THE RIGHT UNDER THE SECOND SPANISH REPUBLIC,

1931 - 1936,

WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE CEDA

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the University of Oxford.

by

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ABSTRACT

The thesis which follows is, as the title suggests, a general study of the Right in Spain from the beginning of the Second Republic in April 1931 until the outbreak of the Civil War in July 1936. Pride of place has been given to the CEDA (and its antecedents Acción Nacional and Acción Popular) because this was the biggest and most important of the parties of the Right during the Republic. The term 'Right' has been taken to signify those parties which did not proclaim themselves Republican, i.e. principally the Catholic CEDA, the Monarchist groups and the 'Fascist' Falange. Consideration has also been given to two important institutions usually believed to be 'on the Right': the Church and the Army.

Although some information on the Right has appeared in various books, no attempt at a comprehensive study has hitherto been made. Galindo Herrero's Los partidos monárquicos bajo la segunda República (1956) deals inadequately with the Monarchist parties. Professor Payne's study of the Falange does not satisfactorily place the movement in the context of the other Rightist movements with which it quarrelled or was from time to time connected. The same author's work on the Army (Politics and the Military in Modern Spain), was published just before this thesis went to the typist, as were the biographies of Franco by Crozier and Hills. Professor Sánchez's book on the Church and the Republic, Reform and Reaction, appeared in 1964, two years after work on this thesis began.

Concentration on the CEDA in this thesis is felt by the writer to be fully justified, not only because of that party's size and importance for the history of the Republic, but also because it has hitherto been so neglected by historians. Only one book in any language deals with it - Monge Bernal's Acción Popular - and it is an 'authorized' history written by a party member at the end of 1935. Neglect of the party's history is perhaps attributable to the fact that its leaders were personae non gratae both to the Left and to the victors in the Civil War.

The purpose of this thesis is therefore to try and provide a comprehensive study of the Right during the Republic. The thesis endeavours to explain why the various parties existed, to trace the development of each of them and to give an account of relations between them. The attitude of each to the Church and to the Army (and vice versa) is also discussed. An attempt is also made to examine and explain the policies, ideology and strength of each and, so far as is possible, to indicate socially and geographically whence came their supporters. The absence of adequate biographical information has however hindered a proper study of the economic interests represented by them.

This thesis also constitutes an attempt to set the Right's activities firmly within the broader context of the history of the Republic and the events leading up to the Civil War. For this reason the chronological approach adopted would seem to be justified: the events of the years 1931-1936 in Spain are comparable in their

complexity to those of, for example, the years 1789-1799 in France. Furthermore, the activities and development of the Right were to a considerable extent dictated by this kaleidoscopic sequence of events in which, by and large, the Left held the initiative.

The content of the thesis has naturally been limited by the sources available. Historians of Spain in this period have a mass of raw material available to them, but it is not as complete as that available to students of German, Italian or indeed British history in the same period. The archives of the Ministry of the Interior, for instance, are not open to inspection. It is also very difficult to gain access to private papers - where these have survived. The leader of the CEDA, D. José Ma. Gil Robles, said in 1964 that his papers were not available because he was on the point of publishing his memoirs, but these have not yet appeared. Those of the Monarchist leader, the late D. Antonio Goicoechea, are in the exclusive possession of D. José Gutiérrez-Ravé, whose biography of this politician has been 'forthcoming' for well over a decade. Another Monarchist leader, D. Pedro Sáinz Rodríguez, has a whole flat in Lisbon full of papers in a state of considerable disorder; from these he intends some day to write memoirs. The papers of Dr. Salvador de Madariaga were in his home in Spain but have been confiscated by the present régime. The former secretary-general of the CEDA, D. Geminiano Carrascal, stated in 1964 that he would have been delighted to make available the archives of his party as well as his own papers; unfortunately, however, all had been burnt or looted

and lost during the Civil War.

For the above reasons the thesis is perforce somewhat limited regarding sources of finance for the Right and also on manoeuvring 'behind the scenes'. Nevertheless it must be stated that the politicians interviewed were sometimes curious to know how the writer had obtained certain pieces of information and seemed genuinely surprised that these had been gleaned from reading the newspapers of the time.

The principal sources used have been the press of the period and the record of parliamentary debates. The writer believes that, with the possible exception of D. Joaquín Arrarás, he is the first historian to have read meticulously and <u>in toto</u> the main Catholic daily (<u>El Debate</u>), themain Monarchist daily (<u>ABC</u>) and <u>El Socialista</u> for the years 1931-1936, as well as the <u>Diario de sesiones de las Cortes</u>. These sources have proved most rewarding and revealing and have been grossly neglected. The non-parliamentary speeches of the leading politicians were fully reported in at least one of the dailies cited and it has been possible to evaluate reporting of events by comparing the Right's versions with those of <u>El Socialista</u>. However <u>El Debate</u> possessed the only proper nation-wide news-service and its wealth allowed it to print three times as many pages as <u>El Socialista</u>. This, added to the fact that <u>El Socialista</u> devoted much of its space to theoretical questions, could make for a distorted Rightist interpretation by too much reliance on <u>El Debate</u> as a source of information. However the writer believes that he has retained

a sense of objectivity thanks to the parliamentary record, in which both sides had equal opportunity to state and argue their cases. Nevertheless, somewhat to his surprise, the writer has formed the impression from the latter source that the Right got the better of the argument in the majority of cases. The newspapers also acted as an insurance against getting the importance of issues out of proportion; insofar as the press gave publicity to what contemporaries thought was important, Macaulay was correct in maintaining that the true history of a people is to be found in its newspapers.

Published memoirs by politicians prominent during the period studied are relatively few. Some, such as Largo Caballero's Mis recuerdos, are disappointing. Miguel Maura's Así cayó Alfonso XIII is illuminating on the early months of the Republic, while Lizarza's Memorias de la conspiración is revealing on Carlism in Navarre. Perhaps the two most useful and informative memoirs are Aguirre's Entre la libertad y la revolución and Lerroux's La pequeña historia. The former, an indispensable source on Basque Nationalism (a movement 'objectively' on the Right until 1933), has been accepted as accurate on all save a few points by anti-Basque historians. The latter, written in Portugal in 1937 without access to his papers by the leader of the Radical Party, which moved from Centre-Left to Centre-Right during the Republic, seemed at first reading suspect owing to its polemical tone and the author's reputation. Comparison of the work with other material available has however led this writer to the conclusion that it is much more accurate and useful than is often

thought.

Secondary works written about the period inside and outside Spain often distort as much as they explain. Nevertheless they often include quite important pieces of evidence which are helpful. Such is the case with Arrarás's lengthy Historia de la segunda República española, which, despite its obvious bias, is a mine of information since it is largely a succession of quotations from primary material.

For military conspiracy secondary works, for the most part biographies written with a clear propagandistic intention, are virtually all that is available. Nevertheless some - notably Pemán's life of Varela (Un soldado en la Historia) - are based on diaries and papers and provide useful information. When the 'authorized' biographies and 'official' histories are compared there appears a plethora of discrepancies, yet the writer thinks that it has been possible from such works to piece together a reasonably coherent account of what happened.

The quantity of footnotes in the thesis could be thought by some to be unnecessarily great, but the writer believes this justifiable in a study of a period about which written works are more often than not in quite violent disagreement over relatively minor points of fact. Where a synthesis of various accounts has been attempted (e.g. in Chapter VI - iv) all sources consulted have been indicated. Elsewhere, references to secondary (or other) works indicate that the writer considers the source to be the best available to date on a particular event.

As the thesis is presented in quite strict chronological form, and because the table of contents clearly shows how the material has been organized, this abstract does not contain a full summary. The introduction states the theme of the thesis: 'possibilism' v. 'catastrophism' as the underlying division on the Right. It also sketches the background of failure of 'regeneration' from the Right in the early part of the century. The first section of Chapter I consists of an analytical survey of the forces of the Right during the last months of the Monarchy and serves as a prelude to the study in greater depth which begins in April 1931. Each chapter starts with a summary interpretation of the material subsequently presented in detail; these summaries also serve to indicate the conclusions to which the writer has been led. The necessary general background has been incorporated stage by stage so as to place the Right's activities in the perspective of the history of the Republic.

The writer believes that new information has been provided, and new light shed, on many aspects of the subject under consideration. He believes this to be the first adequate and comprehensive study of the Right as a whole during the Republic, and the first attempt seriously to study the CEDA and its antecedents. A great deal of information has been brought to light, particularly on the CEDA and the Alfonsine Monarchists. Particular consideration has also been given to the three general elections and to the aims of the Socialists. A more comprehensive study than hitherto attempted has been made of the much neglected period between October 1934 and December

1935 (in Chapter V).

With regard to the broader question of the interpretation of the history of the Republic and the causes of the Civil War of 1936, the writer thinks that two crucial points have clearly come to light. Firstly, given that the future of the Republic depended on the Socialist movement and the Catholic party, it is important to recognize that it was the former and not the latter which abandoned democratic methods and appealed to violence. Secondly, it is clear that the Left Republican leaders themselves dealt the democratic Republic a serious blow by equating the form of government with their own ideological predilections. In the light of these conclusions, certain assumptions still widely-held outside Spain concerning the responsibility of the Right for the disaster of July 1936 must be reconsidered.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I should like to express my gratitude to my supervisor, Professor Raymond Carr, for his patience, help and guidance, which have been invaluable.

R.A.H.R.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

(i) Political parties, trade unions, etc.

AET	Agrupación Escolar Tradicionalista
CEDA	Confederación Española de Derechas Autónomas
CESO	Confederación Española de Sindicatos Obreros
CET	Coalición Española de Trabajadores
CMI	Círculo Monárquico Independiente
CNCA	Confederación Nacional Católico-Agraria
CNSCO	Confederación Nacional de Sindicatos Católicos Obreros
CNT	Confederación Nacional del Trabajo
CONS	Central Obrera Nacional-Sindicalista
DRV	Derecha Regional Valenciana
FAI	Federación Anarquista Ibérica
FE	Falange Española de las JONS (see below)
FET	Federación Española de Trabajadores
FNT	Frente Nacional del Trabajo
FUE	Federación Universitaria Española
ILE	Institución Libre de Enseñanza
JAP	Juventud (or Juventudes) de Acción Popular
JMI	Juventud Monárquica Independiente
JONS	Juntas de Ofensiva Nacional-Sindicalista
JSU	Juventudes Socialistas Unificadas
ORGA	Organización Republicana Gallega Autónoma

PCE	Partido Comunista de España
PNE	Partido Nacionalista Español
PNV	Partido Nacionalista Vasco
POUM	Partido Obrero de Unificación Marxista
PSOE	Partido Socialista Obrero Español
PSP	Partido Social Popular
SEU	Sindicato Español Universitario
SEV	Sociedad de Estudios Vascos
SOV	Solidaridad de Obreros Vascos
TYRE	Tradicionalistas y Renovación Española
UGT	Unión General de Trabajadores
UME	Unión Militar Española
UMN	Unión Monárquica Nacional
UP	Unión Patriótica

(ii) Sources.

AP	Acción Popular
BOT	Boletín de Orientación Tradicionalista
BSS	Bulletin of Spanish Studies
DSC	Diario de las sesiones de Cortes
DSCC	Diario de sesiones de las Cortes Constituyentes
HCE	Historia de la Cruzada española
HGL	Historia de la guerra de liberación (tomo I)
HSRE	Historia de la segunda República espanola

JA	José Antonio
O.c.	Obras completas (of J.A. Primo de Rivera)

NOTE ON TITLES

Titles were officially abolished by the Second Republic; nevertheless many title-holders continued to use them. Persons are therefore referred to by the name most commonly accepted, e.g. Conde de Rodezno and Conde de Vallellano (and not Tomás Domínguez Arévalo and Fernando Suárez de Tangil), but José Antonio Primo de Rivera and General José Sanjurjo (and not the Marqués de Estella and General the Marqués del Rif).

NOTE ON PLACE-NAMES

Certain widely-accepted Anglicized forms have been used, e.g. Catalonia for Cataluña, Corunna for La Coruña, Biscay for Vizcaya, Seville for Sevilla, Navarre for Navarra, etc.

INTRODUCTION

The principal division on the Spanish Right in the nineteenth century, as in the 1930s, lay between those who advocated violence in order to rid the country of liberalism and those who were willing to work within the established system in order steadily to purge it of liberalism. This division between 'catastrophism' and 'possibilism' was epitomized by the writings and careers of Fr. Balmes and Donoso Cortés respectively. The former was a Carlist who pursued 'the policy of the lesser evil' of trying to reunite the Bourbon family and facilitate Catholic unity. The latter was not a Carlist but saw dictatorship as the only means by which to avert the 'catastrophe' of social revolution.[1] In the 1930s the division was to be represented by the 'possibilist' Gil Robles and the 'catastrophist' Calvo Sotelo.

The basis of the nineteenth-century Right was the Carlist movement. Its ideology was a revivification of traditional ideals in opposition to the liberal Monarchy of Isabel II. An ideological schism was superimposed on the dynastic schism. Carlists defended a legitimate Monarchy 'limited' by traditional Cortes, Catholic unity

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1 Carlists were the supporters of Fernando VII's younger brother. In 1833 they opposed the succession of Isabel II (Fernando's infant daughter) on the grounds that Fernando had no right to alter the Salic Law. For general nineteenth-century background see R. Carr, Spain 1808-1939 (Oxford, 1966).

and regional fueros (liberties, laws and usages) against the centralism and parliamentarianism of the Isabelline Monarchy.

However the Right could also be defined as including the Moderates, the conservative party within the dominant liberal Monarchy. This Monarchy was overthrown in 1868, but restored in 1874: the confusion of these years brought about the triumph of this liberal-conservative tendency, for the Army, a liberal force, set about defeating the Carlists for the second time and was responsible for restoring Alfonso XII (Isabel's son).

The architect of the restored Monarchy was Cánovas del Castillo, a conservative liberal who disapproved of this premature military action. His aim was to take advantage of the exhaustion of the Left after the sterility of the preceding quinquennium in order to create a political system within which Right and Left could co-operate, or at least coexist peacefully.[1] With the help of Sagasta, his opposite number on the Left, he successfully installed a liberal

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1 Some knowledge of the events of 1868-74 is essential for understanding the Restoration period. The events of these years were a good example of the revolutionary process. The military men who rose against the Queen to 'restore constitutional Monarchy' soon found themselves committed to a programme of religious freedom and universal suffrage owing to civilian pressure. The glissement à gauche, which, after the interlude of the poorly-supported Monarchy of Amadeo of Savoy, was to end in the revolutionary chaos of the federal First Republic in 1873, had begun. Radicalism and anti-clericalism led to a reaction in favour of Carlism, resulting in civil war from 1872. The Army stepped in to uphold order in 1873 and Gen. Pavía closed the Cortes in Jan. 1874 to avoid another drift to the Left. Restoration of the Isabelline line seemed the only path left if the social order were to be maintained and Carlist provincial reaction defeated.

Monarchy based on the co-sovereignty of Cortes and King. Cánovas and Sagasta rendered military intervention unnecessary by devising the practice of 'pacific rotation' in office for their parties, the Liberal-Conservatives and the Liberals. As in contemporary Italy, parliamentary majorities were 'made' from the Ministry of the Interior by patronage and the manipulation of local political bosses (caciques). Cánovas's system lasted until 1923, although it began to break down after the turn of the century.

If Cánovas's liberal régime were to be comprehensive, it clearly had to embrace the Church and as many Catholics as possible in addition to the throne, the oligarchy and the army. The Church had refused to accept the short-lived Constitution of 1869 which permitted toleration for non-Catholic sects and Alfonsine propaganda presented the restoration as a return to religion after persecution. The Constitution of 1876 therefore reaffirmed the provisions of the Concordat of 1851 with some modifications. Article 11 allowed freedom of worship in private to non-Catholics.[1] This compromise did not please the more fervent anti-clericals or Catholics, but the defeat of Carlism and the election of Leo XIII in 1878 ensured that there would be no serious challenge to the settlement from the Right.

After its second failure in the field the Carlist movement began

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1 On Cánovas's work see Carr, Spain, 347-79. Cf. J.M. García Escudero, De Cánovas a la República (2nd ed., Madrid, 1953), 21-102. The Concordat of 1851 made Catholicism the sole religion of the State, allowed in the Orders and said that all education should conform to Catholic doctrine.

to disintegrate. The first group to leave was headed by Pidal, who decided to follow the 'possibilist' tactics of Balmes in defence of religion. In 1883 he led his Unión Católica into Cánovas's party with the approval of Primate and Pope. Five years later Ramón Nocedal founded his intransigent Integrist Party with Carlists who put religion before royalism.[1] Then in 1919 the orator Vázquez de Mella left the fold, taking most of the other leading personalities with him. The Jaimists (as the Carlists were known after the succession of Jaime III in 1909) were now an insignificant group enjoying 'the static tranquillity of a sensuous Nirvana.'[2] Apart from a tradition of intransigent anti-liberalism, these groups bequeathed to the Right an important intellectual inheritance: the thought and writings of Menéndez Pelayo (a follower of Pidal) and Vázquez de Mella.

Menéndez Pelayo provided Catholics and the Right with a thorough historical interpretation of Spain to counteract the growing intellectual influence of Krausist laicism, and his contribution to the Right has been likened to that of Fichte to German nationalism. Catholicism was the great and essential unifying factor in Spanish

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1 See J.N. Schumacher, 'Integrism', Catholic Historical Review, XLVIII (1962), 344-63.

2 Duque de Maura & M. Fernández Almagro, Por qué cayó Alfonso XIII (Madrid, 1948), 345. Typical was the Marqués de Oñate who refused to go to the opera when 'the Institutions' (i.e. Alfonso XIII) were there (A. de Foxá, Madrid de Corte a Cheka [n.pl., 1938, 62-3] - a novel, but based on accurate factual information).

history. The Catholic Kings were the most genuine representation of Spain. In their Golden Century the Spaniards, 'a nation of armed theologians', were the chosen instrument of God's will. 'Spain, evangelist of half the globe; Spain, hammer of heretics, light of Trent, sword of Rome, cradle of St. Ignatius; this is our greatness and our unity: we have no other... Two centuries of unceasing and systematic work artificially to produce the revolution, here where it could never be organic, have brought about, not the renewal of the national way of life, but the vitiation, confusion and perversion of it.' He believed the pays réel to be still basically healthy, but if its 'slow suicide' were to be averted it must return to its Catholic culture and the old Monarchy with its regional variety. An old people, denying its traditions, ignorant of its history, was condemned to senile imbecility, if not to death.[1]

From the 1890s Vázquez de Mella codified and developed Carlist ideology along Thomist lines. He campaigned for a 'representative and federative Monarchy' that was neither absolute nor parliamentary, like the Alfonsine system which was founded upon 'an absurd combination of the most contrary principles' and was but a staging-post on the road to Republican democracy. Since religion was the foundation

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1 M. Menéndez Pelayo, Textos sobre España (2nd ed., Madrid, 1962); see also P. Sáinz Rodríguez, Evolución de las ideas sobre la decadencia española y otros estudios de crítica literaria (Madrid, 1962), 430-572, & A. Herrera Oria, Obras selectas (Madrid, 1963), 266-311.

of liberty he advocated the moral union of Church and State, but their economic and administrative separation. The King would reign and rule, limited and aided by corporative Cortes representing material, spiritual and intellectual interests. Society was 'polyarchic', being composed of a series of 'intermediary republics' (guild, municipality, region) between the 'monarchies' of the State and the family. Social reform on the lines of Rerum Novarum (1891) was necessary because laissez faire capitalism was tyrannical, lacking in justice and charity, and would surely lead to a 'new Apocalypse' by comparison with which the French revolution would seem an idyll. Catholic corporativism was the answer to Socialism and Anarchism. He saw the historic regions as tributaries flowing into the river of the nation. They should retain their juridical personalities and enjoy 'autarchy' (internal self-government) within a 'federative union' including Portugal. Centralisation and separatism he abhorred.[1]

Such regionalist ideas did not however satisfy the aspirations of Catalans and Basques in the twentieth century. Carlism as a weapon against liberal centralization had failed; thoughts therefore turned to nationalism and federalism based on theories of contract. In Catalonia traditional regionalism gave way to the more

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1 J. Vázquez de Mella, Regionalismo y Monarquía (Madrid, 1957); L. Aguirre Prado, Vázquez de Mella (2nd ed., Madrid, 1959); L. Legaz Lacambra & R. Buide Laverde, Cátedra Vázquez de Mella: conferencias (Santiago de Compostela, 1945).

modern demands of the Lliga, founded in 1901 by Cambó and Prat de la Riba, which fifteen years later raised the question of sovereignty. In the Basque Country the Carlist failure led to the foundation in 1906 of a nationalist party based on the separatist ideas of Arana Goiri.[1]

Peripheral nationalisms were not the only challenge to Cánovas's system after the turn of the century. Defeat in the disastrous war of 1898 with the United States brought forth cries for 'regeneration' on all sides. The laicist intellectuals of the 'Generation of '98' saw the answer in speedy 'Europeanization', but few were as practical as Costa with his ideas for agrarian reform under a strong government. There was also a revival, if not of Republicanism, of the 'Republican spirit' and anti-clericalism, which was taken up by Liberals. Industrialization led to the growth of Socialism in Madrid and Bilbao, and of Anarcho-Syndicalism in Barcelona. Over-population and bad conditions produced Anarchism in the countryside of the south. Furthermore, with the passing of Cánovas and Sagasta the system of bi-partisan rotation started to break down as their parties disintegrated into factions. 'Regenerationism' on the Right appeared in two guises: one non-political, social-Catholicism; the other political, Maurismo. Both failed to meet the challenge of

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1 See M. García Venero, Historia del nacionalismo catalán (Madrid, 1944) and his Historia del nacionalismo vasco (Madrid, 1945).

the 'other' Spain of laicism and revolution.[1]

Catholicism in the late nineteenth century was strongest in the north and east, the areas from which Carlism had drawn its following. The Church had succeeded in winning the allegiance of the ruling oligarchy and the provincial middle class, but, on the whole, it failed to appreciate the significance of the drift to the towns. To the urban working class it seemed a 'bourgeois' institution. The clergy as a whole lacked ideas on social problems, but there were important exceptions. Something of a Catholic revival can be discerned at the turn of the century.[2]

As early as 1864 the Jesuit Fr. Vicent had begun to found mixed workers' and employers' Círculos Católicos dependent on the hierarchy. His immediate aim was to prevent the apostasy of the masses by securing for them just wages, the means to save and education. He hoped that out of the Círculos would grow 'guild-corporations' to regulate production, competition, distribution, consumption and wages. He was helped in his task by the Marqués de Comillas, a wealthy philanthropist who started a bank to provide cheap credit. Although many Círculos were set up, Fr. Vicent's corporative dream did not come true. Employers considered the Círculos useful recreation

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1 For the period 1898-1923 see Carr, Spain, chapters xi-xiii. Cf. García Escudero, De Cánovas, 135-235.

2 J. Vicens Vives, Historia social y económica de España y América, IV-2 (Barcelona, 1959), 145-8.

centres but strongly opposed the creation of workers' unions. Those priests who tried to organize unions were denounced for not sticking to their last. By 1912 Fr. Vicent and Comillas recognized their failure; they had been wasting their time on too ambitious a project.[1]

Inspired by Fr. Vicent's example others attempted to found industrial workers' unions and agrarian organizations. In 1911 the Catholic unions in the Basque provinces formed the Solidaridad de Obreros Vascos, which however went over to Basque nationalism. About the same time the Dominican Fr. Gafo began organizing his free Catholic unions in the north which were eventually wrecked by disputes over confessionalism. Fr. Paláu's efforts in Barcelona to develop Acción Social Popular were thwarted when its members were refused permission to participate in a just strike. Similarly Canon Arboleya's activities in Asturias met with hostility from the beati possedentes, who short-sightedly denounced such priests to bishops as revolutionaries and even on occasion demanded their excommunication. When a national confederation of Catholic workers' unions (CNSCO) was at last established in 1919, it consisted of 60,000 miners and railwaymen, compared with a membership of 200,000 for the Socialist UGT and 700,000 for the Anarcho-Syndicalist CNT. Nor were the non-confessional Sindicatos Libres, founded in 1920 in

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1 F. del Valle, El P. Antonio Vicent, S.J., y la acción social católica española (Madrid, 1947); A. Osorio García, 'El sindicalismo español anterior a 1936', A.C.N.de P., 15 May 1961.

the Ateneo Legitimista in Barcelona, any more successful.[1]

In the countryside of Castile and León, however, social-Catholicism did meet with success. The smallholders' syndicates of the area were in 1917 organized into a confederation, the CNCA, among the aims of which was opposition to Socialism, usury, caciquismo and 'the pagan principles of liberalism'. By 1920 the confederation claimed to have 600,000 members.[2] This success was to ensure political Catholicism a solid basis of support in the 1930s.

The political response of the Right to the new challenge was Maurismo. Antonio Maura was a conservative 'regenerationist'. He believed that the pays réel was 'sound', and therefore sought to carry out a 'revolution from above' to forestall revolution from below. Opposed to caciquismo, insincere elections and oligarchy, he tried to reform local government to create the conditions necessary for democracy and also to come to terms with the regional regenerationists of the Lliga. He assumed that the masses would follow a democratic Conservative caudillo who succeeded in getting things done. However he did not bargain for the alliance of the increasingly anti-clerical dynastic Liberals with Leftist parties

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1 Osorio García, ibid.; J.N. García-Nieto, El sindicalismo cristiano en España (Bilbao, 1960), 63-178; J. Gómez Acebo, Origen, desarrollo y trascendencia del movimiento sindicalista obrero (Madrid, 1915), passim; & C. Cardó, Histoire spirituelle des Espagnes (Paris, 1946), 144-5.

2 A. Monedero Martín, La Confederación Nacional Católico-Agraria en 1920 (Madrid, 1921).

which did not accept the Monarchy. In the crises of 1909 and 1912 Alfonso XIII (who had come of age in 1902) preferred to appease the Leftist bloc rather than tie the Monarchy's future to Maura. In 1913, with Maura in effect boycotting the Crown, the King gave power to another Conservative politician, Dato, whereupon the Conservative Party fell apart. Maura's vision of conservative democracy faded.[1]

As a result of Dato's 'treason' the Young Conservatives rallied to Maura's personal cause and programme. The Maurista movement was founded in the autumn of 1913 by the Aragonese Conservative leader Ossorio Gallardo. Maura was a sincere Catholic, a sincere Alfonsine Monarchist and a sincere liberal. He declined to espouse clericalism, ally with the Jaimists or countenance dictatorship, which he thought would be suicide for the Monarchy. Yet, although he could do no wrong in the eyes of his romantic young followers, the style and tone of 'street Maurismo' was combative and authoritarian in its contempt for the 'old politics'. With their catechism and anthem the 'civic guerrillas' tried to shock the 'neutral masses' from their slumbers and 'make politics moral'. However when the caudillo was entrusted with leadership of a national coalition government in 1918 the movement lost its raison d'être. With his failure to produce results Maurismo went into decline. It was not surprising that its members should provide the civilian general

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1 D. Sevilla Andrés, Antonio Maura (Barcelona, 1954), esp. 190-5, & Carr, Spain, 477-87.

staff for the Dictatorship and the authoritarian Monarchism of the 1930s. A young lawyer with a keen interest in social problems, Calvo Sotelo, said that Maurismo was neither of the Right nor of the Left, but a synthesis of the best elements in both.[1]

In the confusion and disorder of the years between the abortive revolutionary movement of 1917 and the military coup of 1923, an attempt was made to revivify and unify the Right within a Christian-Democratic framework. Three men were responsible for this project: Ángel Herrera, the energetic social-Catholic editor of the daily El Debate, who since 1909 had helped to create an association of Catholic propagandists, Spanish Catholic Action, the Editorial Católica, the CNCA, and the Catholic students' confederation; Severino Aznar, President of the Grupo de la Democracia Cristiana (a non-political study-group) and organizer of the 'social weeks' of 1906-12; and Mgr. Tedeschini, an admirer of Sturzo who became the Papal Nuncio in 1921. They really created the Partido Social Popular of 1923, whose leaders were Ossorio and a young social-Catholic academic, José María Gil Robles, the son of a Carlist deputy and ideologue.

The PSP was formed from men with differing political backgrounds who were united on fundamentals. It claimed to represent 'the

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1 J. Gutiérrez-Ravé, Yo fuí un joven maurista (Madrid, 1945); Sevilla Andrés, Maura, 444ff; A. Ossorio Gallardo, La guerra de España y los católicos (Buenos Aires, 1942), 62-73; & M. Pi Navarro, Los primeros 25 años de la vida de José Calvo Sotelo (Saragossa, 1961), 124-31.

essence of Traditionalism, Maurismo and regionalism' and was open to all desiring 'the regeneration of Spain within Christian channels'. This 'austere and reforming citizens' movement' was intended as a third force between oligarchic liberalism and Marxism. It stood for the purification of politics, for 'healthy traditional Christian regionalism' and, above all, for social reforms based on the 'social and popular' teaching of the Gospels as interpreted in the Encyclicals of Leo XIII. Among those who rallied to this united Catholic front were disappointed Mauristas, such as Calvo Sotelo and Vallellano, and ex-Jaimists like Pradera. The PSP was virtually still-born, for in September 1923 the military took over. Nevertheless it was clearly the precursor of the Catholic political organization of the 1930s.[1]

From 1814 military intervention was a constant feature of Spanish politics. The army was the mainstay of liberalism against the Carlists and from the middle of the nineteenth century became increasingly associated with the maintenance of order and the power of the centralized State. The dependence of governments upon military loyalty meant that the army saw itself as the repository of the general will of the nation as well as the defender of its own professional interests. When a government was felt by officers no longer to represent 'opinion', or when it could not keep order, these

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1 Nothing has been written about the PSP, but see A. Boissel, Un Chef: Gil Robles (Paris, 1934), 24 & 37-9; also Gutiérrez-Ravé, Joven maurista, 256-63.

officers made a 'pronouncement' against the politicians in power. If the rest of the army did not positively support the government, a phenomenon known as the 'negative pronouncement', the pronunciamiento was successful.[1]

Having precipitated the restoration of the Monarchy in 1874, the army remained in the background as the nation's last resort in time of need even though Cánovas had ended its function as the instrument of political change by his system of 'pacific rotation'. After the turn of the century, however, the army began to show signs of re-emerging on the political scene as the guardian of national integrity and public order. As heirs to the liberal centralizing tradition, military men detested Catalanism. Anti-militarist sentiments and the campaigns in Morocco made officers hostile to the Left and social radicalism. The enthusiastic patronage of Alfonso XIII also flattered their sense of importance.

Then in 1916-17 bureaucratic junior officers in the Peninsula formed Juntas de Defensa to press for better conditions for themselves and a strong government for the nation. When the army in Morocco, which had little liking for the chairborne Junteros, was defeated by tribesmen at Annual (1921) and politicians who could not keep order at home sought scapegoats in the King and the military leadership, General Primo de Rivera decided that it was time to

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1 Carr, Spain, esp. 124-6, 129, 214-9 & 336-7. Cf. S.G. Payne, Politics and the Military in Modern Spain (London, 1967), 1-43.

'pronounce' against the unpatriotic professional politicians who had ruined a perfectly good country.[1]

Primo de Rivera ruled Spain by 'intuitionism' from 1923 to 1930, though in 1925 the Military Directory made way for the Civil Directory.[2] When he took power he announced that his dictatorship would only be a parenthesis in the constitutional life of the country during which order would be restored and politics purged of self-seeking politicians. The bluff Andalusian was a simple patriot who saw his task as national regeneration under the Monarchy, a regeneration based upon the 'iron surgery' recommended by Costa and the 'revolution from above' preached by Maura. His slogan, 'Country, Religion, Monarchy', was vague, while the Dictatorship's official organism, the Unión Patriótica with its eclectic programme, claimed to be 'apolitical' and 'not a party'. Like the Somatén (civic militia), it was open to 'all men of goodwill'. It was joined by time-servers as well as idealists. As the Minister of Finance, Calvo Sotelo, observed, it was bound to prove fruitless because it was artificially created from above.[3]

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1 Carr, Spain, 500-6, 516-23 & 558-64; Vicens Vives, Historia social, IV-2, 184-5; Payne, The Military, 44-205.

2 For the Dictatorship see Carr, Spain, 564-91; D.F. Ratcliff, Prelude to Franco (New York, 1957), and the articles by Gen. Primo de Rivera in El Debate, 21-23 & 25 March 1930. See also Payne, The Military, 205-55, and M. Tuñón de Lara, La España del siglo XX (Paris, 1966), 121-88.

3 J. Calvo Sotelo, Mis servicios al Estado (Madrid, 1931), 331.

The Dictator solved the Moroccan problem, gave the country order and gained the cooperation of the Socialist UGT, which seized the opportunity to build up its strength. While favourable economic conditions prevailed his civilian Ministers did much useful work. Calvo Sotelo's financial reforms permitted Guadalhorce to embark on an ambitious programme of public works, while Aunós set up a corporative system of industrial arbitration with the UGT. The tragedy of the Dictatorship was that Primo de Rivera could find no political solution. The consultative National Assembly convoked in 1927 was a failure, not because it was boycotted by intellectuals or the old politicians, but because the Socialists, now the only real political force in Spain, refused to attend. The Socialist decision to follow a policy of alliance with Republicans, as advocated by Prieto, and not to help draw up a new constitution for the Monarchy, as advocated by Besteiro, was a most important turning-point in Spanish twentieth-century history.[1]

Since the Dictator could not now create 'a new legality', he and those associated with him were politically doomed. He alienated the old political class by suspending and dispensing with the Constitution. He alienated intellectuals and students by his support for clerical education and by his haphazard censorship. He

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1 Sáinz Rodríguez (conversation), who attended the Assembly as a loyal critic of the Dictator, says that had Prieto's arguments not prevailed with the UGT, the Assembly would have been truly representative and could have resulted in the Belgian-style Monarchy which he and Besteiro desired.

alienated opinion in Catalonia and the Basque Country by his rigorous suppression of regionalism. He alienated important sections of the armed forces by his attacks on the artillery corps. He alienated conservatives and economic interests by his interventionism and his paternalistic social justice. He even alienated the Church by his mild regalism and his favouritism of the UGT at the expense of Catholic unions. The King who gently edged him from power was left compromised by his acceptance of the 'illegal' régime. The Right, weak in 1923, was left powerless, discredited and in disarray.

CHAPTER I

THE RIGHT IN DISARRAY, JANUARY 1930-JULY 1931

The last months of Alfonso XIII's reign proved to be the prologue to the Second Republic in more than a chronological sense. The Monarchy was invertebrate. The forces upon which it depended - the army, the Church, the conservative classes, the political establishment - all considered the form of government of secondary importance. The preservation of their own particular interests was what they considered essential. None supported Alfonso wholeheartedly and all were willing to give the Republic a try. From the end of the Dictatorship the King was on the defensive and even went so far as to try and reach agreement with his imprisoned opponents. Thus, when in April 1931 the 'neutral masses' of the towns voted against him and the forces of order staged a 'negative pronunciamiento' against him, he had no alternative but to leave.

The components of the new Republican government were disparate. The Socialists provided its real strength although they participated only to further their own interests. The Left Republicans were a collection of bourgeois radicals with the negative aim of getting rid of the 'old Spain' of King, Church and army. These radical elements were hidden behind the moderate façade of 'respectable' politicians who wanted little more than the replacement of a king by a president. Surprised to find themselves in power so suddenly,

the Republicans and Socialists at first moved cautiously, but in so doing they alienated those who wanted a revolutionary break with the past.

The burning of conventos in May by small bands of extremists proved to be an indelible stain on the Republican record. The episode raised dramatically the two basic issues that were to plague the history of the régime: religion and public order. Divisions of opinion inside and outside the government hardened, with the result that in the elections in June the liberal-Catholic via media propounded by the leaders of the Republican-Socialist coalition, who had failed to keep order in May, suffered a defeat. In the absence of a real Right conservatives voted as a pis aller for the 'historic Republicans' of Lerroux, who emerged as a conservative by contrast with the triumphant Socialist and Left Republican reformers.

The Right proper was weak and disorganized. Although there was a general feeling that the Republic meant revolutionary change, two different schools of thought emerged. Some said that only the Monarchy could safeguard the Church, national unity and the social order. Others, more numerous, followed the policy of the Church in rejecting the idea that the causes of Monarchy, Catholicism and Spain were inseparable. They believed that Catholic and patriotic interests could best be defended within the newly established régime. There was controversy on the Right from the start of the Republic over the validity of 'accidentalism' (indifference to forms of government). The Right proper did poorly in the elections because

it had insufficient time in which to organize. Furthermore it was harassed by Republicans who wanted to make sure of an overwhelming majority in the Constituent Cortes.

i. The collapse of the Alfonsine Monarchy

In January 1930 Alfonso had two alternatives before him: he could either become dictator himself, like Alexander in Yugoslavia, or he could endeavour to return to the Constitution of 1876.[1] He chose the latter course and appointed General Dámaso Berenguer to preside over a Dictablanda which was to make the transition from the Dictadura of Primo de Rivera. To achieve their purpose, King and General needed the collaboration of Primo de Rivera's political opponents. Still smarting from the humiliation of a spell of enforced retirement, the politicians did not rally round immediately. The Duque de Maura and Cambó, leaders of the Conservatives and the Lliga respectively, refused to join this government, while the Conde de Romanones and his Liberals, offended at not being asked to join it, kept up an opposition that proved fatal to the General's efforts.

A section of the political class was prepared to forgive Alfonso in order to re-create the network of caciquismo destroyed

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1 For the fall of the Monarchy see Carr, Spain, 591-602. Cf. García Escudero, De Cánovas, 289-317; S. Galindo Herrero, Los partidos monárquicos bajo la segunda República (2nd ed., Madrid, 1956), 40-70, & Tuñón de Lara, España, 189-227.

by the Dictator. By February 1931 these politicians had decided that circumstances demanded a temporary closing of ranks and a new government was formed, including Maura, Romanones and Cambó's lieutenant, Ventosa Calvell. The problem now was to 'make' the elections for the Cortes; but since the Liberals and their Catalan and Conservative rivals who formed themselves into the Constitutional Centre Party, could not agree upon the ideal result, it was decided to hold municipal elections first.[1] To ensure fair play, the two crucial positions in the new government were filled by non-party men: Admiral Aznar was the Premier with the Marqués de Hoyos at the Ministry of the Interior.

Those willing to cooperate with Alfonso and confident of their ability to reconstruct the constitutional system, represented only a part of the old political class. A second group preferred to remain on the margin of loyal opposition to the Monarchy. These 'Constitutionalists' included former Liberal and Conservative leaders like Santiago Alba and Burgos Mazo, the Reformist chief Melquiades Álvarez, and other rebels against the Dictatorship. Their leader was the ex-Conservative José Sánchez Guerra.

They adopted, in effect, the Reformist policy: belief in a liberal Constitution was essential; forms of government were of secondary importance. They advocated Alfonso's abdication rather

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1 Sáinz Rodríguez (conversation), who was a member of the abortive Constitutional Centre.

than a Republic and called for the election of Constituent Cortes to judge the King for his actions since 1923. Posing as spokesman for the discontents of the 'neutral masses' they sought to gain their end by withdrawing from Alfonso's governments the prestige which they believed their names still represented. Typical among them was Ossorio, who now described himself as a 'Monarchist without a King'.[1]

The opponents of Alfonso, said a Monarchists speaker, could be divided into three groups: Republicans, Socialists and 'Monarchists who have grown tired of being Monarchists and intellectuals who have grown tired of being no more than intellectuals'.[2] Meeting in San Sebastián in August 1930, lifelong Republicans, newly-converted Republicans, Socialists and Catalan Leftists agreed to join together against the Monarchy with a programme of general reform, including autonomy for Catalonia, to be carried out under a Republic.[3]

The 'historic' Republicans, the Radicals, were led by Alejandro Lerroux, a reputedly corrupt professional politician who had begun

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1 He added that his cat had more advanced views - it had already become a Republican.

2 Goicoechea, speech in Madrid, 20 Apr. 1930, quoted in Historia de la Cruzada española (ed. J. Arrarás Iribarren), (Madrid, 1939-40), I-2, 218.

3 Monarchist confidence is reflected in the report of the local Governor, describing the meeting as 'of no importance'. (A. Alcalá Galiano, The Fall of a Throne, [London, 1933], 29).

his career with violent anti-clerical outbursts and attacks on society, but who now advocated a Republic of orderly conservatism. To his Left were new converts like Manuel Azaña and the 'Jacobin' Radical-Socialists, who wanted a more radical bourgeois parliamentarist Republic with pronounced anti-clerical characteristics. Apart from the Radicals, who had some organization, the Republicans had no political organization apart from cliques of friends. They had therefore to ally with the Socialist Workers' Party (PSOE), which had a nation-wide organization thanks to the protection given by the Dictatorship to its union, the UGT. By tradition Republicans, the Socialists believed a Republic would give them greater scope and open the way to Socialism.[1]

To mask any impression of social and anti-Catholic revolution and so reassure the 'neutral masses', the leaders of this Republican-Socialist coalition were two Catholics converted to Republicanism since the end of the Dictatorship: Niceto Alcalá-Zamora, a former Liberal Minister, and Miguel Maura, a son of Antonio Maura. In contrast to the Left Republicans, Alcalá-Zamora promised a conservative Republic led by ex-Monarchists like himself, which would even allow the Primate to sit in its upper chamber.[2] The manifesto of his Liberal Republican Right mentioned authority, the gradual

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1 Largo Caballero, El Socialista, 7 Apr. 1931.

2 Speech at Valencia, 15 Apr. 1930, quoted in HCE I-2, 217.

separation of Church and State by negotiation, and recognition of the rights of property, albeit subject to modern needs.[1] The two politicians had joined the Republicans and Socialists because they deemed it unwise 'to leave the Left alone in the Republican camp'. They intended to fight the revolution by leading it.[2]

They succeeded in imposing their views on the others in the electoral manifesto of the coalition, which promised a tolerant Republic with a maximum religious programme of freedom of religion so as to emancipate Spain from 'discreditable clericalism'.[3] A more spectacular manifesto was that of the 'Intellectuals in the Service of the Republic', who declared that the Monarchy of 1876 had failed to take root in the nation and thus become one with its needs, though they admitted that the Monarchy was dying from internal causes and was not being killed off by the opposition.[4] The Republican Committee did not expect the fall of the Monarchy as a consequence of the municipal elections.

The strongest opposition to the Republican-Socialist coalition came from groups on the Right which were in virtual opposition to the governments of Berenguer and Aznar. By implication they dis-

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1 Quoted by A. Mendizábal, The Martyrdom of Spain (London, 1938), 94.

2 M. Maura, Así cayó Alfonso XIII... (Mexico City, 1962), 50 & 82.

3 Quoted by Sánchez, Reform and Reaction, 74.

4 Quoted by Alcalá Galiano, Fall of a Throne, 106.

approved of the policy chosen by the King, whose throne they were ardently defending. The most important of these groups - which, like all parties except the Socialist, lacked masses - was the Unión Monárquica Nacional. It appeared in April 1930, succeeding the Dictator's Unión Patriótica as the organization incorporating those who remained loyal to his memory and aspirations. Its leaders were the ex-Ministers of the Dictatorship and the General's eldest son, José Antonio, all under the direction of the Conde de Guadalhorce. Its manifesto rejected the idea of a new Dictatorship and proposed instead constitutional reforms to strengthen the prestige of the executive power.[1] However the group's chief intellectual, Ramiro de Maeztu, believed a 'military Monarchy' would be a necessity for at least two generations to make the transition to a resuscitated Catholic traditional Monarchy. 'The notion of Parliament', he added, 'is foreign to the Spanish national genius.'[2]

Such views, together with the denigration of the Dictatorship by parliamentary Monarchists, made the formation of single Monarchist lists difficult although these were seen to be necessary.[3] On

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1 HCE I-2, 223-4; & Galindo, Los partidos, 49. The ex-Minister of Labour, Aunós, set out to found his own Labour Party.

2 Interviewed in The Spectator, 21 Mar. 1931, 453-4.

3 Marqués de Hoyos, Mi testimonio (Madrid, 1962), 108. Alfonso's failure to attend Primo de Rivera's funeral caused resentment among UMN Monarchists.

the other hand, the character of the UMN encouraged Integrists to join actively in the fight. The Integrist daily El Siglo Futuro made propaganda for the supporters of Alfonso XIII, and in San Sebastián the Monarchist list was an Integrist-UMN coalition.[1]

Another group, the Juventud Monárquica Independiente led by Eugenio Vegas Latapié, made efforts to rouse Monarchists from their apathy by organizing demonstrations. It also tried to keep what little enthusiasm there was from being dissipated in a proliferation of even smaller bodies calling themselves grandiosely Acción Monárquica, Acción Nobiliaria, Partido Socialista Monárquico 'Alfonso XIII'.[2] Such was the lack of enthusiasm among moneyed supporters of the Monarchy that Vegas could not even collect sufficient funds to start a review in October 1930.[3] Although the Alfonsine daily ABC warned that the coalition stood for social revolution, separatism and anti-Catholicism as well as a Republic,[4] Reacción Ciudadana, the electoral body of the Monarchists in Madrid, existed in little more than name. It collected only 22,000 pesetas, and was therefore unable to employ sufficient staff to check the

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1 ABC, 2 & 3 Apr. 1931.

2 Galindo, Los partidos, 61-2.

3 E. Vegas Latapié, 'Maeztu y Acción Española', ABC, 2 Nov. 1952.

4 ABC, 7 Apr. 1931.

electoral roll.[1]

At a more popular and 'Right radical' level, two attempts were made to start a nationalist revival. A Spanish version of the Camelots du Roi was founded in April 1930 by a former Freemason and neurologist, José María Albiñana. The members of his Partido Nacionalista Español (Legionarios de España) saluted in the Roman manner and came to blows with anybody who shouted 'Long live the Republic'. Such energetic behaviour was frowned upon by the authorities, who considered shouts for King or Monarchy more provocative than shouts for the Republic.[2] The policy of the PNE was violently nationalist and authoritarian but was otherwise negative.

Another attempt was made in February 1931 by the signatories of the manifesto of La Conquista del Estado, a small group including Ramiro Ledesma Ramos and Ernesto Giménez Caballero. The manifesto proclaimed their desire for 'revolutionary action for a State of radical novelty' to be founded upon 'Hispanic values' and a syndicalist economic structure in which 'all power belonged to the State'. The group produced the first number of their review in March 1931. La Conquista del Estado did not take sides, however, in the elections, which it termed a farce for señoritos. Ledesma declared that the

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1 Hoyos, Testimonio, 106-7 & 217.

2 Galindo, Los partidos, 50; Alcalá Galiano, Fall of a Throne, 58-9. El Socialista, 1 Apr. 1931, reported that a man in Córdoba who displayed a placard reading 'Long live the King' on his balcony had been ordered to take it down.

group would fight against whichever faction won.[1]

With no organized masses upon which to rely, there remained for Alfonso, at least in theory, the army and the Church. In the armed forces the Dictatorship had left divisions like those in the political class. Officers who had quarrelled with Primo de Rivera were ripe for conspiracy. The Director-General of Security, General Mola, observed that the air force, the artillery corps, which the Dictator had dissolved, and the navy, precisely those branches of the armed services enjoying royal favour and the slackest discipline, were those most affected by conspiratorial activities. Yet when the Republican military revolts at Jaca and Cuatro Vientos took place in December 1930, hardly anybody supported General Queipo de Llano, Captain Galán or the aviator Major Ramón Franco. The small air force was disbanded and the army and navy remained obedient until 14 April.[2] The great majority of officers wanted to stay in barracks and out of politics in order not to increase the unpopularity gained by the army as a result of its political interventions. Political opinions were sacrificed to keep the officer corps united.[3]

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1 R. Ledesma Ramos, Antología (Barcelona, 1940), 33-7 & 42; S.G. Payne, Falange (London, 1962), 13.

2 E. Mola Vidal, Obras completas (Valladolid, 1940), 1038-42.

3 D. Berenguer, De la Dictadura a la República (Madrid, 1946), 223. Col. Varela, contacted unsuccessfully in 1930 by Lerroux, noted in his diary: "I believe that the Army must remain on the touchline in political struggles." (J.M. Pemán, Un soldado en la historia [Cádiz, 1954], 100). The Navy's lack of enthusiasm is reflected in Alfonso's later lament to Lord Londonderry: 'Charlie, even the Navy turned against me!' (R. Sencourt, King Alfonso [London, 1942], 231).

In 1929 the Pope told Spanish Catholics that they could belong to any political party not of a revolutionary character. The Bishops, appointed by the King, true to Papal doctrines of obedience to the constituted power, took the side of the Monarchy. Given the anti-clerical, when not anti-Catholic, tradition of Spanish Republicanism, they had little choice even if their attitude was 'not based primarily upon an attachment to monarchical government per se'.[1]

While the Bishops could not conduct propaganda campaigns, the laity could and did. The leader of the Grupo de la Democracia Cristiana, Severino Aznar, spoke up for the Monarchy because a Republic ruled by anti-clericals and Socialists would suppress the Catholic unions.[2] Ángel Herrera, however, pointed out to his Propagandists a notable example of loyalty to Papal advice: the immediate acceptance of the Weimar Republic by German Catholics, in contrast to the disloyalty of some French Catholics to the ralliement, an error which led to a victory for anti-clericalism.[3] As long as the Monarchy continued the Propagandists nevertheless supported it as a guarantee of order. El Debate warned that 'the Republic in Spain would be the opening of an era of anarchy in which Religion, property, the family, in short, everything upon which

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1 J.M. Sánchez, Reform and Reaction (Chapel Hill, 1964), 68-9 & 75.

2 S. Aznar, Impresiones de un demócrata cristiano (2nd ed., Madrid, 1950), 223-30 & 237.

3 Herrera, Obras, 11-24 (speech of 11 June 1930).

society is based, would be the object of experiments à la russe'.[1]

The municipal elections took place on 12 April 1931 under the supervision of Hoyos, who claimed that no political pressure was exerted.[2] 80,280 councillors were to be elected. The reports of the provincial Governors forecast a Monarchist victory with slender Republican majorities in some capitals - a not unprecedented situation.[3] The results known by the early hours of 14 April, mostly those from the towns, showed the election of 22,150 Monarchists compared with 5,875 Republicans and Socialists. The Monarchists won only nine of the fifty provincial capitals, but to judge by the trend of the first results from the pueblos, an overwhelming majority of the remaining 52,255 councillors would have been Monarchists.[4]

The complete results, however, did not interest the King's Ministers, who thought solely in terms of the towns where the 'neutral

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1 El Debate, 8 Apr. 1931.

2 Hoyos, Testimonio, 67. Romanones also testifies to the complete 'inhibition' of the government in this election (Conde de Romanones, Obras completas, III [Madrid, 1949], 441).

3 Hoyos, Testimonio, 68, 109 & 206-7.

4 Hoyos, Testimonio, 183-6. 14,216 Monarchist and 1,747 Anti-Monarchist councillors were proclaimed unopposed under Article 29 of the electoral law. The 9 capitals won by the Monarchists were Ávila, Burgos, Cádiz, Gerona, Lugo, Palma de Mallorca, Pamplona, Soria and Vitoria. The full results were never published and a request to see the returns was refused by the Republicans later. (E.A. Peers, The Spanish Tragedy [3rd ed., London, 1936], 233). M. Maura concedes victory to the Monarchists in the countryside, where the Republicans had not campaigned (Así cayó Alfonso, 141 & 147).

masses' voted. The prevailing political outlook was qualitative, not quantitative: the votes of over seventy per cent of Spaniards who lived in the country were considered insignificant. The psychological effect of the urban results, giving the Republican coalition a bigger vote than expected, left the government thunderstruck. With one or two exceptions, its members deemed that all was lost.[1]

On the morning of the 14 April Alfonso ordered a car to be prepared for his departure.[2] The decision was not surprising. On the 13th Romanones advised him to leave, while the Duque de Maura declared that the first results robbed the Monarchy of its legitimacy.[3] On the same day Berenguer at the War Ministry circularized the Captains-General, telling them, in effect, to maintain the internal unity of the Army by avoiding political compromises and awaiting developments. Already, on the 12th, the Director-General

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1 Romanones and La Cierva were shaken by Republican victories in their 'fiefs' of Guadalajara and Murcia, and Hoyos by the loss of Toledo with its ecclesiastical, military and rural electorate. In Madrid the Republicans won the upper-class district of Buenavista, and 30 seats in all to the 20 Monarchists. In Barcelona the Catalan Left beat the Lliga, thanks to a pact with the CNT made after an optimistic Cambó refused the request of a pessimistic Maciá for a coalition. (Hoyos, Testimonio, 51, 110-1, 121 & 125; Romanones, Obras III, 442-3; Maura, Así cayó Alfonso, 147).

2 See Maura, Así cayó Alfonso, 164.

3 Galindo, Los partidos, 73-4 & 77-8. The Premier, Aznar, said that Spain had gone to bed Monarchist and awoken Republican.

of the Civil Guard, General Sanjurjo, had warned Ministers not to count on the Civil Guard.[1] On the Republican side, no immediate changes were expected. Not until the morning of the 14th did the Republican Committee realize that events had moved in its favour; its members were surprised that the Monarchists had 'presented them with power'.[2]

In the early hours of the 15th, Alfonso boarded a cruiser at Cartagena and set sail for Marseilles and an exile he expected to be brief. He left behind three parting messages, two of which thanked the army and navy for their past loyalty and bade them now serve Spain. In the third message, to the country, the King recognized that he had lost the love of his people. His conscience informed him, however, that the aversion would not be definitive, and forgiveness would follow. While he justified his departure on the grounds that bloodshed had thereby been avoided, Alfonso XIII remained 'the King of all Spaniards... I renounce none of my rights'.[3]

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1 Romanones, Obras III, 443-4. Sanjurjo's unhelpful attitude was perhaps prompted by Alfonso's shabby treatment of Primo de Rivera, a close friend. A. Lerroux, La pequeña historia (Buenos Aires, 1945), 83-4, describes Sanjurjo's position as that of a benevolent neutral. He did not offer his services to the Republicans until after he knew of the King's decision to leave. (Maura, Así cayó Alfonso, 164-6).

2 Maura, Así cayó Alfonso, 152-3 & 188; he excludes himself from the pessimism.

3 Texts in Habla el Rey (ed. J. Gutiérrez-Ravé), (Madrid, 1955), 330-1. On reaching Marseilles, his first question was whether a reaction had yet begun in Spain in his favour; he was clearly disappointed when told that it had not. (J. Arrarás, Historia de la segunda República española, I, [2nd ed., Madrid, 1956], 47).

In fact he had made rather an important sentimental error.

At about the same time as the King left Madrid various ex-Ministers of the Dictatorship met at ~~the~~ Guadalhorce's house and held their inquest on a régime which seemed to have fulfilled Metternich's dictum: 'If Monarchies disappear, it is because they themselves surrender'. Some fixed the blame on the person of the King, others on the government of Berenguer; Maeztu blamed constitutionalism. Before their own departures for France or Portugal to avoid Republican retribution, they agreed that 'a school of up-to-date counter-revolutionary thought' must quickly be created to give political leaders faith in Monarchy and arguments with which to justify it.[1] The principal Alfonsine daily, while still believing that 'the Monarchy...is the history of Spain', followed the advice of the Duque de Maura, who said it was not the moment to attack 'the first Republican dictatorship, which is to-day the government of Spain'. ABC promised not to encourage acts of military rebellion: 'We are constitutional and parliamentary Monarchists and we seek to attain victory for our ideals by lawful means'.[2]

In contrast to both these views was the policy chosen by Herrera's El Debate. On the 14th it asked Alfonso not to abandon his inheritance and to await the full results, but its editorial on

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1 E. Vegas Latapié, El pensamiento político de Calvo Sotelo (Madrid, 1941), 88-92.

2 ABC, 14, 18 & 19 Apr. 1931.

the 15th, which cited texts from Encyclicals and which was entitled 'Before a constituted power', was quite different. The Catholic daily acknowledged the Republic to be 'the form of government established de facto in our country. Consequently our duty is to obey it... We shall obey it in a loyal and active manner, contributing what we can to aid it in its task... Men of the Monarchy, men of the Republic, must join together in a common ideal... which is Spain... because the nation is above forms of government. To do otherwise would be treason.'[1]

ii. The burning of the conventos

A new charter for Spanish politics was drawn up on 15 April by the Provisional Government of the Republic: the Juridical Statute, moderate in tone and content, representing the minimum aspirations of the Republican-Socialist coalition. The Statute reflected the rather vague views of Radicals and Liberal Rightists. It proclaimed the inauguration of a State based upon 'a plexus of norms of justice', pending the voting of a constitution by Constituent Cortes. Until such time, the Provisional Government assumed full powers, subject to the examination of its conduct by the Cortes. It announced that judgment would be passed on the last governments of the Monarchy. The third clause proclaimed complete freedom of religion, thus implicitly revoking the Concordat of 1851. Private property-rights

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1 El Debate, 14 & 15 Apr. 1931.

were guaranteed, though reference was made to agrarian reforms. Individual rights and the right of association were recognized although individual rights were for the time being subject to governmental whim so that the nascent Republic should not be defenceless against any who might choose to oppose its consolidation.[1]

This liberal charter enabled the Right to organize in the defence of its interests. Stimulation was provided by the assurance of early elections for Constituent Cortes which would give definitive shape to the Republic. The threat to the status quo ante 14 April was obvious from a government composed mainly of anti-clericals, if not anti-Catholics, and for the first time including three Socialists, all in important Ministries. The installation of the Republic, however, left the old parties and factions of the Monarchy, with the exception of the Lliga, mere handfuls of isolated and discredited individuals deprived now of the possibility of reconstructing their former organizations from the Ministry of the Interior. The change of régime also dashed the hopes of the Constitutionalists, who found themselves in a similar predicament. To

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1 Text in Arrarás, HSRE I, 27-19. The Provisional Government was composed of two Liberal Rightists (Alcalá-Zamora, President; M. Maura, Interior); two Radicals (Lerroux, Foreign Affairs; Martínez Barrio, Communications); three Socialists (Largo Caballero, Labour; Prieto, Finance; Los Ríos, Justice); two Radical-Socialists (Domingo, Public Instruction; Albornoz, Public Works); and one representative each of the Left Republican groups Acción Republicana, Acción Catalana and the ORGA (Azaña, War; Nicolau d'Olwer, Industry and Commerce; Casares Quiroga, Navy, respectively).

such politicians there remained only the fame, or notoriety, of their names, and perhaps some friends in the provinces with influence in a few pueblos. The old parties of the Monarchy simply disappeared. The only Monarchist group which continued to function was Vegas's JMI, and it was quite insignificant. Clearly new organizations and new men were urgently needed on the Right.

The process of organization began as early as 15 April, when Herrera addressed an ordinary meeting of Young Propagandists in Madrid. He asked them to make renewed efforts while 'seeking in all systems of government the glory of God and the salvation of souls', so that forces of defence might be organized for the coming struggle.[1] El Debate proposed the idea of a single organization for 'all the anti-revolutionary elements' in the coming elections. Its slogan should be 'Religion, Country, Order, Family, Property', omitting 'Monarchy' so that conservative Republicans as well as Monarchists could participate.[2] ABC, however, was shocked by the omission: 'The Monarchy also meant Religion, Order, Property, etc. ... The Republic is the Revolution... The concept of the accidental nature of forms of government, if in doctrine immoral, is in practice absurd... Monarchy defines better than anything else the

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1 J. Monge Bernal, Acción Popular (Madrid, 1936), 128; & Galindo, Los partidos, 101.

2 El Debate, 21 & 23 Apr. 1931.

opposite of revolutionizing, and under it we ought all to gather'.[1]

Herrera was not deterred. On 26 April an assembly of Young Propagandists decided to create Acción Nacional, an organization to breathe new life into Spanish Catholicism. Propagandists dispatched to the provinces to survey the situation there did not bring back glowing reports; Catholic Action alone would not suffice.[2] On 29 April, El Debate therefore announced the formation of Acción Nacional, 'an electoral organization to bring together the elements of order... It is not a new political party'. On the same day, ABC announced the foundation of a rival, the Círculo Monárquico Independiente, 'to serve as a link between the elements wishing to work for the substantive ideals of Monarchy'.

The cause of Alfonsine Monarchism was at a very low ebb. The King's first message to his followers from a London hotel did nothing to relieve their gloom, for in it he did not even counsel stoicism in the face of the Republic. Monarchists were not to put obstacles in the way of the new government, which Alfonso himself

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1 ABC, 22 & 26 Apr. 1931. Monarchists attributed Herrera's coolness towards the Monarchy to the failure of his 'Great Social Campaign' in 1922 when Alfonso refused to give 125,000 pesetas. (J. Cortés Cavanillas, Gil Robles, ¿ monárquico?, [Madrid, 1935], 39-47).

2 Monge Bernal, AP, 129-32. Acción Nacional was sponsored by the Nuncio and Cardinals Vidal Barraquer and Ilundáin (Archbishops of Tarragona and Seville respectively) (C. Cardó, Histoire spirituelle, 208).

accepted as 'the government of Spain'; in fact they ought to support it in the defence of order and national integrity. Military rebellion was specifically condemned. The Monarchy would only return if the electorate wanted it. Alfonso was not against Monarchists organizing as Monarchists provided that they worked openly for the elections in a legal manner and followed his advice on the attitude to the government. The King's lack of enthusiasm was further emphasized when the editor of ABC was told in the language of El Debate: 'above the formal ideas of Republic or Monarchy is Spain'.[1]

Although ABC continued to sponsor the CMI and to attack Acción Nacional for its 'ambiguous and confused' tactics, it now advocated that the two groups should work together. The ideals of Acción Nacional, claimed ABC, were its own, 'those of Monarchist Spain'.[2] But first it was necessary to elect an executive committee. Members of the CMI, with the permission of the Director-General of Security, met on 10 May to do this in the former offices of Reacción Ciudadana at Alcalá, 67.[3] Afterwards some members celebrated by playing the

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1 ABC, 5 May 1931. Alfonso's view was also expressed in a private letter to Honorio Maura, offering overt collaboration with the government (H. Vallotton, Alphonse XIII, [Lausanne, 1943], 192).

2 ABC, 8 & 10 May 1931.

3 It was decided that the leadership should not include figures prominently associated with the liberal or Primoderriverista groups. Lesser known men were therefore chosen: the Conde de Gamazo, E. Cobián, A. Bernabéu, J. Danvila Rivera, the Duque de la Seo de Urgel, F. Santander, L. Garrido Juaristi.

Marcha Real on a gramophone at the busiest hour of the Sunday morning and cheered for King and Monarchy on the balcony. A hostile crowd gathered and threatened to storm the building. The Monarchists telephoned for the Civil Guard, who took most of them into custody amid scuffling and car-burning.

The Minister of the Interior, Miguel Maura, returned from an excursion to El Pardo on the afternoon of the 10th in time to order Civil Guards to prevent an angry crowd, under the false impression that Luca de Tena (editor of ABC) had killed a taxi-driver, from storming the ABC building - which they did at the cost of two lives. The result was a meeting of the government in the Ministry of the Interior that night while a crowd outside called for Maura's resignation. Maura was determined that the Second Republic should not degenerate into the anarchy of the First and wanted to make full use of the Civil Guard. Outside, young members of the Ateneo distributed lists of religious buildings to be burnt the following day, while other members spoke from the Ministry's windows of the need for 'rapid and exemplary action'. The President of the Ateneo, Azaña, the War Minister, refused to use his influence with his fellow Ateneístas, and led the opposition within the government to the use of the Civil Guard. With nothing decided the Ministers adjourned until 9 a.m. on the 11th.

Then came the news that the first Jesuit Residence was alight. Maura threatened to resign if no action were taken. An embarrassed Alcalá-Zamora said the trouble would soon be over: 'some little

boys' were just 'playing at revolution'. Azaña thought that all the conventos in Madrid were not worth the life of one Republican, and said he would resign if action were taken. A vote showed that Maura alone was in favour of action. The Socialists abstained: they saw the need to intervene but would not take responsibility for the use of the Civil Guard. When the government received a delegation of incendiarists, Maura went home to write his letter of resignation. He was pressed not to resign by the Nuncio, who argued that his continued presence in the government might prevent a repetition in the provinces the next day. Maura remained adamant until about midnight, when he withdrew his resignation in exchange for a free hand. The government had called out the Army in the afternoon rather than use the Civil Guard.

Despite strict orders to provincial Governors, a repetition of the events in Madrid on the 11th was not avoided on 12 May in parts of Andalusia and the Levante. The worst outbreak occurred in Málaga, where the Military Governor sent a telegram to the War Minister reading: 'The burning of churches has begun. Tomorrow it will continue'. Maura dismissed the Director-General of Security and various provincial Governors. ABC, El Debate and the Communist Mundo Obrero were suspended.

The buildings burnt in Madrid included two colleges in which free education was given to 800 working-class children, and one of the few Institutes in Spain capable of providing good technical

education.[1] In all, eleven buildings of a religious character were burnt or sacked in Madrid, forty-one in Málaga, twenty-one in the capital and province of Valencia, thirteen in Alicante, five in Jérez de la Frontera, four each in Cádiz, Murcia and Seville and two each in Algeciras and Sanlúcar de Barrameda.[2] El Debate was suspended until 20 May, and ABC until 5 June.

The fires of 11 and 12 May did not, perhaps surprisingly, cause any change in the attitude of the Vatican towards the Republic. The Holy See had declared itself untroubled by the change of régime. Although the separation of Church and State was expected, it was hoped that Republican declarations of respect for the Church would be maintained.[3] From 15 April until 9 May the Nuncio, Mgr. Tedeschini, an exponent of cooperation with the Republic, had been

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1 This account is based principally on Maura, Así cayó Alfonso, 240-64; Arrarás, HSRE I, 74-100; El Sol, 12 May 1931; and F. Narbona, La quema de conventos, (2nd ed., Madrid, 1959). Maura's account presumably shows himself in the best light. No mention is made of the later statement by Casares Quiroga that Maura had been informed of plans to burn conventos forty-eight hours earlier and chose to disregard the information (Memorias íntimas de Azaña, [ed. J. Arrarás], [5th ed., Madrid, 1939], 132). The moving spirits of the outbreak in Madrid were Ateneístas, at this time in touch with two opposition groups on the Left, the CNT and the Communists. Certainly the burnings occurred in areas where the CNT was strong. Exceptions were Saragossa, where Maura records the energetic action of the Governor, and Barcelona, where the CNT was dissuaded from burning conventos by Companys (J. Plá, Historia de la segunda República española, [Barcelona, 1940-41], I, 145).

2 A. Montero Moreno, Historia de la persecución religiosa en España (Madrid, 1961), 25.

3 El Debate, 16 Apr. 1931.

negotiating with a team of three Ministers, led by Alcalá-Zamora, on the civil status of the Church. The moderate Republicans wanted their position strengthened by the Nuncio's influence, in the Republic's favour, with bishops and the Catholic opposition. The Nuncio wished to maintain amicable relations with the Republic so as to protect the Church's interests and weaken the anti-clerical case. No specific agreements could be made before the Constitution was drawn up, but Tedeschini received the promise of Alcalá-Zamora and Lerroux that they would oppose extremism. The Socialist Los Ríos promised nothing.[1]

The Nuncio's policy prevailed. Archbishops and Bishops issued statements pointing to Leonine texts on the question of forms of government and obedience to the constituted power.[2] On 2 May however the government decreed that the sale or transfer of ecclesiastical property was forbidden, despite the assurances that the Church's possessions would not be confiscated. On the 6th, compulsory religious instruction in State schools was made voluntary. On the 22nd a decree established freedom of religion, as the Juridical Statute had promised. Although the Concordat had been broken the

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1 Sánchez, Reform and Reaction, 81-4. J. de la Cierva, Notas de mi vida (Madrid, 1955), 330-4, refers to a pact between Tedeschini and Alcalá-Zamora prior to 12 April which was negotiated in the German Embassy; Plá, HSRE I, 72, refers to an interview.

2 For the texts, see El Debate, 19 Apr.-26 May 1931. There were hesitations: the Bishop of Segovia on 15 April thought of renouncing his position (J.F. Huerta, Defensa de España, [Biarritz, 1964], 207).

two latter decrees produced only what Tedeschini called 'a very moderate little note'. The burnings themselves led to a moderate protest, and the Vatican refused its placet to the Republican Ambassador.[1]

A real cause of tension in Church-State relations was the Primate, Cardinal Segura, Archbishop of Toledo, a man of irascible intransigence who once called El Debate 'a liberal sheet'.[2] Segura was generally expected to take a hostile stand against the Republic with its freedom of religion. Almost at once a campaign against him began. The Left alleged that he had said: 'May the wrath of God and the curse of the Heavens fall upon Spain, if the Republic takes root!'[3] When his Pastoral appeared it was termed by the government 'eminently political' and of 'concealed bellicosity', showing 'opposition, when not hostility, to the Republican régime'.[4]

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1 El Debate, 10, 23, 25 & 30 May 1931. The removal of crucifixes from schools produced an outcry from Catholic parents. It was the view of the Socialist Director-General of Primary Education, Llopis, that education should be a 'revolutionary' weapon to transform society. (El Socialista, 19 Apr. 1931).

2 H. Buckley, Life and death of the Spanish Republic, [London, 1940], 107.

3 El Socialista, 23 Apr. 1931. His biographer claims Segura said: 'The Spanish Church is sad and troubled.' (J. Requejo San Román, El cardenal Segura, [Toledo, 1932], 130-1). The Socialist A. Ramos Oliveira (Politics, Economics and Men of Modern Spain [London, 1946], 438) describes the Cardinal-Primate as 'a type which the Church no longer produces, a man whose piety seemed eccentric to modern eyes, who thought a bath was the invention of the heathen, if not of the devil himself, and who wore the hair-shirt like a monk of old'.

4 Quoted in Bulletin of Spanish Studies, VIII (1931), 140.

The Vatican was asked to remove the offending Prelate.

The Pastoral began, in fact, by reminding Catholics that the Church was not tied to any particular type of earthly institution, and continued, controversially, with a glowing tribute to Alfonso XIII and the Monarchy. After again stressing Papal doctrines on obedience to the constituted power, the Primate declared the Church to be in danger. Catholics were urged to bestir themselves and, in accordance with Papal teaching, to take an active part in politics to defend religion. The document ended by explaining that, since the form of government was a secondary matter, it was the duty of all Catholics to unite for the elections in defence of religion and the social order.[1]

On 13 May, after the burning of the conventos, the Cardinal-Primate left Spain for consultations in Rome. On 11 June he re-crossed the Pyrenees, but was arrested near Guadalajara and escorted back to the frontier, which he again crossed on the 15th without having received an explanation for his expulsion.

According to Miguel Maura's subsequent account, Segura had spent a week in Rome and then stayed at a village on the French side of the Pyrenees, while his secretary made daily journeys with a suspicious brief-case to San Sebastián. Searched one day at the frontier, the case was found to contain documents ordering parish priests to sell certain ecclesiastical possessions with a view to

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1 In El Debate, 7 May 1931.

sending the money obtained to a safe place outside Spain. Other documents sought to justify this with legal arguments based on the Concordat. Clearly the proposition violated the Decree of 2 May, which presumably had prompted the idea. Maura showed the captured papers to the Nuncio, who was shocked and promised to use his influence in Rome to prevent these orders being carried out, as well as to arrange a fixed place of residence for Segura. When the Primate crossed the frontier unexpectedly, Maura had him arrested and expelled. Only then did Maura inform his colleagues leaving Alcalá-Zamora to explain things away. Thus was one cause of tension removed. The Nuncio delivered a formal protest from the Vatican.[1]

The Minister of the Interior had earlier removed another strong-willed cleric while the Right's press was suspended, and again on his own initiative. The Bishop of Vitoria had arranged his diocesan tour on 1 April, and the fervent Catholics of Bilbao made plans to hold a major demonstration on his arrival there, a demonstration which the Socialists of Bilbao said they could not permit.

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1 Maura, Así cayó Alfonso, 299-304. The almost contemporary account by Requejo San Román (Segura, 150-163) did not, obviously, include the then secret activities of Maura; the accounts also differ on certain facts, e.g. where Segura crossed the frontier and how. Cortés Cavanillas (Gil Robles, 80) suggests that Herrera was involved; Maura mentions only that Herrera arranged the passport for Segura's first departure. The Nuncio and Segura had been on very bad terms since 1929 (J. de Iturralde, El catolicismo y la cruzada de Franco [Vienne, 1955-], I, 371-2).

The Bishop refused to cancel his visit and was expelled.[1]

Yet despite the Bishop's expulsion and the burning of the conventos, El Debate on its re-appearance printed no detailed account of the events of 10-12 May, although, like the Metropolitans, it protested at what had happened. The paper's aim was to allow the atmosphere to clear; as a Young Propagandist of Acción Nacional explained, the Constituent Cortes could do more harm to the Church than could hooligans.[2]

Although such views were uncommon among Catholics, the policy of the Vatican remained constant. When Urquijo Ibarra, representing the Integrist Catholics of the North, sought approval in Rome for a policy of outright opposition by every means to the Republic and all its works, the Vatican chose to endorse the passive resistance of ralliement advocated by Herrera and pursued by the Nuncio.[3] Thus the summary expulsion of the Primate of the Spains drew no more than a formal protest. Church-State relations now depended on the composition and actions of the Constituent Cortes. The Metropolitans therefore told Catholics that they had 'the strictest duty to take part as actively as possible' in the elections and to 'unite circumstant-

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1 Maura, Así cayó Alfonso, 294-6; & El Debate, 20 & 22 May 1931. El Socialista, 10 Apr. 1931, called the Bishop 'the Negus of the diocese of Vitoria'.

2 El Debate, 20 May & 2 June 1931.

3 Cortés Cavanillas, Gil Robles, 65-7.

ially' for the defence of religion. They repeated their own 'sincere desire not to create difficulties for the Republic'.[1]

iii. The political organization of the Right

With the CMI closed from 10 May, Herrera's Acción Nacional was left as the principal electoral organization for those who were not Republicans. It was therefore thought wise after the burnings to issue a second manifesto 'to avoid possible erroneous interpretations'. It explicitly stated that Acción Nacional was 'not a Monarchist organization'. The Seville branch in its manifesto announced that 'the consolidation of the de facto régime in Spain is a patriotic imperative for all Spaniards even at the cost of sacrificing individual preferences'.[2] Candidates fighting under the aegis of the organization had to accept its basic principles - Religion, Country, Family, Order, Work, Property and the implicit one of inhibition regarding forms of government - but were otherwise independent.[3]

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1 Collective Pastoral of the Metropolitans, El Debate, 12 June 1931.

2 El Debate, 20 & 27 May 1931 respectively. The first manifesto (El Debate, 7 May 1931) was a compendium of El Debate's ideas. The Committee of Acción Nacional was composed of: President, A. Herrera Oria; Vice-President, J.M. Valiente Soriano; Sec., A. López; Undersec., J. Martín-Sánchez Juliá; Treasurer, J. Martín Artajo; Undersec., J. Moreno Dávila; Members, J.M. Sagués Irujo, M. Senante, F. Eliso and M. Serrano Mendicute. The key posts were held by Young Propagandists; one member, Senante, was an Integrist.

3 El Debate, 11 June 1931. The label 'Republican of Acción Nacional' was forbidden (ibid., 15 June).

Although its President and founder constantly stressed legality, condemned violence and appealed to the conservative classes to accept the social teaching of the Church so as to bring about 'a real ideological revolution in the world of labour... which will often coincide with Socialist solutions',[1] there were other candidates who fitted poorly the image of the social-Catholic indifferent to the form of government. Goicoechea, an ex-Maurista dandy who was incapable of being anything but a Monarchist, was a candidate in Madrid with Herrera. The Conde de Vallellano, the Dictator's Mayor of Madrid who stood in Jaén, had in May been involved in the first Monarchist conspiracy.[2] As was to be expected, the candidates were a motley assortment. Many were Young Propagandists or connected with El Debate. Some were priests. A few were ex-Conservatives like the Marqués de Lema and Marín Lázaro. Also included were a Traditionalist and the poet José María Pemán.[3]

Acción Nacional conducted its campaign on the religious issue and also on unemployment and rural discontent. The actual details

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1 El Debate, 2 & 13 June 1931.

2 HCE I-4, 486. A discussion took place in Quintanar's house, but the idea of action was vetoed by the ex-Ministers in Biarritz. Also involved was the journalist Pujol, at this time an Acción Nacional speaker.

3 El Debate, 23 June 1931, mentioned 39 candidates in 19 constituencies; the accompanying list, however, named 44 in 18 constituencies (after subtraction of 3 who later dropped out).

of the programme were filled in to suit their constituencies by the candidates themselves. The provincial committees of 'elements of order' were often created by Young Propagandists sent out from Madrid for the purpose. Sometimes the work of organization was hindered by the Local authorities.[1] In the first few days, it was reported that committees had been formed in Cádiz, Palencia, Jérez, Seville, Huelva, Valladolid and León, the latter using the offices of the Círculo de la Juventud Monárquica.[2] Doubtless in other areas the new organization was based on the skeleton of a former grouping, but in Valladolid most of the work was done by students who preferred campaigning to examinations.[3] A good example of the improvised committee was that of Córdoba: the President was the editor of the local Catholic newspaper and its members were three engineers, three lawyers, two landowners and two traders.[4] Committees were set up in many places, but it seems likely that organization did not progress much beyond this stage before the elections in the

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1 E.g. in Murcia, when the Propagandists Valiente and Sánchez Miranda arrived to hold talks in the Catholic Workingmen's Club, the Governor took them for agents of a Basque plot. (Monge Bernal, AP, 1034). In Cádiz, some 2,000 wanted to join in the first two days, but the Governor would not approve the branch's statutes. (El Debate, 9 June). In Madrid, 2,361 joined in the first three days (El Debate, 6 May).

2 El Debate, 6 May 1931.

3 Monge Bernal, AP, 1118.

4 El Debate, 8 May 1931.

majority of cases.

In a few areas Acción Nacional was able to link itself with similar organizations already in existence. In Salamanca, an organization founded in June 1930 for farmers with a Rightist outlook now had a hundred local committees in the province. Acción Castellana, as it was called, did not abandon its Monarchist convictions, but set them aside for the election. Thus it was able to enter into alliance with two Right Republicans on a programme of 'agro-social reform': better credit facilities, the creation of smallholdings and the defence of property.[1] In Palma de Mallorca the Derecha Social was founded and included Integrists.[2]

The most important of such local groups was the Derecha Regional Valenciana, founded by the ex-Jaimist editor of the Diario de Valencia, Luis Lucía, in December 1929. This confessional party had declared forms of government to be of secondary importance before the fall of the Monarchy. Its principles were Religion, Society, Country and Christian Public Law. In social policy it adopted Papal doctrines as a basis. It put first priority on the renovation of local government and local services with a view to making the three provinces of the old Kingdom of Valencia an autonomous and autarchic region 'within the unity of Spain'. On this regionalist

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1 El Debate, 9 & 13 June 1931.

2 El Debate, 8 May 1931.

foundation Lucía planned to build a national Catholic party with a similar ideology, which would be a federation of regional parties. The DRV was composed in the main of former Jaimists who had made the transition from Traditional Monarchy to Christian Democracy. As Lucía explained: 'It does not matter to us whether the vessel is of clay or gold: what is important is the content.'[1]

Traditionalists who had not, like Lucía, evolved, remained divided into Jaimists and Integrists. The strength of Jaimism lay as ever in Navarre, though the Communion still had pockets of adherents elsewhere, principally in Aragón, Catalonia and the province of Castellón. It had no great figures and no daily in Madrid to compete with the Integrist El Siglo Futuro. The Integrists also had the only Traditionalist orator of importance, Víctor Pradera, who now wrote articles for the Alfonsine ABC. The advent of the Republic, however, left all Traditionalists in agreement that the prophecies had been fulfilled: Monarchies associating themselves with liberalism were doomed to perish by reason of their inner contradictions.

In the new situation, Traditionalists prepared to resist laicism to the death. To mark the Republic's decree ending obligatory religious instruction, the Jaimists of Aragón telegraphed Cardinal

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1 Quotation from El Debate, 31 May 1931. The programme is set out in L. Lucía Lucía, En estas horas de transición (Valencia, 1930). Lucía had worked with Fr. Vicent.

Segura to offer him their lives in defence of the Catholic Church.[1] The coming of the Republic had also the practical result of healing the old divisions. Jaime issued a manifesto on 23 April calling for the formation of a single, federative, Legitimist party beneath the banner of anti-Communism. His experience of Russia convinced him that Marxist revolution followed quickly upon the fall of a throne.[2] The Integrists were returning to the fold: at a rally in Pamplona on 14 June an Integrist made a speech while the Delegate of the Communion, the Marqués de Villores, presided.[3] Indeed with the Republic triumphant, plans for Monarchist unity went still further. Representatives of the two Bourbon exiles met in St. Jean-de-Luz to form, at least as a first step, a single anti-revolutionary front inspired by Traditionalist principles.[4]

Jaime's followers were not content with mere words. In June, Young Jaimists in Pamplona founded La Esperanza, a journal bidding

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1 Quoted in El Debate, 10 May 1931.

2 A. Lizarza Iribarren, Memorias de la conspiración (3rd ed., Pamplona, 1954), 15-16. The manifesto was the work of Bilbao Eguía who had been expelled from the Communion for accepting office under the Dictator (Galindo, Los partidos, 103).

3 HCE I-4, 486; & L. Redondo & J. de Zavala, El Requeté (2nd ed., Barcelona, 1957), 236. The Integrist was Senante, at this time on the Committee of Acción Nacional. The meeting ended with shouts of 'Long live Don Jaime' and 'To Madrid! To Madrid!'

4 F. Melgar, El noble final de la escisión dinástica (Madrid, 1964), 105-7.

Navarrese not simply to live on the memory of the glories of the Carlist past, but to surpass them in the present. Any thought of obedience to the heathen Republic was totally rejected. At Leiza on 14 June, delegates from Navarre, Logroño, Guipúzcoa and Biscay reached agreement on the first plans for an uprising and then submitted them to Jaime in Paris. Jaime gave his permission. In the meantime Decurias of Requetés were formed with the immediate assignment of guarding religious buildings. These duties were performed with the advice of a committee of parish priests.[1] The coming elections were not to be overlooked, and for these a tactical alliance was to be negotiated with the Basque Nationalists. Traditionalists did not, however, put much trust in such things. A leading Jaimist explained the nature of elections as follows: 'If they are not sincere, fraud triumphs; if they are sincere, they are wont to be the triumph of cultural inferiority, that is to say, of the greater number.'[2]

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1 Lizarza, Memorias, 16-7; Redondo & Zavala, Requeté, 235. The atmosphere of religious fervour in the Basque provinces may be deduced from the 'visions of Ezquioga' (Guipúzcoa). Two children claimed to have seen the Virgin, and thousands of people from the Basque provinces, Navarre and Burgos came to pray at the scene in June 1931. Many claimed that they had seen the Virgin and St. Michael the Archangel, who held a sword dripping with blood, and that they had been told there would be war between Catholics and non-Catholics: initially the Catholics would suffer heavy losses, but ultimately they would triumph with the aid of the angels and Our Lady. (W. Starkie, 'Spanish kaleidoscope', The Fortnightly, Dec. 1936, p. 684).

2 Electoral manifesto of Larramendi, El Debate, 26 June 1931.

In the three Basque provinces (Biscay, Guipúzcoa and Álava) a three-cornered fight had taken place on 12 April. The Basque Nationalists opposed the Monarchist and Republican-Socialist coalitions with sufficient success, at least outside the main towns, to allow the young Mayor of Guecho, José Antonio Aguirre, to get most of the councils of Biscay to accept the idea of a Basque Republic within a Federation of Spanish Republics on 14 April. An assembly was to meet on 17 April at Guernica, at which, 'in the name of Almighty God and the Biscayan people', the Mayors were to call on their colleagues in Álava, Guipúzcoa and Navarre, to join in the creation of a Basque State. Although the government did not allow the assembly to take place, the Biscayan Mayors persevered; rural municipalities were generally favourable, but Leftist councils remained hostile. A set-back was the government's appointment of temporary committees for the Basque Deputations. The elected Mayors therefore changed their plans to use these bodies, and entrusted the drafting of a Statute to a cultural body, the Sociedad de Estudios Vascos.

The Statute was to be passed by a grand assembly in Pamplona and then to be used as the electoral programme. It was drafted by Nationalists and Alfonsine and Jaimist Monarchists and was ready by 1 June. The Navarrese had collaborated to obtain 'complete restitution of fueros and recognition of the sovereign rights of Navarre'. On the eve of the Grand Assembly, political attitudes were still confused. In general, the Nationalist press was in favour, and

Urquijo Ibarra's influential Traditionalist La Gaceta del Norte lent its support, whereas the Republican, Socialist, Alfonsine, Integrist and Jaimist press came out against it. In the opinion of the Basque Nationalist Party (PNV), the draft did not give Euzkadi its full sovereignty. Representatives of the Traditionalist Communion who met at San Sebastián were in favour if, as the PNV also desired, it were amended to ensure regional control of education and Church-State relations. Socialists were generally hostile, but there was some vacillation. In the event, it was a strong section of the Traditionalists of Navarre whose opposition disrupted plans. They organized their own Catholic-*fuerista* rally for 14 June in Pamplona, the same date and place as that scheduled for the Grand Assembly, which now had to be held in Estella.

At Estella, the draft was duly amended to include provision for a Basque concordat with Rome and linguistic parity in education and the administration of justice. To this 'General Statute of the Basque State' the Traditionalists of Pamplona then adhered, and on this basis they negotiated a coalition for the elections with Aguirre. The circumstantial nature of this alliance is clear from the interpretations of the two parties. For Aguirre's PNV, the elections were to be a plebiscite for or against the Basque State, autonomous within the Republic. The Navarrese, on the other hand, saw the agreement as a 'Catholic-*fuerista* coalition for the defence of the lofty interests of the Church, full restitution of

fueros and the Statute which Navarre may approve'.[1] It was a rather negative alliance for religion and against centralization; the PNV and Traditionalists held incompatible views on where sovereignty should reside.

In contrast to the Basque situation in 1931, the forces of Catalan nationalism were firmly in the Republican camp. On 14 April the Republic was proclaimed by the non-separatist Companys. Less than three hours later his colleague in the Esquerra, Maciá, leader of the separatists of Estat Catalá, proclaimed the Catalan Republic within an Iberian Federation. Although the position was regularized on 18 April when Maciá agreed to a Generalidad, the Spanish Right

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1 J.A. de Agiŕe Lekube (= Aguirre Lecube), Entre la libertad y la revolución (Bilbao, 1935), 6-92. A PNV delegation had offered its support to the Republican Committee before 12 April on condition that the Republic would be federalist (op. cit., 121). Alfonsine Monarchists were advised to join the Basque Nationalists as a tactic while the King remained in exile (op. cit., 146-7). The text of the General Statute is in García Venero, Nacionalismo vasco, 473-91. The main points were that Spain should retain control over foreign affairs (except with the Vatican), customs, and the monetary system. The Concierto económico was to remain until re-negotiated. The Basques were to control nearly everything else, even to the extent of Basque soldiers forming a distinct section of the army which was to serve only in the Basque provinces. Pradera, the veteran anti-Nationalist, refused to be a candidate in the elections, considering the Statute anti-fuerista (Arrarás, HSRE I, 178). Prieto, leader of the Bilbao Socialists, at this time called the Statute reactionarily anti-liberal: 'Spain cannot tolerate that territory turning itself into a Vaticanist Gibraltar'. (El Socialista, 30 June 1931). According to one source Prieto had got the Provisional Government to agree in 1930 that only Leftist regions should be given autonomy (Iturralde, Catolicismo, I, 60).

had been provided with the emotive weapon of 'anti-separatist' propaganda.[1]

Inside Catalonia, the conservative regionalists of the Lliga found themselves without their two leaders, Cambó and Ventosa Calvell, who had compromised themselves with the Monarchy and left for a spell abroad. The party was now led by Abadal, who on 17 April told Maciá that the Lliga would support him in the defence of Catalanist aspirations 'within the Spanish State'. On 21 April the Catalan Regional Committee of Traditionalists also offered Maciá their collaboration, but on condition that his actions were not hostile to their ideals or the Christian tradition of the people.[2] Relations with the Esquerra, however, were troubled. Lliga councillors often found themselves removed by the Generalidad because they had been elected as Monarchists. The Lliga appointed a new committee under Abadal, excluding Cambó, Ventosa Calvell and Durán Ventosa, to demonstrate its wish to become a party of the Republican Right.[3]

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1 A. Ossorio Gallardo, Vida y sacrificio de Companys (Buenos Aires, 1943), 83-7. Maciá now adopted the view that he would swap separatism for a statute of autonomy, but would return to his former separatism if the Cortes voted for a unitary Republic (statement of 29 May in García Venero, Nacionalismo catalán, 517). ABC (e.g. 23 Apr.) fulminated against 'the separatist threat'. El Debate (24 Apr., 12 June) attacked Maciá for his lack of seny, while defending administrative decentralization as opposed to political autonomy.

2 Arrarás, HSRE I, 64-5. The Catalan Traditionalists had drafted a statute in 1930.

3 El Debate, 10 May 1931.

The first political event in the rule of the Generalidad was the election, on 24 May, of the Provisional Deputation, which was to draft the Statute of Autonomy. For the sake of solidarity, the parties in Catalonia made a pact allocating the number of seats proportionately. By the terms of the agreement the Lliga was allotted six seats, compared with twenty-one for the Esquerra and ten for Acción Catalana Republicana.[1] The Lliga, however, claimed that the Esquerra had broken the pact by putting up candidates where seats had not been allotted to it. The Lliga and other parties therefore withdrew from the elections.

It was made clear at the same time that the party would support the Statute to be drafted if it were 'in accord with the needs, not only of Catalonia, but of Spain, insofar as it can be copied by all the regions which so desire'. On the other hand, with a view doubtless to the economic interests of the party leadership as well as to the non-Catalan vote, Abadal said that the Lliga would oppose it if it were 'restrictive, parochial, narrow, incompatible with the complete life of Spain'. The party's attitude was, as usual, carefully opportunist. Officially it now stood for autonomy within the Republic: 'Great Catalonia within a great Spain is our text'.[2]

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1 El Debate, 20 May 1931.

2 Abadal, El Sol, 5 June 1931. The other parties which withdrew from the May elections were: Traditionalists, Liberal Republican Right, Federals, Radicals and UGT-Socialists. (El Debate, 23 May 1931).

The attitude of former leaders of factions under the Monarchy was similar. The Constitutionalists accepted the Republic and the idea of change, though convinced that concessions should be made as slowly as possible. On the question of the form of government, Sánchez Guerra described his position as follows: 'I, a Monarchist, want the Republic to consolidate itself and take root, because before being a Monarchist I am a Spaniard, and consequently I say that there is no other solution for Spain but the Republic'.[1] Melquiades Álvarez, whose main support lay in Asturias, went back on his previous acceptance of the Monarchy. His Reformists became the Liberal-Democrat Republicans, a 'party of conservation and social progress'. They wanted a Republic of order, liberty and justice, neither revolutionary nor reactionary, laicist but with respect for religion.[2]

Santiago Alba declared himself 'for Spain, with the Republic', the key-notes of which should be order and gradual reform. Thirty years should be taken to revise the status of the Church, and an unspecified period to create the half-million smallholders needed as a barrier against Communism.[3] Typical of this vague liberal reformist-conservative mentality of the 'Republicans of 14 April'

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1 El Debate, 11 June 1931. Initially he appeared on the Acción Nacional list, but soon withdrew.

2 El Sol, 26 May 1931.

3 El Socialista, 19 May 1931; El Sol, 19 June 1931.

was the list of candidates entitled 'Support for the Republic' in Madrid. Its organizer was Montiel, the ex-Ciervista President of the Círculo de la Unión Mercantil. The other three on the list were Sánchez Guerra, Ossorio (now a 'Monarchist without a King in the service of the Republic') and M. Álvarez.[1]

Within the government coalition, the Right - in an economic rather than a religious sense - advocated a similar version of the Republic. It was the Radical Republicans of Lerroux, more than the Liberal Republican Right of Alcalá-Zamora and Miguel Maura, who now began to win praise in the columns of ABC as the anti-Socialist champions. Both parties, in fact, produced the same vague, conservative, opportunist phraseology as the ex-Constitutionalists. Miguel Maura called for an 'evolutionary revolution... of slow but constant rhythm', with tolerance for Catholics in a State separated from the Church. Regarding Catalonia, the Pact of San Sebastián was to be strictly adhered to; the Cortes should pass a statute of autonomy, but the 'blasphemy' of separatism must be eschewed.[2]

Lerroux, like Maura, took his stand on the Pact of San Sebastián. He also tried to justify his political evolution from the radical Left to the conservative Centre, if not Right. This he did by pointing to the change of régime: with the Republic installed,

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1 A. Ossorio, Mis memorias (Buenos Aires, 1946), 230.

2 El Sol, 16 June 1931.

revolutionary violence was unnecessary. The way to consolidate the Republic lay in tolerance towards religious and economic interests.[1] His views were in marked contrast to those of the Republican Left who thought that the Republic was by definition a radical régime with no obligation to conserve anything.

As in the municipal elections of 12 April, the Republicans were to a very considerable extent dependent upon Socialist organization for the success of their candidates. Cooperation was forthcoming from the Socialist leadership, but the Liberal Right, which at first had hoped for some 150 seats to compare with perhaps 50 for the Socialists, soon discovered that its position within the coalition in the provinces had been eroded. A case in point was the province of Seville: there two Liberal Rightists found that the ambitions of local Socialists had swollen the number of candidates. Lists of coalition candidates were then circulated by them, on which the Liberal Rightists did not appear.[2]

Another weapon which Liberal Rightists could use was what remained of the old parties' caciquismo. This they and the Radicals did, at the cost of antagonizing the Socialists, who considered such 'neo-Republicans' worse than Monarchists. The latter at least could

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1 El Sol, 9, 14 & 23 June 1931.

2 Fernández Castillejo (conversation).

not 'disfigure' the Republic from within.[1] Thus the Liberal Right was at a considerable disadvantage compared with the fiery Radical-Socialists, whose caciques the Socialists were prepared to overlook as long as both had the same ideal of making the anti-clerical, bourgeois revolution. The Radicals were not as badly affected, as they had some organization of their own on which to rely. But such were the internal tensions within the Republican-Socialist coalition that only 115 candidates actually fought under the coalition label.[2]

iv. The elections of June 1931

Caciquismo was a perennial topic of controversy in elections during the Republic, but its significance would seem to have been much exaggerated for obvious purposes of propaganda. In subsequent elections, the Left was to ascribe the Right's voting strength almost entirely to the machinations of local caciques, just as the Right was to attribute much of the Left's strength to the caciquismo

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1 Complaints appeared in El Socialista,(10, 17 & 21 June 1931). A notable example of the process was Burgos Mazo's decision to join the Radicals in Huelva (ABC, 20 June 1931). There was much dissension inside the Liberal Right, aggravated by the appointment of Chapaprieta as organizer. Efforts to incorporate similar groups were not always successful: thus a number of Ossorio's disciples in Saragossa joined the party, but left again when no seats were assured them. (El Sol, 2 & 21 June).

2 Prieto, El Socialista, 27 June 1931.

of Socialist union-leaders using the old trick of making future employment dependent on the appropriate vote being cast.

In 1931, with the Right in disarray, the situation could not fit the pattern. According to El Socialista, the coming of the Republic caused the old local bosses of the Monarchy to turn Republican in order to preserve their influence.[1] The paper denounced the entry of caciques into the Right Republican parties. However, judging from later recriminations in the Cortes, it would seem that caciques offered their services to all the parties of the new régime. It was a general belief in the ensuing months that caciques of the Unión Patriótica had in the main been employed by the Radical-Socialists, and some by the Socialists themselves. Those who were not mere time-servers remained loyal to the Right. Their fate was illuminated by the case of Priego (Córdoba), which before 1923 had been the 'fief' of Alcalá-Zamora. Primo de Rivera had turned out Alcalá-Zamora's men and on 12 April 1931 they had been defeated by the Dictator's supporters. The new régime soon removed these Monarchists and the President's friends returned to office. On the basis of a whole series of such dismissals, the press of the Right attacked the government for its 'caciquista

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1 El Socialista, 19 Apr. 1931, reported this phenomenon with reference to Galicia. On 25 Apr., it was reported in many pueblos. On 6 May, the paper stated that rural caciquismo was now Republican. A French visitor to Toledo was told that caciques were still active, but they now called themselves Republicans (P. Dominique, Marche, Espagne [Paris, 1931], 124).

policy' in the coming elections.[1]

The evidence concerning the Provisional Government's conduct with regard to municipal councils is incomplete and confused. Maura announced on 17 April that he would appoint temporary committees in municipalities where malpractice was alleged. He later annulled five per cent of the 2,700 cases which he looked into, and the positions thus left vacant were filled by partial elections on 31 May.[2] Allowing for the good intentions of the Minister of the Interior, it would seem that in many areas the actions of local Republicans prevented Monarchists from taking their posts. In any case, 'Republicanization' of local councils took place on a large scale; possibly this was as much the result of voluntary changes of

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1 ABC, 21, 25 & 28 Apr.; El Debate, 29 Apr. 1931. ABC on 28 Apr. reported M. Maura as saying that if he had followed the example of Cánovas before the Cortes of the Restoration, there would not be one Monarchist council left; to which ABC retorted that, had the last government of the King acted in this way, there would not now be a Republic. ABC, 25 Apr., thought Maura worse than Romero Robledo, the Monarchy's most notorious electoral manager.

2 Maura, Así cayó Alfonso, 309. Sir G. Young, The New Spain (London, 1933), 136, says Maura removed about 7,500 Monarchist councillors. The results of the partial elections of 31 May were: Government coalition, 1,645 councillors; Socialists, 674; Monarchists, 201; Liberal Republican Right, 757; Radical-Socialists, 301; Gremiales, 4; Republican-Regionalist coalition, 5; Federals, 89; independent Republicans, 156; Catholics, 47; Radicals, 208; 'In the Service of the Republic', 15; Agrarian Republicans, 91; workers, 13; Liberal-Democrats, 84; Alianza Republicana, 141; followers of J. March, 54; Unión Republicana Autonomista, 461; Traditionalists, Nationalists, Jaimists, etc., 354. (El Sol, 2 June 1931).

allegiance by the elected councillors themselves as of arbitrary measures.[1]

Another electoral practice taken over by the Republicans was the 'instruction' of Mayors by provincial Governors - with or without the permission of the Minister of the Interior.[2] Given the Monarchist nature of the rural councils elected on 12 April, it would seem unlikely that the Republican authorities at some level did not take steps to change the character of local government in the great majority of cases. In any event, it can be said that caciquismo in June and July 1931 worked in favour of parties represented in the Provisional Government and the Generalidad.

A crucial step, however, was taken to undermine the system of caciquismo in the sense of the influence of political bosses over a small area or pueblo. The Decree of 8 May abolished the former small constituencies and created new ones on the basis of provincial boundaries, except for urban centres of over 100,000 inhabitants, which formed separate constituencies. Within these new constit-

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1 Fernández Castillejo, appointed Governor of Valencia after the May burnings, says he found local government in chaos, with the province under the sway of the Blasquistas (local Radicals). (Conversation with same.)

2 El Debate, 23 June 1931, reported this in Zamora and Salamanca. The description of the average provincial Governor given in Maura's memoirs leads one to suppose them capable of anything. Miguel Maura was himself a candidate in Zamora.

uencies, the number of deputies elected corresponded to the size of the population: one deputy for each 50,000 people. Candidates, who could now be women or priests, had to obtain over twenty per cent of the vote to be elected, vacancies being filled in a second contest a fortnight later. The electorate was composed of all males of twenty-three and over.[1] The decree therefore largely submerged pockets of influence, and gave the advantage to well-organized mass parties with sizable financial resources or auxiliary organizations. In 1931, there existed two of the latter type, although they were of a regional nature: the Socialist UGT, strong in Madrid, Bilbao, Extremadura and eastern Andalusia; and the CNCA, concentrated in the Castiles and León. According to Largo Caballero after the event, Socialist success was the result of good organization, caciquismo having been largely destroyed by the new electoral system.[2]

Apart from changes in local councils, the conversion of local bosses into Republicans and the 'instruction' of provincial Governors, the principal disadvantages from which the Right suffered were the

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1 Arrarás, HSRE I, 111-2.

2 El Socialista, 30 June & 5 July 1931. He noted that, of three great caciques, only Romanones had been elected; Bergamín and Burgos Mazo were defeated in Málaga and Huelva respectively. The CNT had a wide organization, but, outside Catalonia, it counselled abstention in protest against 'the revolutionary incapacity of the government'. (Quoted, El Socialista, 28 May 1931). Caciquismo nevertheless retained its influence in parts of Galicia; in the province of Corunna caciques helped the Republicans of Casares Quiroga (D. Quiroga Ríos, Contra los nuevos oligarcas [2nd ed., Corunna, 1932], esp. 42-3).

almost total lack of organization and the frequent lack of juridical guarantees. With the closure of the CMI, ABC counselled abstention because the government had made opposition impossible.[1] In contrast, El Debate - supported by La Nación (Primoderriverista), El Siglo Futuro (Traditionalist) and La Epoca (conservative), and by the Bishops - campaigned against such defeatism. The maximum effort should be made in elections for Cortes which would decide vital matters of religion, education and national unity. It admitted that abstention was justifiable where no meetings could be held, no papers published and where the police were employed for partisan purposes; even so, it was not recommended.[2] On the eve of the election, ABC modified its attitude and advised Monarchists to vote for conservative candidates, preferably for those of Acción Nacional.[3] Notable withdrawals due to lack of guarantees were the DRV and the Liberal-Democrats of Asturias, whose first meeting was broken up by a mob of Socialists and Republicans.[4]

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1 ABC, 7, 17 & 19 June 1931; ABC argued that the government coalition would split up if the non-Republican Right abstained.

2 El Debate, 3 May 1931.

3 ABC, 26 June 1931.

4 The DRV abstained as its meetings were broken up with impunity (El Debate, 17 June); Lucía advised his followers to vote for the Jaimists. Events in Asturias were reported in El Sol, 20-21 June; the local Acción Nacional also withdrew in solidarity (El Debate, 23 June). M. Álvarez had earlier been approached by Azaña for a coalition in Asturias, but had refused. (M. García Venero, Melquiades Álvarez, [Madrid, 1954], 365).

Autopsies by candidates of Acción Nacional revealed the weakness of the new Right: ignorance of the social teaching of the Church among all classes of society. Other factors contributed to defeat. Intervention by the authorities on behalf of government candidates was noted in Toledo, Guadalajara and in Cuenca, where the Governor instructed all 291 Mayors to see that coalition candidates were returned. Violence by the Left, making Rightist propaganda difficult, was noted in Córdoba and Jaén, while in Cuenca the Catholic paper was suspended and only one meeting was held; a second was prevented by the Governor who told the Mayor that the Right's list had been withdrawn. Abstention by the classes of order was recorded in Toledo. In Cuenca it was attributed to disapproval of Acción Nacional's passivity regarding the burning of the conventos, while in Jaén, Córdoba and Guadalajara, fear of violence was believed to be the reason.

In Toledo, the two successful candidates attributed their victory to the 30,000 votes of Catholic farmers: Dimas de Madariaga was a native of Corral de Almaguer and therefore known in one part of the province as a social-Catholic worker, while Fr. Molina picked up protest votes against the expulsion of the Cardinal-Archbishop. In Cuenca, votes came from the small pueblos influenced by the local notables. In Jaén and Córdoba, defeat was seen as the inevitable consequence of the desperation of the masses who voted Socialist after fifty years' suppression by caciques because of the lack of popular Catholicism. In Jaén, all caciques were defeated except

Alcalá-Zamora, while in Córdoba the callousness of employers could be gauged by the fact that Canon Gallegos Rocafull, founder of a small workers' union, was almost run out of the province as a revolutionary. In Guadalajara, fragmentation brought defeat: Rightist voters had a choice between Romanones, the Liberal Right, independent conservatives, Acción Nacional, and Agrarian Republicans. The Agrarians represented a Catholic peasants' league, and campaigned against the rural proletariat of the CNCA, represented by Acción Nacional. The lack of organization was apparent, if not glaring, in all provinces.[1]

The elections for the single chamber of the Constituent Cortes were held on 28 June, with second contests on 12 July. Polling-day produced no serious disturbances, although some irregularities occurred.[2] The government parties, in particular the Socialists, did well. Abstention was blamed for the poor performance of the Liberal Right and the other Rightist groups, although 70% of the electorate voted. The Radicals emerged as the main conservative

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1 Reports by Madariaga (Toledo), Marín Lázaro (Cuenca), Tornos (Jaén), Fr. Yaben (Guadalajara) and Medina Togores (Córdoba-prov.) in El Debate, 8, 10, 12, 31 & 16 July 1931 respectively. In Seville-prov., Acción Nacional was prevented from holding even one meeting by the Left. (Monge Bernal, AP, 1078).

2 El Debate, 30 June 1931. BSS, VIII, 194, says that there were no major riots, but there was a toll of 8 dead. A riot occurred in Salamanca, in protest against the Agrarian coalition's success (El Debate, 1 July). El Debate also reported that in some parts of León province it was not known that elections had taken place (5 July). In some places, old habits were not broken: more votes were recorded than there were voters.

force of the Republic. In Madrid, Lerroux topped the poll with 133,425 votes, compared with 117,993 for the first Socialist. Herrera, who obtained 27,481 to Goicoechea's 26,744, just missed election, being beaten by the list giving 'Support for the Republic'.[1] In Barcelona, the Esquerra, supported by the CNT, won easily.

The resultant composition of the Cortes was as follows: Socialists, 113; Radicals, 89; Radical-Socialists, 50; Esquerra, 43; Acción Republicana, 24; Agrarians, 24; Liberal Right, 23; Federals, 16; ORGA, 16; Basque-Navarrese coalition, 15; 'In the Service of the Republic', 11; Catalan Regionalists (Lliga), 3; Liberal Democrats, 2; Social Revolutionary (later Communist), 1. There were also 26 independents.[2]

In the Basque provinces and Navarre, the Catholic Rightist coalition was victorious, although in Bilbao Prieto's Republican-Socialist list won. At San Sebastián on 5 July, the Basque-Navarrese electoral coalition was renewed by the 'Pact of the Hotel de Londres': the question of régime was omitted, and a minimum

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1 El Debate, 2 July 1931. According to Prieto, the Socialists had expected 40-50 seats (El Socialista, 1 July 1931).

2 Figures compiled from statistics of the Instituto Geográfico y Estadístico, in El Debate, 5 Dec. 1933. Press and books give similar figures for the composition of the chamber, though they rarely agree exactly. The Instituto's figures incorporate the odd by-elections later in 1931. These results did not affect the overall position: in them, the Lliga got its third seat and an Agrarian was elected in Logroño, replacing a Liberal Rightist who died. Initially, therefore, the Liberal Right numbered 24 to the Agrarians' 23.

programme for the defence of religion and the restoration of ancient local rights was approved. The parliamentary minority was to be led by the Jaimist Joaquín Beúnza, with the Nationalist chief Aguirre as secretary.[1] On 12 July a rally was held in celebration at Guernica. The atmosphere was one of aggressive euphoria. The Lectoral Canon of Vitoria announced: 'We are the Ireland of the West, and we now have our O'Connell [Aguirre] to rouse us'. Aguirre threatened that the Basques would seize the autonomy they wanted if it were not given to them.

Yet although one Traditionalist considered Aguirre 'providential', the old differences could be detected. The Conde de Rodezno concentrated on religious issues though he referred to 'the traditional liberties of the Fueros, consubstantial with these provinces and the Kingdom of Navarre'. The Statute was implicitly rejected.[2] The minority consisted of 6 Traditionalists, 6 Basque Nationalists, and two independents from Guipúzcoa closely allied to the PNV, an ex-Maurista. Socialists described the minority as 'the Beúnza tribe'

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1 Aguirre, Libertad, 96-8. The minority initially numbered 14: Aguirre was elected for Navarre and Biscay-prov.; in a by-election in the latter, he was replaced by the worker Robles Aránguiz (PNV).

2 Aguirre, Libertad, 99-106; García Venero, Nacionalismo vasco, 425; Arrarás, HSRE I, 179-80. In his opening speech in the Cortes, Beúnza placed religion first as the justification for the minority; on local rights, he explained with great tact that it was a union of Navarrese defending 'Dios y Fueros' and Basques defending 'Jaungoikoa eta lagi-zarra' (God and the ancient laws). He then spoke of a separate statute for Navarre. (Diario de sesiones de las Cortes constituyentes de la República española, 29 July 1931).

of 'cavemen' and 'troglodytes'.

In Catalonia, the popularity of the Lliga was at a low ebb. The veterans Abadal and Rahola represented Barcelona-capital, while Estelrich won a seat in Gerona in coalition with the Liberal Right. The Liberal Republican Right itself, although the largest single Catholic group in the Cortes, had not proved a success. With the rest of the Right disorganized, only twenty-four of its hundred and twenty-four candidates were elected; its most favourable moment had passed without glory. The group's Deputies were scattered over constitutencies as far apart as Almería and Lugo, Cádiz and Castellón: no indication of potential strength could be observed in any particular locality.

The new Right Republicans also recorded little success. M. Álvarez was elected in Madrid with Ossorio and Sánchez Guerra, and, thanks to Lerroux, in Valencia; his only Liberal Democrat colleague, Villalobos, owed his place to the Agrarian coalition in Salamanca. Among the miscellany of independents could be found Santiago Alba, in Zamora; also, on home ground in the Balearics, two 'Centre Republicans' revealed themselves as Juan March Ordinas and an associate, but they announced their spiritual home in Madrid as the Radical minority. The only Deputy actually elected as a Monarchist was the independent liberal Romanones in his usual habitat of Guadalajara. Also a known Monarchist, though of a different kind, was the independent Deputy for Orense, José Calvo Sotelo; he was not, however, permitted to take his seat in the Cortes and so stayed

in exile in Portugal, later moving to France.[1]

The Agrarian minority, as General Fanjul explained, was a gathering of Deputies of conflicting ideologies who had coalesced to comply with parliamentary regulations stipulating the minimum size for a minority in order to qualify for representation on parliamentary committees. The leader of the minority was the last Undersecretary of Grace and Justice of the Monarchy, José Martínez de Velasco, an Albista Liberal. Its secretary was a former Conservative Senator, Ramón de la Cuesta, also elected for Burgos.[2] The minority's members came almost entirely from the Castiles and León: 22 of its 24 Deputies were elected for constituencies in this region, six for Burgos alone, and three for Salamanca.

That such should be the case was not pure chance. The CNCA and other farmers' organizations were strong in this area where

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1 His aim in standing was to be able to defend his work as the Dictator's Minister of Finance, then under strong attack. He told the Lisbon Diario da Manhã in May that he did not support the idea of a restoration at the moment; Monarchists should collaborate with the Republican government but not become too closely involved with it. He accepted freedom of religion so long as the Orders remained with permission to teach. As always, he stressed the need for order to keep up confidence in the economy. Although he wanted to return after his election, he could not obtain a guarantee of parliamentary immunity from Alcalá-Zamora. (J. Calvo Sotelo, En defensa propia, [Madrid, 1932], 119-29 & 185-90). In Biarritz, Guadalhorce, on behalf of the ex-Ministers of Primo de Rivera, refused to accept the Republic when asked so to do by an emissary from Herrera. (Cortés Cavanillas, Gil Robles, 70).

2 Speech, in DSCC, 28 July 1931. The minority, as formed on 15 July, numbered nineteen: all from the Castiles and León except Guallar from Aragón (El Debate, 16 July 1931).

smallholdings predominated. Furthermore, wheat-growing was the area's principal occupation. A Republican-Socialist government, with its real strength in the towns, was likely to favour cheaper bread for the urban worker: this could be achieved only by the import of cheaper foreign wheat at the expense of the Castilian peasant's livelihood. This underlying economic factor, combined with the fact that Catholicism had not been seriously challenged here by Socialist or Anarchist propaganda, explains this regional phenomenon, apparent in 1931 if quite obvious in later elections.

If geographically homogeneous, the Agrarian minority was certainly politically heterogeneous. Two main types were discernible: the liberal - liberal in politics, conservative with regard to the agrarian status quo - and the Catholic - putting first priority on defence of the Church, while being interested in agrarian matters. The liberal trend found its focus in the ex-Albistas: Royo Villanova, Martínez de Velasco and Cid.[1] Half the minority was liberal, and the clearest example of its connection with the 'old politics' was the ex-Conservative Minister Abilio Calderón, who had represented Palencia since 1890. The Catholic trend, on the other hand, was in general composed of younger men. The minority included four

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1 These deputies had planned a National Agrarian Party, which they hoped Alba himself would lead, just before the fall of the Monarchy. Alba, in fact, was Cid's running mate in Zamora; however, like Velayos, another of his followers elected in Ávila, he did not join the Agrarian minority. (M. García Venero, Santiago Alba, [Madrid, 1963], 331 & 333).

priests (one a Traditionalist), the worker Dimas de Madariaga, the Alfonsine academic Sáinz Rodríguez, and a disciple of Herrera, José María Gil Robles.

Thus the disarray of the Right in 1931 produced some alliances which would at other times have been thought infamous. Heterogeneous in their political pasts, the minority's members remained so: of the twenty-four, 11 were simply Agrarians and six men of Acción Nacional; three were Traditionalist and one Alfonsine Monarchists. The number was made up by a lawyer from the Canaries and a priest from Santander who had no marked political loyalties. Though officially led by the fifty-six year old Martínez de Velasco, the thirty-two year old Gil Robles immediately eclipsed him as the minority's real leader with a maiden speech in defence of the purity of the Agrarian coalition of Salamanca's electoral victory. The leading Republican intellectual declared that the Right, as always, had found a great parliamentarian to lead it.[1]

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1 Comment of Ortega Gasset (quoted in El Debate, 25 July 1931). The complete list of the Agrarian minority was: Burgos, 4 Agrarians & 2 Traditionalists; Cuenca, 2 Agrarians; Logroño, 1 Acción Riojana; Palencia, 1 Agrarian & 1 Unión Castellana Agraria; Salamanca, 1 Traditionalist & 2 Acción Nacional; Sta.Cruz de Tenerife, 1 independent Republican; Santander, 2 Agrupación Regional Independiente; Saragossa-cap., 1 Acción Nacional; Segovia, 1 Agrarian Republican; Toledo, 2 Acción Nacional; Valladolid, 2 Agrarians; Zamora, 1 Agrarian Republican.

Based on the professions declared by the Deputies themselves, the minority consisted of: Lawyers, 9; priests, 4; engineers, 3; academics, 3; property-owners, 2; worker, 1; Army General, 1; notary, 1. The list provides an indication of the social composition of the minority, though not of its economic interests.

CHAPTER II

LEGALITY AND CONSPIRACY, JULY 1931-SEPTEMBER 1932

The future of the Republic was in the hands of the deputies elected in June. If the new régime were to take permanent root in Spain it had to have a constitution acceptable not only to the Socialists and Left Republicans but also to Catholic opinion, which events were to show was under-represented in the Constituent Cortes. The driving-force behind the Constitution came from the 'Jacobin' Left Republicans whose first priority was the subjugation of the Church. They were loyally supported by the Socialists who wanted them to carry through the 'bourgeois revolution'. The anti-clerical Constitution which resulted from this alliance offended Catholic Spain and ominously identified the régime with the particular type of Republicanism epitomized by Azaña. The first President of the Republic, Alcalá-Zamora, found to his dismay that the violent spirit of the incendiarists of May had been clothed in legality: the Constitution was a standing invitation to civil war.[1]

Moderate Republicans saw that the survival of the régime depended on its ability to retain the loyalty of the 'neutral masses' who had voted against Alfonso and to reassure and attract as many

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1 N. Alcalá-Zamora, Los defectos de la Constitución de 1931 (Madrid, 1936), 50 & 91.

as possible of those who had voted for him in April. The chances of re-building in modified form the bridge between the two Spains constructed by Cánovas rapidly disappeared. The constant factor in the Republic's history was to be the increasing polarization of politics around Right and Left: parties in the Centre kept collapsing. This process began with the resignation of Alcalá-Zamora and Maura in October 1931: anti-clerical intransigence torpedoed liberal-Catholic Republicanism. The gap was widened in December when Azaña formed a coalition with the Socialists. Lerroux was excluded because he wanted to attract conservatives into the Republic through his own party.

The Socialists were clearly the key to the Republic's history. Their position seemed paradoxical. They provided the government with mass support and proclaimed themselves defenders of the régime while admitting that for them the Republic was accidental and Socialism fundamental. They refused to accept the idea of a Republic ruled by conservatives like Lerroux. In fact they were keeping their eyes on the main chance and using Azaña's Republic as a means of eliminating conservative obstacles to their future progress as well as a tool for crushing their old rivals in the CNT. Their social-democratic reformism was therefore tactical. Azaña and his colleagues were forced to ally with the Socialists because progressive politicians without masses could not do otherwise.[1]

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1 Azaña insisted that it was 'impossible for a Republican government to exist' without Socialist collaboration (G. Picard-Moch & J. Moch, L'Espagne républicaine [Paris, 1933], 48).

In a sense the Left Republicans and the Socialists played into the hands of their opponents. The anti-clerical content of the Constitution provoked a nation-wide Catholic reaction which took them by surprise, while moderate opinion wary of this reaction rallied to Lerroux for protection. The cardinal error of Azaña and his supporters was to launch a frontal attack on the Church first, for this enabled opponents of social reform and of decentralization to hitch their interests to the cause of religion. At the same time the governments' delay in implementing social changes, notably agrarian reform, led disillusioned workers into the revolutionary paths of the CNT, now controlled by the extremists of the FAI. Its constant violence, which the government seemed unable to eradicate,[1] contributed to the conservative revival, as did fear of Socialism and increasing economic difficulties for which the world depression was not mainly responsible. The Defence Law of the Republic also had the effect of helping the Right. The government's use of its dictatorial powers caused anger, bitterness and inconvenience; capricious discrimination stiffened the resolve of its opponents, only a minority of whom resorted to arms, thereby playing into the hands of the government.

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1 Asked whether the agitation of the extreme Left worried him, Azaña replied that it did not: 'it fills me with joy' (Dominique, Marche, Espagne, 118).

i. Religion and the Constitution

The Constituent Cortes of the Second Spanish Republic met on Bastille Day, 1931. The Socialist academic Besteiro was elected its President, and confidence in the government was quickly ratified. The Republican-Socialist coalition remained in being, forming a solid majority in the Chamber.[1] Debates on the Constitution did not begin, however, until late in August.

The first draft produced by the Advisory Juridical Committee, under Ossorio, had been rejected by the principal government party, the Socialists, as confused, reactionary and inadequate.[2] Ossorio's draft was an attempt to adapt the Constitution of 1876 to a Republican framework, with some admixture of ideas from the social Encyclicals. Its religious provisions reflected the liberal-Catholic views of Right Republicans. Freedom of conscience and religion was proclaimed, while Church and State were to be separated by the Church becoming an 'institution of public law'. Religious instruction in schools was guaranteed, though freedom to start private schools was also granted.[3] The Episcopacy, however, objected to this subordination of the Church to 'the absolute laicism of the State'. Catholic deputies were told that they must defend the

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1 DSCC, 30 July 1931.

2 El Socialista, 3 July 1931.

3 Ossorio, Mis memorias, 189-99; R.M. Smith, The Day of the Liberals in Spain (London, 1938), 119-34.

Church. All Catholics ought to implore the Virgin for help in keeping Spain 'the Catholic nation par excellence' and oppose a document which denied that the State had a religion and that all power proceeded from God.[1]

Relations between Church and State became strained even though the Vatican continued to be conciliatory. Cardinal Segura, from his exile in France, continued to protest about his unjust expulsion and asked Alcalá-Zamora to allow him to return. He still counselled resistance in matters where the interests of the Church were threatened, but reaffirmed his obedience to the constituted power.[2] The climax came when the Vicar-General of Vitoria was arrested at the frontier on 14 August. He was found to be the bearer of a plan for disguising the fact that the Church owned property.[3] Segura denied that the documents concerned the sale of ecclesiastical property and the investment of the proceeds abroad and said that the intention was simply to prevent the confiscation of diocesan reserve

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1 Collective Pastoral, El Debate, 16 Aug. 1931. Individually some Bishops were more forthright: the Bishop of Orense protested to Alcalá-Zamora about separation of Church and State in violation of the Concordat, and about the 'legal banishment of all religious emblems and catechist instruction from public schools at the behest of any Bolshevik seeking to convert Spain into a Soviet Russia'. (El Debate, 13 Aug. 1931).

2 Pastoral, and letter to Alcalá-Zamora, in El Debate, 31 July & 5 Aug. 1931 respectively.

3 Prieto, El Socialista, 25 Aug. 1931.

funds.[1] Nevertheless, the government suspended the temporalities of the Cardinal-Archbishop of Toledo and his fellow exile, Bishop Múgica of Vitoria.[2] When Segura's renunciation of the archiepiscopal see was announced on 26 September Los Ríos saw it as a great victory for the State and proof that, in the Vatican, liberal views had prevailed over integrist pressures.[3] These events added fuel to the flames during the debates on the religious clauses of the Constitution.

After the rejection of Ossorio's draft, a new constitutional committee was set up under the Socialist Jiménez de Asúa. Debates on the new draft began in the second half of August.[4] For the

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1 Sánchez, Reform and Reaction, 119.

2 El Debate, 23 Aug. 1931.

3 El Debate, 1 Oct. 1931. It was said that Herrera and S. Aznar had earlier counselled Segura's deposition in Rome. Segura, in Paris, was asked by Mgr. Maglione (Nuncio in France) on behalf of Pius XI to renounce the see. Segura agreed after argument, but renounced also his office of Cardinal, something for which the Pope had not bargained. When they met in Rome, Pius got Segura to withdraw this to avoid further scandal; but when asked by the Pope to say that he had renounced the see of his own free will, Segura flatly refused, telling Pius that he would not lie even for the Pope. (Cortés Cavanillas, Gil Robles, 82-5). Segura, whom the Pope officially thanked for the sacrifice he had made in following the example of St. Gregory of Nazianzus, was given a post in Rome. (El Debate, 26 Dec. 1931).

4 The Committee consisted of 5 Socialists, 4 Radicals, 3 Radical-Socialists, 2 Esquerra and one representative each of Acción Republicana, ORGA, the Federals, Alcalá-Zamora's group, those 'in the service of the Republic', the Basque-Navarrese coalition and the Agrarians - the latter two being Leizaola and Gil Robles. (Smith, Day of the Liberals, 166-7). The new draft is in DSCC, 18 Aug. 1931, App.

Socialists, the Constitution of the bourgeois Republic was the first stage on the road to Socialism. They wanted the Church to be firmly under the control of the laicist Republic. The expulsion of the Orders, confiscation of their possessions and cancellation of the ecclesiastical budget were 'elementary aspirations of democracy'.[1]

Catholics naturally considered the religious question the most important. Gil Robles warned that the future of the Republic would depend largely on the solution found.[2] El Debate exhorted Catholics to be resolute and so prevent victory for the opponents of the Church.[3] Compromise was from the first unlikely; Catholic deputies were often shouted down. For the Agrarians, Sáinz Rodríguez put forward a basis for compromise. He suggested that the Right would accept the most advanced social legislation of the Left, if the Left would accept the national spiritual tradition. If the Left did not accept it, the Republic could abandon hope for a legal existence. The Socialists however walked out of the Chamber at the start of his speech.[4]

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1 El Socialista, 11 Aug. & 1, 9 & 17 Oct. 1931.

2 ABC, 4 Oct. 1931.

3 El Debate, 21 July 1931.

4 DSCC, 8 Sept. 1931. The Socialists, who had collaborated with the Dictator, left in protest against a speech by one who had attended the Dictator's National Assembly.

Before the religious clauses were discussed, the regional issue and the rights of property were debated. The Republic was defined as 'an integral State compatible with the autonomy of Municipalities and Regions'.[1] Articles 11 to 20 of the draft defined in general terms what functions should be kept by the State and what should be conceded to the regions, as well as the procedure for obtaining a statute of autonomy. Here, as in general on regional questions, the Right was split. The Basque-Navarrese advocated wider powers for the regions, as did the Lliga, whereas the Agrarians favoured the minimum power for regions, being obsessed by fears of separatism. Their main spokesman was a staunch liberal, Antonio Royo Villanova, and the liberal element in the minority took the lead in opposing regional aspirations. The Catholic element adhered to traditionalist theories. Thus while the Basque Leizaola sought more regional control over Church-State relations, the judiciary and the army, Royo and the Agrarians concentrated on 'the preservation of national unity and integrity'.[2] Passions were aroused, but Catalans and Castilians alike treated the debates as a preliminary skirmish. Article 22 of the Constitution, allowing provinces to opt out of a constituted region if they wished, was notable in being the sole

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1 Unless cited, the sources are the original and final text of the Constitution, respectively in appendices to DSCC, 18 Aug. & 9 Dec. 1931.

2 DSCC, 25 Sept. 1931; & amdmts. of Leizaola to Artics. 14 & 15, & Royo to Artic. 14, in apps. to DSCC, 20 & 21 Aug. & 11 Sept. 1931.

Agrarian amendment accepted.[1]

The Articles concerning property and labour which caused friction were numbered 42 and 44. Article 42 stated that all sources of national wealth were really owned by the State in the name of the Nation. Private property rights would be recognized until gradual socialization took place. The State virtually had the right to do what it liked with private property; compensation need not be paid in all cases. Public services and undertakings of national interest were to be nationalized as soon as possible. Confiscation of possessions could not be imposed as a legal or political penalty.

Agrarians, Catholics and all conservative Republicans protested against this 'sword of Damocles suspended over property rights'.[2] Gil Robles and Leizaola opposed the social-Catholic view to the Socialist: property was a natural, but not absolute, right. The State should only take over property for reasons of social utility after 'previous just compensation'. They rejected the classical view of jus utendi, fruendi et abutendi as anti-Christian.[3] The liberal Agrarians, however, thought expropriation justifiable with full compensation only if the courts could prove unlawful ownership.

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1 Alonso de Armiño, DSCC, 25 Sept. 1931.

2 Sáinz Rodríguez, DSCC, 8 Sept. 1931.

3 Gil Robles-Leizaola amdmt. to Artic. 42, DSCC, 20 Aug. 1931 App.; & Gil Robles, DSCC, 6 Oct. 1931.

One of them noted that it was little consolation for an owner to be told that he had been expropriated without compensation, though assured that the penalty of confiscation had not been imposed.[1] Eventually the original text of Article 42 was amended by anti-Socialist Republicans, so that Article 44 of the Constitution, as it became, permitted expropriation for reasons of social utility, or socialization, with adequate compensation, unless an absolute majority voted against compensation. The penalty of confiscation was strictly forbidden. Thus, although blunted a little, the sword of Damocles remained in position.

Article 44 of the draft, which became Article 46 of the Constitution, defined work as 'a social obligation'. Social legislation was to cover social securities, child and female labour, the length of the working day, minimum and family wages, annual holidays with pay, the rights of the Spanish worker abroad, cooperative societies, workers' participation in the management, administration and profits of firms, and the economic and juridical relationship between the factors of production. This enumeration of social aims was modified and extended in an amendment presented by the Catholic worker Dimas de Madariaga. Work ought to be re-defined as 'an ethical duty which is binding on everybody'. The worker, in addition to the aforesaid, should have the right to cheap and healthy housing and

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1 Martín Martín, amdmt. to Artic. 42, DSCC, 1 Oct. 1931 App.; & Alonso de Armiño, DSCC, 6 Oct. 1931.

rest-homes. Legislation should also deal with savings and insurance societies. The economic and juridical relationship between the factors of production ought to be institutionalized in corporative bodies with equal representation for both sides. Madariaga's amendment was, in fact, an unsuccessful attempt to pour into Article 44 the most comprehensive statement possible of social-Catholic aims.[1]

The religious clauses were recognized by all to be the most important in the Constitution. They formed, claimed Catholics, the leit-motiv of this 'laicist, anti-religious, atheist' document designed to rob Spain of her faith.[2] The Alfonsine Sáinz Rodríguez pointed out that such anachronistic Jacobinism was to be found in no other post-war constitution.[3] Other Catholic Agrarians were at pains to avoid accusations of Monarchism: 'We are not idolizers of the person, but servants of the principle...of discipline, of order, of subordination, of obedience to the legitimate power, whatever it be called, in whatever person it be incarnate, whether Charles V or Alcalá-Zamora'.[4]

Article 3 of the draft read simply: 'There is no state religion'.

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1 Madariaga, amdmt. to Artic. 44, DSCC, 23 Sept. 1931 App.

2 Molina Nieto, DSCC, 27 Aug. 1931.

3 DSCC, 8 Sept. 1931.

4 Molina Nieto, DSCC, 27 Aug. 1931. The choice of examples by the Canon from Toledo caused considerable amusement in the Cortes.

This the Catholics found unacceptable. They wanted the Article omitted because there was only one religion in Spain, that of the vast majority, namely Catholicism.[1] The Article was, in fact, rephrased so that it read: 'The Spanish State has no official religion'. This text was passed on 13 October against the opposition of Agrarians, Basques, Navarrese and various Catholic Republicans, including Alcalá-Zamora. It remained for such as Fr. Guallar the epitome of 'integral laicism'.[2] There was also friction over part of Article 1, which stated that all power emanated from the people. Catholics wanted some recognition that all power in the last resort proceeded from God, but the majority remained unmoved when told that the Constitution of the Polish Republic made reference to the Almighty.[3]

The religious provisions abrogated the Concordat of 1851 and represented the vengeance which anti-clericals, the most voluble of whom were the Radical-Socialists, wished to take on the Church. Article 25 of the draft proclaimed freedom of religion, but allowed it to be practised only inside churches, thus implicitly forbidding religious processions. This article Gil Robles and Leizaola again wanted suppressed. The liberal Royo Villanova joined with Right Republicans in pointing out that if it were not omitted, the Constitution would automatically lead to rioting over the banning of

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1 Gil Robles-Leizaola amdmt., DSCC, 21 Aug. 1931 App.

2 DSCC, 13 Oct. 1931.

3 Estévanez, DSCC, 10 Sept. 1931.

traditional processions.[1] Article 41 permitted divorce by mutual consent, and equal rights in the family for legitimate and illegitimate children. The Catholics also wanted this provision suppressed. Instead, they asked for state support for large families.[2] Article 46 of the draft stated that primary education would be obligatory, free and laicist in a 'single school' system; religious instruction was allowed only in the Church's own establishments. This article has to be seen together with the most controversial, Article 24 of the draft, which declared all religions 'Associations subject to the general laws of the country'. The State was under no circumstances to favour or give material aid to any religious body, and it was stated all religious orders would be dissolved and their property nationalized. It was around Article 24, and its consequences upon Article 46, that the battle really raged.

Gil Robles and Leizaola suggested an alternative Article 24: Church-State relations should be regulated by a new concordat with the Holy See. The liberal Agrarians and Right Republicans asked for no more than that the Orders be allowed to continue.[3] Regarding

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1 Amdmts. of Gil Robles-Leizaola & Royo Villanova, DSCC, 21 Aug. & 30 Sept. 1931 Apps. Royo and the leader of the minority, Martínez de Velasco, had entered Parliament in 1910 as supporters of freedom of worship under the leadership of Canalejas. (T. Ortega, Presidente: Martínez de Velasco [Barcelona, 1935], 8 & 68).

2 Amdmts. of Gil Robles-Leizaola & Oriol, DSCC, 21 Aug. & 6 Oct. 1931 Apps.

3 Amdmts. to Artic. 24 of Gil Robles-Leizaola & Royo Villanova, DSCC, 21 Aug. & 30 Sept. 1931 Apps.

education, amendments were put forward to permit parents to decide about religious instruction, to permit the foundation of local religious schools, to allow the Orders to go on teaching in institutions where workers received free education, and to suggest that state aid be given to all educational establishments.[1] Article 24 also brought to an end the ecclesiastical budget which the State paid under the terms of the Concordat as compensation for the disentailment of Church lands in the nineteenth century. Fr. Guallar demanded that the budget continue as long as there was no other compensation, while Beúnza and the Basque-Navarrese argued that it must continue unless the lands of the Church were returned.[2]

From 8 to 13 October the battle was waged in the Cortes with increasing intensity. Whilst Traditionalists fought against separation, social-Catholics like Gil Robles demanded the 'absolute separation of Church and State as two perfect societies' in their own spheres. From this Gil Robles deduced that the Church must have complete independence in its own sphere. This the draft did not permit because the religious articles violated the general precepts of other articles already passed concerning individual liberties, the right of association and the principle of equality. The draft

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1 Amdmts. of Gil Robles-Leizaola to Artics. 46 & 47; of Madariaga to Artic. 46; & of Royo Villanova to Artic. 46, in Apps. to DSCC, 21 Aug., 23 Sept., & 7 Oct. 1931 respectively.

2 Amdmts. of Guallar to Artic. 24, & of Beúnza to Artic. 3, DSCC, 24 Sept. & 15 Sept. 1931 Apps. respectively.

was therefore 'a plan for religious persecution'. From the liberal-Catholic standpoint, Martínez de Velasco denounced the laicist 'single school' system as 'tyrannical'.[1] Catholics who were declared Republicans pleaded with the majority to avoid identifying the Republic with anti-Catholicism by being intolerant. If the articles were passed, warned the Premier, Catholics would have to move into opposition: better, therefore, a negotiated settlement than the resuscitation of the policy of Combes.[2] Catholic opposition, in its impotence in the Cortes, resorted to warnings and threats. Alcalá-Zamora advocated opposition within the Republic. Gil Robles spoke of a Spanish Kulturkampf, a passionate but legal campaign for revision. The Traditionalist answer, however, was more radical: Beúnza warned that persecution would force them to resort to 'the dignity of free men against tyranny' [3] - a veiled threat of violence.

Under pressure from Alcalá-Zamora, a new draft of Article 24, drawn up by the Constitutional Committee without the knowledge of Gil Robles and Leizaola, was put to the Cortes. The new draft

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1 Gil Robles & Martínez de Velasco, DSCC, 8 Oct. 1931. For Traditionalist opposition to separation, see Estévanez, DSCC, 29 July 1931.

2 García Gallego & Alcalá-Zamora, DSCC, 9 & 10 Oct. 1931. Canon García Gallego was an opponent of Primo de Rivera and El Debate; elected as a Catholic Republican Democrat, he worked 'in the service of the Republic'.

3 Gil Robles, DSCC, 8 Oct.; & Alcalá-Zamora & Beúnza, DSCC, 10 Oct. 1931. In Beúnza's view, necessities of State could demand a man's life and fortune, but could never lay claim to the souls of the children.

called for the ending of the ecclesiastical budget within two years. Religious Orders taking a fourth vow (the Jesuits) were to be dissolved and their property nationalized. Other Orders were to be subject to a special law permitting their dissolution if they constituted 'a danger for the security of the State'; they were not to engage in industry, commerce nor education, and provision was made for the nationalization of their property. Alcalá-Zamora persuaded all the Ministers except Prieto to accept a relatively harmonious solution.[1]

The session of 13 October was passionate and lengthy. The Catholics continued to present amendments against the new draft, and the Radical-Socialists in favour of the old; when the latter were rejected, the Radical-Socialists, including two Ministers, walked out. The anti-clerical Azaña proclaimed that Spain had ceased to be Catholic because its intellectual élite was now laicist; measures taken against the Orders were necessary for public safety and the defence of the Republic. In reply, the Catholic Catalan nationalist Carrasco Formiguera denounced Azaña's 'Fascist concept of the State'. Gil Robles asked how the State was going to replace the teaching of the Orders without at least temporarily depriving 60,000 children in Madrid alone of education: no answer was given. Alcalá-

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1 The cabinet met on 13 Oct. in the Finance Ministry (Alcalá-Zamora, Los defectos, 13).

2 DSCC, 13 Oct. 1931.

Zamora pleaded for tolerance, but the ministerial promises of his colleagues were not kept. Article 24 - Article 26 of the Constitution - was passed by 178 votes to 59. The session ended at 7.35 a.m. on 14 October amid cries of 'long live the Republic' from the Left and 'long live freedom' from the Basque-Navarrese. Leizaola was assaulted by an anti-clerical deputy. The Basque-Navarrese, the Agrarians and the Right Republican Deputy Ayats now withdrew from the Cortes for the remaining constitutional debates;[1] the exception in the two Rightist minorities was Royo Villanova.

On 14 October Alcalá-Zamora and Miguel Maura, who had voted against Article 26, resigned, and a second provisional government was formed by Manuel Azaña, the <u>bête noire</u> of the Right.[2] With only Royo Villanova present from the Rightist minorities, the remaining articles, mainly concerned with the balance of constitutional powers, were the subject of controversy between Republicans. Prior to 13 October however, the Catholics had, with the Socialists, voted for female suffrage and won in the face of opposition from the bourgeois

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1 <u>I.e.</u> they attended any sessions during which matters other than the text of the Constitution were debated.

2 <u>El Socialista</u>, 15 Oct. 1931, rejoiced over their resignation: 'a great difficulty for the development of the Revolution' had been removed. The Government of 14 Oct. was: Premier and War Minister, Azaña (<u>Acción Republicana</u>); State, Lerroux (Radical); Interior, Casares Quiroga (<u>ORGA</u>); Navy, Giral (<u>Acción Republicana</u>); Finance, Prieto (Socialist); Public Instruction, Domingo (Radical-Socialist); Public Works, Albornoz (Radical-Socialist); Labour, Largo Caballero (Socialist); Economy, Nicolău d'Olwer (<u>Acción Catalana</u>); Communications, Martínez Barrio (Radical); & Justice, Los Ríos (Socialist).

Republicans.[1] The Catholics' ideas on other constitutional matters were contained in amendments they had earlier presented. Like Alcalá-Zamora, they wanted a second chamber to put a brake on extremism. Gil Robles and Leizaola envisaged a bi-cameral system with equal powers for Senate and Congress. Congress, the lower house, was to be elected on the individualist basis of proportional representation; the Senate was to be organic and corporative. They also sought provision for a referendum on important pieces of legislation if a tenth of the electorate or a third of Parliament should demand one. The Court of Constitutional Guarantees was to have power to decide whether or not laws were constitutional.[2] The second chamber and the referendum were rejected.

Royo Villanova took a different view from the Catholics on such questions. As a liberal, he defended to the utmost the supremacy of Parliament against plebiscitary or presidentialist tendencies: 'For me the ideal Republic, like the ideal Monarchy (for the form of government is accidental), is parliamentary; the essential thing in the world is liberty and democracy, and the essential thing in politics is Parliament'.[3]

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1 DSCC, 29 & 30 Sept. 1931.

2 Amdmts. to Artics. 49, 50, 80, 81, 118 & 121 in DSCC, 20 & 21 Aug. 1931 Apps. The Senate was to be composed of 100 representatives of regions, provinces & municipalities; 25 workers; 25 employers; 50 liberal professions; & 50 representatives from universities, cultural institutions and religious bodies. It was to be indissoluble, each group being renewed by election every four years.

3 DSCC, 29 Oct. 1931; see also his amdmt., 26 Nov. 1931 App.

The Constitution was passed on 9 December 1931 by 368 votes, including those of Alcalá-Zamora and Maura. Although its controversial religious provisions were soon put into effect, in the sphere of civil rights it long remained a paper constitution. Though Spain had officially ceased to be Catholic, Azaña immediately took steps to defend the Republican creation against the Catholic revisionist campaign. An enabling law, the Defence Law of the Republic, was introduced on 20 October and quickly approved. The law defined as 'acts of aggression against the Republic' incitement to resist legislation, incitement of the armed forces, spreading news which could be harmful to public peace, political and unjustifiable strikes, use of Monarchist emblems and verbal defence of the Monarchy, lack of zeal in carrying out orders by civil servants and, indeed, 'any action or expression which redounds to the discredit of the Institutions and organs of the State'. The Minister of the Interior was to decide when and by whom the law had been contravened, and could sanction confinement of the alleged offender, impose a fine of up to 10,000 pesetas and suspend any meeting, association or publication at will.[1] The government, in fact, voted itself dictatorial powers.

The Cortes also passed a bill of attainder against Alfonso XIII. The King was found guilty by acclamation of high treason, and

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1 Text in Arrarás, HSRE I, 197.

sentenced to perpetual banishment. His property was confiscated.[1] ABC described the bill as 'an act of spiteful and unnecessary persecution', for which it was fined and suspended for three days.[2] On 10 December 1931 the Cortes elected Alcalá-Zamora the first President of the Republic.[3] The first government was formed by Azaña, who chose to rely on Socialist support instead of the Radical alternative.[4]

The government went ahead quickly with legislation to implement the religious clauses of the Constitution. On 23 January 1932 President Alcalá-Zamora signed a decree dissolving the Society of Jesus in Spain; the process was to be completed within ten days and steps were taken to nationalize its property.[5] The Traditional-

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1 The original charges, DSCC, 12 Nov. App., accused Alfonso of lèse-majesté and military rebellion. In the debate (DSCC, 19 Nov.) Romanones defended him on the grounds that he had yielded to public opinion in 1923 and 1931. Gil Robles and Balbontín (Social Revolutionary) asked why, if the charges were known, Alcalá-Zamora had asked the King to leave Spain on 14 April.

2 ABC, 20 & 22 Nov. 1931; it was suspended 25-27 Nov. and fined 1,000 ptas.

3 DSCC, 10 Dec. 1931. He got 362 votes, to the 7 of his nearest rival, Pi Arsuaga (Federal). The Basque Nationalists voted for him to re-affirm their Republicanism, while the Navarrese abstained (Aguirre, Libertad, 225-6).

4 Govt. of 15 Dec.: Premier & War, Azaña; State, Zulueta (independent Republican); Justice, Albornoz; Navy, Giral; Finance, Carner (Acción Catalana); Interior, Casares Quiroga; Public Instruction, Los Ríos; Public Works, Prieto; Labour, Largo Caballero; Agriculture, Industry & Commerce, Domingo.

5 Text in Arrarás, HSRE I, 275-6.

ist Agrarian Lamamié de Clairac immediately demanded a debate. He argued that, since the fourth vow was taken by only ten per cent of Jesuits, who thereby made explicit for missionary work their obedience to the Pope, Article 26 could not properly be applied to all Jesuits. Moreover, the Jesuits were not enemies of the Republic, and their religious activities did not concern the State. The decree, he said, contravened Article 44, forbidding confiscation of property and permitting expropriation only with adequate compensation. He lamented that the Court of Constitutional Guarantees was not in being so that such matters could be submitted to it. The closing of Jesuit colleges violated the government's promise to let children complete their education in religious institutions.

Traditionalists saw in such legislation the sinister influence of a Masonic International bent on the destruction of the Church. Beúnza, leader of the Basque-Navarrese, defending the Order founded by the Basque St.Ignatius of Loyola, challenged Masonic deputies to declare their affiliations so that Traditionalist suspicions could be proved or disproved.[1] The Nuncio protested that the decree was an insult to the Church, but on 4 February the debate was guillotined by 189 votes to 45.[2] The Jesuits were therefore dissolved,

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1 Lamamié & Beúnza in DSCC, 29 Jan. & 2 Feb. 1932.

2 Nuncio's protest of 29 Jan., Arrarás, HSRE I, 277-80; & DSCC, 4 Feb. 1932. Lamamié's reply to a government defence was thus not permitted; he claimed that the Minister had misquoted a Bull to prove his case. He also said that a Radical-Socialist had told him that there were 183 Masons in the Chamber that day. (La Época, 15 Feb. 1932).

their schools and institutes closed and preparations made to confiscate their reputedly great riches. Though some remained in Spain, most of them went to the Low Countries.[1]

In January 1932, a law was passed confirming the Decree of 9 July for the secularisation of cemeteries. Church burials were permitted if requested in the deceased's will, but as nine-tenths of Spaniards made no will, surviving relatives were allowed to decide. In practice an anti-clerical municipality could do much to hinder the survivors' wishes.[2] In Madrid during the preceding twenty years, 346,970 Catholic burials had been recorded, compared with 2,343 civil ceremonies; in the last six months of 1931, with the anti-clericals in full cry, the figures were 7,859 to 134 in favour of Catholic funerals.[3]

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1 There were 2,987 Jesuits resident in Spain at the time; they gave free primary and technical education to a total of 31,805 in Madrid, and to 26,910 in the rest of Spain, and secondary education to 6,798 children. They ran the ICAI in Madrid and the commercial university of Deusto, as well as two observatories and modern scientific laboratories. Their workers' clubs gave free education to 11,800 workers in Valladolid and Burgos. (El Debate, 26 March 1932). Their wealth is unknown, though in 4 years property worth 200,000,000 pesetas was confiscated (Ramos Oliveira, Politics, 446). Third persons were usually the owners, e.g. the Iglesia del Flor was owned by a New Yorker (Buckley, Spanish Republic, 99). ABC, 8 June 1932, said that alleged Jesuit property held by third persons was being seized in violation of the letter of the decree.

2 Sánchez, Reform and Reaction, 117-8, & Madariaga, Spain, 406; text of the law in DSCC, 2 Feb. 1932 App. Artic. 27 of the Constitution declared civil jurisdiction over cemeteries and forbade separation of burial-grounds for religious reasons.

3 In DSCC, 19 Jan. 1932. In Salamanca, 13,753 deaths were recorded since 1920, but only 26 civil funerals (El Debate, 24 June 1932).

Catholic opposition was based on the principle of 'one faith, one cemetery'. Aguirre argued that the law violated the spirit of the League of Nations, and contrasted the Spanish Republicans' attitude with Greek respect for Moslem cemeteries and Turkish respect for Christian and Jewish cemeteries.[1] The law in fact provided an outlet for the unsatisfied passions of anti-clerical town councillors: if it were more difficult to laicize the living, at least the dead could be secularized. Cemeteries were taken over, and many municipalities prohibited the appearance of the Cross at burials; in some municipalities taking the Viaticum through the streets, as well as use of the Cross at burials, was banned by a strict interpretation of Article 27 as public demonstrations of religion which only the government could authorize.[2] In Barcelona, Ventosa Calvell reported, anti-clericals actually put up a barrier between Catholic and non-Catholic graves so that they could symbolically knock it down.[3]

The divorce law, implementing Article 43, was called by Catholics 'one insult more to the Church'.[4] The Basque Nationalist

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1 Aguirre, DSCC, 19 Jan., & Gómez Rojí & Lamamié, DSCC, 13 & 15 Jan. 1932.

2 Ortiz de Solórzano, DSCC, 19 July 1932; El Debate, 22 June 1932, cited other examples.

3 J. Camba, Haciendo de República (Madrid, 1934), 206-7.

4 Guallar, DSCC, 3 Feb. 1932.

Leizaola marshalled statistics to demonstrate that the crime rate among divorced and widowed Germans was double the average. Divorce, he concluded, stimulated crime, juvenile delinquency and suicide. Therefore, if divorce were introduced into Spain, the majority in the Cortes would be responsible for 4,500 deaths a year. The majority, however, was not deterred and passed the law on 25 February by 260 votes to 23.[1]

The temporalities of the Bishop of Segovia were suspended following his Pastoral of 30 March, in which he condemned civil marriage as blatant concubinage. Fr. Guallar here found further proof that in Spain there existed, 'not the free Church in the free State, but the oppressed Church in the oppressor-State'. Bishop Pérez Platero had been denied the right to defend marriage as a Sacrament, while the propagation of other views went unhindered.[2] The reduction of the ecclesiastical budget from sixty-six to twenty-nine million pesetas was also strongly opposed by the Catholics.[3]

The Episcopacy bewailed the 'absolute laicism' of the Constitution, that 'juridical outrage against the Church'. The Bishops protested against the unilateral termination of the Concordat by the Republic, towards which they had carefully avoided any act of

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1 Leizaola, DSCC, 8 Sept. 1931 & 3 Feb. 1932; & DSCC, 25 Feb. 1932.

2 In DSCC, 17 June 1932; & El Debate, 12 June 1932.

3 DSCC, 30 March 1932.

hostility. The grievances against each religious clause were listed. Catholics were urged to obey the constituted power, but to do their utmost to bring about a change in the laws. Catholic Action was to be reinvigorated and Catholics were to found schools. 'Religious reconquest' was to be 'the totalitarian ideal' of the faithful. While the Church could not identify itself with any political party, a priori abstention and opposition were declared 'irreconcilable with love of Religion and Country': it was 'almost treason' to upset the social order in the hope that something better might follow. In such times 'union, or at least common practical action, is an unavoidable obligation for all Catholics, whatever be the party to which they belong'.[1] Within this framework Catholics embarked on a determined and passionate revisionist campaign: 'Purify us by persecution and the victory is ours!'[2]

ii. The revisionist campaign

The results of the elections of June 1931 were considered by the leaders of Acción Nacional sufficiently encouraging to justify the electoral organization being turned into a permanent body. Monthly subscriptions were demanded to cover the expenses of offices,

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1 Declaración colectiva del Episcopado español (Madrid, 1932). The Declaration was dated 20 Dec. 1931.

2 Gil Robles, DSCC, 8 Oct. 1931.

electoral organization and propaganda.[1] The new phase was inaugurated with a dinner on 12 July at which its President, Herrera, outlined his plans. The general aim was the creation of 'a great, profoundly Christian nation', to be achieved by winning the working-class to the social-Catholic programme by legal means. Military victories never solved any political problem.

Acción Nacional was not a political party, though it could be the midwife for one. Meanwhile its candidates, when elected, retained their independence within the framework of its fundamental principles. Herrera took as his model the Belgian Union Catholique, an amalgam of trade unions, agrarians, bourgeois and Catholic associations which formed one parliamentary bloc although each section independently defended its particular interests. In Spain, the agrarian wing already existed, as did the Catholic associations. The election of Dimas de Madariaga, he hoped, would mark the beginning of a Catholic workers' movement created by the workers themselves. Conservatives could help in this indispensable task by atoning for the sins of injustice they had committed.[2] Territorially the first priority was consolidation in the Castiles to give Acción Nacional a solid basis.[3]

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1 El Debate, 4 July 1931. Subscription rates were 1 pta. for students, workers & employees; 5 ptas. minimum; 10 ptas. ordinary; 50 ptas. special; & 1,000 for 'guardian members'.

2 El Debate, 14 July 1931.

3 Herrera, El Debate, 21 July 1931.

It was not until October 1931 that Acción Nacional really got under way with the passing of the anti-clerical clauses of the Constitution and the withdrawal of the Catholic deputies; Article 26 was the turning-point. The movement for withdrawal from the Cortes was initiated by the Basque-Navarrese, whom El Debate originally publicly asked not to withdraw.[1] At a meeting of the Basque-Navarrese and Agrarian minorities at which some other Catholic deputies were present, Gil Robles argued in favour of staying, as did Royo Villanova and Martínez de Velasco.[2] A majority of Agrarians, however, favoured withdrawal while the Constitution was being debated, and only Royo Villanova actually stayed on in the Cortes. The Alfonsine Sáinz Rodrígues and the Traditionalist Lamamié de Clairac claimed credit for the withdrawal.[3]

The manifesto issued by the deputies who retired declared that the views of the country and the Cortes had diverged: the 'neutral masses' who had voted for the Republic in April and June had not voted for anti-clericalism. The deputies took no responsibility for the Constitution and raised the standard of revision within the

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1 El Debate, 14 Oct. 1931.

2 El Debate, 15 Oct. 1931.

3 El Debate, 15 & 17 Oct. 1931; Sáinz Rodríguez, El Debate, 1 Nov. & Lamamié, El Debate, 20 Oct. & 21 Nov. 1931. The latter said that a minority of Agrarians had opposed collaboration from the start, but the majority had only been won over by the passage of Artic. 26.

law even before it was passed. The Basque-Navarrese withdrew to a man, while the recalcitrance of Royo Villanova among the Agrarians was compensated by the withdrawal of Ayatś, elected as a Liberal Rightist for Gerona. Royo Villanova nevertheless signed the manifesto, as did the Catalan nationalist Carrasco, the Lliga deputies, four Catholic Regionalists from Galicia and the Right Republican Gregorio Arranz.[1]

The effect of this on the organization of Acción Nacional was immediate. In July the provisional statutes had been drawn up for this 'politico-social organization' for 'the defence of the principles of Religion, Country, Family, Order, Work and Property'. Its task was two-fold: to set up branches and to be the link between regional and provincial groups accepting its fundamental principles. Local groups were semi-autonomous: the central body controlled the choice of candidates, electoral alliances and national policy. A deliberative assembly was to be elected by all members to approve the political programme and elect a finance and an executive committee, the latter being the initiator of policy.[2]

Elections were held in July and August for the deliberative assembly. Those elected included Gil Robles, Madariaga and others with a similar political outlook, the liberal agrarian Martínez de Velasco, and Alfonsines with a penchant for conspiracy such as

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1 El Debate, 17 Oct. 1931.

2 El Debate, 18 July 1931.

Vallellano and Juan Pujol.[1] The assembly did not meet to elect the executive committee until 17 October. Most of its ten members were Herreristas; three were prominent Alfonsines, one a Traditionalist and one, Ramón Bergé, had been a co-founder of Maurismo in 1913. Gil Robles became its President in November.[2]

Acción Nacional was now ready to undertake the revisionist campaign which El Debate announced on 15 October as the answer to Azaña's vision of a laicist State 'with all its consequences'.[3] The first meeting was held at Ledesma on 18 October. 'Many are asking what is happening in Madrid,' said Gil Robles, 'when will a General arise to bring the present state of affairs to an end? And to those who ask the answer must be that salvation lies in the exertions of all, in citizenship. We have to find salvation by ourselves, and not wait for a Messiah who will not come.'[4]

The first of the big rallies which were to be a feature of the

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1 El Debate, 29 July & 7 Aug. 1931.

2 El Debate, 18 Oct. & 18 Nov. 1931; & Monge, AP, 169. The Executive Committee consisted of: J.M. Gil Robles Quiñones de León, D. de Madariaga Almendros, C. Martín Álvarez, J. Medina Togores, C. Flá, C. Tornos Laffitte, Conde de Vallellano, A. Goicoechea Cosculluela, Conde de Rodezno, R. Bergé. Martínez de Velasco joined in Apr. 1932. Herrera stood down because Gil Robles was a deputy whereas he himself had not been elected (according to Monge, AP, 165-7). Buckley (Spanish Republic, 109) says that Herrera realized he was a poor speaker and not the man for the moment as Gil Robles clearly was. Arrarás (HSRE I, 233-4) suggests as the main reason friction within the committee between Herrera and the Monarchists.

3 El Debate, 15 Oct. 1931.

4 El Debate, 20 Oct. 1931.

campaign took place, despite Socialist disapproval, at Palencia on 8 November: 22,000 people were present at this 'new Covadonga', as were twenty-six deputies. If the meeting proved that the campaign had support, it also drew attention to the heterogeneity of the campaigners. The liberal Martínez de Velasco disclaimed any anti-Republican motives. On the other hand, the Carlist Beúnza believed the government was run by 'a bunch of Masons' against whom 'all means, legal and illegal', were licit.[1] While Gil Robles stressed that the campaign did not involve the question of régime, Sáinz Rodríguez, a member of the same organization, advocated a programme of anti-parliamentarist 'integral nationalism' inspired by the Golden Century. Traditionalists emphasized that their participation in Acción Nacional was circumstantial: God and Country they would defend with others, but they remained 'representative Monarchists'.[2] The Herrerista Medina Togores described Acción Nacional as a Rightist movement 'within the law and within the Republic'.[3] Clearly an effort had to be made to define Acción Nacional more closely.

On 3 December the Deliberative Assembly met, confirmed Gil

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1 El Debate, 10 Nov. 1931.

2 El Debate, 22 Oct. (Gil Robles), 12 Nov. (Sáinz Rodríguez), & 21 & 29 Nov. 1931 (Lamamié & Beúnza).

3 El Debate, 1 Dec. 1931.

Robles as leader, and approved a much more detailed programme.[1] Acción Nacional was not a political party, nor a federation of groups: it sought 'to establish a formula of comprehension and a bond of union between citizens of diverse ideology, who, whether attached or not to other parties, have the same opinions on some urgent and capital problems and on the solutions to be applied. The programme of Acción Nacional is, then, "circumstantial", like the union to which it aspires; "minimal", as it is the product of a real compromise between political ideas and positions...; simply "affirmative" concerning fundamental ideas and "defensive" regarding threatened sentiments and institutions. Finally, Acción Nacional reiterates its respect for the prevailing legality and its aim of obedience to the constituted power. Acción Nacional respects in its members not only the conviction which each person holds regarding the form of government, but also the freedom to defend his ideal outside its organization.'

The programme was 'minimal' on religious matters in order to overcome differences between those for and against separation of Church and State. All were to uphold the 'liberty and dignity' of the Church and recognition for its personality, defend the right of the Orders to exist and teach, and agitate for maintenance of the ecclesiastical budget and the principle of settlement by concordat. The Nation, it was believed, was threatened by international

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1 Monge, AP, 169 & 185.

Socialism and extremist separatism. Spanish unity was 'perpetual and indestructible'. The Family was the basis of social organization. The principle of private property was reaffirmed, and extension of ownership to as many people as possible was desirable. The common good was supreme, but any expropriation must be compensated. Economic individualism was declared 'destructive of the sources of wealth, and thus as noxious as true Communism'.

Under the heading of 'Work', Christian spirit was to replace class warfare; the good of all depended on inter-class solidarity. Workers nevertheless had a right to the family wage, shares, social security, cheap housing and technical education. The principle of Authority should be strengthened to keep order, but laws must be equitably applied. With regard to regional autonomy, something more than administrative decentralization was necessary, although the Constitution was condemned for its federalism. Control over languages, education, public order and the fiscal system ought to be kept in central hands. Liberty of education was demanded because the 'single school' was 'really no more than Communism applied to education': laicist claims for neutrality were hypocrisy. In matters of agrarian reform, utopian demagogy had to be avoided and irrigation was the proper way to create smallholdings. Rural wages ought to be higher than they had been in the past. Finally, the Constitution was, of course, to be revised.[1]

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1 El Debate, 6 Dec. 1931.

The phraseology of the new programme did not, in fact, settle differences about forms of government. Probably it was only intended as a transitory compromise, for almost immediately Monarchists and 'accidentalists', as those like Herrera and Gil Robles were termed, set about working for the future. Herrera's El Debate now called for the formation of a political party and Acción Nacional was clearly intended to develop into that party: 'The political and social doctrines of this party must be derived from the fundamental principles of the doctrine of the Church... We speak of a party analogous to the Belgian Catholic Union, to the German Centre, to the Czechoslovak People's Party, to the Christian Social Party of Austria, or to the Catholic parties of Holland or Switzerland. All this, clearly, with the necessary adaptation to Spanish needs.' The Encyclicals were to become more than the mere expressions of pious sentiments.[1]

The leadership of Acción Nacional began to lay increasing stress on the concept of 'accidentalism', whereas previously the emphasis had been upon 'inhibition' of convictions regarding forms of government. In practice, accidentalism meant that the movement or party would be in the Republic, but not of it. Herrera found an 'infallible guide: the great Leo XIII'. The situation in France in the 1890s, he argued, was 'identical' with that in Spain

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1 El Debate, 10 Dec. 1931.

in the 1930s. Catholics must therefore 'fight to improve the legislation within the established Constitution', although he himself was very critical of this Constitution.[1] Herrera and Gil Robles found their blueprint for future development in Lucía's Derecha Regional Valenciana, which the caudillo of the revisionists proclaimed a model for the rest of Spain.[2]

As part of the organization of the Right at a local level, which was stimulated by Acción Nacional's campaign, the opportunity was taken to form women's organizations, a youth movement and a workers' party. The first women's organization was founded in Salamanca in October 1931.[3] The central organization (Asociación Femenina de Acción Nacional) formed its first general purposes' committee in Madrid on 17 December under the presidency of Mercedes Fernández Villaverde. Membership was for those over eighteen, and was divided into three categories: honorary (appointed by the committee), active and followers who gave moral support. The monthly subscription was 25 céntimos, but the executive committee could excuse working-class women from payment.

The general procedure for the formation of provincial organizations was as follows. First, an organizing committee was created,

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1 Herrera, Obras, 25-40 (speech in Valencia, 21 Dec. 1931); also El Debate, 5 Apr. 1932.

2 Gil Robles (visiting the DRV) El Debate, 5 Apr. 1932. Herrera praised the party in his speech of 21 Dec. 1931.

3 El Debate, 25 Oct. 1931.

which then drew up the statutes defining the organization as political, though not necessarily as Catholic. Links were then to be forged with the local male organization, and branches set up in the pueblos. Women's organizations were divided into functional sections for cultural activities, checking of the electoral roll and propaganda. Close links were established with Madrid,[1] which would seem to indicate that the accidentalists planned to tie provincial organization as much as possible to the centre in case the politically heterogeneous male organizations should choose to be dissident.

The decision to create a youth movement was taken in mid-October 1931, and the first Juventud de Acción Nacional appeared a month later in Cuenca.[2] The central organization of the same name was formed in February 1932 under the presidency of José María Valiente. Membership was open to those between the ages of sixteen and thirty-five. The movement was described as having 'autonomy within the superior organism' of Acción Nacional.[3]

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1 Monge, AP, 205-12. The President soon joined the executive committee of Acción Nacional.

2 El Debate, 20 Oct. & 22 Nov. 1931. On 2 Dec. the paper reported the creation of a Juventud de Unión Regional de Derechas at Santiago de Compostela with 400 members, mostly students.

3 La Época, 22 Feb. 1932, & Monge, AP, 223. The executive committee consisted of J.M. Valiente Soriano, J.M. Pérez de Laborda, G. Santiago Castiella, A. Parrondo, J.R. Prieto Noriega, M. Serrano Mendicute, A. Bermúdez Cañete, A. Crespi de Valldaura, L. Doussinague, J. García Val, V. Pérez de Laborda, M. Palacios Amores, the Marqués de Navarrés, T. de la Cerda & J. López Vázquez. Valiente, like Serrano Mendicute a member of the original Acción Nacional committee, was President of the Juventud Española Católica and the law-partner of Gil Robles. Bermúdez Cañete was at this time also a 'triumvir' of the JONS.

Its manifesto elaborated the programme of the parent organization, but conveyed an impression of urgency and energy, a dynamism tending to extremism. 'We are the future and we must prevent the materialist civilization of Moscow from replacing a spiritual civilization twenty centuries old... We go forth to preach the justice and the love which flow from the Gospel and the Encyclicals of the Popes, convinced that Catholic social doctrine alone can mollify frenzy below and bridle egoism above. We want the true spirit of Christ to renovate completely the present society, certain that only thus will a better world be attained... We are men of the Right... We shall obey the legitimate orders of authority; but we shall not tolerate the impositions of the irresponsible rabble. The valour necessary to assure ourselves respect will never be wanting. We declare war on Communism, as on Masonry,... now allied with a sectarian and exploiting bourgeoisie which, in denying the traditions of Spain, denies Spain itself.' The group expressed the desire to be the vanguard of the Right in fraternal union with other youth movements defending the same ideals.[1] 'We must forge new men', said Valiente, 'a new authentic youth, happy, optimistic, in short, Spanish, and not like that other youth, sad and sour, stuffed with Russian novels and fitting offspring of the anarchic generation of ninety-eight'.[2]

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1 La Época, 24 Feb. 1932.

2 El Debate, 28 June 1932.

Whereas the youth and women's organizations soon flourished, the workers' party made little headway. Since 1927 Dimas de Madariaga had wanted to add a political wing to the CNSCO but had been opposed by those who believed Catholic unionism should be outside politics. His idea was given new life by Herrera on 12 July when he stressed the need for a workers' component for Acción Nacional. In December 1931 a committee was set up by Madariaga with a railwayman and a priest. Social propaganda was a prominent feature of Acción Nacional's campaign in early 1932, but progress was hardly spectacular; not until 30 June was Acción Obrerista properly constituted as an autonomous 'Christian Social Workers' Party'.[1]

There was indeed little that could be done, given the semi-revolutionary situation exploited by the CNT and the monopolistic tendencies of the UGT with Largo Caballero at the Ministry of Labour. Catholic social doctrine permitted no appeals to violence or immoderate solutions. As Madariaga himself said: 'The mass of the workers is separated from us'. A verbal onslaught was nevertheless launched on the conservaduros (social reactionaries). Herrera saw the contemporary situation as a just punishment for past injustices by employers and called for 'the redemption of the proletariat'.[2] Fr. Guallar, a scourge of the conservaduros, hoped for 'the embrace

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1 Monge, AP, 313-6.

2 Speeches of 21 Dec. 1931 (Obras, 40) & 21 Feb. 1932 (Arrarás, HSRE I, 269-70).

of worker and employer in the arms of the first worker, Jesus Christ'.[1] Gil Robles himself attacked the selfishness of the conservative classes, 'who passed the time idly warming themselves in the rays of the sun of prosperity, without a thought for their other brothers in Christ who endured hunger and were forsaken'.[2]

While these efforts were being made to develop Acción Nacional, which on 29 April 1932 had to change its name to Acción Popular,[3] the Monarchists of both dynastic branches were not inactive. Though it was clear from the first that Jaimists were active in Acción Nacional solely for the defence of religion and society,[4] the case of the Alfonsines, who had no organization of their own, was rather more confusing. Acción Nacional demanded of its members inhibition regarding forms of government, but it did not become clear for some

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1 El Debate, 28 June 1932. Guallar was confused by the terminology of Right and Left: if the Left attacked Country, Religion, Family, etc., he was a Rightist; if the Right meant oligarchies of economic interests and plutocrats with souls padlocked against Reform, he was a Leftist. The present human condition was the result of 'the pagan Renaissance' and the Reformation which produced capitalism, so that 'modern society is like those old prints of the Last Judgment, in which only a chosen few exulted in Glory while the vast majority vegetated and were lost in the darkness of the tomb and misery. For us to be able to call ourselves civilized, these miseries must disappear...' (DSCC, 7 Oct. 1931).

2 La Epoca, 23 Feb. 1932.

3 In accordance with the Decree of 21 April 1932, prohibiting use of the word 'nacional' by other than State organizations. (Monge, AP, 183).

4 Rodezno, El Debate, 26 July 1931.

time whether Alfonsines had really accepted accidentalism or were using that organization for their own purposes. The programme of 3 December gave rise to a paradoxical situation: Monarchists, who, as members of Acción Nacional, were bound to obey the Republic as the constituted power, could also, as Monarchists, make speeches against the established régime. Similarly, although Acción Nacional declared its raison d'être to be the organization of a legal revisionist campaign, some of its fervently Monarchist members at the same time indulged in conspiracy.

As a result of meetings between Traditionalists and Alfonsines in France, the two exiled Monarchs, Jaime III and Alfonso XIII, decided upon joint action. In September 1931, they agreed in a pact that new Constituent Cortes should decide who was to be King. It was also agreed that Alfonsines and Traditionalists should work together for Religion and Country against the Republic. Jaime, however, died early in October, and was succeeded by his octogenarian uncle Alfonso, who, to avoid confusion, took the title of Alfonso Carlos I. He decided that cooperation between Alfonsines and Carlists should continue, but, although retaining dynastic union as an objective, he would have no truck with the 'liberal' pact made by his nephew with Alfonso. Apart from the question of persons, the acceptance of Carlist-Traditionalist principles was the issue at stake. The two branches remained distinct, if on amicable terms; the only positive result was the decision to combine their forces of

propaganda.[1]

The outcome of these contacts and negotiations was to be seen in two manifestos. On 6 January Alfonso Carlos issued his attack on the 'atheist Republic' with its 'illegitimate' Constitution. Freedom of religion and the anti-religious clauses were denounced and the Carlist credo re-stated: traditional Cortes, regionalism, agricultural protection, industrial harmony, public works. His cousin Alfonso could succeed him as King, as he ought under the law of hereditary succession, but only if he first accepted Traditionalist principles.[2] Alfonso XIII's manifesto appeared on 23 January. In it, he called upon all Monarchists to unite and work for new Constituent Cortes. While stating that the 'fundamental principles' of Alfonso Carlos and himself were the same, he once again offered to be King if asked by the national will.[3] In Spain in early 1932, prominent Traditionalists campaigned jointly with prominent Alfonsines.[4]

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1 See APPENDIX I.

2 HCE, I-4, 460-2. It was drafted by Bilbao Eguía, who was at this time detained at Navia de Suavia under the Defence Law (Galindo, Los partidos, 142).

3 Habla el Rey, 340-3. It was drawn up by Vallellano, approved by La Cierva and the ex-Ministers of the Dictatorship, and signed at Mürren (HCE, I-4, 462). Alfonso himself, questioned later by reporters in the Near East, denied knowledge of it (Arrarás, HSRE I, 246).

4 Traditionalists, e.g. Rodezno, Bilbao, Lamamié, Beúnza, Chicharro; Alfonsines, e.g. Vallellano, Sáinz Rodríguez (HCE, I-4, 463; Galindo, Los partidos, 146-8).

Probably the most important reperoussion was the apparent conversion of Alfonsine leaders to a neo-Traditionalist doctrinal position. On 15 December 1931 there appeared in Madrid the first number of Acción Española, a fortnightly review of culture, economics and politics defending 'the most substantive and traditional concepts of our Country'. Its contributors included Alfonsines like Calvo Sotelo and Maeztu, who with the Integrist Pradera was its leading figure, and well-known names from Acción Nacional - Pemán, Goicoechea, Sáinz Rodríguez, the Marqués de Lozoya.[1]

Maeztu's first editorial sketched the neo-Traditionalist ideology now adopted by most Alfonsines. He chose Balmes, Donoso and Menéndez Pelayo as its spiritual ancestors, and outlined the Traditionalist interpretation of Spanish history. The 'symphony' of the 'Hispanic ideal' of the Golden Age had been interrupted in 1700 by 'two hundred years of the Revolution', a period of 'foreignization' during which the 'Anti-Country' prevailed over Spanish

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1 Advertisement in El Debate, 16 Dec. 1931. The 'prime mover' was Vegas Latapié, who had planned to found a cultural review 'with religious and patriotic missionary characteristics'. In 1928-30 he obtained the collaboration of Rodezno, Maeztu, Lozoya and Quintanar, but could get no funds. Acción Española was founded on 100,000 ptas. originally given by the Marqueses de Pelayo for Orgaz's plot (E. Vegas Latapié, Escritos políticos, [Madrid, 1940], 8-12; & his 'Maeztu y Acción Española', ABC, 2 Nov. 1952). Vegas had wanted to call the review Contrarrevolución; Maeztu preferred Hispanidad (L. Aguirre Prado, Ramiro de Maeztu, [Madrid, 1959], 18).

Tradition. Since 1900, however, the failure of 'pagan humanism and naturalism' had become apparent. 'The world has come full circle and is now with us, for its better spirits are everywhere seeking principles analogous to or identical with those which we upheld in our great centuries'. The Thomist common good had ousted theories of the popular will. Spain must therefore take up her half-completed historical mission in these propitious times.[1] In February 1932, there developed from the review 'cultural society absolutely free from all political parties, past and present', the intellectual manifestation of the Alfonsine-Carlist rapprochement.[2]

Monarchists within Acción Nacional began to air views very different from the accidentalism of Herrera and Gil Robles. 'I was and am a Monarchist', declared Sáinz Rodríguez; 'the Republic is a régime of denationalization incompatible with the tradition and future of Spain... Today the State is our enemy, and if the Right does not change its mentality we are lost... Either Russia or a just society founded upon traditional doctrines'.[3] Beúnza declared that Traditionalists were 'abolitionists', not 'revisionists'; when other countries were adopting corporativism, Spain must return to its traditional system and abandon 'the French system adopted in the

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1 Acción Española: antología (XVIII, no. 89), (Burgos, 1937), 45-51.

2 El Debate, 27 Apr. 1932; Aguirre Prado, Maeztu, 18; Vegas Latapié (conversation).

3 ABC, 29 March 1932.

Cortes of Cádiz'.[1] Monarchists of both lines preached counter-revolution, basing their programme on Spanish Traditionalism and encouraged by other 'counter-revolutionary' successes abroad. Luca de Tena (editor of ABC) was exceptional in declaring himself 'more liberal than ever'.[2]

Despite the formula of 3 December, it was becoming increasingly difficult to fit such authoritarian Monarchism into the accidentalist, legalist framework of Acción Nacional. Goicoechea attempted to do so by defining it as 'a federation of parties respecting the autonomy of each one of them for the defence of its respective ideals'. He envisaged Acción Nacional, Acción Española, independents and old-style Monarchists, all forming one grand coalition: 'into the vast national ambit all can be fitted, as all the colours of the rainbow are found in a single sunbeam'.[3] The inner contradictions of Acción Nacional's programme however proved too much. The divergence increased until the government issued summonses against Goicoechea and Vallellano for attacks on the régime at the Acción Popular meeting at Gijón on 16 July.[4]

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1 El Debate, 5 & 12 Jan. 1932.

2 El Debate, 5 Apr. 1932.

3 El Debate, 5 Apr. 1932.

4 La Epoca, 5 Aug. 1932. At a dinner on 11 June for Goicoechea, Pradera and Sáinz Rodríguez, there was much Monarchist fervour with attacks on the Republic and toasts to the King (L.M. Ansón, Acción Española, [Saragossa, 1960], 104.

Gil Robles continued to develop the accidentalist viewpoint. The authoritarian Monarchism of the Dictatorship he denounced as a façade behind which no problems had been solved, so that on 12 April, not only the Spanish Monarchy fell, but a whole social and political system whose foundations had rotted away and which had no vitality left. The only sure way to re-make Catholic Spain was by a lengthy civil struggle, the maxims for which were 'first, elimination of the problem relating to the form of government; second, obedience to the constituted power; and third, fight within legality.' Gil Robles remained convinced of the correctness of the Kulturkampf tactics: 'If examination of one year's activity shows us the splendid results of the present moment, what else must we do but follow the same road?'[1]

The revisionist campaign had in fact provided the stimulus for the creation of a nation-wide and increasingly strong political organization under the banner of Acción Nacional, even though the campaign was often suspended. The real bugbear of the revisionists was the Defence Law of the Republic, called by Herrera 'a law of defence against the legitimate manifestations of public opinion'.[2] The campaign was suspended almost as soon as it had started until the Constitution had been passed. It was suspended again while the

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1 El Debate, 16 June 1932.

2 El Debate, 5 Apr. 1932.

Jesuits were dissolved, a ban lifted on 4 February by the Minister of the Interior, Casares Quiroga, subject to authorisation of meetings by provincial governors.[1] In mid-June, Gil Robles said 61 meetings had been banned, while the DRV, which planned 44 meetings on 26 June, had 19 of them banned.[2] Provincial branches of Acción Popular were closed from time to time, often on slender grounds.[3]

Much of the pressure against the campaign came from the Socialists, the largest group in Azaña's government. They originally said it would be a failure because Catholics were in a minority and because the Civil Guard would no longer protect Rightist speakers. Their attitude changed when events belied the prophecy. They then advocated strike action to sabotage a religious campaign 'distracting' the proletariat from its material aims. They also denounced it as a Monarchist campaign in preparation for an armed rising. The Socialist Youth declared itself the vanguard of the Republic and proclaimed violence obligatory. Those who had collaborated with the Dictator - except for the Socialists - had no right to claim

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1 El Socialiste, 14 Nov. 1931, & ABC, 28 Nov. 1931 & 4 Feb. 1932.

2 El Debate, 14 & 28 June 1932. An AP meeting on 22 May was banned while the CNT - the title was now illegal - was allowed to hold meetings to launch a 'week of revolutionary agitation' (El Debate, 24 May 1932).

3 The Oviedo branch was closed & fines imposed as members had circulated a sonnet lampooning the Leftist Victoria Kent & had 'subversive postcards' (El Debate, 18 June 1932). On 9 July it reported the Ávila branch had been closed for sixty days.

Republican liberty.[1] Violence frequently occurred at meetings. El Debate was suspended for sixty-six days for criticising the doings of the Cortes and the prevalence of disorder; Royo Villanova, an opponent of the Dictatorship, noted that Primo de Rivera had never imposed such a penalty. Gil Robles asked why the law was applied one-sidedly: 'is it that the government has one standard for its political friends and another for political enemies?' 'Obviously!' was Azaña's truculent reply.[2]

Despite these difficulties Acción Popular extended its organization at a rapid pace. The DRV was chosen as the model because it was the best organized and most dynamic of the provincial groups. It was democratically run and had sections to look after legal matters, to found Catholic schools and to foster local culture. It had many working-class members and was therefore a good advertisement for social-Catholic ideals; workers and employers appeared side by side on its platforms. It also admirably represented traditional theories of regionalism: members were busy drawing up a statute of autonomy for the Valencian region which would give parity to Valencian and make Catholicism the official religion of a

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1 El Socialista, 20 Oct., 8, 10 & 12 Nov. 1931, & 19 & 27 Jan. 1932. Leaflets circulated before a meeting in Lugo read: 'The clericals, captained by a group of idle women, are trying to go against the Republic, brought about with the blood of the people; you must not tolerate their wild cavemen's cries... Crush the enemies without hesitation or pity!' (El Debate, 3 Jan. 1932).

2 DSCC, 9 Mar. 1932. El Debate was suspended 20 Jan.-25 Mar. 1932.

Valencian State 'within the unity of Spain'.[1] Lucía's DRV rejected separatist nationalism, but in other respects it was similar to the PNV and to Carrasco's small Unió Democràtica de Catalunya.

Elsewhere in Spain a marked acceleration in the creation of local Rightist groups was noticeable once the revisionist campaign got under way. More and more politically heterogeneous organizations appeared. In one province Alfonsine and Carlist Monarchists combined with Catholic farm-workers; in another 'accidentalist' social-Catholics joined forces with farmers and provincial notables who represented the 'old politics'. These subsidiary bodies of Acción Popular flourished in Old Castile and León, where the CNCA was strongest, though they also made progress in Galicia, Asturias, New Castile, Aragón and to a lesser extent in the south. By the summer of 1932 there were autonomous Rightist groups adhering to the 'fundamental principles' of Acción Popular in nearly every province outside Catalonia and the Basque Country.[2] Thanks to the initiative of Herrera, the stimulus of anti-clericalism and the seemingly boundless energy of Gil Robles, the Right was better organized than ever before.

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1 El Debate, 17 Nov. 1931 (report of DRV assembly).

2 For details of these groups see APPENDIX II.

iii. The Republic in difficulties

Azaña's government had the support of the Socialists but not of their Anarcho-Syndicalist rivals who declared that 'not one minute's truce' was possible with Republicans and Socialists who had abandoned revolutionary methods. The CNT provided a backcloth of disorder for the Republic which alienated conservative sections of society. Agitation by deed was constant, though violence was also used by local Socialists. Sporadic and particularly violent outbreaks brought notoriety to some hitherto remote and scarcely known pueblo. Notable in the first year of the Republic were the Anarchist rising in Seville in July 1931, and in 1932 the episodes at Castilblanco, in the Llobregat valley and at Villa de Don Fadrique. Not even deportation to Africa could still the turbulence.[1] The first eighteen months of the Republic provided a total of 400 dead, 3,000 injured, 30 general and 3,600 partial strikes.[2] These disorders were mainly the work of Anarcho-Syndicalists carrying on a vendetta with the Socialists.

The Socialists were in fact the king-pin of the Republic: they had the largest parliamentary minority and they had the UGT behind them as a powerful bargaining-counter with the Republicans. Their

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1 104 revolutionaries were deported to Spanish Guinea in Feb. 1932 (Plá, HSRE II, 37). On the disorders, see Arrarás, HSRE I, 120-6, 186-93, 247-64, 293-4, 322-31 & 419-28.

2 Plá, HSRE II, 153, & V. Alba, Historia de la segunda República española (Mexico City, 1961), 147.

dilemma was whether to satisfy their revolutionary aspirations directly, or to consolidate the Republic and risk losing face with the revolutionary masses. The dilemma was resolved in favour of evolutionary tactics by the party's congress in July 1931.[1] The PSOE was to be the axis of the Republic, the consolidation of which was to be achieved by a social-democratic programme to carry through the bourgeois revolution from above.[2] The ultimate aim of full Socialism was not forgotten: no steps backward were permissible on the evolutionary road. The disorders of the CNT were condemned: parliamentary democracy was the means for the time being.[3]

The Socialists in the government were to stay there to keep the Republic to the left and protect it against the conservative forces led by Lerroux.[4] All means were justifiable to keep the 'historic' Republicans out of power or to prevent a dissolution of the Cortes. Largo Caballero in November 1931 announced that the Socialist Party would switch to revolutionary methods if excluded from power; a dissolution would oblige it 'to proceed to civil war'.[5]

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1 Victory of Largo Caballero & Prieto over Besteiro, who wanted the party out of the government, but not revolution (El Socialista, 1, 2, 9, 11 & 12 July 1931).

2 El Socialista, 18 July 1931.

3 El Socialista, e.g. 23, 25, 26, 29 July, 6 Sept., 18 Oct., 17 Nov. & 1 Dec. 1931; & 10 & 22 Jan. 1932.

4 El Socialista, e.g. 9, 13, 19, 20 Aug., 21 Oct., 4, 28 Nov. & 8 Dec. 1931; & 15 July 1932.

5 El Socialista, 24 Nov. 1931.

'Rightist domination' of the Republic would mean frustration of the revolution.[1] The Republic, for the Socialists, was no more than a means to their end. Largo Caballero warned the proletariat not to be dazzled by its myth; Socialists aided the Republic solely for their own interests.[2] As Cordero said, 'the Republic is accidental and Socialism fundamental'.[3]

Perennial disorder and the promise of progressive socialization did at least as much in the first year of the Republic to bring about economic crisis ~~than~~ as the longer-term effects of the world depression. The worsening of the situation in May 1931 was not, as the government claimed, solely due to the withdrawal of capital by anti-Republicans, which totalled only some 70,000,000 pesetas.[4] Carner, Minister of Finance in 1932, admitted that early Republican measures had produced a partial economic collapse and a fall in the revenue.[5] On the London market the peseta fell from 45¼ to the £

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1 El Socialista, 3 June 1932; Rightist domination signified government by Lerroux.

2 El Socialista, 4 Feb. 1932.

3 El Socialista, 19 Nov. 1931. The Socialist Youth demanded 'the conquest of power by the revolutionary action of the masses' if bourgeois democrats should obstruct evolution (El Socialista, 16 Feb. 1932).

4 S. Canals, De cómo van las cosas de España (Madrid, 1933), 243-4.

5 In The Economist, 27 Feb. 1932.

in March to 54 in September 1931.[1] The cost of living index rose from 171.6 in 1930 to 175 in 1931, while industrial shares fell.[2]

The main attack on the government was made by Ventosa Calvell of the Lliga who voiced the discontents of industry. He painted a gloomy picture of everything falling: the peseta, gold reserves, savings, bank accounts, the volume of credit, the amount of trade. The assets of the Banco de España had fallen by a quarter, mortgages by a fifth; building in Madrid was down by a half, while an insurance company which paid out 362,000 pesetas in 1930, paid out 618,000 in 1931. The root cause was disorder.[3] Calvo Sotelo noted from exile that trade figures showed a fall in imports reflecting industrial collapse, since industry was dependent on foreign raw materials. Public expenditure had risen, but the bureaucracy swallowed up the rise while public works remained strangled and unemployment rose. Wages were rising fast, but the national cake was diminishing.[4] Gil Robles noted 60,000 unemployed in Madrid, increasing at the rate of 500 a day.[5] While the government blamed the

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1 The Economist, which noted a further 15% fall when the Jesuits were dissolved.

2 The Economist, 13 Feb. 1932, & 31 Oct. 1931. Base 100=1913 level.

3 ABC, 17 Jan. 1932.

4 J. Calvo Sotelo, La voz de un perseguido (Madrid, 1933), I, 55 & 152-5.

5 La Epoca, 15 Mar. 1932.

world crisis and the work of Calvo Sotelo the Right blamed disorder and lack of confidence brought about by incompetence and threats of socialization.

Such a situation led many who had voted for the Republic to complain that 'it is not this'.[1] Ortega Gasset spoke of the need to 'rectify' the Republic which after seven months had turned 'sad and sour'. He suggested the formation of a 'party of national breadth' to help 'nationalize' the new régime. The ideal of 'the Nation' was necessary to stir the masses, so 'Nation and Labour' was put forward as the slogan for a new democracy. The idea was, however, still-born.[2]

Nor was the Liberal Republican Right successful in exploiting the wave of disillusion. It became in August 1931 the Progressive Republican Party with a liberal-conservative programme.[3] Miguel Maura, who had left the group in July, also wanted a conservative Republic and revision of the Constitution, though he attacked Acción Nacional's campaign as dangerous for the Republic. He was in fact trying to recreate the old Conservative Party within the

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1 Cited in Arrarás, HSRE I, 228.

2 Ortega, El Debate, 6 Dec. 1931 & La Epoca, 5, 6 & 8 Feb. 1932. A basic reason for failure was the disdain of the 'Intellectuals in the Service of the Republic' for practical matters of organization (Conversation with Salvador de Madariaga).

3 El Debate, 4 Aug. 1931.

Republic but, though he gained the adherence of some Progressives, the Catholic masses were hostile to the man who, they believed, had let the conventos burn. Possibly he could lead a group of economic interests, but not the 'authentic' Catholic Right.[1]

Ortega, Maura, and the President's friends were in fact crushed between Acción Nacional and Lerroux's Radicals who sought to persuade the 'neutral masses' that they were the best hope for moderation. Lerroux opposed Socialist participation in the government, wanted a dissolution and preached tolerance, especially in religious matters.[2] He expected to succeed Alcalá-Zamora in October, but Socialists, Left Republicans and the Esquerra presented a united front against him. In December his ambition was again thwarted when Azaña chose Socialist partners, thereby rejecting Lerroux's view that conservatives could be attracted into the Republic if the Socialists were dropped.[3] His policy was one of opposition within the Republic which he hoped soon to govern.

If the 'authentic' Right shunned representation of industrial

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1 Maura's speeches in El Debate, 25 Oct. 1931 & 12 Jan. 1932; for criticisms, El Debate, 6 Aug., 27 Oct., 19, 20 Dec. 1931 & 24 May 1932. Apart from differences of temperament, Maura & Alcalá-Zamora disagreed over the feasibility of trying to create a Republican party from defenders of the Monarchy: only Maura thought it possible. (Conversation with Fernández Castillejo).

2 El Sol, 11 Feb. 1932.

3 Lerroux, Pequeña historia, 119-20 & 133-8. He promised: 'I will not die without leading a government, and I make it my life's aim to lead one' (ABC, 26 Aug. 1931).

interests, it was certainly eager to defend agriculture: 'the idea of God', said Royo Villanova, 'is something consubstantial with the peasant'.[1] The Castilian Agrarians were stalwart defenders of the wheat interest and complained that the cost of production had risen thirty per cent due to higher wages and shorter hours, while the minimum price-level was 47 pesetas per quintal compared with 54/55 pesetas for the cost of production. For Agrarians the wheat price was the main agricultural problem; they wanted it raised with government aid. Higher wages and land re-distribution were farcical if produce had to be sold at less than cost price. Tariffs should be maintained so that cheap foreign wheat would not undercut the livelihood of Castile. In this respect, Catalonia must not be allowed to disturb its traditional economic interdependence with Castile: Castilian wheat for Catalonia, Catalan manufactures for Castile.

If necessary urban food prices should be raised: ten céntimos on bread, calculated their chief spokesman Pedro Martín, would make another peseta a day possible for the land-worker. Without such measures, however, a forty to fifty per cent increase in rural wages and the import of 2,924,122 quintals of foreign wheat in 1932 were ridiculous, they argued, because higher wages and lower prices would cause a decrease in the area cultivated, and the bankruptcy of smallholders who could not pay their debts nor obtain credit.

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1 El Debate, 10 Nov. 1931.

The result was an increase in unemployment - seventy per cent of the unemployed were on the land - as public works schemes were inadequate to cope with this problem.[1]

The causes of unemployment were seen by the Right as a combination of the reduction of irrigation and public works schemes, the effects of the Law of Municipal Boundaries, the consequence of depressed prices for agricultural produce, the threat of Socialist legislation which caused uncertainty, falling land values and the virtual extinction of credit, and revolutionary demagogy which stirred up the rural masses with utopian promises. 600,000 unemployed were the result of retrenchment by the Berenguer government, which abandoned the Dictatorship's plans for irrigation and road and rail development; in September 1931, under 2,000 were employed by the Confederación del Ebro, compared with 24,000 under the Dictator.[2]

The Law of Municipal Boundaries was an attempt by Largo

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1 Martín, DSCC, 4 Aug. & 1 Sept. 1931 & 3 May 1932; & DSCC, 5, 6 & 7 Aug. 1931 (Calderón, Lamamié, Royo), & 6 Oct. 1931 (Madariaga). Wages were fixed at 5½ ptas. a day by Largo Caballero, & 11 ptas. at harvest-time; an 8 hour day was enforced (Ramos Oliveira, Politics, 340). Domingo's importation of wheat was largely the result of lobbying by millers and bakers who wanted a good profit-margin (Canals, Las cosas, 267). The wheat crop of 1931 was poor: 36,585,330 quintals compared with 39,925,575 in 1930 (El Debate, 3 Dec. 1931). El Socialista (6 Aug. 1931) accused Martín of being a wheat monopolizer seeking higher prices to increase his personal profit.

2 J. de Medina Togores, Un año de Cortes constituyentes (Madrid, 1932), 67, & F.E. Manuel, The Politics of Modern Spain (New York, 1938), 96.

Caballero to prevent the payment of starvation wages by rural employers who brought in outside labour to swamp the local market. Though the intention was excellent, in practice it was not a great success. In municipalities where there was little labour, farm-hands had to be taken on who knew nothing of agriculture; in municipalities with a big labour force, surplus numbers were billeted unofficially on farmers who often went bankrupt as a result. With the use of machinery strictly limited, the harvest was often held up because the traditional migration of labourers from Galicia to Castile and from the Levante to Andalusia was now prohibited.[1] In Seville it had the effect of reducing dramatically the amount of land cultivated by owners by January 1932.[2]

Apart from Anarchist agitation, great uncertainty was caused by Socialist actions. Decrees on 29 April and 6 August 1931 halted evictions of tenants - leases were notoriously short - while tenants could propose the immediate revision of leases and reduction of rents pending legislation.[3] Legislation did not come, so uncertainty upset the rural economic structure, as did the delay in drafting an agrarian reform law. Credit dried up and cultivation decreased

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1 Decree of 28 Apr., becoming law of 9 Nov. 1931. See El Socialista, 10 & 14 June 1932; El Debate, 1 July 1932 (& Madariaga in 28 June); & Plá, HSRE II, 70 & 73-5: in Seville in 1932 the law had to be set aside to get the crops in.

2 Governor of Seville, ABC, 14 Jan. 1932.

3 Plá, HSRE I, 132; Ramos, Politics, 340.

when Ministers said that nationalization of the land was the only solution to the agrarian problem.[1] At a local level Socialists encouraged the landless to adopt their own solutions.[2]

The solutions proposed by the Right to the agrarian problem were of a non-revolutionary, long-term nature. Faith was generally placed in irrigation as a solution, not only for the temporary absorption of the unemployed, but also to provide new viable smallholdings. Calvo Sotelo thought that the irrigation of a million and a half hectares was the answer. Maeztu also developed the ideas of Guadalhorce: the unirrigated land of the latifundios was suitable only for large-scale mechanized farming, while irrigated land was to be used to settle the landless and at the same time help the urban unemployment problem by expanding the internal market.[3] As for re-distribution, the model was that of the CNCA, which between 1917 and 1931 had bought and parcelled out 29,859 hectares among 9,849 smallholders: a modest achievement, but the only initiative of its kind at the time.[4]

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1 Largo Caballero, El Socialista, 9 July 1931.

2 E.g. in Salamanca in June 1932, 200 people led by their Mayor took over an estate, divided it up and registered the new properties with the government official (Manuel, Politics, 99).

3 Calvo Sotelo, En defensa propia, 147; R. de Maeztu, Un ideal sindicalista (Madrid, 1961), 336-7.

4 Gil Robles - who as its secretary-general had a hand in this - in ABC, 23 Apr. 1932.

Alongside such measures, concentration should be fixed upon price-maintenance, advantageous foreign trade treaties to assure export markets, maintenance of the closed economy in general, the abolition of the Law of Municipal Boundaries, the settlement of rent disputes by mixed juries, better credit facilities, and the organization of cooperatives for marketing and the mutual aid of smallholders and workers.[1] In general, the Right seemed much more concerned with the smallholder society of the northern half of Spain than with the thornier problems of the south. Furthermore the more vocal sections of the Right tended to be the more socially-minded; behind them lurked large numbers of defenders of the status quo.

Debates on the fourth draft of the Law of Bases for Agrarian Reform began in May 1932, simultaneously with debates on the Catalan Statute. The aim of the Minister of Agriculture, Marcelino Domingo, was to alleviate rural unemployment by the re-distribution of property and the rationalization of Spanish agriculture. El Debate pointed to ILO statistics showing that such re-parcellation led to increased unemployment, but at the same time condemning the draft as the only agrarian reform in Europe, except for Russia, to reject the idea of the smallholding.[2] The debates dragged on at a very slow pace. The Agrarians were accused of obstruction, though

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1 E.g. the programme of the Bloque Agrario of Salamanca, in El Debate, 1 Dec. 1931; also Alvarez Robles, El Debate, 4 May 1932.

2 El Debate, 17 June 1932.

Domingo himself thought their amendments justifiable.[1]

The law was to apply to Andalusia, Extremadura, and the provinces of Albacete, Ciudad Real, Salamanca and Toledo - the dry south - as well as to señoríos all over Spain. The Agrarians were in broad agreement as to the area of application, although Lamamié de Clairac and Casanueva, landowners in Salamanca, pleaded for the exclusion of their province.[2] The State was to give the Institute of Agrarian Reform 50,000,000 pesetas annually to carry out the reform; original hopes of settling 75,000 before the end of the year had been reduced to 25,000. Casanueva calculated that it would cost some 200,000,000 pesetas to create so many viable settlements in the remaining nine months, an amount which could not be spared from the unbalanced budget.[3]

Much heat was generated over the question of the señoríos which were to be expropriated without compensation; compensation was to be given for uncultivated or badly cultivated land, land capable of rapid irrigation, lands leased for more than twelve years and various

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1 Quoted in El Debate, 5 July 1932. The best summary of the draft's provisions, together with the Agrarians' amendments, set out in tabular form, is given by El Debate, 10 May 1932; this, together with the final text, in DSCC, 1 Oct. 1932 App., is the source of information used here, unless specifically cited.

2 DSCC, 5 July & 9 Aug. 1932; they said the type of soil was unsuited to intensive cultivation: its silicon content made it suitable only for pasture.

3 DSCC, 18 May 1932.

estates of more than a given area. Agrarians opposed wholesale expropriation of señoríos, which had legally ceased to exist in 1811, seeing in the proposal a political act aimed at the economic destruction of the Monarchist aristocracy. Señoríos cultivated in a model manner ought to be excluded, they argued. Similarly, size was no criterion for expropriation, as the quality of land varied. There was no provision for owners to cultivate leased lands to avoid expropriation, and landlords who had not increased the rent for thirty years were to be hard done by. The law was seen as a sop to revolutionary violence stirred up by electoral propaganda.[1] Methods of compensation were also attacked, objection being made to the idea of special agrarian debt bonds, disposable only at the rate of a tenth a year.[2] Particular annoyance was caused by the assessment of compensation according to the declared net taxable profit, always well below the real figure: Agrarians wanted expert valuation with recourse to the Supreme Court if necessary.[3] Common lands were to be reclaimed by 'simple presumption of their former existence': Agrarians preferred municipalities to prove their claims in the courts.[4]

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1 Casanueva, DSCC, 18 & 24 May 1932; & Rodezno, 19 July, who feared for the family señorío in Logroño, bought in the eighteenth century; also Guallar, 28 June & 26 July; Rodezno, 22 July; Casanueva, 5 Aug. (all DSCC, 1932).

2 Casanueva, DSCC, 18 May 1932.

3 Martínez de Velasco, DSCC, 2 Sept. 1932; & Ramos Oliveira, Politics, 341.

4 Martínez de Velasco & Lamamié, DSCC, 31 Aug. & 1 Sept. 1932.

The main objection of Agrarians was, however, to the law's 'Socialism'. This was common ground upon which the minority could unite, keeping a divergence of views latent. There were two concepts of property: that of the social-Catholics who advocated the smallholder ideal as conducive to the common good, and who were prepared to accept expropriation with compensation if necessary,[1] and whose aim was the law's technical amelioration and its approximation to their ideal; and that of the liberal agrarians, who would use any argument to safeguard the unmolested enjoyment of private property. The law provided for the settlement of poor workers and peasants, who were to form a community on each estate and themselves decide whether to work it collectively or individually. The land was to be held in perpetuity, those settled paying an annual land-tax to the State. The formula was, in fact, a compromise between the bourgeois Republican preference for smallholdings and the Socialist collective ideal.[2] The Agrarian position was based on the creation of smallholdings pure and simple. The law, they argued, made the beneficiaries of reform 'serfs in the service of a feudal lord - the State'.[3]

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1 E.g. Gil Robles, ABC, 23 Apr. 1932.

2 El Socialista, 11 & 24 May 1932, said the law was not Socialist, but the minimum they could support as a start. It was a bourgeois law, whereas their reform would bear 'great similarity to the Russian agrarian revolution' (El Socialista, 18 June 1932).

3 Madariaga, El Debate, 28 June 1932; also DSCC, 17 & 18 May (Fanjul & Casanueva) & 6 July 1932 (Guallar).

Yet despite efforts to turn the law into social-Catholic channels, the Agrarians in the last resort rejected it as impracticable. Their leading spokesman, Cándido Casanueva, told the majority in the Cortes that it was 'a very well-outlined scheme on paper, but with the inconvenience of being completely removed from the life of the Spanish countryside... You must bear in mind that [agrarian reform] is not the work of a day, nor of a year, but of generations; to carry it out in haste is to take a leap into space'.[1] The law was at last passed by 318 votes to 19 on 9 September.[2]

The debates on the Catalan Statute, alternating with those on agrarian reform, provoked a reaction inside and outside the Cortes comparable with that against religious legislation. Since 14 April, the guardians of Spanish unity and Castilian nationalists had been on the alert; their ranks included not only the Right, but also Socialists, Radicals and Right Republicans who were bound by the Pact of San Sebastián to support a statute of autonomy.[3] The

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1 DSCC, 18 May 1932.

2 DSCC, 9 Sept. 1932. Agrarians were supported by the Lliga, Fr. García Gallego, two Navarrese and, for quite different reasons, by the Social Revolutionary Balbontín. The Basques did not vote. Final text in DSCC, 1 Oct. 1932 App.

3 The centrally-minded Socialists disliked Maciá's patronage of their CNT rivals. Prieto wanted to resign over the regional clauses of the Constitution (El Socialista, 25 & 30 Sept. 1931). During the debates on the Statute, there was dissidence in the UGT in Aragón led by the deputy Algora, who was expelled from the party for voting against it (El Socialista, 25 & 26 June 1932).

Statute was drafted by the Esquerra at Nuria and approved overwhelmingly in the plebiscite of 2 August 1931.[1] Immediately emotions were roused. Maciá declared Catalans free at last: no human power could oppose the will of the Catalans, who had 'deprived themselves for a short time of a modicum of that sovereignty which is theirs by right... If the fruits of our plebiscite are denied to us we will fight to the death to achieve our aspirations to freedom'.[2] His aim was to obtain the maximum concessions from Madrid by brinkmanship and present the Statute as a pact between two sovereign powers.[3]

In Castile and Aragón such language provoked equally strong passions. For Goicoechea the Statute contained 'not the maximum programme of the autonomists, but the minimum programme of separatism'.[4] El Debate described it as an insult to the Constitution, the Cortes and the entire Spanish people, a piece of camouflaged separatism.[5] The editor of ABC considered it equivalent to 'the

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1 The text of the original Statute is in DSCC, 18 Aug. 1931 App. Of 792,574 voters, 595,205 voted in favour and 3,286 against. Plá, HSRE I, 251, says the CNT voted in favour.

2 The Economist, 22 Aug. 1931; & Peers, Catalonia Infelix, 202-3.

3 In 1931 Maciá told Miravitlles that separatism would be the death of Catalonia (F. Jellinek, The Civil War in Spain [London, 1938], 127).

4 El Debate, 1 June 1932; another ex-Maurista saw the Catalans coming to Madrid as victors to dictate terms to the vanquished (Alonso de Armiño, DSCC, 12 May)

5 El Debate, 3 & 4 May 1932.

dismemberment of the Country'.[1] Students demonstrated against it,[2] and a leading Radical urged that the struggle against separatism be taken into the streets: 'In Parliament nothing can be achieved ... Spaniards! Let us perish if perish we must; but may the Country be saved!'[3]

Behind the strong language, however, the Right was divided into liberal centralizers and traditional regionalists. Royo Villanova, the most vehement anti-Catalanist, said that it was not 'reactionary' to oppose the Statute, but 'liberal and progressive'. Attacks on Spanish unity were more shocking for him than attacks on religion.[4] The Traditionalist Lamamié de Clairac, on the other hand, believed the Carlist doctrine of 'infra-sovereignty' the only one capable of pleasing both Catalonia and Castile: full regionalism could be enjoyed by Catalonia without endangering the unity of the nation only when the highest representatives of region and nation were one and the same person.[5] El Debate also advocated 'sound, legitimate, traditional regionalism' in opposition to the revolutionary federalism of a Statute pushed through the Cortes by 'a conglomeration of

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1 Luca de Tena, ABC, 4 May 1932.

2 Arrarás, HSRE I, p. 340; also DSCC, 17 May 1932.

3 Emiliano Iglesias, ABC, 14 June 1932.

4 El Debate, 28 July 1932 & DSCC, 27 May 1932.

5 DSCC, 4 Aug. 1932.

Masons, separatists and Socialists'.[1] Centralizers and decentralizers could nevertheless present a common front in defence of the integrity of the Spanish nation against covert separatism. 'We want liberty for that region', said Gil Robles, 'but we do not want to hand it over to the Esquerra.'[2] ABC took the lead in the campaign against the Statute, while inside the Cortes Catalans were exasperated by the unending amendments persistently defended by Royo Villanova to the point of obstruction.[3]

Apart from the questions of sovereignty and linguistic parity, opposition centred around the division of powers between the Generalidad and the State, with particular regard to finance, public order and education. Basic objections were to the head of the region, the representative of the central State, being appointed by Catalonia, and to Catalan control of the police.[4] To give Catalans charge of the police, quite apart from the danger of separatism, would be to deliver public order into the hands of a régime dependent

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1 El Debate, 2 June & 19 July 1932.

2 El Debate, 12 July 1932. He declared himself 'an autonomist' and 'profoundly regionalist', but he could not go against 'the intangible unity of the Country, which is what we are at present defending.' (DSCC, 10 June 1932).

3 An Esquerra deputy caused uproar by calling Royo Villanova an ass; Fanjul then called the Catalans 'traitors' (DSCC, 6 July 1932). Royo defended an amendment the next day with a speech devoted to the theme of his past speeches (DSCC, 7 July 1932). El Debate (8 July 1932) reported that Royo had had to stop speaking when overcome by fatigue.

4 The principal objections of El Debate, 12 July & 4 Aug. 1932.

on the revolution in the form of the CNT, which the Generalidad had not shown itself capable of mastering.[1] Yet at the same time Royo defended immigrant workers against the fate of 'Catalanization' by the Esquerra. Justice and education he thought should be controlled from Madrid; the young ought not to be indoctrinated with 'anti-Spanish nationalism.' The University must remain Castilian.[2]

Regarding finance, the State was to retain control of indirect taxation, but surrender direct taxation to Barcelona. Aside from the question of fiscal sovereignty, it was argued that provinces of Spain should contribute to the Treasury according to their wealth. The idea of Catalonia contributing solely in proportion to its population was preposterous since Catalans were collectively wealthier than other Spaniards as the result of protection of their industries behind national tariffs which ensured them ninety per cent of the home market.[3] It was argued that the rest of Spain would be financing a privileged status for the richest region: taxes ceded to the Generalidad were valued at 282,759,741 pesetas, while the services

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1 Royo Villanova, DSCC, 5 July & 3 Aug. 1932.

2 A. Royo Villanova, Treinta años de política antiespañola (Valladolid, 1940), 185-6; & DSCC, 29 June, 26 July, 2, 9 & 16 Aug. 1932. In Barcelona, pop. 1,009,000, there were 634,673 non-Catalans (Arrarás, HSRE I, 383).

3 DSCC, 1932: Alonso de Armiño, 12 May; Martínez de Velasco, 26 May; Fanjul, 10 June; Calderón, 25 Aug.; Royo, 1 & 2 Sept. The average wealth of Spaniards outside Catalonia & the Basque Country being 100, the average in Catalonia was 172 (J. Larraz, La Hacienda pública y el Estatuto catalán [Madrid, 1932], 90).

to be transferred would cost the region only 79,735,000 pesetas.[1] Yet in its final form the Statute was not as favourable to Catalonia as the 'economic arrangement' was to the Basques.[2] The Statute, in a more moderate form than that voted by Catalans, was eventually passed by 314 votes to 24 in September.[3]

The Lliga had decided to support the Statute of Nuria before the plebiscite of 2 August.[4] In the Cortes, its three deputies supported the Esquerra because the Lliga had always worked for 'the autonomy of Catalonia within the Spanish State.' Abadal claimed that autonomous regions represented the true structure of Spain. The Generalidad was part of the 'integral State' of Article 1 of the Constitution: therefore there was no division of sovereignty. Furthermore, like the Constitution, the Statute was not immutable.[5] Estelrich took a traditionalist line. His Catalan nationalism was not that sired by the French Revolution; a State containing distinct nations was therefore quite possible. His ideal was the internal

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1 HCE, I-4, 482.

2 Calvo Sotelo, La voz de un perseguido, II, 81-4.

3 DSCC, 9 Sept. 1932. With the Agrarians voted the Republicans M. Maura & Sánchez Román; Lerroux, like the Lliga & the Basques, voted for the Statute, the final text of which is in DSCC, 1 Oct. 1932 App.

4 El Debate, 16 July 1931.

5 Abadal, DSCC, 13 May 1932.

re-establishment, resurgence and restoration of the 'collective personality' of Catalonia, with the ultimate ideal of union with Portugal in Iberian harmony.[1]

Ventosa Calvell's championship of Spanish industry, however, showed that the facts of economic interdependence between Catalonia and Castile were still very much present in Lliga minds, even if no agreement could be reached with Acción Popular.[2] Cambó, still in exile, counselled compromise on both sides.[3] Durán Ventosa went further and in July blamed the difficulties encountered by the Statute in the Cortes on the Esquerra because it had not adopted the more moderate draft of 1919 which bore the signatures of Lerroux and Largo Caballero.[4]

An effort to form a Basque-Navarrese-Catalan front in the summer of 1931 came to nothing, but the Basques voted with the Catalans on the regional clauses of the Constitution. Aguirre and two deputies visited Barcelona in October to re-affirm their solidarity with Macià.[5] In August 1931, Maura had noted in Biscay 'great

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1 DSCC, 30 June 1932. He defended Catalan control of all education.

2 When debates on the Statute began in the Cortes, a polemic developed between El Debate, defending de-centralization but really no more, and the Lliga organ La Veu de Catalunya; see e.g. El Debate, 15 May 1932.

3 García Venero, Nacionalismo catalán, 532

4 Arrarás, HSRE I, 413.

5 García Venero, Nacionalismo vasco, 426, 430 & 434-5. At this stage the Basques thought the Esquerra had let down the cause by backing the government so strongly. The Lliga, Carrasco Formiguera and others took the PNV view.

effervescence on account of the religious question' and had suspended thirteen newspapers.[1] Typical of the Traditionalist attitude was the counsel of the Heraldo Alavés: '"Obey your authorities", says the Scripture. But it adds, in another place: "It is necessary to obey God, before men."'[2]

Despite all this the Traditionalist alliance with the Republican PNV continued. The Statute of Estella, approved by the Navarrese town councils, was presented to a non-committal Alcalá-Zamora in September.[3] But by the beginning of October at the latest, Aguirre had decided that the Traditionalist alliance was a drawback to the aspirations of the PNV. He persuaded the Temporary Committees to accept the Statute of the SEV before amendment at Estella. When in December the government decreed that the Temporary Committees should draw up a Statute to be approved by the town councils before a plebiscite could take place, a mixed committee of ten was soon formed by the Committees, the Nationalist Mayors and the Socialists. By 31 January 1932 a single Statute for the four provinces had been agreed upon, the provisions of which omitted those aspects of the

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1 ABC, 22 Aug. 1931; El Debate, 22, 23 & 25 Aug. 1931; DSCC, 25 Aug. 1931. Gil Robles attacked Maura for stepping outside a legality that did not yet exist, thus encouraging others to follow suit.

2 D. de Arrese, Bajo la Ley de defensa de la República (Madrid, 1933), 234.

3 Aguirre, Libertad, 112 & 133-9.

Statute of Estella which had appealed to the Traditionalists. The possibility of a regional concordat was excluded and the region conceded greater powers to the State in the spheres of education, public order and justice.[1]

This 'Single Statute' was strongly attacked by the Integrist leader Juan de Olazábal, who lamented: 'Oh, if St. Peter the Apostle were living in these times, what epistles he would write against certain Catholics!' The Bishop of Vitoria, in exile near Poitiers, refused however to take sides. In Navarre, Traditionalists came out strongly against the new 'Single Statute' because it would subject their province to a new centralism. When all the councillors assembled in Pamplona on 19 June for the Great Assembly of Basque Municipalities, they encountered such slogans as 'Do not vote for the laicist Statute' and 'Fueros, yes! Statute, no!' There was confusion at the Assembly, but the town councils of Álava, Guipúzcoa and Biscay voted for the 'Single Statute' while the Navarrese rejected it. Oriol Urigüen, Traditionalist deputy for Álava, now began to campaign against the Statute since, without Navarre, Álava would be a satellite of industrial Biscay.[2]

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1 Aguirre, Libertad, 180-9 & 193-215; Madariaga, Spain, 404. The new Statute also permitted revision of the 'economic arrangement' to Madrid's advantage. The regional parliament was now to be elected by inorganic suffrage.

2 Aguirre, Libertad, 231-301. Olazábal's La Constancia fulminated against the new Statute because it was 'Godless' and contaminated with laicism and modernism (Iturralde, Catolicismo I, 242).

The PNV-Traditionalist alliance broke down over the provisions of the 'Single Statute'. The Navarrese had only agreed to the alliance after the amendments made at Estella permitting a regional concordat, and they differed from the PNV on the definition of fueros. A contributory factor was also the change which began to take place within Traditionalism after the accession of Alfonso Carlos. At a meeting in Pamplona on 6 January 1932, at which Integrists and Mellistas were officially accepted back into the fold, the new title of Comunión Tradicionalista Carlista was adopted instead of the former Comunión Católico-Monárquica.[1] Alfonso Carlos re-appointed as his Delegate the Valencian Marqués de Villores, but with schemes afoot for joint action with Alfonsines any lingering ideas of cooperation with Basque Nationalism as a lesser evil soon disappeared.

When Villores died in May, the Navarrese Rodezno became head of a committee of three ex-Integrists: Pradera, Lamamié de Clairac and Oriol Urigüen.[2] Alfonso Carlos moved to Ascain, arms were smuggled across the frontier, shooting affrays occurred with Social-

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1 Galindo, Los partidos, 130; R. Oyarzun, Historia del carlismo (2nd ed., Madrid, 1944), 461. Alfonso Carlos had not offended Mellistas by Francophilia in the Great War, nor did he bear the responsibility of his brother for the Integrist split.

2 HCE, I-4, 489; Oyarzun, Carlismo, 461; Lizarza, Memorias, 20; & Aguirre, Libertad, 289-90 & 304-5, who says thoughts now turned to the overthrow of the Republic.

ists and recruiting of youths in the mountains for training by a retired Colonel, Sanz de Lerín, got under way.[1] The Basque-Navarrese parliamentary minority was therefore dissolved in July 1932, and the Basques began to take a more active part in the Cortes in support of the Catalan Statute. The breaking of the alliance was in any case inevitable because, although the PNV was a confessional party of 'virile and integral Catholicism', its leader openly proclaimed his separatist aspirations: 'In the political sphere, we seek the full sovereignty of Euzkadi over itself.'[2]

iv. The abortive pronunciamiento of 10 August 1932

On the whole, the army had avoided compromising itself with Monarchy or Republic before 14 April and after the change of régime its attitude continued to be 'accidentalist'. Typical perhaps of the Generals' view was the attitude of Francisco Franco, commanding the General Military Academy at Saragossa. Orders for 15 April 1931 emphasized discipline and the duty of sacrificing all personal opinions for the good of the Country and for civil peace. On 18 April, dispelling rumours that he was to be given an important appointment in Morocco, Franco explained that he had been loyal to

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1 HCE, I-4, 486 & 489; Lizarza, Memorias, 20.

2 Aguirre, DSCC, 26 Aug. 1931; in this speech he ruled out violence as a way of obtaining his ends, and blamed both the government and the Bilbao plutocracy for creating a violent atmosphere.

the Monarchy until its fall, but now that the new régime was installed he was equally obedient to it. When the War Minister, Azaña, abruptly closed the Academy, Franco's farewell speech in July again stressed discipline and loyalty to Spain.[1]

Many officers however decided, despite Alfonso's parting message to the armed forces bidding them to serve Spain, that the oath of loyalty to the Republic was too much, especially when accompanied by a change in the national flag. By the Decree of 25 April, officers were permitted to retire on full pay if they so wished; some eleven thousand of the twenty-one thousand availed themselves of the opportunity.[2]

From one standpoint, Azaña's military reforms were no more radical than the plans of Primo de Rivera, save that the former put his into practice. There was general agreement that the top-heavy bureaucracy which was the military establishment, with its one officer to every six men and its eight hundred Generals on the active and reserve lists, was in urgent need of pruning. Azaña in fact reduced

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1 J. Arrarás, Francisco Franco (London, 1938), 120-5. Azaña however, objected to the tone of the speech (G. Hills, Franco [London, 1967], 172). Franco asked Alfonso XIII whether he ought to stay in the Army: the King told him that he must serve Spain. Regarding the matter of the flag, Alfonso suggested that officers should try to think of the new purple band of the Republican tricolour as signifying the Royal Ensign of Castile, which was the same colour. (Conversation Cortés Cavanillas).

2 Ramos Oliveira, Politics, 326, states that many Republicans were among those who opted out. General Fanjul, DSCC, 2 Aug. 1932, claimed that retirements were often the result of pressure; 'voluntary' was a military honorific term.

the number of Infantry Divisions from sixteen to eight, and Cavalry Divisions from eight to three. What needled military feelings were the accompanying aspects of the reforms, carried out by an anti-militarist who boasted that his aim was to 'mash' the Army. Captains-General, the Law of Jurisdictions, the Supreme Army and Navy Council and Courts of Honour were all abolished, thereby placing the Army under the civilian jurisdiction of the Minister's personal 'Military Cabinet' packed, it was alleged, with discontents out to settle old grudges.

Azaña, some military men complained, was undermining military discipline and morale and showing unwarranted distrust of officers who had sworn loyalty to the Republic. He had ignored the advice of the technical departments of his Ministry, and had broken his promise not to interfere with promotions. Officers expelled from the Army under the Dictatorship were being reinstated regardless of the reason for their expulsion. Discrimination in appointments in favour of chairborne Junteros, who had intrigued while others had risked their lives in Morocco, was much resented; the moral integrity of the officer corps could no longer be guaranteed. Azaña's 'policy of persecution' disregarded military criteria: the best Academy had been closed, and the Moroccan establishment cut so heavily that Mola doubted whether it could withstand a native rising. If the Minister had found Infantry Regiments of eighty men and Cavalry Regiments without horses, he had not been sufficiently energetic in re-equipping the armed forces. Azaña's 'Republicanization' was

altogether most distasteful, not to say unpatriotic.[1]

Conspirators against the government could therefore play upon the internal dissatisfactions of the Army and could draw on an ample fund of retired officers. The first attempt at conspiracy was led by General Luis Orgaz who, with General Ponte, had been involved since May 1931 with the Alfonsine group (including Vallellano, Pujol and Fuentes Pila) meeting at Quintanar's house.[2] The conspiracy, however, never progressed very far. Some funds were collected from Monarchists and efforts were aimed chiefly at bringing together retired officers, but the plotters never got beyond the talking stage.[3]

Before Orgaz's arrest and banishment to the Canaries, unsuccessful contact was made with the Basque Nationalists after a march-past of thousands of Mendigoixales (Basque Nationalist youths) at a rally at Deva at the end of August 1931. Accounts of the episode differ.

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1 Fanjul, DSCC, 2 Aug. 1932; Ramos Oliveira, Politics, 325-6; Maura, Así cayó Alfonso, 226-8; Mola, Obras, 946, 950, 992, 1020, 1046-51, 1060-3 & 1113. The rebels of Cuatro Vientos were well rewarded: Queipo de Llano became Military Commander in Madrid and then Head of the President's Military Household, while Ramón Franco was chief of the re-constituted air force until his attempt to lead a social revolutionary movement at Seville in June 1931. Cf. Payne, The Military, 266-76 on Azaña's reforms; he emphasizes that africanistas (those who had served in Morocco and gained promotion by merit) were the bitterest opponents.

2 HCE, I-4, 486; Galindo, Los partidos, 115-6.

3 Conversation with Vegas Latapié, who was one of the conspirators. As noted earlier, 100,000 ptas. of the funds were used to found Acción Española in Dec. 1931. The Carlists refused to become involved (Payne, The Military, 280).

According to Aguirre, a meeting was requested by Orgaz, then involved with circles in Bilbao in a military conspiracy. Orgaz told Aguirre that his aim was to overthrow the Provisional Government so that elections could be held for new Constituent Cortes to decide upon the form of régime. It was a movement for Spain: 'We are not attempting restoration of the Monarchy.' The Alfonsine General wanted to hear Aguirre's views and promised the Basques 'extensive powers of autonomy' excluding the possibility of secession. Orgaz, on the other hand, said that the meeting, which took place at Lequeitio at the beginning of September, was requested by Aguirre, who was in search of officers to train his Mendigoixales for an uprising in the Basque Country which he wished the General to lead. Whatever actually took place, the interview had no repercussions and no agreement proved possible.[1] The General's plot came to nothing.

By November 1931 the ex-Constitutionalists had become thoroughly alarmed at the progress of the Republic. Burgos Mazo discussed the situation with the Director-General of the Civil Guard, General José Sanjurjo, whom he found to be in general agreement with him;

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1 Aguirre (Libertad, 150-4) published his version in 1935, whereupon Orgaz produced a different version and claimed that he had got Aguirre to admit his memory was at fault (see García Venero, Nacionalismo vasco, 426-9). According to Iturralde, (Catolicismo I, 35-6) Aguirre and Orgaz met before the civil war and discovered that the interview had been arranged by Monarchists: both mistakenly believed the other had taken the initiative. Yet Aguirre repeated his first version in his Freedom was Flesh and Blood (London, 1945), 233-4.

both agreed that they were conservatives and Republicans.[1] In January, Sanjurjo's views became apparent when he saw the mutilated bodies of four of his Civil Guards in Castilblanco; he was pressed to rise there and then by Civil Guard officers, but decided not to act precipitately.[2] General Goded, Chief of the General Staff, visited Burgos Mazo, however, to offer his services in case of a rising. Burgos Mazo, who had abandoned hope of Azaña's government being toppled by Lerroux, went ahead with his preparations: the capable Goded was to be the master-mind of the movement, while the brave but not very intelligent Sanjurjo was to be the figure-head. A manifesto drawn up in July by Burgos Mazo was approved by Melquiades Alvarez and Santiago Alba, also ex-Constitutionalists: it spoke of maintaining and purifying the Republic, not of a Monarchist restoration.[3]

Meanwhile Sanjurjo vacillated. In January he saw his old friend Lerroux, who sympathized with his views but would not agree to rise against the Republican government.[4] In February Sanjurjo

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1 Burgos Mazo, quoted in Arrarás, HSRE I, 435-6. There were rumours that Sanjurjo had earlier in 1931 had contacts with the Alfonsine General Cavalcanti regarding a rising.

2 E. Esteban-Infantes, General Sanjurjo (Barcelona, 1957), 177. Sanjurjo said the atrocities were worse than he had seen in the Riff, and blamed the Socialist Deputy Margarita Nelken Amusbergen for stirring up the local population.

3 Burgos Mazo, quoted in Arrarás, HSRE I, 437-8.

4 Lerroux, Pequeña historia, 143-4. Rumours of the interview were reported in El Socialista, 8 Jan. 1932.

was demoted to the Directorate-General of Customs Guards because of his forthright speech at the funeral of the four Civil Guards; he declined Azaña's offer to become Marshal of Spain and tour the Americas for a couple of years with an annual salary of 125,000 pesetas.[1] The debates on the Catalan Statute however pushed him towards a decision. He again visited Lerroux, who again refused to join in a rising although it was clear that the Statute could not be stopped in the Cortes. Early in July 1932 Sanjurjo made his preparations, linking up with a Monarchist conspiracy already in existence.[2]

The strands of the Monarchist conspiracy disrupted by the removal of Orgaz to the Canaries in 1931 were taken up in 1932 by his associate General Ponte from France. In the spring, Pujol asked the Alfonsine General Emilio Barrera to head a junta to prepare a revolt; some 300,000 pesetas had already been collected for the purpose.[3] In April, an intrepid aviator, the retired Major Juan Antonio Ansaldo, was sent to Rome by Ponte to seek Italian aid; agreement was reached with the Air Minister, Marshal Balbo, but

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1 J. Romano, Sanjurjo (Madrid, 1940), 120-2.

2 Lerroux, Pequeña historia, 145; Arrarás, HSRE I, 434 & 487; HCE, I-4, 492.

3 HCE, I-4, 489-90.

there were in the event no practical consequences.[1] Monarchist security, however, was poor, for on 15 June various conspirators, including Barrera and Orgaz, were arrested. Although the Director-General of Security announced the existence of a Monarchist plot, they were nevertheless released within a few days.[2]

The incident helped to worsen relations between the military and the government. Officers were incensed when a Minister declared that the Generals were wrong to believe that they could have influence under the Republic, and added: 'the Generals think the régime is going to waver because they sneeze.'[3] Addressing infantry officers at a dinner at Carabanchel on 27 June, Goded spoke on the theme of national unity, ending: 'Long live Spain and nothing more!' Therepon the ex-Juntero Colonel Mangada made it plain that he was not amused by this slight on the government. Mangada was put in military prison, but Generals Villegas and Caballero were removed

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1 J.A. Ansaldo, ¿Para qué...? (Buenos Aires, 1951), 31 & 34-5; some machine guns arrived at Gibraltar, but were not unloaded. V.G. Salmador, Juan Antonio Ansaldo (Montevideo, 1962), 74, adds that some aircraft were sent to Portugal, ostensibly on a sales tour; but they were not used either. Italian policy was apparently influenced by two considerations: belief that a secret Franco-Spanish pact existed allowing France to take over the Balearics in case of a Mediterranean conflict; and assistance given to Italian exiles by some Spanish Republicans (R. Guariglia, Ricordi [Naples, 1950], 185, 189 & 774-80).

2 El Debate, 16-18 & 24 June 1932.

3 Albornoz (at Ávila, 19 June), quoted in HCE, I-4, 491.

from their posts. Goded resigned in protest at this.[1] Such was the situation at the beginning of July 1932 when Sanjurjo finally made up his mind to join military colleagues in the preparation of a pronunciamiento, which had civilian support from Monarchists, the JONS in Valladolid and some disillusioned Republicans of conservative opinions like Joaquín del Moral.[2]

Among Alfonsine Monarchists, La Cierva and the ex-Ministers of the Dictatorship were involved, as were leading members of Acción Española such as Vallellano, Sáinz Rodríguez and Goicoechea (also members of Acción Popular).[3] The military junta for the rising was headed by the Alfonsine Barrera, who insisted that the 'single and exclusive aim' of the movement was the overthrow of Azaña's government. The question of the régime was secondary; the provisional junta was simply to guarantee order.[4] Alfonso XIII was not himself involved, but the plan fitted well with his manifesto of 23 January, drawn up by Vallellano: if he were to return, it should be at the request of new Cortes convoked by a provisional

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1 El Debate, 28-29 June 1932; Arrarás, HSRE I, 430-3; M. Goded, Un faccioso cien por cien (Saragossa, 1938), 15-6. The General's son claims that his father's conduct was calculated provocation so that an excuse would be provided for revolt and the seizure of Azaña; Villegas and Caballero failed, however, to act.

2 HCE, I-4, 485. Moral had been a Republican since 1914, but was anti-Socialist.

3 Salmador, Ansaldo, 78.

4 Barrera, quoted by Arrarás, HSRE I, 475.

government. Although he did not go back on his earlier statements forbidding violence on behalf of his person, the last sentence seemed to suggest the overthrow of the government: 'Act suitably before the labour of destruction is fully consummated and with it the ruin of our dear Country.'[1] Alfonsine Monarchists took part, therefore, in order to weaken the Republic, and with the secondary hope that success could be the first step towards an eventual restoration.[2] Thus there was sufficient common ground to allow joint action with Sanjurjo, who looked upon his action as for the good of Spain but not against the Republican régime.[3] The Carlists were doubtful about the character of the movement. At the Assembly of the Communion at the Château de Mondonville, near Toulouse, it was decided that the Communion as such could not participate because the conspirators' programme was so imprecise, but individual members could take part if they wished.[4]

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1 Habla el Rey, 343.

2 HCE, I-4, 485, & conversations with Sáinz Rodríguez, Cortés Cavanillas & Vegas Latapié. Ansaldo says that the aim was left deliberately vague so that agreement could be reached permitting common action; he himself hoped the outcome would be an authoritarian Monarchy with Alfonso's third son, Juan, as King, thus uniting the two branches of the dynasty (¿ Para qué?, 32).

3 His manifesto, drafted by the Alfonsines Pujol and Gen. García de la Herrán, said that the aim was not to 'impose a political régime against the Republic' but simply to overthrow the government, hold free elections and allow the national will to choose its course. (Text in Arrarás, HSRE I, 464-5).

4 Galindo, Los partidos, 160. 2 Traditionalists were among the dead in Madrid; 90 Requetés came out to help Sanjurjo in Seville; Traditionalists in Barcelona conspired (Redondo & Zavala, Requeté, 239 & 242).

Civilian support was far from being the prime consideration of the military conspirators, but their plans incorporated the use of Albiñana's PNE and the JONS in Valladolid as auxiliaries. With the arrival of the Republic, Albiñana was detained without trial and the Madrid offices of the PNE sacked by Republican enthusiasts. Albiñana was released in December 1931, to be re-arrested in May 1932 and deported to Las Hurdes. During his spell of freedom he took the opportunity to re-found the PNE as the Spanish equivalent of the movements of Hitler and Mussolini. Nationalism must be based on native traditions: therefore in Spain the programme must be founded on religion, Monarchy and the red and gold flag. Masonry was not to be tolerated; only God could take precedence over the Country. With Albiñana again detained, the small PNE was drawn into the orbit of Acción Española.[1]

Ledesma's La Conquista del Estado, the other radical Rightist group of pre-Republican days, fared equally badly: government seizures of the paper and lack of financial support had killed it by 24 October.[2] Before its termination however, Ledesma fused what remained of his group with a similar grouping in Valladolid, led by Onésimo Redondo, to form the Juntas de Ofensiva Nacional-Sindicalista (JONS) on 13 October 1931. The Sixteen Points of the

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1 HCE, I-3, 290; El Debate, 10 Dec. 1931 & 29 Mar., 12 & 22 May 1932.

2 Arrarás, HSRE I, 238. In a letter to El Debate, 30 July 1931, Ledesma complained of the confiscation of five consecutive issues.

new amalgam stressed national unity, respect for the national Catholic tradition, recovery of Gibraltar, imperial expansion in North Africa, and the end of parliamentarism. The JONS pledged themselves to 'direct action in the service of the Country' and the dissolution and extermination of all Marxist and anti-national parties. The new National-Syndicalist State, to be ruled by the under-forties, was to be based on the National-Syndicalist Militia.[1] Jonsistas wore black shirts and red ties, the colours of the Anarchists, while adopting as their device the yoked arrows of the Catholic Kings with the motto 'Spain One, Great and Free!'[2]

The two leaders of the JONS, Ledesma and Redondo, came of similar backgrounds. Both were born in 1905 in Old Castile of peasant stock and both took state employment to help their university studies. Their political views coincided on the need for revolutionary violence to implant an authoritarian National-Syndicalist State, yet their basic ideological approaches differed. Ledesma was influenced by Unamuno, Nietzsche and Ortega Gasset. His writings, though illiberal and extremist, bore a certain resemblance to Ortega's - both found inspiration in German thought. La

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1 M. Fernández Almagro, Historia de la República española (Madrid, 1940), 211.

2 Arrarás, HSRE I, 237. The JONS anthem included the words: 'No more kings of foreign stock and no more men without bread to eat' (Ledesma, Antología, 16).

Conquista del Estado had a Germanic tone with its theatrical generalizations: the Zeitgeist was collectivist, therefore 'the individual is dead'. Ledesma as a social radical declared his hatred of the mediocre, decadent, liberal, bourgeois spirit, although the first enemy was Communism. Any who hindered the advance of Syndicalist organization were 'enemies of the Country'. The two supreme aims ought to be 'to subvert the present Masonic, anti-Spanish system' and 'to impose by violence the strictest fidelity to the spirit of the Country'. Support was sought among the students, who were tiring of the monopoly of representation given to the Republican FUE. The immediate issue to be exploited was Castilian opposition to Catalanism.[1]

With the termination of La Conquista del Estado, the centre of activity of the JONS in 1932 was Valladolid rather than Madrid. There Onésimo Redondo, a Catholic activist who had lectured in Germany, had founded a union for beet-growers in 1930.[2] In May 1931 he had been one of the young founders of Acción Nacional in the province. On 13 June the first issue of his own paper, Libertad, appeared in defence of the rural population and against Catalanism; La Conquista del Estado was admired for its fighting spirit and

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1 Fernández Almagro, República, 210; Ledesma, Antología, esp. 17, 45-8, 56, 60-1, 148, 159 & 252; & H.R. Southworth, Antifalange (Paris, 1967), 64-70, who stresses Ortega's influence on Ledesma and Giménez Caballero.

2 Arrarás, HSRE I, 237.

'Hispanic vehemence' but criticized for its excessive anti-Semitism.[1] In August, the Juntas Castellanas de Actuación Hispánica appeared as a political group with the slogan 'Castile, save Spain!' Their programme was traditional and nationalistic and aimed at renovating Castile by better agricultural methods, afforestation and modernization of villages. A compulsory corporative syndical organization, protected and regulated by the State to unify 'the national interests of production', was advocated.[2]

Like Ledesma, Redondo concentrated on anti-Catalanism. The JONS of Valladolid during 1932 drew off members of the Juventud de Acción Popular who had despaired of the passivity of that organization. At first, Redondo's group was little different from the JAP, but, perhaps under Ledesma's influence, all relations were severed between the local JAP and the non-confessional JONS.[3] Unlike Ledesma, who was unenthusiastic about conservative Generals, Redondo supported the military conspiracy as a means towards a dictatorship. Libertad was frequently seized and fined, suffering twenty lawsuits

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1 Monge, AP, 1118; O. Redondo, Obras completas (Madrid, 1954-5), I, 9.

2 Redondo, Obras, I, 247-9; Arrarás, HSRE I, 237; Fernández Almagro, República, 211.

3 Monge, AP, 1127. Libertad, 28 Dec. 1931, praised Herrera, but found his policy lacking in youthful frenzy; on 22 Feb. 1932, nationalism was defined as 'neither Monarchist nor anti-Monarchist. Nor is it confessional, though in no way anti-religious.' (Redondo, Obras, I, 405-7, & II, 27).

before suspension in August 1932.[1] Despite the fusion the JONS of Valladolid and Madrid tended to exist as separate units. The direction of the movement was officially in the hands of a triumvirate of Ledesma, Redondo and Bermúdez Cañete,[2] a young journalist ideologically of a type with the authoritarian Catholic Redondo rather than with the secular, Teutonic nationalism of Ledesma. The JONS was as yet insignificant in national politics.

The support of Rightist political groups was a tertiary consideration for the Generals; apart from soldiers on active service, they planned to use numerous retired officers as auxiliaries where necessary, notably in Madrid. The success of the movement depended on the attitude of the garrisons once the cry of revolt had been raised in the classic tradition of the nineteenth-century pronunciamiento. Sanjurjo's aide-de-camp explained that 'it was never thought that the moment to fight would arrive. The real strength of the insurrection consisted in avoiding it.'[3] The broad plan of the plotters was for simultaneous take-overs in various cities:

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1 Payne, Falange, 19; N. García Sánchez, Onésimo Redondo (Madrid, 1956), 17.

2 Arrarás, HSRE I, 238. Antonio Bermúdez Cañete signed the manifesto of La Conquista del Estado (Feb. 1931) as well as the JONS manifesto; meanwhile he wrote odd editorials on economic affairs for El Debate (e.g. 2 May 1931), was elected a member of the Acción Nacional deliberative assembly (July 1931), and in Feb. 1932 was a member of the executive committee of Juventud de Acción Nacional.

3 E. Esteban-Infantes, La sublevación del general Sanjurjo (2nd ed., Madrid, 1933), 31-2.

in Madrid, General Barrera was to be in command as Head of the Junta; Sanjurjo was to rise in Seville, Colonel Varela in Cádiz, General González Carrasco in Granada and General Ponte in Valladolid, seconded by the JONS. In Navarre, despite the decision of the Communion's assembly, Colonel Sanz de Lerín was to provide 6,000 Requetés. Other garrisons were expected to follow suit, but their commanders had not positively compromised themselves with the movement.[1] Perhaps several adopted the attitude of Franco, commanding the garrison at Corunna, who told Sanjurjo that he would not rise - though he promised not to lead troops against those who did rise, if ordered to do so.[2]

Preparations went ahead for the rising in July as the debates on the Catalan Statute dragged on. The imminence of a military move to be led by Sanjurjo was an open secret. After Lerroux's meeting with Sanjurjo at Montemayor in June, Azaña had been informed of a military movement by Martínez Barrio.[3] Azaña had in fact known of the conspiracy for some time, but decided to play a waiting game,

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1 HCE I-4, 493; Galindo, Los partidos, 158. According to one source, Goded was to have led the rising in Madrid, but Barrera kept him in the dark (M. García Venero, La Falange en la guerra de España [Paris, 1967], 20).

2 Interview between Sanjurjo & Franco in a Madrid café, arranged by Sáinz Rodríguez, who was present (Sáinz Rodríguez, conversation). This evidence seems more reliable than that used by Hills, Franco, 181, or by B. Crozier, Franco (London, 1967), 124. In 1931 Franco had refused to conspire when asked by Monarchists (Iturralde, Catolicismo I, 57).

3 Lerroux, Pequeña historia, 146.

believing the movement doomed to failure; before the rising he only closed the offices of the PNE and Acción Española.[1]

The Generals were aware that possibilities of surprise were not good; the danger of preventive action against the conspirators appeared to be increasing. Many conspirators, too, were beginning to despair of the military ever rising and began to leave for their summer holidays. Sanjurjo, at a meeting of the Junta on 8 August at the estate near Madrid of the Duque del Infantado, demanded further postponement on the grounds that the time was not propitious, but was apparently overruled by Barrera and other colleagues.[2] Another motive for urgency was presumably the announcement of the government's intention shortly to guillotine debates on the Statute and agrarian reform.[3] News that the rising would commence early on 10 August reached the government as quickly as it did some of the conspirators.[4]

In Madrid the rising began at 4 a.m. on 10 August as scheduled.

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1 Memorias íntimas de Azaña, 186. In his speech in the Cortes on 10 Aug. (DSCC), he said he had known of the plot's existence for 3 or 4 months. The closure of offices & some arrests on 5 Aug. were reported in El Debate, 7 Aug. & La Época, 9 Aug. 1932, which noted closure of PNE branches at Burgos, Vigo and Bilbao.

2 Esteban-Infantes, Sanjurjo, 191; Arrarás, HSRE I, 443; Vegas Latapié, conversation.

3 El Debate, 2 Aug. 1932.

4 Memorias íntimas de Azaña, 187; the Director-General of Security knew that the rising was for that night from the mistress of one of the officers in the plot. The Alfonsine Lequerica said his sereno told him that same night (Ansaldo, ¿ Para Qué?, 35).

Generals Barrera, Cavalcanti and Fernández Pérez were the leaders. Azaña was to be detained in the War Ministry by a band composed mainly of retired officers, who were to gain entry with the complicity of the Civil Guards on duty; from there the good news was to be telephoned to the rebel Generals, the garrisons and the Captaincy-General, the commanding officers of which were expected to rally to the cause. Azaña, forewarned, had however put ninety trusted Assault Guards in the Ministry garden, and these repulsed the surprised intruders. Firing continued for a while in the Plaza de la Cibeles, but the Post Office was not taken by the rebels, ten of whom were killed. Under the circumstances, conspiratorial promises were not kept: the 31st Infantry Regiment did not leave barracks, and someone turned back the cavalry approaching from Alcalá de Henares. The rising in Madrid proved a fiasco which was over before breakfast.[1] Ansaldo therefore flew the Head of the Junta, Barrera, to Pamplona, but no one in Navarre could be persuaded to rise. The General was accordingly taken on to Biarritz. At La Cierva's house he was persuaded by Calvo Sotelo to fly to Seville with Ansaldo when it was learnt from the radio that the rising there had not been suppressed; but by the time they arrived in

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1 Ansaldo, ¿ Para qué?, 38-40; Memorias íntimas de Azaña, 188 & 192-3; Arrarás, HSRE I, 449-54; & J. del Moral, Lo del 10 de Agosto y la justicia (Madrid, 1933), 31-6, who said that the commanding officer in Madrid failed to keep his promise, as did a Colonel of the Civil Guard who had been bribed 6,000 ptas. The ten dead were all military men, apart from the Traditionalist student Triana.

Seville, the fleeting reign of Sanjurjo was at an end.[1]

In Seville Sanjurjo won the allegiance of the garrison and took over the city by 7 a.m. on the 10th.[2] Not a shot was fired, and martial law was declared by Sanjurjo as Captain-General of Andalusia. The proclamation ended with the words 'Long live Spain one and immortal!' The full manifesto of the pronunciamiento also referred to saving Spain from 'dismemberment'; although it denounced the entire activity of the government and the Cortes, anti-Catalanism and anti-Socialism, together with complaints about anarchy and military policy, appear to have been the dominant motives of the insurrection.[3] Sanjurjo in Seville was however alone: in Cádiz, Córdoba and Granada no one stirred, and the momentary success of Civil Guards in Jérez was insignificant.[4] From Madrid, Azaña ordered troop movements and made naval and air preparations;[5] a Moorish unit

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1 Ansaldo, ¿ Para qué?, 41-5; Salmador, Ansaldo, 74-5 & 77; Vegas, Calvo Sotelo, 101-2. Esteban-Infantes, La sublevación, 31, claimed that the rising in Madrid was diversionary, to give time for the provincial garrisons to march on the capital; a similar view is given by Salmador, but this would seem to be a retrospective explanation. Barrera himself (Arrarás, HSRE I, 475) blamed broken promises for the failure.

2 Esteban-Infantes, La sublevación, 43.

3 Texts of proclamation and manifesto in Arrarás, HSRE I, 464-5; pp. 463-74 provide perhaps the best account of the day in Seville.

4 HCE, I-4, 516. In Cádiz, Varela did not rise as he did not judge the atmosphere suitable; however he refused to obey Azaña's orders to march on Seville (F.J. Mariñas, General Varela [Barcelona, 1956], 57-9).

5 Arrarás, HSRE I, 457.

was landed at Cádiz but was not needed.[1] In the afternoon, the first signs of opposition to the coup in Seville came from workers' unions, which organized a strike soon paralyzing the city.

By the late hours of the 10th, it was clear that the position of Sanjurjo, isolated and inactive in Seville, was hopeless. Faced with the possibility of having to fight their colleagues, the officers of Seville withdrew their support from the 'Lion of the Riff' who, with the words 'Farewell, loyal veterans! This time we have lost the game', left the city at 1.30 a.m. on the 11th to give himself up to the authorities at Huelva, where he was arrested by a policeman.[2] The affair had been a sword-stroke in the water, conducted in the best bloodless tradition of the pronunciamiento - on the eve of his attempt, Sanjurjo had told friends that, like a good conspirator, he was re-reading the doings of Prim and other Generals of the nineteenth century.[3]

The failure of the movement intended to overthrow the government in fact put Azaña, at least for some time, more firmly in the saddle and gave him an excuse to accelerate implementation of the Left Republican programme. He publicly denounced the rising as an attempt to 'oust the Republican régime' and restore the Monarchy or set up

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1 J.J. Calleja, Yagüe (Barcelona, 1963), 57.

2 Esteban-Infantes, La sublevación, 65, 67, 77 & 91.

3 Esteban-Infantes, Sanjurjo, 191.

a military dictatorship; its failure represented 'the death-rattle of a parasite within the Republic'.[1] Republican solidarity was at a premium: not only Radicals and ex-Constitutionalists, but also the Agrarian leader hastened to assure the government of their loyalty.[2] Azaña therefore exploited his advantage: 'I do not want to make martyrs, but beggars.'[3] On 16 August a bill was introduced to expropriate without compensation the lands of suspected plotters, in effect all the Grandees, the economic basis of Monarchism.[4] The measure was opposed by Casanueva as 'a juridical enormity' since confiscation was to be approved before the suspects had been tried. He alleged this 'spoliation' was unconstitutional. The State, in breaking the law, was guilty of 'a monstrosity as great as that which a father would commit by violating his daughter... From today ...the national wealth is at the mercy of any informer.' The bill was passed by 262 votes to 14.[5] The list of Grandees affected

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1 Azaña, DSCC, 10 & 11 Aug. 1932. In his diary (22 July) he noted the existence of a plot against his government and the Cortes, but not against the régime (Memorias íntimas, 184).

2 Martínez de Velasco, DSCC, 10 Aug. 1932.

3 Quoted in HCE, I-4, 530.

4 Text in DSCC, 17 Aug. 1932 App. The lands were to be used for agrarian reform.

5 DSCC, 18 Aug. 1932. Para. 2 of Artic. 44 permitted expropriation 'by reason of social utility with adequate compensation, unless a law approved by the votes of the absolute majority of the Cortes should resolve otherwise.' The measure got an absolute majority, but Para. 6 of Artic. 44 read: 'In no case will the penalty of confiscation of property be imposed'.

totalled 390, and included 127 Dukes, 174 Marquesses and 78 Counts. The measure was incorporated in the Law of Agrarian Reform, which, with the Catalan Statute, now had a much speedier passage through the Cortes.[1] Further 'Republicanization' of the armed forces, civil service, foreign service and judiciary also took place.[2]

Sanjurjo himself was quickly tried for military rebellion and attempting to overthrow the régime. His lawyer was an ex-Constitutional friend, Bergamín, who argued that the rising was against the government, not the régime, and that bloodshed had been deliberately avoided. The court sentenced him to death, but the sentence was commuted by the government and President to life imprisonment.[3] Conservatives expected leniency for a General who had made a mistake in interpreting the general will and were shocked when he became a common prisoner.[4] Eleven Madrid newspapers were suspended and 98

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1 Prior to 10 Aug., 5 of the 24 Bases of Agrarian Reform, and only half of the sections of the Statute had been approved; Both were finally passed on 9 Sept., thanks to the failure of the pronunciamiento (Plá, HSRE, II, 142-3 & 145).

2 Arrarás, HSRE I, 502-8. By the Decree of 8 Sept., Albornoz dismissed a hundred judges and magistrates whom he considered did not 'sense Republican justice'. Thus it was said that Para. 3 of Artic, 94 was infringed:- 'Judges are independent regarding the discharge of their duties. They are subject only to the law' (Moral, 10 de Agosto, 130-2).

3 La Epoca, 24-26 Aug. 1932. Sanjurjo did not wish to appeal, and told Bergamín: 'I played and lost; I am prepared to pay' (La Epoca, 30 Aug. 1932). Generals Barrera and González Carrasco went into hiding for a month and then escaped across the frontier into France.

4 R. Carr, 'Spain: rule by Generals', Soldiers & governments (ed. M. Howard), (London, 1957), 146.

in the provinces.[1] 145 suspected plotters were deported to Villa Cisneros in the Sahara without trial, in the main retired officers from the upper class.[2] Over 5,000 people were detained.[3] Of these some were local committee members of Acción Popular, many of whose branches were closed.

For the legalists like Gil Robles, the affair was a setback; although a few prominent Monarchists within the grouping were clearly involved the organization as such had not conspired.[4] In Pontevedra, youths of Lis Quiben's Unión Regional de Derechas demonstrated in favour of Sanjurjo on the 10th, but they were the exception.[5] Members of the Seville branch were detained although they had explicitly refused to cooperate with Sanjurjo on the 10th, in accordance with instructions from Madrid given four months earlier to keep out of conspiracies.[6] Gil Robles himself had contacts with the Monarchist plotters, but even though he attended a meeting

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1 List in J. Cortés Cavanillas, Acta de acusación (Madrid, 1933), 744-6; 5 papers were already suspended, making 114 in all.

2 Arrarás, HSRE I, 510-1.

3 Estado Mayor Central del Ejército, Historia de la guerra de liberación (Madrid, 1945), 289.

4 Gil Robles, La Época, 1 Sept. 1932.

5 La Época, 23 Aug. 1932.

6 Arrarás, HSRE I, 506.

at Biarritz on 7 August, he would not undertake to restore the Monarchy or be a plotter.[1] In June he had already made clear his position and that of Acción Popular: 'fight within legality'. He explicitly stated that he was opposed to a resort to arms which was quite unjustifiable because government was not in the gutter.[2] Government action against Acción Popular exacerbated internal divisions and led to recriminations and new departures.

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1 Cortés Cavanillas, Gil Robles, 145-6, & conversation with same.

2 El Debate, 16 June 1932. A leader of the Zamora branch describes the attitude of Acción Popular as one of 'inhibition'. (Conversation with Carrascal).

CHAPTER III

UNITY IN DIVERSITY, SEPTEMBER 1932-DECEMBER 1933

Sanjurjo's unsuccessful attempt to revive the pronunciamiento as an instrument of political change reinvigorated Azaña's coalition, but only briefly. The high-handedness of its repressive measures, which won Azaña the admiration of Mussolini, gave renewed impetus to the movement of reaction against the government. The shootings at Casas Viejas (January 1933) and the government's failure to tackle social problems more energetically accentuated the growing disillusionment of a section of the working class. Casas Viejas caused the Radicals to go into full opposition and obstruct in the Cortes, though they rallied to the government when laws complementary to the Constitution were debated. The Law concerning Religious Confessions and Congregations, however, only served to strengthen the Catholic opposition still further. The President therefore sought an opportunity to dissolve the Cortes before the reaction against Azaña's rule turned into a reaction against the Republic itself. As expected the elections went against Azaña and the Socialists. Lerroux and Gil Robles were the victors.

The participation of Monarchist members of Acción Popular in the abortive pronunciamiento precipitated a crisis in the Catholic organization. The division had been latent since the end of 1931. Gil Robles and his 'accidentalist' supporters wanted the movement to

develop into a Catholic political party within the Republic. Monarchists however wanted to use the organization as a front for their own anti-Republican propaganda. This division of opinion coincided with another: the 'accidentalists' stood for legal methods, whereas the Monarchists were prepared to use violence. Acción Popular gave birth to the CEDA while the Alfonsines created Renovación Española, abandoning altogether their traditional liberalism in an attempt to attract Carlists.

Behind the 'accidentalist'-Monarchist schism on the Right lay what was perhaps the most important, if often implicit, issue in the politics of the time: the interpretation of the word 'Republic'. For the life-long Republican Lerroux it simply meant a form of government open to all provided they did not use violence. For Left Republicans like Azaña, as for the Monarchists, Republicanism was an ideology defined in the Constitution of 1931 and its complementary laws; anyone who did not accept these as final was therefore not truly a Republican. The corollary of this for Monarchists was that Catholics could never accept the Republic. Gil Robles thought otherwise: Catholics could be loyal to the Republic though they could not formally accept it as long as its legislation infringed the rights of the Church. In his view legislation was the essential thing, the form of government was accidental. From their point of view the Socialists Prieto and Largo Caballero also considered the legislative content of the Republic more important than the Republic as a mere form of government. Thus the word

'Republic' meant different things to different people.

The views of Azaña and the Socialists on one side and of Lerroux and the CEDA on the other proved mutually exclusive. However the vital difference between the two most important political groups, the Socialists and the CEDA, was one of methods. The 'possibilism' of Gil Robles signified evolution towards an ideal Catholic régime by legal means; violence could be used only in reply to the violence of others. The Socialists adopted evolutionary tactics, but only for opportunistic reasons. When in 1933 opinion started to turn against them they spoke of revolutionary methods for the defence of their gains and the furtherance of Socialist ideals. The Socialists and the CEDA both had ideals incompatible with liberal-democracy, but whereas the evolutionary tactic was dogma for the CEDA it was not for the Socialists. The latter accused the former of being Fascist in 1933, but whereas Largo Caballero had threatened to use violence since the autumn of 1931, Gil Robles did not make counter-threats until the autumn of 1933. It was the Socialists, not the CEDA, who turned against the democratic system.

i. The political reorganization of the Right

The repressive measures taken by the government after 10 August included the closure of many branches of Acción Popular which had not been involved in the military movement. The participation in it of prominent Alfonsine politicians brought on a crisis within

Acción Popular which was inevitable sooner or later. Gil Robles seized his opportunity: the conglomeration of individuals and groups whose leadership he had taken over in the autumn of 1931 could now be transformed into a homogeneous political party with the aim of obtaining power by legal means.[1] Now was the moment to make a reality of the counsels of El Debate: the members of Acción Popular should be 'the paladins of the legal struggle and of obedience to the constituted powers'.[2] The moment was particularly propitious as Goicoechea was in gaol, Vallellano was still in France and ABC was still suspended.[3] Five hundred delegates, claiming to represent 619,000 members of Acción Popular and allied entities, therefore journeyed to Madrid for the First Assembly of the movement, which opened on 22 October 1932.[4]

The political debate revolved around the paradoxical formula of the programme of December 1931 which, although making no mention explicitly of forms of government, had reaffirmed the obedience of

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1. This had been his real aim from the time he took over (J.M. Gil Robles, Spain in Chains [New York, 1937], 1).

2 El Debate, 8 Oct. 1932.

3 Goicoechea returned from Hendaye when his wife died, his return being arranged by Gil Robles on condition that he surrendered to the authorities to face charges for verbal attacks on the régime made at Gijón in July. This he did; he was released in November (El Debate, 8 & 12 Oct. & 12 Nov. 1932). Vallellano came back to give himself up and spend a while in gaol in the last week in November (El Debate, 30 Nov. 1932).

4 El Debate, 23 Oct. 1932.

Acción Popular to the constituted power while permitting members to defend their own ideals as they saw fit. This formula was now discussed in the light of the pronunciamiento and the growing tension between Alfonsines and 'accidentalists' in the preceding months.

The debate on 22 October began with speakers defending the status quo. Fernández Ruano from Málaga asked: 'Declaration of Republican faith? Never. (Applause). This, as well as being an act of folly as great as that of making an affirmation of Monarchism, would be at this juncture an act of cowardice and meanness.' Fernández-Ladreda, the Dictator's Mayor of Oviedo and leader of the strong Asturian group, also wished to avoid the expulsion of Monarchists: 'Within Acción Popular there are men who believe that the Republic in Spain is not a régime, but a revolutionary doctrine; men who, faced with the government's anti-religious campaign, believe that they cannot collaborate with a régime which assists and defends this system. There are others, too, who are Catholics and enter Acción Popular to fight against those who oppose their religious ideas, but who are in political communion with the Republic... Those who hold Republican opinions cannot ask us to support the work of consolidation of the Republican régime; we have nothing to consolidate.' His speech brought the first exchanges over the formula of December 1931, and fears that the movement would now break up prompted Fr. Guallar to ask that the issue be shelved and that Acción Popular continue as originally conceived, as a union in defence of Religion and Country, not a political party.

Convinced accidentalists, however, were determined that the issue should be squarely faced and resolved. Medina Togores, a leader-writer for El Debate, took up the cudgels: 'It is disloyal to lend obedience to the régime at one moment and appear later as a Monarchist. (Protests, A voice: "Why is it disloyal?"). It is disloyal because one cannot talk of obedience and then pick up a rifle and rush into the street... This obedience must be converted into a postulate... With regard to the régime, obedience pure and simple. (Applause).' Now that battle had been joined, Cimas Leal, editor of La Gaceta Regional of Salamanca, the organ of Gil Robles, carried the accidentalist thesis a stage further: 'Obedience means acceptance. (Voices: "No! No!")... Obedience means acceptance, or it means nothing more than an external formula demanded by the law. And this would be cowardice.' The Monarchists were now incensed and the division clear. Moutas from Oviedo attempted at this point to move a round of applause for the absent Goicoechea, but found himself overruled by the chair. Ceballos drew the conclusion from Cimas Leal's speech that Monarchists would have to leave if Acción Popular could not permit freedom in this matter to the individual member; but, as Medina Togores remarked, on joining members accepted the programme: 'obedience cannot be a fiction.'

Now that it was obvious that the accidentalists would not give way, the debate broadened out. The Alfonsine Deputy Sáinz Rodríguez, leader of the Agrupación Regional Independiente of Santander, argued that the problem had been raised solely as a consequence of '10 August';

the issue was being introduced under pressure of the government's actions. He wished Monarchists to remain, denying that the ralliement was a valid parallel since in Spain the legislation was consubstantial with the régime - precisely the view of Azaña. Valiente, leader of the JAP, therefore introduced a compromise solution which was to have the effect of splitting the Monarchists: the issue should be shelved on condition that the leaders of Acción Popular did not indulge in Republican or Monarchist propaganda.

While it later became apparent that Monarchists such as Fernández-Ladreda were prepared to accept this condition, ardent Alfonsines could not. Tornos not only continued to resist the transformation of Acción Popular into a political party led by accidentalists, but claimed that it had already 'failed in its methods'. The Young Propagandist Moreno Dávila was quick to avail himself of a golden opportunity and replied that 'all that has been lost is the fault of 10 August; our [legal] tactic led us on to victory and other tactics caused us to lose what had been gained. Let us, then, follow the tactic of yesterday.'

Fr. Guallar added a corollary to the legal tactic, the need for an advanced social programme. He believed that violence was incompatible with the 'Christian redemption of society'; such methods were used only by selfish materialists. Lucía, leader of the important DRV, agreed: schools and the workers' bread were the issues, and the slow, hard task was to recover the ground lost by a century of 'Christian abandonment'. Acción Popular must become a

disciplined political party to overcome its great defect: the lack of a out-and-dried political programme.[1]

The outcome of the debate was victory for the accidentalists: violence and membership of Acción Popular were incompatible and its leaders could not be active members of other parties. Respect for opinions concerning the form of government was, however, reiterated.[2] The accidentalists wished to dissociate themselves from Monarchism, but not to press their case too strongly and so drive out such important organizations as that in Asturias with 29,000 members, the Monarchist leaders of which were willing to accept compromises. Closing the Assembly, Gil Robles emphasized the need for constitutional revision to liberate the Church and for a social policy 'to consolidate the just social advances'; the question of the form of régime was less important than the struggle against atheist materialism.[3]

Plans for the creation of a political party to succeed Acción Popular developed in November 1932 when Gil Robles attended the Third Assembly of the DRV in Valencia. Lucía's blueprint of 1930 for a nation-wide, confederal, Catholic party fitted well with his aims and Lucía, in charge of Acción Popular's organization, became his source of inspiration. Their mission was 'to recover what has

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1 The Debate was fully reported in El Debate, 23 Oct. 1932.

2 El Debate, 23 Oct. 1932.

3 El Debate, 25 Oct. 1932.

been lost, not the institutions, which pass away, but the principles which cannot die.'[1] The Right must await events and prepare itself for the task of government. The immediate rise of the Right to power would be 'a catastrophe' because persecution was too recent to allow serenity of judgment. The target should be the election of 120 or 150 deputies to the Cortes to put an end to this persecution and press for revision of the Constitution. 'These truths may not be to the liking of the partisans of "all or nothing", who, by wanting all, will most probably achieve nothing... The Right must be prepared for the occupation of power. When? At any time. Under what régime? Under any régime. Let us not get bogged down over what is accidental. The essential thing is the defence of Religion and Country... I am going to defend these wherever necessary and however possible; not to do this will be to put what is accidental before what is essential.'[2]

Although Goicoechea's resignation from Acción Popular was not made public until January 1933,[3] it was clear from the October Assembly that Monarchist activists could no longer continue within Acción

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1 El Debate, 29 Nov. 1932; for a summary of Lucía's En estas horas de transición, see Chapter II.

2 Gil Robles, El Debate, 30 Nov. 1932. Medina Togores reported that the speech had caused much surprise. The headline read: 'The Confederación española de las Derechas Autónomas approved.'

3 Goicoechea's letter of 8 Jan. said that he had told Gil Robles in October of his intention to leave after the prohibition of other political activities, and that he had delayed his resignation at the request of Gil Robles. Gil Robles's letter of 9 Jan. accepted his resignation and expressed hope for future cooperation (El Debate, 11 Jan. 1933).

Popular. If, to ease tender Monarchist consciences, Gil Robles maintained the theory that 'each member remains at liberty to uphold his convictions in their entirety and can defend them outside the organization',[1] in practice the programme of December 1931, in which Goicoechea had been responsible for the clause proclaiming 'the necessity for a discreet silence on the problem of the form of government',[2] was now a dead letter.

As soon as he was released from gaol in November 1932 Goicoechea began to work for a new Federación de Derechas which would take a stand on forms of government.[3] He hoped to attract into this new formation Monarchists within Acción Popular who felt uneasy about 'twisting their hearts round' in order to accept the new discipline of the group.[4] He also hoped that the Traditionalists would join, and at the invitation of some Traditionalists he addressed them on his programme, the basis of which he claimed was 'one symbol-word: tradition'. He explicitly rejected 'possibilism' and outlined a common policy founded upon Religion, Nation and 'unity of command'. He followed Vázquez de Mella in recommending separation of Church and State in conjunction with a concordat. Individual rights were

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1 El Nervión (Bilbao), 5 Jan. 1933, cited in Arrarás, HSRE II, 138.

2 Arrarás, HSRE II, 134-5.

3 Goicoechea, ABC, 25 Dec. 1932.

4 Conversations with Cortés Cavanillas and Vegas Latapié.

to be guaranteed by a strong and independent judiciary. His new Monarchy was also to have a 'parliamentary institution': Traditionalists were uneasy about his exact meaning on this point.[1]

The opportunity for Carlist-Alfonsine cooperation once again offered itself after the new turn taken by Acción Popular. In the autumn of 1932, on the initiative of Calvo Sotelo, another effort was made in Paris to end the dynastic schism. Alfonso XIII, accompanied by Calvo Sotelo and Vallellano among others, discussed matters with the Carlists Rodezno, Lamamié de Clairac, Oriol and Olazábal. As usual, the theoretical solution was that Alfonso's son Juan should succeed Alfonso Carlos after having accepted the principles of Traditionalism; since he would succeed Alfonso XIII, the two branches of the dynasty would thus be reunited. In practice, however, mutual distrust made matters difficult. Lamamié de Clairac suggested that Alfonso should renounce his claims in favour of his son, with the proviso that the renunciation would become invalid if Alfonso Carlos did not also renounce his rights in favour of Juan before an agreed time-limit should expire. Similarly, to reassure Carlists, Juan must go to live with Alfonso Carlos so that he could be immersed in the Traditionalist credo to which he would have to subscribe. The efforts failed in 1932 as they had in 1931: this time

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1 ABC, 20 Dec. 1932. A Traditionalist advocate of Monarchist unity had the week before emphasized the pre-condition of a traditional, not a parliamentary, Monarchy (Bilbao, ABC, 13 Dec. 1932). Goicoechea's phraseology did not remove Traditionalist doubts.

Alfonso XIII declined to accept the proposition after consultation with the old party-leaders La Cierva, Lema and Romanones. This failure, which led to renewed exchanges in Madrid between ABC and El Siglo Futuro in December,[1] put paid to Goicoechea's hopes for a Federación de Derechas. The letter of 10 January 1933, asking him to found a new grouping to be based on his speech on 'Traditionalism', was signed only by Alfonsines.[2]

Goicoechea announced the party's programme in another letter, which began by criticizing his former colleagues in Acción Popular for their undignified and deceitful accidentalist ideas. The aim of his own Monarchist party was to be 'nationalization of our institutions...and at the same time a total change in the organization and life of the State' - both impossible 'if we consider as indifferent problems described as being those of form, but which, in reality, are those of régime... We want a renovated Spain, but one which does not cease to be Spain. Spanish Renovation: such is our ideal and such must also be our device... For us the State is not form without content, but activity and thought consciously

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1 Galindo Herrero, Los partidos, 173-5.

2 ABC, 13 Jan. 1933. Signatories included ex-Mauristas like Silió, ex-members of the UMN like Maeztu, 'historic' Conservative, Liberal and independent Monarchists, Albiñana of the PNE, and two leaders of the Agrupación Autónoma Asturiana de Acción Popular, Fernández-Ladreda and Moutas, who had defended the Monarchist presence at the October Assembly, but who in fact chose to follow Gil Robles instead of Goicoechea. La Cierva had declined to lead a new party because he was too old (HCE, I-5, 573).

directed to the achievement of ends... The movement of redemptive reaction which we represent does not propose as its objective the pure and simple resurrection of the past prior to 14 April.'

'In the religious sphere, we are Catholics; in the political sphere, Monarchists; in the juridical sphere, constitutionalists and legalists; and in the social sphere, democrats.' Elaborating upon this statement of belief, Goicoechea explained that Church and State were to be separate. On the subject of politics he was emphatic: 'We are not Monarchists without a King, nor Monarchists without a Monarchy, nor Monarchists of a Monarchy silently buried in our breasts, but convinced and active Monarchists, who see in the Monarchy the keystone of the constitutional arch and the essential principle irreplaceable in a new order.' Nevertheless he saw the need for 'popular intervention in government' through an 'organized suffrage' and strong municipal liberties. He called for 'the submission of the State to Law', not in a parliament, but in 'a system of guarantees, of petitions; in a word, in what the English were wont to call "remedies" and Spanish political history called "fueros"... The centre of gravity of the constitutional edifice of the future will be removed from the parliamentary organ to the monarchical power and the judicial power.'

His social programme was vaguely Thomist. It spoke of responsibility for the mighty and aid for the weak and poor, thus obviating the class struggle by building a society in which the State regained 'its natural function of giving to each one his own, in default of

spontaneous agreement between the parts.'[1] Some days later Pemán spoke of reincorporating in the Monarchist programme 'the postulates of social renovation... Socially, such has been our behaviour that we have given grounds for the people to believe that capitalsim and Catholicism are twin ideas, or at least that they have a non-aggression pact signed between them. And this is to bring Christ into disrepute and sterilize the Blood of the Cross.'[2] The programme of Goicoechea did not provide incontrovertible proof of a volte-face.

Renovación Española was officially constituted on 23 February 1933.[3] Goicoechea continued to woo the Traditionalists: 'Of Traditionalism I shall say that in the past much has separated us; in the present almost nothing separates us, and in the future nothing will separate us.'[4] The Traditionalists however were not convinced of Alfonsine sincerity: Traditionalists remained Traditionalists and though circumstantial alliances could be concluded, they were determined to retain their identity and ideas intact.[5] The meagre

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1 ABC, 13 Jan. 1933.

2 ABC, 24 Jan. 1933.

3 ABC, 24 Feb. 1933. The first entry in the party's minute-book is dated 9 Feb. The executive committee was: A. Goicoechea Consulluela; Conde de Vallellano; S. Fuentes Pila, J. Danvila Rivera, A. Serrano Jover (all ex-Mauristas save one). Sec.: J. Layús.

4 ABC, 31 Jan. 1933; the sentence was a regular feature of subsequent speeches.

5 Lamamié de Clairac, ABC, 31 Jan. 1933.

result of all Goicoechea's labours was the creation in March of a joint electoral office, TYRE.[1]

The dynastic conundrum remained unsolved. The very thought of alliance with Alfonsine usurpers led to the foundation of a dissident Círculo Carlista in Madrid.[2] Within the Communion the El Cruzado Español group refused to countenance possible usurpation and pressed the senile Alfonso Carlos to convoke a grand assembly of Carlists to choose a successor.[3] Although Alfonso Carlos rejected such impertinence, comparing the scheme to an election for a President of the Republic, he remained firm in his contention that his rights could 'only be entrusted to that person who promises and swears to preserve intact the traditional principles, which...are above persons.' He did not actually exclude Juan provided that all the required conditions were fulfilled.[4] In June 1933 Juan formally became Alfonso

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1 First mentioned in ABC, 26 Mar. 1933. Abbreviation of Tradicionalistas y Renovación Española.

2 One of its leaders even wrote to El Socialista (11 Jan. 1933) to explain that the descendants of nineteenth-century veterans opposed Integrists who, 'covering themselves with the name of Traditionalists, which they have usurped from us, and under the pretext of a Federación de Derechas, with electoral aims - each time we understand less what the word 'Right' means - now seek to create a comic-opera Traditionalism... Never must we Traditionalists accept the person entitled 'Alfonso XIII' nor any of his descendants without our faces blushing with shame and the blood shed by our martyrs weighing on our consciences.'

3 Galindo, Los partidos, 185-6. The group was led by Gen. Díez de la Cortina, José de Cora Lira and Lorenzo Sáenz.

4 Documentos de D. Alfonso Carlos de Borbón y de Austria-Este (ed. M. Ferrer), (Madrid, 1950), 178, 194, 200, 203-6 & 215-7.

XIII's heir, but his father remained adamant: 'Even though the Monarchy is absent, I am and I shall be as long as I live the King of Spain. I have not renounced my rights nor am I thinking of doing so... I shall not abdicate in exile.'[1]

While these development had been taking place within the Monarchist Right, Gil Robles and Lucía had been active in the formation of a confederal Catholic party incorporating as far as was possible all the former groups adhering to Acción Popular. The new formation was to conclude electoral alliances with other Rightist groups as circumstances demanded. Gil Robles was an opponent of any 'permanent organization of union for Rightist forces.'[2] Members could be Republican or Monarchist at home, but must adhere publicly only to the principles of Acción Popular.[3] A congress of the various groups interested opened in Madrid on 28 February 1933. It was attended by delegates representing 735,058 members, thus constituting the biggest-ever Spanish political party.[4] On 4 March the Confederación Española de Derechas Autónomas (CEDA) was officially founded on the

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1 J. Cortés Cavanillas, Confesiones y muerte de Alfonso XIII (2nd ed., Madrid, 1951), 51 (23 July 1933). Texts of the renunciations of Alfonso and Jaime, the eldest sons, in Melgar, Escisión dinástica, 184-5.

2 El Debate, 23 Dec. 1932.

3 Gil Robles, El Debate, 27 Dec. 1932.

4 El Debate, 2 Mar. 1933.

initiative of the DRV, whose leader had originally conceived the idea. Immediately the party passed as three general points of its programme its affirmation of Christian civilization, the need for constitutional revision to help attain this ideal, and obedience to the precepts of the Collective Declaration of the Episcopacy of December 1931.[1]

The social policies of the new party followed closely the Encyclicals of Leo XIII and Pius XI. The principles on which its social policy was based were rejection of the class struggle, the limited intervention of the State in social and economic affairs, a directed economy regulated, not by the State, but by means of its own corporative organization, a juster distribution of wealth and the spread of small-scale property-owning, and the right to work for all workers, manual and intellectual. From these principles, the party programme formulated certain practical deductions. Free choice was allowed in respect of membership of unions, but membership of corporations was to be obligatory. The system of Mixed

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1 El Debate, 5 Mar. 1933. Lucía explicitly claimed to be the initiator of the CEDA at the DRV Assembly of Nov. 1932 (El Debate, 8 Jan. & 7 Mar. 1933). The National Council of the CEDA comprised:- Pres.: Gil Robles. Vicepres.: Lucía (DRV) & Madariaga (Acción Obrerista). Sec.: F. Salmón Amorín (Murcia). Vice-sec.: Srta. Velasco (Asociación Femenina, Madrid). Treas.: Valiente (JAP). Members: Fernández Ruano & Pabón (Andalusia); Mañueco (León); Sánchez Miranda (Extremadura); Ruiz del Castillo (Galicia); Sancho Izquierdo (Aragón); Marqués de Verger (Balearics); Pérez Valero (Canaries); Fernández-Ladreda (Asturias); Ortiz de Solórzano & Cirujano (Castiles); Sra. Arroyo & Srta. Bohigas (Asociaciones Femeninas; & Serrano Rodríguez (Acción Obrerista).

Juries was to be retained to settle work-contracts and resolve labour disputes, but the members of the juries were to be elected on a system of proportional representation and presidents were to be 'social magistrates' uncommitted to either side. There was to be a just minimum wage, profit-sharing and co-management in firms within the framework of the Encyclicals, as well as a compulsory system of social insurance to be financed jointly by the State, employers and workers. The length of the working-day was to depend on the nature of the work. Workers were to receive training in skills, while in general industries were to be 'Hispanicized' and workers given the best deal possible, subject to the exigencies of the national economy in relation to the international economy.[1]

Thus the Congress decided against 'an anti-Christian social régime, based upon egoism, which has failed', and against 'the suicidal class struggle, which ruins the economy, and, therefore, the working class.' The motion for a corporative state based on such a policy was put forward by the DRV, Acción Obrerista and the JAP of Madrid.[2] The result was a formulation of social and economic corporativism in line with the Encyclical Quadragesimo Anno (1931).

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1 El Debate, 5 Mar. 1933. Other points included repeal of anti-clerical legislation and a concordat, the strengthening of the executive, regionalism, full municipal autonomy, freedom of education, neutrality in external affairs, closer links with Spanish America and the Holy See and modernization of the army (Arrarás, HSRE II, 147).

2 El Debate, 4 Mar. 1933.

The political superstructure to be built on this socio-economic basis was left an open question by the Congress, though a motion put down by the JAP condemning universal inorganic suffrage and calling for an Italian-style corporative régime was rejected.[1] In the CEDA's system, unions were to cease to be purely organizations for resistance and were to become organs for collaboration in 'a Christian conception of the corporative organization of the State.'[2] The party sought a third way between economic individualism and the 'fetishism' of socialism, nationalism or communism.[3] Gil Robles proclaimed that 'one does not fight against Marxism with Hitlerian militias or Fascist legions, but with an advanced social programme.'[4]

The CEDA, like Acción Popular, with its autonomous ally Acción Obrerista, before it, took great care to project its image as a party of social reform, and as such, an alternative to Socialism. In the process, strong attacks were made on selfish property-owners and employers whose sole ambition lay 'in the maintenance of an order guaranteed by the rifles of the Civil Guard' and who intended 'the priests to fulfil the shameful function of keeping order by preaching to the people resignation and obedience and not revealing to them

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1 El Debate, 3 Mar. 1933.

2 El Debate, 3 Jan. 1933 (also 23 Dec. 1932).

3 Salmón, El Debate, 16 May 1933.

4 El Debate, 7 Mar. 1933.

their rights.'[1] The time had come for a change: 'we live in times of terrible truths; we want nothing to do with the Red Star of Moscow; but we declare war on black capitalism, exploiter of the poor... More religion and less Pharisaism; more justice and less liturgy.'[2] For those like Herrera, who lamented that Rerum Novarum had not pentrated the minds of Spanish Catholics,[3] this was a source of encouragement. The new wave of enthusiasm led Fr. Guallar to quote Bakunin with approval: 'Let us go to the people!'[4] The social-Catholic cry was taken up throughout the CEDA; even the millionaire notary and absentee landlord Cananueva asked: 'What concept of property have the propertied upheld? Ninety per cent of them do not know the Encyclicals of Leo XIII and Pius XI save by name. What has the upper class done? It has forgotten its tradition and played polo and golf. And the youth? Cut class and played billiards.'[5] Self-criticism was fashionable; it remained to be

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1 Fr. Guallar, El Debate, 19 Nov. 1932.

2 The words of a young lawyer addressing the Congress of Catholic Youths, El Debate, 20 Dec. 1932.

3 El Debate, 27 June 1933.

4 El Debate, 19 Nov. 1932.

5 El Debate, 11 Apr. 1933. Valiente got a mixed reception at a Monarchist dinner when he said that 'the revolution surprised the aristocracy of lineage playing bridge.' (El Debate, 24 Feb. 1933). Gil Robles himself recommended 'little casino life and much going out to the villages and pueblos of Spain. Less toasting in champagne and more going to see the needs of the farmers who cannot make a living' (El Debate, 20 June 1933).

seen whether it would lead to practical consequences.

The policy of the CEDA also emphasized decentralization in accordance with Papal doctrines of pluralism, although for some members of the party its programme tended towards centralism. If the party's ideology subscribed to traditional theories of regionalism, the importance of the rôle of the region was perhaps undermined by the stress put on the rôle of the municipality as a natural entity to be recognized by law. Municipal government was seen as a 'school for citizenship' and must therefore be freed from caciquismo and be granted wide powers of administrative autonomy. In this respect, the party programme was consciously indebted to Maurismo.[1]

Policy reflected perhaps the regional strength of the CEDA: the local patriotism of the Meseta tended to identify itself with national patriotism and its 'regionalism' was 'anti-regionalist', for the Meseta was the heart of Spain, not simply one region among many. Regionalism was kept fully alive in 'peripheral' Spain by the DRV, which held fast to its vision of 'an autonomous and autarchic Valencia with capacity and power to govern itself and prescribe the laws by which it must be ruled, within the sphere of its regional ends.' This liberty was for Lucía a sine qua non for participation in the Catholic political confederation, which he carefully emphasized was based on a pact and was not the product of

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1 El Debate, 4 & 5 Mar. 1933; Monge Bernal, AP, 640-61.

simple amalgamation. He saw the DRV as forming the link between the CEDA and other Catholic regional parties - the Lliga and the PNV - although his grand design was never realised.[1]

In general, the policies and structure of the CEDA bore quite close resemblance to the Christian Democrat parties of Western Europe. Like them, it was a confederation of regions and social classes, even if the working-class element was not very considerable in the towns. The backbone of its membership was the farming community, particularly the peasant society of León and the two Castiles. It believed in 'localism' subject to the greater organism represented by the nation, and its policies followed carefully the social teaching of the Church.[2] First and foremost it was profoundly Catholic: 'the essence, the marrow and the heart of Acción Popular and, consequently, of the CEDA, is its religious confessionalism.'[3] 'We are proud of our confessionalism', said Lucía, 'but...those responsible for our political acts are ourselves... We wish to be of service to the Church, not to use the Church in our service.'

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1 L. Lucía, La Confederación Española de Derechas Autónomas (Valencia, 1933), 13-4; & El Debate, 8 Jan. 1933, which reported his visit to Barcelona for talks with Cambó. Gil Robles had previously refused to take part in Cambó's plan for a Derecha Republicana, to be led by Cambó and to be composed of the Lliga, Acción Popular and the Conservative Republicans of Miguel Maura (ABC, 30 Dec. 1932).

2 Cf. M.P. Fogarty, Christian Democracy in Western Europe (London, 1957), esp. 78, 86 & 101.

3 Monge Bernal, AP, 470.

'Let us defend God and Spain and leave in His hands the form of government', said Gil Robles. 'They [the Monarchists] tell us that we are cowards because we do not commit ourselves in favour of one or other form of government... But is it we who allowed the Monarchy to fall?... From the Crown that perished I could only pluck a Cross and I clasped it to me and with it I began the Reconquest of the Spanish Right... Before form we defend content; before the perishable we defend the eternal; before men, we defend God.'[1]

The formation of rival Catholic-accidentalist and Alfonsine parties brought division and a new alignment to the Right. The CEDA, successor to Acción Popular and Acción Nacional, was not in the event weakened significantly by the departure of Alfonsines who could not bring themselves to remain Monarchists in foro interno. Of the two groups which had opposed the virtual expulsion of the Monarchists at the October Assembly, the Agrupación Regional Independiente (Santander) retained its independence as a local coalition of all Rightists, while Acción Popular in Asturias accepted the discipline of the CEDA. Alfonsines, like Carlists, left the original provincial coalitions, but only one of these, Acción Ciudadana of Cádiz, cast off from the parent organization.[2]

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1 El Debate, 7 Mar. 1933.

2 Acción Ciudadana was led by the ex-UMN Alfonsines Pemán and the Marqués de Villapesadilla and the Traditionalist Martínez de Pinillos (El Debate, 19 Feb. 1933).

Goicoechea's hopes of drawing off large numbers of Alfonsines were dashed. Renovación Española proved such a disappointment that by June 1933 its leaders were pressing for use of the ultimate weapon: a declaration by Alfonso XIII that membership of the CEDA was incompatible with Monarchist convictions. Alfonso called Gil Robles to Paris, but although the latter told him that he would be loyal to the Republic, the King chose not to make difficulties for the CEDA.[1] The division of the 'authentic' Right into three parts - accidentalist, Alfonsine, Carlist - was now clear and polemics frequent. To opponents, however, the Right still appeared as a Traditionalist had envisaged it: three corps of the same army separated only by tactical considerations.[2]

ii. The decline and fall of Azaña

The immediate concern of the Right when the Cortes reopened in

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1 They met secretly at the house of the Conde de Aybar. Gil Robles said: 'I am a Monarchist; but I am prepared to govern under the Republic in defence of the highest interests, and if I govern under the Republic I shall be completely loyal to it, because a Monarchy brought in by anyone disloyal would not last three months in Spain. If I can serve Spain within the Republic I shall do so, even though it be to the detriment of the restoration of the Monarchy.' He argued that the CEDA would not compromise the Monarchist cause if its tactics failed, which he thought probable. Alfonso accepted this and told Gil Robles: 'Your task is immense. I shall do nothing to hinder you.' No condemnation of the CEDA was issued (J. Gutiérrez-Ravé, 'Algunas entrevistas históricas de Don Alfonso XIII', ABC, 28 Feb. 1964). Galindo, Los partidos, 235-6, notes another interview, at which Casanueva was also present, some weeks later.

2 Lamamié de Clairac, ABC, 7 Feb. 1933.

October 1932 was to mitigate the repressive measures taken by the government after 10 August. Of the main newspapers suspended, El Debate was allowed to reappear on 8 October and La Nación and El Imparcial on 22 October, but it was not until 30 November that the 'civic death' of ABC came to an end after three and a half months which had cost the Monarchist daily 2,391,438 pesetas.[1] Gil Robles, who had supported the government on 10 August, protested that people were still detained after two months although government-appointed special judges had acquitted them, and newspapers remained suspended even though no charge could be brought against them under the Defence Law.[2]

On 23 November Agrarians, Basque-Navarrese and Federal Republicans demanded the immediate discussion of the law creating the Court of Constitutional Guarantees, or alternatively the setting up of a Cortes Committee to deal with complaints concerning detentions and deportations. The motion was rejected but it gave rise to an interesting confrontation between Azaña and Gil Robles. 'Sr. Azaña:

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1 ABC paid its Madrid and Seville staffs during the period; it cited editorials from before 10 August to show that it had not been implicated, and said the government had never given any reason for the suspension: 'Never...during all the governments of six reigns and two Republics was there applied to a newspaper a governmental sanction so severe as it was lacking in legal justification' (ABC, 30 Nov. 1932).

2 DSCC, 18 Oct. 1932. He said that 5,000 people were still detained, of whom only 137 had been tried (DSCC, 9 Nov. 1932).

Independence of the judicial power? It depends! Independence from what? (Sr. Gil Robles: From the government.) Exactly. Independence of the judicial power from what? (Sr. Gil Robles: From the meddlings of the government. - Murmurs) Then I do not believe in the independence of the judicial power. (Sr. Gil Robles: But the Constitution says so.) The Constitution may say what it likes, what I say... (Sr. Gil Robles: Article 94 of the Constitution.) Calm yourself, Sr. Gil Robles. What I say, Señores Diputados, is that neither the judicial power, nor the legislative power, nor the executive power can be independent of the national public spirit.'[1]

The deportations without trial or time-limit to Villa Cisneros were not debated until the end of December, though Lamamié de Clairac had been pressing for a debate since 7 October. They were, he said, quite unconstitutional; he made an issue of the government's choice of vessel, España núm. 5, an old cattle-transport, unsafe, insanitary and overcrowded.[2] Apart from deportations, detentions and closure of political offices, the constant complaint of the Right in 1933, as in 1932, was the use made of the Defence Law of the Republic. Priests were fined or imprisoned for sermons against civil marriage and divorce; one of their number claimed that 'any attack, not on the régime, but on the laws emanating from the

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1 DSCC, 23 Nov. 1932.

2 DSCC, 28 Dec. 1932. Casares Quiroga called the accusations exaggerated.

powers of the Republic, is considered an attack on the régime.'[1] Local authorities in the hands of the government's friends were accused of caciquismo.[2] The arch-liberal Royo Villanova said that 'a government which calls itself liberal and democratic cannot govern with the Defence Law of the Republic.' The new régime had become 'a Fascist Republic... You have had the effrontery to say: "Long live the Republic and death to liberty".'[3] During 1932 Acción Popular held 695 meetings, but had 172 suspended;[4] this situation continued into 1933 and was seen by Gil Robles as an effort by Azaña to tempt the party to abandon legal methods.[5]

Whether or not the Right was correct in maintaining that measures against its propaganda were motivated by fear of publicity of

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1 Guallar, DSCC, 11 Nov. 1932.

2 In Villafranca de los Caballeros the town-council hired a band and billeted the musicians on their political enemies instead of paying them (Madariaga, DSCC, 31 Mar. 1933). In El Redal it was said that a man who had voted for the Right had committed suicide after failing to gain admission to a hospital through the machinations of caciques of Acción Republicana (Ortiz de Solórzano, DSCC, 18 May 1933). Rightists were keen to reveal the origins of government agents: the Mayor of Las Navalmorales, now a self-styled 'Marxist', was formerly President of the local Unión Patriótica (Madariaga, DSCC, 7 July 1933).

3 DSCC, 15 Feb., 15 Mar. & 16 May 1933.

4 El Debate, 1 Jan. 1933.

5 Gil Robles, Spain in Chains, 2. Under Azaña, 150 papers were suspended, 320 branches of Acción Popular were closed, 3,000 fines levied on Rightists, 470 political activists and publicists imprisoned or deported, 280 meetings banned and 80 members' houses damaged by mobs - all by the arbitrary decision or non-intervention of the authorities.

the government's shortcomings, the economic situation continued to worsen as a consequence of disorder and now of the world depression. The volume of trade decreased, while imports continued to exceed exports. The crisis continued in the metallurgical and mining industries, the chief employers of non-agricultural labour, and agricultural exports fell by half during the biennium.[1] With falling revenue and increased expenditure, the budget deficit increased.[2] The peseta also continued to fall: the exchange-rate with the French franc, 37.05 per 100 in April 1931, was 48.05 in September 1932.[3] While, in general, the government presented economic difficulties in the light of the world depression, the Right blamed it for its incompetence, its chronic inability to keep order and its socializing tendencies which destroyed internal and external business confidence. Industrial unrest was perhaps at its worst in the first half of 1933, being largely the consequence of the revolutionary émeutes of the CNT. It was calculated that 102 persons were killed and 140 hurt as a result of social crimes in the first six months of 1933.[4] It

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1 F.G. Bruguera, Histoire contemporaine d'Espagne (n.pl., 1954), 391. The index of industrial production fell from 84.5 in March 1931 to 67 in June 1932 (100 = 1928): DSCC, 18 Oct. 1932. Export markets for the Valencisn orange, an important item, shrank in Germany and Britain, in the latter case as a consequence of protection after the Ottawa Conference.

2 Madariaga, Spain, 441.

3 Carner, DSCC, 18 Oct. 1932.

4 Arrarás, HSRE II, 157-62 & 164-6.

was against such a background that the budget for 1933 was severely criticized in the Cortes.

The main lines of the Agrarian attack on Carner's budget were that expenditure had been increased in non-productive sectors, while it was inadequate for the things that really mattered. Frequent criticisms were voiced concerning the wasteful expansion of the bureaucracy at the expense of the productive sector, notably public works; enchufismo was something which scandalized all Agrarians.[1] Under the Monarchy, some 2,000,000,000 pesetas had been spent on public works; Carner had increased this item to the inadequate extent of 143,000,000, despite the termination of the royal and ecclesiastical budgets and a cut of 170,000,000 in Moroccan expenditure - and this at a time when there were more than half a million unemployed. On the other hand, expenditure on the bureaucracy had soared by 1,000,000,000 pesetas.[2] The Republic of workers of every class had become, in Unamuno's phrase, the Republic of functionaries.

On the Ministry of Labour's budget, Largo Caballero found him-

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1 E.g. Calderón, DSCC, 25 Nov. 1932; liberal Agrarians were at heart opposed to any new expenditure and longed for a balanced budget.

2 Pildáin, DSCC, 3 & 4 Nov. 1932. The Canon of Vitoria stressed the need for work-creation schemes on lines planned by the German Ministry of Labour and the Belgian Socialists. The official figure for unemployment - probably an under-estimate - was around 600-700,000; e.g. in Aug. 1933 there were 285,898 totally unemployed and 258,000 working a 3/4 day week (quoted in El Debate, 18 Aug. 1933).

self under fire from Fr.Guallar from the Right and Balbontín from his Left. 1,000,000 pesetas had been allocated for relief of the unemployed, just one four-hundredth of the total budget. Fr.Guallar demanded a forty-fold increase, though agreeing with the Minister that preparation of a compulsory insurance system by the State was an urgent necessity. In the short run, more relief and more public works were the answers, together with the restoration of order necessary to attract capital and get the economy moving again. He also attacked Largo Caballero's mixed juries: although the principle was good, partisan presidents were not. Yet the boycott by the CNT often made them pointless; in some areas Governors and employers negotiated directly with the Anarcho-Syndicalists, and this must either be stopped or the juries disbanded.[1] Social-Catholics complained that the theory and practice of social legislation diverged widely for political reasons. The system had been turned into 'a weapon in the service of the new caciquismos' of the Socialists.[2]

Spirited attacks were also directed against the agricultural budget; unemployment was mostly rural. Only 0.45 per cent of the total budget was devoted to agriculture, and bureaucrats accounted for much of this at the expense of the need for credit, electricity

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1 DSCC, 8 & 9 Dec. 1932. Guallar pointed out that the juries were a continuation of the Dictator's arbitration committees, if now 'perverted'. Likewise Largo's Caja especial para el paro forzoso was the Instituto Nacional de Previsión of 1928 under another name.

2 Madariaga, DSCC, 8 Dec. 1932.

and reafforestation.[1] The condition of the countryside in 1933 remained much as it had been in 1932; here again anarchy and government incompetence were the charges levelled by the Right.[2] In the 'stable' area of the Meseta the problem was one of wheat prices. In the provinces of Burgos and Palencia, it was said, prices had fallen to a pre-1914 level; in Valladolid wheat was being sold at 40 pesetas, instead of the official minimum 46 pesetas. There was a surplus in 1933, but Agrarians could not persuade Domingo to raise the minimum price-level, give more credit-facilities to farmers and millers, build silos for storage or tie wages to prices.[3]

In the Cortes a cerealist group was formed under Royo Villanova which included Agrarians, Conservatives, Radicals and Progressives.[4] The National Cerealist Assembly held in May 1933 demanded the resignations of Domingo and Largo Caballero, a minimum price-level of 53 pesetas, lower rail-charges, better credit-facilities, an end to disorder and the Law of Municipal Boundaries, a total ban on importation of cereals and a reform of the mixed juries to give the deciding voice to judges and agronomists.[5] According to Gil Robles,

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1 Fanjul, DSCC, 16 Dec. 1932.

2 E.g. El Debate, 1 Feb. 1933.

3 Martín, DSCC, 4 May 1933. Domingo thought the surplus exceptionally large.

4 El Debate, 17 Mar. 1933.

5 El Debate, 17 & 18 May 1933. Speakers noted with suspicion that the trade with Catalonia had fallen from 300 to 30 wagons per week.

3,140,000 rural workers were being sacrificed to please 1,860,000 urban workers; an increase of the wheat price, at least to cover the cost of production, was imperative. The consequent rise in the price of bread could be borne by townsmen if they spent less on luxuries.[1]

In the 'unstable' countryside of Andalusia and Extremadura, where unemployment was worst, government policies (or lack of them) and disorder were denounced by the Right as the root-causes of the trouble. The government's promises of agrarian reform did not materialize; by February 1933, 1,325 properties of 16,082 hectares had been expropriated by the Institute,[2] but Domingo seemed to be able to do nothing except create confusion and disillusionment.[3] Disillusionment led to extra-legal methods and a Decree for the Intensification of Farming (1 November 1932) which was used to legalize as temporary occupations the illegal seizure of land, notably in Extremadura.[4] In Extremadura, it was reported, 'a state of veritable anarchy' existed, with daily violence and invasions of estates

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1 DSCC, 18 Oct. 1932.

2 El Debate, 2 Feb. 1933.

3 Memorias íntimas de Azaña, 90-3, notes that nothing had been done by the summer of 1933. Azaña portrays Domingo as quite ignorant of agriculture and having little idea of what he was doing; land reform was held up by the 'little parliament' of the Institute.

4 El Debate, 2 Feb. 1933. The Governor sanctioned occupations with slips of paper (Ventosa, ABC, 9 May 1933).

organized by the Socialist Casas del Pueblo without the interference of the Civil Guard which had orders to turn a blind eye.[1] According to the conservative ABC 'the atmosphere of violence, of anarchic indiscipline, which continues unabated like an incurable madness from end to end of Spain, goes on providing its daily list of killings, of outrages, of pillagings, of all kind of rebelliousness and abuse. The break-up of the State...is not a rhetorical image.'[2]

Apart from violence the actions of the Socialist-controlled mixed juries caused trouble. The jury of Salamanca province permitted employment of UGT members only and forbade dismissals. Reapers were to be paid 12 pesetas for an eight-hour day, and since overtime was inevitable at harvest-time the daily wage rose to 19.65 pesetas, more than was earned by a skilled urban worker. With prices depressed, smallholders simply could not pay these sums and joined the ranks of unemployed labourers. The area under cultivation fell, and Gil Robles noted unprecedented unemployment in Salamanca in spite of the ban on Portuguese and Gallego migrant labour.[3] The farmers reacted by disregarding the jury's orders.

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1 Arrarás, HSRE II, 50.

2 ABC, 21 May 1933.

3 DSCC, 18 Oct. 1932.

Clashes and arrests followed.[1] In the province of Seville the picture was also one of decreasing cultivation, falling production, low prices, starvation, anarchy and economic collapse.[2]

It was in this atmosphere of desperation and collapse in the countryside that one of the periodic Anarchist _jacqueries_ took place in January 1933. One of the places affected was an insignificant _pueblo_ in the backward province of Cádiz called Casas Viejas, where on 11 January 'Libertarian Communism' was proclaimed by 'Sixfingers', a man with ideas. The government sought to put down the Anarchist outbreaks as speedily as possible, and Assault Guards were sent to Casas Viejas with orders to be tough which came from the impulsive Minister of the Interior, Casares Quiroga.[3] In Casas Viejas the resistance of 'Sixfingers' was overcome; the officer in charge then rounded up twelve of the inhabitants and shot them. When this became known, Azaña and his government came under severe attack from the extreme Left and from the Radicals, who saw a chance to bring down the government and who had a reputation for favouring local Anarchists as a way of worsting their common Socialist enemy.

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1 _El Debate_, 22 June-11 July 1933. The leader of the _Bloque Agrario_ had been imprisoned for advising farmers not to sow or pay taxes. The situation in Jaén had been similar (_El Socialista_, 1 & 4 Oct. 1932.

2 Protest of 2,000 Sevillano farmers to Alcalá-Zamora, _El Debate_, 9 May 1933.

3 Entry in Azaña's diary, 11 Jan. 1933 (_Memorias íntimas_, 208).

The debates in the Cortes were prolonged and heated, and revolved around whether or not the government had given the order 'No wounded, no prisoners. Shoot in the belly.' The Right did not lead the attack in the Cortes but allowed the Radicals to do the work so that the gap between the Republican parties would widen. Lerroux's lieutenant Martínez Barrio launched a fierce attack on the government: 'I believe that there is something worse than a régime being lost, and that is that this régime should fall spattered with mud, cursed by History, surrounded by disgrace, tears and blood.'[1] From these words the Right as well as the Radicals were to gain great profit; henceforth Azaña's régime was widely known as 'the government of Casas Viejas'.[2]

After the Casas Viejas affair, which caused a fall in Azaña's popularity in Republican circles, debate began in earnest on the Law concerning Religious Confessions and Congregations, already denounced by El Debate when introduced in the previous autumn as 'an act of aggression against the Catholic Church...a declaration of

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1 DSCC, 23 Feb. 1933; the phrase in fact became telescoped into: 'a régime of mud, blood and tears.'

2 The Rightist opposition at the time is freely termed 'Pharisaism' by Sáinz Rodrígues (conversation). The affair also destroyed the image of the Assault Guards, a creation of Miguel Maura in 1931; henceforth these armed police had the same prestige as the tricorn-hats of the Civil Guard. On the affair see Arrarás, HSRE II, 81-105; cf. G. Jackson, The Spanish Republic and the Civil War (Princeton, 1965), 101-2 & 513-4.

war on a most important sector of Spanish society; we believe the most numerous one.' Government policy seemed to be to force Catholics into opposition to the Republic.[1] The law was designed to give effect to Articles 26 and 27 of the Constitution and said that all ecclesiastical property belonged to the State, though the Church could go on using the buildings. Religious Orders and Congregations were forbidden to engage directly or indirectly in commerce, industry, agriculture or education. The activities of the Orders were thus drastically curtailed and brought under close supervision by the State.[2]

According to Catholic statistics, the educational and welfare work of the Orders affected 1,312,770 people. The Orders gave primary education to 601,950 pupils in comparison with the 1,774,400 in state schools, while they provided secondary schooling for 27,000, compared with the State's 25,000.[3] All this was to come to an end. Gil Robles declared Catholics' 'implacable hostility' to the bill, and warned that if it ever came into force they would have to disobey

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1 El Debate, 15 Oct. & 2 Dec. 1932.

2 Text of the law in DSCC, 2 June 1933 App.

3 El Debate, 26 Feb. 1933, citing the Church survey of 1931; there were 4,804 religious houses in Spain - 998 male and 3,806 female. Los Ríos, who admitted that his figures were deficient, said the Orders had 351,937 primary and 17,098 secondary pupils (Arrarás, HSRE II, 122). Among welfare services were help given to 669,982 of the poor, hospital treatment for 82,386, care for 30,784 children, meals for 190,460, shelter for 39,077 and care for 15,320 cases of leprosy and 18,073 mental cases (El Debate, 30 Apr. 1933).

it.[1] The Radicals, who had said that they would obstruct in the Cortes until the Socialists left power, now dissociated themselves from the Catholics on the grounds that this was an exceptional case of a law complementary to the Constitution.[2] For the Socialists, the law meant 'simply a deprivation of privileges which nobody can claim when the State wishes to be truly sovereign.'[3]

Agrarian Deputies opposed the law with claims that it exceeded the terms of Article 26 and contradicted other articles of the Constitution; the State ownership of Church property was confiscation clearly contrary to the Constitution. For Gil Robles, opposition was a 'duty of conscience' since he recognized that the Catholics had no hope of modifying the Draft or even of submitting it to the Court of Constitutional Guarantees because this still had to be created. To replace the Orders' education would cost the debilitated Treasury another 200,000,000 pesetas annually. He saw the law as an expedient to hold together Azaña's creaking coalition, 'an injection of anticlericalism to give life to the corpse which occupies the Blue Bench'; even though the price was spiritual civil war. He warned the government that it was opening any abyss between Catholics and non-Catholics: 'Sedition is not licit, but passive

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1 El Debate, 21 Feb. 1933.

2 Lerroux, El Debate, 19 & 23 Feb. 1933.

3 El Socialista, 7 Feb. 1933.

resistance is when the law is contrary to the principles of justice, which are above legal formalism.'[1]

Basque Nationalists considered the law an attack on Basque liberty as well as on their consciences. The government's bill reflected the educational concepts of Gentile and the étatisme of Mussolini and was therefore 'pure Fascism'.[2] From the liberal-Catholic standpoint, Estelrich of the Lliga thought it an 'act of war' while Royo Villanova found it contradictory: Church and State were separate, yet this was intervention by the State in the province of the Church.[3] Meanwhile Fr. Guallar examined the government's motives: 'Anti-clericalism is the cream-tart which is given to people when there is nothing else to give them... Just as the Roman Emperors distracted the people with the cruel and brutish games of the amphitheatre so that it should not be mindful of its servitude, so today they distract it with the parish priests and the monks. These are the circenses of our times.'[4]

Yet despite all the passion engendered, the articles of the

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1 Cid & Gil Robles, DSCC, 9 Feb. 1933.

2 Aguirre & Leizaola, DSCC, 10 Feb. & 29 Mar. 1933; also the Traditionalist Oreja Elósegui, DSCC, 22 Feb. 1933.

3 Estelrich, DSCC, 6 Apr. 1933; Royo Villanova, DSCC, 15 & 17 Mar. 1933.

4 Guallar, DSCC, 10 Feb. 1933. Canon Pildáin failed to convince Socialists to abandon anti-clericalism and to join Catholics in the quest for social justice (DSCC, 10 Feb. & 1 Mar. 1933).

law were passed one by one. Encouraged by the victory they claimed in the municipal elections of 23 April, the Agrarians and Basque-Navarrese began systematic obstruction of the measure at the end of April, when the additional provisions of Radical-Socialists and Left Republicans that the Orders' education should end by 1 October (except for primary education which could continue until 31 December 1933) were accepted by the government.[1] To obviate lengthy discussion of amendments demanding the exclusion of each Order from the effects of the law, the government decided to guillotine the debates. The law was finally passed on 17 May by 278 votes to 50.[2] Catholics saw the 'Law against Religious Congregations and Communities' as the fruit of the labour of the five Ministers and sixty-two Deputies who were Masons; but 'the Masonic lodges can press their victory too far.'[3]

Now it was up to Alcalá-Zamora, for the Constitution allowed the President to send laws back to the Cortes for reconsideration. Catholic organizations lobbied him relentlessly for the statutory fortnight, but Alcalá-Zamora merely made the token gesture of post-

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1 El Debate, 28 Apr. 1933. Fanjul called for the withdrawal of the law after the elections, and Gil Robles for the government's resignation (DSCC, 26 Apr. 1933).

2 DSCC, 17 May 1933. Those voting against the law were the Agrarians, the Basque-Navarrese, the Lliga, Right Republicans including S. Alba, and Gallego Catholics.

3 El Debate & ABC, 18 May 1933.

poning his signature for as long as constitutionally permissible.[1] He signed on 2 June. The next day the Catholic Deputies issued their manifesto to the country. In it, Alcalá-Zamora was criticized for not having made full use of his constitutional powers. The Deputies called for the repeal of all anti-religious legislation, appealing to 'all citizens of good faith who view with deep sadness the ruin of their Country, irresponsibly managed by the foreign powers of the Masonic sects and the Socialist International.'[2]

Alcalá-Zamora's signature also prompted the publication of a collective declaration by the Bishops protesting against the laicist attack on the Church but stressing that the Church was not anti-Republican. The law had infringed the right of fathers to educate their children and disregarded the Church's inviolable right to instruct. The Declaration reminded the faithful that attendance at lay schools was contrary to canon law and that there were canonical penalties for persecutors of the Church. The Bishops spoke of the 'lack of legal force of all enacted in opposition to the integral rights of the Church' and exhorted the faithful to see to it that

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1 It seems very unlikely that Alcalá-Zamora seriously thought of withholding his signature. The Italian Ambassador notes that he sent for the Nuncio, but greeted Tedeschini with the words, 'Excellency, look what they're making me do!' (Guariglia, Ricordi, 207).

2 The manifesto was signed by all Agrarians, Basques and Navarrese, and by the Independent Republican Canon García Gallego and Blanco-Rajoy, a Gallego Catholic. Renovación Española demanded a referendum (El Debate, 4, 5 & 6 June 1933).

the offending sections were removed from the law of the land.[1]

Similarly Pius XI's Encyclical Dilectissimi Nobis (3 June) referred to 'the unjust situation created for the Church in Spain ... We have frequently made known to the present Spanish rulers how erroneous is the path embarked upon.' The Pope nevertheless emphasized that 'Our Word is not directed against forms of government.' Catholics ought to oppose the latest law by 'all the legitimate means which Natural Law and [Republican] legislation allow them.' Religious education must be fostered, unity must be the watchword and Catholic Action must be strengthened 'for the defence of the Faith and to ward off the dangers which threaten civil society itself.'[2] Rightist personalities therefore united to start a company to found Catholic private schools,[3] while Catholic Action was reinvigorated by Herrera. El Debate recommended a boycott of lay schools, following the precedent of Belgium.[4]

During the acrimonious debates on the Law concerning Religious Confessions and Congregations, partial municipal elections were

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1 El Debate, 3 June 1933. The Declaration was dated 25 May 1933.

2 El Debate, 4 June 1933.

3 The board of the Sociedad Anónima de Enseñanza Libre included the liberal Martínez de Velasco, the Alfonsine Sáinz Rodríguez, the Carlist Lamamié de Clairac, Gil Robles, and the wealthy Marqués de la Vega de Anzo (ABC, 4 July 1933). Buckley (Spanish Republic, 100) says that though there was always a lay headmaster, teachers were often monks or nuns in ordinary dress.

4 El Debate, 1 July 1933. Herrera had resigned as editor in February 1933 to take over Catholic Action.

held on 23 April to replace the temporary committees appointed by Maura in 1931. Although Martínez de Velasco suggested that the Right should boycott the elections if the Defence Law were not suspended, it was the contrary view of Gil Robles which prevailed. Abstention by Rightists would be wrong; they should form part of a 'single anti-Marxist front.'[1] The Agrarian minority reached agreement with the Republicans in opposition - Radicals, Conservatives, Liberal-Democrats - and alliances were concluded according to local needs.[2]

The elections were important, not only as a sounding of opinion, but because Mayors controlled local life by their command over rural police and labour-exchanges.[3] During the campaign there were many violent incidents and some irregularities, in which the Left would seem to have been mainly at fault.[4] The Ministry of the Interior's

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1 Martínez de Velasco & Gil Robles, El Debate, 8 & 14 Mar. 1933 respectively.

2 El Debate, 5 & 8 Apr. 1933; the PNV declined to join, not wishing to involve itself in 'Spanish' problems. In some areas, Gil Robles claimed, Radicals and Conservatives allied with Socialists (El Debate, 18 Apr. 1933).

3 Gil Robles, El Debate, 18 Apr. 1933.

4 E.g. at Reinosa (Santander) on 31 Mar. Sáinz Rodríguez & Fernández were addressing local sympathizers with the permission of the Socialist Mayor when Socialists fired on the building and set fire to it. One Rightist was killed, but neither the Mayor nor the Civil Guard would intervene (El Debate, 1 & 2 Apr. 1933). At Garcirrey (Salamanca) the local Socialist leader, ex-President of the UP, proclaimed himself elected and forbade presentation of the Agrarian candidates. In Guadalajara there were disorders after leaflets were circulated reading: 'Comrades: Let no one dare to take tolerance for weakness. We have already had enough of tolerance!' (El Debate, 18 Apr. 1933). In Badajoz, the Civil Governor resigned because he had too few Civil Guards to check Socialist intimidation. In Carmona (Seville) 11 members of Acción Popular were fined 500 ptas. apiece for saying preference for jobs should be given to party members (El Debate, 23 Apr. 1933).

figures showed that 5,048 councillors had been elected for the government parties, 4,954 for the parties of the Right, 4,206 for the Republicans in opposition, 548 for other Republicans, and 1,272 for various other groups.[1] The Right and the Republicans in opposition had together elected almost twice as many councillors as the government parties. The former therefore claimed a popular mandate for their policies of obstruction. On the other hand, these municipalities had in most cases elected Monarchists on 12 April 1931; Azaña contemptuously dismissed the results as insignificant because these were 'rotten boroughs'.[2] Time was soon to tell who was right.

A combination of the results of the municipal elections, his own dislike of the Law concerning Religious Confessions and Congregations, the obstruction in the Cortes of Radicals, Conservatives, Progressives, Federals, Independent Republicans and some Radical-Socialists, together with the approval of the Law setting up the Court of Constitutional Guarantees,[3] prompted Alcalá-Zamora to force

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1 Results from 2,192 of the 2,478 pueblos, El Debate, 25 Apr. 1933. The 532 Basque Nationalists were included with the Right. The figures showed 2,964 "agrarians" among the Right (cf. 395 Acción Popular); these 'agrarians' were claimed as theirs by M. Maura, Gil Robles & Martínez de Velasco, who saw them as a basis for an Agrarian Party which he did not found for the time being (El Debate, 25-6 Apr.).

2 Arrarás, HSRE II, 118. According to Casares Quiroga 'more sincere elections' were impossible (ABC, 25 Apr. 1933). Against Azaña's view may be set the earlier claims by the Right that caciques, especially those of the UP, had gone over to the government parties en masse (Madariaga & Gil Robles, DSCC, 14 Oct. 1932).

3 Among the provisions of this law was the exclusion of legislation passed by the Constituent Cortes from appeals against its constitutional validity. Text in DSCC, 14 June 1933 App.

a government crisis on 8 June even though Azaña had not been defeated in the Cortes. The President's intention was to broaden the governing coalition, but efforts to achieve this broke against the rocks of the Radical demand for exclusion of the Socialists and the Socialist veto on Radical participation. The outcome of the 'crisis of the five days' was the formation on 13 June of a new government by Azaña similar to the last.[1]

All the parties in opposition were infuriated. Gil Robles complained that the new government prolonged 'a dictatorship supported by a [parliamentary] majority which does not represent the country'; he warned that such prolongation would undo his careful work of organizing the Right for evolutionary, democratic methods.[2] The strongest reaction came, however, from Miguel Maura, who saw a chance to regain lost ground. He demanded a dissolution and the 14

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1 El Debate, 9-13 June 1933; El Socialista (6 June) said that the Socialists would refuse to leave power, and (13 June) congratulated itself for achieving this. However Besteiro was not of quite the same opinion; nor was Prieto, according to F. Largo Caballero, Mis recuerdos (Mexico City, 1954), 128 & 145. The new government was:- Premier & War, Azaña (Acción Republicana); State, Los Ríos (Socialist); Justice, Albornoz (Radical-Socialist); Navy, Companys (Esquerra); Interior, Casares Quiroga (ORGA); Finance, Viñuales (Acción Republicana); Public Instruction, F. Barnés (Radical-Socialist); Labour, Largo Caballero (Socialist); Agriculture, Domingo (Radical-Socialist); Public Works, Prieto (Socialist); & Industry & Commerce, Franchy Roca (Federal). The Federals joined on condition that the Defence Law was lifted; the small Federal minority split when this did not occur.

2 DSCC, 14 June 1933.

Conservatives withdrew from the Cortes after the 'manifest fraud' perpetrated on opinion by the government parties ganging up on the President. The Conservative Republicans would permit themselves 'neither dialogue nor relations with this dictatorial government nor with these Cortes which represent the exact opposite of the true opinion of Spain... We find ourselves before a Dictatorship.'[1]

The three months which the new Azaña government lasted were little more than a slow death-agony. Legislation was made almost impossible by determined obstruction by the parties in opposition, obstruction which Azaña termed 'parliamentary terrorism'.[2] During July, a law was passed to permit legal action to be taken for non-payment of rent by tenants, but prohibiting evictions for any other reason, and also the Law concerning Public Order, which gave elaborate constitutional validity to the powers of the Defence Law.[3]

The crucial battle, however, was fought over the Draft of the Law on Rural Leases, a subject that Agrarians had wanted to include

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1 El Debate, 14 June 1933. The Progressives, i.e. the President's friends, decided to stay in the Cortes to vote against a government which had betrayed the Republic and become the 'steering committee of the revolution' (El Debate, 17 June 1933).

2 DSCC, 25 Aug. 1933.

3 The texts of these laws are in DSCC, 27 & 28 July 1933 Apps. The Law concerning Public Order, like the Defence Law of the Republic before it, had a clear parallel in Article 48 of the Weimar Constitution; the Law gave wide powers to the government by means of the proclamation of graded states of prevention, alarm and war.

as an extra item in the Law of Bases for Agrarian Reform of 1932.[1] The Draft forbade sub-letting and its Article 7 pegged rents at a maximum of two-thirds of the tax-assessment or, where it existed, at the property-census figure; mixed juries were to regulate this and reductions in rent were to be enforced in the case of natural disaster. Leases were to run for a minimum six years, and the lessee had the right to renew the lease at the end of each six years unless the owner wished himself to farm the land. Article 17 permitted tenants or their close kin who had leased land for twenty years to convert their tenure into a 'reserved annuity' (censo reservativo). All necessary repairs were to be carried out by the owner. Eviction could take place for non-payment of rent, at the end of six years if the owner wanted to farm the land himself, if the tenant sub-let any of the land, or for bad farming as decided by the mixed juries. Mixed juries for rural property were to keep watch on leases and settle disputes. A fourth additional provision stated that conversion of tenure into 'reserved annuities' was to apply to lands leased already.[2]

Agrarians objected to the law for several reasons, but their opposition centred on Articles 7 and 17 and the fourth additional provision. According to El Debate, owners would no longer make

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1 This was suggested by Gil Robles at the prompting of the Bloque Agrario of Salamanca (El Debate, 9 July 1932).

2 The text of the Agriculture Committee's Draft is in DSCC, 23 June 1933.

long leases and would evict tenants before the twenty years were up; if they did not, they would neglect their property. The Draft meant in the last analysis 'the death of the rural lease as a juridical institution'.[1] In the Cortes, it was argued that annuities were usurious and in any case did not provide owners with adequate compensation. In Galicia, with its minifundios, application of the law would bring chaos, and Deputies of the ORGA also moved into the ranks of the opposition. Liberal Agrarians maintained that the law was unfair to landlords and was far removed from their ideal of laissez faire, while social-Catholics protested that 'reserved annuities' were not the smallholdings recommended by Leo XIII.[2]

The Agrarians had in fact decided to obstruct from the first, and the initial batch of 250 amendments was justified by Royo Villanova on the grounds that the law was inopportune; also a respectable liberal precedent could be found in the Liberal and Republican obstruction of Maura's local government bill in 1907.[3] Compromise appeared possible on 4 August when the Committee agreed to consider an amendment to Article 17 by Gil Robles which, in fulfil-

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1 El Debate, 23 July 1933.

2 E.g. DSCC, 27 July (Casanueva, Cid, Martín, Cornide Quiroga), 28 July (Blanco-Rajoy, Royo Villanova) & Guallar, 2 Aug. 1933.

3 DSCC, 28 July & 2 Aug. 1933. The Agrarians' intention to obstruct the Draft was reported in El Debate, 15 July 1933.

ment of Article 47 of the Constitution, would create 'family patrimonies' that could not be distrained, divided or alienated. After negotiation in the Committee agreement was reached, but in the Cortes the Socialists opposed the Committee's new draft. They were heatedly accused of breach of faith by the Agrarians and Basque-Navarrese, who were now joined in their obstruction by the Radicals and the ORGA.[1] Progress on the law now came to a standstill under the weight of amendments and the resulting frequent lack of a quorum.[2]

With obstruction in full swing in the Cortes, elections were held on 3 September for the Court of Constitutional Guarantees. Its members were elected by the councillors of the municipalities - in Catalonia by the Parliament of the Generalidad - and by the universities and colleges of lawyers. The results showed the defeat of the government's candidates in ten of the fifteen regions as well as in the universities and colleges of lawyers. The parties in opposition polled 34,193 municipal votes to the 12,910 of the ruling parties.

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1 DSCC, 4 Aug. & El Debate, 5, 6 & 10 Aug. 1933.

2 E.g. Guallar put down 125 amendments to Article 8 & Cid 94 to Article 16 (DSCC, 11 & 25 Aug. Apps.). Since Deputies knew that nothing was being done save talk, attendance dropped to a very low level; hence the failure to obtain a quorum which was usually demanded when the time came to vote. The Radical-Socialists, who had an eye to property now that religious legislation had been exhausted, refused to help facilitate a quorum for the government to which they were committed (El Debate, 4 Aug. 1933).

For the regions seven Radicals were elected, six Cedistas, three Socialists, two members each for the Traditionalists, the Basque Nationalists, Acción Republicana, the Esquerra, the ORGA and the Centre Republicans of Juan March, and one each for the Radical-Socialists and the Federals. The universities and colleges of lawyers gave victory to the Right; the election of such figures as the exiled Monarchist Calvo Sotelo reflected a marked swing to the Right among the professional bourgeoisie.[1]

Faced with this new blow, and mindful of the disintegration of his coalition, Azaña finally resigned on 8 September.[2] On 12 September 1933 a new Republican coalition was formed under Lerroux. The Socialists, ousted from office, announced the opening of 'a new revolutionary phase' now that the Republic with the 'historic' Republican at the helm had become 'much less Republican'.[3]

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1 El Debate, 5 & 12 Sept. & ABC, 6 Sept. 1933. The votes recorded were:- Radicals, 15,868; CEDA, 13,515; Socialists, 9,006; Traditionalists, 1,966; PNV, 1,156; Centre, 1,277; Acción Republicana, 497; ORGA, 1,821; Radical-Socialists, 1,586; Liberal-Democrats, 411.

2 Los Ríos informed the U.S. Ambassador that disintegration of the coalition prompted the resignation (C.G. Bowers, My Mission to Spain [London, 1954], 35). The Radical-Socialists were by now in complete chaos and divided into two main factions on whether or not Socialists were acceptable as partners in government.

3 El Socialista, 14 Sept. 1933. The new government consisted of:- Premier, Lerroux (Radical); State, Sánchez Albornoz (Acción Republicana); Justice, Botella Asensi (Radical-Socialist Left); War, Rocha (Radical); Navy, Iranzo (Independent Republican); Finance, Lara (Radical); Interior, Martínez Barrio (Radical); Public Instruction, D. Barnés (Radical-Socialist); Public Works, Guerra del Río (Radical); Labour, Samper (Radical); Industry & Commerce, Gómez Paratcha (ORGA); Communications, Santaló (Esquerra); Agriculture, Feced (Radical-Socialist).

iii. 'Fascism' and the Socialists

In October 1932 the Socialist party held its Congress in Madrid. The PSOE, like its affiliated union, the UGT, could claim a great increase in its numbers since the installation of the Republic, an increase due at least in some cases to the advantages of office as much as to spontaneous conversion.[1] At the Congress, personalities and policies were, as usual, intertwined. As in December 1930, Besteiro, a convinced reformist, took a stand against collaboration in the government, and was opposed by Prieto and Largo Caballero, Ministers under Azaña. The Congress approved a motion put forward by Prieto justifying Socialist participation in order to keep out the Radicals of Lerroux. Socialists in government must pursue 'a possibilist policy' leading towards 'the redemptive light of the ideal' of true Socialism. Thus the party adopted the evolutionary tactics of furthering the Socialist cause from within the government, a policy which safeguarded its widespread control of local government. Largo Caballero was elected President of the Executive Committee, ousting Besteiro and his supporters.[2]

The Congress of the party was closely followed by that of the

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1 Membership of the PSOE went up from 16,878 in June 1930 to 75,133 in June 1932. In the same period the UGT expanded from 277,011 to 1,041,539; 445,414 of these were rural workers (Picard-Moch & Moch, L'Espagne, 279-81 & 286). El Debate, 14 Oct. 1932, reported an admission by Largo Caballero that Socialists in some areas had used the Law of Municipal Boundaries as a weapon of caciquismo - i.e. preference for employment was given to UGT members.

2 El Socialista & El Debate, 8-13 Oct. 1932.

UGT, at which Besteiro and his ally Saborit were elected President and Vice-President; Largo Caballero was elected Secretary-General, but declined to take up the office.[1] El Socialista summed up the position in the autumn of 1932 thus: 'After the Republic Socialism will be imposed. The Republic is the surest bridge for the historical transition. Therefore we Socialists defend it and, up to a point, consider it ours.'[2]

Apart from the bogey of Freemasonry, the Right's propaganda had from the first denounced Socialism as its real opponent. While Gil Robles found in the failure of '10 August' proof that the democratic method was the way to meet the Socialist threat, avowed Monarchists, enemies of the Republic in any case, found in Socialist participation, if not dominance, in government an added incentive for violent counter-revolutionary action. The possibility of Spain becoming a Socialist State, together with contemporary events elsewhere in Europe, persuaded them of the need for a 'Fascist reaction' in Spain. Goicoechea discovered two ways of putting an end to class-warfare, the Russian and the Italian, and he came down decidedly in favour of the latter.[3] According to another of its leaders, the new Alfonsine party was 'anti-Marxist, anti-liberal, anti-

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1 El Socialista, 23 Oct. 1932.

2 El Socialista, 9 Nov. 1932.

3 ABC, 2 Mar. 1933.

democratic and anti-parliamentary. Renovación Española is the spirit of tradition, adapted to the fashions of present-day life.[1] Such fashions were deemed to include corporative organization on Italian lines.[2] Goicoechea asked himself: 'What is my position? That of a Traditionalist? That of a Fascist? A bit of each, why deny it.'[3] Nor did the ideological review Acción Española ignore the practical example of Italy, though its doctrines remained firmly rooted in Spanish tradition.[4]

While Renovación Española propagated the counter-revolution in Spain, Monarchists conspired anew north of the Pyrenees. In

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1 Vallellano, ABC, 20 June 1933.

2 Fuentes Pila, ABC, 30 Aug. 1933.

3 ABC, 22 Sept. 1933. Renovación Española was in fact a party comprising various ideological positions united in defence of the Alfonsine dynasty. The dominant foreign influence on the leadership was the practical example of Mussolini's Italy and not - as sometimes suggested - the ideas of Maurras's Action Française (Conversation with Cortés Cavanillas, later Secretary-General of Renovación Española).

4 Acción Española, 16 May 1933, carried an article on the general theory of the corporative state by the Italian academic Costamagna (Antología, 101-14). The historian Gaxotte (Action Française) was also a contributor in 1933. Yet the review still defined Spanish nationalism as service to Catholicism and the Church by quoting Menéndez Pelayo (16 Aug. 1933: Antología, 71). Vegas found hope for his cause because 'the Traditionalist doctrine [had been] purified in the crucible of adversity' and secondly because 'the world [is] today pervaded by a "Fascist" atmosphere, which in its main bases retains great similarity to the postulates of Traditionalism' (16 Sept. 1933: Antología, 157). Vegas (conversation) says that Acción Española's ideology was based on Christian public law and Traditionalism, particularly Menéndez Pelayo. The agnostic Maurras was used only as an additional source for arguments for Monarchy; Mussolini was admired as a 'man of order' though Fascist doctrine was 'laughable'.

September 1932 a group of Alfonsines - Vegas Latapié, Ansaldo, Vigón, the Marqués de la Eliseda - made preparations in Biarritz for a coup d'état. Ansaldo was entrusted with the collection of funds and some 3,000,000 pesetas were soon collected or promised.[1] In the autumn the aid of Alfonso XIII was enlisted; he assured the plotters of his full support and gave permission for his name to be used in procuring funds, though reserving the right to decide himself when the moment for action should arrive.[2] It was intended that Sanjurjo be the nominal leader, but since he was still imprisoned, the plotters approached Martínez Anido; the ex-Minister, however, declined the offer and so the conspiracy had no official head.[3]

The original plan conceived by Vegas envisaged the surprise

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1 Ansaldo, ¿ Para qué?, 47-8; Salmador, Ansaldo, 87, mentions aristocrats as the main contributors.

2 Ansaldo, ¿ Para qué?, 48-50. Alfonso would seem to have pursued two policies. On the one hand he declined to make difficulties for Gil Robles, while on the other he sanctioned preparations for violent action should circumstances demand it. He had not been party to '10 August', though he gave money to officers who lost their positions and livelihood (Sáinz Rodríguez, conversation). In the autumn of 1932 Alfonso told Vallellano: 'no acts of force, deaths or violence of any kind for my cause. If God has disposed that I must return to reign, it will be because the Spaniards have decided anew to call for me' (Habla el Rey, 362). Perhaps Alfonso drew a distinction between conspiracy on Spain's behalf and conspiracy on behalf of his person.

3. Ansaldo, ¿ Para qué?, 51. Salmador, Ansaldo, 90, notes that the offer to Martínez Anido was supported by a letter signed by the King.

seizure of key-points in Madrid and the arrest of Ministers, but this scheme was soon broadened to include action by the military in conjunction with retired officers and civilian auxiliaries.[1] The modified scheme demanded infiltration of the officer corps, which did not prove easy as soldiers were often discovered to value their pay more than their lives, as well as to be imbued with an irritating respect for discipline. Nevertheless the help of two well-placed men was acquired: one Martín Báguenas, chief of police in the Directorate-General of Security, the other Colonel Galarza ('El Técnico'), a member of the army General Staff, who coordinated conspiratorial activities among officers.[2] The only positive action taken inside Spain seems to have been to contribute to the funds of Anarcho-Syndicalist revolutionaries.[3]

Other activities of the conspirators in Biarritz were the selection and grooming of a civilian leader for the coming counter-revolution, and the quest for external aid. Calvo Sotelo's rôle on 10 August in persuading Barrera to fly back to Seville drew the attention of the conspirators to the ex-Minister's change of heart:

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1 Salmador, Ansaldo, 85-6.

2 Ansaldo, ¿ Para qué?, 50-1; Salmador, Ansaldo, 86.

3 Ansaldo, ¿ Para qué?, 51, writes: 'Daring contacts were not lacking with certain Syndicalist sectors, who on some occasions were used to make life difficult for successive Republican governments.' It is impossible to believe, however, that Anarchist disturbances during 1933 were dependent simply on Monarchist money.

he had now overcome his susceptibilities concerning the use of violence. The task was therefore to give this former Maurista a proper counter-revolutionary education. The means were to hand in the person of a half-Colombian member of the Action Française, Armand Magescas, who was known to the plotters and who was able to arrange frequent meetings between Calvo Sotelo and the leaders of the French Monarchist movement.[1] Soon the works of Maurras appeared in pride of place in Calvo Sotelo's room in Paris, and he expressed admiration for Fascism and the belief that the spirit of the age was irrevocably authoritarian.[2] In February 1933 he visited Rome for talks with Fascist leaders, but no agreement could be reached with the Italians, who did not wish at this time to enter into any clandestine commitments with Spanish Rightists.[3]

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1 Vegas Latapié, Calvo Sotelo, 104-10.

2 Aunós, Calvo Sotelo (Madrid, 1941), 125, 136, 145 & 152. Calvo now thought Tardieu too moderate. Italian Fascism was 'a political régime [which] attracted him with especial warmth.' Calvo saw Hitler's accession to power (30 Jan. 1933) as an event that 'announces the fatal triumph of the totalitarian system.'

3 Ansaldo, ¿ Para qué?, 58, says that Calvo went because Aunós would not, and that he had a cordial interview with Balbo. Salmador, Ansaldo, 91, says that he saw Balbo and Cardinal Segura. According to the ex-Minister Yanguas Messía, he saw Mussolini (E. del Corral, Calvo Sotelo [2nd ed., Madrid, 1956], 18). Guariglia, who became Italian Ambassador in Sept. 1932, had instructions to repair the damage done to Italo-Spanish relations by the contacts with the '10 August' plotters, about which Azaña knew. The Duce saw the failure of 10 August as the entrenchment of Azaña, a possible dictator - 'he has used my own methods' was his comment on Azaña's repressive measures. Mussolini now sought to woo Azaña as a diplomatic ally against France (Guariglia, Ricordi, 185, 190-9 & 773-4).

The Alfonsine military conspiracy was not a great success, and the success of Renovación Española also proved to be marginal: membership never extended beyond a minority of the aristocracy and a section of the bourgeoisie with a sentimental attachment to Alfonso XIII.[1] Such drawing-room Monarchists were unlikely to take on the Socialists in the streets. It was necessary therefore to find some shock-troops. The PNE was still to hand, but it was a quantité negligeable; except for the detention of its leader, its only distinction was to have its offices raided by the police in March 1933.[2] Also in March, an attempt was made to launch a publication entitled El Fascio, advocating a strong State to guarantee the 'internal unity of Spain and its expansion in the world'.[3]

The moving spirit was Delgado Barreto, editor of La Nación (the daily founded by the Dictator). His editorial board for the propagation of Fascist ideas comprised an array of dissimilar personalities, including the Dictator's eldest son José Antonio, the wandering intellectual Giménez Caballero, Ledesma Ramos of the

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1 Conversation with Cortés Cavanillas; there was a courageous but tiny youth movement, Juventud de Renovación Española, which wore green berets.

2 The police seized 101 blue shirts emblazoned with the cross of Santiago, and the list of subscribers, with aristocrats in the van, who paid the PNE only 6,456.55 ptas. a month. Albiñana himself was moved from Las Hurdes to Almería, to receive a short sentence for insulting the régime, and then to his native Enguera (El Debate, 15, 18, 23 & 29 Mar. 1933).

3 El Debate, 7 Mar. 1933.

JONS, the adventurous airman Ruiz de Alda, García Valdecasas, a Deputy and disciple of Ortega Gasset, and Rodríguez Tarduchy, who led a more or less Traditionalist combat-group. There was disagreement between José Antonio, then pro-Italian in outlook, and the Germanophile Ledesma, but such differences proved irrelevant, for the first issue - due to appear on 16 March, the day of the Dictator's death - was banned by the government at Socialist prompting.[1]

The result of this abortive little affair, however, was indirectly to attract national attention at last to the JONS. Already, though Redondo was in Portugal, a transport-workers' union had been started in Valladolid in January which by July claimed 3,000 members. In Madrid, though Ledesma was in gaol, a clash occurred on 10 March in the university between Jonsistas and members of the increasingly unpopular official FUE, after which 400 students formed the first Jonsista union. The anti-FUE protest movement spread to other universities and other Jonsista groups were formed.[2]

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1 HCE I-5, 593-4; Arrarás, HSRE II, 148-54; Payne, Falange, 30-1. Ortega had dissolved his group 'in the service of the Republic' in Oct. 1932, since the Republic had proved a disillusioning reversion to the previous century and had failed to create 'a new ideology and politico-social philosophy' (Arrarás, HSRE II, 35-6).

2 Arrarás, HSRE II, 154; HCE, I-5, 593. The Madrid group's manifesto said: 'The JONS are a Spanish national party which embraces the deepest interests of the university and working-class youths: the right to a Country, the affirmation of the eternal values of one's land and the creation of an economy that guarantees the vigour and might of the Spanish people.' El Debate, 11 Mar. 1933, noted that Jonsistas sang La Giovinezza.

The Monarchist conspirators, however, pinned their hopes less on the JONS of the little-known Ledesma than on the prestigious figure of José Antonio Primo de Rivera, once an under-secretary of the UMN. Apart from unsuccessfully contesting a by-election in Madrid in October 1931 simply to win 'a seat in the Cortes to defend the memory of my father',[1] José Antonio kept out of politics until late in 1932. Then he saw the Dictator's Ministers in Paris and agreed that an authoritarian régime was needed to save Spain and that foreign aid should be procured with a view to installing this.[2] After the El Fascio episode, he began to plan a Fascist movement with Julio Ruiz de Alda whose thoughts turned to a violent movement of workers and intellectuals unemcumbered by the defence of capitalism - and to nationalization of the virtually non-existent aircraft industry.[3]

For José Antonio Fascism meant unity. The Country could not allow class-warfare, the product of the relativist, liberal State which made 'a dogma of the anti-dogma'. In place of liberalism there was to be, not a transitory dictatorship like that of his father, but permanent conquest of the State by the upholders of 'an

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1 Text of the electoral manifesto is in J.A. Primo de Rivera, Obras completas (Madrid, 1942), 785-8.

2 Yanguas Messía, quoted by Corral, Calvo Sotelo, 18.

3 L. Aguirre Prado, Ruiz de Alda (Madrid, 1955), 19-20; Payne, Falange, 34.

integrative, totalitarian, national principle.' Violence was justifiable in defence of justice or against Socialist domination.[1] In October 1933 he paid Mussolini a visit, and returned to declare that Fascism was 'a total, universal, interpretation of life... Fascism is "essentially traditionalist". In Italy it seeks the tradition of the [Roman] Empire. In Spain it will seek the tradition of our Empire.'[2] In the autumn he and Ruiz de Alda visited Ansaldo in St.Jean de Luz, and the latter arranged the necessary financial backing for the foundation of the Falange Española, seen by the conspirators as just one more group to be coordinated with the PNE and the Traditionalists in Alfonsine plans.[3]

On 29 October 1933 the Falange Española was founded at a meeting of 'Spanish affirmation' in Madrid at which the speakers were Ruiz de Alda, García Valdecasas and Primo de Rivera.[4] José Antonio

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1 Primo de Rivera, O.c. , 531-4, 536-40, 601-5 & 1057-8.

2 J.A. Primo de Rivera, Textos inéditos y epistolario (Madrid, 1956), 140-1. His impressions of his interview with the Duce are in O.c., 522-3. Cuariglia, Ricordi, 203-4, says that he arranged the visit to counter the designs of the German Ambassador, who was trying to bring the nascent movement within the Nazi orbit. José Antonio had been offended by Mussolini's derision for Spanish 'Fascism' and Guariglia wished to keep out Nazi competition.

3 Salmador, Ansaldo, 99; & Ansaldo, ¿ Para qué?, 63. The minute-book of Renovación Española records that 100,000 ptas. of party funds were allocated for the foundation of the Falange.

4 See Payne, Falange, 38-41. García Valdecasas had been an opponent of the Dictatorship.

denounced Rousseau for his wrong-headed individualism and the liberal State for its inability to believe in a mission of its own. Socialism was the necessary reaction to the inhuman consequences of economic liberalism, but Socialism aimed, not at a return to justice, but at the creation of a new form of oppression. It was destructive of social and spiritual unity and was materialist. The proper solution therefore lay in 'a lord who does not die', one above interests and parties; thus the State would acquire its primary need, unity, as well as the pre-condition for true social justice. To achieve this state of political salvation, 'a poetic movement' was required, an anti-party of neither Left nor Right which was prepared to make use of 'the dialectic of fists and pistols' and not put its faith in the ballot-box.[1] Despite the poetic phraseology, the speech was not particularly original; as the Traditionalist Pradera pointed out, with the exception of one or two ideas on social policy, it was merely a recital of the ideas of Traditionalism.[2]

Thus Fascism in Spain was patronized by Alfonsine Monarchists. The government and the Socialists might reasonably be expected to have been alarmed at its growth, and measures were accordingly taken. El Fascio did not appear and in July hundreds of suspected Fascists were arrested; they were soon released when the government was

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1 The text of his speech is in his O.c., pp. 17-28.

2 Acción Española, 16 Dec. 1933 (Antología, 210-8).

satisfied that there was no real threat from this quarter.[1] Socialists kept an eye on Jonsistas and head-strong Monarchists, but were not unduly alarmed; Goicoechea, leader of the counter-revolutionaries of Renovación Española, was dismissed as a figure of fun unworthy of serious attention.[2] The Socialists turned their fire instead on their two main opponents: the Radicals of Lerroux, whose accession to power they had seen as justifying civil strife as early as 1931, and the CEDA of Gil Robles, which ousted Lerroux from his place as first enemy of Socialism in 1933.

Socialist attacks on their political enemies were always couched in strong terms. In January 1932 El Socialista denounced the liberal-democrat Lerroux as the Mussolini of the upholders of order.[3] When the Radicals went into full opposition to the government over Casas Viejas, the charges were equally spirited: Lerroux's Republicanism was 'purely nominal' because he was now the 'patron-saint of the landowners and devoted defender of the plutocracy, which is certainly Monarchist.' For the party's organ 'the Monarchist-clerical-Anarchist alliance against the revolution' was a fact.[4] During 1933, however, the CEDA became the bête noire. The policies

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1 Payne, Falange, 35.

2 El Socialista, 17 Jan. 1933.

3 El Socialista, 1 Jan. 1932.

4 El Socialista, 15, 17 & 22 Feb. 1933.

of Gil Robles meant 'the enslavement, in Mussoliniesque style, of the proletariat'; as for the slogan of Acción Popular - 'Before all, Religion and Spain' - 'it is the Fascist device.'[1] With Hitler's rise to power the tone of El Socialista became more strident: illiberal means should be employed and liberty sacrificed in face of the Fascist threat, principally coming from the CEDA. Spanish Socialists must be prepared to fight, heeding the words of Otto Braun from Germany: 'May our comrades in Spain not fall into our own errors!'[2]

To what extent were the charges and fears of the Socialists with regard to Gil Robles justified? The CEDA Congress had formulated a programme of socio-economic corporativism in tune with Papal doctrines and had rejected a Japista motion for Italian-style corporativism, but had left political aims unclear. Shortly afterwards Gil Robles formally denounced Fascism. Identification of the Nation with the State, fusion of the State with a political party and 'total nullification of the individual personality' were inadmissible doctrines for Catholics. Fascism was a heresy, 'the last phase of a politico-philosophical revolution beginning with the criterio-

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1 El Socialista, 21 Jan. 1933.

2 El Socialista, 18, 21 & 24 Mar. 1933. The party's intellectuals were perhaps the most perturbed by events abroad. Araquistáin, the Republic's Ambassador in Berlin, witnessed the Nazi victory, from which he drew the unshakable conclusion that the passive tactics and optimistic fatalism of German Marxists regarding Nazism were quite wrong: the Left must strike first.

logical [sic] individualism and the psychological subjectivism of Descartes and ending with the pantheist monism of Hegel... Catholic Doctrine defines political society as a moral entity,...a system which exalts and dignifies the personality of the individual in opposition to the absorbent and pagan étatisme of the modern Fascist doctrines.' Violence was inseparable from Fascism, whereas the CEDA's tactic was 'legal struggle... Evolution instead of revolution.' Gil Robles followed in the footsteps of Windthorst, not Mussolini.[1]

Clearly the CEDA leadership did not regard itself as Fascist; but for Socialists the internal doctrinal niceties of the Right were unimportant. The negative critique of pure Fascism was for them irrelevant; the real question was, what were the positive intentions of Gil Robles? He had, in practice, accepted the Republic and constantly advocated the legal, democratic method of attaining power, the path of evolution; but in power, what would he do?

Before the autumn of 1933 statements of intent were few. In a speech at Salamanca in December 1932 made with local political considerations in mind, he stressed his family's Carlist tradition and declared: 'The Traditionalist Party has ten basic fundamental principles... We have no more than nine fundamental and one accidental.

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1 El Debate, 22 Mar. 1933. The paper reported that only half his audience in Barcelona approved of his speech, the purpose of which was to bring to their senses 'those stupid people who, by their action, are going to give the government grounds for taking measures against the Right.'

Here lies the difference.'[1] The policy of the CEDA, he later explained, was motivated by the Encyclicals and reality. Its programme was not 'maximalist' but 'possibilist': it would be implemented gradually as circumstances permitted, but it did not include a change in the form of government.[2] Though pronouncements were few and imprecise, the basic points were by now clear. The ultimate goal of the CEDA was a State based on Catholic corporative principles. This State would be the result of a process of gradual transformation of the liberal-democratic structure by constitutional and democratic means. The pace of change would depend on the extent and profundity of the conversion of Spanish society by propaganda to Catholic social and political doctrines. Force was ruled out, as the impatient young men of the JAP were told: 'Today the first thing the Right must do is to incorporate the masses of the people to make the true revolution, crucifix in hand. We are not partisans of universal suffrage, but for good or ill this is the only weapon and it must be used well.'[3]

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1 El Debate, 27 Dec. 1932. Political difficulties had arisen in Salamanca within the Rightist coalition grouping after the October Assembly of Acción Popular. The Traditionalist Lamamié de Clairac was a key-figure, and in fact took the local Carlists out of Acción Popular's subsidiary (ABC, 28 Dec. 1932).

2 Gil Robles at Murcia, El Debate, 14 Mar. 1933.

3 Valiente, El Debate, 18 Feb. 1933. Gil Robles told Japistas ('the Youth of 12 April, the Youth of the Revolution') how hard it was to advise young men to desist from force and violence: 'But bear in mind that violence and firmness are distinct' (El Debate, 17 Feb. 1933).

The Socialists, however, were not inclined to draw a distinction between Fascism and evolutionary Catholic corporativism, which, if it were attained, would mean the end of Socialism just as the attainment of Socialism would mean suppression of political Catholicism. Their attitude to the political rallies of Acción Popular in 1933 was the same as it had been in 1932; but whereas before 10 August they could point to prominent Monarchists in Acción Popular who were bent on overthrowing the Republic, by late 1932 the argument no longer held good because the party had rid itself of those who would not forswear violence or agree to obey the established form of government. In 1933 Socialists called for prohibition of the meetings of Acción Popular on the grounds that they were 'Fascist demonstrations', and they were sometimes successful, as in the case of the meeting to be held in Valladolid in May.

Agrarians and Acción Popular obtained the permission of the Governor to hold a rally, at which Gil Robles and Royo Villanova were to speak, in celebration of the electoral success of 23 April; they hoped that up to 40,000 people would attend from Castile, León and Asturias. The Socialist railwaymen of the city, alleging that the JONS had associated itself with this 'Monarchizing' meeting, decided that the rally should not take place. They duly got the Governor's permission to stage a counter-demonstration on the same day, and announced a strike to sabotage the Right's plans - a political strike forbidden by Article 1 of the Defence Law. When the Socialists seemed to have persuaded the Governor to ban the Right's

rally to avert bloodshed, the affair took on national significance. Gil Robles saw Casares Quiroga, the Minister of the Interior, who told him that the Socialist attitude represented compulsion which he was not prepared to tolerate. El Socialista denounced the anti-Republican 'Fascist mobilization' and warned: 'If the State folds its arms before the challenging meeting of Valladolid, the workers will know how to replace the State and show it its duties.' After meeting the Socialist Ministers, Casares Quiroga decided to suspend the rally.[1] From such episodes Rightists concluded that the Socialists had the whip hand in the government.

The anti-Fascist campaign of the Socialists had two faces. If, negatively, it were necessary to halt the Right's propaganda, the other lesson from Germany was that Fascism could only be thwarted if Socialists themselves took charge of the State. The 'accidentalism' of Acción Popular, according to El Socialista, was just a method for 'knocking out all the revolutionary content which the Republic has,

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1 El Socialista, 24 May & El Debate, 25 May 1933; J. Arrabal, José María Gil Robles (Madrid, 1933), 231-47. This example has been chosen as it is the best documented, although the extraneous factor of the JONS is present. The JONS had formed part of the Right's electoral alliance in Valladolid, and local Socialists pledged themselves to a campaign of disorder as long as the alliance lasted (El Debate, 19 & 29 Mar. 1933). However many meetings before and afterwards were suspended under Socialist pressure in areas where there was no JONS, e.g. that of Acción Popular in Badajoz just a few days later (El Debate, 27 May 1933). Socialists were also determined that no 'yellow' unions should flourish, e.g. a strike-threat by the UGT procured the dismissal of 20 members of the Federación Española de Trabajadores working on the same site in the University City (El Debate, 29 Aug. 1933).

without overthrowing the Republic... We [Socialists] defend it and support it for what it contains.'[1] Prieto said that it was all the same to him whether the Right intended to overthrow the Republic or whether it intended to revise the laws of the Republic: 'The names of things matter little to me; what certainly matters to me are the things themselves.' Socialists could be loyal to the Republic only so long as it progressed along the same path as hitherto.[2] Los Ríos declared that Socialists, whether inside or outside the government, would not yield an inch of the ground gained.[3] The party's organ denied suggestions that Spanish Socialism was losing momentum and members, and continued: 'It is with this strength and with this enthusiasm that we propose to act. In Parliament? Outside Parliament? As the others wish. We should prefer it to be in Parliament; but it does not seem to be there that we must make our victory legitimate. The paths of democracy are denied us. But such a refusal binds us to nothing...'[4]

How, in fact, had the paths of democracy been denied to the Socialists? They had not - unless denial of greater ministerial representation by their Republican partners, or the possibility of

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1 El Socialista, 25 Oct. 1932.

2 El Socialista, 14 Mar. & 11 Apr. 1933.

3 El Socialista, 2 May 1933.

4 El Socialista, 17 May 1933.

an electoral defeat interrupting their inevitable progress toward the ultimate goal of Socialism, be called undemocratic.

The speech which spread real alarm on the Right was made by Largo Caballero to an ILO conference in Geneva. There he asked Lenin's question, 'liberty for what?... Liberty to undermine the foundations of the State and demolish it on the first suitable occasion? That would be an act of ingenuousness that the true Republicans and we Socialists are not prepared to commit. We shall not desert our duty and we shall carry the Spanish revolution to the ends that the people's will indicates, by all the means which may be necessary for this.'[1] This line of thought was opposed by Besteiro, an admirer of MacDonald and leader of a diminishing section of Spanish Socialist opinion. He begged his colleagues to accept democracy, because revolutionary tactics would lead to a powerful anti-Socialist reaction. Salvation lay in revitalizing bourgeois democracy: 'With the Republic installed, to think of dictatorship is false reasoning. I declare myself an enemy of the dictatorship of the poletariat.'[2]

Largo Caballero's reply was that the Republic depended on the PSOE and the UGT for its defence: 'Being Socialists, we are Republicans... We are proceeding to the conquest of power within the

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1 El Socialista & El Debate, 25 June 1933.

2 El Socialista, 4 July 1933; Arrarás, HSRE II, 190.

Constitution and the laws... We have worked for flexible legislation that allows us to achieve power without great violence, without great bloodshed, legally if possible. But if because we are workers we are put outside the Constitution, we shall conquer power in another manner.' He told the Socialist Youth later: 'Today I am convinced that to carry out Socialist work within a bourgeois democracy is impossible.'[1] Other Socialist Deputies were equally outspoken. 'Let those who want to fight for the revolution follow us; but if they [the enemies of Socialism] cross our path, blocking the way, we shall sweep them aside even though it cost blood!'[2]

Thus by mid-September 1933 there existed a certain parallelism between the attitudes of the two mass groupings, the Socialists and the CEDA, on the Left and Right of the Republic. Both wanted to transform the Republic of Azaña into a State to their own tastes, Socialist or corporativist. While the Socialists boasted of being the bulwark of Republican defence, their position was really similar to the official accidentalism of the CEDA: what mattered to both was the legislative content of the Republic. There was, however, a crucial difference between their pronouncements. Whereas the CEDA sought to achieve its aims by evolutionary, democratic means, the Socialists, while declaring their preferences for this method, added

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1 He added: 'since I have been in the government...I have become, if possible, much redder than when I went in: but much redder!' (El Socialista, 13 Aug. 1933).

2 B. Alonso, El Socialista, 29 Aug. 1933.

the proviso that they would use other, revolutionary, means if the paths of democracy should prove fruitless for them.

Doubtless fear of Fascism in the Europe of 1933 was genuine, but this was not the only factor influencing Socialist attitudes. El Debate saw the labelling of the legalist Right as Fascist as a ploy to obscure the CEDA's position of legality. ABC suggested that the anti-Fascist campaign was a convenient way of covering up for the government's failings, a red herring produced as a distraction from the stench of Casas Viejas.[1] The Socialists, who demanded to be in the government to keep Lerroux out of it, found that they had to share in its growing unpopularity; desperation attracted workers to the chronic revolutionism of the CNT. The anti-Fascist campaign was a smokescreen for the Socialist change of tactics.

iv. The elections of November 1933

In mid-September 1933 Azaña's two years of power came to an end and Lerroux formed a new Republican coalition. His aims were 'to give battle to the Socialists and to contain an avalanche from the inflamed Right' caused by the deeds of the previous government. His ideal Republic was 'neither conservative, nor revolutionary, neither Right-wing, nor Left-wing, but equidistant from all extremism...; a tolerant, progressive, reforming Republic without violence, strictly

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1 El Debate & ABC, 19 Mar. 1933.

just without vengeance.' He became Premier, he believed, with the President's tacit authorization for a dissolution which would lead to 'rectification' of the policies of the Republic.[1] He told the Cortes that he wanted to put through a budget first; his general policy would be to modify the practice of existing laws without repealing the work of the Constituent Cortes. Such a policy would consolidate the Republic, which to be stable must be orderly and possess a moderate Right to balance the Left. The new Right that he hoped to tie to the Republic was the CEDA, which he did not mention by name, referring instead to 'a great legion of men full of goodwill, who are convinced of the impossibility of a Monarchist restoration.'[2]

The Socialists were in opposition from the first. Outside the Cortes Largo Caballero declared that power had been given to 'the saboteurs of the Republic... The Republic is in danger... Our party, ideologically, tactically, is a revolutionary party...and aspires to a complete transformation of society... To do this it is necessary to create a revolutionary spirit in the masses...to exchange this Republic for a social Republic.'[3] In the Cortes Prieto moved a motion of no confidence: all Socialist compromises with all Republi-

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1 Lerroux, Pequeña historia, 151-2, 163, 168-9 & 173-4.

2 DSCC, 2 Oct. 1933.

3 El Socialista, 3 Oct. 1933.

cans were at an end. According to Azaña, Lerroux's overtures to the Right were a betrayal of the Republic, since such elements were incompatible with the Constitution and the spirit of the régime; Lerroux's was a policy which aimed at 'attracting to the Republic Monarchists who still remain hostile to the régime.' Acción Republicana, the Esquerra, the Radical-Socialists and the ORGA, all represented in the government, withdrew their support and their Ministers, and Lerroux's first government fell on 3 October.[1] Alcalá-Zamora was anxious for a dissolution lest the reaction against Azaña's rule should turn into a reaction against the Republic.[2] After some unsuccessful attempts to find a Premier, another Republican coalition was formed on 8 October by Lerroux's lieutenant Martínez Barrio, who did not risk meeting the Cortes. General elections were announced for 19 November, with second contests where necessary on 3 December.[3]

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1 DSCC, 2-3 Oct. 1933. El Debate, 10 Sept. 1933, had seen the government as an improvement on Azaña's but it had to be opposed as it was laicist. Lerroux was defeated by 187 votes to 91; the Right abstained and he was supported only by his Radicals and some dissident Radical-Socialists and Federals.

2 Alcalá-Zamora, Los defectos, 172.

3 El Debate, 6-10 Oct. 1933. El Socialista, 8 Oct. 1933, reported the party's refusal to participate. The government was:- Premier, Martínez Barrio (Radical); State, Sánchez Albornoz (Acción Republicana); Justice, Botella Asensi (Radical-Socialist Left); War, Iranzo (Independent Republican); Navy, Pita Romero (ORGA); Finance, Lara (Radical); Interior, Rico Avello (Independent Republican); Public Instruction, Barnés (Radical-Socialist); Public Works, Guerra del Río (Radical); Agriculture, Del Río (Progressive); Industry & Commerce, Gordón Ordás (Radical-Socialist); Communications, Palomo (Independent Radical-Socialist); Labour, Pi Súñer (Esquerra).

The election campaign was conducted in a pre-revolutionary atmosphere dominated by the rival figures of Largo Caballero and Gil Robles. Gil Robles was more explicit about his conception of the future State and imitated the bellicose language of Socialists. The tone of the Right's campaign was set by the JAP, whose manifestos said that it was debatable 'whether parliamentarism is or is not the fit means for ruling peoples...but it is the only way that we now have for succeeding in restoring Spain... The JAP does not expect the solution of Spain's problems from the possible result of a parliamentary victory in a worn-out inorganic system.'[1] Japistas would use violence in the elections only by way of legitimate self-defence.

Gil Robles, speaking in Madrid on 15 October, outlined his policies. Violence as a means he ruled out, for the April and September elections proved that the Right could win a democratic contest. Once again he dissociated himself from Fascism: 'In the way we have heard voices which spoke to us of exotic novelties; but I ask myself if they are not mad, for we find the unifying principle for a totalitarian policy in our glorious Tradition. We need not take as our unifying principle that of other countries, which seek it in the glories of the Roman Empire, in the fetishism of the State, in the idolatry of the race.' His vision of the future was

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1 El Debate, 12 Oct. 1933.

a great Spain, purged of Freemasons and 'Judaizers', and 'in harmony with the spiritual currents which are springing up anew in the world.' The State would respect individual liberties, but impose unity and social justice. 'We must proceed to a new State... What does it matter if it costs us bloodshed! We need complete power and this is what we demand... Democracy is for us not an end, but a means for proceeding to the conquest of a new State. When the time comes Parliament either agrees or we make it disappear.'[1]

On 2 November Gil Robles spoke in Valladolid. He warned Leftists not to use illegal methods or turn against democracy. If they did, then his party would also turn against democracy and install its own system of government.[2] Back in Madrid on 5 November, he repeated that it was up to the Socialists to choose the battle-ground: 'If they want the law, the law; if they want violence, violence.'

The following Sunday he further explained the nature of the new State: 'We do not want a dictatorship that destroys the rights of the individual; but neither do we want excess of individual liberty to destroy collective rights. We do not want a personal power that never ends; but neither do we want a dissolvent parlia-

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1 El Debate, 17 Oct. 1933. José Antonio wrote that Gil Robles was now proclaiming 'Fascist' principles: 'he does not express himself as the caudillo of a Christian-Democrat party.' (Textos inéditos, 142).

2 El Debate, 3 Nov. 1933.

mentarism. We seek a revision of the Constitution in its dogmatic part, which is repugnant to our consciences, and in its organic part, representing a Parliament that is the most active agent in the dissolution of the Spanish people. To do this we shall not resort to foreign patrons, very worthy people, who have arisen the day before yesterday. In Tradition I find everything relating to the limitation of power, justice and corporations. Let us return to our old traditions, which is to return to Spain, to return to our own life.'[1] His speech on film, shown in the capital from a mobile cinema, had, however, a more demagogic ring: 'We want a new policy to put an end to this sterile parliamentarism... We are about to put democracy to the test, perhaps for the last time. It does not matter to us. We are going to Parliament to defend our ideals, but if tomorrow Parliament is against our ideals, we shall go against Parliament, because in politics, not the forms, but the content is what interests us.'[2]

From this plethora of words spoken during the campaign, what now emerged concerning the intentions of Gil Robles? With regard to his eventual aim, the rather vague Catholic corporativism of the summer had taken on a new dimension. Whether he was prompted by the fear that many of his followers and his impatient youth movement

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1 El Debate, 7 & 14 Nov. 1933.

2 El Debate, 18 Nov. 1933.

would go over to the 'maximalist' Right, with its Fascist tendencies, or whether he yearned for the Integrism of his youth, he had now committed himself to a new State inspired by Traditionalist principles. With regard to the means by which this State was to be attained, he still adhered to the evolutionary method, though the violent tone of his speeches and their sometimes ambiguous phraseology gave the impression that he was perhaps less firmly wedded to this course. While it was inherent in his declared aims that liberal-parliamentarism would be abolished at some time, the bald manner in which he had now stated this conveyed the impression that it might be sooner rather than later. Possibly the ambiguities were deliberate and aimed at curbing impatient followers with words without compromising his principles; yet perhaps these ambiguities reflected an inner vacillation between the Christian-Democrat influence of Herrera on the one hand, and on the other a combination of the influences of his Carlist upbringing and the rising tide of authoritarianism outside Spain.

Gil Robles's language at this stage was similar to that of his Monarchist ally Calvo Sotelo, who thought it important for the Right to win seats in Parliament to stop the Left winning them, not because Parliament was important in itself. European trends showed that 'the hour of inorganic parliamentarism has passed.'[1] If Gil

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1 Speech on a gramophone record by Calvo Sotelo, ABC, 19 Nov. 1933.

Robles and Calvo Sotelo agreed on this point, they were still at odds as to the pace and means of transformation, the form of government and their attitudes to Fascism. In exile Calvo Sotelo announced: 'More than a century ago we allowed ourselves to be carried away by the Encyclopedist cry, and we think in the French manner. We shall not now be able to escape the corporative and Fascist tide. With the difference that then we de-Hispanicized ourselves and now we are re-Hispanicizing ourselves.'[1]

Whether or not Gil Robles was clear in his mind about his intentions, his Socialist opponents were clear in theirs. His recent speeches, starting with the 'authentic Fascist harangue'[2] of 15 October, provided evidence for the charges they had been making against the CEDA in previous months. Largo Caballero told Socialists: 'First in the voting-urns...then in the street... The enemies have already begun the war, and say through the mouth of Gil Robles that if Parliament does not serve their purpose they will go against it. All right. We reply: "We are proceeding legally toward the evolution of society. But if you do not want this, we shall make the revolution violently." "This", the enemies will say, "is to stir up civil war." Let us be realistic... We are in [a] full-scale civil war [although] this war has not yet taken on the bloody

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1 ABC, 10 Oct. 1933.

2 Thus it was described by El Socialista, 17 Oct. 1933.

character that, for good or ill, it will inexorably assume.' 'The leader of Acción Popular said...that the Socialists accept democracy when it suits them; but when it does not suit them, they take the shortest path. All right; I must say with frankness that this is the truth. If legality is of no use to us, if it hinders our advance, we shall bypass bourgeois democracy and proceed to the revolutionary conquest of power.'[1]

The party's intellectuals, mindful of Germany, found themselves in agreement with Largo Caballero's course. Fascism was 'inevitable' where Socialism was not revolutionary, 'but it will not be inevitable where Socialism is animated by a revolutionary spirit; it has not been so in Russia.'[2] Socialists would make no electoral alliances with Republicans who had failed to keep eighty per cent of their promises; when Azaña fell agrarian reform existed only on paper and laicist education was a myth in the eyes of Largo Caballero.[3]

While Azaña and his former Socialist allies went to the polls separately, the opposition presented to the electorate the united front which had proved successful in the municipal elections in April. The parties of the Right had from the first expected to

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1 El Socialista, 9 & 14 Nov. 1933.

2 Araquistáin, El Socialista, 31 Oct. 1933.

3 Largo Caballero, El Socialista, 24 Sept. & 20 Oct. 1933. Los Ríos told the U.S. Ambassador that he foresaw a Rightist victory (Bowers, My Mission, 42).

fight in alliance; the call of Dilectissimi Nobis for Catholic unity provided an added stimulant. For the CEDA, the Monarchist split was seen not as 'a division, which does not exist, but a differentiation... There will not just be union with only one or two parties, but with all those groups which coincide on the reform of the Constitution and its complementary laws... These unions will be circumstantial and dependent upon what the situation in national politics demands' though the local groupings were to make the arrangements. Lamamié de Clairac for the Carlists had long maintained that it was necessary 'to go to the elections united, although we do not much believe in them.' Goicoechea for the Alfonsines was anxious not to be left out and so made the concession of 'sacrificing momentarily our Monarchist ideal. The ideal now can be none other than revision of the Constitution.'[1]

It was therefore no surprise when a central committee was set up in Madrid to facilitate agreement on the Right. It consisted of Agrarian Deputies representing the various strains in the minority - Cedista, Alfonsine, Carlist and Agrarian - under the presidency of Martínez de Velasco.[2] The Right's electoral unity was based on the following pact:[3]

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1 Gil Robles, El Debate, 20 June 1933; Lamamié, El Debate, 31 Jan. 1933; Goicoechea, ABC, 18 June 1933.

2 The committee was:- Martínez de Velasco, Royo Villanova & Cid (ex-Liberal Agrarians); Gil Robles & Cañanueva (CEDA); Lamamié de Clairac (Carlist); Sáinz Rodríguez (Alfonsine); Calderón (ex-Conservative Agrarian).

3 ABC, 15 Oct. 1933.

> Common aspirations, without detriment to the particular ideology of each organization, will be:
>
> A) Revision of the laicist and socialistic legislation set out in the constitutional text as in other laws.
>
> B) A rigorous defence in the future Parliament of the economic interests of the country, with recognition of the legitimate preponderance of agriculture as the basis of national wealth.
>
> C) Absolute amnesty for all political offences as soon as the Cortes are constituted, with the same generosity with which it was conceded to those responsible for the revolutionary movement of August 1917.

Although the coordinating committee was soon functioning, the drafting of lists of candidates did not proceed very smoothly. Local rivalries had to be dealt with and each party jockeyed for the greatest possible representation. The Right was also divided on who should be included in the coalitions. Gil Robles wanted not only circumstantial alliance with other Rightists, but also a purely electoral anti-Marxist front with Republicans of the Centre in areas where this was necessary to defeat the Socialists; in this, he was supported by liberal Agrarians.[1] Alfonsines strongly objected to this, preferring to set the bounds of the coalition no wider than the Agrarian minority. For ABC, anti-Marxism was not the best of ideas; all the parties in the original Republican coalition of 1931 were enemies.[2] Carlists felt that they could unite with fellow-Catholics but, like ABC, jibbed at the thought of alliance

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1 Gil Robles, Royo Villanova, Cid, in El Debate, 28 Sept., 5 & 7 Oct. 1933.

2 ABC, 30 Sept. 1933; also Vallellano, ABC, 13 Oct. 1933.

with any Republicans.[1]

Gil Robles, however, was adamant about his broad anti-Marxist front and carried the day. The Right formed anti-Marxist lists for 19 November with Republicans of the Centre and Centre-Right in thirteen provinces outside Catalonia and the Basque Country.[2] The Radicals had earlier announced that there would be no government lists: they would ally with Right or Left according to the particular local situation.[3] To make cooperation with Republicans easier and so as not to frighten the 'neutral masses', Gil Robles exerted his party's numerical predominance within the Right to eliminate, especially from the list in the capital, names associated with violence or dictatorship.[4]

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1 El Debate, 11 Oct. 1933.

2 From the press, it would seem that the following alliances were made by the Right: Alicante (with Chapaprieta); Asturias (Liberal-Democrats); Badajoz (Radicals and Conservatives); Balearics (Centre Republicans of March); Cáceres (Radicals); Ceuta (Radicals); Ciudad Real (Conservatives); Granada (Radicals); Huelva (Conservatives); Jaén (Radicals and Conservatives); Lugo (Conservatives); Murcia-prov. (Liberal-Democrats); Zamora (S.Alba, now a Radical). In Guadalajara the Right was in alliance with Romanones.

3 Martínez Barrio, El Debate, 12 Oct. 1933. Left Republicans were very disappointed to hear this. The Radicals fought alone where they were strong, e.g. Madrid, Valencia, the Canaries, and allied with Left Republicans, e.g. with Radical-Socialists in Alicante, with Acción Republicana in Almería and Ávila.

4 He wanted a Radical-Right alliance in Madrid-cap. The Monarchists would not permit this, but he got José Antonio relegated to Cádiz, Delgado Barreto to the Canaries, Albiñana to Burgos & Sanjurjo to Melilla - where he was not allowed to stand (El Debate, 10, 17 & 26 Oct. 1933; HCE, I-5, 655; F. Casares, La CEDA va a gobernar [Madrid, 1934], 38 & 45-6). Redondo had to withdraw in Valladolid and García Valdecasas in Granada. Disputes were legion: one of the more heated was over Madrid-prov., where, as in Valencia, the views of the CEDA prevailed over those of Renovación Española.

In Catalonia, the situation was different. After the passage of the Statute, elections were held for the Parliament of the Generalidad on 20 November 1932. The contest proved to be between the Esquerra, which received the votes of 40% of the total electorate and obtained 69 seats, and the Lliga, now again led by Cambó, which got 18 seats with 35%. In December Maciá was elected President of the Generalidad, with Companys as President of the Parliament; the rule of the Esquerra continued.[1] The Lliga had improved its position with the return of many of its supporters to their old allegiance, a process that continued during 1933.[2] The party set about reorganizing itself within the new political framework, and its assembly in February 1933 changed the name from the Lliga Regionalista to Lliga Catalana.[3] The party sought to recover its pre-Republican strength from the general reaction to Azaña's government and the defects of the Esquerra's administration. Now that the CNT and the Esquerra had fallen out, turbulence mounted in Barcelona under the direction of the FAI. The conservative press claimed

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1 Arrarás, HSRE II, 20-5. The Esquerra got 192,000 votes to the Lliga's 129,000; the Monarchist Right polled 15,300, the Catalan Communists 10,900.

2 J.M. de Nadal, Seis años con D. Francisco Cambó (Barcelona, 1957), 144.

3 M. García Venero, Vida de Cambó (Barcelona, 1952), 364. Its policy remained the achievement 'by all legal means' of the 'greatest degree of moral and material progress for the Catalan people' through the region's 'consciousness of its personality and the persistent action of its own endeavour.'

that 'unbridled anarchy' ruled in the capital.[1]

In the Catalan countryside the Lliga also looked to a reaction from conservative elements. Under the Dictatorship Companys had built himself firm political support in the Unió de Rabassaires - rabassaires being leaseholders who had put down a lump sum initially and held the land for the duration of the vine, paying the landowner perhaps a third or a half of each harvest. Now they wanted to become the owners themselves.[2] Maciá promised legislation to give them land and thus stave off violence, a promise of dubious constitutional validity. His plans, however, were held up in Parliament and this led to a crisis in the Generalidad in October when Aragay, Secretary of the Unió, resigned in protest from the Catalan government.[3] While the Lliga sought to rally the owners and other farmers exasperated by lawlessness, Companys decided to renew his pledges to the Unió, a good source of electoral support.[4] In November 1933, as in November 1932, the struggle was therefore between the Catalanist

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1 La Vanguardia, 12 July 1933. Textile men thought it better to emigrate than 'to live under the constant terrorist threat' (Arrarás, HSRE II, 165 & 195).

2 E.A. Peers, Catalonia Infelix (London, 1937), 224-5; Ramos Oliveira, Politics, 221.

3 Peers, Catalonia, 225; Arrarás, HSRE II, 219.

4 Farmers in March 1933 had threatened to destroy their crops if the Generalidad did not afford them protection (Arrarás, HSRE II, 165). Companys, renewing his solidarity with the Unió, said: 'I am what I am thanks to the rabassaires' (Ossorio, Companys, 79).

forces of the Lliga and the Esquerra; in Barcelona, the Monarchists and anti-Catalanists tried to get an alliance with the Lliga, but found the latter's terms impossible.[1]

In the Basque Country, too, peculiar factors were present. The gap between the PNV and the Traditionalists grew wider. The strength of Aguirre's party came from the countryside, where people were much under the tutelage of pro-Nationalist parish priests, from younger members of the bourgeoisie, and from the workers of the Solidaridad Obrera Vasca, the rival in the area of the UGT.[2] Apart from the resurgence of Carlism in Álava, the great disappointment for the PNV was Navarre, which continued to be their Ulster.[3] Following the break-up of the Basque-Navarrese minority, Monarchists in August 1932 produced a pamphlet revealing a startling Nationalist-

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1 The Lliga stood alone in Barcelona, negotiations with the Radicals and the Right having failed, in the latter case because the Lliga demanded all the candidates on the list. Monarchists, Agrarians and the like formed their own list under the title Bloque Nacional de Derechas in Barcelona, on which Gil Robles refused to appear, ostensibly because of his regionalist convictions. In Lérida, the Lliga formed a list with Traditionalists, Radicals and Liberal-Democrats.

2 Sierra Bustamente, Euzkadi, 237, 240 & 270; Aguirre, Libertad, 315. Aguirre gives the SOV over 50,000 members, the Alfonsine Sierra 35,000. In 1932 a priest wrote to Aguirre to assure him that 'there is no other redemption save Nationalism'; another wrote: 'You must not abandon your leadership of the Basque Israel for which God has appointed you.' Support came also from the farmers' organization Euzko-Nekazarien Alkartasuna (Iturralde, Catolicismo, I, 426).

3 Letter from Irujo to Aguirre, 5 May 1932, cited by Arrarás, HSRE I, 387.

Communist-Jewish-Masonic plot; the PNV however enlisted the aid of the Nuncio and the Bishops of Vitoria and Pamplona against this libel. While warding off the Right, Aguirre continued to work for a Statute. Hopes were raised when the President signed the Catalan Statute in San Sebastián on 15 September 1932; on this occasion, Prieto, the leader of the Socialists of Bilbao, privately told Nationalists that he favoured a Statute for the three Basque provinces. In October the PNV Deputies met in Madrid to speed up operations, and on 19 October a new committee to draft a Statute was formed with Socialists and Traditionalists, both of whom, however, soon sabotaged the plan.[1]

In the municipal elections of April 1933 the PNV stood alone and won twice as many seats as all the other groups together. In May, therefore, the visit of the President was coolly received and accompanied by clashes and a general strike by the SOV. On 6 August a meeting of town councils and temporary committees took place in Vitoria; disagreement between the PNV and the Traditionalists was again rife, the latter defending provincial rights. Nevertheless a Statute was accepted by 249 town councils and rejected by only 28; a Committee of Eighteen was set up to organize a plebiscite as the Constitution demanded. The plebiscite was arranged in the three

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1 Aguirre, Libertad, 308-14, 318-31 & 338-42. El Debate, 30 Oct. 1932, reported that the Traditionalist committees of the 3 provinces had decided on restitution of fueros rather than draft a Statute. Aguirre, DSCC, 9 Nov. 1932, pointedly said, 'my Country is Euzkadi' when other Deputies held that it could only be Spain.

provinces for 5 November.

The PNV approached the Socialists for their support, but this Prieto, who wanted the plebiscite to be held after the general election (19 November), refused. Also with a view to the elections, the Traditionalist José María Urquijo offered to help Aguirre by calling off Oriol's Traditionalist propaganda campaign in Álava in exchange for a united Catholic list with the PNV in the general election; this Aguirre refused. The Traditionalists, as usual, vacillated before the plebiscite; the matter was left to individual consciences though Alfonso Carlos was himself against the Statute and Oriol pressed the government to suspend the plebiscite. The Socialists advised abstention. The result of the plebiscite of 5 November, in which women voted, showed that 88.44% of the inhabitants of Biscay and 89.52% of those of Guipúzcoa were in favour of the Statute; in Álava, however, only 46.4% were in favour of it.[1] The PNV again approached the Socialists for a joint 'pro-Statute' list for the elections, but was again rebuffed; the PNV once again fought alone.[2]

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1 Aguirre, Libertad, 351-3, 364-80 & 388-404. In Álava, there was widespread abstention by Traditionalists: 26,015 voted in favour, 6,695 against. Alfonso Carlos expressed his opinion in a letter to Olazábal (Documentos de Alfonso Carlos, 229). Prieto's organ El Liberal suspected gerrymandering, asking how 88% of Biscayans could have voted in favour when the Socialists had counselled abstention. (Quoted in Arrarás, HSRE II, 263-4). The Bishop of Vitoria, who had been allowed to return from exile in April 1933, had said that it was licit for Catholics to vote for the Statute if they so desired (García Venero, Nacionalismo vasco, 445).

2 ABC, 12 Nov. 1933. El Socialista (8 Aug. 1933) thought it as necessary to 'smother' separatist nationalism as it was 'Fascism'.

The national campaign, dominated by the verbal contest between Gil Robles and Largo Caballero, was naturally fought around the performance of the first Republican biennium. The propaganda of the Right was, by Spanish standards, massive; the shortcomings of Azaña and the evils of Masonry and Marxism were brought home to the electorate by thousands of posters, over the radio and, initially, by aerial means.[1] The precise sources of the funds for this expensive campaign were not revealed, but the cash available for the Right would seem to have been something approaching 1,000,000 pesetas.[2] The posters of Acción Popular denounced two years which had seen burning churches, Casas Viejas, deportations, the Defence Law, separatism, laicism, enchufismo, pistolerismo, the ruin of the countryside, hunger, unemployment, blood and tears: 'Vote for the Right! Vote against Marxism!' One poster pictured a luxurious official limousine beside an impoverished workman, with the comment that 14,000,000 pesetas had been spent on official cars and 1,000,000 on the unemployed. Another poster took 'anti-national policy' to task with a bloodstained

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1 The government banned aerial propaganda on 4 Nov., as only the Right had aeroplanes; the CEDA had eight, and one autogiro.

2 Many of the gifts were anonymous. ABC, 22 Oct. 1933, said that Acción Popular had received 500,000 ptas. in gifts, 150,000 from one family alone; ABC, 27 Oct., reported another anonymous gift of 100,000 ptas. Cortés Cavanillas (conversation) mentions the names Urquijo and Vega de Anzó among the many members of the plutocracy who made donations. Gil Robles (conversation) says that the CEDA was financed by the monthly subscriptions of members, though there were 'extraordinary subscriptions' for elections.

map of Spain rent by the three daggers of Masonry, Socialism and separatism; over it passed a red line indicative of a Moscow-Mexico axis.

ABC contrasted the utopias of Marxism with the realities of anti-Marxism, such as denial of God with true religion, class war with social peace, free love with the sanctity of marriage and exaltation of force with the rule of law.[1] Cedistas appealed to the disillusioned and whipped up their supporters to renewed enthusiasm: 'For two years in Spain we have endured the class struggle and there has never been so much hunger... Religion, Country, Family ...all that is most fundamental for a civilized people turns to enter into battle. Spain will not pardon deserters!'[2] Calvo Sotelo's recorded voice called on electors 'to choose between three hosts: Socialists, Republicans and Rightists... Demagogy... Democracy... Hierarchy and Authority... Three names: Marx, Rousseau, Christ. Three symbols: thehammer and sickle, the triangle and the Cross.'[3]

The elections of 19 November were held in accordance with the

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1 El Debate, 27 Oct. 1933 & ABC, 12 Nov. 1933. Catholics used the slogan: 'Save the souls of the little children!' (Manuel, Politics, 106).

2 El Debate, 3 & 10 Oct. 1933.

3 ABC, 19 Nov. 1933; 'he who votes for the Socialists, votes openly for Marx; but no less so does he who votes for Lerroux ...because the Centre always fumbles before the Left.'

Electoral Law of 27 July 1933. This law was in principle the same as the decree of 1931: each province formed a constituency, but provincial capitals with over 150,000 inhabitants formed distinct constituencies. The number of deputies allotted to each constituency in relation to its population was divided into a majority and a minority: to gain election in the first round, one candidate at least had to obtain 40% of the poll. If a second ballot had to be held, only candidates who had obtained over 8% of the votes in the previous round could seek election. The real innovation since 1931 was the introduction of female suffrage. The system of majorities and minorities put the premium on mass parties and the formation of alliances, since representation was weighted in favour of the majorities [1] - a factor in the formation of alliances between the Right and the Centre in areas where the Socialists were strong. Gil Robles, in fact, had wanted abolition of majorities and minorities, foreseeing violent changes in the composition of the Cortes and the need for moderate parties to ally with the political extremes, but the government of Azaña had rejected his plea.[2]

On Sunday 19 November voters went to the polls; the electorate at this time numbered 13,187,311 - 6,337,885 men and 6,849,426 women.[3]

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1 J. Bécarud, La deuxième République espagnole (Paris, 1962),49-50.

2 DSCC, 4 July 1933.

3 All electoral statistics, unless otherwise stated, are based on the detailed information, based on official figures, in El Debate, 5 Dec. 1933 & 2 Feb. 1936.

A swing to the Right was evident, but second contests had to be held on 3 December to elect some 95 deputies.[1]

The intervening fortnight gave time for re-alignment of forces. El Debate noted the success of the Centre-Right coalition in keeping out the Socialists. In the four provinces of Badajoz, Cáceres, Granada and Jaén, strongholds of rural Socialism, the representation of the PSOE had been cut from 38 seats to 11.[2] Gil Robles had on the eve of the poll made it plain that his party did not seek to govern, but would lend outside support to a Centre government. The Secretary-General of the CEDA now said that Gil Robles had got more seats than he wanted.[3] The bait was thus clearly dangled before Lerroux who took it. He rejected a plea from the Radical-Socialist Minister Palomo for a Socialist-Radical-Left Republican alliance on 3 December on the grounds that this would be a betrayal of the votes cast on 19 November; instead, he repeated that Radicals would ally with anyone but Socialists and Monarchists.[4] In practice, this

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1 ABC, 2 Dec. 1933.

2 El Debate, 23 Nov. 1933. In Badajoz the Centre-Right polled 141,316 votes to the Socialists' 136,603, obtaining 11 and 3 seats respectively under the majority-minority system. The other results were similar, viz. Cáceres: Centre-Right 7 seats (116,094 votes), Socialists 2 (67,058). Granada: Centre-Right 10 (121,945), Socialists 3 (96,649). Jaén: Centre-Right 10 (140,997), Socialists 3 (112,459).

3 El Debate, 19 Nov. 1933; Salmón (at Murcia, 25 Nov.), cited in Arrarás, HSRE II, 240.

4 ABC, 22 & 23 Nov. 1933.

meant alliance between the laicist Radicals and the Catholic CEDA against the common Socialist enemy to the chagrin of the Monarchists, who had to be squeezed off the lists. In the two Madrid constituencies, the latter apparently refused to budge, and so the Radical and Conservative candidates simply withdrew.[1] In the marginal constituencies of Murcia (capital and province), Málaga (capital and province), Alicante and Córdoba, Centre-Right coalitions were negotiated for 3 December; in Alicante and Córdoba Monarchists had to withdraw.[2] In five of the six constituencies the new combination won.[3]

The final results of the general election gave a new look to the first ordinary Cortes of the Republic. On the Left, the

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1 In Madrid-cap. in the first contest the Right polled 133,366 votes, the Centre 72,299, Socialists 141,796, Left Republicans 22,177, Communists 12,685. In the second, in a straight fight, Socialists 177,331, the Right 171,757; 13 seats to 4. In Madrid-prov., the Socialists got 58,854, the Right 52,165, the Centre 27,174 in the first; in the second, the Socialists lost to the Right in a straight fight, 2 seats to 6.

2 Córdoba provided a cause célèbre: Gil Robles forced out the Alfonsine Valverde, Alcalá-Zamora's personal rival in Priego, to make room on the list for the Progressives, the President's friends (Cortés Cavanillas, Gil Robles, 157-60).

3 In Córdoba the Right alone would have beaten the Socialists alone, but a Socialist-Communist alliance - the PCE here polled 25,693 - would have defeated the Right and the Centre separately. In Alicante, Murcia and Málaga-prov., the Socialists could only be overcome by a Centre-Right alliance. In Málaga-cap., a Socialist-Communist alliance defeated the Centre-Right: Bolívar of the PCE just topped the poll with 12,901. It may be noted that in Oviedo, the Socialists were beaten by a CEDA-Liberal-Democrat list, while in Huelva the Socialists won because the Radicals had a separate list from the Conservative-CEDA coalition; both these constituencies were decided on 19 Nov.

Socialists had 58 seats, the Esquerra 22, Acción Republicana 5, the ORGA 5, the Federals 2, the Independent Radical-Socialists 2, the Radical-Socialists 2, the Communists one. In the centre, the Radicals had 104 seats, the Lliga 24, the Conservatives 17, the Basque Nationalists 12, the Liberal-Democrats 9, the Progressives 3, the Centre Republicans 2; there were also 5 independent Republicans and one Balearic Regionalist. On the Right, the CEDA had 117 seats, the Agrarians 29, the Traditionalists 21, Renovación Española 14, the PNE one; in addition, there were 19 independents, among them José Antonio Primo de Rivera.

In comparison with the Constituent Cortes, the Left had fallen from 247 to 97, the Centre had risen from 152 to 177, while the Right had soared from 41 to 201.[1] The parties of Azaña's former coalition were now very much in a minority. 62.9% of the electorate had voted, the CNT having abstained. The Right - CEDA, Agrarians and Monarchists - obtained 3,085,676 votes, compared with the Radicals 1,351,100 and the 321,754 of the Conservatives. On the Left, the Socialists obtained 1,673,648 votes to the 636,705 of the parties of the Republican Left, excluding the Esquerra. The Basque Nationalists polled 183,190 votes, the Progressives 58,477, and the Communists

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1 Dividing the parties in the Constituent Cortes on the same lines as here used for 1933, except that the Basque Nationalists, included in the Right in 1931, have been included with the Centre in 1933. Also, of the 26 independents of 1931, 24 have been included with the Centre, two - Calvo Sotelo and Romanones - with the Right.

171,040. In Catalonia, the Lliga, with 24 seats, obtained 307,730 votes, while the Esquerra got 372,932 votes but only 22 seats. The election revealed a sharp swing to the Right, and the decimation of the Republican Left, tendencies accentuated by the quirks of the electoral system. The Right alone had won 28 constituencies, the Centre and the Centre and Right in alliance 27 more; the Left had carried only 5.[1]

The Socialists attempted to explain away their defeat by accusing the anti-Marxists of corrupt practices; thus, according to Araquistáin, the party's defeat was the result of the Radicals' old political methods.[2] In some provinces, it would seem, Radicals and other Ministers did try to use governmental machinery in their favour, against both Left and Right, though apparently to little effect.[3] The most turbulent areas were Granada, Badajoz and Valencia: in the former provinces violence came from both sides, and the Right claimed that Socialist local authorities intimidated

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1 Viz. Barcelona-prov., Gerona, Huelva, Madrid-cap. and Málaga-cap.

2 El Socialista, 25 Nov. 1933; in general, Socialists' complaints involved Radicals more often than Rightists.

3 Socialists spoke of Radical caciquismo in Badajoz, Granada, Jaén & Pontevedra, saying the Governors were Radical partisans. El Debate, 16 Nov. 1933, mentioned caciquismo by the Governor of Cuenca, by Radicals in Madrid-prov., and in Toledo where the Minister Palomo was standing: here propagandists were arrested, as was D. de Madariaga for a time. ABC, 18 Nov. 1933, printed a letter from the Minister Sánchez Albornoz to a cacique in Ávila, requesting his aid.

voters and influenced them by their control over employment.[1] Electoral malpractice seems to have occurred in Galicia, and there was something possibly awry in Valencia, in this case to the disadvantage of the Right.[2] Since local government was still largely in Leftist hands, it is difficult to believe that any caciquismo by anti-Marxists was not cancelled out on a national scale by the neo-caciquismo of the Socialist Left.[3] Though six people were killed on 19 November, the Right successfully got its voters, including nuns and the aged and infirm, to the polls; in some areas they were escorted by Japistas carrying pistols. The JAP lost eight dead in

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1 El Debate, 21 Nov. 1933, reported Socialist breaking of voting-urns in Badajoz. On 26 Oct. it reported that Rightists had been fired at in Vigo, Toledo & Madrid prov. On 14 Nov. it reported shots at the audience of Pemán & José Antonio in Cádiz prov.

2 Caciquismo seems still to have flourished in Galicia, possibly because of the great dependence of minifundistas on municipal whims. Possibly the Right here inherited the old Conservative organization, the Left that of the Liberals. Corunna, returning 12 of the Centre & Right, & the 5 ORGA men, was the only province where scrutiny of votes did not take place; El Debate, 16 Nov., reported a request by the Governor for the return of blank papers - to allow him to fill them in as he thought fit. Valencia (Memorias íntimas de Azaña, 173) was the most corrupt region in Spain under the Blasquistas (Radicals). The DRV complained of violence - 1 of their poll-supervisors was killed. According to Cortés Cavanillas (Gil Robles, 160-1) the DRV really won, but Lerroux & Blasco threatened to burn churches, whereupon the Archbishop, Lucía & Gil Robles conferred & agreed to a Radical victory. (The official result in both constituencies of Valencia shows a marginal Radical win over the DRV-Carlist coalition.)

3 Lerroux, Pequeña historia, 192-4, says the Interior Minister, Rico, himself defeated in Oviedo, was scrupulously fair and implies that a more 'experienced' man would have produced a Radical majority. Botella, Leftist Justice Minister, resigned because the government's 'inhibition' had let in too many Rightists (El Socialista, 30 Nov. 1933).

the campaign, but apparently carried out no reprisals.[1] A clandestine activity of the Right was payment of money to Anarchists in some areas; Rightists were haunted by the fear that the CNT might vote for the Left, but it seems certain that their decision to abstain was not just the result of Rightist bribery.[2]

The reasons for the Right's victory were less intriguing than the Left suggested. The Right was now well-organized with a mass following, and went to the polls in some areas with the Centre. The Socialists refused to ally with the Republican Left, in any case weak, and were defeated by the wave of disillusionment which the preceding biennium had provoked. The electoral law drawn up and passed by the Left proved under the circumstances disadvantageous

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1 El Debate, 21 Nov. 1933; Monge Bernal, AP, 217 & 360-1.

2 Sáinz Rodríguez (conversation) says money was given to Anarchists in the Ebro Valley, Cádiz and other parts of Andalusia. El Socialista, 21 Jan. 1934, quoted the comment of Guerra del Río (Radical) on the CNT rising of Dec. 1933: 'Now they have to justify the money they received in the elections for not voting.' F. Bravo, José Antonio (2nd ed., Madrid, 1940), 31-2, says that in Cádiz money went to a CNT leader to accentuate the inhibitionist tendency. The FAI-CNT's whole attitude of violence against the Republican-Socialist régime would seem to indicate a spontaneous decision to abstain; the Right and the Radicals were in a sense for Anarchists in 1933 allies: they had condemned Casas Viejas and both promised amnesty for political offences in their programmes in November - many Anarchists were detained. B. Bolloten, The Grand Camouflage (London, 1961), 150, cites the Anarchist Tierra y Libertad, 10 Nov. 1933: 'Workers! Do not vote!... All politicians are our enemies... The CNT...is not interested in Parliament, which is a filthy house of prostitution... Destroy the ballots! Destroy the ballot boxes! Crack the heads of the ballot supervisers as well as those of the candidates!'

to itself, leaving it proportionally under-represented. The CNT's decision to abstain deprived the Left of perhaps 800,000 proletarian votes.

The elections revealed the political geography of Spain. In León and the Castiles, the Catholic Right held sway, if elements of the 'old politics', now styled Agrarians, retained a certain influence among cereal-growers. In Extremadura, Upper Andalusia, Murcia, Asturias, Madrid and Bilbao, the Socialists were strong, but they were counterbalanced by the forces of the Right and Centre in the South and the capital, by the PNV in Bilbao, and by the Catholics and Liberal-Democrats in Asturias. Biscay and Guipúzcoa formed the fortress of the PNV, while Navarre and Álava were the Traditionalist bastion. Right and Left were roughly balanced in Galicia, and in Catalonia the Lliga balanced the Esquerra, in Valencia the DRV the Blasquista Radicals. The CNT was an unpredictable counterweight to conservative forces in Lower Andalusia and Aragón, and could tip the balance against them in Barcelona, Asturias and perhaps parts of the Levante. Off the mainland, the Canaries were a Radical preserve; the men of Juan March were a key-factor in the Balearics. Nothing can be said about the one-deputy presidios of Ceuta and Melilla. Thus Right and Left were more or less evenly balanced. Given the nature of the electoral system, marginal movements of opinion could lead to marked changes in the composition of the Cortes. In 1933, the trend of opinion was clearly against the Left; there-

fore for the Right, as a French observer noted, the outcome was a 'triumph surpassing the most optimistic forecasts.'[1]

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1 Nicolas, Revue des Deux Mondes, 15 Dec. 1933, 918.

CHAPTER IV

THE REPUBLIC AND THE REVOLUTION, DECEMBER 1933-OCTOBER 1934

From December 1933 until October 1934 Spain was ruled by Republican coalitions based on Lerroux's Radical Party and supported from outside by the CEDA. This arrangement was made possible by Lerroux and Gil Robles. Lerroux wanted to rectify the Leftist policies pursued by governments in the previous two years and move the centre of gravity of the régime from the Left to the Centre. Such a policy was acceptable to Gil Robles who had announced on the eve of the elections that he did not want his party to govern for some time. Collaboration in the elections between Radicals and Cedistas cemented this alliance of convenience.

Lerroux wanted to open the Republic to the Right in order to consolidate the régime, but owing to the composition of the new Cortes and to the hostility towards him of Socialists and Left Republicans he now had no alternative but to rely on Rightist allies. Cedista and Agrarian benevolence in turn made government possible and perhaps saved the country from civil war at this stage. For Lerroux the CEDA's willingness to support his government with the Constitution still unreformed was proof that Gil Robles had really accepted the Republic: the CEDA, to the fury of Monarchists, was now a Republican party in all but name. Lerroux's opinion was not shared by Left Republicans or Socialists because they had their own

conceptions of what the Republic ought to be. Most Socialists flatly refused to accept the verdict of the polls for government by conservatives; nor did Azaña and his colleagues renounce their narrow conception of Republicanism even though the results demonstrated that theirs was a Republic almost without Republicans except in Catalonia.

According to Prieto Cedistas were 'enemies of the Republic' and repeal of the work of the Constituent Cortes - the 'essence' of the régime - would be tantamount to a coup d'état, which in turn would justify and necessitate revolution. For Left Republicans revision of their policies was equivalent to putting the clock back to the pre-Republican days of 1930 and this justified revolutionary action to restore their 'true' Republic. Except for the Esquerra, they did not take part in the new revolutionary movement because its motive-power was represented by Largo Caballero, whose views were incompatible with their own. The majority of Socialists in 1934 sought to install the dictatorship of the proletariat, not to restore the progressive bourgeois régime. 'In 1934 the liberal Republic had failed in Spain, as it had failed in Russia in October 1917.'[1] Hence Azaña was caught between the Scylla of a conservative Republic with Cedista participation in government and the Charybdis of proletarian revolution. Though he advised Catalan Leftists not

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1 Ramos Oliveira, Politics, 506.

to rise at the last minute, Azaña did not set his face against violence during 1934 in the same way as Gil Robles had in 1932.

Gil Robles took up the challenge of Prieto: the entry of the CEDA into the government, given the views of the Left on the nature of the régime, would indeed represent a coup d'état, even without violence. As leader of the biggest parliamentary group, which undertook to serve and defend the Republic with complete loyalty, his democratic right to claim at least a share in government could not be denied him. In the tradition of Balmes he followed the path of 'possibilism' and rejected the 'catastrophist' solutions of the Monarchists, from whom he dissociated his party even more clearly after the elections than before. While trying to restrain the impatience of his followers (especially the JAP), he saw that his legal 'tactic' must produce results if the Right's masses were not to desert him. Even so there were signs that he was becoming less insistent on introducing his new State during 1934; but in any case his dogmatic adherence to constitutional means meant that the electorate would have to consent to any changes.[1]

i. Lerroux's reotification of the Republic

The largest group in the new Cortes was led by Gil Robles and

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1 Article 125 of the Constitution (concerning its reform) stipulated that the existing Cortes had to be dissolved and proposed changes submitted to the electorate.

composed of those who had stood as candidates of the branches of the CEDA and of many who technically had been representatives of farmers' organizations: it was therefore officially called the Minoría Popular Agraria.[1] On the eve of the poll Gil Robles had announced that his party did not intend to govern immediately. The parties of the Centre would reform Azaña's handiwork because they would be unable to govern without the Right's support.[2] After the poll he repeated this view, which he had first expressed in Valencia in November 1932. The CEDA was unfit to govern immediately because Catholic feelings were still upset by Azaña's persecution.[3]

Cedistas were conscious of their strength and commanding position: government was impossible without their support. There would be a period of government by the Centre after which the Right would take over.[4] Gil Robles warned those Rightists who disliked this policy that, given the incompatibility of Lerroux and the Socialists, the alternative was 'a solution of the Left' which would be 'the brief preface to an essay in the dictatorship of the proletariat'.[5]

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1 The Minority initially numbered 114 - 7 Dec. 1933 - with J. Martín Artajo as Secretary. By June 1934 the number had risen to 117. In April, G. Carrascal Martín took over as Secretary (El Debate, 8 Dec. 1933, 7 Apr. & 1 June 1934).

2 El Debate, 19 Nov. 1933.

3 Diario de las sesiones de Cortes, 19 Dec. 1933.

4 El Debate, 3 Dec. 1933.

5 El Debate, 17 Dec. 1933.

Monarchist pressure to use his strength to wreck the Republic was ignored though he made it plain to the Radicals that his support was conditional on implementation of policies which they had in common.[1] Gil Robles stated his intentions simply and clearly: 'Today I shall facilitate the formation of governments of the Centre; tomorrow, when the time comes, I shall call for power and carry out constitutional reform. If they do not hand over power to us, if events show that there is no room for Rightist political evolution within the Republic, it will pay the consequences. This is not a threat; it is a warning.'[2]

The size of the CEDA's parliamentary group reflected the success of the leadership in attracting and keeping the allegiance of a large proportion of the representatives of agricultural organizations. It betokened, in fact, victory over the liberal Agrarians in the discreet battle waged behind the scenes since the municipal elections of April 1933 for the support of discontented rural interests. At the end of November 1933, Martínez de Velasco, leader of the old Agrarian Minority, expected 40 to 50 deputies to form a new Agrarian group which, said Royo Villanova, would act as a third force on the Right alongside the CEDA and the Monarchists, but would participate in government to make the Republic more liberal, more conservative,

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1 ABC, 21 Dec. 1933.

2 El Debate, 22 Dec. 1933.

more unitary and altogether less Socialist.[1] A preliminary meeting held on 1 December, was attended by 41 Deputies: present were the liberal wing of the old Agrarian Minority - figures such as Cid, Calderón and Martín Martín; other survivors from the 'old politics', such as Romanones and the Conservative ex-Minister Rodríguez de Viguri; and, by invitation, some conservative Cedistas like Casanueva.

This attempt to attract Cedistas failed. The new Agrarian Minority had only 29 members, the majority of whom favoured the personal participation of one of their number in the government.[2] The leader, Martínez de Velasco, nevertheless set out to create a national party with the immediate objective of repealing the existing agrarian and educational laws. On 23 January he announced the unanimous decision of Agrarians 'to accept the legally constituted régime'(a formal declaration of Republicanism).[3] It quickly transpired, however, that there had been no unanimous decision: within a week 8 Deputies, including Romanones, Calderón and Fanjul, left in protest at this piece of sharp practice. A clique of ex-Albistas - Martínez

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1 Royo, El Debate, 22 & 24 Nov. 1933; Martínez de Velasco, El Debate, 1 Dec. 1933.

2 El Debate, 2 Dec. 1933. Calderón was Vice-President, J. Romero Radigales Sec. The 29 were divided as to the merits of collaboration: Romanones argued in favour, the ex-Conservatives Calderón and Rodríguez de Viguri against it.

3 El Debate, 8 & 15 Dec. 1933, & 24 Jan. 1934.

de Velasco, Cid, Royo Villanova, and Velayos - were now in clear control of the rump.[1]

The manifesto of Martínez de Velasco's Partido Agrario Español appeared on 31 January 1934. The party declared that it would support and participate in Republican governments, and that it stood for order at home and peace abroad, the reform of the anti-clerical and 'socialistic' parts of the Constitution and the creation of a second chamber. It pledged itself always to defend national unity, though not to the exclusion of some administrative decentralization, as well as to procure reductions in government expenditure. Its prime concern was protection for agriculture, as for industry, by means of tariffs fixed by bodies beyond ministerial control. Inside the tariff-walls, however, the party was strongly in favour of the principle of laissez faire. The exception here was the need for intervention by the State to ensure rural prosperity: thus, if there were to be price-levels for produce, these must be fully adequate. The State ought to organize better credit-facilities and improve

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1 ABC & El Debate, 26-27 Jan. 1934; & Calderón in Blanco y Negro, 4 Feb. 1934. ABC, which saw the decision as a collective betrayal of the electors, seems to have been instrumental, by its glare of publicity, in securing the resignation of some Deputies. Apparently only 4 members of the group had declared their preferences in the elections - Romanones as a liberal Monarchist, Royo Villanova, Cid and Velayos as Republicans. Martínez de Velasco defended his announcement by saying that the tactics to be adopted in the defence of agriculture were his personal concern as leader: 'I have chosen the path of serving the régime so as the better to serve Spain.' (Arrarás, HSRE, II, 281).

rural life with more roads, electricity, technical education and re-afforestation. The party did not approve of the redistribution of landed property, though it conceded that some latifundios could be broken up if full compensation were paid to the owners.[1]

The manifesto was typical of the programme of a rural party defending political and economic liberalism and social conservatism, an accurate reflection of those who composed it. The new Agrarian Party of the ex-Albista Liberals, though Republican, had more in common with the world of the liberal Monarchy than with the new Right of the 1930s. Though its membership was not confined to Castile and it did not defend the wheat interest alone, it was nevertheless, in essence, a party of the Castilian well-to-do; as such, it incorporated many elements of the 'old politics'.

The decisions of the CEDA and the Agrarians to support government by the Centre dismayed the Monarchists, who wanted the electoral coalition to be maintained in the Cortes. Their spokesman Calvo Sotelo advised from France that the Right should make their support available only for revision of the Constitution by the Radicals. If they would not do this, then the Right should obstruct to a man. In contrast to the 'possibilism' of Gil Robles, this exponent of 'catastrophism' opposed any Rightist participation in Republican government.

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1 El Debate, 1 Feb. 1934. Of the 27 signatories, 10 had been Deputies in the Constituent Cortes - 8 in the old Agrarian Minority, and two Right Republicans: Velayos and Lazcano.

The unstable Centre would not long be able to postpone the fated clash of Left and Right. Parliament was incapable of coping with revolution. The answer was a totalitarian State incorporating the masses, because the imminent choice before Spain lay between 'collectivist tyranny (or, as Caillaux says of Russia, "a State capitalism founded upon bondage") and a State with an authoritarian basis, with a parliament, but not parliamentary, and, of course, with a corporative system.'[1]

However, since Gil Robles had decided not to torpedo the Centre, it was necessary to prepare for parliamentary activity. Goicoechea and the Alfonsines declared their 'irreducible' hostility to the Republican régime, but decided to cooperate in carrying out the electoral mandate.[2] The Traditionalists also announced their support for implementation of the electoral pact, but their leader, Rodezno, informed Deputies that they would at all times make clear their 'absolute, resolute and categorical incompatibility with the established régime, as Catholics and as Spaniards.'[3] The Monarchists were

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1 ABC, 21 & 28 Nov. & 6 Dec. 1933.

2 ABC, & El Debate, 8 Dec. 1933. Sec. of the Minority was S. Fuentes Pila. Goicoechea had tried to create a 'National Agrarian Bloc' with the Agrarians as a rival to the CEDA, but the Agrarians would not join without the CEDA (El Debate, 14 Dec. 1933).

3 ABC & El Debate, 16 Dec. 1933; DSC, 20 Dec. 1933. The Sec. of the Minority was R. de Toledo Robles.

joined in their hostility by the independent snipers Albiñana and Primo de Rivera.[1]

While these various attitudes were being clarified on the Right, Lerroux, as leader of the biggest Republican minority, had to decide how best to insure the Republic which he at last had within his grasp. He announced that he would govern with anyone 'within the Republican orbit.'[2] The Republicans alone did not have sufficient Deputies to maintain a government. The Socialists were now, because of their revolutionary position, 'outside Republican orthodoxy' and a coalition with them was thus impossible. The only possible solution, he argued, was a minority government with the attendant risks of dependence on outside support from the Right. When Gil Robles and the Agrarians offered him their aid, he therefore accepted it: an open agreement with accidentalists he thought certainly no worse than the pacts made with 'separatists', 'Communists' and ex-Monarchists such as the President himself, in order to bring in the Republic. Gil Robles and Martínez de Velasco made the continuance

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1 Albiñana declared himself simply 'anti-Republican' (DSC, 19 Dec. 1933) though later on he joined up with Renovación Española. Asked where he would sit in the Chamber, he replied: 'The place does not matter. What I want is to be between Casares Quiroga and Azaña, so as to have the same company as Christ on the Cross.' (El Debate, 8 Dec. 1933). Among the Rightist Deputies for Cádiz, José Antonio and the Alfonsine Marqués de la Eliseda formed a Falangista duo, while Pemán was initially independent though in collaboration with both Monarchist Minorities. He and Eliseda joined up with their fellow-Alfonsines in due course.

2 El Debate, 3 Dec. 1933.

of the Republic possible.[1]

Time was given for Lerroux to put the finishing touches to his government by the outbreak on 8 December of the most serious uprising yet by the CNT. The caretaker government of Martínez Barrio proclaimed a 'state of alarm' and was supported by all Rightists against the threat of Libertarian Communism.[2] It was not until 19 December that Lerroux presented to the Cortes a government of seven other Radicals allied with four Centre Republicans and an Agrarian.[3]

In his ministerial declaration, Lerroux said he would govern so as to reconcile all Spaniards: Azaña's legislation would be modified where necessary by constitutional means, order would be

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1 Lerroux, Pequeña historia, 211-2, 231 & 273. Possibly Lerroux and the CEDA came to their agreement while negotiating alliances for the second electoral contests. On 21 Nov., Casanueva visited Lerroux, though it was officially denied that they had been discussing a political solution (El Debate, 22 & 26 Nov. 1933).

2 DSC, 12 Dec. 1933; El Debate, 9-13 Dec. 1933; Arrarás, HSRE II, 251-7; J. Peirats, La CNT en la revolución española, I (Toulouse, 1951), 64-8. Aragón was the centre of the outbreak, though churches were burned in various places and 19 were killed when the Barcelona-Seville express was derailed. The official toll was 89 dead in 9 provinces, with 160 hurt (El Debate, 28 Jan. 1934).

3 The government was:- Premier, Lerroux (Radical); State, Pita Romero (ORGA-independent); Interior, Rico Avello (independent); War, Martínez Barrio (Radical); Navy, Rocha (Radical); Finance, Lara (Radical); Justice, Álvarez Valdés (Liberal-Democrat); Public Works, Guerra del Río (Radical); Industry & Commerce, Samper (Radical); Public Instruction, Pareja Yébenes (Radical); Labour, Estadella (Radical); Agriculture, Del Río (Progressive); Communications, Cid (Agrarian). In a reshuffle on 23 Jan. 1934, Martínez Barrio moved to the Interior in place of Rico, who became High Commissioner in Morocco; the new War Minister was Hidalgo (Radical).

kept, expenditure curbed and the amnesty promised in the electoral programme would not be introduced immediately. Keeping his side of the bargain, Gil Robles interpreted the electoral victory as a vote against the Constituent Cortes but not against the Republic; he would press the centre to reform religious legislation, grant an amnesty, reform agrarian and labour legislation and pass an unemployment measure. The CEDA would act 'with complete and absolute loyalty to a régime which the Spanish people has willed... We should never use the means placed in our hands to proceed against the political system placed in our hands.' Reform was necessary, but he explicitly rejected a dictatorship of Right or Left, as he did the 'integral, authoritarian' solution proposed by José Antonio.

The Socialist spokesman, Prieto, was not convinced of Cedista sincerity and brushed aside these protestations of loyalty. The danger of 'the seizure of the Republic by the Right hostile to it' remained: 'Deep down, Sr. Gil Robles, you hanker after a dictatorial régime.' Lerroux's collaboration with the CEDA, he claimed, was a betrayal of the Pact of San Sebastián. He solemnly announced that the Socialists would defend 'by every means' the 'essential postulates of the Republic' (i.e. the work of the Constituent Cortes): 'the revolution will be found facing the coup d'état... The Socialist Party publicly commits itself to unleashing the revolution in this event.' The Socialists and the Left Republicans voted against

the government, which easily survived with the support of the Centre, the CEDA and the Agrarians by 265 votes to 53; the Monarchists abstained.[1]

The attitude of revolutionary opposition to the CEDA assumed by Socialists during 1933 was intensified by the electoral defeat of the Left - 'the unjust result of November' which, as one Socialist put it, 'created a revolutionary situation in Spain'.[2] The leaders' attitude to the second contests on 3 December clearly showed that they were unwilling to accept the verdict of the ballot-boxes. Prieto urged Socialists to go to the polls 'as a prologue to other revolutionary days which, in my view, are in Spain inevitable'. According to Largo Caballero, 'the working class recognizes that it is not incompatible to go to the polls on the 3rd and to the revolutionary battle on any other day'. The latter declared that the Communist Party was 'no more Communist than we': the coming revolution would give the PSOE full power to achieve the transition to integral Socialism.[3]

During January 1934, El Socialista continued its enthusiastic advocacy of revolution. 'Concord? No. Class war! Hatred to the death of the criminal bourgeoisie. Concord? Yes; but between proletarians of all opinions who want to gain salvation and free Spain

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1 DSC, 19 & 20 Dec. 1933.

2 A. Ramos Oliveira, La revolución de Octubre (Madrid, 1935), 19.

3 El Socialista, 26 & 30 Nov. 1933.

from derision. Come what may, watch the red signal!' Some days later, the newspaper again subjected itself to interrogation: 'Anti-democrats? Yes. Completely. But not enemies of the true democracy, ours, Socialist democracy, the birth of which will not be brought about by the art of magic, just as bourgeois democracy was not born by magic means.'[1] Since the elections had put legality on the side of Gil Robles, Largo Caballero adopted the theory that 'legality is created by whoever is in power. Therefore, should the workers conquer power, the legality they would create would be just as legal as that which the present government creates.' Amid shouts of 'Long live the machine-guns!' the 'Spanish Lenin' appealed for a single workers' front.[2]

It was against this troubled background that Lerroux's lieutenant, Martínez Barrio, took over the Ministry of the Interior on 23 January from the inexperienced hands of Rico Avello.[3] On 7 February, however, Gil Robles voiced the discontent of his party with Martínez Barrio, whose inactivity in a pre-revolutionary situation was much resented. It soon became clear, too, that Martínez Barrio did not approve of

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1 El Socialista, 3 & 17 Jan. 1934.

2 El Socialista, 23 Jan. 1934.

3 Of the Socialists, Martínez Barrio said: 'After having lived within the law and at the government's side, they now suffer from I know not what dictatorial impulses as if they only want the Republic when it is at their service. They are behaving like real enemies of the Republic' (El Debate, 23 Jan. 1934).

Lerroux's policy of dependence on the accidentalist Right.[1] The distaste of the Grand Master of the Spanish Grand Orient for Lerroux's Giolittian scheme for 'transforming' the CEDA into the conservative party of the Republic was brought irrevocably into the open in an interview with a Monarchist magazine on 11 February.[2]

By the end of that month, Gil Robles had decided that it was time to oust the Minister by ceasing to support this 'completely exhausted government'. He told Cedistas, however, that the time for government by the Right was not yet at hand: 'it is still necessary to exhaust intermediate solutions, analogous to the present one.' This speech brought the crisis within the Radical Party to a head, and Martínez Barrio resigned from the government. Alcalá-Zamora, whose relations with Lerroux were somewhat strained, took the opportunity to withdraw Presidential confidence, thus precipitating the first in a weary succession of government crises.[3] Later, in May, Martínez Barrio, the outgoing Minister of Finance Lara, and twelve other Deputies left the Radical Party to become Radical-Democrats, giving as their reason belief that the CEDA ought not to be allowed

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1 DSC, 7 Feb. 1934.

2 Lerroux, Pequeña historia, 221-2 & 232-6; Martínez Barrio did not agree with Lerroux that, by voting for his government, the CEDA 'had already realized an act of recognition of the régime' - the first stage towards full incorporation in the Republic.

3 El Debate, 27 Feb. & 1-3 Mar. 1934.

to govern since it was not an explicitly Republican party and was likely to betray the régime.[1]

Lerroux re-formed his government on 3 March.[2] It was called upon to deal with the question of an amnesty, which had troubled its predecessor. Gil Robles and Lerroux had agreed in December not to press the issue for the moment, but the Monarchists were mindful that Calvo Sotelo and Guadalhorce, elected to the Cortes, were still in exile. With Agrarian support, Monarchists put down a motion that they should be legally proclaimed Deputies immediately, a motion embarrassing for the CEDA. In the debate on 24 January, Goicoechea, who reminded the Right and the Radicals that the amnesty was part of both their electoral programmes, was stalled by the Minister of Justice, who promised instead a general amnesty in due course. Gil

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1 El Debate, 3 & 10 Apr. & 17 May 1934. García Venero, Santiago Alba, 348-9, says the two younger candidates - Martínez Barrio & Lara - for the Radical leadership were upset by Lerroux's elevation of Alba, who had just joined the party, to the Presidency of the Cortes, a sign that Lerroux had thus chosen a successor. Lerroux himself wrote of the shock of being betrayed by his favourite and ascribed his dissidence to intrigue by Alcalá-Zamora, bent on creating a Republican Right of his own, a plan necessitating destruction of the Radical Party. Lerroux also notes that all the dissidents were militant Freemasons (Pequeña historia, 186-8, 216-8, 220, 277-87 & 325-6).

2 The government was:- Premier, Lerroux (Radical); State, Pita Romero (independent Republican); Interior, Salazar Alonso (Radical); War, Hidalgo (Radical); Navy, Rocha (Radical); Finance, Marraco (Radical); Agriculture, Del Río (Progressive); Industry & Commerce, Samper (Radical); Labour, Estadella (Radical); Communications, Cid (Agrarian); Public Works, Guerra del Río (Radical); Justice, Álvarez Valdés (Liberal-Democrat); Public Instruction, S. de Madariaga (independent Republican). The latter became interim Minister of Justice as well as on 17 April.

Robles and Martínez de Velasco declared that they were satisfied with the Minister's pledge, and Goicoechea's motion was accordingly defeated.[1]

In April the government's bill appeared, providing amnesty for those who had committed offences prior to 3 December 1933.[2] For the Socialists, Prieto argued that the measure should also apply to those detained for the post-electoral uprising of the CNT, while at the same time maintaining that the Republic was not strong enough to be able to concede any amnesty. Álvarez Valdés, the Liberal-Democrat Minister of Justice, stood firm in his belief that the election results were a mandate to amnesty the men of '10 August', while insisting that he was opposed to violence in politics. The skilled parliamentarian Prieto seized upon this statement and challenged the Minister to apply his maxim to the Jaca rising of December 1930. Alvarez Valdés said he did not condone that episode, adding that the Republic owed its existence to the elections of 12 April. Politically, however, the damage was done; Prieto made much capital from

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1 DSC, 24 Jan. 1934. The motion was defeated by 186 to 54: the Left and Centre voted against; Agrarians, Monarchists and 4 Cedistas - Adánez, García Guijarro, Moutas, Serrano Súñer - in favour. Gil Robles said he had allowed them to vote for personal reasons (El Debate, 26 Jan. 1934). A Radical motion for amnesty in due course was passed by 167 votes (Centre & CEDA), to 54 (Socialists).

2 DSC, 6 Apr. 1934 App. According to the Director-General of Prisons, the bill would apply to 8,000 inmates, 6,000 of whom were classified as of the extreme Left, i.e. chiefly Anarcho-Syndicalists (Arrarás, HSRE II, 326).

rhetoric in praise of the Republican martyrs of Jaca disowned by a Minister of the Republic. So great was the scandal that Álvarez Valdés was forced to resign.[1]

In mid-April, the intellectual diplomat Madariaga took over the Ministry of Justice and found the measure blocked by a host of Socialist amendments. He accepted some of them, so that the measure now applied to offences committed up to 14 April 1934. He argued that the amnesty was an act of generosity, not of justice, but Monarchists who wanted reinstatement of the military in their former posts were left unsatisfied. In the face of their opposition the measure was finally passed on 20 April.[2] Yet this was not the end of the matter, for the President, lobbied by the Left, was reluctant to give his consent and wished to send it back to the Cortes as Article 83 of the Constitution permitted. Article 84 stipulated that such a decision must be countersigned by a Minister. No Minister would oblige, and Alcalá-Zamora even failed to persuade his Progressive colleague Del Río to resign. He therefore agreed to promulgate the amnesty, but insisted on issuing a note to demonstrate his dislike for it - a course which Rightists were quick to note that he had omitted to follow when confronted with Azaña's religious legislation. The government was opposed to the Presidential note. Don Niceto and Don Alejandro were again at loggerheads and another crisis ensued.[3]

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1 DSC, 11, 12 & 13 Apr. 1934.

2 DSC, 17-20 Apr. 1934.

3 Lerroux, Pequeña historia, 247-51; El Debate, 25-26 Apr. 1934.

Apart from the amnesty, the outgoing government had achieved a minor but very controversial 'rectification' of the Republic in the religious sphere by passing a Law regulating the incomes of parish priests. A bill had been introduced in January to pay two-thirds of their stipends to priests over forty in areas with a population of under 3,000; this was justified on the grounds that such priests had rendered services to the State under the Concordat of 1851 and the Constitution of 1876.[1] The Socialists obstructed the measure with a flood of amendments and were supported by the Esquerra and other Left Republicans. They argued, rightly, that Article 26 of the Constitution expressly forbade the State to give financial aid to religious bodies, and the same article said that the clerical budget was to end before December 1933. To evade Article 26, the government insisted that the impoverished rural clergy were public servants under the terms of the Constitution of 1876; the bill merely rewarded them. The Left retorted that ecclesiastical services could not be equated with public services.[2] A gesture of compromise by the Radicals to limit the annual sum payable to 16,500,000 pesetas was accepted by Gil Robles as the current 'possible

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1 DSC, 12 Jan. 1934.

2 DSC, 14 Mar. 1934. DSC, 9 Feb. 1934 App. alone contained 107 Socialist amendments.

good', but obstruction continued from the Left until debate was finally guillotined and the law passed on 4 April.[1]

A more important modification was the suspension of the Law concerning Religious Confessions and Congregations with regard to the replacement of religious by lay schools. Lerroux realised that the CEDA would make its support conditional on cancellation of this part of the law, but was justified in saying that replacement by January 1934 was in any case impossible.[2] Suspension of the offending clauses was decreed on 30 December 1933.[3]

The crisis provoked by Alcalá-Zamora over the amnesty exasperated the Right. Rodesno and Royo Villanova demanded the resignation of this 'Alfonso in paperback'.[4] The Left called for new elections,

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1 DSC, 22 Mar. & 4 Apr. 1934. The law was passed by 281 to 6: Socialists and Left Republicans abstained, opponents including some anti-clerical Radicals. Text of the law in DSC, 6 Apr. 1934 App.

2 Lerroux added that to trouble the consciences of the majority was not in the national interest; he would 'treat the Church with the same consideration as other bodies no less worthy of respect' (El Debate, 21 Dec. 1933). Gil Robles said his party would flatly refuse to vote credits for substitution and would obstruct any such attempt to the limit (El Debate, 22 Dec. 1933).

3 Sánchez, Reform and Reaction, 181. The official figures claimed the creation of 7,000 schools in 1931; 2,580 in 1932; 3,990 in 1933 (Ramos Oliveira, Politics, 457). Madariaga, who became Minister in Mar. 1934, writes that of the 7,000 created on paper in 1931, about 3,000 actually existed; he inherited a chaotic situation in which there were 'about 10,500 schoolmasters without a school, and about 10,500 schools without a schoolmaster' (Spain, 413). His Radical predecessor declared substitution a flop, and said Los Ríos and Barnés had in fact lacked statistics (Pareja Yébenes, El Debate, 16 Mar. 1934). The figure of 7,000 for 1931 is probably an embellishment on the claim of Los Ríos that the Republic created 6,280 schools in its first ten months (El Socialista, 2 Mar. 1932).

4 ABC, 26 Apr. 1934. This nickname was used by both Republicans and Monarchists to liken Alcalá-Zamora's conduct to the alleged political meddling of Alfonso XIII.

while Gil Robles put the CEDA at the President's disposal as 'an instrument of government loyally serving the Republic.'[1] The President declined the offer. During the political manoeuvring Casanueva offered the votes of the accidentalist Right to Lerroux should the latter wish to censure Alcalá-Zamora in the Cortes. This offer was declined by the Radical leader. The outcome of the crisis was, on 28 April, a government headed by Ricardo Samper, a little-known Blasquista Radical from Valencia more amenable to Presidential advice than Lerroux. Neither Lerroux himself nor the CEDA participated in the new Ministry, though the energetic young Radical Salazar Alonso remained at the Interior.[2] With the continuing support of the

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1 El Debate, 26 Apr. 1934.

2 Lerroux (Pequeña historia, 257-62) said that Alcalá-Zamora wanted Samper as Premier; Lerroux agreed, despite opposition from Radical ranks, on condition that Salazar Alonso, on poor terms with the President, was retained. He also said that Casanueva offered him the CEDA's support for the Presidency of the Republic should a vote of censure lead to Alcalá-Zamora's deposition. Alcalá-Zamora wrote (Los defectos, 150) that Lerroux's governments never told him more than he had to know - much to the President's displeasure. Lerroux (op. cit., 241) complained that Alcalá-Zamora had wanted to 'inspire, draw up, correct and intervene in the discussion of all bills and afterwards make up the decrees and rules for enforcement.' With regard to the appointment of Samper, this conversation was attributed to the British Ambassador: 'Tell me, is President Samper the father of the Señorita Samper who was "Miss Spain" last year?' His Spanish friend replied: 'What nonsense! They have nothing to do with one another'; whereupon the Ambassador exclaimed: 'How odd! Then, why have they made him President of the Council of Ministers?' (HCR, II-6, 51). The government was composed of:- Premier, Samper (Radical); State, Pita Romero (independent Republican); Interior, Salazar Alonso (Radical); Finance, Marraco (Radical); War, Hidalgo (Radical); Navy, Rocha (Radical); Justice, Cantos (Radical); Public Instruction, Villalobos (Liberal-Democrat); Public Works, Guerra del Río (Radical); Agriculture, Del Río (Progressive); Industry & Commerce, Iranzo (independent Republican); Labour, Estadella (Radical); Communications, Cid (Agrarian).

accidentalist Right, the new Centre coalition turned to the vexed question of the repeal of the Law of Municipal Boundaries of 1931.

The debates on agrarian matters in the new Cortes revealed divisions on the Right. In general, Agrarians and Monarchists saw the electoral victory as a mandate for the restoration of order in the countryside, the reduction of wages, the maintenance of the inviolability of property-rights and repeal of the laws of the first Republican biennium to permit a return to the status quo ante 1931. Similar views were held by many within the CEDA. Within the Right as a whole, the social-Christian wing of the CEDA, while accepting the need for order, opposed as best they could the revanchisme of their colleagues. These internal differences became apparent early in 1934 when debates began on a measure introduced by the Progressive Minister of Agriculture, Cirilo del Río. He proposed that, since they had already sown for 1934, the ploughmen (yunteros) of Extremadura should be allowed to stay on the land which they had occupied under the aegis of Domingo's Decree for the Intensification of Farming, at least until the end of 1934. The Institute of Agrarian Reform ought to be left to decide on the rent which they would then pay the owners.[1] The Minister argued that to turn the yunteros off the land would simply recreate the situation of 1932, and there would be renewed attacks on and invasions of property. Surely a peaceful solution, which legalized the facts of

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1 Text in DSC, 29 Dec. 1933.

life in Extremadura, was preferable to this for all concerned.[1]

Conservaduros, including the Cedistas Casanueva and Azpeitia, did not agree. They pointed out that the seizure of land by the yunteros was not provided for in the Law of Agrarian Reform. The yunteros were in possession only because Azaña's Governor-General, Peña Novo, had made spurious use of a decree to condone illegal acts. The Minister's scheme was therefore as revolutionary as Domingo's decree of November 1932. Furthermore, the pastures of Extremadura were being ruined by attempts to grow cereals, an activity for which the unirrigated soil was unsuited. The yunteros must leave as soon as they had harvested at the latest, and should pay a 'just' rent to the owners as well as compensation for damage done.[2] The Minister was supported by Cedista Deputies who represented Extremadura. One, Manuel Giménez Fernández, Professor of Canon Law at Seville, stated that this was clearly a case in which moral consideration of the plight of the yunteros took precedence over the rights of property. On 9 February Del Río's law was passed by the Cortes.[3] Gil Robles

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1 DSC, 1 & 2 Feb. 1934 - the yunteros occupied land because, being unemployed, there was no other means of existence.

2 Azpeitia, Rodríguez Jurado, Casanueva, DSC, 31 Jan., 1 & 6 Feb. 1934.

3 The law was passed by 147 votes to 41. Giménez Fernández (CEDA, Badajoz) said that 'the status quo of what has been termed juridicidad and what we call legality cannot continue; at the bottom of juridical problems there exists a moral content - others say it is an economic basis - which we cannot lose sight of, and all recognize that in the case of extreme necessity one must override private property-rights.' Vega Bermejo (CEDA, Cáceres), the son of a cattle-breeder, appealed to Deputies to aid 'the efficacious labour of the Minister with some solution ...so that the means to live, at the least, may be made possible for these thousands of Extremeño peasants who have no land wherein to stick a plough.' (DSC, 7 & 9 Feb. 1934).

persuaded Cedistas to vote with the Centre and Left in favour of the measure, much to the chagrin of Agrarian and Monarchist opponents.[1]

The Samper government was called upon to deal with the Law of Municipal Boundaries, which, since it affected all Spain, the Right was even more anxious to repeal. A bill to this effect was introduced in January, but it was not until 24 May, after determined Socialist obstruction, that debates were guillotined. The law repealing that of 9 September 1931 stipulated that employers hiring hands from other areas must pay wages equivalent to those fixed by the mixed juries in their own district.[2] Acción Popular quickly issued a statement saying that it would expel any of its members who slashed the wages of employees,[3] but it may be doubted how strictly provincial organizations adhered to this directive.

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1 Gil Robles incurred the wrath of most of the landowners of Cáceres for supporting this law (Romero Solano, DSC, 28 Mar. 1934). The view of the absentee Monarchist landowner concerning the electoral result is well captured by Foxá: 'The old Duque drank the health of Gil Robles, saviour of Spain and future Regent of the Kingdom. He thought of his pastures in Extremadura saved from agrarian reform. But he confined himself to saying, "Religion has been saved".' (Madrid de Corte a Cheka, 181).

2 DSC, 11 Jan. & 24 May 1934; the voting was 218 to 18. Text in DSC, 29 May 1934 App.

3 El Debate, 26 May 1934. Earlier Acción Popular in Seville had said that it would expel vengeful employers who disregarded wage-levels. Acción Popular in Saragossa asked workers to denounce unjust employers so that they could be expelled. From Granada it was reported that Acción Popular had actually expelled an employer for cutting wages. (El Debate, 16 & 17 Dec. 1933, 11 & 20 Feb. 1934). The case of the Marqués de Oquendo, leader of the Cáceres branch, was probably exceptional: his workers said they would not take less than 8 ptas. a day, but he thought 10 ptas. a fairer wage and paid them accordingly. (El Debate, 5 June 1934).

The repeal of the law had been debated against a background of Socialist accusations that wage-levels were being ignored, mixed juries were no longer functioning and employers were discriminating against Socialists when hiring labour. The Deputies of Acción Obrerista claimed, on the other hand, that the State's labour-exchanges were still in the grip of caciques of the Casas del Pueblo and were run for political purposes.[1] In fact Acción Popular's Secretariat for Social Questions was a network of labour-exchanges parallel to the State organisation which the Socialists had appropriated when in power.[2] After the repeal of the Law of Municipal Boundaries it was rightly said that the onus for 'the pacification of spirits' now rested upon employers rather than workers. In general, however, such appeals for moderation went unheeded.[3]

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1 E.g. DSC, 10 May 1934. Blázquez (Socialist) said it was necessary to be a Cedista to get work: in Albarreal del Tajo (Toledo) only 12 workers had not voted Socialist and these were the only ones employed. D. de Madariaga denied such accusations and charged the Socialists with caciquismo. The Radical Minister, Estadella, accepted the veracity of Blázquez's evidence, but added that there were still many pueblos where only UGT workers could get a job. There were three workers in the Minoría Popular Agraria: D. de Madariaga (Toledo), Ruiz Alonso (Granada) & Martí Oluoha (Castellón).

2 Socialists said employers were by-passing the State system. Acción Popular denied that its Secretariat was a labour-exchange, but explained that employers seeking labour could enquire and the Secretariat would pass on the request to Catholic unions (El Debate, 16 May & 6 June 1934).

3 E.g. El Correo de Zamora (cited by El Debate, 25 May 1934). Though workers were given food and lodgings, Fr. Gafo, a pioneer of Catholic unionism, asked how their families could be kept on money-payments as low as 1.80 ptas.aday: 'plutocrats, rich men, you who call yourselves Christians, who say it repeatedly with your lips and deny it with your hearts...the time has come to abandon your positions and your liberal individualism, which is extremism in opposition to this Socialism.' (DSC, 18 May 1934). El Debate, 26 Aug. 1934, reported cases of conservadurismo which 'indict a social class...an attitude as suicidal as it is indicative of a conscience devoid of the most elementary principles of justice and charity.'

It was from the social discontent engendered by such 'rectifications' of the Republic that the Socialists sought to draw support for their political revolution against the CEDA and its 'compliant slaves' the Radicals. They were seconded 'unconditionally' by the Esquerra.[1] They explained their position by contending that the CEDA was not Republican. Yet, as the Liberal-Democrat leader argued, such people overlooked the fact that, 'by virtue of the number of Deputies they have in Parliament, it would follow that the country had elected a Monarchist majority... All those parties that declared themselves custodians of the Republic...say that they are going to restore true Republicanism, but I ask in whose name they are going to do it. If they are really democratic, they must resign themselves to the privation and begin again to win over the people with propaganda.'[2] The Left strongly objected to the deeds of the new Cortes. A veteran parliamentarian asked 'if we are to proclaim and come to the absurd conclusion that these Cortes do not possess the same sovereignty as the Constituent Cortes to alter laws?' If this were the case, it 'would be contrary to the very essence of the parliamentary régime.'[3]

The Socialists, however, had already enunciated their own theory of democracy which had nothing to do with numerical majorities. The Left Republicans approved neither of Radical practice nor of Socialist

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1 Prieto & Santaló, DSC, 2 May 1934.

2 M. Alvarez, El Debate, 29 May & 4 Sept. 1934.

3 Ventosa Calvell, DSC, 7 Feb. 1934.

theory and were thus in a quandary - apart from Domingo, who fell back on the Jacobin formula that 'when a policy that benefits the people is found not to be wanted by the people, it must be imposed even against the people's will.'[1] The former members of Azaña's coalition confused the Republic as a form of government with their own ideological predilections. Those who had remained Monarchists could console themselves with the thought that the Republic was not proving to be the system of government which divided Spaniards least.

ii. Accidentalists and Monarchists

From the advent of the Republic internal disputes on the Right centred on the rights and wrongs of 'accidentalism' as a political doctrine. The argument started in April 1931 as a dialogue between the leader-writers of ABC and El Debate and in 1932 brought about the schism in Acción Popular. The controversy was at its fiercest in 1933 and 1934, but it was no longer simply a question of whether or not Rightist parties should 'inhibit' themselves with regard to forms of government. New dimensions were added. Was it licit for Catholics to serve, support or even accept a Republic with an anti-Catholic Constitution? Was Republican legislation so harmful to the Church as to justify or even necessitate the use of armed force against the Republic according to Catholic doctrine?

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1 Quoted by Casares, La CEDA, 162.

Herrera and Gil Robles, with the support of the Nuncio, based their policy on the precedents of the ralliement in France in the 1890s and on the German Centre's acceptance of the Weimar Republic.[1] Alfonsine Monarchists like Vegas argued that Leo XIII's policy had failed in France and should not therefore be repeated in Spain. The ralliement had weakened the powers of resistance of French Catholics by dividing them into ralliés and Monarchists. The Republicans had been able to intensify religious persecution, separate Church and State and expel the Orders. As in France, so in Spain, the Republic was consubstantial with irreligion and Freemasonry; its Constitution enshrined doctrines condemned by the Church. Appeasement did not pay: the ralliement was 'sterile and...prejudicial to the interests of France and also of the Church'. The French Jesuit Fr. de la Taille had written that it was licit for citizens of a de facto régime to prepare for the restoration of the de jure government 'even by a coup de force, if this coup de force has the approval of the legitimate prince and has real possibilities of success'.[2]

Another contributor to Acción Española, Canon Castro Albarrán, reached similar conclusions. He argued that Leo XIII's Au milieu des sollicitudes applied only to France because it was not written in Latin. Moreover the circumstances in Spain were different to those

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1 Gil Robles said Acción Popular was comparable to the German Centre: 'Monarchy? Republic? What does it matter?' (Cortés Cavanillas, Gil Robles, 93).

2 E. Vegas Latapié, Catolicismo y República (Madrid, 1932).

in France, where the Republic had become the legitimate régime because it had taken root by the 1890s. In Spain in the 1930s the Republic was still a de facto régime which could not demand obedience from Catholics because it trampled on the rights of the Church and did not exercise power for the common good. Even Leo XIII had made respect for the liberty of the Church and good government preconditions for obedience. Gil Robles and Herrera were therefore in error: 'obedience to the constituted power' could only be an external and transitory formula for Catholics under an illegitimate régime. Accidentalism was licit in theory, but in practice each country must adopt the form of government most suited to its character and history. Ecclesiastical authority could not be used for political ends; Papal advice on matters other than faith and morals was not binding. The laws of the Republic were contrary to Divine Law and therefore, as Suárez had written, it was licit to rise up against tyranny and restore the legitimate power. 'Do not seek to lull the Spanish soul to sleep with the drug of false acquiescence. Do not put out the fire of holy disobedience.'[1]

Complete Monarchist disillusionment with the CEDA set in after the elections. Monarchists hoped that Gil Robles would continue his electoral alliance with them so as to wreck the Republic as a prelude

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1 A. de Castro Albarrán, El derecho a la rebeldía (Madrid, 1934). Cf. Pradera: 'If the laws of the State are in opposition to Divine Law, resistance is a duty and obedience a crime.' (HCE, I-5, 590).

to restoration of the Monarchy.[1] However El Debate's editorial 'Catholics and the Republic' on 15 December 1933 was welcomed by politicians of the Centre. The paper argued that, although opposition to some of the existing laws would have to be maintained until repeal, Catholicism and Republicanism were not incompatible: 'always saving the rights of God and the Christian conscience, Spanish Catholics, as such, can find no difficulty...inreconciling themselves with the Republican institutions.'

The Monarchist press was appalled. The Carlist El Siglo Futuro claimed that El Debate had proclaimed a new and curious 'obligation of conscience' for Catholics, namely to become Republicans. Like the Carlist organ, the Alfonsine ABC reminded readers that the Church left Spanish Catholics a free choice between Monarchism and Republicanism and went on to accuse the CEDA of 'treachery' to those who had voted for it because it was not a Republican party.[2] El Debate and Gil Robles replied that the CEDA was merely drawing the logical conclusion from its adherence to accidentalism. It was defending religion, property and the family under the established régime, which Spain had given itself thanks to 'the action of some and the omissions of others'. The Minoría Popular Agraria declared its complete

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1 Cf. Monarchist euphoria after the election in Foxá, Madrid de Corte a Cheka, 180: 'The revolution is over'; 'We'll have the King in Madrid in a couple of months'.

2 ABC, 16 Dec. 1933; & El Siglo Futuro, 16 Dec. 1933, in Arrarás, HSRE II, 275.

solidarity with its leader.[1] The ideologues of Acción Española nevertheless persisted in their criticism. The Republic was the political incarnation of 'the principles of the Revolution'. The 'essence of the Republican régime is precisely this: laicism, absolute popular sovereignty and, consequently, liberalism'; since these principles were 'condemned in their entirety by the Church' Catholicism and Republicanism were mutually exclusive.[2]

Certain Monarchist accusations were more difficult to answer. On 27 September 1933 the Cedista leader spoke of having made a vow when Article 26 was passed 'never to accept, never, pacts or compromises of any kind' with those who had voted for it until it had been repealed.[3] Yet within three months of this statement he reached agreement with Lerroux's Radicals. Gil Robles answered such accusations of insincerity by invoking a higher morality: 'everything I am doing is to save the Church'.[4] Monarchists drew the conclusion that accidentalism was motivated only by 'the pontifical obstinacy of Herrera and the cowardly ambition of Gil Robles'. The Cedista leader was in their opinion the marionette of that éminence grise Herrera, 'the apostle of "the lesser evil", which he has now re-

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1 El Debate, 17, 19 & 20 Dec. 1933.

2 La Epoca, 29 Dec. 1933 (in J.I. Escobar, J. Vigón & E. Vegas Latapié, Escritos sobre la instauración monárquica [Madrid, 1955], 38-40).

3 Quoted in Cortés Cavanillas, Gil Robles, 125.

4 Quoted in Sánchez, Reform and Reaction, 178.

christened "the possible good"'.[1]

The CEDA was also attacked by Monarchists for its 'tactic' of 'possibilism'. They complained that this method of defending religion contributed to the consolidation of the Republic and that root-cause of Spain's ruin, parliamentarism. The 'tactic' was sapping the morale of the Right's masses and in practice put the victors at the polls 'in the service of the vanquished'.[2] Cedistas were not being very patriotic in trying to evangelize the enemy; they were 'people who are always dreaming of entering Attila's tent to draw him to the truth. And if they can, they stay there.'[3] According to ABC however, they were unlikely to be admitted. The trend of events showed that Alcalá-Zamora was determined to keep the CEDA out of power whether or not Gil Robles edged closer to a declaration of outright Republicanism. The paper confidently prophesied 'the failure of a tactic'.[4]

Gil Robles was unabashed. He defended the CEDA's accidentalist and strictly legal policies against critics from the Right, while at

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1 Cortés Cavanillas, Gil Robles, 38 & 99. Gil Robles himself and Martín Artajo and Carrascal (secretaries of the Minority) say Herrera played no part in the party after 1931; decisions were made by Gil Robles, the party executive and the Minority. Cortés Cavanillas sticks to the contemporary Monarchist view. (Conversations with all the above.)

2 Lamamié de Clairac, Goicoechea, Pradera in ABC, 30 Jan., 6 Feb. & 22 May 1934 respectively.

3 Lequerica, ABC, 12 May 1934.

4 ABC, 16 May & 5 June 1934.

the same time issuing warnings to Republicans. Legal activity had brought success at the polls; similarly, 'when legality is on our side, the right to power cannot be denied us... Should this happen, we who lead the Right should consider ourselves failures... The Rightist masses, with their organizations, would follow another road, thereby constituting a grave source of perturbation for the country.'[1] Meanwhile the party did edge closer to outright Republicanism. Its leader promised in December 1933 that it would behave 'with complete loyalty regarding the régime that the people has willed' - thus accepting the Republican interpretation of the elections of April 1931. In May 1934 the party and its deputies proclaimed themselves 'ready to serve and defend the Republic so as to serve and defend Spain'.[2]

In the controversy about accidentalism neither Cedistas nor Monarchists could demonstrate conclusively from Papal texts that either were in the right. This was partly explicable by the general vagueness of Papal declarations, and partly owing to the preference of Cedistas for the texts of Leo XIII and Pius XI in contrast to the Monarchist preference for the more conservative pronouncements of Pius IX and St. Pius X. The debate therefore moved to Rome, where

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1 El Debate, 8 Apr. 1934.

2 El Debate, 17 Dec. 1933 & 13 & 18 May 1934. Casanueva, spokesman of conservative Cedistas, said they served the régime 'with no mental reservations' (El Debate, 2 Feb. 1934).

from February to August 1934 the Republican Minister Pita Romero, to the horror of Monarchists, negotiated unsuccessfully with the Vatican for a modus vivendi.[1]

The pro-Cedista lobby in Rome included the Nuncio, Herrera (now head of Spanish Catholic Action), Cardinal Vidal Barraquer (Archbishop of Tarragona) and Mgr. Pizzardo (Papal Pro-Secretary). The opposing lobby included the exiled Segura, and his successor as Primate, Archbishop Gomá.[2] Cedistas failed to get Castro Albarrán's El derecho a la rebeldía condemned as heretical, but otherwise their views prevailed.[3] An Alfonsine visitor to the Vatican was told that he ought not to think in terms of a Monarchist restoration, but of making the Republic more conservative.[4] When Gomá and Segura met at Anglet in July 1934 they agreed that the pro-Republican policy of

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1 Sánchez, Reform and Reaction, 187; Cortés Cavanillas, Gil Robles, 23-4; Arrarás, HSRE II, 438-9. Pita initially hoped for a concordat, but Cardinal Pacelli insisted on prior revision of Article 26. The Vatican broke off talks in the hope of resuming them with a Rightist government later.

2 Arrarás, HSRE II, 310. Gomá was translated from the see of Tarazona in Apr. 1933. Both he and the Nuncio were made Cardinals in 1935.

3 Galindo, Los partidos, 223-4; Arrarás, HSRE II, 276. El Debate (10 July 1934) warned Spanish Monarchists against putting politics before religion as the condemned Action Française had done. In 1935 Cortés Cavanillas (conversation) cancelled a second edition of his Gil Robles at the personal request of the Nuncio; the book had been termed defamatory by Cedistas who declined to go to the courts when challenged.

4 Cortés Cavanillas, Gil Robles, 27.

the cold and calculating Pius XI stemmed from his desire to be on good terms with all governments.[1] Papal support for Cedista views enraged Traditionalists. The Communion's bulletin accused the CEDA of 'playing Masonry's game' by caring more for liberalism than for religion, and it hinted darkly at apostasy.[2]

Renovación Española made as little headway against the CEDA in Spain as it did in Rome. Membership remained stationary and only one Cedista deputy deserted to the Alfonsines although most of the Minoría Popular Agraria were, like their leader, Monarchist in foro interno.[3] Renovación Española's only hope lay in persuading Alfonso XIII to declare membership of the CEDA incompatible with Monarchist convictions. Gil Robles was sufficiently concerned about this possibility to send Valiente (President of the JAP) secretly to Fontainebleau in June 1934 to prevent any such development. Much to Gil Robles's embarrassment news of the visit appeared in ABC and

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1 Iturralde, Catolicismo I, 367-8.

2 Boletín de Orientación Tradicionalista, 9 & 16 Sept. 1934. A Monarchist conspirator, Fr. Segarra, said the Vatican had written off the Traditionalists as an insignificant anachronism. He thought Acción Popular 'most pernicious', the Nuncio 'a veritable calamity' and El Debate 'economically enslaved by the Jews' (Iturralde, Catolicismo I, 323-7).

3 Renovación Española's membership in Madrid was constantly around 12,000 (Cortés Cavanillas, conversation). Lis Quiben, a prominent Gallego Cedista, went over to the Alfonsines in July 1934. Carrascal, Secretary of the Minority (conversation), says the majority 'had Monarchist convictions'; the number of those wanting an overt 'opening to the Republic' was always 'very small'.

Valiente was forced to resign his offices in the party.[1] Nevertheless Renovación Española gained no benefit from the episode. Alfonso still saw success for the CEDA as a precondition for his return by peaceful means; Monarchists should therefore stay under its umbrella until the Republican storm abated. He reminded the leader of his 'drawing-room Monarchists' that his cause was 'accidental and transient' compared with 'the supreme good', the unity and survival of Spain.[2]

Gil Robles stuck to the 'tactic' of achieving a new Catholic corporative State by evolutionary means. The CEDA would put its programme into effect stage by stage and then, 'when the time is ripe, entirely'. After a long period of government by the Centre it would take power despite the hostility of the Left: 'power for us, why deny it, would be a coup d'état.'[3] Monarchist dissatisfaction with the 'tactic' was a less important factor for him than the pressure of the JAP for quick authoritarian solutions. Gil Robles was obliged to give Japistas a measure of independence to retain their allegiance even though their youthful exuberance provided the Left with ammunition for their accusations of 'Fascism'. Gil Robles himself sought

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1 ABC, 7-9 June & El Debate, 8 & 12 June 1934; Arrarás, HSRE II, 350; HCE, II-6, 81. Valiente says he was Gil Robles's delegate, but Gil Robles (conversation) still denies this.

2 Arrarás, loc. cit.; Cortés Cavanillas, Confesiones, 82; Habla el Rey, 344.

3 El Debate, 27 Feb. & 20 Mar. 1934.

to rebut the charge by likening the CEDA to Sturzo's party which had opposed Fascism: 'I am not a Fascist nor do I sympathize with that system of government.'[1]

The nature of the JAP was accurately reflected in the telegraphic style of its 'Nineteen Points':[2]

1. To think of Spain, to work for Spain, to die for Spain.
2. Discipline. The leaders do not make mistakes.
3. Youth, faith, boldness, purpose, young spirit in the new politics.
4. Repeal of sectarian, socialistic and anti-Spanish legislation.
5. Christian family in opposition to pagan modernism.
6. Valour of the race, pre-military education, abolition of the soldado de cuota.
7. Freedom of education. Children do not belong to the State.
8. Love for the region the basis of love for Spain.
9. Specialization, more preparation and fewer speeches.
10. Our revolution is social justice, neither egoistic capitalism nor destructive Marxism.
11. More property-owners and a juster distribution of wealth.
12. War on decadent señoritismo and professional vagrancy, recognition for all activities, work for all; he who does not work shall not eat.
13. Anti-parliamentarianism, anti-dictatorship, the people incorporated in government in an organic and hierarchic manner, not by degenerate democracy.
14. Reconstruction of Spain, war on the class-struggle, the economy in the service of the nation.
15. Spain strong, respected in the world.
16. First: Reason, and faced with violence, reason and force.

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1 ABC, 13 Dec. 1933.

2 El Debate, 15 Mar. 1934. The soldado de cuota system permitted the wealthy to buy exemption from military service. Señoritismo is a pejorative term for the idleness and egoism of the sons of the rich.

17. Prestige of authority, strong executive power, to prevent better than to repress.
18. In the presence of the martyrs of our ideal, present and forward.
19. Above all Spain, and above Spain God.

The Japista programme perhaps reflected the ideals preached during the Dictatorship when many of its members had been at school or university.

José María Pérez de Laborda, its leader from June 1934, said the movement was not Fascist because it could not accept 'the God-State' or 'violence as a system'. Nevertheless Fascism was respected as a system for others and Japistas who visited Italy in 1933 were impressed by the régime although they found its educational policies quite unacceptable. The JAP's flags and rallies might be reminiscent of Fascism, but they were in fact inspired by the example of the Socialist Youth. Its Movilización Civil was not a force of storm-troopers but a young citizens' organization to help the authorities run essential services during a revolutionary general strike.[1]

Japistas saw themselves as the vanguard of the CEDA in both the social and political fields. They wanted 'to inject a young spirit into Spanish politics' and 'to be rebels faced with an unjust and anti-Christian society'. They considered themselves the antithesis

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1 El Debate, 17 &23 Jan. 1934. It was significant that Japistas should visit Italy while travellers sponsored by the Christian-Democrat DRV went to the Low Countries and Denmark. El Socialista (21 Dec. 1933) saw the Movilización as evidence of preparation of a coup.

of the 'Generation of '98'; the JAP was to be a patriotic national movement for renovation 'guided by a providential man', a movement of neither of Right nor Left which would incorporate all Spaniards.[1] Some Japistas dreamed of a new Catholic totalitarian State with 'only one national party carrying out a genuinely Spanish policy'.[2] At their congress in April 1934, however, they failed to agree on the nature of the future State and this matter was left an open question. Their indecision on this point gave the 'infallible leader' a free hand, as did their decision not to insist on making the various local youth groups into a single autonomous body within the party.[3]

The first of a series of big Japista rallies was held in front of the Monastery of El Escorial on 22 April amid snow showers, while the Socialists protested by staging a general strike in Madrid.[4] The crowd of around 20,000 was told by Gil Robles after Mass that Cedistas were 'the staunchest defenders of established legality' and the only force capable of effectively opposing social revolution. 'We are an army of citizens, not an army that needs uniforms and martial parades.'

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1 Pérez de Laborda & Ceballos, El Debate, 23 Jan. 1934.

2 La Calzada, ABC & El Debate, 27 Feb. 1934.

3 El Debate, 21-22 Apr. 1934. Socialists shot a Japista on the eve of the Congress, bringing the total of 'martyrs' to 14.

4 El Debate, 24 Apr. 1934; Buckley, Spanish Republic, 126-7. It was to have been held on 8 Apr. but the Socialist Youth threatened to break it up by holding a counter-demonstration. Salazar Alonso therefore postponed it until the 22nd and banned a march-past (El Debate, 3 & 18 Apr. & El Socialista, 19 Jan. & 20 Mar. 1934).

The Japistas then took an oath of complete obedience to their leader, raised their right hands to their left shoulders in salute and sang their anthem:[1]

> Forward, with faith in victory,
> For the Country and for God,
> To conquer or to die;
> The laurel of Glory awaits us,
> For History is with us,
> The future is on our side.

Gil Robles was determined that Japistas should not be seduced by Fascist ideas. 'We must not have recourse to pagan Rome nor to the diseased exaltation of race. The more Catholic, the more Spanish. The more Spanish, the more Catholic.'[2] Advocates of 'excessive haste' within the CEDA should stop and study Spanish history and traditions instead of seeking non-Spanish patrons; to introduce the 'foreign-izing prurience' of Fascism into Spain would be as calamitous as was the introduction of liberalism. 'Hysterical enthusiasm' and 'external theatricality' should be shunned. The JAP would not, like the Falange, form bands of gunmen: 'to send lads of eighteen to avenge deaths with deaths is atreasonable crime.'[3] Gil Robles was neverthe-

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1 Lyric by Pemán (Monge, AP, 245); the tune was a march by Grieg. El Socialista (16 Mar. 1934) reported that Sevillano Japistas were told to wear 'uniform', i.e. gaiters or high boots, breeches, and bright-coloured shirts with the JAP emblem.

2 El Debate, 24 Apr. 1934.

3 El Debate, 2 & 28 June 1934. On 5 July the paper reported the creation, mainly by Cedistas, of an Agrupación Menéndez y Pelayo to propagate 'the authentic values of immortal Spain'.

less subjected to 'Fascistic' adulation. Japistas considered him a gift from God and chanted '¡ Jefe! ¡ Jefe! ¡ Jefe!' at their rallies. Nor was adulation confined to the young: the wealthy landowner Casanueva thought that cleaning out latrines would be enjoyable with a leader like Gil Robles.[1]

Socialists concluded that if Gil Robles were not the Spanish Mussolini he was the Spanish Dollfuss. Certainly Cedistas found the Austrian Chancellor a 'very suggestive figure, the quintessence of Christian nationalism'.[2] El Debate praised his new régime in principle, but suspended definitive judgement until the practical working of its constitution could be observed. The leaders of the CEDA watched the Austrian experiment closely and sympathetically,[3] but they did not set out to imitate. The leadership was concerned, not with introducing a dictatorship, but with evolution towards a Catholic corporative State inspired by Spanish traditions, adapted to current Spanish needs and in line with Quadragesimo Anno. The new State must not be 'a tree without roots, a danger to those going near

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1 Valiente, El Debate, 21 Apr. 1934; Casanueva quoted by Cortés Cavanillas, Gil Robles, 151. In 1933 Gil Robles's biographer Arrabal caused unintentional amusement by likening him to the Maid of Orleans in the preface.

2 Martín Artajo (conversation).

3 El Debate, 4 May & 26-29 July 1934. The paper lamented Dollfuss's death and saw him as a man who had become a dictator against his wishes in order to defend Austria from Marxism and Nazism.

it'; it must have a solid socio-economic basis. The CEDA's 'national solution' demanded working-class support; Gil Robles echoed Pius XI: 'so long as we do not incorporate labouring masses in our movement, we shall have built our victory on sand.'[1]

While the CEDA's corporativism presupposed a 'revolution from below', that of the Alfonsines, many of whom had been Mauristas, put greater emphasis on a 'revolution from above'. National regeneration would be primarily the work of the State and an élite in contrast to the social evolution preached by Cedistas. The intellectual dynamo of Monarchism was Acción Española, whose offices, closed on 5 August 1932, reopened on 3 May 1934. The aim of this 'politico-cultural' body, led by Pemán but still including some Cedistas, was to undo the work of the 'generation of '98' by converting the intelligentsia to Rightist doctrines.[2] Once this intellectual reconquest had been achieved, the right ideas would filter down to the masses.

With the failure of Renovación Española under Goicoechea's leadership the Alfonsines of Acción Española were anxious to make the most of the return from exile of Calvo Sotelo at the beginning of May 1934. At a dinner given for him on 20 May Sáinz Rodríguez

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1 El Debate, 7 & 31 Dec. 1933 & 24 May 1934.

2 Galindo, Los partidos, 229-30. The vice-presidents were Pradera, Sáinz Rodríguez and the Cedista Ruiz del Castillo. Of the ten committee members, two were Cedistas (Lozoya and Ibáñez Martín) and two of the Alfonsines were in the Falange (Ansaldo & Eliseda). Serrano Súñer (Cedista) was one of its speakers.

outlined Monarchist plans. All those who had not gone to the polls in November as Republicans - Alfonsines, Carlists, Cedistas, Falangistas - should join together in a 'national bloc' under Calvo Sotelo's leadership. To facilitate this new union of the Right the Monarchists would 'not make a precondition of the presence of a king on the throne'.[1] Calvo Sotelo, accepting the task, made it clear that he did not agree with the 'tactic' of Gil Robles. Monarchists stood for the dogmatic straight line in politics which led to 'integral possession' of power; the CEDA's tactical curve could never achieve what the Right and Spain desired.[2]

Calvo Sotelo spent the summer of 1934 criticizing the policies of Gil Robles and outlining his own solution for Spanish problems. Though a member of the Minority of Renovación Española, outside the Cortes he declined to join any party so that he could be 'cementing material' for a new 'Bloque Hispano Nacional'. He admired the work done by Gil Robles up to the elections, but believed the Cedista leader was now pursuing mistaken policies despite his patriotic intentions. It would be just as easy for Gil Robles to scrap the whole Constitution as it would be to revise Article 26. The 'possibilism' of the CEDA meant that its energy was being frittered away in parlia-

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1 ABC, 22 May 1934; HCE, II-6, 59.

2 Acción Española, 1 June 1934 (Antología, 244-53). He ended his speech with a strong attack on Alcalá-Zamora which could not be printed at the time.

mentary manoeuvring and it would lose sight of the ideal of its new State. Calvo Sotelo thought him too timid. 'Gil Robles wants power; we, the State, Gil Robles, within the régime; we, over and above the régime. Gil Robles, partial revision [of the Constitution]; we, total.'

Calvo Sotelo said his difference with Gil Robles on the form of government was 'substantive', but he nevertheless hoped that the CEDA would join his Rightist bloc to carry through a common minimal programme, namely 'the complete conquest of the State'. For Calvo Sotelo the new State meant in the economic field 'a new economic structure' built around the corporative organization of labour and a modified form of capitalism: in short, 'a directed economy'. In the political sphere there would be plebiscites and a parliament of interest-groups; people would vote separately for ideas and interests, not (as in the existing system) for parties and personalities. This new State had to be set up immediately, but the Monarchy would only return at a later stage. It would be a Monarchy different in every respect from that which collapsed in 1931; there would be an 'installation (instauración)' not a 'restoration (restauración)'.[1]

Gil Robles however would have nothing to do with Calvo Sotelo's 'dictatorial' schemes and stuck to his evolutionary policy. He thought that the parliamentary system of representation could certainly

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1 Calvo Sotelo in ABC, 14 June & 24, 29 & 31 July 1934.

be improved but he made it quite clear, borrowing a phrase from Cavour, that he preferred 'a bad Chamber (Cámara) to a good camarilla'.[1] Gil Robles believed the political structure must be reformed piecemeal as a result of popular pressure; Calvo Sotelo saw the State as the instrument of total reform from above.

Monarchists still dreamed of the overthrow of the Republic. In March 1934 the Alfonsines Goicoechea and General Barrera, and the Carlists Rafael de Olazábal and Lizarza, visited Rome for talks with Marshal Balbo. On 31 March, after a meeting with the Duce himself, agreements were signed between the Spanish Monarchists and the Italian leaders. The Italians undertook to 'support the two parties in opposition to the present régime in Spain with assistance and necessary means in the work of overthrowing it and substituting a Regency which would prepare the complete restoration of the Monarchy.' As an initial gesture of good faith, the Italians promised an immediate gift of a quantity of arms and 1,500,000 pesetas in cash. More aid would be supplied 'as the work realized justified it and circumstances rendered it necessary.' It was agreed that Olazábal should take charge of the money - a third of which was handed over on 1 April - and he would hand it over in Spain to Goicoechea and Rodezno, who were also to see to the importation and distribution of the arms, which Barrera and Balbo had agreed should be collected in Tripoli. Some young Spaniards were also to be given weapon-training in Italy.

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1 ABC, 26 Sept. 1934.

A political agreement was also signed, providing for an Italo-Spanish treaty of friendship and neutrality when the new régime had been installed. The status quo respecting Spanish territorial rights in the western Mediterranean was to be guaranteed by Italy. Italy and Spain would conclude a commercial treaty to coordinate exports of certain products, and would generally forge close economic links. Such treaties, however, were dependent upon prior 'denunciation and abrogation of the secret Franco-Spanish treaty' which the Italians and the Monarchists both wrongly believed that Azaña had made with Herriot in 1932 to allow passage of French troops through Spain and French occupation of the Balearics in wartime. These political provisions were to take effect within a month of the new régime's foundation; Italy would help it obtain recognition 'insofar as it is internationally possible'.[1] From the Italian viewpoint, the pact was another move in their rivalry with France for influence in the Mediterranean, while the Monarchists could congratulate themselves on enlisting a powerful ally.

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1 The procès-verbal and the political agreement found among Italian documents after the second world war are in W.C. Askew, 'Italian intervention in Spain', Journal of Modern History, vol. XXIV, no. 2 (1952), 182. Lizarza, Memorias, 24-7, gives an account in agreement with the documents, though he mentions figures of 20,000 rifles, 20,000 grenades and 200 machine-guns, while the Italian source says 10,000 rifles, 10,000 grenades and 200 machine-guns. For the alleged Franco-Spanish pact, see Arrarás, HSRE II, 45-8, & Plá, HSRE II, 160. Lizarza writes that the visit was arranged by Olazábal, but Cortés Cavanillas (conversation) says that Alfonso XIII himself, a friend of the Duce since his state visit to Italy in 1923, was really responsible for the agreement. The documents were signed by Balbo, but not by Mussolini - Balbo had received Alfonsine visitors in 1932 and 1933.

The Monarchists, however, could not agree on whom the King should be. When Mussolini asked the delegation whether Alfonso XIII were to be restored, all gave a negative reply; but when Goicoechea said Juan could be the new King, the Carlists disagreed. Similarly there was a dispute over the distribution of arms: Goicoechea demanded that they be shared equally between the two parties, but Lizarza pointed out that the Alfonsines had no troops whereas the Carlists had their Requetés.[1]

Until May 1934, the Communion was led by Rodezno, known to Carlists as the champion of dynastic fusion in the person of Juan. Rodezno, like Pradera a collaborator in Acción Española, had no faith in Carlist violence and thought that Carlism had now completed its mission of preserving Traditionalist principles. Rodezno, who had remained a Jaimist, had a rival within the Communion in the person of a young ex-Integrist lawyer from Seville, Manuel Fal Conde, an advocate of armed action as opposed to the 'diplomatic way' of Rodezno, and one who had shown energy and resource in organizing the Communion in Andalusia virtually from scratch since 1931. Though he did not completely reject the Juanista solution, he was suspicious of close relations with Alfonsines. On this score, he had circumstantial allies within the Communion in the ultras who, while loathe

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1 Lizarza, Memorias, 25 & 28; Gen. Barrera agreed with the Carlists as there was no alternative from the military angle.

to forgive him for his disloyalty to Jaime, were totally opposed to Rodezno's passive and 'pro-Alfonsine' policies.[1] The views of Fal Conde and the ultras were shared by the youth of Navarre, whose organ declared: 'Are we always going to be hard-hearted ombre-players, assiduous frequenters of cafés? No, no and no... We want to be like them, like the Carlists of the last century.'[2] Victory would be achieved, not by the skills of incorrigible politicians, but with the bayonets of the Requetés.[3]

On 20 April 1934 a meeting of regional leaders took place, and they recommended that 'new orientations' be given to the Communion without changing 'the immutable principles of our ideology'. On 3 May Alfonso Carlos granted their request with the appointment of Fal Conde as Royal Secretary General, with instructions to carry out a complete reorganization of the Communion. Rodezno and his advisory committee therefore resigned.[4]

The new orientation of the Communion with regard to the

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1 Lizarza, Memorias, 29-33; HCE, II-8, 285-6. The ultras wanted Alfonso Carlos to be succeeded by Carlos VII's grandsons (Jaime's cousins), though the succession would have to pass through a female (their mother Blanca).

2 AET (Pamplona), 2 Feb. 1934, quoted by Redondo & Zavala, Requeté, 250. AET first appeared on 26 Jan. 1934; edited by Jaime del Burgo, it succeeded La Esperanza.

3 AET, 9 Apr. 1934, in J. del Burgo, Requetés en Navarra antes del Alzamiento (San Sebastián, 1939), 98.

4 Documentos de Alfonso Carlos, 240-1; HCE, II-8, 205-6.

Alfonsines quickly became apparent. On 6 May Alfonso Carlos issued orders to the former leader, Rodezno, that 'TYRE must be suppressed ... There must be no union nor any affiliation with those of Renovación.'[1] Thus Alfonso Carlos reflected the views of Navarrese youth, who saw Goicoechea's party as the 'refuge of caciques and riff-raff of the Alfonsine Monarchy, which has adopted the name of Renovación Española, as if we did not know that the renovation with which they entice us is the return of a régime of iniquity repugnant to every honourable conscience.'[2]

Nevertheless, the neo-Traditionalist Alfonsines of Acción Española, whose daily organ was La Época, were anxious for agreement on the dynastic question so as to give the projected Bloque Hispano Nacional some chance of success. On 14 June, in his interview with ABC, Calvo Sotelo had spoken of the 'installation' of the Monarchy, not its 'restoration'. La Época accordingly sought to calm Carlist fears: 'We cannot restore the liberal, democratic Monarchy that fell on 14 April, nor the absolute Monarchy of Carlos III and Fernando VII.' It was a question, as St.Pius X had said, of 'restoring the organisms destroyed by the revolution, adapting them to present needs'. Rodezno declared himself in agreement with these views, but not with the conclusion that Alfonso XIII or Juan could be King in such a

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1 Documentos de Alfonso Carlos, 243.

2 AET, 9 Mar. 1934, in Del Burgo, Requetés, 76.

Monarchy. La Epoca therefore recalled the words of the Comte de Chambord: 'My person is nothing; my principle is everything.' The paper continued to advocate dynastic union in the person of Juan, and reminded Carlists that Alfonso Carlos was himself the son of a liberal skeleton in their cupboard, Juan III.[1]

The Carlist die-hards in Navarre, however, were not open to persuasion by La Epoca: the succession of Juan signified 'usurpation'.[2] The official Carlist reply to Alfonsine overtures was contained in Alfonso Carlos's manifesto of 29 June. Monarchy, he wrote, needs continuity, and hence there was a law of succession; but it also requires legitimacy - legitimacy of origin by the law of succession and 'legitimacy of exercise, according to which the King remains subject to the inviolable prescriptions of Natural Law and to the corpus of those fundamental laws that, consecrated by tradition and promulgated prior to the revolutions, constitute, with respect for the spiritual sovereignty of the Church, the insuperable limit of their own sovereignty.' This 'double legitimacy' he and his line represented 'in opposition to all Monarchist or Republican illegitimacies.' Since he had no direct heir, his successor would have to swear to these principles and recognize the legitimacy of the

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1 La Epoca, 16 & 21 June 1934 (Escobar, Escritos, 43-5 & 48-52). Juan III was the Carlist claimant (1861-68) who was more liberal than Isabel II (see S. Galindo Herrero, Breve historia del tradicionalismo español [Madrid, 1956], 111-8).

2 AET, 18 May 1934 (Del Burgo, Requetés, 125-8).

Carlist line; 'legitimacy of exercise' was considered more important than 'legitimacy of origin'. If he should return to Spain he would convoke Cortes-General of the Kingdom and proclaim his successor. Should he die in exile without having named a successor, Carlists must not be dismayed: 'even though all possible legitimacies be extinct', there remained the sacred right of peoples 'to give themselves the prince who knows how to represent with dignity the cause of the Country.'[1]

Juan was not therefore totally excluded, but the Carlist terms proved unacceptable to Alfonso XIII, who still hoped to be restored by electoral means and remained at heart a liberal.[2] ABC therefore replied: 'The succession in the dynasty has been reduced to only one line, represented by the last King, Don Alfonso XIII, and his heirs. The dissidence cannot last because, after the venerable old man who today maintains it, there will be no one left in his branch to invoke the titles that he uselessly upheld... If the restoration of the Spanish Monarchy takes place, it will be exclusively the work of the national will...and it alone can...give [the Monarchy] form and content.'[3]

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1 Documentos de Alfonso Carlos, 255-60.

2 Melgar, Escisión dinástica, 127, says Alfonso was constantly influenced by defenders of the liberal Monarchy. Fr. Segarra thought the Alfonsines would set up a temporary dictatorship, and then revert to liberalism (Iturralde, Catolicismo I, 332).

3 ABC, 11 July 1934. ABC was still liberal and criticized La Época for advocating violence and absorption of the individual by the State (23 & 28 Mar. 1934); but in August Luca de Tena spoke of a constitutional, parliamentary Monarchy without universal suffrage, though not the Monarchy of 1876 (ABC, 16 Aug. 1934).

The 'fundamental bases' which the Communion upheld 'in permanent protest against all illegitimacies enthroned by the liberal revolution' were definitively restated by Alfonso Carlos in his manifesto of 29 June 1934:

> **First.** Religious unity, which is to say the close and everlasting moral union of Church and State, and the complete affirmation of the rights that, in its internal as in the external order, belong to the former by reason of its indisputable sovereignty.
>
> Second. The political affirmation, or the re-establishment of the traditional Monarchy with its key-notes: Catholic, moderated, federative, hereditary and legitimate, and, therefore, fundamentally opposed to the liberal, democratic, parliamentary, centralistic and constitutionalist Monarchy.
>
> Third. The organic affirmation, which, repudiating the individualist, atomic and disorganizing spirit of liberal systems, establishes society upon a harmonious mass of organisms, ordered with regard to the hierarchy of their ends and endowed with the autarchy necessary for their fulfilment, with their own organs, Councils, Juntas and regional Cortes, commencing with the family, the first of all social activities, restored to the plenitude of its natural rights.
>
> Fourth. The federative affirmation, which entails the restoration of the regions with all their Fueros, liberties, franchises, good uses and customs, exemptions and rights that belong to them and with the guarantee of the pase foral, a condition necessary for their integrity, not only compatible with, but moreover inseparable from the indissoluble unity of the Spanish nation.
>
> Fifth. The affirmation of the Monarchy, moderated by its councils, necessary organs for its consultation, and the Cortes, authentic instrument of the national will. No fundamental law of the kingdom may be changed or altered save in Cortes convoked for this purpose and with the assistance of the procuradores, subject to the authoritative mandate of the organisms and activities represented by them.
>
> Sixth. The dynastic affirmation, which originated with what was inappropriately called the Salic Law - because it does not absolutely exclude females, called to the succession by the failure of the male line - as Felipe V promulgated it in 1713.

After seeking the aid and benediction of the Sacred Heart of Jesus, to which the Banner of National Tradition had been consecrated, the manifesto ended with the words: 'Long live Christ the King! Long live Spain!'[1]

Carlists remained 'quixotic idealists of the Revolution... Reaction is to return to the situation immediately preceding the present one. Revolution is the tendency to re-establish a much older situation, which means the traditional régime...the sixteenth century.'[2] Their ideal social order lay even further in the past. The railwayman Ginés Martínez Rubio, Deputy for Seville, had expressed the Traditionalist outlook before the elections: 'When people talk of advances in the social laws, I recall that in the fifteenth century there was in Spain an organization of labour superior to all present gains.'[3]

The appointment of Fal Conde led to a complete overhaul of the Communion and to increased enthusiasm for military preparations. During the summer of 1934 new regional and local leaders were appointed and special delegacies set up for propaganda, the youth

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1 A literal and rather clumsy translation has been made in an attempt to give the 'flavour' of the original. Text in Documentos de Alfonso Carlos, 255-60. Procuradores was the old term for representatives attending the Cortes. The pase foral was the region's right to accept or reject central legislation.

2 AET, 16 Feb. 1934 (Del Burgo, Requetés, 52-3).

3 ABC, 14 Nov. 1933; he was the only worker in the Traditionalist Minority.

and the press. A cultural council was also created under Pradera.[1] In the previous year, Lamamié de Clairac had organized Unidades de Acción to counter disorder and anarchy,[2] and the Decurias of Navarrese Requetés had been re-formed into five-man Patrols. By 1934, these Requetés were militarily organized and went about the pueblos dressed in their khaki uniforms and red berets. Arms were purchased and bombs locally manufactured.[3] Fal Conde organized a series of aplechs (rallies) in all parts of Spain, beginning with one in Seville province on 15 April; Requetés attended in their uniforms and in military formations.[4] These aplechs served the purpose of drawing attention to the Requetés as 'the true national counter-revolutionary militia.'[5] The hopes of Fal Conde were clearly expressed at the aplech at Potes. 'A historical bridge stretches between the seventy thousand volunteers who fought in the past epic and these youths of

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1 Documentos de Alfonso Carlos, 244-54; BOT, 23 Sept. 1934. Lamamié de Clairac was in charge of propaganda, González-Quevedo of the press, and Arellano Dihinx of youth, including the student organization AET (Agrupación Escolar Tradicionalista). BOT, 9 Sept. 1934, listed ten Traditionalist dailies in Barcelona, Jaén, Jéres, Madrid, Pamplona, San Sebastián, Seville, Tortosa, Vich and Vitoria.

2 Redondo & Zavala, Requeté, 245.

3 Del Burgo, Requetés, 9; Lizarza, Memorias, 22-3. Lizarza was the chief organizer in Navarre.

4 For an account of this aplech on the estate of El Quintillo, see M. Ferrer, 'Veinticinco años atrás...' el Requeté vela las armas (Seville, 1959).

5 BOT, 16 Sept. 1934.

today... Peoples have a right to rise up against tyrants... Let us proceed to the third reconquest, but to a reconquest lasting not eight centuries, but eight days, eight hours.'[1]

While the Carlists could count on their own Requetés, the Alfonsines hoped to rely on Primo de Rivera's Falange, the foundation of which they had financed; but they were to be disappointed, and thus left without a force of shock-troops. Within a month of its creation, Falange Española claimed over a thousand members, drawn in the main from the FUE and revolutionary Republican elements.[2] Its success boded ill for Ledesma's JONS, which began to stagnate; the two groups therefore merged on 13 February 1934 into the Falange Española de las JONS, led by the triumvirate of José Antonio, Ledesma and Ruiz de Alda.[3] The new formation retained the old Jonsista slogans and now attracted some Rightists interested in Fascism.[4]

The 'initial points' of the Falange had declared Spain, in terms

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1 HCE, II-8, 286. There the colours of the Requeté Cántabro were blessed by the Abbot of Cóbreces (Documentos de Alfonso Carlos, 263). In 1934 the Communion claimed a membership of 700,000 (Redondo & Zavala, Requeté, 254) - this seems an exaggeration.

2 José Antonio's interview with André Nicolas on 24 Nov. (Revue des Deux Mondes, 15 Dec. 1933, 923).

3 HCE, II-6, 22; Payne, Falange, 45-7.

4 F. Bravo, Historia de Falange Española de las JONS (2nd ed., Madrid, 1943), 23-4; the slogans were 'Spain One, Great and Free' and 'Country, Bread and Justice'.

borrowed from Ortega, 'a unit of destiny in the universal' superior to all individuals, classes and groups. The State ought to be in the service of this unit, and should banish separatism, the class struggle, parties and Parliament. The Falangista totalitarian State was to be based on the family, the municipality and the guild or union; social justice was to be its prime aim, on a basis of 'Authority, Hierarchy, Order'. This State would be Catholic but not clerical. Until its installation, 'violence can be licit when used for a justifiable ideal'.[1] José Antonio claimed to have integrated 'Country and social justice, and...upon these two unshakable principles we wish to carry out our revolution...the true revolution.' The leit-motiv of his policy was a fusion of Castilian nationalism with a brand of un-Marxism and pre-Marxian Socialism - Socialism, he believed, had ceased to be a redemptive movement when Marx introduced the primacy of economics. The new group could be styled Fascist, since Fascism meant for José Antonio the turning inward of each nation upon its own essence. Finally, he insisted that his grouping was not a party: 'it is a militia'.[2]

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1 FE, 7 Dec. 1933 (O.c., 553-63).

2 O.c., 29-40. His ardour for foreign régimes cooled in 1934. He went to Rome (ABC, 22 Mar. 1934) but was snubbed by Mussolini, who said Largo Caballero was the only leader of masses in Spain (Buckley, Spanish Republic, 130). He went to Germany in May and met minor Nazi dignitaries, but returned disillusioned by the internal politics of Nazism (Ansaldo, ¿Para qué?, 78; Payne, Falange, 77; F. Ximénez de Sandoval, José Antonio [2nd ed., Madrid, 1949], 290).

Early in 1934 several Monarchists, notably Ansaldo, joined the Falange and set about making it a Monarchist instrument for street-warfare and a coup de main.[1] The Alfonsines hoped to bring the new group into their plans for a national Rightist bloc, but such hopes were frustrated by the acute dislike of José Antonio for Calvo Sotelo.[2] José Antonio refused to declare himself a Monarchist: '14 April...is a historical fact that must be accepted.'[3] Alfonsines nevertheless continued to subsidize the FE de las JONS in the hope of bringing it under their control, but their efforts came to nothing because its leader was determined that his group should not be employed as 'a voluntary gendarmerie for the defence of what is

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1 Ansaldo, ¿Para qué?, 71-2; & Payne, Falange, 42, who notes that García Valdecasas left the group when Monarchists and pistolero elements of Albiñana's PNE joined it.

2 Ximénez, JA, 284 & 565-72; Ansaldo, ¿Para qué?, 56 & 76. ABC (Seville), 13 Mar. 1934, reported that José Antonio had visited Calvo Sotelo in Paris. The two had never been friends. Ansaldo and Ruiz de Alda wanted Calvo Sotelo to join, but José Antonio would not hear of it as he maintained that Calvo should have defended the Dictator in the Cortes in 1931 - ignoring the fact that he would have been arrested upon entering Spain. José Antonio also disliked Calvo's contacts with the financial world and his realism, as opposed to José Antonio's idealism; he thought Calvo 'a man who understood only figures and did not know even one piece of poetry.' In Calvo's view 'numbers also have their poetry'. (J. Calvo Sotelo, El Estado que queremos [Madrid, 1958], 50).

3 Bravo, José Antonio, 69; & Ultimos hallazgos de escritos y cartas de José Antonio (Madrid, 1962), 74. Cortés Cavanillas (conversation) thinks he might have remained a Monarchist had the Juanista solution been agreed upon, for he was among the first to suggest Juan as a possible King in 1931.

conservative.[1] Toward the end of July 1934, relations between José Antonio and the Monarchist Falangistas became strained to breaking-point; Ansaldo was expelled and those with similar opinions then left. Goicoechea, however, persisted in his attempts to gain some hold on José Antonio by financial means, but his efforts were in vain. The head-strong son of the Dictator had decided to go his own way.[2]

From its foundation the Falange, like the JONS, had declared itself explicitly in favour of violence. Young Socialists from the first took the Falange at its word, and during 1934 the list of Falangista 'martyrs' grew steadily longer. José Antonio, 'more a poet than a politician',[3] disliked the practice of violence, but by April 1934 he had conceded the need to observe 'the law of reprisal' under pressure from his followers. Counter-terrorism was carried out by the 'Falange de la Sangre' which Ansaldo had started to organize in February as 'Chief of Objectives for the Militias'.[4] Such

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1 Bravo, José Antonio, 68. Financial aid was provided by the Alfonsine Lequerica at this time (Ximénez, JA, 264-5).

2 Textos inéditos, 433-4; Ansaldo, ¿Para qué?, 87 & 89; Salmador, Ansaldo, 100; Payne, Falange, 60-3 & 86. Ansaldo was expelled mainly for plotting to oust José Antonio and make the group Monarchist. Goicoechea later drew up the 'Ten Points of El Escorial', which promised José Antonio 300,000 ptas. if he would obey Alfonsine instructions. The Juventud de Renovación Española still worked closely with the Falange (Cortés Cavanillas, conversation).

3 In the words of Bravo, José Antonio, 27. He was not a very good poet.

4 Ansaldo, ¿Para qué?, 72-3; Salmador, Ansalde, 101; Payne, Falange, 54 & 57-8. An attempt was made on José Antonio's life in March.

activities placed the Falange beyond the law, and the Minister of the Interior kept a watchful eye on it. A surprise concentration of Falangistas on an airfield near Madrid in June was dispersed by the Civil Guard and heavy fines imposed on the leaders. In July 65 Falangistas were arrested for possessing arms and explosives.[1]

The Falange relied for its membership mainly on students opposed to the FUE, and these were enrolled in the SEU, founded in November 1933 with a double aim: 'Syndical professional action. Revolutionary political action.'[2] In the summer of 1934 a union was created called the CONS which taxi-drivers found attractive.[3] Falangistas hoped that a decline in Gil Robles's popularity among Japistas would boost their numbers in the future. Meanwhile, the polemic between the two accidentalist parties was heated. Gil Robles said Falangistas were señoritos incapable of achieving anything; José Antonio likened the CEDA to sterilized milk, containing neither microbes nor vitamins.[4]

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1 José Antonio, Ledesma, Ruiz de Alda, Ansaldo and Fernández Cuesta were each fined 10,000 ptas. (HCE, II-6, 75; Bravo, Falange, 48). The 65 arrested in July included Ansaldo, José Antonio and the Marqués de la Eliseda; the latter two were released immediately as they enjoyed parliamentary immunity (El Debate, 11 July 1934).

2 D. Jato, La rebelión de los estudiantes (Madrid, 1953), 10, 61, 70-1 & 102-3. Recruits to the SEU included Monarchists and Communists. Typical of their doings was an assault on the offices of the FUE with the reigning wrestling champion in the van.

3 HGL, 336; Payne, Falange, 63.

4 Bravo, Falange, 24 & 33-5. José Antonio respected only the Traditionalists on the Right, but he considered them old-fashioned. He said that the CEDA could not remove the causes of revolution; only the Falange could by combining a national ideal with social justice (O.c., 853-4).

iii. The October revolution

After the elections of 1933 the Socialist leadership was, in fact, divided as to the course of action to be followed. Besteiro and reformists in the UGT still favoured a peaceful and democratic transformation of Spain and emphasized the need to introduce a second corporative chamber which would open the way to a revolution allegedly more profound than that achieved by violent methods in Russia. Besteiro argued that, whereas Cedista corporativism was 'static', his Socialist corporativism was 'dynamic'.[1] Provincial Socialist leaders on the other hand, favoured the revolutionary path indicated by Largo Caballero. The executives of the PSOE and the UGT met in January 1934 and came to a decision in favour of the revolutionary method, and a committee was set up to supervise the purchase and distribution of arms. Besteiro and the reformists resigned from leadership of the UGT, thus leaving the union in revolutionary hands. Prieto adhered to the revolutionary group with a programme that included the socialization of land, some socialization of industry, abolition of religious Orders, the disbanding of the existing army and Civil Guard, reform of taxation and a purge of civil servants, all of which was to be implemented by decree and endorsed by the people's legislative organs; the President was to accept these decrees or be ousted. Following the decision in favour of revolution,

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1 Besteiro, El Debate, 31 Jan. 1934. In Dec. 1933 he said that there was no danger of Fascism in Spain (D. Ibárruri, El único camino [2nd ed., Paris, 1965], 176).

the Socialists of Madrid demanded a united front 'so that a start may be made on the revolutionary movement giving us the conquest of political power as soon as possible.'[1]

A sense of urgency was given to the Socialists by Dollfuss's suppression of the Austrian Socialist rising in February 1934. The Spanish party's organ noted: 'the fight that the Austrian workers are putting up is, like ours, a struggle for existence itself against clerical Fascism; but the outbreak in Austria has come with some delay. Let this fault be a lesson for us and its dangers be a warning.' The Austrian Christian-Socials were 'almost identical' to the CEDA, and Dollfuss was an 'agent of the Vatican, like Gil Robles.' While El Socialista drew the conclusion that it was fatal to remain within legality too long, El Debate discovered a different 'lesson for all': revolution against a government prepared to quell it was useless and left behind only a futile wake of corpses.[2] The Socialists persisted in their view that the CEDA was the Fascist

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1 Largo Caballero, Recuerdos, 132-5; Arrarás, HSRE II, 296. Largo Caballero became Secretary-General of the UGT. Besteiro had the support of the reformist union-leaders A. Saborit and T. Gómez. It would seem that Prieto hesitated to join the revolutionaries until his programme had been accepted. The programme later appeared in El Liberal (Bilbao), 11 Jan. 1936 (cited in Peirats, La CNT, I, 88-90). Reformists were ousted from the Socialist landworkers' union in Jan. 1934 by Zabalza, who advocated revolution as the prelude to socialization of the land (E.E. Malefakis, Land Tenure, Agrarian Reform and Peasant Revolution in Twentieth Century Spain [unpublished thesis, Columbia Univ., 1965], part II, chapter viii).

2 El Socialista, 14 Feb. & El Debate, 16 Feb. 1934.

menace in Spain.[1]

After the Austrian rising the tone of El Socialista became even more strident and uncompromising: 'there is only one solution: the revolutionary dictatorship of the Socialist Party with the proletariat that is prepared to emancipate itself.' Socialists had now become disillusioned with the Republic, the keenest defenders of which they had claimed to be: 'Another 14 April? Much better something else: a Spanish October. The difference is this: April, frustrated hope, lost illusion; October, firm eagerness, sure solution... April, citizens with ballot-papers; October, workers with rifles.'[2] Largo Caballero continued meanwhile to rouse the Socialist masses: 'Comrades! Organize the final struggle. And in this struggle, abnegation, sacrifice, heroism. The battle will be cruel and long. But if we enter it with the will to win, then

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1 El Socialista, 5 May 1934, said it did not matter whether or not Gil Robles declared himself a Republican, for Hitler, Dollfuss, Mussolini, Carmona and Juan Vicente Gómez, 'the hangman of Venezuela', were all Republicans. According to the Socialist intellectual Ramos Oliveira (La revolución, 103-4), 'the great Spanish Fascist movement is that of Acción Popular ..., agrarian and Vaticanist, twin-brother of the Austrian... An anti-Marxist front is a Fascist front.'

2 El Socialista, 29 Apr. 1934. The disillusionment was thus expressed in March 1934 by Araquistáin: 'It was thought that a bourgeois, liberal, democratic Republic, like that installed in 1931, would permit the working class to gain power peacefully, in order gradually to realize the Socialist revolution from power... Less than three years' Republican experience has convinced us that the attempt...is a chimera.' (Quoted in C.M. Rama, La crisis española del siglo XX [Mexico City, 1960], 165-6).

we shall be able to frustrate the coercive apparatus of the bourgeois State.'[1]

The reaction of the Left Republicans to Socialist revolutionary plans was at first one of disapproval. Azaña said privately that the electoral defeat could only be undone by electoral means, and that a Socialist revolution would be a disaster whether or not it was successful: 'no Republican...accepts power from a victorious proletarian insurrection.'[2] Yet he did not exclude the possibility of a basically Republican revolutionary movement: 'A Republican barrier must be formed; a victorious Republic. In short, the revolution must be made. Long live the revolution!... We are not prepared to support a Republic imbued with Monarchism... Rather than the Republic converted into the ugliness of Fascism or Monarchism... we prefer any catastrophe, even though it be our lot to lose.'[3] Azaña wanted to oppose to the 'elements which...have set out to destroy the Republic' a social-democratic coalition of Left Republicans and moderate Socialists, including Besteiro and Prieto. Although

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1 El Socialista, 21 Apr. 1934.

2 Azaña's papers (2 Jan. 1934), cited in Arrarás, HSRE II, 300. Azaña believed that 'in these Cortes one cannot govern as a Republican.' (El Debate, 17 Dec. 1933).

3 Speeches, in El Socialista, 17 Apr. & 3 July 1934; he thought that the result of the Nov. 1933 elections had put back the clock to the time before 12 Apr. 1931. On 1 Apr. 1934 Azaña became a leader of Izquierda Republicana, a fusion of his Acción Republicana with Casares Quiroga's ORGA and Domingo's Independent Radical-Socialists (El Debate, 3 Apr. 1934).

he still believed in 'a parliamentary government as the medium through which to achieve revolution..., the day may come when we will have no other remedy but to take up the carbine.'[1]

The Left Republicans were left in a quandary, for the revolutionary Socialists were not interested in reviving the first biennium. They now believed that 'the Republic is lost... We say this: Let it die. And let us do this: Prepare ourselves for the new conquest.' Any union with Republicans was explicitly rejected: the workers would act alone.[2] 'We fight the Monarchists better without middlemen. We want no obstructions in our path.'[3] El Socialista stated Azaña's dilemma: 'Tied to the Socialists...the Republic cannot live. Separated from the Socialists the Republic is dead. Strange paradox!'[4]

Largo Caballero and the Socialists preferred a united front with the extreme Left to a revived Republican-Socialist coalition. To this end, Alianzas Obreras were set up to unite beneath a single executive committee all workers' parties and unions in the various areas of Spain. The Russian soviet was taken consciously as the model.[5] The CNT, dominated by the inflexible anarchism of the FAI,

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1 Interview in the summer of 1934 with L. Fernsworth, Spain's Struggle for Freedom (Boston, 1957), 156-61.

2 El Socialista, 25, 27 & 28 July 1934.

3 El Socialista, 25 Sept. 1934.

4 El Socialista, 29 Sept. 1934.

5 J. Maurín, Hacia la segunda revolución (2nd ed., Barcelona, 1935), 107-9.

had since 1931 opposed the Socialists in power, but in February 1934 there was a change of policy with a call for united action against Fascism in response to Largo Caballero's overtures. In many areas the CNT in fact continued to hold itself aloof from the Socialists. In March, however, the important Asturian section of the Anarcho-Syndicalists agreed to a revolutionary alliance based upon federal and Socialist principles.[1] The Communists of the PCE had also been opposed to the Socialists since 1931, dubbing their leaders 'social-Fascists'; they had also been on poor terms with the CNT. However, during 1934 the PCE too came round to the view that Fascism was the main enemy, and in September it agreed to join the Alianzas Obreras. The Socialist and Communist Youths had already begun to cooperate and the new alliance was consummated by a joint youth rally in Madrid on 14 September.[2]

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1 Maurín, Segunda revolución, 82-9 & 112-4; Peirats, La CNT, I, 78-80.

2 Maurín, Segunda revolución, 94-104 & 112-4; Rama, Crisis, 169; Arrarás, HSRE II, 410-1; H. Thomas, The Spanish Civil War (2nd. ed., Harmondsworth, 1965), 102 & 106-10; J.A. Balbontín, La España de mi experiencia (Mexico City, 1952), 274-5; Ibárruri, Único camino, 177. The PCE's policy had been to win over the CNT and UGT rank-and-file; by Dec. 1933 it had perhaps 25,000 members. Its union, the CGTU, joined with the UGT in 1934. The party's lone Deputy, Bolívar, said: 'I am not going to come out in defence of this parliamentary régime; I am an enemy of it... The time has come for all Spanish workers and peasants to launch themselves into the street... Only there can the working people gain respect and achieve their total emancipation.' The PCE stood for 'the liberation of the oppressed peoples of Catalonia, Vasconia and Galicia' and for 'the Union of Soviet Republics of Spain' (DSC, 4 Apr. & 26 June 1934). At the rally of 14 Sept., a Young Socialist said the Spanish Socialists had broken with the Second International, and a Communist said the assembled youths were 'the phalanxes that are going to take power in Spain by assault'.(El Socialista, 15 Sept. 1934).

On 7 March 1934 a 'state of alarm' was proclaimed under the Law of Public Order, and 'states of alarm and prevention' remained in force until October. They permitted the Minister of the Interior, Salazar Alonso, to deal with the strike activities of the UGT and the CNT, and with revolutionary preparations in general. The most serious threat faced by the government was the rural strike movement launched by the Socialists on 5 June with the aim of sabotaging the harvest. Salazar Alonso declared the harvest a 'national service', and only a fifth of the rural workers in 15 provinces went on strike: the areas most affected were the Socialist strongholds of Extremadura and Jaén. The harvest collected proved to be the second best of the century.[1]

Many strikes took place in Spanish cities during 1934, but it was noticeable that two of the more important - a builders' strike in Madrid and one in the metallurgical industry - were halted by the government, which upheld the workers' claim for a 44-hour week against

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1 El Debate, 30 May, 19 & 23 June 1934; DSC, 30 May & 7 June 1934; BSS, XI, 209. The Socialists attempted to channel economic discontent into political unrest. El Debate, 14 & 23 June 1934, reported that Socialists in Badajoz used funds provided by the State for agrarian reform to finance the strike: people were paid 5 or 6 ptas. to fight for the strike and hinder harvesting. A printed appeal to rural workers referred to the strike's political purpose in opposing 'the government of hangmen, with its savage, blood-thirsty dog, Salazar Alonso, this odious and wretched Spanish Dollfuss', and against the threat of 'Fascist dictatorship, under the inspiration of the Fascist Catholic Gil Robles, the representative of the big capitalists, bankers and usurers.' (quoted in Fernández Almagro, República, 104-5).

the employers' plans to cut wages and stage a lock-out.[1] The month of March saw a strike over the question of the use of non-UGT labour by the Alfonsine daily ABC; a general printers' strike ensued in the capital. The real issue at stake was whether the UGT should maintain a closed-shop in the printing industry, and with it the power to halt publication of the non-Socialist press when it suited Socialist plans. El Debate, which did not use Socialist labour, and El Socialista were the only papers to appear for a fortnight, and the strike then ended. Salazar Alonso was determined not to allow the growth of a Socialist State within the existing State.[2]

His actions, none of which contravened the Law of Public Order passed by Azaña's Republican-Socialist coalition, made him the bête noire of the Socialists. His aim was to uphold the authority of the State against all, be they of Left or Right. 'We shall maintain the prestige of authority', he said, 'with serenity and energy...because we know that without this serenity and this energy the dissolution of society would be a fact... There exists a government determined to defend the State and Spain against any who desire to oppose them... For me, Right and Left are the same. The law is the same for all, and I shall do my duty... Neither Italy nor Russia. Spain!' Extremism could only triumph if the Republic failed

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1 El Debate, 13, 17, 21 & 27 Feb., 7 & 20 Mar., 1 & 17 June 1934; & R. Salazar Alonso, Bajo el signo de la revolución, Madrid, 1935, pp. 50-1.

2 DSC, 13 Mar. 1934; El Debate, 1, 11 & 15 Mar. 1934; & Salazar Alonso, Bajo el signo, 64-71.

to face up to its responsibility for keeping order.[1]

The Socialists attacked him for partiality to the Right, but by and large he seems to have been impartial. Falangista offices were closed and issues of Rightist dailies seized, though the brunt of his activity fell upon the Socialists who were openly preparing for revolution.[2] The official figures for the number of youths killed or arrested for political crimes showed that the Left had been more to blame than the Right.[3] The number of town councils dismissed for disobedience or irregularities was no greater than the number dismissed by Casares Quiroga.[4] The government and the CEDA voted for proceedings to be taken against José Antonio, as well as two

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1 From Salazar Alonso's speeches, DSC, 7 Mar. 1934; El Debate, 17 Apr. & 1 Aug. 1934; & ABC, 17 Apr. 1934.

2 E.g., in March the offices of the PCE, the CNT, the Socialist Youth, Falange and PNE were closed, and both Fascist and revolutionary Leftist publications banned (El Debate, 8-10 Mar. & 22 Apr. 1934). Issues of Informaciones, La Nación, El Siglo Futuro & La Epoca were seized (El Debate, 27 & 29 Apr., 23 May & 5 June 1934), but El Socialista suffered 104 arraignments between Dec. 1933 & Oct. 1934, and was fined some 45,000 ptas. (El Socialista, 3 Aug. & 4 Oct. 1934).

3 The Directorate-General of Security's figures from 1 Jan. to mid-Aug. 1934 showed 348 Leftists and 95 Rightists arrested. Similarly the number of those under 21 killed or wounded in Madrid was 43, only 5 of whom were Young Socialists, the great majority being Falangistas. (Quoted by El Debate, 25 & 29 Aug. 1934).

4 By mid-Aug. Salazar Alonso had dismissed 249 councils, compared with the 88 dismissed by Maura, 316 by Casares Quiroga, 6 by Martínez Barrio, 40 by Rico Avello (El Debate, 18 Aug. 1934). Corruption in local government was normal, and Ministers were perhaps keener to dismiss councils controlled by their political enemies. El Socialista, 23 Aug. 1934, printed a letter from the Agrarians of Seville province to party leaders in Madrid complaining that the Radicals and the Cedistas, to the exclusion of the Agrarians, were sharing out local offices as other councillors were removed.

Socialist Deputies, for illegal possession of arms.[1] Salazar Alonso indeed continued to be energetic in seizing Socialist arms, whether in Madrid or Asturias.[2] Some people on the Right however remained dissatisfied with governmental unwillingness to use extra-legal methods. In September ABC again asked whether the State and the country could passively await the revolution threatening them.[3]

After the elections of 1933 the Basque Nationalists were confident that at last they would obtain a statute of autonomy. In December the Draft Statute was presented to the President and Lerroux, who virtually promised to support the Statute in exchange for the PNV's support for the government.[4] In February 1934 a Cortes committee was set up to examine the Statute, but already opposition to it had begun to form. The Traditionalist Deputy for Álava, Oriol Urigüen, backed by 57 of the 77 town councils of the province, demanded that Álava be excluded on the grounds that the voting in November had

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1 DSC, 3-4 July 1934. Socialists and Monarchists voted against removal of parliamentary immunity, as did certain Cedistas sympathetic to José Antonio, viz. Serrano Súñer, Ibáñez Martín, La Calzada, Sierra Pomares, Núñez Manso, García Atance.

2 For details see El Debate, 15-16 & 20 Sept. 1934; Arrarás, HSRE II, 412-7; J. Álvarez del Vayo, The Last Optimist (London, 1950), 261-2.

3 ABC, 13 Sept. 1934.

4 Aguirre, Libertad, 410-1; El Debate, 17 Dec. 1933; DSC, 20 Dec. 1933.

clearly gone against the PNV.[1]

The Cortes committee, with a Rightist majority, proposed that another plebiscite be held in Álava, but Aguirre and the PNV opposed this.[2] For the CEDA, Salmón pointed out that in the original plebiscite in Álava the Statute had not obtained the two-thirds majority required by the Constitution. The Traditionalists said that they favoured autonomy on a provincial basis, but not a single statute entailing Álava's domination by the two other provinces; anyhow, the Draft Statute endangered national unity. Aguirre and the PNV argued that abstention in the plebiscite meant approval of the Statute. Álava was an integral part of the Basque region for geographical and economic reasons. The Statute's progress was blocked by early April 1934 by Rightist support for the claims of Álava. The PNV was frustrated and the Monarchists delighted.[3] Having failed to enlist Cedista support, the PNV now began to drift towards the Left.[4] When

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1 Aguirre, Libertad, 416 & 447-8; Arrarás, HSRE II, 265; Oriol, DSC, 29 Dec. 1933. In the elections the Traditionalists had polled 20,718 votes, the PNV 11,524 and the Left 7,445 in Álava. (Sierra, Euzkadi, 216).

2 DSC, 8 & 9 Feb. 1934 Apps.

3 DSC, 27 & 28 Feb. & 5 Apr. 1934. The Lliga and the Esquerra supported the PNV. The figures for the plebiscite in Álava were, it will be recalled, 46% in favour, 11% against, with 43% abstaining.

4 Gil Robles and Aguirre had met at the end of 1933. Aguirre said the PNV gave the Statute absolute priority, and would prefer it to be conceded by the Right, though the Left had promised to grant it. Gil Robles however held to the Cedista policy of administrative autonomy, as opposed to the political autonomy of the Statute. Negotiations were broken off, and the Basques said they were willing to seek a Leftist alliance. (J.M. Gil Robles, 'The Spanish Republic and Basque independence', The Tablet, 19 June 1937, 876-7).

the Esquerra withdrew from the Cortes in June, the PNV also withdrew at the request of the Generalidad.[1]

The PNV now found that it had to defend Basque economic privileges, all that had remained of Basque liberties since 1876. The central government, at the request of many deputies, wished to reduce the tariffs on wines, upon which the local finances of the Basque Country happened to depend; it also wanted to negotiate the inclusion of an income-tax into the 'economic arrangement'. However the Basque negotiating body, the Temporary Provincial Committees, were staffed by Radicals at odds with the Nationalist town councils, and so the PNV asked the government to be allowed to hold elections on 12 August for 'the executive committee in defence of the economic arrangement and municipal autonomy in each Basque region' - a plan which Velarde, the Radical Governor, declared illegal.[2] The government said that it would not break the 'economic arrangement' and that elections could be held in due course, but stood firm on the illegality of a locally-organized poll on 12 August.[3]

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1 DSC, 12 June 1934; Aguirre, Libertad, 454. Aguirre believed that the cause of Catalan liberty was the cause of Basque liberty. He told ABC, 13 June 1934: 'We are neither with the Left nor the Right: we are absolutely autonomist.'

2 Aguirre, Libertad, 459-71.

3 Aguirre, Libertad, 479. Samper was less adamant than Velarde and Salazar Alonso; the latter threatened resignation unless a firm line was taken (Salazar Alonso, Bajo el signo, 201-3). The Navarrese opposed the PNV's plan (El Debate, 11 Aug. 1934) while the Socialists back it (El Socialista, 4 Aug. 1934). The government and the CEDA wanted to reform the electoral law before any more elections (DSC, 31 Jan. 1934).

Aguirre, perhaps under pressure from his extremists, went ahead with the scheme, though in fact elections were held only by a minority of town councils. Many mayors were arrested and fines imposed.[1] Samper now tried to do a deal with the PNV, promising to give way over the elections if Basques would oppose the threatened revolution; neither the PNV nor Samper's colleagues accepted the plan. Instead, the PNV held a joint rally with the Esquerra and the Socialists at Zumárraga on 2 September, at which Prieto was the main speaker; there followed clashes with the police and many arrests. The Socialists then tried to bring the PNV into its revolutionary plans, but the PNV declined to rise save against a dictatorship or a restoration. Aguirre still pursued a policy of sacred egoism and held aloof from non-Basque causes: 'I conceive of my people fighting for its liberty and if necessary going to the ultimate consequences. But for foreign flags, no.'[2]

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1 Aguirre, Libertad, 481-7. El Debate, 14 Aug. 1934, reported that elections were held by stratagem by 4 councils in Biscay, 27 in Guipúzcoa, and one in Álava; no attempt was made to hold them in 68 of the 120 councils in Biscay, nor in 43 of the councils in Guipúzcoa. Basque Nationalism was divided into two groups: the moderates (comunionistas) such as Leizaola and other Deputies who wanted negotiated solutions, and the ultra-separatists (aberrianos) led by Gallástegui who refused to stand as a candidate for a 'foreign' parliament in Madrid. The young and the Mendigoixales were under his influence and had orders to be ready to proclaim the Basque Republic at any moment, though they were not properly armed. (El Socialista, 3 Jan. & 27 Feb. 1934).

2 Aguirre, Libertad, 492-6, 500-20, 523-5 & 534-7.

On Christmas Day 1933 President Maciá died and in January the Catalan Parliament elected Companys, leader of the Esquerra, as the next President of Catalonia.[1] In January also, the Lliga withdrew from the regional parliament in protest against the Esquerra's use of the police and its Escamots (youth movement) against the Lliga in the local election campaign, as well as against the lack of proportional representation.[2] In the elections on 14 January the Esquerra won comfortably, the Lliga having control of 420 of the 1069 town councils of Catalonia.[3] Catalonia therefore remained in the eyes of the Left 'the bulwark of the Republic'.[4]

With the Lliga absent from parliament and with its victory at the polls behind it, the Esquerra now set about fulfilling its pledges to the rabassaires. The Law of Farming Leases stipulated that leases were to be for a minimum six-year period, with the tenant having the option of renewing it. If the owner wanted to farm the land himself, he was to pay the tenant a sum of money. Rents were to be fixed at four per cent of land value, and tenants could buy the land, if necessary by instalments, if they had farmed it for eighteen

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1 BSS, XI, 90.

2 ABC, 18 & 20 Jan. 1934; Nadal, 6 años, 169-71.

3 ABC, 27 Jan. 1934. The Esquerra polled 162,616 votes, the Lliga 132,942, the Radicals 21,088, the Communists 1,504 (Arrarás, HSRE II, 271).

4 Prieto, speaking in Barcelona, El Socialista, 9 Jan. 1934.

years.[1] This law was passed by the Catalan Parliament on 11 April; the Lliga protested that it attacked 'the most elementary principles of contract-law' and was not in tune with Catalan law.[2] Catalan landowners of the Instituto Agrícola Catalán de San Isidro visited Madrid to win support for their view that the law was illegal, and in April the Lliga and the CEDA brought up the matter in the Cortes and it was referred to the Court of Constitutional Guarantees.[3]

On 8 June the Court announced its verdict: the Catalan Parliament, by passing the law, had violated Article 15 of the Constitution and the Law of Agrarian Reform of 1932, and the law was therefore null and void.[4] On 12 June the Esquerra withdrew from the Cortes, its spokesman declaring the verdict and the slowness in transferring services 'acts of aggression' against Catalonia, which would play its historic rôle as 'the last defender of Spanish liberties'.[5]

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1 Ramos Oliveira, Politics, 351-2.

2 Arrarás, HSRE II, 366.

3 El Debate, 24 Mar., 15, 20 & 25 Apr. 1934; the paper claimed that Casanueva was mainly responsible for the motion, and he had negotiated with the landlords via the Marqués de Verger, Cedista leader in the Balearics. Nadal (6 años, 176) claims most of the credit for Cambó.

4 El Debate, 9 June 1934; HCE, II-6, 67. The attitudes of the Catalan parties were opportunistic: the Esquerra, which now upheld the Catalan right to pass the law, had in 1932-3 demanded that the question of the rabassaires be dealt with in national legislation; the Lliga, now opposing the Esquerra's view, had in 1932 wished to reserve such matters for the Catalan Parliament. (Ventosa, DSC, 12 June 1934).

5 DSC, 12 June 1934. The transfer of services under the Statute had broken down when Cid, Minister of Communications, refused to hand over broadcasting to the Generalidad and threatened to resign (ABC, 1 June, & El Debate, 5 June 1934).

The Monarchists pressed for a debate to embarrass the government and the CEDA, upon which it was dependent.[1] In the debate on 25 June, Samper announced the government's intention of reaching 'a harmonious solution based on obedience to the verdict.' Cambó and Martínez de Velasco emphasized that the Constitution and verdict had to be upheld, while Goicoechea denounced the government for its inaction and appeasement of open rebellion which was leading to the Balkanization of Spain. Gil Robles was also emphatic on enforcement of the verdict, though he explained that his aim was not an offensive against Catalonia and its Statute. Prieto, however, declared that Catalonia could count on the Spanish proletariat in its battle, while Azaña said that the Generalidad was the last bastion of Republicanism left in Spain.[2] In the very stormy session on 4 July, during which fist-fights broke out and pistols were brandished, the government succeeded in adjourning the Cortes so as to reach a solution in accord with the Constitution and the Statute. The CEDA voted for the government on this condition.[3]

From July to October Companys stood his ground, offering at most minor amendments that did not affect the content or illegality

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1 DSC, 21 June 1934.

2 DSC, 25 June 1934.

3 DSC, 4 July 1934. The Socialist Tirado fought with the Cedista Oriol de la Puerta, and Prieto and another Socialist waved pistols.

of the law.[1] Tension was increased by an order to ban imports of wheat from the rest of Spain, and by a meeting of Catalan farmers in Madrid on 8 September, held under the auspices of the Right.[2] Nevertheless Samper continued to try and negotiate with Companys and services were still handed over to the intransigent Generalidad.[3] In Catalonia the Councillor for the Interior, the separatist Dencás, made military preparations.[4] On the Right, the Alfonsines were the most ardent partisans of immediate action against the Catalan rebels.[5] Gil Robles, for his part, hoped that the government would solve the thorny problem satisfactorily and went abroad for his honeymoon. In mid-August he returned, and, after talks at San Sebastián with Lucía, Aizpún and Martínez de Velasco, it was decided that the CEDA would not support the government when the Cortes reopened in October

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1 El Debate, 20 July, 10 Aug. & 19 Sept. 1934.

2 El Debate, 21 & 23 Aug. & 7-9 Sept. 1934. The UGT organized a strike against the meeting, which resulted in clashes with 6 dead and 46 hurt.

3 El Debate, 31 July & 13 Sept. 1934.

4 Arrarás, HSRE II, 374-5.

5 ABC, 21 Aug. 1934. El Socialista, 8 July 1934, published the Alfonsine Marqués de Villapesadilla's plan to change the commander in Catalonia, send warships and put divisions at the ready on the Ebro, form volunteer bands from the loyal 45 provinces and get the government to arm them, and even transfer the Catalan population if necessary.

if the matter remained unsolved - a decision probably hastened by pressure from within the party.[1]

This promise to topple the government if it produced no satisfactory results Gil Robles officially announced to cheering Japistas at Covadonga on 9 September.[2] Indeed, the idea was now canvassed that a majority government, including the CEDA, should be installed before the Cortes met, but nothing came of this apparently owing to some Radical opposition.[3] The Cortes was due to assemble in October, and in late September people throughout Spain were certain that the government would fall, but not so certain of the consequences. El Socialista, perhaps still hoping that the President would yield to pressure and keep the CEDA out of office, wrote: 'The clouds move laden towards October. What is going to happen? The truth is that no one knows. The workers must always be ready for everything... Watch the red signal!'[4]

When the Cortes met on 1 October, Samper began by saying that he had found a formula for solving the Catalan question: the

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1 El Debate, 15 & 17 Aug. 1934. ABC (16 Aug. 1934) reported discontent within the CEDA over Catalonia; El Socialista (8 Sept. 1934) reported that 40 Cedista Deputies were expected to go over to Calvo Sotelo if nothing was done.

2 El Debate, 11 Sept. 1934.

3 El Debate, 13, 14 & 28 Sept. 1934. Samper and Guerra del Río were the Radical opponents; Samper was very much a puppet of the President.

4 El Socialista, 27 Sept. 1934; the paper prophesied a choice between the Holy Office and the Red Flag.

Generalidad could modify the text of its law if the Cortes were to pass a law allowing the former to legislate on the issue. Gil Robles then rose to say that this would be legalization of rebellion and the flouting of the Court of Constitutional Guarantees - in short, capitulation. Samper had performed 'the service of showing that the ways of concord and accommodation are impossible when the same desire and the same good faith are not to be found in both parties.' Now a new policy was necessary, for which Samper was not the man; he demanded a majority government or elections. Samper next asked for other leaders to express their views, but none rose. The Agrarian Minister Cid then left the government bench amid applause. The session was suspended at 6.40 p.m. and the government resigned at 7.05 p.m.[1]

On 2 October Lerroux was entrusted by the President to form a government, the composition of which was finally announced on 4 October. It included three Cedistas - Aizpún at Justice, Giménez Fernández at Agriculture, Anguera de Sojo at Labour - and Lerroux guaranteed its 'absolute obedience to the Constitution'.[2]

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1 DSC, 1 Oct. 1934; Bowers, My Mission, 96; El Debate, 2 Oct. 1934.

2 El Debate, 3-5 Oct. 1934. There were difficulties in the negotiations. El Debate said that the CEDA had wanted Anguera de Sojo, the Catalan and former Republican Attorney-General, at the Interior, but the Lliga had objected to this. Lucía

Continued on page 346/.....

On the same day the Left Republicans and Miguel Maura formally broke with the existing régime,[1] and the Socialist general strike began. On 6 October, with Barcelona in revolt, Lerroux declared a 'state of war' at 10 p.m.[2]

In Madrid the general strike turned out to be political rather than revolutionary and lasted about ten days. The Socialists suffered from lack of arms, and no soldiers came over to them as they had hoped. A police raid on their headquarters on 4 October dealt a crucial blow to their plans. There was sporadic shooting for eight days, but the position of the government was never threatened. Young men of the JAP's Movilización Civil saw to it that essential

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Footnote 2, page 345, continued/.....

was excluded since Samper, his local political rival in Valencia, was included. Lerroux (Pequeña historia, 295 & 301-2) noted that Alcalá-Zamora intensely disliked Gil Robles and wanted no Cedista Ministers; he was persuaded to accept three in exchange for the dropping of his other enemy, Salazar Alonso. The government was:- Premier, Lerroux (Radical); State, Samper (Radical); Justice, Aizpún Santafé (CEDA); Finance, Marraco (Radical); War, Hidalgo (Radical); Navy, Rocha (Radical); Agriculture, Giménez Fernández (CEDA); Communications, Jalón (Radical); Industry & Commerce, Orozco (Radical); Interior, Vaquero (Radical); Labour, Anguera de Sojo (CEDA); Public Instruction, Villalobos (Liberal-Democrat); without portfolios, Martínez de Velasco (Agrarian) & Pita Romero (independent Republican).

1 For texts of the notes issued by Unión Republicana (a fusion of Radical-Socialists with Radical-Democrats under Martínez Barrio), Izquierda Republicana, the Federals, the Radical-Socialist Left and Maura's Conservatives, see Ramos Oliveira, La revolución, 59-61. Maura, by his Leftist orientation during 1934, had shed many of his Deputies and provincial branches, and his minority had to be dissolved.

2 El Debate, 5-7 Oct. 1934.

services continued to operate.[1] The revolution had coincided with a meeting of the National Council of the Falange, at which José Antonio was elected 'National Chief'. The Falange demonstrated in favour of the government and offered its services to clean up the capital if given arms. This offer Lerroux refused, just as he declined to address the Falangista demonstrators, answering their cries of 'long live Spain' with shouts of 'long live the Republic'.[2]

In Barcelona there was at first vacillation in the Generalidad. Azaña, who happened to be in Barcelona, advised the Catalans not to use violent methods.[3] However Companys gave way to the pressure of the separatists of Estat Català, led by Dencás, and to a much lesser extent to the wishes of the Alianza Obrera, from which the all-important CNT held itself aloof. At 8 p.m. on 6 October Companys declared that 'Monarchizing and Fascist forces' had taken power in Madrid and that true Republicans and other Leftists had taken up arms as a result; he therefore proclaimed 'the Catalan State in the Federal Spanish Republic' and invited the formation of a provisional

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1 Accounts of events in Madrid are given by Ramos Oliveira, La revolución, 77-99; Buckley, Spanish Republic, 147-8; & HCE, II-7, 150-1.

2 HCE, II-7, 142-3 & 150; Bravo, Falange, 65-70; Lerroux, Pequeña historia, 314-6. Fal Conde offered the Traditionalists' services to the government on 7 October (BOT, 14 Oct. 1934).

3 Reported in ABC, 4 Oct. 1934 - of interest in view of subsequent Rightist accusations against Azaña.

Republican government in Catalonia. The military commander, General Batet, remained loyal to Madrid and, after little resistance, he brought about the surrender of Companys and the Generalidad at 6.30 a.m. on 7 October. Dencás escaped down a sewer.[1] The Lliga was in no way implicated in the rising, and its municipal councillors openly opposed the decision to revolt.[2]

The most serious revolt occurred in Asturias, commencing with the seizure of Mieres by revolutionary miners on the night of 4 October. In Asturias the Socialists and Communists of the Sindicato Minero had formed a united proletarian front with the Anarcho-Syndicalists of the Confederación Regional del Trabajo; perhaps 8,000 of their number entered Oviedo on the night of 5 October. In the province there were, according to Salazar Alonso, 1,493 soldiers, 650 Civil Guards, 490 Assault Guards and 64 policemen; these government forces had to face the larger and more determined body of miners armed with the dynamite, rifles and machine-guns they had captured from arms factories. With Asturias virtually overrun by the revolutionaries and land communications cut, the War Minister, Hidalgo, called in General Franco, whom he esteemed the ablest officer in the army. It was soon decided that the rebellion could only be crushed

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1 Accounts of the Catalan rising are given by Arrarás, HSRE II, 469-514; Jackson, Spanish Republic, 149-53; Maurín, Segunda revolución, 123-43. See also Ossorio, Companys, 123-7, & D. Hidalgo, ¿ Por qué fuí lanzado del Ministerio de la Guerra? (Madrid, 1934), 65-8.

2 HCE, II-7, 159.

by experienced, professional troops. The other areas of Spain could not be denuded of their garrisons in case there were other revolutionary outbreaks. Franco therefore called upon Colonel Yagüe to lead a force of Moorish regulars to help reconquer the province from the rebels. The men of General López de Ochoa finally retook Oviedo on 12 October, but mopping-up operations went on until at least 19 October.[1]

In the Basque provinces there were risings in Socialist areas such as the mining district of Biscay. At Mondragón the revolutionaries murdered the Traditionalist Deputy Oreja Elósegui. The attitude of Aguirre and the PNV was one of 'absolute abstention': the Nationalists told Radicals on 3 October that they would not rise, but neither would they lift a finger to help the government if others did. Despite this official neutrality members of the SOV, the PNV's union, did take part in the general strike in several places.[2] As a result of their attitude Aguirre and his fellow-Nationalists were greeted with shouts of 'out! out!' when they entered the Cortes

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1 Accounts of the Asturian rising are given by Arrarás, HSRE II, 531-641; Jackson, Spanish Republic, 153-9; Thomas, Civil War, 118-23. See also Ramos Oliveira, La revolución, 116-25; Maurín, Segunda revolución, 145-66; Mendizábal, Martyrdom, 208-13; Hidalgo, ¿Por qué?, 77-81, 83-7 & 140-1; Álvarez del Vayo, Last Optimist, 268-72. Salazar Alonso, Bajo el signo, 299, gives the strength of government forces.

2 Aguirre, Libertad, 542-54; García Venero, Nacionalismo vasco, 455-6; Sierra, Euzkadi, 145

on 9 October, and Traditionalist Deputies had to intervene to separate Aguirre and Calvo Sotelo, who came to blows. The Basque Nationalist Deputies sat impassively while other Deputies shouted 'long live Spain!'[1]

The Cortes met on 9 October in an atmosphere charged with emotion. Gil Robles, after calling recent events a disgrace to a civilized country, said that the CEDA recognized that 'the representation of the Republic is the very incarnation of Spain'. Goicoechea, Lamamié de Clairac and Romanones, speaking for their various brands of Monarchism, were more cautious but, horrified at the revolutionary outbreaks, they all supported Lerroux to the hilt for the preservation of public order and national unity. The staunch liberal Royo Villanova solemnly declared: 'I have learnt from Castelar that the Country comes first, Liberty second and the Republic third; and because for me the Country comes first, I tell the government not to be afraid to sacrifice Liberty, if this sacrifice must be made to save the Country.' José Antonio, for his part, thanked Lerroux for releasing Spanish youth from its pessimism and for restoring to many faith in Spain. A jubilant Lerroux ended the session, from which Socialists and Left Republicans had absented themselves, with a cry of 'long live Spain! Long live the Republic!'[2] It was the moment of

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1 DSC, 9 Oct. 1934; El Debate, 10 Oct. 1934.

2 DSC, 9 Oct. 1934.

triumph for Lerroux and the conservative Republic for which he stood, but if the defeated Left were silent, there were still discordant notes struck on the Right. Monarchists preferred to give thanks for their salvation to the army; 'not the Republican nor the Monarchist Army, but the Army of Spain'.[1]

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1 ABC, 16 Oct. 1934.

CHAPTER V

THE CEDA-RADICAL PARTNERSHIP, OCTOBER 1934-DECEMBER 1935

The Socialist and Catalan Leftist rebellions of October 1934 against the legal government, and the severance of relations by other Republicans with the system which they themselves created simply because they no longer controlled it, represented a watershed in the history of the Republic. Those who had proclaimed themselves the stoutest champions of democracy in theory rejected it in practice. A fateful precedent had been set for the future.

After the rebellion Lerroux, as the historic Republican, sought to re-establish the Republic as the régime for all Spaniards. He hoped that the defeat of the revolution would persuade Left Republicans and Socialists to form themselves into a democratic party of the Left which could play the parliamentary game against the democratic party of the Right, the CEDA. Though he had no success with the Left, the 'pact of Salamanca' with Gil Robles signified the consolidation of the régime: the reformist Catholic Right definitively accepted it to the chagrin of Monarchists. The intransigence of the Left, the President's suspicion of Lerroux and Gil Robles and, above all, the disintegration of the Radical Party in the autumn of 1935 under the weight of financial scandals, destroyed Lerroux's vision of a peaceful future. The collapse of his party was the penultimate stage in the process of eradicating the Centre. The

Radical buffer between Left and Right disappeared and only the President remained trying to hold apart the two Spains and prevent full-scale civil war.

The real political debate after October 1934 took place within the Right and concerned the methods to be used to defeat the Left. Gil Robles remained true to his 'tactic' of possibilism and refused to seize the chance presented by the disarray of the Left to take possession of the State with the help of the military and the Monarchists. He believed that dictatorship would merely make things worse in the long run and thus sought to overcome 'the Revolution' with advanced social measures as a preliminary to constitutional reform. His hopes for social reform were however dashed by the opposition of members of his own party and others on the Right, as well as by the pressure of economic circumstances and recurrent political crises. Even so, governments which his party supported or in which it participated introduced the first law against unemployment and achieved more in the realm of agrarian reform than their predecessors. Gil Robles considered liberal-democracy a lesser evil than <u>étatisme</u> even though he wanted eventually to get a mandate to set up corporative institutions inspired by Traditionalist ideas.

His Monarchist opponents, led by Calvo Sotelo, preferred the solutions of Donoso to the tactics of Balmes. The October rebellion proved to them that the 'other' Spain was not prepared to accept a parliamentary system which allowed the Right to govern. The golden opportunity to take full possession of the State before the Left had

time to recover must be seized. The Army was the guarantee for the nation's future, which ought not to be gambled away in more elections. The Left had chosen violence and was unrepentant; many Socialists saw the rebellion as the Spanish equivalent of the Russian revolution of 1905. Spain was therefore in a state of civil war and the Right must get its blow in first while conditions were favourable if catastrophe were to be averted.

i. The aftermath of the revolution

From October 1934 until the fall of the first Radical-CEDA coalition government in March 1935, the principal political issue was the repression of the revolution. The government announced that the revolutionaries would be treated with 'neither cruelty nor impunity'. El Debate subscribed to this view, but emphasized that full use must be made of the law to punish the guilty lest they be tempted to repeat the attempt to seize power.[1] Gil Robles said that death-sentences should be carried out right away so that the government could not be accused of cruelty and so that the necessary example might be set.[2] ABC demanded that the law be obeyed since Spain's ills sprang from the failure of citizens and governments to heed the law. Lerroux must therefore apply the law inflexibly to the cul-

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1 El Debate, 13, 18, 19 Oct. 1934.

2 ABC, 26 Oct. 1934.

prits: the real culprits were the promoters and leaders of the rebellion.[1]

The government tried to act calmly, but it had to contend with the emotional and vengeful atmosphere created by the events of October which had so terrified the Spanish bourgeoisie. A Cedista Deputy said that the events were comparable to the burning of Rome by Nero and the invasion of Spain by the barbarians of the north.[2] The horror felt by Rightists was epitomized by the assertion that a monk had been burnt alive by the revolutionaries after they had cut off his legs.[3]

Gil Robles and the CEDA found themselves caught between demands for vengeance from the Right and demands for a conciliatory policy from the President. Certain Monarchist and military elements attempted to seize the opportunity presented by the abortive revolution for a coup d'état, but their plans were thwarted by the opposition of General Franco.[4] Monarchists really wanted the installation of

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1 ABC, 16 Oct. 1934.

2 Fernández-Ladreda (Deputy for Asturias), DSC, 7 Nov. 1934. According to official figures 1,377 persons died (1,051 being civilians); 2,954 were injured (2,051 being civilians); 7 were missing (quoted in ABC, 19 Feb. 1935).

3 Cid, ABC, 28 Oct. 1934. Rightists probably exaggerated the brutality of the rebels; Aizpún told his Navarrese constituents after a visit to Asturias that the rebels' deeds had been magnified (El Debate, 28 Oct. 1934).

4 Sáinz Rodríguez and Vigón, among others, had agreed to a plan: Ansaldo was to fly Sanjurjo from Portugal to Asturias, where Col. Yagüe would put the Army's best troops at his disposal. The operation necessitated the agreement of the overall commander, Franco in Madrid, who refused to cooperate (Ansaldo, ¿Para qué?, 92-3). Sanjurjo and Barrera had previously offered their services to Lerroux, who declined the offers (Royo Villanova, 30 años, 193).

an authoritarian régime based upon the Army, and Gil Robles was pressed to take action when the first death-sentences came before the cabinet at the beginning of November. Twenty-three such sentences had been passed by military courts. Article 102 of the Constitution empowered the President to commute these sentences only if the government proposed that this be done. The government opposed commutation until Lerroux, who was not thirsty for blood, allowed Alcalá-Zamora to persuade him to propose commutation of twenty-one of the sentences. Two minor revolutionaries were executed because of the 'especial ferocity' of their crimes.[1] The Monarchists wanted Gil Robles to bring down the government by withdrawing his Ministers. Gil Robles, however, feared that if he did this Alcalá-Zamora would appoint Martínez Barrio as Premier, in which case all would be lost. Generals Goded and Fanjul told Gil Robles that they would stage a coup, but this idea was abandoned after the garrison commanders had been consulted.[2]

In the Cortes Lerroux sought to justify his action. Those responsible for the 'wind of criminal folly [that had] passed over

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1 HCE, II-8, 275; El Debate, 6 Nov. 1934; Lerroux, Pequeña historia, 326-36 & 363. The two executed were a man who had given an order to fire on women and children and a deserter, Sgt. Vázquez, who had used prisoners as a shield in an attack on a barracks (see Arrarás, HSRE II, 580 & 591-3).

2 HCE, II-8, 277; & Gil Robles's account in C. Seco Serrano, Historia de España, tomo VI (Barcelona, 1962), 99. Casanueva was the go-between.

the whole Peninsula' in October must face the legal consequences, but the Republic, like the Monarchy before it, ought also to exercize the prerogative of mercy. Calvo Sotelo wanted officially to accuse Alcalá-Zamora of acting unconstitutionally in usurping the government's function of proposing commutation, but he failed to collect the necessary fifty Deputies' signatures for his motion. Instead, he reminded Lerroux of the words of Quevedo: 'He who orders what he does not do, undoes what he orders.' The key to the survival of the Third French Republic, he said, was the stern repression of the Paris Commune. Lerroux must be as tough as Thiers if the Spanish Republic were to survive.[1] Up to the present, Calvo Sotelo argued, the Republic had only succeeded in inverting the maxim of Bishop Antonio de Guevara: 'It is the custom of Castilian kings to pardon the people and behead the leaders.'[2]

While Monarchists accused Lerroux and the CEDA of weakness, the Left began to protest at the severity of repression in Asturias. It was said that innocent people had been shot and prisoners brutally

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1 DSC, 5 & 6 Nov. 1934. During the debate, Maeztu interrupted to tell Republicans that it had taken '140,000 shootings' to liquidate the Commune.

2 Quoted by F. Acedo Colunga, José Calvo Sotelo (Barcelona, 1957), 279.

tortured by the agents of authority.[1] Until December 1934 the work of repression was carried out by Major Doval of the Civil Guard, a man with a reputation for severity, as Special Delegate of the War Ministry in Asturias.[2] The government denied that the Left's atrocity propaganda was true, and forbade publication of the charges; the Left therefore publicized its case abroad.[3]

Inside the government there was always tension. The CEDA was concerned lest the revolutionaries escape lightly and sought to increase its share of portfolios so as to be able to force Lerroux

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1 The Left Republican Miranda (DSC, 30 Nov. 1934) said 80 innocent persons had been shot. Copious details of alleged atrocities were collected by Los Ríos, Gordón Ordás and Álvarez del Vayo, and were put before British Leftists by L. Manning, What I Saw in Spain (London, 1935), 167-221. An army officer later wrote that Civil and Assault Guards each arrested a suspect for the same crime. Both suspects independently confessed their guilt when tortured. Madrid, however, decided that two persons could not be guilty; the two sets of police then got both victims to retract their confessions under torture (J. Martín Blázquez, I Helped to Build an Army [London, 1939], 22).

2 In Oct. Hidalgo gave Doval the 'necessary autonomy and special jurisdiction' to circumvent normal procedures (Hidalgo, ¿Por qué?, 92). Doval declared he would spare no rebel's life and would 'exterminate the revolutionary seed in the bellies of mothers' (Alba, HSRE, 167). Velarde, who became Governor-General in Dec., found 30,000 had been detained; 27,000 of these were released in 5 months ('A.S.', 'Comentarios a "La guerra civil española" de Hugh Thomas', Revista de Estudios Políticos, no. 120 [1961], 246). Trials continued throughout 1935.

3 If the Left's evidence was as impeccable as it maintained, it seems strange that virtually no action was taken against the alleged offenders in 1936. The Bulgarian Lt. Ivanov was given a 6-month sentence for shooting the Leftist journalist Sirval (El Debate, 5 Sept. 1935). Maeztu thought the Left's new 'ferrerada' just the second half of Nechaev's formula: 'Against bodies, violence; against souls, lies.' (ABC, 23 Nov. 1934).

to carry out its wishes. Lerroux, Martínez de Velasco and M. Álvarez, the leaders of the other parties in the coalition, were anxious to keep their existing representation, if not to increase it. Between November 1934 and January 1935 ministerial adjustments did occur, but the government's complexion remained the same.[1]

Breaking-point was reached in March 1935 when the cabinet considered the death-sentences passed on the Socialist Deputies González Peña and T. Menéndez for their parts in the Asturian revolt. Pressed by his followers to take a firmer line than he had in November, Gil Robles demanded the liquidation of the revolution 'without vacillations, with energy, with a spirit of justice, without making distinctions between delinquents.'[2] A government crisis seemed inevitable, so he announced that the existing coalition should be maintained with portfolios distributed rather differently.[3] In an attempt to make the most of the opportunity, the CEDA on 26 March sent a public memorandum to Lerroux on how to reduce unemployment.[4] Alcalá-Zamora

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1 On 16 Nov. Samper and Hidalgo were ousted to appease the Right, who accused them of having appeased the revolution. They were temporarily replaced by Rocha at State and Lerroux at War. On 27 Dec. Villalobos was replaced by Dualde (also a Liberal-Democrat) at Public Instruction after a clash with Cedistas (ABC, 22 Dec. 1934). On 5 Jan. Martínez de Velasco and Pita Romero (both without portfolio) resigned. After a wrangle (see El Debate, 12-22 Jan. 1935), Abad Conde (Radical) became on 23 Jan. Minister for the Navy instead of Rocha.

2 El Debate, 19 Mar. 1935.

3 El Debate, 26 Mar. 1935.

4 The document called for tax reforms and special legislation and more expenditure to cure unemployment; reafforestation, railway development and the planned expenditure of 150,000,000 ptas. before 1 Dec. 1936 were advocated (El Debate, 27 Mar. 1935).

again urged Lerroux to commute the death-sentences and the Radical majority in the cabinet agreed to do this. On 27 March El Debate's editorial suggested that the crisis could be averted if Lerroux agreed to implement the unemployment proposal; by implication, the CEDA would turn a blind eye to commutation of the death-sentences. Gil Robles and the CEDA, however, for once dissociated themselves from El Debate. When the cabinet next met, on 29 March, the seven Radicals voted against the sentences. The Cedista, Agrarian and Liberal-Democrat Ministers immediately resigned.[1]

The President entrusted the formation of a new government to Lerroux, but he failed to reconcile the conflicting demands of his coalition partners. Martínez de Velasco failed for the same reason. The basic clash was between the CEDA, demanding six portfolios, and the Agrarians, demanding four; both parties wanted the Ministries of War and the Interior. Neither Lerroux nor Alcalá-Zamora would accept these terms. Lerroux finally formed an interim government with some of the President's friends on 3 April. Since it could not hoped to secure a parliamentary majority, the President suspended the

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1 El Debate, 27-30 Mar. 1935; Lerroux, Pequeña historia, 369-75. Who wrote this editorial is not known: Bowers (My Mission, 132) suggests Herrera, but some Cedistas at the time suggested Giménez Fernández. Gil Robles said he was disgusted by the editorial (ABC, 28 Mar. 1935). The CEDA objected to Alcalá-Zamora's unconstitutional pressure on the government and his reluctance to be tough with revolutionaries (Gil Robles, conversation). This view was expressed also by Martínez de Velasco (El Debate, 26 Mar. 1935).

Cortes for a month.[1] Monarchists were delighted at the CEDA's apparent failure; Calvo Sotelo's organ announced that the tactic had failed completely,[2] while Goicoechea hoped for a reunited Right.[3]

However Lerroux was determined to reconstitute the governmental bloc while the Cortes were suspended.[4] This was also Gil Robles's aim: armed with another vote of confidence from the CEDA's National Council, he asked for more portfolios or elections.[5] By the end of April Gil Robles, Lerroux, Martínez de Velasco and M. Álvarez - 'the Four' - had reached agreement among themselves.[6] Alcalá-Zamora was still something of a stumbling-block. He distrusted Gil Robles and was hostile to the CEDA because he considered it insufficiently Republican and because he had ambitions of his own. He also wanted to be the recognized leader of the Republican Right.[7] He tried to break

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1 El Debate, 31 Mar. & 2-4 Apr. 1935. This government consisted of:- Premier, Lerroux (Radical); State, Rocha (Radical); Justice, Cantos (Radical); Finance, Zabala (Progressive); War, Gen. Masquelet; Navy, Adm. Salas; Interior, Portela Valladares (independent); Public Instruction, Prieto Bances (independent); Labour, Vaquero (Radical); Public Works, Guerra del Río (Radical); Agriculture, Benayas (Progressive); Industry, Marraco (Radical); Communications, Jalón (Radical).

2 La Nación, 3 Apr. 1935 (quoted by ABC, 4 Apr. 1935).

3 ABC, 9 Apr. 1935.

4 El Debate, 7 Apr. 1935.

5 El Debate, 10 Apr. & Fernández Ruano, ABC, 13 Apr. 1935.

6 El Debate, 28 Apr. 1935.

7 Gil Robles, conversation.

up the CEDA with the same technique that he had used to part Martínez Barrio from Lerroux. He made tempting propositions to Giménez Fernández, to Lucía and to Gil Robles himself, but without success.[1] He therefore had to accept on 5 May a government led by Lerroux which included five Cedistas, one of whom was Gil Robles at the War Ministry.[2]

The question of how to deal with the active revolutionaries was not the only problem that the Radical-CEDA government faced after October 1934. There was also the problem posed by the passive revolutionaries - the Republicans who had publicly severed relations with those in power. The government quickly introduced censorship of speeches made in the Cortes. Despite this, Besteiro advised the reformist Socialists who, like himself, had taken no part in the rebellion, to return to the Cortes. The majority of the Socialist Deputies however rejected his counsel. Izquierda Republicana, the

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1 HCE, II-8, 331; Seco Serrano, Historia de España, VI, 106.

2 This government consisted of:- Premier, Lerroux (Radical); War, Gil Robles (CEDA); Interior, Portela (independent); Labour, Salmón (CEDA); Communications, Lucía (CEDA); Finance, Chapaprieta (Independent Republican); Public Works, Marraco (Radical); State, Rocha (Radical); Industry & Commerce, Aizpún (CEDA); Agriculture, Velayos (Agrarian); Justice, Casanueva (CEDA); Navy, Royo Villanova (Agrarian); Public Instruction, Dualde (Liberal-Democrat). Alcalá-Zamora did not want Gil Robles at War nor so many Cedistas; in Lerroux's opinion Gil Robles was 'a gentleman and a loyal fellow' and his party had crossed the Rubicon into the Republic (Lerroux, Pequeña historia, 387-90). Giménez Fernández had recently ended a speech with 'long live the Republic' (El Debate, 19 Mar. 1935).

Esquerra, Unión Republicana and the Conservatives also boycotted the Cortes. When the government lifted this form of censorship in mid-November 1934, the Deputies of the Left and M. Maura again began to attend sessions.[1]

Their return was welcomed by Lerroux, but was not to the liking of Monarchists and many Cedistas. The Right therefore made efforts to eliminate Azaña from the political scene. It was widely believed among Rightists that he had encouraged the rising in Barcelona, but it soon transpired that the evidence for this was lacking. The Monarchists therefore demanded that both Azaña and Casares Quiroga stand trial for providing Portuguese revolutionaries with arms during the first biennium; these arms had been sent to Asturias in 1934.[2] The Court of Constitutional Guarantees in fact acquitted Azaña on 6 April 1935. A Monarchist motion to reopen the matter in July failed to obtain the requisite number of votes in the Cortes.[3] The Court did condemn Companys and the former Councillors of the Generalidad to thirty years in prison and exclusion from public office.[4]

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1 El Debate, 6 Nov. & ABC, 6, 13 & 14 Nov. 1934.

2 DSC, 20 & 21 Mar. 1935. Gil Robles wanted the Court of Constitutional Guarantees to try Azaña so as to clear up the confusion.

3 DSC, 20 July 1935; Jackson, Spanish Republic, 168.

4 El Debate, 6 June 1935.

The Catalan Statute was also an important political issue after October 1934. On the eve of the rising in Barcelona Gil Robles had declared that he favoured revision of the Statute and 'restricted autonomy'.[1] When the Cortes met on 9 October the Monarchists, as expected, proposed its abolition. Lerroux opposed this, though he conceded that it could be modified by constitutional means. Ventosa for the Lliga announced that his party intended to defend the Statute in its existing form and pointed out that the Lliga had 'practised respect for the integrity of Spain' by opposing the rising of 6 October.[2] The Monarchists nevertheless still aimed to do away with the Statute. The Lliga, they claimed, really did not differ from the Esquerra in its aims; its methods were more subtle. They were anxious lest this golden opportunity to correct past mistakes should be missed.[3] ABC wrote that Catalonia could legitimately aspire only to 'purely administrative local and provincial autonomy', which entailed the 'pure and simple repeal' of the Statute.[4] Gil Robles

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1 ABC, 2 Oct. 1934.

2 DSC, 9 Oct. 1934.

3 DSC, 5 & 29 Nov. 1934. The attack was led by Goicoechea and H. Maura. The former found himself accused by Cambó of betraying his political past as a Maurista and leader of the abortive Constitutional Centre in 1931 which had proclaimed the principle of autonomy (DSC, 6 Dec. 1934).

4 ABC, 25 Oct. & 7 Dec. 1934.

réstated the quasi-Traditionalist view of the CEDA. The Traditionalists themselves, like the Alfonsines, Agrarians, Liberal-Democrats and José Antonio, called for its abolition.[1] On 11 December the Monarchist motion for its abolition suffered defeat although many of the government's usual supporters abstained. Lerroux, buttressed by Gil Robles, held firm to the principle of autonomy: 'we have no right to chastise a [whole] people.'[2]

The Radical-CEDA alternative to abolition was suspension of the Statute until the Cortes, at the suggestion of the government, should vote for the gradual restoration of the powers of the Generalidad. In the meantime a Governor-General was to preside over the Generalidad's executive council. The government undertook to set up a committee to decide on the transfer of services within three months; a special law was to deal with the controversial services of public order, justice and education. Such were the terms of the law of 2 January 1935 establishing a provisional régime in Catalonia.[3]

Portela Valladares, a prominent Freemason whom the CEDA disliked, was appointed Governor-General.[4] In April 1935 Pich Pon, the leader

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1 DSC, 30 Nov. & 6-7 Dec. 1934.

2 DSC, 11 Dec. 1934; 3 Cedistas actually voted for the motion.

3 Text in DSC, 23 Jan. 1935 App.

4 El Debate, 28 Dec. 1934; Portela was a Liberal Minister under the Monarchy.

of the Catalan Radicals, became President of the Generalidad and Lerroux's interim government decreed the return to Barcelona of all services previously transferred, with the exception of public order.[1]

The leaders of the Right held different views on Catalan autonomy, as on most subjects. Gil Robles believed that Catalonia was 'a region with distinguishable characteristics and has a right to an autonomy...that does not bring Catalonia and Spain into conflict.'[2] Calvo Sotelo, however, interpreted the 'definitive dogma' of the motto of the Catholic Kings, 'Spain united and in order', as permitting only administrative variety. Political autonomy in the hands of the Lliga was for him no better than rule by the Esquerra: 'The Statute is a vehicle for disintegration... Political autonomy leads to secessionism. As has happened in Ireland.'[3]

The Radical-CEDA governments had to face also the legacy of Azaña's biennium in matters of agrarian reform, labour legislation and education. From April 1934 until September 1935 the Ministry of Public Instruction was almost continuously in the care of Liberal-Democrats. This was probably more by design than by accident, for

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1 El Debate, 5 Apr. & ABC, 18 Apr. 1935. The Lliga had already complained of the corrupt nature of Pich Pon's men (DSC, 6 Feb. 1935).

2 El Debate, 10 Mar. 1935. He complained that when he tried to put into effect the doctrines of Vázquez de Mella the latter's disciples accused him of separatism (El Debate, 23 Dec. 1934).

3 ABC, 30 Apr. 1935 (speech at Tarrasa).

their tenure provided an assurance to both Catholics and laicists that neither educational system would be destroyed. In general terms, the cautious laicizers Villalobos and Dualde continued to build up state schools, albeit at a slower rate than that of the first biennium. Catholic and private educational establishments were left to their own devices. This compromise satisfied the partners in the coalition, although in December 1934 Villalobos resigned after Cedistas had sharply criticized his plans for the organization of secondary education.[1] During 1935 the expansion of laicist education fell a victim to the general policy of economic retrenchment, which was not a cause for gloom among Cedistas. The laicizing policies of Azaña's governments were then considerably diluted and eventually came to a virtual halt, but it cannot be said that any effort was made to turn back the clock during the second biennium. The CEDA respected the Constitution.[2]

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1 See speeches of Pabón and Villalobos, DSC, 21 Dec. 1934.

2 A more critical version, based on laicist sources, is given by Jackson, Spanish Republic, 170-1. The law of 16 Sept. 1932 stipulated that 50,000,000 ptas. would be set aside annually in the budget for new state schools. In fact, 20,000,000 ptas. were provided in 1932; 25,000,000 in 1933; 25,000,000 in 1934; and 25,000,000 in 1935, all of which had been spent by mid-April (Prieto Bances, ABC, 17 Apr. 1935). The 1935 budget allotted 5,267,000 ptas. in aid to the ILE, 2,948,000 more than in 1931 (Galindo, Los partidos, 286). According to the Socialist Llopis, only 3,521 new state schools were opened in 1934-5, compared with the 12,988 of 1931-3 (DSC, 3 June 1936). El Debate, 7 Aug. 1935, criticized the 'pedagogical missions' because they had been used to spread political subversion; the paper thought that technical instruction on farming methods would be more useful to the rural population than the declamation of Sophocles. During 1934-5 Catholic schools were built (in accordance with the Constitution) by the Cruzados de la Enseñanza, a private company created for the purpose.

Giménez Fernández's first task as Minister of Agriculture was to draft a law for the protection of yunteros and small farmers. The purpose of the law was to remedy unemployment in Extremadura by ensuring that those with little or no land who owned ploughs or other implements should have sufficient land to make a living. In general, the idea was to extend until 31 July 1935 the occupations that had taken place under Domingo's decree of November 1932 and Del Río's law of February 1934, except where the land was unsuitable for sowing. Landowners were told that occupation did not mean expropriation, while those yunteros likely to be evicted in 1935 were promised that their names would be put on the Institute of Agrarian Reform's waiting-list.[1]

Giménez Fernández was determined to take action 'that redounds to the benefit of Spain and the Republic... I cannot forget that I am a professor of canon law and I uphold a canonical concept of property. That is to say that since all property must be based on the concept that possessions have been given to us as a means of aiding human nature, all use of possessions that exceeds what is necessary for covering those needs for which property was created may be abusive, and certainly is abusive when coinciding with a state of extreme need in our brethren.' The Minister obeyed the dictates of his conscience:

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1 Giménez Fernández's draft, DSC, 5 Nov. 1934 App.; final text DSC, 21 Dec. 1934 App. Since Nov. 1932 land had been provided for 15,467 peasants in Badajoz and 18,459 in Cáceres.

'I do things because I must do them.'[1] Agrarians and Monarchists complained that the hopes of Extremeño landowners and stock-breeders had been dashed by a 'revolutionary' and 'demagogic' law that, like Domingo's decree, ignored the rights of property. Redistribution of land was not to be equated with social justice and would not prevent Marxist revolution: 'let us not abandon the Civil Guard and let us arm ourselves to the teeth.'[2] Some landed Cedistas opposed their colleague's law though Gil Robles supported it.[3] It was passed on 20 December 1934 by 203 votes to 30.[4]

Giménez Fernández next brought before the Cortes a law on rural leases which he had inherited from Del Río. Its purpose was to assure tenants of long leases, compensation for improvements done by them, rents fixed by arbitration tribunals and eviction only for non-payment of rent. At the same time he introduced his own law

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1 DSC, 21 Nov. 1934.

2 DSC, 21-3 & 28 Nov. 1934 - speeches of Álvarez Lara, Royo Villanova, Daza and Lamamié de Clairac.

3 Opponents included leaders of the Entidades Agropecuarias de España, the Cedistas Rodríguez Jurado, Oriol de la Puerta, Sierra Pomares (ABC, 28 Nov. 1934); such people stayed in the party only to try to restrain the social-reformists (as Rodríguez Jurado admitted, ABC, 12 Feb. 1935). Gil Robles said this law was an 'urgent necessity' (ABC, 4 Dec. 1934).

4 DSC, 20 Dec. 1934. Radicals, Cedistas, Progressives, Liberal-Democrats, PNV and Unión Republicana voted for it. The Agrarians voted against. The Lliga was split. Monarchists abstained. Giménez Fernández thought his main enemies were absentee landlords living in Madrid; landowners in Badajoz were in favour, he claimed (El Debate, 1 Jan. 1935).

allowing tenants to acquire the land they farmed from the owners after twelve or sixteen years (depending on the nature of the land) for a sum agreed between them or fixed by independent arbitration.[1] The Minister's plans caused a storm of protest from landowners, represented in the Cortes by Agrarians, Monarchists and conservative Cedistas like Casanueva and Rodríguez Jurado. They said that these laws would subvert tenancy-agreements, for many tenants would, in effect, be immune from eviction, which would make the possibility of their buying the land a certainty. Landlords under this system were sure to get controlled rents unfair to the landlord. The two laws would lead to owners being relieved of their property without even the guarantee of proper compensation.[2] For Rodríguez Jurado, President of the Landowners' Association, irrigation was the only permissible way of creating new smallholdings.[3] The Minister's opponents were not impressed by his appeals to the teaching of the Church. Lamamié de Clairac even declared: 'If you try to take away our land with your encyclicals, we shall become schismatics.'[4]

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1 Text of law on leases, as modified by Cortes committee, in DSC, 15 June 1934 App.; text of law on accession to property, DSC, 4 Dec. 1934 App.

2 See, in particular, speeches of Casanueva, Maroto and Lamamié de Clairac in DSC, 5, 11 & 13 Dec. 1934 respectively.

3 Rodríguez Jurado, ABC, 12 Apr. 1935.

4 Iturralde, Catolicismo, I, 234. The stock-breeder Lamamié de Clairac interpreted Leo XIII's teachings in a very conservative fashion to show that property-rights were inviolable. He wanted new smallholdings to be created 'without taking anything from anybody', i.e. by irrigation (DSC, 23 Nov. 1934). El Debate, 6 Dec. 1934, described the drafts as 'the Encyclicals made into laws'.

Giménez Fernández's ideal was that those who farmed the land should also own it. The only way to create a large number of small-holdings, he argued, was to transfer the ownership of rented land, because the State could not afford to spend vast sums on irrigation or compensation for expropriation. He wanted the minimum duration of a lease to be six years, but he thought it fair that owners should be able to farm one of their holdings themselves.[1] In the debates in the Cortes his main supporters were his predecessor in the Ministry Del Río, the Radical landowner Álvarez Mendizábal and a Cedista Deputy for León, Álvarez Robles.[2] Outside the Cortes the JAP made the Minister their hero, 'genuine representative of the spirit of Acción Popular.'[3]

However some other Cedistas saw him in a different light and dubbed him a 'white Bolshevik'. Gil Robles had to mediate between the social-Catholic and conservative wings of his party in order to avoid a split which would put his political aims in jeopardy.[4] As a

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1 Giménez Fernández, El Debate, 5 Dec. & DSC, 12 Dec. 1934.

2 Álvarez Robles, like the Minister, had no faith in an urbanized Spain; he wanted the country to be 're-agrarianized' (DSC, 6 Dec. 1934).

3 'Manuel Jiménez Fernández! Present and forward!... The agrarian laws will go into the Gaceta, or Acción Popular would cease to be Acción Popular!' (JAP, 22 Dec. 1934). JAP, 24 Nov. 1934, was not embarrassed when some Deputies referred to the CEDA as 'a confessional Left'.

4 ABC, 12 Mar. 1935.

result a modified law on rural leases was passed on 14 March which reduced the minimum duration of leases to four years, left arbitration to the courts and permitted buyers of land to evict tenants and farm it themselves.[1] For the time being the law for the acquisition of land by tenants fell by the wayside. Giménez Fernández and the conservative wing of the CEDA were at loggerheads. Although Gil Robles himself favoured the Minister's laws, as leader of the party he had to keep it in one piece.[2] The price of unity soon became known: Giménez Fernández was not reappointed as Minister of Agriculture when the CEDA re-entered the government in May 1935 even though his work was clearly unfinished.

That 'dynamism' in the Ministry of Agriculture, which Calvo Sotelo had seen as the only redeeming feature of the first Radical-CEDA government,[3] disappeared with the appointment of the conservative Agrarian Velayos in May 1935. The law on rural leases proved in practice to be a boon for conservaduros. By July 1935 many evictions

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1 DSC, 14 Mar. 1935. This law was passed by 189 votes to 38: Radicals, Cedistas, Agrarians, PNV and José Antonio voted for it; Monarchists, Independents and Lliga voted against.

2 Giménez Fernández also introduced a bill for the purchase of parts of large estates in Extremadura to increase the size of smallholdings (text, DSC, 23 Jan. 1935); the Cortes committee rejected it, but the Minister put it forward as a private motion. In the voting the CEDA was completely divided; Gil Robles voted for it. The bill then went back to the committee (DSC, 27 Feb. & 15 Mar. 1935).

3 ABC, 23 Apr. 1935. Calvo's views on social policies were not typical of the average Alfonsine.

had taken place and a mass of notices to quit had been given by landlords, who everywhere made unscrupulous use of the provision that allowed tenants to be evicted so that the owners could farm the land directly. In most cases the landlords had no intention of doing this and simply took advantage of their tenants' ignorance of their legal rights. Velayos refused to intervene to stop these abuses.[1] The modified law passed in March 1935 did not serve the intentions of its original sponsors. Though its wording prompted attempts to evict tenants, the real trouble was that local authorities of all political persuasions neither enforced its provisions nor made any effort to inform tenants of their rights. In any case, tenants were unlikely to be able to afford litigation. After Velayos's declaration that he would not intervene, the number of evictions soared into tens of thousands.[2]

Almost the sole concern of Velayos, as of Monarchists and his fellow Agrarians, was the repeal of the Law of Agrarian Reform of

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1 DSC, 11 & 12 July 1935 - debates on a PNV motion, supported by Giménez Fernández, Álvarez Robles, Del Río, some Radicals and Unión Republicana. The law permitted tenants to recover land if wrongly evicted. Álvarez Mendizábal estimated that 98% of the notices given were contrary to the law.

2 DSC, 29 Apr., 21 May & 1 July 1936: Mije (Communist) said there had been 187,000 evictions, but Giménez Fernández said this figure was ridiculously exaggerated. Azaña put the number at around 80,000. The yunteros who had occupied land were evicted or had to pay higher rents after July 1935 (see Malefakis, Land Tenure [thesis], Part II, chapter ix).

1932. Del Río had continued to enforce the law in 1934 and Giménez Fernández did the same, though by a decree in January 1935 he halted expropriations of grandees' estates while continuing, to the distress of Monarchists, to carry out confiscations already ordered.[1] Although the actions of Del Río and Giménez Fernández were not exactly spectacular, they achieved more in the realm of land redistribution than their predecessors.[2] Agrarian reform ground to a halt under Velayos; more had not previously been achieved owing to the inefficiency of the Institute.[3]

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1 DSC, 7 Feb. 1935; R. Tamames, Estructura económica de España (2nd ed., Madrid, 1964), 44. ABC, 1 Dec. 1934, thought it intolerable and incredible that the CEDA should allow expropriations to continue.

2 The statistics vary. According to the Institute (in Tamames, Estructura, 43), from 1932 to 31 Dec. 1934 12,260 settlements had been made on 116,837 hectares. According to a Socialist source, by 31 Dec. 1934 18,420 had been made on 128,179 hectares (L. García Palacios, El segundo bienio [n.pl., 1936], 32). According to the Ministry of Agriculture, by June 1935 13,471 settlements (i.e. about 50,000 individuals, as most were families) had been made on 132,160 hectares (quoted in ABC, 9 June 1935). By Sept. 1935 8,559 labourers had been settled as well as 65,771 persons living in 452 communities leased collectively (according to the Anuario Estadístico, quoted by Manuel, Politics, 102). Little practical had been achieved before Azaña's fall in 1933. Del Río said he had expropriated 80,000 hectares and settled 10-11,000 families while Minister (ABC, 19 Mar. 1935); but according to a later Minister, Del Río and Giménez Fernández had settled 7,000 and set up 131 communities (DSC, 1 July 1936).

3 The Institute was supposed to receive 50,000,000 ptas. p.a. In fact in 1932 it got 8,300,000; in 1933 50,000,000; in 1934 50,000,000; in the first half of 1935 25,000,000. Up to 6 June 1935 it had only spent 28,400,000 ptas. in all (Ministry of Agriculture report, ABC, 9 June 1935). The Institute's personnel, appointed by Domingo, remained unchanged (ABC, 13 June 1935). By the end of 1935 the Institute had been given 158,300,000 ptas. in all; 95,800,000 remained unspent (Malefakis, Land Tenure [thesis], Part II, chapter ix).

Various drafts modifying the law of 1932 were discussed in committee and debates did not begin in the Cortes until July 1935. The aim of Velayos's draft was to reform the law of 15 September 1932 and thus to promote a return to normality in the countryside and a rise in property-values. Its main feature was to abolish any expropriation of land without compensation. The method of valuing land for purchase, like the method of compensation, was modified to the landowners' advantage. Certain types of estates were exempted from the provisions of the law, and the type of settlement to be adopted was the smallholding. The Cortes committee made it clear that lands hitherto expropriated were to be considered as temporarily occupied. If after six years the settler had shown himself to be a capable farmer, he would be able to buy the land over a period at a price fixed by the Institute.[1]

While some Monarchists and Agrarians grumbled that the draft should simply have stated that the law of 1932 had been abolished in its entirety, others on the Right were less happy. Giménez Fernández and Álvarez Robles clearly did not like the draft, and eventually gained sufficient support among Cedistas, Radicals and Progressives for the inclusion of clauses on the accession of tenant-farmers to property and the tax-free family patrimony. The main opposition to the draft in the Cortes came from Del Río, José Antonio and, for the

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1 DSC, 28 Mar., 3 & 5 July 1935 Apps.

Left Republicans, Sánchez Albornoz. They all argued that agrarian reform, in the form of land redistribution, was an urgent necessity in Spain, and that Velayos's law was merely a disguise for its nullification. The State could not afford to buy estates at their full market-value. Settlers could not be expected to purchase their holdings without falling completely into the hands of usurers. Sánchez Albornoz warned conservatives that if there were no legal reform, revolution would quickly follow. José Antonio calculated that with the Institute's expenditure limited as it was to 50,000,000 pesetas a year, it would take 160 years to buy up the land scheduled for redistribution. He also advocated collective settlements on unirrigated land. Velayos, however, stuck to his view that 'a liberal Republic cannot proceed against one social class'. The Left Republicans therefore withdrew from the Cortes on 25 July. This reform of agrarian reform, promulgated on 1 August 1935, represented a triumph for the conservatives, and, in the atmosphere of general economic retrenchment, brought the redistribution of land to a standstill.[1]

In the realm of social policy, the Cedista Ministers made little or no headway. Before October 1934 many mixed juries had ceased to function; the confusion was increased thereafter by the action taken against members of the UGT for revolutionary activities. In

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1 DSC, 23-26 July 1935; final text in DSC, 24 Sept. 1935 App. Giménez Fernández succeeded in getting the principle of expropriation of any farm for reasons of 'social utility' incorporated in the text.

December 1934 the conservative Cedista Anguera de Sojo suspended the juries' activities for a month so that they could be re-staffed with non-revolutionary workers' representatives,[1] but it would seem that the system of labour arbitration to a large extent collapsed.[2] The building and metallurgical industries went back to a 48-hour week and the dismissal of workers for having taken part in revolutionary strikes was fairly general despite ministerial exhortations to employers not to do this.[3] When D. de Madariaga protested against the vengeful attitude of employers, Anguera de Sojo replied that he would not fight 'Red Socialism' with 'White Socialism'.[4] In the countryside in particular, employers took their revenge by slashing wages. The Ministry of Labour was flooded with petitions about infringements of wage-agreements by employers. Federico Salmón, the social-Catholic who became Minister in May 1935, made a brave attempt to stem the tide of reaction, but was swamped by the sheer volume of complaints.[5]

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1 El Debate, 8 Dec. 1934.

2 A subsequent Minister of Labour said that half the mixed juries ceased to exist in 1934-5 (Lluhí, DSC, 1 July 1936).

3 El Debate, 7 Dec. 1934; & Giménez Fernández, El Debate, 11 Oct. 1934.

4 DSC, 12 Feb. 1935.

5 E.g. Portuguese labourers in Badajoz were paid 3.50-4 ptas. a day, when they should have had 9.75; the employers were fined 250 ptas. (El Debate, 21 May 1935). Wages of 1.25-1.50 ptas. a day were paid at Toboso (Bolívar, DSC, 2 Oct. 1935). The Conde de las Torres was fined 10,000 ptas. for paying low wages (El Debate, 7 Dec. 1934). In Almería wage-rates were cut from 7.50, 8 & 6 ptas. a day in 1933 to 4.50, 5 & 3.50 in 1934; in Albuquerque an employer was fined for giving reapers their keep but no wage for a 16-hour day (Mije, DSC, 1 July 1936). El Debate, 21 June 1935, wrote of constant denunciations of injustice and constant sanctions against employers by Salmón. Lluhí said that in July 1936 there were still 8,000 complaints from Seville province alone waiting to be dealt with (DSC, 1 July 1936).

Salmón's aim was to make the mixed juries into institutions of social harmony and social justice by appointing civil servants with a legal training as their presidents, but this was a mere paper reform: the UGT boycotted elections for new juries. The Minister virtually admitted that, insofar as they still existed, the juries had been turned into instruments for social exploitation.[1] He also introduced a law to counter unemployment which stipulated that 200,000,000 pesetas would be spent on public works, social insurance and bounties for firms undertaking public works, and that committees would be set up to direct long-term policies.[2] Such plans were however subject to the overall economic situation, which was far from healthy. The law aided recovery in the building industry, but, on the whole, little impression was made on the level of unemployment, statistics about which were in any case suspect. Government grants tended to end up in the pockets of town councillors.[3]

The social ideas of the CEDA, such as the family wage, remained

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1 El Debate, 28 May & 19 Sept. 1935; & DSC, 11 June 1935 App. (text of law).

2 Draft in DSC, 15 May 1935 App.; final text, DSC, 21 June 1935 App.

3 El Debate, 8 Nov. 1935, said that the law had given work to 20,000 persons, and more building was in progress in Madrid than there had been since 1930. Salmón complained that if he hinted that public works would be started in a municipality, the local returns for the number of unemployed had an uncanny habit of rising steeply; funds stuck to the local politicians' fingers (DSC, 12 June & El Debate, 4 Dec. 1935). Local government was largely the preserve of notoriously corrupt Radicals (DSC, 6 Feb. 1935; HCE, II-8, 361).

utopian theories. Salmón sadly commented that 'if the doctrines of St. Thomas were to be applied in all their purity they would lead to anarchy.'[1] Gil Robles still castigated conservadurismo with words,[2] but these were not matched by actions. The CEDA was failing to live up to its promises of killing revolution by kindness.

ii. Constitutional reform and the Catholic Right

After October 1934 the government of the Republic was still dependent on collaboration between Radicals and Cedistas. Though Lerroux and Gil Robles had different views about the purpose of the coalition, the two parties worked together quite smoothly until the demise of the Radicals in the autumn of 1935. Both leaders had to defend the arrangement against attacks from their opponents. The three stages of the CEDA's tactic were: firstly, to support Lerroux; then to collaborate with him; and eventually to supplant him in power.[3] Gil Robles pointed out to Monarchists that, since he had

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1 DSC, 12 June 1935. The PNV and D. de Madariaga urged the introduction of the family wage (DSC, 18 June & 3 Nov. 1935).

2 E.g. El Debate, 23 Dec. 1934, 19 Mar. & 4 Sept. 1935. He said that conservatives who would have given half their fortunes in the first biennium to save the other half, would now not give a tenth of their wealth to implement a Christian policy. He warned them that social justice was the only defence against revolution. By September, he was inviting the rich and hypocritical who claimed to be Catholics to leave the CEDA.

3 El Debate, 18 Nov. 1934.

not enough Deputies to govern alone, his party had to unite with groups outside the Right in order to serve Spain: 'It is said that we are working with Masons... Christ ate with sinners.'[1] He would not allow his party to adopt 'the catastrophic tactic' of others, for 'after the Dictatorship...came political revolution. A new dictatorship could produce, after a period of tranquillity, social revolution, a Communist Republic.' The maintenance of the governmental bloc was therefore the only solution; its ends were 'to make social revolution impossible, to undertake a work of national reconstruction, to plan the reform of the Constitution.'[2]

For his part, Lerroux was willing to cooperate with the CEDA and promised it the 'loyal collaboration' of Radicals, if it should take power, on the understanding that it kept 'within Republican legality'.[3] While he still believed that the CEDA should be the conservative party of the Republic, he also thought that Spain needed the formation of 'a great party of the Left' which could take power on suitable occasions.[4] Lerroux's ideal was then that the Radicals should hold the balance between Right and Left. When both had been brought

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1 El Debate, 16 Dec. 1934.

2 El Debate, 23 Dec. 1934.

3 El Debate, 18 Dec. 1934.

4 ABC, 5 Jan. 1935. At this time, he said, the CEDA and the Radicals were the only effective forces 'in the camp of the Republic'.

within the Republican fold Lerroux could retire from the scene with dignity.[1]

On 23 June 1935 Lerroux and Gil Robles put their relationship on a firm basis by concluding the 'governmental pact of Salamanca'. Gil Robles said that the CEDA had not renounced its ideals, but would realize its programme 'with a healthy possibilism'. He and Lerroux would continue to work together 'for a long time', and when the moment came to part they would go their own ways 'not as enemies, nor even as adversaries, but as faithful friends'. Lerroux recalled that he had offered his party's friendship to Left and Right, but the Left had spurned his offer. He had been a revolutionary, but now declared his incompatibility with those who appealed to violence. The union with the CEDA had been of use in 'laying the foundations for the new institutions, for saving society'. He solemnly swore not to abandon the coalition as long as the CEDA also supported it.[2]

Lerroux and the Monarchists were agreed that Gil Robles had definitely committed himself to the Republic, thereby finally consolidating it.[3] Lerroux tried to raise his standing with the Left by

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1 El Debate, 27 Aug. 1935; Lerroux was by now in old age and expected younger Radicals to join the party 'whose discipline satisfies the needs of their consciences'.

2 El Debate, 25 June 1935.

3 Lerroux told Guerra del Río: 'With this act...the problem of the Monarchy has been definitively removed' (ABC, 25 June 1935). ABC, 26 & 28 June 1935, complained that the CEDA had sold out to the Republic and rejected the Right. Romanones commented: 'The Republican sincerity of Gil Robles leaves no room for doubts... Sr. Gil Robles, who could have hastened the opportunity for a restoration after the last elections, has consolidated the Republic... Acción Popular has turned the insecure and the unripe into the mature and the stable.' (ABC, 11 July 1935).

drawing attention to his achievements. His work of 'widening the base of the Republic' was proving successful. The régime was now 'definitively constituted' with the CEDA's adherence to it: 'Let them tell me upon what I have had to compromise... Who have evolved? They [i.e. the CEDA] or we?... They.'[1] Lerroux and Gil Robles reaffirmed their pact at a dinner in Madrid on 9 October.[2] Monarchists observed how the claws of an old lion were slowly crushing the delicate young bones of a simple guileless dove.[3]

Gil Robles's intention was to govern with the Radicals, implement some of the CEDA's social policies, prepare a generally acceptable draft for constitutional reform, and then, after 9 December 1935, go to the country to get the draft approved.[4] Preparations for reform began in January 1935 when the President advocated moderate changes, such as a second chamber and the toning down of the clauses on

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1 Speeches at Valencia and Pontevedra, in El Debate, 9 July & 6 Aug. 1935, & Fernández Almagro, República, 142-3. 'I always prefer a conservative Republic to a progressive liberal Monarchy.'

2 El Debate, 10 Oct. 1935; Gil Robles spoke about constitutional reform, Lerroux again dwelt on the need for a Leftist bloc to give the Republic stability.

3 Goicoechea, ABC, 1 Sept. 1935 (Lerroux was the lion, Gil Robles the dove).

4 Artic. 125 allowed the government or a quarter of the deputies to propose constitutional reforms. These reforms had to be drafted into a bill which had to obtain an absolute majority after 9 Dec. 1935 or a two-thirds majority before that date. If the bill were passed by the necessary majority, the Cortes were automatically dissolved and the next Cortes were empowered to decide on the reforms proposed.

religion and the socialization of property. There was much argument between the partners in the coalition and it was not until July that a draft prepared by the Liberal-Democrat Dualde was ready. It proposed the revision of 44 of the 125 Articles of the Constitution.[1] Since it was the function of the next Cortes to draft the new texts, Dualde's proposal only provided general guiding-lines.

The more important features of his draft included rectification of the articles about regional autonomy to keep public order in the sphere of the central power and prevent statutes endangering national unity. The religious clauses (notably Article 26) were to be modified to permit a concordat, to soften the rigidity of provisions on religious matters and to disentangle ordinary legislation from the Constitution. The text of Article 44, allowing expropriation without compensation, was to thoroughly revised, as was the article on state education. A senate which could censure the government was to be created, and it, with the lower chamber, would elect the President of the Republic. The President's powers were to be re-defined, so that he might have more freedom regarding dissolution of the Cortes, but less opportunity to meddle in day-to-day government. The Senate would take over many of the functions of the Court of Constitutional Guarantees. The articles concerning amnesties, pardons, budgets and

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1 Alcalá-Zamora, Los defectos, 7 & 58 (& passim for his constitutional ideas). Text of Dualde's draft in DSC, 5 July 1935 App.

the procedure for constitutional reform were to be amended. This document satisfied the coalition partners and the President, but the Left flatly refused to consider any revision of its constitution.[1]

Gil Robles spoke freely after October 1934 about his policies and his ideas for Spain's future. In his pronouncements he showed himself to be a reformist; he adopted a tone different from that of the electoral campaign of 1933. Yet, despite this important change of emphasis, his long-term aims remained unchanged: the complete transformation of existing institutions.[2] His thinking was based upon a traditionalist view of history. He expressed nostalgia for pre-liberal corporative life dominated by 'the religious sentiment of Catholicity', and he desired a return to its principles. However, for reasons of human imperfection, the old organic society had been undermined by eighteenth-century rationalism and given the coup de grâce by the French revolution. The consequence had been the atomization of society and political life. Political parties and

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1 The Left refused to discuss the draft in the Cortes committee (DSC, 16 Oct. 1935). Azaña came out against reform in April (El Debate, 12 Apr. 1935). Alcalá-Zamora, Los defectos, 60, wrote of the Left's 'unheard-of intransigence' over reform.

2 This paragraph, and those that follow, are a synthesis of Gil Robles's interview with La Vanguardia (Barcelona), reprinted in ABC, 22 Nov. 1934; speeches reported in El Debate, 23 Dec. 1934 & 3 Mar. 1935; his preface 'on the problem in Spain' (dated 1 May 1935) to A. Tardieu, La reforma del Estado, Madrid, 1935, pp. 23-35; & his interview with the Diario Español (Buenos Aires), in El Debate, 31 May 1936.

associations for class-warfare had become the only realities. Rationalism and revolutionary individualism had produced the fruit of liberal-democracy, which, by virtue of its origins, was unacceptable to Catholic philosophy. Although English constitutionalism was not for export, since it did not accord with continental traditions, one must nevertheless recognize that democracy, defined as the incorporation of the people into the governance of the State, was 'a definitive conquest of modern times'. However desirable a return to medieval political organization might be in theory, in practice one had to reckon with reality; and the reality was that liberalism, as the variety of political parties demonstrated, had shattered the old consensus upon which corporativism had been based.

The excesses of political liberalism had provoked a doctrinal reaction which had resulted in the absorption by the State of all individual and social activities. The philosophy behind this phenomenon could be termed 'Hegelian pantheism'. The practical result of such doctrines was 'the exacerbation of nationalist sentiments', leading to 'pagan nationalism' and 'divinization of the State'. An inevitable consequence of this was a system of State Socialism with the unrestricted growth of the powers of the central organs of government and 'nullification, not only of the individual personality, but of the natural societies anterior and even superior to the State'. This totalitarian phenomenon was epitomized by the Fascist formula: 'Everything in the State, nothing outside the State, nothing against the State'. It was just as necessary to react against this political

trend, which was likely to appeal to the young and also conflicted with Catholic orthodoxy, as it was to react against decadent nineteenth-century liberalism. He told Calvo Sotelo in the Cortes that he feared the excesses of individualism, but he feared much more the excesses of étatisme.[1]

Some form of corporativism was then desirable, but any political evolution must start out from the reality of parliamentarianism with its political parties. The suppression of political parties, however noble the motives for doing this, would merely bring about the absolute predominance of one party, whose programme and principles would be identified with those of the State itself. The legal existence of other parties would be thus terminated, but the ideological divisions which they reflected would not die with them. A dictatorship would not create a national consensus. The political transformation of a people could not be decreed from above: this was 'a dangerous illusion'. Bottai had recognized that Italian corporativism, despite favourable circumstances, had made little real progress in this field. Fascist corporativism was the artificial creation of a dictatorial power; were this power to be removed, the whole edifice would probably collapse. The same criticism applied to the German régime. In short, to conquer the State and impose corporativism on a society

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1 The Traditionalist Toledo Robles interrupted at this point to exclaim: 'This is Traditionalism'. Gil Robles replied that this was more or less true, but that Traditionalism was not the exclusive property of any one party (DSC, 6 Nov. 1934).

unprepared for it was no solution. Such an étatiste reaction to the anarchy of liberal individualism was understandable, but was likely to degenerate into mere tyranny without effecting any real change in society.

Therefore 'the problem, which we could call post-democratic, is not one of conquest, but of organization... I am a decided partisan of deliberative assemblies. More than once I have recalled the famous phrase that 'a bad chamber is worth more than a good camarilla' ... The excesses of parliamentarism and the abuses of so-called popular assemblies have brought down upon the representative principle the discredit which ought, in justice, only to fall upon parliamentarist errors... A parliamentarist?...I am not such in the derogatory sense of a parliament which neither governs nor permits government, which neither administers nor permits administration. But I am a partisan of political representation, of deliberative chambers with popular representation... I am aware of the multitude of its defects, but I am not liable to the madness of trying to overthrow Parliament. It is very easy to undermine the foundations of institutions, and difficult afterwards to replace efficiently the function that they fulfilled.'

In the near future, he thought that the executive power should be strengthened; popular assemblies should be reduced 'to their specific legislative function and limited criticism of governmental work'; subsidiary social bodies should share in the work of government, and administration and services should be decentralized.

'Alongside parliaments of ideology, which will be necessary while parties exist, and parties will exist while there are differences of opinion among men, it is necessary to create the representation of interests.' One way of doing this would be to resurrect the defunct National Economic Council with representatives of economic interests, workers and employers. The Council could legislate on economic matters, the laws being voted without debate by Parliament 'because parliamentarians have no economic competence'. It would therefore become 'a co-legislative organ', a second chamber.

Gil Robles's long-term aim was a corporative system based upon the principles of Christian public law. 'I am not attempting to create a new State right away. I want to take existing reality, with its indubitable errors, and transform it... I do not want to have recourse under any circumstances to foreign, dramatic and exotic visions.' A strong State was necessary to enforce the law and as a pre-condition for economic development; it must also be above interests. It must be neither tyrannical nor absorbent, but must protect, stimulate and coordinate the efforts of different social forces in the collective interest. The goal was a <u>via media</u> between totalitarian excess and unrestrained individualism, a State in harmony with society. The State could encourage the growth of, and indeed give the 'initial impulse' to the re-creation of subsidiary social bodies. However, to be fecund and lasting, changes in the political structure must be the work principally of society, and secondarily of the State: 'The political transformation of a people has to be the product of

evolution'. Such evolution would be gradual because the new order had to be created from below, by society itself. 'We seek something more organic... But first it is necessary for collective and syndical feeling to be strengthened. It is a very slow business, which sometimes takes centuries.'[1]

The new State's structure and the ideal society of the distant future would be true to Catholic principles and Spanish traditions. Their precise details could only be the product of experience gained during the long process of evolution by a society prepared to renew itself and which put its faith 'in a glorious destiny' and not 'in messianic human hopes'. Having accepted the Christian concept of the State in principle, Gil Robles admitted that 'difficulties arise when one comes down to earth' to apply the concept. Nevertheless, in general, 'true corporativism is a complete system. It embraces the economic, the social and the political order; it has as its basis men grouped according to the community of their natural interests and social functions; and it aspires to the public and distinct representation of such organisms, as the coping and pinnacle of the system.'

The great key-notes of Gil Robles's policy were 'possibilism' and gradualism: all depended on the pace at which the Spanish people

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1 Cf. editorial of El Debate, 4 Jan. 1935: 'It is the State's business to promulgate laws that stimulate and favour the growth of the corporative shoots which the social body itself produces. But these shoots will not spring up if we do not first fashion the corporative social conscience. The individual, the corporative man, must be created before the institutions' - a very slow process.

could be schooled in the idea of the great enterprise. The ultimate goal was clearly quite different from liberal-democracy; democracy, indeed, was only 'a transitory means' to the corporative end. In the final analysis, however, it was up to the electorate to accept or reject this blue-print for the future. 'Will the peoples return to those immutable and eternal principles, unifiers of consciences, without loss of liberty? I do not know, though I hope so... Meanwhile, we do not deceive ourselves. In Spain there is in the political sphere no reality other than parties.'

Gil Robles was trying to adapt Traditionalism to the age of democracy. His debt to the Carlist heritage was perhaps most obvious with regard to regionalism. Gil Robles believed that the region and the municipality were 'natural personalities' within the nation, which could include several races. 'The region, within the sovereign State, is a public personality perfectly defined by tradition and history. It has the faculty for self-government, which I call autarchy, with two limitations: the capacity to rule itself and the collective interest of the nation, which is above all regional interests... Regional languages must be respected and, furthermore, be lovingly preserved.' He was firmly opposed to anything smacking of separatism.[1]

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1 Speech at San Sebastián, El Debate, 22 Oct. 1935. He criticised the PNV's separatism and said he could not imagine a little parliament beneath the branches of the Tree of Guernica. He suggested the possibility of regional representation in a second chamber.

Gil Robles's regionalism, like that of the Traditionalists, was anachronistic. Anything more than administrative autonomy conceded to the regions was bound to resemble federalism, which, since it would imply the regions' right to sovereignty, he rejected. During 1934 and 1935 relations between the Basque Nationalists and the Right deteriorated still further. The PNV's Draft Statute made no progress in the Cortes, and the party remained essentially separatist.[1] There was no common ground. In October 1934 the CEDA opened branches in San Sebastián and Bilbao to try and draw support away from the PNV.[2] However, insofar as the PNV was in decline in 1935, it was to the Left that it lost followers.[3]

October 1934 also saw the foundation of Acción Popular Catalana under the leadership of Cirera Voltá. Its manifesto proclaimed 'the consubstantial union of Catalonia with the rest of Spain' -

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1 Text of Statute in DSC, 4 July 1935 App. At a PNV rally on 24 Nov. 1935, Sabino Arana was quoted: 'We want a free and sovereign Country'; independence could be won by stages, the first of which was the Statute. Irujo said: 'It is not a problem of federalism or regionalism; it is a question of Country, and Euzkadi is the Country of the Basques.' In the Cortes, Monzón quoted Pidal to the effect that, if Castile broke the 1839 agreement, the Basques could also consider it void; he believed intransigence in Madrid would lead to separatism as it had in Cuba and the Philippines. Aguirre said: 'I proclaim...Basque nationality, Euzkadi, with sovereignty over its own destinies. So as to do what?... That depends more on you than on us' - yet 'the essence of nationality is total independence'. (Speeches in DSC, 5 Dec. 1935).

2 For details see Appendix II.

3 García Venero, Nacionalismo vasco, 459-60: the PNV kept its hold in the hills.

hostility to separatism but not to autonomy.[1] The group quickly absorbed a local agrarian party, but it was weakened almost from the start by internal dissension. In essence, it was a group representing conservative interests in the countryside who saw their best chance for protection in the minimum of autonomy for their region.[2] It attracted politicians from other Catalan parties but, despite its participation in the government of the Generalidad in 1935, it made no real headway.[3] The only achievement attributable to the CEDA in regional affairs was the law of December 1934 re-establishing the Diputación foral in Navarre, a law introduced at the behest of Aizpún and Traditionalists.[4]

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1 The creation of this group was agreed by Gil Robles, Anguera de Sojo and Cirera at Saragossa (El Debate, 29 Sept. 1934). Manifesto in MCE, II-8, 278. Cirera was head of the Instituto Agrario Catalán de San Isidro, the farmers' organization.

2 Fortuny's Partit Agrari Català had offices in half the pueblos of the region (El Debate, 20 Nov. 1934). Cirera's men kept control of the Instituto de San Isidro against opposition from the Lliga (ABC, 28 Feb. 1935). They wanted little autonomy because a Generalidad favourable to the rabassaires would adversely affect their interests; there was an economic meaning behind the slogan 'Catalonia will be Spanish or it will die' (El Debate, 4 June 1935).

3 Its youth section complained of Catalanist recruits from the Lliga, Acción Catalana and Carrasco's Catholic nationalist Unió Democràtica de Catalunya. Anguera de Sojo, one of the latter, left the group within a year (ABC, 18 Dec. 1934 & 2 Oct. 1935). The Catalan Deputies Ayats and Mullerat (Lliga) joined the CEDA. The Cedista Villalonga was Governor-General Nov.-Dec. 1935.

4 DSC, 20 Dec. 1934. The elections for this body on 27 Jan. 1935 were boycotted by the PNV and the Left; 3 Traditionalists, 1 Radical, 1 independent and 2 members of Unión Navarra were elected. Unión Navarra, a branch of the CEDA, had 7,000 members and was led by the ex-Maurista Aizpún and the ex-Jaimist Gortari (El Debate, 11 Dec. 1934 & 29 Jan. 1935).

During 1935 Gil Robles continued to experience difficulties with his youth movement, Pérez de Laborda's JAP. These young men in a hurry were liable to be seduced by the simpler authoritarian policies of Calvo Sotelo, José Antonio and the Traditionalists. In order to keep their allegiance, Gil Robles was constrained to allow them a certain independence,[1] even though this sometimes led to some discrepancy between the pronouncements of the CEDA and the JAP. The Left seised on Japista deviations to justify its continuing distrust of Gil Robles 'the anti-Republic..., a Catholic Fascist' pursuing a course 'exactly the same as Dollfuss in Austria.'[2]

Gil Robles tried to cover up differences by saying that the JAP was the vanguard of the CEDA, which moved in the same direction at a slower and surer pace.[3] Embarrassing statements were dismissed as 'young people's business which is of no importance'.[4] In November

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1 Martín Artajo (conversation).

2 Gordón Ordás, DSC, 30 Oct. 1935, who agreed with Monarchists that the Republic was 'not a name, but a content, and there is no other Republic than ours.' Trabal, DSC, 7 Nov. 1935, believed Japista statements represented the real policy of Gil Robles.

3 Speech to JAP rally at Santiago, El Debate, 3 Sept. 1935; he spoke of 'our aim of total revision' of the Constitution, demanded by the JAP, but took care not to specify when this would occur.

4 ABC, 11 Aug. 1935. The Ministry of the Interior twice fined the weekly JAP 5,000 ptas. and banned issues in Aug.; Gil Robles himself withdrew the issue of 8 June for 'linguistic excesses' although the censor had passed it (El Debate, 14 Apr., 11 June, 18 & 31 Aug. 1935).

1935, however, he decided to talk seriously to wayward spirits. The JAP's views were being used by others as 'a battering-ram' against himself and the party. He declared his solidarity with the JAP, though not with its 'juvenile paroxysms', understandable and even desirable though these might be. Japistas must guard against 'accidental indiscipline which could disturb the spiritual communion of our ideals... Sometimes you do not seem to see the way clearly; sometimes external aspects of other apparently more gaudy attitudes seem to seduce you... To do great things you do not need to extend your arms... You do not need to have a uniform, which is often no more than an external covering for internal deformity.'[1]

The JAP continually affirmed its loyalty and obedience to 'the political genius and virile energy' of Gil Robles in extravagant terms: 'Providence has presented us with the vigorous personality of a great caudillo and guide: the Jefe, our Jefe, the Jefe of Spain; he is one of those men whom God gives to nations every two or three hundred years to devise their happiness.'[2] For all that, Japistas

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1 Addressing the Madrid JAP, El Debate, 10 Nov. 1935. When the group's weekly got into financial difficulties, it had to appeal publicly for funds - something which might not have happened if the JAP's relations with its parent-body had been satisfactory (JAP, 5 Oct. 1935).

2 'The Jefe commands and the JAP obeys. We shall go where he says, how he says and when he says... Any decision of the Jefe, for the JAP, is beyond criticism and discussion.' (JAP, 27 Oct. 1934, 19 Jan., 15 May & 19 Oct. 1935). Censored columns were filled in with a monotonous ' ¡JEFE! ¡JEFE! ¡JEFE! ¡JEFE! '

thought that their 'intrepid mission in the van' allowed them loudly to demand the 'new State'. There was henceforth to be no thought of rotation in power with Azaña and the Socialists, nor would they permit 'shameful' revision of some parts of the Constitution: 'we want all power for the Jefe' and 'a total reform of the Constitution ..., another Constitution!'[1] The CEDA could never be 'a party in the style of the German Centre and the Italian People's parties'; it was 'a National Movement' for 'moral and material regeneration'. It was the JAP's function to counteract any tendency to return to the old politics of rotation of parties in power; Pérez de Laborda said he would resign if this were to happen.[2]

The JAP's enemies were 'Spain's enemies: Marxism, egoistic capitalism, caciquismo, separatism and Masonry.' Within the CEDA, the JAP's duty was to oppose 'those who imagined that our movement was to be in the service of employers, firms, vested interests... Let them stay outside, the Pharisees, the usurers who call themselves Rightists because they beat their breasts at the one o'clock mass!'[3]

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1 JAP, 27 Oct. 1934, 15 May & 8 June 1935; & El Debate, 17 Sept. 1935. Pérez de Laborda (ABC, 1 Sept. 1935) wanted only heads of families to have the vote.

2 JAP, 19 Jan., 20 Apr. & 22 June 1935; & Pérez de Laborda's interview with ABC, 1 Sept. 1935. JAP, 20 July 1935, recommended study of Portuguese political developments.

3 JAP, 27 Oct. 1934 & 22 June 1935. Albiñana noticed that half those who went about preaching that people who did not work should not eat (i.e. Japistas) 'have not worked in their lives and continue to eat splendidly' (ABC, 26 Mar. 1935).

Spain's salvation would came from the 'workers of the countryside, hardened by the sun', who ate 'simple foods', and not from the university students of the Falange.[1]

Though it maintained that 'the Spanish Fascists have no raison d'être', the JAP shared some of the Falange's views, but objected to its violence, the allegedly Marxist implications of its economic policies and the 'connection of its leaders with the anti-traditional "generation of '98"'. The Falange had no masses and 'a surfeit of pedantic intellectuality'; José Antonio was 'an intelligent lad, qualified, a good lawyer. But nothing more.'[2] Traditionalism was also inadequate: 'We do not stagnate in the past or mourn for the return of our magnificent sixteenth century... Drawing inspiration from our traditional spirit we think of the twenty-first century.' With Calvo Sotelo's programme they were in basic agreement and at times seem to have preferred it to the CEDA's; ideally, however, 'the illustrious Spaniard' ought to be the Jefe's Minister of Finance. The men of Renovación Española, on the other hand, suffered from 'monarchical thrombosis'.[3]

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1 Pérez de Laborda, ABC, 1 Sept. 1935 & JAP, 23 Nov. 1935.

2 Pérez de Laborda, ABC, 1 Sept. 1935 & JAP, 25 May & 23 Nov. 1935. They had in common anti-Marxism, faith in national resurgence and the cult of youth; both also abhorred use of the 'outdated' terms 'Right' and 'Left' when applied to themselves.

3 JAP, 27 Oct., 8 & 22 Dec. 1934, 8 June, 17 & 31 Aug., 5 Oct. 1935. 'Monarchical thrombosis' was caused by 'bacteriological poisoning by...egoism, little passions, morbid anxiety bacilli, worry-insomnia for frivolous exaggerated applause; spectacularism and acute pseudopatriotitis.'

Loyal to the Jefe, the JAP intended to uphold its own intensely Catholic position; yet it flirted with Falangista slogans. 'Imperialism' was invoked by Japistas, as were the heady slogans '¡Arriba España!' and the scarcely grammatical '¡A por los 300!'[1] Their manifesto in December 1935 showed that they were still at odds with Gil Robles's views, and the document hinted that Japistas' faith and enthusiasm would evaporate if the CEDA did not stop behaving like any other parliamentarist party.[2] Falangistas and Requetés, however, had only contempt for the legalism of the 'soft' young men of the JAP.[3]

Most of the CEDA's mass following came from the peasantry of Castile and León, where Catholic agrarian organizations were

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1 JAP, 27 Oct. & 10 Nov. 1934; ABC, 1 Sept. 1935; El Debate, 3 & 17 Sept., 6 & 13 Oct. 1935. 'Empire' meant 'spiritual empire', 'faith in Spain's destinies', a big merchant fleet and a voice in international affairs. The Virgin of the Pillar was the JAP's patron-saint - 'Hispanity' was in vogue. The JAP's emblem was a black Cross, from which hung the letters Alpha and Omega, set on a white ground with a red surround - all of which symbolized Pelayo and the Reconquest, and an immaculate ship on a sea of martyrs' blood. 'Menéndez Pelayo is the thinker of the JAP' (JAP, 19 Oct. 1935).

2 In El Debate, 3 Dec. 1935.

3 Requetés and Falangistas usually pronounced the 'j' in 'JAP' in an excessively gutteral manner, thus imitating the sound of expectoration. The SEU leader Jato (Rebelión, 99) called Japistas 'men without guts'. The JAP numbered tens of thousands to the Falange's thousands. No complete membership figures were given, but its Movilización civil in Madrid alone had 14,217 members (JAP, 2 Feb. 1935). The JAP justified its legalism on the grounds that 'with the law...we have displaced anti-Spain from the legality that they constructed' (JAP, 8 Dec. 1934).

strongest.[1] Catholics agreed that the failure of the revolution and the action taken against Socialist Casas del Pueblo provided a great opportunity for winning over the proletariat.[2] Catholic and other non-revolutionary unions therefore formed the Frente Nacional del Trabajo in October 1934 as an independent non-political grouping to defend workers against employers, Marxism and anarchy, under the leadership of the metal-worker Inchausti. The FNT claimed to have won over in the autumn of 1934 several unions in Andalusia hitherto affiliated to the UGT.[3]

Catholic working-class leaders, however, did not see eye to eye on what ought to be done. In November 1934 Ruiz Alonso resigned from Acción Obrerista because he believed that all efforts should be concentrated on the creation of professional and Catholic unions not

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1 The CNCA had 200,000 peasant families (about a million individuals) in 39 provinces at the end of 1935; it had redistributed some 50,000 hectares to 10,000 of its members. There were also the Liga Nacional de Campesinos, the Unión Obrera Campesina with 5,600 members in 29 provinces, and other farmers' organizations. (See the survey in El Debate, 14 June 1936).

2 El Debate, 10 & 12 Oct. 1934. Ruiz Alonso was to lead a campaign in Marxist-dominated areas. At this time unions were strongest in León and Castile. Catholic workers' unions had 60,000 members and free unions 100,000 (García-Nieto, Sindicalismo cristiano, 187-8).

3 El Debate, 10, 18, 30 & 31 Oct. & 1 & 18 Nov. 1934. The FNT affiliates had 12,000 members in Madrid, and made progress among the rural workers of the south. Inspiration was drawn from the example of Vicente Madera, founder of the Catholic miners' union in Asturias in 1922, who held out against the revolutionaries in Oct. 1934.

affiliated to any political party. In his opinion, it was a mistake to try and build up a national, anti-Marxist workers' party. Acción Obrerista nevertheless continued to campaign under D. de Madariaga's leadership and extended its organization in the south.[1] A parallel attempt was made to spread a social-Christian outlook among employers with the foundation in November 1934 of the Asociación Patronal Católica de España,[2] but it did not prove successful.

In December 1935 the FNT held its congress in Madrid. It was attended by representatives of 276,389 members of the Catholic CNSCO, the Falange's CONS, the CET, the FET and other local free unions. The outcome was the creation of the Confederación Española de Sindicatos Obreros, from which the CONS held itself aloof.[3] The CESO was affiliated to no political party and was a purely professional organization with an aversion to political strikes. Although its programme was based upon Christian ethico-religious principles and it was affiliated to the Utrecht International of Christian Trade Unions,

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1 Ruiz Alonso, El Debate, 18 Nov. 1934; ABC, 19 Mar. 1935.

2 Based on Dutch and Belgian models, it appealed to employers to undertake the noble mission of 'making the horrible scourge of workers' unemployment disappear for ever! Let us not tolerate for one day more the shame of seeing our brothers, who ask for work, dying of hunger, while we have one peseta paralyzed!' (El Debate, 18 & 24 Nov. 1934).

3 El Debate, 20-21 Dec. 1935; García-Nieto, Sindicalismo cristiano, 189-91; & F. Guillén Salaya, Historia del sindicalismo español (Madrid, 1941), 63. The CONS had branches in Madrid and Saragossa.

it rejected confessionalism.[1]

Catholic and professional trade-unionism remained however a delicate bloom in Spain. Probably most of those who joined after October 1934 did so, not from conviction, but simply to find employment. As the CEDA's Minister of Labour remarked, 'the unions hostile to the class-struggle have not yet generated in workers the conviction that they are honestly going to defend their rights and interests with independence and truth.'[2] Madariaga's and Ruiz Alonso's demands in the Cortes for energetic measures against unemployment and injustices apparently found few determined supporters. In October 1935 Madariaga came near to withdrawing Acción Obrerista from the CEDA because the latter was not living up to its social programme.[3] The CEDA was not producing those social and economic results for the workers that were so necessary if it were to gain their confidence for its programme of political reform.[4] José Antonio's prophecy that the Right's

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1 García-Nieto, Sindicalismo cristiano, 205, & El Debate, 7 Feb. 1936. The Madrid Federación de Sindicatos Católicos refused to join because it was not confessional. A. de Incháusti was the President of CESO.

2 Salmón, JAP, 7 Sept. 1935. Trabajo, largely circulated free, attacked the abuses of capitalism and its failure to fulfil its social obligations, but defended capitalism in principle (Jellinek, Civil War, 52-3).

3 This crack was papered over in the National Council of the CEDA (ABC, 18 Oct. 1935).

4 Giménez Fernández warned that if the Right did not keep its promises and permitted a return to the status quo ante 1931, the sure consequence would be its electoral defeat (El Debate, 21 & 22 June 1935).

electoral triumph would prove a 'wingless victory' seemed to be being fulfilled.[1]

iii. Calvo Sotelo and the counter-revolutionary Right

For Monarchists, the events of October and Gil Robles's failure to seize his chance to take over the State underlined the need to give Calvo Sotelo a broadly-based political movement. In the Cortes, Calvo Sotelo explained that Parliament was a dialogue dependent upon a basic measure of agreement between all political groups. Recent events demonstrated conclusively that there was now no such consensus of opinion: 'The possibility of parliamentary dialogue in Spain has disappeared... Let us have no illusions.' Furthermore, the liberal State had shown itself incapable of suppressing class-warfare: 'Liberties based upon subjective prerogatives, upon individual affirmations of absolute rights, are now no use whatsoever.' Prerogative must be replaced by function, right by duty, profit by service.[2] In short, the liberal State was 'a genuine ruin' and must be succeeded by a totalitarian, corporative State.

Though a declared Monarchist, he realized that the fundamental problem was not the immediate installation of the 'institution' of

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1 FE, 7 Dec. 1933 (O.c., 607-10).

2 DSC, 6 Nov. 1934. Calvo Sotelo said that where there was a consensus, as in Britain (where the Socialists were not revolutionary), Parliament was a fine institution.

Monarchy, but the infusion into the State of 'Monarchist essences, that is to say single command, continuity, tradition, authority. Each hour has its task.' He would therefore found the Bloque Nacional, 'a patriotic front to coordinate...existing forces. Objective? The conquest of the State. Programme?... In economic matters, Leftism; in political matters, Rightism. That is to say, social justice and authority.'[1] The need to swing the Right's masses behind Calvo Sotelo was pressing, for 'it seems that it is the historic Republicans who have taken possession of the CEDA's leader, rather than he of them.'[2]

The manifesto of the Bloque Nacional finally appeared early in December 1934, but the censors permitted only extracts to appear in the press.[3] The document declared that 'the Revolution is still

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1 ABC, 11 Nov. 1934.

2 ABC, 29 Nov. 1934. The residual liberalism of ABC led it to prefer Gil Robles's conception of the 'new State' to that of Calvo Sotelo. La Nación and La Época wholeheartedly agreed with Calvo Sotelo's view (ABC, 10-11 Nov. 1934).

3 Galindo, Los partidos, 254. ABC, 8 Dec. 1934, explained that the manifesto had been ready for some days, and that the censorship had only now consented to its partial publication with one signature (Calvo Sotelo's). El Debate, 9 Dec. 1934, reported the document's existence, but published no excerpts. Copies printed by La Nación were handed out in the streets; what follows is taken from one of these copies, given to me by D. Julián Cortés Cavanillas. The Radical Minister of the Interior forbade publication because the manifesto's aim was to seduce the military (Vaquero, DSC, 29 Jan. 1935). For a literal translation of the whole document and a consideration of its content see R.A.H. Robinson, 'Calvo Sotelo's Bloque Nacional and its manifesto', University of Birmingham Historical Journal, vol. X, no. 2 (1966), 160-84.

unbeaten since it has been the natural fruit of political causes which persist and whose necessary extirpation is a desire beyond the reach of the present rulers.' There remained 'doleful memorials to the Constituent spirit, without whose disappearance the recovery of the country, subjected for a long period to deadly Marxist and anti-Spanish poisoning, will be a chimera.' Both State and society had to be reformed and existing institutions destroyed. The government had wasted its opportunities and all the Republican parties had failed. The new political grouping wanted a Catholic Spain and adopted the motto of Fernando the Catholic: 'Spain united and in order'. It demanded 'an authentic Spain, faithful to her history and her own image: one and indivisible'. 'Defence to the death and frenzied exaltation of Spanish unity' and the 'singular political sovereignty of the State' were its slogans. The 'integrative State' of the future would guarantee 'natural rights, inherent in the human personality', and impose moral, political and economic unity upon all classes by intervention to ban strikes, lock-outs and 'the trade-unionist anti-State' and by enforcement of 'a distributive social justice'.

Just as economic life would be corporatively organized, so the parliamentary constitutional system, 'anti-Spanish in spirit and letter', would make way for 'organic Cortes'. The manifesto demanded a referendum, which, though forbidden by the Constitution, 'no democracy can refuse', in order to let Spain decide whether it accepted or rejected laicism, and whether it did or did not want the suppression

of the class struggle, the restoration of the old flag and the abolition of the Catalan Statute. 'A few weeks of implacable action' by a strong, patriotic government would set things right, while 'the backbone of the Country', the Army, 'school of citizenship, purified by its Courts of Honour, will spread discipline and the civic virtues, forging in its barracks a youth filled with patriotic spirit and beyond the reach of all Marxist and separatist venom.'

The signatories, 'trembling with emotion and burning with faith', therefore called for 'the organization of a sweeping Bloque Nacional' to conquer completely the existing State, and to replace it by 'a new State' with 'unity of command and traditional historical continuity'. The movement was open to 'all citizens who share our ideas', be they Republican, Monarchist or neither. Nearly all the signatories were, in fact, Monarchists who refused to hide their convictions. The 'substantive' question of the form of government was to be postponed for the present because the hour demanded a State based on 'the principles of unity, continuity, hierarchy, competence, corporation and spirituality'. They would act simply 'for the sake of Spain' as part of 'a social, national, nationalist and nationalizing force' at a 'difficult, most grave, dolorous' time.

The manifesto was signed by nearly all the Deputies of Renovación Española and the Traditionalist Communion, and by two Independents and one Cedista in the Cortes.[1] Other signatories included Ministers

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1 The absence may be noted of the Alfonsine Marqués de Villapesadilla and the Traditionalist Bilbao Eguía - for no apparent reason. The Cedista was Sierra Pomares, who often seems to have disregarded party discipline. The Independents were Cano López (ex-Conservative Republican) and Fr. Gafo (Dominican pioneer of Catholic unionism). The Independent Minority in the Cortes was a group of ten led by the ex-Agrarian Calderón, created in Nov. 1934.

of the Dictatorship, ex-Mauristas and contributors to Acción Española.[1] A number of lawyers, academics and authors, including the playwright Benavente, signed the document, as did some engineers, businessmen, bankers and property-owners. The aim of the movement was to gather as many parties and individuals as possible beneath one umbrella. Before the manifesto appeared, Albiñana's PNE announced that it would join, but the Falange said that it would not.[2] The Traditionalist Communion adhered to the Bloque Nacional because the latter was a patriotic grouping.[3] Renovación Española officially adhered on 27 December 1934. The Bloque was to be a link between the Communion and Renovación Española in provinces where both existed; in provinces where there was as yet no Monarchist organization, Monarchists were to unite to found branches of the Bloque Nacional.[4] The movement there-

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1 Among the latter, one was Pradera, another Areilza, who was on the Falange's National Council in Oct. 1934, and who led Unión Vascongada, a Monarchist group in Bilbao, supporting the 'economic arrangement' and 'the integral sovereignty of the State' against separatism (ABC, 16 July 1935). The Duque de Alba, a close friend of Alfonso, also signed, as did the disillusioned Republican Del Moral.

2 ABC, 16 & 28 Nov. 1934. According to Ansaldo (¿Para qué?, 94) one of the main aims was to attract José Antonio. Ansaldo was on the Bloque's executive committee with Calvo Sotelo, Lamamié de Clairac, Sáinz Rodríguez, and Pradera - three Alfonsines and two Carlists.

3 BOT, 16 Dec. 1934; the Traditionalist creed remained the true panacea.

4 ABC, 16 & 28 Dec. 1934. From ABC, it would seem that Renovación Española had opened branches earlier in 1934 in Cáceres, Ciudad Real, Toledo, Valencia, Vigo and Burgos. In 1935 branches of Renovación Española/Bloque Nacional were set up in Málaga, Palencia, Salamanca, Ávila, León, Córdoba, Lugo, Murcia, Pontevedra and Lower Aragón.

fore did little more than officially unite Monarchists behind Calvo Sotelo in opposition to the Republic and liberal-democracy.

There was never any chance of the CEDA adhering to the Bloque; indeed, Calvo Sotelo complained that a government supported by Gil Robles was using the press censorship to suffocate the new movement.[1] The offices of the Bloque and TYRE were closed for a time in January 1935.[2] During the course of 1935, Calvo Sotelo tried hard to attract Cedistas away from Gil Robles. In March he suggested that the Bloque and the CEDA might unite to reform the Constitution, after which the Bloque would pursue its own Monarchist ideal. Yet in the same breath he strongly attacked 'the theory of the possible good' and its 'dangerous synthesis in the formula "may it be as it may be" ... We oppose to it another [formula] more juridical and Christian ...: "may it be as it ought to be". Accidentalism is...politically sleight of hand; spiritually, inelegance; morally, mutilation, when not lameness.'[3]

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1 The Alfonsine writer El Caballero Audaz was arbitrarily fined 20,000 ptas.; an editorial in La Epoca entitled 'The Army, saviour of Spain' was suppressed; it was said that Cedista attacks on the Centre in 1933 could not now be quoted (DSC, 27 Nov. & 5 Dec. 1934). The Bloque complained of Japista attacks as well as the censorship; Gil Robles replied that the Bloque attacked him daily, but he would use his influence with the government to see that propaganda aimed at his own party's destruction was not hindered (El Debate & ABC, 27 Dec. 1934).

2 El Debate, 16 Jan. & ABC, 1 Feb. 1935.

3 ABC, 9 Mar. 1935; he believed the theory of the possible good has 'Machiavellian roots'. Goicoechea criticized the 'tactic' with Beatriz de Bobadilla's words to Enrique IV: 'You are buying off uncertain dangers with certain shame' (ABC, 28 Dec. 1934).

When in May the CEDA obtained five portfolios, Calvo Sotelo said that he still thought the 'tactic' would fail, but he seemed less sure: 'If our forebodings do not come to pass, Spain will have been saved; if they do come to pass, we shall have to save her... We are an army in reserve.' However in August he defined the Bloque's attitude as one of 'deep affinity with the [Cedista] masses. Serious discrepancy with the lines that their leaders are taking. I make mine the cry of the JAP: "Another Constitution".' By November he was speaking confidently of the CEDA's counter-revolution that failed.[1] Yet, despite his constant criticism of the 'tactic' and despite the CEDA's setbacks, the Bloque's gains at its rival's expense were negligible.[2]

During 1935 Calvo Sotelo continued to define his own views as well as to criticize the inadequacy of Gil Robles's policy. The basic difference between the two leaders lay in the means by which the 'new State' was to come into being: Gil Robles saw it as the

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1 ABC, 11 May, 6 Aug. & 12 Nov. 1935.

2 Roa de la Vega (CEDA, León) went over to the Bloque in Dec. 1934; he had, in fact, signed the manifesto. Valiente also left the CEDA in June 1935 as he had not been allowed to speak or hold office for a year; he joined the Bloque in Dec. and became a Traditionalist. He said that the CEDA was being disfigured by an influx of time-servers (El Debate, 2 June 1935; ABC, 12 & 15 Dec. 1934 & 14 Aug. & 11 Dec. 1935). Two minor branches joined the Communion; Lagartera (Toledo) and Briones (Logroño) (BOT, 3 & 10 Feb. 1935). Gil Robles complained that the Bloque spent more time and energy attacking his party than it did the advocates of revolution (El Debate, 27 Aug. 1935).

product of gradual evolution, Calvo Sotelo as a creation imposed from above by a strong government at the first opportunity. In the latter's opinion, the future of Spain could not be left to the whims of electors. The counting of heads was 'more suitable for Zulus than for civilized men':[1] democracy was 'the supreme inanity leading Spain to chaos'.[2] The Spanish situation had to be seen 'in its intimate reality. Either Marxism is extirpated, or Marxism destroys Spain... The reality is that Spain is living in [a state of] civil war'.[3] The rotation of parties in power was possible only when they agreed on essentials and differed on inessentials, 'but now the debate is between being or not being, between Christ and anti-Christ, between civilization and non-civilization'.[4] No one could remain neutral, not even the President of the Republic: 'he who is not against the revolution is with the revolution'.[5] The Centre was doomed to 'pulverization, atomization, nothingness'.[6] The plans for constitutional reform were pointless, since it was a question 'not of revision,

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1 La Nación, 1 Nov. 1935 (quoted in Vegas, Calvo Sotelo, 129).

2 DSC, 1 Oct. 1935 & ABC, 9 Mar. 1935.

3 ABC, 2 June 1935.

4 ABC, 3 Feb. 1935. Cf. Pemán: 'The Patria and the Sub-Patria cannot alternate anymore than can life and death; either one is dead or one is alive.' (ABC, 28 May 1935).

5 DSC, 1 Oct. 1935.

6 DSC, 6 June 1935.

but of substitution..., of foundations, not of architecture'.[1] Regional nationalism had also to be extirpated, because 'a broken Spain (España rota)' would be even worse than 'a Red Spain (España roja)'.[2]

According to Calvo Sotelo, the 'integrative State' which should be installed immediately was 'authoritarian', but not 'absolutist' nor 'pantheist... We say...: "Nothing within the State against the State; but the State in the service of the Nation"... The people's interest does not lie in governing, but in being governed well.' Yet 'the single command...requires a double complement: the suffrage of social interests or corporativism, and the suffrage of guiding ideas or plebiscite.'[3] Calvo Sotelo therefore denied that his ideas were pantheistic. He also denied that he wanted to be a dictator: 'I am a man firmly convinced that governments need parliamentary control' by a chamber elected by organic suffrage.[4] He could not imagine a

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1 ABC, 9 Mar. 1935, & Vegas, Calvo Sotelo, 156 (speech at Tarrasa, 28 Apr. 1935). Cf. Sangenís (Traditionalist): 'We are abolitionists' (ABC, 5 Nov. 1935).

2 ABC, 12 Nov. 1935. His ideas on regionalism were similar to those of Gil Robles, but he wanted the PNV proscribed as a subversive organization (DSC, 5 Dec. 1935).

3 ABC, 3 Feb. 1935. Calvo thought Italy was not 'a perfect model' (Vegas, Calvo Sotelo, 139). Goicoechea thought Italy 'the best example on which we can reflect... All for the State. All incorporated in the State, and thus peace and progress.' (ABC, 13 Aug. 1935).

4 DSC, 22 Nov. 1935. He had previously stated: 'New State, yes. But without dictatorship.' (Alborada, 6 Oct. 1935, in Vegas, Calvo Sotelo, 144). However, Comín (Traditionalist) spoke openly of 'National Dictatorship' as the only alternative to 'Red Dictatorship' (DSC, 6 June 1935).

counter-revolution being carried out with the Republican tricolour and anthem, but the Monarchy was only to return at the end of an indefinite 'evolutionary cycle'.[1]

Although the immediate need was a State 'capable of saving Christian civilization',[2] he nevertheless maintained his uncompromising allegiance to 'the ideal..., the installation of a Monarchy... which has the essences but none of the dross of that which fell, with the Crown and the Cross as its symbol, the red and gold flag as its ensign, and as its content tradition.'[3] He believed that 'Tradition is not an unfruitfully mummified past, but a profound, life-giving spirit. Tradition is the sap in the tree of the Country. Because we love Tradition, we are progressives. The Spain of the future must be based upon its Tradition and to it we must give our labours, our exertions and, when they may be needed, our lives.'[4] Calvo Sotelo's pronouncements were sometimes rather contradictory, but his 'new State' seemed to imply some form of dictatorship, at least in its initial stages.[5]

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1 ABC, 23 Apr., & DSC, 3 Oct. 1935.

2 In El Estado que queremos, 73 (speech at Tarrasa, 28 Apr. 1935).

3 Vegas, Calvo Sotelo, 183 (San Sebastián, 10 Nov. 1935); Calvo compared the ideal to the star that guided pilgrims to Compostela.

4 Quoted in HCE, II-8, 298.

5 Though he did not commit himself to copying the Italian, Portuguese, Austrian or Hungarian régimes, he thought well of all of them and wanted Spain to adopt something similar (ABC, 3 Feb. 1935). Cortés Cavanillas (conversation), who signed the Bloque's manifesto, says the movement was not specifically Fascist, but the Italian example was a powerful influence on its style.

Within the general framework of the programme of the Bloque Nacional, the Alfonsines of La Epoca continued to propound hereditary Monarchy as 'the best form of government'. Dictators like Porfirio Díaz and Pilsudski were not enough: 'the caudillo dies; a dynasty does not'. Kings were 'for the kingdom, for the people, not vice versa', but they must govern as well as reign. 'The Catholic Monarchy' could not be 'a crowned Republic' like that in Spain before 1923, nor 'a democratic Republic with an hereditary crowned President' like the Britain of George V. 'The new State' would be the first step towards eradicating 'the revolutionary ideology' whose 'origin and source may be placed around the name of Rousseau, Marx and Marxism being no more than a stage, an anticipated milestone on the route toward chaos'. Dollfuss in Austria had demonstrated that 'truth can be imposed by force'. Such was the true doctrine of counter-revolution.[1]

Acción Española's leading Alfonsine intellectual, the Anglo-Basque Maeztu, saw the Spanish problem as part of an international one. The roots of 'the Revolution' lay in the Enlightenment's subversion of traditional values and its anthropological naturalism. From this rejection of the dogma of original sin stemmed all evils: anti-Christian laicism, relativism, Republicanism, democracy, class-

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1 From the editorials of La Epoca, 1934-5 (collected in Escobar, Escritos). From some of the phraseology, it would seem that the leader-writers were familiar with the writings of Maurras, as well as the corpus of Spanish Traditionalism.

warfare, nationalism (though not Spanish nationalism), Catalanism, liberalism, Socialism, Communism, and, of course, Freemasonry, 'the world organization of the Revolution...in the service of the race of Israel.' Revolutionary aggression, however, had provoked an equally international counter-revolutionary movement to restore, not the status quo, but the 'essences' of Tradition. In the battle to the death between the Cross and the hammer and sickle, no quarter could be given: 'with the Revolution no pacts are possible'. It could not be killed by kindness. Good was certain to triumph over evil, for 'the winds of the world, adverse for so many centuries, are now blowing in our favour'.

He stressed that the counter-revolutionary State must suppress class-warfare and pursue an advanced social programme based on 'the Thomist principle' within a 'directed economy', but it must assert the primacy of the spirit over instinct and materialism. Maeztu's twin themes were 'the Counter-Revolution' and 'Hispanity'. The Hispanic peoples of Europe and America, 'threatened by Communist revolution on one side, and by Nordic financial imperialism on the other', must reaffirm their consciousness of common ideals and form 'a confraternity'. 'Hispanity' was a spiritual, not a racial or territorial concept. 'Liberty, Equality, Fraternity' must be replaced by 'Service, Hierarchy and Brotherhood'. Only a return to 'the old Catholic Monarchy' and its Hispanic mission could save Spain. Only a return to Spanish medieval values could preserve the

West against the awakening East: 'ex praeterito spes in futurum'.[1]

Another Alfonsine intellectual, Sáinz Rodríguez, argued that 'the totalitarian State', far from being foreign, was 'something that springs from the very substratum of the Spanish soul' and was to be found in the sixteenth-century Monarchy, when 'State and Nation formed a single moral concept'. The State of the future must be true to the Catholicism of the Counter-Reformation and the 'theological concept of freedom... We are not enemies of freedom; what we are enemies of is the liberal interpretation of freedom', which, by imposing no restraint on human passions, made men slaves of these passions. The State ought to have a municipal basis, no political parties, and Cortes to vote money and to censure bad government. In short, the traditional Monarchy had to be reinstalled.[2]

Yet another variation on the counter-revolutionary theme was written by Aunós, the Dictator's Minister of Labour, who appealed to

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1 Synthesis of articles by Maeztu, collected under the titles Frente a la República (Madrid, 1956), and El nuevo tradicionalismo y la revolución social (Madrid, 1959); and R. de Maeztu, Defensa de la Hispanidad (Madrid, 1934). He admired Hitler and Mussolini, especially for 'substituting for the class-struggle an authoritarian organization of social justice' - but he did not like Fascism's 'excess of Italianism'; as for Nazism, 'its racist feeling offends me'. He saw a revival of 'Hispanity' in the Nicaraguan poet Rubén Darío's warnings about the encroachment of the U.S.A.; the concept meant that 'the Argentines must be more Argentine', etc.

2 P. Sáinz Rodríguez, La Tradición nacional y el Estado futuro (Madrid, 1935).

the young. He wanted 'a great caudillo', supported by Socialist masses and aided by an 'ardent, disinterested, young militia, a sort of order of chivalry'. This mass movement 'absolutely free from capitalist servitude' would install a national, functional, corporative State, the motor of which would be social justice. This State would surpass Fascism, dominated as it was by Sorelian syndicalism and Socialist étatisme, by drawing inspiration from La Tour du Pin's traditionalism. Aunós's State would therefore be 'organic' and 'pluralist', not 'absorbent'. The corporations would have a certain autonomy within a directed economy, and have a legislative function. There was to be no State-party. The Monarchy would be restored only if it were fully corporativist in spirit. The future would see 'the imperial unity of Europe' on a corporative basis, inspired by Christianity like the empires of Charlemagne and Charles V.[1]

The Alfonsines wanted to install a Monarchy similar to that of the Carlists, and efforts to end the dynastic schism continued during 1935. The Traditionalists conceded that Juan was Alfonso Carlos's successor by the laws of heredity, but this was not enough. They

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1 E. Aunós Pérez, La reforma corporativa del Estado (Madrid, 1935). His blue-print was worked out in considerable detail, the inspiration coming from the theories of La Tour du Pin and Italian practice, e.g. he advocated a Grand Council to advise the Head of State. He believed that the Fascist régime was not conservative. His emphasis on the need to get Socialist cooperation derived from his experience as a Minister. He was critical of the artificial corporativism of Dollfuss and Salazar. Spain, of course, was to lead the movement towards European unity.

could accept him as king only if he embraced Traditionalism.[1] The aim of the Alfonsines of the Bloque Nacional was to persuade Alfonso XIII to renounce his rights in favour of Juan, so as to expedite complete union with the Traditionalists. Alfonso however refused to abdicate and opposed the idea of premature union with the Traditionalists, because he would in any case become head of the House of Bourbon when Alfonso Carlos died. Juan rejected any suggestion that he should act independently of his father.[2] Thus the dynastic deadlock continued. Alfonso also refused his followers' requests to condemn the CEDA, although in October 1935 he made his

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1 Fal Conde, Ideal (Granada), 15 Nov. 1934 (quoted in Melgar, Escisión dinástica, 180); HCE, II-8, 368-9; HGL, 398-9. Alfonso's visit to Alfonso Carlos at Puchheim in Aug. 1935 was apparently without political significance. The Círculo Carlista in Saragossa in May 1935 demanded a national assembly of Carlists to choose a successor; for this, it was disowned by Alfonso Carlos, who stated: 'no one can choose my successor without my assistance.' (ABC, 19 May & 25 Aug. 1935; Documentos de Alfonso Carlos, 279 & 287). Some Traditionalists keen on the Juanista solution tried to oust Fal Conde and put Rodezno in his place (García Venero, Falange, 328).

2 Ansón, Acción Española, 155-7; HCE, II-8, 307-8; Cortés Cavanillas, Confesiones, 121-2; & M. de Almagro San Martín, Ocaso y fin de un reinado (Madrid, 1947), 244. There was quite a lot of intrigue to tempt Juan to act alone. The men of Acción Española even consulted Maurras, who said that Alfonso XIII ought not to abdicate.

first public criticism of it.[1]

The sort of State which Carlists seeking the Juanista solution hoped that Alfonso's heir would agree to was described by Pradera. His 'New State' was broadly similar to that of the Alfonsine Neo-Traditionalists with whom he collaborated, though he adhered more rigidly to the Integrism of Vázquez de Mella. The new State must be a good State subject to God's laws and based upon Tradition, 'the past that survives and has the virtue to make itself future'. The true rights of man were 'rights of Nature', and 'public law...must of necessity be Catholic... Society...implies plurality... The nation does not consume its components, for personality and sovereignty are two different things'. The nation was the aggregate unit for achieving a common destiny: 'without Tradition there is no nation'. Church and State were dual societies, but, in the final analysis, the

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1 In Jan. 1935 Alfonso still believed that the 'tactic' was 'a political experiment that must be performed even though it fails'. By June, however, he was lamenting that the chance for a restoration had not been seized in Oct. 1934 (Cortés Cavanillas, Confesiones, 106 & 113). At Juan's wedding in Rome on 12 Oct. 1935, he told Alfonsines that 'sooner or later, the confused, the timorous, the compliant, will have to follow your example, being persuaded that in Spain Monarchy and Country continue to be consubstantial'. (J. Gutiérrez-Ravé, El conde de Barcelona [Madrid, 1962], 107). Renovación Española (entry in minute-book for 2 July 1935) agreed to ask Alfonso to declare his disagreement with the methods of Acción Popular so that 'things be made plain and it be known that Monarchists must not and cannot serve in Republican parties, even though these may call themselves Rightist'; and secondly, since union with the Traditionalists was necessary, that 'doubts be cleared up and the situation be explained for the occasion of Don Juan's marriage, so that an effective approximation may exist between both branches.'

spiritual sphere took precedence over the temporal.

Civil society was composed of four basic 'infra-sovereign societies': domestic, municipal, regional, national. While sovereignty resided in the nation, the minor societies should each enjoy 'autarchy, which is the government peculiar to the particular social ends'. This Catholic conception of society 'removes the apparent antinomies which arise in the human order and, at the same time, it destroys the opposite errors of individualism, nationalism and socialism'. Social classes were not to be defined horizontally by birth or wealth, but by the vertical functional divisions in society. Such classes were naturally organised in corporations whose various indispensable functions were in harmony with the national interest. There was no place for political parties and Rousseauist monism; society was 'organic', not 'mechanical', in composition.

Authority, as Leo XIII had said, was necessary 'to reduce plurality to a certain unity'. The source of authority was God. The prince of the new State which would replace ramshackle liberalism was the representative organ of the nation. Pradera argued from Leo XIII's statements that the Church inhibited itself regarding forms of government. He himself was sure that Spain's 'internal constitution propounds...the representative Monarchy as a national form of government. Science points to it as the most perfect of all political forms', because one man could best represent national sovereignty and a dynasty secured independence and continuity for this 'most eminent organ'. The King was restrained from absolutism by the

Church, 'the autarchies belonging to the sub-sovereign societies' and by the Cortes and councils through which he must act - in fact, by the 'objective juridical principle' derived from natural laws. The State's function was to be 'the juridical regulator of social cooperation..., the integrator of the diverse social interests in the general interest'. Corporative Cortes would legislate, while executive power would be exercized separately by a government nominated by the King. The judiciary, also nominated by the King, would be totally independent of executive and legislature. In general, wealth 'must be the object of distribution among those who in social solidarity produce it'. Liberal and socialist economic views were false. Paradoxically, therefore, 'the New State is no other than the Spanish State of the Catholic Kings.'[1]

Pradera's was then an aesthetic vision of the beauty of order, stability, harmony and unity. In the terminology of European Catholic thought, the Spanish Monarchists of the 1930s were social-romantics, the Cedistas social-reformists.

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1 V. Pradera, The New State (London, 1939) - first published in Spain in 1935. The legal code was to be based on the decrees of the Council of Trent. The organic Cortes were to consist of 400 deputies in eight sections (agriculture, commerce, industry, property, manual labour, professional labour, regions, State bodies) elected regionally by proportional representation. Another 50 deputies would represent national bodies and corporations. Each section would meet and debate separately on matters within its own sphere. The review of the book in El Debate, 10 Nov. 1935, conceded that it had its good points, but it provided no really constructive ideas, since it was not easy to return to the State of the Catholic Kings. In his speeches, Pradera proclaimed that Spain could be saved by returning to St. Thomas Aquinas (ABC, 9 Mar. 1935).

Not all Traditionalists, however, were as enthusiastic about the Juanista solution as the likes of Pradera. The Communion retained its distinctive position, despite patriotic adherence to the Bloque Nacional.[1] The CEDA's policy of consolidating the Republic was bitterly criticised by Traditionalists. Catholics ought to prefer the equally 'licit and holy' aim of the Communion, with its tactic of outright hostility toward all liberalism, parties and 'illegitimate powers'.[2] Spanish Fascism was also denounced, because it was 'a materialist monster, lacking in Christian supernaturalism'.[3] The Communion still refused to compromise with anyone, but there was the consolation that 'the way of the Cross is hard and painful.'[4] The process of internal reorganization continued into 1935. Efforts were made to spread the gospel in Andalusia and Aragón.[5] The

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1 BOT, 24 Mar. 1935.

2 BOT, 11 Nov. 1934. The CEDA's policy was like that of Christians who had chosen to accept Moslem law and domination rather than to crusade; it was a 'Mozarabic and Muladí tactic' (BOT, 3 Mar. 1935).

3 BOT, 9 Dec. 1934. Fascism could be a very good system abroad, but 'in Spain, no'. González de Amezúa coined the political slogan, 'Neither Moscow nor Rome: Spain' (BOT, 25 Aug. 1935).

4 BOT, 5 & 12 May 1935.

5 From the Boletín, it would appear that, apart from the Navarrese stronghold, Carlist organization was refurbished in Catalonia, Valencia, the Basque Country and Santander. Organizations were springing up in Andalusia and Aragón, but they probably had few members. In May 1935, the Communion had 11 dailies, 22 weeklies and 3 reviews.

Requetés were reorganized with Colonel Varela's help, more arms were distributed, and some two hundred young Carlists went to Italy for training.[1] An atmosphere of expectancy was generated at aplechs, where the faithful were told that 'the hour of sacrifice is at hand. Requetés, be ready...to fight, to fight, to fight, and to conquer, to conquer, to conquer!'[2]

One of the main purposes of the Bloque was to attract José Antonio into the Monarchist camp, although in 1934 convinced Alfonsines had left the Falange. In January 1935 Monarchists started giving money to the Bloque instead of to José Antonio. The consequent shortage of funds tempted José Antonio to join, but he was dissuaded by Ruiz de Alda.[3] Monarchists were incensed by José Antonio's attitude to Monarchy: 'we feel no nostalgia for the dead institutions; we want to renovate the revolutionary aspiration of 14 April'.[4] His

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1 Lizarza, Memorias, 35-8, 49 & 55; Oyarzun, Carlismo, 464. Varela (alias 'Don Pepe') from 1934 organized them into battalions (Tercios) of 3 companies (Requetés), each of 246 men. He was replaced as Inspector-General of Requetés in June 1935 by Col. Rada. The 200 young Carlists were trained on an airfield near Rome, where they masqueraded as 'Peruvian officers on a training-mission'.

2 Zamanillo at Montserrat (3 Nov.), ABC, 5 Nov. 1935. The aplechs at Poblet and Montserrat were attended by 30,000 and 50,000 respectively - according to BOT, 9 June & 10 Nov. 1935.

3 Ansaldo, ¿Para qué?, 94 & 100-1; Ximénez, JA, 359-67 & 396. The most notable resignation was that of La Eliseda, who claimed its religious policy was 'frankly heretical' since it gave the political sphere primacy over the religious. José Antonio said he was a 'convinced Catholic', but believed, like Mussolini, that the State should educate the young: 'I am Spain's missionary, not God's missionary.' According to Iturralde, Catolicismo, I 169, José Antonio favoured a more pro-Catholic policy, but gave way to Ledesma, Giménez Caballero and Sánchez Mazas.

4 Últimos hallazgos, 91.

group remained apart from Monarchist or Catholic 'reaction', belonged neither to the Right, nor to the Left, nor to the Centre, and was 'implacably anti-capitalist, implacably anti-Communist'.[1] To make the Falange's position absolutely unique, he added that it was 'not a Fascist movement'.[2]

The Falange represented, in fact, the regenerationist outlook of older Spanish intellectuals, adapted to a post-liberal age. The leaders of the 'Generation of '98', however, felt themselves too old to readjust to youthful authoritarianism.[3] Falangista ideology stemmed less from the 'Tradition' of Monarchists and Cedistas than from liberal regenerationism, which José Antonio transformed into authoritarian regenerationism. Typical of this outlook were such phrases as, 'we love Spain because we do not like it', and the need to change

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1 O.c., 100-1 & 225. Falangistas preferred 'the poetic, tragic, theological, Spanish Christ' of Unamuno to 'the utilitarian, economistic, sociological, Belgian Christ' of the CEDA (Sánchez Mazas, in Bravo, José Antonio, 92).

2 Payne, Falange, 78. It was said to be a national party coinciding with Fascism. José Antonio did not attend the Montreux 'Fascist International' meeting in 1934, but he did go in 1935 (HCE, II-8, 302; Ximénez, JA, 407-8).

3 José Antonio was fully conscious of his debt to Ortega's ideas. Sons of Ortega and Marañón were Falangistas, and Unamuno's was very interested (Bravo, José Antonio, 73). Unamuno himself confessed admiration for José Antonio, but added: 'I must die a liberal. Your affair is for the young.' (Bravo, Falange, 87). José Antonio's concept of national tradition bore strong resemblance to Unamuno's concept of Spain's eternal 'intrahistoria'. José Antonio and Ortega had the same Spenglerian end of the nation in athletic form; Ortega's liberal means of doing this with the Republic had failed, hence José Antonio tried Fascist means. (For discussion of the older ideas, see P. Laín Entralgo, La generación del noventa y ocho [4th ed., Madrid, 1959], passim.)

completely the Spaniards' 'mode of being'.[1]

Just as José Antonio's references to 'dead institutions' shocked Monarchists, so his attacks on 'the Bolshevism of the privileged' and his desire to 'clear away' capitalism, abolish the payment of rent and expropriate estates without compensation scandalized the wealthy and conservative,[2] even though Ledesma and his radical friends left the Falange in January 1935.[3] The 'Twenty-Seven Points' of November 1934 declared Spain, in Ortega's phrase, 'a unit of destiny in the universal' and proclaimed the Falangista 'will to Empire'. The State was to be 'a totalitarian instrument' founded upon family, municipality and syndicate. Though private enterprise was not to disappear, Spain was to become 'one gigantic syndicate of producers' corporatively organized by branches of production in vertical syndicates. Banking was to be nationalized.

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1 O.c., 88 & 166.

2 O.c., 92, 122-4 & 619-21. The Rightist paper Informaciones in Jan. 1935 called the Falange 'a legion of people without identity-cards emanating from the Marxist camp.' (Textos inéditos, 452).

3 Ledesma and a group of ex-Jonsistas and ex-Communists left, mainly owing to personal differences with José Antonio, whom they considered too aristocratic and intellectual. They restarted an independent JONS with La Patria Libre as its organ. Ledesma wanted greater imitation of Nazism and more emphasis on the workers. He stressed that patriotism and Catholicism were not to be equated. (Ximénez, JA, 372-3 & 382-6; HGL, 336 & 381; Bravo, Falange, 85; & R. Ledesma Ramos, Discurso a las juventudes de España [4th ed., Madrid, 1942]).

Agrarian reform would be carried out: bad land would be planted with trees; land in the dry zone would be redistributed for collective mechanized farming; smallholdings in the wet zone would be reorganized so that each would be of viable size. Although 'the Catholic sentiment' was to play its part in national reconstruction, the State would have control of education and the Church would be strictly confined to its own sphere by a concordat. Such was to be the Falangista 'new order' after 'the national revolution', which would be carried out in 'direct, ardent and combative' style because 'life is warfare'. Point 27 expressed the hope that the Falange would triumph with its own forces; any pacts made with others would be on the basis of its predominance.[1] Meanwhile, the government kept its eye on the movement, which still consisted mainly of students under voting age.[2]

Apart from the drilling of Requetés, the only illegal action

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1 Text in F. Díaz-Plaja (ed.), La guerra (Madrid, 1963), 402-6. Views on agrarian policy in *o.c.*, 119-24. Ideas on a Spanish-American bloc and agrarian policies were quite close to those of Maeztu - from whom they were possibly derived.

2 El Debate, 28 Oct. 1934, reported arrests after a demonstration in Madrid. The authorities kept a close watch on Falangista activities (see García Venero, Falange, 75-7). Arriba (José Antonio's paper) was suspended from 11 July to 31 Oct. 1935 (Bravo, Falange, 99). Payne puts membership in 1935 at 5,000: 60-70% were under twenty-one, and students were the biggest single category (Falange, 81-2).

taken by the Right in 1935 was the work of Falangistas.[1] In June, José Antonio's political committee met at the Parador de Gredos to discuss tactics and the possibility of making an armed 'gesture'. They agreed that the Falange should rise alone if necessary, though they hoped to have military support. Since it was a carbonaro-type group without masses, its leaders decided to try to infiltrate the garrisons by means of the Unión Militar Española.[2] The UME was a clandestine organization founded by Captain Barba Hernández in 1934 which circulated anonymous leaflets in garrisons all over Spain. Its aims were rather vague, but the general idea was to bind together junior officers in a sort of Rightist underground to preserve the Army from harmful influences. Barba persuaded General Goded to become its mentor. José Antonio's aim was to make the UME a dependency of the Falange and a source of supply for arms.[3] The Falange

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1 A hundred Falangistas raided the SEPU store in Madrid on 16 March to protest against 'Jewish exploitation' of its workers (Bravo, Falange, 90). In Dec. 1934 Ansaldo put 100 Guerrillas de España in grey shirts and legionary caps, but the Bloque would only use them for sticking up posters; he was disgusted at such respect for legality and so dissolved them in Feb. 1935 (Ansaldo, ¿Para qué?, 95-6; Salmador, Ansaldo, 108-9).

2 Bravo, Falange, 97-8, & his José Antonio, 102; Últimos hallazgos, 99-102. José Antonio said that he could count on a General and the supply of 10,000 rifles.

3 A. Cacho Zabalza, La Unión Militar Española (Alicante, 1940), 13-21; HCE, II-8, 359. Barba and Arredondo ran the network from Madrid with Col. Rodríguez Tarduchy, who enlisted the help of officers retired, like himself, by Azaña. José Antonio had four interviews with Barba in 1935, and in Oct. saw Goded (Textos inéditos, 465).

conceived the idea of rising in Toledo, but General Franco vetoed any military cooperation and nothing happened.[1]

Meanwhile, Colonel Galarza linked the UME with Alfonsines who tried to make it a dependency of the Bloque Nacional.[2] Some officers were also in touch with Sanjurjo in Estoril, who was in turn in touch with Carlists. Sanjurjo at first disapproved of the UME, but eventually agreed to become its nominal head.[3] All in all, the conspiratorial activities of 1935 were really not to be taken seriously.

iv. The CEDA and economic retrenchment

When Gil Robles became Minister of War in May 1935, the Left feared that dictatorship was at hand. Leftist fears, however, proved unfounded. Gil Robles told his supporters: 'What ignorance of what our party stands for to suppose that we were going to station ourselves on ground different from the law!... Why should I have wanted to go to the War Ministry to carry out a coup d'état? What need had

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1 Payne, Falange, 87; B. Gómez Oliveros & J. Moscardó, General Moscardó (Barcelona, 1956), 104. Falangistas were to rally in Toledo and then march on Madrid, where military elements would seize key points. Col. Moscardó, Military Commandant of Toledo, was approached by a friend of José Antonio. Moscardó immediately drove to Madrid to consult Franco (Chief of Staff), who turned down the whole scheme. Cf. Southworth, Antifalange, 91-4, who casts doubts on the evidence for this episode.

2 Cacho Zabalza, UME, 30; Ansaldo, ¿Para qué?, 95.

3 Esteban-Infantes, Sanjurjo, 241 & 244. On the UME, cf. Payne, The Military, 293-4, 300-2 & 306-7: he writes of divisions and confusion among the leaders (among whom he puts Gen. Fanjul), but says it made headway after Oct. 1934.

I of the Army to triumph?... A coup d'état is carried out by one who is in a minority; but he who, like us, has honest Spain [behind him], has sufficient with the force of citizenship, with ballot-papers.'[1]

Calvo Sotelo, who, since he lacked masses, wished to win over the military, spoke of the Army as 'much more than the arm of the Country; I shall not say that it is the brain, because it ought not to be, but...it is the backbone, and if it is broken... Spain is broken.'[2] Gil Robles objected to such a definition: 'The Army is not the backbone, but the weaponed arm of the Country. The backbone is the people itself.' Politicians ought not to woo the Army, nor try to use it for party political ends: 'the Army is above politics, it is in the service of all Spaniards.'[3] Gil Robles's appointment as Minister of War reassured conservatives and the officer corps, and thus dealt a crucial blow to the hopes of the Bloque Nacional.[4]

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1 El Debate, 2 July 1935. He addressed 50,000 people at Medina del Campo on the morning of 30 June, and then flew to Valencia to address the biggest rally yet held in Spain: 200,000 were present according to El Debate, 125,000 according to Le Temps. Gil Robles denied the rumour that he wanted the police forces transferred from the Ministry of the Interior to the War Ministry (El Debate, 9 June 1935). He told M. Maura: 'While I hold the portfolio for War, forget any fear of a coup d'état. Take no notice of any rumour.' (Iturralde, Catolicismo, I, 91-2).

2 DSC, 6 Nov. 1934. Azaña had said that the Army was the Country's arm. Cf. Vallellano: 'Soldiers: you are the incarnation of the Spanish people.' (quoted in DSC, 27 Nov. 1934).

3 El Debate, 23 Dec. 1934.

4 Ansaldo, ¿Para qué?, 103-4, who added that the Bloque's financial support dropped when Gil Robles took over, and officers thought of promotion rather than rebellion. For Ansaldo, the Bloque was just the civilian manifestation of Alfonsine military plotting.

The policy of Radical War Ministers had been to smoothe military feelings ruffled by Azaña and give the Army satisfaction, for Lerroux believed that it was still liberal at heart.[1] Gil Robles's aim was also to 'restore internal satisfaction' after Azaña's 'mashing'; to 'give the Army confidence in its own strength, faith in the destinies of the Country' by 'the creation and development of the organs necessary to assure the continuity of a military policy entrusted always to responsible technical organisms; a policy that will have to be above the fluctuations that conflicting parties may cause' - in short, 'to take this Army and give it the material and moral benefits that it needs to live with dignity and to fulfil its mission.'[2] Gil Robles insisted that 'the Spanish Army, faithful to its tradition, has to be completely removed from anything that is not the supreme national interest within the régime that Spain itself has resolved to bestow on itself... The Army's purpose is not to carry out any coups d'état nor to intervene in politics. The Army is the guaranty for independence and security in the external sphere; it is also the guaranty in the internal sphere, when disturbances arise that could end up with power having been abandoned in the street.'[3]

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1 Lerroux, Pequeña historia, 345-7 & 354. During Radical tenure of the Ministry, Gens. Goded, Fanjul, Franco, Millán Astray and Queipo de Llano were promoted.

2 El Debate, 8 May, 27 Aug. & 21 Dec. 1935.

3 El Debate, 8 May & 10 Nov. 1935.

Thus the tacit quid pro quo was that the Army would be loyal to the civil authorities in exchange for a certain internal autonomy and outward prestige. Gil Robles wanted to make the Spanish Army strong like that of the French Republic in order to safeguard Spanish neutrality and prevent humiliation in international affairs, but it was not to dream of 'imperialist labours', nor of 'mad adventures'.[1]

Gil Robles set about restoring 'internal satisfaction' in the Army by promising to re-equip it and by promoting popular officers. He appointed the Agrarian Deputy General Fanjul as his under-secretary and, on 17 May, General Franco, who shared his ideas on the Army's function, as Chief of the General Staff.[2] A Supreme War Council was created under the Minister's presidency. Some forty officers known for their Azañista sympathies were dismissed for 'technical reasons', while among those promoted were Generals Goded and Mola and the pro-Carlist Colonel Varela because they were 'excellent soldiers'.[3] Gil

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1 El Debate, 27 Aug. & 10 Nov. 1935; JAP, 22 Dec. 1934.

2 El Debate, 18 May 1935. S. de Madariaga (conversation) says that when he met Franco in Oct. 1935 he was struck by the latter's conviction that the military ought not to meddle in politics, as well as by his intelligence. Franco had been approached in 1933 to stand as a Cedista candidate, but he had refused (Arrarás, Franco, 128).

3 Gil Robles, El Debate, 21 Dec. 1935; Arrarás, Franco, 144-5. Alcalá-Zamora disliked the promotion and reinstatement of 'enemies of the Republic'. Varela was made a General, Goded Inspector-General of the Army and later Director-General of the Air Force, Mola Commander-in-Chief in Morocco. Those dismissed included Miaja, Mangada, Riquelme and Hidalgo de Cisneros.

Robles said that he would not tolerate military juntas, and he dismissed the UME as a retired officers' group with little support within the Army.[1] He made no preparations for a coup, and refused to countenance any suggestions for one.[2] The Supreme War Council set about reorganizing and re-equipping the Army, which was in rather a parlous condition. Existing divisions were reorganized. Two new brigades were created. New aircraft were ordered. The code of military justice was revised. Steps were taken to boost recruiting. Munitions workers were forbidden to join revolutionary organizations. Production of armaments was increased. The defences of the Balearics and Cartagena were strengthened. A three-year plan for national defence and rearmament was drawn up.[3] However, implementation of this long-term programme depended upon the government's economic policy, as well as on political developments.

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1 El Debate, 8 Aug., & ABC, 28 Aug. 1935.

2 Cortés Cavanillas (conversation) says that the majority of officers would have liked a coup, which they thought could be legalized in the Cortes by the Right and some Radicals, but Gil Robles and Franco were against the idea. Gil Robles (conversation) says he never asked officers about a coup, but officers occasionally approached him to ask his opinion; he always replied by asking them their opinion, and they were never in agreement.

3 Arrarás, Franco, 143-4 & 146-8. When Gil Robles took over, the Army had enough munitions for 24 hours of modern warfare, helmets and gas-masks were deficient, and the Air Force's vintage bombers could only carry 5 kg. bombs. In Oct. 1934, soldiers had died of gangrene because they had not even had first-aid kits. A quarter of the troops were said to belong to revolutionary organizations. Gil Robles had intended to re-start a military academy and the Courts of Honour (El Debate, 21 Dec. 1935).

The principal political issue in the second half of 1935 was the economic situation, which continued to worsen. The economic crisis was more Spanish in origin than a consequence of the world depression. The budgetary situation was chaotic. In 1931 the Republicans had simply taken over the Monarchy's budget. Carner's budget of 1932 was the Republic's only budget, which was subsequently extended again and again. Between 1931 and 1935 expenditure had risen by some 1,000,000,000 pesetas, but revenue had increased only by about 150,000,000. A rise in expenditure was inevitable, but much of it was unproductive: no less than 39% of it went on the bureaucracy, which swallowed 300,000,000 more than in 1931. The floating debt stood at some 1,690,000,000 pesetas in January 1935.[1] The budget deficit had risen steadily to reach 811,800,000 pesetas in 1934.[2] The volume of foreign trade diminished by around a third between 1931 and 1934, and the trade deficit continued to rise dangerously.[3] The

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1 Calvo Sotelo, DSC, 5 Jan. 1935; & ABC, 3 Feb. 1935. He argued that public disorder was the fundamental factor in the Spanish situation.

2 The budget deficit rose as follows: 373,400,000 ptas. in 1931; 534,900,000 in 1932; 616,300,000 in 1933; 811,800,000 in 1934 (García Palacios, El segundo bienio, 24). In 1935, thanks to Chapaprieta, it was to fall to 779,900,000 ptas.

3 The official figures (in DSC, 20 Nov. 1935) for the trade deficit were as follows: 186,000,000 ptas. in 1931; 234,000,000 in 1932; 163,000,000 in 1933; 243,000,000 in 1934. The deficit in 1935 was to be 287,900,000 ptas. - quoted by J. Plaza Prieto, 'El desarrollo del comercio exterior español', Revista de Economía Política, vol. VI, no. 2 (May-Aug. 1955), 59.

widening trade gap had by 1935 led to talk of devaluation of the peseta.

The Right was divided as to the remedies to be applied. Chapaprieta and the bankers and businessmen of the Lliga believed in the strictest financial orthodoxy and the virtues of laissez faire, while Calvo Sotelo believed in a directed economy and was willing to borrow ideas from the Roosevelt administration.[1] Gil Robles also favoured a mixed economy and State intervention when necessary. All were agreed, however, on the need for political stability and the maintenance of public order.

The most controversial economist on the Right was Calvo Sotelo. He argued that the 'surplus value' - the difference between the cost of labour and the value of the product - was 'the corner-stone of the present economic system...and of any other economic system that implies State organization', including Soviet 'State-capitalism'. In any economic system, expansion depended on the utilization of this surplus value. In practice, Soviet collectivism had not improved conditions of production and had lowered workers' living standards, while the State had absorbed the surplus value. The capitalist system had the advantage of allowing social mobility. However, primitive capitalism, based on saving, had given way to speculative capitalism, based on credit. The growth in the size of firms and the importance

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1 For the influence of Roosevelt, see Calvo's speeches in DSC, 20 & 30 June 1934.

of the stock-exchange had led to the concentration of financial power in a few hands, as Pius XI had observed. The banker had ousted the manufacturer. Trusts and cartels were not in themselves evil, but they must be controlled in the interests of the consumer, just as the State must control banking policy. Laws must be passed to stop the abuses of unbridled capitalism, for it was the abuses of finance-capitalism that had led to crisis. Capitalism was good insofar as it satisfied a natural desire for property, and its productive capacity was beyond question. What had to be changed was the system of distribution of the wealth.

Irresponsible speculation on the stock-exchange would have to be prohibited and, as in Italy and Germany, a limit would have to be placed on dividends. The worker must be made to feel part of the firm. The 'integrative State' above class would administer social justice as it did civil or criminal justice. There could be no return to the liberal or individualistic capitalism of the nineteenth century. The State would control the stock company by means of independent experts, who would see that shareholders were protected and that national and social interests were served. Banks were not to be allowed to share in the running of stock companies, and directors' salaries were to be limited. Calvo Sotelo favoured a mixed economy with public corporations for such things as irrigation and cheap housing. 'The State must assume a tutelary mission of vigilance and prevention, over the creation and circulation of capital.' His 'new capitalism' was to have none of the failings of the old capitalism,

whose anti-social consequences were to be replaced by a just distribution of wealth. Such a system demanded 'a diligent State, imbued with holy Christian spirituality and capable of carrying it into the very marrow of economic life.'[1] Therefore Spain must decide once and for all between a socialist, a liberal and a directed economy; the latter was the only one suitable. Economic and political liberalism must be abolished in order to get to grips with the problem of unemployment.[2]

Calvo Sotelo's economic ideas, like his political ideas, necessitated sweeping changes. He still thought in terms of a balanced ordinary budget, with a parallel extraordinary budget for public works, as he had under the Dictatorship, though now he invoked the example of the American 'New Deal'.[3] All this, of course, was anathema to the liberal economists of the Lliga, who rejected 'the so-called directed economy, which constitutes a concealed and attenuated form

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1 J. Calvo Sotelo, El capitalismo contemporáneo y su evolución (Madrid, 1935), being his lecture to the National Academy of Jurisprudence and Legislation on 30 Nov. 1935. The footnotes referred to a multitude of sources, including Pope Pius XI, Henri de Man and Sombart.

2 Calvo Sotelo, DSC, 30 June 1934. 'The only formula [is] a directed economy, in which the State supplants, is superposed on the conflicting interests of employers and workers, on those of capital, depriving it of usury, and on those of the unions, forbidding them all compulsion, and [in which the State] plans an economic goal to which all the economic activities of the country are subordinated.'

3 DSC, 20 June 1934.

of Socialism.' Intervention by the State meant 'the disturbed economy, not the directed economy.'[1]

Gil Robles's economic ideas were a little vague, but, like Calvo Sotelo, he envisaged a mixed economy.[2] His short-term solutions were also not unlike those of Calvo Sotelo, although he was more chary of deficit-finance. The government ought to take special powers to circumvent parliamentary procedures and reduce budget expenditure, rationalize administration and make economies in the bureaucracy. The income-tax introduced by Carner should be developed at the expense of the wealthy and over-privileged. At the root of the unemployment problem, he argued, lay the evil of under-consumption. Prices of agricultural produce should be raised to provide purchasing-power among the rural masses for Spanish industrial products. Public works' schemes and subsidies for industry would also help to cure unemployment. A lower bank-rate would stimulate expansion.[3]

The politician to whom the task of leading Spain out of her economic difficulties fell was Joaquín Chapaprieta, a former Minister

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1 Ventosa, DSC, 9 Jan. 1935; Gallart, DSC, 12 June 1935.

2 El Debate, 4 June 1935.

3 El Debate, 3 Mar. 1935 (cf. Calvo Sotelo, DSC, 12 June 1935). Some of these ideas were incorporated in Salmón's unemployment law. Bank-rate had been fixed at 6% in 1932; it was cut to 5½% on 29 Oct. 1934, and to 5% on 15 July 1935. D. de Madariaga wanted expenditure on unemployment to take precedence over a balanced budget (DSC, 7 Dec. 1934).

of the Monarchy now an independent Republican, and a firm believer in retrenchment.[1] On becoming Minister of Finance in May 1935, he drafted a law authorizing the government to restrict expenditure. The bureaucracy was to be reorganized to achieve economies; expenditure on personnel was to be reduced and those not properly qualified were to be dismissed. The number of Ministries and their employees was to be reduced by decree. Special funds and quasi-legal levies were to be suppressed. Pensions were to be revised and cut. Grants to bodies like the Institute of Agrarian Reform were also to be cut, and all government spending generally curbed.[2] He intended to eliminate corruption and balance the budget for normal expenditure by the end of 1936. He would reduce the deficit in 1935 by a third by his economies and by the reform of taxation and the harrying of tax-dodgers.

Calvo Sotelo and Ventosa thought these proposals all right as far as they went. Ventosa saw balanced budgeting as soon as possible

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1 He had been S. Alba's lieutenant and Minister of War, Dec. 1922-Sept. 1923. In 1931 he had for a time been a leading figure in Alcalá-Zamora's party. In Dec. 1934 he set up the Independent Republican Minority of ten in the Cortes, which included the Progressives Del Río and Fernández Castillejo; Iranzo, a former follower of Ortega Gasset; and the ex-Radical Iglesias.

2 Text in DSC, 29 May 1935 App. The Institute was supposed to get a credit of 50,000,000 ptas. a year; in future, it would only be given enough to ensure that it had 50,000,000 at any given time - it had not spent its last grants. Chapaprieta wanted to stop the practice of functionaries drawing a full day's pay for only an afternoon's work, and being paid a salary of 8-10,000 ptas. while they drew 60-70,000 ptas. for expenses (ABC, 1 June 1935).

as the only way to restore confidence and rejected Calvo Sotelo's suggestions. For the latter, the fundamental problem was monetary. Only his own permanent political solution could guarantee public order, the key to economic recovery. Only thus could foreign capital be attracted for long-term investment and the currency be stabilized. Meanwhile, the peseta should be allowed to float between minimum and maximum limits, like the currencies of Belgium and the United States.[1]

Gil Robles fully approved of these economies, but warned Chapaprieta not to get too carried away by the vision of a balanced budget: there must be no economies on defence, unemployment or 'the development of the national wealth'.[2] Chapaprieta's law was expected to take effect on 23 September, and the next day the government was to be quietly reorganized with fewer Ministers. Six Ministries were to become three. The CEDA expected the Radicals, the Agrarians and itself each to renounce a portfolio.[3]

No such smooth transition, however, took place. On 20 September, the two Agrarian Ministers resigned and another governmental crisis ensued. The Minister of the Navy, Royo Villanova, who always, in Lerroux's phrase, 'lost his equanimity' where Catalan affairs were concerned, resigned in protest against his colleagues' transfer of

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1 DSC, 29 May 1935.

2 El Debate, 27 Aug. 1935.

3 El Debate, 12, 17 & 18 Sept. 1935.

public works to the Generalidad. Velayos, whose inactivity at the Ministry of Agriculture was criticized by Cedistas, declared his solidarity with his fellow Agrarian.[1] Alcalá-Zamora wanted a coalition government to include the PNV and reformist Socialists, but the CEDA vetoed this idea. He entrusted formation of a government first to Alba and then to Chapaprieta, both ex-Monarchist Ministers like himself. 'The Four' agreed to support the latter, whose government included three Cedistas, Martínez de Velasco and Rahola (Lliga), although the Agrarians had previously said they would not serve with the Lliga.[2] The new government intended to balance the budget in 1936.[3]

Lerroux did not press his claims to the Premiership in September because he knew that a scandal implicating leading Radicals was about

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1 El Debate, 14-21 Sept. 1935; Lerroux, Pequeña historia, 427-32; Royo Villanova, 30 años, 218-46. Royo considered the Lliga 'enemies of the Country'; he wrote that the cabinet had decided on a decree to transfer road services while he was representing the government at a memorial service for the Queen of the Belgians in San Sebastián. He first heard of it from the Gaceta.

2 El Debate, 21-25 Sept. 1935; Lerroux, Pequeña historia, 432-4. This government of 25 Sept. consisted of:- Premier & Finance, Chapaprieta (Independent Republican); State, Lerroux (Radical); War, Gil Robles (CEDA); Navy, Rahola (Lliga); Interior, Pablo-Blanco (Radical); Public Works & Communications, Lucía (CEDA); Public Instruction, Rocha (Radical); Labour & Justice, Salmón (CEDA); Agriculture & Industry, Martínez de Velasco (Agrarian).

3 DSC, 1 Oct. 1935. Ventosa said transfer of services to Catalonia was the Lliga's condition for joining the government. Calvo Sotelo attacked the President's handling of the crisis, while Royo compared the ousting of Lerroux to Alfonso's ousting of A. Maura.

to break. One Daniel Strauss, of uncertain nationality, had in 1934 bribed Radical politicians to introduce into Spain the '<u>straperlo</u>', a roulette-wheel which allegedly eliminated the element of chance. Socialists had got to hear about it, and so the then Minister of the Interior, Salazar Alonso, had put a stop to this illegal gambling. During 1935 Strauss had written to Lerroux (whose adopted son Aurelio had been involved) seeking compensation for the losses he had incurred when the government had revoked his concession. Later a French lawyer visited Lerroux and threatened to provoke a scandal if the matter were not settled privately. Lerroux ignored these attempts at blackmail. Strauss next wrote to Alcalá-Zamora, who insisted on making it a cabinet issue.

The matter was brought into the open on 18 October, when Chapaprieta said that Strauss's accusation had been handed over to the Attorney-General. The Cortes then debated the issue. The government wanted the courts to deal with it, and Gil Robles and Lerroux accused the Left of collusion with Strauss in withholding the matter until it could be used to the best political advantage. Gil Robles, however, gave way to Monarchist demands for a Committee of the Cortes, even though Monarchists were using the issue to discredit the Republican régime. On 28 October the Cortes exonerated Salazar Alonso, but found Aurelio Lerroux and three leading Radicals

guilty.[1]

Lerroux's Radical Republicans had enjoyed a reputation for corruption from their foundation, and all opposition groups were now determined to make the most of the '_straperlo_' affair. The Left found in it proof that the Radicals were unprincipled and unfit to govern, and hinted that the _CEDA_-Radical alliance depended on a tacit deal: Gil Robles would turn a blind eye to corruption if Lerroux went along with the _CEDA_'s ambitions. Monarchists took the chance to try and equate the régime with corruption, and attacked Gil Robles's alliance with rogues. The Radical Party itself began to disintegrate, and Lerroux and Rocha left the government on 29 October.[2] José Antonio saw the affair as typical of parliamentary politics, while a Communist said it was 'a symptom of the decomposition of the capitalist system.'[3]

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1 Lerroux, _Pequeña historia_, 384-7, 399, 411-25 & 446-55; _El Debate_, 19 Oct. 1935; _DSC_, 22-28 Oct. 1935; Buckley, _Spanish Republic_, 179-80. The three Radicals implicated were Benzo Cano (ex-Under-Sec. of the Interior), Pich Pon (leader of the party in Catalonia) and Blasco-Ibáñez (leader of the Valencian Autonomist Radicals). According to Lerroux, Strauss, Prieto and Azaña hatched the plot at the Brussels Exhibition, and Alcalá-Zamora joyfully used it to achieve his aims of destroying the government bloc, the Radical Party and Gil Robles's chances. Bowers refers to Prieto advising Strauss (_My Mission_, 162).

2 _El Debate_, 30 Oct. 1935. The Radical Bardají replaced Rocha at Public Instruction; the Radical Usabiaga took over Agriculture & Industry from Martínez de Velasco, who in turn replaced Lerroux as Minister of State.

3 Bolívar, _DSC_, 28 Oct. 1935. José Antonio shouted '_¡Viva straperlo!_' when the vote was taken (Bowers, _My Mission_, 164).

Only a month later, a 'second wave of asphyxiating gases'[1] known as 'the Nombela affair' gave the Radicals the coup de grâce. Lerroux's Under-Secretary for Colonies had agreed to compensate a shipping-line out of government funds to the tune of 3,033,318 pesetas for the loss of two ships. The Inspector-General of Colonies, Nombela, had reported irregularities and had then been sacked. He was now appealing against wrongful dismissal. Monarchists wanted the Cortes to accuse Lerroux himself, but in the voting he was exonerated and his Under-Secretary found guilty.[2] The scandals destroyed the Republic's Radical Centre. The Socialist and Catholic masses now had no buffer between them.

If the scandals lowered their prestige indirectly, the reputation of the CEDA and the Agrarians sank in the eyes of their most loyal supporters as a result of their handling of the wheat surplus, called by El Debate 'the most serious economic conflict that has faced any government since the proclamation of the Republic.'[3] The average

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1 Lerroux, ABC, 30 Nov. 1935.

2 DSC, 29 Nov.-7 Dec. 1935; Lerroux, Pequeña historia, 457-76; D. Martínez Barrio, Orígenes del Frente Popular español (Buenos Aires, 1943), 66-84. The Casa Tayá had a contract, rescinded in 1932 but restored in 1935, to ply to Spanish Guinea; the two boats apparently sank in the interim. In fact, Gil Robles and Lucía had prevented payment being made. José Antonio again shouted '¡Viva straperlo!' when the outcome was known (Bowers, My Mission, 169).

3 El Debate, 19 Sept. 1935. 40% of the wheat was grown in León, Old Castile and La Mancha. 30% of the crop was grown by smallholders (J. Larraz, El ordenamiento del mercado triguero en España [Madrid, 1935], 34-5).

annual demand for wheat in Spain was 40,000,000 quintals, but the bumper crop of 1934 had produced over 50,000,000. Unless the surplus was somehow withdrawn from the market, the farmers would suffer as much as in a bad year.[1] By January 1935, the position was serious: smallholders were unable to sell their crops and were falling more and more heavily into debt. Giménez Fernández at first resisted demands for State buying because the State could not afford it and a precedent would be set for other produce. The most that he could do would be to set up storage depots and prevent more land being used for wheat-growing.[2] However, pressure from the farmers led to legislation in February and June authorizing the withdrawal of about 6,000,000 quintals.[3] Wheat-growers continued to complain that the official price-levels were being ignored by their bêtes noires, the millers. When the 1935 crop was harvested, the situation became even worse. By September, the peasants' cry was:

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1 El Debate, 1 Feb. 1935. Spanish wheat was too dear to compete in foreign markets. Protection since 1922 had led to an increase in the area of wheat cultivation. (Larraz, Mercado triguero, 10, 29 & 40; Thomas, Civil War, 783).

2 DSC, 23 & 25 Jan. 1935. Smallholders who could not sell their crops were dependent on provincial money-lenders for their existence. One of the arguments used by opponents of Giménez Fernández's plans to create smallholdings in Extremadura was that the new owners would grow wheat, thus defeating his other object of limiting the area devoted to wheat-growing.

3 Larraz, Mercado triguero, 29.

'We have no money, we are not selling wheat, we are being ruined.'[1]

Gil Robles now intervened himself. The War Ministry was to buy a large amount of wheat; the State was immediately to purchase 'defective wheat' and pay millers to grind it; credit was to be extended to farmers, and one organization per province was to be designated to buy wheat for the State.[2] In the Cortes, Cedista Deputies launched strong attacks on the incompetence of successive Ministers of Agriculture: the Agrarians Velayos and Martínez de Velasco and the Radical Usabiaga. They said that the law was not being enforced. In Toledo, the company designated to buy wheat was in league with the millers and was forcing the smaller growers to sell at prices well below the official level. In Guadalajara, millers refused to buy at the official price, which the Governor declined to enforce. In Zamora and in Andalusia, the Minister had failed even to

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1 El Debate, 11 Sept. 1935. The wheat-growers of e.g. Cáceres, said the 1934 crop had not yet been sold; they demanded a tax moratorium, inspection of the port of Barcelona and of flour-mills, and the immediate creation of a consortium and an agrarian bank (El Debate, 13 Aug. 1935). The four Cedistas representing Madrid-prov. threatened to renounce their seats in the Cortes if no solution were forthcoming (ABC, 23 July 1935). Fixed price-levels had been introduced in 1930, but had often been disregarded, as they were continuously from Sept. 1934 (Larraz, Mercado triguero, 18, 20 & 27). The 1935 crop was just under 43,000,000 quintals.

2 El Debate, 30 Aug., 13, 15 & 19 Sept. 1935. The government was to lend some 30,000,000 ptas. to farmers to cover urgent payments. The problem was within the Minister of Agriculture's sphere, but a wheat committee was set up on which Gil Robles and Chapaprieta joined Velayos.

authorize buying. In Valladolid, the 1935 crop was being bought; the official buying organization told small growers to sell the 1934 crop privately at low prices, and the price-levels had disappeared. Everywhere there was corruption.[1] The thirty ministerial decrees of 1935 added to the confusion. After the Agrarians torpedoed plans for a national agrarian bank, the government in October authorized loans to farmers, but once again the law was not enforced.[2] The small wheat-growers suffered much hardship. Late in 1935 an expert, Larraz, was appointed Commissary for Wheat, and he drew up plans for a long-term solution.[3]

When the Cortes was not discussing scandals or surplus wheat in

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1 DSC, 4 & 8 Oct., 5 & 6 Dec. 1935. The chief critics were Avia and Madariaga (Toledo), La Calzada (Valladolid), Gil Albarellos (Logroño) and Arizcún (Guadalajara) - all Cedistas. The respected Agrarian Martín Martín (Valladolid) left his party in disgust at his colleagues' incompetence. The provincial organizations designated were often Catholic farmers' associations who bought their members' crops first, to the detriment of other smallholders (García Palacios, Segundo bienio, 60).

2 García Palacios, Segundo bienio, 46 & 58; DSC, 6 Dec. 1935. The decree of 24 Oct. stipulated 6-month loans at 4½% on up to two-thirds the value of wheat hypothecated. La Calzada said the farmers could not get the loans promised, certainly not at 4½%; bankers were profiteering unscrupulously. The Agrarian Party to some extent represented provincial money-lenders.

3 He hoped by 1937 to end the free market in wheat, which, even with credits and price-levels, hit the smaller grower hardest. The market would be organized 'on the principle of the single buyer-seller', the Comunidad Nacional del Trigo, a corporative organization for all with an interest in wheat, which would see to prices, credit, etc. (El Debate, 22 Dec. 1935).

the autumn of 1935, Chapaprieta's budget for 1936 was debated. He estimated that he would reduce expenditure by more than 400,000,000 pesetas as a result of his economies and the conversion of debts. He would introduce no new taxes, but would look into exemptions and energetically pursue tax-dodgers. He would reform the taxes on alcohol and lower the starting-level for the graduated income-tax. The land-tax would be graduated and payment of death-duties would be made universal. Thus he estimated a rise of some 500,000,000 pesetas in revenue. Allowing for defence and public works needs, he even hoped for a surplus of perhaps 50,000,000 pesetas. A balanced budget ought to restore confidence and get the economy moving again.[1] He rejected devaluation as a means of boosting exports.[2]

Lerroux and Gil Robles both supported Chapaprieta's view that the wealthy would have to make sacrifices, though not all their followers agreed with them.[3] For Chapaprieta a balanced budget was

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1 Chapaprieta, DSC, 15 Oct. 1935. The lower limit for income-tax was reduced from 100,000 to 80,000 ptas.; this the Cortes approved (DSC, 12 Nov. 1935 App.).

2 He supported Cambó's view that devaluation would mean inflation and the destruction of the middle class. Calvo Sotelo argued that Spain ought to abandon the gold standard (only 17% of her trade was with the 'gold bloc'); devaluation would not lead to inflation. (The Lliga opposed devaluation because Catalan industry depended on imports.) Chapaprieta attributed the fall in exports to higher foreign tariffs. He proposed to give legal standing to the quota-system that had grown up. The State was to supervise all importing and exporting, and would encourage exporting bodies and sales propaganda abroad (DSC, 15, 20, 22 & 29 Nov. [App.] 1935).

3 El Debate, 7 & 10 Nov. 1935.

dogma. Although on 27 January 1935 he had said it would take three years to balance it, on 19 November he announced that it would be balanced in six months. 'One cannot have a sound economic policy when the budget is not sound. Our economy must be invigorated by balancing the budget.' A balanced budget was the essential pre-condition for economic reconstruction and progress; it must precede any such schemes.[1]

Gil Robles, however, had rather different ideas. He thought that the government should put through a legislative programme as well as the budget. When indispensable laws had been passed, the government ought to propose constitutional reform; the Cortes would then automatically be dissolved and elections could be held under an absolutely impartial government.[2] Drafts of these 'indispensable' laws were now ready. Lucía produced a five-year plan for modernizing rural life: roads were to be built to remote villages; pueblos were to be provided with sanitation and a water-supply; irrigation was to go ahead. Salmón planned more public buildings and a cheap housing programme. Gil Robles himself tried to spur the Institute of Agrarian Reform into action.[3] Such plans, if implemented, would be of

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1 Chapaprieta, in El Debate, 3 & 19 Nov. & 10 Dec. 1935.

2 El Debate, 5 Nov. 1935.

3 DSC, 20 Nov. 1935 App.; El Debate, 23-24 Nov. & 1 Dec. 1935. There were also plans for rearmament, industrial tariffs, sugar-beet and wheat marketing, railways and fisheries.

more use to the CEDA in an election than a balanced budget. Then, on 2 December, Larraz said he wanted the government to lend farmers more money. Since these costly measures were incompatible with a balanced budget in 1936, Gil Robles asked Chapaprieta to think again.[1] Chapaprieta, however, refused to cancel his budget and took his stand on his proposals for death-duties, to which the conservative Cedista Aspeitia had put forward amendments. The result was that on 9 December Spain faced yet another governmental crisis. If its immediate cause was death-duties, its real origin lay in the clash between the priorities of Gil Robles and Chapaprieta.[2]

The Left demanded a dissolution to avert constitutional reform, which now required only an absolute majority in the Cortes. Gil Robles demanded another government based on 'the Four' with himself as Premier.[3] The President, however, wanted either a coalition including both Right and Left, or a government of the Centre. The formation of such a government was first entrusted to his friend Martínez de Velasco. When he failed, El Debate suggested an all-Cedista government. Alcalá-Zamora, however, now entrusted the task to Chapaprieta and then to Miguel Maura, but their efforts were

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1 ABC, 3 Dec. 1935.

2 ABC, 5 & 10 Dec., & El Debate, 10 Dec. 1935. Gil Robles approved of balanced budgets in principle, but not in practice if they precluded solutions to pressing problems.

3 El Debate, 10 Dec. 1935; Seco Serrano, Historia de España, VI, 122.

thwarted by opposition from 'the Four'. On 14 December, a government was at last formed by Portela Valladares, a leading Freemason and a cacique in Galicia, who was not a Deputy. The Right disliked him for his conduct at the Ministry of the Interior during 1935, which had won him some sympathy on the Left. Portela's government included Martínez de Velasco, a Liberal-Democrat, two Radicals whom Lerroux disowned, and Rahola of the Lliga.[1] 'The Four' were no longer united. Cedistas were angry at their exclusion from power. One of them commented: 'Total, two years lost for Spain.'[2]

When Gil Robles asked to be made Premier, Alcalá-Zamora persuaded Pablo-Blanco (Minister of the Interior) to surround the War Ministry with Civil Guards because he feared a coup. Generals Fanjul and Varela, indeed, wanted to seize the President of the Republic, but Gil Robles warned them that a pronunciamiento would only result in civil war. He refused to countenance a coup on his

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1 El Debate & ABC, 12-15 Dec. 1935. Maura, who had hoped to include the Lliga and Unión Republicana, refused to join Portela's government 'of the oldest political style'. Maura later complained that Alcalá-Zamora had double-crossed him (Bowers, My Mission, 170-1). Portela even offered José Antonio Agriculture, but he refused on the advice of Aunós (Ximénez, JA, 622). The government of 14 Dec. was made up of:- Premier & Interior, Portela (independent); State, Martínez de Velasco (Agrarian); Justice & Labour, Martínez (Liberal-Democrat); War, Gen. Molero; Navy, Adm. Salas; Finance, Chapaprieta (Independent Republican); Public Works, Del Río (Progressive); Public Instruction, Becerra (Radical); Agriculture, Pablo-Blanco (Radical); and without portfolio, Rahola (Lliga).

2 Casanueva, ABC, 13 Dec. 1935.

behalf, but left the Generals to decide whether or not they ought to rise. General Franco again vetoed a rising.[1] Gil Robles therefore bade the Army farewell at a tearful ceremony. Franco declared that 'honour, discipline, all the basic concepts of the Army have been restored and given substance by your excellency.' Gil Robles replied that he was sure that he would return to the War Ministry, and repeated that the Army must always remain outside party conflicts.[2]

The politicians of the Right now indulged in mutual recriminations as to who had provoked the crisis and why 'the Four' had broken up.[3] The CEDA's main attack was on the President, who had supported a Minister without followers (i.e. Chapaprieta) against the rest of the government. Furthermore, the President had brushed aside the legitimate claims of the biggest parliamentary group: 'At bottom

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1 Gil Robles's account, in Seco Serrano, Historia de España, VI, 122. According to Goded, Un faccioso, 24-6, Gil Robles would not rise with the Generals and they would not rise without him. Ansaldo was told that the Generals would not rise because they were not sure of their troops (Salmador, Ansaldo, 119-20). Franco explained that he had not risen because the Country was 'not yet in imminent danger'. There was therefore no justification for a military rising in support of a political party when elections were about to be held. (Franco's letter to Gil Robles, March 1937, quoted in HCE, II-8, 401).

2 El Debate, 15 Dec. 1935.

3 Gil Robles accused the Lliga of plotting for a crisis with Portela. Cambó in turn accused Gil Robles of precipitating it. Gil Robles denied this. Cambó said the Lliga had joined Portela's government to prevent a Leftist filling the vacuum. Martínez de Velasco also said he had joined under pressure. Reyo Villanova left the Agrarians because of their leader's conduct in the crisis (El Debate, 17-19 Dec. 1935).

what won the day was a revolutionary threat that, before the possibility of the reform of the Constitution, demanded the elimination of the CEDA from power and the dissolution of the Cortes.' However, 'the injustice that has been perpetrated against us does not shift us from our position nor from our tactic.'[1] Alcalá-Zamora, indeed, wanted the CEDA out of power because it was not sufficiently Republican. He also wished to be rid of the 'Fernandine Cortes'.[2] Ironically, the four main posts in the régime were now held by former Liberal Ministers of the King.[3] Those who were still Monarchists thought that their prophecies had been fulfilled: 'the tactic has realized all the suspicions that we, its adversaries, harboured and none of the hopes that its partisans cherished.'[4] In fact, for the CEDA, as for Spain, all depended on the outcome of the elections.

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1 Gil Robles, El Debate, 17 Dec. 1935. Gil Robles (conversation) still maintains that the crisis was engineered by Alcalá-Zamora and the Socialists in order to bring about a dissolution. For Lerroux the crisis proved again that Alcalá-Zamora was eliminating rivals for the leadership of the conservative masses (Pequeña historia, 496).

2 Alcalá-Zamora, Los defectos, 55, 112 & 163; he wrote of those 'who had not accepted the Republican régime, which a great number of them rejected and many viewed with hostility.'

3 Viz. President Alcalá-Zamora; S. Alba, President of the Cortes and hence Vice-President of the Republic; Portela, Premier and Minister of the Interior. (Chapaprieta was Finance Minister in addition.)

4 Calvo Sotelo, ABC, 17 Dec. 1935. Cf. Fal Conde: 'the tactics that failed so many times have failed once more.' (BOT, 22 Dec. 1935).

CHAPTER VI

'DESCENSUS IN AVERNO', DECEMBER 1935-JULY 1936

Alcalá-Zamora's refusal to entrust Gil Robles with power in December 1935 did not mark, as Monarchists claimed, the definitive failure of the CEDA's 'tactic'. If he could win the election Gil Robles would retain the loyalty of the Right's masses and thus take the wind out of the sails of his critics. But when the Leftist coalition won the majority of seats, though not of votes, and revolution again seemed to threaten, his followers began to desert and put their faith in the violence he could not sanction. 'Possibilism' only yielded to 'catastrophism' after the elections.

The election campaign was fought in an atmosphere of civil war and was the continuation of the violent events of October 1934 by other means. Right and Left both saw the supreme significance of this election and each feared the victory of the other. Rightists saw the battle as one between revolution and counter-revolution, between Spain and 'anti-Spain'; Socialists believed the choice lay between 'Rome and Moscow, between the black banner of Fascism and the red flag of Socialism'.[1] The efforts of Alcalá-Zamora and Portela to create a new buffer between the two Spains by reverting

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1 Carrascal (CEDA), El Debate, 7 Jan. 1936; Zabalza (Socialist), El Socialista, 18 Jan. 1936.

to the corrupt means of the 'old politics' came to nothing. Left and Right came face to face and fear bred aggression.

The events of February to July 1936 were the prelude to civil war. On the Left most Socialists, spurred on as ever by fear of gains by the CNT among the working class, prepared for the advent of the dictatorship of the proletariat. On the Right the Falange met the sporadic violence of the Left with counter-terrorism while military leaders and Monarchists prepared to do battle with 'the Revolution'. Largo Caballero and Calvo Sotelo emerged as the symbolic leaders of the two Spains.

The moderates, Azaña (now again Premier), Prieto (now the advocate of evolutionary Socialism) and the legalist Gil Robles, were pessimistic but tried to avert the disaster which they clearly saw ahead. The only chance of avoiding full-scale civil war lay in the formation of a national coalition government with full powers and including Socialists and Cedistas. When Azaña became President of the Republic in May the opportunity for re-alignment occurred. However Prieto realised that Largo Caballero would split the Popular Front and the Socialist movement rather than allow him to become Premier, and this would mean the collapse of the Left before the Right and the Army. The possibility of a national coalition was torpedoed by Largo Caballero because he was trying to unite all the proletarian forces for the violent seizure of power. In a sense therefore, 'what made the Spanish Civil War inevitable was the civil

war within the Socialist Party'.[1] As in Italy in the early 1920s violence accompanied by talk of revolution drove the bourgeoisie to 'Fascism'.

The two months of government by Casares Quiroga (May-July) represented the death-agony of the Republic of 1931. He enraged the Right without giving satisfaction to the Marxist Left. Lacking a mass following, the Left Republican government could only walk the tight-rope between the Army and the revolutionary working class while the tide of anarchy rose. Survival depended on neither turning openly against the régime. When the murder of Calvo Sotelo presented the military[2] with the psychological moment for action to restore order and save the Country from the revolutionary threat, the Republic of 1931 only remained as a pathetic façade for the revolutionaries.

i. The elections of February 1936

With the formation of Portela's government, it was assumed by both Left and Right that the President had given his Premier the decree for dissolution. This was not, in fact, the case, but the election campaign nevertheless began immediately. Gil Robles sought to form 'a national front against the revolution and its accomplices',

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1 Madariaga, Spain, 455.

2 By 'the military' in this context is meant that section of the Army which was prepared to rise against the Popular Front government. Conspirators were, in the main, africanistas removed from active commands in late Feb. 1936; they had in most cases to get rid of Azañista garrison-commanders before 'pronouncing' against the government.

to launch 'a great Spanish spiritual crusade' to win the elections.[1] Portela however wanted not only to act as umpire, but to create a new Centre under his own and Alcalá-Zamora's leadership so as to hold the balance between Right and Left. He hoped to achieve this by the old means of using government machinery in support of his nominees. New Governors were appointed and he began 'packing' provincial committees with his men.[2]

If Portela were to persevere with his plans, the anti-Leftist vote would be split. Gil Robles therefore set about disrupting the government. Inside the government Chapaprieta, Martínez de Velasco and Pablo-Blanco were believed to favour a Centre-Rightist 'anti-revolutionary bloc' and the CEDA's inclusion in the government, while Portela and Del Río wanted separate government lists of candidates. Gil Robles exerted pressure on two fronts. Firstly, he said that it would be illegal to extend the budget that expired on 31 December by decree. Therefore either the Cortes must meet, in which case Portela would fall, or the decree of dissolution must appear very soon. Secondly, the CEDA would not ally with the Agrarians, the Liberal-Democrats or Chapaprieta if they were still in the government when the decree of dissolution appeared. There-

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1 El Debate, 15 & 17 Dec. 1935.

2 El Debate, 20, 21 & 29 Dec. 1935. Gil Robles said hopes of a Centre bloc of 150 Deputies were illusory, since the days of caciquismo had gone for ever.

fore they must either leave the government or be prepared to commit electoral suicide.[1]

Portela's first government duly broke up on 30 December. By 10 p.m. on the same day, however, he had formed another, consisting entirely of independents amenable to his and the President's wishes.[2] Portela needed time to attract politicians to the new Centre that he believed essential because Left and Right were so hostile towards each other. Alcalá-Zamora therefore signed a decree on 1 January suspending the Cortes until the end of the month. However, the President of the Cortes, Alba, said that this was an unconstitutional act upon which the Cortes would have to pass judgment. On 2 January, the Alfonsine Vallellano presented Alba with a document signed by the necessary one-tenth of the Deputies (Monarchists and Cedistas) demanding

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1 El Debate, 18, 24, 26-28 Dec., & ABC, 28 Dec. 1935. Gil Robles (letter of 16 Dec. to President of Cortes) took his stand on Artic. 110: Parliament, not the executive, must make financial decisions. Alcalá-Zamora (Los defectos, 201-6) took his on Artic. 107: budgets could be extended by decree if they were not modified. The Liberal-Democrats' only hope for seats was in alliance with the CEDA in Asturias. The CEDA threatened to fight the Agrarians in Martínez de Velasco's own province of Burgos.

2 By 30 Dec. the Agrarians, Liberal-Democrats, Lliga and Chapaprieta had accepted Gil Robles's demands. The cabinet meeting was stormy: Portela tried to hit Chapaprieta. In the crisis, Agrarians, Liberal-Democrats, Lliga, M. Maura and Calderón all boycotted Portela, whose new government was:- Premier & Interior, Portela; State, Urráiz (ex-Radical); Finance, Rico Avello; Justice & Labour, Becerra (ex-Radical); Public Works, Del Río (Progressive); War, Gen. Molero; Navy, Adm. Asarola; Agriculture, Álvarez Mendizábal (ex-Radical); Public Instruction, Villalobos (ex-Liberal-Democrat) (El Debate, 29 & 31 Dec. & ABC, 31 Dec. 1935; HCE, II-8, 407; Bowers, My Mission, 175-6).

that the Cortes meet immediately. Gil Robles declared that 'the suspension of sessions by the government implied a manifest violation of the present Constitution, was equivalent to a coup d'état and put the President of the Republic and the government outside the law'. He demanded a meeting of the Permanent Deputation of the Cortes to consider the matter. Portela agreed to its meeting on 7 January.[1] Since he could not hope for a majority, he published the decree of dissolution, drawn up on 30 December, only hours before it met.[2] The electoral campaign now officially began. Polling-day was to be 16 February, with second contests where necessary on 1 March.

Portela's confidence, however, had not yet been shaken. He continued to 'pack' local government posts with his friends.[3] At

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1 El Debate, 1-4 & 7 Jan. 1936. The Permanent Deputation was a small group which could meet at any time when the Cortes was suspended; it consisted of representatives of the government and the bigger parliamentary minorities.

2 El Debate, 8 Jan. 1936; Alcalá-Zamora, Los defectos, 175.

3 El Debate, & ABC, 9-11 Jan. 1936. Reports of these activities came from the South, Galicia, Aragón and Valencia. In Daimiel (Ciudad Real) Del Río's men took over. The Radical Tuñón de Lara declared: 'In my province, Almería, where up to now there have only been Socialists, CEDA and Radicals, 15 Progressives have sprung up to form a temporary committee, where from nobody knows.' In Dec., Portela offered the Liberal-Democrats a Governor in Asturias to pack the town councils, if Rico Avello could be on their list. Portela demanded a letter of loyalty from the Governor of Cádiz, otherwise he and all the councillors appointed by him would be sacked. Chapaprieta said the hey-day of Romero Robledo had returned. Many appointments were said to be backdated: the Law of 27 July 1933 specifically forbade changes in public personnel in the electoral period.

Lugo, Gil Robles launched a violent attack on the government, whose candidates without a programme merely sought 'to put themselves on the side of the hottest sun... Previously only Heads of State were untouchable; now the magnificent precious Governors are also untouchable... I am not offended because they call me a Catholic, so neither can Señor Portela be offended because they say that he is a Mason, and Grade 33.' He appealed to the electors of Galicia, where Portela's caciquismo was most in evidence, to show that they would not be corrupted.[1]

The Socialists and Left Republicans were also outraged, and threatened to boycott the elections if Portela did not act more fairly.[2] The Right's press continued to report a whole stream of abuses committed by the government and its agents.[3] During January,

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1 El Debate, 7 Jan. 1936; his meeting was suspended by the government's observer. His meeting at Guadalajara on 31 Dec. was banned, perhaps because he had referred to 'all the illegal acts that are being consummated from the heights of power... The revolution found a redoubt in the heights of power'; Portela was 'an agent of the Masonic Lodges'. (El Debate, 31 Dec. 1935).

2 El Debate, 9-10 Jan. 1936. Orders were therefore given to reopen Casas del Pueblo in the South (El Debate, 12 Jan. 1936).

3 E.g. Velayos protested that the new Governor of Avila was packing local councils; Portela's friends said Velayos's men were dismissed for peculation. The Gov. of Toledo was sacked for not prosecuting Gil Robles. The Gov. of Cuenca resigned because the Minister of Agriculture (a candidate there) had dismissed 100 town councils. Pérez de Laborda was detained for pointing out that Del Río had been a Monarchist candidate on 12 Apr. 1931. For the first time the government monopolised radio propaganda. Gil Robles said the government was giving public works money to pueblos in exchange for their votes (El Debate, 19 Jan.-13 Feb. 1936).

however, it would seem that Portela and his Ministers began to lose confidence in the possibilities of managing the election. Though the Portelista Centre's manifesto again appealed to electors to vote for it as the only way of avoiding the civil war that Left and Right both threatened to unleash, its candidates were encouraged to enter coalitions, at first with anyone from Besteiro to the CEDA, and later with anyone.[1]

Both Left and Right, then, disapproved of what Largo Caballero called Portela's 'political hermaphroditism'.[2] On 7 February, Portela announced that his candidates would ally with the Right in constituencies where the Left refused to give them a place on its lists.[3] In fact, the Left rebuffed Portela everywhere, except in Lugo, where an alliance was formed. Although Monarchists disapproved, Gil Robles was more receptive to Portela's suggestions, despite his recent bitter attacks on the Premier, because the CEDA expected the Left to win in the south.[4] Both Portela and Gil Robles stressed

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1 El Debate, 26 & 29 Jan. & ABC, 8 Feb. 1936. Del Río, who fought alone, said the CEDA and the Socialists were the only forces in Ciudad Real; he would be lucky if he kept his seat (El Debate, 12 Jan. 1936).

2 El Socialista, 21 Jan. 1936.

3 ABC, 8 Feb. 1936.

4 Bowers was told by a journalist close to Gil Robles that the south, Catalonia, Saragossa and Bilbao would go to the Left, and a bloody revolution would follow a Leftist victory. The journalist was sent to the U.S., German and British Embassies to get them to press the President to abandon his policy of creating a Centre - the implication being that if the anti-Leftist vote was split, the Left would win and threaten foreign investments, etc. (My Mission, 173-6).

that no pact between the government and the CEDA had been made: it was simply a question of local tactical alliances.[1] Portelistas were indeed included in the 'counter-revolutionary' coalition in a dozen provinces in the south. Here, therefore, the CEDA had the marginal advantage of the support of the authorities.[2] Elsewhere, Portelista candidates fought alone - for example, the ex-Radical Alvarez Mendizábal in Cuenca, the Progressive Del Río in Ciudad Real, Pita Romero (ex-ORGA) in Corunna and Portela himself in Pontevedra. In Valencia, the Blasquistas were the government's candidates. Efforts to reach agreement with the PNV failed: it fought on its own again.[3]

Local alliances between the CEDA and elements of the Republican Right were general. In Catalonia the Lliga went to the polls with

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1 El Debate, 9 Feb. & ABC, 8 & 9 Feb. 1936.

2 Viz. Badajoz, Cáceres, Albacete, Alicante, Huelva, Jaén, Granada, Córdoba, Málaga-prov., Murcia-prov. and Tenerife. An interesting illustration of Portela's efforts was the case of the Progressive Roldán, whose name first appeared on the Left's list for Málaga-cap., but was then transferred to the Right's list for Málaga-prov.

3 The PNV's attitude was: 'We want nothing to do with the revolutionaries nor with the counter-revolutionaries'. (Monzón, quoted by Sierra Bustamente, Euskadi, 152). A Basque Nationalist delegation was told in Rome in January by the Papal Pro-Secretary that the PNV should unite with the Right since 'the struggle is between Christ and Lenin'. The Basques reaffirmed their intense Catholicism, but declined to ally with the CEDA (see Iturralde, Catolicismo, I, 395-6, 411-6 & 420-1).

Radicals, Traditionalists and Cedistas in the 'Catalan Front of Order'. Lerroux and those Radicals that remained loyal to him, such as Salazar Alonso, Velarde and Pérez Madrigal, took up a clear Rightist position: Spain's problem was 'not one of régime, but of being or not being'.[1] The 'counter-revolutionary' coalitions often included Radicals, Agrarians, independent local notables, a few Conservatives, and (mostly in Asturias) Liberal-Democrats. The Conservative leaders M. Maura and Arranz fought alone in Soria, though Maura announced that his party would ally with the Right. Like Gil Robles, he demanded that the next Cortes judge the President's conduct.[2] Local notables with whom the CEDA allied included Romanones in Guadalajara, March in the Balearics and Calderón in Palencia. Agrarians formed part of the coalition in many provinces, but not in Burgos, where the CEDA, Traditionalists and Albiñana

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1 Lerroux, ABC, 4 Feb. 1936, echoing Calvo Sotelo's phraseology. The JAP nevertheless continued to attack him (Bowers, My Mission, 181).

2 Maura said that Portela had subverted the Constitution, and the Republic had been disfigured. Gil Robles, he said, had since 1933 proved himself a loyal servant of the Republic, whereas Azaña was the revolutionaries' prisoner (El Debate, 14 Jan. 1936). Gil Robles called for judgment of the President on 23 Jan. (El Debate, 24 Jan. 1936). Maura's electoral policy was a complete volte-face from his attitude in Oct. 1934. Soria had in the past elected Arranz. Some Conservatives (e.g. in Salamanca) preferred alliance with Portelistas to joining the Right, which did not like them.

set out to trounce Martínez de Velasco and his fellow caciques.[1]

Gil Robles sought the widest possible coalition. The CEDA's alliances were 'most varied... For us, the counter-revolutionary front begins where that formed by the defenders of the revolution ends... Our compromises, with whatever party or forces they may be, are entirely electoral; they will not last a day longer than the electoral agreement... We are united because thus we are going to beat the revolution.'[2]

Agreement with the Monarchists, however, was not so easy. Calvo Sotelo proclaimed the need for 'a great anti-revolutionary front' based on a pact for unity during and after the elections until its provisions were implemented. This pact should stipulate prohibition of separatist parties and revolutionary Marxism, strict arbitration in labour disputes, strict maintenance of public order, crucifixes in the schools, a big unemployment programme and higher agricultural prices. It was 'ingenuousness' to hope to transform the régime from within. An alliance of Monarchists, Cedistas and independents - all

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1 There were various reasons for this split. Officially, the Agrarians refused to stand with Albiñana (El Debate, 11 Jan. 1936). However Cedistas dwelt on Agrarian incompetence over the wheat surplus and the party's political tergiversations. The local CEDA and Traditionalists represented Catholic farmers and smallholders while Albiñana had a following among farm-labourers. Martínez de Velasco, on the other hand, represented larger farmers and urban bourgeois elements, and presumably had the old Albista political organisation.

2 Gil Robles, El Debate, 6 & 11 Feb. 1936.

Radicals were excluded - should judge the President, install a new constitution and set up a dictatorship: 'If two years from our victory we have to engage in a new life-and-death battle, like this one, it will not be worth the trouble to win now.'[1] The Falange also said that it was in favour of a 'national front' in principle. Calvo Sotelo therefore asked for its inclusion in his projected Rightist coalition.[2]

Gil Robles, however, was not going to be stampeded into any entangling commitments. The 'tactic' had not failed: an electoral victory would indeed assure its success. The CEDA would keep its personality as the 'axis' of a counter-revolutionary front made up of local, tactical, circumstantial, purely electoral coalitions.[3] Calvo Sotelo, who had said that the next Cortes would be constituent, had to announce that this was only a personal opinion.[4] Monarchists

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1 ABC, 17, 18 & 24 Dec. 1935. Calvo explained: 'England, a model country, excludes from elections the Crown, democracy, legality, religion... We are now gambling on one card everything substantive, discarding the accidental and disputable.' (ABC, 31 Dec. 1935). Traditionalists wanted a national counter-revolutionary front with a definite pact to revise completely the Constitution, citizens' liberties and State organization (ABC, 31 Dec. 1935 & 7 Jan. 1936; El Debate, 20 Dec. 1935). Goicoechea demanded 'a Corporative State beneath the guardianship of the Monarchy.' (ABC, 24 Dec. 1935).

2 El Debate, 20 Dec. 1935; HCE, II-9, 415; ABC, 31 Dec. 1935.

3 El Debate, 22 Dec. 1935, 3 & 7 Jan. 1936. According to El Socialista, 23 Jan. 1936, Herrera and Lucía restrained Gil Robles from a more pro-Monarchist line.

4 ABC, 31 Dec. 1935 & 14 Jan. 1936; El Debate, 23 Jan. 1936.

continued to demand a joint Rightist pact or manifesto, ostensibly because a definite programme would arouse more enthusiasm.[1] What they really sought was an agreement binding the CEDA to the Bloque Nacional and thus making Centre-Rightist alliances impossible. If, as they hoped, the Right won a marginal majority, Gil Robles would then have to rely on the Monarchists to govern and there would be many opportunities for political blackmail. Gil Robles, however, refused Monarchist and Falangista demands for large numbers of places on anti-Leftist lists.[2]

The Falange's failure to get places and its disapproval of Gil Robles's type of national front soon led it to break with the Right. It put up candidates of its own in eleven constituencies; José Antonio himself stood in eight.[3] As usual, he advocated his own blend of social-nationalism. He denounced the Centre-Right's 'sterile and melancholy biennium', and stated that the Falange would not respect the verdict of the polls if it proved 'dangerously

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1 ABC, 31 Dec. 1935, 4, 5 & 14 Jan. 1936.

2 An electoral committee of Sáinz Rodríguez, Gil Robles and José Antonio functioned for a time, but Gil Robles rejected big Monarchist claims and vetoed José Antonio's name for the list in the capital (Gutiérrez-Ravé, conversation).

3 El Debate, 9 Jan. 1936; Primo de Rivera, O.c., 1097-102; Bravo, Falange, 126, 133-8 & 150; Ximénez, JA, 623-5; Payne, Falange, 91; García Venero, Falange, 89. It would appear that he had wanted 25-30 places. When Gil Robles refused this request, José Antonio said that the Right's front was unacceptably negative.

contrary to the eternal destinies of Spain'.[1]

Calvo Sotelo agreed to support the CEDA on 20 January, but earlier in the day Gil Robles had agreed with Radicals, Conservatives and Agrarians that their aim was to defend the Republic and ensure the proper functioning of Parliament. No pact was made with the Monarchists, who campaigned separately.[2] Monarchists appeared on the anti-revolutionary lists in most constituencies, though many were excluded by the CEDA when places had to be found for Republicans.[3] As a result, some lone Alfonsine candidates appeared in some provinces - for instance, the Dictator's Minister Yanguas in Avila. The Traditionalists put up separate lists in Castellón and Santander.[4] The 'National Counter-Revolutionary Front' list for the capital, including Monarchists and Republicans, was not agreed upon until

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1 O.c., 129-44 (2 Feb. 1936) & 181-8 (22 Dec. 1935). He thought that the Right's social propaganda was insincere; the Left was unacceptably 'Asiatic' and materialist. Jap*istas* tore down Falangista posters (Ximénez, JA, 657).

2 HCE, II-9, 427 & 435.

3 ABC, 28, 29 Jan., 2, 4, 6, 9, 13, 16 Feb. 1936. E.g. when 2 Alfonsines in Toledo stood firm, the CEDA threatened to cancel the national agreement with the Monarchists; the 2 Alfonsines were prevailed upon to withdraw.

4 In Santander the Traditionalist Zamanillo allied with the Falangista Ruiz de Alda (García Venero, Falange, 87 & 92).

4 February.[1] Monarchists disliked having to accept alliances with Republicans, but grudgingly conceded that this was a cruel necessity. Monarchists saw themselves as upright gentlemen, Gil Robles as a scheming politician whom they had to assist with their money and their votes, even though they knew that he would again betray them, because Largo Caballero was the only alternative.[2]

The Bloque Nacional's campaign was not just anti-Leftist, but anti-Republican and anti-democratic. For Calvo Sotelo, 'the Revolution' could not simply be beaten at the polls; this was only a preliminary skirmish. The Right would have to make it legally impossible for revolutionary parties to operate as they were now in the Leftist coalition, which was merely 'the Revolution...in the sheep's clothing of legality.' He also made what he called 'an indirect invocation to force': the Army, 'the Nation in arms', was expected to rise when legality was used by the government against 'the Country' - a clear reference to the course to be taken if the

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1 El Debate, 5 Feb. 1936. It consisted of Gil Robles and 4 other Cedistas (one of them Bermúdez-Cañete of the JAP, formerly of the JONS, who had been El Debate's correspondent in Berlin until the Nazis expelled him in 1935); Calvo Sotelo and 2 other Alfonsines; 2 Radicals; Royo Villanova; a Traditionalist; and Giménez Caballero (once a Jonsista, but now associated with the newly-formed Partido Económico Patronal Español, which demanded abolition of strikes and revolutionary parties, and a free hand for employers - El Debate, 24 Dec. 1935, 21 Jan. 1936).

2 The argument of the electoral booklet by 'El Caballero Audaz', La revolución y sus cómplices (Madrid, 1936), 13-5.

Left were to win. Such disobedience, he believed, was fully justified according to St. Thomas and Fr. Mariana. He agreed with Pradera that 'the Republic is the Revolution'. The next Cortes must be constituent and abolish elections.[1] The main point, then, in Monarchist propaganda in 1936 was the same as it had been in 1933: 'Let us vote so that some day we can stop voting.'[2]

As usual, the Right's campaign fund was bigger than the Left's, though it was perhaps not so big as it had been in 1933.[3] The CEDA's propaganda, in the care of the JAP, concentrated on the fear of revolution, but it also made as much as possible of its Ministers' achievements, of the plans that its exclusion from power had prevented

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1 ABC, 14, 21 & 24 Jan. 1936; Calvo's speech of 12 Jan., quoted in J. Pérez Madrigal, España a dos voces (Madrid, 1961), 418-20.

2 Acción Española, 1 Jan. 1936 (Antología, 84). Renovación Española's manifesto said it would obstruct in the Cortes any Rightist government that did not outlaw Socialists and separatists, and depose Alcalá-Zamora (ABC, 15 Feb. 1936). Alfonsines and Carlists officially campaigned together in the Bloque Nacional, whose meeting in Madrid on 12 Jan. was addressed by Calvo Sotelo, Goicoechea, Pradera, Rodezno, Fal Conde and Lamamié de Clairac. Alfonso Carlos ordered his men to put up as many candidates as possible in defence of Religion and Country, but the Communion must keep its identity. (Documentos de Alfonso Carlos, 291). As usual, Fal Conde refused to be a candidate.

3 Buckley (conversation), who says that the Duque de Alba was said to have given only 10,000 ptas., and Maron, whom the Left always named as their opponents' financier (El Socialista, 19 Jan. 1936, said he had given 2,000,000 ptas.), was as tight-fisted as ever. HCE, II-9, 427, records that Acción Popular raised a million pesetas in one day.

from being carried out, and of the personality of the Jefe.[1]

Japistas were rather unruly. Since the autumn they had been preparing for an electoral victory which would end the liberal State, universal suffrage and the revolutionary threat once and for all. In December they still talked of 'annihilating the revolution', of 'dictating another Constitution', of 'conquering all power' and of 'the decisive victory'. At the same time they tried to goad the apathetic into action.[2] In January the JAP's pronouncements were curbed from above.[3] However it was perhaps pressure from his youth movement that led Gil Robles to make an important change in policy in the last week of the campaign: in Seville he announced that the new Cortes would revise the Constitution.[4] He nevertheless

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1 The CEDA claimed credit for the building boom, the fall in unemployment and bank-rate among other things. Others were blamed for shortcomings in labour legislation and wheat withdrawals (El Debate, 9 Feb. 1936). Leaflets were entitled 'Spain and anti-Spain', 'All Spain will be Asturias if the Revolution wins', etc. (El Debate, 11 Jan. 1936). An enormous portrait of the Jefe covered a 7-storey building in the Puerta del Sol (Buckley, Spanish Republic, 188-9). British, French and German electoral techniques were imitated (El Debate, 18 Dec. 1935).

2 JAP, 5, 12, 19 Oct., 21 & 28 Dec. 1935; as usual, they pledged their obedience to the Jefe. They addressed 'señores conservaduros' as follows: 'What awaits you if Marxism wins:... Arming of the rabble. Burning of banks and private houses. Sharing out of goods and lands. Pillaging in earnest. Sharing out of women. Ruin!! Ruin!! Ruin!! You can go on sleeping if you like!'

3 El Debate, 19 &31 Jan. 1936. Gil Robles ordered an issue of the weekly to be withdrawn, and the government banned two others.

4 El Debate, 12 Feb. 1936.

continued to reject dictatorship.[1] On the eve of the poll he declared his intention of governing in energetic and determined fashion, but without this signifying 'the smashing of the adversary, destruction of the enemy, annihilation of he who is opposed to us.' To try to steal the Left's thunder, he promised an amnesty for 'all those dragged along or deceived' by revolutionaries.[2]

The Leftist coalition gave an impression of greater cohesion than the Rightist, but it too had its divisions. Azaña's Izquierda Republicana, Martínez Barrio's Unión Republicana and Sánchez Román's group of National Republicans had worked together closely in 1935 for a return to the first biennium. The Socialists were divided: Besteiro's reformists rejected revolution and a Republican alliance; Prieto's centrists wanted a repetition of the first biennium; Largo Caballero and the party's Youth wanted an all-Socialist government to follow a short Republican interlude.[3] The PSOE opened negotiations with the Left Republicans on 14 November at the latter's request. Within the PSOE, the collaborationist views of Prieto

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1 Romanones and Gil Robles were interviewed by the Diario de Lisboa (El Debate, 13 & 14 Feb. 1936). Romanones said he thought a temporary eclipse of parliamentarism inevitable after the elections; Gil Robles would make the transition to a civil dictatorship. Gil Robles, however, denied such rumours as 'impertinence and rubbish to which I have already given the lie in broad daylight for all to see.'

2 El Debate, 14 & 16 Feb. 1936.

3 Martínez Barrio, Frente Popular, 30-61.

carried the day. His rival, Largo Caballero, therefore resigned from the party's executive committee on 18 December.[1] However, he and his followers, the Caballeristas, accepted the need for unity at the polls in order to defeat the Right. The PCE, the orthodox Communist party, also favoured collaboration, in obedience to the Comintern's decision in August 1935 to create 'anti-Fascist' Popular Fronts.[2]

The Popular Front's pact, signed by Izquierda Republicana, Unión Republicana, the PSOE, the UGT, the Socialist Youth, the PCE, Pestaña's small Syndicalist Party and Maurín's POUM, appeared in mid-January. It was an electoral pact which set out an eight-point programme to be implemented by the Left Republicans with the support of the rest of the Left. All those arrested since the last election were to be amnestied, and workers and civil servants dismissed since then were to be reinstated. The provisions of the Constitution were to be properly enforced. Agrarian legislation would be revised to help the peasant and smallholder; it was recorded that the Socialists had wanted nationalization of the land, but the Republicans had not accepted this. Industry was to be protected. A public

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1 El Socialista, 19 & 26 Dec. 1935. The Socialist daily reappeared on 18 Dec., after being suspended for 14 months.

2 Bolloten, Grand Camouflage, 93; D.T. Cattell, Communism and the Spanish Civil War (Berkeley, 1955), 219. The Seventh Congress advised fusion of the Socialist and Communist Youths as a preliminary to the formation of a single Spanish proletarian party.

works' programme was to be implemented; the workers' parties' demand for aid for the unemployed was noted, as was the Republicans' belief that this would be rendered superfluous by the rest of the programme. The social legislation of 1931-33 was to be reintroduced, though the Republicans rejected Socialist ideas of workers' control: 'The Republic conceived by the Republican parties is not a Republic directed by social or economic class motives, but a régime of political liberty, driven by considerations of public interest and social progress.' State laicist education would be developed, as would regional autonomy and support for the League of Nations.[1]

Just as Monarchists saw their alliance with the CEDA as a tactical necessity in order to defeat the other side, so the Caballeristas saw the Popular Front in similar terms. It was 'an intermediate stage of common labour, in which the Republicans dissolve the Fascist centres and purge the armed forces, so that the Socialists may soon install the dictatorship of the proletariat.'[2] Largo

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1 Text in El Socialista, 16 Jan. 1936. Sánchez Román did not sign because he disapproved of the extreme Left and militias being included in the alliance (El Debate, 16 Jan. 1936). The Partido Obrero de Unificación Marxista, an independent Catalan Communist grouping, later withdrew, but told its followers to vote for the Popular Front even though this was considered a barrier to proletarian revolution (H. Gannes & T. Repard, Spain in Revolt [London, 1936], 126). The Esquerra, whose leaders were still in prison, was in practice part of the Popular Front. Madariaga (conversation) says that, as delegate to the League, he found Azaña less enthusiastic about it than Lerroux or Chapaprieta; the latter, when Premier, had been prepared to go to war with Italy over Ethiopia if the League had decided on this course.

2 Alvarez del Vayo, ABC, 3 Jan. 1936.

Caballero himself declared 'that, before the Republic, our duty was to bring it about; but, with the Republic established, our duty is to bring about Socialism. And when I speak of Socialism, I do not speak of Socialism alone; I speak of Marxist Socialism. And in speaking of Marxist Socialism, I speak of revolutionary Socialism... We are Socialists, but revolutionary Marxist Socialists... Our aspiration is the conquest of political power. Method? That which we are able to use!... Let it be well understood that by going with the Left Republicans we are not mortgaging anything in our ideology and action... It is a circumstantial coalition, for which a programme is being produced that is certainly not going to satisfy us.'[1]

If the Right were to win the elections, then 'we shall have to proceed to declared civil war. And this is not a threat, it is a warning... I desire a Republic without class warfare; but for this it is necessary for one class to disappear.'[2] Young Socialists proclaimed their disagreement with 'the democratic way-out', but accepted it for the moment in order to bar Fascism's path, free prisoners and exact responsibilities for the repression. They wanted no ministerial portfolios: 'The only thing that we long for is to be allowed

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1 El Socialista, 14 Jan. 1936 (speech in Madrid on 12 Jan., i.e. before the appearance of the electoral pact).

2 Largo Caballero, El Socialista, 28 Jan. 1936.

freedom to prepare our revolutionary army and conquer power.'[1]

Socialists of all persuasions took the initiative in making the repression in Asturias the main issue in the campaign.[2] They also dwelt on the Centre-Right's biennium as a whole: 'Hunger. Unemployment. Tyranny. Fraud. Exploitation. Robbery. Nepotism. Ineptitude. Negligence. Immorality. Mire. Slime. Such is, in synthesis, the work of these two years of Fernandine reaction, of Inquisition.'[3] They appealed for the support of the CNT in order to get their prisoners released,[4] since they knew that they needed Anarchist votes to be sure of winning in the south, the Levante, Saragossa and Catalonia. The FAI-CNT scorned the Popular Front's programme because it was a 'profoundly conservative document', but, in effect, advised its followers to vote for the Left so as to get prisoners released and also because a Rightist victory would be more prejudicial

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1 Muños Lizoano, El Socialista, 16 Jan. 1936. He and other Leftists talked of over '30,000 prisoners'. According to HGL, 424, there were in Feb. 1936 only 20,446; just 6,000 of these had been arrested in connection with the events of Oct. 1934.

2 E.g. Prieto's El Liberal printed 18 pages of affidavits on Moorish and legionary brutality (Bowers, My Mission, 181). The Right concentrated instead on the events of 5-13 Oct. 1934, which the Left overlooked. Socialists were also accused of using bogus photographs (El Debate, 16 Jan. 1936).

3 The conclusion of the Socialist election booklet by García Palacios, El segundo bienio, 67.

4 E.g. El Socialista, 25 Dec. 1935.

to the Anarcho-Syndicalist cause.[1]

According to El Socialista, Spanish politics were now polarized: the Right advocated clerical-Fascism, the Left wished to draw out 'the natural consequences' from the Republic. The Left was terrified of 'Fascism', the Right of 'Revolution'. Both sides were fully conscious of the vital importance of this election. Only victory could ensure survival.[2]

The campaign was conducted by both sides in an atmosphere of civil war, and there were the usual violent incidents in the streets.[3] Tension mounted not only because of the nature of the issues at stake, but also because no one was really confident of success.[4] Leaders

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1 Bolloten, Grand Camouflage, 151; P. Broué & E. Témime, La révolution et la guerre d'Espagne (Paris, 1961), 61.

2 El Socialista, 19 Dec. 1935. The Right was further alarmed by the result of the Socialist poll for their candidates in the capital: Caballeristas won, Besteiro was excluded (El Debate, 2 Feb. 1936; Bowers, My Mission, 184-5). The Right thought Republicans in the Popular Front of little account: 'The Girondins helped Robespierre to raise a scaffold that was used to execute them, and Kerensky was ousted and exiled by Lenin. Such is the fate of politicians who, lacking strength of their own, serve only as a mask for revolutionaries!' (Marín Lázaro, El Debate, 11 Feb. 1936).

3 Between 31 Dec. and 21 Jan., 14 people were killed and 19 injured in street incidents (El Debate, 22 Jan. 1936).

4 Azaña and Gil Robles both confessed in private that they did not expect to win (Madariaga, Spain, 484). Azaña told Ossorio (Memorias, 215) that he feared the victory of the Popular Front most of all. José Antonio, who had in 1935 gained notoriety for predicting victory for Azaña, now changed his mind and thought Gil Robles would carry the day; hence he saw no need to withdraw the Falange's candidates in the interests of defeating the Left (Ultimos hallazgos, 116; Textos inéditos, 347).

on both sides naturally planned for victory, but nothing illustrated the uncertainty better than the declarations of José Antonio, Largo Caballero and Calvo Sotelo that they would take to violence if defeated. El Debate, which sought to avoid violence, made anguished appeals for everyone to vote: 'To abstain is a crime, which in this case is committed against the rights of God and the sacred interests of Spain.'[1]

On Sunday 16 February, some 70% of the electorate went to the polling-booths to select 472 Deputies from 987 candidates.[2] The elections resulted in a victory for the Left.[3] Of the parties of the Popular Front, the Socialists won 88 seats, Izquierda Republicana 79, Unión Republicana 32, Esquerra de Catalunya 20, Communists 15, Acció Catalana 5, Unió Socialista de Catalunya 4, Galleguistas 3,

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1 El Debate, 13 Feb. 1936. The Primate's Pastoral referred to the connection in Spain between religion and patriotism and urged all to vote against laicist candidates; but charity must be shown towards opponents: 'Avoid violence. Respect the liberty of those who do not think like you.' (El Debate, 29 Jan. 1936).

2 ABC, 10 Feb. 1936 for candidates proclaimed. The CEDA had the largest number, 177, followed by the Socialists with 125 and Izquierda Republicana with 120. The Falange put up 44. According to the calculations of O Seculo (quoted in El Debate, 6 Mar. 1936), 69.1% of the 13,528,609 electors voted - but these figures apparently excluded the late returns from Las Palmas, and parts of Tenerife and Málaga-cap. Over 4,000,000 electors therefore did not vote. (The poll in 1933 had been 62.9%.)

3 For these elections in general, the studies by the Socialist J. Venegas (Las elecciones del Frente Popular [Buenos Aires, 1942]), by C.M. Rama (Ideología, regiones y clases sociales en la España contemporánea [Montevideo, 1958]) and by Bécarud (Deuxième République, 61-74) have been consulted. The first two, in particular, contain inaccuracies.

Federals, Catalan Nationalist Republicans and Unió de Rabassaires two each, and Left Agrarians, Esquerra Valenciana, Frente Català Proletari and the POUM one each; there were also eight independents, among them the Syndicalist Pestaña. In the Centre, Portelistas won 19 seats, Lliga 11, PNV 9, Radicals 8, Progressives 6, Conservatives 3 and Liberal-Democrats one; there were also seven independents. On the Right, the CEDA won 96 seats, Traditionalists 14, Renovación Española 12, Agrarians 11 and the PNE one; there were also ten independents, including Romanones and his son. Thus, in comparison with the position in 1933, the Left had risen from 97 to 264, the Centre had declined from 177 to 64 and the Right from 201 to 144 seats.[1]

Although, as usual, the Cortes were conceived of as composed of three segments, many of the Deputies of the Centre had been on the Right in the elections. Paradoxically, the candidates of the Popular Front obtained some 4,356,559 votes, while the 'anti-revolutionary' candidates polled 4,570,744. The Portelistas, Progressives and odd independents of the Centre received 340,073, and the Basque

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1 El Debate, 7 Mar. 1936. El Sol, 3 Mar. 1936, classified some Deputies in a slightly different way and arrived at totals of: Left, 266; Centre, 65; Right, 142. Both sets of figures took into account the results of the second round on 1 March in Álava, Castellón, Soria, Biscay-prov. and Guipúzcoa. In the lattermost, the Right withdrew in the cause of religion to let the PNV win, as Bishop Múgica of Vitoria had advised (HCE, II-9, 463).

Nationalists 141,137 votes.[1] Thus the opponents of the Popular Front, excluding the non-aligned Centre and PNV, got more votes than the Left. The quirks of the electoral system worked in favour of the latter, because it won in 34 constituencies, whereas the Right retained only 24 and the PNV two.[2] Portela had made the mistake of believing that Spain was electorally more corrupt than it was.

The results of the voting on 16 February showed that the Right - principally the CEDA - was unshakable in León and the Castiles. In 1936 there were more abstentions in these regions than in 1933, probably because some wheat-growers did not vote in protest against the mishandling of the wheat surplus. The Right held some areas bordering the Castilian heartland: Albacete, Teruel, Saragossa province, Álava and, of course, Navarre. Madrid province, however, was lost to the Left - perhaps a special case, as it was more open to the influences of the capital. All the big cities went to the Left: Madrid, Barcelona, Saragossa, Bilbao, Seville, Málaga,

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1 The totals of the Juntas del Censo, in El Debate, 26 Feb. 1936 - these figures exoluded returns awaited from Las Palmas and some parts of Tenerife and Málaga-cap. If these returns (details of which did not appear) be included, the gap between Left and Right could not have been narrowed by more than a few thousands. Many works give figures quite different from these and from each other's - often giving the Left a numerical victory - but sources for the figures are never indicated. The figures given above seem, therefore, to be the best available.

2 The PNV held Biscay-prov. and Guipúzcoa. The figure for the Left includes Lugo, won by the Left-Portelista list, and that for the Right Albacete, Granada and Tenerife, won by Right-Portelista lists, as well as Soria, won by Conservatives.

Valencia, Murcia.[1] In areas where the CNT was strong, its intervention assured the Left of victory and the level of abstentions was lower than in 1933, as was the case in Lower Andalusia, the Levante, Catalonia and Huesca. Possibly its followers voted for Left Republicans rather than Socialists. In provinces where Socialists and anti-Socialists were fairly evenly balanced, there was a swing to the Left - in Extremadura, Upper Andalusia and Asturias.[2] In Galicia, the Right retained Orense, but the Left gained the coastal provinces. Here Anarchist intervention may possibly have helped the Left, but the situation was confused by the attitude of the Portelista Governors, for Galicia was the region where caciquismo seems still to have been a significant factor. Off the mainland, the Balearics remained March's preserve, whilst Ceuta and Melilla went to the Left. In the Canaries Las Palmas went to the Left and Tenerife to the Right, though caciquismo perhaps played a part in both results.

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1 In the capital, the Popular Front got 224,540 votes, the Rightist bloc 186,422, the Falange only 4,948 (Venegas, Elecciones, 28). The Falange's total national vote was some 40,000 (Payne, Falange, 94). Madrid and Málaga had gone to the Left in 1933. Prieto regained Bilbao from the PNV. The CNT vote assured the Left's victory in the other cities.

2 Though sometimes there was not a violent swing: in Cáceres, the Left won with 98,616 votes to the Centre-Right's 95,686; in Jaén, the verdict was 135,823 to 133,991 in the Left's favour; in Granada, where the Left complained of corruption, the Centre-Right got 148,649 votes to the Left's 100,013 (figures from El Sol, 3 Mar. 1936). In Asturias, the CNT vote swelled the Left's majority. In Catalonia, where the Esquerra and its allies won everywhere, the 'Front of Order' obtained some 540,000 votes to the Left's 675,000 (El Debate, 29 Feb. 1936).

In general, then, there was a marginal movement of opinion to the Left, reinforced by Anarchist support. In 1933 the Left had been divided and the electoral system had accentuated the swing to the Centre-Right; in 1936 the opposite happened, though numerically the Popular Front was in a minority. The demise of the old liberal-conservative Centre was symbolized by the defeat of Lerroux, Cambó and Martínez de Velasco.[1]

Voting on 16 February took place in a general atmosphere of order and calm. There were only a few incidents.[2] Although the Rightist press was slow to concede defeat, politicians realized by late on the 16th that the Popular Front had won.[3] On the night of the 16th, rioting broke out in parts of the country, apparently instigated by supporters of the CNT who wanted to release their prisoners immediately, and by young Leftists eager for the immediate transfer of power to the Popular Front. The rioting spread in the next couple of days, even though Portela declared a 'state of alarm'

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1 Lerroux and Cambó defeated by the Left in Barcelona, Martínez de Velasco by the Right in Burgos.

2 ABC, 17 Feb. & El Debate, 18 Feb. 1936 both agreed on this point, though the latter did report some incidents, mostly in Galicia and Seville. Buckley gives a figure of 3 dead and 17 injured (Spanish Republic, 192).

3 Bowers, My Mission, 189. ABC's special Monday afternoon (17 Feb.) edition carried a headline saying that it was impossible to tell yet who had won.

on the 17th. Several Civil Governors threw in the sponge and simply deserted their posts.[1] Against this background of growing disorder, Rightist and military leaders pressed Portela to call out the Army and hold the Left at bay.

During the night of 16-17 February, José Antonio asked Portela in vain for rifles. He offered the Premier the services of the Falange in the event of a Leftist coup.[2] In the early hours of the 17th Gil Robles, who had just angrily rejected Monarchist appeals for a Rightist coup, also called on Portela at the Ministry of the Interior. He asked for a 'state of war' to be proclaimed immediately, and told Portela to associate him with the government, be it as 'a Minister, or your secretary, or a stenographer, or whatever you like', so as to allay Rightist fears. Portela refused both these requests.[3]

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1 Fernández Almagro, República, 167; Bowers, My Mission, 191-2; Jackson, Spanish Republic, 197; Broué & Témine, La révolution, 65; N. Alcalá-Zamora, 'Les débuts du Frente Popular' in Journal de Genève, 17 Jan. 1937 (photostat in Ministerio de Justicia, Causa General [Madrid, 1944], anexo I). In Alicante, churches were set on fire, whereupon the Military Governor demanded action from the Civil Governor. The latter (who had earlier told a crowd: 'You are free, you are masters of power') informed the Military Governor: 'One ought not to go against the people.' (Fernández Almagro, República, 169).

2 Ansaldo, ¿Para qué?, 114; Jato, Rebelión, 208.

3 HCE, II-9, 439; HGL, 420-1; Buckley, Spanish Republic, 195-6; J. Gutiérrez-Ravé, Las Cortes errantes del Frente Popular (Madrid, 1953), 30; & Farnsworth, Spain's Struggle, 182-4 (giving Portela's subsequent 'definitive' version). Portela's account refers to Gil Robles's demand for 'dictatorship' - apparently Portela's dramatised version of a 'state of war'. Portela's version, despite the claims made for it, ought to be treated with caution; at the least, it is vitiated by chronological errors. According to HGL, Portela said that he would think over Gil Robles's demands.

Next, the Chief of Staff, Franco, telephoned the War Minister to ask for the proclamation of a 'state of war', but General Molero replied that he would not do this without the authority of Portela. Franco also telephoned General Pozas, who was in command of the Civil Guard, and was given the same answer. Franco and other Generals nevertheless made ready for such a proclamation, and, in the process, were informed by officers that they would not lead troops onto the streets unless the support of the Civil and Assault Guards were assured.[1] Franco therefore next pressed the Premier to declare a 'state of war'. Portela apparently suggested such a course when the cabinet met, but the President advised against it because it would be an act of provocation in the eyes of the Left.[2]

On the evening of the 17th - the day on which Portela declared

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1 HGL, 420-2; HCE, II-9, 439; L. Galinsoga, Centinela de occidente (Barcelona, 1956), 179. Others involved in preparations were Gens. Fanjul, Goded, Rodríguez del Barrio, and Col. Galarza. Franco had previously (on the afternoon of 16 Feb.) told Pozas that he feared violence, but Pozas did not share this view (Arrarás, Franco, 164-5). According to Goded (Un faccioso, 26), the suggestion was conveyed to Portela that the latter should be neutral if the military made a move. On the eve of the elections Franco had instructed Mola to be ready to send troops from Morocco at a moment's notice (C. Martin, Franco [Paris, 1959], 106).

2 Arrarás, Franco, 165-6; HGL, 421; HCE, II-9, 440 - according to which Alcalá-Zamora vetoed the idea when Portela raised it. However, Portela (in Farnsworth, loc. cit.) claims that the President agreed to it, but that he (Portela) did not go through with it for fear of playing into the hands of the Right. According to the version given by Crozier (Franco, 159), Portela did actually proclaim a 'state of war' on the morning of 17 Feb., but Alcalá-Zamora countermanded the order in the afternoon.

a 'state of alarm' - a meeting between Portela and Franco was arranged by Natalio Rivas, a Portelista candidate in the elections. Franco again pressed the Premier to proclaim a 'state of war', if necessary in defiance of the President's wishes. The Army, Franco explained, could not act on its own because 'it has not now the moral unity needed for carrying out this undertaking'. The legal sanction of a proclamation by the Premier would overcome internal military differences and ensure the necessary police support from Pozas. Portela, however, said that he was too old for such strong measures, but he nevertheless promised to sleep on it.[1]

By this stage, the Socialists were demanding power for the Popular Front immediately; the alternative was a general strike. Gil Robles, on the other hand, publicly asked Portela to follow Martínez Barrio's example in 1933: he should keep order and stay in power until the new Cortes met on 16 March.[2] However, on the morning of the 18th Portela contacted Azaña because he thought that the disorders could only be halted by the latter taking power immediately; but Azaña wanted Portela to stay on until the Cortes met.[3] In the

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1 HCE, II-9, 441; Galinsoga, Centinela, 179-80; Arrarás, Franco, 166; HGL, 422; & F. de Valdesoto, Francisco Franco (Madrid, 1943), 98-9. A UME Captain in Alicante tried to take his troops out to restore order, but was shot by his Republican Corporals (Jellinek, Civil War, 219). Portela (Farnsworth, loc. cit.) again claims that he resisted a demand for 'dictatorship' outright.

2 El Socialista, & El Debate, 18 Feb. 1936; Bowers, My Mission, 191-2.

3 Jackson, Spanish Republic, 195 (giving Martínez Barrio's account).

evening Portela conferred with Martínes Barrio in an effort to persuade him either to take power himself or to get Azaña to change his mind. During the meeting Pozas spoke of preparations being made by the military. When Portela told Franco of his intention to give power to the Left and assured him that the situation was not really so bad, Franco tried hard to dissuade him.[1]

One last effort to persuade Portela not to hand over power to the Left was made later that night by Calvo Sotelo at a pre-arranged meeting in the 'Hotel Palace'. He asked Portela to use the Army to save Spain from anarchy, crush the Left and entrust government to stronger hands than his own. When Portela refused, Calvo Sotelo declared that all was lost.[2] On the morning of the 19th, Portela again asked Azaña to become Premier, but he again refused. In

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1 Arrarás, Franco, 167; HGL, 421; Farnsworth, loc. cit.; Ximénez, JA, 676-8; Crozier, Franco, 160-1. Pozas spoke of Goded and Franco stirring up the garrisons - probably this referred to the soundings among commanders begun on 17 Feb. (vide supra). Jellinek, Civil War, 219, writes of officers at Alicante and Saragossa being ready to act, and of the Republican Gens. Pozas and Masquelet being told of this. During this meeting Pozas and Gen. Núñez del Prado (in charge of Assault Guards) pledged themselves to the Popular Front (Hills, Franco, 213). ABC, 19 Feb. 1936, reported the rumour that Azaña wanted Martínez Barrio to take power, but the latter thought that Azaña must be Premier. On the 18th it was known in the Ministry of the Interior that the Left was sure of 240 seats - a majority. Martínez Barrio advised the President to transfer power to the Left to prevent the general strike.

2 HCE, II-9, 443; HGL, 422; Valdesoto, Franco, 105-6; F. Bertrán Güell, Preparación y desarrollo del Alzamiento Nacional (Valladolid, 1939), 24-5; Junta local del homenaje nacional, José Calvo Sotelo (Tarrasa, 1957), 22-3. The meeting was arranged over coffee in the afternoon by Calvo's friend Bau and Portela's secretary.

Portela's opinion, only Azaña could restore order and avert a general strike. He therefore resigned in order to precipitate Azaña's assumption of power. The President, who had wanted Portela to remain in power at least until the votes had been scrutinized on 20 February, had now to ask Azaña to form a government. The latter felt bound to accept power in the circumstances, and a new government was announced by him at 9 p.m. on the 19th. Spain was now ruled by Left Republicans in the name of the Popular Front.[1]

The parties of the Right now sought to explain why it was that they had lost the elections. Gil Robles tried to put the defeat in proportion: the CEDA, with its 96 seats, was still the biggest single parliamentary group, and it alone on the Right had increased its vote since 1933. There was therefore no cause for despair. Various factors, in his opinion, accounted for the defeat. In 1935 the party had not had time to put its programme into effect. Portela's attempt to create his own 'Centre' had confused conservative voters. The Left had been united and had been able to exploit

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1 Bowers, My Mission, 193-4; HGL, 422; Gutiérrez-Ravé, Las Cortes, 32; Jackson, Spanish Republic, 195; Jellinek, Civil War, 220. The government of 19 Feb. consisted of:- Premier, Azaña; Interior, Salvador; Navy, Giral; Finance, G. Franco; Public Instruction, Domingo; Labour, Ramos; Agriculture, Ruiz Funes; Public Works, Casares Quiroga (all nine of Izquierda Republicana; Industry & Commerce, Álvarez-Buylla; Justice, Lara; Communications, Blasco Garzón (all three of Unión Republicana); War, Gen. Masquelet (interim Gen. Miaja). On 16 Apr., owing to the illness of Salvador, Casares Quiroga - also a sick man - took over the Ministry of the Interior.

Catalanist feeling as well as the emotional issue of an amnesty; in 1933 Casas Viejas had worked in favour of the Right, in 1936 the Asturian repression had worked against it, since 'Spain is a country that always takes the side of him whom it believes [to have been] persecuted.'

In some provinces the allies of the CEDA had been in league with the Governors and had been disloyal. In others, he said, the Left had used force or threats, and thus had caused the crucial abstention of some conservative voters. In four or five provinces, he went on, the Right had lost thirty to thirty-five seats because Leftists had falsified the results during the 'anarchy' of 17 to 20 February. The votes of the CNT and the lack of martyrs on the CEDA's part had also been factors. Lastly, all capitalists and property owners ought not to be blamed, yet there were 'very many who, as soon as the Right attained a share in government, with suicidal egoism lowered wages, put up rents, started unjust evictions and forgot the sad experience of the years 1930-1933. Therefore in many provinces the Left's vote increased among humble farmers and agricultural workers, who, with a just social policy, would always be on our side.'[1]

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1 Gil Robles, interviewed in El Debate, 6 Mar. 1936, and quoted by Jellinek, Civil War, 217. Timid Rightist voters probably did not go to the polling-booths for fear of Leftist violence. El Debate, 25 Feb. 1936, explained that the CEDA had spent 1934 trying to win acceptance within the régime, and in 1935 had been hindered by its coalition partners: 'The CEDA, then, had neither the political tranquillity necessary, nor the homogeneity needed, nor the time strictly indispensable, for putting its essential plans into effect.' For discussion of the accusation concerning the falsification of returns, see section ii of this chapter.

The Cedistas of León added that Socialist organization was superior to the CEDA's. Opinion was fickle, and the Right had lost votes by mishandling the wheat problem and by pruning the bureaucracy. Nevertheless, the key-factor had been the non-implementation of social and agrarian legislation: 'We must be more generous than we have been in social policy. The behaviour of certain Rightist elements has not been in harmony with the doctrines that we preach, and owing to certain abuses,...the Right in effect has appeared as defender of these in the eyes of the proletariat.'[1] El Debate came to the general conclusion that there were three Spains: the towns, the stable countryside and the unstable countryside. The first was Leftist, the second Rightist, while the fickle third (Extremadura, Andalusia, etc.) held the balance: it had voted against the Left in 1933, but against the Right in 1936.[2]

Monarchists, however, put forward different explanations. Calvo Sotelo held the CEDA responsible for the defeat because it had called the tune during the campaign. Goicoechea blamed the policy of appeasement in 1934-1935, and attributed abstentions to the CEDA's refusal to adopt an offensive counter-revolutionary programme with Monarchists against the régime. Rightists had lacked enthusiasm and conviction: 'the tactic and its defenders will be answerable to

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1 Speeches of Contreras and Álvarez Robles to Acción Popular Agraria, León, in El Debate, 25 Feb. 1936.

2 El Debate, 27 Feb. 1936.

the Rightist masses.' Fal Conde spoke of 'a defeat for lack of programme, unity of thought and tactic. As always, those who subordinate the substantive to the tactical end up by losing the tactical and the substantive.'[1] It remained to be seen whether these internal divisions on the Right would or would not disappear in opposition to government by the Popular Front.

ii. The Spain of Azaña

When he assumed power again on 19 February 1936, Azaña was a man fully conscious of his great responsibilities in a delicate situation. His address to the nation was notable for the absence of his old partisan bitterness: 'No persecution is to be feared from the government, as long as everyone keeps within the law... Prosperity, liberty and justice...: let us all unite under this banner, beneath which there is room for Republicans and non-Republicans, for all who feel love of Country, discipline and respect for constituted authority.'[2] The CEDA's leaders responded by saying that they would put no obstacles in the way of a Republican government which acted with moderation and kept order. They were very critical

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1 ABC, 19, 21 & 29 Feb. 1936.

2 Quoted in HGL, 424. He told Paris-Soir: 'Before the elections we drew up a minimum reform programme. We intend to carry it out. I want to govern in accordance with the law. No dangerous innovations. We want peace and order, we are moderates.' (quoted by Alba, HSRE, 178).

of Rightists who panicked.[1] Azaña began by repealing by decree Chapaprieta's economic measures, restoring the town councillors of 1931 to their posts and appointing new provincial Governors to replace those who had deserted their posts. The Right saw that it must help Azaña if the extreme Left were to be brought under control and order restored. In the Permanent Deputation of the Cortes Rightists voted for decrees freeing the Basque Mayors and all others held for political or social crimes, and allowing the Catalan Parliament to meet right away so that it could give the Generalidad a government led by Companys.[2]

El Debate outlined the CEDA's terms for cooperation with the government: dissolution of all militias as in France, a programme of economic reconstruction that the Right could support and no full-scale campaign against Catholic schools.[3] Gil Robles thought that Asaña would keep his head above water for a time, but sooner or later the Socialists would turn against him and his position would

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1 El Debate, 19 & 20 Feb. 1936, which criticised those who scuttled abroad and caused a fall on the stock-exchange. Gil Robles, who on 19 Feb. took a short rest, leaving the Republican Giménez Fernández in charge of the party, later attacked Renovación Española's behaviour: 'since the Left's victory half the party, seized by an inexplicable panic, has fled abroad.' (ABC, 22 Mar. 1936).

2 El Debate, 20 Feb.-1 Mar. 1936. The Permanent Deputation had a Centre-Rightist majority since it represented the old Cortes. The amnesty was passed unanimously, but Goicoechea voted against the Catalan decree. The Court of Constitutional Guarantees now found the Law of 2 Jan. 1935 (concerning Catalonia) to have been unconstitutional (ABC, 8 Mar. 1936).

3 El Debate, 21, 23, 26 Feb. & 1 Mar. 1936.

become perilous.[1] After a meeting of his party's National Council on 4 March, he defined the CEDA's attitude to the government more precisely: 'At its side without hesitation concerning the maintenance of public order, seriously endangered by great masses of the Popular Front. In other matters, most firm maintenance of our party's ideas and position in the face of the government's plans. In Parliament, firm, reasoned, unruffled opposition to all that conflicts with what we are and represent, with no systematic obstruction, sterile when not self-defeating... Our party is not changing its tactic, neither does it think vaguely of solutions by force. It knows how to win and it knows how to lose... Could a moment of anarchy arrive when the legal struggle would become impossible? In the first place, I just do not believe that the government will allow itself to be overrun, and we are all ready to aid it in this undertaking. But, in the last resort, action in moments of anarchy is not the function of political parties. And we, in the final analysis, are a party.'[2]

While Gil Robles wanted to bolster Azaña's position vis-à-vis his Socialist allies, other Rightist leaders in February decided to give Asaña a breathing-space for tactical reasons. Goicoechea conceded that Azaña would act legally, but the decisive factor would be the activity of the Leftist masses. Alfonsines would support any government that seriously meant to keep order, but he said that he

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1 Jellinek, Civil War, 223.

2 El Debate, 6 Mar. 1936.

could find no evidence that Azaña had the firm intention of becoming 'a barrier against the uncontrolled revolutionary torrent.'[1] Even Fal Conde spoke of supporting the government if necessary in the interests of Spain. Calvo Sotelo publicly declared that, in his opinion, Azaña would try to keep order for reasons of amour-propre, but his honeymoon with the Leftist extremists could not last long. In private, however, Calvo Sotelo described his position as, 'as ever, at the cannon's foot.'[2] José Antonio also instructed his followers for the moment to wait and see. He advised Azaña to break with his Marxist and separatist allies, broaden his government and carry out the 'national revolution'. If this did not happen, then Falangistas themselves would begin to carry out this revolution.[3]

In early March, however, the Monarchist Right decided that any hope of compromise had vanished. The government had not quelled the disorders and the streets were still in the hands of uniformed Socialist and Communist militiamen chanting revolutionary slogans. The CEDA was impenitent and, according to Monarchists, was refusing to recognize the revolutionary realities of the situation.[4] For its

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1 ABC, 29 Feb. 1936.

2 ABC, 21 Feb. 1936; El Estado que queremos, 63.

3 O.c., 1033-7 & 1105-6. In Arriba, 5 Mar. 1936, he wrote that the fight was now 'Russia (or Asia) against Europe'; the Socialists and Communists had cast Azaña for the part of Kerensky (O.c., 1039-45).

4 ABC, 1 &10 Mar. 1936.

part, the Falange again took to a policy of physical reprisals, which led to the imprisonment of José Antonio in mid-March and, in mid-April, to the proscription of the movement. Nevertheless it continued its activities as a clandestine militia.[1] The Falange's counter-terrorist violence from late February onwards attracted into its ranks Japistas and other young Rightists in considerable numbers. So great was the influx that José Antonio was worried lest his movement lose its identity.[2] The JAP under the leadership of Pérez de Laborda remained loyal to the Jefe despite the decline in numbers, and the Catholic student body refused to amalgamate with Falangistas.[3] The CEDA firmly denied Socialist accusations that it was harbouring

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1 All FE offices were closed on 27 Feb. Reprisals then began, and José Antonio soon officially ordered his men to 'go over to the offensive'. The leaders were arrested on 14 Mar., after an attempt on Jiménez de Asúa's life. José Antonio refused suggestions to flee to Portugal. The FE was suspended on 17 Mar. and declared illegal on 17 Apr. after a general strike by the UGT and CNT. (El Debate, 28 Feb., 15 & 18 Mar., 18 Apr. 1936; Ximénez, JA, 698-9 & 709; Textos inéditos, 358; Ansaldo, ¿Para qué?, 115; Payne, Falange, 99-100; Rama, La crisis española, 196).

2 Payne, Falange, 98 & 104; Jackson, Spanish Republic, 216; Bowers, My Mission, 253; & E.J. Hughes, Report from Spain (New York, 1947), 37, who estimates that 50-75,000 joined the FE between Feb. and July 1936. In mid-June José Antonio claimed 10-15,000 Japistas had gone over to him and that the FE had 150,000 members (2,000 of them in gaol), being strongest in Valladolid, Madrid, Santander and Asturias (Ultimos hallazgos, 127-9). He ordered subordinates to hold firm to Falangista ideology and keep newcomers from positions of command; he forbade pacts with other groups (o.c., 1105-6 & 1108).

3 In Mar. the SEU and the AET fused in the Frente Nacional Universitario, but the Catholics refused to join (Ximénez, JA, 706-9). Some young Cedistas did cooperate with José Antonio nevertheless: Serrano Súñer, Avia, the Conde de Mayalde and Contreras.

gunmen, but it warned that people would lose faith in legality if there were no return to normal.[1]

Gil Robles was not to be deflected from his course: 'We must rely on the patriotic [good] sense of Señor Azaña to turn the government towards the Centre, breaking its links with Socialism and Communism... It is necessary to reinforce Azaña's authority so that, strengthened, he can face up to the situation of public order that confronts him. The resources of government are very great, and when they are well used there is nothing to fear.' Conservatives must accept an advanced social programme as the quid pro quo; indeed, 'the Spanish privileged classes need cudgelling to make them see reason.'[2] In fact, behind the scenes, Giménez Fernández, with the authorisation of Gil Robles, was negotiating with Prieto, who had emerged as the leader of the social-democratic tendency within the PSOE, for a national coalition government. The success or failure of these negotiations was, in the final analysis, dependent upon Prieto's relations with his fellow Socialists, and it was for reasons

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1 El Debate, 15 Mar. 1936.

2 Gil Robles talking to the Argentine press, in ABC, 22 Mar. 1936. His gloss that only statements made to the Spanish press were authentic (ABC, 24 Mar. 1936) seems to indicate that many Cedistas were not happy about this policy.

of this nature that agreement could never be reached.[1]

Hopes of compromise suffered something of a set-back in late March when a committee of the Cortes began to examine various certificates of election (actas). As usual, each side accused the other of malpractice and corruption. According to the Right, Leftists had taken advantage of the anarchic situation between polling-day and the official provincial scrutiny (20 February) to falsify returns, thus robbing the Right of victory in Cáceres, Corunna, Lugo, Pontevedra and Valencia province. The Left denied these charges and accused the Right of winning by foul means in the Balearics, Cuenca, Granada, Orense, Salamanca and Saragossa province, which, of course, the Right denied. Were the Popular Front, which had majorities in both the committee and the chamber, to act in a partisan spirit of unity, Gil Robles, Calvo Sotelo and Goicoechea would all be unseated. For the intransigent Left (Caballeristas and Communists) this was a tempting solution. The Popular Front was also aware that, although it already had a majority in the Cortes, it did not have sufficient Deputies on its own to ensure the quorum necessary for approving

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1 Gil Robles (conversation), who says that Prieto 'would not give an inch'. (For discussion of Prieto's dilemma, see below.) Gil Robles's loyal supporters considered that Prieto, unlike Largo Caballero, was 'a patriot' (Martín Artajo, conversation). HGL, 450, mentions abortive negotiations between Gil Robles and Prieto for a government of seven Prietistas with Left Republican and Cedista representation. HGL puts this episode in late June, but it seems more probable that it is a reference to the above negotiations; (see also Gil Robles's speech in the Cortes on 16 June, cited in section iii, for confirmation of this view).

legislation. It is impossible to reach any definitive judgment on the validity of the evidence presented, but it would seem that odd things had been happening, particularly in Cáceres, Cuenca, Granada and Galicia.[1]

In the committee on the actas, the Right accused the Left of acting from partisan motives and refusing to study the evidence impartially. On 27 March the Right withdrew from the committee, leaving Calderón as an observer, after rejecting a political compromise giving the Right the Balearics and Saragossa province and the Left Cuenca and Granada. Then, on 30 March, Prieto, chairman of the committee, resigned because he said that he could not be sure of

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1 El Debate, 24, 28 & 31 Mar. 1936; HGL, 425; Plá, HSRE, IV, 308; DSC, 31 Mar. & 1 Apr. 1936. The evidence presented was very confused: both sides accused the other of lying. The Left seemed to have the better case on Granada, a turbulent area in 1933. The Governor had obstructed the Left's campaign because there was a Portelista-Right list. The Right was said to have hired bands of thugs. Some results were quaint, e.g. Huéscar de la Sierra: Right, 2,056; Left, 0 (voters, 2,056). The Right emphasised that 48,000 was a big majority. In the case of Cáceres, the Right claimed to have won by 18,000, basing their figures on municipal returns and the Junta central del Censo. The Left upheld the figures of the provincial junta, which gave it victory. The Right alleged that the Left had falsified the latter. In Galicia (Gil Robles, Spain in Chains, 10), the Governor of Lugo was said to have detained the Right's candidates and requisitioned their cars; in Corunna, the Right's candidates had been locked in the Governor's office and forced to sign a document admitting defeat at gunpoint; in Pontevedra (where Portela was just elected) government agents had seized returns from 230 wards and falsified these to the advantage of Portela and the Left. According to Alcalá-Zamora (cited in HGL, 425), the Left falsified the votes in Pontevedra and gave Portela another 22,000 - sufficient for him to oust a Rightist from the list of those elected.

agreeing with one of the decisions about to be made.[1] On 31 March, the CEDA and the Monarchists withdrew temporarily from the Cortes. Giménez Fernández declared that the CEDA could not be party to 'the substitution of the popular will, basis of a democratic régime, by the absolute command of a disputable majority, essence of totalitarian régimes... Your path is free. Constitute Parliament as you please... We leave in your hands, gentlemen of the majority, the fate of the parliamentary system.' Goicoechea said that coexistence was now impossible in the Cortes, while Lamamié de Clairac in effect announced that rebellion was now licit. Ventosa (Lliga) and Cid (Agrarian) said that their parties would not withdraw, but they appealed to the Left not to light the fires of civil war for the sake of a few extra seats.[2]

The moderates of the Popular Front saved the day: the Republicans of the Left and Centre outvoted Socialists and Communists and so upheld the results in Orense and Salamanca, which had respectively elected Calvo Sotelo and Gil Robles. The elections in Granada and

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1 El Debate, 28, 29 & 31 Mar. 1936. Prieto maintained a sphinx-like silence, but it was believed that he thought Portela's acta invalid.

2 DSC, 31 Mar. 1936. Whereas Vallellano wanted only a brief withdrawal, Rodesno wanted Monarchists to renounce their seats since it was impossible 'to live with a government and a majority that are the negation of Spain' (El Socialista, 1 Apr. 1936). According to Alcalá-Zamora (Journal de Genève, 17 Jan. 1937), the Popular Front and the PNV acted arbitrarily in order to reduce the size of the opposition.

Cuenca (Goicoechea's constituency) were annulled,[1] but no other changes were made, save that four Rightists were unseated for 'incompatibilities'.[2]

New elections were to be held in Cuenca and Granada on 3 May. In both provinces the Right formed a 'National Front'. That in Granada contained the Falangistas Ruiz de Alda and Valdés, General Varela and Cedistas (including Pérez de Laborda and the worker Ruiz Alonso). On 29 April the Right withdrew from the contest as the Governor denied its candidates the freedom to campaign and took no action against the violence of leftists. Gil Robles refused a Socialist offer of three seats for the CEDA on condition that Ruiz Alonso withdrew. All thirteen candidates of the Popular Front were returned.[3]

In Cuenca the Right's list consisted initially of a local

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1 DSC, 1-3 Apr. 1936. The actas committee had in fact quickly approved the Salamanca result: the Socialist Minority then disagreed with the decision (El Debate, 21 Mar. 1936). Calvo Sotelo returned to the Cortes to defend his acta since he thought it his duty to his electors though Parliament was now quite without significance (Acedo Colunga, Calvo, 298). Azaña and the Republicans voted for Calvo to avoid further antagonizing the opposition (Duchess of Atholl, Searchlight on Spain [3rd ed., Harmondsworth, 1938], 49).

2 Viz. 2 Carlists (one Lamamié de Clairac) and 2 Cedistas from Salamanca, on the grounds that they held office in agrarian unions that had bought wheat for the State under contract in 1935. (El Debate, 20 Mar. & 5 Apr. 1936). Therefore the relative strengths in the Cortes now were: Left, 261; Centre, 59; Right, 129.

3 El Debate, 28-30 Apr. & 8 May 1936; DSC, 30 Apr. & 22 May 1936.

Cedista, an ex-Agrarian independent, Goicoechea, General Franco and José Antonio. As Prieto pointed out, the list cast doubts on the legalism of the Right. Franco soon withdrew because the imprisoned José Antonio refused for personal reasons to appear on the list with him. The government next changed its mind and insisted that this election was, in fact, the second round of the contest of 16 February, thus disqualifying José Antonio because he had not then been a candidate in Cuenca. The Governor arrested Rightists during the campaign and closed many of their offices, while the Socialists brought in gunmen from the capital. Some returns were falsified. Three Leftist candidates, the Portelista Álvarez Mendizábal, the Cedista and the ex-Agrarian were declared elected. José Antonio obtained the highest Rightist poll but was disqualified.[1] The final composi-

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1 El Debate, 28, 30 Apr., 2 & 12 May 1936; Prieto, El Socialista, 2 May 1936; DSC, 30 Apr. & 2 June 1936; HGL, 440-2; HCE, II-9, 488; Payne, Falange, 106; Bravo, Falange, 173-4; Arrarás, Franco, 170; B. Félix Maíz, Alzamiento en España (Pamplona, 1952), 82. Serrano Súñer suggested Franco so that he could be brought back from the Canaries and be able to conspire with parliamentary immunity. Cortés Cavanillas (conversation) visited José Antonio in gaol but found him adamant: he hated Franco because the latter had once insulted the Dictator in Morocco. Franco himself was not very keen to stand, but announced his withdrawalostensibly because 'when the funds of the workers' organizations are devoted to political bribery, the purchase of arms and munitions, and the hiring of gunmen and assassins, democracy, as represented by universal suffrage, has ceased to exist.' The government had at first decreed new elections (the actas had been annulled) for 3 May, with a second contest if need be on 17 May. Then the provincial junta del censo 'discovered' that no candidate had polled the requisite 40% on 16 Feb. The Junta central del Censo said Parliament must decide on the issue, but the government simply upheld the provincial junta's view. José Antonio, if elected, would have been released. Some wards on 3 May recorded more votes cast than there were electors.

tion of the Cortes was: Left, 277; Centre, 60; Right, 131. The Socialists emerged as the biggest single group.

After this blow to the cause of compromise, Azaña made another attempt to appease Right and Left. He asked Socialists to be patient: he intended to carry out the Popular Front's programme without omissions and without additions. He explained to the Right that on 19 February he had inherited 'a country abandoned by the authorities', with scarcely a provincial Governor doing his duty. Time would be needed to overcome disorder and reestablish the power of the State.

The government, however, decided that there was no more time available for Alcalá-Zamora. The President was at odds with the government because it seemed to him to be doing nothing to restore order, although it was armed with 'draconian censorship'; it was letting itself be overawed by the Leftist extremists in the streets. The last straw for both President and Premier came at the end of March over the question of dismissing inept Governors.[1] On 3 April, at

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1 Azaña, DSC, 3 Apr. 1936; Alcalá-Zamora, Journal de Genève, 17 Jan. 1937. The government asked him to sign a decree accepting the resignations of the Governors of Cádiz, Murcia, Granada and Logroño, who had allowed churches to burn without ordering the police to intervene. Alcalá-Zamora insisted that the decree say that they had been dismissed, since they had not offered to resign. The government did not agree. According to Gil Robles, Spain in Chains, 12, the Governor of Logroño actually led a mob that burnt seven churches in an afternoon. President and Premier had communicated by messenger for three weeks. The cabinet decided to oust the President on 2 Apr. (Jellinek, Civil War, 237-8, who adds that Alcalá-Zamora was thought to want Sanjurjo as the next President).

Prieto's bidding, the Cortes decided that Alcalá-Zamora's powers of dissolution of the Cortes were exhausted according to Article 81 of the Constitution. This was not Alcalá-Zamora's opinion. If, as the Cortes had decided, the dissolution in January represented the President's second use of his powers, then the Cortes were bound by Article 81 to examine whether the last dissolution had been justified. The Left now went back on its earlier pronouncements and decided it had not been justified, although it had resulted in a victory for the Left. Gil Robles, who had also previously called for judgment of the President by the Cortes, now wanted the Court of Constitutional Guarantees to settle the matter. Nevertheless, on 7 April Alcalá-Zamora was dismissed by the Cortes, the President of which, Martínez Barrio, became the interim President of the Republic.[1]

There was, indeed, a rising tide of lawlessness which the government failed to stem. Censorship prevented the Rightist press from reporting what was happening in full, but the more sensational

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1 DSC, 3 & 7 Apr., & El Debate, 4 & 8 Apr. 1936; Lerroux, Pequeña historia, 540-50. On 3 Apr. the CEDA and Centre-Right voted against Prieto's interpretation; Portelistas and Monarchists abstained. On 7 Apr. the Right abstained, but 5 Portelistas voted against his dismissal. Artic. 81 allowed the President to dissolve the Cortes twice only. The decree of 7 Jan. referred to dissolution of 'the first ordinary Cortes of the Republic' (El Socialista, 8 Jan. 1936). El Socialista, 18 Dec. 1935, openly asked for a dissolution - which indeed had been the Left's aim for the previous two years. Madariaga, Spain, 454, calls the episode 'the most glaring denial of logic the history of a free nation can show.' Companys observed that the movement of October 1934 had now been completely successful (El Debate, 9 Apr. 1936), Calvo Sotelo that here was proof that the Revolution devours its leaders (ABC, 8 Apr. 1936).

incidents could not be suppressed. The impression consequently emerged of gang-warfare carried on mainly in the capital between extremist gunmen. In March, unsuccessful attempts were made to kill the Socialist Jiménez de Asúa and to burn down Largo Caballero's house by Falangistas, while in Oviedo the Liberal-Democrat ex-Minister Martínez was killed by the extreme Left. In April, a judge in Madrid who had passed sentence on a Falangista gunman was shot by the Falange; in Seville, a parallel attempt on the life of a judge who had sentenced a Communist for killing a Falangista was made by the extreme Left. On 14 April, Lieutenant Los Reyes of the Civil Guard was shot, apparently by a Socialist. The funeral two days later was attended by such Rightists as Gil Robles, Calvo Sotelo and Pradera, and ended with a gun-battle between Falangistas and Young Socialists, an abortive attempt by some of the mourners to march on the Cortes and mutiny in a Civil Guard barracks. On 8 May, Captain Faraudo, who drilled Socialist militiamen, was shot, possibly by the UME. His funeral, in turn, was made into a big demonstration, with Prieto and Sra. Ibárruri (the Communist 'La Pasionaria') among the mourners. A few days earlier, a rumour, denounced by the government as 'absolutely false', had been spread in working-class districts of Madrid that monks had given children poisoned sweets. Monks and nuns were attacked and churches burnt as a consequence.[1]

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1 El Debate, 13, 17, 24, 25 Mar., 15, 17 Apr., 5, 10 May 1936, supplemented by Buckley, Spanish Republic, 200-6; HGL, 436; Jellinek, Civil War, 242-5; & R. García, El bulo de los caramelos (Madrid, 1953), 3 & 9-12. The UME and Falangistas were ordered to attend Los Reyes's funeral armed (Cacho Zabalza, UME, 25).

Not all of Spain was convulsed by violence all the time: the 'Catalan oasis' under Companys was normally quiet, and the Holy Week processions in Seville passed off without incident.[1] Socialists and Rightists, however, were agreed that there existed a general state of disorder; the former talked of Rightist 'provocation', the latter blamed the Left. Since publication of parliamentary debates went uncensored in the press, Rightist leaders used the Cortes to state their complaints at length. Indeed, for Calvo Sotelo this was the only use for the Cortes, and the Right saw to it that public disorder was an issue regularly aired.

The first of what was to be a series of great and dramatic debates took place on 15 April. Calvo Sotelo noted that the government appealed for calm, but he asked how people could possibly keep calm when 'security of life is non-existent in the street, when everywhere stalks the threat of social disintegration... Since 16 February it could be said that a storm of fire and fury has raged over Spain', and he presented detailed statistics of the damage. He admitted that Azaña had faced a difficult situation on 19 February, but this could not explain why the Church of San Luis, only two hundred paces from the Ministry of the Interior, had been allowed to burn on 13 March: 'If a State does not know how to guarantee order,

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1 Jackson, Spanish Republic, 214-5. On 28 Apr. Anarchists killed the separatist Badía brothers in Barcelona (El Debate, 29 Apr. 1936).

peace, the rights of all its citizens..., [then] let the representatives of this State resign!' If the government's inaction were to leave the path clear for the seizure of power by Bolshevized Socialists, then 'we must stand up here and cry that we are prepared to resist with every means, saying that the precedent of extermination, of tragic destruction, that the bourgeois and conservative classes of Russia experienced will not be repeated in Spain.'[1]

For Gil Robles, the Cortes also provided a platform from which to address the country; but whereas Calvo Sotelo's speeches were purely denunciatory and propagandistic in intention, Gil Robles also hoped that his speeches would persuade the government of the error of its ways before all were engulfed by violence. He pleaded with Azaña to restore order and either discipline or break with his extremist allies, because the alternative was civil war: the Rightist half of Spain could not and would not resign itself to extinction. If the government really believed that agents provocateurs were behind the disorders as it claimed, why then, he asked, was the government

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1 DSC, 15 Apr. 1936. Between 16 Feb. and 2 Apr. the following took place:- Assaults and destruction of political offices, 58; of public and private buildings, 72; of private houses, 33; of churches, 36. Burnings of political offices, 12; of public and private buildings, 45; of private houses, 15; of churches, 106 (56 completely destroyed). General strikes, 11. Riots, 169. Shooting affrays, 39. Assaults 85. Highway robberies, 24. Dead, 74. Injured, 345. Details of each incident were appended to the record of the session. (Highway robberies were usually ascribed to the Socorro Rojo Internacional, which officially collected funds for victims of the Asturian repression.)

not taking action against them? He would not object to strong measures provided that the government treated Rightist and Leftist offenders in the same way. 'We condemn all violence, from whatever quarter it may come.' However, the disorders and the unjust 'implacable persecution' of Rightists was leading to a situation in which 'we, the parties that act within legality, begin to lose control of our masses, we begin to appear failures in their eyes; the idea of violence to fight against persecution starts to germinate among our people; we, men with firm convictions, cannot change course so easily; but a time will come when, as a citizenly obligation of conscience, we shall have to turn to our masses and tell them: "Within legality you have no protection, because the law, which is the supreme guarantee of [the rights of] citizenship, does not enjoy the government's support; in our party we cannot defend you; with anguish we must tell you to go to other organizations, to other political nuclei that offer you at least the attraction of revenge."'[1]

Azaña gave an assurance to the Right that he had not taken power 'to preside over a civil war... The Popular Front does not signify social revolution, nor does it signify the business of enthroning Communism...: it signifies the reinstallation of the Republic on

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1 DSC, 15 Apr. 1936. Ventosa (Lliga) also asked Azaña to be firm and told him to beware of a glissement à gauche. Since police protection for churches was often not assured, Catholic volunteers guarded them themselves - but often they were arrested for infringing the laws of public assembly (Mendizábal, Martyrdom, 259).

[the plinth of] its Constitution and the Republican parties.'[1] The emphasis of his Minister of the Interior, Casares Quiroga, was however rather different: when asked by Calvo Sotelo to disarm everyone, he replied that he would concentrate his energies on 'Fascism' and added: 'social revolution does not worry me'.[2]

According to Caballeristas, 'all incidents, all, have been provoked by the Right. Every one.'[3] However, this myth was destroyed from within the Socialist ranks by Prieto: 'What no country can endure is the constant blood-letting of public disorder without an immediate revolutionary end; what no nation can bear is the attrition of its public authority and its own economic vitality through the continuance of uneasiness, anxiety and restlessness.' In Prieto's opinion, the Socialists' task was 'to proceed intelligently to the destruction of privileges, to destroy the foundation on which

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1 DSC, 15 & 16 Apr. 1936.

2 DSC, 6 May 1936. In this session Calvo Sotelo presented his statistics for the period 1 Apr.-4 May:- Dead, 47. Injured, 216 (200 seriously). Strikes, 38. Bombs and petards, 53. Fires, 52 (mostly churches). Robberies, assaults, lootings, etc., 99. Number of 'Fascists' now detained, 8-12,000 (estimated).

3 Llopis, DSC, 15 Apr. 1936, who said Socialists would support the government so as to implement the Popular Front's programme, but they did not renounce their own aims. Leftist charges of Rightist provocation referred not only to the deeds of Falangistas when these could be cited, but also were used to justify émeutes on the grounds that these were the inevitable sequel to the Centre-Right's 'black biennium'. Socialists therefore implicitly admitted that the extreme Left was causing disorder.

these privileges rest; but this is not done by means of isolated, sporadic excesses that leave behind as evidence of the people's exertions some charred images, some burnt altars or some church-doors blackened by flames. I tell you that this is not the revolution.' Indeed, he continued, such actions simply created a situation in which 'Fascism' could prosper: 'that way does not lead to Socialism, nor does that way lead to the consolidation of the democratic Republic, which I believe is in our interest...; it leads to an utterly hopeless anarchy that is not even in the Libertarian ideology; it leads to an economic mess that may finish the country.'[1] Thus Prieto put the main burden of responsibility for disorder on the extreme Left - where it properly belonged.

The division within the Socialist Party was perhaps the most important factor in Spanish politics in 1936. In part, the division was one of personalities: there had been recriminations over the Asturian revolt, and Prieto, from comfortable exile, had accused the imprisoned Largo Caballero of having been half-hearted about the rising. In part, it was a question of analysis and beliefs: Prieto drew the conclusion that the Socialists were not strong or mature enough to stage a successful revolution, while Largo Caballero decided that Prieto 'did not fit Socialist ideas'. Besteiro was by this time of no consequence. Prieto believed that the political moment

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1 El Socialista, 2 May 1936 (Prieto's May Day speech at Cuenca).

was Republican, not Socialist; Largo Caballero saw this as a betrayal of the working class.[1] Prieto thought that the Socialists could not afford to desert the Left Republicans: if they did, Azaña would 'find compensating votes in the Centre and a benevolent attitude on the Right', which would support him 'unconditionally' against revolutionary Socialism.[2] To Largo Caballero, Azaña's idea of social peace without Socialism was anathema.[3] In April he announced: 'The present régime cannot continue, and, although circumstantially we support it, we must declare that this help and this support has not to be prolonged indefinitely.' The proletariat had to be ready to use force, for 'no new régime has been born without bloodshed and violence.'[4]

The Socialist Deputies were divided in their allegiances, but Prieto was in control of the PSOE's executive and the party's official organ, El Socialista.[5] Largo Caballero's support came

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1 Largo Caballero, Recuerdos, 140-4 & 150.

2 Prieto, quoted in Jellinek, Civil War, 230.

3 Largo Caballero, Recuerdos, 153-4.

4 Largo's speech on 5 Apr., in Claridad, 6 Apr. & El Socialista, 7 Apr. 1936. Interviewed in L'Intransigeant, 6 Mar. 1936, Largo said that the hour for the Socialist conquest of power had not yet come, but if the government continued to be conservative, the Socialists would stage a revolution, for which undertaking they were adequately armed.

5 Largo Caballero, Recuerdos, 148, claimed that Prieto had ousted Caballeristas from the executive by sharp practice.

principally from the UGT, the Socialist Youth and the Agrupación Socialista Madrileña, and he had his own mouthpiece in Claridad.[1] The Socialist Youth was the most pro-Communist section of the party, and in March most of its branches agreed to join the Communist Youth in the JSU (Juventudes Socialistas Unificadas). It was hoped that this would be the prelude to ideological and organic union between the Socialist and Communist parties.[2] Largo Caballero was not himself a mere puppet of Moscow, but his views at this time coincided with those of the PCE.[3] Largo Caballero's aim was to unite Socialists, Communists and Anarcho-Syndicalists in one proletarian front. In the meantime, there must be no thought of rotation in power with the Right ever again. Socialists had to criticize and bully the government in their own interests[4] - hence the threats of revolution and

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1 Claridad, originally a weekly, became an evening daily on 6 April 1936. In March the Agrupación Madrileña elections resulted in 1,554 votes for the Caballeristas and 474 for González Peña's centrists (El Debate, 8 Mar. 1936). This influential body declared that the aim was the Socialist conquest of power by any means available in order to install the dictatorship of the proletariat (Broué & Témime, La révolution, 67).

2 Cattell, Communism, 33; El Debate, 27 Mar., Claridad, 6 Apr. & El Socialista, 7 Apr. 1936. Cattell writes that some northern branches under Prieto's influence did not join; he puts membership at 150,000 (cf. 14,000 for the Communist Youth).

3 Sra. Ibárruri said the PCE did not think the Cortes very important: 'the struggle in the street to mobilize the masses [is] our essential objective' (ABC, 13 Mar. 1936). Largo has been described as a 'Titoist before Tito' (by D. Sevilla Andrés, Historia política de la zona roja [Madrid, 1954], 178).

4 Largo Caballero, Claridad, 11 & 13 Apr. 1936.

the need for acts of violence.

Against this backcloth of violence a new President of the Republic was to be elected by the Deputies and an equal number of delegates chosen by universal suffrage. The Right decided to boycott the elections for delegates on 26 April,[1] partly because there was little freedom to campaign, partly no doubt to try and accelerate the break-up of the Popular Front. The disputes over actas and the inaction of the government did not cause Gil Robles to abandon hope of a national government. He thought that the Popular Front was about to fall apart, while the spirit of violence was increasing on the extreme Left. The choice therefore lay between revolution and strong government. He called for 'a very extensive concentration of non-Marxist forces to oppose the revolution in relentless fashion within the régime' and to put through 'very advanced' social and economic measures: 'in short; either anarchy or [a] government of national understanding, strong and authoritarian. The latter, very quickly.'[2] Calvo Sotelo was not in agreement: the imminent choice lay between 'Communism or [a] national State' and the Right must therefore stick together.[3] The CEDA's leaders saw that the govern-

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1 ABC, 23 Apr. 1936. The Lliga, Conservatives and Portelistas said that they would take part.

2 El Debate, 24 Apr. 1936. At this time Sánchez Román was trying to get M. Maura and Prieto to form a national government under Azaña in order to keep order and thus remove any justification for a coup from the Right (Jellinek, Civil War, 232).

3 ABC, 26 Apr. 1936.

mental reorganization necessary when the new President was elected provided a great opportunity for a change of course by the moderates of the Popular Front. El Debate therefore told the Catholic masses that their duty remained 'perseverant obedience' to the authorities. Giménez Fernández called on them to 'lend support to the government, for the government is the Republic and the Republic is Spain, and Spain is all of us.'[1]

The national coalition which the CEDA desired was not to be. Azaña suggested Sánchez Román for President because he was a Republican outside the Popular Front, but the extreme Left vetoed his name for this very reason. Some suggested Besteiro or Los Ríos: Largo Caballero vetoed them too, and others were not keen because they were Socialists. Caballeristas proposed Albornoz, a convinced anti-clerical who was sure to antagonize the Right. The Popular Front therefore compromised on Azaña himself.[2] On 10 May he was duly elected President, with the Cedista Deputies casting blank votes to show that they were within the régime but disapproved of such a partisan candidate.[3] Now seemed the moment to broaden the government

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1 El Debate, 3 & 5 May 1936.

2 Prieto's account, in El Socialista, 29 Apr. 1936; & Claridad, 22 & 24 Apr. 1936, which said that no Socialist could be President save Largo Caballero, whom the Republicans would not accept.

3 El Debate, 12 May 1936. The Monarchists absented themselves. The voting was:- Azaña, 754; González Peña, 2; Largo Caballero, 1; Lerroux, 1; Primo de Rivera, 1; blank, 88.

to Left and to Right under the Premiership of Prieto. However, the Caballeristas vetoed any Socialist participation in the government and invoked the terms of the electoral pact.[1] Azaña nevertheless asked Prieto to form a government, but the latter refused, since to do so without the support of his party would have brought about the break-up of the Popular Front and the bifurcation of its mainstay, the PSOE, developments which could only have redounded to the benefit of the Right.[2] Martínez Barrio was Azaña's next choice, but he was apparently thought to be too conservative by Socialists. Therefore the lot fell upon his old colleague, the impetuous consumptive Casares Quiroga, who formed another Left Republican Ministry.[3]

Azaña as Premier had been pessimistic about the future and was probably thankful for what Calvo Sotelo called his 'withdrawal to the Palatine'.[4] During the crisis the moderates of the Popular Front

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1 Claridad, 6, 7, 9 May & El Socialista, 9 May 1936. The JSU and the UGT announced that if a Socialist entered the government, they would go it alone outside the Popular Front.

2 Prieto, El Socialista, 26 May 1936; Bolloten, Grand Camouflage, 303. The Socialist Minority defeated the idea of a Prietista government by 49 votes to 19 (M. García Venero, Historia de las Internacionales en España, tomo II [Madrid, 1957], 502).

3 El Debate, 13 May 1936. Azaña consulted party leaders from the Communists to the CEDA (inclusive). The government of 12 May was:- Premier & War, Casares Quiroga; State, Barcia; Interior, Moles; Navy, Giral; Finance, Ramos; Public Instruction, F. Barnés; Public Works, Velao Oñate; Agriculture, Ruiz Funes (all 8 of Izquierda Republicana); Justice, Blasco Garzón; Industry & Commerce, Álvarez-Buylla; Communications, Giner de los Ríos (all 3 of Unión Republicana); Labour, Lluhí (Esquerra).

4 DSC, 19 May 1936.

had allowed themselves to be blackmailed by the Caballeristas, who had prevented any 'opening to the Right'. Consequently they had mortgaged the future of their Republic to Largo Caballero, whose declared policy was to destroy liberal-democracy when it suited him. Prieto and some Left Republicans clearly realized that strong government was needed, but Largo Caballero outmanoeuvred Prieto as Stalin had outmanoeuvred his opponents in the 1920s: he was prepared to risk splitting the party in order to get his own way. Prieto rightly saw that the break-up of the PSOE and its dependent bodies would only benefit the Right. Yet Gil Robles could not hope to keep his Rightists from adopting violent means for very much longer unless the Caballeristas were disciplined by a strong government which treated everybody equally. A strong government with which the CEDA could collaborate closely was the only way of taking the wind out of the sails of Monarchist and military conspirators seeking to put an end to anarchy with more drastic remedies. Such a government would have reassured Rightists and removed any justification for unilateral military action or continued Falangista reprisals.[1] This failure to form a coalition with elements to the Right of the Popular Front therefore brought civil war much closer. Furthermore, the new Premier's outlook and temperament were not likely to appease the Right.

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1 Between 16 Feb. and 20 May, 40 Falangistas were killed and over 100 injured. The Falange administered its own form of lynch-law: e.g. at Carrión de los Condes in May, Socialists shot the local FE leader; the next day, Falangistas strung up various local Socialists on trees by the roadside (Bravo, Falange, 191).

iii. The Spain of Casares Quiroga

Casares Quiroga presented his new government to the Cortes on 19 May 1936. He declared that he would adhere to the Popular Front's programme, but that now the pace would be quickened to please Leftist critics. He said that he did not care whether or not his government received the support of Deputies outside the Popular Front. He spoke of introducing measures to restrict the independence of the judiciary, and announced that he intended to defend the Republic with the best method known to him, namely with 'the tactic of attack in depth...: wherever the enemy presents himself...we shall proceed to smash him... When it is a question of Fascism, when it is a question of implanting in Spain a system that is contrary to the democratic Republic and contrary to all those conquests which we have made in company with the proletariat, ah! [then] I cannot remain detached from these struggles and I make it public to you, gentlemen of the Popular Front, that against Fascism the government is a belligerent.'

Casares Quiroga's speech well illustrated the predicament of Left Republicans: lacking masses, they were doomed to be prisoners either of the Socialists or of the Right. Casares Quiroga clearly resolved this dilemma with the old formula, 'pas d'ennemis à gauche'. As the liberal-conservative Ventosa pointed out, the new Premier's speech marked the end of the politics of tentative compromise: unlike his predecessor, he had not held out his hand to the Right and he had expressed no intention of trying to govern in a conciliatory

manner, rather the reverse. Ventosa wondered whether his method of defending the Republic did not entail persecution of people for their ideas, not just punishment for their actions.[1]

Gil Robles immediately denied that the CEDA was in any way Fascist: 'we can feel neither enthusiasm for nor concomitance with the Fascist ideology... If our party has signified anything in Spanish politics, it has represented a prodigious effort to introduce the Rightist masses to democratic processes.' Yet he thought it undeniable that 'Fascism' was growing in Spain: not the doctrine of Fascism, but 'Fascism' as a state of mind. The blame for this growth, he argued, must be apportioned to the Left since it had disillusioned Rightists with democracy by its behaviour at a time when this system was everywhere in crisis. By persecuting Rightists, the government was driving them into the arms of 'Fascism': Ministers were therefore 'today the best propagandists for Fascism', a phenomenon whose growth in Spain could also be explained as a reaction to the influence of Moscow-inspired Socialists on the government. As usual, Gil Robles appealed for an impartial national government which would effect reforms: the alternative was civil war.[2]

He had recently admitted in the press that many had already

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1 DSC, 19 May 1936.

2 DSC, 19 May 1936. The party's secretary, Carrascal, said that Cedistas were being arrested and imprisoned in all areas simply because they were Cedistas (El Debate, 16 May 1936).

deserted the CEDA, though not all had left it for the same reason. There were those who had departed 'for paths of violence, honestly believing that national problems are resolved in this way', and those who had gone because the party could not now distribute offices and sinecures. However, the CEDA would carry on, even though 'heroic remedies seduce many people, because they are quick, and perhaps because they do not require effort from everyone. Slow evolution is always more fruitful.'[1] The leader of the JAP once again pledged the loyalty of himself and those who still served him to the Jefe and his policy.[2]

Calvo Sotelo interpreted the new Premier's speech as a declaration of solidarity with the Caballeristas, whose leader not only rejected the evolutionary Marxism of Blum but had ideas on property more radical than those of the Secretary of the French Communist Party. He continued: 'The government can never be a belligerent, Sr. Casares Quiroga; the government must apply the law inexorably, and to all.' It was not the government's function to interfere with the judiciary. 'We are living in [a state of] Asiatic cantonalism ... Where is authority?' The results of such lack of authority were plain to see: 'economically, impoverishment; spiritually, hatred;

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1 El Debate, 10 May 1936.

2 Pérez de Laborda, El Debate, 17 May 1936. He emphasised that 'the JAP is where it was, and all rumours circulated concerning its disappearance or fusion with Falange are totally false'.

morally, indiscipline; politically, sterility; nationally, disintegration.'[1]

Ten days later the leader of the Bloque Nacional again attacked 'a government, or rather a few gentlemen who call themselves Ministers and say they govern,but misgovern... In Spain the State...is absent from its main functions..., [is] humiliated by being supplanted by elements alien to the State's organization who are putting their own essential beliefs into practice, who are corroding the bases of Spanish life and preparing a fearful future... Parliament is haughtily, pompously presiding over the Spanish anarchy; the legislative power gives an impression of normality, while all the other powers, the whole of Spanish life, are the personification of chaos, disorder and abnormality. This seems to me as grotesque, as absurd, as out of place as would be the holding of a magnificent cabaret amid the cypresses of a magnificent necropolis.' Then he reminded the government of the maxim of Tardieu: '"If you want to make the Country healthy and preserve liberty, reestablish authority"... You are living on anarchy,...because to repress it you would have to forfeit the political oxygen which these extreme forces give you. Have the courage to die slaying anarchy and Spain will be saved.'[2]

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1 DSC, 19 May 1936. The Right heatedly opposed the introduction by the government of a bill to set up a 'special court to bring to account judges, magistrates and prosecutors' (DSC, 3 June 1936).

2 DSC, 29 May 1936.

The Right's principal complaint therefore was that the government could not or would not keep order; when it did take action, it took action only against Rightists whom it often dubbed 'Fascists'. The burning of churches was particularly offensive to Catholics, but the CEDA was not prepared to make of this a separate issue: it was just part of the problem of public order.

The willingness of Azaña's government to proceed cautiously in religious matters was demonstrated on 28 April, when only Socialists and Communists voted in favour of abolishing the payment of stipends.[1] The new government, however, with Barnés as Minister of Public Instruction, opened old wounds. Azaña's government had on 28 February ordered inspectors to visit schools run by religious congregations. Apparently these inspectors often closed down schools on their own initiative. With the appointment of Barnés, however, it would seem that closure of schools run by the congregations and the illegal confiscation of private schools became, in effect, official policy.[2] Cedista spokesmen asked that no schools be closed unless there were places for their pupils in State schools. The Minister replied that Catholics must now suffer for their sins of omission in failing to develop sufficiently the State system since 1933. On 4 June, the CEDA temporarily withdrew from the Cortes because the

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1 ABC, 29 Apr. 1936 (the motion was therefore defeated).

2 El Debate, 20, 21, 26, 27 May, 2 & 3 June 1936; DSC, 3 June 1936.

Minister's insulting language as much as his policy gave 'intolerable offence to the Catholic conscience of the country'.[1] Cedistas continued to complain of religious persecution, while the government went ahead with its laicising policies.[2]

The question of regional autonomy also reappeared as a political issue. In Catalonia, the former régime of the Generalidad had been restored and the Law on Farming Leases implemented, but Companys, like Asaña, was now more moderate than he had been earlier. In May 1936 he edged the separatists of Estat Catalá out of the Esquerra. He stood firm against religious persecution and adopted, in general, an empirical reformist position: the economy was not to be sacrificed to social experimentation. He intended to hold new elections in October, and was in July negotiating with the Lliga for a joint 'Front of Order'.[3] The PNV supported the government in order to

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1 DSC, 20 May & 4 June 1936; El Debate, 6 June 1936. The Cedista Deputies said that if Martínez Barrio (President of the Cortes) did not give some assurance to the Right, the Minoría Popular Agraria 'would decide on irrevocable separation from a Parliament in which a minimum of coexistence is not decently possible'.

2 Members of the DRV, in particular, protested against persecution; e.g. Duato said 100,000 people in the diocese of Valencia had been deprived of spiritual assistance because Mayors had expelled priests and locked churches, quite apart from the fact that 40 churches and 14 rectories had been burnt down in the diocese in 3 months (DSC, 17 June 1936). Pabón (CEDA) said that in central Castile in the 25 days up to 15 May, 79 schools (with 5,095 pupils) had been burnt down or closed by unauthorised persons (DSC, 4 June 1936). The government voted 16,500,000 ptas. towards building more State schools (DSC, 30 June 1936).

3 García Venero, Nacionalismo catalán, 540-1; Ossorio, Companys, 148-55; Cardó, Histoire spirituelle, 245; Peers, Catalonia, 241-2.

obtain a Basque statute of autonomy, which came before the Cortes in April. By July the Cortes committee had approved the text despite obstruction from Calvo Sotelo.[1] On 28 June voting took place in Galicia on a statute for that region, but the referendum was marred by corruption and Rightist abstention.[2] There was also talk of statutes being drafted for Aragón, Valencia, Navarre, Asturias and the Balearics.[3]

This potential proliferation of autonomy caused concern on the Right about the unity of the country. In May, however, the ex-Maurista Silió put foward the idea of a defensive statute for León and Old Castile. His suggestion was supported by Rightists, though for tactical reasons in the main: the idea was quite soon forgotten. Nevertheless the very suggestion caused misgivings in some Rightist circles. The fierce anti-regionalist Royo Villanova retired from politics in disgust at this attempt by his political friends to play

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1 DSC, 15 Apr. 1936; ABC, 16 Apr. 1936; Ramos Oliveira, Politics, 423. The draft text introduced in Apr. bore the signatures of Basque Socialists and Republicans as well as Nationalists. It was sponsored by Prieto and supported by the Popular Front and the Lliga.

2 El Debate, 26 & 30 June 1936, which reported the official result of voting in Corunna as 36,311 in favour, 82 against, with 52 blank votes. The paper said that a very much smaller proportion of the 39,000 electors had in fact gone to the polls. Tuñón de Lara (España, 409) gives the complete figures: 991,476 votes in favour; 6,085 against; 30% of the electors abstained.

3 According to reports in El Debate, 26 & 31 May, & ABC, 28 May 1936.

the separatists' game.[1]

Like the question of religious persecution, agrarian and economic matters could not altogether be divorced from the issue of public order. The government of the Popular Front was expected to reintroduce the agrarian legislation of 1932-1933, and did so. Landowners were as outraged as ever, but the CEDA's attitude was not one of blind opposition. With some modification the Law of Agrarian Reform of 1932 replaced that of 1935; Giménez Fernández regretted that the sections on accession to property and the family patrimony had not been retained. Cedistas abstained when all evictions of tenants since 1 July 1934 were annulled. A new law on rural leases was also introduced, as were plans for a graduated tax on rural property, previously advocated by Giménez Fernández, and, in June, a law for the recovery of common lands.[2]

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1 El Debate, 17, 22, 23 & 26 May 1936; Royo Villanova, 30 años, 273-5. Although ABC, 21 May 1936, claimed that Calvo Sotelo had suggested the idea, its main proponents were, apart from Silió, Calderón and the Cedistas Cortés and Álvarez Robles. Some were probably sincere in wanting to put into practice, as they saw it, the ideas of Menéndez Pelayo on regionalism. The purpose of the projected statute was to be protection of the region against other region's claims on the central power by getting adequate economic help for irrigation, etc.; also to strengthen municipal government and counteract domination by the capital, and to preserve 'the peculiar vigour of the Castilian spirit'.

2 DSC, 17 & 30 Apr., 7 May & 24 June (Apps.), & 21-28 May 1936.

The latter draft was bitterly attacked by Rightists. They claimed that it would affect some seventy per cent of rural property and would ruin small and medium-sized farmers who were supposed to be the basis of the Republic. The municipalities were not, in any case, competent to farm the land. It was a 'Marxist' scheme to confiscate private property and ruin the peasantry. The social-Catholic Alvarez Robles, however, said that he approved of the idea in principle, but in practice it would 'degenerate into a policy for common misery'. On the other hand, the Socialist Landworkers' leader said that the draft did not go far enough, though it was a step towards socialisation of the land.[1] Yet, despite the controversy that took place over the government's legislation, all recognised that in 1936 the texts of laws were not the most important aspect of the situation. Perhaps only in the case of wheat prices was what the government decreed of some consequence. In April the price-levels were abolished, with the result that prices fell and the small grower ran into difficulties once again.[2]

The Minister of Agriculture, Ruiz Funes, intended to speed up

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1 DSC, 26 June & 1 July 1936 (speeches of Berjano, Alvarez Robles, Rebuelta and Zabalza).

2 El Debate, 9, 15 Apr., & 5 May 1936; ABC, 10 Apr. 1936. Abolition of price-levels gave the advantage to the larger grower who could produce more cheaply. Giménez Fernández suggested a multiple answer: cooperatives, dearer bread, State purchasing of wheat and cheaper credit.

land redistribution and, like Domingo in 1932, he issued decrees authorizing the temporary occupation of estates, particularly in Extremadura. By the end of April he was speaking of tens of thousands having been provided with land, but in most cases the Ministry was merely giving legal recognition to the invasion and seizure of estates that had already taken place under the auspices of local Leftists.[1] The Left claimed that landowners were ceasing to cultivate their lands so as to make the situation worse for the government. According to the Right, smallholders were being forced to give up farming because they simply could not pay the high wages now demanded by the unions. Farmers were also being forced by local union officials to pay unemployed workers billeted on them; if the farmers could not or would not pay up, their land was taken from them and often they were imprisoned. Farmers said that they were being bankrupted by high wages, short hours and low prices. When bad weather was added to these factors, it seemed very probable that the harvest would be meagre and a food-shortage would ensue. ABC described the situation as 'tragic, simply tragic'.

In the Cortes on 1 July, the Agrarian Cid painted a picture of

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1 DSC, 15 & 29 Apr. 1936; Bolloten, Grand Camouflage, 21-2. The Socialist Landworkers' newspaper in February said labourers 'must resolve the agrarian problem by themselves in such a way that the Popular Front government need only give legal form to realities which the peasant organizations have already created'. Seizures of land began in March and were well-organized in Extremadura, where 60,000 peasants acted on a single day. About 535,000 hectares had been occupied by 17 July (Malefakis, Land Tenure, Part II, ch. x.)

rural chaos, especially in Andalusia, where revolutionary committees were in many places the de facto authority. There was security neither for persons nor for property. Calvo Sotelo, for his part, conceded that rural wages had been unjust, but the pendulum had already swung so far in the opposite direction that economic collapse in the autumn was now certain: 'people are going to move from wages of starvation to starvation of wages.' Addressing the extreme Left, he said that, if all this were intended as the prelude to the horrors of Soviet collectivization, then 'you will not get the chance to try out your absurd schemes. We shall not let you!'[1]

Urban as well as rural employers suffered from being forced to keep men who were unemployed on their pay-rolls. The government decreed on 29 February that all workers dismissed for taking part in political strikes since 1 January 1934 were to get their jobs back and be compensated by employers for the wages lost since then.[2] At the end of April, a young Cedista said that the consequences of this decree were proving catastrophic: 'the disorganization of the

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1 El Debate, 29 Mar. & 17 & 24 June 1936 (a reaper's wage for a 7-hour day was now 13.50 ptas.); ABC, 26 June & 2 July 1936; Bolloten, Grand Camouflage, 20; & DSC, 1 July 1936. Calvo's speech provoked a near-riot in the Cortes on the part of the extreme Left. Mije (Communist) replied: 'Yes we shall pass: today with the democratic Republic; and tomorrow with something else.' There were as many agricultural strikes between 1 May and 18 July as in the whole of 1932 (Malefakis, loc. cit.).

2 ABC, 29 Feb. 1936. This paper on 3 Mar. called the decree 'proper to a revolutionary dictatorship'.

productive organism will be a reality in this country within a few months.'[1] Unemployment in February 1936 had already risen above the level in 1935. The economic situation was being made worse by continuing disorder and the increasing number of strikes from both economic and political motives which occurred with still greater frequency from May onwards. Some employers began to feel that they had nothing to lose by absolute intransigence.[2]

A by-product of this situation was the elimination of Catholic workers' unions. Leftist unionists insisted on the sacking of Catholic unionists, which meant virtual starvation for them.[3] Urban Catholic unionism therefore collapsed as a result of outside pressures. Yet its general weakness in the 1930s had other causes as well: a dearth of working-class leaders, internal bickering, and a lack of vision and understanding on the part of its ecclesiastical

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1 Bermúdez-Cañete, DSC, 30 Apr. 1936.

2 Bolloten, Grand Camouflage, 22-3; Jellinek, Civil War, 225; J. Álvarez del Vayo, Freedom's Battle (London, 1940). Unemployment on 29 Feb. stood at 843,872 (El Socialista, 25 Apr. 1936). According to Ministry of Labour figures there were 719 industrial strikes between 1 May and 18 July, more than in any previous 12-month period (Malefakis, loc. cit.) Gil Robles, Spain in Chains, 14, writes: 'strikes were not aimed at obtaining economic reforms which were more or less justified'; workers in a pueblo in Málaga demanded 30 ptas. for a 4-hour day.

3 El Debate, 5 Mar., 19 & 24 May 1936; García-Nieto, Sindicalismo cristiano, 190-1. In the Cortes, a Socialist said that Catholic workers were 'not workers; they are lackeys in the service of the bosses'. D$. de Madariaga replied: 'Your mentality is always the same: a man who does not submit to your yoke is a man who is condemned to die of hunger.' (DSC, 20 May 1936).

and lay mentors who often had 'an excessively "bourgeois" outlook on life [which] masked [from them] the poignant reality of the Spanish proletariat.'[1]

Leftists maintained that Rightists were sabotaging the economy by taking their money abroad, and on 16 May the government forbade anyone to take more than 500 pesetas out of the country. The Right saw the export of capital and the fall on the stock-exchange as inevitable results of lack of confidence brought about by disorder and the absence of an economic policy on the part of the government. No attempt was being made to draw up a budget, revenue was falling, unemployment was increasing, prices were rising, consumption was decreasing and the peseta was losing ground.[2] Calvo Sotelo advocated a policy like that of Roosevelt to solve the problem of unemployment. However, he believed that the extreme Left was out to wreck the economy as a prelude to Marxist revolution, and that the government was doing nothing to prevent this.[3]

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1 García-Nieto, Sindicalismo cristiano, 193.

2 ABC, 3, 17, 19 May 1936; DSC, 15 Apr., 6 & 19 May, 30 June 1936. Socialists said Rightists had taken 500,000,000 ptas. out of Spain since 16 Feb., and pointed out that the Bank of Spain was still paying dividends of up to 30% in May. Calvo presented figures to illustrate his case: the value of Spanish securities on the stock-exchange fell by 1,936,000,000 ptas. between 14 Feb. and 11 Apr.; between 14 Feb. and 4 Apr. the amount of paper-money in circulation rose from 4,850,000,000 to 5,330,000,000 ptas.; in the same period the peseta lost 12-14% of its value on the Paris market. The Economist, 27 June 1936, quoted the official rate in London as 36.95 ptas. to the £, but reported a black-market rate of 45 ptas.

3 DSC, 19 May 1936.

The Right was becoming convinced that continued disorder and the prevalence of strikes were part of a plan to bring about economic collapse as the precondition for revolution: 'History will have to record that the Marxists realised what they planned because you, the Republicans and democrats, neither knew how to nor wished to defend what you said you loved.'[1] On 11 June the Cedista Carrascal stated that the Minister of the Interior had simply lost control of the country: Governors were acting independently of the Ministry, Mayors independently of Governors and the masses of the Left were doing as they pleased. A statement from the government the next day suggested that Carrascal's claims were substantially true.[2]

A frightened bourgeoisie took revolutionary phraseology at its face-value. Yet the duality of powers which the extremists of the Left sought was becoming a reality: on the one hand the government and Cortes, and on the other the Casas del Pueblo and the Alianzas Obreras y Campesinas, which were, according at least to the JSU, Spanish soviets.[3]

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1 Ceballos (CEDA), DSC, 8 July 1936; El Debate, 30 May & 2 July 1936.

2 Carrascal, DSC, 11 June 1936; & El Debate, 13 June 1936, quoting a cabinet statement publicly appealing to Governors and Mayors to put an end to the usurpation of authority by armed bands. Four Governors were changed on 13 June (El Debate, 14 June 1936).

3 E. Conze, Spain To-Day (London, 1936), 141-2. The parallel with Russia in 1917 was clear.

In fact the situation on the Left was rather more complex than this view would suggest. Largo Caballero did not tie himself to a precise revolutionary time-table, but he made it quite clear that the Socialists would not submit 'directly or indirectly' to 'certain parties that have no strength in Spain'. As a prelude to the political fusion of the organizations of the extreme Left, the proletariat (Socialist, Communist, Anarcho-Syndicalist) was to unite in the Alianzas Obreras. Once the proletariat was united, it would be strong enough to overpower the police and the military, and the desired violent revolution could take place.[1] The CNT reacted to such overtures by saying that it would sign a 'revolutionary pact' with the PSOE only if the latter would abandon all parliamentary activities and pledge itself to the complete destruction of the existing régime.[2] Prietistas, however, still controlled the PSOE's executive and official newspaper, which continued to praise the policies of Blum and to uphold the evolutionary course.[3] On 26 May, the Prietista

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1 Largo Caballero, Claridad, 11 May 1936. In one speech (Claridad, 11 Apr. 1936), he talked vaguely of the Cortes lasting four years, but in other speeches he gave the impression that revolution would not be so long delayed.

2 Peirats, La CNT, I, 115-6.

3 El Socialista, 17, 19, 22 May & 3 June 1936. The paper explained that the French Popular Front stood for a renewal of democracy in the face of Fascism, and for advanced social legislation without full Socialism - i.e. it had the same aims as had Prieto.

executive accused the Caballeristas of 'revolutionary verbalism' that was helping 'the counter-revolution', and of dividing the party. On 31 May, Caballeristas and the JSU replied with a remarkable demonstration against 'rotten reformism and centrism' at Écija: Prieto and two Asturian miners' leaders were forced to flee from the town under a hail of fraternal bullets.[1]

Communists and Caballeristas were united in all but name. Relations between Caballeristas and the CNT, however, deteriorated. There were disagreements over strike action in Madrid, while in Málaga in June Communists and the UGT tried to settle their differences with the CNT with bullets.[2] Meanwhile, the struggle inside the PSOE continued. In May the Prietistas had decided to postpone the party's congress until October. The Caballeristas denounced this decision as a Prietista coup within the party. They demanded an extraordinary congress for 27 June, at which an inquest would be held on the events of October 1934, the party's programme would be revised, a new executive would be elected and unity with other pro-

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1 El Socialista, 2 & 7 June 1936; & Madariaga, Spain, 456 (quoting Prieto's account).

2 El Debate, 11 June, & ABC & El Socialista, 12-13 June 1936, on the shooting in Málaga. Largo Caballero and Díaz (Communist) were whistled at by Anarcho-Syndicalists in Saragossa on their visit there, while in Madrid the CNT's building-workers were on strike in defiance of the UGT. (El Debate, 2 June & ABC, 8 & 14 July 1936). CNT offices were closed in Madrid after bomb-attacks were made on bars where waiters were not obeying orders to strike (ABC, 30 May 1936).

letarian parties would be effected. The Prietista executive now decided to hold a plebiscite within the party on whether such a congress should meet, but the Caballeristas feared gerrymandering and announced in advance that they would not accept the result. The Priestistas' plebiscite duly found insufficient support for the convening of a special congress. The Caballeristas said the plebiscite had been corrupt, as had the elections for a new executive, on which Prietistas were again dominant.[1]

Possibly Prieto hoped that by October Largo Caballero's policies would have been discredited in the eyes of the Socialist rank-and-file and that the congress would then agree to adhere to evolutionary tactics; if so, time was not on his side. Although Largo Caballero did not envisage revolution until he had come to terms with the all-important CNT, which seemed less and less likely to happen, his revolutionary talk and the uncoordinated revolutionary activity and chaos which his words encouraged nevertheless served to advance the cause of counter-revolution, as both Prieto and Gil Robles had prophesied.

In June, attempts were still being made by Miguel Maura to bring

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1 El Debate, 26 May & 1 July; El Socialista, 1 & 15 July; & Claridad, 18 June & 1 July 1936. Caballeristas said that their list for the executive had got some 22,000 votes; according to Prietistas, their list won by 12,000 votes to the Caballeristas' 11,000. In the plebiscite for a special congress, the results given by the Prietistas were: in favour, 13,427; votes declared invalid, 10,573 (total party membership, 59,846).

about a national coalition government which would act as a 'Republican dictatorship'.[1] However, during the debate on 16 June, it became clear that the time for such efforts had now passed.[2] As usual, Gil Robles complained of inaction, the persecution of Rightists and the lawlessness of local authorities despite the government's special powers: 'You have exercized power arbitrarily, but, moreover, with absolute, with total inefficacy.' He denied that the Right was responsible for the disorder, but added for the sake of argument that 'a government fails just the same by not being able to master subversion whether caused by the Right or created by the Left.'

He then announced an important change in policy. He no longer hoped for the break-up of the Popular Front, whose parties constituted, as far as the CEDA was concerned, the only possible governmental majority in the Cortes. Furthermore, 'as the failure is obvious, as you are going to lead the country to ruin, as your fall is going to be noisy', it was in the CEDA's interest that the Popular Front should alone be held responsible for the disaster. 'A country can survive as a Monarchy or as a Republic, with a parliamentary system or with a presidential system, with Sovietism or with Fascism;

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1 Jackson, Spanish Republic, 216; Jellinek, Civil War, 251; Payne, Falange, 112.

2 DSC, 16 June 1936 (debate on the Rightist motion: 'The Cortes expects from the Government the rapid adoption of the means necessary to put an end to the state of subversion in which Spain is living.')

however the one way that it does not survive is in anarchy, and Spain today, unhappily, is living in anarchy' - the prelude to Socialist dictatorship. Gil Robles insisted that it was the government's fault that the Deputies were 'attending democracy's funeral'.[1]

Speaking in the same debate, Calvo Sotelo expressed the belief that the propaganda and policies of the Popular Front had provoked sixty per cent of the disorders; the government's inaction had exacerbated the situation. He then made what Socialists took to be a declaration that he was now the leader of Spanish Fascism:[2] 'In opposition to this sterile State, I raise the concept of the integra-

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1 He produced what he said were incomplete figures for disorders between 16 Feb. and 15 June:- Churches totally destroyed, 160; assaults on and attempted burning or sacking of churches, 251. Dead, 269; injured, 1,287. Attempted assaults on persons, 215. Robberies, 138. Attempted robberies, 138. Private and political offices wrecked, 69; assaulted, 312. General strikes, 113; strikes, 228. Newspaper offices totally wrecked, 10; assaulted and attempts to wreck, 33. Bombs and petards, 146 (plus 78 seized before exploding). Gil Robles had earlier been accused of trying to split the Popular Front when the Right abstained from voting on the Yeste incident (DSC, 29 May 1936), in which 17 peasants and 1 Civil Guard had been killed: the Minister ordered an inquiry. For the Right, this was perhaps a test-case to see whether the government would support its servants against Socialists and Communists. Unión Republicana had protested against Socialist violence in Murcia, and the Governor had threatened to resign if the government gave him no support (El Debate, 23, 25 Apr. & 5 May 1936). Gil Robles's change of policy possibly upset some of his followers: there were reports that Republicans in the CEDA were about to leave it and join the 'conservative sector of the Republic' (El Socialista, 17 June 1936); Jellinek,(Civil War, 252) says that Lucía and the DRV approached M. Maura. Payne (The Military, 318) however says that proponents of violence took charge of the DRV late in Feb. 1936. He also states that the Treasurer of Acción Popular put 500,000 ptas. of the party's funds at Mola's disposal in June (p. 330).

2 El Socialista, 17 June 1936.

tive State, which administers economic justice and can say with complete authority: "no more strikes, no more lock-outs, no more usurious interest, no more of abusive capitalism's financial formulas, no more starvation wages, no more political salaries gained by a happy accident, no more anarchic liberty, no more criminal loss of production, for national production is above all classes, all parties and all interests." This State many call a Fascist State; well, if this is the Fascist State, I, who agree with the idea of this State, I, who believe in it, declare myself a Fascist.' He also criticized the government's interference in military matters, and concluded that any officer who would rise against the Republic for the Monarchy would be 'a madman'; but so would any officer who would not rise for Spain against anarchy 'if this came to pass'.

Casares Quiroga interpreted these remarks by Calvo Sotelo as an appeal to the Army to rise against the government, an attempt to rouse 'a subversive spirit'. Therefore, said the Premier, 'if anything were to happen, your excellency would be the one responsible, with full responsibility.' According to Casares Quiroga, the disorder was the product of the policies pursued during the 'second biennium'. He spoke of the 'veritable frenzy' of the masses, yet in the same breath claimed that there was 'relative peace' in Spain: this 'state of confusion' was not to be equated with anarchy. Ventosa, for the Lliga, accused the Premier of complacency and of encouraging subversion by his declared belligerence and his tampering with the judiciary. For Maurín (POUM), on the other hand, the very fact that

Calvo Sotelo was still at large was evidence that the government was insufficiently belligerent: it was allowing 'a pre-Fascist situation' to develop.

Later in the debate, Calvo Sotelo replied to the Premier's challenge: 'My shoulders are broad; I accept with pleasure and I shirk none of the responsibilities that may be derived from acts that I perform, and I also accept others' responsibilities, if they are for the good of my Country (Exclamations) and for the glory of Spain. Well, how absurd! I say what St. Dominic of Silos said in reply to a Castilian King: "Sire, life you can take from me, but more you cannot." And it is better to die with glory than to live with contempt... Kerensky represented ignorance; Karolyi, the betrayal of a whole millenary civilization. Your excellency will not be Kerensky, because he is not witless, he is fully aware of what he says, of what he does not say and what he thinks. God grant that your excellency may never be able to compare himself with Karolyi.'[1]

The tone of the debate on 16 June suggested that positions were being taken up in anticipation of the outbreak of hostilities. As he himself had foreseen, Gil Robles was losing ground to those to

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1 DSC, 16 June 1936. There was obvious personal animosity between the two Gallegos: for Casares, Calvo was a hated 'man of order', a dreaded Fascist; for Calvo, Casares was an opportunist señorito demagogue who had once harangued Anarchists.

his Right.[1] The speeches of the Leftists clearly showed that they knew Calvo Sotelo was a leading figure among Rightist and military conspirators, who were expected to act in the near future. Since April, threats had been made in the Cortes against Gil Robles and Calvo Sotelo.[2] Early in July, Monarchist friends of Calvo Sotelo heard that there were plans afoot to liquidate him. Since his police escort was involved, Calvo Sotelo went to see the Minister of the Interior, Moles, who said that he had given no orders to

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1 This development may perhaps be illustrated by the poll taken on who should be Head of State by the Madrid Catholic evening paper Ya, showing a relative swing away from the moderates, viz. José Antonio, 38,496; Calvo Sotelo, 29,522; Gil Robles, 29,201; Lerroux, 27,624; Sanjurjo, 25,874; Alfonso XIII, 25,638; Royo Villanova, 23,887; Martínez Anido, 20,176; D. Juan, 18,502; Ortega Gasset, 16,875 (Bravo, Falange, 180).

2 The exact words used are disputed, and only traces of some of the threats appear in the Cortes record. For this, two explanations can be advanced: (i) it was usual for the President of the Cortes to order the deletion of 'unparliamentary' remarks from the official record; (ii) in the frequent moments of uproar some heated exchanges were probably only heard by some Deputies. Rightists allege that the following threats were made:- Díaz Ramos (Communist) on 15 Apr.: 'I cannot be sure how Sr. Gil Robles will die, but I can affirm that he will die with his boots on.' Calvo's life was threatened on 7 May by Srta. Nelken (Socialist); and on 1 July by Sra. Ibárruri (who said: 'This man has spoken today for the last time') and by Galarza (Socialist), who said that violence against Calvo would be licit (see A. de Urbina, 'Calvo Sotelo', Punta Europa, July-Aug. 1958, 111; & Gutiérrez-Ravé, Las Cortes errantes, 58). From DSC, 15 Apr. & 1 July 1936, it seems certain that threats were made by Díaz and Galarza; Ibárruri (El único camino, 251) denies making any threat.

endanger the life of the leader of the Bloque Nacional.[1]

Late on 12 July, Lieutenant Castillo of the Assault Guards was shot by gunmen of the extreme Right.[2] This event produced a longing for revenge among members of his company of Assault Guards, stationed at the barracks next to the Ministry of the Interior. Captain Moreno, their commander, and Captain Condés of the Civil Guard, both collaborators with the extreme Left, took advantage of the situation to organise expeditions to assassinate Calvo Sotelo, Gil Robles and Goicoechea. However, only Calvo Sotelo could be found at home in the early hours of the 13th. He was kidnapped, shot and his corpse

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1 According to Causa General, 6-7, Alonso Mallol (Director-General of Police) changed Calvo's police escort. Then Aguirre Sánchez (i.e. personnel at Madrid Police H.Q.) told the new escort not to hinder any attempt at assassination, and even to help do the job if an attack should take place outside the city. One of the escort told Bau, a friend of Calvo. Calvo then saw Moles, who did not really believe the story. According to HGL, 452-4, Calvo's escort was again changed on 12 July - this source refers to a vague scheme to kill him, without a definite plan, which existed from mid-June and involved the Under-Secretary for the Interior, an ex-Captain, and Condés and Moreno [see below]. On 10 July Calvo's friends bought him an armoured Buick which he refused to use because people would say that he thought he was Mussolini (Bau Nolla, conversation). Cortés Cavanillas (conversation) says he told Calvo on 10 July of a report from a Monarchist spy in the Madrid Casa del Pueblo that there was a plot to kill him; Calvo did not take the report seriously.

2 Castillo was a 'known Communist' (Jellinek, Civil War, 262). It would seem that he was shot by Falangistas - though the UME and Traditionalists have also been suggested (Buckley, Spanish Republic, 205; El Estado que queremos, 66) - because he had shot a cousin of José Antonio during clashes at Los Reyes's funeral on 16 April (HGL, 453).

left at a cemetery.[1] The body was not identified until after mid-day, and Calvo Sotelo's friends until then thought he had simply been kidnapped or arrested.[2] The government issued a statement deploring both assassinations and the members of Moreno's company were detained.[3] The Socialists and Communists feared imminent action by the Right and announced their support for the régime, but the Premier refused their request for arms.[4]

Calvo Sotelo's funeral took place on the 14th, and was attended by thousands, including representatives of all Monarchist groups, Gil Robles and other Cedistas, Liberal-Democrats, Portelistas, Agrarians, Radicals, the Lliga and the independent intellectual Marañón. Many gave Roman salutes, and Goicoechea delivered a funeral oration which was, in effect, a declaration of civil war: 'Before

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1 Causa General, 8-10; HGL, 453-4; Acedo, Calvo, 330-42; Jackson, Spanish Republic, 229. B. Bentura, 'Hoy hace veinte años', Ya, 13 July 1956, gives a different version, according to which Moreno, Condés and Castillo intended to kill Calvo, but Castillo got cold feet, whereupon the other two got rid of Castillo; on 13 July, Castillo's brother said that Assault Guards had killed him. Gil Robles was in Biarritz; an account by a member of the expedition assigned to his house is given by V. Reguengo, Guerra sin frentes (3rd ed., Barcelona, 1955), 256. Several accounts say Casares Quiroga sanctioned the expeditions: this seems 'not proven'.

2 Acedo, Calvo, 324; HGL, 445; Vegas, Calvo Sotelo, 215-7.

3 El Debate, 14 July 1936; Madariaga, Spain, 460. El Socialista, 14 July 1936, also condemned both murders.

4 El Socialista, 14 July 1936; Jellinek, Civil War, 263 (Largo Caballero was in London at the time).

this flag placed as a relic over your breast, before God who hears us and sees us, we take a solemn oath to devote our lives to this triple labour: to imitate your example, to avenge your death, to save Spain, which is all one and the same thing.' Rightist leaders had to stop the crowd stoning the Republican representatives from the Cortes, and in the ensuing demonstrations the Assault Guards opened fire and seventy arrests were made.[1]

The next morning El Socialista printed an article by Prieto, in which he declared that, 'for the honour of all, this cannot go on... Faced with the enemy, union... If reaction dreams of a bloodless coup d'état like that of 1923, it is entirely mistaken. If it supposes that it will find the régime defenceless, it is deluding itself. To conquer it will have to surmount the human barrier with which the proletarian masses bar its way. There will be, I have said it many times, a battle to the death, because each side knows that the adversary, if he wins, will give him no quarter. Even if this were the way it had to be, a decisive engagement would be better than this continuous blood-letting.'[2]

Prieto's opinion was echoed in the last session of the Permanent

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1 El Debate, 15 July 1936; El Estado que queremos, 65; HCE, II-9, 543.

2 El Socialista, 15 July 1936.

Deputation of the Cortes on 15 July.[1] For the Monarchists, Vallellano announced that Calvo Sotelo's death - a 'crime without precedent in our political history..., carried out by authority's own agents' - obliged them to withdraw from the Cortes. The background of Leftist threats and the Premier's speech on 16 June meant that they could 'not coexist a moment longer with the protectors and moral accomplices of this act. We do not want to mislead the country and international opinion by accepting a part in the farce of feigning the existence of a normal civilized State, when, in reality, since 16 February we have been living in complete anarchy, beneath the sway of a monstrous subversion of all moral values that has succeeded in putting authority and justice in the service of violence... He who wishes to save Spain, its moral patrimony as a civilized people, will find us first on the path of duty and sacrifice.'[2]

Gil Robles also attacked the government for failing to keep order: 'Neither the right to life, nor freedom of association, nor freedom of syndication, nor freedom of work, nor the inviolability

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1 On 14 July Martínez Barrio (President of the Cortes) suspended ordinary sessions for eight days. The Deputation had to meet to renew the 'state of alarm'. The official text of the session is in Díaz-Plaja, La guerra, 119-48.

2 Uncensored text of Vallellano's speech in Gutiérrez-Ravé, Las Cortes errantes, 99-100. Martínez Barrio caused some remarks about the crime being committed by the government's agents to be deleted from the official record.

of the home have enjoyed the least guarantee with this exceptional law in the government's hands, which, on the contrary, has been made into an element of persecution against all those who do not hold the same political ideas as the component elements of the Popular Front.' The CEDA now had as little influence over its masses, who had despaired of legality, as the government had over the workers' organisations of the Popular Front. 'When citizens' lives are at the mercy of the first gunman, when the government is incapable of putting an end to this state of affairs, do not pretend that people believe in either legality or democracy; rest assured that they will turn more and more to paths of violence, and we who are not capable of preaching violence nor of profiting from it will gradually be displaced by others bolder and more violent who will come to harvest this deep national feeling.'

He condemned both murders, but claimed that they were not connected. Calvo Sotelo had been 'assassinated by agents of authority', but he believed the government bore no direct or indirect criminal responsibility. However, it must bear the political and moral responsibility for the crime: the Premier himself had prepared the 'moral climate'. The Minister of the Interior was not responsible, but the organs he controlled had failed to take obvious precautions when Calvo Sotelo had said his life had been threatened. Gil Robles concluded by saying that there was now 'an abyss between the farce that Parliament represents and the profound and most grave national tragedy. We are not prepared to continue with this farce.' Violence

would breed more violence, and the Revolution would devour its children. He ended: 'You will soon be in Spain the government of the Popular Front of hunger and misery, as you are now of shame, mud and blood.'[1] After the 'Spanish Sarajevo' everyone awaited the outbreak of civil war.[2]

iv. Preparations for the 'National Rising'

One of Azaña's first acts after taking power was to remove two Generals of whom he was suspicious from the Peninsula. On 21 February a decree announced that the Chief of Staff, Franco, was to be posted to the Canaries, and the Chief of the Air Force, Goded, to the Balearics.[3] Both had played leading parts in preparing the Army for action in anticipation of the proclamation of the 'state of war' which they desired. Military opinion was alarmed at the result

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1 He produced statistics of events, proved beyond doubt to have taken place, between 16 June and 13 July:- Church-burnings, 10; abuse and expulsion of priests, 9; thefts and confiscations, 11; pulling down of crosses, 5. Dead, 61; injured, 224. Highway robberies, 17. Invasions of and attacks on estates, 32; confiscations and thefts, 16. Offices attacked or burnt, 10. General strikes, 15; strikes, 129. Bombs, 74; petards, 58; bottles of inflammable liquid thrown at persons or things, 7; fires (other than churches), 19. His final words were those which Martínez Barrio had used against Azaña's government after the Casas Viejas affair in 1933.

2 According to Jellinek, Civil War, 265, Gil Robles said at the end of the session: 'Right! And now let justice take its course!' After the session, Gil Robles went back to Biarritz, Goicoechea and Vallellano went to Portugal, S. Alba to St.-Jean-de-Luz and Sáinz Rodríguez to Burgos (HGL, 457; García Venero, Alba, 368).

3 El Debate, 22 Feb. 1936.

of the elections and at the ensuing disorders. The two Generals reacted by visiting Alcalá-Zamora and Azaña, apparently to urge them to proclaim the 'state of war' and to assure them of the Army's loyalty in this event, but their counsels were disregarded.[1] The military leaders feared the worst, but were by no means agreed on the course to be taken. Franco discreetly sounded out political opinion.[2] Goded, however, thought of General Pavía's coup in 1874 and suggested that the military should arrest all Deputies likely to oppose them when the Cortes opened on 16 March.[3]

In fact, two main schools of thought soon emerged among the Generals. Some were cautious and, impressed by the strength of the Left, wanted careful preparation with civilian support for a nation-wide rising, which would only take place in extremis. Other more exuberant spirits thought in terms of rapid military action in the capital, believing that the rest of the country would accept a fait accompli.

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1 A. Ruiz Vilaplana, Burgos Justice (London, 1938), 79; Arrarás, Franco, 168; HCE, II-9, 468; HGL, 430. Goded was very indignant about being sent to Palma 'to play bridge with the English'.

2 He saw José Antonio, who told him the Falange's strength; the go-between was the Cedista Serrano Súñer, an old friend of José Antonio and Franco's brother-in-law (HCE, II-9, 467-8; Payne, Falange, 281). He also contacted the Carlists through a Falangista and was told they would only participate in a Monarchist movement (HGL, 430-1).

3 Mariñas, Varela, 66; Pemán, Soldado, 138.

This conflict of opinion became apparent during a five-hour meeting of *africanistas* on 8 March at the home of the stock-broker Delgado in Madrid. Present were Generals Varela (apparently acting as Sanjurjo's delegate), Franco (who was leaving for the Canaries that night),[1] Fanjul, Villegas, Orgaz and Mola (on his way to Pamplona, having been transferred from Morocco on 28 February),[2] as well as 'The Technician' (Colonel Galarza). Varela announced that he favoured 'a *coup* of audacity and valour' in Madrid, which would achieve success by surprise. Mola, however, was not so optimistic: the time for such a *coup* had passed and the troops could not be relied upon to obey orders. In short, the days of the *pronunciamiento* had gone; civilian support was essential. Franco held a similar view, and he and Mola agreed that military intervention would only be justified if Largo Caballero were given power, or if Spain were to drift into anarchy, or if a civilian rising occurred which entailed the Army being called out into the streets. Franco also got general agreement that any such action would be taken purely and simply 'for Spain' and for no other cause; the old flag would only be restored later. There was also agreement on the distribution of commands if a deterioration in the situation should make a rising necessary. However, Varela and Orgaz, who were to be in charge in

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1 Galinsoga, *Centinela*, 187, who gives the date as 8 March.

2 Date given by Ramos Oliveira, *Politics*, 545.

Madrid, persisted with their scheme for a military coup in the capital, arguing that the Requetés and others would rally round afterwards.[1]

Varela and Orgaz believed in audacity. They planned to strike on 19 April, with the Inspector-General of the Army, Rodríguez del Barrio, as nominal head of the movement, as agreed in March. Rodríguez del Barrio was to arrange an interview between Varela and the War Minister, General Masquelet, in the War Ministry. Varela would then arrest the Minister, take over his office and issue orders to the Army. Meanwhile, Orgaz would seize the Captaincy-General with a force of Civil Guards waiting in the Italian Embassy nearby. A retired Admiral, the Marqués de Villapesadilla (an Alfonsine Deputy), would also seize the Ministry of the Navy with a plain-clothes force from the Post Office and the Bank of Spain. It seems that they also hoped to stage simultaneous coups in Barcelona, Burgos and Tarragona, and to count on certain Falangista and even Japista elements in Madrid. On 18 April, however, Rodríguez del Barrio said he was ill and could not go through with the plan - perhaps he got cold feet, perhaps more prudent Generals advised him to torpedo the scheme. Varela's plans

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1 Account based on HGL, 429-30; Pemán, Soldado, 138-40; Mariñas, Varela, 67-8; J.M. Iribarren, El general Mola (2nd ed., Madrid, 1945), 43; HCE, II-9, 467. There is some disagreement as to who was present: here Delgado's account (in Pemán, loc. cit.) has been preferred. Franco had earlier exchanged views with Varela. According to Romano, Sanjurjo, 188, Sanjurjo had favoured a coup before the elections. Sanjurjo, head of the UME, was kept informed of developments in Estoril (Esteban-Infantes, Sanjurjo, 251-3).

therefore had to be cancelled. The government, apprehensive after what had happened at Los Reyes's funeral on the 16th, seems to have got wind of the plan and immediately sent Varela to Cádiz and Orgaz to the Canaries.[1]

Mola arrived in Pamplona on 15 March.[2] With the removal of Varela, he now became the principal conspirator. He enjoyed the confidence of Franco and apparently had the approval of Sanjurjo.[3] In the second half of April, the Republican General Queipo de Llano offered his services to Mola. He had decided to join the plotters after the deposition by the Popular Front of President Alcalá-Zamora, his father-in-law. He also influenced other Republican officers to take a similar course - notably the commander in Saragossa, the Radical

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1 Synthesis of Pemán, Soldado, 140-3; Mariñas, Varela, 68-70; HCE, II-9, 510; HGL, 436-7 (the accounts differ on some points - as usual). Fanjul was to raise the garrison in Burgos, Villegas that in Tarragona, González Carrasco that in Barcelona. They presumably counted on a 'negative pronunciamiento' elsewhere. When Mola arrived in Pamplona, he told Félix Maíz: 'The organization of a rising like the one projected, and the conditions in which it is going to be carried out,...has the minimum of possibilities of success and the maximum of probabilities of failure.' (Alzamiento, 54). Cf. Payne's account (The Military, 319-20) which makes Fanjul the moving spirit behind this attempted coup.

2 Iribarren, Mola, 41.

3 See HGL, 429 & 437; Pemán, Soldado, 147; Lizarza, Memorias, 79; Félix Maíz, Alzamiento, 71; HCE, II-9, 511; Esteban-Infantes, Sanjurjo, 253; J. Vigón, General Mola (Barcelona, 1957), 91. Some versions suggest that Mola was now Sanjurjo's delegate and in full charge of the conspiracy; Vigón's version, that Mola considered himself Sanjurjo's delegate at this stage but had not yet in fact been appointed as such, would seem to be the correct one. Certainly Mola was now fully in charge of military plotting in the north. (See below for evidence supporting this view.)

General Cabanellas. Queipo de Llano, who in 1930 had been on the opposite side to Mola, never enjoyed the latter's confidence, but as Inspector-General of Customs Guards he had plenty of freedom to travel. Apparently at Fanjul's suggestion, he began to sound out garrisons in the south; his old-fashioned method of conspiring openly and on his own account caused alarm amongst other Generals.[1]

In the second half of April, Mola issued his first confidential circular, which may be said to have opened a new and more earnest phase in military conspiracy. He informed fellow officers that this was not the time for 'unpremeditated high-spirited adventures', but for 'caution, reflection and quiet audacity... The most grave circumstances through which the Nation is passing owing to an electoral pact, the immediate consequence of which has been to make the government prisoner of the revolutionary organizations, is fatefully leading Spain to a chaotic situation that can only be avoided by means of violent action. Therefore, the elements that love the Country must of necessity organize themselves for rebellion, with the aim of conquering power and imposing therefrom Order, Peace and Justice.' Power was to be seized at 'the first favourable opport-

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1 Félix Maíz, Alzamiento, 72 & 100; Esteban-Infantes, Sanjurjo, 254; Pemán, Soldado, 149 & 154; A. Olmedo Delgado & J. Cuesta Monereo, General Queipo de Llano (Barcelona, 1957), 84-9. He specialized in contacting Civil and Assault Guard officers; the garrisons he found unenthusiastic, and was rebuffed by the officers of Granada, Huelva and Málaga. (When Alcalá-Zamora was deposed, the Cortes delegation found him at home with Queipo de Llano and Samper - ABC, 8 Apr. 1936).

unity' by the military and anti-revolutionary civilians. All leaders of revolutionary parties and unions would be locked up, parallel military and civil authorities would be set up in each province and a military dictatorship would be installed to restore order and the rule of law. The nation itself would decide later on the form of government.[1]

Mola, however, by no means had the monopoly of conspiratorial activity even among the military. Generals like Varela were not yet convinced of the need for civilian auxiliaries: 'Better ourselves alone. They will rally round afterwards.'[2] Fanjul and Villegas, now the leaders of the plot in Madrid, hit upon the idea of a coup on 11 May, when Azaña was to be sworn in as President, but this plan was abandoned.[3] The exiled Sanjurjo, who was plotting on his own account, perhaps now realised that Mola was the man who must be put

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1 I. Bernard, Mola (Granada, 1938), 83-7; Iribarren, Mola, 45-7; Pemán, Soldado, 148. Arrarás (conversation) stresses that as far as Mola was concerned, meetings and contacts up to this point were merely exchanges of impressions; now he started to conspire seriously.

2 Pemán, Soldado, 149 (quoting Varela). Mola and Franco favoured detailed preparations; Varela and Orgaz continued to urge speed (Pemán, Soldado, 157).

3 HGL, 443; HCE, II-9, 510; Romano, Sanjurjo, 202. Payne (The Military, 321) refers to a plan by López de Ochoa to persuade Alcalá-Zamora to oust the government at this time, but the deposed President would not cooperate. López de Ochoa is said to have been the UME leader at this time in Madrid, the UME having turned against Fanjul.

in control and must negotiate direct with the Carlists in Pamplona. At the end of May, Sanjurjo agreed to Mola becoming the leader of the conspiracy.[1] This was a victory for Mola's conception of the movement's aims as well as for his strategy. He counted on the failure of the rising in the capital, which he would take with four columns converging on it from the north and east.[2]

Sanjurjo in Estoril, as head of the UME and a man in close touch with Carlists for many months, acted as the link between various conspiratorial activities.[3] It would seem that, as in 1932, he kept the threads of various ill-coordinated plots in his own hands. The Traditionalist Communion under Fal Conde was in a permanent state of reorganization and preparation. On 20 December 1935 Fal Conde had been appointed by Alfonso Carlos Delegate-in-Chief in Spain with an advisory council, which meant that he was now in charge of all Carlist activities, not simply the political, as hitherto.[4] Within

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1 Vigón, Mola, 92; Iribarren, Mola, 51; Esteban-Infantes, Sanjurjo, 251-4; Félix Maíz, Alzamiento, 103. This decision was conveyed by the go-between 'Garcilaso' (R. García, independent Rightist Deputy for Navarre and editor of the Diario de Navarra), who had been sent to Estoril by Mola to inquire about the position of the Carlists. The date is variously given as 29 or 31 May.

2 Iribarren, Mola, 51-2; HGL, 447. The four columns were to start out from Valencia, Valladolid, Saragossa and Navarre (the latter being joined by forces from Burgos and Logrono).

3 Esteban-Infantes, Sanjurjo, 251-3.

4 Documentos de Alfonso Carlos, 293. The Council of the Communion was:- J.M. Lamamié de Clairac, L.H. de Larramendi, E. Bilbao Eguía, L.M. Alier and M. Senante, with Fal Conde as president.

the Communion, views on who should succeed Alfonso Carlos were divergent.[1] When, in January 1936, the aged Claimant was taken ill at Guéthary, the selection of a successor became a matter of urgency. On 23 January Alfonso Carlos issued a decree embodying a compromise solution. If no legitimate successor had been chosen before the old man died, Javier of Bourbon-Parma (François Xavier, a son of Duke Robert of Parma and nephew of Alfonso Carlos's wife María de las Nieves) was to become the Carlist Regent. His designation as Regent was not to deprive him of any right to the throne, and as Regent he had of course to swear to the principles of Carlist legitimism.[2]

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1 Some (including Larramendi) thought the next legitimate heir Duarte (descended from a daughter of Carlos IV who married Joao VI of Portugal); some wanted the descendants of Francisco de Paula (younger brother of Fernando VII), which would have meant Alfonso XIII; others favoured Juan. But the Juanista solution was bitterly opposed by veterans and military elements, who wanted the succession to pass to the female closest to the last male (they invoked the 'Semisalic Law of Felipe V'), i.e. to Blanca, eldest daughter of Carlos VII, now an Austrian Archduchess, and to her heirs (Oyarzun, Carlismo, 470-1; Melgar, Escisión dinástica, 136).

2 Oyarzun, Carlismo, 467-8; Documentos de Alfonso Carlos, 295; HCE, II-9, 421; Lizarza, Memorias, 192. The idea was suggested and the decree drafted by Larramendi. The Regent and the eventual successor were to swear publicly to uphold 'the foundations of Spanish Legitimacy, to wit: I. The Roman Apostolic Catholic Religion, with the unity and juridical consequences with which it was traditionally beloved and served in our Kingdoms. II. The natural and organic Constitution of the States and public bodies of traditional society. III. The historic progeny of the diverse regions and their fueros and liberties, components of the unity of the Spanish Patria. IV. The authentic traditional Monarchy, legitimate in origin and exercise. V. The principles and spirits and, insofar as is possible in practice, the same state of law and law-making anterior to the evil so-called new law.'

Dissension in the Carlist ranks had not, however, been eliminated. In general, the Traditionalist Deputies still favoured the Juanista solution and complete adherence to the Bloque Nacional, while the Carlist die-hards, such as Larramendi and Senante, were opposed to this policy. In February, Fal Conde convened a meeting in Barcelona to settle matters. He had his way and the Communion continued officially to form part of the Bloque, though the delegates from the regions where Carlism was strongest were not in favour of this.[1] Any hopes for the Juanista solution were dashed on 10 March, when Alfonso Carlos informed Javier by letter that all attempts to come to terms with Alfonso had failed. Javier was now charged with the task of finding a successor faithful to Carlist principles, and the old man strongly hinted that Javier was himself the best candidate.[2] Nevertheless the Cruzadistas, a group of Carlists excluded from the Traditionalist Communion, continued to uphold the cause of Carlos VII's

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1 Oyarzun, Carlismo, 465-6; Galindo, Los partidos, 307. The Navarrese, Basque and Catalan delegates opposed adherence to the Bloque.

2 Documentos de Alfonso Carlos, 299-301: Alfonso had refused to abdicate, and neither he nor his sons had shown any inclination to accept Traditionalism. In a letter written to Fal Conde on 8 July 1936, but never sent, Alfonso Carlos stated that he favoured Javier as his successor (Documentos, 319-20).

grandchildren.[1]

In March 1936, the Carlist Supreme Military Junta in St.-Jean-de-Luz drew up a plan for a Carlist rising. The Carlists felt sure that Sanjurjo was their man, and in March Fal Conde offered him the leadership of the Requetés, which he accepted. Sanjurjo now sought to link Carlist plans with the Army's plans, with Varela as his delegate in Spain.[2] The Carlists, however, were anxious to strike soon, because in March the government started threatening to oust the Provincial Deputation elected by the law of 27 December 1934.[3] A clandestine leaflet announced: 'At last the decisive hour, so longed for by the Carlist Requetés, has come... Workers of the Dawn: Open the shutters to the sun, for the sun of Hispanic resurgence is already casting its first rays on the North.'[4] Sanjurjo continued

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1 Lizarza, Memorias, 193; Melgar, Escisión dinástica, 139. Archduchess Blanca was keen to uphold her sons' rights, and in Vienna on 30 May her youngest son signed the principles of Traditionalism in the hope of becoming Carlos VIII. The Cruzadistas (i.e. the dissidents of El Cruzado Español) officially styled themselves Comunión Carlista - Núcleo de la Lealtad (ABC, 4 Feb. 1936).

2 Redondo & Zavala, Requeté, 345-8; Romano, Sanjurjo, 202. The Junta consisted of:- Gen. Muslera, Cols. Rada and Baselga, Regional Inspectors of Requetés and Capt. Sanjurjo (the General's son). Exactly when Varela became Sanjurjo's delegate is not clear.

3 Redondo & Zavala, Requeté, 416: its members were asked to resign, but they said they were in permanent session, and ate and slept in the building. El Debate, 12-13 Mar. 1936, reported that the government wanted to put in its own nominees, thus in effect ending the régimen foral so far as the people of Navarre was concerned.

4 Quoted in Del Burgo, Requetés, 175.

to negotiate with Fal Conde and the Army, and in May Javier himself went to Estoril to complete matters. If the Carlists and the Army rose together, Sanjurjo would head a 'Provisional Government of Monarchist Restoration'; but if the Carlists had to rise alone, Sanjurjo would put Alfonso Carlos on the throne.[1]

Sanjurjo also approved the Carlist Military Junta's plan of campaign drawn up in March. Requetés would rise in the mountains of Huelva and Cáceres, next to the Portuguese frontier. While the government was thus distracted, the Requetés of Navarre and the Basque Country, under Sanjurjo, would march on Madrid, as would others who were to rise in the Maestrazgo. In the capital, more Requetés, disguised as Civil Guards, would seize key buildings. The government, however, soon confiscated these Civil Guard uniforms.[2]

Exactly how these Carlist plans were coordinated with Varela's or Fanjul's schemes to take over Madrid is not clear; indeed, it would seem that there was no connection, although Sanjurjo was supposed to act as a link between them. Exactly what was Mola's relationship with the Carlists and Sanjurjo up to the end of May is also not clear. Various Captains of the UME in the Pamplona garrison

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1 Redondo & Zavala, Requeté, 348-9; Galindo, Los partidos, 322; Lizarza, Memorias, 61; Iribarren, Mola, 75.

2 Redondo & Zavala, Requeté, 349-50; Iribarren, Mola, 75; Galindo, Los partidos, 321, who says Sanjurjo was to lead the Requetés from Cáceres on Madrid.

were in touch with the Carlists from February, and they in turn had contacts with officers in other northern garrisons, but these Captins did not put themselves under Mola's control until around 20 April.[1] It would seem that Fal Conde successfully pressed Sanjurjo to appoint Mola as his delegate in Spain after Varela's removal to Cádiz. Javier brought back from Estoril in May a letter asking Mola, if he would make a certain decision, to act as Sanjurjo's delegate, in which case Sanjurjo would only enter Spain at his request. Mola then sent his emissary 'Garcilaso' to Estoril to confirm this agreement, and thus at the end of May he became 'The Director' of all conspiratorial activities,[2] upon whom success or failure now depended.

José Antonio had been in prison in Madrid since 14 March, but this did not prevent him from issuing orders and instructions to the Falange. In March he said that the Falange would assist the Army

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1 Félix Maíz, Alzamiento, 39-41 & 64-9; Lizarza, Memorias, 109; Cacho Zabalza, UME, 19 & 27. It is generally agreed that Mola had no contact with the Carlists till early June; in view of the Carlist plan, of the UME officers and of Mola's desire for civilian support, it seems odd that there was no contact earlier. Galindo, Los partidos, 321, says two Carlists (Baleztena and Martínez Berasáin) told Mola of the Carlist plan - but when?

2 Redondo & Zavala, Requeté, 352-3. A sentence is quoted from Sanjurjo's letter to Mola: 'I need your decision; if you decide, I want you to represent me.' As Sanjurjo approved of Mola making military plans in the north from late April, and Javier visited Estoril in May, the 'decision' surely cannot refer to whether or not Mola would rise; possibly it referred to the political aims of the rising. An unpublished source (quoted in Payne, The Military, 323) suggests that Sanjurjo decided in mid-May that a rising by Mola with Carlist support was the best bet.

if it were asked so to do, but he insisted that his movement remain an independent force.[1] On 4 May he issued an address to the military, to be circulated by the UME in the barracks.[2] The extinction of Spain he believed was now at hand, and he therefore appealed to the Army, 'guardian of what is permanent', to rise up and save Spain before it was too late. He reminded officers of Spengler's dictum: 'In the last resort it has always been a platoon of soldiers that has saved civilisation.'[3] On 13 May he again told his followers not to make pacts with other parties.[4] Then, at the end of May, the Falange joined the mainstream of conspiracy. Through an emissary, José Antonio told Mola that he could offer him 4,000 Falangista shock-troops.[5] He had also been in touch with Fal Conde for some time, and now told him that, if the Carlists reached agreement with Mola, he would give the necessary orders to the Falange if forewarned.[6] On 28 May José Antonio was given a five-month sentence for illegal possession of fire-arms, and on 5 June the government transferred him

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1 Bravo, Falange, 165-6.

2 Iribarren, Mola, 44.

3 O.c., 763-9.

4 O.c., 1108.

5 Payne, Falange, 102 & 110; HCE, II-9, 511; HGL, 447.

6 Redondo & Zavala, Requeté, 356.

to the gaol at Alicante. His brother Fernando was now left to negotiate with the military, though José Antonio in fact retained overall control.[1]

Mola was from the end of May the '*de jure*' head of the conspiracy, as it were, though since April he had been its '*de facto*' leader. His task was not an easy one; as Félix Maíz recorded in his diary: 'The task of General Mola is two-fold: to organise a National Movement and to disorganise ill-advised local actions.'[2] Some officers wanted to rise immediately regardless of the consequences, while others had yet to be won over to the movement. Decrees in March and June allowed the War Minister to retire officers at will and replace them with whom he pleased.[3] Conservative military men were perturbed by being thus put at the mercy of a civilian's whim; new appointments would be 'political', in the sense that the Minister would choose officers of Leftist sympathies on whom he could rely

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1 Buckley, *Spanish Republic*, 200; Bravo, *Falange*, 199 & 201. At his trial he characteristically emptied an ink-pot over the clerk of the court.

2 Félix Maíz, *Alzamiento*, 195. Apparently the idea of a *coup* in Madrid was raised yet again. In April Mola had prevented a rising in Burgos, and at the end of May officers in Valencia had to be restrained (Iribarren, *Mola*, 51 & 68).

3 These decrees were attacked by Calvo Sotelo (*DSC*, 16 June 1936) as an insult to military dignity. On 23 June Franco wrote to Casares Quiroga complaining that they had undermined morale by ending promotion by seniority and by permitting the reinstatement of officers dismissed by the Army since Oct. 1934; he claimed that ninety per cent of the officer corps had no confidence in the new appointments (Arrarás, *Franco*, 171-4).

absolutely. The effect of these measures was to exacerbate the feelings of officers: the more hot-headed became more hot-headed, the more cautious became more cautious. A similar effect on military minds, which further increased Mola's difficulties, was produced by incidents between officers and workers' organizations. For example, in May cavalrymen and workers had clashed at Alcalá de Henares. The government decided it would be best to transfer two regiments, but officers were outraged at the government taking the side of the revolutionary Left against them. They mutinied and were duly arrested.[1] Then there was the fear that the War Minister would transfer or remove key conspirators - as nearly happened to Mola and Yagüe.[2]

Mola therefore had constantly to try and assert his authority over both military and civilian conspirators. It would seem that he was in the main successful. For organizing the plot in the garrisons Mola now had the network of the UME at his disposal [3] -

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1 On this incident, see Calvo Sotelo, DSC, 16 June 1936; Atholl, Searchlight, 60; Gannes & Repard, Spain, 132; & J.L. Jalón, El Ejército español (2nd ed., Madrid, 1959), 11.

2 In mid-May the Republican Gen. García Caminero visited Pamplona and advised the government to relieve Mola of his command and disperse the garrison (Iribarren, Mola, 49-50). In July Gen. Batet (for the government) quizzed Mola at Irache; he had no choice but to deny that he was plotting an adventure (Iribarren, Mola, 87; Félix Maíz, Alzamiento, 249-52). In June Casares called Yagüe to Madrid and tried to persuade him to take a post abroad (Calleja, Yagüe, 75-6).

3 Cacho Zabalza, UME, 37-8. Capt. Barba's junta in Madrid was detained for a time in June, but was replaced by a reserve junta (Cols. Ortiz de Zárate, Ungría, Muñoz Grandes, Alvarez Rementería). The man most useful to Mola was 'The Technician' (Galarza of the UME) who used the Army's communications network in the service of the conspiracy.

perhaps more impressive on paper than in practice.[1] Late in June he provisionally assigned Generals on whom he hoped he could rely to command operations in the various regions.[2] He asked the various garrisons to despatch representatives to Pamplona to receive final instructions.[3] His strategy was still to march on the capital from various points, and on 24 June he signed the plan for the rising in Morocco, where operations were to begin. A coded telegram would be sent from Pamplona to Yagüe telling him when to strike.[4]

However, Mola was still not sure of some garrisons and was having difficulty with civilians. On 1 July, a confidential report from Pamplona informed fellow conspirators that 'the executive of the patriotic movement' believed that 'enthusiasm for the cause has still not reached the degree of exaltation needed to obtain a decisive victory.' Agreement had not been reached with a 'very important national force, indispensable for action in certain provinces', because

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1 Payne (The Military, 316-7) nevertheless believes there was a revival of the UME after the elections and accepts figures for March 1936 giving it the allegiance of half the officers on active service.

2 Iribarren, Mola, 62-3; Queipo de Llano was to be in charge in Andalusia, Franco in Africa, Mola himself in Navarre and the north, Villegas in Madrid, Cabanellas in Saragossa, González Carrasco in Barcelona, and Saliquet and Goded in Valencia. Yagüe was to bring the Moroccan Army across the Straits and head for Madrid. It would seem that Mola was not yet sure of the attitude of some of these Generals. Only two - Yagüe and Cabanellas - held actual commands.

3 Calleja, Yagüe, 82.

4 Félix Maíz, Alzamiento, 197.

it was making impossible demands that would make the military its prisoners for the future.[1] The original plan to rise between 24 and 29 June had therefore to be cancelled.[2]

Mola apparently had no dealings with the Carlists until June. It would seem that early in the month local Carlists offered him Requetés in connection with opposition to the government's plans to change the personnel of local government in Navarre.[3] Mola believed Carlist support essential because he did not have many soldiers in Pamplona, and many of these were Asturians with Leftist sympathies. The Communion claimed to be able to put 8,400 men into the field at a moment's notice, but its leaders were not prepared to sacrifice their Requetés merely for a coup to overthrow the government.[4] In Pamplona on 11 June Mola met Zamanillo, representing the Communion's leadership, who insisted that the aims must be to abolish the Constitution, parties and unions, and to make Sanjurjo dictator for the purpose of creating a corporative State with corporative Cortes and

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1 Bernard, Mola, 103.

2 HGL, 450 (between St. John's Day and St. Peter's Day).

3 See HGL, 447; Iribarren, Mola, 55 & 76; & Vigón, Mola, 98-9 who says that the consejo foral was planning an armed demonstration, which prompted 'Garcilaso' to get three Carlists to see Mola and offer him 7,000 Requetés. Mola told them a rising should be for a national, not a foral cause.

4 Lizarza, Memorias, 85, 88, 91 & 99.

the old flag.[1] Mola considered these Carlist conditions 'inadmissible', for they would take away the Generals' freedom to manoeuvre as effectively as the Pact of San Sebastián had that of the Republicans.

On 15 June he gave Fal Conde at Irache a copy of his own proposals, dated 5 June: a five-man Directory of Generals would rule with the help of technicians, and they would legislate by decree. In effect, they would constitute a 'Republican dictatorship' as they would undertake not to change the form of government. They would in due course convoke Cortes, but the electoral system was to be left an open question for the time being. Fal Conde and Mola agreed to rise in principle, but neither would give an inch to facilitate agreement. On 2 July Mola was officially told by Zamanillo that his programme was unacceptable to the Carlists. Thus there was deadlock.[2]

The Falange meanwhile provided headaches for both José Antonio and Mola. José Antonio, as usual, wanted to run the Falange

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1 Lizarza, Memorias, 92-3; Redondo & Zavala, Requeté, 355. Zamanillo was National Delegate for Requetés and carried the official proposals of Fal Conde, who was unable to be there himself. Sanjurjo had agreed with the Carlists to be President of a Military Directory, with two Carlist advisers and a cabinet of 'technocrats', including José Antonio as Minister for Corporations.

2 Lizarza, Memorias, 94-8; Redondo & Zavala, Requeté, 357-9; Vigón, Mola, 95; Félix Maíz, Alzamiento, 207 (the latter two give the date as the 16th). HGL, 430, seems to suggest that Fal Conde had agreed on a date for the rising (on 15 June?) but then threatened to withdraw the Requetés if his terms were not accepted.

personally, even though he was in Alicante gaol. He was still anxious about the movement's independence: on 24 June he threatened local leaders with expulsion if they negotiated with local military conspirators. He did not want his social policy to be disregarded by the Army in the hour of victory.[1] He was also anxious that his rival Calvo Sotelo should not emerge as the main civilian leader.[2] However even José Antonio soon realised that the Falange's system of communications was a shambles, and so, on 29 June, he issued a guide for negotiating with the military: the Falange should retain its independence. At the same time he wondered, like others, whether the Generals would ever make a move, and there was apparently a plan for a Falangista rising on 10 July to force their hand. This was cancelled, but in the general confusion Valencian Falangistas seized the local radio station on the 11th.[3]

Meanwhile, Mola was more worried about the Carlist impasse.

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1 O.c., 1109-12 (negotiations with the military were only to be conducted at the highest level).

2 Ximénez, JA, 573; his ostensible objection to Calvo was that 'he does not know how to get on a horse'. (For Calvo's position at this time, see below.)

3 O.c., 1113-4, for the orders of 29 June, saying the military were not to appoint the civilian authorities until three days after victory. This order was valid until 10 July; it was renewed on the 9th until the 20th (Payne, Falange, 113). Ximénez, JA, 771, refers to a plan to rise on the 10th, cancelled when the bearer of the watchword was arrested. See El Debate, 12 July 1936, for the Valencian episode and the Leftist rioting that followed.

Earlier, he had even thought of retiring to his native Cuba rather than risk failure with a lot of bloodshed,[1] but this phase of extreme pessimism seems to have passed by the beginning of July. On the 4th he wrote to Varela, saying that the rising might take place between the 12th and the 20th.[2] However, owing to the Carlist problem, and perhaps to the San Fermín celebrations in Pamplona, Mola revised this to between the 15th and the 23rd.[3]

Mola now apparently thought that the military conspiracy at least was in as good shape as it was ever likely to be. He had always bargained for failure in Madrid, and seems now to have resigned himself to the possibility of failure in Barcelona, Valencia and Corunna; nor does he seem to have been very sure of how things would go in Saragossa or Andalusia.[4] The question of Carlist participation

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1 Esteban-Infantes, Sanjurjo, 255.

2 Pemán, Soldado, 154.

3 Iribarren, Mola, 61, who says the 12th was the first choice, but S. Fermín did not finish until the 14th; & Calleja, Yagüe, 82, who gives 15-23 and says emissaries from the garrisons went to get final instructions under cover of S. Fermín. HGL, 450, also gives the date as the 15th.

4 Félix Maíz, Alzamiento, 224-5 & 229 (Mola thought Goded would be of more use in Valencia, but he insisted on going to Barcelona); & M. Aznar, Historia militar de la guerra de España, tomo I (3rd ed., Madrid, 1958), 85-7: Sanjurjo was to arrive when Mola wanted him to; Franco was to fly to Morocco and invade the south; Mola was i.c. in the north; Fanjul and García de la Herrán in Madrid; González de Lara in Burgos; Cabanellas in Saragossa; Queipo de Llano in Seville; Varela and López Pinto in Cádiz; Patxot in Málaga; Col. Cascajo in Córdoba; Saliquet in Valencia; Goded in Barcelona. According to his son, the plotters in both Valencia and Barcelona wanted Goded (Goded, Un faccioso, 29).

had to be settled urgently. On 7 July he told Fal Conde that his decision was required immediately, saying that the question of the flag could be settled soon after the rising. Fal Conde replied that the question of the flag had to be settled right away and he must have a guarantee that an anti-democratic régime would be installed. Mola refused to countenance these conditions and accused the Communion of unpatriotic intransigence worthy of the Popular Front.[1]

Two attempts at mediation were now made. Lizarza, on Fal Conde's behalf, went to Estoril to see Sanjurjo, who wrote two copies of a letter on the 9th, one for Fal Conde, one for Mola. This letter suggested that the Carlists should use the old flag, and military units to which they were attached should use none. The military would form a 'purely apolitical' government with advisers from among the civilian conspirators. This government would revise religious and social legislation, end parties and introduce an anti-democratic system. Thus agreement with the Carlists on these terms was possible. Lizarza gave Fal Conde his copy in St.-Jean-de-Luz on the 11th, firmly believing that Sanjurjo had given his backing to the Carlists.[2]

At about the time Sanjurjo was being consulted, Fal Conde's old rival Rodezno met Mola, who said he wanted some Requetés to stiffen

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1 Thomas, Civil War, 167; cf. Payne, The Military, 335-6.

2 Lizarza, Memorias, 100-4; Galindo, Los partidos, 334-6.

his companies, but he did not have arms for the 7,000 or so offered. Rodesno suggested that Mola negotiate with the Regional Junta, who would be less intransigent, though both recognized that St.-Jean-de-Luz would have to be consulted.[1] Mola received his copy of Sanjurjo's letter on the 12th but did not change his attitude to Fal Conde, who now ordered negotiations with Mola to be broken off. Apparently unbeknown to Lizarza and Fal Conde, Sanjurjo had sent another emissary to Mola to explain that he had only signed the letter to keep the Carlists in the movement; he was not restricting Mola's freedom of action.[2] In fact, Sanjurjo was playing a double game. By this stage his first loyalties were to his military colleagues, not to the Carlists. Meanwhile Mola had taken up Rodesno's suggestion and saw that his best chance lay with the Regional Junta. Thus, when the Regional Junta on the 12th asked Javier for permission to mobilise the Requetés and put them under Mola, its members came armed with a promise that they could use the old flag and could staff all

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1 Lizarza, Memorias, 101-2, who says 'Garcilaso' arranged the meeting on the 9th; & Iribarren, Mola, 76 & 78, who gives the date as the 5th. It would seem that Rodesno assured Mola that the Regional Junta (under Balestena) would be cooperative. Félix Maíz, Alzamiento, 279, says Rodesno assured Mola of the Requetés' support.

2 Lizarza, Memorias, 105-6; HGL, 430. Lizarza says Mola did not believe Sanjurjo had written it. HGL explains this: Sanjurjo had not marked it with the agreed countermark; the letter was not therefore valid, and the emissary from Estoril was sent to be sure Mola knew the circumstances.

the town councils in Navarre. Javier, without consulting Fal Conde, agreed to this.[1] Mola thus assured himself of Carlist support, or so it seemed.

Mola now wanted the matter fully cut and dried with all Carlist leaders, for Calvo Sotelo's death presented an ideal psychological moment for a rising. It appears that he had already agreed with the Regional Junta that the Carlists could use the old flag and the Army the tricolour, and that companies of Requetés 'would go together with' his own companies.[2] However, Fal Conde complicated matters on the 13th by ordering Lizarza to get the Requeté leaders in Pamplona to swear not to join a rising unless orders came from St.-Jean-de-Luz via Lizarza. Lizarza and the UME Captains now agreed that the latter should tell Mola to accept the terms of Sanjurjo's letter. Mola sent Lizarza a note saying that he did accept its 'orientations', a note which Lizarza immediately took to St.-Jean-de-Luz. He came back with a note for Mola from Javier and Fal Conde

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1 Lizarza, Memorias, 107-8, who says Fal Conde would have resigned if the rising had not been imminent; & Iribarren, Mola, 77-8. Javier actually said he would write to Alfonso Carlos in Vienna; if no reply came before the rising, they were to join it. Nothing was received from Vienna until after the rising. Alfonso Carlos said Carlists must join a rising for Religion and Country, and not insist on pressing his personal cause (Documentos de Alfonso Carlos, 305 & 310).

2 Iribarren, Mola, 79-80 (a compromise between Mola's wish to have the Requetés fully under military control, and the Carlists' wish to remain separate).

saying the Communion would participate on the basis of Sanjurjo's letter.[1] Before Lizarza gave this note to Mola, it would seem that the General had already despatched Félix Maíz to St.-Jean-de-Luz to see Fal Conde, who gave him a note identical to the one given to Lizarza, which Félix Maíz duly delivered to Mola on the 16th. Mola could now give the final order for the rising to begin.[2]

It could be said that the Bloque Nacional had implicitly relied on military action for the realization of its programme since its inception in 1934. In 1935 some of its members had been in close touch with the UME. From February 1936 Calvo Sotelo was in touch with military conspirators, and was recognized by many as the civilian leader of the movement. Because he was closely watched by agents of the government, he was unable to take a direct part in the plotting,

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1 Lizarza, Memorias, 108-12.

2 Félix Maíz, Alzamiento, 278-84. Lizarza says that Félix Maíz's version is wrong. The above is therefore an attempt to piece the information together, not rendered easy by sometimes vague chronology. Lizarza says he gave his note to Mola on the 15th, though a close examination of his account rather suggests it could have been the 16th. In short, it would seem that the various Carlists and Mola were all to some extent carrying on rather different negotiations behind each others' backs. The above version would seem to fit with Iribarren, Mola, 81, who says negotiations were completed with the Carlists 14-16 July. Esteban-Infantes, Sanjurjo, 256, says Mola obtained Javier's consent when 'Garcilaso' visited St.-Jean: from the context this appears to be after Calvo's death; possibly this should refer to Javier's decision on the 12th - the Regional Junta apparently stayed in St.-Jean until the 14th (?) to await Alfonso Carlos's reply.

but he was kept informed by and gave advice to the military through friends.[1] He disagreed with Mola's plan and wanted success in the capital to be assured.[2] Nevertheless, in mid-June he put himself at Mola's disposal, and in early July assured him of the support of his followers.[3] On 10 July his friend Bau met the leading conspirators in Madrid, and reported back that the conspiracy was still not in very good shape. Calvo Sotelo, who had been told on the 8th of the orders given to his police escort, said that his own death could have the effect of giving the plotters the necessary jolt.[4] After his assassination there were demands for immediate action. José Antonio from Alicante sent an emissary to Mola to say that the Falange would rise alone if the General did not act by the 18th.[5] In Madrid, officers from a regiment at El Pardo asked for machine-guns with which to kill Asaña, but they were told that all was now

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1 Bau Nolla (conversation), who was one of these emissaries; he was Traditionalist Deputy for Tarragona and a close friend.

2 Vegas, Calvo Sotelo, 211-3.

3 Félix Maíz, Alzamiento, 168; Vigón, Mola, 102. The emissary was the ubiquitous 'Garcilaso'. An attempt was apparently made in July to persuade Calvo to leave Madrid for Navarre.

4 Bau Nolla (conversation). Bau had met Gens. Villegas and Fanjul, Col. Álvarez Rementería (UME) and the police chief Martín Báguenas near the Retiro.

5 Payne, Falange, 115.

in hand.[1] In Estoril, Sanjurjo bemoaned the loss of his future Premier.[2]

For the conspirators in the Peninsula, there remained the mystery of Franco in Tenerife. In early July, Varela asked another conspirator, Kindelán: 'Do you think Franquito will come?' Kindelán replied: 'Mola thinks so.'[3] On 8 March Franco had approved of preparations being made for a rising should the situation deteriorate. He had also apparently agreed that Mola should be in charge of these preparations.[4] On 12 March he arrived in Tenerife.[5] He was not enthusiastic about being a parliamentary candidate, and in early

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1 Vegas, Calvo Sotelo, 220-1. 'The Technician' was by now setting things in motion from the War Ministry. (Ansaldo, ¿ Para qué?, 125).

2 Romano, Sanjurjo, 187, who was in Estoril at the time and says Sanjurjo intended giving power to Calvo; Sanjurjo commented: 'The enemy knows what he is doing. He has removed our best piece.' Jellinek, Civil War, 284-7, cites a document taken from a leading conspirator in Barcelona which named a Military Directory of Sanjurjo (President), Mola, Franco, Cabanellas, Goded, Queipo de Llano and Fanjul - with Salazar Alonso as High Commissioner in Morocco. This was to be succeeded by a government led by Calvo Sotelo and including Franco (War), Mola (Interior), Goicoechea (Foreign Affairs), Albiñana (Agriculture), Gil Robles (Navy), Pemán (Education). (Calvo Sotelo was to have had lunch with Gil Robles on 14 July to try and get him to join the movement.)

3 Salmador, Ansaldo, 90 (Gen. Kindelán being the source).

4 HGL, 429 (on p. 437 Franco is said to have approved of Sanjurjo as the nominal leader).

5 Galinsoga, Centinela, 189-91. In Cádiz he had found church-burning in progress. The Military Governor (a Colonel) said he had orders not to intervene; Franco told him he should disobey such orders in the name of a higher duty.

May told a visitor that the Army's intervention was justifiable only when matters 'escape from the political sphere and enter into the orbit of the true supreme interest of the salvation of the country.'[1] In the Canaries he was often visited by Serrano Súñer, but neither he nor the Generals could ascertain Franco's views.[2] Mola's plans were therefore flexible: they envisaged Franco flying to Morocco, but they also envisaged Yagüe bringing forces across the Straits. Franco's sphinx-like attitude may have been simply prompted by caution. On the other hand, his conduct during the Republic suggests that he had a strong respect for legality, and therefore needed to be sure in his own mind whether or not rebellion was justified in the circumstances. His letter of 23 June to Casares Quiroga complaining of interference with promotions can be interpreted either as an attempt to effect a change in policy to avoid a rising, or as an effort to make the conspirators' task easier.[3]

Franco seems to have made his decision to participate in the

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1 'El Tebib Arrumi', El Caudillo (Avila, 1937), 32; by implication, he did not think this had yet happened. (Cf. Mola's view in 1934: 'Indiscipline is justified when the abuses of power constitute oppression and infamy, or are leading the nation to ruin. Meekness is in the first case disgraceful; in the second, treason'. - Vigón, Mola, 87-8).

2 L. Ramírez, Francisco Franco (Paris, 1964), 194-5. Arrarás (conversation) also says emissaries returned from Tenerife without answers, much to the disquiet of Mola.

3 For the letter, see Arrarás, Franco, 171-4.

rising between 10 and 13 July, having received an ultimatum to the effect that the other Generals would go ahead without him if necessary.[1] The conspirators attached great importance to Franco's participation because of his prestige. They had therefore taken the precaution of ordering an aircraft to take him to Morocco. He was able to go from Tenerife to Las Palmas (on Grand Canary) with the government's permission to attend the funeral of General Balmes on the 17th. Early on the 18th he heard that Yagüe had begun to take over in Morocco. He then set off in the hired Dragon Rapide and landed at Tetuán at 7 a.m. on the 19th to take command of the best troops in the Army.[2] On the 17th, Yagüe had taken over in

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1 Cortés Cavanillas (conversation) says Calvo Sotelo told him on 10 July: 'Franco has not decided'. Arrarás (conversation) says he knows of no evidence to show that his decision was made until the week before the rising. Vegas (conversation) says the task of telling Franco that the others would rise without him was entrusted to the diplomat Sangrónis - Ramírez, Franco, 203, says Sangrónis reached Tenerife on the 14th to tell him a plane had been arranged. Ansaldo puts the decision just before Calvo's death. The less cautious were infuriated by Franco's attitude, as they had been since at least 1934 - hence Sanjurjo's remarks: 'With or without Franquito, we shall save Spain!' (Ansaldo, ¿Para qué?, 121 & 125). According to Salmador, Ansaldo, 102, Mola sent Franco a message saying the movement had no room for parasites and 'the friend who is not a friend will be treated as an enemy'.

2 Kindelán asked Luca de Tena to hire a plane. On 5 July the latter rang up his London correspondent, Bolín, and asked him to see to it (£2,000 was waiting in a London bank). He and La Cierva got hold of a Dragon Rapide with a British pilot. The plane's orders were to wait in Casablanca until 31 July and return if no other instructions were given. Bolín and party left Croydon on the 11th, and the plane reached Grand Canary on the 15th. Gen. Balmes accidentally shot himself on the 16th

Continued on page 566/.....

Morocco from his Republican civilian and military superiors. The rising had begun.[1]

During the 18th, military risings took place in Andalusia.[2] The government was not taken by surprise. Ministers knew of military conspiracies, but took no determined action against the suspected leaders. Politically, the Left Republicans were dependent on the Left's masses. They had minimized the disorder caused by the latter when addressing the Right. They took no determined action against the military because the existence of an armed anti-revolutionary force was for them the only hope of preserving a

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Footnote 2 on page 565 continued/.....

and Franco went to Las Palmas. At 3 a.m. on the 18th Yagüe telegraphed Franco in his hotel. Franco proclaimed martial law and left Orgaz i.c. Canaries. He left at 2 p.m. and stopped at Agadir and Casablanca en route. (L. Bolín, Spain [London, 1967], 10-52; Thomas, Civil War, 168; Galinsoga, Centinela, 209-10; J. Díaz de Villegas, Guerra de liberación [Barcelona, 1957], 54-5; J. Millán Astray, Franco el caudillo [Salamanca, 1939], 21-3; El Debate, 18 July 1936; News Chronicle, 7 Nov. 1936 - the pilot's version; D. Jerrold, Georgian Adventure [London, 1937], 370-3, for the details. There are the customary discrepancies).

1 Calleja, Yagüe, 80-4, says the Republicans in Morocco knew of a plot on the 11th but Yagüe reassured them. His emissary to Pamplona returned unable to recall whether Mola had said the 14th or the 15th. He was ready by the 14th, but instructions from the Peninsula said the 17th at 17.00. He in fact began the rising at Dar Riffien at 11 a.m., disregarding a new order to wait till the 18th because the authorities in Melilla got to know the rising was imminent there. A rather different version, nevertheless giving a similar impression of confusion, is H. Fernández de Castro, El Alzamiento Nacional en Melilla (Melilla, 1940), esp. 91, 97-8 & 145. Hills, Franco, 236 & 258, produces evidence that Mola intended the Moroccan rising to begin on the 18th.

2 See Thomas, Civil War, 186-9.

certain independence of action vis-à-vis the workers' organizations. This tight-rope walking was the only course really open to the Left Republicans if they were not to break up the Popular Front: therefore they minimized the doings of the military to the Left as well as the deeds of the extreme Left to the politicians of the Right. Their complacent, optimistic declarations to both sides were dictated by necessity.[1]

Casares Quiroga had tried to insure against military action by putting forward the troops' summer leave in July,[2] but the Left Republicans' policy never really had much hope of success. With the rising in Morocco the policy entered its death-agony. To keep the Socialists at bay, the government throughout the 18th broadcast the news that the military rising had collapsed; on the same day, a telegram was received from Lucía supporting the government's position. The UGT however declared a general strike and the Socialists ordered their followers to mobilize for 'victory or death'.[3]

1 Their failure to take preventive action against the Army infuriated the Left (see Alvarez del Vayo, Freedom's Battle, 245; Largo Caballero, Recuerdos, 162; Thomas, Civil War, 168-9 & 176).

2 Iribarren, Mola, 61; Bravo, Falange, 208; Aznar, Historia militar, I, 84. Since conspirators were nervous about the troops, the effect of this reduction in military strength probably had little influence on the plotters. The pretext was that the troops should go home to help with the harvest.

3 El Debate, 19 July 1936; & Claridad, 18 July 1936. Lucía's note read: 'As an ex-Minister of the Republic, as leader of the Derecha Regional Valenciana, as a Deputy and as a Spaniard, I lift up my heart in this grave hour above all political differences to put myself on the side of the authority which, in opposition to violence and rebellion, is the incarnation of the Republic and the Country.'

The Left Republicans tried one last throw. In the early hours of the 19th a new government was formed under Martínez Barrio, the least Leftist leader in the Popular Front, and Sánchez Román was one of the Ministers.[1] General Miaja, the new War Minister, telephoned Mola, and discovered that he would rise within hours. Martínez Barrio now telephoned to offer him the War Ministry in a coalition government which would restore order. Mola refused: 'If I were to agree on a compromise with you, we should both be traitors to our ideals and our men, and we should both be strung up by them... Only the Army can now give the country back the peace it needs... Only a military dictatorship can save Spain.'[2] The attempt to disrupt the military movement thus failed, and the Left Republicans were now in the power of the workers' organizations. Within hours the Socialists forced this government's replacement by another weak Left Republican ministry under Giral. Arms were distributed to the workers, who had been demanding them since the 18th.[3] In Pamplona, Mola proclaimed martial law at 6 a.m. and the Requetés flocked to

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1 El Debate, 19 July 1936. On the 18th the Socialists vetoed Azaña's plan to install a national government of the type advocated by M. Maura (Jackson, Spanish Republic, 243).

2 Iribarren, Mola, 101-3; Bernard, Mola, 77; R. Fernández de Castro, Franco, Mola, Varela (2nd ed., Melilla, 1938), 189-90; E. Corma, El general Mola (2nd ed., Madrid, 1956), 23-4.

3 Thomas, Civil War, 194-6.

support him.[1]

On 19 and 20 July the movement spread to the rest of the Peninsula. By the 21st it was clear that any hopes of a rapid and complete military take-over had disappeared. The insurgents had gained control of less than half the country: Galicia, León, northern Castile (but not Santander), Aragón, Navarre, Álava, half Cáceres, the Canaries, Morocco and the Balearics (though not Menorca). They also held a pocket around Cádiz, Seville, Córdoba and Oviedo.[2] In general terms, it seemed that where military leaders acted quickly, boldly and with resource, they gained the advantage even in Leftist cities, such as Seville, Oviedo and Saragossa. Where they vacillated, as for instance in Málaga, Valencia and Santander, the Popular Front's forces thwarted their plans.[3] Yet, given the confused and ill-prepared nature of the conspiracy and the risings, the military plotters were lucky to have done so well.[4] They had to rely on

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1 Félix Maíz, Alzamiento, 314. Mola had said he would blow his brains out if the Carlists failed to turn up (HGL, 430). By this time Mola knew that Queipo had risen in Seville.

2 Plus odd buildings in Toledo, San Sebastián, Valencia, Gijón, Albacete and Jaén. For the risings of 17-20 July, see Thomas, Civil War, 181-217, & Broué & Témime, La révolution, 82-102.

3 Mola thought Goded's presence could have won the day in Valencia; Vegas (conversation) believes Lucía's attitude was a key factor there. In Málaga, Patxot took his men into the streets but was persuaded to bring them back in when Martínez Barrio convinced him that Mola was not going to rise (Iribarren, Mola, 103).

4 Vegas (conversation) stresses the confusion and lack of proper preparation; he describes the conspiracy as little more than an agreement between Generals. No instructions were sent to smaller garrisons, not even to one so close to the capital as Segovia.

quite small numbers of soldiers in the Peninsula.[1] Outside Navarre, civilian para-military help came from small groups of Monarchists, Falangistas and, in some areas, Japistas.[2] The acknowledged leader of the whole movement, Sanjurjo, was killed in an air-crash near Cascais on the 20th. It seems clear, however, that he had little intention of putting the movement under Carlist control.[3]

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1 Hills, Franco, 240-3, provides interesting figures on military and police loyalties and shows that the insurgents ended up with less than half the officers in the Peninsula. The Army in Morocco was 24,000 strong.

2 On the 17th José Antonio called on his followers to rise for Spain with the Army (O.c., 773-5). Gil Robles had said on the 15th that he had lost control of his followers. The local JAP's participation is noted at Cádiz (Mariñas, Varela, 72), Burgos (Redondo & Zavala, Requeté, 490) and Valladolid (T. Prieto, Soldados de España [Madrid, 1946], 99) - its participation was probably more widespread.

3 Fal Conde and Javier sent a 'magnificent bimotor' to Alberça to fly him to Biarritz so that he could lead the Requetés from Pamplona. Mola sent Ansaldo and his Puss Moth with orders to fly him to Burgos. Sanjurjo significantly decided to take Ansaldo's plane to Burgos (where Alfonsine leaders awaited him; Ansaldo thought he would have restored the Alfonsine branch). Ansaldo had put down at a military aerodrome: the friendly Portuguese, under diplomatic pressure, said he could not use an official 'drome. So he chose a ploughed-up racecourse near Cascais. Ansaldo himself believed his propeller broke on hitting a ridge on take-off. He cleared a row of trees but lost speed and hit some rocks when attempting a forced landing. His plane then burnt out. (Salmador, Ansaldo, 122-32; Redondo & Zavala, Requeté, 379-81; Lizarza, Memorias, 116-7; Félix Maíz, Alzamiento, 275).

EPILOGUE

The original political aims of the movement were somewhat imprecise: it was a movement 'for Spain' but not in favour of the Monarchy. Mola's proclamation of martial law made no mention of the form of government. It merely stated that the military were acting 'to hold Spain back from the very brink of the abyss' because 'Spain, prey to the most fearful anarchy, is bleeding to death'. Franco's proclamation in the Canaries also simply referred to the restoration of order and the quelling of revolution.[1] This 'accidentalist' approach meant that the movement did not aim to end the Republican form of government; indeed, the first proclamation in Melilla said: 'It is a question of reestablishing the rule of order within the Republic', and maintained that the Army was acting to carry out the will of the majority.[2]

This was not perhaps an unjustified claim, bearing in mind the numbers of votes cast in the elections. Though, with the division of the country, outward loyalties tended to be decided geographically, it may be presumed that the attitudes of political leaders still

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1 Mola's proclamation in Félix Maíz, Alzamiento, 306; Franco's in S.F.A. Coles, Franco of Spain (London, 1955), 175-7.

2 Melilla proclamation (in Franco's name) in Fernández de Castro, Franco, 80-2 (& his Alzamiento, 216-8). The idea of the majority's will also appeared in González Carrasco's proclamation in Barcelona (Jellinek, Civil War, 290-2).

largely reflected the views of their supporters. Following the rising, Gil Robles, Lerroux, Cambó and Ventosa, M. Álvarez, Martínez de Velasco, Portela and, rather ironically, Unamuno, Ortega Gasset and Marañón, all showed support for it.[1] The PNV, to the anger of the insurgents, sided with the Popular Front because the Basques had been promised a statute of autonomy.[2]

The military conspirators rose principally because they believed an unpatriotic government was not keeping order, and Socialist or Communist revolution would be the eventual outcome if they did not intervene. The more conspiratorially-minded among the insurgents perhaps believed in a 'Red plot'.[3] Military motives have perhaps been best expressed by General González Mendoza, who has written of a rising against 'anti-Spain' by 'the party in the Army [that] main-

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1 Though some (Portela, Unamuno, Ortega) had second thoughts later, Lucía was exceptional among Cedistas (he was imprisoned by the Republicans and later imprisoned by the Nationalists).

2 The PNV issued a note explaining that, 'the contest being between citizenship and Fascism, Republic and Monarchy, its principles undoubtedly demand that it come down on the side of citizenship and Republic in consonance with the democratic and Republican régime that our people was deprived of in its centuries of freedom'. (Sierra Bustamente, Euzkadi, 164). The Nationalists were to maintain that the PNV was illicitly helping the enemies of religion against its defenders (e.g. I.G. Menéndez-Reigada, La guerra nacional española ante la Moral y el Derecho [Salamanca, 1937], 18-9).

3 On the 'plot' evidence, see H.R. Southworth, El mito de la cruzada de Franco (Paris, 1963), 247-58.

tained the concept of National Honour, and the internal mission pertaining to the Army within the definition of this principle when a depraved and anti-national State seeks to lead the country against its proper destiny.'[1]

Conservative-minded Republicans like Lerroux thought the rising was justified because citizens had no obligation to obey a government which could not guarantee their safety. Calvo Sotelo's death demonstrated, for them, that legality and the State had ceased to exist in practice. Therefore it fell to the Army to fill the vacuum and supply the necessary authority.[2] The great majority of Catholic opinion - lay and ecclesiastical - endorsed the rising on similar grounds and because the Popular Front was seen as the enemy of religion. (The Church could not, of course, initiate such a rising.) The Catholic viewpoint was summarized by Gil Robles: 'The Leftist government lacked legitimacy of origin and of execution. Its action was not directed to the common good but to the destruction of society. It was no longer a duty to obey a power which was habitually and

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1 Cien años en la vida del Ejército español (Madrid, 1956), 50. Article 2 of the 'Constitutive Law of the Army' defined its mission as 'to defend the Country from external and internal enemies'. (quoted in F. Salvá Miquel & J. Vicente, Francisco Franco [Barcelona, 1959], 167).

2 Lerroux, Pequeña historia, 567-88. Lerroux had declined to join the conspiracy, but said he would support the Generals if they rose when government was in the gutter. He was warned of the rising by Martín Báguenas and crossed into Portugal on the 18th.

seriously unjust. The Spanish Rightists found themselves faced by a situation uniting all the conditions which, according to the traditional doctrine of Catholic political ethics, justified resistance to oppression, not only passively, but actively, through the use of armed force.'[1]

The failure of the military conspirators to achieve complete success meant civil war. Mola had earlier prophesied: 'the campaign will be long and costly... In Madrid there will be another Commune.'[2] What began, at least so far as the military insurgents were concerned, as a rising within the existing Republican framework, soon took on a different political aspect, if only because the Popular Front's forces had already monopolized the adjective

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1 Spain in Chains, 11 & 15-6, where he argued that the Left had rebelled against the verdict of the polls in Nov. 1933 (Oct. 1934) and that the 1936 election was won by fraud: 'Whose fault was it that the Rightists should have withdrawn from a legal fiction which served only to annihilate them?' In an interview with Paris-Soir, 30 July 1936 (in Gannes & Repard, Spain, 162-3), he denied that he had any 'material and moral responsibility' for the rising, though he had seen it coming; he now advocated a temporary dictatorship as the only alternative to Communism. Catholics justified the rising with texts from St. Thomas, Suárez, Vitoria, Pius XI's Firmissimam, etc. (see, e.g., HCE, II-9, 558; Menéndez-Reigada, op. cit.).

2 Bernard, Mola, 71-2. Cf. Franco: 'If the coup fails there will be a long and bloody civil war.' (quoted by Coles, Franco, 192).

'Republican'.[1] In the 'National' zone, all political groups were amalgamated on the basis of the Falange's programme into the FET y de las JONS on 19 April 1937. The leader of this 'single political entity of a national character' was General Franco, since September 1936 the 'Head of the Government of the Spanish State'. Thus the parties of the Spanish Right were united from without.[2]

During the civil war the Nationalists received foreign aid - German, Italian and Portuguese. Certainly attempts were made by the conspirators to buy arms from abroad before the rising, but they bought from private sources. The pact of 1934 with the Italians seems to have been virtually dead until immediately after the rising.

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1 The President of the 'Junta of National Defence' set up in Burgos on 23 July 1936 was Cabanellas, the oldest General and a Republican. Its programme referred to a Military Directory, but did not mention the form of government. The old flag was not restored by the insurgents until 29 August. The 'accidentalist' Franco became Head of State on 29 September. (Díaz-Plaja, La guerra, 173-6, 234-5 & 249-50). A statement by Franco published in ABC (Seville) as late as 23 July, ended: 'Long live Spain and the Republic!' (Tuñón de Lara, España, 443).

2 Standing for Falange Española Tradicionalista y de las JONS. The decree and the messages of adherence from the Carlists, Goicoechea and Gil Robles are given in Díaz-Plaja, La guerra, 396-408. Gil Robles's followers had hitherto been organized under a Junta de mando de las Milicias. Gil Robles officially brought his party to an end on 25 April 1937 in a letter from Portugal to La Calzada (text in J. Gutiérrez-Ravé, Diccionario histórico de la guerra de liberación de España [Madrid, n.d.], 84-5). Gil Robles had been expelled from the Nationalist zone twice in the first weeks of the war, and was again in 1938 (García Venero, Falange, 298).

Aid from Germany and Portugal was also negotiated after the war had started. The plotters, however, expected sympathy from these quarters when they rose.[1]

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1 Lizarza, Memorias, 49-50, refers to the purchase of large quantities of arms in Belgium, France and Germany, but these were held up in Belgium when the rising occurred. In late June the English publicist Jerrold was asked to obtain 50 machine-guns and half a million rounds of ammunition (Georgian Adventure, 367). Rumours of official German aid before the rising circulated by Republicans were mistaken. Sanjurjo was contacted by German arms manufacturers and visited their factories early in 1936. In June he declined an offer by the businessman Bernhardt to buy Junkers on credit (C. Foltz, The Masquerade in Spain [Boston, 1948], 39 & 46). It seems likely that German nationals in Spain sold some small arms to Rightists before the rising (The Nazi Conspiracy in Spain [London, 1937], 227-8). Félix Maíz, Alzamiento, 264, refers to the idea of La Cierva being sent to Berlin after the rising to approach Admiral Canaris and one von Veltjens to get arms. Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918-1945, srs. D, vol. III (London, 1951), mention a private deal being negotiated in July with Feltjen, a professional gun-runner. The first request to the German government for help is dated 22 July (pp. 1-4).

The question of Italian aid is more complex. It seems that the pact of 1934 had lapsed, apart from training some Carlists in 1935; no arms were delivered (Foltz, Masquerade, 39). Cortés Cavanillas (conversation) ascribes this to personal estrangement between Mussolini and Alfonso in 1935, but Goicoechea went to Rome immediately after the rising, saw Ciano and Mussolini and invoked the pact. Gutiérrez-Ravé (conversation) says Alfonso immediately put his money at Franco's disposal to buy planes. Goicoechea and Sáinz Rodríguez secured the aid on 24 July, though other emissaries from Franco (Bolín and Viana) asked Ciano on the 22nd (Thomas, Civil War, 286 & 296; Bolín, Spain, 53 & 162-72). Yet a certain mystery remains. Pemán, Soldado, 141, says the Italians gave permission for their embassy to be used for the projected coup in April. Presumably the question had to be referred to Rome, but this is not certain. The Ambassador, Pedrazzi, was sympathetic to the Monarchist cause.

The Portuguese government was sympathetic to the insurgents, but clearly was not sure whether the rising would succeed - hence it bowed to Republican pressure and stopped Sanjurjo's plane using an official aerodrome. Yet the President, Marshal Carmona, had previously invited Sanjurjo to be his guest at military parades, and when told on 14 July of the conspirators' plans he provided Sanjurjo with a Portuguese security guard (Romano, Sanjurjo, 216).

For three years the 'Nationals' with their foreign auxiliaries fought the 'Republicans' with their foreign auxiliaries. The outcome of this battle without quarter between the two Spains was the extinction of the Second Republic. The 'National Rising' that led to this had begun just five years to the day after the most eminent Republican had declared: 'If the Spanish Republic goes under, ours will be the blame. If we do not know how to govern, the blame will be ours.'[1]

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1 Azaña on 17 July 1931, quoted by F. Sedwick, The Tragedy of Manuel Azaña (Columbus, 1963), 100.

APPENDIX I

ATTEMPTS AT DYNASTIC RECONCILIATION, AUGUST 1931-JANUARY 1932

With Alfonso XIII in exile and styling himself Duque de Toledo, another attempt was made to bring the dynastic schism to an end. From late May or early June 1931 representatives of the two branches met at the Vicomtesse de la Gironde's villa in St.-Jean-de-Luz to see what could be done for Monarchist unity. The representatives agreed on a Traditionalist ideological content for the restored Monarchy, but the vexed question of who should be king remained. The Alfonsine Danvila and the ex-Integrist Jaimist Gómez Pujadas were asked to approach the two Claimants. One result was a letter written by Jaime III (also styled Duque de Madrid) on 15 August in Frohsdorf. In it the Carlist Claimant urged a united Monarchist front against the Republic. To be effective such a front needed one leader: Jaime proposed to his cousin Alfonso that the latter should abdicate in favour of his son Juan, who should be educated in the principles of Traditionalism by Jaime. Jaime, if he became King, would then name Juan as his successor. Alfonso was impressed by this proposal but some of his advisers dissuaded him from acting precipitately.[1]

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1 Melgar, Escisión dinástica, 105-10; Documentos de Alfonso Carlos, 216 (letter of 12 May 1933 to Sáenz referring to the document of 15 Aug. - Galindo, Los partidos, 120, wrongly assumes that the document referred to was the pact of 12 Sept.).

As a result of the meetings in St.-Jean-de-Luz Danvila and Gómez Pujadas drafted a six-clause pact for dynastic union. This document was signed by the two Claimants at Territet on Lake Geneva on 12 September. Both undertook not to support violent movements for a restoration and agreed to work for the election of new Constituent Cortes. Neither Claimant, nor Alfonso's sons, were to enter Spain until a new constitution had been introduced by these Cortes. Both promised to use their influence with their followers to get them to work together. Each promised to accept the decision of the Cortes as to who should be the King. If Alfonso XIII were chosen Jaime and his uncle Alfonso (Duque de San Jaime) would renounce their rights; if Jaime were chosen the Constituent Cortes would designate his successor.[1]

Jaime clearly wanted to end the schism, even going so far as to allow the Monarch to be chosen by election. The pact between the two cousins was kept secret: Villores, Jaime's Delegate, did not even inform the Supreme Junta of the Communion of its existence.[2] On 23 September Alfonso visited Jaime in his flat on the Avenue Hoche

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1 Text in Arrarás, HSRE I, 239 (and photo of signatures on p. 244). See also Galindo, Los partidos, 117-8, & J. Danvila Rivera, 'Datos para la Historia', ABC, 20 July 1954.

2 J.M. Lamamié de Clairac, 'Negociaciones e intentos de pactos entre las dos ramas dinásticas', Informaciones, 7 July 1954.

in Paris and two days later Jaime went to see Alfonso at the Hotel Savoy in Fontainebleau. At these meetings they made an agreement to form a 'united political front' against anarchy and Communism. Jaime told the French press about this but added that neither he nor his cousin had renounced their rights.[1] Nevertheless Jaime and Alfonso seemed to be progressing towards a solution of the dynastic question when Jaime died on 2 October.

The new Carlist Claimant was Jaime's uncle Alfonso, a younger brother of Carlos VII, who had fought in the Second Carlist War. He was 82 years old and childless. He became Alfonso Carlos I because to have taken the title 'Alfonso XIV' would have meant recognition of the legitimacy of Alfonso XIII's father, while to have assumed the title 'Alfonso XII' would have irrevocably alienated all Alfonsines.[2] Alfonso XIII immediately offered Alfonso Carlos the terms of the pact of 12 September. The latter however was deeply shocked at his nephew's flirtation with erroneous liberal ideas and could not sleep at night. He told Villores (his Delegate) that he would never have signed such a pact. As far as he was concerned no pact with Alfonso

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1 Melgar, Escisión dinástica, 112-7. See also Galindo, Los partidos, 120-1, & Documentos de Alfonso Carlos, 171 (letter of 1 Dec. 1931 saying he congratulated Jaime on a pact for joint Monarchist action - he confuses the dates of the two agreements).

2 Galindo, Los partidos, 123; Vegas Latapié (conversation).

existed and the Carlists' copy was destroyed.[1]

Since he had no direct heir Alfonso Carlos put a counter-proposal to Alfonso: the latter should abjure liberalism, accept the principles of Tradition and undertake to abide by whatever decisions might be made by traditional Cortes convoked by Alfonso Carlos. Alfonso rejected this suggestion.[2]

At the end of November Alfonso and Alfonso Carlos met and agreed to work together for Spain and Religion though the schism remained.[3] A committee of Carlists and Alfonsines continued to meet in the Hotel Bordeaux in Bordeaux to work for the closest possible cooperation between supporters of the two Claimants. Another pact was drafted setting up a joint executive committee for the Monarchist movement. It also stipulated that, when circumstances required it, Alfonso Carlos as Head of the House of Bourbon and Regent would convoke Cortes to give Spain a régime inspired by Tradition. However this document remained a dead letter.[4]

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1 Lamamié de Clairac, op. cit.; Documentos de Alfonso Carlos, 157 (letter to Villores, 2 Nov. 1931) & 204-5 (letter to Sáenz, 8 Feb. 1933). The Alfonsine Danvila (op. cit.) says Alfonso Carlos initially favoured the pact, but intransigent advisers soon turned him against it.

2 Melgar, Escisión dinástica, 125.

3 Documentos de Alfonso Carlos, 171 (letter to Oller, 1 Dec. 1931).

4 HCE, I-4, 462 & Galindo, Los partidos, 135-8.

Although Alfonsines and Carlists worked together in Spain a solution to the dynastic question eluded Monarchists. In his manifesto of 6 January 1932 Alfonso Carlos attacked the Republic for its treatment of his 'beloved cousin Alfonso', but he advocated a full-blooded Traditional Monarchy. He stated that Alfonso would indeed succeed him after his death, but to be King it was incumbent upon him to accept Traditionalist principles. Alfonso XIII's manifesto of 23 January, which was the work of Vallellano (a member of the Bordeaux committee), proclaimed that he did accept the 'fundamental principles' upheld by his 'beloved uncle' Alfonso Carlos, whom he naturally recognized as the head of the Bourbon family. The manifesto went on to envisage a provisional government convoking Cortes to give Spain a new constitution. Alfonso was ready to reign again and would always submit to the national will.[1] Both documents were the product of the Carlist-Alfonsine discussions in Bordeaux.

Alfonso Carlos clearly acknowledged that Alfonso was his heir by the laws of heredity, but the Carlists refused to compromise on principles. Alfonso Carlos made it clear that his rights could only pass to someone 'who promises and swears to preserve intact traditional principles, which...are above persons'.[2] Alfonso XIII, who

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1 Texts in HCE, I-4, 460-3; see also Galindo, Los partidos, 138-48.

2 Documentos de Alfonso Carlos, 178 (letter to Supreme Junta of the Communion, 29 Feb. 1932). Ultras like Cora Lira opposed Alfonso's succession whatever the circumstances.

was in the Near East, said that he had no knowledge of the manifesto he allegedly signed at Mürren.[1] During 1932 hopes of ending the schism faded away as each Claimant fell under the influence of intransigent advisers.[2]

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1 Arrarás, HSRE I, 246.

2 Danvila, op. cit., says Vallellano's manifesto represented the end of the episode; Lamamié de Clairac, op. cit., mentions another abortive attempt in Paris later in 1932, involving Calvo Sotelo.

APPENDIX II

COMPONENT ORGANIZATIONS OF ACCION POPULAR AND THE CEDA

The general pattern to be observed is the formation of ad hoc Rightist coalitions in the provinces based on the ideological principles of Acción Nacional in Madrid. Until the foundation of the CEDA in March 1933 these 'umbrella organizations' sheltered convinced Monarchists; thereafter the Monarchists left them or new, specifically Cedista, organizations were set up.

The information which follows is drawn from El Debate (1931-36) and from Monge Bernal, Acción Popular, 936-1150. The abbreviations AN and AP are here used for Acción Nacional and Acción Popular: all bodies styled Acción Nacional were re-styled Acción Popular in April 1932. For convenience of reference organizations are listed by regions, divided where necessary into provinces.

ANDALUSIA

Almería. Organization of AN began in Sept. 1931 and AN de Almería was officially founded on 29 Nov. 1931. Two of the founders were Traditionalists who left after the 1933 elections. The two leading figures were Gallardo Gallardo and Giménez Canga-Argüelles, the latter formerly a follower of the Conservative Sánchez Guerra.

Cádiz. AN electoral organizations were formed in May 1931 in Jérez de la Frontera and Cádiz: the latter began with 300 members

and a further 2,000 asked to join in the first 48 hours. In Sept. 1931 two separate permanent bodies were created: Acción Ciudadana in Cádiz and the Unión de Derechas Independientes at Jérez. The former was run by Monarchists and declined to join the CEDA in March 1933; the Jérez organization was therefore the AP provincial body.

Córdoba. The 'forces of order' formed an electoral organization in May 1931 around the paper El Defensor de Córdoba. The permanent AN branch was founded on 9 June 1931. Development was hampered by closure for 4 months after 10 Aug. 1932. It took the name AP Agraria in Oct. 1933. Its sección femenina claimed 3,900 members in Jan. 1932. A moving spirit in the branch was Medina Togores, a Sevillano aristocrat and leader-writer for El Debate (d. 1934).

Granada. The Unión de Derechas was set up in Dec. 1931/Jan. 1932 with 200 members, some of whom were soon killed by Socialists. The organization had a generally stormy passage throughout the Republic. Because of the inexperience of local men the driving force was Moreno Dávila, a lawyer-journalist sent down from Madrid as adviser. Though an 'umbrella organization', the Unión de Derechas joined the CEDA in March 1933. After the 1933 elections a proper AP branch was created from it. It was supported by the paper Ideal.

Huelva. An AN committee came into being in May 1931. However caciquismo remained quite strong in the province; the old politicians of the Monarchy went over to the Radicals or M. Maura in 1931.

AP remained pretty insignificant until Jan. 1935, when Pérez de Güzman finally deserted Maura and took over AP, to which he added his Agrupación Provincial de Derechas Democráticas (founded in June 1932).

Jaén. A Rightist committee was formed in July 1931 which adhered to AN. In July 1933 AP claimed about 700 members, but serious organization did not begin until Feb. 1934. The AP paper La Provincia was started in Aug. 1934.

Málaga. An 'umbrella organization' adhering to AN, Defensa Social, was created before the June 1931 election. In 1932 it started a free meals' service but suffered a serious set-back after 10 Aug.; Monarchists were prominent in the leadership, some of whom were deported. AP, headed by Fernández Ruano, stayed in the CEDA, to which another entity, the Agrupación Mercantil y Agraria, also adhered in Oct. 1933.

Seville. An AN electoral committee was formed in May 1931. In Nov. 1931 the Unión Ciudadana was officially created as the AN branch. Although in Sept. 1931 the organization had only 664 members (47 of whom were not in the capital), the leadership considered the organization complete in the city by Feb. 1932; attention was then turned to the pueblos. The branch was hampered by unjust closure for 4 months after 10 Aug. 1932. The chief figure was the Conde de Bustillo and prominent activists included the historian Pabón.

ARAGÓN

Huesca. In Oct. 1931 200 of the younger citizens were reported to be forming the Agrupación de Defensa Social. However AP's strength in this Radical-dominated area was slight and no proper organization existed even in 1935. Though there were by then 2 JAP branches, Cedistas decided to stay in the Rightist 'umbrella organization' Acción Agraria Altoaragonesa.

Saragossa. AN here started before the June 1931 election as the successor to the pre-Republican Rightist electoral centre which included Liberals and Conservatives; it was now joined by Traditionalists and it became a real force on 8 Dec. 1931 when the Unión de las Derechas was officially founded. The coalition with the Traditionalists ended with the formation of the CEDA, to which AP Agraria Aragonesa adhered. Its main personalities included Fr. Guallar and Serrano Súñer.

Teruel. A Rightist committee appeared in Teruel in 1931 and AP Agraria was set up in La Estrella in Apr. 1932. In June 1932 an 'umbrella organization' for the whole province, the Unión de Derechas, came into being, out of which sprang AP y Agraria (officially founded on 21 Dec. 1932).

ASTURIAS

Oviedo. AN began as an electoral organization in June 1931, but was officially founded on 14 Oct. 1931. It was an 'umbrella organi-

zation' including Monarchists and took the name Agrupación Autónoma Asturiana de AP. In March 1933 the Monarchists left and the body entered the CEDA as the Agrupación Asturiana de AP. It was keen to uphold the character of the region and drafted a statute in 1931. Its creator and leader was Fernández-Ladreda, Mayor of Oviedo under Primo de Rivera and later a Minister under Franco. The branch had a total membership of 52,800 in Dec. 1935 (though it claimed 80,000 in Feb. 1934).

BALEARICS

On 5 June 1931 the Derecha Social (including Integrists) was founded in Palma de Mallorca; it adhered to AN. In July it merged with the former Conservative Party and this Unión de Derechas claimed 1,400 members by Dec. 1931. In Jan. 1935 it became AP Agraria and then had 39,500 members. Its founder and leader was the Marqués de Verger. There was a separate organization on Ibiza, the Partido Social Agrario (founded as an AN affiliate in Nov. 1931).

BASQUE PROVINCES.

Álava. The Rightist group here was the Traditionalist Hermandad Alavesa.

Biscay. A Centro de AN existed in Baracaldo from 1931, but there were no plans to start an organization until 1934. An information centre was opened in Bilbao in June and AP de Vizcaya (subsequently

called AP Vascongada) was founded in late Oct. 1934 from Basque Nationalists who disapproved of Aguirre's drift to the Left.

Guipúzcoa. No branch was opened until 18 Oct. 1934, when Lojendio (formerly a diplomat) founded the Derecha Vasca Autónoma in San Sebastián. 250 people were reported to have joined in the first 8 days.

CANARIES.

Las Palmas. AP de Las Palmas was founded with a largely working-class membership in Feb. 1933; it had 1,000 members in Nov. 1933 and 8,000 by Dec. 1935. From Apr. 1935 it had its own daily, Acción. AP worked closely with the local agrarian party founded in 1933 by Mesa López, who sat as a Cedista in the Cortes.

Santa Cruz de Tenerife. AP Agraria was founded in May 1932 and in 1935 had a total membership of 9,500.

CATALONIA.

Relations between AP and the Lliga (supported by the Catalan clergy) were generally good and there seems to have been hope of some more formal understanding between them. The CEDA made no attempt to penetrate the region until 1934. (In July 1931 the Derecha Social de Cataluña, based on the remnants of Paláu's Acción Social Popular, sent its adherence to AN; in July 1932 the foundation of two AP-style groups was reported: the Liga Ciudadana de Derecha in

Lérida and the Derecha Arenyense in Arenys de Mar.) Acción Popular Catalana was founded just after the rebellion of October 1934 as a result of collaboration between Gil Robles and Cirera Voltá (President of the Instituto Agrícola Catalán de San Isidro) against Companys's law on rural leases. The group attracted those who despaired of the Lliga as a force with which to oppose the Esquerra; in Nov. 1934 it was joined by Fortuny's agrarian party which had committees in half the pueblos of the region. AP Catalana provided two Councillors for the Generalidad in 1935 (Interior and Labour).

EXTREMADURA.

Badajoz. Three AN candidates were supported by the paper El Correo Extremeño in the 1931 election, but Leftist opposition apparently hampered organization. A branch was started at Almendralejo in Apr. 1932, but it was not until 24 March 1933 that the provincial branch was founded officially; it became AP Agraria in Sept. 1933. The chief figure was Hermida, formerly a follower of the Conservative Sánchez Guerra.

Cáceres. The Derecha Regional Agraria was founded in Nov. 1931 but there was no real organization until 1934; it became AP Agraria in 1935. (In Trujillo in July 1933 about 1,000 workers reportedly left the ocialists and formed the Rightist Unión Agraria Comarcal.) The leader was Vega Bermejo who supported the yunteros in the Cortes.

GALICIA.

Corunna. AP de la Coruña was created early in 1932 by Vázquez Gundín from the Federación Católico-Agraria. However by then two 'umbrella organizations' were already in existence in other towns. The Unión Regional de Derechas in Santiago de Compostela was founded in Nov. 1931 with 400 members. A group with the same name was founded in El Ferrol in Dec. 1931 which claimed 20,000 members in July 1932. These three organizations were merged on entering the CEDA in March 1933.

Lugo. From the beginning of 1932 López Pérez (a popular ex-Mayor) built up the Unión de Derechas Lucenses with the help of the paper La Voz de Verdad. It was not until May 1933 that the Unión de Derechas y Agrarios (the basis of which was López Pérez's group) was considered properly organized.

Orense. In Nov. 1931 the foundation of Acción Ciudadana Gallega was announced. In Jan. 1933 an 'umbrella organization', the Unión Orensana de Derechas was set up. A separate AP de Orense was founded in Aug. 1933.

Pontevedra. In Jan. 1932 Lis Quiben founded the Unión Regional de Derechas, an 'umbrella organization' incorporating the AN branch started at Vigo the same month. The group, which claimed 30,000 members in June 1932, joined the CEDA in 1933. An awkward situation was created when its founder went over to Renovación Española in 1934. Leadership was assumed by Guisasola and the name was changed to AP in Dec. 1935.

LEÓN.

León. The AN electoral organization was set up in May 1931 in the offices of the Juventud Monárquica. From AN and agrarian elements Acción Agraria Leonesa was formed on 30 Nov. 1931. The revisionist campaign gave it a membership of 30,000 by Nov. 1932. It became AP Agraria Leonesa in May 1936. Its principal activist was the social-Catholic reformer Álvarez Robles.

Palencia. An AN committee was formed in May 1931; this led to the foundation of the Unión Castellana Agraria by the social-Catholic property-owner Cortés Villasana in June 1931. This organization was dissolved in Jan. 1932 when its members joined with agrarian elements (led by Calderón, twice a Minister under the Monarchy) and UP-type Monarchists (led by Vallellano) to form the Unión de Derechas Sociales y Agrarias. The creation of a separate AP was reported in March 1934, but in 1935 the 'umbrella organization' still existed and it was said that younger members were working for a proper AP branch.

Salamanca. In this province there was a multiplicity of organizations and the situation was complicated. From June 1930 there was a Monarchist farmers' organization, Acción Castellana, one of whose leaders was the Integrist landowner Lamamié de Clairac. This body turned 'accidentalist' and in May 1931 merged with other rural elements to form the Bloque Agrario (Leaders Gil Robles, Casanueva, Lamamié de Clairac). By May 1933 it claimed 20,000 members. In Oct. 1931 a separate AN women's organization was set up which had 20,000 members in 1935. These two bodies formed the basis of the

political 'umbrella organization' set up in Feb. 1932, the Unión de Derechas Salmantinas. On 26 Dec. 1932 Gil Robles founded the Derecha Autónoma Salmantina, exclusively for 'accidentalists'. Its membership overlapped with that of the Bloque Agrario which continued to function as a farmers' organization. The DAS was supported by La Gaceta Regional, whose editor (Gimas Leal) was one of its leaders; by 1935 it had won over most members of the Unión de Agricultores, a body committed to M. Maura.

Valladolid. AN was started in May 1931 and relied mainly on support from the young. Among the latter was O. Redondo who left to form his own group; in 1932 his JONS attracted quite a number of youths from AP. AP was closed for 2 months after 10 Aug. 1932 and became AP Agraria in June 1933. One of its leaders was La Calzada.

Zamora. The creation of a branch in this province was slow. AP got under way in the spring of 1932. Its chief figure was Carrascal.

MOROCCO.

Representatives from Ceuta and Melilla attended the AP Assembly in Oct. 1932 and branches were opened prior to the 1933 elections.

MURCIA.

Albacete. AP had only a few committees in the province by Nov. 1933. The task of organization was then carried out by Acacio Sandoval, elected as an independent agrarian and coming of a wealthy

Conservative landowning family.

Murcia. An AN branch was set up by 2 propagandists sent from Madrid in May 1931. The organization was built up with the help of the paper La Voz de Murcia. When the Monarchists left AP Murciana joined the CEDA. Its chief figures were the social-Catholic lawyer Salmón and Ibáñez Martín.

NAVARRE.

Navarre. Unión Navarra was founded in March 1933 by the former Maurista Aizpún; it was keen to defend the regional personality and claimed not to be a political party but an organization for those uncommitted to one. It had 7,000 members in Dec. 1934 and changed its name to AP Navarra in Jan. 1936. Its candidates topped the poll in the 1936 elections.

NEW CASTILE.

Ciudad Real. Organization was slow here, apparently owing to Leftist pressure. Acción Agraria Manchega was officially founded on 12 Jan. 1933 and clashes with the Left were frequent. The chief figures were Mateo La Iglesia and Ruiz de Valdepeñas, an ardent defender of the wine interest.

Cuenca. An AN organization was created for the 1931 election and developed into the 'umbrella organization' Acción Ciudadana y Agraria in Dec. 1931. This later became AP Agraria.

Guadalajara. An AN organization based on the CNCA was created for the June 1931 election in opposition to the Left and the caciques of Romanones. It joined with Traditionalists to become the 'umbrella organization' Acción Regional Agraria y Ciudadana in July 1931. The moving spirit of AP was Arizcún, removed from his post as chief provincial agronomist by Azaña's government.

Madrid. AN was founded by Herrera on 29 Apr. 1931; 2,361 people joined in the capital in the first 3 days. It had 9,000 members by Jan. 1932 and 42,000 when the Civil War started. The organization in the province dated from the early summer of 1931 and was based on Catholic unions; its driving force was J. Martín Artajo, a lawyer and journalist specializing in agrarian questions.

Toledo. AN was set up in June 1931 in the offices of the Centro de Defensa Social. It developed into AP Agraria which had 100,000 members in March 1933. The leaders included the worker D. de Madariaga, Canon Molina Nieto and the Conde de Mayalde.

OLD CASTILE.

Avila. AN was founded on 6 Aug. 1931 with 115 members. Its development was hindered by closure for much of 1932. Reorganization was carried out in 1933 by an emissary from Madrid and it had over 1,000 members by late 1935. In Sept. 1933 the Bloque Agrario Abulense also adhered to the CEDA.

Burgos. There was talk of starting an AN branch here in 1931 but there was apparently no wish to compete with Martínez de Velasco's

organization. Acción Mirandesa was formed at Miranda de Ebro in Jan. 1932, but it was not until May 1932 that an 'umbrella organization', Acción Burgalesa de Derechas, was founded in Burgos with 6,000 members. After the foundation of the Agrarian Party AP Agraria was set up in March 1934.

Logroño. AN started in May 1931 and became a strong branch under the name Acción Riojana. Its mainstay was the military engineer Ortiz de Solórzano.

Santander. The 'umbrella organization' Agrupación Regional Independiente was founded in Apr. 1931 and included Liberals, Conservatives, Mauristas, Integrists, Jaimists and Catholic trade-unionists. In Jan. 1932 it had 1,600 members in the capital (its real strength lay among the rural workers). It was led by the Alfonsine Sáinz Rodríguez and in Feb. 1933 it voted to stay out of the CEDA. In Sept. 1934 Valiente and Pérez del Molino formed a separate AP branch.

Segovia. AN was founded in June 1931 with its headquarters in the palacio of its creator, the historian, poet, art critic and landowner the Marqués de Lozoya. Organization was extended to all pueblos in the first month. In 1935 it had 600 members in the capital.

Soria. M. Maura's Conservatives were strong here. The formation of a Bloque Agrario was reported in June 1932. An emissary was sent out from Madrid in 1933 to ginger things up and an AP branch was opened in Dec. 1933.

VALENCIA.

The Derecha Regional Valenciana was founded by Lucía (editor of the Diario de Valencia) and a few friends in Dec. 1929. The DRV officially adhered to AN on 14 June 1931 and subsequently became the model and inspiration for the CEDA. Its organization extended over the 3 provinces of Alicante, Castellón and Valencia and it had 20,000 members in Nov. 1931. Organization in the region was considered complete by May 1932; the provincial semi-autonomous subsidiaries in Alicante and Castellón were styled Derecha Regional Agraria. The Alicante organization had 41,000 members in July 1934. There was also a specifically working-class Christian party in Valencia from June 1931 called Acción Democrática Social.

The Americas. The first Centro de la CEDA in Spanish America was opened in Havana in Sept. 1935.

APPENDIX III

SOCIAL COMPOSITION OF THE MINORITIES OF THE RIGHT, LLIGA AND PNV

In the absence of biographical dictionaries for the period it is difficult to analyse in detail the interests represented by the Rightist Deputies. The following tables are based on the occupations declared by Deputies to ABC (20 Dec. 1933 and 6 Mar. 1936). Not all Deputies complied with the paper's request for information. The occupations declared by those who did provide a good guide to their social standing but not to their material interests; for example, Lamamié de Clairac said he was a lawyer but did not say he was a stock-breeder in the west and therefore likely to be a vehement opponent of land redistribution. The sample for the Cortes of 1933-35 breaks down as follows:-

Occupation	CEDA	RE[1]	Trads.	Ags.	Lliga[2]	PNV	Others[3]	Total
Lawyers	44	9	10	17	11	7	83	181
Engineers	14	1	1	3	1	-	11	31
Academics	8	1	-	2	-	-	14	25
Journalists & writers	3	2	1	-	-	1	17	24
Physicians	5	1	-	1	-	-	16	23
Property-owners	6	1	2	3	-	1	2	15
Workers	2	-	1	-	-	1	11	15
Manufacturers	3	-	1	-	-	-	10	14
Farmers	6	-	-	2	-	-	2	10
Office-workers	1	-	-	-	-	1	7	9
Notaries	5	-	-	-	-	-	3	8
Priests	4	-	-	-	-	-	2	6
Architects	2	-	1	-	-	-	1	4
Army Officers	1	-	-	1	-	-	2	4
Consuls & diplomats	-	-	-	-	1	-	1	2
Licenciados en ciencias	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	2
Inspectors of education	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	2
Property registrars	-	-	-	-	1	-	1	2
Publishers	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	1
Mariners	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1
Ship-owners	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	1
Supreme Court clerks	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	1
Others	-	-	-	-	-	-	28	28
	106	16	20	29	15	11	212	409
(Total	117	16	21	29	25	12	255	475)

1 Includes Pemán (originally independent Monarchist) and Albiñana (PNE).

2 Includes Fons (Balearic Regionalist).

3 Includes Rightist and other independents (as well as other minorities), e.g. Fr. Gafo.

The break-down of the sample for the Cortes of 1936 was as follows:-

Occupation	CEDA	RE[1]	Trads.	Ags.	Lliga	PNV	Others[2]	Total
Lawyers	33	7	5	6	7	1	69	128
Workers	1	-	1	-	-	1	32	35
Academics	4	1	1	-	1	-	25	32
Physicians	4	2	-	1	-	-	24	31
Writers & journalists	3	-	-	-	-	-	20	23
Engineers	8	-	-	1	-	-	11	20
Manufacturers & traders	3	-	-	-	-	-	12	15
Civil servants	-	-	-	-	1	-	10	11
Farmers	3	1	-	-	-	-	5	9
Property-owners	3	1	-	1	-	-	3	8
Employees	2	-	-	-	-	-	6	8
Army officers	1	-	-	-	-	-	3	4
Diplomats	1	-	-	-	1	-	2	4
Architects	1	-	-	-	-	-	3	4
Notaries	3	-	-	-	-	-	1	4
Property-registrars	1	-	1	-	1	-	1	4
Mariners	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	2
Priests	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	2
Supreme Court clerks	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	2
Magistrates	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	1
Others	-	-	-	-	-	-	25	25
	76	12	8	9	11	2	254	372
(Total[3]	96	13	14	11	11	9	328	472).

1 Including Albiñana (PNE).

2 Including Rightist independents, as before.

3 ABC collected and printed the information before the Cortes opened; some of those listed were subsequently unseated.

Only two conclusions can really be drawn from the two tables. Firstly, the parties of the Right contained a lot of lawyers, just as did those of the Left and Centre: the Second Republic was a Republic of lawyers. Secondly, the great majority of working-class Deputies were Socialists. Insofar as they are of any use the tables confirm the obvious.

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