Varieties of Onset:
Onset and Conflict Dynamics in Civil War



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Acknowledgments

I have been asked recently if knowing what completing doctoral studies is like, I would do it again. Strangely, I have been asked this question many times. To a point where it seems to be a common question these days. And to be honest, I feel like I have run a long race. A race that has been hard and one that has been good too. And now, just passed the finish line, I look back at all the way travelled and a feeling of pride blends with one of relief. Unlike running, doctoral studies don't repeat themselves. You run it, you win in your own way, and you move forward. That's what I'll do. This research is not quite over yet. That I can say with confidence. Now on the finish line, the credit for this accomplishment lies not solely in my hands but in the mentors, colleagues, friends, and family who have supported me when tired and encouraged me when going strong. Obviously, such a list is long, but I will go through it in writing now for this thesis would not have been the work it is today without them.

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Abstract

How do civil wars begin? And does the type of onset impact how conflicts unfold? While the study of *why* civil wars start has been a central focus in the literature on civil war, the study of *how* civil wars start has received limited attention so far. In this thesis, I contribute to this scholarship with a novel conceptualization of civil war onset as a varied political event. I argue that different types of onset represent different forms of political challenge to state sovereignty and, as such, set countries in distinct conflict trajectories.

Theoretically, I propose a novel typology to account for the variation across onsets. I identify four ideal-typical forms of civil war onset: *peripheral challenge*, *state disintegration*, *coup*, and *insurrectionary protests*. I then build on this original typology and develop a path-dependent explanation for several macro-level wartime dynamics, including warfare, intensity, and conflict duration, that originate in the form of onset. In that sense, the types of civil war onset reflect different initial conditions that set conflicts onto patterned trajectories. Given how civil wars begin, I expect that some conflicts will be more likely to be fought through symmetric modes of warfare, some will be more severe, or last longer than others.

Empirically, I build a novel dataset of civil war, DatOnset, that accounts for the variation in the form of onset in all civil wars between 1944 and 2020, and validate the proposed classification through an extensive expert survey. Next, I use the typology of civil war onset empirically in two complementary ways. First, I replicate several landmark studies of the causes of civil war and provide evidence that the correlates of onset that we know about are clustered by types of onset. Second, to test my theory of civil war trajectories, I conduct cross-national regression analysis using the typology of onset as the main independent variable. I find clear empirical patterns in how civil wars unfold, which originate in the form of conflict onset. Lastly, I complement the cross-national findings with original archival material from Burundi's civil war (1993-2006) to describe in depth the dynamics at play during onset in the form of state disintegration. I demonstrate that state disintegration onsets occur in highly fragmented political landscapes, paired with weak institutions, and the existence of private militias mobilized by political elites.

Overall, the thesis makes several important contributions. Among these, distinguishing between civil wars based on the type of onset provides clear scope conditions and insightful case selection strategies, which is essential for robust comparative analyses of civil wars.

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Introduction

In recent years, four new civil wars began. Yet, each did so in very different ways. The town of Mocímboa da Praia in northern Mozambique had been mostly peaceful until October 2017, when a group of insurgents attacked and occupied the area for around two days, before retreating to the bush when police forces arrived (Morier-Genoud 2020). After this first move, several other attacks followed across the northern province of Cabo Delgado. According to residents, the rebels were well-known in the community. In fact, they belonged to the 'Al-Shabaab' religious sect, which had a mosque in town. While the group was initially formed as a religious organization, it soon began to incorporate military cells with the goal to implement radical Islamic law in Mozambique (Habibe, Forquilha and Pereira 2019). In the face of these initial attacks, the state claimed that peace will only be achieved through a military route and through restoring security in the region, therefore sending additional troops to stop the insurgents, starting with the destruction of the mosque, entering the war that is still raging today (Feijó 2021; Matsinhe and Valoi 2019).

Four years earlier, in South Sudan, not long after the country's independence, competition for political power among elites grew fiercer. It culminated when several members of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) political committee, led by Vice-President Riek Machar, announced their intention to compete in the forthcoming general

election. In response, President Salva Kiir dismissed Machar and most of his cabinet. For nine months, conflict among political elites went on, with no insulation between the party and the army, until political competition transformed into full-scale armed conflict in December 2013 in Juba, causing the whole edifice of government, party, and army to collapse (De Waal 2014). By the end of the year, the army had split between the forces loyal to the President and those loyal to the Vice-President, weapons had been handed out to youths supporting the various sides, and fighting had spread from the country's capital to other states including Unity, Upper Nile, and Jonglei (Rolandsen 2015; Nyadera 2018).

A couple of years earlier, in March 2011, anti-regime protests erupted in the city of Deraa, southwestern Syria. Soon protesters clashed with police forces, which were ordered to put down protests by force. In the following days, protests quickly spread to other major cities including Damascus, Hama, and Homs (Laub 2021), and across those cities, the Syrian army opened fire on unarmed protesters and carried out mass arrests. In response, protesters took up arms and local armed forces formed in villages and urban neighborhoods to organize resistance. A few months later, defectors from the Syrian army formed the Free Syrian Army (FSA) and attempted to coordinate the various militias (Della Porta et al. 2018; Laub 2021). By then, the Syrian civil war had begun.

In Côte d'Ivoire, events took on yet a different form. In September 2002, a large group of soldiers under the command of army officers attempted a coup d'état against President Laurent Gbagbo. On the same day, the rebel troops simultaneously attacked the cities of Abidjan, Bouaké and Korhogo, resulting in heavy fighting between the two sides. Although the forces loyal to Gbagbo quickly repelled the attack on Abidjan, the rebellious troops, known as the *Mouvement Patriotique de la Côte d'Ivoire* (MPCI), retreated to Bouaké and seized cities and towns in the northern and central regions, dividing the country into two and launching a civil war that would last two years (Förster 2015; Bakarr Bah 2010).

These four stories illustrate a puzzling aspect of civil war: they substantively vary in how they begin. Yet this important variation has been largely overlooked in the civil war literature.[1] To address this gap, this thesis introduces an original typology of civil war onset and then uses it to systematically account for the variation in how civil wars begin and examine the implications of this variation for how civil wars consequently unfold.

[1] Throughout this dissertation, civil war refers to an "armed combat within the boundaries of a recognized sovereign entity between parties subject to a common authority at the outset of the hostilities" (Kalyvas 2006: 17).

Initial puzzles and motivation

The Cold War has left a remarkable trace on common conceptions of civil wars and insurgencies, often informed by famous doctrines by Lenin, Mao Zedong, or Che Guevara. That period was in fact characterized by numerous guerrilla wars against sitting governments. Well-known examples include the civil wars in India (1989-ongoing), the Philippines (1972-1992), El Salvador (1980-1992), Peru (1980-1996), and Ethiopia (1978-1991). More recently, numerous Islamist insurgencies emerged, triggering civil wars in places like Mali (2012-ongoing), Nigeria (2009-ongoing) and Yemen (2010-ongoing). Although based on a radically different ideology, they appear to follow a similar process of conflict onset (Kalyvas 2018).

As a result, with perhaps the exception of histographies and case studies of individual conflicts (e.g., Figes 1996; Thomas 1961; Lewis 2020; Shesterinina 2021; Pearlman 2021), civil wars are broadly assumed to take the form of peripheral insurgencies. That is, a technology of military conflict characterized by small, lightly armed bands practicing guerrilla warfare from rural bases against stronger states, characterized by irregular rather than conventional warfare (Muller and Seligson 1987; Fearon and Laitin 2003; Staniland 2012; Lewis 2020). Such a model of civil war also bears assumptions about the form of conflict onset: civil wars are started by a small group of rebel entrepreneurs, who initially dispose of limited military means and support, and who launch an armed struggle against a stronger state from bases in the periphery where state presence is low. Is such an assumption about civil war onset empirically valid? More broadly, is it both theoretically and empirically reasonable to assume a common form of onset across conflicts? Are we not losing meaningful empirical variation that may in turn inform our theories of conflict onset, wartime dynamics, and post-conflict trajectories?

In fact, many civil wars since the end of World War II began in markedly different ways, which have been largely overlooked in existing research.[2] For example, the civil war in East Timor (1975-1999) was triggered by the rapid withdrawal of Portugal from its colony which led to fighting between local political groups. Similarly, the Greek civil war (1944-1949) followed the end of the German occupation, and its onset was characterized by the mobilization of several Communist and Nationalist groups. In Nigeria, the civil war started in May 1967

[2] Some recent and valuable exceptions include McLauchlin's work on 'army-splinter rebellions' (2022), Lacher's (2022) work on escalatory processes of civil war onset, Shesterinina's (2022) work on the processual understanding of civil war, della Porta and colleagues' (2018) and Pearlman's (2021) work on the escalation of social movements into war, and Lewis' (2020) work on insurgencies. This dissertation builds on and substantively contributes to this emerging research agenda.

when Igbo high-ranking military personnel declared the independence of the Republic of Biafra causing the army to splinter. In Libya and Yemen in 2011, civil war resulted from mass protests against the government following the Arab Spring. In Romania, sustained fighting between the National Salvation Front and the army took place in several cities across the country following the Romanian revolution in December 1989. In sum, civil wars vary greatly in how they begin.

How can we make sense of this variation? Do civil wars begin in patterned ways? Do the different ways in which they begin represent different political challenges to state sovereignty? Does how civil wars begin matter for how they unfold? And can we derive from the form of onset expectations about subsequent wartime dynamics? These questions reveal a central, yet underexplored, paradox. While the study of *why* civil wars start has been a central focus in the current literature on civil war, the study of *how* civil wars start has received limited attention so far. In other words, while the study of civil war onset has produced a vast literature on the causes of conflict, there has been comparatively little scholarly attention devoted to onset as a distinct analytical category with meaningful variation of its own.

Existing literature primarily focuses on onset because it signals the beginning of a prolonged period of war between organized armed groups. In that sense, onset is often considered *binary*: that is, either a civil war begins in a given country-year or it does not. As this thesis demonstrates, this conceptualization overlooks the crucial fact that not all civil wars start in the same way, and that these differences may be consequential for wartime dynamics. If this is the case, a detailed understanding of the types of onset should inform theories of civil wars.

Building on the rich scholarship on civil war onset, this thesis contributes to the current literature in two complementary manners. First, I explore *how* civil wars begin. That is, how societies and states break down into political violence. In doing so, I conduct a detailed comparative analysis of all civil wars since World War II and develop an original typology of civil war onsets. Second, I explore whether these differences in how civil wars begin account for the differences in several wartime dynamics, such as warfare, severity, and duration. That is, I explore the implications of onset for the conduct of war.

Main argument

I argue that different types of onset represent different forms of political challenge to state sovereignty and, as such, set countries in distinct conflict trajectories. Across types, civil war onset refers to the *breakdown of state sovereignty that results from the initial violent*

confrontations between domestic armed organizations for the control of political power, either over the whole territory or over parts of it, and that leads to prolonged armed conflict. In that sense, civil war onset is an event that occurs at the level of the polity (Sambanis and Schulhofer-Wohl 2019).[3]

Importantly, the armed organizations involved in civil war onset do not all launch their military challenge to state authority in the same way. Conceptually, I propose a typology to systematically account for the variation across civil war onsets, based on three key dimensions which together account for who fight and where. First, armed groups differ in how they form and who the first movers are. Some armed organizations are led by a small group of core political entrepreneurs such as radicalized militants or excluded politicians, while others emerge from rebellious military units. Others yet form as private militias, while some mobilize out of mass protests. Second, across the different types of civil war onsets, the army also responds differently. While in some cases, the state forces remain largely loyal to the regime, in others, they suffer from substantive split or even entirely collapse. Third, these initial interactions between key actors vary in where they occur. While some take place in urban areas, including the capital city, others are set in the rural countryside in the periphery of the country.

Combining these three key dimensions, I inductively identify four mutually exclusive types of civil war onset based (Table 1.1). *Peripheral challenges* refer to the instances in which outsiders from the state apparatus, typically radicalized militants, excluded politicians, or mutineers launch an armed challenge against the state to capture political power, often with limited recruits and means, and face mostly loyal and cohesive armed forces. I call *state disintegration* the cases in which private militias, led by political elites and benefitting from the collapse of the state and of its armed forces, mobilize against one another in an attempt to capture political power. Given the disintegration of the state, these militias often fight one another at the political center of the state in urban areas and fighting spreads outward across the territory. I call *coups* cases of civil war onset led by insiders to the security forces of the state in an attempt to seize political power, who as the army splits often initiate their armed struggle at the political center of the state. Lastly, there exists a fourth category of onset in which anti-regime protesters mobilize in urban areas, which I call *insurrectionary protests*. Although often initially non-violent, protesters take up arms in response to repression by state forces, which suffers from defection to the newly formed rebel groups that organize and

[3] The definition of civil war onset is discussed in further details in Chapter 1, including violence threshold and actors' characteristics.

coordinate their military challenge against the state. Hence, this dissertation conceptualizes systematically an aspect of civil war so far largely overlooked.

Theoretically, I use this original typology as a starting point and develop a path-dependent explanation for several macro-level wartime dynamics, including the type of warfare, intensity, and duration of the conflict, that originate in the form of onset. In that sense, the types of civil war onset reflect different initial conditions that set conflicts onto patterned trajectories. As civil wars are launched by different first movers disposing of different means, who fight against governments that respond differently to the challenge to their sovereignty, and in different direct environments, the prolonged military challenges that subsequently unfold will do so in patterned ways. Based on these initial differences, the onset of conflict triggers a patterned chain of dynamics and interactions, which are connected to one another, and all connected to conflict onset. Given how civil wars begin, some armed groups will resort to guerrilla warfare, while others will opt for conventional warfare. Some onsets will result in especially violent civil wars, while others will be characterized by lower levels of violence intensity. Some civil war onsets will lead to relatively brief conflicts, while others signal the beginning of longer civil wars. In sum, this thesis argues that how a civil war begins matters because it improves our understanding of conflict onset, but also because onset is a good predictor of how wars are likely to unfold.

Table 1.1. A typology of civil war onset

Onset types	*Onset characteristics*		
	First movers	**State forces**	**Location**
Peripheral challenge	Radicalized activists/ Excluded politicians/ Army personnel (mutineers)	Mostly loyal	Periphery/ rural
State disintegration	Politicians/ Private militias	Collapse	Center/ urban
Coup	Army personnel (officers)	Split	Center/ urban
Insurrectionary protests	Protesters	Split	Periphery/ Urban

Empirical design and findings

Having identified patterns of onset based on extensive secondary literature and theorized on the relation between onset and several key macro-level wartime dynamics, this thesis proceeds to a systematic empirical analysis. First, building on Sambanis and Schulhofer-Wohl (2019)'s dataset, I introduce a novel dataset of civil war, DatOnset, which accounts for the variation in the form of onset in all civil wars between 1944 and 2020, which I validated through an extensive expert survey. In doing so, I identify key trends in civil war onset. Specifically, I find that one out of three civil war onsets does not fit the model of peripheral insurgency and instead starts through a substantively different process, amounting to a total of 67 civil wars over that period. Descriptive evidence also reveals that the typology of onset does not overlap with existing typologies of civil war in the current literature, that is, ethnic versus non-ethnic and secessionist versus non-secessionist. That these typologies do not overlap provides further evidence that my typology of onset encapsulates a dimension of civil war so far unaccounted for. I argue that this dimension is inherently political as it refers to the form of challenge to state sovereignty and the distribution of power across key parties involved in violent contestations.

Next, I use the typology of civil war onset empirically in two complementary ways. First, I use the variation in onset as the main outcome variable and replicate several landmark studies of the causes of civil war to examine whether the correlates of onset that we know about apply to all civil wars or are clustered by types of onset.[4] I find that key results are indeed often driven by specific types of onset. For example, I find that increased state capacity reduces the risk of civil war onset in the form of peripheral challenge or coups but has no significant effect in the case of state disintegration and insurrectionary protests. This suggests that the most common correlate of onset may not equally apply to all types of onset and, more broadly, that different mechanisms linking specific correlates to civil war onset may be at play in different settings. In other words, different types of civil war onset are caused by different factors.

Second, I use my typology of onset as the main independent variable to test the theory of macro-level civil war trajectories through rigorous statistical analysis. To do so, I use logistic regression models to examine the relation between onset and warfare and severity, and survival models to determine the link between onset and conflict duration. Based on such cross-national comparative analysis of conflicts between 1944 and 2020, I find clear empirical patterns in how

[4] Specifically, I replicate the following studies in Chapter 4: Fearon and Laitin (2003); Gleditsch and Ruggeri (2010); Salehyan and Gleditsch (2006); and Nel and Righarts (2008).

civil wars unfold, which originate in the form of conflict onset. In fact, the results of the various statistical models provide robust evidence that given how they begin, some civil wars are more likely to be fought through symmetric modes of warfare, to be more severe, or to last longer than others. Specifically, I find that compared to peripheral challenges, all other three forms of onset are likely to lead to symmetric warfare, that onset in the form of state disintegration is especially likely to lead to high violence intensity, and that while peripheral challenges and state disintegration tend to lead to longer conflict duration, coups and insurrectionary protests tend to lead to shorter wars.

Lastly, I complement the quantitative findings with a case study of Burundi's civil war (1993-2006) to further describe in depth the dynamics at play during onset in the form of state disintegration, linking infighting between political elites with increased local-level mobilization. To do so, I exploit original archival material about the onset of Burundi's civil war in the form of testimonies, which I pair with extensive secondary literature. Given that peripheral challenges have been extensively covered in the existing literature, focusing the case of state disintegration allows to better grasp the mechanisms at play in a distinct type of onset, which represent the second most common form of civil war onset.

Specifically, I demonstrate that state disintegration onsets occur in highly fragmented political landscapes, paired with weak institutions, and the existence of private militias mobilized by political elites. Through the case study of Burundi, I show in great detail how violence reached the level of war, which local groups mobilized and how they did so, and what form of organization they established. Rather than guerrilla war, I find that the dynamics of violence and mobilization following state disintegration resemble those of communal wars. As the state disintegrates, private militias led by political figures mobilize and are empowered by increased civilian mobilization and either the defection of military personnel or the inactivity of the army. This detailed analysis also points to the meso-level mechanisms that drive the macro-level patterns of conflict thereby contributing to a growing literature on the possible to bridge micro and macro approaches to civil war (e.g., Balcells and Justino 2014). Although tentative, the findings suggest that militias are especially prone to infighting and fragmentation and tend to engage in high levels of civilian victimization in the form of massacres and ethnic cleansing. A discussion of the civil wars in Afghanistan (1992-1996), Bosnia (1992-1995), and Lebanon (1975-1990) provides further support for the external validity of this argument.

Contributions for the comparative study of civil war

Considered broadly, the finding that the form of civil war onset is a useful basis upon which to disaggregate conflicts and that onsets are systematically correlated with several macro-level wartime dynamics indicates that the analytical and empirical category of civil war is rather an heterogenous one. Such a finding bears important contributions on three parallel fronts: theoretical, methodological, and for policy.

On the theoretical front, this conceptual framework provides clear scope conditions for existing and future findings in the civil war literature. More systematic scope conditions in turn serve a twofold purpose. On the one hand, it minimizes the risk of false negatives. That is, the risk of rejecting a theory on the basis that it does not apply to all civil wars, when, in fact, that theory would be especially valuable to make sense of a specific type of civil war. On the other hand, it also minimizes the risk of false positives. That is, we may assume that we fully understand a given conflict dynamic across conflicts, when in fact, we may only know about such a dynamic in one specific type of civil war. Second, in identifying that civil wars vary in patterned ways, this research provides a framework allowing for the aggregation of current findings into coherent analytical narratives of conflict, all the more important that often findings about given wartime dynamics are often disconnected from one another and studied in isolation.[5]

On the methodological front, distinguishing between civil wars based on the type of onset provides insightful case selection strategies, which is essential for robust comparative analyses of civil wars. These strategies come in three forms. First, identifying classes of civil wars based on onset allows for informed within-case comparison. Comparing conflicts that begin in similar ways, such studies should expect to observe similar dynamics. In the instances when they do not, such divergence between cases should point to important factors that can be used both as explanatory and dependent variables in various model specifications. Second, identifying types of civil wars along a single dimension also provide a useful basis for cross-category comparisons. In those instances, studies should expect different outcomes. Once again, divergence from the expected results may point to factors especially important in shaping civil war dynamics. Lastly, it may also be valuable for case study designs as identifying classes of civil war based on the types of onset provides useful baselines against which to

[5] Weinstein's (2006) work on civil war and initial endowments stands out here as he connects several wartime dynamics to one another, as well as to the initial resource environment. Balcells and Kalyvas's (2014) study of the effect of warfare on several other conflict dynamics also provides a good illustration.

compare the observed wartime trajectory of a given conflict. Once more, divergence from those expectations may point to consequential factors that may otherwise be missed.

Lastly, on the policy front, the finding that civil wars vary in patterned ways and that the type of onset provides a useful basis on which to distinguish between them is especially relevant. The ability to identify which conflicts are likely to last longer than others, to be more severe than others, or to lead to longer negotiation periods based on how they start potentially allows to decide on interventions is the most efficient ways possible. In fact, a conflict that is likely to be short and cause high numbers of casualties may not need the same conflict resolutions strategies as one that is likely to last longer, cause fewer casualties, and may not as severely affect the survival of the state experiencing civil war. Overall, although probabilistic rather than deterministic, the main finding of this thesis provides valuable contributions, both for academic research and policymaking.

Organization of the thesis

This thesis is organized in seven chapters following this introduction. The next chapter reviews the current literature on civil war onset. It discusses the quantitative, cross-national research that has come to dominate the study of civil war onset in the past two decades, as well as case study research. In doing so, it identifies the common ontological assumptions about civil war onset and identifies their implications for the study of civil war. It then provides a novel conceptualization of civil war onset as a multifaceted political phenomenon. Chapter 2 provides a detailed account of each type of civil war onset. Exploiting extensive anecdotal evidence from various civil wars between 1944 and 2020, the chapter illustrates the dynamics of onset which represent the different types of challenges to state authority. Focusing on each dimension of civil war onset in turn —the identity and origin of first movers, the initial response by state forces, and the location of these interactions—, I inductively identify key patterns and construct a novel typology of civil war onset, which informs all the remaining chapters.

Based on this novel typology, Chapter 3 formulates hypotheses about macro-level dynamics of conflict. Specifically, I examine the effects of onset on three key dynamics: conflict severity, warfare, and duration. In a nutshell, I expect *civil wars that begin as a coup* to be severe, especially in terms of combatant casualties, to be fought through conventional warfare, and to be short. By contrast, *civil wars that begin as a peripheral challenge* should be likely to be relatively less violent, although civilian victimization is likely to be high, to take the form of irregular warfare, and to last longer. Regarding *civil wars that follow state*

disintegration, I expect that they are especially violent, fought through symmetric warfare, that is, either conventional or symmetric non-conventional, and to be long. Lastly, I expect *civil wars that begin as insurrectionary protests* to be relatively less severe, to take the form of symmetric non-conventional warfare, and to be relatively short.

Turning to the empirical analysis, Chapter 4 introduces a new dataset of civil wars which accounts for the variation in the form of onset. DatOnset includes 194 civil wars between 1944 and 2020. In doing so, I discuss the data-generating process and replicate landmark studies of onset, using the types of onset as the main independent variable. Next, Chapter 5 provides macro-level evidence in support of the theory of civil war trajectories and the hypotheses summarized above. Based on cross-national analysis, I discuss the results of several logistic regression and survival models linking civil war onset and three key macro-level wartime dynamics: warfare, severity, and duration. Chapter 6 then focuses on the dynamics of civil wars that begin with state disintegration, providing a detailed account of the processes of mobilization by political elites. To do so, I use original archival material in the form of testimonies from Burundi's civil war (1993-2006) and complement it with extensive secondary literature to connect the conflict onset and wartime dynamics.

The last chapter concludes and identifies the contours of a novel research agenda centered around the key finding that civil wars vary in how they begin, and that this variation both allows to disaggregate the correlates of civil war onset and shapes several key wartime dynamics, making onset a central and meaningful dimension in the study of civil wars.

PART I — RETHINKING CIVIL WAR ONSET

Chapter 1

Civil war onset in the current literature

Since the mid-1990s, the study of civil wars has attracted considerable attention, both in academic and policy circles, following the wars in Bosnia, Rwanda, and Liberia among others and the relative decline of interstate wars. As a result of this acute interest, there exists today an immense body of literature that addresses the causes and recurrence of civil war. This chapter reviews developments in this literature and proceeds in four parts. First, I review the conceptualization of civil war onset in the current literature. In doing so, I discuss the advantages and limitations of a dichotomous understanding of onset and identifies recent alternative approaches. Second, I identify the criteria commonly used to empirically distinguish civil war onset from other types of violent political events and emphasize the recent concept of sovereignty rupture (Sambanis and Schulhofer-Wohl 2019). Third, I discuss recent studies that provide dynamic models of civil war onset, typically in the form of conflict escalation. In the last section, I build on this review of the literature and lay out the novel conceptualization of civil war onset as a heterogeneous political event, on which this thesis is founded.

1.1. The conceptualization of civil war onset

Following the new wave of scholarly interest in civil wars, the study of their onset soon became a central focus in the conflict literature, following several key publications (e.g., Sambanis 2001; Fearon and Laitin 2003; Collier and Hoeffler 2004). Since then, scholars have developed

ever more precise estimates and measurements of key correlates of civil war onset (e.g., Gleditsch and Ruggeri 2010; Bartusevičius and Skaaning 2018; Chiba and Gleditsch 2017; Bormann and Savun 2018). As a result, our understanding of the causes of conflict has progressed considerably, as demonstrated by the vast existing literature, both quantitative and qualitative, and the numerous attempts to gather high-quality data and construct rigorous research designs. Within this literature, I identify two broad categories of studies: those that use a binary conceptualization of civil war onset; and those, more recent, that move beyond such approach. This section reviews these two trends of research in turn.

1.1.1. Binary onsets in the current literature

Most studies of civil war onset conceptualize it as a dichotomous event: either a civil war starts in a given country and year, or no civil war begins. In this perspective, onset is understood as an indicator of civil war and merely signals the start of a conflict, distinguishing periods of relative peace from periods of prolonged domestic military conflict. This binary approach to onset is largely prevalent in quantitative studies of civil war onset which typically examine the effects of a wide range of factors on the likelihood of civil war. These studies display a great diversity both in the correlates considered and measurement strategies, which at times produce contradictory findings.[6] Numerous reviews of this immense literature exist and point to key

[6] Given the large size of this literature, a fully exhaustive list is difficult to establish. Nevertheless, among these studies, some scholars emphasize the role of *institutional factors*. These include factors such as state capacity and strength (Fearon and Laitin 2003; Tilly 1978; Skocpol 1979; Koren and Sarbahi 2018; Thies 2010), horizontal inequality, political exclusion, and grievance (Cederman, Weidmann and Gleditsch 2011; Gurr 1970; Østby 2008; Cederman and Girardin 2007; Fearon, Kasara and Laitin 2007), regime type and institutions (Elbadawi and Sambanis 2002; Hegre et al. 2001; Gleditsch and Ruggeri 2010; Goldstone et al. 2010; Gurses and Mason 2010; Vreeland 2008), colonial past (Blanton, Mason and Athow 2001; Djankov and Reynal-Querol 2007), and civil society organizations (Braithwaite and Licht 2020). Others focus on the effect of *economic factors* of the likelihood of civil war onset, such as poverty and income inequality (Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Collier 2000; Jakobsen, De Soya and Jakobsen 2013; Muller and Seligson 1987; Mani, Bohara and Gawande 2011) and economic shocks (Bazzi and Blattman 2014; Deaton and Miller 1995; Brückner and Ciccone 2010; Miguel, Satyanath and Sergenti 2004). A third category of studies explicitly stress the role of *geographic factors* in triggering civil war onset, including climate shocks and natural disasters (Ash and Orbadovich 2020; Nel and Righarts 2008; Bergholt and Lujala 2012; Theisen 2012; Slettebak 2012), natural resources (Ross 2004a, 2004b; Humphreys 2005; Bodea 2012; Lujala et al. 2005; Paine 2016), conflict proximity (Bormann and Hammond 2016), and disease (Cervelatti, Sunde and Valmori 2017). While others attribute the outbreak of armed conflict to *demographic characteristics* such as ethnic cleavages (Bormann, Cederman and Vogt 2017; Reynal-Querol 2002; Fearon and Laitin 2000; Eck 2009; Elbadawi and Sambanis 2002; Kaufman 1996; Montalvo and Reynal-Querol 2005; Sambanis and Shayo 2013; Scarcelli 2014), population size and attributes (Brückner 2010; Urdal 2006; Weidmann 2009), or gender inequality (Caprioli 2005; Melander 2005); civil war recurrence (Atlas and Licklider 1999; Ziegler 2016; Fortna 2004; Mason and Greig 2017; Haer and Böhmelt 2016; Rudloff and Findley 2016; Themner 2013; Hegre and Nygård 2015; Shair-Rosenfield and Wood 2017). Others examine the effect of *international factors* in triggering domestic political violence, such as foreign aid and intervention (Cunningham 2016; Nielsen et al. 2011; Esman and Herring 2003; Blattman and Miguel 2010; Dixon 1996; Kaplan 2019; Rauchhaus 2006), neighboring conflict and regional environment (Salehyan 2007; Gibler and Miller 2014; Salehyan and Gleditsch 2006; Bara 2017), and transnational ethnic kin (Cederman et al. 2013). Lastly, some scholars advocate for the *interactions of several of factors* (Dyrstad and Hillesund 2020; Collier, Hoeffler and Rohner 2009; Ballentine and Sherman 2003; Kalyvas 2001; Masullo and Bajo 2014; Regan and Norton 2005; Bara 2014).

differences in the definition of civil war used across studies, as well as differences in their time coverage (Sambanis 2004; Hegre and Sambanis 2006; Dixon 2009; Fearon 2010; Cederman and Vogt 2017).

Yet, there exists one similarity across these studies that has not been put forward so far: all these studies have in common that onset is conceptualized as a binary event. This similarly across studies bears an important question: does this conceptualization result from the fact that the specific dynamics of onset do not matter? Or is it because current research may have overlooked such variation as meaningful? Either way, following the dichotomous conceptualization, it is typically assumed that onset takes a similar form across conflicts, the factors that impact the onset of civil war do so homogenously, and that civil wars do not differ in how they unfold based on the differences in how they begin. This dissertation explicitly examines these assumptions.

Among studies of the correlates commonly associated with civil war onset, poverty stands among the most robust predictors (Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Fearon and Laitin 2003; Sambanis 2004; Buhaug 2006). However, interpretations and causal mechanisms vary. For example, while Collier and Hoeffler (2004) suggest that poverty increases the likelihood of civil war onset as it lowers the individual opportunity cost of joining a rebellion, Fearon and Laitin (2003) explain that poverty and low GDP per capita mainly signal weak state capacity, corruption, and limited state presence in the periphery, which create the structural opportunity to launch rebellions.

Although these findings are often considered to apply broadly, Fearon and Laitin (2003) describe civil wars as a specific form of violent political conflict: insurgencies taking place in the periphery of the state in a guerrilla fashion. Likewise, Collier (2000) explicitly formulates assumptions about civil war onset and group formation when he notes (2000: 851) that "rebel movements usually have to grow from small origins using extra-legal means." Typically growing in the periphery of the state, these clandestine rebel organizations finance themselves by criminal activities, benefit from financial support by foreign government that see an advantage in generating insurgency, and demand contributions from local populations (Collier 2000). Although pointing to specific mechanisms, these descriptions are often assumed to be representative of most, if not all, civil war onsets.

Is it reasonable to assume homogeneity across onsets? Do all civil wars begin through similar dynamics? And are the dynamics of insurgencies representative of all civil war onsets? If there is little doubt that peripheral insurgency is a common form of intrastate war, especially

during the Cold War (Kalyvas and Balcells 2010), the assumption of onset homogeneity inherently denies attention to other forms of onset and conflict dynamics. In fact, understanding civil war onset as a dichotomous event shapes any interpretations of statistical results. As such, it remains unclear if the correlates of onset identified by Fearon and Laitin (2003) — low GDP per capita, political instability, rough terrain, and large populations — increase the likelihood of civil war onset in general, or if these results are driven by a specific type of onset, in this case peripheral insurgencies, within the larger universe of civil wars. For example, rough terrain intuitively may have little effect on civil wars that begin at the political center of the state, including capital cities and other large urban areas, such as the repeated conflicts in Congo during the 1990s or Iraqi civil war in 2003. Likewise, population size may have little effect on the onset of civil wars that are initiated by first movers who mobilize from within the state apparatus and rely on defection of a substantive part of the armed forces, such as the civil war in Ivory Coast in 2011 or the Argentinian civil war in 1955.

Although the model of peripheral insurgency certainly has empirical validity and is valuable to make sense of a specific form of civil war, it is not clear that it necessarily applies to most civil wars. For example, Atlas and Licklider (1999) provide a different narrative of civil war onset as they examine the recurrence of conflict after settlements and attribute it to the breakdown of relations between former allies, rather than between enemies. In those cases, post-conflict political institutions deepen divisions between allies who eventually resume violence. Then, instead of occurring in the periphery, onset may be more likely to take place at the center of the state, and lead to the mobilization of private militias and splits within the army, as in the Lebanese civil war (1975-1990), the war in Angola (1975-1991), or in Cyprus in 1974.

In sum, most studies of civil war onset are founded on the shared assumption that onset merely signals the start of a civil war, and therefore is a homogeneous analytical object: because onset is typically conceptualized as binary —that is, either a civil war begins or not— it follows that civil war onset is assumed to take a similar form across cases. Theoretically, a dichotomous conceptualization of onset may lead to several caveats. First, we risk wrongly assuming that we know about the effect of a given set of factors on all civil war onsets, when in fact, the uncovered causal mechanisms may only apply to a specific type of onset, and different sets of factors may account for different types of onsets. Second, we also risk rejecting theories of civil war onset on the basis that they do not apply to most onsets, when in fact these theories may be valuable to explain why and when specific types of civil war onset occur. Lastly, it may also lead us to overlook the potential relationship between specific processes of civil war

onset and consequent wartime dynamics. This dissertation contributes to the existing literature precisely through a careful and systematic examination of the dynamics of civil war onset and their implications for wartime dynamics.

1.1.2. Beyond binary onsets, disaggregating civil wars

Alongside this conceptualization, several studies develop, explicitly or implicitly, non-binary approaches to civil war onset. Recognizing conflict specificities, these studies often argue for a logic of disaggregation. While disaggregation has often been associated with the transfer of focus from macro- to micro-level dynamics (Kalyvas 2006; Cederman and Gleditsch 2009; Costalli and Moro 2012), it need not be the case. In fact, several studies disaggregate civil wars into distinct analytical categories, while still primarily focused on cross-national comparisons and macro-level dynamics. Two main typologies exist in the current literature and have been widely used. The first distinguishes between ethnic and non-ethnic civil wars (Sambanis 2001; Wimmer, Cederman and Min 2009; Toft 2003; Denny and Walter 2014; Eck 2009), while the other differentiate secessionist and non-secessionist civil wars (Walter 2009; Cunningham, Bakke and Seymour 2012; Butt 2017).

For example, when civil war onset does occur, Sambanis (2001) distinguishes ethnic from non-ethnic conflicts and finds that they result from different underlying causes: ethnic civil wars are specifically associated with ethnic heterogeneity and political grievances. Focusing on secessionist conflicts, Cunningham (2013b) argues that their onset results from strategic choice by actors between violent and nonviolent campaigns, compared to conventional politics. Yet, although they divide cases of onset, both studies assume homogeneity within the categories they identify. Either disaggregating civil wars into ethnic or non-ethnic and secessionist or non-secessionist, cases within these categories are assumed to be a homogeneous group of events, grouping for example in the case of secessionist conflicts, the onsets of the Kashmir insurgency in 1989 or the Kurd insurgency in 1984 together with the Biafran war (1967-1970) or the 1994 Yemeni civil war. Do these civil wars not differ in important ways, beyond their similarity of goals? Are all secessionist or ethnic civil wars respectively similar in most aspects?

Some studies further disaggregate these categories of civil war. For example, Wimmer, Cederman and Min (2009) argue that it is not ethnic heterogeneity per se that drives conflict but instead certain ethnopolitical configurations of power. In identifying these different constellations, they identify different types of ethnic civil wars which result from different

causal processes. They also find that, in the case of ethnic civil wars, their model of political arrangements applies equally to secessionist and non-secessionist wars. Likewise, Kaufman (1996) suggests that there is no single path to war which all ethnic conflicts follow but rather, two different patterns exist: mass-led and elite-led conflicts, both either initiated by dominant or subordinate groups.

These findings put an important question forward: do political factors, rather than identity or goals, provide an accurate and useful dimension along which to disaggregate civil wars? Supporting this intuition, critics of the new war thesis argue that neither the causes, forms of support, nor the use of violence provide empirically valid dimensions to compare so-called new and old civil wars (Kalyvas 2001; Duyvesteyn 2000).[7] Instead, both types of conflict represent political challenges to state authority. The main question therefore becomes whether different civil wars represent different types of political challenges to state sovereignty, unrelated to the identity and goals of the insurgents.

Alongside these explicit typologies of civil wars, there also exist numerous studies that implicitly use a logic of disaggregation. Pointing to different types of civil wars, these studies contribute to refining the ways in which civil wars may be disaggregated. For example, Buhaug (2006) finds that, in institutionally and economically capable states, groups will seek secession in the frontier region of the country. In contrast, when regimes are poorer, resource-dependent, and inconsistent, insurgents will favor coups and revolutions. More recently, Blaxland (2021) points to different processes of conflict onset focusing on their incubation period: in some cases, insurgents form long in advance to the outset of hostilities, sometimes years or even decades, while in others, they initiate conflict straight away.

Likewise, Cederman, Wimmer and Min's (2010) analysis of the differentiated likelihood of civil war onset between excluded and included groups provides insights for an approach to civil war onset beyond a dichotomous conceptualization as they point to two distinct processes of onset. On the one hand, conflicts launched by recently excluded groups, which are likely to regroup in their home territory where support is high and spark conflict from the periphery. On the other hand, conflict initiated at the center of the political arena by

[7] The new war thesis argues that the end of the Cold War was accompanied by the emergence of a new type of wars, linked with globalization and weaker states, and which display specific characteristics such as private and exclusive goals, often linked to identity, numerous fighting units, and specific sources of financing, often private, decentralized, or illegal (Kaldor 1999; 2005; 2012; Collier 2000; Duffield 1998). Given that it is no longer a commonly used typology of civil wars, I do not include it alongside the ethnic versus non-ethnic and secessionist versus non-secessionist categories. I further discuss the new war thesis in Chapters 2 and 4 of this dissertation.

included groups. In those cases, civil war onset takes the form of a breakdown of power-sharing agreement between parties to a given government.

In sum, this section has done two things: first, it has identified a common assumption of homogeneity of civil war onset in the current literature that derives from a binary conceptualization of onset; and second, it has pointed to several studies that suggest meaningful ways to disaggregate civil wars into distinct categories, thereby identifying valuable ways to move beyond a binary approach to civil war onset. This dissertation contributes to the existing literature by examining whether the forms of civil war onset is a relevant dimension to distinguish between civil wars, capturing a dimension so far underexplored and going beyond group identities and goals.

1.2. The identification of onset

Focusing on the ontology of civil war, ongoing debates provide ways to empirically identify when onset occurs. The current literature identifies several indicators that distinguish civil wars from other types of organized political violence, and by extension characterize the onset of civil war. This section reviews these indicators in turn.

1.2.1. Violence threshold

Perhaps the most common indicator used in the literature, although often combined with others, is the intensity of violence between warring parties. In that sense, civil war refers to episodes of extreme violence. According to Collier and Hoeffler (2004: 565), civil war onset occurs the first year that an internal conflict causes at least 1,000 combat-related deaths and both the government forces and an identifiable rebel organization suffer at least five percent of these fatalities. Likewise, however with slightly different criteria, Fearon and Laitin (2003: 76) identify that onset occurs "the first year in which 100 were killed or in which a violent event occurred that was followed by a sequence of actions that came to satisfy the primary criteria."[8] Using a much lower violence threshold, the Uppsala Conflict Data Program identifies the occurrence of civil war onset when an intrastate armed conflict results in over 25 battle deaths in a given year (Gleditsch et al. 2002; Pettersson et al. 2021). In his review of the definitions of civil war,

[8] The primary criteria to qualify as a civil war are (1) they involved fighting between agents of (or claimants to) a state and organized, nonstate groups who sought either to take control of a government, to take power in a region, or to use violence to change government policies, (2) the conflict killed at least 1,000 over its course, with a yearly average of at least 100, and (3) at least 100 were killed on both sides (including civilians attacked by rebels) (Fearon and Laitin 2003: 76).

Sambanis (2004) offers yet another set of criteria and argues that a conflict qualifies as a civil war when it causes at least 500 fatalities in a given year.[9] Importantly, these differences have concrete implications as they lead to differences in the lists of conflicts as civil wars and their onset dates across datasets.[10]

Other scholars claim that these violence thresholds may at times be misleading. In her recent research, Lewis (2020) argues that because the literature focuses on armed groups that become viable threat to the incumbent, it confounds the correlates of onset with those of conflict escalation. Instead, she claims that the dynamics of initial group formation differ from those of conflict escalation, and that it is the group formation that qualifies as the conflict onset. In that perspective, Lewis (2017: 1421) defines onset as "occurring when a rebel group forms, that is, when a group forms a nascent organization and begins using violence to challenge the authority of the incumbent government." She adds that a group is considered as having formed when it has a discernable command and control structure and has committed or clearly planned to commit at least one act of violence against the state (Lewis 2017). In the case of Uganda since 1986, Lewis finds that over half of rebel groups failed early and as a result are missing from the main cross-national datasets of civil war. Instead of using a violence threshold to signal the onset of civil war, Lewis (2020) suggests that group characteristics are more indicative.

1.2.2. Actors and goals

Alongside violence, most definitions of civil war, and by extension civil war onset, also include characteristics of the armed groups and their goals. In his landscape of political violence, Kalyvas (2019) explicitly distinguishes civil wars from other types of political violence by the identity of the perpetrator and the target of violence. Civil war being a form of political violence that is characterized by non-state perpetrators and state targets of violence. These non-state groups must also have publicly stated political objectives (Sambanis 2004). Pettersson, Högbladh and Öberg (2019) identify a civil war onset only when armed conflict concerns a stated incompatibility, either over government or territory. Conflicts that reach the violence level of civil wars but are not centered around a stated incompatibility, therefore do not qualify

[9] Note that if the conflict does not cause 500 deaths or more in the first year, onset is coded in that year only if cumulative deaths in the next three years reach the 1,000-casualty threshold (Sambanis 2004).

[10] For example, the Afghan civil war that followed the resignation of Najibullah in March 1992 is coded across datasets as having started on June 28, 1992 (COW), in 1992 (Fearon and Laitin 2003), May 1992 (Collier and Hoeffler 2004), April 27, 1978 (UCDP), and 1993 (Doyle and Sambanis 2000).

as civil wars. Instead, these are typically referred to as intercommunal violence (Brass 1997; Wilkinson 2004; Dunning 2011) or communal wars (Krause 2018).

In addition to formulating political objectives, the key actors involved in a civil war must display other characteristics. On the side of the rebels, insurgents must be clearly identifiable and display at least some level of organization (Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Lewis 2017). Sambanis (2004) notes that insurgents must be locally represented and must recruit locally, as civil wars are domestic conflicts. However, insurgents may operate from neighboring countries, but when they do, they must have at least some territorial control or bases in the country experiencing civil war.

On the side of the state, most definitions of civil war stipulate that the government, through its military and armed forces, must be a principal combatant (Doyle and Sambanis 2000; Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Sambanis 2004; Kalyvas 2006).[11] Is it empirically valid to assume that the government is necessarily an active party to the conflict? Does such a description of civil war onset not reject specific processes of onset that involve collapsed states? Anecdotal evidence suggests that, in some cases, the state may cease to be a military actor. In Afghanistan, a day after Mohammad Najibullah announced his imminent resignation, the regime dissolved, and military resources were absorbed by the various mujahideen parties (Christia 2012; Staniland 2014). At onset of the 1993 civil war in Congo, central political order collapsed, and fighting broke out between private militias formed by various politicians eager to capture government power, which signaled complete state failure (Widner 1995). In South Sudan, fighting broke out between the President and the Vice-President, both members of the political elite and ruling party, the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (De Waal 2014). This suggests that the key actors vary across civil wars and must be clearly identified.

1.2.3. Dyadic or polity-level onset

Focusing on the interactions between two key actors, these identification criteria —violence threshold and actors' characteristics— are founded on a dyadic understanding of civil war. That is, the onset of civil war is characterized by intense fighting between an incumbent and an insurgent. This dyadic approach produces key implications for the study of civil war as it places the analytical focus on the level of armed organizations, which is discernible in existing typologies of civil wars in the current literature. In that sense, ethnic and non-ethnic civil wars

[11] Sambanis (2004: 829) somewhat loosens this criterion in including that if there is no functioning government, then the party representing the government internationally and/or claiming the state domestically must be involved as a combatant.

are conflicts fought by different types of groups, distinguished by their identities, while secessionist and non-secessionist civil wars are conflicts fought by groups with different types of goals.

More recently, Sambanis and Schulhofer-Wohl (2019) argue for an approach to civil war at a different level of analysis. No longer dyadic and at the level of armed organizations, they advocate for the concept of 'sovereignty rupture' as being the core element of civil war.[12] Sovereignty ruptures, they explain, result from the violent contest between the governing authority and its opponents, which constitute the core feature of civil war. In that sense, civil war no longer solely takes place between specific actors but is a phenomenon that acquires meaning at the level of the political community (Sambanis and Schulhofer-Wohl 2019). Such an approach is useful as it places the inherent political nature of civil war in the center of study: civil war indicates a profound transformation of a given political community and a breakdown of political order and state sovereignty.

Examining civil war as a polity-level phenomenon points to unexplored questions. Instead of asking who fight or why people rebels (e.g., Gurr 1970; Cederman, Weidmann and Gleditsch 2011; Collier, Hoeffler and Rohner 2009), the questions instead become: How does political order break down? How do states and political communities collapse into severe political violence? How is state sovereignty challenged? Which political actor initiate the challenge to state sovereignty? And where does this military challenge emerge? These are the questions that lay at the core of this dissertation, and which are key as to fully understand why civil wars start and how they unfold, it is essential to identify how they begin.

1.3. Dynamic onset and conflict escalation

An emerging framework in the current literature perhaps addresses some of the questions formulated above. Conceptualizing onset as a process, these studies develop more dynamic models of civil war initiation, especially in the form of conflict escalation. Typically, these studies propose a two-stage process: first the emergence of political claims and incompatibilities, and second, the militarization of such claims and the turn to violent armed

[12] Note that there is no strict opposition between the typologies of civil wars and the concept of sovereignty rupture. In that sense, some ruptures of sovereignty can be categorized as ethnic, such as the Lebanese civil war (1975-1990), others as secessionist, such as the conflict in Papua New Guinea (1988-1998), and others as both ethnic and secessionist, such as the Kurd insurgencies in Turkey (1984-2003) and (2005-ongoing). However, because of the differences in the level of analysis, it may require additional caution when categorizing a single instance of sovereign rupture when it includes numerous dyads.

conflict (Bartusevičius and Gleditsch 2019; Cunningham et al. 2017; Germann and Sambanis 2021; Blaxland 2021; Webster 2018).

Disaggregating between cases where an incompatibility exists and those where this incompatibility escalates into armed conflict, these studies find that correlates of large-scale mobilization differ from those of militarization of the political contention. For example, Bartusevičius and Gleditsch (2019) find that group-based horizontal political inequalities are associated with conflict origination, however they have no effect on militarization of the incompatibility, while state capacity and refugee flows are found to only affect militarization if a conflict has already originated. In contrast, Germann and Sambanis (2021) find that political exclusion, while correlated with the escalation of nonviolent claims, is only weakly associated with the emergence of these claims in the first place, whereas recent losses of autonomy trigger both the emergence of claims and the escalation into civil war.

Although these studies usefully identify distinct stages within the process of conflict onset, escalation is often assumed to take on a similar form across cases. In Bartusevičius and Gleditsch (2019), civil wars are assumed to emerge form extra-institutional nonviolent mobilization, typically in the form of demonstrations and protests, strikes, or other acts of defiance. Likewise, although acknowledging that the speed of the sequence varies Cunningham et al. (2017: 470) describe onset as a process that starts with "individuals developing awareness over incompatibilities or motivation over grievances, followed by explicit articulation of claims or demands on state authorities by some organization or group, before we ultimately see large-scale violent or nonviolent action."

Do all contested incompatibilities escalate to armed conflict in the same manner? Are the actors that drive the escalation of conflict the same across cases? And are the actors who engage in conflict origination the ones that contribute to its militarization and escalation? Is the state systematically in the same capacity when facing the escalation of political claims into armed conflict? And do these claims escalate in the same way when they emerge in urban or in rural areas? These are several questions that remain unaddressed so far but are essential if we are to understand civil war onset as a dynamic process.

A glance at case study empirical evidence suggests that not all civil wars result from the same process of mobilization and militarization of non-violent campaigns. For example, the Spanish civil war started with a military coup in northern Morocco —then a Spanish protectorate— in July 1936 by the Nationalist forces, led by General Franco, against the Republican government (Balcells 2010: 293). The coup triggered events in the most of Spain

and quickly, the military split almost evenly (Payne 1963). In contrast, in Somalia in the early 1990s, the country had no clear-cut 'government' and 'opposition' parties, and no disciplined and organised political parties. Instead, there were clan-based political factions owned by their leaders (Elmi and Barise 2006). It is those political factions that mobilized for civil war in 1991. In India, the Kashmir insurgency resulted from a long process of militancy that turned violent when conventional political processes failed. As Staniland (2013) describes, when Delhi became more involved in manipulating politics in the Valley, dissident voices grew in power. Believing the 1987 state elections were rigged, political activists linked to the mobilization campaign of 1987 turned to militancy, and were soon confronted to sustained large-scale Indian counterinsurgency.

In sum, while studies of conflict escalation insightfully conceptualize onset as a dynamic political process and distinguish between different stages within that process, civil war onset often remains dichotomous. That is, either onset occurs in a given year and country or it does not, and when onset does occur, it is assumed to follow a common logic of escalation. However, instead of a universal process of escalation, anecdotal evidence suggest that incompatibilities and their militarization occur through varied dynamics. In fact, as this review has shown, several studies point to substantive heterogeneity in the dynamics of civil war onset. For example, Lewis (2017) distinguishes between armed conflicts that begin like a social movement, with mobilization of large groups of civilians leading to rebel group formation, and those when mobilization occurs after a small core of rebel entrepreneurs form a clandestine group and initiate violence. Pearlman (2021) identifies a pattern of civil war onset which is characterized by large-scale mobilization prior to group formation. Altogether, disaggregating between types of civil war onset would allow to theorize on the role of specific factors and mechanisms at play in categories of cases that share greater causal homogeneity and to ultimately refine our explanations of civil wars.

1.4. Civil war onset in this thesis

How do polities transition from pre-war to wartime? How do societies break down into civil war? How do political incompatibilities turn into armed conflict? And does the way in which civil wars begin shape how armed conflict unfolds? This review of the current literature reveals a central paradox: while most studies of civil war conceptualize onset as a dichotomous event, that is either a civil war start or not, empirical evidence indicates great heterogeneity in how civil wars begin.

A comprehensive framework that accounts for the variation in civil war onset is needed for three complementary reasons. First, a systematic analysis of the variation in civil war onset is essential for descriptive accuracy, which is the foundation to robust theorization on civil wars. Second, it may also refine our understanding of the causes of civil wars as different types of civil war onset may be driven by different factors. Lastly, a systematic description of the variation in civil war onset is needed to examine whether the characteristics of onset shape wartime dynamics. For example, Kalyvas (2005) offers a tentative conjecture linking the form of onset and the mode of warfare in civil war: where coups or insurgencies with high levels of external support should intuitively lead to conventional warfare, most insurgencies should result in irregular warfare, and state collapse should lead to symmetric non-conventional warfare. Likewise, Fearon's (2004) study of civil war duration points to different types of onsets as he finds that civil wars that arise out of coups and popular revolutions or followed the dissolution of the Soviet Union tend to be relatively short, while civil wars that emerge in the countryside in the form of peripheral insurgencies last much longer.

1.4.1. Civil war onset as a heterogenous process of violent political rupture

I define civil war onset as *the breakdown of state sovereignty that results from the initial violent confrontations between domestic armed organizations for the control of political power, either over the whole territory or over parts of it, and that leads to prolonged armed conflict*. Following Sambanis and Schulhofer-Wohl (2019), this rupture of sovereignty occurs at the level of the polity. I depart from and contribute to the current literature insofar as I refer to civil war onset as a distinct and meaningful political phenomenon with variation of its own and conceptualize it as a categorical variable which may take multiple forms. Based on this characterization of onset, this dissertation synthesizes this variation in onset, identifies key patterns in how civil wars begin, and theorizes on their implications for how conflict unfolds.

Although varied, some fundamental characteristics nevertheless distinguish civil war onset for other forms of organized political violence and apply across types of onset, as summarized in Table 2.1. First, civil war onset is the process by which state sovereignty is challenged. Therefore, the concept of onset no longer uniquely refers to the static and somewhat abstract crossing of a given violence threshold. Instead, it captures the interactions between key actors in the initiation of violent political conflict over state control and places the various actor constellations at the center of the analysis. To identify onset is therefore to focus

on who these actors are, in what capacity they stand, and where they initially interact, all of which vary across cases.

Second, the onset of civil war implies relatively high levels of violence. By focusing on violent events, this concept distinguishes civil war onset from relatively more peaceful challenges to political order and state sovereignty. Following Sambanis (2004), the violent interactions between key actors qualify as a civil war onset when they cause at least 500 fatalities in a given year.[13] In this sense, I take a different approach to reconceptualize civil war

Table 2.1. Indicators of civil war onset

Dimension	***Indicator***	***Description***
Timing	Initial interactions between first movers and the incumbent, both of which use violence.	Civil war onset is a process of state authority rupture. Rather than a single moment in time, it is composed of the initial attacks by insurgents and the response by the incumbent. When the government disintegrates, the initial attacks and counter-attacks between armed groups signal the onset of civil war.
Violence	Onset when at least 500 fatalities result from fighting between domestic groups.	Civil war onset is characterized by severe political violence. This indicator excludes low intensity conflicts that represent different types of political violence.
Insurgents	Challengers to state authority are organized groups that use violence.	Civil war onset is a concerted challenge to state authority. This indicator excludes spontaneous and disorganized violence.
Incumbent	One party to the conflict is often the government, but the state in which the armed forces are at the onset of conflict varies substantively.	The government is often one party to the civil war. Although some conflicts are characterized by the disintegration of the state, which then ceases to be an actor to the conflict. The identity of primary parties cannot be systematically assumed across conflicts and must be clearly identified.
Location	The initial acts of violence must take place within the boundaries of a recognized state.	Civil war is a domestic conflict between political organized groups. Although it may become internationalized, the initial challenge to state sovereignty is typically domestic. The location within the state varies.
Support	Insurgents must recruit, at least in part, within domestic populations.	Civil war onset is characterized by the mobilization of local populations and national citizens on all sides. This indicator distinguishes civil wars from interstate wars and international terrorism.

[13] Following Sambanis' criteria, if the conflict does not cause 500 deaths or more in the first year, onset is coded in that year if cumulative deaths in the next three years reach the 1,000-casualty threshold.

onset than Lewis (2017; 2020). While she argues that violence thresholds obscure the actual onset, I argue that we can substantively refine our understanding of civil war onset by disaggregating between the different types of onset, which does not require to abandon such thresholds. Although not mutually exclusive and potentially complementary, they are two different analytical approaches that entail different theorization strategies and empirical analyses.

Third, although the key actors in civil war onset vary across cases, there exist two necessary attributes of insurgents. They must be domestic actors, that is subject to state authority at the onset of hostilities (Kalyvas 2006), hence differentiating civil war onset from the onset of interstate wars. In addition, insurgent groups must have some level of organization (Lewis 2020; Collier and Hoeffler 2004). Fourth, civil war onset represents a military challenge to capture state sovereignty. As a result, in most cases, the incumbent, as official holder of state authority, is a party to the conflict. However, the state in which the incumbent is varies substantively, and in some case, it may cease to be an active participant to the conflict, giving way to fighting over government power between non-state groups. Fifth, civil war onset is a domestic political event, therefore it must be located within the boundaries of a recognized state. But within the state, initial confrontations between key actors may take place in urban or rural areas, in the periphery or at the political center of the state. Lastly, all groups must at least in part recruit from local populations and national citizens, thereby distinguishing civil war onset from interstate wars and international terrorism.

1.4.2. Looking ahead

Conceptualizing civil war onset as a meaningful and varied political phenomenon is essential as the variation in onset indicates different types of political ruptures which are fought by different types of insurgents, opposed to government and armies in different capacities, and in different environments. Describing this variation systematically is key as these differences in how civil wars begin may shape how civil wars are subsequently fought. Insurgents primarily based in the periphery, disposing of limited military capacities, and opposed to stronger governments are likely to choose strategies different than the strategies used by army officers who encourage large-scale defection among military personnel and initiate military conflict in the capital city. Yet, those strategies may also differ from those chosen by protesters who organize into armed groups and militarize following state repression and engage in armed confrontation in urban areas.

Based on extensive empirical evidence from numerous civil wars between 1944 and 2020, the following chapter inductively identifies patterns of civil war onset based on three dimensions: the origin of the first movers, the army status, and the location of the initial interactions between these actors. Having identified four mutually exclusive forms of civil war onset, Chapter 3 then theorizes on the implications of these different types of sovereignty ruptures for conflict dynamics for three key macro-level dynamics: the mode of warfare, conflict intensity, and duration.

Chapter 2

Patterns of civil war onset

Building on the definition of civil war onset introduced in the previous chapter, I propose an original typology of onset on the basis on three dimensions: the identity and origin of the first movers, the status of the armed forces, and the location of the initial interactions between these key actors. If we are to account for how polities transition from peace to war, we must consider the attributes of the key actors that drive such transitions as well as the direct environment in which they take place. In fact, to focus exclusively on the first movers would be a study of rebel group formation (e.g., Braithwaite and Cunningham 2020; Larson and Lewis 2018; Staniland 2012). On the other hand, to focus exclusively on the status of the armed forces would mean to conduct a study of military practices and organization in civil war (e.g., McLauchlin 2010, 2015; Koehler, Ohl and Albrecht 2016).

Therefore, the study of civil war onset, defined as a heterogenous process of violent political rupture, entails considering in tandem the attributes of both categories of key actors to identify actor constellations at the crucial moment of transition from pre-war to wartime. Yet, these interactions do not occur in a vacuum. Instead, they are partly shaped by the direct environment in which they take place, which therefore must be accounted for. In sum, to classify civil war onset is to jointly consider the attributes of both the first movers and state forces and the characteristics of the environment in which they interact. That is, who are the first movers in each armed challenge to state sovereignty? In what capacity are the government'

armed forces when such challenge is initiated, and how do they respond? And where do the initial interactions between these key actors take place?

Based on evidence from numerous civil wars between 1944 and 2020, this chapter inductively identifies the common combination of these dimensions and categorizes civil war onsets in four mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive ideal types: peripheral challenge, state disintegration, coup, and insurrectionary protests. Together, these three dimensions — first movers, army status, and location— allow to grasp the logic of different types of onset, which, as this dissertation argues, represent different sets of initial conditions that affect how conflict unfolds during wartime. In other words, the combination of these key dimensions captures the different actor constellations at the time of onset, as they tell us who fight, in what capacity, and in which direct environment.

Exploiting extensive anecdotal evidence, this chapter discusses each dimension in turn and proceeds in four parts. I begin by introducing the different categories of first movers. Next, I identify the different statuses of the armed forces, varying from loyalty, to split, to collapse. Third, I turn to the environment in which these actors interact, distinguishing between rural and urban, as well as the periphery and center. The last section aggregates these key dimensions and discusses the novel typology of civil war onset.

2.1. First movers in civil war onset

Who are the first movers who initiate a rebellion against state authority? What background do they have, and what do they do prior to mobilizing for rebellion? Are they part of the state apparatus, or do they mobilize outside of it? This is the first set of key questions when disaggregating civil war onsets. First movers are "those individuals willing to undertake high levels of risk in collective action processes whose outcome is uncertain" (Kalyvas 2018: 43). They are the initiators of the political challenge to state sovereignty. Based on systematic comparison across cases of civil war onset and consistent with current literature on the foundations of rebel groups (Braithwaite and Cunningham 2020), I identify two broad categories of first movers: outsiders and insiders to the state apparatus.

2.1.1. Outsiders as first movers

There exist three categories of first movers who are outsiders to the state apparatus: radicalized militants, excluded politicians, and protesters. In each case, these contesters to state sovereignty initiate civil war against the government.

2.1.1.1. Radicalized militants

Perhaps a well-known type of first movers, typically in grievance-based narratives of civil war, can be identified as radicalized militants. The precise content of their political claims or objectives may vary, including nationalist, Marxist, or Islamist. But all have in common that they emerge after a relatively prolonged process of radicalization and militarization of militancy. In Sri Lanka, the late 1960s have been marked by low-level militant mobilization among young Tamils "but the 1970-1973 period was pivotal; that was when insurgency became more than an idle threat. […] The most prominent politicized opposition was the Tamil United Front, which was created when the Federal Party merged with other Tamil parties in 1972. […] Newly politicized social bases also emerged, drawing on preexisting caste and student networks that were now imbued with clear opposition to the political status quo. In 1972, Velupillai Prabhakaran, a Karaiyar from Velvetithurai, founded the Tamil New Tigers in the Jaffna Peninsula, renamed the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in 1976" (Staniland 2014: 148; Mampilly 2011).

These radicalized militants typically emerge out of established political networks of activists. In that sense, they can be described as ideological vanguards. As Bennett (1983: 96) describes, "the TPLF in Ethiopia began its armed struggle in 1975, though prior to this there had been underground cultural and political agitation groups set up in the major towns of Ethiopia, including Addis Ababa. […] It comprised mostly intellectuals discriminated against by the increasing Amhara domination of civil and public sectors. […] In 1975, a small group moved 'to the hills' and declared armed struggles against the central regime." In a similar evolution, in Myanmar, "Communist revolt had already begun under colonial rule in 1946, when a tiny splinter group of the Communist Party of Burma (CDP) took up the gun. The breakaway Red Flag faction argued to give up its collaboration with the AFPFL and instead concentrate on leading and organizing a revolutionary uprising of the working class" (Smith 1999: 68). In Costa Rica, Jose Figeres, who came to play to a central role in the 1948 insurgency had close political contacts in similar movements in other Latin American countries. With the help of a small group of exiles from Nicaragua, Honduras and the Dominican Republic, he trained and equipped his insurgent forces (Høivik and Aas 1981: 336; Olander 1996).

As the demands of these militant movements remain unaddressed or their initial actions are repressed, factions within these movements turn to the use of violence. As Jamal (2008: 6) describes, "the liberation war of Bangladesh in 1971 was a logical conclusion of the Bengali nationalist movement that started soon after the formation of Pakistan in 1947. The movement,

based on the nationalistic aspirations of the Bengalis living in erstwhile East Pakistan, was fueled by the continuous neglect of Bengalis and their interests by the Pakistani rulers." In Burundi in 1990, the arrests of PALIPEHUTU by the state created tensions, "partly out of exasperation, partly because they figured they had no other choice, those activists who remained on the ground turned to the use of force against police and military installations" (Lemarchand 1994: 155-156). In El Salvador, "while peaceful calls for reform from both peasant and urban unions were prominent in the 1960s and 1970s, government forces responded with extraordinary repression. As reformers disappeared, the revolutionary armed groups that would unite to form the FMLN coalesced and gained strength, drawing particularly from church-based peasant organizing (Wood 2003)" (Hoover Green 2017: 693).

In some cases, these first movers can be traced back to youth movements. The 1971 JVP in Sri Lanka, "had been a youth movement, and almost exclusively Sinhalese Buddhist. Its national leadership was closely linked with the many small Marxist parties and factions which have been a characteristic feature of Sri Lankan politics" (Moore 1993: 608). Likewise, in Ethiopia, following internal disagreements, the EPLF split in 1973 from the ELF, which had been founded in 1961 by Eritrean intellectuals and students exiled in Cairo, Egypt (Spears 2010: 48). As Marks (2019: 3; also Abdullah 1998) notes, "the RUF had its political origin in the pan-African student movements of the 1980s and had military origin in Muammar Ghaddafi's guerrilla revolutionary training center in Libya. The leader of the RUF, Foday Sankoh, was selected by a group of two dozen Sierra Leonean trainees at Gaddafi's school in Benghazi, where he developed close ties with Liberia's insurgent entrepreneur, Charles Taylor."

2.1.1.2. Excluded politicians

In other civil wars, first movers and rebel leaders are excluded politicians. As opposed to radicalized militants who are typically outsiders to the state administration from the beginning, excluded politicians have occupied position in former governments or the army but, at the time of onset, have been dismissed from their political role. A well-known case initiated by this type of first movers is the first Liberian civil war. Before launching his rebellion in December 1989 in Liberia's northern Nimba county, Charles Taylor served as an official in the government of President Samuel Doe during the first half of the 1980s, until he was dismissed following accusations of embezzlement and a failed attempts to overthrow Doe in 1985 (Reno 2015).

Similarly, in the various rebellions that occurred in Uganda since 1986, "almost all of the groups' initial leaders included at least one who was a member (often relatively senior official) of a former Ugandan government or military" (Lewis 2020: 74). In Ethiopia, after a delicate relationship between the government and Ogaden nationalists, hardliners were banned from conventional politics and "regrouped and appointed Admiral Mohamed Omar Asman, a retired Somalia marine, as their chairman in 1998" (Abdullahi 2007: 557). Likewise, as Weinstein and Francisco (2005: 163-64) note about first movers in Mozambique, the initial leader of RENAMO was André Matsangaissa, a former military banned from the national army, who gathered the first RENAMO members "from among discontented Mozambicans based in Rhodesia, including a large number of former felchas, members of the colonial army and police service, and former FRELIMO guerrillas."

2.1.1.3. Protesters

The third category of first movers differs from the previous two types of outsiders as whereas radicalized militants and excluded politicians often lead relatively small first groups, protesters emerge out of large-scale mobilization. In other words, while first movers and rebel entrepreneurs can be precisely identified when they are radicalized militants or excluded politicians, protesters are first movers in numbers, and it is out of the mass mobilization against the regime that first groups typically emerge. In addition, the mobilization of protesters also tends to be more spontaneous (Pearlman 2021). Lacher's (2020: 19 and 22) account of the Libyan civil war is telling of these dynamics: "The Libyan revolution erupted as a dramatic chain reaction that was sparked by spontaneous protests and regime violence. Within ten days of the first protest on 15 February, events had reached a revolutionary situation: a state of split sovereignty, with rebels taking over major cities and regions, contesting the Qadhafi regime's claim to legitimacy, and establishing their own leadership. […] The elite figures in and around the NTC quickly lost control over the revolutionary forces as they emerged on the ground. The groups of young revolutionary fighters that formed in Benghazi, al-Bayda and Darna to fight Qadhafi's forces on the eastern front had seized weapons in the initial chaos; they escaped central oversight, and many were deeply suspicious of Younes and other senior army defectors."

In Syria, "there were instances of spontaneous uses of live fire by small groups of protesters from March 2011. […] In June-July 2011, small militias aimed at 'protecting the people' began to emerge in various parts of the country. […] they emerged around small groups

of people within a neighborhood, a mosque, or a village" (della Porta et al. 2018: 59; Mazur 2021: 96). Baczko and colleagues (2017: 94) provide a similar account: "in the summer of 2011, the first armed groups were still marginal. The progressive shift to an armed struggle grew out of local initiatives beginning only in late 2011. The first groups formed spontaneously to protect the marchers and neighborhoods against snipers and regime militias," which Pearlman (2021) describes as 'mobilization from scratch.'

2.1.2. Insiders as first movers

While these three types of first movers were outsiders to the regime when they initiate their challenge to state sovereignty, a second category consists of insiders to the state apparatus. They are either members of the armed forces or members of the political elites at the time of onset and therefore initiate civil war from within.

2.1.2.1. Army personnel

When coup attempts, that is "illegal and overt attempts by the military or other elites within the state apparatus to unseat the sitting executive" (Powell and Thyne 2011: 252), lead to civil war, first movers are typically insiders to the regime, often members of its military. The Spanish civil war (1936-1939) is illustrative. Mobilizing army troops from Spanish Morocco on 17 July 1936 against a legally constituted democratic Republican government, the Nationalist forces, led by General Franco, quickly took control of Seville and other areas in the south in a military coup. The insurgents' aim was to secure power throughout mainland Spain and its protectorates with a rapid takeover (Balcells 2010: 293; Matthews 2010: 344). Instead, groups mobilized in larger cities in the center and north of the country and a civil war ensued, opposing armed groups along the left-right cleavage, pitting the Nationalist rebels commanded by General Franco against the Republican forces, formed by army officers who remained loyal to the Republic, as well as left-wing militias (Villamil 2021: 5).

As for the previous types of first movers, their political objectives matter less than their origin from within the armed forces. When they have separatist goals, army personnel may initiate formal secessions such as the Biafran War in Nigeria between 1967 and 1970 during which the secessionist forces of Biafra, led by General Ojukwu, comprised a large part of the former Nigerian officer corps (Heerten and Moses 2014: 173). Likewise, "on 26 September 1962, only one week after the death of Imam Ahmad, a group of Yemeni military officers overthrew Ahmad's son Imam Muhammad al-Badr and declared the establishment of the

Yemen Arab Republic (YAR). The Imam's supporters amongst northern Yemeni tribes staged a counterrevolution against the newly formed Yemeni republic" (Orkaby 2017: 72; Clausen 2018).

These first movers need not necessarily be acting in isolation. In some cases, they also coordinate with groups outside of the state apparatus. In Ivory Coast, in mid-September 2002, troops, many of whom originated from the north of the country, mutinied against the regime, in coordination with MPCI leader Guillaume Soro, in what Förster (2015: 206) calls a 'military insurgency.' Not long before that, in Sierra Leone, following a military coup in May 1997, "Kabbah was displaced to Guinea. The mutinous army – calling itself the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) – combined forces, firepower, and command structures with the RUF under the banner 'People's Army.' […] In exile, Kabbah recruited foreign mining firms and British mercenary to arm and forcibly reinstall his civilian government in exchange for mining revenues and concessions" (Marks 2019: 7).

Lastly, in some instances, the challenge posed by army personnel differs from coups and is better described as mutinies. As (Dwyer and Tansey 2020: 865) describe, "mutinies tend to be carried out by rank-and-file soldiers, whereas coups are more commonly initiated from within the officers' corps and while mutinies are directed against the military leadership, coups target the political leadership of the country." In some cases, although rare, mutineers trigger civil war. Then, the dynamics at play differ from coup attempts. In Indonesia, the key initiators of the Ambon revolt, which was aimed at establishing an independent Republic of the South Moluccas, were demobilized soldiers from the Dutch colonial army allied with local leaders. Soon, the Ambon garrison became the meeting place for discontented soldiers returning from Java (Chauvel 1990: 48). The recent conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo is also illustrative. In March 2012, a mutiny erupted including a few hundred soldiers in the eastern Kivu province, who opposed their integration into the Congolese army, accusing the government of not abiding by the March 2009 peace treaty that had been signed between the government and the CNDP —National Congress for the Defence of the People (Stearns 2014). The conflict soon escalated into civil war between M23 rebels and the Congolese armed forces.

2.1.2.2. Political elites and private militias

Lastly, some first movers are neither outsiders to the state apparatus nor do they emerge from the state's armed forces. Instead, they are leaders of private militias. In some cases, these militias are formed and led by politicians and members of government coalitions. In those

cases, as tensions escalate, political elites form militias that act as private armies. Khalaf's (2002: 106) account of the start of the 1958 Lebanese civil war is illustrative of these dynamics: "Political order broke down; authority at the center disintegrated; leaders normally reticent about violent politics became progressively more involved in it. As in earlier episodes of communal conflict, a bewildering plurality of factions, driven by shifting allegiances and motives, were entrapped in an escalating spiral of hostility."

Similar dynamics can be observed in numerous civil wars. In Tajikistan in 1992, "elites on both sides activated their networks and at the village level their connections mobilized people in a very organized way" (Tunçer-Kilavuz 2011: 268). In Congo, following the contested May 1993 elections, "the three leading politicians had formed private militias to control access to various quarters of Brazzaville. […] By mid-1993 each of the country's politicians had deployed private militias in the neighborhoods where their respective ethno-regional constituents predominated" (Clark 1998: 31-32; Bazenguissa-Ganga 1999). More recently, in Ivory Coast in 2011, when Laurent Gbagbo refused to step down and violent clashes erupted between pro-Gbagbo and pro-Ouattara militias (Piccolino 2018; Human Rights Watch 2011).

In other cases, these political elites are less closely linked to government coalition. Instead, there are political leaders who activate local networks of supporters. For example, at the onset of the post-Barre civil war, following the collapse of the Somalian state in 1991, the country had no clear-cut 'government' or 'opposition' parties and no organized political parties. Instead, political networks clan-based political factions that were owned by their leaders" (Elmi and Barise 2006). Likewise, in Afghanistan in 1992, after the resignation of Mohammad Najibullah, local political elites and their respective militias mobilized to capture political power, mostly based on clan identity and within their respective ethnic spaces (Christia 2012; Staniland 2014; Sinno 2008).

As opposed to radicalized militants, this category of first movers mobilizes the political networks relatively quickly. As Pearce (2015: 23) describes about the onset of the Angolan civil war: "If older people in the Central Highlands remember the second half of 1975 as a period of turmoil, they also remember a time barely a year earlier when the political movements competed peacefully for popular support. But that period too was brief. Some could remember a time before the nationalist movements were present at all. Villagers talked of how 'the movements arrived in 1974, and recalled no kind of political mobilization in the countryside before that. Many town dwellers had become familiar with nationalist ideas and had known of

the existence of nationalist movements during the 1960s, but they did not recall any systematic political organization in the region before 1974."

They are typically able to mobilize quickly because they utilize existing political bases of support often following a triggering event. In that sense, they do not need to build their base of support to an extent similar to some of the other types of first movers. In Afghanistan, private militias mobilized after the resignation of Najubullah, the last Communist leader of Afghanistan. In Angola, "it was only after the Portuguese coup d'état in April 1974 that either movement was able to mobilize" (Pearce 2012: 444). Likewise in Burundi, the mobilization of militias was triggered by the attempted coup and assassination of President Melchior Ndadaye in October 1993 (Watt 2008: 47). In the Balkans, it was the dissolution of Yugoslavia that gave rise to ethno-nationalist claims led by political entrepreneurs, as in Bosnia in 1991 or in Croatia the following year. In Georgia, leaders in Georgian, Abkhazian, and South Ossetian societies mobilized after the collapse of the Soviet Union to advance their political goals (Chankvetadze and Murusidze 2021; Sammut and Cvetkovski 1996).

2.2. The state and its army in civil war onset

Having identified the different categories of first movers, I turn to the other key actor in civil war onset: the state and its armed forces. Following the initiation of the armed challenge by first movers, how does the state respond? And what is the status of the armed forces when political conflict becomes violent? What effect does the violent challenge to state sovereignty have on the integrity of the government forces? Do they coalesce against the domestic military threat and remain loyal to the sitting government? Or do they disunite and potentially defect and join first movers? Based on anecdotal evidence from numerous civil wars, this section illustrates the three typical army statuses when state sovereignty is challenged by first movers: loyalty, split, and collapse.

2.2.1. Loyalty

Military cohesion has been found to be a key determinants of regime survival (Albrecht and Ohl 2016; Roessler 2011; McLauchlin 2010). Following Albrecht and Ohl (2016), loyalty refers to instances in which the military uses force to defend to regime in the face of a violent challenge to its sovereignty. Then, the state deploys its army in counterinsurgency to repress armed contenders (Kilcullen 2010; Rid and Keaney 2010; Hazelton 2017; Downes 2007). Although the army remains loyal, it does not entail that violence is contained. Well-known

counterinsurgency campaigns include the cases of Vietnam, El Salvador, or Indonesia. In Burundi, the army was sent to repress the Hutu insurgencies in 1972 and 1988. The repression that followed was vastly indiscriminate, sending thousands of refugees to Rwanda (Ngaruko and Nkurunziza 2000; Reyntjens 1994). In Pakistan in the 1970s, the "general pattern of repression consisted of the destruction and burning of villages on a colossal scale, indiscriminate killing and raping of civilians, and sorting out and murdering Hindus, university teachers and students, lawyers, doctors, Awami League leaders and supporters, Bengali military and police officers" (Nanda 1979: 73-74).

At times, the deployment of the military is delayed as the initial response by the government is to neglect the military threat caused by the nascent armed conflict, which often allows insurgents to grow their forces and expand their bases of support. With the growth of the Shining Path in the 1980s, "the Peruvian government was forced into a reactive response, in part because it did not take Sendero seriously for some time, a fact that often enabled the insurgents to continue to choose the time and place of their actions" (Palmer 1992: 2). It typically emphasized military strategies, frequently using excessive and sometimes indiscriminate violence, which harmed the civilian population it was charged with protecting as much or more than it affected Shining Path and contributed to an expansion of violence (Palmer 1992; Fumerton 2003).

Similarly, in Aceh, the Indonesian government initially responded to the attacks on its forces in a low-key manner. However, President Suharto later ordered 6,000 additional troops to Aceh, including special counterinsurgency units, and by the end of 1991, many of GAM's field commanders had been captured or killed, but the government's brutality produced a deep-seated antipathy toward Jakarta (Ross 2005). In Turkey, the political authorities initially did not take the PKK —the Kurdistan Workers' Party— threat seriously and described the group as a 'bunch of bandits,' and therefore the government's response to the PKK came mainly from the military (Pusane 2015: 728).

2.2.2. Collapse

At the other end of the spectrum of army status at the time onset are instances of collapse. In those cases, the army ceases to be a primary actor and the mobilization of first movers and their first groups is closely linked to the dissolution of the state and its armies. Yet armed forces dissolve in various ways. In some cases, the army completely dissolves, and former military personnel join the various militias. In Afghanistan, following the collapse of the Soviet regime

in 1992, former elements of the armed forces recoalesced into a series of militia groups, joined sides with the mujahideen, or fled into exile (Staniland 2014). In the Central African Republic, less than a year after taking power, Seleka leader Michel Djotodia disbanded its armed forces, already dispersed and diverse, which then regrouped into local militias (Lombard 2016). In Bosnia, the various militia armies were in part composed of former career officers of the Yugoslav' People Army who had defected to their ethnic groups (Kalyvas and Sambanis 2005; Donia and Fine 1994).

In other instances, the army remains inactive and a bystander of the violence between armed groups at first, thereby also failing to serve its primary function. At the start of the Lebanese civil war in 1975, the army remained inactive, "refusing to commit the troops to a security role, for committing the army to action, with its largely Christian officer corps, could have provoked new encounters" (Abraham 1996: 3). Khalidi (1979: 67) notes that the army had come to "accept its political unreliability and cautioned against its use in a security role." And in January 1976, it eventually disintegrated and split four ways: "One section constituted itself the Arab Army of Lebanon. Another joined the right-wing Christian militias. A third, comprising perhaps the bulk of the officers, remained, at least until the autumn of 1976, 'neutral'. A fourth section went home. Each taking with it equipment that went "almost equally" to the first third sections" (Khalidi 1979: 68). In Azerbaijan, "poorly equipped and trained, the Azeri army seems unable to settle on a unified strategy that could reverse these losses. Furthermore, Azeri youths have not flocked in large numbers to join the army because, not surprisingly, ethnic and clan considerations dominated their behaviors. […] In fact, Azeri soldiers often flee with refugees, leaving weapons intact to advancing Armenian forces" (Kechichian and Karasik 1995: 62). Likewise in Iraq, "the invasion and the subsequent radical program of political transformation carried out by the United States (with highly inadequate means) destroyed Iraq's only remaining multiethnic and national institutions: the bureaucracy, the army, and the Ba'ath Party. The collapse of the Ba'athist government left a vacuum that has yet to be filled" (Kalyvas and Kocher 2007: 214).

In sum, while in some cases, the army is loyal to the sitting government and the military uses force to defend to regime in the face of a violent challenge to its sovereignty, other civil wars are characterized by the collapse of the armed forces, which therefore cease to perform their role as loyal agent to the state. In between these two army statuses are instances of splits during which a part of the armed forces defect while the other remains loyal to the government.

2.2.3. Split

Army split refers to instances of defection when government soldiers, instead of fighting for the regime, desert, or fight for the opposition (McLauchlin 2010). They differ both from army loyalty, when the armed forces remain disciplined and under the control of the regime, and from army collapse, when the entire armed force dissolves to the various opposition groups or remains inactive. Instead, army split leads to a division of the army in two parts: one part remaining loyal to the government, and the other part actively fighting against it. At the onset of civil war, these splits vary in forms and dynamics.

First, some army-splits are led by first movers inside the military, typically during a coup d'état (Roessler 2011). At the onset of the Spanish civil war in 1936, the coup led by General Franco triggered events in the rest of Spain and quickly the military split almost evenly (Payne 1963). Likewise, in Ivory Coast, the failed coup in 2002 against President Laurent Gbagbo split the country in two halves, each under the control of either one warring party (Förster 2015: 203). In Guinea-Bissau, when on June 6, 1998, President Viera dismissed armed forces chief-of-staff Ansumane Mané, accusing his of supporting the separatists in Casamance, Senegal, Mané mobilized against the regime the 6,000 soldier-strong troops previously under his command, while his rebellion was widely supported by war veterans and young volunteers, particularly from the rural areas (Embaló 2012: 265).

In other instances, the army split may take the form of formal secession. In Nigeria, "amidst rampant fears among the Igbos in particular, the Eastern Region began to call for more autonomy. Ever since the end of colonialism had become imaginable, the leaderships of all regions had at times pondered secession. Now, after failed negotiations, this dramatic step was finally taken. On 30 May 1967, the east's political leadership around Ojukwu declared its independence as the Republic of Biafra, named after the Bight of Biafra, a bay on the country's Atlantic coast. Hostilities erupted a few weeks later" (Heerten and Moses 2014: 173). Likewise, in Yemen in 1994, "the fighting quickly escalated into full-scale warfare between the armies of the North and South" (Day 2010: 5).

Lastly, some army splits result from the refusal to obey government's orders. In those cases, army split often leads to defection to the rebel side. In Homs, Syria, the first armed groups initially formed to protect marchers swelled with defectors from the army who had come to offer protection (Baczko et al. 2017: 94). As they describe, "when members of the security forces opened fire on a funeral procession, the protesters looted a police station, armed themselves and were quickly joined by deserters from the nearby military unit. The army

responded with a sweep operation that provoked many more desertions" (Baczko et al. 2017: 95-96). However, although suffering from defection, the Syrian regime remained strong militarily and most of its armed forces willing to stand by the president (Landis 2012). Nevertheless, it is the waves of military defections to the protesters that encouraged the formation of armed groups and the intensification of violence (Mazur 2021: 95).

Likewise, in Ukraine, when sent to repress protesters, "many of the government forces were initially reluctant to follow the orders to use force against the separatists. [In fact,] the local police and security forces either refused to offer armed resistance to the separatist forces and the Strelkov Russian unit or sided with them in various degrees" (Katchanovski 2016: 479). During the Iranian revolution, "defection became widespread, not only because of the appeal of the ideals of the Revolution but also because it had an apparent chance of victory. […] The revolutionaries also made desertion quite easy for soldiers, providing them with civilian clothing and travel money to return to their families. By the winter of 1978, desertions had apparently reached 1,000 per day" (McLauchlin 2010: 344).

2.3. Location of civil war onset

The last key dimension of onset refers to the location of the interactions between the key actors engaged in civil war. To fully capture the dynamics of civil war onset is to simultaneously describe both the actors at play and the environment in which they interact. Where do these interactions between first movers and the state forces take place? Are violent challenges to state authority launched in the periphery of the state? Or do they instead occur at the political center of the state? Do the key actors interact in urban areas? Or do they mostly confront each other in rural regions? Having characterized the key actors in onset, this last dimension describes the direct environment in which they interact.

2.3.1. Periphery versus center

Resulting for state capacity arguments, civil wars are often assumed to take place in the periphery, where state presence is low and policing is difficult, as opposed to centers of government control (e.g., Fearon and Laitin 2003; Brustein and Levi 1987). The focus on the periphery also results from grievance-based arguments stressing the role of spatial, horizontal, and land inequality, which tend to be especially salient in rural areas (Murshed and Gates 2005; Albertus and Kaplan 2013; Nieto-Matiz 2019). The periphery need not necessarily refer to the frontier regions of the state. Instead, it describes areas away from center of government

presence and control, which allows for greater insurgent mobilization and control (Toft 2003). Numerous accounts of civil war describe the peripheral origin and dynamics of conflict. In Greece, the KKE (Communist Party of Greece) insurgents established their forces and bases of support in mountainous terrains in central Greece (Kalyvas 2015), in Iran, the Kurdish insurgents initiated conflict in Sanandaj in the western part of country (Degenhardt 1988: 168), and in El Salvador, the FSLN — Sandinista National Liberation Front— rebels were primarily active in the northern and eastern highlands of El Salvador (Wickham-Crowley 2015).

In some cases, the periphery does refer to the frontier region. In those cases, first movers typically launch their military challenge from a territory close to a border. In Djibouti, government repression provided hundreds of people with added reasons for joining the FRUD — Front for the Restoration of Unity and Democracy— which was created at Bahlo in northern Djibouti near the Ethiopian frontier (Kadamy 1996). Some first movers even initiate their military struggle from across state borders. On Christmas Eve 1989, Taylor and just over 100 NPLF rebels crossed the Ivorian border and attacked the town of Butou in Liberia's northern Nimba county (Hoffman 2011: 29; also Adebajo 2002). Likewise, it was a cross-border attack by RUF fighters into the Kailahun district that signaled the onset of the Sierra Leone civil war (Hoffman 2011: 32-33; Marks 2019: 3). In 1963, exiled Tutsis entered Rwanda from Burundi, rallied Tutsis living in Rwanda and advanced toward Kigali before they were stopped by the government forces (Kadamy 1996). Almost thirty years later, in October 1990, RPF insurgents once again led an armed incursion, this time from northern Uganda (Straus 2015: 293).

In contrast, as opposed to the periphery, some civil wars begin in the political center of the state, including the capital city. In Afghanistan, following the collapse of the Communist regime in 1992, fighting erupted in Kabul and surrounding areas, then later spread to the rest of the country (Christia 2012; Goodson 2001). Likewise, in Chad, when the power sharing agreement between factions broke down in March 1979 as forces started fighting in the capital, N'Djamena, first between the forces of Habre and Malloum, and later between the forces of Habre and Goukouni (Nolutshungu 1996). During the 1990s in Congo, "as new elections approached in 1997, political rivalries once again led to fighting between rival party militias, this time leading to very heavy fighting and pitched battles in Brazzaville which ended only with the military victory of former President Sassou-Nguesso in October 1997" (Bazenguissa-Ganga 1999: 38). Similarly, the second Lebanese civil war started in Beirut, the capital city and the first year of fighting seems to have been centred around the capital, with the exception of Tripoli in the north and Damour and Jiye south of the capital (Abraham 1996; Khalidi 1979).

2.3.2. Rural versus urban

A second distinction opposes rural and urban settings, which are present in many accounts of civil wars. This second distinction often overlaps with the periphery-center dimension: the periphery is often rural, while the political center is typically urban. However, they do not necessarily need to. For example, there could exist urban areas in the periphery that are neglected by the political elites such as former economic or industrial hubs that are no longer vital for the state's development.

In Sri Lanka, "the JVP of 1971 was largely a rural movement, especially in the sense that it was only in rural areas that it managed to organize sufficient force to control territory and populations for a few days or weeks" (Moore 1993: 600). In Nepal, Pettigrew (2013: 13) identifies about the insurgents' activities that "in an inversion of the usual direction of political action – protest movements in Nepal are primarily urban based – most of their actions were rural based and initiated from the countryside." In India, the Naxalite insurgents in India had by the early 1980s, "established a stronghold and sanctuary in the interlinked North Telangana village and Dandakaranya forests areas along the Adhra Pradesh and Orissa border" in eastern India (Lynch 2016: 11). In Nicaragua in 1982, "with a force of only a few hundred armed men, insurgents began fighting out of bases in the Costa Rican jungle near the San Juan River (Dickey 1983: 671-72). Although primarily rural, these areas also include small towns. The Sendero Luminoso first emerged in a small and isolated department capital (Palmer 1992) and in Argentina, the Montoneros insurgents were also active in provincial towns (Pozzi 2015). Likewise, the Huk rebellion was "based primarily in rural areas of central and, to a lesser extent, southern Luzon, the largest and most heavily populated island in the Philippine archipelago" (Goodwin 1997: 57).

In contrast, other civil wars start at in urban areas. While relatively understudied compared to the rural dimension of civil war, the urban dimension is central to several well-known conflicts. In Colombia, following two years of violent politics between the Conservatives and the Liberals, violence turned into civil war in April 1948 in Bogota and Cali, following the assassination of Jorge Eliécer Gaitán, Liberal party leader, and sparked subsequent violence across the country (Steele 2017; Bailey 1967; Gott 1970). In Somalia, most of the initial fighting in 1991 took place in Mogadishu and urban centers in the north, including Hargeysa and Burao (Metz 1993). Likewise, in 2004, fighting between Sunni and Shiite militias started in Baghdad and other large urban centers (Fearon 2007), or more

recently, in Syria, initial demonstrations took place in Daraa, a city in southwestern Syria, and quickly spread to other towns and cities across the country (Laub 2021).

2.4. A typology of civil war onset

Based on extensive anecdotal evidence, I mobilize this analytical framework and systematic classify cases of civil war onsets along the three dimensions —first movers, army status, and location. Proceeding inductively, the analysis reveals clear patterns in conflict onsets. In fact, radicalized activists and excluded politicians typically initiate their armed challenge in the rural periphery, while protesters tend to mobilize in urban areas, that is large urban centers. Private militias mobilize when the armed forces collapse, typically in urban areas, whereas radicalized activists typically face a military that is mostly loyal to the regime. Lastly, army personnel typically initiate in the capital city, where the government resides. Appendix 2 provides a description of each case of civil war onset between 1944 and 2020, which were further corroborated by an extensive expert survey.[14]

Specifically, the combination of the three dimensions points to four recurring empirical patterns that represent ideal typical processes of civil war onset, as summarized in Table 3.1. The first pattern refers to *peripheral challenges*, which can be associated with the classic model of insurgency (Muller and Seligson 1987; Fearon and Laitin 2003; Staniland 2012; Lewis 2020). In peripheral challenges, first movers are radicalized militants or excluded politicians, and in some rare instances army mutineers, initiate their military struggle in the periphery, often in rural areas, and face mostly loyal and cohesive government forces. It should be noted however that although the army is loyal, it may be weak and poorly trained, but it does not suffer from substantive split or defection to the rebel side.

The Kashmir insurgency (1989-ongoing) provides a clear illustration of this process of civil war onset. The outbreak of conflict in the Kashmir region in northern India resulted from a long process of militancy that turned violent when conventional political processes failed (Ganguly 1996). As Staniland describes (2013: 934), when "Delhi became more involved in manipulating politics in the Valley, dissident voices grew in power and contested the 1987 state elections under the banner of the Muslim United Front. Believing these elections were rigged

[14] To ascertain the validity of my coding, I contacted 52 experts of 110 conflicts in 47 countries between February and March 2022. I received responses from 41 experts who provided useful information on a total of 87 conflicts in 38 countries. These experts were provided with stylized descriptions of the dynamics of onset, usually three to four sentences, that highlighted the three key dimensions of the typology of civil war: who the first movers are, in what capacity are the state forces, and where the initial interactions take place.

Table 3.1. A typology of civil war onset

Onset types	*Onset characteristics*			*Logic of onset*
	First movers	**State/armed forces**	**Location**	
Peripheral challenge	Radicalized militants/ Excluded politicians/ Mutineers	Mostly loyal	Periphery (often rural)	Based in the rural periphery of the state, radicalized militants, excluded politicians, or mutineers launch an armed challenge against the state to capture political power. Often with limited recruits and means, they typically face mostly loyal and cohesive armed forces.
State disintegration	Local militias/ Private militias	Collapse	Urban (either in the capital city or in other large urban centers)	Private militias, benefitting from the collapse of the state and of its armed forces, mobilize against one another, in an attempt to capture political power. Given the disintegration of the state, they fight one another at the political center of the state in urban areas and fighting spreads outward across the territory.
Coup	Army personnel	Split	Center/ urban	Coup plotters, typically military officers, initiate violence against the state from inside its apparatus, in an attempt to seize political power. As the army splits in two, rebels often initiate their armed struggle at the political center of the state.
Insurrectionary protests	Protesters	Split	Urban (often in urban centers, sometimes in the capital)	Anti-regime protesters mobilize in the urban periphery. Often initially non-violent, they take up arms in response to repression by state forces, which suffers from defection to the newly formed rebel groups that organize and coordinate their military challenge against the state.

to maintain NC [National Conference] and Indian National Congress Party control, political activists linked to the mobilization campaigns of 1987 turned to militancy. With important material backing from Pakistan, they launched an insurgency that directly challenged Indian control." The onset of insurgency was quickly met with sustained large-scale Indian counterinsurgency in the region (Staniland 2013).

A second ideal type refers to cases of *state disintegration* and points to the initiation of civil war by private militias who confront each other when government forces collapse, typically in urban areas, either in the capital or in other large cities. As opposed to rural insurgencies, this pattern can be associated with so-called new wars (Kaldor 1999; 2005). In those cases, the state is often no longer able to perform basic functions (Zartman 1995; Rotberg 2004), the army ceases to be an active party in the conflict as it collapses, and factions join the various militias giving way to fighting between diverse militias, often initially in urban areas, including the capital city.

The onset of the first Lebanese civil war in 1958 is illustrative of the dynamics of state disintegration. As Khalaf (2002: 106) concisely describes, at the onset of the war, "political order broke down; authority at the center disintegrated; leaders normally reticent about violent politics became progressively more involved in it. As in earlier episodes of communal conflict, a bewildering plurality of factions, driven by shifting allegiances and motives, were entrapped in an escalating spiral of hostility. Predominantly nonsectarian, involving issues of presidential succession, constitutional amendments, foreign policy, political grievances, and the like, the crisis degenerated willy-nilly into a confessional hostility; thereby reawakening religious enmity and heightening the intensity of violence."

The third ideal type of onset refers to conflicts initiated by military personnel, who trigger a split within the armed forces, and engage in fighting at the political center of the state, typically in urban areas, often the capital city. This pattern refers to *coups* that transform into civil wars. In those cases, the army typically splits in two: on the one hand, forces that remain loyal, and on the other, those that rebel against the incumbent. The civil war in Guinea-Bissau (1998-1999) provides a clear example. On June 6, 1998, when President Viera fired the armed chief-of-staff Anusmane Mane, accusing him of supporting the Casamance rebels in Senegal, fighting broke out in the capital Bissau, as large parts of the army joined the rebels led by Mane against the government. In response, troops from Senegal and Guinea entered the conflict to support the president (Embaló 2012; Parker et al. 2000; Sambanis 2004).

The last ideal type of civil war onset refers to dynamics that take place in urban areas, often in cities other than the capital but sometimes in the capital itself, initiated by protesters who mobilize against the regime and militarize in response to state repression. The government's order to repress often triggers some defection among armed forces, which further empowers armed protesters. These dynamics can be described as *insurrectionary protests*. The Syrian uprising of 2011 is illustrative of such a process of civil war onset.

Through the beginning of 2011, initial demonstrations remained until mid-March 2011, when "a group of families, protesting the detention of their children in the small city of Daraa, was fired upon by security forces" (Mazur 2021: 95). The incident intensified protests in Daraa and soon demonstrations spread to locales across Syria, and within a few weeks, several cities were the scene of near-daily demonstrations. In response, "the security forces brutally prevented protesters from occupying the squares, using live fire on nonviolent crowds and killings tens or hundreds in each case" (Mazur 2021: 95). At that time, some protesters began carrying small weapons to demonstrations in cities like Daraa and Homs, and while they initially intended to protect protesters from state violence, this militarization provoked disproportionate response by the regime forces (Mazur 2021: 96; della Porta et al. 2018: 59). Altogether, these dynamics of militarization and escalation characterized the onset of the civil war.

In sum, the combination of the dimensions of onset — first movers, army status, and location— point to four ideal typical patterns of civil war onset. While I identify these recurring patterns inductively, they are not necessarily logically exhaustive. Other combinations can therefore theoretically exist; however, these represent exceptions rather than the norm. Overall, the four ideal types of civil war onset closely correspond to 164 conflicts between 1944 and 2020, as described in Appendix 2.[15] The remaining 30 cases of onset slightly diverge from these ideal types on one dimension. For instance, in some rare cases, radicalized militants initiate their military challenge against loyal government forces in the political center of the state, instead of the periphery, such as the Montoneros in Argentina in 1975. In other cases, army personnel initiate their coup attempt in the periphery of the state as opposed to the capital, such as the Biafran War in Nigeria (1967-1970).

These particular cases can nevertheless each be associated with one of the four ideal types. For example, the dynamics of conflict onset in Argentina in 1975 are closest to a

[15] Among the 194 cases of civil war onset between 1944 and 2020, 124 cases closely fit the pattern of peripheral challenge, 21 fit the pattern of state disintegration, 12 fit the pattern of coup, and 7 fit the pattern of insurrectionary protests. The remaining cases slightly diverge from these ideal types, as described in Appendix 2.

peripheral challenge, and those of the Biafran war are closest to a coup. As a result, the descriptive analysis of civil war onset provides four mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive analytical categories, which minimize the variation between cases within categories, while maximizing the variation across these categories (Collier and Collier 1991; Collier, Laporte and Seawright 2012). Having identified ideal types of civil war onset, the following chapter theorizes on the links between these differences in conflict onset and the differences in several wartime dynamics. That is, does the form of onset matter? What are the implications of onset for the conduct of war? And do civil wars unfold in patterned ways given how they begin?

Chapter 3

From onset to wartime dynamics in civil wars

As outlined in the previous chapter, civil war onset comes in four mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive categories: peripheral challenge, state disintegration, coup, and insurrectionary protests. Based on extensive anecdotal evidence from numerous civil wars between 1944 and 2020, I showed that these different processes of civil war onset were characterized by differences in the identity of first movers, the army status, and the location of the initial interactions between these key actors. Building on this novel typology of civil war onset, this chapter asks whether the variation in onset matters for conflict dynamics. What are the implications of onset for the conduct of war? Do civil wars unfold in patterned ways given how they begin? Addressing these questions, I theorize on three key macro-level wartime dynamics: warfare, severity, and duration. In doing so, this chapter provides a novel theory of civil war trajectories that originate in the form of civil war onset.

3.1. Theorizing the link between civil war onset and wartime dynamics

Theorizing in this chapter proceeds from a twofold starting point. First, it assumes that a civil war has started in a given country and that military conflict will follow. In other words, I do not theorize on why civil wars start. Instead, given that a civil war has begun, I examine how it begins and hypothesize on how it is likely to subsequently unfold. In that perspective, onset

is the key moment in domestic political competition that signals the transition from pre-war to wartime and shapes the trajectory of conflict.

Recently, scholars have argued for a processual understanding of civil wars from pre-war to wartime to post-war, in which conflict dynamics are the result of the evolving interactions between multiple actors including numerous nonstate groups, state forces, civilians, and external actors (Shesterinina 2022). The theory of civil war trajectories in this chapter is compatible with such an understanding of conflict, but focuses on a specific sequence within the overarching process of civil war. Zooming in on the features of conflict onset, the transition into wartime can be split into two steps: first, pre-war to onset, and then onset to wartime. Based on this distinction, this chapter assumes for now that the first step has occurred and examines the link between onset and wartime dynamics.[16] In sum, the logic in this chapter goes as follows: given that a conflict has begun, does the manner in which it starts —that is who the first movers are, what the status of the armed forces is, and where the initial interactions between these actors take place— shape how the conflict is likely to unfold?

The second key assumption is that civil wars are path-dependent political processes. There exists ample empirical evidence that point to such nature of civil wars. In his social-institutional theory of insurgent organizations, Staniland (2014) finds that armed organizations are built out of pre-existing networks and that these "initial organizational starting points determine the most likely pathways of insurgent change over time" (Staniland 2014: 10). In a different study of insurgent organizations, Weinstein (2006) finds that the variation in the initial conditions that leaders confront shape how they are likely to behave during wartime. Rebel groups that emerge in resource-rich environments —that is, rich in natural resources or benefiting from the support of external patrons— tend to commit high levels of violence, while groups that arise in resource-poor environments use violence more selectively. Similarly, Blaxland (2021) shows that choices made by proto-insurgents before the escalation to large-scale conflict affects how long conflict will last, and Heinkelmann-Wild and Mehrl (2022) find that the type of connection between rebel groups and their foreign sponsors is set at conflict onset and does not change over time.

As most claims about path dependence, this thesis rests on the fundamental assumption that "beginnings are extremely important" (Pierson 2004: 11). Considered broadly, it implies

[16] The first step in the sequence refers to the well-studied question of *why* civil wars start. The second part in the sequence refers to the questions of *how* civil wars start and how do the features of onset shape conflict dynamics. This chapter theorizes the latter, while the first step, pre-war to onset, is discussed in Chapter 4 of this dissertation through the replication of several landmark studies of civil war onset.

that what happened at an earlier point in time will affect the possible outcomes at a later point (Sewell 1996). Numerous studies that rely on path dependence show that enduring consequences stem from the emergence of particular institutional arrangements (Somers 1998; Collier and Collier 1991; Mahoney 2001; Pierson 2004). These key moments are often referred to as critical junctures (Mahoney 2000; Collier and Collier 1991). Similarly, this chapter argues that civil war onset is a key moment of transition in political competition. Furthermore, the types of onset indicate different actor constellations as the variation in the types of onset points to different types of armed actors, who dispose of different capacities, and interact in different environments. This will in turn affect how conflict unfolds during wartime.

Although conflict does not begin with the onset of civil war and actors exist in some forms prior to the onset of armed conflict (Staniland 2014; Lewis 2020), the outbreak of large-scale violence does represent a rupture from pre-war dynamics. In that sense, when first movers favor the option of armed competition and the state forces initially respond such the challenge to its sovereignty, political competition becomes a military contest between organized armed groups. As this thesis argues, the specific features of the transition into civil war —the identify and origin of first movers, the army status, and the location of their initial interactions— set conflicts onto distinct wartime trajectories.

Table 4.1. Hypotheses on macro-level wartime dynamics

Onset types	*Wartime dynamics*		
	Warfare	**Severity**[17]	**Duration**
Peripheral challenge	Irregular	Low	Long
State disintegration	Symmetric non-conventional	High	Long
Coup	Conventional	High	Short
Insurrectionary protests	Symmetric non-conventional	Low	Short

[17] These predictions are relative to other types of onset. In all cases, civil war causes important human suffering, and I expect violence to be at least so violent that it meets the violence threshold and qualifies as a civil war.

The remainder of this chapter theorizes on conflict trajectories for each type of onset, focusing on three key macro-level wartime dynamics: warfare, severity, and duration.[18] The following sections formulate hypotheses about each conflict dynamic in turn, as summarized in Table 4.1.

3.2. Civil war onset and the modes of warfare

Does the type of onset shape the mode of warfare during wartime? That is, are civil wars that begin in different ways fought differently? I expect that the type of onset affects how civil wars are fought as the identity of first movers, army status, and the location of the initial fighting condition the initial resources available to both insurgents and incumbents. As Weinstein (2006: 7) points out, "fighting an insurgency involves building an organization capable of challenging a government militarily. Many barriers to the organization of insurgency exist. Potential rebels must raise capital to finance the logistics of a military campaign, recruit foot soldiers willing to risk their lives in battle against a stronger government force, and generate support from civilians who can supply food, information about the location and strategies of government forces, and valuable labor in support of the movement." Yet, I argue, not all first movers face these challenges to the same extent and not all government forces are as strong as Weinstein tends to assume.

The mode of warfare is a function of the armed groups' relative military capacities (Kalyvas and Balcells 2010). While some civil wars are characterized by asymmetric military capacities between insurgents and incumbents —irregular warfare—, others display relative parity of capacities, either at high levels —conventional warfare— or at lower levels —symmetric non-conventional warfare. As Kalyvas (2007: 429) tentatively suggests, there may be a relation between the civil war onset and the form of warfare characterizing the war. Having identified distinct processes of civil war onset, I argue that they reflect strategies used by first movers who dispose of different military capacities and face state forces that are in different conditions. Because first movers emerge from different background, they dispose of different levels of military capacity at onset. Correspondingly, the status of the state forces when first movers initiate the conflict varies, which signals different levels of military capacity on the

[18] As onset refers to a polity-level event, I focus on wartime dynamics that occur at the same level of analysis. Within macro-level dynamics, I select those that have been extensively studied in the current literature. In the last chapter of this dissertation, I suggest avenues to extend the analysis to additional macro-level dynamics, as well as to meso- and micro-level dynamics.

government side, as well as associated effects on the military capacity of the rebels. I therefore expect that different types of civil war onset should lead to different modes of warfare.

3.2.1. Peripheral challenges and warfare

First, as civil wars that begin as a peripheral challenge are characterized by small groups of radicalized militants and excluded politicians active in the periphery of the state, this type of onset should lead to greater asymmetry in military capacity, hence irregular warfare. In those cases, the rebels must typically build the armed organizations from the ground up (Lewis 2017). They often face the challenge of acquiring weaponry and recruits and often rely heavily on civilian support to launch and sustain their armed struggle (Kalyvas 2006).

These civil wars typically refer to the well-known model of insurgency, that is, "military conflict characterized by small, lightly armed bands practicing guerrilla warfare from rural base areas [… and in which] insurgents are weak relative to the governments they are fighting, at least at the start of operations" (Fearon and Laitin 2003: 79). As first movers are radicalized activists or excluded politicians, that is, outsiders to the regime, they often dispose of limited military means with which to challenge state sovereignty (Lewis 2020). Instead, they engage in a slow and patient process of state building and attempt to build support from local populations (Kalyvas 2006, 2007). Often, the main aims of the warring parties are "to render the other side unable to fight or to impose costs that motivate the other side to negotiate a favorable settlement" (Fearon 2004: 277).

As shown in Chapter 2, first movers in peripheral challenge typically face mostly loyal state forces which reinforced the imbalance in military capacities. Therefore, given the features of this types of civil war onset, peripheral challenges should typically lead to conflicts fought through irregular warfare.

3.2.2. Coups and warfare

In contrast, civil wars that begin as military coups should lead to the opposite conflict trajectory with regard to warfare. This time launched by insiders to the state apparatus, several of the barriers faced by first movers in peripheral challenges are less salient. Whereas first movers in peripheral challenges must build their armed groups from the ground, first movers in coups inherit military organizations and capabilities from the state arsenal directly. In other words, while many describe that rebels in civil wars begin their military challenge using readily available and limited weapons and rely on theft from government units as the rebellion spreads

(Moore 2012; Duquet 2009; Jackson 2010), there exists a set of cases to which such a description does not apply: civil wars that begin as military coups.

In those cases, as the army splits in two parts. As Singh (2014) points out, when coups lead to fighting, the other armed actor is almost always another faction within the armed forces. As first movers are members of the armed forces, military capacities are divided among the two sides as a function of the size and prominence of the splinter group. That is, in theory, one would expect that a military that divides in two parts of equal size and prominence would be of equal strength immediately after the split. Often, splits may be less clear and army splits may lead to imbalances in military strength, for example due to the position of the coup makers within the military (Singh 2014; De Bruin 2019).[19] However, even when disparity is visible, when a civil war begins as a military coup, both parties are expected to benefit from available weaponry, internal institutions, and experienced personnel, given that first movers emerge from within the military. In other words, civil wars that begin as coup are no longer conflicts between nascent, small, and poorly equipped rebels and a stronger army, but instead, are conflicts between army-like armed groups on both sides that result from a split within the army.

In sum, such splits have a double effect: on the one hand, rebels emerge stronger than those that launch peripheral challenges, and on the other, military coups weaken the armed forces as they lose both personnel and weaponry to the splinter faction. Therefore, I expect civil wars that begin as coups to lead to conventional warfare, that is, a military technology that is characterized by high and symmetric military capacities on both sides.

3.2.3. State disintegration and warfare

Third, civil wars that follow state disintegration follow a similar causal logic to coup, although with several important differences. Whereas coups lead to a division of the armed forces into two parts, in cases of state disintegration, the state and its military dissolve completely and military personnel join the different armed militias that mobilize to capture political power. Lacina (2006: 281; also Herbst 2004) concisely summarizes this intuition as she notes that "in

[19] Singh (2014: 10) argues that "coups from the middle are those mounted by majors, lieutenant colonels, and colonels, the officers in charge of the actual fighting units in the military and thus those with the greatest amount of firepower at their disposal." In comparison, he finds that coups led by the top of the military, usually generals, tend to end quickly and with relatively little chaos and bloodshed. While in coups from the bottom, led by enlisted men, non-commissioned officers, and junior officers, the coup makers generally have neither soft nor hard power and for this reason, begin with the least initial credibility, and they involve the most violence, threat, and confusion. De Bruin (2019: 808) similarly finds that "senior officer coups also involve less bloodshed than those led by junior officers and enlisted men. This is in part because their success is less detrimental to the institutional interests of the military and because coups from the lower ranks may indicate pre-existing divisions within the military that make subsequent violence less costly."

wars of outright state collapse, all combatant groups have minimal military strength and organizational coherence. The resulting anarchic and disorganized conflict is typified more by humanitarian crisis, predatory violence, and warlordism than sustained combat."

In those instances, as opposed to coups, splits within the armed forces are much less coordinated and the degree of fractionalization is higher. As a result, the disintegration of the state has the effect to increase the military capacity of all private militias, while the state army ceases to be an active participant in the conflict. As the size and extent of military capacity at a given point in time is finite, a higher degree of fractionalization following state disintegration should a priori correlate with smaller military capabilities on all sides compared to military coups. However, just as for coups, the distribution of resources is likely not equal across factions. This may be especially true when specific groups are overrepresented within the military and where, as a result, the most represented group benefits from the disintegration of the army to the greatest extent. In addition, the resulting level of military capacity also likely depends on the strength of the army directly prior to collapse. In that sense, the disintegration of stronger militaries should give way to stronger militias compared to weaker militaries.

In sum, either at higher or lower levels of capacity, I expect warfare in conflicts that begin with state disintegration to be symmetric. While I expect it to often refer to symmetric non-conventional warfare, state disintegration may lead to conventional warfare in cases where the military was stronger directly prior its collapse.

3.2.4. Insurrectionary protests and warfare

Lastly, civil wars that begin as insurrectionary protests should follow a distinct link with warfare. In those cases, first movers, who initially resort to non-violent means of contention, militarize in response to state repression (della Porta et al. 2018; Pearlman 2021; Lacher 2020). Given that social groups organize for violence and militarize after mobilization has occurred, these groups are likely poorly equipped at least at the beginning. In addition, rebel groups are likely to be numerous and relatively local as they mobilize in response to repression, thereby dividing the advantage to gain from defection of military personnel.

On the side of the government, the army is likely to be better equipped and organized. However, two characteristics of insurrectionary protests may mitigate the asymmetry of military capacities. First, the government's order to repress civilians often triggers defection (Lutscher 2016; Stephan and Chenoweth 2008), especially when the level of social mobilization is high (Bellin 2012). Defection to the protesters in turn increases the capabilities

of the first movers that emerge out of the mass protests. In those cases, defection might weaken the army, although potentially not enough to balance the military capacity of both insurgents and incumbents. Second, as insurrectionary protests tend to take place in urban areas, the state is likely to be limited in its uses of military forces (Nedal, Stewart and Weintraub 2020; Vautravers 2010). In fact, it often must abandon the resort to artillery and aerial bombings for lighter and more mobile weaponry which is able to operate in denser urban environments.

Therefore, I expect that insurrectionary protests that escalate into civil war give way to armed conflict that are fought through symmetric non-conventional warfare, that is, a symmetric technology of rebellion where both the insurgents and the incumbents rely on limited available military capacity.[20]

3.3. Civil war onset and conflict severity

Turning to conflict severity, the civil war literature has investigated a variety of factors, both at the macro and micro levels, including regime type and poverty (Lacina 2006; Chaudoin, Pekowitz and Stanton 2017; Lu and Thies 2011), territorial control (Kalyvas 2006), warfare (Balcells and Kalyvas 2014), ethnicity (Eck 2009; Costalli and Moro 2012; Esteban, Mayoral, and Ray 2012), polarization (Esteban, Morelli, and Rohner 2015), peacekeeping and mediation (Beardsley, Cunningham and White 2019; Hultman, Kathman and Shannon 2014) and international factors (Kaldor 1999; Melander, Öberg and Hall 2009). Yet the characteristics of civil war onset, as an independent factor shaping conflict severity, have been largely overlooked. Are civil wars that begin as peripheral challenges, coups, or insurrectionary protests or follow state disintegration likely to lead to similar levels of violence intensity?

So far, I have theoretically linked the variation of civil war with the mode of warfare. In this section, I formulate hypotheses about conflict severity which point to plausible mechanisms on their own, but which are also internally consistent with the hypotheses on warfare. Balcells and Kalyvas (2014) provide evidence that the mode of warfare is correlated with conflict severity. Irregular civil wars generate greater civilian victimization since civilian collaboration plays a central role for the success of rebels (Kalyvas 2006). In contrast, conventional civil wars cause higher levels of battle-related deaths since they entail direct military clashes (Kalyvas and Balcells 2010). In this theoretical framework, as warfare is

[20] The mode of warfare or technologies of rebellion refers to the military capacities used by the warring parties, not the potential capacities (Kalyvas and Balcells 2010). Their coding procedure indicates that they examine whether heavy weaponry was *used* by either the insurgents or the incumbents.

expected to be linked to the type of onset, it becomes an intermediary variable in a broader trajectory of civil war: as civil wars begin in different ways, which signals different types of political challenges to state authority, first movers and state forces emerge in different initial conditions, hence decide on different military strategies given the means they have available and which ultimately leads to more or less severe conflicts.

3.3.1. Peripheral challenges and conflict severity

As first movers in peripheral challenges often operate in the rural periphery with limited means, they must mobilize civilian populations in their support and promote their collaboration (Kalyvas 2006; Arjona 2016; Lewis 2020; Masullo 2021). Given their limited means, at least at first, these groups are likely to opt for irregular warfare, avoiding direct confrontation with the state forces (Kalyvas and Balcells 2010). In that sense, first movers and their first groups emerge as clandestine organizations. Following Balcells and Kalyvas (2014), given the initial conditions at onset and the military strategy chosen by first movers in peripheral challenges, I hypothesize that this type of onset should lead to conflicts that display fewer battle-related deaths. Such expectation does not automatically apply to civilian victimization, however.

As first movers are typically radicalized militants, they are often ideologically motivated and establish a relatively clear political agenda, both characteristics that should lead to fewer levels of civilian casualties (Weinstein 2006; Arjona 2016; Hoover Green 2018). However, two factors may lead to the opposite expectation. On the one hand, as discussed in the previous chapter, first movers in several instances of peripheral challenges are excluded politicians who may be much less ideologically motivated than activists and militants, and willing to grab power for personal gain. In those cases, first movers may resemble political entrepreneurs that are central in state disintegration onsets. On the other hand, given the centrality of civilian support for first movers in peripheral challenges, civilian victimization is likely to be high as the opponent, typically the state, targets civilians to undermine the insurgents (Valentino, Huth and Balch-Lindsay 2004).[21]

3.3.2. Coups and conflict severity

First movers in civil war that start as military coup are insiders to the regime. As the rebels launch their military challenge, the army splits in two parts between rebellions factions and the

[21] I do not examine empirically the link between civil war onset and civilian victimization in this dissertation. Instead, I focus on intensity, measured in battle-related deaths.

forces who remain loyal to the incumbent. I therefore hypothesize that they form armed organizations with similar internal institutions. In other words, I expect armed groups that fight civil wars that begin as coup to be on average better organized and equipped than most other groups in other civil wars, which allows them to sustain the strain of direct military confrontations. In addition, as the army splinters, warring factions are known, and so often are their capacities and location (Fearon 2004). Consistent with the prediction that these conflicts are likely to be fought as conventional wars, I expect fighting between armed organizations in civil wars that begin as military coups to lead to high levels of battle deaths as they compete for state control.

Once again, the expectation may differ with regards to civilian victimization. As first groups inherit internal hierarchies and institutions from first movers who have experience in managing armed organizations and as clashes between equipped forces are likely to be fought along frontlines, these conflicts may be less likely to lead to high levels of civilian victimization (Kalyvas 2005; Balcells and Kalyvas 2014). For example, Balcells (2010: 295) notes about the Spanish civil war that "the war was largely comprised of pitched battles and aerial attacks" and civilians were generally "isolated from the battlefield: while some may live close to the frontlines, or even go there to visit combatants, their everyday life tends to be independent from the war events." However, not all state armies have either the will or capacity to control violence against civilians (Hoover Green 2018).

3.3.3. State disintegration and conflict severity

As the state disintegrates, private militias often mobilize precisely in response to the collapse of the state and the security concerns that it creates (Kasfir 2004). In that sense, mobilization is likely to be relatively unplanned compared to peripheral challenges that result from the radicalization of militancy and long incubation periods (Blaxland 2021) or coups that are typically preceded by careful planning and coordination by elites (Powell and Thyne 2011; Singh 2014). As political cooperation breaks down, elites mobilize their respective political bases through loose coalitions of supporters, which results in the likely presence of numerous armed groups who engage in direct fighting in urban areas. In addition, these groups benefit from the collapse of the military which increases the military capacity of the various militias and is no longer able to contain the violence. I therefore expect the level of battle deaths to be high in civil wars that follow state disintegration as the presence of more groups and symmetric capacities tend to lead to higher severity in civil wars (Butler, Cunningham and Gates 2015).

Given the dynamics of onset, state disintegration also creates the situation in which it becomes difficult to distinguish between combatant and civilian deaths. As private militias often mobilize along identity lines, collective violence and civilian victimization may also be high in civil wars that begin with state disintegration. For example, Costalli and Moro (2012) find that when armed groups are mobilized along ethnic lines, ethnic polarization is a good predictor of the severity of violence. Similarly, Di Salvatore (2016) shows that violence is associated with the presence of ethnic minorities in areas dominated by other ethnic groups. Both findings support the hypothesis that civil war that begin with state disintegration are likely to be severe.

3.3.4. Insurrectionary protests and conflict severity

Contrary to civil wars that begin with state disintegration, I expect insurrectionary protests to lead to relatively less severe civil wars. On the one hand, local armed groups, sometimes joined by army defectors, typically form in response to state repression (Pearlman 2021; della Porta et al 2018; Laub 2021). As these groups emerge spontaneously, they typically dispose of limited military capacities to fight against the state. On the other hand, civil wars that begin as insurrectionary protests are launched in urban environments which presents challenges to the state forces, who cannot easily deploy heavy weaponry against large scale mobilization (Nedal, Stewart and Weintraud 2020; Brathwaite and Konaev 2022). As a result, even if the state dispose of high military capacities, it is unable to deploy them effectively and instead is forced to resort to lighter weaponry. In addition, responding violently to protests comes at high costs for the incumbent and is more likely to backfire (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011). This in turn is likely to further limit high levels of violence by state forces.

In sum, insurrectionary protests create the conditions that should limit the use of violence by all sides to the conflict: insurgents because they emerge in response to repression, yet unprepared for military campaigns, and the incumbent because the form of the initial challenge to its authority and the location of the clashes prevent it from deploying heavy equipment.

3.4. Civil war onset and conflict duration

The duration of civil wars varies greatly across conflicts: some last over decades such as the civil wars in Colombia or Myanmar, while others end after one year as did the conflicts in Bolivia or Gambia. Several factors have been found to affect the duration of conflict. On the

one hand, structural factors commonly associated with duration include GDP per capita (Collier, Hoeffler and Söderbom 2004), ethnic heterogeneity (Collier, Hoeffler and Söderbom 2004), natural resources (Ross 2004), or state capacity (Cunningham, Gleditsch and Salehyan 2009; Mukherjee 2014). On the other hand, dynamic factors include the severity of violence, the number of rebel organizations (Akcinaroglu 2012; Cunningham 2006), warfare (Balcells and Kalyvas 2014), and external intervention (Elbadawi and Sambanis 2000; Balch-Lindsay and Enterline 2000; Regan 2002). Focusing either on country-level attributes or on specific conflict dynamics, the characteristics of onset have been largely ignored. One exception stands out. Fearon (2004) identifies several classes of civil wars across which conflict duration varies, some of which refers to the type of conflict onset: while coups and popular revolutions lead to shorter wars, peripheral insurgencies lead to longer duration of conflict.

So far, this theory of civil war trajectories has linked the different types of civil war onset, which are characterized by differences in the identity of first movers, the army status, and the location of the first interactions between these actors, to patterns of warfare and conflict severity. In doing so, I have highlighted the centrality of these dimensions as they tell us who fights, with what means, and where. In the remainder of this section, I hypothesize that the type of civil war onset also affects how long conflict is likely to last: while some types of onset create the conditions for longer conflicts, others make for much shorter ones.

3.4.1. Peripheral challenges and conflict duration

First movers in peripheral challenges rarely expect to win quickly (Fearon 2004; Kalyvas and Balcells 2010). Instead, they build their insurgency slowly in the periphery of the state (Lewis 2020) and hope to succeed "either by gaining a position of military dominance that allows the imposition of terms, or by using violence to inflict costs that will induce the other side to negotiate a favorable settlement" (Fearon 2004: 289; Fearon and Laitin 2003). Consistent with the hypothesis that peripheral challenges lead to irregular civil wars, warfare in the rural periphery implies that insurgents hide among local populations, hence avoiding identification by the state forces, making those conflicts difficult to end (Kalyvas 2006).

In peripheral challenges, first movers typically radicalize their claims over political power and attempt to build support from local populations to accumulate resources and personnel and increase their capacities. These dynamics of onset often lead to the emergence of rebel groups "with the capacity to develop strong relations with civilian populations and build resilient institutions of governance" (Balcells and Kalyvas 2014: 1395; Arjona 2014). As

first movers slowly expand their base of support in the periphery, they gain control of territories which provides rebels with significant security from the reach of the government and allows them to sustain their military struggle. In fact, civil wars are found to last longer "when rebels are weaker than the government but control territory in the periphery, and when they do not have the option of using political means to advance their demands" (Cunningham, Gleditsch and Salehyan 2009: 573). Given the characteristics of first movers and actor constellation in peripheral challenge which shape the strategies used by the armed actors, I expect peripheral challenges to lead to long civil wars.

3.4.2. Coups and conflict duration

In contrast, first movers in civil wars that begin as coups do not face several of the challenges at onset experienced by insurgents in peripheral challenges. They typically emerge stronger and fight against a state that is weakened by the split within its military. Fearon (2004: 289) accounts for the shorter duration of civil war that begin as coups by a tipping process that produces extensive defections within the regime. In that sense, as Fearon puts it, it is basically "all or nothing." In those conflicts, as the military splits following the coup attempt, military capacity are known, hence reducing the asymmetry of information and leading to a shorter duration.

Moreover, Mukherjee (2014) argues that conflicts are likely to last longer when the threat they represent for the survival of the state is not existential and that those states are of medium capacities. In those cases, governments can opt for a "live with" strategy to contain, rather than suppress, the military challenge to its authority (Mukherjee 2014: 173). Civil wars that begin as military coups are the opposite: as they often start in the capital or other large cities and involve equipped and organized armed factions, they often represent an existential threat to the state survival which cannot be ignored. Strong rebels who pose a military challenge to the state are likely to lead to shorter wars (Cunningham, Gleditsch and Salehyan 2009). Therefore, because first movers are insiders to the state apparatus, defection weakens the state, and fighting erupts in or near the capital, I expect civil wars that begin as a military coup to lead to shorter conflicts.

3.4.3. State disintegration and conflict duration

State disintegration represents a distinct situation that is more difficult to link with conflict duration. In fact, as the state institutions and military dissolve, fighting erupts between private

militias who fight to capture political power, often by recruiting locally and either promoting local political agendas or allying with political elites. In some cases, one party may quickly emerge stronger than the others in which case it is likely to win a military victory and conflict should be relatively short. On the other hand, scholars have found that fractionalization and ethnic identities lead to longer conflicts. For example, Chaudoin, Pekowitz and Stanton (2017: 62) argue that fractionalization might make conflicts more persistent: "Once ethnic or religious tensions boil over to violent conflict, this may make divisions between groups more salient, making negotiated settlement more difficult." Ethnicity has also been found to lead to longer conflict duration especially in the context of exclusionary ethnonationalist policies by the state (Wucherpfennig et al. 2012) or when paired with fractionalization (Fearon 2004). Typically, as the state breaks down, identity and local networks become the focus of mobilization around which armed groups form. Therefore, I expect that, unless one group quickly emerge much stronger than the others, state disintegration should lead to longer civil wars.

3.4.4. Insurrectionary protests and conflict duration

Lastly, just as coups, insurrectionary protests often represent an existential threat to the incumbent. As mass protests spread across urban areas, it becomes impossible for the state to ignore them. Insurrectionary protests, as a type of civil war onset, also have in particular that first movers initially use nonviolent tactics, and later resort to violence in response to state repression (Lacher 2020; della Porta et al. 2018; Laub 2021). This provides them with additional advantages. On the one hand, the use of nonviolent tactics, at least at first, lower to barriers to participation which leads to high mobilization increased (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011). On the other hand, the repression of nonviolent demonstrations often backfires against the incumbent as it increases the internal and external costs of repression, which should force incumbent into making concessions (Stephan and Chenoweth 2008).

In addition, several factors that were hypothesized to shape the mode of warfare and conflict severity should also affect conflict duration. First, mass mobilization in urban areas make it difficult for the incumbent to use heavy weaponry. Second, the order to repress often triggers defection among the armed forces, which weakens the incumbent. These two factors should make the government more likely to enter negotiations or concede power as it can neither opt for a "live with" strategy nor can it, at least in most cases, fully military strategy. Altogether, I expect that insurrectionary protests should lead to relatively shorter civil wars.

3.5. Possible caveats and limitations

In this chapter, I have developed a theory of civil war trajectories that originate in the conflict onset. In that sense, the different types of civil war onset represent distinct sets of initial conditions. These initial conditions result from the combination of three dimensions: the identity and origin of the first movers, the army status when conflict is initiated, and the location of the initial interactions between these actors. As discussed in Chapter 3, the combination of these three factors leads to four ideal typical processes of onset: peripheral challenge, state disintegration, coup, and insurrectionary protests. As I have argued in this chapter, these different actor constellations, or initial conditions, shape how conflict subsequently unfolds as it sets conflict onto distinct trajectories. In the remainder of this section, I discuss two potential critiques of the argument: determinism and endogeneity.

3.5.1. Onset, conflict trajectories, and determinism

The first critique points to the potential determinism of this theory of civil war trajectories based on the type of onset. Critics may argue that, past the onset of conflict, civil wars unfold in ways that are driven by wartime events, rather than the way political sovereignty was challenged in the beginning. That is, recognizing that onsets are dynamic events, one must also recognize that civil wars are dynamic political event. In that sense, the extent to which civil wars are path-dependent requires further elaboration.

The theoretical framework and hypotheses formulated in this chapter state that the actor constellations at the onset of hostilities shape the potential outcome of several macro-level wartime dynamics, as they indicate differences in the types of actors, the means they have available, and the environment in which they interact. Yet, while I theorize on the effect of each type of onset on key wartime dynamics in isolation, once under way, civil wars may be subject to wartime shocks that create variation in how they unfold. In fact, my argument does not imply that onset alone matters in shaping how conflicts unfold. Instead, I argue that, given how political sovereignty is initially challenged, some conflict trajectories are more likely to occur than others during wartime. However, once conflict is underway, wartime events may act as factors of divergence from these predicted trajectories.

These wartime shocks are potentially numerous. For example, the capture or killing of a rebel leader, the sudden gain or loss of foreign support, or the onset of another war in the same country or in neighboring countries could all potentially create divergence. Yet, to identify divergence caused by wartime shocks, we must know about the baseline trajectory,

that is the expected path from which a particular observation may diverge at times. This theoretical framework contributes to the literature as it provides the theoretical counterfactual against which to compare actual cases and allows the identification of these diverging events in a systematic way. Furthermore, it may be that a same wartime event creates a diverging moment in some conflicts and not in others depending on how they start. For example, a split within rebel organizations may reroute the trajectory of a civil war that begins as a peripheral challenge, while it may not be so impactful in civil wars that follow state disintegration, which typically are characterized by the existence of numerous militias.

In sum, although potential divergences may somewhat blur the link between onset type and wartime dynamics, it would not disconfirm my theory altogether. If it is the case that, given the numerous potential wartime shocks, onset in the end has no effect on how conflict unfolds, I should not observe any empirical association between the type of civil war onset and macro-level dynamics in the following chapters. In contrast, the observation that such a correlation exists supports my argument, which altogether demonstrates that civil wars are indeed path-dependent political phenomena, and that onset is a meaningful event on its own to an extent far greater than merely signaling the beginning of a conflict.

3.5.2. Correlates of onset, onset types, conflict dynamics, and endogeneity

The second potential critique of this theory relates to the issue of endogeneity. That is, onset and wartime dynamics may be related to each other, but both may also be together related to a same set of factors. In this case, these factors likely encompass pre-war characteristics. Yet, theoretically, there are reasons to expect that the factors that determine onset do not also determine wartime dynamics, thereby 'cutting endogeneity' at the moment of onset. In fact, it may be that conflict onset is caused by an endogenous shock and that, once the conflict is ongoing, it evolves independently of what triggered it in the first place.

I use the case of state disintegration to illustrative this claim. Comparative evidence from this category of onset highlights that civil war onset in the form of state disintegration typically take place when state institutions, including the military, are severely weakened and no longer able to structure and contain political competition. Civil war also seems to be triggered by endogenous shocks in a fragile political landscape such as the resignation of a leading political figure as in Afghanistan in 1992, a referendum for independence as in Bosnia in 1992, or a political assassination as in Burundi in 1993. However, the factors that account for why state institutions are so fragile at a given point in time, such as the newness of the state

or the nature of state institutions (Clapham 2004), or economic factors (Doornbos 2002; van de Walle 2004), may not account for why conflict is fought through a specific mode of warfare or why it reaches especially high levels of violence. In other words, the conditions which affect the onset of civil war are unlikely to fully determine how conflict unfolds once underway. Instead, it may be that the characteristics of the conflict itself drive how it evolves once it begins.[22] In that sense, theoretically, onset is especially meaningful as it allows to grasp fundamental characteristics of the conflict when it emerges. As I have argued in this chapter, it is those initial conditions that set conflicts onto distinct trajectories.

In the following empirical chapters, I develop several mechanisms to control for the potential endogeneity issue. Ideally, one would need an experimental or quasi-experimental set-up that, in the case of macro-level analysis of civil war, is difficult to achieve.[23] In general, any findings in the following empirical analysis would be subject to endogeneity bias if the pre-war factors that determine the type of civil war onset are the same factors that predict wartime dynamics. If that were the case, civil war onset itself may have a limited effect on its own in shaping how conflicts unfold, and the estimated relationship may be confounded by other factors such as pre-war conditions. If pre-war conditions indeed drive the variation of both onset type and wartime dynamics, I should observe two empirical patterns in the results. First, I should observe a substantive decrease in the significance of the type of onset once controlling for pre-war covariates. And second, the effect of such factors on wartime dynamics should be statistically significant across model specifications, both including and excluding the type of onset. I investigate those possibilities in the following empirical analysis to ensure that it is not the case.

Although the following analysis cannot formulate causal claims with certainty, it nevertheless provides rigorous empirical evidence that onset types are systematically correlated with several macro-level conflict dynamics, pointing to important patterns of civil war. There also exist ways to minimize the risk of endogeneity bias with other statistical methods relying on observational data. To address this potential issue, I first provide descriptive statistics of

[22] For example, Lacina (2006) finds that the determinants of conflict severity are quite different from those of conflict onset. Specifically, she finds no evidence that state capacity, a factor commonly associated with civil war onset, influences the severity of conflict. Similarly, others have found that what accounts for wartime dynamics are not pre-war structural variables. Among these findings, the use of violence by armed groups has been found to be caused by territorial control or political education (Kalyvas 2006; Hoover Green 2018) and sexual violence by patterns of recruitment (Cohen 2016).

[23] One possibility would be to use methods from causal inference to identify the causal effect of onset type. For example, matching civil wars of different onset types on a set of theoretically informed pre-war characteristics may provide insightful avenues for further research. I am currently exploring this research design in an extension to the empirical analysis conducted in this dissertation.

several pre-war covariates across the different types of civil war onset, to shed light on any relevant pattern.[24] Second, in the following chapter, I replicate several landmark studies of civil war onset to examine whether different types of civil war onset are caused by different factors. Lastly, in all statistical models used in Chapter 5 to empirically test the implications of the theory of civil war trajectories, I systematically control for theoretically-informed pre-war covariates, thereby aiming to isolate the relation between onset type as the main explanatory variables and the different wartime dynamics, warfare, severity, and duration. Together, this raises my confidence in the credibility of the estimates of the relationship between onset type and wartime dynamics, which I provide in the second part of this dissertation.

[24] These statistics are available in Appendix 5 and 6.

PART II — COMPARATIVE EVIDENCE

Chapter 4

Onset types and the correlates of civil war onset

There exists an extensive literature on the causes of civil war. Yet, all of these studies conceptualize conflict onset as a binary event: either a civil war begins in a given year, month, or day, or it does not. As described at length in the previous chapters, my research identifies and theorizes the variation in how civil wars begin. This chapter introduces a new cross-sectional dataset of civil wars between 1944 and 2020, DatOnset, that accounts for the variation in onset across cases. Based on extensive secondary literature and validation by country experts, I classify all instances of civil war onset between 1944 and 2020 into four mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive categories: peripheral challenge, state disintegration, coup, and insurrectionary protests.

This original dataset of civil wars allows for a twofold empirical exploration. First, it allows to refine our theories of civil war onset by disaggregating conflict onset into its different types. In fact, it may be that different types of civil war onset are driven by different factors, which may help solve the contradictions and inconsistencies found in studies focusing on the causes of onset. This chapter tests this implication empirically through the replication of several landmark studies on civil war onset. I find that several key correlates of civil war onset are indeed associated with specific types of onset, which points to specific causal mechanisms, and allows to reject others. Second, this original data on civil war onset allows to test empirically for the patterns of wartime dynamics, as outlined in the theory of civil war trajectories in

Chapter 3. This empirical investigation, which I conduct in the next chapter, is especially useful as it allows to identify macro-level patterns of how civil wars unfold. The uncovering of such patterns based on civil wars between 1944 and 2020 may in turn prove useful to (cautiously) infer expectations on how current and future conflicts are likely to unfold.

This chapter is the first of a series of three empirical chapters. First, it introduces the new dataset of civil war, DatOnset (1944-2020), which contains important information on the dynamics and processes at play across countries when politics becomes a military contest between domestic actors. When introducing the data, this chapter carefully accounts for the data generation process and validates it against other commonly used datasets of civil wars. Second, I elaborate on the main contribution of this new dataset, that is a categorical conceptualization of civil war onset, by providing extensive descriptive statistics of civil war onset between 1944 and 2020. I proceed to link them to other findings in the literature. Lastly, this chapter replicates several landmark studies of civil war onset and disaggregates the correlates of conflict onset by type of civil war onset. In doing so, this chapters contributes to the existing literature in two important ways: first, it refines our understanding of the causes of civil war by identifying systematic associations between some correlates and specific types of civil war onset; and second, it points to key causal mechanisms at play given the differentiated effects of these correlates of onset across types.

4.1. Introducing DatOnset, 1944-2020.

Identifying the start date of civil war is a reputed difficult task. It refers to the ontology of civil war, that is what constitutes a civil war and how it relates to other types of organized political violence. Numerous cross-national datasets of civil war exist (Doyle and Sambanis 2000; Gleditsch et al. 2002; Fearon and Laitin 2003; Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Sambanis 2004; Dixon and Sarkees 2015; Fearon 2017; Sambanis and Schulhofer-Wohl 2019). These datasets at times differ in substantive ways both in their criteria for inclusion of conflicts as civil wars and their time coverage. Combined, these differences ultimately result in variation in the list of conflicts included as well as the start and end dates of those conflicts. For example, across datasets, the same civil war in Afghanistan is coded as having started in 1992 (Fearon and Laitin 2003), May 1992 (Collier and Hoeffler 2004), 1993 (Doyle and Sambanis 2000), February 1992 (Sambanis 2004), June 28, 1992 (Dixon and Sarkees 2015), or April 27, 1978 (Gleditsch et al. 2002). These differences matter as this dissertation is concerned with categorizing the processes and dynamics of civil war onset. The remainder of this section

details the data generation process. In doing so, it further discusses the identification and measurement of civil war onset as well as the types of conflict onset.

4.1.1. Identifying civil war onsets

As discussed in Chapter 1, existing datasets vary in their criteria for inclusion of conflicts as cases of civil war. Several reviews of these differences and their implications for theories of civil wars exist (Sambanis 2004; Hegre and Sambanis 2006). This dissertation does not aim to establish new rules for inclusion as civil wars, since it is not primarily preoccupied with defining civil war in a broader range of organized political violence (e.g., Kalyvas 2019). Rather, this research contributes to the literature as it identifies, for the cases of civil wars, how conflicts begin. However, as this dissertation provides a novel classification of civil war onsets, it must make sense of the ambiguities surrounding the start of civil wars.[25]

In this thesis, civil war onset refers to the rupture of state sovereignty that results from the initial violent confrontations between domestic armed organizations for the control of political power, either over the whole territory or over parts of it, and that leads to prolonged armed conflict.[26] As a rupture of state sovereignty, civil war onset is an event occurring at the level of the polity. In that sense, a single instance of sovereignty rupture may include several conflict dyads (Sambanis and Schulhofer-Wohl 2019). Based on this definition, this dissertation establishes an original conceptualization of civil war onset as a heterogenous political phenomenon, which may take different forms across cases. As I will show in the following chapters, such variation is meaningful both to understand why civil wars start, and how they unfold.

Consistent with this conceptualization of civil war onset, I use the recent list of civil wars constructed by Sambanis and Schulhofer-Wohl (2019), which I extend to 2020 to include the most recent conflicts such as the Islamist insurgencies in Mozambique and Burkina Faso in 2017 and 2019 respectively, and the onset of civil war in Tigray in Ethiopia in 2020.[27]

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[25] An advantage of my conceptualization of civil war onset as a process of sovereignty rupture is that it somewhat relaxes the need to identify a precise moment of onset. Instead, in identifying the onset of civil war in this study, I aim to capture the moment at which political conflict transforms into a military challenge, with each onset type indicating a different process of transformation.

[26] Further discussion on this definition of civil war is available in Chapter 2. This definition is based on the definition of civil war by Kalyvas (2006) and the definition of sovereignty rupture by Sambanis and Schulhofer-Wohl (2019). Note that violent military confrontations imply a violence threshold. The threshold used in this dissertation is taken from Sambanis (2004: 829-31): that is the start year of the civil war is the first year the conflict causes at least 500 deaths, and if a conflict does not cause 500 deaths or more in the first year it is active, the war is coded as having started in that year only if cumulative deaths in the next 3 years reach 1,000 fatalities.

[27] A detailed discussion of the changes and extensions made to the original list can be found in Appendix 1. I have extended the list to include the most recent civil wars to cover the entire period from 1944 to 2020, and slightly

Understood as "a challenge to an incumbent government's role as the ultimate arbiter of behavior within a polity" (Sambanis and Schulhofer-Wohl 2019: 1547), civil wars in this list may include several dyadic conflicts between a specific armed group and the government if the different dyads share political stakes and strategic coordination. That is, "if several groups arise in a revolutionary civil war, each aiming to capture the state, we would code a single war by virtue of the single, overarching rupture of sovereignty in the country" (Sambanis and Schulhofer-Wohl 2019: 1553). For example, this is the case in Uganda in 1986 or in Somalia in 1991.

Two separate instances of sovereignty rupture may also occur simultaneously, as in Myanmar in 1948 when both the Karen rebellion and the Communist insurgency began or in India in 1989 when the Kashmir and the Communist rebellions turned into civil war. In both cases, political stakes differ as one is center-seeking, hence the sovereignty rupture is total, and the other is secessionist, the rupture then being partial. Often, these separate instances of sovereignty rupture take place in different regions, although that need not be the case. For example, while the Kashmir insurgency started and was mainly limited to northernmost region of India, the Communist insurgency was mostly active in the central and eastern regions of India. Ultimately, the concept of sovereignty rupture is useful as it allows to distinguish between the processes of polity breakdown into civil war and the formation of new armed groups during civil war, which *a priori* should be driven by different factors and follow distinct mechanisms.

The final list of civil wars in DatOnset includes 194 conflicts that started between 1944 and 2020. By focusing on relatively severe civil wars,[28] I exclude the smallest conflicts that are fought at lower intensity, often in the periphery of the state or by terrorist organizations in richer countries (de la Calle and Sánchez-Cuenca 2012), and that do not constitute an existential threat to state survival. Figure 5.1 plots the distribution of civil war onsets over time between 1944 and 2020, which is consistent with the general trend of civil wars since the end of the second World War (Kalyvas and Balcells 2010; Pettersson and Wallensteen 2015; Melander, Pettersson and Themnér 2016; Fearon 2017). As the figure shows, there was a large number of civil war onsets following the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union. However, quickly the number of new conflict onsets declined, although it remained relatively

modified the coding of older conflicts based on extensive secondary literature and discussions with country experts.

[28] Following Sambanis (2004: 829-31), the start year of the civil war is the first year the conflict causes at least 500 deaths, and if a conflict does not cause 500 deaths or more in the first year it is active, the war is coded as having started in that year only if cumulative deaths in the next 3 years reach 1,000 fatalities.

high throughout the 1990s. A clear decrease in the number of new onsets is visible during the first decade of the twenty-first century, interrupted by a substantive increase in the number of new civil wars in 2011, following the Arab Spring. I discuss these patterns further in the following section.

This overall trend is largely consistent with other often-used datasets in the current literature, as shown in Figure 5.2. One difference stands out, however. The pattern of civil war onset with data from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) displays a large increase in the number of onsets in 2015, which reaches levels higher to those of the early 1990s. This spike in onsets in 2015 reflects the emergence of numerous armed groups affiliated with the Islamic State across regions, which are systematically coded as onsets of new civil wars in UCDP dataset. However, most of these conflicts do not qualify as new instances of sovereignty rupture as they either do not reach the level of intensity required for inclusion as a civil war in this thesis, as in Russia, Chad, or Niger, or they refer to the emergence of a new actor in an ongoing conflict as in Afghanistan, Libya, Syria, Yemen, or Nigeria.

Figure 5.1. Distribution of civil war onsets over time (N = 194)





Figure 5.2. Distribution of civil war onsets across datasets



4.1.2. Measuring the types of civil war onset

All existing cross-national datasets have in common that civil war onset is a dichotomous variable, that is, either a civil war starts, or it does not. DatOnset constitutes the first dataset that accounts for the variation of civil war onset in a systematic way. To do so, I operationalize the indicators developed in Chapter 2, namely the identity of first movers, the army status, and the location of the initial interactions between these key actors. Based on extensive secondary literature and validation by country experts, I classify all instances of civil war onset between 1944 and 2020 into four mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive categories: peripheral challenge, state disintegration, coup, and insurrectionary protests.

As all typologies, this classification of civil war onset aims at maximizing the variation across categories while simultaneously minimizing the variation across cases within categories (Bailey 1994; Collier, Laporte and Seawright 2008). Individual cases certainly display important specificities that relate to each context and the actors who engage in the civil war. Somewhat abstracting from these particularities, it is nevertheless possible to find meaningful similarities in the dynamics at play at the onset of conflict, which allows for a robust classification. Individual case descriptions and coding decisions are available in Appendix 2.

In practice, some cases fall very close to one ideal-type, such as the Kashmir insurgency in India that resulted from a prolonged militancy, initially nonviolent, but which turned into civil war in 1989 when conventional politics failed. Other examples include the onset of civil war in Lebanon in 1975 that are characterized by a clear break down of cooperation among political elites that led fighting in Beirut, or the civil war in Syria in 2011 that escalated from the pro-democracy demonstrations that were violently repressed by the government. In contrast, other cases of civil war onset are more ambiguous, and are therefore more difficult to classify. I discuss some of these cases in the following section.

4.1.2.1. Dealing with complex sequences of events

Describing civil war onset as a process has the added advantage that it places the politics between actors at the center of the conceptualization of onset. Yet, one resulting challenge from this conceptualization is where to situate the boundaries between the events that compose civil war onsets, and those that refer to pre-war politics. In many cases, accurately classifying civil war onset does not require identifying a precise moment in time. Instead, the main objective in classifying onset is to capture the underlying logic of mobilization of first movers and the initial response by the state forces. This is useful empirically as it allows to fully capture the dynamics of onset which unfold more or less quickly across cases, and to adapt to and include some of the cases' specificities. In other instances, the sequence of consecutive and related events is particularly complex and therefore requires a stricter coding procedure to ensure consistency.

First, there are some countries that experience a coup, but it is not the coup itself that triggers the onset of civil war. In those cases, the coup significantly alters the political arena and conditions within the state, but it is later events that trigger civil war. The unfolding of events in Cambodia in 1970 is illustrative. Chanda (1989: 27) describes that civil war in Cambodia started with the March 1970 coup that "plunged the country into civil war." Yet, a closer look at the dynamics at play shows that civil war started in a way clearly distinct from a split in the army and fighting between thes resulting two armies as in Nigeria in 1967, when ethnic Igbo generals declared secession and the creation of the Republic of Biafra, in Laos in 1960, or Gambia in 1981. In Cambodia, Prince Norodom Sihanouk was ousted in a bloodless coup in 1970 while outside the country, after a vote in the National Assembly. In exile, Sihanouk allied with the communist Khmer Rouge, whose base of mobilization was mostly peasants. The army, which had not suffered from splits linked to the March 1970 coup, was deployed to counter the advance of the Communist forces supported by North Vietnam (Kubota

2013). Applying the typology of civil war onset strictly, it appears clearly that first movers were radicalized communist militants allied with Sihanouk in exile, that the army did not suffer for split, and that the initial interactions between key actors took place in the northern periphery of Cambodia, all of which indicates that this instance is best described as a peripheral challenge.

Other instances of similar sequences of events include the onset of civil war in Afghanistan in 1978, Algeria in 1992, or Guatemala in the 1960s, all of which also experienced a coup, but are better understood as peripheral challenges.[29] For example, the Commission for Historical Clarification (1999: 123) in Guatemala describes that "the experience of exile radicalized several of the military insurgents [referring to the November 1960 junior-officer revolt], who began to consider the possibility of a new uprising where civilians would be given greater participation". By 1962, these exiled junior officers established the insurgent group MR-13, which capitalized on the growing radicalization of groups of the Guatemalan left, notably among sectors of the students, teachers, urban workers, and peasants (Commission for Historical Clarification 1999).

A second type of complex sequences includes cases in which civil wars follow each other so closely that the first conflict creates the conditions for the second. These cases often refer to partial conflict resolution or the breakdown of peace agreements. In the Central African Republic, after the Seleka forces captured the capital Bangui and seized government power in early 2013, the Seleka leadership ultimately failed to establish control both over the territory and over its troops which were officially disbanded in September 2013. This led to renewed violence and the formation of anti-Balaka groups across the country that fought against former Seleka rebels (Kisangani 2015; Lombard 2016). The onset of civil war in Yemen after the capture of Sana'a by Houthi insurgents in 2014 also illustrates this sequence of events.

Mobilizing the novel typology of onset based on the concept of sovereignty rupture which identifies separate onsets in those cases, it appears clearly that these rebel victories were followed by state disintegration, as political power and state institutions collapsed quickly after the establishment of rebel governments. This procedure is therefore valuable as missing these transitions might aggregate dynamics of two conflicts that started in different ways and therefore, as this dissertation theorizes, are likely to unfold in different ways too. This would ultimately blur conflict trajectories. Other examples of closely connected civil wars include the

[29] The recent events in Myanmar following the military coup in February 2021 provide an example of a different sequence linked to a coup d'état in which the coup triggered mass protests which were then heavily repressed by the state forces. The repression of the anti-coup protests later led to the formation of armed groups to fight against the military junta, and coalesced around the banner of the People's Defence Force. In this sequence, the onset of the civil war is coded as a case of insurrectionary protests.

conflicts in Liberia in 1989 and 1992, Burundi in 1991 and 1993, Somalia in 1988 and 1991 or Congo in 1993, 1997 and 1998. Each time, the outcome of the first conflict created the conditions that affected the onset of the second. In all these cases, the typology of onset was applied strictly to each separate rupture of state sovereignty, so as to fully capture and distinguish the dynamics of civil war onset.

4.2. Descriptive statistics

4.2.1. Distribution of onset types

Out of 194 civil wars over that period, I find that 127 began as peripheral challenges, 36 started following state disintegration, 17 started as coups, and the remaining 14 escalated from insurrectionary protests. Figure 5.3 displays the distribution of events by onset type. This distribution simultaneously accounts for why the current literature misses a robust typology of civil war onset, and why it is greatly needed.[30]

Specifically, the overrepresentation of peripheral challenges may explain why civil wars have commonly been assumed to necessarily begin in the form of rural insurgencies, and why such dynamics have received the most attention in the current civil war literature, which often refers to them as peripheral insurgencies (Fearon 2004) or irregular wars (Kalyvas 2005). Such a model of peripheral insurgencies entails assumptions about the form civil war onset takes: they are typically launched by small bands of rebels in the rural periphery of the state (Fearon 2004; Kalyvas and Balcells 2010; Fearon and Laitin 2003; Collier and Hoeffler 2004). The distribution of onset types therefore supports arguments on the causes of civil wars that emphasize political opportunity and state capacity as primary correlates of conflict onset. The periphery, often characterized by lower state presence, offers the possibility to organize and initiate a military challenge against the government (Fearon and Laitin 2003; Lewis 2020). Additionally, these regions may also be the ones more likely to have strong grievances, hence increasing the potential for political violence (Gurr 1970; Cederman, Weidmann and Gleditsch 2011). This distribution of onset types thus provides indirect support for existing theories of civil war. In particular, political opportunity and potential for mobilization, in the form of weak state presence and impoverished populations, are central in many civil wars.

However, over a third of all civil wars between 1944 and 2020 (34,54 percent) started through dynamics of onset other than a peripheral challenge, and do not fit well with the

[30] Additional figures and the distribution of onset type by time period and regions are available in Appendix 5.

common assumption of insurgencies. This is illustrated by the right panel in Figure 5.3. In other words, I find that one civil war onset out of three is not accurately described by the model of peripheral insurgencies, and that the dynamics at play in a substantive number of conflicts remain to be explained in systematic ways. Those begin in urban environments, either in the periphery or at the political center of the state, are initiated by different types of first movers, who oppose government forces facing different internal challenges and dispose of different capacities. These conflicts, in comparison, have received much less scholarly attention.

In addition, the disaggregation of civil war onsets by type reveals that the general trend of civil wars over time has been driven by different types of onsets at different points in time, as shown in Figure 5.4. While the growing number of civil wars through the Cold War has been driven mostly by a large number of peripheral challenge onsets through the 1970s, the peak at the beginning of the 1990s was mostly due to a stark increase in the number of onsets in the form of state disintegration, several following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the dissolution of Yugoslavia. As numerous new states emerge, they were soon affected by internal

Figure 5.3. Distribution of civil war onsets by type (N = 194)





Figure 5.4. Distribution of onsets over time and by type



competition between political elites which mobilized supporters and escalated into civil wars. This category of civil war onset, overrepresented in the 1990s, may have motivated the new war thesis, which has in part been associated with state collapse (Kaldor 2005). Yet, when identifying those instances over a larger time frame and with a clear analytical framework of civil war onset, it appears that such dynamics are not restricted to the post-Cold war era but have occurred repeatedly since 1944. In that sense, Figure 5.4 suggests that there is nothing intrinsically new about these wars. Instead, they are a type of civil war onset which occurs when specific conditions arise and displays specific dynamics.[31]

Third, the data suggests that the recent increase in the number of civil wars since 2011 was in part driven by insurrectionary protests which have been more common following the Arab Spring. In fact, out of the fourteen civil wars that started as insurrectionary protests, almost half (42.86 percent) occurred in the ten years between 2011 and 2020, while the

[31] Chapter 6 of this dissertation exclusively focuses on the dynamics of state disintegration.

remaining 57.14 percent occurred during the 67 years between 1944 and 2010. Since 2011, civil wars emerged out of mass protests in Syria, Yemen, Libya, Ukraine, Burundi, and Cameroon. Given these trends, three onset types —peripheral challenge, state disintegration, and insurrectionary protests— seem to be closely linked to events in international politics (Skocpol 1979; Kalyvas and Balcells 2010; Linebarger 2016; Forsberg 2014).

The remaining type of civil war onset —coup— stands out as a highly domestic political issue. In fact, it has occurred throughout the twentieth century without evident patterns. I venture two interpretations for this phenomenon. First, as recent studies find that coups have declined in numbers since 1990 (Dwyer and Tansey 2020), it may be that the number of civil wars that start off as coups has similarly decreased. A second interpretation is that recently, coups have become more decisive: they either succeed or fail quickly, but do not fall in between, the situation which typically creates the conditions for civil wars and that Geddes (1999) describes as the worst possible outcome of a coup.[32] Recent events in West Africa suggests that coups are indeed often decisive as they have succeeded in Burkina Faso, Chad, Guinea, Mali and Sudan, and fail in Niger and Guinea-Bissau.

4.2.2. Onset types and existing typologies of civil wars


How does the typology of onset relate to existing typologies of civil war in the current literature? Arguably, this novel typology is only valuable to the extent that it captures part of a political phenomenon that is so far unidentified, and therefore overlooked. There exist two main typologies in the current literature that have been used to disaggregate civil wars.

The first typology distinguishes between ethnic and non-ethnic civil wars. This typology has been used extensively to explain conflict onset (Sambanis 2001; Wimmer, Cederman and Min 2009; Toft 2003; Denny and Walter 2014; Eck 2009). Does the new typology of civil war onset capture something different from the ethnic versus non-ethnic distinction? Figure 5.5 plots the joint distribution of the different types of onsets and ethnic civil wars. The data on ethnic civil wars is taken from the Ethnic Armed Conflict dataset (Cederman, Wimmer, and Min 2010), which I extend to 2020 following the same coding procedures. Following Cederman, Wimmer, and Min (2010), ethnic conflicts are set apart by the aims of the armed organizations and their recruitment and alliance structures. Figure 5.5 shows that a majority of civil wars are ethnic conflicts. Out of 194 civil wars in DatOnset, 125

[32] Linked to this conjecture, one potential explanation may refer to the identity and rank of the coup makers within the military in cases that escalate into civil war. In fact, Singh (2014) and De Bruin (2019) find that the intensity of violence during military coups varies based on the features of coup plotters.

are ethnic wars, which represents around two-thirds of all conflicts.[33] When disaggregating civil wars based on their type of onset, I find that a relatively similar distribution applies to all but one type: civil wars that start as coup are correlated with non-ethnic conflicts.[34] This finding does not imply that the majority of coups are non-ethnic. Instead, it suggests that among the coups that escalate into civil wars, a majority are non-ethnic. In other words, this indicates that ethnic competition and divisions within the military create the conditions that, in addition to increasing the likelihood of coups (Jenkins and Kposowa 1992), may favor decisive coups, either to the advantage of the incumbent or the plotters. In sum, these descriptive results suggest that, apart from coups, the different types of onset are strategies of violent political challenge used equally by ethnic and non-ethnic groups.

Figure 5.5. Distribution of onset types, ethnic wars, and secessionist wars (N=194)



[33] This pattern is consistent with Sambanis (2001), who finds that among conflicts between 1960 and 1999, 32 (29.3%) were revolutionary/non-ethnic wars and 77 (70.6%) were ethnic wars.

[34] A chi-square test of independence provides a p-value of 0.0006 in the case of coups, which indicates that civil wars that start as coups and non-ethnic conflicts are correlated. All other results achieve significance levels greater than the .05 threshold. Therefore, it can be assumed that the other three types of onset and ethnic conflict are independent from each other. All values of the statistical test are available in Appendix 5.

The second existing typology of reference disaggregates civil wars between secessionist and non-secessionist conflicts (Buhaug 2006; Deiwiks, Cederman and Gleditsch 2012; Cunningham, Bakke and Seymour 2012; Toft 2012). Out of the 194 civil wars in DatOnset, 71 (36.6%) are secessionist and 123 (63.4%) are non-secessionist wars. As shown in Figure 5.5, I find a broadly similar distribution for each type of onset. This indicates that there is no clear overlap between secessionist wars and the different types of onset, with perhaps the exception of coups that appear to be in their majority non-secessionist.[35] Therefore, as for ethnic civil wars, the different types of onset are strategies of violent political challenge used equally by secessionist and non-secessionist groups. In sum, this descriptive analysis provides strong evidence that my typology of civil war onset does indeed capture a novel dimension, so far overlooked, of a well-known and important political phenomenon.

4.3. Applications

What does the proposed typology of onset contribute to the study of causes of civil war? Having identified that the typology captures a new dimension of comparison between civil wars, that is the processes through which civil wars begin, do different sets of correlates explain different types of civil war onset? Aggregating all civil war onsets into a dichotomous variable may lead to theoretical and methodological caveats. We risk concluding that a given set of factors feeds equally into all cases on the basis that empirical analysis produces strong results, while in fact, that given set of factors may only trigger specific types of conflict onset. Analogously, we might also reject some correlates as irrelevant on the basis that the empirical analysis does not provide significant results, when in fact these factors would have been especially useful to account for a specific type of onset. Given the distribution of the types of civil war onsets in the previous section, it is likely that empirical support for a given set of factors is driven by cases of peripheral challenges, and that these cases simultaneously obscure the effects of either the same or other sets of correlates on the remaining three types of civil war onsets.

As a way to test for these implications, in the remainder of this section I replicate four landmark studies of civil war onsets: Fearon and Laitin's (2003) article on the effects of state capacity on civil war onset; Gleditsch and Ruggeri's (2010) article on the effects of regime type on civil war onset; Salehyan and Gleditsch's (2006) article on the effects of refugee flows

[35] Chi-square test of independence systematically return values that are greater than the .05 significance level, indicating that the two variables onset type and secessionist wars are independent from one another. The values for each statistical test are available in Appendix 5.

on civil war onset; and Nel and Righarts's (2008) article on the effects of natural disasters and climate-related shocks on civil war onset. All of these studies use a dichotomous measure of civil war onset, and I proceed to examine the effects of disaggregating onset on their results. In each case, my expectation is that the inclusion of a categorical variable of civil war onset is likely to have important implications for these analyses.

Before turning to the actual replications, a cautionary note is required. Disaggregating civil wars, which are already rare events, into four separate categories, reduces the number of observations for each type of onset, at times substantively. The small size of some categories increases the chances of including outliers within each category, resulting in inflated standard errors for some coefficients. In this case, as I aim for strict replication, I use the same models as the ones used in the original study. Being aware of these limitations, I call for caution when interpreting some of the results in the following sections.

4.3.1. Onset types and state capacity

In their path-setting article, Fearon and Laitin (2003) ask why some countries experience civil wars and others do not. Based on a dataset of 127 civil wars between 1945 and 1999, they conduct a multivariate analysis, and find that the main determinants of civil war are the factors that favors insurgency, namely poverty —which indicates low state capacity—, political instability, large populations, and mountainous terrain. In essence, they argue that politically, financially, and organizationally weak governments make insurgency more feasible and attractive, as their policing over the periphery is weak and their counterinsurgency inadequate (2003: 75). The results of their analyses are reproduced in Table 5.1. They measure civil war onset as a dichotomous variable which takes the value 1 for all country-years in which a civil war started, and 0 otherwise.[36]

Given the similarities between Fearon and Laitin's list of civil wars and the cases included in DatOnset, I associate to each onset year in their data the corresponding onset type.[37] As a result of this overlap, I conduct a strict replication in which the only change to the original data is the inclusion of an onset type variable, which was turned into four binary variables, one

[36] Fearon and Laitin (2003: 76) define civil wars as conflict that "(1) involve fighting between agents of (or claimants to) a state and organized, nonstate groups who sought either to take control of a government, to take power in a region, or to use violence to change government policies. (2) The conflict killed at least 1,000 over its course, with a yearly average of at least 100. (3) At least 100 were killed on both sides (including civilians attacked by rebels)."

[37] There were four cases that are in Fearon and Laitin and not in DatOnset. To replicate the exact analysis, I coded these four cases manually: Algeria 1962 (Kabylie), Turkey 1977 (militarized politics), China 1991 (Xinjiang), and India 1952 (northeast uprisings). Details about the coding decision are available in Appendix 5.

per onset type, to use logistic regression models. Following Fearon and Laitin, the different onset variables take the value 1 when a civil war onset of a specific type occurs, and 0 otherwise. Table 5.1 provides the results of Fearon and Laitin's analysis when including the variation in onset. As previously mentioned, the use of four binary variables reduces the number of onsets in each category, and at times substantively.[38] Therefore, the results displayed below should be considered with caution. Nevertheless, they indicate a clear association between some correlates and different onset types. This suggests that different types of civil war onsets are driven by different factors.

First, I find that increased state capacity, proxied by income per capita, reduces the risk of civil war onset in the form of peripheral challenge or coups, but has no significant effect in the case of state disintegration and insurrectionary protests. This suggests that the most common correlate of onset is not equally relevant for all types of onset. In that sense, richer states may not be fully immune to civil war and experience conflict onset in the form of state disintegration or insurrectionary protests.[39] Second, the results show that the presence of oil favors civil wars onset through state breakdown, either in the form of state disintegration or coup, while it has no significant effect for peripheral challenge and insurrectionary protests. This is probable to the extent that, as political elites are the ones who benefit the most from oil rents, competition over those revenues especially exacerbates tension among them.

Lastly, the results also show that political instability and anocracy increase the risk of civil war onsets in the form of coup and state disintegration respectively, but has no effect on peripheral challenge nor insurrectionary protests. That anocracies are more likely to experience civil wars in the form of state disintegration is consistent with the conjecture that this type of onset results from the breakdown of peace agreements and incomplete conflict resolution. Indeed, peace agreements typically entail some sort of power sharing arrangements, electoral practices, and army integration, thereby laying the foundation for democratic modes of governance. Yet, coexistence in this novel, and potentially fragile, institutional framework may fail. This conjecture is also consistent with the finding that anocracies are most likely to experience civil war in the first few years of their existence (Regan and Bell 2010).

[38] Out of the 111 civil war onsets in Fearon and Laitin, there are 72 cases of peripheral challenge, 22 cases of state disintegration, 14 cases of coup, and 3 cases of insurrectionary protests.

[39] The distribution of mean GDP per capita levels by onset type is available in Appendix 6. It suggests that state disintegration and insurrectionary protests do indeed take place in countries that are on average somewhat richer the year prior to onset. It is especially clear for the cases of insurrectionary protests.

Table 5.1. Replication of Fearon and Laitin (2003) with onset types

	Models				
	Fearon &Laitin: Model 3	*Peripheral challenge*	*State disintegration*	*Coup*	*Insurrec. Protests*
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Prior war	-0.916***	-0.975***	-0.116	-17.452	-17.938
	(0.312)	(0.365)	(0.679)	(2,358.533)	(3,732.789)
Per capita income[a,b]	-0.318***	-0.471***	-0.062	-0.438*	0.126
	(0.071)	(0.113)	(0.111)	(0.230)	(0.112)
log(population)[a,b]	0.272***	0.427***	0.037	-0.426	0.122
	(0.074)	(0.088)	(0.197)	(0.261)	(0.560)
log(% mountainous)	0.199**	0.145	0.365*	0.146	0.177
	(0.085)	(0.103)	(0.220)	(0.233)	(0.539)
Noncontiguous state	0.426	0.371	0.814	-16.102	1.002
	(0.272)	(0.334)	(0.596)	(1,963.595)	(1.695)
Oil exporter	0.751***	0.406	0.975*	1.660**	1.007
	(0.278)	(0.366)	(0.590)	(0.724)	(1.354)
New state	1.658***	1.430***	2.561***	-17.406	-17.212
	(0.342)	(0.450)	(0.585)	(5,731.773)	(8,929.874)
Instability[a]	0.513**	0.486*	-0.144	1.589***	-16.955
	(0.242)	(0.293)	(0.686)	(0.594)	(3,611.948)
Ethnic fractionalization	0.164	0.535	-0.549	-1.600	5.748
	(0.368)	(0.450)	(0.883)	(1.135)	(3.589)
Religious fractionalization	0.326	-0.328	0.919	2.442	-3.967
	(0.506)	(0.644)	(1.133)	(1.514)	(3.489)
Anocracy[a]	0.521**	0.430	1.152**	-0.126	0.755
	(0.237)	(0.291)	(0.576)	(0.735)	(1.484)
Democracy[a,c]	0.127	0.062	-0.640	0.823	0.645
	(0.304)	(0.375)	(0.934)	(0.695)	(1.577)
Constant	-7.019***	-8.365***	-7.986***	-2.892	-11.850**
	(0.751)	(0.925)	(1.907)	(2.272)	(4.801)
Observations	6,327	6,327	6,327	6,327	6,327
Log Likelihood	-478.671	-337.318	-107.534	-77.239	-21.667
Akaike Inf. Crit.	983.342	700.636	241.067	180.478	69.333

Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. *p<0.1;**p<0.05;***p<0.01

[a] *Lagged one year.*
[b] *In 1000's.*
[c] *Dichotomous.*

4.3.2. Onset types, political structures, and regime type

Gleditsch and Ruggeri (2010) examine the role of political institutions in affecting the risk of civil war. They find that weaker governments, proxied by irregular leader transitions, are more likely to face civil war. They also find that democratic institutions decrease the risk of civil war. They measure conflict onset at the country-year level, based on the Uppsala/PRIO Armed Conflict Data (Gleditsch et al. 2002), excluding observations of subsequent years of the same conflict. They use the Archigos data to identify whether a leader in power entered or exited irregularly and the tenure of leaders, measured in days (Goemans, Gleditsch and Chiozza 2009). Do the political opportunities created by irregular leader change favor some types of civil war onset compared to others?

As in this case, the respective lists of civil wars do not overlap perfectly, I use a two-step replication strategy: first, I replicate Gleditsch and Ruggeri's study using the list of civil war onsets from DatOnset, measured as a dichotomous variable, and second, I disaggregate the results by onset type using the categorical measure of civil war onset.[40] Following Gleditsch and Ruggeri, years of ongoing conflict are dropped from the analysis. Table 5.2 shows the results, where Models 1 and 7 provide the results of the original study, Models 2 and 8 replicate the same analyses using a dichotomous measure of civil war onset from DatOnset, and Models 3 to 6 and 9 to 12 show the results of separate logistic regressions for each onset type.[41]

I find that irregular transitions are associated with the onset of civil war especially in the form of peripheral challenges and coups. One interpretation for peripheral challenges is that as a leader is removed irregularly, she resists the new government, either from the periphery or in exile, and organizes a military force to challenge the government, as it was the case in Cambodia in 1970. Regarding onsets in the form of coups, the results point to attempts by the army to counter the irregular transition, either in support of the deposed leader or for the benefit of army officers who see in the irregular transition the potential to increase their hold over political power, as suggested by Gleditsch and Ruggeri. This interpretation is further supported by the results for irregular entry specifically, which provide a highly significant coefficient only for onset in the form of coups. Although the absence of significant results for state disintegration and insurrectionary should be considered with caution, it seems that these two types of onset are driven by mechanisms distinct from irregular leader entry.

[40] The distribution of onset type for the time frame of Gleditsch and Ruggeri's study is as follows: 104 cases of peripheral challenge, 30 cases of state disintegration, 17 cases of coup, and 8 cases of insurrectionary protests.
[41] The caveat pointed out at the beginning of this section still applies and as for the previous replication, coefficients must be interpreted with caution.

Table 5.2. Replication of Gleditsch and Ruggeri (2010) with onset types

	Gleditsch & Ruggeri : Model 3						*Gleditsch & Ruggeri : Model 5*					
	Gleditsch & Ruggeri	*DatOnset*	*Peripheral challenge*	*State dis.*	*Coup*	*Insurrec. protests*	*Gleditsch & Ruggeri*	*DatOnset*	*Peripheral challenge*	*State dis.*	*Coup*	*Insurrec. protests*
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
log of GDP pc	-0.312***	-0.345***	-0.495***	0.072	-1.126***	1.193**	-0.307***	-0.375***	-0.514***	-0.016	-1.272***	1.348***
	(0.084)	(0.114)	(0.138)	(0.284)	(0.434)	(0.471)	(0.085)	(0.115)	(0.140)	(0.295)	(0.447)	(0.517)
Polity	-0.048***	-0.041*	-0.049	-0.087*	0.073	0.099	-0.044**	-0.047*	-0.052*	-0.115**	0.095	0.104
	(0.017)	(0.023)	(0.030)	(0.051)	(0.075)	(0.140)	(0.018)	(0.024)	(0.031)	(0.053)	(0.081)	(0.157)
Polity = -77	1.614***	2.930***	2.208***	3.329***	3.293***	-8.182	2.193***	3.159***	2.322***	3.236***	4.209***	-6.900
	(0.444)	(0.493)	(0.626)	(0.762)	(1.092)	(1,643.274)	(0.465)	(0.499)	(0.627)	(0.775)	(1.174)	(1,532.476)
Polity = -88	0.161	0.504	0.465	-15.900	1.030	5.593**	0.216	0.604	0.556	-16.009	1.643	6.435**
	(0.384)	(0.461)	(0.553)	(1,103.583)	(1.364)	(2.772)	(0.382)	(0.453)	(0.546)	(1,126.449)	(1.362)	(3.144)
PARCOMP = 0 | 1	-0.656***	-0.619**	-0.485	-2.129***	-0.478	2.505	-0.702***	-0.621**	-0.493	-2.050**	-0.604	2.621
	(0.197)	(0.263)	(0.309)	(0.820)	(0.847)	(2.371)	(0.199)	(0.265)	(0.311)	(0.822)	(0.869)	(2.696)
PARREG = 1 | 2	0.499**	-0.083	-0.003	-0.506	-0.489	0.451	0.542**	-0.053	0.030	-0.549	-0.236	0.404
	(0.226)	(0.337)	(0.423)	(0.878)	(0.994)	(1.305)	(0.227)	(0.337)	(0.425)	(0.879)	(0.982)	(1.312)
log of population	0.369***	0.251***	0.331***	0.092	-0.136	0.340	0.378***	0.262***	0.342***	0.152	-0.159	0.367
	(0.042)	(0.058)	(0.067)	(0.150)	(0.209)	(0.257)	(0.043)	(0.059)	(0.069)	(0.155)	(0.208)	(0.266)
Conflict history	2.052***	2.299***	2.238***	3.353***	0.386	2.599***	2.020***	2.190***	2.154***	3.130***	0.277	3.063***
	(0.183)	(0.231)	(0.274)	(0.590)	(0.791)	(0.975)	(0.186)	(0.234)	(0.278)	(0.606)	(0.791)	(1.034)
Irregular transition	0.779***	1.335***	0.930**	1.248*	3.055***	0.715						
	(0.245)	(0.279)	(0.371)	(0.660)	(0.615)	(1.372)						

Table 5.2. *(continued)*

	Gleditsch & Ruggeri : Model 3						*Gleditsch & Ruggeri : Model 5*					
	Gleditsch & Ruggeri	*DatOnset*	*Peripheral challenge*	*State dis.*	*Coup*	*Insurrec. protests*	*Gleditsch & Ruggeri*	*DatOnset*	*Peripheral challenge*	*State dis.*	*Coup*	*Insurrec. protests*
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Irregular entry							1.087***	0.793**	0.541	0.603	3.553***	-9.508
							(0.313)	(0.387)	(0.474)	(0.958)	(1.148)	(9.195)
log of tenure							-0.050	-0.222	-0.166	-0.568*	0.061	-0.159
							(0.108)	(0.144)	(0.171)	(0.341)	(0.537)	(0.558)
Entry * log tenure							-0.386**	-0.303	-0.166	-0.989	-1.582**	3.466
							(0.167)	(0.217)	(0.250)	(0.883)	(0.731)	(2.835)
Constant	-4.760***	-4.231***	-4.212***	-8.208***	3.143	-22.470***	-4.869***	-3.718***	-3.900***	-6.989**	4.330	-24.190***
	(0.819)	(1.131)	(1.362)	(2.847)	(3.970)	(5.828)	(0.851)	(1.152)	(1.395)	(2.806)	(4.036)	(6.651)
Observations	6,103	6,127	6,079	6,013	6,000	5,993	6,093	6,121	6,074	6,007	5,995	5,988
Log Likelihood	-835.689	-509.669	-381.184	-103.720	-69.795	-42.735	-826.974	-511.907	-381.455	-100.750	-70.780	-40.370
Akaike Inf. Crit.	1,691.378	1,039.338	782.368	227.440	159.590	105.469	1,677.947	1,047.814	786.911	225.501	165.559	104.740

Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. *p<0.1;**p<0.05;***p<0.01

4.3.3. Onset types, transnational factors, and refugee flows

Starting from the empirical observation that some regions experience civil war much more often than others, Salehyan and Gleditsch (2006) find that the presence of refugees from neighboring countries increases the risk of civil war in the host country. This effect works either through the "importation" of rebel networks and resources, support to domestic groups opposing the host government, a change in the ethnic balance of the host state, which may trigger conflict, or through competition with local populations over scarce resources. Given these mechanisms, I expect that the results are mainly driven by onsets in the form of peripheral challenge. However, it is possible that the changes in the ethnic balance of the host state produced by the refuge flows lead to civil war onset in the forms of state disintegration, when the host is relatively new or its institutions fragile; and coups, when the ethnic divisions are particularly salient, and army personnel share the same ethnic identity as the refugee population.

In their analysis, Salehyan and Gleditsch use a dichotomous measure of conflict onset from the Uppsala/PRIO Conflict dataset between 1951 and 2001, where conflict onset is coded 1 for the first year of a conflict, and 0 if no conflict takes place in the state in that particular year. As for the previous replication, because there exists some mismatch between their list of civil wars and DatOnset, I proceed with a two-step replication strategy. Following Salehyan and Gleditsch, years of ongoing conflict are dropped from the analysis. Table 5.3 shows the results, where Model 1 is the original study, Model 2 replicates the same analysis using a dichotomous measure of civil war onset from DatOnset, and Models 3 to 6 show the results of separate logistic regression for each onset type.[42]

As expected, refugee flows only affect the risk of civil war onset in the form of peripheral challenges, with a highly statistically significant estimated coefficient. In contrast, refugee flows do not seem to increase the risk of civil war in any other form. This result suggests that refugee flows are linked to civil war onset through local-level dynamics and mechanisms, as opposed to top-down dynamics led by insiders to the state apparatus. In that sense, civil war following refugee flows is the consequence of empowered radicalized militants and excluded politicians in host regions and communities, who initiate their military struggle against state forces that remain largely cohesive, often in the rural periphery.

[42] The distribution of onset type for the time frame of Salehyan and Gledtisch's study is as follows: 102 cases of peripheral challenge, 28 cases of state disintegration, 17 cases of coup, and 8 cases of insurrectionary protests.

Although Salehyan and Gleditsch describe that refugee flows are typically caused by exposure to political violence, several mechanisms they suggest may equally apply to population movements triggered by other factors. Given the likelihood of an increase in the occurrence of climate-induced migration, a refined understanding of the potential consequences of refugee movements on conflict onset is of acute need and relevance.

Table 5.3. Replication of Salehyan and Gleditsch (2006) with onset types

	Models					
	Salehyan & Gleditsch: Model 2	*DatOnset*	*Peripheral challenge*	*State disintegration*	*Coup*	*Insurrec. protests*
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Refugees	0.042***	0.050**	0.063***	0.026	-0.010	-0.014
	(0.014)	(0.021)	(0.024)	(0.050)	(0.077)	(0.109)
Civil war in neighbor	0.337**	0.360	0.537*	0.762	-0.789	-0.705
	(0.156)	(0.236)	(0.314)	(0.543)	(0.660)	(1.013)
Polity	0.006	0.014	0.015	-0.015	0.107*	-0.100
	(0.012)	(0.019)	(0.023)	(0.061)	(0.062)	(0.077)
Polity squared	-0.015***	-0.020***	-0.013***	-0.050***	-0.030**	-0.009
	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.016)
GDP per capita (log)	-0.214**	-0.522***	-0.802***	0.187	-1.163**	0.902
	(0.090)	(0.142)	(0.185)	(0.309)	(0.508)	(0.620)
Population (log)	0.264***	0.152**	0.213***	-0.034	-0.220	0.612*
	(0.043)	(0.068)	(0.081)	(0.168)	(0.228)	(0.318)
Ethnic heterogeneity	0.016***	0.011	0.010	0.006	0.010	0.034
	(0.005)	(0.007)	(0.009)	(0.017)	(0.021)	(0.022)
Peace years	-0.492***	-0.379***	-0.229**	-0.674***	-0.574*	-0.441
	(0.060)	(0.090)	(0.109)	(0.223)	(0.319)	(0.425)
Spline 1	-0.007***	-0.005***	-0.002	-0.009*	-0.013**	-0.007
	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.009)
Spline 2	0.003***	0.003**	0.0004	0.005	0.008**	0.004
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.005)
Spline 3	-0.0004	-0.0003	0.0004	-0.001	-0.002*	-0.001
	(0.0002)	(0.0003)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Constant	-2.298***	0.210	0.641	-3.923	6.831	-19.085***
	(0.859)	(1.324)	(1.693)	(2.945)	(4.530)	(6.829)
Observations	5,567	5,383	5,348	5,302	5,294	5,288
Log Likelihood	-821.040	-415.006	-287.355	-92.286	-65.849	-35.000
Akaike Inf. Crit.	1,666.081	854.013	598.710	208.572	155.698	94.000

Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

4.3.4. Onset types, natural disaster, and climate shocks

Based on their analysis of conflict onset between 1950 and 2000, Nel and Righarts (2008) find that natural disasters significantly increase the risk of civil war both in the short and medium run, and especially in countries that are at higher risk of experiencing civil conflict. This finding is all the more important as climate change has rapidly increased the rate at which natural disasters occur across the world. Do natural disasters increase the likelihood of all civil war onset equally? Natural disasters may create the conditions for different types of onset. It may increase the grievances of specific communities in the periphery of the state, often more at risk of experiencing natural disasters. This, in turn, may lead local militants to radicalize their political demands. It is also possible that these demands lead to conflict among political elites, exacerbating tensions and causing infighting and state breakdown in countries that already suffer from fragile institutions. Lastly, it may also lead to waves of mass protests demanding changes in the government and state policies, that, if repressed, may escalate into civil conflict.

As Nel and Righarts point out, it may be the case that civil wars do not immediately follow natural disasters. It is also possible that this time effect works differently across types of civil war onsets. I therefore replicate Model 2 in Nel and Righarts' study, as well as Model 5, which controls for timing. As for the previous replications, because there exists some mismatch between Nel and Righarts' list of civil wars and DatOnset, I proceed with a two-step replication strategy. Following Nel and Righarts, the different variables of onset take the value 1 when an onset of a specific type occurs, and 0 for all other years. Table 5.4 displays the results, where Models 1 and 7 show the results of the original study, Models 2 and 8 replicate the same analyses using a dichotomous measure of civil war onset from DatOnset, and Models 3 to 6 and 9 to 12 show the results of separate rare-event logistic regression for each onset type.[43]

The results suggest that natural disasters increase the risk of civil war only in the form of peripheral challenge, which shows a statistically significant estimated coefficient. By contrast, the coefficients for the remaining three types of onset report no significant results.[44] Once again, due to the limited size of each category of onset, these results should be considered with caution. They nevertheless suggest that, just as refugee flows, natural disasters lead to conflict through local channels, as opposed to trigger splits within political elites or the

[43] The distribution of onset type for the time frame of Nel and Righarts' study is as follows: 92 cases of peripheral challenge, 23 cases of state disintegration, 14 cases of coup, and 6 cases of insurrectionary protests.
[44] Note that in the case of Models 5, 11, and 12, the model did not converge probably due to small number of cases of onset, I therefore do not interpret the results.

military. Such finding is consistent with several explanations of civil war onset. Natural disasters may increase the risk of peripheral challenges as they exacerbate the grievances of impoverished populations, often rural, through growing food and land insecurity, who in consequence may choose to turn to armed rebellion. Natural disasters may also reduce the individual opportunity costs of rebellion as they may render the soil unfit for cultivation, especially in the case of droughts or heavy rainfall, or destroy the means for cultivation, such as equipment and seed reserves, as well as jobs. As climate-induced disasters are increasing rapidly, this finding suggests that the number of civil war onsets in the form of peripheral challenge, which have been steadily decreasing since the early 2010s, may increase in the near future, with all their consequences for human security.

Table 5.4. Replication of Nel and Righarts (2008) with onset types

	Nel & Righarts : Model 2						*Nel & Righarts : Model 5*					
	Nel & Righarts[1]	*DatOnset*	*Peripheral challenge*	*State dis.*	*Coup*	*Insurrec. protests*	*Nel & Righarts*[2]	*DatOnset*	*Peripheral challenge*	*State dis.*	*Coup*	*Insurrec. protests*
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
No. natural disasters per capita	1.185***	0.681	1.154**	-1.400	-1.657	1.338	1.106***	1.059**	1.282**	0.180	2.188	1.385
	(0.275)	(0.419)	(0.435)	(1.589)	(2.315)	(0.691)	(0.312)	(0.409)	(0.458)	(1.140)	(0.724)	(0.700)
Infant mortality rate *t* - 1	0.023***	0.037***	0.053***	0.010	0.027	-0.035	0.026***	0.040***	0.051***	0.026	0.040**	-0.032
	(0.005)	(0.008)	(0.011)	(0.016)	(0.019)	(0.017)	(0.005)	(0.008)	(0.010)	(0.018)	(0.020)	(0.018)
Infant mortality rate squared *t* - 1	-0.00007***	-0.0001***	-0.0002***	-0.00001	-0.00007	0.0001	-0.00008***	0.0001***	-0.0001***	-0.0001	-0.0001	0.0001
	(0.00002)	(0.00003)	(0.00004)	(0.00006)	(0.00008)	(0.00007)	(0.00002)	(0.00003)	(0.00004)	(0.00008)	(0.00008)	(0.00007)
Mixed regime	0.524***	0.409**	0.302	0.598	1.040*	0.103	0.387**	0.273	0.219	0.271	0.748	0.247
	(0.150)	(0.195)	(0.232)	(0.467)	(0.491)	(0.824)	(0.155)	(0.201)	(0.240)	(0.487)	(0.505)	(0.823)
GDP growth	-0.068***	-0.046*	-0.036	-0.057	-0.131*	0.117	-0.052**	-0.018	-0.021	-0.067	-0.025	0.127*
	(0.020)	(0.026)	(0.031)	(0.063)	(0.051)	(0.040)	(0.020)	(0.026)	(0.031)	(0.061)	(0.071)	(0.035)
Brevity of peace	0.872***	1.397***	1.297***	2.429***	0.637	1.511	0.557***	1.066***	1.120***	2.025***	-1.145	0.811
	(0.167)	(0.206)	(0.244)	(0.516)	(0.592)	(0.814)	(0.174)	(0.210)	(0.246)	(0.509)	(0.857)	(0.908)
Constant	-5.187***	-6.470***	-7.599***	-7.489***	-8.038***	-6.563***	-5.182***	-6.554***	-7.489***	-7.810***	-8.882***	-6.512***
	(0.263)	(0.407)	(0.567)	(0.856)	(1.093)	(0.694)	(0.267)	(0.414)	(0.559)	(0.922)	(1.221)	(0.694)
Observations	7,839	7,839	7,839	7,839	7,839	7,839	7,662	7,662	7,662	7,662	7,662	7,662
Likelihood ratio test	143.6163	129.831	107.1731	30.46164	16.98423	7.207745	107.3506	106.0169	92.92253	25.08857	15.07124	6.954371
Wald test	2,316.343	1,739.671	1,426.119	586.7032	548.8001	365.553	2351.489	1,774.172	1,444.062	607.9072	554.8313	368.6098

Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. *p<0.1;**p<0.05;***p<0.01

[1] *All conflicts*

[2] *All conflicts t + 1*

4.4. Conclusion

This chapter has covered important grounds. First, I have introduced a novel dataset of civil war onset, which represents the first attempt to systematically account for the variation in civil war onset across cases and over an extended period of time. As such, DatOnset (1944-2020) contains important information on the dynamics and processes at play across countries when politics becomes a military contest between domestic actors. When introducing the new dataset, I have discussed the data generation process at length, and presented an extended list of civil wars based on the recent concept of sovereignty rupture (Sambanis and Schulhofer-Wohl 2019), and which is validated against other commonly used datasets of civil wars. Turning to the measurement of onset type, I have highlighted complex sequences of events, and described the procedures used to generate consistent coding across cases based on three key indicators of onset: the identity of first movers, the army status, and the location of the initial interactions between these key actors.

Focusing on the main contribution of this new dataset, that is a categorical and fine-grained conceptualization of civil war onset, I have provided extensive descriptive statistics of civil war onset between 1944 and 2020, and linked them to current findings in the literature. Lastly, I have provided a concrete application of the typology of onset through the replication of several landmark studies of civil war onset. In doing so, this chapter contributes to the existing literature in two complementary ways: first, it refines our understanding of the causes of civil war by identifying systematic associations between some correlates and specific types of civil war onset; and second, based on the differentiated effects of these correlates of onset across types, this chapter points to key causal mechanisms at play during the onset of civil war, and overlooked thus far.

Building on this novel dataset and having demonstrated the value of this original conceptualization of onset for our understanding of the causes of civil war, the next chapter empirically tests the implications of the different types of civil war onsets for how conflicts unfold and provides empirical evidence of civil war trajectories that originate in the conflict onset.

Chapter 5

Civil war onset and wartime dynamics: Macro-level comparative evidence

Do civil wars unfold in patterned ways given how they begin? The previous chapter introduced a new dataset of civil war onset, which includes for the variation in conflict onset for all civil wars between 1944 and 2020. Having showed the value of this novel conceptualization of onset for our understanding of the causes of civil war, this chapter now asks whether the dynamics of civil war onset allow to uncover some information about how a conflict is likely to unfold. While in the previous chapter, civil war onset is used as the main outcome variable, in this chapter, I use the variation in civil war onset as the main independent variable. Do some types of onset lead to more violent civil wars? Given how they begin, are civil wars likely to be fought through specific modes of warfare? And do some types of onset lead to longer civil wars compared to others?

This second empirical chapter addresses each of these questions in turn, and tests the theory of civil war trajectories presented in Chapter 3. Using cross-national comparative evidence from conflicts between 1944 and 2020, I find clear empirical patterns in how civil wars unfold, which originate in the conflict onset. Specifically, the results provide strong evidence that given how civil wars begin, some conflicts are more likely to be fought through symmetric modes of warfare, some are more severe, and others yet last longer than others. These findings have important implications for research on civil war and the comparative

analysis of conflict. First, the results show that the type of onset is an important, and so far omitted, factor shaping conflict dynamics. Second, based on these patterns of wartime dynamics, it is possible to infer, although cautiously, some expectations about how contemporary civil wars are likely to unfold given how they begin.

This chapter is organized in three remaining parts. First, I introduce the research design and measurement of the various outcomes and control variables. Second, I turn to the empirical analysis and discuss the results for the three outcomes in turn —warfare, severity, and duration. The last section concludes.

5.1. Research design

Throughout this chapter, I use statistical methods to compare conflict dynamics across different civil wars between 1944 and 2020, using the type of onset as the main explanatory variable of interest. Specifically, I use logistic regression models to examine the relation between onset and warfare and conflict severity, and survival models for conflict duration. So far, I have argued that given the different ways in which political sovereignty is challenged, conflicts should display different patterns in how they unfold. In other words, the hypotheses formulated in the previous chapter predict a strong correlation between onset and macro-level wartime dynamics. This chapter investigates whether these patterns are empirically valid.

Using conflict-level measures, this research design allows for a systematic and rigorous test for the patterns of civil war postulated in Chapter 3. In that sense, the cross-national analysis serves a fundamental purpose: it establishes whether statistically significant associations between the types of civil war onset and several key wartime dynamics exist for the universe of cases. While this design allows to test for the predicted conflict trajectories, it is not able to validate with certainty the meso-level mechanisms which are postulated to link onset and key wartime dynamics. Identifying these trajectories of conflict is nevertheless valuable, as it is necessary to establish the existence of such macro-level patterns before turning to refining our understanding of the key meso- and micro-level causal mechanisms that may drive them. Regarding those underlying patterns, Chapter 3 hypothesized for each outcome logical and theoretically funded underlying mechanisms that may account for the aggregated patterns. Strong empirical support for the macro-level trajectories of civil war would provide indirect support for these mechanisms, which will gain from further refinement based on clever empirical designs at a different level of analysis. In this mindset, Chapter 6 illustrates the mechanisms at play in the case of civil wars that start with state disintegration through a

detailed case study of Burundi's civil war (1993-2006), which is further corroborated by small-N comparative evidence from civil wars in Afghanistan (1992-1996), Bosnia (1992-1995), and Lebanon (1975-1990).

In sum, these two empirical chapters together provide a two-step test of the theory. First, this chapter uses the full set of civil wars to establish whether there exists in fact a clear correlation between how a conflict begins and how it unfolds. Second, the following chapter focuses on the case of state disintegration and its specific features, and assesses how they are linked to wartime dynamics in this particular type of civil war onset.

5.1.1. Measuring civil war onset

Following Sambanis (2004), civil war onset occurs when fighting between parties that are politically and militarily organized which have stated political objectives, and which takes place within the territory of a state causes at least 500 to 1,000 deaths.[45] By focusing on relatively severe civil wars, I exclude the smallest conflicts that are systematically fought at low intensity, often in the periphery or by terrorist organizations in richer countries (de la Calle and Sánchez-Cuenca 2012), and that rarely constitutes an existential threat to the state authority. As discussed at length in Chapter 4, I use Sambanis and Schulhofer-Wolh's (2019) dataset based on the concept of sovereignty rupture to identify instances of civil wars.

Next, I categorize each case of civil war onset between 1944 and 2020, based on the three key indicators developed in Chapter 3: (1) the identity of the first movers, (2) the state forces status, and (3) the location of the initial interactions between these key actors. The combination of these indicators leads to four ideal-types of civil war onset: peripheral challenge, state disintegration, coup, and insurrectionary protests. Based on extensive secondary literature and validation by an extensive expert survey, I construct a nominal variable, *onsettype*, which captures the different types of civil war onset —the main explanatory variable of interest in this study. As a result, each instance of onset between 1944 and 2020 included in DatOnset is assigned one of four values, which are mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive.[46] The list of all 194 civil wars with associated start dates and onset types is available in Appendix 4. The next section turns to the main outcome variables.

[45] These are the main criteria for inclusion of the onset of an armed conflict as the onset of a civil war. The additional criteria to identify a civil war onset are listed in Appendix 1. This appendix also lists the modifications made to Sambanis and Schulhofer-Wohl's (2019) list of civil wars.
[46] The details about the coding decisions for each civil war onset is available in Appendix 2.

5.1.2. Measuring warfare, severity, and duration

Warfare. The variable *warfare* is a binary variable that captures the mode of warfare used between warring parties. The data is taken from the Technologies of Rebellion dataset (Kalyvas and Balcells 2010) and extended using the same coding procedures. As an aggregate measure of warfare, it takes one of three mutually exclusive values: irregular, conventional, or symmetric non-conventional. The modes of warfare are a function of the military capacities available to insurgents and the incumbent engaged in a civil war. Conventional warfare refers to symmetric warfare when heavy armor and artillery is used by both sides to the conflict. Irregular warfare refers to a technology of rebellion where rebels rely on light weapons, while the incumbent deploys heavy weaponry. Lastly, symmetric non-conventional warfare refers to a technology of rebellion where neither the insurgents not the incumbent uses heavy weaponry (Kalyvas and Balcells 2010).

Using an aggregate measure of warfare may potentially obscure the dynamic nature of warfare in civil war (Lockyer 2010). However, it allows to capture the primary type of warfare used during the conflict, which is a valuable information on the dynamics of conflict. Moreover, the coding procedure used by Kalyvas and Balcells (2010) is especially useful for this study as they measure technologies of rebellion based on the military capabilities of warring parties during the entire first year of the conflict. It is advantageous in this case, as it mitigates the risk that wartime shocks may redirect conflict trajectories, thereby blurring the relation between onset type and warfare, as discussed in the previous chapter. In that sense, Kalyvas and Balcells (2010) provide an appropriate and useful measure of warfare before any such shocks potentially transform conflict trajectories.

I also construct an alternative measure of warfare based on the definition of technologies of rebellion. The binary variable *warfare2* captures the parity in military capacities across warring parties. This measure is useful as it focuses on the symmetry of military capacities in purely relative terms. That is, there is no more distinction between high and low capacities in absolute terms, merging conventional and symmetric non-conventional modes of warfare as a single category opposed to asymmetric warfare. This measure mitigates the fact the military capacities in absolute terms, high *versus* low, may be correlated with the level of state military capacities directly prior to civil war onset more than with the dynamics of onset whose effect on warfare may be better measured in relative terms, symmetric *versus* asymmetric.[47]

[47] This may especially affect civil wars that begin either as a military coup or with state disintegration.

Table 6.1. Distribution of warfare (N = 194)

	Cold War		Post-Cold War		Both Periods	
	N	%	*N*	%	*N*	%
Technologies of Rebellion	(1944-1990)		(1991-2020)		(1944-2020)	
Conventional	28	25.00	29	35.37	57	29.38
Irregular	73	65.18	33	40.24	106	54.64
SNC	11	9.82	20	24.39	31	15.98
Total	112	100	82	100	194	100
Parity						
Symmetric	39	34.82	49	59.76	88	45.36
Asymmetric	73	65.18	33	40.24	106	54.64
Total	112	100	82	100	194	100

Table 6.1 provides the distribution of both variables for warfare in DatOnset, distinguishing between the Cold War and Post-Cold War periods. Column 3 in the table provides the distribution of warfare for the entire 1944-2020 period. These trends are largely consistent with Kalyvas and Balcells (2010). While a majority of civil wars during the Cold War period were fought through irregular warfare, the post-Cold War period witnessed a clear decrease in the number of asymmetric civil wars, from 73 to 33 conflicts. This is accompanied by an increase in the number of civil wars fought through symmetric warfare, from 39 in the period 1944-1990 to 49 in the period 1991-2020. Given these trends, I control for the time period in all statistical models.

Severity. Measuring the severity of civil wars is inherently difficult as "relevant information is frequently concealed by parties to the conflict, destroyed in the course of the war, or never recorded at all" (Lacina and Gleditsch 2005).[48] Nevertheless, investigating the severity of conflicts has been a prominent subject of empirical analysis (Lacina 2006; Bazzi and Blattman 2014; Balcells and Kalyvas 2014; Chaudoin, Peskowitz and Stanton 2017). In this case, a second challenge arises from the difference in the conceptualization of civil war onset across different datasets. The Uppsala Conflict Data Program being the most often used dataset on civil war fatalities, there are some limitations to how the data can be used to estimate the intensity of conflict, conceptualized as polity-level events. Due to the mismatch between the list of dyadic conflicts and DatOnset, I cannot directly use their continuous measure of conflict

[48] Throughout this dissertation, I use the term intensity and severity interchangebly.

intensity. Instead, I exploit an alternative measure based on Kalyvas, Kreiman, and Siberdt (2022) and combine it with the UCDP data to build three indicators of conflict intensity.

Specifically, I use the standard thresholds in the literature to distinguish low intensity from high intensity of violence. Those are based on the count of battle deaths, which refer to "deaths resulting directly from violence inflicted through the use of armed force by a party to an armed conflict during contested combat" (Lacina and Gleditsch 2005: 162). Specifically, each year in the lifespan of a conflict during which the number of recorded battle deaths lies between 25 and 999 is coded as low intensity —what UCDP refers to as minor conflict[49]—, while each year during which the number of battle deaths reaches 1,000 is coded as high intensity —or war, following UCDP's terminology (Pettersson 2021: 5; Gleditsch et al. 2002).

I then construct several measures of intensity based on data from UCDP. Although binary measures entail the loss of some nuances, I am confident that, in this case, they still provide useful estimates of the severity of civil war at the aggregate level. First, I code *onset intensity,* a binary variable that captures the number of battle deaths recorded during the first year of fighting between parties to the civil war. Taking the level of intensity in the first calendar year of the conflict might produce a misleading estimate when conflicts start late in the calendar year, such as the Liberian civil war which started in December 1989 or the civil war in Cyprus that started in November 1963. I therefore adjust the measure of onset intensity and take the intensity level of the following year for all conflicts that begin in the second half of any given year. Such a measure thus allows to identify whether some types of civil war onset

Table 6.2. Distribution of onset and conflict intensity (N = 194)

	Intensity level					
	High		Low		Total	
Measure of intensity	*N*	*%*	*N*	*%*	*N*	*%*
Onset intensity	85	43.81	109	56.19	194	100
Conflict intensity (60 percent threshold)	66	34.02	128	65.98	194	100
Conflict intensity (75 percent threshold)	57	29.38	137	70.62	194	100

[49] In each case, the years considered as ongoing conflict correspond to the start and end dates in DatOnset, based on Sambanis and Schulhofer-Wohl (2019). For each conflict, the yearly values for intensity, high or low, were taken for those years only, which is some cases did not exactly match those in UCDP. In addition, the values for different dyads that are part of the same civil war were added up to provide yearly estimates of conflict intensity at the conflict level.

are "bang" conflicts, which are fought at high intensity from the get-go, or "whimper" conflicts, those that start at low intensity of violence, and sometimes escalate (Kalyvas, Kreiman and Siberdt 2022).

Second, given that the hypotheses on conflict severity predict macro-level patterns of conflict intensity, I use an aggregated measure of *conflict intensity*. Following Kalyvas, Kreiman, and Siberdt (2022)[50], I use two thresholds of aggregated severity. First, based on data from UCDP, I code high intensity overall for a given conflict if at least 60 percent of a conflict's duration, measured in years, was fought at high intensity. Second, to ensure that the results are not dependent of the arbitrary threshold, I use a similar logic with a higher threshold of 75 percent. Table 6.2 provides the summary statistics for each measure of intensity.

Duration. Coding the start and end of civil wars has always been challenging, for the primary reason that conflict do not simply start, go on, and disappear once fighting is over. Instead, political conflicts evolve into and out of military confrontations. An advantage of my conceptualization of civil war onset as a process of sovereignty rupture is that it somewhat relaxes the need to identify a precise moment of onset. Instead, in identifying the onset of civil war in this study, I aim to place in time the moment at which the transformation of political conflict into a military challenge takes place, with each onset type indicating a different process of transformation.

How to identify when these transitions occur? As detailed in the previous chapter, I use the concept of sovereignty rupture as the guideline to identify the start and end date of each civil war (Sambanis and Schulhofer-Wohl 2019). Having discussed the identification and measurement of onset in Chapter 4, I focus here on the measurement of termination.[51] Civil wars end in different ways, from peace agreements, to ceasefire, to military victories either by the government or the rebels (Kreutz 2010; DeRouen and Sobek 2004; Mason, Weingarten and Fett 1999; Fearon 2004; Licklider 1995; Fortna 2004). Sambanis (2004) lays out the different coding decisions applying to each type of conflict termination. Details about the coding

[50] Given the occasional differences in start and end dates of civil wars, as well as the addition of several conflicts, I adjusted the values when necessary. The logic behind the coding of intensity remains the same and further details are available in Kalyvas, Kreiman and Siberdt's (2022) appendix.

[51] Recall that, following Sambanis and Schulhofer-Wolh (2019), themselves based on Sambanis (2004), a civil war is considered to begin the first year that a political conflict between organized groups causes at least 500 to 1,000 fatalities. If the conflict has not caused more than 500 casualties in the first year, the war is coded as having started in that year if the cumulative deaths in the next three-year period amount to 1,000 casualties. Once they begin, conflicts are coded as ongoing as long as they display sustained violence. That is, they should be no three-year period during which the conflict causes fewer than 500 casualties (Sambanis 2004).


procedures are available in Appendix 1 for cases that diverge from Sambanis and Schulhofer-Wohl's (2019) initial list.

In sum, the duration of conflict is the time that a conflict is characterized by sustained violence between warring parties. It is computed as the lapse of time, measured in years, from the transition into military conflict that is captured by civil war onset, and the transition out of it, captured by the different civil war outcomes. Figure 6.1 shows the distribution of conflict duration, with a mean duration of 7.1 years, for all conflicts included in DatOnset.

5.1.3. Controlling for pre-war structural conditions

I have shown in the previous chapter that some determinants of civil war onset are actually associated with specific types of onset. These findings are valuable here, as they point to possible backdoor paths linking onset type and wartime dynamics. I therefore control for various potential confounders in the following analysis to avoid omitted variable bias, as failing to do so would result in spurious correlations. Specifically, I consider in turn several pre-war structural factors that are commonly associated with civil war onset and may potentially shape

Figure 6.1. Distribution of conflict duration (1944-2020)



some wartime dynamics, including state capacity, natural resources, time period, regime type, and ethnic fractionalization. Detailed descriptive statistics for each of these factors are available in Appendix 6.

First, low GDP per capita, either as an indicator of state capacity (Fearon and Laitin 2003) or individual opportunity costs (Collier and Hoeffler 2004), is commonly found to be a good predictor of civil war onset. The replication of landmark studies of civil war onset in the previous chapter has shown that low state capacity is associated with peripheral challenges and coups, and appears uncorrelated with state disintegration and insurrectionary protests. I therefore control for the level of state capacity, measured as GDP per capita using data from the Maddison project (Bolt and van Zanden 2020).[52] The variable is lagged by one year and, due to skewness in its distribution, enters as a log in all specifications.

Second, natural resources have been found to increase the likelihood of civil war onset (Ross 2004; Humphreys 2005; Collier and Hoeffler 2004). It has also been found to affect some dynamics, including conflict duration (Fearon 2004). As for state capacity, it may be that the presence of natural resources increases the likelihood of some types of civil war onset compared with others.[53] The replication of Fearon and Laitin's (2003) study suggests that oil exports are specifically correlated with civil war onsets in the form of state disintegration and coups. I therefore control for the presence of natural resources using data from Fearon and Laitin (2003), themselves based on oil exports data from the World Bank. The binary variable *Oil* takes the value 1 for country-years in which fuel exports represent at least one-third of all export revenues, and 0 otherwise. The variable is lagged by one year.[54]

Third, the distribution of onset types over time in the previous chapter shows that different types of onset peaked at different times between 1944 and 2020, with the evolution of the international environment. It is therefore possible that some conditions of the international system, such as the presence of foreign patrons or global revolutionary ideologies, shape both the type of civil war onset and wartime dynamics (e.g., Kalyvas and Balcells 2010). I therefore control for the time period, using a binary measure that takes the value 1 when onset occurs after the end the Cold War (1991-2020), and 0 otherwise (1944-1990).[55]

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[52] Appendix 6 provides the distribution of GDP per capita for each onset types, with associated means. Civil war onset in the form of insurrectionary protests is especially correlated with high levels of GDP per capita.
[53] Appendix 6 provides the cross-tabulation between the presence of natural resources and the types of civil war onset.
[54] When the data for the year prior to onset was missing, I take the closest date prior to onset. For cases prior to 1960, I follow Fearon and Laitin (2003) and took the value of 1960.
[55] The distributions of onset types by time period are available in Appendix 5.

Fourth, democracies may face domestic military threats in forms systematically different from authoritarian regime, and they may also fight insurgents in different ways (Lacina 2006). I therefore control for regime type using data from Polity5 (Marshall and Gurr 2020). I use a continuous measure of regime in all model specifications, which is lagged by one year.[56]

Fifth, I control for the degree of ethnic fractionalization, as it has been found to affect the likelihood of civil war onset, as well as some wartime dynamics (Bormann, Cederman and Vogt 2017; Eck 2009; Elbadawi and Sambanis 2002). Data is taken from the Historical Index of Ethnic Fractionalization Dataset (HIEF) (Drazanova 2019). The index at the country-year level reflects the likelihood that two people chosen at random within a given country will be from different ethnic groups. It ranges from 0, when there is no ethnic fractionalization and all individuals are members of the same ethnic group to 1, where each individual belongs to his or her own ethnic group. The variable is lagged by one year.

Lastly, I control for several additional factors according to the specific dependent variable under study. These variables include a measure of military personnel taken from the National Military Capabilities Dataset V6 (COW) (Singer, Bremer and Stuckey 1972), terrain

Table 6.3. Summary statistics for the control variables

Statistic	***N***	***Median***	***Mean***	***Standard deviation***	***Min***	***Max***
(ln) GDP per capita	180	7.752	7.819	0.900	6.194	10.280
Oil	190	0.000	0.205	0.405	0.000	1.000
Regime type	193	-2.500	-1.554	5.689	-10.000	10.000
Military personnel (in thousands)	184	52.5	352.7	958.862	0.000	5112.0
Terrain ruggedness	188	96.7	132.8	99.124	14.7	530.1
Marxist	194	0.000	0.196	0.398	0.000	1.000
Islamist	194	0.000	0.144	0.352	0.000	1.000
Ethnic fractionalization	179	0.572	0.517	0.271	0.000	0.890
Religious fractionalization	189	0.480	0.428	0.205	0.000	0.783
(ln) population	185	9.626	9.640	1.528	6.213	13.619

[56] DatOnset also includes a binary measure of regime type based on Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland (2010) and extended by Bjornskov and Rode (2020). This variable *democracy* that takes the value 1 when democratic regime; and 0 otherwise. The distribution of regime type by onset type is available in Appendix 6, both measured as a continuous and binary variable in turn.

ruggedness (Nunn and Puga 2012), Marxist rebels (Kalyvas and Balcells 2010), Islamist rebels (Gleditsch and Rudolfsen 2016), population size (Bolt and van Zanden 2020), and religious fractionalization (Fearon and Laitin 2003).[57] Table 6.3 summarizes the descriptive statistics for all control variables.

5.2. Empirical analysis and results

Having discussed measurement and data, in this section, I proceed with the empirical analysis of the macro-level relation between the type of civil war onset and three key wartime dynamics in turn: warfare, severity, and duration.

5.2.1. Onset and warfare

In Chapter 3, I have theorized about the relation between the type of civil war onset and the mode of warfare that is likely to be used during wartime. Given the identity and origin of the first movers, the status of the state forces, and the location of the initial interactions between these key actors, I have formulated predictions about the mode of warfare most likely to be used during fighting. Specifically, I hypothesize that the types of civil war onset condition the initial resources available to the different key actors, which in turn shape the form of warfare characterizing the war, as summarized in Table 6.4.

To estimate the effect of the type of onset on warfare, I run multinomial logistic regression models, using irregular warfare as the reference category for the dependent variable and peripheral challenge as the reference category for the independent variable.[58] I estimate the following model:

$$Y_i = \alpha + \beta Onset\ type_i + \gamma X_i + \epsilon_i$$

where Y_i is the type of warfare, $Onset\ type_i$ is the type of onset with peripheral challenge as the reference category, X_i is a vector of controls specified for each model, and ϵ_i is the error term.

[57] Additional details about the coding of each variable can be found in the codebook in Appendix 3.

[58] I use the categorical variable for warfare in the main analysis as it is the more nuanced measure. I replicate the analysis using the alternative binary measure of warfare as a robustness check. I also replicate these models including fixed effects. Across both tests, the results are consistent across measures of warfare and remain highly significant. These replications are available in Appendix 6. Lastly, as military officers may at times interact closely with political elites, I replicate the empirical analysis with an alternative classification which merges coup and state disintegration into a single category of civil war onset. The results are discussed in Appendix 6.

Table 6.4. Summary of the hypotheses on warfare

	Onset type			
	Peripheral challenge	***State disintegration***	***Coup***	***Insurrectionary protests***
Mode of warfare	Irregular	Symmetric non-conventional	Conventional	Symmetric non-conventional

Table 6.5 shows the results of the multinomial regression analysis with different model specifications. Model 1 start with a bivariate test. Model 2 includes a set of key controls. Model 3 adds several controls on the identity and goals of insurgents, and Model 4 adds two structural controls. Model 5 provides the results with the full set of controls. The key variable of interest – onset type – is statistically and substantively significant across all models. Overall, the findings confirm that the type of civil war onset is a key determinant of the mode of warfare. They also suggest that civil wars are indeed a heterogenous group of military challenges to state sovereignty, and that different types of political challenges are fought differently.

Altogether, the empirical analysis provides strong support for the hypotheses on warfare, for all four types of civil war onset. First, compared to peripheral challenge, all others three types of onset are more likely to be fought through symmetric warfare, either conventional or symmetric non-conventional, compared with irregular warfare. This finding shows a clear association between how a civil war begins and the distribution of military capacity among key actors. While peripheral challenges are characterized by a great imbalance in military capabilities, the other types of onset create the conditions for a relative parity across armed groups.

Second, when focusing on the comparison between peripheral challenges and insurrectionary protests, the results indicate that the latter is more likely to be fought through symmetric non-conventional warfare, while the difference regarding conventional warfare is not statistically significant. This finding suggests that, as insurrectionary protests typically take place in urban areas, the environment limits the use of military capacity by the state forces, leading to symmetric non-conventional warfare, as opposed to irregular warfare.

Table 6.5. Multinomial regression on the modes of warfare

	Models									
	Conventional (1)	*SNC (1)*	*Conventional (2)*	*SNC (2)*	*Conventional (3)*	*SNC (3)*	*Conventional (4)*	*SNC (4)*	*Conventional (5)*	*SNC (5)*
State disintegration	3.237***	3.284***	2.928***	3.434***	2.777***	3.326***	3.175***	3.404***	3.131***	3.724***
	(0.598)	(0.672)	(0.667)	(0.783)	(0.689)	(0.844)	(0.749)	(0.892)	(0.798)	(1.008)
Coup	4.064***	3.658***	3.949***	3.799***	3.898***	3.690***	3.944***	3.256***	3.781***	3.362**
	(1.069)	(1.166)	(1.099)	(1.237)	(1.169)	(1.332)	(1.104)	(1.248)	(1.170)	(1.343)
Insurrectionary protests	1.579**	2.678***	1.462	4.192***	1.190	4.134***	1.512	5.193***	1.230	5.182***
	(0.749)	(0.726)	(0.979)	(1.059)	(1.008)	(1.250)	(0.965)	(1.373)	(1.016)	(1.651)
(ln) GDP per capita			-0.051	-0.525	0.029	-0.253	-0.012	-0.183	0.042	0.062
			(0.281)	(0.358)	(0.304)	(0.410)	(0.270)	(0.191)	(0.295)	(0.220)
Post-Cold War			0.840*	0.984*	1.125**	1.120*	0.631	1.157**	0.993*	1.284**
			(0.453)	(0.535)	(0.535)	(0.637)	(0.485)	(0.578)	(0.565)	(0.655)
Mountainous terrain			0.001	-0.003	0.001	-0.0002	0.0003	-0.003	0.001	0.0001
			(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Polity			-0.077*	-0.043	-0.082*	-0.049	-0.069	-0.076	-0.079*	-0.076
			(0.042)	(0.049)	(0.044)	(0.057)	(0.045)	(0.055)	(0.047)	(0.063)
Ethnic fractionalization			-0.318	1.988	-0.781	2.094	-0.993	1.875	-1.432	2.407*
			(0.934)	(1.388)	(1.015)	(1.547)	(0.951)	(1.199)	(1.062)	(1.326)
Marxist					-0.791	-1.333			-0.680	-1.347
					(0.675)	(1.017)			(0.685)	(1.032)

Table 6.5. *(continued)*

	Models									
	Conventional (1)	*SNC (1)*	*Conventional (2)*	*SNC (2)*	*Conventional (3)*	*SNC (3)*	*Conventional (4)*	*SNC (4)*	*Conventional (5)*	*SNC (5)*
Ethnic war					0.451	0.681			0.107	0.546
					(0.581)	(0.732)			(0.597)	(0.739)
Secessionist war					-0.243	-1.946**			-0.092	-1.807**
					(0.527)	(0.769)			(0.572)	(0.842)
Islamist war					-1.814**	-17.411***			-2.195**	-17.474***
					(0.815)	(0.00000)			(0.963)	(0.00000)
Natural resources							-0.667	-0.666	-0.254	-0.952
							(0.652)	(0.880)	(0.727)	(1.095)
Military personnel							0.0001	-0.010**	0.0001	-0.008
							(0.001)	(0.005)	(0.001)	(0.005)
Constant	-1.579***	-2.272***	-1.529	0.319	-1.826	-1.567	-1.267	-1.542	-1.326	-3.736***
	(0.246)	(0.332)	(2.438)	(3.166)	(2.555)	(3.589)	(2.262)	(0.976)	(2.369)	(1.001)
Number of observations	194	194	169	169	169	169	159	159	159	159
Akaike Inf. Crit.	315.161	315.161	284.683	284.683	273.626	273.626	262.852	262.852	260.204	260.204

Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. *p<0.1;**p<0.05;***p<0.01

[+] *Peripheral challenge is the reference category for onset type*
[++] *Irregular warfare is the reference category for warfare*

Lastly, compared to peripheral challenges, both state disintegration and coups are found to lead to a higher probability of conventional and symmetric non-conventional warfare as opposed to irregular warfare. While this finding goes in the direction predicted by the theory, it does not allow to distinguish between parity at high or low levels of military capacities, which may be linked to the strength of the military directly prior to the onset of civil war more than to the way state sovereignty is challenged by first movers.

In addition to the type of onset, I find that a few other factors are significantly associated with the mode of warfare, as I briefly review. First, secessionist wars appear to be less likely to be fought through either conventional or symmetric non-conventional warfare, compared to irregular warfare. Starting from these results and using this theoretical framework backwards, this finding suggest that secessionist civil wars are often started by radicalized activists or excluded politicians in the periphery and confront state forces that remains mostly loyal in the form of irregular wars. Ample anecdotal evidence suggests that it is the case. For example, consider the civil war in India that began when Kashmiri political parties turned to violence, supported by the local population (Ali et al. 2011) or the war in Cabinda, Angola between the government and separatist insurgents in the 1990s as Cabinda representants excluded from the Alvor agreement adopted violent guerrilla tactics against military targets in the region (Arbucias 2020).

Second, civil wars that are fought by Islamist insurgents also appear to be negatively correlated with either conventional or symmetric non-conventional warfare, compared to irregular warfare. This suggests that most of these cases are started by radicalized groups in the periphery. The recent conflicts onset in Nigeria or in Mozambique provide a good illustration. In Nigeria, the period from 2004 and 2009 was marked by relative calm, although punctuated by some episodes of violence (Weeraratne 2017). But as of 2009, Boko Haram's Islamist insurgents had established a stronghold in the north (Akinola 2015) and violence increased in 2011 with most incidents taking place in Borno state, northeast Nigeria (Weeraratne 2017). In Mozambique, the initial attacks in the northernest region Cabo Delgado in 2017 were led by members of the Al-Shabaab religious sect that formed in the region a decade earlier and was known to the residents. The shift to violence first occurred in 2015 as the sect had been "at the receiving end of increased opposition and repression by mainstream Muslim organizations and the state – with a tipping point reached around 2016" (Morier-Genoud 2020: 404).

Interpreting the magnitude of the effects in multinomial logit models is made difficult by the large number of parameters (Long 1997), even more so in this case as both the dependent


and the main outcome variables are nominal. Therefore, to estimate the substantive effect of onset type on the mode of warfare, I replicate the analysis using an alternative binary measure of warfare, capturing whether warfare is symmetric or asymmetric. This strategy is further supported by the results of the multinomial models that indicate similar effects for both conventional and symmetric non-conventional warfare when onset takes the form of coups and state disintegration. In the case of insurrectionary protests, symmetric warfare likely refers to symmetric non-conventional warfare specifically. The results of the logistic regression models are available in Appendix 6. Altogether, they confirm the importance of the type of onset in determining how conflicts are likely to be fought. All three types of civil war onset are associated with symmetric warfare compared to peripheral challenges, and the estimates are statistically significant across model specifications.

Figure 6.2 shows the predicted probabilities of symmetric warfare for each type of civil war onset, holding all other variables in Model 5 of the logistic regression analysis at their mean or median levels.[59] Overall, the results show that the size of the effect is large. In fact, the predicted probability of conflict being fought through symmetric warfare increases substantively for each onset type compared to peripheral challenges. From a predicted probability of .34 in the case of peripheral challenges, the probability of symmetric warfare increases to .95 when onset takes the form of a coup, all other variables being held constant. The predicted probability increases to .93 following state disintegration and to .78 in the case of insurrectionary protests, all other variables being held constant.

In sum, the empirical analysis has shown so far that the type of civil war onset is strongly correlated with the mode of warfare. Compared to peripheral challenges, all other three types of onset are more likely to be fought through symmetric warfare, either conventional or symmetric non-conventional. This finding suggests that the type of civil war onset —that is the identity of the first movers, the state forces status, and the location of the initial interactions between these actors— conditions the level of military capabilities available to warring parties, hence leading to conflict characterized by different modes of warfare. These results are robust across model specifications. As onset is strongly correlated with warfare, the next step is to examine whether it is also correlated with conflict severity. The next section sets out to do so.

[59] The results of the logistic regression models are available in Appendix 6. The effects of onset type on warfare remain highly significant across all model specifications.

Figure 6.2. Predicted probabilities of symmetric warfare by onset type



5.2.2. Onset and conflict severity

As discussed in Chapter 3, given the variation in civil war onset which signals different types of challenge to state sovereignty, I expect to observe differences in the overall level of severity, measured as battle deaths, as summarize in Table 6.6. Specifically, I postulate that in the case of coup and state disintegration, as groups dispose of available military capacities, either because they splintered from the army or because they benefit from the disintegration of the state institutions and army, these two types of onset should lead to relatively higher levels of conflict intensity. In contrast, peripheral challenges and insurrectionary protests are expected to lead to less severe violence, through separate mechanisms. In peripheral challenges, it is because insurgents dispose of limited capabilities and avoid direct confrontations with government forces. And in the case of insurrectionary protests, it is both because civil war emerges out of non-violent mobilization which is more difficult to repress, and because they occur in urban areas with limits the deployment of heavy weaponry in the case of civil war.

Table 6.6. Summary of the hypotheses on conflict severity

	Onset type			
	Peripheral challenge	***State disintegration***	***Coup***	***Insurrectionary protests***
Conflict severity	Low	High	High	Low

First, I consider whether the type of onset is correlated with more or less severe violence during the first year of fighting. Kalyvas, Kreiman and Siberdt (2022) find that a substantive minority of conflicts, around 40 percent, begin directly at high intensity of violence, defined as at least 1,000 battle deaths. Compatible with my argument, this distribution points to substantive variation across civil war onsets. In this section, I ask whether some types of political challenges to state sovereignty lead to more severe violence at onset than others. Consistent with the hypotheses on overall conflict severity, I expect that both coup and state disintegration result in high-intensity onsets. In the following analysis, onset intensity is a binary variable that takes the value 1 when the first year of fighting is recorded as having caused at least 1,000 battle deaths, and 0 otherwise. I estimate the following equation:

$$Y_i = \alpha + \beta Onset\ type_i + \gamma X_i + \epsilon_i$$

where Y_i is the binary onset intensity, $Onset\ type_i$ is the type of onset with peripheral challenge as the reference category, X_i is a vector of controls, and ϵ_i is the error term.

Table 6.7 shows the results of logistic regression models using onset intensity as the dependent variable, and peripheral challenge as the reference category of onset type. Model 1 shows the results of a bivariate regression. Model 2 uses a specification similar to other studies on conflict severity with the addition of the type of onset (Lacina 2006). The third model adds identity factors, while the fourth model includes additional structural factors. Lastly, Model 5 shows the results when all variables are included.

Table 6.7. Logistic regression on onset intensity

	Models				
	(1)	*(2)*	*(3)*	*(4)*	*(5)*
State disintegration	1.487***	1.671***	1.899***	2.084***	2.016***
	(0.415)	(0.487)	(0.534)	(0.583)	(0.584)
Coup	0.414	0.172	0.366	0.400	0.304
	(0.520)	(0.563)	(0.612)	(0.605)	(0.622)
Insurrectionary protests	-0.384	-0.162	-0.236	-0.016	-0.168
	(0.619)	(0.760)	(0.784)	(0.808)	(0.842)
(ln) GDP per capita		-0.390*	-0.358	-0.494**	-0.469*
		(0.218)	(0.229)	(0.252)	(0.263)
Military personnel				-0.0005	-0.001
				(0.001)	(0.001)
(ln) population			0.263*	0.228	0.265
			(0.154)	(0.169)	(0.188)
Post-Cold War		-0.491	-0.691*	-0.676*	-0.654
		(0.359)	(0.397)	(0.389)	(0.410)
Mountainous terrain		0.0003	0.001	0.001	0.001
		(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Polity		-0.044	-0.045	-0.037	-0.040
		(0.031)	(0.032)	(0.034)	(0.034)
Natural resources				0.659	0.781
				(0.478)	(0.516)
Ethnic fractionalization		-0.479	-0.534	-0.916	-0.975
		(0.723)	(0.736)	(0.802)	(0.813)
Marxist			-0.384		-0.254
			(0.482)		(0.499)
Secessionist war			-0.263		0.024
			(0.418)		(0.439)
Islamist war			-0.240		-0.593
			(0.569)		(0.643)
Constant	-0.532***	2.850	0.320	1.629	1.190
	(0.184)	(1.881)	(2.419)	(2.561)	(2.775)
Observations	194	169	169	159	159
Log Likelihood	-125.093	-106.097	-104.256	-96.695	-96.117
Akaike Inf. Crit.	258.186	230.193	234.512	217.390	222.234

Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. *p<0.1;**p<0.05;***p<0.01

[+] *Peripheral challenge is the reference category for onset type*

The results show that civil war onset in the form of state disintegration is associated with high-intensity onsets, which is consistent across model specifications. The effect is of large magnitude too, as the predicted probability of high intensity onset almost doubles, from .39 following peripheral challenges to .83 in the case of state disintegration, when all other variables are held at the mean or median levels respectively.[60] This finding confirms the hypothesis and suggests that when the government and military disintegrate, fighting between private militias is especially violent from the get-go. It also highlights the role of the state in containing violence, either because of democratic norms and political accountability (Lacina 2006; Valentino, Huth and Balch-Lindsay 2004), or because the presence of the state deters some armed groups from turning to military competition over political power, thereby reducing the overall number of competing armed organizations which have been found to lead to lower levels of conflict severity (Butler, Cunningham and Gates 2015). Turning to the remaining two types of onset, although it is not possible to formally reject the null hypothesis, the results report consistent coefficients across model specifications, which are positive for coups and negative for insurrectionary protests, as hypothesized.[61]

Next, I ask whether the type of civil war onset leads to more or less severe conflict overall, measured in battle-deaths, and estimate the following equation:

$$Y_i = \alpha + \beta Onset\ type_i + \gamma X_i + \epsilon_i$$

where Y_i is the binary conflict severity, $Onset\ type_i$ is the type of onset, with peripheral challenge as the reference category, X_i is a vector of controls, and ϵ_i is the error term. Table 6.8 shows the results of logistic regression models, using conflict severity measured at the 75 percent threshold as the dependent variable.[62]

[60] Plotted predicted probabilities for high violence intensity of onset for each onset type are available in Appendix 6. They are .39 for peripheral challenge, .83 for state disintegration, .47 for coup, and .35 for insurrectionary protests.

[61] The distribution of onset intensity for insurrectionary protests further supports the hypothesis that it leads to relatively less violent conflict onsets. Out of 14 cases, 10 recorded low intensity of violence in the first year of hostilities, while 4 started at high intensity. In the case of coups, the relation is less clear: 8 cases started at high intensity and 9 started at low intensity. Both distributions control for the timing of onset within a given year.

[62] The 75 percent threshold means that a conflict was considered as being severe when 75 percent of its duration in years was fought at high intensity (<1,000 battle deaths). Further detail about the coding of severity is available in Appendix 3. As a robustness check, the analysis is replicated at a lower threshold (60 percent) which is available in Appendix 6. The results remain the same.

Taken together, these results suggest that civil wars do unfold in patterned ways.[63] First, state disintegration, which was found to be strongly correlated with severe onset, also leads to more severe conflicts overall. As shown in Figure 6.3, compared to peripheral challenges that have a predicted probability of leading to severe conflict of .24, state disintegration lead to severe conflict with a predicted probability of .49, all other variables held at the mean or median levels. This increase in predicted probabilities indicates a substantive effect of onset type, and confirms the hypothesis that following the disintegration of the state, conflicts are more likely to be especially violent.

This finding highlights the important role that the state plays in containing and deterring the use of violence. As it collapses, the likelihood of extreme violence increases. The results point to a pattern similar to the one associated with onset intensity. This interpretation is further supported by the finding that higher state capacity leads to lower conflict intensity overall. In that sense, weaker states, who dispose of fewer military capacities and whose control over territory is often sparser (Fearon and Laitin 2003) are less able to deter groups from launching their military challenge *and* to contain it once it has begun (Chaudoin, Peskowitz and Stanton 2017; Bazzi and Blattman 2014).

Second, coups also seem to be associated with higher severity, although the results are not statistically significant at the 5 percent level.[64] The predicted probability of severe conflict following a coup is .36, which is over a ten percent increase compared to peripheral challenges. This is consistent with existing findings in the literature, which find that conventional warfare —found here to be strongly correlated with onset in the form of coups— is associated with higher levels of battle deaths overall (Balcells and Kalyvas 2014).

These results also suggest that it is indeed difficult to infer conflict severity from actors' military capabilities and vice-versa. Highly-equipped actors may not systematically fight high intensity conflict. Instead, the cohesion and discipline in armed organizations may play an important role as determinants of conflict severity (Weinstein 2006; Cohen 2016; Hoover Green 2018). In that sense, lesser-equipped armed groups who suffer from a lack of internal

[63] The analysis on conflict severity was replicated using a lower threshold of intensity to ensure that the results were not artificially created by an arbitrary threshold. In the replication, I use a 60 percent threshold, calculated in the same manner. All results are unchanged: compared with peripheral challenges, state disintegration is positive and statistically significant, coup is consistently positive although not statistically significant, and insurrectionary protests is consistently negative although also not statistically significant. The results of logistic regression models and associated predicted probabilities are available in Appendix 6.

[64] In the case of civil war onsets in the form of coups and insurrectionary protests, the relatively small number of cases may in part account for the absence of clear results. As discussed at legnth in the previous chapters, these two categories of civil war onset are relatively rare events: between 1944 and 2020, I identify 17 cases of coups and 14 cases of insurrectionary protests.


Table 6.8. Logistic regression on conflict severity

	Models				
	(1)	*(2)*	*(3)*	*(4)*	*(5)*
State disintegration	0.907**	1.213**	1.252**	1.131**	1.142**
	(0.394)	(0.482)	(0.499)	(0.542)	(0.549)
Coup	0.774	0.459	0.513	0.580	0.586
	(0.534)	(0.593)	(0.617)	(0.629)	(0.639)
Insurrectionary protests	-0.169	-0.057	0.004	0.181	0.236
	(0.683)	(0.869)	(0.885)	(0.916)	(0.938)
(ln) GDP per capita		-0.485**	-0.510**	-0.641**	-0.665**
		(0.236)	(0.246)	(0.283)	(0.296)
Post-Cold War		-0.595	-0.690	-0.895**	-0.874*
		(0.391)	(0.425)	(0.429)	(0.452)
Mountainous terrain		0.002	0.001	0.002	0.002
		(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Polity		-0.038	-0.037	-0.023	-0.025
		(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.036)	(0.037)
Ethnic fractionalization		-1.081	-1.130	-1.339	-1.387
		(0.766)	(0.774)	(0.852)	(0.864)
Marxist			-0.142		0.019
			(0.504)		(0.526)
Secessionist war			0.130		0.194
			(0.412)		(0.495)
Islamist war			0.305		0.054
			(0.577)		(0.682)
Military personnel				0.00002	0.00000
				(0.001)	(0.001)
(ln) population				0.020	-0.008
				(0.179)	(0.198)
Natural resources				0.732	0.744
				(0.521)	(0.552)
Constant	-1.130***	3.167	3.355	4.165	4.548
	(0.207)	(2.011)	(2.051)	(2.897)	(3.119)
Observations	194	169	169	159	159
Log Likelihood	-114.103	-94.762	-94.506	-86.134	-86.055
Akaike Inf. Crit.	236.206	207.524	213.013	196.267	202.109

Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. *p<0.1;**p<0.05;***p<0.01

[+] *Peripheral challenge is the reference category for onset type*

Figure 6.3. Predicted probabilities of high conflict intensity by onset type



cohesion and clear political objectives, as they often do in civil wars that begin with state disintegration, create more severe conflicts compared to highly-equipped but better-organized armed groups, which are typically found in civil wars that follow military coups.

Lastly, the results do not allow to confirm nor refute the hypothesis for insurrectionary protests, as there appears to be no clear pattern in the case of civil war that begin as insurrectionary protests, which may be due to the small sample size of this category. Nevertheless, a closer look at the cases of state insurrectionary protests reveals that out of 14 cases, only three cases (21.4 percent) reached the level of high conflict intensity at both thresholds and may represent outliers: China in 1947, Libya in 2011, and Syria in 2011.

In sum, this empirical analysis has revealed two clear trajectories of civil war. First, conflicts that begin with state disintegration are fought through symmetric warfare and are especially severe. And second, perhaps a better-known trajectory, conflicts that are launched by radicalized militants in the periphery of the state are fought through irregular warfare and are relatively less severe. The findings also point to two additional trajectories, perhaps less well demarcated: civil wars that follow military coups are fought through conventional warfare

and are somewhat severe; and conflicts that begin as insurrectionary protests are fought through symmetric non-conventional warfare and are also relatively less severe.

5.2.3. Onset and conflict duration

I now turn to the last outcome I investigate, and ask whether some types of onset create the conditions for longer civil wars. So far, I have found strong empirical support for the relation between the type of civil war onset and the mode of warfare: the different types of onset represent substantively different constellations of power and distribution of military capabilities across key actors, who opt for different military strategies to compete for political power. I also find that civil wars that start with state disintegration tend to lead to more violent conflicts, suggesting that the higher the disintegration of the state, the higher the level of violence. In this section, I turn to a third macro-level wartime dynamics: conflict duration.

As summarized in Table 6.9, I hypothesize that two types of civil war onset create the conditions for longer conflict, peripheral challenge and state disintegration, while the remaining two types should lead to shorter civil wars. In peripheral challenges, insurgents are often resilient rebels, who attempt to grow in size and power from the periphery of the state. In addition, since they dispose of limited military capabilities, they often do not represent an existential threat to the state survival. By contrast, civil war onsets in the form of coups are led by highly-equipped rebels in urban areas, often the capital, and as they splinter form the military, capabilities are known to the warring parties, and military confrontations are direct. Third, state disintegration creates the conditions for prolonged conflict between competing militias to capture government power, who have been empowered by the disintegration of the state institutions. Lastly, insurrectionary protests typically emerge in urban areas and cannot be ignored by governments, which must deal with the challenge to its authority. The features of protests in urban areas forces the government into concessions, which ultimately favors shorter wars.

Table 6.9. Summary of the hypotheses on conflict duration

	Onset type			
	Peripheral challenge	***State disintegration***	***Coup***	***Insurrectionary protests***
Conflict duration	Long	Long	Short	Short

As my theory of civil war trajectories predicts differentiated durations following different onset types, disaggregating the simple mean duration by onset type yields first-cut evidence. Of all four categories of onset, peripheral challenges appear to create the conditions for the longest conflicts with a group mean of 8.23 years. Civil wars that begin as coups and insurrectionary protests appear to lead to substantively shorter conflict duration, with mean durations of 2.41 years and 3.55 years respectively.[65] By contrast, state disintegration seems to create the conditions for relatively longer durations, with a mean of 6 years.

To further test for these differences empirically, I compute Kaplan-Meier estimates of the survival function following each type of onset, as shown in Figure 6.4. The findings support the patterns identified above, which are statistically significant, and suggest that onsets do create the conditions for relatively longer or shorter periods of fighting.[66] Table 6.10 displays the results of a Cox Proportional Hazards model, with different specifications.[67] Model 1 provides the results of a bivariate analysis, and Model 2 includes a limited set of control variables. Model 3 adds several controls linked to the identity and goals of insurgent, while Model 4 adds structural controls. Model 5 shows the results when all controls are included. Consistent with the hypotheses on conflict duration, the results for Model 1 indicate that both coup and insurrectionary protests, as types of civil war onset, lead to shorter conflicts, compared with peripheral challenge. State disintegration is not statistically different form peripheral challenge, which is also consistent with the hypothesis that it creates the conditions for relatively long civil wars.

First, civil war onset in the form of coups provide the most contrasting duration trajectory compared to peripheral challenges. The results of the Cox proportional hazards model provide evidence that they tend to be much shorter than civil wars that begin as peripheral challenges, which is statistically significant across model specifications. This result is consistent with existing findings (Fearon 2004; Mukherjee 2014; Cunningham, Gleditsch and Salehyan 2009), all of which find that the emergence of stronger rebels leads to shorter conflicts. Anecdotal evidence provides illustrative examples. The conflict that started in 1974 in Cyprus following the Greek military coup led by a detachment of the National Guard against

[65] In the case of insurrectionary protests, the mean duration was computed after removing a clear outlier (Northern Ireland). Details about the distribution of duration are available in Appendix 6. The mean duration including the case of Northern Ireland is 6.3 years.
[66] The p-value is equal to 0.000002, which confirms that onset type affects conflict duration.
[67] The Cox Proportional Hazards model is well-suited as it does not make explicit assumptions about the shape of the hazard rate. Because it is semi-parametric, it is more flexible than alternatives such as the exponential model or the Weibull Accelerated Failure Time model.

Figure 6.4. Kaplan-Meier estimates of survival function of civil wars, 1944-2020




Table 6.10. Cox proportional hazards model on conflict duration

	Models				
	(1)	*(2)*	*(3)*	*(4)*	*(5)*
State disintegration	0.305	0.006	-0.071	0.003	-0.111
	(0.203)	(0.250)	(0.256)	(0.253)	(0.266)
Coup	1.347***	1.144***	0.990***	1.128***	0.982***
	(0.272)	(0.298)	(0.312)	(0.304)	(0.314)
Insurrectionary protests	0.919***	0.466	0.491	0.517	0.515
	(0.351)	(0.456)	(0.468)	(0.459)	(0.464)
(ln)GDP per capita		0.041	0.049	0.062	0.059
		(0.120)	(0.123)	(0.133)	(0.134)
Military personnel		0.0002	0.0003	0.0002	0.0002
		(0.0003)	(0.0003)	(0.0003)	(0.0003)
Post-Cold War		0.247	0.277	0.285	0.324
		(0.193)	(0.201)	(0.199)	(0.209)
Mountainous terrain		-0.00005	0.0001	-0.0001	0.0003
		(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Polity				-0.021	-0.018
				(0.018)	(0.019)
Natural resources				-0.022	0.102
				(0.265)	(0.286)
Marxist		-0.438*	-0.553**	-0.422*	-0.526**
		(0.248)	(0.258)	(0.256)	(0.262)
Ethnic fractionalization		-0.200	-0.265	-0.212	-0.255
		(0.361)	(0.365)	(0.370)	(0.371)
Secessionist war			-0.337*		-0.298
			(0.201)		(0.202)
Islamist war			-0.368		-0.470
			(0.325)		(0.352)
Observations	166	142	142	141	141
R^2	0.129	0.170	0.190	0.179	0.198
Max. Possible R^2	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
Log Likelihood	-674.562	-551.875	-550.144	-546.287	-544.583
Wald Test	28.460*** (df = 3)	30.110*** (df = 9)	33.380*** (df = 11)	31.390*** (df = 11)	34.860*** (df = 13)
LR Test	23.006*** (df = 3)	26.499*** (df = 9)	29.963*** (df = 11)	27.763*** (df = 11)	31.173*** (df = 13)
Score (Logrank) Test	31.807*** (df = 3)	33.230*** (df = 9)	36.655*** (df = 11)	34.446*** (df = 11)	38.063*** (df = 13)

Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. *p<0.1;**p<0.05;***p<0.01

[+] *Peripheral challenge is the reference category for onset type*

the GC government and led to the Turkish invasion lasted for a few months (Doyle and Sambanis 2006), so did the wars in Argentina in 1955 between the forces loyal to Juan Peron and the newly installed government or the 1994 military coup in Yemen (Day 2010).

Second, turning to state disintegration, the coefficients indicate that it is not different from peripheral challenge wioth regards to duration. This finding supports the hypothesis that state disintegration creates the conditions for longer wars: as the state disintegrates, private militias fight one another to seize political power in the form of stalemated fighting between loosely-allied forces. Existing studies also find that these characteristics lead to long duration: stalemates prolong wars (Balch-Lindsay and Enterline 2000), and so does the number of armed organizations (Cunningham 2006; Akcinaroglu 2012).

Nevertheless, a closer look at individual cases suggests that the pattern may not be so clear. In fact, it seems that following state disintegration, fighting either reaches an outcome relatively quickly due to the victory of one party or a peace agreement following military stalemate as in Afghanistan (1992-1996) or Bosnia (1992-1995) or last much longer and become difficult to end as in Burundi (1993-2006), Lebanon (1975-1990), or Somalia (1991-ongoing), when negotiations have at times lasted especially long. Therefore, while peripheral challenges lead to longer duration through the mechanism of "resilient rebels," state disintegration may lead to similarly long conflicts through the mechanism of group proliferation and fractionalization in the absence of a clear state authority. In one case, the presence of a stronger state forces the development of cohesive insurgents, while in the other, the absence of the state allows for weaker but more numerous armed groups to emerge. Both of which will lead to longer conflicts.

Lastly, in the case of insurrectionary protests, the estimated coefficients also support the hypothesis that conflict is likely to be short, though results are not significant across model specifications. Nevertheless, examining the cases closely provides additional evidence in support of the hypothesis: they are on average very brief, with the exception of three civil wars that have been particularly long — Israel (1987-1997 and 2000-2009), Syria (2011-ongoing), and Ukraine (2014-ongoing). In fact, excluding these cases, the remaining conflicts have durations that range from one to three years, far below the mean duration of all civil wars. Although such evidence only bears indirect support for the hypothesis on conflict duration following insurrectionary protests, it also points to potential insightful comparative studies.

5.3. Observed and expected conflict trajectories: Discussing outliers

The results of the quantitative analysis are largely consistent with my argument of civil war trajectories. Based on how they begin, civil wars display patterns across their mode of warfare, severity, and duration. Overall, I find that the patterns uncovered in this chapter correspond to the observed trajectories of civil war in 122 cases out of 167 (73.05%), when allowing one single dynamic to diverge.[68] Among those, the patterns of conflict dynamics expected by my argument perfectly match the observed trajectories for 65 civil wars (38.92% of all conflicts). In contrast, there are just 9 cases out of 167 (5.39%) that can be described as complete outliers, that is civil wars that unfolded in ways opposite to the expectations for all three wartime dynamics based on their type of onset.[69] Among these cases, seven are complete outliers for peripheral challenge and two are outliers for state disintegration. There are no complete outliers for onsets either in the form of coups or insurrectionary protests.

What accounts for these cases of complete divergence? Do those cases share features that make them significantly different from the remaining cases? Or do they each display some specificities that may explain their observed conflict trajectory? As I argue that civil wars unfold in patterned ways given how they begin, these outliers should substantively differ from other cases in at least one important aspect. A closer look at several of these complete outliers reveals that they indeed display some specific features that may account for their unique trajectory.[70] In identifying these features, the remainder of this section also points to insightful new avenues for the comparative analysis of civil war, thereby demonstrating the value of this analytical framework based on civil war onset.

First, contrary to the expectation based on its onset in the form of a peripheral challenge, the Costa Rican civil war of 1948 was short, violent, and fought through symmetric warfare. Within less than two months, the insurgents led by Jose Figueres won the war. What features

[68] As conflict duration is one of the three key macro-level dynamics of interest, I exclude ongoing civil wars in testing the fit of the expected trajectories as their duration is unknown and computing a temporary duration based on the time elapsed between onset and 2020 would artificially create for each case a duration which may end up far from the eventual duration of each conflict. In total, there are 27 ongoing conflicts in 2020 in DatOnset. These cases are dropped.

[69] These cases include Burundi (1972), Costa Rica (1948), Indonesia (1950), Jordan (1970-1971), Pakistan (1971), Rwanda (1963-1964), Sri Lanka (2005-2009), East Timor (1975-1999), and Zimbabwe (1983-1987). In addition, out of 167 cases, there are 36 civil wars that diverged from the expected trajectories in two dynamics simultaneously. These can be described as "partial outliers" and represent 21.56% of all civil wars.

[70] As this section shows, these characteristics are diverse, and the few complete outliers occur across different categories of onset. These outliers neither point to a particular type of onset that could have been missed nor a consistent pattern of civil war dynamics not accounted for by the theory, which strongly suggests that the analytical framework and theory provided in this thesis remain fully valid and comprehensive to make sense of a large majority of civil wars.

of Costa Rica may explain these wartime dynamics and this swift rebel victory? The civil war erupted in a context of increased tensions between the opposition and government following a contested presidential election (Lehoucq 1991). Perhaps more unique to the case of Costa Rica, it disposed of an especially small and ill-equipped army. As Høivik and Aas (1981: 336) describe, "the government forces consisted of a small regular army of maybe 1000 men, who were reinforced by 500 soldiers from Somoza-governed Nicaragua. Vanguardia Popular offered a volunteer force of 3000 members, but these were never given weapons by the government," well below the mean size of 52,500 military personnel in the year prior to onset across all civil wars (Greig and Enterline 2021).

On the side of the insurgents, Figueres had close political contacts with similar movements in other Latin American countries and with the help of a small group of exiles from Nicaragua, Honduras, and the Dominican Republic, he trained and equipped a National Liberation Army of 600 men" (Høivik and Aas 1981: 336). In addition, they were able to attract large numbers of recruits and sympathizers. In sum, the Costa Rican civil war represents a rare case in which, although the insurgents quickly outmatched the size and power of the small and unprepared military. Once underway, the insurgents engaged in direct fighting against the military, largely supported by Communist militias, thereby accounting for the conflict's specific trajectory.

Second, two other outliers were the prolongation of high-intensity wars: Sri Lanka (2005-2009) and Jordan (1970-1971).[71] As Staniland (2014: 141) notes, "the annihilation of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam [in May 2009], one of the world's most innovative, disciplined, and ruthless insurgent groups, brought to a close over three decades of terror, guerrilla warfare, and counterinsurgency." In Jordan, the civil war that pitted the government forces against the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) is directly linked to the Six-Day War of 1967 during which the PLO actively fought Israel, alongside Jordan, from bases on Jordanian soil. As PLO controlled grew larger in parts of Jordan, tensions increased and escalated to full-fledge civil war (Nevo 2008; Rubinovitz 2010).

In this case, these features may account for the divergence in wartime dynamics from the expected trajectory of conflict following a peripheral challenge. As insurgents were active in prior high-intensity conflicts, they disposed of already formed and equipped fighting forces,

[71] To be sure, other civil wars can be described as prolongation of prior conflicts such as the Kurd insurgencies (1983-2003) and (2005-ongoing) or the consecutive civil wars in Aceh, Indonesia, from 1990 to 1991 and 1999 to 2005. However, these wars were low intensity conflicts. For example, in the case of Aceh, the insurgents were vanquished as many of GAM's field commanders had been captured or killed (Ross 2005: 44).

which allowed them to confront the state forces directly and caused high levels of battle-related deaths. In that sense, they were militarily capable forces as opposed to nascent organizations having to build a military force from the ground. In Sri Lanka, the last civil war followed a previous phase of both irregular and conventional fighting between the LTTE and the government (Staniland 2014). This points to important questions. When are armed organization able to maintain their fighting forces over time? How do armed organizations maintain their forces and internal structures during the inter-war period? And how do insurgents adapt to a new opponent and a changing conflict environment? For example, while the LTTE and the Sri Lankan army had fought to a stalemate in 2002, during the ceasefire, the latter had been reformed, refitted, and expanded, while the LTTE suffered from infighting which ultimately put them at a disadvantage when fighting resumed (Staniland 2014).

Lastly, two other outliers diverged from the expected trajectory following direct large-scale military interventions by a neighboring state: Pakistan (1971) and East Timor (1975-1999). In Pakistan, the conflict diverged from the expected trajectory following a peripheral challenge when "on 3 December the Indian armed forces entered Bangladesh to fight jointly with Bangladeshi separatist troops against the Pakistani military and their associates. The Pakistani army could not resist the allied forces and surrendered on 16 December, resulting in the independence of Bangladesh as a sovereign state" (Panday 2021). In East Timor, following the onset of the civil war linked to the rapid withdrawal of Portugal, the Indonesian President General Suharto, fearing the creation of a communist state, launched a large-scale military operation with the goal to incorporate East Timor, which eventually became a province in July 1976 (Paul et al. 2013).

In both these cases, the military intervention substantively altered the balance of power between warring parties. In Pakistan, the direct support of India increased the military capacity of separatist groups against the Pakistani army to such an extent that the latter soon renounced the war, leading to a severe but short conflict although it had started as a peripheral challenge. In contrast, in East Timor, the Indonesian invasion increased the power of pro-independence groups that were engaged in fighting against several other political groups following the withdrawal of Portugal, thereby creating the condition for prolonged asymmetric warfare and lower-intensity fighting, although the civil war had followed state disintegration.

External intervention broadly occurs during civil wars (Cunningham 2010; Balch-Lindsay, Enterline and Joyce 2008; Elbadawi and Sambanis 2000; Gent 2008). Within this analytical framework, some questions on the effect of external intervention can be

reformulated. For example, under what circumstances do external interventions create divergence in the conflict trajectory? Importantly, as these two outliers started in different ways, military intervention triggered divergence from their respective trajectories, thereby pointing to the potential differentiated effect of a same factor in civil wars that began in different ways.[72]

5.4. Conclusion

Do civil wars unfold differently when they begin in different ways? Focusing on warfare, severity, and duration, this chapter provides systematic empirical evidence that civil wars do unfold in patterns ways based on their type of onset. These findings largely support the theory of civil war trajectories developed in this thesis. Taken together, they provide strong evidence that the type of civil war onset is an important, yet so far omitted, variable that shapes conflict dynamics. First, the results provide evidence consistent with the existing literature on peripheral insurgencies. Initiated by radicalized militants and excluded politicians opposing mostly loyal and cohesive state forces in the periphery, I have found that peripheral challenges lead to civil war that tend to be fought through asymmetric warfare, to lead to relatively fewer battle-deaths, and to last longer. Well-known examples include the Kashmir insurgency (1989-ongoing) in India, the Colombian civil war (1978-2016) and the Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria (2009- ongoing).

Importantly, in addition to this trajectory of civil war, I have found that macro-level patterns of conflict differ substantively from the often-assumed model of insurgency. Specifically, I have provided evidence that when onset takes the form of state disintegration, conflict is likely to be fought through symmetric warfare, to lead to especially high level of violence, and to last relatively long. The civil war in Angola that started in 1975 is illustrative. Almost immediately after Portugal withdrew from Angola, the Alvor Accord that created a coalition government between the MPLA, FNLA and UNITA broke down and power struggle between the former anti-colonial armed groups triggered a civil war (Jett 2019). Conflict soon intensified as parties benefitted largely from foreign support, mostly Cuba, South Africa, and the United States. The Uppsala Conflict Data Program estimates the total number of fatalities

[72] In Pakistan, as a result of military intervention, the civil war was short, fought through symmetric warfare, and severe. While in East Timor, following military intervention, the conflict was long, fought through irregular warfare, and relatively less violent.

over the 17 year-long war to approximate 500,000 and caused additional millions to be displaced by ongoing fighting.

When a conflict starts a military coup, the findings suggest that it is likely to be fought through symmetric warfare and to be relatively short, while there is no clear relation with conflict severity. The civil war that followed the coup d'état in Cyprus in 1974 is a good example. The Intercommunal Talks of 1968-1973 to attain a comprehensive solution to the constitutional and territorial problems in Cyprus came to an end following a military coup by the Cypriot National Guard against the Greek Cypriot government in July 1974. Conflict evolved into civil war as, five days later, the Turkish send troops to Cyprus to counter the coup (Doyle and Sambanis 2006). The conflict ended a couple of months later following a ceasefire and the de facto partition of Cyprus.

Lastly, the results indicate that when onset takes the form of insurrectionary protests, conflict is likely to be symmetric, relatively less violent, and short – although the results of the statistical analysis are less precise given the small sample size. The civil war in Yemen in 2011 is illustrative. Pro-democracy protests against the regime were radically transformed when 52 demonstrators were killed by security forces (Fattah 2011). In the aftermath, tensions escalated, and widespread anger erupted, followed by defection by members of the ruling party and army personnel which were soon deployed to protect protesters from violent repression (della Porta et al. 2018). Conflict lasted for over a year, until presidential elections were held in February 2012. Over that period, estimates of casualties report between 200 and 2,000 deaths.

Having identified macro-level patterns of civil war dynamics that originate in the conflict onset, the following chapter focuses on cases of state disintegration, which together represent the second most common form of onset since 1944. Through a detailed case study of Burundi's civil war (1993-2006), the next chapter proceeds to illustrate the meso- and micro-level dynamics at play when civil war begins with state disintegration.

Chapter 6

The case of state disintegration: Evidence from Burundi

In the years leading up to the civil war in Bosnia, the political terrain had become increasingly fragmented and ethnicized following the dissolution of Yugoslavia. The referendum for independence in February 1992 was telling of the rupture among ethnic groups, largely supported by the Muslims and the Croats, while boycotted by the Serbs. The result of the pro-independence referendum encouraged the already defiant Serbs to initiate the conflict, and within one month, war broke out across the country (Christia 2012).

In Lebanon, the early 1970s witnessed a falling-out among the members of the Lebanese oligarchy. Although always present in Lebanon, during the late 1960s, a new intensity in personal estrangement grew among sectarian leaders, increasingly precluding dialogue and ultimately leading to a total breakdown of communication (Khalidi 1979). In this political context, the Lebanese civil war began as widespread clashes erupted in and around Beirut between Maronite militiamen on one side and National Movement and Palestinian militiamen on the other.

Through the end of the 1980s and the early 1990s, although the Soviets had withdrawn from Afghanistan, they continued to provide resources and support to the Najibullah regime which managed to remain in power following a decade-long conflict. However, that period was one of overall political fragmentation and violence, and when the assistance from the Soviet Union ceased, Najibullah announced his resignation and civil war broke out between the various mujahideen forces (Staniland 2014; Christia 2012).

All three cases illustrate the process of state disintegration, which is the object of this last empirical chapter. They point to the political context in which state disintegration occurs. As I have argued so far, this creates the conditions for a specific type of civil war onset which, in turn, leads to a specific pattern of wartime dynamics. Focusing on state disintegration is essential as it is an often-overlooked type of onset, substantively different from peripheral insurgencies, yet it represents almost one out of five civil wars between 1944 and 2020.

The previous empirical chapters have done two things: first, I have showed the value of the new typology of civil war onset for disaggregating and refining our understanding of the causes of civil war; second, I have provided systematic empirical evidence of macro-level patterns of conflict dynamics, suggesting that given how they begin, civil wars unfold in patterned ways. In this chapter, I trace the trajectory of civil wars that begin with state disintegration, thereby linking pre-war conditions to civil war onset to wartime dynamics. How do civil wars begin in the context of state disintegration? How is state sovereignty challenged and by whom? What are the dynamics of mobilization and violence when the state ceases to be a military actor in the conflict? What types of armed organizations emerge? And how do they engage in fighting against one another?

I examine this specific trajectory of civil war in two steps. First, based on original archival material, I conduct a detailed case study of the onset of Burundi's civil war to identify the conditions that lead to state disintegration, explore how violence reaches the level of war, which groups mobilize and how they do so. Instead of guerrilla wars, I find that the dynamics of violence and mobilization following state disintegration resemble those of communal wars (Krause 2018). As the state disintegrates, private militias mobilize and are empowered by increased civilian mobilization and either the defections of military personnel or the inactivity of the army. Second, I link these initial dynamics to meso-level wartime dynamics such as the armed groups' organization, military capabilities and tactics, and their consequence for civilian victimization. Consistent with the overall argument in this dissertation, I find that these conflicts unfold in patterned ways. Militias tend to be especially prone to infighting and fragmentation, engage in symmetric warfare, and tend to perpetrate high levels of civilian victimization in the form of massacres and ethnic cleansing as territory becomes segmented.

This chapter is structured in six remaining parts. The following section defines the concept of state disintegration and provides descriptive statistics on this type of onset. The third section formulates expectations about wartime dynamics based on the features of this particular type of civil war onset. The fourth section discusses case selection and introduces the data. The

fifth section provides the empirical results of the case study of Burundi's civil war, while the sixth section discusses external validity through small-n comparative evidence from the civil wars in Afghanistan, Bosnia, and Lebanon. The last section concludes.

6.1. Why onset in the form of state disintegration

The focus on cases of state disintegration is motivated by three complementary findings. First, they are the second most common type of civil war onset, amounting to 36 cases of onset between 1944 and 2020. Second, as showed in the previous chapter, this type of onset also tends to create the conditions for especially violent and relatively long conflicts, making it essential to better understand their underlying dynamics. Third, it is a process of civil war onset that substantively differs from the often-assumed model of peripheral insurgency. This section defines the concept of state disintegration, before providing descriptive statistics and identifying key patterns.

6.1.1. State disintegration: Definition and relevance

Instances in which states cease to function have been commonly studied in the current literature, often referred to as state failure or state collapse (Rubin 1995; Zartman 1995; Menkhaus 2004; Rotberg 2004; Reno 2002; Allen 1999; Bates 2008). Defined strictly, states fail when they no longer perform their basic functions (Zartman 1995). In other words, it occurs when states are no longer able to provide key public goods, including security, to individuals within their borders (Rotberg 2004). Often seen as a spectrum of state capacity and fragility, collapsed states refer to an extreme form of state failure.

Why introduce the concept of state disintegration? Although closely linked, the main difference between the two concepts lies in their primary focus. While state collapse focuses on the government of a given state and its ability to perform state functions, the focal point of state disintegration is the armed forces of a given state. What becomes of the state's armed forces when governments cease to function? What role do members of the army play in the outset of conflict following state disintegration. These questions are key in explaining this type of civil war onset, yet they remain obscured by an exclusive focus on government institutions and state management issues. In cases of state disintegration, as cooperation between political elites breaks down, the army either splits along similar lines, with different factions supporting different political elites, or does not intervene to stop the violence perpetrated by private armed militias.

A large part of the literature on state failure has been preoccupied with its causes. Examining institutional factors, some attribute the collapse of states, especially in Africa, to a mismatch between global ideals of statehood, mostly modern European models of statehood, and local conceptions of authority and power (Clapham 2004; Herbst 2004). Others highlight the role of small armed bands and weapons diffusion as a trigger of state collapse, in that sense, often equating state failure to civil war onset (Klare 2004). Others still identify as causes economic factors, from the privatization of state assets (Doornbos 2002), to taxation, foreign aid, and macroeconomic state policies (van de Walle 2004).

However, not all instances of state failure are followed by civil war onset. Therefore, these factors provide little explanation for the dynamics of conflict onset in the case of state disintegration. Kasfir (2004) explicitly disentangles the causes of violence directly following state disintegration from the factors that cause the state to collapse in the first place, especially social grievances. Instead, it is state breakdown itself that accounts for the dynamics of conflict at civil war onset, notably the security dilemma that it creates. As Kasfir (2004: 53) notes:

> People who had succeeded in living peacefully side by side suddenly find themselves caught up in deadly conflict. The social rules by which they had previously lived together no longer sustain their cooperation, nor provide them with guides for restoring peace. Since their cultural or ideological differences had not caused them to become enemies before, their responses to state breakdown, in some cases, may provide more relevant reasons for their hostilities.

How to identify state disintegration? As mentioned above, state disintegration is paired with military disintegration. Yet, armed forces can dissolve in various ways. In some cases, the army completely dissolves, and former military personnel join the various militias. In Afghanistan, following the collapse of the Soviet regime in 1992, former elements of the armed forces recoalesced into a series of militia groups, joined sides with the mujahideen, or fled into exile (Staniland 2014). In the Central African Republic, less than a year after taking power, Seleka leader Djotodia disbanded its armed forces, already dispersed and diverse, which then regrouped into local militias (Lombard 2016). In Bosnia, former members of the Yugoslav' People Army who had defected joined the various ethnic groups and escalated violence (Donia and Fine 1994; Kalyvas and Sambanis 2005). In the Congo in the 1990s, political entrepreneurs created private militias on all sides linked to the factions of the army, which engaged in violence as cooperation between elites collapsed at the center (Clark 1998; Bazenguissa-Ganga 1998, 1999).

In other cases, the army remains inactive and a bystander of the violence between local armed groups. At the start of the Lebanese civil war in 1975, the army remained inactive, "refusing to commit the troops to a security role, for committing the army to action, with its largely Christian officer corps, could have provoked new encounters" (Abraham 1996: 3). Khalidi (1979: 67) notes that the army had come to "accept its political unreliability and cautioned against its use in a security role." In January 1976, it eventually disintegrated and split four ways: "one section constituted itself the Arab Army of Lebanon. Another joined the right-wing Christian militias. A third, comprising perhaps the bulk of the officers, remained, at least until the autumn of 1976, 'neutral'. A fourth section went home. Each taking with it equipment that went 'almost equally' to the first three sections" (Khalidi 1979: 68).

In sum, state disintegration refers to instances in which cooperation between political elites collapses and involves the mobilization of private armed militias that engage in fighting against one another, either empowered by widespread defections in the armed forces or benefiting from the inactivity of the security forces. This distinguishes civil wars that follow state disintegration from those that follow military coups, in which the army splits, typically in two opposing armed organizations, one of which remains loyal to the government of the state (Roessler 2011), such as in Spain (1936-1939), Guinea-Bissau (1998-1999), or Ivory Coast (2002-2004).

6.1.2. Patterns of civil war onset in the form of state disintegration

Table 7.1 below lists all instances of state disintegration between 1944 and 2020. While state disintegration has occurred repeatedly over this period, it appears to have peaked in the early 1990: there were five and seven cases of civil war onset in the form of state disintegration in 1991 and 1992 respectively.[73] Such a pattern provides indirect evidence that state disintegration is associated with the failure of new states, which is further supported by the geographical distribution of cases.[74] As states gain their independence, political cooperation breaks down at the center and groups, often ethnic or nationalist, mobilize against one another in an attempt to seize government power. Yet, a closer look at the list of cases further suggests that state disintegration is not limited to post-independence periods, as in Angola in 1975, East Timor in 1975, but also occurs when regime transition fails, as in Lebanon in 1975, Afghanistan in 1992, the Congo in 1997, or Libya in 2014.


[73] Additional descriptive statistics and figures are available in Appendix 7.

[74] Out of 36 cases, 17 took place in Africa and 10 occurred in Europe. The full distribution of cases by region is available in Appendix 7.

Table 7.1. List of civil wars that followed state disintegration, 1944-2020 (N=36)

Country	*Onset year*	*Armed groups/conflict*
Greece	1944	ADES/ELAS; EAM, KKE
China	1946	PLA
Colombia	1948	La Violencia
Lebanon	1958	Nasserites v. Chamoun
D. R. Congo (Zaïre)	1960	Katanga; Kasai; Kwilu (eastern DRC)
Cyprus	1963	GC-TC civil war
Angola	1975	UNITA; MPLA; FNLA
Indonesia	1975	CNRT (East Timor)
Lebanon	1975	Aoun; militias; PLO; Israel
Chad	1979	FAN; FARF; FROLINAT
Zimbabwe	1983	Post-independence war (ZAPU; ZANU)
Azerbaijan	1991	Nagorno-Karabakh
Georgia	1991	South Ossetia
Moldova	1991	Transdniestria (PMR)
Somalia	1991	Post-Barre war
Yugoslavia	1991	Croatia/Krajina
Afghanistan	1992	Intra-Mujahideen war
Angola	1992	UNITA; MPLA
Bosnia	1992	Rep. SRPSKA, Croats, Muslims
Croatia	1992	Krajina; Medak; Western Slavonia
Georgia	1992	Abkhazia war
Liberia	1992	NPLF; ULIMO; NPF; LPC; LDF
Tajikistan	1992	Popular Democratic Army; UTO
Burundi	1993	CNDD-FDD; PALIPEHUTU-FNL; FROLINA; ULINA
Congo	1993	Lissouba v. Sassou-Nguesso v. Kolelas
Russia	1994	Chechnya I
Rwanda	1994	RPF; Genocide
Angola	1997	UNITA; MPLA
Congo	1997	Lissouba v. Sassou-Nguesso v. Kolelas
Congo	1998	Lissouba v. Sassou-Nguesso v. Kolelas
Iraq	2003	Sunni and Shiite militias
Ivory Coast	2011	Gbagbo vs. Ouattara
Central African Republic	2013	Anti-Balaka; post-Seleka
South Sudan	2013	Kiir vs. Machar; SPLM/A-IO
Libya	2014	Militarized factions
Yemen	2014	Post-Hadi war

Figure 7.1. Distribution of pre-war covariates



Do the regimes that experience civil war onset in the form of state disintegration substantively differ from all other regimes that experience civil war along a range of observable characteristics? Figure 7.1 compares the distribution of several pre-war covariates between cases of state disintegration and other types of civil war onset.[75] Three of these comparisons stand out. First, it appears that state disintegration onsets take place in somewhat wealthier states, which is consistent with my findings from the replication of landmark studies of the causes of civil war in Chapter 4 and suggests that richer states may not be immune to this type of onset. Second, these distributions also suggest that the presence of oil is correlated with onset in the form of state disintegration. As postulated in the previous chapters, it may be that

[75] The results of t-tests to show whether these differences in means are statistically significant are available in Appendix 7. Three of these differences are statistically significant: GDP per capita (log), population (log), and oil.

oil revenues exacerbate tensions among political elites and increase the resources available to initiate fighting against one another as cooperation and institutions break down.

Lastly, the distribution of polity scores suggests that state disintegration often follows previous conflicts and incomplete conflict resolution.[76] Out of 36 conflicts, 11 civil wars (30.5%) followed a previous episode of conflict that ended within one year before the new onset, which would increase if one were to include other violent events such as military invasion as in Greece or East Timor or anti-colonial as in Angola.[77] This trend is further supported by the overall distribution of polity scores. Among cases of state disintegration, six cases were coded as interregnum or anarchy following Polity 5 coding procedures. Such a pattern matters as it suggests that the parties to the conflict often dispose of mobilized networks for violence that reactivate as state institutions break down. All other covariates appear to be similarly distributed across both samples.

6.2. Dynamics of civil war following state disintegration

Having defined the concept of state disintegration and provided descriptive statistics, this section connects the immediate pre-war conditions, the dynamics of onset, and wartime trajectory. Specifically, I hold that, as the state disintegrates, the process of onset closely resembles that of communal wars. I then point to the implications for meso-level wartime dynamics focusing on the armed groups' structure, military capabilities and tactics, and the patterns of civilian victimization.

6.2.1. Civil war onset

State disintegration typically occurs in a highly fragmented and hostile political context. Within this fragile context, the disintegration of the state is often triggered by an endogenous shock, which varies in its specific form. In Afghanistan, fighting broke out following the announcement of President Mohammad Najibullah's resignation (Staniland 2014). In Bosnia, it was the independence referendum following the dissolution of Yugoslavia (Christia 2012). In the Congo, the political shock took the form of highly contested presidential elections

[76] Although the result of the t-test is not statistically significant when comparing the means of polity score across the two groups, the distribution is interesting given the coding of polity scores and suggests that the reactivation of prior conflicts after a period of relative peace is a common development in cases of state disintegration. Further research on the dynamics of state disintegration will be useful to confirm this path and potentially uncover others. The distribution of polity score for all cases of state disintegration is available in Appendix 7.

[77] Considering civil wars that ended within 5 years prior to the onset of the new conflict, the number increases to 16 (44.44%). The list is available in Appendix 7. For comparison, there are 25 peripheral challenges out of 127 (19.68%) that began within one year after the end of a previous conflict and 49 (38.58%) within five years.

(Bazenguissa-Ganga 1999). Yet, in Angola or East Timor, it was the rapid decolonization following a domestic coup d'état in Portugal (Jett 2019; Paul et al. 2013).

Under these conditions, institutionalized politics break down at the center, and such a collapse triggers the mobilization of private militias. These armed groups are often mobilized by political entrepreneurs who attempt to seize power in the absence of a functioning central government. In the Congo, following the contested elections in May 1993, the three leading politicians formed private militias to control access to various quarters of Brazzaville, and by mid-1993 each of the country's politicians had deployed these armed groups in the neighborhoods where their respective ethno-regional constituents predominated (Clark 1998; Bazenguissa-Ganga 1999). Between 1995 and 1997, "each of the political principals maintained and strengthened his private militia contrary to an agreement to integrate them into the national army" (Clark 1998: 32). Then in 1997, as new elections approached, "political rivalries once again led to fighting between rival party militias, this time leading to very heavy fighting and pitched battles in Brazzaville which ended only with the military victory of former President Sassou-Nguesso in October 1997" (Bazenguissa-Ganga 1999: 38).

Similar dynamics of political breakdown can be observed elsewhere. In Chad, as the power sharing agreement between several factions broke down in March 1979, fighting started in the capital, N'Djamena, first between the forces of Habre and Malloum, and later between the forces of Habre and Goukouni. At the time of onset, both the government and army dissolved into various armed factions (Nolutshungu 1996). In Iraq, "the invasion and the subsequent radical program of political transformation carried out by the United States destroyed Iraq's only remaining multiethnic and national institutions: the bureaucracy, the army, and the Ba'ath Party. The collapse of the Ba'athist government left a vacuum that has yet to be filled" (Kalyvas and Kocher 2007: 214). In that context, violent conflict broke out between Sunni and Shiite militias in Baghdad and other large urban areas, which all had loose ties with political parties (Fearon 2007).

Led by political entrepreneurs either among or close to the political elites, these militias are typically composed of both former army personal and armed civilians. In the Congo in the late 1990s, "one group was composed of the Cobra militia and soldiers who supported Sassou-Nguesso, and the other camp included soldiers loyal to President Lissouba, making common cause with his own party militias" (Bazenguissa-Ganga 1999: 39). In Bosnia, the armies that fought were a mix of irregular and regular forces. As Kalyvas and Sambanis (2005: 212) describe:

> At the one end of the spectrum were criminal and quasi-criminal elements, often freed from prison in order to take part in the fighting (Mueller 2000). At the other end were former career officers of the JNA [Jugoslav National Army] who had defected to the various ethnic armies. In the middle were reservists and home guards, armed and trained by the JNA. They were mobilized locally by ethnic parties and ethnic entrepreneurs. The mobilization of civilians into militias was facilitated by the abundance of weapons.

Given the features of this type of onset, the dynamics of mobilization following state disintegration closely resemble those of communal wars, that is "non-state conflict between two or more social groups that results in casualty numbers that reach the civil war threshold" (Krause 2018: 17).[78] Often, the mobilization of these local groups results from "everyday violence networks," which includes vigilante groups for community protection or gangs involved in crime (Tilly 2003; Krause 2019), and the violence is not only "carried out by thugs mobilized by elites but also rely on widespread civilian mobilization" (Krause 2019: 1477). In addition, these groups differ from riots or pogroms (Brass 1997; Horowitz 2001; Berenschot 2011; Frøystad 2009), during which violence is often spontaneous and disorganized, led by large mobs of civilians, typically following elections (Dunning 2011; Wilkinson 2004), as they typically display some cohesion and internal organization.

Civil war onset in the form of state disintegration also differs from inter-rebel fighting, as inter-rebel fighting in multiparty civil wars is typically theorized as dual contests between non-state armed organizations and against the incumbent (Wood and Kathman 2015; Stein and Cantin 2021; Cunningham, Bakke and Seymour 2012). In that sense, the state and its armed forces are assumed to be an integral part, at times described as the "common enemy," in the calculus of non-state armed groups to engage in fighting against one another (Pischedda 2018). Comparing the dynamics of state disintegration with those of communal wars is therefore useful as, in both instances, the state does not constitute a primary actor.

In sum, there exists a distinct type of civil war onset that differs from the model of peripheral insurgencies and instead displays the dynamics of communal wars. In those cases, political entrepreneurs, that is, members of government coalitions or the political elites, who typically see in the disintegration of the state the opportunity to advance their political agenda, mobilize supporters, often along ethnic and nationalist lines. As the armed forces dissolve along

[78] There remains one key difference between communal wars and civil war onset in the form of state disintegration, that is the primary goals of the armed groups. In cases of state disintegration, non-state groups mobilize to capture state control, whereas communal war mostly concern local issues. The resemblance between state disintegration and communal wars lies in the dynamics of mobilization and violence between non-state groups.

similar lines, these private militias benefit from an initial wave of new recruits including both armed civilians and former army personnel, as well as additional resources and weapons. Once formed, these groups fight against each other to seize power in the security vacuum created by the disintegration of the state.

6.2.2. Wartime dynamics

In Chapter 5, I provide ample evidence that given how they begin, civil wars unfold in patterned ways. Specifically, I find that civil wars that follow state disintegration tend to be fought through symmetric warfare, lead to high levels of violence, and last relatively long. The remainder of this section points to some of the meso-level dynamics that drive this macro-level pattern.

As the state is no longer a stronger opponent against whom to fight, state disintegration creates the opportunity for numerous groups to mobilize to capture power. I expect that these groups are often characterized by a strong local character both in how the organize and in the geographic scope of their operations. It is within their respective locality and base of support that political entrepreneurs mobilize recruits to form armed militias, including large urban areas. In that sense, state disintegration triggers fighting between non-state armed militias, often identified along some collective attributes such as ethnicity, religion, party affiliation, or a combination of them. As a result, when these militias formalize their internal organization, they should take the form of parochial and fragmented groups, which have in common that they suffer from weak horizontal ties, that is, networks that connect elites and organizers between them (Staniland 2014).

Organizational cohesion is structured not only by the perceived viability of rebel organizations, but also by the existence of a common, unifying threat (Woldemariam 2018). It is precisely the absence of such a common threat, typically in the form of a stronger state, that characterizes civil wars that follow state disintegration. In other words, the disintegration of the state creates the opportunity for smaller, less well-equipped, and local organizations to mobilize to capture state power and advance private political agendas. An implication is that, while fragmentation and inter-rebel fighting may be common across conflicts (Bakke, Cunningham and Seymour 2012; Fjelde and Nilsson 2012), these organizations should be especially vulnerable to fragmentation and breakdowns of alliances between local militias as military gains and losses occur and disagreements over the division of postwar spoils emerge (Christia 2012).

As these various armed militias mobilize locally and dispose of relatively symmetric military capacities, the territory likely becomes segmented, and frontlines are identified and highly contested (Kalyvas and Balcells 2010; Carboni and Moody 2018). For example, during the Bosnian war (1992-1995), Sarajevo was divided territorially between a Serb-controlled area and a Bosnian part (Kaldor 1999). Specific to civil wars that follow state disintegration, these pockets of territory are likely to be limited in size, and the interactions between militias bounded to specific locales. Lastly, as the state disintegrates, these groups often formulate exclusive claims to state power based on nationalism, party affiliation, or ethnicity and religion.[79] As a result of these features —disintegration of the state institutions, numerous private armed militias, relatively symmetric military capabilities, and segmented territory,— these conflicts should also be characterized by high levels of civilian victimization, especially in the form of collective targeting such as massacres and cleansing.

In sum, consistent with the findings from the previous empirical chapters, this section further points to meso-level mechanism that may drive the macro-level wartime dynamics. At the onset of civil war, following the disintegration of the state, private militias mobilize, led by political entrepreneurs, and joined by armed civilians and army defectors. Absent the state and a clear political agenda other than seizing state power, these militias mobilize along exclusive ethnic, nationalist, or religious lines. In those cases, onset and wartime dynamics are best described as communal wars, that is, fighting between organized non-state armed groups that typically benefit from strong local ties but otherwise exist as loose coalitions of suborganizations, which are vulnerable to infighting and fragmentation and perpetrate high levels of civilian victimization in their attempts to seize state power and advance political agendas.

6.3. Case selection and data

To further examine empirically the conditions in which state disintegration occurs, the dynamics of mobilization, and consequent wartime dynamics, I conduct a detailed case study of Burundi's civil war from 1993 to 2006. I select the case of Burundi for two complementary reasons: first, it is an illustrative case of state disintegration, and second, it is very close to the macro-level pattern identified in the previous chapter (Elman, Gerring and Mahoney 2016; Lieberman 2005). In fact, it was fought through symmetric non-conventional warfare, it lasted

[79] Kaldor (1999: 79) refers to this characteristic as 'identity politics,' that is "movement which mobilize around ethnic, racial, or religious identity for the purpose of claiming state power."

for 14 years, which is twice the mean duration of civil wars, and although it is not categorized as high intensity of violence overall, the conflict started with especially high violence in 1993.[80] In that sense, Burundi's civil war represents an emblematic case of civil war that begins with state disintegration.[81]

While selecting 'on the line' cases may at times lead to selection bias (Fearon and Laitin 2008; Gerring and Cojocaru 2016), in this case, it does not represent an issue as the main purpose of this section is to provide detailed descriptive evidence of the process of civil war onset in the form of state disintegration, not the formulation of causal claims.[82] In addition, a non-random selection ensures that enough sufficient data on this case is available to allow for such detailed descriptions. Specifically, I use the case of Burundi's civil war to investigate how state disintegration triggers mobilization for civil war. In doing so, I demonstrate that in the case of Burundi, given the central role of political networks and elites in the mobilization of individuals at the local level, it is difficult to imagine a similar scenario of civil war onset had the cooperation between elites not broken down at the center. Having done so, I point to potential links between such mobilization and meso- and micro-level dynamics, thereby highlighting avenues for further research.

In the remainder of this section, I first summarize the political history of Burundi until 1993. Next, I detail the dynamics of state disintegration in Burundi following the 1993 election. Lastly, I introduce the original data on the events that directly followed the disintegration of the state in October 1993.

6.3.1. A brief history of political conflict in Burundi, 1962-1993

Since independence in 1962, the political struggle in Burundi became increasingly ethnic (ICIB 2002). In 1966, Michel Micombero, a Tutsi officer, overthrew the monarchy in a coup d'état, assumed absolute power, and engaged in brutal ethnic repression. In doing so, he filled the officer corps and ranks of the army with Tutsis of his own clan. As Mitchell notes (2018: 161),

[80] Based on UCDP's estimates, past the onset year, violence measured in battle-deaths average 431 fatalities for each subsequent years until 2006, with a peak of between 727 and 1,507 fatalities in 2001.

[81] The case of Burundi somewhat differs from other cases of state disintegration in its level of GDP per capita. The value of GDP per capita (log) for Burundi is 7.028, compared with an average of 8.147 for all cases of state disintegration. As a measure of state capacity (e.g., Fearon and Laitin 2003), this difference suggests that the state was less equipped and less present across the territory prior to the onset of civil war in Burundi compared with the average for this category of civil war onset.

[82] As Fearon and Laitin (2008) argue, cases studies are useful to assess the causal mechanism that give rise to empirical regularities. However, in this case, the case study is not designed to confirm regularities or estimate a causal effect. In other words, I do not use this case-study to interpret the results of the statistical analysis (Small 2011). Instead, I use this case study to provide additional fine-grained descriptive evidence of the processes at play in the case of state disintegration, which is a common yet underexplored pathway to civil war.

"since its inception in 1960, the Armée Nationale du Burundi ("BNA") had been purged of Hutu officers and infantry men on a semi-regular basis. By the time Buyoya came to power in 1987, only 2 of the military's 398 officers were Hutu." Although the ethnic balance in the population is approximately 85 to 90 percent Hutu, 10 to 14 percent Tutsi, and about one percent Twa (Uvin 1999), this overwhelming majority of Tutsis in the Burundian army persisted until the start of the 1993 civil war.

Prior to the onset of the civil war in 1993, Burundi experienced several episodes of political violence, often in the form of Hutu insurgency in the periphery of the state. In April 1972, Hutus trained in neighboring countries carried out attacks against Tutsis in the region adjoining Lake Tanganyika in southern Burundi, resulting in several thousand casualties. Around the same time, several other small armed groups attempted attacks in different provinces including Bujumbura, Gitega and Cankuzo. Each time, the Micombero regime responded with highly violent repression which overall is estimated to have resulted in over a hundred thousand victims and forced several hundred thousand into exile (ICIB 2002). As Lemarchand (1994: 97) notes, "the carnage continued unabated until August. By then, almost every educated Hutu was either dead or in exile". In the aftermath of the repression, Hutus were deprived of all effective political power, at all administrative levels (ICIB 2002). The following years were marked by a series of military coups, which eventually brought Pierre Buyoya, another Tutsi officer, to power in 1987 (Pabanel 1984; Wiking 1983).

Around the same time, a second wave of rebellions erupted. In 1988, Hutus took up arms against several hundred Tutsis in two northern communes along the border with Rwanda, Ntega and Marangara, in what is now the Kirundo province. As during the previous rebellions, repression by the army was brutal and indiscriminate: several thousand Hutus were killed and tens of thousands fled to neighboring Rwanda (ICIB 2002). By the end of the 1980s, international reaction to these events forced President Buyoya to liberalize the regime and allow some Hutu political participation. But beginning in 1990, the arrests of supporters of PALIPEHUTU – the Party for the Liberation of the Hutu People – by the state created tensions. Partly out of exasperation, partly because they figured they had no other choice, those activists who remained on the ground turned to the use of force against police and military installations in several provinces (Lemarchand 1994). In the process, scores of Tutsi civilians were killed, which led to relatively indiscriminate repression, accompanied by looting, by government troops, although inferior to the levels of 1972.

Alongside small clandestine Hutu political groups such as PALIPEHUTU, the opening of the regime and the ongoing process of ethnic reconciliation led to the formation of the *Front pour la démocratie au Burundi*, FRODEBU. The party was founded by educated Hutus, who had survived the 1972 massacres and went into exile in neighboring Rwanda, together with a small number of Tutsis. This process culminated in the June 1993 presidential elections, which saw the victory of FRODEBU candidate Melchior Ndadaye, a Hutu, with 65 percent of the vote, largely drawing support from the Hutu population (ICIB 2002; Reyntjens 1993).

6.3.2. State disintegration in Burundi

As I have discussed above, state disintegration often results from a sudden shock in a highly fragmented and fragile political landscape. Within such a context, state disintegration refers to instances in which cooperation between political elites collapses and is accompanied by the mobilization of private armed militias that engage in fighting against one another, either empowered by defections in the armed forces or benefiting from the inactivity of the security forces. Evidence from secondary literature supports the claim that the state indeed disintegrated in October 1993 in Burundi.

Following several decades of single-party politics dominated by the Uprona, the exclusion of Hutu from the state apparatus, and several waves of brutal army repression, the practice of multi-partism started in April 1992. This recent turn to democracy culminated in the 1993 elections that were the first democratic exercise since 1965 and provoked a "political earthquake" in Burundi which saw the demise of the long-standing Uprona and the election of a Hutu civilian as President (Reyntjens 1993: 573). However, as Reyntjens (1993: 567) notes, during the campaign, two realities become clear:

> First, it was clear that the contest was to be very much a two-party affair. The *Front democratique du Burundi* (Frodebu) emerged as the only significant challenger to the entrenched rule of Uprona because of its successful recruitment campaign nationwide, its solid organisation, the commitment of its members, and the quality and diversity of its leadership. Secondly, starting at the end of 1992, the salience of ethnicity as a major electoral element emerged increasingly clearly, because after realising the considerable ground that the new party was gaining, Uprona embarked on a campaign which attempted to discredit Frodebu, accusing it of being an ethnic organisation of Hutu and even the 'legal arm' of the outlawed Palipehutu.

Following the investiture of President Ndadaye, several advances were quickly made, however not without challenges, which would soon contribute to the events that followed the

assassination of President Ndadaye in October 1993. First, the media "often exercised their recently acquired freedom in an incendiary manner, with negative effects on a population unaccustomed to open debate" (ICIB 2002: 22). Second, at the commune and colline levels, FRODEBU authorities took over across the country. Third, "[t]housands of Hutus that had gone into exile after 1972, began to return to the country and demand restitution of their land. Although President Ndadaye proposed their resettlement in outlying areas, in fact local authorities proceeded to many evictions" (ICIB 2002: 22). And lastly, substantive changes were made in the military, affecting the structure of command and admission requirements in the national police and the army (ICIB 2002).

In this context of new state institutions, increased salience of ethnicity, and a history of army repression, the political shock that triggered the onset of civil war in October 1993 was the assassination of the newly elected Hutu president, Melchior Ndadaye. Following the attempted coup d'état, although the Hutu political party FORDEBU was still in power, the government was headless and the army physically in control of most of the territory (Watt 2008: 57). As the remnants of the government fled to the French embassy and neighboring Rwanda, the failed coup "created a constitutional void which quickly made it impossible to agree on new high representatives without putting an end to the war first" (Nsanze 2003: 346).[83]

In the army, a tendency could be observed in Burundi of a "growing criminalization of power […] and its potential destabilization at the hands of senior officers and foot soldiers who have acquainted the habits of warlords" (Chrétien 2008: 10). As Chrétien (2008: 10) furthers notes, "the efficacy and presence of the state and its administration are open to discussion, in particular in rural Burundi, where insecurity is high."

Following the assassination, as violence spread across the country, the army was surprised by the scale and rapidity of reprisals in rural areas, causing it to lose control (Ngaruko and Nkurunziza 2005). Following the onset of conflict, a de facto alliance came to be between elements of the armed forces —which were predominantly Tutsi— and Tutsi militias that had mobilized in response to the formation of Hutu militias. In this context of communal fighting, the army typically supported the militias and engaged in violence against civilians, or stood aside while militias engaged in killings, assassinations, looting and broader destruction (Ntiantunganya 1999: 44). As Reynjens (1993: 581) describes, "in some instances, Tutsi

[83] This situation lasted until a slow reconstruction of the government began after Buyoya returned to power by a bloodless coup in July 1996 (Nsanze 2003). Yet, the reconstruction of the state suffered from communication difficulties with armed youth groups and parts of the army, which began a long process of sabotaging peace efforts by the government (Nsanze 2003; Ngaruko and Nkurunziza 2005).

soldiers massively killed Hutu, including Frodebu officials; in others, Hutu civilians systematically attacked Tutsi; in others still, Tutsi civilians —sometimes assisted by Rwandan refugees— attacked Hutu."

6.3.3. Data on Burundi's civil war onset

I exploit original archival data to explore the events that directly followed the disintegration of the state in October 1993, and examine the dynamics of mobilization and civil war onset in Burundi. The archives consist of a volume of testimonies and reports of the events that followed the assassination of President Melchior Ndadaye and the initiation of violence across Burundi. They also include letters addressed to officials including province electives, the prime minister, and the President of the International Commission of Inquiry for Burundi, dated between late 1994 and 1996. The archival material comes in two forms. First, it includes detailed descriptions of the events at the local level by witnesses and survivors. Second, it includes the lists of victims and perpetrators at the local level, with the usual socio-demographic variables such as age, gender, marital status, and professional occupation, reported by witnesses and survivors of the 1993 violence. This data was initially collected by several civil society organizations in Burundi, while the civil war was still ongoing. These organizations include various associations for regional and local development, associations of the relatives of the victims, and associations for the support of victims.[84]

Although incredibly rich and valuable, this data comes with some caveats. First, it was collected and compiled while conflict was ongoing in numerous parts of Burundi, which may have prevented access to some localities as well as limited the means with which data was collected. Second, some claims are difficult to assess given the high level of ethnic loyalty in Burundi at the time. As the International Commission of Inquiry for Burundi states in its report (2002: 50), "the ethnic confrontation in Burundi is not confined to the political or military leadership, but permeates every layer of society. This confrontation is, if anything, stronger in the camps and in the hills of the central and northern highlands, where practically every Hutu and Tutsi family has lost members to ethnic violence." Lastly, in some cases, there is very limited information available on the civil society organizations that collected the testimonies during the civil war.

To mitigate these caveats and whenever possible, I cross-check the testimonies with the official report by the International Commission of Inquiry for Burundi. I also limit my use of

[84] A full list of the civil society organizations that contributed to the archives are available in Appendix 7.

the data to what it can provide, that is detailed descriptions of the events that took place at the local level during the first few weeks of the civil war. Lastly, I do not claim that the data is comprehensive. Instead, I leverage the valuable descriptions from the testimonies to identify the dynamics of onset and mobilization for violence in the localities where violence occurred.

Burundi is divided into administrative provinces, communes, collines, and sous-collines. In the early 1990s, Burundi was composed of 16 provinces, 119 communes, and 2,239 collines or hills. Nearly 95 percent of the population is rural. Apart from Bujumbura, Gitega, and Ngozi, the provincial capitals are not much bigger than villages (ICIB 2002). In addition, the rural population is dispersed, with each family living on its plot. As a result, except for the lakeshore and the provincial capitals, there are practically no towns or villages (ICIB 2002). In 1993, the gross national product of Burundi was estimated to be 230 billion Burundian francs (about 1.1 billion US dollars) and its per capita income, estimated at 180 US dollars, was one of the lowest in Africa. Agriculture provides about half of the gross national product, one of the highest proportions in the world. Most of the produce is used for the subsistence of the farmers themselves (ICIB 2002).

The archives provide information for a total of 491 collines, distributed across 53 communes. I use the data in two complementary ways. First, I use the descriptions of events at the local level for all collines for which data is available to examine the dynamics of mobilization and the initiation of violence following state disintegration. In particular, I describe the form that mobilization took at onset, who the first movers and political entrepreneurs were, whether they met resistance from individuals or the community, how intense the initial episodes of violence were, and how violence spread across villages. Second, I use OCR software to digitalize the data and compile a dataset of victims and perpetrators of the violence in October 1993. Mobilizing this data, I estimate the socio-demographic profile of the victims and perpetrators of violence based on the information available in the archives for a carefully motivated subset of the data. As the material was initially collected by different civil organizations in each province, it is not consistently detailed. While it sometimes provides the full range of socio-demographic characteristics, in other cases the data is limited to a list of names. To make sure that the archival material is used to its greatest extent possible, I select the communes for which descriptions are especially detailed across several provinces. The final selection includes five communes in the center and north of the country, which is where violence erupted in October 1993 (Reyntjens 1993). Figure 7.2 shows both the data coverage and the communes selected for analysis.

Figure 7.2. Mapping of all communes available in the data and sample for analysis





Figure 7.3. Mapping of selected collines by commune (N=25)



Within each of these communes, except Bujumbura Rural, I randomly select for the analysis half of the collines for which some data is available. In the case of Bujumbura Rural, given that few collines are included, I include all the collines for which data is available. Figure 7.3 shows the geographical distribution of selected collines within each commune. After data cleaning and careful selection, the final subset for analysis includes 25 collines in five communes across four provinces of Burundi. Across the selected collines, the final dataset includes a total of 2,034 observations. I subsequently divide the data into a subset for the victims and another for the perpetrators.[85] For each of them, I control for duplicates. I compare

[85] For ethical reasons, I have removed all names of both the victims and the perpetrators. Instead, I have assigned a unique numeric identifier to each individual in the data.

all observations that shared the same name across age and gender, occupation, location, and date of death. The observations for which these variables differed were kept as distinct observations. The final datasets include 1,842 and 440 observations, for victims and perpetrators respectively.

Lastly, I rely on extensive secondary literature, including quantitative and qualitative studies, across academic fields, from political science and history to anthropology, to examine the dynamics of conflict during wartime. When aggregated and compared, these various pieces of evidence provide a substantive pool of detailed information to identify plausible meso-level mechanisms underlying the macro-level patterns of civil war. Altogether, this empirical strategy provides a detailed account of the processes of state disintegration, both linking political breakdown at the center with local-level mobilization of militia groups, and connecting those dynamics of onset to several wartime dynamics at a level of analysis so far uninvestigated by the previous empirical chapters.

6.4. Burundi's civil war, 1993-2006

6.4.1. Mobilization and the onset of the civil war

How did violence escalate in Burundi following the disintegration of the state? The onset of violence was surprisingly quick in Burundi. After the assassination of President Ndadaye, violent reprisals targeting Tutsi civilians broke out throughout the country (Uvin 2009; Ould-Abdallah 2000). Around 50,000 people, mostly Tutsi, were massacred in the first week after the coup attempt (Ngaruko and Nkurunziza 2005). Existing studies point to several factors to explain both the spread and intensity of the violence, from poverty (Prunier 2009), population density (Ould-Abdallah 2000), to previous experience of violence (Chrétien 2008). While these studies ask why violence escalated, my research focuses on *how* violence escalated at the onset of Burundi's civil war. To investigate this question, I leverage the original archival data described above.

I have argued in the previous chapters that state disintegration is a process of civil war onset which refers to the breakdown of cooperation among political elites, who mobilize militias to seize power. In the case of Burundi, I therefore expect the mobilization to be top-down. That is political elites, either at high levels of power, such as president, vice-president, and ministers, or local political leaders such as governors or local administrators to be the first movers and play a central role in the mobilization for violence leading to the onset of civil war. Evidence from archival data provides clear support for this process of onset.

A consistent pattern of the onset of Burundi's civil war is the mobilization of political networks from the center all the way down to the colline level. It is through that channel that orders seem to have been given and spread across the country. In that sense, mobilization was quick and centered around local FRODEBU leaders, and was initiated by political elites.[86] In commune Bubanza, mobilization began after the visit of the provincial governor and was led by local administrators including the 'chef de secteur', 'chef de colline', and the director of primary school. A similar process took place in commune Murata where the communal administrator and other local councilmen organized the mobilization of the local population following a visit by the provincial governor. According to the testimonies, the local administrators travelled across their respective communes to the different collines on motorcycles to give the orders following the capture of President Ndadaye. Such was the case in communes Rango, Rutegama, Mutaho, or Kirundo. In commune Isale, witnesses report that the provincial governor held a hasty meeting in a bar on the road between Buja and Gitega, where weapons were distributed to local militiamen.

In the various collines, these local administrators then formed first groups of armed civilians. Systematically, the first orders were to cut bridges and block all roads to prevent movements across localities. In commune Bwambarangwe, as soon as Radio Kigali insinuated the death of President Melchior Ndadaye, the communal administrator travelled through the communes' 17 collines with a microphone to order to block roads, prepare weapons, and regroup Tutsi inhabitants. In commune Isale, witnesses report constant movements of FRODEBU militants and the formation of small groups led by local administrators in public places such as markets and bars. These first groups typically engaged in displays of power. In communes Bukirasazi, Nyabikere, Rango, or Bubanza, these groups marched through the locality in protest against the coup attempt, which as witnesses report had the effect of attracting more men.

Who mobilized around those local political leaders? As Prunier (2009) notes, the violence in Burundi was that of neighbors against neighbors. Testimonies report that the first groups were in fact either from the same colline or travelled from neighboring collines to perpetrate violence. Although the initiators of mobilization and violence were political elites, the initial groups who perpetrated the violence and the target of such violence were 'ordinary

[86] This finding is consistent with other studies that point to the major role played by the administrative authorities of the FRODEBU political party in initiating and organizing the killings (e.g., Chrétien and Mukuri 2002; Bundervoet 2009).

civilians' with no particular ties to political networks other than being FORDEBU supporters.[87] Based on the socio-demographic archival data, it appears that perpetrators were in vast majority men. Most of them were farmers: they make out 151 of the 255 perpetrators for whom data on occupation is available. Builders is the second most common profession among perpetrators. Only four individuals were known to be part of security forces, most of them members of the local police. On the side of the victims, the majority was also farmers: 259 out of the 492 individuals for whom data on occupation is available. Many victims were students. They represent the second most represented category. Victims were of all ages; the mean and median are 31 and 30 respectively. Although victims were more balanced in their gender, men were especially targeted – among the victims included in the data, 1221 were men and 519 women, including children. Testimonies from several localities report that men were often the first victims. In commune Musigati, armed attackers targeted men first, then young men, children, and lastly women.

At the onset of hostilities, the army was surprised by the scale and rapidity of reprisals in rural areas, causing it to lose control (Ngaruko and Nkurunziza 2005). Testimonies report that the armed forces often remained inactive or arrived weeks after the violence started. In commune Murata, some inhabitant walked along a side road to inform the commandant of the military camp of the events that were taking place. The commandant reportedly responded that the military could not be sent by fear of fueling more violence. In commune Rango, although they had reportedly been informed, the army did not intervene. Military units arrived in Rango three weeks after the events. In some other cases, however, testimonies report that the army did protect local populations. In commune Rugazi for example, few deaths were reported because Tutsi quickly learned of the events that began across the region and sought protection from the military unit that stood at the local chief town.

Although, when violence did occur, it was the result of the mobilization of local party supporters led by political elites across Burundi, it should be noted that not all collines equally suffered from the violence. As this chapter aims at identifying the dynamics through which state disintegration leads to civil war onset, the systematic examination of the variation in the intensity and occurrence of violence at the local level falls out of the scope of this study.[88]

[87] Another clear aspect of the salience of political support in the event of October 1993 and which shows that mobilization was not merely ethnic is that Hutu supporters of the UPRONA party were targeted alongside Tutsi and were considered traitor to the Hutu cause (Bundervoet 2009).

[88] Existing studies focused on such variation point to different factors. For example, Bundervoet (2009) find that older and wealthier persons were more likely to be killed, and so did educated people. In addition, at the commune level, he finds that higher population density and localities with FRODEBU was dominant but not the sole party

Nevertheless, while in some collines, entire communities fell victims of the violence, in others, few casualties were reported (Lynch 2013). Testimonies recount that local administrators sometimes advocated for restraint, such as in commune Nyabikere or Makebuko, thereby countering the dynamics of top-down mobilization by political elites. In commune Mutumba, the local leader informed all Tutsi inhabitants that massacres were taking place in neighboring collines. In commune Bibara, resistance came from the local population, which at first opted not to engage in violence, although violence eventually was perpetrated in the locality. In Makebuko, survivors report that many Tutsi were hidden by their Hutu neighbors and escaped violence.

6.4.2. Armed groups, warfare, and civilian victimization during Burundi's civil war

As state disintegration leads to civil war onset through the mobilization of political networks down to the local level following the breakdown of cooperation among political elites, this section examines in the case of Burundi whether such dynamics of onset lead to specific wartime dynamics. In the previous empirical chapters, I have shown that following state disintegration, civil war is likely to be fought through symmetric warfare, lead to high levels of violence, and last relatively long. In this section, I refine this pattern and explore the implications of the features of onset for meso-level wartime dynamics that may in part drive the macro-level patterns identified in Chapter 5. Having illustrated the dynamics of mobilization following state disintegration, this section compares the descriptions of conflict dynamics in the current literature to identify similarities. In that sense, the repeated accounts of specific dynamics in the secondary literature provides indirect evidence that onset may also shape meso-level dynamics in important ways.[89]

Specifically, given the characteristics of mobilization at the conflict onset, armed groups should be likely to experience fragmentation and infighting. Moreover, I expect civilian victimization, both lethal and non-lethal, to be perpetrated along collective attributes and to reach high levels. Using extensive secondary literature, the remainder of this section assesses whether these patterns were salient during Burundi's civil war. It should be noted that these conflict dynamics are by no means exclusive to this specific type of civil war onset, and may also take place in civil wars that begin in different ways. However, the empirical evidence

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were at higher risk of violence. Pointing to additional factors, Lynch (2013) links the variation in violence at the local level to individuals' beliefs about the opposing group based on experiences of past violence.

[89] To further validate these patterns, the following section in this chapter explores in a similar manner, three additional civil wars that followed state disintegration: Afghanistan (1992-1996), Bosnia (1992-1995), and Lebanon (1975-1990). As I demonstrate later, these conflicts displayed similar dynamics.

below suggests that civil wars that follow state disintegration may be especially likely to exhibit those features.

Armed organizations. The Hutu militias were far from unified. Some of these groups had been created prior to the onset of violence. At the time, they remained primarily clandestine, and later mobilized in the context of state disintegration. These organizations include the *Forces Nationales de Libération* (FNL), which were created as the armed branch of the PALIPEHUTU, and the *Front pour la Libération Nationale* (FROLINA), which was created in the late 1980s. Other armed groups were created during wartime. In June 1994, several leaders within FRODEBU split from the party rather than compromise with the opposition and created the Council for the Defense of Democracy (CNDD) and its armed branch the Forces for the Defense of Democracy (FDD). The *Union de Liberation Nationale* (ULINA) was created in 1996 (Ngaruko and Nkurunziza 2005).

Just as the government had relied on regional and ethnic ties and networks prior to the war, these practices were also at play in rebel command structures. In fact, "the problem of regionalism was so deep within rebel groups that bloody in-fights emerged between Bururi fighters and those from other parts of the country" (Ngaruko and Nkurunziza 2005: 49). Recruits were primarily motivated by revenge for the loss of power, relatives, and friends to army repression. To a lesser extent, other young men and women joined various armed groups because they identified with rebel propaganda (Ngaruko and Nkurunziza 2005). As the army was mostly Tutsi, there exist reports of numerous rogue army units which sided with Tutsi militias, and others who indiscriminately targeted Hutu civilians (ICIB 2002). In addition, various rebel groups were joined by Rwandan Hutus from the 1994 disbanded army (Balencie and La Grange 1996).

Tutsi militias mostly formed in response to the mobilization of local Hutu groups. They started as gangs of youths and, especially in 1994 and 1995, led punitive expeditions against those supposedly responsible for the deaths of their family members (Chrétien 2008). These militias operated without any political agenda, but were later manipulated by a few Tutsi politicians to serve their cause (Ngaruko and Nkurunziza 2005). Violence did not spare the capital Bujumbura, where most of these youth gangs operated and engaged in killings and looting, either with the armed forces being complicit or directly under the supervision of some officers (Ngaruko and Nkurunziza 2005).

These numerous organizations on all sides suffered from "an endless process of fragmentation within groups" (Lemarchand 2009: 142). From four main parties in 1996, no fewer than seventeen had come into being in 2000, of which ten were pro-Tutsi and seven, pro-Hutu. These factional splits did not simply follow ethnic lines. For example, some Tutsi political parties allied with Hutu PALIPEHUTU against government led by the CNDD, while CNDD and PALIPEHUTU had been strong allies before the Pretoria agreement but opponents after it (Cunningham 2011: 164-165). Splits were thus often driven by strategy and tactic decisions more than ideology (Ngaruko and Nkurunziza 2005), and by divisions between extremists and moderates on both sides (Lemarchand 2009).

Warfare and fighting. As Reyntjens (1995: 21) notes, the war in Burundi quickly became a "mutually hurting stalemate and both sides knew that military victory was impossible." In fact, the larger militias on each side were of relatively similar size and capacity (Ngaruko and Nkurunziza 2005). Regarding territorial control, Prunier (2009: 63) describes that there were no compactly held territory and no battle lines in Burundi, mostly because the two sides were hopelessly intertwined as they had lived side by side before the conflict. In addition, as the militias never had the military means to cut off certain areas, various actors often operated within the same areas. While the CNDD-FDD was the most successful and operated in many provinces, other groups were more localized, such as the FNL, which was primarily active in western Burundi and in control of the main roads leading out of Bujumbura (Watt 2008: 66).

In this sense, although fighting appears to have been conducted through symmetric non-conventional warfare, that is, between forces that dispose of symmetric but low military capacity, none of them were strong enough to establish exclusive control over given portions of territory. This may be a result of a high population density across the territory which renders control of territory more difficult. Reports suggest that pockets of control may have been exclusive but limited in scope, as testimonies from witnesses and survivors describe villages in which all opposition to Hutu militias had been suppressed.

Civilian victimization. Burundi's civil war generated high numbers of civilian deaths (Cunningham 2011). Around 300,000 were killed, 500,000 sought refuge abroad, and 800,000 were internally displaced (Uvin 2009: 18). During the war, armed groups continued to commit numerous serious human right abuses against civilians including killings, kidnapping, rapes, theft, extortion, and the forcible recruitment and employment of children as child soldiers and

forced labor (State Department Human Rights). Cohen (2016) and Pickering (2010) both record that forced recruitment and abduction were used by all militias, especially in the second half of the 1990s. Examining sexual violence, Cohen (2016) reports widespread instances of rape that reflected intent to use rape as a method of control. Such practices were displayed both by all major militias as well as army units. Looking more closely at the conflict-year level, the use of sexual violence increased as the conflict lasted and became widespread after 1999. Such a pattern also appears to correspond to the increased fragmentation of armed groups. It may be that at first, the various militias benefited from the initial wave of mobilization, but as the war dragged on, both voluntary recruitment and cohesion decreased.

In sum, in the case of Burundi's civil war, civil war onset in the form of state disintegration led to the emergence of numerous local organizations, which regularly suffered from infighting and fractionalization, disposed of relatively similar military capacities, and committed high levels of civilian victimization in the form of collective targeting. Although this evidence based on secondary literature does allow to formulate causal claims, it nevertheless provides initial evidence that the features of onset may shape meso- and micro-level dynamics, such as the organization and cohesion of armed groups, their recruitment practices, and their military strategy in addition to macro-level patterns.

6.4.3. Caveat and limitations

While indirect evidence from secondary literature points to specific meso-level dynamics consistent with the macro-level patterns uncovered in the previous chapter, some characteristics may be specific to the case of Burundi.[90] First, after having disintegrated following the coup attempt in 1993, the state returned, at least in part, before the end of the conflict. As noted above, when Buyoya returned in 1996, several factions of the army became loyal again, and negotiations between rebel militias and the state could begin. This may in turn have affected conflict dynamics in ways that depart from the predicted trajectory of conflict following state disintegration. Second, Burundi's civil war occurred in a context of great regional instability. This allowed militias on all sides, perhaps Hutu groups especially, to travel across state borders and seek refuge in neighboring countries. One may expect that a conflict

[90] The evidence provided in this section serves an illustrative purpose and points to mechanisms that potentially account for the macro-level patterns of civil war that follow state disintegration. Further and more systematic analysis with robust research design are needed to formally confirm and disconfirm this set of mechanisms and identify their causal link with civil war onset.

would have unfolded in a different way had the rebels had no possibilities to seek refuge abroad.

Lastly, Burundi's ethnic composition in the early 1990s was extremely unbalanced as approximately 85 to 90 percent of the population was Hutu, 10 to 14 percent was Tutsi, and about one percent was Twa (Uvin 1999). This may have affected the dynamics of mobilization at onset as well as conflict dynamics, since the Hutu population represents a large majority in most localities. In addition, the population was often heterogenous across the territory, with no enclave of a specific ethnic groups. Instead, communities were composed of individuals of all ethnic backgrounds, which could explain both why onset was so geographically widespread and why militias failed to establish clear territorial control. Burundi was also densely populated with no large city except Bujumbura, Gitega, and Ngozi. In fact, one may expect that wartime dynamics vary when occurring in more demographically balanced and geographically clustered population and urban environment. The comparative evidence from Afghanistan (1992-1996), Bosnia (1992-1995), and Lebanon (1975-1990) in the following section is informative since these cases vary in those characteristics, among others.

6.5. Beyond the case of Burundi: Small-N comparative evidence

On the empirical front, this chapter has done two things. First, it provides a detailed account of the mobilization of local groups following state disintegration in October 1993 based on testimonies from witnesses and survivors. Second, focusing on the case of Burundi, it points to meso- and micro-level dynamics that may be characteristics of civil wars that begin with state disintegration. Can a similar pattern of wartime dynamics be observed in other cases of civil wars that follow state disintegration? To support the external validity of such a pattern, this section provides empirical evidence of these dynamics beyond Burundi's civil war through a small-N comparison of the civil wars in Afghanistan (1992-1996), Bosnia (1992-1995), and Lebanon (1975-1990). In doing so, I provide further support to the overarching argument in this dissertation that, given how they begin, civil wars unfold in patterned ways.

Just as the civil war in Burundi, these three cases display macro-level patterns that are to the expected trajectory of conflict following state disintegration. They also have in common that ethnic identities became salient in the conflict, which is representative of most conflicts in that category. Lastly, they share that they experienced prior conflict, either at home or in their direct neighborhood, which is also representative of most cases. In Afghanistan, the intra-mujahedeen war followed the first Afghan war (1978-1992); in Bosnia, several newly

independent countries in former Yugoslavia were experiencing civil wars; and Lebanon had experienced a first civil war in 1958 between Nasserite forces and those loyal to Chamoun.

These cases also differ in important ways which makes them useful candidates for comparison. First, they vary in the level of state capacity prior to onset, measured as GDP per capita. Second, they vary in location and are spread across different regions. Third, while in Burundi, conflict mostly took place in rural areas, in these cases violence started in urban areas including the capital cities. Lastly, they vary in their respective ethnic and religious makeup. Summary statistics are available in Appendix 7.

6.5.1. Afghanistan, 1992-1996

In the wake of state disintegration in Afghanistan, following the resignation of President Mohammad Najibullah, local warlords, most of whom took part in the mujahideen war the previous decade, mobilized their respective followers (Sinno 2008). The mobilization of supporters and the simultaneous defection from the remnants of the Afghan army was mainly conducted along ethnic lines, often clan-based. Typically, groups recruited among members of their own ethnicity, as they could not reach out to larger bases of support (Sinno 2008). As Staniland (2014: 127) describes:

> Hekmatyar's Hezb could not build broad, reliable local control; Massoud's tightly disciplined forces could not expand far; the Jamiat remained a loose coalition; and the Harakat continued to be fragmented and essentially nonexistent as a coherent group. As Dorronsoro argues, 'No organization was truly represented at the national level, since party discipline was generally less strong than local solidarity.'

Furthermore, these organizations often suffered from fragmentation, driven by revolts from below or infighting between group leaders (Staniland 2014). For example, the Hezb-I Islami experienced recurring problems related to local mobilization and control that undermined the ability of the leadership core to create an integrated organization. As a result, the group did not extend beyond the networks of the Islamists and had few ties to the countryside, especially in the tribal eastern and southern Pashtun areas (Staniland 2014: 113-115). Additionally, none of the armed groups were "strong enough to overcome the multitude of independent or semi-independent groups that shared their or their rivals' ethnic spaces. Such groups were numerous in Pashtun areas and still persisted in other regions" (Sinno 2008: 216).

A different group, Jamiat-e Islami, managed to mobilize many armed factions among the non-Pashtun population. As such, it had a larger social base, but suffered from weaker central command. As Staniland (2014: 118) notes:

> The group lacked a tight, coherent strategic and decision-making core. The pattern of conflict within the Jamiat-e Islami was between commanders, rather than between local units and a unified set of elites: the organization 'suffered from frictions between main commanders and smaller ones, who resented the centralization of the decision process, and (after 1992) between its two main field commanders, Ismail Khan in the West and Massoud in the East.'

Interactions between these numerous groups were a combination of various and often shifting alliances (Christia 2012). Despite the Islamabad accord of 1993, Goodson (2001: 74) describes, "the rival mujahideen groups and militias could never settle on an acceptable power-sharing arrangement, and fighting flared repeatedly between groups who allied with each other in various and constantly shifting combinations."

At the national level, the war was "complex and scattered, fought by numerous small organizations and few larger armed groups that nevertheless did not span the nation" (Staniland 2014: 127). Many militias were attached to geographic areas. For example, Junbish-i Milli was the majority Uzbek party of Dostum, whose area of control was the north, primarily the provinces of Jowzjan, Faryab, Balkh, and Samangan, and was constrained during the war by its regional character and mainly confined to this specific area (Christia 2012: 60).

As these examples make clear, most groups during the Afghan war (1992-1996) struggled to expand further, in part due to the geographic character of their support base, and in part because of the presence of many effectively independent armed groups that coalesced under threat. The difficulty of advancing in rural areas also explains in part why all ambitious organizations focused on Kabul —the only challengers in the capital were the other centralized organizations (Sinno 2008; Christia 2012). Overall, fighting between the various clan-based militias quickly reached a stalemate (Sinno 2008). In addition, extensive external involvement of regional players continued to be important throughout the war (Christia 2012), and the "profusion of weaponry and shadow economies throughout Afghanistan reduced the leverage sponsors could gain from resource flows" (Staniland 2014: 127).

This fractured landscape was transformed however in 1994 by the growth of the Taliban, which expanded from the south to eventually control most of the territory by the late 1990s

(Christia 2012). This wartime development had consequential implications. As Staniland (2014: 133) summarizes:

> The strains of war had already undermined the cohesion of most of Afghanistan's contenders for power and essentially wiped out several others. The rise of the Taliban added further stress that triggered defections and infighting. Hekmatyar's units abandoned him, Dostum's militia became internally divided, Khan's group suffered spirals of defection and feuding before collapsing, and Massoud and Rabbani were forced back into an ever-shrinking northeastern redoubt. The Taliban incorporated factions of other armed groups and absorbed blocs that were defecting from its rival. This mix of expansion and control was enormously powerful.

In sum, similarly to the case of Burundi, the civil war in Afghanistan was characterized by the presence of numerous factions that repeatedly suffered from infighting, fractionalization, and loose alliances. Consistent with the argument in this thesis, this suggests that state disintegration may create the condition for weaker groups to emerge and fight another in an attempt to capture political power.

6.5.2. Bosnia, 1992-1995

In the context of the disintegration of Yugolsavia, the years leading up to the conflict in Bosnia were marked by increasingly ethnicized politics, mostly along religious lines (Christia 2012). When conflict erupted in March 1992, ethnic groups mobilized. Of the three main fighting groups, the Bosnian Serbs were better equipped, as they benefited from the support of the remnants of the Yugoslav army. In contrast, the Muslims and Croats were less prepared. In fact, the Muslims were slow to establish a concerted fighting force, lacking weaponry and a unified command structure (Christia 2012). Overall, ethnicity appears to be a good predictor of the side that an individual was likely to join (Kalyvas and Sambanis 2005). However, many fighters were conscripts rather than volunteers (Maass 1996). As Mueller (2000: 47) notes, "the effective murderous core of the wars were not hordes composed of ordinary citizens ripped loose from their repression or incited into violence against their neighbors. Rather the politicians found it necessary to recruit thugs and hooligans for the job."

On all sides, the armies that fought the Bosnian war were a mix of regular and irregular forces, from criminal freed from prison, to armed civilians and reservists, to former officers of the Yugoslav army (O'Ballance 1995; Kalyvas and Sambanis 2005). These various armies also benefited from the support of large diasporas, both in the form of financial assistance and volunteers from other countries (Kalyvas and Sambanis 2005). Contrary to the case of

Afghanistan, in Bosnia, as the conflict went on, "many of these units underwent an organizational transformation during the war; becoming more organized and centralized" (Kalyavs and Sambanis 2005: 212).

While violence spread across the country, the war was conducted in both large urban areas and the countryside. By spring of 1992, "Bosnia was now fragmenting into a patchwork of small, defended localities with differing allegiances, each determined to protect its own territory. Main through roads were barricaded against all but their allies" (O'Ballance 1995: 51). By the end of 1993, each side displayed relative military parity and the war reached a stalemate (Christia 2012; Kalyvas and Sambanis 2005). However, in most regions of Bosnia, the conflict retained a distinctly local character and the various alliances were highly regionalized, though still driven by the dynamics of the national leadership of each faction (Christia 2012; O'Ballance 1995). On the ground, although instances differed geographically, a general pattern emerged (Kalyvas and Sambanis 2005: 213):

> Initially, Serb forces would establish military control of an area, either from inside, relying on the local Serb population, or by attack or siege. This task was often carried out by Serb roving militias, though artillery support could be provided by regular units. In many cases, these outsiders were accompanied and helped by locals. […] These units would attack, and usually defeat, hastily organized 'self-defense' units formed by Muslim villagers. Where complete control could not be achieved, for instance in some of Bosnia's larger cities, Serb forces lay the area under siege. […] Although some of the violence was targeted, much of it was indiscriminate.

Civilian victimization was especially high throughout the Bosnian war, especially in the form of ethnic cleansing (Kalyvas and Sambanis 2005; O'Ballance 1995; Kaldor 1999). Violence commonly took the form of civilian victimization, including looting and numerous instances of sexual violence (Donia and Fine 1994; Kalyvas and Sambanis 2005). As Mueller (2000: 43) describes, "sometimes operating with local authorities, [militias] would then take control and persecute members of other ethnic groups, who would usually flee to areas protected by their own ethnic ruffians, sometimes to join them in seeking revenge." Looting was also widespread as a large percentage of militia members used it to sustain themselves (Kalyvas and Sambanis 2005). As a result, less than a month into the conflict, UNHCR estimates that 370,000 Bosnians had become refugees. This number increased to 750,000 by June 1992, and to 2 million refugees by the fall of 1992, amounting to almost half of Bosnia's population according to the 1991 census (Donia and Fine 1994: 244-45).

In sum, just as during Burundi's civil war, as the various groups reached a stalemate, the conflict in Bosnia at the local level displayed the dynamics of communal war, in which non-state armed groups targeted individuals along ethnic lines, causing especially high levels of civilian victimization in the form of massacres and ethnic cleansing.

6.5.3. Lebanon, 1975-1990

The Lebanese civil war was characterized by a "dizzying and changing number of protagonists and combatants (internal and external, identified and unidentified, controlled and undisciplined, zealots and mercenaries); […and] an alternating pattern and intensity of violence; the swift and successive changes in issues involved" (Khalaf 2002: 21). Although religion was a factor in the conflict, "it was never the cause of the strife, for almost all the militias had both Christian and Moslem members" (Abraham 1996: 173). In addition, infighting was common between factions of the same camp (Makdisi and Sadaka 2005).

The conflict began as militias started fighting in the capital while the paralyzed army stood by helplessly (Abraham 1996). In a Christian suburb of Beirut, on 13 April 1975, unknown assailants fired at a Sunday church gathering attended by Pierre Gemayel, leader of the Maronite Phalanges, killing his bodyguard and two others. In retaliation, "Maronite militiamen ambushed a bus passing through the neighborhood a short while later, massacring the 28 passengers (mostly Palestinians) on board. Widespread clashes immediately erupted in the country between Maronite militiamen on the one hand and National Movement and Palestinian militiamen on the other" (Khalidi 1979: 47).

By the following day, the conflict was attracting more combatants. As O'Ballance (1998: 2) describes, "extremist Lebanese Muslim groups joined in on the side of the Palestinians, and elements of several smaller Christian militias on the side of the Falangists. There was no shortage of volunteers, as everyone seemed to be itching to have a go at a traditional enemy. Nor was there a shortage of weapons."

On all sides, the large militias developed into elaborate organizations, supported by external interventions, particularly from Lebanon's two regional neighbors Israel and Syria (Fisk 1990; Makdisi and Sadaka 2005). The Maronites Christians were led by a loose quadripartite coalition known as the Lebanese Forces, and could cooperate effectively with one another despite internal tensions (Khalidi 1979; Makdisi and Sadaka 2005). However, some of these militias often seemed to act in defiance of the quadripartite leadership, by either refusing to acquiesce to agreed-upon ceasefires, or going completely rogue (Khalidi 1979).

The opposing camp was more heterogenous. In addition to the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), it included several Lebanese political parties and groups, notably Amal (Shiite) and the Progressive Socialist Party (Druze, Muslim). As the war unfolded, the Lebanese armed groups became stronger, especially after the bulk of Palestinian forces had to withdraw from the country following the Israeli invasion (Makdisi and Sadaka 2005). However, in the long run, the PLO and the leftist alliance had "unsuccessfully worked together to achieve a still illusionary goal; other than their hatred of the Lebanese-right, they had no plan to win over the Lebanese people" (Abraham 1996: 173).

The fighting, which started in Beirut, soon spread to other regions both in the north, including Tripoli, and in southern Lebanon (Abraham 1996; O'Ballance 1998). Soon after, the civil war settled into a relative stable pattern of territorial control and confrontation lines that largely corresponded to sectarian divisions (Makdisi and Sadaka 2005; Abraham 1996). By 1980, "the country became effectively divided into regions that were militarily controlled by Syria, the Lebanese army and the Lebanese forces, and the PLO and the Lebanese parties allied with it. Beirut was again divided into an eastern part, controlled by the Lebanese Forces and the Lebanese army, and a western part, controlled by the PLO/Lebanese coalition" (Makdisi and Sadaka 2005: 67).

In the dynamics of siege and occupation, the conflict was characterized by numerous instances of deliberate killings of civilians (Khalaf 2002; Fisk 1990; Abraham 1996). For example, as Makdisi and Sadaka (2005: 67) describe, "the battles that took place between the Kataeb party and Palestinian groups at the outskirts of Beirut, in areas that included Palestinian refugee camps, ended with the Kataeb militia in control of the refugee camps in the northeast suburbs of Beirut and the forced eviction of their residents. Christian towns south of Beirut, notably Damour, were ransacked by Palestinian and Lebanese militias. Atrocities were committed by both sides."

As the previous cases, evidence from Lebanon points to common military strategies and patterns of civilian victimization. As the territory becomes segmented, non-state militias engage in widespread abuses along ethnic or religious lines in their attempt to capture power. Although this evidence does not allow to formulate causal claim, the recurrence of similar conflict dynamics across cases of civil war that begins with state disintegration suggests that how a civil war starts may also shape, at least in part, meso- and micro-level dynamics of conflict.

6.6. Conclusion

This chapter has illustrated the dynamics at play during the onset of civil war following state disintegration: as the state disintegrates and political cooperation breaks down between political elites, local groups led by political entrepreneurs quickly mobilize into private armed militias, empowered by both a series of defection and a substantive increase in civilian mobilization. In that sense, instead of guerrilla wars, conflict dynamics following the disintegration of the state resemble those of communal war, that is, organized violence between militias on all sides, often identified along ethnic or religious lines (Krause 2018).

Through a detailed case study of Burundi's civil war based on original archival data, this chapter has illustrated the dynamics of top-down mobilization initiated by political elites. In a context of heightened political tensions at the center of the state apparatus, a shock triggers the disintegration of the state and its army, thereby opening the way for fighting between private militias led by various political elites. In Burundi following the assassination of newly elected President Ndadaye in October 1993, orders to mobilize travelled the hierarchy of political parties from the level of governors all the way down to village administrators. This is turn led to the formation of numerous local groups, loosely controlled by political elites. The onset of civil war in South Sudan in 2013 suggests that similar dynamics of onset and mobilization are also at play more recent case of state disintegration, as fighting broke out in Juba between rival factions of led by President Salva Kiir and former Vice-President Riek Machar (Rolandsen 2015; Downie 2013).

Having described the processes of onset in the case of state disintegration, this chapters has examined the implications for several meso- and micro-level dynamics, thereby expending the scope of the broader empirical analysis in this dissertation. Based on the features of onset, this chapter has formulated conjectures about the organization of armed groups, the military strategy, and use of violence. Comparing the case of Burundi with three additional civil wars, it points to common dynamics following state disintegration. The numerous militias tend to start and remain local, both in their base of support and geographical scope of their operations, and dispose of vague political agendas other than capturing state power. As a result, instead of being an anomaly, fragmentation and infighting appear to be the norm. As the war spreads across the country, the territory fragments into pockets of militia control. Typically mobilized along identity lines, these militias also perpetrate high level of civilian victimization in the form of ethnic cleansing and large-scale collective targeting.

Altogether, this chapter illustrates the value of considering specific wartime dynamics within each category of civil war onset, as although the same dynamics may occur across categories, they may very well play out differently and lead to different outcomes. The systematic study of these differences may open the way to a fruitful agenda for the comparative research of civil war.

Conclusion

This dissertation has provided systematic evidence that civil war onset is a varied political phenomenon. To systematically account for this variation, this thesis has developed a novel typology and has provided a theory of civil war trajectories linking the variation in the form of onset to macro-level conflict dynamics. This research builds on a vast body of literature on the causes of civil war and specifically contributes to the existing literature as, unlike most studies which consider civil war onset as a dichotomous event, it provides a novel conceptualization of onset as a categorical political event. Approaching civil war onset through this lens, the question that this thesis has sought to answer is no longer *why* civil wars start, which has been addressed extensively, but instead *how* civil wars start and whether the way in which state sovereignty is challenged shapes how conflict subsequently unfolds.

A well-known conception of civil war, often informed by famous doctrines by Lenin, Mao Zedong, or Che Guevara, is that they typically take the form of peripheral insurgencies, launched by revolutionaries, who, at the time of onset, dispose of limited military capacity, often in the rural periphery of the state, and attempt to attract civilian support and cooperation to militarily compete against the state. Yet, this thesis has shown that there exist three other forms of civil war onset, much less studied, and which together amount to one third of all conflicts since the end of World War II: state disintegration, coup, and insurrectionary protests.

Recognizing that civil war onset varies is paramount as each type of onset represents a specific form of military challenge to state sovereignty and results in differences in wartime dynamics. Furthermore, the novel typology of civil war onset does not overlap with existing typologies in the literature suggesting that the different types of onset are strategies of violent political challenge emphasize a dimension of conflict so far overlooked.

Combining three key dimensions —the origin of first movers, the army status, and the location of initial interactions—, I show in Chapter 2 that when a civil war begins, it takes one of four mutually exclusive forms. In *peripheral challenge*, first movers are radicalized militants or excluded politicians who initiate their military struggle in the periphery, often in rural areas, and face mostly loyal and cohesive government forces. In contrast, in cases of *state disintegration*, civil war is initiated by private militias who confront each other when government forces and institutions collapse, typically in urban areas, either in the capital or in other large cities. Onset in the form of a *coup* refers to civil wars initiated by military personnel, who trigger a split within the armed forces, and engage in fighting at the political center of the state, typically in urban areas, including the capital city. Lastly, *insurrectionary protest* captures dynamics that take place in urban areas, often in large cities in the periphery but sometimes in the capital, initiated by protesters who mobilize against the regime and militarize in response to state repression, which often also triggers some defection among the armed forces that further empowers armed protesters.

Theorizing on this variation, I provide in Chapter 3 an original path-dependent explanation for several key macro-level wartime dynamics. In that sense, civil war onset is a critical juncture during which civil war is initiated in a specific way. In other words, the features of the transition into civil war indicate different actor constellations, which in turn, set conflict onto patterned trajectories. Specifically, I find that four ideal-type trajectories at the macro-level based on the variation in civil war onset.

Using peripheral challenge as a baseline category, I find that when onset takes the form of state disintegration, conflict is likely to be fought through symmetric warfare, to lead to especially high level of violence, and to last long. In contrast, when a civil war starts as a military coup, the findings suggest that it is likely to be fought through symmetric warfare and be relatively short. Lastly, when civil war onset takes the form of insurrectionary protests, although the results of the statistical analysis are less precise, conflict tend to be fought through symmetric warfare, be relatively less violent, and be short. Given these results and consistent with the existing literature, among all four types of onset, peripheral challenge is the form of

onset most likely to lead to irregular warfare, lead to relatively fewer battle-deaths, but last long.

The empirical basis of these findings comes from a detailed descriptive analysis of all civil war onsets between 1944 and 2020 combined with a careful research design that operationalizes the typology of civil war onset in various ways to test the theory of civil war trajectories. In Chapter 4, I introduce a novel dataset of civil war onsets between 1944 and 2020, DatOnset, which accounts for the variation in onset. Mobilizing this new data and using the typology of onset as a dependent variable, I replicate several landmark studies on the correlates of civil war onset and provide evidence that common correlates of onset can be disaggregated across the different types. For example, the results suggest that increased state capacity reduces the risk of civil war onset in the form of peripheral challenge or coups, but has no significant effect in the case of state disintegration and insurrectionary protests. In contrast, the risk of civil war onsets in the form of coup and state disintegration is made greater by political instability and anocracy respectively, but which has no effect on peripheral challenge or insurrectionary protests.

In Chapter 5, I proceed to empirically examine the relation between the variation in the form of conflict onset, used as the main independent variable and several key wartime dynamics: warfare, severity, and duration. Based on rigorous cross-national logistic regressions and survival models, I find strong support for my theory of civil war trajectories, confirming that onset type is an important, yet so far omitted, factor in shaping macro-level wartime dynamics. Lastly, in Chapter 6, I exclusively focus on the dynamics of state disintegration, which represents the second most common form of onset and substantively diverge from the often-assumed model of peripheral insurgency. Based on original archival material from Burundi's civil war (1993-2006) in the form of testimonies from victims and witnesses, I show that civil war onset in the form of state disintegration occurs in highly fragmented political landscapes, paired with especially weak or collapsed institutions, and existing private militias which are mobilized by political elites using their respective networks of supporters.

In the remainder of this chapter, I discuss potential caveats and extensions of the theoretical and analytical framework that this thesis provides. Next, I identify implications of these findings for current and future comparative research on civil wars and point to new avenues for research. Lastly, I apply the findings of this thesis to contribute to a debate that has captured a lot of attention in the current political and media spheres: the possibility of civil war in the United States.

Limitations and avenues for further research

In this section, I discuss three avenues for further research that have the potential to increase the scope and analytical power of the framework provided in this thesis. First, although I empirically examine the link between the form of onset and three macro-level wartime dynamics —warfare, severity, and duration,— the effect of onset need not be restricted to these specific dynamics. Further research may potentially uncover important relations between onset and additional macro-level dynamics. Two dynamics are appropriate candidates for further analysis: conflict outcome and recurrence.

It may be that some types of civil war onset are associated with specific outcome. Civil wars most often end in one of two ways: either with a decisive victory of one side, or with a negotiated settlement (Toft 2009). The relation between the type of onset and conflict outcome is far from straightforward. The first challenge is the duration of conflict itself as civil wars are endogenous political events. In that sense, wartime events may blur the relationship between onset and outcome. Second, it is theoretically unclear which outcome to expect given the type of onset. In fact, the current literature points to opposing expectations. Since the 1990s, negotiated settlements have become much more common and in fact represented the majority of civil war termination in the late 2000s (Toft 2009). As I have shown in Chapter 4, the post-Cold War period has also witnessed a sharp increase in the number of civil war onset in the form of state disintegration and insurrectionary protests, thereby pointing to a potential correlation.

Others find that governments are more likely to win civil wars in the first years, but that their odds of military victory substantively decrease the longer the war (Cunningham, Gleditsch and Salehyan 2009). Given the empirical result in this dissertation that some onset types are associated with longer conflict duration, there is reason to expect that peripheral challenges and state disintegration should be correlated with either negotiated settlement or rebel victory. However, Balcells and Kalyvas (2014) find that conflicts fought through irregular warfare are more likely to be won by the incumbent compared to conflicts fought through symmetric warfare. In other words, rebels have the best odds of victory when fighting symmetric wars. This leads to yet another expectation, as I find in Chapter 5 that, compared to peripheral challenges, all other three types of onset are associated with symmetric warfare. In sum, further theorizing and empirical work might potentially uncover important relationships between how a civil war begins and how it ends.

An associated research agenda focuses on civil war recurrence. Within the framework of this dissertation, it may be that the occurrence of one type of onset makes it more likely to observe a second onset of a specific type. Further study should investigate whether onset types reproduce themselves, in line with theories of repertoires of contention (e.g., Tilly 1995, 2006). The successive Kurds insurgency onset in Turkey in 1984 and 2005 or the repeated civil wars in the Congo throughout the 1990s provide illustrative examples of this pattern. In contrast, it may also be that different types of civil war onsets follow each other in sequence, whereby one conflict recreates the condition for a second onset in a different form. The succession of civil wars in Afghanistan between 1978 and 2021 points to distinct sequences as the first civil war (1978-1992), a peripheral challenge, led to the onset of a second war (1992-1996) in the form of state disintegration. This second conflict in turn gave way to a third onset in the form of peripheral challenge as the Northern Alliance/United Front, which consisted of remnants of the forces of the 1992 war, regrouped in the Panjsher Valley, northern Afghanistan (Christia 2012). In sum, the potential for further research is important in linking the typology of onset and the study of civil war recurrence.

The second avenue for further research links wartime dynamics typically studied at different levels of analysis. The theory and findings in this thesis focus on macro-level dynamics of civil war. Based on cross-national comparative evidence of civil wars between 1944 and 2020, it identifies patterns linking onset and several key wartime dynamics. To inform these macro-level trajectories, the theory developed in Chapter 3 considers several characteristics of the key actors involved in military conflict as well as the context in which they interact. A fundamental development in the civil war literature has been the turn to the micro-foundations of conflict, which has provided numerous significant insights into specific dynamics of conflict and violence (e.g., Petersen 2001; Wood 2003; Kalyvas 2006; Arjona 2016; Steele 2017). Scholars have since attempted to promote research agendas linking these micro-level conflict dynamics and wider political and social processes and contexts (Balcells and Justino 2014). This research on macro-level patterns of civil war offers one way to bridge these approaches.

In Chapter 6, I provide initial evidence that the context of state disintegration may create conditions especially conducive to specific conflict dynamics such as siege, internal fractionalization, and collective targeting. Although further research is needed to systematically examine these conjectures, it nevertheless suggests that specific meso- and micro-level dynamics may unfold differently in different civil war contexts, linked to the form

of onset. For example, the formation of alliances between armed groups may be the result of different calculus, unfold in different ways, and produce different effects depending on whether they occur in civil wars that start as a peripheral challenge, coup, insurrectionary protests, or follow state disintegration.

To be sure variation in macro-level dynamics does not necessarily imply a corresponding variation at the micro-level. Local dynamics of conflict such as individual exposure to violence, local resistance, and other aspects of everyday life in conflict areas may vary due to factors unrelated to macro-level factors. For example, civilians in specific localities may experience the violence perpetrated by armed groups in ways that do not substantively differ be it carried out by groups that interact in a civil war that started as a peripheral challenge as opposed to one that began following state disintegration. In that sense, local actors and dynamics may be separated from macro actors and dynamics (Kalyvas 2003). Nevertheless, in the instance that meso- and micro-level dynamics do differ across types of civil war, this thesis provides a useful framework to organize these findings into coherent analytical and empirical narratives.

As discussed in Chapter 3, conflict dynamics at the meso-level may be especially linked to differ the different types of onset, that is the behaviors, organization, and practices of the armed groups. In that sense, further research may uncover patterns in meso-level dynamics that drive that macro-level patterns. For example, the internal organization of armed groups may differ whether they are splinter military units or created by radicalized militants. One might expect that armed actors in civil wars that begin as a coup will take the form of integrated groups, whereas radicalized militants might create vanguard organizations. Importantly, these differences in internal institutions of armed groups which can be traced back to the conflict onset may in turn shape their behaviors during wartime such as civilian victimization, their methods of recruitment, or their ability and will to govern local populations.

In sum, the macro-level findings in this thesis may inform theories about meso- and micro-level dynamics in all their complexity in theoretically informed multilevel analysis of civil war. Whether conflict results from a peripheral challenge to state authority, the disintegration of the state, a coup attempt, or insurrectionary protests may shape the ways in which key actors are likely to organize and behave as they display different characteristics and interact in different political contexts. Through the analytical framework provided in this thesis, further research disposes of new theoretical tools to systematically investigate whether groups

fight differently in their attempt to capture political power in different contexts, indicated by the types of onset.

A third avenue for further research concerns the actors that are considered in this framework. In Chapter 3, I introduce a novel typology of civil war onset based on three key dimensions: the identity of first movers, the status of the armed forces, and the location of the initial interactions between these actors. Yet, existing studies show the importance of two additional actors in shaping conflict dynamics: civilians and foreign party. Although this thesis does not deny the importance of these actors, the decision to focus on first movers and state forces rests on the assumption that they necessarily are the first two actors involved in civil war onset. In other words, neither non-combatant civilians nor a foreign party can start a civil war in a given state. However, both civilians and foreign parties may potentially affect conflict trajectories once civil war has begun. In Chapter 5, I point to the role of third-party intervention in discussing outliers. In the civil wars in Pakistan (1971) and East Timor (1975-1999), large-scale military intervention by a third-party created substantive divergence from the expected trajectories. Building on the new analytical framework, further research should examine the potential influence that these additional actors may have on conflict trajectories. For example, neighboring states may intervene to different extent and in different ways across types of conflict, which may also produce differentiated effects.

Contributions for the comparative study of civil war

Having suggested three complementary avenues for further research, it becomes apparent that this framework brings forward a specific type of theoretical investigation and empirical strategies. These shared attributes point to the main theoretical and methodological contributions of this thesis.

On the theoretical front, the analytical framework based on the variation in civil onset and empirical analysis point to four distinct types of civil war which may display substantive variation in how specific dynamics unfold. This provides clear scope conditions for existing and future findings in the civil war literature. More systematic scope conditions in turn serve a twofold purpose. On the one hand, it minimizes the risk of false negatives. That is, the risk of rejecting a theory on the basis that it does not apply to all civil wars, when, in fact, that theory would be especially valuable to make sense of a specific type of civil war. On the other hand, it also minimizes the risk of false positives. That is, we may assume that we fully understand a given conflict dynamics across conflicts, when in fact, we may only know about such a

dynamic in one specific type of civil war. Furthermore, in identifying that civil wars vary in patterned ways, this research provides a framework capable of aggregating current findings into coherent analytical narratives of conflict, which is all the more important as often findings about given wartime dynamics are disconnected from one another and studied in isolation.

On the methodological front, distinguishing between civil wars based on the type of onset provides insightful case selection strategies, which is essential for robust comparative analyses of civil wars. These case selection strategies come in three forms. First, identifying classes of civil wars based on onset allows for informed within-case comparison. Comparing conflicts that begin in similar ways, such studies should expect to observe similar dynamics. In the instances when they do not, such divergence between cases should point to important factors that can be used both as explanatory and dependent variables in various model specifications. Second, identifying types of civil wars along a single dimension also provide a useful basis for cross-category comparisons. In those instances, studies should expect different outcomes. Once again, divergence from the expected results may point to factors especially important in shaping civil war dynamics. Lastly, it may also be valuable for case study designs as identifying classes of civil war based on the types of onset provides useful baselines against which to compare the observed wartime trajectory of a given conflict. Once more, divergence from those expectations may point to important factors that may otherwise be missed.

One concluding application

On the morning of January 6, 2021, hundreds of people are seen heading towards to the U.S. Capitol in advance of President Trump's speech. Only a few minutes in, President Trump urges his supporters to march to the Capitol to stop the certification of Joe Biden's victory and reclaim the election which they believe has been stolen from them. Within one hour, the crowd grows larger, outnumbering the police who tries to contain them. The large crowd waves flags as they march forward. By the end of his speech, President Trump incites violence. "We fight, he says, we fight like hell and if we don't fight like hell, you're not going to have a country anymore. So let's walk down Pennsylvania Avenue" (BBC 2021). Shortly after, Capitol police calls for backup as the crowd is becoming dangerously violent. Within two hours, the protesters break through windows and those inside kick open the doors to let the others in the Capitol. They wear hoods and helmets and carry flags as they spread through the buildings. The session in Congress is interrupted, Senators are evacuated. Three hours after his speech, President Trump calls protesters to remain peaceful. Meanwhile the crowd is still inside the Capitol, thousands

surround the building, one police officer has been beaten by protesters and killed, one rioter has been shot, and three others have died in the rampage (Healy 2021).

Many Americans and probably others around the world were stunned by these events. People were puzzled too. How could these events take place in the United States? And what do they mean? Among these questions, one in particular has attracted a lot of attention: is the United States on the brink of civil war? In her recent book, Barbara Walter (2022: 159) is affirmative: the United States today is a "factionalized anocracy that is quickly approaching the open insurgency stage." She argues that all the signals are there. The country has become an anocracy, the regime type most likely to experience civil war; ethnic factions have emerged and are organized; they feel strong grievances associated with their current loss of status; and they are losing hope that conventional politics will improve their situation.

As Walter (2022: xviii) puts it, "civil wars ignite and escalate in ways that a predictable; they follow a script."[91] Yet, this thesis provides strong evidence that civil wars may follow different scripts. In fact, if there were to be a civil war in the United States, like any other countries, its onset would take one of four forms: peripheral challenge, state disintegration, coup, or insurrectionary protests.[92] As this thesis shows, the drivers of civil war onset differ across types, the dynamics of onset differs, and the unfolding of civil war also differs accordingly. Therefore, the central question, in light of the analytical framework provided in this dissertation, is not merely whether the United States is close to civil war, but which is the type of civil war onset it is the closer to experience and what indicators should we pay particular attention to? Examining the risk of civil war in the United States entails to disaggregate the signals by type of onset and establishing which type of civil war onset the United States is at risk of experiencing, if at all at risk.

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[91] Walter's uniform script of civil war onset, in line with the common assumption in the literature, refers to what I categorize as a peripheral challenge. As she describes, "movements that are geographically concentrated and predominantly rural are more likely to mobilize violent resistance because it is easier to recruit soldiers, collect funding, and evade police in areas far from the capital" (2022: 151). "Most insurgencies pass through similar stages of development during their life cycle. In the pre-insurgency phase, a group begins to identify a set of common grievances and build a collective identity around a gripping narrative […]. They begin to recruit members, some of whom even travel abroad for training. They begin to stockpile arms and supplies" (2022: 156). "The second phase is when government becomes aware of the groups behind these attacks but the violence is often dismissed as the work of bandits, criminals, and terrorists" (2022: 158). "The open insurgency phase, the final stage, is characterized by sustained violence as increasingly active extremists launch attacks that involve terrorism and guerrilla warfare, including assassinations and ambushes, as well as hit-and-run raids on police and military units" (2022: 159).

[92] Without a clear typology of civil war onset, Walter unknowingly aggregates these distinct types of onset as she includes numerous examples. Among the ones most cited are: Iraq (2003), Georgia (1991), Bosnia (1992), or East Timor (1975) which refer to state disintegration; Sri Lanka (1983), Philippines (1971), or Ethiopia (1999) which illustrate a peripheral challenge; Syria (2011), Ukraine (2014), or Northern Ireland (1968) which refer to insurrectionary protests.

It is undeniable that several signals point to a potential increase in political violence, which is certainly worrying: the assault on the Capitol was unprecedented in recent American history, far-right militias multiply and grow across the country and benefit from the availability of weapons (Steinhauer 2021; Bokat-Lindell 2022), and political elites increasingly give in to violent and confrontational narratives. However, these recent developments potentially point to distinct patterns of civil war onset, which the analytical framework in this dissertation allows to categorize. When doing so, it becomes apparent that the United States is unlikely to experience any type of civil war onset.

Had the January 6 riots escalate into civil war, it would have taken the form of insurrectionary protests. In fact, they displayed some key characteristics. First, it took place in an urban area, in this case the country's capital Washington D.C. Second, in a study of the rioters' profiles, Pape and his colleagues at the Chicago Project on Security and Threats (2022) find that the vast majority of the protesters were not members of organized armed groups, instead they were ordinary pro-Trump activists who had travelled from all parts of the country, often large urban counties. However, it is unlikely that these events would have triggered civil war directly. Typically, in the case of insurrectionary protests, civil war begins as protesters are violent repressed by the state armed forces, which would motivate existing small militias to mobilize in response of repression or the formation of new armed groups for protection, as for example in Syria or Libya in 2011. Even in the situation the United States were in last year, such a scenario is highly improbable.

Nor did the events of January 6 lead to civil war onset in an indirect way, through increased mobilization and recruitment of right-wing extremist groups. "Despite fears that Jan. 6 was going to birth a 'Hezbollah wing' of the Republican Party, there has been no major far-right follow-up to the event, no dramatic surge in Proud Boys or Oath Keepers visibility, no campaign of anti-Biden terrorism" (Douthat 2022). Contrary to Walter's (2022) assessment, civil war onset in the form of a peripheral challenge is also unlikely. As described in Chapter 2, a peripheral challenge is typically initiated by radicalized militants or excluded politicians in the rural periphery of the state, where state presence is low, and grievances tend to be high. In the case of the United States, these groups would be far-right militias.

However, while grievances may be high in parts of the country, the opportunity for large-scale political violence remains thin. As Koren (2022) notes, "the high levels of American policing and intelligence capacity mean that insurgency opportunities are rare in the U.S. Individuals who organize, arm themselves and decide to act against the government risk being

detected and thwarted before they can become real threats." For example, the plot to kidnap Democrat Governor Gretchen Whitmer of Michigan instigated by members of the Wolverine Watchmen militia was countered before it could even take shape (Bogel-Burroughs, Dewan and Gray 2021). Two additional structural characteristics make a peripheral challenge unlikely. First, there is no clear regional split and the "rule of law remains strong and government officials are in firm position to penalize those who engage in violent actions" (Gale and West 2021). The second characteristic is linked to urban density. As Koren (2022) further notes, "because of the low urban density of the U.S., even if such rebels are successful in organizing, they will be unable to reach, let alone conquer, big cities or threaten American sovereignty in significant ways."

Lastly, while civil war is unlikely to emerge in the periphery, it may potential begin from the center in the form of state disintegration.[93] However, this type of onset too seems unlikely. Civil war onset in the form of state disintegration refers to the breakdown of cooperation among political elites, who mobilize private armies and benefit from the collapse of the army or its inactivity when violence erupts. The central role played by President Trump in the January 6 protests points to the potential for this specific type of onset. While I find through the replication of Fearon and Laitin's (2003) seminal study of civil war onset that state disintegration is associated with anocracy and weak political institutions, several features of the current situation in the United States suggests that civil war onset is unlikely in this form too.

First, cases of state disintegration typically take place in fragile states that either recently experienced a prior episode of large-scale political violence such as in Somalia in 1991, Afghanistan in 1992, or the Central African Republic in 2013, or the transition out of authoritarian regimes as following the collapse of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia in the early 1990s, in the Congo and in Burundi in 1993. In those cases, political institutions were new and fragile and ultimately ill-equipped to contain political competition. The situation in the United States is different. Having a long history of successful democratic practices, President Trump's refusal to relinquish power seems unlikely to potentially undermined state institutions so much that they would split, either supporting the incumbent or the newly elected candidate.

Second, as argued in Chapter 6, state disintegration is typically accompanied by the collapse of the state forces. Yet, as Walter (2022: 139) herself points out that the army in the

[93] I do not discuss the possibility that civil war in the United States may start as a military coup as I did not find any recent academic or newspaper articles that suggests that it may be likely to happen.

US remains strong and largely cohesive. “Trump catered to America’s generals throughout his time in office, but rather than validate his bids for more power, they distanced themselves from his agenda at key moments. […] On January 3, 2021, the ten living former defense secretaries, including James Mattis, Mark Esper, Dick Cheney, and Donald Rumsfeld, issued a statement in the Washington Post making clear that they would defend the Constitution, not the President.” General Mark Milley, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, had made a similar statement several months earlier publicly claiming that “there is no role for the U.S. military in determining the outcome of a U.S. election.” In addition, organized militias in the United States do not have the backing of public organizations, neither are they sponsored by state or local governments (Gale and West 2021).

Two elements are worrying, nevertheless, and require careful monitoring. So far, a large share of the exacerbation of political tensions, especially via social media, can be attributed to former President Trump. Yet, other Republicans engaged in similar behaviors and, although Mr. Trump’s support within the Republican party is declining, he maintains his primacy in the party (Bender 2022). More broadly, the belief among political elite that the other side does not play fair could lead to heightened competition and potentially desperate solutions. However, we have yet to witness Democrat representatives, President Biden, or Vice-President Harris give in to the rhetoric used by some Republicans. On the other hand, the infiltration of the armed forces by right-wing extremists may open ways for formalized links between existing militias and army units. As this thesis shows, the integrity of the government forces is central in shaping civil war onset. If the army had to be divided along similar lines as political elites, the threat to state sovereignty may be larger. Seemingly aware of such risk, the Department of Defense has been intensifying its effort to identify and counter far-right extremism in its ranks (Schmitt, Steinhauer and Cooper 2021).

In sum, given the current situation in the United States, civil war is unlikely to break out in the near future. What is more likely however is an increase in domestic terrorism, to which richer countries have been found not to be immune (de la Calle and Sánchez-Cuenca 2012). This may either be perpetrated by right-wing extremist groups or in the form of “lone wolf” attacks perpetrated by individuals with different motives such as the Charleston church shooting in 2015, the Congressional baseball shooting and the Charlottesville car attack in 2017, or the 2019 El Paso shooting. But if there were nevertheless to be a civil war in the United States, one may ask, what would it look like? As this thesis demonstrates, it all depends on how it would begin.

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Appendices

Appendix 1

Dataset of civil wars

DatOnset contains 194 civil wars that have started between 1944 and 2020. It is based on the list of 148 civil wars by Sambanis (2004) and 193 civil wars by Sambanis and Schulhofer-Wohl (2019), to which I have made the modifications explained below. Following Sambanis and Schulhofer-Wohl (2019: 1543), civil war is the rupture of state sovereignty, and therefore, civil war occurs at the level of the polity. Such a rupture of sovereignty that results from the violent contest between the governing authority and its opponents constitutes the core feature of civil war. In that sense, it may contain several individual dyads, as coded in Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP).

Following Sambanis (2004: 829-31), an armed conflict should be classified as a civil war if:

1. The war takes place within the territory of a state that is a member of the international system with a population of 500,000 or greater;
2. The parties are politically and militarily organized, and they have publicly stated political objective;
3. The government, through its military or militias, must be a principal combatant, if there is no functioning government, then the party representing the government internationally and/or claiming the state domestically must be involved as a combatant;
4. The main insurgent organization(s) must be locally represented and must recruit locally, insurgents may operate from neighboring countries, but they must also have some territorial control or bases in the civil war country and/or rebels must reside in the civil war country;
5. The start year of the war is the first year that the conflict causes at least 500 to 1,000 deaths, if the conflict has not caused 500 deaths or more in the first year, the war is coded as having started in that year only if cumulative deaths in the next 3 years reach 1,000;
6. Throughout its duration, the conflict must be characterized by sustained violence, at least at the minor or intermediate level, there should be no 3-year period during which the conflict causes fewer than 500 deaths;
7. Effective resistance of the weaker party must cause at least 100 deaths on the stronger party;
8. A peace treaty that produces at least 6 months of peace marks an end to the war;
9. A decisive military victory by the rebels that produces a new regime should mark the end of the war because civil war is understood as an armed conflict against the government, continuing armed conflict against a new government implies a new civil war, if a government wins the war, a period of peace longer than 6 months must persist before we code a new war;
10. A cease-fire, truce, or simply an end to fighting can also mark the end of a civil war if they result in at least 2 years of peace; and
11. If new parties enter the war over new issues, a new war onset should be coded, subject to the same operational criteria and if the same parties return to war over the same

issues, we generally code the continuation of the old war, unless any of the above criteria for coding a war's end apply for the period before the resurgence of fighting.

I extended the list of civil wars from Sambanis and Schulhofer-Wohl (2019) to conflicts in 1944 and conflicts that started after 2016. This way, DatOnset includes all civil wars that started in the post-WWII period, which is the time period covered by most cross-national studies on civil war onset (e.g., Doyle and Sambanis 2000; Fearon and Laitin 2003: Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Sambanis 2004; Kalyvas and Balcells 2010; Sambanis and Schulhofer-Wohl 2019). Kalyvas and Balcells (2010: 415 ft) note that the pre-1944 wars are in majority colonial conquests that opposed modern and "primitive" armies rather than civil wars. I also exclude anti-colonial wars that may follow a separate logic of onset, pitting locals against colonizers and for which data about various correlates of onset is not available (e.g., Doyle and Sambanis 2000; Kalyvas and Balcells 2010; Sambanis 2004; Sambanis and Schulhofer-Wohl 2019).

Building on Sambanis and Schulhofer-Wohl (2019), I have made the following modifications as summarized in Table A1.1. The remainder of this appendix provides details about each coding decision.

Figure A1.1. Onset distribution in DatOnset and SSW




Table A1.1. Modifications to Sambanis and Schulhofer-Wohl (2019)

Added (7 cases)	Burkina Faso (2019) Cameroon (2017) Central African Republic (2012) Ethiopia (2020) Gambia (1981) Guinea (2000) Mozambique (2017)
Excluded (4 cases)	Algeria (1962) India (1946) Namibia (1977) Uganda (1978)
Divided (2 cases)	Burundi (1991 and 1993) Nicaragua (1981 and 1982)
Folded (3 cases)	Somalia (1991) Turkey (2005) Uganda (1986)
Modified dates (11 cases) * These small changes are either about specific months or years, and concern either the start or end date of the conflict.	Afghanistan (1978) Cambodia (1979) Central African Republic (2013) Chad (1965) D.R. Congo (2016) Ethiopia (1998) India (1989) Indonesia (1956) Libya (2014) Pakistan (2007) United Kingdom (1968)

1.1 Detailed list of modifications

Afghanistan

I changed the month of onset of the 1978 conflict onset in Afghanistan. Although the coup is often used as a marker of the onset of the first Afghan war, detailed reading about the onset of the conflict reveals that the coup was brief and successful and did not reach the violence threshold for inclusion as a civil war. The violence that directly followed the coup consisted essentially of purge and internal fighting. Once in power the PDPA engaged in large-scale societal reforms. It was those attempts at reforms that triggered widespread resistance in the countryside, which ultimately gave way to the civil war. Newell (1979) notes that the coup itself generated little immediate resentment as the Daoud regime was unpopular. He further notes that "resistance has spread from outbreaks in Badakshan and Nuristan in the summer of 1978 to a rural uprising involving nearly all of Afghanistan's regions and ethnic groups. Most resistance has resulted from clashes between the government and local communities" (1979: 438-439). I use the summer of 1978 as the onset of the Afghan civil war.

Sources:

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- Staniland, Paul. 2014. *Networks of Rebellion*. Itahca: Cornell University Press.
- Ellison, Miranda. 2017. "Communist Coup in Kabul." Wilson Center [online] https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/communist-coup-kabul
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- Newell, Richard S. 1979. "Revolution and Revolt in Afghanistan." *The World Today* 35(11): 432-442.

Algeria

I excluded the 1962 war as I could not find sufficient evidence to confirm that it is in fact a civil war onset, distinct from the post-conflict violence following the war of independence (1954-1962). More importantly, I could not find information that would allow the classification of the onset type. Lastly, inconsistencies across datasets suggest that it may be an ambiguous case: Sambanis (2004) codes it as "post-independence strife"; Fearon (2017) codes it as "Kabylie conflict"; COW codes "Algerian revolution of 1962"; and UCDP does not include a conflict onset in 1962.

Burkina Faso

I added a civil war onset in 2019 as I found ample evidence that both the cumulative and yearly levels of fatalities as well as group characteristics satisfy the criteria for inclusion as a civil war. UCDP (2022) estimates 541 fatalities in 2019. Demuynck and Coleman (2022) provide further estimates of fatalities since 2019. They estimate that around 2,000 Burkinabe have been killed between 2019 and 2022. Islamist insurgent groups have been fighting security forces, although ill-equipped and weakened by the 2022 coup. Eizenga and Williams (2020) provide detailed information on the group's structure and bases of operations. The groups clearly appear to have bases in Burkina Faso, from which they operate.

Sources:

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Burundi

I added a civil war onset in 1993, following the assassination of President Ndadaye in October 1993. The conflict that erupted in 1991 as the regime embarked on a process of political democratization is considered to have ended prior to 1993 as, as Lynch (2013) describes, the PALIPEHUTU rebels fled quickly once they realized the extent to which they were outnumbered by the army, which was deployed to counter the rebels' attacks in northwestern Burundi. Furthermore, with the election of Hutu President Ndadaye in July 1993, as the rebel activists of PALIPEHUTU had advocated for an armed struggle to achieve ethnic and regional proportional distribution of political and administrative positions (Lemarchand 1994: 154-56; UCDP 2021). Given that these goals were met with the election of Hutu officials at all levels of administrative control (both national and local), a new conflict is coded to have started in October 1993 following the assassination of Ndadaye, which triggered an unprecedented wave of violence across the country and led to the formation of new armed groups, both Hutus and Tutsis. The conflict is coded as being terminated with the signing of a ceasefire between the government at the last active rebel group, the Forces de Libération Nationale (FNL) (BBC 2018). This coding is consistent with many case studies of Burundi (e.g., Ngaruko and Nkurunziza 2000; 2005).

Sources:

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Cambodia

I modified the onset data of the second Cambodian civil war. While Sambanis and Schulhofer-Wohl (2019) code ongoing conflict from 1975 to 1991, I do not code a civil war during the period 1975-1979 during which the Khmer Rouge ruled. Although that period was far from

peaceful; The Khmer Rouge government was engaged in interstate war against Vietnam and conflict took place on Cambodian territory. The Khmer Rouge simultaneously engaged in genocidal violence (Sambanis 2004 RN; Sambanis and Schulhofer-Wohl (2019).

Coding the onset of the second Cambodian civil war in 1979 is consistent with Fearon (2017). In addition, in their appendix, Sambanis and Schulhofer-Wohl (2019) identify the start of the second Cambodian civil war in January 1979 when the Khmer Rouge government was ousted.

Cameroon

I added a civil war onset in 2017 between the government of Cameroon and Ambazonia guerrilla insurgents. Conflict, which started as local protests in 2016 and 2017, escalated in 2018, the first year for which estimates cross the 500 deaths threshold. UCDP (2021) estimate that deaths amount to between 751 and 1007 for the year 2018. The violence decreased in 2020 to just below the threshold. Other estimates report the deaths of at least 4,000 civilians since the conflict escalated (Aljazeera 2021). Other estimates suggest that since 2016 the conflict has caused 3,000 deaths and nearly 730,000 displaced as of February 2020 (Craig 2020). Around 170 casualties were on the side of the government as of November 2018 (Washington Post 2019). Craig (2020) reports between 800 and 1,000 casualties among government forces between 2016 and 2020. The conflict is coded as ongoing in 2020 as there were no settlements at the time (UCDP). I code onset in October 2017 when pretests were repressed, and conflict escalated. Also in 2017, the insurgents declared the Republic of Ambazonia and the govt declared war against them.

"According to the International Crisis Group's estimates, fighting has already killed nearly 200 soldiers, gendarmes, and police officers, with some 300 injured, and killed more than 600 separatists. At least 500 civilians have died in the violence. The UN counts 30,000 Anglophone refugees in Nigeria and 437,000 internally displaced in Cameroon" (Malley 2018).

Sources:

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Central African Republic

I added a civil war onset in December 2012 between the government and the Seleka alliance in northern CAR. Note that this is an ambiguous case as it may not have reached the violence threshold for inclusion according to Sambanis. Nevertheless, the fighting was quick and in March 2013, the rebels entered Bangui and took control of the government. The establishment of the Seleka is key as it directly led to the onset of a new civil war in September 2013 which have been much more violent (See below). UCDP (2021) reports around 200 deaths between December 2012 and March 2013. Lombard also mention a brief civil war and fast rebel advance toward the capital.

I changed the following civil war onset to September 2013, after the Seleka rebels who took power in a short insurgency from northern CAR were officially disbanded (Lombard 2016; UCDP 2021). That episode did not however reach the 500 deaths threshold, not the cumulative 1,000 deaths over a 3-year threshold and therefore is not included in the list of civil wars. In contrast, the conflict that followed to seizure of power by Seleka which started in 2013 did reach the required level of violence. Estimates by the Council on Foreign Relations (2019) report that thousands of individuals, including civilians, have been killed since 2013 and that nearly 575,000 have been displaced. The conflict is coded as ongoing, although at a lower level of intensity (<500 deaths), as multiple peace agreement has failed to put an end to the conflict as of December 2020 which led to the prolongation of the MINUSCA operation (UCDP 2021).

Sources:

- Council on Foreign Relations. 2019. "Violence in the Central African Republic." [online] *https://www.cfr.org/interactive/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/violence-central-african-republic*.
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Chad

Based on Nolutshungu (1996), I code the ending of the first conflict in August 1978 with the signing of the Habre-Malloum Fundamental Charter, as opposed to June 1979 in Sambanis (2004), which did not match any clear event in the timeline of Chad's conflict. In addition, I code the onset of the second conflict in Chad in March 1979, as opposed to 1980 as in Sambanis (2004). As noted in Sambanis (2004 RN) the Lagos Accord of August 1979 did little to end the violence and violence immediately resumed after the agreement. Following this decision, the new conflict dates for Chad are: 1965-August 1978 and March 1979-June 1982.

Sources:

- Sambanis, Nicholas. 2004. "What Is a Civil War? Conceptual and Empirical Complexities of an Operational Definition." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 48(6): 814-858. (Research Notes).
- Nolutshungu, Sam C. 1996. *Limits of Anarchy: Intervention and State Formation in Chad*. Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia.
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- Minorities at Risk Project. 2004. "Chronology for Southerners in Chad." UNHCR [online] https://www.refworld.org/docid/469f3878c.html

Dem. Rep. of Congo

I coded an end to the Kamuni Nsapu conflict in 2018, as most of the rebels surrendered to the government (UCDP).

Sources:

- UCDP Battle-Related Deaths Dataset (version 21.1).
- UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset (version 21.1).
- Lake, Milli. 2017. "Building the Rule of War: Postconflict Institutions and the Micro-Dynamics of Conflict in Eastern DR Congo." *International Organization* 71(2): 281-315.
- Autesserre, Severine. 2006. "Local Violence, National Peace? Postwar "Settlement" in the Eastern D.R. Congo (2003-2006)." *African Studies Review* 49(3): 1-29.
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- Human Rights Watch. 2003. "Covered in Blood: Ethnically Targeted Violence in Northern DRC." [online] https://www.hrw.org/report/2003/07/07/covered-blood/ethnically-targeted-violence-northern-drc

Ethiopia

I code an end to the Ogaden conflict in October 2018 with the signing of a comprehensive peace agreement between the Ogaden insurgents and the government. The agreement led to demobilization and violence fell below the 25 deaths threshold (UCDP 2021).

I added a civil war onset in 2020 in the Tigray region as the TPFL resorted to armed rebellion against the Ethiopian government. UCDP (2021) records over 1,300 deaths in 2020 as a result of the conflict. Several sources support the claim that a new episode of civil war began in the Tigray region in 2020 (HRW 2020a; HRW 2020b; NYT 2020; Aljazeera 2021). NYT (2022) and Aljazeera (2021) report "thousands" of casualties since November 2020.

It may be possible to add a new civil war onset in 1991 against the newly installed EPRDF government, which ousted the previous government and won the 1978-1991 war. A garrison rebelled against the new government and engaged in active fighting in June 1991. As the new group emerged to fight a newly installed government, and that estimates report between 600 and 800 casualties, this would justify coding a new onset of a brief but violent conflict in Ethiopia (UCDP 2021). Although I could not find information about the conflict to confirm that the conflict was a civil war or how exactly it started, and as a result did not include a conflict onset in 1991 following the victory of the EPRDF in May. The decision not to include this conflict is consistent with all major datasets, except UCDP (2021).

Sources:

- UCDP Battle-Related Deaths Dataset (version 21.1).
- UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset (version 21.1).
- International Crisis Group. 2019. "Preventing Further Conflict and Fragmentation in Ethiopia." [online] https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/ethiopia/preventing-further-conflict-and-fragmentation-ethiopia
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Gambia

I added a new civil war onset in 1981 between the government and the NRC rebels. The conflict is included in the UCDP Armed Conflict list of civil wars. Following a coup, violence was sustained during early August. Plotters took power and fought against the Senegalese troops which supported the deposed government. Estimates report between 400 and 500 deaths (Saine 1996). Other estimates report up to 1,000 deaths in the fighting that took place following the coup (Wiseman 1981).

Sources:

- Saine, Abdoulaye S.M. 1996. "The Coup d'Etat in the Gambia: The End of the First Republic." *Armed forces and society* 23(1): 97-111.
- Dash, Leon. 1981. "Senegalese Troops in Gambia Find Welcome Wearing Thin." Washington Post [online] https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1981/08/13/senegalese-troops-in-gambia-find-welcome-wearing-thin/3e2c1b26-b285-4531-bb7b-c5143f5509fd/
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Guinea

I added a civil war onset in Guinea in 2000 between the RDFG (Rassemblement des Forces démocratiques de Guinée; Rally of Democratic Forces of Guinea) and the Guinean government. Although Sambanis (2004) notes that there is no evidence of civil war in Guinea between 1998 and 2004, I find that rebels did perpetrate attacks against Guinean forces and population between 2000 and 2001. These groups are closely linked to ongoing conflicts in Sierra Leone and Liberia. However, I find reports that there were bases within Guinea from which attacks on Guinean soil were perpetrated and that a substantive rebel contingent was composed of Guineans, refugees from Sierra Leone and Liberia also made up a good part of the rebel forces, and that Guineans also joined pro-government militias to counter these attacks (Milner 2006; Arieff 2009). UCDP (2021) reports that the rebels had publicly stated their goal to overthrow the regime of President Conté. Milner (2006) reports that the conflict caused around 1,500 deaths which largely crosses the violence threshold for inclusion as a civil war. UCDP also estimate that the total number of deaths lies between 614 and 1,300. The COW and UCDP also code a civil war onset in Guinea in 2000 between the RDFG and the Guinean government.

Sources:

- Arieff, Alexis. 2009. "Still Standing: Neighborhood Wars and Political Stability in Guinea." *Journal of Modern African Studies* 47(3): 331-348.
- Milner, James. 2006. "The Militarization and Demilitarization of Refugee Camps in Guinea." in Robert Muggah, ed., *No Refugee: The Crisis of Refugee Militarization in Africa*. London: Zed Books.
- UCDP Battle-Related Deaths Dataset (version 21.1).
- UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset (version 21.1).

India

Following Kalyvas and Balcells (2010), I excluded the 1946-1948 conflict as it is better described as inter-communal violence instead of civil war. In fact, in his coding notes, Sambanis (2004) identifies that the inclusion of the conflict as a civil war is ambiguous and that it can be dropped. This is consistent with several other datasets which do not code the onset of a civil war in 1946 (Fearon and Laitin 2003; Collier and Hoeffler 2004; COW; UCDP). I code the Kashmir conflict as ongoing in 2020 based on UCDP estimates.

Sources:

- Kalyvas and Balcells (2010) "Technologies of Rebellion" dataset.
- UCDP Battle-Related Deaths Dataset (version 21.1).
- UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset (version 21.1).
- Sambanis, Nicholas. 2004. "What Is a Civil War? Conceptual and Empirical Complexities of an Operational Definition." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 48(6): 814-858. (Research Notes).

Indonesia (I thank Edward Aspinall for his help with this case)

I extended the second Darul Islam conflict that started in 1956 to 1961 as estimates suggest more than 500 fatalities in 1961. In fact, case study evidence indicates that violence exceeded 1,000 between 1957 and 1961, and over 500 in 1961. "From 1955 to 1962 the annual number of evacuees fluctuated between 209,355 in 1962 and 303,764 in 1958, with an average of about 250,000 a year. In 1957, Darul Islam troops killed 2,447 persons, burned 17,673 houses, and engaged in 102,984 lootings. Until 1961 more than 1,500 people were killed annually. In 1961 this figure dropped sharply to just over 500, however. From 1958 to 1960 the number of houses burnt was between 10,000 and 14,000 yearly, rising to 18,336 in 1961 and dropping to 414 in 1962 (Pinardi 1964:179)" (van Dijk 1981: 104-105).

Sources:

- Van Dijk, Cornelis. 1981. Rebellion under the Banner of Islam: The Darul Islam in Indonesia. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.

Libya

I changed the start year of the second civil war started to 2014, at the time when several armed militias resorted to violence. This conflict involves the Forces of the House of Representatives, the Islamic State, and the Libyan National Army led by Khalifa Haftar. UCDP data provides evidence that the conflict reached the violence threshold for inclusion as a civil war, as over 1,000 were counted in the first three years of conflict. Other estimates confirm that the conflict has produced a significant number of deaths. Libya Body Count reports 2,825 deaths in 2014 and over 1,500 in 2015 and 2016. The Libya Observer reports 3,719 deaths in 2018.

Sources:

- Carboni Andrea and James Moody. 2018. "Between the Cracks: Actor Fragmentation and Local Conflict Systems in the Libyan Civil War." *Small Wars & Insurgencies* 29(3): 456-490.
- De Waal, Alex. 2013. "African Roles in the Libyan Conflict of 2011." *International Affairs* 89(2): 365-379.
- McKernan, Bethan. 2020. "War in Libya: How Did It Start, Who Is Involved and What Happens Next?" The Guardian [online] https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/may/18/war-in-libya-how-did-it-start-what-happens-next
- Daragahi, Borzou. 2021. "Ten Years Ago, Libyans Staged a Revolution. Here's Why It Has Failed." Atlantic Council [online]

https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/ten-years-ago-libyans-staged-a-revolution-heres-why-it-has-failed/
- Megerisi, Tarek. 2020. "Geostrategic Dimensions of Libya's Civil War." Africa Security Briefs (37): 1-10.
- Mandhai, Shafik. 2017. "Libya Six Years On: No Regrets over Gaddafi's Demise." Aljazeera [online] https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/10/20/libya-six-years-on-no-regrets-over-gaddafis-demise
- Daw, Mohamed A., Abdallah El-Bouzedi and Aghnaya A. Dau. 2015. "Libyan Armed Conflict 2011: Mortality, Injury and Population Displacement." *African Journal of Emergency Medicine* 5: 101-107.
- Wehrey, Frederic. 2020. "Our Hearts Are Dead: After 9 Years of Civil War, Libyans Are Tired of Being Pawns in a Geopolitical Game of Chess." Time [online] https://time.com/5779348/war-libya-global-conflict/
- Libya Body Count. 2022. [online] http://www.libyabodycount.org/
- Assad, Abdulkader. 2019. "Human Rights Solidarity: About 4000 People Were Victims of Armed Fighting in Libya in 2018." The Libya Observer [online] https://www.libyaobserver.ly/news/human-rights-solidarity-about-4000-people-were-victims-armed-fighting-libya-2018
- Wintour, Patrick. 2020. "Libya Peace Talks to Go Ahead in Berlin Despite Ceasefire Setback." The Guardian [online] https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/jan/14/libyan-warlord-haftar-leaves-moscow-without-signing-ceasefire-deal

Mozambique

I added a civil war onset in 2017 between the government and the Islamist group active in the Cabo Delgado province in the northern part of the country, Ansar al-Sunnah which became a franchise of the Islamic State in 2019. According the UCDP (2021) when considering 2019 and 2020, the conflict caused over 1,000 deaths, which justifies including it in the present data set. Estimates lie between 803 and 2,361 over this two-year period. IPSS (2021) reports 3,926 civilian deaths due to the conflict between 2017 and 2021. According to ACLED and the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, death toll from the conflict reached more than 2,614. Chatham House (2021) provides similar estimates. By March 2016, the UNHCR was already reporting over 10,000 Mozambicans fleeing to Malawi (Regalia 2017). The conflict is coded as ongoing as of December 2020.

Sources:

- Center for Preventive Action. 2022. "Instability in Mali." Global Conflict Tracker [online] https://microsites-live-backend.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/destabilization-mali
- UCDP Battle-Related Deaths Dataset (version 21.1).
- UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset (version 21.1).
- Vines, Alex. 2021. "What Next for the Insurgency in Cabo Delgado?" Chatham House [online] https://www.chathamhouse.org/2021/04/what-next-insurgency-cabo-delgado
- Regalia, Stephanie. 2017. "The Resurgence of Conflict in Mozambique: Ghosts from the Past and Brakes to Peaceful Democracy." *Notes de l'Ifri*.

Namibia

I excluded the civil war in Namibia as given that it is so intertwined with the Angolan civil war and the war against South Africa. Gleditsch and colleagues (2001) code it as an extrasystemic war. In addition, conflict started before Namibia's independence. For these reasons, I exclude it from the list, which is consistent with most cross-national datasets on civil war onset (Fearon and Laitin 2003; Fearon 2017; COW; Collier and Hoeffler 2004).

Nicaragua

While Sambanis and Schulhofer-Wohl (2019) code one civil war in Nicaragua between1981 and 1990, I divided the conflict in two separate wars with distinct goals and identities. I code a first civil war in 1981 between the Nicaraguan government and Misurata and Misura, the insurgent national indian organization. This was a conflict over autonomy of the Miskito, Sumo, Rama, Creole, Garifona, and Mestizo populations of the Atlantic Coast, which the government saw as a conflict of self-determination of indigenous and ethnic minorities (Diskin et al. 1986: 2). In his review, Dennis (1993) describes the Miskito-Sandinista conflict in a similar way.

I code a separate civil war between 1982 and 1990 between the Contras, right-wing counter-revolutionary rebel groups, and the Marxist Sandinista government which took power in 1979 when it replaced the Somoza dictatorship. The Contras were mainly composed of former National Guard members, who recruited peasants to fight the Sandinista government and largely supported by the United States (Hager 1998; Prevost 1987; UCDP 2022). No longer about autonomy, this conflict aims at capturing government at the center, which qualifies as a separate instance of sovereignty rupture (Sambanis and Schulhofer-Wohl 2019).

Sources:

- Uppsala Armed Conflict Database. 2022. [online] https://ucdp.uu.se/statebased/742
- Diskin, Martin, Thomas Bossert, Salomón Nahmad and Stéfano Varese. 1986. "Peace and Autonomy on the Atlantic Coast of Nicaragua." *Latin American Studies Association*. https://www.lasaweb.org/uploads/reports/peacenicaragua.pdf
- Dennis, Philip A. 1993. "The Miskito-Sandinista Conflict in Nicaragua in the 1980s." *Latin American Research Review* 28(3): 214-234.
- Hager, Robert P. 1998. "The Origins of the 'Contra War' in Nicaragua: The Results of a Failed Development Model." *Terrorism and Political Violence* 10(1): 133-164.
- Prevost, Gary. 1987. "The 'Contra' War in Nicargua." *Conflict Quarterly*. file:///Users/benoit/Downloads/administrator,+cq7_3art01.pdf

Philippines

I do not code a new civil war onset between the government and the Islamic State in 2016 as it is included in the Mindanao insurgency which began in the 1970s and is ongoing, although at lower intensity of violence. IS in the Philippines recruited from existing Islamist groups, already active in the region (UCDP 2021). Therefore, although the group is new, it does not qualify as a new instance of sovereignty rupture.

Somalia

I folded the onsets of civil war in Somalia into the conflict that started after the collapse of the state in 1991 and the onset of the post-Barre war. Given that the onset of the 1991 civil war is one of state disintegration (See Appendix 2 for further details about this case) and that none of the conflict termination identified by Sambanis and Schulhofer-Wohl (2019) led to post conflict peace (which they note themselves on page 1553), I code one single civil war. I believe that the alternative would create artificial state disintegration onset: given that the state disintegrated once in 1991 and that no capture of Mogadishu by clan-based militia led to a substantive interruption in fighting, it would be misleading to code three separate instances of state disintegration. Instead, I code one long instance of state failure and collapse in Somalia, from 1991 and ongoing as of December 2020. This decision is consistent with most major datasets (UCDP 2021; Fearon 2017; Kalyvas and Balcells 2010) and numerous case studies. See Appendix 2 for additional details and references.

South Sudan

SSW identify the onset of civil war in South Sudan in 2013. UCDP (2021) estimates report that the conflict satisfied the violence criteria in 2013 with 800 to 2000 deaths that year. The Council on Foreign Relations (2021) reports 400,000 deaths since December 2013. South Sudan achieved independence in 2011 and therefore must be considered as a new instance of sovereignty. Sovereignty that was challenged in 2013 as infighting within the government led to the resurgence of violence between the new government of independent South Sudan and opposition groups. While SSW code it as ongoing (their data stops in 2016), the conflict is coded in DatOnset as having ended in September 2018 with the signing of the R-ARCSS peace deal. Although some clashes were reported during 2019 and 2020, violence did not meet the 25 battle deaths threshold (UCDP 2021), and the signing of the peace agreement can be coded as the termination of the South Sudanese civil war.

Sources:

- UCDP Battle-Related Deaths Dataset (version 21.1).
- Center for Preventive Action. 2022. “Civil War in South Sudan.” Global Conflict Tracker [online] https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/civil-war-south-sudan
- De Waal, Alex. 2014. “When Kleptocracy Becomes Insolvent: Brute Causes of the Civil War in South Sudan.” *African Affairs* 113(452): 347-369.
- Rolandsen, Øystein H. 2015. “Another Civil War in South Sudan: The Failure of Guerrilla Government?” *Journal of Eastern African Studies* 9(1): 163-174.
- UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset (version 21.1).

Turkey

I folded the two conflicts between 2005-2013 and 2015-ongoing between the Turkish government and the PKK into one as the fighting parties as well as their goals remain the same. This decision is made given that the interruption in fighting was very brief (just over one year), groups did not seem to have fully demobilized, and conflict escalated again in August 2014 and resulted in over 1,000 fatalities in 2015. This is an ambiguous case, and the alternative coding could also be used. In that case, two separate instances of peripheral challenges should be coded in 2005 and 2015.

Sources:

- UCDP Battle-Related Deaths Dataset (version 21.1).

Uganda (I thank Nelson Kasfir for his help with this case)

I made two changes regarding the conflicts that took place in Uganda since its independence.

Uganda 1978. This conflict is not a civil war. As Nelson Kasfir rightly pointed out, what might be considered a mutiny by Ugandan Army soldiers in one barracks far from the capital was covered up by Idi Amin (the 'sitting government') by invading and despoiling a small section of northern Tanzania. A few weeks later, Tanzanian troops retaliated by driving the invaders out of Tanzania and then marching into Uganda, accompanied by a tiny force of Ugandans (a figleaf so it wouldn't seem like an international invasion) and eventually six months later defeated the Ugandan Army, forcing Amin to flee to Libya. It was an international war, not a civil war.

During the 1970s, "the regime's external enemies consisted of Ugandan exiles and bordering states" (Kasozi 1994). In the late 1970s, "Amin ordered his unsettled and rebellious troops into Tanzania's Kagera Salient north of the river of the same name. […] His soldiers went on a looting spree and did a thorough job of destruction. […] Tanzanians mobilized and asked Ugandan exiles and patriots to join the struggle against Amin. Obote's group was the largest […]" (Kasozi 1994: 125). "In 1979, a coalition of Ugandan rebel forces ousted Amin [who had taken power via a coup in 1971] with the aid of the Tanzanian army. But these parties failed to agree on a successor, and in the resulting confusion and political struggle, six presidents led Uganda between the end of Amin's regime and January 1986" (Lewis 2020: 66).

I therefore drop this case which is consistent with many cross-sectional datasets of civil war: Fearon and Laitin (2003), UCDP, COW, Collier and Hoeffler (2004), and Fearon (2017).

Uganda 1986. I folded the onsets of civil war in Uganda after the seizure of government power by the NRM in January 1986 into a single conflict. The decision is based on the detailed case study by Janet Lewis (2020). This coding is also consistent with Fearon (2017) and UCDP (2021). Therefore, the new dates of onset from 1980 onward are as followed: 1/1981-1/1986 (Bush War) and 6/1986-2005 (post-Bush war). See Appendix 2 for further details about these cases.

Sources:

- Lewis, Janet I. 2020. *How Insurgency Begins: Rebel Group Formation in Uganda and Beyond*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

United Kingdom (I thank Kit Rickard for her help with this case)

This conflict is an ambiguous case when using strict violence thresholds. Year by year estimates (the Guardian 2010) indicates that the conflict never met the threshold: at least 500 to 1,000 deaths, if the conflict has not caused 500 deaths or more in the first year, the war is coded as having started in that year only if cumulative deaths in the next 3 years reach 1,000 (Sambanis 2004). Same note when using UCDP data (2021). On this basis, it could be argued that the case should be dropped from the list of civil wars. (e.g., Kalyvas and Balcells 2010 do not include it, neither do the COW dataset and Collier and Hoeffler 2004). However, consistent

with the literature (Sambanis 2004; Sambanis and Schulhofer-Wolh 2019; Fearon 2017; Fearon and Laitin 2003; UCDP 2021).

Following discussion with Kit Rickard, I take the Civil Rights March of October 1968 in Derry as the onset of the conflict, the Troubles. As Kit Rickard describes, following the demonstration, ethnic rioting ensued and spread across Northern Ireland. Then the IRA re-emerged. The Northern faction of the IRA assumed de jure independence in early 1969 and split into the Provisional (mostly Northern) and the Official (mostly Southern) IRA in 1970. Internment was introduced in 1971 which triggered a large increase in IRA membership.

He further identifies two reasons to prefer October 1968 as the start date:

First, the IRA started to protect catholic urban communities in late 1968 and early 1969. Ethnic rioting caused large population movements, including IDPs and refugees to the Republic of Ireland. At this point, it was more about protecting communities from the police and loyalist groups than launching attacks on state forces. In the words of Cathal Goulding, the IRA chief at the time, "the only defence was armed defence".

Second, but related, the IRA had no weapons at the outset of the conflict. Many of the weapons the IRA were getting between 1968-1970 were being dug up in Cork and dated from the Irish War of Independence (early 1920s). The Provisional IRA emerged in 1970 and started to get meaningful weaponry from the US (the armalite being the most famous) and later from Libya (a ship named the Claudia was intercepted in 1973 carrying tones of weaponry). After Bloody Sunday and internment, it still did not have the weapons to sustain the number of people trying to join its ranks.

Coding the end to the conflict on the basis on Sambanis (2004) is also ambiguous (throughout its duration, the conflict must be characterized by sustained violence, at least at the minor or intermediate level, there should be no 3-year period during which the conflict causes fewer than 500 deaths). Given that such threshold was not met in the first place, I consider the end of the conflict to be the Good Friday Agreement of 1998. Note that following this coding, the conflict is a long but low-intensity civil war. Given these ambiguities, I conduct an alternative empirical analysis excluding this case which risks driving the results for its category of onset.

Sources:

- Rogers, Simon. 2010. "Deaths in the Northern Ireland Conflict since 1969." The Guardian [online] https://www.theguardian.com/news/datablog/2010/jun/10/deaths-in-northern-ireland-conflict-data
- Rickard, Kit and Kristin M. Bakke. 2021. "Legacies of Wartime Order: Punishment Attacks and Social Control in Northern Ireland." *Security Studies* 30(4): 603-636.

Appendix 2

Coding notes for onset types, 1944-2020

I examined numerous works and case studies to code the type of each civil war onset between 1944 and 2020 (N=194). For each conflict, I included the list of references consulted. In addition, to ascertain the validity of my coding, I contacted 52 experts of 110 conflicts in 47 countries between February and March 2022. I received responses from 41 experts who provided useful information on a total of 87 conflicts in 38 countries. These experts were provided with stylized descriptions of the dynamics of onset that highlighted the three key dimensions of the typology of civil war: who the first movers are, in what capacity are the state forces, and where the initial interactions take place. Table A2.1 summarizes the indicators for each type of onset.

Table A2.1. Indicators of the type of civil war onset with associated logics

Onset types	*Onset characteristics*			*Logic of onset*
	First movers	**State/armed forces**	**Location**	
Peripheral challenge	Radicalized militants/ Excluded politicians/ Mutineers	Mostly loyal	Periphery (often rural)	Based in the rural periphery of the state, radicalized militants, excluded politicians, or mutineers launch an armed challenge against the state to capture political power. Often with limited recruits and means, they typically face mostly loyal and cohesive armed forces.
State disintegration	Local militias/ Private militias	Collapse	Urban (either in the capital city or in other large urban centers)	Private militias, benefitting from the collapse of the state and of its armed forces, mobilize against one another, in an attempt to capture political power. Given the disintegration of the state, they fight one another at the political center of the state in urban areas and fighting spreads outward across the territory.

Table A2.1. (continued)

Onset types	*Onset characteristics*			*Logic of onset*
	First movers	**State/armed forces**	**Location**	
Coup	Army personnel	Split	Center/ urban	Coup plotters, typically military officers, initiate violence against the state from inside its apparatus, in an attempt to seize political power. As the army splits in two, rebels often initiate their armed struggle at the political center of the state.
Insurrectionary protests	Protesters	Split	Urban (often in urban centers, sometimes in the capital)	Anti-regime protesters mobilize in the urban periphery. Often initially non-violent, they take up arms in response to repression by state forces, which suffers from defection to the newly formed rebel groups that organize and coordinate their military challenge against the state.

2.1. Case descriptions and associated coding

Afghanistan (I thank Fotini Christia and Romain Malejacq for their help with this case)

I code 4 onsets in Afghanistan between 1944 and 2020: 1978; 1992; 1996; and 2001.

Afghanistan 1978.
Coup that overthrew Mohammad Daoud was led by the Afghan Communist Party (PDPA) in April 1978, which brought it to power. Now in power, the PDPA was plagued by tensions and factionalism (Christia 2012: 104). During the following years, the Afghan army continued to suffer from waves of defections. By 1980, 50,000 soldiers had defected to the various mujahideen groups, out of 80,000 (Christia 2012: 107).

The PDPA engaged in a massive program of social transformation which met resistance from the Afghan population, and by the end of the 1978, there were uprisings in 24 out of 32 provinces, as the largely rural and illiterate Afghan population felt their culture and tradition were under serious threat. The Islamist groups took advantage of these revolts and mobilized (Staniland 2014: 112). The outburst of violence against the regime was stifled with the Soviet invasion which led to the solidification of PDPA control across Afghan urban centers. In opposition to the Communist regime, mujahideen groups emerged across the territory. During a discussion, Romain Malejacq pointed out several things regarding the mobilization of these

groups: (1) the mobilization and rebellions quickly spread throughout the territory, (2) most of the mujahideen leaders were highly educated and socialized in Kabul, (3) the rebellion had a fragmented structure across mujahideen groups, and (4) the rebellion was also opposed by pro-government militias.

"The period from April 1978 up to the end of 1979 was one of continued weakening of that regime: on the one hand, while the civilian apparatus suffered a mild loss of personnel, due to defections to the opposition or individual decisions to go into exile, accentuated by heavy rates of arrest and execution, the party structures, in ministries and the armed forces, were severely weakened by at least four waves of factional disputes" (Halliday and Tanin 1998: 1361).

Has the state disintegrated? The situation deteriorated after "the collapse of the army and the prospect of a disintegrating Afghanistan," which motivated the Soviet invasion in December 1979 (HNR 2001). However other sources report that "despite all these conflicts, Amin's regime was not about to collapse when Soviet forces invaded in December 1979: it retained the loyalty of the Khalqi military and had cowed the civilian population in the major cities" (Halliday and Tanin 1998: 1362).

The war followed the PDPA coup of April 1978. Although the state was already weak prior to the coup, and it had little presence outside the larger cities. This trend continued after the coup as the regime found itself incapable of controlling the country. Although defections followed the coup, further weakening the regime and the army, I do *not* code a case of state disintegration in 1978 as the regime was clearly identified throughout and maintained its position due to extensive Soviet support. I also do *not* code a coup as the warring parties in the 1978-1992 war were not the deposed government and loyal army versus the plotters, but rather the newly installed Communist government and several mujahideen groups in the countryside that capitalized on a widespread wave of opposition to the reforms led by the government and the weakening of the central government in Afghanistan. Therefore, I code a case of peripheral challenge in 1978.

Afghanistan 1992.
The war started with the collapse of the Communist regime in 1992 and ended with the Taliban's takeover of the country (Christia 2012). Fighting erupted in Kabul and surrounding areas, then later spread to the rest of the country (Christia 2012; Goodson 2001). The fighting opposed mobilized militias and mujahideen group, which had participated in the 1978 war (Staniland 2014).

Staniland (2014: 126) note "state failure in Afghanistan in 1989-1992." The army also disintegrated completely as "former elements of the regime recoalesced into a series of militia forces, joined sides with a mujahideen force, or fled into exile" (Staniland 2014: 127). With the dissolution of the communist regime, military resources – both troops and equipment – were absorbed by the various mujahedin parties (Christia 2012: 61).

The war ended with the victory of the Taliban who took Kabul and established control over most of the country (Christia 2012; Staniland 2014). I code an instance of state disintegration in 1992 in Afghanistan.

Afghanistan 1996.
The Afghan government faced opposition from the Northern Alliance/United Front from 1996 to 2001, which consisted of remnants of the forces of the 1992 war and had regrouped in the

Panjsher Valley, northern Afghanistan (Christia 2012; UCDP 2021). This conflict ended in September 2001 when the Taliban were defeated following the US invasion. I code a case of peripheral challenge.

Afghanistan 2001.
After the US involvement, the Taliban lost control and relocated to southern Afghanistan and across the border to Pakistan. From those bases in the periphery and abroad, they reorganized and engaged in fighting with American and Afghan troops (CFR 2021; UCDP 2021). Romain Malejacq pointed out that it took a few years before the Taliban fully reorganized themselves. The conflict between the US-backed Afghan government and the Islamic State from 2015 onward is included in this rupture of sovereignty and the opposition can be grouped as Islamic insurgents. I code a case of peripheral challenge.

Sources:

- Christia, Fotini. 2012. *Alliance Formation in Civil War*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Staniland, Paul. 2014. *Networks of Rebellion*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Human Rights Watch. 2001. "backgrounder on Afghanistan: History of the War." [online] https://www.hrw.org/legacy/backgrounder/asia/afghan-bck1023.pdf
- Halliday, Fred and Zahir Tanin. 1998. "The Communist Regime in Afghanistan 1978-1992: Institutions and Conflicts." *Europe-Asia Studies* 50(8): 1357-1380.
- Goodson, L. P. 2001 *Afghanistan's Endless War. State Failure, Regional Politics, and the Rise of the Taliban*. Seattle and London: University of Washington Press.
- Sinno, A. H. 2008 *Organizations at War in Afghanistan and Beyond*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Center for Preventive Action. 2022. "War in Afghanistan." Global Conflict Tracker [online] https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/war-afghanistan
- Bosin, Yury V. 2009. "Afghanistan, 1978 Revolution and Islamic Civil War." *International Encyclopedia of revolution and Protests*: 13-15.

Algeria (I thank Luis Martinez and John Entelis for their advice on this case)

I code one onset in Algeria between 1944 and 2020: 1992. The 1954 civil war was an anticolonial one and therefore is not included in this list.

Algeria 1992.
The conflict escalated with the annulment of electoral results of December 1991. Significant violence started in January 1992 (Lowi 2002). The *Front Islamique du Salut* (FIS – Islamic Salvation Front) won in the first round of the elections. On January 11, 1992, a coup removed Chadli Benjedid from the Presidency, replacing him with a 5-man High Council of State, outlawing FIS (Sambanis 2004 RN).

In January 1992, a military coup d'état staged by the army high command on 11 January 1992, followed almost immediately by a vicious bloody civil war that lasted nearly 10 years, costing the lives of over 200,000 people (Entelis 2011). The coup initially went almost unchallenged because even the FIS leadership discouraged its followers from provoking clashes with the military. However, within a month, near civil war occurred as Islamists struck back against the military crackdown: Some 600 members of the security forces, and hundreds more civilians and Islamist demonstrators, were killed in the first 12 months following the coup. The majority

of Algerians, meanwhile, were caught in the middle, distrusting the army as much as the Islamists (Entelis 2011).

In an exchange, Entelis described that the civil war emerged in an ongoing process that began when the regime made several failed efforts to undermine the electoral efforts of the FIS in advance of parliamentary elections originally scheduled for June 1991 but finally conducted in two stages on December 26, 1991, and January 16, 1992. In that process of irregular political competition, the military coup of January 11, 1992, in which the totality of the political process was overturned, served as a trigger event that allowed the more radicalized elements of FIS to justify taking armed action against the army-installed new regime. The formation of radicalized FIS groups was accompanied by the mobilization of Islamist groups (AIS, GIA, GSPC/AQIM). In response, the military began a counter-terrorist campaign against these groups guided by a policy of "out terrorizing the terrorists." In the end the Algerian civil war's descent into civil war was the result of the actions of both the military and the Islamists.

"Algeria's descent into political violence did not begin suddenly with the decision to cancel the elections. Episodes of Islamist violence had preceded the elections, and the regime had used force against demonstrators in 1988, killing several hundred" (Pierre and Quandt 1995: 136).

Throughout the months of 1992, different armed groups opposing the military regime formed. They quickly took on police officers, but it took more than a year for this very diverse armed opposition to start structuring resistance against governmental forces (Entelis 2011). "After the coup in 1992, Algeria witnessed the emergence of diverse armed groups of radical activists. At the core of the insurgency were seven groups, namely Armed Islamic Movement (AIM), Islamic State Movement (ISM), Islamic Front of the Armed Jihad (IFAJ), Islamic Army of Salvation (AIS), Armed Islamic Group (GIA), and Guardian of Salafi Call (GSC)" (Zeraoulia 2020: 35). Islamic supporters "formed themselves into several armed groups, principally the Islamic Armed Movement (MIA), based in the mountains, and the Armed Islamic Group (GIA), based in the towns. The guerrillas initially targeted the army and police, but some groups soon started attacking civilians" (McGill 2021).

Evidence of clashes in Algiers: "From 3 to 7 February 1992, in reaction to a demonstration following the arrest of an imam in Batna, the security forces and the army intervened and charged the protesters. Dozens were killed" (Mellah 2004).

"From 1992, thousands of FIS sympathizers or so presumed were arrested, detained and deported to internment camps in the South of the country, and dozens were killed in confrontations around mosques at weekly worships on Fridays or in combed searches by the security forces and, increasingly, by the special police forces" (Mellah 2004). "Thousands of the FIS sympathizers or presumed sympathizers were arrested, detained, and deported by the army to internment camps in the southern part of the country and dozens were killed in confrontations around mosques (Zeraoulia 2020).

"Many Islamist opponents for their part chose to take up arms. They attacked security forces, preferably ordinary policemen, to collect the weapons they lacked. A multitude of small groups, often composed of former Afghanistan combatants, operated without any common programme or strategy. The year 1992 was marked by dozens of killings of members of the security forces, the majority of which were policemen" (Mellah 2004).

"The more radical Islamic fundamentalists actors, inside and outside the party officialdom, began recruiting disgruntled FIS members and sympathizers stigmatized by police repression into underground networks, and prepared them for an armed uprising. […] These groups staged small-scale but well-organized attacks on military installations and personnel. However, their leaders' previous military experiences and training led these organizations to adopt traditional guerrilla tactics and to set up bases in the hills surrounding the towns, particularly in the Algiers region. […] The strategy of making the rebellion progress from its mountain strongholds towards the urban centres left de facto the army in a position of strength in the towns" (Volpi 2002: 67-68).

I do *not* code the conflict onset as a coup since violence did not follow the bloodless coup directly. In fact, the army remained loyal to the sitting government, and I could not find evidence of split within the armed forces. Instead, various groups of radicalized FIS militants and Islamist groups emerged during 1992 and started to oppose the military-installed government. In 1992, these groups established their strongholds in the mountainous regions around Algiers. Therefore, I code the onset of civil war in Algeria in 1992 as a case of peripheral challenge.

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Angola (I thank Martin James for his advice on this case)

I code 4 onsets in Angola between 1944 and 2020: 1975; 1992; 1994; and 1997.

Angola 1975.

In 1975, right after independence, factions that had previously agreed to form a transitional government turned against one another. Heavy fighting erupted south of the capital Luanda between the various factions. Fronts also emerged in the south between MPLA, UNITA, and FNLA and in the north between MPLA and FNLA (UCDP 2021).

“the fighting continued in the cities continually from August to late July at which time FNLA was driven out of Luanda, moving northward while newly CIA-enriched UNITA, with 5,000 troops, marched south” (Garrett and Neto 1976: 9).

“Following a military coup in Lisbon in 1974, the new military government in Portugal abruptly decided to give its five African colonies their independence. In June 1975, the Portuguese signed the Alvor Accord with the MPLA, FNLA, and UNITA, which called for a coalition government composed of all three parties. This transitional government was to be short-lived, as the accord called for general elections in October 1975 and full independence the following month. Despite this short timetable, the Portuguese provided no institutional support for the transitional government, no system for the disarmament of insurgent forces, and no policy framework for keeping the parties together. Since Luanda was its regional stronghold, the MPLA was able to fill most of the executive branch positions in government. The other two parties were, not surprisingly, dissatisfied, and distrustful of that result, even if it was to be temporary. Soon after the transitional government took office, heavy fighting broke out among all three rival groups” (Jett 2019: 118).

At the time of independence, “the division between the three large nationalist movements had grown into an intrastate war. Fifteen years of anticolonial fighting against the Portuguese served to legitimize anti-state politics and guerrilla movements. Once the country became independent on 11 November 1975, it had to live with this legacy and this accepted mode of political action. The new legal state was thus faced with challenges to its legitimacy from those same groups that had fought for its legal existence. The situation was rendered even more difficult than that faced by other newly independent countries because the Portuguese colonizers did little to provide for any power transition and because the three large, fractionalized national liberation movements were isolated, with little common ground between them save that of liberating Angola from colonial rule” (Knudsen and Zartman 1995: 132).

Based on these accounts, I code an instance of state disintegration in Angola in 1975.

Angola 1992.
“The number of fatalities decreased dramatically in 1991 as the fall of communism meant the end of the Russian intervention in the civil war in Angola, and as UNITA and the MPLA signed the Bicesse Peace Agreement. The agreement provided the installation of a multi-party system, which allowed presidential elections to be held the following year. In 1992, fighting started again and the number in fatalities rose rapidly after MPLA won the presidential election and UNITA’s leader, Savimbi, claimed fraud. The number of fatalities reached by far the greatest magnitude during the whole period in 1993, as UNITA managed to take control of over three quarters of the country and intense fighting with the MPLA broke across the country” (UCDP 2021). “On 18 April 1991 the MPLA announced that it was prepared to hold multi-party elections within 18 months of a cease-fire agreement, breaking the deadlock over the timing of the election process. The final piece of the jigsaw fell into place on 24 April 1991 when President Dos Santos, addressing an extraordinary Congress of the MPLA in Luanda, announced his acceptance of a Portuguese proposal of a cease-fire.36 On 1 May 1991 a settlement agreement was reached, to be ratified on 15 May when hostilities ended, with the formal cease- fire beginning on 1 June. The Bicesse accord, ratified by the MPLA and UNITA in May 1991, became the basis for the September 1992 election. UNITA would concede control over the entire country to the MPLA government, allowing the government to implement a population census as a first step to completing a voters' role for the elections” (Pycroft 1994: 249).

Rosie (2020) associates the onset of the civil war in 1992 to the breakdown of the peace accords of 1991. “The September 1992 election should have marked Angola's transition from 17 years of post-independence war. The election was intended as a reconciliation to create the political envi- ronment for the reconstruction and development of this potentially rich country. The September 1992 election result gave the Movimento Popular de LibertaVao de Angola (MPLA) a clear majority in the parliamentary election. President Dos Santos narrowly failed to achieve the 50 per cent plus-one vote required for outright victory over his rival, Jonas Savimbi, the leader of the Uniao Nacional para a Independencia Total de Angola (UNITA). Savimbi's refusal to accept the election result, and failure to contest a second-round presidential election, precipitated the return to war. The renewed war, the most bloody in the world at that time, claimed the lives of over a thousand people a day, and saw more intense fighting than at any time during Angola's long civil war” (Pycroft 1994: 241).

“By August 1992 only 1,500 soldiers had been retrained for integration into the new unified army, the Forcas Armadas de Angola (FAA), an insignificant proportion of the planned 40,000 strong army. The FAA was both understaffed and ill-prepared, its soldiers receiving only half the scheduled four weeks basic training from Portuguese and British instructors” (Pycroft 1994: 250).

“Fighting erupted in Luanda on 30 October. After three days of combat, in which UNITA was driven from the capital, over 1,000 people were reported killed, including UNITA's deputy leader, Jeremias Chitunda, and Savimbi's nephew, Elias Salupeto Pena. UNITA took control of Huambo on 30 October and established its headquarters there, and laid siege to Malanje. Fighting spread through the north of the country as UNITA attempted to occupy as much territory as possible. Caxito, the capital of Bengo province, was captured by UNITA on 2 November. UNITA's move to take control met with relatively little opposition from the FAA and the newly trained Emergency Police. In most cases MPLA officials and supporters fled, abandoning control to UNITA” (Pycroft 1994: 252).

Based on these accounts, I code a case of state disintegration.

Angola 1994.
Rebel group was formed by activists and intellectuals. Founder of FLEC was Ranque Franque, a Cabinda politician pro-independence. It is a secessionist civil war. The conflict took place in the Angolan enclave of Cabinda, north of Angola. Cabinda is a province of Angola, separated from the country’s other seventeen provinces by a narrow strip of the DRC. Reports of low-intensity violence prior to 1993. The conflict escalated to civil war in early 1993, when the government of Angola deployed some 15,000 troops to Cabinda (HRW 2004). See also Arbucias (2020: 79-84). Sambanis and Schulhofer-Wohl (2019) code the start year in 1994. Either in 1993 or 1994, the type of onset remains the same. I code an instance of peripheral challenge.

Angola 1997.
In 1997, fighting between the MPLA and the UNITA resumes after having decreased following the Lusaka Accord of 1994. By 1998, when fighting resumed, the MPLA was more firmly in power and the UNITA had split, leading to the formation of the UNITA-Renovada which were open to comprise with the MPLA government. However, most of UNITA remained loyal to Savimbi, and although weakened, still active outside the capital.

Following the Lusaka Accord, "by some reports, however, fighting between the two parties continued. Schneider et al. argue that in mid-September 1995 there was a weekly death toll of more than 100 victims. Overall, however, reports indicate that the years 1994 – 1998 brought an uneasy peace between the two sides. The 1997 Government of National Reconciliation failed when Savimbi rejected the position of Vice-President. In 1998, President Dos Santos thus initiated another armed offensive against UNITA strongholds" (WPF 2015).

"The Lusaka Protocol, which brought an uneasy truce for four years, was marred by sporadic fighting and violations by the two sides. Both the government and UNITA continued to prepare for war during this time, procuring weapons through the sale of oil and diamonds, respectively. […] In December 1998 the Lusaka protocol collapsed and UNITA resumed armed struggle. The primary cause of the crisis in Angola was the failure by the leadership of UNITA to comply with its obligations under the Lusaka Protocol" (GlobalSecurity).

"The Lusaka Accords were signed in November 1994. The signing came after 12 months of negotiations and two years of battlefield carnage, and were an attempt to correct what were assumed to be the fatal flaws of the Bicesse Accords. The Lusaka agreement mandated a flexible demobilisation time frame, provided provisions for power-sharing, and gave the UN sufficient muscle and money to implement the accords. In December 1998, after a tenuous four-year ceasefire, the accords collapsed and the country plunged back into full-scale war" (Knudsen, Mundt and Zartman 2000).

Human Rights Watch (1997) describes in detail the breakdown of cooperation between parties to the Lusaka Accords and the return to war. Based on all accounts, I code a case of state disintegration in 1997. Note that most account attribute the role of state to MPLA and rebels to UNITA.

I code an instance of state disintegration.

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Argentina (I thank Guillermo Kreiman for his advice on this case)

I code 2 onsets in Argentina between 1944 and 2020: 1955; and 1975.

Argentina 1955.
The brief conflict in Argentina between June 1955 and September 1955 is a military coup against Juan Péron from office which reached the level of civil war. The military revolt led by General Eduardo Lonardi, General Pedro Aramburu and Admiral Isaac Rojas, deposed Perón and established a provisional government. For several days, there was some fighting in places like the city of Córoba (Lonardi's central command), the Puerto Belgrano Naval Base, another naval base at Río Santiago, and a mechanized infantry regiment at Curuzú Cuatiá, Corrientes Province. The exact number of fatalities following the coup varies around the threshold for inclusion across studies. I choose nevertheless to include it as a civil war which is consistent with all often-cited datasets with the exception of Collier and Hoeffler (2004) who record no civil wars in Argentina.

Argentina 1975.
A number of leftist guerrilla groups emerged in Argentina in the early 1970s in the context of renewed military rule. Out of these groups, the Montoneros and the ERP grew in strength and fighting reached the level of civil war. Rebel entrepreneurs were activists and intellectuals. Santucho, founder of the ERP was communist intellectual and activist. The Montoneros guerrilla organisation was formed in 1968 by revolutionary left-wing elements of the Peronist youth movement. The groups were active in provincial towns (Pozzi 2015), especially in Tucuman region in northern Argentina (UCDP 2021).

However, these groups were mostly active in towns and engaged in urban guerrilla warfare at the onset and throughout the war. Therefore, this case does not fit the typology well. It is perhaps closer to other cases of urban guerrilla wars such as Brazil and Uruguay. The Montoneros was an urban guerrilla groups, while the ERP had both an urban and rural fronts

(Lewis 2002). About half of all guerrilla attacks happened in the city of Buenos Aires and the surrounding province. Córdoba and Santa Fe provinces another 30 percent, and Tucumán and Mendoza another 10 percent (Lewis 2002: 53).

Given these accounts, this case is difficult to categorize. First movers are radicalized leftist militants who turn to violence against the regime. The armed forces at onset remain mostly loyal to the military regime. Most attacks take place in cities, especially Buenos Aires. In that sense, it is a peripheral challenge in all aspect except location. The tactics used to initiate violence are also those one would except in a peripheral challenge: hit-and-run attacks, kidnappings, artisanal bombing, etc. Therefore, I choose to code it as a peripheral challenge as it is the closest ideal-type to describe the dynamics of onset. I also flagged this case as an exception to the location criteria. I ran all models dropping this case. The exclusion of this case does not change the results.

Sources:

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Azerbaijan (I thank Charlotte Hille for her advice on this case)

Tensions between the Azerbaijani government and the Armenian minority erupted prior to the collapse of the Soviet Union. However, the conflict escalated dramatically directly following the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the independence of Azerbaijan to cross the threshold of 1,000 battle-deaths (UCDP 2021). As the USSR collapsed, it gave way to fighting between ethnic groups in the country. Evidence that the new Azeri government was not in control of the entire territory. In fact, clans mobilized after the collapse of the Soviet Union giving way to numerous conflicts (see Hille 2020 on clans and state building). Although most never reached the level of civil war, it suggests high fragmentation within Azerbaijan in 1991. As Hille described during our discussion, due to the declaration of independence, the infrastructure that Azerbaijan had collapsed, and groups rivalled for power. Hille also noted that those with a political network from Soviet times were in a better position to rule, and thus the 'old' rulers came back to power, having exchanged communist ideology for nationalist ideology.

In addition, the army was weak and suffered defection. "Poorly equipped and trained, the Azeri army seems unable to settle on a unified strategy that could reverse these losses. Furthermore, Azeri youths have not flocked in large numbers to join the army because, not surprisingly, ethnic and clan considerations dominated their behaviors" (1995: 62). "In fact, Azeri soldiers often flee with refugees, leaving weapons intact to advancing Armenian forces" (1995: 62). Based on these accounts, I code a case of state disintegration.

Sources:

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Bangladesh (I thank Pranab Panday for his advice on this case)

The armed conflict in the Chittagong Hill Tracts (1974-1997) originated in the political and economic marginalization of the area's indigenous population, which fueled aspirations for autonomy (UCDP 2021). The founder of Shanti Bahini was Manabendra Narayan Larma, a politician and activist for the rights of the people of the Chittagong Hill Tracts. Warfare was confined to the contested region, the Chittagong Hill Tracts region in southern Bangladesh. Rebels recruited locally among the tribal population. See Mathur (2015) for a description of the conflict.

During a discussion, Panday described that the demand for autonomy was a long-standing demand of the indigenous people of the CHT region. Although they were 98 percent of the total population in 1952, they were becoming the minorities there. Therefore, they started fighting for their demand after the independence of Bangladesh. The situation aggravated drastically after 1975 when the military government adopted the policy of infiltrating Bangali settlers there.

Based on these accounts, I code an instance of peripheral challenge.

Sources:

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Bolivia (I thank Herbert Klein for his advice on this case)

On April 9, 1952, the National Revolutionary Movement (MNR) launched a rebellion in La Paz (Arnold 1995). The revolt tried to overthrow the military junta of General Hugo Ballivian. The member of the ruling junta in charge of police and internal security at the time defected to the rebels, while large numbers of minors blocked access roads to the capital. Although some description of the event as a coup (e.g., Russell (1974, 101) citing several sources that describe the Bolivian rebellion as a conspiracy between General Antonio Seleme, Chief of the National Military Police, and the MNR, a mass movement (in Sambanis 2004 RN)), the challenge was led by the MNR, which emerged as a leftist, broadly based party, and encouraged insurrectionary protests in LaPaz (UCDP 2021).

Bosnia (I thank Marie Berry for her advice on this case)

The Bosnian war started in the context of the dissolution of Yugoslavia (Kalyvas & Sambanis 2005: 210). "In the years leading up to the conflict, BiH's political terrain had become increasingly ethnicized" (Christia 2012: 152). "It [the Bosnian war] had three ethnic groups of different demographic sizes and military power, and one notable identity cleavage, that of religion" (Christia 2012: 149).

Following independence of Slovenia and Croatia in 1992-92, "[t]he proposal for a referendum for independence for BiH in February-March 1992 was supported by the Republic's Muslim and Croat citizens but was opposed by its Serb constituents [in favour of remaining within Yugoslavia], who had set up their own parliament and had held their first separate plebiscite in November 1991. The February 29-March 1, 1992 referendum came out 62.68 percent in favor of independence, an anticipated outcome given that the Serbs – who constituted 31 percent of the republic's population – were boycotting while the Muslims and the Croats had come out in favor. Within a mere two days after the referendum, on March 3, 1992, Alija Izetbegovic, the Bosnian Presidency's Muslim president, declared BiH's independence. The result of the pro-independence referendum encouraged the already defiant Serbs to initiate the conflict. War broke out across the country in early April of that year" (Christia 2012: 152-53).

"Sporadic shooting took place in the day of the referendum [late February 1992]. Two days later, Serbian irregulars shelled Bosanski Brod, a town on the Sava River in northern Bosnia. On march 27, 1992, the day the political leaders of the Bosnian Serbs proclaimed their own constitution, the YPA [Yugoslav's People Army] launched attacks against the newly declared republic of Bosnia from the south, west, and north-west. […] In late March 1992, hostilities escalated to a full-scale war" (Donia & Fine 1994: 238). The towns of eastern Bosnia, inhabited principally by Serbs and Muslims, were early targets of the Serbian forces (Donia & Fine 1994: 241).

"The armies that fought in the Bosnian war were a mix of irregular and regular forces. At the one end of the spectrum were criminal and quasi-criminal elements, often freed from prison in order to take part in the fighting (Mueller 2000). At the other end were former career officers of the JNA [Jugoslav National Army] who had defected to the various ethnic armies. In the middle were reservists and home guards, armed and trained by the JNA. They were mobilized locally by ethnic parties and ethnic entrepreneurs. The mobilization of civilians into militias was facilitated by the abundance of weapons. Paramilitary forces from outside Bosnia also actively participated. The degree of organization and discipline also varied widely, with the quasi-criminal groups in one end and regular units in the other. Moreover, many of these units underwent an organizational transformation during the war; becoming more organized and centralized" (Kalyvas & Sambanis 2005: 212).

In sum, following the dissolution of the Yugoslavia and the independence of Bosnia-Herzegovina in March 1992, fighting erupted between militarized ethnic factions: Serbs, Muslims, and Croats. The state institutions collapsed following the outset of conflict and the different factions proclaimed their autonomy and zones of control. I code an instance of state disintegration.

Sources:

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Burkina Faso

"By 2019, violence had spread from its origins in the north of the country to the east, as well. Burkina Faso has never had a civil war, but Nsaibia says the current conflict has many of the key characteristics of one. The fighting has its origins in neighbouring Mali where armed groups such as Jama'at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM) and Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS), linked to al-Qaeda and ISIL respectively, took over large parts of that country from 2012 onwards. Flown out of the country by a French intelligence service helicopter into exile in neighbouring Ivory Coast, the departure of Compaore after the insurrection was the triggering event which allowed the conflict to spill over the border into Burkina Faso" (Wilkins 2020).

"In Burkina Faso, violence is intensifying as a result of a multifaceted rural crisis. Armed groups are proliferating, including bandits, jihadists and self-defence movements. In 2019, Burkina Faso suffered more jihadist attacks than any other Sahelian country. Jihadists are gaining ground by exploiting rural communities' frustrations. In turn, the government's largely military response often entails abuses by security forces and self-defence groups that fuel local, community-based violence that provides a fertile recruiting ground for diverse armed groups. […] In Burkina Faso, violence is escalating amid a governance crisis across rural areas. Jihadists returning from neighbouring Mali, most of whom are Burkinabè, gained a foothold in 2016 by exploiting the frustration and anger of rural communities. Self-defence groups that villagers began forming in 2014 have fuelled local community-based violence, especially since 2019 in the Centre-Nord and Soum regions. [… In the context of weakened state presence and capacity,] Islamist militants have expanded their footprint across rural areas. In 2019, Burkina Faso suffered more jihadist attacks than any other Sahelian country. Militants are a motley crowd of insurgents motivated by local concerns around a small core of ideologues" (Crisis Group 2020). "The situation is worsening despite the counter-insurgency efforts of the Burkinabè state and its partners: 66 per cent of the violent incidents took place in 2019. In October 2017, Crisis Group published its first report on the uprising in northern Burkina Faso, mainly in Soum, in connection with the Malian crisis. Over the following two years, violence has plagued the Sahel, East and Centre-North regions and is now spreading elsewhere, particularly in the North and the Boucle du Mouhoun regions" (Crisis Group 2020).

Based on these accounts, I code a case of peripheral challenge.

Sources:

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Burundi

I code 6 onsets in Burundi between 1944 and 2020: 1965; 1972; 1988; 1991; 1993; and 2015.

Burundi 1965.
Following Sambanis (2004 RN) and Ngaruko and Nkurunziza (2000; 2005), I code this first conflict in Burundi as a peripheral challenge onset. Following the May 1965 legislative elections, Hutu politicians resorted to a coup that was foiled. In the aftermath of the coup attempt, several Hutu leaders were executed. Meanwhile, Tutsi civilians were executed in the Muramvya province by Hutu Burundian politicians based in Rwanda. Government moved in and engaged in repression of Hutu civilians. In fact, fighting in the Muramvya province was not between coup plotters and the government. Instead, the coup motivated an uprising in central Burundi. The coup itself did not lead to fighting that reached the violence threshold of civil war.

Burundi 1972.
Conflict started as a large number of Hutus, coordinated by some Hutus from the army, attacked thousands of Tutsis in the southern part of the country. The army moved in and violently repressed Hutus, not limited to those who took part in the previous attacks against civilians (Ngaruko and Nkurunziza 2000; Reyntjens 1994).

Burundi 1988.
This event is similar to the 1972 uprising. In 1988, Hutu insurgents killed Tutsi families in two communes in northern Burundi (Ntega and Marangara). The army moved in and intervened violently sending thousands of refugees to Rwanda (Ngaruko and Nkurunziza 2000).

Burundi 1991.
Beginning in 1990, the arrests of supporters of PALIPEHUTU by the state created tensions (Lemarchand 1994: 154-155). Partly out of exasperation, partly because they figured they had no other choice, those activists who remained on the ground turned to the use of force against police and military installations (Lemarchand 1994: 155-156). In the process, series of Tutsi civilians were killed which led to pitiless repression, relatively indiscriminate and accompanied by looting, by government troops. Supporters were recruited from refugee camps and settlement in Tanzania and well as support for the insurgents within Burundi, primarily from the Muramvya province and the areas around Lake Tanganijka (UCDP 2021).

Burundi 1993.
After four previous conflicts, the coup attempt of October 1993 provoked the collapse of the state and fighting broke out across the country, where local groups, mostly Hutus, took up arms against Tutsis (Watt 2008; Ngaruko and Nkurunziza 2000; Uvin 2009).

About the army. “A tendency can be observed in Burundi of a growing criminalization of power […] and its potential destabilization at the hands of senior officers and foot soldiers who have acquainted the habits of warlords” (Chrétien 2008: 10). At the time of onset, “the army was surprised by the scale and rapidity of reprisals in rural areas, causing it to lose control”

(Ngaruko and Nkurunziza 2005). Across the country, soldiers joined Tutsi militias that organized in response to Hutu attacks (Prunier 2009).

About the government. The onset of civil war created a "constitutional void which quickly made it impossible to agree on new high representatives without putting an end to the war first" (Nsanze 2003: 346). After the 1993 coup, the government fled to the French embassy and neighboring Rwanda (Nsanze 2003: 350). Until 1996, the government was left "headless", and the army left to its own in the countryside (Watt 2008). Human Rights Watch considers this a continuous conflict until the present, noting the breakdown of authority and government violence in 1993 and 1994.

Given evidence from case studies summarized above, I code an instance of state disintegration onset in Burundi in 1993. All previous onsets were cases of peripheral challenges.

Burundi 2015.
"Nkurunziza's unwillingness to step down following his second term in office in 2015, as stipulated in the Arusha Accords and the 2005 Constitution, reversed this hopeful path and set off the current crisis. His decision to pursue a third term coupled with the resurfacing of the Hutu nationalist agenda of his ruling CNDD-FDD party triggered months of protests and a failed coup attempt in May 2015. It also set off a wave of defections and tit-for-tat violence in the military, targeted killings of civilians—often with ethnic undertones—and the launching of armed rebellions by three separate movements" (Nantulya 2019).

"Divisions in the military are growing. A wave of desertions occurred in the aftermath of a failed coup attempt in May, with about 150 officers and enlisted men from the 11th Armor Battalion and 121st Parachute Battalion going into exile or rebellion. Attrition among key officers has continued since. In October, officers from the elite 17th Battalion (including its deputy commander) and the Logistics Brigade, left the force with about 120 officers and enlisted men, weapons, and communications equipment. After the coup, the government has undertaken purges of those in the military seen as insufficiently loyal. This has fueled distrust in one of the institutions that is seen as having made genuine progress in advancing the multi-ethnic spirit of the Arusha Accord. The force is composed equally of soldiers of the ex-Armed forces of Burundi (ex-FAB), which are predominantly Tutsi, and militiamen of the majority Hutu rebel groups that fought against successive Tutsi-led governments. The Nkurunziza government's reprisals following the coup attempt have mostly targeted the ex-FAB" (Nantulya 2016).

"The crisis in Burundi was triggered on April 25, when incumbent President Pierre Nkurunziza announced he would seek a third term in office, despite a two-term limit in the country's constitution. Popular, peaceful protests organized by a multi-ethnic coalition of civil society organizations ensued. So too did an orchestrated campaign of intimidation by a youth militia, the Imbonerakure, which was established, trained, and armed by the ruling CNDD-FDD party for at least a year in advance. The repression escalated following an attempted military coup in May" (Siegle 2015).

"In April, demonstrations broke out in response to the news that President Pierre Nkurunziza would seek election for a third term. Police used excessive force and shot demonstrators indiscriminately, killing and injuring scores of people. The government launched a crackdown against civil society activists and journalists and closed the four most popular private radio stations. Leading human rights activist Pierre Claver Mbonimpa was seriously injured in an

assassination attempt. Around 200,000 Burundians fled the country, most to Tanzania and Rwanda. Dozens of journalists, civil society activists, and opposition party members remain in exile" (HRW 2016).

"The crisis currently sweeping through Burundi began in April 2015, when President Pierre Nkurunziza announced he was running for a third term, in violation of the country's constitution. The day after Nkurunziza made his announcement, thousands of people took to the streets in protest. Police responded by shooting live ammunition into the crowds, killing two and injuring more […] After an attempted military coup was thwarted in May 2015, protests continued throughout the summer but were suppressed, often with brutality. 'Burundian police used excessive lethal force, including against women and children, to silence those opposed to President Pierre Nkurunziza's bid for a third term,' warned Amnesty International" (Thomson 2016).

Based on accounts of the 2015 events, I code the onset of the war in April 2015 when protests started in the capital (note the slight change from SSW that code the onset in May of that year). This is a difficult case to code. During Spring of 2015, accounts describe protests and violent repression, a coup attempt and military purge, and communal violence between civilian militias, as well as some incursions by Burundian rebels from Rwanda. I take the initial act of state authority rupture as the triggering event, in this case it is the protests following President Nkurunziza's announcement. My understanding is that the strains of the protests led to tensions within the military, that first remained neutral, and which led to the coup attempt that further fueled the violence. However, intense violence was already ongoing and was characterized by the protesters' turn to violence following brutal police repression and targeting by state-led militias.

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Cambodia (I thank Yuichi Kubota for his advice on this case)

I code 2 onsets in Cambodia between 1944 and 2020: 1970 and 1979.

Cambodia 1970.
Chanda (1989: 27) describes that conflict started with the March 1970 coup that "plunged the country into civil war." Ousted Prince Sihanouk fled to China where he resisted the coup with the help of China and North Vietnam and the Cambodian communist forces. Fighting took place in northern Cambodia between the new government of Lon Nol and the communist forces after the coup had taken place. The Khmer Rouge participated in the opposition alliances FUNK (National United Front of Kampuchea, Front uni national du Kampuchéa) between 1970-75 (UCDP 2021). The conflict ended with the victory of the Communist forces in 1975. Powell and Thyne (2011) identify a coup in 1970 in Cambodia.

Although the civil war opposed the deposed government to the new one following a coup in 1970, I do not code an instance of coup as the process of civil war onset. As Yuichi Kubota described during our discussion, Lon Nol forces did not substantially split in and after 1970. The March 1970 coup was mostly bloodless as Sihanouk was outside of the country at the time. As Benzaquen-Gautier (2021: 454) describes, "on 18 March 1970, the National Assembly and the Council of the Kingdom voted unanimously for Sihanouk's removal from power. The process that led to the vote had started a few days prior with a series of anti-Sihanouk demonstrations in provincial towns and in Phnom Penh. The prince was accused of financial and moral corruption, and more importantly, of treason for having facilitated and supported the presence of the Vietnamese communists in Cambodia. Sihanouk, who was in Moscow when he learned about his overthrow, flew to China." "When the Cambodian government rejected this proposal, China and North Vietnam decided to back Sihanouk. Zhou Enlai convinced the prince to form an alliance with his former enemies, the communists or 'Khmer Rouge', a term coined by Sihanouk himself in the 1960s to designate his opponents. The new coalition established a double structure including a government-in-exile, the GRUNC (Royal Government of the National Union of Cambodia) headed by Sihanouk, and an interior resistance, the FUNK (National United Front for Kampuchea)."

There may be some groups within the military or the police who had sympathy to and collaborated with Sihanouk, but defection was likely limited. Sihanouk was able to counter the coup mostly through his alliance with the Khmer Rouge whose base of mobilization was mostly peasants. In fact, "while intellectuals and students in Phnom Penh welcomed the change, the situation was far more volatile in the countryside. At the end of March 1970, revolts in Kampong Chang and Takeo Provinces, harshly repressed by the new authorities, showed the hostility of peasants towards the National Assembly and the measures it had passed (Summers 1972, 262)" (Benzaquen-Gautier 2021: 455). As a result, Sihanouk forces resisted the coup in the rural periphery of Cambodia in what follows the dynamics of a peripheral challenge.

Cambodia 1979.
The Khmer Rouge ruled between 1975-1979. Although I do not code a civil war during the period, it was far from peaceful. The Khmer Rouge government was engaged in interstate war against Vietnam and conflict took place on Cambodian territory. The Khmer Rouge simultaneously engaged in genocidal violence (Sambanis 2004 RN; Sambanis and Schulhofer-Wohl (2019). Sambanis and Schulhofer-Wohl (2019 appendix) identify the start of the second Cambodian civil war in January 1979 when the Khmer Rouge government was ousted. After being ousted from government in 1979, the Khmer Rouge leadership remained in place as the organization established military camps in the eastern regions of the country, where it fought the new Cambodian government until October 1991, with the support of foreign countries (e.g. Vietnam). I code an instance of peripheral challenge.

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Cameroon

I code 2 onsets in Cameroon between 1944 and 2020: 2014 and 2017.

Cameroon 2014.
Since 2014, Cameroon experiences a civil war against Boko Haram in the Far North region. "Since 2013 the Nigeria-based Boko Haram militia has successively expanded its terror attacks and bombings into Cameroon. Until then Cameroon had been a safe haven where the authorities tolerated the group in the context of an unspoken mutual non-aggression pact. The escalation occurred in two stages, triggered by a formal declaration of war on Boko Haram issued by President Paul Biya after the regional summit on the insurgency in Paris in May 2014. This led to surge of military confrontations in northern Cameroon's regions bordering Nigeria, with many casualties on both sides and the deployment of two thousand reinforcements by government forces" (Tull 2015: 1).

"The official name of the movement is Jama'atu Ahlis Suna Lidda'awati Wal Jihad (People Committed to the Propagation of the Prophet's Teachings and Jihad). The group was formed on the charismatic preaching of Yusuf Muhammad, which attracted hundreds of thousands of followers across northern Nigeria, Cameroon, Niger and Chad. The group's campaign is informed by Islamic revivalism, widespread poverty, political corruption, repression and a weak justice system in the region" (Oyewole 2015). I code an instance of peripheral challenge.

Cameroon 2017.
"The mobilization of lawyers, teachers and students starting in October 2016, ignored then put down by the government, has revived identity-based movements which date back to the 1970s. These movements are demanding a return to the federal model that existed from 1961 to 1972. Since then, the two Anglophone regions have lived through general strikes, school boycotts and sporadic violence. Small secessionist groups have emerged since January. They are taking advantage of the situation to radicalize the population with support from part of the Anglophone diaspora. While the risk of partition of the country is low, the risk of a resurgence of the problem in the form of armed violence is high, as some groups are now advocating that approach" (Crisis Group 2017). Similar accounts from UCDP (2021). Craig (2020) also provides a similar account of the conflict onset: the crisis escalated beginning in 2016 after peaceful protests where repressed in Ambazonia region by government forces. Following repression in October 2017, protesters and separatist groups took up arms and engaged in fighting against the government and conflict escalated to civil war (Africa Portal 2021).

Protests started in Bamenda, the capital of Cameroon' northwest region (Bone 2021). "This conflict originates from the 2016 protests, which were led by lawyers, students and teachers against the marginalization of Cameroon's Anglophone minority. As protests were violently put down by the government, the protesters begun to demand independence for Ambazonia, the name given to the region by the separatists" (Palik, Rustad and Methi 2020: 161). I code an instance of insurrectionary protests.

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Central African Republic (I thank Louisa Lombard and Timothy Stapleton for their advice on this case)

I code 3 onsets in Central African Republic between 1944 and 2020: 1996; 2012 and 2013.

Central African Republic 1996.
The war started with a military revolt in April 1996 over back pay for soldiers, which gave way to a series of mutinies against the regime throughout 1996 (NYT 1996; OCHA 2013). In 1996 elements of the FACA mutinied, resulting in the looting of the arms depot at the Kassaï barracks in the capital, Bangui (Berman and Lombard 2008). The onset of the civil war was characterized by an army mutiny against the government in the capital Bangui, especially in the southern part of the city. Bangui was the main theatre of violence in 1996 and 1997 (Mehler 2011). In sum, several army mutinies together led to violence that reached the level of civil war. First movers were army personnel who initiated their challenge against the government in the capital Bangui. As a result, the conflict opposed the part of the armed forces that rebelled against those that supported the government. Therefore, given that first movers were army personnel, the armed forces broadly split in two camps and the events took place in the capital, I code an instance of coup as the process of civil war onset in Central African Republic.

Central African Republic 2012.
Following years of unrest and low intensity violence in the north between 2004 and 2012 following Bozizé's capture of power in a coup in 2003, the Seleka rebels, a coalition of several armed groups such as the Union of Democratic Forces for Unity (UFDR), the Convention of Patriots for Justice and Peace (CPJP) and the Wa Kodro Salute Patriotic Convention (CPSK), joined by fighters coming from Chad and Darfur, emerged in northeastern CAR and reached the capital in December 2012 (OCHA 2013; Stapleton 2019). "The emergence of the Seleka coalition results from the absence of solution to the problem of the armed groups of northeastern CAR; the lack of a program of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) for these fighters; and a crippled security system (OCHA 2013). In sum, the formation of Seleka in 2012 represented a new threat to state sovereignty with increased violence. The group formed and launched its first attacks in northeastern CAR and marched toward Bangui. Contrary to the 1996 civil war onset, this time the periphery was most affected as opposed to the capital. Although weak and ultimately unsuccessful, the army attempted to contain the insurgency. Therefore, I code an instance of peripheral challenge.

Central African Republic 2013.
The seizure of power by Seleka rebel was followed by a failure to establish control and governance over the country (Lombard 2016). OCHA (2013) notes that following the capture of the capital by Seleka rebels, "Central African Republic is neither governed nor governable. The critical thing now is the restoration of law and order in Bangui as well as in the rest of the country. The heterogeneous structure of the rebellion makes it very fragile and the Seleka leadership might not be able to control all its troops, as demonstrated by the looting that already happened in Bangui." Same account in Kisangani (2015). In sum, following the seizure of government power by rebels in early 2013, the newly installed rebel government ultimately

failed to establish control over the country. As the Seleka forces were disbanded, violence erupted across the country between former rebels and local militias. The armed forces remained inactive or joined the militias in the face of widespread violence. I code a case of state disintegration.

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Chad

I code 6 onsets in Chad between 1944 and 2020: 1965; 1979; 1982; 1990; 1998; and 2005.

Chad 1965.

"In October 1965 there erupted, in the Center-East area of Mangalmé, a peasant revolt directed mainly against taxes and the high-handed manner of local officials of the central government (though local political disputes may also have been involved). Casualties ran into the hundreds and included the speaker of the National Assembly, Mahamat Senoussi. The revolts spread to encompass a large area and continued for at least a year" (Nolutshungu 1996: 53). These riots were brutally repressed by the regime (UNHCR 2004). These uprisings across the country gave way to the formation of numerous armed groups led by local leaders, especially in northern and eastern Chad, which ultimately led to the formation of the FROLINAT in June 1966 (Nolutshungu 1996). What happened to the armed forces of Tombalbaye's government? The army appear to have remain loyal, as it was mostly composed of southerner's (as was the

government of Tambalbaye) (UNCHR 2004). The conflict ended in August 1978 with the signing of the Habre-Malloum Fundamental Charter.

"In response to oppression and excessive taxation, the first peasant rebellions broke out in central and eastern Chad in September 1965, beginning in Bitchotchi in the district of Mangalmé. Moubi peasants killed members of a government delegation who came to demand un-paid taxes, after which severe repressive measures were taken by the Chadian army (Abbo Netcho 1997, Buijtenhuijs 1978, Azevedo 1998). The first incidents in the Tibesti took place in the same month (Lemoine 1997). Since independence, opposition to the Chadian government was growing among Chadian migrants and refugees in Sudan and Egypt. This Chadian movement in exile was the precursor of the FROLINAT that was founded in Nyala (Sudan) on June 22, 1966 under the leadership of Ibrahima Abatcha. In the same year FROLINAT started attacks in the central and eastern parts of Chad, joining the existing peasant rebellions (Buijtenhuijs 1978, Lemoine 1997). By the end of 1968, the Chadian government had also to confront opposition in the northern provinces, the BET" (65).

"The fiscal burden grew heavier and the launch of the national lending scheme in April 1964 was met with outright hostility in the countryside. In October 1965, peasants in the Mangalmé region rebelled against the tax collectors who were taking advantage of the levying of taxes to rob them. The repression imposed by the Chadian army created several hundred victims. Other peasant rebellions broke out in the centre and east of the country. These were led by peasants who had no experience of combat: 'those rebel gangs rarely [leave] their original region and, as they do not have any modern weapons at their disposal, they [avoid] as often as possible any contact with the Chadian army'. The demands of the insurgents were restricted to the local level" (Debos 2016: 47). In the context of those rebellions, the FROLINAT formed and began operating in the countryside, benefitting from the weakness of the army.

Nolutshungu (1996: 56-57) describeses that "it is doubtful that the government of Tombalbaye ever enjoyed any real authority over most of the rural areas of the north. As has been mentioned, the BET [The Borkou-Ennedi-Tibesti, northern region of Chad] remained under French administration until 1965, and within three years of its transfer was in complete revolt […]."

To be consistent with the decision made regarding the 1978 Afghan conflict onset and given the description of the events summarized above, I code a case of peripheral challenge in Chad in 1965. The conflict is coded as having ended in August 1978 with the formation of the national unity government which established power sharing arrangement between Habré and Malloum.

Chad 1979.
The power sharing agreement between factions of the national unity government broke down in March 1979 as forces started fighting in the capital, N'Djamena. First between the forces of Habre and Malloum, and later between the forces of Habre and Goukouni (Nolutshungu 1996). At the time of onset, both the government and army disintegration into various armed factions. The conflict ended with Habre taking power in June 1982. I code state disintegration in this case in Chad in 1979.

Chad 1982.
After Habre'take of power in Chad, Goukouni's forces recoalesced and created a government in exile in Goukouni's northern stronghold in Bardai, Tibesti (UNHCR 2004). These forces continued resistance against Habre's new regime, with the support of Libya (Nolutshungu

1996). At the same time, the Habre regime also faced resistance in the south as the Codos Rouge was formed against the regime and benefited from the support of Libya and CAR (UNHCR 2004). Although challenged in the periphery, the regime remained and by September 1987, Habre's forces, with the support of France, had driven Libyan forces from all of Chad, which marks the end of this conflict (Debos 2016; HRW 2016). I code a case of peripheral challenge.

Chad 1990.
In 1990, Deby, former commander in chief of the armed forces under Habre who had fled the country, led a rebel army from neighboring Sudan to topple Habre (Reuters 2021). "In March 1990 in Bamina, a locality in Darfur, the insurgents formed an alliance called the Mouvement Patriotique du Salut or Patriotic Salvation Movement, known by its French acronym MPS. The army, poorly paid, put up little resistance to the MPS combatants, who were supported by three countries: primarily France but also Sudan and Libya – even though the interest of these countries diverged" (Debos 2016: 63).

Once in power after a brief rebellion that did not meet the violence threshold for inclusion as a civil war, Deby was challenged by numerous armed factions. "Ever since 1990, new groups had come into existence while the old ones fragmented. […] The first significant rebellion, which brought together former supporter of Habre, broke out shortly after the MPS victory" (Debos 2016: 65). The group – MDD – was based in the west, around Lake Chad. Then a second rebellion broke in the center, led by the FAIDT. And another in the east led by the CNR and FNT (Debos 2016). The conflict ended in 1994 with the withdrawal of the Libyan troops from Chad and there was wide support for peace negotiations among the various fighting parties (Sambanis 2004 RN). Given the nature and location of these challenges, I code a peripheral challenge onset in 1990.

Chad 1998.
After a period of relative calm (although violence was still ongoing but at a lower level of intensity in 1995 and 1996 when negotiations with different armed groups took place (UCDP 2021; UNHCR 2004), violence escalated again after the formation of the MDLT (Mouvement pour la démocratie et la justice au Tchad, or Movement for Democracy and Justice in Chad) in October 1998 by Youssouf Togoimi who had previously been Minister of Defense and Minister of Interior, Security, and Decentralization in President Déby's administration, before defecting to create the MDJT in the Tibetsi region in northwestern Chad (Sambanis 2004 RN; UCDP 2021). The MDJT was composed of recruits from the Tibetsi region and defections from the national army.

Is this a coup? No. Youssouf Togoimi resigned from his function in the government in June 1997, a year before forming his rebel group, and therefore did not challenge the state from within (UNHCR 2000). In addition, the army was never fully reorganized due to consecutive conflicts and defections. Therefore, the dynamics at play differ from stronger state in which coups unfold differently. "Since the collapse of the Chadian armed forces in 1979, the regular army has been a space of coexistence for men (and a minority of women) from different generations and different backgrounds. Professional soldiers coexist with former rebels. […] It is difficult to know the actual size of the regular forces. The numbers have fluctuated as men have deserted or re-joined, or have been recruited locally by commanders" (Debos 2016: 122-123). I code a peripheral challenge instead, even if parts of the recruits used to be members of the ANT.

Chad 2005.
"After only a few years of peace, armed movements in eastern Chad re-emerged between 2005 and 2009. The escalation of the politico-military crisis initially sprang from within" (Debos 2016: 65). The RDL was formed by Mohammed Nour Abdelkarim, ANR's ex-military commander and member of the Tama people, a "non-Arab" group native to eastern Chad and western Sudan. Attacks were reported in December 2005. In 2006, the RDL allied with seven other insurgent groups to form the FUCD (UCDP 2021). I code a case of peripheral challenge given both the identity of the first movers and the location of the initial challenge to state authority.

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China (I thank Patricia Thornton for her advice on this case)

I code 5 onsets in Chad between 1944 and 2020: 1946; 1947; 1949; 1950; and 1956.

China 1946.
The war followed World War II and the defeat of Japan, as well as the withdrawal of the Soviet forces from Manchuria. "In August 1945, Chiang and Mao Zedong met personally for the first time in 20 years. The two leaders agreed on a truce, but it is doubtful whether either of them intended it to last. The differences between them ran too deep. It was no surprise, therefore, that within a few months such agreement as had been reached had broken down. Formally, negotiations still continued, but by June 1946 the two sides were openly fighting each other again" (Lynch 2010). "The war was often a complex affair at the local level. The lines between Communists and Nationalists were often blurred by the interplay of local activists. In some

areas villages formed armed units to protect themselves against the forces of both sides. To increase their security, these self-protection units often did deals with local bandits and marauders. In some areas, resistance groups, which had first been formed to fight the Japanese, did not disband after Japan's surrender but stayed together as a local army" (Lynch 2010).

"The wartime causes that conditioned the outcome of the post-1945 civil war are mainly three, all linked to the effects of the Japanese attack: the accentuation of rural poverty, the crisis of massive collaboration, and the weakening of Guomindang state and party institutions. The impoverishment of rural societies in parts of China as a result of dislocation and destruction provided the Communists with a social laboratory for land reform. The high level of collaboration with Japanese authorities, especially in the coastal cities, effectively split the prewar Chinese elites. And the onslaught of the Japanese army, against which it formed the main, but generally unsuccessful, resistance, reduced the GMD regime's reserves of military power, economic resources, and morale. The China and Chinese government that was rescued from collapse by the U.S. defeat of Japan in the Pacific were very different from what they had been in 1937. Although there is no doubt that some of the Guomindang's postwar troubles – factionalism and corruption among them – had prewar roots, it was during the last phase of the world war that these ills reached crises proportions" (Westad 2003: 7).

Based on these accounts, I code an instance of state disintegration.

China 1947.
After the KMT retreated to Taiwan, it dominated the island's administration and sequestered property belonging to the indigenous population. An uprising escalated on 27 February 1947 when the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) government violently suppressed an anti-government uprising in Taiwan (OFTaiwan 2021). The Taiwanese protests led to three weeks of "rioting and violence between Taiwanese civilians and Nationalist soldiers. 'When additional Nationalist troops arrived in Taiwan, the troops restored order in Taiwan, often with great brutality' (Hutchins 2001 135-36)" (in Sambanis 2004 RN).

This is an ambiguous case. This may not qualify as a civil war as fighting between protesters and the National Army forces began as a spontaneous event, and there were some mass demonstrations and protests, but all were put down quite quickly. In fact, not all datasets include the 1947 protests as a civil war. However, to be consistent, I include this case following Sambanis (2004). If included in the list of civil war, there is no doubt that it is a case of insurrectionary protests. The alternative is to drop the case from the list on the basis that it does not qualify as a civil war.

China 1949.
"From late 1949 to 1953, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) engaged in what it called "the suppression of bandits and local despots" throughout Southern China. This conflict is distinct from the land reforms and political purges that took place in other areas under the CCP's control, which would be classified as politicides. According to our sources, thousands were killed, and the hostilities ended around 1953. This episode was clearly related to the broader Chinese civil war; we code it, however, as a separate period of state consolidation in which the new government purges pockets of armed opposition in what amounts to a new civil war" (Sambanis and Schulhofer-Wohl 2019: 1549). Sambanis and Schulhofer-Wohl (2019) refer to Du Runsheng (1996: 309-13) and Luo Pinghan (2005: 304-18). I code this onset as a peripheral challenge.

China 1950.
After the Chinese civil war drew to a close, the Chinese Red Army moved in and effectively re-confirmed Chinese sovereignty over Tibet (Sambanis 2004 RN). The conflict in Tibet opposed the PLA and the Tibetan army and lasted until 1951 (Jian 2006). I code an instance of peripheral challenge.

China 1956.
"The Tibetan resistance to Mao's migration policies, begun around 1956 with the Khampas (Ethnic Tibetans from Khams, Eastern Tibet, who were skilled in guerilla warfare) fighting the CCP armies along the borders of Tibet and Western China" (in Sambanis 2004 RN). The conflict culminated with the protest in Lhasa in March 1959 against the Chinese occupation of Tibet. I code a second instance of peripheral challenge.

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Colombia (I thank Abbey Steele for her advice on this case)

I code 2 onsets in Colombia between 1944 and 2020: 1948 and 1978.

Colombia 1948.
Following two years of violent politics between the Conservatives and the Liberals, violence turned into civil war in April 1948, following the assassination of Jorge Eliécer Gaitán, Liberal party leader. The initial violence and uprising in Bogota and Cali (the Bogotazo) sparked subsequent violence across the country (Steele 2017; Bailey 1967; Gott 1970). In an exchange with Abbey Steele, she noted that radio reports to the rest of the country portrayed what was happening in the capital in a way that implied the collapse of government and onset of war. While the riot decreased in strength in the capital, the countryside spiraled between party supporters and private militias.

This is a difficult case regarding onset. Uprising of Liberal supporters in Bogota and Cali led to increased violence across the country as numerous armed bands emerge locally and rapidly grew in size and brutality (Bailey 1967). However, several case studies mention government repression against these armed groups, repression which correspondingly grew in intensity too.

Overall, most reports consulted seems to suggest that intense partisan rivalries between Colombia's two traditional political parties—the Colombian Liberal Party and the Conservative Party—provided the initial catalyst. "Paul H. Oquist and Jonathan Hartlyn argue that partisan violence created a rift between Liberals and Conservatives, which ultimately

triggered a breakdown of existing institutional structures and a partial collapse of the state" (WPF 2016).

"The regime finally broke down in November 1949 when Conservative President Mariano Ospina declared a state of siege, closed Congress and imposed other measures. Another Conservative, Laureano Gomez, ran unopposed and won the elections that had been moved up to late 1949. The inability of some and the unwillingness of other elements of the top leadership in both parties to negotiate in good faith with each other ultimately led regional conflicts to spiral into the break-down of the regime, a "partial collapse of the state" and one of the "greatest armed mobilization[s] of peasants ... in the recent history of the western hemisphere." However, the violence had different characteristics across regions […]" (Hartlyn 1993: 39). The return of state institutions can be identified in 1957 with the establishment of the consociational National Front between the two traditional parties (Hartlyn 1993).

Because political order broke down at the center between parties, institutions collapsed and the army no longer remained neutral in the fighting between local groups across the country, I code a case of state disintegration in Colombia in 1948.

Colombia 1978.
The FARC and the National Liberation Army (known by its Spanish acronym, ELN) were founded in the 1960s after a decade of political violence known as La Violencia (1948–58). Excluded from a power-sharing agreement that ended the fighting, communist guerrillas took up arms against the government. The FARC was composed of militant communists and peasant self-defense groups, while the ELN's ranks were dominated by students, Catholic radicals, and left-wing intellectuals who hoped to replicate Fidel Castro's communist revolution (CFR 2017). "Those groups that had a rural orientation began their operations in areas of past guerrilla activity in the country, and a number of their leaders or adherents had suffered as a consequence of La Violencia (murders of close family members, forced migration, etc.)" (Hartlyn 1993: 50). The first attacks between the armed forces and the FARC took place in Marquetalia, central Colombia.

Prof. Abbey Steele noted that the Turbay administration during 1978-1982 launched a repressive campaign against militants in the cities, which radicalized and joined the leftists rebel groups in the countryside, which strengthened the rural insurgencies. She also noted that one group, the M-19, broke away from the FARC in the early 1970s explicitly to operate in the cities.

Based on these accounts, I code a case of peripheral challenge.

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Congo

I code 3 onsets in Congo between 1944 and 2020: 1993; 1997; and 1998.

Congo 1993.
Initial violence between armed militias broke out as a result of disputed elections held in May 1993 (Sambanis 2004 RN). “In the wake of the 1992-93 legislative and presidential elections, which awarded victory to Pascal Lissouba and his party UPADS (Union Panafricaine pour la Démocratie Sociale, the Pan-African Union for Social Democracy), the political elites plunged the country into civil war as they competed for control over the government. To make credible claims to power, the three main parties mobilized youths from their respective ethnic constituency into armed militias – the Cobras (PCT), the Cocoyes (UPADS), and the Ninjas (MCDDI)” (UCDP 2021).

Lissouba had dissolved the parliament after the government coalition broke down. Following the contested May 1993 elections, “the three leading politicians had formed private militias to control access to various quarters of Brazzaville. By December 1993 Congo had slipped into civil war” (Clark 1998: 31). “By mid-1993 each of the country's politicians had deployed private militias in the neighborhoods where their respective ethno-regional constituents predominated” (Clark 1998: 32).

Disputed legislative elections in 1993 led to violent conflict between militias, representing party political and ethnic interests and formed to support the three major political leaders (UNHCR 2000; Bazenguissa-Ganga 1999). “That episode created a political divide that would soon thrust the country into civil war in 1993” (GlobalSecurity 2021).

Is it a coup? No. At onset, central political order collapsed and fighting broke out between private militias formed by various politicians eager to capture government power, rather than between loyal and rebel units within the armed forces of the state. In line with this decision not to code a coup onset, Powell and Thyne (2011) do not code a coup in Congo in 1993. Widner (1995) argues that Congo can be considered a failed state following the outset of violence between several factions. For these reasons, I code a case of state disintegration in Congo in 1993.

Congo 1997.
Following the creation of a new government in January 1995, the next two years displayed an uneasy peace between the different factions, punctuated by episodes of violence, accusation, and recrimination (Clark 1998). However, between 1995 and 1997, "each of the political principals maintained and strengthened his private militia contrary to an agreement to integrate them into the national army" (Clark 1998: 32). "As new elections approached in 1997, political rivalries once again led to fighting between rival party militias, this time leading to very heavy fighting and pitched battles in Brazzaville which ended only with the military victory of former President Sassou-Nguesso in October 1997" (Bazenguissa-Ganga 1999: 38). "One group was composed of the Cobra militia and soldiers who supported Sassou-Nguesso, and the other camp included soldiers loyal to President Lissouba, making common cause with his own party militias (Bazenguissa-Ganga 1999: 39).

"In June 1997, when President Lissouba, fearing a coup d'etat, sent Cocoyes to arrest Sassou and disarm his Cobras, fighting spread throughout the capital-Brazzaville was divided into three zones each controlled by one of the militias" (UNHCR 2000).

"The termination year should be when Denis Sassou-Nguesso sizes power (October 1997): although violence continued, this is a new regime and should be coded as a new civil war" (Sambanis 2004 RN).

Congo 1998.
Once again, political order broke down in Congo between factions (Amnesty International 2000). "Insecurity linked to armed groups allied to Congo's key political figures has continued sporadically since the end of the 1997 war. Without a resolution to the militia phenomenon, […] (OCHA 1999). The dynamics are similar to the previous two conflicts. Therefore, I code a third instance of state disintegration in Congo in 1998.

Overall, based on the evidence listed below, it seems that inter-war period were interruptions in the violent politics in Congo during the 1990s. Even though, each eruption of violence qualifies as a new civil war onset according to Sambanis (2004), one could with reason propose to code one longer instance of state disintegration between 1997 and 1999. This would be consistent with Fearon (2017).

Sources:

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Costa Rica (I thank Raquel Chanto Viquez for her advice on this case)

The short conflict in Costa Rica started in 1948 following the annulment of the March Presidential election by the Constitutional Congress which led to the outbreak of armed conflict between the government and opposition. Lehoucq (1991: 53) describes the onset of the Costa Rican civil war as the "breakdown of electoral institutions."

Sambanis (2004 RN) notes that the Costa Rica civil war was a coup that developed into a civil war. The NYT (1990) also describes a coup carried out by the army in alliance with Communist-led guerrillas. However, the first movers appear to be the forces led by José Figueres Ferrer, who was planning to overthrow the government (Olander 1996). Instead, Díaz Arias (2020) describes that the civil war started on 12 March 1948 when a group of rebels (Figueristas) led by José Figueres Ferrer began what they called a "War of National Liberation." At onset, fighting opposed the revolutionaries and the pro-government troops.

On the rebel side: "Jose Figueres played a central role. He was a small-scale plantation owner and industrialist and a self-styled social democrat since the early 1940's. He had close political contacts with similar movements in other Latin American countries. With the help of a small group of exiles from Nicaragua, Honduras and the Dominican Republic, he trained and equipped a National Liberation Army of 600 men" (Høivik and Aas 1981: 336).

On the government side: "The government forces consisted of a small regular army of maybe 1000 men, who were reinforced by 500 soldiers from Somoza-governed Nicaragua. Vanguardia Popular offered a volunteer force of 3000 members, but these were never given weapons by the government" (Høivik and Aas 1981: 336).

The conflict started in the periphery of the state and "by a series of surprise operations, the National Liberation Army was able to capture several important towns and to encircle the capital of San José" (Høivik and Aas 1981: 336). The NLA started in the mountainous region in the Central Valley (Talamanca Range) in Costa Rica, around La Lucha (Bell 1971). See Bell (1971, from page 135) for a detailed description of the events. I code a case of peripheral challenge.

Sources:
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Croatia

Conflict in Croatia in 1992 began in Croatia at the time of independence in spring 1992. As Croatian Serbs opposed the secession of Croatia and declared the Serbian Republic of Krajina. The militias, supported by Yugoslavia and Serbian irregulars fought the government of Croatia until 1995 (UCDP 2021). I code a case of state disintegration as evidence suggest that the government never was in control of the entire territory around the time of independence and the national army was the aggregation of the Croatian militias that had fought in 1991.

A prior conflict is coded in Yugoslavia between May and December 1991 in the territory that is Croatia. Fighting broke out between various militias and irregulars on all sides. The JNA (Yugolsav army served Serbian interests as opposed to those of the Yugoslavian state) (UCDP 2021). Therefore, I code a case of state disintegration in Yugoslavia in 1991. The conflict ended with the independence of Croatia, although fighting continued between the newly independent Croatian state and various Serbian militias.

Note that it would be possible here to code one single instance of state disintegration in Yugoslavia/Croatia between 1991 and 1995.

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Cuba

"In December 1956, Castro and his 80 troops re-entered Cuba. From 1956 onwards, Castro started rebuilding his guerillas forces and recruiting among the peasants. He had financial support from Cuban exiles in the US. In May 1958, Batista launched a massive offensive against Castro, using 13,000 troops" (Sambanis 2004 RN). In 1958, the guerrilla was active in the Sierra Maestra mountains (UCDP 2021). I code a case of peripheral challenge.

Cyprus

I code 2 onsets in Cyprus between 1944 and 2020: 1963 and 1974.

Cyprus 1963.
Tensions escalated between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots soon after independence in 1960 and by 1963, the state was paralyzed. In 1963, war broke out and the TC began to

withdraw from ethnically mixed regions and formed self-administered militarized enclaves (Doyle and Sambanis 2006). Both the government and army were malfunctioning between 1960 and 1963 as ethnic parties could not agree to power-sharing agreements (Kayaoglu 2008). Fighting eventually broke out between ethnic factions across the country. I code a case of state disintegration.

Cyprus 1974.
Conflict started again in 1974 following the Greek military coup led by a detachment of the National Guard against the GC government. The coup was followed by Turkish invasion (Doyle and Sambanis 2006; NYT 2016; Kayaoglu 2008; Kliot and Mansfield 1997).

Sources:

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Dem. Rep. of Congo

I code 7 onsets in the Democratic Republic of Congo between 1944 and 2020: 1960; 1967; 1977; 1996; 1998; 2012; and 2016.

DR Congo 1960.
In the early 1960s, the newly independent DRC was immediately challenged by a series uprising in the eastern regions (Katanga, South Kasai, etc.) (Sambanis 2004 RN; UCDP 2021). One week after independence, the army mutinied, demanding faster Africanization of the armed forces and better payment, and within weeks, rich provinces declared their secession: Shaba (11 July, under Tshombé), South Kasai (8 August, under Kalonji) and Kivu (under Kashamura) (Hesselbein 2007). While eastern regions led by provincial governments proclaimed independence, the central government split into different factions: one led by Prime Minister Lumumba, a second by President Kasavubu and a third by army chief of staff Mobutu (UCDP 2021). In September, the government was overthrown by the army Chief-of-Staff, Mobutu (Hesselbein 2007).

As Hesselbein (2007: 22) notes, "the Congolese state as a territorial unit and as a common project was highly contested by different parties. There was no central government authority whatsoever. However, there was also no clear-cut contesting authority in each of the various provinces, "autonomous" or not. Governments were overthrown or contested the moment they tried to establish themselves; at times there were four competing governments trying to claim authority over Congo." Van Reybrouck describes the period from 1960 to 1965 as 'la lutte pour le trône' (the fight for the throne) which describe a situation of multiparty fighting with no clear center of authority or government. Van Reybrouck (2012: 363) describes "À présent, on appelle la période entre 1960 et 1965 la Première République, mais à l'époque elle évoquait

plutôt le Jugement dernier. Le pays se décomposa, fût confronté à la guerre civile, à des pogroms ethniques, deux coups d'État, trois rébellions et six chefs de gouvernement (Lumumba, Ileo, Bomboko, Adoula, Tshombe et Kimba), dont certainement deux et peut-être même trois furent assassinés." The conflict ended in November 1965 with the coup by Mobutu.

Based on these accounts, I code a case of state disintegration onset in 1960.

DR Congo 1967.
Conflict started in 1967 as mercenaries in Katanga loyal to Tshombe mutinied against the army. A previous mutiny in support of Tshombe had taken place in 1966 in Kisangani. Around 100 mutineers started by attacking ANC soldiers and their families. The rebellious troops opposed their integration in the ANC (Hesselbein 2007). Given that the revolt was mostly mercenary-led and restricted to the Katanga region, I code a case of peripheral challenge.

DR Congo 1977.
Conflict in Katanga flared up again in 1977 and 1978, known as the Shaba wars. The FLNC (Front de libération nationale congolais) was the main rebel group and was formed by former Katangan gendarmes that had received sanctuary in Angola after the military Defeat of the State of Katanga. These gendarmes had been a part of the Angolan rebel group MPLA (UCDP 2021). Given the identity of first movers and the location of the challenge, I code a case of peripheral challenge.

DR Congo 1996.
The first Congo War. Fighting broke out in October 1996 following the formation of the AFDL (Alliance des forces démocratiques pour la libération du Congo), which consisted in the alliance of four rebel groups: ADP, CNRD, MRLZ, and PRP (this last group was led by Kabila). These groups had been waging low intensity conflict prior to the onset of the 1996 civil war. Conflict started along the border with Rwanda and Uganda, in eastern DR Congo. I code a case of peripheral challenge.

DR Congo 1998.
The second Congo War. On 2 August 1998, with the help of Rwanda and Uganda, an anti-Kabila revolt broke out. The anti-Kabila rebellion was soon opposed by many ethnic groups in Kivu (Ndikumana and Emizet 2005). The conflict started in Eastern DRC. I code an instance of peripheral challenge.

DR Congo 2012.
"In spring 2012 a group consisting of Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo defectors in North and South Kivu mutinied and created a new rebellion group called M23 (Movement du 23 Mars)" (Alida 2014). "The M23 mainly consists of former members of CNDP, which were reintegrated into the Congolese army in 2009 as part of the peace agreement between the CNDP and the Congolese government. Indeed, some analysts argue that the M23 is made up of Tutsi fighters from the CNDP, integrated into the FARDC under the framework of the peace agreement signed with Kinshasa on March 23, 2009. Others have argued that many of the "mutineers are Hutu," and the M23 itself claims to comprise different ethnic groups existing in the Congo" (Alida 2014). "Despite the presence of thousands of UN peacekeepers, the fighting between the government forces and the M23 culminated in the M23 capturing Goma in November 2012" (Alida 2014). "After three years of relative calm, in April 2012, a group of FARDC Rwandophone soldiers deserted from the FARDC army and created the M23 movement with a branch of the army called "Armée Révolutionnaire Congolaise," ARC for

short. Members of the ARC claim that they were mistreated and not paid while serving in the FARDC" (Alida 2014: 77).

"On 4 May the main leader of M23 Colonel Sultani Makenga defected and went to Rwanda. On 6 May M23 was formed as a group and released a statement that their goal was to revive the stalled 23 March 2009 agreement. In July M23 formed a political wing and 2 July 2012 the group widened its goal in a new statement "we are upset by the Congolese governments fraudulent election and failure to improve the living conditions of the Congolese people; we want to chase the government in Kinshasa from power. We are calling for a revolution." During this period the group has managed to take control over large parts of the Rutshuru Territory in the North Kivu Province. In November 2012 the conflict escalated even further as fighting came closer to the Provincial Capital Goma" (UCDP 2022).

"The soldiers who took part in a mutiny from the Congolese army between late March and May and formed the M23 group were previously members of the National Congress for the Defense of the People (CNDP), a former Rwanda-backed rebel group that integrated into the Congolese army in January 2009" (HRW 2012). See Jason Stearns (2012) for a detailed description of the group.

Given that the military personnel defected and went into neighboring Rwanda to form and organize an insurgent group and that fighting mostly occurred in North Kivu, I code a case of peripheral challenge.

DR Congo 2016.
"The Kamuina Nsapu insurgency arose last year [2016] as a locally rooted conflict in the Kasai-Central province of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), but has since gained intensity and is spreading to neighbouring provinces" (Hoebeke 2017). "The Kasai region, which was split from two into five provinces in 2015 in a policy known as découpage, is one of the DRC's poorest, and usually far off the radar of politicians and diplomats in the distant capital, Kinshasa. Since April 2016, it has experienced an increasingly violent insurgency by the Kamuina Nsapu militia, named after the title of a hereditary chief in Kasai-Central province. Fighting has rapidly spread from Kasai-Central to neighbouring Kasai, Kasai-Oriental and Lomami provinces" (Hoebeke 2017).

"The Kasaï conflict started as a local dispute over the nomination of a customary chief of Bashila Kasanga groupement in Dibaya territory, Kasaï Central province, also known as the Kamuina Nsapu. The conflict was between chief Jean-Prince Pandi, designated as chief Kamuina Nsapu by the ruling family, and the provincial and national governments, who imposed a different candidate. Incensed by his treatment by the provincial government and the security forces, JP Pandi started to give anti-government speeches and initiated local youth and mobilized them against the state. After attempts at negotiations failed, JP Pandi's fighters attacked local government officials and the village of his rival chief. After he ignored an ultimatum to give in, JP Pandi was killed by government security forces on August 12, 2016 and his body taken to Kananga. The heavy-handed military response motivated other Dibaya customary chiefs to organize further militias in the name of Kamuina Nsapu to pursue Pandi's anti-government agenda and to liberate the deceased's body. Kamuina Nsapu units then attacked the provincial capital Kananga on September 22, 2016, briefly occupying the airport, after which they were repulsed by the Congolese military (Forces Armées de la RDC – FARDC) and chased into different directions" (Mercy Corps 2020). I code an instance of peripheral challenge.

Sources:

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Djibouti

Kadamy (1996: 516) provides a clear description of the onset of the Djiboutian civil war: "The regime raised the political tension in January 1991, by accusing the Afars of plotting against the state, and imprisoned prominent personalities, cadres and members of the FDLD. Repression furnished hundreds of people with added reasons for joining the guerrilla groups forming in the north and southwest of the country. From June 1991 onwards, more and more young people from Arhiba, Tadjourah, Dikhil, Yoboki and Obock joined the guerrilla army. The unity of the movement was forged in the bush, and FRUD was created in August 1991 at Bahlo in northern Djibouti near the Ethiopian frontier. It was the product of the fusion of three political movements: the Front Populaire pour le Restauration du Loi et de l'Equalite (FRDE), the Front de la Resistance Patriotique de Djibouti (FRPD), and the Action pour la Revision de l'Ordre a Djibouti (AROD)." I code a case of peripheral challenge onset.

Sources:

- Kadamy, Mohamed. 1996. "Djibouti: Between War and Peace." *Review of African Political Economy* 23(70): 511-521.

Dominican Republic

There is little ambiguity about the onset of the civil war in the Dominican Republic. Sambanis (2004) codes a coup in 1965, so do Powell and Thyne (2011). The review of numerous studies by Ferguson (1973) also describes the onset as a coup.

Sources:

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Egypt

I code 2 onsets in Egypt between 1944 and 2020: 1994 and 2013.

Egypt 1994.
The 1994 conflict opposed the Egyptian government and Islamist militants. The militant organization was founded as early as the mid-1970s by Islamic students. Twenty years later the conflict evolved into a civil war as the group committed a number of attacks against the government forces (police) (UCDP 2021). Initial clashes in 1994 were reported to take place in southern Egypt (Amnesty International 1994). I code a case of peripheral challenge.

Egypt 2013.
Following the ousting of Mohamed Morsi in July 2013, conflict between the government and Islamist insurgents picked up again. "The state crackdown on the Muslim Brotherhood, Egypt's largest Islamist group, in addition to divisions within the organization have weakened the Brotherhood leadership and have paved the way for its loss of control over a growing number of members. Various Salafists, ultraconservative Islamists, have rallied around the Brotherhood, framing the struggle with the regime as one between a secular state and Islam. Two increasingly distinct Brotherhood factions have emerged. One embraces confrontational tactics and violence while the other emphasizes nonviolence. Brotherhood and Salafi radicals justify political violence as a legitimate tool of protest and encourage youth to adopt violence under the guise of self-defense, religiously justified retribution, and defending Islam" (Awad and Hashem 2015: 1). In November 2014, Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis, active in the Sinai region, pledged alliance to the Islamic state and benefited from the security situation to secure their presence in the region (UCDP 2021). I code a case of peripheral challenge in 2014.

Sources:

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El Salvador

The conflict in El Salvador started in 1979 when five separate leftist groups turned to armed challenge against the state: ERP, FAL, FARN, FPL, and PRTC. In 1980, these five separate left-wing groups seeking to overthrow the state merged to form an umbrella guerilla organization, the FMLN (Cohen 2016). "While peaceful calls for reform from both peasant and urban unions were prominent in the 1960s and 1970s, government forces responded with extraordinary repression. As reformers disappeared, the revolutionary armed groups that would unite to form the FMLN coalesced and gained strength, drawing particularly from church-based peasant organizing (Wood 2003)" (Hoover Green 2017: 693). Insurgent strongholds were in the northern and eastern highlands in El Salvador (Wickham-Crowley 2015). Based on these studies, I code a case of peripheral challenge.

Sources:

- Wood, Elisabeth J. 2003. *Insurgent Collective Action and Civil War in El Salvador*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Cohen, Dara K. 2016. *Rape during Civil War*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Hoover Green, Amelia. 2017. "Armed Group Institutions and Combatant Socialization: Evidence from El Salvador." *Journal of Peace Research* 54(5): 687-700.
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- Wickham-Crowley, Timothy. "Del Gobierno de Abajo al Gobierno de Arriba… and back: Transitions to and from Rebel Governance in Latin America, 1956-1990." in Arjona, Ana, Nelson Kasfir and Zachariah Mampilly (eds.) *Rebel Governance in Civil War*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Ethiopia

I code 6 onsets in Ethiopia between 1944 and 2020: 1974; 1976; 1978; 1998; 1999; and 2020.

Ethiopia 1974.

The 1974 opposed the Ethiopian government and Eritrean militants. "The Eritrean rebellion began at a low intensity Muslim rebellion in September 1961, one year before the formal annexation of Eritrea by Ethiopia (Erlich 1983)" (in Sambanis 2004 RN). In 1973, following internal disagreements, the EPLF split in 1973 from the ELF, which had been founded in 1961 by Eritrean intellectuals and students exiled in Cairo, Egypt (Spears 2010: 48). "During the 1960s and early 1970s, the ELF struggled with internal bickering, insufficient resources, and a narrow political base made narrower by the perception that it was advancing the interests if Arab states (Spears 2010: 48). As the conflict between rebels and the government was vastly circumscribed to the Eritrean territory, I code a case of peripheral challenge.

Following Sambanis (2004), the war ended when the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) seized the capital in 1991 and the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF) took control of the province of Eritrea.

Ethiopia 1976.
This event refers to the rebellion staged by the Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF) for control of the southern Ethiopian province of Ogaden, which both the WSLF and Somalia wanted Somalia to annex (Sambanis 2004 RN). The conflict was located in the Ogaden region in eastern Ethiopia, along the border with Somali. "Despite the victory of Ethiopia over Somalia, the government continued to sponsor the Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF), the leading liberation movement at the time of the Ethiopia-Somalia war. Nonetheless, WSLF was affected by the withdrawal of Somalia government support when both military governments in Somalia and Ethiopia signed a peace agreement to end the hostilities in Djibouti in 1988. However, the WSLF was also challenged internally by a 'front within a front' led by young Ogaden intellectuals, who believed that Ogaden destiny had to be decided by what they call 'Ogaadeenia', rather than the Somali government and their client organization WSLF. This conviction of Ogaadeenism led to the birth of ONLF in the Gulf States in March 1984. Nevertheless, the ONLF was inactive in the region until the military regime in Ethiopia was overthrown by the Tigrai People's Liberation Front (TPLF) in 1991" (Abdullahi 2007: 556).

Ethiopia 1978.
In the first half of the 1970s, several rebel groups emerged to oppose the Derg regime, especially in northern Ethiopia. "The TPLF began its armed struggle in February 1975, though prior to this there had been underground cultural and political agitation groups set up in the major towns of Ethiopia, including Addis Ababa. These were organized through the 1960s and 1970s under the umbrella organization, the Tigray National Organization (TNO). It comprised mostly intellectuals discriminated against by the increasing Amhara domination of civil and public posts; and indeed the TPLF still retains a network of informants working in underground cell structures in the major towns. In 1975 a small group moved 'to the hills' and declared armed struggle against the central regime" (Bennett 1983: 96). The EPRP (Ethiopian People Revolutionary Party) was a Marxist movement founded in 1972 and launched a conflict against the regime as the latter rejected demands for civilian rule (UCDP 2021). Other groups which joined the coalition against the Derg regime include the OPDO (Oromo Peoples Democratic Organization) and EDORM (Ethiopian Democratic Officers Revolutionary Movement). Given the location and first movers in the rebel groups that opposed the Derg regime staring in the mid-1970s, I code a case of peripheral challenge.

Ethiopia 1998.
After delicate relationship between the Ethiopian government and Ogaden nationalists, hardliners were banned from conventional politics and "regrouped and appointed Admiral Mohamed Omar Osman, a retired Somalia marine, as their Chairman in 1998. Their stated aim is to liberate the Ogaden people from Ethiopia by creating an independent state called 'Ogaadeenia'" (Abdullahi 2007: 557). They attempted to mobilize locally along Ogaden populations. However, "while the organization claimed to represent the entire Somali people in the region, other non-Ogaadeen clans, including the Jidwaaq, Iise, Garre and 'minority' clans and groups, withheld their support since they perceived ONLF as an exclusively Ogaadeeni political body" and as a result, "OLNF forces are predominantly fighting in areas that are inhabited by the Ogaadeen clan, such as Dhagahbour, Fiiq, Godey, Qorahay and Wardheer zones. Their strategy is based on carrying out hit-and-run attacks against the government army, which controls the main towns in these areas, while the ONLF is in charge of the 'bush'" (Abdullahi 2007: 557-58). Based on this account of the onset of the second Ogaden conflict in 1998, I code a case of peripheral challenge.

Ethiopia 1999.
Conflict in Oromo region. Similarly to other parts of Ethiopia, the conflict opposed the central government to insurgents for the self-determination of the ethnic Oromo. The main group is the OLF (Oromo Liberation Front). Given those similarities in the group formation, claim, support by neighboring countries, and tactics to oppose the government, I code a case of peripheral challenge.

Ethiopia 2020.
In the context of increasing tensions between the federal government and the Tigray region, "on the night of Nov. 3-4, [2020] TPLF forces attacked a federal military base in Tigray and attempted to steal its weapons. The TPLF has said it had struck preemptively because federal forces were preparing to assault Tigray. Hours later, Mr. Abiy ordered the military offensive into Tigray" (NYT 2020a). About the leader of the TPLF: "Ethiopian officials say their immediate goal is to topple the rebellious Tigray authorities and capture their 12-person executive committee: a group of politicians, ideologues and security officials, many veterans of Tigray's last war in the 1980s" (NYT 2020b). I code a case of peripheral challenge.

Sources:

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Gambia

Conflict started in 1981 between the government and the NRC rebels. Following a coup, violence was sustained during early August. Plotters took power and fought against the Senegalese troops which supported the deposed government. Estimates report between 400 and 500 deaths (Saine 1996). Other estimates report up to 1,000 deaths in the fighting that took place following the coup (Wiseman 1981). Powell and Thyne (2011) code a coup in Gambia in 1981.

Sources:

- Saine, Abdoulaye S.M. 1996. "The Coup d'Etat in the Gambia: The End of the First Republic." *Armed forces and society* 23(1): 97-111.

- Dash, Leon. 1981. “Senegalese Troops in Gambia Find Welcome Wearing Thin.” Washington Post [online] https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1981/08/13/senegalese-troops-in-gambia-find-welcome-wearing-thin/3e2c1b26-b285-4531-bb7b-c5143f5509fd/
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- Sallah, Tijan M. 1990. “Economics and Politics in the Gambia.” *Journal of Modern African Studies* 28(4): 621-648.

Georgia (I thank Anastasia Shesterinina for her advice on this case).

I code 3 onsets in Georgia between 1944 and 2020: 1991; 1992; and 2008.

Georgia 1991.
Both conflicts in Georgia followed the collapse of the Soviet Union which triggered waves of ethnic nationalism (German and Bloch 2006). “Both regions have been out of Tbilisi’s control for thirty years and run by de facto authorities that are heavily influenced by Russia” (Chankvetadze and Murusidze 2021). The causes of these conflicts are various: “Russian influence, the chaos caused by the gradual breakup of the Soviet Union, and the ethnonationalist aspirations of political leaders in Georgian, Abkhazian, and South Ossetian societies all contributed to their outbreak” (Chankvetadze and Murusidze 2021: 2).

In the case of South Ossetia (northern Georgia), following two years of legalistic struggle between Georgia’s central authorities and the South Ossetian leadership (1989-1991), armed conflict broke out in 1991. “On 6 January 1991, troops of the Soviet Interior Ministry left Tskhinvali for their barracks and six-thousand Georgian militants invaded the city causing destruction and killing civilians” (Markedonov 2015: 112). Sammut and Cvetkovski (1996) note that the South Ossetia war was “one of several conflicts that plagued the territory of the former Soviet Union after its collapse.”

“Calls for independence, the legal proclamation of Georgian as the only official language in August 1989, and Georgia referendum on independence and the subsequent election of nationalist leader Zviad Gamsakhurdia in May 1991 provide the background against which these tensions escalated into full-scale violent conflict: Abkhaz and South Ossetians wanted to preserve, and remain within, the Soviet Union considering their survival as ethno-cultural communities distinct from the Georgian majority to be in acute danger in an independent Georgian state (Cohen 2002, Coppieters 1999, Wennmann 2006). […] Tensions grew in the last years of the Soviet Union and escalated initially into full-scale conflict between November 1989 and January 1990. Prompted by the “March on Tskhinvali”, the South Ossetian capital, of between 20,000 and 30,000 Georgian nationalists in August, supposedly to protect the city’s Georgian population, the violence which ensued led to the death of six people and the injury of an additional 140 (Cornell 2001: 101). Subsequently, South Ossetians not only boycotted the political process in Georgia, including the September 1990 elections, but also declared their region’s independence, while Georgians effectively abolished South Ossetia’s autonomy with

the proclamation of Georgia as an independent, unitary state with no internal borders" (Wolff 2022).

"The civil wars in the Caucasus must be analyzed against the backdrop of the institutional legacy of the Soviet System, in particular Soviet ethnofederalism, which was critical in fueling movements for self-determination during a period of regime change in the Soviet Union. […] Georgia descended into a short-lived civil war immediately after independence. The state nearly collapsed in 1992, […]. The conflict arose out of the contest among nationalist parties fighting for power in Georgia" (Zürcher, Baev and Koehler 2005).

Based on these accounts, I code a case of state disintegration in 1991 in Georgia.

Georgia 1992.
Evidence points to similar dynamics of onset following the break-down of the Soviet Union in Abkhazia (western Georgia). Following ethnic tensions since 1989, the conflict started as Georgian armed forces entered Abkhazia territory in the summer of 1992 (Shesterinina 2021).

"Following Georgia's declaration of independence in 1991, and the simultaneous abolition of Abkhazia's autonomy, the Abkhaz immediately reinstated their 1925 constitution, defining it as an independent state united with Georgia on the basis of special union treaty and proceeded to declare their desire to leave Georgia and remain part of the Soviet Union/Russian Federation. This quickly escalated into open violence with Georgian forces taking over the Gali region in August 1992 and cutting Abkhazia off from Russia" (Wolff 2022).

Given the similarities in the dynamics that unfolded in Abkhazia, I also code an instance of state disintegration in 1992.

Georgia 2008.
The ceasefire was interrupted in August 2008 as the new Georgian president Mikheil Saakashvili made an attempt to regain control over the region. Conflict broke out when the Georgian army that had attacked Tskhinvali was repelled by South Ossetian and Russian troops. In 2008, "The escalation of violence [in South Ossetia] led to a Georgian massive armed assault on Tskhinvali and a very tough response by Russia which apparently was unexpected by both Tbilisi and by the West. The long-simmering conflict between Georgia and South Ossetia thus escalated into a five-day war in August and became the third armed confrontation between Georgia and South Ossetia since the early 1990s" (Markedonov 2015: 116). I code an instance of peripheral challenge.

Sources:

- Markedonov, Sergey. 2015 "The South Ossetia Conflict." in Bebler, Anton (ed.) *Frozen Conflict in Europe*. Opladen: Verlag Barbara Budrich.
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Greece (I thank Stathis Kalyvas for his advice on this case)

The first phase of the Greek civil war included conflicts between the several resistance organizations, including EAM (National Liberation Front), created and led by the Communist party (KKE) in September 1941, and its army the ELAS (the National Popular Liberation Army) versus various nationalist resistance organizations, such as the EDES (National Democratic Greek League), EKKA (National and Social Liberation). But also EAM/ELAS versus various collaborationist militias. And lastly, between EAM/ELAS and the British-backed government (Kalyvas 2006: 248). Following the German withdrawal in September/November 1944, the KKE attacked the British-backed "National Unity" government, which resulted in a muscular British intervention and a subsequent communist defeat. During 1945-1946, leftist supporters were persecuted by right-wing militias with more or less tacit support of the gendarmerie and local states authorities. From February 1946, the KKE stepped up its guerrilla activities, launching various attacks against gendarmerie outposts in the countryside (Kalyvas 2015). The KKE was "rooted in a nationwide network of highly motivated cadres with considerable experience in clandestine political activity […] allowing it to establish itself as the prominent political and military force, first in the mountains of central Greece and soon after it in the entire Greek territory" (Kalyvas 2015: 123).

The Greek civil war unfolded in two phases. In 1944, conflict broke out between armed factions following the end of the German occupation. These groups included communist and nationalist armed organizations. After the communist groups regrouped, they launched a new offensive in 1946 in the classic form of guerrilla war. As the Greek civil war is a single conflict, I only consider the 1944 onset and therefore code a case of state disintegration.

Sources:

- Kalyvas, Stathis N. 2006. *The Logic of Violence in Civil War*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Kalyvas, Stathis N. 2015. "Rebel Governance during the Greek Civil War, 1942-1949." in Arjona, Ana, Nelson Kasfir and Zachariah Mampilly (eds.) *Rebel Governance in Civil War*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Guatemala (I thank Regina Bateson for her help with this case)

I code 2 onsets in Guatemala between 1944 and 2020: 1966 and 1978.

Guatemala 1966.

The Revolutionary Armed Forces (FAR) was formed in early 1960s by unifying various rebel groups hoping to repeat Fidel Castro's success in Cuba, although fighting was at low intensity

and violence mostly took the form of abductions and selective killings (Booth 1980). The election of César Méndez Montenegro into power, while it was supported by the PGT (Guatemalan Party of Labour) and other opposition parties, as well as the military, marked the beginning of the civil war, because the military forced him to sign an agreement to allow the military to fight guerrillas without interference from the government or justice system (Sambanis 2004 RN). In turn, this led to the formation of various right-wing militias, who commenced terror against targets vaguely associated with the left (Booth 1980). In response, rebels "began in 1966 to target not only their military opponents, but also those in the civilian population that were against them as well as the US and other foreign advisors who were aiding the counter insurgency effort (Ball et al Chapter 2)" (in Sambanis 2004).

Beginning in 1966, the army began to bomb guerrilla operations in eastern areas of Zacapa and Izabal, areas which were primarily Ladino (Sambanis 2004 RN). Throughout the conflict, "concentration of military activity from 1962-1970 based in eastern part of country, Guatemala City, and the south coast, the targeted victims being peasants, members of rural union organizations, university and schoolteachers and students, and finally guerrilla supporters" (Sambanis 2004 RN). The FAR "grew with the support of poor, mainly non-indigenous (ladino) peasants in the east of the country" (WRITENET 1995)

"The most important state-actor was undoubtedly the army. During the civil war, it further reinforced its traditionally-strong political powers and began to strengthen its control over the state and society, which in the first half of 1980s became virtually absolute (Commission for Historical Clarification: 36th column). Its policy towards the civil sector was one of drastic militarisa tion, with serious antidemocratic effects: "Militarisation was one of the factors that provided the incentive for and fed the armed confrontation as it pro foundly limited the possibilities for exercising rights as citizens" (Ibid: 37)" (Eckhardt 2006: 31). In addition, "Very often, the state delegated the responsibility for its military actions to loyal civilians (Ibid: 80). This is not only true for the unofficial death-squads (Ibid: 90), but for private individuals as well. Usually, these were large landowners, whose violent actions against civilians were in accordance with the anti-trade union policy of the state institutions, as well as with their own economic interests. There was "close co-operation between powerful business people and securi ty forces" (Ibid: 144-146)" (Eckhardt 2006: 32).

During a discussion, Regina Bateson pointed to the officer revolt of 1960 as a potential start event of the Guatemalan civil war. My understanding of the events leading to the onset of the civil war is as follows: On 13 November 1960, a group of junior military officers of the national military academy led a revolt against the government of General Ydigoras Fuentes, which ultimately failed. The rebellious junior officers then fled to the mountainous region of Eastern Guatemala and Honduras, where they established contact with Cuba's Castro.

"The experience of exile radicalized several of the military insurgents, who began to consider the possibility of a new uprising where civilians would be given greater participation. Four months later, on March 6, 1961, twenty-three of the insurgents returned to the country to continue their fight against the Government of Ydígoras Fuentes. At course of 1961 the insurgents managed to establish important contacts with leaders of the PR, the MLN, the DC and finally with the PGT" (CHC 1999: 124).

By 1962, these exiled junior officers established the insurgent group MR-13. That year, they attacked offices of the United Fruit Company, an American corporation, which attracted sympathizers, often university students and leftist groups. The actions of the MR-13 motivated

other guerrilla attempts (CHC 1999: 125). The coalition of guerrilla groups formed the Rebel Armed Forces (FAR) at the end of 1962. "In this context, there was also the radicalization of groups of the Guatemalan left, in which former officials of the governments of Arévalo and Arbenz, members and leaders of the political parties affected by the counterrevolution, and soldiers involved in the uprising of November 13, 1960, who took advantage of the reactivation and discomfort of the social movement, especially among sectors of the students, teachers, urban workers, peasants and some professionals. The rebellion of the left took social roots and turned into an armed uprising due to economic and social exclusion and the absence of a democratic space" (CHC 1999: 123). FAR engaged in low-intensity violence throughout the 1960s until 1966 when government repression and counterinsurgency escalated the conflict to the level of civil war.

"The coup d'état of March 30, 1963 represented the adoption of the counterinsurgency model that was consolidated during the government of Julio César Méndez Montenegro (1966-1970), through a secret pact between the high command of the Army and the new civilian government. The Constitution of 1965 was the legal framework in which the institutional restructuring that guaranteed the power of the Army took place, under the spirit of the DSN. Beginning in 1966, the military resorted increasingly to practice of terror as part of the counterinsurgency strategy and accelerated the process of professionalizing its intelligence section and its combat operations in which they began to involve civilians" (CHC 1999: 123).

Based on this account, I do not code the onset of the civil war as a coup in 1960 but instead code an instance of peripheral challenge.

Guatemala 1978.
After the period of decreasing violence, conflict broke out again in 1978, when confrontation between the government and the guerrilla deepened, and the guerrilla support base spread and expanded locations of activities (Sambanis 2004 RN). "During the 1970s, large numbers of landless Mayan peasants migrated to virgin lands in the rain forests on the borders of Mexico. Land colonization programmes were promoted by the U.S. Agency for International Development and a series of cooperatives were set up separately on land bought by U.S. Maryknoll priests. Tensions in this area grew as military landowners attempted to encroach on land belonging to the settlers. The beginnings of new guerrilla activity in these areas provided the excuse for a repression of the church cooperatives which began as selective arrests and ended in the wholesale massacre of communities. The political and military repression of peasant, union and church-linked organizations by the military government of Lucas García (1978-1982) led large numbers of their members to swell the ranks of the new armed opposition, particularly in the Mayan highlands" (WRITENET 1995). I code a second case of peripheral challenge.

Sources:

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Guinea

I code an instance of peripheral challenge in Guinea in 2000. See Appendix 1 for further details about the onset of this conflict.

Guinea-Bissau

On June 6, 1998, President Viera fired armed forces chief-of-staff Ansumane Mane, accusing him of supporting separatists in Casamance, Senegal (Parker et al. 2000). An army mutiny followed with most of the army's 6000 soldiers joining the rebels. Troops from Senegal and Guinea (Conarky) moved to protect the president (Sambanis 2004 RN). Embaló (2012) provides a similar description of the conflict onset. Fighting broke out in the capital, Bissau (Gebremichael et al. 2018; UCDP 2021). Powell and Thyne (2011) code an instance of coup in Guinea-Bissau in 1998. I do the same.

Sources:

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Haiti

"On September 29, 1991 forces loyal to Raoul Cedras launched a coup shortly after Aristide returned from a speech at the UN. Aristide was captured after his presidential guard largely deserted, but allowed to go into exile in Venezuela. There seemed to be little armed resistance within the military to the coup, with isolated Aristide supporters quickly arrested or killed. Civilians who took to the streets protesting the coup were "simply fired upon" by troops posted at strategic points around the city" (Farmer 1994: 183)" (in Sambanis 2004 RN). Following the coup, fighting broke out between the forces of Cedras and the supporters of Aristide (HRW). Powell and Thyne (2011) code an instance of coup in Haiti in 1991.

"Most of the killings took place in the "poor slums… on the outside of the capital and Cite Soleil near downtown Port-au-Prince, where Aristide is extremely popular" (HIB 185)" (in Sambanis 2004 RN). Other reports describe violence in and around the capital (RefWorld 1992).

Sources:

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India

I code 4 onsets in India between 1944 and 2020: 1984; 1989; 1989; and 1990.

India 1984.
Sikh. Although low intensity violence was ongoing, the events of 1984 mark of substantive growth in violence in the Punjab region (Pravin 1987), and violent conflict broke out in the northwestern part of India between militants of the Sikh separatist movement and the central government (Mahmood 1989). "In 1984, the fact that this identity had acquired a strongly militant cast became known to the world through the assassination of India's Prime Minister Indira Gandhi by her two Sikh bodyguards" (Mahmood 1989: 326). Same description in Gargan (1993). This repression in turn triggered repression by the government against Sikh ethnic group, which further polarized the Sikh and Hindu communities in Punjab and across North India. I code a case of peripheral challenge in India in 1984.

India 1989.
Kashmir. Ganguly (1996) describes a long process of militancy that turns to violence and conventional political processes fail. Kashmiri political parties turned to violence, supported by the local population. Following contestations to the 1987 elections which increased support for Kashmir militancy, conflict broke out in 1989, led by imprisoned MUF (Muslim United Front) members (Ali et al. 2011). The onset of insurgency was met with sustained counterinsurgency (Staniland 2013). I code a case of peripheral challenge.

India 1989.
Naxalites. The Naxalite movement began in 1968. The movement declined in political power in 1972 (NYT, 5 August 1972). Violence rose again in mid- to late-1980s (Sambanis 2004 RN). After the defeat of the first wave of Naxalite uprising in the 1960s, remnants and successors scattered and rebuilt a movement that emerged again in the 1980s (Puri 2019). "By the early 1980s insurgents had established a stronghold and sanctuary in the interlinked North Telangana village and Dandakaranya forests areas along the Adhra Pradesh and Orissa border" in eastern India (Lynch 2016: 11). "In 1985 Naxalite insurgents began ambushing police" (Lynch 2016: 11). I code an instance of peripheral challenge.

India 1990.
Northeast. The Indian government has faced several separatist insurgencies in the northeastern provinces. There is little doubt that these conflicts, which are considered together as a single

instance of sovereignty rupture (following Sambanis and Schulhofer-Wohl 2019), qualify as a peripheral challenge. See Bhaumik (2007) for a detailed overview of these conflicts.

Sources:

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Indonesia (I thank Edward Aspinall for his advice on this case)

I code 7 onsets in Indonesia between 1944 and 2020: 1950; 1953; 1956; 1975; 1976; 1990; and 1999.

Indonesia 1950.

Republic of Moluccas. There is little detailed information about the onset of this brief intrastate conflict. NYT (1950) suggests that the battalion of Indonesian troops of the Netherlands Indies Army garrisoned at Amboina joined the rebellion and that the Federal government has no soldiers in the Moluccas. It further notes that the Moluccas separatists were led by Dr. Soumokil, former Attorney General of East Indonesia and other leaders may include acting chief of the previous administration on Amboina, Manahutu, and a south Moluccas councilman, Wairisal.

Krause (2018: 99) summarizes: "Upon Indonesian independence in 1945, many Christian Malukans feared Muslim religious and Javanese cultural dominance in a unitary Indonesian state. In 1950, some of them proclaimed the Republic of Maluku Selatan (RMS, South Maluku Republic) in an effort to break away."

The garrison stationed in Ambon, supported by some civilians, rebelled against the Indonesian state. The Ambon garrison became the meeting place for discontented soldiers returning from Java (Chauvel 2008: 347-48). He also reports clashes between TNI troops and the Ambonese KNIL (Royal Netherlands Indies Army) in Ambon at the onset of the conflict.

In a discussion about this case, Edward Aspinall pointed out that this case does not correspond to the dynamics of coups. Instead, the key initiators of the Ambon revolt, which was aimed at establishing an independent Republic of the South Moluccas, were demobilized soldiers from the Dutch colonial army. In that sense, it was not a split within the Indonesian army. The Dutch were withdrawing from Indonesia, and this was fundamentally a revolt by their former soldiers in a heavily Christian part of Indonesia. Aspinall suggested that an accurate stylized description should be as follows: "In 1950, conflict broke out when local leaders proclaimed an independent state, gaining support from demobilized soldiers from the Dutch colonial army and leading to conflict with troops of the new Indonesian state." Consistent with this description, Powell and Thyne (2011) do not identify a coup in 1950. Based on these accounts, I code an instance of peripheral challenge in Indonesia in 1950.

Indonesia 1953.
Darul Islam. Through most of the 1950s, "Darul Islam conducted an effective guerrilla campaign in the province of West Java that threatened to spread to other regions of the country" (Paul et al. 2013: 118). "The Darul Islam insurgency was rooted in Indonesia's independence movement. Among the forces fighting against the Dutch in the late 1940s were powerful factions that advocated for the creation of a federal state that would allow individual provinces to adopt sharia law. While these groups maintained a common cause in seeking independence, they opposed the creation of the centralized, secular state that was ultimately established in 1949. Darul Islam, led by Kartosuwiryo, was the most prominent of the colonial-era groups that mobilized against the new government in Jakarta. Kartosuwiryo was able to maintain his militia forces in West Java and develop an increasingly powerful resistance movement in the early 1950s, at a time when the new central government struggled to achieve political stability and administrative control over a highly fractured country. Although the group often relied on intimidation and brutal tactics against the population, it was able to maintain a powerful stronghold in the region. Importantly, Darul Islam received no outside support. It was able to raise funding from its followers in the hinterlands and by looting communities that its members perceived as enemies of their cause. Militarily, the Darul Islam movement maintained a strategic advantage by operating from bases in the mountainous areas of the province, from which they could raid low-lying villages and roads in the surrounding valleys. The Indonesian army attempted to provide protection to the population but could not adequately guard against night raids or muster enough troop strength to secure every area" (Paul et al. 2013: 119). See Matesan (2020) and Fogg (2019) for further descriptions, these accounts correspond to peripheral challenge.

Note that the Darul Islam rebellion has been active in different parts of Indonesia at different times during the 1950s and early 1960s, including West Java, South Kalimantan, Aceh, and South Sulawesi (Van Dijk 1981). For this reason, it is difficult to pinpoint one single process of onset, as well as a precise termination to the conflict. Nevertheless, all these rebellions had in common that they aim at establishing an Islamic State of Indonesia, hence should be considered together as a single instance of sovereignty rupture. (See Appendix 1 for details about the chosen start and end dates of the Darul Islam rebellion). For the purpose of this coding however, there is little doubt that Darul Islam illustrates a case of peripheral challenge as all indicators (first movers, army, location) indicate: (1) first movers were radicalized militants

and intellectuals, (2) the Indonesian army remained mostly cohesive and loyal to the government, and (3) the insurgency was rural in the periphery of the state. Based on this account, I code an instance of peripheral challenge in 1953.

Indonesia 1956.
Darul Islam. PRRI. Permesta. Several Islamist guerrilla groups waged conflicts against the Indonesian state in several region including West Java, Central Java and others. The PRRI rebels operated primarily out of North Sulawesi and West Sumatra from 1958-1961. These groups were local: they recruited locally and fought in specific localities. See Van Dijk (1981) for further details. Aspinall pointed out during an exchange, that while all the other peripheral insurgencies in Indonesia were initiated by radicalized militants, in this case first movers are best described as disaffected local military and civilian leaders, which also correspond to a category of first movers in peripheral challenges. Therefore, I code an instance of peripheral challenge.

Indonesia 1975.
East Timor. Membership of the CNRT began with the small community of urban elite who had received education from the Portuguese. When this widened into the FRETILIN national liberation movement, substantial support was gained from the East Timorese population. This resulted from the mobilization of Revolutionary Brigades in April 1975, which consisted of then-FRETILIN leaders and students from urban areas moving to rural villages to start the armed struggle (UCDP 2021).

"The conflict in East Timor began soon after Portugal ended its colonial rule and departed from the region, leaving a Marxist-leaning group, the Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor (FRETILIN), as the strongest party in the Timorese independence movement" (Paul et al. 2013). Conflict in East Timor was "precipitated by a military coup in Portugal in 1974 that led the former colonial power to launch a rapid withdrawal from its former colonies. Upon Portugal's withdrawal, a civil war broke out between competing political groups in the region. The Marxist-oriented FRETILIN asserted itself as the most powerful of the political parties and took the lead in declaring an independent state of East Timor" (Paul et al. 2013).

In sum, conflict in East Timor in 1975 was triggered by a rapid withdrawal of Portugal from its colony, which in turn led to fighting between local political groups to seize political control of the island of Timor-Leste. Based on this account of the onset of conflict in East Timor, I code an instance of state disintegration.

Indonesia 1976.
West Papua. Since integration into Indonesia in 1969, Papua has seen a low-intensity but sustained separatist insurrection by the armed wing of the Free Papua Organization (TPN-OPM). UCDP (2021) describes a small but persistent guerrilla group active in West Papua. I code a case of peripheral challenge.

Indonesia 1990.
Aceh I. From early 1989 to early 1990, GAM (Free Aceh Movement) attacked only Indonesian police and army units, killing about two dozen officers in the western end of Indonesia. In mid-1990, it began targeting civil authorities, commercial property, suspected government informers, and non-Acehnese settlers in the Lhokseumawe area (Ross 2005: 43-44). Until mid-1990, the government responded to the attacks on its forces in a relatively low-key manner. But in June 1990, President Suharto ordered 6,000 additional troops to Aceh, including special

counter-insurgency units. "The government's response was successful in the short term. By the end of 1991, many of GAM's field commanders had been captured or killed. But the government's brutality produced a deep-seated antipathy toward Jakarta" (Ross 2005: 44). The main rebel organization (GAM) was active in the 1970s and built up its base of support in the second half of the 1980s. It recruited more than 200 members in 1986- 87 and received Libyan support in 1988-89 (Ross 2002: 24).

"The GAM evolved in opposition to the Indonesian government's centralization policies and its exploitation of Aceh's natural gas resources. Led by a charismatic business leader, Hasan Muhammad di Tiro, the GAM called for Aceh's independence from the "imperialist Javanese" government in Jakarta" (Paul et al. 2013: 404). "During much of the 1980s, the GAM appeared to be largely dormant, with its activities limited to occasional ambushes and anticolonial rhetoric directed against the Indonesian government. The movement was, in fact, reorganizing and receiving training from Libya during this time. From bases outside the country, di Toro and his advisers planned to remobilize their insurgency to take advantage of growing public distrust of Indonesian corruption and the exploitation of the province's resources. Active engagement between the GAM and Indonesian forces resumed in 1989, when between 150 and 800 Libyan-trained fighters returned to Aceh. Benefiting from better training and organization, the GAM was more aggressive than it had been in 1979. The group launched a series of attacks on soldiers and non-Acehnese migrants" (Paul et al. 2013: 405-06). I code an instance of peripheral challenge.

Indonesia 1999.
Aceh II. In early 1999, "GAM reappeared and began to grow more quickly than it ever had before. By July 1999, it reportedly had more than 800 men under arms, equipped with assault rifles and grenades launchers. By mid 2001, GAM had 2,000 – 3,000 regular fighters, and an additional 13,000 – 24,000 militia members; it was reportedly in control of 80 percent of Aceh's villages" (Ross 2005: 47). I code an instance of peripheral challenge.

Source:

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Iran

I code 2 onsets in Iran between 1944 and 2020: 1978 and 1979.

Iran 1978.
Rasler (1996) notes that the Shah's regime army and internal security apparatus were intact, there was no defeat in war and no peasant insurrections during the Iranian revolution. She attributes to onset of violent conflict to “the Shah's policies of concession and repression in 1977 and 1978 escalated the revolutionary mobilization of large numbers of people and assured the collapse of the regime in 1979” (Rasler 1996: 132). Kurzman (1996) describes government repression of protests: “In early September, the day after hundreds and perhaps thousands of peaceful demonstrators were gunned down in Tehran's Zhalih Square.” Other instances of repression of protests in urban centers throughout 1978: “On January 9, 1978, two days after the publication of the letter, several thousand pro-Khomeini theology students and other sympathizers in the city of Qom staged a demonstration to protest and condemn the publication of the newspaper article and to apply pressure on the leading ulama in the holy city to publicly condemn the government. In ensuing clashes between the police and demonstrators, 9 people were killed and 45 were injured (Ashraf and Banuazizi 1985: 7). I code an instance of insurrectionary protests.

Iran 1979.
According to Degenhardt (1988: 168): “A number of violent incidents led to the outbreak in March 1979 of a Kurdish rebellion in Sanandaj (in the mountainous, western part of Iran), involving the loss of between 100 and 200 lives” (in Sambanis 2004 RN). The conflict opposed the Iran govt and Kurdish nationalist militants in western Iran (Ahmadzadeh and Stansfield 2010; Tezcür and Asadzade 2019). The KDPI, Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran, was led by Dr. Abdul Rahman Qasimlu, an Iranian Kurd politician. I code a case of peripheral challenge.

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Iraq

I code 6 onsets in Iraq between 1944 and 2020: 1959; 1961; 1974; 1985; 1991; and 2003.

Iraq 1959.
Powell and Thyne (2011) codes a coup in 1959 in Iraq. The conflict was led by Nationalist officers under Abd al-Karim Qasim. There is no disagreement or confusion about this case. I code an instance of coup onset.

Iraq 1961.
"Following unfulfilled promises of autonomy under the rule of Iraqi Prime Minister Abd al-Karim Qasim, Barzani launches a Kurdish rebellion. It continues throughout the decade against successive Iraqi regimes. Iraq's Baath party, a regional branch of the pan-Arabist socialist movement, comes into power in 1968. In March 1970, the Baathist government details plans for Kurdish autonomy" (CFR). The KDP was led by nationalist activists and intellectuals. KDP leader was Mustafa Barzani, who fought in Iranian Kurdistan and had ties with the Soviet Union (UCDP 2021). Conflict took the form of guerrilla warfare in Iraqi Kurdistan, northern Iraq. I code an instance of peripheral challenge.

Iraq 1974.
"With the collapse of an autonomy agreement in 1974, Iraq's Baathist regime, seeking to consolidate government control over the oil-rich regions in the country's north, displaces hundreds of thousands of Kurdish inhabitants of the area and replaces them with Arabs from central and southern Iraq. Iraqi Kurds, supported by Iran and the United States, revolt against the Baathist regime" (CFR). As for the previous onset, I code an instance of peripheral challenge as Kurd rebels resume fighting against the Iraqi govt for autonomy.

Iraq 1985.
Once more, the conflict between Iraqi Kurds and the government reached the level of civil war. Consistent with the previous two instances, I code a case of peripheral challenge to the government authority in Iraq in 1985.

Iraq 1991.
Shiite uprising. This is a difficult case to code. "The first sparks of the rebellion were in the Sunni towns of Abu al-Khasib and Zubayr, about 60-70 kilometers south of Basra. It was the last day of February 1991, three days before the formal Iraqi surrender to Gen. Norman Schwarzkopf at Safwan. The revolt gained momentum immediately, and other cities followed suit: Basra, March 1; Suq al-Shuyukh, March 2; Nasiriyya, Najaf and Kufa, March 4; Karbala', March 7; and then Amara, Hilla, Kut and on throughout the south. In the north the sequence was: Raniyya and Chawar Qurna, March 5; Kol Sanjaq, March 6; Suleimaniya, March 7 and 8; Halabja and Arabat, March 9; Erbil, March 11; Dohuk, Zakho and other small townships, March 10 and 13; and finally, Kirkuk, March 20. A detailed account of what happened in each city and township is impossible but reports in various outlawed Iraqi publications speak of a series of events remarkably similar in every case. Masses would gather in the streets to denounce Saddam Hussein and Baathist rule, then march to seize the mayor's office, the Baath Party headquarters, the secret police (mukhabarat) building, the prison and the city's garrison (if there was one). People shot as they went at every poster or wall relief of the dictator. As the cities came under rebel control, the insurgents cleaned out Baathists and mukhabarat" (Jabar 1992).

“In the south, the hypothetical scenario of the uprising which the opposition parties had once sketched out was stood on its head. Armed mutiny was the first, not the last, link in the chain. Following the revolt in Zubayr and Abu al-Khasib, Basra too took up arms, led by the angry retreating soldiers and followed by a mass of equally angry civilians. […] The Basra revolt was led at first by Muhammad Ibrahim Wali, an Iraqi officer who gathered a force of tanks, armored vehicles and trucks to attack the mayor’s office, Baath Party offices and security headquarters. The vast majority of the Basra population backed the revolt. Most of the active participants in the clashes were between 14 and 35 years old. Almost all the soldiers took part, including Mechanized Regiment 24 stationed near Tannouma. […] This spontaneous rebellion in Basra did not have a well-forged leadership, an integrated organization, or a political or military program. Many brave soldiers lamented the fact that cannons, tanks and other weapons were scattered here and there with no plan to move to Baghdad and no contact with other officers and soldiers in other units” (Jabar 1992). “Beginning in Basra and spreading throughout Najaf, Karbala, and Nasiriyya, Shia rebels and Iraqi Army sympathizers attacked government security agents and regime targets” (Zenko 2016).

“By the end of February 1991, Southern Iraqis could view an Iraqi military that was in shambles and a seemingly overwhelming Coalition military presence "just over the horizon." A seeming power vacuum had developed in the south and, in March, a number of Shia areas exploded into active insurrection” (Cline 2000).

This is an ambiguous case. Rebellion of army units in southern Iraq following the end of the Gulf War appear to have been spontaneous and without any clear political agenda or coordination. In addition, mass mobilization of civilians in demonstrations blurs the event surrounding the onset of conflict. Powell and Thyne (2011) code a coup in September 1991. Khadduri and Ghareed (1997: 189-192) provides a useful account of the event. Based on all accounts, I code an instance of insurrectionary protests, even though it appears to have been led by disenchanted soldiers following military defeat in the Gulf War. See Khadduri and Ghareed for a concise summary of the onset of the Shiite uprising in Iraq in 1991. I do not code a coup because the uprising was spontaneous and lacked any political goal. I do not code an instance of state disintegration as the government remained in control of the other parts of the country (except the Kurdish north) and quickly responded to the uprising by sending loyal troops.

Iraq 2003.
Fearon (2007) notes that the war began with fighting between Sunni and Shiite militias in Baghdad and other large urban centers. These various militias had loose ties with political parties (Fearon 2007). He also identifies that the Lebanese civil war of 1975-1990 is the closest case to the event that took place in Iraq in the mid-2000s (see Lebanon for details about the case).

About the army: “The Iraqi army and, even more, the Iraqi police force appear to have little autonomy from society and politics” (Fearon 2007: 6). “The army has somewhat more institutional coherence and autonomy, but it is Shiite-dominated and has few functional mixed units. Some evidence suggests that high-level figures in the army are facilitating, if not actively pursuing, ethnic cleansing. Accordingly, a power grab by a subset of the army leadership would be widely interpreted as a power grab by a particular Shiite faction-and could lead the army to break up along sectarian and, possibly, factional lines” (Fearon 2007: 6). About the govt: “both the Sunnis and the Shiites are highly factionalized, at the national political level and at the level of neighborhood militias and gang” (Fearon 2007: 10). “Intra-Shiite political rivalries render

the new government almost completely dysfunctional. Its ministers see their best option as cultivating militias (or ties to militias) for current and coming fights, extortion rackets, and smuggling operations" (Fearon 2007: 10). "In Iraq, the invasion and the subsequent radical program of political transformation carried out by the United States (with highly inadequate means) destroyed Iraq's only remaining multiethnic and national institutions: the bureaucracy, the army, and the Ba'ath Party. The collapse of the Ba'athist government left a vacuum that has yet to be filled" (Kalyvas and Kocher 2007: 214). Similar account by Flibbert (2013) and Hamasaeed and Nada (2020). I code an instance of state disintegration.

Sources:

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Israel

I code 2 onsets in Israel between 1944 and 2020: 1987 and 2000.

The first and second Intifada followed relatively similar dynamics of onset. Both in 1987 and 2000, mass mobilization by Palestinians were met with violent repression by Israeli forces. I code two instances of insurrectionary protests in Israel.

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Ivory Coast (I thank Sebastian van Baalen for his advice on this case)

I code 2 onsets in Ivory Coast between 1944 and 2020: 2002 and 2011.

Ivory Coast 2002.
Powell and Thyne (2011) identify a coup in 2002 in Ivory Coast. The core leaders of MPCI led by Guillaume Soro, present in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso, in the build-up to the conflict, cooperated with elements in the Ivorian army and in the early hours of 19 September 2002, troops, many of whom originated from the north of the country, mutinied. They launched attacks in many cities, including Abidjan. By midday they had control of the north of the country (UCDP 2021). Förster (2015) provides a similar account.

"On 19 September 2002, a group of around 700 soldiers attempted a coup d'état in Côte d'Ivoire, attacking simultaneously the cities of Abidjan, Bouaké and Korhogo. Having failed to take the commercial capital, Abidjan, they retreated to Bouaké. The failed coup soon degenerated into a war between loyalist government forces and breakaway army troops. After a week, the latter, calling themselves the Mouvement Patriotique de la Côte d'Ivoire (MPCI), seized cities and towns in the northern and central regions" (ICG 2003: 9).

Ivory Coast 2011.
Conflict broke out again in 2011 following the November 2010 presidential elections (which were part of the 2007 peace agreement but had been delayed). As incumbent Laurent Gbagbo refused to step down, politics between the two camps turned violent and clashes erupted between pro-Gbagbo and pro-Ouattara militias. "The 2010–2011 election crisis resulted in thousands of civilian deaths, further damaged an economy already jeopardized by the long period of political instability and led to the collapse of the formal security sector" (Piccolino 2018: 486). Human Rights Watch 2011 report describes militia fighting including in the capital. "Between December 2010 and April 2011, pro-Gbagbo militiamen stopped hundreds at checkpoints based on the person's dress or name on an identity card; they often proceeded to beat the victim savagely, pile tires and wood and douse petrol on the limp body, and then burn the person alive" (HRW 2011). "As the Republican Forces began their offensive in early March, they likewise engaged in collective punishment of real and perceived Gbagbo supporters" (HRW 2011). Note that this conflict is also referred to as a post-electoral crisis. Van Baalen also notes that its roots originate in the first civil war in Côte d'Ivoire.

Based on these accounts, I code an instance of state disintegration in 2011 in Ivory Coast.

Sources:
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Jordan

Conflict broke out in Jordan in 1970 between the PLO Fedayeen and the Jordan military. "Following the Six-Day War, the Palestinian fedayeen, led by the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), used Jordan as a base for launching terror attacks into Israel and into the newly occupied territories. It appeared that Hussein had lost control over his country, and that Yasser Arafat, the leader of the PLO, was operating a state within a state, holding a shivery modus vivendi with Jordan. In September 1970, as on other occasions, it seemed that the fedayeen were about to take over Jordan" (Rubinovitz 2010: 689). The PLO, active in the northwestern region in Jordan and which initially targeted Israel, eventually competed against the Jordanian government which led to the outbreak of war. See Nevo (2008) for a detailed discussion on the onset of the Jordan civil war. Based on his account, I code a case of peripheral challenge.

Sources:

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- Nevo, Joseph. 2008. "September 1970 in Jordan: A Civil War?" *Civil Wars* 10(3): 217-230.
- Sirriyeh, Hussein. 2000. "Jordan and the legacies of the civil war of 1970–71." *Civil Wars* 3(3): 74-86.
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Kenya

I code 2 onsets in Kenya between 1944 and 2020: 1963 and 1991.

Kenya 1963.

"On 28 December 1963, a State of Emergency was declared in Kenya's North Eastern Region (NER). The declaration came just over two weeks after Kenya gained independence and represented the first serious challenge to the integrity and stability of the new state. At issue was the status of the area known during British administration as the Northern Frontier District (NFD). This region was comprised of six districts, Garissa, Isiolo, Mandera, Marsabit, Moyale,

and Wajir that were inhabited almost entirely by the pastoral Somali, Boran, Gabra, and Rend" (Whittaker 2012: 391). "Within a fortnight of independence in December 1963, Kenya's Government declared a state of emergency. A few hundred Somali residents resident in the NFD took up arms against the Kenyan state in the weeks leading up to independence. They represented a community that made up just 1% of the total population of the new Kenyan nation, but they were spread across a territory totaling 45,000 square miles, or a fifth of the landmass of the country" (Branch 2014: 644).

"At the apex of the movement was a leadership group, made up of 'radical' members, committed secessionists who established the NPPPP, and acted as political spokesmen for the NFD between 1960 and 1963. They were school-educated men and often from wealthy lineages who wielded significant influence within their communities. They were able to establish personal commands at shifta base camps in the Somali Republic, from where they negotiated for arms with Somali officials, and organized the recruitment and training of secondary members" (Whittaker 2012: 394-95). "The majority of the shifta, however, were 'light lads' or 'the youth'; men aged between 18 and 40 who engaged in livestock keeping and had little or no formal schooling. They were recruited into the movement and were subsequently taught how to use guns, grenades, and later landmines" (Whittaker 2012: 395).

"Caught unawares by the onset of the insurgency and bogged down by the rains, the security forces did little in the opening months of the conflict to effectively counter the insurgents. Local populations remained supportive of the guerrillas throughout the first year of the insurgency, and a stalemate prevailed. The insurgents were lightly armed, small in number and unable to win a military victory against the Kenyan security forces" (Branch 2014: 644).

Given the identity of first movers and recruits and the location of the challenge to the Kenyan government's authority, I code an instance of peripheral challenge.

Kenya 1991.
"The first acts of violence erupted in October 1991 at a settlement farm on the border of the Rift Valley, Nyanza and Western Provinces. Within a few days, the fighting escalated and took on an ethnic dimension. Skirmishes later spread to several districts in the region, an area with about 51% of Kenya's population (The Kiliku Report 1992)" (Osamba 2001: 40).

"On 29 October 1991, a number of houses on the farm were burned to the ground, and several people were killed. The violence was targeted at "outsiders" or the original members of Meteitei farm, mostly former migrant labourers from outside the district. This apparent land dispute marked the beginning of a series of massacres which the Kenyan government officially called 'ethnic clashes.'" (Klopp 2001: 473-74).

"Ethnic clashes began soon after the implementation of democratization reforms. Clashes took place in the Rift valley, Nyanza and Western provinces. The clashes "pitted members of Moi's own ethnic group, the Kalenjin, as well as members of the Massai, Samburu, and Turkana minority groups aligned with the Moi regime against the Kikuyu, Kisii, Luhya, and Luo communities—all communities associated with the opposition" (Kahl 1998). This was a case in which the government directly supported and mobilized communal violence but the army itself was not directly involved" (in Sambanis 2004 RN).

There is disagreement about whether the 1991 violence in the Rift Valley is best described as a civil war or inter-communal violence. Therefore, this case is difficult to code as onset of civil

war differs from onset of communal violence. Given the location of the challenge and that the army did not suffer for a major split, nor did institutions collapsed across the country, I code an instance of peripheral challenge.

Sources:

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Korea (South) (I thank Seung Chae for his advice on this case)

About the Communist rebellion (Cheju-Do insurgency): "Led by Communist guerrilla bands rushing down from Halla mountain, the people of the island rose up on April 3, 1948, in opposition to elections scheduled for the southern zone. Before it was over, a year later, the rebellion had claimed tens of thousands of persons as its victims. Whole villages in the interior of the island were laid waste, their inhabitants cruelly massacred or forcibly relocated to refugee camps along the coast" (Merrill 1980: 140). Based on Merrill (1980), the Communist rebellion caused over 1,500 casualties and qualifies as a civil war.

Note that during the rebellion, "fighting [during the Cheju-do rebellion] intensified when seven more policemen were killed in October in a series of guerrilla raids on villages along the coast. As the attacks continued, constabulary forces were again committed to counterguerrilla operations. The situation was serious enough for a Cheju field command to be established on October 11 to direct action against the guerrillas. Plans were also made to reinforce the regiment already on the island by dispatching an additional battalion from the Fourteenth Regiment stationed at the nearby mainland port of Yosu. But as the first elements of the battalion were embarking from the Yosu docks on October 20, the entire regiment rose up in rebellion" (Merrill 1980: 179).

In a discussion about the case, Chae described that the historical background is that, due to the emerging Cold War dynamics, the South Korean government (led by US educated Syungman Rhee) and the US Military government wanted to run elections in just the South of the peninsular, effectively separating South Korea from the USSR occupied North Korea. Many people, however, opposed this split. On 1 March 1948, Jeju citizens held a rally celebrating Korea's independence from Japan. In the process, the police accidentally killed a child. In response, citizens asked the police to apologize but they did not, starting an island-wide attack against police precincts. This created the opportunity for the Communists, who also did not support a separation of South and North Korea to mobilize and organize their military struggle. The South Chosun Communist Party encouraged and spearheaded an island-wide campaign against the police, using guerrilla tactics. In response, the Rhee government directly and

indirectly (through far-right civilian organizations) killed approximately an eighth of the entire island population.

Based on these accounts, I code this onset as an instance of peripheral challenge.

Sources:

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Laos

I code 3 onsets in Laos between 1944 and 2020: 1960;1963; and 1976.

Laos 1960.

I could only find limited information about the onsets of civil war in Laos. The first onset refers to the violence that followed the military coup: In 1960, "a Royal Lao Army commander, Kong-Le, carried out a coup and tried to form a moderate government. The United States supported a counter-coup headed by a rightist leader, Phoumi Nosovan, and sent in U.S. troops to fight alongside the Royal Lao Army. As a result, the neutralists joined the communists and large-scale civil war erupted" (287). Powell and Thyne (2011) code an instance of coup in 1960 in Laos. I code an instance of coup onset.

Laos 1963.

"Desperate to halt communism in Southeast Asia, the United States boosted military capability against the communists by providing the Royal Lao Army advanced weapons and aircraft. From 1964 to 1973, the United States conducted the secret bombing campaign in Laos as part of an attempt to weaken North Vietnamese forces and destroy communist supply lines along the Ho Chi Minh Trail that ran from North Vietnam to South Vietnam through Laos and Cambodia" (Sisavath 2019). Bases of Pathet Lao were situated in northeastern Laos (Zasloff 1973). The conflict is closely intertwined with the war in Vietnam. I code an instance of peripheral challenge led by the Pathet Lao insurgents.

Laos 1976.

"In 1976, the two major groups of Hmong rebels in Phu Bia were under Mr Yong Youa Her (Ntxoov Zuag Hawj), a former sargeant in Vang Pao's secret army, and Mr Xai Shua Yang, a former Tasseng (canton chief) at Pha Khao, east of Long Cheng that used to be Vang Pao's military headquarters. Before 1975, Yong Youa was part of a Hmong revivalist movement which, amidst all the suffering sustained by the Hmong in the Lao civil war, was advocating the formation of a "true" Hmong society, in anticipation of the return of the legendary Hmong king who would rescue Hmong believers from oppression by other people. Under Yong Youa's military guidance and messianic leadership, the resistance movement soon became known as "Chao Fa" (a Lao term meaning "Lord of the Sky" or God). According to Lee (op.cit.: 213), Yong Yua's leadership attracted many Hmong, desperate to stay alive but unwilling to submit to the PL government. At one stage his messianic army was said to have 400 or 500 men, operating in units of 20 to 50 against PL forces. Believing that they were invulnerable and had God's protection, they went to war with strong religious convictions, carrying their own flag. They only had old rifles, left-over from Vang Pao's days, but used them sparingly and

only when sure of their aim, in order to preserve their scarce ammunition. Sometimes, they might supplement their arm caches with what they could take from their dead victims. By 1979, Xai Shua Yang's followers had to split into small bands after they ran out of food and could no longer withstand the shelling and gassing of their strongholds by PL and Vietnamese troops. A few months later, most of them reached Thailand with their families, leaving only Yong Youa and his followers to roam the thickets of Phu Bia" (Lee 2005). I code an instance of peripheral challenge.

Sources:

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Lebanon

I code 2 onsets in Lebanon between 1944 and 2020: 1958 and 1975.

Lebanon 1958.

"The crisis in 1958 was triggered by President Camille Chamoun's attempt to weaken his opposition and by factional conflict among opposition parties. A constitutional amendment was being considered to enable Chamoun to run for a second term. External involvement (by Egypt) escalated the crisis and US forces landed near Beirut. The commander of the army was elected President and a four-man cabinet formed to represent loyalist and opposition groups" (in Sambanis 2004 RN).

In the context of increasing political rivalry and predominantly sectarian alignments of communities in 1958, "the cross-sectarian cooperation of the elite that had brought Chamoun to the presidency broke down due to a number of tactical errors such as the overwhelming defeat of political opponents in the 1957 parliamentary which gave his disparate opponents an opportunity to join forces against him in a loose coalition that would ensure their return to power and access to patronage" (Attie 2020). "Political order broke down; authority at the center disintegrated; leaders normally reticent about violent politics became progressively more involved in it. As in earlier episodes of communal conflict, a bewildering plurality of factions, driven by shifting allegiances and motives, were entrapped in an escalating spiral of hostility. Predominantly nonsectarian, involving issues of presidential succession, constitutional amendments, foreign policy, political grievances, and the like, the crisis degenerated willy-nilly into a confessional hostility; thereby reawakening religious enmity and heightening the intensity of violence" (Khalaf 2002: 106). I code an instance of state disintegration.

Lebanon 1975.

The civil war in Lebanon in 1975 followed "falling-out among the members of the Lebanese oligarchy (the traditional sectarian leaders)." Always present in Lebanon, the late 1960s witnessed a new intensity in personal estrangement, increasingly precluding dialogue and more often than not leading to a total breakdown of communication (Khalidi 1979: 96). Khalidi (1979: 47) provides an account of the first acts of violence that triggered the civil war: The start of the Lebanese Civil War occurred at Ain Rummaneh, a Christian suburb of Beirut, on 13 April 1975. Unknown assailants fired at a Sunday church gathering attended by Pierre Gemayel, leader of the Maronite Phalanges, killing his bodyguard and two others. Maronite militiamen in blind retaliation ambushed a bus passing through the neighborhood a short while later, massacring the 28 passengers (mostly Palestinians) on board. Widespread clashes immediately erupted in the country between Maronite militiamen on the one hand and National Movement and Palestinian militiamen on the other" (Khalidi 1979: 47). Abraham (1996) provides a similar account of the onset of the war.

Conflict started in Beirut, the capital city. And the first year of fighting seems to have been centred around Beirut, with the exception of Tripoli in the north and Damour and Jiye south of the capital (Abraham 1996). "By the following day [first days of conflict] the fighting was attracting more combatants. Extremist Lebanese Muslim groups joined in on the side of the Palestinians, and elements of several smaller Christian militias on the side of the Falangists. There was no shortage of volunteers, as everyone seemed to be itching to have a go at a traditional enemy. Nor was there a shortage of weapons" (O'Ballance 1998: 2).

On the government side: the government "seemed powerless to stop the conflict and, hence, the government's longevity was in serious doubts" (Abraham 1996: 3). "The Lebanese army remained inactive, with the premier refusing to commit the troops to a security role, for committing the army to action, with its largely Christian officer corps, could have provoked new encounters" (Abraham 1996: 3). "Growing decomposition of Lebanon's political framework" (Abraham 1996: 4). "The unabated opposition [from both Christians and Muslims] to the largely powerless military cabinet brought it closer to collapse" (Abraham 1996: 5). "The political and religious lines were now drawn between the contenders for the capital, and the Lebanese military option had been discredited" (Abraham 1996: 5). "Collapse of Lebanese government army" (Fisk 1990: xvii). "The army split four ways: One section constituted itself the Arab Army of Lebanon. Another joined the right-wing Christian militias. A third, comprising perhaps the bulk of the officers, remained, at least until the autumn of 1976, 'neutral'. A fourth section went home. Each taking with it equipment that went "almost equally" to the first third sections (Khalidi 1979: 68).

Given these accounts, I code an instance of state disintegration in Lebanon in 1975.

Sources :

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- Fisk, R. 1990. *Pity the Nation. Lebanon at War*, London: André Deutsch.
- Khalidi, W. 1979. *Conflict and Violence in Lebanon: Confrontation in the Middle East*, Cambridge, MA: Center for International Affairs.
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- Khalaf, Samir. 2002. *Civil and Uncivil Violence in Lebanon: A History of the Internationalization of Communal Conflict*. New York: Columbia University Press.

- Attie, Caroline. 2020. “The Crisis of 1958 in Lebanon: Political Rivalries.” in Karam, Jeffrey G. (ed.) *The Middle East in 1958: Reimagining a Revolutionary Year*. London: I B Tauris.

Liberia (I thank Danny Hoffman for his advice on this case)

I code 3 onsets in Liberia between 1944 and 2020: 1989; 1992; and 1999.

Liberia 1989.
On Christmas Eve 1989, Taylor and just over 100 NPLF rebels crossed the Ivorian border and attacked the town of Butou in Liberia’s northern Nimba county. The ethnic politics of Nimba county had grown increasingly violent in the preceding years as President Doe stoked ethnic tensions and marginalized Nimba County’s Gio majority (Hoffman 2011: 29; also Adebajo 2002). Taylor served as on official in the administration of President Samuel Doe during the first half of the 1980s, then was laid off following accusations of embezzlement and a failed attempt to overthrow Doe in 1985 (Reno 2015). I code an instance of peripheral challenge.

Liberia 1992.
After the Bamako agreement of 1990, an interim government was established in the capital Monrovia, although Taylor was de facto in control of around 90 percent of the territory (Adebajo 2002: 73). Following several peace agreements between 1990 and 1992, conflict broke out again by the end of 1992 and the disintegration of the Liberian army and the Doe government soon began to spawn new armed factions, opposed to Charles Taylor and his NPLF (UCDP 2021). In essence, it appears that factions that had agreed to negotiations turned against one another and fighting resumed in and around Monrovia, the capital. As Human Rights Watch (1993) reports, “to most Liberians, the AFL [Liberian Army] is virtually synonymous with looting. I code an instance of state disintegration in 1992 in Liberia.

Liberia 1999.
“In short, the post-first civil war peace-building project was a dismal failure. The proximate causes included the use of ethnic scapegoating by the Taylor government, the regime's abuses of human rights, and its failure to tackle the chronic social and economic problems. Against this background, the Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) launched armed attacks initially against the northwestern regions of Liberia on April 21, 1999. As expected, the Taylor regime launched counter attacks against the insurgents, thereby setting into motion the second Liberian civil war” (Kieh 2009: 7). The LURD launched its attacks in Lofa County, northern Liberia, from neighboring Guinea. “LURD’s founders were a disparate collection political figures and members of armed factions that had participated in the first phase of the Liberian armed conflict 1990-1996, and who had fled the country in 1997 and 1998 following persecution by Charles Taylor” (UCDP 2021b). The conflict ended in August 2003 with the signing of the Accra Comprehensive Peace Agreement. I code an instance of peripheral challenge.

Sources:
- Reno, William. 2015. “Predatory Rebellions and Governance: The National Patriotic Front of Liberia, 1989-1992.” in Arjona, Ana, Nelson Kasfir and Zachariah Mampilly (eds.) *Rebel Governance in Civil War*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Hoffman, Danny. 2011 *The War Machines: Young Men and Violence in Sierra Leone and Liberia*. Durham: Duke University Press.

- Kieh, George K. Jr. 2009. "The Roots of the Second Liberian Civil War." *International Journal on World* Peace 26(1): 7-30.
- Adebajo, Adekeye. 2002. *Liberia's Civil War: Nigeria, ECOMOG and Regional Security in West Africa*. Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
- UCDP (2021) https://ucdp.uu.se/statebased/760
- Human Rights Watch. 1993. "Waging War to Keep the Peace." [online] https://www.hrw.org/reports/1993/liberia/#5
- UCDP (2021b) https://ucdp.uu.se/actor/509

Libya (I thank Wolfram Lacher for his advice on this case)

I code 2 onsets in Libya between 1944 and 2020: 2011 and 2014.

Libya 2011.
"The Libyan revolution erupted as a dramatic chain reaction that was sparked by spontaneous protests and regime violence. Within ten days of the first protest on 15 February, events had reached a revolutionary situation: a state of split sovereignty, with rebels taking over major cities and regions, contesting the Qadhafi regime's claim to legitimacy, and establishing their own leadership" (Lacher 2020: 19). "A spate of high-level defections accompanied the breathtaking dynamic of cities erupting in rebellion" (Lacher 2020: 21). "The elite figures in and around the NTC quickly lost control over the revolutionary forces as they emerged on the ground. The groups of young revolutionary fighters that formed in Benghazi, al-Bayda and Darna to fight Qadhafi's forces on the eastern front had seized weapons in the initial chaos; they escaped central oversight, and many were deeply suspicious of Younes and other senior army defectors" (Lacher 2020: 22). The conflict ended in October 2011 with the death of Gaddafi and the NTC embarking on the transitional program. During an exchange, Wolfram Lacher pointed out that repression and the militarization of the uprising were quasi simultaneous as protesters began to arm themselves from the very first days.

I code an instance of insurrectionary protests. Note that the first civil war paved the way for complete disintegration as numerous groups emerged throughout 2011 with local bases of support and competing interests.

Libya 2014.
The army and security apparatus had largely collapsed with the regime (Lacher 2020). "Competition and polarisation between multiple armed and political groups in the post-2011 political setting led to rising tensions culminating in a wave of assassinations of civil society activists, security officers and political figures in Benghazi from late 2013 to early 2014. In May 2014, tensions conflagrated as General Khalifa Haftar, who had mobilised his self-styled Libyan National Army (LNA) against the GNC, launched a military offensive to clear Benghazi of armed Islamist groups. Against this backdrop, a constellation of actors supporting the GNC – including the Libyan Revolutionaries Operations Room (LROR) and militias from Misrata – attempted to wrest control of Tripoli International Airport by forcing out anti-GNC Zintan militias" (Carnoni and Moody 2018: 461).

I code an instance of state disintegration in 2014.

Sources:

- Lacher, Wolfram. 2020. *Libya's Fragmentation: Structure and Process in Violent Conflict*. London: I.B. Tauris.
- Carboni Andrea and James Moody. 2018. "Between the Cracks: Actor Fragmentation and Local Conflict Systems in the Libyan Civil War." *Small Wars & Insurgencies* 29(3): 456-490.
- See Appendix 1 for additional sources.

Mali (I thank Natsaja Rupesinghe for her advice on this case)

I code 2 onsets in Mali between 1944 and 2020: 1990 and 2012.

Mali 1990.

"The Tuareg in northern Mali rose up against the Malian state in 1990 in what became a low-intensity conflict. The Tuareg had begun logistical preparations for this uprising in the late 1980s with the organization of arms depots. At the beginning of 1990 the Malian secret service learned of the existence of the Tuareg organization, arrested some of its members, and confiscated the arsenal. At the end of June 1990, a group of barely armed rebels attacked the town of Menaka in northern Mali, freed the prisoners, captured weaponry from the Malian armed forces, and confiscated some four-wheel-drive vehicles. This rebel organization became the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MPLA) and won a number of resounding victories over the Malian army during the last months of 1990" (Lecocq and Klute 2013: 426).

"The dissolution of the Libyan-financed Islamic legion in the late 1980s, and the Soviet evacuation of Afghanistan in 1989 resulted in the return of additional young male Tuaregs to their home areas. Thus, by the end of the 1980s, Tuareg communities throughout the Sahel had numbers of unemployed and restless young men with considerable military experience" (Keita 1998: 111). "Tuareg combatants were mounted on light vehicles and seemed to have an unlimited supply of modern Soviet small arms. They also were much more effective in destroying government facilities and eluding government pursuit, finding apparent safe-haven in the neighboring countries" (Keita 1998: 112).

"Nor were rebel forces ever very large: at most, the various groups probably totaled no more than several thousand combatants at any one time" (Keita 1998: 112). "However, in the vast, sparsely populated regions of northern Mali, a group of a few dozen highly-mobile rebels, utilizing the element of surprise, could cause considerable damage to lightly-defended government facilities and civilian communities. […] Initially, the government reacted to the new Tuareg rebellion by declaring a state of emergency in the north and attempting to duplicate the strong-arm counterinsurgency measures of the 1960s, including very destructive attacks on Tuareg communities. This featured encouragement of the non-Tuareg population in the region to attack Tuareg communities. However, the violence only escalated" (Keita 1998: 112).

"The successful fight against Mali unleashed social and political dynamics within Tuareg society. From January 1991 onwards the rebel movement splintered under violent internal conflicts that were to persist until October 1994" (Lecocq and Klute 2013: 426). "A series of peacemaking initiatives at the local, regional, and national levels managed to reduce the violence, and in 1995 the fighting ground to a halt altogether (Posthumus, Bram, "Mali: Successful Mediation Effort Could Lead to Lasting Peace," in Mekenjamp et al, 1999)" (in Sambanis 2004 RN). I code an instance of peripheral challenge.

Mali 2012.
"On 17 January 2012, the MNLA started attacks in northern Mali and within 10 weeks had conquered all towns and villages in the north, completely defeating the Malian army. On 6 April, the movement declared the independence of northern Mali, announcing the creation of a new state called Azawad" (Lecocq and Klute 2013: 430).

"On January 18, 2012, the separatist Tuareg movement, the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA), triggered the Tuareg rebellion with an attack against the small city Aguelhok in northern Mali. Numerous soldiers of the Malian army based in the military camp were killed. Tens of soldiers surrendered at the end of the battle and were executed.1 During the first weeks of the conflict, international observers discovered that the MNLA was not the only non-state armed group in this conflict. Trans-national jihadist groups such as Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), the MUJWA and a local jihadist group Ansar Dine (literally "the supporters of the [Islamic] religion" in Arabic) were also part of it. The MNLA and the jihadist groups were collaborating at the beginning of the conflict, notably in the first attack in Aguelhok" (Bencherif, Campana and Stockemer 2020: 1).

Although a peace accord was signed in 2015, implementation lagged, however, while conflicts multiplied and spread (CRS 2021; HRW 2017). Failed implementation of the 2015 peace agreements (Bencherif, Campana and Stockemer 2020: 2). The conflict is ongoing as of December 2020. I code an instance of peripheral challenge.

Sources:

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Moldova

In the context of the dissolution of the USSR, "on 27 August 1991, the Soviet republic declared independence from the crumbling USSR and renamed itself the Republic of Moldova. Because of its mixed historical background, including attempts by the Soviets to essentially rewrite Moldovan history to create a new identity, analysts argue that modern day Moldova is a republic with no clear antecedents. As a result of Russian control of the area, especially during the Soviet period, the Moldovan population is now an amalgamation of different ethnic groups, an issue which, arguably, lay at the center of the separatist course" (Sanchez 2009: 155).

"The first demands for autonomy were made in 1989 by Trans-Dniester Slavs (Gurr et al. 2001, 29; Minahan 1996, 153-155; Sambanis 2000, 35). In 1990 leaders unilaterally declared the region's autonomy. Moldova became independent in 1991 and demands for Trans-Dniester separation escalated. In September 1991 the regional parliament declared independence of region as Dniester Moldovian Republic. In December armed conflict broke out as the Moldovan army attacked the Soviet-backed rebels (Gurr 2000, 218-222; Minahan 1996, 153-155)" (in Sambanis 2004 RN). "The Transnistria War erupted in November 1990 involving pro-Transnistria (PMR) independence forces (Transnistrian Republican Guard, irregular militias, Cossack units, and Russian 14th Army), against pro-Moldovan forces (incorporating regular troops, police, and some irregulars) (Baban, 2015, 1-12)" (Duffy 2021).

To be consistent with the coding of the other civil wars that have erupted following the collapse of the USSR, I code an instance of state disintegration.

Sources:

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Morocco

In 1975, Polisario, which had been founded in 1973 as a national liberation movement, adopted armed struggle against the governments of Mauritania and Morocco after Spain gave up its territory, which was to be divided between the former. When the Spanish withdrew from Western Sahara, the Polisario Front announced (from exile in Algeria) the establishment of the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) as an independent state (Chograni 2021). "Initially, the poorly armed Sahrawis conducted mainly defensive operations, and helped to evacuate the civilian population in flight because of the brutality of the Moroccan troops" (Besenyo 2017). "Polisario opposed the colonial state, whether in the form of Spain, until 1976, or Morocco thereafter. Polisario's dismissal of the colonial state is shared with many other liberation movements; in the case of Polisario, anti-colonialism also intersects with a discourse of tribal resistance to state power" (Wilson 2020).
Maghraoui (2003) describes the Polisario as a guerrilla group, not a conventional force. I code an instance of peripheral challenge.

Sources:

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Mozambique (I thank Corinna Jentzsch for her advice on this case)

I code 2 onsets in Mozambique between 1944 and 2020: 1976 and 2017.

Mozambique 1976.
Soon after independence in 1975 and the establishment of the FRELIMO government, "the insurgency that aimed to topple the government came from outside the country, mobilized discontented elites, and did not draw directly on an organized base of peasant discontent" (Weinstein and Francisco 2005: 159; also Hultman 2009). "When FRELIMO came to power in 1975, it faced a complex regional and global situation. […] In 1976, Rhodesia launched an effort to establish a guerrilla force capable of fighting within Mozambique to defeat ZANLA guerrilla. The security services invested significant resources in the development of this Mozambican insurgency, the MNR (Mozambican National Resistance), which later came to be called RENAMO. It recruited its first members from among discontented Mozambicans based in Rhodesia, including a large number of former felchas, members of the colonial army and police service, and former FRELIMO guerrillas" (Weinstein and Francisco 2005: 163-64). The initial leader of RENAMO was André Matsangaissa, a former military banned from the national army. After a first phase of operations conducted from bases in Rhodesia and South Africa, RENAMO moved the vast majority of its forces into Mozambique. It established areas of operations around Gorongosa, Mabate, and Sitatonga, all in the central provinces of the country (Weinstein 2007: 112). I code an instance of peripheral challenge.

Mozambique 2017.
The northern region of Cabo Delgado has long experienced instability but in 2017 a civil war erupted between the government and Islamist insurgents when "members of the shadowy armed group Ahlu Sunnah Wa-Jama, also known locally as al-Shabab (no established links to the armed group of the same name in Somalia)" (Aljazeera 2021). I code an instance of peripheral challenge.

Sources:
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Myanmar (Burma)

I code 4 onsets in Myanmar between 1944 and 2020: 1948; 1948; 1960; and 2011.

Myanmar 1948.
Since independence from Britain in 1948, Burma/Myanmar has been plagued by civil war, with three main groups fighting one another – the government, the Communist Party of Burma (CPB) and ethnic insurgencies seeking regional autonomy (Sharma 2014; South 2011; Crisis Group 2020; Kipgen 2011). See Sharma (2014) for overview of each main ethnic insurgencies. Given the high number of organizations over the years, it is difficult to code the onset of conflict. However, they all share some specificities: located in the periphery of the state, mostly underground and guerrilla organizations, and led by nationalist militants. Given these characteristics, I code an instance of peripheral challenge for each onset of ethnic rebellions in Myanmar between 1944 and 2020.

“When Burma became independent in 1948, the Karen were equally ready for their own state, but their requests were ignored by the Burman and British leaders. It did not take long before the KNU officially started the Karen rebellion. Initially very successful, forces of the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA, the armed wing of the KNU) eventually had to retreat eastwards” (Brouwer and van Wijk 2013: 837). The first leader of the KNU was Saw Ba U Gyi, a university-educated Karen militant. “The Karen insurgency movement was so influential that the Karen troops in the government army began to desert in January-February 1949 (Ball 1998: 130)” (Kipgen 2011: 50). This does not qualify as a coup. I code an instance of peripheral challenge.

Myanmar 1948.
Communist insurgency. The Communist guerrillas were led by marginalized CPB political elites, who had played a significant role in the struggle for independence and had their headquarters mostly in the forests and hills along the Sittang River valley in Central Burma (UCDP 2021). “Communist revolt had already begun under colonial rule in 1946, when a tiny splinter group of the Communist Party of Burma (CPB)—Thakin Soe’s CPB-Red Flag (Lintner, 1990, p. 10)—took up the gun. The breakaway Red Flag faction argued for the CPB “to give up its collaboration with the AFPFL and instead concentrate on leading and organizing a revolutionary uprising of the working class” (Smith, 1999, p. 68). Like the MCP and Viet Minh revolts, this insurgency emerged in the dying days of authoritarian empire. However, the

main leftist revolts came later, launched by the larger CPB White Flag and parts of the People's Volunteer Organisation (PVO) in 1948. The CPB's turn to war by March 1948 (Callahan, 2003, p. 114; Lintner, 1990, pp. 11–14) was caused by its rivalry with and then split from the Aung San's Socialist Party, which dominated the AFPFL coalition that succeeded the Raj. The CPB was de facto expelled from the AFPFL in November 1946 and "from this point on the Socialist Party nominees. . . dominated the AFPFL and held virtually all the key positions in the first post-independence government" (Smith, 1991, p. 69). The CPB saw itself being sidelined by the Socialists, who intended to lead a parliamentary democracy. Independence thus promised both democracy and marginalization for the CPB at the hands of the center-left" (Staniland 2021: 538). I code an instance of peripheral challenge.

Myanmar 1960.
Ethnic rebellions II. (See note above). Given the similarities in dynamics, I code an instance of peripheral challenge.

Myanmar 2011.
Ethnic rebellions III. (See note above). Given the similarities in dynamics, I code an instance of peripheral challenge.

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Nepal (I thank Prakash Adhikari for his advice on this case)

"The Nepalese insurgency is between the government (the government is led by Prime Minister Sher Bahadur Deuba) and Maoist rebels (CPN-M/UPF), led by leftist intellectuals who want to replace Nepal's constitutional monarchy with a communist republic" (in Sambanis 2004 RN). The war "began in February 1996 with a series of raids by the Maoists [insurgents] on police stations in the middle-western part of the country" (Gilligan, Pasquale and Samii 2014: 607). From 1996 to 2001, the insurgents increasingly expanded control in rural areas. During our exchange, Adhikari pointed out that the state considered the insurgency to be at first a law and order problem and mobilized a poorly trained police force to deal with the uprising (see Adhikari and Samford 2012).

Maoism in Nepal has a long history that goes back to the 1940s. "The 'People's War' was officially declared in February 1996, when the CPN (Maoist) presented a list of forty demands to the government of Nepal/ The points dealt largely with rectifying economic and social injustice, abolishing the monarchy, and establishing a Constituent Assembly. […] When their demands were not addressed, the Maoists escalated their underground war. In an inversion of the usual direction of political action – protest movements in Nepal are primarily urban based – most of their actions were rural based and initiated from the countryside" (Pettigrew 2013: 13). "Alongside their original strongholds in the midwestern districts of Rolpa and Rukum, the Maoists slowly began to establish "base areas" elsewhere in the country (Pettigrew 2013: 14). The conflict ended with the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in November 2006. I code an instance of peripheral challenge.

Sources:

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- Gilligan, Michael J., Benjamin J. Pasquale and Cyrus Samii. 2014. "Civil War and Social Cohesion: Lab-in-the-Field Evidence from Nepal." *American Journal of Political Science* 58(3): 604-619.
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Nicaragua

I code 3 onsets in Nicaragua between 1944 and 2020: 1978; 1981; and 1982.

Nicaragua 1978.
"The conflict was over control of the central government. The Sandinistas, a Marxist- Leninist party, sought to overthrow the dictatorial Somoza regime, which was mostly right-wing, but its ruling junta, especially towards the end of the regime, also had some left-wing members. Sources: Goldstone (1998, 370-371); Grynspan (1991, 88- 115); and Laffin (1986, 111-118). The means by which the Sandinistas began their rebellion was rural guerilla warfare. However, by June 1979 (the war ended with the surrender of the Somoza regime in July 1979) the rebels controlled most of the major towns in Nicaragua as well as the slum district of Managua, the country's capital. Source: Banks, Day and Muller (1997, 607-614)" (in Sambanis 2004 RN).

The FSLN gained strength in the north after the earthquake of 1974 and started launching guerrilla attacks against government installations (Leogrande 1979: 30). Initial confrontations took place in the countryside, and small-scale guerrilla attacks in cities (Leogrande 1979). "Students initially dominated the membership of the FSLN as the movement sprang from a small group of student activists, who were discontent with the conditions in Nicaragua. Yet, as the FSLN carried out its campaign against the government, its membership broadened to include a substantial portion of the Nicaraguan peasant population. I code an instance of peripheral challenge.

Nicaragua 1981.
"To protect their rights and traditional lands, they [the Miskitos] organized the organization of ALPROMISU (Alliance for the Progress of Miskitos and Sumus) in 1974, led by Steadman Fagoth and Brooklyn Rivera. Replacing ALPROMISU in November 1979, MISURASATA (Mascot, Rama, and Sandinista United) was formed to represent the indigenous populations' more serious grievances to the Sandinista government. Over 80 percent Miskito, MISURASATA supported claims for indigenous communal land grants and the promotion of language and culture. When the Sandinistas banned it as a rebel movement in 1981, the group began launching attacks on the Sandinista military from Honduras, with funding from the CIA. The Sandinistas responded by forcibly relocating 8,500 Miskitos, destroying as many as 100 villages. MISURATA leaders and up to 20,000 followers fled to Honduras, where they formed an alliance with the Contras" (in Sambanis 2004 RN).

"In the remote jungles of the Atlantic Coast, where a special force of the native Miskito Indians had been trained to fight them as part of the covert war, the Sandinistas forcibly evicted tens of thousands of other Miskitos from their villages along the Coco River bordering eastern Honduras and relocated them, in many cases after brutal marches, to internment camps" (Dickey 1983: 673). "This rupture initiated the conflict which by the end of 1981 had resulted in the withdrawal of official recognition of MISURASATA, with a great number of Miskitu refugees in Honduras, a build-up of military confrontation in the area and the majority of the MISURASATA leadership in exile (Buvollen 1987: 594). I code an instance of peripheral challenge.

Nicaragua 1982.
"The structure of a totalitarian system was firmly in place within a year after the end of the insurrection, and by 1982 most of those voices within the original government that were fundamentally opposed to notions of "democratic centralism" and variations on the theme of a "dictatorship of the proletariat" were out of the country, in many cases having chosen self-imposed exile. These included many of the nation's most capable technocrats, political leaders, even heroes of the revolution: the famous Commander Zero, Edén Pastora; former Sandinista Junta members Alfonso Robelo and Arturo Cruz; former director of the Central Bank and member of the elite Sandinista Party itself, Alfredo César. Many moderate exiles coalesced around Pastora and Robelo in active political opposition to the Sandinista leadership. For a year they eschewed military action in the hopes that they could win international political support and tap into domestic Nicaraguan dissension sufficiently to moderate the Sandinista leadership. Unable to achieve either of these goals and concerned that he was overshadowed by the burgeoning strength the FDN showed at the time, Pastora took up arms against his former comrades in the Sandinista government in April 1983. With a force of only a few hundred armed men, he began fighting out of bases in the Costa Rican jungle near the San Juan River" (Dickey 1983: 671-72). FDN was composed of former National Guards still loyal to Somoza, mainly in exile in Honduras. The northwestern province, along the Caribbean coast was where the FDN was most active. After the Contras blew up two bridges in the north of the country, the Sandinista government declared a state of emergency (Dickey 1983). I code an instance of peripheral challenge.

Sources:

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Nigeria

I code 3 onsets in Nigeria between 1944 and 2020: 1967; 1980; and 2009.

Nigeria 1967.
Biafran War. Following a series of coups and counter-coups, the conflict in southern Nigeria started as Biafra declared its secession, led by military governor General Ojukwu. “In May 1967, ethnic Igbo generals from a rebel province declared independence for the "Republic of Biafra", sparking a bloody civil war and a terrible famine” (AfricaNews 2021). “The military power of both sides was limited because of a lack of funds, personnel, discipline and education. The federal army was still better equipped even though the secessionist forces comprised a large part of the former Nigerian officer corps, which had been dominated by Igbo” (Heerten and Moses 2014: 173). Powell and Thyne (2011) code two coups in Nigeria in 1966. I code an instance of coup onset in 1967.

Nigeria 1980.
Maitatsine rebellion. The Maitatsine uprisings of 1980 to 1985 were the first major manifestation of Islamic fundamentalism in northern Nigeria (Odesoji 2011). “Maitatsine was the nickname of a Camerounian religious teacher who died a violent death in Kano, Nigeria, in 1980. His teachings were deeply heterodox-he claimed to be a Prophet. In December 1980, his followers in Kano revolted; the city was convulsed by what was virtually civil war, and 4177 died, among them Maitatsine himself. In October 1982 a new rising broke out at Bulumkutu, 15 kilometres from Maiduguri, far to the east. 3,350 were killed. Fighting also broke out in Rigasa village, near Kaduna, which spread into the city. In March 1984 there was an outbreak of violence in Yola, the capital of Gongola State, which left between 500 and 1,000 dead. In April, 1985, there was yet an- other rising in Gombe, in Bauchi State, when over a hundred were killed. His followers are usually called "Maitatsine"; the movement is also known as Kalo Kato” (Isichei 1987: 194).

“On 18 December 1980, four police units were sent to Shahauci playground, an open space near Maitatsine's headquarters, to arrest some of his preachers. The police were ambushed and routed by men attacking suddenly from all directions, "using hatchets, bows and arrows, swords, clubs, daneguns, daggers and other similar dangerous weapons." The next day, the "fanatics"-as they are always called in the Nigerian press-moved into other parts of Kano. The New Nigerian called it all "a major war." Houses, traders' stalls, an abattoir, cinemas, and vehicles were burnt, and the rising was only put down by the joint action of the army and air

force. When it was all over, 4,177 had died, according to official figure" (Isichei 1987: 197). I code an instance of peripheral challenge.

Nigeria 2009.
"The period from 2004–2009 was one of relative calm for Boko Haram, albeit punctuated by bouts of violence. The group expanded into states such as Bauchi, Yobe, and Niger from their base in Maiduguri. Examples of violence in this period include attacks on police stations in several locations in Borno in late 2004 and intermittent attacks in Bauchi, Yobe, and Borno states. The sect's trademark modus operandi during this period was the use of gunmen on motorbikes" (Weeraratne 2017: 612). "As of 2009, Boko Haram had established a stronghold in the north [of Nigeria]" (Akinola 2015: 19). Violence peaked to the level of civil war in 2011 and "the state of Borno in northeast Nigeria remains the epicenter of violence, and well over 60% of all incidents from 2011 onwards were recorded in the state" (Weeraratne 2017: 614). I code an instance of peripheral challenge.

Sources:

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Oman

The calls for autonomy in the Dhofar region in Northern Oman date back to the early 1960s. The Dhofar Liberation Front (DLF) began sniping at patrols of the Sultan's Armed Forces (SAF) and mining oil trucks as early as 1962 (Martinez 2012). "In November 1967, Aden was granted independence by Britain and became the People's Republic of Yemen. The new Marxist state – the only one with an official state religion, Islam – began arming other disaffected tribesmen of Dhofar. The People's Front for the Liberation of the Occupied Arab Gulf (PFLOAG; later called the Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman or PFLO) gained control of the growing rebellion in 1967 as a result of Aden's independence and the 1967 Six Day War. Soon the PFLOAG eclipsed the older movement, becoming overtly Marxist and supplied by China and other communist bloc nations. By 1969 the rebellion had captured large

swathes of Dhofar" (Martinez 2012: 518). By 1970, the PFLOAG controlled most of Dhofar, except the main towns. I code an instance of peripheral challenge.

Sources:

- Martinez, Ian I. 2012. "The Battle of Mirbat: Turning Point in the Omani Dhofar Rebellion." *Small Wars & Insurgencies* 23(3): 517-526.

Pakistan

I code 5 onsets in Pakistan between 1944 and 2020: 1971; 1973; 1994; 2006 and 2006.

Pakistan 1971. (I thank Pranab Panday for his advice on this case)
"The Bangladesh secessionist war was led by a political party which had won an overwhelming election victory. The people of East Pakistan took part in the war spontaneously and continued it for nine months. It involved intensive indigenous mass participation" (Islam 1985: 213). "The liberation war of Bangladesh in 1971 was a logical conclusion of the Bengali nationalist movement that started soon after the formation of Pakistan in 1947. The movement, based on the nationalistic aspirations of the Bengalis living in erstwhile East Pakistan, was fueled by the continuous neglect of Bengalis and their interests by the Pakistani rulers" (Jamal 2008: 6).

"The West Pakistani military and political leaders exacerbated the volatile situation in East Pakistan when President Yahya Khan postponed the convening of the National Assembly which was due to meet on March 3, 1971 to draft a constitution. Mass demonstrations in East Pakistan followed; the Bengalis greeted Yahya with slogans of "Joi Bangla" ("long live independent Bengal") and brought business to a standstill at Sheikh Rahman's call for non-cooperation with the government. On the eve of the civil war, Rahman said that the East Pakistanis wished only to be "left in peace [and to] live as free people."' There ensued serious acts of civil disobedience, including refusal to pay taxes and a total strike in government offices and businesses. This was accompanied by a change in the East Bengali mood which began to reflect a desire for complete independence as opposed to mere autonomy. Following three weeks of inconclusive negotiations in Dacca between Yahya and Rahman, the Pakistani military attacked Dacca without warning on the night of March 25, 1971 and initiated a reign of terror throughout East Pakistan which continued with increasing intensity until December 1971. The general pattern of repression consisted of the destruction and burning of villages on a colossal scale, indiscriminate killing and raping of civilians, and sorting out and murdering Hindus, university teachers and students, lawyers, doctors, Awami League leaders and supporters, Bengali military and police officers" (Nanda 1979: 73-74).

"By late 1970, the Mukti Bahini, armed and trained by India, had begun undertaking subversive activities targeting power plants, railways, industries, bridges, fuel depots, looting banks, raiding warehouses, mining ships and killing non-Bengalis. On 26 March 1971, Pakistan Army initiated Operation Searchlight-a law-and-order enforcement operation to safeguard the lives and properties of East Pakistanis and establish the writ of the state. As of March 1971, the total strength of Pakistan army troops posted in East Pakistan stood at 12,000 (armed only with small weapons). By late-April 1971, Operation Searchlight had managed to throw the Mukti Bahini across the border back into India. Mukti Bahini's 'Monsoon offensive' was also neutralized. […] Mukti Bahini guerillas along with RAW operatives and Indian Army regulars would enter East Pakistan through forward bases that were set up in Tripura and West Bengal" (Saleem 2016).

Panday described in a discussion that before 1971, the people of Bengal were subjected to brutal torture and discrimination by the Pakistani army from every aspect. Even Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman did not call for a war until 1971. The West Pakistani military government was making a ploy not to hand over power to Awami League even though the party secured a landslide victory in the 1970 election. Moreover, the army government conducted a massacre at midnight on the 25th of March 1971 on the people of Bangladesh. Therefore, Bangabandhu did not have any alternative but to declare the independence of Bangladesh in the early hours of the 26th of March, 1971. After that, the people of then West Bengal got involved in the liberation war against the West Pakistani military government and won the election within nine months. In the nine months, around 3 million people of East Bengal were killed by the military.

I do not code an instance of state disintegration for the main reason that political authority did not break down at the center but rather in the periphery of the state. The authority of the Pakistani government was unchallenged and stable in West Pakistan and the challenge was geographically concentrated in Eastern Pakistan (now Bangladesh). Therefore, I code an instance of peripheral challenge (which ultimately led to the independence of Bangladesh).

Pakistan 1973.
Baluchistan. "A Baloch resistance, which crystallized around the objective of protecting the populations and their interests and was inspired by Marxist-Leninist liberation movements, emerged shortly after the brief encounters of 1962. A few hundred ideologically motivated men assembled under the banner of Sher Mohammed Marri and the militant Baloch People's Liberation Front, setting up what was to become the infrastructure of the 1973 insurgency. Although still under the authority of a member of the Marri tribe, this infrastructure extended far beyond Marri territory. By July 1963, 22 nationalist camps had been established, spanning from the Mengal areas of central Balochistan to the Marri territory in the northeast of the province. Some 400 full-time volunteers ran the operations. The demand for independence came later, not as a claim of the Baloch People's Liberation Front, but as a result of the gradual alienation and radicalization of Baloch youth during the 1973–1977 conflict. President and later Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto had given Pakistan a democratic constitution but refused to respect the norms he had helped to establish. In 1973, he dissolved the provincial government formed by the opposition National Awami Party (NAP) and accused its main leaders of attempting to sabotage the foundations of the state. The most radical elements of the nascent Baloch nationalist movement then joined the guerilla effort initiated by the Marris and Mengals" (Grare 2013: 7). I code an instance of peripheral challenge.

Pakistan 1994.
"This intergroup competition [between Muhajirs and Sindh] was reflected in the formation of the All- Pakistan Muhajir Students Organisation in 1978, and then by the founding of the MQM in 1984, both under the leadership of Altaf Hussein (Verkaaik, 2004). Professing to be a political party, the MQM was also an armed group with cadres in Karachi, Hyderabad, and other parts of Sindh; it was based primarily in cities as "an almost exclusively urban-based movement" (Haq, 1995, p. 1004)" (in Staniland 2010: 1634). "As the MQM grew in power in the late 1980s and early 1990s, it used violence in Karachi and Hyderabad. [In turn,] the Pakistani military went into Karachi and other parts of urban Sindh in force in June 1992. When it did, full-blown civil war erupted between the MQM and various Pakistani security forces" (Staniland 2010: 1635). I code an instance of peripheral challenge.

Pakistan 2006.
"Thirty years after a bloody conflict that official sources estimate caused more than five thousand deaths among the rebels and almost three thousand among the Pakistan Army, Baluchistan seems to be heading toward another armed insurrection. During the summer of 2004, there were numerous attacks against the army and the paramilitary forces as well as repeated sabotage of oil pipelines. Since the rape of a female doctor by a group of soldiers on January 2, 2005, in the hospital in Sui, the principal gas-producing center in Baluchistan, assaults have multiplied, culminating in a pitched battle between the Frontier Corps, a paramilitary unit, and the local Bugtis, one of the largest Baluch tribes. According to the Pakistani daily, The Nation, approximately 1,568 "terrorist" attacks occurred through April 3, 2005. These attacks have not been confined only to tribal areas but have targeted Pakistani armed forces and Chinese nationals working on major regional projects all over the province" (Grare 2006: 3). "The eruption of violence, led by Baloch nationalists, was generally perceived as merely another expression of restiveness in a province traditionally uneasy with Pakistan's central government—after all, the two groups had come into conflict on four occasions in the past" (Grare 2013). Just as for the previous conflict in Balochistan, I code a case of peripheral challenge.

Pakistan 2007.
Taliban (TTP). "In a statement released on Feb. 12, the Tehreek-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP) distanced itself from international terrorism, declaring that its violence was singularly focused on Pakistan" (Rafiq 2022). "Challenges to state authority in recent years have many of the features of previous insurgent movements but differ in the substance and scope of the threat they pose for the state. Principal among them are an estimated 13 groups that operate under the banner of the Tehrik-e-Taliban (TTP), a loosely connected set of militias led by commanders whose power derives from their easy access to weapons and money, and whose legitimacy is drawn from their tribal connections and professed Islamic piety. Taliban forces have taken up arms against the state and its agencies in a traditionally lightly governed Federally Administered Tribal Area (FATA) in order to impose locally their ideas of Islamic governance as a step toward eventually affecting change in the political and social fabric of Pakistan. Organized in 2007, the TTP grew out of armed resistance to the state by organized militias located mostly in tribal North and South Waziristan" (Weinbaum 2017: 36). I code an instance of peripheral challenge.

Sources:

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- Grare, Frédéric. 2013. “Balochistan, the State versus the Nation.” Carnegie papers.

Papua New Guinea

“In April 1988, Francis Ona, a young leader within the group and a former BCL employee, asked the multinational copper firm for compensation in the sum of 10 billion kina (then equal to 10 billion US dollars). Six months later, the first acts of sabotage against the plants began following a study commissioned by the government that minimized the environmental impact of the mining activities. Ona and Joseph Kabui, both natives of the mining region, and Sam Kauona, a former lieutenant in the PNG Defence Force (PNGDF), set up the Bougainville Revolutionary Army (BRA)” (Adamo 2018: 170). “The rebellion soon became ethno-nationalist, including in response to ‘red-skin’ police and PNGDF brutality. In February 1989, Ona said that secession had become the target of the armed struggle. Meanwhile, the BRA had chosen its membership from the ranks of young people from economically and socially disadvantaged classes, known as the ‘raskals’ who were often involved in criminal activities and unrestrained violence (Adamo 2018: 171). “PNG troops were often the target of BRA ambushes and were unable to restore order in Bougainville” (Adamo 2018: 171). Regan (1998: 277) provides a similar account of the onset of conflict in Papua New Guinea. Based on these two accounts, I code an instance of peripheral challenge.

Sources:

- Adamo, Antonino. 2018. “A Cursed and Fragmented Island: History and Conflict Analysis in Bougainville, Papua New Guinea.” *Small Wars & Insurgencies* 29(1): 164-186.
- Regan, Anthony J. 1998. “Causes and Course of the Bougainville Conflict.” *Journal of Pacific History* 33(3): 269- 285.

Paraguay

“Shifty maneuvering by members of Morinigo's coalition cabinet resulted in a very tense political situation in Paraguay, as the Colorado Party quickly consolidated its control over the

government by expelling the opposition. In March 1947 a coalition of communists, Liberals and Febreristas (cadres of the February 1936 Revolution) launched an insurrection against the Asuncion government" (Mora 1998: 456). "In 1947, a war broke out as a three-party alliance (Febreristas, Liberals and Communists) led by Rafael Franco challenged the dictatorial seven-year-long rule of President Higinio Morínigo. One year prior to the war, Morínigo attempted to democratize Paraguayan politics by forming a coalition government with previously banned political parties such as the Febreristas. The effort backfired and within a year the Febreristas resigned and instead colluded with the Liberals and Communists. The conflict started as a foiled coup by the opposition coalition in December 1946, intensified into war in the spring of 1947 as large parts of the military defected to the rebels' side, and ended in late August 1947 when Morínigo, supported by the republican Partido Colorado (Colorado Party), managed to regain control of the country" (UCDP 2021). "The Paraguayan revolt is reported to have spread to areas east and south-east of Asuncion, the capital. Despatches from the frontier report artillery units totalling perhaps 2500 men with equipment revolted at Paraguari, 30 miles to the south-east of Asuncion. Meanwhile, insurgent headquarters at Conception assert that the garrison at Villarrica, 80 miles south-east of Asuncion, and the second city of the republic, has joined the revolt and a bloody' battle occurred at Ajos, 76 miles to the east of the capital. Authoritative sources in Asuncion subsequently denied the reports of the revolts at Paraguari and Villarrica and declared that; peace prevailed at Ajos" (Archives). I code an instance of coup.

Sources:

- Mora, Frank O. 1998. "The Forgotten Relationship: United States-Paraguay Relations, 1937-89." *Journal of Contemporary History* 33(3): 451-473.
- UCDP (2021) https://ucdp.uu.se/country/150
- Archives [online] https://trove.nla.gov.au/newspaper/article/95593088 (consulted 5 November 2021).

Peru

The PCP-SL was formed in 1970 as a splinter from the Communist Party Bardera Roja in its regional base of Ayacucho, under the leadership of Guzman (González 2011: 37). "Formed in a small, newly refunded provincial university in a small, isolated, historic but impoverished department (state) capital" (Palmer 1992: 1). With the emergence of the Shining Path, "the Peruvian government was forced into a reactive response, in part because it did not take Sendero seriously for some time, a fact that often enabled the insurgents to continue to choose the time and place of their actions. Once the government did get involved, for some time it emphasized military initiatives, frequently excessive and sometimes indiscriminate, which harmed the civilian population it was charged with protecting as much or more than it affected Shining Path. This contributed to an expansion of violence, particularly in the countryside, which often played into the guerrillas' hands" (Palmer 1992: 2).

"The death toll during the first two years of the insurgency was extremely low: six policemen and seven civilians, none of whom were peasants. […] At first, the government did not take these acts seriously and dealing with the insurgency was left in the hands of the police. The political crisis eventually worsened to such an extent that the government saw no alternative but to declare a state of emergency over the entire department of Ayacucho on 3 March 1982" (Fumerton 2003: 73). Most affected department (state): Ayacucho, Apurimac, and Huancavelica in central-southern region (among the poorest areas in the country) (González

2011: 37). “According to numerous interviews, Sendero gained control over at least nine villages in the Rio Pampas region by the end of 1981: Tambo, Paras, Totos, San José de Secce, Vilcas Huaman, Chuschi, Quispillaqta, Cancha Cancha, and Pomabamba” (Isbell 1992: 67). I code an instance of peripheral challenge.

Sources:

- Fumerton, M. 2003. *From Victims to Heroes: Peasant Counter-Rebellion and Civil War in Ayacucho, Peru, 1980-2000*. Amsterdam: Rozenberg Publishers.
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Philippines (I thank Michael Rubin for his advice on this case)

I code 3 onsets in the Philippines between 1944 and 2020: 1946; 1971; and 1972.

Philippines 1946.
“The Huks (Hukbong Bayan Labansa Hapon – People’s Army Against the Japanese), later called the Hukbong Magpapalayang Bayan (The Liberation Army of the People) were affiliated with the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP), Communist governments such as the Soviet Union and China. In 1941, the Huks began to distribute Anti-Japanese propaganda that encouraged people to take up arms against the Japanese. This nationalistic ideology gained them popular support. They were led by Luis Taruc. Between 1942 and 1948, the Huks became well-trained and well-armed, using American weapons and equipment and numbering approximately 20,000 members, engaged in guerrilla warfare against the Japanese” (in Sambanis 2004 RN).

“The Hukbong Mapagpalayang Bayan, or People's Liberation Army (HMB), that spearheaded the Huk rebellion developed out of the wartime Hukbalahap (People's Anti-Japanese Army). The Hukbalahap was founded in March 1942 by the Communist Party of the Philippines (Partido Komunistang Pilipinas, or PKP) following the Japanese invasion the previous year. Both the Hukbalahap movement and the postwar Huk rebellion were based primarily in rural areas of central and, to a lesser extent, southern Luzon, the largest and most heavily populated island in the Philippine archipelago. In these areas during the 1930s, Socialists and Communists had organized large movements of sharecropping peasants who sought larger crop shares and easier credit from wealthy and politically powerful landlords. The Hukbalahap was directed by a military committee composed of PKP cadres, and the Huk commander-in-chief was Party member Luis Taruc. The People's Liberation Army, similarly, was directed by the Military Department of the PKP (Pomeroy 1978: 514; Saulo 1990: 176)” (Goodwin 1997: 57). Same account in Mitchell (1969). I code an instance of peripheral challenge.

Philippines 1971.
“By the 1960s, the Moros had become a minority in many parts of their traditional homeland, with many losing their land to the immigrant settlers through dubious legal transactions or outright confiscation. Indeed, Catholics outnumber Muslims in most provinces in the south

today. The problem of growing Moro landlessness was compounded by the settlement of many surrendered communist Huk rebels who were given land in the south. Violent confrontations between Muslims and Catholics became so serious that President Marcos imposed martial law in 1972" (Tan 2000: 271). "In 1969, the Mindanao Independence Movement (MIM) was created, and it vowed to establish an independent state in Mindanao, the Sulu and Palawan islands. At about the same time, other radical Muslim organizations, the Union of Islamic Forces and Organisations (UIFO) and the Ansar El Islam were also established" (Tan 272). "In 1969, a group of Muslims from the MIM and the UIFO began military training in camps in the Malaysian state of Sabah, where they received the support of its then chief minister, Tun Mustapha, with the tacit agreement of the Malaysian government" (Tan 2000: 272). "This support from Malaysia has been crucial to the formation of the Moro rebel armies, for the Malaysian trainees returned and went on to organize and lead separatist guerilla armies. One of them, Nur Misuari, a former student at the University of the Philippines, founded the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) in 1972. Misuari was able to capitalize on popular Moro resentment over the influx of Catholic settlers and the general economic poverty in the south. The MIM was dissolved in its favor, and the MNLF also succeeded in obtaining the support of the Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers (ICFM), the Organisation of Islamic Conferences (OIC), and Libya. Large numbers of Muslims joined the MNLF as it launched a jihad against the central government. The MNLF's military arm, the Bangsa Moro Army, conducted a bitter guerilla campaign against the Philippine Armed Forces" (Tan 2000: 272). I code an instance of peripheral challenge.

Philippines 1972.
The communist insurgency in the Philippines is divided into three organizations. The Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP), the New People's Army (NPA), and the National Democratic Front (NDF). "The CPP-NPA-NDF is primarily active in poor rural and mountainous regions in most part other country. The armed wing of the movement uses guerrilla tactics, such as hit-and-run attacks, sabotage, and political assassinations. In Mindanao, the CPP-NPA-NDF is especially strong in the East, which is a strategic region for the rebellion since it provides them with most of their financial resources" (Walch 2014: 44). Michael Rubin pointed out during a discussion that the Communist insurgency grew out of communist and other anti-regime political organizations that were largely urban-based networks. But to launch the insurgency, the leadership did hideout in the periphery to formally initiate the insurgency and fighting and launch the Communist Party of the Philippines and the New People's Army. See Magno and Gregor (1986) for additional details. I code an instance of peripheral challenge.

Sources:

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Romania

"On 17 December 1989, demonstrations broke out in Timisoara, a town of approximately 330,000 people close to the Hungarian border. After initial successes by the insurgents, organised by the NSF (National Salvation Front), Securitate (Romanian Secret Police) opened fire on civilians throughout the town. The demonstrations spread to Bucharest, and on 22 December, the Romanian army defected to the demonstrators. That same day Ceausescu and his wife fled the capital in a helicopter but were captured and taken into custody by the armed forces. Clashes continued between Securitate (the forces loyal to Ceausescu) and the army when the army tried to take control over the presidential palace" (UCDP 2021). See Siani-Davies (1996) for a discussion about the Romanian Revolution (revolution v. coup v. rebellion). As far as this project is concerned, it is a case of insurrectionary protests.

Sources:
- UCDP (2021) https://ucdp.uu.se/statebased/14471
- Siani-Davies, Peter. 1996. "Romanian Revolution or Coup d'Etat? A Theoretical View of the Events of December 1989." *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 29(4): 453-465.

Russia

I code 2 onsets in Russia between 1944 and 2020: 1994 and 1999. Note that I code an additional 4 onsets in 1944 under USSR (see below).

Russia 1994.
"The decision for a large-scale military intervention against Chechnya appears to have been taken in late November 1994, following the disastrous failure of another proxy attack on Dudaev. When the invasion came in late December 1994 the war quickly became a catalogue of disasters which laid bare the poor state of Russian military readiness. The initial attack on Grozny, in particular, was one of Russia's worst military defeats since the Second World War. Russian troops were badly led and early setbacks in Grozny led to a collapse in morale. For many Russian observers the demoralisation of the army was a reflection of the profound depth of national humiliation after the collapse of the USSR and the tearing apart of Soviet society. […] The demoralisation was completed by institutional incompetence, as the command of Russian forces was divided between the Army and Ministry of Interior forces, who competed against each other, refused to coordinate their operational activities and on occasion even shot at each other. The military command was corrupt, incompetent and overconfident" (Hughes 2001: 31). "The Russians, besides having an inherently balky military hierarchy, suffered further because strategic control was impaired by a contradictory, decentralizing trend that had gained force since the dissolution of the Soviet Union" (Arquilla and Karasik 1999: 208).

"In December 1994, the Russian federal authorities launched their first attempt to suppress Chechen separatism by military action. After fierce fighting, the Russian army brought

practically the whole territory of the republic under its formal control. It was at this point, however, that a guerrilla war started […]" (Pain 2005: 67). Fronts were numerous: "the war was fought throughout Chechnya (and sometimes beyond its borders), from urban centers and villages to the distant mountains" (Arquilla and Karasik 1999: 208). Many of the Chechen fighters were former Soviet soldiers (Arquilla and Karasik 1999: 211).

As ethno-nationalist tensions erupted in 1991, I code an instance of state disintegration for the first Chechen War. See Hughes (2001) for a discussion of the link between the collapse of the Soviet Union and the outbreak of conflict in Chechnya in the early 1990s. This is an ambiguous case. An alternative coding for the first Chechen War may be a case of peripheral challenge. However, for consistency in the coding procedures with the others civil wars that followed the collapse of the Soviet Union, I find that state disintegration is the appropriate coding for this case.

Russia 1999.
"The conflict in Chechnya has been the most destructive by most measures, whether in terms of military and civilian casualties, physical destruction, or the number of refugees. From late 1991 onwards to the start of the second war in September 1999, the population of Chechnya declined from around one million to around 300,000" (Hughes 2001: 15). During 1997 and 1998, tensions increased within the Chechen leadership, as radicalization followed the first Chechen War. "A turning point came in August 1999 when a large force of several thousand Wahhabi-influenced Chechen Islamic guerrillas led by Basaev and Khattab invaded neighbouring Dagestan as the start of a 'Holy War'" (Hughes 2001: 35). I code an instance of peripheral challenge in 1999.

Sources:

- Hughes, James. 2001. "Chechnya: The Causes of a Protracted Post-Soviet Conflict." *Civil Wars* 4(4): 11-48.
- Pain, Emi. 2005 "The Chechen War in the Context of Contemporary Russian Politics." In Sakwa, Richard (ed.) *Chechnya: From Past to Future*. London: Anthem Press.
- Arquilla, John, and Theodore Karasik. 1999. "Chechnya: A Glimpse of Future Conflict?" *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 22(3): 207-229.

Rwanda

I code 3 onsets in Rwanda between 1944 and 2020: 1963; 1990; and 1994.

Rwanda 1963.
"In 1962, some exiled Tutsis began armed incursions on Rwanda, which in turn triggered reprisals against Tutsis inside the country. By 1963, more than 100,000 refugees were living abroad. A decisive moment came after an armed incursion in December 1963 by exiled Tutsis. In that operation, Tutsi exiles entered Rwanda from Burundi, rallies Tutsis living in Rwanda, and then marched toward Kigali before they were stopped by Rwandan troops with Belgian assistance" (Straus 2015: 283). I code an instance of peripheral challenge.

Rwanda 1990.
"Composed principally of Tutsi descendants of refugees who had fled Rwanda in earlier episodes of violence, the RPF [Rwandan Patriotic Front] also critically came to include some high-level Hutu dissidents from the Habyarimana period and won recruits from the Rwandan

domestic Tutsi population. The RPF attacked the country from northern Uganda in October 1990. The key military leadership in the RPF had experience fighting alongside Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni in his ultimately successful insurgency, and the Rwandan officers occupied key posts in the Ugandan intelligence and military institutions. The RPF also benefited from a sophisticated system of contributions from the mostly Tutsi elite diaspora. […] However, their first major operation for the RPF ended poorly. The overall commander was killed on the second day of fighting, followed within the month by his two replacements. By the end of the first month the Rwandan army succeeded in a counter-attack, and the RPF insurgents scattered into a northern territory. In November, Major Paul Kagame returned from the United States where he had been training, pulled together the RPF's remaining forces in the northwest forest of Virunga, resupplied, and recruited Tutsis from neighboring states. Kagame also changed tactics to fight using guerrilla tactics […]" (Straus 2015: 293). I code an instance of peripheral challenge.

Rwanda 1994.
Tensions between the RPF and the MRND (National Republican Movement for Democracy and Development) escalated following the August 1993 Arusha Accords. Tensions were both political and military. "One other dimension that needs to be underlined is the way in which the state and the ruling party in particular, but not exclusively, invested in alternative institutions. These included a civilian defense force and militia training. The efforts were consistent with the idea that the MRND camp's advantage lay with the people and the idea that, through the Arusha and the formation of coalition governments in 1992 and 1993, they had lost control of key institutions. The same logic is true for the MRND's investments in an alternative radio station, Radio Télévision Milles Collines, which became a font of pro-Hutu, anti-Tutsi rhetoric. The documents that are available today […] depict a period of intense distrust and the virtual collapse of the government. In particular, in the last few months of 1993 and the first three months of 1994, the state was effectively not functioning. […] The MRND leaders and the RPF were both preparing for war and accusing the other of doing the same. There were also high-level political assassinations of party leaders, both pro-Hutu Power and pro-Tutsi Power. There were public rallies of militias and youth wings. […] The catalyst […] was the assassinations of President Habyarimana on April 6, 1994. […] Immediately following Habyarimana's death, RPF forces went on the offensive, principally from their position in the north but also from their position in Kigali. Meanwhile, from April 6, 1994, government forces were on the defensive. […] The government military side faced a vacuum of leadership in both the political and military arenas. Into that vacuum jumped the MRND hardliners and the key power brokers that had surrounded the president. […] The military response overall was one of confusion, disarray and division" (Straus 2015: 303-306). I code an instance of state disintegration.

Sources:

- Straus, Scott. 2015. *Making and Unmaking Nations: War, Leadership, and Genocide in Modern Africa*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Senegal

Casamance is geographically separated from the rest of Senegal and lies in the south. The MFDC (Mouvement des Forces Démocratiques de la Casamance) was founded to promote Casamance interests. "Contrary to the claims of the separatist rebel leaders who started the insurgency in the 1980s and used the same name for their organization, the original MFDC was

one of several regionally or ethnically oriented political organizations operating in Senegal (Straus 2015: 209). "The key leaders of the separatist movement were Father Augustin Diamacoune Senghor and Mamdou Sané (known as Nkrumah). Diamacoune was a well-known figure due to his religious and cultural broadcasts on Senegalese national radio. Sané had earned a scholarship to pursue secondary education in Morocco but ended up in France. Together they formed a new political entity with the same name as the original MFDC" (Straus 2015: 210).

Tensions in Casamance grew through the 1980s. The start of the political conflict is 1982 through popular protests. However, violence broke out toward the end of the 1980s when the MFDC created their armed wing and engaged in guerrilla warfare against government forces (Straus 2015; Evans 2004). "Tensions between Casamance and the North of the country became increasingly manifest until they finally turned violent. In December 1982, the newly created MFDC organized a peaceful protest march, in which men and women of different ethnic communities, religions, and social backgrounds participated. In the course of the event, the protestors replaced the Senegalese flag on the regional governor's office by a white one. The Senegalese government reacted with rigorous repression with the Diola being the main target. In the wake of a more aggressive, but still largely improvised attack on the regional capital Ziguinchor a year later, the MFDC was driven underground into the forests, where it radicalized and formed an armed wing (the maquis). It engaged in guerrilla activities targeting the Senegalese army and symbols of Senegalese statehood. Violence intensified and the conflict turned into a low-scale civil war in 1990" (Theobald 2015: 185).

"The exact beginning of the protracted conflict between the MFDC and the Senegalese armed forces has been difficult to identify. Events in the 1980s contributed to an escalation of the conflict: repression contributed to further mobilization, which led to further repression. In 1983, three gendarmes were killed trying to arrest MFDC supporters during a meeting in the sacred forest, while an MFDC protest later that year was suppressed with force, officially resulting in 24 fatalities (Evans 2004; Foucher 2007). More youth were recruited into the movement, and the MFDC's first attack on a customs post at Seleti in April 1990, followed by large-scale army deployment (Evans 2004)" (Clark 2011: 156). I code an instance of peripheral challenge.

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Sierra Leone (I thank Zoe Marks for her advice on this case)

I code 2 onsets in Sierra Leone between 1944 and 2020: 1991 and 1997.

Sierra Leone 1991.
"The RUF had its political origins in the pan-African student movements of the 1980s and had military origins in Muammar Ghaddafi's guerrilla revolutionary training center in Libya. The leader of the RUF, Foday Sankoh, was selected by a group of two dozen Sierra Leonean trainees at Ghaddafi's school in Benghazi, where he developed close ties with Liberia's insurgent entrepreneur, Charles Taylor (Abdullah, 1998). Sankoh and Taylor closely coordinated their attempt to seize control of the governments of first Liberia, then Sierra Leone, as they sought to consolidate a new order. The first phase of the Sierra Leone war was launched with support from rebels and mercenaries from Burkina Faso and Liberia, who invaded the country in March and April 1991 and helped the RUF vanguard rapidly expand its ranks. The RUF recruiting from opposition strongholds in poor rural communities close to the insecure Liberian border. […] Caught off-guard and under-equipped to fight even novice rebels, the state armed forces were on the back foot and venter their frustration by launching their own military coup against the government in 1992. Successful in taking power, they ramped up military recruitment and expanded the counter-insurgency budget" (Marks 2019: 3).

"It was a cross-border attack on 23 March 1991, however, that truly inaugurated the Sierra Leone front of the war. A group calling itself the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) launched assaults on two border villages in the Kailahun district. As with Taylor's NPLF assault on Liberia, the RUF entered Sierra Leone with a small group of fighters, a mixture of Burkinabes, NPLF-affiliated Liberians, and Sierra Leone exiles. […] Within a week the RUF had attacked larger towns in the east and within a month had captured virtually all of Kailahun" (Hoffman 2011: 32-33).

Marks pointed out during a discussion that earliest attacks were by members of Taylor's NPFL, subsequent attacks were by Sankoh's trainees in East and South, backed by NPFL commanders and Burkinabe mercenaries (who had been fighting in Liberia). They opposed the ruling government and corruption; under-resourced counterinsurgency led to the army-led NPRC coup in 1992. Based on these accounts, I code an instance of peripheral challenge.

Sierra Leone 1997.
After a series of five military coups in the 1990s (Powell and Thyne 2011), the May 1997 coup restarted the war in Sierra Leone after a brief interruption following the 1996 Abidjan Peace Accords. "Yet, another military coup soon followed and in May 1997 Kabbah was displaced to Guinea. The mutinous army – calling itself the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) – combined forces, firepower, and command structures with the RUF under the banner 'People's Army.' […] In exile, Kabbah recruited foreign mining firms and British mercenary company Sandline International to arm and forcibly reinstall his civilian government in exchange for mining revenues and concessions" (Marks 2019: 7). "A peace treaty was signed with the rebels in November, 1996. But Sankoh was arrested in March 1997 for arms trafficking, and the rebels began fighting again. In May 1997, the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC), led by Major Johnny Paul Koroma overthrew the elected government" (in Sambanis 2004 RN).

"On 25 May 1997, the government of President Ahmed Tejan Kabbah, who had been elected president in March 1996 in the first multi-party elections for nearly three decades in Sierra Leone, was overthrown by a group of soldiers from the Sierra Leone Army (SLA) who had formed the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC). The leader of the coup and head of the newly formed AFRC, Johnny Paul Koroma, had been among nine soldiers charged with attempting to overthrow the government in September 1996. The armed forces were joined by

the rebel Revolutionary United Front (RUF) and formed what became known as the People's Army. In effect, AFRC soldiers (formerly SLA soldiers) and rebel RUF soldiers jointly ruled Sierra Leone until February 1998 when ECOMOG (Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group) troops stormed Freetown and returned President Kabbah to power. The RUF and AFRC, including members of the SLA, retreated to the country side (UK, Apr. 2000, 5; HRW, July 1998, 4; UN OCHA-IRIN, 29 Dec. 2000)" (USBCIS 2000).

Marks described that Factions in military (internal divisions) led to confused collusion between RUF and AFRC; some AFRC were opposed to RUF and some RUF were opposed to AFRC, but ultimately, they were all fighting against civilian government, residual military, and external forces. Marks also pointed out that the 1996 peace talks are overwhelmingly described as failed, not as temporarily successful. Therefore, the second civil war is very much the continuation of the first war. While she agreed that it makes sense to talk about them as two onsets, she noted that an alternative coding would be to code two onsets in one conflict. To be consistent with Sambanis' (2004) coding rules, and therefore internal consistency in this dataset, I include two separate onsets. In the case of the second, I code an instance of coup.

Sources:

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Somalia (I thank Mikael Naghizadeh for his advice on this case)

I code 2 onsets in Somalia between 1944 and 2020: 1988 and 1991.

Somalia 1988.

Opposition to Barre. "In 1981 some politicians of the Isaaq clan established an opposition movement (the Somali National Movement, SNM) in London, England. Again, the military government started to punish civilians. The Siad Barre regime destroyed Hargeysa and Bur'o and murdered many innocent civilians when the SNM attacked these cities in 1988" (Elmi and Barise 2006: 35). "Other opposition groups, such as the USC (the Hawiye clan's opposition party) and the Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM) (the Ogaden clan's party) organised their military activities from Ethiopia" (Elmi and Barise 2006: 36).

"Armed opposition against the military regime began as early as 1978, shortly after Somalia's defeat in the war with Ethiopia. Dissatisfied army officers from the Darood/Majeerteen clan formed the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF) and, with the help of Ethiopia, started their low-scale guerrilla war against the military dictatorship. Only a few years later, in 1981, a second opposition group, the Somali National Movement (SNM), was formed in London but was soon participating in the armed struggle. From their Ethiopian sanctuary both organisations intermittently launched cross-border raids against the Somali state (Bakonyi 2009: 436).

While at first, the SNM recruited its activists mainly from the urban petty bourgeoisie, in 1988 it transformed itself from an elitist organisation into a clan-based mass movement by broadening its support base particularly, but not exclusively, among the north-western Isaaq clan-family (Bakonyi 2009: 437). Founded by self-exiled Isaaq of the upper social strata, the SNM soon managed to extend its support networks among those home-based urban elites, whose upward mobility was seriously challenged as they were successively marginalised and drawn out of the state-centred patron–client networks (Bakonyi 2009: 438).

"The low scale guerrilla attacks against the military regime under Siyaad Barre, who ruled the country from 1969, started in the northern region and intensified until 1988 to a fully-fledged civil war which soon spread to the central and southern regions (Bakonyi 2009: 434). Based on these accounts, I code an instance of peripheral challenge.

Somalia 1991.
Post-Barre war. "When the power struggle broke out in 1991 between Ali Mahdi Mohamed and General Mohamed Farah Aideed (who both belong to the Hiraab sub-clan), the clan identities that mattered became those of the Muddullod and the Habargidir (their respective sub-clans)" (Elmi and Barise 2006: 37). "As a result of the civil war, de facto clan borders exist all over Somalia" (Elmi and Barise 2006: 50). "Somalia has no clear-cut 'government' and 'opposition' parties. Moreover, there are no disciplined and organised political parties. Instead, there are clan-based political factions that are owned by their leaders. Some clans have factions while others do not. Moreover, as stated earlier, clan identity is fluid" (Elmi and Barise 2006: 47).

"Geographical location of fighting: Most of the heaviest fighting took place in Mogadishu and urban centers in the north, including Hargeysa and Burao (Metz, 1993: 92). Although difficult to state conclusively, recruitment seems to have been relatively variable amongst both the government and rebel forces, given the fluid nature of clan relations and the numerous clan divisions and subdivisions, each of which frequently acted to maximize their own best interests" (Sambanis 2004 RN).

Linke and Raleigh (2011: 47) describe the situation in Somalia as a full state collapse since 1991, and where insurgent organizations have successfully exercised sovereign control of internal territory, resulting in quasi-state administrations within Somalia. "So far all attempts to bring about effective and consensual central governance have failed, either through domestic 'spoilers' or through the intervention of neighbouring countries (Menkhaus, 2007a, 2009)" (Shortland 2013: 545). Although peace negotiations and short-lived military victories have been numerous, fighting is ongoing since 1991 in Somalia and warlords remain in charge of segmented pockets of territories. "As of June 2007, the capital Mogadishu has been beset by months of sporadically heavy fighting pitting Ethiopian occupying forces and their Somali allies in the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) against a complex insurgency of clan militias, warlords and regrouping Islamists" (Menkhaus 2007a: 357). I code an instance of state disintegration.

Sources:

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South Africa

The conflict in South Africa resulted from the intensification of the anti-apartheid struggle. "Prior to 1984 acts of political violence within South Africa were committed overwhelmingly by established political organisations, and of those engaged in violence against the apartheid state, the African National Congress (ANC) was the most prominent. Nonetheless, the scope of the armed struggle waged by the ANC through its military wing Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK) remained at the level of sporadic attacks, and the movement's initiatives to escalate its military effort were repeatedly frustrated by police countermeasures" (Simpson 2009: 158).

"During the first few years, the armed conflict between ANC and the government of South Africa took the form of sporadic guerrilla attacks on South African targets, and retaliatory raids by the government against ANC targets in neighbouring countries" (UCDP 2021a). "In 1983, following pressure by the states providing support to it, the ANC set up a formal MK headquarters in order to facilitate military cooperation. The headquarters – the Politico-Military Council (PMC) – was situated in Lusaka, Zambia, with local structures set up inside South Africa and in neighboring states. While the new structure decreased the coordination between the political and military branches of the ANC, it also increased the capacity for internal activity and for coordinating the ANC's struggle with the internal mass movement" (UCDP 2021b).

In the late 1970s, "the ANC attempted to simultaneously absorb waves of new exiles, building a series of forward bases and safe houses in Angola, Mozambique, Swaziland, and Lesotho, while implanting their model of revolution into the emergent culture of mass protest gripping urban South Africa" (Davis 2018: 16). In the mid-1980s, violence peaked following the Vaal Triangle uprising, as it led to a steep increase in the number of MK (ANC's armed wing) operations inside South Africa. I code an instance of peripheral challenge.

Sources:
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South Sudan (I thank Jana Krause for her advice on this case)

"Hostilities begun in Juba, the capital of South Sudan, in the late evening of 15 December 2013, in the barracks south of the city centre. The fighting spread to the military headquarters of Bilpam located north of Juba. During the night and the following day, opposition leaders within the SPLM were rounded up by government forces. Most of them came along without a fight, but the bodyguards of former Vice-President Riek Machar resisted and he got away, only to reappear in the "bush" as a rebel leader. On 16 and 17 December there was widespread fighting in different parts of Juba. According to reports, hundreds of civilians were killed, and thousands fled to UN compounds for protection; Nuer residents were targeted in house-to-house searches" (Rolandsen 2015: 163). "Division led by Peter Gadet mutinied and proceeded to attack the capital of Jonglei, Bor. On 19 December the Fourth Division in Unity also mutinied, and there were additional defections elsewhere, especially in Upper Nile. Also a number of armed civilians in Greater Upper Nile (the three states of Unity, Upper Nile and Jonglei) flocked to Riek Machar and the former governor of Unity state, Taban Deng. In the following weeks and months, the state capitals in Greater Upper Nile, Bentiu, Malakal and Bor changed hands several times in pitched battles between, on the one side, government forces, Darfuri rebels and the Ugandan army and the defected SPLA soldiers and armed civilians on the other" (Rolandsen 2015: 164).

"Fighting has broken out in South Sudan between rival factions of the country's armed forces, the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA). According to some reports, heavy machine guns and mortars were used during the violence, which began in the early hours of December 16 in the capital, Juba. President Salva Kiir said an attempted coup d'état had been launched by supporters of Riek Machar, the country's former vice president who was fired in July" (Downie 2013).

"On 16 December 2013 the President of the Republic of South Sudan, Salva Kiir Mayardit, appeared on state television in military uniform to announce that he had successfully put down a coup attempt in the capital, Juba. The coup attempt was said to have been led by former Vice-President Riek Machar and several ex-cabinet ministers and officials of the ruling Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM), including Madame Rebecca Nyanding de Mabior, the widow of the SPLM's first leader, John Garang. Eleven alleged coup plotters were arrested in their homes, but Riek Machar escaped from Juba, and, amid reports over the next few days of targeted killings of Nuer in Juba by men in uniform loyal to the President, the commanders of the 8th and 4th army divisions of the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) in Jonglei and Unity states announced their defection to Riek Machar and seized control of the state capitals of Bor and Bentiu" (Johnson 2014: 300).

"It is rather the fallout of a political crisis within the SPLM; a crisis exacerbated by the lack of cohesion and central control within the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) – the guerrilla cum government army. It was the combination of a weak patrimonial state, a wartime mentality and lack of peaceful mechanisms for political contestation and transition that brought about the current war. This becomes apparent when we look closer at the structural causes of the conflict, the background for the internal problems within the SPLM and the dynamics by which internal tensions within the SPLM came to a head during 2013" (Rolandsen 2015).

Based on these accounts, I code an instance of state disintegration. In fact, it was not a coup d'état. Instead fighting broke out between soldiers and militias associated with the president and the vice-president who fought for government power. In that sense, it is a breakdown of cooperation within the governing elite that marked the onset of the civil war.

Sources:

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Sri Lanka (I thank Zachariah Mampilly for his advice on this case)

I code 4 onsets in Sri Lanka between 1944 and 2020: 1971; 1983; 1987; and 2005.

Sri Lanka 1971.

"JVP existed as a small underground movement from 1965, and under the leadership of Wijeweera, subsequently grew into the shape of a revolutionary political party" (UCDP 2021). "The JVP (Janatha Vikmuthi Peramuna-the People's Liberation Front) first came to the attention of the world outside Sri Lanka when it launched an abortive insurrection (Moore 1993: 593). "The JVP of 1971 was largely a rural movement, especially in the sense that it was only in rural areas that it managed to organize sufficient force to control territory and populations for a few days or weeks" (Moore 1993: 600). "The 1971 JVP had been a youth movement, and almost exclusively Sinhalese Buddhist. Its national leadership was closely linked with the many small Marxist parties and factions which have been a characteristic feature of Sri Lankan politics. […] . At that stage the JVP was a very loosely organized 'movement' characterized by considerable internal dissension. The 'Insurrection' of April 1971 was extremely ill prepared. Despite the smallness of the island, the first attacks in different localities-mainly on police stations-were spread over a full week. Insofar as there was a common characteristic uniting the leadership and the local activists and supporters of the JVP, it was a sense of grievance at exclusion from the fruits of access to the state. Many of the leaders of the 1971 JVP coup, including the leader, Rohana Wijeweera, survived to be tried and imprisoned (Moore 1993: 608). (Note that in this quotation, the term 'coup' is misused).

"The April 1971 insurrection began with widespread armed attacks on nearly 100 police stations on 5 April 1971. These attacks resulted in the capture or abandonment of 49 rural police stations, which comprised one fourth of the police divisions in Sri Lanka. The significant guerrilla action which took place in the countryside did not affect the urban areas. The spread of the rebellion was confined to a few districts: Kegalle, Galle, Anuradhapura, Kurunagala, Polonnaruwa, Matara, Ampara and Ambalangoda. There was considerable fighting along the main southern province route to Galle and Matara and the Police were withdrawn altogether from east of Hambantota a southern based city. Major towns which witnessed JVP incursions or temporary occupation included Maho, Elpitiya, Deniyaya, Horowpotana, Warakapola and

Monaragala. Within three weeks, the JVP insurrection was defeated" (Samaranayake 1997: 113-14).

"Concerned by the JVP's growing popularity and revolutionary ideology, the United Front government proscribed the JVP in early 1971, arresting Wijeweera and other JVP leaders. In response, the JVP leadership accelerated their plans for revolution. From 5 April 1971, the JVP attacked 93 police stations around the country. The plan was to amass arms, first from the police and then the military, to enable a 'one day' revolution buoyed by popular support. But the JVP leadership overestimated their capacity to summon the necessary resources and support. Only around 30 police stations were captured, which were quickly surrounded, and with the mobilization of the army alongside the police, the insurgency was successfully suppressed within eight weeks" (Hill 2013: 359). I code an instance of peripheral challenge.

Sri Lanka 1983.
The LTTE was "built around a combination of mass political grievances and individual leadership" (Staniland 2014: 149). "There was low-level militant mobilization among the young Tamils in the late 1960s (especially 1969) but the 1970-1073 period was pivotal; that was when insurgency became more than an idle threat. […] The most prominent politicized opposition was the Tamil United Front, which was created when the Federal Party merged with other Tamil parties in 1972. […] Newly politicized social bases also emerged, drawing on preexisting caste and student networks that were now imbued with clear opposition to the political status quo. In 1972, Velupillai Prabhakaran, a Karaiyar from Velvethithurai, founded the Tamil New Tigers in the Jaffna Peninsula, renamed the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in 1976" (Staniland 2014: 148). Other Tamil organizations also formed around the same time. Prior to the escalation of 1983, these militants were not yet key political actors. "The conflict in Sri Lanka escalated significantly during the summer of 1983, when an LTTE ambush of an army convoy in Jaffna that killed thirteen soldiers triggered anti-Tamil riots" (Staniland 2014: 155). Mampilly (2011) provides a similar account. I code an instance of peripheral challenge.

Sri Lanka 1987.
"In 1987, the JVP made another bid to come to power by force of arms. The insurrection of 1987-1989 was better-prepared and more deeply-rooted than that of 1971; the human costs and societal consequences of its extirpation were correspondingly greater. Although the JVP came close to achieving state power both in late 1988 and mid-1989, it was there- after destroyed very rapidly (Moore 1993: 593). While the JVP participated in the electoral process during the late 1970s and early 1980s, in 1983, "the JVP was proscribed once again and forced to revert to operation as an underground organization" (Samaranayake 1997: 108).

"The proscription of the JVP after ethnic violence in July 1983 and the presence of the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) were instrumental in a resurgence of the insurgency. […] the JVP, in collaboration of the Deshapreme Janatha Viyaparaya (DJV), used its campaign of violence against the politicians of the governing party, police and other armed personnel and their family members, state-officials, civilians, politicians from opposition parties and their supporters. This is a strategy of urban guerrilla warfare based on the use of terror and assassinations as a means of paralyzing the state apparatus. In addition, they carried out planned and selected sporadic armed attacks on police stations and military bases. […] Furthermore, the JVP raided rural banks, co-operative stores, government administrative offices, post offices and sub-post offices, destroyed government vehicles by using explosives or through arson in various parts of the country. […] The 1987-89 armed struggle was much more widespread and better

organized than the insurrection in 1971. It was very strong in the southern, central, north-central and western provinces of the country (Samaranayake 1997: 114).

Note that this time, the army was more hesitant in its counterinsurgency. As Mampilly pointed out during our exchange, the JVP insurgency split the Sinhalese society and the army was primarily ethnic Sinhalese. As Hill (2013: 360) notes: "Most worrying to the UNP government and its supporters was the apparent ambivalence of the army – its personnel were sympathetic to the JVP's agenda and hostile towards the Indo-Lanka Accord – which took little aggressive action against the JVP in 1987 and 1988. By early 1989, as the JVP's violence, reach and control increased, many believed the UNP government would fall. The hesitance of the armed forces changed, however, in response to a JVP public demand that military personnel stop defending the government or face reprisals against their families. From mid-1989, after taking steps to secure military families, the army aggressively pursued JVP activists countrywide, working alongside paramilitary and vigilante units engaged in a counter-assassination campaign against JVP members and supporters." Although quite hesitant to repress the insurgency at first, I could not find evidence of large-scale defection or collapse of the army. Therefore, I code an instance of peripheral challenge.

Sri Lanka 2005.
After the failure of a ceasefire that lasted from 2002 to 2006, the conflict started again and lasted until 2009. The government led major campaigns to destroy the Tigers and reestablish control over the entire island (Staniland 2014: 145). Starting with a new series of assassinations and abductions since the Karuna split, the conflict exploded again into full warfare in the summer of 2006 (Staniland 2014: 175). I code a second instance of peripheral challenge in the conflict between Tamil militants and the Sri Lankan government.

Sources:

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Sudan

I code 4 onsets in Sudan between 1944 and 2020: 1963; 1983; 2003; and 2011.

Sudan 1963.
"The Anyanya movement emerged in the early 1960s as a loose alliance between army mutineers and politically active southern Sudanese, united against what they perceived as the hegemony of northern elites in a newly independent Sudan. These groups nevertheless operated under dispersed and informal authority, at least throughout the 1960s. […] Despite intense grievances, factional conflict and limited external support prevented the Anyanya movement from mobilizing a sufficiently large force to mount high-intensity warfare throughout the

1960s. In the 1970s, however, the emergence of Israel as a military supplier and the ability of the military wing of the movement to consolidate power under one military leader, Joseph Lagu, allowed for the projection of a coordinated military campaign in the field for the first time since the launching of the insurgency" (Gadir, Elbadawi and El-Batahani 2005: 199).

"The first Anya Nya war was fought by a collection of small southern militias, many with roots in the province of Equatoria along the northern Uganda border. Initially, the various guerrilla bands operated autonomously along ethnic lines, even going as far as to proclaim the establishment of their own republics, such as the Sue River Republic of Samuel Abujohn and the Anyidi Republic of Akuot Atem. Six years later, in 1970, Joseph Lagu – an Equatorian leader who received support from Israel through the brokerage of Idi Amin – consolidated these groups into a single force that came to be known as the Southern Sudan Liberation Movement (SSLM)" (Mampilly 2011: 135). I code an instance of peripheral challenge.

Sudan 1983.
Following the end of the first civil war in 1972, "political miscalculations by the Nimeri regime and the gross economic mismanagement of the peace dividend generated many grievances among southern Sudanese civil servants, students, and the military in the barracks, including former rebels subsequently absorbed into the army. […] It took a mutiny by two battalions in three Sudanese Army garrisons in southern Sudan (Bor, Ayod, and Pibor) in mid-1983 to provide the trigger event that heralded the outbreak of the present war, and the formation of the SPLA/M" (Gadir, Elbadawi and El-Batahani 2005: 199). "Although it was senior and junior army officers who initiated the rebellion, the rebel leadership also later attracted many politicians, intellectuals, university lecturers, and students. Although the members of the Political-Military High Command, the highest institution of the SPLA/M, were mainly former military officers of the Sudanese army, it was presumed to represent a combination of political and military groups" (Gadir, Elbadawi and El-Batahani 2005: 200-201).

"The guerrilla bands which began to proliferate throughout Upper Nile, Jonglei, Bahr al-Ghazal and Lakes provinces often had very local grievances. In 1980 and 1981 local people were often perplexed by the behaviour of the guerrillas and apprehensive about the future. This began to change as confrontations between the regional and central government became more frequent. During the border dispute late in 1980 some Anyanya-2 moved into Bentiu district, announcing they had come to protect the South's oil fields. In 1981 and 1982 the guerrillas in Nasir, Bentiu and Fangak districts began to make direct contact with Southern police and soldiers explaining that their quarrel was not with them, but with the North. The number of northern troops in the South increased during this time, and army harassment of civilians became common in the towns of Nasir, Bentiu and Malakal, and shooting of civilians was frequent in the rural areas around Nasir, Bentiu and Aweil. Southern soldiers stationed in the rural areas of Upper Nile and Jonglei complained of the army's tactics. Civilians began to talk more favourably about the guerrillas, contrasting their increasingly disciplined and principled behaviour (in not targeting civilians), with the behaviour of the Northern soldiers. By 1982 there were also more positive contacts developing between some southern army officers and the guerrillas. One of the most influential guerrilla leaders operating out of Ethiopia was Akwot Atem, a Twic Dinka from around Kongor who had been 'interior minister' in one of the previous Anyanya governments, and who had never accepted the Addis Agreement. Three former Anyanya officers who had served together in Upper Nile, Colonel John Garang, retired Major William Abdallah Cuol and Samuel Gai Tut (then a minister in the interim Southern Regional Government) were in contact with Akwot Atem and were involved in efforts to smuggle arms to his forces. Samuel Gai Tut was found out and arrested. Another serving ex-Anyanya officer,

Major Kerubino Kuanyin Bol, had been actively engaged fighting the Anyanya-2 in Jonglei province. By 1982 he, too, was in contact with them and was even reported to have visited their camps in the bush some months prior to the events in Bor in May 1983. Throughout April and May 1983 more and more police and soldiers deserted their units for the bush. It needed only an overt action by Khartoum to push all of these groups together into an active alliance" (Johnson 2016: 61).

This case is ambiguous as the trigger to the civil war appear to have been the defection of soldiers in southern Sudan. However, based on Johnson (2016)'s account soldiers deserted to join guerrilla groups already active in the region and which were the descendants of the first civil war in Sudan. In addition, Powell and Thyne (2011) do not code a coup in 1983 in Sudan. Based on the accounts above, I code a case of peripheral challenge.

Sudan 2003.
"It is usually said that the rebellion in Darfur began on 26 February 2003 when a group calling itself the Darfur Liberation Front (DLF) issued a statement claiming an attack on Golo, the district headquarters of Jebel Marra. But by the time of the attack on Golo, war was already raging in Darfur: the rebels were attacking police stations, army posts and convoys, and Jebel Marra was under heavy ground and air attack. […] the existence of a rebel movement in Darfur had been known to the government since an attack on a police station in Golo in June 2002" (Flint and De Waal 2008: 81).

"As the SLM/A wanted to create a coalition among different tribes, it was decided that the leadership should consist of people from all three of the main tribes which made up the movement. Abdul Wahid Mohammad al-Nur, a Fur lawyer, became the Secretary-General of SLM/A, and, Minni Minawi from the semi-nomadic and cattle-herding Zaghawa tribe, became Secretary of the rebel group. Despite the outspoken purpose of SLM/A to remain united, tribal differences led to a split within the movement in October 2005" (UCDP 2021).

Given the location, first movers and onset dynamics, I code an instance of peripheral challenge.

Sudan 2011.
"In early 2011, smouldering tensions between the Government of Sudan (GoS) and the Sudanese People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) flared up again in Sudan's South Kordofan and Blue Nile, two states bordering what was soon to become independent South Sudan. By June 2011, large-scale conflict engulfed South Kordofan's Nuba Mountains area, later spreading to Blue Nile in September. Within just a few weeks, this 'new war' saw the mobilization of thousands of men and huge quantities of weapons and ammunition, air strikes, and the displacement of hundreds of thousands of people. The new conflict pits Sudanese forces—the national army and paramilitaries—against the northern branch of the SPLM, including former members of the southern SPLA, and allied elements of the Darfur armed opposition" (Gramizzi and Tubiana 2013: 8). "The SPLM-North (SPLM-N) was supposed to become an opposition political party after July 2011, but it still had troops, which Khartoum wanted to expel or disarm expeditiously. This in particular led to the resumption of war in South Kordofan and Blue Nile" (Crisis Group 2013). "SPLM/A–North was formed from SPLM/A troops that refused to withdraw south of the 1956 boundary line that became the border between Sudan and South Sudan after the latter gained its independence in 2011." "Originally, the Chairman of SPLM/A–North was Malik Agar, an ethnic Ingessana and Governor of Blue Nile state. Deputy-Chairman was Abdelaziz al-Hilu; a Masalit from the Nuba Mountains, who was the former Deputy Governor of South Kordofan, and held responsibility

for the SPLM/A–North in South Kordofan. Yassir Arman served as Secretary-General; he was a riverine Arab and was responsible for political issues" (UCDP).

"Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and the Sudan People's Liberation Army-North (SPLA-N) are locked in an armed conflict in Southern Kordofan state and neighboring Blue Nile state, both of which lie north of the border with South Sudan, which gained independence in July 2011. Communities in both states were aligned with the southern rebels during Sudan's 22-year civil war" (HRW 2012). "In a grim reprise of the civil war, the Sudanese government of President Omar Hassan Ahmed Bashir has been fighting armed opposition groups with historical links to the former southern rebels, the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A), in Southern Kordofan and in Blue Nile. Both states are home to ethnic African populations whose grievances and injustices were not appropriately addressed in the 2005 peace agreement or in its implementation. Adding insult to injury, the governor of Southern Kordofan is Ahmed Haroun, who, along with President Bashir, is wanted by the International Criminal Court for crimes committed in Darfur. Fighting broke out in Southern Kordofan in early June following hotly disputed state elections, in which Haroun narrowly claimed the governorship for a second term, and in the context of government attempts to disarm the Sudan People's Liberation Army" (HRW 2012b).

This is an ambiguous case to code. Rebel leaders were local leaders and politicians, notably Abdelaziz al-Hilu, a native from the Nuba mountains, who had fought alongside John Garang in the Sudanese civil war as a commander and fought in the SPLM-North in 2011. The Sudanese armed forces remained largely loyal to the government of Sudan and was deployed in brutal counterinsurgency. Lastly, fighting broke out in and around a state capital at frontier region with newly independent South Sudan. Based on this account, I code an instance of peripheral challenge.

Sources:

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- Human Rights Watch. 2012b. “In Sudan, Peace Remains Elusive.” [online] https://www.hrw.org/news/2011/10/25/sudan-peace-remains-elusive

Syria

I code 2 onsets in Syria between 1944 and 2020: 1979 and 2011.

Syria 1979.
“The Brotherhood’s path to formally adopting violence took more than one and a half decades after the Baʿth seizure of power, underlining its leaders’ reticence about the strategy. But while the Brotherhood’s leaders took years to change their thinking, the group’s new operating environment had quickly impressed the need for a change in strategy on junior members. Ideas of violence emerged within the Brotherhood’s grassroots soon after the Baʿthist coup, as evidenced by a violent confrontation between the regime and the organisation’s youth just one year later. This marked the Brotherhood’s first step towards violence” (Conduit 2019: 95). Violence broke out on 16 June 1979 when “the Fighting Vanguard launched an attack on Alawite cadets at the Aleppo Artillery Academy. The attack was masterminded by the Vanguard’s Aleppan leader Husni Abu and Captain Ibrahim al-Youssef who was a Baʿth Party member and senior army officer stationed at the Academy. […] The Brotherhood, whose entire leadership was in exile by this point, claimed to have had no prior warning of the massacre, having only become aware of the attack after the Fighting Vanguard leader Adnan Uqlah issued a statement of responsibility” (Conduit 2019: 112). “The Syrian government responded to the massacre with a level of fury and repression not previously seen in the country” (Conduit 2019: 113). See Conduit (2019) for a full overview.

“The insurgency began in 1979 with a campaign of state-centered sabotage and assassinations of Ba’ath officials and the regime’s Soviet military advisers. The true scale of the MB’s new reach was revealed in June of the same year, when the movement succeeded in killing approximately 63 army cadets at an artillery camp in Aleppo” (UCDP).

This case does not fit the typology as well as most other cases. In fact, most of the activities of the rebels occurred in urban areas in the northern region of Syria, especially in Aleppo, Homs, and Hama. Nevertheless, given the background of the Brotherhood, the type of violence it used at onset, and that the challenge to authority came neither from mass protests nor the army nor did it follow complete collapse of state institutions, I code a case of peripheral challenge.

Syria 2011.
“[…] in reaction to regime repression, there were instances of spontaneous uses of live fire by small groups of protesters from March 2011. […] In June-July 2011, small militias aimed at ‘protecting the people’ began to emerge in various parts of the country. […] they emerged around small groups of people within a neighborhood, a mosque, or a village. On 29 July 2011, the formation of the Free Syrian Army (FSA) was announced” (della Porta et al. 2018: 59). “Founded by seven officers, it aimed to promote desertions from the Syrian army and protect civilians from government repression (Landis 2011)” (della Porta et al. 2018: 60). “In the year that followed the formation of the FSA and the emergence of rebel militias, a gruesome deadlock of escalating violence took hold of the uprising. Syrians continued to protest, the army continued to repress, but increasingly the newly formed militias (more or less under the banner of the FSA) would fight back” (della Porta et al. 2018: 60-61). “The emergence of militias alongside the FSA also laid the basis for an Islamization of the uprising” (della Porta

et al. 2018: 61). Initial demonstrations in Daraa, city in southwestern Syria. However, it quickly spread to other towns and cities across the country. Laub (2021) provides a good review of the onset. I code an instance of insurrectionary protests.

Sources:

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Tajikistan

"The civil war in Tajikistan was fought between supporters of the United Tajik Opposition (UTO) – an umbrella group composed of such parties as the Islamic Revival Party (IRP, Hizbi Nahzati Islomii Tojikiston), Rastokhez, the Democratic Party of Tajikistan (DPT, Hizbi Demokrati Tojikiston) and Lali Badakhshan – and supporters of the communist government" (Tunçer-Kilavuz 2011: 264). "In the scholarly literature specifically on the civil war in Tajikistan, some scholars see the war as an armed struggle among clans (Collins 2006). Others emphasize economic and political inequalities between regional groups in Tajikistan (e.g., Jawad & Tadjbakhsh 1995; Tadjbakhsh, 1993)" (Tunçer-Kilavuz 2011: 264). "Some scholars have argued that, as a weak state, Tajikistan lacked sufficient state capacity to deal with the problems of the transition (Rubin 1995b)" (Tunçer-Kilavuz 2011: 266).

"The civil war in Tajikistan shows that in conflicts it is possible to connect the masses with the elites at local and national levels through networks. Elites on both sides activated their networks and at the village level their connections mobilised people in a very organised way" (Tunçer-Kilavuz 2011: 268). "In Tajikistan parties to the war were not as homogenous as a region-based explanation would suggest. Not all people from the same region were on the same side and both sides of the conflict contained people from every region. Some people from the so-called pro-opposition regions supported the government. Likewise, some people from pro-government regions supported the opposition" (Tunçer-Kilavuz 2011: 269)

"In the early 1990s, as the forces that once held together the Soviet Union began to dissolve, political competition and conflict began to escalate in Tajikistan, the far south-eastern republic of the USSR. Shortly after independence was declared in September 1991, the struggle for state power played out more or less peacefully, albeit with frequent public demonstrations in the capital, Dushanbe. Nine presidential candidates contested the first multi-party elections, which were won by a former leader of the Communist Party. Yet a popular consensus on the legitimacy of his presidency remained elusive. Tension between supporters of the government and the opposition parties intensified to the point where different factions took up weapons. Less than a year after independence, Tajikistan was engulfed in civil war" (Akiner and Barnes 2001).

"In order to understand the causes of the civil war, it is necessary to discuss the emergence of the Tajik Union Republic in the USSR and the nature of politics in the Soviet era. These circumstances, combined with the particular effects of the Soviet collapse on Tajikistan, were the main driving forces for the conflict in 1992. Civil war erupted as a result of a weak Tajik

national identity, combined with disintegrating institutions in circumstances of economic collapse and political mobilization" (Lynch 2001: 52). I code an instance of state disintegration.

Sources:

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Thailand (I thank Shane Barter for his advice on this case)

I code 2 onsets in Thailand between 1944 and 2020: 1966 and 2004.

Thailand 1966.

"The Maoist-oriented CPT was active in the northeast, south, and west of the country, although the area of heaviest fighting was in the northeast along the Laotian border. Multi-ethnic in nature, the group drew disproportionate support from northeastern Hmong Hill Tribes (Bunge 1981: 220)" (in Sambanis 2004). "The serious and deteriorating security situation in the Northeast results both from the slow progress in improving the economic and social conditions of the area and from the determined efforts of Hanoi and Peking to undermine the position of the Bangkok government. It is estimated that up to one thousand armed insurgents are now operating in certain areas of the Northeast, and information gained from a defector and recently made public reveals that a training camp is functioning in North Vietnam to produce additional Thai guerrilla cadres. By November, more than eighty assassinations, mainly of local officials, had been committed in 1966, and there was no indication that the insurgency was diminishing in intensity. On the contrary, the Communist terrorists acted with increasing boldness against the defenseless villagers, and the number of attacks on government police units was rising (Nuechterlein 1967: 128-29). I code an instance of peripheral challenge.

Thailand 2004.

"On 4 January 2004, the insurgents launched their largest attack in almost three decades. Unidentified gunmen attacked the Chulaporn military army camp in Narathiwat, killing four and making off with large numbers of weapons. More violence followed in the early hours of 28 April in the same year, when simultaneous attacks were launched on a dozen checkpoints throughout the region, including a symbolic storming of the Kru Se Mosque. Many of the militants were only armed with sticks or knives and 105 were killed by the security agencies, which only suffered five casualties. On 25 October 2004, a demonstration outside the Tak Bai police station in Narathiwat got out of hand and left seven demonstrators killed at the site with another 78 casualties claimed from suffocation during transport to an army camp (Senate 2005)" (Engvall 2014: 177). "The Thai state has responded with violent suppression of the insurgency and with increased presence of police and military personnel (Ukrist 2006). Security agencies have also resorted to extrajudicial killings and abductions (Amnesty International 2009). The government has also promoted paramilitary groups, such as village defense volunteers and rangers (International Crisis Group 2007)" (Engvall 2014: 179). Similar account in Funston (2008). I code an instance of peripheral challenge.

Sources:

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Turkey (I thank Alsi Cansunar for her advice on this case).

I code 2 onsets in Turkey between 1944 and 2020: 1984 and 2005. Given that both conflicts oppose the Turkish govt and the Kurds, I discuss them together here.

“The PKK was founded in 1978 as a Marxist/Leninist organization, formed by Abdullah Ocalan. Their actions were only political until 1984, but they started violent attacks against the Turkish army starting in 1984 with the goal of creating an independent Kurdish state in predominantly Kurdish-populated areas of Turkey, Iraq, Syria, and Iran. The PKK’s first major attacks were on military targets in south-eastern Turkey in 1984. At first, the Turkish political authorities did not take the PKK threat seriously and identified the group as a ‘bunch of bandits.’ Thus, the initial response to the PKK came mainly from the military” (Pusane 2015: 728). “The PKK was formulated as a political party in 1978 with a political, social, and military apparatus (Pusane 2015: 731). “In May 1983, these PKK militants ambushed a Turkish army unit, killing three soldiers and wounding an officer. The Turkish authorities took the matter seriously and, with the permission of Iraq, launched a strike over the border. According to the Turks, the Kurds immediately fled their camps. […] The Turkish strike of May 1983, however, failed to end Kurdish activity. Indeed, it appears that PKK was able to step up its raids after August 1984 to a point where one report concluded that "Kurdish rebels skirmish almost daily with [Turkish] troops (Gunter 1988: 396).

“These developments [negotiations in the mid-1990s and early 2000s] seemed to mark the beginning of a process in which the PKK renounced violence. In the early 2000s, discussions mainly revolved around the implications of Turkey’s victory over the PKK and the PKK’s efforts to politicize the organization. However, after his arrest Ocalan never asked the PKK to disarm, and the PKK members continued their armed and political activities in northern Iraq. The subsequent developments demonstrated that it was too early to talk about a defeat on the PKK front. The peace turned out to be short-lived. On 1 June 2004, the PKK resumed its armed struggle against Turkey. This situation showed that Turkey’s seemingly successful counterinsurgency policy had a number of serious limitations” (Pusane 2015: 729-30). I code two instances of peripheral challenge.

Sources:

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Uganda (I thank Janet Lewis and Nelson Kasfir for their advice on this case)

I code 3 onsets in Uganda between 1944 and 2020: 1966; 1981; and 1986.

Uganda 1966.
"In 1966, Obote suspended the 1962 constitution that had required him to share executive power with the king of Buganda, the kingdom that surrounds the current capital city, Kampala" (Lewis 2020: 65). "Obote had depended on the army for his 1966 victory over his enemies in party and state" (Kasozi 1994: 88). Tensions and power struggles with the UPC (Uganda People's Congress – a political party led by Obote) soon involved violence, as both sides had made contact with the army (Kasozi 1994: 83). Through internal political games and a reshuffle of the army, Obote assumed complete power of the state, supported by General Idi Amin. Following the suspension of the constitution, Obote established himself as sole leader: "Under the new constitution, all executive power were to be vested in an executive president, Uganda was to become a unitary state, and the federal and semifederal status of kingdoms and districts was abolished" (Kasozi 1994: 85). In May 1966, the Mengo establishment ordered the central government to remove itself from Bugandan soil. […] But their enemy controlled the means of violence in the geographical area […]. On 23 May 1966 three of the sponsors, militant country chiefs were arrested. […] Angry mobs joined by Baganda ex-servicemen began a desperate, foolhardy, and uncoordinated show of resistance. On 24 May Obote sent his loyal lieutenant, Idi Amin Dada […].

During our exchange, Nelson Kasfir pointed out that the leaders controlling the Buganda Kingdom government (a conservative faction not representing many Baganda) without preparation declared the secession of Buganda from Uganda. Then, the Prime Minister sent his army leader (Idi Amin) and a small contingent of soldiers to attack the palace and parliament, guarded by a small number of Baganda ex-servicemen who had served in WWII and who had been hurriedly recruited to defend it. They were quickly routed, and the government then slaughtered many Baganda in villages over the next several weeks.

This a difficult case to code. It represents a peripheral challenge to state sovereignty, although not in the classic form of a rural insurgency. While it may be argued that the conflict does not qualify as a civil war, I do include it for internal consistency. In addition, many cross-sectional datasets of civil war similarly include the conflict: Kalyvas and Balcells (2010), Doyle and Sambanis (2000), Sambanis (2004) and Sambanis and Schulhifer-Wohl (2019), Collier and Hoeffler (2004), and COW. This case may not fit the stylized description of peripheral challenges perfectly, but I argue that it falls the closest to it out of the four ideal-types of civil war onset. Therefore, I code an instance of peripheral challenge (with the caveat that it was not a rural insurgency).

Uganda 1981.
"By the mid-1980s, Uganda was a failed state" (Lewis 2020: 64). "A common trope of post-independence sub-Saharan African states generally captures what took place in Uganda next: a barely institutionalized proto-state gave way to power struggles, political rivalries articulated

as ethno-regional divisions, and then coups, violence, and steady economic and political decline" (Lewis 2020: 65).

"Elections were held in 1981 and former President Obote was declared victorious – but amidst widespread allegations of fraud. A civil war now known as the Bush War ensued, affecting much of the country's central and southwestern regions from 1981 to 1985. Several rebel factions fought against Obote's army, the Ugandan National Liberation Army (UNLA), during this war. One of these groups was the National Resistance Movement (NRM) led by Yoweri Museveni, who had come in fourth in the official results of the 1980 presidential elections. Much of the violence and confusion associated with the Bush War ended in July 1985 after UNLA commander Tito Okello staged a coup and peace negotiations between the new Okello-led government and the various rebel factions were initiated. However, the NRM continued recruiting soldiers throughout the negotiations and seized Kampala from the Okello-led government in January 1986. The former UNLA military disbanded – most fled to their home villages, predominantly in northern Uganda, while some sought to enter the NRM vetting system, through which they could join the new Ugandan army, the NRA. On January 29, 1986 Yoweri Museveni was sworn in as president and has remained president since" (Lewis 2020: 66-67).

"In February 1981, the NRA began its battle with twenty-seven men against the government of Milton Obote and his Uganda People's Congress (UPC), which had come to power through election fraud in December 1980" (Schubert 2006: 94). "The NRA's operational territory was the so-called Luwero Triangle, an area north of the capital, Kampala, between the main roads to the north and to the west. In the Luwero Triangle, the NRA carried out attacks against the police and the military, established training camps, and began to recruit from the local population. At the end of 1982, a massive counter-insurgency of the government army, the National Liberation Army (UNLA), began, which attempted to destroy the guerrillas and break their support among the civilian population through massive violence and expulsion. The NRA, which was militarily inferior to the UNLA, was able to retreat to Singo in the north of the Luwero Triangle and survive the government offensive despite a serious shortage of food. During this period of great difficulty, the NRA also recruited civilians, in particular youth who had fled from the government army and the marauding Youth Wingers, the youth organization of the ruling UPC" (Schubert 2006: 96).

As Nelson Kasfir described in a discussion about the case, the stolen election resulted in the installation of a predatory and murderous elite. Mobilizing against this government, the first movers were a group of young university students and others who had no elite status, plus one minister (Museveni) who organized the rebellion. In face of this challenge to state sovereignty, the state army did not dissolve and remained coherent throughout the war. Of course, there were defectors, a few who joined Museveni's forces and even fewer joined other rebel groups. In that sense, the war did not follow state disintegration and was not the result of fighting between governing elites. Instead, it was led by excluded politicians who initiated the armed struggle and formed initial groups of insurgents. Janet Lewis also pointed out that the army did not dissolve at the onset of the civil war and defections occurred quite late in the war.

Based on these accounts, I code an instance of peripheral challenge in Uganda in 1981 which marked the beginning of the Bush War. Note that in this case, the state was especially weak at the onset of conflict, as a result of years of political instability following the ousting of Amin in 1979.

Uganda 1986.
The new state that emerged after the Bush War was weak after the establishment of the NRM government in January 1986 (Lewis 2020). "Amidst uncertainty, for seven months after the NRM seized Kampala at the end of January 1986, Uganda was largely free of organized political violence. But in August, a new rebel group called the Ugandan People's Defense Army (UPDA) launched its first attack. […] During the twenty years that followed, the NRM government faced some rebel groups that became particularly threatening to their control over a region of Uganda – particularly Joseph Kony's Lord's Resistance Army (LRA). However, few outside observers of conflict realize that Uganda has also recently faced numerous other rebellions – sixteen distinct rebellions in all […] Only four of these groups – ADF, HSM, LRA, and UPA – went on to become viable, able to at least minimally threaten the authority of the central government" (Lewis 2020: 69-70).

"The aspiring rebel leaders who initiated these groups were mostly young adults or middle aged when they decide to form rebel groups. Most initial leaders were not typical villagers: they were generally better educated than the average Ugandan, having completed at least some secondary school" (Lewis 2020: 70). All groups' stated goal was to take over Uganda's central government (Lewis 2020: 76). "These would-be rebel leaders typically began their rebellions in their home areas, often holding several clandestine planning meetings while living at home, and soon moved to nearby forested 'bush' areas" (Lewis 2020: 91-92). In our discussion, Lewis pointed out that many of the first movers were leaders of previous regimes' security forces.

The UPA rebellion lasted from 1987 to 1992. "The group was conceived in December 1986 when two individuals from Teso who had served as military and polical commanders for the Obote regime – respectively, Francis "Hitler" Eregu and Nathan Okurut – began to discuss the possibility of forming an armed rebel group" (Lewis 2020: 108). The group emerged in the Teso region in eastern Uganda. "Between 1987 and 1989, numerous villages in the Teso region were under contested control, with the government decisively controlling only the urban areas. After that time, the conflict continued, but the group operated using mobile forces, losing ground to the government until several leaders were captured or surrendered in 1991. A negotiated settlement was reached in 1992" (Lewis 2020: 108).

"The LRA began in what is today Atanga subcounty in western Pader district, in the Acholi region of northern Uganda, when soon after joining the UPDA as an adviser, Kony broke away, deciding to form his own group" (Lewis 2020: 117). Kony "brought a small handful of devoted followers, from his home area Odek, to 'the bush'. Most of the initial core of Kony's group was reportedly made up of his schoolmates and friends" (Lewis 2020: 117).

For additional details about group formation in Uganda post-1986, see Lewis (2020). Based on her detailed account of the Ugandan civil war, I code an instance of peripheral challenge in 1986, post-Bush war, which includes the various groups which fought the new NRM government in various regions of Uganda (see Lewis 2020: 71 for a summary table of the groups, leaders, and region).

Sources:

- Lewis, Janet I. 2020. *How Insurgency Begins: Rebel Group Formation in Uganda and Beyond*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Kasozi, A. 1994. *The Social Origins of Violence in Uganda, 1964-1985*. Montreal; Buffalo: McGill-Queen's University Press.

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Ukraine (I thank Ilmari Käihkö for his advice on this case)

"The first demonstrations against the government in the east began on 1 March, when pro-Russian and anti-Maidan rallies gathered tens of thousands of participants. In Kharkiv thousands of people stormed the administration building, which had been occupied by around 500 pro-Maidan activists for six days" (Käihkö 2021: 37). The uprising in Donbas was a continuation of the Maidan protests (Käihkö 2021: 35).

"Pro-Russian separatists – with the direct involvement of groups of armed Russians – seized power in most of Donbas (the Donetsk and Luhansk Regions) and proclaimed the Donetsk People's Republic (DNR) and the Luhansk People's Republic (LNR) in early April 2014. The conflict in Donbas [eastern Ukraine] quickly turned into a war" (Katchanovski 2016: 474). "The overthrow of the government led to a power vacuum in the Donetsk and Luhansk Regions, which were – until then – strongholds of Yanukovych and his Party of Regions. Starting in March 2014, unarmed and armed separatists seized and occupied regional administrations, security service (SBU), and police headquarters in Donetsk, Luhansk, and other cities and towns in the regions. Igor Strelkov and other members of his armed group of Russian nationalists arrived from Russia via Crimea and seized police headquarters in the towns of Sloviansk and Kramatorsk in the Donetsk Region on 12 April 2014" (Katchanovski 2016: 479). Igor Girkin, a Russian military veteran played an important role in coordinating and leading the separatist forces in eastern Ukraine (Käihkö 2021: 38).

"Many of the government forces were initially reluctant to follow the orders to use force against the separatists. As a result, paramilitary units and special police battalions, organized by the radical nationalist and neo-Nazi organizations with help of the government and oligarchs, were much more ideologically motivated and willing to use force" (Katchanovski 2016: 480). "The local police and security services either refused to offer armed resistance to the separatists and the Strelkov Russian unit or sided with them to various degrees" (Katchanovski 2016: 479).

Käihkö pointed out during our exchange on this case the role that Russian actors played in transforming the protests into civil war in the Donbas. As the local population and separatist militants mobilized in insurrectionary protests, rebel leaders such as Igor Girkin capitalized on the mobilization to initiate violent conflict. Note that Girkin had been active in Crimea too. I code an instance of insurrectionary protests as it is through demonstrations that local populations mobilized and these demonstrations created deep divisions that the war fed into.

Sources:

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- Käihkö, Ilmari. 2021. "A Conventional War: Escalation in the War in Donbas, Ukraine." *Journal of Slavic Military Studies* 34(1): 24-49.

United Kingdom (I thank Kit Rickard for his advice on this case)

"Emerging in 1967, the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association (NICRA) became an umbrella organization that coordinated the activities of civil rights groups throughout the region" (Woodwell 2005: 165). "Within the context of instability and frequent small-scale rioting, opposition to O'Neill's [Prime Minister of Northern Ireland] reforms mounted in late 1968 and early 1969" (Woodwell 2005: 166). In that context, in January 1970, the Provisional IRA was created. "By the mid-1970s, the IRA was increasingly prepared to broaden its initial campaign of scattered bombings, and membership had reached approximately 1,000 (Kelley 1988: 137)" (Woodwell 2005: 168).

"Sectarian rioting by Protestant extremists and a biased local government response in 1969 spurred the rise of the Provisional Irish Republican Army (IRA) in Derry and Belfast. Among Catholics, traditional family networks in urban areas were rapidly mobilized by traditional Irish republicans from the sectarian ghettoes of Northern Ireland's two major cities" (Staniland 2010: 1641).

Following discussion with Kit Rickard, I take the Civil Rights March of October 1968 in Derry as the onset of the conflict, the Troubles. As Kit Rickard describes, following the demonstration, ethnic rioting ensued and spread across Northern Ireland. Then the IRA re-emerged to protect catholic urban communities. At that point, it was more about protecting communities from the violence by police and loyalist groups. In the words of Cathal Goulding, the IRA chief at the time, "the only defence was armed defence." The Northern faction of the IRA assumed de jure independence in early 1969 and split into the Provisional (mostly Northern) and the Official (mostly Southern) IRA in 1970. Internment was introduced in 1971 which triggered a large increase in IRA membership.

Based on these accounts, I code a case of insurrectionary protests.

Sources:

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USSR

Information in English about the different conflicts in 1944 in Ukraine, Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania is scarce. Based on UCDP and other online encyclopedia, I gathered the following information. Although not very precise, I believe it is sufficient to rule out all types of onsets but peripheral challenge. Therefore, I code four instances of peripheral challenge in the USSR in 1944.

Latvia (LNPA). The Latvian Forest Brothers were most active in the border regions, including Dundaga, Taurkalne, Lubāna, Aloja, and Līvāni. In the eastern regions, they had ties with the Estonian Forest Brothers, and in the western regions, with the Lithuanians.

Lithuania (BDPS). Lithuanian officials, students, farmers, teachers, even the pupils joined the partisan movement. Leaders included Žemaitis, a retired captain in the Lithuania military forces, and Adolfas Ramanauskas a prominent Lithuanian partisan and a teacher. Reports of activities in the environs of Nemunaitis and Alovė, southern Lithuania.

Estonia (Forest Brothers). Võru County along the borderlands between Pärnu and Lääne Counties. Significant activities between Tartu and Viru counties as well.

Ukraine (UPA). Established by the Organization of the Ukrainian Nationalists, the insurgent army arose out of separate militant formations, some former defectors of the Ukrainian Auxiliary Police and mobilization of local populations. The resistance was strongest around Rivne, western Ukraine.

Vietnam

"Keesing's Record of World Events (http://www.keesings.com) reports "From the end of 1959 onwards, and throughout 1960 and 1961, the Communist Viet Cong guerrillas intensified their activities on an ever-increasing scale in many parts of the country, notably in the Mekong delta, in the Point Camau area in the extreme south, and in the jungle areas along the Cambodian frontier. In nearly every month during 1960 and 1961 there were several hundred casualties in fighting between the guerrillas and Government forces, the latter being at a considerable disadvantage owing to the difficult nature of the terrain" (in Sambanis 2004 RN). As Kalyvas and Kocher (2009: 337) note, "few, however, would disagree that the core of the conflict was an 'insurgency', also known as a 'guerrilla' or 'irregular war.'

"In 1959-60, the communist remnants of the South, fortified with 'returnees' from the North, launched a new insurgency. They relied on the infrastructure of the 1946-54 period, mixed a socially redistributive with a nationalist message, recalled the memories of the anticolonial struggle, and castigated the governmental repression against real and suspected communist activists (Elliott, 2003; Race, 1972). In most respects, this was a textbook insurgency, though it was active not just in a remote periphery but in the heartland of South Vietnam. Mixing selective incentives (especially land reform) with selective violence against political opponents, the insurgents, who became known as the National Liberation Front – NLF, widely known as Vietcong – were able to sap the presence of the state (often referred to as GVN for Government of Vietnam) in much of the country, undermining its ability to control its territory" (Kalyvas and Kocher 2009: 337). I code an instance of peripheral challenge.

Sources:

- Sambanis, Nicholas. 2004. "What Is Civil War? Conceptual and Empirical Complexities of an Operational Definition." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 48(6): 814–58 (research notes).
- Kalyvas, Stathis N. and Matthew Kocher. 2009. "The Dynamics of Violence in Vietnam: An Analysis of the Hamlet Evaluation System (HES)." *Journal of Peace Research* 46(3): 335-355.

Yemen (I thank Marieke Brandt for her advice on this case)

I code 5 onsets in Yemen between 1944 and 2020: 1994; 2004; 2010; 2011; and 2014.

Yemen 1994.
"In late April 1994, fighting broke out at an encampment of southern soldiers near Sanaa. The fighting quickly escalated into full-scale warfare between the armies of the North and South. On May 20, after three weeks of clashes involving Scud missiles lobbed into Sanaa, military aircraft, and heavy artillery, former southern leader Ali Salem al-Beidh formally declared secession. Battles dragged on until July 7, when Saleh's troops marched into Aden while al-Beidh and colleagues fled the country" (Day 2010: 5). I code an instance of coup.

Yemen 2004.
"In 1990, the movement found a political expression with the formation of the Hizb al-Haqq (Party of Truth) in the wake of the democratic opening that followed the unification of North and South Yemen. Yes, the Yemeni regime, that had sought to neutralize the authority of local Zaydi elites, was uneasy about the popularity of the party and launched a campaign of harassment, most notably against Badr al-Din al-Houthi and his son, Hussein al-Houthi, who were among the founders of al-Haqq party. Hence Hussein al-Houthi instead focused on social activism at grassroots level through a group, the Believing Youth. In the early 2000s, the conflict between the Believing Youth and the regime escalated and in 2004, the regime issued an arrest warrant for Hussein al-Houthi after his followers had chanted the movement's slogan 'God is great, death to America, death to Israel, curse upon the Jews, victory for Islam', in the presence of Saleh. This was a clear provocation in the context of Saleh's unpopular decision to align Yemen with the Americans in their so-called 'War on Terror'. Hussein al-Houthi was killed as fighting ensued between his followers and government forces. This further entrenched the conflict and five additional rounds of war followed between 2004 and 2010. The six Houthi wars were ruthless on the civil population of Sa'ada, the home province of the Houthis, as the regime used indiscriminate violence, including air bombardments" (Clausen 2018: 563-64). "Saleh's decision to deploy the military against the Houthis was uncharacteristic for a regime that generally preferred to co-opt opponents. The result was a gradual escalation and deepening of the conflict" (Clausen 2018: 564-65).

"During the intervening years, the al Haq political party made itself more prominent by attempting to appeal to Zeydis throughout Yemen. At the same time, Hussein al Houthi, the prominent Zeydi cleric, made his opposition to the Yemeni government more direct and began clamoring for Yemen to stop supporting the U.S. government in the War on Terror, prompting crowds to gather in the capital of Yemen, Sana'a, and chant anti-U.S. slogans. "Their insistence on chanting the slogans attracted the authorities' attention and increased government worries over the extent of the al-Houthi movement's influence. The security authorities thought that if today the Houthis chanted 'Death to America,' tomorrow they could be chanting 'Death to the president [of Yemen]." Knowing that the danger of unrest was no longer confined to the Saad'a governorate, President Saleh invited Hussain al Houthi to Sana'a to discuss SAM's grievances, as well as those of the Yemeni Zeydi population. Al Houthi refused to go and al Saleh prepared for war. On 18 June 2004, the Yemeni government attacked SAM mountain strongholds in an attempt to arrest or destroy the leader, Hussain al-Houthi. After his refusal to meet with President al Saleh, the government declared him wanted for trial on charges of "harming Yemen's stability and interests"—obviously a reference to the anti-U.S. demonstrations in Sana'a. During the clashes, the Yemeni security forces resorted to the use of tanks and

warplanes in their effort to dislodge what they call a "rebel cleric" and his supporters" (Freeman 2009: 1009).

"The Sa'da conflict began with either a government police or military convoy sent to arrest or kill Husayn al-Huthi in the Marran area. Fighting continued for approximately three and one-half months, with casualties reaching roughly 480 individuals. Most of the fighting took place in the mountainous terrain of Marran, which is located in the Haydan district" (Salmoni, Loidolt, Wells 2010: 162). I code an instance of peripheral challenge.

Yemen 2010.
"AQAP was formed by Nasser Al-Wuhayshi, Sa'id Al-Shihiri and Mohammad Al-Awfi in 2009, when the Yemeni and Saudi Arabian branches of Al-Qaeda united in the pursuit of shared political goals that included the overthrow of key regionally located governments, including that of Saudi Arabia. Soon thereafter, an AQAP suicide bomber almost succeeded in an attempt to take the life of Saudi Deputy Interior Minister – Prince Mohammed bin Nayef. By 2010, AQAP had entered full military confrontations with the Yemeni Government in Lawdar, Zinjibar and Huta [southern Yemen], three territories where the group had established a presence and was trying to bring under its full control" (Lewis 2013: 86).

"Al-Qaeda in Yemen was actually bolstered by the Saudi crackdown on Islamist extremism. Saudi jihadists fled across the border into Yemen and in January 2009, the Saudi and Yemeni branches of alQaeda merged to form al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)" (Kendall 2018: 3). "Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) formed in 2009 when Saudi Arabia pushed the branch of Al Qaeda (AQ) located within its territory across the border into Yemen. This move initiated a merger of the Saudi and Yemeni AQ franchises into a single group that operated with the name AQAP. Though AQAP was officially established in 2009, the organization traces its roots back to the 1990s. After the conclusion of the Soviet-Afghan war, mujahideen fighters traveled to Yemen, including both those who were from Yemen and the now stateless foreigners whose countries denied them re-entry. Resettling in Yemen, they were granted sanctuary by the ruling Saleh regime. While most former mujahideen integrated into Yemeni society, a small group remained determined to wage violent jihad. Some reportedly collaborated with the regime to fight the Marxist government in South Yemen until the country was unified, while others fought for the opposition" (MMO 2020). I code an instance of peripheral challenge.

Yemen 2011.
"On March 18, the peaceful protest was radically transformed when 52 demonstrators were killed by rooftop snipers. In the aftermath, widespread national anger erupted, and events began to turn negative toward the Saleh regime. Mass defections by members of the ruling party, senior civilian officials, ambassadors and, more significant, army personnel were publicly announced. One of the defecting officers, General Ali Muhsin, the commander of one of Yemen's four main military zones, has always been perceived as the iron fist of the regime. Following his defection, General Muhsin deployed his troops to protect the protesters at their sit-in in Sanaa" (Fattah 2011: 81-82). Della Porta and colleagues (2018) provide useful description of the escalation from protests to civil war. I code an instance of insurrectionary protests.

Yemen 2014.
Following the seizure of the capital by Houthi insurgents in 2014, a new civil war began between the newly installed Houthi government and several armed groups across the territory.

The Houthis failed to establish control over the territory and fighting escalated in 2015. According to UCDP, following the collapse of the peace agreement and the capture of the capital by Houthi insurgents, security forces in Aden governorate declared that it would no longer take orders from the capital. After Hadi escaped in February 2015, he retracted his resignation and resumed the position as president. The Houthi government started advancing south and intense fighting broke out with the forces of Hadi, supported by Saudi Arabia. Clashes and airstrikes took place at numerous places in Yemen, including in around the major cities of Sanaa, Aden and Taiz, as well as along the Yemeni-Saudi border. At the same time, several other state-based and non-state conflicts erupted, mainly involving AQAP, Islamic State, and the separatist movement Southern Transition Council (STC) (UCDP). I code an instance of state disintegration.

Sources:

- Day, Stephen. 2010. "The Political Challenge of Yemen's Southern Movement." Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
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- Clausen, Maria-Louise. 2018. "Competing for Control over the State: The Case of Yemen." *Small Wars & Insurgencies* 29(3): 560-578.
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- Lewis, Alexandra. 2013. "Unpacking Terrorism, Revolution and Insurgency in Yemen: Real and Imagined Threats to Regional Security." *Perspectives on Terrorism* 7(5): 77-92.
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- Fattah, Khaled. 2011. "Yemen: A Social Intifada in a Republic of Sheiks." *Middle East Policy* 18(3): 79-85.
- Della Porta, Donatella et al. 2018. *Social Movements and Civil War: When Protests for Democratization Fail*. Abingdon, New York: Routledge.

Yemen Arab Republic

I code 2 onsets in the Yemen Arab Republic between 1944 and 2020: 1948 and 1962.

Yemen Arab Republic 1948.

"The assassination of Yahya in 1948 and a failed attempt to install a replacement imam was followed by multiple attempts on the life of Imam Ahmad until his death in September 1962" (Orkaby 2019). Sambanis (2004 RN) also identifies a coup attempt: The first war resulted in government victory. The 1948 coup was unsuccessful as the son of the President succeeded

him and ruled until 1962. In February 1948 Imam Yahya was assassinated; but by March, the coup had failed and Ahmad was installed as Imam. Following the coup attempt, conflict broke out between the Yahya family and the government. UCDP (2021) identify a short intrastate conflict following the 1948 coup attempt. Conflict took place in and around Sana'a (Al-Abdin 1979). See al-Adbdin (1979) for a detailed account of the events that took place in 1948. Based in this account, I code an instance of coup.

Yemen Arab Republic 1962.
"On 26 September 1962, only one week after the death of Imam Ahmad, a group of Yemeni military officers overthrew Ahmad's son Imam Muhammad al-Badr and declared the establishment of the Yemen Arab Republic (YAR). The Imam's supporters amongst northern Yemeni tribes staged a counterrevolution against the newly formed Yemeni republic, prompting a large-scale military intervention by the Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser" (Orkaby 2017: 72). "The coup in 1962 threw Yemen into a civil war that lasted until 1970, where the Yemen Arab Republic (YAR), known as North Yemen, was declared. In this war, Saudi Arabia supported the royalists whereas the republicans were supported by Egypt" (Clausen 2018: 572 ft21).

"The overthrow of the Imam by a group of military officers in 1962 led to the establishment of the Yemen Arab Republic (YAR), but it was wracked by eight years of civil war between republicans, assisted at one stage by up to 60,000 Egyptian troops, and the royalist supporters of the Imam, backed by Saudi Arabia. In the south, the National Liberation Front, backed by the YAR regime and the Egyptians, took power in 1967, renaming the country as the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY) in 1970 and transforming itself into the Marxist Yemeni Socialist Party (YSP)" (Brehony 2015: 233). "When Imam Ahmed died in 1962, his son Muhammad al-Badr became Imam, but Egyptian-trained Nasserist officers ousted him within a week. An intrastate conflict ensued between the Royalists – the supporters of the Imam, primarily made up of Zaydi tribesmen – and the new government that had established a republic in North Yemen" (UCDP 2021). Powell and Thyne (2011) code a coup in 1962. I code an instance of coup.

Sources:

- Orkaby, Asher. 2017. "The North Yemen civil war and the failure of the Federation of South Arabia." *Middle Eastern Studies* 53(1): 69-83.
- Orkaby, Asher A. 2014. "The International History of the Yemen Civil War, 1962-1968." Doctoral dissertation, Harvard University.
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- Clausen, Maria-Louise. 2018. "Competing for Control over the State: The Case of Yemen." *Small Wars & Insurgencies* 29(3): 560-578.
- Brehony, Noel. 2015. "Yemen and the Huthis: Genesis of the 2015 Crisis." *Asian Affairs* 46(2): 232-250.
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Yemen People Republic

"In January 1986 the South's ruling Yemeni Socialist Party (YSP) split, and factional fighting sent President Ali Nasser Muhammad and tens of thousands of supporters fleeing north across the border, where Saleh welcomed them" (Day 2010: 4). "Violent intra-regime battle in Aden among factions of Yemeni Socialist Party (YSP) formed in the late 1970s. President Ali Nasser Muhammad is overthrown and flees country with thousands of refugees, dimming the prospects of unity with the North" (Day 2010: 17).

"We do not know with any certainty the precise chain of events precipitating the tragic, bloody convulsion that began on January 13? Who fired the first shot and why. Aden, where the fighting was largely concentrated, was sacked, but this was not an example of a traditional Yemeni struggle of the rural hinterland against the city, even if that appears to have been the unintended result. Geographically, 'Ali Nasir seems to have drawn support from Dathina, his regional base north of the capital. His victorious opponents had their support from regions north and east of Aden and deployed the guerrillas of the North Yemeni NDF as well. 'Ali Nasir seems to have had the backing of the navy and most of the air force as well. But the army split, with the tank corps in Aden apparently playing a key role on the side of the opposition. This corps had been formed by the former Minister of Defense (1978-1981), 'Ali 'Antar, who was allegedly assassinated by 'Ali Nasir at a leadership meeting when the crisis broke. This killing of 'Ali 'Antar on the first day reportedly turned the loyalty of the officers' corps of the army when it became known to them three or four days later. This seems to have been decisive in the military struggle. The intelligence service reportedly also sided with the rebels; its former leader, Muhammad Sa'id 'Abd Allah ("Moh-sen"), previously exiled, is now back in office. The militia seems to have split on regional lines" (Halliday 1986: 39). Powell and Thyne (2011) code a coup in January 1986. I also code a coup.

Sources:

- Day, Stephen. 2010. "The Political Challenge of Yemen's Southern Movement." Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
- Powell, Jonathan and Clayton Thyne. 2011. "Global Instances of Coups from 1950-Present." *Journal of Peace Research* 48(2): 249-259.
- Halliday, Fred. 1986. "Catastrophe in South Yemen: A Preliminary Assessment." *Middle East Report* 139: 37-39.

Yugoslavia

I code 2 onsets in Yugoslavia between 1944 and 2020: 1991 and 1998.

Yugoslavia 1991.
See Croatia above (this appendix) for more details about this onset. I code an instance of state disintegration.

Yugoslavia 1998.
"Barely mentioned in the Dayton Agreement which had ended the war in Bosnia in 1995, the status of this region soon emerged as the new centre of gravity of Yugoslavia's violent dissolution. The lurch into violence had multiple and complex roots, but its immediate impulse was the rise of Kosovar Albanian militancy in the shape of the KLA coupled with brutal

countermeasures on the part of the Yugoslav army and special forces of the Serbian Interior Ministry" (Webber 2009: 449).

"In February 1998 the Serbs seem to have perceived that violent Albanian resistance to Serb rule had begun to accelerate, or was preparing to do so. The Serbs responded (or preempted, depending on one's interpretation of disparate evidence) with considerable force, particularly in the Drenica Valley region, which further aroused the already restive Albanian population of Kosovo and increased the number of individuals willing to take up arms. Serbia quickly escalated the violence, mounting an intense counterinsurgency campaign in the summer of 1998, which caused many Albanians to flee their homes and disperse in the mountains and forests. This humanitarian emergency, coupled with the general level of violence in the province, attracted the attention of both Europe and NATO. NATO coerced the Serbs into a kind of armistice in October 1998; the agreement has not been published. Serbs were meant to reduce their forces in the province with the understanding that the Kosovar Albanian militants, dubbed the Kosovo Liberation Army (abbreviated KLA in English, UCK in Albanian), were meant to reduce their military activity. Eighteen hundred unarmed observers from the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) were to supervise the accord. As far as one can tell, neither side fully abided by the understandings, and the KLA quickly recovered from the battering it received from the Serbs in the summer fighting, imported more arms, recruited more soldiers, and moved to expand its presence in areas from which the Serbs had withdrawn. The Serbs, not entirely living up to the October agreement in any case, responded accordingly" (Posen 2000: 43).

"In 1998 violence flared as the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) came out in open rebellion against Serbian rule, and police and army reinforcements were sent in to crush the insurgents. In their campaign, the Serb forces heavily targeted civilians, shelling villages and forcing Kosovo Albanians to flee. As the attempt at an internationally-brokered deal to end the crisis failed in early 1999 at the Rambouillet peace talks, NATO carried out a 78-day-long campaign of air strikes against targets in Kosovo and Serbia. In response, Serb forces further intensified the persecution of the Kosovo Albanian civilians. Ultimately, Serbian President Slobodan Milošević agreed to withdraw his troops and police from the province" (UN).

"The actions of the KLA provoked harsh responses from the Serbian-controlled federal government. In 1997, the KLA began to attack and kill the police in Kosovo. Things came to a climax in March 1997 when 30,000 Kosovar Albanians, who were protesting the deaths of their compatriots, clashed with the police" (Tatum 2010: 124-125).

This is an ambiguous onset. It resembles the other wars in the Balkans in some ways, however I did not find evidence that state institutions collapsed and by the time of onset, the country had lasted seven years since the collapse of the Soviet Union, which indicate that at least some formal political order was in place. Therefore, I code an instance of peripheral challenge. An alternative coding would be state disintegration and consider the war in Kosovo as the last conflict that resulted from the dissolution of Yugoslavia.

Sources:

- Webber, Mark. 2009. "The Kosovo War: A Recapitulation." *International Affairs* 85(3): 447-459.
- Posen, Barry R. 2000. "The War for Kosovo: Serbia's Political-Military Strategy." *International Security* 24(4): 39-84.

- United Nations. [online] https://www.icty.org/en/about/what-former-yugoslavia/conflicts
- Tatum, Dale C. 2010. *Genocide at the Dawn of the Twenty-First Century: Rwanda, Bosnia, Kosovo, and Darfur*. New York: Palgrave MacMillan.

Zimbabwe (I thank Jocelyn Alexander for her advice on this case)

I code 2 onsets in Zimbabwe between 1944 and 2020: 1972 and 1983.

Zimbabwe 1972.
"The Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) was founded in 1961 by Joseph Nkomo. However, under Nkomo ZAPU was never sufficiently militant to satisfy its more radical members and this led to a split in 1963 when Rev. Ndabaningi Sithole left it to form the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), the group later led by Robert Mugabe (who took over in 1976). Both groups were banned by the Smith regime and the leadership was either imprisoned or conducted their struggle from exile. The conflict was first active in 1967–1968, followed by a period of low activity. The conflict then became active again from 1972. ZANU and ZAPU fought separately, but for the same goal, namely black majority rule, until 1976 when they formed the joint political and military council, PF (Patriotic Front)" (UCDP 2021a).

"From bases in Zambia, ZANU's armed branch ZANLA (Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army) and ZAPU's armed branch ZIPRA (Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army) launched small-scale attacks from 1964 onwards. The conflict became active for the first time in 1967-1968, when ZAPU launched a larger campaign in cooperation with the South African group ANC (African National Congress)" (UCDP 2021b). "In the 1970s, the conditions for guerrilla struggle against the white minority government of Rhodesia began to improve. During a few years with only low-level armed activity, ZAPU (Zimbabwe African People's Union) and ZANU (Zimbabwe African National Union) had concentrated on mobilisation, training and establishing structures for efficient guerrilla warfare. ZANU began to cooperate with the Mozambican rebel group Frelimo (Frente de libertação de Moçambique; Front for the Liberation of Mozambique), which enabled it to establish bases in parts of Mozambique and launch attacks on Rhodesia from there. Meanwhile, ZAPU continued to have bases in Zambia, whose support to ZAPU was reinforced after the departure of ZANU. By late 1972, both groups were conducting raids into northern Zimbabwe, with much of their activity targeting white farmers in the border area but also clashing with security forces. In 1973, the violence again reached the intensity of an armed conflict, with both ZAPU and ZANU active. The Rhodesian government responded by reinforcing its army and establishing local militia units" (UCDP 2021b).

I code an instance of peripheral challenge. Note that Jocelyn Alexander pointed that an alternative start date of the liberation war would be mid-late 1960s, however it is correct that the conflict reached a higher level of intensity in the early 1970s and peaked around 1978/1979. For consistency with the coding procedures, I use 1972 as the start year but a different violence threshold might justify identifying an earlier start date.

Zimbabwe 1983.
The second civil war begun in the context of demobilization after the Lancaster House Agreement that ended the Rhodesian Bush War and the formation of a new national army.

Rivalry within the newly formed army escalated into uprisings (Jackson 2011: 385). “Three of the nine integrated battalions disintegrated into faction fighting. A high proportion of former ZIPRA guerrillas [closely associated with the Matabeleland region], both within the military and outside, felt threatened and insecure, and many thousands deserted and returned to their tribal homelands where they were seen as a political threat to the Government” (Jackson 2011: 385). “The painting of former ZIPRA cadres as ‘dissidents’, effectively making them outlaws, led to a situation where the Government claimed that these dissidents were trying to overthrow them” (Jackson 2011: 385). This led to brutal repression led by government forces in Matabeleland but also in Mashonaland where government troops attacked civilians despite any proof of involvement of ZAPU or ZIPRA. Based on Jackson’s account, the second civil war appears to be the result of the failure to reintegrate ex-combatant and ultimately the failure of the tripartite agreement of December 1979.

“Southwestern Zimbabwe (Matabeleland) was overrun by “bandits,” soldiers loyal to ZAPU. The bandits killed white farmers and hundreds of blacks and kidnapped foreigners. To restore order, Mugabe sent the fifth battalion into southwestern Zimbabwe to eliminate opposition among Sindebele-speaking [Ndebele] citizens who backed Nkomo (ZAPU). Mugabe’s soldiers exterminated non-combatant villagers and visited atrocities on local inhabitants, presumably because of their linguistic and inferred ZAPU affiliations. Between 20,000 and 30,000 Zimbabweans were massacred in the country’s southwest (Rotberg, 231, 246)” (in Sambanis 2004 RN). In 1982, thousands of armed former Zipras deserted and were subsequently persecuted in the Matabeleland region (Alexander, McGregor and Ranger 2000).

“The two guerrilla armies had, over the course of the 1970s, developed regional areas of operation and recruitment which left them dominated by different language groups: Zipra by Ndebele and Zanla by Shona. After independence these operational areas continued to carry weight in terms of political loyalty. Voting largely, though not completely, followed ethnic and regional divisions, creating the possibility of conflict along those lines (see Cliffe et al., 1980)” (Alexander 1998: 152). “The desertion in 1982 of thousands of armed former Zipras from the ZNA and their persecution at home led to a vast increase in dissident violence, and for the first time incidents were almost wholly concentrated in the western Matabeleland region and its borders. The dissidents were not the same as those of 1980: their position was due to the deterioration of relations within the ZNA and the targeting of former Zipras outside it, not to distrust of the cease-fire (Alexander 1998: 157).

The return to arms by ‘dissidents’, all of whom had fought in ZAPU’s armed wing, ZIPRA, in the liberation war of the 1970s, “was primarily a result of distrust within and then repression by the newly formed Zimbabze National Army (ZNA)” (Alexander 1998: 151).

“Following the cease-fire, insecurity was rife and there were still considerable levels of violence throughout the country. Guerrillas, with their guns, were called upon to gather in designated Assembly Points (APs) from which they would be demobilised or integrated into the nascent ZNA. But many guerrillas refused to enter APs, or made sorties outside them, and regularly cached arms and ammunition. Their motives were diverse: most important was a pervasive fear that they would be bombed or attacked while concentrated in the APs-the Rhodesian army was, after all, still very much intact. A significant group of guerrillas also objected to the negotiated cease- fire as a 'sell-out', preferring instead military victory. Others sought to campaign on behalf of their political leaders outside the APs, while some simply wanted to enjoy what they saw as the spoils of war and refused to accept the authority of new institutions-the courts, the police-as a result. Problems also flowed from the continuation of

conflicts whose origins lay in tensions within and between the guerrilla armies during the liberation war" (Alexander 1998: 152).

Based on these accounts, I code an instance of state disintegration in Zimbabwe in 1983.

This is an ambiguous case, as Alexander noted during our discussion, it was a period of intense state repression in which the persecution of former members of one of the guerrilla armies and its political wing (ZAPU and ZIPRA) in and outside the newly integrated national army led some to take up arms again, largely in self-defense. The vast majority of former ZIPRA soldiers did not do so and the vast majority of victims of state violence were unarmed civilians who supported ZAPU. For consistency with Sambanis and Schulhofer-Wohl (2019), I include this case as a civil war onset. However, a different interpretation might classify it as state repression instead of a civil war. This case is noted as ambiguous in the dataset.

Sources:

- Alexander, Jocelyn, Jo Ann McGregor and Terence Ranger. 2000. "Ethnicity and the Politics of Conflict: The Case of Matabeleland." in Nafziger, E. Wayne, Frances Stewart and Raimo Väyrynen (eds.) *War, Hunger, and Displacement*. Volume 1. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- UCDP (2021a) https://ucdp.uu.se/country/552
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- Alexander, Jocelyn. 1998. "Dissident Perspectives on Zimbabwe's Post-Independence War." *Journal of the International African Institute* 68(2): 151-182.
- Preston, Matthew. 2004. "Stalemate and the Termination of Civil War: Rhodesia Reassessed." *Journal of Peace Research* 41(1): 65-83.
- Jackson, Paul. 2011. "The Civil War Roots of Military Domination in Zimbabwe: The Integration Process Following the Rhodesian War and the Road to ZANLA Dominance." *Civil Wars* 13(4): 371-395.

Appendix 3

DatOnset codebook

conflict_id *[numeric]:* Unique conflict identifier.

country *[character]*: Name of the country in which a given conflict takes place.

startyear *[numeric]*: Year of onset of armed conflict. The onset year is taken from Sambanis and Schulhofer-Wohl (2019). See Appendix 1 for details about the changes made to the original list.

startmonth *[date]*: Month of onset of armed conflict. The onset month is taken from Sambanis and Schulhofer-Wohl (2019). See Appendix 1 for details about the changes made to the original list.

endyear *[numeric]*: Year of termination of the armed conflict. The end year is taken from Sambanis and Schulhofer-Wohl (2019). See Appendix 1 for details about the changes made to the original list. As of 2020, conflicts for which violence was recorded in 2020 are considered to be ongoing.

endmonth *[date]*: Month of termination of the armed conflict. The end month is taken from Sambanis and Schulhofer-Wohl (2019). See Appendix 1 for details about the changes made to the original list.

groups *[character]*: Name of the rebel groups involved in armed combat against the incumbent.

onsettype *[character]*: Original categorical variable that captures the type of onset. It takes one of four mutually exclusive values: (1) peripheral challenge; (2) state disintegration; (3) coup; and (4) insurrectionary protests. See Appendix 2 for details about each case.

ended *[numeric]*: Binary variable that takes the value 1 if the conflict has ended; and 0 otherwise. It is based on 'endyear' variable (see above).

duration_years *[numeric]*: Duration of the conflict measured in years. The values are computed from start and end year (see above).

onsetint *[numeric]*: Binary variable of violence intensity at onset. It takes the value 1 when the onset year is of high intensity (>1,000 deaths); and 0 otherwise. The data is taken from UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset Version 21.1. Note that I followed the onset date in this dataset which sometimes does not correspond to UCDP start year — which often identifies the start earlier due to lower threshold for inclusion as a civil war). For cases that were not included in UCDP (2021), I relied on the data available in Sambanis (2004, supplemental material) and secondary literature.

onsetint2 *[numeric]*: Alternative measure of onset intensity, controlling for onset month. When onset occurs in the second half of the year, I take the intensity level of the following year. Onsetint2 is a binary variable that takes the value 1 when high intensity onset (controlling for month); and 0 otherwise. The same note applies (see onsetint above).

cumul_int *[numeric]*: Binary variable that captures the overall intensity of the conflict. It takes the value 1 when a conflict causes over 1,000 casualties over its course; and 0 otherwise. The data is taken from UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset Version 21.1.

intensity60 *[numeric]*: Binary variable that measures the primary level of conflict intensity. It takes the value 1 when at least 60 percent of the conflict duration is fought at high intensity (>1,000 deaths per year); and 0 otherwise. For the conflict that have not yet ended in 2020, the primary type was calculated based on available years. The data is taken from Kalyvas, Kreiman and Siberdt (2022). For cases that did not match for start and end date in KKS, a new value was computed using the same sources and coding procedure.

intensity75 *[numeric]*: Binary variable that measures the primary level of conflict intensity. It takes the value 1 when at least 75 percent of the conflict duration is fought at high intensity (>1,000 deaths per year); and 0 otherwise. For the conflict that have not yet ended in 2020, the primary type was calculated based on available years. The data is taken from Kalyvas, Kreiman and Siberdt (2022). For cases that did not match for start and end date in KKS, a new value was computed using the same sources and coding procedure.

warfare *[character]*: Categorical variable that capture the type of warfare. It takes one of three mutually exclusive values: (1) conventional; (2) irregular; and (3) symmetric non-conventional. The data is taken from the Technologies of Rebellion dataset (Kalyvas and Balcells 2010) and extended using the same coding procedure (see Kalyvas and Balcells (2010) appendix).

warfare2 *[character]*: Alternative coding of warfare. Binary variable that takes the value 1 when symmetric warfare (either conventional and symmetric non-conventional); and 0 otherwise (irregular warfare). It is based on the '*Warfare'* variable (see above).

milper *[numeric]*: Continuous variable that provides a measure of state capacity directly linked to the size of its armed forces. It provides the size of a state's military personnel (in thousands), which are defined as "troops under the command of the national government, intended for use against foreign adversaries, and held ready for combat as of January 1 of the referent year" (Greig and Enterline 2021: 11). The data is taken from the National Military Capabilities Dataset V6 (COW) (Singer, Bremer and Stuckey 1972).

region *[character]*: Region in which lies the country experiencing civil war. The data is taken from UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset Version 20.1, themselves based on Gleditsch and Ward (2009). Categorical variable that takes one of five mutually exclusive values: 1 = Europe (GWNo: 200-399); 2= Middle East (GWNo: 630-699)**,** 3= Asia (GWNo: 700-999)**;** 4= Africa (GWNo: 400-626)**;** 5= Americas (GWNo: 2-199)."

islam *[numeric]*: Binary variable that takes the value 1 if at least one armed actor is classified as Islamist; and 0 otherwise. The data is taken from Gleditsch, Petter and Rudolfsen (2016).

marxist *[numeric]*: Binary variable that takes the value 1 when the conflict involved Marxist insurgents; and 0 otherwise. The data is taken from the Technologies of Rebellion dataset (Kalyvas and Balcells 2010) and extended to 2020 using secondary literature.

ethnowar *[numeric]*: Binary variable that takes the value 1 if the civil war is an ethnic conflict, and 0 otherwise. The data is taken from the Ethnic Armed Conflict dataset (Cederman, Min and Wimmer 2010), extended to 2020. Following Cederman, Min, and Wimmer (2010), "ethnic/nonethnic conflicts are distinguished by the aims of the armed organizations and their recruitment and alliance structures, in line with other ongoing coding projects (Sambanis 2009). Ethnic wars typically involve conflicts over ethnonational selfdetermination, the ethnic balance of power in government, ethnoregional autonomy, ethnic and racial discrimination (whether alleged or real), and language and other cultural rights. We define all other war aims as nonethnic."

incompatibility *[character]*: Binary variable that captures the main issue for a given conflict. It takes the character value 'territory' when the stated incompatibility is about territory; and the character value 'government' when the stated incompatibility is about government. The data is taken from UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset Version 21.1.

secessionist *[numeric]*: Alternative coding of incompatibility variable. Binary variable that takes the value 1 if a conflict is over secession; and 0 otherwise. It is based on UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset version 21.1.

secessionist2 *[numeric]*: Alternative coding of secessionist variable using a different source. This measure is taken from Ethnic Armed Conflict dataset (Cederman, Min and Wimmer 2010), extended to 2020.

prior_civil_war *[numeric]*: Binary variable that takes the value 1 if a civil war onset occurred prior to the onset of the civil war under study; and 0 otherwise. The measure is based on inclusion of civil war in this list.

end_1yr *[numeric]*: Binary variable that takes the value 1 if a previous civil war ended in the year prior to the onset of the conflict under study or another conflict is ongoing; and 0 otherwise. The measure is based on conflict termination in this dataset (see *ended* variable above).

end_2yrs *[numeric]*: Binary variable that takes the value 1 if a previous civil war ended within two years prior to the onset of the conflict under study or another conflict is ongoing; and 0 otherwise. The measure is based on conflict termination in this dataset (see *ended* variable above).

end_3yrs *[numeric]*: Binary variable that takes the value 1 if a previous civil war ended within three years prior to the onset of the conflict under study or another conflict is ongoing; and 0 otherwise. The measure is based on conflict termination in this dataset (see *ended* variable above).

end_5yrs *[numeric]*: Binary variable that takes the value 1 if a previous civil war ended within five years prior to the onset of the conflict under study or another conflict is ongoing; and 0 otherwise. The measure is based on conflict termination in this dataset (see *ended* variable above).

end_10yrs *[numeric]*: Binary variable that takes the value 1 if a previous civil war ended within ten years prior to the onset of the conflict under study or another conflict is ongoing; and 0 otherwise. The measure is based on conflict termination in this dataset (see *ended* variable above).

end_20yrs *[numeric]*: Binary variable that takes the value 1 if a previous civil war ended within twenty years prior to the onset of the conflict under study or another conflict is ongoing; and 0 otherwise. The measure is based on conflict termination in this dataset (see *ended* variable above).

period *[numeric]*: Categorical variable that indicates the time period in which a given civil war started. The variable takes the value 1 if the conflict occurred during the Cold War (1944-1990); 2 if it occurred during the post-Cold War (1991-2001 included); 3 if it occurred during post-post-Cold war (post-2001). The measure is based on the *startyear* variable in this dataset (see above).

coldwar *[numeric]*: Binary variable that takes the value 1 if a conflict took place during the Cold War, and 0 otherwise. It is based on the period variable (see above).

postcw *[numeric]*: Alternative coding of the *period* variable (see above). Binary variable that takes the value 1 is the conflict started post-Cold War (1991 onward); and 0 otherwise.

gdppc *[numeric]*: Continuous measure of GDP per capita based on the Maddison project (2020). The GDP per capita is taken for the year prior to the onset year. When that year was missing in Maddison (2020) and available for the onset year, the latter was taken to avoid missing data. GDP per capita is measured in 2011 US dollars.

lngdppc *[numeric]*: Natural logarithm of the GDP per capita measure (see above).

pop *[numeric]*: Continuous measure of the population per country based on the Maddison project (2020). Data on population is taken for the year prior to the onset year. When that year was missing in Maddison (2020) and available for the onset year, the latter was taken to avoid missing data. Population is measured mid-year in thousands of individuals.

lnpop *[numeric]*: Natural logarithm of the population measure (see above).

polity *[numeric]*: Discrete measure of regime type based on Polity5 Dataset (2020). Regime type is taken for the year prior to onset. When that year was missing in Polity5 and available for the onset year, the latter was taken to avoid missing data.

polity_dummy *[numeric]*: Alternative coding of regime type as a dummy variable, based on Polity5, that takes the value 1, democracy, when the polity score is equal to or higher than 6, and 0 otherwise. This coding is consistent with recommendations for categorizing by Polity team, as well as with practices in the current literature (e.g. Lacina 2006).

democracy *[numeric]*: Alternative measure of regime type based on Cheibub, Ganghi and Vreeland (2010) and extended by Bjornskov and Rode (2020). Binary variable that takes the value 1 when democratic regime; and 0 otherwise. Regime type is taken for the year prior to onset. When the value was missing for that year was missing and available for the onset year,

the latter was taken to avoid missing data. The dichotomous indicator of democracy is based on a minimalist definition. A country is defined as democratic, if elections were conducted, these were free and fair, and if there was a peaceful turnover of legislative and executive offices following those elections. To avoid missing data, I used Polity score as an indicator and coded democracy when the score is higher than 5, which marks the transition to institutionalized politics (3 cases: Colombia, Greece, Korea). This is not problematic as for cases for which both are available, a score of 5+ in Polity5 corresponds to a value 1 in Bjornskov and Rode (2020).

mountain1 *[numeric]*: Continuous measure of the proportion of mountainous terrain in a given country based on Fearon and Laitin (2003), themselves based on Gerrard (2000) who constructed a measure of the percentage of each country that is covered by mountains. The data is extrapolated to 2020 based on last year available in Fearon and Laitin (2003) as the variable is constant overtime in their dataset.

lnmountain1 *[numeric]*: Natural logarithm of the *mountain1* measure (see above).

mountain2 *[numeric]*: Alternative measure of terrain ruggedness taken from Nunn and Puga (2012), themselves based on Riley, DeGloria and Elliot (1999). The ruggedness index is measured in hundreds of meters of elevation difference for grid points 30 arc-seconds (926 meters on a meridian) apart.

mountain2b *[numeric]*: Alternative coding of *mountain2* variable. Categorical variable that may take one of 7 mutually exclusive values: (1) leveled terrain (0-80); (2) nearly leveled (81-116); (3) slightly rugged (117-161); (4) intermediately rugged (162-239); (5) moderately rugged (240-497); (6) highly rugged (498-958); and (7) extremely rugged (over 959).

fl_oil *[numeric]*: Binary variable that takes the value 1 when fuel exports exceeded one-third of export revenues, and 0 otherwise. The data is taken from Fearon and Laitin (2003), themselves based on World Bank data. The data are for five-year intervals beginning in 1960; Fearon and Laitin (2003) interpolated for years after 1960, set the value to that in 1960 for years prior to 1960, and used country-specific sources for a few countries without World Bank coverage.

oil *[numeric]*: Alternative measures of natural resources that takes the value 1 when at least 30 percent of export revenues came from fuel, based on World Bank data. When the year prior was missing, I took the value of the closest year prior to onset available. When there was no data for prior years, I took the value of the first year available after the onset in order to avoid missing data. Such a practice is consistent with that of Fearon and Laitin (2003). I researched the few countries that are not covered in the data individually.

ethfrac *[numeric]*: Continuous measure of ethnic fractionalization based on the Historical Index of Ethnic Fractionalization Dataset (HIEF) (Drazanova 2019). The ethnic fractionalization index (country-year) reflects the likelihood that two people chosen at random within a given country will be from different ethnic groups. The ethnic fractionalization index ranges from 0, when there is no ethnic fractionalization and all individuals are members of the same ethnic group to 1, where each individual belongs to his or her own ethnic group. The value is taken for the year prior to onset. When the year is missing, the value for the onset year is taken to avoid missing value. Also, to avoid missing value, for onset year after 2013, the value of 2013 was taken, which is the end year of the HIEF dataset (3 cases: Cameroon, Ethiopia, and Yemen).

ethfrac2 *[numeric]*: Alternative measure of ethnic fractionalization based on Fearon and Laitin (2003). The measure gives “the probability that two randomly drawn individuals in a country are from two different ethnolinguistic groups" (Fearon and Laitin 2003: 78). The data was extended to 2020 since the variable is constant over time in Fearon and Laitin (2003).

relfrac *[numeric]*: Measure of religious fractionalization which gives the probability that two randomly drawn individuals in a country are from two different religious groups. The measure is constructed by Fearon and Laitin (2003) "using data from the CIA Factbook and other sources" (Fearon and Laitin 2003: 79). The data was extended to 2020 since the variable is constant over time in Fearon and Laitin (2003).

Appendix 4

List of civil wars with associated onset types

Table A4.1. List of civil war onsets

Country	*Start year*	*Onset type*
Greece	1944	State disintegration
USSR	1944	Peripheral challenge
USSR	1944	Peripheral challenge
USSR	1944	Peripheral challenge
USSR	1944	Peripheral challenge
China	1946	State disintegration
Philippines	1946	Peripheral challenge
China	1947	Insurrectionary protests
Paraguay	1947	Coup
Colombia	1948	State disintegration
Costa Rica	1948	Peripheral challenge
Korea South	1948	Peripheral challenge
Myanmar/Burma	1948	Peripheral challenge
Myanmar/Burma	1948	Peripheral challenge
Yemen AR	1948	Coup
China	1949	Peripheral challenge
China	1950	Peripheral challenge
Indonesia	1950	Peripheral challenge
Bolivia	1952	Insurrectionary protests
Indonesia	1953	Peripheral challenge
Argentina	1955	Coup
China	1956	Peripheral challenge
Indonesia	1956	Peripheral challenge
Cuba	1958	Peripheral challenge
Lebanon	1958	State disintegration
Iraq	1959	Coup
Dem. Rep. Congo (Zaïre)	1960	State disintegration
Laos	1960	Coup
Myanmar/Burma	1960	Peripheral challenge
Vietnam	1960	Peripheral challenge
Iraq	1961	Peripheral challenge
Yemen AR	1962	Coup
Cyprus	1963	State disintegration

Table A4.1. (continued)

Country	*Start year*	*Onset type*
Kenya	1963	Peripheral challenge
Laos	1963	Peripheral challenge
Rwanda	1963	Peripheral challenge
Sudan	1963	Peripheral challenge
Burundi	1965	Peripheral challenge
Chad	1965	Peripheral challenge
Dominican Republic	1965	Coup
Guatemala	1966	Peripheral challenge
Thailand	1966	Peripheral challenge
Uganda	1966	Peripheral challenge
Dem. Rep. Congo (Zaïre)	1967	Peripheral challenge
Nigeria	1967	Coup
United Kingdom	1968	Insurrectionary protests
Cambodia	1970	Peripheral challenge
Jordan	1970	Peripheral challenge
Oman	1971	Peripheral challenge
Pakistan	1971	Peripheral challenge
Philippines	1971	Peripheral challenge
Sri Lanka	1971	Peripheral challenge
Burundi	1972	Peripheral challenge
Philippines	1972	Peripheral challenge
Zimbabwe	1972	Peripheral challenge
Pakistan	1973	Peripheral challenge
Bangladesh	1974	Peripheral challenge
Cyprus	1974	Coup
Ethiopia	1974	Peripheral challenge
Iraq	1974	Peripheral challenge
Angola	1975	State disintegration
Argentina	1975	Peripheral challenge
Indonesia	1975	State disintegration
Lebanon	1975	State disintegration
Morocco	1975	Peripheral challenge
Ethiopia	1976	Peripheral challenge
Indonesia	1976	Peripheral challenge
Laos	1976	Peripheral challenge
Mozambique	1976	Peripheral challenge
Dem. Rep. Congo (Zaïre)	1977	Peripheral challenge
Afghanistan	1978	Peripheral challenge
Colombia	1978	Peripheral challenge
Ethiopia	1978	Peripheral challenge

Table A4.1. (continued)

Country	*Start year*	*Onset type*
Guatemala	1978	Peripheral challenge
Iran	1978	Insurrectionary protests
Nicaragua	1978	Peripheral challenge
Cambodia	1979	Peripheral challenge
Chad	1979	State disintegration
El Salvador	1979	Peripheral challenge
Iran	1979	Peripheral challenge
Syria	1979	Peripheral challenge
Nigeria	1980	Peripheral challenge
Peru	1980	Peripheral challenge
Gambia	1981	Coup
Nicaragua	1981	Peripheral challenge
Uganda	1981	Peripheral challenge
Chad	1982	Peripheral challenge
Nicaragua	1982	Peripheral challenge
Sri Lanka	1983	Peripheral challenge
Sudan	1983	Peripheral challenge
Zimbabwe	1983	State disintegration
India	1984	Peripheral challenge
South Africa	1984	Peripheral challenge
Turkey	1984	Peripheral challenge
Iraq	1985	Peripheral challenge
Uganda	1986	Peripheral challenge
Yemen PR	1986	Coup
Israel	1987	Insurrectionary protests
Sri Lanka	1987	Peripheral challenge
Burundi	1988	Peripheral challenge
Papua New Guinea	1988	Peripheral challenge
Somalia	1988	Peripheral challenge
India	1989	Peripheral challenge
India	1989	Peripheral challenge
Liberia	1989	Peripheral challenge
Romania	1989	Insurrectionary protests
Senegal	1989	Peripheral challenge
Chad	1990	Peripheral challenge
India	1990	Peripheral challenge
Indonesia	1990	Peripheral challenge
Mali	1990	Peripheral challenge
Rwanda	1990	Peripheral challenge
Azerbaijan	1991	State disintegration

Table A4.1. (continued)

Country	*Start year*	*Onset type*
Burundi	1991	Peripheral challenge
Djibouti	1991	Peripheral challenge
Georgia	1991	State disintegration
Haiti	1991	Coup
Iraq	1991	Insurrectionary protests
Kenya	1991	Peripheral challenge
Moldova	1991	State disintegration
Sierra Leone	1991	Peripheral challenge
Somalia	1991	State disintegration
Yugoslavia	1991	State disintegration
Afghanistan	1992	State disintegration
Algeria	1992	Peripheral challenge
Angola	1992	State disintegration
Bosnia	1992	State disintegration
Croatia	1992	State disintegration
Georgia	1992	State disintegration
Liberia	1992	State disintegration
Tajikistan	1992	State disintegration
Burundi	1993	State disintegration
Congo	1993	State disintegration
Angola	1994	Peripheral challenge
Egypt	1994	Peripheral challenge
Pakistan	1994	Peripheral challenge
Russia	1994	State disintegration
Rwanda	1994	State disintegration
Yemen	1994	Coup
Afghanistan	1996	Peripheral challenge
Central African Republic	1996	Coup
Dem. Rep. Congo (Zaïre)	1996	Peripheral challenge
Nepal	1996	Peripheral challenge
Angola	1997	State disintegration
Congo	1997	State disintegration
Sierra Leone	1997	Coup
Chad	1998	Peripheral challenge
Congo	1998	State disintegration
Dem. Rep. Congo (Zaïre)	1998	Peripheral challenge
Ethiopia	1998	Peripheral challenge
Guinea-Bissau	1998	Coup
Yugoslavia	1998	Peripheral challenge
Ethiopia	1999	Peripheral challenge

Table A4.1. (continued)

Country	*Start year*	*Onset type*
Indonesia	1999	Peripheral challenge
Liberia	1999	Peripheral challenge
Russia	1999	Peripheral challenge
Guinea	2000	Peripheral challenge
Israel	2000	Insurrectionary protests
Afghanistan	2001	Peripheral challenge
Ivory Coast	2002	Coup
Iraq	2003	State disintegration
Sudan	2003	Peripheral challenge
Thailand	2004	Peripheral challenge
Yemen	2004	Peripheral challenge
Chad	2005	Peripheral challenge
Sri Lanka	2005	Peripheral challenge
Turkey	2005	Peripheral challenge
Pakistan	2006	Peripheral challenge
Pakistan	2007	Peripheral challenge
Georgia	2008	Peripheral challenge
Nigeria	2009	Peripheral challenge
Yemen	2010	Peripheral challenge
Ivory Coast	2011	State disintegration
Libya	2011	Insurrectionary protests
Myanmar/Burma	2011	Peripheral challenge
Sudan	2011	Peripheral challenge
Syria	2011	Insurrectionary protests
Yemen	2011	Insurrectionary protests
Central African Republic	2012	Peripheral challenge
Dem. Rep. Congo (Zaïre)	2012	Peripheral challenge
Mali	2012	Peripheral challenge
Central African Republic	2013	State disintegration
Egypt	2013	Peripheral challenge
South Sudan	2013	State disintegration
Cameroon	2014	Peripheral challenge
Libya	2014	State disintegration
Ukraine	2014	Insurrectionary protests
Yemen	2014	State disintegration
Burundi	2015	Insurrectionary protests
Dem. Rep. Congo (Zaïre)	2016	Peripheral challenge
Cameroon	2017	Insurrectionary protests
Mozambique	2017	Peripheral challenge
Burkina Faso	2019	Peripheral challenge
Ethiopia	2020	Peripheral challenge

Appendix 5

Additional material to Chapter 4

This appendix includes additional materials for Chapter 4. The first section provides additional descriptive statistics, which are not shown in the main text. I start with the distributions of onset type across time period and regions and provide additional statistics associated with pre-war structural conditions in Appendix 6.

A5.1. Onset types, time periods, and geographical distribution

Figure A5.1 shows the distribution of onset types over time, using the Cold War as a reference point. Figure A5.2 shows the distribution using an alternative classification of time periods. Two types of onset have become more common following the end of the Cold War: insurrectionary protests and state disintegration. In the case of state disintegration, such a pattern is driven by the numerous instances of state collapse in Eastern Europe following the dissolution of Yugoslavia in the early 1990s. Figure A5.2 confirms this pattern. I therefore control for the end of the Cold War in all model specifications.

Figure A5.1. Cold War and onset types




Figure A5.2. Time period and onset types





Figure A5.3 shows the distribution of onset types across region. I use data from UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset Version 20.1, themselves based on Gleditsch and Ward (2009) to code the location of each state. Peripheral challenge is the most common form of onset across regions, with the exception of Europe where state disintegration is more common than peripheral challenges. In addition, insurrectionary protests are most common in the Middle East, which is consistent with the distribution of onset over time that shows that the occurrence of insurrectionary protests increase following the Arab Spring of 2011. The Middle East also appear to be the region where onset is the most varied. In contrast, Asia appears to have been affected almost exclusively by peripheral challenges between 1944 and 2020.

Figure A5.3. Regions and onset types



A5.2. Onset types, ethnic wars, and secessionist wars

Table A5.1 provides the p-values for Chi-square test of independence. Except the relation between coup and ethnic civil war, the test systematically returns values greater than the 0.05 significance level, indicating that the onset types and both ethnic and secessionist wars are independent from each other.

Table 5A.1. Onset types and existing typologies

	Chi-square test of independence (p-values)	
Onset type	*Ethnic civil war*	*Secessionist civil war*
Peripheral challenge	0.5983	0.2076
State disintegration	0.09682	0.5207
Coup	0.0006192	0.1514
Insurrectionary protests	1	0.8284

A5.3. Note on the coding of additional cases in Fearon and Laitin (2003)

There were four cases in Fearon and Laitin that were not in DatOnset:

1. Algeria in 1962, Kabylie
2. Turkey in 1977, militarized politics
3. China in 1991, Xinjiang
4. India in 1952, northeast uprisings

To include the same number of cases as Fearon and Laitin in the replication analysis, I coded these four onsets following the same coding procedure as used in DatOnset. The details about these cases is provided below.

Algeria 1962, Kabylie

Following the war of independence (1954-1962), Kabyle people fought against post-colonial Algeria to regain their autonomy. This struggle was marked by the war of Kabylia against post-colonial Algeria (1963-1965). Since 1962 and the independence of Algeria, the idea of autonomy and of a political plan for Kabylie has moved along; the FFS, or Front of Socialist Forces, challenges the authority of the single party and the fundamental laws of Algeria which conceal the Berber dimension of Algeria. The party of Hocine Aït Ahmed led an armed insurrection which was considered to be a secessionist attempt by the authorities. I code a case of peripheral challenge.

Turkey 1977, militarized politics

This is a difficult case to code. I code an instance of state disintegration for consistency. The events, political terrorism, led to intense fighting between numerous groups in urban areas. The events loosely resemble the onset of the 1948 Colombian civil war. See Sabri Sayari. 2010. 'Political Violence and Terrorism in Turkey, 1976–80: A Retrospective Analysis.' *Terrorism and Political Violence* 22(2): 198-215.

China 1991, Xinjiang

"Although there had been periodic outbreaks for several years beforehand, notably in a protest against nuclear testing in Lop Nur in 1986, the current unrest began with the Baren incident in April 1990, when hundreds of armed Uyghurs invaded Baren, attacked local government offices and for several days fought off the Chinese military sent to stop them. Chinese sources are vague about where the Uyghurs' weapons came from, although they make clear that the Uyghurs bought them, and in some sense were forced to move more quickly than they intended because their plot was on the verge of being discovered. I code a case of peripheral challenge. See Hastings, Justin V. 2011. 'Charting the Course of Uyghur Unrest.' *China Quarterly* 208(208): 893-912.

India 1952, northeast uprisings

Ever since the British withdrawal from South Asia in 1947, India's Northeast has been scarred by sustained separatist insurgencies mass agitations, ethnic riots and heavy-handed stet response resulting in bloodletting. I code a case of peripheral challenge. See Bhaumik, Subir. 2007. 'Insurgencies in India's Northeast: Conflict, Co-option & Change.' East-West Center.

Appendix 6

Additional material to Chapter 5

This appendix provides additional material to Chapter 5. This appendix is organized in two parts. First, I provide descriptive statistics on several variables used in the different regression models. Second, I conduct robustness checks for the empirical analyses of each outcome in turn (warfare, severity, and duration).

A6.1. Descriptive statistics on pre-war structural conditions

Figure A6.1 shows the distribution of GDP per capita for each type of civil war onset with associated means. The means are 7.69 (coup), 7.63 (peripheral challenge), 8.15 (state disintegration), and 8.87 (insurrectionary protests). It appears that insurrectionary protests tend to occur in richer state. This finding is consistent with the current literature: as the state is richer and better equipped, armed insurgency is less attractive to opponents to the regime who choose to confront the state in other ways. State disintegration also appears to take place in somewhat richer state. This points to interesting avenues for future research examining the regime features that make state disintegration more likely, such as elections quality and institutional practices (e.g., Donno, Morrison and Savun 2021; Siberdt and McLauchlin 2022).[94]

Figure A6.2 shows the distribution of natural resources for each type of civil war onset. Most conflicts begin in environments that have limited available natural resources (117 in resource-poor and 64 in resource-rich environments). As the figure shows, the presence of available natural resources does not seem to be associated with any particular type of onset.

[94] Donno, Daniela, Kelly Morrison and Burcu Savun. 2021. "Not All Elections Are Created Equal: Election Quality and Civil Conflict." *Journal of Politics* 84(1): 134-147. Siberdt, Benoit and Theodore McLauchlin. 2022. "Elections, State Disintegration, and Civil War." Unpublished working paper.

Figure A6.1. GDP per capita (log) and onset types




Figure A6.2. Oil and onset types




Figure A6.3 shows the distribution of regime types by onset types with associated means. It suggests that most civil wars take place in relatively non-democratic regimes. The means on a polity scale for each onset type are -1.64 (insurrectionary protests), -2.00 (coup), -1.71 (peripheral challenge), and -0.78 (state disintegration). It is worth noting the distribution of scores for the category of state disintegration, which stands out compared to the other three distributions. The relatively higher value for state disintegration may be an artefact of the coding procedure by Polity5 which assign 0 to case in which information is missing. In fact, state disintegration often occurs in newly formed states or states that recently experienced prior conflict and transition to democracy. Alternatively, it may be that state disintegration, typically in the form of breakdown of government coalitions, is most likely in less authoritarian regimes as these are the regimes more likely to have government coalitions in the first place. In other words, when there is no power-sharing, there will be no coalition breakdowns. Figure A6.4 shows the result for a binary measure of regime type based on Cheibub, Ganghi and Vreeland (2010) and extended by Bjornskov and Rode (2020).

Figure A6.3. Regime type by onset type




Figure A6.4. Regime type by onset type (binary)




Figure A6.5 and A6.6 show the distribution of ethnic and religious fractionalization for each onset type respectively, with associated means. The data on ethnic fractionalization is taken from the Historical Index of Ethnic Fractionalization Dataset (HIEF) (Drazanova 2019). The ethnic fractionalization index (country-year) reflects the likelihood that two people chosen at random within a given country will be from different ethnic groups. The ethnic fractionalization index ranges from 0, when there is no ethnic fractionalization and all individuals are members of the same ethnic group to 1, where each individual belongs to his or her own ethnic group. The value is taken for the year prior to onset. The mean levels of ethnic fractionalization for each onset type are 0.33 (insurrectionary protests), 0.43 (coup), 0.51 (state disintegration), and 0.56 (peripheral challenge). These statistics are consistent with the binary measure of ethnic civil war discussed above. Turning to religious fractionalization in Figure A6.6, all distributions are similar across onset types, with means being 0.42 (peripheral challenge), 0.43 (coup and insurrectionary protests), and 0.47 (state disintegration).

Figure A6.5. Ethnic fractionalization and onset types





Figure A6.6. Religious fractionalization and onset types



A6.2. Additional analysis and robustness checks for the analysis on warfare

I replicate the analysis presented in Table 6.5 in the main text using the alternative measure of warfare. I use this model to calculate the predicted probabilities plotted in the main text. This time, I measure warfare as asymmetric versus symmetric. Further details about measurement are available in Chapter 6. Specifically, I estimate the following equation:

$$Y_i = \alpha + \beta Onset\ type_i + \gamma X_i + \epsilon_i$$

where Y_i is the binary mode of warfare, $Onset\ type_i$ is the type of onset with peripheral challenge as the reference category, X_i is a vector of control, and ϵ_i is the error term. Table A6.1 provides the results of the logistic regression models. The results are the same as those from the multinomial regression analysis displayed in the main text.

Note that when calculating predicted probabilities to measure the size of the effect of onset type on the mode of warfare (which is discussed in the main text), I hold all control variables at the mean of median level. As a result, the hypothetical civil war used is one that occurred during the Cold War, was non-Marxist, non-Islamist, and non-secessionist, but it is an ethnic civil war. It also occurred in a country with no large oil resources, with a log GDP per capita of 7.8, somewhat mountainous, with a level of ethnic fractionalization of 0.517, and a polity score of -1.5.

To further demonstrate the robustness of these findings, Table A6.2 displays the results of multinomial models on the mode of warfare with fixed effects. I use a model with limited controls. Once more, the results remain unchanged. Onset in the form of state disintegration, coup, and insurrectionary protests are all more likely to lead to symmetric warfare compared with civil war onset in the form of peripheral challenge.

Lastly, as military officers may at times interact closely with political elites, I replicate the empirical analysis with an alternative classification which merges coup and state disintegration into a single category of civil war onset. With regards to warfare, I expect that the results will remain significant as both conventional and symmetric non-conventional modes of warfare are symmetric. As I discuss in the main text, the intensity of military confrontations may be driven by the level of state capacity pre-war rather than the form of onset. However, I argue that the symmetric character of warfare is directly impacted by the type of onset. Table A6.3 replicates the logistic regression models, and Table A6.4 replicates the multinomial regression. As expected, the new category of insider challenges is more likely to lead to symmetric warfare, both conventional and symmetric non-conventional compared with onset in the form of peripheral challenge. I maintain that state disintegration and coup, although they share some similarities are two different processes of onset, which, while they display similar correlations with warfare, may at times differ with regards to intensity and clearly differ in their duration as shown in the empirical analysis in Chapter 5.

Table A6.1. Logistic regression on the mode of warfare

	Models on symmetric warfare				
	(1)	*(2)*	*(3)*	*(4)*	*(5)*
State disintegration	3.253***	3.121***	2.929***	3.442***	3.330***
	(0.570)	(0.637)	(0.664)	(0.720)	(0.773)
Coup	3.946***	3.967***	3.806***	3.882***	3.676***
	(1.052)	(1.081)	(1.137)	(1.086)	(1.134)
Insurrectionary protests	2.090***	2.500***	2.020**	2.427***	1.929**
	(0.627)	(0.831)	(0.870)	(0.850)	(0.906)
(ln) GDP per capita		-0.226	-0.035	-0.145	0.033
		(0.255)	(0.281)	(0.288)	(0.318)
Post-Cold War		0.910**	1.178**	0.806*	1.095**
		(0.409)	(0.486)	(0.433)	(0.509)
Mountainous terrain		-0.0002	0.001	-0.001	-0.0002
		(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Polity		-0.064*	-0.072*	-0.071*	-0.079*
		(0.037)	(0.040)	(0.040)	(0.044)
Ethnic fractionalization		0.264	-0.068	-0.343	-0.540
		(0.868)	(0.945)	(0.935)	(1.043)
Marxist			-0.970		-0.927
			(0.626)		(0.638)
Ethnic war			0.479		0.212
			(0.530)		(0.538)
Secessionist war			-0.749		-0.652
			(0.485)		(0.516)
Islamist war			-2.445***		-2.815***
			(0.812)		(0.966)
Natural resources				-0.878	-0.471
				(0.604)	(0.708)
Military personnel				-0.0002	0.00003
				(0.001)	(0.001)
Constant	-1.174***	0.058	-1.006	0.086	-0.957
	(0.209)	(2.199)	(2.360)	(2.456)	(2.639)
Observations	194	169	169	159	159
Log Likelihood	-94.166	-81.229	-73.002	-75.328	-68.141
Akaike Inf. Crit.	196.332	180.457	172.004	172.655	166.282

Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. *p<0.1;**p<0.05;***p<0.01

Table A6.2. Multinomial model on the mode of warfare with fixed effects

	Models			
	Conventional	*SNC*	*Conventional*	*SNC*
	(1)	*(1)*	*(2)*	*(2)*
State disintegration	3.065***	4.919***	3.203**	5.792***
	(1.065)	(1.719)	(1.277)	(2.231)
Coup	80.319***	25.730***	55.432***	20.318***
	(0.00000)	(0.00000)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Insurrectionary protests	48.521	120.433***	29.703***	78.087***
	(833.231)	(34.541)	(0.203)	(3.885)
(ln) GDP per capita			2.204	-1.779
			(1.461)	(2.544)
Post-Cold War			-2.234*	2.267
			(1.157)	(1.528)
Mountainous terrain			0.122***	-0.043
			(0.008)	(0.041)
Polity			0.189	-0.255
			(0.122)	(0.167)
Ethnic fractionalization			-1.626	56.630***
			(1.171)	(5.369)
Constant	-0.580	-57.510***	-42.442***	-49.158***
	(1.150)	(3.687)	(9.434)	(9.931)
Fixed effects	*Yes*	*Yes*	*Yes*	*Yes*
Number of observations	194	194	169	169
Akaike Inf. Crit.	451.576	451.576	416.111	416.111

Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. *p<0.1;**p<0.05;***p<0.01

Table A6.3. Logistic regression on symmetric warfare with insider challenge

	Models				
	(1)	*(2)*	*(3)*	*(4)*	*(5)*
Insiders	3.435***	3.372***	3.177***	3.583***	3.443***
	(0.514)	(0.568)	(0.597)	(0.624)	(0.663)
Insurrectionary protests	2.090***	2.521***	2.031**	2.443***	1.936**
	(0.627)	(0.833)	(0.872)	(0.850)	(0.908)
(ln) GDP per capita		-0.244	-0.046	-0.152	0.029
		(0.254)	(0.281)	(0.287)	(0.318)
Post-Cold War		0.883**	1.149**	0.797*	1.087**
		(0.408)	(0.485)	(0.433)	(0.508)
Mountainous terrain		-0.0003	0.001	-0.001	-0.0002
		(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Polity		-0.065*	-0.072*	-0.071*	-0.079*
		(0.037)	(0.040)	(0.040)	(0.043)
Ethnic fractionalization		0.219	-0.088	-0.377	-0.554
		(0.863)	(0.942)	(0.929)	(1.040)
Marxist			-0.990		-0.930
			(0.622)		(0.637)
Ethnic war			0.414		0.189
			(0.521)		(0.531)
Secessionist war			-0.744		-0.649
			(0.485)		(0.516)
Islamist war			-2.523***		-2.859***
			(0.821)		(0.963)
Natural resources				-0.901	-0.484
				(0.603)	(0.709)
Military personnel				-0.0002	0.00003
				(0.001)	(0.001)
Constant	-1.174***	0.249	-0.824	0.180	-0.892
	(0.209)	(2.188)	(2.351)	(2.442)	(2.628)
Observations	194	169	169	159	159
Log Likelihood	-94.365	-81.509	-73.273	-75.394	-68.177
Akaike Inf. Crit.	194.731	179.018	170.547	170.788	164.354
Note:	Standard errors are in parentheses. *p<0.1;**p<0.05;***p<0.01				

Table A6.4. Multinomial regression on symmetric warfare with insider challenge

	Models									
	Conventional (1)	*SNC (1)*	*Conventional (2)*	*SNC (2)*	*Conventional (3)*	*SNC (3)*	*Conventional (4)*	*SNC (4)*	*Conventional (5)*	*SNC (5)*
Insiders	3.466***	3.371***	3.246***	3.527***	3.099***	3.429***	3.454***	3.310***	3.355***	3.563***
	(0.539)	(0.614)	(0.590)	(0.705)	(0.616)	(0.771)	(0.645)	(0.779)	(0.681)	(0.871)
Insurrectionary protests	1.579**	2.678***	1.510	4.180***	1.213	4.159***	1.559	5.106***	1.245	5.098***
	(0.749)	(0.726)	(0.979)	(1.055)	(1.012)	(1.252)	(0.963)	(1.362)	(1.019)	(1.640)
(ln) GDP per capita			-0.087	-0.499	0.007	-0.214	-0.038	-0.135	0.030	0.107
			(0.279)	(0.351)	(0.303)	(0.406)	(0.266)	(0.190)	(0.291)	(0.219)
Post-Cold War			0.786*	1.011*	1.068**	1.148*	0.598	1.203**	0.963*	1.328**
			(0.451)	(0.531)	(0.531)	(0.635)	(0.485)	(0.576)	(0.564)	(0.654)
Mountainous terrain			0.001	-0.003	0.001	-0.0002	0.0001	-0.002	0.001	0.0004
			(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.003)
Polity			-0.077*	-0.046	-0.083*	-0.052	-0.069	-0.078	-0.079*	-0.075
			(0.041)	(0.049)	(0.044)	(0.057)	(0.044)	(0.055)	(0.047)	(0.063)
Ethnic fractionalization			-0.392	2.067	-0.802	2.181	-1.089	2.053*	-1.460	2.487*
			(0.928)	(1.378)	(1.009)	(1.537)	(0.941)	(1.184)	(1.054)	(1.310)
Marxist					-0.852	-1.252			-0.725	-1.239
					(0.668)	(0.999)			(0.681)	(1.001)

Table A6.4. *(continued)*

	Models									
	Conventional (1)	*SNC (1)*	*Conventional (2)*	*SNC (2)*	*Conventional (3)*	*SNC (3)*	*Conventional (4)*	*SNC (4)*	*Conventional (5)*	*SNC (5)*
Ethnic war					0.306	0.781			-0.007	0.728
					(0.560)	(0.702)			(0.578)	(0.714)
Secessionist war					-0.223	-1.988**			-0.068	-1.835**
					(0.526)	(0.773)			(0.571)	(0.845)
Islamist war					-1.922**	-17.639***			-2.287**	-17.447***
					(0.827)	(0.00000)			(0.967)	(0.00000)
Natural resources							-0.730	-0.576	-0.288	-0.752
							(0.650)	(0.853)	(0.730)	(1.045)
Military personnel							0.0001	-0.010**	0.0001	-0.008
							(0.001)	(0.005)	(0.001)	(0.005)
Constant	-1.579***	-2.272***	-1.158	0.053	-1.468	-2.011	-0.947	-2.081**	-1.089	-4.315***
	(0.246)	(0.332)	(2.410)	(3.105)	(2.533)	(3.503)	(2.214)	(0.985)	(2.324)	(1.017)
Number of observations	194	194	169	169	169	169	159	159	159	159
Akaike Inf. Crit.	312.006	312.006	281.853	281.853	270.848	270.848	260.098	260.098	257.274	257.274

Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. *p<0.1;**p<0.05;***p<0.01


[+] *Peripheral challenge is the reference category for onset type*

[++] *Irregular warfare is the reference category for warfare*

A6.3. Additional analysis and robustness checks for the analysis on severity

Figure A6.7 displays the predicted probabilities of high intensity onset by onset type. They are .39 for peripheral challenge, .83 for state disintegration, .47 for coup, and .35 for insurrectionary protests. Note that when calculating predicted probabilities to measure the size of the effect of onset type on onset intensity, I hold all control variables at the mean of median level. As a result, the hypothetical civil war used is one that occurred during the Cold War, was non-Marxist, non-Islamist, and non-secessionist. It also occurred in a country with no large oil resources, with a log GDP per capita of 7.8, somewhat mountainous, with a level of ethnic fractionalization of 0.517, and a polity score of -1.5.

Figure A6.7. Predicted probabilities of high intensity onset.



Next, Table A6.5 below replicates the models shown in Table 6.8 in the main text and shows the results of the same logistic models using a different threshold of conflict intensity. This time, the 60 percent threshold means that a conflict was considered as being severe when 60 percent of its duration in years was fought at high intensity (<1,000 battle deaths). All results are unchanged: compared with peripheral challenges, state disintegration is positive and statistically significant (although it loses some degree of significance in specific model specifications), coup is consistently positive although not statistically significant, and insurrectionary protests is consistently negative although also not statistically significant. Figure A6.8 displays the associated predicted probabilities, using the same hypothetical civil


war as to calculate the previous predicted probabilities. The predicted probabilities of high intensity onset are .29 for peripheral challenge, .50 for state disintegration, .40 for coup, and .23 for insurrectionary protests.

Table A6.5. Logistic regression on conflict intensity (60 percent threshold)

	Models				
	(1)	*(2)*	*(3)*	*(4)*	*(5)*
State disintegration	0.740*	0.988**	1.042**	0.886*	0.907*
	(0.386)	(0.466)	(0.484)	(0.528)	(0.535)
Coup	0.733	0.397	0.466	0.479	0.504
	(0.523)	(0.583)	(0.606)	(0.621)	(0.630)
Insurrectionary protests	-0.448	-0.558	-0.488	-0.405	-0.335
	(0.680)	(0.859)	(0.875)	(0.904)	(0.925)
(ln) GDP per capita		-0.364	-0.382	-0.521*	-0.541*
		(0.226)	(0.237)	(0.267)	(0.278)
Post-Cold War		-0.525	-0.655	-0.800**	-0.799*
		(0.373)	(0.409)	(0.408)	(0.432)
Mountainous terrain		0.001	0.001	0.002	0.002
		(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Polity		-0.049	-0.046	-0.034	-0.034
		(0.032)	(0.033)	(0.035)	(0.035)
Ethnic fractionalization		-1.374*	-1.381*	-1.673**	-1.694**
		(0.744)	(0.751)	(0.823)	(0.833)
Marxist			-0.116		0.058
			(0.486)		(0.507)
Secessionist war			0.036		0.132
			(0.396)		(0.472)
Islamist war			0.436		0.177
			(0.546)		(0.647)
Military personnel				-0.0002	-0.0002
				(0.001)	(0.001)
(ln) population				0.030	0.003
				(0.172)	(0.191)
Natural resources				0.834*	0.814
				(0.497)	(0.526)
Constant	-0.851***	2.669	2.812	3.608	3.969
	(0.194)	(1.952)	(1.992)	(2.754)	(2.966)
Observations	194	169	169	159	159
Log Likelihood	-121.421	-100.022	-99.618	-91.230	-91.172
Akaike Inf. Crit.	250.842	218.045	223.237	206.459	212.344

Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. *p<0.1;**p<0.05;***p<0.01

Figure A6.8. Predicted probabilities of high conflict intensity (60 percent threshold).



As for the analysis on warfare, I replicate the model on conflict intensity with the alternative model specifications. Given my theory of conflict trajectory laid out in Chapter 3, I expect to find a positive relationship between the insider challenges and conflict intensity. Table A6.7 displays the results of logistic regression models using the 75 percent threshold, which are largely consistent with my expectations. Figure A6.9 plots the predicted probabilities calculated based on Model 4 in Table A6.7. The predicted probabilities of high intensity conflict are .12 for peripheral challenges, .14 for insurrectionary protests, and .25 for insider challenges.


Table A6.7. Replication of Table 6.8 with alternative coding of onset type

	Models				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Insiders	0.865**	0.925**	0.980**	0.906**	0.918**
	(0.346)	(0.405)	(0.428)	(0.456)	(0.466)
Insurrectionary protests	-0.169	-0.094	-0.019	0.146	0.205
	(0.683)	(0.867)	(0.884)	(0.916)	(0.937)
(ln) GDP per capita		-0.446*	-0.476*	-0.622**	-0.646**
		(0.232)	(0.243)	(0.282)	(0.294)
Post-Cold War		-0.526	-0.623	-0.850**	-0.827*
		(0.382)	(0.417)	(0.422)	(0.445)
Mountainous terrain		0.002	0.002	0.002	0.002
		(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Polity		-0.037	-0.036	-0.022	-0.023
		(0.033)	(0.034)	(0.036)	(0.036)
Ethnic fractionalization		-0.950	-1.001	-1.214	-1.258
		(0.753)	(0.761)	(0.833)	(0.844)
Marxist			-0.117		0.033
			(0.500)		(0.524)
Secessionist war			0.147		0.190
			(0.410)		(0.493)
Islamist war			0.338		0.070
			(0.571)		(0.677)
Military personnel				0.0001	0.00004
				(0.001)	(0.001)
(ln) population				0.018	-0.010
				(0.177)	(0.196)
Natural resources				0.777	0.786
				(0.518)	(0.549)
Constant	-1.130***	2.746	2.966	3.919	4.300
	(0.207)	(1.964)	(2.009)	(2.860)	(3.074)
Observations	194	169	169	159	159
Log Likelihood	-114.128	-95.379	-95.095	-86.428	-86.354
Akaike Inf. Crit.	234.256	206.758	212.191	194.856	200.707

Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. *p<0.1;**p<0.05;***p<0.01

[+] *Peripheral challenge is the reference category for onset type*

Figure A6.9. Predicted probabilities of high conflict intensity with insider challenge (75 percent threshold).



A6.4. Additional analysis and robustness checks for the analysis on duration

As I discuss in the main text, the mean duration of conflict varies across onset types: 2.41 years for coups, 3.55 years for insurrectionary protests, 6 years for state disintegration, and 8.23 for peripheral challenges. In the case of insurrectionary protests, the initial distribution of cases was subject to serious outliers. As I explain in the text, I remove the case of Northern Ireland from the analysis on conflict duration. Figures A6.10 and A6.11 below justify provide evidence that this case is a clear outlier, hence justifying my decision.

Next, I turn to the diagnostics for the Cox proportional hazards model. First, I provide below plotted Schoenfeld residuals to test the assumption of proportional hazards. As shown in Figure A6.12, all covariates display a non-zero slope which indicates that none violates the proportional hazard assumption. In addition, I test for influential observations. Figure A6.13 shows the results. It appears that none of the observations is highly influential individually, as they are more or less around the line, even though some values are large compared to others for some covariates.

Figure A6.10. Distribution of conflict duration for cases of insurrectionary protests (N = 10)




Figure A6.11. Boxplot of duration (N = 10)




Figure A6.12. Schoenfeld residuals





Figure A6.13. Tests for influential observations



Lastly, I replicate the survival analysis with the alternative classification of onset. Figure A6.14 displays the Kaplan-Meier estimates of survival function of civil wars. As shown, state disintegration and coup present substantively different patterns of conflict duration. While state disintegration creates the conditions for long civil wars, coup leads to much shorter conflicts. Importantly, these patterns would be missed if one fails to recognize the different character of state disintegration and coup. In the case of the former, as political cooperation among elites as well as state institutions including the army break down, conflict emerges against several armed parties mobilized by political elites and joined by defecting army factions. Coup as a form of civil war onset follows a different logic. As one part of the army, led by officers, rebels against the state, fighting opposes two army-like organizations. Such a situation creates the conditions for shorter conflict as parties and their respective capacities are known (Fearon 1995, 2004). In fact, it is both conceptually and empirically sound to have in separate categories of civil war the conflict in Lebanon (1975-1990) and the Biafran war in Nigeria (1967-1970).

Figure A6.14. Kaplan-Meier estimates of survival function of civil wars, 1944-2020 with insider challenge




Table A6.8. Cox proportional hazards model on conflict duration, with insider challenge

	Models				
	(1)	*(2)*	*(3)*	*(4)*	*(5)*
Insiders	0.547***	0.343	0.232	0.347*	0.228
	(0.175)	(0.209)	(0.219)	(0.211)	(0.224)
Insurrectionary protests	0.895**	0.589	0.606	0.587	0.599
	(0.351)	(0.451)	(0.460)	(0.456)	(0.458)
(ln)GDP per capita		-0.042	-0.029	0.015	0.011
		(0.115)	(0.117)	(0.129)	(0.131)
Military personnel		0.0001	0.0002	0.0001	0.0002
		(0.0003)	(0.0003)	(0.0003)	(0.0003)
Post-Cold War		0.246	0.273	0.292	0.322
		(0.194)	(0.201)	(0.199)	(0.208)
Mountainous terrain		-0.0002	0.00004	-0.0004	0.00002
		(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Polity				-0.026	-0.022
				(0.018)	(0.019)
Natural resources				-0.187	-0.074
				(0.260)	(0.277)
Marxist		-0.405	-0.546**	-0.433*	-0.543**
		(0.246)	(0.256)	(0.254)	(0.259)
Ethnic fractionalization		-0.408	-0.469	-0.468	-0.494
		(0.354)	(0.357)	(0.361)	(0.361)
Secessionist war			-0.396**		-0.348*
			(0.200)		(0.202)
Islamist war			-0.416		-0.448
			(0.323)		(0.347)
Observations	166	142	142	141	141
R^2	0.074	0.111	0.140	0.124	0.149
Max. Possible R^2	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
Log Likelihood	-679.657	-556.786	-554.408	-550.843	-548.832
Wald Test	13.980*** (df = 2)	16.700** (df = 8)	21.370** (df = 10)	18.560** (df = 10)	22.780** (df = 12)
LR Test	12.817*** (df = 2)	16.678** (df = 8)	21.434** (df = 10)	18.652** (df = 10)	22.675** (df = 12)
Score (Logrank) Test	14.491*** (df = 2)	17.269** (df = 8)	22.022** (df = 10)	19.105** (df = 10)	23.429** (df = 12)
Note:	Standard errors are in parentheses. *p<0.1;**p<0.05;***p<0.01				

Appendix 7

Additional material to Chapter 6

A7.1. Additional descriptive statistics

This last appendix provides additional material for Chapter 6. Figure A7.1 displays the distribution of cases of state disintegration over the 1944-2020 period. As discussed in the main text, the peak in state disintegration onset appears to correlate with the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union. Figure A7.2 provides the distribution of cases by region. The largest share of cases occurred in Africa (17 cases), which is to be expected as Africa is where most civil war over the post-World War II period took place. More surprisingly, is that Europe is the second location in which state disintegration occurs (10 cases), which is consistent with the trend over time.

Figure A7.1. Distribution of cases of state disintegration over time





Figure A7.2. Distribution of cases by region



Next, Figure A7.3 provides the distribution of ethnic wars among cases of state disintegration. A large majority of cases of state disintegration are wars categorized as ethnic. Out of 36 cases, 28 are ethnic conflicts while 8 are non-ethnic. As I put forward in the main text, such a finding can be explained by the fact that as state institutions collapse, elites and recruits mobilize alternative social categories, ethnic being one such identity. Another explanation, although not entirely separated, may be that ethnic states are more fragile to disintegration and conflict in the first place.

Figure A7.3. Distribution of ethnic civil war for cases of state disintegration




Table A7.1 compares descriptive statistics of several structural factors between countries that experience state disintegration and those that experience other types of civil war onset.

Table A7.1. Profiles of regimes that experience state disintegration.

	Subset		All other cases		t-test results
Covariates (all lagged one year)	*Mean*	*Standard deviation*	*Mean*	*Standard deviation*	*p-values*
(log) GDP per capita	8.147	0.853	7.746	0.897	0.019
Polity	-0.778	4.727	-1.732	5.886	0.302
Ethnic fractionalization	0.506	0.264	0.520	0.274	0.772
Religious fractionalization	0.466	0.221	0.419	0.201	0.255
(log) population	9.019	1.331	9.780	1.538	0.005
Oil	0.361	0.487	0.169	0.376	0.031

Figure A7.4 plots the distribution of polity score for countries that experienced civil war onset in the form state disintegration between 1944 and 2020. 13 of these countries have polity scores greater than 0, while 17 have scores smaller than 0. Table A7.2 lists the cases with a polity score of 0.

Figure A7.4. Distribution of polity scores for cases of state disintegration




Table A7.2. List of cases with polity score of zero

Country	*Onset year*	*Armed groups/conflict*
D. R. Congo (Zaïre)	1960	Katanga; Kasai; Kwilu (eastern DRC)
Bosnia	1992	Rep. SRPSKA, Croats, Muslims
Liberia	1992	NPLF; ULIMO; NPF; LPC; LDF
South Sudan	2013	Kiir vs. Machar; SPLM/A-IO
Libya	2014	Militarized factions
Yemen	2014	Post-Hadi war

Tables A7.3 and A7.4 provide the list of cases that have experienced prior conflict within one and five years respectively. Almost one third (30.56%) of the cases of state disintegration started within one year following the termination of a previous episode of conflict. In comparison, 19.68% of the cases of peripheral challenges occurred within one year following a prior conflict.

Table A7.3. List of cases that followed previous conflict within one year (N = 11)

Country	*Onset year*	*Armed groups/conflict*
Chad	1979	FAN; FARF; FROLINAT
Somalia	1991	Post-Barre war
Afghanistan	1992	Intra-Mujahideen war
Angola	1992	UNITA; MPLA
Georgia	1992	Abkhazia war
Burundi	1993	CNDD-FDD; PALIPEHUTU-FNL; FROLINA; ULINA
Rwanda	1994	RPF; Genocide
Angola	1997	UNITA; MPLA
Congo	1998	Lissouba v. Sassou-Nguesso v. Kolelas
Central African Republic	2013	Anti-Balaka; post-Seleka
Yemen	2014	Post-Hadi war

Table A7.4. List of cases that followed previous conflict within five years (N = 16)

Country	*Onset year*	*Armed groups/conflict*
Chad	1979	FAN; FARF; FROLINAT
Zimbabwe	1983	Post-independence war (ZAPU vs. ZANU)
Somalia	1991	Post-Barre war
Afghanistan	1992	Intra-Mujahideen war
Angola	1992	UNITA; MPLA
Georgia	1992	Abkhazia war
Liberia	1992	NPLF, ULIMO, NPF, LPC, LDF
Burundi	1993	CNDD-FDD; PALIPEHUTU-FNL; FROLINA; ULINA
Rwanda	1994	RPF; Genocide
Angola	1997	UNITA; MPLA
Congo	1997	Lissouba v. Sassou-Nguesso v. Kolelas
Congo	1998	Lissouba v. Sassou-Nguesso v. Kolelas
Ivory Coast	2011	Gbagbo vs. Ouattara
Central African Republic	2013	Anti-Balaka; post-Seleka
Libya	2014	Militarized factions
Yemen	2014	Post-Hadi war

A7.2. List of the civil society organizations that contributed to the archives

Bubanza
- Parents des victimes de Bubanza

Bujumbura rural
- Parents des victimes de Bujumbura

Canzuko
- Association pour le Développement de Cankuzo (ASSODECA)

Cibitoke
- Parents des victimes de Cibitoke

Gitega
- Runyinya (Commune Makebuko, Buraza, Itaba, Bukirasazi)
- Association des Volontaires pour le Développement de Bugendana (AVODEBU)
- Association de Développement de Giheta (ADEGI)
- Parents des victimes de la Commune Mutaho
- Parents des victimes de la Commune Gitega
- Association de Développement de la Commune Ryansoro (ADCR)
- Parents des victimes de la Commune Gishubi

Karuzi
- Association pour le Développement Économique de Karuzi (ADECAR)

Kayanza
- Association pour l'Assistance aux Sinistrés de Kayanza (ASSIKA)

Kirundo
- Kirundo avenir (KIRA)

Muramvya
- Association de Développement de Mbuye (ADECOM)
- Association des sinistrés de Kiganda

Muyinga
- Association pour le Soutien des Sinistrés de Muyinga

Ngozi
- Association pour le Développement de Ruhororo (ASDR)

Rutana
- Association pour le Développement de Rutana (ADECOR)
- Association pour le Développement de la Commune Gitanga (ADECOGI)

Ruyigi
- Cercle des Ressortissants et des Amis de la Province de Ruyigi
- Association pour la Protection des Minorités (APM-ASBL)

A7.3. Comparison of cases

Lastly, Table A7.5 provides summary statistics on the additional cases: Afghanistan, Bosnia, and Lebanon. As I discuss in the main text, these three additional cases display macro-level patterns that are to the expected trajectory of conflict following state disintegration. They also have in common that ethnic identities became salient in the conflict, which is representative of most conflicts in that category. Lastly, they share that they experienced prior conflict, either at home or in their direct neighborhood, which is also representative of most cases. These cases also differ in important ways which makes them useful candidates for comparison. First, they vary in the level of state capacity prior to onset, measured as GDP per capita. Second, they vary in location and are spread across different regions. Third, while in Burundi, conflict mostly took place in rural areas, in these cases violence started in urban areas including the capital cities. Lastly, they vary in their respective ethnic and religious makeup.

Table A7.5. Comparison of selected cases

Covariates	**Burundi**	**Afghanistan**	**Bosnia**	**Lebanon**
Region	Africa	Asia	Europe	Middle East
Start year	1993	1992	1992	1975
Onset type	State disintegration	State disintegration	State disintegration	State disintegration
Onset intensity	High	High	High	Low
Conflict intensity	Low	High	High	Low

Table A7.5 *(continued)*

Covariates	**Burundi**	**Afghanistan**	**Bosnia**	**Lebanon**
Duration (in years)	14	5	4	17
Warfare	SNC	Conventional	Conventional	Conventional
*GDP per capita (log)**	7.028	6.781	8.542	9.034
*Polity**	-3	-8	0	3
*Ethnic fractionalization**	0.289	0.702	0.663	0.128
*Religious fractionalization**	0.550	0.272	0.710	0.753

* The covariates are lagged by one year.