Redistributive Authoritarianism

Land Reform and Regime Durability in the Middle East



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Abstract

A growing literature on land reform under autocracy shows that leaders often use the expropriation and redistribution to disempower incumbent elites and to signal a credible commitment to potential coalition members. Although these strategies have been found to extend leader tenure in Latin America (Albertus and Menaldo, 2012), these patterns have yet to be systematically tested in other parts of the world. Counter to the expectations generated by the Latin American experience, I find that leaders who pursue land reform in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) have shorter tenures than non-reformers. This finding motivates my central research question: why are redistributive autocrats *less* likely to endure than their non-redistributive counterparts?

I address this puzzle in two stages. First, I argue that the legacies of European colonialism impacted the inclusivity of elite coalitions. In countries with legacies of exclusive coalitions, autocrats inherited more intense demands for redistribution than in countries with legacies of inclusive coalitions. Strong demands from previously excluded elites drove leaders to pursue radical land reforms. I use a medium-N quantitative analysis to uncover patterns regarding the implementation of land reform and the survival prospects of redistributive autocrats.

Second, radical reformers must also decide how to attract a loyal support coalition after redistribution is underway. Radical reformers who simultaneously extend cooptive state capacity through investment in and provision of "soft" institutions (e.g., agricultural cooperatives, health, education) are more likely to send a credible signal to potential members of an expanded supporting coalition. Alternatively, autocrats that pursue radical reform and rely on the expansion of repressive institutions (e.g., the military) are less likely to attract new supporters and are consequently more vulnerable to ouster. I turn to the case studies of Jordan, Iraq, and Egypt to disentangle the patterns suggested by the cross-national findings.

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Chapter 1

Introduction

Across the developing world, and particularly in autocracies, land reform is a great force for political and economic change. For autocratic leaders, redistributing land has proved an expedient means of undermining the power of the landed class. These conservative landed elites are often blamed for arresting economic development (Beramendi and Rogers, 2015) and limiting the development of state capacity (Beramendi et al., 2019) in order to maintain their political and economic power. In response, autocrats the world over have resorted to land reform to break landed elite monopolies on rural labor and agricultural land (Albertus, 2015) and to cultivate new cross-class and elite alliances in the early days of their tenure (Albertus and Menaldo, 2012; Walder, 1999).


Autocrats in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), like their counterparts in other regions, frequently opted to pursue land reform. In the wake of colonial rule, newly-independent leaders across the region redistributed land, often early in an autocrat's tenure. While the timing of land reform resembles patterns in Latin American autocracies, redistributive Middle Eastern autocrats have much shorter post-reform tenures than their South American counterparts. Although 20 percent of MENA leaders[1] pursued land reform, their

[1]This descriptive analysis is based on the Arcigos database of global leader tenure (Goemans et al., 2009). I used a subset of the dataset that included all 121 MENA leaders in power from 1950 to 2002 to provide a meaningful comparison with the findings presented in Albertus and Menaldo (2012).

tenure accounts for only 22 percent of all dictator-years from 1950 to 2002. In Latin America, however, the same proportion of leaders expropriated land and other assets, but make up almost double (40 percent) the dictator-year observations during the same period (Albertus and Menaldo, 2012).

Figure 1.1 presents a simple analysis of the divergent survival rates of redistributive and non-redistributive MENA autocrats. After two years in office, leader survival rates rapidly decline for those who adopted land reform when compared with non-reformers. This finding motivates the central empirical puzzle of this dissertation: under what conditions does the pursuit of land reform shorten autocratic leader tenure?

Fig. 1.1 Autocratic Leader Tenure and Land Reform (Kaplan–Meier Survival Curve)




This finding is all the more surprising in light of land reform's broad appeal in MENA countries throughout the post-colonial period. As states across the region gained their independence, newly sovereign autocrats frequently pursued land reform. From revolutionary military men like Egypt's Gamal Abdul Nasser and Iraq's Abdul Karim Qassim to monarchs

like Jordan's King Hussein and Morocco's King Hassan II, leaders embarked upon programs of expropriation and redistribution soon after independence. Yet some leaders, like Nasser and King Hussein, ruled for decades, while other reformist leaders were ousted. Accounting for this variation in tenure within the pool of reformer leaders constitutes an empirical puzzle.

1.1 The Argument

To understand why leader tenure might be threatened by land reform, I consider two outcomes in sequence. First, I explore why autocrats choose to redistribute land at all. I argue that independent leaders inherit elite coalitions from the colonial period. Under foreign rule, the colonizer's strategic decisions about local alliances and played a key role in elevating previously local elites into positions of national influence. At the same time, new elite groups began to emerge that challenged the colonial political order. Educated in modern classrooms, these new professional elites arose as a direct consequence of colonial state building. Tasked with resolving intra-elite conflicts, autocrats' preferences over land reform depend on inclusivity of his inherited coalition. Exclusive elite coalitions are more likely to incur intense redistributive grievances from excluded elite groups, compelling the leader to pursue radical land reform. Radical reforms often applied new caps on landownership across the entire country, and expropriated any land in excess of these ceilings for redistribution to the rural poor and middle class. Inclusive elite coalitions, more amenable to rising elites, put less pressure on the autocrat to redistribute. In the absence of intense redistributive pressure, autocrats opt for more conservative reforms as a strategy of elite maintenance. Conservative reforms do not alter the property rights of landed elites, and often involve redistribution of property within a delimited area. These reforms often expropriate landowners who are not represented within the autocrat's support coalition, and usually result in new lands being made available to members of the support coalition.

Fig. 1.2 Argument Outline



In countries with legacies of exclusive elite coalitions, however, land reform directly addressed intra-elite conflicts in a way few other policies could. By expropriating incumbent landed elites, autocrats took direct aim not only at political inequality among elite groups, but also at repressive labor practices and poor living conditions for the rural poor. These intended benefits of land redistribution were thought to enhance the leaders' legitimacy among the masses and elites who had, until land reform, been marginalized. But as Figure 1.1 shows, land reform frequently failed to protect the leader and enhance his survival in office.

The extensive social, political, and economic changes brought about by radical redistribution require reliable elite allies to insulate the autocrat from challenges to his rule. Although an autocrat's choice of land reform is constrained by the type of elite coalition he inherits, the leader also makes other strategic calculations that impact his prospects for a long-lived tenure. The most of important of these is how to invest in state capacity. Leaders that opt to engage in cooptive state building during land reform stand a greater chance of co-opting rising modernizing elites and the rural poor via the expansion of new institutions like cooperatives, health, and education. Autocrats who favor repressive state capacity development, however, fail to extend their exclusive coalition. As a consequence, they risk alienating the masses and potential elite supporters through repressive tactics, leaving them vulnerable to ouster. The logic of my argument is presented in Figure 1.2.

1.2 Existing Explanations for Autocratic Leader Durability

Scholars of authoritarianism often assume the be a strategic actor, capable of assessing the level of elite or mass-based threats, and then responding to neutralize any challenge (Brownlee, 2007; Greitens, 2016; Svolik, 2013; Wintrobe, 1998). But as Figure 1.1 shows, these calculations sometimes fail to insulate the autocrat from overthrow. de Mesquita et al. (2003) argue that autocrats' tenure ultimately relies on continued good will from their "winning coalition." Winning coalitions consist of actors and groups whose support is essential for a leader's continued rule. Rulers maintain these groups' support by distributing private and public goods.

Coalition maintenance is paramount to non-elected leaders' survival, and the support of ruling elites is particularly critical. Recent scholarship argues that democratization is actually a way for elites to maintain power while resolving redistributive conflict from below (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2005; Boix, 2003). Redistributive conflict is defined as the mobilization of redistributive grievances on the part of economically disadvantaged groups (Haggard and Kaufman, 2012). More recently, however, the literature has begun to focus on redistribution as an result of intra-elite conflict (Ansell and Samuels, 2014). Autocrats are active redistributors, although the targeting of autocratic redistribution is often mediated through elite interests (Albertus, 2015; Albertus et al., 2018b; Albertus and Menaldo, 2012; Piketty, 2014). The nature of elite ruling coalitions is an important determinant of how regimes manage redistributive conflict under autocracy (Gallagher and Hanson, 2009; Hesselbein, 2011; Magaloni, 2008; Pepinsky, 2009). The resolution of intense redistributive conflicts requires either regime concessions (DeNardo, 1985; Kohli, 2004; Lust, 2005) or elite consensus (Armijo and Faucber, 1994; Gelman, 2003; Haggard and Kaufman, 1992; Perthes, 2004) on reform. Autocrats also need to be supported by a state

with capacity to implement socially transformative policies as land redistribution (Doner et al., 2005; Fortin-Rittberger, 2014; Slater, 2008; Slater and Fenner, 2011).

Existing political science theories about redistribution and regime outcomes suggest, however, that we should expect regimes that redistribute land to survive longer. What we know about land redistribution and regime outcomes from other contexts suggests that land reform would have positive externalities for autocrats hoping to establish long-lasting regimes (Ammen and Mitchell, 2018; Lipton, 2009). The literature hypothesizes that land reform increases regimes' popular legitimacy (El-Ghonemy, 1990; Tai, 1974), expands regimes' cross-class support coalition (Walder, 1999), or balances elite interests within the ruling coalition (Albertus and Menaldo, 2012).[2] Scholars often assume that land redistribution makes regimes more popular with underclasses, improving economic conditions and the regime's popularity with the masses (Albertus and Kaplan, 2012; El-Ghonemy, 2013; Ghonemy, 1968; Tannous, 1951). Lower classes are thought to be the main redistributive pressure in an unequal society and the source of threats to the redistributive equilibrium (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2005; Boix, 2003). This populist motivation assumes that taking from the rich to give to the poor enhances the regime's legitimacy with the masses and consolidates their ruling coalition.

Given the centrality of redistribution to global debates about authoritarian leader tenure and political stability, I explore the empirical relationship between redistribution and leader tenure with a focus on the region's most ubiquitous asset: land. Existing literature predicts that redistributive regimes are more durable (Bates, 1981; Desai et al., 2007; Thomson, 2017), at least in the short[3] term (Wallace, 2013). This study suggests renewed attention to land as an alternative and understudied sources of resource wealth in MENA. Traditional inequality

[2]The literature delineates between a regime's ruling and support coalitions. Ruling coalitions include the body of elites that can influence regimes' policy choices, while support coalitions may include non-elite actors that fall in behind the regime. Neither group should be confused with the regime itself, which I regard as separate from the elite groups in the ruling coalition.

[3]Wallace (2013) argues that pro-urban redistributive policies enhance short-term durability, but cause long-term threats by concentrating populations in major cities, where the masses can be more threatening to the regime.

measures used in political science, like income redistribution by taxation, are better seen as measures of state capacity than of redistributive strategy. Tax income as a proportion of GDP in MENA is notoriously low and the average citizen is more likely to hold their personal assets in land or property than in a bank. This re-orientation moves the region beyond an exclusive focus on oil-driven rentierism and connects with older arguments about the agrarian origins of social order.[4] The importance of agriculture to the MENA economy is often overlooked in favor of oil and foreign aid as income sources.[5] Table 1.1 attests to the high proportions of the regions labor and GDP were concentrated in the agricultural sector in the first few decades after European withdrawal.

Table 1.1 Agricultural Economies in Post-Independence MENA. Source: IRBD World Tables, as cited in (Issawi, 1982)

Country	*Agriculture (% GDP, 1950s)*	*Agricultural Employment (%, 1970)*
Algeria	33 (1950)	50
Libya	10 (1960)	37
Morocco	30 (1950)	50
Tunisia	25 (1960)	53
Egypt	35 (1953)	53
Iran	31 (1960)	41
Iraq	22 (1953)	59
Israel	11 (1950)	9
Jordan	16 (1960)	29
Lebanon	20 (1950)	19
Kuwait	no data	2
Saudi Arabia	9 (1963)	61
Sudan	61 (1956)	80
Syria	44 (1953)	54
Turkey	49 (1950)	67

Most MENA states achieved independence in the first two decades after World War II. During these formative decades, agriculture contributed significantly to GDP, and by 1970, agriculture still employed over half the labor force in many MENA states (Table 1.1). Given

[4] See particularly Baer (1982); Gerber (1987) and Hourani (2002).

[5] While these are indeed important features of the regional political economy, Hertog (2011) and others have shown that pre-oil institutions condition how oil money is spent more than oil determines rentier states' politics.

the economic importance of agriculture, it stands to reason that land-related redistributive conflict would play a significant role in post-colonial politics. Land ownership was also politicized. Landed elites played important social, political, and economic roles before, during, and immediately after the colonial period. During the twentieth century, the landed elite faced the challenge of modernization and the literature often considers the propertied class to be a conservative political force. In colonial states, landed elites associated closely with the colonial administration as proxy rulers in the countryside or as economic allies. Close colonial ties sometimes tarnished landowners' reputation after independence.[6] New regimes often viewed the landed elite as adversaries who arrested economic and political development, and who could (and should) be weakened through expropriation.[7]

Studies of autocratic leader tenure in MENA tend to focus on rents from natural resources, remittances, and aid (Ahmed, 2012; Ross, 1999, 2001, 2013; Smith, 2004). Other non-redistributive mechanisms for regime durability stem from ethnic politics (Choi, 2014; Lobell and Mauceri, 2004), regime type and institutions (Geddes, 1999; Geddes et al., 2014; Knutsen and Nygård, 2015; Menaldo, 2012; Wright and Escribà-Folch, 2012), or the role of repression (Bellin, 2004, 2012; Escribà-Folch, 2013; Josua and Edel, 2015). In particular, the debate concerning the role of oil in MENA's political economy raises more questions than answers. While some research finds that oil states have higher distributive capacity and political stability, others find that resource riches correlate to civil war and higher rates of political violence. This ambiguity suggests that something other that oil rent drives regime outcomes. Taken together, many of these explanations fail to capture the empirical realities of MENA states. Iraqi oil endowments and a revolutionary regime did not save them from chronic regime instability. Similarly, the persistence of Jordan's Hashemite monarchy in the face of

[6]MENA case studies exploring agrarian post-colonial politics include Baer (1982); Binder (1978); Gerber (1987); Heydemann (1999); Keilany (1980); Leveau (1970); Parks (2012); Walder (1999).

[7]Ziblatt (2017) shows how European political development followed a different trajectory. In Britain, for example, landed elites were disproportionately represented in the state apparatus and positions of power through the early 20th century, and in continental Europe landed elites were the dominant political actors through the late 19th century. Landed elites granted democratic reforms like suffrage in order to maintain their political power (Ziblatt, 2017). MENA did not have a landed aristocracy analogous to Europe's (Baer, 1982; Blaydes and Chaney, 2013), and the region split into nation states primarily in the twentieth century (Owen, 2004).

resource poverty, refugee inflows, and chronic economic challenges puzzles Middle East experts and political science theorists alike (Kao, 2017; Lucas, 2006; Schlumberger and Bank, 2002; Yom, 2011, 2015).

Although many authors agree that the top priority for autocrats is "regime maintenance" (Albrecht, 2004), there are multiple competing explanations for how regimes persist. Existing theories generally favor structural explanations for long-lived authoritarian rule. This section discusses where this project fills gaps in our understanding of autocratic leader tenure by showing why conventional explanations for long-lived regimes fall short, particularly in the MENA context. I address the literature's dual focus on rents and regime type as main competing hypotheses to explain autocratic tenure, particularly in MENA.

Rents

Unearned income, or rents, from natural resources[8] and aid are thought to be a cheap way of subsidizing autocracy. Several studies show that aid and resource rents increases the durability of authoritarian regimes because they can side-step the tensions arising from redistributive conflict (Ahmed, 2012; Beblawi and Luciani, 1987; Bellin, 2004; Chaudhry, 1994; Ross, 2001; Yom, 2011).

An improvement on this literature comes from work on how rents are filtered through institutions, which in turn shape development trajectories. There is a growing academic consensus that historical institutions, rather than resources, influence development outcomes. Scholars who study institutions in oil-rich countries suggest that rents are filtered through pre-oil institutional arrangements, leading to political lock-in and poor governance (Cammett et al., 2015; Hertog, 2011; Menaldo, 2016).

Outside of rentier states, comparative historical analysis traces the long-term implications of pre-colonial and colonial institutions across a range of developing country contexts

[8]Natural resources are usually considered to be "exogenous" because the location of oil and gas deposits is a matter of geology . However, the modern colonial origins of many oil-state borders, as well as the extractive nature of European states interested in oil for their own use, muddies an exogenous interpretation of resource rents.

(Acemoglu et al., 2001; Boone, 2003, 2014; Kohli, 2004; La Porta et al., 1998; Mahoney and Thelen, 2010; Nunn, 2009; Nunn and Qian, 2011; Nunn and Wantchekon, 2011). The literature on path-dependency and colonial institutions has much to offer the MENA region, although the literature is vague about the precise mechanisms of institutional continuity and rupture. Despite the prominence of colonialism in the region, scholars who study MENA using historical econometric approaches theorize the roots of MENA's economic and political underdevelopment stem from Islamic legal principles (Kuran, 2010) or the lack of feudalism under Ottoman rule (Blaydes and Chaney, 2013). These theories gloss over the significant variation in these arrangements across the Arab and Muslim world.

Regime Type

Regimes power structures and corporate organization have been a popular way of unpacking divergent regime outcomes. Empirical correlations between regime type and survival are far from conclusive. Although regional and comparative work finds monarchies to be more stable, the ouster of royal families and the collapse of monarchies was common in the post-independence decades, including Libya's al-Sennussi royalty, the Hashemites of Iraq, and Egypt's King Farouk. Regimes that rely on narrow ruling coalitions, such as personalistic dictatorships, are often correlated with failure, but most MENA regimes are coded (depending on the dataset) as military, party-based, monarchies, or as hybrid regimes. Scholars of political institutions argue that regimes may use different state institutions to increase their chances of survival. Competitive autocracies and hybrid regimes have been shown to make use of legislatures and elections to deflect challenges, increase legitimacy, and expand their control (Boix, 2003; Brownlee, 2007; Gandhi, 2010; Gandhi and Przeworski, 2007; Geddes, 1999).

The power of MENA militaries has been a popular explanation for durable MENA authoritarianism (Bellin, 2004, 2012). Despite the political violence inherent in revolutions, Levitsky and Way (2013) find that revolutionary regimes last longer than other regime types

due to party coherence, destruction of independent power centers, and a partisan monopoly of violence. But this does not bear out empirically in the MENA region. Although Egypt's long-lived hybrid regime ruled over half a century after the 1952 revolution, Egypt's post-revolutionary Muslim Brotherhood government, in addition to Iraq, Syria, and Algeria's revolutionary post-colonial governments meet Levitsky and Way's criteria of "violent, protracted struggle" and strong ruling parties failed cement lasting political settlements. The rapid turnover in post-colonial regimes across the region suggests the need for alternative survival mechanisms.

1.3 Contributions

1.3.1 Redistribution and Social Conflict in Authoritarian Contexts

This study advances the Barrington Moore research tradition on the social origins of political order. Starting from a similar agrarian premise, the Middle East and North Africa experienced a very different path to modernity than Europe or Latin America. Colonialism occurred much later, and across much of the region, was the second experience with foreign rule after centuries of Ottoman control. It stands to reason that class development and redistributive conflict would arise between a different constellation of actors than in the industrialized and early-colonized worlds.

As a result, the redistribution and social conflict literature's focus on income redistribution is less applicable in late-developing countries. This focus muddles our understanding of redistribution in developing states where state capacity may be insufficiently developed to collect taxes and redistribute income. Late colonial and developing economies face different geopolitical and economic environments than states colonized earlier or that were never colonized at all. Explicitly comparing MENA with Europe or Latin America, for example, is likely less theoretically fruitful that comparing the region with similar post-colonial and non-industrialized cases. Late-developing and post-colonial autocracies tend to provide

welfare and enact "distributive" policies funded by the state rents rather than taxpayers, including health, education or subsidy programs. Rather than income-based redistribution, redistributive reform is more common through bank expropriation or land redistribution.

Until the mid-twentieth century, Middle Eastern economies were predominantly characterized as agrarian. As such, land was an important determinant of landed elite wealth and livelihoods of the rural poor. Land behave differently from many other assets considered in extant models of redistribution. Land assets are fixed, and thus cannot be moved abroad to escape the state's reach; social conflict theory predicts low likelihood of democratic transition when elites hold high-specificity assets like land for several reasons (Albertus, 2015; Moore, 2003). First, Piketty (2014) observes that the concentration of wealth in a society usually exceeds the concentration of income. Albertus (2015) notes that this means the redistribution of assets like land holds much more political consequence than does the redistribution of income.

Albertus and Menaldo (2012) shows that in Latin America, leader tenure is extended when regimes expropriate elite assets. The authors, echoing Boix (2003), theorize that when elites have high-specificity assets, both the cost of elite defection by coup and of regime repression decrease relative to the elites' expected tax burden. This means that landed elites should, in theory, be easy to expropriate. My empirical analysis suggest that this correlation neglects an important component of expropriation, namely state capacity. By considering both the targeting of expropriation and the autocrat's post-reform state building preferences, I develop generalizable propositions about the relationship between land redistribution and autocratic leader tenure.

1.3.2 Contributions to the Study of Land Redistribution

Recent political science scholarship brings land redistribution into the mainstream theoretical debate about political order. Existing scholarship would lead us to believe that land reform would be a logical choice for any aspiring autocrat. Recent work makes the case that

redistributive conflicts in developing societies are more likely to emerge over fixed assets like land due to agriculture's central role in the economy (Albertus, 2015; Albertus et al., 2018b; Boone, 2014). Strong property rights are linked with strong institutions, especially underpinning state and economic development (Besley and Persson, 2009; Blaydes and Chaney, 2013; de Soto, 2000; Feder et al., 1988; Kuran, 2010; Mauro, 1995; North and Thomas, 1973). Numerous case studies and cross-country comparisons from the developing world point to the importance of landholding and agrarian relations in shaping downstream political and economic institutions.[9] In agrarian societies, large landowners are a powerful class with corporate political and economic interests. Given their economic power, landed elites play an important role in determining the course of state building, but who may also stand in the way of regimes' developmental or political agendas to maintain their own well-being.

Albertus (2015) explains land reform as a function of a divided elite and low institutional constraints on elite power. Focusing primarily on Latin America, Albertus argues that when landed elites are not included in the ruling political elite and the legislature or judiciary have limited policy oversight, land reform is more likely to result. The concept of elite splits is a helpful conceptual starting point, as national elites are rarely unified and acknowledging their differences helps explain otherwise puzzling policy outcomes. This study also considers the positionality of the landed elite other key elite actors.

One key area where the Albertus model does not offer a testable explanation is why elite interests diverge in the first place. By focusing on the colonial era as a pivotal moment of elite consolidation, I address this gap by examining how the inclusivity of the elite coalition under colonial rule may condition the emergence of intra-elite redistributive conflict. On this point, another existing theory of land reform helps disentangle the origins of elite conflicts over land. Boone (2014) examines the role of land tenure in national and sub-national political

[9] In the developing world at large: Bell (1990); Binswanger et al. (1995); Feder and Feeny (1991); Hillmann (2013); Russett (1964). In Latin America: Albertus et al. (2018a); Haber et al. (2003); Sinkler (2014). In Asia: Banerjee and Iyer (2005); Banerjee et al. (2005); Ho (2014); Joshi and Mason (2010); Mukherjee (2018). In Sub-Saharan Africa Boone (2003, 2013, 2014) .

instability in Africa. Boone presents a historically-informed typology of land tenure regimes; statist land tenure regimes instrumentalize property regimes as a method of controlling rural areas, whereas local, neopatrimonial tenure augments local power hierarchies. Locally-governed tenure keeps conflicts local, while state-enforced tenure elevates conflict to the national level.

Although Africa's redistributive pressure comes from a large agrarian population and scarce land resources and MENA's land-demography relationship is the opposite, I also adopt another theoretical element of Boone's work help explain land redistribution in MENA. Boone underscores that institutions are dynamic, citing how colonizers created neopatrimonial systems that differed significantly from traditional Sub-Saharan land tenure. In the MENA context, I show that elite coalitions could be the mechanism that transmits colonial legacies into the post-colonial political calculus. Inheriting an exclusive coalition, for example, does not mean that the elite coalition in that country is permanently narrow. Rather, exclusive coalitions result in higher redistributive demands, presenting the autocrat with an opportunity to broaden his support coalition through redistributive land reform.

1.3.3 Colonial Legacies and Post-Colonial Politics

Existing historical studies on the colonial origins of MENA states attest to wide variation in regional state building processes, but these are often limited single country case studies and do not generate broader hypotheses about the region's development trajectories. Understanding post-colonial continuity and rupture requires a serious consideration of the colonial period. Sharp breaks from the colonial past still require a concrete understanding of colonial legacies. Decolonizing regimes often elect to dismantle unpopular colonial policies or institutions as a part of the state-building process. To study the immediate post-colonial period, we therefore need to understand the colonial project.

This dissertation contributes a novel focus on the proximate effects of colonial legacies on regional post-colonial politics. Studies of colonial legacies often address distal patterns

of later development, leaving the mechanisms somewhat unspecified. I link the situation at decolonization directly to post-colonial efforts at land redistribution, and lays out how perceived threats to the regime affected decisions about land redistribution. Although many states inherited intense redistributive conflicts, not all had the capacity to manage the political consequences of redistributive reform. I show how the popular decision to expropriate landed elites during decolonization led to downstream challenges that regimes with low state capacity struggled to manage, increasing their likelihood of collapse.

This dissertation illustrates colonial legacies in MENA using original data sources. I leverage cross-national and subnational data from censuses, colonial and post-colonial statistical yearbooks and government reports to assess the mechanisms of my theory. These data were collected from archives in Britain[10], Jordan[11] and the United States[12]. Qualitative case studies of Jordan, Egypt, and Iraq leverage rich historical detail to validate the hypothesized relationship between key independent and dependent variables.

1.4 Research Design and Case Selection

In this dissertation, I adopt a mixed-methods approach for analyzing the relationship between land redistribution and autocratic leader tenure (Collier and Elman, 2008, 780). My quantitative analysis uses cross-national and subnational observational data, while my qualitative analysis focuses on process tracing through paired case studies. Using mixed-methods leverages the complementary strengths of each approach; hypotheses developed using one method can be substantiated by another (Seawright, 2016).

[10]London: Kew National Archive and the British Library. Oxford: Oxford University's Bodleian Library, the St. Antony's College Middle East Centre Archive. Durham: Durham University's Middle East Documentation Unit.

[11]The University of Jordan Documentation Centre and Library, the National Library, the Ministry of Water and Irrigation Archive, the Department of Land and Survey Archive

[12]Stanford University's Hoover Institution Iraq Memory Foundation Archive, Harvard University's Lamont, Widener, and Law School Libraries.

The puzzle at hand is a historical one, and this study is concerned with the identification and explanation of the process that results in redistributive autocrats vulnerable to ouster. To do so, I engage in systematic hypothesis testing at both cross-national and country case levels of analysis. In this study, quantitative cross-national data tests the theory. Then, qualitative case studies test the validity of my hypothesized causal chain. Case studies provide inferential leverage through the "intensive study of a single unit for the purpose of understanding a larger class of similar units" (Gerring, 2006, 17). For each case, I follow a within-case process tracing methodology. This involves the diagnosis of processes based on observable sequences in the context of a single case (Mahoney and Rueschemeyer, 2003).

Although its rare for paired case comparisons to be matched perfectly on all controls, I select cases that constitute most similar cases, approximating Mill's method of difference (Seawright and Gerring, 2008). Given my two stage research question, this procedure calls for different case pairs in each stage. I selected Jordan and Iraq as case studies to examine land reform outcomes because they are favorably comparable across several important variables during the colonial period, and vary on the independent and dependent variables of interest. Both share a common starting point as predominantly rural tribal societies. Both were former Ottoman territories subjected to new borders and a Hashemite monarchy under British colonial rule. One potentially confounding factor is the fact that Iraq is an oil rich country, while Jordan has few natural resources. During the colonial period, however, Iraqi oil was managed by the British and most of the revenue did not accrue to the Iraqi state, mitigating concerns of resource-based rentierism during this formative period. Importantly for my study, the elite coalition that developed during the colonial period was an inclusive one, while Iraq's remained exclusive throughout the colonial and monarchical periods. Jordan and Iraq, therefore, differ on the key independent variable (coalition inclusivity) and the case evidence suggests that this mechanism drives differences in demands for land reform post-independence. After taking colonial legacies of elite coalitions into account, Iraq and

Jordan constitute *diverse* cases that represent distinct land reform outcomes (Seawright and Gerring, 2008).

I repeat this process a second time to examine why, as the quantitative analysis shows, radical reform drives up the likelihood of irregular leader exit.[13] I replicate the most-similar case selection process, this time choosing Iraq and Egypt. Both cases share a colonial and monarchical history before revolutionary military regimes come to power in the 1950s. Gamal Abdul Nasser in Egypt and Abdul Karim Qassim in Iraq inherit exclusive elite coalitions, and radical land reform is quickly implemented. Nasser remains in power until his natural death in 1970, while Qassim is overthrown by a military coup five years into his tenure. Using archival sources and political biographies, the two leaders both enact radical land reform but rely on different types of state-building to carry out their mission. Nasser makes a concerted effort to extend state institutions into rural areas marked for redistribution. Qassim, however, systematically limits the spread of new institutions into the countryside, opting instead to build up his military apparatus. Although both leaders begin their tenure with exclusive ruling coalitions, Qassim's reliance on the military and neglect of institutional state building means he fails both to co-opt loyal supporting elites and control the masses.

In my analyses, I draw on evidence from over three years of archival work in Jordan, the United Kingdom, and the United States. I also rely on 18 months of field work and interviews with Jordanian and Jordan-based Iraqi bureaucrats, political elites, development professionals, landowners and farmers in Jordan from 2012 until 2018. Arabic-language political biographies, political analyses, and encyclopedias from the colonial period through the present allow me trace class backgrounds of the elite actors involved in the struggle to remake the Middle East's post-colonial political order.

[13] Irregular exits include any leader change that does not result from natural death or a formal process of the transfer of power. Irregular exits may be the result of elite defection, coup, mass revolution, foreign intervention, or democratic transition (Geddes et al., 2014).

1.4.1 Plan of the Dissertation

In the chapters that follow, I argue that the colonial period played a formative role in shaping the inclusivity of elite coalitions. Inclusive coalitions, by their nature, were more open to admitting rising elites to their ranks, and as a consequence the autocrats that relied on them were under less pressure to redistribute. Exclusive coalitions were more resistant to new members, and demands for redistribution in those countries were intense. In such cases, autocrats were more likely to pursue radical land reforms to gain credibility with previously excluded elites and to re-shape the political landscape. Radical reforms came with an inherent risk for the leader: if the autocrat failed to consolidate a loyal support network of elites, he was more susceptible to overthrow.

In chapter 2, I present concepts and measures important to the study of land reform and autocratic leader tenure. After clarifying these definitions, I set out a general theory of how the inclusivity of elite coalitions the autocrats' strategic options over land reform, and under what conditions redistribution may damage his chances of survival. In chapter 3, I provide historical context for colonial and post-colonial Middle East. I draw on case material from Egypt, Iraq, Morocco, Tunisia, and Jordan to sketch the pathways from coalition inclusivity to post-reform leader tenure. In chapter 4, I test my theory using cross-nationally using time series analyses of land reform and leader tenure from 18 MENA states from 1920 to 2010.

Case study chapters draw on field and archival research using evidence from Egypt, Jordan, and Iraq. Chapter 5 documents the emergence of an inclusive coalition in Jordan and an exclusive coalition in Iraq. In particular, I use an original dataset of minister biographies from both countries that captures the origin, ethnicity, and class of every minister from the beginning of colonial rule until 1980. Using these data, I map the variation in elite coalition building strategies within a single colonizer - the British Empire - and demonstrate how exclusive coalitions gave rise to fervent demands for the expropriation and political destruction of the incumbent elite through land reform in the early post-independence period. Chapter 6 makes clear these coalitions' implications for post-colonial autocrats' choice

of land reform by process tracing the conservative land reform process under Jordan's inclusive coalition and the radical land reform in exclusive Iraq. Chapter 7 unpacks the how leaders manage radical reforms has major implications for their survival. Using archival and quantitative evidence from Iraq and Egypt, this chapter demonstrates how cooptive state building during Nasser's radical reforms insulated him from threats, while Qassim's reliance on the repressive state building left him bereft of coalition partners and ultimately vulnerable to coup. In chapter 8, I conclude by extending my analysis beyond the immediate post-colonial decades by reflecting on the continued importance of land and property in MENA politics. From the inflation of urban real estate prices to contestation of colonial-era property regimes during the Arab Spring, land remains a salient subject of politics throughout the region. Finally, I discuss the implications of my theory and empirical evidence for broader questions of political stability and reform, and the role of redistribution creating lasting political settlements more broadly.

Chapter 2

Concepts, Measures, and Theory

Before proceeding further it is essential to explain the key terms for my theory. In this chapter, I define actors (the autocrat, elite coalitions) and concepts (repressive and cooptive state capacity), as well as offering a new taxonomy of land redistribution that captures the intensity of each reform. I also present a new dataset of MENA land reforms from 1945 to 2010. After clarifying my terminology, I then present my two stage theory about how inherited coalitions condition the autocrat's choice of land reform, and why land reforms may shorten the tenure of the redistributive autocrat.

2.1 Concepts and Measures

2.1.1 The Autocrat

Autocratic[1] leader tenure is the outcome of interest in this study. Comparative politics often uses regimes' structural features (military, personalistic, etc.) to explain macro-political outcomes like autocratic survival. Reducing regimes to their type, however, does not capture

[1] Autocratic regimes take many forms, but all autocracies share a common feature in that they are not based on a system of free and fair elections. Democracies can be defined procedurally through the individual franchise and a free, fair competitive struggle for votes (Schumpeter, 1942, 269). Without the option to electorally voice their discontent, theories of autocracy center around the consolidation of "authoritarian bargains" wherein citizens accept fewer political rights in exchange for economic security (Desai et al., 2007).

the sociological dimension of leader tenure, as the identity of decision-makers and those who constrain them is likely more consequential to autocratic survival outcomes (de Mesquita et al., 2003; Hinnebusch, 2006; Weber, 1978).

I adopt the Geddes et al. (2014) definition of a regime as a consistent and coherent set group of decision-makers who maintain a body of rules and relationships that govern political behavior. I define the autocrat as the most powerful individual in the regime, and is distinguished by his monopoly on political power (de Mesquita et al., 2003). Autocrats can be overthrown (i.e., suffer "irregular exit") as a result of elite defection, coup, mass revolution, foreign intervention, or democratic transition (Geddes et al., 2014).

2.1.2 Inclusive and Exclusive Coalitions

No autocrat rules alone. Autocrats sustain their rule by entering into coalitions with elites or forming cross-class alliances with non-elite interest groups (de Mesquita et al., 2003). Political actors in the ruling coalition constrain the dictator's otherwise unfettered hand (Albertus, 2015). This study follows Svolik's conception of authoritarian politics in arguing that unlike in democracies, where politicians make economic policy decisions weighing votes as the litmus test of their support, autocrats make decisions to appease their ruling coalition (Svolik, 2010). I follow much of the recent scholarship on authoritarian politics in arguing that the form of authoritarian politics depends upon the composition and interests of the elite support coalition (Albertus, 2015; Albertus and Menaldo, 2012; Ansell and Samuels, 2014; de Mesquita et al., 2003).

The structure of elite coalitions is the unifying concept for the relationship between expropriation, redistribution and political stability.[2] The authoritarian policy-making literature focuses on elite interests as the determining factor in authoritarian politics. Some recent analyses of non-democratic politics note that factors beyond elite competition have pro-

[2] Albertus and Menaldo (2012) uses a coalitional approach to explain why expropriation extends leader tenure in Latin America.

found impacts on regime type and durability, including the strength of national movements, cross-class support coalitions, and international interference in domestic affairs (Parks, 2012; Pepinsky, 2009; Tudor, 2013; Yom, 2015).

Since we know non-democratic regimes must cater to certain interest groups over others, the identity of those groups matters for understanding authoritarian policy-making, including land redistribution. Land reform is a product of intra-elite conflict (Albertus, 2015; Albertus and Menaldo, 2012). The resulting tension pushes the autocrat to favor the interests of one elite group over another. I examine the role of two elite classes in determining whether land reform occurs: the landed elites and the professional class, known in Arabic as the *effendiyya*.[3] Both classes possessed sufficient economic and political clout to be credible veto players in post-colonial ruling coalitions.

The first actor, the landed elite, is often portrayed as a conservative and anti-democratic force (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2005; Beramendi and Rogers, 2015; Boix, 2003). Mahoney (2003) suggests that their preferences stem from a desire to continue repressive labor arrangements between landowners and rural labor. I consider the landed class to be motivated primarily by the preservation of their economic and political power by preserving their privileged property rights. If the autocrat protects these privileges, landed elites will support them. Landowners often enjoy exclusive property rights that endow them with both special privileges and rents (Albertus, 2015, 27). The main source of the landed class's political cohesion is a shared vested interest in maintaining their privileged access to land. Thus, landed elites in this analysis are not restricted to historical landlords or intensive cultivators, but include all elites that leverage their landownership as a source of political power. Landed elites may become so through a variety of landownership patterns, including landholding as, " a livelihood,...as financial security (e.g., as a hedge against inflation, and as a resource for

[3]Throughout the rest of the dissertation, the terms professional class and *effendiyya* will be used interchangeably.

consumption purposes (e.g. country estates held by urban elites for leisure purposes" (Ellis (1992, 196), as cited in Albertus (2015)).[4]

Economic development, intensive regional urbanization, and rural-urban migration of rural labor in MENA states since independence led to the diversification of the landed class' economic interests over time. Given this study's focus on political dynamics in the first post-colonial decades, I focus primarily on agricultural landholding.

The second key actor, the *effendiyya*, were the main opposition to landed elite's political monopoly during the 1950s and 1960s. As colonial states grew, so too did the need for local labor to staff the increasingly complex bureaucracy. Highly educated and sympathetic to leftist causes, the *effendiyya* were young men who received Western "modern" educations. Universities in Beirut, Baghdad, and Damascus as well as prestigious secondary schools and military academies educated the new *effendiyya* from across the Arab world. These institutions became known for their leftist ideologies, particularly Communism, Arab Socialism, and Ba'athism.[5] This class included urban lawyers, medical doctors, civil servants, the intelligentsia, and military officers. *Effendiyya* stood out as the new urban elites, and their in-demand skills and high density in the military and bureaucracy made the *effendiyya* a coherent and important class. They prefer and prioritize policies that increase their economic well-being and access to political power, including reforms aimed at breaking landed elites' grip on power.

In the theory presented below, I argue that the most important quality of the elite coalition is its degree of inclusivity. A number of factors could lead to the development of more or less inclusive elite coalitions. Lindemann (2008) argues that the inclusiveness of clientelist

[4]Younger generations often leave rural areas and landed elites often invest in new sectors to capitalize on their incumbent economic leverage. Land value at the moment of state formation was agricultural. At present, land's value derives more from real estate potential than agricultural productivity. In an increasingly urban MENA region, property is still an important source of wealth. Disproportionate access to land differentiates contemporary landed elites from other urban elites.

[5]Both foreign (communist, socialist) and regional (Arab Socialist and Ba'athist) leftist ideologies proliferated through the region during the colonial period. They were primarily circulated among the educated classes who became the leadership of leftist and opposition parties, but in more industrialized states like Egypt, labor did populate the ranks of party membership (Beinin, 1989, 2001).

systems matters for understanding the onset of civil war in Sub-Saharan Africa. He argues that who receives patronage is more important than how that patronage is delivered; this argument focuses on the actors themselves and their identities rather than the second order observable features of the hierarchical structure of patronage distribution. He advocates focusing on the varying ability of ruling political parties to overcome the specific historical legacy of high social fragmentation by forging and maintaining 'inclusive elite bargains' to explain the outbreak of political violence versus stability. Inclusive elite coalitions draw on elites from diverse geographic and class backgrounds to create a coherent national ruling class that is capable of presenting the interests of the selectorate to the autocrat. Exclusive coalitions, however, draw on a much narrower pool of elites, and the population of excluded elite and non-elite groups is much larger than the elite in-group.

Quantitatively measuring the inclusivity of the elite coalition is difficult due to information assymmetries inherent in autocratic rule (Svolik, 2010). One way to measure the extent of the elite coalition is to monitor who receives appointments to high-ranking government posts. Like Buehler and Ayari (2018), I use minister identities to shed light on the nature of the ruling coalition. In later chapters, I will show how the Jordanian elite coalition included a diverse range of individuals, starting in the colonial period. Iraq, in contrast, maintained an exclusive coalition of Baghdadi elites and landowners.

2.1.3 Types of Land Redistribution

Redistributive land reform is an agrarian policy meant to restructure relationships governing land and labor. Land reforms have been implemented throughout the 20th and 21st centuries,

in both developed[6] and developing[7] states. Redistributive land reform always entails two stages: the expropriation of land from one group, followed by its distribution to another.

Conventional definitions of land reform often assume that all reforms are populist, where that land is expropriated from large landowners and redistributed to small holders or landless families (El-Ghonemy, 1990; Lipton, 2009). In practice, however, this is often not the case. I offer a novel classification of land redistribution that adds a finer grain to our understanding of the winners and losers in land redistribution. By targeting a particular class or group for expropriation, the autocrat aims to undercut that group's political and economic power. While social justice or equality for the rural poor may be the rhetorical justification for redistribution, the leader's calculations include the political utility of reducing or removing the landed elite as a power player. Reforms that target politically important elites can have an unsettling and socially transformative effect on power hierarchies and ruling coalitions.

In the process of disentangling this relationship, I propose a novel classification of land reforms.[8] Land redistribution can be broken down into analytical types based on each reform's intended winners and losers.

The dataset codes each reform by whether the law and implementation reflected radical or conservative outcomes. Every MENA country with the exception of Lebanon, Sudan and those on the Arabian peninsula[9] instituted redistributive land reform during the state-building period. All models use an original cross-sectional time series dataset on Middle East land

[6]Australia (1976-2004), Estonia (1919, 1991), Finland (1946), Scotland (2003, 2016)

[7]Among others: Bolivia (1953-2006), Chile (1962-1973), Cuba (1959-1963), Guatemala (1953-1954), Mexico (1910-1940), Venezuela (2001-2003), Albania (1946, 1950s, 1991), Russia (1918, 1922), Kenya (1960s, 2006), Namibia (1990), South Africa (1994), Zimbabwe (1979), Afghanistan (1975), China (1940s, 1950s, 1970s, 1983, 1998), India (various states at different times since 1961), Japan (1947), Philippines (1960s, 1980s), Sri Lanka (1972, 1975), South Korea (1945-1950), Taiwan (1950s), Vietnam (1953-1956, 1970)

[8]There are several other types of reforms involving the distribution of land that operate under different logics than land expropriation and redistribution, including settlement and colonization. Land settlement and colonization happen when existing state land or newly "settled" irrigated land is distributed by the state to the landless. While this policy is inherently "distributive", it lacks the socially disruptive potential that comes from taking land away from a particular set of landowners. Therefore, this reform is less costly and would not likely threaten the leader's survival in the way land redistribution does. Settlement through irrigation has been used in Jordan, post-1970s Syria, Ba'athist Iraq, and Saudi Arabia to alleviate land pressure and reward loyal elites.

[9]Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, UAE, Oman, Yemen

Table 2.1 Land Redistribution Typology and Logics

Land Reform Type	Logic Description	Winners	Losers	Country-Years in Sample n=1027
Conservative	Out-group landowners expropriated, usually in a delimited area. Incumbent landed elites maintain their property rights.	Landed Elite Effendiyya	Rural Poor	78 (7.59 percent, 49 percent of land reform country years)
Radical	Expropriate landed elites, redistribute to rural poor.	Rural Poor Effendiyya	Landed Elites	81 (7.89 percent, 51 percent of land reform country-years)

redistribution spanning the period from 1946 to 2010. States enter the dataset in the year of decolonization, except for Iran, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Oman, which never officially experienced colonial rule. The coding criteria are shown in Table 2.1. The Table in Appendix 1 summarizes my original qualitative land reform dataset built on a compendium of Arabic legislation from all 18 MENA countries, as well as English, French, and Arabic secondary sources. Breaking down reforms by country, I describe the nature of each reform, indicate the number of previous land reforms that occurred, the dates of reform implementation, and finally its coded type. I operationalize these types as a categorical variable, where 0 indicates that no land reform occurred in a given country-year observation. This measure is the dependent variable in my land reform models and the key independent variable in my models of irregular leader exit.

For each country-year observation in the dataset, I code 0 if no land redistribution occurred. Land redistribution is coded as conservative reform (= 1) when land is expropriated from large landholders outside the ruling coalition or from non-elite classes. Although the rural poor may receive land, conservative reform is a form of compromise between protecting loyal landed elites' interests and satisfying *effendiyya* demands for economic development. More often than not, incumbent landowners are the primary beneficiaries. The Jordanian East Ghor Canal land reforms are a prime example of conservative reform. In the 1960s, the land reform bill awarded landowners from outside the project area priority over local smallholders when allocating land. Not only did incumbent Jordanian landowners stand to gain from the East Ghor reform, but other members of the political elite also acquired land


through cronyism and political connections. Conservative reforms make up 7.59 percent of all observations, and became the dominant type of land reform in the region post-1980.

Radical reforms, coded as 2, are cases that fit the classical definition of land reform. Land is taken from landowning elites and redistributed to the landless poor or smallholders under title. These reforms are explicitly political and are intended to break the economic foundations of landed elite power. Radical reforms are aimed at weakening the landed class. In such cases, land is expropriated from landed elites and granted to the landless poor or smallholders under title. These reforms should, in theory, be the most threatening for autocratic survival. The revolutionary regimes of Egypt's Gamal Abdul Nasser and Iraq's Abdul Karim Qasim enacted radical reforms soon after taking power. Large, privately owned estates were expropriated, and any property exceeding a certain threshold was earmarked for redistribution. These reforms make up 7.89 percent of observations.

Figure 2.1 shows the distribution of land reforms by type since 1950 and over the course of a regime's duration. Most MENA land reforms occurred in the early years of state-building between independence and the end of the 1970s. Radical reforms cluster in the three state-building decades after the second World War.

This distribution of reform types suggests a change in autocrats' strategic preferences for land reform over time. Decolonization, state-building, and coalition formation were prime concerns for post-colonial rulers. By the end of the 1950s, most MENA countries had achieved independence. They inherited slow-growing, unindustrialized economies and began to invest in building new social contracts that relied on state-provision of services and jobs. In this context, the professional *effendiyya* elite were an important constituency as the state grew in bureaucratic size and capacity. Autocrats needed educated citizens to staff the developing state. In many cases, however, the political system was still monopolized by notables and elites from the colonial era who blocked the *effendiyya* from holding high legislative and bureaucratic offices. For autocrats seeking to co-opt the *effendiyya* or eliminate the landed class as political spoilers, land reform was a logical way to re-order the political playing

Fig. 2.1 Land Redistribution By Type Over Time



field. On an institutional level, radical redistribution also presented an opportunity for leaders to dispense with old local orders and replace them with centralized state institutions and policies.

Targeted expropriations against the landed elite decreased after new elite coalitions consolidated and state institutions became more ubiquitous. Radical reforms are favored by young regimes, while conservative strategies emerge as the dominant land reform type after approximately 18 years in power. This suggests that conservative reforms are more likely after the ruling coalition has consolidated, i.e., after the state building period. This process of state building and coalition consolidation shifted MENA politics from a redistributive paradigm, to what Albertus et al. (2018b) call "coercive distribution." By the 1970s, public sectors ballooned due to the expansion of bureaucratic employment and public services, which was often financed through deficit spending, resource rents, or foreign aid. At the same time, regimes systematically limited avenues for political organization and opposition. Leaders across the the region attacked parties, jailed dissenters, and cracked down on public protest. Rulers in Egypt, Jordan, and Iraq used "emergency laws" to dispense with leader term

limits, elections, and party politics. By the end of the 1970s, competitive politics in MENA was functionally non-existent. Land reform during this period reflected the ossification of new ruling coalitions. From the early 1980s onward, autocrats exclusively opted for conservative land reforms, signaling a reticence to disturb agrarian order.

Fig. 2.2 Number of Land Reform Laws Passed by Country (White = 0, Dark Blue = 4)




Figure 2.2 visualizes the number of land reform laws enacted by country; many countries enacted land reform more than once. In Jordan and Tunisia, early land reforms were conservative (See Appendix). When land reform was repeated decades later, those reforms also favored elite interests. Radical land reforms were the first redistribution strategies taken by countries with legacies of exclusive colonial-era coalitions, like Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Turkey, and Iran. In Egypt, Gamal Abdul Nasser issued three separate land reform laws (1952, 1961, 1969) that targeted the landed class. After this initial salvo, the Egyptian regime did not redistribute land again until 1992, and this time the reform distributed land to favored military officers and agrarian bourgeoisie who had become landed elites through Nasser's original reforms (Bush, 2007). The example of Egyptian leaders' dynamic attitude toward land redistribution and the dataset's descriptive statistics paint a picture of land reform as context-dependent. Autocrats use land reform as a tool to mitigate against potential threats, whether they come from the opposition or from the elite themselves. Radical redistribution is more

likely to occur during moments of coalition consolidation and state-building. Conservative reforms that reinforce the status quo occur only after a ruling coalition consolidates.

Social strata that factored into redistributive conflicts elsewhere in the world were either underdeveloped in MENA or faced systematic obstacles to mobilization. High public employment, minimal industrialization, and low non-state organizational capacity made groups traditionally associated with redistributive demands less powerful or non-existent in MENA than in Europe or Latin America. Trade unions, for example, are notoriously weak in the Arab world, with the notable exception of Tunisia. Afraid of organizations that might collectively oppose the regime, unions, political parties, and cooperatives were often banned and their members repressed. While socioeconomic justice and inequality reduction are common slogans in the political dialogue motivating land reform, both rural and urban labor were often instrumented by opposition elites rather than playing an independent political role in lobbying for reform. Available evidence suggests the masses did not put forward specific or unified demands for post-colonial land redistribution. Urban and rural lower classes did not independently organize and rally for land reform. Urban skilled or industrial labor was non-existent. The peasantry who occasionally rallied behind nationalist independence movements were ineffectual political allies post-independence. The rural bourgeoisie, as neither leftists nor activists for land redistribution, fell more in line with landed elite interests. I therefore assume urban elite competition to be primarily directed at other elite groups rather than labor.

Another alternative explanation for land redistribution is regime populism. Many regimes and opposition groups established used populist rhetoric and built support coalitions with non-elite classes. Regimes in particular spent heavily on policies that favored the interests of the *effendiyya*, like expanding public services (Waldner, 1999). According to the authoritarian bargain model, services are also a mechanism for diffusing popular discontent. Regimes seek to hedge the possibility of mass unrest by providing economic stability and services. Like other populist and distributive reforms, land redistribution could be interpreted as an

attempt to "buy off" the masses. This interpretation, however, would contradict the consensus about the importance of elites to the survival authoritarian regimes. While these radical reforms also shaped the nature of state development and redistribution, the underclasses were primarily policy takers rather than policy makers. Reforms that benefited the masses still required the support of the elite support coalition.

2.1.4 State Building and Varieties of State Capacity

Recent literature on authoritarian state building suggests that state capacity is a pre-requisite of durable regimes (Andersen et al., 2014; Doner et al., 2005; Slater and Fenner, 2011; Teichman, 2016). In all states, the provision of key state-building institutions like public education, the judicial and security apparatus, and fiscal capacity establish programmatic links with the central state through coercion as well as participation. Extractive and repressive institutions like taxation and policing establish the authority of the state over society. Participatory institutions like schooling create early contact between citizens and the state's national, centralizing ideology (Migdal, 1988).

The arguments in this dissertation make an analytical distinction between the autocrat and the state. The state is the bundle of bureaucratic institutions and laws through which the autocrat decides which policies to pursue. I adopt a Gramscian definition of the state as an institutional arena rather than as an actor unto itself. This approach resonates with Joel Migdal's "state-in-society" schema.[10] For Migdal, the state is neither omnipotent nor a mere reflection of social power relations (Migdal, 1988). Rather, Migdal's state accumulates authority along a spectrum from weak to strong, where the weak state falls victims to social interests and the strong state can use incentives and sanctions to persuade citizens to accept its authority.

[10]Weber (1978) and Migdal (1988) both view the state as a type of social organization "structured by relations of dominance and authority" (Lambach, 2004, 11).

Recent work on authoritarian durability considers the role of state capacity in conditioning leaders' staying power, and breaks state capacity down into several categories. Slater and Fenner (2011) observe that regimes are the "most immediate beneficiaries" when states have more infrastructural power (Mann, 1984) - the ability to implement political decisions throughout the territory. A strong state that is capable of effectively implementing autocrats' policies constitutes the "ultimate institutional weapons in the authoritarian arsenal" (Slater and Fenner, 2011, 17). Migdal (1988) argues that state social control, or the successful subordination of people's own inclinations in favor of state rules, is critical for a strong state.[11] Slater and Fenner (2011) suggest a variety of mechanisms through which state infrastructural mechanisms lead to long-lived autocrats, including extracting revenues (fiscal capacity), registering citizens (legibility), coercing rivals (repressive capacity), and cultivating dependence (cooptive).

In this study, I focus on coercive and cooptive state capacity as important tools the autocrat can leverage to shape his new coalition. In particular, I examine how expanding the military apparatus (repressive capacity) may affect the prospects of reformist leaders attracting new members of to the elite coalition. Cooptive state capacity involves providing institutions that cultivate dependence on the state, enhancing the autocrat's legitimacy by sending a pro-development signal to potential coalition members and "enmeshing" (Albertus et al., 2018b) the masses interests in the continued survival of his regime.

[11] Migdal (1988) considers a strong state to be one where citizens are compliant, active participants in a system they consider legitimate. Compliance is forced through institutions that impose sanctions on social actors. Such sanctions are exacted through some combination of force (local police, military) and Mann's infrastructural power (courts, taxation), whereby societies interact with the state through legal and physical institutions. Participation, the second component, is when the population repeatedly and voluntarily uses state institutions such as cooperatives, state clinics, and education. Third and least tangible is legitimation, where people follow state rules on the basis of approval and acceptance of the state's "symbolic configuration."

2.2 Theory

My theory builds on these concepts to make explicit the historical process linking land reform and leader tenure. An established literature argues that history matters for political and economic development (Nunn, 2009). But if scholars have reached a consensus about history's importance, there is still an open debate about *how* and *why* the past impacts the present. I offer a fresh interpretation about how institutional changes during the colonial period were transmitted through elite conflicts. In doing so, this dissertation is part of the "institutional turn" in the study of comparative authoritarianism by engaging in a broader discussion about the relationship between long-run socioeconomic relations and "concrete problems of redistribution and policy making"(Pepinsky, 2014).

A complementary economics literature takes up this challenge by examining the role of institutions in post-colonial political development. Evidence from other developing regions suggests that colonial administrations had enormous power in shaping subsequent legal institutions (La Porta et al., 1998) and economic development (Acemoglu et al., 2001; Engerman and Sokoloff, 2006) in post-colonial states. This rich literature shows that pre-state and colonial institutions impact long-run political outcomes, including human development, economic inequality, state capacity, and violent conflict (Banerjee and Iyer, 2005; Engerman and Sokoloff, 2006; Nunn and Qian, 2011; Wucherpfennig et al., 2015). Scholars have not, however, explicitly studied how historical legacies might effect the development of redistributive conflicts. I fill this gap by focusing on the origins and development of social relationships and institutions that give rise to redistributive conflict.

Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) suggest a framework in which institutions may persist by serving elite interests. Authoritarian bargain theory rests on elites as the key decision-makers shaping political outcomes. In contrast, the structural nature of institutional theories argues that "good" or "bad" institutional qualities perpetuate themselves, causing underdevelop-

ment.[12] Merging both elite-centered and institutional explanations, therefore, incorporate agentive political interests into an otherwise static, path-dependent theory.

First, I argue that colonial legacies were primarily transmitted through the nature of the elite coalition. Autocrats inherited inclusive or exclusive elite bargains from the previous period, and had to decide how to move forward and consolidate a new political settlement based on these initial conditions.

The inclusivity of inherited elite coalitions determined the intensivity of the *effendiyya's* demands for land reform. In countries with legacies of exclusive coalitions, the autocrat inherits more intense demands for redistribution than in countries with legacies of inclusive coalitions. MENA leaders were driven to diffuse threats from the *effendiyya* who had previously been excluded from power under colonial rule. In countries where an exclusive elite coalition is dominated by the landed class, rising elites levy more radical demands to break the coalition's monopoly, while inclusive elite coalitions should result in more modest demands, or none at all. These strong demands from previously excluded elites compel the autocrat to pursue radical reforms. In countries with legacies of inclusive coalitions, however, leaders typically inherit lower demands for land reform. When land reform does occur, it is more conservative and aimed at maintaining the patronage ties between the autocrat and the supporting elite. Table 2.2 summarizes these expectations.

Table 2.2 Conditions for Land Redistribution

	Inclusive	***Exclusive***
Low Demand	No Reform	Conservative
High Demand	Conservative	Radical

The second step of the theory links the type of land reform enacted to leader tenure. Conservative reforms are more likely to prolong leader tenure. By reinforcing the incumbent coalition, the autocrat is better insulated from potential threats. Radical reforms, in contrast,


[12] See Mahoney (2003) and Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2005) for a review.

carry more risk due to their higher potential for re-ordering both national and rural power relations.

I theorize two modes of radical reform: repressive and co-optive. When autocrats opt to redistribute via repression, they rely upon coercive state institutions like the military and police to quell dissent using force or imprisonment. These tactics alienate potential coalition members by signaling the autocrat's willingness to use violent methods to enforce and pursue policies, leaving the autocrat without a robust winning coalition. Autocrats that favor co-optation couple redistribution with investments in "soft" institutions like education and agricultural cooperatives. Soft institution building enhances the population's legibility to the central state while cultivating rural citizens' dependence on the state. Co-optative strategies increase the autocrat's control over the redistributive process, "enmeshes" (Slater and Fenner, 2011) the rural area into the new political order and signals competence to prospective members of the ruling coalition.

Cooptive reforms stand to broaden the social classes and other elites that lend support to the ruler. In regions impacted by land reforms, the expansion of state institutions provides a state-centered substitute for the historical role of displaced landed elites, providing inputs for farming, irrigation, and other agricultural services. Finally, increased spending on welfare, health, and education signals a credible commitment to development that would appeal to the professional classes who lobbied for reform in the first place. Autocrats who follow radical reform with cooptive state building are thus better equipped to stave off threats by broadening the range of actors who benefit from their rule. When autocrats pair radical reform with repressive state building, however, the autocrat fails to enmesh the broader array of actors into their new support coalition. By disproportionately focusing on coercive institutions like the military and police, the autocrat fails to co-opt new members of the support coalition. Instead, the autocrat relies primarily on the support of the repressive apparatus for support and policy enforcement, leaving them vulnerable to the political and economic preferences of

Fig. 2.3 Theory Outline



the coercive apparatus, and thus to ouster. This two stage argument is summarized in Figure 2.3

2.2.1 Scoring MENA Cases

As an initial validation exercise, I score the universe of MENA autocracies based on the concepts introduced in this chapter. Table 2.3 details the independence date of each case, the nature of the inherited elite coalition, and the first type of land reform enacted by the autocrat post-independence. Because I theorize that the autocrat's state building efforts during and post-reform matter for his probability of continued rule, score each case based on their effort in extending cooptive and repressive state capacity. I also included two measures of extractive state capacity to proxy for the level of bureaucratic competence inherited by the autocrat. It could be potentially confounding for my theory if all state capacity measures were simply inherited from the colonial period. This exercise helps allay those concerns.

Table 2.3 Outcomes of Interest and State Capacity Measures

Country	De Facto Independence Date	Stage 1 IV	*Stage 1 DV*	*State Capacity Measures*			
		Colonial-Era Coalition Type	First Post-Colonial Land Reform Type	Cooptive Capacity			Repressive Capacity
				Avg. % Direct Taxes/Gov't Revenue	RPE (Agri)	Secondary School Enrollment (% pop aged 15-64)	Mil. Ex. Per Capita (USD)
1. Reformers							
Morocco	1956	**Inclusive**	Conservative (1956-1966)	19.72 (1956)	0.713 (1960)	1.52 (1955) to 14 (1965)	4.41
Algeria	1962	**Exclusive**	Conservative (1963-1966)	21.35 (1963)	0.96	7.27 (1960) to 6.36 (1965)	7.94
Tunisia	1956	**Inclusive**	Conservative (1957-1959)	20.79 (1957)	1.289 (1960)	4.52 (1955) to 9.71 (1960)	2.72
Libya	1951	**Exclusive**	Radical (1969)	2.64 (1966)	0.755	11.83 (1965) to 17.67 (1970)	24.82
Egypt	1952	**Exclusive**	Radical (1952-1960)	18.53 (1952)	0.444 (1960)	14.88 (1950) to 22 (1965)	8.2
Syria	1946	**Exclusive**	Radical (1958-1961)	14.78 (1950)	0.790 (1960)	6.72 (1955) to 12 (1960)	15.63
Jordan	1946	**Inclusive**	Conservative (1962-1967)	10.10 (1965)	0.620	22.37 (1960) to 33.11 (1970)	32.42
Iraq	1958	**Exclusive**	Radical (1958-1970)	4.42 (1962)	1.041	10 (1960) to 19 (1970)	24.98
Yemen	1967	**Exclusive**	Radical (1970)	17.99 (1967)	No Data	0.23 (1965) to 3.0 (1975)	13.54
2. Non-Reformers							
Lebanon	1943	**Inclusive**	No reform	8.46 (1954)	0.523 (1960)	No Data	4.42 (1946)
Sudan	1956	**Inclusive**	No reform	5.17 (1956)	1.817 (1960)	2.85 (1960)	0.78 (1956)
Oman	1970	**Exclusive**	No reform	1.6 (1971)	1.420 (1970)	No Data	51.49 (1971)
Qatar	1971	**Exclusive**	No reform	10.53 (1971)	1.743 (1971)	No Data	2377.78 (1972)
UAE	1971	**Exclusive**	No reform	No Data	1.381 (1971)	No Data	35.67 (1973)
Bahrain	1971	**Exclusive**	No reform	8.36 (1971)	1.518 (1971)	No Data	40.58 (1971)
Kuwait	1961	**Inclusive**	No reform	11.52 (1961)	1.423 (1961)	20 (1960)	52.31 (1961)
3. Liminal Cases							
Iran	British Influence	**Inclusive**	Radical (1960-1962)	10.05 (1946)	0.772	10 (1960) to 24.37 (1965)	8.33
KSA	British Influence (until 1932)	**Inclusive**	No reform	57.2 (1964)	0.701 (1960)	No Data	26.41 (1964)

Table 2.3 continued from previous page

Country	De Facto Independence Date	Stage 1 IV	*Stage 1 DV*	*State Capacity Measures*			
		Colonial-Era Coalition Type	First Post-Colonial Land Reform Type	Infrastructural Power			Repressive Capacity
				% Direct Taxes/Gov't Revenue	RPE (Agri)	Secondary School Enrollment (% pop aged 15-64)	Mil. Ex. Per Capita (USD)
Turkey	Ottoman Empire (1923)	**NA**	Radical (1975-1978)	36.03 (1948)	1.062	22.79 (1975) to 28.68 (1980)	60.14

I hypothesize that elite coalition inclusivity conditions the demands on the autocrat for land reform. Inclusive and exclusive coalitional legacies are represented among both reformers and non-reformer, categories. Radical land reform only occurs, however, in cases with exclusive coalitions. Concerns that these relationships might be driven by weak state capacity are mitigated by the wide variation within reformer and non-reform categories in the percentage of government revenue that comes from direct taxation[13] and the Relative Political Extraction (RPE)[14] score. These measures come from the earliest post-colonial observation to attempt and capture the level of state capacity at the moment of independence and to pre-date the onset of reform to best combat the concern that low state capacity drives reform.

I then move on rough measures of cooptive and repressive state capacity. These measures are intend to capture the relative emphasis placed by the autocrat on developing cooptive and repressive capacity during the reform. I report secondary school enrollment[15] at the beginning and end of each land reform period to assess the autocrat's relative emphasis on extending cooptive state capacity. I also use average military expenditure per capita[16] during

[13]Data for this measure come from Lucas and Richter (2016). This dataset uses IMF documents to capture government spending and revenue in developing economies.

[14]Data from Arbetman-Rabinowitz et al. (2011). Agricultural RPE is a standard measure of fiscal capacity. RPE is an index of proportion of GDP coming from agriculture, mining, and exports that approximates the amount of GDP that comes from tax revenues. According to the dataset's authors, this measure "approximates the ability of governments to appropriate portions of the national output to advance public goals."

[15]Captures the percentage of the population aged 15 to 64 enrolled in secondary school. Taken from Barro and Lee (2016).

[16]Reported in USD. Taken from the Correlates of War National Material Capabilities Dataset (Singer, 1987).

the land reform to assess the degree to which the autocrat invests in extending repressive state capacity. Egypt and Iraq, two radical reformers, perform relatively equally in terms of improvements to secondary school enrollment rates, but Iraq spends far more per capita on the military than does Egypt. This comparison is interesting because of the similarity in the two regimes, which will be explored in detail in Chapter 7.

Table 2.3 lends descriptive support for my theory. Autocrats that inherited inclusive coalitions from the colonial period enact conservative land reforms post-independence[17], or no reform at all.[18] Countries where autocrats inherited exclusive elite coalitions typically pursued radical reforms, including Algeria, Libya, Egypt, Syria, and Yemen. Within this set of country cases, Algeria and Libya are large oil producers, suggesting that oil rents are insufficient to stave off demands for land redistribution. All exclusive coalition cases without land reform are located in the Gulf region (Oman, Qatar, UAE, Bahrain) where arable land is in short supply. Landed elites did not have the same economic standing in arid environments where property values and agricultural yields were lower; we would expect other cleavages would be more salient in determining redistributive preferences.

2.2.2 A Note on Endogeneity

Endogeneity concerns potentially confound this study's empirical findings due to a reliance on observational data. Endogeneity, or non-independence between key independent variables and outcomes of interest, is a common theoretical concern for observational studies that link policies to other political outcomes. Put differently, it is possible that x (land redistribution) and y (irregular leader exit) have a simultaneous causal relationship. For theories to claim causal inference, researchers must also show that treatment conditions are associated with changes in the outcome in ways that cannot be attributed to other factors. Without repre-

[17] These cases include Morocco, Tunisia, and Jordan

[18] Cases with inclusive coalitions but no land reform include Lebanon, Sudan, and Kuwait.

sentative sampling and random assignment, observational studies struggle to meet these standards.

Two primary endogeneity concerns arise from linking land redistribution to leader tenure. The first is that only leaders with unstable regimes might choose to enact land reform, and that instability is simply begetting instability. The second is that the mechanism of state-elite relations might be simultaneously causally related to both state capacity and land reform type.

I confront the first concern by using comparative historical analysis. In later chapters, I process trace theorized relationship between land reform and regime instability using case studies of Jordan's durable Hashemite regime and Iraq's cascade of failed regimes. To show that radical land reform is not endogenous to political instability, I use Egypt as a revolutionary shadow case to show that, unlike Iraq, the Egyptian regime redistributed land and persisted.

Endogeneity is an important consideration in any study that aspires to make causal claims about the role of institutions in shaping political outcomes. This study faces similar concerns. First, the empirical strategy does not follow a causally-identified quantitative strategy[19] and is based on observational data. Scholars have argued, however, that historical process tracing is a valid form of causal inference that can be used to fill gaps left by observational quantitative work.

The relationship between land reform type and state building is only relevant to my argument if these factors have an independent effect on autocratic tenure. If unstable regimes with low state capacity were more likely to pursue radical reforms in general, then it would be difficult to argue that radical reforms and state capacity independently influence regime outcomes. To address these concerns, I consider whether the nature of landed elites might be jointly causing land reform type and state capacity through the same channel. Then, I

[19]I have experimented with several potential instrumental variables for landed elite type, including the amount of irrigated or rain-fed land in a given country prior to colonialism. These instruments did not meet the exclusion restriction. In future work I will experiment with alternative instruments.

evaluate the possibility that political instability and low state capacity are driving radical land reforms.

According to my theory, I expect coalition inclusivity to condition the nature of redistributive conflict. A large literature in economic history also argues that the level of state capacity may also shaped by states' use of landed elites as proxy rulers in the periphery. Causality stemming from the landed elite for both state capacity and redistribution type would be problematic for my argument, because then we would expect, *a priori*, that inheriting a narrow coalition would simultaneously result in low state capacity and political instability, with or without land reform.

Exclusive coalitions, and particularly the landed elites within them, may have preferred to curb the spread of state institutions and oversight in rural areas. Studies from other parts of the world have corroborated that areas where large landlords had greater historical oversight often have lower development outcomes, most notably in India (Banerjee and Iyer, 2005). Lee (2019) argues that landed elite legacies repress local, long-run development outcomes through state capacity; regions with landlords allied to the colonial government were more likely to be excluded from colonial institution building because of the nature of proxy rule. With proxy rulers, colonizers did not need to create state-centered institutions of control. Increasing the local level of state institutions would also likely be counter to landlords' personal preferences. The more states extended their infrastructural power into rural areas, the less autonomy landed elites would enjoy. For landed elites who had additional social roles as tribal sheikhs or regional administrators, they might muster their social capital and manpower to pose a credible and violent threat against any attempts by the state to interfere. State institutions like education, agricultural cooperatives, or judicial systems would also break landed elites monopoly on labor and production and incur significant taxes for large landowners.

These are credible arguments, and I believe that they hold weight in the MENA context. But it's also true that large landed elites were a relatively late development in the MENA

region (See Chapter 3), and that other factors conditioned state capacity. First among them was pre-colonial institutions. The Ottomans in the Levant and rulers across North Africa also engaged in variable state-building prior to colonization. Furthermore, colonization induced a change in borders that often affected local power structures. Algeria is one extreme example where the French waged a decades-long campaign against tribal Algerians. After winning the war, the French restructured the land market to favor white French settlers, thus increasing state capacity in places that might otherwise been excluded from state building had the French not occupied Algeria. Additionally, colonial states often brought new territories under a single government like never before. Egypt and Morocco are the only post-colonial states that roughly maintained their pre-colonial borders. Every state in the Levant[20] falls inside new borders that bear little resemblance to Ottoman administrative divisions, while Tunisia, Libya, and Algeria were amalgamated from smaller beylics and principalities. How these new territories were governed, therefore, was also determined by colonial willingness to spend resources and exert force to do so. A potential argument against a colonial role in determining state capacity is that Europeans simply didn't bother with difficult to govern areas, instead relegating them automatically to proxy rulers. Yet, as the case of Algeria shows, the French completely rewired the rural political economy. Even in other MENA cases where colonizers instrumented select notables to serve as proxy rulers, as in Iraq, the British created new shaykhs and alienated others who rebelled against colonial rule (Haj, 1997). The development of state capacity in the colonial moment, therefore, had as much to do with colonizer preferences as it did with underlying conditions or landed elite power.

Endogeneity issues could also apply to a second concern about exclusive coalitions and land reform type. Exclusive coalition legacies could be conditioning *effendiyya* grievances through low state capacity. To check for this possibility, I regressed my state capacity variable on land reform type (including effendiyya strength, landed elite type, and baseline controls in the models). There was no statistically significant effect. Theoretically, I argue that the

[20]Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, Iraq

elite level of redistributive conflict is analytically distinct from my structural argument about the autocrat's state capacity building during and after reforms. Furthermore, the data bears out the hypothesis that land reform should not happen if there is no demand for it. Absent an organized *effendiyya*, even regimes that inherit exclusive coalitions are unlikely to pursue radical reform.

A third endogeneity concern is the relationship between political instability and the regime's choice of land reform type. Several instances of radical reform happen in the wake of revolutions. There could be some concern that radical reforms are symptomatic of political instability or endogenous to low state capacity. However, radical reforms happen across a range of regime types and at different moments in a regime's lifespan. Additionally, the Egyptian regime came to power through a military coup in 1952, and remained in power until 2011. They enacted radical redistribution in the same year, and again in 1961 and 1969 with reduced land holding ceilings each time. Moreover, the Syrian Ba'thist regime also adopted radical reforms in the 1970s after several years in power, suggesting that this extreme form of redistribution is not simply a function of revolutions.

2.3 Conclusion

In conclusion, autocrats in post-colonial countries must contend with the redistributive legacies of European rule. I argue that these legacies are transmitted through the inclusivity of elite coalitions, which in turn affect the development of intra-elite redistributive demands. Autocrats' face challenges to their tenure when they undertake radical reforms without investing in cooptive institutions that might broaden their appeal to new supporters. By taking into account the variation in colonial experiences, we better understand the incentives and constraints on post-colonial autocrats.

Chapter 3

Historical Legacies and Redistributive Demand

3.1 Introduction

This chapter provides historical context for the processes described in this dissertation. I place particular emphasis on the colonial period as a critical juncture for political development in the MENA region. The imposition of centralized states, bolstered by European funds and military power, and created new national arenas of political competition like parliaments and ministerial cabinets. Who received these positions was an observable signal of who was included in the elite coalition, and excluded groups voiced their discontent through demands for reform

The political legacies of colonialism are visible in intra-elite redistributive conflict post-independence. Managing elites is a fundamental component of political stability, and autocrats must address intra-elite redistributive conflict in order to endure. My theory builds off the scholarly consensus that loyal supporters are critical components of authoritarian longevity (Svolik, 2010; Yom, 2011). Elite interests matter for stable autocracies. However,

rather than attributing elite loyalty to natural resource wealth[1], coercive capacity[2], or foreign intervention[3], I argue that colonial legacies play a significant role in elite coalition formation and the intensity of post-independence redistributive conflict.

In the next section, I describe the emergence of two key elite actors in these coalitions: the landed elite and the *effendiyya*. Landed elites were the most powerful political incumbents during the colonial period. The creation of central states under colonialism transformed the formerly localized influence of landed elites into national power. Landed elites had valuable social and economic capital that enabled them to exercise their power as ministers and parliamentarians. The *effendiyya* were the main proponents of land reform, and were also a product of the colonial era. *Effendis*[4] were products of the "modern" secondary and tertiary institutions founded under colonial administrations. Graduates became civil servants, military officers, and members of the professional *bourgeoisie* who could assist colonizers in running the modern state. The *effendiyya*, however, vehemently opposed colonial rule and the political monopoly of the landed class. The *effendiyya* organized and led political parties, professional unions, and other structures that mounted visible and occasionally violent opposition against the colonial status quo.

I then trace these conflicts using case vignettes of inclusive (Jordan, Morocco) and exclusive (Syria, Iraq) coalitions, and link them to divergent land reform strategies. In countries with legacies of exclusive coalitions, leaders were particularly concerned with the question of whether and how to respond to *effendiyya* grievances against the landed elite. Dependent on coalition inclusivity, independent autocrats used land reform to prevent elite defection and manage intra-elite conflict. Autocrats could choose to enact no reform (low demand, inclusive coalition) to radical reforms (high demand, exclusive coalition). I conclude by reflecting on the possible risks autocrats face by undertaking radical reform.

[1] Smith (2004)
[2] Andersen et al. (2014)
[3] Yom (2011)
[4] Proper noun for individuals from the *effendiyya* class.

3.2 Colonialism and the Origins of Redistributive Conflict in MENA

The Middle East stands to make an important contribution to our understanding of how colonial legacies affect successor states' authoritarian institutions. All but three of the region's eighteen states experienced some form of colonial rule[5], and most MENA states[6] have been governed by some form of post-colonial authoritarianism. Current theories and empirical evidence about colonial legacies draw primarily on cases from the Americas (Acemoglu et al., 2001; Engerman and Sokoloff, 2006), India (Lee, 2019), and Sub-Saharan Africa (Michalopoulos and Papaioannou, 2013, 2014).

The colonial period was a critical juncture in MENA political development. Colonizers began to encroach on MENA territories as the long-standing regional hegemon, the Ottoman Empire, weakened during the 19th century.[7] Centuries of Ottoman rule over Arab provinces in North Africa and the Levant had precluded the development of independent Arab governments from Algeria to Iraq. As Istanbul's influence diminished, European states chipped away at Ottoman Arab provinces and sovereign territories over several waves of occupation and administrative encroachment. Regional colonization began in 1820 when the British agreed to provide military protection to the Arab sheikhdoms in the Persian Gulf. European militaries occupied Algeria (France, 1830), Egypt (Britain, 1882), and Libya (Italy, 1911) and the French established protectorates in Tunisia (1881) and Morocco (1912). When the Ottoman

[5]These states are Turkey, Iran, and Saudi Arabia. All three, however, were profoundly affected by European regional influence, military interests, and resource extraction.

[6]Israel and Lebanon are the only countries who have consistently been considered as democratic by the Geddes et al. dataset, and these classifications do not account for years of Lebanese civil war and the ethnocratic and military elements of Israeli democracy post-1948.

[7]A series of domestic and international challenges in the late 1800s, including chronic indebtedness to European nations, shook the Empire's economic and political foundations. The ascendancy of Western industrialization and the Ottoman's flagging administrative capacity stymied Ottoman efforts to keep economic pace with European powers. At the same time, peripheral states like Morocco and Iran were drawn into Europe's sphere of influence by trade treaties, Great Game[8] geopolitics, and the discovery of oil.

Empire collapsed in the wake of World War I, the European powers divided the Arab provinces between the British (Palestine, Transjordan, Iraq) and the French (Syria, Lebanon).

I define independence as the point when the colonizer divests both militarily and administratively from the former colony. In MENA's decolonization experience, however, the line between colonialism and sovereignty is often blurred. For example, Egypt and Iraq were granted nominal independence from Britain in 1922 and 1932 respectively. Yet in both countries, British advisors continued to play an important role in day-to-day governance and British military forces continued to occupy strategic regions related to trade (Egypt's Suez Canal) or resource extraction (Iraqi oil fields).[9]

In the rest of this chapter, I describe the development elite coalitions under colonial rule and their effect on two sequential outcomes: the intensity of redistributive demands and the fate of post-reform autocrats. The main actors of interest in these elite coalitions are the landed elite and *effendiyya*. Landed elites arose as part of the colonial drive to settle land rights under private tenure regimes; these land settlement programs used pre-existing Ottoman records to create more or less inclusive ties between the colonial state and landowners. The thoroughness of pre-colonial land titling varied, which I argue conditioned the inclusivity of the initial elite coalition. Reform demands stem from the *effendiyya*, who organized to rally for a more open political order where they could also aspire to political power. The more organized and numerous the *effendiyya*, the more credible were their demands for redistributive reform. By accounting for the nature of both the landed elite and the rising professional class, we can gain greater leverage on when and why autocrats adopt land reform, and trace the political effects of those reforms after they begin.

[9]See Table 3.1 for a complete list of the *de jure* and *de facto* independence dates for all MENA countries. States with one independence date had no remnants of colonial administration after the end of *de jure* independence, and "NA" indicates no direct or indirect colonization.

3.2.1 Colonial Origins of Elite Coalitions

Colonial changes in land tenure forged new linkages between rural populations and the central state, often unintentionally. Prior to the colonial period, the "state" often remained an abstract construct for most rural communities. When European administrators arrived, they worked with pre-existing land records to commute pre-colonial tenure into "modern", private property regimes. After the colonial state became more involved with administering property rights, these powerful elites lobbied to secure policies in line with their interests that insulated them from the control of the state. In areas where pre-colonial titling was widespread, the landed class (and thereby the coalition) became more diverse and inclusive, whereas limited titling led to a more exclusive coalition.

Foundations: Pre-Colonial Titling

The origins of a nationally-important landed elite date to pre-colonial land registration. The nineteenth century was a watershed moment for agrarian relations across the region. The Ottomans moved to make local land tenure regimes more legible to the central state mid-century. Lawmakers passed the Land Code of 1858 as part of the multi-pronged modernization reforms known as the *Tanzimat*. By that time, the Ottoman empire had fallen into heavy debt to European countries who had financed expensive modernization projects through loans. Struggling to keep up with industrializing nations, the Ottoman government turned to tax to generate much needed revenue. The primary objective of the Land Code was to establish title and tax every piece of productive land in the Empire. Focusing on the rural tax base made economic sense. By 1900, the empire was still primarily agrarian, and four-fifths of Ottoman subjects made their living from agriculture (Quataert, 1994, 843). Well into the nineteenth century, Ottoman land ownership was governed locally rather than by Istanbul (Gerber, 1987).

Although titles did not establish private ownership under pre-colonial land regimes, granting title did create a one-to-one correspondence between a given property and the

person responsible for paying tax (Rogan, 2002). Titling was especially popular among elites who understood that title security increased the value of the land. These new landed elites drew from diverse class interests that enjoyed some combination of wealth and social prestige, including tribal sheikhs, religious authorities, bankers and Muslim merchants, and members of the Ottoman or Mamluk militaries (Hourani, 2002, 236).[10] For landed elites, property titling meant greater access to the institutions of state and exclusive control over means of production. Understanding the foundational property system clarifies the status quo distribution of land and political power that colonial powers encountered at the outset of their rule.[11]

Property rights in pre-colonial MENA[12] fell under four broad categories that governed access, use and ownership of land according to Islamic, Ottoman and customary precepts: private (*mulk*), communal, state (*miri*), and Islamic religious endowment (*waqf*). These categories in order of title security[13] are:

1. *mulk* an exclusive form of private tenure where the owner enjoys the right of full ownership and usufruct of the land. Inheritance follows Islamic law where heirs are eligible to receive a fraction of the the owner's property. *Mulk* registered under individual title is classified as *mafruz*.

[10] In some regions, large, individually held estates began to coalesce in the nineteenth century. Before then, large, heritable estates were rare in the Arab world. Centuries before, tax farming had been a popular way for Ottomans to recoup tax revenue, and the feudal (*iqta'*) system had been used to reward select military and political elites for their service (Blaydes, 2018; Kuran, 2010), but these large landholdings were rarely owned as private freehold, were excluded from inheritance, and had disappeared by the nineteenth century.

[11] Furthermore, the Ottoman property convention of "state land" (*miri*) constitutes a major component of colonial and post-colonial land policy that was under-discussed in my theoretical framework. State land can be distributed by the regime to allies and ruling-coalition members as affirmation of their status, to create new elites or to resolve redistributive disputes. This phenomenon is particularly pronounced in former-Ottoman territories where the colonial powers either enshrined state property in their property rights reform or in non-colonial cases where the status quo persisted.

[12] Some territories were beyond Ottoman reach, namely Iran, most of Arabia, the Sudan and Morocco. While they were not under Ottoman control, the property categories and social identities discussed here were similar these regions.

[13] Ordered from greatest to least secure.

2. *miri* land is owned by the state and usufruct is typically granted to individuals for agricultural use. The Ottoman Empire hedged against large landlord power and tribal domination by granting *miri* land to small cultivators, thereby projecting state power into the countryside. Occupation and usufruct rights were inheritable. A degree of uncertainty remained as rights could be withdrawn by the state at any time.

3. *waqf*[14] land remains outside the land market and is earmarked for religious or charitable purposes. It is not eligible for resale and is usually leased to tenants while remaining under the original owner's title in perpetuity.

4. *musha'a* land organized land ownership jointly among all farmers in a given village. Usufruct rights were occasionally redistributed according to changes in population.

5. *mawat*, or "dead", land held under communal property regimes for pastoral agriculture by local tribal groups. This land is usually located in arid steppe or desert areas, making them "dead" or difficult to cultivate. Individual usufruct is common, but disposable individual ownership is rare. Pastoral land is sparsely populated, but often characterized as a highly political space viewed as threatening to state control.

Although MENA tenure regimes are undeniably diverse, several analytical generalizations can be made about property rights at the outset of colonial rule that are important to this study. The first is that communal ownership was common across the region, particularly in areas where tribal structures still existed. While *mulk*, *miri*, and *waqf* landholdings were recognized as legal categories by the central Ottoman state, whereas landholding systems under collective and tribal tenure were governed by local norms outside the purview of the bureaucracy. In sedentary agrarian areas, land was farmed by smallholding *fellahin* (peasants). These lands were owned collectively at the village level and right of use was determined by the local authorities. In more arid environments, pastoral nomadic tribes often held land in common as a social unit.

[14] Also called *habbous* land in North Africa.

The second is that private property during the Ottoman period was primarily confined to urban centers. Agricultural land was governed locally or through personalistic ties between the ruler and selected elites. Critically, these systems allocated rights of access and use rather than exclusive ownership. The major change introduced by colonial governments was to recognize usufruct rights as private property. This change cemented links between landed elites and the colonial state, but also empowered them to large landholdings that had been previously governed by communal or state access regimes.

After the push for titling began in the 1850s, the status quo shifted away from local land tenure regimes to state-regulated property titles. The Ottoman State began to bequeath state-owned land (*miri* land) to individuals, both by ownership (*raqaba*) and by usufruct (*tasarruf*), although many *fellahin* and rank and file tribesmen across the Levant[15] did not register property rights in their own names, either to avoid conscription and taxation or because they preferred to adhere to traditional, oral agreements governing land use. Lack of title meant less security to one's property rights when the colonial state began to recognize titles as private ownership.

These patterns hold in the several countries in this study that were not under Ottoman jurisdiction. The variation titling practices in Morocco, Egypt, Turkey, and the Arab Gulf maps on to their divergent rural-center relations in the early 20th century. In Turkey, the former Ottoman core had an arguably longer history of statehood than most the Arab provinces and was more directly ruled by Istanbul. Other regional states had long histories outside the Empire's borders. Morocco had been ruled by an independent Alaouite sultanate since 1631. Although Algeria's three beylics had once been Ottoman territories, they secured *de facto* autonomy in 1631 following an elite coup, and the breakaway Egyptian state under Muhammad Ali Pasha brought centuries of *de facto* Ottoman rule to an end. Iran and Oman also their own dynasties, and the rest of the future Gulf states had been on the periphery of these empires for centuries.

[15]The Levant refers to the historic Ottoman Vilayets of Syria and Palestine, including the modern states of Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, Israel and the Palestinian Territories.

My theory's observations about property holding also apply to regional cases outside the Ottoman Empire during the same period. Customary and traditional Islamic laws governing land access began to change during the nineteenth century. Egypt and Iran enacted land registration and civil code reforms in the late 1800s that led to the rise of individual property titling similar to Ottoman reforms. The effect of Iranian titling was to reinforce the power of the wealthy and educated classes who understood the procedures for registering land at the expense of peasants and tribesmen (Cronin, 2009). Where they didn't change and the state made little effort to register land, the programmatic ties between the state and rural areas remained weak, as in Morocco (Pascon, 1986; Pennell, 2000).

I argue that the emergence of nationally powerful landed elites was an unintended consequence of the European interpretation of pre-colonial titling. As European states began to colonize the region in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, norms regarding landownership changed. Instead of registering land use, colonial land settlement and titling established private ownership over a given plot of land. Private property ownership fundamentally changes the relationship between the title holder and the state. The nineteenth century, therefore, marked a decisive change in elites ability to amass and individually hold land that influenced the nature of the landed elite in the colonial period.

3.2.2 Colonial Origins of the *Effendiyya*

Redistributive demands against the landed elite stem from the rise of a new oppositional elite, the *effendiyya*. The *effendiyya* were a nascent class that emerged from the proliferation of modern schools designed to create a small professional class capable of staffing the colonial bureaucracy. Although the education provided to MENA citizens under colonialism was by no means broad, it did produce a stratum of lawyers, doctors, teachers, and military officers who staffed the growing state. Distinguished by their modern education, the *effendiyya* stood to gain the most from land reform during the state-building period.[16] Landed elite incumbents

[16] See Eppel (2009) for a discussion of the term *effendiyya*.


often denied other classes the ability to participate in formal political institutions like the parliament or ministerial cabinet. Post-independence, leaders recognized both the *effendiyya*'s utility to their mission of economic development and their capacity to threaten autocrats through political protest, coup, or other means of defection. Therefore, the *effendiyya*'s demands had to be taken seriously by autocrats hoping to endure.

Figure 3.1 approximates the numerical strength of the *effendiyya* by plotting secondary school completion rates in MENA among males aged 15 to 25 during the first half of the 20th century. Jordan had notably high levels of secondary completion compared to regional averages, whereas Iraq, Syria, and Morocco were all less than 2.5 percent of males in their cohort. Between 1900 and 1965, Yemen lagged behind the region with an estimated completion rate of 0 percent. Secondary schools in MENA were often concentrated in major cities and towns, contributing to a growing divergence between rural and urban opportunities.

After independence from colonial powers, these growing educated classes staffed the civil service or served as military officers. Politically, they joined leftist parties that called for for industrial expansion and for the provision of public goods. Welfare networks based on kinship or local political economies were under strain as educated professionals relocated to cities. The educated stratum found itself in a unique position within the transforming socio-economic milieu. Rather than using traditional forms of resistance and collective action like the bazaar, guild, or mosque, these educated young men joined political parties, syndicates, or unions. These new groups launched strikes, demonstrations, boycotts and often allied with rural and urban working classes (Anderson, 2005). They were among the primary advocates of land redistribution across the MENA region.[17] Autocrats must therefore choose between favoring the incumbent political class - the landed elite - and extending political and decision-making power to the *effendiyya*.

[17]The MENA case diverges from other areas of the developing world in that merchants were often members of the landowning class. Baer (1982), Gerber (1987) and Hourani (2002) describe how merchants in MENA purchased land to diversify their investments in the late 18th and early 19th centuries. Consequently, the mercantile class has significant overlap with the landed elite.

Fig. 3.1 Variation in Secondary School Completion in MENA (Males Age 15-25) (Data: Barro and Lee 2016)



The next section explores the development of redistributive conflict between the *effendiyya* and the landed elite in Iraq, Syria, Jordan, and Morocco. I then examine incidence of conservative and radical land reforms, and evaluate their impact on the autocrat's prospects for continued rule post-reform.

3.3 Historical Legacies and Redistributive Conflict

The colonial period in MENA lasted for over a century, but the onset and duration of colonial rule varies significantly from case to case. Comparing between post-colonial regional countries, however, I argue that there are generalizable observations that can be used to better understand redistributive conflicts post-independence. Table 3.1 summarizes the seventeen post-colonial MENA states in my sample according to their level of stability. Iraq, Syria, Sudan and Yemen were had high levels of irregular leader turnover (four or more irregular exits) post-independence. Algeria, Egypt, Libya, and Iran experienced middling autocratic durability (1-3 leader exits). Tunisia, Morocco, Lebanon, Jordan, and the Gulf states are classified as stable (no irregular exits). Critically for my theory, the two most prominent alternative explanations for MENA regime longevity - oil and regime type - vary within each level of stability. Put another way, monarchical regimes - thought to be more stable than other regime types - appear among the chronically unstable, middling, and stable country cases. The same is true for oil producing states. Colonizer identity, a potential factor differentiating institutional development, also varies. This variation suggests that other factors should be considered in any theory seeking to explain redistribution and regime durability.

In the interest of theory-building, I select two redistributive cases from the high (Iraq, Syria) and low (Jordan, Morocco) turnover categories to explore how colonial-era legacies might effect post-colonial redistributive behavior and co. Given the historical focus of my argument, case pairs include states from British and French colonial rule to substantiate

my claim that colonial state-elite relations are the primary factor conditioning post-colonial redistributive conflict, not colonizer identity.

Table 3.1 Leader Tenure in Post-Colonial MENA Cases

Leader Tenure	Case	Colonizer	Independence	Irregular Exits	Regime Type	Oil State	Land Reform
High	Iraq	British	De jure: 1932 De facto: 1958	1932-1958 1958-1963 1963-1968 1968-1979 1979-2003	Monarchy Military-Personalistic Military-Personalistic Party Personal-Party	Y	Y
	Syria	French	De jure: 1944 De facto: 1946	1946-1947 1949-1951 1957-1958 1962-1963 1963 - Present	Oligarchy Indirect Military Personal Indirect Military Party-Personal-Military	N	Y
	Sudan	British	1956	1958-1964 1969-1985 1986-1986 1989-2011	Military Personal Military Personal	Y	N
	Yemen (North and South)	British	South: 1967	1918-1962 1962-1967 1967-1974 1974-1978 1978 - 2011 South 1978-1990	Monarchy Military Personal Military Personal Party-Based	N	Y
Middling	Algeria	French	1962	1962-1992 1992- Present	Military-Party Military	Y	Y
	Egypt	British	De jure: 1922 De facto: 1952	1922-1952 1952-2011 2011-Present	Monarchy Party-Personal-Military Military-Personal	N	Y
	Libya	Italian, British, French	1951	1951-1969 1969-2012	Monarchy Military-Personal	Y	Y
	Iran	British Influence	NA	1925-1979 1979-Present	Monarchy Theocratic Oligarchy	Y	Y
Low	Morocco	French	1956	1956-Present	Monarchy	N	Y
	Tunisia	French	1956	1956-2011	Party	N	Y
	Lebanon	French	1943	1943-Present	Oligarchic Democracy	N	N
	Jordan	British	1946	1946-Present	Monarchy	N	Y
	Kuwait	British	1961	1961-Present	Monarchy	Y	N
	Saudi Arabia	British-influence	NA	1927-Present	Theocratic monarchy	Y	N
	UAE	British	1971	1971-Present	Monarchy	Y	N
	Qatar	British	1971	1971-Present	Monarchy	Y	N
	Oman	British	De jure: 1941 De facto: 1971	1941-Present	Monarchy	Y	N

The following case vignettes address several preliminary questions about post-colonial continuity and change. How did the landed elite relate to the state during the colonial period? Did these relationships continue post-colonialism? Who demanded land reform and why? And finally, what differentiated states that redistributed land and survived from those that failed post-reform?

3.3.1 High Leader Turnover in Post-Colonial Syria and Iraq

Syria and Iraq are two such cases where redistributive autocrats suffered irregular exits. While scholars of political legitimacy might suggest that redistribution will prolong leader tenure through pro-poor, welfare-enhancing policies, the land reform outcomes in post-independence Syria and Iraq show strong evidence to the contrary.

Iraq and Syria share strikingly similar elite profiles during the Mandate period. Under colonial rule, Iraqi and Syrian landed elites enjoyed out-sized political power, and exclusive elite coalitions resulted. The British in Iraq and the French in Syria allied with and institutionalized the power of the landed class at the national level. Also during the colonial period, an increasingly influential but politically alienated *effendiyya* class began agitating for greater representation and more favorable economic policies. Post-independence, the *effendiyya* in both countries pushed new regimes to enact land redistribution targeted at destroying landed elite power. The *effendiyya* constituted a serious threat to the regime due to their methods of organization (e.g., parties and syndicates), the mass appeal of their ideological position, and their utility to the regime as educated professionals and civil servants. To meet the *effendiyya*'s demands, the independent Syrian and Iraqi regimes implemented land redistribution policies that were designed to dis-empower landed elites.

Iraq

Pre-Colonial Land Titling in Iraq

Pre-colonial land titling in Iraq primarily recorded the land rights of rural notables and elites rather than smallholders. Ottoman officials attempted to title land under the Land Code of 1858. Midhat Pasha, the Baghdad governor from 1869 to 1872, hoped that settling nomadic tribes and titling cultivators would lead to the rise of a modern agricultural sector based on smallholders, who could also be taxed directly on their production. Iraq's population was predominantly rural, and of those, most belonged to a settled or semi-settled tribes. The population of cultivators rose quickly during the late 19th century as tribes recognized the economic potential of settled agriculture (Haj, 1997). Çetinsaya (2006, 13) estimates that the proportion of Iraq's rural population who lived as nomads fell from 35 to 17 percent between 1867 and 1905, while settled cultivators rose from 41 percent to 59 percent during the same period. The extent of land titling in Ottoman Iraq varied by province, with more smallholders being titled in Baghdad than Basra, while much of Mosul was controlled by Kurdish aghas. Smallholders, however, typically had no rights over the land they tilled, and kept less than one-quarter of total agricultural production (Ceylan, 2011, 167).

The process of Ottoman land titling, therefore, set the stage for the creation of a nationally-powerful landed elite under the British Mandate. Before the creation of Iraq, landowners exercised their power locally. Rural notables were natural proxy rulers for the Ottoman state. Sheikhs in particular were compensated for their role in tax collection with land grants from the Sublime Porte. As land values increased and agriculture improved, landed elites became more powerful and autonomous from the state and from their tribal constituents.

Colonial Rule and Landed Elite Development

The British occupied Iraq during the Mesopotamian campaign (1915 - 1918) and assumed official administrative control of the new Iraqi Mandate in 1920. The British Mandate

government ruled the Iraqi hinterland by proxy through tribal sheikhs to minimize the amount of expense and coercion needed to govern the country. Under Mandate rule, the British introduced changes to the land tenure system that increased notable titling to the detriment of smallholders. Sheikhs often registered communal holdings as personal property, building a new class of large latifundia-style land owners in addition to the Ottoman era mercantile urban stratum who owned land in absentia. Landed elites also enhanced their position by securing preferential property rights from the colonial state. Tribes that collaborated with the British authorities received land grants as allies of the colonial powers. The creation of a central state and the imposition of new, state-governed property rights meant that those with titles (the landed elite) forged new, direct relations with the political center while most other rural dwellers remained landless and disconnected from state institutions.

Although the Mandate officially ended in 1932, the British continued to play a significant role in the administration of Iraq. British forces re-invaded Iraq in the 1940s, and were still involved in governance up until the 1958 revolution. In that revolutionary year, the Iraqi landowning elite consisted of 49 families who owned 16.8 percent of private agricultural land (Batatu, 1978, 57). Tribal sheikhs held 51 per cent of that area. The other 49 per cent were either mercantile or religious elites. Landowners had long dominated Iraqi legislative and ministerial positions. Landed families of all backgrounds had deputies and senators among them, and 10 families regularly provided premiers and ministers. Politicians from outside the landed class also used their position or procure large landholdings. Calls for land reform to redress these political and economic inequalities began to circulate throughout the Iraqi political classes in the early 1950s.

The *effendiyya* were the primary proponents of land redistribution. Originally from the lower and middle classes, Iraqi *effendis* graduated from Baghdadi universities or from the military staff college. During their education, they encountered Arab nationalist, socialist, and communist ideologies. Educated young men took their places as professionals in their chosen vocations, particularly in the bureaucracy. At the same time, they participated in

political parties or created new ones. Anti-imperialist and anti-feudalist sentiment ran high; every major opposition party adopted land reform as part of its political program during the 1950s. In response, the British and monarchy actively suppressed leftist activism, particularly the Iraqi Communist Party, which called for radical land reform and collectivization in the years leading up to the Iraqi Revolution (Gabbay, 1978).

Growing redistributive conflict played an important role in Iraq's revolutionary rupture with the colonial status quo. The landed elite's monopoly over the Iraqi elite coalition during the colonial and monarchical period proved to be too narrow a coalition to be sustained over the long-term. Incumbent elites had prevented the growing *effendiyya* classes from rising in the political hierarchy. The Free Officers Revolution of 14 July 1958 was thus the natural culmination of decades of pent up resentment against the colonial status quo. King Faisal II, Crown Prince Abd al-Ilah, and long-time pro-British statesmen Nuri al-Said were all killed by revolutionaries. In the aftermath of the coup, General Brigadier Abd al-Karim Qasim declared a popular government, replacing the "imperialist and corrupt" ancien regime. Qasim dissolved the parliament and the ministerial cabinet, both of which were previously dominated by landlords.

Implementation and Political Effects of Land Reform in Iraq

Qasim's government declared a new land redistribution policy a mere 90 days after the Revolution in October 1958. The main concern of the *effendiyya* was to limit landed elites' political power. The law took aim at the landowners' economic power to undercut their political influence. The law imposed ceilings on individual landholdings (618 acres in irrigated areas, 1,236 in rain-fed regions), and promised expropriated land would be distributed among landless fellahin in 20-40 acre plots. While the expropriation of land owners proceeded according to plan, very little of the expropriated land was ever distributed. The new regime came across multiple obstacles in implementing the reform, chief among them was a notable lack in bureaucratic capacity to carry out the redistributive element of

reform. Furthermore, the Qasim regime disbanded agricultural cooperatives due to concerns that they were controlled by the Iraqi Communist Party (Haj, 1997). Ultimately, the low penetration of state institutions in rural areas confounded the regime's ability to supply alternative channels of order and authority in regions previously dominated by landed elites.

Land reform is directly implicated in Iraq's post-colonial instability. Kurdish aghas in the north broke out in open rebellion against the Qasim regime after being threatened with expropriation. In the south, the state was to effectively replace landlords' provision of inputs and financial investment. Peasants who received land lacked the know-how and financial support to successfully cultivate their land. Agricultural cooperatives received limited support and were viewed by suspicion with Qassim as potential vehicles for revolt (Haj, 1997). Lack of capital input and institutional organization directly contributed to a decline in agricultural production. For the first time, Iraq became a net importer of grain. Left with no work and few alternatives, peasants moved en mass from rural areas to cities. Baghdad was especially hard-hit, where rural migrants lived in *sarifahs*, or periurban slums with mud huts (Al-Yasiri, 1965). With so many negative consequences of the redistribution, disgruntled military officers who self-identified as Ba'thists overthrew the Qasim regime.

The destabilizing effects of annihilating the rural elite at such a critical state-building juncture undoubtedly contributed to the instability of Iraqi regimes post-colonialism. Political infighting exacerbated an already fragile post-revolutionary society. Qasim's regime was ousted in a military coup in 1963. The president and his closest advisors were captured, given a show trial and summarily executed by the new military-dominated regime. Regime change followed again in 1968 when Ba'athist officers began to exclude non-Ba'athists from the elite coalition. Under the leadership of the former Major General al-Bakr, the Ba'athist regime began to forge new links with the countryside by implementing new land reform laws in 1970 and 1975. Most of this land was retained under regime control as state land or state-run collective farms rather than direct redistribution. During this time, the regime spent considerable resources in institutionalizing the countryside, and by the time Saddam

Hussein completed his gradual take-over and firmly established his personalistic regime in 1979, the regime had established new channels of power in the rural periphery dominated by state institutions and the Ba'ath party.

Syria

Pre-Colonial Land Titling in Syria

Land titling in Ottoman Syria benefited notables more than smallholder farmers. Urban and rural notables used their social and economic standing to procure individual titles to large tracts of agricultural land. For urban merchants, land was a solid investment. Property titles increased the value of land, and the old urban commercial elite were keen to diversify their wealth. The Ottoman Land Code of 1858 also extended the frontiers of cultivation by settling Bedouin tribes in Syria's western Jezira region. Registering title to tribal sheikhs, the Land Code empowered a new group of tribal landowners whose class interests allied with their urban counter-parts, rather than their tribes (Keilany, 1980). These newly minted tribal landlords put their kinsmen to work as cultivators on large landholdings, while urban notables used the new tenure system to their financial benefit by providing loans to smallholders and demanding debt repayment in the form of land (Lewis, 1987). Some acquired entire villages through smallholder indebtedness (Warriner, 1948). These landlords, divorced from the local context by virtue of their absenteeism, exploited their tenants rather than the land and invested minimal capital into improving the agricultural productivity of their holdings (Khoury, 1989, 9).

Colonialism and the Development of An Exclusive Elite Coalition

The French established their colonial Mandate in Syria and Lebanon in 1923. During their 23 years of rule, the French administration implemented a divide and conquer strategy that pitted class against class, city and against village, and sought to create wedges between ethnic groups. The French conducted a cadastral survey to promote smallholder property

rights, reduce the Ottoman-era practice of landed elite tax farming, and to establish a more equitable tax system (Khoury, 1989, p. 214). Laws passed in 1925 and 1926 formalized French attempts at rural reform like dismantling collective *musha'a* land tenure. The work of the Bureau de Cadastre (the French Survey Office) in implementing these laws was both underfunded and unpopular, and the plans were discarded after re-titling only 50,000 acres (Warriner, 1948). Importantly, this most Syrian smallholders remained under-titled while leaving the powerful landed class virtually undisturbed.[18]

The landed elite were well positioned to become the driving forces in Syrian politics, and their immense power meant that their power rivaled the state's. Daniel Neep (2015) documents the French's preoccupation with military conquest in Syria's interior and their focus on setting rural and urban interests against each other inspired by French colonial practice in Morocco. Yet, when they tried to raise new landed elites loyal to the French, these new notables found more in common with anti-colonial landowners. In contrast to Iraq's insular landed elite, the Syrian landowning elite did join forces with other pro-nationalist forces like the commercial bourgeoisie to agitate against the French colonial government for independence (Khoury, 1989, 97). While some co-opted landowners remained outside the nationalist fold, the pro-nationalist wing of the absentee landowning class threw their support in with other nationalists hailing from the *effendiyya* and peasant classes. Following the outbreak of the rural, nationalist-led Great Syrian Revolt (1925-1927), the French abandoned their policy of targeted disenfranchisement of the landed elite.[19] This alliance between landed elites and the *effendiyya* was short-lived, however. As the old and new landed class coalesced into a single interest group, the situation in Syria began to resemble that of Iraq. Like in

[18]Gerber and Warriner estimate that over only half of Syrian land property had been surveyed and titled by independence.

[19]When the French forced nationalist leaders out of urban areas in the early 1920s, pro-nationalist landowners rallied their peasantry against the property of collaborating landowners. Nationalist expropriation of collaborating elites both provisioned revolt forces to continue attacks against the French and prompted remaining absentee landowners to defect to the nationalist cause when it became clear that the French were not willing to protect their property. Landowner defection from the colonial cause increased when the French High Commissioner attempted to undercut their material interests through rural tax reform.

Iraq, the Syrian landed elite used their monopoly on power to accumulate more wealth and influence to the exclusion of other classes.

Collusion between the commercial and landed notables was counterbalanced by the development of the *effendiyya* under the Mandate (Khoury, 1989, p. 210). The process of state-building encouraged by the Mandate enlarged the bureaucracy, which in turn grew the ranks of the urban professional classes educated in the West (Abboud, 2015). Despite this, the Syrian post-independence political landscape reflected the concentration of power in the hands of the old landed and commercial elites, especially in their disproportionate representation in parliament and the organs of state and control over rural Syria. The landed oligarchy remained the most powerful elite class at Syria's independence in 1946.

Syrian Land Reforms and Political Stability

Syria's first decade of independence (1946 to 1956) was marked by political instability without significant redistributive reform, with 20 different cabinets, four drafted constitutions, and three military coups d'etat. David Waldner labels the period between 1946 and 1963 as one of mediated oligarchic rule in Syria (Walder, 1999, 76). Although discontent with the prevailing landed oligarchy and institutional weakness played significant roles in early Syrian regime changes, the *effendiyya* were too poorly organized to successfully push for redistributive reform. The Mandate-era nationalist coalition between landed elites and less economically privileged classes dissolved as economic issues became a matter of political contention. As Steven Heydemann (1999, 28) notes, lags in restructuring the economy were "a critical factor in the organization of social conflict." The systemic inequality embodied by landed elites' political and economic veto power fostered deep redistributive grievances among the *effendiyya* (including the military officer corps) who emerged as a new power center in Syrian politics. In 1950 and 1952, constitutional amendments and bills were proposed by the *effendiyya* in parliament, but were subsequently defeated by landlords and

their cronies throughout the 1950s.[20] During the 1950s, controlling the growing tension between the landowning oligarchs and the *effendiyya* became a central concern for the Syrian regime (Walder, 1999).

Syria's first radical land reform law was passed in 1958. This reform took place soon after the parliament voted to merge with Egypt to form the United Arab Republic (UAR). This regime change could be interpreted as a rebellion against the status quo; although landed elites no longer monopolized the state, they still constituted a powerful veto player in Syrian politics. The reform was modeled on Egypt's 1952 radical reform, introducing caps on property sizes and directly targeting landed elite interests. Expropriated land was intended for distribution among landless peasants.[21] The program was estimated to benefit 150,000 families, or 17 per cent of the total Syrian population.[22]

Redistributive land reforms introduced in 1958 contributed to regime fragility. Egyptian President Gamal Abd el-Nasser's reforms excluded both the old and new Syrian power centers, driving military officers (excluded from power) into an anti-Egyptian alliance with the traditional landowning and commercial elite (Walder, 1999, 82). In 1961, the officers and oligarchic elite staged a coup, ending the UAR experiment. In addition to upsetting the political status quo, the land reforms revealed weaknesses in the state's rural capacity. Prior to 1963, the Syrian state had limited bureaucratic reach into the countryside where landowners continued to dominate the rural political economy. The land reforms enacted by the UAR did not provide alternative, state-run institutions to replace landed elites.

The 1958 land land reform law was repealed following Syria's withdrawal from the UAR in 1961. Landed elites were quick to negotiate more favorable terms and many even reclaimed expropriated assets. Under the new military regime, a modified version of the 1958 law was legislated in 1963 that allowed landowners to distribute a larger share of their

[20]Norman Lewis references the 1955 modification of 1952 proposed agrarian reform that would protect agricultural labour. A left-wing parliamentary walkout in 1956 resulted in mild compromise in that year's new Law of the Tribes that abolished the practice of state-appointed tribal sheikhs, a hangover from the Mandate-era.

[21]The law called for distributed plot areas to eight hectares or less of irrigated land and 30 hectares of non-irrigated land (Hinnebusch et al., 2011).

[22]27 per cent of the rural population.

land among family members. This radical reform included institution-building provisions that had been absent from previous land reforms, but it was difficult to put into practice given low levels of Syrian state capacity and the regime remained vulnerable and unstable.

In 1966, the old guard lost their formal positions in the party and the more radical elements consolidated their control over the state apparatus. In 1970, these party members were pushed out of power by military officers who successfully incorporated Syrian businessmen into a cross-class alliance with peasants and workers. Amid continuing redistributive conflict, the Ba'th party came to power through through a military coup in 1966 (Hopwood, 1988, p. 89). After gaining power, the Ba'th party announced reforms that converted all natural resources, including land, into "the property of the people." The law also declared that "the socialist state is based on collective ownership as the means of production." State ownership and reclamation of lands became the norm, although private property was not explicitly abolished (Hopwood, 1988, p. 91). In the land expropriation and redistribution that followed, the landless and smallholders who received land were obliged to form co-operatives (Hopwood, 1988, p. 102). State farms were also established. In contrast to previous land reforms that directly attacked the landed class, the Ba'athist reforms served to strengthen the power of the bureaucratic state in the countryside. A key component of Ba'thist regime that took control in Syria in 1966 was to provide welfare enhancing institutions, including cooperatives, health care, and education to peasants who were less and less dependent on landed patrons for inputs and marketing of their production (Walder, 1999, 84). Heydemann (1999) argues that the expansion of state institutions and regulatory capacity was a critical component of what ultimately empowered the Ba'ath party to implement land reform, restructure rural-state relations, and achieve a degree of political stability where previous regimes failed. As has been documented by Hinnebusch (1989), the bureaucratic expansion of the Ba'athist state into the rural periphery played a decisive role in undercutting any potential opposition to an increasingly totalitarian regime. With greater state capacity in rural Syria, this cross-class alliance enabled the Ba'ath to establish a regime that has persisted until the present day.

Implications

Comparison of the Iraqi and Syrian land reform histories shows that radical land reforms have the potential to create new problems for autocrats. In part, this is due to a failure in both Iraq and Syria to establish cooptive institutions in the countryside after the redistribution programs began. The first rounds of land reforms in Syria and Iraq were explicitly anti-elite and did little to build rural state capacity. The Iraqi and Syrian experiences featured an exclusive elite coalition that limited the upward mobility of politically aspirational classes like the *effendiyya*. The 1958 land reforms in Iraq and Syria were regimes' logical response to mounting *effendiyya* discontent with the status quo. But rather than resulting in greater stability, autocrats placed too much emphasis on redistribution while eschewing the necessary creation of new patronage and cooptation institutions.

Both regimes changed their approach in the 1960s in ways that help extend state control into the periphery. As in Iraq, a select class of Syrian landed elites rose to national political prominence in the colonial period, making them a key veto player post-independence. Syrian landed elites were targeted for expropriation early in the UAR regime (1958-1960) and in successive regimes pre-1970. All of these reforms targeted the landed class directly early in regime tenure. Like in Iraq, the urban leftist forces rose to fill the gap left by expropriated elites. When Iraqi and Syrian regimes implemented these reforms in the 1970s, the cooptive element became a central feature of these reforms, reducing their likelihood of destabilizing the rural sector and reflecting poorly on the leader. After the establishment of the neo-Ba'athist regime under Hafez al-Asad, the regime adopted a new land reform strategy that put the regime and state squarely in control of Syrian land. This reform did not destabilize the regime, and may have in fact increased its state capacity, and in so doing, the autocrat's ability to co-opt new supporters increased.

3.3.2 Low Leader Turnover in Jordan and Morocco

Jordan and Morocco are both examples of cases that implemented conservative land reforms. Both countries inherited inclusive elite coalitions from the colonial period, making them fundamentally different from Syria and Iraq. In Jordan, colonial property rights titled landowners large and small across the entire country. When land reform was implemented in the 1960s, it was a reform that supported elite interests by allowing incumbent elites to procure more land in the Jordan Valley project area. Morocco also had an inclusive elite coalition, but a lack of state-oversight regarding property rights meant that the autocrat was less constrained by landed interests. In the absence of *effendiyya* demand, the Moroccan regime pursued conservative redistribution at the monarch's discretion, and expropriated land came under the control of the royal family and select loyal elites.

Jordan

Pre-Colonial Land Titling in Jordan

Prior to the arrival of the British, Transjordan was governed as peripheral territory of the Ottoman wilayet of Damascus. The region was populated by both nomadic and sedentary tribes and clans. The Ottoman Land Code had been implemented in the late 19th century, and titled the rights of both large and small landowners. Although some large landholdings existed, sedentary cultivator lands was primarily governed by the collective *musha'a'* system. Under the *musha'a'* system, a local shaykh would periodically redistribute land within a village with the consideration of family size and the productivity of allocated parcels. The British Mandate, and later the Jordanian state, dissolved this communal property system through a protracted, but relatively peaceful, process of land registry and settlement.

Colonial Land Settlement and an Inclusive Elite Coalition in Transjordan

The British Mandate of Transjordan established post-World War I. Emir, and later King, Abdullah established a strong power base with merchants and tribal notables after he lobbied the British for the throne (Robins, 2004). Property reforms, however, were an unpopular decision forced by the British to increase Transjordan's tax revenue through a new land tax system. Using Ottoman land records, the British Mandate government registered any peasant or landowner who could successfully demonstrate their claim to certain tracts of land. The registration process had a decisive impact on the corridors of power between rural hinterland and the regime. British Mandate officials were quick to hail the Transjordanian land settlement programme as "the best thing Her Majesty's Government has ever done for that country" (Fischbach, 2000, p. 124). But as Fischbach (2000) shows, what started as a policy intended to protect peasant land access resulted in the growth of a new landed elite. While some Ottoman-era large landowners existed in Mandate Transjordan, they were few and primarily located in the remote Jordan Valley. The registration system reinforced pre-existing estate ownership in for the small number of Ottoman-era landlords, but also for the Jordan's majority small-holding class. The few large landowners that did exist became wealthier as the new property system increased land values.

These new elites, including Palestinian and Syrian merchants who purchased land during the Mandate land tenure registration, became incorporated into the regime's ruling coalition. Land owners in the early state were primarily local and typically lived on or near their property. As such, these landowners continued to fill local political function as well as a burgeoning national role. The regime's legitimacy was built on the foundation of a elite coalition with deep local roots. Moreover, they were diverse - sedentary and Bedouin, mercantile and agrarian, Sunni Muslim and Christian - making a broad coalition united the state's protection of their property rights.

Post-Colonial Redistributive Politics in Jordan

When Jordan was granted independence in 1946, landed elites played a large role national politics. The political value of landed elites in the Jordanian ruling coalition was two-fold. First, the new landed elites' stake in the new central government was high, cemented by a single, centralized tenure system. The likelihood of landed elite defection from the coalition was low as long as the regime continued to favor them economically and politically. Second, landed elites retained important roles as mediators between society and state.

Although the Jordanian regime's reputation is one of exceptional stability, the Jordanian regime did face existential crises in its inaugural decades. The most difficult domestic problem facing Jordanian agriculture and land holding was demographic. Palestinian refugees flooded into Jordan in 1948 after Israel declared its independence. The population of Jordan's capital, Amman, increased from 30,000 to almost 100,000 overnight. Political tensions occasionally led to violence. Jordan's first king, Abdullah, was assassinated by a Palestinian nationalist in 1951, five years after independence. An attempted military coup against the monarchy was diffused on 13 April 1957, and Prime Minister Hazza' al-Majali was assassinated in 1960.

The primary opposition movement in Jordan was led by the *effendiyya*. The Jordanian National Movement (JNM) targeted the Hashemite monarchical regime for revolutionary reform. Under the banner of the JNM, communists, Pan-Arabists, and Ba'athists. The leadership were predominantly lawyers, doctors teachers, and lower ranked military officers challenged the monarchy's legitimacy (Anderson, 2005, p. 119). The rapid increase in Jordan's population due to refugee inflows and a weak economy escalated a deepening humanitarian and redistributive crisis. Land reform was touted as a potential solution to these issues. For the Jordanian *effendiyya*, land reform was a question of economic development. Although tensions between incumbent landowners and professional classes were tangible and impacted politics, the regime relied heavily on both classes as part of the ruling coalition. *Effendiyya* calls for redistribution would be met with a Hashemite developmental response.

The history of Jordanian state-building and the prevalence of land-titling resulted in a more inclusive elite coalition than in Iraq, Syria, or Egypt. Large landowners, dependent on the state for secure property rights and agricultural loans, began to invest in capital-intensive agriculture and retained a role in national politics. Their continued national role did not deter newcomers. The *effendiyya* began to encroach on the political power of traditional political elites. In the October 1956 elections, the year Suleiman Nabulsi's *effendiyya* government formed, only 32.5 per cent of *nuwwab* (representatives) in parliament were farmers, compared with 60 per cent hailing from the urban professional class. Despite this professional turn, most of the population still worked in agriculture and unemployment rates were high. Landlessness was increasing because of population growth and shrinking land parcel sizes fragmented by inheritance, resulting in redistributive tensions.

Land Reform and Jordanian Regime Stability

Redistribution in the 1960s was billed as a populist reform that would breath new life into the agricultural sector and settle landless Jordanians and Palestinians in the Jordan Valley. The spirit of the law matched the type of reform sought by the *effendiyya*. Under a loyalist government led by a landowner-politician, the Jordanian council of ministers proposed land redistribution in the Jordan Valley as part of the East Ghor Canal development project in 1959. The Jordan Valley is the most productive and valuable agricultural land in Jordan, and most of the land had been titled to tribal landowners and merchants under the British land settlement.

Land redistribution in Jordan was focused on developing capitalist agriculture, and preserved the pre-existing landed elite structure and property rights system instituted by the British. Land redistribution was concentrated within the confines of the Jordan Valley, a thin strip of arable land stretching along the board with Israel from Lake Tiberius in the north to the Red Sea in the south. Under the auspices of the East Ghor Canal Project (1959-1967), the regime introduced property caps and redistribution with the stated goal of (1) increasing

agricultural output and (2) raising the standard of living of families residing in the project area. The result of land reform, however, saw an increase in sharecropping and absenteeism. A 1955 survey by UNRWA of the Jordan Valley showed that land ownership was highly concentrated among a few families. While owners of less than 100 dunums represented 84 per cent of all owners, they held only 21 per cent of the land. At the opposite extreme, 54 owners with holdings in excess of 1,000 dunums and representing only a little over 1 per cent of all owners, held over 152,000 dunums or 35 per cent of the total area.[23] Post-reform, holders of less than 90 dunums constituted 85 per cent of all landowners and 44 per cent of the total area, while holders of units in excess of 1,000 dunums represented less than 0.3 per cent of all owners and only 9.5 per cent of the total area (Hazleton, 1979). In the long term, however, the redistribution of Jordan Valley land worked to the benefit of urban interests and traditional regime "old guards." The process of redistribution disadvantaged poorer farmers, and provided an opportunity for Jordan Valley elites and landowners from other regions to accumulate new property.

Although Jordanian state capacity was relatively low at the close of the 1950s, conservative reform served to extend the reach of the state without disrupting institutions all ready in place throughout the rest of the country. Along with land redistribution, the extended pre-existing social systems like schooling, health, and cooperatives into the Jordan Valley. In addition, a special agency called the East Ghor Canal Authority was established to coordinate agricultural and developmental projects within the area.

In the case of Jordan, land redistribution was a convenient strategy that both rewarded loyal landed elites and appeased growing demands for redistribution. Under colonialism, the British titling and registration programme created a new class of landed elites that played a fundamental role in the Jordanian ruling coalition. Ultimately, the land reforms of the 1960s and 1970s did not displace the traditional landed elites, and more likely worked in their favor.

[23] In addition, joint ownership was common with only 35 per cent of the area and 46 per cent of the parcels being individually owned.

In Iraq and Syria, this strategy would have been less feasible. *Effendiyya* demands in those countries were more intense than in Jordan; despite high levels of political organization by the professional class, the inclusive nature of the elite coalition muted calls for expropriation. In Iraq or Syria, such reforms would have been less effective as they did not fundamentally address political grievances against the landed class.

Morocco

Pre-Colonial Land Titling in Morocco

The links between landowners and the Moroccan pre-colonial regime were not bureaucratically regulated by a central state. In rural areas, property rights were completely determined by local institutions, and allegiances beyond one's tribe were weak. In areas near cities, *Mulk*, or private, land was strictly governed by practices that forbade sale to outsiders, and usually not formalized with title deeds.[24] In most other rural regions, tribal agriculturalists practiced a combination of pastoralism and subsistence agriculture more conducive to collective (*jmou*) landholding.[25] The only lands subject to central control were *makhzan* and *guish* lands directly governed by the Sultan which approximately equate to *miri* lands elsewhere in MENA. *Makhzan* lands were controlled by the Moroccan sultan and his family, while usufruct rights to *guish*[26] land was allocated by the Sultan to loyal tribes in recompense of military protection. The few large landholdings (*'azib*) that did appear were associated with Makhzan officials and Sultan-appointed qaids, but these were personalistic land grants that were not heritable and could be revoked by the monarch at any time (Michel, 1997, 364). Agronomist Paul Pascon describes the variability of the pre-colonial Moroccan "caidaliste" agrarian system:

[24] Individual (*mulk*) rights were prevalent in crop-growing regions like the Atlantic coastal plains, but they were not registered through titles.

[25] Land could also be held in charitable and religious trusts called (*habbous*, similar to the *waqf* in other regions, to prevent fragmentation and arbitrary expropriation.

[26] similar to *miri*, but specifically earmarked for tribes that performed military duties for the sultan.

> the various parts of the country did not always experience exactly the same history and the historical duration of "caidal" forms was in some places either nil, more or less durable, more or less strong, and that as a result there was neither a unification nor material and institutional works that are mature enough to establish a direction and a relatively rigid order of social formation (Pascon, 1980).

Colonialism and Competing Property Rights Regimes in Morocco

The imposition of the French colonial apparatus centralized Morocco's political life when the French forged alliances not only with the crown, but also Makhzan elite networks (Mohammad 2001). Before the Protectorate was established in 1912, tribal chiefs dominated outlying rural areas while urban trading and artisan families from the Fes, Tetouan, Meknes and Sale bourgeoisie, the Makhzan families and religious notables held considerable urban power. During the Protectorate, these identities were reproduced through affiliation with state structures; rural elites tended to favor the army while urban notables opted for French schooling (Bennai-Chraibi 2008).

Under the French Protectorate, large foreign companies were encouraged to buy up Moroccan land and invest heavily in capital-intensive agriculture. To encourage this, the French government, under the leadership of Resident General Hubert Lyautey. Lyautey wanted to avoid the dominance of settler colonialism like in Algeria. Instead, the Resident General supported the idea of fostering large-scale commercial agriculture (Pennell, 2000). While the Protectorate did not systematically dismantle traditional forms of tenure in the way the British did in Jordan, they did establish the process of registering private property where none existed previously. The Protectorate decreed that all tribal land and forest would be considered property of the Makhzan.[27] A *dahir*[28] issued in August 1913 established procedures for registering private land, and the Spanish Protectorate followed suit in 1914 (Pennell, 2000, p. 171). As much land as possible was funneled into the category of state

[27] All roads, beaches, and rivers were also declared Makhzan property.
[28] official or royal decree

(Makhzan) land with the intent of selling it to foreign investors. Decrees issued by the French Protectorate increased the amount of land under state control and introduced private property titling used to reward loyal elites. Despite Lyautey's antipathy for settlers, 29,000 French *colons* arrived in 1913 alone. A small population of Europeans[29] and Moroccans gained large landholdings under colonialism, but by and large most agricultural property remained held under traditional forms of tenure that were *de jure* owned by the regime.

Post-Independence Redistribution, Weak Ties, and Moroccan Regime Stability

Following a struggle for independence that resulted in the re-introduction of the pre-French dynasty, the monarchical regime drew heavily on support from rural Berber areas in both the armed forces and through local leaders known as *qaids*. The urban-based Moroccan *effendiyya* were few in number and ultimately unable to independently push for policies that favored their interests. The only organized political force in colonial and early-post independence Morocco capable of pushing for land reform was the centrist Istiqlal[30] party. Despite their organization, their small numbers and the disconnect between urban and rural politics forestalled any *effendiyya* demands for land redistribution. After Moroccan independence, the Istiqlal elites invited the Moroccan dynasty to return from French-imposed exile in 1956 to lead an independent Morocco.

Unlike in Jordan, landed elites did not ascend to the ranks of the national political elite. Instead, rural notables transmitted the authority of the Makhzan locally. There is striking continuity between the pre-colonial and contemporary role played by landed elites as middlemen between the center and rural periphery. Just as the pre-colonial Makhzan and the French Protectorate did, the Moroccan monarchy post-1956 uses rural notables to gather information and re-reinforce its authority in the countryside. Post-independence rural notables have worked to block comprehensive property rights reform that would reconcile

[29] Despite Lyautey's opposition to European settlers, they acquired about half a million hectares by 1925, and owned double that figure at the end of the Protectorate in 1956 (Pennell, 2000, p. 199).

[30] Arabic for independence

the country's three land codes (White 2001). Post-colonial urban elites dominate national politics, particularly business elites from the northern city of Fes and the southern region of Sousse dominate the political class while also exhibiting dependency on the regime for their continued economic success (White 2001).

In the absence of elite or popular mobilization for land redistribution and without strong landed elites to appease, the Moroccan land reforms are reflect a conservative approach where the autocrat exercised almost complete discretion over the reform. Post-independence land expropriation was an expedient tool to rid Morocco of disloyal rural elements as well as European settlers (Zartman, 1963). The decision to redistribute land was taken at the level of the monarchy and ultimately used to reward coalition members for their loyalty. Expropriated land accrued to the state, monarchy and other elites who sided with the monarchy during the liberation struggle, while small holders and the landless received virtually nothing.

Since independence, communal tenure has been protected and enforced on Makhzan (state) land. Morocco's land tenure was and continues to be governed by three tenure codes that the state considers equally valid - civil, Islamic and tribal. The existence of multiple forms of property rights dilutes the state's authority in land disputes, with most being solved locally using whatever legal system privileges the favored claimants' continued access to land. The continuity of rural property regimes has abrogated the need for the state to institutionalize in the periphery, relying instead on a network of rural notables that continue to support the Makhzan. In this way, the Moroccan regime has avoided any blame in ensuing redistributive issues and maintained a separation between rural and urban spheres of governance, contributing to the regime's longevity.

Implications

Jordan and Morocco pursued conservative reforms that followed two distinct logics. In Jordan, the autocrat was constrained by his reliance on an inclusive coalition, and therefore resorted to conservative land reforms to signal his continued commitment to their interests.

The Jordanian *effendiyya* pushed the regime to adopt more widespread redistributive policies, but land reforms ultimately benefited the wealthy and landed elites. In Morocco, the king used conservative reforms as a way to enhance his own power. Absent state regulation of land ownership, the monarch was less restricted by the interests of his inclusive coalition than King Hussein in Jordan. The *effendiyya* were politically weak, and the land reforms that did occur brought land under the control of the regime, especially the royal family under Hassan II. Jordanian and Moroccan land reforms provide a counter-example to the radical reforms observed in Iraq and Syria.

These four historical vignettes contribute several theoretical insights about the relationship between land reform and leader tenure in MENA autocracies. First, not all MENA land reforms were radical after colonial rule. The diversity of the landed elite conditioned the types of land reforms that independent regimes chose. In former colonies where the state determined property rights, and titled landowners broadly, the elite coalition was more inclusive. This is illustrated by the Jordanian experience, when land reforms in the Jordan Valley preserved the national property rights system while also favoring landed elites from outside the redistribution area. In cases where land titling was less thorough, Ottoman and colonial elites were able to amass more land at the expense of smallholders, resulting in an exclusive coalition like in Iraq, Syria, and Egypt. Second, the degree to which states were able to implement radical reforms and survive depended on whether or not they provided sufficient means to co-opt rural and urban elites. The Iraqi and Syrian experiences shows that the expropriation of the landed class without alternative state institutions had unanticipated knock-on effects, including a decrease in agricultural production and significant rural-urban migration among the peasantry. In addition, the failure of a high profile and important policy like land reform introduced uncertainty in the elite coalition, particularly when land reform was one of the only policies about which many disparate post-independence factions could agree.

3.4 Conclusion

The case studies presented here demonstrate that power-sharing relationships between landed elites and the state emerged during the colonial period when European colonizer's modernizing agendas encountered a diverse range of agrarian relations. Colonial land reforms recognized individual land owners. This disrupted other long-standing ways of holding land, like communal tenure and temporary use of state land. Societies with fewer recognizable claimants to land resulted in a powerful few claiming lands under the colonial system. When a minority held land themselves or managed its allocation, colonial land titling created an exclusive but powerful landed elite. When the majority of the population held recognized land titles, landed elite power was more diluted by other class interests. Centralized colonial states were layered over extant property regimes, and that this interaction conditioned post-colonial levels of redistributive conflict over land. Landed elites became implicated in these new, national political hierarchies, primarily due to their powerful social and economic roles agrarian society. Biased toward individually-held land titles, colonial land settlement[31] policies thus resulted in a variety of power-sharing arrangements between the colonial state and rural notables.

These cases also show that new political classes, particularly the *effendiyya*, pushed for more inclusive political settlements in the late colonial period and in the first state-building decades. *Effendiyya* lobbied for greater political participation across the region. The strength and credibility of their threats against regimes varied, however. Education provision needed to be wide enough during the colonial period that a critical mass of professionals could emerge as political leaders. The *effendiyya*'s strength was increased when they were able to organize politically, in parties or in other corporate forms of political coordination. In Morocco, for example, the *effendiyya* class were small. Although parties did exist, loyalist parties like Istiqlal predominated. After securing independence, the lack of landed elites

[31] Settlement refers to the determination of individually-held titles to a piece of property, in accord with European private property norms.

in government meant that the *effendis* were able to gain power through the bureaucracy relatively unimpeded. The small *effendiyya* population in the Arab Gulf countries (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, etc) are another reason that land reform is extremely rare in those country cases. Party politics in Jordan, Syria, Iraq, and Egypt were much more active, and the early establishment of secondary schools and education initiatives meant that their opposition movements were vibrant and engaged in redistributive struggle against the incumbent landed elite.

Independent leaders could view expropriation of exclusive coalitions as a win-win strategy: the autocrat makes room for new coalition members from the *effendiyya* class, while neutralizing landed elites as political spoilers. Expropriation of local elites is trickier, as they are more likely part of the state's networks of rural control and have "bought" in to the same regime of property rights as everyone else. Changing these settlements now would result in elite, if not mass, reprisal against the regime. As the educated stratum grows larger, the cleavages that might drive differences between elite groups begin to erode.

When choosing between redistributive options, the regime evaluates what is both possible and least likely to threaten its survival. Based on these assumptions, I disaggregate the types of land redistribution into three distinct archetypes. These are ideal types and do not completely account for the nuances of each land reform program, but they do capture how the land reform laws were written to favor certain constituencies, and whether or not the reform achieved those goals. It's particularly important to take winners and losers in land reform seriously; most literature on MENA land reforms took for granted their pro-poor intentions.[32]

The primary argument of this chapter was distinct types of elite coalitions emerged during the colonial period. I showed that showed that these coalitions varied in inclusivity, in part due to endogenous factors and partly due to European preferences. At the same time, colonial education policies helped to create regimes' primary oppositional class, the *effendiyya*. The

[32]Exceptions to this include work on the Egyptian reforms Binder (1978); Migdal (1988) and a regional study by El-Ghonemy (1998).

critical factor determining *effendiyya* demands for redistribution hinged on their ability to organize and present a credible threat of defection against the regime. Building from this historical background, chapter 4 will present cross-national empirical tests of the theoretical concepts and measures from chapter 2 and historical observations in chapter three.

Chapter 4

Cross-National Analysis of Land Reform and Leader Tenure in MENA

> The present government of Egypt has ideals but no ideology. No single intellectual influence has been predominant. It combines pure nationalists and revolutionaries, held together by Colonel Nasser in a tense union for action. Even at the outset it was not united, except on the issue of land reform.
>
> –Doreen Warriner, *Land Reform and Development in the Near East (1962)*

4.1 Introduction

This chapter presents statistical evidence to explain why autocrats elect to pursue land reform in post-colonial MENA states, and how that decision may abbreviate autocrats' tenure in office. Following the two-stage theory presented in Chapter 2, I model two outcomes in sequence. First, I test the assertion that colonial legacies of inclusive or exclusive coalitions matter for the type of reforms autocrats choose to pursue. Faced with growing intra-elite grievances, autocrats may consider land reform as a resolution to these conflicts. I argue that coalition inclusivity conditions autocrats' redistributive strategies. Leaders that inherit inclusive coalitions are more able to accommodate and absorb new elites; as a result, such

leaders are likely likely to forgo land reform all together because elite grievances are low. For dictators that inherit exclusive coalitions, politically marginalized elites often press more stringent demands for land reform. In such cases, leaders are more likely to pursue radical reforms. These theoretical expectations are borne out in the cross-sectional time series models presented in Section 4.2.

The second stage of my argument evaluates the differential effect of conservative and radical land reforms on leader tenure (Section 4.3). I model the probability of irregular leader exit as a function of land reform type. Radical reforms correlate to an increase in the odds of irregular leader exit, while conservative reforms do not. Finally, I provide preliminary evidence that the autocrat's preferences for cooptive or coercive state building may help explain the conditions under which radical reforms threaten the autocrat's tenure. The results suggest that cooptive strategies of state building (measured through the provision of secondary schools) decrease the likelihood that radical reformers will be ousted, whereas autocrats that pursue repressive state building (measured by the growth in military spending per capita) after repressive reforms are more likely to be removed from power. The final section of this chapter uses these results to motivate my case selection for the second half of the dissertation.

4.2 Colonial Legacies of Inclusive Coalitions and Land Reform Under Autocracy

In this section I model the conditions under which autocrats elect to pursue land reform. In Chapter 2, I hypothesized that land reforms are function of a political struggle faced by regimes to establish a loyal ruling coalition. In decolonizing MENA states, the *effendiyya* viewed the end of European administration as an opportunity to move up the political ranks and become policy-makers instead takers. When the *effendiyya* present a strong, organized

front, autocrats are incentivized to redistribute land to send a credible signal and diffuse any threats from this rising elite.

Faced with this potential challenge to their rule, the autocrat elects to redistribute land in one of two ways: through conservative or radical reforms. To model these potential outcomes, I use my dataset of MENA land reforms described in Chapter 2. Using this dataset, I code my dependent variable (*Land Reform Type*) in each country-year observation as a categorical measure.Land reform is coded as "0" in country-years when the autocrat does not redistribute land. Conservative land reforms are coded "1" and radical land reforms as "2."[1] In the 18 MENA countries, land reform does not occur in most of the 1027 county-year observations. Conservative and radical land reforms occur with nearly equal frequency (7.59 and 7.89 percent respectively).

The autocrat's reform path is contingent upon the two factors. First, the autocrat's redistribution preferences are constrained by the inclusivity of the elite coalition he inherits. I use a binary variable (*Exclusive*) to capture whether the colonial elite coalition was inclusive or exclusive (See Table 2.3). To be coded as exclusive (=1), the coalition drew upon a narrow segment of elite actors. The exclusivity of this elite could be due to geographic[2], class[3], or ethnic[4] reasons, but exclusive coalitions commonly banded together to prevent new entrants from rising to the level of the power elite. Across all country cases in the MENA region, this small group included the landed elite. Inclusive elite coalitions (=0) drew upon a wider range of elites and were more likely to allow new elites to ascend to the level of the power elite.

Second, the autocrat needs to believe that his rule is credibly threatened. Land reform will not occur without pressure on the autocrat. According to my theory, *effendiyya* are the main proponents of land reform in the MENA region. One of the prime political concerns facing MENA autocrats in the 1950s and 1960s was containing the rise of *effendiyya* interests. As discussed in Chapter 2, the *effendiyya* constituted an important interest bloc of educated urban

[1] Descriptive statistics for each reform are presented in Appendix 1, Table 2.1.
[2] Drawing from predominantly from one city or region, for example.
[3] One class dominates the elite coalition.
[4] One ethnic or religious group dominates the elite coalition in countries with diverse ethnic composition.

professionals. The *effendiyya* are politically important because as professional elites, they are potential "builders" of the state, and are necessary to regimes' conservative aspirations as bureaucrats, lawyers, engineers, and medical doctors. The *effendiyya* were both the leaders and rank and file of leftist political parties, and often lobbied for redistributive reforms through their parties, including land reform. From the perspective of an autocrat seeking to maintain control, land redistribution might be an expedient strategy to appease a reform-minded *effendiyya*. Based on the US Department of State Strength of World Communist Organizations annual report (1950 to 1980), British diplomatic cables in Kew, and secondary sources on organized political parties in MENA, I use the number of communist party members as my *Effendiyya Organization* variable. My main source, the World Communist Organizations annual report, underpinned this classification by providing an annual summary of global communist and leftist activities and their relationship to the state in each country. These reports included estimates of the number of communist and socialist party members in each country. I used the natural log of this population estimate to capture the level of *effendiyya* organization in each country year observation.

The following models include standard controls for population, area, regional dummies, and soil quality of each country. I also include linear, quadratic, and cubic time trends (Beck et al., 1998)[5] as well as a count variable (*Prior LR*) of all previous country-year observations when land reform occurred to account for the possibility that previous land reform impacted downstream redistribution. To account for the interests of land reform beneficiaries, I construct a measure of rural pressure based on FAO data rural labour and arable land data. Rural pressure, the proportion of rural laborers divided by the percentage of arable land, measures how much population pressure is put on a country's agricultural resources. This variable is inverted for ease of interpretation so that higher coefficients mean higher rural pressure.[6] Land scarcity can lead to conflict, but exclusion from arable

[5]Carter and Signorino (2010) and Albertus (2015) also use this approach to account for time in non-linear cross-sectional models.

[6]This specification of rural pressure was adopted from Albertus (2015).

land can also lead to extreme deprivation and welfare decreases for the rural poor who are disproportionately employed in agriculture. Given that their livelihood is predicated on agriculture, controlling for the interests of the rural poor allows us to test mass grievance explanations for the enacting land reform.

I include measures of conflict that theoretically impact the autocrat's decision to redistribute: riots from the Banks (2013) dataset and PRIO's civil war variable. Finally, I measure a number of alternative explanations for redistribution. Resource rents[7] and trade openness (Penn World Tables) may reduce the incentive to redistribute land in light of non-agricultural sources of income. Foreign aid may impact an autocrat's incentives to redistribute land (Yom, 2011). For example, the literature on Jordanian land reform refers to United States and World Bank involvement in advocating for land redistribution. To account for the possibility that foreign influence prompted land redistribution, I use the logged value of annual US foreign aid retrieved from USAID's Greenbook Dataset. Finally, to capture variation in each state's coercive capacity, I use the *Relative Political Extraction (RPE)* of Agriculture measure (Arbetman-Rabinowitz et al., 2011) to capture a given developing country's ability to extract fiscal resources from its population. Relative Political Extraction (RPE) "approximates the ability of governments to appropriate portions of the national output to advance public goals" (Kugler and Tammen, 2012). This is a conventional measure of state capacity that has been widely used the comparative political economy and development economics literature to measure bureaucratic efficacy, particularly as regards fiscal extraction. The authors of the dataset also find that RPE correlates to other measures of state capacity, like service provision. RPE measures how much tax revenue a society collects given its economic structure. Specifically, it is produced by estimating the expected size of a nation's economy using inputs (agriculture, mining, exports, industry) and comparing its tax revenue to nations with similar economic inputs. I also construct the annual military spending per capita variable from information contained in the National Material Capabilities data from the Correlates of War database

[7] the natural log of Total Fuel Income from Haber and Menaldo (2011)

(Singer, 1987; Singer et al., 1972). Taken together, these variables give a rough idea of the bureaucratic and repressive resources available to the autocrat to carry out land reform.

Empirical Analysis

Across all models, legacies of exclusive coalitions and the presence of an organized, sizable *effendiyya* are correlated with an increase in the odds of radical reform. These variables do not, however, correlate to conservative reforms. That both riots and rural pressure decrease the odds of radical reform suggest that my elite-level argument holds weight. This may be because the autocrat enacts conservative reforms at moments when it is strategically prudent to reassure or signal a re-commitment to his inclusive elite coalition. These patterns are consistent across all four models. These results hold in the presence of higher levels of economic development (Model 2), political violence measured by riots and revolutions (Model 3), and civil war (Model 4).

The results of my analysis are presented in Tables 4.1 and 4.2. Across all models, legacies of exclusive coalitions and the presence of an organized, sizable *effendiyya* are correlated with an increase in the odds of radical reform. Political violence in the form of riots (Model 3) decrease the odds of radical reform, suggesting that demands from the masses are not driving the observed variation in land reform outcomes. Demand for agricultural land as measured by *Rural Pressure* also decreases the likelihood of both conservative and radical land reform. These models do not, however, help us explain autocrat's decision to enact conservative land reforms. This may be because the autocrat enacts conservative reforms at moments of political crisis that are more difficult to observe, such as rumors of elite defection or other signals shared among coalition members.

Table 4.2 estimates the same models again, but this time accounting for trade openness (Model 1), the amount US foreign aid received (Model 2) and the levels of fiscal (Model 3) and repressive (Model 4) state capacity. The main effects from Table still hold. *Effendiyya organization* and *exclusive legacies* have a positive and significant impact on the likelihood

of radical reforms, but not conservative. These findings allay concerns that only weak states pursue radical land reform in the first place; the odds of pursuing radical redistribution are almost 31 times more likely with each unit increase in RPE, at the the .001 level. At the same time, the odds of implementing radical reform actually *decrease* with more military spending per capita by about 15 times.

Table 4.1 Cross-Sectional Time Series Models of Land Reform

	(1) Base	(2) Income Per Capita	(3) Political Violence	(4) Civil War
DV: Conservative LR				
Exclusive Coalition	1.143	1.199	1.634	1.198
	(0.413)	(0.448)	(0.745)	(0.448)
Effendiyya Organization	1.168	1.160	1.139	1.160
	(0.117)	(0.120)	(0.120)	(0.118)
Rural Pressure	0.000000640*	6.71e-08*	1.22e-09*	6.98e-08*
	(0.00000414)	(0.000000539)	(1.12e-08)	(0.000000566)
Log(PCI)		1.277	1.257	1.278
		(0.532)	(0.611)	(0.531)
Riots			0.983	
			(0.120)	
Revolutions			1.679	
			(0.628)	
Civil War				0.915
				(0.703)
DV: Radical LR				
Exclusive Coalition	69.85*	60.78*	114.5***	60.90*
	(119.2)	(103.1)	(154.1)	(103.2)
Effendiyya Organization	1.297**	1.258**	1.232*	1.260**
	(0.109)	(0.112)	(0.127)	(0.109)
Rural Pressure	6.61e-13**	1.21e-09*	2.83e-13***	1.37e-09*
	(6.17e-12)	(1.08e-08)	(2.39e-12)	(1.24e-08)
Log(PCI)		0.674	0.727	0.677
		(0.309)	(0.414)	(0.302)
Riots			0.444*	
			(0.168)	
Revolution			2.410	
			(1.140)	
Civil War				0.764
				(0.824)
Observations	817	817	796	817
Pseudo R^2	0.572	0.576	0.597	0.576
AIC	461.2	458.1	420.8	458.1
BIC	531.8	528.7	491.0	528.7

Exponentiated coefficients; Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table 4.2 Cross-Sectional Time Series Models of Land Reform, Cont'd

	(1) Base	(2) Foreign Aid	(3) Fiscal Capacity	(4) Repressive Capacity
Conservative Reform				
Exclusive Coalition	1.468	1.942	1.487	1.145
	(0.520)	(1.047)	(0.573)	(0.662)
Effendiyya Organization	1.177	1.029	1.179	1.157
	(0.115)	(0.131)	(0.133)	(0.120)
Log(PCI)	1.438	1.545	1.234	1.229
	(0.630)	(0.805)	(0.514)	(0.564)
Rural Pressure	0.00000180	1.89e-13**	0.000000110	2.39e-09*
	(0.0000155)	(1.97e-12)	(0.000000947)	(2.14e-08)
Openness	0.989			
	(0.00709)			
US Aid		0.900		
		(0.113)		
RPE (Agri)			1.732	
			(1.306)	
Log(Military Personnel PC)				1.348
				(0.489)
Radical Reform				
Exclusive Coalition	101.0**	22.81	106.0***	215.5***
	(169.5)	(44.84)	(124.3)	(322.0)
Effendiyya Organization	1.311**	1.464	1.354***	1.224**
	(0.125)	(0.319)	(0.0910)	(0.0934)
Log(PCI)	0.976	0.485	0.413	0.777
	(0.457)	(0.353)	(0.206)	(0.483)
Openness	0.965**			
	(0.0119)			
Rural Pressure	0.00000822	0.000000912	0.00000313	0.000000217
	(0.0000679)	(0.0000125)	(0.0000214)	(0.00000188)
US Aid		0.903		
		(0.150)		
RPE (Agri)			30.91***	
			(29.22)	
Log(Military Personnel PC)				0.151*
				(0.125)
Observations	792	502	817	795
Pseudo R^2	0.579	0.582	0.596	0.605
AIC	449.9	339.8	437.0	416.5
BIC	520.0	394.6	507.6	486.6

Exponentiated coefficients; Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

The findings are supported by the historical experience in Jordan and Iraq. These cases are comparable across several characteristics. Both colonies were classified as British Mandates and came into being after the first World War. Both had previously been governed under smaller Ottoman administrative units and were cobbled together as new "patchwork" nation states. The elite coalition that emerged in both countries, however, diverged starkly in terms of their inclusivity. In Jordan, the elite coalition drew upon elites from across Palestine and Transjordan, whereas the Iraqi elite were primarily from Baghdad. Although landed elites were present in nearly equal measure at the highest levels of government, the exclusivity of the Iraqi elite coalition resulted in a close-knit cadre of elites who rarely allowed new entrants to their small but immensely powerful group. After independence, demands for land reform from rising elites were frequent and intense. In Jordan, however, the inclusivity of the elite coalition allowed for new elites to rise to the level of decision-making power. This inclusivity resulted in more muted demands for elite expropriation and land redistribution after independence. Modest demands for reform in Jordan result in conservative reforms during a period of mass political upheaval, whereas intense demands in Iraq pushed President Qasim to quickly adopt radical land reform in 1958.

4.3 Radical Reforms and Autocratic Leader Tenure

Having found suggestive evidence that radical and conservative land reforms arise under different conditions, I move on to the second stage of my argument to examine the effect of these reforms on autocratic tenure. As above, these models use cross-sectional time series estimations with clustered standard errors to control for within country correlation. Spell dummies and previous failures have been included in the analysis. I base my coding of irregular leader exit on the Goemans et al. (2009) (Arcigos) dataset of political leaders. I use

the binary (*iexit*) to capture when leaders were ousted outside the electoral process or before their term limit ended.[8]

I control for geographic and demographic factors[9], as well as for alternative theories of autocratic survival, including modernization[10], rentier state theory (RST)[11], ethnic fractionalization, and Huntington's (1991) Islamic civilization thesis.[12]

My models also account for additional explanations of leader tenure including fiscal[13] and repressive state capacity[14], urban population density[16], colonizer identity[17], and regime type[18].

[8] I also use the Geddes et al. (2014) *fail* measure as a robustness check; the results are consistent.

[9] I follow Haber and Menaldo (2011); Menaldo (2012) in using the logged area and population of each country, as redistributive conflicts might manifest differently in smaller countries.

[10] Ln(PCI), or the log of GDP per Capita Income from Haber and Menaldo (2011) in real 2007 international dollars. Modernization theory predicts that higher levels of wealth may lead to growing inter-class struggles or intra-elite conflict with greater potential for a transition to democracy. As the country gets wealthier, new rent streams are also at the autocrat's disposal to co-opt new elites, as Hertog (2013) notes is a common phenomenon in the MENA private sector.

[11] RST explains leader tenure via the mechanisms of either buying-off citizens with natural resource rent distribution or quashing opposition and dissent through resource-funded oppression. For discussion on oil and its relation to regime type, see Dunning (2008). I account for this by including the log of total fuel income per capita in real 2007 dollars from Haber and Menaldo (2011).

[12] Drawing on work by Wright (2008), I use Fearon, James and Laitin (2003) measure of ethnic fractionalization due to its theorized role in the onset of intrastate conflict. Huntington (1991) argues that countries with predominantly Muslim citizens and Islamic institutions may be more prone to authoritarianism, so I include the proportion of the population that is Muslim. Ansell and Samuels (2014) also control for ethnic fractionalization and Muslim majority populations in their models predicting autocratic durability, following Boix (2003) and Przeworski (2000).

[13] As in previous models of land reform, I measure bureaucratic state capacity as relative political extraction (RPE) to make sure that autocratic exit is not simply a function of weak state capacity.

[14] A logged value of military per capita expenditure as a proportion of GDP approximates the country's repressive capability. To capture more specific measures of interest, I include the percentage of secondary school enrollment for all citizens aged 15 to 64 (Barro and Lee, 2016) as a measure of the state's ability to co-opt new groups through the provision of public goods, as well as the annual change in military spending per capita.[15] The intuition for this repression measure is that if an autocrat focuses more on extending the state through repressive more than cooptive means, the ruler is less insulated from threats of ouster.

Andersen et al. (2014) argue that repressive state capacity is more critical to authoritarian stability due to citizens' lack of "voice" in the political system.

[16] Scholars have also considered urban populations as threatening to authoritarians' rule due to their numerical superiority to the selectorate. Wallace (2013) theorizes that larger cities have greater capacity for collective action and lobbying for redistribution. To account for this hypothesis, I use urban population data from the United Nations Population Division's World Urbanization Prospects (2009) to calculate the proportion of the population that live in the capital city.

[17] colonizer identity comes from the Correlates of War (COW) dataset.

[18] Regime type classifications were taken from Geddes et al. (2014)

Table 4.3 BCSTS Logit Models of Land Reform's Effect on Irregular Leader Exit

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Conservative LR	2.440	0.949	1.664	3.254	3.283
	(1.310)	(1.030)	(1.759)	(3.800)	(2.682)
Radical LR	4.002*	4.729**	12.84**	21.08*	74.46***
	(2.344)	(2.746)	(12.23)	(32.07)	(63.04)
RPE (Agri)	0.492*	0.338*	0.296*	0.300	0.210*
	(0.140)	(0.157)	(0.172)	(0.308)	(0.132)
% Sec. School Enroll.		0.899	0.911	0.891	0.947
		(0.0621)	(0.0571)	(0.0904)	(0.0995)
Mil. Spend PC		0.999	0.999	0.998	0.997*
		(0.00104)	(0.00117)	(0.00164)	(0.00129)
Δ Mil. Spend PC		0.990	0.983	0.983	0.982
		(0.00562)	(0.0120)	(0.0119)	(0.0135)
Log(PCI)			3.664*	1.167	2.660
			(1.892)	(1.238)	(2.964)
Log(TFI)			0.887*	0.850**	0.903
			(0.0510)	(0.0482)	(0.0818)
% Muslim			0.926	1.211	0.947
			(0.0582)	(0.184)	(0.118)
Civil War 10			3.120	3.693	3.181
			(2.512)	(3.135)	(2.335)
British Col.				317.1**	
				(690.3)	
French Col.				1.462	
				(1.621)	
Italian Col.				92.10*	
				(177.4)	
Military Regime					10.86**
					(9.029)
Monarchy					0.387
					(0.846)
Party					0.130
					(0.152)
Observations	816	639	609	609	609
Pseudo R^2	0.222	0.299	0.354	0.388	0.431
AIC	235.0	162.8	152.4	143.8	137.4
BIC	282.0	216.3	209.8	196.7	194.7

Exponentiated coefficients; Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

The results in Tables 4.3 and 4.4 find that radical reform consistently correlates to increased odds of irregular leader exit. These findings are robust to the inclusion of the autocrat's ability to fiscally extra and coerce via repressive means, although the odds of irregular exit decrease with each unit increase both variables (albeit not always at conventional levels of statistical significance). In Table 4.3, All colonizer identities (Model 4) are associated with an increased odds of autocratic exit when compared to non-colonized countries, although only British and Italian histories are significant. In Model 5, being a military regime is positively correlated with autocratic exit, which is consistent with the literature on military regimes and the potential for coups and counter coups. Even given the significance of military regime type, the main effects hold. My measures of the autocrat's effort to extend repressive and cooptive state capacity are associated with a decrease in the odds of leader exit, although not at conventional levels of significance. These results hold in Table 4.4, where unit increases in openness (Model 3) and ethnic fractionalization (Model 4) are significantly associated with higher odds of the autocrat's removal from power, while receiving more US Aid decreases those odds, consistent with the expectations of Yom (2011).

Table 4.4 BCSTS Models of Land Reform's Effect on Irregular Leader Exit, Cont'd

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
					3
Irregular Exit					
Conservative LR	0.742	0.756	1	1.101	1.800
	(0.811)	(0.906)	(.)	(1.201)	(1.994)
Radical LR	3.847**	5.219***	4.660*	5.691***	12.68*
	(1.756)	(1.970)	(2.844)	(2.211)	(15.16)
% Sec. School Enroll.	0.892	0.884	0.952	0.865	0.806
	(0.0927)	(0.0607)	(0.0782)	(0.0718)	(0.107)
Δ Mil. Spend PC	1.000	0.999	1.000	0.999	0.999
	(0.000550)	(0.000692)	(0.00130)	(0.000702)	(0.000961)
Mil. Spend PC	0.991**	0.993	0.996	0.991	0.980
	(0.00330)	(0.00489)	(0.00520)	(0.00624)	(0.0140)
RPE (Agri)	0.347	0.439*	0.905	0.530	0.103***
	(0.208)	(0.164)	(0.688)	(0.205)	(0.0627)
Log(PCI)	1.612*	1.732*	0.928	1.735*	2.584***
	(0.368)	(0.393)	(0.365)	(0.461)	(0.736)
Log(TFI)	0.868*	0.835**	0.844*	0.844**	0.864*
	(0.0513)	(0.0489)	(0.0686)	(0.0472)	(0.0574)
Rural Inequality	0.991				
	(0.0289)				
Prop. of Pop. in Capital		0.981			
		(0.0249)			
Openness			1.000***		
			(1.45e-08)		
Ethnic Frac.				1.026*	
				(0.0124)	
US Aid					0.682***
					(0.0716)
Observations	495	681	500	681	382
Pseudo R^2	0.222	0.282	0.262	0.289	0.373
AIC	166.1	174.3	117.0	173.0	97.31
BIC	220.8	242.1	176.0	240.9	140.7

Exponentiated coefficients; Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

As a final test of my theory, I add interaction terms to the my base models of autocratic exit. I interact the type of land reform with observed rates of secondary schooling (Table 4.5, Model 1) and the change in annual military spending per capita (Model 2). These interaction terms capture the state building priorities of the autocrat while land reform is underway.

Although by no means conclusive, these results are suggestive of an important interaction effect between the type of land reform and the subsequent state building strategies that the autocrat elects to pursue. In both models, the independent effect of radical reform is still significantly associated with increased odds of leader exit. Although the coefficients on conservative reform are also positive, they are not significant. The independent effect of a unit increase in secondary schooling decrease the odds of leader exit, albeit not within conventional levels of statistical significance. The odds of leader exit significantly decrease by a factor of .376 with every unit increase in the interaction term interaction between schooling and radical reform. There is no interactive effect of conservative reform and the extension of cooptive state capacity. Figure 4.1 depicts the marginal effect of radical reform on autocratic exit as secondary schooling increases. The probability of irregular exit quickly becomes indistinguishable form zero, but the pattern conforms to my theoretical expectation that more provision of cooptive institutions benefit the autocrat and prolong his tenure, even after pursuing radical reform.

In Model 2 (Table 4.5), we see the opposite effect. The interaction between the change in military spending per capita and land reform increases the odds of failure for both types of land reform. But given the significance and magnitude of radical reforms (still significant) positive relationship with leader exit, this finding suggests that an autocratic focus on extending the repressive capacity of the state actually harms his chances of survival. The marginal effects of radical reform on leader exit are shown in Figure 4.2, where as military spending per capita increases, the probability of ouster increases.

Table 4.5 BTSCS Logit Models of Land Reform Type and State Building Strategy: An Interactive Effect on Irregular Leader Exit

	(1) Cooptive	(2) Repressive
Conservative LR	379.5	1.702
	(1627.3)	(1.888)
Radical LR	42.51***	6.999*
	(46.76)	(5.520)
% Sec. School Enroll.	0.889	0.880
	(0.0595)	(0.0905)
Conservative LR × Sec. School Enroll.	0.0332	
	(0.0869)	
Radical LR × Sec. School Enroll.	0.376*	
	(0.173)	
Δ Mil. Spend PC	0.998	0.987**
	(0.000900)	(0.00467)
Conservative LR × Δ Mil. Spend PC		1.013*
		(0.00600)
Radical LR × Δ Mil. Spend PC		1.013**
		(0.00483)
Observations	639	639
Pseudo R^2	0.322	0.318
AIC	160.4	161.2
BIC	218.3	219.2

Exponentiated coefficients; Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Fig. 4.1 Average Marginal Effect of Radical Land Reform on Leader Exit as Secondary Schooling Increases (Model 1, Table 4.5. 95 Percent CIs)





Fig. 4.2 Average Marginal Effect of Radical Land Reform on Leader Exit as the Change in Military Expenditure Per Capita Varies (Model 2, Table 4.5. 95 Percent CIs)



4.4 From Cross-National to Case Study Analysis

Although medium-N analyses are helpful for identifying broad patterns in the data, case studies are necessary to process trace autocratic motivations for pursuing land reform, and the factors that complicated the leader's continued rule after enacting reform. I therefore use the findings in this chapter to motivate my case selection to unpack the redistributive legacies of colonial rule in independent autocracies.

Case study analysis engages in the "intensive study of a single unit for the purpose of understanding a larger class of smaller units" (Gerring, 2006, 17). I use cases that are similar across many variables of interest so that I can attempt to isolate the independent effect of variables of interest on outcomes important to that study. I select cases from within a set of British colonies to keep the identity of the imperial power consistent.[19] From there, I subset colonies that began as monarchies: Jordan, Iraq, and Egypt. I then pair these cases to analyze both outcomes in my two step argument.

First, I examine how variation in the colonial elite coalition led to different demands for land reform in Jordan and Iraq. Both colonies were classified as British Mandates and came into being after the first World War. Both territories had previously been governed under smaller Ottoman administrative units and were cobbled together as new "patchwork" nation states. The elite coalition that emerged in both countries, however, diverged starkly in terms of their inclusivity. In Jordan, the elite coalition drew upon elites from across Palestine and Transjordan, whereas the Iraqi elite were primarily from Baghdad. Although landed elites were present in nearly equal measure at the highest levels of government, the exclusivity of the Iraqi elite coalition resulted in a close-knit cadre of elites who rarely allowed new entrants to their small but immensely powerful group. After independence, demands for land reform from rising elites were frequent and intense. In Jordan, however, the inclusivity of the elite coalition allowed for new elites to rise to the level of decision-making power. This

[19] See Lawrence (2013) for analogous reasoning on examining the emergence of nationalist movements from within a single empire.

inclusivity resulted in more muted demands for elite expropriation and land redistribution after independence.

Post-reform leader tenure in Jordan and Iraq mirror the cross-national empirical results in this chapter. Modest demands for reform in Jordan result in conservative reforms, whereas intense demands in Iraq push Qassim to quickly adopt radical land reform in 1958. Yet, to understand why radical reforms may pose a threat to the autocrat himself, I need to introduce an additional case where the autocrat enjoyed a long tenure despite pursuing radical reform. To that end, I compare Iraq with the case of post-revolutionary Egypt. Again, these cases are similar across a number of measures. Both redistributive regimes came to power through military coups against British-backed monarchical regimes. Both inherited exclusive coalitions from the colonial period, and both enacted land reform less than ninety days post-revolution.

The outcomes in autocratic tenure, however, couldn't be more different. The Egyptian president, Gamal Abdul Nasser, manages to survive not only the period of land reform, but successive domestic and international challenges until his natural death in 1970 from heart failure. Qassim, however, fails to consolidate a loyal support coalition, and in 1963 is ousted and executed in a bloody military coup. By carefully comparing the state building priorities of these two radical reformers, I find that Nasser invested much more in extending the cooptive capacity of the state, whereas Qassim doubled down on building up repressive capacity. Qassim's strategy failed to attract reliable allies, and he was left vulnerable to insider coups from within his own military-based launching organization. Nasser's strategy created both mass and elite buy-in, insulating him from threats. Through two sets of structured case comparisons, I am able to account for the cross-national findings presented in this chapter.

4.5 Conclusion

This chapter provided cross-national quantitative support for a sequential pathway from land reform to leader tenure outcomes. I showed that colonial legacies of inclusive or exclusive elite coalitions may condition the intensity of redistributive demands placed upon post-colonial autocrats. When the autocrat inherited exclusive coalitional legacies and in the presence of a numerous and organized *effendiyya* class, demands for land reform were at their most intense. In response, autocrats often pursued radical land redistribution. Conservative reforms, however, were not predicted by these factors, indicating that such intra-selectorate rewards were more discretionary for autocrats, and particularly for those seeking to maintain their incumbent inclusive coalition.

I then explored how my land reform typology affected the autocrat's tenure prospects. Radical reforms consistently correlated with a greater likelihood of irregular leader exit. Interacting land reform type with autocrat's preferences for cooptive or repressive state building, however, provided a potential explanation for the variation in autocratic tenure outcomes for radical reformers. Autocrats that pursue cooptive state building post-reform reduce the threat that radical redistribution poses to their tenure, while autocrats that focus on expanding the coercive apparatus increase their probability of irregular exit.

In the chapters that follow, I present structured case comparisons to process trace both outcomes. In Chapter 5, I compare the development of elite coalitions in Iraq and Jordan. In Chapter 6, I show how Iraq's exclusive elite coalition impeded the entrance of rising elites and resulted in higher demand for radical reform. The Jordanian inclusive coalition was more amenable to new elites, and as a result redistributive demand was less intense. King Hussein only enacted conservative land reforms after averting an attempted coup, and the reforms benefited incumbent elites. In Chapter 7, I focus on the variation in leader tenure outcomes between radical reformer cases by comparing Egypt and Iraq. Although both military regimes inherited exclusive elite coalitions from British colonial rule, Gamal Abdul

Nasser was able to implement radical reform without succumbing to ouster, whereas Iraq's Abdul Karim Qassim was overthrown by a military coup five years after his radical reform program began. I argue these divergent outcomes were due to Nasser's explicit focus on providing cooptive institutions, whereas Qassim relied on expanding repressive state capacity during the critical early years of land reform. As a result, Qassim failed to attract supporters from non-military elite actors and underclasses, leaving him vulnerable to ouster.

Chapter 5

Elite Coalition Inclusivity in Jordan and Iraq

In this chapter, I examine the role of landed elites in Jordanian and Iraqi elite coalitions during the colonial and early independence periods. I have argued in previous chapters that inclusive elite coalitions forestall elite demands for redistributive land reforms post-independence, while exclusive coalitions foment support for radical land reform among marginalized elites. The evidence presented in this chapter supports this argument. To capture the degree of landed elite representation in each coalition, I use a new dataset of ministerial appointments in both countries from 1920 to 1967. I find that Jordan and Iraq do not differ significantly in the proportion of ministers drawn from the landed class. These cases diverge, however, along two important metrics of inclusion: geographic representation and the selection of first-time ministers into the executive cabinet. In Jordan, a broad array of localities are represented among ministers, and there is a high frequency of freshman ministers in colonial and post-colonial cabinets. In Iraq, however, ministers hail primarily from the capital city, Baghdad, and new ministerial appointees are rare in the decades before the 1958 Revolution.

The question of who rules is one of the most fundamental questions of empirical political science (Putnam, 1976, 2). In non-democratic contexts, the appointment of ministers sheds

light on the composition of a regime's elite coalition and the relative power enjoyed by certain regions, classes, or ethnic groups. Ministerial cabinets serve as a locus of power-sharing (Arriola and Johnson, 2014, 11), and are shown to have tangible impacts on the distribution of state services and resources (Hodler and Raschky, 2014; Ricart-Huget, 2019). Particularly in autocracies, ministers often display disproportionate political favor for their home districts (Kramon and Posner, 2016). Examining the ministerial cabinet, therefore, helps scholars to render the "black box" of autocratic rule more transparent(Buehler and Ayari, 2018), and clarify relationship between regimes and elite actors.

In the next section, I justify the comparison of elite formation in Jordan and Iraq, followed by a historical analysis of the origins of the landed elite in both cases. I then turn to the ministerial data to describe the emergence of an inclusive coalition in Jordan and an exclusive coalition in Iraq. I conclude with a discussion of implications these findings for my general argument about coalition inclusivity and redistributive conflict post-independence.

5.1 Case Selection

Transjordan and Iraq share many features that make their comparison useful for the study of political development. Both territories were comprised of peripheral provinces ruled for centuries by the Ottoman Empire. After the Empire collapsed in the wake of the first World War, the British assumed control of Iraq and Transjordan as United Nations-granted mandates. The mandate system provided a paternalistic charter that allowed Britain and France to control their respective Levantine territories until such time that they were deemed "ready" for independence. Colonial rule in Transjordan and Iraq created new nation states with little regard for locally-accepted boundaries and political realities. Until the establishment of these mandates, neither country had ever been administered as a unified polity.

The establishment of "twin" Hashemite monarchies with British backing also lends strength to the comparison of elite development in Iraq and Transjordan. The Hashemite

family were the rulers of the Hijaz region in the Arabian peninsula in the early 19th century. As the Ottoman Empire showed signs of collapse during World War I, the Hashemite Sharif Hussein corresponded with the British, promising to launch an Arab Revolt against the Ottomans in exchange for post-war Arab independence.[1] Hussein's sons, Faisal and Abdullah, led the revolt in support of the Allies throughout Greater Syria. When an Arab military force occupied Damascus in 1918, Faisal was declared king of Greater Syria. He was forced to relinquish his title after the French announced their intentions to invade and establish a mandate in Lebanon and Syria. After a period of exile in London, Faisal was made King of the new Mandate of Iraq in March 1921. His younger brother, Abdullah, had also played a key role in the Arab Revolt. Abdullah used his martial skill and political influence to negotiate Transjordan's administrative separation from Palestine and to secure the title of Emir of Transjordan in 1921.

Given these similarities, the divergent redistributive conflicts in colonial Iraq and Transjordan become more puzzling. Economic historians theorize that colonizer identity and regime type are two predictors of political development and redistributive behavior, but with these factors held constant in Transjordan and Iraq, we must turn to alternative explanations.

5.2 British Colonialism, State-Building, and the Consolidation of the Colonial Landed Class

The colonial moment in the Middle East and North Africa was a critical juncture in state-building and class formation. Colonial governments administered territories as new national units that had previously been governed as separate territories, either by local notables or as Ottoman wilayets.[2] The economy of these territories was primarily agricultural, and the imposition of European notions of property and social organization played a key role

[1] This diplomatic exchange is also known as the Hussein-McMahon Correspondence of 1915.

[2] Egypt and Morocco are exceptions to this observation, having a longer history of statehood then most other colonized countries in MENA.

in the development of landed elite as a political class. In the cases of Iraq and Jordan, British land settlement policies forged new links between landowners and the state and were instrumental in conditioning how landed elites related to the political center. British-designed land programs in both states were underpinned by two ideological principles: a belief that individual land ownership was the most modern and efficient mode of landholding, and a misplaced understanding that pre-colonial - and particularly tribal - authority was a primordial and natural state of social order in Asian and African societies.

Land settlement, or the determination and registration of individual land rights, was applied throughout British colonies from the late nineteenth century (Home, 2006, 7). Colonizers viewed the state as means of forcing society into *uniform*, individual-based systems of land ownership. The British believed property settlement would provide a reliable system for taxation and pave the way for more efficient agricultural production. A cadre of professional land surveyors moved from India to other British colonies conducting cadastral surveys and instituting colonial ordinances for land settlement. MENA was no exception.[3]

Britain's attempt to apply these concepts uniformly across their colonial territories was confounded by the wide variation in pre-colonial land tenure arrangements. In MENA, pre-colonial land records reflected the 19th century push by regional governments to register land and recoup more tax revenue. The Ottomans in particular had pushed to register land in the agriculturally productive Arab regions during the Tanzimat reform period from 1858 forward. As an agrarian empire with mounting foreign debts, the Ottomans were primarily interested in extracting much-needed tax revenue from Arab cultivators. The implementation of Tanzimat property reforms varied from location to location, with much depending on the political skill of local Ottoman officials and the receptiveness of the population (Rogan, 2002).

The application of this policy and divergent outcomes in Transjordan and Iraq. In Transjordan, smallholders had by and large registered their land rights with local Ottoman officials,

[3]The first British land program in MENA began in Egypt in 1898. By 1907, the survey had recorded over two million parcels in 3400 villages (Home, 2006, 11).

and retained those rights as private landowners under the Transjordanian state (Rogan, 2002). Most Transjordanians held small to medium landholdings governed communally at the village or tribal level, but large tribal plantations did emerge in some regions, particularly in the Bani Sakher lands in Balqa (Abujaber, 1989). Individual rights - even if their lands were technically held in common - were entered into the tapu, or property, registry.

Ottoman reforms in Iraq titled fewer smallholders than in Transjordan. Smallholders avoided registration because they were afraid of being conscripted into the Turkish military or of a higher tax burden (Çetinsaya, 2006; Ceylan, 2011). Land registration also had the effect, however, of increasing land values. This increase made tribal sheikhs more interested in acquiring land. Land titles were therefore registered in the name of notables - mostly tribal sheikhs and merchants - who turned tribal cultivators into sharecroppers and landless agricultural labor. Landed elites thus had unconstrained control over rural wealth and populations, and served as the gate-keepers for the state's access to the countryside.

When British embarked on land tenure reforms under the Transjordanian and Iraqi mandates, they relied on Ottoman "tapu" title deeds to determine land rights. Ottoman land titles had only granted usufruct rights under the Ottomans, while the British re-interpreted tapu titles as a record of private property rights. This practice had the effect of converting local notables (mayors, tribal shaykhs) who had represented their communities to Ottoman authorities into large landowners by virtue of the fact that notables were more likely to be recorded in tapu registries. In Transjordan, the colonial land program began with a British cadastral survey conducted in the late 1920s. Using this survey to assess land values, private property rights were then allocated using Ottoman tapu records.[4] Progress was not always fast[5] (the program lasted from 1933 through to the 1950s, post-independence), but actors across classes - peasants, sheikhs, and merchants - felt that the land program served their basic interests (Alon, 2007; Fischbach, 2000, 211). Historian Michael Fischbach's meticulous

[4] Kew National Archives files CO 831/19/3, CO 831/33/5, CO 831/54/7


[5] See *Village Settlement Register*, Jordan Department of Lands and Survey, 1952.

study of British land settlement in Transjordan summarizes the overall impact of the program as fundamentally shaping the relationship between the Hashemite state and Jordanian society:

> Thousands of people had seen this very visible manifestation of the regime's existence with their own eyes. Thousands had seen the mounted police officer coming to collect the annual land taxes. In truth, government employees involved with land and land taxation offered the most visible expression of the state's existence, a state that had only existed (and then under British tutelage) since 1921. (Fischbach, 2000, 147)

This program was applied across the country (Figure 5.1), meaning that all landowners in settled regions enjoyed state-backed property rights. By 1946, the year of Transjordanian independence, the most heavily populated regions of Irbid, Ajlun, and Balqa were mostly settled. Six years later, the entire country's property rights had been determined and titled.

Fig. 5.1 Jordanian Land Settlement Progress at Independence (1946) and in 1952 (Source: Village Settlement Register, Jordanian Department of Land and Survey (n=454 villages)



In Iraq, however, the British Mandate's philosophical approach of favoring both title holders and tribal interests combined to create an exclusive and powerful landed class in Iraq. As in Transjordan, the British relied on Ottoman tapu records to allocate property rights (Batatu, 1978; Haj, 1997). When the British occupied Mesopotamia during World War I, the occupying administration made a conscious decision to revive the declining role of tribal landowners. The author of a 1918 military report wrote that tribal landowners

had been "antagonized by Ottoman officials in Baghdad, Basra and Mosul" and that a "total misunderstanding" of tribal land ownership had resulted in agrarian chaos.[6] The colonial government in Iraq understood that the Ottomans had restructured the rural order, but mistakenly viewed powerful sheikhs as victims of Ottoman corruption and incompetence, rather than beneficiaries of titled usufruct rights. To rectify those perceived injustices and to co-opt tribal shaykhs, Sir Henry Dobbs, as the British Commissioner of Iraq, encouraged colonial officers to , "[give shaykhs] a somewhat larger holding than other persons and possibly in some cases by imposing upon them the task of collecting Government revenues and taking a percentage of the expenses for collection."

The British Iraq Government applied their modernizing world view with the ultimate aims of political expediency and administrative economy. Sluglett refers to this informal alliance between the Iraq Government and the landed elite resulted in the landowners being "left as far as possible to their own devices."(Sluglett, 1976, 232). At one extreme, the British did not bother to expand the state into the tribal district of Muntafiq. They levied minimal taxes, and actually reduced the previous administrative and tax collection responsibilities that the Ottoman government had exacted (Haj, 1997, 29). As Elliot notes, while the British occasionally applied force to keep order, they "[made] the tribes more responsible and co-operative [...] by giving selective grants of land-leases (almost all of the land in Iraq belonged to the state) virtually free of tax" (Elliot, 1996, 9). Agricultural land in 'Amarah and Kut liwas[7] was under permanent lease to loyal tribal shaykhs and members of their families; 'Amarah and Kut would later become the most unequal provinces in Iraq in terms of landholding. Many reports attest to the British using land as a reward for loyal sheikhs, particularly those in Amarah liwa.[8] A confidential dispatch dated 1 April 1935 described how the "rebellious sheikhs of the Middle Euphrates" refused to quieten despite personal visits from the Minister of Interior or entreaties from the Mutassarif (governor) of


[6] Review of the Civil Administration of the Occupied Territories of Al-'Iraq 1914-1918, L/P&S/10/617
[7] Liwa was the term used to refer the Iraq province administrative unit until 1958.
[8] AIR 40/1419, FO 838/12, and FO 624/201

Diwaniyah province. The Government's inability to act led to the escalation of rural tribal violence that couldn't be put down even by British military forces, including the seizure of an important irrigation regulator and the beseigement of government offices. The matter was only concluded when the government appointed tribal favorite and large landowner Rashid al-Gilani as minister of the interior.

The British policy of awarding land to cooperative notables made a formerly flexible and locally determined pre-colonial landholding system into a state-sponsored and centrally governed system of private property rights aimed at elite patronage. The British and Iraq Government passed a series of laws that consolidated the new landowners as a class and enshrined their special relationship with the state. The first law, the Tribal Criminal and Civil Disputes Regulation of 1925, gave Arab sheikhs and Kurdish aghas the ability to hold their own courts through a separate tribal legal system, and involved them in the fledgling Iraqi political process by managing (and influencing elections). Consequently, tribal landowners were well represented in the Chamber of Deputies and exercised a high degree of local and national power. The second set of laws dealt with the question of land settlement. Official land settlement in Iraq began, as in Transjordan, with a cadastral survey. From 1927 to 1930, the British used Ottoman tapu registers and aerial photos from the Royal Air Force to survey 4287 square miles of Iraqi territory (Home, 2006, 14). The Land Settlement Law of 1932 created a new class of land tenure, miri lazmeh, that established a process for confirming the leases of landlords on very generous terms, particularly on newly irrigated lands. The Law Governing the Rights and Duties of Cultivators (1933) also gave landlords feudalistic powers over the fellaheen (Elliot, 1996, 10).

British reports on the progress of land settlement reflect a growing concern for the power of the landed elite. These policies, however, were insufficient to curb the power of the landed elite that the British had previously supported. Although the land settlement policy stated an intention"to put an end to the grant of land in large blocks to individuals [and] to settle as many small independent tenants as possible", a British-designed amendment to limit

Fig. 5.2 Proportion of Land Settlement by Liwa, Iraq 1958



large landownership was defeated by the parliament.[9] By 1938, five years after the land settlement law was passed, the process was still struggling to gain the same traction as the land settlement program in Transjordan. Although 5,461,735 dunums [10] underwent land settlement operations[11] by 1938, progress was slowed by an under-staffed survey department and by landed elite interference.[12] By the final year of the Iraqi monarchy's rule, land settlement only progressed in the red-shaded regions in Figure 5.2 with more smallholders (Baghdad), weaker tribes (Hillah), or where miri lazmeh rights were prevalent (Kut).

5.3 Land and Political Power in Jordan and Iraq

The historical record supports the argument that British colonial land policies influenced the political development of the landed elite in Iraq and Transjordan. In Iraq, these policies

[9] British National Archives, "Land Settlement", Baghdad Embassy, 1936, FO 624/8
[10] A dunum is equal to 1000 square meters.
[11] In the liwas of Kirkuk, Baghdad, Kut, Diyala, Dulaim, and Hillah.
[12] "Land Settlement" Baghdad Embassy Report, 1938, FO 624/10

resulted in a narrow alliance between rural and urban landowners who maintained an exclusive grip on power. In Transjordan, no equivalent to the Baghdadi landowning class existed; instead, landowners from across the country were brought into the political fold with relatively equal footing. The result was a relatively inclusive cross-section of elites that enjoyed political representation at the highest levels of government.

I illustrate these broad characterizations with an analysis of Iraqi and Jordanian ministers from 1920 to 1967. I used archival sources and Arabic political biographies to document the place of origin, ethnicity, and class background of each minister. Ministers names were collected from official government sources. In Jordan, I used the Official Gazette which listed the members of each government and compared them with ministerial lists published by the Jordanian government newspaper, *Petra*.[13] Biographical data for each minister, including place of birth, religion, ethnicity, and education level, were collected from volumes of Jordanian parliamentary minutes[14], obituaries published in Jordanian newspapers, political memoirs, and encyclopedias[15] of Jordanian politicians. I used Leading Personality reports from Transjordan's colonial administration housed at the British National Archives in London to determine ministers' class background, including whether or not they were from the large landowning class.[16] I corroborated ministers' landowner status by sending my dataset to Jordanian political historians[17] for validation. Out of 251 ministers that served in Jordanian cabinets from 1921 until 1970, I could not identify 17 ministers home region or class background.

[13]These lists are available in Arabic at http://www.petra.gov.jo/Include/Menu.jsp?ID=160&lang=ar&name=cms_pages.

[14]Mudhakirat al-Majlis al-Umma (Parliamentary Minutes) were accessed in the Jordanian National Library and Archive.

[15]In particular, the *Musu'at al-shakhsiyyat al-urduniyya (Encyclopedia of Jordanian Personalities)* series.

[16]The British compiled "Leading Personalities" reports in each of their colonies and protectorates. This dataset used the Transjordanian reports from 1946 (FO 371/52945), 1955 (FO 371/115636), and 1979 (FO 93/1470).

[17]Thank you to Dr. Ayoub Abu-Dayyeh, Ali Kassey, Dr. Abul Ilah al-Khatib, and Dr. Tariq al-Tell for your sharing your expertise.

I followed a similar process for the Iraqi dataset. Comprehensive lists of cabinets and ministers were based on the definitive *Tarikh al-Wizarat al-Iraqiyya (The History of Iraqi Cabinets)* (Al-Hasani, 1953), and extended using the cabinet list appendix to the *Historical Dictionary of Iraq* (Ghareb, 2004). Information about each minister's birth place and date, schooling, class background, sect and ethnicity come from the *Musu'at al-Ahzab al-Iraqiyya (Encyclopedia of Iraqi Parties)* (Al-Zubaidi, 2007), Hanna Batatu's political sociology of the Iraqi elite (Batatu, 1978), and British Leading Personality[18] reports. Out of the 230 Iraqi ministers from 1920 until 1967, I could not locate place of origin data for 65 individuals.

5.4 Measuring Elite Coalitions: Ministerial Cabinets

Comparing the composition of ministerial cabinets illuminates potential sources of inequality social conflict within the political elite. As one former member of the Jordanian Royal Court put it, " social logics govern ministerial appointments."[19] By cataloguing ministers' biographical information, I uncover broader patterns of elite representation; these patterns have strong implications for the targeting and implementation of distributive and redistributive policies like land reform.

5.4.1 Landed Elite Representation in Ministerial Cabinets

One possible explanation for Iraq's exclusive coalition might be that landowners comprise a greater share of cabinet appointments than they do in Jordan. A comparison of ministers' class background, however, shows relative parity with regard to landed elite representation in the cabinet. Figures 5.3 and 5.4, with both countries' cabinets drawing over 30 percent of appointed ministers from among the landed elite.

[18] I referenced Iraqi Leading Personality reports from 1920 (CO 1073/52), 1945 (FO 371/45353), and 1957 (FO 371/128039).

[19] Interview with Ali Kassay, former speech writer for the Royal Court. Amman, Jordan, 9 July 2017.

An individual-level comparison of landed elite minister profiles shows that the composition of this group varies between Iraq and Jordan. In Jordan (Figures 5.3), the first eight cabinets were dominated by foreign advisors, and thus had no Transjordanian landed elites at all. Without executive positions, there may have been limited opportunities for landed elites to capture the policy-making process. The landed elites in later cabinets represented diverse constituencies. Khalid Abu-Al Hoda's third cabinet in 1929 was the first to include Transjordanian landed elites, including the Ammani Circassian landowner Said al-Mufti and Audeh al-Qasus, a Christian tribal landowner from the southern region of Karak. From 1929 until 1947, cabinets consistently drew over 30 percent of appointed ministers from the landed elite from across several districts; these landed elites held key portfolios as prime ministers, as well as ministers of interior and finance. As the state grew in the late 1940s and early 1950s, new ministries were added and portfolios were extended to up-and-coming technocrats. Even during this period of ministerial expansion when landed elites held proportionally fewer posts, they retained their positions of power in the Prime Ministry and ministries of finance, economy, defense, and interior.

In Iraq as in Transjordan, (Figure 5.4) between 30 and 40 percent of the average cabinet Iraqi cabinet pre-1958 came from the landed elite. But unlike Transjordan, where most ministers in the 1920s were foreign, the Iraqi state included landed elites from the beginning of the Mandate in 1920; early involvement of landed elites in policy-making meant a greater degree of influence over policy-making. There is also a potential incumbency effect where previous landed elite ministers may choose to elevate others from their to important appointments. Furthermore, most of the landed elite ministers originated from Baghdad and neighboring districts like Kadhemain, centralizing executive power within the Baghdadi elite. Non-Baghdadi tribal landed elites were often awarded seats in cronyistic parliament and played an important role in ratifying policies favored by ministers, the monarch, and the British administration.




Fig. 5.3 Percentage of Landed Elites Per Cabinet




Fig. 5.4 Percentage of Landed Elites Per Iraqi Cabinet

Geographic Political Inclusion

Figures 5.5 and 5.6 show how the Transjordanian regime appointed ministers from diverse localities, reflecting the national character of the Hashemite elite coalition. Figure 5.5 shows the number of ministers by city of origin, where yellow indicates Transjordanian cities and blue represents foreign cities. The capital Amman is shaded in red. In the period from 1921 to 1970, most ministers were drawn from the Palestinian cities of Jerusalem and Nablus, while the East Bank cities of Salt and Karak contributed the next greatest number. Despite its status as the capital, only twelve ministers were originally from Amman. Figure 5.6 shows the cumulative number of ministers from Jordanian provinces over time, showing that the north (Irbid), center (Balqa), and southern (Karak) regions were well-represented among minister cabinets, and that these regions consistently outpaced Amman in appointees from the 1930s until 1970.




Fig. 5.5 Number of Jordanian Ministers By City of Origin




Fig. 5.6 Regional Distribution of Ministers (Cumulative)

This diversity reflects the colonial state-building processes brought peripheral regions under the political authority of Amman. Rather than building a series of narrow alliances with a small group of elites, King Abdullah pursued a policy that was spatially diverse and allowed for the elevation of new elites. Both the process of land settlement and the expansion of education throughout the country brought Transjordanians under the authority of the Hashemite state. At the same time, these one-to-one relationships also created a broad and inclusive state-society relationship that is reflected in the composition of the elite coalition.

The Jordanian elite coalition, by virtue of its inclusive and national nature was more amenable to admitting new entrants and was not as divided between classes or geographies. As the *effendiyya* grew in number and became more organized, the colonial regime began recognized their political power. Indeed, the lines between the *effendiyya* and the landed elite are not always clear cut. Suleiman al-Nabulsi came from a mercantile landed elite family, but he also emerged as a leader of the *effendiyya*. His university education meant that he first worked for the state as school teacher before joining the bureaucracy, and was appointed Minister of Finance in the early 1950s. This political flexibility enabled the




Fig. 5.7 Number of Ministers Per City of Origin

Hashemite regime to pivot when necessary away from its traditional base to accommodate strong political demands from the opposition.

Figure 5.7 shows the extent of Baghdad's out-sized representation in Iraqi politics. Over 100 of Iraq's 212 ministers came from Baghdadi families, and Mosul - the second most represented city - contributed just twenty. Although ministers included individuals from Iraq's Shia majority and other minorities[20] there was clear marginalization of non-Sunni and non-Arab ethnic groups, in part because of the heavy dominance of Baghdadi elites.

5.4.2 New-Entrants

In addition to geographic representation, cabinet inclusivity can be measured by the number of new ministers in each cabinet. Over-reliance on the same ministers signals low prospects for political advancement for non-incumbents. In Iraq, landed elites and their Baghdadi allies

[20] including Christians, Jews, and Kurds

blocked new political actors from positions of political power.The cabinet showed signs of geographic diversification during the 1950s, and but several of the new members were related to established politicians by marriage or through other social connections (Batatu, 1978). Whereas new appointees accounted for about 50 percent of the average Transjordanian cabinet, the Iraqi average was about 25 percent. In the 1950s, Muhammad Fadhil al-Jamali's second and third cabinets had no new faces, nor did Nuri al-Said's fourteenth and final cabinet. Even when new ministers were admitted, they were often drawn from among the educated sons of privileged Baghdadi or landed families.




Fig. 5.8 Percentage of Ministers Per Cabinet in First Appointment




Fig. 5.9 Percentage of First Time Ministers Per Iraqi Cabinet

5.5 Elite Coalitions, Inclusivity, and Post-Colonial Redistributive Demands

Transjordan's broad and flexible elite coalition did not neutralize elite dissent completely. After British granted Transjordan independence in 1946, the shadow Britain loomed large over the kingdom as British military advisors were retained and maintained control over the Arab Legion. Redistribution became an even more pressing issue after the creation of Israel in 1948. Hundreds of thousands of Palestinian refugees crossed the border into Transjordan, increasing the population by almost 20 percent overnight.[21] The influx of Palestinians added fuel to the fire, both by making apparent the need for redistributive reform and by putting pressure on the long-standing Hashemite social contract. The nationalist challenge to the Hashemite regime accelerated after the assassination of King Abdullah in 1951 (Robins, 2004). The succession crisis that followed resulted in the young King Hussein's coronation. King Hussein drew upon political practices rooted in the colonial period to balance turbulent post-colonial politics. The Hashemite elite coalition had historically been inclusive, both in terms of elevating new political elites from among a new class of educated bureaucrats (the *effendiyya*) and in drawing from diverse geographies. As he sought to establish his new rule, he alternated between favoring new reformists from the *effendiyya* and traditional elites from his grandfather's reign.

Reformist *effendis* from within the bureaucracy viewed agricultural development as both economically and politically necessary. More radical elements among them called for radical land reform (especially in the socialist and communist parties), but by and large the *effendiyya* demanded reforms that emphasized economic development over social re-engineering (Al-Hajaj, 2001). Land policy and rural development at the forefront of these demands, particularly because the majority of the country's labor force worked in agriculture (Kingston, 2002). These demands became more pressing after the creation of the state of

[21] This figure does not include the 280,000 Palestinians who lived or became displaced to the West Bank, which was annexed by Jordan between 1949 and 1967.

Israel and the population of Transjordan multiplied as Palestinian refugees arrived in waves. Leftist elements among the Transjordanian *effendiyya* banded together with Palestinian communist and nationalist *effendis* to lobby the government for state-led development in agriculture and public services.

These dynamics came to a head in 1957, when leftists from the *effendiyya* won a majority in Parliament. King Hussein invited Suleiman al-Nabulsi, as head of the National Socialist Party (NSP) and largest share of parliamentary seats, to form a government. For a few months, the *effendiyya* had decisive control over Jordanian policy. However, the increasingly radical line taken by the *effendiyya* resulted in regime backlash, where the government was dissolved, and after an attempted military coup, the regime disbanded political parties, imprisoned dissidents, and reverted to its traditional landed elite base in ministerial appointments. Soon after, however, the regime began to include more balanced representation from the *effendiyya*, both Transjordanian and Palestinian. Under this configuration, land reform was announced in 1958 as a developmental response to the on-going crisis of rural poverty that had been a key *effendiyya* demand throughout the 1950s.

In the Iraqi case, the political privilege enjoyed by landed elite (Baghdadis and their shaykhaly allies) was one of the most profound legacies of British colonialism in Iraq and a driving force in the 1958 Revolution. *De jure* British colonialism ended in 1932, but British advisors remained in-country until after the July Revolution of 1958 which overthrew the Hashemite monarchy. After a decade of reduced involvement, the British re-occupied Iraq during World War II after a pro-Axis coup threatened British interests in the Near East theatre. Coupled with lingering British involvement in Iraqi domestic affairs, landed elites and veteran politicians continued to monopolize Iraqi politics. Throughout the post-war 1950s, rising redistributive demands increasingly targeted the landed political elite, their disproportionate political power, and their influence in rural Iraq.

During the 1930s and 1940s, a professional elite emerged that included “lawyers, students, journalists, doctors, superior shopkeepers, commercial employees, higher technicians,

middlemen and ex-officers" who were aggrieved by a "lack of active outlets in public life and especially by its failure to break into the ruling circles." (Gabbay, 1978, 48). The most popular ideological currents were communism and Ba'athism. As early as the 1930s, this rising class voiced progressive liberal and socialist ideals, many of whom participated in the influential Ahali Group Batatu (1978). Members of the Ahali Group founded the Popular Reform Society under Hikmat Sulieman's government in 1936, calling for distribution of land among peasants and protection of rights of working class.[22] Founded in March 1934, the Iraqi Communist Party (ICP) was the first communist party in the region and constituted a radical break from the nationalist al-Ahali Group. During the 1930s, reformists sympathetic to the *effendiyya* came in and out of power during this period with few observable changes in policy. The Hashemite regime declared communism illegal in 1937. Underground cells proliferated during the 1940s and 1950s as education increased and leftist ideology became popular with students. By 1954, some 85 percent of all students of secondary and higher institutions of learning belonged to the General Association of Iraqi Students, known to be a Communist front organization (Gabbay, 1978).

The *effendiyya*'s main strength was their large numbers and their capacity to organize politically. Parties began to coordinate across ideological lines in 1956, when the United National Front[23] issued a platform declaring their demands for complete independence, abolition of the Baghdad Pact, eradication of feudalism, democratic rights, Arab solidarity against imperialism and Zionism. The United National Front also connected with disgruntled army officers via the Central Committee of Free Officers who shared these political views. The *effendiyya*'s focus on agrarian solutions to the redistributive conflict were a relatively late development. Even the ICP, the most radical party of the group, did not demonstrate any special interest in agricultural issues until 1948, preferring to work with urban working class. The ICP and other *effendiyya*-led political parties had little involvement or presence in rural Iraq, and the party's pivot toward agrarian issues in the late 1940s rather reflected a political

[22] The Popular Reform Society dissolved itself in 1937.

[23] Included the pan-Arab Istiqlal Party, NDP, Ba'th Socialist Party, ICP.

agenda based on grievances related to *effendis'* political exclusion and leftist ideals, but not pragmatic action (Gabbay, 1978).

5.6 Conclusion

British policies had a profound impact on power-sharing arrangements between elites and the Hashemite regimes in Iraq and Transjordan. The Transjordanian regime built a more inclusive and diverse elite coalition that drew on multiple classes and elevated members of the opposition elite to power during the state building period. Transjordanian ministers from across Transjordan received minister appointments, as did Palestinians from across class backgrounds. In Iraq, in contrast, landed elites in Baghdad entered into a power-sharing relationship with tribal landowners, and both groups amassed even more land during the decades of colonial rule and British influence. The British practice of delineating between the Iraqi city and village had profound consequences for the development of the new national elite. Land settlement in Iraq titled mainly powerful notables with the money and influence to acquire more land. These advantages were institutionalized with the passage of laws that transformed Iraqi agricultural into a feudal-like system during the 1920s and 1930s. This small group of elites came to dominate the state, occupying a high proportion of ministerial posts and elevating their relations to positions of political power. Also unlike in Transjordan, the *effendiyya* were confined to urban areas where the British acquiesced to popular pressure for secondary and higher education. Rural Iraq was almost completely cut off from these opportunities. As a result, redistributive conflict became an intense struggle between incumbent landed elites and rising urban *effendiyya* who saw the state as biased toward rural notables. The regime did little to elevate new elites to the coalition, relying instead on the Baghdadi and landed elite. This clash of rural and urban interests manifested in intense *effendiyya* demands for redistributive reform as early as the 1940s.

In Chapter 6, I will discuss how these divergent redistributive conflicts conditioned the nature of *effendiyya* demands for land reform. By examining the content and effects of these laws, I argue that Transjordanian land reform upheld existing power-sharing arrangements established under colonial rule by pursuing developmental reform, whereas Iraqi reforms were aimed at weakening incumbent landed elites through radical reform. Chapter 7 will substantively assess the effects of these reforms on leader tenure by examining how autocrats' strategic choices about state building can prolong or abbreviate leader tenure after embarking on a program of radical reform.

Chapter 6

The Politics of Land Reform in Jordan and Iraq

6.1 Introduction

This chapter examines post-independence Iraqi and Jordanian land reforms. Using archival and interview evidence, I examine the first set of land reforms in each country. The argument builds on the findings from Chapter 5 that showed Iraq inherited more intense intra-elite conflict between the *effendiyya* and landed elite than did Jordan. This chapter focuses on the autocrat's redistributive strategies to address these conflicts. I show that Jordanian and Iraqi land redistribution diverged according to the leaders' motivations for pursuing such reforms, the nature of the reforms themselves, and ultimately in the benefits and challenges that resulted from land redistribution in each case.

Land reforms need to be contextualized to understand both autocrat motivations for redistributing land and the impacts of such reforms on regime consolidation in the short to medium term. The post-independence land reforms studied in this dissertation represent one of a series of policies undertaken by authoritarian leaders during the state-building period intended to safeguard leader survival by directly addressing grievances of the *effendiyya*. As

theorized in Chapter 2 and suggested by the cross-national results in Chapter 4, colonial legacies of landed elite and *effendiyya* power shape the nature of the threats perceived by independent autocrats. Different types of land reforms result as different responses to these inherited elite conflicts.

I demonstrated in Chapter 5 that elite redistributive conflict differed in post-independence Jordan and Iraq due to divergent legacies of colonial state-building. In this chapter, I examine how these conflicts shaped ways in which the Jordanian and Iraqi leaders opted to address these conflicts through distinct land reform strategies. In Jordan, both *effendis* and the landed elite were constrained by their economic dependence on the growing Jordanian state. The Jordanian East Ghor land reform program preserved the extant power-sharing relationship between the autocrat and incumbent landed elites. At the same time, the conservative focus of the Jordanian land reform, the redistribution of land in the project area, and the cultivation of strong ties with a new crop of technocratic *effendis* helped to consolidate King Hussein's ruling coalition during a period of political turmoil.

In Iraq, however, the small but powerful and unpopular landed class appeared to be an easy target for expropriation and the potential gains to autocratic legitimacy through redistribution would have been tempting for Qasim. Qasim responded to *effendiyya* demands by enacting reforms intended to politically and economically weaken landed elites. Because radical land reform was a central issue for the *effendiyya*, the regime sent a credible signal to its ruling coalition by enacting radical redistributive reforms. These radical reforms, however, had negative consequences for the Iraqi regime, including increasing rural unrest, decreasing agricultural production, and cultivating reform-related grievances against the regime. Furthermore, the leader did not sufficiently prioritize extending cooptive state capacity, instead favoring the expansion of the repressive apparatus. Qasim was unable to attract a loyal elite coalition from outside the military, and as a result had no allies to insulate him from coup plotters in 1963.

6.2 Stage 1: Reforms in Political Context

6.2.1 Jordan

Redistribution and welfare were pressing issues for the Jordanian monarch post-independence. Urban *effendiyya* organized new political parties to lobby for a more open political settlement. They campaigned for social justice and improved public services to put pressure on incumbent (often landed) elites and to increase their cross-class appeal. The threats presented by the *effendiyya* against the leader were credible and occasionally violent. During the state building decades from 1946 to 1980, Jordan witnessed political protests, riots, assassinations[1], an attempted military coup (1957), and a civil war (1970-1971). East Bank and West Bank *effendis* sought to open the Hashemite social contract and force the Hashemites to redistribute through welfare services, transfers, and economic development plans.

Legacies of a relatively inclusive elite coalition did not erase redistributive conflict between regime loyalists (including landed elites) and the up-and-coming educated *effendiyya*. New educated men in the towns and cities viewed redistributive reforms as a way to open the political system even further. In the 1950s, Leftist and nationalist political parties ran on platforms of increasing welfare, particularly for refugees and the rural poor who began to crowd into Amman seeking medical care, and work opportunities.

The *effendiyya*'s political efforts focused on improving welfare provision in Jordan. In May 1948, about 200,000 people crossed the border into Jordan, tripling the population of the East Bank. This sharp rise in Jordan's population put pressure on state services and the fragile economy, and led to strong calls from the *effendiyya* for the government to pay more attention to development efforts that might benefit the rural poor. This call was not completely altruistic; by tapping into pro-Palestinian sentiments and economic grievances, the *effendiyya* were able to rally lower classes to their political causes and parties. The politics of Jordan's


[1] Most notably, King Abdullah I (1951) and prime ministers Hazza al-Majali (1960) and Wasfi al-Tell (1971).

first decade of independence reflect a weak economy and strained bureaucracy struggled to accommodate both new arrivals and Jordanian citizens.

In Chapter 5, I showed that the relative inclusivity of the Jordanian ruling coalition was a historical legacy of programmatic ties between Jordanian citizens and the state. In particular, landed elites and *effendiyya* became dependent on the state for their livelihoods, wealth, and political standing. The king leaned heavily on these elites as intermediaries linking state and society. Excising the landed elite through radical reforms, for example, would have disrupted critical social networks like tribal and business ties that the regime needed to survive. Given symbiotic relationship between the incumbent, broad elite coalition and the leader, *effendiyya* demands for land reform were dealt with through a pro-elite strategy that respected the property rights of incumbent landed elites while pursuing the developmental and redistributive aims pushed for by the *effendiyya*.

Land redistribution was touted as a potential solution to these issues by allocating refugees and landless Jordanians plots in the Jordan Valley. The Ghor, or the Jordan Valley, is a thin strip of arable land stretching along the board with Israel and the West Bank from Lake Tiberius in the north to the Red Sea in the south. The Ghor is geographically unique; the Valley floor is the lowest point on Earth, and as such temperatures remain high year-round. At the confluence of two rivers, the River Jordan and the Yarmouk, the area's high irrigation potential made the land perfectly suited for the development of capitalist agriculture. As such, conservative land reforms appeased both the *effendiyya*, by providing an avenue for economic development and refugee resettlement, while landed elite interests in the highland heartlands of Jordanian politics remained unaffected by redistribution. In fact, landed elites stood to enrich their position by accumulating lands in the Jordan Valley through the proposed reforms. King Hussein described the plan as Jordan's best chance for economic development. Land redistribution in Jordan did not arise out of a populist demand for reform, but rather as part of a broader developmentalist push that emerged in the 1950s. Agriculture was thought to be the engine of Jordanian economic growth, or as Porter put it, Jordan's "only hope" to

Fig. 6.1 East Ghor Land Reform Area (Author)



reduce economic dependence on foreign aid. The East Ghor Canal project brought 12,200 new hectares under irrigation from 1960 to 1967 (Haddadin, 2009, 50).

Land redistribution in Jordan was limited to the Ghor (the Jordan Valley), British and American development agencies viewed the region as having the potential to invigorate Jordan's economy through agricultural development and to integrate Palestinian refugees into the rural political economy as smallholders. In the press and in policy, the East Ghor Canal Project (the irrigation canal that began construction in 1958 and was completed in July 1966) and accompanying land redistribution program were publicized as a transformative economic development initiative aimed at increasing the welfare and livelihoods of Palestinian refugee peasants and the landless Jordanian fellahin.[2] The Jordanian land redistribution program was couched in language of economic development rather than populist redistributive justice.

[2]See Government of Jordan Official Gazette, 1959.


Even the most pro-opposition Jordanian periodicals, al-Difa' and Filastin, heralded the project as an important economic development initiative with potential to revolutionize Jordanian agriculture.

6.2.2 Iraq

Intra-elite redistributive conflict in Iraq played a role in the rupture of the colonial status quo and the overthrow of the Hashemite monarchy in July 1958. In Chapter 5, I showed that Baghdadi elite dominated the Iraqi exclusive coalition. Landed elites were primarily tribal sheikhs and wealthy Baghdadi families. These families, whose members made up a significant proportion of Iraq's ministers, parliamentarians, and economic elite, were among the first to be targeted by Qasim. The leader announced the Agrarian Land Reform Law in September 1958, ninety days after taking power, aiming to "abolish feudal relations...and emancipate the peasantry." The July Revolution's legitimacy drew from its anti-Hashemite, anti-colonial stance, and enacting radical land reforms was a popular decision. From the perspective of the autocrat, radical reform appeared to be a logical choice. Faced with a well-organized urban *effendiyya* who had been lobbying for land reform throughout the 1940s and 1950s, the new Prime Minister, Brigadier Abd al-Karim Qasim, sought to appease *effendiyya* interests by curbing the power of the landed elite.

These reforms cut across ethnic and sectarian divides to target all landed elites who owned properties above a maximum threshold to give up their lands for redistribution to shareholders and landless Iraqis. Large, latifundia-style estates emerged in the green, irrigated regions shown in Figure 6.2, which began in the northern Mosul region, through Baghdad, to cover the most area in the southern region of Basra. Such reforms, national in scope, had transformative potential for the lives of most of Iraq's citizen who made their living through cultivation and lived in rural areas.

Fig. 6.2 Cultivation Zones in Iraq (Source: Iraqi Ministry of Agrarian Reform 1978



6.3 Stage 2: Land Reform Content and Implementation

6.3.1 Conservative Land Reform in Jordan

The first land redistribution legislation, Law 14 of 1959, was never implemented. The proposed law remained under consideration by the Legislative Committee in the Majlis al-Nuwwāb (Lower House) from March 7, 1959[3] until June 1960[4] Jordan's land redistribution laws were passed while Jordan was ruled by martial law[5]. Under such provisions, the Prime Minister would be theoretically able to force such laws through parliament. The content of the land reforms laws and the archival record, however, shows that the process was consultative and ultimately favored the interests of incumbent land owners both within the project area and elsewhere in Jordan.

[3] *Mudhakirat Majlis al-Umma*, March 7, 1959.
[4] *Mudhakirat Majlis al-Umma*, June, 1960.
[5] In the wake of the 1957 coup attempt, King Hussein banned political parties and instituted an Emergency Law that would remain in effect until 1989.

The Jordanian land reforms established maximum and minimum areas for individual landownership within the East Ghor Project area. Ongoing negotiations saw the maximum holding go from 300 dunums[6] (1959) to 500 (1960) to settle on a maximum of 200 dunums in 1962. According to the law, amounts over the maximum threshold were expropriated, the owners compensated, and the excess land redistributed by a three-member committee to new owners according to the priories in Table 6.1. Under the final 1962 law, parcels from 30 to 50 dunums were exempt from expropriation, and any holding over that size received a scaled percentage of the excess land.[7] Column one of Table 6.1 shows how lands were allocated by each iteration of the land reform laws. Law 14 of 1959 and Law 13 of 1960 reflected a commitment to pro-welfare development policies favored by the *effendiyya*. Landowners in the project area received first priority for irrigated, redistributed land. The second priority for allocation were renters and sharecroppers, who were typically Palestinian refugees or non-Bedouin East Bankers local to the Jordan Valley known pejoratively as Ghorani and usually discriminated against for their dark skin (Aken, 2007). Redistributed lands would then be made available to local professional farmers, and then to non-local farmers from across the district and the country.

Table 6.1 Recipients by Priority in Jordan Valley Land Redistribution Laws, 1959 - 1962

Priority Order	Law 14, 1959 and Law 13, 1960	Law 31, 1962
1	Owner cultivators in the Project Area	Owner cultivators in the Project Area
2	Renters or share-croppers in the Project Area	Professional farmers in the Project Area
3	Professional farmers in the Project Area	Professional farmers residing in the same district
4	Professional farmers residing in the same district	Professional farmers living in other districts
5	Professional farmers living in other districts	Renters or sharecroppers in the Project Area

King Hussein pursued a land redistribution program couched in the language of economic development. Aware of the pressures the refugee crisis put on Amman, the United States favored a solution that involved land redistribution and the settlement of refugees

[6] 1 dunum = 1000 meters squared.

[7] Holdings of 51 to 100 dunums were reduced to 50 dunums plus 25 percent of the additional area; holdings of from 101 to 500 dunums were reduced to 62 dunums plus 17 percent of the additional area; holdings of 501 to 1000 dunums were reduced to 130 dunums plus 17 percent of the additional area. Holdings in excess of 1,000 dunums were to be allotted 200 dunums.

as smallholders in the Jordan Valley. This plan, conceived of with the United States Point IV program, the World Bank, and UNRWA, called for the allocation of irrigated plots to refugees and landless Jordanians to afford them a subsistence livelihood. Although the rhetoric surrounding the reforms subscribed to this notion of pro-poor redistribution, the land redistribution that ensued heavily favored the interests of incumbent landed elites both in the Jordan Valley and in the Jordanian Highlands. Instead of creating a rural landscape of smallholder subsistence farmers, the irrigation of the Jordan Valley via the East Ghor Canal gave rise to a new stratum of capitalist farmers that drew heavily from incumbent landowning elites.

Enacting the law was not without opposition. Landowners whose lands were subject to redistribution opposed expropriation. Parliamentary minutes from the legislative council show that incumbent landed elites were uneasy at the proposed violation of property rights by applying caps on familial landownership the project area. In particular, landowners did not like that their children's' inheritance rights might be jeopardized by the proposed redistribution.[8] Then Prime-Minister Hazza' al-Majali, himself a large landowner in southern Jordan, held sessions with local landowners to secure their agreement to the planned redistribution in exchange for government-supplied irrigation networks and social and economic development programs (Haddadin, 2009, 46). Despite these tangible improvements to their lands, many owners were not convinced and continued to dissent. The most visible manifestation of this dissent is in the evolution of successive land reform laws from 1959 to 1962. Landed elites received priorities both locally and nationally, particularly under the 1962 law.

Land redistribution in the Jordan Valley favored incumbent landed elite interests. This pro-elite bias manifests in several ways. First, the richest and most powerful landed elites in the Ghor owned vast orchards that were exempted from expropriation by Law 13 of 1960 and Law 31 of 1962. Given that orchards were predominantly concentrated in the northern section of the Jordan Valley and that the redistribution proceeded from north to south, this provision

[8] Mudhakirat Majlis al-Umma, 1959.

assured that the assets of the most powerful landed elites in the Ghor were protected. Second, local landowners fundamentally disagreed with the expropriation of their property. In the 1960 version of the law, the definition of holder was amended to allow members of the same family to receive individual allotments (Hazleton, 1979, 262).

Archival records show that although reforms favored elites, refugees and local landless farmers did receive some land through the East Ghor Canal redistribution project. By 1965, 3742 farmers received farm units in the project area. Statistical evidence suggests that the local political economy developed into a capitalist-oriented agricultural development project rather than the creation of a smallholding class. Despite the stated pro-poor orientation of the redistribution, sharecropping increased post-reform. This means that more individuals were engaged in farm work without own their own land. In addition, the average plot size also increased, suggesting that the reforms were successful in combating parcel fragmentation, but masks the reality that multiple family members received land before an excess land was expropriated and redistributed.

The Jordanian reform program also included developmentalist provisions that extended state capacity in the Ghor. An independent authority, the East Ghor Canal Authority, was established to monitor and implement socioeconomic development in the project area. This included not only agricultural projects, but also the building of roads, schools, health centers, public housing, and electricity. The provision of state services in the Ghor enabled locals to opt for alternative career paths outside of the agricultural sector, particularly for those whose families did not own their own parcels post-reform.

Taken together, these features show that the Jordanian conservative land reforms were pro-elite. Redistribution did not fundamentally alter the political or economic power of the landed class. Instead, these reforms privileged incumbent farmer landowners who were able to expand their holdings into the Ghor and gain prime irrigated agricultural land. The relationship between the Hashemite regime and landed elites and *effendiyya* consolidated during this period. King Hussein sent a strong signal that he continued to support the old

mercantile and landed elite, while also showing that he could deliver on developmentalist demands made by the *effendiyya*.

6.3.2 Radical Land Reform in Iraq

The Agrarian Reform Law of 1958 was touted as the answer to long-standing intra-elite conflict between large landowners and rise urban professionals. Political parties hailed Qasim's revolution as the dawn of an anti-colonial new order, and land reform was championed by party programs and the new leader as the cornerstone of a new economic and political foundation.

The law imposed ceilings on individual landholdings[9] throughout Iraq. Landless fellahin[10] and former sharecroppers had top priority to receive expropriated lands in 20-40 acre plots. The hope was that this would lead to the creation of an independent smallholder class. Landed elite properties, often thousands of dunums in area, were explicitly targeted for expropriation.

While the expropriation of land owners proceeded according to plan, land redistribution and settlement was much slower. This happened for several reasons. The first is that the bureaucratic elements of the state were unprepared for the difficult task of titling and registering properties after expropriation. Second, there was no explicit developmental component to the Agrarian reform law. Qasim was afraid that creating agricultural cooperatives in land reform areas would favor his political rivals, particularly the Communists who he feared would use peasant organization as leverage against the regime. Historian Samira Haj observes that while the revolutionary agrarian reform program of 1958 succeeded in dismantling the landed elite power base of the oligarchic monarchy, it "failed to complete its historical mission of social reconstruction" (Haj, 1997, 136).

[9] 618 acres in irrigated areas, 1,236 in rain-fed regions
[10] Peasants

6.4 Stage 3: Political Effects of Land Reform

Land reform in both Jordan and Iraq occurred in response to political demands from urban elites who sought to create a new political order. Jordanian reforms managed to appease both landed elites and the *effendiyya*, while Iraqi reforms fulfilled *effendiyya* demands at the expense of incumbent landed elites. These reforms both had political consequences for the regime. In this section, I argue that Jordan's conservative reforms helped consolidate the leader's elite support coalition and improved the country's agricultural output. Developmentally, the reforms may not have created a class of smallholders, but they did alleviate some of Jordan's economic and demographic pressures that threatened to exacerbate redistributive conflict among elites. In Iraq, despite the popularity of expropriation and the rapid weakening of the landed class, the Iraqi autocrat suffered several setbacks as a direct consequence of radical reform. In addition to tribal and peasant-led unrest (particularly in Kurdistan), agricultural production plummeted and rural-urban migration created a new crisis of unemployment in Iraq's major cities.

6.4.1 Jordan

Land reform in Jordan did not fundamentally alter landed elite power within the elite coalition. In practice, the land redistribution program had limited impact on the peasants and refugees, but the outcomes did help the Hashemites signal a strong commitment to key elite groups. Post-reform records from the Department of Land and Survey list local families as well as elite families as landowners in the project area.[11] Interviewees familiar with the redistribution process confirmed that it favored politically connected individuals. The daughter of an engineer who worked on the East Ghor Canal project recalled that her father quit his position due to what he called "rampant corruption" in the land allocation process.[12] A retired Jordan Valley agricultural engineer also confirmed the importance of social and political connections


[11] Department of Land and Survey, Jordan Valley Land Registry
[12] Interview with author, Amman, Jordan. July 18, 2018.

in receive land in the Ghor during the process of redistribution.[13] Awn Khasawneh, a former prime minister, has a family farm on choice land in North Shuneh that his family was reported to have received after his father represented the former owners in court against expropriation.[14] A tribal family from Salt received land and manor homes in 'Addasiyya in recognition of the tribal sheikh's loyalty to the Hashemite regime.[15] Although these allocation resemble corruption, they were also carried out in accordance with the provisions of the land reform law itself. Rather than be extra-legal, these patterns of redistribution were legislatively sanctioned to favor elites.

At the same time, reforms addressed *effendiyya* demands on the leader to provide more welfare by developing a critical agricultural region. By sending credible signals to both the landed elite and the *effendiyya*, the East Ghor Canal project was an opportunity for the Hashemites to consolidate a solid ruling coalition that would see them through decades of domestic and international political challenges. Prior to the reforms, a 1955 UNRWA survey of the Jordan Valley revealed a high concentration of land ownership. While owners of less than 100 dunums represented 84 per cent of all owners, they held only 21 per cent of the land. At the opposite extreme, 54 owners with holdings in excess of 1,000 dunums and representing only a little over 1 per cent of all owners, held over 152,000 dunums - 35 per cent of the total area. Post-reform, holders of less than 90 dunums constituted 85 per cent of all landowners and 44 per cent of the total area, while holders of units in excess of 1,000 dunums represented less than 0.3 per cent of all owners and only 9.5 per cent of the total area (Hazleton, 1979). Despite this change in the range of land ownership, anthropologist Mohamed Tarawneh found that that the structure of the laws benefited highland landowners looking to speculate newly irrigated land, or established tribal elites in the Jordan Valley who were able to distribute their previous holdings among their family members (Tarawneh, 2014).

[13] Interview with author, Agrabeh, Irbid, Jordan. August 8, 2018.
[14] Interview with local landowner, Umm Qais, Irbid, Jordan. November 2016.
[15] Interview with local landowner, Addasiyya, Northern Jordan Valley. November 2016.

Fig. 6.3 Cereal Production (Tonnes) Per Hectare



Given the developmental and capitalist orientation of Jordanian land reform, it also succeed into improving agricultural production. Figure 6.3 shows how cereal production increased after the redistribution of irrigated land began to make significant headway in 1962. The land reforms were bundled with developmental projects that extended state capacity in the Ghor. Interviewees described the Jordan Valley as the "Wild West of Jordan" prior to the establishment of the East Ghor Canal Authority. Munther Haddadin, former Secretary General of the Jordan Valley Authority, credits the success of the program to the fact that the king "respected the elites" throughout the reform process.[16]

6.4.2 Iraq

Although land expropriation was completed quickly, the process of redistribution was protracted. Two million acres of former private and state owned land passed into peasant ownership by July 1962. This was far below the over 9 million acres that was expropriated and promised to be redistributed by September 1963. Distribution also did categorically mean that new owners possessed the land directly. A tangled process of formalities, disputes, litigation further delayed redistribution. All told, only 1.5 million acres was effectively redistributed four years after reforms began. The pace of reform incurred political dissent at the elite level. Pressure from *effendiyya* members of Communist and Ba'th parties denigrated

[16]Interview with author, Amman, Jordan. October 2016.

Qasim's slow pace of reform. The British Ambassador in Baghdad confirmed this emerging crisis in an Embassy report in 1962:

> Political pressure is probably too strong for the distribution period to be stretched, even at a later date, to the fifteen or twenty years which has been recommended, but it seems possible that the comparatively practicable period of ten years may -again tacitly - be accepted. Officially, of course, the original target has never been repudiated and the Ministry of Agrarian Reform is likely to continue indefinitely its practice of publishing statistics which, while not inaccurate, deliberately give he misleading impression that land redistribution is proceeding at twice its actual rate. These statistics are intended only to satisfy Qasim and to impress the casual reader and it is not too difficult to disentangle the true picture. Indeed, the Communist press in Baghdad have done so in a number of indignant editorials, but these have so far had as little impact as earlier Communist accusations that the Ministry has gone out of its way to favor landowners at the expense of the peasants.[17]


The anger was directed specifically at Qasim, whose drives to achieve legitimacy failed to impress potential coalition members.

Qasim was also slow to offer any direct institutional replacement for the landed elite post-expropriation. By late 1961, no agricultural cooperatives had been registered in land reform areas.[18] The governor of Hilla province, a region historically dominated by large landowners, noted that demands for more schools and the provision of more police of the "security of peasants" were "continually increasing."[19] This contrasted sharply with Egypt's radical reforms, where cooperative membership was a requirement of receiving land. Sharecroppers who had relied on landowners relied now on subsidies from the Government, although often the funds were spent on consumer goods rather than investing in productive agriculture.[20] Rural productivity declined as a result. Under the monarchy, Iraq had exported cereals, and now it became a net importer. Figure 6.4 tracks the decline in cereal production after the passage of reform in 1958. Dates - once a higher source of revenue than oil - now spoiled unpicked on the trees because laborers had left. Former sharecroppers drifted from their

[17] Letter from Roger Allen to The Earl of Home, British Embassy Baghdad July 23, 1962. FO 371/164270
[18] J.M. Ross, Note on Land Reform and Cooperation in Iraq, August 19, 1961, FO 371/157706
[19] Quoted in Iraq's Rural Revolution by Thomas Talia, The Daily Telegraph April 3, 1962 - FO 371/164270
[20] J.M. Ross, Note on Land Reform and Cooperation in Iraq, August 19, 1961, FO 371/157706

holdings into towns and cities, where shanty towns of unemployed rural migrants began to put put pressure on urban areas (Fernea, 1970; Hashimi and Edwards, 1961).

Fig. 6.4 Cereal Production (Tonnes) Per Hectare



Disagreements over land reform fractured national politics at a critical moment of coalition formation for Qasim, and his response was to rely even more heavily on repressive force. The Iraqi Communist Party (ICP) who had come to power in coalition with Qasim disagreed about the role of private property in the 1958 reform. The ICP favored land reform that collectivized land under state ownership and improved small-holder farming, whereas Qasim sought to curry favor with mid-size landholders and former land managers (Gabbay, 1978).[21]. Qasim turned on the ICP and implemented an aggressive program of repression and purging. In the summer of 1959, Qasim launched an offensive against all forms of organization associated with the ICP, including peasant societies, through imprisonment, banishment, and killing. An uprising of Kurdish landlords in 1961 explicitly opposed the agrarian reform. After Qasim used bombardment and force against the rebellious Barazanis and the suspension of the Kurdish Democratic Party, the Kurds revolted against Qasim (Haj, 1997).

[21]These political differences mapped on to local organization. Peasant societies that cropped up in the early days of the new regime were politically divided between Qasim (1,310 societies) and the ICP (2,267 societies)(Haj, 1997, 124)

In this contentious environment, Qasim continued to attack its former allies and emboldened opponents in a climate of increasing alienation, the regime's popularity plummeted. Gen. Qasim was ousted by his colleague Abdul Salam 'Arif in a military coup in 1963. After a series of missteps in the international[22] and domestic[23] arenas, Qasim and his closest advisors were captured, given a show trial and summarily executed by Ba'athist coup plotters.

6.5 Conclusion

In this chapter, I compared conservative land reforms in Jordan with radical land reforms in Iraq. I broke land reforms down into three stages. In the first stage, regimes survey the political environment and make a calculation about how best to diffuse elite challenges to their rule. In the second stage, regimes design and implement reforms. The third and final stage captures what happens once regimes are under way in the short to medium term post-reform.

In Jordan, the king opted for redistributive reform that encouraged the development of capitalist agriculture and maintained the interests of incumbent elites. Although some smallholders and refugees received land, the strongest effect of the reform was increase the holdings of incumbent landed elites while satisfying the developmental inclinations of the *effendiyya*. In Iraq, radical land reforms are directly implicated in a number of destabilizing political consequences that resulted in elite conflict. In the next chapter, I argue that the type of state building projects emphasized by the leader conditions the relationship between radical reform and regime failure.

[22] Most notably the 1961 annexation of Kuwait
[23] Attacking his support base, the Iraqi Communist Party

Chapter 7

Radical Land Reform, State Building, and Leader Tenure

In this final empirical chapter, I use archival and quantitative evidence to trace divergent leader tenure outcomes after radical land redistribution. Radical land reforms carry enormous transformative potential by displacing incumbent landed elites and re-wiring the rural political and social hierarchies. Radical reforms intended to weaken the landed class are also associated with anti-colonial and progressive programs that would have been key issues for leaders seeking legitimacy post-independence. This drive for legitimacy also has high stakes, and reforms that fail to deliver quick results reflect poorly on the leader.

As I discussed in Chapter 6, downstream political effects that arise from reforms may threaten the autocrat through reputational and political costs. But how autocrats manage land reforms also matters. I argue that autocrats that choose to extend cooptive over repressive capacity stand a higher chance of surviving process of radical reform. When autocrats over-invest in repressive capacity, the regime sacrifices the ability to create new patterns of patronage and damages the credible signal broadcast to other elites by land reform. Extending cooptive institutions, however, is necessary to increase regimes control over the countryside. Cooptation through institutions like agricultural cooperatives, or to provide critical public

services like education, health, or policing that signal the leader's competent control and interest in development.

In the rest of the chapter, I use case material from Iraq and Egypt to show the relationship between radical reforms and leader tenure is conditioned by the autocrat's choice of state building strategy following land reform. Egypt shares many similarities with Iraq. Both regimes were dominated by an exclusive coalition under British colonial rule. Like Iraq, Egypt's monarchical regime was overthrown by a military-led coalition of Egyptian *effendiyya* post-independence. As in the Iraqi case, the new regime opted to pursue radical land reform against the landed class.

Comparing Iraq and Egypt allows me to confront several endogeneity concerns. First, Egypt had higher state capacity than Iraq prior to enacting land reform. This variation suggests that land reform is not contingent on pre-reform levels of state capacity, but arose from intra-elite redistributive conflict. Comparing Iraq and Egypt also allows me to confront concerns that the link between land reform and regime failure is endogenous, either due to political instability causing land reform, or that previous regime change explains downstream regime failure.

In the next section, I turn to archival evidence to show how an over-reliance on repressive state building confounded the Qasim's ability to respond to problems arising from land reform. Historical sources directly implicate Qasim's failure to realize social reconstruction through land reform as a primary factor in his regime's overthrow. Without establishing new cooptive institutions to maintain rural political and economic order, the Iraqi regime was poorly situated to manage the grievances that resulted from Qasim's land reform program. Nationalist elites supported a military coup against his regime to redress failings they perceived as being due to the regimes poor domestic performance. In sum, Qasim's attempt to cater to *effendiyya* demands through radical, radical redistribution was undermined by a lack of credible signaling and poor governance. Despite the popularity of land reform, Qassim's reputation was irreparably damaged among potential supporting elites as well as within the

military. The officers who overthrew him cited his post-reform failures as among the primary reasons for his ouster in 1963 (Haj, 1997).

I then present suggestive quantitative evidence from Iraq that shows that state capacity was lower in provinces most impacted by land reform. I use a new province-level dataset to show that these districts had lower coercive and bureaucratic levels of state capacity than other Iraqi regions. Post-reform, these regions lacked the state capacity to replace the landed elite.

7.1 Radical Reform and Authoritarian State-Building

In this section, I make the case that Nasser and Qassim's post-reform state building strategies played a decisive role in their divergent tenure outcomes. According to my theory (Chapter 2), consolidating an elite coalition is among the top determinants of authoritarian longevity. Rulers cannot rule alone, and they need to attract loyal elites supporters to insulate them from coup-threats. I argue that the most effective way to attract new coalition members is to engage in cooptive state building. This type of state building is similar to strategies enmeshment or patronage described in Albertus et al. (2018b) and Slater and Fenner (2011). Low state cooptive state capacity is a symptom of exclusive elite coalitions. Because radical reform is driven by the autocrat's fear of excluded elites' grievances, he needs to make steps toward instituting new institutions that can assist him in cooptation.

One of the most salient institutions that the autocrat can invest in concerning land reform are agricultural cooperatives. Cooperatives act as a substitute for expropriated landed elites by providing inputs and state support for farmers (Migdal, 1988). The descriptive statistics in Figure 7.1 are suggestive of a greater effort to build cooptive institutions in Egypt than in Iraq. At the same time, increased investment in the military apparatus fails to achieve the same goal; money spent on the military only invests in that institution with few spill-over

effects. The choice to emphasize the repressive over cooptive state building was one made by Qassim, as showing Figure 7.2.

Fig. 7.1 Frequency of Agricultural Cooperatives Established in Egypt and Iraq by Year of Reform (Source: Statistical Yearbooks for Egypt (1954-1962) and Iraq (1959-1964)






Fig. 7.2 Military Expenditure Per Capita in Egypt and Iraq (1945-1970) (Singer, 1987)



In the remainder of this section, I demonstrate how radical reforms' impact on leader tenure were mediated by complementary state-building efforts in Egypt and Iraq. My findings are summarized in Figure 7.3.

Fig. 7.3 Iraq and Egypt Comparison Logic



7.2 Land Reform and Regime Failure in Iraq

In the previous chapter, I presented several political effects that resulted from the Qasim regime's radical land reforms. These effects included a decline in agricultural production, consequent rural-urban migration, civil unrest, and elite grievances with the reform process. In this chapter, I argue that the Qasim regime made a critical mistake by over-emphasizing the development of repressive capacity in lieu of extending state institutions into land reform regions. Archival evidence from the British Foreign Office indicates that low bureaucratic state capacity presented a problem for the Qasim regime. Fortnightly reports from the British Embassy in Baghdad throughout late 1958 and 1959 took stock of unfolding political and economic developments. Land reform features prominently in these reports. British diplomats and intelligence agents focused on the Iraqi state's bureaucratic state capacity to implement these reforms, and also document mounting elite and rural grievances as the reforms stoked challenges to the regime's legitimacy. One year after the Revolution, the British observed that local Ministry of Agriculture staff from before the revolution remained at their posts, but did "very little work" and that most of Ministry's work was at a "standstill."[1].

[1] Agriculture in Iraq, Conversation between Mr. Eyre and Major Nocton on June 10, FO 371/141034

These inefficiencies and lack of coordination between Baghdad and local offices proved difficult for Qasim's regime. By 1961, the British acknowledged the political necessity of enacting land reform in 1958 - a decision that was "in principle generally popular [...]" but had the primary effect of creating "chaos in the countryside due to the general incompetence of the land reform administration."[2] Land tenure expert J.C. Eyre of the Middle East Development Division directly implicated the agrarian reform in accelerating the exodus of rural labor to towns and major cities, resulting in a drop in acreage planted and insufficient labor for cultivation and harvest.[3] Eyre continued to say that the Ministry of Agrarian reform:

> is doing serious damage to the country. I gathered that it has had very little success in replacing landlords by cooperatives and although much of the land has been divided, very little of it is now being cultivated. I was told that there's is a very strong communist influence in the Ministry and that it is more interested in theories than getting down to practical administration of the Agrarian Reform law. The fact that so many people are leaving rural areas for the towns must in the end cause serious difficulties for the Government unless industries can be rapidly developed in towns to provide employment. Judged by the conversations I had, it seems very evident that industries are being boosted and the rural areas and agriculture seriously neglected.[4]

Razzaq, the grandson of a trial sheikh and landed elite, described Amara[5] province's desperate conditions after land reform saying: "There was nothing after reform. You had to go to the city if you wanted to find a job. Without the landowners, agriculture in Amara collapsed. My grandfather was a sheikh and he didn't even have electricity in his house until the 1970s."[6]

British diplomats and Foreign Office experts recognized the political dangers of the languishing countryside and the Iraqi state's inability to mitigate them. Commentators were particularly concerned with Iraq's low state capacity. "It is dangerous economically and politically to allow the present vacuum created by the withdrawal of the large landowners,"

[2] *The Political Scene in Iraq*, Sir Humphrey Trevelyan to Selwyn Lloyd, June 20, 1961.
[3] J.C. Eyre, Middle East Development Division, February 25, 1961, FO 371/157706
[4] *Ibid.*
[5] Amara was infamous for the dominance of its tribal landed class and landholding there was the most unequal of Iraq's 14 provinces.
[6] Interview with author (Boston, MA, November 16, 2017).

wrote J.M. Ross, a land reform expert in the Foreign Service. "To continue as it defeats the whole purpose of the Land Reform legislation. This vacuum can only be filled by the creation of cooperatives and cooperatives cannot be created in the existing circumstances until cooperative managers have been trained."[7] By 1962, agricultural production had stagnated, although the British noted signs of improvement: "Although the administration of agrarian reform is inefficient some progress has been made [...] The peasants are not discontented and their prospects are better now that the Ministry of Agrarian Reform have cleared up the early mess and achieved some sort of organization. So long as Qasim does not interfere too much there is a good chance that agrarian reform will proceed satisfactorily."[8]

The multiple crises brought on land reform reached a political head when Qasim's political opponents used all of these factors as justification for the Ba'thist coup that overthrew Qasim's regime in 1963. Historian Samira Haj attributes the failure of Qasim's regime to the inability to complete its "historical mission of social reconstruction" (Haj, 1997, 136). Land reform's critical short-term impact was to expose weaknesses in Iraq's rural state capacity. Upon taking power, the 'Arif's new military regime focused on portraying Qasim's regime as "dictatorial" and his promises of reform as unmet. The new military government discredited the 1958 land redistribution program as a "piece of propaganda [and] false promises given to the peasants to win their support."[9] Compensating for the deficiencies of the previous land reform program, the new regime passed a second land reform law which provisions to provide agricultural cooperatives, housing, schools, and other public services in land reform regions. This factors contributed to popular disenchantment with Qasim, while the military also chafed at being forced to fight an unpopular war against the Kurds in the north, which had, in part, been brought on by attempts to implement land reform.

In the next section, I provide quantitative evidence of low Iraqi state capacity in the regions most impacted by land reform. I use two different measures of state capacity at the

[7] J.M. Ross, Note on Land Reform and Cooperation in Iraq, August 19, 1961, FO 371/157706

[8] Subsequent Developments of Agrarian Reform in Iraq, Sir R. Allen, Baghdad. July 1962. FO 371/164270

[9] transcript of official announcement from Agrarian Reform Ministry February 21, 1963 in FO 371/170497

province level to explore the hypothesis that low state capacity confounded the Iraqi regime's ability to both efficiently implement reforms and to confront the challenges that arose as a result of those reforms. In particular, I look at policing[10] as a measure of informational capacity and secondary schooling as a measure of bureaucratic state capacity to capture a wide range of state functions. My findings suggest that landed elite-dominated areas had lower state capacity than other regions of Iraq both before and after the reforms; deficient state capacity hobbled the Qasim regime's ability to weather the political effects of land reform.

7.2.1 Quantitative Analysis

I theorize that radical land reform is more likely to lead to leader exit when the autocrat relies on coercive power rather than extending bureaucratic institutions that could buy him allies and incorporate the masses. Land reforms are bureaucratically taxing, and the complexity of expropriating large landholdings and redistributing parcels to new owners requires new institutions to replace old landowners, bureaucratic and informational capacity to track landowners, and at times local coercion through police forces. Projecting regime authority across the territory requires strong state resources at the autocrats disposal to both coerce and co-opt citizens by providing patronage goods and legitimizing the regime's rule through effective reform.

In the case of Iraq, I argue that land reforms exposed weaknesses in the institutional fabric of the state. The removal of landlords left large regions of Iraq outside easy reach of the bureaucratic state. There were also social implications of low state capacity, particularly regarding national cohesion. This was particularly true with regard to education. State education was a critical driver of human capital creation necessary for development, and also for promulgating the national narrative of the new, independent Iraq. Secondary education

[10] Although policing is also a measure of coercive capacity, in this case, I use it as a measure of the state's ability to surveil and enforce its laws subnationally. Qasim's focus on was on expanding the coercive power of the military as the primary coercive institution in Iraq.

was particularly important, as a high school diploma was a prerequisite for employment in the bureaucracy or other growing professions. The extension of school also sends a credible signal to other reform-minded political elites that the leader takes their concerns seriously. Lower levels of secondary education also stymied the uptake of the type of national narrative needed to make a new coherent national identity.

Data and Methods

I use an original dataset to examine the variation in state capacity across all 14 Iraqi provinces (*liwas*) from 1929 to 1970. My dataset draws on statistical yearbooks published by the the Iraqi Government. As no library owns a complete collection, acquiring these yearbooks required extensive archival research in multiple locations, including the British Library, Durham University's Middle East Documentation Unit, Oxford's Bodleian Library, the Harvard Lamont Library, and the National Library of Jordan. These annual publications collect statistics from every ministry and sector, and thus provide an unprecedented account of the development of state institutions and the Iraqi economy from the end of the colonial period forward.[11] I digitized, cleaned, and systematized the data for each liwa to create a panel from 1929 to 1970.[12] The final sample totals 517 liwa-year observations. The level, units, and sources of my data are listed in Table 7.1.

I use two measures of state capacity. I measure informational capacity using the number of police officers per 1000 liwa inhabitants. Policing is a simple proxy for the authority of the state surveillance apparatus on a local level. I also measure patronage and bureaucratic state capacity using the percentage of the population enrolled in secondary school. Secondary education represents a level of schooling that prepares citizens for key sectors in a developing

[11] Statistical Yearbooks were published continuously until 1988, but begin to leave out variables of interest or report them at the national level. Another challenge is that administrative borders changed frequently in the post-revolutionary period (i.e., after 1958), and thus maintaining consistent geographic units will require additional methods to approximate variables of interest.

[12] The Iraqi liwas during this period are Mosul, Erbil, Sulimaniyah, Kirkuk, Baghdad, Dulaim (Ramadi from 1958), Diyalah, Diwaniyyah, Hillah, Kut, Amarah, Karbalah, Muntafiq (Nasiriyyah from 1958), and Basra.

Table 7.1 Data Sources

	Variable	Units	Source
Dependent	stud_percapita	Perc. of pop. in secondary school	Iraq Statistical Yearbooks (1929-1970)
	police_perthou	Police per 1000 Inhabitants	Iraq Statistical Yearbooks (1929-1970)
Independent	tribal	Binary = 1 if mentioned as tribal	Iraq Admin. Reports (1918)
	pumps_perkm2	Number of irrigation pumps per square km	Iraq Statistical Yearbooks (1929-1970)
Controls	oil	Binary 1 = active oil extraction in the liwa	Iraq Statistical Yearbooks (1929-1970)
	kurdish_area	Binary 1 = majority Kurdish region	Iraq Census (1946)
	elec_percapita	Electricity consumption in kWhrs per capita	Iraq Statistical Yearbooks (1929-1970)
	logpop	Population Logged	Iraq Statistical Yearbooks (1929-1970)
	logarea	Area in Square Kilometers	Iraq Statistical Yearbooks (1929-1970)

economy.[13] While both are quality measures of state institutions and capacity, I chose these variables due to their importance in building and enforcing state authority, as these would be qualities needed to overcome potential economic and political challenges arising from land reform (Slater and Fenner, 2011). In future work, I will include other dimensions of state capacity, including public employment, cooperative membership, taxation, and conscription to address the cooptive, extractive, and legibility dimensions of infrastructural power more directly.

My independent variable of interest is the historical landed elite power. I measure landed elite power using an interaction effect between a district's tribal status and agricultural development. Irrigated agriculture was the source of tribal landowners' economic and political power. To measure the influence of landowning tribal sheikhs, I use the interaction between a binary variable (0 or 1 for being included in the 1918 Administration's list of tribal areas) and the number of irrigation pumps per square kilometer. Irrigation pumps were funded by private capital from urban merchants or wealthy rural notables during the colonial period. Irrigation revolutionized Iraqi agriculture by transforming uncultivable land into productive landholdings. Increasing land values and capitalist agricultural development only served to make landowners more despotic with peasant cultivators who sharecropped on elites' large estates.

[13] University education was limited to a very small urban elite, and was often undertaken abroad.

I also control for several other characteristics, including the liwa's area, population, oil production, the Kurdish population, and urbanization.[14] Summary statistics are reported in Addendum Table 1.

Because of the panel nature of my data, I begin my analysis by estimating a series of pooled Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) with Driscoll-Kraay standard errors to control for serial correlation and heteroskedasticity in panel regressions (See Addendum Tables 2 and 3). I follow Menaldo (2012) in using a battery of robustness estimations including panel corrected standard errors and standard errors clustered by liwa and year (See Addendum Table 4). There are several limitations to my models' current specifications. First, there are likely several factors that might affect the level of local policing, including past histories of local riots and anti-state uprisings. However, many uprisings prior to 1970 originated in tribal regions, so tribalism should result in an increasing in policing if the state is sufficiently able to exercise authority and respond to threats in that region.


Results

My quantitative results provide suggestive evidence that areas with both high levels of irrigation pumps and tribal authority correspond to lower schooling and policing outcomes. Figure 7.4 shows an ambiguous and slightly positive independent effect of tribalism, and more decisively positive effect of irrigation pumps on education outcomes. This model excludes Baghdad, which being geographically situated between two rivers and being the capital region, is disproportionately wealthy and prone to irrigation, but the results are robust to including Baghdad.

Secondary education outcomes in tribal areas decrease the more intensive irrigation is in the liwa. Figure 7.5 shows that when the region is tribal, the marginal effect of more irrigation pumps per square kilometer is negative above a threshold of about .01 pumps per


[14] I measure urbanization using the amount of electricity consumed by lighting. The yearbooks report lighting and manufacturing electricity consumption at the liwa level. I use lighting electricity consumption as a more likely proxy for domestic energy use.

Fig. 7.4 Model 7: Pooled OLS model: Landed Elite Power on Proportion of Secondary Students




square kilometer irrigation. Said differently, education outcomes in tribal regions with less agricultural pumps are higher than those that are more intensively irrigated. This supports my intuition that landed elite regions had lower state capacity than other regions of Iraq, complicating the task of radical land reform.

Fig. 7.5 Model 7: Marginal Effect of Landed Elite Power on Proportion of Secondary Students as Pumps per Sq. Km Varies



The overall impact of tribalism on education is not consistent across all models.[15] As currently specified, there are mixed results to support the conclusion that landed elite regions correlate with lower secondary schooling. Qualitatively, it appears that landlord-dominated regions tend to fall in among the lowest performers in secondary schooling (Figure 7.6, plots shaded in gray denote landed elite-dominated regions.), but the models do not consistently support that conclusion.


Fig. 7.6 Proportion of Secondary Students by Liwa, 1929-1970. Grey signifies landed elite liwa.



For policing, the models show a more robustly negative outcome. Policing is lower in tribal areas with more irrigation. The British military and intelligence records often noted antagonism between the police forces and tribal militias. Indeed, one of the initial reasons the British made overtures to sheikhs was because a number of them, particularly in Muntafiq, commanded legions of armed fighters. In liwas with more landed elite dominance, state police forces are notably fewer than in parts of Iraq.

[15] See Tables 2 and 3 in the Addendum to this chapter.

Fig. 7.7 Model 8: Pooled OLS model: Landed Elite Power on Police per 1000 Inhabitants



Policing has a robustly negative relationship with the interaction effect between tribal authority and irrigation. In the absence of tribalism, the effects of both irrigation and correlates to higher levels of policing. Kurdish areas are also significantly correlated with a greater police presence, which is unsurprising due to British drives to employ Kurds in the police force and due to their frequent uprisings against colonial forces. These findings hold even when I account for the urbanization, measured by electricity consumption[16] per capita.

Policing correlates negatively with landed elite power. Figure 7.8 shows that when the region is tribal, the marginal effect of more irrigation pumps per square kilometer is negative above a threshold of about .02 pumps per square kilometer irrigation. Policing outcomes in tribal regions with less agricultural pumps are higher than those that are more intensively irrigated. The graphs of policing trends in Figure 7.9 are broadly supportive of a relationship between tribal authority and lower policing, with the exception of erratic and elevated levels of police forces in Erbil and Sulimaniyah for the reasons I mentioned above.

These findings provide preliminary evidence that liwas with high landed elite power had lower state capacity. Although Qasim's land reforms did succeed in disabling these landed elites, the reform did not insulate the autocrat from the complications that followed. As was shown in this section, coercive state capacity was lower in landed elite liwas. There

[16]Lighting only. No manufacturing electricity is included.

Fig. 7.8 Model 8: Marginal Effect of Landed Elite Power on Police per 1000 Inhabitants as Pumps per Sq. Km Varies





Fig. 7.9 Police pre 1000 Inhabitants by Liwa, 1929-1970. Grey signifies landed elite liwa.



was also mixed evidence suggesting that secondary schooling rates were also lower in liwas with strong landed elites. This corroborates secondary accounts from anthropologists and historians that chronicle the difficult conditions in rural Iraq after land reforms. Robert Fernea conducted fieldwork in the landed elite-dominated province of Diwaniyyah from 1956 to 1966. His unique vantage point allowed him to record local impressions of how land reform changed Iraq's rural political economy. As in other parts of Iraq, agricultural production and land under cultivation declined post-reform. Toward the end of that decade, intermediate and secondary schools appeared, and the number of primary schools tripled, although most men who farmed the land left for Baghdad or other cities (Fernea, 1970, 22-23).

In the next section, I use Egypt as a comparative case with that of Iraq. Egypt is similar to Iraq across many theoretically important dimensions. Iraq and Egypt were both colonized by Egypt and emerged from European rule with legacies of exclusive elite coalitions. Their respective monarchies were overthrown by coups, after which the landed elite (part of the exclusive ruling elite) were targeted for expropriation through radical land reforms. My comparison of Egypt and Iraq helps validate state capacity's role as a mediating variable conditioning leaders' probability of survival after pursuing radical land reform.

7.3 The Egyptian Alternative: Radical Reform and Extended Leader Tenure

Using the Egyptian case as a comparison with Iraq helps to address questions of endogeneity common in observational studies. We need to be convinced of two criteria to credibly dismiss endogeneity concerns. First, that radical land reform is not caused by low state capacity, and second, that previous leader exit is not the main driver of downstream brief leader tenure. Regarding the first concern, Egypt and Iraq both pursue radical land reform, but Egypt inherited much higher state capacity from the colonial and pre-colonial period than did Iraq. Pursuit of the same reform across state capacity types allays concerns of endogeneity. The

second concern is whether only flailing leaders with weak states and high levels of political conflict resort to land reform. If land reform simply added fuel to an already raging political fire, we would not expect to see different outcomes between similar cases. Instead, Nasser's tenure lasted until his natural death in 1970, after which another military crony took power. Although Nasser is able to retain control of Egypt throughout the process of reform, Iraq's reformist leadership suffers repeated irregular leader exits during the state building decades from 1958 to 1970. The Egyptian case therefore also introduces important variation in autocratic leader tenure following radical reform.

The British-backed Egyptian monarchy was overthrown by the revolutionary Free Officers and their allies in 1952. The first two goals listed in the Free Officers' Manifesto of 1951 listed ridding Egypt of the British and their domestic supporters and eliminating feudalism in rank order (Goldschmidt Jr., 2004). These changes resonated with *effendiyya* priorities of creating a more open and inclusive political settlement by espousing leftist and nationalist aims. As in Iraq, a privileged landed elite developed during the colonial period and monopolized political life. The landed elite had risen to prominence in Egypt in the late 19th century. Changes to property laws in the 1880s allowed landowners and political favorites to amass private holdings without paying taxes, and their political and economic power grew under British colonial rule (Cuno, 1992). As in Iraq, new urban *effendis* were denied the opportunity to hold high political offices or meaningfully impact national policy. Land tenure expert Doreen Warinner was in Egypt after the revolution, and observed that the diverse *effendiyya* interests that came together to support the new leader had no ideology and no unifying characteristics except for their unanimous agreement that land reform was necessary (Warriner, 1961). Much like Qasim's Iraq, Nasser's legitimacy squarely rested on their commitment to pursuing land reform. Redistributive tensions were high and public pronouncements from the government reflected their populist tack.[17] When

[17]The new Foreign Secretary is reported to have said during a speech "Down with the Pashas [landed elite] and up with the Fellahin [peasants]!" (FO 371/97023, Cairo Telegram in Copy of Minute by the Prime Minister, September 7, 1952)

the new government announced its intention to implement land reform in September 1952, the policy was extremely popular.

The Egyptian prime minister, Ali Maher, was keen to implement land reform in such a way that it was accompanied by new institutions to replace the previous role of the landed elite. Ali Maher was a veteran politician and landowner who took the task of agrarian reform seriously. He sought advice from foreign and domestic actors, including welcoming advice from British experience redistributing land in their occupied zone of Germany[18] and sending his under-secretary of foreign affairs to see the Turkish ambassador to inquire about their 1946 land reform program.[19] Cooperatives were of particular interest to Maher, which had existed in Egypt since the early 20th century but were widely understood to be under the control of the landed elite. Maher's vision of successful agrarian reform included an understanding that institutional reform was key to successful implementation. Maher also consulted with landowners prior to implementing reforms. In a press statement released by the Prime Ministry, Maher detailed a meeting where a delegation of landed elites had presented suggestions to make reform implementation more efficient and that they accepted the principle of property caps.[20]

The radical land reforms in Egypt limited agricultural landholdings to 200 feddans (approximately 208 acres). Property owned by the royal family and "feudalist" landed elite were the primary targets of the reform (Abbas and El-Dessouky, 2011). Confiscated land was slated for redistribution to former tenants, sharecroppers, and landless villagers (Binder, 1978). Although the reforms were implemented nation-wide, the effects were relatively modest. Egypt is covered by desert, and most of population concentrated in the arable regions along Nile. At the time of expropriation, 5 million peasant families cultivated as sharecroppers or landless laborers across Egypt's six million cultivable acres. Between 12 to

[18]FO 371/97023, Foreign Office telegram from Sir R. Stevenson to Whitehall, September 6, 1952.

[19]In the Turkish case, the government had restricted redistribution to state domains and had not in fact touched private property due to the conclusion that "it would stir up disorders and would damage the economy of the country."(FO 371/97023, Foreign Office telegram from Sir R. Stevenson to Whitehall, August 25, 1952.)

[20]FO 371/97023, Foreign Office telegram from Sir R. Stevenson to Whitehall, September 6, 1952.

14 percent of Egypt's cultivable areas was redistribute to over 341,000 families (Sadowski, 1991). Expropriated landowners were to be compensated over a 30 year period with 3 percent interest.

Ali Maher's cabinet announced the details of the decreed land reform law on September 9, 1952.[21] The Egyptian government decided government stewardship[22] of appropriated land and the institution of production cooperatives were the most prudent way forward.

Observers of Egypt were far from certain that the revolutionary regime would endure, and land reform introduced new challenges for the new leadership. British diplomatic correspondence after the coup highlights uncertainty of the Egyptian leader's success at the time. A handwritten note from August 1953 asked for updates on the "political state" of organized labor and the peasantry so we can "take them into account when assessing the chances of survival of the present regime."[23] Political challenges from elites and popular protests arose in the course of implementing land reform. According to one account, one landlord had gone with his retainers to try and break up the local Government Office, resulting in the landlord's sentencing to life imprisonment. This sentence was later overturned after the landlord's family visited General Naguib.[24] Agricultural production decreased as big landowners became aware that their excess holdings would be confiscated, although the Ministry of Agriculture assumed management of expropriated property.[25] As would be the case in Iraq six years later, Egyptian landlords had supplied critical inputs that modernized

[21]This announcement occurred several days before the British diplomatic consultations would come to a consensus about what advice to offer the post-coup government, demonstrating the independence of Egyptian policy design from international influences. British advice arrived several days later, and was based on previous experience in British colony of Ceylon. In Ceylon, the government first acquired the land and then allocated it via long term leases on the condition that holders join government-run cooperatives (FO 371/97023, Confidential letter from the Middle East Secretariat to the Chancery, Cairo, to September 12, 1952).

[22]The original draft of the law envisioned that land-owners may sell portions of their holdings directly to peasants. This provision was withdrawn and replaced with conditions that ensured all land was taken over by the Egyptian government before redistribution (FO 371/97023, Confidential letter from the Middle East Secretariat to the Chancery, Cairo, to September 12, 1952).

[23]FO 371/102908, Africa Office Correspondence, August 27, 1953.

[24]Secret Dispatch, Agrarian Reform Discussions, From Sir R. Stevenson Cairo, August 25, 1952, FO 371/97023

[25]Letter from British Embassy, Cairo, to R. Allen January 27, 1953 FO 371/102908

and supported agricultural production. Landlords lobbied in person and through group letters warning that large estates would not be easily replaced, and advocated instead for progressive taxation.[26]

The British diplomatic cables praised the efficiency of the bureaucracy, particularly the Minister of Agriculture Dr. Abdel Razzak Sidky for being "the best type of Egyptian civil servant" and the Ministry itself for being "perhaps the best run of all Egyptian Government departments."[27] The effects of reforms also affected the national elite. The oldest parties, including the Wafd and excepting the Muslim Brotherhood, had been dominated by large landowners. On the local level, Nasser focused intently on tapping into existing institutions and creating new mechanisms of social control that could replace the landed elite. Policing under the colonial state had already penetrated rural areas, giving the state high coercive capacity. Institutionally, Nasser used the cooperative movement to forge a tangible link between farmers and the state. Over 750,000 farmers already belonged to cooperatives by 1952. The reforms re-engineered these cooperatives to provide key services like credit, marketing, and inputs, and also made receiving redistributed land contingent on joining a cooperative. At the same time, other new institutions including health care and schools began to appear in villages, creating new links between the state and rural Egyptians (Migdal, 1988, 191).

In the next section, I use a new dataset of Iraqi provinces (*liwas*) to examine variation in infrastructural mechanisms of durability. State capacity can be measured in several ways. In order to capture different facets of the state's ability to create and sustain state institutions, I use two measures: policing per 1000 residents and the provision of secondary schooling. Policing is a measure of coercive state capacity that gives a sense of how able the state is to repress citizens and political rivals. Policing would be an important institution in maintain order and assert state authority, particularly after the expropriation of tribal landed elites who

[26]Quoted in "Critical Analysis of Egypt's Land Reform Law," Paul V. Maris, TCA consultant Land Tenure and Supervised Credit, November 5, 1952, FO 371/102908

[27]Letter from British Embassy, Cairo, to R. Allen January 27, 1953 FO 371/102908

tended to police regions with their own tribal paramilitary forces. Policing also provides an important measure of public employment, which cultivates dependence on the state through public employment. In addition, a larger police force increases the state's informational capacity. Secondary education is another measure that captures several different elements of Slater and Fenner's typology. Public schooling is an important state institution that provides tangible benefits to citizens and allows for the transmission of a state-sanctioned curriculum. Schooling standardizes the state's rule throughout a territory, increasing the legibility of the state. Additionally, providing secondary education requires higher human capital and more developed education bureaucracies than primary schools. By measuring the amount of secondary school provision, I capture the level to which these complicated processes have been implemented in each province. I discuss these findings in terms of how lower provision of important state services like policing and education signal the Iraqi state's limited capacity to administer regions where landed elites had been expropriated.

7.4 Conclusion

In this chapter, I argued that autocrat's strategic preference between repressive and cooptive state building is an important mediating variable that conditions the relationship between radical land reform and autocratic leader tenure. The literature on authoritarian durability considers state capacity to be an important element of resilience in the face of challenges to political stability. But repressive and cooptive state capacity are not substitutes; the failure to extend cooptive institutions poses particular problems after radical reforms that alter pre-existing power-sharing arrangements between local and national elites. In Iraq, Qasim faced serious challenges in the wake of land reform. Because of his fear of collective institutions, he tactically decided to under-provide institutions like agricultural cooperatives that might have brought order and credibility to his reforms. Furthermore, the spread of secondary schooling and the development of a local police force were slower in areas affected by land

reform than in other parts of Iraq. As a result, Qasim relied upon an expanded military to put out fires across the country that had their origins in the radical reform. Without attracting new elite allies, Qasim was left vulnerable to threats from within the military that ultimately overthrew him in 1963.

I then introduced Egypt as a shadow case to examine this process when more cooptive institutions are provided. The similarities between Egypt and Iraq help address endogeneity concerns and are particularly well-suited to compare radical land reforms in post-revolutionary contexts. Archival and secondary source material corroborate that Egypt made more explicit effort to provide new, state run cooperatives than in Iraq, particularly in areas where land reform occurred. The Egyptian regime therefore able to create new institutions that helped strengthen the credible signal sent by radical reform and draw new segments of society in line behind the leader.

7.5 Statistical Addendum

7.5.1 Summary Statistics

Table 7.2 Summary Statistics

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.	N
Percentage of Pop Secondary Students	0.006	0.007	0	0.03	518
Police Per 1000 Inhabitants	2.586	1.309	0.917	7.645	518
Tribal	0.571	0.495	0	1	518
Irrigation Pumps per Sq. Km.	0.015	0.02	0	0.123	518
Log(Population)	12.614	0.497	11.408	14.569	518
Log(Area)	9.875	0.914	8.573	12.984	518
Oil	0.214	0.411	0	1	518
Kurdish	0.286	0.452	0	1	518
Electricity (KwH pc)	23.255	29.694	0.044	133.518	299

7.5.2 Regression Tables

	(1. DSKSE) Education	(2. DSKSE) Police	(3. DSKSE) Education	(4. DSKSE) Police
Tribal	-0.00347***	1.020***	-0.00316***	0.921***
	(0.000657)	(0.169)	(0.000688)	(0.129)
Pumps				
per Sq. Km.	0.134***	-0.00378	0.00902	20.02***
	(0.0172)	(2.329)	(0.0405)	(2.139)
Tribal X Pumps				
per Sq. Km.	-0.0249	-42.68***	0.0599	-31.93***
	(0.0127)	(6.127)	(0.0326)	(3.509)
Log Pop			0.00693**	-0.424***
			(0.00194)	(0.0845)
Log Area			0.000298	0.0737*
			(0.000262)	(0.0318)
Oil			-0.00154**	-0.420***
			(0.000528)	(0.0812)
Kurdish			0.000470	2.356***
			(0.000628)	(0.139)
Constant	0.00599***	2.370***	-0.0831***	6.066***
	(0.00150)	(0.0647)	(0.0222)	(1.100)
N	518	518	518	518
R^2	0.233	0.194	0.381	0.669

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

	(5. DSKSE) Education	(6. DSKSE) Police	(7. DSKSE) Education	(8. DSKSE) Police
Tribal	-0.0583	1.171***	0.00318***	1.465***
	(0.0815)	(0.168)	(0.000773)	(0.253)
Pumps per Sq. Km.	-2.105	24.54***	0.384***	50.49**
	(2.786)	(3.519)	(0.0927)	(14.44)
Tribal X Pumps per Sq. Km.	5.716	-43.06***	-0.342***	-67.79***
	(3.582)	(4.447)	(0.0702)	(15.08)
Log Pop	0.384***	-0.596***	0.00406**	-0.730***
	(0.0857)	(0.0893)	(0.00139)	(0.0502)
Log Area	0.0941***	0.124***	0.00211***	0.206***
	(0.0198)	(0.0330)	(0.000334)	(0.0490)
Oil	-0.0130	-0.394**	-0.000160	-0.331*
	(0.0477)	(0.118)	(0.000489)	(0.122)
Kurdish	-0.188*	2.227***	-0.00155	2.276***
	(0.0888)	(0.238)	(0.00106)	(0.239)
Electricity PC	0.0137***	-0.00547***	0.000139***	-0.00447***
	(0.00302)	(0.00114)	(0.0000272)	(0.00102)
Constant	-5.197***	7.942***	-0.0699***	8.500***
	(1.173)	(1.140)	(0.0172)	(0.929)
N	299	299	273	273
R^2	0.516	0.716	0.491	0.728

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Robustness Checks

	(1. PCSE)	(2. PCSE)	(3. Robust (Liwa))	(4. Robust (Liwa))	(5. Robust (Year))	(6. Robust (Year)
	Education	Police	Education	Police	Education	Police
Tribal	0.000171	0.545**	0.00318	1.465*	0.00318***	1.465***
	(0.00153)	(0.172)	(0.00219)	(0.515)	(0.000724)	(0.201)
Pumps per						
Sq. Km.	0.0138	6.395**	0.384**	50.49	0.384***	50.49***
	(0.00907)	(1.955)	(0.109)	(29.50)	(0.0974)	(11.26)
Tribal X Pumps						
per Sq. Km.	0.0143	-11.39**	-0.342*	-67.79*	-0.342***	-67.79***
	(0.0144)	(3.964)	(0.127)	(30.77)	(0.0710)	(11.82)
Log Pop	0.00727**	-0.279*	0.00406	-0.730	0.00406**	-0.730***
	(0.00222)	(0.135)	(0.00246)	(0.371)	(0.00119)	(0.0469)
Log Area	-0.00000951	0.0254	0.00211	0.206	0.00211***	0.206***
	(0.000140)	(0.0228)	(0.00112)	(0.189)	(0.000358)	(0.0427)
Oil	0.00103	-0.597***	-0.000160	-0.331	-0.000160	-0.331**
	(0.00227)	(0.156)	(0.00197)	(0.485)	(0.000385)	(0.0906)
Kurdish	-0.00242	2.252***	-0.00155	2.276***	-0.00155	2.276***
	(0.00168)	(0.293)	(0.00147)	(0.379)	(0.000927)	(0.175)
Elec PC	0.000104***	-0.00405	0.000139**	-0.00447	0.000139***	-0.00447***
	(0.0000199)	(0.00232)	(0.0000437)	(0.00405)	(0.0000202)	(0.000930)
Constant	-0.0858**	5.185**	-0.0699	8.500	-0.0699***	8.500***
	(0.0293)	(1.775)	(0.0334)	(4.386)	(0.0135)	(0.850)
N	299	299	273	273	273	273
R^2	.	0.573	0.491	0.728	0.491	0.728

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Chapter 8

Conclusion

> The relations of groups of men to plots of land, of organized communities to units of territory, form the basic content of political history. The conflicting territorial claims of communities constitute the greater part of conscious international history; social stratifications and convulsions, primarily arising from the relationship of men to land, make the greater, not always fully conscious, part of the domestic history of nations.
>
> Lewis Namier in *England in the Age of the American Revolution* (1936)

This dissertation investigated how MENA autocrats attempt to resolve inherited, intra-elite conflicts through land reform. In Chapter 1, I presented a counter-intuitive empirical finding: land reform in MENA correlates with a higher likelihood of autocrats' ouster. This relationship stands counter to conventional expectations that reform under autocracy increases the leaders legitimacy and prospects for prolonged tenure. I adopted a mixed-methods approach that uses medium-N cross-national analysis paired with case studies explain why autocrats redistribute, and under what conditions this may prove detrimental to their long-term survival.

Agrarian relations has long been thought to be critical for state formation and political order. A core body of comparative politics literature examines the relationship between the landed elite and rising classes to explain democratic transition, regime type, and redistributive conflict. These works have historically omitted the Middle East and North Africa in both theory building and empirical testing. The colonial moment in MENA had a profound effect

on elite-state relations and institution building. These political features were inherited by independent states, and conditioned regimes' survival strategies. Land reform was one such strategy with far-reaching implications for political stability. I argue that understanding the relationship between regime survival and land redistribution increases our understanding of why some leaders enjoy longer tenures than others, and how reforms may incur unintended negative consequences for reformist autocrats.

In Chapter 2, I advanced a two-part argument that examined the variety land reform strategies adopted by MENA autocrats, and these reforms differential impacts on leader tenure. First, I argue that post-independence, MENA leaders were driven to diffuse threats from rising urban elites. The inclusivity of inherited elite coalitions determined how intensive demands for land reform became. In countries with legacies of exclusive coalitions, the autocrat inherits more intense demeans for redistribution than in countries with legacies of inclusive coalitions. These strong demands from previously excluded elites compel the autocrat to pursue radical reforms. In countries with legacies of inclusive coalitions, however, leaders typically inherit lower demands for land reform. When land reform does occur, it is more conservative and aimed at maintaining the patronage ties between the autocrat and the supporting elite.

The second step of the argument links the type of land reform enacted to leader tenure. Conservative reforms are more likely to prolong leader tenure. By reinforcing the incumbent coalition, the autocrat is better insulated from potential threats. Radical reforms, in contrast, carry more risk due to their higher potential for re-ordering both national and rural power relations. Post-reform, the autocrat's continued rule depends on how they choose to marshal the state's capacity to manage the changes introduced by land redistribution. At this juncture, the autocrat chooses between investing in repressive or cooptive state building to manage the process of reform. Following radical reform, repressive and cooptive state building send very different signals to potential coalition members. Cooptive reforms stand to broaden the social classes and other elites that lend support to the ruler. In regions impacted by land reforms,

the expansion of state institutions provides a state-centered substitute for the historical role of displaced landed elites, providing inputs for farming, irrigation, and other agricultural services. Finally, increased spending on welfare, health, and education signals a credible commitment to development that would appeal to the professional classes who lobbied for reform in the first place. Autocrats who follow radical reform with cooptive state building are thus better equipped to stave off threats by broadening the range of actors who benefit from their rule. When autocrats pair radical reform with repressive state building, however, the autocrat fails to enmesh the broader array of actors into their new support coalition. By disproportionately focusing on coercive institutions like the military and police, the autocrat fails to co-opt new members of the support coalition. Instead, the autocrat relies primarily on the support of the repressive apparatus for support and policy enforcement, leaving them vulnerable to the political and economic preferences of the coercive apparatus, and thus to ouster. Chapter 3 provided MENA-specific historical background to these processes, and Chapter 4 provided cross-national empirical evidence for my two-stage theory.

The second part of the dissertation turned to case study analysis. I use historical process tracing of the colonial and post-independence decades to document when particular reforms arise and what their implicates are for leader tenure. In Chapter 5, I show how the colonial moment shaped intra-elite conflicts in both countries. Jordan emerged a more inclusive selectorate that accommodated diverse elite interests. Iraq, in contrast, was less inclusive and dominated throughout the colonial period by the landed class and Baghdadi elite. Consequently, the Iraqi *effendiyya* favored more revolutionary means to redress their grievances and secure a position among the power elite under Qassim. In Chapter 6, I show how redistributive reforms in both contexts reflected these dynamics. Jordanian land reforms pursued conservative measures that catered to both sets of elites, while Iraqi reforms displaced incumbent landowners, mirroring the radical preferences of the *effendiyya*. Chapter 7 showed that hazard of Qassim's strategy of relying heavily on the military without expanding state institutions in land reform areas. Drawing on Egypt's comparative expansion of cooptive

state capacity, I showed that Qassim's emphasis on expanding repressive state capacity was a factor in his early ouster post-reform.

Conventional understandings of Middle Eastern authoritarianism are rooted in post-colonial politics. By pushing the historical narrative deeper into the colonial period, I have sought to unsettle the dominant political science theories that default to cultural or religious explanations for the region's exceptional authoritarianism. The institutional and political effects of foreign rule should be taken seriously in accounts of post-colonial state building. Accounts that neglect colonial legacies dismiss fact that the states and political dynamics inherited by post-colonial regimes were wired for control and repression rather than mass enfranchisement and inclusive participation. The logics of control favored by colonial powers conditioned how social groups interacted with the state, and had serious implications for proximate post-colonial outcomes and the longer trajectories of political development across the region.

To conclude, I first summarize the role of land politics beyond the state building period in my primary cases, Jordan and Iraq. I then summarize the contributions and implications of my dissertation for the MENA region and for our global understanding of redistribution and political order in late-developer states.

8.1 Redistribution and Regimes after State-Building: Jordan and Iraq Post-1970

In Jordan and Iraq, land reform continued to be used to alter political geographies and reward in-group elites after the initial state-building decades. Jordanian factions divided into regime loyalists and pro-Palestinian leftist group, the PLO, in what is now called Black September. From 1970 to 1971, the country dissolved into civil war. The Jordan Valley was a hotbed for PLO *fedayeen* who used the rough geography to hide. Villagers from the Jordan Valley remember being relocated to the highlands so the Jordanian and Israeli

militaries could conduct raids on suspected rebel hideaways. After two successive conflicts (war between Jordan and Israel in 1967 and the civil war), the irrigation canal and other vital infrastructure were severely damaged. The government made another push to develop the Ghor as a capitalist agriculture zone.

In the 1980s, the Jordanian government extended the land reforms of the 1960s south of the Dead Sea. By redistributing land in the southern Ghor, the Jordanian state did away with existing patterns of small-holder agriculture and increased the presence of state. Interviewees told me that Ghor as-Safi, a major agricultural settlement in the southern Jordan Valley, did not have public schools or health centers until land reform. Despite the provision of new state services, land reform proceeded much as it at in the north: the government established minimum thresholds for ownership and consolidated fragmented plots into 30 square dunum parcels. Capitalist elites purchased land formerly owned by smallholders, decimating the local agrarian economy. Losing their land pushed cultivators out of farming, forcing them into dependence on the state as army recruits. Political elites from the highland city of al-Karak were among the primary beneficiaries of the land reforms.

From north to south, the farmers in the Ghor feel that agricultural policies continue to favor important elites in Amman. Middlemen and landowners continue to capitalize on technology-intensive crops and sky-rocking land prices to the exclusion of farmers, who primarily rent or sharecrop their fields. Across Jordan, land inequality is on the rise. Large landownership has changed in meaning as the country urbanized, but historically landed families have maintained the political importance and vast holdings.

Under King Abdullah, the inclusive nature of Jordanian elite politics has eroded. Ammani business elites have become the power players in Jordanian politics, even at the expense of traditional tribal networks. This dynamic is visible in the nature of land allocations in urban property as well as agricultural land in Jordan's desert interior. Elites have gained land on the Syrian and Saudi borders that are irrigated by groundwater wells, and the produce is shipped directly to Europe, by-passing the Jordanian market. A massive real-estate project

to build "New Amman" is taking place on the lands of important tribal interests, opening a new rent stream for the political elite. As the elite become more exclusive and ever-more powerful, the middle classes have come under strain. Tax protests in the summer of 2018 were led by what could be termed a new *effendiyya*. Political parties in Jordan are still weak, despite being legal since 1989. Professional syndicates, long led by the co-opted Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood, shifted to the control of the secular elements of the professional middle class. New IMF-imposed tax reforms roused these professional elements to take to the streets because of the disproportionate burden the new law put on the middle class. King Abdullah capitulated in the face of the *effendiyya*'s protests, and ordered the formation of a new government under freshman premier Omar al-Razzaz.

In the 1970s Iraq, agrarian policy became a key way for the Ba'thist regime to institutionalize their power. The Ba'thists who took power in 1968 recognized that low state capacity complicated previous radical reforms. Building institutions as well as redistributing land became a key component of the Ba'athist policy that emerged in the early 1970s. Collective state farms were used to match land with cultivators while building the new schools, health centers, and government offices the regime needed to maintain control. These policies helped the political regime establish the type of bureaucratic capacity necessary for stable political order. The Ba'th was able to establish new ways of collecting information and repressing dissidents through the rural institutions put in place through 1970s land reform.

Land continued to be important after Saddam Hussein took control and established his personalistic regime in 1979. During the 1980s, Saddam personally directed land allocations through the Revolutionary Command Council. Loyal Ba'thist elites and military veterans were the main beneficiaries. In the south, Saddam placed awarded Ba'thist officers with irrigation pumps. This put loyal party members in charge of water resources, allowing them to enhance their own holdings and cut off water to uncooperative farmers.[1] In the Kurdish north, Saddam expropriated dissidents and gave their lands to Arab Iraqis in a process known

[1] Interview with Dr. Kamal Almfrji, London, United Kingdom. 3 February 2018.

as "Arabization." This process extended beyond agricultural land into urban property, and patterns of expropriation and redistribution were used to further entrench party loyalists in dissident regions through ethnic cleansing.

The shadow of "two-speed" governance in Iraq looms large. Rural regions in Iraq with histories of landed elite domination continue to see lower levels of state institutions and political participation. In the summer of 2018, the southern region of Basra rose in protests against the Shia-led government. The primary complaints included lack of access to public services like water and electricity. In response, the government cut off internet communications and resorted to a military response. Similar trends can be seen in Kurdistan. Recent research has shown that regions that received better services from the Iraqi government historically were more favorably disposed to remain federated with the Iraqi state, whereas marginalized regions were more likely to vote to leave in the 2017 referendum on independence. Although some scholars have alluded to Saddam's ability to cultivate ties with elites across ethnic and confessional divides, Iraqi politics has struggled to become a truly inclusive ruling coalition. Much like in the post-colonial period, Iraqi regime changes have seen the replacement of one exclusive elite coalition with another, complicating the enormous task of bringing Iraq together under one national banner.

8.2 Implications of Findings

This dissertation used a medium-N cross-national analysis of the MENA region and case studies of three former British colonies to study the proximate effects of colonial rule on post-colonial redistribution and autocratic leader tenure. This dissertation's theoretical framework also contributes several insights that travel to other contexts. First, this research re-examines one of the most prevalent questions in the study of the Middle East, namely the prevalence of authoritarian rule. By linking the colonial past to the immediate post-colonial period, I make an important first step in systematically linking the colonial state to post-colonial

authoritarian rule. MENA states' low fiscal capacity and high reliance on natural resource wealth become less of a puzzle when analyzed in tandem with pre-independence politics. The survival of post-colonial regimes depended in large part on their ability to address grievances left from the colonial era and cement reliable ruling coalitions.[2] Land reform played a decisive role in both of those tasks.

The post-colonial dynamics that give rise to difference regime incentives for reforms travel to other late-developing post-colonial cases. The *effendiyya* of the Arab world can be seen in places where colonial powers educated new civil servants to staff their bureaucracies, including South and East Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Indeed, the continuity between other empires and their modern replacements - including Russia and post-Ottoman Turkey - had incumbent classes that they needed to politically manage in light of demands from rising classes. At it's most macro level, this dissertation asks what happens when empires pull away and domestic powers are left to fight over the states that are left behind.

A better understanding of colonial politics and state building tells us much about the critical early decades of independence. Political science is only starting to systematically integrate the study of colonialism into mainstream arguments about state building, state capacity, and political development. By using both colonial and Jordanian and Iraqi state archives, I have shed light on how colonial dynamics matter for post-independence regime consolidation and patterns of reform. The Middle East remains a difficult environment for social scientific research. Data and historical information are highly securitized, and the data that are available are often subject to political manipulation. Pushing deeper into the past for quantitative and qualitative data removes some concerns about the quality of data. In addition, the origins of the state and its institutions are necessary data points to be able to test theories about institutional persistence and change.

[2]One understudied element in my dissertation's MENA case analysis are settler colonial populations. My shadow case, Egypt, did have a large European presence that was predominantly urban. But in the states of the French Maghreb - Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia - and in Libya, decolonization also involved considerations for European settlers and their assets. In some cases, the abandonment of European property post-independence, as in Algeria and Tunisia, may have reduced redistributive demands on the state. Despite this, my typologies for elite actors still map on to cases where settler colonialism existed.

The cases in this dissertation show that such reforms can also have destabilizing effects. Redistribution is often portrayed as a normatively positive action in political economy, but recent work highlights the destabilizing potential of reform. Finkel et al. (2015) directly attribute peasant unrest to grievances related to the implementation of the Russian 1861 Emancipation Manifesto. Evidence from Latin America also suggests that land reform has conditional effects depending on either the level of political commitment to reforms (Albertus and Kaplan, 2012) or landowners' collective action potential (Albertus et al., 2018a). However, these studies do not systematically consider the simultaneous signaling sent by the tenor of state building efforts in combination with land reform.

This story is not one that is limited to post-colonial cases. Coalition consolidation around the autocrat is a critical determinant of non-democratic leader tenure globally. The colonial period does, however, amplify grievances of excluded elites against incumbents. Elites who are widely held to have collaborated with a foreign power to facilitate colonialism become tainted by association, but in the context of regime change, incumbent elites may struggle to retain their position. Indeed, this is a central component of diagnosing elite splits in Albertus (2015). Therefore, the importance of incumbent elite inclusivity as key variable in explaining the intensity of redistributive conflict outside of the body of post-colonial cases could validate that the mechanisms studied in this dissertation are broadly applicable to other contexts of authoritarian regime change.

This dissertation's disaggregation between conservative and radical land reforms also speaks to recent work by Daniel Ziblatt work on importance of co-optation of conservative elites in ensuring political stability. Ziblatt (2017) finds that strong and well-organized conservative parties played a critical role in the democratization and constitutional stability of European countries from the nineteenth century to the Second World War. Democratic transition, therefore, was a function of conservative elites maintaining a central role in national politics and adapting organizationally to maintain power. This resonates with my findings about legacies of inclusive colonial elite coalitions and conservative land reforms.

By keeping the landed elite in power as part of a broad elite coalition, the autocrat constrains his own autonomy relative to his support coalition. But as this dissertation has shown, this strategy might be the most optimal for ensuring long-lived rule. Although these inclusive legacy countries are characterized by greater representation from elites, they are still non-democratic. With the exception of Tunisia, no Middle Eastern country has democratized, and the prospects for change are still unclear.

Although land was the primary focus of this dissertation, further work should address the destabilizing effects of other forms of redistribution. This project begins a larger research agenda analyzing the causes and consequences of redistributive reform. Future work will map the extension of bureaucratic and coercive state capacity sub-nationally and across time. In addition, my research has implications for the creation of political patterns of behavior that persist over time. Future work will expand the scope of my analysis from the past to the present by examining how historical legacies of redistribution map on to contemporary political attitudes in MENA states.

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Chapter 9

MENA Land Reform Types by Country

C = Conservative land reform. R = Radical radical land reform.

Table 9.1 MENA Land Reform Events by Country, Date, Sequence and Type

Country	Land Reform Description	Years	No. Previous Land Reform Events	Land Reform Type
Algeria	Algeria's first president, Ahmed Ben Bella, came on the heals of peasants seizure of French land post-independence. He nationalized the remaining colonial holdings. Named "the self-managed sector" but run under state control, this land, approximately 2.7 million hectares, represented Algeria's best farmland and comprised the majority of the country's high-value crops. The central government consolidated 22,000 self-managed farms into approximately 2,000 large state farms. On these large units, the government controlled production and marketing decisions, and finances. (Sources: Kielstra 1979; Pfiefer 1981; Pfiefer 1983; Swearingen 1990.)	1963-1966	0	C
	After seizing power in 1965, the Boumediene regime rewarded loyal military elites with land grants in 1966. The regime distributed approximately 330,000 hectares of former colonial land to war veterans. Veterans were required to join a "cooperative auricle de production des anciens moujahidine" (CAPAM) a cooperative devoted to the military elites' capital-intensive agriculture. CAPAM land usually was not considered to belong to the former self-managed sector, and its deduction gives the oft-seen total of 2.4 million hectares for Algeria's self-managed sector. (Sources: Kielstra 1979; Pfiefer 1981; Pfiefer 1983; Swearingen 1990.)	1966	1	C

	The Boumediene regime introduced a new reform (“the Agrarian Revolution”) with two rhetorical goals: to reduce lingering-colonial era agrarian inequalities and make Algeria self-sufficient in food production. The reform banned exploitative forms of tenure and distributed land to landless and land-poor peasants from state lands and expropriated private holdings. The reform expropriated all land in excess of 45 hectares 26,000 large landowners. Holdings of approximately 34,100 absentee landowners was expropriated.Land remained in state ownership, and recipients had no right of resale. (Sources: Kielstra 1979; Pfiefer 1981; Pfiefer 1983; Swearingen 1990.)	1971-1980	2	R
	The government restructured the state agricultural sector in 1981, hoping to create more economically viable units. By 1985, the self-managed and agrarian revolution units had been completely merged and reorganized into about 3,429 state farms known as "domaines agricoles socialistes," (socialist farms) amounting to 2.8 million hectares. The regime used the reform to return land to former landed elites. An additional 700,000 hectares of former agrarian revolution land were privatized and sold or leased to farmers or returned to their former owners. Algeria’s large and/or absentee landowners managed to retain nearly a third of the country’s arable land. The amount of land that evaded land reform is twice as large as the amount included. (Sources: Kielstra 1979; Pfiefer 1981; Pfiefer 1983; Swearingen 1990.)	1981-1987	3	C
Tunisia	The state appropriated and divided tribal lands into individual plots of 10-20 acres each with usufruct rights, but not ownership for tenants. (Sources: Bouman 1977; Duwaji, 1968; Karabenick 1967; White 2014)	1957-1959	0	C
	Mdjerdah Valley Scheme of June 1958 limited landownership size in that region at 50 hectares. Anything above this was expropriated and redistributed in 5-10 acres subsistence plots to those with experience in irrigated farming. This redistributive reform targeted Tunisian landed elites rather than colons. (Sources: Bouman 1977; Duwaji, 1968; Karabenick 1967; White 2014)	1958	1	R
	Cooperativization of lands beginning with the establishment of the Office des Terres Dominiales. The Law of May 27 1963 started cooperatives of land in the north and polyculture cooperatives in central and northern Tunisia, extending state control of farmland. (Sources: Bouman 1977; Duwaji, 1968; Karabenick 1967; White 2014)	1961-1963	2	R
	This reform nationalised colonial properties and redistributed to elites. (Sources: Bouman 1977; Duwaji, 1968; Karabenick 1967; White 2014)	1964-1967	3	C

Morocco	Expropriation was limited to Moroccans who opposed the Liberation Army and collaborated with the French. Paul Pascon (1986) shows that only 19 per cent of land seized was redistributed to farming tenants, 81 per cent was retained by the state or elites, and leased through public auction. (Sources: Leveau 1970; Pascon 1986; Zartman 1963)	1956-1960	0	C
	Official colonial lands acquired by the state through land reform laws of 1963, 1966 and 1973. 590,000 hectares of individual foreign owned land was bilaterally sold by owners to Moroccan state after independence. The total foreign holdings that accrued to the state equaled 740,000 hectares. According to a 1989 report by Ministry of Agriculture and Agrarian Reform, 327,008 hectares redistributed to 23,600 families. (Sources: Leveau 1970; Pascon 1986; Zartman 1963)	1963-1966	1	C
	See 1963-1966 reform.	1966-1973	2	C
	See 1963-1966.	1973-1976	3	C
Libya	Shortly after Colonel Qaddhafi's revolution, the government confiscated all Italian-owned farms (about 38,000 hectares) and redistributed much of this land in smaller plots to Libyans. The state retained some of the confiscated lands for state farming ventures, but in general the government did not seek to eliminate the private sector from agriculture as it had with commerce. (Sources: El-Ghonemy 1993; Fowler 1973)	1969	0	R
	All cultivated land was declared to be state property; land redistributed to cronies. (Sources: El-Ghonemy 1993; Fowler 1973)	1971	1	C
	Tribal land confiscated by the state to be converted for cultivation instead of traditional pastoral nomadism. (Sources: El-Ghonemy 1993; Fowler 1973)	1977	2	C
Egypt	In 1952 Nasser's Free Officers passed Law 178, which limited land holdings to 200 feddans (84 hectares) per person. Owners were entitled to transfer up to 100 feddans (42 hectares) to their non-adult children and to sell the remainder. Former landlords were allowed to keep some property. (Sources: Abbas and El-Dessouky 2011; Bush 1993; Shaw 1954; Warriner 1961)	1952-1960	0	R
	A new law in 1961 reduced the limit to 100 feddans per individual, and 200 feddans per household. (Sources: Abbas and El-Dessouky 2011; Bush 1993; Shaw 1954; Warriner 1961)	1961-1969	1	R
	The ownership ceiling was reduced to 50 per individual in 1969.	1969-1970	2	R
	On June 24, 1992, the Egyptian People's Assembly reversed the agrarian relations law, for more than 1.5 million of Egypt's 6 million feddans of agricultural land. (Hinnebusch 1993)	1992-1997	1	C

Syria	A land reform law was among the first legislation passed under the newly established United Arab Republic between Egypt and Syria. The law was modeled on Egypt's land reform law. No person was allowed to own more than 80 hectares of irrigated land and 300 hectares of rain-fed land. About 1.37 million hectares were to be expropriated. Landowners were to be compensated in full for expropriated land over a period of forty years by means of negotiable bonds at 1.5 per cent interest. The number of the beneficiaries from this program was estimated in 1958 at 750,000 persons which involved about 150,000 families representing 17 per cent of the population or 27 per cent of the rural population. Expropriated land was to be distributed to landless peasants in plots not exceeding eight hectares of irrigated land and 30 hectares of non-irrigated land. (Sources: Garzouzi 1963; Hinnebush 1989;Shakra 1966; Springborg 1981)	1958-1961	0	R
	Marouf Dawalibi's government introduced law No. 3 of 1962 to revise the UAR land reform law in accordance with landowners' rejection of ownership limitations and the protracted method of compensation. The amended law increased the amount of land which landowners could keep, contingent on such factors as land quality and the method of irrigation. Landowners could retain was 200 hectares of irrigated land and 600 hectares of non-irrigated land. The law also approved the distribution of land among landowners' heirs, signaling heavy favoritism toward old elites. (Sources: Garzouzi 1963; Hinnebush 1989;Shakra 1966; Springborg 1981)	1962	1	C
	The original land reform law of 1958 was re-instated with some modifications. Under Law No. 161 of 1958, 40.5 per cent of cultivated land was redistributed to peasants and 25 per cent of farm families benefited by receiving land and other services from the land reform program. Despite this, landed elites were allowed a greater area of land and were able to distribute their lands amongst their family members before being expropriated. Those expropriated under the previous law were able to contest their expropriation and regain a proportion of their land. These provisions were cancelled in the new law, making it an anti-elite reform. (Sources: Garzouzi 1963; Hinnebush 1989;Shakra 1966; Springborg 1981)	1962-1966	2	R

	The Ba'ath government passed a new law and accelerated the pace of expropriation and distribution of land. By the end of 1966, expropriated land amounted to 994,058 hectares of which 232,050 hectares had been actually distributed. When land reform was completed in 1970, 1,513,000 hectares had been expropriated by the state, including 443,000 that had been distributed to private individual peasants, 338,000 ha distributed to peasant cooperatives, 38,000 ha sold and 140,000 ha reserved for state farms. 351,400 ha arid land were not distributed (Sources: Garzouzi 1963; Hinnebush 1989;Shakra 1966; Springborg 1981)	1966-1970	3	R
	Pilot Project State Farms (15 farms started in 1972) were distributed among 5,600 people. 1/3 of recipients sharecroppers with state contracts, 1/5 were state employees. Land rental occurred where former employees received the equivalent of the pay lost, while large land contractors grew rich off the reform and acquired land three times cheaper than market prices. Reform favored a re-emergent class of latifundiests tied to central state and power structures. (Source: Ababsa 2006)	2000-2005	4	C
Iraq	Expropriation of large privately owned and leased estates. Estates exceeding 500 hectares in rainfed areas and 250 hectares were to be redistributed to peasants. By one 1964 estimate, the total effected area amounted to 8-10 million dunums, or 2-2.5 million hectares. The practice of redistribution was difficult lacking an institutions that included proper registration and land title norms. Prior to its overthrow, the monarchy made muted attempts at land reform where the government made state land available for purchase and generated new land resources through irrigation. While appearing progressive, these reforms heavily favoured landed elites and were non-expropriative in nature. (Sources: Ali 1955; Al-Jasim 1968; Fernea 1969; Haj 1994; Springborg 1981)	1958-1970	1	R

	Pro-socialism land reform law. Policy-makers made adjustments which pooled all former land-related legislation and lowered the ceiling on private landownership in irrigated areas by 40 percent. Collective farms were legally established, and allowed for variation in soil quality, type of cropping and location in relation to market towns, and flexibility about minimum size of units to be redistributed to allow for more beneficiaries. By 1977, total redistribution was 1.92 million hectares to 218,000 households. By 1985, 2.4 million hectares was distributed to 262,000 agricultural households. If add state-leased farms, amount is 3 million hectares to 322,000 households, or 56 percent of total agricultural households. (Sources: Ali 1955; Al-Jasim 1968; Fernea 1969; Haj 1994; Springborg 1981	1970	2	R
Jordan	East Ghor Canal Project (EGCP). The major purposes of the EGCP were: (1) to provide farms in the area with water for full irrigation; (2) to consolidate land ownership and to redistribute farm units so as to obtain a pattern of farms serviceable with the irrigation system; (3) to provide assistance to farmers for the development and modernisation of the farms, including technical, financial, and marketing services; (4) to increase agricultural output; and (5) to raise the standard of living of families residing in the project area. Result was to favor the interests of professional farmers, not landless peasants. (Sources: Hazleton 1979; Tarawneh 2014)	1959-1960	0	C
	. The Jordanian government amended the land law in 1960 to award non-resident (absentee) landowners priority in redistribution. Holder of the land in this instance was the title holder. It is important to note that this reform also effectively made the state the landowner, as all resale and leasing had to go through the government. Despite this, the main effect was redistributive and the government did not exercise its power until subsequent reforms. (Sources: Hazleton 1979; Tarawneh 2014)	1960-1962	1	C
	The land law was amended again in 1962 to change the definition of holder to family holder. This distinction meant that new rising large landowners (usually neither farmers nor residents of the Valley) could distribute agricultural units amongst their heirs (males, females, children, and occasionally cousins). This created conditions of absentee landlordism (Tarawneh 2014). (Sources: Hazleton 1979; Tarawneh 2014)	1962-1967	2	C

	The Jordan Valley Authority, established in 1977, commenced a new redistribution program in the southern Valley under the auspices of development and agricultural efficiency. Projects included the development of an underground system of water distribution for irrigation, the re-location of homes to adjacent non-productive land, and the restructuring of the road system. Major new areas were brought under cultivation and land ownership was redistributive away from the local population to the highland powerful tribes. (Sources: Hazleton 1979; Palmer et al. 2013; Tarawneh 2014)	1980-1984	3	C
Turkey	230,000 ha distributed to 1218 landless and small holding families (despite the fact that 3.2 million ha were marked for expropriation and 540,000 peasants were supposed to benefit).			
	Two previous land reforms were passed that were not strictly redistributive in the sense that land was distributed from the state as in the Arab Gulf countries. First, in 1921, Atatürk's government replaced the Ottoman Land Code with a new civil code encouraging private ownership. The state relinquished control over 40 per cent of arable land and distributed land to Balkan immigrants. Second, from 1947 to 1962, landed elites blocked the passage of a truly redistributive reform, and most of the 1.8 million hectares distributed was state land. (Sources: Aktan 1966; Morvaridi 1990; Unal 2012)	1975-1978	2	C
Iran	Limited ownership to a maximum of one village with the balance purchased by the government for redistribution to occupying tenants or sharecroppers. Area of village = 300 to 600 hectare range.			
	A previous distributive reform from the Crown occurred in 1951. Shah sold private Crown land and some state-owned land at 800-1500 rials per hectare. Peasants as well as landlords, city merchants and military personnel benefited. Because no expropriation occurred, this land reform is not included in the dataset. (Sources: Majd 1991; Majd 2000; Moghaddam 1972)	1960-1962	1	R
	Maximum property ceilings were specified, ranging from 20 hectares in irrigated rice-growing areas to 150 hectares in rain-fed wheat growing areas. (Sources: Majd 1991; Majd 2000; Moghaddam 1972)	1963-1964	2	R

	Farm Corporations Law, pooling all lands of individual peasants to establish large-scale, mechanised farms managed by gov't officials. (Sources: Haghayeghi 1990; Keddie 1968; Majd 1991; Majd 2000; Moghaddam 1972; Najmabadi 1987)	1967	3	C
	Land previously owned by members of the Shah regime expropriated and redistributed by the Islamic Republic. Many of these lands were abandoned after regime members fled the revolution. (Source: Haghayeghi 1990)	1980-1991	4	R
YPR	126000 feddans of land were expropriated from large landowners after the revolutionary take over, and redistributed to smallholders. (Sources: Alley 2010; Deeb 1986; Dresch 1990; Gause 1988)	1968-1969	0	R
	Deepening of the previous reform.	1975-1982	1	R
Yemen	President expropriates and redistributes land according to his elite supporters. (Sources: Alley 2010; CICM Yemen Report)	1994-1997	0	C