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Rethinking the epistemic case against epistocracy

Abstract:

In this article, I focus on arguments which suggest that disenfranchising persons on the grounds of incompetence is likely to produce epistemically sub-optimal decisions. I suggest three ways in which such arguments can be strengthened. First, I argue that they can be untethered from the controversial ‘best judge’ principle, according to which each person is the best judge of his or her own interests. Second, I suggest that epistemic arguments against epistocracy are currently insensitive to ...

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Publication status:
Published
Peer review status:
Peer reviewed

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Publisher copy:
10.1080/13698230.2018.1497246

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Institution:
University of Oxford
Division:
Colleges and Halls
Department:
Lady Margaret Hall
Department:
Oxford, Colleges and Halls
Role:
Author
Publisher:
Routledge
Journal:
Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy More from this journal
Publication date:
2018-07-16
Acceptance date:
2018-06-17
DOI:
EISSN:
1743-8772
ISSN:
1369-8230
Keywords:
Pubs id:
pubs:865007
UUID:
uuid:8a708def-a946-47c3-b69f-0d82a207381f
Local pid:
pubs:865007
Source identifiers:
865007
Deposit date:
2018-07-06

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