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

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Liberals, Socialists, Internationalists, Jews*

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In his landmark 1997 book *Cultural Internationalism and World Order*, Akira Iriye set out to 'show that it is perfectly possible to narrate the drama of international relations without giving principal roles to separate national existence'.[1] Thus he sought to 'downplay the theme of power' by emphasising instead the role of 'individuals and groups of people from different lands' in seeking to develop an alternative community of nations through cross-national cooperation and interchange. Historians and social scientists have certainly heeded Iriye's call. This new historiography has highlighted the long-term significance of internationalism, its deep roots in the nineteenth century, and its role in shaping the twentieth century.[2] In this context, Glenda Sluga has emphasised both the importance of 'objective internationalism' as a historic preoccupation, and the mutually constitutive nature of nationalism and internationalism more generally.[3] International gatherings like the Hague Peace Conferences

* I would like to thank David Feldman, Ruth Harris, Eliyahu Stern, and the editors of this special issue for their feedback on this article. I am also grateful to the Arts and Humanities Research Council for supporting this work through a Leadership Fellowship.

[1] Akira Iriye, *Cultural Internationalism and World Order* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997), 1.

[2] Martin H. Geyer and Johannes Paulmann, eds., *The Mechanics of Internationalism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001); Akira Iriye, *Global Community. The Role of International Organizations in the Making of the Contemporary World* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002); Frank J. Lechner and John Boli, *World Culture: Origins and Consequences* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2005); Mark Mazower, *Governing the World. The History of an Idea* (London: Allen Lane, 2012); Glenda Sluga and Patricia Clavin, eds., *Internationalisms. A Twentieth Century History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017).

[3] Glenda Sluga, *Internationalism in the Age of Nationalism*, Pennsylvania Studies in Human Rights (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013).

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and the Universal Races Congress certainly acted as magnets for a fascinating range of individuals and organisations. Nor is it surprising that these eclectic, cosmopolitan events seem so appealing to historians of our self-consciously global age. Yet the framework of the national or imperial state remained a far more meaningful context than these ephemeral international gatherings, even for participants. This article, therefore, seeks to turn Iriye's proposition on its head by arguing that a bottom-up, actor-focused approach to writing the history of international relations – and of internationalism in particular – must take proper account of the national arena in ways that go beyond the national/international binary. It is easy to pay lip-service to the role of individuals in constructing internationalism, but far harder to think about what this meant in practice in ways that go beyond the banal.

Thinking about the relationship between liberalism and socialism provides a good way into this problem precisely because – in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries – this relationship was not clear-cut. In this period, both liberalism and socialism were broadly conceived ideologies with international horizons and more narrowly conceived political movements that sought to promote these ideologies in specific national contexts. We cannot understand the relationship between the former without considering the latter, and we need to understand both if we want to think about how individuals navigated the boundaries between them and what, if anything, this tells us about the international as a sphere of action. I propose to explore these issues by thinking about Jews – more specifically Jewish men, since Jewish women faced a different set of limits and opportunities that were conditioned as much by their gender as by their Jewishness.[4] On one level, Jewishness provides a useful point of comparison across otherwise divergent nation states in which key issues like religion and class were very differently weighted. On another level, as we shall see, Jewishness cuts across liberal/socialist, religious/secular and national/international boundaries in ways that defy easy ideological categorisation.

Using Jewishness as a point of comparison may appear problematic because it implies a homogeneity that is entirely at odds with the realities of Jewish life at the turn of the nineteenth century: none of the

[4] On the internationalism of Jewish women see Jaclyn Granick and Abigail Green, eds., *Gendering Jewish Inter/Nationalism*, forthcoming special issue of the *Journal of Modern Jewish Studies* scheduled for 2020. Mary McCune, *'The Whole Wide World Without Limits'. International Relief, Gender Politics, and American Jewish Women, 1893–1930* (Detroit, Michigan: Wayne State University Press, 2005) addresses these issues to some degree.

protagonists of this article were conventionally religious or observant Jews. Yet as Hannah Arendt argued in the immediate aftermath of the Holocaust, the unique place Jews occupied in the European political imagination reified Jewishness in a way that made it possible to live a self-consciously Jewish life without frequent or even any explicit engagement with Jewish communal or religious life.[5] The subjective nature of Jewishness makes for a complicated category of analysis, but it is precisely this subjectivity that promises to shed new light on how individuals navigated the boundary between the national and the international. If variability is the essence of ethnicity in its significance for the structuring of social relations in diverse contexts, then thinking about the different behaviour of individuals in distinct national contexts and in the international arena can help us to identify the shifting balance between cognitive and structural determinants of Jewishness – and vice versa.[6]

The article is framed as a comparative survey of fin-de-siècle politics at the interface between liberalism and socialism through a focus on four important political figures, all of whom were Jewish: Victor Basch, a founder-member of the *Ligue des Droits de l'Homme*, who eventually emerged as one of the architects of the French Popular Front government; Ernesto Nathan, a leading freemason and second-generation disciple of Mazzini who served as Mayor of Rome between 1907 and 1913; the German political journalist Paul Nathan, who became a founder of the *Deutsche Demokratische Partei* in 1918; and the British New Liberal Herbert Samuel, long-serving cabinet minister and later leader of a Liberal Party in decline. The first two parts of the article are essentially comparative, but the concluding section, which focuses on the ways in which Jewishness shaped the political engagements of these men, ranges more broadly both chronologically and geographically. The careers of all four protagonists illuminate the political dynamics at work in four very different Western European contexts: Catholic France and Italy, where the politics of the left were defined partly by anti-clericalism; and Germany and Britain, two largely Protestant countries in which divergent political traditions and institutions made for a very different balance between liberal and socialist forces. Importantly, all four of these men were also connected to internationalist networks – socialist, masonic, liberal, pacifist.

[5] See for instance Hannah Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism* (New York: Harvest Book, 1968), chap 3.

[6] Jonathan Y. Okamura, 'Situational Ethnicity', *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 4, no. 4 (1981): 452–464.

Notwithstanding their more or less secular commitments, all four also engaged as internationalists with explicitly Jewish causes (Dreyfus, pogroms, refugees, Zionism).

Jewishness certainly inhibited the freedom of political action available to these men, who were unlikely to be drawn towards right-wing politics because these were often aggressively anti-Jewish – even if liberal and socialist politics was by no means free of anti-semitic undercurrents.[7] Thinking about Jews therefore serves to underline the common ground between liberal and socialism at a time when illiberal politics (and illiberal internationalism) was to be found primarily on the right – in the reactionary internationalism of the Catholic Church, and the almost equally precocious internationalism of political antisemitism.[8] Here, it is important to remember that while *we* may understand Jewishness as an ethno-religious category, the protagonists of this article operated in a context in which the ethnic dimensions of Jewishness were profoundly suspect. Only through the Minorities Treaties of 1919, did ethnicity acquire formal recognition as a category in the international arena, but after 1917 the fundamental opposition between a liberal world order and the politics of communist revolution had become abundantly clear. By contrast, freedom of religion was relatively uncontroversial and anti-clericalism had long been a central dimension of European liberal politics for both Christians and Jews.[9] Before 1848, liberals had not necessarily supported Jewish emancipation, but after 1848 civil and religious equality became a defining feature of the new political order liberals hoped to create. By 1878, policy towards the emerging Christian states of the Balkans suggested that civil and religious equality had become a prerequisite of nation-statehood and acceptance in the Western world order.[10] Even in

[7] On the role of socialism in early French antisemitism, see Julie Kalman, *Rethinking Antisemitism in Nineteenth-Century France* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), chap. 5. More generally Michele Battini, *Socialism of Fools. Capitalism and Modern Anti-Semitism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2016). For a general reassessment of the complex place of Jews in liberal political culture see Abigail Green and Simon Levis-Sullam, eds., *Jews, Liberalism, Antisemitism: A Global History* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, forthcoming).

[8] Emiel Lambert, ed., *The Black International. 1870–1878. The Holy See and Militant Catholicism in Europe*, KADOC Studies (Brussels, Rome: Belgisch Historisch Instituut te Rome, 2002); Arendt, *Origins of Totalitarianism*, Part 1, chap. 2, iii; Faith Hillis, 'The "Franco-Russian Marseillaise": International Exchange and the Making of Antiliberal Politics in Fin de Siècle France', *Journal of Modern History* 2017, no. 89 (2017): 39–78.

[9] Christopher Clark and Wolfram Kaiser, eds., *Culture Wars. Secular-Catholic Conflict in Nineteenth-Century Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003); Ari Joskowicz, *The Modernity of Others. Jewish Anti-Catholicism in Germany and France* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2014).

[10] Abigail Green, 'The Limits of Intervention: Coercive Diplomacy and the Jewish Question in the 19th Century', *International History Review* 36, no. 3 (2014): 473–492.

Romania where leading liberals like Ion C. Brătianu embraced the politics of antisemitism, the central liberal premise of freedom of religion was never called into question. Romanian liberals maintained that Judaism as a religion was not the target; Jews as foreigners were. The German National Liberal Heinrich von Treitschke famously took a similar line.[11] Although early socialism was imbricated with antisemitism, socialists too embraced the politics of anti-clericalism and accepted the principle of freedom of religion.

That said, liberals and socialists understood secularism in fundamentally different ways, with important consequences for how the protagonists of this article navigated the boundaries between them at the local, national and international level. The balance struck between 'liberal' and 'illiberal' forces in specific national contexts was a further critical factor. The politicians that are the focus of this article would not have questioned the existence or meaning of the divide between liberalism and socialism, any more than they would have challenged the opposition between the religious and the secular that structured politics at both national and international level. Yet these crude oppositions fail to capture the complexity of their public lives as Jews, or indeed their private selves. In this sense, thinking about their Jewishness forces us to think more deeply about their humanity.

Throughout, the article underscores the multiple entanglements between liberalism and socialism in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, highlighting the liminal status of social democracy and its role in consolidating, rather than challenging, the liberal world order. This may appear to state the obvious, for nothing the article says about these specific national contexts will come as a surprise to specialists. Yet the comparative lens makes it easier to spot broader trends. Indeed, once we set these national contexts alongside 'the international' it becomes clear that these different levels of activity were not just mutually constitutive, they were also contradictory – albeit in unexpected ways. Thinking about these contradictions highlights both the limits and the possibilities of the new historiography of internationalism.

[11] Marcel Stoetzler, *The State, the Nation & the Jews. Liberalism and the Antisemitism Dispute in Bismarck's Germany* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2008).

National Contexts

If the early twentieth century was a period in which socialism began to pose a real threat to the liberal order, then it was also – perhaps as a consequence – a period that saw accommodation between liberalism and socialism, and some meaningful collaboration. Inevitably, this took different forms in different contexts and was motivated by different concerns in different times and places. Broadly speaking, however, it is worth noting that this collaboration was invariably stimulated by the need to oppose different forms of illiberal politics: Catholicism, right-wing antisemitism and attacks on freedom of expression.

In France the fin-de-siècle saw a fundamental realignment of the French party system as the Dreyfus Affair created a constellation conducive to collaboration between liberal republicans of the centre-left, radicals and socialists.[12] This collaboration had looked much less likely during the 'ralliement' of the early 1890s, when the encylicals *Libertas* (1888) and *Rerum Novarum* (1891) issued by Leo XIII went some way to breaking the association between Catholicism and illiberal politics cemented in 1864 by Pius IX's Syllabus of Errors.[13] Leo XIII had intended to forge a new Catholic politics of social solidarity, but what emerged in France was a parliamentary coalition between centrist republicans and the right-wing parties traditionally associated with Catholicism in defence of the existing social and economic order. Class was replacing religion as the critical fault-line in French politics. A wave of strikes and the brutal repression of working class activism seemed to confirm a new age of violent social conflict. As right-wing republicans like Jules Méline rejected the politics of anti-clericalism and free-trade, so radicals like Jean Jaurés and Alexandre Millerand rejected economic individualism and stood for parliament not as

[12] On the Dreyfus Affair see above all Ruth Harris, *The Man on Devil's Island: Alfred Dreyfus and the Affair That Divided France* (London: Allen Lane/ Penguin Press, 2010). For a classic account of its impact on the French party system see François Goguel, *La Politique des Partis sous la IIIe République* (Paris: Seuil, 1946), chap. 4–5; also Pierre Lévêque, *1880–1940*, vol. 2 of *Histoire Des Forces Politiques en France* (Paris: Armand Colin, 1994), chap. I–III.

[13] On the new international politics of Leo XIII see Vincent Viaene, ed., *The Papacy and the New World Order. Vatican Diplomacy, Catholic Opinion and International Politics in the Time of Leo XIII, 1878–1903* (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2005). On Catholic internationalism more generally see Vincent Viaene, 'International History, Religious History, Catholic History: Perspectives for Cross-Fertilization (1830–1914)', *European History Quarterly* 38 (2008) and Vincent Viaene, 'Nineteenth-Century Catholic Internationalism and Its Predecessors', in *Religious Internationals in the Modern World: Globalization and Faith Communities Since 1750*, ed. Abigail Green and Vincent Viaene (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2012), 82–110.

republicans but as socialists. The Dreyfus Affair transformed this dynamic. The perceived need to defend the Republic against the politically entrenched forces of Catholicism and the illiberal French right created the basis for a coalition of the centre-left that united socialists and radicals in defence of the France of 1789. This rapprochement was demonstrated by Millerand's willingness to join Pierre Waldeck-Rousseau's cabinet of 'republican defence' as Minister of Commerce. The 'Dreyfus Revolution' had a dual quality, combining social reform and worker representation in the newly created labour councils with radical anti-clerical legislation that sought to minimise the influence of institutional Catholicism in France by the closure of church orders and, in 1905, the formal separation of church and state. Radicals and socialists continued to collaborate until 1906 in the *Bloc des Gauches*; thereafter the growing popularity of revolutionary syndicalism saw violent social conflict re-emerge as a driving force.

Even so, the shared commitment to Republican liberties that had emerged during the Dreyfus Affair created important points of contact between socialists and leftish republicans that lasted well into the twentieth century. Chief among them was the Dreyfusard *Ligue des Droits de l'Homme et du Citoyen*, a humanitarian NGO conceived in the tradition of 1789 that is still with us today.[14] Founded in 1898 at the instigation of Ludovic Trarieux, a republican anti-clerical lawyer and freemason, the *Ligue* rapidly became a mass membership organisation: there were 60,000 members in 500 sections by the time Dreyfus was rehabilitated in 1906; 80,000 in 1910 and 180,000 in 1932.[15] Although the *Ligue* owed its establishment to a group of Dreyfusard intellectuals, its aims were framed in general terms that spoke to both republicans and socialists, while its anti-clerical origins ensured that it appealed disproportionately to Protestants, Jews and Freemasons. As William Irvine has pointed out, the *Ligue* was a key unifying element in the political culture of the French left after 1900: in any given year nearly a quarter of the members of the Central Committee were deputies, and nearly half the governments of the interwar years were headed by men who belonged, or had belonged to the *Ligue*.[16] Only thirty years after its foundation did it acquire a president, Victor Basch, who was neither a senator nor a deputy.

[14] On the *Ligue* see William D. Irvine, *Between Justice and Politics: The Ligue Des Droits de l'Homme, 1898–1945* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006) and Emmanuel Naquet, *Pour l'Humanité: La Ligue des Droits de l'Homme, de l'Affaire Dreyfus à la Défaite de 1940* (Rennes: PU Rennes, 2014).

[15] Irvine, *Between Justice and Politics*, 6.

[16] Ibid., 57.

Born in Hungary but raised in France, Basch was a philosopher, socialist and freemason who became an early member of the *Ligue* and founded its first provincial section in Rennes – a Catholic stronghold that was the venue for the notorious Dreyfus retrial of 1899.[17] Dreyfus' Jewishness was a central dimension of the Affair. As a prominent Jewish Dreyfusard in a provincial backwater, Basch became a target for local anti-semitic agitation. From the first, he sought to expand the *Ligue* beyond its elitist, republican origins by involving workers and their representatives in its activities. He eventually became president in 1925. Notwithstanding his socialist (but never communist) commitments, Basch sought to position the *Ligue* above party politics so that it could continue to act as a unifying body capable of holding together the diverse fractions of the Left. Thus membership of the *Ligue* was a rare element of common ground among the otherwise ideologically divergent members of the Popular Front government. Indeed Basch understood the Popular Front – which he helped to establish – as the true conclusion of the Dreyfusard campaign, highlighting this continuity when he called for silence in memory of Captain Dreyfus at a national rally held in Paris on Bastille Day 1935. At this moment, as Simon Dell has noted, Basch self-consciously embodied a connection between the Dreyfusards and the antifascists.[18] In the year of the Nuremberg laws, his Jewishness was not incidental to this connection. For Basch, then, the Dreyfus Affair was a 'fundamental and paradigmatic' event.[19] It was, certainly, an event he experienced as a Jew. Over a decade afterwards he would write to Joseph Reinach: 'there are two ways to carry the burden of the Semite: shamefully and proudly'. As for me, I have chosen the latter since 1898, when, for the first time, they threw stones at me to accompany the old cry of 'Hepp-Hepp'.[20] Basch's commitment to the *Ligue* allowed him to carry this burden in a self-consciously French way, for the *Ligue* evoked a very French political tradition in response to a moment of national crisis.

[17] For an excellent biography see Françoise Basch, *Victor Basch. De l'Affaire Dreyfus au Crime de la Milice* (Paris: Plon, 1994).
[18] Simon Dell, *The Image of the Popular Front: The Masses and the Media in Interwar France* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2007), 27–28.
[19] Françoise Basch, *Victor Basch*, 30.
[20] Ibid., 38.

The confluence between liberal republicanism, socialism, anti-clericalism and free-masonry in the *Ligue des Droits de l'Homme* found striking echoes in the popular bloc that governed Rome between 1907 and 1913.[21] As in France, anti-clericalism was the glue that held this motley coalition of reform socialists, radical republicans, democrats and liberal seculars together. The 1890s in Italy were a period of acute and violent social conflict, characterised by peasant revolts and large-scale strike actions in the cities and the countryside. As Italian socialism assumed a more organised and disruptive form, Italian politics took an illiberal turn. Faced with political oppression from a series of increasingly authoritarian regimes, a growing number of socialist deputies joined forces with liberals like Giuseppe Zanardelli and Giovanni Giolitti in defence of parliamentary democracy. The general election of 1900 saw a decisive shift away from reactionary government towards this left-wing alliance. There are parallels here with the Dreyfusard defense of the republic, except that this time the attack on the political institutions of the new Italian state had come also from men like Francesco Crispi who were profoundly identified with the democratic nationalism of the Risorgimento. The position of the Catholic church in this situation was complex. In Italy too *Rerum Novarum* had created the possibility for a Catholic social politics that was not necessarily hostile to organised labour. After 1900, both the church and Giolitti were beginning to reach across the divide between Catholicism and the new Italy created by the Pope's loss of temporal power. Yet in Rome the Vatican remained an overpowering presence. The city – struggling to cope with the challenges of modernity – was the natural home for a revived anti-clericalism. Nothing could have symbolised this more dramatically than its new Mayor, Ernesto Nathan, who represented the politics of the extreme, Mazzinian left and appeared to Catholics as the living embodiment of the international Jewish-masonic conspiracy.

Born in London to an Italian mother and a German father, Ernesto Nathan spoke Italian with a pronounced English accent and had to be naturalised as an Italian citizen in order to pursue a career in politics. This and his personal connections to the revolutionary generation of 1848 provide points of comparison with Basch. But Ernesto's upbringing at the heart of Giuseppe Mazzini's London circle rendered

[21] On Nathan, see for instance Nadia Ciani, *Da Mazzini al Campidoglio. Vita di Ernesto Nathan* (Rome: Ediesse, 2007), as well as the more contemporary Alessandro Levi, *Ricordi della Vita e dei Tempi di Ernesto Nathan*, ed. Andrea Bocchi (Maria Pacini Fazzi Editore).

him a political insider with impeccably nationalist credentials. After his family returned to Italy in the early 1860s, their home became a focus for patriots and republicans like Mazzini, Maurizio Quadrio, Carlo Venturi, Giuseppe Missori, Giuseppe Marcora, Alberto Mario and Jessie White. The connections forged in the crucible of revolution and exile between the Nathan family and Mazzini's disciples proved critical over decades both for Ernesto Nathan's political career and for the official recognition accorded him as the guardian of Mazzini's legacy. Legal responsibility for Mazzini's literary estate had passed to Nathan's mother in 1872; her sons – first Giuseppe, then Ernesto – served on the commission officially entrusted with publishing his complete works over many decades. In this capacity Ernesto committed himself to cultivating the great man's legacy through public lectures and personal appearances at innumerable commemorative ceremonies, and through his repeated public declarations and reformulations of the Mazzinian gospel.[22]

Mazzinian nationalism, then, was the defining element of Ernesto Nathan's political worldview, although he sought to reconcile this tradition with the monarchy after the accession of the more conciliatory Vittorio Emmanuele III in 1900. Anti-clericalism was the second pillar of his politics. Standing in 1892 as the radical candidate for Pesaro-Fossombrone, he had attacked the Catholic church as a state within a state, a power at once foreign and indigenous that conspired against the nation at home and abroad, exploiting exceptional legislation to undermine a hard-won unity.[23] This anti-clerical agenda infused his speeches and writings as Grand Master of Italian Freemasonry between 1896 and 1904, and Rome was always pivotal to it. In his speech to the National Masonic Conference of 1898 for instance, Ernesto Nathan declared: 'if the Pontificate exists, then Italy cannot exist, with its heart at Rome, its pulsating brain in its glorious central city'.[24] Even as Giolitti sought to build bridges with Catholic opinion, Nathan as Mayor of Rome promoted an anti-clerical agenda, which united the ideologically diverse elements of his municipal coalition. In so doing, he developed the kind of connections

[22] To get a sense of this, see Anna Maria Isastia, ed., *Scritti Politici di Ernesto Nathan* (Foggia: Bastogi, 1998).

[23] Levi, *Ernesto Nathan*, 210.

[24] Speech by Grand Master Ernesto Nathan at the Conferenza Massonica Nazionale di Torino, 20 September 1898. Anna Maria Isastia, ed., *Scritti Massonici di Ernesto Nathan* (Foggia: Bastogi, 1998), 60–61.

forged within Italian freemasonry, which constituted an influential lay network uniting members of the anti-clerical Left, radicals, republicans and some socialists with moderate and liberal constitutionalists.[25] Here too, there are parallels with France. Importantly, Ernesto Nathan's mayoralty and the anti-clerical bloc that underpinned it predated the formal approval accorded such politics by the Italian Socialist Party at its congress in 1908. Recognising the role of freemasonry in creating a milieu conducive to such collaboration, the revolutionary intransigents of the Federation of Young Italian Socialists (who opposed a politics that prioritised anti-clericalism and social reform over class-struggle) expelled freemasons from their movement two years later – pointing towards a future in which the liberal-socialist divide would be harder to bridge.[26]

Nathan's Jewishness inevitably played into his political positioning: he never spoke about it, but he could not but be aware of its totemic qualities in the context of the public office he held.[27] On 20 September 1910, for instance, Ernesto Nathan delivered an anti-papal broadside to mark the fortieth anniversary of the fall of papal Rome. If Nathan had a religious faith, it was Mazzinian, masonic and universalist, yet the speech was full of references that spoke to his position as a prominent Italian Jew.[28] Standing at the very site where the Italian army had breached the walls, Nathan contrasted modern Rome – his Rome, the Rome of secular schools, free thought and the 'enlightened conscience of every faith' – to the intolerant Rome of the ghetto, Papal Rome, 'the fortress of dogma where the last despairing effort is being made to keep up the reign of ignorance'. This was Ernesto Nathan's most high-profile anti-clerical intervention. It prompted attacks not just from the Vatican itself but from Catholics the world over.[29]

In less heavily Catholic countries, the politics of class not religion drove liberal-socialist collaboration. In Germany, the illiberal nature of

[25] See for instance Fulvio Conti, 'Massoneria e Sfera Pubblica nell'Italia Liberale', in *La Massoneria*, ed. Gian Mario Cazzaniga (Turin: Einaudi, 2006), 579–610, which also touches explicitly on Nathan's role. On Jews in Italian freemasonry see Francesca Sofia, 'Gli Ebrei Risorgimentali fra Tradizione Biblica, Libera Muratoria e Nazione', in Ibid., 244–265.

[26] On this see Earlene Craver, 'The Third Generation: The Young Socialists in Italy, 1907–1915', *Canadian Journal of History* XXXI (August 1996): 199–226.

[27] On this see Alberto Cavaglion, 'Ernesto Nathan e l'Ebraismo Italiano del Primo Novecento', *Critica Sociologica* (1997): 61–74.

[28] Ernesto Nathan, *Noi Massoni* (Foggia: Bastogi, 1993), 64.

[29] On the international ramifications of this speech see Peter D'Agostino, *Rome in America: Transnational Catholic Ideology from the Risorgimento to Fascism* (University of North Carolina Press, 2004), chap. 3. For a full account of this controversy through contemporary sources see *Nathan e Pio X* (Rome: Podrecca-Galantara, 1911).

the country's political institutions was a decisive factor. At sub-national level, divergent political and social constellations in the various federal states fostered different kinds of accommodation in specific regional contexts. Socialist deputies in the South-West German states of Baden and Württemberg cooperated pragmatically with their liberal counterparts over franchise reform and were sufficiently domesticated to participate in group outings to the King of Württemberg's palace.[30] In Prussia and Saxony, by contrast, the three-class franchise created a confrontational political environment far less favourable towards liberal collaboration or socialist revisionism.[31] Religion was certainly a factor in German politics, where the anti-Catholic policies pursued by Bismarck in collaboration with the National Liberals in the 1870s had led the substantial Catholic minority to unify behind a Catholic Centre Party. After Bismarck's 'refounding of the Reich' in 1878, this party moved from opposition into an informal and uneasy coalition of conservatives and right-wing liberals. Alienated as they now were from what Theodor Mommsen described as a 'pseudo constitutional regime', left-liberals in Wilhelmine Germany saw the attractions of what we would now describe as a progressive alliance.[32] Writing from Hamburg to the leading liberal journalist and Jewish activist Paul Nathan in 1908, Eugen Katz identified three choices. Liberals could sit it out; they could try to bring right-wing liberals into a parliamentary coalition broad enough to push effectively for a broader franchise; or they could take inspiration from the chartists and join forces with the social democrats on the streets. Katz preferred the last option. 'I would be happy if the Germans would finally stop letting themselves be treated like dogs and make a Rebellion. I jokingly told [the left-liberal leader] Dr. Barth he should telegraph me then, and I would travel at once with a red flag to Berlin'.[33]

[30] For details of electoral reform in Württemberg see Merith Niehuss, 'Party Configurations in State and Municipal Elections in Southern Germany, 1871–1914', in *Elections, Parties and Political Traditions. Social Foundations of German Parties and Party Systems 1867–1987*, ed. Karl Rohe (New York: Berg, 1990), 87–107. On socialist support for the King of Württemberg, see Paul Sauer, *Württembergs letzter König. Das Leben Wilhelm II* (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1994), 171–178.

[31] See for instance Siomne Lässig, 'Wahlrechtsreformen in den deutschen Einzelstaaten: Indikatoren für Modernisierungstendenzen und Reformfähigkeit im Kaiserreich', in *Modernisierung und Region im Wilhelminischen Deutschland. Wahlen, Wahlrecht und Politische Kultur*, ed. Simone Lässig et al. (Bielefeld: Verlag für Regionalgeschichte, 1995), 127–170.

[32] Cited after Ernst Feder, *Politik und Humanität. Paul Nathan. ein Lebensbild* (Berlin: Deutsche Verlagsgesellschaft für Politik und Geschichte, 1929), 63.

[33] Eugen Katz, Hannover, 23 January 1908, to Paul Nathan, N2207/09 (Bl 5–9), Paul Nathan Nachlass, Bundesarchiv Berlin (PNN).

In 1903 Paul Nathan abandoned a journalistic career of 20 years at the heart of the left-liberal establishment as deputy editor of Theodor Barth's *Die Nation* when it became clear he had no hope of a parliamentary seat.[34] Instead, he founded the *Hilfsverein deutscher Juden* and devoted himself to international Jewish activism. Paul Nathan was a Berlin city councillor yet unlike Ernesto whose position was also rooted in municipal politics, he never became a properly national figure. He self-identified as a liberal, but as he wrote Max Warburg in 1917, his 'very good and very close relations' with Social Democracy were better by far than his links to the National Liberals.[35] For instance, Paul Nathan helped to pave the way for the return of Eduard Bernstein, a leading socialist, to Germany in 1901: the connection forged between them was to survive the First World War.[36] Bernstein was, like Nathan, a secular Jew. Paul's initial interest in his plight may have been prompted in part by the fact that Bernstein's uncle Aron had been one of the leaders of the Berlin democrats in the 1860s and 1870s.[37] Paul Nathan had close connections to this world. His mentors Ludwig Bamberger and Eduard Lasker were both Jewish politicians who played a leading role in National Liberal politics in the 1870s before leading the left-liberal Secession of the early 1880s – a move not unrelated to the embrace of political antisemitism by right-wing National Liberal politicians like Heinrich von Treitschke.[38] Support for both German liberalism and German socialism was rooted primarily in Protestant milieux, but whereas some progressive liberal politicians like Eugen Richter were willing to endorse anti-semitic candidates in run-off elections against socialists, Jews like Nathan saw the socialist as the lesser of these two evils.[39] In this context, it was the weakness of the

[34] His motivations are clear from his correspondence with Otto Hartwig, Marburg, 23 October 1903 to Paul Nathan N2207/6 (Bl 95), PNN. Feder, *Politik und Humanität* was for decades the only biography available of Nathan. Christoph Jahr, *Paul Nathan, Publizist, Politiker und Philanthrop, 1857–1927* (Göttingen: Wallstein, 2018) represents a tremendous advance on this situation.

[35] Paul Nathan, Berlin, 26 July 1917 to Max Warburg N2207/16 (Bl 6–14), PNN.

[36] Eduard Bernstein, London 12 December 1901, to Paul Nathan, Hoch geehrter Herr, N2207/3 (Bl 1–2), PNN.

[37] See Julius H. Schoeps, *A. Bernstein in seiner Zeit. Bürgerliche Aufklärung und Liberales Freiheitsdenken* (Hildesheim: Georg Olms, 2011).

[38] On this see Stoetzler, *The State, the Nation & the Jews*. On Bamberger see Benedikt Koehler, *Ludwig Bamberger. Revolutionär und Bankier* (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1999), Stanley Zucker, *Ludwig Bamberger: German Liberal Political and Social Critic, 1823–1899* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1975). On Lasker see James F. Harris, *A Study in the Theory and Practice of German Liberalism: Eduard Lasker, 1829–1884* (Lanham: University Press of America, 1984).

[39] Paul Nathan, 'Antisemit oder Sozialdemokrat', *Die Nation* 21, no. 21 (1904): 322–323.

liberal centre, the illiberal traditions of the Prusso-German state and the aggressively nationalist politics of right-wing National Liberals that forced members of the liberal left – in particular Jewish ones – into alliance with moderate socialism. Although Paul Nathan helped found the *Deutsche Demokratische Partei* in 1918, he subsequently concluded collaboration with the radical left was the best policy. 'We should do nothing to damage majority Social Democracy', he wrote Warburg in 1919. 'We must attempt to exercise a moderating influence upon it; we must restrain them from fantasies and help to ensure that the weight of facts completes their education'.[40]

In Britain, by contrast, a much less charged political context created favourable conditions for the electoral pact between the Liberals and the Independent Labour Party, paving the way for a decade of Liberal hegemony and Lloyd George's wide-ranging programme of welfare reform.[41] Liberalism had been the predominant force in British politics for the best part of seventy years, and socialists within the Labour movement were only just beginning to emerge as a viable electoral force: they were on the back-foot and behaved accordingly. Yet this electoral alliance was not just a pragmatic arrangement. Rather, it was underpinned by radical common ground that was much less apparent in Germany, but very different in kind to the secularist anti-clericalism that was so important in France and Italy. We can see this clearly in the career of Herbert Samuel, whose book *Liberalism: An Attempt to State the Principles and Proposals of Contemporary Liberalism in England* was published in 1902 with a forward by future Prime-Minister Herbert Asquith as a manifesto for the 'New Liberals' of his generation.[42]

Samuel's liberal credentials were impeccable. He belonged to a leading Jewish political dynasty: his uncle and his brother were Liberal MPs, while he and his cousin Edwin Montagu were both to become liberal cabinet ministers.[43] At Oxford, Samuel had been President of the (Liberal) Russell Club, but in the 1890s we find him writing tracts

[40] Paul Nathan, Berlin, 18 December 1919 to Max Warburg N2207/16 (Bl 6–19), PNN.

[41] For an excellent account of liberal politics in this period see G. R. Searle, *The Liberal Party: Triumph and Disintegration, 1886–1929* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1992). On the Liberal-ILP pact see George L. Bernstein, 'Liberalism and the Progressive Alliance in the Constituencies, 1900–1914: Three Case Studies', *Historical Journal* 26, no. 3 (1983): 617–640.

[42] Herbert Samuel, *Liberalism. An Attempt to State the Principles and Proposals of Contemporary Liberalism in England* (London: Grant Richards, 1902); Bernard Wasserstein, *Herbert Samuel. A Political Life* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992) is a very serviceable biography.

[43] On Montagu see Naomi B. Levine, *Politics, Religion and Love. The Story of H. H. Asquith, Venetia Stanley and Edwin Montagu, Based on the Life and Letters of Edwin Samuel Montagu* (New York: New York University Press, 1991).

for the Fabian Society and a member of the Rainbow Circle alongside Ramsay Macdonald and J. A. Hobson.[44] Standing as the Liberal candidate for South Oxfordshire in 1895, he proudly asserted his social radicalism: 'At present all politics hinge on the Labour question. I am one of the Labour Radicals . . . '. Samuel stressed, nonetheless, that he was not a socialist and could not accept collectivist ideas of state ownership of all the means of production.[45] Nor did he abandon these inclinations in government. Addressing his electors during the 1909 Cleveland by-election, he declared that: 'As a Member of the Cabinet I hope to be able to promote, with undiminished zeal and with a larger influence, those great measures of Social Reform of which our Country stands in urgent need, which form the central work of the present Government, and to which my own energies have been, and will be, mainly devoted'.[46] Decades later, in October 1926 Beatrice Webb reflected: 'There is today no reason why Keynes, E. D. Simon and Herbert Samuel should not be among the leaders of the Labour Party – they are certainly more advanced than J. R. M[acdonald] and J. H. T[homas] in their constructive proposals'[47] (Macdonald was the first Labour Prime Minister, and Thomas a trade-unionist who had served in his cabinet). Politically, philosophically and sentimentally Samuel was a liberal, but his affinities with Labour persisted from the 1890s to 1931 when, as Liberal leader, he served under Macdonald in the National Unity Government. Jewishness, in this context, seems to have been relatively unimportant in shaping Samuel's liberal politics or public perceptions of him: the Marconi scandal in which he was (falsely) implicated proved an isolated episode. While prominent Liberals like Asquith certainly harboured negative perceptions of Jews, other leading figures like Lloyd George were influenced by the philosemitic traditions of British evangelical and non-conformist Christianity.[48]

It should be clear by now that the relationship between liberalism and socialism in this period was surprisingly fluid at national level, in

[44] Herbert Samuel, *The Parish Councils Act. What It is and How to Work It* (London: Fabian Society Tract, 1894). Samuel was the author of four other similar tracts. On his Rainbow Circle involvement see SAM A/10, Herbert Samuel Papers (HSP), Parliamentary Archives.

[45] Cited after Wasserstein, *Herbert Samuel*, 31.

[46] Cleveland By-election 1909. Herbert Samuel's address to Electors, SAM A/31/1, HSP.

[47] Wasserstein, *Herbert Samuel*, 291.

[48] On Asquith's anti-semitic attitudes towards Samuel's cousin Edwin Montagu, see Levine, *Politics, Religion and Love*, 177, 193–194. On the role of Protestant philo-semitism in liberal politics see Donald Lewis, *The Origins of Christian Zionism. Lord Shaftesbury and Evangelical Support for a Jewish Homeland* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010).

ways that undercut our assumptions about the relationship between these conflicting ideologies in the international sphere. Anti-clericalism was a key cement for socialist-liberal alliances in countries like France and Italy where Catholicism was associated with the illiberal politics of the right. In Germany and Britain, by contrast, this collaboration was driven by the new politics of class. Liberalism was weak in Germany and strong in Britain. In Britain, the still limited franchise made it harder for socialists to gain ground than in national German elections, where universal manhood suffrage applied, although the three-class franchise complicated the situation in both Prussia and Saxony. Yet in all these cases the rise of labour politics and more or less explicitly socialist parties pushed left-liberals into collaboration with their socialist challengers. Industrial relations and the strike movements across Europe before 1914 pointed in a different direction, of course, but until 1917 the revolutionary challenge posed by socialism to a liberal world order was largely theoretical.

Needless to say, socialists and liberals usually viewed the prospects of long-term cooperation with each other differently. Sympathetic and left-leaning liberals, like Paul Nathan, often believed that socialists would eventually come to their senses and become liberals themselves. Men from the other side of the political divide, like Victor Basch, remained true in principle to the ideal of revolution and consequently understood alliances with 'bourgeois' leaders were temporary tactical arrangements – although in Basch's case, this alliance eventually became an end in itself. Whatever their motivations, Jewish politicians were more constrained in their choices, although the extent to which their Jewishness actually shaped their politics at national level remains open to question.

It is perhaps telling that of the four men under consideration here only Basch, the socialist, was inclined to reflect in public on his Jewishness.[49] The other three appear to have operated according to the classic dictum that Jews should be men in the street and Jews at home. For Basch, running the gamut of popular anti-semitism in Rennes, such a position was particularly hard to sustain; he was, after all, a socialist not a liberal. In any case, all four of these men diverged from what historians have understood as the classic liberal model because all four rejected Judaism as a faith. Victor Basch's granddaughter dwells at some length on the complete absence of religious Judaism from his life in her excellent biography of him.[50] Ernesto

[49] See for instance Victor Basch, 'Mon Judaïsme', *Connaître*, August 1924.
[50] Françoise Basch, *Victor Basch*.

Nathan was a freemason who requested a secular funeral, although his wife Virginia opted for a traditional Jewish one and their marriage was presumably conducted according to Jewish rites.[51] Paul Nathan never married and appears to have been utterly disengaged from both religious Judaism and from alternative forms of spirituality, although he was buried with his mother in the Jewish cemetery in Weissensee. Only Samuel was in any sense practising and his affiliation with the Jewish community flew in the face of his committed and well-known atheism. In short, their Jewishness was personal to them as individuals, but they were not precisely Jews in the home. In the international sphere, however, things were rather different.

Internationalist Commitments

Victor Basch, Ernesto Nathan, Paul Nathan and Herbert Samuel were all active in national politics and vocal as patriots, but they were internationalists too. As a disciple of Mazzini, Ernesto Nathan was most emphatic about the importance of nationalism in his political vision: his speeches and writings, both as a politician and a freemason, dwelt extensively on the need for national renewal to fulfil Mazzini's dream.[52] In practice, his nationalism was aggressive, irredentist, anti-Austrian and inherently anti-imperial: tellingly, he opposed the British during the South African war, proposing a subscription for Boer widows and orphans among Italian freemasons to coincide with the anniversary of the fall of Rome.[53] Yet Nathan's enthusiastic support for Italy entering the First World War did not dilute his theoretical commitment to a cosmopolitan nationalism in which Italy was a proud element in the international family of nations. Ernesto Nathan pursued this agenda most actively in his capacity as Grand Master of Italian Freemasonry. He understood the masonic order as a patriotic and educational association dedicated to a national agenda of social and moral renewal but also committed to promoting 'international harmony conducive to

[51] On the range of choices available in death to secular Jews in liberal Italy see Luisa Levi d'Ancona Modena, 'Giving and Dying in Liberal Italy: Jewish Men and Women in Italian Culture Wars', in *Jews, Liberalism, Antisemitism*, ed. Green and Levis-Sullam.

[52] This is the central thread of the speeches collected in Isastia, *Scritti Massonici* and *Scritti Politic*.

[53] *Rivista della Massoneria Italiana* (1902), 206–207.

universal peace' by fostering 'aspirations of brotherhood in the hearts of the peoples'.[54] To this end, he convoked in 1900 an International Masonic Conference to mark the turn of the century in Rome, 'cradle of civilization' – a move that can be interpreted as a deliberate challenge to the Catholic establishment. (Nor was Ernesto Nathan's internationalism restricted to the world of freemasonry: his cosmopolitan outlook and mastery of the English language rendered him the obvious candidate to coordinate Italian representation at the San Francisco World Fair in 1915.)

The anti-semitic currents within German nationalism created problems for Paul Nathan, yet fundamentally his instincts were not dissimilar to Ernesto's.[55] As deputy editor of *Die Nation*, Paul helped to promote an inclusive and humanistic vision of the German nation in which Jewish writers like Heinrich Heine and Berthold Auerbach were recognised for their formative contribution to German *Kultur*. This liberal nationalism was very different to that promoted by Heinrich von Treitschke, and entirely compatible with the kind of cosmopolitan nationalism Mazzini had advocated. Thus shortly before he stepped down from *Die Nation*, Nathan became involved with the international literary review *Cosmopolis*: a multi-lingual magazine published in London, with local editions produced in Berlin, Paris and St. Petersburg. Like the anti-Austrian Ernesto, but unlike Herbert Samuel, he instinctively saw nationalism and empire as antithetical forces. After the outbreak of the First World War, he attacked the Western Allies as militaristic imperialists whose ambitions were 'a danger for the culture of the whole world, and the independent and peaceful development of individual nations'.[56] The belligerent tone was a product of the wartime context, and the need for men like Paul Nathan to be seen to identify with the war-effort; the content remains telling all the same.

Ernesto and Paul Nathan were children of the 1850s; Basch and Samuel belonged to a different generation. Economically their politics could hardly have been more different, but both men were patriots and

[54] Ernesto Nathan, 'Il Compito Massonico. Discorso Inaugrale del Gran Mestro Ernest Nathan alla Conferenza Massonica Nazionale di Torino, 20 Settembre 1898', in *Scritti Massonici Di Ernesto Nathan*, ed. Giuseppe Schiavone (Foggia: Bastogi), 53–61. Citations here from p. 57.

[55] On Jews in German Freemasonry see Stefan-Ludwig Hoffmann, 'Brothers or Strangers? Jews and Freemasons in Nineteenth-Century Germany', *German History* 18, no. 2 (2000): 143–161. More generally Jacob Katz, *Jews and Freemasons in Europe, 1723–1939*, trans. Leonard Oschry (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1979).

[56] Paul Nathan, *Die Enttäuschungen unserer Gegner. August – September – Okober. Eine Vierteljahrsabrechnung* (Berlin: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1914), 34.

pacifists, whose commitment to the League of Nations and to juridical internationalism was directly shaped by the experience of the Great War. For Basch, this reinforced his existing commitments as a socialist and a member of the *Ligue des Droits de l'Homme*; for Samuel it was a new development. The *Ligue* had in fact been affiliated with the International Peace Bureau since 1906, although it adopted a position of 'defensive patriotism' in the years immediately preceding the war. As early as 1915 Basch was actively engaged in its pacifist activities. He was one of a number of individuals who connected the pacifism of the *Ligue* with the juridical internationalism of French socialists under Jaurès.[57] These ideological commitments did not preclude Basch's sentimental attachment to France or deeply ingrained patriotism. The Zionist Shmuel Tolowsky described him tellingly in 1918 as 'the son of an Austrian but a French jingo . . . socialist, a little bolshevik'.[58]

Herbert Samuel's politics were more straightforward. Samuel was a British liberal imperialist: he was committed to the idea of the British empire and believed in its benign influence, but understood that empire as a framework within which different nationalities might flourish. This understanding informed his commitment to Home Rule and imperial federalism as early as 1911–1912.[59] Nationalism remained an important dimension of Samuel's liberal politics, even as his internationalist commitments became more pronounced during the 1920s. Writing in *The Daily Compass* in 1928, for instance he declared that the world was too large to be governed as one state, that human variety was a good thing in itself, and that '[n]ationality preserves differences which, so long as they tolerate one another and do not breed enmities, enrich the interests and enlarge the possibilities of human life'.[60] In his valedictory address to the Liberal Summer school that year entitled 'Patriotism and Peace', Samuel clearly articulated an ideology of liberal internationalism. He welcomed the League of Nations 'as by far the greatest and most beneficent event in the modern history of mankind', rejoiced at Locarno, and emphasised the need for effective arbitration machinery. Above all, he put the case for international connectedness, recognising that '"the greatest nation is but a

[57] See Julian Jackson, *Beyond the Balance of Power: France and the Politics of National Security* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 73–74.

[58] Françoise Basch, *Victor Basch*, 161.

[59] See Herbert Samuel, *Irish Self-Government. A Speech Delivered by the Right Hon. Herbert L. Samuel M.P. (Postmaster-General) at Belfast, on Friday, October 6, 1911* (Belfast: R. Carswell & Son, 1911); Herbert Samuel, *Mr. Herbert Samuel's Speech in the Debate on the Introduction of the Home Rule Bill of 1912* (London: Home Rule Council, 1912).

[60] Herbert Samuel, 'Patriotism Now', *The Daily Compass*, 3 July 1928.

fragment" – not an ultimate unit, but one part among many of a greater whole, each with a duty towards the common membership; that the world is not merely a congerie of separate sovereign States but a moral unity, divided for its own advantage into different nationalities and governments'. And yet, he did not reject patriotism: 'When all this is done, still there would remain a place for patriotism; still there would be a call to promote the greatness, as rightly understood of our own country, and for others to promote the similar greatness of theirs; still there would be the need to maintain in the nation a willingness and a capacity to respond, almost as by instinct, to legitimate appeals on behalf of country . . . '.[61] Not one of the men discussed here could have disagreed with this statement. How did their Jewishness relate to these nationalist and internationalist commitments?

Jewishness

Before the emergence of Zionism as a significant political movement in the early twentieth century, Jewish internationalism was essentially a liberal phenomenon.[62] Historians have understood this in terms of class: international Jewish organisations like the *Alliance Israélite* (est. 1860), the Anglo-Jewish Association (est. 1871), the *Israelitische Allianz zu Wien* (est. 1873) and the *Hilfsverein der deutschen Juden* (est. 1901) are viewed as 'old-style', top-down communal organisations in the hands of acculturated and nationally oriented Jewish elites.[63] I would emphasise, however, that these elites were politically and sentimentally liberal. Many key figures were, in fact, prominent liberal politicians. The republican Adolphe Crémieux, one of the founders of the *Alliance* and its high-profile president, served twice as a French

[61] Herbert Samuel, 'Patriotism and Peace', *Contemporary Review*, September 1928, 273–281.

[62] On Jewish internationalism see Abigail Green, 'Religious Internationalisms', in *Internationalism*, ed. Sluga and Clavin; Abigail Green, 'Old Networks, New Connections: The Emergence of the Jewish International', in *Religious Internationals*, ed. Green and Viaene, 53–81.

[63] On these organisations see Eli Bar-Chen, *Weder Asiaten noch Orientalen. Internationale jüdische Organisationen und die Europäisierung 'rückständiger' Juden* (Würzburg: Ergon Verlag, 2005). On the *Alliance* see André Chouraqui, *Cent Ans d'Histoire. L' Alliance Israélite Universelle et la Renaissance Juive Contemporaine (1860–1960)* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1965) and Aron Rodrigue, *French Jews, Turkish Jews. The Alliance Israélite Universelle and the Politics of Jewish Schooling in Turkey, 1860–1925* (Bloomington; Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1990). On the Vienna *Allianz* see Bjoern Siegel, *Österreichisches Judentum zwischen Ost und West – Die Israelitische Allianz zu Wien 1873–1938* (Frankfurt am Main: Campus Verlag, 2010).

government minister and was celebrated both in his lifetime and on his death as a pillar of the Republic.[64] The Anglo-Jewish Association was established by Sir Francis Goldsmid, a liberal MP who regularly intervened on international Jewish issues in the House of Commons.[65] Ignaz Kuranda, Vice-President of the Vienna *Allianz* in the 1870s, had been a pillar of the Austrian opposition in the 1840s and was, by this time, not just a liberal deputy but the leader of the Austro-German Liberal Party.[66] Paul Nathan founded the *Hilfsverein* substantially later, but in the 1870s his mentors the prominent National Liberal politicians Ludwig Bamberger and Eduard Lasker both spoke about Romanian Jewry in the Reichstag and the latter even joined the *Alliance* in 1880.[67]

In an age of properly democratic politics, men like these needed to transcend their Jewishness to make it as liberal politicians on a national stage, if only because Jewishness was rarely a vote-winner. Some succeeded better than others. As liberals they believed, in any case, that their Jewishness was largely irrelevant to their politics: in theory all citizens are equal in a liberal democracy, where religious belief is left to the individual conscience. Certainly, they espoused the cause of religious toleration and tended to support the idea of a secular state. Both as Jews and as liberals, however, they framed this agenda in general terms and refrained from talking too narrowly about Jewish rights in a domestic context. The activism of Jewish liberals during the revolutions of 1848 was paradigmatic in this regard.[68] Internationally, however, it was a different story.

Like the principal protagonists of this article, most of these men were disengaged from Judaism as a lived religion; many actively rejected it. Even those, like Kuranda and Crémieux, who did assume positions of communal responsibility were very clear that matters of conscience should be left to the individual, supporting a pluralist state-secularism

[64] See Daniel Amson, *Adolphe Crémieux, L'Oublié de la Gloire* (Paris: Seuil, 1988); S. Posener, *Adolphe Crémieux, a Biography*, ed. Eugene Golob (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society of America, 1940).

[65] There is no book-length study of the AJA, but see Bar-Chen, *Weder Asiaten noch Orientalen*.

[66] Kuranda lacks a biographer, but see Curt Philipp Schmitt, 'Ignaz Kuranda's Die Grenzboten (1841–1848): A Case Study of Vormärz Journalism and Identity', Submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy (Cambridge, 2003).

[67] On the Romanian debate see Helmut Steinsdorfer, *Die Liberale Reichspartei (LRP) von 1871* (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 2000), 223–226.

[68] On this see Abigail Green, 'Jews in the Liberal Politics of Secularism and Revolution: 1848 – 1859 – 1905', in *Jews, Liberalism, Antisemitism: A Global History*, ed. Green and Levis-Sullam.

in which the state was infused with religious values but treated all faiths equally.[69] As it happens, Crémieux's wife and children converted to Catholicism in the 1840s; as Grand Master of the French Grand Orient, his personal religiosity was better reflected by Freemasonry than traditional Judaism. In Paris, Crémieux moved in the same anti-clerical circles as Bamberger, whose attitude to Catholicism in particular was shaped by his upbringing in Hessen-Darmstadt. Bamberger's friend Anna von Helmholtz thought that: 'no longer a Jew, he could never become a Christian – all religion signified the church and as such was incomprehensible'.[70] Yet Bamberger demonstrated his sense of connection to the Jewish community on moving to Berlin in 1870 by inscribing his name in the list of donors to the *Gesellschaft Hachnassath-Kallah*.[71] His detached relationship with Judaism found expression at his funeral, which took place in the Jewish cemetery in Prenzlauer Berg but without the traditional religious ceremony. He was buried beside Lasker, with whom he had worked so closely as a liberal parliamentarian. Lasker is generally regarded as having being closer to orthodox Judaism, yet he too was a secularist who became one of the leading members of the Freethought Association Lessing founded in Berlin in 1881.

What are we to make of the willingness of such men to engage in international Jewish activism? To answer this question we need to think about their liberalism and their secularism, but also about their Jewishness and their sense of self. As Todd Weir has shown, secularism was not in fact a value-neutral set of beliefs but rather a quasi-religious value-system which was profoundly connected to liberal politics and often particularly appealing to Jews.[72] For men like Crémieux and Lasker, Jewishness worked with the grain of secularism in a national context and was a central dimension of liberal politics. Crémieux made this clear as early as 1833 when he described freedom of religion as the

[69] Here I draw upon the analysis in Lisa Moses Leff, *Sacred Bonds of Solidarity. The Rise of Jewish Internationalism in Nineteenth-Century France* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2006), chap. 2. For Ignaz Kuranda's approach to these issues see Kuranda, 'Der Jesuitenkampf in Oesterreich und Deutschland', *Die Grenzboten* 5: II (1845), also Ignaz Kuranda, Leipzig, 10 August 1847 to Ludwig August Frankl, H.I.N.-98696, Wienbibliothek Handschriften.

[70] Stanley Zucker, 'Ludwig Bamberger and the Rise of Anti-Semitism in Germany, 1848–1893', *Central European History* 3, no. 4 (1970): 334.

[71] *Namen-Verzeichniss sämmtlicher Mitglieder der Gesellschaft Hachnassath-Kallah (Ausstattung der Bräute) in Berlin am 22 Mai 1870* (Berlin: Friedländer'sche Buchdruckerei, 1870).

[72] Todd H. Weir, *Secularism and Religion in Nineteenth-Century Germany. The Rise of the Fourth Confession* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014).

great achievement of 1830 and the sole uncontested freedom of the July Monarchy.[73] Lasker endorsed a similar position when he led the progressive Secession from the National Liberal party, asserting in 1881 that: 'More than for any other country, for Germany denominational and religious freedom is the foundation of domestic peace . . . '.[74] And yet, when Crémieux first invited Lasker to join the *Alliance* in 1868, he appealed to him in the name of the 'holy cause of Judaism' – an expression he clearly believed held meaning for both of them.[75]

This striking expression was not casually deployed; instead it points to a broader truth. All these liberal politicians found it easier to perform and express their Jewishness once they moved beyond the confines of domestic politics – a pattern that persisted into the twentieth century. In Italy it applied to Ernesto Nathan's friend and fellow freemason, Luigi Luzzatti, who served for years as a government minister and, more briefly, as prime-minister. Luzzatti actively embraced the cause of Romanian, Russian and even Moroccan Jewry in the name of religious freedom, although his own spiritual inclinations drew him in other directions (Protestant, Buddhist . . .).[76] Ernesto Nathan too, refused to see Jewishness as a national identity, yet he did not hesitate to conclude his 1898 speech to the National Congress of Freemasons in Turin by saluting the moral purity of the Dreyfusards – a declaration that may have resonated differently for the Jews in his audience (of whom there were surely many).[77] Here secularism and Jewishness worked together. In Germany, it applied to Paul Nathan whose Jewish activism was restricted to the international realm of the *Hilfsverein*, rather than the national realm of the *Centralverein deutscher Juden*, a civil-defense organisation in which he played a very marginal role. In Britain, it applied to Herbert Samuel, a man who was out and proud as High Commissioner to Palestine from 1920 to 1925, and when he travelled abroad to Canada and the United States in 1913 and again in

[73] Adolphe Crémieux, *Code des Codes* (Paris, 1833), 315.

[74] Weir, *Secularism and Religion*, 227.

[75] Adolphe Crémieux, Alliance Israélite Universelle, 9 March 1868 to Eduard Lasker, Schwad 01 11 105, National Library of Israel (HNUL), with thanks to Andreas Pfuetzner.

[76] These issues are sensitively dealt with in Ester Capuzzo, 'Luigi Luzzatti, gli Ebrie e gli Armeni', in *Luigi Luzzatti e la Grande Guerra. Temi e Vicende dell'Italia Divisa: Dall'intervento ai Trattati di Pace*, ed. Pier Luigi Ballini (Venice: Istituto veneto di scienze, letter ed arti, 2016), 189–226.

[77] Ernesto Nathan, 'Il Compito Massonico', 57, 61. On the international dimensions of Nathan's Italian nationalism see Beatrice Pisa, 'Ernesto Nathan e la "Politica Nazionale"', *Rassegna Storia de Risorgimento* (1997), 17–66. On the relationship between religion and nationhood in a Jewish context, see Ernesto Nathan, 1 January 1917, to Abraham Shalom Yahuda, Abraham Shalom Yahuda Archive. Series 1: Correspondence. Arc Ms Var Yah 38, 1864, HNUL.

the 1930s, but who consistently downplayed his Jewishness in a domestic context and refused to take up such obvious Jewish causes as opposition to the Aliens Act of 1905.[78] Indeed it also applied to liberal Jewish politicians in the United States like Oscar Straus and Louis Brandeis. Straus became the first Jewish member of a U.S. cabinet in 1906 and served three times as U.S. Ambassador to the Ottoman Empire between 1887 and 1910, yet when he stood as Governor of New York in 1912 he ran as a progressive without the support of Jewish liberals and socialists allying against the Catholic electoral machine: he too restricted his 'Jewish' politics to the international arena.[79] The parallels with Samuel are very clear here. Brandeis, meanwhile, became a liberal icon as the first Jewish Supreme Court judge, but both his Judaism and his Jewish activism were restricted to his Zionist activities. Zionism, in this reading, was not an aberration; rather, it was the international that opened up new political possibilities for such men. The concept of situational ethnicity gives us one key to understanding this behaviour, but continuities with the politics of Jewish 1848ers, and the persistence of this pattern in the United States both before and after the foundation of the State of Israel suggests that it may also tell us something about the way in which liberalism itself functioned nationally – and internationally.[80]

The fact that early forms of Jewish internationalism were structured by liberal preoccupations – civil and religious liberty, humanitarianism, civilizational discourse, liberal imperialism – made it possible for secular Jewish liberals to engage in collective Jewish action in the international sphere. The *Ligue des Droits de l'Homme* (which was in some ways a mirror image of the *Alliance*) drew heavily on these liberal traditions of international humanitarianism. Yet in origin, membership, ideological diversity and scope the *Ligue* transcended the realm of international Jewish activism even as it intersected with this world at moments of crisis. French Jewish socialists like Basch might join the *Ligue* and applaud its activities, yet they did not engage in more

[78] For examples of his Jewish profile when visiting Canada in 1913, see 'Finds One Defect in Canadian Tour . . . Postmaster-General Commends That Jews Always Care for Poor World Over', *Montreal Daily Mail*, 10 October 1913; 'Rt. Hon. Herbert Samuel Opens Jewish Working Girls' Club', *Toronto Globe*, 6 October 1913; 'Postmaster Spoke at Jewish Club', *Toronto World*, 6 October 1913. During his 1933 visit to New York he met with Jews and was celebrated as a Zionist icon, see Diary Kept by Sir Herbert Samuel 31/07/1933–21/10/1933, SAM A/ 96 (6), HSP.

[79] My thanks to Matthew Silver for this insight.

[80] On this see Green, '1848 – 1859 – 1905" in process; James Loeffler, 'Nationalism Without a Nation? On the Invisibility of American Jewish Politics', *Jewish Quarterly Review* 105, no. 3 (2015): 367–398.

explicitly Jewish forms of international activism before the birth of Zionism and other nationally inflected forms of collective Jewish politics, like Bundism. When they did, they operated on fundamentally different premises because unlike liberals they were able to articulate Jewishness in ways that went beyond individual faith and religious toleration. Thus it was easier by far for a socialist 'jingo' like Basch to embrace Zionism than it was to his liberal counterparts in the *Alliance*. As the *Écho Sioniste* commented in 1912: 'Victor Basch is French, French by heart and education, and he intends to remain French, and he maintains that one can be simultaneously a good Frenchman and a good Zionist, and he hopes to bring us other good Frenchmen who will also be good Zionists, a language to which French Jews are hardly accustomed'.[81]

This important difference in the way that socialism and liberalism functioned in the international sphere highlights a key distinction between the two movements, which the accommodation between them at the national level makes hard to grasp. For, the ability of socialists and liberals to forge secularist alliances on the basis of anti-clerical politics in specific national contexts obscures the fact that liberal and socialist anti-clericals operated on quite different premises. Marx famously dismissed religion as the opium of the people, and socialists for the most part did not accept the validity of religion as a category – even if, in practice non-Marxist forms of socialism were often embedded in specific religious sub-cultures. By contrast, liberals, whether secular or religious, *never* questioned religion as a category – indeed their insistence on freedom of conscience was testimony to the importance they attached to religious belief. There was room for collaboration in a national context because secularist politics within individual polities were always at some level about religious toleration, church-state relations and disestablishment. At local and state level these issues threw up controversies rooted in very concrete problems – the Dreyfus Affair, the dominance of the Vatican in Rome – but they mattered far less in the international sphere and could not serve as a bridge between liberal and socialist internationalisms.

Socialists might also be secularists, but their secularism was rooted in a materialist conception of the body rather than an alternative spirituality. Individual socialists may have been committed secularists, but international socialism was not secularist in this sense. Yet secularism was certainly a value system that found

[81] Baruch Hagani, 'Une Conversion', *L'Écho Sioniste*, 10 January 1912.

expression internationally – not just through anti-clerical agitations like those unleashed by the Mortara and Dreyfus Affairs, but also, perhaps more importantly, through quasi-religious associational movements many of which had strong Jewish associations. These included Freemasonry, the Ethical Culture movement founded by Felix Adler and even the religious philosophy Homaranismo developed by Ludwig Zamenhof, a Lithuanian Jew better known for inventing Esperanto.

These fundamental philosophical differences go some way to explaining the failure of anti-clerical alliances forged in national contexts to be replicated internationally, despite the fact that ultra-conservatives and Fascists often came to believe in the existence of an international Jewish-Masonic anti-clerical conspiracy. What they meant in practice is that individual liberals could adopt quite different attitudes towards socialism and the labour movement at local, national and international level. The career of the founder of the Ethical Culture movement, Felix Adler illustrates this kind of divergence very clearly. Adler, a German-born immigrant to the United States, broke with the reform Judaism of his rabbinical father at a young age and developed a more secular and universal creed. He rejected both market capitalism and socialism as overly preoccupied with material needs, but this did not preclude his active involvement with unionism and promoting workers' rights, which culminated in the leading part he played in resolving the New York Garment Workers strike of 1910. In an international context, however, the Ethical Culture movement remained clearly distinct from the world of the Second and Third Internationals. Conversely, Adler's anti-imperialist and pacifist internationalism remained uncompromisingly liberal in character. Attitudes towards institutional religion, then, might serve to bridge the ideological divide between liberals and socialists in a domestic political context, while reinforcing it in the international sphere. How far did this dynamic change once a more explicitly ethnic form of Jewish politics – in the shape of Zionism – entered the picture? And what does this tell us about the relationship between the national and international as spheres of political activism?

In theory, the internationalist orientation of socialism should have rendered it incompatible with a nationalist ideology like Zionism, but the precocious role of Moses Hess in both movements suggest this was not necessarily the case. Many doctrinaire socialists did reject Zionism, but socialist ideals still infused the *Poalei-Zion* movement that spread from Europe to Palestine in the early 1900s, as part of an emergent world federation of similar parties: some moderately

social-democratic and others explicitly Marxist. By contrast, liberals who understood Judaism as a religion found it difficult to embrace a form of Jewish politics couched in ethno-national terms. It is this that renders the liberal orientation of earlier forms of Jewish internationalism so surprising. To read this earlier Jewish internationalism as a form of proto-nationalist activity, however, is to fail to appreciate the extent to which liberalism infused both collective Jewish politics and the international order.[82] Jewish liberals from Crémieux, Bamberger and Lasker to Luzzatti and Paul Nathan found that they could help Jews out and act as members of a Jewish collective when that collective was constructed outside the state in the international arena, and when they articulated their concerns in terms that reinforced liberal norms.

The former Italian Prime Minister Luigi Luzzatti wrote in early 1917 that he was 'satisfied to see that the Jewish world is turning its attention toward Palestine, the Land of its own forefathers, and the Jews as looking to Palestine a place of refuge and emancipation', but he consistently emphasised religious freedom rather than nationhood when affirming this vision. In the aftermath of the Balfour Declaration, he stressed that 'delivered from Turks Jews will live not in sovereignty but as free citizens'; in later years he dreamt of a future when Christians, Jews and Muslims would live together in Palestine in harmony and mutual respect.[83] In Britain too, Herbert Samuel's ability to square the circle and bring his high-profile Zionism into line with his status as a liberal politician on the national stage reflected a particular context in which, as Arie Dubnov has shown, individuals like Lewis Namier and Josiah Wedgwood supported the idea of Dominion Status for a Jewish state in Palestine.[84] Christian Zionists had always imagined a synergy between British and Jewish interests in the Middle East and Zionism did not therefore appear to pose a threat to British liberal imperialism. Yet in other ways, Samuel conforms to the profile of Jewish liberal politicians outlined above. In the United States, meanwhile, the existence of parallel immigrant communities with diasporic identities linked to national homelands made it easier for secular Jewish liberals

[82] Michael Graetz, *The Jews in Nineteenth-Century France. From the French Revolution to the Alliance Israélite Universelle*, trans. Jane Marie Todd (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1996).

[83] Capuzzo, 'Luigi Luzzatti', 202–203, 207.

[84] See Arie Dubnov, 'Jews, Imperial Liberalism, and the Predicament of Small Nations: Lewis Namier's Gentry Nationalism', in *Jews, Liberalism, Antisemitism*, ed. Green and Levis-Sullam.

like Horace Kallen, Julian Mack, Felix Frankfurter, Oskar Janowsky and Louis Brandeis to combine Zionism with their identity as Americans in a way that was impossible for their liberal counterparts in Europe.[85] Kallen, for instance, famously argued that cultural diversity and national pride were compatible with each other and that ethnic and civil diversity strengthened America.[86]

As these examples indicate, twentieth century international Jewish politics provided a context in which Jewish liberals and Jewish socialists could collaborate. Zionism was an important part of this picture, but it was not the whole story. The mass migration of East European Jews to the United States and the catastrophic impact of the First World War on Jews living in Central Europe and the Russo-Polish borderlands mattered too.[87] They created conditions in which the humanitarian mode of older, liberal forms of Jewish internationalism could intersect and the new nationally inflected forms of Jewish socialism embraced by Eastern European Jews on both sides of the Atlantic. Paradoxically, international politics allowed for the incorporation of a discourse of Jewish nationhood that spoke to socialists as well as some liberals. This enabled international Jewish activism to bridge the political divide between liberals and socialists, which remained important in local and national contexts. Crucially, like other religious and secular internationalisms, Jewish internationalism changed fundamentally in character as it grew more geographically and socially diverse.

Unlike liberal forms of Jewish internationalism, which were a product of Western political culture, both socialist Zionism and Bundism were rooted in the cultural and social realities of Eastern European Jewish life. In the absence of anything resembling a liberal political order, Jews in the Pale of Settlement and the Russo-Polish borderlands found it harder to redefine their Jewishness in purely confessional terms, although members of the Russian Jewish elite – particularly those living beyond the Pale – did try to promote a

[85] See for instance James Loeffler, 'Between Zionism and Liberalism: Oscar Janowsky and Diaspora Nationalism in America', *AJS Review* 34, no. 2 (2010): 289–308. More generally see Matthew Silver, 'From East to West: America as the Melting Pot of Jewish Politics', in *Jews, Liberalism, Antisemitism*, ed. Green and Levis-Sullam.

[86] Horace Kallen, 'Democracy Versus the Melting-Pot. A Study of American Nationality', *The Nation*, 25 February 1915. http://www.expo98.msu.edu/people/kallen.htm.

[87] Jaclyn Granick, 'Waging Relief: The Politics and Logistics of American Jewish War Relief in Europe and the Near East (1914–1918)', *First World War Studies* 5, no. 1 (2014): 55–68; Jaclyn Granick, 'Humanitarian Responses to Jewish Suffering Abroad by American Jewish Organizations, 1914–1929' (Doctoral Thesis, Geneva: Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, 2015).

liberal politics of emancipation on Western lines.[88] Even when these Eastern European Jews rejected Judaism and embraced secular ideologies such as socialism or nationalism, they usually did so in a Jewish key and in a way that blurred the boundaries between the national and the international. This identification with Jewish culture and less narrowly religious understanding of Jewish identity was at odds with the approach taken by Jewish liberals in the West. But the very real ties that still bound Jewish immigrants to their communities of origin (in ways that echoed Kallen's sense of diasporic belonging) allowed for cross-fertilisation between these new strains of Jewish internationalism and older liberal currents.[89]

Take, for instance, the trajectory of the *Arbeter Ring*, founded in 1892 by a small New-York group of radical and emphatically secular Jewish workers. By 1925, its membership had reached 85,000 and spread far beyond this original base. As its focus shifted from socialist internationalism towards a Yiddishist diaspora nationalism, the *Arbeter Ring* developed close ties with similar groups, most obviously the socialist Jewish Bundist movement, which originated in Lithuania. As the situation in Eastern Europe worsened, members of the *Arbeter Ring* raised large amounts of money on behalf of their Jewish brethren in distress. In 1915, the leadership sent a cheque of $20,000 to the American Jewish Relief Council, an organisation dominated by American Jewish liberal elites and led by Felix Warburg (whose brother Max we encountered earlier in correspondence with Paul Nathan). Early in 1916, despite its official opposition to Zionism, the *Arbeter Ring* declared its willingness to help Jewish war victims in Palestine as well.[90] Meanwhile, liberal Jewish elites were forced to take more account of the sensibilities, preoccupations and concerns of the Jewish masses, in ways that echo developments at state level in mainstream politics. These pressures for democratisation, combined with influential Jewish liberals like Herbert Samuel and Louis Brandeis, brought Zionism in from the cold. Thus Zionists played a key role in the emergence of democratically organised umbrella organisations that

[88] See Benjamin Nathans, *Beyond the Pale. The Jewish Encounter with Late Imperial Russia* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002); Brian J. Horowitz, *Jewish Philanthropy and Enlightenment in Late Tsarist Russia* (Seattle, WA: University of Washington Press, 2009).

[89] Rebecca Kobrin, *Jewish Bialystok and Its Diaspora* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2010).

[90] McCune, *Whole Wide World*, 13–16, 58–59 and more generally.

were either international in their interests, like the American Jewish Congress (est.1918), or explicitly international in their composition, like the Comité des Délégations Juives (est.1919).[91] Outside the Jewish world, the October revolution had rendered the opposition between international communism and the liberal world order of Versailles the critical opposition of the post-war era.[92] Inside the Jewish world, men like Victor Basch remind us of the permeability of this divide.

To our return to our initial starting point, something shifted during the First World War and its aftermath in the way individual Jewish activists navigated the boundaries between 'religious' and secular strands of Jewish internationalism and between liberalism and socialism in national and international contexts. To some extent this was a specifically Jewish phenomenon that reflected the particular set of traumas and opportunities Jews faced during the First World War and its aftermath. To some extent it reflected the new political realities created by the Russian Revolution on the world stage. Here too, something had shifted. Just as liberals like Paul Nathan embraced moderate socialism as a bulwark against communism at state level, so the League of Nations and the International Labour Organization (ILO) had created possibilities for interaction between liberals and socialists in the international sphere. The key divide on the left after 1917 was surely no longer that between liberals and socialists, but rather between the Third International and the rest. In this sense, the national and international sphere now appeared more closely aligned.

For Jews, however, this alignment was only partial. Before the war, men like Paul Nathan and Luigi Luzzatti had intuitively grasped that the national and international were different political registers in which different conventions applied. The behaviour of men like Brandeis and Samuel during the 1920s and 1930s suggests that Jewish liberals continued to find it easier to perform and express their Jewishness more freely within the international arena. It would be simplistic to view this behaviour as a strategy, nor was it (as anti-semites would have it) an act of typically Jewish bad faith by men whose primary loyalties were to their own, Jewish, nation. Rather, this pattern

[91] On Jewish diplomacy at Versailles see Mark Levene, *War, Jews, and the New Europe. The Diplomacy of Lucien Wolf, 1914–1919* (Oxford: Littman Library of Jewish Civilization, 1992) and Carole Fink, *Defending the Rights of Others. The Great Powers, the Jews, and International Minority Protection, 1878–1938* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).

[92] See Arno Mayer, *Politics and Diplomacy of Peacemaking. Containment and Counter-revolution at Versailles, 1918–1919* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 1968).

of activity appears to have been instinctive. Nowhere in the correspondence that I have read did these men feel a need to reflect upon it or to think it through. Perhaps for this very reason, it has gone unremarked.

Liberalism was not a pose for these men, it was a deeply held political and personal commitment to which they dedicated their lives. Jewishness, by contrast, was a side-issue. And yet to foreground Jewishness in some contexts but not in others was as natural to them as breathing: they had been doing it all their lives. As a consequence, they understood intuitively that they could instrumentalise different strategies in different contexts in ways that reflected these different selves. I do not mean to suggest that this was a uniquely Jewish understanding, or that Jews were a decisive factor in the permeability between nationalism and internationalism. Rather, my point is that thinking about patterns of Jewish political behaviour in the early twentieth century helps us to see that the national and the international were simultaneously mutually constitutive and divergent contexts. All this suggests that writing individuals into the history of international relations is rather harder than we might wish. It is one thing to detect the existence of internationalist activity as a meaningful dimension of international politics; it is quite another to understand how and why individuals embraced this dimension, and what it meant for them. In particular, we need to be alive to the contradictions within individuals, as well as between different levels of politics. These were contradictions that they did not necessarily seek to resolve.