served by a Southern

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[224] 'Eire security forces victims of terrorists bombs on border', *CG,* July 1972, p. 67. McKitterick et. al., *Lost Lives*, p. 196.
[225] 'Country mourns for murdered constables', *CG,* Sept. 1970, p. 83. McKitterick et. al., *Lost Lives*, pp. 56-7. 'Funeral tributes to murdered policemen', *CG,* Nov. 1971, p. 7.
[226] Arthur Troop, *Service Through Friendship* (Stamford, Lincolnshire, 1997), p. 49. Ibid. p. 141.
[227] 'International police association forthcoming outings', *CG,* February 1965, p. 67. 'I.P.A. reception', photograph, *CG,* June 1968, p. 63.

Irish co-president from Wexford, also provided a forum in which to meet and discuss mutual problems.[228]

The U.S.C.

The RUC in Northern Ireland was supported in their work during periods of tension by the semi-militarised Ulster Special Constabulary. First recruited on 1 November 1920, the USC had an establishment strength of 54,250 men in three classes, A, B and C, who made up 'one in four of all Protestant men of military age.'[229] It was an almost exclusively protestant force and had been formed in the early years of the state to protect loyalists, and ultimately Ulster itself, from the IRA and the perceived inefficiency and unreliability of the old RIC.[230] As a consequence, relations between themselves and the regular police were 'often very bad'.[231] USC members served predominantly in border areas and, as such, provide an interesting counter study to the concept of familiarity and contact as important factors in building cooperation networks.

Despite their geographical proximity to the border, and the predominantly local residence of their members, no contacts can be traced between the USC and Garda Síochána. No Garda member was recorded as being present at the funeral of men killed on duty while

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[228] M. Cameron, *The Women in Green* (Belfast, 1993), p. 51. 'Ireland honoured at international police congress', *GR,* Dec. 1950, p. 32.
[229] A. Hezlet, *The 'B' Specials* (London, 1972), p. 87.
[230] Ibid., p. 10 and 19.
[231] Ibid. p. 30. See Denis Donoghue, *Warrenpoint* (London, 1990), p. 10. The B-Specials were even held responsible by some RUC men for the shooting of Catholic RUC Sergeant Joseph Campbell in 1977, though a former 'Special' and RUC man was acquitted of his murder in 1980. W. G. A. Scott interviewed by author, 23 May 2006. McKittrick et al, *Lost Lives*, p. 704.

serving with the USC's successor-force, the Ulster Defence Regiment (UDR), and no mention of the Garda appears in the USC's regular *Constabulary Gazette* column.[232] No directly equivalent organisation to the USC existed South of the border, and their semi-military nature alone may have been sufficient to distance them from the avowedly civilian Guards. The force was also an emergency one, called up in times of perceived threat. This mitigated against the establishment of long-term contacts by its members. The USC's avowedly protestant ethos, 'lamentable level of indiscipline' and self perceived role as the protectors of Ulster against invasion probably contributed to this lack of contact, as did the force's reputation among even moderate nationalists, who saw them as a hopelessly biased body of men, 'effectively a unionist militia' who merely 'masquerad[ed] as police but [were], in actual fact, Unionist Party followers, many of them sectarian thugs armed to the teeth [and] in uniform,' and 'an intrusive and sometimes a repressive presence in their everyday lives.'[233] The lack of contact between these two forces is valuable evidence in favour of the assertion that opportunity alone was insufficient to ensure the formation of cooperation networks. Despite serving within short distances of each other, the two forces remained distant operationally, due to a lack of trust and the will to establish working contacts.

Conclusion

Police cooperation was a legally and politically complex issue which, for much of this period, operated in a quasi-legal, unofficial form. As such, it provides a good case-study

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[232] 'Round the counties, Co. Tyrone, Tyrone man first in U.D.R to fall', *CG,* Sept. 1971, p. 88.
[233] Senia Pašeta, *Modern Ireland* (Oxford, 2003), p.105. James Kelly, *Bonfires on the Hillside* (Belfast, 1995), pp. 13 and 68, Garret Fitzgerald, *All in a Life* (London, 1992), p. 90 and Jackson, *Ireland*, p. 337.

of informal contacts expanding to fill the spaces where official policy and practical necessity did not coincide. That such cooperation took place is not denied, either by the two forces' friends, or by those antagonistic to them.[234] The curve of this contact network was, however, very closely tied to the wider political picture, flowering before and between the major upheavals of the border campaign and Northern Troubles, particularly in response to perceived official sanction post-1965.

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[234] See, for example, Dermot P. J. Walsh, *The Irish Police* (Dublin, 1998), p. 411 and Patsy McArdle *The Secret War* (Manchester, c.1984), pp. 35 and 37.

6. Administering the Borderlands - Local Authorities and the Irish Border

Five Southern counties and four Northern Irish counties face each other across the political border. The County Councils [CCs] charged with their administration had, since the passing of the 1898 Local Government Act, gradually become the basic units of local government on the island of Ireland.[1] Legislative changes since that time had created what Anderson and Goodman have termed 'institutional divergence and mismatch' between the councils, in particular with reference to central management and control.[2] Since 'every local government system – indeed every local authority – is different to some extent, and shaped by national and local circumstances,' there was not always an overlap in the decision-making powers and competences enjoyed by the councils North and South.[3] Nonetheless, the ten border councils shared a number of common areas of concern, as well as an overall interest in the delivery of efficient services and low rates of local taxation to their electors. As such, they had a motivation to work together in order to achieve these shared aims. Through an examination of a number of these areas of common competence, it is intended to examine the extent, and means, whereby border councils developed cross-border networks.

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[1] Derek Birrell, *Local Government Councillors in Northern Ireland* (Glasgow, 1981), p. 1. (Henceforth – *Local Councillors*).
[2] J. Anderson, and J. Goodman, 'Problems of Integration', p. 45. O'Dowd, Corrigan, and Moore, *Urban Research*, pp. 278-9.
[3] Mark Callanan, 'Managing multiple relationships and demands: trends and developments in local government management abroad', *Administration,* Vol. 54, No. 1, 2006, p. 90.

The local government system in Ireland

'Local Government might be described … as a system of democratic representation and public administration whose primary purpose is to provide various services and regulate certain matters at local level, and to represent and promote the interests of the local community.'[4] In Ireland, the modern system of local administration emerged following the 1898 Local Government Act, which divided the territory into County Councils (CCs), Urban District Councils (UDCs) and Rural District Councils (RDCs), on the English model, and defined the powers and responsibilities between them.[5] Borough Councils were created in the towns, of which Belfast and Londonderry Urban Borough Councils were the only representatives in what became Northern Ireland. This lasted until 1968, when Londonderry Corporation was suspended under O'Neill's 5-point program of reform.[6] At the time, the responsibilities of these councils overlapped with other authorities, such as boards of poor law guardians and town commissions.[7] As these gradually faded away 'local government in Ireland became …primarily county council government,' supported by a network of RDCs and UDCs.[8] 'That was a great system', noted one former council employee, 'because it was responsible for everything: water, sewerage, roads, education, and welfare. Everything you might name. Planning, the whole lot. Everything underneath one body. And it worked great.'[9] Others, particularly in the North of Ireland, disagreed with this analysis, and with the wisdom of concentrating

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[4] Department of the Environment, *Local Government and the Elected Member* (Dublin, 1991), p. 9.
[5] Daly (ed.) C*ounty and Town*, p. x. Birrell and Murie, *Policy and Government*, p. 155.
[6] Alvin Jackson, 'Local Government in Northern Ireland, 1920-73', in Daly (ed.) *County and Town,* p. 64.
[7] Ibid., p. 57.
[8] Basil Chubb, *The Government and Politics of Ireland* (London, 1982), p. 295
[9] Cyril Coulter, Former Finance Manager, Fermanagh District Council. Interviewed by author, 10 May 2006.

so much power into the hands of local men 'because of the poor record of many councils.'[10]

In the South, CCs had the responsibility for striking the rate to be paid by local householders and businesses, from which funds, together with the increasingly important government grants and subsidies, they would apportion a budget to each of the UDCs and RDCs under their control.[11] They would also frequently raise loans, from private as well as public sources to fund major capital projects, a practice which their Northern contemporaries were not permitted to follow.[12] In Northern Ireland, the rating system operated the other way, with UDCs and RDCs collected the rates, and paying for CC services via a county levy.[13] Using these funds, local councils would then carry out their functions in maintaining minor roads, water, sewerage and sanitation, the registering of births, deaths and marriages, and some limited welfare functions.[14] The remainder was used to carry out county functions such as major road maintenance, drainage, transport subsidies, social welfare and the running of hospitals and county homes.[15] In the Republic, CCs also gained control of the newly created vocational education sector, while in Northern Ireland councils oversaw all primary and secondary education which was

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[10] See, for example, the Gordon Report on Mental Health in Birrell and Murie, *Policy and Government*, p. 158.

[11] Department of Local Government (D.L.G.), *Powers Vested in Elected Members of Local Authorities* (Dublin, 1962), p. 14. (Henceforth –*Vested Powers 1962*). Inter-departmental Committee on Local Finance and Taxation, *Report on Rates and other Sources of Revenue for local Authorities* (Dublin, c.1968), p. 7. Donal De Buitléir, 'Local Government Finance in Ireland', in Daly (ed.) *County and Town*, p. 142. Sacks, *The Donegal Mafia,* p. 66.

[12] Department of the Environment, *Local Government and the Elected Member* (Dublin, 1991), p. 53 Birrell and Murie, *Policy and Government,* p. 163. Maurice Hayes, interviewed by author, 30 May 2006.

[13] Birrell and Murie, *Policy and Government*, p. 162.

[14] For a summery of the powers of different levels of local government in Northern Ireland, see Birrell and Murie, *Policy and Government,* p. 157 and Birrell, *Local Councillors*, p. 1. D.L.G, *Vested Powers 1962*, pp. 7-8.

[15] D.L.G, *Vested Powers 1962*, pp. 7-8.

under state control, though in neither part of the island did councils gain as extensive a control of local life as enjoyed by their English counterparts, for example, in areas such as policing.[16] This system continued largely unchanged throughout Ireland post-1921, with only minor alterations.[17] In 1925, RDCs were officially disbanded south of the border, their territories merged into those of the nearest UDC, while 1929 saw the first moves towards the implementation of the county management system when Cork, a city at the heart of Ireland's civil war, had its powerful corporation replaced with a council, guided by a city manager.[18] In Northern Ireland, few major changes took place until 1967, when all local government in County Fermanagh was amalgamated under the County Council, bringing an end to the independent existence of 'three Rural District Councils; Irvinestown, Lisnaskea, Enniskillen and the Borough Council of Enniskillen,' in the process creating the only administrative area to remain county-coherent following the 1973 reform.[19] The major re-structuring of council responsibilities, however, took place in Northern Ireland just beyond the end of the period under examination, when, amid widespread allegations of discrimination by councils, the implementation of the Macrory Report in 1973 stripped 'local government … of all its major functions – education, housing, planning and social services – and left [it] to empty the bins, sweep

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[16] Jackson, 'Local Government in Northern Ireland, 1920-73', in *County and Town*, p. 59. Michael Byrne, *The Vocational Education Movement* (Tullamore, Co. Offaly, 1980), pp. 17-19. Birrell and Murie, *Policy and Government*, pp. 156-7.

[17] G.F. Loughran, 'The problem of Local Government in Northern Ireland', *Administration,* Vol. 13, No. 1, 1965, p. 36.

[18] Birrell and Murie, *Policy and Government*, p. 156. Eunan O'Halpin, 'The system of city and County Management', in Daly (ed.) *County and Town*, p. 35. Aodh Quinlivan, *Philip Monahan – A Man Apart* (Dublin, 2006), pp. 68-71.

[19] Ministry of Development, *Northern Ireland Local Government Areas* (Belfast, 1972), map. See also Ministry of Development, *Fermanagh Final District Electoral Areas* (Belfast, 1972), map.

the streets, tend the parks and bury the dead', or, as one town clerk dismissively put it, 'bins, bogs and burials.'[20]

From 1940 and the passing of the first County Management Act, the Republic's local government system began to diverge administratively from that which continued to be practiced in Northern Ireland.[21] This Act transferred certain council executive powers, such as employment and fiscal control, away from elected local representatives and into the hands of a full-time manager, aided by officers including the county secretary, engineer and financial officer.[22] Senior staff were appointed via a Local Appointments Commission, sitting in Dublin.[23] This body made statutory recommendation to councillors, who then nominally appointed the manager.[24] Other executive officers would then be appointed by him or her, again based on the commission's recommendation.[25] The County manager was also responsible for all minor appointments 'such as clerks, street sweepers and porters,' this being one of the few areas where council members had no right of compulsion over him.[26] The regime, still smarting from a severe civil war, aimed in this way to prevent the establishment of local power-bases, and to curb the extent to which councillors could partake in 'the politics of brokerage and patronage

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[20] Mike Tomlinson, 'Relegating Local Government', in O'Dowd, Rolston and Tomlinson, *Northern Ireland – Between Civil Rights and Civil War* (London, 1980), p. 95 and Hayes, 'A Town Clerk'sPerspective', in *County and Town*, p. 74. For a formulation of discrimination allegations, see, for example, Fermanagh Civil Rights Association, *Fermanagh Facts* (Place unknown, c.1968), p. 1.

[21] See http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/ZZA12Y1940.html. Accessed 21 March 2007.

[22] Arthur W. Bromage, 'Irish Councilmen at work', *Administration,* Vol. 2, No. 1, 1954, p. 88. For details of the choosing and appointment of county managers and executive, Seamus Keating, interviewed by author, 8 Nov. 2005.

[23] Neil Collins, *Local Government Managers at Work* (Dublin, 1987), p. 22.

[24] Myles Tierney, *The Parish Pump* (Dublin, 1982), p. 27.

[25] D.L.G., *Vested Powers 1962*, p. 7.

[26] D.L.G., *Notes on the Powers Vested by Law in the Elected Members of Local Authorities* (Dublin, 1955), pp. 18-19. (Henceforth – *Vested Powers 1955*) Daly, 'Local Appointments', in Daly (ed.) *County and Town*, p. 52.

familiar throughout Ireland' via corruption, nepotism and discrimination.[27] This move was seen, justly, by local members as a diminution of local democracy, and a series of amending legislations forced though a new power balance between the county manager and county council which gave them greater power of financial supervision, and the ability, under clause 4 of the County Management Act of 1955, to force the manager to act as they wished, 'provided that what they want done can lawfully be done, and that money for the purpose has been provided.'[28] The procedure allowing councillors to over-rule managers was detailed in the handbook provided to each elected member.[29] This was, however, 'the cold law' only and 'it was not the intention … that elected members and the manager should act independently of each other.'[30] In practice, recalled Richard Haslam, there was a:

> Good relationship in a lot of counties between the manager and the council, and as a matter of fact, as a manager, I never had a section 4 in my time, in twenty years. There were things they wanted to do, and they might put down a resolution but they say that they accept the manager's decision afterwards. They don't want to fall out with the manager. It's very much a give and take.[31]

The relative peace achieved between councils and managers can be seen in the extensive discussions surrounding changes to the County Management Acts, where many councils came out in support of their managers, if not of the system which appointed them, and the

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[27] Paul Arthur, *Special Relationships* (Belfast, 2000), p. 45. Eunan O'Halpin, 'The system of city and County Management', in Daly (ed.) *County and Town*, pp. 36-7.
[28] D.L.G. *Vested Powers 1962*, pp. 8-9. See also Albert Eastham, 'The Irish City Manager', Unpublished MA thesis, University College, Cork. Submitted 18 Sept 1970, p. 12 and Basil Chubb, *The Government and Politics of Ireland* (London, 1982), pp. 303-4.
[29] D.L.G., *Vested Powers 1955*, pp. 16-18.
[30] Ibid., p. 5.
[31] Richard Haslam, former head of the County Managers Association. Interviewed by author, 7 Nov. 2005.

admission even by the system's critics that Irish local government was 'very well served by its paid officials.'[32]

The division of power between manager and council was governed in a manner similar to that currently in operation between Westminster and the Welsh assembly.[33] A list of 'reserve' functions was held by the councils, with all other power devolved to the manager as 'executive' functions.[34] These 'executive' functions included all employment decisions, except those concerning tax collectors, and the placing of contracts, subject to pre-agreed council guidelines.[35] The reserve functions included the choice and priority of projects to be pursued, the division of funds and placing of tenants, the setting of local rents and rates, which were for the most part formulated by the county manager and then debated by the council, and the right to lobby the government on issues of local concern.[36] The presence of the executive, with its certain degree of freedom of action, helped to speed up the decision-making processes in the Republic, since county engineers, for example, though obliged to repair those roads chosen by the council, could also repair others through a general account, which was passed by the council retrospectively as part of the Manager's Orders.[37]

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[32] Castleblaney UDC minutes, 3 Sept. 1954, C.U.D.C.O.. Myles Tierney, *The Parish Pump* (Dublin, 1982), p. 7.
[33] John Osmond, 'Devolution in Wales: nation building and the national assembly' in John Coakley, Brigid Laffan and Jennifer Todd (ed.), *Renovation or Revolution? New Territorial Politics in Ireland and the United Kingdom* (Dublin, 2005), pp. 56-7.
[34] D.L.G., *Vested Powers 1955*, p. 5. A full list of reserved functions is provided in the appendices of the *Notes*, pp. 21-39. See also, Basil Chubb, *The Government and Politics of Ireland* (London, 1982), p. 302.
[35] D.L.G., *Vested Powers 1955*, p. 7. Seamus Keating, interviewed by author, 8 Nov. 2005.
[36] D.L.G., *Vested Powers 1955*, p. 11-14. Monaghan County Council was proud that it was the only CC to form a rates committee, rather then delegating this task to its County manager. Monaghan CCM, M.C.C.O., 7 March 1966.
[37] A good example of this can be seen with reference to the repairs of the Altadavin Bridge between County Monaghan and Armagh. Six months were taken by Clougher RDC to clear the decision to have the bridge repaired, which the Monaghan county engineer cleared with his manager in one letter, dated 5 Feb. 1963.

The institution of a managerial system on the American model in the Republic was a major innovation and created a wide 'institutional divergence and mismatch' between decision-makers North and South.[38] While Northern councils employed executive officers, these were based on the English model and served as employees of the councils, without independent authority. As such, no direct tallying existed between their roles and those of the county managers, which hindered the ability of the two to cooperate effectively.[39]

The presence of the managerial system spared Southern councils from much of the criticism levelled at their Northern equivalents with regards to council housing and jobs.[40] Southern Councillors were themselves aware that 'one of the things a family never forgot was if you helped them into a house, or helped them with grants to improve a house.'[41] In the North, electoral stasis insulated councils from electoral control. Few elections were actively contested. In 1973, 24 percent of Northern councillors had 20 years or more experience of council work and 48 percent were sixty years of age or over. One of the ways in which this was achieved was through a systematic failure to provide housing or jobs for political opponents, thus forcing them away from the area.[42] Indeed,

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See, File F2-1, Roads Section, Monaghan CC, M.C.C.O.. For an example of manger's orders, see 14 Aug. 1967, Monaghan CCM, M.C.C.O..

[38] J. Anderson, and J. Goodman, 'Problems of Integration', p. 45. Basil Chubb, *The Government and Politics of Ireland* (London, 1982), p. 92.

[39] Richard Haslam, interviewed by author, 7 Nov. 2005.

[40] James Loughlin, *The Ulster Question since 1945* (Basingstoke and New York, 2004), pp. 39-41. Livingstone, *The Fermanagh Story*, p. 369. Denis P. Barritt and Charles F. Carter, *The Northern Ireland Problem* (Oxford, 1962), pp. 97-100 and 113.

[41] Charlie Cullen, interviewed by author, 25 May 2006.

[42] Hayes, *Minority Verdict*, pp. 26-9. Birrell, *Local Councillors*, p. 12 and 14. Hayes, 'A Town Clerk'sPerspective', pp. 70–71 and Jackson, 'Local Government in Northern Ireland, 1920 - 73', pp. 61-2,

John Whyte asserted that Stormont's main failing was not 'that it was directly responsible for widespread discrimination, but that it allowed discrimination on such a scale over a substantial segment of Northern Ireland' by the local authorities under its control.[43] After all, notes Loughlin, 'sins of omission were scarcely less damnable than sins of commission.'[44] The case most frequently cited in this regard was the placing of unmarried, nineteen-year-old, Emily Beattie in a council-built bungalow in the village of Caledon, while many catholic families remained on the waiting list.[45]

Interestingly, as the 1960s progressed, no Northern county council minutes record the growing agitation for reform, and no discussion is implied of the allegations being made. The first indication of unrest to appear within the minutes of Fermanagh CC, for example, which suffered sit-ins and protests within its council chamber before this date, comes as late as February 1970, when a motion is put to the council stating that:[46]

> Conscious of the need to improve community relations in Fermanagh, and in the knowledge that Fermanagh County Council is not representative of the people and that its affairs have been conducted along sectarian and bigoted lines we hereby resolve that the council should be dissolved and a new council truly representative of the people of the county constituted in its place.[47]

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in *County and Town*. Government of Northern Ireland, *Cameron Report*, paragraphs 128-130. Fermanagh Civil Rights Association, *Fermanagh Facts*, pp. 25 – 35. In the 1967 local elections, for example, only 66 of 496 seats in the Rural Districts were contested. See Birrell and Murie, *Policy and Government* , pp. 163-4.

[43] John Whyte 'How much discrimination was there under the Unionist regime 1921 – 1968?', in Tom Gallagher and John O'Connell (ed.), *Contemporary Irish Studies* (Manchester, 1983), p. 31.

[44] James Loughlin, *The Ulster Question since 1945* (Basingstoke and New York, 2004), p. 41.

[45] Government of Northern Ireland, *Cameron Report*, paragraphs 26-28.

[46] Cyril Coulter, interviewed by author, 10 May 2006.

[47] 20 Feb. 1970, Fermanagh CCM, file LA4 2GA 10, PRONI.

Once the motion had failed to pass, the ten members supporting it, presumably Fermanagh's Nationalist members, walked out of the meeting, despite the assurances of their fellow councillors that they had a right to be proud of the work which the council did.[48]

Fermanagh had for a long time been a controversial county, being one of twelve local government areas where a catholic majority were ruled by a permanently unionist council.[49] Its re-organisation and absorption of the rural and urban councils in its area in 1967 was seen as 'a fresh gerrymander', the bitterness of which was still livid.[50] At the same time, Fermanagh unionism was heavily dominated by the old landed elite, who sought to control pressure from working-class unionists by being, and being seen to be, uncompromising in their stand on the constitutional issue.[51] The council's refusal to debate these issues, however, was in line with the general position of unionism at this time, which sought to discredit the allegations by refusing to acknowledge them.[52] Londonderry CC was able to take this policy still further, failing to note in its minutes even the occurrence of Bloody Sunday, 30 January 1972, other than in terms of providing space for the meetings of the Widgery Commission, formed to investigate the event.[53] The council, as one former councillor noted, was not responsible for the County Borough

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[48] Ibid.
[49] Birrell and Murie, *Policy and Government*, p. 164.
[50] Marc Mulholland, 'Assimilation versus Segregation: Unionist strategy in the 1960s', *Twentieth Century British History*, Vol. 11, No. 3, 2000, p. 301. See also Henry Patterson, *Ireland Since 1939* (Dublin, 2006), p. 121 – 2. Government of Northern Ireland, *Cameron Report*, Paragraph 134. Livingstone, *The Fermanagh Story*, p. 368, Fermanagh Civil Rights Association, *Fermanagh Facts*, pp. 10-11.
[51] Mulholland, *Crossroads*, pp. 125-6.
[52] Ibid. p. 138. Cyril Coulter, interviewed by author, 10 May 2006.
[53] Londonderry CCM, 15 Feb. 1972 and 18 April 1972, file LA5/2GA/24, PRONI.

of Londonderry, which was a separate authority.[54] Interestingly, the one council which did debate allegations of housing discrimination made against it was nationalist-dominated Newry Number Two RDC, which twice, in 1951 and 1965, debated allegations made by local unionists against it.[55] The council was also highlighted by Lord Cameron as one of only two which had brought in competitive examinations for local government appointments pre-1969.[56] This action either confirms that ignoring discrimination was indeed a specifically unionist policy, or highlights an intentional act by Newry to shame Unionist councils into action.

The controversy surrounding local government gerrymandering, the ratepayer franchise and allegations of discrimination by minority groups formed an invisible barrier to cooperation between Northern and Southern councils. Attempts to reform the Northern bodies in line with the demands of the civil rights movement through, for example, embodied in the Macrory report of 1972, were overtaken by events, so that the proposals were out of date at implementation, since they envisaged a local government system operating under two parliaments, the British parliament in Westminster and the subordinate parliament at Stormont, the later of which had by this time been prorogued.[57]

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[54] Jim Barr, interviewed by author, 23 Oct. 2006.
[55] Newry Number Two Rural District Council Minutes, 16 Nov. 1951, file LA57/2FA/22, and 4 Nov. 1965, file LA57/2FA/37, PRONI.
[56] Government of Northern Ireland, *Cameron Report*, paragraph 138.
[57] Review Body on Local Government in Northern Ireland (Macrory Report), *Report* (Belfast, 1970), recommendation 8. (Henceforth – *Macrory Report*). Jackson, 'Local Government in Northern Ireland, 1920 - 73', in *County and Town*, p. 64. Cyril Coulter, interviewed by author, 10 May 2006.

Councils both North and South inherited the highly centralised, bureaucratic system of local government supervision which had existed pre-1921.[58] As such, their scope for independent action was limited in various ways:

> The main emphasis was on *vires*, on ensuring that the council had legal powers to do what it had done and to commit resources to it, and that proper procedures had been followed. There was no talk then of value for money, or measuring outcomes, or efficiency or effectiveness – the sole test was legality … local authorities were restricted too in not having a general power to take action in the interests of their districts. Their power was a derived power, dependent on the legislation, and a council could not do anything, or spend money on anything, for which it was not expressly empowered by statute. A council could not spend more than £100 without the prior approval in writing of the ministry at Stormont.[59]

County managers can themselves be seen as the successors to the earlier inspectors, who had maintained the link between the councils and the Local Government Board pre-partition.[60] In the absence of such figures in the North, the government made use of the auditing of council accounts and the provision of variable grants-in-aid in order to influence council policy.[61] As the pre-partition system was reformed and adjusted, new institutional mismatches arose. For example, CCs in the South maintained their power as the roads authorities for their areas, which in Northern Ireland were delegated to UDCs and RDCs. This led to confusion when cross border bridges required mending.[62]

CCs held an ambiguous position between their local electorate and central government. On the one hand, councils were expected to act as the voice of the local population, and

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[58] Daly, *Buffer State*, pp. 14-5.
[59] Hayes, 'A Town Clerk'sPerspective', in *County and Town*, p. 68.
[60] Daly, *Buffer State,* p. 15.
[61] Hayes, 'A Town Clerk'sPerspective', in *County and Town*, pp. 68-9.
[62] See, for example, the case of Altadavin Bridge between County Tyrone and County Monaghan in File F2-1, Roads Division, Monaghan CC, M.C.C.O..

only sixty-five percent of county councillors in the North officially represented a political party, independents being even more common at UDC and RDC level.[63] 'Some councils have prided themselves on sinking party differences,' and even in the Republic, where the majority of councillors had a party affiliation, according to Basil Chubb, 'it has been common to find working arrangements for filling the post of chairman or mayor … that have ignored party affiliation.'[64] 'I had won by the biggest margin, so they had no choice but to elect me Chairmen, even though I did not belong to either of their parties and I was only about 19 years old,' one councillor recalled.[65] In the Republic, on the other hand, local government was recognised as 'the training ground for most of the Dáil Deputies,' those progressing to national politics rarely relinquishing their local positions.[66] In the 1969 Dáil, sixty-six percent of TDs were also members of their county or borough council, election to which was seen as vital to maintaining a strong local client network.[67] Access to the Dáil provided TD councillors with another, wider stage on which they could exercise their role as patrons and service their electoral machines 'structured around the individualist distribution of goods and services'.[68] Such ongoing local ties prevented deputies from focusing on their national role.[69] 'Let's face it,' commented the *Westmeath Examiner*, 'the task of the Deputy is a never-ending round of letter-writing about mundane subjects, introducing deputations and looking after so many causes that

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[63] Birrell, *Local Councillors*, p. 9.
[64] Basil Chubb, *The Government and Politics of Ireland* (London, 1976), p. 307. Liam McQuaid and Crawford McFarland, interviewed by author, 23 Oct. 2006.
[65] Richard Shannon, interviewed by author, 25 Oct. 2006.
[66] Myles Tierney, *The Parish Pump* (Dublin, 1982), p. 8.
[67] Basil Chubb, '"Going about persecuting civil servants": the role of the Irish Parliamentary Representative', *Political Studies*, Vol. 11, No. 3, 1963, p. 275. Brian Farrell, 'Dáil Deputies: the 1969 Generation', *Economic and Social Review,* Vol. 2, April 1971, p. 320. Basil Chubb, *The Government and Politics of Ireland* (London, 1976), p. 305.
[68] K.R. Carty, *Electoral Politics in Ireland – Party and Parish Pump* (Dingle, Co. Kerry, 1983), pp. 22-3. Sacks, *The Donegal Mafia*, p. 5. See also 'Ratepayer attended' Audit, *NS,* 31 May 1968 p. 2.
[69] Myles Tierney, *The Parish Pump* (Dublin, 1982), p. 9. Brian Farrell, 'Dáil Deputies: the 1969 Generation', *Economic and Social Review,* Vol. 2, April 1971, p. 325.

are lost beforehand.'[70] At the same time, their dual role meant that few councillors were wiling to openly criticise central government, especially when their own party was in control.[71] For example, Leitrim CC went through a period around 1960 in which Sinn Féin members continually submitted motions criticising British and Irish responses to the IRA border campaign, the Offences Against the State Act and interment without trial in the tradition of 'nationalist rhetoric' in Irish government.[72] These resolutions were consistently ruled out of order by the chairman on the grounds that the council was not supposed to discuss political matters. Then, on 16 November 1962, one such resolution was allowed to stand, and was passed unanimously.[73] The reason was the removal from the resolution of all criticism of the Irish government, but not of the British government, making it, presumably, less divisive and hence less 'political'. Another example of this was the planning permission case cited by Paul Sacks from Donegal CC on 14 October 1969.[74] Here, planning permission was revoked after the council's original refusal was overruled by the minister. 'In [this] case,' Sacks notes, 'there was a recoded vote which went along party lines – a rare occurrence,' linked, I would suggest, to the implied criticism of the government which it contained.[75]

In theory, a strong clientalist structure, or 'brokerage politics', meant that each individual politician was only elected on the basis of what he could achieve centrally for his clients,

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[70] 17 May 1969, quoted in Brian Farrell, 'Dáil Deputies: the 1969 Generation', *Economic and Social Review,* Vol. 2, April 1971, p. 310.
[71] Paul Arthur, *Special Relationships* (Belfast, 2000), pp. 46-6.
[72] Conor Cruise O'Brien, quoted in Sacks, *The Donegal Mafia,* p. 5. See, for example, Leitrim CCM, 5 Sept. 1960, 27 Nov. 1961, and 8 Jan. 1962, L.C.C.O.
[73] Leitrim CCM, 16 Nov. 1962, L.C.C.O.
[74] Donegal CCM, 14 Oct. 1969. Quoted in Sacks, *The Donegal Mafia*, pp. 51-2.
[75] Ibid. p. 52.

and how much 'pull' he was perceived to have.[76] As Erskine Childers pointed out to Taoiseach Sean Lemass with regards to the Drummully Peninsula, 'these people naturally expect that, with a minister in their constituency, vigorous action will be taken in various directions' to ease their situation.[77] Thanks to their presence in government, Childers and Minister for Agriculture Patrick Smith, TD for County Cavan, ensured the expansion of government measures to help western farmers were extended to cover their constituencies in Cavan and Monaghan, while Neil Blaney, during his tenure as Minister for Local Government (1959 – 1966), 'certainly looked after Donegal CC very well… [in terms] of capital spending on water schemes and sewerage schemes, and even roadworks.'[78] A recognition of the inappropriateness of this dual role was made implicitly in section thirteen of the Local Government Act, 1991, which excluded 'Ministers and Ministers of State' from eligibility for council membership.[79] In practice, local councillors could utilise existing goodwill to introduce their friends into local politics, where they could begin to build up their own client networks.[80] Most councillors were reluctant to do this, however, for fear of setting up rivals to themselves.[81] These deeply localised networks created a certain parochialism among public representatives, with many Stormont MPs and Dublin TDs standing not on the basis of a coherent policy base, but on the strength of their ability to obtain required goods and services.

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[76] Neil Collins, *Local Government Managers at Work* (Dublin, 1987), p. 52. 'Ratepayers attended Audit', *NS,* 31 May 1968, p. 2.
[77] Letter Erskine Childers to Seán Lemass, 22 Jan. 1962, file S1955/63 *Customs*, Dept of Taoiseach, N.A.I..
[78] Seamus Keating, interviewed by author, 8 Nov. 2005. See also Daly, *First Department*, p. 426. Sacks, *The Donegal Mafia*, p. 74.
[79] Department of the Environment, *Local Government and the Elected Member* (Dublin, 1991), p. 17.
[80] Richard Shannon, interviewed by author, 25 Oct. 2006.
[81] M. Bax, 'Patronage Irish style: Irish politicians as brokers', *Sociologische Gids*, Vol. 17, No. 3, 1970, pp. 186-7.

Though heavily concerned with local issues, local councils existed within a national and international context. The growing Catholic ethos of Ireland in the early 1950s, which saw it become 'more a catholic county then a nationalist one' according to Francie O'Donaghue of Carrickmacross UDC, was demonstrated, for example, in the attention paid in 1949 to the arrest in Hungary of Cardinal Mindszenty, and to the death and election of various Popes during this period.[82] Similarly, great attention was paid by Northern councils to the death of King George VI in 1952.[83] The divergent politics of many Northern and Southern councillors acted in itself as an invisible barrier, reducing the ideological common ground. These areas of tension and mismatch served to undermine the potential for cooperation. They were, however, only one aspect of a complex picture, counterbalanced by common origins and common powers, which formed the basis for cooperative contacts rooted in shared concerns.

Potential Areas of Cooperation

Despite the administrative divergence which took place over the century in the structure of local government North and South, the systems remained recognisably similar in terms of powers and the geographical division of territory, until the major transformation occasioned by the Macrory Report into Local Government Reform in 1973, which

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[82] Francie O'Donaghue, interviewed by author, 8 May 2006. See, for example, Louth CCM, 17 Jan. 1949, Louth County Archive (L.C.A.), Dundalk. Castleblaney UDC, 11 June 1963, C.U.D.C.O., Monaghan CCM, 24 June 1963, M.C.C.O. Leitrim CCM, 8 Nov. 1958, L.C.C.O.. See also Nicholas Mansergh, *The Unresolved Question* (New Haven and London, 1991), pp. 337-8 and Senia Pašeta, *Modern Ireland* (Oxford, 2003), pp. 99-100.

[83] See, for example, Down CCM, 21 Feb. 1952, File LA3/2GA/50, PRONI.

transformed Northern Irish local government.[84] Areas of common concern along the border provided the motivation for councils to work together in order to minimise costs, and thus reduce the rates burden upon their electorate. Five such areas stand out as major fields of cross-border cooperation: roads, transport, drainage, service provision and information-sharing, which will be each examined in turn.

Roads

As previously stated, around 170 cross-border roads existed in this period, connecting Northern Ireland and the Republic. These varied from very small local roads, to fairly major national ones, though a main Dublin to Belfast motorway was yet to be built.[85] Of these, only fifteen were approved roads in January 1963, with five more opened in the years that followed.[86] All others were unapproved roads and did not have customs facilities, and could thus only be used by non-motorised traffic, members of certain professions, and government ministers, who were issued with passes for the duration of their time in office.[87] Along these roads, and within twenty miles of the border on either side, the customs authorities had special powers of patrol and search.[88] Some roads, known as salient, or concession, roads, passed through the two jurisdictions a number of

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[84] Review Body on Local Government in Northern Ireland, *Macrory Report*, paragraph 117. Mike Tomlinson, 'Relegating Local Government', in O'Dowd, Rolston and Tomlinson, *Northern Ireland – Between Civil Rights and Civil War* (London, 1980), p. 95.

[85] Notes on Taoiseach's visit to Stormont 11 Dec. 1967 *Appendix C, Physical planning and construction (roads)*, 5 Jan. 1968, File 175(9), *T. K. Whitaker papers*, UCD.

[86] Note Department of Foreign Affairs to Dept. of Taoiseach, 14 Jan. 1963, File S1955/63 *Customs*, Dept. of Taoiseach, N.A.I..

[87] See n55, page 117 in current work. File 2005/23/165, *Land boundary passes for entry into Northern Ireland, 1969 - 1973*, Department of Justice, N.A.I.. 'Note on Ceasing Stamping Pass Books and Control Forms', Jan. 1963, file S1955/63 *Customs*. Dept. of Taoiseach, N.A.I.

[88] Letter John O'Flynn, Office of Revenue Commissioners, to Dan O'Sullivan, Dept. of Taoiseach, 10 Nov. 1959. File S1955B/94 *Customs,* Dept. of Taoiseach, N.A.I.

times.[89] On these, cars were able to travel without clearing customs, so long as they did not stop within the opposite jurisdiction.[90] As roads authorities for their local areas, councils possessed duties of maintenance towards this legalistic and geographical puzzle. This proved challenging both in terms of physical upkeep, and in terms of access.

As noted earlier, local councils played a central role in campaigns regarding the opening of new roads, and this served as a major point of contact between them.[91] Since road opening was economically useful and politically uncontroversial, and as the closing of roads was seen as a major inconvenience imposed on local people by national forces, it provided an obvious topic around which local, border sympathies could build up *vis-à-vis* the central government as 'other'.[92] This was particularly so since Stormont had no power over this issue, so that campaigning on this issue could unite all political factions without fear of its being interpreted politically.[93]

Since many of the roads dated from the pre-partition era, and traversed considerable distances, the CCs road maintenance role frequently brought them into contact with each other, and created tensions where road maintenance priorities diverged. One such case was the Carrickmacross-Dundalk road, which passed through Armagh and Louth. In 1966, Monaghan CC wrote to both of these councils, asking that repairs be carried out on it.[94] Armagh responded, assuring Monaghan on 9 January 1967 that repairs were in hand,

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[89] Note on Ceasing Stamping Pass Books and Control Forms, Jan. 1963, file S1955/63 *Customs*. Dept. of Taoiseach, N.A.I.
[90] Richard Hayworth, *Border Foray* (London, 1957), p. 155.
[91] See pages 121-125 of current work.
[92] O'Dowd and Corrigan, 'Buffer Zone or Bridge', p. 337.
[93] 'North - South meeting in Castleblaney - Politicians showed will to co-operate', *NS,* 26 March 1964, p. 3.
[94] Monaghan CCM, 12 Dec. 1966, M.C.C.O..

while Louth wrote back rejecting claims that the road required repair.[95] This led to considerable tensions between the Monaghan and Louth CCs, since the road concerned was vital to the former county's contact with Dublin and the ports, and merely peripheral to the latter.[96] Where a road itself marked the frontier, which ran along its central reservation, as occurred in sections of the Monaghan/Armagh border, these problems became even more acute.[97]

In areas where maintenance up to one's own border was illogical or impossible, such as in the provision of cross-jurisdictional bridges, or where the border cut a road along its centre, agreements were reached between the CCs as to who would carry out maintenance, the cost being subsequently divided.[98] Bridges which spanned border streams were thus considered to be co-owned by the two authorities. Adopting schemes for their 'construction, improvement, alteration, maintenance or abandonment' were designated a reserved function of local councils in the South under section 41 of the Local Government Act, 1955.[99]

The construction of new bridges were provided based on agreements between councils. One example of this can be seen in Tyrone and Donegal CCs' joint provision of a new road bridge at the Lifford-Strabane crossing. Here, as elsewhere, the River Foyle formed the boundary line between the Republic and Northern Ireland. On 10 July 1953, a

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[95] Ibid., 9 Jan. 1967.
[96] Ibid. 12 June 1967.
[97] Cormac Boylan, interview by author, 21 May 2006.
[98] Cormac Boylan, interviewed by author, 21 May 2006. See, for example, Files F2-10 *Misc. 1946 - 1972*, and F2-10 *Moy Bridge*, Roads Division, M.C.C.O..
[99] Department of the Environment, *Local Government and the Elected Member* (Dublin, 1991), p. 28.

conference involving the two CCs and their respective government departments decided to invite tenders for a survey of the new bridge.[100] Negotiations were slow and meticulous. All tenders had to be submitted to both councils, and both had to agree on all major planning decisions.[101] High local unemployment in both counties put a premium on council employment, making the choice of contractor, and the terms within which they would be allowed to select their labourers, issues of major concern.[102] A final agreement between the two councils was reached in May 1956.[103] In it, Donegal CC undertook to supervise the work subject to clearance from Tyrone, whose councillors were to have full access to all documentation.[104] The project's cross-border nature meant that issues arose regarding the payment of customs duties on materials, and over the exact subsidies available towards construction.[105] The project also faced standard construction difficulties, such as the discovery that the bedrock at the Strabane end was considerably deeper than had originally been anticipated.[106] Finally, meticulous plans had to be put into place regarding the opening ceremony, to ensure that all was as even-handed as possible.[107] It is a testament to the project's success, and a vindication of the theory that increased cooperation stems from increased knowledge and goodwill, that Tyrone CC later voted to re-form the sub-committee which had been in charge of the bridge project to work alongside Donegal on a number of other 'matters of common interest to the two

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[100] Donegal CCM, 25 Aug. 1953, D.C.A.
[101] Donegal CCM, 30 Jan. 1956, D.C.A.
[102] Ibid., 18 Oct. 1962.
[103] Ibid., 30 May 1956.
[104] Tyrone CCM, 12 June 1961, File LA6/2GA/12, PRONI.
[105] Donegal CCM, 24 June 1952, D.C.A.
[106] Ibid, 21 May 1962.
[107] Tyrone CCM, 2 Dec. 1963, 9 Dec. 1963, 13 Jan. 1964 and 11 Nov. 1963, File LA6/2GA/12, PRONI.

councils,' such as joint approaches to customs authorities regarding approved crossings, and the proposed new north-west airport.[108]

Damage caused to a cross-border bridge required the agreement of both councils concerned in order for repairs to be carried out. This could lead to complications where the road concerned was either of more importance to one county than the other, or where the damage had been intentionally caused. Following British Army operations in 1971, for example, Monaghan CC claimed damages to four such co-owned bridges, three shared with County Fermanagh and one with County Tyrone.[109] Having approached both councils with a view to having the bridges repaired, Monaghan received two letters informing them that 'this council did not wish, at this stage, to take any steps in the matter of repairs' and that 'when the time comes to have the bridge restored this council will claim the cost from the Ministry of Defence.'[110] This was not the first time, however, that Monaghan CC had had to deal with the consequences of deliberate damage to its co-owned bridges.

Moy Bridge, connecting Counties Monaghan and Tyrone, is first recorded as undergoing repair in this period under the auspices of Tyrone CC in December, 1950, when Monaghan County manager George Cannon put a resolution to the council committing it

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[108] The original formation of the committee is recorded in Tyrone CCM, 11 Feb. 1957, and its re-formation on 14 June 1965, and 8 Feb. 1966, all in File LA6/2GA/10, PRONI.
[109] Letter, Monaghan Staff Officer to Ministry of Defence Claims Commission, Belfast, 9 Dec. 1971. File F2-14, Roads Division, M.C.C.O..
[110] Letter, Mervyn W. Dennison, Fermanagh County Secretary to Monaghan CC staff officer, 16 Feb. 1972. Letter, Robert Parke, Tyrone County Secretary to the Monaghan County Secretary, 3 March 1972. Both file F2-14, Roads Division, M.C.C.O..

to paying half of the costs, estimated at £30.[111] In 1961, the bridge was apparently damaged in an attack as part of the IRA's Border Campaign.[112] As a result, discussions concerning the bridge's possible repair and re-opening were as much concerned with the ability of the security forces to close it again, as with its re-opening.[113] Tyrone CC, having repaired the bridge only a decade earlier, were reported to be uninterested in erecting a temporary structure at the site, and reluctant to invest in a permanent one which might be damaged again.[114] This was particularly so as one Sinn Féin councillor from Castleblaney UDC, went so far as to request in open meeting that 'when you're building the bridge, make sure you leave enough holes in it to put the gelignite in.'[115] As a result, Monaghan was left independently to provide a temporary structure in place of Moy Bridge, and to deal with all claims arising out of its use. On 9 March 1964, Tyrone CC finally agreed to pass a scheme for the bridge's reconstruction.[116] Incident reports from July 1968, however, show that, at this stage, a temporary bailey bridge was still being used at the site.[117] In 1971, when the Dublin Erection Company Ltd. enquired about bridges with weight limits in County Monaghan, Moy Bridge was again listed as having a weight restriction of twenty tonnes, as it had been in 1968, suggesting that its nature as a temporary bridge had not altered.[118] It would be 1980 before a new permanent structure was put into place, only for it too to be attacked by the IRA.[119] The difficulties

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[111] For County Monaghan Roads Section discussion on Moy Bridge see File F2-10 *Misc. 1946 - 1972*, Roads Division, and Monaghan CCM, 26 June 1961 and 30 Sept. 1963, M.C.C.O.. For the Tyrone discussion see Tyrone CCM, 9 March 1964, File LA6/2GA/12, PRONI.
[112] Monaghan CCM, 30 Sept. 1963, M.C.C.O..
[113] Ibid., 11 Sept. 1961.
[114] Cormac Boylan, interviewed by author, 21 May 2006.
[115] Ibid.. See also 'Political Banalities', *NS*, 4 Oct. 1963, p. 1.
[116] Tyrone CCM, 9 March 1964, File LA6/2GA/12, PRONI.
[117] File F2-5 Roads Division, M.C.C.O
[118] Ibid.
[119] Cormac Boylan, interviewed by author, 21 May 2006.

encountered over Moy Bridge illustrate the importance of external factors, such as the security situation, in influencing cooperation between counties, both in terms of the atmosphere created, and in terms of the abilities of the cooperating partners to bring their schemes to fruition. In this respect, aspects of high politics such as defence and security fed directly into the cooperation potential of localised networks.

The difficulties embedded in pursuing cross-border cooperation were the result of human, as well as institutional, difficulties. Where councillors wished to make cooperation difficult, it was within their power to do so. This was highlighted during discussions between Donegal and Londonderry CC over the repair of a minor bridge between the two counties. An agreement was drafted by Londonderry, which was then presented to Donegal CC by its secretary, Seamus Keating:

> I was reading out the agreement for the councillors before their vote on it, and I was reading the text exactly as it was written, and it referred to 'Londonderry County Council.' And one of the Donegal County Councillors interrupted and he said 'excuse me, Mr. Secretary, do you not know that there is no such place as LONDONderry?' So I said to him, 'Councillor, I am reading what's in the document.' Left it at that.[120]

This situation highlighted the importance of the will to cooperate, and the potential for disruption represented by individuals seeking to score political points, rather than further cooperative relations. Once key players lost the willingness to cooperate, it was a simple matter to find political stumbling blocks upon which to wreck a proposed projects.

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[120] Seamus Keating, interviewed by author, 8 Nov. 2005.

Transport

For much of the period under consideration, personal transport in Ireland was unusual. The few privately-owned vehicles that did exist tended to be linked to agricultural or commercial concerns such as shops.[121] For the majority of rural residents, therefore, the rail and bus networks provided both commercial and personal transportation. This was exacerbated by the nationalisation of the transport networks, North and South, which made the carriage of passengers or goods for profit illegal, until the Ulster Transport Authority's (UTA) privatisation in the late 1960s.[122] Public transport was thus a major concern of the local electorate, and its representatives. A sizable amount of council time was spent in discussions with Córas Iompair Éireann (CIE), Great Northern Railway (GNR) and UTA in an attempt to make arrival and departure times compatible with local time-tables, such as the visiting hours of county hospitals, the departure times of onward connections to Belfast or Dublin, and the beginning and end of the work or school day.[123] These discussions reveal a great deal about the ongoing importance of commercial centres such as Belfast, for example, to the local population of County Monaghan. Once proposed closures of railway lines began to be made, in the mid to late 1950s, councils went first through a period of protest, and then through a phase of attempting to adjust the resulting arrangements to their best advantage, either by the removal of the rail subsidy payable to central government, or the award of greater road improvement grants and

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[121] Sean McCreesh, interviewed by author, 10 May 2006. Hugh Robinson, *Across the Fields of Yesterday* (Belfast, 1999), p. 11.
[122] Mulholland, *Crossroads*, p. 39.
[123] See, for example, Leitrim CCM, 22 Feb. 1952, L.C.C.O., Castleblaney UDC Minutes, 22 Dec. 1953, C.U.D.C.O., Carrickmacross UDC Minutes, 13 June 1953 C.T.H. and Monaghan CCM, 14 Dec. 1954, M.C.C.O..

other transport facilities.[124] It is interesting to note that protests regarding railway closures were far more common among the southern councils, though rural Northern Ireland suffered equally from the loss of the railways during the 'dark period of the later 1950s', with both Tyrone and Fermanagh left with no rail links at all.[125] This relative quiescence may be seen as the result of the active policy of road building undertaken by the Northern Irish government in the early 1960s, as compared to the Republic of Ireland, where the previous decade had seen an increase in the amount of road maintenance work placed upon local councils.[126]

Prior to its closure, the rail network had formed one of the major links between North and South, with GNR's lines alone crossing the border no fewer than seventeen times.[127] The Sligo and Leitrim Railway connected cattle breeders along the west coast with British buyers at the market in Enniskillen.[128] The Newry, Dundalk and Greenore Railway, 'English owned throughout its existence,' defined its self-image very much in terms of its cross-border role, its crest displaying Ireland, in its representation as Cathleen Ní Houlihan, shaking hands with the United Kingdom, personified by Britannia.[129] Its lines connected the eastern border counties, via Greenore Port, to the rest of the United

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[124] For protests against rail closures of the GNR lines see: Louth CCM, 19 Aug. 1957, L.C.A.. Monaghan CCM, 20 Aug. 1957, M.C.C.O.. Donegal CCM, 24 Feb. 1958, D.C.A.. For protests against the closure of the Sligo and Leitrim line see: Leitrim CCM, 30 Jan. 1954, L.C.C.O.. For protests against the closure of the Dundalk, Newry and Greenore line see: Louth CCM, 23 June 1952, L.C.A. and Cavan CCM 11 Sept. 1951, C.C.A.. In the aftermath, various councils attempted to argue for extra funds for themselves to deal with rail closures. These include: Monaghan CCM, 15 Nov. 1957, M.C.C.O.. Donegal CCM, 7 Dec. 1959 and 30 April 1956, D.C.A., Louth CCM, 25 May 1954, L.C.A..

[125] Casserley, *Outline of Irish Railway History*, pp. 173 and 175.

[126] Mulholland, *Crossroads*, p. 39. Daly, *Buffer State,* p. 403.

[127] Ferris, *The Great Northern Railway*, p. 9.

[128] Leitrim CCM, 13 Oct. 1951, L.C.C.O..

[129] See plate 3 below.

Kingdom, carrying both goods and local cross-border commuters.[130] The proposed closure of this line in the early 1950s led to the CCs involved establishing a cross-border body to campaign for its retention. In October 1951, Louth CC elected members to a joint committee 'representative of interests on both sides of the border' to meet the British Transport Commission, owner of Greenore railway and port, in an attempt to gain a reprieve for the line.[131] While the pressure thus exerted failed to save the Greenore line, it helped to convince the two governments of the unpopularity of railway closures, and thus influenced their later decision to buy out the ailing Great Northern Railway, and run it jointly for a period of five years, making it a unique enterprise at the time 'in that it was owned by the national undertakings of two different countries.'[132] The move was not economically sound but, as the Greenore protests made clear, 'politically, they could not allow the railway to close.'[133]

The trend towards the development of regional airports, either by converting existing World War Two airfields, or by building new airfields towards the end of this period formed a particularly important area of cross-border council cooperation.[134] Since airfields were by nature facilities with wide catchment areas, any such provision close to the Irish border would necessarily be a cross-border concern, requiring a cross-border customer base and, because of the level of financial investment involved, multiple

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[130] Casserley, *Outline of Irish Railway History,* p. 189.
[131] Louth CCM, 22 Oct. 1951, L.C.A..
[132] Casserley, *Outline of Irish Railway History*, p. 178.
[133] T.K. Whitaker, interviewed by author, 13 Feb. 2006. For full details on the joint buy-out of the Great Northern Railway, see Kennedy, *Division and Consensus*, pp. 120-147.
[134] See, for example, Donegal CCM, 4 Dec. 1961, D.C.A.. Londonderry CCM, 15 April 1969, File LA5/2GA/23, PRONI Monaghan CCM, 21 Sept. 1959, M.C.C.O. Finance, Law and Parliamentary Committee, Down CC discussions re: Bishopscourt Airport, 6 Feb. 1970, file LA3/4AA/48, PRONI. See also Hayes, *Minority Verdict*, p. 28.

sources of funding as well. At least six of the ten border counties under consideration showed an interest in some form of airport development in this period; Fermanagh, Tyrone, Londonderry, Donegal, Down and Monaghan. For all but County Monaghan, this desire was rationalised in terms of the increased tourism income which such a development would bring into the local area. Monaghan, being an overwhelmingly rural county, underdeveloped in terms of tourism, discussed its own requirements in terms of potential new markets for locally produced fresh fruit and milk.[135]

Aware of the costs and catchment area likely to be served by an airport in the north-west, Donegal CC envisioned its development plans from the outset in cooperation with neighbouring counties, approaching first Londonderry and Tyrone CCs, in December 1961, and later Leitrim in April 1968.[136] However, it faced difficulties both in terms of the cross-border nature of its plans, and in terms of the competition from other potential sites. Londonderry CC, for example, on 15 May 1967, agreed that it did not have the statutory authority to contribute towards a feasibility study for an airport in the Republic, and that it did not wish to jeopardise the likely success of Fermanagh's proposed Enniskillen Airport.[137] They thus wished Donegal the best of luck, and withdrew.[138] However, they attended a preliminary meeting with the surveyors in an observational capacity and when the initial survey suggested Ballykelly, in County Londonderry, might well be recommended, agreed to vote the money for the study, subject to special

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[135] Monaghan CC, 21 Sept. 1959, M.C.C.O..
[136] Donegal CCM, 4 Dec. 1961, D.C.A. Leitrim CCM, 8 April 1968, L.C.C.O..
[137] Londonderry CCM, 15 May 1965, File LA5/2GA/22, PRONI.
[138] Ibid.

governmental permission.[139] At this stage, with no guarantee that their own preferred site at Porthall would even be seriously examined by the surveyors, Donegal itself withdrew from the joint project, and decided instead to develop its own airport independently.[140] The project would later be reconsidered following the Good Friday Agreement.[141] This proposal highlights one of the major obstacles to cross-border cooperation in service provision. All councils aimed to provide very similar services to their constituents, and this meant that while they were in a position to help one another, they were also in competition. A county might choose, as County Leitrim did, to support a cross-border project such as St Angelo's Airport over one within its own jurisdiction, but they could also refuse to do so.[142] County Londonderry's response also demonstrates that claims of legislative incompatibility should not be accepted at face value, and may simply provide a useful cover for a disinclination to become engaged with a particular project.

Drainage

The border counties included part of the catchment areas of the rivers Blackwater, Finn, Erne, Shannon and their tributaries, which on occasion crossed the border, and on occasion formed it.[143] The flooding caused by these rivers rendered the agricultural land within their floodplains useless for much of the year, creating problems for farmers,

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[139] Ibid., 30 May 1967.
[140] Donegal CCM, 13 May 1968, D.C.A..
[141] Henderson and Teague, *Economic Cooperation*, p. 17.
[142] Leitrim CCM, 8 April 1968, L.C.C.O..
[143] See page 8 in current work.

particularly as the land was still liable for rates during this time.[144] So severe was the problem in some border areas that a common saying arose asserting that 'in the summer time Lough Erne was in Fermanagh and in the winter time Fermanagh was in Lough Erne.'[145] The designation of the rivers as boundaries made this problem harder to tackle, as Barry Murphy, the former head of the Office of Public Works (OPW), the public body charged with major drainage projects in the Republic, recalled:

> I was doing a drainage project on the Monaghan Blackwater and one thing when you are doing a drainage project, … is you straighten the river out so as to let the water run better, so we asked the government, could we straighten the river out, because it was marking the border in various areas, and the answer was 'no', we had to do a drainage scheme on a bendy river, because there was no way of negotiating, or talking to anybody, about rational things.[146]

Their drainage role required the OPW's commissioners to maintain 'informal contact with their counterparts in the north' in order to solve such issues.[147] With the agricultural community making up more than half of the electorate in many border counties, it was unsurprising that this drainage situation was a major source of concern to local councils.[148]

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[144] See for example, Leitrim CCM, 2 Sept 1966, L.C.C.O.. In his *A Border Diary* (London, 1995), p. 1, Sean Connaughton notes 'On the hill a bullock stands pissing red water … Red water is a disease in cattle picked up from bad land. Border land is always bad.' In attempting to explain the very low density of sheep in some border areas, A.A. Horner, J.A. Walsh and J.A. Williams noted that 'In some of these areas (South Leitrim, East Cavan, Monaghan, East Fermanagh and North Armagh) the soils are poorly drained which can lead to a high incidence of fluke disease and lameness among sheep.' *Agriculture in Ireland - A Census Atlas* (Dublin, 1984), p. 24.

[145] Farrell McElgunn, interviewed by author, 24 May 2006.

[146] Brian Murphy, interviewed by author, 14 Dec. 2004.

[147] Leitrim CC Minutes, 11 April 1959, L.C.C.O.

[148] '60 percent life off "fat of the Land"', *NS*, 3 Nov. 1972, p. 7. Leitrim CCM, 25 Feb. 1960, L.C.C.O..

Because of the scale of the projects involved, both financially and logistically, and since rivers frequently flowed through both jurisdictions in this area, major drainage projects were rare, and handled by the central government's Departments of Public Works in the Republic and Agriculture in the North, rather than the local authorities. Competition between councils to attract such projects was hence fierce.[149] Since, as with the railways, local councils could act freely as spokespeople for their electorate, tensions developed between themselves and the government agencies, concerned that the most vital work was given priority on a national scale, and within nationally agreed tax budgets.[150] Drainage was thus one of the most controversial areas of interaction between government and local authorities.[151]

Due to its frequent cross-border nature and the massive financial implications for local farmers, drainage was the area in which, more than anywhere else, cross-border unity developed in the centre/periphery model envisaged by O'Dowd and Corrigan.[152] On a number of occasions, CCs appealed to their cross-border compatriots, suffering from the effects of the same river, to join them, or use their good offices with their own government to see that the work was done.[153] In a move which chimes closely with O'Dowd's model, local authorities exchanged information about projects accepted by their authorities in order to aid their cross-border compatriots in pressurising their own

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[149] Leitrim CC Minutes, 11 April 1959, L.C.C.O.
[150] See Leitrim CC Minutes, 24 Feb. 1959, 11 April 1959 and 8 Nov. 1962, L.C.C.O. Cavan CCM, 10 Jan. 1953, C.C.A..
[151] Leitrim CC, for example, discussed flooding almost sixty times during this period, and the closure of its rail-links over thirty times. See Leitrim CCM, 1949 – 1972, D.C.A..
[152] O'Dowd and Corrigan, 'Buffer Zone or Bridge', p. 337.
[153] See, for example, Monaghan CCM, 21 Aug. 1956, M.C.C.O..

central governments to do likewise.[154] Thus, for example, with regard to the boundary drains between Counties Monaghan and Fermanagh, Monaghan CC wrote to the OPW that 'the people in Northern Ireland were prepared to co-operate in any way possible and would contribute their portion of any expenditure that would be incurred,' having been assured of this fact in a letter from the Fermanagh Council.[155]

Psychologically, such pressure worked for the council on two levels. Firstly, by unfavourably comparing the work done in the South with that done in the North, they implied superior standards in the North, or vice-versa, the councils implied superior standards there, attacking the nationalist pride of their political masters in the hope of achieving the desired outcome. Secondly, they were employing the concept of 'supported choice', which implies that, if party A has already chosen to take course A, Party B would consider it more seriously, giving weight to the fact that party A must have had good reason to make the choice it did. This 'supported choice' theory assumes that the central government departments were rational actors, whose decisions take account of the behaviour of others, and allow it to influence their own choices.[156] This is a development of the basic rules of game theory, which assumes 'that individuals try to predict what others will do in reply to their own actions, and then optimize on the understanding that others are thinking in the same way.'[157] We find several councils employing this method of argument; Louth over the Kilcoo River, for example, and Donegal over the Finn.[158]

The councils were not alone in using the unfavourable comparison method in order to

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[154] O'Dowd and Corrigan, 'Buffer Zone or Bridge', p. 337.
[155] Monaghan CCM, 14 March 1960, M.C.C.O. See also Monaghan CCM, 20 April 1954 , M.C.C.O..
[156] M. Weber, *On the Methodology of Social Sciences* (Glencoe, Illinois, 1949), p. 5.
[157] Hargreaves Heap, Hollis, Lyons, Sugden and Weale, *The Theory of Choice* (Oxford, 1992), p. 94.
[158] Leitrim CCM, 11 Nov. 1950, L.C.C.O.. Donegal CCM, 15 Dec. 1953, D.C.A..

achieve their aims. The same system, as previously discussed, was employed by the Chambers of Commerce and by the Garda Síochána in the matter of police pay.[159]

Since drainage work was the concern of central government, rather than local councils, its impact on practical cross-border cooperation tended also to be at an inter-governmental level, with the CCs acting as interested stakeholders, coaxing cooperation into existence, but without the power to engage in it as independent entities.[160] Considering this, it is unsurprising that one of the three major case-studies of cooperation discussed by Michael Kennedy in *Division and Consensus* should be the drainage and harnessing of the River Erne, whose catchment area took in much of counties Fermanagh and Leitrim, before flowing into the sea from Donegal.[161] The river was dammed near its mouth in Ballyshannon, and its flow used for the production of hydroelectricity, which was then shared between the two electricity boards.[162] Drainage formed, in many ways, an ideal area for cooperation, since it was one in which every side stood to gain. It also benefited from being the concern of essentially practical government departments. The OPW, recalled Barry Murphy, was 'unlike any other government department. It has a really strange ethic, or ethos or whatever, in that the OPW is there to actually *do* things, don't think about it, someone wants something done, you just do it.'[163] Similarly, in his memoirs *Working at Stormont,* John A. Oliver recalled that 'the Ministry of Agriculture was probably the department that knew its own mind best' and went about achieving it in

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[159] See pages 129-130 of current work and PJG, 'Without Prejudice - British Police Pay Increase', *GR,* September, 1951, p. 803.
[160] For example, Monaghan CCM, 21 Aug. 1956, M.C.C.O. and Cavan CCM 10 Feb. 1951, C.C.A.
[161] Kennedy, *Division and Consensus*, pp. 90-114.
[162] Ibid.
[163] Brian Murphy, interviewed by author, 14 Dec. 2004.

the most practical way.[164] Once a project came to the attention of a more politicised department, where the will to cooperate was less evident, its completion became more difficult. A good example of this was the 1965 project to clear the banks of the Woodford River.[165]

The Woodford River Project began life as a proposal from the Northern Ireland Tourist Board (NITB) to Bord Fáilte, the Southern Irish Tourist Board, that they should both take advantage of an International Voluntary Service Corps which the Northern authority had engaged to clear the Northern bank of the Woodford.[166] The river had been of concern due to flooding for some time.[167] It would make sense, the head of Board Fáilte reasoned to the DTP, to get both sides of the river cleared at the same time.[168] With the minister and secretary away, DTP staff sought clearance from the Department of External Affairs (DEA), particularly with regard to the British Army's involvement in setting up the camp for the volunteers, and in providing the transport.[169] At this point, the project moved beyond the remit of a generally supportive and cooperative department, and into the hands of one famous for its intransigence.[170] To the DEA, the situation was politically impossible, since it would require British Army vehicles to deliver the volunteers to work inside the Republic, thus violating the border.[171] An assistant secretary who ratified the

[164] Oliver, *Working at Stormont,* p. 35.
[165] File 98/3/35, *Cross-Border Cooperation in Tourism,* Department of Transport and Power, N.A.I..
[166] Memo of telephone conversation, McMahon and Ceannt, 10 June 1965. Ibid.
[167] Cavan CCM, 12 Jan. 1963, CCA.
[168] Memo of telephone conversation, McMahon and Ceannt, 10 June 1965. Ibid.
[169] Ibid.
[170] Kenneth Bloomfield, *Stormont in Crisis* (Belfast, 1994), p. 202.
[171] Memo of telephone conversation, McMahon and Ceannt, 10 June 1965. File 98/3/35, *Cross-Border Cooperation in Tourism,* Department of Transport and Power, N.A.I..

scheme was overruled by McCann, secretary of the DEA.[172] Another option, that the Republic provide some accommodation and transport, was dismissed on the grounds that, in the time available, they could not hope to provide facilities matching those provided by the British, and should thus be made to look foolish and backwards by comparison in the eyes of the young international volunteers.[173] In the end, the project was allowed to go ahead on the basis that the army came and set up the camp, but did not provide the transport or logistical support once the volunteers had arrived.[174] The compromise was hard-fought, and owed much to the DTP's willingness to argue for its survival.

One project of cross-border significance perpetually under discussion in this period was the re-opening of the Ballyconnell and Ballinamore Canal, linking the rivers Erne and Shannon between Counties Fermanagh and Leitrim.[175] Originally dug as a drainage channel for the Erne River, the re-opening of the canal raised the possibility of continuous navigation between Ireland's longest waterway, the Shannon, via the Erne and Foyle, to the sea at Derry.[176] Its reopening, it was argued, would open up miles of previously unconnected waterways to leisure boating and tourism, an industry in which Fermanagh had a considerable interest, and which Leitrim was in the process of building up with the aid of Bord Fáilte, via developments such as the Carrick-on-Shannon

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[172] McCann to Beere, 21 June 1965 in ibid.
[173] Ibid.
[174] Letter, Ceannt to McCann, 23 June 1965, McCann to Beere, 24 June 1965 and Beere to Ceannt, 24 June 1965 in ibid.
[175] See, for example, Leitrim CCM 17 June 1963, L.C.C.O and Cavan CCM, 12 Oct. 1963, C.C.A..
[176] Brian Murphy, interviewed by author, 14 Dec. 2004. Fergal McElgunn, interviewed by author, 24 May 2005.

Marina.[177] There is some suggestion that the canal was already at this stage in the joint care of a cross-border drainage committee, delegated from Cavan, Leitrim and Fermanagh CCs.[178] Its possible development was mentioned over thirty times in Leitrim's records between 1961 and 1972 alone.[179] The campaign for its opening would not reach fruition, however, until the late 1980s, when the then Fianna Fáil Taoiseach, Charles Haughey threw his weight behind the project, as a means of creating a platform at which he could meet his Northern Irish colleagues.[180] 'With the political process stalled,' recalled former DEA civil servant Eamon Delaney, 'other avenues of advance were sought, like economics or even environmental projects like the Canal.'[181] Once re-opened, the Ballyconnell and Ballinamore canal remained useful for only a short period, however. 'It suffered from something called rising bottoms … so it silted up straightaway and it is hardly usable now,' recalled Barry Murphy[182] Its history, however, proves a useful illustration both of the powerlessness of local authorities to force central government departments to carry out major projects at a local level, and of the rapidity with which a project's situation could change once the will existed in central government for its completion.

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[177] See Leitrim CCM, 14 Sept. 1964, 8 Feb. 1965, 31 May 1965, 28 March 1966, 8 July 68, 18 Sept. 1968, L.C.C.O.. D.E. Dunn, 'The Commercial Development of the Shannon', *Administration,* Vol. 25, No. 2, 1977, p. 218.
[178] Fergal McElgunn, interviewed by author, 24 May 2005.
[179] See, for example, Leitrim CCM, 9 Aug. 1958, 16 Nov. 1962 and 10 April, 1967, L.C.C.O..
[180] Brian Murphy, interviewed by author, 14 Dec. 2004. Fergal McElgunn, interviewed by author, 24 May 2006.
[181] Eamon Delaney, *The Accidental Diplomat* (Dublin, 2001), p. 294.
[182] Brian Murphy, interviewed by author, 14 Dec. 2004.

Service Provision

Due in part to their common origins, local councils on both sides of the border were responsible for the delivery of a wide range of similar services to their electors, and faced similar difficulties.[183] The geographical layout of the borderlands meant that it was on occasion more cost-effective for a council to pay another to deliver a service on its behalf than to do so itself. This was true across a range of sectors, including some particularly controversial ones, such as education.[184]

The school systems North and South were quite distinct during this period, if for no other reason than due to the focus in Southern schools on learning through Irish. Students who wished to attend schools in the neighbouring jurisdiction, however, were able to do so to a significant enough degree that Paul Compton has argued that they skewed the reliability of population estimates based on school attendance and child benefit in the Newry area.[185] Sean McCreesh, resident of Forkhill, County Armagh, recalled how he himself studied at the Christian Brothers' School in Dundalk for two years, and how students from the nearby village of Kilcurry, in County Armagh, also did so in this period if they wished to proceed to secondary education.[186]

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[183] Jonathan Greer, 'Local Authority Cross-Border Networks: Lessons in Partnership and North-South Cooperation in Ireland', *Administration,* Vol. 48, No. 1, 2000, p. 53.
[184] Sabine Wichert, *Northern Ireland since 1945* (London and New York, 1999), pp. 45-7. Jonathan Bardon, *A History of Ulster* (Belfast, 2001), pp. 593-6.
[185] Paul A. Compton, 'The 1981 Northern Ireland Census of Population – estimates of non-enumerated population', in Chris Morris, Paul Compton and Arthur Luke (ed.), *Non-enumeration in the 1981 Northern Ireland Census of Population* (Belfast, 1985), pp. 28-9.
[186] Sean McCreesh, interviewed by author, 10 May 2006.

Facilities for special-needs education, for which there was less demand, and hence a larger catchment area per school, also appear to have been cross-border in their admissions. In 1965, for example, Dr. Paisley, county medical officer for County Armagh, and Mr. McCourt, an education psychologist, undertook an inspection of special needs schools in the Republic at which the county was maintaining students.[187] The schools included institutes for the physically disabled, the blind, and children with learning difficulties.[188] The report of the inspectors concluded 'that the committee can be very well satisfied with the educational provision being made for all children at these schools and for the care they received outside school hours,' and the schools were said to be delighted.[189] Monaghan CC's manager's orders for December 1966 also register, under the health section, that the 'council is responsible for the maintenance of P. Suitor in the Glencraig Curative School, Craigavon, Holywood, Co. Down from the 24th of March 1966' and 'for the maintenance of J. Dale in Beechlawn School, Hillsborough, Co. Down, from 19th September, 1966.'[190] An earlier set of manager's orders had included a note of the manager's agreement 'that the maintenance charges in the Ulster School for the Deaf and Dumb be increased to £250 per annum.'[191] This institution, also known as the Jordanstown Schools, was maintained by the Northern Irish Department of Education under the Education Act (Northern Ireland), 1923.[192] Nonetheless, the Ulster Society, which had originally founded the schools, allowed life-membership to those who

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[187] 'Eire special schools were delighted', *UG,* 25 Nov. 1965, p. 2.
[188] Ibid.
[189] Ibid.
[190] Monaghan CCM, 12 Dec. 1966, M.C.C.O..
[191] Jan. to May 1962 Manager's Orders, presented to the council 25 June 1962, Monaghan CCM, M.C.C.O..
[192] J. G. McClelland, *A History of the Jordanstown Schools,* p. 15.

contributed over a certain sum *per annum* to its coffers. [193] It is possible that the unorthodox format of the manager's order dealing with the schools, which discusses fees, but not the child beneficiary, was the result of Monaghan CC's position as such a member.

One of the major educational roles of Southern CCs was the provision and administration of scholarship schemes designed to allow local young people to attend secondary and tertiary education.[194] These were open to young people attending any school or university in Ireland, including Northern Ireland.[195] This was of particular importance in County Donegal, where a tradition of attendance at St Columba's College and Magee University College in Derry existed. Seamus Keating recalled that:

> On one occasion, the Department of Local Government produced a scheme for higher educational grants, which local authorities would administer but which would be funded by the state. And I remember when it reached me as county secretary in Donegal, I knew instantly that it wasn't catering for Donegal people. I alerted my council to it, and we got it changed so as to ensure that people could avail of their third level education in the North of Ireland, or even their second level education in the North of Ireland. But particularly their third level.[196]

Young people were not the only group to benefit from the educational opportunities available across the border. Keating himself recalled attending, along with other council employees, extra-mural courses on economic affairs ran by Magee College at Castlederg.[197] County engineers, and others who could more easily get to Belfast than to

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[193] Ibid., p. 1.
[194] See, for example, Cavan CCM 15 March 1949 and 9 Aug. 1952, C.C.A..
[195] Monaghan CCM, 15 Sept. 1953, M.C.C.O..
[196] Seamus Keating, interviewed by author, 8 Nov. 2005.
[197] Ibid.

Dublin would also attend professional courses run in Belfast on, for example, new forms of concrete laying, road building and so on.[198] Such extra-mural seminars and professional workshops formed an important link between council personnel and an opportunity for forming the initial contacts and networks. Interestingly, the one exception that appears to have been explicitly made with regards to the holding of university scholarships was for Trinity College, Dublin. In 1953, Trinity applied to County Louth asking that County Scholarships be made available there.[199] After discussions regarding non-catholic students, there still being a Bishop's ban on catholic students attending Trinity, the request was refused amid uncertainty whether such an amendment of the rules would be in breach of section 10 of the Irish Universities Act of 1908.[200]

From the passing of the 1947 Health Act, until the creation of regional health boards in 1970, CCs in the Republic were the primary health authorities within their areas.[201] In Northern Ireland, these powers began to be transferred under the Health Services Act (Northern Ireland) of 1946, from the old boards of guardians and the smaller UDCs and RDCs.[202] As with education, specialist healthcare continued to be provided on a cross-border basis where such care was unavailable within the county. Monaghan CC records, for example, listed among the county's expenses the maintenance of two patients, Margaret and Elizabeth Kelly, in the Incorporated Cripples' Institute in Belfast.[203] Seamus Keating, discussing his period as secretary of Donegal CC, recalled that until the

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[198] Ibid. Richard Haslam, interview by author, 7 Nov. 2005.
[199] Louth CCM, 20 April 1953, L.C.A.
[200] Ibid.
[201] Diarmaid Ferriter 'Local Government, Public Health and Welfare in Twentieth-Century Ireland' in Daly, (ed.) *County and Town*, pp. 117-118.
[202] Birrell and Murie, *Policy and Government* , p. 156.
[203] Manager's Orders, presented to the Council, Monaghan CCM, 13 Sept. 1965, M.C.C.O.

1960s, there was a longstanding tradition of Donegal people going to Derry for specialist services 'and then, from the 60s onwards … the Irish health service was developed at a rapid pace and there wasn't a need to go anywhere for specialist services beyond Letterkenny, except maybe when they referred you to a Dublin hospital or something like that.'[204] Improvements in the facilities available in-county thus tended to reduce the need, and hence the motivation, for joint solutions to be sought.[205] Where facilities remained unequal, cross-border cooperation continued, as noted earlier with reference to some Derry rioters who had sought refuge in Letterkenny, only to be 'transferred to hospital authority ambulances and taken to Northern Ireland hospitals,' and individuals continued to seek across the border what they could not obtain at home.[206] In 1967, for example, a catholic doctor in the Republic, discussing the widespread use of the contraceptive pill among his patients, noted to a visiting American journalist, 'If I don't supply it to my patients they'll go to some Protestant doctor on the other side and get it from him.'[207] The costs of hospitalisation in emergency situations was resolved retrospectively between the relevant councils, while longer-term care arrangements were reached in advance, for example, regarding the payments due to County Monaghan for the maintenance of County Louth tuberculosis patients.[208]

Emergency services provided a particularly important type of cross-border cooperation, intimately tied, as they are, to the need for a quick response to scenarios as they arise.

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[204] Seamus Keating, interviewed by author, 8 Nov. 2005
[205] Sally Shortall, 'The Irish Rural Development Paradigm – an Explanatory Analysis', *Economic and Social Review,* Vol. 25, No. 3, 1994, p. 238.
[206] Aileen McCorkell, *A Red Cross In My Pocket* (Northern Ireland, c.1992), p. 27.
[207] Donald S. Connery, *The Irish* (London, 1968), p. 169.
[208] Seamus Keating, interviewed by author, 8 Nov. 2005. Louth CCM, 21 Nov. 1949, L.C.A..

Under the Fire Brigades Act of 1940, Southern CCs were responsible for the provision and maintenance of their own ambulance and fire crews.[209] Interestingly, it does not appear that ambulances were shared on a cross-border basis in emergency situations, while a formal agreement existed with regards to the sharing of fire engines.[210] Under the agreement, from a Southern perspective, 'The National Fire Service in Northern Ireland [would] be [made] available to assist in the case of serious fires occurring in Donegal, Cavan, Monaghan and Louth', though their services were only to be called once it had been deemed 'that the fire is serious; that the local fire fighting service is inadequate; that the necessary assistance [could not] be obtained from adjacent fire-services in the State and that the services from Northern Ireland can reach the scene within a reasonable time.'[211] The contact stations given were Derry for Donegal, Newry for those areas adjoining it, and Belfast for all others.[212] Under the proposed rules for this agreement recommended by the CCs' General Council in the Republic, the Northern authority would subsequently be reimbursed for their services by the council concerned.[213] This arrangement was clearly in operation at least along the Donegal border in the later part of this period, for, in the aftermath of the bombing of Lifford Customs Post by the IRA in January 1971, Councillor Harte 'paid tribute to the Strabane Fire service for the prompt manner in which they answered the fire call.'[214] In light of this agreement's existence, the importance attached by subsequent historiography and mythology to the sending of Southern fire engines to Belfast during the Blitz of 1941 would seem misplaced,

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[209] Diarmaid Ferriter, 'Local Government, Public Health and Welfare in Twentieth-Century Ireland' in Daly, (ed.) *County and Town*, p. 115.
[210] Seamus Keating, interviewed by author, 8 Nov. 2005. Donegal CCM, 31 Aug. 1959, D.C.A..
[211] 'Arrangement with National Fire Service of Northern Ireland', *Garda Code* (Dublin, 1965), Section 29.5, p. 196.
[212] Ibid.
[213] Seamus Keating, interviewed by author, 8 Nov. 2005.
[214] Special Meeting, Donegal CCM, 26 Jan. 1971, D.C.A..

supporting Clare O'Halloran's assertion that emphasis on this event may have been an attempt to defuse awkward questions within Irish Nationalism regarding the impact of neutrality upon the prospects for Irish unity.[215]

Material supplies for council projects such as road building and house construction were sourced, wherever possible, from within the county itself, in order to encourage local industry and employment. Where this was not possible, external contractors were utilised, and even actively advertised for. Leitrim CC, for example, regularly placed advertisements in the Enniskillen based 'catholic' *Fermanagh Herald* newspaper.[216] The closing of the county's own Koshcarrigan quarry in 1970, would have required them to bring in gravel from County Fermanagh, while the manager's orders in County Monaghan include payment for machinery rented in Counties Fermanagh and Tyrone.[217] Such supplies were controversial, however, with one Leitrim councillor questioning 'why road material is being bought in County Fermanagh while suitable material is available in the local quarries.'[218] In order to avoid such complaints, some suppliers bidding for council contracts specifically opened branch offices within both jurisdictions.[219]

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[215] Clare O'Halloran, *Partition and the Limits of Irish Nationalism* (Dublin, 1978), p. 182. See, for example, David Harkness, *Ireland in the 20th Century – Divided Island* (Basingstoke, 1996), p. 70, James Kelly, *Bonfires on the Hillside* (Belfast, 1995), p. 114 and Robert Fisk, *In Time of War* (London, 1983), pp. 420-421.

[216] Leitrim CCM, Resolution 32, 1951. L.C.C.O.

[217] Leitrim CCM, 14 Sept. 1970, L.C.C.O., Manager's Orders, Monaghan CC, 14 Jan. 1963 and 9 Feb. 1970, M.C.C.O.

[218] Councillor Charles Cullen, Leitrim CCM, 9 Oct. 1967, L.C.C.O.

[219] Maurice Hayes, interviewed by author, 30 May 2006.

As with facilities, so with services, with specialists requiring a wide catchment area frequently enjoying cross-border patronage.[220] Donegal CC would make frequent use of Liam McCormack's architects and surveyor's firm based in Londonderry, for example, since the county did not itself possess sufficient architects for the amount of work which it had in hand.[221] Monaghan CC's records also note the employment of M/s. Dwyer, son and partners of 6, Trevor Hill, Newry, as consulting engineers for the proposed sewerage scheme at Inniskeen, while Newry Number Two RDC employed a Dublin engineer, N. O'Dwyer to design their own regional waterworks comprehensive scheme, and Fermanagh made use of Dublin based software engineers for its office needs.[222] Such cross-border employment could lead to difficulties, however. Newry Number Two RDC, for example, employed a Limerick-born, Southern-qualified chief engineer, who, not having qualifications compatible with the Northern requirements, had to be given a title different to that shared by officials of the same grade throughout the rest of Northern Ireland.[223]

As part of their responsibility for housing and sanitation, local councils were responsible for the provision of clean water and sewerage facilities within their areas. Due to the fragmentation of local government in Northern Ireland, this was an area in which councils had long standing 'joint and *ad hoc'* arrangements.[224] Such schemes were funded directly from local sources, either via rises in rates or, in the South, group water

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[220] For discussion of service catchment areas, see page 67 of current work.
[221] Seamus Keating, interviewed by author, 8 Nov. 2005.
[222] Monaghan CCM, 27 July 1964, M.C.C.O., Newry Number Two R.D.C., 13 May 1954, File LA57/2FA/25, PRONI. Cyril Coulter, interviewed by author, 10 May 2006.
[223] Kevin O'Neill, interviewed by author, 10 May 2006.
[224] Birrell and Murie, *Policy and Government*, p. 159.

schemes, whereby the residents paid a percentage of the cost and the government gave in grants for the remainder.[225] Since 'local councillors were reluctant to increase the burden on ratepayers,' this made them particularly wary of being seen to act other than in the most cost-effective way in this regard.[226] Wherever possible, it was most economical to run such pipes in straight lines. Along the meandering Irish border, the closest source of water was not always within the same county as the resident requiring it, nor was it most cost-effective that they should be supplied from in-county sources. In these circumstances, the council of the county of residence could approach its neighbour to request provision of water from their own supplies. Fermanagh CC, for example, was approached in 1971 and agreed with Monaghan that it would provide water to the village of Scothouse, a solution for which Monaghan had been seeking at least since 1950, as the village lay only two miles from Fermanagh's own Lisnaskea water scheme.[227] In 1965, Newry Number Two RDC was in discussions with Louth CC regarding the provision of water supplies from South Armagh to considerable areas of North Louth, and also offered to provide water to the Corrinshigagh area of County Monaghan.[228] In such circumstances, the supplying council gained payment for its water and connection, and the requesting council was able to save money whilst providing water for residents for whom it would otherwise have been financially impractical, thus providing both parties with an incentive to cooperate.

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[225] Charlie Cullen, interviewed by author, 25 May 2006.
[226] Birrell and Murie, *Policy and Government*, p. 160.
[227] Fermanagh CCM, 20 July 1971 and 19 Oct. 1971, File LA4/2GA/11, PRONI. The earliest mention of the search for a water supply for Scothouse in this period is in the Monaghan CCM for 27 March 1950, M.C.C.O.. On 29 June 1959, a scheme for providing a bore hole in Scothouse failed due to 'high iron content and the hardness of the wells in question', Monaghan CCM, M.C.C.O.. The council then re-commenced a search for a lake based supply.
[228] See Newry Number 2 R.D.C. 15 June 1961, file LA57/2FA/33, 11 Oct. 1962, LA57/2FA/34, 11 March 1965, LA57/2FA/37, and 10 June 1965, LA57/2FA/37, PRONI. 'Northern water for Eire from North?' *UG,* 27 Feb. 1964, p. 5.

Information Exchange

Certain services for which CCs were responsible required a considerable financial outlay in their realisation. In these circumstances, councils sought to consult as widely as possible, both internally and across the border, in order to maximise the information available to them in reaching their decision.

During this period, councils on both sides of the border consulted on a range of high cost provisions, linked to projects such as housing and public swimming pools provision. One such undertaking was Blackrock Pool, the provision of which County Louth was considering from October 1953.[229] The late 1950s period saw a concerted campaign by the Water Safety Council and by the two governments to encourage local councils to provide swimming pools in their local area, both for their tourist potential and for the advantage they provided in allowing school children to be taught swimming, life saving and other water based skills.[230] Swimming pools were expensive and complex facilities to provide however, and not all councils considered them worth the expense.[231] Louth was therefore keen to take advantage of the experience accumulated by other public bodies engaged in similar projects when it came to providing its own pool. Among those whom it approached during the decade-long gestation of Blackrock Pool was Armagh City

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[229] Louth CCM, 19 Oct. 1953, L.C.A..
[230] Louth CCM, 17 July 1961, L.C.A.. See also P. McKimm, 'Provision and Operation of Swimming Pools', *Administration*, Vol. 13, No. 3, 1965, pp. 213-4.
[231] Leitrim CC, 6 Sept. 1971, L.C.C.O.

Council, whose pool, alongside Portadown's, the Louth Swimming Pool Sub-Committee came to inspect.[232]

A number of formal channels existed through which information could be exchanged between local council personnel in this period. The Republic's Institute of Public Administration acted as one such hub. Bringing together predominantly civil servants from both central government and local councils within the Republic, the Institute also maintained contact with Northern civil servants, and encouraged their attendance at seminars and discussions, and their contribution to publications.[233] Councillors from Northern Ireland would also on occasion be invited to attend, and, though proportionately more nationalist councillors then unionists chose to do so, both were represented.[234] The Institute also acted as a major publisher of books related to government and administration, including several works of Northern origin and interest, such as the memoirs of Northern Irish civil servant John Oliver and, more recently, Derek Birrell and Amanda Hayes's *The Local Government System in Northern Ireland*.[235]

In the mid-1970s, information exchange between council representatives, and between border councils and central government, was strengthened through the formation of joint cross-border liaison committees. The first of these, founded in 1975, catered for the North West Region, being based in Derry and included Londonderry, Limavady, Strabane and

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[232] Louth CC swimming pool sub-committee, 30 Oct. 1970, Louth CCM. L.C.A.. 'Armagh city council notes - Cross border thanks', *UG,* 7 Jan. 1971, p. 3.
[233] Maurice Hayes, interviewed by author, 30 May 2006. See for example, Hayes, 'Town Clerk'sPerspective' in the Institute of Public Affairs-published Daly (ed.), *County and Town* (Dublin, 2001), pp. 67-76.
[234] Maurice Hayes, interviewed by author, 30 May 2006.
[235] Oliver, *Working at Stormont*. Derek Birrell, and Amanda Hayes, *The Local Government System in Northern Ireland* (Dublin, 1999).

Donegal councils. The second, East Border Region, comprising Louth, Monaghan, Newry-Mourne and South Down, was known to have formed in 1976, though one delegate to it recalled its origins as having 'pre-dated the Troubles'.[236] Much later, in 1995, these were augmented by the Irish Central Border Area Committee.[237] The delay in setting up this final committee was explained by Andy Pollak, Director of the Centre for Cross Border Studies in Armagh, by the fact that 'it contains a much higher proportion of councils with strong unionist memberships' suggesting that political stances and cooperation were linked.[238] These committees allowed members from both jurisdictions to discuss issues within their 'economic and social brief', formalising the creation of bonds between peripheral groups as discussed by O'Dowd and Corrigan.[239] As 'bridge' organisations between the border areas and political centres, these committees benefited in having on their panel facilitators provided directly by the two administrations, able to convey their views back to the central authorities.[240]

The passing of resolutions was one major avenue by which councils, particularly in the South, could communicate and exchange information. When a council wished to raise an issue in this way, it would pass a resolution at its meeting to which were added the words

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[236] Eamon Delaney, *The Accidental Diplomat* (Dublin, 2001), p. 302. See also Pamela Arthurs, interviewed by author, 10 May 2006. Brian Harvey et. al, *The Emerald Curtain* (Carrickmacross, 2005), pp. 122-3.
[237] Eamon Delaney, *The Accidental Diplomat* (Dublin, 2001), p. 302.
[238] Andy Pollak, 'A practical example of cross-border cooperation: the Irish Border Region', *Team Europe Training Seminar*, 19 June 2001, p. 6.
[239] Eamon Delaney, *The Accidental Diplomat* (Dublin, 2001), p. 302. O'Dowd and Corrigan 'Buffer Zone or Bridge', pp. 335-351.
[240] Eamon Delaney, *The Accidental Diplomat* (Dublin, 2001), pp. 302-9. O'Dowd and Corrigan 'Buffer Zone or Bridge', pp. 335-351. For use of facilitators in collaboration initiatives, see B. Bramwell and A. Sharman, 'Collaboration in local tourism policy making', *Annals of Tourism Research,* Vol. 26, No. 2, 1999, p. 396.

'copy to be sent to all County Councils,' or equivalent.[241] The wording of the resolution was then sent out by the secretary to all the bodies specified, who could then either pass the resolution themselves, mark it 'read', or 'noted', or ignore it entirely.[242] In the event of the first two, the proposing council was then notified of the action taken.[243] The take-up of this system was not uniform across public bodies, nor was its utility, and indeed, 'such resolutions [were] often nationalistic in content and largely ritualistic.'[244] Some, such as Louth CC, rarely if ever passed a resolution proposed to them by others, while Donegal, for example, frequently both initiated resolutions and passed incoming ones.[245]

Southern councils passing a resolution could specify that it should also be sent for the attention of the Northern councils.[246] One example of when this was a resolution passed by Carrickmacross Council seeking the release of six individuals held as 'political prisoners' in the UK.[247] Two reports exist in the *Ulster Gazette* into the response which this request received, with Armagh City Council and Tandragee Urban District Council both reported to have marked the request as 'read' following discussion at council meetings.[248] Tyrone CC's records also show that they decided to take no action on a resolution submitted to them by Dublin Corporation in September 1959, concerning IRA

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[241] See, for example, the resolution on the use of native fuel by the council, Leitrim CCM, 14 Dec. 1964, L.C.C.O..
[242] Resolution on republican prisoners by Leitrim CC sent to 'every public body in the Republic'. Leitrim CCM, 25 Sept. 1961, L.C.C.O..
[243] See, for example, Castleblaney U.D.C. minutes 29 Nov. 1949 and 25 Oct. 1949 for responses to Castleblaney's resolution concerning housing loans. C.U.D.C.O..
[244] Basil Chubb, *The Government and Politics of Ireland* (London, 1982), p. 307.
[245] See for example, Donegal CCM, 25 Oct. 1949, D.C.A.. The council passed a resolution coming from Sligo on ground rents and one from County Kerry on an Anti-partitionist statement made by Senator Murray of Montana in the US senate. On 31 Aug. 1954, the council adopted no fewer then eight resolutions proposed by outside bodies. Louth, meanwhile, simply marked as 'read' collectively all resolutions sent to them. See Louth CCM, 16 Feb. 1953 and 23 June 1952, L.C.A..
[246] Seamus Keating, interviewed by author, 8 Nov. 2005.
[247] 'Political Prisoners Resolution', *UG,* 4 June 1970, p. 3.
[248] Ibid. '50 new houses for Tandragee', *UG,* 4 June 1970, p. 10.

prisoners.[249] The system of resolution distribution appears to have been much less active in Northern Ireland, generally, with far fewer resolutions being circulated, and many being treated as 'letters' or 'communications' when they were received.[250]

The role and responsibilities of local government were undergoing simultaneous review North and South of the border in the late 1960s. In the Republic, major changes had already been introduced with the creation and adjustment of the county management scheme, but for Northern Ireland this period saw the first major review to have been undertaken since partition.[251] Local councils were still at this stage using a rate-payer franchise long discarded in Britain and the Republic, and allegations of corruption and gerrymandering were placing local government reform at the heart of the emerging civil rights agenda.[252] Reflecting on his post-war work with the Department of Health and Local Government, John Oliver admitted:

> I am genuinely sorry now that we did not put in hand at once the job of reforming the local government structure. It would have paid handsome dividends in later years, and a strong, modernised local authority system might possibly have saved the country some of its troubles twenty-five years later … in retrospect, this seems to have been a serious error of judgment on our part.[253]

Oliver was already heading a review of local government, begun in 1966, when increasing pressure from the civil rights movement, and the removal by James Callaghan

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[249] 14 Sept. 1959, Tyrone CCM, LA6/2GA/11, PRONI.
[250] See, for example, 14 Feb. 1958, Fermanagh CCM, letter from Bundoran UDC. File LA4/2GA/6, PRONI.
[251] Richard Haslam, 'The County Manager', in Daly (ed.) *County and Town*, pp. 98-9. Birrell and Murie, *Policy and Government*, p. 155.
[252] Jackson, 'Local Government in Northern Ireland, 1920 - 73', in *County and Town*, p. 58. Jonathan Bardon, *A History of Ulster* (Belfast, 2001), pp. 638-9. Senia Pašeta, *Modern Ireland* (Oxford, 2003), p. 106.
[253] Oliver *Working at Stormont*, p. 71.

of housing powers from Northern Irish councils, led to the creation of the Macrory Commission on Local Government in Northern Ireland, which reported back in June 1970. [254] By the time its recommendations were due to be implemented, 1 October 1973, however, they were already somewhat superseded by events, the fall of Stormont and the introduction of direct rule having changed the political landscape.[255] The implementation of the Macrory reforms lies outside the scope of our period. The investigation itself, however, is noteworthy for the unofficial role played in its information gathering efforts by the Northern Irish Town Clerks' Association. The urban and borough members of the Association, 'saw themselves as most at risk in a re-organisation,' and had an obvious interest in the executive form of local government operated in the South, which allowed far greater power to officials such as themselves. They therefore began a structured series of consultations with executive members south of the border 'particularly the county managers … there was a particularly helpful county manager in Louth, in Dundalk … in Wicklow … [and] in Kilkenny.'[256] Once the information was gathered, it was passed directly to civil servant John Oliver, 'the main driver behind the whole thing.'[257] Oliver was aware of the Republic's Devlin Commission Report into Public Services Organisation, completed in 1969, and the 1971 review of local government carried out there.[258] Subsequent reviews of local government have similarly included reference to

[254] Oliver *Working at Stormont*, pp. 89–90. Mulholland, *Crossroads*, pp. 40-1. Hayes, 'A Town Clerk'sPerspective', in *County and Town*, p. 74. Review Body on Local Government in Northern Ireland, *Macrory Report*, cover page.
[255] Jackson, 'Local Government in Northern Ireland, 1920 - 73', in *County and Town*, p. 64 and Colin Knox and Joanne Hughes, 'Local Government and Community Relations', in Seamus Dunn, *Facets of the Conflict in Northern Ireland* (Basingstoke and London, 1995), pp. 43-4.
[256] Maurice Hayes, interviewed by author, 30 May 2006.
[257] Ibid.
[258] Oliver, *Working at Stormont*, p. 165. Daly, *Buffer State*, p. 511.

practices within the opposite jurisdiction.[259] The actions of the Town Clerks' Association in this instance were clear case of 'low' politics working to influence national policy, albeit one whose effects are hard to quantify. Since the Town Clerks Association shared an established social link with its Southern contemporaries, this is also a good example of an occasion on which social contacts were taken forward to create cooperative contacts between organisations.[260]

Social and semi-social contact between council personnel

Under the model suggested by this research, cooperation was more likely where some form of contact, social or personal, had been established beforehand. With this in mind, it is now proposed to examine some of the cooperation projects mentioned above in terms of the levels of contact which pre-existed them and the impact that this may have had. This is more straightforward to establish in some cases than in others. Particularly where contact was recalled by personnel other then those who took part in it, conclusions about the impact of prior contacts were hard to arrive at. Where this was the case, the existence of contact will be noted, but no conclusions drawn from it.

Newry Number Two RDC, one of a handful of Nationalist-controlled Northern councils, had a substantial number of cross-border interests, and was considered a 'spokescouncil' for the nationalist community. As a result, it was consulted on nationalist issues, even those that lay outside its area of competence. For example, in January 1965, South

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[259] See, for example, KPMG, *Local Government Financing* (Dublin, 1996), pp. 8-9.
[260] Maurice Hayes, interviewed by author, 30 May 2006.

Armagh Nationalist Stormont MP Eddie Richardson consulted it, following the Lemass/O'Neill visits, regarding whether the Nationalist Party should accept the position of official opposition.[261] Newry's contacts with the South were considerable; one of the councillors, indeed, was said to be resident just south of the border, in North Louth, where he ran a petrol station.[262] On a number of occasions the council's annual dinner was held south of the border in Dundalk, which forced the Stormont personnel attending to cross the border also.[263] This was controversial for a number of reasons, not least because the hotel chosen was allegedly managed by the Newry chairman's son and that it implied a criticism of Newry hotels, which sat uneasily with the council's tourism and economic promotion role, though others dismissed the allegations, suggesting that hotel facilities in Newry were simply inadequate to host these events.[264] Louth CC and Dundalk town councillors would on such occasions have featured among the guests, providing a social setting in which the various councillors were able to meet.[265] A similar social network was maintained by the Town Clerks' Association, which invited members of their Southern equivalent organisation to attend their annual dinner every year.[266] Even for a Newry councillor who felt very much the localism of his role, 'the business of the council at that time was very little, and very local,' contacts with Dundalk remained ongoing, with friendships from schooldays in the city being maintained via attendance at dances and cinema trips.[267] These levels of contact would ensure an awareness, at least,

[261] Newry Number Two R.D.C., 21 Jan. 1965, File LA57/2FA/37, PRONI.
[262] Maurice Hayes, interviewed by author, 30 May 2006.
[263] Oliver, *Working at Stormont*, p. 192.
[264] Maurice Hayes, interviewed by author, 30 May 2006. Kevin O'Neill, interviewed by author, 10 May 2006. J. Deegan and D.A. Dineen, *Tourism policy and performance – the Irish Experience* (London, 1997), p. 196.
[265] Kevin O'Neill, interviewed by author, 10 May 2006.
[266] Maurice Hayes, interviewed by author, 30 May 2006.
[267] Sean McCreesh, interviewed by author, 10 May 2006.

of opinions and circumstances south of the border, even if not direct council to council contact. It is interesting to note, however, the number of occasions on which Fermanagh CC in particular, controversial and heavily gerrymandered though it was, became involved in cross-border contacts with its Republican neighbours, confirming that Newry's Nationalism was not the sole criteria for its success in this field.

Council personnel were instrumental in building cross-border social spheres, both for themselves and for others. Donegal County Secretary Seamus Keating, for example, recalled how council personnel North and South were responsible for the formation of the joint Lifford-Strabane Rotary Club, the only such club in the world to operated on an international basis:

> The county manager … in Donegal was Desmond Williams … The county engineer … Morris O'Connell … the local Doctor in Lifford, Matt Coin … I was a founder member of that, with [Strabane Chief Executive Jim] McGahern and some of the others, and, as far as I remember, some of the initiative for it, or some of the initial contacts at least, they came from Jim McGahern. He left the service of Strabane RDC sometime in the early 1970s I think and he went to the Northern Ireland Housing Trust.[268]

The club formed part of a dense web of social contacts between the two towns. Many Donegal Council staff chose to live in Strabane, which was the bigger town and provided better services.[269] Some form of tax incentive also existed for them to do so.[270] Those

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[268] Seamus Keating, interviewed by author, 8 Nov. 2005. R. J. Fleming, future Chief Inspector of Derry, was a member, as was Detective-Sergeant George McBride, Head of the RUC Drug Squad. See: 'Round the counties - County Londonderry - new chief Inspector for Derry', *CG,* Aug. 1971, pp. 33-4 and 'Round the Counties – County Tyrone drug traffic well organised', *CG*, Feb. 1971, pp. 45-5.
[269] Seamus Keating, interviewed by author, 8 Nov. 2005.
[270] Ibid.

who did not live in Strabane would travel across for banking facilities, or to join to institutions such as the golf club.[271]

County engineers, sharing professional interests, motives and the same practical mindset which was previously noted as being helpful to cooperation initiatives at the Office of Public Works, were the officials most frequently mentioned with reference to joint cross-border work. Keating recalled:

> The Donegal County Engineer had a sort of a reasonable amount of dealing, you know, contacts [across the border], quite possibly informal and because of their common interest in engineering and the common work they were doing … It would depend, too, on the personalities involved and in my time in Donegal the county engineer there was a very good … had very good social skills, so that may have accounted for it.[272]

Cyril Coulter, reflecting on Fermanagh CC's contacts with their Southern neighbours, also noted:

> There was one engineer here, hired 1967, he had contact the other side of the border but that would be unofficial. With the co-engineer across the way. I know he did have contact then, and they would have had contact with him, but nothing was at an official level … about roads, that was mentioned, about could this be done or could that be done or could they meet them, you know, that kind of thing … I know there was quite a close relationship between our chap here and the fellow in Leitrim. He'd go down there, he'd come up here, unofficially … His name was McClure, Archie McClure. A right capable engineer, very … It was Leitrim in particular, one man in Leitrim, I heard him talk about. He was … a bit of a character, Archie McClure, but a very capable man, very capable. He got an awful lot of work done in this county.[273]

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[271] Ibid.
[272] Ibid.
[273] Cyril Coulter, interviewed by author, 10 May 2006.

Training itself could, on occasion, provide county engineers with the context for preliminary contact. Cormac Boylan, District Engineer in Castleblaney, remembered studying alongside Armagh County Engineer Tom McAvoy at University College Dublin (UCD): 'He was from Northern Ireland but he'd qualified in Dublin so he went back to the North and went that way. [I saw him] about twice a year or something.'[274] This helped the professional contact between the two men. For example, when McAvoy's men failed to locate a stream which formed the border at one point, as the farmer had had it piped, Boylan recalled:

> The Armagh fellas, when they came to repair their road, the stream wasn't there any longer so they came to the next stream that they found. And that was [inside County Monaghan] … Our roads at that time were in a pretty bad state, so I rang McAvoy and told him, 'I see you're taking over part of our roads.' He says 'Considering the condition your roads are in you should be happy if we took them all over.'[275]

Most UCD engineers entered consulting firms in Dublin, leaving University College Galway graduates to dominate the local government service in the South.[276] Thus the UCD connection was important for Boylan and McAvoy. Previous training also formed bonds among other grades within the local government service, with many county managers, for example, coming from legal backgrounds, where they had previously met.[277] Once employed, contacts were maintained via regular meetings of, for example, the County Managers' Association.[278] It is unclear whether these contacts extended

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[274] Cormac Boylan, interview by author 21 May 2006
[275] Ibid.
[276] Ibid.
[277] Cyril Coulter, interviewed by author, 10 May 2006. Richard Haslam, interview by author 7 Nov. 2005.
[278] Richard Haslam, interview by author 7 Nov. 2005.

across the border during this period, though they certainly did so later.[279] Staff movement between councils was frequent in the South, though less so in Northern Ireland, where catholic employees, for example, could only move to other Nationalist-controlled councils, leading to frustration and a certain breakdown in the inter-council interaction.[280]

Conclusions

Contemporary source material reveals an extensive network of cross-border council contacts aimed at the efficient delivery of services. While such contacts formed only a small fraction of council interests, they appear to have been at least as common as inter-council contact within the same jurisdictions.

Interestingly, there is no evidence to suggest that councils utilised cross-border cooperation in order to compensate for weak links within their own jurisdictions, as Stephen Roper suggests could be expected.[281] Nor did councils in this period advocate greater regionalisation as a means to combat their peripheral position within the state, as O'Dowd and Corrigan suggest they later did.[282] Indeed, attempts to centrally-impose increased regionalisation in the Republic, through the introduction of tourism boards in 1964 and health boards in 1971, were resisted at a local level as detrimental to local

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[279] Ibid. Seamus Keating, interviewed by author, 8 Nov. 2005.
[280] Maurice Hayes, *Minority Verdict*, pp. 44-5.
[281] Stephen Roper, *Cross-border and Local Cooperation on the Island of Ireland: an Economic Perspective* (Dublin, 2006), p. 7.
[282] See O'Dowd and Corrigan 'Buffer Zone or Bridge', pp. 335-351.

democracy and the survival of local government.[283] This would seem to sit uneasily with the already limited power held by local administrations. However, in a clientalist culture such as Ireland, where 'pull and personality count more than experience and ideas,' representatives in Dublin and Belfast would be expected to influence decisions made by direct contact.[284] Any attempt to place a further layer of bureaucracy, such as regional boards, between these patrons and the decision-makers would thus be seen as a reduction in their power, though local politicians soon came to dominate these new structures also.[285] The high number of TDs who were also councillors had an interest in maintaining their powerful patron role, and may well have influenced councils against devolving power to organisations in which their influence as brokers would be diminished.

The first signs of the weakening of this centralist focus, and the growth of a distinctive border regional voice, appear only towards the mid-1970s, with the advent of the Eastern and Western Border Regions Committees, which for the first time allowed the border regions *per se* a voice within the two governments.[286] This may have been the result of the transfer of ideas from mainland Europe, where Euro-regions had already been under development for a number of years.[287] The involvement of leading Europhiles such as John Hume in the border regions committees lends further weight to this possibility.[288]

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[283] Desmond Roche, 'Local Government Reorganisation: The Issues Involved', *Administration,* Vol. 19, No. 4, 1971, p. 323. Myles Tierney, *The Parish Pump* (Dublin, 1982), p. 23. See, for example, Leitrim CCM, 24 May 1971, debate on Local Government re-organisation, L.C.C.O..

[284] Donald S. Connery, *The Irish* (London, 1968), p. 108

[285] Douglas G. Pearce, 'Tourism in Ireland', *Tourism Management,* Vol. 11, No. 2, 1990, p. 138.

[286] See page 255 above.

[287] Thomas Christiansen, 'The European Canvas', in Democratic Dialogue (ed.) *No Frontiers* (Belfast, 1999), p. 31.

[288] Eamon Delaney, *The Accidental Diplomat* (Dublin, 2001), p. 302.

Councils were able to maintain friendly contacts across the border by a judicious separation between the known and unknown 'other'. In this, they were aided by the two-branch format of their councils, since the executive could maintain friendly contact even while the legislative branch issued the nationalist statements which they felt were expected of them by their electorate.

7. Tourism - Sub National and Local Cooperation within a National Policy Framework

Tourism, 'a new form of earning … that was hardly known before the war,' rose during this period to become the second most important foreign currency earner for Southern Ireland, and a growth industry throughout the world.[1] First appearing as a possible area of cooperation on the agenda of the January 1965 Lemass/O'Neill meeting, 'as it was considered a relatively non-contentious area of economic activity on which there appeared to be scope … for deeper north-south economic cooperation,' it became one of the first fields in which cooperation at governmental level was actively pursued.[2] Yet the economic importance and essentially propagandist nature of the industry made tourism an area of considerable sensitivity, particularly as the two governments were committed, at least in theory, to the projection of two very different images of Ireland.[3]

Active cooperation was delegated by the two governments to the sub-governmental tourist boards, Bord Fáilte and the Northern Ireland Tourist Board (NITB). This chapter will examine how these bodies balanced governmental expectations with the need to pursue a successful cooperation programme and the effect which governmental interest had upon their agenda.

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[1] G. Colley, 'International Tourism Today', *Lloyds Bank Review,* July 1967, p. 31. James Meenan 'National Income, Expenditure and Investment', *Studies*, Vol. 40, June 1951, p. 177.
[2] Henderson and Teague, *Economic Cooperation*, p. 7. See 'Notes on Meeting 14/1/65', File 175(9), *T. K. Whitaker papers*, UCD.
[3] Jones to Beere, 20 Sept. 1965. File 98/3/35, *Cross-Border Tourism,* D.T.P., N.A.I..

The structure of the tourism industry within Ireland

Tourism in Ireland was supervised by the Department of Commerce in the North, and the Department of Industry and Commerce in the South until 1965, when it was transferred to the new Department of Transport and Power (DTP), later re-named Transport, Power and Tourism. Below them, the NITB, set up under the Development of Tourism Traffic Act, 1948, and Bord Fáilte, the re-constituted Irish Tourist Board set up following the Christenberry Report in 1951, acted as semi-state agents charged with the day-to-day promotion of Ireland to tourists, and the development of tourism infrastructure.[4] In terms of international publicity, the NITB acted as part of the British Travel Association (BTA).

From 1951 until 1955, tourism publicity for the Republic was handled by Fógra Fáilte, a semi-independent body absorbed by Bord Fáilte in 1955 to form Bord Fáilte Éireann.[5] In 1963 some work was transferred to eight regional tourism boards, making Bord Fáilte the first government agency to implement regionalisation.[6] The intention was to transfer some of the financial burden of tourism from central government to the local authorities, which acted as the new boards' primary financial backers.[7] In order to ensure their contribution, each group providing £500 or more was entitled to nominate one board

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[4] Department of Industry and Commerce, *Synthasis of reports on tourism 1950 - 51* (Dublin, 1951), pp. 1-2. Jonathan Greer, 'Developing trans-jurisdictional tourism partnerships – insights from the Island o Ireland', *Tourism Management,* Vol. 23, No. 4, 2002, p. 357. Bord Fáilte, *Tourism – the Welcome Industry* (Dublin, c. 1982), p. 10.

[5] Irene Furlong, 'Tourism and the Irish State in the 1950s', in Keogh, O'Shea and Quinlan (ed.), *Ireland in the 1950s* (Cork, 2004), pp. 172-3.

[6] Bord Fáilte, *Tourism – the Welcome Industry* (Dublin, c.1982), p. 11. For debates regarding the introduction of local tourism boards, see for example Louth CC Agenda, 10 Feb.1964, file LCC/MB/1/28, L.C.A., and Monaghan CCM, 13 Jan. 1964, M.C.C.O.. Douglas G. Pearce, 'Tourism in Ireland', *Tourism Management,* Vol. 11, No. 2, 1990, p. 138.

[7] Douglas G. Pearce, 'Tourism in Ireland', *Tourism Management,* Vol. 11, No. 2, 1990, p. 138.

director. Groups providing less then £500 could club together and nominate one director per £500 contribution. In a political culture heavily reliant upon face-to-face contact, this ensured that, despite grumbling about the meagre attention given to them by the tourism authorities, all CCs agreed to provide £500.[8] The formation of the regional boards created an institutional imbalance and 'mis-match of responsibilities' between the tourism industries North and South which 'inhibit[ed] economic cooperation' to an extent.[9]

As well as these statutory bodies, both jurisdictions had voluntary national organisations dedicated to encouraging tourism, the Irish Tourist Association (ITA) and Ulster (originally Northern Ireland) Tourist Development Association (UTDA). These bodies pre-dated the tourist boards, having been created in 1924-5 through the amalgamation of previous organisations.[10] Their role was to act as 'the advertising committee and the "parliament" of the industry', and to foster the creation of local Tourist Development Associations (TDAs) to promote tourism on a more localised basis. 'Anybody could join the ITA, if [they] paid the subscription, and it was supported by the hoteliers, by the carriers.'[11] This 'greatly weakened' it, according to the Irish Hotel Commission, 'by having to include too many representatives of contributing local bodies, many of whom appear[ed] to have [had] little interest in Tourism.' In 1935, for example, the UTDA's membership including seven local TDAs, all seventy-three Northern Irish local authorities (all but five of whom supported it financially), and various tourism-related

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[8] For councils complaints regarding lack of support for their area, see, for example, Castleblaney UDC 30 Aug. 1949, C.U.D.C.O., and 'Carrick Urban affairs Attitude to Tourism Company', *NS,* 24 Sept. 1965, p. 3. For decisions regarding funding increases see Monaghan CC discussion on the introduction of tourism boards, Monaghan CCM, 13 Jan. 1964, as compared 20 June 1964, M.C.C.O..

[9] O'Dowd and Corrigan, 'Buffer Zone or Bridge', p. 346.

[10] UTDA Council discussion, 14 Feb. 1935, file TOUR/1/1/3, PRONI. C.S. Andrews, *Man of No Property* (Dublin and Cork 1982), p. 71.

[11] Michael Kevin O'Doherty, interviewed by author, 5 Feb. 2004.

businesses.[12] Despite this, the UTDA complained of funding shortages, claiming that northern counties such as Tyrone and Down contributed considerably less to its work than Donegal, the poorest county in Eire contributed to its Southern equivalent.[13] The ITA was wound-up in 1964, when its tourist bureau and publicity function and its local authority contributions were transferred to the regional tourism organisations.[14]

As well as supporting the ITA, Southern Local councils also became heavily involved in tourism promotion through Bord Fáilte-sponsored schemes. For example, from its inception in 1958 until 1972, Castleblaney UDC raised issues concerning the Bord Fáilte tidy towns competition no fewer the forty-three times.[15] Scores were analysed, improvements suggested and complaints voiced. Monaghan Town's proud record in the competition was proclaimed in banner headlines in the local press. It is noteworthy also that tourism promotion became one of the few areas to remain in the hands of Northern local authorities post-1973, probably due to the perceived importance of local knowledge and enthusiasm to it.[16]

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[12] UTDA Council discussion, 14 Feb. 1935, file TOUR/1/1/3, PRONI.
[13] Finance/Executive committee minutes, UTDA, 31 Jan. 1962, File LA1/3AH/39, PRONI.
[14] Department of Industry and Commerce, *Synthasis of reports on tourism 1950 - 51* (Dublin, 1951), p. 3. James Deegan and Donel A. Dineen, *Tourism Policy and Performance* (London, 1997), p. 22.
[15] See, for example Castleblaney UDC Minutes, 28 Jan. 1958, 22 July 1958, 23 May 1972, 23 Sept. 1969 and 25 March 1969, C.U.D.C.O..
[16] 'Top of the Class Monaghan!', NS, 1 Sept. 1961, p. 1. 'Monaghan Town awarded £500 for tidiness', *NS,* 1 Sept. 1961, p. 2. 'Monaghan did it again!', *NS,* 31 Aug. 1962, p. 1. 'Monaghan is Jubilant', *NS,* 30 Aug. 1963, p. 1. 'Monaghan is top of the class', *NS,* 30 Aug. 1963, p. 3. 'Monaghan Cleans Up!' *NS,* 28 Aug. 1964, p. 1. 'Monaghan Gets shock - no prize', *NS,* 3 Sept. 1965, p. 1. See also Mike Tomlinson, 'Relegating Local Government', in O'Dowd, Rolston and Tomlinson, *Northern Ireland – Between Civil Rights and Civil War* (London, 1980), p. 95.

The UTDA and ITA worked to encourage the formation of local TDAs among hoteliers, publicans, and bed and breakfast owners in small towns.[17] These smaller bodies campaigned on issues such as environmental pollution and better transport facilities, as well as working with visitors and travel agents to facilitate holidays in their areas.[18] Many such groups formed along the border where, due to economic difficulties, tourism was considered particularly important. Other local groups, such as the chambers of commerce and the traditionally powerful Vintner's Association, also campaigned on tourism issues affecting them.[19] Even local Garda barracks were enrolled in 'best kept roadside gardens' competitions.[20] Bord Fáilte encouraged this local enthusiasm by spending the majority of its funds, not on tourism publicity abroad, but on the provision of tourism facilities inside Ireland, which would also benefit local people.[21]

The Ideological background to tourism cooperation

Cooperation in tourism faced many of the same ideological and practical challenges regarding recognition experienced in other fields.[22] Particular difficulties were attached to this field however, due to its leading role in international image-making and its

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[17] Finance/Executive committee minutes, UTDA, 31 Jan. 1962, File LA1/3AH/39, PRONI.
[18] 'Monaghan to get 'bus tours', *NS,* 8 July 1966, p. 1. 'Big Scottish airlift in July 500 tourists for 'Blaney', *NS*, 3 Feb. 1967, p. 2.
[19] 'Tourism at Border post', *Irish Press,* 10 Oct. 1967 and 'Efforts for Tourist centre at border', *Frontier Sentinel*, 14 Oct. 1967, file 98/3/35, *Cross-Border Tourism,* D.T.P., N.A.I.. Ferriter, *Transformation of Ireland*, p. 16 and p. 508. For details of the Vintner's Association's campaign, see *The Ulster Magazine and Eire Review*, from 1959 to 1969, e.g. 'New licensing Act causes uproar in Republic "death knell to tourism" says Donegal Trader', Sept. 1960, p. 10 and ''hoteliers condemn "farcical" licensing laws in Northern Ireland', May 1963, p. 11.
[20] "Zeitgeist", 'District News, Tralee, Killarney and Dingle districts - Tralee Station Garden', *GR, April* 1952, p. 421.
[21] Bord Fáilte General Policy, 19th November 1969, Michael Gorman private papers. Bord Fáilte, *Annual Report 1961* (Dublin, 1961), p. 21.
[22] See for example, pages 99-101 in current work.

importance as a 'globalising force, linking places to the wider world and influencing the changing meanings of places.'[23]

As the smaller market, Northern Ireland stood to gain more economically from tourism cooperation, particularly within the North American market, in which the Republic was perceived to have a stronghold and to which Northern Ireland 'had woken up rather late.'[24] Ideologically and economically, however, such cooperation presented far greater difficulties for the Northern government which had, since 1922, struggled to have its territory recognised as a legitimate political unit. Fears were expressed that joint publicity would undermine this legitimacy, alienating both electors and external supporters for limited financial return, as island-wide tourists would spend proportionately less of their holiday in the North.[25] As a result of concerns over Northern Ireland's constitutional position, joint publicity inside the U.K., where the risk was perceived to be greatest, was ruled out at an early stage, except in the case of small, local projects.[26] Interestingly, the Republic of Ireland perceived a similar, if smaller, constitutional threat in the distribution of its pamphlets through the BTA, particularly since in 1966 the BTA was already

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[23] Bernadette Quinn, 'Shaping Tourism Places: Agency and Interconnections in Festival Settings', in Cronin and O'Connor (ed.), *Irish Tourism* (Clevedon, 2003), p. 61.
[24] Kenneth Bloomfield, *Stormont in Crisis* (Belfast, 1994), p. 35. In his 1995 survey of the industry, Grey noted that '100% of US tour operators surveyed were in favour of much closer cooperation' between the two tourist boards. A.W. Gray, *The Economic Consequences of Peace in Ireland* (Dublin, 1995), p. 9.
[25] Northern Ireland Cabinet Discussion 20 Nov. 1960, *Joint Tourist publicity with South,* File CAB/4/1147, PRONI. Minister for Development in Northern Ireland Cabinet Discussion, 3 June 1965, *Tourist Publicity Cooperation,* File CAB/4/1308, PRONI. Bord Fáilte apparently shared this fear. See: David Wilson, 'Tourism, Public Policy and the Image of Northern Ireland since the Troubles', in Barbara O'Connor and Michael Cronin (ed.), *Tourism in Ireland* (Cork, 1993), pp. 142 and 150.
[26] Notes on Jones and Beere meeting, held in Belfast 26 Feb. 1965. Written 1 March 1965. File 98/3/35 *Cross-Border Tourism,* D.T.P., N.A.I..

publicising Ireland as part of its 'Holidays at Home' campaign.[27] The Republic's higher independent profile, however, made the risk correspondingly smaller.[28]

Cooperation in tourism presented Stormont with an opportunity to appear both politically reasonable and economically innovative to an increasingly impatient British government. In 1965 Brian Faulkner, Northern Minister for Commerce, was all too aware that 'in recent years the Republic has been able to demonstrate both its apparent willingness to take part in a joint effort and the lack of response from the Northern Ireland government,' thus earning kudos with Westminster and costing Northern Ireland precious good-will.[29] 'The British Travel Association,' he noted, 'had long been anxious to establish cooperation abroad with Bord Fáilte as a means of promoting increased interest in the United Kingdom, particularly among Irish Americans.'[30] In light of the victory of a Labour government in the Westminster elections of 1964 which 'was by no means convinced that partition was the only available option for Ireland,' unhappy with the role of Ulster Unionist MPs at Westminster, and under pressure from within and without to declare its support for a 32-county Irish Republic, or at least reform within the Stormont system, there was an increased need for Stormont to demonstrate its political and economic commitment.[31]

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[27] BTA leaflet, File 2001/3/1364, *Bord Fáilte Tourism Co-ordination Meeting December 1966*, Dept. of Finance, N.A.I..

[28] Notes on Jones and Beere meeting, held in Belfast 26 Feb. 1965, Tourism appendix II. Written 1 March 1965. Beere, *Joint Tourist Publicity of Bord Fáilte and NITB, Summery,* written 12 July 1965. Letter, Sean Ronan, secretary, DEA, to Beere, DTP, 7 April 1965. See also: 'Britain and Ireland in tourist Link', *Evening Press,* 10 Jan. 1966. All in file 98/3/35 *Cross-Border Tourism,* D.T.P., N.A.I..

[29] Memorandum by the Minister for Commerce Brian Faulkner, 20 January 1965, file CAB/4/1289, PRONI.

[30] Ibid.

[31] Sabine Wichert, *Northern Ireland Since 1945* (London and New York, 1999), p. 43. Kenneth Bloomfield, *Stormont in Crisis* (Belfast, 1994), p. 98. Memorandum, 1958, p. 3. File WAK6/1, Lord

Tourism, with the opportunities it afforded to impress outsiders and disseminate positive imagery, could provide a strong focus for nationalist feeling and the enforcement of national myths of belonging. The Government of Northern Ireland had made extensive use of this in designing and running its section of the 1951 Festival of Britain exhibition.[32] For both governments, therefore, tourism cooperation was potentially problematic, if used to strengthen an alternative vision to their own, and both expressed concerns in this regard.[33] 'Tourist literature is not the proper medium for political propaganda' noted DTP Secretary Thécla Beere, 'and if we tolerate a measure of it on the part of N.I. it is only because of the ultimate goal we have in view and … the safeguards which we can invoke.'[34] This fear of propaganda masquerading as tourism publicity haunted government cooperation efforts in this field throughout the period, particularly at times of high tensions. In 1965, for example, fears were expressed in the Northern Cabinet that joint publicity, disseminated via Bord Fáilte, would be sent in consignments together with unsuitable material, such as brochures publicising the 1916 commemorations.[35]

Wakehurst papers, House of Lords Archive, London. See: Wilson on Ulster Unionist MPs in 'Note for the Record', 19 May 1965, file PREM13/2266 *Northern Ireland Part 1,* Prime Minister's Office, N.A.L., Irish Labour Party letter to British Labour MPs, Circa. 4 May 1949, File LEV/27, Ben W. Levy, M.B.E. papers, House of Lords Archive, London and Labour Party Conference Agendas, 1957, *Ireland* p. 42, 1958, *Ireland* p. 39 and 1960 *Ireland*, p. 49, Labour Party Archives, Labour History Archive and Study Centre, Manchester. See also Paul Dixon, *Northern Ireland - The Politics of War and Peace* (Basingstoke and New York), p. 58. Jackson, *Ireland*, pp. 368-9.

[32] J. Loughlin, *Ulster Unionism and British National Identity* (London and New York, 1995), p. 154.

[33] Notes on Jones and Beere meeting, held in Belfast 26 Feb. 1965, Tourism appendix II. Written 1 March 1965. File 98/3/35 *Cross-Border Cooperation in Tourism,* D.T.P., N.A.I.. Northern Ireland Cabinet discussions 20 Jan. 1965, *Joint Tourist publicity,* File CAB/4/1289, PRONI

[34] Beere, meeting observations, 3 March 1965. File 98/3/35 *Cross-Border Cooperation in Tourism,* D.T.P., N.A.I..

[35] Northern Ireland Cabinet discussions, 7 Oct. 1965 *Cooperation with the Irish Republic: Joint Tourist literature*, CAB/4/1315, PRONI.

Due to tourism's international aspects, debates concerning joint publicity had to be cleared via the DEA in Dublin which, as noted earlier, was notoriously uncooperative.[36] Here, as in the Woodford River project, the DEA provided the cautious voice, expressing doubts about the zeal with which the BTA could be relied upon to promote Ireland, particularly in light of the experience of Irish Railways, which, it appears, operated a non-equal joint publicity operation with British Railways in America.[37] Interestingly, however, while Sean Ronan, the department's secretary, agreed with Thécla Beere that work with the BTA may raise objections, particularly amongst Irish American nationalists, he counselled that if the arrangements were financially beneficial then they should go ahead, subject to clearance.[38]

In the original note on his meeting with Beere, H.E. Jones, Permanent Secretary to the Department of Commerce, included; statistics and border crossing facilities, encouragement of cross-border traffic, sponsored visits and promotions, reciprocity of gun, game and fishing licences, cooperation between CIE and UTA hotels, cooperation on Enniskillen (St Angelo's) Airport, the reopening of the Ballinamore-Ballyconnell Canal, and publicity outside the UK as areas of possible cooperation.[39] An invitation for Childers, the Southern minister, to visit Belfast was also extended.[40] In the Republic's copy of this note, the reference to 'outside' the UK was underlined, suggesting it was

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[36] See pages 242-243 in current work.
[37] Undated letter to Dr. O'Sullivan, Assistant Secretary of the Government Secretariat, Dept. of Taoiseach, 1966. File 98/3/35, *Cross-Border Cooperation in Tourism,* D.T.P., N.A.I..
[38] Ronan to Beere, 7 April 1965. Ibid.
[39] Jones notes on Beere meeting, 1 March 1965, File 98/3/35 *Cross-Border Cooperation in Tourism,* D.T.P., N.A.I..
[40] Ibid.

controversial.[41] The note goes on to enumerate the conditions under which joint literature could be produced. These included; showing the border on joint maps, not using provocative colours such as orange and green, not issuing statements suggesting Ireland was one unit, clearing all literature through both departments and including a joint explanatory statement at the front of each leaflet. Of this list, the first two are ticked in the Southern copy, while the third is crossed and annotated 'use of "Ireland".'[42] The major objection for the Southern department lay, therefore, not where the Northern government thought it did, over the showing of the border on maps, but on the terms to be used to describe the two parts of the island. This seriously undermines Faulkner's claim that the Republic's agreement to show the border on joint maps was a major victory for the cooperative process.[43]

The DTP made extensive use of Northern Irish newspapers to gauge opinions concerning cooperation. Looking at the *Belfast Telegraph* report on the first announcement of tourism cooperation, for example, a member of departmental staff circled the various references to Northern Ireland, Republic of Ireland, all-Ireland, thirty-two counties, Ulster, and Island of Ireland, concluding from the diverse terminology employed that the term 'all-Ireland' no longer held the terror for unionists that it once did.[44] Another item which drew the department's attention was an advertisement for the 'Irish overlander' ticket published in the *Belfast Telegraph* of 7 April 1965.[45] This advert, by a Northern

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[41] Ibid.
[42] Ibid.
[43] Northern Ireland Cabinet discussions, *Tourist Publicity Cooperation,* 3 June 1965, CAB/4/1308, PRONI.
[44] 'Wooing the Tourist', *Belfast Newsletter,* 3 April 1965. File 98/3/35, *Cross-Border Cooperation in Tourism,* D.T.P., N.A.I.
[45] 'Irish Overlander' Advertisement, *Belfast Telegraph*, 7 April 1965. Ibid.

travel firm, was annotated 'no border in Northern Ireland publicity for tourism in Belfast newspaper!' The heavy reliance of the DTP on newspaper coverage suggests that the department did not feel the information being provided by the Northern Department of Commerce was either complete, or entirely representative.

Once cooperation had been cleared by the two government departments, Bord Fáilte and the NITB were brought in to act as proxies, or 'principal-agents', through whom actual cooperation would take place, as the Board of Trade had been regarding trade negotiations.[46]

> On the invitation of the Minister for Transport and Power and the Minister for Commerce from Northern Ireland, the two tourist boards … appointed a joint committee in April 1965, through which [they would] … consult together. The committee [was intended to] discuss practical improvements to facilitate and encourage cross-border tourist traffic, improvement of tourist statistics and joint promotional efforts [and] … to make recommendations to the two ministers concerned on further measures for cooperation.[47]

The Committee was composed of highly-placed officials within the two organisations, and met regularly after 1965.[48] Informal meetings between the directors of the NITB and Bord Fáilte, S. T. J. O'Driscoll and N. W. L. Stevens, had already taken place before this time, but now these took place more publicly, and regularly.[49] The new arrangements gave the two governments a greater say in the agenda of these talks, which brought them into conflict with the tourist boards, who saw their role as 'developing [tourism] for the

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[46] Henderson and Teague, *Economic Cooperation,* p. 6. See page 101 in current work.
[47] Anonymous, 'The Department of Transport Power', *Administration,* Vol. 13, No. 4, 1965, pp. 312-3.
[48] 'High Hopes' on Irish Tourist Cooperation, *Daily Telegraph,* 4 May 1965, file 98/3/35, *Cross-Border Tourism,* D.T.P., N.A.I..
[49] Jonathan Greer, 'Developing trans-jurisdictional tourism partnerships – insights from the Island of Ireland', *Tourism Management,* Vol. 23, No. 4, 2002, p. 358. For examples of reported meetings see: 'Tourist chiefs hold talks', *Belfast Newsletter,* 13 May 1965.

country at large,' and who were not overly concerned about the minutia of constitutional niceties.[50] For the industry heads, their proxy role was frustrating. What had once been quietly taking place with no implied political agenda was now mulled over in great detail, and subjected to intense scrutiny at official levels. Decisions took on a political aspect, and had to be carefully managed in the light of national policy. Yet by using them as proxies, the governments were able to maintain a certain distance from politically controversial decisions, and to delegate blame.[51] So frustrated did Bord Fáilte Director General Tim O'Driscoll become with this situation, that he made it the aim of his period in charge to eliminate government interference in the Board's work.[52] A sense that this situation was inappropriate resulted in a 1985 policy document stating that responsible government departments 'must make a greater input to tourism policy rather than leave this process to subsidiary agencies.'[53]

There is some evidence that increased contact and governmental interest, initiated following the cession of the DTP from the Department of Commerce in 1959, allowed the tourist boards a greater degree of flexibility regarding each other. Until this time, for example, *Ireland of the Welcomes*, 'the official magazine of the Irish Tourist Board', first published in 1952 and sharing its name with a 1930 ITA-produced guide-book, had sought cautiously to avoid referring to the border and exceeding its remit of promoting

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[50] Desmond McGimpsey, interviewed by author, 17 Oct. 2006. The advantages of tourism collaborations are discussed by Bramwell and A. Sharman in 'Collaboration in local tourism policy making', *Annals of Tourism Research,* Vol. 26, No. 2, 1999, pp. 392-3.
[51] See, Brian Faulkner, Northern Ireland Cabinet Discussion, 3 June 1965, CAB/4/1308, PRONI.
[52] Michael Gorman, interviewed by author, 20 Jan. 2004.
[53] Ireland, *Government White Paper on Tourism Policy* (Dublin, 1985), p. 6.

tourism to the twenty six counties.[54] In order to do this, maps inside the publication made extensive use of county boundaries, or historic province boundaries rather than the political boundary. A special 1954 An Tostál edition, for example, had the front cover illustration showing the island of Ireland, with tricolours so placed on it that none were inside Northern Ireland, though one was placed in Donegal, and each historic province, including Ulster, decorated with its provincial symbol.[55] No mention was made of Northern Ireland *per se* within the magazine, though an occasional event such as the North-West 200 Motorcycle Race, held at Portstewart, would be noted in the listings, and tourist guides to Belfast reviewed.[56] Instructions on documentation to be carried by travellers between the UK and Ireland were given without reference to Northern Ireland.[57] While this was not, according to the editor, a deliberate policy, it is significant that the July-August 1966 edition carried the first full-length article on a Northern Irish site, written by Benedict Keily and dedicated to the Giant's Causeway.[58] In a subsequent edition, May-June 1967, as pressure on the Northern Irish Prime Minister began to build up, with the founding of the Northern Ireland Campaign for Civil Rights, the first in a series of articles on Irish noble families by Eoin O'Mahony focused on the O'Neills of

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[54] Michael Cronin, 'Next to Being there: Ireland of the Welcomes and Tourism of the Word', in Cronin and O'Connor (ed.), *Irish Tourism* (Clevedon, 2003), p. 179. Daniel L. Kelleher, *Ireland of the Welcomes* (Dublin, 1930).

[55] *Ireland of the Welcomes*, front cover, Nov.-Dec. 1954.

[56] North-West 200, Portstewart, Co. Derry: *Ireland of the Welcomes*, May-June 1952, p. 12. Northern Ireland Grand Prix at Clady Circuit, Belfast, *Ireland of the Welcomes,* July-August 1953, p. 15 and North of Ireland Golf tournament at Portrush, County Antrim, *Ireland of the Welcomes,* July-August 1953, p. 14. Royal Ulster Society Autumn show, Showgrounds, Belmoral, Belfast: *Ireland of the Welcomes,* Sept. - Oct. 1953, p. 19. Review of *Belfast Through the Ages* by Richard Hayward: *Ireland of the Welcomes,* Nov.-Dec. 1952 p. 25.

[57] *Ireland of the Welcomes*, May-June 1952, p. 24.

[58] Michael Gorman, interviewed by author, 20 Jan. 2004. See *Ireland of the Welcomes*, July-August 1966, pp. 6-9.

Ulster.[59] The same edition included, in an enclosed leaflet on 'Houses and Gardens in Ireland,' a section on 'Houses and Gardens in Northern Ireland'.[60]

Other tourist interests also reacted to the new political dispensation, with the Belfast Port Authority announcing in 1966, for example, that they were to build a new ferry terminal to accommodate the increased visitor numbers expected as a result of the joint work by Bord Fáilte and the NITB.[61] In the absence of detailed attitude surveys, however, it is difficult to estimate the relative impact on visitor numbers of, for example, the Lemass/O'Neill meetings, the J. F. Kennedy visit of 1963, or, indeed, the failure of Kennedy to include Northern Ireland in his itinerary during this visit.[62]

Bord Fáilte's resistance to government interference was matched in turn by resistance at local levels to the board's own. The creation of regional tourist boards had displaced a number of individuals previously engaged in tourism promotion in a voluntary capacity through the TDAs, which now, along with their parent body, made way for the new organisation. Some of these individuals, such as J. J. Quigley, a local councillor and Chairmen of Carrickmacross TDA, objected to such perceived interference with local autonomy.[63] Quigley arranged a series of meetings along the border aimed at establishing a new tourism organisation for South Monaghan, South Armagh and Northern County

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[59] *Ireland of the Welcomes*, May-June 1967, pp. 18-22.
[60] Ibid., insert p. 10.
[61] 'British and Irish Tourist promotion', *Irish Times,* 11 Jan. 1966. File 98/3/35, *Cross-Border Tourism,* D.T.P., N.A.I.
[62] Terence O'Neill's *Ulster at the Crossroads* (London, 1969), pp. 48-9. File PREM/11/4386, 'Prime Minister's Correspondence and papers, 1951 - 1964', Prime Minister's Office, N.A.L..
[63] J.J. Quigley, 'Letters to the Editor' Tourist Organisation "an extravagance"', *NS*, 21 Oct. 1966, p. 3. 22 March 1966, Castleblaney U.D.C. minutes, C.U.D.C.O.. 'Monaghan Urban Council - Annoyed at Housing Delay', *NS,* 25 Feb. 1966, p. 2. 'Carrickmacross Development Association to Carry On - new tourist body criticised', *NS,* 11 June 1965, p. 2.

Meath, to be staffed by local volunteers in direct competition with the government board.[64] In this case, what was being contested was not national political definitions, but the balance of power between various interest groups, using cross-border elements to resist internal trends.

Personal Contacts within tourism

Despite the potential practical and ideological problems associated with it, tourism succeeded as a field for cooperation. The reasons for this were several. To begin with, tourism and international travel formed arenas wherein individuals expected to encounter the 'other'. Being predominantly focused on international audiences, cooperation in this field also did not have an obvious visual presence within the home territories which could unsettle political sensibilities and form a focus for protest.[65] Bord Fáilte and the NITB also faced similar difficulties in the period, such as dealing with the competition created by new 'Sunshine' and package holidays.[66] Another influential factor was support among industry staff, and a belief that 'cooperation will improve service delivery or achieve greater economic and operational efficiency' for all.[67] As noted earlier, the DTP, in particular, was a department keen on cross-border work, and this was supported by pre-existing links between the relevant sub-governmental bodies.[68]

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[64] 'Tourist Development', *NS,* 4 June 1971, p. 13. 'Monaghan Urban Council - Annoyed at Housing Delay', *NS,* 25 Feb. 1966, p. 2. 'Tourist groups to merge', *UG,* 11 May 1971, p. 15.
[65] This was insisted on by the Northern Irish government, who ruled out cooperation in the British and home markets early on. See page 276 in current work.
[66] Denise Guiney, *The Tourism and Travel Industry in Ireland* (Dublin, 2002), p. 38.
[67] Jonathan Greer, 'Developing trans-jurisdictional tourism partnerships – insights from the Island of Ireland', *Tourism Management,* Vol. 23, No. 4, 2002, p. 356.
[68] See pages 95-6 in current work.

Pre-1965, a range of international organisations such as the Skål International and the World Federation of Official Travel Agents provided NITB and Bord Fáilte officials with the forums for legitimate, informal and non-political encounters, essential for successful cooperation.[69] It was at such a forum, for example, that the BTA's role as unofficial agent for Bord Fáilte in New Zealand and Australia, where the latter had no offices, was arranged.[70] As early as October 1947, Kevin O'Doherty, secretary and later general manager of Bord Fáilte, recalls being aided in his first visit to an international conference, in Paris, by John Bridges, then director of the BTA.[71] Later, Bridges brought with him to an International Union of Official Travel Organizations (IUOTO) convention in Dublin Bob Frizzell, chief executive of the NITB, who became O'Doherty's main contact in the North.[72] Tim O'Driscoll, director general of Bord Fáilte, was able to include cooperation with Northern Ireland under 'the list of similar joint co-operative activities of the European Tourism Board,' of which he was acting chairmen.[73] In this way, contacts were established away from possible political implications, and portrayed as part of normal, wider international contacts.

Having similar aims in view, NITB and Bord Fáilte personnel frequently attended the same events within the island of Ireland. The NITB, for example, ran a stand in

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[69] Michael Kevin O'Doherty, interviewed by author, 5 Feb. 2004. Paul Mattessich and Barbara Monsey, *Collaboration: What Makes it Work* (St. Paul, Minnesota, 2001), p. 24.
[70] Michael Kevin O'Doherty, interviewed by author, 5 Feb. 2004.
[71] Ibid. Northern Ireland representatives were also present at the Paris meeting. See NITB, *12th Annual Report* (Belfast, 1959), p. 8.
[72] Michael Kevin O'Doherty, interviewed by author, 5 Feb. 2004.
[73] 'Big Joint Effort in Tourism', *Irish Press,* 11 Jan. 1966. File 98/3/35, *Cross-Border Tourism,* D.T.P., N.A.I.

cooperation with GNR at the Royal Dublin Horse Show, in Cork and in Limerick.[74] Indeed, even before the NITB came into existence, the UTDA maintained a place on its board for an area representative for the Republic.[75] The NITB provided 'special publicity and information service' in the Republic from before 1956 and employed staff there earlier still.[76] In September 1963, the board engaged a resident representative for Dublin and the south of Ireland, before eventually opening permanent offices in Dublin, as Bord Fáilte had done in Belfast.[77] 'In its first six and a half months alone, the Dublin office of the NITB handled a total of 6,394 queries; 2,475 personal, 2,129 postal, and 1,790 by telephone.'[78] Staff mobility encouraged contact. Michael Gorman, former publicity manager for Bord Fáilte, recalled being sent to a tri-partite BTA/NITB/Bord Fáilte meeting post-1965:

> At that meeting the rep. from London was their number two in command, whose name was Frank Kelly, someone who had grown up and been at college in UCD with me … and the man from Belfast was also a Dubliner … So you had this ludicrous situation that they were all being represented by people from Dublin.[79]

This mobility and inter-changeability was present in all aspects of the tourism and hospitality trade.[80] It was not unknown, for example, for a publican to move cross-border, and vintners' associations operated a wide network of cross-border social

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[74] NITB, *7th Annual Report* (Belfast, 1955), pp.. 13-4. NITB, *10th Annual Report* (Belfast, 1958), p. 9. NITB, *11th Annual Report* (Belfast, 1959), p. 10. NITB, *16th Annual Report* (Belfast, 1963), p. 6. The UTDA also held exhibitions in the South. See, for example, UTDA *General Correspondence*, 13 Feb. 1962, File TOUR1/3/11, PRONI

[75] *Folder of General Correspondence*, file TOUR1/3/25, PRONI.

[76] NITB, *7th Annual Report* (Belfast, 1955), p. 10.

[77] NITB, *16th Annual Report* (Belfast, 1963), p. 6.

[78] NITB, *19th Annual Report* (Belfast, 1966), p. 18.

[79] Michael Gorman, interviewed by author, 20 Jan. 2004.

[80] For a definition of the different components of the tourism trade, see Ronnie Scott and Nigel Guy, *The Economic Impact of Tourism in Northern Ireland* (Northern Ireland, 1992), pp. 3-4.

contacts, including brewery visits, dinners and an annual golf tournament, played for the William Younger Cup between the Wine and Spirits Trade Golf Society of Northern Ireland and the Dublin Vintners' Golfing Society.[81] In 1966, Belfast based Irene Culvert, President of the Belfast Chamber of Commerce, was appointed while in office to run the Southern Group of hotels.[82] This degree of mobility allowed members to share ideas and to campaign on issues of joint concern, such as licensing laws, drink-driving rules, hotel grants, differential taxation, and was actively encouraged by the tourist boards, who invited trade figures, journalists, porters and maitres d'hotels to visit, and hosted leading cross-border figures as speakers in trade study conferences.[83]

The Economic Realities of Cross-border tourism

Northern Ireland and the Republic provided each other's biggest, and expanding, tourist markets. This was acknowledged as early as 1956, when the NITB ran a special campaign to attract Southerners north.[84] In that year, about 100,000 Southerners were estimated to have visited Northern Ireland on holiday.[85] Reciprocal visits were disproportionately significant in the Republic's border region, as the 'Northern Irish share

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[81] See, for example, *The Ulster Magazine and Eire Review*, Nov. 1959, p. 27 and 'Emyvale Man Purchases Pub in Newry', *NS,* 2 Oct. 1970, p. 1. 'Guinness's trade visitors come from all over Ireland', *The Ulster Magazine and Eire Review*, July 1959, p. 16, and 'North wins back inter-city cup', *The Ulster Magazine and Eire Review*, June 1961, p. 30.

[82] 'Town talk - Presidents who have crossed the border', *NIP,* Jan. 1966, pp. 23-7.

[83] 'Hotels continue to wait for licensing laws revision', Feb. 1965, p. 7 and 'No free vote on Republic's Licensing bill', March 1960, p. 35, *Ulster Magazine and Eire Review.* NITB, *21st Annual Report* (Belfast, 1968), p. 9. NITB, *17th Annual Report* (Belfast, 1964), p. 6. NITB, *20th Annual Report* (Belfast, 1967), p. 11.

[84] NITB, *8th Annual Report* (Belfast, 1956), p. 8.

[85] Ibid.

of hotel guests deceasing with distance from the Border.'[86] In the ten years which followed, the number of Northern Irish visitors to the Republic rose from 450,000 to 550,000 for overnight visits, and 2,200,000 to 14,000,000 for day-trips.[87] A newspaper report in 1966 noted that during 1965, visitors to the Republic from Northern Ireland had spent £29 million, while Southerners making the return journey had spent £14 million of the North's total tourist income of £23 million.[88] Interestingly, despite the Republic having almost three times the population, twice as many Northerners went south for their holidays as went the other way.[89] This may be because the South, being the larger geographical entity, provided more domestic holiday destinations then were available in the North, or that its beauty spots had a greater effective catchments area.

Local tourist interests were as aware as their national colleagues of the importance which the opposite jurisdiction played in their market. Consequently, they would frequently focus their campaigns there, independent of the national organisations. Bangor, a County Down seaside town, had 'an excellent exhibition program in the South of Ireland' which the NITB hoped to see emulated by others.[90] Cork and Kerry, under their joint tourist board for the 'Ivernia' region, held a publicity campaign in Belfast, including an exhibition in the Grand Central Hotel and features in the *Belfast Telegraph*.[91] Fermanagh CC, for whom tourism was a major industry, combined with the NITB to produce a map

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[86] H. J. Plettner, *Geographical Aspects of Tourism in the Republic of Ireland* (Galway, 1979), p. 33.
[87] File 2001/3/1364, Bord Fáilte Tourism Co-ordination Meeting December 1966, Dept. of Finance, N.A.I..
[88] 'Ireland as a holiday centre regardless of border', *Irish Press,* 23 March 1966. File 98/3/35, *Cross-Border Tourism,* D.T.P., N.A.I.
[89] Ibid.
[90] NITB, *17th Annual Report* (Belfast, 1964), p. 5. NITB, *18th Annual Report* (Belfast, 1965), p. 11.
[91] 'Ivernia: It's a new word ... and in Counties Cork and Kerry...the latest word, in tourism', *Belfast Telegraph,* 26 April 1965, p. 8. 'Cork and Kerry come to Belfast April 27th and 28th', *Belfast Telegraph,* 26 April 1965, p. 8. 'Cork and Kerry - Tourist Drive aimed at North', *Irish News,* 27 April 1965. File 98/3/35, *Cross-Border Tourism,* D.T.P., N.A.I.

of the county for distribution 'on both sides of the border.'[92] Local bodies also got involved in more abstract campaigns on issues which they believed to be influential on the tourism industry. South Down and Mourne Tourist Development Association, for example, campaigned in 1973 for the removal of partisan slogans from public places as these were believed to be making tourists uncomfortable.[93]

Areas of cooperation

As early as 1935, the UTDA contemplated the publication of a joint hotel directory in cooperation with the ITA in Dublin, listing all hotels on the island of Ireland.[94] Though this scheme fell through amid concerns regarding funding and organisation, it showed an early awareness of the possibility of joint projects within the tourism industry.

The NITB and Bord Fáilte, in their publications, refer to the existence of 'very friendly exchange of ideas and action on matters of joint interest' between them, and note ongoing cooperation in angling, game reserves and the re-stocking of rivers and lakes before the establishment of ministerial consent.[95] As a result, when asked to cooperate, the two boards were able to quickly suggest a range of possible projects. Within the first year a joint survey was commissioned into tourist car-hiring habits and the effect which a

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[92] NITB, *20th Annual Report* (Belfast, 1967), p. 21.
[93] 'Remove slogans, says tourist body', *Irish Times,* 11 March 1973. File 2002/19/421 *Tourism in Northern Ireland,* D.F.A., N.A.I..
[94] UTDA meeting 12 Sept. 1935 and 14 Nov. 1935. TOUR/1/1/3, '*Minute book 1935 - 1936*'. PRONI
[95] See: NITB, *12th Annual Report* (Belfast, 1959), p. 8. 'A 32 - County Tourist Body', *Irish Press*, 3 April 1965. File 98/3/35, *Cross-Border Tourism,* D.T.P., N.A.I.

simplification of border bureaucracy was likely to have on this trade.[96] Though powerless to force the two administrations to simplify the procedure, the boards were under pressure to ensure that they did so, with a Department of Finance study group on economic development noting that:

> (2) (a) Bord Fáilte should encourage car-hire firms to take certain steps to overcome the difficulties caused by the prohibition on cars hired here by British tourists being used in the Six-Counties.[97]

Within the first year of officially-sanctioned cooperation, the two boards also held a joint visit for international travel journalists aimed at encouraging increased international visitors to Ireland as a whole.[98] This they would continue to do in later years.[99] Staff also exchanged useful technical information, and initiated research into capital projects near the border, as well as attending meetings arranged on a tripartite basis between them.[100]

The NTIB and BTA were invited as 'externs' to the half way meeting for the five year economic programme, tourism section, held in 1966 at the Shelbourne Hotel in Dublin, where UTA was also included as 'internal transport' suppliers.[101] The level of this activity, and the organisation which it entailed, strongly supports the theory that official

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[96] File 2001/3/1364, Bord Fáilte Tourism Co-ordination Meeting December 1966, Dept. of Finance, N.A.I..
[97] Ibid. Memorandum on Motor Tourist Traffic, Economic Development Branch, Ministry of Finance, file 2001/3/181 *Report of Tourism Study Group. Inclusive Tours*, D.T.P., N.A.I..
[98] 'They saw the scenic gems of the North', (*Northern?) Herald*, 21 May 1965. File 98/3/35, *Cross-Border Cooperation in Tourism,* D.T.P., N.A.I.
[99] 'Cooperation on Tourism', *Belfast Newsletter,* 5 May 1966, p. 7. File 98/3/35, *Cross-Border Cooperation in Tourism,* D.T.P., N.A.I.
[100] NITB, *18th Annual Report* (Belfast, 1965), p. 16.
[101] Tourism co-ordination meeting Dec 8-9 1966 Shelbourne Hotel. File 2001/3/1364, *Bord Fáilte Tourism Co-ordination Meeting December 1966*, Dept. of Finance, N.A.I.. It is worth noting, however, that by 1969, Bord Fáilte was able to produce a policy document entirely omitting to mention Northern Ireland. Bord Fáilte's General Policy, 19 November 1969, Michael Gorman private papers.

sanction allowed more open cooperation on the basis of pre-existing knowledge and contact networks, rather than creating such networks itself.

Another area in which cooperation was initiated very quickly was in the matter of hotel grading.[102] Grading had been introduced in the Republic in 1943-44 by Bord Fáilte, at great political cost.[103] The NITB though 'envious' did not introduce such a system until later.[104] By 1966, it had, however, 'carried out two surveys with a view to the grading of hotels, and had discussed the various steps with Bord Fáilte. They were agreed that it would be good to apply to the whole country whatever system was introduced,' so that tourists visiting Ireland would be able to accurately select their accommodation, even in advance of the introduction of such a system elsewhere in the United Kingdom.[105] By 1968, grading was implemented in Northern Ireland amid 'close exchanges of ideas and information with Bord Fáilte in order to achieve the greatest possible uniformity in standards on both sides of the Border.'[106] Concerns that high hotel prices were threatening the sustainability of the tourism industry in Ireland made such systems essential in allowing the tourist boards greater control over the quality and prices of accommodation.[107]

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[102] Desmond McGimpsey, interviewed by author, 17 Oct. 2006. This remained an area of interest. See Henderson and Teague, *Economic Cooperation*, p. 13.
[103] Michael Kevin O'Doherty, interviewed by author, 5 Feb. 2004. Bord Fáilte, *Annual Report* (Dublin, 1944), p. 2.
[104] Michael Kevin O'Doherty, interviewed by author, 5 Feb. 2004.
[105] File 2001/3/1242, *Mid Term Progress Report 1966 - Tourism*, D.T.P., N.A.I.. 'Tourist Deal can benefit North and South', *Belfast Telegraph* 2 Nov. 1966 File 98/3/35 and 'Cooperation with Britain for Tourism', *Irish Independent* 7 July 1967. Both in file 98/3/35, *Cross-Border Tourism,* D.T.P., N.A.I. 'Hotel Grading Moves', *The Ulster Magazine and Eire Review,* August 1968, p. 7.
[106] NITB, *21st Annual Report* (Belfast, 1968), p. 8.
[107] Liam Cosgrove, Parliamentary Question to Minister of Transport and Power, 22 June 1965. File 96/9/84, *Parliamentary Question,* D.T.P.. See also Elizabeth Nicholas: 'Eire's foreign goose', *Sunday Times,* 13 June 1965, the original report referred to by Cosgrove, and 'Excessive Prices warning to hotels', *Irish Independent*, 16 June 1965. 'Mr. Ceannt said that since 1st January, 1965 the Board have received 82

The two boards also cooperated on more unusual projects, such as the bringing to Ireland of the BBC's 'The Archers' radio program.[108] This project, which 'turned out to be an unusual and most interesting publicity project' brought the tourist boards in contact with several outside agencies including the British Broadcasting Corporation, Radio Éireann, the Farmer's Unions, the Ministries of Agriculture and private trade sponsors.[109] Cooperation was also discussed in terms of air travel, rail, the extension of the tourist season and the campaign to simplify border procedures.[110]

The most controversial project undertaken by the two tourist boards was the introduction of joint publicity aimed firstly at the North American market and later at other markets such as France, Germany and Australia.[111] Following meetings between Bord Fáilte and the NITB, governmental analysis of their focused on this area almost to the exclusion of all else.[112] On 3 June 1965, Brain Faulkner was quoted in the Northern Ireland Cabinet meeting as saying that:

> Following discussions in Dublin last week the NITB had issued a press statement covering matters (such as joint participation in exhibitions) for which they had no authority from him or from the cabinet. He had subsequently pointed this out very firmly to them.[113]

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complaints about overcharging or poor value for money, compared with 29 similar complaints in the same period last year.' Minute for the Minister of Transport and Power, 18 June 1965, 96/9/84 D.T.P., N.A.I..

[108] NITB, *18th Annual Report* (Belfast,. 1965), p. 11. Desmond McGimpsey, 'Ulster Tourism – 1900 to 1970', unpublished.

[109] Desmond McGimpsey, 'Ulster Tourism – 1900 to 1970', unpublished.

[110] NITB, *19th Annual Report* (Belfast, 1966), p. 14.

[111] For debates concerning joint publicity, see File 98/3/35, *Cross-Border Tourism,* and D.T.P., N.A.I.

[112] Ibid.

[113] Minister for Commerce comment, 3 June 1965, CAB/4/1308, PRONI.

At the same meeting, the Minister for Home Affairs also expressed concerns regarding the possibility of joint publicity.[114] Despite this, it appears that the cabinet passed the initiative, with Jones writing to Beere on 4 June 1965 to convey their approval of joint publicity to be distributed through the BTA, under certain conditions.[115]

The main issue at stake in the joint publicity debate was that of maps, and how Ireland was to be presented on them. The DEA, unsurprisingly, began the debate, requesting a compromise on the naming of Derry/Londonderry, for example, by naming the city Londonderry and the County Derry.[116] Interestingly, however, they were keen not to seem dogmatic on the point, with Departmental Secretary Sean Ronan writing that 'my minister would not object to this ['Londonderry'] as he feels that we cannot very well interfere with what the Northern Ireland ministry wishes to include in the maps for the six county area.'[117] In the same letter, the DEA also launched the issue which would become the major sticking point in the debate, the description of the border to be used.[118]

Beere's response to the inter-departmental debate was formulated in a letter to Jones enclosing an amended copy of his 'specific instructions to boards.'[119] This suggested permitting some cooperation at non-BTA events and expressed the hope that the clearance of individual pieces of publicity might be replaced by general supervision.[120] Beere also comments on the description of the border, on the ordering of the names of the

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[114] Ibid.
[115] Letter, Jones to Beere, 4 June 1965. File 98/3/35, *Cross-Border Tourism,* and D.T.P., N.A.I.
[116] Letter, Ronan to Beere, 10 June 1965. Ibid.
[117] Ibid.
[118] Ibid.
[119] Letter, Beere to Jones, 16 June 1965. Ibid.
[120] Ibid.

two boards, over which the Department of the Taoiseach had expressed concern, and on the possible use of Derry, instead of Londonderry.[121] Jones's reply of 23 June 1965 is cautious.[122] He asks that 'politically' be maintained in the phrase 'Northern Ireland is politically part of the United Kingdom' and suggests that joint exhibitions were probably a step too far too soon.[123] His letter hints that the cooperation initiative was already facing opposition within the Northern Cabinet, as indeed is clear from the cabinet minutes of 3 June, and thus ought not to be jeopardised by too much action.[124] Beere accepted Jones' suggestions, sending a finalised version of the 'instructions' to the DEA.[125]

By this stage, staff changes within the DEA had Sean Ronan replaced by Hugh McCann, who brought with him a more combative attitude towards possible cooperation. The minister, writes McCann, was not prepared to accept the dropping of 'politically' from the description and demanded that the footnote be entirely re-written.[126] Since the minister, Frank Aiken, had not changed in this time, the new attitude was more likely to reflect McCann's own stand than that of the minister, who was by all accounts 'concentrated his energies on Ireland's multilateral relations within the United Nations, spending a number of months each year living in New York.'[127] The new wording was rejected by the Northern Department of Commerce, which was itself experiencing

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[121] Ibid. Hand note by Lemass on letter from Beere, 9 June 1965. Ibid.
[122] Letter, Jones to Beere, 23 July 1965. Ibid.
[123] Ibid.
[124] Ibid. Cabinet minutes, 3 June 1965, File CAB/4/1308, PRONI.
[125] Letter, Beere to McCann, Secretary, DEA, 24 June 1965. File 98/3/35, *Cross-Border Tourism,* D.T.P., N.A.I..
[126] Letter, McCann to Beere, 25 June 1965, Ibid..
[127] Dermot Keogh, 'Irish Neutrality and the First Application for Membership of the EEC, 1961 - 3', in Michael Kennedy and Joseph Morrison Skelly (ed.), *Irish Foreign Policy, 1919 - 66* (Dublin, 2000), p. 267.

personnel instability at this time.[128] Shimeld, writing for Jones, who was temporarily absent, proposed a new formula instead.[129] By this time, a further meeting between the NITB and Bord Fáilte was drawing near, and Beere suggested to the Departments of Finance and DEA that the North's wording be accepted in order to let this go ahead.[130] External Affairs, fearing international reaction as well as constitutional objections, refused.[131] A new list of possible formulas was drawn up, and the two civil service heads, Bateman and Whitaker, called in to try to reach a compromise.[132] The debate continued, however, with Jones, now back at his desk, appealing to Beere not to allow the project to collapse on a technicality.[133]

What is most interesting about this exchange is that while it was still ongoing, the meeting scheduled between the heads of the tourist boards went ahead, and agreement on new proposals for joint publicity in the United States was reached.[134] This strongly implies that Bord Fáilte and the NITB acted, to a certain extent, independently of their administrative overlords, an implication former staff members strongly support.[135] An alarmed letter requesting clarification from Board Fáilte proves that no prior permission

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[128] Letter, Shimeld (for Jones) to Beere, 5 July 1965. Ibid..
[129] Ibid.
[130] Letter, Beere to McCann 7 July 1965, and 12 July 1965 memorandum 'Joint Tourist Publicity of Bord Fáilte and NITB'. Ibid.
[131] Letter ,McCann to Beere, 14 July 1965. Ibid.
[132] Note on telephone conversation with Bateman. Whitaker to Beere 4 July 1965. Ibid.
[133] Letter, Jones to Beere, undated. Beere note on Jones telephone conversation 26 Aug. 1965, Ibid.
[134] 'Britain, Ulster and Eire unite in drive for US tourists', *Belfast Telegraph*, 10 Jan 1966. 'Britain and Ireland in tourist Link', *Evening Press*, 10 Jan 1966. 'Big joint effort in Tourism', *Irish Press*, 11 Jan. 1966. 'Irish Unite for More Tourists', *Daily Telegraph,* 11 Jan. 1966. 'Joining with Britain to boost tourism', *Irish Independent,* 11 Jan. 1966. 'British and Irish Tourist promotion', *Irish Times,* 11 Jan. 1966. 'Hands across border for tourism promotion', *Belfast Newsletter,* 11 Jan. 1966. All in File 98/3/35, *Cross-Border Tourism,* D.T.P., N.A.I..
[135] Michael Gorman, interviewed by author, 20 Jan. 2004.

for this decision had been given.[136] Eamon Ceannt, then head of Bord Fáilte, replied reassuring the department that no joint publicity had yet being produced, and that any such publication would first be cleared with the relevant departments.[137] Despite this, no further departmental correspondence is present in the files until 17 April 1967, by which time joint publicity had been issued to the North American market.[138] On 13 March 1966 a joint advertising supplement was placed in the *New York Times,* highlighting both the attractions of Ireland, and the ease with which it could be used to access other destinations in Britain and in continental Europe.[139] In spring 1967, 100,000 joint folders were issued via Bord Fáilte and BTA offices in North America, 60,000 to the United States and 40,000 to Canada.[140] This was later extended to Europe, predominantly France and Germany.[141] Virtually no discussion regarding these developments appears in the government files beyond press reports chronicling these developments, and a note complaining of the 'hash' made of the joint maps at the end.[142] Now that joint publicity with the BTA was contemplated, the note goes on to say, the entire process would have to begin again.[143] However, joint publicity with the BTA appears only a short time afterwards, and next in the files, without apparent drama.[144]

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[136] Hand note: Dr Brennan to Mr Nolan regarding clarification of position with Bord Fáilte on joint publicity, 11 Jan. 1966. File 98/3/35, *Cross-Border Tourism,* D.T.P., N.A.I.
[137] Reply Nolan to Brennan regarding conversation with Ceannt of Bord Fáilte. Undated. Ibid.
[138] Letter, unknown to O'Sullivan, 17 April 1967. 'Advertising supplement', 13 March 1966, *New York Times*. Both in ibid.
[139] Ibid.
[140] NITB, *20th Annual Report* (Belfast, 1967), p. 21.
[141] 'Joint Bid for Tourists from Europe', *Irish Press,* 7 July 1967 and 'Irish-British Tourism Talks', *Irish Press* 21 April 1967. File 98/3/35, *Cross-Border Cooperation in Tourism,* D.T.P., N.A.I.
[142] Hand note unknown to O'Sullivan. 17 April 1967. Ibid.
[143] Ibid.
[144] Brochure 'Visit Ireland and Britain'. Ibid.

The resolution, or rather non-resolution, of the joint publicity debate highlights a number of important issues with regards to intra- and inter-state cooperation. It demonstrates that cooperation could still take place among lower-level organisations despite wrangling at a higher political level. It also demonstrates that the wish to control the cooperation process did not always equate to the ability to do so. Following the issue of the joint publicity, and possibly as a result of the ineffectiveness which it highlighted, departmental interest in cooperation within the DTP in the South wanes. In 1966, Thécla Beere retired from the Southern Irish civil service. By 15 August 1967, correspondence with Roy Bradford, Minister for Commerce in Belfast, is carried on by the DTP via Brendon O'Regan, Chairman of Shannon Free Airport Development Company and member of Bord Fáilte, and is concerned predominantly with the impact of civil unrest in Northern Ireland on the tourism industry.[145] Beere's departure, and the immediate down-turn in relations which followed, forcefully illustrate the impact which in the individual's willingness had upon the possibility of successful cooperation.

Non-politicisation and the maintenance of 'grey' areas

Sub-governmental contact within tourism was able to exist prior to, and to a certain extent following the loss of, political agreement thanks to a deliberate maintenance by the individuals concerned of a non-political façade on their actions and 'respect [for] the traditions and values of each other.'[146] Bramwell and Sharman identify 'the degree to which the dialogue among participants reflects openness, honesty, tolerant and respectful

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[145] Letter, Roy Bradford, Minister of Commerce, to Brendon O'Regan, Chairman, Shannon Free Airport Development Company, Ltd, 15 Aug. 1967 and reply O'Regan to Bradford, 18 Aug. 1967. Ibid.

[146] Jonathan Greer, 'Developing trans-jurisdictional tourism partnerships – insights from the Island of Ireland', *Tourism Management,* Vol. 23, No. 4, 2002, p. 356. See also Paul Mattessich and Barbara Monsey, *Collaboration: What Makes it Work* (St. Paul, Minnesota, 2001), pp. 14-5.

speaking and listening, confidence and trust' as essential to successful collaborative efforts.[147] While this façade was not always an accurate reflection of personal belief, particularly in the case of politically-committed individuals such as C. S. Andrews, head of CIE and former ITA employee, it provided a necessary fiction in allowing cooperation to take place.[148] This balance only survived, however, by being carefully observed and maintained, so avoiding the 'raise[ing] of tensions … and entrench[ing of] different groups in the partnership into traditional camps.'[149] For example, when the NITB brought out a pamphlet using quotes from Churchill in praise of Northern Ireland's wartime loyalty, thus offending the republican sympathies of Bord Fáilte manager Kevin O'Doherty, he felt compelled to act. 'I wrote a short piece which regretted that the NITB had gone political ... Political propaganda should not be used to attract tourists. We should be beyond that. So that booklet went out of circulation. I never heard any more about it.[150] The NITB, in withdrawing the leaflet, allowed a recalibration of the careful balance of non-alignment wherein both they and Bord Fáilte possessed common ground. This allowed the boards to maintain contact between them within the 'agreed consensual framework' and at its first stage, that of specific, solvable difficulties, rather than allow its escalation into 'general disagreement,' which could not be resolved, and would thus creates antagonism.[151]

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[147] B. Bramwell and A. Sharman, 'Collaboration in local tourism policy making', *Annals of Tourism Research,* Vol. 26, No. 2, 1999, p. 398.
[148] C.S. Andrews, *Man of No Property* (Dublin and Cork 1982), p. 267. Michael Kevin O'Doherty, interviewed by author, 5 Feb. 2004.
[149] Jonathan Greer, 'Developing trans-jurisdictional tourism partnerships – insights from the Island of Ireland', *Tourism Management,* Vol. 23, No. 4, 2002, p. 356.
[150] Michael Kevin O'Doherty, interviewed by author, 5 Feb. 2004.
[151] John Darby, *Intimidation and the Control of Conflict in Northern Ireland* (Dublin, 1986), pp. 2-3.

The consensual framework within which cooperation took place was frequently defined in economic terms by its participants. Thus, for example, when approached by a the Bord Fáilte employee with regards to placing an advertisement, the editor of the northern unionist *Belfast Telegraph* replied: 'You can have a full page and print it in green white and yellow if you like, as long as you pay for it.'[152] Indeed, this attitude was noted by Bord Fáilte, who, in their 1966 report, commented on how 'generous' the Northern press had been to Ireland with regards to notices of its attractions, and of festivals taking place there.[153] This attitude was reciprocated by the Bord Fáilte editors of *Ireland of the Welcomes*, which carried adverts for UTA and the GNR regarding hotels and tours to Northern Ireland, and for two manufacturers of Belfast linen, which were occasionally combined in a single Ulster double spread, prominently displayed within the magazine.[154]

Where political sensitivities were not accommodated, potential cooperation initiatives could fail to be realised. In contrast to Board Fáilte and the NITB's solution of the Woodford River project of 1965 by the withdrawal of British Army involvement, Northern Ireland's participation in the An Tostál Festival of 1953, 'the first concerted effort to promote off-season tourist traffic to Ireland' and an early arrival in the 'steadily increas[ing]…number of newly created festivals' noted by Picard and Robinson, was apparently prevented by the insistence of elements within the Republic's organising committee on the inclusion of a march past the GPO by the Irish Army as part of the

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[152] Michael Gorman, interviewed by author, 20 Jan. 2004.
[153] File 2001/3/1364, *Bord Fáilte Tourism Co-ordination Meeting December 1966*, Dept. of Finance, N.A.I..
[154] See, for example, *Ireland of the Welcomes*, May/June 1954, pp. 2-3.

festival's opening ceremony, creating a 'meaningful framework' for the festival within which Unionism did not fit.[155]

Local Tourism Cooperation

For rural communities, tourism proved a vital industry, bringing jobs and income into otherwise economically poor areas, using their own natural advantages.[156] The increase in motoring traffic during the 1960s meant that the industry developed rapidly outside traditional resorts, a fact acknowledged by the 1966 Tourist Traffic Act, which extended financial support to facilities in such locations.[157] In Ireland, in particular, 'the propensity of overseas tourists to visit more than a single region … is strong and helps to geographically distribute the benefits generated by a given volume of tourists.'[158] This was important for border areas, which, being relatively under-developed, stood to benefit disproportionately from such trends. For some, such as Monaghan and Ballybay, the border itself could be used as a feature to attract visitors. As noted earlier, particularly in times of difficulty, Northern Irish people used the border as a means of escape, while price differentials and the variable availability of goods helped to encourage cross-border visits.[159] Donegal, in particular, had 'an above-average supply of holiday homes' to cater

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[155] For details regarding the Woodford River project see pages 242-243 in current work. File S15647A, *An Bord Fáilte and Fógra Fáilte Reports and Accounts 1953 - 54*, D.T.P., N.A.I.. David Picard and Mike Robinson, 'Remaking Worlds: Festivals, Tourism and change', in Picard and Robinson (ed.) *Festivals, Tourism and Social Change* (Clevedon, Buffalo, Toronto, 2006), pp. 2 and 12. James Deegan and Donel A. Dineen, *Tourism Policy and Performance* (London, 1997), p. 22. Discussions regarding Northern involvement in An Tostál included in Michael Kevin Doherty, interviewed by author, 5 Feb. 2004.

[156] Bord Fáilte, *Tourism in the Irish Economy* (Dublin, 1989), p. 13. Bord Fáilte, *Tourism – the Welcome Industry* (Dublin, c.1982), p. 9.

[157] James Deegan and Donel A. Dineen, *Tourism Policy and Performance* (London, 1997), p. 39.

[158] Ibid., p. 88.

[159] See pages 50-52, 74-78 & 151 in current work.

for such visitors.[160] Border towns attempted to encourage this trade by the creation of TDAs under the auspices of the ITA and UTDA.[161]

In July 1966, spurred on by the success of Carrickmacross TDA, Monaghan Town TDA began to run 'mystery tours' and 'shopping tours' to the town in cooperation with Ulsterbus.[162] Twice weekly, the Northern Transport Authority would bring coaches of visitors to the town, while the association provided guides, ensured that shops remained open to receive them and pressed locals publicans to lay on singing and music evenings in order to entertain them.[163] The tours were an unexpectedly big success. On the very first trip, fourteen coach-loads of visitors were brought into the town from Northern Ireland, rather then the four or five which had been expected.[164] This threw the association into panic, strong-worded newspaper warnings being issued to local publicans that the trade would not last unless they could provide entertainment and value for money for their visitors.[165] Not all TDAs experienced the same success, however. Similar efforts by Castleblaney UDC to ensure a 'fair number' of UTA tours came to the town in 1949 had failed when Ulsterbus insisted that 'private hire services were operated to the points requested by the hirer whose wishes must be met.'[166]

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[160] H. J. Plettner, *Geographical Aspects of Tourism in the Republic of Ireland* (Galway, 1979), p. 12.
[161] See, for example, Press Release, 'Bangor Tourist Development and Local Traders Association set up', 2 April, 1971. File 2002/19/421 *Tourism in Northern Ireland,* D.F.A., N.A.I. 'Tourist body formed in Monaghan', *NS,* 14 Jan.1966, p. 1. 'Ballybay News - Anglers' week-end trip', *NS,* 27 May 1966, p. 8.
[162] 'Monaghan to get 'bus tours', *NS,* 8 July 1966, p. 1.
[163] Ibid. 'Bus tours to Monaghan start tonight call to businessmen', *NS,* 15 July 1966, p. 1.
[164] 'N.I. Bus tours to Monaghan', *NS,* 22 July 1966, p. 1.
[165] Ibid.
[166] Castleblaney UDC contact Northern Ireland Transport Board, 26 April 1949, and reply, 9 May 1949, read in council on 24 May 1949. Castleblaney UDC minutes, C.U.D.C.O..

The Irish borderlands contained many rivers such as the Blackwater and Finn, and as a result the area benefited disproportionately from the development of inland fishing as one of Ireland's 'main tourist assets' post-World War II, strongly supported by the then Minister for Lands, Erskine Childers.[167] By 1982, 50,000 individuals a year were coming to Ireland to fish.[168] Such visitors were particularly valuable as 'they provide[d] a high level of repeat business' to the areas to which they travelled.[169] The anglers 'were very good customers because they had a certain amount of money to spend and they spent it,' the British more so than the Germans.[170] 'This was a great area for course angling,' recalled local Councillor Fergal McElgunn. 'Lots of lakes, the Shannon, the Erne, and all the lakes in between and so on. You had Cavan, Fermanagh, Leitrim, going into course fishing' aimed particularly at anglers from England and Germany, where course fishing was a major pastime.[171] In 1973, eighty-two percent of course anglers in the Lakelands region were British.[172] Fishing competitions were organised to introduce visitors to the amenities of local areas, special advertising campaigns were laid on, and group trips from anglers' clubs organised.[173] Course fishing in Ireland was free, unlike in much of Britain, and this was used as a lure to attract visitors, who then spent their funds in local hotels, bed and breakfasts and public houses, and whose wives and children could then be

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[167] Bord Fáilte, *Annual Report 1947* (Dublin, 1947), p. 7. Midland Regional Tourism Organisation, *Lake Land for holidays* (Mullingar, c.1977), p. 2. Bord Fáilte, *Annual Report 1959* (Dublin, 1959), p. 18.
[168] Bord Fáilte, *Tourism – the Welcome Industry* (Dublin, c.1982), p. 6.
[169] Ibid.
[170] Fergal McElgunn, interviewed by author, 24 May 2006. S. Connaughton, *A Border Diary* (London, 1995), pp. 57-8.
[171] Fergal McElgunn, interviewed by author, 24 May 2006. See also 'Record number of tourists expected', *Ulster Magazine and Eire Review*, Feb 1965, p. 24. 'Ballybay News - German Anglers', *NS,* 28 April 1967, p. 5.
[172] 'Lakelands' Midland Tourism Region, *Annual Report* (1973), p. 74.
[173] 'Tourist groups to merge', *UG,* 11 May 1971, p. 15. 'Carrick's tourist drive', *NS,* 12 Feb. 1965, p. 3. Bord Fáilte, *Annual Report 1963* (Dublin, 1963), p. 24.

entertained at local attractions.[174] Since most local fishermen were interested in game fishing for salmon and trout, the two groups could exist side by side with minimal conflict, though attempts by local fishermen to gain exclusive licences, and ESB attempts to sell such licences on the Shannon river system, threatened this coexistence.[175]

The number of deep local waterways made parts of the Irish border ideal for pleasure-boat cruising, and this type of tourism rapidly followed angling into the area, particularly in Fermanagh, the Erne Lakes and Shannon system.[176] Carrick-on-Shannon developed a marina complex to cater for this trade as increasing number of visitors moved from land to water based accommodation in the 1960s, and joint North/South campaigns were launched for the re-opening of the Ballinamore and Ballyconnell Canal.[177] Acknowledging the area's importance, Bord Fáilte belatedly added Shannon to its list of major resorts eligible for large grants under the 1959 Tourist Traffic Act.[178] The adjoining tourism authorities began to investigate ways of jointly promoting the area as soon as cooperation at national level was announced, with Fermanagh Tourist Development Organisation 'for the first time [holding] regular conferences … [with] the adjacent Bord Fáilte regions' to research potential joint developments.[179] In Counties Armagh and Monaghan, Carrickmacross, Castleblaney and Crossmaglen councils worked

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[174] Ibid, p. 26. Fergal McElgunn, interviewed by author, 24 May 2006.
[175] Fergal McElgunn, interviewed by author, 24 May 2006. Leitrim CCM, 14 Sept. 1957, L.C.C.O.
[176] Midland Regional Tourism Organisation, *Lake Land for Holidays* (Mullingar, c.1977), p. 4.
[177] H. J. Plettner, *Geographical Aspects of Tourism in the Republic of Ireland* (Galway, 1979), p. 10. Leitrim CCM 8 Feb. 1965 and 10 April 1967, L.C.C.O.. Bord Fáilte, *Annual Report 1963* (Dublin, 1963), p. 2. 'New tourist region welcomed', *NS,* 24 Nov. 1972, p. 5. Letter, chairmen of cross-border roads committee and Ballyconnell waterways branch to Jack Lynch, 4 Feb. 1971. File S1955A *Customs,* Dept. of Taoiseach, N.A.I..For more details of the Ballyconnell canal project, see pages. 243-245 in current work.
[178] James Deegan and Donel A. Dineen, *Tourism Policy and Performance* (London, 1997), p. 40.
[179] NITB, *18th Annual Report* (Belfast, 1965), p. 14.

together to hold a joint Lakelands Festival to highlight the amenities available locally to tourists, and to bring more tourists in.[180]

The availability of information regarding amenities, and the accessibility of border areas to the tourist were of major concern to local interests, and the provision of such facilities provided the motivation for a considerable amount of cross-border cooperation. As early as 1965 Maurice Watts, Chairman of the NITB Publicity Committee, came to work alongside the Fermanagh Development Association and the two regional tourist boards in the Republic which bordered it, the Midlands and North West, on issues such as the provision of a local airport and the creation of joint publicity material for the area.[181] Cavan CC discussed proposals in October 1972 for the creation of a cross-border tourism region to include Fermanagh and themselves, amongst others.[182] County Donegal also explored the possibility of a joint tourist board with Counties Tyrone and Londonderry, which they hoped would form a more geographically coherent unit than the North West Regional Board of which they were part.[183] Indeed, the original memorandum concerning tourism cooperation submitted to the Northern Cabinet noted that West Ulster/Donegal and Leitrim/Sligo were already cooperating on matters of tourist interest.[184] The creation of regional tourist organisations in the South, and groups such as the Irish Farm Holidays, formed in 1966, helped to encourage tourism into non-traditional areas, such as the

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[180] Tourist Drive for summer months', *UG,* 21 May 1970, p. 12. 'Crossmaglen stages big attraction', *UG,* 23 July 1970, p. 3. 'Tourism Must Develop – MP', *UG,* 30 July 1970, p. 7.
[181] 'A 32-County Tourist Body' *Irish Press*, 3 April 1965. File 98/3/35, *Cross-Border Tourism,* D.T.P., N.A.I.
[182] Cavan CCM, 17 Oct. 1972, C.C.A.
[183] Donegal CCM, 31 May 1971, D.C.A.. 'North-South tourism Drive urged', *Irish Independent,* 11 Oct. 1967. File 98/3/35, *Cross-Border Tourism,* D.T.P., N.A.I.
[184] Northern Ireland Cabinet Memorandum, 9 March 1965, CAB/4/1295, PRONI.

borderlands, and created specific interest-groups with a remit focused on increasing tourism to these areas.[185]

A certain amount of fluidity existed in cooperation work at a local level, since, as noted earlier, similar individuals were often involved in multiple groups.[186] One example of this can be seen in Armagh City Council's minutes of 3 May 1971.[187] Armagh had been approached by Monaghan Town UDC regarding possible cooperation in various areas of common concern such as the route of the proposed M1 motorway from Dublin to Belfast, industry, and 'trading generally'.[188] Tourism being one of the areas raised at the subsequent meeting between the council chiefs, the Chairmen of Armagh suggested that 'subject to the agreement of the council, their [Monaghan's] representatives should meet with the Armagh Tourist Development Association, of which Councillor McManus was Chairmen,' to discuss the issue further.[189] This can be seen as an attempt by the council to politely distance themselves from the proposed talks by delegating, as the two governments had done. Equally, however, this could be seen as an admission that cooperation was best handled by local, non-political groups. The Armagh TDA had a long-standing interest in cross-border cooperation, having spear-headed a cross-border fundraising campaign for the Armagh Planetarium in 1969.[190]

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[185] Douglas G. Pearce, 'Tourism in Ireland', *Tourism Management,* Vol. 11, No. 2, 1990, p. 144.
[186] See pages 90-91 of current work.
[187] Armagh UDC Minutes, 3 May 1971, LA10/2CA/20, PRONI.
[188] 'Monaghan offers hand to Armagh', *UG*, 4 March 1971 p. 2. 'Bids for cross-border cooperation - invitation to Armagh', *NS,* 5 March 1971, p. 1.
[189] Armagh UDC Minutes, 3 May 1971, LA10/2CA/20, PRONI.
[190] '£50,000 Planetarium For Armagh', *UG,* 8 June 1950, p. 6. Armagh CCM, 18 June 1958, File LA2/2GA/48, PRONI.

The impact of political change on tourism

Tourism, as a luxury industry heavily reliant upon good image and public relations, was heavily influenced by external factors such as changing political and social situations. As such, it was one of the first to suffer when the civil disturbances within Northern Ireland began to draw international attention. As images of protestors clashing with police were beamed across the world from television cameramen present at the 5 November 1968 civil rights march in Londonderry, 'the Northern Ireland conflict began to make its mark on foreign audiences' perception of Ireland as a holiday destination,' making the North 'almost 'unsaleable' as a tourist destination.'[191] The results for the tourism industry were dire. In the year ending 30 September 1969, ''Northern Ireland's tourist revenue … was estimated at £24.5 million. This represented a fall of £3.7 million (13.1 percent) from the 1968 record figure of £28.2 million.'[192] Aer Lingus' cross-channel routes suffered an 11 percent drop in inbound traffic, and a 6 percent drop in visitors on the continental routes.[193] From 1969 to 1972 'the overall number of visitors [to Northern Ireland] … more than halved,' from 'a high point of 792,000 in 1969 to … around 300,000 until the late 1970s' as tourism in the north was 'virtually wiped out'.[194] 1972 proved the industry's nadir in terms of visitor numbers, with only 435,000 arrivals into Northern

[191] Mícheál Ó Riain , *Aer Lingus 1936-1986: A Business Monograph* (Dublin, 1986), p. 35. David Wilson, 'Tourism, Public Policy and the Image of Northern Ireland since the Troubles', in Barbara O'Connor and Michael Cronin (ed.), *Tourism in Ireland* (Cork, 1993), p. 148.
[192] NITB, *22nd Annual Report* (Belfast, 1969), p. 4.
[193] Ó Riain, *Aer Lingus*, p. 35.
[194] Ronnie Scott and Nigel Guy, *The Economic Impact of Tourism in Northern Ireland* (Northern Ireland, 1992), p. 10. David Wilson, 'Tourism, Public Policy and the Image of Northern Ireland since the Troubles', in Barbara O'Connor and Michael Cronin (ed.), *Tourism in Ireland* (Cork, 1993), pp. 139-40. See also 'Tourist Sector Sees a Glimmer of Light', *Financial Times,* 4 July 1978, p. 24.

Ireland.[195] For local towns in the border area, which had increased their supply of hotel accommodation to cater for expected increases in trade, over-capacity resulted.[196] From a peak of 28 million visitors in 1968, tourist numbers in Northern Ireland fell by 3.7 million in 1969, and a further 1.8. Million in 1970.[197] Bord Fáilte, seeing its own tourist numbers drop, acknowledged that 'tourism [was] vulnerable to influences outside and inside the State over which the board has no control,' and that it was suffering as a consequence.[198] Looking back over the period, A. W. Gray concluded that 'violence has undoubtedly been the single most important factor preventing tourism in Northern Ireland from realising its potential.'[199]

Cross-border travel appears to have suffered disproportionately from the worsening political conditions. 'With the onset of the Troubles the number of NI people visiting the South fell by around 50 percent' as Northern Irish residents 'become more reluctant to travel South.'[200] Inquiries at the NITB offices in Dublin fell by forty eight percent, and cross-border traffic was reportedly cut by 38 percent.[201] Orange Lodges began advising their members against travelling south, amid stories of cars with Northern number plates having their tyres slashed, and individual unionist leaders such as MP Knox Cunningham

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[195] Robert Griffith-Jones, 'Northern Ireland –putting the record straight', *Tourism Management,* Vol. 5, No. 2, 1984, p. 138.
[196] H. J. Plettner, *Geographical Aspects of Tourism in the Republic of Ireland* (Galway, 1979), p. 15.
[197] 'Ulster's 1970 tourism tally is encouraging', *Newsletter,* 24 Nov. 1971. File 2002/19/421 *Tourism in Northern Ireland,* D.F.A., N.A.I.
[198] Bord Fáilte's General Policy 19th November 1969, Michael Gorman private papers.
[199] Gray, *The Economic Consequences of Peace in Ireland*, p. 4.
[200] David Wilson, 'Tourism, Public Policy and the Image of Northern Ireland since the Troubles', in Barbara O'Connor and Michael Cronin (ed.), *Tourism in Ireland* (Cork, 1993), p. 140. See also Desmond Gillmore, 'Tourism Development and Impact in the Republic of Ireland', in Ullrich Kockel (ed.), *Culture, Tourism and Development – the Case of Ireland* (Liverpool, 1994), p. 20.
[201] 'Drop in Northern Ireland tourist income 'disastrous'', *Irish Times*, 16 Dec. 1969. File 98/3/35, *Cross-Border Tourism,* D.T.P., N.A.I. Judith Rosenfield, 'Decline in Border traffic', *Irish Press,* 24 July 1973, file 2002/19/421 *Tourism in Northern Ireland,* D.F.A., N.A.I.

began to call for a boycott on tourism cooperation with Eire in protest against the 'vile propaganda' which he accused Bord Fáilte of producing, 'blackening [Ulster's] good name.'[202] Border areas in the Republic, already handicapped by a weaker tourism profile than that enjoyed by Western Ireland, and relying heavily on Northern Irish visitors, suffered disproportionately, with valuable angling tourists and day-visitors staying away.[203] As late as 1994, Desmond Gillmor noted that 'in the northern part of the [Republic], proximity to the border … has a deterrent influence' on tourist numbers.[204] The relatively early stage at which the Troubles caught rural tourism development suggests that the damage was due to the stunting of tourism growth along the border, rather than the abandonment of existing infrastructure.

Specific incidents could cause a heavy fall in tourist numbers. The attempted burning of a British tourist coach in Connemara, for example, led to the cancellation by British tour companies of any further trips to the island, costing Ireland millions in tourism revenue.[205] The burning of the British Embassy in Dublin also took a heavy toll, with '15,000 people cancel[ling] their scheduled tours to Ireland' in its aftermath.[206] The U.K. market was the worst hit as 'potential visitors from Great Britain … [feared that] they

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[202] 'Drop in Northern Ireland tourist income 'disastrous'', *Irish Times*, 16 Dec. 1969 and 'What Dr Tim has to say about those Eire holiday rumours…', *Belfast Telegraph,* 25 Aug. 1970. 'Stop Cooperation, says Cunningham', *Irish Times,* 17 Oct. 1969. *Cross- Border Tourism,* File 98/3/35 D.T.P., N.A.I..

[203] 'English Anglers interested but afraid', *NS,* 3 March 1972, p. 5. See also H. J. Plettner, *Geographical Aspects of Tourism in the Republic of Ireland* (Galway, 1979), p. 33 and Catherine Nash, ''Embodying the Nation' – The West of Ireland Landscape and Irish Identity', in Barbara O'Connor and Michael Cronin (ed.), *Tourism in Ireland* (Cork, 1993), p. 86.

[204] Desmond Gillmore, 'Tourism Development and Impact in the Republic of Ireland', in Ullrich Kockel (ed.), *Culture, Tourism and Development – the Case of Ireland* (Liverpool, 1994), p. 26.

[205] Michael Kevin O'Doherty, interviewed by author, 5 Feb. 2004. 'Eire faces from US in tourism', *Daily Telegraph,* 4 Feb.1972, file 2002/19/421 *Tourism in Northern Ireland,* D.F.A., N.A.I..

[206] Eire faces from US in tourism', *Daily Telegraph,* 4 Feb.1972, file 2002/19/421 *Tourism in Northern Ireland,* D.F.A., N.A.I..

would be unwelcome to parts of Ireland'.[207] 'Clearly the perception that Ireland was no longer a 'safe' tourist destination coupled with the media image of a nation expressing strong anti-British feelings encouraged British tourists to look to alternative destinations', though this decline stabilised by 1974.[208]

After the cross-border and British markets, the next worse hit was the American market. Americans are notoriously cautious tourists who 'normally keep clear of any country where there has been public disorder' and, 'as the Sixties turned into the Seventies, the potential US tourist became wary of visiting a small country whose violent events received front page treatment day after day in his morning newspaper.'[209] Aer Lingus' business on the Atlantic route fell by 6 percent in 1972, just as its new Boeing 747 fleet was coming into use.[210] As Ó Riain notes, 'US travel to Ireland sank.'[211] In the face of all this negative publicity, there was little that Bord Fáilte felt able to do. Michael Gorman recalled :

> The amount of money we had was tiny compared to the impact of one bomb on every newspaper in the United States and every television. What could you do … there was no way you could counter the effect of that. So it was just a matter of managing along.[212]

'Marketing and promotion of Northern Ireland was significantly curtailed,' and although the Northern Irish government attempted to combat the adverse publicity, and reassure

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[207] Gray, *The Economic Consequences of Peace in Ireland*, p. 30. Ireland, *Government White Paper on Tourism Policy* (Dublin, 1985), p. 16.
[208] James Deegan and Donel A. Dineen, *Tourism Policy and Performance* (London, 1997), p. 47. Plettner, H. J., *Geographical Aspects of Tourism in the Republic of Ireland* (Galway, 1979), p. 35.
[209] Michael Kevin O'Doherty, interviewed by author, 5 Feb. 2004. Ó Riain, *Aer Lingus*, p. 34.
[210] Ó Riain, *Aer Lingus*, p. 34.
[211] Ibid.
[212] Michael Gorman, interviewed by author, 20 Jan. 2004.

potential visitors and investors alike by placing advertisements challenging the widespread 'bombs, brutality and bullets' picture of Northern Ireland on television and in the press, and by providing material for books willing to highlight the 'other side' of life in the North, it was impossible to ignore the damage that had been caused.[213] Attempts by individuals to reduce the Troubles' impact by minimising their visibility, for example by appealing to the British Army to reduce the size and threatening aspect of its border checkpoints admitted by the NITB to be off-putting to tourists, were similarly unsuccessful.[214] This situation was perhaps the most glaring example from the period of the effect of government policy, whether intentional or otherwise, on an industry and on cross-border cooperation efforts within it.[215]

> As the industry attempted to focus on the positive, the 1970 drop was not as big as the 1969 drop, evidence was suggesting that the tourists who were coming were spending more and so on, the industry turned inwards and began planning for a new, post-Troubles future.[216]

One of the first casualties of this retrenchment was the policy of cooperation between North and South, which was 'put on the back burner' if not quite abandoned until the end of the Troubles, amid attempts by Bord Fáilte to disassociate the Republic from 'the

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[213] 'Bombs, brutality and bullets', *Irish Times,* 20 April 1978. Reproduced in File 2002/19/421 *Tourism in Northern Ireland,* D.F.A., N.A.I.. 'Bombs, brutality and bullets', *The Times,* 3 Nov. 1977, p. 7. The Times Digital Archive. See also Roy Bradford, Minister for Commerce, Northern Ireland, in BBC's 'world this week', quoted in 'Northern Irish hotels hit by disturbances', *Irish Times,* 24 Aug. 1970, File 98/3/35 *Cross-Border Tourism,* D.T.P., N.A.I.. John Chartres, Bert Henshaw and Michael Dewar, *Northern Ireland Scrapbook* (London, 1986), p. 7. Jonathan Greer, 'Developing trans-jurisdictional tourism partnerships – insights from the Island of Ireland', *Tourism Management,* Vol. 23, No. 4, 2002, p. 358.

[214] NITB, *Corporate Plan* (Belfast, 1992), p. 9. Letter and photographs, Senator P. McGowen, to Jack Lynch, 19 April 1072. File 2003/16/8 (S1955C) *Customs,* Dept. of Taoiseach, N.A.I.

[215] 'Bord Fáilte refutes MP', *Irish Independent,* 19 Oct. 1969. File 2003/16/8 (S1955C) *Customs,* Dept. of Taoiseach, N.A.I.

[216] Ibid. 'Tourism hit in North, but visitors spend more', *Evening Herald,* 24 July 1973. File 2002/19/421 *Tourism in Northern Ireland,* D.F.A., N.A.I. Debates about the post-Troubles direction which the tourism industry would take re-ignited following the IRA cease fires of 1994. See, for example, Gray, *The Economic Consequences of Peace in Ireland*, p. 1.

(Northern) conflict that dare not speak its name.'[217] Some cooperation continued on, with Bord Fáilte contributing to a British joint tourist boards publication in 1973 and appearing in their bibliography of 1974, but, within Ireland, both boards began to look inwards for means to support the industry.[218] In 1972, the NITB requested clarification from the Northern Irish government as to its position regarding home advertising, which was not believed to fall within its remit, in order to launch a "Holidays at Home" campaign encouraging Ulstermen to spend at least one holiday weekend each year within Northern Ireland.[219] Since a 1966 report had found that 'some 70-80 percent of total world expenditure on tourism is by people on holiday or on business travel within their own countries, that is, *domestic* tourism,' this was, economically, a very sound policy.[220]

The idea of promoting holidays at home as a means of boosting the domestic economy was not new. A suggestion for inducements to encourage domestic tourism had been raised and rejected in the Republic in 1965.[221] In 1966, calls by the opposition to provide such inducements 'during the present financial crisis' were again rejected by the DTP amid fears that such a move would alienate Ireland's trade-partners and lead to damaging

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[217] Michael Kevin O'Doherty, interviewed by author, 5 Feb. 2004. NITB, *37th Annual Report* (Belfast, 1985), p. 17. Michael Cronin, 'Next to Being there: Ireland of the Welcomes and Tourism of the Word', in Cronin and O'Connor (ed.), *Irish Tourism* (Clevedon, 2003), p. 190. See also David Wilson, 'Tourism, Public Policy and the Image of Northern Ireland since the Troubles', in Barbara O'Connor and Michael Cronin (ed.), *Tourism in Ireland* (Cork, 1993), p. 150. For developments since 1990, see Henderson and Teague, *Economic Cooperation*, pp. 11-5.

[218] Joint Tourist Boards, *Symbols for Tourist Guides, maps and publications* (London, 1973). Joint Tourist Boards, *A Select Tourism Bibliography* (London, 1974), p. 9.

[219] NITB, *7th Annual Report* (Belfast, 1955), p. 3. Northern Ireland Cabinet minutes, 18 Jan. 1972, file CAB/4/1633, PRONI. David Wilson, 'Tourism, Public Policy and the Image of Northern Ireland since the Troubles', in Barbara O'Connor and Michael Cronin (ed.), *Tourism in Ireland* (Cork, 1993), p. 150.

[220] G. Colley, 'International Tourism Today', *Lloyds Bank Review* July 1967, p. 29.

[221] Murrey, Dept. of Finance suggested a 'See Ireland first;' campaign 18 Nov. 1965 due to balance of payment situation. Note for the minister's information, file 96/9/343, *Parliamentary Question*, D.T.P., N.A.I..

of counter-measures.[222] 'The State incentives for tourist development benefit all holiday makers,' argued the minister, 'preferential treatment for our own holiday makers would be quite unjustified and calculated to damage the ever growing tourist trade'.[223] In 1972, as the Troubles began to hit home, 'Bord Fáilte initiated active promotion on the home market' and targeted Irish emigrants in Britain, running special promotional campaigns in London, Manchester, Birmingham and Edinburgh.[224] A similar scheme had already been pioneered by the Monaghan TDA in 1967, when it had attempted to use ex-Monaghan residents as agents, to encourage their workmates and associates to visit the county.[225] Such projects were not uniformly successful, however, and carried some risk with 'the number of NI residents travelling outside NI … increasing three-fold' between 1969 and the late 1970s, despite the NITB's efforts.[226] At the same time, the fall in emigration during the 1960s and 1970s reduced the size of the ethnic market to which Bord Fáilte could appeal, and hence the number of 'ethnic' visitors.[227]

Tourism's vulnerability as an industry was actively exploited by terrorist groups.[228] The 1976 IRA bombing of Portrush, for example, were seen as a direct attack upon the industry.[229] Sinn Féin organised a number of supposedly 'spontaneous' protests outside

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[222] Letter, T. J. O'Driscoll, Bord Fáilte chief executive, to Theclá Beere, 12 May 1966, file 96/9/343 *Parliamentary Question*, D.T.P., N.A.I.
[223] Minister's Reply to parliamentary question by TD Gerry L'Estrange, 8 June 1966, file 96/9/343 P*arliamentary Question*, D.T.P., N.A.I.. Dáil Éireann Debates, Volume 223, 8 June 1966. Http://historical debates.oireachtas.ie/D/0223/D.0223.196606080014.html.
[224] Bord Fáilte, *Tourism – the Welcome Industry* (Dublin, c.1982), p. 3. See also Michael Kevin O'Doherty, interviewed by author, 5 Feb. 2004.
[225] 'Monaghan plans to attract tourists', *NS*, 13 Jan. 1967, p. 8.
[226] David Wilson, 'Tourism, Public Policy and the Image of Northern Ireland since the Troubles', in Barbara O'Connor and Michael Cronin (ed.), *Tourism in Ireland* (Cork, 1993), p. 140.
[227] Ireland, *Government White Paper on Tourism Policy* (Dublin, 1985), p. 27.
[228] P. J. Buckley and M. Klemn, 'The Decline of Tourism in Northern Ireland: The Causes', *Tourism Management,* Vol. 14, No. 3, 1993, p. 192.
[229] John Chartres, Bert Henshaw and Michael Dewar, *Northern Ireland Scrapbook* (London, 1986), p. 72.

Bord Fáilte offices in the UK to demand help and recognition from the Irish state, while Bord Fáilte offices abroad were attacked by Loyalist paramilitaries.[230] As a result, cautious real estate agents refused to rent Bord Fáilte offices on the prestigious Fifth Avenue in New York.[231] In 1972, Vanguard, an extremist loyalist organisation, sent out letters purporting to be from Sinn Féin warning travel agents in the UK, USA and Germany against bringing tour groups to the Republic.[232] The rationale behind this action, set out in a letter to the Taoiseach, Jack Lynch, was to force the Irish government to crack down on the IRA in order to rid itself of the economic menace of Vanguard.[233]

During the early years of the Troubles, there was still hope within the industry that a quick return to peace would prevent long-term damage.[234] As the conflict continued, however, regular visitors ceased coming to Northern Ireland in particular, and it began to be omitted from tourism guides. In Beth Bryant's 1977-8 *Ireland on $10 a Day*, a follow up from the hugely successful 1969-70, *Ireland on $5 a Day,* which had extensively covered the North the author comments in her introduction; 'are you worried about the Troubles? Aren't we all!' and informs her readers that 'as of last edition, I have dropped all mention of Northern Ireland as a tourist destination' following the failure of the Sunningdale agreement to bring peace to the region.[235] 'Should the strife cease and the lovely Northern countryside once again become viable for vacationing,' Bryant goes on

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[230] Michael Gorman, interviewed by author, 20 Jan. 2004.
[231] Ibid.
[232] Letter, Ulster Vanguard Alliance to Jack Lynch, Aug. 1972, File S10585G 2003/16/81 *Partition,* Dept. of Taoiseach, N.A.I..
[233] Ibid.
[234] *Antrim Tourist Report*, Sept 1973, file LA1/50/B3, PRONI, p. 2. '5 – year tourist plan for N Revenue target of 35m', *Irish Press,* 25 July 1973. File 2002/19/421 *Tourism in Northern Ireland,* D.F.A., N.A.I..
[235] Beth Bryant *Ireland on $5 a Day* (New York, 1969-1970), pp. 222–239. Beth Bryant, *Ireland on $10 a Day* (New York, 1977-1978). Foreword.

to say, 'the Northern Ireland Tourist Board (48 High Street, Belfast) can provide you with information on accommodation and sights.'[236] She attempts, however, to dispel the effect of 'misplaced' concerns regarding visits to the Republic.[237] 'The violence above has seldom spilled over the border. You'll be as safe in the South as in your own back yard. If you come from a large American city – you'll be safer!'[238] This was very much the line which Bord Fáilte wished to convey, and was probably adopted as a result of Bryant's close contact with that body.[239] While by 1995 there was 'a large untapped international demand for tourism travel to Ireland,' tourists never entirely ceased visiting, a UDR man commenting as late as June 1989, while on patrol on Lough Erne, 'you wouldn't think there was a war on, the way the tourists can't stay away.'[240]

The Troubles were far from the first political event to have affected the tourism industry in this period. Indeed, Buckley and Klemn have asserted that they were not even solely responsible for the drop in tourist numbers post-1969.[241] The 1956 to 1962 Border Campaign, with its attendant road cratering, had pre-trained the industry in the effects of unrest, while a Fianna Fáil report on tourism from 1951 to 1954 noted the impact of such events as the ending of rationing and the opening up of Europe post-war as factors contributing to a greater competition for the Irish market.[242] The NITB identified the

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[236] Beth Bryant, *Ireland on $10 a Day* (New York, 1977-1978). Foreword.
[237] Gray, *The Economic Consequences of Peace in Ireland*, p. 4.
[238] Ibid.
[239] Michael Kevin O'Doherty, interviewed by author, 5 Feb. 2004.
[240] Gray, *The Economic Consequences of Peace in Ireland*, p. 5. Michael Dewar, *A Day in the Life of the British Army* (Newton Abbot, c.1990), p. 118.
[241] P. J. Buckley and M. Klemn, 'The Decline of Tourism in Northern Ireland: The Causes', *Tourism Management,* Vol. 14, No. 3, 1993, p. 194. Bord Fáilte agreed. Bord Fáilte, *Tourism – the Welcome Industry* (Dublin, c.1982), p. 12.
[242] NITB, *10th Annual Report* (Belfast, 1958), p. 3. Report by Fógra Fáilte Publicity and Statistics Committee, 21st Sept. 1951 to 31st March 1954. File S15647A, *An Bord Fáilte and Fógra Fáilte Reports*

1956 Suez Crisis, with its resultant petrol restrictions, as adversely effecting early season and motor traffic.[243] At the same time, political events could also on occasion prove helpful to the industry. The Seamen's Strike of 1966, for example, prevented many Northern Irish people from travelling abroad or to destinations elsewhere in the United Kingdom on holiday. The opportunity thus created was seized by Bord Fáilte, who mounted a special campaign to attract those individuals South.[244] The campaign, designed to last three weeks and involving five major newspapers was, according to them, 'the first occasion Bord Fáilte has mounted a special campaign in Northern Ireland,' though the North had previously been included in all-Ireland 'holidays at home' campaigns.[245]

Up until the outbreak of the Troubles, the most important impact of the border on tourism was not the result of violence or strike, but of the differential regimes concerning pub licensing.

> The liquor licensing laws in the North of Ireland at weekends were a lot more stringent than the Southern side and there was a very large influx of people from the North of Ireland to the pubs around Lifford and the border areas at the weekends.[246]

Denis O'Donaghue, in his memoirs of his childhood at Warrenpoint, recalled that, among the town's three main advantages as a holiday destination, 'if you came to Warrenpoint

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and Accounts 1953-54, D.T.P., N.A.I.. Bord Fáilte, *Annual Report 1956 -7* (Dublin, 1957), p. 8. James Deegan and Donel A. Dineen, *Tourism Policy and Performance* (London, 1997), p. 14.

[243] NITB, *10th Annual Report* (Belfast, 1958), p. 3. Bord Fáilte, *Annual Report 1956 -7* (Dublin, 1957), p. 8.

[244] File 2001/3/1364, *Bord Fáilte Tourism Co-ordination Meeting December 1966*, Dept. of Finance, N.A.I..

[245] Bord Fáilte Press Release, 1 June 1966, File 96/9/343 *Parliamentary Question*, D.T.P. File S15647A, *An Bord Fáilte and Fógra Fáilte Reports and Accounts 1953 - 54*, D.T.P., N.A.I..

[246] Seamus Keating, interviewed by author, 8 Nov. 2005.

for a Sunday trip, you would find the public houses shut, but you could go by ferryboat across to Omeath, an open town on the Sabbath, for drink and noise.'[247] The GNR even ran special cross-border trains from Omagh to Bundoran on summer Sundays to:

> Allow the opportunities for families to take the sea air and for other citizens of Omagh, in search of the liquid refreshments denied to them at home, to slake their thirst. It was said that some Omagh men never got beyond the pubs on Railway Road and were heard to express surprise when told that Bundoran was on the coast.[248]

The concerns of the licensing trade regarding the resultant loss of revenue were voiced at the highest levels of the tourist industry, but dismissed at cabinet level.[249] Since publicans were heavily represented among the catholic middle class, the conflict over Sunday drinking became a part of the general sense of alienation and economic dissatisfaction among Northern catholics, and who saw the Government's insistence on upholding through legal means protestant shabbatarian principles as another attempt against their economic well-being.[250]

The initiation of eight tourism regions in the Republic in 1966 resolved definitively the issue of responsibility for internal tourism and for local cross-border initiatives, which were specifically included within the remit of the regional bodies. This development, alongside the general rise in interest in the tourism industry, encouraged the creation of

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[247] D. Donoghue, *Warrenpoint* (London, 1990), p. 5.
[248] Ferris, *The Great Northern Railway*, p. 3.
[249] See UTDA Board Discussion, 14 March, 1935, *Ulster Tourist Development Association (Limited) Annual Reports,* file TOUR/1/1/3, PRONI. NITB, *12th Annual Report* (Belfast, 1959, pp. 14-15. NITB, *18th Annual Report* (Belfast, 1965), p. 7. NITB, *19th Annual Report* (Belfast, 1966), pp. 9-10. NITB, *21st Annual Report* (Belfast, 1968), p. 9. See W. Craig in Parliamentary Debates, *Differences in Cross-Border Laws (Representation),* 22 June 1967. Reproduced in File 98/3/35 *Cross-Border Tourism,* D.T.P., N.A.I..
[250] Publicans represented a powerful lobby within the Catholic middle class, and within the Nationalist Party. See Brendan Lynn, *Holding the Ground* (Aldershot and Brookfield, Vermont, 1997), p. 17.

several local cross-border initiatives, such as Monaghan's bus tours and Carrickmacross, Crossmaglen and Castleblaney's Lakelands Festival, though it also created potentially harmful organisational imbalance between themselves and the NITB.[251] Here as elsewhere, however, cooperation did not act along strictly linear separations between local and national, with local projects of major significance, such as the drive to provide an airport for the north-west of Ireland, or the bid to fund a new planetarium in Armagh, attracting interest from all levels of government.[252]

Conclusion

Tourism was an economically vital industry for both Irish economies, and one where the two necessarily intermingled, forming each other's primary markets. This led to the industries early adoption as an area of possible cooperation. The industry's however, sensitivity, both in terms of propaganda and adverse publicity, made for a complex relationship between the two jurisdictions. Yet cooperation also took place independently of government intervention, for example, Donegal was already looking into cross-border links with western Northern Ireland before the Northern Cabinet began discussing such possibilities, and the NITB and Bord Fáilte already enjoyed 'a very friendly exchange of ideas and actions on matters of joint interest' in 1959.[253] A decade later, local tourism bodies in Crossmaglen and Castleblaney were able to mount a cross-border 'lakelands

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[251] 'Crossmaglen stages big attraction', *UG,* 23 July 1970, p. 3. 'Monaghan to get 'bus tours', *NS,* 8 July 1966, p. 1. B. Bramwell and A. Sharman, 'Collaboration in local tourism policy making', *Annals of Tourism Research,* Vol. 26, No. 2, 1999, p. 394.
[252] See, for example: Northern Ireland Cabinet Memorandum, 11 Aug. 1965, file CAB/4/1313, PRONI. Donegal CCM, 4 Dec. 1961, D.C.A.. NITB, *19th Annual Report* (Belfast, 1966), p. 14.
[253] Northern Irish Cabinet discussion, 9 March 1965, file CAB/4/1295, PRONI. NITB, *12th Annual Report* (Belfast, 1959), p. 8.

festival' even while relations between the two governments soured.[254] At the same time, however, more initiatives began to take place following government assent in 1965. Clearly, therefore, the levels of cooperation within tourism were influenced by, but not dictated by, conditions elsewhere.[255]

[254] 'Crossmaglen stages big attraction', *UG,* 23 July 1971, p. 3.
[255] For discussion on the interaction between different levels of the tourism industry in Ireland see Douglas G. Pearce, 'Tourism in Ireland', *Tourism Management,* Vol. 11, No. 2, 1990, pp.133-151.

8. Conclusion

Cross-border contact and cooperation was ongoing throughout the 1949 to 1972 period, maintained through a range of cross-border networks; familial, social and professional, and varying in level and extent according to time and circumstances. Three basic criteria have been identified as necessary for the evolution of contact networks into active cooperation mechanisms. These can be summarised as: will, opportunity, and motive. The varying levels of these factors dictated the extent to which cooperation was possible, and the speed with which it took place.[1]

The will to cooperate was largely an internal, psychological criterion, necessitating an ability to visualise the political 'other' as an ally and on some level as a 'same'. This necessitated the active consideration of similarities and minimising of differences under titles such as 'brother Irishmen and brother policemen' and 'colleagues'.[2] A disturbance of this image of sameness by an assertion of difference, as took place, for example, over the use of Churchill quotes in NITB literature, could reduce or remove the will to cooperate.[3] The same was true of political conflict which 'had the potential to create obstacles' where politicians wished it to.[4] The image of 'sameness' did not necessarily depend upon actual agreement or similarities, but on the existence of sufficient 'grey

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[1] Michael Kennedy, for example, highlights an increased caution and 'foot dragging' among the Northern Irish business community as the reason behind the slowing down of tariff reductions during the summer of 1961. Kennedy 'Towards cooperation', p.56.
[2] "Fear Faire", 'Divisional news, Depot notes', *GR,* Oct. 1951, p. 901. Desmond McGimpsey, interviewed by author, 17 Oct. 2006.
[3] See pages 295-296 in current work and Michael Kevin O'Doherty, interviewed by author, 5 Feb. 2004.
[4] Derek Birrell and Amanda Hayes, 'Managing Cross-Border cooperation between voluntary originations in Ireland', *Nonprofits Management and Leadership*, Vol. 15, No. 1, Fall 2004, p. 50.

areas' within which each participant could locate their own image of 'sameness'. The ability to see the 'other' as a 'same' requires a certain greying, or overriding, of map-images which utilise the border as an end-point.[5] While this could be presumed to be easier for Southern residents, whose country still claimed *de jure* boundaries which excluded the border, partition had by 1949 been in existence for the effective lengths of many professional careers, with the result that *de facto*, the border had come to be an end-point for many.[6]

The second criteria necessary in order for cooperation to take place was the presence of an opportunity to meet, at a local, national or international level. Physical encounters with the opposite party were cited as the base from which joint projects arose at all levels, from McGurk's fictional Gardaí, whose contacts with the RUC were built up over midnight meetings out on patrol, to T. K. Whitaker, head of the Southern civil service and Department of Finance, whose contacts with Malley and O'Neill at World Bank meetings helped to establish the groundwork for the Lemass/O'Neill meetings of 1965.[7] It was here that large cross-border friendship and kinship networks played the most direct role in encouraging cross-border cooperation, by providing the forums and links through which individuals met.

The last factor necessary was the presence of a motive, since until a situation arose which necessitated cooperative action, contacts could proceed at 'contact' level without further

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[5] John Bowman, *De Valera and the Ulster Question* (Oxford, 1982), p. 23.
[6] See, for example, pages 272-273 in current work and anonymous, interviewed by author, 27 Oct. 2004.
[7] J. McGurk, 'God's Children', *GR,* June 1963, pp. 493-495., 'Lemass O'Neill meeting welcomed - Northern Ireland Premier to visit Dublin', newspaper unknown, in File 175(9), *T.K. Whitaker papers*, UCD.

evolution for an indefinite period. For example, in the two cases cited above, contact had remained merely friendly and professional until the imminent risk of an IRA attack, and the desire of the Northern premier to break the deadlock with his Southern counterpart, provided motives for their evolution into cooperative action.[8] Motives could be as diverse as the need for local people to access a service or regional market town, or for organisations to make the most effective use of limited financial resources.[9]

The patterns of cross-border interaction in the 1949 to 1972 period follow a trajectory only tangentially linked to government policy. Cooperation at government level could aid the establishment of cross-border links, but it could also damage those links by subjecting them to a higher degree of public scrutiny. In many ways, indeed, the politicisation of cross-border cooperation created a reaction similar to that caused by the O'Neill reforms in Northern Ireland, raising expectations on the one side, and thus drawing the suspicion of the 'other'. As a result, politically controversial but practically necessary decisions such as leeway to the British Army in terms of border crossings were agreed in private and without public comment.[10] A more certain correlation exists between levels of cooperation and overall public mood, with the period of optimism of the early 1960s coinciding with the launch of several cross-border initiatives such as the United Societies of Castleblaney, and the formalisation of others including the cross-border Chambers of Commerce Committee, sports fixtures between the Garda and RUC, and the publication

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[8] Ibid.

[9] Jonathan Greer, 'Developing trans-jurisdictional tourism partnerships – insights from the Island of Ireland', *Tourism Management,* Vol. 23, No. 4, 2002, p. 356. See, for example, the Carrickmacross-Crossmaglen Cross-border committee, page 120 and cooperation between the NITB and Bord Fáilte, pages 282 of current work.

[10] Paul Dixon, *Northern Ireland - The Politics of War and Peace* (Basingstoke and New York), p. 37.

of joint tourism publicity by the NITB and Bord Fáilte.[11] The relative reduction in these contacts post-1968 then follows, as individuals retrenched in the face of perceived external threats, financial and physical, reducing self-perception back to 'us' and 'them'. Thus, while contact actually increased in the early years of the Northern Ireland Troubles, with the number of Northern Irish born individuals enumerated in the Southern border counties rising, cooperation declined.[12] Cross-border cooperation was not, therefore, an all or nothing phenomenon, but a curve, sensitive to changes in the atmosphere in border areas, policy decisions taken at national, and later also international, levels and the changing fortunes of cooperation-minded border leaders, a factor itself dependent on local mood and wider political developments.

Despite the apparent 'Cold War' taking place between the Republic of Ireland and the Northern Irish governments in the pre-1965 period, communities and organisations along the border continued to interact in order to allow the border to operate. The major instances of cooperation cited in general texts, such as electricity interconnection and the meetings of Lemass and O'Neill in 1965, were not islands in an otherwise flat sea, but the results of continued low level contact taking place among various strata of Irish society.[13] The impact of local cooperation networks was not confined to providing a basis on which government contact could be built, however. Local networks could act as substitutes for governmental or legislative action, as in the case of tariff reductions and police cooperation, or as an alternative to it, as in the case of the United Societies of Castleblaney. Cross-border contacts could also act as a pointer towards likely periods of

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[11] See pages 79-86, 126-127, 200-204 and 290 in current work.
[12] See pages 33-35 in current work.
[13] Kennedy, *Division and Consensus*, pp. 1-3.

high-level contact, since they formed part of, and were influenced by, the same trends which allowed such high-level contacts to take place; economic prosperity, national optimism, and relative political peace.

9. Plates



Plate 1: Brian McRoberts, Election Flier for South Armagh election.
http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/images/posters/election/index. html. Accessed 13 April 2007.



Plate 2: Two Gardaí, two RUC men and a Customs man on the Irish Border, *Irish Press* c.1949. RUC press collection, courtesy of Stephen Crockard.



Plate 3: Britannia and Cathleen Ní Houlihan. Dundalk and Greenore Railway Company Crest. Courtesy of Iarnród Éirean Museum, Clarke Station, Dundalk.

Plate 4 – 'United Societies of Castleblaney - First Conference on Trans-Border Cooperation', *Program*, 19 March 1964. Martin Hanratty Papers, Castleblaney.

United Societies of Castleblayney

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First Conference

- ON -

TRANS-BORDER CO-OPERATION

to be held on

THURSDAY, 19th MARCH, 1964, at 8.30 p.m.

- in -

THE EMBASSY BALLROOM, CASTLEBLAYNEY

(By kind permission of the management)

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Admission by Programme only

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No admission after 8.30 p.m.



Plate 5: Attendees at first Conference of the United Societies of Castleblaney. From right to left: (back) Bernard Geoghegan, Dominic Spelman, Uunknown, Eddie Richardson, Erskine Childers, Macarten McCormack, Martin Hanratty, (Seated) Adair, James Dillon, Albert Walmsley, Brennan, James Tully, Albert McElroy.

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