# Argentine and Chilean Approaches to Modern Pan-Americanism, 1888-1930

Mark Petersen
Corpus Christi College

Submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy
Trinity Term 2014

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This thesis seeks to explain Argentine and Chilean approaches to modern Pan-Americanism. It offers several significant contributions to the historiography of Pan-Americanism and Southern Cone policymaking. First, it provides a sweeping overview of Pan-Americanism as a form of regional cooperation from 1888 to 1930, gathering the various strands of Pan-American history and forming a coherent overall narrative. It introduces a two-dimensional analytical framework for understanding Pan-American cooperation as a whole. The 'first dimension' included efforts to regulate the political relationships in the Americas while the 'second dimension' was more technical, social, cultural, and commercial. Within this framework, the approaches of two participant countries (Chile and Argentina) are closely examined in parallel. Attitudes towards the US, geopolitical calculations, and economic considerations – the basis of most historical interpretations – form part of the explanation, but this thesis presents a more complicated set of actors, influences, and ideas. Inspired by the methodology of Foreign Policy Analysis and recent studies in modern regionalism, the second half of the thesis deconstructs Pan-American policies. It examines four patterns that emerged through research: changes in the organization of policymaking, the influence of non-state actors and public opinion, the rise of intermestic strands of Pan-Americanism, and the role of ideas in international relations. Each pattern is analyzed and fully substantiated using evidence selected from the narrative and supplemented by wider research. Referencing models from multiple disciplines, the chapters reveal how different actors and objectives (including stemming social crisis, gaining prestige, and demonstrating commitment to democratic governance) influenced policy at different moments. Ultimately, this thesis emphasises the interplay of factors and suggests that deconstructing Pan-Americanism has implications for understanding Latin America's role in international history and modern regionalism in the Americas.

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Long Abstract

This thesis enhances historiographical trends that challenge simple understandings of Pan-American relations and emphasize Southern Cone participation, cooperation, and manipulation in modern Pan-Americanism between 1888 and 1930. Recent studies have led to the fragmentation of Pan-American history; the analysis in this thesis collects the diverse strands to offer a broad view of Pan-Americanism as a form of regional cooperation. It also examines Chilean and Argentine policymaking and questions the importance of anti-US sentiments and rivalry between hemispheric powers in determining Pan-American policy. Instead, it analyses a variety of factors that emerge from the archival sources and from the narrative of Pan-American cooperation. Inspired by the methodological pluralism of Foreign Policy Analysis and studies in modern regionalism, this thesis employs a multi-disciplinary framework to analyze these factors and deconstruct Pan-Americanism, thus avoiding the limitations of traditional diplomatic history.

The first chapter defines modern Pan-Americanism, a task that is complicated by the term's multiple uses in history and ambiguity in historiography. Discarding simple definitions, the chapter argues that Pan-Americanism was a collection of movements under the banner of inter-American cooperation. The chapter introduces two dichotomies used in the rest of the thesis. The first is both chronological and

thematic, distinguishing pre-1880s attempts at hemispheric cooperation as 'traditional Pan-Americanism' and post-1880s efforts as 'modern Pan-Americanism'. This distinction is based on previous historical analyses and on the definitions of 'Pan-Americanism' used by historical figures, which antedated Pan-Americanism to describe earlier Latin American efforts at continental cooperation from the Panamanian Congress of 1826 to the 1888 Montevideo Juridical Congress. Traditional Pan-American efforts were led by Latin America and generally driven by security concerns. In contrast, the US initiated and led modern Pan-Americanism as a wide-ranging project of hemispheric cooperation and, to a degree, a vehicle for US hegemonic aspirations. The second dichotomy helps analyse the variegated nature of modern Pan-Americanism. The 'first dimension' included efforts to regulate political relationships in the Americas, while the 'second dimension' was centred on technical, social, cultural, and commercial interactions. These dimensions were complementary and many influential historical actors maintained a holistic view of Pan-American cooperation. Finally, a brief section considers important exclusions within Pan-Americanism, particularly the exclusion of Canada, and re-iterates that Pan-Americanism was a contested idea.

The next two chapters offer a sweeping overview of Pan-American cooperation and Southern Cone approaches to it. Unlike previous histories of Pan-Americanism, they incorporate the various strands of cooperation into one narrative and take regional cooperation instead of merely US-Latin American relations as a narrative framework. This broader perspective reveals a story of gradual engagement with Pan-Americanism. Both Chile and Argentina were (in the 1880s) antagonistic and (in the 1890s) indifferent towards Pan-Americanism. Chilean policymakers feared Pan-

American intervention in the Tacna-Arica question, a dispute with Peru over territories Chile occupied since the War of the Pacific (1879-83). Argentine policymakers found Pan-Americanism impractical and preferred to pursue more limited (that is, Latin American) regional cooperation. In the 1900s both countries increased their participation in and manipulation of Pan-Americanism, which included forms of cooperation on public health and intellectual exchange. By 1908, several Latin American governments (Chile among them) had raised the profile of second-dimension cooperation. Chile's shift towards participation occurred in the early 1900s, partly due to a decreased threat of Peruvian revanche through Pan-Americanism. Argentina, however, did not warm to Pan-Americanism until later in the decade when opportunities arose for greater Argentine leadership and the US recognized the Southern Cone powers as co-civilizers in the hemisphere. With two major conferences late in the decade – the First Pan-American Scientific Congress of 1908 in Santiago and the Fourth International Conference of American States of 1910 in Buenos Aires – both countries emerged as Pan-American leaders. Events in the early 1910s, particularly mediation between Mexico and the US conducted by Argentina, Brazil and Chile (the ABC), strengthened Southern Cone claims to be in the vanguard. Meanwhile, Pan-Americanism became increasingly institutionalized through the reform of the Pan American Union (PAU) and the establishment of the American Institute of International Law (AIIL). At the Second Pan-American Scientific Congress held in Washington (1915), the Argentine and Chilean delegations lauded Pan-American cooperation and the US government launched a 'New Pan-Americanism' based on justice and equality of states, principles long upheld by Latin American diplomats.

In pre-1915 Pan-Americanism, then, Argentine and Chilean approaches shifted from resistance and indifference to participation and manipulation. After 1906, their approaches resembled, to an extent, the characteristics of a 'subordinate state' in regionalism as described by Andrew Hurrell. They sought to build coalitions to restrain US hegemonic aspirations, worked within Pan-American institutions to insert their interests into a regional agenda, and promoted certain normative principles (such as equality and non-intervention). Yet both also acted as 'dominant states', using Pan-American cooperation to legitimize their claims to regional leadership. Chile and Argentina continued to pursue this middle ground after 1915.

The First World War caused significant changes in the international system and economic crises in both Argentina and Chile. During the War, efforts at different forms of regional cooperation (a Pan-American Pact, an ABC Treaty, and an 'American' conference of neutrals that excluded the US) demonstrated persistent contestation over a regional ideal and the continued cooperation between the Southern Cone powers and the US. Non-state actors – including students, feminists, public health experts, amateur aviators, and child rights activists – appropriated Pan-Americanism and expanded the variety of Pan-American cooperation. The contrast between cooperation in the Americas and catastrophe in Europe led some Latin American policymakers to argue for Western Hemisphere leadership in reconstructing the post-War global order. After the First World War, both countries recognized changes in the international system and hoped to encourage economic recovery through closer relations with the US. As part of that effort, they were willing to follow US lead in Pan-American commercial cooperation. Yet neither relinquished their claim to regional leadership and both governments portrayed their country as

Pan-American leaders. Behind the rhetoric of solidarity, however, intra-continental divisions continued over major questions such as disarmament and the ideal international legal order.

As cultural internationalism developed globally in the mid-1920s, Pan-American cooperation increased in frequency and grew in variety, largely due to the initiative of non-state actors. Existing Pan-American institutions expanded and new institutions emerged to address common issues in the hemisphere, such as women's rights, children's health, and commercial aviation. Both Chilean and Argentine governments supported these initiatives, often with the ambiguous rhetoric of 'practicality'. Chilean participation in Pan-Americanism, however, curtailed when negotiations over Tacna-Arica soured. Meanwhile, internal upheaval in both countries and persistent US intervention in Latin America caused fluctuations in attitudes towards first-dimension Pan-Americanism. By 1928, the year of the Sixth International Conference of American States in Havana, policymakers in the Argentine Foreign Ministry again saw opportunity to shape Pan-American relations according to Argentine norms. Some Chilean policymakers also worked to advance their ideals, but the Chilean government, under the dictatorship of General Carlos Ibáñez del Campo since 1927, was less inclined towards Pan-American cooperation. Engaging with a historiographical controversy over the Havana Conference, this thesis provides evidence to support arguments for the cooperative nature of the Conference despite clashes between US delegates and Latin American representatives over the question of intervention. Cooperation between Argentina and the US and an unexpected cordial relationship between Chile and Peru led to several important agreements, including a hemispheric code of Private International Law and the establishment of

the Inter American Commission of Women. In the next two years, Chile gradually increased its participation in Pan-Americanism while Argentina withdrew under the beleaguered second administration of Hipólito Yrigoyen.

Attitudes towards the US, geopolitical calculations, and economic considerations – factors which form the basis of many explanations of Pan-American policies – are significant, but ultimately unsatisfactory in explaining wider Pan-American participation. The final four chapters of the thesis, therefore, seek a more comprehensive understanding of Pan-American policies. They deconstruct Chilean and Argentine participation in Pan-Americanism by closely examining patterns and themes that emerged from research and the narrative in Chapters Two and Three. These patterns are loosely categorized into four groups: changes in the organization of policymaking; the role of non-state actors and public opinion; the rise of intermestic Pan-American cooperation; and the influence of ideas in international relations. Each chapter employs a different approach, grounded in historiography and social science theory, to understand policies.

The organization of policymaking is the focus of Chapter Four. This analysis draws on the ideas of Organizational Process and Bureaucratic Political models, which argue against the state as a unitary actor and suggest that how state bureaucracies are arranged and entrenched make a difference to policymaking. The chapter first reconstructs the organization of policymaking, emphasizing changes over time. It argues that the Foreign Ministries, the Presidency and other executive ministries were the most important state actors. National Congress and the military played secondary roles. Within the Foreign Ministries, the policymaking bureaucracy expanded

significantly from 1888 to 1930, leading to greater specialization and more collaboration. The increased role of official legal advisers and the establishment of bureaucratic organizations focused on Pan-American cooperation were significant developments. Foreign policymaking in the late nineteenth century was largely the purview of the Ministries and President. By the 1910s, however, the expansion of international cooperation into diverse areas led to the delegation of policymaking to other ministries. These developments had significant effects on Pan-American policy. In the 1890s, political and economic crises (including a civil war in Chile) drew attention away from foreign policy and left the small bureaucracies within the foreign ministries unable to afford attention to nascent Pan-Americanism. By the 1900s, expansions in bureaucracy facilitated greater engagement with Pan-American questions. The development of bureaucratic institutions focused on Pan-Americanism and the delegation of policymaking gave continuity to Pan-American participation within the foreign policies of both countries.

Chapter Five examines non-state actors and the role of public opinion, noting that transnational activity and civil society networks have been an important element of modern regionalism. The influence of domestic non-state interest groups (from organized labour to religious associations) on policymaking is first analyzed and quickly determined to have limited impact on policy direction. Instead, non-state actors played a more important role by participating directly in international affairs. Argentine and Chilean contributions to non-state Pan-American initiatives were significant. Non-state efforts helped to diversify Pan-American cooperation and offered another opportunity for Latin American governments of Argentina and Chile to support Pan-Americanism without endorsing US intervention in Latin America.

Through Pan-American activity, non-state actors gained legitimacy and publicity for their advocacy. This argument is developed through close analysis of one group that appropriated Pan-Americanism: feminists. The final sections of the chapter examine public opinion as another means of non-state influence and argue that policymaker perception of public opinion had a significant impact on policy decisions. Cognizant of a public audience both international and domestic, policymakers angled to display their country as civilized and prestigious. Pan-Americanism offered some opportunities to demonstrate regional importance through leadership in cooperation and through displays of progress and modernity.

The analysis turns more fully to the question of policymaker preferences in Chapter Six. Considering the importance of 'practicality' to Argentine and Chilean rhetoric, this chapter explores how Pan-American cooperation became increasingly relevant to domestic policy debates and thus intermestic (a term used by IR theorists for policies that have international and domestic implications). In the 1890s and early 1900s, several topics that were important domestically (monetary reform, transportation, public health, and stemming radical leftist threats) became part of Pan-American discussions. That trend accelerated after the turn of the century, as Pan-American cooperation on social and technical questions increased. In Chile and Argentina, the rise of reformist parties and a widespread concern for the 'cuestión social' elevated social concerns in domestic politics. Governments in both countries looked abroad for models of reform and hoped to demonstrate activism in social issues and modernity through international cooperation. At the end of the 1920s, domestic social legislation and other international efforts to address social issues reduced the utility of Pan-American cooperation. Gradual democratization was another domestic

development that affected approaches to Pan-American. As suffrage incrementally increased and politicians in both countries claimed greater commitment to democratic norms, the rhetoric of democracy appeared more frequently in foreign policy. Both Chilean and Argentine diplomats also made calls to establish inter-American relations on democratic principles. This gradual development increased Pan-Americanism's appeal, which emphasized democracy as a distinguishing feature of the Americas. Moreover, applying democracy to Pan-American relations became a means of managing US hegemonic aspirations. Democratic rhetoric appealed to the moral diplomacy of Washington while also implying accountability.

The final chapter builds on recent studies of regionalism that emphasize the importance of ideas in international relations by examining the general worldview of Chilean and Argentine policymakers. Referring to archival sources and texts on international affairs, the chapter argues that Southern Cone policymakers recognized normative frameworks in international relations. Those frameworks prioritized international law, drew on principles advocated by major Latin American jurists including Andrés Bello and Carlos Calvo, and reflected national context. The increasingly legalistic nature of Pan-Americanism appealed to the priorities of Argentine and Chilean policymakers, who sought to advance certain legal principles through Pan-American channels. Major differences between Argentine and Chilean perspectives, exemplified by division over a 'derecho internacional americano', help to explain the distinct trajectories of their approaches to Pan-Americanism. Chilean perspectives were more regional and drew on Chile's past leadership of regional cooperation in the nineteenth century. Argentine policymakers, in contrast, advocated a more universalist approach to international law and regional affairs,

resisting impractical forms of regionalism that could be antagonistic to Europe. Through negotiation and contestation, US-led Pan-Americanism gained a degree of conceptual hegemony in regional cooperation in the Americas. Yet by the 1910s, Pan-American cooperation had come to resemble Chilean and Argentine norms.

In the Conclusion, a brief epilogue offers notes how the dramatic changes to international politics and the global economy after the Great Depression of 1929 affected Pan-Americanism. The 1930s were a new era of Pan-American relations shaped by a more conciliatory US – which accepted non-intervention as a principle without reservation in 1936 – and greater institutionalization. Pan-American cooperation also faced more intense challenges, including the Chaco War between Bolivia and Paraguay. The accomplishments and challenges of the 1930s had roots in the preceding four decades of negotiation, manipulation, and contestation. A final section emphasizes the wider conclusions made in this thesis, considers the implications of these conclusions on historiography and the social science theories mentioned, and suggests areas for further research. Most importantly, future studies of Pan-Americanism should recognize the multi-factorial nature of inter-American cooperation. Deconstructing Pan-Americanism contributes to the integration of Latin America into global history. Historical interpretation of Chilean and Argentine foreign policies more generally will continue to benefit from considering the impact of bureaucratic organization, non-state actors, domestic context, and normative frameworks. Finally, patterns of behaviour that shape modern regionalism have roots in pre-1930 Pan-Americanism and the institutions that such cooperation produced.

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# Abbreviations

| | |
|---|---|
| ABC | Argentina, Brazil, and Chile |
| AGNA | Archivo General de la Nación Argentina (Buenos Aires, Argentina) |
| AIIL | American Institute of International Law |
| AMRECIC | Archivo Histórico del Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores y Culto (Buenos Aires, Argentina) |
| AMRREE | Archivo General del Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores (Santiago, Chile) |
| ANA | Archivo Nacional de la Administración (Santiago, Chile) |
| ANH | Archivo Nacional Histórico (Santiago, Chile) |
| BN | Biblioteca Nacional (Santiago, Chile) |
| BPAU | *Bulletin of the Pan American Union* |
| CEHP | Charles Evans Hughes Papers |
| CHP | Cordell Hull Papers |
| CML | Columbus Memorial Library (Washington, DC) |
| CRG | Conrado Ríos Gallardo Papers |
| EBC | Emilio Bello Codesido Papers |
| FKP | Frank Kellogg Papers |
| FOA | Federación Obrera Argentina |
| FORA | Federación Obrera Regional Argentina |
| FV | Fondos Varios |
| HAHR | Hispanic American Historical Review |
| HLS | Henry Stimson Diaries |
| IACI | Inter-American Children's Institute |
| IACW | Inter-American Commission of Women |
| ICCA | Inter-American Commission on Commercial Aviation |
| IHC | International High Commission |
| ILO | International Labour Organization |
| JBP | John Barrett Papers |
| LOC | Library of Congress (Washington, DC) |
| LSR | Leo S Rowe Papers |
| NARA | National Archives and Record Administration (Washington, DC) |
| PAN | Partido Autonomista Nacional (Argentina) |
| PASB | Pan-American Sanitary Bureau |
| PAU | Pan American Union |
| RG | Record Group |
| RDHL | *Revista de Derecho, Historia y Letras* |
| SFL | Sergio Fernández Larraín Collection |
| SNA | Sociedad Nacional de Agricultura (Chile) |
| SOFOFA | Sociedad de Fomento Fabril (Chile) |
| SRA | Sociedad Rural Argentina |
| TAN | Transnational Advocacy Network |
| UCR | Unión Cívia Radical (Argentina) |
| UIA | Unión Industrial Argentina |

# Introduction

In 1935, a publishing house based in Valparaíso, Chile printed *Por la cooperación interamericana*, a short book authored by a Peruvian journalist that included a prologue by an Ecuadorian diplomat. The book is interesting not only for the inter-American nature of its production, but also for the scope of its contents. Surveying the rise of international cooperation in the Western Hemisphere, the author reminded his reader that he referred not 'únicamente a las siete conferencias diplomáticas, verificadas desde 1889, sino también a las 80 conferencias especiales y técnicas, de carácter panamericano.'[1] This thesis includes a similar reminder: its central aim is to explain Chilean and Argentine approaches to Pan-Americanism between 1888 and 1930 and its analysis includes not only diplomatic meetings, but also a wide range of international events, initiatives, and movements. It will offer a sweeping overview of Pan-American cooperation and Southern Cone approaches to it, deconstructing both in order to reveal the complicated interplay of actors, influences, and ideas.

This thesis, then, is not primarily diplomatic history in the traditional sense; rather, it fits within the efforts, begun in the 1990s, to revitalize international history and develop a 'new diplomatic history'.[2] The focus of analysis here is foreign policy and

[1] Alberto Sayán Viduarre, *Por la cooperación interamericana* (Valparaíso, 1935), p. 22. The seven diplomatic conferences were the International Conferences of American States: Washington 1889-90, Mexico City 1901-02, Rio de Janeiro 1906, Buenos Aires 1910, Santiago 1923, Havana 1928 and Montevideo 1933.

[2] For a concise review of the development of international history, see Patrick Finney, 'Introduction: What is International History?' in Finney (ed), *Palgrave Advances in International History* (London, 2005). Diplomatic history has been a beleaguered field of history since the rise of more fashionable historical pursuits such as social and cultural history. The most famous critique is Charles Maier's 'Marking Time: The Historiography of International Relations' in M Kammen (ed), *The Past Before Us: Contemporary Historical Writing in the United States* (Ithaca, 1980). This article ignited a fierce debate within the discipline and led to many, often passionate, responses; the Symposium in

the development of regional cooperation in the Americas. Diplomacy is a major concern, of course, but not the only one. Drawing inspiration from studies of internationalism and recent discussions on transnational approaches, this thesis reiterates that inter-American diplomacy was not, as the cliché goes, merely what one clerk said to another.[3] The analysis is inter-disciplinary, employing theoretical frameworks from political science (especially International Relations, or IR) and sociology to help understand a large and varied set of source material. Recent studies by IR scholars on regionalism in the Americas – driven by the rapid increase in regional initiatives since the late 1980s – are particularly relevant and useful.[4] The research presented here has implications (modest, though they are) for these studies. Such implications are secondary, however, to the contributions to scholarship in Pan-American and Latin American international history. This introduction will briefly outline the relevant historiography before further commenting on the organization and methodology used in this thesis.

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*Diplomatic History* 5:4 (1981) is one good example. For the international history perspective on diplomatic history's plight, see Alexander DeConde, 'Essay and Reflection: On the Nature of International History' *International History Review* 10:2 (1988). A more recent example from 2001 is Finney's 'Still 'marking time'? Text, Discourse and Truth in International History' *Review of International Studies* 27 (2001). Tides are turning, however; Thomas Zeiler, in a 2009 article, suggests that the redefinition of diplomatic history has begun ('The Diplomatic History Bandwagon: A State of the Field' *The Journal of American History*, 95:4). Cultural approaches to diplomatic history have been an important element of this revitalization; see Robert Dean 'Commentary: Tradition, Cause and Effect, and the Cultural History of International Relations' *Diplomatic History* 24:4 (2000) and Markus Mösslang and Torstan Riotte, *The Diplomats' World: A Cultural History of Diplomacy, 1815-1914* (Oxford, 2008).

[3] This expression originated as a critique of diplomatic history in GM Young's *Victorian England: Portrait of an Age* (London, 1936; in the second edition from 1953, the jibe can be found on p. 103). The history of internationalism, pioneered by historians such as Akira Iriye (see *Cultural Internationalism and World Order* (Baltimore, 1997)), has flourished recently. For a recent study, see Glenda Sluga, *Internationalism in the Age of Nationalism* (Philadelphia, 2013). On the issue of 'transnational', see David Thelen's introduction to and justification of the transnational approach in 'The Nation and Beyond: Transnational Perspectives on United States History' *Journal of American History* 86:3 (1999). See also '*AHR* Conversation: On Transnational History' *American Historical Review* 111:5 (2006). The transnational approach in studying internationalist institutions was recently the focus of an issue of the *Journal of Global History* (6:2, 2011).

[4] For example: Louise Fawcett and Mónica Serrano (eds), *Regionalism and Governance in the Americas* (Basingstoke, 2005); Gordon Mace and Jean-Philippe Thérien, *Foreign Policy and Regionalism in the Americas* (Boulder, 1996); Olivier Dabène, *The Politics of Regional Integration in Latin America: Theoretical and Comparative Explorations* (New York, 2009); and Jorge Heine, 'Regional Integration and Political Cooperation in Latin America' *Latin American Research Review* 47:3 (2012).

*Pan-Americanism*

Before the 1960s, Pan-Americanism attracted considerable attention from historians.[5] From the 1960s until the 1980s, however, Pan-Americanism was frequently confined to the pages either of United States diplomatic history (usually as a short section within broader analysis of rising US imperialism and world power) or of polemical accounts of US influence in Latin America.[6] Rarely did Pan-Americanism receive top billing; only a handful of English-language titles made it their central focus.[7] When an historian chose to focus on Pan-Americanism, the most common framework was US diplomacy, and the subject of study was usually the International Conferences of American States (there were six between 1889 and 1928). As diplomatic history's popularity diminished in the 1970s and 1980s, Pan-Americanism seemed an exhausted vein of historical inquiry. The 1990s, however, witnessed a revival of interest in the topic, partly due to a post-Cold War revision of diplomatic history that questioned the paramountcy of power relations in Cold War era historiography. Growing interest in non-traditional subjects of analysis, especially civil society actors, combined with the application of methods developed in other sub-fields (especially gender history) to breathe new life into the study of Pan-Americanism. This process is most evident in an edited volume published in 2000 on the new avenues open to historians interested in the topic: *Beyond the Ideal: Pan Americanism in Inter-*

[5] David Trask, Michael Meyer, and Roger Trask produced a useful bibliography of Pan-American history: *Bibliography of United States-Latin American Relations since 1810: a selected list of eleven thousand published references* (Lincoln, NE, 1968), especially pp. 93-97 and 167-203. Herbert Bolton's school of hemispheric history, which reached its apogee in the 1930s-1950s, boosted interest in Pan-American history. See Russell Magnaghi, *Herbert E. Bolton and the Historiography of the Americas* (Westport, CT, 1998).

[6] An example of the latter is Alonso Aguilar's *Pan-Americanism from Monroe to the Present: A View from the Other Side* (New York, 1968, trans. by Asa Zatz).

[7] One example is Mark T Gilderhus, *Pan American Visions: Woodrow Wilson and the Western Hemisphere, 1913-1921* (Tucson, 1986).

*American Affairs*.[8] Research on the wide range of issues found under the Pan-American umbrella, from women and children's rights to cultural and intellectual cooperation, has flourished.[9] This expansion of Pan-American history coincided with trends in the theory of regionalism in the Americas that highlighted multi-dimensionality and the development of networks.[10]

In direct contrast to earlier histories that viewed Pan-Americanism as 'generally thwarted' before the 1930s, recent historians have demonstrated that Pan-American cooperation was a burgeoning field from the 1890s to the 1920s.[11] One of the greatest virtues of this trend is the attention paid to actors not traditionally included in the history of international relations: non-state activists, academics, artists, technical experts, and others. Historical understandings of Pan-American cooperation have changed, shifting away from questions of geopolitics and towards a wider conception of international affairs. As Chapter One of this thesis will discuss, defining 'Pan-Americanism' has become complicated; yet it is a task that opens new channels of investigation and interpretation.

The recent surge of Pan-American studies has therefore broadened the horizons for historians of Latin American international relations.[12] Perhaps naturally, however,

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[8] David Sheinin (ed), *Beyond the Ideal: Pan Americanism in Inter-American Affairs* (Westport, 2000).
[9] Besides the authors of the *Beyond the Ideal* volume, other historians that have produced works on Pan-American topics in the last twenty years include Amy Birn, Benjamin Coates, Rodrigo Fernos, Robert González, Ramón Gutiérrez (working with Jorge Tartarini and Rubens Stagno), Donna Guy, Corinne Pernet, Ori Preuss, Megan Threlkeld, Ricardo Salvatore, and Juan Pablo Scarfi. References to their works and others can be found throughout the body of the text and in the bibliography.
[10] See Mace and Thérien, 'Introduction: Foreign Policy and Regionalism in the Americas' in Mace and Thérien, *Foreign Policy*, pp. 1-9.
[11] Federico Gil, *Latin American-United States Relations* (New York, 1971), p. 153.
[12] National approaches prevail in the historiography of Latin American international relations; few comprehensive attempts have been made to look at the region as a whole. A classic example of such an attempt is Harold E Davis, et al, *Latin American Diplomatic History: An Introduction* (Baton Rouge, 1977). Recent work on sub-regional relations include Pablo Lacoste, *La imagen del otro en las relaciones de Argentina y Chile (1534-2000)* (Buenos Aires, 2003) and Mario Rapoport and Amado

this trend has led to the fragmentation of the field. No historian has yet to gather all of the strands together to produce a comprehensive narrative of Pan-American cooperation in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.[13] Although it may seem a quixotic effort given the range of issues and the immense number of actors involved, it is a necessary one. Many of those actors involved in the development of Pan-American cooperation (including officials of the Pan American Union, governments of the participating states, and academics) viewed the phenomenon as a whole, a point that will be made throughout this thesis, while recognizing its multi-dimensional nature. The inter-connectedness of the Pan-American initiatives cannot be ignored. In taking a wide perspective on Pan-Americanism, this thesis begins filling the historiographical gap and offers an analytical framework for understanding Pan-American cooperation based on two complementary 'dimensions'.

One aspect of this historiography that has not significantly changed is the connection between Pan-Americanism and US hegemony in Latin America. The expansion of Pan-American historiography developed in parallel (and often in conversation) with new approaches to US empire that focus on broader questions of power and influence.[14] Although it is tempting to argue provocatively that Pan-American

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Luiz Cervo (eds), *El Cono Sur: una historia común* (Buenos Aires, 2001). Recent efforts to integrate Latin America into 'world' or 'global' history provide some insight into the region's participation in wider international affairs. For example, Marcello Carmagnani offers a provocative analysis that rejects structural frameworks, especially dependency, in two chapters (four and five) of his *Other West: Latin America from Invasion to Globalization* (Berkeley, CA, 2011). Carmagnani employs very broad strokes, however, that often blur some of the profound controversies among Latin American opinions over issues like non-intervention (see pp. 196-98).

[13] *Beyond the Ideal* began such a conversation, yet left it open-ended. Sheinin, the editor, briefly brings the disparate strands together in the Introduction (pp. 1-8).

[14] Examples of more recent studies in US hegemony abound. Illustrative examples include: Mark Berger, *Under Northern Eyes: Latin American Studies and US Hegemony in the Americas, 1898-1990* (Bloomington, 1995); Mark Gilderhus, *The Second Century: US-Latin American Relations since 1889* (Wilmington, 2000); Gilbert Joseph, Catherine Legrand, and Ricardo Salvatore (eds), *Close Encounters of Empire: Writing the Cultural History of US-Latin American Relations* (Durham, NC, 1998); Alfred McCoy and Francisco Scarano, *Colonial Crucible: Empire in the Making of the Modern American State* (Madison, 2009); Frank Rosen (ed), *Empire and Dissent: The United States and Latin America* (Durham, NC, 2008); Emily Rosenberg, *Financial Missionaries to the World: The Politics and Culture*

cooperation can be divorced from US hegemonic aspirations, such an argument is not empirically sound. The terms 'Pan-American' and 'Pan-Americanism' emerged in the 1880s as descriptions of US Secretary of State James G Blaine's project to secure US hegemony in the Western Hemisphere by means of exclusive (that is, excluding European powers) economic integration and a regional commitment to peaceful arbitration of disputes.[15] For the next forty years, Pan-American cooperation served to increase US influence in Latin America and remained under US leadership. The Pan American Union, or PAU, was headquartered in Washington and an official from the US State Department chaired its governing body. Even the supposedly apolitical aspects of Pan-Americanism – such as scientific cooperation or technological exchange – could be vehicles for advancing US hegemony, consciously or not (a point that historian Ricardo Salvatore has addressed).[16]

Nonetheless, this connection does not imply that Pan-American cooperation was imposed upon Latin America. Instead Pan-American cooperation was in many ways manipulated and appropriated by Latin American actors in order to manage US hegemony and bend it towards their interests. US-Latin American relations, therefore, are important to the story. Yet Pan-Americanism was also a form of international cooperation in a hemisphere that had a long history of attempts at greater integration. It was an example of the internationalism that gained momentum globally in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and that offered practical

*of Dollar Diplomacy, 1900-1930* (Cambridge, MA, 1999); and Lars Schoultz, *Beneath the United States: A History of US Policy Toward Latin America* (Cambridge, MA, 1998).

[15] Blaine claimed inspiration from the malleable Monroe Doctrine, the ambiguity of which he employed to justify US hegemony in Latin America; see Jay Sexton, *The Monroe Doctrine: Empire and Nation in Nineteenth-Century America* (New York, 2011), pp. 185-90. For a disucssion at Blaine's political calculations, see Russell Bastert, 'A New Approach to the Origins of Blaine's Pan American Policy' *Hispanic American Historical Review* 39:3 (1959).

[16] See Ricardo Salvatore, 'Imperial Mechanics: South America's Hemispheric Integration in the Machine Age' *Americas Quarterly* 58:3 (2006).

benefits.[17] To ensure that these characteristics of Pan-American cooperation are not forgotten, the framework of this thesis is regional cooperation rather than US-Latin American relations.

As trends in Pan-American historiography have changed the understanding of Pan-American cooperation – how it was defined, whom it involved, what issues it addressed and what space (both physical and conceptual) it occupied – historians should reconsider how to interpret policies towards it. Such work has yet to be done and few recent studies of Pan-Americanism take as their main subject of analysis official foreign policy.[18] The nation-state and national governments should remain central to studying Pan-American cooperation as this form of regionalism developed on the basis of nation-states and in relation to government.[19] Even Pan-American initiatives that addressed more 'transnational' issues, such as architectural styles or children's health, involved governmental representatives or delegates appointed by governments. Governments also provided support, both financial and logistical, to meetings initiated by non-state actors. Although civil society groups led many Pan-American efforts, they often invited governments to participate and framed discussions as an exchange of national perspectives. The nation-state and national governments, therefore, mattered. This thesis will consider closely how governments formulated policies towards a collection of movements like Pan-Americanism. The

[17] On emerging internationalism, see Iriye, *Cultural Internationalism*, and (for a look at 'international society' from an Anglo-centric perspective) Daniel Gorman, *The Emergence of International Society in the 1920s* (Cambridge, 2012).

[18] The exceptions are usually studies of US-Latin American relations; see, for example, Sheinin, *Searching for Authority: Pan Americanism, Diplomacy and Politics in United States-Argentine Relations 1910-1930* (New Orleans, 1998); Morgenfeld, *Vecinos en conflicto: Argentina y Estados Unidos en las Conferencias Panamericanas* (Buenos Aires, 2011); and Luis Ugalde, *Gomecismo y la política panamericana de Estados Unidos* (Caracas, 2005).

[19] Understanding 'nation-state' and 'state' in nineteenth-century Latin America has been an area of significant scholarship; see James Dunkerley (ed), *Studies in the Formation of the Nation State in Latin America* (London, 2002) and Miguel Centeno and Fernando López-Alves (eds), *The Other Mirror: Grand Theory through the Lens of Latin America* (Princeton, 2001), especially Part II.

use of 'approaches' in the title is deliberate, as it incorporates a range of ideas and activities: policies, attitudes, and participation in and manipulation of cooperation.

*The two cases: Argentina and Chile*

Adding richness to the analysis, this thesis will look two national cases: Argentina and Chile. The rationale behind this decision is two-fold. First, as a form of regional cooperation, Pan-Americanism was a common experience to the independent American republics. The policies that determined how states engaged with that experience developed simultaneously and often obeyed similar impulses and concerns. It seems logical, therefore, to study policy towards Pan-American cooperation not as unique to one particular state or national government, but as an approach evolving in conjunction with and in relation to other states and their policies. A simple way to do that is to examine two or more cases in parallel.

In addition, looking at two cases allows for comparative analysis, highlighting certain factors in policymaking that were common across borders but also dependent on national context. Comparison may help distinguish between structural and contingent factors. That is, recognizing similarities in the context of policymaking of two national cases puts in relief the historical contingencies caused by the agency of historical actors. Comparison, however, has its pitfalls; it may, for example, demonstrate the tautology that cases are different because, ultimately, they are separate. Comparative history is most effective, as Deborah Cohen noted in 2004, when limited to 'smart juxtapositions' and 'parallel histories that shed light on cross-

national phenomena.'[20] Argentine and Chilean approaches to Pan-Americanism are a good example of the latter.

The two countries were different in many ways. The size of territory is an obvious example. Population is another; Argentina counted 3.9 million inhabitants in 1895 and 11.8 million by 1930, while Chile was smaller with 2.7 million in 1895 and 4.4 million by 1930.[21] Yet they were also in a similar historical phase from the 1890s to 1930s. At the beginning of this period, both countries were characterized by an oligarchical political system, a state with an expanding professional bureaucracy, an export-led economic model that fostered a degree of industrialization, and urbanization. During the next forty years, both Argentina and Chile experienced similar socio-economic phenomena, including increasing labour militancy, gradual political reform, and cyclical economic booms and busts largely dependent on a handful of exports (nitrates and copper for Chile, beef and wheat for Argentina). Culturally, elites and intellectuals demonstrated an affinity for Europe, though Europhilia declined in the early twentieth century, particularly after the First World War. Both societies also faced similar tensions under the umbrella term 'la cuestión social'.[22] These general developments were not identical, however, and their differences had implications for foreign policy formulation.

[20] Deborah Cohen, 'Comparative History: Buyer Beware' in Deborah Cohen and Maureen O'Connor (eds), *Comparison and History: Europe in Cross-National Perspective* (New York, 2004), p. 70.
[21] For population statistics of Argentina, see Roberto Cortés Conde, 'The Growth of the Argentine Economy, c. 1870-1914' and David Rock, 'From the First World War to 1930', both in Leslie Bethell (ed), *Argentina Since Independence* (Cambridge, 1993), especially pp. 55 and 173. For those of Chile, see Simon Collier and William Sater, *A History of Chile, 1808-2002* (Cambridge, 2004), p. 115 and Thomas Merrick, 'The Population of Laitn America, 1930-1990' in Leslie Bethell (ed), *Latin America: Economy and Society Since 1930* (Cambridge, 1998), p. 7.
[22] All of these elements of Argentine and Chilean domestic context will be described in more detail (and references for further reading will be given) later in the text of this thesis.

Most importantly, Chilean and Argentine foreign policies are good subjects for comparison. In the late 1880s, Chile and Argentina occupied similar positions within the international system as peripheral powers with strong cultural and economic ties with Europe. Both had been victorious in mid-century wars (Chile against Bolivia and Peru in the War of the Pacific, 1879-83, and Argentina, with Brazil and Uruguay, against Paraguay in the War of the Triple Alliance, 1865-70) and both claimed the status of regional power. Both had regional allies (Uruguay for Argentina, Brazil and Ecuador for Chile) and regional rivals (Brazil and Chile for Argentina, Peru and Argentina for Chile), which provided a sense of equilibrium within regional politics.[23] Partly due to contentious border issues that sparked an arms race, Argentina and Chile were militarily equal in the 1880s and 1890s. Regarding modern Pan-Americanism, the two countries began from a similar starting point: a mixture of antagonism and indifference towards Blaine's project. Thus Chile and Argentina were on par in international standing and initial Pan-American policy. The convergence and divergence of their foreign policies after 1888, therefore, requires explanation.

Historical analysis of Chilean and Argentine approaches to Pan-Americanism has often demonstrated an excessive emphasis on anti-US sentiments, overshadowing the two countries' extensive participation in Pan-American cooperation. Chile's approach has received less attention from historians; in fact, there are no historical monographs that have the topic as its central concern. Analysis of Chilean Pan-American policies appears instead in more general studies of Chilean diplomatic history. The works of Mario Barros, Robert Burr, Juan Ricardo Couyoumdjian, Joaquín Fermandois,

[23] A classic look at South American equilibrium politics is Robert Burr, 'The Balance of Power in Nineteenth-Century South America' *Hispanic American Historical Review* 35:1 (1955).

Frederick Pike, and William Sater are among the most significant.[24] Pike's book, *Chile and the United States* (1965), offers one of the more extensive analyses of Chile and Pan-Americanism. Unlike many of his contemporaries, Pike argued that diplomacy must be understood in relation to the domestic context: 'Chilean diplomacy has been a natural, organic outgrowth of national attitudes and experiences.'[25] To prove this thesis, he alternated chapters on socio-political and diplomatic history. Generally, his approach is convincing, but he failed to provide clear connections between many policy decisions and their domestic context in the pre-1930 period. Pan-American policy is, unfortunately, one of the areas lacking clarity. Moreover, his analysis relies heavily on 'national attitudes' towards the US, thereby neglecting attitudes towards international cooperation more generally. Other historians offer useful overviews, but provide few details of Pan-American policies.[26]

In contrast, the Argentine approach to Pan-Americanism has been the subject of several historical monographs by historians such as Alén Lascano, Thomas McGann, Leandro Morgenfeld, David Sheinin and Beatriz Solveira.[27] There is also a wealth of

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[24] Mario Barros, *Historia diplomática de Chile (1541-1938)* (Barcelona, 1970), *passim*; Burr, *By Reason or Force: Chile and the balancing of power in South America, 1830-1905* (Berkeley, 1965), pp. 188-90 and 240-44; Juan Ricardo Couyoumdjian, *Chile y Gran Bretaña durante la primera guerra mundial y la postguerra, 1914-1921* (Santiago, 1986), pp. 49, 62-66, 93-96, 167 and 215; Joaquín Fermandois, *Mundo y fin del mundo: Chile en la política mundial, 1900-2004* (Santiago, 2004); Frederick Pike, *Chile and the United States: The emergence of Chile's social crisis and the challenge to United States Diplomacy* (Notre Dame, 1965), pp. 62-65, 126-35, 150-55, and 224-31; William Sater, *Chile and the United States: Empires in Conflict* (Athens, GA, 1991). Another work, though mainly a repetition of Burr and Pike's arguments, is Emilio Meneses's unpublished Oxford DPhil thesis *Coping with Decline: Chilean Foreign Policy during the Twentieth Century, 1902-1972* (1989).

[25] Pike, *Chile and the US*, p. ix.

[26] Couyoumdjian's work (*Chile y Gran Bretaña*) is, as the title suggests, focused on British-Chilean relations in the 1910s and 1920s and so mentions Pan-Americanism more for context; Sater's work (*Chile and the US*) is a sweeping look at bilateral relations with the US and Pan-Americanism is studied as only one example among many.

[27] Alén Lascano, *Yrigoyen, Sandino y el panamericanismo* (Buenos Aires, 1986); Thomas McGann, *Argentina, the United States, and the Inter-American System 1880-1914* (Cambridge, MA, 1957); Morgenfeld, *Vecinos en conflicto*; Beatriz Solveira, *La Argentina y la Quinta Conferencia Panamericana* (Córdoba, 1993); and David Sheinin, *Searching for Authority: Pan Americanism, Diplomacy and Politics in US-Argentine Relations* (New Orleans, 1998). Morgenfeld provides a review of works relating to Argentine diplomacy, including Pan-American policy in pp. 19-29. Sheinin also

secondary sources on Argentine diplomacy and US-Argentine relations that mention pre-1930 Pan-American cooperation.[28] The greater interest in Argentine participation in Pan-Americanism stems, perhaps, from the traditional view of conflict between Argentina and the US.[29] Pan-American conferences were occasionally sites of tense and dramatic exchanges between the US and Argentine delegations. Assuming the existence of rivalry between the two hemispheric powers, many historians have employed Pan-American interactions as evidence of sustained Argentine resistance to US interests and widespread anti-US sentiments. Leandro Morgenfeld's book from 2011, carrying the title *Vecinos en conflicto*, is the latest of such interpretations.[30] Morgenfeld's work is laudable for its attempt to provide a detailed account of Pan-American policy over a long sweep of history (1880-1955) and for its emphasis on archival material. Yet, he neglected to consider recent historiographical developments, particularly research on cooperation outside the major Pan-American conferences and the convincing arguments for Argentine support of Pan-Americanism presented by Sheinin.

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produced the article 'Argentina and the United States at the Sixth Pan American Conference (Havana 1928)' (London, 1991).

[28] Some important volumes include: Andrés Cisneros and Carlos Escudé (eds), *Historia general de las relaciones exteriores de la República Argentina* (16 volumes, Buenos Aires, 1999), especially volumes Seven and Eight; Roberto Etchepareborda, *Historia de las relaciones internacionales argentinas* (Buenos Aires, 1978), *passim*; José Paradiso, *Debates y trayectoria de la política exterior argentina* (Buenos Aires, 1993), which is a work of historical sociology though offers important insights into the mindset of policymaking, especially pp. 19-80; Juan A Lanús, *Aquel apogeo: política internacional argentina 1910-1939* (Buenos Aires, 2001), *passim*; Harold Peterson, *Argentina and the United States, 1810-1960* (New York, 1964), especially pp. 275-396; Isidoro Ruiz Moreno, *Historia de las relaciones exteriores argentinas, 1810-1955* (Buenos Aires, 1961), especially Chapter Seven; David Sheinin, *Argentina and the United States: An Alliance Contained* (Athens, GA, 2006), especially Chapter Two; Joseph Tulchin, *Argentina and the United States: A Conflicted Relationship* (Boston, 1990); and Mario Rapoport and Claudio Spiguel, *Política exterior argentina:Poder y conflictos internos (1880-2001)* (Buenos Aires, 2005).

[29] Rivalry is a major theme of Peterson and Tulchin's works (the latter even hints at underlying conflict in its subtitle).

[30] McGann made rivalry central to his interpretation in *Argentina and the US*. Lascano also emphasized rivalry and interpreted Argentina's approach to Pan-Americanism under Yrigoyen as anti-imperialism; see Lascano, *Yrigoyen*, pp. 9-56.

Sheinin's book *Searching for Authority: Pan Americanism, Diplomacy and Politics in United States-Argentine Relations, 1910-1930* (1998) argues that Argentina's approach to Pan-American cooperation was pragmatic and not an anti-US campaign. While maintaining that Argentine policymakers viewed relations with the US in terms of competition, Sheinin uses extensive archival research to demonstrate that Argentine governments supported Pan-Americanism in the 1900s and after. These governments used Pan-American cooperation to level the playing field with the US and reap practical benefits.[31] This thesis will build on Sheinin's work, which highlighted economic questions, by examining multiple factors in policymaking.

*Deconstructing Regional Cooperation*

Choosing which factors to emphasize is one of the biggest methodological challenges of this study. The historiography of foreign policies mentioned above has generally favoured explanations based on attitudes towards the US, geopolitical calculations (including continental balance of power), and economic considerations. Such factors were significant. Pan-American cooperation did not occur in a vacuum, but was part of a broad field of international power politics and economic interactions, both inter- and intra-hemispheric. Economic questions frequently shaped policymaking debates; the need to cultivate markets and attract capital, for example, were driving forces behind the foreign policy of both countries. Increased willingness to participate in Pan-American cooperation coincided with growth (or the perceived potential of

[31] This is also a major theme in Sheinin's *Argentina and the United States* and 'Argentina and the United States'. Sheinin is not alone in his assertion of Argentine support of cooperation; Juan Archibaldo Lanús, diplomat and author of several works on international affairs and history, portrays Argentina in *Aquel apogeo* as a genuine proponent of Pan-American cooperation (pp. 182-230).

growth) in inter-American commerce. These factors remain important reference points and will be woven into the overall narrative in Chapters Two and Three.

Yet this thesis will demonstrate that deconstructing Pan-American cooperation and unpacking the policymaking process in Argentina and Chile render economic and geopolitical explanations insufficient. Different aspects of Pan-American policies, geared towards different strands of cooperation, reveal a wider set of factors. How to structure analysis of approaches to variegated regional cooperation remains a challenge unaddressed in the historiography. Models from other disciplines may hold the key, as some diplomatic historians have already suggested. Stephen Pelz, for example, argues that IR methods and theory can help to understand recurring themes that emerge from research in diplomatic history.[32] Pelz's argument shapes the analytical methodology of Chapters Four through Seven, where interesting patterns in the archival record and the Pan-American narrative are more closely examined using ideas from other disciplines as a starting point for understanding the patterns' implications. Four broad categories organize the patterns and provide the chapters' titles: organization of policymaking, non-state actors and public opinion, intermestic Pan-American policies, and ideas in international relations.

Each chapter thus analyses approaches to Pan-Americanism from a different angle. Chapter Four focuses on policymaking at the state level, exploring the bureaucracy inside and outside the Foreign Ministry (in this thesis, the terms 'Cancillería' and 'Ministerio' will be used to refer to the Chilean and Argentine Foreign Ministries,

[32] Stephen Pelz, 'Toward a New Diplomatic History: Two and a Half Cheers for International Relations Methods' in Colin Elman and Miriam Fendius Elman (eds), *Bridges and Boundaries: Historians, Political Scientists, and the Study of International Relations* (Cambridge, 2001). Pelz was one voice among many that called for an approximation of diplomatic history and IR; see also Stephen H. Haber, David M. Kennedy, and Stephen D. Krasner, 'Brothers Under the Skin: Diplomatic History and International Relations' *International Security* 22:1 (1997).

respectively). The relative bargaining positions of state actors including members of the executive, National Congress, and the military will also be analyzed. In contrast, Chapter Five will consider actors and influences from outside state institutions. The next chapter shifts analysis to preferences and strategy in foreign policy. Chapter Six considers the impact of domestic developments (including political reform, industrialization, and urbanization) on practical calculations in policymaking. Finally, Chapter Seven closely examines how policymakers understood the nature of international relations and the concept of regional cooperation. Each approach has its own historiographical and theoretical grounding, which will feature at the beginning of the chapters.

Two sets of social science theory were particularly significant to organizing this thesis. The first is the Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) sub-field of IR theory, which emphasises multi-level analysis and multi-factorial explanans and so seeks a more comprehensive understanding of policymaking.[33] FPA theorists argue that investigations at the actor level, state level, and international system level are valid. Actor agency is central, though the international system limits the range of potential activity. FPA theories also reject the state as a unitary actor; rather, the state is comprised of complicated networks representing various interests and perspectives.[34] FPA analysis is of limited use here, however, as its actor-specific approach requires detailed examination of select actors, usually in one historical moment – a task out of the scope of this thesis. Another set of social science theories that avoids the

[33] For a concise introduction to the FPA approach, see Valerie M Hudson, 'Foreign Policy Analysis: Actor-Specific Theory and the Ground of International Relations' *Foreign Policy Analysis* 1 (2005). Also see James Rosenau, 'Pre-theories and Theories of Foreign Policy' in R Barry Farrell, *Approaches to Comparative and International Politics* (Evanston, 1966).

[34] The idea of examining the networks and organizations was most famously developed by Graham T. Allison. See his *The Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis* (Boston, 1971) and *Remaking Foreign Policy: The Organisational Connection* (New York, 1976).

limitation of FPA is the study of modern regionalism. As in FPA, recent regionalist studies prefer multi-factorial approaches.[35] Some also take a more critical line than FPA on attempts at formulating grand theory, arguing that regionalism can be understood best with what Louise Fawcett and Mónica Serrano call 'methodological pluralism.'[36] Although the research methodology for this thesis was straightforwardly historical (archival work supplemented by printed texts from the period), its analytical methodology is heterogeneous.

*Chronology: 1888-1930*

Before delving into the analysis, some thought should be given to chronology. For reasons explained in Chapter One, this thesis distinguishes between 'traditional' and 'modern' Pan-Americanism. 'Traditional' refers to the long history of cooperation/integration mentioned previously. 'Modern' began with Blaine's project, first articulated in 1881 but delayed because of domestic political events in the US until later in the decade. In 1888, the US government issued invitations to an International Conference of American States, to be convened in Washington, DC a year later. These invitations, however, are not the reason for starting with 1888. Rather, in order to situate the Washington Conference and its inauguration of modern Pan-Americanism within the context of wider regional cooperation in the Americas, the story here begins with the juridical Congress of Montevideo of 1888. A meeting of South American nations for the codification of private international law, the Congress of Montevideo was a prelude to modern Pan-Americanism.

[35] Particularly Fawcett and Serrano (eds), *Regionalism*, and Mace and Thérien (eds), *Foreign Policy*.
[36] Fawcett and Serrano, 'Introduction', in Fawcett and Serrano, *Regionalism*, p. xxiii.

The end-date, 1930, has less to do with Pan-American cooperation; the more logical stopping point in terms of Pan-American chronology would be 1933, the year of the Seventh International Conference of American States at which the US government publicly accepted the principle of non-intervention (a point addressed in this thesis's conclusion). 1930 is, instead, important in terms of Chilean and Argentine history. The early 1930s were a period of drastic and dramatic upheaval for both countries. The effects of the Great Depression of 1929 combined with underlying political tensions to cause the overthrow of the second administration of President Hipólito Yrigoyen in Argentina (1930) and of the dictatorial presidency of General Carlos Ibáñez del Campo in Chile (1931). What followed were periods of political uncertainty and readjustment; although a new and relatively stable regime consolidated in both countries in 1932, the shock of the previous two years had a profound impact. There was continuity in foreign policies before and after 1930, but this year also marked a significant break. Economic questions, which had always been important in foreign policy, gained greater urgency as the new governments attempted to stimulate economic recovery. In Argentina, for example, the emphasis and attention given to negotiations over the Roca-Runciman Treaty (a trade agreement with Great Britain) overshadowed most other policy issues in the early 1930s. In Chile, the new foreign minister, Miguel Cruchaga Tocornal, told an incoming ministerial employee: 'Usted sabe bastante historia, derecho internacional y la teoría de las relaciones exteriores. Pero lo que necesitamos ahora, en momentos de crisis, es exportar porotos, cebollas y ajos.'[37] The centrality of economic recovery changed Argentine and Chilean outlooks on foreign policy, including Pan-American cooperation. The changes to international politics and economics wrought by the

[37] Enrique Bernstein Carabantes, *Recuerdos de un diplomático*, (2 vols, 2nd ed, Santiago, 1984), i, 6.

Great Depression and the internal upheaval of 1930-31, therefore, make the end of 1930 a good place to stop.

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Pan-American cooperation was one element of inter-American relations between 1888 and 1930, and its overall significance to the international affairs of the Western Hemisphere and the foreign policies of the American republics was, for some contemporaries and historians, debatable. Yet, if Pan-Americanism is deconstructed and its parts are examined (without losing sight of the whole), it becomes a useful means of gaining a richer understanding of international history. Argentine and Chilean actors participated in and exploited the various strands of Pan-Americanism to different extents and to different effects. Overall, the approaches taken by Argentines and Chileans helped shape the nature of regional cooperation, internationalism, and the hegemonic aspirations of the US in the Western Hemisphere. This thesis will re-focus the Pan-American narrative, offering both an overall perspective and a detailed look at select strands of Pan-Americanism, thus providing insight into patterns of 'resistance, engagement, and withdrawal' that some scholars argue still exist in modern regionalism.[38]

[38] Fawcett and Serrano, 'Introduction', p. xxiv.

# Chapter 1

# Defining Pan-Americanism (1888 - 1930)

Pan-Americanism defies simple definition.[1] John Edwin Fagg, in his 1982 history of Pan-Americanism, marvelled at the plethora of interpretations. 'Pan Americanism', he noted, 'has been considered a movement, a cause, a sentiment, a dream, a spiritual union, an advocacy, an aspiration, or a quasi-legal embodiment of a fraternity of the nations of the Western Hemisphere.'[2] Further adding to this complexity is the confusion over the term in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Indeed, a lively debate over Pan-Americanism raged in the forty years after the 1889 Washington Conference, leading to competing visions and warnings against 'false apostles of Pan Americanism.'[3] Authorities of Pan-American institutions, such as the Director General of the PAU, also felt the need to manage the public discourse over the term through various forms of propaganda: speeches, radio addresses, and copious amounts of literature. Leo S Rowe (Director from 1920 to 1946), for example, gave this definition in a radio programme for NBC:

> True Pan Americanism is the outward expression of a growing realization on the part of the nations of America that the social, economic and cultural problems that confront them have much in common, and that through a constant interchange of experience, as well as through constructive cooperation, they can be most helpful to one another in the solution of these problems.[4]

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[1] Sheinin calls Pan-Americanism 'elusive' in his introduction to *Beyond the Ideal*, p. 1.
[2] John Fagg, *Pan Americanism* (Malabar, FL, 1982), p. 1.
[3] This was the title of a radio address on 13 January 1933 given by a Latin American journalist and supporter of Pan-Americanism, A. Ramón Ruiz. The transcript can be found in the John Barrett Papers (LOC JBP Container 98).
[4] Rowe, 'Pan Americanism as a Factor in the Maintenance of World Peace', Radio Address, NBC, 24 April 19[?], CML LSR Container 12. Although there is no year stated on the transcript, references within the address point to the early 1930s.

Yet neither Rowe – who, according to Sheinin, was 'an intellectual progenitor of the movement' – nor any other official source achieved a monopoly on the interpretation and the use of Pan-Americanism.[5] Instead, the concept was subject to intense debate, definition, and re-definition. It was the topic of numerous newspaper editorials, journal and magazine articles, academic theses, and monographs. Its usage was varied and unregulated. A comparison of two events in 1910 illustrates this point well. In April, President William H Taft dedicated a new PAU building in Washington before a crowd of esteemed dignitaries from all reaches of the continent, planting a 'Peace Tree' (a fig-rubber hybrid, symbolizing the unity of the two Americas). The same year, but thousands of miles away in Chillán, Chile, schoolmarm María Espindola de Muñoz inaugurated the ephemeral Federación Femenina Panamericana without such fanfare. These two events were different in nearly every way – in participants, objectives, structure and scope – yet both invoked Pan-Americanism. Both, then, could be included in this thesis's analysis.

Simplicity, nonetheless, is tempting. Take, for example, the definition provided by William Spence Robinson in 1923: 'a tendency displayed by independent nations of America to associate together.'[6] Or perhaps that of Antonio Recabarren from 1938: 'una idea geográfica de unidad continental.'[7] Both of these, however, are unsatisfactory. The first is too ambiguous in its use of 'associate'; Pan-Americanism involved cooperation, not mere association. Recabarren's definition implies that the

[5] Sheinin, 'Re-thinking Pan-Americanism', p. 5. For more on Rowe, see David Barton Castle, 'Leo Stanton Rowe and the Meaning of Pan Americanism' in Sheinin (ed.), *Beyond the Ideal*, p. 34. This article offers a justifiably critical view of the PAU and Rowe's influence in particular. Barton Castle portrays Rowe as a well-intentioned, though misguided, Pan-American proselytiser whose naivety and blind faith in the movement ultimately undermined the PAU's efficiency. An overview of Rowe's career can be found in Sumner Welles's fulsome 'In Memoriam: Dr. Leo S Rowe' (*The Americas,* 3:3, 1947).

[6] Spence Robinson, *Hispanic-American Relations with the United States* (New York, 1923), p. 378.

[7] Recabarren, 'La Conferencia de Lima: El Panamericanismo y su historia' *Zig-Zag* No 1756 (17 November 1938), p. 36.

main, if not only, impetus behind Pan-Americanism was the convenience of geography, thereby ignoring elements of intellectual, cultural, and historical affinity that were more important for many Pan-American proponents. Other attempts at simple definitions are equally unsatisfactory. Rather, a definition with more nuance and complexity, such as Rowe's radio address, is more appropriate. Yet even Rowe's statement ignored significant elements of Pan-Americanism, particularly the aspiration to regulate inter-American relations with international law under the leadership of one or more countries.[8] What can be simply stated is this: Pan-Americanism was a multifarious movement; or rather, a collection of related movements under the umbrella of cooperation within the Americas. The rest of this chapter will explain what can – and should – be included in this thesis. In doing so, it will introduce two important categorizations: 'traditional' and 'modern' Pan-Americanism and the multiple dimensions of Pan-American cooperation.

*Pan-American Chronology: Where to begin?*

The term 'Pan-Americanism' was not used until the 1880s. The word first appeared in print to describe Blaine's idea for an International Conference of American States.[9] In Spanish, the term *panamericanismo* dates to the same period, most likely a hispanization of the English word. Dating Pan-Americanism, however, is not as straightforward; there had been discussions of and attempts at continental cooperation before the 1880s including congresses in Panama in 1826, in Lima in 1846-47 and again in 1864-65, and in Santiago, Chile in 1856. Two legal conferences (Lima

[8] The fact that Rowe did not mention a political aspect to 'Pan-Americanism' was a deliberate attempt to redefine the term, avoiding controversial (or 'political') questions.
[9] Joseph B Lockey, an ardent supporter of the movement, credited the New York *Evening Post* with the first usage of the term in 1882; see *Pan-Americanism: Its Beginning* (New York, 1920), p. 2.

1877-78 and Montevideo 1888) and a Conference on Sanitation (Lima 1888) were also convened. Yet these used the label 'American' or 'Continental' rather than 'Pan-American'. Historians have nonetheless recognized in these earlier efforts and in the Monroe Doctrine of 1823 the roots of Pan-Americanism.[10] Historiographically, the term 'Pan-American' has therefore been antedated (that is, extended beyond its etymological inception in the 1880s). In order to distinguish the two periods, some historians have categorized them into 'Old' and 'New' Pan-Americanism.[11]

Other historians, however, have rejected or simply ignored this categorization. Sheinin, while recognizing Pan-Americanism's early-nineteenth-century roots, uses the term 'Pan-American' to distinguish the periods before and after Blaine. Joseph Smith also disregards the antedating of Pan-Americanism, arguing that the idea was connected to new demands of US political and economic expansion.[12] Earlier historians, such as Robert Burr and Roland Hussey, preferred to use the term 'inter-American'.[13] This term, occasionally interchangeable with 'Pan-American', was a later invention. Although its etymology is not as certain as that of 'Pan-Americanism' (there is at least one example of the use of *interamericana* as early as 1902), it was in

[10] The few historians who did not were Latin American historians reacting against US influence in the region. Alfonso Aguilar's *Pan-Americanism* provides a good example. For Aguilar, Camilo Barcia Trelles's 1924 description of Pan-Americanism was apt in its concision: 'Pan-Americanism was born in Washington in 1889, was promoted from Washington, and was received by Latin America' (Aguilar, p. 39). Another example is Ricardo Martínez's, *El Panamericanismo, Doctrina y Practica Imperialista* (Buenos Aires, 1957).

[11] See Trask, Meyer and Trask, *Bibliography*, which contains sections on 'The Old Pan Americanism', pp. 34-35, and 'The New Pan Americanism Since 1889', pp. 167-70.

[12] Smith acknowledges the precedent set by the nineteenth-century congresses, but argues that post-1889 Pan-Americanism cannot be seen in this wider inter-American context. Instead, it was 'a function of US political and economic expansionism in the Americas' ('The First Conference of American States (1889-1890) and the Early Pan American Policy of the United States' in Sheinin, *Beyond the Ideal*).

[13] Burr and Hussey, *Documents on Inter-American Cooperation, Volume I: 1810-81* (Philadelphia, 1955).

common usage by the 1910s.[14] The fact that this term was not immediately associated with Blaine's initiative of 1889 perhaps made it more appropriate for historians discussing the development of hemispheric cooperation since the eighteenth century. Arthur Whitaker's work on the intellectual basis of inter-continental cooperation – particularly the 'Western Hemisphere idea' – viewed the Panamanian Congress and the post-1889 Conferences as merely distinct 'shifting and imperfect forms in which it [the Western Hemisphere Idea] has been given form.'[15] Whitaker argued that 'Pan-Americanism' as an idea dated to Thomas Jefferson's use of a personified 'America' in a letter to Alexander von Humboldt in 1813, but did not apply that label to any pre-1889 conferences.[16]

Theoretically, antedating Pan-Americanism to include pre-1880s initiatives is problematic for several reasons. It encourages a misguided teleological view of Blaine's project. Monroe's statement and the pre-1880s congresses were steps towards the later (perhaps inevitable?) emergence of 'Pan-Americanism' as defined by Blaine.[17] It also dislodges the pre-1880s actors from their historical context; their terminology (including 'americano' and 'continental') encapsulated debates and ideas specific to the moment.[18] Perhaps, then, historians should avoid antedating. Yet, there is use in the practice as it helps to understand the perspectives of some historical actors. Chilean writers had, by the turn of the century, already begun define 'Pan-Americanism' to include earlier nineteenth-century efforts. In 1902, Enrique Burgos

[14] One example from 1902 is in the report that the president of the Argentine delegation to the Pan-American Conference in Mexico (1901-02), Antonio Bermejo to the Cancillería, 15 April 1902, AMRECIC Serie 25 Caja 2: III, p. 70.
[15] Whitaker, *The Western Hemisphere Idea: Its Rise and Decline* (Ithaca, NY, 1954), p. vi.
[16] Ibid., pp. 29-30.
[17] For an overview of the Monroe Doctrine, and its many re-interpretations in the nineteenth century, see Sexton, *The Monroe Doctrine*.
[18] For an example of different definitions of these terms, see Chapter Four of Jorge Myers, *Orden y virtud: el discurso republicano en el régimen rosista* (Buenos Aires, 1995).

Varas, noted journalist and politician, published a thesis on 'Los Congresos Pan-Americanos' that contained a review of the Congresses from Panama in 1826 to Mexico in 1901-02.[19] Another source from the same year – Miguel Cruchaga Tocornal's well-respected and widely-read *Nociones del derecho internacional* – included a similar list.[20] Various examples in the early twentieth century, including a book written by a member of the Chilean delegation to the Third International Conference of American States in Rio de Janeiro, attest to the fact that the antedating of Pan-Americanism was an important element of Chilean definitions of Pan-Americanism.[21] The most eloquent expression of this tendency came in President Alejandro Alessandri's opening speech at the Fifth International Conference of American States in Santiago (1923). After listing the various inter-American efforts of the previous century (collectively described as 'la epopeya americana'), Alessandri proclaimed that they 'encarnan una promesa de germinación espiritual que afianzará perdurablemente el principio del Panamericanismo.'[22]

In contrast, Argentine definitions of 'Pan-Americanism' usually did not antedate the term to include the nineteenth century congresses. Official statements such as the opening address of Foreign Minister Victorino de la Plaza to the Fourth International Conference of American States in Buenos Aires (1910) and a memorandum on regional cooperation from 1921 dated Pan-Americanism to the 1889 Conference.[23]

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[19] Burgos Varas, *Los Congresos Pan-Americanos: su fisonomía ante el derecho internacional, bosquejo histórico y análisis juridico* (Santiago, 1902). He included all of the nineteenth century conferences, with the exception of the Lima juridical conference in 1877-79, which had been interrupted by the outbreak of the War of the Pacific.
[20] Cruchaga, *Nociones del derecho internacional*, 2nd ed (Santiago, 1902), p. 225.
[21] Benjamin Vicuña Subercaseaux, *Los Congresos Pan-Americanos*, 2nd ed (Santiago, 1910), pp. 4-14.
[22] Alessandri, *Discurso de S.E. el Presidente de la República don Arturo Alessandri en la sesión de instalación de la Quinta Conferencia Internacional Americana* (Santiago, 1923), p. 13.
[23] Victorino de la Plaza, *Discurso de inauguración por el Ministro de Relaciones Exteriores y Culto, Dr Victorino de la Plaza, el día 12 de julio de 1910* (Buenos Aires, 1910); Ministerio de Relaciones

Other terms were employed for the pre-1889 congresses, including americanismo, latinoamericanismo, and panhispanoamericanismo.[24] This observation does not imply universal disregard of antedating. In fact, there is an example from 1906: Epifanio Portela, Argentine Minister to Washington at the time, referenced in a meeting 'la digna tradición de los Congresos de Montevideo, Washington y Méjico,' thereby grouping the 1888 Juridical Congress of Montevideo with the first two International Conferences of American States.[25] This was a significant difference between Argentine and Chilean definitions of Pan-Americanism, which will be further explored in Chapter Seven.

As antedating can help historians to understand the perspectives of historical actors in this study, it will occasionally be used in this thesis with the terms 'traditional' and 'modern' instead of 'old' and 'new'. There are several reasons behind this departure from the historiography. The terms 'old' and 'new' imply that the main, and perhaps only, distinction between the two is chronological. Rather, there were significant substantive differences (discussed below) that should be recognised in the descriptive terminology. Also, the old/new distinction should be replaced to avoid confusion; in the 1910s and 1920s, the distinction was used to differentiate between pre- and post-1915 'Pan-Americanism' (discussed in more detail in the next chapter). More importantly, 'traditional' fits better with the descriptions of Pan-Americanism used in this period. Although writers at the time did not use the term, their treatments of pre-

Exteriores y Culto, 'Circular Mensual', April 1921; a copy of this circular was sent by Stimson to the State Department and can be found in NARA RG59 M514 Roll 11, pp. 215-44.

[24] For examples, see Ernesto Quesada, *La evolución del panamericanismo* (Buenos Aires, 1919), p. 33 and Daniel Antokoletz, *Manual diplomático y consular (para uso de los aspirantes y funcionarios de ambas carreras)* (Buenos Aires, 1928), pp. 24-26.

[25] Portela to Secretary of PAU Governing Board, 7 March 1906, AMRREE Histórico 295.

1889 Pan-Americanism suggested that it was the tradition upon which the 'modern' movement and Latin American approaches to it were founded.

*'Traditional' and 'Modern' Pan-Americanisms*

The modern Pan-Americanism that emerged in the 1880s was a US-led movement with an institutionalized structure. Traditional Pan-Americanism was more amorphous and, except for the invitations to the US to join the Panamanian and Lima Congresses (1826 and 1847 respectively), was exclusively Latin American.[26] The aims of the traditional and modern were also distinct. Traditional Pan-Americanism focused mainly on collective security, conditioned by the fear of recolonization by Spain or other European interventions. Discussions included other objectives, such as the uniformity of postal rates and communications, though these were ultimately subordinate to security. In contrast, the modern form was initially more concerned with commerce and trade. The First International Conference of American States in 1889-90, the first modern Pan-American conference, was called not only to ensure peace among the American republics but also to impress the Latin American governments with US economic and industrial prowess and convince them of the benefits of a hemispheric customs union. Modern Pan-Americanism quickly expanded from this focus into a variety of issues, as will be seen in the following section of this chapter.

The impetuses behind traditional and modern also diverged. The former was usually a reaction to a specific threat or perceived threat. Fears of Spanish reconquest with

[26] These were in the end exclusively Latin American. The US did eventually designate delegates for the Panama Congress, but these delegates did not arrive in Panama in time for the Congress (one died en route). The US did not accept the Lima invitation.

the aid of the Holy Alliance (France, Russia and Austria-Hungary) inspired Simón Bolívar to call the Panamanian Congress of 1826. The Conference in Lima (1847) was a response to an Ecuadorian president's attempt to enlist European intervention in Ecuador's domestic affairs; another conference in that city (1864) convened after the Spanish occupation of Peru's Chincha Islands and the ensuing war pitting Spain against Peru, Ecuador and Chile. Domestic political party manoeuvres played a role in Chile's invitation to a conference in Santiago in 1856. Yet, it was William Walker's filibuster in Nicaragua and the threat of US infringements of Latin American sovereignty that determined the timing of that conference and provided its *cause célèbre*.[27] Colombia unsuccessfully attempted to convene a conference in 1881, aimed at minimising the consequences of the War of the Pacific. Although discussions on Latin American unity occurred throughout the nineteenth century – involving such eminent Latin American thinkers as Andrés Bello, Domingo Sarmiento and Juan Bautista Alberdi – this discourse yielded action mainly in times of crisis and external threat.[28]

Modern Pan-Americanism's origins were less reactive. In 1881, Secretary of State Blaine, believing in the benefits of closer relations with Latin America and in the need to supplant European commercial dominance of the region, launched a project of American unity bolstered by an arbitration convention and a customs union. His initial attempt to convene a conference of American states was derailed by the assassination of President James Garfield at the end of 1881. The idea of a Pan-American conference was revived under President Grover Cleveland's first

[27] For more on the origins of the conference and its accomplishments (ephemeral though they were), see GA Nuermberger, 'The Continental Treaties of 1856: An American Union 'Exclusive of the United States'' *HAHR* 20:1 (1940).
[28] Further discussion of these thinkers and their impact on ideas of regional cooperation after 1888 will be examined in Chapter Seven.

administration (1885-89), which eventually sent invitations for a conference in Washington. Blaine, once again the Secretary of State in the administration of Benjamin Harrison (1889-1893), carried the idea to fruition. Modern Pan-Americanism's decade-long birth demonstrates its most important characteristic: it was squarely a US-led initiative. The movement was moulded around the interests of the emerging 'colossus of the north', under the banner of the Monroe Doctrine's 'America for Americans'.

The importance of the US in modern Pan-Americanism should not be understated. Washington was the headquarters of the most important Pan-American institutions, which were often viewed as branches of the State Department. Both of the pre-World War II PAU Directors General (John Barrett and Leo S Rowe) were US citizens with close ties (occasionally personal) to the US government. The connection between the PAU and the US government was recognized as a matter of fact by many Latin American actors. When Mexico proposed at the 1928 Sixth International Conference of American States to make the chairmanship of the PAU governing body a rotating position, Argentina disagreed and noted that the organization was 'directly connected with the Government of the United States.'[29] Modern Pan-Americanism was in part an official US-led project of regional hegemony.

There are a few examples of nineteenth-century Pan-Americanism that defy the traditional/modern categorization: the Congress of Lima in 1877, the Montevideo Conference in 1888, and the Lima Sanitation Congress in 1888. The first two attempted to establish uniform legal codes, while the third sought to address the threat

[29] 'Speech of Honorario Pueyrredón to the Pan American Conference, 30 January 1928', translated by JG Parmentier, LOC CEHP Reel 118.

of epidemic disease. All three included only Latin American participants, although both meetings in 1888 had invited the United States.[30] In this sense, they were traditional Pan-Americanism. Yet they were not convened due to any external threat, but were rather a pro-active attempt by Peru (in the first and last instance) and Argentina and Uruguay (in the second) to cooperate on non-security matters. Thus, they shared something with modern Pan-Americanism. This ambiguity made these congresses a conceptual bridge between the traditional and modern Pan-Americanisms for some Southern Cone intellectuals and policymakers.

*The dimensions of Modern Pan-Americanism*

As mentioned in the Introduction, historical research in the past two decades has highlighted the vast array of movements that modern Pan-Americanism came to encompass. From environmentalism to women's health and aviation to sanitation, topics addressed in a Pan-American context abounded in the early twentieth century.[31] In fact, historians have reason to discuss 'Pan-Americanisms' as opposed to one single movement. In this thesis, Pan-Americanism will be categorized into two dimensions - an analytic approach that reflects the historiography. One dimension (the first) encompasses those aspects of the movement that were the focus of most research until the resurgence of Pan-American history in the 1990s while the other (the second) includes those aspects often ignored until recently. This categorization

[30] The US declined the invitation to Montevideo with the argument that the federal structure of its legal system prevented it from signing any international agreements on private international law.

[31] For example: M Threlkeld, 'The Pan American Conference of Women, 1922: Successful Suffragists Turn to International Relations' *Diplomatic History* 31:5 (2007); Donna Guy, 'The Politics of Pan-American Cooperation: Maternalist Feminism and the Child Rights Movement, 1913-60' *Gender & History*, 10:3 (1998); CA Pernet, 'Chilean Feminists, the International Women's Movement, and Suffrage, 1915-1950' *Pacific Historical Review*, 69:4 (2000); Rodrigo Fernos, *Science Still Born: The Rise and Impact of the Pan American Scientific Congresses, 1898-1916* (Lincoln, 2003); and AE Birn, ' "No More Surprising Than a Broken Pitcher?" Maternal and Child Health in the Early Years of the Pan American Sanitary Bureau' *Canadian Bulletin of Medical History* 19 (2002).

also corresponds to a thematic difference and is influenced by the perspectives of Pan-Americanism held by relevant historical actors. The first dimension of Pan-Americanism focused on traditional geopolitical considerations in inter-American affairs, what policymakers in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century often referred to as 'political'. Questions of territorial integrity, conflict resolution, armament limitation, and national sovereignty were the pillars of this dimension. Certain aspects of commercial relations, particularly the question of an American customs union, also fell in the first dimension. Second-dimension Pan-Americanism included cooperation on matters that were often considered 'apolitical'. Issues of common concern among the American republics – sanitation, urban housing, prevention of epidemic diseases, protection of patents and trademarks, communications, aviation, women's rights, etc. – were the topics of discussion. Geopolitical questions were actively avoided in order to promote cooperation. The political/apolitical divide is misleading, however. Second-dimension discussions had political implications and controversy was not always avoidable, as will be seen in other chapters.[32] The top-down promotion of inter-American commerce and the uniformity of financial systems (which clearly involved politics) was in the 1900s increasingly described as 'practical' and 'apolitical' and so shifted from the first to second dimension. While this dichotomy was never explicitly used in the period, there are examples of rhetorical devices that approximate it, including Barrett's discussions of 'Practical' Pan-Americanism and Rowe's frequent reference to the 'larger aspects of Pan-Americanism' and 'Constructive' Pan-Americanism.[33]

[32] The political nature of technical questions is a theme of recent literature; see Cleide de Lima Chaves, 'Poder e saúde na América do Sol: os congressos sanitários internacionais, 1870-1889' *História, Ciências, Saúde – Marguinhos* 20: 2 (2013).

[33] Barrett claimed in a 'Memorandum' from 6 April 1927 to have used that phraseology as early as 1902 (LOC JBP Container 98). For more on the development and use of the term 'practical' Pan-Americanism, see Robert Seidel, 'Progressive Pan Americanism: Development and United States

The first dimension centred on the International Conferences of American States: Washington, 1889-90; Mexico City, 1901-02; Rio de Janeiro, 1906; Buenos Aires, 1910; Santiago, 1923; and Havana, 1928. Other significant meetings included several juridical meetings and the 1929 International Conference of American States on Conciliation and Arbitration. These conferences were not exclusively first-dimension, however. At Washington in 1889, for example, delegates discussed methods to improve communications, integrate patent law, and unify monetary systems. Following the Mexico Conference (1901-02), issues such as sanitation and intellectual cooperation became regular features in Pan-American Conference programmes. By the Fifth Conference in Santiago (1923), programmes included social legislation and combating alcoholism. The 1923 Conference also resulted in an agreement to discuss women's rights at all subsequent Conferences.[34] These conferences were a small portion of overall Pan-American activity. Between 1888 and 1930, there were eight Sanitary Congresses, six Children's Congresses, five Medical Congresses, four Congresses of American Students, four Congresses of Architects, three Scientific Congresses, three Aviation Conferences, two Postal Congresses, and two conferences on tuberculosis, among many others.[35]

Pan-Americanism was not merely a series of meetings, however. A permanent institutional structure also developed. The earliest example is the Commercial Bureau

Policy toward South America, 1906-31' (Unpublished PhD Dissertation, Cornell University 1973), pp. 43-44. Rowe's usage of 'larger aspects' and 'constructive' can be seen in various speeches and letters in this papers at the CML, particularly boxes 12-13a.

[34] This proposal was made by Máximo Soto Hall, an Guatemalan delegate, after pressure from women's rights groups, such as the Pan-American International Women's Committee; see Francisca Miller, 'The International Relations of Women of the Americas, 1890-1928' *The Americas* 43:2 (1986).

[35] A useful, and almost complete, list of technical meetings can be found in Pope, *Encyclopedia of the Inter-American System* (Westport, CT, 1997), p. 433.

of American Republics, established in 1889. A decade later, reforms to the Bureau removed 'Commercial' from its name and expanded Latin American representation. The Bureau aimed to coordinate the exchange of information about its various members, to promote hemispheric cooperation and commerce, and to oversee the organization of Pan-American meetings. Its purview expanded in the 1900s, concerning itself with almost all manifestations of Pan-American cooperation. The Bureau was re-named as the Pan-American Union in 1910. Under the direction of Barrett (nicknamed 'Old Pan America' by President Theodore Roosevelt, he held the position from 1907-20), and Rowe (1920-46), the PAU sought to cultivate inter-American cooperation until the Organization of American States (OAS) superseded it in 1948.[36] The PAU's directors and Governing Body believed that the internal development and stability of each republic was the keystone of inter-American harmony, leading them to enthusiastically support second-dimension activities.

Another significant institution was the Inter-American High Commission (IHC), established in 1915 as the International High Commission and renamed in 1920. Like the PAU, the IHC worked towards both first- and second-dimension Pan-American goals. Its main objective was to create favourable conditions for greater economic integration in the Americas. This was pursued mainly through monetary reform and the normalization of banking practices. The IHC had a decentralized structure. Each republic was charged to establish a national section of financial experts under the aegis of the Ministry of Finance (or corresponding department). A meeting of the national sections in Buenos Aires in 1916 augmented the IHC system by providing for

[36] Barrett's nickname can be seen in his papers at the Library of Congress. One example is a statement from 1922 about an 'Argentine amphibian' - an alleged plesiosaurus or other ancient lizard living in the jungles of Argentina that Theodore Roosevelt considered trying to find. LOC JBP Container 95.

a Central Executive Council based in Washington.[37] Other institutions established in this period included the Pan American Sanitary Bureau (PASB, 1902), the American Institute of International Law (AIIL, 1915), the Inter-American Children's Institute (IACI, 1924), the Inter-American Commission on Commercial Aviation (ICCA, 1927), the Pan American Institute of Geography and History (1928), and the Inter-American Commission of Women (IACW, 1928).[38] Besides the AIIL, these organizations were mainly second-dimension.

Expanded Pan-Americanism, especially its second dimension, increased the opportunity for participation in the pursuit and the definition of Pan-American objectives. Private citizens, usually experts or activists, often served as representatives of American governments to the more technical conferences. Activists themselves also took the initiative and assumed the mantle of 'Pan-American'. Thus emerged the Pan American Medical Congresses (first held in 1893), the Pan American Women's Conference, the Pan American Aviation Federation, the Pan American Congress of Architects, and many others. Rowe noted the significance of these initiatives at an academic conference on 'The Recent Foreign Policy of the US' in 1925:

> Constructive Pan-Americanism...extends far beyond the confines of governmental action and it can not be brought to full fruition unless it has the active support of the masses of the people. There are, therefore, certain basic non-governmental factors in the situation which are of primary importance.[39]

One of the most important second-dimension initiatives, the Pan American Scientific Congresses, also began as a non-governmental affair. These congresses trace their

[37] See Seidel, 'Progressive Pan Americanism', pp. 76-94, and John Bassett Moore, 'The Work of the International High Commission' *The Advocate of Peace* 82:2 (1920), pp. 46-49.
[38] The IACW was preceded by the Pan American Association for the Advancement of Women, established at the 1922 Pan American Women's Conference in Baltimore.
[39] Rowe, 'The Significance of Pan-Americanism', presented 7 August 1925, CML LSR Box 12.

origin to the First Latin American Scientific Congress of 1898, which was called and organized by the Argentine Scientific Society. Latin American governments, taking note of the interesting and potentially useful discussions at this congress, quickly supported the endeavour and granted the subsequent congresses (Montevideo in 1902, Rio de Janeiro in 1905, and Santiago in 1908) semi-official status by sending government delegations. When the Santiago congress Organizing Committee decided to make the congress 'truly' Pan-American by inviting the US to attend, President Pedro Montt and his foreign minister offered an eager endorsement.[40]

The two dimensions were complementary. Those involved in the second-dimension meetings regularly reminded the press that their work was a contribution to the general harmonization of the Americas, thus furthering the overall objectives of Pan-Americanism. Barrett believed the 1922 Pan-American Women's Conference, for example, had 'a direct bearing on the development of all phases of Pan American friendship.'[41] Similarly, the Secretary of the American Society for International Law described the 'scientific and other activities' of Pan-Americanism as 'a by-product, so to speak, of the International Conferences of American States of a general character.'[42] Chilean and Argentine policymakers also recognized the connection between the various strands of Pan-American cooperation. Emilio Bello Codesido, a prominent Chilean diplomat and politician who served as Foreign Minister and delegate to various international meetings, noted in 1923 that 'formas de panamericanismo' included 'las Conferencias Panamericanas' and 'Congresos

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[40] Eduardo Poirier, *Cuarto Congreso Científico (1º Pan-Americano): su reunion en Santiago de Chile, celebrada del 25 de Diciembre de 1908 al 5 de Enero de 1909* (Santiago, 1915), pp. 1-25.
[41] Barrett, 'Women's Big Conference' *New York Times*, 16 April 1922.
[42] George A Finch, 'Eighth American Scientific Congress' *American Journal of International Law* 34:3 (1940), p. 513.

Científicos, Financieros, Sanitarios, de Ferrocarriles, de Codificación del Derecho Internacional, etc.'[43] Ernesto Quesada, Argentine diplomat and first professor of Pan-American legislation at the Universidad de Buenos Aires, declared in 1919 that Pan-Americanism was 'realizada...por medio de periódicas y regulares conferencias diplomáticas, comisiones financieras, congresos de todo orden e instituciones: políticas unas...científicas otras.'[44] This holistic perspective should be borne in mind when analyzing approaches to Pan-Americanism.

*The Twenty-Second Chair: 'Today Pan Americanism is Part-Americanism'*[45]

This chapter has, thus far, focused on inclusive Pan-Americanism – inclusive of older forms of the concept, of more diverse strands of cooperation, and of an expanding cast. In defining the Pan-Americanism, however, important exclusions must be mentioned. 'Western Hemisphere' and 'New World' rhetoric within Pan-American literature was not panoptic. The PAU comprised the twenty-one independent republics of the Americas and did *not* include foreign dependencies and, most importantly, Canada. Canada's exclusion was predicated on two major issues: the fact that it was not a republic and the control that Great Britain continued to hold over Canadian foreign policy.[46] While Canada had achieved effective home rule during the nineteenth century, its foreign policy remained under the ultimate authority of the British government until the 1920s. In 1926, Canada took a major step towards

[43] Bello, *Memorandum* (1923), ANH EBC 25, p. 296.
[44] Ernesto Quesada, *La evolución del panamericanismo* (Buenos Aires, 1919), p. 6.
[45] John Barrett, 'Shall Canada Become a Member of the Pan American Union?' 19 Feb 1923, LOC JBP Container 95, p. 1.
[46] The latter was more important than the former. The objection to Canada based on its non-republic status was a convenient excuse. When the idea for the Washington Conference of 1889 was first proposed in Congress, it included provision for inviting Canada and Brazil - neither one a republic at the time. Brazil became a republic in a blood-less coup that overthrew Emperor Pedro II in 1889, giving the US government an excuse to differentiate Canada and exclude it from Pan-Americanism.

determining its own foreign affairs when it named a Minister to Washington. Ottawa's control over its own foreign policy increased significantly with the 1931 Statute of Westminster, granting the Dominion legislative equality with Great Britain. This was not enough, however, to yield an invitation to join the PAU.

Canada did have advocates within the PAU, however. One of the most outspoken was the first Director. Barrett took steps to bring Canada into the fold, meeting with Premier Wilfrid Laurier in 1909 and later with Sir Robert Borden and William Mackenzie King. Although each Premier exhibited interest in the idea, they took no concrete actions.[47] Undeterred, Barrett continued pursuing the objective. He believed that 'Pan Americanism and the Pan American Union could not long continue as a powerful and permanent continental policy and organization, respectively, unless Canada should eventually become an active member.'[48] So he told the Canadian Club of Toronto in 1923, intimating that many other supporters of Pan-Americanism felt the same. One of them, according to Barrett, was the former Secretary of State, Elihu Root (he served from 1905-09). Root reportedly gave Barrett instructions to include in the PAU building's courtyard Canada's crest among those of the other American states. Moreover, a chair was ordered for the boardroom bearing the label 'Canada', signifying an expectation for eventual Canadian membership. Apart from the crest and the chair (referred to as the 'empty chair' or the 'twenty-second chair' in later literature), Root seems to have made no further effort to attract Canada to the PAU. Neither did his successors; and in 1923 Barrett, reflecting on the unachieved dream,

[47] The nature of this interest is uncertain. Eugene Miller described the Premiers' reactions as 'enthusiastic' ('Canada and the Pan American Union' *International Journal* 3:1 (1947/48), p. 28) while Peter McKenna suggests the interest was no more than 'guarded' (*Canada and the OAS: From Dilettante to Full Partner* (Ottawa, 1995), p. 67). Regardless, the lack of commitment from any of the Premiers is proof enough that Canada did not seriously consider the proposal at the time.
[48] Barrett, 'Shall Canada Become a Member?', p. 1.

exclaimed: 'that chair is actually today in the storeroom of the Pan American Union carefully covered and protected awaiting the use of the Canadian representative!'[49]

Barrett claimed to have contacted nearly five hundred statesmen of both the United States and Latin America to suggest the inclusion of Canada, and received favourable responses from an overwhelming majority (nearly four-fifths). While his bias and dubious methodology make this claim unreliable, there is no doubt that many in the US and Latin America supported Canada's inclusion. One of the earliest Latin American supporters was Chilean diplomat and newspaper owner Agustín Edwards, who, with Santiago's support, attempted unsuccessfully to initiate negotiations with the British government over the issue in 1916. The Chilean government continued to advocate the effort throughout the 1920s. By the end of that decade, Mexico had also thrown its weight behind the campaign.

In fact, Mexico sought more concerted action than Chile and intended to introduce the issue to the Sixth International Conference of American States.[50] Although both the Chilean and Mexican delegations declared their favourable opinions of Canada's inclusion, neither proposed a formal resolution. Despite Barrett's support, the US was officially opposed to pursuing the idea, largely as it would give Great Britain influence in Pan-American affairs. For fear of kindling antagonism, which could put first-dimension Pan-Americanism asunder, US policy in this area was subtle. Although President Calvin Coolidge disliked the idea of 'indirectly admitting' the British Empire to Pan-Americanism, he agreed that the US should not openly oppose

[49] Ibid, p. 1.
[50] An earlier attempt to discuss Canada in the Governing Board of the PAU (in a meeting on 3 March 1926) failed when the Secretary of State, as President of the Board, argued that changes to the PAU could only be made in Pan American Conferences. The minutes of this meeting can be found in LOC FKP Reel 20.

any proposal made by a Latin American state on the matter in 1928. Secretary of State Frank Kellogg relayed this instruction to the president of the US delegation, Charles Evans Hughes, adding that this position applied to proposals 'with any prospect of...being accepted.'[51] The US, therefore, relied on other PAU members to lead the opposition. Such an approach proved successful as Latin American opinions were divided. The lack of Latin American enthusiasm persuaded Mexico to wait for more auspicious moments; the issue was not again discussed seriously until a Governing Board meeting in 1931, when Venezuela's Minister emphatically dissented and refused to even mention the subject to Caracas.[52]

Due to divisions over the issue, no formal invitation was extended to Canada. On the other side, the Canadian government never sought membership, regardless of growing interest in the French Canadian community (based on a loose sense of kinship with other 'Latin' Americans) and in nationalist circles (eager to distance Canada from British policies).[53] Nonetheless, Canada did occasionally participate in some of the second-dimension Pan-American efforts - the PASB, for example. That several Latin American governments challenged the US leadership and actively sought to change the definition of Pan-Americanism by including Canada is significant. The motives behind this policy will be discussed in the analysis in following chapters. It will suffice to note that the Canadian question exemplifies the contested nature of Pan-Americanism.

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[51] Kellogg to Hughes, 04 February 1928, LOC FKP Reel 30.

[52] This event is recorded in Secretary of State Henry Stimson's diaries (2 February 1931 entry, LOC HLS Reel 4, pp. 118-19). According to Stimson, Venezuela's opposition was based partly on a contrarian tradition towards Mexican initiatives and partly on lingering resentment towards British interventions in the 1890s and 1900s. Other motivations included pressure from the US and concerns for relations with the US.

[53] Douglas Anglin, 'United States Opposition to Canadian Membership in the Pan American Union: A Canadian View' *International Organization* 15:1 (1961), pp. 5-6.

The Pan-American vision as defined by the PAU and Pan-American Conferences was thus limited to the twenty-one independent American republics. This definition was inline with US policy and the aspirations of US hegemony through regional cooperation. Canada's exclusion also points to a deeper issue important to defining Pan-Americanism: an underlying sense of 'American' exceptionalism (or Whitaker's 'Western Hemisphere Idea'). The idea of exceptionalism was present from the beginning of modern Pan-Americanism, embodied most radically in Blaine's appeal to 'America for Americans'. Most Pan-American literature recognized that the geography, history, and governmental traditions of the American states differentiated them from the Old World. The contrast of republican institutions and democracy within the Western Hemisphere with the European monarchies was particularly important.[54] European observers unsurprisingly made this exceptionalist tendency central to their definitions of Pan-Americanism. Frederik Johannesson, a Swedish scholar, identified Pan-American philosophy in this way:

> the American states are geographically and politically in a world of their own, in a world of republics and democracies, isolated and shielded from the old state system hundreds of miles overseas.[55]

Some legal scholars, such as Chile's Alejandro Álvarez, extended this argument to justify the existence of an entirely new international legal system for the Americas ('derecho internacional americano'). Álvarez believed that this system would eventually supersede the old European legal order and state system in general. The differentiation between Old and New Worlds became particularly relevant during and

[54] Republicanism was one of many rhetorical strands that comprised this form 'American' exceptionalism. See Whitaker's *The Western Hemisphere Idea* for a more complete overview of its development.

[55] Johannesson, *Det Panamerikanska Problemet (1826-1920)* (*The Pan-American Problem*, Uppsala, 1922), p. iii. Originally in Swedish - my translation.

after the First World War, a point discussed in greater detail in Chapters Five and Seven.

Challenges to exceptionalism were also present from 1889 onwards. Roque Sáenz Peña, Argentine delegate to the First International Conference of American States, made one of the most famous challenges in his 'America para la humanidad' speech in 1890. Sáenz Peña insisted that the ample natural resources and potential for great industrial advance of the Americas should be used for the benefit of both Americans and Europeans. Many Latin American writers refuted the idea of continental exceptionalism and emphasised the cultural and institutional affinities of the Americas and their former colonial metropoles. In the case of Spanish America, these writers developed a competing cultural movement to Pan-Americanism that encouraged ties to Spain: hispanismo.[56] Beyond this extreme, many challenges to exceptionalist arguments contested the implications of exceptionalism (especially the potential for antagonism towards Europe) rather than the basic idea behind it.

*Conclusion*

The process of defining Pan-Americanism has, since the term's inception in the 1880s, been open to the participation of a diverse community spanning the two continents and beyond. Thus Pan-American cooperation came to incorporate a wide range of initiatives from disarmament discussions to women's rights movements. Some of

[56] A good overview of hispanismo, and the active role that Spain played in promoting it, can be found in Richard Salisbury, 'Hispanismo versus Pan Americanism: Spanish Efforts to Counter US Influence in Latin America before 1930' in Sheinin (ed), *Beyond the Ideal*. See also Pike, *Hispanismo, 1898-1936: Spanish Conservatives and Liberals and their Relations with Spanish America* (South Bend, 1971) and Isidro Sepúlveda, *El sueño de la madre patria: hispanoamericanismo y nacionalismo* (Madrid, 2005).

these initiatives and the overall narrative of modern Pan-Americanism's development will be the focus of the next two chapters. Pan-Americanism's elasticity makes analysis of it – and approaches to it – a daunting task. This chapter has provided two methods of categorization that will help frame the analysis. Both are based on contemporary perspectives of Pan-Americanism as well as the historiography of the phenomenon. The first distinguishes traditional from modern Pan-Americanism – a scheme that depends on substantive differences as much as chronology. Traditional Pan-Americanism, an anachronism that is justifiable due to its use by historical actors, was Latin American and mainly a reaction to outside stimuli. In contrast, modern Pan-Americanism was US-led and pro-active. The division of modern Pan-Americanism into two dimensions (the second categorization) serves the same purpose: to recognize a trend within both contemporary definitions and historiography while making analysis more manageable. Throughout the rest of this thesis, both dimensions will be examined. Finally, certain limitations restricted the broad definition of Pan-Americanism. While not necessarily antagonistic to non-American states, Pan-American cooperation was ultimately exclusive and exceptionalist. It was also often constrained by its connection to the US. Yet exclusivity and Pan-Americanism more generally were contested. A close examination of attempts to shape and redefine Pan-American cooperation will yield new insights into the nature and motivation of regional cooperation, the influence that Latin America had on Pan-Americanism, and the foreign policymaking process in Argentina and Chile.

# Chapter 2

# Approaches to Modern Pan-Americanism (1888-1915)

Defining Pan-Americanism as an expansive collection of movements and initiatives changes the Pan-American narrative and makes Pan-American cooperation an interesting case for studying governmental approaches to international relations more broadly. The next two chapters will identify trends in Argentine and Chilean participation in Pan-American cooperation that will be analyzed more fully in Chapters Four through Seven. The wider field of international affairs, geopolitics, and economic development will be mentioned, mainly to contextualize the case study. The framework of the narrative is regional cooperation in general, with US-Latin American relations providing context to the story, and this chapter begins with the 1888-89 juridical Congress of Montevideo. It will end in 1915, with the introduction of 'new Pan-Americanism' at a scientific congress in Washington. Between those dates, both Argentina and Chile gradually transitioned from antagonism to indifference and eventually engagement with Pan-American cooperation.

When the idea of a Pan-American meeting first circulated in the early 1880s, both Chile and Argentina were rising regional powers with economies geared towards European markets and buttressed by European capital. Chile was still mired in the War of the Pacific, fought between 1879 and 1883 against her two neighbours to the north, Peru and Bolivia. The war drastically altered Chile's foreign and domestic affairs. At the end of the conflict, Chile controlled Bolivia's littoral province, Tarapacá, and Peru's southernmost provinces, Tacna and Arica. These acquisitions brought Chile a major boon: nitrate reserves that helped fuel Chilean development for

the next forty years. The wealth produced from nitrate export was a major source of government revenue and helped Chile to industrialize. The two Peruvian provinces also brought Chile a major foreign policy challenge. Tacna and Arica, while not nitrate-rich like Tarapacá, were strategically important in protecting the newly-acquired resources. Unlike Tarapacá, which was annexed outright, Tacna-Arica was only occupied by Chile; Peru did not relinquish her rights over the territory but rather agreed in the Treaty of Ancón (1884) to allow Chilean occupation and, after ten years, to submit the matter to a plebiscite (which the Chilean government quickly decided was not likely to favour Chile). Retaining the territory and rebuffing Peruvian revanche thus became the single most important issue in Chilean foreign policy. Besides territory, the victory had given Chile substantial prestige internationally and made the country a major power in South America and the Pacific.[1] The Chilean star in the 1880s, then, was ascendant.

Argentina was also on the rise. In 1880, the Argentine Republic accomplished the final step of its national consolidation with the federalization of Buenos Aires. The definitive formation of the national state based on the liberal 'fórmula alberdiana', which prescribed a strong executive but also left room for local interests in powerful provincial governors and National Congress, allowed the federal government to focus more attention on foreign affairs.[2] The administrations of Julio A Roca (1880-86) and Miguel Juárez Celman (1886-90) sought to improve Argentina's international position. Under Roca, Argentina expanded its territory, offering to Chile its neutrality

[1] US observers of the War were so impressed by the Chilean navy that some viewed Chile as a potential threat to US interests. See Kenneth Hagan, *American Gunboat Diplomacy and the Old Navy, 1877-1889* (Westport, CT, 1973), pp. 138-39; Sater, *Chile and the United States*, p. 51; and David Healy, *James G Blaine and Latin America*, (Columbia, MO, 2001), p.180.

[2] This formula was named for Juan B Alberdi, whose writings on Argentine liberalism helped to shape the emerging order. For a more detailed definition, see Natalio Botano, *El orden conservador: La política argentina entre 1880 y 1914* (2nd ed, Buenos Aires, 1979), p. 25-81.

in the War of the Pacific in exchange for most of Patagonia. Control of the Río de la Plata and a lingering rivalry with Brazil (dating to the independence period) were also major concerns for the fledgling federal Ministerio. At the end of the 1880s, the Argentine government turned towards arbitration and cooperation with Brazil to lessen the threat.[3] Chile's expansion, however, heightened regional rivalries. Meanwhile, the Argentine economy – based mainly on agricultural production – experienced impressive growth. Annual export growth averaged 6.7 percent while export purchasing power growth averaged 8.2 percent from 1870 to 1890.[4] This growth attracted large waves of immigration to Argentina and, like Chile, provided impetus and capital for industrialization. Both countries sought foreign investment (particularly from Europe) to maintain economic growth, expand the export sector, and create infrastructure.

*A Tale of Two Conferences: Montevideo (1888-89) and Washington (1889-90)*

In relatively strong regional positions, both countries turned to regional cooperation in the 1880s. In the 1888 juridical Congress of Montevideo, convened by Argentina and Uruguay, a handful of South American governments sought to establish a uniform South American code of private international law. The Congress was also partly a reaction to the US's proposal of regional cooperation; as McGann noted, Argentine policymakers hoped to demonstrate that 'there might be more than one way of defining Americanism.'[5] With the invitations for the US's proposed conference in

[3] For more on Argentine-Brazilian relations, see Cisneros and Escudé, *Historia General*, vii, 109-14 and Etchepareborda, *Historia*, pp. 29-41.
[4] Victor Bulmer-Thomas, *The Economic History of Latin America Since Independence* (2nd ed, Cambridge, 2003), p. 64. See also Roberto Cortés Conde, 'The Growth of the Argentine Economy, 1870-1914' in L Bethell (ed), *Argentina Since Independence* (Cambridge, 1993), pp. 47-67.
[5] McGann, *Argentina*, pp. 76-80.

hand, the participating Latin American governments viewed Montevideo as a means of defining regional cooperation in Latin American terms. Later, in the 1890s and 1900s, some policymakers saw it as a prelude to Pan-Americanism.

As co-convener of the Congress, the Argentine government was optimistic. Foreign Minister Norberto Quirno Costa's opening address, peppered with references to a growing South American fraternal spirit and reassurances of friendship with Europe, outlined the wider aims of the Congress. Fundamentally, Argentina hoped for greater South American unity, which would be a 'medio de acción en el mundo civilizado, como fuerza que debe pesarse y sentirse en el concierto de las naciones.'[6] In highlighting international law as a defining feature of intra-continental relations, South America was to be a model for the rest of the world. Behind their rhetoric, however, Argentine policymakers also desired to consolidate Argentine leadership in Latin America. In the end, they were not completely satisfied with the Congress's results; the final treaties (there were three in total) established the basis for future legal codification, but lacklustre support from the Brazilian and Chilean governments (neither ratified the treaties) suggested that claims of Argentine regional leadership were not fully substantiated. Nonetheless, diplomats and Ministers touted the Congress's importance and Argentina ratified the treaties in 1894.

Chile's government was supportive of the Congress, but also concerned that the cooperation might accelerate a rapprochement between Argentina (Chile's traditional rival) and Brazil (Chile's traditional ally). The Chilean government's attention was also occupied by other pressing matters: purchasing naval vessels from foreign

[6] *Actas y tratados celebrados por el Congreso Internacional Sud-Americano de Montevideo* (Montevideo, 1889), p. 14.

powers, annexing Easter Island, furthering the 'chilenización' of Tacna-Arica, and professionalizing its military.[7] Nonetheless, the Chilean government recognized the practicality of legal uniformity as a means of fostering better regional relations, and the Chilean delegation actively participated in the Montevideo discussions. Although the treaties failed to achieve ratification, they gained the admiration of later Chilean writers who extolled the work of the Congress for its practical aims and its ability to facilitate regional cooperation.[8]

In contrast to the positive view of the Montevideo Congress, Argentine and Chilean reactions to the US's proposal were overwhelmingly negative. Both governments expressed doubts over the feasibility and the true aims of the conference. Argentine minister in Washington, Vicente Quesada, was early an opponent of the idea. From January 1888 – when Senator John Sherman of Ohio proposed an inter-American conference – until the end of the year, Quesada made his doubts about the Pan-American project well known at the Ministerio through a series of alarmist reports. His reasons for concern included the threat to Argentina's freedom of action, the potential harm to relations with Europe, and underlying fears of ulterior (that is, imperialist) motives of the US.[9] Indeed, Quesada believed that a customs union would be 'el caballo de Troya' to further US influence, 'el pacto del lobo con el cordero' for Latin America.[10] In spite of these strident warnings and similar doubts in the press, the Ministerio accepted the invitation in October 1888. The Foreign

[7] On the professionalization of the military, see Frederick Nunn, 'Emil Körner and the Prussianization of the Chilean Army: Origins, Process, and Consequences, 1885-1920' *HAHR* 50:2 (1970) and William Sater and Holger Herwig, *The Grand Illusion: The Prussianization of the Chilean Army* (Lincoln, 1999).

[8] For example, Enrique Burgos Varas, in *Los congresos pan-americanos*, claimed that the Montevideo convention was 'uno de los grandes i loables esfuerzos, hechos por las naciones americanas, para propender al desarrollo uniforme de su cultura' (p. 47).

[9] See Quesada's correspondence with Quirno Costa in AMRECIC Series 25 Box 1, particularly the letters from 5 January, 23 May and 7 June 1888.

[10] Quesada to Quirno Costa, 23 May 1888, AMRECIC Series 25 Box 1.

Minister justified the decision to Quesada as an act of courtesy to maintain good relations with the US. He also admitted to the Argentine minister in Santiago that 'ninguna razón política aconsejaría' Argentina's absence from a conference that would discuss commerce, monetary policy, arbitration and the navigation of waterways.[11] The Ministerio shared some of Quesada's worries, telling the Argentine delegation to reject outright proposals for an American customs union (noting that US customs regulations were not congruent with Argentine interests) and a permanent tribunal of arbitration due to its threat to freedom of action.[12] Historians have rightly noted the pessimism of Argentina's policymakers towards Pan-Americanism as defined by the US in 1889. Yet the fact that the Ministerio did see some practicality in attending the Conference cannot be overlooked.

Chile was similarly uncertain over the Pan-American project. Relations with Washington had been shaky since the US haphazardly intervened in the War of the Pacific, attempting to mediate between Chile and Peru but ultimately alienating both due to overzealous diplomats and dire miscommunication. Despite President José María Balmaceda's friendly overtures to the US minister in Santiago, the government still harboured suspicions regarding US motives in South America. Foreign Minister Demetrio Lastarria recognized that the Washington Conference would be an 'acontecimiento tan transcendental,' but he doubted the feasibility and desirability of the conference's main objectives.[13] Due to the unresolved Tacna-Arica issue, the Cancillería found Blaine's emphasis on arbitration particularly worrying. Eventually,

[11] Quirno Costa to Uriburu, 25 October 1888, AMRECIC Series 25 Box 1.
[12] 'Instrucciones a que deberán ajustarse en el desempeño de su misión los Plenipotenciarios...nombrados para representar a la República Argentina en el Congreso Internacional Americano que se reunirá en Washington el 2 de octubre del año corriente de 1889', AMRECIC Series 25 Box 1.
[13] Lastarria to Emilio Varas, 9 July 1888, AMRREE Histórico 132, p. 27.

the acceptance of other Latin American countries (especially Peru and Bolivia), the fear of ostracism from regional relations, the desire to forestall compulsory arbitration, and persistent US and Brazilian encouragement convinced Chile to accept. Moreover, certain topics interested the Chilean government, including monetary policy and the expansion of inter-American steamship lines.[14] Chile, therefore, accepted the invitation 'solo en cuanto ella se refiere a facilitar i vigorizar las relaciones mercantiles,' but not in reference to arbitration.[15]

Both Argentine and Chilean policymakers predicted that Pan-American cooperation would divide Latin America. Quesada feared that the 'little republics' of the circum-Caribbean would act as the 'dóciles pupilas' of the US and help weaken the more powerful South American nations.[16] The Chilean minister in Buenos Aires noted in a letter to Santiago that the Conference was of greater interest and benefit to the states closer to the US for reasons of convenience and a greater sense of 'vecindad.'[17] No unified Latin American response to Pan-Americanism was foreseen, and the political and practical implications were different for the circum-Caribbean and South America. Nonetheless, both Argentine and Chilean policymakers saw potential benefits in participation, limited though they were. The Argentine government, while doubting the utility of hemispheric cooperation (it preferred more limited regional efforts, such as the Montevideo Congress and a sanitary convention it had signed with Brazil and Uruguay in 1888), still hoped to use the Conference as a platform to increase commerce with the US and affirm the principle of arbitration (partly to spite Chile). Chile's government viewed hemispheric cooperation as a potential means for

[14] Ibid., pp. 28-29.
[15] Foreign Minister to Varas, 30 April 1889, AMRREE Histórico 132, p. 70.
[16] Quesada to Quirno Costa, 7 June 1888, AMRECIC Series 25 Box 1.
[17] Matta to Lastarria, 9 July 1888, a copy of which can be found in AMRECIC Series 25 Box 1.

expanding nitrate markets and facilitating inter-American capital flow. Both also hoped to keep an eye on the US.

The opening session in October 1889 has received considerable attention from historians due to the controversial opposition of Chile and Argentina to Blaine's nomination for president of the Conference. Officially, the two delegations opposed a technicality: Blaine was not a member of the US delegation and therefore not a plenipotentiary participant in the Conference. The true motive, however, is more complicated. Some US newspapers interpreted the move as an opening salvo in an anti-US and anti-Pan-Americanism campaign. McGann, citing a note sent by the Argentine delegates to Buenos Aires, also interpreted 'l'affaire Blaine' as anti-US and, ultimately, anti-Pan-Americanism.[18] Yet Argentina's delegates explicitly denied anti-US motives in another letter to their government.[19] In fact, Argentina's delegation (Manuel Quintana, a lawyer and politician that to many represented Argentine aristocracy, and Roque Saénz Peña, politician, former sub-secretary of the Ministerio and diplomat)[20] privately met with Blaine in order to affirm their governments' sympathies. Ultimately, both the Argentine and Chilean delegates accepted Blaine's election with absence (for Argentina) or abstention (for Chile). Their opposition was not a total rejection of US-led Pan-Americanism. It was a symbolic gesture in favour of the equality of states as the basis of the Conference in the tradition of the Latin American continental conferences and the Montevideo Congress.

During the conference, Chile and Argentina gave their delegates a wide remit in policymaking, although this led to complaints of uncertainty. Chile's two delegates

[18] McGann, *Argentina*, pp. 133-34.
[19] Quintana to Zeballos, 11 October 1889, AMRECIC Series 25 Box 1.
[20] McGann provides some entertaining notes on both men's biography, see *Argentina*, pp. 75-77.

(Emilio Varas, minister to Washington, and José Alfonso, a santiaguino jurist renowned for commercial law) worried about the lack of instruction from Santiago but followed the general lines of their government's opinion: caution, giving way to antagonism when necessary (especially regarding obligatory arbitration).[21] Varas shared Santiago's doubts over the ability of the Conference to yield concrete results. He found the proceedings tedious and was more interested in other things, such as the US political system (he wrote reports on topics such as the 'call-roll', as he mistakenly called it, in the US Congress).[22] Argentina's delegates complained about the 'escasa dedicación' to topics interesting to South America in the first weeks.[23] Like the Chileans, the Argentine delegates displayed caution and opposition, particularly towards any efforts that could be interpreted as antagonistic to Europe.[24] Chile and Argentina were key actors in derailing plans for an American *Zollverein* early in the Conference. Despite Latin American doubts, some results were achieved, notably the establishment of a Commercial Bureau of American Republics, headquartered in Washington. Talk of a Pan-American Railroad also resulted in an agreement to investigate the project's potential.

The question of arbitration caused the most heated debates in the Conference. Argentina and Brazil offered plans for a general agreement in January 1890; according to Quintana, they modified their proposals in order to mollify an anxious Chile.[25] The Chilean delegation nonetheless offered stiff opposition to anything that

[21] Varas to Cancillería, 10 March 1890, AMRREE Histórico 139.
[22] Varas to Cancillería, 10 April 1890, AMRREE Histórico 139.
[23] Quintana and Saénz Peña to Zeballos, 24 December 1889, AMRECIC Series 25 Box 1.
[24] Both governments closely monitored European opinions, the Cancillería and the Ministerio each receiving notes from representatives in Europe about the reaction of the European press.
[25] Quintana to Ministerio, 20 January 1890, AMRECIC Series 25 Box 1. Supposedly, Argentina meant to propose arbitration only for future cases; Peru and Bolivia took advantage of the ambiguous proposal, however, to attack Chile over her conquests.

mentioned obligatory arbitration. With Peru and Bolivia eagerly supporting retroactive arbitration, the Chileans hardened their stance. This opposition helped to weaken the consequent treaty, which failed to achieve ratification in any Latin American country. At the closing ceremony of the Conference, Argentina's Roque Saénz Peña made what has become the most famous statement of the entire Conference and, as mentioned in the previous chapter, a key challenge to US-led Pan-Americanism. Arguing against cooperation aimed at excluding Europe, Sáenz Peña rejected Blaine's invocation of 'America for Americans' and insisted instead on 'América para la humanidad.' Although the Argentine and Chilean delegations participated more positively in other areas – discussion of extradition treaties, inter-American banking practices, and steamship lines, for example – overall, their approach was characterized by indifference and opposition.

In the following decade, Chilean and Argentine indifference towards Pan-Americanism persisted. Less than a year after the Washington Conference closed, an American Monetary Conference convened in the US capital (as in 1889, Canada was not invited, although Hawaii was). Both Argentina and Chile sent representatives, whose attendance was sporadic, and the Conference quickly ended without any practical results. In 1893, the American Medical Association (AMA), noting the potential for information exchange, hosted a Pan-American Medical Congress in Washington. Again, the governments of Chile and Argentina agreed to participate.[26] Despite these developments, the 1890s were in general not an auspicious decade for regional cooperation; indeed, border disputes between Chile and Argentina led to an arms race between the two neighbours. A war scare between Chile and the US in

[26] For more information on this Congress, see First Pan American Medical Congress, *Transactions of the first Pan-American Medical Congress, held in the city of Washington, DC, September 1893* (Washington, 1895).

1891-92 (a result of the '*Baltimore* affair', an international incident sparked by a bar fight in Valparaíso) soured relations between the two countries for most of the decade.[27]

Neither the Chilean nor the Argentine government found much use for the Commercial Bureau, which was effectively run as a body of the US government and was soon in financial trouble when the US Congress (under Democratic control) cut its budget.[28] In 1891, a civil war erupted in Chile pitting supporters of President José Manuel Balmaceda (including the army) against Balmaceda's opposition in Congress (joined by the navy); although Balmaceda's government attempted to maintain regular diplomatic activity during the costly war, its priorities did not include participation in the Commercial Bureau.[29] The civil war ended in August 1891, culminating in the death of Balmaceda by suicide and the establishment of a new regime based on a parliamentary system.[30] Chilean indifference towards the Commercial Bureau, however, continued until the end of the 1890s. None of the correspondence sent by the Chilean Minister in Washington to the Cancillería in 1895, for example, mentioned the Bureau.[31] Argentina also demonstrated little interest in the Bureau and withdrew in 1894. Indifference was partly a matter of economics. Chilean and Argentine trade with the rest of the Americas was significantly less than that with Europe. In 1895, Chile exported approximately 8.8 million metric quintals of nitrate

[27] See Joyce Goldberg, *The* Baltimore *Affair* (Lincoln, 1986) for the most complete account of the incident.
[28] See James Vivian, 'The Commercial Bureau of American Republics, 1894-1902: The Advertising policy, the State Department, and the Governance of the International Union' *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society*, 118:6 (1974) for more information on the work, and failure, of the Bureau in this period.
[29] Wharton to Prudencio Lazcano (Chilean Minister to the US), 23 July 1891, NARA RG59 Microcopy 99, Roll 12.
[30] A recent, and thorough, review of the civil war can be found in Alejandro San Francisco, *La guerra civil de 1891* (Santiago, 2008).
[31] AMRREE Histórico 217.

to Germany, Great Britain and France compared with just 1.2 million to the US (exports to the rest of the Americas did not exceed 64,000).[32] The most important trading partner of Argentina was Great Britain, accounting for at least twenty percent of Argentina's total exports. Inter-American trade paled in comparison; total trade with Brazil (Argentina's most important Latin American trading partner) was less than one sixth of Anglo-Argentine trade.[33] European imports and investments were also considerably more important than those from the Americas.[34]

In addition, economic policymaking during the Argentina's brief membership in the Bureau was focused on reviving commerce with and capital flows from Europe after the Barings Crisis of 1890. This sovereign debt crisis emerged at the end of 1889 but deepened rapidly when Argentina defaulted on almost £48 million of debt in 1890, plunging Argentina into recession (Gross Domestic Product fell eleven percent from 1890 to 1891) and causing social and political upheaval.[35] The Argentine government focused its energy on restoring the confidence of European investors rather than participating in a supposedly regional body with a questionable future. Nonetheless, signs of change appeared in the late 1890s, particularly as trade with the US grew at a rate faster than that of trade with any European country.[36]

[32] Carmen Cariola and Osvaldo Sunkel, *Un siglo de historia económica de Chile, 1830-1930* (Santiago, 1990), pp. 134-35.
[33] David Rock, 'The Argentine Economy 1890-1914: Some Salient Features' in Guido di Tella and DCM Platt (eds), *The Political Economy of Argentina, 1880-1946* (New York, 1986), p. 64-68.
[34] For some illuminating statistics, see DCM Platt, *Latin America and British Trade, 1806-1914* (London, 1972), p. 231.
[35] KJ Mitchener and MD Weidenmier, 'The Baring Crisis and the Great Latin American Meltdown of the 1890s' *Journal of Economic History* 68:2 (2008), p. 467. I highlight Mitchener and Weidenmier's recent work as it demonstrates that the effects of the Barings crisis were felt regionally.
[36] Sheinin, *Argentina and the US*, p. 34.

*Pan-Americanism in Flux: The Early 1900s*

By the turn of the century Pan-American cooperation began to change. The Commercial Bureau underwent significant reform. Its dependence on the US State Department reduced; budgetary reforms made other member states responsible for paying dues calculated according to population (meaning that the US continued to provide the majority of its budget). The US government, in consultation with Latin American representatives, changed the structure of the executive council between 1896 and 1899, allowing for more Latin American representation while retaining a US State Department representative as the Chair *ex-officio*. Several Latin American diplomats were central in enacting the Bureau reforms, including Argentina's Minister in Washington Martín García Mérou.[37] These changes brought Chile and Argentina back to the Bureau; by 1900, all South American republics were represented. The label 'Commercial' was dropped, a reflection of the expanding scope of activities of the new Bureau (in Spanish: Oficina Internacional de las Repúblicas Americanas). Still an advocate of inter-American commerce, the Bureau also encouraged cooperation on other issues, such as sanitation, and fostered information exchange through regular publications.

In 1901, after years of preparation and with considerable funding from the US Congress, a Pan-American Exposition opened in Buffalo, New York, to display the 'progress' of the Americas and foster inter-American commerce and goodwill. Despite the imperialist undertones of the Exposition, the Argentine and Chilean governments decide to participate. Their presence was not merely the result of US

[37] Vivian, 'The Commercial Bureau', p. 564.

pressure, but also driven by the potential of promoting trade and investment and the opportunity to demonstrate Argentine and Chilean progress and civilization.[38] Argentina appropriated $30,000 for sections in the Forestry and Agriculture buildings while Chile spent the most of any foreign country ($170,000) and constructed an elaborate building to show 'her wonderful advance in culture and the arts of civilization.'[39]

While in Washington Pan-American institutions consolidated, and in Buffalo Pan-American sentiment went on display (superficially, at least), in South America the international context continued to undermine regional cooperation. In fact, the border disputes between Chile and Argentina escalated in the late 1890s, leading to calls for war on both sides of the Andes. Advocates of armed conflict included prominent politicans, such as Estanislao Zeballos in Argentina and Joaquín Walker Martínez in Chile. Armed conflict remained unlikely; the presidents of both Argentina and Chile personally preferred a peaceful resolution. Yet the pressure applied by bellicose politicians and newspapers added urgency and risk to the negotiations. By the end of 1901, negotiations between the two had progressed, partly due to the influence of Great Britain (which feared for British investments in both countries). Neither side was eager to discuss the matter in a Pan-American context. In addition, distrust of the US within South America heightened with the Spanish-American War of 1898. The US's intervention in the Cuban struggle for independence and its annexation of Puerto Rico heralded a period of repeated US intervention in the circum-Caribbean that drew heavy criticism from Latin America. Opinions in Argentina and Chile over US

[38] Robert Rydell highlighted the influence of imperialist visions in the organization and goals of the 'Pan', as it was known. See Rydell, *All the World's a Fair: Visions of Empire at American International Expositions, 1876-1916* (Chicago, 1984), p. 126-53.
[39] *Official Catalogue and Guide Book to the Pan-American Exposition, with Maps of Exposition and Illustrations* (Buffalo, 1901), pp. 31-33.

intervention, however, were divided; while many decried US imperialism, others approved the actions of a 'civilized' nation in the unstable and 'uncivilized' circum-Caribbean.

In this context, the invitation for another Pan-American Conference (suggested by the US in 1899) arrived. Policymakers from both countries demonstrated continued anxiety over Pan-Americanism. Correspondence from Argentine representatives in Washington, where the negotiations for the programme took place, suggested underlying distrust of the US. Argentina's interim Chargé d'Affaires, for example, complained of Washington's desire to show Europe 'la supremacia, la influencia que ejerce a todos los países de América.'[40] García Mérou also disparaged the potential Conference. Like Quesada in 1889, García Mérou feared that the circum-Caribbean governments would act as puppets of the US. He suggested one possibility for 'la salvación del Congreso': a bloc of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Uruguay, Paraguay, Peru and Bolivia, an 'especie de Solid-South internacional que daría sériedad y trascendencia á los actos de la asamblea.'[41] With tensions rising between the South American nations, however, this counterweight to the US was unlikely.

Chile, anxious over arbitration, attempted to impose a moratorium on discussion of any issues not mentioned specifically in the programme, which Argentina decried as an assault on freedom of action.[42] Aggravating Chilean concerns, Argentina collaborated with Peru and Bolivia to campaign for an ambiguous programme.

[40] Del Viso a Alcorta, 12 July 1901, AMRECIC Series 25 Box 2:I.
[41] García Mérou a Alcorta, 9 August 1901, AMRECIC Series 25 Box 2:I. The use of 'Solid-South' is interesting; traditionally, the term refers to the tendency of Southern US states to vote as a bloc for Democratic presidential candidates after Reconstruction ended in 1877. As the Minister in Washington, he was probably familiar with the phrase.
[42] See Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, Culto y Colonización, *Memoria, 1902*, (2 vols, Santiago, 1902), ii, 27.

Ultimately, Chilean pressure succeeded and Mexico changed the programme to restrict arbitration discussions. Yet Santiago was not fully satisfied. Chile accepted the invitation in August 1901, emphasizing American harmony and noting the right of participants to withdraw if such harmony was broken.[43] The Cancillería used the months leading up to the Conference to secure the support over arbitration of governments seen as friendly to Chile – Brazil, Mexico, much of Central America, Paraguay, Uruguay and Ecuador. Yet Chile's selection of Joaquín Walker Martínez, by then Chilean Minister in Washington, as delegate portended tensions between Argentina and Chile during the conference.

The foreign ministries prepared straightforward instructions. Chile's main aim was to avoid controversy and remain on the defensive.[44] Little detail was offered on the rest of the programme, which included discussion on the Pan-American Railroad, a Pan-American Bank, universal patents, sanitation police to prevent the spread of epidemics, international commerce, legal codes, the Bureau's organization, and a potential Court of Reclamations. Argentina's instructions were less pessimistic. Buenos Aires viewed the Conference as an opportunity to deepen relations with South American governments while supporting wide and obligatory arbitration. The Ministerio noted that changes in US policy, especially after the Spanish-American War, were important considerations but did not dwell on the issue. As in 1889, the delegates were given ample room to manoeuvre in terms of policy during the Conference.

[43] Telegram from Cancillería to Mexican Foreign Ministry, 27 August 1901, AMRREE Histórico 278a, p. 242.
[44] Walker Martínez to Germán Riesco, 13 November 1901, ANH SFL155.

Argentina's delegation (García Mérou, Lorenzo Anadón and Antonio Bermejo) arrived at the Conference prepared to position Argentina as a regional leader. Instead of joining the other delegations on a tour of Mexico, Argentina's delegates remained in Mexico City in order to prepare a report on their country's progress in sanitation, communication, and banking to circulate at the Conference.[45] In the opening sessions in October 1901, Argentina successfully proposed to make the Conference proceedings public, opening sessions to the press. As the Chileans feared, Argentina joined Bolivia and Peru in an attempt to revive obligatory arbitration.[46] The work of Argentina's delegates and the persistence of border disputes throughout the region resulted in considerable support for Argentina's proposals. Representatives from countries once thought safely in Chile's column (Uruguay, Paraguay and Guatemala in particular) threw their support behind Argentina and Peru.

With help from the US – fearing the collapse of Pan-Americanism – and Mexico – fearing the failure of the Conference – Chile maintained her corner. Chilean delegates invoked the concept Argentina had used during negotiations over the Conference programme: freedom of action. The American republics, Chile argued, should sign bilateral agreements instead of a regional treaty and endorse an agreement on *voluntary* arbitration written at The Hague Conference of 1899.[47] Mexico and the US later recommended voting on two treaties (one on obligatory arbitration, one on the Hague Convention), but Chile rejected the idea. According to one Chilean secretary, equal treatment of the two resolutions would be 'una derrota que la opinión pública

[45] Antonio Bermejo, 'Informe', 1902, AMRECIC Series 25 Box 2:III.
[46] This was universally recognized as the most important topic at the Conference and the committee on arbitration was the only one to have a representative from every participating nation in attendance.
[47] Mexico was the only Latin American participant at the Hague Conference. Hoping to prove their Chile's commitment to arbitration as an ideal, the delegation suggested using an agreement that Chile had neither authored nor signed.

podía, con cierta apariencia de verdad, interpretar como un fracaso de nuestra política.'[48] Ultimately, Chile won the day. The Conference voted on the Hague resolution, accepting it; those countries supporting obligatory arbitration signed a separate treaty after the Conference. These discussions and the treaties they produced overshadowed the rest of the Conference and the other resolutions passed. Among the other agreements was a recommendation for a Sanitary Bureau, a treaty for the extradition of anarchists, and a resolution to investigate international law codification.[49]

The Conference ended with an agreement to reconvene in 1906 at Rio de Janeiro. Post-Conference assessments from Chile and Argentina were starkly divergent. Chile's delegation reported a Chilean 'triumph' and praised the conference, calling the results an important step towards successful hemispheric cooperation, with one delegate (Emilio Bello Codesido) writing:

> el principal objetivo de un Congreso Internacional no es el de consagrar ideas mas o menos hermosos, sino el de buscar la armonía de relaciones i de intereses entre las naciones congregadas, apartando las cuestiónes que pueden dividirlas i resolviendo los problemas de interes comun que puedan unirlas en unánimes i provechosas resoluciones...En este sentido, la obra del Congreso de Méjico ha sido de trascendental importancia para los intereses americanos.[50]

Argentina's Antonio Bermejo held similar views on the aims of international conferences: 'derivan de los sentimientos de solidaridad que suscritan y de la uniformidad de los principios que consagran, como espresión [*sic*] evidente de la comunidad del derecho entre las naciones.'[51] Yet he believed the Mexico City Conference fell short. While he noted the utility of some agreements (particularly the

[48] Álvarez to Cancillería (*Confidential*), 10 February 1902, p. 27, AMRREE Histórico 360a.
[49] For more on the agreements made at Mexico City, see John V Noel, *History of the Second Pan-American Congress* (Baltimore, 1902).
[50] Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, *Memoria, 1902*, ii, 53.
[51] Bermejo, 'Informe del Delegado de la República Argentina ante la Segunda Conferencia Internacional Americana reunida en México', 15 April 1902, AMRECIC Series 25 Box 2:III, pp. 4-5.

call for a conference on river navigation), he argued that many others (including those dealing with sanitation) were unnecessary. In the end, he argued that the main thrust of the Conference had been US commercial expansion; greater inter-American cooperation was secondary.[52] Bermejo's colleague, Lorenzo Anadón, disagreed. He suggested that the Conference had helped to clarify a vision of cooperation. Nonetheless, Anadón was pessimistic about the future of US-led Pan-Americanism. 'El pan-americano está destinado,' he concluded, 'a desaparecer en breve tiempo.'[53]

He was proved wrong. In the years after the Mexico City Conference, the field of Pan-American cooperation expanded. The Bureau gained several new responsibilities stemming from recommendations made at Mexico City on public health, sanitation, railroads and patent recognition. Publication of Bureau pamphlets and statistics promoting inter-American trade increased. In addition, the Bureau collected and distributed pamphlets and volumes from the member nations, usually encouraging investment and trade. The Bureau hosted two Sanitary Conferences in Washington (1902 and 1905), establishing uniform sanitary practices to prevent the spread of disease within the hemisphere and creating the International Sanitation Office (predecessor of the PASB). Outside the Bureau, second-dimension Pan-Americanism found further expression. The AMA, for example, held several other Pan-American Medical Congresses (Mexico City 1896, Havana 1901 and Panama City 1905).

Efforts towards Latin American regional cooperation that excluded the US developed in parallel to these Pan-American initiatives. The Sociedad Científica Argentina

[52] Ibid., p. 70.
[53] Anadón, 'Informe confidencial, presentado al Exmo. Señor Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, Dr. Luis M Drago, con ocasión del Congreso de Méjico y sobre cuestiones de política americana', 1903, AMRECIC Series 25 Box 2:III, pp. 35-36 and 43.

initiated a series of Latin American Scientific Congresses in 1898 with a Congress in Buenos Aires. Two additional Congresses were held at Montevideo (1902) and at Rio de Janeiro (1905). In Chile, the Sociedad Médica hosted a Latin American Medical Congress; another Congress took place in Buenos Aires in 1904.[54] The Argentine and Chilean governments supported these efforts and sent representatives. These congresses served to spread research and ideas while demonstrating that continental cooperation could be defined by Latin America. *La Nación*, an Argentine newspaper that frequently voiced the opinion of the government, noted that the 1898 Congress advanced 'una alta misión de cordialidad internacional, difundiendo *en toda la América* el espíritu de paz y de concordia que se inspira el sentimiento nacional argentino.'[55]

While Pike argued in his history of US-Chilean relations that 'dislike of the over-all Pan-American movement had reached a new peak of intensity,' the record of Chilean participation in Pan-American cooperation suggests a different story.[56] Chile's approach shifted away from indifference and the Chilean government gradually began to position the country as a leader in Pan-American cooperation. Chile was generally punctual in the payments of its dues for the Bureau and was one of the few countries that paid its share of the International Sanitation Office budget.[57] With the exception of the 1902 Customs Congress, Chile participated in all Pan-American Conferences

[54] For more information, see Marta Almeida, 'Circuito aberto: idéias e intercâmbios médicos-científicos na América Latino nos primórdios do século XX' *História, Ciências, Saúde – Manguinhos* 13:3 (2006).
[55] *La Nación*, 15 April 1898. Emphasis added, to show the hemispheric nature of the claim.
[56] Pike, *Chile and the US*, p. 131.
[57] The other nations were Cuba, Honduras, Mexico, El Salvador, Venezuela and the United States. Information regarding these Pan-American activities came mainly from Bureau documents and correspondence sent to the Cancillería archives in Santiago by the Chilean legation in Washington (AMRREE Histórico 295).

and Congresses.[58] Initial indifference towards the publishing and distributing efforts of the Bureau gave way to pro-activity by 1905. In that year, Chile sent the second highest number of official publications to the Bureau for distribution or cataloguing in the Bureau's library (the Columbus Memorial Library).[59]

Argentina's pessimism after the Mexico City Conference contributed to indifference towards Pan-American cooperation but did not result in an openly negative policy. Argentina supported the reforms to the Bureau and policymakers viewed the institution as a means of maintaining good relations with the US. The Foreign Minister in 1902, Luis María Drago, hoped to capitalize on good bilateral relations and gain US approval of his pet project: a hemispheric rejection of foreign intervention in the internal affairs of sovereign states, which he framed as a hemispheric Monroe Doctrine. The Drago Doctrine, as this proposal came to be known, garnered praise in Latin America but did not receive US approval. Argentine hopes for equal status with the US as hemispheric leader were frustrated in the Bureau of American Republics. According to a letter from Epifanio Portela – Argentine minister to Washington – dated 18 January 1906, the inferior rank of Argentina's representative (as minister) compared to the representatives of Mexico and Brazil (which were ambassadors) led to Argentina's marginalization.[60] His resentment over

[58] Participation by the other Latin American nations was often patchy (e.g. Colombia curtailed its activity after Panama joined in 1905); only eleven nations attended the 1905 sanitation conference.
[59] Report from Director Williams Fox to US Secretary of State and Latin American Representatives in the United States, 1 December 1905, AMRREE Histórico 295. The Library was opened in 1902 to provide information for potential investors and businessmen.
[60] Argentina's representative in Washington was not elevated to the rank of Ambassador until 1914. This did not indicate anti-US feelings in Argentina, as Morgenfeld appears to believe (*Vecinos en conflicto*, p. 70). Rather, it was partly a result of an internal debate in Argentina over the compatibility of ambassadorships with republican/egalitarian ideology. Declared an unconstitutional assignment of rank, the appointment of ambassadors sparked a heated exchange in the Chamber of Deputies between Drago (opposing ambassadorships) and Foreign Minister José Luis Murature in August 1914. The republican arguments failed, however, and shortly thereafter Argentina named its first ambassador to

Mexico and Brazil's position led him to avoid Bureau meetings and question the value of the Bureau and its activities. He recommended terminating the Bureau, 'esa comedia con el prestigio de su nombre.'[61]

Argentina's participation in Pan-American cooperation overall was minimal compared to Chile's. The Argentine government did not send representatives to the sanitary meetings, claiming that domestic legislation and agreements with neighbouring Uruguay and Brazil were sufficient. The republic contributed less to information exchange than Chile; in 1905, Chileans sent 163 volumes and 43 pamphlets to the Bureau while Argentines sent only sixteen and six, respectively.[62] The Bureau's activities in the first half of the 1900s attracted little attention from the Ministerio and from Argentine observers in general. Although Argentina's delegates in the Mexico City Conference had committed Argentina to organizing a Geographic Congress for South American states, their government postponed the event indefinitely.[63]

*1906, a New Era Dawning?*

The call in 1905 for a Third International Conference of American States, with Rio de Janeiro as proposed host city, found Chile and Argentina in a different position than five years earlier. In May 1902, the neighbours signed a series of treaties that settled

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the US. See José León Suárez, *Diplomacia universitaria americana: Argentina en el Brasil* (Buenos Aires, 1918), pp. 471-85.

[61] Portela to Carlos Rodríguez Larreta, 18 January 1906, AMRECIC Series 25 Box 4:II. Rodríguez Larreta's response (written four months later, 18 May 1906), exhorts Portela to avoid making these opinions public for the sake of good relations with the US.

[62] Fox to US Secretary of State and Latin American Representatives, 1 December 1905, AMRREE Histórico 295.

[63] The idea was proposed by General Rafael Reyes, Colombian delegate, as a means of integrating South American economies and communications. He based his proposal on personal experience of river exploration, a trip that (according to his report) caused the death of his two brothers - one to fever and the other to 'los antropófagos del Putumayo'. For his report and more details on the proposed Conference (and Argentina's failure to comply), see AMRECIC Series 25 Box 3.

many of their border disputes, committed both countries to resolve any others through arbitration, and effectively ended their naval arms race. The treaties delineated the countries' spheres of influence (Chile claiming the Pacific and Argentina the Atlantic) and removed the threat of Argentine intervention in Chile's disputes with Peru and Bolivia. These treaties, known as the Pactos de Mayo, were controversial in domestic politics but gave both countries the opportunity to claim the mantle of regional fraternity and leadership in arbitration.[64] Chile also reached a rapprochement with Bolivia in the Treaty of Peace and Friendship of 1904. Hope for a harmonious Pan-American conference, then, was high. In addition, inter-American trade (while still small compared to trade with Europe) had increased significantly in the early 1900s. According to Sheinin, annual US sales to Argentina increased by 100 percent between the periods 1894-98 and 1898-1903 (in comparison, British sales rose only by fifty percent and German sales only by twenty-six between the same periods).[65] The US became a relatively important market for Chilean nitrates. US consumption of Chilean nitrate increased to 3.22 million metric quintals by 1905, surpassing the levels of Britain (just over one million) and France (2.5 million) but still below Germany (5.5 million).[66]

Yet latent concerns over first-dimension Pan-Americanism remained. Chilean optimism after the Mexico City Conference dissipated due to renewed worries over

[64] The domestic controversy consisted of opposition from elite sectors that believed that their country should play a more assertive role in world affairs. Despite this pressure, the Argentine and Chilean governments continued to present the Pactos as a landmark achievement. See Barros, *Historia*, pp. 608-09, and Paradiso, *Debates*, pp. 34-36.
[65] Sheinin, *Searching*, p. 12. Trade between Argentina and Brazil also increased significantly in the late 1890s and early 1900s; see Luiz Alberto Moniz Bandeira, 'Las relaciones en el Cono Sur: iniciativas de integración' in Rapoport and Cervo (eds), *El Cono Sur*, pp. 293-94.
[66] Cariola and Sunkel, *Un siglo*, pp. 134-35. Cariola and Sunkel lump the rest of the Americas under 'Países Varios', which consumed 518,000 metric quintals in 1905.

the arbitration issue.[67] Peru again attempted to include obligatory arbitration on the programme and suggested changing the venue to Buenos Aires (Chile staunchly opposed the idea).[68] Walker Martínez, still Chilean minister in Washington, lamented that some 'todavía no comprenden que en una Conferencia Pan-Americana las pasiones particulares deben posponerse a los intereses generales.'[69] While Walker Martínez personally disliked Pan-American Conferences, partly because of their lack of practical results, he did not oppose participating.[70] Assurances of harmony and cooperation from US Secretary of State Elihu Root had put his mind somewhat at ease. He also believed in the need to fill 'grandes lagunas' within international law (he offered few specifics, however).[71] This Conference had promise, then, especially after the US and Mexico cooperated with Chile to keep arbitration off the programme.

The Argentine government was determined to focus on practical aims. In his correspondence, the excitable Portela revived the idea of a Latin American counterweight to the US. He hoped that the representatives from Brazil, Chile and Argentina in the programme committee would be enough to 'neutralizar la influencia sideral de la Gran República del Norte.'[72] Yet the Ministerio preferred to cooperate with the US. In fact, the Foreign Minister Carlos Rodríguez Larreta wrote to Portela in March 1906 instructing him to meet privately with Root and discuss possibilities

[67] See Pike, *Chile and the US*, p. 131.
[68] Chile objected on the grounds of fairness. The Chilean representative argued that the tradition was to hold the Conferences in the major cities of the Americas moving gradually southwards. Thus, Washington and Mexico should logically be followed by Rio de Janeiro and only afterwards Buenos Aires. Argentina's government, for its part, had previously decided the idea was politically too difficult. Argentina rejected Peru's suggestion, stating that it had already agreed to Rio de Janeiro (Rodríguez Larreta to Argentine Minister in Lima, 30 November 1905, AMRECIC Series 25 Box 4:1).
[69] Walker Martínez to Cancillería, 18 March 1906, AMRREE Histórico 343.
[70] This was reported by Argentina's Portela in a letter to Larreta Rodríguez, 28 November 1905, AMRECIC Series 25 Box 4:I.
[71] Ibid.
[72] Portela to Larreta Rodríguez, 20 December 1905, AMRECIC Series 25 Box 4:I.

for cooperation.[73] As Sheinin has argued, the Argentine government in the mid-1900s shifted their position to one of 'quiet Pan-Americanism.' Argentine policy supported Pan-Americanism as a means of building a commercial and juridical inter-American system in which Argentina could feasibly compete with the US for leadership on equal footing.[74] Thus, during Conference preparations, Argentina advocated legal codification (hailing the Montevideo Congress as the ideal), commercial normalization, and the Drago Doctrine.[75] Drago's doctrine, having gained global attention, was a matter of prestige for Argentina. The Ministerio hoped to achieve a hemispheric agreement based on the Doctrine, but with one change. Drago's original letter referred to the Monroe Doctrine as a guarantee of sovereignty in the Western Hemisphere; President Roosevelt's 1904 corollary to the Monroe Doctrine, which justified US intervention in the circum-Caribbean, made that reference a liability. Thus, the Ministerio instructed its delegates to seek regional adoption of the Drago Doctrine while disassociating it from the Monroe Doctrine.[76]

The Drago Doctrine caused controversy during programme negotiations. Brazil and Chile led the opposition. The latter saw the Doctrine, like arbitration, as unsuitable for regional discussion. Moreover, the Doctrine was irresponsible; surely, Chile argued, countries should avoid excessive debt. Again, the US supported Chile and the Chilean delegates praised Root's cooperation.[77] Ultimately, however, Argentina's insistence won a place for the Doctrine on the programme, 'un triunfo argentino'

[73] Larreta Rodríguez to Portela, 12 March 1906, AMRECIC Series 25 Box 4:II.
[74] Sheinin, *Argentina and the US*, pp. 33-36 and Sheinin, *Searching*, pp. 14-15.
[75] Portela did not originally plan on proposing the Drago Doctrine for the programme, though he believed that other representatives wanted to include it (see his telegram to the Ministerio, 13 March 1906, AMRECIC Series 25 Box 4:II). The Ministerio instructed him to pursue the proposal.
[76] Montes de Oca to Portela, 20 March 1906, AMRECIC Series 25 Box 4:II.
[77] Walker Martínez to Cancillería, 23 March 1906, AMRREE Histórico 343.

according to Portela.[78] Less triumphant was Argentina's attempt to place other questions of 'gran interés,' such as arbitration and river navigation, on the programme.[79] The Cancillería in Chile prepared to defend their position on arbitration, 'la política tradicional.'[80] Meanwhile, the Argentine Ministerio congregated its delegates to discuss expectations. Despite Portela's scepticism, his government highlighted the potential benefits of the Conference, including discussion of intellectual exchange, which they called 'el elemento de cultura más poderoso entre los pueblos.' The Ministerio supported reforming the Bureau to increase its efficiency, mentioning Portela's criticism but not heeding his advice on dismantling the organization.[81]

Despite doubts, both Chilean and Argentine reports were overwhelmingly positive during and after the conference. The results of the meeting, according to one of the Chilean delegation's secretaries, 'no pudo ser mas satisfactorio.'[82] The Argentine delegates (Joaquín González, José Terry, and Eduardo Bidau) praised the proceedings, writing in their report:

> Una de las primeras observaciones que ocurren a la mente es la de la inmensa utilidad de estas reuniones periódicas de representantes de las diversas Naciones de América, no solo por tratarse en ellas de asuntos de alto interés pare [*sic*] sus desenvolvimientos y su progreso, aunque ellos no lleguen a traducir en tratados obligatorios, sino por la comunicamión [*sic*] de ideas y de sentimientos comunes que ensanchan el radio de acción de la política de paz y armonía en que sin duda les conviene vivir.

The congregated delegations hailed arbitration as an important principle but agreed that the upcoming international law conference in The Hague (1907) was a better

[78] Portela to Montes de Oca, 23 April 1906, AMRECIC Series 25 Box 4:III.
[79] 'Memorandum sobre el Congreso Americno de Rio de Janeiro', 10 April 1906, AMRECIC Series 25 Box 4:III.
[80] Álvarez uses this term in his notes, 19-23 June 1906, AMRREE Histórico 306a, p. 112.
[81] See both Montes de Oca to Delegados Argentinos, 12 July 1906, and 'Minutas de reunión con los delegados a la Conferencia Panamericana', 1906, in AMRECIC Series 25 Box 5:I.
[82] Vicuña, *Los congresos*, p. 41.

arena for such discussions.[83] Discussion of the Drago Doctrine yielded only a recommendation for further study and a suggestion to put the question to The Hague Conference.[84] The Chilean delegates lauded these decisions, and the Argentine delegates accepted them while noting the respect afforded to Argentina by the rest of the delegations. The Conference focused on other topics of interest for both the Chilean and Argentine governments, such as uniform international public and private legal codes, a centre of sanitation information in Montevideo, commercial treaties, diffusion of statistical information, and increased inter-American communications.

Near the end of the conference, news reached Mexico of an earthquake in Chile that devastated one of the country's largest cities, Valparaíso. The outpouring of condolences and support from other delegations deeply affected the Chilean delegates. Their government was equally moved by the offers of monetary support made by the governments of Argentina, Brazil, Ecuador, Peru, Bolivia, Mexico, Uruguay and the US. Interestingly, in the Cancillería's *Memoria* for 1906, only American governments are mentioned in the records of condolences following the earthquake.[85] The Argentine delegates and their government also commented on the amicable atmosphere in the Conference, something that the previous two lacked. At the end of the Conference, the Argentine delegation sought to have Buenos Aires nominated as the site for the next International Conference of American States. The

[83] The Second Hague Conference was originally scheduled for 1906 and thus clashed with the Rio de Janeiro Conference. Argentina proposed delaying the Pan-American Conference so that the results of the Hague Conference could be discussed in Rio de Janeiro. In the end, the reverse occurred: the US secured the postponement of the Hague Conference.

[84] At The Hague Conference, the US did propose a Convention based on the Drago doctrine. The resulting Porter Convention (named for US Delegate Horace Porter) rejected intervention *unless* arbitration was refused. The Argentine delegation and government were not impressed by this change. Neither was much of Latin America with, perhaps, the exception of Brazil (see Joseph Smith, *Unequal Giants: Diplomatic Relations between the United States and Brazil, 1889-1930* (Pittsburgh, 1991) p. 60).

[85] Cancillería, *Memoria* (Santiago, 1906), p. 44.

Conference left the final decision to the Bureau, but the vocal support of most delegations for Buenos Aires all but guaranteed its selection.

A new era of Pan-American cooperation seemed close at hand. Root declared at the end of the Conference that the US abandoned any intention of territorial expansion and hailed equality as the basis of inter-American relations. Root continued to foster goodwill by visiting several South American countries after the Conference. His time in Buenos Aires received wide press coverage and large crowds lined the streets to see him. Root's speech at the official reception banquet placed Argentina on equal footing with the US in regards to achievements, progress, and faith in free government.[86] In Santiago, Root again attracted large crowds and he declared that difficulties between Chile and the US, which he blamed on misunderstandings, were a thing of the past.[87] A common theme in Root's speeches was the need for nations to learn more about each other. In this Pan-American cooperation had a central role.

*Pan-American Leadership Shifts South (1907-1914)*

Despite Root's more conciliatory tones, the US continued its policy of intervention in the circum-Caribbean and intensified its campaign for economic penetration of the region with the 'dollar diplomacy' of President William H Taft (1909-13) and his Secretary of State Philander C. Knox.[88] These policies drew mixed reactions from the Southern Cone (some condemned intervention on principle while others approved the

[86] 'Recepción de Mr. Elihu Root", *La Nación*, 15 August 1906, pp. 5-6.
[87] *Memoria* (Santiago, 1906), p. 36. All of Root's speeches, and the speeches of many dignitaries on occasion of his visit, can be found in US Department of State, *Speeches Incident to the Visit of Secretary Root to South America, July 4 to September 30, 1906* (Washington, 1906).
[88] See David Healy, *Drive to Hegemony: The United States in the Caribbean, 1898-1917* (Madison, 1988).

US's stated aim of bringing stability) and did not drastically alter policy towards Pan-American cooperation. Neither did the revival of Argentine-Brazilian tensions. At the end of 1906, Estanislao Zeballos, a well known war-mongering public intellectual and politician, became Argentine Foreign Minister for a third time (he had previously served in 1889 and 1891-92). Zeballos pushed for an aggressive expansion of Argentine influence in Latin America, leading to heightened tensions with Brazil during his two-year tenure as Minister. Nonetheless, Argentina continued to gradually engage with Pan-Americanism. In 1909, the Ministerio in Buenos Aires sent its representative in Washington a letter of cautious optimism for hemispheric cooperation and praised Root, who supported naval equilibrium between Argentina and Brazil.[89] Public expressions of optimism increased during the government of President José Figueroa Alcorta (1906-1910). Following the US's example, the Argentine president established by decree a Pan-American Commission in 1908. The Commission, chaired by the Foreign Minister, involved diplomats, representatives from each branch of the federal government, and experts on international law, education and medicine. Yet Argentine participation in Pan-American cooperation was still limited. Although Argentine delegates had lauded Pan-American sanitation discussions at the Rio de Janeiro conference, their government did not send a representative to the Third and Fourth Pan-American Sanitary Conferences (at Mexico City, 1907, and San José, Costa Rica, 1910).[90]

[89] Ministerio to Epifanio Portela, 27 February 1909, AGNA Floor VII (hereafter, VII) 349. For more information on the Argentine-Brazilian naval race and the US's role, see Cisneros and Escudé, *Historia*, viii, 84-86.

[90] McGann also notes the important persistence of anti-Pan American rhetoric by various intellectuals and policymakers, pp. 235-64. Despite these doubts, however, Argentina's engagement with Pan-Americanism progressed.

Positive assessments of Pan-Americanism after the 1906 Conference in the press and within elite circles had concrete consequences for Chilean policy. In July 1907 the government appointed a Committee on Resolutions of the International American Conferences in order to expedite the ratification of Pan-American agreements. By 1910, Chile could point to a high rate of ratification.[91] Chile's government also embraced Pan-Americanism with the Fourth Latin American Scientific Congress in Santiago. When the Congress's Organizing Committee met in 1907, it decided to make the Congress truly Pan-American and invited the US to participate, thus incorporating the US into what had since 1898 been a Latin American form of regional cooperation.[92] The Committee, composed of key foreign policymakers, received governmental approval and funds (almost $600,000 pesos).[93] The US accepted the invitation and thus what had begun as an Argentine initiative had, by Chilean effort, become Pan-American.

By most accounts, the Scientific Congress was a success. It began on a high note with the debut of an unabashedly positivistic Pan-American Hymn.[94] The achievements of the various committees garnered applause from the Chilean press and praise from the President. Numbers give a sense of the Congress's scale: 20 republics attended, with 2,238 participants (1,119 of them Chileans, including government officials, scientists, intellectuals and members of prominent civic associations) and 742 papers presented for discussion.[95] The programme included pure sciences,

[91] Compared to the other major Latin American powers; see Pike, *Chile and the US,* p. 135.
[92] Poirier, *Cuatro Congreso Científico*, p. 10.
[93] The Committee included Marcial Martínez (former secretary to Chile's legation in the US and delegation secretary at the Mexico Conference), Miguel Cruchaga, Alejandro Álvarez, and Anselmo Hevia (former minister to Brazil and delegate to the Rio de Janeiro Conference).
[94] One of the three verses was dedicated to 'Ciencia' and 'el sublie deseo de afianzar el progreso mundial'; Poirier, 'Himno Panamericano', AMRREE Histórico 493.
[95] Poirier, *Cuarto Congreso Científico,* p. 3.

medicine, hygiene, and law. A majority of papers presented dealt with the social sciences and resolutions included calls for employer responsibility for on-site accidents and amplified protection for women and children.[96] Alejandro Álvarez, a Chilean jurist and former Sub-Secretary of the Cancillería, used the Congress as a platform to advocate a distinct 'derecho internacional americano', separating the Americas juridically from Europe. The idea caused considerable debate, with prominent Argentine jurists leading the opposition (this debate will be examined more closely in Chapter Seven). Although a substantial delegation from Argentina attended, the optimistic sentiments expressed by the government and the press in 1898 were not repeated for the 1908 Congress. Argentine newspaper *La Prensa* referred to the Congress in some articles as the 'Congreso Científico Latino Americano' and in others as 'panamericano'.

In the late 1900s, Pan-American activity increased in frequency. Several Sanitary Conventions took place and a sanitation information centre was established in Montevideo.[97] An International Conference of American Students convened in Montevideo in 1908, followed by a second conference in Buenos Aires in 1910. The Bureau's presses continued publishing country profiles, commercial statistics, and manuals meant to foster inter-American investment and trade. In 1910, the Bureau added an Education Section.[98] A Pan-American Congress of Jurists was held in 1907 at Rio de Janeiro in order to continue the work of the 1888 Montevideo Congress, elevating juridical discussion within Pan-American cooperation. Preparations for the

[96] Fernos, *Science*, p. 17.
[97] For information on the Fourth Convention (Costa Rica, 1909), see RH von Ezdorf, 'Fourth International Sanitary Conference of the American Republics' *Public Health Reports (1896-1970)* 25:8 (1910).
[98] Cancillería to Chilean Legation (Washington), 31 March 1910, ANA Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores 1544, p. 3.

next International Conference of American States began in 1908. Argentina's Ministerio was anxious to confirm Buenos Aires as the host city and Chile agreed to nominate the Argentine capital, demonstrating cooperation between the old rivals within Pan-Americanism.[99]

Not all policymakers shared the optimism; Portela, for example, still doubted the benefits of the Bureau. He wrote to the Ministerio in 1909 to re-iterate his opinions of 1906, accusing the US of working towards continental dominance through puppet governments in the circum-Caribbean and giving the Bureau, through Root, 'una ficción política.'[100] Portela's distrust of Pan-Americanism was not mere anti-Americanism, but rather the result of Argentina's continued inferiority in the Bureau compared to Brazil and Mexico. When Brazil demanded that Argentina prevent discussion of river navigation at the 1910 Conference (threatening Brazil's withdrawal from the Conference), Portela caustically repudiated the idea as symptomatic of Brazilian entitlement within the Bureau. Equality within the Pan-American organization, according to Portela, was farcical.[101] Ongoing arms rivalry between Brazil and Argentina shaped these sentiments. Underlying reservations about Chile's position vis-à-vis Argentina also appeared in Portela's rant; he viewed with suspicion Chile's negotiations to avoid arbitration at the Conference and was convinced that Costa Rica had become a Chilean satellite. Yet Portela was also recognized that the Bureau and the Conference were established facts and he hoped that the programme Commission would finish its work peacefully.

[99] Costa Rica foiled these plans (unintentionally, it seems) by proposing Buenos Aires before Chile's Minister had the chance. See Portela to Ministerio, 6 February 1908, AMRECIC Series 25 Box 7:I.
[100] See his letters to the Ministerio on 20 February, 24 February, and 12 March 1909, AMRECIC Series 25 Box 7:II.
[101] Portela to Ministerio, 24 February 1909, AMRECIC Series 25 Box 7:II.

In Chile, anxiety about US hegemony caused some caution. Newspapers saw promise in Pan-Americanism and hoped for good relations with the US, though suspicions remained.[102] The 1908 Scientific Congress, for example, elicited a nervous article in *El Mercurio* predicting the 'hegemonía intelectual de Estados Unidos en el continente americano.'[103] Policymakers, such as Chile's envoy to Japan, worried about US 'pretensiones de hegemonía' in both the circum-Caribbean and South America.[104] An unresolved reclamation case brought against Chile by the US-owned Alsop & Co. after the War of the Pacific heightened concern, especially after a poorly judged attempt by the US government to intervene. Perhaps worried that the Scientific Congresses would become another channel for US hegemony, the Chilean representative to the Bureau rejected a proposal to discuss the Congresses at the Fourth International Conference of American States. He preferred, instead, to leave the two forms of Pan-American cooperation in separate orbits.[105] Even Alejandro Álvarez, a known Pan-Americanist, privately worried about granting the Bureau any political power; he admitted this to Argentina's minister in Santiago, simultaneously lamenting the lack of novelty in the 1910 programme.[106] Nonetheless, Chilean policy towards the upcoming Conference was generally positive. The Chilean government continued to block proposals for arbitration discussions by appealing to the Hague Conventions. The Cancillería accepted the programme almost immediately. 'Todo augura,' wrote the Cancillería to Congress, 'un féliz resultado para esta reunión internacional.'[107]

[102] For example, *El Ferrocarril,* 15 November 1908 and *El Mercurio*, 22 December 1908.
[103] *El Mercurio*, 2 November 1908.
[104] Envoy in Japan to Foreign Minister, 12 February 1910, ANH FV280.
[105] Portela to Ministerio, 21 October 1909, AMRECIC Series 25 Box 7:II.
[106] Anadón to Victorino de la Plaza, 18 December 1909, AMRECIC Series 25 Box 7:II.
[107] *Memoria de Relaciones Exteriores 1910*, p. 19.

Argentina's government prioritized preparations for the 1910 Conference, which became an opportunity to showcase Argentine regional leadership, and decided to incorporate the event into the centenary celebrations of Argentina's independence. Hoping to exceed the success of Brazil in 1906, the Ministerio instructed its representatives to avoid controversy.[108] The Pan-American Commission wrote to Portela near the end of 1908, exhorting him to eliminate divisive topics from the programme and to support discussions that would further 'los vínculos de fraternidad entre los Estados Americanos.'[109] Portela, despite his personal reservations, followed these instructions and sought to minimize divisive issues in the programme committee. The final product included a wide range of issues that attested to the expanding scope of Pan-American cooperation. Supervision of the food supply, wireless telegraphy and aerial navigation, immigration, monetary systems, regulations for protection against anarchists, the unification of legal codes and sanitation policy all found a place on the programme.[110] Recognizing the role that the wives of government officials had played in the organization of previous conferences, the Argentine government also appointed a committee of women (mainly relatives of the Pan-American Committee) to prepare the conference's social schedule. This committee was not the only means for women to participate in Pan-American cooperation. Women had presented papers at the Scientific Congress of 1908 and Argentine feminists planned an inter-American meeting for later in 1910.

[108] De la Plaza to Portela, 30 September 1909, AGNA VII fol. 349.
[109] Comisión Panamericana to Portela, 1 December 1908, AMRECIC Series 25 Box 7:I.
[110] American Society of International Law, 'The Fourth Pan-American Conference' *The American Journal of International Law*, 3:4 (1909), p. 964-66.

Conference preparations, however, experienced several difficulties when Bolivia and Brazil's attendance was thrown into question. Bolivia suspended relations with Argentina in 1909 due to Argentina's decision as arbiter in a boundary dispute with Peru earlier in the decade.[111] The Bolivian government attempted to court Uruguayan support by suggesting the Conference move to Montevideo, an idea that attracted minimal interest from Montevideo and irritation from Buenos Aires. Although annoyed, Figueroa Alcorta's government genuinely wanted Bolivia to attend.[112] The fact that *all* of the American republics had attended the 1906 conference in Brazil made full attendance a priority for Buenos Aires. A Brazilian official also caused anxiety when he told Argentina's minister in Rio de Janeiro that the selection of Estanislao Zeballos as delegate to the conference might cause Brazil to withdraw. In the end, Brazil attended while Bolivia did not. Despite these issues, the Argentine government was certain that the Conference would be the most significant Pan-American event to date. The Ministerio nominated a distinguished delegation of politicians, international legal experts, and seasoned diplomats and provided their delegates with detailed instructions prepared with the help of other ministries. In anticipation of controversy, the Ministerio instructed the delegates to refuse any nomination for committee presidency and so preserve their freedom of action. The Ministerio was optimistic, but also realistic.

By the time of the Conference, Chilean public interest in Pan-Americanism had increased and positive portrayals of the concept, such as Benjamín Vicuña

[111] Bolivia's dissatisfaction arose when Figueroa Alcorta overreached his negotiated mandate and suggested a new border altogether. See Peterson, *Argentina and the United States,* pp. 266-67.
[112] See de la Plaza to Portela, 30 September 1909, AGNA VII 349.

Subercaseaux's *Los congresos panamericanos*, circulated.[113] *El Mercurio* also published a revised history of Pan-Americanism, presenting Blaine's intentions as good (if misguided) and the 1889 Washington Conference as an indication that US would abandon coercion.[114] Attitudes in Chile and Argentina had also warmed to the Bureau. Newspapers in both countries announced the inauguration of the Bureau's new building in Washington (paid for mainly by Andrew Carnegie) with positive assessments of the Bureau's endeavours. In Chile, *El Mercurio* praised the 'admirable obra de la Oficina Internacional de las Repúblicas Americanas, que está consagrada al fomento del comercio, de la amistad, y de la paz entre las naciones americanas.'[115] The paper's owner, Agustín Edwards, was Foreign Minister at that time, and so this panegyric probably reflected the Chilean government's opinion. The Argentine press also celebrated the occasion, though in less effusive terms. *La Nación* provided Argentine readers with an outline of the Bureau's work, highlighting its role of distributing information and acting as a meeting place for the American republics. The article assured its readers that the Bureau 'no guarda antagonismo alguno contra Europa ó contra el desarrollo de relaciones comerciales más íntimas entre la América latina y Europa.'[116] Despite the positive view of the Bureau, neither Chile nor Argentina wanted to see it become an entangling alliance. When the Bureau suggested a treaty in 1910 requiring two years notice before withdrawing, both governments opposed the idea, upholding the freedom of action.[117]

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[113] Vicuña Subercaseaux, author, journalist, and son of renowned ex-Mayor of Santiago Benjamín Vicuña MacKenna, was a secretary to the Chilean delegation in 1906.
[114] Emilio Rodríguez Mendoza, 'Los Congresos Pan-Americanos' *El Mercurio*, 06 July 1910.
[115] 'Palacio de las Republicas Americanas' *El Mercurio*, 23 May 1910.
[116] 'La Oficina Internacional de las República Americanas: El nuevo edificio' *La Nación*, 16 May 1910, p. 7.
[117] Cancillería to Chilean Legation (Washington), 31 March 1910, ANA Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores 1544, p. 4.

The Buenos Aires Conference was, by Argentine and Chilean assessments, a success. As in 1906, both delegations noted the Conference's harmonious atmosphere. Controversy was not completely absent; one of the more contentious moments of the Conference followed a Brazilian proposal that paid homage to the Monroe Doctrine. Argentine and Chilean delegates worked together to impede the resolution's adoption, demonstrating Argentine-Chilean cooperation and continued uncertainty towards US intentions in Latin America. Nonetheless, agreement was reached on several issues, including the reorganization of the Bureau into the Pan-American Union, a name change that emphasised the greater multilateral nature of the organization. The Chilean Minister in Washington, Aníbal Cruz, joined the Commission for the Reorganization of the Bureau later that year.[118] Most importantly for Chile, Santiago became the favourite to host the next International Conference of American States. At the end of the conference, Argentina's Foreign Minister, Rodríguez Larreta, offered a speech praising modern Pan-Americanism, lauding the 'American spirit', and echoing Sáenz Peña's declaration of 'America for humanity'.[119] Rodríguez chose to end his speech, however, by celebrating the phrase that Sáenz Peña had attempted to replace: 'America for Americans'. The Americas could benefit both Americans and humanity more generally. This rhetoric demonstrated Argentina's acceptance of modern Pan-Americanism, partly as a means of achieving hemispheric leadership and, perhaps, global significance.

[118] According to Pike, he was 'the most pro-United States envoy that Chile had sent to Washington since the War of the Pacific' (*Chile and the United States*, p. 135).
[119] His speech can be found in 'Fourth International Conference of American States: Message from the President of the United States transmitting a letter from the Secretary of State inclosing a report, with accompanying papers, relative to the Fourth International Conference of American States held at Buenos Aires from July 12 to August 30, 1910' (Washington, 1911), pp. 53-54.

Rodríguez's optimism and Argentina's policy in 1910 was part of a general trend towards leadership in the Americas through cooperation with the United States. Argentina's economic buoyancy (its export-led growth had placed the republic into the top tier of economies globally) and relative political stability encouraged policymakers to expand Argentina's international presence.[120] Under the guidance of Victorino de la Plaza (Foreign Minister from 1908-10, Vice President from 1910-14 and President upon the death of President Roque Sáenz Peña in 1914) and Rodríguez, Argentina worked closely with the US government in the mediation of a number of regional disputes. In a related development, Argentine attendance to PAU board meetings increased. Chile also drew closer to the US after the Alsop case settled in 1910. Despite widespread concern over US influence in Latin America (even in Patagonia, according to the US consul in Magallanes, the public was 'unquestionably suspicious of America and its policies regarding Chile'), the government sought to improve relations with Washington.[121] US Minister to Chile, Henry Fletcher, reported excitedly in late 1911 that 'Chile is ready to give an entirely new direction to her foreign policy in the sense of a close friendship and cooperation between Chile and the United States.'[122] Fletcher ingratiated himself with much of the Santiago elite, contributing to the increasingly positive view of the US held by Chilean policymakers.[123] Like their Argentine counterparts, Chilean policymakers hoped to gain recognition of Chile's equal status as regional leader. That Chile had been the site of the First Pan-American Scientific Congress and was the assumed host of the

[120] See Sheinin, *Searching*, pp. 41-50 and Peterson, *Argentina*, p. 268. For an overview of Argentina's economic growth in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, see Cortés Conde, 'The growth of the Argentine economy'.
[121] Consul in Punta Arenas to Assistant Secretary of State, 17 February 1910, NARA RG59 M489 Reel 1.
[122] Fletcher to Phliander Knox, 26 October 1911, NARA RG59 M489 Reel 1.
[123] See Pike, *Chile and the United States*, pp. 136-44.

next International Conference of American States made Pan-Americanism a vehicle for this objective.

In the early 1910s, several technical Pan-American meetings convened. On the initiative of the US government, the PAU hosted a Pan-American Commercial Conference in 1911. John Barrett – an experienced diplomat who served as US minister in three Latin American countries, including Argentina, and as Director of the PAU since 1907 – emphatically stated in the invitation that 'political, partisan and controversial questions will be avoided.'[124] Both Chile and Argentina authorized Chargé d'Affaires to participate and offer papers. Later that year, the Fifth International Sanitary Conference met in Santiago, organized by one of Chile's leading public health experts, Dr Alejandro del Río. For the first time, Argentina sent a representative. In 1912, two Pan-American meetings took place: the Congress of Jurists in Rio de Janeiro and the Third International Congress of American Students in Lima. Debate over the 'derecho internacional americano' dominated the Congress of Jurists and again revealed divisions among Latin American perspectives on the nature of international law and the international order it upheld. Chile's Álvarez defended the separation of European and American international law while Brazil's Manoel Sá Vianna and Argentina's Carlos Rodríguez upheld universality.[125]

Argentina continued to push for commercial normalization in the Americas as a means of extending its economic influence.[126] Chile's government, meanwhile, sought to increase inter-American trade to mitigate potential commercial decline that

[124] John Barrett to Alberto Yoacham, 17 January 1911, AMRREE Histórico 341.
[125] See James Brown Scott, 'The American Institute of International Law' *University of Pennsylvania Law Review and American Law Register* 61:8 (1913), pp. 580-87.
[126] Sheinin, *Searching*, pp. 41-57.

the nearly-completed Panama Canal might bring (as it would redirect shipping lines between the Atlantic and Pacific). Barrett, conscious of Chilean concerns, wrote to Chile's minister in Washington to give his personal assurance that the PAU would strive to raise awareness of commercial opportunities in Chile.[127] Chilean representatives also suggested the establishment of a permanent Pan-American Exposition of Products in Buenos Aires. Argentina seemed interested but the exposition never came to fruition.[128] Pan-American cooperation was, then, economically practical for both governments.

While non-governmental actors in the two countries – students, public health experts, and feminist activists – appropriated Pan-Americanism with greater frequency, general interest in the activities of the PAU and in Pan-American initiatives also seemed to increase, evident in the success of the PAU *Bulletin*. While the *Bulletin* had attracted little interest in Latin America in the early 1900s, counting just seventy-six regular subscribers in 1902, a decade later it had nearly twelve thousand subscribers, many of them schools and universities. There was greater demand for the Spanish and Portuguese editions than for the English. While Chilean interest in the *Bulletin* had developed in the 1900s, Argentine interest developed after 1910; by 1913, Spanish edition subscriptions in Argentina had surpassed four thousand.[129] As 1914 approached and preparations began for the next International Conference of American States in Santiago, an important change was noticeable within Pan-Americanism. The US was still at the vanguard, but it was not alone.

[127] Barrett to Eduardo Suárez, 28 September 1913, AMRREE Histórico 442.
[128] See Ministerio de Agricultura to Ministerio de Realciones Exteriores, 13 January 1913, AMRECIC Series 25 Box 6:V.
[129] See Barrett's 'Memorandum regarding the report of the Committee on the *Bulletin*' without date (though references in the document suggest 1913), in LOC JBP fol 95.

*ABC Leadership and a 'New Pan-Americanism' (1914-15)*

In 1914, Chile and Argentina's leadership in the inter-American system appeared confirmed. Since 1910, better relations among Argentina, Brazil, and Chile (or the ABC) encouraged policymakers in all three to consider an ABC bloc to ensure international order in South America and regulate hemispheric relations on par with the US. When the US invaded Veracruz, Mexico in April 1914, a move inspired by the moral diplomacy of President Woodrow Wilson (above all by Wilson's desire to oust Victoriano Huerta, who had led a coup against Mexican President Francisco Madero in 1913), an opportunity to test the ABC idea emerged. Argentina and Chile's ministers in Washington joined with the Brazilian ambassador in offering mediation between the US and Mexico.[130] The US's acceptance was hailed by the ABC diplomats in Washington and observers in the Southern Cone as proof of Pan-Americanism and the promise of peace through inter-American cooperation. The Peace Conference, held at Niagara Falls from May to July 1914, was ultimately a failure. The US and Mexico signed a protocol ensuring that war (which was unlikely anyway) would be avoided, but the Conference did not end the occupation of Veracruz, which continued until November.[131]

Regardless of its unimpressive results, the Conference received widespread praise in Chile and Argentina. Both governments overestimated the Conference's importance

[130] See Michael Small, *The Forgotten Peace: Mediation at Niagara Falls, 1914* (Ottawa, 2009), for a recent analysis of the mediation. Small notes that the Chilean minister originally suggested the idea for a conference and that much of the groundwork was laid with fervent commitment by Argentina's minister. Huerta's government in Mexico encouraged mediation as a potential means of slowing the advance of the ongoing revolution. See also Sheinin, *Searching*, pp. 27-40.

[131] One major obstacle to mediation was the victories of the Constitutionalist forces under Venustiano Carranza over the forces of the Huerta government. The Mexican delegates at Niagara represented Huerta and thus the developments within Mexico threw the mediation into doubt. Carranza did not send representatives to Niagara, forcing the mediators to hastily conclude the Conference (Small, *The Forgotten Peace*, pp. 87-108).

and celebrated the event as evidence of ABC leadership through Pan-American cooperation.[132] The Conference led the ABC powers to pursue further cooperation and eventually an ABC Treaty of cooperation in 1915. Chilean opinions of the ABC policies were generally positive and the National Congress quickly ratified the Treaty. Argentine opinions were more divided. Some decried the Treaty as a limit to the freedom of action and others pushed for a wider regional pact; these objections doomed the Treaty in Argentina's Chamber of Deputies.[133] Despite these divisions, Argentina's official policy continued to seek Argentine leadership in the Americas through ABC cooperation.[134]

Argentina and Chile also found equality in the PAU governing board. In late 1914, both Chile and Argentina upgraded their representation in the US from Ministers Plenipotentiary to Ambassadors (the US reciprocated, appointing ambassadors in Santiago and Buenos Aires). The Director of the PAU confidentially lobbied for this change as a means to 'strengthen the ties of comity and commerce between the United States and Latin America.'[135] Portela's complaints of inferiority were resolved, and policymakers in both countries interpreted the reciprocal upgrade as evidence of closer relations with the US. Improved economic ties bolstered these diplomatic relations. Argentine and Chilean trade with the US had continued to grow in the late 1900s and early 1910s and the US became an important source of capital for burgeoning industries in both countries, including petroleum and meat processing in

[132] For a closer look at the governments' rhetoric, see Cristián Guerrero Yoacham, *Las conferencias del Niágara Falls* (Santiago, 1966), pp. 156-65.
[133] Etchepareborda, *Historia de las relaciones*, pp. 123-24
[134] For more on the intellectual trappings behind that leadership, see Sheinin,*Searching*, pp. 41-47.
[135] Barrett, Confidential Memorandum to Senator Shively, 13 March 1914, LOC John Barrett Papers fol. 97. Chile's small size raised doubts in Washington over appropriateness of an embassy. Barrett argued that Chile deserved the honour, suggesting that 'in many respects it has a greater strength [than Argentina and Brazil] because of its peculiar relationship to the other Latin American Republics.'

Argentina and copper in Chile.[136] Moreover, with the support of the US government and aided by negotiations through Pan-American channels, US companies had won contracts to construct two battleships for the Argentine government in 1910, to be delivered by 1915.[137]

Meanwhile, preparations for the next International Conference of American States were underway. Hopes of consolidating hemispheric leadership outweighed lingering doubts over the utility of such conferences in Argentina. The Argentine Foreign Minister, Ernesto Bosch, questioned the practicality of the impending conference to Romulo Naón (Argentine Minister in Washington), yet urged Naón to remain active in the preparations in order to maintain Argentina's presence in the PAU. According to Bosch, the PAU was an 'autoridad moral' in the Western Hemisphere in which Argentina should appear interested.[138] Instructions sent from Buenos Aires demonstrated a desire to avoid conflict and maintain Pan-American cooperation. 'Por razones de armonia continental' and to maintain Argentina's place as Pan-American leader (and not antagonist), the Ministerio agreed that arbitration would not figure in the programme.[139] This was a relief for Chilean policymakers.

The provisional programme included many familiar topics and a handful of new issues, such as the protection of indigenous tribes (a proposal from Colombia which met approval from Chile and indifference from Argentina). Interestingly, the programme contained a proposal to restrict the rights of diplomatic intervention on behalf of expatriate citizens. Echoing the arguments of Argentine international lawyer

[136] Sheinin, *Argentina and the United States*, pp. 39-42, and Monteón, *Chile*, p. 109.
[137] Sheinin, *Argentina and the United States*, p. 42.
[138] Bosch to Naón, 9 September 1913, AMRECIC Series 25 Box 22:I.
[139] Bosch to Carlos Gómez, 3 December 1913, AMRECIC Series 25 Box 25:I.

Carlos Calvo, the proposal signified a major concession from the US Secretary of State and came as an unpleasant surprise (according to *The New York Sun*) for many in the Latin American division of the State Department.[140] The outbreak of war in Europe, however, led Argentina to suggest postponing the conference. Chile at that time faced severe economic problems, partly because of stagnant production and a decline in maritime traffic after the Panama Canal's opening in 1914, and received the suggestion gratefully. With the approval of various important policymakers (including former presidents and former foreign ministers), the Cancillería agreed to postpone the conference until after the war. The delay lasted until 1923.

The First World War presented a number of opportunities and challenges for Argentine and Chilean foreign policies. The two countries remained neutral throughout the conflict despite pressure from both sides. The importance of trade with countries on both sides (particularly Britain and Germany), the influence of expatriate business communities from both sides, and moral and legal arguments against belligerence (especially the lack of a casus belli) bolstered neutrality. Both countries faced economic challenges due to the loss of European investment and restricted European markets. Although the initial economic effect included an increase in demands for Argentine meat and wool and Chilean nitrates for gunpowder, by 1915 the net effect was increasingly negative.[141] Yet the War also provided opportunity: the contrast of European destruction and American cooperation inspired

[140] 'Bryan Blundered in Washington View', *The New York Sun*, 16 December 1913.
[141] See Bill Albert's *South America and the First World War: The Impact of the War on Brazil, Argentina, Peru and Chile* (Cambridge, 1988) for a comprehensive account of the impact of the War. For more on Argentina's economy, see also David Rock, 'From the First World War to 1930' in L Bethell (ed), *Argentina Since Independence* (Cambridge, 1993), pp. 141-43. For Chile, see Michael Monteón, *Chile in the Nitrate Era: The Evolution of Economic Dependence, 1880-1930* (Madison, 1982), pp. 111-12 and Couyoumdjian, *Chile y Gran Bretaña*.

Latin American diplomats and jurists to argue that the region could shed its peripheral status and become central in the construction of a transformed international system.

The War also changed the US's approach to Latin America. Late in 1914, President Wilson and his advisor Edward House began an attempt to consolidate the inter-American system through a Pan-American Pact – an agreement of collective security and a guarantee of republican government. In House's plan, the Pact would first involve the US and ABC powers, gradually incorporating the rest of the hemisphere. Negotiations between Washington and the ABC governments over the Pact stalled due to Chilean reluctance. Chile first objected to the project's implication for intervention in bilateral relations (Tacna-Arica was clearly in mind) and eventually widened its opposition with general non-intervention rhetoric, arguing that the guarantee of republican government could lead to authorized foreign interventions and grant legitimacy to violations of national sovereignty. Moreover, the likelihood of reciprocity (that is, Latin American intervention in the US) was low; the Pact, therefore, was an affront to the equality of states.[142] Argentina, in contrast, initially supported the idea and scoffed at Chilean objections as overreactions. The Ministerio in Buenos Aires viewed the Pact as another way of positioning Argentina in a co-civilizing role; under the leadership of President de la Plaza, Argentina almost signed the Pact independently of Brazil and Chile. Negotiations continued throughout 1915 with few signs of resolution.[143]

[142] Pike, *Chile and the US*, pp. 150-54. See also Couyoumdjian, *Chile y Gran Bretaña*, pp. 62-66 and 93-96.
[143] For more on the Pact, see Mark Gilderhus's detailed description from the US perspective in his book *Pan American Visions*.

Meanwhile, two major Pan-American events occurred in 1915: a Financial Conference and the Second Pan American Scientific Congress, both held in Washington. The former, which the US Treasury Department hoped would advance US economic influence in Latin America in the context of the European war, established the International High Commission (IHC). Composed of financial ministers and economic experts from around the hemisphere, the IHC meant to coordinate financial and monetary policies to help capital flow from the US to Latin America. Chile and Argentina, affected by the drastic cut in capital from Europe, were receptive to the idea. In the Second Pan-American Scientific Congress, large and distinguished delegations represented Argentina and Chile. Argentina's government selected Ernesto Quesada, son of Vicente Quesada and renowned jurist, as delegation chair. Quesada, despite earlier arguments against 'la pretensión arrogante de los políticos de la escuela de Blaine,' declared in the Congress's opening sessions that the European war required American solidarity.[144] Chile's head delegate (and ambassador to Washington) acted as honorary president of the Congress and expressed hope in American cooperation.

The US government made the Congress more of a diplomatic event than a scientific one. In his opening address, Secretary of State Robert Lansing contrasted the calamity of the European War with Pan-American cooperation and heralded a 'new Pan Americanism...an expression of the idea of internationalism' that was inherently practical. Later in the Congress, President Wilson offered a short address re-iterating his government's call for a new Pan-Americanism based on equality, arbitration,

[144] Ernesto Quesada, *Nuestra Raza* (Buenos Aires, 1900), p. 26.

justice and peace.[145] The Congress provoked mixed reactions in Latin America. Although some historians, especially Pike, argue that Chile positioned itself in opposition to Wilson's ideas due to the negotiations of a Pan-American Pact, that was not actually the case.[146] In fact, Chilean Ambassador Eduardo Suárez Mujica wrote in laudatory tones to his Cancillería about Lansing's speech, noting that it reflected the 'espíritu [de] confraternidad panamericana que inspira la política de este Gobierno.'[147] In Santiago, Eduardo Poirier (who had helped organize the First Pan American Scientific Congress) wrote several articles for Chile's leading newspapers praising the Congress.[148] Argentine reactions, however, were less optimistic. Despite his opening remarks at the Congress, Quesada later questioned Wilson's intentions in a lecture hosted by *La Nación*.[149] One book published in Buenos Aires (J. Soraci's *El concepto panamericano*, 1917) took a more extreme position and attacked Lansing and Wilson's sentiments as veiled imperialism. The Argentine government, nonetheless, remained outwardly supportive of Pan-American cooperation.

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The Second Pan American Scientific Congress included a reprisal of the hymn that debuted in 1908. Its optimistic verses echoed Lansing and Wilson's speeches and its chorus matched the sentiments of 'New Pan-Americanism':

> De Minerva al reclamo vibrante
> Hoy la América erguida se ve:
> ¡Sus heraldos el Verbo gigante
> promulguemos, henchidos de fé![150]

[145] See World Peace Foundation, *The New Pan-Americanism* (Boston, 1916), pp. 98-109.
[146] Pike, *Chile and the US*, p. 153.
[147] Suárez to Cancillería, 27 December 1915, AMRREE Histórico 493.
[148] Many of these articles were collected and archived in AMRREE Histórico 493.
[149] Stimson to Lansing, 24 June 1919, NARA RG59 M514 Roll 19. Quesada's gave his lecture in 1916.
[150] Poirier, *Cuarto Congreso*, p. 95.

The events of 1915 appear an appropriate opportunity to use the term 'turning point'. Yet, as this chapter has shown, there were many moments that could fit that epithet. The reform of the Commercial Bureau in 1899, for example, was a significant step towards the expansion and institutionalization of Pan-American cooperation. Root's speeches and visit to Latin America in 1906 inspired re-evaluations of US-led cooperation. For Chile, the conference of Rio de Janeiro was important in removing obligatory arbitration. The 1908 Pan American Scientific Congress merged Latin American intellectual cooperation into Pan-Americanism, opening the door for other forms of practical cooperation. A similar process occurred in 1913, when the Fifth Latin American Medical Congress and the Sixth Pan-American Medical Congress were held in conjunction at Lima. The Niagara Falls Conference of 1914 signalled the transformation of Argentina and Chile from detractors to vanguard. In the end, so many 'turning points' renders the label ineffective. Rather, the Pan-American narrative was one of gradual evolution, expansion, amalgamation, and collaboration.

Gradual change also characterized Argentine and Chilean approaches. While antagonistic towards Pan-American cooperation in the 1880s, policymakers in both countries were not opposed to regional cooperation in general. Attitudes towards the 1888-89 Montevideo Congress and the Scientific Congresses demonstrated the persistence of older forms of cooperation. These forms did not disappear altogether; rather, traditional and modern Pan-Americanism became more closely aligned. Argentine and Chilean actors played a crucial role in this process. Both countries had become centres of Pan-American activity by the 1910s, but by different trajectories; Chilean policymakers embraced Pan-Americanism earlier than their Argentine

counterparts. The similarities and differences in Argentine and Chilean approaches laid the foundation for oscillating policies in the post-war years.

Economic pragmatism partly explains the general shift from resistance to engagement. From 1890 to 1915, the US became a more important market for exports and a source of imports and capital. Pan-American cooperation and institutions promoted this development and in some ways served Argentine and Chilean economic interests. In addition, Argentine policymakers hoped to gain economic influence in the Americas and Pan-American efforts to normalize inter-American economic relations through uniform practices (in customs and banking, for example) were therefore attractive. Yet, despite the potential of greater economic integration, the economies of both countries were still oriented towards Europe. Before 1914, Germany maintained its position as the most important market for Chilean nitrates. For Argentine exports, Britain remained the largest market. Political commitment to many aspects of regional economic integration was superficial. Although the delegations at the 1910 Buenos Aires Conference signed an agreement on patents, for example, neither Chile nor Argentina ratified it.

Power considerations also played a role. Initial antagonism to Pan-Americanism was partly resistance by two regional powers to expanding US influence in Latin America. Intra-continental rivalries, border disputes, and arms races also undermined attempts at regional cooperation. Although some policymakers and observers attacked Pan-Americanism as a vehicle for US hegemony, especially after 1898, others noted the benefits to engaging with Pan-American cooperation. Pan-American meetings provided opportunities to build coalitions to counter-balance the US. Juridical

discussions opened the possibility of regulating inter-American relations with international law and constraining the US with regional norms. Chilean and Argentine governments employed Pan-American platforms to advance certain principles, including voluntary arbitration and non-intervention. These approaches resemble what Andrew Hurrell describes as 'subordinate state' behaviour in regionalism characterized by asymmetrical power relations (particularly the presence of a regional hegemon).[151] Hurrell notes that subordinate states can also pursue 'insider activism' – that is, working within regionalist institutions – and exploit the framework of regional cooperation – fostering networks of experts and organizing conferences – to insert their interests into the regional agenda. Hurrell's observations are useful for identifying patterns that suggest the influence of power considerations, but are limited by the difference in historical context. Hurrell takes US hegemony to be an established element of modern regionalism; at the end of the nineteenth century, however, the US aspired to hegemony and Argentine and Chilean policymakers believed that their countries could reasonably claim the status of 'dominant state'.[152] Policymakers sought to legitimize Argentine and Chilean leadership and impose norms and ideals on the hemispheric system through Pan-American cooperation.

Economic and geopolitical calculations help to understand Chilean and Argentine approaches and the themes outlined briefly above continued after 1915. Yet this chapter has also demonstrated that regional cooperation under the Pan-American label began to incorporate a wide set of actors, interests, and issues that render simple explanations incomplete. During and after the First World War, diversification and contestation remained salient features of both dimensions of Pan-Americanism.

[151] Hurrell, 'Hegemony and Regional Governance in the Americas' in Fawcett and Serrano, *Regionalism*, pp. 195-98.
[152] Ibid., p. 198-203

# Chapter 3

# Approaches to Modern Pan-Americanism (1915-1930)

In the next fifteen years, first-dimension Pan-Americanism fluctuated in importance (declining in the late 1910s, reviving in the early 1920s, and declining again in the mid-1920s), while second-dimension cooperation steadily increased to address a wide array of topics. Much of the expansion after 1910 was the work of civil society actors convening meetings and organizing institutions, networks and publications. By the mid-1920s, 'cultural Pan Americanism' had entered the regional lexicon to describe efforts that promoted mutual familiarity among the peoples of the Americas.[1] The number and range of Pan-American events and initiatives from 1915 to 1930 makes analysis of each individual expression of Pan-American cooperation impossible here. Therefore, this chapter will focus on those initiatives and trends that were particularly important in terms of Argentine and Chilean participation. The post-war expansion of Pan-American cooperation can be understood within the context of rising internationalism globally (e.g. the League of Nations, disarmament conferences, anti-war agreements, etc.), which led to the proliferation of international activity. In 1927 the Chilean Cancillería recorded in its *Memoria* that it received thirty-six invitations to international conferences, congresses, conventions and exhibitions. Three years later, this number reached 114.[2] This rise was not merely evidence of greater diligence in the Cancillería; the rapid increase in internationalist activity is corroborated by other primary sources (the Chilean Foreign Minister, for example,

[1] See, for example, Juan Senillosa, *Panamericanimso cultural* (Buenos Aires, 1924).
[2] These figures are based on the invitations recorded in the *Memorias del Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores* presented to Congress each year. A complete collection of these *Memorias* can be found in the Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional, Santiago

complained about this trend) and secondary literature.[3] Pan-Americanism was thus part of a broader trend.

Important changes in the foreign policy objectives of both countries occurred in the post-war period. Argentina oscillated between the US and Great Britain in commercial and political interests whereas Chile demonstrated a more continual (though gradual) shift away from Europe and towards the US. Chile also renewed efforts to resolve the Tacna-Arica dispute. Negotiations began in earnest in 1922, collapsed in the mid-1920s and finally produced a settlement in 1929. A number of major issues occupied the Argentine Ministerio, including the resolution of boundary disputes with Bolivia, balance of military power with Brazil, and relations with the Vatican.[4] Both countries continued to claim status as regional leaders, though by 1914 Argentina had clearly surpassed Chile in economic and military strength. The equality assumed in the Pactos de Mayo no longer matched reality. Ostensibly, this could have resulted in more internationalist and conciliatory policies for Chile (which did occur) and more assertive and unilateral policies for Argentina (which did not). This chapter will explore how Chile and Argentina shaped and reacted to the shifting fortunes of Pan-Americanism. As was demonstrated in the previous chapter, both countries had gradually come to promote Pan-Americanism and use it to secure leadership roles in the region. Such policies continued to shape Argentine and Chilean participation and Southern Cone actors remained leaders of regional cooperation, though a number of issues (particularly Tacna-Arica negotiations and US intervention in the circum-Caribbean) continued to raise doubts among policymakers.

[3] See Iriye, *Cultural Internationalism*, especially pp. 91-131, and Gorman, *The Emergence*, pp. 1-18.
[4] This final concern was important to the Ministry partly due to the coupling of 'Relaciones Exteriores' and 'Culto' under one ministerial umbrella.

*New Pan-Americanism and Old Americanism (1915-18)*

The promise of 'New Pan-Americanism', heralded by Lansing and Wilson, was regional cooperation based on equality, practicality, and international law. Efforts to define and codify international law in a Pan-American context gained an institutional advocate in 1915 with the inauguration of the American Institute of International Law (AIIL). The idea for the AIIL first appeared in 1911 and, through the collaboration of Chile's Alejandro Álvarez and the US's James Scott Brown, slowly gained support among official and academic circles. At the AIIL inauguration, the honorary president, Elihu Root, recognized Latin American contributions to international law and described law as the best protection of weaker states, a principle that had been central to nineteenth-century Latin American legal thought.[5] The AIIL became a recognized authority in the hemisphere, although opinions of it varied. The Institute's early promotion of the 'derecho internacional americano' caused controversy and led many Argentine policymakers and intellectuals to work outside of AIIL networks (for reasons that will be discussed in Chapter Seven). Recent work, particularly that of Juan Pablo Scarfi, has demonstrated that the AIIL's work was imbued with US notions of 'civilising Latin America through the promotion of the international rule of law.'[6] Many Latin American intellectuals recognized the hegemonic pretensions of the AIIL, and some believed the AIIL was an opportunity to regulate those pretensions. Even AIIL detractors in Argentina recognized the Institution as evidence of international law's growing importance to Pan-American relations.

[5] Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, *Memoria del Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, Culto y Colonización (Diciembre de 1914 – Diciembre de 1915)* (Santiago, 1918), p. 72.
[6] Juan Pablo Scarfi, 'International Law adn Pan-Americanism in the Americas, 1890-1942' (Unpublished PhD dissertation, Cambridge, 2013), p. 19.

Technical and intellectual Pan-American cooperation also expanded. A Pan-American Aviation Convention, for example, convened in Santiago, Chile in 1916 at which representatives drafted several aerial navigation laws.[7] Though these laws never achieved ratification, they did provide precedents for future discussions on sovereignty over airspace.[8] Several Argentine academics, often with government support, initiated efforts to foster mutual understanding and cooperation. Two conferences in 1916 claimed that goal: the American Congress of Social Sciences in Tucumán and the American Bibliographic and Historical Conference in Buenos Aires. Ultimately, both were academic boondoggles largely aimed at improving their conveners' profile, but they did help to develop inter-American academic networks.[9] Individual efforts included those of Argentina's Ernesto Nelson, who aimed to dispel stereotypes of Latin America by writing articles in US newspapers, and Chile's Álvarez, who lectured extensively in US universities.[10]

Women also became increasingly active in Pan-American cooperation with the First Pan-American Child Congress and the Women's Auxiliary Conference to the Second Pan-American Scientific Congress, both in 1916. Dr Julieta Latieri – one of Argentina's most prominent feminists – organized the Children's Congress, which brought together leading social workers from around the Americas.[11] Many organizers (Latieri in particular) also saw the Congress as a means to advocate civil

[7] Information on the development of aviation in Latin America and on the Pan-American aspects of that development can be found in Wesley Phillips Newton's *Perilous Sky: U.S. Aviation Diplomacy and Latin America, 1919-31* (Coral Gables, 1978).
[8] Ibid., p. 17.
[9] Carmen Perilli argues that the Social Sciences Congress was part of the tucumeño elite's attempts to demonstrate their province's modern cosmopolitanism. See Perilli, 'La patria entre naranjos y cañaverales. Tucumán y el primer centenario' *Revista Pilquen* 12 (2010).
[10] Alejandro Álvarez, *International Law and Related Subjects from the Point of View of the American Continent* (Washington, 1922).
[11] For a description of the Congress and its results, see the *BPAU* from 1916, pp. 562-66, and Donna Guy, 'The Pan American Child Congresses, 1916 to 1942: Pan Americanism, Child Reform, and the Welfare State in Latin America' *Journal of Family History* 23:3 (1998).

rights for women. The emphasis on children and wider welfare issues was part of a strategy employed by many Latin American female activists to advance the place of women in society while avoiding controversy over political rights (a strategy Maxine Molyneux has termed 'civic maternalism').[12] The Women's Auxiliary Conference also addressed children's welfare and equally skirted the question of political rights. These two conferences demonstrated both the potential for social advocacy through Pan-American cooperation and the divide that often existed between US and Latin American female activists. Latieri criticised the composition of the Women's Auxiliary Conference Committee (all wives of elite politicians and diplomats) and refused to attend the Auxiliary Conference because no Committee member had endorsed the Child Congress.[13] Despite the divisions, the resolutions passed at such congresses occasionally yielded significant results; Donna Guy has shown, for example, that the Child Congress helped usher in Argentina's first child rights law (the Agote Law of 1919).[14]

In rhetoric, the Chilean government was enthusiastically Pan-American. At a reception of the American Luncheon Club in London, Chile's Minister Agustín Edwards announced that the US and the ABC powers were in the 'vanguard of Pan-Americanism.' He defined Pan-Americanism as the application of democratic principles to American international relations.[15] The Argentine government also employed the rhetoric of inter-American cooperation and continental solidarity. As host of a conference of the IHC in 1916, de la Plaza's administration lent its support to

[12] Molyneux, 'Twentieth-Century State Formations in Latin America' in E Dore and M Molyneux (eds), *Hidden Histories of Gender and the State in Latin America* (Durham, NC, 2000).
[13] Donna Guy, *White Slavery and Mothers Alive and Dead: The Troubled Meaning of Sex, Gender, and Public Health in the Americas* (Lincoln, NE, 2000), pp. 56-57.
[14] Guy, 'Pan American Child Congresses', p. 277.
[15] 'El panamericanismo: discurso pronunciado por el Ministro de Chile en Gran Bretaña en el American Luncheon Club' *El Mercurio*, 8 August 1916, p. 3.

practical Pan-Americanism and agreed to proposals that gave the US primacy in inter-American commerce.[16] Many of the resolutions were merely recommendations for further discussion (on, for example, the creation of a hemispheric gold fund) and most never achieved implementation. A few, however, had immediate impact. Recognizing US leadership in hemispheric trade, the Conference gave the IHC a permanent home in Washington and an executive council of three members (all from the US). The Argentine and Chilean governments, hoping to help their country's struggling economies, acquiesced. Other initiatives demonstrated the diverse usage of Pan-American terminology, often to gain a sense of legitimacy or prestige. A Pan-American sharp-shooter competition and a Pan American Golf Cup were held in Buenos Aires. US Ambassador to Argentina Frederick Stimson observed late in 1917 the proliferation of 'Pan-American diplomatic dinners' where political topics were carefully avoided.[17]

Yet Chilean and Argentine attitudes towards Pan-Americanism were not entirely positive. Indeed, many saw in 'new Pan-Americanism' nothing more than empty ideals, while others accused Pan-Americanism of hiding more insidious imperialist motives.[18] Few shared the zeal of PAU Director John Barrett. In fact, the Secretary of the Chilean Embassy in Washington wrote to the Cancillería:

> La Oficina de la Panamerican Union reviste una importancia meramente convencional y un carácter casi simplemente decorativo; y en cuanto a Barrett, muy por el contrario de lo que parece creerse en los países de Sud-América, inclusive Chile, no tiene aquí en realidad más importancia y situación personal que la que le da el constante movimiento en que vive y el incesante ruido que el mismo hace alrededor de su persona, en la prensa y en sus diarias piezas oratorias a través del país. Nadie toma aquí verdaderamente en serio a Barrett…[19]

[16] Sheinin, *Searching*, pp. 67-68.
[17] Stimson to Lansing, 2 November 1917, NARA RG59 M514 Roll 10.
[18] Pike highlighted many examples of anti-US sentiments in *Chile and the US*, pp. 144-69.
[19] Dario Ovalle to Cancillería, 19 March 1915, AMRREE Histórico 493.

Despite doubts about practicality and worries about US imperialism, the Chilean government and Chilean civil society actors continued to participate in Pan-American cooperation. Economic considerations played a role; with European markets limited by the War, Chile became reliant on the US for trade. The percentage of total exports going to the US increased from 21.3 in 1913 to 56.8 in 1918.[20] While the nitrate industry suffered due to limited access to German markets, the copper industry rose in importance. Copper exports to the US grew substantially, from 34 million pounds of pig copper in 1915 to 138 million in 1917.[21] Even if Chile's government opposed some forms of first-dimension Pan-Americanism, particularly Wilson's Pan-American Pact, it saw clear benefits to commercial Pan-American cooperation.

Doubts in Argentina were more prevalent and had a greater policy impact. Official scepticism towards Pan-American projects contrasted with inter-American rhetoric; the de la Plaza administration stalled when it came to implementing Pan-American resolutions, including those from the 1916 IHC conference. Later that year, the first presidential election after major political reform in 1912 (which introduced universal male suffrage) brought to power Hipólito Yrigoyen and the Unión Cívica Radical (UCR, also known as the Radicals). Yrigoyen and the Radicals were openly critical of regional cooperation that implied inequality among states; thus, they shelved the ABC treaty with arguments against ABC superiority in Latin America. In the wider intellectual context, writers such as Manuel Ugarte and José Ingenieros attacked US influence in Latin America and called for the revival of anti-imperialist Latin-Americanism. Ugarte established an Asociación Latinoamericana in 1914, which

[20] Bulmer-Thomas, *Economic History*, p. 156.
[21] 'U.S. Trade Doubled With Latin America' *New York Times*, 18 September 1917. The figures were compiled by the National City Bank.

opposed Pan-Americanism.[22] Historians, such as Alén Lascano, have taken Radical rhetoric and the wider context as proof of Argentina's rejection of Pan-Americanism and entrenched rivalry with the US.[23] Anti-Americanism, however, was limited to a radical minority in the late 1910s.[24] Although Yrigoyen's government hoped to compete for leadership in Latin America, it was prepared to do so on the US's terms and use second-dimension Pan-American initiatives to position Argentina as a leader in Latin American development. As in Chile, economics encouraged support for Pan-American cooperation. Although the US was less important to Argentina in terms of trade (the US received 29.3 percent of Argentina's total exports in 1918), it was an important market for Argentine quebracho and wool.[25] US producers helped satisfy an urgent demand for coal and gained a near monopoly on certain Argentine imports (automobiles and agricultural machinery, for example).[26]

When the US declared war against Germany in 1917, Washington called for American solidarity behind the Allied war effort. While Chile and Argentina had passively supported the Allies economically since late 1914 (by not challenging the blockade of the Central Powers), both were among the most ardent defenders of political neutrality. Yrigoyen saw in these circumstances an opportunity to advance Argentina's leadership in Latin America by convening a conference of neutrals. Argentina did not want to alienate the US; in fact, the Ministerio instructed its Ambassador in Washington to seek US support for the conference.[27] Unsurprisingly,

[22] Congress, recognizing the importance of Ugarte's ideas and the Asociación's popularity, invited Ugarte to address the Chamber of Deputies in 1914. Documents relating to the Asociación can be found in AGNA VII fol. 2246.
[23] Lascano, *Yrigoyen,* pp. 33-34. See also Morgenfeld, *Vecinos*, p. 177.
[24] Sheinin, 'Flaccid Anti-Americanism', p. 26-30.
[25] Bulmer-Thomas, *Economic History*, p. 156.
[26] Sheinin, *Searching*, p. 73
[27] As Sheinin notes, this move demonstrated the mistaken belief that Argentina and the US were equal partners in influencing inter-American affairs. Ibid., pp. 71-72.

the State Department repudiated Argentina's request and pressured Latin American governments to reject the suggestion. Frustrated, Yrigoyen revived the idea of a Latin American conference on the war later in the year; this occasion was more obviously an attempt to increase Argentine regional influence at the expense of the US. Yrigoyen issued the invitation with reference to 'americanismo', invoking nineteenth-century Latin American cooperation. The invitation revealed lingering resentment over Washington's earlier rebuff and the increased influence of Diego Luis Molinari, a young lawyer appointed as Sub-Secretary of the Ministerio in 1917. Molinari had briefly studied at the University of Illinois and returned, according to Stimson, 'with a strong dislike for the United States' and was throughout the 1920s a leading opponent of US influence in Latin America.[28] Fifteen Latin American governments accepted the invitation, though US effort eventually caused all but two (Mexico and Colombia) to reconsider. Fearing scant attendance and pre-occupied with pressing domestic questions (including escalating labour militancy), the Argentine government cancelled the conference. The attempted conference was not forgotten, however. A Ministerio circular from 1921 listed the conference as the final 'congreso americano', a category that included the traditional Pan-American conferences from Panama in 1826 to the Congress of Montevideo in 1888-89 but none of the modern Pan-American meetings.[29] Argentina's government hoped to rewrite the history of this failure as evidence for Argentine leadership in improving 'la situación y figura de [los países de América] en el concierto general de las Naciones.'[30]

[28] Stimson to Secretary of State, 31 December 1917, NARA RG59 M514 Roll 11.
[29] Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores y Culto, 'Circular Mensual', April 1921, NARA RG59 M514 Roll 11, pp. 215-44.
[30] Ibid., p. 241.

*Post-War Pan-Americanism (1918-22)*

As the First World War ended, Argentine and Chilean policymakers sought to influence the post-war order. Though unrepresented at the Paris Peace Conference (as neither had been belligerents), Argentina and Chile became members of the League of Nations in 1920. Argentina had qualms about the League, however. Yrigoyen's government balked at the League Covenant's reference to the Monroe Doctrine as a regional agreement, arguing that the Doctrine was a unilateral policy and contrary to internationalism at large. In a nod to Argentina's traditional defence of the equality of independent states, the Argentine representative in 1920 proposed amending the Covenant to allow all sovereign nations access to League membership, a move that simultaneously implied inviting Germany and threatened the position of dependencies or dominions within the League. Argentina also proposed to make the League's Council elected by the Assembly. When the Allied Powers rebuffed these proposals, Argentina withdrew her representative. Although Buenos Aires continued to pay its League membership dues in the 1920s, it did not participate in Assemblies until the 1930s.

Chile also harboured concerns over the League. The Cancillería worried that the League, like the pre-1906 Pan-American Conferences, would become a platform for Peru and Bolivia to air their territorial disputes with Chile. Santiago correctly predicted that Peru would raise the issue in both the Paris Peace Conference and the League assembly. Chile's representative to the League, Agustín Edwards, countered Peru's attempt and effectively removed the question from League discussions. When

Arturo Alessandri assumed the presidency of Chile in 1920, he declared his intention to resolve the Tacna-Arica issue through direct negotiation. With Tacna-Arica off the table, Chile heightened its presence in Geneva and the League elected Edwards as president of the Third Assembly (1922). That same year Chile and Peru agreed to negotiate the Tacna-Arica matter in Washington. Eventually, they decided to adhere to the 1884 treaty and hold a plebiscite in the two territories, submitting the entire project to the arbitration of the US President.

Tacna-Arica had wider policy implications. After the War, Chilean politicians, intellectuals and journalists launched a concerted effort to convince the Allied Powers that Chile's neutrality had been both justified and favourable to the eventual victors. Peru and Bolivia had severed relations with the Central Powers, an act interpreted in Santiago as a ploy to gain the Allied Powers' support of their positions against Chile. Some who had written scathing comments about US imperialism earlier in the decade shifted towards praise of Wilson and his programme of peace, and Chile's government sanctioned an official propaganda mission to the US led by journalist Félix Nieto del Río.[31] Instructions for the mission left no doubt that the primary aim was to avoid intervention in the Tacna-Arica dispute.[32] The instructions also emphasized the potential for commercial and political cooperation between Chile and the Allies. Pan-Americanism, the instructions claimed, had evolved from a system of tutelage into one of respect for international law and reciprocal cooperation that sustained the spirit of democracy.[33] Chile, moreover, was a Pan-American leader. The Chilean

[31] See Pike, *Chile and the US*, pp. 157-59.
[32] The instructions can be found in ANH EBC fol 24.
[33] 'Instrucciones para la MISION ESPECIAL constituida por Decreto de 27 de Febrero de 1919 (a Eliodro Yáñez)', ANH EBC 24, p. 16.

government recognized the US's increased importance and perceived a decline of Great Britain in the post-war international order.

Argentina also sought to improve relations with the US, though in a less overt manner. In 1919, the Argentine Ambassador to the US (Rómulo Naón) published an article on Pan-Americanism that lamented the neutrality of some American states in the War (an interesting critique of his government's former policy), celebrated cooperation based on equality of states, and rejoiced in the persistence of the Pan-American 'spirit'.[34] When Naón returned to Argentina later that year, his replacement (Tomás Le Breton, an experienced diplomat, an influential member of the Radical party, and an expert in patent and trademark protection) received a warm reception by Washington. His optimistic response led the Argentine press to interpret the occasion as a sign of both countries' commitment to better relations.[35]

Economics also encouraged closer relations with the US. Sluggish European post-war recovery caused continued uncertainty in Chile and Argentina. In this context, opportunities opened for greater inter-American trade and US investment. Not coincidentally, an American-Chilean Chamber of Commerce and an Argentine-American Chamber of Commerce were established in 1918 and 1919, respectively. The Chilean economy's shift towards the US was more significant and permanent than that of Argentina. The US had, by 1918, become the largest consumer of Chilean nitrates and one of the major investors in the copper industry.[36] Chile's need for capital and technological innovation, particularly to compete with synthetic nitrates

[34] Naón, 'European War and Pan-Americanism' *The Columbia University Quarterly* 21:2 (1919), reprinted that same year as a pamphlet by the American Association for International Conciliation.
[35] US Ambassador Stimson to the State Department on 7 March 1919, NARA RG59 M515 Reel 1.
[36] Se Monteón, *Chile*, pp. 109 and Cariola and Sunkel, *Un siglo*, pp. 134-35.

developed during the war, led the Chilean government to promote partnerships with the US. Robert Seidel, in his work on commercial Pan-Americanism, highlighted one extreme example of this policy: a proposal in 1921, made by Chile's embassy in Washington, to amalgamate Chilean nitrate companies under the control of a US company.[37] This proposal (never enacted) demonstrated the Chilean government's willingness to give the US greater influence. The exigencies of the War and post-War periods also led to significant gains in US-Argentine economic relations. US capital became crucial (especially for the industrial sector) as British investment retracted and exports to the US grew in relative importance from four percent of total exports in 1913, to almost thirty by 1919.[38] The gradual recovery of European markets and protectionist measures enacted by the US, including a 1922 tariff law that placed duties on many Argentine products, caused a decline in the mid-1920s. Yet the uncertainty of the preceding five years strengthened the belief among Argentine policymakers in the need for economic cooperation with the US.

The US government sought to consolidate economic influence through Pan-American cooperation, seen most obviously in the Pan American Commercial Conference of 1919 and the Pan American Financial Conference of 1920. Chile and Argentina eagerly participated, hoping to address issues particular to their country's economic crisis. At the Financial Conference, the US preferred to focus on more general questions of communications and normalizing financial practice based on US interests.[39] Although disappointed by the lack of immediately applicable results, the Argentine and Chilean governments praised the Conference's work. The Argentine

[37] Seidel, 'Progressive Pan-Americanism', p. 327.
[38] Bulmer-Thomas, *Economic History*, p. 156. See also Cortés Conde, *La economía política de la Argentina en el siglo XX* (Buenos Aires, 2005), pp. 53-85.
[39] Cisneros and Escudé, *Historia general*, viii, 116-17, and Sheinin, *Searching*, p. 106-08.

Finance Minister declared them notable 'por la sólida amistad internacional que se había logrado establecer.'[40] With Europe still reeling, Latin American governments had few options besides following the US lead. Cooperation eventually yielded benefits; with the help of the US government, Chile secured a $6 million loan and Argentina a $27 million loan from US bank consortia in 1921.

A shift took place in 1920 in the PAU; the Director John Barrett, champion of Pan-American commerce, retired and was replaced by Leo S Rowe, a prominent social scientist and expert on Latin American affairs who had long been involved in Pan-American legal and scientific initiatives.[41] Rowe's appointment was particularly significant for Argentina and Chile. He had studied their politics and economies, had visited them on several occasions, and had developed contacts with Argentine and Chilean intellectuals and politicians. The intelligentsias of both countries were familiar with Rowe's ideas about inter-American intellectual cooperation and the need for the ABC Powers and the US to act as 'co-civilizers' in the Americas.[42] Upon receiving the news of Rowe's nomination, *El Mercurio* applauded the appointment and noted that 'el espíritu distinguido y cultísimo de Mr. Rowe se ha intersado especialmente por Chile y acaso no hay otro país del continente donde tenga mayor número de amigos y de entusiastas admiradores.'[43] Rowe's contacts in Argentina

[40] 'Declaración del Ministro de Hacienda de la Argentina' *El Mercurio,* 26 Jan 1920, p. 11.
[41] Rowe was not the only candidate to replace Barrett; in fact, Venezuela's Fernando Yánes, Secretary of the Bureau and PAU and the director of its Education Section, was also considered. Yánes preferred to focus on education and Rowe became the heir-apparent in late 1919. Yánes's candidacy, although unlikely to succeed, is interesting and was probably a way to demonstrate the nominal equality of Latin America within the PAU.
[42] More information about his visits to Argentina and the influence of his ideas can be found in Ricardo Salvatore, 'The Making of a Hemispheric Intellectual: Leo S Rowe in Argentina (1906-1919)' *Journal of Transnational American Studies* 2:1 (2010). Inspired by Salvatore's work, Miguel Muñoz Asenjo produced a similar work about Rowe's visits to Chile ('Las visitas de Leo Stanton Rowe a Chile y sus ideas en torno a la cooperación intelectual entre Sudamérica y Estados Unidos' *Latin American Journal of International Affairs* 3:1 (2011)).
[43] 'El nuevo director de la Oficina de las Repúblicas Americanas' *El Mercurio,* 9 May 1920, p. 3.

equalled (if not surpassed) those in Chile, yet his nomination was not as enthusiastically hailed in Argentine newspapers. Rowe's appointment likely made the PAU and Pan-Americanism more palatable to Chilean and Argentine intellectuals and policymakers. More importantly, Rowe's appointment signalled the rising importance of intellectual cooperation within Pan-Americanism. As Ricardo Salvatore convincingly argues, Rowe's push for intellectual cooperation in the 1910s was a method of constructing US hegemony in Latin America with the help of local elites.[44] Rowe's approach to the PAU, which he viewed as a channel through which US ideas of modernization could be spread throughout the hemisphere, was similar.[45]

The PAU became a locus of transnational activity, hosting meetings of both Pan-American dimensions. The American Federation of Arts, for example, held a meeting at the PAU building in April 1922 'for the purpose of fostering cultural relations between the countries of America.'[46] The Pan-American institutional structure also developed. Member states agreed to increase the budget of the Pan American Sanitary Bureau, allowing it to expand. The Governing Body of the PAU established permanent committees on the development of economic and commercial relations (Chile was a member of this committee), the international organization of labour in the Americas, hygiene, and intellectual cooperation (Argentina's representative sat on this Committee). The Education Section advocated Latin American students' study in US universities with the aim of sending the students back to Latin America as agents of reform and of US business. Study in the US advanced as a suitable option for the

[44] Salvatore, 'The Making'.
[45] See David Barton Castle, 'Leo Stanton Rowe and the Meaning of Pan Americanism' in Sheinin, *Beyond the Ideal*, pp. 33-44. Rowe was not unique as an intellectual who attempted to shape inter-American affairs. See Mark Berger, *Under Northern Eyes: Latin American Studies and US Hegemony in the Americas, 1898-1990* (Bloomington, 1995).
[46] 'Minutes of the Pan American Union Meeting, 6 April 1922' LOC Charles Evans Hughes Papers [CEHP] fol. 40.

Latin American elite and upper middle class and over seven thousand Latin American students enrolled in US universities by 1921.[47] There was, however, a hiatus of Pan American activity at the PAU building when it hosted the Washington Disarmament Conference in 1921-22. Although the Latin American representatives in Washington voted unanimously to allow the use of the PAU Building and several representatives praised the Conferences' objectives, no Latin American nation was invited to participate. This marginalization caused resentment among many of the PAU members. John Barrett, who continued to work with the PAU in his retirement, reported that unnamed Latin American representatives sarcastically suggested renaming the PAU Building the 'Pan Asian' Union building, given Japan and China's prominent role in the discussions.[48]

Outside the PAU, non-governmental actors also invoked Pan-Americanism. Architects in Montevideo, influenced by the diffusion of information through the PAU *Bulletin*, convened a Pan American Congress of Architects in 1920.[49] With the support of the Uruguayan government, the Congress brought together leading architects to discuss aesthetics, technical innovation, and construction of affordable housing, comparing national projects and debating how best to use government funding. Two years later, the National League of Women Voters in the US hosted a Pan-American Conference of Women in Baltimore. Many of the most prominent female activists in the hemisphere, including Chile's Graciela Mandujano and

[47] The number of students comes from a report by Rowe in *Advocate of Peace through Justice* 83:4, p. 145. For more on Latin American students in the US, see Salvatore, 'The Making'.
[48] Barrett, 'All the Americas to Meet', 1 January 1922, LOC JBP fol. 95.
[49] Ramon Gutiérrez, et al. *Congresos panamericanos de arquitectos, 1920-2000: aportes para su historia* (Buenos Aires, 2007), p. 9.

Argentina's Alicia Moreau, attended.[50] Although the Conference's aim was the advancement of women (resulting in the short-lived Pan-American Association for the Advancement of Women), it claimed a wider purpose of strengthening inter-American relations. The PAU lent its moral support and Rowe used the Conference as an example of 'the larger significance of the Pan American movement.'[51] Chilean and Argentine observers were optimistic about the work of women in resolving common social issues such as child labour and public health; to the dismay of Latin American delegations, the US delegation's adamant focus on suffrage hindered discussion of such topics. While these conferences were opportunities to build networks of experts and activists and exchange information, their practical results were limited. In the Pan American Conference of Women, the rhetoric of concord whitewashed significant divisions between US and Latin American feminists that inhibited real cooperation.[52] The Argentine and Chilean governments authorized official representatives but paid little attention to the proceedings.

*Santiago de Chile, 1923*

By 1921, attention turned towards the long delayed Fifth International Conference of American States. The Chilean Cancillería sought to include various topics in the programme, particularly the limitation of armaments. The programme established in 1913 (before the delay) was discarded for the lack of 'significance commensurate with the importance of the Pan American Conferences', and a new programme was gradually formulated incorporating questions of public health, education,

[50] For more information on the Conference, see M Threlkeld, 'The Pan American Conference of Women, 1922: Successful Suffragists Turn to International Relations' *Diplomatic History* 31:5 (2007).
[51] 'Address given by Leo S Rowe to delegates of the Pan-American Conference of Women' (1922), CML LSR fol. 12.
[52] Threlkeld, 'The Pan American Conference', p. 827-28.

communications, agriculture, and anti-alcohol measures.[53] Yrigoyen's government, concerned about declining beef exports, pressed for the inclusion of agricultural cooperation (especially the fight against diseases in cattle) and the adoption of Resolution XVII of the Second Pan American Financial Congress against prohibitive duties. Both Santiago and Buenos Aires approved the programme; the President of Chile's delegation, Agustín Edwards, highlighted the social issues as particularly important for Chile.

Disarmament was the most controversial question of the programme. The Argentine-Brazilian rivalry had flared in the late 1910s when Brazil broke relations with Germany in 1917, a move interpreted in Buenos Aires as a Brazilian attempt to curry favour with the US and gain influence in Latin America. The Radical government's opposition to the ABC Treaty in 1916-17 also cooled relations between the two countries. Late in 1922, Brazil's Foreign Ministry (or Itamaraty, the name used in general diplomatic parlance) proposed to revive ABC cooperation through a conference on armaments in Valparaíso before the Santiago Conference. Itamaraty, according to official conversations, hoped to unify opinions and share technical preparation, though many Argentine diplomats (such as the Minister to Uruguay) saw in the proposal nothing more than a Brazilian attempt to project dominance in Latin America.[54] Alessandri's government, motivated by Chile's traditional good relations with Brazil and by hopes of demonstrating Chilean leadership in the hemisphere, accepted the invitation and agreed to host the meeting.[55]

[53] PAU, 'Memorandum on the Program of the Fifth Pan American Conference', without date, LOC CEHP fol. 40.
[54] Marmól to Ministerio, 12 December 1922, AMRECIC Series 25 Box 22:IV.
[55] Alessandri and his ministers were also likely motivated by the concern over a bilateral agreement between Argentina and Brazil that would diminish Chile's importance in continental politics. Or so

Argentina, with the more moderate Radical Marcelo T. de Alvear as president and Le Breton as interim Foreign Minister, was unconvinced. Appealing to the ideal of 'solidaridad continental', the equality of states, and lack of time to prepare, the Argentine Ministerio suggested waiting until the Santiago Conference to discuss armaments.[56] Buenos Aires also feared that a Chilean-Brazilian alliance might restrict Argentina's ability to maintain naval parity (or something close to it) with Brazil. Argentina's rejection won the praise of various non-ABC governments, who objected to their marginalization. Itamaraty's resulting consternation subsided at least superficially with the convenient (and coincidental) visit of the new Argentine Foreign Minister, Ángel Gallardo, to Rio de Janeiro. At a reception in Itamaraty, Gallardo received a fulsome tribute from Brazil's Foreign Minister and responded by observing that, from a European perspective, the Americas 'se presenta como un conjunto armónico y se desarrollaba un sentimiento de patriotismo continental.'[57] Gallardo, speaking extemporaneously, accepted the rhetoric of American solidarity and separated the Americas (Argentina along with it) from Europe. Argentine rhetoric, then, had come to resemble the Chilean rhetoric of the 1910s. When Gallardo arrived in Buenos Aires, he made the Santiago Conference the top priority of the Ministerio.

Statements of the two countries' presidents – Alvear's address to the Argentine Senate, requesting the approval of Argentina's delegation, and Alessandri's inaugural speech

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Alessandri told Argentina's Ambassador in Santiago later in 1923 (Malbrán to Gallardo, 26 September 1923, AMRECIC Series 25 Box 25:'Tema XII').

[56] Le Breton to Pedro de Toledo, 4 December 1922, AMRECIC Series 25 Box 22:IV.

[57] Gallardo, *Memorias para mis hijos y nietos* (Buenos Aires, 1982), p. 331. At the time of his speech, he was not well informed on the ABC controversy. Of his comments, then, Gallardo noted: 'con la inconciencia de un sonámbulo había pasado yo por un gran peligro.'

at the Santiago Conference – demonstrated congruity in Argentine and Chilean Pan-American rhetoric.[58] Both portrayed Pan-American history as a positive and progressive narrative. Argentine and Chilean participation had a central role in the survival and development of Pan-American cooperation. Alvear claimed that 'en todo momento la República prestó su concurso entusiasta' while Alessandri noted that his country '[había] respondido siempre con hechos positivos a los ideales de paz y confraternidad americana' even during the 1889-90 Washington Conference.[59] The two Presidents agreed about the potential of the 1923 Conference. In his opening lines, Alessandri noted that the American states had assembled 'para luchar por su progreso y por el bienestar de la Humanidad', thus unknowingly echoing Alvear's closing line in the Senate, 'para bien de la America y de la humanidad.' In both messages, internationalism and Pan-Americanism's practicality were central. For Alessandri and Alvear, the PAU was practical only if it was apolitical (that is, only if it avoided geopolitical controversies and focused instead on technical cooperation). Thus, both Argentina and Chile opposed a Uruguayan plan to establish a League of American Nations, based on the ideas of former Uruguayan president Baltasar Brum. Although Brum believed his idea would strengthen peace in the Americas, the Argentine and Chilean governments interpreted it as an entangling alliance and a potential channel for greater US intervention in Latin American affairs.

Yet Argentine and Chilean official attitudes were not completely parallel. Policymakers in the two countries continued to disagree on the question of the 'derecho internacional americano'. In Chile, Álvarez (still a major advocate of the

[58] A copy of Alvear's message (from 31 January 1923) can be found in AMRECIC Series 25 Box 22:VI. For Alessandri's speech, see Alessandri, *Discurso de S.E. el Presidente*.
[59] 'Mensaje del Presidente al Senado', AMRECIC Series 25 Box 22:VI and Alessandri, *Discurso*, p. 21-22.

unique American system of international law) held sway within the Cancillería. Jurists in Argentina's Ministerio, such as Daniel Antokoletz, polemically wrote against the concept and upheld the universality of international law. For this reason, Chile remained an active and stalwart presence in the AIIL while Argentina maintained its distance. Another difference between the two countries was their commitment to the agreements made at Pan-American Conferences. Chile had a slightly better record of ratifying Pan-American conventions: five compared to only two by Argentina (though the four conventions signed in Buenos Aires gained Senate approval by 1922).[60] Nonetheless, the governments in Santiago and Buenos Aires demonstrated a similar desire to promote Pan-American cooperation.

The Chilean government sought to demonstrate their country's leadership through Pan-American cooperation in the Santiago conference, which Alessandri believed fit within 'las tradiciones establecidas invariablemente por los Gobiernos anteriores.'[61] The Cancillería had a clear hierarchy of states when organizing the conference. While Santiago pressured Álvaro Obregón's government in Mexico to change its decision to abstain (due to the US's continued reluctance to recognize Obregón), it was less concerned when Peru and Bolivia rejected the invitation over their continuing border disputes with Chile.[62] Peru and Bolivia's absence assured that contentious issues with those nations would not blight the harmonious atmosphere. Argentina's Ministerio chose a distinguished delegation and sent with them several military advisors to help

[60] Chile's rate of ratification, while better than Argentina's, was not actually that impressive. A total of seventeen conventions had been signed at the Second, Third and Fourth International Conferences of American States, placing Chile well behind countries such as Brazil, Costa Rica, Cuba, and Ecuador. Unsurprisingly, the countries with the highest amount of ratifications were those within the US' sphere of influence in the circum-Caribbean, with the exception of Brazil (which had traditionally been close to the US).
[61] Cancillería to Agustín Edwards, 17 April 1923 (No 74), AMRREE Histórico 981d.
[62] Obregón's government did not send a delegation to the Conference.

with armament discussions. The US sought to continue its success in Pan-American financial and commercial discussions. Given the complicity of Chile and Argentina in the proceedings of the Pan-American Financial Conference of 1920, cooperation among the three countries was likely. Yet Chile's determination to reach a disarmament agreement and Uruguay's proposal for a League of American Nations meant that controversy was likely.

Historians have highlighted the discord at the Santiago conference, interpreting the event as an opportunity for Latin American governments to oppose US intervention. These interpretations were informed by post-Conference assessments, particularly in the press throughout Latin America, that focused on disarmament and League of American Nations debates; however, such discussions constituted only a small portion of the Conference proceedings. Indeed, cooperation marked most of the sessions. The Conference participants signed four conventions, including a regional commitment to avoid war and reduce preparations for hostilities, proposed by Paraguay's Manuel Gondra, and passed over seventy resolutions.[63] The assembled delegations established an Inter-American Commission on Commercial Aviation, agreed to discuss women's issues at subsequent conferences, called for further study of the codification of international law (a compromise between Chile's arguments for 'derecho internacional americano' and Argentina's vitriolic rejection of it), authorized an investigation into the reform of the PAU, and agreed to allow PAU member states to send as representative any specially appointed person.[64] Many delegations,

[63] For a detailed description of the conference and its accomplishments, see Herman G James, 'Latin America in 1923' *American Political Science Review* 18:3 (1924), pp. 541-45. For a more detailed study of Argentina's participation, see Beatriz Solveira, *La Argentina y la Quinta Conferencia Panamericana* (Córdoba, Argentina, 1993).

[64] Regarding the changes to the PAU's Directive Council: the president of that body had, before 1923, been automatically the US Secretary of State. The second change (relating to the member states'

including those of Chile and Argentina, celebrated the changes to the PAU as a strengthening of democratic principles within Pan-Americanism.

A significant, yet understudied, aspect of the Conference was the discussion of social issues such as labour conditions, health and sanitation in working class neighbourhoods, and affordable housing. Alessandri highlighted these discussions in his opening address, hailing social justice as a prerequisite of internal and international peace. Later, the Chilean delegation proposed a resolution that guaranteed the inclusion of social questions in future conference programmes. Argentina's delegate, Montes de Oca, supported the proposal. In addressing social questions, Montes de Oca saw a wider purpose: demonstrating to the world that in the Americas, 'despojado por completo el trabajo humano del carácter arcaico y cruel de mercancía, aparezca consolidado el bienestar en el Continente de la democracia.'[65] Significantly, he believed that the discussion of social legislation provided an opportunity for Argentine leadership. Other topics addressed included education (Chile and Argentina both offering proposals, the former for a Pan American Pedagogic Congress the latter for industrial training and teacher exchanges) and curbing alcoholism. While Chile felt this last topic was a key issue, Argentina's delegate noted that his country did not have an alcohol problem other than over-consumption within immigrant communities.[66]

Despite the preparations, a disarmament convention was not achieved. Gallardo considered this a major failure and blamed a secret agreement between Chile and

representatives) was made in order to resolve the question of representation for governments not recognized by the US and thus without official diplomatic representation in Washington.

[65] 'Informe presentado por la delegación argentina al Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores acerca de la Quinta Conferencia International Americana' AMRECIC Series 25 Box 23:Anexo to X, p. 29.

[66] Ibid., p. 29.

Brazil. Edwards, in Gallardo's opinion, had betrayed a promise of cooperation made before the Conference and had attempted to torpedo disarmament negotiations in order to revive the ABC treaty.[67] This was, however, a misinterpretation; the Chilean delegation had genuinely hoped for a convention as a means of placing Chile in the forefront of the arms limitation movement globally. Resolution was elusive given Brazil's insistence on an ABC agreement and Argentina's suspicion of her ABC partners. In public, however, both governments lauded the Conference as an ultimate demonstration of inter-American cooperation. Rhetoric and reality were therefore far removed; yet the difference between the denunciations of Pan-Americanism in 1889 and the celebratory rhetoric of 1923 was stark.

Unofficial criticism of the Conference was not as reserved; attacks targeted US intentions and the failure to defend national interests. A good example of such criticism came from Zeballos, the outspoken former foreign minister of Argentina. 'After thirty-four years,' Zeballos told the Institute of Politics in Williamstown, Massachusetts, 'the results of the Pan American Policy are far from being as satisfactory as expected; practically and politically the endeavors of this policy were not successful. Morally and intellectually it has been fruitful.'[68] His opinion of Rowe was positive (Zeballos had become acquainted with Rowe during the latter's visits to Argentina), but he noted that rising anti-American sentiments in Latin America provoked by US interventionism were a major obstacle. Nonetheless, he admitted that Pan-American cooperation was viable and potentially useful.

[67] Gallardo, *Memorias*, pp. 345-46.
[68] Zeballos, 'Address at the Institute of Politics, Williamstown' 21 August 1923, LOC CEHP Reel 43.

Despite criticism of Pan-American politics, 'cultural Pan-Americanism' accelerated. The study of Pan-American questions increased in Latin America; in Argentina, for example, the Universidad de Buenos Aires began a course on Pan-American treaties and legislation in 1919. Following the 1923 Santiago Conference, US President Warren Harding urged John Barrett to form a 'strictly unofficial, altruistic and non-propaganda movement to develop better Pan American understanding.' Barrett thus established the International Pan American Committee (IPAC), which worked in collaboration with prominent Latin American scholars and diplomats to fund thousands of studies in Pan-Americanism in the region.[69] On Columbus Day (in Latin America, el Día de la Raza) in 1923, a Pan American International Women's Committee organized celebrations in twelve countries and the Chilean and Argentine governments participated in events in Santiago and Buenos Aires.[70] Alessandri's government sought to extend the prestige of the 1923 Conference by supporting the Second Pan-American Congress of Architects held in Santiago that year. Thus under government patronage, the continental meeting of architects tackled common problems in the Americas, especially affordable housing.[71]

*Practical Pan-American Cooperation (1923-27)*

Many historians who focus on first-dimension Pan-Americanism observe a decline in hemispheric cooperation in the mid-1920s.[72] Latin American criticism of US policies

[69] Barrett, 'Special Emergency Statement', 6 November 1929, LOC JBP container 95: 'Practical Pan Americanism'.
[70] Alessandri's wife and the wife of the Chilean foreign minister participated in the event in Santiago while the Argentine Foreign Minister, Gallardo, and Montes de Oca took part in Buenos Aires. See Pan American International Women's Committee, *Proceedings and Report of the Columbus Day Conferences held in Twelve American Countries on October 12, 1923* (New York, 1926).
[71] Chile's government emphasised the Congress's importance in a circular (No. 33) sent by the Chilean Cancillería on 26 July 1923 (AMRREE Circulares vol. 15).
[72] For example, Lascano, *Yrigoyen*, pp. 24-39.

in the circum-Caribbean, particularly the occupation of Nicaragua and Haiti, escalated. The US had maintained an occupational force in Nicaragua between 1912 and 1925; withdrawal in 1925 was ephemeral, as a stronger force returned in 1926 in response to Augusto Sandino's revolutionary movement. Moreover, tensions between Bolivia and Paraguay over claims to the Gran Chaco – and its presumed petroleum reserves – heightened. The continued Chilean-Peruvian controversy also led to concerns for conflict as the attempt at a plebiscite (under the supervision of US General Pershing and, after he resigned in frustration, General William Lassiter) failed due to the manoeuvres of both sides to manipulate the results.[73] Anger over the decision of the US-mediated commission to cancel the plebiscite in 1925 led President Alessandri to publicly repudiate Pan-Americanism.[74] Alessandri's rhetorical departure from earlier Chilean endorsements demonstrated the primacy of the Tacna-Arica question in Chilean foreign policy in the 1920s. The promise of new Pan-Americanism, then, seemed debatable while the principles espoused by Pan-Americanists – including peace and international cooperation – were invoked in extra-regional organizations, such as the League of Nations, and agreements, such as the Locarno Treaty of 1925.

Internally, both Chile and Argentina experienced political uncertainty in the mid-1920s. Alessandri had failed to pass effective social legislation due to conservative opposition, leading to heightened fears among reform-minded junior military officers

[73] While both sides did attempt to curry the favour of the US to gain an advantage, historians such as William Sater have attributed the plebiscite's failure more to Chilean obfuscation than to Peruvian unwillingness. See Sater, *Chile and the United States*, pp. 95-98.

[74] Ibid., p. 98. Widespread anger in Chile towards the US over the question was such that the US Ambassador to Chile, William Collier, requested transfer to Europe or Japan after suffering as 'the "shock troops" actively engaged on the firing line' (Collier to Kellogg, 28 June 1926, LOC FKP Roll 20). US Secretary of State Frank Kellogg also distanced himself from the entire question; he wrote to his wife shortly after the plebiscite was cancelled: 'The Lord knows I have worked and been patient almost beyond human limit to bring those people together so I am not going to think about it anymore' (Frank Kellogg to Clara Kellogg, 17 June 1926, LOC FKP Reel 20).

of social upheaval and radical social reorganization. Also frustrated by long-standing grievances (particularly payments in arrears), a cadre of those officers imposed an advisory council on Alessandri that eventually resulted in the president's resignation in September 1924. In the next two years, control of the republic's government shifted from a civilian-military junta to a re-installed Alessandri administration (during which a new constitution was established) to a brief interim presidency and, finally, to the presidency of Emiliano Figueroa Larraín in 1926. Figueroa was heavily influenced by the Minister of War, and subsequently Minister of Interior, General Carlos Ibáñez del Campo. Within eighteen months, political pressure led to Figueroa's resignation, opening the way for Ibáñez to become president following a single-candidate election.

In Argentina, political change was less dramatic. The most important development was a split within the Radical Party that emerged in 1924. While Alvear had gained the presidency with Yrigoyen's approval in 1922, he gradually attempted to lessen Yrigoyen's influence and advocated a more conservative Radicalism. Yrigoyen's attempts to maintain personal control over the Party led to a formal split in the ranks as the more conservative faction denounced Yrigoyen's *personalismo*. Thus formed the Unión Cívica Radical Antipersonalista. Although this change was not comparable to the upheaval in Chile, it did place the nature (and, perhaps, the persistence) of the Radicals' control of the Argentine federal government in question. The prospect of another presidential election in 1928 brought such questions to the fore by 1926. The impact of these transitions on foreign policy will be explored more fully in later chapters; nevertheless, it is important to note here that a growing sense of uncertainty

in first-dimension Pan-Americanism coincided with political uncertainty in Chile and Argentina.

Yet, despite challenges in inter-American relations and internal politics, Pan-American cooperation continued and the Chilean and Argentine governments continued to position their countries as leaders within Pan-Americanism. The inter-American arena remained an important outlet for Latin American internationalism. Latin American participation in the League of Nations was considerable; Chile's Gabriela Mistral became Latin America's representative at the Institute for Intellectual Cooperation. Yet Latin American members of the League of Nations found themselves increasingly marginalized in League discussions (due to the European focus of the League agenda). Pan-American activities initiated and organized by non-governmental actors allowed governments to demonstrate commitment to internationalism by offering monetary, logistical or (most often) moral support.

Pan-American networks of socially conscious technical experts with government support emerged through scientific congresses, women's and child's conferences, and meetings of architects. The Pan American Child Congresses, begun by Argentine welfare experts in 1916, continued through congresses at Montevideo (1919), Rio de Janeiro (1922), Santiago (1924), and Havana (1927). The Fourth Congress was given official backing by the Junta de Gobierno of Chile (after Alessandri resigned), though the fanfare that accompanied the government's reception of the delegates was less impressive than in previous Congresses.[75] At this Congress, the delegations established an Inter-American Institute for the Protection of Children (later renamed

[75] The President of the Congress was also a government official: Ismael Valdés Valdés, president of the Consejo Superior de Beneficencia Pública.

the Inter-American Children's Institute, or IACI) headquartered in Montevideo. Argentina and Chile were among the first countries to join the IACI and Argentina supplied its Council's first president (Gregorio Aráoz). Although Chilean and Argentine governments had little to do with the organization and functioning of the IACI, they supported the initiative and provided space for it to develop. Another Congress of Architects was held in 1927 in Buenos Aires, where the delegates were treated to a lavish reception courtesy of the Argentine government.[76] Chile's representative noted in an article in *El Mercurio* that the meeting had 'importancia enorme desde el punto de vista del bienestar público.'[77]

The Child Congresses originally allowed women to participate in both Pan-Americanism and debates over mothers' rights, but male experts in child health gradually came to dominate the Congresses.[78] Women continued to pursue Pan-American action, however. A Second Pan American Women's Conference convened in 1924 as an auxiliary to the Third Pan American Scientific Congress in Lima.[79] As with the efforts of the 1910s, Latin American women involved in the Congress focused their attention on issues that did not challenge traditional perceptions of femininity: children's and mothers' health, the role of women in social assistance, the domestic sciences, and education. The delegates discussed social questions, such as women in the workforce, and claimed a role in the maintenance of world peace and

[76] Alvear planned to welcome them, offering the Congress the moral support of Argentina, but he was unable to attend at the last minute and Foreign Minister Gallardo took his place (see Gallardo, *Memorias*, p. 427).
[77] Alberto Schade, 'Ecos del III Congreso Panamericano de Buenos Aire: el urbanismo en sus principios con la arquitectura', *El Mercurio*, 1 January 1928.
[78] See Donna Guy, 'The Pan American Child Congresses'.
[79] Like the 1916 Women's Auxiliary Conference, the women attending were mainly the wives of delegates to the Lima Scientific Congress. Chile was not represented at the Women's Conference, as there was no Chilean delegation at the Scientific Congress. See the pamphlet published by the Third Pan American Scientific Congress ('Second Pan-American Conference of Women, Lima, Peru 1924') held at the Columbus Memorial Library.

continental solidarity. The agreed resolutions were occasionally progressive (such as XXII, calling for governments to grant women the exercise of 'the civil rights to which they are entitled'), but more often appealed to a vague maternal responsibility towards national and international wellbeing. While advocating a more public role for women and extolling inter-American cooperation, the delegates produced moderate recommendations that governments could support.

Commitment to Pan-American cooperation, however, was variable. The Chilean government acted on the agreements reached at Santiago – establishing, for example, a national Pan-American Committee and a Federación Nacional de Educación Vial – yet the changing fortunes of the Tacna-Arica controversy also affected Chilean participation in second-dimension Pan-Americanism. When negotiations between Peru and Chile soured in 1924, the Chilean government refused to send representatives to the Third Pan American Scientific Congress in Lima, making Chile the only American republic not represented.[80] Meanwhile, the Argentine government seemed indifferent to the implementation of many Pan-American agreements but continued to participate in Pan-American cooperation. Argentina's participation in the 1924 Conference on Electronic Communications (mainly radio) is a good example. Despite not ratifying a Pan-American agreement on the conference, Argentina sent a delegate based on a belief in 'las ventajas que reportará a [la Argentina] el estar representado.'[81] At the Conference, Argentina joined the US in calling for increased

[80] The Congress itself was relatively small compared to the Congresses that preceded it. While the First Pan-American Scientific Congress had over two thousand participants, the Third had only 309 official delegates (EV Huntington, 'The Pan-American Scientific Congress' *Bulletin of the American Mathematical Society* 31:7 (1925)).

[81] The resolution had been passed by the Fifth International Conference of American States. See Ministro de la Marina to Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, 14 January 1924, and Dirección General de Correos y Telégrafos al Ministerio de Interior, 22 April 1924, both in AMRECIC Series 25 Box 23:XI.

communications and the regulation of radio within the Americas. This was, according to the Argentine delegate, necessary for establishing a Pan-American community.[82]

Pan-American cooperation in areas such as radio communications, aviation, urban planning, and highway construction, encouraged Chilean and Argentine policymakers to highlight the practicality of Pan-Americanism. The first speech given by Chile's Ambassador to the US, Miguel Cruchaga, at a PAU Governing Body meeting in 1926 praised the organization's 'truly practical usefulness.'[83] Even the more tangential meetings were, to some policymakers, potentially useful. Benjamín Cohen, secretary of the Chilean Embassy in Washington, argued for Chile's attendance at a semi-official Pan American Commercial Congress in Atlanta in 1925, even though 'las materias consideradas por el Congreso eran de muy escaso interés directo,' because 'sus sesiones sirvieron para desarrollar una intensa y efectiva propaganda sobretodo en favor del salitre.'[84] In PAU governing body meetings, the Argentine and Chilean representatives (whose attendance was still sporadic) advocated Pan-American solutions of problems relevant to them. Chileans and Argentines also found the 1924 Pan American Sanitary Code (which, incidentally, is still in force today) and the 1927 Inter-American Convention on Commercial Aviation useful developments.[85] Havana, the site of the next major Pan-American Conference, hosted two second-dimension conferences in 1927: the First Pan American Conference on Eugenics and

[82] Ultimately, he did not believe that the Americas were ready for useful cooperation in the area of electronic communication due to disparities in technological development. The only fruitful cooperation, in his opinion, was that between Argentina and the United States. See 'Informe de Faustino E Juarez', 24 November 1924, AMRECIC Series 25 Box 24:XI.
[83] 'Minutes of the Governing Body of the Pan American Union, 5 May 1926', LOC FKP Roll 22.
[84] Cohen to Cancillería, 10 February 1925, AMRREE Histórico 1025.
[85] Pueyrredón, as Ambassador in Washington and Argentina's representative to the PAU, made a strong statement in support of discussing aviation standards in a Pan-American context. In this he refuted the Mexican representative's arguments that each government should legislate on the matter before setting standards. See 'Minutes of the Meeting of the Governing Body' 5 May 1926, LOC FKP roll 22.

Homiculture and the Fifth Pan American Child's Congress.[86] The Departamento Nacional de Higiene of Argentina noted 'el alto interés' that such meetings had for Argentina.[87]

*Crisis in 1928?*

In the traditional Pan-American narrative, the Sixth International Conference of American States (held in Havana, 1928) was a moment when Latin American governments clashed with the US over the question of intervention.[88] According to such accounts, US-Argentine rivalry motivated Argentina's head delegate, Honorio Pueyrredón, to lead a Latin American attack on US imperialism. The Chilean delegation acted as mediator in a desperate attempt to keep Pan-Americanism from unravelling completely.[89] Although Sheinin has convincingly argued against this interpretation, demonstrating considerable cooperation between Argentina and the US in and around the Conference, the old emphasis on rivalry has persisted.[90] Sheinin's argument is more empirically accurate and congruent with the analysis of Argentina's cautious and practical Pan-Americanism before 1928. To understand the Havana Conference, however, analysis should begin in 1927.

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[86] The word 'homiculture' was an invention of Cuban physicians Eusebio Hernández and Domingo Ramos, who proposed the word in 1927 as an expansion on puericulture. Hernández and Ramos used it to denote 'the scientific cultivation of the entire individual'; see Nancy Stepan, "*The Hour of Eugenics": Race, Gender and Nation in Latin America* (Ithaca, 1991), p. 79.

[87] Gregorio Aráoz to José Tamborini (Ministerio del Interior), 12 December 1927, AMRECIC Series 25 Box 26:IV.

[88] Joseph Smith, *The United States and Latin America: A History of American Diplomacy, 1776-2000*, (London, 2005), pp. 88-89.

[89] Pike, *Chile and the US*, pp. 226-27.

[90] Sheinin, 'Argentina and the United States at the Sixth Pan American Conference'. Also see Sheinin, *Argentina and the United States*, pp. 57-59. For a recent revival of the old interpretation, see Morgenfeld, *Vecinos en conflicto*, pp. 189-209.

Like the 1889 Washington Conference, the 1928 Havana Conference followed juridical meetings that set the scene: the meeting of the AIIL in Montevideo in March 1927 and, a month later, the congress of the International Commission of American Jurists at Rio de Janeiro. These meetings were the result of agreements made at the 1923 Santiago Conference calling for the codification of private and public international law. Proposals for private international law, compiled in Lima in 1924, were relatively uncontroversial and widely considered a significant achievement for the Americas.[91] Public international law, however, contained several points of contention. A meeting of the AIIL in Montevideo discussed the proposals, which were largely the work of Alejandro Álvarez. Significantly, they included an affirmation of the equality of states and the rejection of foreign intervention. These principles were to be discussed at the wider Juridical Congress in Rio, leading many Latin American delegates to see the Rio Congress as more than a meeting for codifying international law. It was also an opportunity to discuss important political points ahead of the Havana Conference, making it 'un termómetro de la política internacional de este Continente.'[92]

Pike provided a standard interpretation of these meetings in his 1965 work on US-Chilean relations. The Montevideo and Rio de Janeiro meetings were a triumph for Chile.[93] The Ibáñez regime supported Álvarez and his project of 'derecho

[91] Ernest Lorenzen, 'The Pan-American Code of Private International Law' *Tulane Law Review* 4:4 (1930). Argentine delegate, Saavedra Lamas, did have some reservations over the code's section on nationality due to its ramifications on Argentine immigration policies. See his letter to Ernesto Restelli, 13 December 1927, AMRECIC Series 25 Box 26:IV.
[92] This was a comment of a Mexican delegate, spoken to the Chilean Minister to Colombia, Pedro Prado, during a chance encounter on a northbound ship from Callao. See Prado's letter to Conrado Ríos Gallardo, 20 July 1927, AMRREE CRG Tome I.
[93] Pike, *Chile and the US*, pp. 225-26.

internacional americano', which gained approval in the meetings.[94] Non-intervention was approved unanimously. Thus Chile, after a hiatus due to the Tacna-Arica affair, returned to the forefront of Pan-Americanism. Most significantly, Argentina put aside its long-standing objection to the 'derecho internacional americano' and acquiesced in Chilean leadership. This interpretation, however, is misleading. It was a success for Chile, although Ibáñez's Cancillería (with Conrado Ríos Gallardo at the helm) was not as supportive as it seemed. Ríos Gallardo, a journalist who thought international law did not often fit reality, considered the results a quixotic victory. He worried that Álvarez's proposals were a 'torbellino de proyectos y teorías cocinadas en los Gabinetes del Instituto Americano de Derecho Internacional para satisfacción de las aspiraciones políticas de los Estados Unidos.'[95] Publicly, the Chilean government celebrated the results of the Congress; privately, the Cancillería harboured serious doubts. Such doubts were not limited to this Congress. In fact, Ríos Gallardo questioned Pan-Americanism in general.

The victory was not only Chile's, however. Argentina's Ministerio viewed the results positively as well. Rather than following Chile's lead, the Argentine delegates at both Montevideo and Rio de Janeiro took an assertive stance. The opinion of Carlos Saavedra Lamas, an adviser to the Ministerio and representative in Rio de Janeiro, was one of great satisfaction: an 'acción de una noble solidaridad y difusión y propaganda de nuestros grandes principios jurídicos.'[96] The Commission approved

[94] Pike does note at least one detractor of Álvarez: the Chilean Ambassador to Brazil, Alfredo Irarrázaval. Irarrázaval disagreed with Álvarez's project and personally disliked the jurist (Pike, *Chile and the US*, p. 225). The feeling, apparently, was mutual. When Álvarez arrived in Rio de Janeiro for the meeting, he did not inform Irarrázaval ('cayó, pues, de las nubes', Irarrázaval quipped in a letter to Ríos Gallardo, 4 April 1927, AMRREE CRG Tome I).
[95] Ríos Gallardo to Irarrázaval, 20 May 1927, AMRREE CRG Tome I.
[96] Saavedra Lamas to Ernesto Restelli, 13 December 1927. Historians should be careful using Saavedra Lamas's comments, as he was prone to self-aggrandizement (a personal vice noted by many contemporary observers). Nonetheless, this document was included in the preparations for Havana.

only twelve of the original thirty proposals, aligning the project to Argentina's interests. Argentina's delegates had neither submitted to the US delegation nor openly opposed it. The result, according to Saavedra Lamas, was a triumph of Argentina's position. Most importantly, the results of the Congress marked 'rumbos definitivos en la orientación del panamericanismo,' guaranteeing the gradual juridical evolution of Pan-Americanism. Gradualism would hinder attempts to impose hegemony through a permanent legal regime or entangling political organizations (including a League of American Nations). At the heart of Argentina's position was the desire to maintain influence in South America. Saavedra Lamas believed that was possible through 'la irradiación de nuestra cultura y progreso' and 'el dominion eficiente aunque menos ostentativo del derecho internacional privado.' Argentina, then, was in control. The Ministerio used Saavedra Lamas's report in the preparations for the Havana Conference, setting the tone for Argentina's policies.

The Rio de Janeiro Congress guaranteed a discussion on the question of intervention at the Havana Conference. The US State Department expected considerable criticism from Latin American delegations over Nicaragua. President Calvin Coolidge planned to personally address the Conference in order to assuage Latin American resentment; the US Senate, however, feared that his appearance would cause more embarrassment if the Nicaraguan question was broached.[97] Intervention was not the only controversial topic on the agenda. The re-organization of the PAU also raised a potential challenge to the US. Although Kellogg doubted the likelihood of another attempt at a Pan-American League of Nations, he worried that Latin American

[97] Kellogg to Olds, 16 January 1928, LOC FKP Reel 30.

delegates would attempt to make the PAU a platform for criticising US policy.[98] Mexico insisted on discussing the composition of the PAU's governing body, proposing that the chairman of the body should be a rotating position instead of an elected one; in this, Mexico found little support from Argentina and Chile. Neither government wanted to open the chairmanship to Latin American rivals who might introduce controversies to the PAU.

Another Mexican proposal found sympathy in Chile and indifference in Argentina: Canada's inclusion in the PAU. As mentioned in Chapter One, Canada's membership was proposed in the 1900s and gained important supporters including Barrett and Root. Chile had been an early advocate of Canada's inclusion, even suggesting that it be debated at the 1923 Conference in Santiago. The Chilean position was probably meant to consolidate Chilean leadership within Pan-Americanism; with Canada as a full member, the ABC nations would have a potential ally in counterbalancing US influence. Although US opposition shelved the issue, the question lingered into the 1920s. In fact, a resolution passed unanimously at the semi-official Pan-American Commercial Conference of 1925 (to which Canada sent a representative) resolving 'that the proper Agencies be urged to invite the Dominion of Canada into full membership in the Pan American Union to the end that Pan America may include really ALL America.'[99] Mexico took up the issue in 1926, bringing the question before the PAU's governing body. This proposal, unsurprisingly, came at a moment of heightened tension between the US and Mexico and of increased Latin American

[98] Kellogg, 'Office of the Secretary', January 1928, LOC FKP Reel 30. Although without a date and an address, this is likely a note to Charles Evans Hughes given the tone and the instructions included.
[99] Cohen to Cancillería, 10 February 1925, AMRREE Histórico 1025.

criticism of US intervention.[100] Some Chilean policymakers agreed with Mexico's proposal; Álvarez, who acted as delegate to the Havana Conference, believed it was an appropriate moment to invite Canada.[101] Others, such as Ríos Gallardo and Ibáñez, appeared indifferent. Like these Chileans, most Argentine policymakers were not enthusiastic. Although not opposed to the idea, Argentine representatives did not actively participate in the debates. Argentina's embassy registered the possibility of Canadian membership, though offered no opinion of the matter. The reasons for Argentine indifference are unclear, though it is possible that Argentine policymakers viewed Canada as another potential competitor for influence in Latin America. In the end, US concerns and Latin American divisions kept the Canadian question off the programme.

In preparing the Conference's programme, Chile's contribution was minimal and Argentina's considerable. In Chile, Ríos Gallardo seriously considered absenting the republic from the Conference. Writing to the Chilean Ambassador in Washington (Carlos Dávila), the Chilean Foreign Minister admitted that since the Rio de Janeiro Juridical Congress, where the question of obligatory arbitration was mentioned, he had maintained 'un sacro horror a todos debates jurídicos de amor pan-americano y cordialidad continental.'[102] His view of the Conference, and all international conferences, degenerated rapidly in late 1927. Nevertheless, the official and public

[100] The US-Mexican tensions increased when the government of Plutarco Elías Calles sought to enforce the expropriation of foreign holdings in Mexico as called for by the 1917 Constitution (but delayed by the governments of Venustiano Carranza and Álvaro Obregón). For more on this topic, see Jean Meyer, 'Revolution and reconstruction in the 1920s' in L Bethell (ed), *Mexico Since Independence* (Cambridge, 1991) and (for a Mexican perspective) Lorenzo Meyer, *México y los Estados Unidos en el conflicto petrolero 1917-42* (Austin, 1977).

[101] Álvarez, *Le panaméricanisme et la Sixième Conférence Panaméricaine tenue à la Havane en 1928* (Paris, 1928), p. 12.

[102] Ríos Gallardo to Dávila, 24 October 1927, AMRREE CRG Tome II. He expressed similar sentiments to several other Chilean diplomats, many of whom attempted to convince Ríos Gallardo of the necessity of Chile's presence in the Conference.

Chilean policy remained positive; assurances from the US opposing discussion of Tacna-Arica and arbitration at the Conference calmed some of Ríos Gallardo's anxiety. He eventually admitted curiosity about the outcomes of the Havana Conference, 'la más interesante que se ha celebrado', which might crack 'el magno edificio del pan-americanismo.'[103]

Argentina's representative at the PAU worked to exclude certain issues from the programme, including the establishment of a Permanent Pan-American Court of Justice and, interestingly, most social questions. The Ministerio in 1926 did not share the opinions of Montes de Oca, who had celebrated social discussions in 1923. One of the Ministerio's legal advisors, Isidoro Ruiz Moreno, explained the position in a detailed memorandum: such questions, particularly in regards to labour, had to be resolved 'con criterio nacional y no internacional.'[104] Many social issues, such as housing and public health, were best discussed at specialized technical conferences that usually produced only recommendations and not agreements that carried more obligations. International discussion of labour issues, in the opinion of Argentina's government, was best limited to the ILO. Chile, the champion of social issues in Santiago, accepted the removal of such topics without objection.

Both governments assembled experienced delegations for Havana with expertise in inter-American questions and international law. The delegations were sensitive to anti-US attitudes circulating in the hemisphere; Felipe Espil (Argentine delegate) noted in late 1927 that the moment was not 'el más propicio para efusiones americanistas' while the Chilean Cancillería stated explicitly in its delegations'

[103] Ríos Gallardo to Villegas, 5 December 1927, AMRREE CRG Tome II.
[104] Ruiz Moreno, 'Memorandum sobre la lista de temas para la Sexta Conferencia Pan Americana', 24 August 1926, AMRECIC Series 25 Box 26:I.

instructions that the circumstances required 'la conveniencia de no exagerar los sentimientos y prácticas panamericanistas.'[105] Yet the Foreign Ministries of both countries did not wish to court or create controversy. The Chilean delegates were instructed to restrict themselves to statements on Chilean national interests. On the question of non-intervention, Argentina's Ministerio told its delegation to refrain from taking a strong stance. If another delegation provoked discussion of Nicaragua, the Ministerio wrote, Argentina's delegate was to affirm the respect for sovereignty without any judgment of US actions in Central America. Equality, respect, and democracy were to be the guiding principles of 'concordia internacional.'[106] Both the Alvear and Ibáñez governments sought to cooperate with, and not attack, the US.

During the conference, Chile remained relatively marginal. While Álvarez was a major actor in the discussion of international law, the Chilean delegation's participation overall was – in the words of its report – 'moderada y efectiva, sin aceptar cargos honoríficos que comprometen sin ser útiles, y sin adoptar actitudes que pudieran apreciarse como de propaganda sonora.'[107] The difference between Chilean participation in the Fifth and Sixth Conferences demonstrated a shift in Chilean attitudes towards Pan-Americanism in general. The internationalism of the Alessandri years apparently had yielded to nationalism under the Ibáñez dictatorship. Yet this shift was not so extreme; outside the conference, Chilean representatives continued to promote Pan-American cooperation. In a speech to the Committee on Co-operation with Latin America, the Chilean Ambassador to Washington

[105] Espil to Ernesto Restelli, 21 October 1927, AMRECIC Series 25 Box 26:III, and Alejandro Lira, 'Memoria de la Delegación de Chile ante la VI Conferencia Internacional Americana', 1928, AMRREE Histórico 1133A.
[106] 'Comte-rendu del Sub-secretario del Ministerio', 13 January 1928, AMRECIC Series 25 Box 27:V.
[107] 'Memoria de la Delegación de Chile ante la VI Conferencia International Americana', AMRREE Histórico 1133A, p. 2.

encouraged closer inter-American ties, noting the importance of education and mutual knowledge.[108]

In contrast, Argentina's participation in the conference proceedings was extensive.[109] Buenos Aires gave its delegates relatively detailed instructions – pieced together with the contributions of numerous ministries, departments and legal advisors – confident that the delegation would defend the republic's interests and engage in practical discussions. The delegates shared this confidence; delegate Felipe Espil later noted that Argentina's delegation arrived in Havana with 'la certidumbre de que ningún asunto pudiera ser resuelto sin su conocimiento y control.'[110] The most notable contributions came from Pueyrredón, who decided (in contradiction to his instructions) to fiercely defend non-intervention in the committee on international law. His speeches were neither spontaneous (having been planned with the rest of the delegation) nor completely inappropriate in the eyes of the Cancillería. Gallardo initially congratulated Pueyrredón on his defence of Argentina's traditional stance on non-intervention. When Pueyrredón also attacked US tariff policies (a sore subject in Argentina, where a US sanitary ban of 1926 against Argentine beef was reviled), the Ministerio attempted to restrain its delegate for fear of appearing overly antagonistic. The other Latin American delegates offered Pueyrredón no support, and Buenos Aires worried that its delegate's stance would hurt Argentina's claim to leadership in regional cooperation.[111] If ('en el peor caso' in Gallardo's words) Pan-Americanism collapsed in Havana, it should be 'por la intransigencia norte americana en la cuestión

[108] A copy of this speech, recorded in 'Americas urged to tightened ties by Chili envoy' *New York Telegram* (10 January 1928), can be found in AMRREE CRG Tome IV.
[109] See Sheinin, 'Argentina and the United States at the Sixth Pan-American Conference'.
[110] Espil to Ángel Gallardo, 30 March 1928, AMRECIC Series 25 Box 27:XII.
[111] The Chilean delegate was receptive to Argentina's arguments but did not come to Argentina's defence in order to avoid a controversial position. See 'Memoria de la Delgación', pp. 12-13.

[de intervención] y no por la Argentina en la de aranceles de menor importancia.'[112] Ultimately, the reprimand of Buenos Aires caused Pueyrredón to resign dramatically. His attitude was not evidence of irreconcilable Argentine-US rivalry; instead, Pueyrredón acted to gain favour among the Argentine electorate. As a presidential candidate in the 1928 election, Pueyrredón attempted to woo voters in the powerful agrarian sector. Pueyrredón's statements after the conference revealed a political motivation, which many contemporary observers recognized.[113]

Both Chile and Argentina cooperated with the US during the conference. Chile's cooperation was subtle, voting with the US and supporting the US delegation during Pueyrredón's tariff controversy. Argentina, on the other hand, openly advocated the continued US leadership in Pan-Americanism. During the discussions over PAU reform, Argentina argued against a rotating chairman of the governing board and defended the practice of allowing the US Secretary of State to act as chairman. Argentina's justification reflected the Alvear government's overall Pan-American rhetoric: 'the United States of America have, alone, greater strength than any of the other countries to realize the practical side of [Pan-Americanism].'[114] The PAU was useful in regulating relations with the US and the Argentine government knew that US leadership would help prevent projects to make the PAU a more political entity.

[112] Gallardo to Pueyrredón, 15 February 1928, AMRECIC Series 25 Box 27:V.

[113] See Sheinin, 'Argentina and the US in the Sixth Pan American Conference', pp. 3, 13-14. Robert Bliss, US Ambassador to Argentina, reported on contemporary observations in Bliss to Kellogg, 16 April 1928, LOC HFP Container 14. He noted that many in Buenos Aires disapproved of Pueyrredón's actions, which put 'Argentina thereby in an unfavorable position before the other American Republics.' William Collier, US Ambassador to Chile, also recorded Chilean portrayals of Pueyrredón in the heavily censored press (Collier to Kellogg, 6 April 1928, LOC HFP Container 14). The Argentine diplomat was lambasted as 'the type, fortunately every day more rare, of the Argentine swollen with pride.' Pueyrredon's replacement, Laurentino Olascoaga, was portrayed much more positively: 'a good man...He has got him a head like that of a father of his country, with mutton chop whiskers, high neck and stock which gives him the air of being one of this own ancestors.'

[114] This speech was given by Pueyrredón on 30 January 1928 (the translated quotation comes from a copy of the speech in LOC CEHP Reel 118). Pueyrredón's support of the US in this case further suggests that his position in the commercial debates was motivated by something other than Argentine official policy.

Chilean and Argentine cooperation helped the Conference achieve several agreements despite the controversy over intervention. The assembled delegates approved the progress in second-dimension Pan-Americanism in the 1920s, created the Inter-American Commission for Women (IACW), voted to allow representatives of Women's Associations to attend Conference sessions, and passed a Code of Private International Law (known as the Bustamante Code, after the Cuban jurist who compiled much of the material). The Conference passed a convention on the PAU, defining its function as economic, social and cultural (the word political was purposefully omitted).

Second-dimension discussions in the Conference were not completely cooperative; aviation, for example, became divisive when the US proposed a resolution allowing bilateral restrictions on air space. The objective was US control over the Canal Zone and, by extension, much of the air traffic between North and South America. Some of the Latin American delegates (Argentina's Espil, for one) recognized this motive and forced the US delegation to accept a substitute resolution that established equality in commercial aviation.[115] Collaboration between Latin American actors, then, overturned US intentions in the name of Pan-Americanism. Yet broad Latin American cooperation did not succeed in forcing the US to agree to non-intervention. Charles Evans Hughes, as the head US delegate, declared in his closing address that the US would not abandon its right to intervene in order to protect its citizens. The debate, however, remained open and the Committee on International Law recommended delaying a resolution on the topic until the next International Conference of American States. As Bryce Wood argued in his history of the Good

[115] Newton, *Perilous Sky*, pp. 152-54.

Neighbor Policy, the protest raised in Havana added to general Latin American diplomatic pressure and contributed to a shift in US policy towards a more conciliatory approach to Latin America from 1928 onwards.[116]

For Chile, one of the more important results of the Conference occurred before the inaugural session. Coincidentally, the Chilean and Peruvian delegations took the same ship to Havana; during the trip, the two struck up a cordial relationship that continued into the conference. Ríos Gallardo marvelled at the reports from Chilean delegate Carlos Silva Vildósola of 'la actitud...amistosa y cordial para Chile' demonstrated by the Peruvian delegation.[117] During the Conference, both delegations spoke to the US about the possibility of re-establishing Chilean-Peruvian diplomatic relations. President Ibáñez approved of this development and, despite uncertainty from Ríos Gallardo, moved to capitalise on it. Later in 1928, the two countries re-opened negotiations with US encouragement; a year later, a final settlement was reached returning Tacna to Peru and allowing Chile to retain Arica. Although other factors contributed to this rapid denouement (Ríos Gallardo personally credited his 'ofensiva económica', specifically agreements with Cuba that aimed to give Cuban sugar an advantage over Peruvian in Chilean markets), the rapport between Chilean and Peruvian delegations during the Pan-American Conference helped to usher in the resolution of Chile's most important foreign policy objective since the 1880s.[118]

*The Pan-American 1920s Come to a Close*

[116] Wood, *The Making of the Good Neighbor Policy* (New York, 1961).
[117] Ríos Gallardo to Dávila, 25 March 1928, AMRREE CRG Tome IV. Peruvian overtures also surprised Alejandro Lira, Chilean head delegate. Lira quickly adjusted Ríos Gallardo's instructions (which had prescribed silent disdain for Peru) to accommodate the new developments.
[118] Ibid.

Historians have seen the intervention controversy of the 1928 Conference as the 'lowest ebb' of the 'tide of Pan-Americanism.'[119] Many official post-conference appraisals, however, disagreed. Kellogg wrote to US delegate Henry Fletcher that 'the result of the Conference was very gratifying.'[120] The Ibáñez and Alvear governments remained, on the surface, positive towards the Conference and Pan-Americanism in general and both nominated delegations to participate in an Inter-American Conference on Arbitration and Conciliation to be held in Washington at the end of 1928. Beneath this veneer, however, was considerable doubt. Ríos Gallardo maintained his aversion to grandiose conferences and one of the Chilean delegates (Vildósola) published an article in *El Mercurio* suggesting that the major conferences achieved 'nothing of value and leave lasting resentments.' Technical conferences of experts organized by the PAU, Vildósola remarked, were the future of Pan-Americanism.[121] In Argentina, the Ministerio disregarded many of the agreements as impractical. Espil wrote in his report on Havana that he did not believe in Pan-Americanism ('un fenómeno que no tiene base natural que lo justifique') and portrayed the major conferences as a platform for a US attempt to shift Latin America away from Europe. Pan-Americanism was at odds with Argentine interests and 'política tradicional.' Yet Espil also believed the PAU and Pan-American cooperation in general to be an unavoidable part of inter-American relations in which Argentina was obliged to participate. More positively, he echoed the theme of usefulness; conferences and the PAU brought 'mutuo conocimiento de hombres y problemas' and were tools 'para resolver nuestros problemas con los Estados Unidos.'[122]

[119] DeConde, *Herbert Hoover,* p. 10.
[120] Kellogg to Fletcher, 23 February 1928, LOC HFP Container 14.
[121] A translation of this article can be found in Ambassador Collier's letter to Kellogg, 6 April 1928, LOC HFP Container 14.
[122] Espil to Gallardo, 30 March 1928, AMRECIC Series 25 Box 27:XII.

The final years of the 1920s saw Chilean and Argentine approaches to Pan-Americanism diverge once again. After two years of withdrawal and indifference, the Chilean government increased its participation. At the Conference of Arbitration and Conciliation, the Chilean delegation was active and prominent, attracting wide support for its position on limited arbitration and collaborating to develop a General Treaty of Inter-American Arbitration. The positive developments in the Tacna-Arica question raised Chile's confidence and inspired policymakers (even Ríos Gallardo) to revise their caution towards Pan-American cooperation. The report of the Chilean delegation expressed this change eloquently:

> El escepticismo con que la opinión mira por lo general las Conferencias Panamericanas, de donde en verdad, ha hecho algo lenta la reacción que era justo esperar de la opinión americana en torno de esta conferencia y de sus resultados, pero ella empieza ya a mostrarse y estamos seguros de que en muy breve tiempo, políticos internacionalistas y tratadistas en general habrán de colocar [el Tratado] al nivel de los jalones que han marcado un mayor progreso en el desarrollo del derecho internacional.[123]

In contrast, Argentina shifted away from Pan-Americanism. Hipólito Yrigoyen's re-election in the hotly contested election of 1928 partly caused this change. The Alvear government had nominated as delegates two well-regarded jurists, Alberto Alcorta and Luis A Podesta Costa, to attend the Washington Conference. The Ministerio expected them to defend and propagate the Argentine perspective of international law, and the pair prepared extensively. With Yrigoyen's inauguration, however, the Ministerio stopped responding to Alcorta and Podesta Costa's enquiries and eventually decided to cancel Argentina's attendance without informing

[123] Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, *Memoria del Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores correspondiente al año 1929* (Santiago, 1930), p. 157.

Washington.[124] Exasperated, Kellogg wrote to Hughes that 'Argentina is bound to go alone and does not propose to take part in any Pan American activities.'[125]

In the following two years, Argentina's presence in Pan-American cooperation declined and its activity in international affairs were curtailed to such an extent in late 1929 that Ambassador Bliss reported that 'foreign policy is non-existent.'[126] Bliss exaggerated, however. Yrigoyen had outlined a foreign policy that was, according to propaganda, based on 'tres hermosos ideales: patriotismo, democracia y humanitarismo.'[127] In practice, the new government sought to deepen Argentine connections with Europe while fiercely defending the country's freedom of action. Thus, Yrigoyen personally oversaw the negotiations with a mission sent by Great Britain to strengthen commercial ties with Argentina and kept Argentina out of the League of Nations. Bilateral relations with the US cooled. When US President-elect Herbert Hoover took a goodwill tour through Latin America in late 1928, he received a relatively indifferent reception in Buenos Aires. The Argentine government delayed sending a new Ambassador to Washington. Bliss reported on his situation biliously. He claimed that, when asked about US-Argentine relations, the Argentine Foreign Minister quipped: 'they have never been better - we don't answer their notes.'[128] Yrigoyen also pro-actively confronted the US by attacking US oil interests in Argentina, a move designed to improve the president's domestic standing.

Yet Pan-American cooperation persisted, with twelve events in 1929 and 1930. Chile had a representative, often an ad-hoc participant (a Chilean citizen who happened to

[124] For more information on this, see the documents in AMRECIC Series 25 Box 27:XVIII.
[125] Kellogg to Hughes, 22 November 1928, LOC FKP Reel 36.
[126] Bliss to Kellogg, 12 November 1929, NARA RG59 M515 Reel 1.
[127] Lucio Moreno Quintana, *La diplomacia de Yrigoyen* (La Plata, 1928), p. 30.
[128] Bliss to Kellogg, 12 November 1929, NARA RG59 M515 Reel 1.

be in the host city at the time), at most of the events. The Cancillería's *Memoria* of 1930 commented positively on many Pan-American initiatives, including 'el éxito alcanzado por la Delegación de Chile' in the Fourth Pan American Congress of Architects (Rio de Janeiro, 1930).[129] Chilean participation did not always favour greater integration. At the Pan American Trademark Conference of 1929, for example, the Chilean delegate resisted pressure to amalgamate Chile's patent and trademark system into an inter-American plan based at the International Trademark Office in Havana.[130] Concerned that US patents and trademarks would dominate the Chilean market, and reluctant to relinquish jurisdiction over trademark regulation, Chilean governments had been wary of regional agreements since the 1889-90 Washington Conference. Chile's delegate in 1929 signed the Convention, but it was never ratified. A protocol relating to the Havana Office went unsigned by the Chilean delegate.

Argentina's renewed aversion to Pan-Americanism was not as deep-seated as it seemed. Although absent from the Arbitration and Trademark conferences of 1929, Argentine delegates did attend other events. In 1930, as opposition to Yrigoyen from both the conservative elite and organized labour escalated, Argentine delegations participated in the Sixth Pan American Child Congress (Lima), the Fourth Pan American Congress of Architects, and the First Inter-American Congress of Rectors, Deans and Educators (Havana). The Argentine Commissioner for Women, Ernestina López del Nelson, attended an IACW Conference in Havana. The government did

[129] Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, *Memoria del Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores correspondiente al año 1930* (Santiago, 1931), p. 202.
[130] For more on the Trademark Convention, see Christine Haight Farley, 'The Pan-American Trademark Convention of 1929: A Bold Vision of Extraterritorial Meets Current Realities' in Irene Calboli and Edward Lee (eds), *Trademark Protection and Territoriality Challenges in a Global Economy* (Cheltenham, 2014).

not necessarily support these delegations (though the participants in the Child Congress were described as 'government delegates'), but Argentina's participation demonstrated persisting interest in Pan-American cooperation and an obligation to maintain Argentina's presence within it. In September 1930, a military coup supported by conservative political parties (including many anti-personalist Radicals) brought Yrigoyen's presidency to an abrupt end.

'Cultural Pan-Americanism' continued to progress through the publishing efforts of the PAU and in bibliographic and educational conferences. The IPAC expanded its reach and reported in 1929 that it had in funded approximately 1,500 students of Pan-American relations in Chile and Argentina.[131] US cultural output (in film and radio particularly), moreover, found a receptive market in both Chile and Argentina. Chile's government encouraged reciprocal initiatives, including the production of films about Chile for US audiences, to reduce ignorance of Chile in the US and foster tourism. News of events and advances in the US were covered in Chilean and Argentine newspapers; the adventures of Charles Lindbergh were especially popular in the two countries. Expanded telegraph and radio networks helped improve communications within the Americas. The Pan-American Railway had slowly progressed, and by 1928 nearly 7,000 of the planned 10,000 miles of railway were complete.[132] A plan for a Pan-American Highway, first suggested in 1923, also gained support. Nonetheless, steamship and aviation connections between the continents remained limited.

[131] The total number for Latin America was around 18,000 (Barrett, 'Special Emergency Report', 6 November 1929, LOC JBP Container 95).
[132] JA Caruso, 'The Pan American Railway', *HAHR* 31:4 (1951), p. 635.

In 1930, the PAU's Governing Body declared 14 April, the date the Commercial Bureau of American States' was founded, 'Pan American Day'. Chile adopted the resolution immediately, while Argentina did so after Yrigoyen's ouster. Pan-American events marked 14 April 1931 throughout the Americas. In Chile, public schools held assemblies and one school, No. 29 in Concepción, sent a message to all of the Americas:

> We send a cordial greeting to all American students from the sylvan banks of the Bío-Bío; this greeting is as unsullied as the Andean snows, as warm as the red of our native *copihues*, and as true as the blue of our Chilean skies. May this greeting find us strong and united, so that neither discord nor war may separate us, and we may march together along the road of progress, chanting together the Song of Peace and Labor.[133]

On the other side of the Andes, celebrations occurred in Buenos Aires and in the Universidad de La Plata. At the latter, Professor José Verzura praised the ideals that inspired the PAU. Verzura argued that Pan-Americanism had a natural foundation in geography and in common democratic-republican institutions. He emphasized the diversity of Pan-American cooperation: 'hoy es una conferencia sobre agricultura, mañana uan reunión importante en que están representadas las mujeres de América, o bien una convención comercial o un congreso de periodistas.'[134] The Western Hemisphere was to be an example to the rest of the world.

*Conclusion*

The trends in Pan-Americanism's development before 1915 continued and matured in the 1920s. Official and non-governmental actors contributed to a growing field of Pan-American cooperation, placing the 'Pan-American' label on initiatives for a wide

[133] Enrique Coronado, 'Pan American Day throughout the Americas' in *Bulletin of the Pan American Union* (hereafter BPAU) 65 (Washington, 1931), p. 689.
[134] Verzura, *El día panamericano* (La Plata, 1931), p. 13.

range of issues. Questions of both international and national development gained a Pan-American context and Pan-American cooperation became entrenched within inter-American affairs. Argentine and Chilean actors were significant in this process. There were many important detractors in both countries, particularly among those who distrusted US influence in Latin America and perceived Pan-Americanism to be merely a tool of US imperialism. Yet the policies of both Chile and Argentina were, in general, aimed at positive cooperation.

Examining the trajectory of Argentine and Chilean policies in parallel has highlighted several important similarities and divergences. Chile took up the banner of 'New Pan-Americanism' quickly while Argentina dabbled in older forms of Americanism. By the early 1920s, both countries had assumed the Pan-American mantle, seeking to maintain their leadership and encouraging practical forms of cooperation. Yet commitment was different; Chile was more willing to follow through on Pan-American agreements than Argentina. In the second-half of the 1920s, both experienced periods of withdrawal from and renewed interest in Pan-Americanism, though at different times and for different reasons.

The motivations behind these approaches and the causes of similarities and differences between them have been partly addressed in the narrative of this chapter. Again, economic considerations and geopolitical calculations are part of the explanation and the power logics highlighted by Hurrell remain useful. Post-war economic crisis and the decline in European power vis-à-vis the US within the international system led policymakers (including some who had previously criticized US imperialism) to seek better relations with the US through Pan-American

cooperation. In the 1920s, the persistence of US intervention in Latin America dimmed enthusiasm for first-dimension Pan-Americanism. Obtaining a favourable resolution to the Tacna-Arica affair became the Chilean government's major foreign policy objective and had important implications for Chilean approaches to Pan-Americanism. Yet Chile and Argentina continued to participate in Pan-American cooperation despite some fluctuation. In some cases, they acted as subordinate states, attempting to build coalitions (exemplified by Chile's effort to bring Canada into the PAU), exploiting Pan-American institutions, and encouraging the development of expert networks to forward their interests (such as armament limitation and reducing trade barriers) in cooperation with the US. Chilean policymakers, sensing a decline in their country's relative power, took a more conciliatory and cooperative position until the Ibáñez presidency. Chileans and Argentines also hoped to maintain their countries' position as dominant states. Rising US power challenged that position; Yrigoyen's failed attempt at a conference of neutrals in 1917-18 suggested shifting power relations within the hemisphere. Nonetheless, both governments used Pan-Americanism to legitimize their leadership and impose Chilean and Argentine norms on the regional system, particularly through international law. Although these factors offer frameworks to interpret Argentine and Chilean approaches to Pan-Americanism, the following chapters will demonstrate that they are, alone, unsatisfactory.

# Chapter 4

# Organization of Policymaking

Social scientists studying foreign policy and modern regionalism in the Americas have come to question simplistic models; so should historians avoid the temptation to rely on simple explanations of Latin American participation in regionalism in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. As the previous chapters demonstrated, Pan-American cooperation was a complex field of activity. The following four chapters will deconstruct Argentine and Chilean approaches to multifarious Pan-Americanism. As indicated in the introduction, these chapters highlight recurrent themes that emerged through research and use a methodologically heterogeneous framework inspired by FPA and studies in regionalism. The first two chapters identify actors and institutions involved in policymaking and consider their influence on approaches to Pan-Americanism.

FPA theorists argue that international relations must be understood by analyzing the policymakers themselves, a method borrowed from history. Indeed, diplomatic historians have long made important policymakers the subject of their research. In the mid-twentieth century, historians of foreign policy began to borrow theoretical frameworks from the social sciences.[1] Since the linguistic and cultural turns of the 1980s the analysis of policymakers has taken a more theoretical direction. For example, the language of foreign policy has proved fertile ground for gender and

[1] A useful survey of social science theory in diplomatic history can be found in Michael Hogan and Thomas Paterson (eds), *Explaining the History of American Foreign Relations* (Cambridge, 2004).

psychoanalytic studies.[2] While these methods have produced interesting interpretations, they are often overly theoretical and attempt to force (occasionally thin) empirical data into a framework that relies heavily on questionable assumptions. Language and ideas are important subjects of analysis (and will feature in Chapter Seven), but this chapter will concentrate on who the policymakers were and in what institutional networks they acted.

Analyzing foreign policymaking in Argentina and Chile in this period is a complicated task as the process was open to a wide range of actors and influences. Nonetheless, a general understanding of who was involved and how those actors accessed the policymaking process gives important context to policy trends. The Organizational Process and Bureaucratic Politics models from FPA are useful in understanding how that context was relevant. First utilized by Graham Allison in his seminal studies on the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, these models assume that policymaking is not performed by a single rational actor but rather is a process that involves bargaining between a number of actors and institutions with distinct interests.[3] The capacity of the various actors to advance their interests is determined by how they are organized; more established policymaking organizations, guided by a set of routines and standard operating procedures, will be more effective in determining policy than new actors that challenge routines. Thus a new president, prime minister or foreign minister will find it difficult to radically or rapidly alter

[2] Zeiler, 'The Diplomatic History Bandwagon', p. 1067 and David Paul Nickles, 'Diplomatic History and the Political Science Wars' *Perspectives on History* 49:5 (May 2011).

[3] The classic texts of the bureaucratic politics models are Allison's *The Essence of Decision:* and *Remaking Foreign Policy*. A useful overview of his models can also be found in an earlier article, 'Conceptual models and the Cuban Missile Crisis' *The American Political Science Review*, 63:3 (1969). It should be noted that, while Graham's works are interesting, they have serious flaws. In attempting to explain the Cuban Missile Crisis, Allison leaves out one of the more obvious actors in the crisis: the Cuban government. See Philip Brenner, 'Cuba and the Missile Crisis' *Journal of Latin American Studies* 22:1-2 (1990).

foreign policy, since that might require a change to the operating procedures of the various ministries involved in deciding and implementing policy. In order to explain policy, then, a detailed examination of bureaucratic bargaining, of routines and operating procedures, and of the nature and relative weight of each actor's interests is necessary. This method has been most convincingly applied to US foreign policy in the 1930s and after. According to J. Gary Clifford, the method will be helpful in understanding policy change during political transition and in explaining how major transformations in the international system produced institutional adjustments.[4] Given the transitions highlighted in previous chapters, bureaucratic politics may be useful for answering the central question of this thesis.

The archival record, however, limits bureaucratic politics analysis of Pan-American policies. Few documents related to inter-ministerial bargaining or intra-ministerial decision-making exist; ministers and members of the foreign ministry bureaucracy rarely recorded meetings or discussions and few ministers wrote memoirs that provide details of policymaking dynamics.[5] The documents that survive suggest that, unlike the US later in the twentieth century, Chile and Argentina at the turn of the twentieth century did not have extensive networks of ministries, institutions, and agencies vying for influence over foreign policy. As a result, diplomatic histories of Argentina and Chile have often focused on a handful of significant individuals. During the 1900s, ministerial reforms and the incorporation of previously national questions into the international arena, which caused other ministries and institutions to take interest in foreign affairs, increased the number of voices in policymaking, a phenomenon not

[4] Clifford, 'Bureaucratic Politics' in Hogan and Paterson (eds), *Explaining the History*, pp. 91-102.
[5] One Argentine Foreign Minister who wrote memoirs was Ángel Gallardo. Chile's Manuel Rivas Vicuña, who was interior minister (1913) and secretary general to the 1923 International Conference of American States in Santiago, did occasionally discuss foreign policy in his history of Chilean politics from 1891 to 1920, see *Historia Politica y Parliamentaria de Chile*, (3 vols, Santiago, 1964).

often recognized in Argentine and Chilean diplomatic historiography. The archives of both countries' foreign ministries record a more collaborative process in the 1910s and 1920s. Despite these limitations, some of the principles of FPA theory can guide the analysis in this chapter. For example, the organization of bureaucracy and the role of actors embedded within it were important factors in determining a government's approach to foreign policy questions. The foreign minister and president operated within networks, both intra- and inter-ministerial. Also, standard operating procedures and routines of bureaucracy were significant and responsive to the international system. Once entrenched, these routines increased the likelihood of continuity despite changes in overall strategic objectives. While such principles alone cannot explain Argentine and Chilean policies, they are useful in understanding those policies. The first task will be to determine what the relevant bureaucratic organization was and how it operated.

*The Cancillería and the Ministerio*

The logical starting point is the Foreign Ministry, the main institution deciding and implementing foreign policy. Few historians have written specifically about the internal dynamics of the Ministries in either country. The only obvious examples are, for Chile, Mario Barros's *El Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores* (1973) and, for Argentina, Beatriz Solveira's *La evolución del servicio exterior argentinto entre 1852 y 1930* (1997).[6] Considering the centrality of the ministries, neglect of their organization and structure is a serious lacuna in the historiography. This section will

[6] As Solveira notes in her introduction, the systematic study of Ministerio and foreign service structure is a topic 'por completo inexplorado tanto por parte de la historiografía como de los internacionalistas argentinos' (p. 9). Although Solveira's work is thus of great utility to any historian of Argentine diplomacy, it leaves to other historians the task of understanding the implications of the structural changes outlined.

outline the organization of the ministries, using the histories above and several contemporary sources.[7]

Between the late 1880s and 1930, the Cancillería and Ministerio underwent several organizational changes that affected methods of policymaking and opened access to that process. Following reform in the 1880s, the Chilean Cancillería became an agglomeration of three distinct, though linked, governmental bodies: Foreign Relations; 'Culto', or government-church relations; and Colonisation, which addressed questions of immigration but was mainly pre-occupied with the attempt to 'Chileanize' Tacna and Arica through public works and Chilean colonization. This implied a hefty load and by the 1900s, the limitations of this arrangement had become obvious. In fact, a drastic effort to alleviate the overburdening was attempted in 1910 (which failed to achieve legislative approval).[8] In Argentina, the Ministerio was organized by regulations implemented in 1879, which *La Nación* decried as 'apenas suficiente.'[9] Its portfolio was not as extensive as its Chilean counterpart, although it did gain 'Culto' and 'Beneficencia' (and thus responsibility over Argentina's meagre social assistance programmes) at the end of the 1890s. Both ministries had a wide set of policy responsibilities and a staff incommensurate with the amount of work to be done.

[7] For Chile, the most useful contemporary sources are the *Memorias* of the Foreign Ministry, which occasionally commented on the ministerial organization (particularly in reporting changes). For Argentina, newspaper commentaries about the Ministerio and an overview in Daniel Antokoletz's *Manual diplomático* (pp. 40-48) are particularly helpful.

[8] For details about the proposed reform, and the deficiencies of the Ministry's structure, see the Cancillería's *Memoria de Relaciones Exteriores, Culto i Colonización* (1910), pp. 383-93. Also see Barros, *El Ministerio*, pp. 66-69.

[9] Solveira, *La evolución*, p. 23.

The bureaucratic organization of both ministries was simple in the 1888: a small cohort of employees under the supervision of a fluctuating number of sub-secretaries who reported to the minister. In the late 1890s and early 1900s, this bureaucracy expanded with increased demands upon the ministries and a desire to professionalize the foreign service. Indeed, both Argentine and Chilean governments hoped to emulate the 'modern' bureaucracies of Europe and the US by establishing stricter regulations on career diplomacy and limiting the policymaking capacity of diplomats abroad.[10] The advent of more sophisticated inter-continental cable telegraph service, with which the Ministry could contact staff abroad, made this centralization possible. In Chile, specialised bodies were added to facilitate certain priorities (such as finding markets and capital for the nitrate industry), lessen the burden on the existing staff, and provide some sense of continuity. One such entity was Sección de Información Exterior, charged with managing the information flow to and from Chilean diplomatic posts and promoting Chile and her products abroad. Another was the Comisión de Estudios Comerciales, established by executive decree in 1906. The Cancillería made several administrative changes in the 1910s that continued to define the division of labour, distanced commerce from other debates, and increased the number of staff.

Similar trends occurred in Argentina, where the Ministerio underwent a number of formal re-organizations.[11] In 1901, the Ministerio counted twenty-three employees; by 1915, this had almost tripled to sixty-three.[12] A section for 'asuntos políticos' appeared in 1900 and was divided in 1909 by geographic region (División América y África and División Europa y Asia) only to be re-unified in 1915 and split again into

[10] Reforms in France, Spain and Great Britain were of particular interest; see Barros, *El Ministerio*, pp. 84-85.
[11] Reforms were passed in 1900, 1906, 1909, 1915 and 1918.
[12] Solveira, *La evolución*, pp. 25 and 34.

'política' and 'comercial' three years later. This frequent re-arranging did not compromise the Ministerio's functioning. Rather, these changes had similar effects to the reforms in the Chilean Cancillería; that is, they tended to make policymaking simultaneously more specialized and more collaborative. Responsibility for studying international issues was gradually diffused among a growing cast of ministerial bureaucrats. In the end of the 1900s, responding to a resolution passed in the 1906 International Conference of American States, both countries established Pan American Committees under the supervision of the ministry. The fate of these committees reflected differences in commitment to Pan-Americanism. Argentina's committee was ephemeral, disappearing shortly after the 1910 conference in Buenos Aires; Chile's lasted longer, for at least a decade, in shifting configurations.

In the 1920s, the Chilean Ministry underwent major reorganization. Specialized offices appeared, including a new Pan-American Commission (an annexe of the Cancillería comprised of various ex-Foreign Ministers and ex-delegates to Pan-American Conferences) in 1923.[13] Relaciones Exteriores gradually shed its partnered portfolios; the official separation of church and state in 1925 removed Culto and Colonización shifted back to Obras Públicas. In 1930, the Cancillería became the Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores y Comercio. The division of labour within the Ministry was made increasingly rigid in the 1910s and 1920s as the roles of each section were more clearly defined.[14] Many of the reforms of the Cancillería in the late 1920s were seen as part of the 'regeneración cívica' under the dictatorship of General

[13] The Commission was eventually incorporated into the Departamento Diplomático in 1927, although its meetings were sporadic. See the Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores's *Memoria* from 1933 (210-12).

[14] Sections included the following: diplomatic, consular, information, 'clave' (in charge of coding and de-coding messages), commercial, Pan-American, and library/archival. More information can be found in Barros, *El Ministerio*.

Ibáñez, which emphasized technical specialty and efficiency. The number of employees within the bureaucracy reached thirty-eight by the end of the decade.[15]

Expansion and reform also led the Argentine Ministerio to reflect the expanding scope of Argentine foreign affairs. Divisions formed to study technical questions (maritime traffic, communications, trademark agreements, etc.) and international conferences. Ad-hoc *Oficinas* also gradually added voices to the policymaking discussion. These included *Oficinas* for International Labour, for International Law and Foreign Legislation (mainly a custodial office to manage and publish Argentina's various international agreements), and for the League of Nations. The Ministerio established an *Oficina Panamericana* as well, though this body had 'una vida precaria' in the 1920s according to one employee.[16] The addition of *oficinas* expanded the ministerial bureaucracy, which counted eighty-five employees by 1930.[17] The Foreign Minister and the President retained directive responsibility over foreign policy and were essential in establishing the general objectives and tone of Argentina's international relations. Yet, they clearly began to rely on these *oficinas* for quotidian policymaking. The memoirs of Foreign Minister Ángel Gallardo (1922-28) contain little reference to anything other than the decade's big political questions. Gallardo recounts in detail the negotiations over the Fifth Pan-American Conference and the nomination of the new Archbishop of Buenos Aires (a question which fell under the Ministerio's Culto remit) yet makes no mention of the numerous technical issues

[15] Ibid., p. 99.
[16] Antokoletz, *Manual*, p. 46.
[17] Incidentally, this process corresponded with a general programme of bureaucratic expansion under the Radical governments, a method of maintaining urban middle-class support. See David Rock, 'Radical Populism and the Conservative Elite, 1912-1930' in Rock (ed), *Argentina in the Twentieth Century* (London, 1975).

before the Ministerio with one exception: the Third Pan-American Congress of Architects, held in Buenos Aires in 1927.[18]

One of the most important consequences of these reforms in both countries was increased collaboration in policymaking; instructions and correspondence to diplomats in the 1920s contained more references to the opinion and suggestions of different divisions and specialists, including legal advisers. In the nineteenth century, both foreign ministries developed informal relationships with international law specialists, seeking their advice on a wide range of questions. In Chile, *asesores letrados* (or legal advisers) had also been officially part of the bureaucracy since the 1820s; this position became more of a permanent fixture in the bureaucracy by the 1900s. In the 1910s, Argentina also added the institution of asesor letrado. The effect on policymaking is clear in the archival record. In the late 1910s and 1920s, reports of legal advisers became important reference points and the advisers frequently contributed to diplomatic instructions. The ministries also sent legal advisers with the delegations to conferences. The prominence of legal advisers had foundations in the legal traditions of both countries (a point that will be further discussed in Chapter Seven). The institutionalization of legal counsel was also a response to a global trend in diplomacy. As Martha Finnemore has argued, international law was embedded gradually within diplomatic discourse and certain legal principles, especially arbitration, became salient features of international relations from the 1900s

[18] Gallardo mentions this Congress only because the last-minute call for him to give the President's welcome (Gallardo, *Memorias*, p. 427). Of course, Gallardo wrote these memoirs fifty years after his time as Minister and so may have simply forgotten the more mundane aspects of his ministerial life. He may have omitted these issues for the sake of making the memoir a more exciting read. Given the increased ministerial bureaucracy, however, it is sensible to assume that Gallardo did not participate in most technical policy questions.

onwards.[19] This process, according to Finnemore, accelerated with The Hague conferences of 1899 and 1907. For Latin America, however, the process began much earlier, with the initial attempts to codify international law in Lima (1877-79) and Montevideo (1888-89).

Sub-secretaries were also key policymakers. As Mario Barros rightly suggested in his history of the Chilean Cancillería, 'la continuidad diplomática recaía, pues, necesariamente, en los Subsecretarios.'[20] His assertion is corroborated by one of the surviving internal documents of the Chilean Cancillería: the notes of Alejandro Álvarez as ministry secretary (1905-06).[21] The practice of ministerial interpellation by Congress led to a high turnover rate of foreign ministers in the Parliamentary Republic (1891-1925).[22] The sub-secretary was a more consistent presence in policymaking discussions. Sub-secretaries held frequent meetings with the Minister in order to discuss various issues of importance and make major decisions. Conferences with the President were also common. Other secretarial duties included instructing diplomats and keeping the Cancillería's records. As the ministerial bureaucracy expanded, the number of sub-secretaries increased and their portfolios narrowed into more specialized roles.

In Argentina, the sub-secretary had a less definite role in policy discussions than his Chilean counterpart. By 1900, the position expanded from its original role (answering logistical correspondence) to one of general managerial oversight. The

[19] Finnemore, *Purpose of Intervention: Changing Beliefs about the Use of Force* (Ithaca, NY, 2004), pp. 27-51.
[20] Barros, *El Ministerio*, p. 90.
[21] See AMRREE Histórico 360a, pp. 23-141.
[22] This turnover rate was the result of a tradition in which the entire executive cabinet resigned in the case of a censure vote against one minister. Such votes were common in the Parliamentary Republic and, in consequence, Chile had over seventy foreign ministers from 1891 to 1925.

sub-secretary's office produced instructions sent to diplomats and consuls, general circulars to all representatives abroad, and consular and diplomatic guides. Overall, then, the sub-secretary and his subordinates played a role in communicating and implementing policy objectives. In the 1920s, the habit of employing experienced diplomats as sub-secretaries demonstrated the importance of the position.[23] Yet it was also occasionally used for political patronage, especially under Yrigoyen. Lucio Moreno Quintana (who, to his credit, was an international jurist who specialized in immigration) came to the position because of his loyalty to Yrigoyen in the late 1910s. His yrigoyenismo eventually led to his resignation in 1923 after the anti-yrigoyenista faction of the Radical Party came to power.[24]

The development within the Ministries added actors to policy making and implementing. Such a process did not necessarily improve ministerial functioning; contemporary observers (Ríos Gallardo in Chile and Moreno Quintana in Argentina, for example) occasionally criticised the ministries for their inefficiency and the lack of technical competence within the bureaucracy.[25] Nonetheless, it had an impact on policymaking that should be kept in mind.

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[23] Those that held the position in the 1920s included Diego Luis Molinari, Ernesto Restelli and Juan G Valenzuela. All of them had held important diplomatic or ministerial posts before being named Sub-Secretary. At least one of them (Restelli) was well versed in international law, having published on the topic. Restelli would later become a professor of the subject at the Facultad de Ciencias Económicas.

[24] Accusations emerged that Moreno had revealed state secrets as a way of embarrassing the new government and he was effectively pushed out of the Ministerio. These accusations were politically motivated and largely false. While he had published a pamphlet discussing Argentina's position towards regional disarmament without the authorization of the Ministerio, the information contained therein did not constitute any 'state secrets' (see Gallardo, *Memorias,* pp. 343-44).

[25] Ríos Gallardo attacked the inefficiency of the Cancillería and the diplomatic corps in *Circular 14* sent to Chile's representatives abroad on 25 March 1927 (in AMRREE Circulares vol 16). Moreno Quintana wrote several articles on this subject for *El Orden* (Tucuman) and *La Época* (Buenos Aires). They were reprinted in his *Pinceladas internacionales y diplomáticas* (La Plata, 1925). These were published after Moreno's forced resignation from the Ministerio; they are, as a result, perhaps overly critical. Yet, his criticisms are corroborated by other newspaper articles and a report from the US Ambassador, JW Riddle.

*The President of the Republic and other Ministries*

The other major institutions that contributed to policymaking were the presidency and other executive ministries. Before the 1891 Civil War, Chilean diplomacy clearly exhibited the president's influence. This was especially true under Balmaceda (President, 1886-91): having been Minister to Argentina during the War of the Pacific and subsequently Foreign Minister, he was experienced in foreign affairs and determined to be master of Chile's diplomacy. Barros noted in his Cancillería history that Balmaceda was compulsive in his control over foreign policy; he personally chose Chile's representatives abroad, responded to a great deal of diplomatic correspondence, and even researched other countries' library catalogues in order to decide which books the Cancillería should purchase for its own collection.[26] Chile's antagonism towards the First International Conference of American States was partly a reflection of Balmaceda's distrust of James G Blaine's motives.[27] After the Civil War of 1891 that overthrew Balmaceda, the executive was weakened and the men who served as president were less assertive than Balmaceda. Nevertheless, the president remained important to policymaking. The correspondence of Presidents Germán Riesco (1901-06) and Pedro Montt (1906-10), for example, often focused on diplomacy and the image Chile presented to the world. Montt was a key figure in Chile's policy of improved Argentine relations, acting as the head of Chile's delegation to Argentina's centennial celebration in 1910 shortly before his death.

Even though the post-Balmaceda reorganization left the President with less power, it kept intact many channels for presidential influence on foreign policy. The President

[26] Barros, *El Ministerio*, p. 79.
[27] Balmaceda's attitude is well known: see, for example, William Sater, *Chile and the War of the Pacific* (Lincoln, 1986), pp. 200-13.

remained responsible for diplomatic appointments and met frequently with the foreign minister and diplomats. As a final resort, the President could appeal to political parties and the public. Foreign Ministers – like all ministers – were responsible to Congress, though they sought direction more from the president. Not all foreign ministers followed presidential lead, however. Minister Eliodoro Yáñez, for example, was wary of President Riesco's policy of reconciliation with Argentina in 1901. When Yáñez issued instructions to the Chilean Minister to Argentina that contradicted the president's plans, Riesco leaked his desired policy to the press, placing Yáñez in an untenable position. Yañez resigned, and Riesco's policy continued apace.[28]

After his election in 1920, Arturo Alessandri sought a more assertive role in foreign policy in a way reminiscent of Balmaceda. Unlike previous administrations, the Alessandri government made international questions a priority, especially the resolution of the Tacna-Arica affair. Under the Constitution of 1925, the President officially regained a prominent place in policymaking. Figueroa Larraín, who served as president after Alessandri's resignation in 1925, was unable to assert his constitutional control due to his weak political position, particularly vis-à-vis the overbearing Interior Minister, Ibáñez del Campo. During the Ibáñez dictatorship, presidential direction in foreign policy was paramount. Like Balmaceda, both Alessandri and Ibáñez sought greater personal participation in policymaking, though neither sought the kind of micromanagement achieved by Balmaceda. Instead, they carefully chose foreign ministers who could be trusted to follow presidential direction, such as Ríos Gallardo.

[28] Vicuña, *Historia Política y Parlamentaria*, i, 80.

In Argentina, presidential authority was more consistent throughout the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Solveira's study suggests that the president was in fact the central actor in policymaking; the Ministerio offered guidance but deferred to the president for decisions.[29] She is right to emphasize the presidency's importance but does not sufficiently recognize that the Ministerio often managed international questions without referral to the president. The many technical questions that came before the Ministerio, for example, rarely received the president's attention. Nonetheless, the President did play a major role. Unlike the Chilean Presidents during the Parliamentary Republic but like Presidents Alessandri and Ibáñez, Argentine heads of state held considerable control over the tone and direction of Argentine foreign policy. Correspondence regarding foreign affairs from diverse sources (ministers, civic associations, newspapers, businessmen from Argentina and beyond, and diplomats) to the president reveals the public role that the president played in embodying foreign policymaking. Some presidents were very active in foreign affairs. Julio Argentino Roca (president 1880-86 and again 1898-1904) was particularly important in the border negotiations with Chile. His military background, as a leader in the War of the Triple Alliance and in several campaigns against Argentina's indigenous populations, lent considerable weight to his public support for a peaceful resolution. This proved crucial in overcoming significant pressure from public figures including Estanislao Zeballos for a more bellicose stance. Yrigoyen also participated actively in the formation and implementation of foreign policy during both of his administrations (1916-22 and 1928-30). He played a key role keeping Argentina neutral during the First World War. In line with his personalist

[29] Solveira, *La evolución*, p. 12.

approach to domestic affairs, Yrigoyen often dealt personally with certain matters of foreign policy such as Argentina's economic relationship with Great Britain.[30]

Other presidents were not as interested in foreign affairs. Miguel Juárez Celman (1886-1890), for instance, was not as active in determining foreign policy. This lack of presidential direction was a source of frustration for his foreign minister, Zeballos. In a letter to Juárez Celman from October 1889, Zeballos noted how difficult it was to preserve the moral authority of Argentina on the international stage if the President did not help him 'conservarla en presencia de los empleados y jefes' of the Foreign Ministry.[31] In the 1920s, President Alvear ceded much of his control of foreign policy to the Ministerio. The memoirs of Ángel Gallardo portray Alvear as interested in foreign affairs and involved in policy discussions, but also unassertive in comparison to Yrigoyen and willing to follow the lead of the Ministerio. Alvear's attention was focused more on domestic questions, particularly the Radical schism in the mid-1920s. Presidents were therefore not always the major actor in policymaking.

Other members of the executive cabinet (and their ministries) also played a significant role in determining policy. From the 1880s to the 1920s, both countries increased their state bureaucracy overall, occasionally through the addition of new ministries (such as the Ministries of Public Works and Agriculture in Argentina, added in 1898) and new departments, divisions and sections. The Chilean Cancillería frequently consulted other ministries on questions that fell within overlapping remits:

[30] The best example is the D'Abernon mission. See Roger Gravil, 'Anglo-U.S. Trade Rivalry in Argentina and the D'Abernon Mission of 1929' in Rock (ed), *Argentina in the Twentieth Century* for more information.

[31] This message was concluded with the reassurance that 'no es una queja.' The tone of the letter, however, renders this assurance blatantly disingenuous. Zeballos to Juárez Celman, 18 October 1889, AGNA VII 1976.

international sanitation policy, for example, was decided by collaboration between the Foreign Relations and Interior ministries (the latter oversaw control of the ports and development of sanitary infrastructure). In Argentina, the records of the Pan-American Conferences include the opinions and reports of other ministers and ministries from the 1910 Buenos Aires Conference and after. Participation of other ministries in setting policy gradually increased. Collaboration became more important as topics such as public health, labour, new forms of communication, women's and minority rights, the construction of highways, and the development of primary education curricula became internationalized through various conferences and congresses. Defence ministries (in Argentina, the Ministry of War and Navy eventually split into separate ministries in the early 1900s; a similar split occurred in Chile in 1924) were also regularly consulted, mainly for military advice but also for technical issues such as aviation and radio communications. The Ministerio de Hacienda (Finance) had significant, sustained influence in the international affairs of both countries. Given the importance of international markets and foreign investment for the export economies of both countries, international commerce and finance was a key part of foreign policy discussions. The foreign ministries had a central role, especially through their consular corps. In Argentina, commerce was part of the Ministerio's portfolio since 1899; commerce was not added to the Chilean Cancillería until 1930. Yet the Ministerio de Hacienda often took the lead in international financial and commercial negotiations.

Argentina also had a Vice President, which Chile lacked. The Vice Presidential position was vaguely defined, being mentioned in the 1853 Constitution only twice, and its role was largely confined to domestic matters (particularly as the president of

the Senate). Occasionally, the Vice President became involved in foreign affairs. Victorino de la Plaza, for example, was widely known to maintain an important role in foreign policy upon assuming the Vice Presidency in 1910 after serving as Foreign Minister under José Figueroa Alcorta.

*National Congress*

Outside the executive, other governmental actors participated in foreign policymaking. As the following brief look at Congressional participation will demonstrate, however, non-executive governmental actors were secondary agents within policymaking's organization in both countries. Diplomatic histories of Chile and Argentina rarely mention Congress as an actor in foreign policy. This neglect is justified: Congress paid relatively little attention to foreign policy and foreign questions often entered the legislative chambers through actions of the executive (for example, diplomatic nominations, ministerial reports, and forwarded international agreements needing ratification). The executive archival records demonstrate little concern for congressional opinion. In Argentina, when US Ambassador JW Riddle asked Foreign Minister Gallardo about the role of Congress in Argentine international affairs in 1925, Gallardo responded by explaining the 'acción preponderante' of the executive over such questions.[32] Diplomatic correspondence and instructions to delegations rarely mentioned the legislature. The executive occasionally flouted Congressional opinion. For example, Yrigoyen refused to alter relations with

[32] Riddle to Secretary of State, 20 May 1925, NARA RG59 M514 Roll 12. Gallardo also mentioned the role of the Supreme Court, which was able to interpret treaties as per Articles 31 and 116 of the National Constitution. Article 31 explicitly incorporates treaties with foreign powers into 'las leyes de la Nación', opening the interpretation of such treaties to the jurisdiction of the Court. Nonetheless, policymakers rarely considered the Supreme Court's opinion.

Germany during the First World War despite Congressional resolutions calling him to do so.[33]

In Chile, Congress also played a secondary role to the executive and did not feature highly in policymaking debates. The notes of Chilean sub-secretary Álvarez, for example, make no reference to the legislature. During the Parliamentary Republic in Chile, diplomats and ministers discussed Congress mainly in the context of complaint: congressional interpellation was a major cause of the short lifespan of a ministry, leading many to blame Congress for uncertainty in the Cancillería.[34] After the implementation of the new Constitution of 1925, the Chilean executive marginalized Congress; the Ibáñez dictatorship dissolved the legislative body in 1927, allowing congressional elections in 1930 only after approving the party's candidate lists.[35]

Nonetheless, Congress did play a role in policymaking. The legislature in both countries had multiple channels through which it could influence foreign policy. For example, Congress had the ability to approve (and remove) foreign ministers and diplomats. Yet this power rarely influenced policy and Congressional opposition to

[33] For more on this and on Argentina's position towards the First World War, see Philip Dehne, 'Britain's Global War and Argentine Neutrality' in Johan den Hertog and Samuël Kruizinga (eds), *Caught in the Middle: Neutrals, Neutrality, and the First World War* (Amsterdam, 2011). Congressional action followed revelations that the German Chargé d'Affaires in Buenos Aires had recommended to his government in Berlin the indiscriminate sinking of Argentine ships leaving European ports. In the same despatches, reprinted in *La Prensa* (9 September 1917, p. 6), he also called the Argentine Foreign Minister a 'notorious ass.' The uproar in Congress and the press led Yrigoyen's government to issue the German diplomat his passports.
[34] J Walker to Germán Riesco, 5 May 1902. ANH 155, #23.
[35] See Germán Urzúa Valenzuela, *Historia política de Chile y su evolución electoral: desde 1810 a 1992* (Santiago, 1992), pp. 437-41 and Vial, *Historia de Chile*, iv, 241-48.

appointments was often based on personal (rather than partisan) politics.[36] In both countries, Congress also controlled budgetary allocations to foreign policy initiatives, including the finances of delegations to international conferences. All treaties signed by Argentine and Chilean representatives were subject to Congressional approval. Moreover, Congress was involved in general discussion of foreign affairs; the Chamber of Deputies and Senate in both countries early established committees on foreign affairs.[37] In Chile, the chairs of these committees were frequently consulted in foreign policy questions; they were also members of the Pan-American Commission.[38] International commerce, border disputes, military spending, relations with the Vatican, and the ABC negotiations sparked prolonged congressional discussions in both countries. These discussions could directly affect foreign policy. Argentina's Congress, for example, debated the country's position in the League of Nations several times and congressional opposition was a cause of Argentina's sustained withdrawal from the League.[39] Chile's Congress debated the country's policy in the Tacna-Arica dispute and the executive discussed the Senate's opinion, particularly when deciding how to move forward after the plebiscite's cancellation in 1925.[40]

[36] See, for example, the opposition to the nomination of Anselmo Hevía (Radical) as minister in Germany. Personal enemies of Hevía in Congress, including members of his own party, blocked this appointment (according to Hevía, see his letter to Riesco, 4 October 1902, ANH SFL155).

[37] For one of the few works on the development of Chilean congressional committees, see Obando, 'The Congressional Committee System of the Chilean Legislature: 1834-1924' *Historia* 44:1 (Jan-Jun 2011).

[38] The chairmen of these committees occasionally went on to become Foreign Ministers (e.g. Emilio Bello Codesido) and delegates to Pan-American conferences.

[39] Manley Hudson, 'The Argentine Republic and the League of Nations' *American Journal of International Law* 28:1 (1934), pp. 127-29.

[40] This consultation was implied in the correspondence between the Chilean Ambassador to the US (Miguel Cruchaga Tocornal) and the Cancillería (see, in particular, the letter from Cruchaga on 14 May 1926, AMRREE Histórico 1059). The Cancillería apparently brokered an agreement with the Senate over how it should proceed regarding a second offer of good offices from the US. The decision to reject the offer was not surprising given the Cancillería's anger with the US over the plebiscite's cancellation; it is likely that consulting the Senate was for support of the Cancillería's existing policy.

Ratification was an important means of congressional influence on foreign affairs. During the Parliamentary Republic in Chile, the lack of cloture mechanisms within both chambers encouraged inertia and discouraged resolution. The 'excessive freedom of speech enjoyed by [the] members of parliament' (as one Conservative politician saw it) delayed the ratification of many international agreements.[41] Chilean ratification of several agreements in the 1900s and 1910s was the result of pressure from the executive and the relatively uncontroversial nature of the agreements. After 1925, Congressional approval was either unnecessary (under the Ibáñez dictatorship from 1927-30) or a rubber stamp. Argentina's Congress was similarly reluctant to put the ratification of international agreements to vote and the rate of Argentine ratification in Pan-American affairs was consistently less than that of Chile. Indecision on ratification proposals was the result of a combination of factors: desire within Congress to keep the republic out of entangling agreements, greater urgency of (and interest in) domestic questions, and relative lack of executive pressure for ratification (when compared with Chile). Opposition to ratification could have a significant impact on foreign policy; opposition in the Chamber of Deputies blocked the ABC Treaty of 1915, which the executive supported.

Congress also used the approval of delegations to affect policy. Before the Mexico City Conference of 1901-02, Argentina's national congress tarried in approving funds for the republic's delegation until it received assurance from the foreign minister that Argentina would not back down from obligatory arbitration.[42] The delegations to Pan-American meetings generally reflected the partisan composition of congress. In Chile, no single party dominated congress from 1891 to 1925; coalitions were the

[41] Guillermo Subercaseaux, *Monetary and Banking Policy of Chile* (Oxford, 1922), pp. 184-85.
[42] McGann, *Argentina and the US*, p. 203.

hallmark of the pseudo-parliamentary regime. Chilean delegations in the Pan-American Conferences were correspondingly multi-partisan. In Argentina, the Partido Autonomista Nacional (PAN) controlled congress until the 1910s, when the Radical party managed to gain a majority. Argentine delegations to the first four International Conferences of American States were notable for their PAN homogeneity. Yet causality is uncertain in this case; the archival record demonstrates that the Cancillería and Ministerio selected delegations based on personal connections, expertise, and location (that is, diplomats posted near to the location of the meeting were given preference).[43] In the Chilean case, diplomats were expected to avoid partisan lines. During the parliamentary era, only a handful of foreign questions (the Tacna-Arica dispute being the prime example) caused inter-party debate.[44]

Foreign economic policy was one area of international affairs that Congress clearly affected, as Congress was responsible for determining some of the basic conditions of commerce. In general, economic historians have characterized the fifty years between 1880 and 1930 as a period dominated by an export-led economic model.[45] Although resources were concentrated in growing the export sector, there was some industrialization in both countries by the 1890s and a growing protectionist lobby by the 1900s. This period witnessed several major tariff debates in both countries (1897, 1916 and 1921 in Chile and 1890 and 1906 in Argentina, with numerous minor

[43] For cases of Chilean delegation selection, see the file for the 1915 Second Pan American Scientific Congress (AMRREE Histórico 493) and the correspondence of Conrado Ríos Gallardo with Carlos Dávila in October 1927 (AMRREE CRG Tome 2). Argentine cases are scattered throughout AMRECIC Series 25.

[44] Karen Remmer, *Party Competition in Argentina and Chile: Political Recruitment and Public Policy, 1890-1930* (Lincoln, 1984) notes this (pp. 63-4), although her description of the historiography (or the lack thereof) suggests that the relatively little attention given to the period may be the cause of this impression.

[45] See for a general discussion Bulmer-Thomas, *Economic History*, pp. 46-189.

adjustments throughout), leading to substantial trade barriers on several imports, including small manufactured goods such as hats and shoes.[46] Tariff policy could, in theory, restrict or enhance the country's position when negotiating with foreign powers over commercial relations; thus, Congress wielded a potentially powerful tool in foreign relations. Additionally, congressional debates were a platform from which economic elites could apply pressure on foreign policy institutions.

Before 1914, the dominance of export-sector elites within Congress meant that the legislature was generally contented with executive policies to increase export capacity through attracting foreign investment and opening foreign markets. The Chilean congress, for example, lent its support to the Cancillería's increase of consulates in promising new markets for nitrates. In pre-1914 Argentina, the legislature worked with the executive to attract investment and develop infrastructure and institutions that geared the republic towards exporting to European markets.[47] After World War I, however, Congress became an arena of greater contestation. Economic interests and party loyalties clashed and the resulting partisan bargaining had direct impact on foreign economic policy. In Chile, manufacturing interests (collectively represented by the Sociedad de Fomento Fabril, or SOFOFA) used Congress to lobby successfully for a more protectionist foreign economic policy.[48] In Argentina, Yrigoyen's policy to deepen commercial and financial ties to Great Britain (at the expense of US interests)

[46] For more on Chilean tariff policy, see Hernán Cortés-Douglas, Andrea Butelmann,, and Pedro Videla, 'Proteccionismo en Chile: Una visión retrospectiva' *Cuadernos de economía* 18:54-55 (1981). For Argentina, see Carlos Díaz Alejandro, 'The Argentine Tariff, 1906-1940' *Oxford Economic Papers* 19:1 (1967).
[47] Della Paolera and Taylor, *Straining the Anchor*, pp. 99-136.
[48] The Alessandri administration was largely supportive of protectionist measures; SOFOFA and the executive therefore collaborated in turning Chile towards protectionism. SOFOFA's effective lobbying helped maintain a moderate level of protectionism throughout the 1920s. See Daniel Lederman, *The Political Economy of Protection: Theory and the Chilean Experience* (Stanford, 2005), pp. 56-63.

during the D'Abernon mission in 1929 was overturned when the Senate refused to ratify the Anglo-Argentine agreements.[49]

In theory, therefore, Congress had the capacity to play a major role in policymaking in both countries, a role that was not always taken in practice. Congress was, in most international questions, a secondary influence on policy. The legislature did, however, directly affect foreign policy in terms of political economy. By controlling tariff policy and by providing different economic interests with a platform, Congress played a role in policymaking. Yet, in the overall policy bargaining game, it remained secondary to the executive.

*The Military*

The Military was another state actor that played a secondary role in Argentine and Chilean policymaking. In both countries, the military establishment's political role was limited in the 1880s and gradually increased in the following decades. Chilean military officers had throughout the nineteenth century been involved in politics, but the military establishment did not constitute a political force until the Civil War of 1891, as Alejandro San Francisco has shown.[50] Over the next two decades, the military officially maintained a cautious distance from politics, although groups within the establishment continued to seek political influence. The Liga Militar and the Liga Naval, which together considered enacting a coup against the Barros Luco government in 1912, are clear examples. The introduction of men of middle-class

[49] See Roger Gravil, 'Anglo-U.S. Trade Rivalry in Argentina and the D'Abernon Mission of 1929' in Rock (ed), *Argentina in the Twentieth Century*. Also see Roy Hora, *The Landowners of the Argentine Pampas: A Social and Political History 1860-1945* (Oxford, 2001), p. 183.
[50] Alejandro San Francisco, *La guerra civil de 1891: la irrupción política de los militares en Chile* (Santiago, 2007).

background into the lower-levels of the officer corps through the professionalization of the military encouraged some sectors of the military to demand radical political reform of the oligarchic Parliamentary regime. Yet, there was no defined middle-class political programme within the military; politically active military groups in the 1910s often supported different oligarchic factions.[51] Frustrations over corruption and ineffective administration and fears of leftist threats from a militant labour movement combined to inspire an attempted coup in 1919. Five years later, junior officers established a military committee that eventually forced Alessandri out of office.[52] The dictatorship of General Ibáñez also granted the military a central role in the national 'regeneración' that guided Ibáñez's political programme.

The military was, therefore, a significant political actor at times, but in general did not become incorporated into the partisan struggles that dominated Chilean politics from the 1880s to the mid-1920s.[53] It was occasionally involved in foreign policymaking. Delegations to the Pan-American Conferences after 1906, for example, included military personnel as advisers. Nonetheless, the military's role in foreign policy was – perhaps surprisingly – minimal. Except during the rare occasion of a serious threat of armed conflict (such as the arms race with Argentina in the 1890s and a particularly tense period in Tacna-Arica negotiations in the mid-1920s), the Cancillería records reveal little concern for military opinion regarding foreign policy. For its part, the military seemed to direct its concern more at internal disorder than external threats; this was possible due to the absence of such threats after the Pactos de Mayo of 1902.

[51] See Alain Joxe, *Las fuerzas armadas en el sistema político de Chile* (Santiago, 1970).
[52] For more on the military and politics in the 1920s, see Frederick Nunn, *Chilean Politics, 1920-31: The Honorable Mission of the Armed Forces* (Albuquerque, 1970). Also Patricio Quiroga and Carlos Maldonado, *El prusianismo en las fuerzas armadas chilenas: un estudio histórico 1885-1945* (Santiago, 1988).
[53] Another look at the role of the military can be found in Federico Gil, *The Political System of Chile* (Boston, 1966), pp. 94-96.

Even during negotiations over the Tacna-Arica dispute in the 1920s, anxiety within the military was more anxious about foreign leftist agents in the northern provinces than any foreign government, Peruvian or otherwise.[54] When groups from within the military imposed government by junta (as in 1924 and 1925), they respected the civilian bureaucratic organization of the Cancillería and appointed civilians with Cancillería or international law experience as Foreign Ministers. Ibáñez continued this practice; none of his foreign ministers were military officers (rather, he chose lawyers and journalists). After 1924, however, all of the Ministers of War and Navy were military officers.

In Argentina, the military was also a secondary actor but stronger in policymaking than in Chile. In the 1880s, the military's role in foreign policymaking was important, though focused on questions of national security. The threat of armed conflict with Chile in the 1890s caused military leaders to push for increased military expenditure and negotiate purchases with foreign governments. As a result, Argentina significantly increased its military capacity, almost doubling the total tonnage of its navy between 1895 and 1898 alone.[55] Military leadership had an important voice in policy debates during the presidencies and ministries of politicians with military connections. Roca, who had seen the army as a pretorian guard and tool to subordinate provincial governments in his first term (1880-84), maintained strong links to the military establishment during his second presidency (1898-1904).[56] One of his closest advisors was General Pablo Riccheri, who served as Minister of War.

[54] There is an exception to this: 'Don Ladislao's War' of 1920, when rumours of potential Bolivian and Peruvian joint action to reclaim territory lost in the War of the Pacific led the War Minister Ladislao Errázuriz to mobilize forces to the north. The mobilization, nonetheless, was more of a ploy by politicians opposing Alessandri (whose election to the presidency they feared in 1920) than an example of military pressure on the civilian government. See Deutsch, *Las Derechas*, p. 64.
[55] Escudé and Cisneros, *Historia general*, vii, 43-48.
[56] Marvin Goldwert, 'The Rise of Modern Militarism in Argentina' *HAHR* 48:2 (1968), p. 190.

As in Chile, the professionalization of the army in the late 1890s led to the incorporation of men from outside the elite (often sons of immigrant families) into the junior officer corps.[57] These junior officers became politicized earlier than their Chilean counterparts: some supported the Radical revolution in 1905.[58] In the late 1910s, military leadership became increasingly politicized as military promotion during the Yrigoyen administration depended on political patronage. Reaction against this practice within the military establishment led to the formation of a military pressure group, the *Logia General San Martín*. Its main complaint was, however, the very politicization of the military; its members did not criticize the direction of Argentina's foreign policy or Yrigoyen's policies in general.[59]

The military establishment had connections to other important policymakers such as Estanislao Zeballos Hailing from a military family, Zeballos was well known within the military's social club, the Circular Militar, which published a number of his commentaries. This personal connection may have fuelled Zeballos's strident support of increased military spending and of a stronger Argentine presence on the international stage.[60] Military officers also occasionally joined the Foreign Ministry. For example, General Dellepiane, who led the *yrigoyenista* faction in the military, served as the head of the Ministry's Section on International Boundaries under Alvear. Unlike in Chile, in Argentina military officers usually headed the military ministries. The military establishment, therefore, had a more prominent role in Argentine executive bargaining over policy.

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[57] See Robert Potash, *The Army & Politics in Argentina, 1928-1945: Yrigoyen to Perón* (Stanford, 1969). Also Alain Rouquié, *Poder militar y sociedad política en la Argentina* (Buenos Aires, 1981).
[58] Rock, *Argentine Politics*, p. 48.
[59] Military officers also joined right-wing movements such as the Liga Patriótica Argentina; in fact, military men provided seventeen percent of the Liga's leaders. See Deutsch, *Las Derechas*, p. 88.
[60] Lacoste, 'Estanislao Zeballos y la política exterior Argentina con Brasil y Chile' *Revista Confluencia* 1:2 (2003) p. 109.

The opinion of the military establishment influenced certain policy decisions. Regional armament discussions are an obvious example. Support for limitation discussions in the early 1920s coincided with pressure on Congress to purchase new military equipment from Europe as requested by the military. The discrepancy in these initiatives did not escape the harsh criticism of vitriolic opponent of the Radical government, Deputy Lisandro de la Torre. In defending against these attacks, Gallardo worked in tandem with Minister of War Colonel Agustín P. Justo and explained their intentions: the good relations the government had cultivated with Argentina's neighbours and Argentina's willingness to discuss arms limitations had reduced suspicions among the regional powers. This provided auspicious circumstances to 'renovar' (rather than increase) Argentina's military equipment.[61] Congress ultimately agreed to the executive's request and authorized the military's programme. Thus, foreign policy served the interests of the military in a manner calculated to reduce risk of Brazilian and Chilean retaliation and maintain Argentina's image as a peaceful influence in the Americas.[62]

Although military actors were present in foreign policy discussions, their participation was limited. As in Chile, the army directed more attention to internal threats than foreign ones. The senior army officer corps, a bastion of the elite, was particularly worried about the rise of anarchist labour agitation from the 1900s onwards. During the Semana Trágica of 1919 (an outburst of violence against immigrant communities in Buenos Aires initially sparked by a labour strike), the army forced Yrigoyen's

[61] Gallardo, *Memorias*, p. 352.
[62] Unsurprisingly, the plan did not succeed; instead, Brazil and Chile saw through Argentine rhetoric of cooperation and peace and questioned the intentions of Argentina's new armament programme. For a recent analysis of the occasionally tense relationship between Argentina and Brazil, see David Mares, *Violent Peace: Militarized Interstate Bargaining in Latin America* (New York, 2013), pp. 123-27.

administration to use violent repression.[63] Throughout the 1920s, the army continued to focus on repressing threats to the internal social and economic order. Naval officers demonstrated more sustained interest in foreign affairs (particularly relating to the balance of naval power in South America) but also joined their counterparts in the army in denouncing internal threats. Therefore, although the Argentine military establishment had a stronger position from which to affect foreign policy, their concern for internal order meant that they left most international questions to other policymakers.

*Organizational Factors in Pan-American Policies*

Policymaking in both countries, therefore, involved a complex matrix of actors, institutions and bureaucracies. Understanding the participants and their relative importance in policy discussions sheds light on major policies, including Pan-Americanism. As the following section will demonstrate, the organization of policymaking was an important factor in the overall development of Pan-American approaches in both countries. Changes in bureaucracy and the shifting bargaining position of the various actors affected the gradual engagement in Pan-American cooperation seen before the First World War and sustained participation in the post-War period. Understanding of the bureaucratic networks helps illuminate why opinions of the US were not often the determining factor of Pan-American policies.

Initial indifference to modern Pan-Americanism in the 1890s should be understood within the context of insufficient ministerial capacity (that is, a small staff in the

[63] Rock, *Argentine Politics*, p. 179.

foreign ministry) in an era of rapidly expanding international interests for both Chile and Argentina. Both the Cancillería and the Ministerio, still heavily dependent on the Foreign Minister and his immediate subordinates to study and determine policy matters, were unable to give attention to issues of low priority such as the Commercial Bureau and early Pan-American efforts. Other more pressing matters of foreign policy, not least the ongoing border controversy between Chile and Argentina, monopolized attention in the ministries. A regional cooperation project with an uncertain future, as Pan-Americanism was in that decade, thus received little consideration.

Other state actors were also preoccupied with pressing domestic political questions. In fact, both Argentina and Chile faced political crisis from late 1889 into the early 1890s. In Argentina, the economic policies of Juárez Celman's administration and the mismanagement of investments by the British Baring Brothers & Co. led to serious financial difficulties by 1889 and an economic collapse in 1890-91.[64] Luis Varela (a renowned intellectual, lawyer, politician, and writer of detective novels under the anagramatic pseudonym Raúl Waleis) expressed the concerns of many Argentine elites in a letter to Juárez Celman in September 1889: 'la crisis que viene forzosamente es peor que una epidemia.'[65] The impending crisis dominated Argentine political debate and encouraged the coalescence of the UCR, the first organized opposition to the PAN since 1880. Riots in Buenos Aires over plummeting real wages amplified political unrest and absorbed the attention of Argentina's political elite just as the International Conference of American States was underway in Washington. Hopes for European help in resolving the financial crisis and fears of

[64] For more on the causes and consequences of the Baring Crisis, see HS Ferns, 'The Baring Crisis Revisited' *Journal of Latin American Studies* 24:2 (1992).
[65] Varela to Juárez Celman, 19 September 1889, AGNA VII fol. 1976.

alienating European investors also made executive and legislative policymakers less receptive to any initiative that appeared antagonistic to European interests. With the major actors in policymaking focused on the Baring Crisis, the Argentine delegates in Washington gained significant authority in formulating Argentine policy on the spot. Roque Sáenz Peña, an advocate of regional cooperation led by Argentina and not the US, set the tone of Argentina's antagonism.

The Chilean government found itself similarly distracted as the Washington Conference approached. Political enemies of President Balmaceda amplified their attacks on the president and the presidential system that had been in place since 1833. Alleging that Balmaceda had overreached his constitutional powers, congressional opposition (in control of both chambers) demanded reforms to increase Congress's power vis-à-vis the executive. Balmaceda's refusal to heed Congress's demands led to extreme polarization of Chilean politics and a split within Balmaceda's own Liberal Party. Political crisis forced Balmaceda to focus on domestic issues. Harold Blakemore argued that Balmaceda was adept at employing foreign policy, such as relations with the Vatican, to quell domestic opposition.[66] Pan-American policy is possibly another example. The defence of Tacna-Arica was a point of general consensus within the Chilean political class that Balmaceda could use to garner broad support despite domestic political divisions. A subpar performance of the Chilean representatives in Washington would be harmful to Balmaceda as it would give his political enemies an opportunity to attack his ability to defend a generally accepted matter of national interest. Chilean antagonism to Pan-Americanism based on obligatory arbitration was, for Balmaceda, not merely a matter of Chile's place within

[66] Harold Blakemore, 'From the War of the Pacific to 1930' in Leslie Bethell (ed), *Chile Since Independence* (Cambridge, 1993), p. 46.

the international system but also a matter of domestic politics.[67] After instructing the Chilean delegates on Tacna-Arica's defence, the Cancillería's small bureaucracy turned to other questions and Balmaceda became increasingly absorbed in domestic issues. Chile's representatives in Washington complained of the paucity of instructions and, given their uncertainty regarding the official position, acted with caution.

The Civil War of 1891, which lasted from January to August, resulted in thousands of casualties (including Balmaceda, who committed suicide after his side capitulated) and general political upheaval. The victorious congresionalistas focused their attention on consolidating the new political regime, a process that involved widespread political persecution of balmacedistas, many of whom had held positions in the Cancillería and diplomatic corps.[68] Partisan politics became even more contested as political parties gained control of the formerly presidential system. The general upheaval and uncertainty encouraged retrenchment in foreign policy compared to the expansionist programme under Balmaceda. Lingering concerns over Tacna-Arica and growing anxiety over the threat of Argentine aggression also led to a more cautious and defensive foreign policy. As the weakened presidency attempted to curb partisan bickering and the foreign minister portfolio changed hands fifteen times between 1891 and 1900, foreign policymaking lacked leadership. Moreover, the new foreign minister (Isidoro Errázuriz) in 1891 replaced all the Cancillería's personnel in one fell swoop. This politically motivated decision added to the general

[67] Another look at the nexus between Balmaceda's internal and external policies can be found in Francisco Vicuña Orrego, 'La política internacional de Balmaceda en el área del Pacífico' in Club José Manuel Balmaceda, *Visión y verdad sobre Balmaceda* (Santiago, 1972). As the title implies, there is an agenda of revision and the essays tend to overstate Balmaceda's agency and celebrate the president's record while ignoring some of his failures. Nonetheless, it is a useful book.

[68] By 1894, however, this had subsided and the majority of Balmacedistas were re-integrated into the political system, eventually forming the Liberal Democratic Party.

confusion in the Cancillería that lasted for several years.[69] In 1898, one astute observer noted disparagingly that uncertainty in Chilean foreign policy since 1891 had its 'oríjen en la anarquía de nuestra política interior.'[70] Internal political disorder enhanced concerns about external vulnerability and, in this context, military leaders pushed for an aggressive armament programme that aggravated the arms race with Argentina. Confusion in the ministry, upheaval in domestic politics, and concern in the military over trans-Andean threats contributed to a general disinterest in the fledgling Pan-American project in the 1890s.

Caution did not remove Chile from the international stage, however. In 1892-96, Chile sent representatives to thirty-seven international conferences on issues such as the labour legislation (1893), military medicine (1895), and pedagogy (1895 and 1896).[71] By the 1900s, complaints about directionless foreign policy were increasingly sensationalist, as the sub-secretary and diplomats provided continuity in Chilean foreign policy despite the rotating ministry. In the early 1900s the country expanded the range of its international activities and resolved a number of pressing international issues (the Pactos de Mayo of 1902 and the Treaty of Peace and Friendship with Bolivia of 1904 being the most significant examples). Domestic politics had by then settled down: the party system had solidified and electoral politics (while more intense) were normalized. By the end of the 1890s, the president and his ministers were better equipped to direct foreign policy. Presidents Germán Riesco and Pedro Montt were more adept at managing parliamentary politics and directing

[69] This was, as Mario Barros notes, 'la mas grande expulsión en masa de la historia del servicio.' The effect was not as drastic as might be assumed. Indeed, the majority of diplomats abroad were retained and these diplomats helped maintain stability in Chile's foreign relations. See Barros, *El Ministerio*, pp. 81-82.
[70] Francisco Valdés Vergara to Prieto, 20 May 1898, ANH FV280. Valdés was the Customs Officer in Valparaíso, a position that reflected his close connections to the Errázuriz Echuarren administration.
[71] Barros, *Historia Diplomatica*, p. 514.

policy than their predecessors. The Chilean government, therefore, was able to pay more attention to emerging international issues, such as the growing trend of Pan-American cooperation. Chile's gradual engagement with the activities of the PAU in the 1900s was possible because of these developments.

Argentina did not experience comparable regime change, but political upheaval still marked the 1890s and early 1900s. Although the PAN consolidated its hold on the federal government through an agreement orchestrated by Roca with factions within the rival Unión Cívica and the Partido Moderista, it also faced increasingly organized and vocal opposition from the UCR and the Socialist Party (established in 1896, it won its first seat in Congress in 1903). The UCR led another unsuccessful uprising in 1893. The political unrest that followed the Baring crisis remained a concern for the PAN elite until the presidency fell into the familiar hands of Roca in 1898. As in Chile, internal disorder and concerns over a trans-Andean threat left little time for Argentina to engage with US-led Pan-Americanism. During Roca's second term (1898-1904), however, the PAN's political machine appeared stable and almost unbeatable, leading the UCR to boycott elections for several years. Argentina's government began to consider expanding the republic's international influence, including support for reforms to the Commercial Bureau that increased Latin American influence. At the Mexico City Conference of 1901-02, Argentina pursued its claim as a hemispheric leader more aggressively. Although nervous military officers and sabre-rattling politicians in congress continued to push for a military build-up to face a potential Chilean threat, Roca's preference for a negotiated settlement (a position backed by his Foreign Minister, Amancio Alcorta) ultimately set Argentina on the path towards signing the Pactos de Mayo. Political uncertainty

again absorbed the attention of Argentina's politicians during another UCR revolutionary attempt in 1905.

The ministerial reforms of the late 1890s and early 1900s, a common experience in both countries, expanded state bureaucracies and, in doing so, increased the capacity of the governments to engage in Pan-American cooperation. Preparation for Pan-American activities increased significantly, reflecting the greater importance that the later conferences held in the eyes of the policymakers and the greater capacity of the ministries to provide such preparation. The difference between 1889 and 1906 is striking. The delegations to the Washington Conference in 1889 received minimal instructions and often felt unprepared during the proceedings. The delegations to the 1906 Rio de Janeiro Conference, however, had met with ministerial officials and discussed the programme at length prior to departure; they carried detailed instructions and were assured that they could clarify points of policy by telegraph.

Increased bureaucratic capacity and advances in communications technology did not cause shifts in Pan-American policy, but rather facilitated closer engagement with Pan-American questions and partly shielded Pan-American policy from fluctuations in the political sphere. For example, when the Chilean presidency changed hands in rapid succession in 1910 after the death of President Pedro Montt, Chilean foreign policy was not affected.[72] By the late 1900s, standard operating procedures had developed in the policymaking bureaucracies of both countries, giving continuity to policies towards Pan-American cooperation. Despite fluctuating attitudes towards US

[72] President Montt, falling ill in 1910, took a leave of absence and his Interior Minister, Elías Fernández y Albano, served as acting president. Shortly after Montt's death, Fernández himself fell ill (allegedly catching a cold at Montt's funeral) and died less than a month later. Fernández's Interior Minister, Emiliano Figueroa Larraín, then served as acting president until Ramón Barros Luco became president by election later in 1910.

policy in Latin America and occasional challenges to participation in the Bureau/PAU, withdrawal from Pan-American institutions was not seriously considered; participation in them had become a standard way of engaging with the US and in inter-American affairs.

The persistence of Pan-American cooperation as an element of inter-American relations changed the bureaucratic organization of policymaking by encouraging governments to establish Pan-American institutions. A clear example was the Pan-American Commissions of the late 1900s. The years following the Commissions' foundation were marked by heightened Chilean and Argentine participation in Pan-American cooperation. In the early 1910s, with massive public works projects such as a longitudinal railway in Chile and a major electoral reform project in Argentina, the president and congress delegated more responsibility to the ministerial bureaucracy, including new Pan-American bodies. In Argentina, President Roque Sáenz Peña (1910-14) did not reverse Argentina's positive Pan-American policy despite his distrust of US influence in Latin America and his previous opposition to Blaine's project in 1889-90. Instead, he allowed his Vice President (Victorino de la Plaza) and foreign minister (Ernesto Bosch) to take the lead in foreign policy. Despite Bosch's doubts over Pan-Americanism's practicality, he believed that participation was necessary to further Argentina's claim to hemispheric leadership. The Argentine Minister in Washington, Rómulo Naón, also advocated Pan-American cooperation; he wrote to the Ministerio in 1915 of 'la necesidad de erigir el Panamericanismo en la idea fundamental y directriz de la política internacional americana.'[73]

[73] Naón to José Murature, 21 May 1915, AGNA VII folio 349.

As the range of Pan-American activity expanded in the 1910s, so did the ministerial bureaucracy in Chile and Argentina. The division of labour within the ministries shifted many Pan-American questions, especially second-dimension issues, away from major policy debates and allowed Chilean and Argentine participation to proceed. First-dimension Pan-American initiatives, such as the Niagara Falls mediation conference and Wilson's Pan-American Pact, received more attention from the president and foreign minister. With de la Plaza as president from 1914 to 1916, José Murature (who was a strong supporter of upgrading Argentina's representation in Washington to an Ambassadorship) as foreign minister, and a ministerial bureaucracy built around participation in Pan-American cooperation, Argentine commitment in the mid-1910s was possible despite reservations among other policymakers, especially in Congress and the military.[74] Chile's president, Ramón Barros Luco, was in contrast largely uninterested in foreign affairs.[75] The Foreign Minister and Chilean Ambassador to Washington harboured concerns about Wilson's Pan-American Pact (thereby providing the driving force behind Chilean opposition to it), yet also worked in conjunction with the ministerial bureaucracy to keep Chile involved in other forms of Pan-American cooperation. By the 1920s, the establishment of Pan-American offices in both foreign ministries further institutionalized Pan-American cooperation and provided specialized attention to Pan-American questions. Much like the late

[74] These reservations were towards concerns of limiting Argentina's foreign policy options. Similar logic was used in opposing ABC treaty of 1915 - see Andrés Rivarola Puntigliano and José Briceño-Ruiz, *Resilience of Regionalism in Latin America and the Caribbean: Developement and Autonomy* (Basingstoke, 2013), p. 213-14.

[75] In fact, contemporaries and historians alike portrayed Barros Luco as a *laissez-faire* president in many regards. His opponents liked to portray him as an old man asleep at the helm. Historians Alberto Edwards and Eduardo Frei noted: 'su imagen más aproximada es la de un anciano que duerme una larga siesta en el sillón presidencial' (Edwards and Frei, *Historia de los partidos políticos chilenos* (Santiago, 1949), p. 181).

1900s, positive attitudes towards Pan-Americanism in 1919-20 led to institutions that sustained participation in Pan-American cooperation.

In the post-war period, the cast of characters in both Pan-American cooperation and the policymaking process in Argentina and Chile increased in number and complexity. In the ministries of both countries official legal advisors gained more influence in policymaking discussions. Although the policymakers of Chile and Argentina were often familiar with international law, the addition of *asesores letrados* in the 1910s brought a clearer juridical voice to policy debates. These advisors were part of the formulation of Pan-American policy; their advice was sought in the preparation of Conference delegations and their arguments were useful in justifying policy decisions. They became particularly significant as international law gradually gained a central place in the definition of inter-American relations (a process that will be discussed in Chapter Seven). The legal advisors in both ministries used the work of the AIIL (occasionally they were key actors in it - Alejandro Álvarez, for example), though Argentine jurists often challenged its arguments. The possibility of building a hemispheric order based on international law through Pan-American cooperation increased the appeal of Pan-Americanism to some jurists within the policymaking bureaucracy.

Due to the technical nature of many Pan-American activities, the foreign ministries became more reliant on their fellow executive ministries. In Chile, the other ministries were often delegated the task of deciding on participation in technical

congresses.[76] Argentine ministries held similar responsibilities, though the archival evidence does not give such a definite sense of delegation of responsibility as in the Chilean case.[77] In both cases, the transfer of decision-making to entities outside the Foreign Ministry kept many aspects of Chilean and Argentine participation in Pan-American cooperation distinct from wider debates over 'political' questions such as arbitration and US intervention in Latin America. Organizations that had greater interest in the discussions and possible outcomes of technical conferences could successfully maintain their country's participation in that strand of Pan-Americanism. For example, Argentina attended the 1924 Pan-American Conference on Electrical Communication, despite doubts in some ministries over the value of sending a delegation, because the Interior Ministry's Dirección General de Correos y Telégrafos decided Argentina would benefit from the information exchanged.[78] Delegation to other ministries was important for Chile's continued engagement in international meetings in the end of the 1920s. The Foreign Minister, Ríos Gallardo, disliked the rapid increase in international conferences and hoped to reduce Chile's attendance.[79] Congress seemed to agree with Ríos Gallardo, cutting the funding available to the Cancillería for sending delegations. Yet Chile's participation did not decline significantly as the entities with greater stake in participation continued to nominate

[76] See the lists of invitations to international events recorded in the Cancillería's *Memorias* from 1927 onwards, which include notes on the ministries responsible for answering invitations received.
[77] The reason for this distinction is uncertain, though it may have to do with the size of the ministerial bureaucracies. Argentina's foreign ministry bureaucracy was more than double that of Chile and thus had greater capacity.
[78] See the correspondence between the Dirección, the Interior Ministry and the Foreign Ministry in AMRECIC Series 25 Box 23:XI.
[79] He wrote to the Chilean Ambassador in Rio de Janeiro, Alfredo Irarrázaval: 'no tengo fé en las Conferencias internacionales, aunque sean de caracter económico y respecto a ellas estimo que, desgraciadamente, el único resultado práctico que arrojan, es una positiva perdida de tiempo y de dinero' (23 September 1927, AMRREE CRG Tome I).

delegates.[80] A noticeable decrease occurred only after the economic collapse in 1931, a result of the Great Depression.

The strong position of the president in policymaking in the 1920s helps to explain the approaches to Pan-American cooperation. President Alessandri in Chile added momentum to Chilean Pan-American participation in the early 1920s as part of his administration's goal of enhancing Chile's international profile and creating favourable circumstances for a resolution of Tacna-Arica, despite the concern of some politicians over US influence in Latin America and Chile.[81] At the end of the 1920s, President Ibáñez and Foreign Minister Ríos Gallardo were lukewarm towards Pan-Americanism, partly due to their desire to seek prestige in other ways (a point discussed in Chapter Five). Without a force like Alessandri behind Pan-American cooperation, Chilean participation in Pan-Americanism diminished. Argentina's President Yrigoyen, who made opposition to US oil interests in Argentina the centrepiece of his second presidential campaign and thus rejected the idea of US-led Pan-American financial cooperation, used the President's bargaining position to overturn Argentina's general policy of participation in the 1920s and to withdraw Argentina from Pan-American cooperation.

Support from the military contributed to positive policies towards Pan-Americanism in the early 1920s. The Chilean military hoped to use regional cooperation as a way to limit Argentine and Brazilian military expenditure, which Chile could not equal. Argentina's military, on the other hand, saw Pan-American cooperation as a tool to

[80] It should be noted that the Chilean government did not always pay for delegates to participate at technical conferences. Although they received government approval to act as official representatives, these 'ad-hoc' delegates were often private citizens that happened to be in the host city or were members of a civil society that paid for their attendance.
[81] For more on these concerns, see Pike, pp. 159-69.

distract or assuage suspicious neighbours while they enhanced Argentine military equipment. Pan-American cooperation was, therefore, practical in the eyes of military advisors and the defence ministries. For the rest of the decade, bureaucratic support helped maintain Argentine engagement in Pan-American cooperation despite political vicissitudes and fluctuations in official policy towards the role of the US in Latin America. In contrast, Chilean bureaucratic institutions geared towards Pan-Americanism ceased operations in the political turmoil of 1924-27. President Ibáñez's plans for national 'regeneración' included the modernization of military equipment, which lessened support from the President and the military for disarmament discussions.[82] These factors contributed to a moderate decline in Chilean participation in Pan-American cooperation, which was already on shaky ground due to the crumbling Tacna-Arica negotiations.

Throughout the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Congress in both countries affected Pan-American policy with its reluctance to ratify Pan-American agreements. Executive policymakers and diplomats employed the unlikelihood of ratification as an argument for less binding agreements such as resolutions, which were easier to ignore without damaging relations with other states or detracting from a cooperative image.[83] Congressional reluctance to ratify also gave the executive a freer hand in Pan-American negotiations. Government representatives could sign agreements for the sake of good relations (for example, Pan-American trademark and patent treaties to appease the US) with the knowledge that congressional inertia (and opposition) would insulate the republic from questionable stipulations. This tactic was

[82] Vial, *Historia de Chile*, iv, 303.
[83] This tactic was used in the Fourth and Fifth International Conferences of American States; see the delegation reports in Delegación Argentina to Carlos Rodriguez Larreta, 30 September 1910, AMRECIC Series 25 Box 6:IV and 'Informe presentado a S.E. el Ministro de Relaciones Exteriores por la delegación argentina' (1923), AMRECIC Series 25 Box 23 Annex to Folder X, p. 69.

particularly important for Argentina and was an underlying reason why the Argentine government managed to maintain a positive Pan-American policy even when a specific element of Pan-American cooperation seemed infeasible or impractical.[84]

Congress, as a key actor in determining the conditions of foreign commerce, had a strong position from which to bargain over Pan-American policy. The US Congress can be used as an example.[85] During the Washington Conference, Congress's proposal of a new tariff law that raised duties on many Latin American products, greatly undermined Blaine's push for an American customs union as Latin American (particularly Argentine and Chilean) participants openly questioned the US's commitment.[86] In Chile and Argentina, however, congressional debates over economic policy did not have as dramatic an effect. Although some voices from within Congress warned against the economic penetration of Chile and Argentina, neither legislature took real action to direct Pan-American policy. When Congress did act, it was often in conjunction with executive policymakers. For instance, when the US imposed its sanitary ban on Argentine beef imports in 1926, Congressional debates encouraged President Alvear's swift reaction against what was interpreted by many Argentine observers as a politically motivated decision.[87]

Tariff debates in Santiago and Buenos Aires had less impact on Pan-American discussions of trade due to the relative low rates of imports from the Americas

[84] Felipe Espil, one of Argentina's top diplomats, confessed to this perspective in 'Informe de Felipe Espil', 30 March 1928, AMRECIC Series 25 Box 27:XI, p. 86.
[85] Joseph Smith's article ('The First International Conference') in Sheinin's *Beyond the Ideal* volume is a notable example. See also the recent article, Benjamin A. Coates, 'The Pan-American Lobbyist: William Eleroy Curtis and U.S. Empire, 1884-1899' *Diplomatic History* 38:1 (2014). For the most insightful look at the 1900s-20s, see Robert Seidel's 'Progressive Pan-Americanism'.
[86] Smith, 'The First International Conference', p. 10.
[87] David Sheinin, 'Defying Infection: Argentine Foot-and-Mouth Disease Policy, 1900-1930' *Canadian Journal of History* 29:3 (1994), pp. 512-14.

compared to imports from Europe before the First World War. In fact, the Americas in total provided less than thirty percent of Chile's imports and less than twenty-five of Argentina's.[88] In the 1920s, congressional debates over stricter protectionist measures (which eventually yielded new tariff laws in Chile in 1921 and Argentina in 1927) perhaps tempered promotion of Pan-American trade but did not prevent the Chilean and Argentine governments from endorsing the reduction of trade barriers in the Americas. More important to Argentine and Chilean foreign policy were debates in the US congress over tariffs. Indeed, it was the 1922 and 1927 tariff laws in the US and not tariff debates in the Argentine congress that led the Alvear government in 1927 to suggest closer trade ties to Britain.[89] Yet Alvear's suggestion was more politics than policy, rhetoric gauged to gain support in domestic politics while the Ministerio instructed Argentina's delegation to cooperate with the US in commercial questions at the 1928 Havana Conference.

*Conclusion*

Policymaking in both countries was a complicated process involving multiple stakeholders and an expanding bureaucracy. While a more extensive 'bureaucratic politics' analysis is difficult given source limitations, lessons drawn from Allison's models are nonetheless useful. Patterns in the overall development of policymaking networks help to explain why Chile and Argentina gradually engaged with Pan-Americanism and maintained that engagement despite fluctuations in the 1920s. The

[88] These estimations are based on a combination of data from Bulmer-Thomas, *The Economic History*, p. 156 and José Peres Cajías, Marc Badia-Miró and Anna Carreras-Marín, 'Interregional trade in South America, 1912-50. Economic linkages before institutional agreements' *Economic History of Developing Regions* 28:2 (2013), p. 17.
[89] See Peterson, *Argentina and the US*, p. 355.

Foreign Ministry and the President were clearly the most important voices in policy discussions, but they were not alone. Also, the Foreign Ministries were not monolithic institutions, but rather an increasingly diversified network of politicians, diplomats, bureaucrats, and international legal experts. In the 1880s and 1890s, before this bureaucracy developed and during a period of acute political crisis in both countries, neither government had the political will or the institutional capacity to engage with a new form of regional cooperation with an uncertain future and serious political implications. In the 1900s, however, reforms of the ministries made it possible for both countries to better deal with an expanding range of international questions. The ministries' increasing complexity paralleled the growing complexity of Pan-American cooperation. Responsibility for determining Pan-American policy gradually shifted away from the foreign minister and president to the bureaucracy in executive ministries. In addition, actors from the legislature and military participated in policy decisions, though mainly as secondary influences. The diffusion of policymaking had the significant effect of distancing many aspects of Pan-Americanism from controversial questions, such as US intervention in Latin America.

By 1910, both countries had established routines of Pan-American participation, entrenched by the establishment of Pan-American commissions and offices. It appears that Pan-American cooperation had become a norm not only in inter-American relations, but also in the operating procedures of the Chilean and Argentine governments by the mid-1910s (instead of the late 1920s, as Pike has argued).[90] There were significant detractors, and occasionally these actors were able to change the routine. Yrigoyen is an important example. His assertive use of presidential

[90] Pike, *Chile and the US*, p. 224-28.

control over foreign policy caused Argentina to withdraw from some aspects of Pan-American cooperation. Yet despite Yrigoyen's anti-Pan-American tone, Argentina still participated in several second-dimension events.

Although the bureaucracies provided a framework for policymaking, for policy continuity, and for engagement in an expanded field of international affairs, they did not determine the preferences of the actors within the network. The individual actors, while working within organizational perimeters, still had considerable agency in policymaking. Following chapters will look more closely at preferences and practical considerations. The next chapter, however, will continue to examine who was involved in policymaking by focusing on the influence and activities of non-state actors.

# Chapter 5

# Non-State Actors and Public Opinion

Another important theme that emerges from the narrative of Argentine and Chilean participation in Pan-Americanism is the contribution of non-state (or civil society) actors, particularly in the second dimension of Pan-Americanism. By forming groups to influence foreign policy, non-state actors influenced the trajectory of Chilean and Argentine approaches to Pan-Americanism. More significantly, non-state groups contributed directly to international relations by initiating and developing transnational movements and organizations. Official policymakers recognized the importance of these non-state actors and of the public perception of foreign policy. The label 'non-state' can be slightly misleading as many of these actors had connections to the state. They often had close ties to state institutions, political parties, and individual politicians. Their actions on the international stage occasionally received official support from governments. Non-state international movements between the 1880s and the 1920s often used state institutions in order to promote organization and enhance legitimacy. Non-state actors frequently used official routes to send invitations for conferences, for example. In addition, many events that involved state actors were the initiatives of 'non-state' groups; the Latin American and Pan-American Scientific Congresses are good examples. The fundamental characteristic of non-state actors was this: they did not claim (or were not authorized) to represent or act on the behalf of a government or state institution.

Foreign policymaking institutions were not insulated from the influence of non-state actors. Many groups from within civil society – business associations, social

activists, intellectuals, and the press – actively sought to shape foreign policy. The role of public opinion, or at least the perception of public opinion held by policymakers, was also a significant factor in policy decisions. This chapter will analyze how non-state actors and public opinion shaped Argentine and Chilean approaches to Pan-Americanism. Emphasis will be placed on actors that were important to Pan-American issues, including businessmen and women's rights activists. Other civil society actors will receive brief attention, including the Roman Catholic Church.

The focus on non-state actors in this chapter is supported by important theoretical trends in history and IR. Historiographically, the study of non-state and civil-society actors in international history is not a new approach. The activities and influence of private businesses, for example, has long been a subject of considerable interest for historians of imperialism.[1] Interwar internationalism in Europe and North America also attracted attention, but this research often focused on the internationalism of state actors (Woodrow Wilson being a prime subject), on institutions, and on inter-governmental organisations.[2] More recently, close examination of non-state actors has become a defining feature of international, 'new diplomatic', global, and transnational history.[3]

[1] A good overview of these debates, critical to claims of 'business imperialism', can be found in DCM Platt (ed), *Business Imperialism, 1840-1930: An Inquiry based on British Experience in Latin America* (Oxford, 1977). Much less has been written about Latin American businesses and their impact on international affairs. See Carlos Dávila and Rory Miller (eds), *Business History in Latin America: The Experience of Seven Countries* (Liverpool, 1999).

[2] See, for example, HLS Lyons, *Internationalism in Europe, 1815-1914* (Leiden, 1963) and Sondra Herman, *Eleven against War: Studies in American Internationalist Thought, 1890-1921* (Stanford, 1969).

[3] For an introduction to these literatures, see Bruce Mazlish and Akira Iriye (eds), *The Global History Reader* (London, 2005), which describes the 'new global history' as different from state-centred histories.

In IR, the role of non-state actors and 'transnational relations' emerged as a major scholarly controversy in the 1970s.[4] Defining 'transnational' has proven to be difficult. Thomas Risse-Kappen defined the nebulous term as 'regular interactions across national boundaries when at least one actor is a non-state agent or does not operate on behalf of a national government or an intergovernmental organization,' which does little to narrow the field of study (indeed, almost all international trade can be included).[5] Yet perhaps that is the point; it is a term useful in highlighting broader elements of international relations and not a strong foundation for theoretical models. Indeed, the debates of the 1970s did not produce a 'transnational' theory in IR, but rather led to a narrower theoretical paradigm: neoliberal institutionalism.[6] Since the mid-1990s, however, interest in the fundamental elements of the debate, particularly the participation of non-state actors in international relations, has increased. A relevant example is regionalism studies; the systematic analysis of non-state and transnational activity has been one of the most important innovations in explaining modern regionalism in the Americas.[7]

'Multi-track diplomacy' and 'citizens' diplomacy' are two other frameworks that developed in the last quarter century, though they have made a considerably smaller

[4] A significant work that defined the debate in the 1970s was Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye's *Transnational Relations and World Politics* (Cambridge, MA, 1971).
[5] Thomas Risse-Kappen, 'Bringing Transnational Relations Back In: An Introduction' in Risse-Kappen (ed), *Bringing Transnational Relations Back In: Non-State Actors, Domestic Structures and International Relations* (Cambridge, 1995), p. 3. This introductory chapter gives a good general sense of the debate over non-state actors in IR theory in the late twentieth century. The essays that follow offer examples of how the study of non-state actors can contribute to understanding current international affairs.
[6] For a recent work that discusses and employs the neoliberal institutionalist framework, see Helen Milner and Andrew Moravscik (eds), *Power, Interdependence and Nonstate Actors in World Politics* (Princeton, 2009).
[7] See the chapters by Blanca Torres ('Transnational Actors and NAFTA: the Search for Coalitions on Labor and the Environment') and Roberto Korzeniewicz and William Smith ('Transnational Civil Society Actors and Regional Governance in the Americas: Elite Projects and Collective Action from Below') in Fawcett and Serrano (ed), *Regionalism*.

splash in IR theoretical waters.[8] Applied mainly in conflict-resolution literature, they highlight civil-society participation in international peace efforts. The international dimension of civil society advocacy has also been the subject of fruitful research in other areas of political science. Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, for example, have provided valuable theoretical and empirical analysis of what they term 'Transnational Advocacy Networks' (TANs). Keck and Sikkink define these networks as 'actors working internationally on an issue, who are bound together by shared values, a common discourse, and dense exchanges of information and services.'[9] An interesting aspect of their research has been the 'boomerang effect': domestic activists using international connections and an international platform in order to pressure national governments.[10]

In this chapter, the influence of non-state actors will be examined from several angles. First, it will assess the impact of civil society groups on the policymaking process and argue that the pressure from such groups rarely determined the direction of foreign policy. Instead, the greatest impact that non-state actors had on Pan-American approaches in both countries was through direct participation in Pan-American cooperation. The final two sections of the chapter will examine the role that the press and public opinion played in Pan-American policy. Policymakers believed that they acted in front of a public audience, internationally and domestically, and shaped policy for that audience.

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[8] For an introduction to these concepts, see John Davies and Edward Kaufman (eds), *Second Track/Citizens' Diplomacy: Concepts and Techniques for Conflict Transformation* (Oxford, 2002); Louise Diamond and John McDonald, *Multi-Track Diplomacy: A Systems Approach to Peace* (West Hartford, CT, 1996); and John McDonald, 'Further Exploration of Track Two Diplomacy' in Louis Kriesberg and Stuart Thornson (eds), *Timing the De-Escalation of International Conflicts* (Syracuse, NY, 1991).

[9] Keck and Sikkink, 'Transnational Advocacy Networks in International and Regional Politics' *International Social Science Journal* 159 (1999), p. 89. See also Keck and Sikkink, *Activists Beyond Borders: Transnational Advocacy Networks in International Politics* (Ithaca, NY, 1998).

[10] Keck and Sikkink, *Activists Beyond Borders*, pp. 12-13.

*Non-state actors in policymaking*

Chilean and Argentine civil society in the late nineteenth-century was marked by a 'cultura de movilización', expressed most effectively through the formation of associations and societies.[11] From elite clubs and commercial associations to working-class mutual aid societies and multi-class Catholic Social Action groups, these organizations became instruments for influencing politics. Many of these groups had minor impact on foreign policymaking and paid little attention to foreign policy. Labour organizations, which increased significantly in militancy and organizational sophistication from the 1890s onwards, are an important example.[12] Ties to international socialist groups (including the Second and Third Internationals) added a transnational dimension to some labour groups, but the focus of organized labour in both countries was domestic. The radicalization of major labour organizations (which took place in the 1900s in Argentina and the 1910s in Chile) led to conflicted relationships with the ILO in the 1920s. More moderate unions, including several state-sponsored organizations in the 1920s, could pressure for greater state activism in international labour discussion and participated in those discussions through the ILO's tripartite structure. Yet their opinions were often marginalized and their knowledge of the ILO's work was limited in the 1920s.[13]

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[11] This phrase comes from Hilda Sábato's study of Argentine civil society and politics in the nineteenth century: *La política en las calles. Entre el voto y la movilización, Buenos Aires, 1862-1880* (Buenos Aires, 1998). See also Sábato's study of 'asociacionismo' in Roberto Di Stefano, et al., *De las cofradias a las organizaciones de la sociedad civil: História de la inciciativa asociativa en Argentina, 1776-1990* (Buenos Aires, 2002), pp. 99-165. For a view of Chilean civil society, see J. Samuel Valenzuela's 'Hacia La Formación de Instituciones Democráticas: Practicas Electorales en Chile durante el Siglo XIX' in *Estudios Públicos*, 66 (Autumn 1997).

[12] For a useful comparative history of labour in both countries, see Charles Bergquist, *Labor in Latin America: Comparative Essays on Chile, Argentina, Venezuela and Colombia* (Stanford, 1986).

[13] A report by the ILO's *International Labour Review* written on the occasion the return of Director General, Albert Thomas, from a trip to several South American countries published as "The Visit to

Other groups expressed opinions on foreign affairs, but were unable to effectively lobby for any particular course of action in foreign policy. Such was the case of right-wing nationalist groups, including the powerful Ligas Patrióticas.[14] Right-wing nationalists chiefly focused on domestic questions – pressuring the government to suppress labour agitation – but they also opposed foreign influence in Chile and Argentina and advocated a strong military. In Chile, the nationalists' influence was weak and their views on foreign affairs had minimal impact. In Argentina, on the other hand, these groups became prominent by the 1910s and were an important platform for sabre-rattling. Their influence on Pan-American policy was hindered, however, by the diversity of opinions among nationalists.[15] Some distrusted the spread of US influence, the presence of US business interests in Argentina, and the limits to independence of action implied by regional cooperation, while others admired the US and used Pan-Americanism as an example of distinct 'American' ideals in contrast to decadent European culture.[16] This divide kept them from constituting an effective lobbying force, yet they contributed to an atmosphere in which national interests were defined in terms of honour and national pride (a point that will be discussed later in this chapter).

Roman Catholic institutions were important to domestic politics in both countries, but they did not take a strong stance on most diplomatic questions, including Pan-

South America of the Director of the International Labour Organization" in *International Labour Review* 12:6 (1925) laments the lack of familiarity with the ILO among Chilean and Argentine labour organizations.

[14] See McGee Deutsch, *Las Derechas*, pp. 11-25, 59-106, and 143-192.

[15] As David Rock notes, the nationalist movement was appropriated by a variety of groups throughout the 1920s. See Rock, *Authoritarian Argentina: The Nationalist Movement, Its History and Its Impact* (Berkeley, 1993), pp. 55-56.

[16] Leopoldo Lugones, a leading nationalist, was among the latter group after the mid-1910s. See, for example, his article on 'Americanismo', originally printed in April 1917 and re-printed in Lugones, *Mi beligerancia* (Buenos Aires, 1917), pp. 181-91.

Americanism. From the 1880s to 1920s, the Vatican and the Church hierarchy were most concerned with defining the church-state relationship and combating secularization. In Argentina, some writers (particularly conservative nationalists, including Manuel Gálvez, Ricardo Rojas, Estanislao Zeballos, and Joaquín González) linked the Catholic faith to hispanismo, an ideological competitor to Pan-Americanism that celebrated cultural ties to Spain.[17] The Church itself was probably ambivalent towards Pan-Americanism (due to questions over Protestant US influence in Latin America), but it did not take a public stance in favour of hispanismo or in opposition to Pan-Americanism.[18] Diplomatically, the Vatican concentrated on maintaining good relations with the Argentine and Chilean governments by encouraging clergy to refrain from participation in confessional political parties and signing bilateral treaties.[19] Occasional controversies made relations with the Vatican a priority among foreign policy objectives. 1924-26 were years of acute tension, for example, as a crisis erupted in Argentina over the nomination of the Archbishop of Buenos Aires and the Chilean government pushed aggressively for the separation of church and state.[20] These debates detracted attention from Pan-American activities, but otherwise did not affect Pan-American policies.

[17] Jesús Méndez, 'Church-State Relations in Argentina in the Twentieth Century: A Case Study of the Thirty-second International Eucharistic Congress' *Journal of Church and State* 27 (1985), p. 227. For more information on the Church in Argentina before 1930, see Michael Burdick, *For God and the Fatherland: Religion and Politics in Argentina* (Albany, 1995), pp. 13-32.

[18] Pan-Americanism and Roman Catholicism were occasionally complementary forces. In the 1910s, for example, Roman Catholic clergy and Latin American diplomatic representatives in Washington, DC collaborated to initiate an annual Pan-American mass to be celebrated on Thanksgiving Day. For more on this failed attempt to combine Pan-Americanism and Roman Catholicism, see James Vivian, 'The Pan-American Mass, 1909-1914: A Rejected Contribution to Thanksgiving Day' *Church History* 51:3 (1982).

[19] Stephen Andes, *The Vatican & Catholic Activism in Mexico & Chile: The Politics of Transnational Catholicism, 1920-1940* (Oxford, 2014), pp. 9-17. Also see pages 30-38 and 105-44 for a good overview of Chilean church-state relations, particularly regarding the international dimension of the Catholic church in Chile.

[20] Gallardo's *Memorias* gives considerable attention to the episcopal controversy; see pages 353-64 and 367-87.

Other groups sought direct influence on policymaking. The Red Cross, national committees of which were established in Argentina in 1880 and in Chile in 1903, called on the governments of both countries to pursue humanitarian and peaceful foreign policies. It became a significant pacifist voice in public discourse during the First World War. The Red Cross national committees also encouraged positive approaches to Pan-Americanism by participating in two Pan-American congresses of the Red Cross, the first in Buenos Aires (1923), the second in Washington (1926). In Argentina, pressure groups focused on foreign policy emerged in the 1910s. Although the First World War sparked intense debates in both countries, only in Argentina did it prompt non-state actors to form defined interest groups, such as the Unión Pro-Neutralidad. A few interest groups had direct interest in Pan-American policymaking. The most important was the Asociación Latinoamericana, established by Manuel Ugarte in 1914. The Asociación, which gained a substantial following among university students, campaigned for latinoamericanismo as a front against US imperialism and Pan-Americanism.[21] The work of Ugarte and the Asociación helped keep anti-US latinoamericanismo a relevant element of the public discourse (to which Yrigoyen appealed in 1928-30), but also gave latinoamericanismo a radical leftist tint that worried many Argentine elites. Chile lacked similar groups, mainly due to the weaker presence of latinoamericanismo there (a point that will be developed in Chapter Seven).

Businesses, banks and commercial houses pressured the government to conduct aspects of its foreign policy to their advantage and individual businessmen took interest in issues in foreign affairs. The tensions between Argentina and Chile, for

[21] For an incisive look at Ugarte's thoughts on latinoamericanismo, see Miguel Ángel Barrios, *El latinoamericanismo en el pensamiento político de Manuel Ugarte* (Buenos Aires, 2007).

example, concerned many international creditors to the two countries, who feared disruption of loan re-payments. Representatives of Barings, H. Albert de Bary, and Rothschild all wrote directly to the Argentine president appealing for peaceful resolution of the tensions.[22] Similar documents do not appear in the records relating to Pan-Americanism. Nonetheless, the commercial nature of modern Pan-Americanism undoubtedly drew the attention of business groups, including the numerous international chambers of commerce operating in both countries. British chambers of commerce were established in 1910 in Argentina and 1917 in Chile, while US chambers were established in 1919 and 1918, respectively. These chambers were not effective lobbying groups, however. One detailed study of the British Chamber of Commerce in Argentina notes that the Chamber's heterogeneous composition (representing competing interests) prevented it from being pro-active in commercial policy.[23] Rather than acting as a pressure group, the British Chamber mainly reacted to government decisions and helped its members navigate the Argentine market. The US Chamber, also heterogeneous, served the same purpose. Yet US Chambers also worked in collaboration with US Ambassadors and Consuls and sought to advocate good inter-American relations (even contradicting US policy when necessary).[24] The US Chambers supported events to foster goodwill, such as annual Fourth of July celebrations that local politicians attended.[25] Their efforts reminded policymakers of the potential benefits of closer links to the US and helped

[22] See the letters from these representatives to Roca (10 December 1901, 23 December 1901, and 6 January 1902) in AGNA VII fol. 1359.
[23] Paul Goodwin, Jr, 'Anglo-Argentine Commercial Relations: A Private Sector View, 1922-43' *HAHR* 61:1 (1981).
[24] In 1920, the US Chamber of Commerce in Chile, for example, wrote a letter to the US Ambassador in Chile (which was published in *El Mercurio*) to denounce a note from the US government to Chile regarding the Tanca-Arica dispute that had caused offense. The US Chamber of Commerce moved to reassure Chileans of US friendship. See 'La Cámara de Comercio Norteamericana protesta de la nota pasada al gobierno de Chile por Estados Unidos' *El Mercurio* 26 March 1920, p. 17.
[25] Argentina's Ángel Gallardo noted these celebrations in his *Memorias*, which suggests that he may have attended them (p. 415).

mitigate the unpopularity of some US policies (intervention in the Tacna-Arica dispute and the sanitary ban against Argentine beef in 1926, for example). Thus, they encouraged engagement with Pan-American cooperation in the 1920s.

Relevant economic interest groups also included influential agricultural and industrial associations such as the Sociedad Rural Argentina (SRA) and Unión Industrial Argentina (UIA) in Argentina and the Sociedad Nacional de Agricultura (SNA) and SOFOFA in Chile.[26] These associations held considerable sway over domestic politics and effectively lobbied congress for preferential policies. They were active participants in foreign policy discussions that involved their dominant interests. For example, Chile's SNA and Argentina's Centro Vitivinícola Nacional led intense campaigns that scuppered Chilean-Argentine negotiations for a trade agreement in the late 1900s.[27] The SRA, concerned about the lopsided benefits of Yrigoyen's agreement with the D'Abernon mission in 1929 (and generally opposed to Yrigoyen's presidency), helped to shore up opposition in the Senate. Given this evidence, it seems likely that these associations were also interested in Pan-American discussions of commerce and finance. As in the case of foreign business groups, however, evidence of these associations' influence in Pan-American policymaking is thin. The lack of evidence is perhaps symptomatic of scant interest. After the defeat of Blaine's *Zollverein* in 1890, Pan-American efforts to increase inter-American commerce were not a threat to major economic sectors in Chile and Argentina. Rather, the PAU worked to open US markets for Chilean and Argentine exports. Pan-Americanism was also a means to work against US tariff barriers. Moreover, Pan-American

[26] The SRA became particularly powerful in the 1890s. See Hora, *The Landowners of the Argentine Pampas*.
[27] See Pablo Lacoste, 'Vinos, carnes, ferrocarriles y el Tratado de Libre Comercio entre Argentina y Chile (1905-1910)' *Historia* (Santiago) 37:1 (2004).

financial initiatives encouraged US investment to both countries, increasingly important for interests within the associations. Industrialists successfully lobbied for protectionist measures against some manufactured imports, but (as the previous Chapter noted) such efforts had a minor impact on Pan-American policy. Competing desires to avoid alienating European investors and buyers (a feared consequence of Pan-Americanism) while encouraging new investors and buyers from the US (a perceived benefit of Pan-American cooperation) left economic associations without a clear line to pursue.

Even when the associations attempted to pressure politicians for a particular policy, success was often superficial. The US sanitary ban of Argentine beef in 1926 drew the ire of the SRA, which condemned the US policy and pressured the Argentine government to seek its reversal. The ban did not greatly affect the SRA's members – the US imported only four million of the 1.3 billion pounds of fresh meat exported in 1926 – but did dampen hopes of gaining a bigger share of the US market.[28] Partly as a response to this pressure, the government issued several statements against the US ban and sought to lessen its severity through negotiation. Yet because of other areas of commercial cooperation between Argentina and the US (the importation of machinery, for example), the Argentine government did not plan to openly oppose the ban at the Havana Conference of 1928. When Argentina's delegate Pueyrredón launched a vitriolic attack on US tariff policy, the Ministerio in Buenos Aires sought to rein him in and reassure the US of Argentine cooperation.

[28] Sheinin, 'Defying Infection', p. 512.

*Non-state actors on the international stage*

Instead of pressuring the government to follow a certain policy, some civil society groups appropriated the idea of Pan-American cooperation for their own purposes. Such non-state activity affected both the development of Pan-Americanism and governmental policy. In fact, non-state actors often initiated, defined, and developed Chilean and Argentine engagement with Pan-American cooperation. Like the cultural internationalists of the US and Europe, many non-state participants in Pan-American cooperation believed that stronger cultural integration of the Americas and greater mutual familiarity would create the conditions for lasting peace, progress, and civilization.[29] These ideals frequently appeared in statements at second-dimension Pan-American events. At the 1925 congress of the Inter-American Union of Women (in Washington, DC), for example, the assembled women claimed the objective of stimulating 'la amistad y comprensión entre las naciones americanas, a fin de mantener justicia y paz en este hemisferio.'[30]

Cultural Pan-Americanism, promoted by both non-state and state actors from the early 1900s onwards, aimed to spread the virtues of modern civilization – including democracy, civic discipline, and personal hygiene – and promote hemispheric peace.[31] José León Suárez, professor of international law and diplomacy at the University of Buenos Aires, argued at an academic conference in Rio de Janeiro in 1918 that peace depended on 'diplomacia universitaria' (i.e., student and academic exchanges), 'diplomacia de los pueblos' (i.e., diplomacy incorporating non-state

[29] For a general overview of cultural internationalism, see Iriye, *Cultural internationalism*, pp. 13-90.
[30] Labarca, *A donde va la mujer*, p. 104.
[31] Personal hygiene, which seems slightly out of place, was a sign of modernization to many Latin American writers and policymakers. See Senillosa, *Panamericanismo cultural*, p. 7, and Ernesto Nelson, *La cuestión social y la cultura* (Buenos Aires, 1920), pp. 105-40.

actors), and the idea, 'que ya sentimos vagamente,' of 'una *patria americana*, subordinada a su vez, a una *patria universal*.'[32] The First World War provided impetus to these hemispheric initiatives as both state and non-state actors in Latin America argued that the old system of diplomacy, practised by diplomats and officials insulated from public opinion, had proved incapable of preventing disaster. Many forms of cultural exchange became potentially important to good international relations. The Chilean newspaper, *El Diario Ilustrado*, noted in 1927, that tourism from the US to Chile was, 'para el conocimiento de Chile en los Estados Unidos, un factor importante en el desenvolvimiento de las relaciones de todo género entre ambos países.'[33]

Civil society actors employed Pan-Americanism for their own interests as well. Activists of various causes developed networks and institutions to exchange information and heighten advocacy (creating what could be loosely described as early TANs). Medical and scientific societies were among the first to recognize the potential in regional or hemispheric initiatives, mainly in the spread of information and research. University students also sought practical benefits of international cooperation. They hoped to develop regional strategies to increase influence over university policy and curricula in several congresses (1908, 1910, and 1912) that eventually involved students from fifteen countries.[34] The students also established a short-lived League of American Students.[35] Although these efforts yielded few results, they laid foundations for region-wide student protests in 1918 that resulted in

[32] Suárez, *Diplomacia universitaria americana: Argentina en el Brasil* (Buenos Aires, 1918), pp. 10-11 and 37.
[33] 'El Turismo' *El Diario Ilustrado* 17 December 1927.
[34] For a full report on the Third Congress in Lima, see 'The Third International Congress of American Students' *BPAU* 34 (1912), pp. 477-97.
[35] Hugo E Biagini, 'Redes estudiantiles en el Cono Sur (1900-1925)' in Renate Marsiske (ed), *Movimientos estudiantiles en la historia de América Latina* (3 vols, Mexico City, 2006), iii, 81-87.

significant university reforms throughout Latin America. In the 1910s and 1920s, the cast of non-state actors using the label 'Pan-American' included feminists, children's rights advocates, amateur aviators, architects, educators and academics. In 1919, a Pan-American Federation of Labor was established under the guidance of US union leader, and founder of the American Federation of Labor, Samuel Gompers. While it managed to bring together a number of unions from the circum-Caribbean and South America (though not from Chile or Argentina), it was a weak federation that did not survive Gompers' death in 1924.[36] Many of the non-state actors that appropriated the term 'Pan-American' used the platform to claim wider significance and legitimacy. For example, architects and advocates of public housing reform used the Pan-American Congresses of Architects to demonstrate the importance of their work for continental wellbeing.[37]

Argentine and Chilean non-state actors were among the most active in the Americas regarding Pan-American initiatives. Some of the most important leaders of the second dimension were from Argentina, including Gregorio Aráoz (Director of the Inter-American Child's Institute) and Julieta Latieri (organizer of the First International Feminist Congress, 1910, and the First Pan-American Children's Congress). Chilean non-state actors also made a significant contribution to Pan-American cooperation; the first Pan American Conference of Aviation (1916), for example, was a project of the Aero Club of Chile. Societies, associations and universities occasionally provided the delegates that officially represented Chile and Argentina in Pan-American events; thus, non-state actors could become state actors. This practice increased the countries' presence within inter-American affairs and

[36] Charles Toth, 'The Pan American Federation of Labor: Its Political Nature' *The Western Political Quarterly* 18:3 (1965).
[37] Schade, 'Ecos del III Congreso Panamericano de Buenos Aires' *El Mercurio* 1 January 1928.

allowed governments to support initiatives without assuming direct responsibility. But not all non-state actors and societies approved of Pan-American cooperation. Pan-American scientific and medical congresses, which had superseded Latin American efforts, raised concerns of US intellectual hegemony. Emilio Coni, a renowned Argentine doctor and sanitation expert, noted in a 1917 article that US involvement in all forms of regional cooperation was inherently disadvantageous for Latin America as the US, 'siendo los más ricos, los más poderosos, se asignarían, como vulgarmente se dice, la parte del león.'[38]

Non-state actors contributed to the ability of the Argentine and Chilean governments to demonstrate support for Pan American cooperation regardless of their position towards first-dimension Pan-Americanism. In the mid-1920s, as Latin American criticism of US intervention in the circum-Caribbean escalated, the two governments remained distant from first-dimension Pan-Americanism yet still praised the ideals of Pan-American cooperation and its inherent practicality in supporting second-dimension activities. The Chilean government claimed to be a standard-bearer of Pan-Americanism in 1923 by participating in the Second Pan-American Congress of Architects and the Columbus Day Pan-American celebrations despite the bitter failure of Pan-American disarmament negotiations. The committee of prominent Argentine architects that organized the Third Pan-American Congress of Architects and the academics of the Universidad de Córdoba who convened the First Pan-American Congress on Tuberculosis, both in 1927, provided opportunities for the Argentine government to endorse practical Pan-American cooperation at a moment of

[38] Emilo Coni, 'Los congresos científicos y médicos latino-americanos' *RDHL* LVI (March 1917), p. 214. See also Juan Carlos Veronelli and Magali Vernoelli Correch, *Los orígenes institucionales de la salud pública en la Argentina*, (2 vols, Santiago, 2004), ii, 327-28.

heightened criticism of US policy towards Nicaragua.[39] With the aid of non-state actors, Argentina's government presented itself as a partner in hemispheric cooperation but not an accomplice in the US project of hegemony.

By employing the label 'Pan American' and utilizing the resources available to them thanks to inter-American networks and institutions, civil society actors were able to insert agendas of advocacy into the realm of international relations, achieving a limited 'boomerang effect'. Most significantly, these actors increased the profile of their pet issue. Newspapers reported on the proceedings of international conferences and magazines frequently featured pieces written by participants. The civil society groups organizing Pan-American meetings often invited governments to send representatives or in some way support their initiative (by hosting a reception for the delegations, providing funding for a venue, or offering a message of support). Support from the state was often secured through the personal connections that organizers had to politicians by means of social clubs, family ties, and political activity. Participants at the opening ceremony of the First Pan-American Congress on Tuberculosis included three ministers of the Argentine government and a number of provincial and municipal politicians. Their attendance was partly due to the national government's interest in stemming the spread of tuberculosis as part of a wider social crisis.[40] That the congress's president, Juan Félix Cafferata (a nationally respected doctor and several times a deputy for Córdoba), had significant political connections in Buenos Aires also helped.[41] What benefits this higher profile yielded, beyond

[39] For more on the architecture congress, see Gutiérrez, *Congresos panamericanos de arquitectos*, pp. 12-14. For a brief report on the Tuberculosis Congress, see *BPAU* 62 (1928), pp. 213-14.
[40] For more on the state and the fight against tuberculosis in Argentina, see Diego Armus, *The Ailing City: Health, Tuberculosis, and Culture in Buenos Aires, 1870-1950* (Durham, NC, 2011), pp. 119-29.
[41] Cafferata was a sitting deputy during the conference and so could be considered a 'state' actor. Despite his political status, he acted in the capacity of doctor and social activist during the Congress (in

public awareness and publicity, is hard to determine and requires extensive research of each individual initiative, a task that is out of the scope of this thesis. The rest of this section will, however, closely examine one case of non-state actors using and influencing Pan-Americanism: the feminist movement.

Chilean and Argentine feminists had a considerable international presence, founded on the strength of female activism in the national context.[42] The women's movements in both countries had roots back to the mid-nineteenth century organizations (many of them Catholic). In Argentina, the country's first female doctor, Cecilia Grierson, led the effort to consolidate and institutionalize the disparate feminist movements under the Consejo Nacional de Mujeres in 1900. Inspired by her attendance at the International Women's Council in London in 1899, Grierson recognized the potential for the international dimension of women's rights advocacy. In 1910, the international perspective came to the fore with the International Feminist Congress in Buenos Aires, attended by South American delegates. Chilean feminists were among the participants. Like their Argentine counterparts, Chile feminists began to establish organizations in the late nineteenth century.[43] By the 1910s, women in both countries had made significant advances in access to education and the professions, but little ground had been gained in the area of civil rights. In the

fact, his political status was not mentioned in the Congress's literature). See 'Primer Congreso Panamericano de la Tuberculosis' *Revista de la Universidad de Córdoba* 14:7-8 (1927).

[42] For introductions to these feminist movements, see Asunción Lavrin, *Women, Feminism and Social Change in Argentina, Chile and Uruguay, 1890-1940* (Lincoln, 1995) and Lavrin (ed), *Latin American Women: Historical Perspectives* (Westport, CT, 1978). The international activities of these movements have been studied in detail in Miller, 'Latin American Feminism and the Transnational Arena', and Pernet, 'Chilean Feminists'.

[43] See Julieta Kirkwood's *Ser política en Chile: las feministas y los partidos* (Santiago, 1986); Erika Maza Valenzuela, 'Catolicismo, anticlericalismo y la extensión del sufragio a la mujer en Chile' *Estudios Públicos*, 58 (1995); and Maza, 'Liberales, radicales y la ciudadanía de la mujer en Chile (1872-1930)' *Estudios Públicos,* 69 (1998).

years after the International Congress in Buenos Aires, feminist activity grew rapidly in both countries.[44]

Working-class women played a minor role. In Chile, female participation in labour organizations and contributions to anarchist and communist publications encouraged debates over women's role in both the workforce and in society in general.[45] In Argentina, working-class women participated in more radical strands of feminism, exemplified by the anarchist *La Voz de la Mujer*, a periodical with the motto 'Ni Dios, ni patrón, ni marido'.[46] Educated upper- and middle-class women who presented their goals in less radical terms led the most prominent feminist organizations. Mainstream Argentine and Chilean feminists emphasized civic maternalism, couching demands for greater rights and for the increased public role of women in the language of maternal virtue and the feminine impulse to work for the benefit of the general welfare. As Mercedes Humano Ortiz, an Argentine feminist, argued in *La emancipación de la mujer*, 'la mujer ha sido y será siempre el elemento reformador de la sociedad.'[47] In Chile, many prominent feminists (such as Amanda Labarca) did not support suffrage until the 1920s and, even then, limited their support to suffrage in municipal elections. Argentine feminists were more consistent in their calls for suffrage. One reason for this difference was the strength of conservative Catholic women's groups in Chile; liberal feminists in Chile feared that these groups would vote for conservative political parties that opposed the liberal programme of female emancipation.

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[44] Cynthia Jeffress Little, 'Education, philanthropy, and feminism: components of Argentine womanhood, 1860-1926' in Lavrín (ed), *Latin American Women*, pp. 244-49.
[45] For more on women in Chilean labour movements, see Elizabeth Hutchinson, *Labors Appropriate to their Sex: Gender, Labor and Politics in Urban Chile, 1900-1930* (Durham, 2001).
[46] See Maxine Molyneux, *La Voz de la Mujer: Periódico Comunista-Anárquico* (Buenos Aires, 1997).
[47] Humano Ortiz, *La emancipación de la mujer* (Buenos Aires, 1918), p. 5.

The political elite's response varied. In Chile, the Radical Party accepted women as members in 1888 but did not support suffrage for fear that female voters would support the pro-Catholic Conservatives. Other political parties, by the late 1910s, were also open to the possibility of reform; the Conservative Party introduced a women's suffrage bill in 1917 while the Alessandri government, backed by the Liberal-Radical Alianza, attempted to increase women's rights by reforming Civil Code in 1922.[48] Like most social reform initiatives, both of these proposed reforms failed. Nonetheless, Alessandri remained a supporter of equal civil rights for women throughout his presidency.[49] Argentine political elites were similarly divided. The Socialist Party was the only party willing to take up the reform cause in the 1900s. Like Alessandri, Yrigoyen and the Radicals in the 1910s openly supported an increased role for Argentine women in society and backed a change to the civil code and, in a few cases, suffrage.[50] Yet Yrigoyen and Alvear preferred only minor changes, expanding the female role in areas already colonized by women (such as social assistance). They also supported issues shaped by female advocacy, particularly child rights reform.[51] By the mid-1920s, it became difficult to defend opposition to a reform of the Civil Code. In 1926, the Argentine feminist movement accomplished a significant victory: both congressional chambers voted to reform the Civil Code, granting women the legal status of adults and allowing women significantly more freedom in public activity and more rights over their children.

[48] See Maza Valenzuela's articles cited above (not 42, p. 203).
[49] Lavrín, *Women*, pp. 290-91.
[50] Ibid,, p. 122.
[51] Donna Guy, *Women Build the Welfare State: Performing Charity and Creating Rights in Argentina, 1880-1955* (Durham, NC, 2009), p. 21.

Female activists in Argentina and Chile looked for models abroad and they were among the first feminists in the Americas to add an inter-American dimension to their advocacy. In 1910, Argentina's Asociación de Mujeres Universitarias convened the first international feminist meeting in the Americas, while María Espíndola established the Federación Femenina Pan-Americana in Chile. Many prominent female activists saw their particular struggle as a regional, and even global, challenge. Exchanges between women of different countries on 'women's issues' were common. Amanda Labarca, a prominent feminist and member of the Radical Party, travelled to the US several times to investigate educational reform and feminist progress, occasionally with government endorsement.[52] Labarca also published *Actividades Femininas en los Estados Unidos* in 1914 with a prologue by Eliodoro Yáñez (Foreign Minister, 1901-02 and Liberal Party leader).[53] By sanctioning Labarca's efforts, the government recognised the benefit of these exchanges. Alicia Moreau of Argentina also visited the US to attend conferences, to study the US feminist movement, and to establish links with US activists such as Carrie Chapman Catt. She helped to spread familiarity with the US feminist movement in Argentina by highlighting developments in the US in her magazine *Nuestra Causa*, widely read within feminist circles.[54] The internationalist perspective was not without its detractors, however. Julieta Lanteri, for example, did not hide her resentment over what she perceived to be the marginalization of Latin American women's movements by the female activists of the US. Even Labarca remained sceptical of the benefits of international conferences until 1925, when an experience as delegate to the Inter-

[52] Valenzuela, 'Catolicismo', p. 169-70. According to Valenzuela, a member of a Catholic women's movement pressed for the translation and distribution in the US of the proceedings of the Congreso Mariano Femenino (1919) in order to counter negative statements made by Labarca.
[53] Valenzuela, 'Liberales', p. 350.
[54] Lavrín, 'Alicia Moreau de Justo: Feminismo y política, 1911-1945' in Susana Menéndez and Barbara Potthast (eds), *Mujer y familia en América Latina, siglos XVIII-XX* (Málaga, 1996), p. 181.

American Congress of Women (held in the PAU building) convinced her of their value.[55] Despite their doubts, Chilean and Argentine women were some of the most active participants in Pan-American advocacy between 1910 and 1930.[56]

The agency that Latin American women attained in the international movement was significant. They exploited the space (physical and ideological) provided by Pan-Americanism to advance discussions of issues important to them. Their pressure led to the incorporation of women's issues in Pan-American discussions at the 1923 Santiago Conference and the establishment of the IACW in 1928. Their preference for civic maternalism over outright appeals for suffrage tempered the rhetoric and results of international meetings, occasionally to the chagrin of the US delegates. The discussions at international conferences mentioned the expansion of political rights, but more often focused on other means of advancing the role of women in society. For example, at the Second Pan-American Women's Conference in Lima (1924-25), resolutions included the protection of childhood, education, and the role of women in spreading the love of peace and international fraternity. Resolution XXX noted that the 'love of beauty is a powerful auxiliary to well-being' and so called upon the women of the Americas to form associations that would 'combat all manifestations of municipal or national bad taste.'[57]

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[55] See her articles 'Camino de un congreso feminista' and 'La Unión Interamericana de Mujeres' (1925) which were reproduced in Labarca's *A donde va la mujer*, pp. 93-104.

[56] Most Latin American feminists were not full-time activists but rather considered themselves above all else professionals (doctors, scientists, journalists, etc.). Their international activities reflected this. Moreau's sojourn in the US in 1919, for example, was predicated on her attendance to a medical congress there. Bertha Lutz, famed Brazilian feminist, apparently left US suffragettes bewildered when she spent part of time at the 1922 Pan-American Women's Conference investigating frogs (June Hahner, *Emancipating the Female Sex: The Struggle for Women's Rights in Brazil, 1850-1940* (Durham, NC, 1990), p. 146-47).

[57] Third Pan-American Scientific Congress, 'Second Pan-American Conference of Women, Lima, Peru 1924' (Washington, 1924).

The moderate stance appealed to a Latin American audience that distrusted more radical feminism. The impact of international feminist advocacy on Argentine and Chilean society was not as profound as the feminists involved hoped; indeed, the slow pace of progress in women's rights, at least until the Civil Code reform in the Argentine case, suggests scant success. Nonetheless, the international dimension of Latin American feminism offered a platform for women, disenfranchised and marginalized in the national context, to voice their opinions and participate in public life.[58] The international stage also lent greater prestige to feminist advocacy and helped to legitimize a greater public role for women in Chilean and Argentine society in terms of social service. International women's meetings offered support (both moral and logistical) and lessons for Chilean and Argentine women to draw on in their national efforts. Despite the minimal progress in rights, therefore, benefits flowed from transnational advocacy and encouraged continued participation.

In addition, the international activities of the Chilean and Argentine feminists at home and abroad encouraged the Chilean and Argentine governments to engage with women's issues. Pan-Americanism, with its moderate stance on feminism in the 1910s and 1920s, was an easy option for demonstrating support for women's issues. The increased willingness of politicians to entertain the idea of reform, including Chilean Radicals' advocacy of civil rights and Yrigoyen's support for greater parental rights for women, meant that policymakers in both countries were more apt to see the Pan-American women's initiatives as positive. Supporting the initiatives was a way to demonstrate sympathy for moderate reform even if legislative action was difficult to achieve. Continued engagement in this branch of Pan-Americanism by both

[58] See Miller, 'The International Relations of Women'.

governments in the 1910s and 1920s is in this context understandable. Withdrawal from Pan-American cooperation in the late 1920s can also be seen through this lens. While feminist activity continued apace, the government of Ibáñez and the second administration of Yrigoyen did not view women's issues as positively. Ibáñez did not share Alessandri's commitment to civil reform and Yrigoyen focused on confronting growing conservative challenges to his government and promoting his campaign against foreign oil interests. Displaying support for women's rights on the international stage, therefore, lost its lustre and the practicality of Pan-Americanism in this sense waned.

*The Press and Public Opinion in Foreign Policy*

Contributions from the broader public to foreign policy decisions also shaped Argentine and Chilean approaches to Pan-Americanism. In both countries, certain matters of foreign affairs (armed conflict, or the potential for it, in particular) elicited public interest and press coverage in the nineteenth-century. Argentina's *La Prensa* (established in 1869), for example, regularly commented on international affairs and added an 'Exterior' section in the late 1870s. At the turn of the century, both the Chilean and Argentine press modernized and began to target middle- and lower-class readers. The opening of *El Mercurio*'s Santiago edition under the direction of Agustín Edwards MacClure in 1900 is one of the more researched examples.[59] As prominent journalist Joaquín Díaz Garcés noted in 1901: 'el público por fin se ha despertado de tal manera que se puede decir sin exageración alguna que dentro de

[59] P Bernedo Pinto and E Arriagada Cardini, 'Los inicios de *El Mercurio* de Santiago en el epistolario de Agustín Edwards Mac Clure (1899-1905)' *Historia* 35 (2002). This article effectively disputes the idea of a romanticised press, demonstrating the presence of modern business models by the end of the nineteenth century.

diez años las minas de oro del país serán los grandes diarios.'[60] In Argentina, *La Prensa* saw its circulation increase from 100,000 in the early 1900s to 160,000 in 1914 and to 235,000 a decade later.[61] Literacy rates in both countries rose through the expansion of state-funded education and literacy programmes. Chile's national literacy rate rose from forty-three percent in 1900 to sixty percent by 1925.[62] Argentina's advances in literacy in this period surpassed those of Chile; the literacy rate rose from forty-five percent in 1895 to fifty-two percent by 1900 and seventy-three percent in 1925.[63]

Population growth, urbanization, immigration from abroad, and the development of new political interest groups also encouraged the diversification of newspapers and magazines. New publications were founded to appeal to new audiences, including political and class-defined markets (e.g. *La Vanguardia*, established in 1894 as a socialist and nominally working-class paper in Argentina, and *El Despertar de los Trabajadores*, a radical leftist paper established by Luis Emilio Recabarren in Chile in 1912). Journals on academic and current affairs, including Estanislao Zeballos's *Revista de Derecho, Historia y Letras* (1898-1923), the ephemeral *Revista Argentina de Derecho Internacional* (1920-22) and *Revista chilena de historia y geografía*

[60] Ibid.
[61] Jorge Nállim, 'An Unbroken Loyalty in Turbulent Times: *La Prensa* and Liberalism in Argentina, 1930-46' *Estudios Interdisciplinarios de América Latina* 20:2 (2009), p. 38.
[62] These rates are for persons over ten years of age; see Elisa Mariscal and Kenneth Sokoloff, 'Schooling, Suffrage, and the Persistence of Inequality in the Americas, 1800-1945' in Stephen Haber (ed), *Political Institutions and Economic Growth in Latin America: Essays in Policy, History and Political Economy* (2000), p. 172.
[63] Mariscal and Soholoff, 'Schooling', p. 172. The rise between 1895 and 1900 is probably too small as the methodology that produced the figures changed slightly; while in 1895, the number represented those over six-years-old who were literate, the numbers thereafter represented those over ten-years-old. According to UNESCO, *World Literacy at Mid-Century: A Statistical Survey* (Paris, 1957), the literacy rate reached 85 percent of Argentina's population over the age of 14 (p. 86).

(1911-present), offered space for intellectuals to debate international affairs.[64] Weekly magazines, directed mainly at upper- and middle-class readers, also emerged in the late nineteenth century. Important magazines included satirical publications, such as *Caras y Caretas* (established 1898) in Argentina and *El Figaro* (established 1891) in Chile, and publications meant to appeal to a wide readership (including women), such as *El Hogar* (established 1904) in Argentina and *Zig-Zag* (established 1903) in Chile.

In 1912, Chilean journalist Belisario García listed foreign affairs as first among 'las políticas que golpean la imaginación pública.'[65] No doubt an exaggeration, García's claim had some truth to it: foreign affairs were common subjects in the Argentine and Chilean press. Articles about events abroad, including Pan-American meetings, regularly appeared in the major national newspapers of both countries.[66] Reports of the various Pan-American conferences were often accompanied by commentary. At the Washington Conference of 1889-90, Argentina's *La Nación* commissioned Cuban poet José Martí as its correspondent; the resulting articles on the Conference and Pan-Americanism attracted plaudits from Buenos Aires for both their literary finesse and their polemical rejection of US hegemony in Latin America.[67] From the Second International Conference of American States onwards, most major newspapers in Chile and Argentina sent correspondents to the inter-American meetings. Second-

[64] The *Revista argentina de ciencias políticas* is another example; for an overview of foreign affairs discussion in the *Revista*, see Néstor Tomaás Auza, *Revista argentina de ciencias políticas: estudio e índice general, 1910-1920* (Buenos Aires, 2008), pp. 60-61.
[65] Belisario García, *Perspectivas internacionales: consideraciones sobre diplomacia sud-americana* (Taltal, 1912), p. 6.
[66] Newspapers from Santiago and Valparaiso in Chile and from Buenos Aires in Argentina were the focus of my research. In both countries, other cities had important newspapers. As policymaking was based in Santiago and Buenos Aires, however, those involved in it paid most of their attention to their capital's press.
[67] Copies of these articles, and other articles that he wrote for various newspapers around Latin America, can be found in José Martí, *Argentina y la primera conferencia panamericana* (Buenos Aires, 1955).

dimension congresses and conferences also appeared in the pages of Argentine newspapers, though they rarely attracted editorial comment. Popular magazines also included articles on foreign affairs (see Figures 1 and 2). These articles reached a wider audience than most periodicals. *Zig-Zag*, for example, was among the most widely-read publication in Chile; as US Ambassador Collier noted in 1927, it was 'not taken very seriously' though did 'enjoy a fairly large street sale among the lower classes.'[68] In the late 1920s, *Zig-Zag* dedicated more space to foreign affairs, suggesting interest among the literate Chilean population for news from abroad. The activities of global celebrities, including Charles Lindbergh's flights to Latin America in the late 1920s, and the introduction of cinemas to the Southern Cone (showing mainly foreign films) fuelled this interest.

Monographs about foreign affairs and foreign policy also circulated in Chile and Argentina and added to the public debate over foreign policy. Authors often had connections to the foreign ministry, such as Lucio Moreno and Ernesto Quesada in Argentina and Luis Orrego Luco and Emilio Bello Codesido in Chile.[69] Journalists, educators, and intellectuals without formal ties to the government also contributed to the debate with treatises and pamphlets. Examples from Chile include Belisario García's *Perspectivas internacionales* (1912) and Carlos Vicuña Fuentes's *La*

[68] Collier to Kellogg, 7 March 1927, NARA RG 59 M487 Roll 40.

[69] Moreno, Ministerio sub-secretary during Yrigoyen's presidency, published several texts on the ministry and on foreign affairs, including *Política americana: refutación de la conferencia pronunciada por el presidente de la República O. de Uruguay, Dr. Baltasar Brum, en la Facultad de Derecho de Montevideo* (Buenos Aires, 1920). Quesada was a prolific author, penning works on international law and foreign affairs in general (including *La evolución del panamericanismo*). Orrego Luco was a well-known novelist, politician and diplomat. A member of the 'Generación del 1900', he published twelve novels and a considerable number of political and diplomatic works. One was a series on Chile's international affairs that included four volumes, several of which were reprinted as *Los problemas internacionales de Chile* (Santiago, 1900-02). Bello Codesido, the grandson of Andrés Bello and long-time member of Chile's diplomatic corps (also thrice Foreign Minister), wrote *Anotaciones para la historia de las negociacones diplomáticas con el Perú y Bolivia (1900-1904)* (Santiago, 1919).

*libertad de opinar y el problema de Tacna y Arica* (1921).[70] In Argentina, titles such as Pablo Córdoba's *Tres ideas* (1915), Gregorio Uriarte's *Problemas de política interancional americana* (1915), Manuel Urgarte's *El destino de un continente* (1923) and Juan Senillosa's *Panamericanismo cultural* (1924) appeared.[71] How widely these works were read is difficult to determine. So is the extent to which these books were known to policymakers. Yet it is clear public discussion of foreign affairs and foreign policy took place. This discussion was transnational; works written by authors from throughout the Americas found their way to the Southern Cone. A survey of authors whose work on Pan-Americanism was published in the *Revista de Derecho, Historia y Letras* in Argentina demonstrates this well: between 1901 and 1922, there were contributions from authors in Brazil, Colombia, Chile, Ecuador, the US, Uruguay and, of course, Argentina. The works of latinoamericanistas, including Martí and Ugarte, were read throughout the hemisphere.

Making an argument about the influence of the press and public opinion is risky. Without polls or surveys, historians are reliant upon the printed material discussed above, which is representative of a small segment of the public sphere, and the occasional letter from a private citizen or groups of citizens to policymakers. Nonetheless, attempting to reconstruct public opinion is not the best approach. As Daniel Hucker convincingly argued in a recent article, the perception that

[70] García was a journalist for *La Ley Electoral*, an Independent Liberal newspaper (see Remmer, *Party Competition*, p. 15). Vicuña Fuentes was an educator heavily involved in the Federación de Estudiantes de Chile and a delegate to the Congreso de Estudiantes Americanos in 1916 (see his biographical entry in the Chilean National Congress's *Reseñas Parlamentarias* website, <http://biografias.bcn.cl/wiki/Carlos_Vicuña_Fuentes> (15/09/2010), accessed 28 November 2010).

[71] Uriarte was a Federal Judge in Bahia Blanca. Senillosa, the scion of a wealthy landowning family, attended Cornell University and entered the consular corps (serving as the Consul General in Canada in the early 1900s). His work in promoting cultural Pan-Americanism was a personal project and included an attempt to convince a US philanthropist to donate $20 million to fund Latin American students in US universities.

policymakers had of public opinion matters more than the public opinion itself.[72] In the case of Argentine and Chilean policymaking, considerable evidence demonstrates concern among policymakers for the press and for public opinion of foreign policy. By the 1910s, policymakers expressed a belief in public opinion as a necessary factor in policymaking. Ernesto Quesada, for example, viewed public opinion – which he left undefined – as the first of three actors piloting the 'nave del estado' in a changing global context (the other two were journalists and statesmen).[73] In Chile, Ricardo Montaner Bello (a widely cited international jurist and adviser to the Cancillería) argued in 1929 that public opinion occasionally caused a change of policy.[74] Others feared the potential disaster in attempting to satisfy a fickle public; Lucio Moreno Quintana, in an article in *Ultima Hora* from 1923, blamed Argentina's failure to take leadership in ABC policy on the confusion that came from listening to public opinion.[75] Moreno's solution was to strengthen provision for technical counsel within the Ministerio. Yet even Moreno recognized that these technocrats could not be completely isolated from public opinion. Rather, they should work to understand and shape public perception of Argentina's national interests.[76]

Alejandro Álvarez's notes as Cancillería sub-secretary in Chile provide evidence of concern for public opinion during policy discussions. In April 1905, for instance, the Foreign Minister agreed to issue a revised regulation on immigration 'para lo que hay es imperfecto y la prensa está pidiendo ese.' Later that year, whilst contemplating the

[72] Daniel Hucker, 'International History and the Study of Public Opinion: Towards Methodological Clarity' *The International History Review* 34:4 (2012), pp. 775-794.
[73] Quesada, *La evolución*, p. 8.
[74] Stella-Jeanne d'Alphand Seibert, *Apuntes tomadas en la clase de Derecho Internacional Público del doctor Ricardo Montaner Bello* (Santiago, 1929), p. 8.
[75] This article (from 2 June 1923) was reprinted in Lucio Moreno Quintana, *Pinceladas internacionales y diplomáticas* (La Plata, 1925), p. 57.
[76] Lucio Moreno, "El contralor de la política internacional argentina" *La Época*, 14 December 1925, reprinted in *Pinceladas internacionales*, pp. 136-38.

benefits of expediting a resolution to the Tacna-Arica affair, Álvarez argued that 'la opinión pública chilena estaba cansada con este asunto.'[77] The correspondence between the Ministry and its representatives at various Pan-American meetings demonstrates a similar preoccupation. The delegation to the 1901-2 Mexico City Conference complained about the press's inaccuracies or omissions in reports on the proceedings of the Conference. In response, the Ministry commissioned the Havas Agency (a French-owned news supplier) to publish the delegates' reports in Chile and abroad.[78] In 1906, the Chilean Minister in Washington commented on the press's coverage of his role in creating the programme for the Rio de Janeiro Conference.[79] In the 1920s, the Cancillería sent articles from Santiago's newspapers to its diplomats in order to keep them updated on the public's opinion of foreign policy. Ríos Gallardo was particularly attentive to the press, a characteristic reflecting his background in journalism. Yet the Cancillería did not merely observe and react to the press; rather, it also attempted to shape public opinion though cordial relations (for most of the period) with the directors of certain newspapers, especially *El Mercurio*. One of *El Mercurio*'s directors, Carlos Silva Vildósola, was even included in the Chilean delegation to the Sixth Pan-American Conference in Havana (1928). Silva Vildósola was evidently an important voice in the public discussions on foreign questions. According to the US Chargé d'Affaires in Santiago, Julius Lay, Silva's 'expressions upon international affairs [carried] considerable weight in Chile.'[80]

[77] AMRREE Histórico 306a, pp. 23 and 80-81.
[78] Yañez to Delegation in Mexico, 7 December 1901, AMRREE H278(a), p. 442. The choice of the Havas Agency was significant, as most of the major newspapers in Chile, including *El Mercurio* and *El Ferrocarril,* used Havas wires for their international news sections.
[79] Walker to Foreign Minister, 31 March 1906, AMRREE Histórico 343, pp 47-48.
[80] Lay to Henry Stimson, 17 December 1929, NARA RG 59 M489 Reel 1.

References to articles in newspapers, journals and magazines can also be found throughout the Argentine Ministerio's records and presidential papers. The Ministerio frequently sent article clippings to its representatives abroad and diplomats regularly sent articles from local newspapers in their host city back to Buenos Aires. The systematic way in which diplomats included local newspaper articles in their correspondence suggests an underlying belief in the need to monitor the press. This belief was institutionalized with the establishment of the publications subdivision in the Ministerio in 1915, which reviewed the national press. To Argentine policymakers, the press both articulated Argentine public opinion and informed it. The latter caused concern for many policymakers, who occasionally expressed disapproval of the press's portrayal of foreign affairs. Vicente Quesada, for example, complained from Washington in 1889 that Argentina's press had missed 'la importancia [y] la trascendencia' of his role during the negotiations over the First Pan-American Conference.[81]

Argentina advocated opening international discussions to a public audience and supported the presence of journalists in Pan-American Conferences. Yet they also sought to control the flow of information by permitting only authorized journalists to attend. During the Buenos Aires Conference of 1910, the Argentine government carefully limited access to those publications approved by the Organizing Committee. During the conference, the Secretary General (Epifanio Portela, Argentine Minister to the US) and his staff had control over reports from closed sessions. Under the Yrigoyen administrations, the Radical-owned *La Época* was used as a vehicle by the government to respond to negative editorials in other papers and to influence public

[81] Quesada to Quirno Costa, 16 April 1889, AMRECIC Series 25 Box 1.

perception of the administration's foreign policy.[82] While policymakers did not base their decisions on the press, they did consider the impact of policy decisions on public opinion. For policymakers, the press was an important, if not the principle (as one legal adviser to the Ministerio argued), means of gauging and massaging the public opinion.[83]

Yet it was not the only means. An irregular stream of correspondence from public societies and private citizens – letters of approval, criticism, supplication and advice – also conveyed public opinion to the president and diplomats. Most of this correspondence appeared during major diplomatic moments; the negotiations and signing of the Pactos de Mayo, for example, were the subject of numerous letters to the presidents of Chile and Argentina. The country's position towards the First World War also inspired private citizens to write. The senders were often civic societies, patriotic leagues, academics and wealthy citizens with some connection to the ruling elite. For example, Santiago Betbeder, a former Argentine soldier and *hacendado* with family connections to the PAN, wrote to President Roca in 1899 to approve of Roca's meeting with Chilean President Federico Errázuriz Echuarren in Patagonia.[84] In Chile, a group of 'ciudadanos' from Valparaíso wrote to Emilio Bello Codesido, a delegate to the Mexico City Conference of 1901-02, in order to congratulate the diplomat on his successful defence of Chilean interests.[85] Like the foreign affairs texts circulating in this period, this public correspondence was most important in reminding policymakers that they had a public audience.

[82] This practice was described by Lucio Moreno in his *La diplomacia de Yrigoyen*, p. 433.
[83] See Ruiz Moreno, *Lecciones en derecho internacional público*, (2 vols, Buenos Aires, 1934), i, 23.
[84] Betbeder to Julio Roca, 19 July 1899.
[85] Ciudadanos de Valparaíso to Bello, 8 December 1902, ANH EBC 25, pp. 290-95.

It is clear, then, that the public paid attention to foreign affairs and policymakers paid attention to the public. Determining how policymakers understood public opinion and how that understanding affected policy decisions is a task that requires elaborate and meticulous analysis, best undertaken when looking at one moment or one policy. Instead, given the focus of this thesis, broader patterns and themes will be examined. The most important theme is that the perception of a public audience added another dimension to Pan-American policy. It was not merely about states relating to each other or about achieving and defending a set of national interests, but also about appealing to a public audience. Why they cared about their public audience is another important question. One potential answer is electoral politics; both countries underwent gradual democratization in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (a theme that will be explored more thoroughly in the next chapter) and governments may have sometimes and to some degree tailored foreign policy to appeal to the electorate. Yet, as most literature on foreign policy and electoral politics suggests, foreign policy beyond war rarely mattered in elections and, as a close survey of the archival record attests, foreign policymakers rarely considered elections in their policy discussions.[86] Occasionally, individual policymakers acted with electoral motivations – Pueyrredón and the 1928 Havana Conference is the most obvious example – but they were more the exception than the rule. In fact, the privately expressed disdain from policymakers in both Argentina and Chile that Pueyrredón's statements provoked suggested a prevailing belief that foreign policy and electoral politics were separate.

[86] For an overview of theoretical literature (with a focus on US foreign policy), see JH Aldrich, et al., 'Foreign Policy and the Electoral Connection' in *Annual Review of Political Science* 9 (2006).

One aspect of public perception that mattered to policymakers was prestige and honour.[87] Argentine and Chilean policymakers believed that the public was concerned for the prestige of their nation in the international arena. As individuals and as representatives of a government, policymakers and diplomats wanted to demonstrate their ability to defend national interests and maintain national honour. This desire underlay the attention Chilean and Argentine diplomats gave to the reporting of their actions in the national press. Some diplomats were particularly candid on the question of honour. Carlos Dávila, a journalist who became Ibáñez's Ambassador to the US, filled his letters to Ríos Gallardo with comments on his personal status within Washingtonian diplomatic and social circles and hoped the Chilean press would take notice.[88] Others did not specifically mention honour or prestige as a goal, but used the concepts to articulate opinions on policy. An early example was Vicente Quesada, who argued in a letter from 1888 that national honour determined the boundaries within which diplomacy worked.[89]

*Prestige and honour in the Pan-American arena*

Definitions of national prestige and honour varied among policymakers and governments. Some associated prestige with a large military force (Estanislao

[87] Prestige and honour are not new concepts to the study of diplomatic history or international relations. Many theoretical works have been produced on the subject; see, for a recent overview of the topic Steve Wood, 'Prestige in World Politics: History, Theory, Expression' *International Politics* 50 (2013). Also see RP Dore, 'The Prestige Factor in International Affairs' *International Affairs* 51:2 (1975). The historiography of Chilean and Argentine diplomacy has occasionally highlighted prestige and honour as factors. See, for Chile, Burr, *By Reason or Force* and Meneses, 'Coping with Decline'. William Sater, in *Chile and The United States*, notes that many Chileans believed that a sense on honour was a significant characteristic of the so-called Latin race (pp. 66-67). For Argentina, prestige has often been invoked when arguing for a US-Argentine rivalry; see, for example, Cisneros and Escude, *Historia general*, ix, 15-16. For comments on prestige more generally, see Tulchin, *Argentina and the United States: A Conflicted Relationship* (Boston, 1990), pp. 26-27.

[88] Various examples can be found in the Conrado Ríos Gallardo papers at AMRREE, the volumes of which are divided into sections corresponding to different diplomatic posts.

[89] Quesada to Foreign Minister, 23 May 1888, AMRECIC Series 25 Box 1.

Zeballos, for example) while others highlighted leadership in international law (Roque Sáenz Peña and Luis María Drago, for example). Most policymakers understood prestige as a combination of factors. In both the Argentine and Chilean cases, the foundation for prestige was what Steve Wood has described as the 'minimalist definition': the recognition of importance.[90] Policymakers demonstrated a desire to display their country's importance within the Americas.

Chile's sense of importance was closely tied to its victory in the War of the Pacific; thus, Tacna and Arica were not merely strategic possessions, but also symbols of Chilean prestige for policymakers and the public.[91] When Chilean delegates ardently defended Chile's rights of conquest in Pan-American meetings, they did so motivated by desire to gain international acceptance of their claim to Tacna-Arica and by a need to defend both Chilean honour and their own honour as custodians of national prestige in front of an international and domestic audience. In the mid-1900s, the Chilean public had grown weary of discussing Tacna-Arica and the defeat of obligatory arbitration at Rio de Janeiro conference of 1906 removed a major source of anxiety and potential embarrassment for Chilean delegations. In this context, the enthusiasm Chile demonstrated for Pan-Americanism in the late 1900s and 1910s is more understandable.

Importance was tied to claims of South American leadership. Chilean policymakers, for example, eagerly reminded both diplomatic and public audiences that Chile had been a leader in 'traditional' Pan-Americanism. Chilean prestige was not based merely on military victories, but also on its reputation as a model for the rest of South

[90] Wood, 'Prestige', p. 388.
[91] For the role of Tacna-Arica in identity and national honour, see William Skuban, *Lines in the Sand: Nationalism and Identity on the Peruvian-Chilean Frontier* (Albuquerque, 2007).

America. Thus, the Chilean government readily exhibited its technological and cultural progress and agreed to send military missions to Colombia and Ecuador in the early 1900s to help re-organize those countries' armed forces in the Chilean model (which was itself based on a Prussian model). Argentine policymakers in the 1880s also pinned their country's prestige on its ability to exert regional leadership. Diplomats portrayed sanitation agreements in the Río de la Plata in the middle of the decade as a model for the rest of the Americas. In addition, arbitration agreements with Brazil in the late 1880s presented Argentines, in the words of diplomat Enrique Moreno, 'a los ojos de la América como los iniciadores de una nueva política.'[92] The 1888 Montevideo Congress was in part a declaration of Argentine leadership and prestige in South America. Although the Argentine government played a minor role in organizing the Latin American Scientific Congress of 1898, it celebrated the event as another instance of practical, Argentine leadership in the Americas.[93]

Considerations of 'civilization' and 'progress' also shaped efforts to demonstrate international importance. Policymakers in the Southern Cone were situated within a broader discussion (both regional and global) over what constituted a 'civilized' nation and sought to prove their country's claim to that label in front of a public audience.[94] A dichotomy between 'civilization' and 'barbarism', most famously described by Domingo Sarmiento in his seminal work *Facundo: Civilización y Barbarie* (1845), was fundamental in Latin American intellectual discourse since the mid-nineteenth

[92] Enrique Moreno to Norberto Quirno Costa, letter from 17 August 1887 quoted in Fermín Arenas Luque, *Enrique B Moreno: Un gran diplomático argentino*, Part 1 (Buenos Aires, 1945), p. 204.
[93] See *La Nación*'s coverage of the opening ceremony, 'Congreso científico latinoamericano' *La Nación* 15 April 1898.
[94] For more on defining civilization and its international dimension see Liliana Obregón's 'Between Civilization and Barbarism: Creole Interventions in International Law' *Third World Quarterly* 27:5 (2006) and Carsten-Andreas Schulz, 'Civlization, Barbarism and the Making of Latin America's Place in Nineteenth-Century International Society' *Millenium: Journal of International Studies* 42:3 (2014). See also Gerrit Gong, *The Standard of 'Civilisation' in International Society* (Oxford, 1984).

century.[95] Influenced by European cultural norms, Latin American writers and politicians appropriated the terminology of 'civilization' to fit their national context; thus, republicanism became a part of civilization in the Americas. By the late nineteenth century – with the popularity of positivism in Chilean and Argentine ruling elites – notions of progress, technological development, and modernity became linked to civilization.[96] Chilean and Argentine policymakers hoped to position their countries as leaders in terms of both power and progress, especially in relation to other American states, which were seen by many Southern Cone elites as inferior and less civilized (partly due to their less European populations).[97]

Pan-Americanism, as defined by Blaine and perceived by Argentines and Chileans as a project of US hegemony, was a potential challenge to national prestige. The opposition offered by Argentine and Chilean delegates at the Washington Conference, overshadowing subtler examples of cooperation, was calculated for an audience in Washington, in the Americas, and at home. As the Mexico City Conference of 1901-02 approached, some policymakers still saw Pan-Americanism as an affront to national honour. Zeballos, for example, balked at the selection of Mexico for the Conference. 'Era lógico que si el primer congreso había celebrado sus

[95] Rafael Moreno-Durán argues in *De la barbarie a la imaginación* (Barcelona, 1976) that the dichotomy underlay most Latin American thought (p. 21). While the assertion is far too generalizing, Moreno-Durán does convincingly show the importance of the dichotomy to several major Latin American thinkers.

[96] These terms were ambiguous and open to multiple definitions. See Charles Hale 'Political and Social Ideas in Latin America, 1870-1930' in Bethell (ed), *Cambridge History of Latin America* (11 volumes, Cambridge, 1986), iv; David Bushnell and Neill Macaulay, *The Emergence of Latin America in the Nineteenth Century* (2nd ed, Oxford, 1994), pp. 286-99; Carlos Alsonso, *Burden of Modernity: The Rhetoric of Cultural Discourse in Spanish America* (Oxford, 1998); and, for an interesting look at technology in literature and the rise of 'export reverie', see Ericka Beckman, *Capital Fictions: The Literature of Latin America's Export Age* (Minneapolis, 2013). For one example of projecting an image of progress internationally, see Ingrid Fey, 'Peddling the Pampas: Argentina at the Paris Universal Exposition of 1889' in William Beezley and Linda Curcio-Nagy, *Latin American Popular Culture: An Introduction* (Wilmington, 2000).

[97] Indeed, racial views shaped beliefs in Chilean and Argentine superiority; see Aline Helg, 'Race in Argentina and Cuba, 1880-1930: Theory, Policy and Popular Reaction' in Richard Graham, Thomas Skidmore, Aline Helg, and Alan Knight, *The Idea of Race in Latin America 1870-1940* (Austin, 1990).

sesiones en los Estados-unidos, extremo norte de América y asiento de la principal civilización del Continente,' Zeballos wrote, 'el segundo se hubiera reunido en Buenos-aires, centro de las civilizaciones que ocupan el segundo rango en el Nuevo-mundo.'[98] During the Conference, Chile's delegation was able to demonstrate leadership by directing the discussions towards its preferred form of arbitration. Thus, the results of that conference were a triumph not only for Chilean interests in Tacna-Arica, but also for Chile's claim to leadership in the Americas. Thereafter, Chilean policymakers' perception of Pan-American cooperation shifted; it became a platform on which Chilean leadership could be demonstrated. Events in the next two decades – the First Pan-American Scientific Congress, the Niagara Falls conference, the Fifth Pan-American Conference – provided Chile ample opportunities to flaunt its leadership for a public audience. Second-dimension activities, from the Pan-American Exposition in 1901 to the various technological conferences (the first Aviation Convention in 1916, for example), also allowed the Chilean government to showcase its country's progress.

The connection between Argentine Pan-American policy and Argentine attempts to secure leadership in the Americas has been demonstrated already by Sheinin's work.[99] That Argentine policymakers viewed leadership in regional cooperation as a means of gaining prestige should be reiterated. Despite serious doubts over the Mexico City Conference, for example, the Argentine delegation still saw the Conference as an opportunity to showcase Argentina's progress in public health, banking, and transportation (the delegates prepared reports to highlight the message). In contrast to the Chilean claim of victory, Argentine policymakers saw the Mexico City

[98] Zeballos, 'El Congreso Pan-Americano' *RDHL* XI (1901).
[99] The best example is Sheinin's *Searching for Authority*.

Conference as a failure because Argentine leadership was not sufficiently recognized. Antonio Bermejo, an Argentine delegate, highlighted considerations of honour in his report on the Conference. After detailing the conference's proceedings, Bermejo lambasted claims that the US or any other American republic had initiated practical regional cooperation. Instead, 'el *honor* de la iniciativa' to bring the Americas together 'sin prevenciones ni desconfianzas antieuropeas que serían un anacronismo...corresponde a la República Argentina...y tuvo su primera manifestación eficiente en el Congreso de Montevideo de 1888.'[100] In the Drago letter of 1902, the Argentine government sought to appropriate the Monroe Doctrine and fortify its claim to leadership in defining international law.[101] Although a letter from one foreign minister to another, Drago's missal was for public consumption and aimed at encouraging US acceptance of Argentine regional importance. The US's ambivalence to Drago's suggestion frustrated Argentine hopes and raised doubts over the potential for leadership in US-led Pan-Americanism. In the early 1900s, Argentina sought other means of staking a claim as a model for Latin America: organizing the Scientific Congresses and arranging sanitation agreements with Brazil and Uruguay, for example.

In 1906, the consensual proceedings in the Rio de Janeiro conference, the respect given to the Drago doctrine, and the comments of Root – particularly his declaration that Argentina and Chile were co-civilizers in the Americas – helped convince

[100] Bermejo, 'Informe del Delegado de la República Argentina ante la Segunda Conferencia Internacional Americana reunida en México', 15 April 1902, AMRECIC Series 25 Box 2:III. Italics are mine. The use of the qualifier 'eficiente' may indicate that Bermejo recognized the Congress of Lima 1877-79 as another potential, though unsuccessful, attempt at the type of regional cooperation he preferred.

[101] Conversations with Juan Pablo Scarfi were useful in understanding attempts to Pan-Americanize the Monroe Doctrine, a theme explored in Scarfi's forthcoming article 'In the Name of the Americas: The Pan-American Redefinition of the Monroe Doctrine and the Emerging Language of American International Law in the Western Hemisphere, 1898-1933' *Diplomatic History*.

Chilean and Argentine policymakers that Pan-American cooperation was a potential vehicle to gain national prestige. A year later, the Chilean organizers of the Fourth Latin American Scientific Congress expanded the possibilities by making the second dimension of Pan-Americanism as prestigious as the first. For Chilean policymakers, Pan-American cooperation became a primary means of demonstrating international importance. By 1910, this was especially important due to widespread doubts among the Chilean public over the country's status as a model republic.[102] Social problems, especially labour militancy, the increasingly wealthy and well-armed Argentina, and a rising US hegemon contributed to a general sense of decline on the international stage. Leading Pan-American cooperation thus provided an opportunity for Chilean governments to prove their status as regional power and reaffirm their place as a model state. In the late 1900s, with the Buenos Aires Conference in 1910, Argentine policymakers also came to see Pan-American cooperation as means to gain prestige. The persistence of Pan-American activity changed Argentine perspectives: Pan-American cooperation was a salient feature of hemispheric relations and abstaining from it would limit claims of regional importance.

Of course, not all policymakers were convinced, and scepticism over potential prestige remained, more so in Argentina than in Chile. Such doubts were at the heart of Portela's attacks on the Bureau of American Republics in 1906 and 1909. His successor, Rómulo Naón, was also uncertain about Argentina's ability to gain prestige through Pan-American cooperation; in fact, he worried that the PAU separated the Latin American diplomatic representatives from the rest of the diplomatic corps,

[102] These doubts have been well documented and incorporated into Chilean diplomatic history; see Pike, *Chile and the United States*, pp. 94-100. One source that is particularly important to understanding fears of Chilean decline is J. Valdés Cange's *Sinceridad: Chile íntimo en 1910* (Santiago, 1910).

grouping Latin America together as equals, but equally inferior to the US. This arrangement was harmful 'por la dignidad' of Argentina.[103] His opinion changed, however, when the US accepted the ABC mediation of the US-Mexican conflict in 1914. After that acknowledgment of Argentine importance by the US in a Pan-American context, Naón became one of Argentina's most ardent Pan-Americanists. The most important example of Argentine scepticism was the Yrigoyen administration's hope to revive alternative sources of regional prestige in the attempted 'American' congress of 1917-18. Indeed, the US's opposition, which the Argentine government interpreted as a rejection of Argentine leadership and equality in the hemisphere, led Yrigoyen to invoke older forms of Latin American regional cooperation. The failure of this project, a major blow to Argentine prestige, demonstrated that hemispheric leadership outside Pan-American cooperation was less viable in the late 1910s than it had been in the 1890s.

The First World War had a significant impact on Chilean and Argentine prestige politics. With Europe embroiled in war and the European-defined international system collapsing, the Americas and their peculiar form of regional cooperation through Pan-Americanism became a potential foundation for reconstructing global politics after the war. That argument was the basis for the 'new Pan-Americanism' and was echoed in Latin American internationalism and international law. Influential Chileans (such as Álvarez) and Argentines (such as Naón) joined a rising chorus of Latin American and US voices (among them Ruy Barbosa, Brazil's most famous diplomat) in proposing the Americas as a model for a new and more equitable global

[103] Naón to Foreign Minister, 13 May 1913, AMRECIC Series 25 Box 22:I. He believed, however, that the PAU was useful for commercial and other practical questions. Thus, he suggested making the PAU governing body a council of Consuls General and not of ministers.

order.[104] Although the sentiment was not universal, it raised the stakes of Pan-American cooperation to a global level.

By demonstrating leadership in Pan-American cooperation, Chilean and Argentine policymakers emphasized their countries' role in a new global order and enhanced their countries' importance. This perception contributed to the heightened enthusiasm for modern Pan-Americanism in the early 1920s and lingered among Chilean and Argentine policymakers until the mid-1920s. The nascent League of Nations provided another means of displaying international importance (which was more important for Chile than for Argentina) but did not supplant Pan-Americanism as a platform for prestige. The League was a disappointment for Argentine policymakers, who hoped to cast the League in a Pan-American model but without US domination. The League Covenant's reference to the Monroe Doctrine and the League's refusal to follow Argentine leadership on the question of equality of members frustrated these hopes. Continued US intervention in Latin America caused disillusionment, particularly for those who had hoped for more equitable hemispheric relations, and undermined the image of Latin American leadership in Pan-Americanism. By the late 1920s, policymakers in both Argentina and Chile began to highlight sources of importance alternative to internationalism.

Prestige was especially important for President Ibáñez and Ríos Gallardo; in a circular from 1927, Ríos Gallardo outlined a diplomatic programme that prioritized efficiency and national honour.[105] Although the Ibáñez government continued to pursue regional importance through Pan-American leadership (Álvarez's

[104] Barbosa spoke on that subject during a visit to Buenos Aires in 1915. See Barbosa, *Conceptos modernos del derecho internacional* (Buenos Aires, 1916).
[105] 'Circular 14', 25 March 1927, AMRREE Circulares vol. 16.

achievements in international law, for example, were lauded for the honour they brought Chile rather than the substance of his work), it also sought to revive traditional Chilean leadership outside of Pan-American cooperation. Thus, the Chilean Cancillería unilaterally worked in 1927 to convince Spain to recognize a new Ecuadorian government (imposed by Ecuador's military after a coup in 1925 and junta until 1926).[106] When Chilean efforts led to a positive resolution, both Ibáñez and Ríos Gallardo quickly interpreted the result as evidence that Chile had reconquered 'la antigua influencia...sobre los países de la Gran Colombia.'[107] Pan-Americanism was still useful but less important to Chilean prestige. A similar shift occurred in Argentina. In Yrigoyen's second presidency (1928-30), the Argentine government more assertively claimed Argentine leadership and prestige outside a Pan-American context. A piece of yrigoyenista propaganda on foreign policy from 1928 credited the Radical president with setting Argentina in a 'situación envidiable dentro de la comunidad de las naciones' that allowed it lead the way towards 'solidaridad internacional.'[108] Argentina would be a central in achieving an ambiguous 'justicia internacional' without mention of Pan-Americanism.[109]

*Conclusion*

Argentine and Chilean Pan-American policies demonstrate the impact that non-state actors had on international relations and on the foreign policy decisions of states. Through associations and civil society groups, they were able to pressure

[106] The Ecuadorian government, under the interim presidency of obstetrician Isidro Ayora Cueva from 1926-29, was also not recognized by the US government until 1928. See Ronn Pineo, *Ecuador and the United States: Useful Strangers* (Athens, GA, 2010), p. 96.
[107] Carlos Ibáñez to Ríos Gallardo, 27 January 1927, AMRREE CRG Tome 3.
[108] Moreno, *La diplomacia*, p. 31.
[109] Ibid., pp. 16 and 29.

governments and occasionally shape, though rarely determine, foreign policy. More importantly, they became directly involved in international affairs by employing the terms and institutions of Pan-Americanism. In doing so, they contributed significantly to the expansion of Pan-American cooperation. In addition, civil society actors encouraged their governments to engage with the broader internationalism of the early twentieth century. The Argentine and Chilean governments used the opportunities opened by non-state actors to showcase positive attitudes towards Pan-American cooperation in general while simultaneously voicing doubts over political integration through Pan-Americanism or over US actions in Latin America. Although the practical benefits of internationalism for the civil society groups' advocacy were mainly intangible (increased publicity and positive governmental rhetoric that often did not lead to concrete change in policy), they were sufficient to cause a substantial increase in internationalism in the 1920s. Non-state initiatives heightened the practicality of Pan-American cooperation (a point to be developed in the following chapter) and so are part of the explanation for gradual engagement seen from the late 1900s onwards and the continued participation despite fluctuating attitudes towards the US and towards first-dimension Pan-Americanism.

Non-state actors also influenced foreign policy through the press and public opinion. Policymakers in both countries clearly had their fingers on the pulse of national and international public opinion, paying close attention to the press and seeking to maintain a positive public perception of foreign policy. Given that context, calculations of prestige and honour entered into Pan-American policy. Prestige, defined in a minimalist sense of recognized importance and connected to the ideas of hemispheric leadership, civilization, and progress, became an objective of Pan-

American cooperation. While not the only means of demonstrating international importance, Pan-American cooperation became a significant platform to display importance and significance to global affairs in the late 1910s and early 1920s. By the end of the decade, however, this significance had waned due to US policies in Latin America. Policymakers employed the stage of Pan-American cooperation for more than just displays of prestige or honour. As the next chapter will demonstrate, the numerous strands of Pan-American cooperation provided an important tool in the state's response to serious political and social questions that emerged during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

# Chapter 6

# Intermestic Pan-American Policy

Practicality, even more than prestige, featured highly in policy discussions and diplomatic rhetoric in a Pan-American context. Advocates of Pan-American cooperation often hailed the 'practical' benefits it could yield. On the other hand, critics of Pan-American cooperation frequently pointed to meagre 'practical' results and ridiculed the zeal of Pan-Americanists as empty rhetoric. Some contemporary observers attributed changes in policy directly to the question of practicality; Benjamín Vicuña Subercaseaux – scion of two of the most influential families in Chile and secretary to Chile's delegation at the 1906 Rio de Janeiro Conference – argued that Chilean participation changed when Pan-American conferences became 'asambleas prácticas, fecundas en resoluciones fraternales i progresistas' after the 1890s.[1] How to define 'practical', however, is difficult. As mentioned in Chapter One, contemporaries often contrasted 'practical' with 'political', an ambiguous (and often misleading) distinction with a variable meaning given the range of stakeholders involved. The term 'practical' often applied to economic and commercial pragmatism, examples of which appeared in Chapters Two and Three. Another way in which policymakers judged practicality was relevance to domestic concerns. Pan-American cooperation, particularly the second dimension, blurred the lines between domestic and international policy.

IR theorists and political scientists use the term 'intermestic' (deemed cacophonous even by its progenitor Bayless Manning) to denote issues and actors that are

[1] Vicuña, *Los congresos panamericanos*, p. 15.

simultaneously international in scope and domestic in implication (or vice versa).[2] As James Rosenau argues in *Along the Domestic-Foreign Frontier* (2006), 'domestic and foreign affairs have always formed a seamless web and the need to treat them as such is urgent.'[3] David Skidmore and Valerie Hudson also argue that 'theories of IR pitched at the systemic level of analysis may complement but cannot substitute for models which specify the domestic determinants of state behavior.'[4] Grander theoretical frameworks, including neoclassical realism, seek causality in the domestic environment in which foreign policy is made as well.[5] More importantly, studies of modern regionalism in the Americas have emphasized that changes in the domestic sphere affect how governments engage with regional integration.[6]

Recognizing the interdependence between foreign and domestic policies has a long tradition within diplomatic history. In the 1960s and 1970s, the 'primat der innenpolitik' (primacy of domestic politics) school, heavily influenced by the work of German historian Eckart Kehr, led diplomatic historians in Europe and the US to emphasize (and often overemphasize) the domestic over the international in

[2] Bayless Manning, 'The Congress, the Executive and Intermestic Affairs: Three Proposals' *Foreign Affairs* 55:3 (1977), p. 309. For an overview on how 'intermestic' has been used, see the first section of Philip Russo and Patrick Haney, 'Intermestic Politics and Homeland Security' in James M. McCormick (ed), *The Domestic Sources of American Foreign Policy: Insights and Evidence* (6th ed, Lanham, MD, 2012), pp. 285-87.

[3] James Rosenau, *Along the Domestic-Foreign Frontier: Exploring Governance in a Turbulent World* (Cambridge, 1997), p. 4.

[4] D Skidmore and VM Hudson, 'Establishing the Limits of State Autonomy: Contending Approaches to the Study of State-Society Relations and Foreign Policy-Making' in Skidmore and Hudson (eds), *The Limits of State Autonomy: Societal Groups and Foreign Policy Formulation* (Boulder, 1993), p. 1.

[5] For more on neoclassical realism, see Fareed Zakaria, 'Realism and Domestic Politics: A Review Essay' *International Security* 17:1 (1992) and Gideon Rose, 'Review: Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy' *World Politics* 51:1 (October 1998).

[6] The influence of domestic development (particularly reform) and regionalism is a theme that runs through most of the chapters in Mace and Thérien (eds), *Foreign Policy*, and is highlighted in the conclusion by W. Andrew Axline (pp. 200-06). Abraham Lowenthal uses 'intermestic' in his analysis of current inter-American cooperation. See, for example, Lowenthal, 'Toward Improving Cooperation in the Americas' *Estudios internacionales* (Chile) 160 (2008).

explaining diplomacy.[7] Historians of Latin American diplomacy have also noted the importance of domestic developments on diplomacy. Pike's survey of US-Chilean relations is one relevant example.[8] Unfortunately, many works that attempt to combine the domestic and international fail to do so effectively. Pike's work again is a good example. While his work placed diplomacy in a domestic context, it did not fully explain *why* certain domestic changes were significant to foreign policy. This shortcoming can also be seen in Leandro Morgenfeld's recent work on Argentina in the Pan-American conferences.[9] This chapter will fill in some of the gaps and further explore the causal relationship between trends in domestic and diplomatic developments. In doing so, it builds on trends in social history that emphasize the international and transnational nature of social policy discussion.[10] It extends the work of Daniel Rodgers on trans-Atlantic 'social politics'; the transfer of ideas on social reform in the North Atlantic that Rodgers highlights had parallels in the inter-American arena.[11]

The resolutions and agreements made at Pan-American meetings were often vague and rarely binding (though there are several exceptions, including the 1924 Sanitation Code and the 1927 Convention on Commercial Aviation), making their effect on domestic developments difficult to measure. Moreover, congressional reluctance to ratify Pan-American agreements minimized potential impact. For governments, therefore, some of the benefits of Pan-American cooperation consisted of gathering

[7] Kehr's essays (from the 1930s onwards) were compiled and published by Hans-Ulrich Wehler as *Der Primat der Innenpolitik* (Berlin, 1970). An English edition was published seven years later: Gordon Craig, *Economic Interest, Militarism, and Foreign Policy* (Berkeley, 1977).
[8] Pike, *Chile and the US*, especially the Preface.
[9] Morgenfeld, *Vecinos en conflicto*.
[10] See Dietrich Rueschemeyer and Theda Skocpol, *States, Social Knowledge, and the Origins of Modern Social Policies* (Princeton, 1996). For a recent illuminating look at Latin America, see Mariano Plotkin and Eduardo Zimmerman (eds), *Los saberes del estado* (Buenos Aires, 2012), especially Part Three.
[11] Daniel Rodgers, *Atlantic Crossings: Social Politics in a Progressive Age* (Cambridge, MA, 1998).

information, drawing lessons from other countries' experiences, and demonstrating an interest in or concern for certain issues. Studies of modern Latin American policymaking note that the region's governments look abroad for models of reform with both instrumental and expressive (or symbolic) objectives.[12] That is, they hope to learn from the experience of others, to gain legitimacy for their calls for reform, and to cultivate an image of modernity and progress. Historians such as James Morris, Jeremy Seekings, Juan Suriano, and Eduardo Zimmerman have suggested that Latin American governments at the turn of the century acted in similar ways.[13] This chapter will further argue for historic parallels and demonstrate how this behaviour affected Pan-Americanism.

*Early Intermestic Pan-American Cooperation*

Blaine's original plans for Pan-American cooperation included topics that corresponded to important internal development questions in Chile and Argentina. A good example was monetary reform and a regional silver standard, discussed at the First International Conference of American States and at the Inter-American Monetary Conference in 1891. This was one of the most significant political questions of the 1880s and 1890s in Chile and the Cancillería recognized the potential benefits of discussing the issue in a regional context. When the Monetary Conference

[12] For a concise overview of recent theories on the use of foreign models, see Kurt Weyland, 'Introduction' in Weyland (ed), *Learning from Foreign Models in Latin American Policy Reform* (Baltimore, 2004).
[13] James Morris, *Élites, intellectuals and consensus: a study of the social question and the industrial relations systems in Chile* (Ithaca, 1966), pp. 170-71; Jeremy Seekings, 'The ILO and Welfare Reform in South Africa, Latin America, and the Caribbean, 1919-1950' in Jasmien Van Daele (ed), *ILO Histories: Essays on the International Labour Organization and its Impact on the World during the Twentieth Century* (Bern, 2010), pp. 160-62; Juan Suriano, 'El mundo como un taller de observación: la creación del Departamento Nacional del Trabajo y las influencias internacionales' *Revista de Indias* 73:257 (2013); Eduardo Zimmerman, *Los liberales reformistas: la cuestión social en la Argentina 1890-1916* (Buenos Aires, 1995).

convened in Washington, however, the 1891 Chilean Civil War eliminated the practicality of such discussion. President Balmaceda depended on paper money emissions to fund his defence against the Revolutionary Junta. Argentina did not initially view the discussion as practical, partly due to an 1887 monetary law in Argentina that restricted the use of silver in currency. The Argentine government sent an expert to act as delegate at the Monetary Conference, mainly to argue against monetary union. Although welcome in theory, union was not feasible due to the different monetary regimes within the Americas and the deep political divisions in the potential members over monetary policy.[14]

Another example was the Pan-American Railroad, which proposed to connect the continents with a rail network from the US to the Southern Cone. Both the Chilean and Argentine governments began plans for widespread railroad construction in the 1890s, which were seen as potential sections of the Pan-American network. Chile supported the idea initially. In fact, it was one the few Latin American countries to pay its dues towards the planning of the railroad.[15] Argentina also supported the plan in theory, though doubted its ultimate feasibility. While Buenos Aires offered no monetary support, it cooperated with the Commission's surveying projects in the 1890s and designated delegates to the Intercontinental Railway Commission in 1890-

[14] Instrucciones, 2 October 1889, AMRECIC Series 25 Box 1. Argentina's government was open to international monetary union; the Finance Minister, José Terry, proposed in 1906 joining the Unión Latina (France, Belgium, Switzerland, and Italy) and adopting the franc. This proposal created controversy among supporters of the gold standard policy as the franc was based on silver. One of the arguments for the franco arjentino was the benefits it would bring to the working class in Buenos Aires, many of which were immigrants already familiar with the franc. See G Pintos, 'La unidad monetaria internacional' *RDHL* XXIV (1906).

[15] Caruso, 'The Pan American Railway', p. 616. The other countries to pay were Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica and Ecuador. See Intercontinental Railway Commission, *A Condensed Report of the Transactions of the Commission and of the Surveys and Explorations of its Engineers in Central and South America, 1891-98* (Washington, 1898), p. 34.

91 and twice again later in the decade.[16] Yet construction on a trans-Andean railroad between Santiago and Mendoza, a key piece of the Pan-American plan, progressed slowly (the line, begun in 1887, was completed in 1910); progress in other parts of the continent were even less impressive. The idea of spanning two continents with rail sparked the imagination of Southern Cone engineers and policymakers but remained a distant dream. Ultimately, like discussions of other forms of increased communications, these practical discussions produced few practical results.

In the early 1900s, Pan-American cooperation included more practical projects, including river navigation, communications, intellectual exchange and the coordination of sanitation policy in order to prevent the spread of epidemics. Sanitation had been a topic of international cooperation since the mid-nineteenth century.[17] Both Argentina and Chile participated in international sanitation efforts, including several smaller-scale regional initiatives (Chile with Bolivia and Ecuador, Argentina with Brazil and Uruguay). The main objective of these agreements was to normalize sanitation practices – including statistics of disease control – and prophylaxis of diseases that were common in port cities. In conjunction with international discussions, Chile's government began to develop national sanitation infrastructure in the 1890s as part of a broader programme of modernization, establishing an Institute of Public Health in 1892. In the early 1900s, the Chilean government prioritized the legal codification of sanitary practices and it was eager to

[16] McGann, *US and Argentina*, p. 181.
[17] See Norman Howard-Jones, *The Scientific Background of the International Sanitary Conferences, 1851-1938* (Geneva, 1975) and Obijiofor Aginam, *Global Health Governance: International Law and Public Health in a Divided World* (Toronto, 2005), pp. 51-52 and 62-66.

study models in other countries, especially the US.[18] Pan-American sanitation discussions were useful in developing this project, particularly as a means of gathering information and reports on outbreaks of diseases that affected (or could potentially affect) Chile such as bubonic plague and cholera. Chilean delegates in the sanitation conferences pushed for resolutions that committed the participants to preventative actions: the eradication of rats from ships and the systematic regulation of prostitution (aimed at curbing venereal disease), for example.[19] Argentina, in contrast, had developed national sanitation institutions, including a Department of Hygiene, and infrastructure much earlier, beginning in the 1870s. It had, moreover, passed hygiene and sanitary police codes in the 1890s. By the early 1900s, the Argentine government was confident in its national sanitary infrastructure.[20] As a result, the Argentine government found Pan-American efforts less relevant and preferred narrower regional agreements that coordinated responses to epidemics in neighbouring countries.

Pan-American cooperation also became a potential method of stemming the spread of another 'disease' in the Americas: anarchism and other radical threats to the political and social order.[21] A common fear among Argentine elites in the 1890s and 1900s, anarchism gained ground in the 1890s and 1900s especially among the large immigrant communities in Buenos Aires. The largest labour organization – the

[18] See Chile's report to the Third Pan-American Sanitary Congress in Mexico City (1907) in Bureau of American Republics, *Transactions of the Third International Sanitary Conference of American Republics* (Washington, 1909), pp. 139-58.
[19] These were Chilean proposals in the Fifth Pan-American Sanitation Congress (1911) that were adopted as resolutions. See PAU, *Transactions of the Fifth International Sanitary Conference of the American Republics* (Washington, 1911), pp. 71-76.
[20] See Julia Rodríguez, *Civilizing Argentina: Science, Medicine, and the Modern State* (Chapel Hill, 2006), pp. 40-44 and 183-85.
[21] Some of Argentina's leading social scientists, criminologists, and elite medical experts attempted to provide a scientific view of anarchism that framed it in pseudo-medical terms of degeneration. See Rodríguez, *Civilizing Argentina*, pp. 88-91.

Federación Obrera Argentina (or FOA, which added 'Regional' to its name in 1904, making it FORA) – adopted an anarchist platform in 1903. Chilean upper classes also worried about anarchism and radical socialism, though to a lesser extent. Labour organization was less centralized until the late 1900s and radicalized in the 1910s. Organization was most effective among urban workers in Valparaíso and Santiago and the nitrate workers of the northern provinces.[22] Militant unions in the nitrate pampas caused particular concern in Santiago, not least due to their impact on nitrate production and thus government revenue. Both governments responded to labour militancy with repression, which often lead to violent clashes and even massacres (such as the 1907 episode at the Escuela Santa María in Iquique, Chile that left over 100 protesters dead). Believing that seditious foreign agents caused anarchist agitation, the Argentine government approved two laws aimed at expelling militant labour agents: the 1902 Ley de Residencia and the 1910 Ley de Defensa Social.

Governments throughout the hemisphere harboured similar fears of anarchism; unsurprisingly, then, attempts at Pan-American coordination in confronting the issue emerged in the 1900s. The delegates at the Mexico City Conference of 1901-02 discussed the perceived anarchist threat and signed a Treaty for the Extradition of Criminals and the Protection from Anarchism, focusing particularly on anarchist assassins.[23] Chile and Argentina's delegations signed the Treaty, though both national congresses neglected to ratify it. The programmes of the Third and Fourth Conferences both initially included discussion on coordinating measures against anarchism, but eventually discarded the topic for uncertain reasons. The provisional programme for the Fifth, finalized in 1913, also included a Peruvian proposal to

[22] See Peter DeShazo, *Urban Workers and Labor Unions in Chile 1902-1927* (Madison, WI, 1983).
[23] The focus on assassins was the result of the assassination of US President William McKinley by an anarchist in 1901 at the Pan-American Exposition.

coordinate policies against anarchism. Little evidence exists to determine Chilean and Argentine opinions of these potential discussions. In Argentina, they clearly appealed to elite concerns; an article in *La Nación* from 1910 declared that anarchism had been 'una de las cuestiones mas interesantes' at the Mexico City Conference.[24] The fact that neither government sought to keep the issue on the programmes of 1906 and 1910 suggests that Pan-American discussions and agreements were peripheral in official attempts to stymie anarchism. Nonetheless, this topic demonstrated to Argentine and Chilean policymakers the potential for practical Pan-American cooperation.

*Elite Reformers and the Cuestión Social*

Fears of anarchism were part of broader debates over socio-economic and political developments. At the turn of the century, demands for political reform gained powerful supporters in both countries. The UCR in Argentina had demanded reform, especially the incorporation of urban middle class groups into politics, since the 1880s. By 1904, the question of how to involve middle class actors and confront unrest among the lowest classes caused a schism within the PAN between a faction led by Roca, supporting the status quo, and another headed by Carlos Pellegrini and Roque Sáenz Peña, advocates of opening the political system (through electoral reform) and developing a popular base for the PAN. In 1906, José Figueroa Alcorta, a reformer, won the presidency. During his term, he campaigned to lessen Roca's influence and took cautious steps towards preparing the ground for reform. These actions precipitated several political crises involving heated disputes between

[24] The article celebrated Argentina's contributions to discussions on the extradition of anarchists and its adherence to the Treaty. 'Cuarta Conferencia Pan-Americana', *La Nación*, 9 July 1910, p. 9.

executive and legislature. Despite resistance from Roca and many of the provincial party leaders, the reformist PAN faction and Sáenz Peña won the presidential election of 1910.[25] Two years later, the reformists achieved a major victory with the Sáenz Peña Law, expanding suffrage to include all adult male citizens. Throughout this process, the reformist elite emphasized measured change from above. The UCR leadership approved of Sáenz Peña's effort and agreed to renounce revolutionary activity. In two years, the Radicals had control of the Chamber of Deputies.

Elite advocacy of reform within traditional parties began earlier in Chile with the consolidation of the Radical Party in the late 1880s. As in Argentina, an advocate of reform (rhetorically, at least) occupied the Chilean executive in 1906. Pedro Montt of the National Party based his 1906 presidential candidacy on promises of 'regeneration' – a new era in Chilean society and politics that would restore the vigour that Chile had lost through *parlamentarismo*. Montt's promises were largely empty, yielding few actual reforms.[26] Montt's inability (and his reluctance) to transform rhetoric into successful policy disheartened many of his supporters. Nonetheless, the hope for 'regeneration' did not fade easily. During this period, the Radicals came to incorporate Chile's growing urban middle sectors (according to Patrick Barr-Melej, the term 'mesocracia' was used frequently), which added new dimensions to the traditional platform for reform.[27] At the 1906 Radical Convention, the Party accepted a platform based on Valentín Letelier's concept of *socialismo de estado*, or 'increased government intervention in social and economic affairs' in a Bismarckian sense.[28] The Radicals gradually increased their influence and acquired

[25] Botana, *El órden*, pp. 223-37 and Rock, *Politics in Argentina*, pp. 31-39.
[26] Vial, *Historia de Chile (1891-1973),* ii, 449-62.
[27] Barr-Melej, *Reforming Chile,* p. 2.
[28] Ibid., pp. 28-29.

several ministerial positions under Pedro Montt's government (1906-1910). In the 1910s, several Radicals held important posts within the Cancillería.

Reformist parties were part of a wider trend: the rise of politicians and intellectuals (or, as was often the case, intellectuals who had entered politics) who espoused a credo of regeneration through reform from above. These *liberales reformistas*, as Zimmerman has labelled them in Argentina, decried the decadence and corruption of the old order – often politically associated with the parliamentary regime in Chile and the roquista machine in Argentina – but without fundamentally challenging oligarchic or liberal politics.[29] They did not advocate re-organizing the social order; rather, they argued for elite-led responses to contemporary social problems and the demands of the growing middle classes. Imbued with positivistic belief in the beneficial properties of scientific progress, expanded education, and 'modernity', the reformers were often connected to scientific societies (especially the Sociedad Científica Argentina, established in 1872, and the Sociedad Científica de Chile, established in 1891) and supported modernization projects. In Argentina, these reformers included influential figures such as Estanislao Zeballos and Joaquín González. Chilean counterparts included Federico Puga Borne and Marcial Martínez.

Debates about reform were predicated on a perceived social crisis, the consequence of recent and rapid industrialization and urbanization common to both Chile and Argentina. Grouped under the convenient rhetorical term 'la cuestión social' (or 'social question'), this crisis involved the stagnant or worsening conditions of the

[29] See Zimmerman, *Los liberales reformistas: la cuestión social en la Argentina 1890-1916* (Buenos Aires, 1995), especially the list of reformist attributes on pages 15-16. Roca's govenrment, although associated with the corrupt old order, also attempted some reform. This was partly the influence of several key *reformistas* that gained important ministerial posts such as Joaquín González (Interior and Foreign Minister) and José Terry (Foreign Minister).

poorest social sectors and included questions of public health, housing, sanitation, labour rights, infant mortality, alcoholism, crime and criminology.[30] Discussion over the cuestión social had been present in political and social discourse well before the twentieth century. Yet the growth of industry and urbanization in both raised concerns of a crisis to new levels. Indeed, such anxiety became pervasive. One contemporary observer in Chile described the cuestión social as 'un hecho, que nadie puede negar...hacia el cual convergen las miradas de cuantos se interesan en el desarrollo social y económico del país.'[31] 'La cuestión social' was a recognized term in élite and working class circles alike.

Such was the importance of the social question in both countries that it deserves a brief interlude. In Chile, the annexation of nitrate-rich northern provinces in 1884 accelerated industrialization in the nitrate pampas and in central and southern Chile. That process encouraged internal migration as agricultural production suffered from competition of more substantial global producers (the North American Mid-West in particular) and investment redirected towards mineral export and industry around Santiago. Santiago and the nitrate towns of the north (both port cities and 'oficinas salitreras', urban developments around nitrate mines) were the most popular destinations, creating a shift in population. While the rural population was twice the size of the urban in 1875, the two were nearly equal by 1900.[32] Santiago's growth was the most rapid; the population increased from 150,000 in 1870 (7.2% of the

[30] For a more complete introduction to the cuestión social, see, for Chile, Sergio Grez, *'La Cuestión Social' en Chile: Ideas y debates precursores (1804-1902)* (Santiago, 1995) and James Morris, *Élites, intellectuals and consensus*; for Argentina, see Juan Suriano (ed), *La cuestión social en Argentina, 1870-1943* (Buenos Aires, 2000) and Zimmerman, *Los liberales reformistas.*
[31] Javier Díaz Lira, *Observaciones sobre la cuestión social en Chile* (Santiago, 1904), p. 3.
[32] Blakemore, 'From the War of the Pacific to 1930', pp. 44-45.

nation's total) to 332,724 (10.4%) in 1907.[33] These changes created new social actors. Organized labour, mainly mutual aid societies known as *mancomunales* before the 1880s, entered a new phase. After 1890, agitation increased; within a decade, labour militancy, violent protest and repression had become frequent. Inspired by the fiery rhetoric of activists like Luis Emilio Recabarren, the labour movement grew and developed a more formalized union structure by the mid-1900s. These organizations, along with a wide variety of civic and religious societies, placed new demands upon the Republic.

Industry in Argentina developed to improve the agricultural production and provide for growing urban populations, concentrating industrial growth in the littoral provinces and particularly around Buenos Aires. Employment in the expanding rail network, in the meatpacking plants (*frigoríficos*), and in the port of Buenos Aires increased significantly. Like Chile, Argentina in the late nineteenth century witnessed rapid urbanization, a combination of internal migration and immigration. The urban population of Argentina increased from approximately 495,000 in 1869 to almost 1.5 million in 1895.[34] The shift towards an urban majority was not as dramatic in Argentina as in Chile; the urban population was only 37.8 percent of the total population in 1895 and reached fifty percent in the 1910s.[35] Many of the new urban inhabitants in Argentina were immigrants, mainly from Southern Europe. Buenos Aires's Spanish and Italian 'colonies' had an important demographic, cultural and

[33] Richard Walter, *Politics and Urban Growth in Santiago, Chile (1891-1941)* (Stanford, 2005), pp. 2-3.
[34] Z Recchini de Lattes, 'El proceso de urbanización en la Argentina: distribución, crecimiento y algunas caracterísitcas de la población urbana' *Desarrollo Económico* 12:48 (1973), p. 870.
[35] Ibid., p. 870.

economic impact.[36] French and German communities, though smaller, were also significant. The presence of large immigrant colonies gave the incipient labour movement in Argentina, which drew heavily upon these communities, a character distinct to its Chilean counterpart. Southern European immigrants brought substantial human capital to Argentina, but also increased among Argentine elites the fear of Spanish- and Italian-style anarchism.

Two important aspects of the social question in both countries were housing and public health. The disparity between living conditions of the poorest urban inhabitants and those of the upper and middle classes was a regular feature of labour literature and elite concern. Much of the urban poor crowded into *conventillos*, collections of one- or two-room apartments grouped around a central patio. Life in the *conventillos* was hard and unhealthy; many rooms lacked direct access to fresh air or daylight. Families crammed themselves into *conventillos* at a rate that astonished many Chilean and Argentine elites.[37] Recent immigrants were especially vulnerable. The plight of housing in Buenos Aires became a major concern for the Argentine government, which worried that dire living conditions would deter further immigration and aggravate labour militancy. Moreover, epidemic diseases such as cholera, smallpox, yellow fever; childhood diseases such as measles and diphtheria; and other diseases common throughout Latin America such as syphilis and tuberculosis ravaged vulnerable urban populations.[38] The statistical data available demonstrate a dire situation for Chile at the turn of the century. Chile had one of the

[36] For detailed histories of Italian and Spanish immigration, see Samuel Baily, *Immigrants in the Lands of Promise: Italians in Buenos Aires and New York City, 1870 to 1914* (Ithaca, 1999) and José Moya, *Cousins and Strangers: Spanish Immigrants in Buenos Aires, 1850-1930* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1998). For a useful review of these works (and others), see Ricardo Salvatore, 'Immigration, Society, and Culture in Modern Argentina' *Latin American Research Review* 37:1 (2002).
[37] Zimmerman, *Liberales reformistas*, pp. 103-05.
[38] Walter, *Politics and Urban Growth*, p. 19.

highest infant mortality rates in Latin America: 261 per 1,000 live births between 1900-04. Argentina had a significantly better rate (146 per 1,000 live births, comparable to the US with approximately 140).[39] Average life expectancy in 1900 was thirty-nine years in Argentina and twenty-nine years in Chile, lower than expectancy in the US (forty-nine years) and in England and Wales (forty-eight years).[40] The lack of accessible health services and potable water was a common grievance, leading *El Mercurio* to declare the question of a Sanitary Code, which was under debate in Congress in 1908, 'la mas transcendental de nuestros dias.'[41] Renowned medical experts in both countries, such as Guillermo Rawson in Argentina and Alejandro del Río in Chile, campaigned to improve sanitation services and helped to develop municipal and national health infrastructure. Despite minor improvements, infant mortality rates and epidemic disease rates remained high.

The Argentine and Chilean political class recognized these problems, and by 1900 began to embark on organized efforts to resolve them. Such initiatives were often the result of private charity. The Catholic Church played a significant role, particularly after Leo XIII's *Rerum Novarum* (1891) exhorted the Church to engage in Social Action as a means of hindering the spread of radical socialism. Both countries had well-established social assistance organizations, including Argentina's Sociedad de Beneficencia (established in 1823) and Chile's Junta de Beneficencia y Salud Pública (established 1832), but these were poorly funded and insufficient. New government

[39] James McGuire and Laura Frankel, 'Mortality Decline in Cuba, 1900-1959: Patterns, Comparisons, and Causes' *Latin American Research Review* 40:2 (2005), p. 86. US statistics are more difficult to come by due to lack of national statistics. The estimate of 140 comes from Myron Wegman, 'Infant Mortality in the 20th Century: Dramatic but Uneven Progress' *Journal of Nutrition* 131:2 (2001), p. 402S.

[40] McGuire and Frankel, 'Mortality Decline', p. 86 and KG Kinsella, 'Changes in Life Expectancy 1900-1990' *Journal of Clinical Nutrition* 55 (1992), p. 1197S. For more on this health crisis in Chile, see Barr-Melej, *Reforming Chile*, p. 34 and S Collier and W Sater, *A History of Chile, 1808-1994* (Cambridge, 1996), pp. 175-6.

[41] *El Mercurio*, 11 December 1908, p. 11.

programmes – initiated by national, municipal, and (in Argentina) provincial governments – in the 1890s included small-scale housing projects and free public health clinics, normally imbued with paternalism.[42] Some members of the political elite rejected the existence of an overall problem. In 1907, Eduardo Pantaleon Fontecilla of Chile wrote disparagingly that 'hace diez años [la cuestión social] no llamaba la atención de nuestras clases directivas.'[43] Governments in both countries responded to organized labour with indifference and repression through violence or legal measures, including deportation.

By the 1900s, it was politically astute for politicians to express concern for the challenges of modern industrial and urban society. Both executive messages and Congressional debates covered social issues such as public health, urban sanitation and education. Preoccupation with Chile's social woes was widespread, although certain parties, especially the Democratic Party, had a more genuine claim to represent the interests of the lower social sectors. The political will to rectify the situation, however, was minimal. Chile's Congress approved only a few initiatives designed to address the social question, most notably the 1906 urban housing act. Argentina's Congress was also reluctant to pass legislation addressing the social question despite the warnings of liberales reformistas.[44] Roca's Interior Minister, Joaquín V. González, attempted to implement a paternalistic labour code in 1904, but was met with opposition from both labour and employer organizations and eventually failed. In 1905, Congress passed a proposal of Deputy Hipólito Yrigoyen to supply

[42] Also important to Chilean and Argentine elite responses to the cuestión social was maternalism; indeed, women were important actors in social provision in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. See, for a detailed look at women's role in one aspect of the cuestión social, Guy's *Women Build the Welfare State*.
[43] Pantaleon, *La reforma legislative y politica y nuestra cuestión social* (Santiago, 1907), p. 26.
[44] Zimmerman, *Liberales reformistas*.

funding for affordable housing projects. The meagre funding yielded paltry results: only sixty-four houses had been constructed by 1910.[45]

Aspects of the social question had become part of foreign policy calculations from the 1880s onwards. For example, when the Chilean Commission on Commercial Treaties debated a free trade treaty with Argentina, its members agreed to consider the interests of Chilean exporters 'sin perjudicar a las clases populares.'[46] One member argued that the Commission, in general, 'debía ocuparse desde los primeros momentos en asuntos que se relacionan tan intimamente con nuestro desarrollo commercial i con el mejoramiento de las condiciones de la clase proletaria.'[47] In this case, introducing cheap Argentine beef would improve the diet of Chile's masses. While the treaty never achieved ratification (commercial interests, especially the Chilean agriculture industry, eventually outweighed social concerns in Congress), the debates in 1906 suggest that the Cancillería considered the social implications of their policies.[48] Argentine policymakers also addressed cuestión social issues through foreign policy. Sanitation is the clearest example. Argentina's government made sanitary agreements a prime objective in its relations with neighbouring states from the 1880s to the 1910s. The sanitary policy had multiple motivations: to avoid disruption in trade due to contagions in the port, to improve relations between the

[45] Laura Golbert, *De la Sociedad de Beneficencia a los Derechos Sociales* (Buenos Aires, 2010), p. 50.
[46] Acta de Sesión, 12 June 1906, AMRREE H346. For more information regarding these particular negotiations, and an interesting contemplation of the popular influence on the result, see Pablo Lacoste, 'Vinos, Carnes, Ferrocarriles y el Tratado de Libre Comercio entre Argentina y Chile (1905-1910)' *Historia*, 37:1 (2004).
[47] Acta de Sesión, 14 June 1906, AMRREE Histórico 346.
[48] This was also a reaction to social unrest; in 1906, the rising price of meat sparked a massive riot in Santiago.

signatories, and to prevent the spread of epidemic disease that disproportionately affected the poorest sector of society.[49]

More importantly, the *liberales reformistas* and other Chileans and Argentines writing on the social question recognised that the problems were not unique to their countries. They encouraged international discussion of common issues and the exchange of knowledge across borders. The most obvious example was the series of Latin American Scientific Congresses, in which papers were presented on pure sciences, social questions (e.g. labour relations and literacy) and medicine. The last category accounted for more than thirty percent of presentations in each congress.[50] Texts on common social issues and programmes circulated throughout the hemisphere. Some had the express purpose of providing information and models, such as Eduardo Poirier's compendium of facts on modernization in twenty American republics.[51] References to Europe (France and Germany especially), the US and other Latin American countries were common in writings on political and social reform. The Chilean and Argentine governments also looked abroad.[52] The Chilean government, for example, commissioned the Secretary of the Superior Council of Public Hygiene in Santiago, Dr Lucio Córdova, to study US sanitary laws.[53] By the 1910s, various executive ministries frequently requested information about social issues and social legislation in other countries.

[49] Fermin Arenas, *Enrique B Moreno: Un gran diplomático argetnino*, (2 vols, Buenos Aires, 1945), i, 179.
[50] Fernos, *Science Still Born*, p. 17.
[51] Poirier, *Chile en 1910. Obra precedida de 20 monografías de las repúblicas americanas, 1810-1910* (Santiago, 1910). Poirier collaborated with Marcial Martínez on the various monographs.
[52] The essays in Plotkin and Zimmerman (eds), *Los saberes*, provide numerous examples.
[53] Manuel Vega to Cancillería, 17 September 1906, AMRREE Histórico 343.

Meanwhile, Argentine diplomats, politicians and academics travelling in the US and Europe sent reports to Buenos Aires about innovations in sanitation, labour relations, education, hygiene and other topics. Miguel Cané, who served in several diplomatic posts in the 1880s and 1890s, was a keen observer of foreign methods to control the new social issues of the late nineteenth century. Germany, and its Bismarckian system, was of particular interest; Cané also provided the Ministerio with reports on educational reform in France and the control of alcohol sales in Sweden.[54] Roca saw benefit in studying and emulating developments in urban infrastructure in the US, suggesting to the Intendente of Buenos Aires in 1896 that the US should be used as a model.[55] When working on the 1904 labour code project, Joaquín González drew inspiration from the US, Australia, New Zealand, and several European states.[56] Both governments supported international scientific congresses and sent official delegates.

Many reformers believed that the US could provide useful examples. Pellegrini came to admire the US political system and methods of social control after he toured the US in 1904-05. While wary of US political influence in the region, Zeballos still asserted that he was 'willing to learn from the United States.'[57] In 1906, during debates over the housing act, Santiago instructed the interim Chargé d'affaires in Washington to request from the Bureau of American Republics a copy of the US Bureau of Labor's 1895 pamphlet 'Housing of the Working People'.[58] Not all reformers believed the US was a positive role model – Marcial Martínez, who had served as Chile's Minister in Washington in the 1890s, offered the US as a cautionary

[54] His papers can be found at AGNA; of particular interest is his official correspondence with the Ministerio (1881-98), AGNA VII 2206.
[55] Letter to Emilio V Bunge, 5 September 1896, AGNA VII 1385.
[56] Zimmerman, *Liberales reformistas*, p. 178.
[57] McGann, *US and Argentina*, p. 195. McGann paraphrases Zeballos from an article in an early edition of *RDHL*.
[58] Yañes to MJ Vega, 15 August 1906, AMRREE Histórico 341.

tale of corruption. But many admired the US's progress and found its approaches to common social problems interesting.[59] US-led Pan-Americanism increased the exchange of information between the US and Latin America. That Pan-American cooperation also highlighted the importance of social order and of reform from above appealed to the underlying conservatism of the Chilean and Argentine governments and most of the elite reformers.

Pan-American cooperation on issues relating to the social question occurred sporadically in the 1890s (the Medical Congresses) and accelerated in the 1900s. Pan-Americanism soon echoed the internationalist perspective, desire for reform from above, and faith in science and education of Southern Cone reformers. Chilean reformers claimed to believe in the potential of Pan-Americanism. The Organizing Committee of the First Pan-American Scientific Congress (chaired by Letelier) chose to include the US in part to bring US experts, and their knowledge, to the discussions. The Bureau of American Republics' distribution efforts and Pan-American discussions on sanitation and education also appealed to the Chilean reformist tendency. These developments encouraged Chile's shift to a positive Pan-American policy in the 1900s.

In Argentina, this effect was less clear. McGann argued that the Argentines saw no benefits of Pan-Americanism, but chose to engage with it in order to 'take a place' at the Pan-American table.[60] Indeed, many intellectuals and reformist politicians (Figueroa Alcorta, Zeballos, and Carlos Rodríguez Larreta among them) openly

[59] Martínez wrote this warning in an article from the early 1900s (no date is given, though there are references to 1901), a copy of which can be found in Martínez, *Obras Completas*, volume 2 (Santiago, 1919), p. 91. He preferred to use European examples, interestingly highlighting Romania as an exemplar for extending the vote to 'los proletarios' (pp. 89-90).
[60] McGann, *US and Argentina*, p. 240.

expressed doubts over Pan-American cooperation in the late 1900s. Emilio Coni's derision of Pan-American scientific congresses is a useful example. Differences between the US and Latin America, in Coni's opinion, would render any discussions impractical. Yet McGann went too far in discounting the practical appeal of Pan-American cooperation in Argentina. Many Argentine reformers and policymakers held positive expectations for hemispheric discussions of social issues. For example, the Argentine delegation for the 1906 Rio de Janeiro Conference highlighted the usefulness of Pan-American intellectual exchange during a preparatory meeting in the Foreign Ministry. The Ministry instructed the delegation to push for the free hemispheric circulation of educational material due to 'la necesidad cada vez mayor que tiene la República Argentina de buenos libros para la enseñanza pública.'[61] The establishment of an Education Section in the Pan American Union in 1910 further demonstrated the potential of education exchange in the Americas.

Chilean policymakers were cautious as well. The government officially desired to keep the scientific congresses, and their practical potential, separated from the other Pan-American Conferences in order to insulate them from wider geo-political controversy. Given that the US government used the Second Pan-American Scientific Congress (Washington, 1915) as a platform to launch its 'new Pan-Americanism', the effort of Chilean policymakers was not completely successful. Despite their caution, Chilean and Argentine policymakers pragmatically sought benefits through Pan-American cooperation over the social issues that concerned them. Combined with the ABC Niagara Falls mediation attempt in 1914, the enhanced practicality of Pan-

[61] 'Minutas de reunión con delegados a la Conferencia Panamericanan para estudiar el programa' 1906, AMRECIC Series 25 Box 5:I.

Americanism helps explain official Argentine and Chilean enthusiasm for the concept in the early 1910s.

*Post-War Social Crisis*

During and after the First World War, the onset of economic crisis in both countries intensified the social question. In Chile, the nitrate industry, the country's major source of employment and revenue, suffered devastating fluctuations. The total number employed in the nitrate industry dropped fifty-nine percent between 1918 and 1920. Although employment had recovered by 1924, the preceding four years were marked by severe hardship.[62] In Argentina, unemployment declined from 1918 onwards due to a boom in international demand for primary foodstuffs; yet costs of living continued to rise as real wages fell.[63] Urban squalor remained stark in the working class districts of Santiago and Buenos Aires. Public housing programmes provided little relief and dealing with the conventillos continued to be an urgent municipal challenge. Meanwhile, the global epidemic of Spanish influenza struck both countries between 1918-20; Chilean experts misdiagnosed the epidemic as typhus, a disease that many connected directly to the country's broader social crisis.[64] These conditions led to increased social unrest and labour militancy. Several violent episodes occurred in the late 1910s and early 1920s including the Semana Trágica of 1919 in Buenos Aires, when striking workers clashed with right-wing nationalist vigilantes and the police leaving hundreds dead, and the massacre of 1921 at the

[62] Brian Loveman, *Chile: The Legacy of Hispanic Capitalism* (3rd edition, New York, 2001), p. 170.
[63] Rock, *Politics in Argentina*, pp. 158-59.
[64] Recent studies on the Spanish Influenza include Hugo Maureira's unpublished PhD dissertation, '"Los culpables de la miseria": Poverty and Public Health during the Spanish Influenza Epidemic in Chile, 1918-1920' (Georgetown, 2012) and an article by Adrián Carbonetti, 'Historia de una epidemia olvidada. La pandemia de gripe española en la argentina, 1918-19' *Desacatos* 32 (2010).

Oficina San Gregorio in the nitrate pampas of Chile, which killed at least forty workers.

The Radical government in Argentina and the Alessandri administration in Chile both expressed concern for the social question and commitment to solving it. During their presidencies, Yrigoyen and Alessandri attempted to quell labour militancy by rhetorical appeals to social justice (defined loosely as improving the conditions for the working class without overturning the existing social order), attempts at social legislation, and ultimately violent repression. Alessandri was more prolific in his use of social justice rhetoric and more energetic in his efforts to mobilize the masses than Yrigoyen. While Alessandri eagerly addressed large mixed-class crowds, Yrigoyen shied away from the limelight and cultivated an aloof personality. Both also sought to calm conservative elite concerns (which feared the consequences of yrigoyenista and alessandrista mass appeal) and to base their political power on the support of a growing middle class electorate (a clearer priority for Yrigoyen than for Alessandri). The middle classes demanded more access to bureaucratic and political positions and stability in the face of perceived radical threats. This sector provided the bulk of right-wing nationalists in Chile. In Argentina middle-class residents of Buenos Aires called upon Yrigoyen to repress militant labour.[65] In this atmosphere, the Radical governments in Argentina and Alessandri in Chile attempted to take action in response to the social crisis without threatening the established order or allocating resources that could otherwise be used for patronage or the expansion of education for the middle class. Participating in international initiatives that garnered publicity but cost little in terms of funding and political capital, therefore, was attractive.

[65] Deutsch, *Las derechas*, pp. 5, 55, and 82.

Yrigoyen, Alvear and Alessandri faced serious opposition over different aspects of proposed social legislation from Congress, employer associations and worker organizations. For these administrations, then, the ability to pursue solutions to social problems on the international stage (where the executive had a freer hand in setting policy) was important.[66] Regardless of congressional gridlock, the president could appear proactive and committed to fostering social justice. Under Alessandri, active Chilean representation at the ILO became a key component of foreign policy. Yrigoyen and Alvear's governments also pursued active roles within the ILO; by the mid-1920s, Argentina had gained a seat on the Governing Body.[67] Although few ILO agreements achieved ratification in either country before 1925 (due partly to opposition in the Chilean congress and to the low priority of ILO agreements in the Argentine congress), the governments of both countries were able to point to a record of responsiveness towards social issues.

Participation in the ILO and other international efforts to foster social justice (or, at least, stem social crisis) was not merely for public perception. Like their predecessors, Argentina's Radical governments and Alessandri's administration seemed to believe in the benefits of gathering information and lessons from abroad.

[66] For more information on the Radical governments' failed attempts at social welfare efforts, see Joel Horowitz, *Argentina's Radical Party and Popular Mobilization, 1916-1930* (University Park, PA, 2008), pp. 95-114. Conservative opposition in both countries did not imply a total rejection of social justice. In fact, many of the conservative politicians who opposed social legislation were very active in private social services, especially those performed by the Roman Catholic church and the Catholic Social Action groups. Their opposition was based on two overall qualms: the intervention of the state into civil society and the fear that social action of the state might encourage more radical activists to push for deeper change to the political and social order.

[67] For more information on the participation of both countries in the ILO, see "The Visit to South America of the Director of the International Labour Organization" in *International Labour Review* 12:6 (1925). A well-researched piece on Chilean participation in the ILO is JC Yáñez Andrade, 'Chile y la Organización Internacional del Trabajo (1919-25): hacia una legislación social universal' *Revista de estudios históricos-jurídicos* 22 (2000).

In Chile, executive ministries continued to request information about social programs in other countries. Of interest were policies on education, hygiene, sanitation, affordable housing, and labor conditions. The main targets of these inquiries were diplomats stationed in Western Europe and the United States, although programs in other Latin American republics, the Philippines, and China occasionally drew attention. Alessandri's government also commissioned individuals to collect information on social programmes while visiting traveling abroad. Argentina's government demonstrated similar interest. Again, the ILO is a good example; there were significant links between Argentine institutions (state and non-state) and the ILO for the purposes of information exchange.[68]

Pan-American cooperation offered an opportunity to appear committed to resolving social problems through moderate, paternalist reform and to gather useful information for domestic programmes. The major aspects of the cuestión social – public health, urban housing, labour relations and education – remained priorities within second-dimension Pan-Americanism and were featured at the Fifth Pan-American Conference in Santiago. Alessandri lauded social justice in his inaugural speech, and both Chilean and Argentine delegations used the social committee to call for greater cooperation in improving the conditions of the poorest sectors. The Sanitary Bureau established at Mexico City (1901-02) was an early example of institutionalized concern for public health within Pan-Americanism. Latin American participation in the Sanitary Bureau's operations before 1920 was mainly symbolic, though a post-war revival of interest led the members to quintuple its budget to $20,000 per annum

[68] International Labour Review, 'The Visit', p. 762.

in 1920.[69] Collaboration with health officials through non-state channels (such as the Rockefeller Foundation) and the celebrated Pan American Sanitary Code of 1924, which normalized public health regulations and facilitated transnational prophylaxis, increased the practical benefits of Pan-American cooperation.[70]

The wide range of initiatives begun by non-state actors expanded Pan-Americanism's relevance to domestic developments in Chile and Argentina. Affordable housing became a key topic in the Congresses of Architects. Education was discussed in meetings of university educators and female activists. Infant mortality and demographic questions were the subject of several conferences. In 1927, a conference convened in Havana to discuss a field that had gained a considerable following in both Chile and Argentina: eugenics.[71] The efforts of the PAU, particularly in spreading information through its monthly *Bulletin*, raised awareness of the practical potential of Pan-American cooperation. The *Bulletin* achieved a wide readership by the end of the 1920s; free subscriptions were held throughout the Southern Cone, even in the far south of Patagonia.[72]

The Chilean and Argentine governments, of course, did not always agree over the practicality of social discussions in a Pan-American context. Debates over alcoholism are a good example. Although concern over excessive alcohol

[69] Howard-Jones, *The Pan American Health Organization: Origins and Evolution*, (Geneva, 1981), pp. 7-13.
[70] See Marcos Cueto, 'The Cycles of Eradication: The Rockefeller Foundation and Latin American Public Health, 1918-1940' in Paul Weindling, *International Health Organizations and Movements, 1918-1939* (Cambridge, 1995).
[71] In Argentina, advocates of eugenics included influential elites such as Juan Senillosa (university professor) and Dr Tomás Amadeo (the President of the Museo Social Argentina, a public institution established to study social issues). An Asociación Argentina de Biotipología, Eugenesia y Medicina Social formed in the late 1920s to raise public awareness with a radio programme. See the file in Juan Senillosa's papers held at AGNA (VII 159). For some analysis of Pan American eugenics efforts, especially their 'Latinization', see Stepan, *'The Hour of Eugenics',* pp. 171-95.
[72] John T Garvin to Secretary of State, 18 August 1928, NARA RG59 M487 Roll 20.

consumption was a significant element of the cuestión social in both countries, only Chilean policymakers believed it useful to discuss the issue at Pan-American conferences. Alessandri mentioned alcoholism in his opening address in 1923. In contrast, the Argentine delegation noted that the discussion was irrelevant to Argentina (yet still observed the discussion with interest). The reason for this disparity is unclear. One potential explanation is the difference in perceived urgency. Chilean anti-alcohol rhetoric focused on the threat that alcoholism posed to the Chilean working class, invoking anxiety over the degradation of 'chilenidad'. Argentine campaigns against alcoholism focused instead on the immigrant community, and policymakers viewed excessive consumption as a foreign vice peculiar to immigrant colonies. In addition, Argentina's wine producers were an effective lobby group (having derailed earlier free trade negotiations with Chile) and may have influenced the government's opinion.

In the late-1920s, both the Chilean and Argentine governments grew less enthusiastic about discussing social issues in the Pan-American context. In fact, the Argentine government worked to remove social discussions from the Sixth Pan-American Conference's programme and Chile did not object. The existence of other, more specialized venues for international discussion of social issues, including the ILO and the Pan-American technical meetings, was partly to blame for this shift in policy. Argentine arguments also echoed the Chilean policy in 1909 for maintaining separate orbits of Pan-Americanism. Yet domestic political changes also played a role. In Argentina, the 1928 presidential election drew attention away from efforts at broad social programmes; the anti-personalists instead attempted to develop more clientelist

relations with certain unions.[73] The idea of a Pan-American labour office, which carried greater financial costs and political commitment than other Pan-American discussions, also found little support among conservative elites. In Chile, the Ibáñez government implemented a wide range of social legislation by decree, continuing a process begun by the junta that ousted Alessandri in 1924. By 1928, the Chilean government had subordinated the labour movement to the state and introduced a state-regulated programme of social justice. The international stage was thus less necessary for demonstrating engagement with the social question.

*Other examples of intermestic Pan-Americanism*

Pan-Americanism touched on other topics that had direct correlation with domestic developments in Chile and Argentina. Advances in technology and communications, for example, quickly became a significant field of Pan-American cooperation. Pan-American meetings on highways, aviation, telegraph and radio all drew the interest of Chilean and Argentine policymakers and technocrats. The Chilean and Argentine governments were occasionally sceptical, however. They recognized that some Pan-American initiatives were geared towards US, rather than hemispheric, interests. Discussion about aviation, while helping to spread aeronautical technology and develop better connections between the American republics, had an ulterior motive: the dominance of US airlines in the hemisphere and the security of the Panama Canal Zone.[74] These motives became clear in the 1927 meeting of the ICCA and the 1928 Sixth Pan-American Conference. They also caused a split between Chile and Argentina. Chile, which was interested in developing airline connections with the

[73] Horowitz, *Argentina's Radical Party*, pp. 149-75.
[74] This is the central argument of Newton's *Perilous Sky*.

US, supported US proposals. Argentina, which had already signed contracts with European airlines, participated with major reservations. Other discussions of transportation and technology were also shaped by what Ricardo Salvatore has described as 'imperial mechanics': a project to use transportation and technology as means of hemispheric integration under US hegemony.[75] Despite the hegemonic implications, policymakers in both Chile and Argentina – usually in ministries other than the Foreign Ministry – found such meetings practical for gathering information about technological advances and coordinating the use of new technology.

Pan-American discussion of monetary reform also continued to interest some policymakers due to its practical implications. The IHC targeted Chile and Argentina in its efforts to promote greater uniformity among American monetary and banking systems. While often serving US interests, the financial conferences and the IHC pursued an agenda of reform and banking regulation that complemented internal political agendas in Latin America.[76] In Chile, supporters of monetary reform (whether for convertibility or more central regulation of paper money) found in Pan-American efforts a source of support and, perhaps, of inspiration. Despite a widespread belief that convertibility had caused a crisis in 1895, calls for a metallic standard continued throughout the 1900s and 1910s and gained wider implications as some claimed that monetary uncertainty caused the country's political quandaries and its moral decadence.[77] Several politicians with influence on foreign policy such as

[75] See Ricardo Salvatore, 'Imperial Mechanics'.
[76] More information about the IHC and its programmes can be found in Seidel, *Progressive Pan-Americanism*, especially pp. 87-98.
[77] Baeza, 'Chile en 1910. El centenario de la muerte' in Baeza, et al, *XX. Historias del siglo veinte chileno* (Santiago, 2008), p. 25. See also Subercaseaux, *Monetary Policy*, p. 120.

Pedro Montt and Guillermo Subercaseaux sought reform.[78] Subercaseaux – an internationally renowned economist, professor at the Universidad de Chile, and three times Interior Minister – supported Pan-American efforts to normalize banking practices in the Americas and the IHC's campaign for a metallic standard. He argued that the benefits of these reforms were reciprocal. An agreement over establishing banking agencies, according to Subercaseaux, was 'one practical means of unifying Pan-American policy.'[79] Monetary discussion was overshadowed by disarmament at the 1923 Conference; nonetheless, some Chilean policymakers remained interested in Pan-American cooperation in monetary policy.[80] In the mid-1920s, the influence that US 'money doctor' Edward Kemmerer had on the monetary policy of several Latin American countries (including Chile but not Argentina) made uniformity in the Americas more feasible. On the other hand, the Kemmerer mission that operated in Chile in 1925-26 resolved (for a short period) monetary debates and made the Ibáñez government less interested in dealing with this domestic issue in the Pan-American arena.[81]

Monetary policy was less contentious in Argentina and policymakers there were less keen to discuss this question through Pan-Americanism. Argentina enjoyed a period of monetary stability based on convertibility that lasted from 1899 to 1913.[82] The creation of a Currency Conversion Board in 1899, governed by a five-member body approved by the Senate, distanced monetary policy from political controversy and left

[78] Subercaseaux was the Interior Minister on three separate occasions, under Pedro Montt, Juan Luis Sanfuentes and Arturo Alessandri. For more on Subercaseaux, and his global fame, see Alain Alcouffe and Mauro Boianovsky, 'Doing Monetary Economics in the South: Subercaseaux on Paper Money' *Journal of the History of Economic Thought* 35:4 (2013).
[79] Subercaseaux, *Monetary Policy*, p. 135.
[80] Seidel, *Progressive Pan-Americanism,* p. 207.
[81] Drake, *The Money Doctor*, pp. 75-109.
[82] Gerardo della Paolera and Alan Taylor, *Straining at the Anchor: the Argentine Currency Board and the Search for Macroeconomic Stability, 1880-1935* (Chicago, 2001), p. 118.

the executive less vulnerable to accusations of secret paper currency emissions (a charge used by the UCR in the 1890s).[83] Monetary discussions in a Pan-American context, therefore, were not of great interest to Argentine policymakers beyond allowing Argentina to boast of its success. The Argentine Minister in Washington was quick to note in 1909 Argentina's unique status among the 'completa anarquía monetaria' that reigned in most American republics; uniformity in monetary matters, then, was illogical.[84] By 1913, Argentina's stellar record faltered as trouble in London's capital markets reverberated in Buenos Aires and the onset of the First World War effectively ended gold-standard stability in Argentina.[85] The political debate that erupted in 1914 provided the context for greater Argentine interest in Pan-American options, including the Pan-American Commercial Conference of 1915 and the IHC. That Buenos Aires hosted the 1916 IHC Congress pointed to the willingness of policymakers to discuss monetary policy in a Pan-American context. The Argentine economy recovered in the early 1920s and the continued control of the Currency Conversion Board, which operated until the 1930s, over monetary policy caused Pan-American monetary discussions to lose their appeal in the 1920s.

*Gradual Democratization and Pan-Americanism*

Another significant internal development in both countries that affected Pan-American policy was gradual democratization.[86] At the turn of the twentieth century and particularly after the First World War, definitions of Pan-American cooperation

[83] Rock, *Politics in Argentina*, p. 44.
[84] Portela to Ministerio, 12 March 1909, AMRECIC Series 25 Box 7:II.
[85] della Paolera and Taylor, *Straining*, pp. 130-42.
[86] For a useful comparative look at 'pre-democratic societies' and democratization in Latin America, see the essays in Eduardo Posada-Carbó (ed), *Elections before Democracy: The History of Elections in Europe and Latin America* (New York, 1996). Chapters Eight (on Argentina by Paula Alonso) and Ten (on Chile by J. Samuel Valenzuela) are of particular use.

appealed less to republicanism and more to democracy.[87] Pan-American events became a platform for strengthening democratic credentials. Additionally, the democratization of Pan-American institutions opened paths for regulating the US's hegemonic project. By gradually shifting control of Pan-Americanism from the US to Latin America, other regional powers laid the foundation for greater equality and accountability in inter-American relations.

As hinted at in previous sections, political change was underway in both Chile and Argentina during the late-nineteenth and early twentieth-century. In Chile, this process began with the electoral reforms of 1874 and continued throughout the period with a slow expansion of suffrage until 1912.[88] The presidential election of 1920 brought the political participation of the middle and lower classes to the fore. Chilean governments in the Parliamentary Republic described themselves as democratic and some had used diplomatic opportunities to hail democracy. A speech given at Elihu Root's reception in the Chilean presidential palace in 1906 by Foreign Minister Antonio Huneeus, for example, celebrated the US as a model of liberty and democracy.[89] In the 1910s, the Radical and Democratic Parties gained influence, increasing their representation in Congress; Radicals and Democrats also served as ministers in the Juan Luis Sanfuentes government (1915-20) despite their parties'

[87] How to define democracy is a tricky question; studies of democracy in modern regionalism, such as Laurence Whitehead's contribution to Fawcett and Serrano's *Regionalism and Governance* ('Democratization and Human Rights in the Americas: Should the Jury Still be Out?') recognize that the variability in defining democracy complicate theoretical discussions. Like Whitehead's 'broad view' (pp. 173-78), 'democracy' in this historic context combined commitment to electoral practices with a vague sense of social justice.

[88] See J. Samuel Valenzuela, *Democratización via Reforma: La expansión del sufragio en Chile* (Buenos Aires, 1985).

[89] Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, *Memoria del Ministerio de Relaciones Esteriores Culto i Colonización, presentada al Congreso Nacional en 1906* (Santiago, 1906), p. 31.

opposition to Sanfuentes's coalition of Conservatives and Liberal Democrats.[90] Electoral participation did not dramatically increase; in fact, it contracted after 1912, from 17.6 percent registered and 8.7 percent voting in 1912 to only 10.2 percent and 5.3 percent, respectively, in 1921.[91] Yet, participation in other ways (such as rallies and party militancy) flourished and parties made efforts to appeal to middle class and popular sectors in numerous ways, including through increasingly popular football clubs.[92] Arturo Alessandri, who came to office with a campaign that mobilized previously disenfranchised citizens, was eager to acclaim democracy and democratic practice. After the coup and rapid succession of governments in 1924-25, the Chilean government under Figueroa Larraín attempted to reassert Chilean claims to being a model democracy. This was quickly undermined by the manoeuvres of Ibáñez, who eventually caused the resignation of Figueroa and was elected as the only candidate on the ballot in 1927. With Ibáñez, electoral practice declined. Yet his dictatorial administration, despite its use of repression and censorship, still appealed to a Chilean tradition of democracy by proclaiming a 'mesocracia' (or government by the middle classes) and claiming that the internal order would be 'democrático-republicano'.[93]

As in Chile, restrictive suffrage in Argentina did not prevent the proliferation of democratic practices and mass participation in politics by means other than the ballot in the late nineteenth century.[94] Movements for greater middle class participation in

[90] See Valenzuela's working paper 'The Origins and Transformations of the Chilean Party System' (University of Notre Dame, 1995), pp. 14-26, and Scully, *Rethinking the Centre*, pp. 43-61.
[91] Karen Remmer, 'The Timing, Pace and Sequence of Political Change in Chile, 1891-1925' *HAHR* 57:2 (1977), p. 226. The 1921 statistic was an improvement on the numbers in 1888, when only 3.5 percent of the population voted.
[92] See Valenzuela, 'Hacia La Formación de Instituciones Democráticas: Practicas Electorales en Chile durante el Siglo XIX' in *Estudios Públicos*, 66 (Autumn 1997) and Brenda Elsey, *Citizens & Sportsmen: Fútbol & Politics in Twentieth-Century Chile* (Austin, 2011), pp. 17-50.
[93] Circular de Servicio de Informaciones Postales No 12, 2 May 1929, AMRREE Circulares v 16.
[94] See the essays in Hilda Sábato and A Lettieri (eds), *La vida política en la Argetnina del siglo XIX: Armas, votos y voces* (Buenos Aires, 2003).

politics, including the revolutionary UCR, gained momentum throughout the 1890s and 1900s. Ultimately, reform came from within the dominant land-owning class under the presidency of Sáenz Peña. The Sáenz Peña Law of 1912 (as it came to be known) made the vote obligatory for all male citizens over eighteen years old. The results of this law were less impressive than expected, however; the number of voters increased but was still a small sector of Argentine society (due, partly, to the low levels of naturalization among immigrant communities).[95] Moreover, the authors of the law and the congress that passed it ensured that there were institutional safeguards for oligarchical power. Thus, there was little resistance from the land-owning class.[96] The tone of Argentine politics shifted due to the 1912 law, particularly with the re-entry of parties that brought democratic rhetoric and practices into the political sphere as never before, especially the UCR and Socialists. Although the Yrigoyen and Alvear administrations employed several undemocratic methods to secure Radical domination in the 1920s – corruption, patronage, and federal intervention in provincial elections were hallmarks of this period – they appealed to democracy, particularly in the inclusion of middle class political actors.[97] Alvear was more willing to accept checks on executive power.

While it may be folly to assert a general theory of congruence between political regime and foreign policy, it can be safely argued from the evidence available that

[95] The immediate results of the law on numbers of voters can be seen in the election of April 1912. In the Capital Federal, for example, registered voters increased from 70,255 in the election of 1910 to 126,303 in 1912 (Botano, *El orden conservador*, p. 301). For more information on why immigrants did not naturalize, see Moya, *Cousins and Strangers*; Fernando Devoto, *Historia de la inmigración en la Argentina* (Buenos Aires, 2003); and Blanca Sánchez-Alonso, *La inmigración española en la Argentina, siglos XIX y XX* (Oviedo, 1992).

[96] Botano, *El orden conservador*, pp. 292-300, and Hora, *The Landowners*, p. 133. The election of 1912 appeared to confirm the effectiveness of these safeguards when the traditional parties of the elite maintained a considerable majority in the Chamber of Deputies.

[97] Scott Mainwaring and Aníbal Pérez-Liñán argue that these Radical governments held 'normative preferences' for democracy; see *Democracies and Dictatorships in Latin America: Emergence, Survival, and Fall* (Cambridge, 2014), pp. 128-29.

gradual democratization and the rise in democratic rhetoric in Argentine and Chilean politics had a positive effect on those countries' Pan-American policies.[98] Indeed, Pan-Americanism became a vehicle for touting democracy on the international stage. Hemispheric intellectuals from both continents laid the foundation by describing a tradition of democracy within the Americas. According to Álvarez, this characteristic distinguished the hemisphere from Europe and conditioned its governments towards greater cooperation.[99] Ruy Barbosa, Brazilian diplomat and celebrity international jurist, declared in a 1915 lecture in Buenos Aires that the democratic governments of the Americas were more preoccupied with rights and peace and would, through forming a union of democratic nations, lead the 'renovación de la vida internacional por el derecho.'[100] The rhetoric of institutions such as the PAU and AIIL took up the idea of democratic distinction by the mid-1910s. War in Europe compared to peace in the Americas provided evidence for the benefits of American democracy in international affairs.

Chilean statesmen soon joined the chorus. Eduardo Súarez Mujica, Chilean Ambassador to the US, proclaimed at the Second Pan American Scientific Congress (1915) that the Monroe Doctrine, as 'una derivación del panamericanismo,' had become 'un lazo de unión...una garantía...un baluarte para nuestras democracias.'[101] On the other side of the Atlantic, the Chilean Ambassador to Great Britain declared Pan-Americanism to be the application of democratic principles to international relations in the Americas. Alessandri amplified such rhetoric. At the Fifth Pan

[98] For an insightful glance at the question of theoretical debates over the impact of political regime on foreign policy, see José Flávio Sombra Saraiva (ed), *Foreign Policy and Political Regime* (Brasilia, 2003), particularly Andrew Hurrell's chapter.
[99] Alejandro Álvarez speech to Universidad de La Plata (Argentina), 1910, AMRREE Histórico 306a.
[100] Barbosa, *Conceptos modernos del derecho internacional* (Buenos Aires, 1916), p. 79.
[101] 'Nuestro Embajador en Washington', *El Mercurio*, 9 March 1916, p. 5.

American Conference in Santiago, he lauded the PAU as 'la célula primaria de la futura democracia internacional de los pueblos americanos.'[102] By 1923, with the Radical government of Alvear in power, Argentine diplomats also employed democratic rhetoric. The Argentine head delegate responded to Alessandri's speech with the proclamation: 'el mundo americano fué la cuna de la democracia, que se ha extendido triunfante hoy por todo el ámbito de la tierra.'[103] The ideal of democracy in internal and international politics was also invoked with the reform of the PAU structure at that conference. At the Sixth International Conference of American States in Havana, the Chilean delegation (in line with the change to the Ibáñez dictatorship) did not echo Alessandri's celebration of democracy. The Argentine delegation, however, received instruction from their Ministerio to couch their statements in terms of respect for 'la democracia que ha de regir sus [las Américas] destinos en la paz interior y en la concordia internacional.'[104] Pueyrredón used this wording in his defence of non-intervention during the Conference.

Therefore, as democracy developed and changed the tone of political discourse in both countries, Chilean and Argentine governments began supporting democratic principles in international relations, including through Pan-Americanism. This fact is open to interpretation. In part it signified that the process of gradual democratization in both countries encouraged policymakers, with at least superficial commitment to democratic principles, to foster the PAU as a union of democracies à la Barbosa. Yet the use of democratic rhetoric had pragmatic motives as well. It was a method of projecting commitment to democracy to a domestic and international audience.

[102] Alessandri, *Discurso en la Quinta Confernecia Internacional Americana*, p. 15.
[103] Delegación argentina, 'Informe presentado por la delegación argentina al Ministerio Relaciones' 26 May 1923, AMRECIC Series 25 Box 23:Anexo to X.
[104] 'Comte-Rendu del Subsecretario' 13 January 1928, AMRECIC Series 25 Box 27:V.

Attuned to public perception of foreign policy and aware of the attention that major speeches abroad received in the national press, the governments and their representatives used the international stage to reverberate domestic democratic rhetoric. Perhaps more important, however, was the international audience. In the late 1910s and early 1920s, policymakers in both countries eagerly celebrated democracy as a way to curry the US's favour. The Chilean Cancillería instructed its Misión Especial to the US after the First World War, sent to improve bilateral relations, to highlight the common democratic systems in the Americas.[105] Argentina's National Congress, in their first session of 1919, applauded the Allied victory as paramount to the survival of civilization, justice and democracy in the world.[106] In the immediate post-War period, when global trends appeared to favour democratization, Southern Cone politicians and intellectuals placed their countries at the forefront and could, through Pan-American democratic distinction, claim equality if not leadership in the international system. Edward's vanguard comment in 1916 was an early assertion.

The principles of democracy were also useful in regulating US hegemonic aspirations in Latin America. Argentina's government, for example, made the maturation of democracy central to repudiating intervention. Applying democracy to international relations also became a tool for containing US influence in inter-American affairs. The attempts to 'democratize' the PAU during the 1920s were obvious examples. Mexico, often the leader in such efforts, intended democratization to curb US power in the PAU; its suggestion of a rotating leadership of the governing body was a direct challenge to the US's position in Pan-Americanism and the hemisphere. Chilean and

[105] Bello Codesido,' Instrucciones a la MISION ESPECIAL', p. 16.
[106] Stimson to Secretary of State, 9 January 1919, NARA RG59 M514 Reel 10.

Argentine policymakers recognized the general intention and offered limited support. While they appreciated the increased Latin American influence within the PAU, the Chilean and Argentine governments still believed it was better to keep the US invested in the PAU and defended their right to vote for the US Secretary of State as chairman of the governing body. The two governments also approved of Rowe's directorship. Pan-Americanism and the PAU provided a way to maintain good relations with the US while on equal footing, recognizing the power and economic importance of the US but keeping it accountable. Chile and Argentina, in sum, aimed to manage US rising hegemony and not overturn it. Before the 1920s, efforts at managing US influence employed the language of equality of states; during the 1920s, the language of democracy joined the mix.

Democratization in Chile and Argentina therefore led to the rise of governments that were more receptive to the affirmation of democracy in Pan-Americanism and more apt to use Pan-American platforms to display adherence to democratic principles. The decline in Chilean participation Pan-Americanism under the dictatorship of Ibáñez (from 1927 onwards), compared to Argentina's surge in 1927-28, is partly explained with this context. Democratization does not completely explain the Pan-American policies of Chile and Argentina in the post-War period, however. In fact, it fails when considering the second Yrigoyen administration (1928-30). Yrigoyen's campaign in the presidential election was steeped in the rhetoric of democracy; in fact, the emphasis on protecting democracy occasionally eclipsed the question of oil nationalization, which has traditionally been seen as the biggest question of the

election.[107] Nonetheless, after his re-election Yrigoyen withdrew Argentina from Pan-Americanism, deciding against attendance at the Conciliation and Arbitration Conference of 1929. The treaty agreed at that conference (the General Convention of Inter-American Arbitration) evoked democracy explicitly, stating that the Republics of the New World were 'governed by the principles, institutions and practices of democracy and bound furthermore by mutual interests.'[108] Although invited to sign the convention and its affirmation of democracy, Yrigoyen's government was uninterested. Democratization in Chile and Argentina made governments more apt to use Pan-Americanism, but did not guarantee that they would.

*Conclusion*

A broader view of Pan-Americanism, therefore, requires analysis of intermestic policymaking. That Pan-American cooperation began to incorporate discussion and action on some of the most important challenges and developments affecting Argentine and Chilean society was no coincidence. Latin American actors with varying connections to the state recognized the potential for practical benefits in Pan-American cooperation and appropriated Pan-American terminology and institutions. As this chapter demonstrated, Pan-Americanism became increasingly relevant to the political and social milieu in which policymakers in both countries were embedded. Although the results of Pan-American cooperation were not necessarily tangible – the discussions and agreements did not usually directly affect domestic development – there were other possible benefits. The two most important benefits involved the

[107] For analysis of the election that highlights the democratic rhetoric, see María José Valdez, 'El "Plebiscito" de Hipólito Yrigoyen: La campaña electoral de 1928 en la ciudad de Buenos Aires vista desde *La Época*' *Poblaciones y Sociedad* 19:1 (2012).
[108] A copy of the Convention can be found in *The American Journal of International Law* 23:2 (1929), pp. 76-82.

opportunity to exchange information and to demonstrate concern and modernity to national and international audiences. Though the sincerity of 'practical' rhetoric is debatable, the intermestic approach taken by many policymakers had a significant effect on overall approaches to Pan-American cooperation. It helps explain why Chile and Argentina both positively engaged with Pan-Americanism in the 1900s and continued to do so despite some fluctuation in policy in the 1920s.

The underlying shift towards greater participation in Pan-American cooperation was connected to the persistent concerns of the social question, the desire to foster technological advances, and the experience of gradual democratization. This final factor was particularly important as it led to governments with a stronger preference for democratic norms and a need to prove democratic credentials. After the First World War, overall Pan-American rhetoric shifted from an emphasis on republican institutions to one on democracy. Pan-American apologists portrayed the Western Hemisphere as the reservoir of democracy. Democratic norms shaped not only domestic politics in the American republics, but their relations to each other. Such was the promise of Pan-Americanism according to Chilean diplomat Agustín Edwards. Discussions of norms and the ideals of democratic international relations raise the question: how important overall were norms and concepts to the formulation of Chilean and Argentine Pan-American policy? Analysis of democratization has also highlighted the fact that Chilean and Argentine policymakers recognized the US's hegemonic project and sought to manage the influence of the US. What affect did their attempts have on the idea of Pan-American cooperation? The following chapter will explore these questions more closely.

# Chapter 7

# Ideas in International Relations

As Louise Fawcett argues, 'ideas matter in the history of regionalism.'[1] This final chapter demonstrates that Fawcett's assertion is valid for the first half-century of modern Pan-Americanism. Given that the tangible benefits of Pan-American cooperation were meagre, the construction of inter-American sentiment was important to the persistence of Pan-Americanism. Pan-American proponents recognized that challenge and sought to promote 'cultural Pan-Americanism' through official and unofficial channels. Such efforts are not the focus of this chapter, however. Continuing the process of deconstructing approaches to Pan-American cooperation, it will instead explore the role ideas played in policymaking. Certain aspects of the thought process behind policymaking have been examined, including considerations of prestige, practicality and power. This chapter will focus more specifically on the worldview of Chilean and Argentine policymakers: how they understood international relations and regional cooperation.[2] An attempt to understand the history of international relations by examining policymakers' views on the international system is not novel; in fact, it is a major element of Akira Iriye's work.[3] Such a method has considerable potential for Latin American and Pan-American history as well.

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[1] Fawcett, 'The Origins and Development of Regional Ideas in the Americas' in Fawcett and Serrano (eds), *Regionalism*, p. 28.

[2] This chapter is, then, partly an intellectual history that draws some inspiration from the 'Cambridge School', which emphasizes the need to reconstruct the intellectual context of historical actors using their own language. See Quentin Skinner, 'Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas' *History and Theory* 8:1 (1969).

[3] See, for example, Iriye, *After Imperialism: The Search for a New Order in the Far East, 1921-31* (Cambridge, MA, 1965).

As Fawcett's argument indicates, there are parallels to this approach in social science theory. Fawcett highlights the contestation between Latin American and US conceptions of regional cooperation – an important theme in this chapter. More generally, concepts are important in the behavioural science strand of FPA and in constructivism, which Ian Hurd summarizes as 'beginning from the assumption that how people and states think and behave in world politics is premised on their understanding of the world around them.'[4] Policymakers act within a socially constructed reality, making meanings and discourse central to interpreting their actions and decisions. We therefore have to get 'inside the heads' of the historical actors.[5] In order to reconstruct (to some extent) the lens through which the actors understood foreign affairs and saw Pan-Americanism, this chapter examines both archival sources and texts written from the 1880s to the 1930s on international relations (some of which were written by the policymakers themselves). As this chapter will demonstrate, Southern Cone consciousness of international relations drew on foreign (mainly European) ideas but re-imagined those ideas to fit a unique historic and cultural context.[6]

Diplomatic historians have granted limited attention to the question of contemporary conceptions of Chilean diplomacy. Barros and Meneses referenced the intellectual

[4] Hurd, 'Constructivism' in Christian Reus-Smit and Duncan Snidal, *The Oxford Handbook of International Relations* (Oxford, 2008). That 'understanding' includes policymakers' 'beliefs about the world, the identities they hold about themselves and others, and the shared understandings and practices in which they participate.'

[5] This approach is also corroborated by anthropological methods of understanding human behaviour. Using linguistic terminology, anthropologists such as Marvin Harris have argued that behaviour can be described by outsiders (an 'etic' description) but can be fully understood only by exploring the perspective and thought processes (the 'emic') of the subject. See Harris, 'History and the Significance of the Emic/Etic Distinction' *Annual Review of Anthropology* 5 (1976).

[6] The use of 'consciousness' is a direct reference to Obregón's work; see 'Completing civilization: Creole consciousness and international law in nineteenth-century Latin America' in Anne Orford, *International Law and Its Others* (Camridge, 2006). See also Fawcett, 'Between West and non-West: Latin American Contributions to International Thought' *The International History Review* 34:4 (2012).

discourse but failed to warrant it sufficient attention. Burr argued that Chilean ideas, largely transplanted from Europe, gave a central position to power politics and regional equilibriums.[7] While Chilean writers used European ideas as their foundation, they did not merely mimic. Instead, they developed a lively discussion rooted in Chile's unique context.[8] The Chilean conceptual antecedent that is most frequently invoked is that of Diego Portales (1793-1837), the Valparaíso businessman who (as Minister of the Interior and Foreign Affairs three times in the 1830s) came to embody the conservative political order that consolidated after the Constitution of 1833. Portales is a useful figure for historians interpreting foreign policy through a realist lens. His foreign policy was predicated on an aggressive defence of Chilean interests through force when necessary and a desire to consolidate Chilean hegemony in South America's Pacific coast.[9] These principles had a lasting impact on the Chilean approach to foreign relations; one former diplomat, when considering diplomatic history, noted that 'siempre se llega en Chile a Don Diego.'[10] Pike identified three strands of international thought in Chile (which he termed 'traditions'). He made the Portalian paramount and offered as the alternatives a tradition of anti-US Hispanic-American union and one of an 'American International Law approach to hemispheric relations.'[11]

Yet Portales's influence has been overplayed. This chapter argues for the more important influence of Andrés Bello (1781-1865), who also features in some

[7] Burr, *By Reason or Force*, pp. 1-10.
[8] It is important to note that most of the sources used here are international law texts (not 'international relations' texts). In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, international relations were often under the umbrella of law and 'derecho international' implied an attempt to describe the nature of the international system.
[9] See Burr, *By Reason*, pp. 15-18, and Meneses, pp. 9-18. Also, for an earlier perspective, see Luis Carcovitch, *Portales y la política internacional hispano-americano* (Santiago, 1937).
[10] Barros, *El Ministerio*, p. 6.
[11] Pike, *Chile and the US*, pp. 27-30.

diplomatic histories. Pike highlights Bello's contributions to the international law approach while Burr notes that the 'towering figure' of Bello granted Chilean foreign policy a sense of continuity.[12] A Venezuelan serving as Gran Colombia's minister in London in the early post-Independence period, Bello accepted a commission from Chile in 1829 and moved to Santiago, where his intellectual reputation had preceded him.[13] He settled in Chile and eventually gained considerable renown within Chilean political, social and intellectual circles. He penned the Chilean Civil Code (1855), an unequivocal tour de force in legal consolidation that had a profound effect throught the region. Also included among his academic repertoire were literature, linguistics, education and politics. Bello ran the Cancillería for three decades and wrote on diplomacy and international law. He published *Principios de derecho de gentes* in 1832 (republished as *Principios de derecho internacional* in 1844 and 1864), which became a central text in Chilean understanding of international law.[14]

In Argentine international history, recent work has emphasized the importance of ideology and especially of international law.[15] Historians – including Etchepareborda, Otero, Cisneros and Escudé, and Morgenfeld – mention an ambiguous 'tradition' and ideology more generally but are less certain than their Chilean counterparts.[16] José Paradiso's *Debates y trayectoria de la política exterior argentina* (1993) offers a comprehensive look at Argentine discourse over

[12] Burr, *By Reason*, p. 19.
[13] For the motivations behind this move, see Ivan Jaksic, *Andrés Bello: Scholarship and Nation-Building in Nineteenth-Century Latin America* (Cambridge, 2001), pp. 91-92.
[14] Reproductions of the *Principios*, in both its whole and in excerpts and with helpful annotation, can be found in the *Obras Completas de Andrés Bello*, Vol X, produced by the Fundación La Casa de Bello (2nd ed 1981) and in *Selected Works of Andres Bello* (trans. FM López-Morillas, Oxford, 1997).
[15] See the special issue of *Revista Complutense de Historia de América*, 39 (2013), especially Ori Preuss and Juan Pablo Scarfi's overview: 'Relaciones internacionales, identidades activas y vida intelectual en América Latina, 1810-1945'.
[16] Etchepareborda, *Historia de relaciones*; Delia Otero, 'Políticas e ideologías en los procesos de integración del Cono sur, siglo xx' in Rapoport and Cervo, *El Cono Sur*; Cisneros and Escudé, *Historia general*, i, especially 'Introducción'; Morgenfeld, *Vecinos*, pp. 29-34.

international affairs, highlighting competing traditions of realists and idealists.[17] It is harder to identify a definitive intellectual progenitor for the Argentine Ministerio than it is for the Chilean Cancillería. The archival record and the substantial corpus of literature on international affairs produced during this period contain references to various historical figures who made important contributions to Argentine diplomatic history. Rufino de Elizalde, Foreign Minister from 1862 to 1867, was often cited for his opposition to the projects for a continental treaty in the 1850s and 1860s. Juan Bautista Alberdi and Domingo Sarmiento are also mentioned, Sarmiento receiving more attention due to his role as president (1868-74). One unknown author (using the pseudonym 'A.B.C.') in 1904 suggested four figures important to both Argentine internal and external politics: Bartólome Mitre, Julio Argentino Roca, Bernardo de Irigoyen and Carlos Pellegrini.[18] The figures that 'A.B.C.' mentioned established precedents invoked by later Argentine policymakers, yet did not provide an overall framework for understanding international relations as Bello and Portales had done in Chile. One figure that had an impact approximate to that of Andrés Bello was Carlos Calvo (1824-1906), an international jurist whose work dominated studies of international law in Argentina.

In order to get 'inside the heads' of policymakers, this chapter will first demonstrate that, in line with recent historiography, international law provided the basis for a

[17] Paradiso, *Debates*, p. 31.

[18] Etchepareborda, *Historia de las relaciones*, p. 115. Etchepareborda's history is based on a wide-ranging bibliography and is a useful resource. His work, nevertheless, should be read with care, as he tends to focus on the work of Estanislao Zeballos, which gives him a narrow view of Argentina's foreign affairs. Conspicuously absent from A.B.C.'s list is Juan Manuel de Rosas, governor of Buenos Aires in 1829-32 and 1835-52, in effect the leader of the Argentine Confederation during those periods. This omission is not surprising given Rosas's controversial status within Argentine literature in the late nineteenth century. Although concerted revision of Rosas took place in the 1890s and again in the late 1920s and 1930s, this did not overcome the general vilification of Rosas in the liberal tradition. One example of a positive treatment of Rosas is Moreno Quintana's *La diplomacia de Yrigoyen*, which pointed to parallels between Rosas and Yrigoyen's defence of Argentine territorial integrity and his attempt to deepen Argentina's influence in South America (p. 35).

widely accepted set of norms that were influenced by the works of Bello and Calvo. Examining these figures uncovers another important aspect of policymakers' perspectives: divergent regionalist and universalist tendencies that drew on wider cultural trends. Finally, the role of historicism within foreign policy calculations will be examined. This chapter will give little attention to the role that 'realist' frameworks (for example, power equilibriums) played. Undoubtedly, such considerations were part of the intellectual exercise of policy design and they have been subject to much historical work.[19] Yet, archival and other printed sources reveal that the policymakers understood the international system not as anarchic but rather as a community of nations regulated by certain norms.

*Normative Frameworks and International Law*

Chapter Five mentioned one central element of the prevailing normative framework in Argentina and Chile: civilization. Policymakers in the Southern Cone frequently made reference to civilized peoples and nations in statements and discussions, usually including their country in that category.[20] By implication, other nations and peoples, including some of the republics of the circum-Caribbean, were less civilized. Pan-American policy discussions occasionally betrayed a belief in the superior civilization of South America (the Southern Cone especially) – doubts over a unified Latin American bloc in the 1889-90 Washington Conference and initial concerns about the role of Central American states in regional cooperation are two examples. According

[19] A clear example is Burr, 'The Balance of Power in Nineteenth-Century South America: An Exploratory Essay' *HAHR* 35:1 (1955).
[20] There are many examples, including a letter from Victorino de la Plaza to the Inspector General de Consulados from 30 September 1912 (AGNA VII fol. 350), the opening speech of Montes de Oca at the 1923 Santiago Conference (AMRECIC Series 25 Box 23:X, pp. 14-20), Álvarez's treatise on 'La nacionalidad en el derecho internacional americano' (1907, AMRREE Histórico 356, p. III), and Bello Codesido's 'Memorandum' in preparation of the 1923 Santiago Conference (AHN EBC fol. 25, p. 270).

to important nineteenth-century intellectuals, including both Bello and Calvo, the disparity between civilized and uncivilized affected international affairs as some states were obliged to promote civilization.[21] Influenced by such arguments, Chilean and Argentine policymakers sought to portray their country as a 'civilizador.'[22] Thus, Root and Rowe's description of the ABC as co-civilizers in the Americas appealed to a prevailing cultural discourse and had a positive impact on attitudes towards the US and US-led Pan-Americanism.

The law of nations was central to Argentine and Chilean perspectives on 'civilized' international relations.[23] Legalism was partly the result of the legal training of most politicians and diplomats in Chile and Argentina, usually completed at the University of Chile or the University of Buenos Aires, respectively.[24] In Chile, legalism had early gained a central place within the articulation of international affairs. By commissioning Andrés Bello as the Oficial Mayor of the Departamento de Relaciones Exteriores, a role he held for nearly twenty years, the government of José Joaquín Prieto (1831-41) sought to define the Chilean state in terms of international law and sponsored the legal approach developed by Bello.[25] Legal language and reasoning permeated the works of major Chilean political writers in the late nineteenth and early

[21] Liliana Obregón, 'Construyendo la región americana: Andrés Bello y el derecho internacional' *Revista de derecho público* 24 (2010).
[22] For example, 'Instrucciones de los delegados argentinos (Tema XIII)' (1923), AMRECIC Series 25 Box 25:XII.
[23] Gong argues in *The Standard of 'Civilization'* (pp. 54-93) that the rise of secular international law was central to the broader discourse on 'standards of civilization' in the nineteenth century. See also Obregón, 'The Civilized and Uncivilized' in Bardo Fassbender and Anne Peters (eds), *The Oxford Handbook of the History of International Law*, pp. 921-27.
[24] For a recent analysis of the role of the University of Buenos Aires's Facultad de Derecho y Ciencias Sociales in Argentine history, see Ortiz, *Facultad de Derecho, Historia, Nación y Universidad* (Buenos Aires, 2011).
[25] For more on Bello's influence in international law, see Fernando Murillo Rubiera and Héctor Gros Espiell's essays in Fundación La Casa de Bello, *Bello y Chile* (2 vols, Caracas, 1981) as well as La Casa de Bello's *Andrés Bello y el Derecho Internacional* (Caracas, 1987), and Jaksic, *Andrés Bello*, p. 105.

twentieth centuries. As one diplomat and author at the turn of the century noted, the 'conciencia pública' was malleable, but the rights of a state were immovable: 'el derecho es la sola pasión digna de un pueblo libre.'[26] Diplomats and policymakers read works of international law; *El Mercurio* noted in 1908 that diplomats, while poorly trained, at least all read Cruchaga Tocornal's *Nociones del derecho internacional*. [27] Carlos Castro Ruiz, secretary of the Cancillería in the late 1910s, also highlighted the importance of international law to the formulation of Chilean foreign policy.[28] In his memoirs, diplomat and Cancillería bureaucrat Enrique Berstein Carabantes later recalled that the 'vieja tradición' within Chilean foreign policy was 'portaliana y legalista.'[29]

Policymaking circles included experts in international law, such as Alejandro Álvarez and Cruchaga Tocornal. Álvarez, considered by contemporaries and historians as among the most influential Chilean jurists and academics of the twentieth century, served as Sub-Secretary and eventually legal adviser to the Cancillería.[30] He produced several works examining the nature of an overarching international legal framework, including his famous *Le Droit International Américain* (1915). Through Pan-American channels (especially the AIIL), he became a renowned hemispheric intellectual and spent much of his time outside of Chile in the late 1910s and 1920s.[31]

[26] Orrego Luco, *Los problemas,* pp. 15-16.
[27] 'Dia a dia' *El Mercurio*, 5 October 1908.
[28] Castro Ruiz, *Jurisprudencia de la Cancillería Chilena*, (2 vols, Santiago, 1918), i, 1-2.
[29] Bernstein, *Recuerdos*, p. 18.
[30] Mario Barros, for example, grants Álvarez the title of 'el gran internacionalista chileno' and includes within his *Historia Diplomática* excerpts of praise for the jurist and his 'trascendental obra', pp. 596-97. Unfortunately, no major biography of Álvarez has been written. Nonetheless, there are a few works that closely examine his work: see Liliana Obregón, 'Noted for Dissent: The International Life of Alejandro Álvarez' *Leiden Journal of International Law* 19 (2006) and Scarfi, 'International Law and Pan-Americanism in the Americas'.
[31] He eagerly kept track of debates in Europe over his idea of a distinct 'derecho internacional americano', directing the attention of Conrado Ríos Gallardo in one letter from 1928 to the fact that

Yet he maintained strong links with the Cancillería, frequently acting as legal adviser to both the Foreign Minister and to Chile's international delegations. He also served as a Chilean delegate to the 1927 Rio de Janeiro Commission of Jurists and the 1928 Havana Conference.

The discussion over international law based in the Cancillería incorporated an increasing number of voices by the 1910s and 1920s. A compendium of international agreements signed by Chile published in 1918 noted that the Cancillería regularly consulted Supreme Court lawyers (such as Miguel Luis Valdés and Ricardo Reyes Solar) and international law professors (including Alamiro Huidobro Valdés, Manuel Foster Recabarren, Ricardo Montaner Bello and J Guillermo Guerra).[32] The professionalization of the Cancillería bureaucracy and Chile's diplomatic corps also added voices to this discussion. In 1917, the Cancillería officially recognized diplomacy as a 'technical' profession and enhanced the provision for diplomatic training. By the 1920s, reforms had made familiarity with international law a requisite for Cancillería employees and diplomats. The Cancillería established the 'Escuela de Servicio Exterior' in 1927, with Enrique Gajardo Villarroel at the helm. Gajardo drew heavily on the work of Álvarez, 'nuestro gran internacionalista', in the development of the curriculum.[33] Not every policymaker in Chile held a legalistic perspective, of course; Foreign Minister Ríos Gallardo, for example, doubted the use of international law and confessed to a close confidant that he found it difficult 'a veces armonizar las teorías del derecho con la conveniencia diplomática.'[34] In fact,

increasing numbers of European students were writing about the 'derecho internacional americano' in their doctoral theses (Álvarez to Ríos Gallardo, 28 July, AMRREE CRG IV).

[32] Castro Ruíz, *La jurisprudencia,* p. 7. Incidentally, Alamiro Huidobro was himself Foreign Minister twice – once in 1916-17 and again in 1919-20.

[33] Gajardo, *Curso en derecho internacional*, p. 25.

[34] Gallardo to Alfredo Irarrázaval, 25 July 1927, AMRREE CRG vol. I.

Ríos Gallardo later declared that 'los ideales del actual Gobierno de Chile son los mismos que inspiraron a Portales', implying a shift away from Bello's legalistic tradition.[35] Nonetheless, legal training and legal reasoning remained an important element of Chilean policymaking. Of the sixty-three diplomats listed in the 1935 register of Chile's diplomatic personnel, forty-two were considered career diplomats and thus had probably received training in international law. The second most common occupational background of Chile's diplomatic personnel was law (twelve listed). Politics (six), civil engineering (two), and engineering (one) completed the list.[36]

Legalism was also an important element of Argentine diplomatic rhetoric and of the general understanding of relations between states.[37] This too was conditioned by the training policymakers had received; almost all the Foreign Ministers – twenty-eight out of the thirty in this period – held degrees in law.[38] As in Chile, law was the most common path to a political career. We should not assign too much significance to this fact, however, as few specialized in international law. Drago, for example, worked mainly in penal law before being elected as a National Deputy and, almost immediately, accepting the portfolio of Foreign Minister. Yet the alumni of the Law Faculty entering careers in diplomacy or the Foreign Ministry were probably familiar with certain basic texts on international law, particularly those of Carlos Calvo.

[35] Gallardo to Luis León, 9 November 1928, AMRREE CRG vol V.
[36] Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores y Comercio, *Sinópsis biográfica del personal diplomática de Chile* (Santiago, 1935).
[37] This legalism has been noted in the historiography of Argentine diplomacy. See, for example, Miguel Cárcano, *La política internacional en la historia argentina*, (2 vols, Buenos Aires, 1972), i, 4.
[38] The two that were not lawyers were Valentín Virasoro, an engineer, and Ángel Gallardo, a civil engineer and biologist.

Argentine policymakers believed, or at least claimed to believe, that international law was the guiding principle of international relations and Argentina was among the most ardent supporters of the codification of international law, both public and private, in the Americas. In justifying Argentine positions and defending national interests, Argentine diplomats frequently resorted to legal arguments. Whether or not Argentine policymakers actually viewed international relations through a legal prism (as opposed to using law *ex post facto* to justify their decisions before international audiences) is difficult to determine. Clearly, doubts over the practicality of the legal approach were present. Eduardo Bidau, professor of international law, warned students in Buenos Aires in 1906 that it was 'no poco incierto...afirmar y precisar para que la comunidad internacional sea regida por el derecho.' Nonetheless, Bidau still maintained that the 'progresos de la civilización' in the nineteenth century had given rise to a set of normative laws that *should* guide international relations.[39]

After the First World War, Argentine writers and policymakers argued that international law should be the foundation for a reconstructed international order. Carlos Saavedra Lamas, for example, argued that a peaceful post-war international system was possible only by employing international law to regulate economic and demographic inequalities.[40] Six years later, Daniel Antokoletz asserted in his *Manual diplomático y consular* of 1928 that 'las relaciones internacionales se fundan sobre bases jurídicas.'[41] A child of middle-class Lithuanian Jewish immigrants, Antokoletz was by the 1920s a respected authority on international law and an influential voice within the Ministerio. Isidoro Ruiz Moreno, adviser to the Ministerio, also included

[39] Bidau, 'El Derecho Internacional Público' *RDHL* XXIV (May 1906), pp. 347-48.
[40] Saavedra Lamas, *Tratados internacionales de tipo social* (Buenos Aires, 1922), pp. 429-30.
[41] Antokoletz, *Manual diplomático*, p. 7.

'el jurídico' amongst the factors that shaped Argentine foreign policy (the other factors were territorial and political considerations).[42] In the 1920s, the Ministerio gave increasing weight to the opinions of its legal experts. An important segment of policymakers, therefore, maintained that Argentina's foreign affairs should be conducted, or influenced, by international law.

The principles embodied in the legalistic perspective derived from a wider, global discussion on international law. Chilean and Argentine jurists recognized the important influence of European and US works, including those of Emmerich de Vattel and Henry Wheaton. Yet a distinct Latin American legal tradition also emerged in the nineteenth century in the works of Bello, Calvo, and others.[43] Bello's perspective on the conduct of international affairs and the maintenance of 'una familia de naciones' shaped Chilean diplomacy for decades.[44] International legal experts in Chile made frequent reference to Bello in their works on international law. Cruchaga Tocornal's *Nociones de Derecho Internacional*, for example, cited Bello among the founding fathers of modern international law. The 'Bello Doctrine', which encouraged 'most-favoured nation' clauses in Latin American commerce treaties (giving Latin American nations preferential trade relations), was relevant well into the 1930s. According to the authors of a Commercial Treaty Commission text from that decade, the doctrine was 'uno de los pocos principios sentados por nuestra

[42] Ruiz Moreno, *La política exterior de la República Argentina* (Buenos Aires, 1931), p. 10. Interestingly, Ruiz Moreno continues his argument by claiming that economic and strategic concerns 'han estado ausentes' in foreign policy formulation. That is obviously nonsense; some of the biggest issues facing the Ministerio were economic or strategic, including campaigning against tariffs and checking Brazilian competition in armaments.
[43] See note 6 above (p. 272).
[44] Bello, *Principios*, p. 21.

Cancillería…y su mantenimiento significaría que Chile sostiene una línea definida en su política comercial internacional.'[45]

Bello argued for the equality of independent, sovereign nations regardless of relative power; the right of a nation to defend its territories and subjects; the obligation of governments to allow for commerce with other nations; and the necessity of reprimand for those nations which refuse to accept 'el derecho internacional'.[46] A religious man, Bello used the language of divine propagation and Christendom but supported the establishment of secular nation-states within a system of order and peace. Bello's emphasis on equality and inviolability of international law was partly a response to the acute reality of Latin America's precarious position in the international system, as many Latin American republics remained unrecognized by Spain for decades after independence.[47] International law was, therefore, the protection of the weak Latin American republics.

Bello also had an influence in Argentina. Calvo was an outspoken advocate of Bello's work, describing *Principios* as 'un tratado elemental de derecho internacional.'[48] Bello's thoughts on inter-American cooperation continued to be relevant in the debate over regional politics.[49] His legacy persisted well into the twentieth century. International law courses in Argentina frequently included Bello's *Principios*, and textbooks, such as Ruiz Moreno's *Lecciones de derecho internacional público* (1934),

[45] Comisión de Tratados de Comercio, *La Doctrina Bello* (Santiago, undated, but with references to the 1930s), p. 1-3; in AMRREE Histórico 346.
[46] For more on Bello's perspective of international law, see Obregón, 'Construyendo'.
[47] Chile was not granted formal recognition by Spain until 1844, 26 years after Chile declared independence.
[48] Calvo, *El derecho internacional téorico y práctico de Europa y América*, (2 vols, Paris, 1868), i, 58. This work was also well known in its French translation: *Le droit international théoretique et practique, pécédé d'un exposé historique des progrès de la science du droit des gens* (Paris, 1870).
[49] See, for example, Roberto Ancízar's article 'Otra especie de Pan-Americanismo (1852-1855)' *RDHL* IX (March 1901).

cited Bello alongside Wheaton and Wharton of the US, Cruchaga Tocornal of Chile, Calvo, Bidau and Antokoletz of Argentina, and various European jurists.[50] Yet Bello's impact was not as significant in Argentina as it was in Chile. Saavedra Lamas noted in 1935 that the influence of Bello was much greater on the other side of the *cordillera*; in Chile, they still maintained 'las grandes tradiciones de Bello.'[51] By implication, Bello counted for less in Argentina.

As Ernesto Rey Caro notes, Calvo and Amancio Alcorta were without doubt the most influential writers for students of international law at Argentine universities; Calvo's work, particularly his doctrine of non-intervention, was a common reference for Argentine jurists and diplomats.[52] Many of the principles described in Calvo's treatises became elements of the normative framework of international relations espoused by Argentine policymakers. Like Bello, Calvo asserted the equality of sovereign states. Calvo placed his emphasis on the independent duties and privileges of states and rejected absolutely the concept of foreign intervention. Approaching the subject historically, he argued that there had never been justifiable coercive intervention in the Americas.[53] Extending this argument, he rejected any intervention of foreign powers on behalf of expatriate citizens (a principle that became known as the Calvo Doctrine). These two ideas – equality of sovereign states and non-intervention – were key principles in Argentine diplomacy in the late nineteenth century and after.

[50] Ruiz Moreno, *Lecciones*, p. 55.
[51] Speech given by Saavedra Lamas at the Second Pan-American Commercial Conference (Buenos Aires, 1935), AMRECIC Series 25 Box 44.
[52]. See Rey Caro, 'Notas sobre la doctrina iusinternacionalista argentina en el siglo XIX. Su proyección en la enseñanza en las universidades argetninas y en particular in la Universidad Nacional de Córdoba' *Revista de la Facultad de Derecho (Universidad Nacional de Córdoba)* 1:1 (2010).
[53] Calvo, *El derecho internacional*, ii, 136-186.

Argentine and Chilean normative frameworks diverged on the degree of commitment to the principle of non-intervention. Bello laid the foundation for a strong non-interventionist stance but also admitted the legitimacy of intervention in certain circumstances, particularly when one state gravely threatened the security of another.[54] He also noted that sovereign states had the right to protect their subjects abroad in the case that a foreign government (or its authorized representatives) had harmed the property or interests of those subjects or failed to honour legally contracted debt. On those grounds, he did not criticize initial foreign intervention in the pecuniary claims of European subjects against Mexico in 1861. He adamantly opposed, however, France's decision to forcibly impose a government on Mexico afterwards. Calvo built on Bello's arguments and took a more stringent line on intervention, rejecting explicitly foreign intervention on behalf of subjects living abroad. Chilean and Argentine approaches to international relations echoed the divide between the two jurists. While Argentina became one of the most ardent defenders of non-intervention, further defining the concept in the Drago Doctrine and leading Latin American opposition to US incursions in the circum-Caribbean, Chile was less supportive. Chile's government was lukewarm on the Drago Doctrine, arguing that debt default was an irresponsible violation of contractual agreements that exposed Latin American governments to sanctions. While Chile appealed to non-intervention when its interests were involved (in its opposition to Wilson's Pan-American Pact, for example), it played a minor role in criticizing US intervention in the circum-Caribbean in the 1920s.

[54] Frank Griffith Dawson provides an insightful look at Bello's ideas on non-intervention in his article, 'The Influence of Andrés Bello on Latin-American Perceptions of Non-Intervention and State Responsibility' *The British Yearbook of International Law* 57:1 (1986).

The importance of international law as a normative framework within Chilean and Argentine perspectives had direct implications for their approach to Pan-Americanism. Initially, US-led Pan-Americanism seemed concerned for international law only in the question of arbitration and patent protection. Pan-American cooperation was, therefore, not founded on terms that appealed to Chilean and Argentine policymakers. The Argentine and Chilean representatives formulated their anxiety over Pan-Americanism through appeals to legal principles. The two most important proposals of the Washington Conference (customs union and obligatory arbitration) clashed with the rights of sovereign states to determine their commercial relations and defend their interests through negotiation. Argentina advocated obligatory arbitration but opposed a permanent tribunal as it limited the participants' ability to negotiate the constitution of arbitration. Chile took a more extreme position, claiming that obligatory action was unacceptable and states should, instead, voluntarily accede to the process or sign bilateral treaties that would accommodate the unique nature of each bilateral relationship. Chilean and Argentine diplomats frequently reminded the inter-American community of the equality of sovereign states. In terms of that principle, both countries opposed Blaine's presidency in the 1889 conference and, in 1905, Chile's Minister to the US defended his right as a 'representative of a free country' to voice his country's opinion in the Bureau of American Republics.[55]

With the Second International Conference of American States, however, Pan-American cooperation in the codification of international law emerged. The establishment of the Commission of Jurists at Rio de Janeiro in 1907 institutionalized

[55] Minutes of the Consejo Directivo, 5 May 1905, AMRREE Histórico 295.

Pan-American legal discussions. Thereafter, questions of international law and its codification were stable features of Pan-American discussions and Pan-American cooperation became more juridical. The legalization process was, in part, a result of Chilean and Argentine pressure; both countries' governments advocated for codification and advanced the principles determined at the 1888-89 Montevideo Congress. US intervention in Latin America, particularly after the Roosevelt Corollary of 1904, tempered Argentine interest in Pan-Americanism's juridical potential. Policymakers in Buenos Aires hoped to use Pan-American cooperation to convince the US to accept their position on non-intervention. The discussion of Drago's doctrine at the 1906 Conference raised expectations, but disappointment soon followed at the Second Hague Conference when the Porter Convention (proposed by the US) admitted certain forms of legitimate intervention. This issue delayed Argentina's positive engagement with Pan-Americanism and remained a point of contention throughout the 1910s and 1920s. In contrast, the question did not have such a dampening effect on Chilean approaches to Pan-Americanism.

The 1912 congress of jurists in Rio de Janeiro and the AIIL further inserted juridical debates into Pan-Americanism. Such debates brought certain principles, particularly equality of sovereign states and the resolution of international disputes with voluntary arbitration, to the fore of Pan-American cooperation. During the First World War, juridical norms became a defining feature of Pan-American rhetoric. In contrast to the intra-European concert of nations, which had failed to base international relations upon juridical norms and thus collapsed into catastrophic war, Pan-American institutions and conferences had placed international law at its centre. Many American jurists and governments considering how the international system should be

reconstructed after the Great War argued that the Americas could lead the way. Such arguments increased the appeal of Pan-Americanism to Chilean and Argentine policymakers. In a 1915 meeting, the Pan-American Union Directive Council praised the idea that 'la ley internacional no es el patrimonio de una sola Nación; es la ley de todas las naciones, y debe, en consecuencia, ser formada o consentida por todas ellas.'[56] Elihu Root, honorary president of the AIIL, appealed to Latin American perspectives later that year when he stated that 'el Derecho Internacional constituye la mejor protección de los países débiles.'[57] Such ideas provided the context for heightened enthusiasm for Pan-Americanism in Chile and Argentine in the early 1920s. The image of Pan-American cooperation among equals remained salient in Chile; as Gajardo Villaroel instructed a new cohort of Chilean diplomats in 1928, 'una de las características del panamericanismo y de sus organismos dirigentes es, precisamente, el respeto de la igualdad de los Estados.'[58]

Yet the 'legalization' of Pan-Americanism was complicated by the continued military intervention of the US in the circum-Caribbean. Hopes that inter-American relations could be the model for the post-War international system also dimmed after the League of Nations chose as the defining example of regional agreements the Monroe Doctrine, enshrining the US's declaration in its charter. Argentine policymakers were particularly upset at this decision, arguing that the Monroe Doctrine was not international law. US intervention in the Americas in the 1920s did not completely undermine the juridical nature of Pan-American cooperation. In fact, the juridical discussions in Pan-Americanism opened a channel through which Chilean and

[56] This statement was made by Suárez Mujica. *Memoria del Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, Culto y Colonización (Diciembre de 1914 – Diciembre de 1915)* (Santiago, 1918), p. 70.
[57] Ibid., p. 72.
[58] Gajardo Villaroel, *Curso de derecho internacional e historia diplomática profesado en el Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores* (Santiago, 1928), p. 22.

Argentine policymakers believed they could eventually manage US actions in the hemisphere. The agreement at the 1927 Rio de Janeiro Juridical Congress demonstrated the potential dividends of this effort for both countries. Charles Evans Hughes' defence of intervention at the 1928 Conference in Havana, nonetheless, reminded Latin American policymakers of the limitations of the juridical strategy. The second Yrigoyen administration in Argentina used the failure at Havana to justify its policy of withdrawal from first-dimension Pan-American cooperation. The Chilean government, despite Ríos Gallardo's uncertainty over international law, continued to pursue the legal regulation of inter-American affairs through codification and agreements on arbitration and conciliation, but with less enthusiasm.

*Regional/Universal Divide*

Bello and Calvo provide further insight into Chile and Argentina's different approaches to cooperation in the Western Hemisphere. Bello's focus was on the Americas; he aimed to insert Latin America into the international system and change the notion of sovereignty in order to assert the equality of the independent American republics to the European monarchies.[59] Increased cooperation and trade among Latin American states was a means to secure independence and facilitate state-building efforts. In other works, Bello advocated regional cooperation and the differentiation of the Americas from Europe due to their distinct institutions and form of governance. Influenced by his studies of Spanish linguistics and poetry (in which he recognized differences between peninsular and Latin American Spanish), his experience during the independence struggles, and his service to two American republics, Bello

[59] See Jaksic, *Andrés Bello: La pasión por el orden* (Santiago, 2001), pp. 135-38.

developed a strong sense of Americanism.[60] Calvo, in contrast, began his career after European recognition for most independent Latin American states was achieved and spent much of his life in France. As a founding member of the Institut de Droit International in Ghent and advocate of international academic networks, Calvo cultivated a trans-Atlantic perspective. He argued for the universality of international law in a way that did not highlight regional differences, though he recognized that context required some differences in regional application of international law.[61] Therefore, while Bello's work reinforced a regional outlook that continued to shape Chilean perspectives on international relations, Calvo provided theoretical justification for a more universalist perspective that distinguished Argentine perspectives. Universalism did not deny all regional differences. The Drago doctrine exemplified the room for regionalism within universal international law. Drago argued that commitment to non-intervention in the Americas should be a principle to which all nations were bound to comply.

Wider cultural trends bolstered the regional/universal divergence in Chilean and Argentine perspectives. In the late nineteenth century, Europhile political elites in both countries appropriated intellectual and cultural norms from Europe (particularly from Britain, France and Germany).[62] Like many Latin American capitals, Buenos Aires and Santiago were transformed after 1870 into modern metropolises along European lines. The close commercial ties between the Southern Cone and Europe

[60] Bello did not propose a clean break from Europe, however. In his works on Spanish grammar, for example, he called for the acceptance of Latin American usage but did not propose severing ties with the peninsular language. Instead, he hoped to reform to prevent divergence among Latin American Spanish speakers and to make Latin American Spanish equal to its peninsular counterpart. His work, therefore, was more conservative than his Chilean contemporaries José Victorino Lastarria and Francisco Bilbao. See Jaksic, 'Introduction' in *Selected Writings*, p. xxxix-xl.
[61] Calvo, *El derecho internacional*, p. 138.
[62] See Hale, 'Political and Social Ideas' for a general overview of this trend.

helped to deepen connections between the two, particularly as the material culture of Europe flowed directly into Argentine and Chilean society through the import of European products. By the early twentieth century, identification with Europe was stronger in Argentina than in Chile, partly due to demographics. Although the governments of both had encouraged European immigration in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Argentina had received a substantially larger number of immigrants. While the proportion of European immigrants in the total Argentine population exceeded twenty-five percent by the 1900s, it never reached five percent in the Chilean.[63] The Argentine population was, therefore, more European, a fact that Argentine elites used to portray their nation as superior to the rest of Latin America.

Reactions against the emulation of Europe and the presence of certain European immigrant colonies emerged in both countries at the turn of the century, embodied in a literary form that historians label 'cultural nationalism'.[64] Rejecting the liberal, positivist principles of earlier generations but still employing positivist methodology, nationalist writers celebrated the distinctive mixture of native and European characteristics (or *mestizaje*) that comprised 'chilenidad' and 'el ser argentino'. The *roto* (Chilean manual labourer) and the gaucho became symbols of the virile, masculine and industrious non-European in the Southern Cone republics. Yet these trends differed. Argentine cultural nationalists were stronger proponents of arielismo and hispanismo than their Chilean counterparts. Even though some nationalists admitted that the attention given to a foreign country (Spain) was odd in the context

[63] Rock, *Politics in Argentina*, pp. 10-11. In Chile, many immigrants were from other American republics. Peruvian and Bolivian immigrants, for example, were prominent in the northern nitrate districts.

[64] For a useful review of the historical literature, see Jeane DeLaney, 'Imagining El Ser Argentino: Cultural Nationalism and Romantic Concepts of Nationhood in Early Twentieth-Century Argentina' *Journal of Latin American Studies* 34:3 (2002) and Barr-Melej, *Reforming Chile*, especially p. 56.

of nationalist literature, they believed that understanding the links to the former metropolis was necessary in order to define Argentine national character.[65] The political implications of cultural nationalism were also different in the two countries. Argentine cultural nationalism remained largely a literary and intellectual movement. In Chile, the most important work of cultural nationalism – Nicolás Palacios's *La raza chilena* (1904) – entered general political discourse and became a common reference for Radicals and Liberals. European culture was, moreover, linked to the widespread sense of decadence and decline mentioned in Chapter Five.[66] In his *Sinceridad: Chile íntimo de 1910*, Alejandro Venegas (better known by his pen name, Dr Valdés Cange) derided attempts to 'europeizar' Chile due to the failure to yield anything beyond superficial progress.[67] Although Chilean political elites continued to import European goods and cultural norms, they were also quicker and more willing than their Argentine counterparts to distance themselves from Europe.

Many Chilean observers viewed the First World War as a failure of European civilization and so turned instead to the Americas for examples of the ideals of humanity.[68] Although some observers (such as nationalist writer Tancredo Pinochet Le-Brun, politician Carlos Walker Martínez, and diplomat Eduardo Suárez Mújica) worried about the cultural influence the US had on Chile, others embraced the idea of an 'American' civilization and sought to define the 'American' style.[69] The Chilean turn away from Europe accelerated as commercial ties to the Old World declined after

[65] Moya, *Cousins and Strangers*, pp. 363-64.
[66] See Pike, *Chile and the United States*, pp. 94-100.
[67] Valdés, *Sinceridad,* p. 250. This book was, according to Sergio Villalobos, 'un verdadero latigazo a la conciencia del país' (*Chile y su historia* (11th edition, Santiago, 2008), p. 336).
[68] See Albert, *South America*, pp. 306-21. Agustín Edwards declared the Americas a reservoir for humanity in 1916, see 'El panamericanismo' *El Mercurio*, 8 August 1916, p. 3.
[69] On concerns over US cultural penetration, see Pike, pp. 164-67. One example of the search for the 'American' style was the Pan-American architecture discussions; see Gutiérrez, *Congresos panamericanos*, pp. 9-14.

1918 and trade with the US increased. Similar developments existed in Argentina, but to a lesser extent. That republic's elite did not face the crisis of confidence seen in Chile. Argentine cultural nationalists' attacks were most vehement against the European immigrant communities, not the European cultural norms of Argentina's elite.[70] Elite projections of a European society, while challenged, were more tenable and prevalent in the 1910s and 1920s in Argentina than in Chile. Argentine universalism and rejection of American exclusivity was, therefore, shaped by a prevailing belief in the European character of Argentina. Chile's regionalism, in comparison, was fortified by weakening cultural and commercial ties to Europe.

Another potential influence on the more universalist position in Argentina was *krausismo*, a minor German philosophical movement emanating from the writings of Karl Christian Friedrich Krause that gained a small but dedicated following in Spain and thus found its way into Latin American intellectual circles. According to O. Carlos Stoetzer, German Eclecticism and, later, krausismo came to dominate some of the most important educational institutions in Argentina.[71] The principles of krausismo, as viewed through an Ibero-American lens, were based on the concepts of humanity and social solidarity. Applied to the international community, these can be summed up in the following list (simplified given the scope of this thesis): state sovereignty was inviolable, equality of states was absolute, and the duty of each state (as with each individual) was to fulfil within a peaceful society its role in universal humanity's destiny.[72]

[70] Rock, *Politics in Argentina,* pp. 180-83 and McGee, *Las Derechas*, pp. 31-33.
[71] Stoetzer, *Karl Christian Friedrich Krause and his Influence in the Hispanic World* (Köln, 1998), pp. 311-87.
[72] Ibid., p. 377.

How influential krausismo was to Argentine understandings of foreign relations is debatable as explicit evidence of Krausean thought is thin. Important figures in Argentine foreign policymaking, including Victorino de la Plaza and Hipólito Yrigoyen, had attended schools that taught Eclecticism and krausismo and so were likely familiar with Krausean principles. Stoetzer claims that Sáenz Peña's 'America for humanity' was a Krausean declaration due to the invocation of humanity, yet provides no concrete evidence to corroborate the interpretation. Yrigoyen has been used as the key example of krausista politicians by Stoetzer and other historians including Carl Dierksmeier, Escudé and Cisneros. [73] Yet the issue is not so straightforward. Joel Horowitz maintains that Yrigoyen neither promoted Krausism as an ideology nor claimed to follow Krause in domestic politics.[74] Furthermore, many of the principles of krausismo had been described by Argentine jurists such as Calvo and Alcorta, without reference to Krause. Yet krausismo's influence on yrigoyenista foreign policy is possible. Lucio Moreno, a friend of Yrigoyen, wrote in 1928 that Yriogoyen's international ideology was influenced by 'el estudio profundizado de ciertos filósofos alemanes que siguieron en cierto modo las huellas de Kant,' a category that includes Krause.[75] The fact that Yrigoyen never mentioned Krause in policy discussions leaves the question to speculation. While not the major framework for Argentine views on international relations, krausismo was an interesting contextual element, particularly under Yrigoyen. Krause's influence was considerably less on Chilean intellectual trends, suggesting another potential reason that Argentine policymakers were more reluctant to participate in regionalism antagonistic to Europe.

[73] Ibid., p. 360; Carl Dierksmeier, 'Krausism' in S Nuccetelli, O Schutte and O Bueno, *A Companion to Latin American Philosophy* (Malden, MA, 2010), pp. 120-22; Escude and Cisnero, *Historia de las relaciones exteriores argentinas*, viii, 36 and 54.
[74] Horowitz, *Argentina's Radical Party*, p. 46.
[75] Moreno, *La diplomacia de Yrigoyen,* p. 31.

Influenced by this context, Chilean and Argentine Pan-American policy demonstrated a divergent regional and universalist focus. From the 1880s until the 1930s, Argentine policymakers and diplomats rejected practical and rhetorical attempts at American exclusivity; they rejected the Pan-American Zollverein on both economic and intellectual grounds. Sáenz Peña's famous 'America for humanity' statement at the closing of the 1889-90 Washington Conference implied a practical (that is, commercial) and altruistic universalism. Re-assurances of goodwill towards Europe often accompanied later Argentine statements in support of Pan-American cooperation. When de la Plaza, as Foreign Minister, spoke at the opening of the 1910 Buenos Aires Conference, he praised Blaine for his role in Pan-Americanism's origin but recognized initial European concerns over Pan-Americanism. These anxieties, he concluded, had been dispelled during the 1900s; Pan-Americanism was *not* anti-European.[76] Chilean policymakers and diplomats also recognized European concerns and sought to minimize anti-European sentiments in Pan-Americanism, yet not to the extent of their Argentine counterparts. Chile was more focused on its position within the region, particularly in relation to the Tacna-Arica dispute.

Argentine reluctance to participate in the Bureau of American Republics compared with Chilean enthusiasm in the 1900s is another example of the different approaches. In the 1910s and 1920s, Argentine and Chilean opposition to Uruguay's project for an American League of Nations diverged along similar lines. Chilean policymakers were concerned that a regional League (or, indeed, a politically amplified PAU)

[76] de la Plaza, *Discurso de inauguración*, pp.8-9.

would attempt to intervene in regional disputes.[77] Argentina, in contrast, objected because of its implied separation of the Americas from Europe. Later in the 1920s, Argentina opposed a regional labour organization and a regional court of justice, suggesting instead that such discussions were universal and better treated at the ILO or The Hague.[78]

The best example of the regional/universal difference, however, was in the debate over the 'derecho internacional americano'. The idea of a distinct regional corpus of international law had been debated, in some form, since the early 1880s. An intense debate in 1883 between Alcorta, who accepted the possibility of forming a distinct legal corpus, and Calvo, who upheld universality even in the case of different regional application of the law, shaped the discourse on universality amongst Argentine jurists for the next fifty years.[79] Alcorta served as Foreign Minister from 1895 to 1902, with a four-month hiatus between December 1899 and April 1900. His influence kept the Argentine government open to the 'derecho internacional americano' in the early 1900s. Calvo's position became dominant after Alcorta's death in 1902, just as international law and the debate over the 'derecho internacional americano' entered into Pan-Americanism. By the 1906 Pan-American Conference, Argentina officially opposed the 'derecho internacional americano'. Joaquín González, Argentine delegate

[77] An explanation of the Chilean policy in 1923 and 1928 (written by men involved in policymaking in both occasions) can be found in Emilio Bello Codesido and Guillermo Subercaseaux's letter to Foreign Minister Conrado Ríos Gallardo, 20 July 1927, ANH EBC 10, pp. 121-22.

[78] For the labour question, see 'Instrucciones' 15 December 1927, AMRECIC Series 25 Box 27:I. For the justice proposal, see Ruiz Moreno, 'Memorandum sobre la lista de temas para la Sexta Conferencia Panamericana', 24 August 1926, AMRECIC Series 25 Box 26:I).

[79] International legal scholars later recognized this debate as a key moment for the controversy over 'derecho internacional americano'. See Arnulf Becker Lorca, 'International Law in Latin America or Latin American International Law? Rise, Fall, and Retrieval of a Tradition of Legal Thinking and Political Imagination' *Harvard International Law Journal*, 47:1 (2006), p. 299, and Obregón, 'Latin American International Law' in David Armstrong (ed), *Routledge Handbook of International Law* (New York, 2009), pp. 154-64. The idea of Latin American International Law had been around before the debate, however, as Vicente G Quesada had written a series of articles in *Nueva Revista de Buenos Aires* about the 'derecho internacional latino-americano' in 1882 (in the June-August issues). Thanks to Juan Pablo Scarfi for pointing out Quesada's contribution.

at the conference, explained the position to his fellow delegates. The geographic, social and historic differences between the Americas and Europe justified exceptions in the application of 'los principios generales del derecho universal, ó europeo,' but not a separate set of principles.[80] Thereafter, the official Argentine position maintained that the 'derecho internacional americano' did not exist, though a small group of Argentine writers continued to consider a distinct hemispheric international law possible. This group included Ernesto Quesada, who described the development of international law in the Americas as the 'soluciones típicamente criollas o regionales... que forman hoy un cuerpo de doctrina jurídica continental.'[81]

Unlike their Argentine counterparts, Chilean policymakers were open to the existence of the 'derecho internacional americano'. Alejandro Ávarez was the most vocal and significant proponent in Chile. Drawing on Bello (who, incidentally, had not mentioned the possibility of a distinct set of American principles), Álvarez argued that the concept emerged organically from the common historical development, legal institutions, and republican and democratic regimes in the Americas.[82] These institutions and traditions differentiated the American republics from the European powers to a sufficient extent that European international law was not wholly applicable to inter-American relations. Álvarez's influence in the Cancillería helped solidify Chilean support for the 'derecho internacional americano' and he represented Chile in a number of Pan-American meetings where he forwarded his arguments. The countries' different opinions were clearly delineated at the creation of a

[80] 'Minutas de reunión con delegados a la Conferencia Panamericana para estudiar el programa' (without a date, 1906), AMRECIC Series 25 Box 5:I.
[81] Quesada, *La evolución*, p. 8. For another example of Argentine writing in defense of the 'derecho interancional americano', see Uriarte, *Problemas*, p. 41.
[82] See, for example, Álvarez,, *Le Droit International Américain* (Paris, 1915), p. 14. Brazil, which did not become a republic until 1889, was also generally included in this sweeping view of Latin American history.

Commission of Jurists in Rio de Janeiro in 1907. Chilean delegates viewed the Commission as a way to more closely define the 'derecho internacional americano', while Argentine delegates hailed the opportunity for the Americas to contribute to universal international law.

Argentina continued to officially deny the 'derecho internacional americano' in the 1920s. Antokoletz firmly disagreed with Álvarez. His opposition influenced a generation of law students in the Universidad de Buenos Aires, many of whom petitioned the Ministerio in 1923 to publish a pamphlet of Antokoletz's main points against Álvarez's arguments.[83] Leopoldo Melo, Argentina's representative at the Montevideo meeting of the AIIL in 1927, stated frankly that he was not 'inclinado a la formación de un derecho exclusivamente americano,' which he believed (citing the opinion of Charles Evans Hughes) would be ultimately unsatisfactory.[84] Carlos Saavedra Lamas and Melo strengthened Argentina's position at the Juridical Congress in Rio de Janeiro that same year.[85] Although the Argentine delegation did not explicitly deny the 'derecho internacional americano' at the 1928 Conference in Havana, its manoeuvres before and during the conference had eliminated the possibility of a definitive and permanent Pan-American acceptance of the idea.

Chileans, in contrast, remained among the strongest proponents of the 'derecho internacional americano'. Chilean delegates upheld the regional distinction in the

[83] Antokoletz to Ernesto Restelli (Subsecretary of the Ministerio), 24 October 1923, AMRECIC Series 25 Box 23.
[84] See his speech on the matter in Facultad de Derecho y Ciencias Sociales, Universidad de Buenos Aires, *La política exterior de la República Argentina* (Buenos Aires, 1931), pp. 411-12.
[85] Saavedra Lamas to Ernesto Restelli, 13 December 1927, AMRECIC Series 25 Box 26:IV. Saavedra Lamas is a good example of conflicted opinions within Argentina over the 'derecho internacional americano'. In fact, earlier in the 1920s, he had written positively about the possibilities of a distinct international law, set apart from the problems of the Old World, only to deny its genuine existence later in the same text (*Tratados Internacionales*, pp. 436 and 438).

AIIL and Pan-American Conferences while professors, including Ricardo Montaner Bello, taught about it in the classroom. Montaner did not dispute that law was a universal concept, but argued for the establishment of 'principios y reglas específicas, para satisfacer y resolver [los] problemas que son peculiares de la América.'[86] The writings of other preeminent international legal scholars with connections to the Cancillería (including Cruchaga Tocornal, Bello Codesido, and Gajardo Villarroel) also recognized the utility of the 'derecho internacional americano'.[87]

The idea of a distinct American set of international laws, therefore, influenced Chilean perspectives of international law in a way unparalleled in Argentina. Whereas many Chilean policymakers viewed relations between American states as structurally unique, their Argentine counterparts preferred to view differences as mere contingencies. After Alcorta's death, Argentine policymakers in general seemed to view international relations as a game played with universal rules developed in the European tradition. With the rise of the 'derecho internacional americano', the appeal of a Pan-American approach to international law increased for Chilean policymakers and decreased for their Argentine counterparts. Chile was an enthusiastic participant and stalwart presence in the AIIL. Chilean policymakers frequently praised the AIIL's work, contributing to an overall positive view of Pan-American cooperation. Argentina instead demonstrated concern for legal codification within Pan-Americanism and remained indifferent to the AIIL even while recognizing the

[86] Stella-Jeanne d'Alphand Seibert, *Apuntes tomadas en la clase de Derecho Internacional Público del doctor Ricardo Montaner Bello* (Santiago, 1929). Montaner taught at the Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile. A generation of Chilean students of international law (some of whom later became diplomats), then, were taught about the 'derecho internacional americano' as an established fact.

[87] See Cruchaga Tocornal, *Derecho Internacional* (Santiago, 1944), pp. xl-xlii; Bello Codesido 'Instrucciones para la MISION ESPECIAL' (1916), p. 16; Gajardo Villaroel, *Curso de derecho internacional*. There were detractors to the idea, however, including Eliodoro Yáñez (see Pike, *Chile and the US*, pp. 220-24).

institution's potential importance. Such concern and indifference contributed to Argentina's more cautious approach to Pan-Americanism overall until the late 1920s. With Argentina's self-proclaimed victory at the 1927 Rio de Janeiro Juridical Congress, Argentine policymakers appeared convinced that they had gained more control over Pan-Americanism, contributing to Argentina's support of Pan-American cooperation in the Havana Conference of 1928. The sense of control also laid the foundation for positive approaches to Pan-Americanism in the 1930s. Progress in legal codification should have also increased Chilean enthusiasm for Pan-Americanism, but this effect was neutralized in part by the decreased importance of international law to the Ibáñez dictatorship.

Argentine universalism and opposition to the 'derecho internacional americano' did not imply a predisposition against regional cooperation in general. Policymakers in Buenos Aires viewed regional cooperation as a means of participating in a wider international society and demonstrating leadership in the Americas. Chilean policymakers shared this perspective. Regional cooperation was, in fact, embedded in the international relations discourse of the Southern Cone. As the following section will demonstrate, the historical experiences of Chile and Argentina in the nineteenth century led to differing commitments to regional cooperation.

*History and Regional Cooperation*

Both Argentine and Chilean policymakers not only legalized international relations, but also historicized them. That is, they placed value on the actions taken by their country in the past and believed that history should guide foreign policy. Many

international legal experts and diplomats in both countries also wrote diplomatic histories as references for policymakers. Mention of past policies, historical figures, and a nebulous concept of 'política tradicional' were frequent in diplomatic rhetoric and correspondence. The use of history in policymaking helped determine Pan-American participation, as both Argentina and Chile had established trajectories of participation in regional cooperation during the nineteenth century. As Pan-American cooperation developed in the twentieth century, the policies of earlier governments were moulded into 'traditions' that could influence foreign policymaking.

Chilean policymakers had a long historical tradition to draw upon when considering regional cooperation. Influential nineteenth-century intellectuals such as Juan Egaña (1769-1836), Pedro Félix Vicuña (1805-74), Francisco Bilbao (1823-65), and José Victorino Lastarria (1817-88) wrote at length on the subject.[88] As has been noted throughout this chapter, Bello also wrote about regional cooperation, suggesting an ideal confluence of national interests based on:

> la cultura intelectual, que difunde las sanas ideas morales, y propende continuamente a cimentar las relaciones de los pueblos sobre la base de la justicia…el incremento de la industria y del comercio…la semejanza de instituciones…[y] la igualdad, o lo que puede suplir por ella, el equilibrio de intereses y fuerzas.[89]

Bello himself was a vocal proponent of the inter-American vision. He eloquently defended the proposal of an American Congress of Plenipotentiaries in a letter to the editor of *El Araucano* in 1844 and continued to ruminate on the logistics of Latin American cooperation into his final years.[90] Partly due to Bello's influence, Chile had

[88] Burr and Hussey, *Documents*, p. 2 and 10-13.
[89] Bello, *Principios*, p. 16.
[90] The letter is reproduced along with an 1864 letter assessing obstacles to the 1864-65 Lima Congress in Jaksic (ed), *Selected Writings* pp. 213-28.

been a leader in 'traditional' Pan-Americanism, participating in every congress after the Congress of Panama and hosting one in 1856.

Argentina, in contrast, lacked such a clear heritage of continental cooperation. Argentine observers in the early 1900s suggested that the republic's foreign policy in the nineteenth century demonstrated two 'lines', one pro-Americanist and the other pro-European.[91] Alberdi and Sarmiento, two of Argentina's most famous nineteenth-century intellectuals, demonstrated their country's conflicted relationship with the idea of regional cooperation. Both in Chile as exiles from the regime of Juan Manuel de Rosas in 1844, they took starkly different approaches: Alberdi called for practical cooperation and greater integration of Latin America along similar lines as Bello, while Sarmiento lambasted the idea.[92] When Chile convened a congress twelve years later, the government of General Justo José de Urquiza rejected the invitation. Foreign Minister Elizalde's letter to the Chilean government claimed that Latin America was not, and could never be, a single political entity; this declaration was cited frequently in Argentina's opposition to an American League of Nations in the 1920s. By the 1860s, Sarmiento's doubts over Latin American congresses had partly dissipated and he attended the Congress of Lima (1864) while en route to a diplomatic post in the United States. Argentina's government, however, had rejected the invitation and President Bartólome Mitre personally admonished Sarmiento's unwelcome initiative. Despite this history of non-participation, Argentine policymakers from the 1880s to the 1920s were quick to note that past Argentine

[91] Etchepareborda, *Historia de las relaciones*, p. 115.

[92] For a short but useful review of Alberdi's thoughts, see Harold Davis, 'Juan Bautista Alberdi, Americanist' *Journal of Inter-American Studies* 4:1 (1960). Sarmiento had two motivations in arguing against the proposed American congress in 1844. He distrusted the entangling alliances that the congress implied but also believed that Rosas would use the opportunity to gain regional support. See Sarmiento, *Recollections of a Provincial Past* (trans Asa Zatz, Oxford, 2005 [originally printed 1845]), p.203, and the editor's note on page 286.

governments were not opposed to regional cooperation in theory. In fact, they had advocated practical cooperation that preserved freedom of action and sovereignty, exemplified in regional legal codification and sanitary agreements. Criticism of nineteenth-century efforts at 'American' congresses targeted the political and entangling nature of this cooperation. Argentina's refusal to participate in the Congresses of Panama, Lima and Santiago became for many Argentine policymakers a defence of ideal cooperation and the statements of Elizalde and Mitre were staple references well into the 1930s.[93]

The failure of the mid-nineteenth-century congresses convinced the policymakers of both countries that political integration was impractical. The more technical congresses of the 1870s and 1880s, however, demonstrated potential for regional cooperation within Latin America. Chilean and Argentines viewed the technical congresses differently, as can be seen in their portrayals of the Montevideo Congress of 1888-89. Chileans claimed Montevideo was a consequence of earlier inter-American efforts, a progression from the continental congresses held throughout the nineteenth century. Argentine policymakers and observers considered Montevideo as part of a new form of American multilateralism that had included the 1877-79 juridical conference in Lima and the sanitation conventions celebrated with Brazil and Uruguay in the 1870s and 1880s.[94] Both perspectives emphasized the strand of nineteenth-century regional cooperation in which the descriptor's country was a major

[93] See, for example, Antonio Bermejo, 'Informe del Delegado de la República Argentina' 15 April 1902, AMRECIC Series 25 Box 2:III; Pablo Córdoba, *Tres Ideas*, p. 36; Ernesto Quesada, *La evolución*, pp. 27-28; Ruiz Moreno, *Lecciones*, p. 68; and Daniel Antokoletz and Raúl Rodríguez Araya, 'Informe sobre "Liga de Naciones Americanas"' 27 December 1936, AMRECIC Series 25 Box 23.

[94] For more on the sanitation conventions, see Chaves, 'Poder e saúde'.

participant and leader. Ideal regional cooperation, according to Argentine and Chilean policymakers, involved Southern Cone leadership.

When Blaine's idea of a 'Pan-American' conference arrived in the Southern Cone, it partly appealed to established conceptions of regional cooperation. The Foreign Ministries in both countries recognized practicality in the Washington Conference despite reservations over Blaine's intentions. On that ground, they accepted the invitation. Chilean historians Patricio Ramírez Araya and Patricio de la Fuenta Laroy argued that Latin American governments attended the 1889-90 conference after realizing that purely Latin American meetings had failed to create practical regional cooperation.[95] Such an argument takes the point too far; neither Argentina nor Chile abandoned Latin American cooperation, as can be seen in the Scientific Congresses from 1898 to 1908. In Argentina, Latin American cooperation remained salient and even preferable to US-led cooperation. While the Argentine government was enthusiastic about the Montevideo Congress of 1888-89, it was antagonistic towards the Washington Conference of 1889-90. Argentine policymakers doubted the use of the Commercial Bureau, yet hailed the Latin American Scientific Congress of 1898 as a step towards fruitful continental cooperation.[96]

Modern Pan-Americanism also challenged pre-existing conceptions. It reversed the trend started by 'traditional' Pan-Americanism, in which Latin America led and to which the US was invited. It sought to re-define regional cooperation by inserting the US as both participant and conceptual progenitor. Chilean and Argentine

[95] Patricio Ramírez Araya and Patricio de la Fuenta Lafoy, *Relaciones entre los Estados Unidos y América Latina en el decenio 1928-1938* (Santiago, 1964), pp. 17-18.
[96] See 'El Congreso Científico' *La Nación*, 15 April 1898, and Bermejo's report on the Mexico City Conference, 15 April 1902, pp. 4-5.

policymakers initially resisted the new formulation and, drawing on historic examples, sought to continue their country's leadership in regional cooperation. They recognized in Blaine's invitation a new conception of regional cooperation imbued with the assumption of US hegemony. As discussed in Chapter Five, the possibility of Chilean and Argentine leadership in modern Pan-Americanism was doubtful in the 1880s and 1890s. By basing regional cooperation on principles derived from the Monroe Doctrine, which emphasized American exclusivity and elevated US interests, the US government alienated Argentine and Chilean policymakers who stressed equality of states, freedom of action, and Latin American agency. Competition between the US and the Southern Cone powers, therefore, was partly a competition of concepts.

The contrast between Latin American cooperation and the US's modern Pan-Americanism also raised questions within both Chile and Argentina over racial implications of the latter. Although the US had been invited to nineteenth-century American Congresses, intellectuals at the time argued that the Latin and Anglo-Saxon races were inherently different and potentially incompatible. Juan Manuel Carrasco Albano, in his widely distributed speech supporting a Latin American Congress given at the University of Chile in 1855, pointed to diverging expectations of the Latin and Anglo-Saxon perspectives on foreign affairs. While the Latin races of the Americas hoped for non-material benefits of association, Carrasco argued, the Anglo-Saxon race sought only material progress.[97] Such arguments were significant in 1889, when policymakers could compare the Montevideo and Washington Conferences. Debates on the different motivations of Latin and Anglo-Saxon races were prevalent in the

[97] Carrasco, 'Necesidad i objetos de un congreso sud-americano' in *Anales de la Universidad de Chile* (serie 1, 1855), pp. 77-85.

1890s and gained popularity after the Spanish-American War of 1898. Hispanismo and arielismo furthered this discourse and garnered many admirers among young Chilean and Argentine intellectuals.[98]

Some historians have given these arguments a central place in the story of US-Latin American relations and US-led Pan-Americanism.[99] To an extent, they are correct. References to racial distinctions in the writings of important policymakers demonstrated that the racial argument shaped debates over international relations. In Chile, Álvarez observed that nineteenth-century regional confederation was seen as a necessity by the Latin races, while the Anglo-Saxon originally found it superfluous, concentrating instead on augmenting its power, territory and wealth.[100] Argentine diplomat Ernesto Quesada explored the distinction between the Anglo-Saxon and Latin races in a speech to the Asociación Patriótica Española that was published as *Nuestra Raza* (1900). In his address, he noted 'los defectos de la raza española' but also offered a warning about the pretensions of Anglo-Saxon tutelage; the antidote was pan-Hispanism.[101]

The Latin/Anglo-Saxon dichotomy was more pervasive and enduring in Argentina than it was in Chile. In Chile, the idea suffered an early blow at the hand of the popular writings of Nicolás Palacios, who argued that Chileans were actually of Germanic stock through their Basque ancestry. Indeed, suggesting that even the

[98] The often cavalier use of *Arielismo* is analysed in many works, including John T Reid, 'The Rise and Decline of the Ariel-Caliban Antithesis in Spanish America' *The Americas*, 34:3 (1978).
[99] Pike, *Chile and the US*, pp. 165-66; Pike argued that this discourse ran both ways – see his *The United States and Latin America: myths and stereotypes of civilization and nature* (Austin, 1992), pp. 193-220.
[100] Álvarez, 'La nacionalidad', pp. VI-X; this work was later published in French. Álvarez's also uses the racial distinction in a speech on the 'Bases del Congreso (científico)' of 1907, AMRREE Histórico 306a.
[101] Quesada, *Nuestra Raza*, p. 19. He highlighted in particular 'la pretensión arrogante de los políticos de la escuela de Blaine' (p. 26).

Chilean *roto* was gothic-Araucanian, Palacios declared 'la raza chilena no es latina.'[102] The weakness of the racial dichotomy for the Chilean perspective was demonstrated in 1923 at a meeting of Ibero-American nations regarding the construction of a memorial celebrating their common emancipation from colonial rule. Despite uncertainty among other participants, Chile proposed to include the United States; shared independence and institutional experiences outweighed the distinct cultural heritage.[103] In Argentina, however, the Spanish-American War (which had a greater cultural impact in Argentina than Chile due to the significant Spanish immigrant community in Buenos Aires) helped to make the racial dichotomy a pervasive trope, eventually leading to the rise of *latinoamericanismo* that included a radical anti-US strand embodied in Manuel Ugarte and Alfredo Palacios.[104] The different impact of this racial perspective adds another factor to Chile's greater willingness to participate in US-led Pan-Americanism than Argentina. Yet racial perspectives should not be overemphasized. Unlike legalistic or historicist arguments, racial arguments were rarely decisive in policy discussions or diplomatic rhetoric. Hispanismo achieved some success, but did not reach the levels of Pan-Americanism.[105]

Changes within Pan-Americanism addressed some conceptual objections. Reforms of the Bureau, for example, gradually increased the Latin American character of the organization and placed the Latin American members on a more equal basis with the US. The development of Pan-Americanism's second dimension increased practical

[102] Palacios, *La raza chilena*, (2 vols, 2nd ed, Santiago, 1918), i, 36. For more on Palacios's influence, see Barr-Melej, *Reforming Chile*, pp. 57-66.
[103] Cancillería to Agustín Edwards, 17 April 1923 (No 72), AMRREE Histórico 981d.
[104] For more on the impact of the Spanish-American War on immigrant communities in Buenos Aires, see Moya, *Cousins and Strangers*, pp. 283-84, 314, and 346. For more on *latinoamericanismo*, see Oscar Terán, *En busca de la ideología argentina* (Buenos Aires,1986), pp. 85-97; Alexandra Pita González and Carlos Marichal Salinas (eds), *Pensar el antiimperialismo: ensayos de historia intelectual latinoamericana, 1900-1930* (Mexico City, 2012); Alan McPherson (ed), *Anti-Americanism in Latin America and the Caribbean* (New York, 2006); and Barrios, *El latinoamericanismo.*
[105] See Salisbury, 'Hispanismo'.

cooperation and diminished political controversy. The pressure for reform and redefinition from Latin American governments suggested an underlying acceptance of Pan-Americanism as a form of regional cooperation.[106] In its emphasis on cultural, social and intellectual links between the American Republics, the second-dimension of Pan-Americanism echoed Bello's vision for American integration. Unlike the customs union proposed in 1889, the Bureau's work after 1900 fit Chilean ideas of inter-American commercial cooperation. With the increased importance of hemispheric commerce to the post-First World War Chilean economy, greater economic integration was practical and ideal. Emilio Bello Codesido (Andrés Bello's grandson) and Guillermo Subercaseaux noted in a memorandum on preparations for the 1928 Conference in Havana that

> el fomento del intercambio comercial entre los paises del continente y las demas medidas que tiendan a procurar una mas estrecha vinculación entre ellos señalando este problema de la organización económica americana como el medio mas eficaz de evitar los conflictos que pueden amenazar la paz y de propender a la armonía…[107]

After 1906, the co-civilizing rhetoric of the US appeared to recognize Southern Cone leadership in regional cooperation; opportunities to demonstrate that leadership proliferated with the expansion of Pan-Americanism.

Argentina's intellectual objections, however, were less easily overcome. Despite the Bureau's reform, Argentine policymakers still balked at inequalities within the Bureau's governing structures and doubted Argentina's ability to demonstrate leadership. Portela's 18 January 1906 note is the most obvious example of this stance. Instead of contributing to the expansion of second-dimension Pan-Americanism, Argentines preferred to support initiatives closer to the principle of Latin American

[106] An important point that Salisbury notes in 'Hispanismo', p. 69.
[107] 20 July 1927, AMRREE Histórico 360a, p. 12.

regional cooperation that the country had advocated in the late nineteenth century, such as the Scientific Congresses and South American sanitation agreements. At Washington, the Argentine delegation called for practical forms of regional integration that would provide benefits for both the region and humanity. In the 1906 Conference, political controversies gave way to more conciliatory and cooperative discussions and Argentina's delegation found itself honoured not only by praises of the Drago Doctrine but also by the swell of support for Buenos Aires as the next host city. Root's egalitarian tones in Rio de Janeiro and Buenos Aires further encouraged Argentine policymakers to see within modern Pan-Americanism as closer to their ideal regional cooperation. By the end of the 1900s, Pan-American cooperation, despite its flaws, appeared to offer an opportunity to fulfil the goal set out by Foreign Minister Carlos Rodríguez Larreta in the Ministerio's *Memoria* of 1904-05: Argentina should exemplify the ideal of peace based on justice and law.[108] Soon, Argentina was poised to be at the vanguard of practical Pan-Americanism, which bolstered the republic's claim to be a model nation (a 'new country' according to sociologist Carlos Waisman) for a global audience.[109] Pan-Americanism had therefore converged with Chilean and Argentine ideals of regionalism in several important ways.

Another way of analyzing this process of contestation and convergence is to look at the language of regional cooperation in both countries. Chapter One of this thesis noted that Chilean writers tended to antedate Pan-Americanism, using that

[108] Memoria del Ministerio de Relacions Exteriores y Culto presentada al Congreso Nacional correspondiente por los años 1904-05 (Buenos Aires, 1906), p. iii.
[109] The term 'new country' denotes the identity formed by the Generación de 1837 of Argentina as a country that could achieve progress in parity with the Old World powers while avoiding their mistakes. See Carlos Waisman, 'The Dynamics of National Identity Frames: The Case of Argentina in the Twentieth-Century' in Luis Roniger and Mario Sznajder, *Constructing Collective Identities and Shaping Public Spheres: Latin American Paths* (Brighton, 1998), pp. 153-54.

terminology to describe nineteenth-century regionalism.[110] Some policymakers, including Álvarez, subsumed 'latinoamericanismo' within Pan-Americanism.[111] Chilean actors redefined Latin American intellectual cooperation along Pan-American lines in the First Pan-American Scientific Congress (a controversial decision, but with governmental support). Throughout the 1910s and 1920s, writers and policymakers argued that modern Pan-Americanism was the result of a long, teleological process beginning in the late-eighteenth or early-nineteenth centuries.[112]

This development suggests the gradual rise of 'Pan-Americanism' to conceptual hegemony in Chile.[113] By adopting Pan-American language, Chilean policymakers and non-state actors legitimized the US-led version of regional cooperation. Pan-American initiatives and institutions became less about US hegemony and more about a nebulous, though relatable, ideal of American solidarity. US policymakers began to actively cultivate such sentiments through cultural and intellectual exchange - the Education Section of the PAU and the IPAC, for example. On the other hand, Chile gained significant agency. Chilean policymakers and non-state actors redefined Pan-Americanism. By appropriating the term 'Pan-American' and associating Pan-American cooperation with more Latin American forms of regionalism, Chilean actors challenged US dominance and changed the nature of Pan-Americanism.

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[110] Another example is Vicuña, *Los congresos*, pp. 6-13.
[111] Alejandro Álvarez, *La nacionalidad,* AMRRREE H356, pp. XIV-XV.
[112] Arturo Alessandri's speech to the Fifth Pan American Conference in Santiago (1923) was an effusive example of such rhetoric. See Alessandri, *Discurso de SE el Presidente*. See also Ricardo Montaner Bello's arguments in d'Alfand Seibert, *Apuntes tomadas*, p. 32.
[113] Discussions of conceptual hegemony bring to mind the work of Antonio Gramsci, who argued that hegemony is founded not merely on force but on the ability of the hegemon to form a dominant set of terms and ideas. Gramsci's ideas on hegemony are mostly found in his prison notebooks (or *Quaderni del carcere*), which have been re-printed and translated several times. For two good introductions to the theory and the context in which it was developed, see Thomas Bates, 'Gramsci and Theory of Hegemony' *Journal of the History of Ideas* 36:2 (1975) and Joseph Fernia, *Gramsci's Political Thought: Hegemony, Consciousness, and the Revolutionary Process* (Oxford, 1987), especially Chapter 2.

Another example of a Chilean attempt to re-define Pan-Americanism and shift the concept away from US hegemony was the unsuccessful attempt to incorporate Canada into the PAU.

Argentine actors were less apt to adopt the language of Pan-Americanism and accept the conceptual hegemony of US-defined regional cooperation. Antedating Pan-Americanism to the nineteenth century, for example, was less common. Instead, many Argentine writers and policymakers preferred to maintain the label 'latinoamericanismo', 'pan-hispanoamericanismo', or 'americanismo'.[114] Perhaps more importantly, Argentine actors and governments continued to pursue other regional cooperation to a greater extent than their Chilean counterparts. Argentine policymakers often presented these forms of regional cooperation as co-existing with Pan-Americanism. International law textbooks also frequently included 'panamericanismo' and 'latinoamericanismo' in sections on international cooperation as two synchronous, but not competing, examples. Others, largely outside of policymaking circles, argued for profound incompatibility. This trend included radical anti-imperialist groups and anti-US latinoamericanismo in Argentine civil society, bringing forth movements such as the Comité Pro México in 1914, the Asociación Latinoamericana in 1915, and the Unión Latinoamericana in 1922. The failure of Yrigoyen's Latin American conferences in 1917-18 contributed significantly to the Argentine acceptance of Pan-Americanism as an inescapable form of regional cooperation in the Americas. Argentine leadership was still possible, but excluding the US from regional cooperation was less feasible.

[114] Quesada, *La evolución,* p. 9. Also see Antokoletz, *Manual diplomática*, pp. 24-26.

In the months leading up to the centenary celebration of the 1826 Congress of Panama, the Alvear government appeared to accept the idea of a longue durée Pan-American history. Ambassador Pueyrredón, in a 'symposium of sentiment and opinion' in Washington, offered his government's approval of the event and honoured Bolívar as 'one of those immortal figures to whom Pan-Americanism owes its being.'[115] His comments appealed to his audience, the congregated American representatives in Washington; they also revealed his government's willingness to conflate Latin American and Pan-American cooperation. Pan-Americanism, despite an occasionally uncertain trajectory and a variety of challenges, had become institutionalized and an important (perhaps dominant) element of inter-American relations.

*Conclusion*

How Chilean and Argentine policymakers understood international relations and regional cooperation had a significant impact on policies towards Pan-Americanism. This chapter sought to add perspective to the analysis of previous chapters. It also confirmed Fawcett's assertion that ideas mattered in regional cooperation. Both Chilean and Argentine officials, in part due to their training and the influences on the Ministries, believed that relations between civilized nations should be regulated by norms and that these norms were defined by international law. Chilean policymakers were more apt to view international relations through a regional lens, while their Argentine counterparts maintained a more global perspective. Regional cooperation was an important part of the historicized diplomatic tradition in both countries.

[115] 'The American Republics and the Bolivarian Centenary' *BPAU* 60 (1926), p. 537.

These observations shed light on the trajectory of Chilean and Argentine participation in Pan-American cooperation. The initial reluctance of both countries to engage with US-led regionalism, for example, was partly a conflicted reaction toward a new concept that both appealed to existing ideas of regional cooperation and challenged it in important ways. In the late 1890s and early 1900s, however, the nature of Pan-Americanism changed through Latin American contestation. Several Pan-Americanisms emerged, allowing this form of regional cooperation to align with Chilean and Argentine ideals. Chilean policymakers, more apt to accept the idea of insular regional cooperation, were quicker to engage with and appropriate Pan-Americanism. Meanwhile, their Argentine counterparts justified indifference with appeals to universalism.

By the 1910s, the ideals of Chilean and Argentine policymakers and those of Pan-American cooperation had converged. The centrality of international law, the equality of states, and Latin American leadership all entered Pan-Americanism with the help of Latin American participation. As Pan-American cooperation expanded to include more practical initiatives and as more voices joined policy discussions (many of which saw benefits in the legal and practical elements of Pan-Americanism), Chilean and Argentine governments became more willing to participate. Pan-American cooperation became a viable model for peaceful and practical international relations.

Yet it was also fundamentally a project of US hegemony, a fact that policymakers in both countries did not ignore. Although the idea of Pan-American cooperation

achieved a degree of conceptual hegemony by the 1910s, it did so only through negotiation, contestation and redefinition. Pike argued in *Chile and the United States* that Chile had accepted Pan-Americanism as an inescapable fact of inter-American relations in the mid-1920s.[116] The observations in this chapter, however, suggest that he was wrong by at least a decade. Argentina also had accepted the presence and importance of Pan-Americanism by the end of the 1910s. Both countries engaged with Pan-American cooperation and attempted to shape it to their interests and ideals. Continued US intervention in the circum-Caribbean, however, frustrated these efforts. Hughes' defence of intervention demonstrated continued disparity between Latin American and US definitions of Pan-Americanism. Those definitions continued to converge and bore fruit at the 1933 Seventh Pan-American Conference in Montevideo. The groundwork, however, was laid by 1930.

[116] Pike, *Chile and the United States*, pp. 224-28.

# Conclusion

On 20 November 1933, the SS *American Legion* crossed the equator carrying US Secretary of State Cordell Hull and a delegation of US diplomats and advisors to Montevideo for the Seventh International Conference of American States. To mark that auspicious occasion, the 'royal court of Neptune' congregated on the ship's deck to induct Hull into the Order of Neptune (an old seafarers' tradition). It became evident, however, that Mrs Frances Hull (the Secretary's wife) was not present – apparently she had fallen ill – which led the court jester to quip:

> Sire, if from the Versailles Conference onwards it were true that all diplomatists of all countries had remained invisible, inaudible, intangible, un-smellable andun-tasteable [*sic*], except possibly to ships' doctors – Sire, I forbear to paint how happy our postwar world would have been.[1]

Given the rise of cultural internationalism and the persistence of divisive political questions of formal diplomacy in Pan-American cooperation, the joke was more apropos than perhaps intended. At the Montevideo Conference, however, the 'diplomatists' achieved a significant feat: a regional convention that both affirmed the equality of states regardless of relative power (Article 4) and rejected the right of states to intervene in the internal affairs of another (Article 8).[2] Article 11, which declared a state's territory inviolable and forbade any form of occupation, effectively codified the Calvo and Drago doctrines. All governments involved, including that of the US, signed the agreement and sixteen ratified it. Unsurprisingly, while Chile ratified the Convention early in 1935, Argentina remains one of the signatories never

[1] 'Extract from the proceedings royal court of Neptune, aboard SS *American Legion*, the Equator, November 20, 1933', LOC Cordell Hull Papers Box 34 Reel 10.
[2] 'Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States', signed 12 December 1933.

to do so.[3] The US signed with an ambiguous reservation, hoping for further definition of unnamed concepts in the Convention and promising to 'follow scrupulously the doctrines and policies...in the law of nations as generally recognized and accepted.' At an Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Peace at Buenos Aires three years later, however, the government of Franklin Roosevelt accepted non-intervention as a fundamental basis of international law without reservation. Given the later history of intervention in the internal politics of Latin America during the Cold War (occasionally with the sanction of the OAS), this accomplishment seems insubstantial.[4] Yet at the time, in the context of the US's withdrawal from Nicaragua in January 1933 and the continued development of the Good Neighbor rhetoric begun by President Hoover, governments throughout the hemisphere lauded the Convention.

As this thesis has demonstrated, modern Pan-Americanism was not limited to questions of intervention and geopolitics. Argentina's head delegate at Montevideo, Carlos Saavedra Lamas, recognized this in a speech to the commission on commerce when he reviewed the 'diferentes faces del Panamericanismo, de orden jurídico, moral, artístico, cultural, de comunicaciones, etc.' that had led to agreements on topics ranging from extradition and the suppression of contraband to intellectual exchange

[3] The reason for Argentina's lack of ratification is unclear, particularly considering the positive opinion that the republic's delegation had of the Convention (see 'Informe presentado por el Presidente de la Delegación Argentina, Dr Carlos Saavedra Lamas', November 1934, AMRECIC Series 25 Box 31:III), and is a question that will benefit from more research.

[4] Much has been written about US intervention in Latin America during the Cold War; see Schoultz's *Beneath the United States* (especially Chapters 17 through 19) and Gilderhus's *Second Century* (Chapters Four through Six). Two provocative interpretations, produced in the last decade and taking a decidedly presentist approach, are Greg Grandin, *Empire's Workshop: Latin America, the United States, and the Rise of the New Imperialism* (New York, 2006) and Brian Loveman, *No Higher Law: American Foreign Policy and the Western Hemisphere since 1776* (Durham, NC, 2012).

and the development of tourism.[5] The results of the Conference reflected the broad nature of Pan-American cooperation, with resolutions on commerce (specifically the reduction of tariff barriers), intellectual cooperation, transportation, communication, and social questions (Chile and Argentina again supported these discussions). Another landmark agreement was reached in a treaty that granted women equal nationality rights throughout the Americas.[6] As at the 1923 Conference, the Chilean and Argentine delegations were among the most enthusiastic participants in discussions.[7] The Chilean delegation hoped to continue the expansion of Pan-American cooperation by means of a Pan-American Labour Office and the inclusion of Canada.[8] Saavedra Lamas of Argentina met with Cordell Hull early in the conference and established a rapport with the Secretary of State that set the stage for substantial cooperation between the two delegations.

[5] 'Informe presentado por el Presidente de la Delegación Argentina, Dr Carlos Saavedra Lamas', November 1934, AMRECIC Series 25 Box 31:III, p. 25.

[6] This was significant in that it allowed women to transfer nationality to their children, fortifying their maternal rights. Many female rights activists hoped that the treaty would tip the scale towards a broader concession of equal rights, while others saw the treaty as a distraction from a bigger struggle. The treaty's signing effectively ended the efforts at Montevideo for a more comprehensive equal rights treaty. For more information, see Candice Lewis Bredbenner, *A Nationality of Her Own: Women, Marriage and the Law of Citizenship* (Berkeley, CA, 1998), especially pp. 233-38, and Beatrice McKenzie, 'The Power of International Positioning: The National Woman's Party, International Law and Diplomacy, 1928-34' *Gender & History* 23:1 (2011), especially pp. 137-40.

[7] In the months before the conference, the Argentine government (in conjunction with its Brazilian counterpart) launched a campaign to delay the Conference, which had already been delayed from 1932 to 1933. Saavedra Lamas justified the suggestion with concerns that the Chaco conflict between Bolivia and Paraguay and a coup in Cuba would inevitably introduce political controversy to the Conference, thus making it 'mortal para el panamericanismo' (Saavedra Lamas to Felipe Espil, 31 October 1933, AMRECIC Series 25 Box 30:II). Peterson argues that the real motivation was Argentina's desire to gain the upper hand in mediation in the Chaco and the hope of weakening inter-American organization (*Argentina and the United States*, p. 382). That interpretation, however, is based on US diplomatic dispatches. Documents in Argentine archives demonstrate that Saavedra Lamas did not want to weaken the inter-American organization per se, but sought to enable Argentina to secure its influence over the proceedings. Saavedra Lamas had in mind a meeting of the AIIL, scheduled for Buenos Aires before the Montevideo Conference, which he believed could set the stage for Argentine control as the AIIL meeting in 1927 had done for the Pan-American Conference of 1928. See the 'Memorandum' of the Ministerio from 9 September 1933 and the letter to Espil from 10 October, AMRECIC Series 25 Box 30:II.

[8] Chilean delegation, 'Informe sobre el capítulo VII del programa de la VII Conferencia Internacional Americana presentado por el relator de la misma', 21 December 1933, AMRREE Histórico 1380A.

The 1930s saw the continuation and maturation of trends seen in the preceding decades. Efforts at Pan-American commitments to peace and arbitration, which had gained momentum in the late 1920s, appeared to come to fruition. Argentina's Saavedra Lamas produced an Anti-War Treaty in 1932, which was accepted at Montevideo a year later. In 1936, at Roosevelt's suggestion and with the support of Chile's Alessandri and Argentina's Justo, Buenos Aires hosted a Conference for the Maintenance of Peace. As the decade drew to a close and war in Europe became an urgent threat, the American republics signed a declaration of collective security at the 1938 Eighth International Conference of American States in Lima. Contestation and negotiation marked these conferences as much as cooperation, and although the 'Declaration of Lima' affirmed American solidarity it did not conceal the fact that Pan-Americanism remained disputed.

Meanwhile, second-dimension Pan-American institutions developed sturdier foundations. The IACW amplified its efforts, producing a comprehensive study on the comparative legislation of women in the Americas. The Lima Conference of 1938 passed a declaration in favour of equal civil rights for women and re-established the IACW on a more permanent basis.[9] The IACI, established in 1927 and led by Argentina's Gregorio Aráoz, initially struggled due to financial uncertainty but managed by the end of the 1930s to organize an office, establish a library, and begin publishing informative pamphlets.[10] The PASB, with a new Directing Council

[9] IACW, *A Summary of the Activities of the Inter American Commission of Women, 1928-1947* (Washington, DC, 1947), p. 1-3. This re-establishment must be qualified; it made the IACW a permanent body under the PAU, but also indicated the end of the IACW's autonomy. Partly due to political reasons (the US delegates to the IACW were appointed under Hoover and were Republicans), the Roosevelt Administration and Eleanor Roosevelt pressured the PAU to limit the IACW's range of activities to the defence of democracy in the face of a European crisis. See Lavrín, *Latin American Women*, pp. 108-09.
[10] IACI, *Fiftieth Anniversary 1927-1977* (Montevideo, 1977), pp. 7-9.

formed in 1927, drafted a formal constitution that was approved by the Ninth Pan American Sanitary Conference held in Buenos Aires in 1934. The proliferation of congresses and conferences seen in the 1920s continued, with Pan-American meetings on children's issues (1935), postal systems (1931 and 1936), tuberculosis (1934 and 1937), highways (1939), national health services (1931 and 1936), eugenics (1934 and 1938), education (1934 and 1937), scientific exchange (1935), labour (1936), and tourism (1939).[11] The continuation and maturation of Pan-American internationalism were part of a wider trend in internationalist efforts in the 1930s, even in the face of increased exclusionary nationalism and aggression.[12]

Despite continuity between the 1920s and 1930s, the Pan-American cooperation of the 1930s was different in a number of ways. It was, in the words of one US policymaker, a 'new era in Pan-American relations.'[13] The global economic and political context had changed. The Great Depression caused major economic shifts and economic nationalism gained ground worldwide. The Ottawa Conference of 1932 initiated a policy of 'imperial preference' within the British Empire, causing concern in many Latin American governments. While the British retreat led Chile to deepen its economic ties to the US, it sparked an altogether different reaction in Argentina: an intense effort to revitalize trade with Britain through a bilateral treaty (the Roca-Runciman Treaty of 1933) that some critics in Argentina decried as a betrayal of Argentine sovereignty.[14] Pan-American commercial and economic initiatives received renewed interest driven by new imperatives of recovery. Both the

[11] For a more extensive list of conferences and congresses, see Pope Atkins *Encyclopedia*, p. 433, and for more information on the various conferences, see Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, *The International Conference of American States: first supplement, 1933-1940* (Washington, 1940).
[12] See Iriye, *Cultural Internationalism*, pp. 91-130.
[13] Sumner Welles, 'The New Era of Pan American Relations' *Foreign Affairs* 15:3 (1937).
[14] Lanús, *Aquel apogeo*, pp. 351-56.

Chilean and Argentine governments in the 1930s called for greater Pan-American economic cooperation.

Meanwhile, the optimistic years of the 1920s that had produced numerous international peace agreements gave way to a troubled decade of conflict with a brutal civil war in Spain, Italy's invasion of Ethiopia, and the Sino-Japanese War of 1937. The League of Nations, seemingly powerless to prevent conflict, began to crumble and several nations, Chile among them, tried unsuccessfully to reform the beleaguered institution. Frustrated at the continued disregard shown to its efforts, the Chilean government withdrew from the League in 1938. More immediately relevant to Pan-Americanism, a war erupted in 1932 between Bolivia and Paraguay over the Gran Chaco, a dispute that had been festering since the late 1920s. The conflict challenged the Pan-American system and its underlying ideals in a way unknown in the preceding forty years. That Pan-American cooperation weathered the Chaco crisis was partly due to the goodwill inspired by the Roosevelt administration's commitment to a Good Neighbor policy. Pan-Americanism took a more definitive cultural turn in this decade as intellectuals and artists in both North and South America explored the idea of a distinctive 'American' culture.[15] These sentiments did not prevent divisions within the American republics over hemispheric cooperation, but did perpetuate discussion over Pan-American ideals.

Similarly, the policymaking process and domestic context in Argentina and Chile demonstrated both continuity and change. The Great Depression was a severe shock

[15] See Corinne Pernet, '"For the Genuine Culture of the Americas": Musical Folklore, Popular Arts, and the Cultural Politics of Pan Americanism, 1933-1950' in Jessica Gienow-Hecht (ed), *De-Centering America* (New York, 2008) and Carol Hess, *Representing the Good Neighbor: Music, Difference, and the Pan American Dream* (New York, 2013).

to both countries (especially Chile) and ushered in political and economic upheaval. For Chile, the resolution of the Tacna-Arica affair in 1929 also altered foreign policy priorities. Bureaucracies remained stable, non-state actors increased their international activity, the public became more attuned to international affairs, state-led efforts to tackle the social question amplified, and concepts of international relations were challenged in the post-Depression era. The limits of this thesis prevent a more detailed and extensive discussion of these changes and their impact on foreign policy. Nonetheless, the analysis of the 1880s to the 1920s provides a model for rethinking Argentine and Chilean policies of the 1930s.

* * * * *

As recent historiography and this thesis have demonstrated, Pan-Americanism was neither a reified concept nor a monolithic movement. Rather, it was a diverse set of initiatives and ideas, often complementary and frequently contested. Unlike most studies of Argentine and Chilean approaches to modern Pan-Americanism, this thesis has taken a broad and varied perspective on regional cooperation and policymaking. The analysis incorporated multiple strands of Pan-American cooperation, categorizing them under a two dimensional framework: the 'first dimension', or the more formal and political means of cooperation between states, and the 'second dimension', or more technical and practical elements that were often the result of non-state actors' initiatives. Developments in historiography should encourage future studies of Pan-Americanism to adopt similarly wide perspectives. More importantly, the holistic perspective of historic policymakers, which recognized the multi-faceted nature of Pan-Americanism, justifies the project to re-think Pan-American relations.

How governments determined their approach to regional cooperation under the label 'Pan-American' was a process that involved multiple dimensions and a wide variety of actors, institutions, interests and ideas.

Argentine and Chilean approaches followed similar trajectories: both began from positions of indifference and occasional antagonism that gradually yielded to engagement, reaching peaks of commitment in the 1910s and the early 1920s and continuing to participate in Pan-Americanism despite fluctuation in attitudes in the 1920s. Yet there were also significant differences. Chile's engagement with Pan-Americanism began earlier than Argentina's. Alternative forms of regional cooperation that competed with Pan-Americanism, latinoamericanismo in particular, continued to be more salient in Argentina than in Chile. In the 1920s, both supported Pan-American cooperation through second-dimension initiatives and questioned (Argentina more strongly than Chile) the political implications of Pan-Americanism and the US's intervention in the hemisphere. While the Chilean government began a moderate withdrawal under Ibáñez, Argentina more boldly asserted its leadership until the second Yrigoyen administration reversed the momentum.

The development of modern Pan-Americanism and Argentine and Chilean approaches to it were therefore roughly linear though hardly straightforward. This thesis deconstructed Pan-American policies and demonstrated that a diverse range of factors had varying levels of influence at different moments. It enhances recent historiographical trends that challenge simplistic interpretations of Latin American international history. Realist and economic explanantia, frequently the foundation of analysis in diplomatic history, were part of the story but ultimately unsatisfactory.

The evidence of cooperation in Argentine and Chilean policy, for example, is a major obstacle to seeing anti-US or inter-American rivalry as the key explanatory framework for hemispheric relations. The fact that both Chilean and Argentine participation continued, and in some ways deepened, during periods of heightened criticism of US influence in the circum-Caribbean suggests why historians should consider other factors at play. Rather, Latin American policymaking was a much more complicated process that involved objectives both tangible (such as security and economic benefits) and intangible (such as power and prestige). Historical explanation of other aspects of Argentine and Chilean foreign policy might benefit from similar analysis. By demonstrating the role of policymaking organization, non-state actors, intermestic pragmatism, and normative preferences in both cases, this thesis suggests a number of frameworks to conduct structural analysis of foreign policy that also accounts for historical contingency. It is likely that the approaches of other Latin American countries to Pan-Americanism were similarly complicated and thus using methodologically heterogeneous analysis might be useful for other cases. Research into the approaches of Brazil, which supported Pan-Americanism more consistently, or a country of the circum-Caribbean, which faced a significantly different set of power logics, will be of particular interest.

Each approach taken by this thesis produced conclusions with implications for further research into Pan-Americanism and Latin American international history. Using Pan-Americanism to understand how hemispheric trends affected Latin American state bureaucracy, for example, will further understandings of policymaking overall in the region. Closer consideration of the role of foreign policy and the state in shaping transnational movements in Pan-American relations is also a fruitful approach. With

that in mind, Pan-American studies can contribute to the project of merging international, diplomatic and social history that is already underway. This thesis has shown that diplomatic records are useful sources in this effort. Furthermore, combining the conclusions on intermestic polices presented in Chapter Six with Rodgers' work on trans-Atlantic progressivism may be a useful means of further integrating Latin America into global history. As is the effort to better understand how global ideas (such as international law) were re-imagined in a regional context. The analysis of Chapter Seven suggests that the national context is also important.

This thesis has alluded to the transnational nature of discussions over definitions of Pan-Americanism. Although Latin American intellectuals and policymakers often wrote within national frameworks, or at least with reference to national interests, they were also aware of the arguments and ideas emanating from around the hemisphere. The conferences, congresses, and exhibitions that proliferated after 1900 offered space for public discussion and contestation of Pan-American cooperation among state and non-state actors. There is good reason to argue that a Pan-American public sphere developed in the early decades of the twentieth century. Modern Pan-Americanism, while led by the US and often linked to US policy, was not unilaterally imposed upon Latin American governments and societies. As this thesis has demonstrated, Latin American actors engaged with US actors in discussing Pan-American cooperation, challenging and shaping its trajectory. Invoking the idea of a 'public sphere' brings to mind the work of German sociologist Jürgen Habermas; in the past decade, public sphere theories have been used to understand multilateral

diplomacy.[16] There is value in further exploring the significance and impact of public sphere theory to earlier periods of modern Pan-American cooperation and, more generally, to the rise of internationalism and multilateral diplomacy in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

In order to understand Chilean and Argentine approaches, this thesis adopted a heterogeneous methodology inspired by FPA and studies in modern regionalism. By demonstrating with historical research how different approaches can fully substantiated without the need of a hierarchy of factors, the analysis presented in this thesis validates Fawcett and Serrano's call for 'methodological pluralism' and provides empirical evidence for the importance of multi-level and multi-factorial analysis. As such, it is an example of how Pelz's suggestion of using IR theory to explore recurrent themes in the history of international relations can open new possibilities for both disciplines.

In fact, this thesis highlighted several parallels between the conclusions of historical research and the observations of scholars studying modern international affairs. For example, Chilean and Argentine approaches resembled Hurrell's arguments on the power logics of regionalism. Both governments used Pan-American meetings and institutions in order to advance the principles that underlay their perspectives of international relations and to insert their interests (from reducing trade barriers to preventing the spread of venereal disease) into inter-American affairs. Supporting expert networks and the organization of meetings, these governments pushed certain agendas forward. They also sought to build coalitions through Pan-American

[16] See Rodgers, *Crossing the Atlantic*, and Jennifer Mitzen, 'Reading Habermas in Anarchy: Multilateral Diplomacy and Global Public Spheres' *American Political Science Review* 99:3 (2005).

activity, partly to address serious domestic problems but also to constrain the hegemonic aspirations of the US. Regional rivalries and divisions within Latin America often undermined attempts at counter-weight (from the 'Solid-South' to the inclusion of Canada), yet Latin American pressure forced the US to recognize other regional powers as partners and pursue policies of cooperation even if the outcome served US interests. Fitting Argentina and Chile into Hurrell's subordinate state category is imprecise, however, as the countries demonstrated the attributes of dominant powers. Argentine and Chilean governments clearly used Pan-American institutions to legitimize their leadership (in terms of power and progress) in the hemisphere. The inexact fit is due to different historical contexts; in the early twentieth-century, the US only aspired to hegemony in the Americas and Southern Cone policymakers believed they could reasonably claim the status of dominant power.

Chapters Four through Seven alluded to other parallels. Non-state actors developed international movements that focused on specialized knowledge, sought governmental support, and emphasized bureaucratization in multilateral organizations (the IACI and IACW, for example), strategies that Roberto Korzeniewicz and William Smith label 'insider civil society' activity in modern regionalism.[17] Civil society advocates of various causes, from women's and children's health to affordable housing, developed Pan-American networks that added legitimacy to their advocacy and encouraged governmental responses. These were, thus, early forms of the TANs described by Keck and Sikkink although their 'boomerang effect' was significantly more muted than that of their modern counterparts. The clash of objectives between

[17] Korzeniewicz and Smith, 'Transnational Civil Society Actors', p. 137-39.

US and Latin American feminists in Pan-American cooperation is loosely comparable to conflicting national perspectives within transnational civil society advocacy in modern regionalism.[18] The expansion of Pan-American cooperation into intermestic issues, often the result of civil society action, allowed governments to look for models of reform and development abroad, a strategy that persists in Latin America.

Differences in historical context, a topic too complicated to discuss here, also render these observations imprecise. Nonetheless, they reiterate the important point mentioned in the Introduction: many of the patterns in modern Latin American foreign policy and regionalism in the Americas have roots in the history presented here. The institutions that developed between 1888 and 1930 – in state bureaucracies, multilateral organizations, and civil society networks – may have been significant in the perpetuation of certain patterns of behaviour and policy decisions. Such a bold assertion, however, deserves further research and inter-disciplinary collaboration.

[18] Environmental advocacy is one example highlighted by Blanca Torres in 'Transnational Actors and NAFTA: the Search for Coalitions on Labor and the Environment' in Fawcett and Serrano, *Regionalism*, pp. 126-30.

# Figures

**Figure 1: 'Bolivia quiere a toda costa desaparecer del mapa'**
(*El Figaro*, 3 May 1900, BN; <www.memoriachilena.cl> (2004) accessed May 2011)
This cartoon, depicting a Chilean *huaso* (cowboy) lassoing the Bolivian 'ballerina' on the cover of a popular newspaper, demonstrates widespread interest in Chile's foreign affairs and the use of 'chilenidad' in articulating this interest.




**Figure 2: 'Hay que completar el alfabeto'**
*Caras y Caretas* (21 September 1912)
This cover demonstrated a public concern for US expansionist policies and a belief that the only effective defence was via cooperation with Brazil and Chile. The three figures on the boats are, from left to right, Chilean President Ramón Barros Luco, Brazilian President Hermes da Fonseca, and Argentine President Roque Sáenz Peña.



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