Rethinking the epistemic case against epistocracy

Journal article

Abstract:: In this article, I focus on arguments which suggest that disenfranchising persons on the grounds of incompetence is likely to produce epistemically sub-optimal decisions. I suggest three ways in which such arguments can be strengthened. First, I argue that they can be untethered from the controversial ‘best judge’ principle, according to which each person is the best judge of his or her own interests. Second, I suggest that epistemic arguments against epistocracy are currently insensitive to ...
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Institution:

University of Oxford

Division:

Colleges and Halls

Department:

Lady Margaret Hall

Department:

Oxford, Colleges and Halls

Role:

Author

Publisher:: Routledge Publisher's website
Journal:: Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy Journal website
Publication date:: 2018-07-16
Acceptance date:: 2018-06-17
DOI:: 10.1080/13698230.2018.1497246
EISSN:: 1743-8772
ISSN:: 1369-8230

Keywords:: democratic theory

epistemic democracy

strategic avoidance

social epistemology

epistocracy
Pubs id:: pubs:865007
UUID:: uuid:8a708def-a946-47c3-b69f-0d82a207381f
Local pid:: pubs:865007
Source identifiers:: 865007
Deposit date:: 2018-07-06

Copyright holder:: Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group
Notes:: Copyright © 2018 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group. This is the accepted manuscript version of the article. The final version is available online from Routledge at: https://doi.org/10.1080/13698230.2018.1497246

Licence:: Terms and Conditions of Use for Oxford University Research Archive

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