Rethinking Chinese National Identity.

The Wider Context of Foreign Policy Making During the Era of Hu Jintao, 2002–2012.

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Rethinking Chinese National Identity. The Wider Context of Foreign Policy Making During the Era of Hu Jintao, 2002–2012.

This thesis analyses China's national identity construction and its foreign policy implications especially towards Japan and the United States during the Hu Jintao period 2002-2012. The vast literature on China's rise takes "rising nationalism" in China as one of the key indicators of increased likelihood for aggressive behaviour in the future. This work problematizes some of the simplified assumptions made in this literature by emphasising the domestic context from which foreign policies rise. I argue that culture specific values deriving from national identities shape attitude structures and affect the whole thinking and conceptualisation related to foreign policy with wide-ranging consequences. Thus, in this research national identity is operationalised through values and attitudes deriving from it. With empirical evidence, I show in my thesis that most things discussed as "nationalism" in China studies literature can be analytically separated into at least two components, each with different foreign policy relevant correlates. Analysing two sets of survey material with statistical methods I show that the type of national attachment in China constrains foreign policy preferences in a different way than often assumed in the literature: "patriots" support an internationalist stance in contrast to "nationalists" who favour more assertive behaviour towards Japan and the US as well as generally protectionist economic policies. In addition to analysing the associations between core values and foreign policy preferences, I also provide other examples of cultural factors shaping Chinese foreign policy context including the role of historical legacies and their political use, and the role of the media in the formation of foreign threat perceptions and foreign policy preferences. The need to better understand these national identity dynamics is emphasised because of the ongoing pluralisation of Chinese foreign policy establishment, which gives more space to domestic input from various levels of society. (294)

Contents

1. Introduction
Framing the Chinese Foreign Policy Making Context. The Role of New Domestic Groups 1
Research Questions and Key Concepts 13
Literature Review on Chinese National Identity 17
Structure of the Thesis 31

2. Chapter
Chinese National Identity and Foreign Policy Context. A Multilevel Understanding. 37
Why National Identity Matters in the Foreign Policy Context 38
Top-down and Bottom-Up: National Identity Construction and Level of Analysis 42
Defining National Identity for Empirical Research 51
Core Values, Knowledge and Foreign Policy Preferences 59
Methods and Sources 63

3. Chapter
China's Foreign Policy Outlook, 2002–2012. Balancing Between Foreign Interpretations and Domestic Expectations of China's Rise 85
Rising and Increasingly Assertive China? 87
Change and Continuity in China's Foreign Policy 94
Public opinion 105
Conclusion 117

4. Chapter
Domestic Drivers of China's International Identity. Perceptions of China's Rise among Chinese Intellectuals 119
Influence of Scholars in Foreign Policy 124
Methods for Analysing Chinese Scholarly Views 137
China's Place in the World 141
Academics' Views on Sino-American Relations in 2002-2012 158
Academics' Views on Sino-Japanese Relations in 2002-2012 164
Conclusion 166

5. Chapter
Anti-foreign Nationalists and Internationalist Patriots. Nationalism and Patriotism as Core Values Shaping Foreign Policy Preferences 168
Nationalism and Patriotism as Concepts 171
Methods 176
Results 190
Conclusion 210

6. Chapter
Afraid of the Other. Chinese Perceptions of Threats from the United States and Japan 215
Threats and Their Non-Material Components 217
Attitude Structures and Perceptions of External Threat 221
Methods 233
Results 242
Conclusion 245

7. Chapter
Politics of Memory, National Identity and Foreign Policy Preferences 248
Collective Memory, Historical Consciousness and National Identity 251
The Political Use of the Past and CCP's Legitimacy 256
Structural Equation Models 272
Results 279
Conclusion 283

8. Chapter
Conclusion 286

Appendix 1
Survey Research in China 295

Appendix 2
Sample Characteristics of the 2007 Survey 297

Bibliography 299

Tables

1.1. Level of analysis in existing research

2.1. Members of the Politburo Standing Committee between 2003–2012

4.1. Frequency of international relations articles that are about Sino-US relations, Sino-Japanese relations or great power relations in Chinese academic journals, 2002–2012.

5.1. Patriotism and nationalism factors of the 2007 data

5.2. Patriotism and nationalism factors of the 2011–2012 data

5.3. Summary of the MANOVA results

5.4. The associations of nationalism and patriotism with statements related to international cooperation

5.5. The associations of nationalism and patriotism with statements related to protectionism

5.6. The associations of nationalism and patriotism with various statements on China's international role (both 2007 and 2011–2012 datasets)

5.7. The associations of nationalism and patriotism with various statements on China's international role (only 2011–2012 data)

5.8. The associations of nationalism and patriotism with statement on willingness to sacrifice one's life for the country

6.1. Sample characteristics

6.2. Perceptions of hostile intentions from the US and Japan

6.3. Perceptions of military threat from the US and Japan

6.4. Perceptions of China's role in world affairs

6.5. Respondents' level of interest in politics

6.6. Media consumption by media type

6.7. Correlation matrix on threat perceptions and proposed explanatory variables

6.8. Multivariate models of perceived threats from the United States and Japan

6.9. Multivariate models of perceived threats from the United States and Japan including all available explanatory factors

Figures

2.1. Linking identity and behaviour

3.1. Chinese respondents general impressions of the US in the Pew Global Attitudes Project's polls 2005–2012

3.2. Chinese respondents general impressions of Japan in the Beijing-Tokyo polls 2005–2012

5.1. Factor structure of the 2007 data in confirmatory factor analysis

5.2. Factor structure of the 2011–2012 data in confirmatory factor analysis

6.1. Chinese perceptions of military threat from the US and Japan in the Beijing-Tokyo forum polls

7.1. SEM model on the US

7.2. Improved US SEM model

7.3. SEM model on Japan

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1. Introduction

Framing the Chinese Foreign Policy Making Context. The Role of New Domestic Groups

> *Discussions of Chinese foreign policy decisions rarely take into account in more than a cursory fashion the domestic context in which those decisions are made, yet that context is important for understanding Chinese foreign policy.*
> Joseph Fewsmith and Stanley Rosen 2001[1]

> *The remarkable resurgence of Chinese nationalism [in post-Tiananmen China] can be observed at least at three levels: in the state apparatus, in the intellectual discourse, and within popular society.*
> Zhao Suisheng 2004[2]

How do Chinese national identity dynamics shape its foreign policy towards the United States and Japan? In other words, how do Chinese leaders and new domestic groups perceive China's interests and its role in the world? How are these issues related to China's domestic political agenda and the demands of the domestic population? Answers to these questions have both direct and indirect relevance for the formulation of China's foreign policy towards the United States and Japan. Many recent analyses of China's contemporary foreign policy tend to have an alarmist undertone either expecting a turn towards a generally more hawkish foreign policy to take place soon or arguing that such change has already happened. In these analyses the cause for caution comes both externally from China's position as a rising power, which according to the structural realist theory is likely to cause conflict, and internally from "rising nationalism," which is claimed to push the Chinese government to adopt tougher foreign policy measures. Both of these perspectives to understand Chinese foreign policy are

[1] Fewsmith, Joseph and Stanley Rosen. 2001. "Domestic Context of Chinese Foreign Policy: Does 'Public Opinion' Matter?" In David Lampton (ed.), *The Making of Chinese Foreign and Security Policy in the Era of Reform, 1978-2000*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 151.
[2] Zhao, Suisheng. 2004a. *A Nation-state by Construction: Dynamics of Modern Chinese Nationalism*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 8.

problematic. To avoid the deterministic structural perspective and overly nationalism-centred domestic perspective in understanding Chinese foreign policy making, this thesis concentrates on Chinese national identity.[3] It describes the complex dynamics of national identity construction and aims to define the implications dominant national identity has especially to China's relations with the United States and Japan. By emphasising the domestic context from which foreign policies rise, my empirical findings bring forward some of the limitations of literature on China's foreign policy as a rising power.

My analysis of the ways Chinese domestic context shapes foreign policy acknowledges both material and ideational factors. Supported by a nascent but growing literature and empirical evidence, I argue that Chinese foreign policy making has become more pluralised with an increasing number of actors, which is why analysis of Chinese foreign policy needs to better understand how these new domestic actors influence foreign policy making. When people (and even political leaders) think about the decision making in some other country, they have a tendency to see the actions taken as being part of a rational centralized plan, while they recognize the role of competing interests and factions when the question is about the decision making in their own country.[4] In other words, people seem to have a tendency to explain others' behaviour emphasizing dispositional causes and take into account also situational causes when thinking of causes for the behaviours of groups they are more familiar with.[5] These tendencies can at worst bias decision-making, which is one reason why the new trends in Chinese foreign policy-making should be understood outside of China too.

In addition, the domestic political level is included in the Chinese leadership's rhetoric in which the need to integrate or coordinate domestic and international levels in their

[3] Such a perspective has been suggested by Allen Carlson. See Carlson, Allen. 2009. "A Flawed Perspective: The Limitations Inherent within the Study of Chinese Nationalism." *Nations and Nationalism* 15 (1), 20–35.
[4] Jervis, Robert. 1976. *Perception and Misperception in International Politics*. Princeton: Princeton University.
[5] Herrmann, Richard. 2013. "Perceptions and Image Theory in International Relations." Leonie Huddy; David O. Sears, and Jack S. Levy (eds.) *The Oxford Handbook of Political Psychology*, 334–363.

policymaking is repeatedly emphasised.[6] The interconnectedness of internal and external affairs is also visible in the idea that when the civil realm is in chaos, foreign aggression will follow (*neiluan waihuan*, 内乱外患).[7] This idea is used to describe for example Western actions in China in the end of the 19th century. Moreover, China defines many of the issues others see as international as its internal affairs. Such issues include for example all of its border disputes and the Taiwan question. In many cases such as the Taiwan issue, external and internal threats are seen as interchangeable, which is very different from the experience of most western countries.[8]

The more substantive part of the analysis is dedicated to ideational factors, namely how Chinese national identity shapes the context of foreign policy making. With the emphasis on national identity, this project is primarily concerned with sources of people's behaviour discoverable in structures and processes of human thinking. The world is essentially what we take it to be, which is why international relations scholarship should take human consciousness seriously. It is also worth noting that the material and ideational worlds are interlinked because of the evolving nature of national identity. From the ideational perspective, dominant national identity has elements that define the possible and permissible limits for Chinese foreign policy actions and thus constrain political leaders. It also influences Chinese citizens, as representations of the dominant national identity are present in the media and taught at school. Still, national identities are never uncontested. In the material front societal changes define whose identity matters most and how much room is given to competing understandings of national identity. In China, new societal actors have gained more power recently due to the pluralisation of China's foreign policy making and legitimacy

[6] Dai, Bingguo. 2010. "Jianchi zou heping fazhan daolu" (Adhering to the road of peaceful development), 7 December 2010, http://www.chinanews.com/gn/2010/12-07/2704984.shtml. Accessed 18 April 2013.
[7] Zheng, Yongnian. 1999. *Discovering Chinese Nationalism in China. Modernization, Identity and International Relations*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 15.
[8] Wang, Jisi. 2007. "Zhongguo de guoji zhanlue yanjiu: fanshi de fanshi yu goujian" (China's strategic and international studies: reflection and construction of paradigms). *Guoji zhengzhi yanjiu* (*International Politics Quarterly*) 4, 1–5.

needs of Chinese foreign policy elite. In practice this means that the opinions new societal actors express have more sounding board at the top political level than before.

From a theoretical perspective, this thesis adopts a constructivist framework emphasising the need to understand the ideational side of international system and state behaviour. In other words, it rejects the view that the anarchic structure of international system dictates state behaviour and holds instead that states can be functionally different with varying primary behavioural drivers. State interests cannot be known a priori, because they depend on the domestic context affecting both in material and ideational terms how national interests are defined. Material structures naturally matter, but they cannot be understood outside of shared understandings held by actors themselves.[9] Constructivist theory argues that state interests directing foreign policy behaviour derive from identities, consisting of domestic beliefs, values and attitudes. Rather than bluntly applying a universalist model, taking account of the particular features of each country will improve our understanding of that country's foreign policy behaviour and help us see the limitations of the view that states are unitary purposive actors. In reality, multiple views and voices exist even in authoritarian countries such as China.

Existing literature on Chinese foreign policy tends to examine either the international or the domestic context of identity formation. These single-level characterisations constitute only a partial understanding of China's national identity construction with reference to its foreign policy. Even with research that claims to be analysing both domestic and international spheres, there is not enough understanding concerning the role of the domestic factors that may influence foreign policy making in China, as well as the indirect interaction that takes place between the foreign policy elite and domestic groups. This new field of research is growing, but although there is an increasing

[9] Hurrell, Andrew. 2007. *On Global Order. Power, Values, and the Constitution of International Society*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 16–17.

number of studies on the domestic determinants of China's external behaviour, most of this research concentrates on conventional policy approaches whereas studies on the societal forces affecting foreign policy making are still scarce.[10] Simply acknowledging the need to integrate different levels of analysis is not enough. Taking account of this need should be present in one's research methodology and use of sources. This thesis aims to contribute bridging this empirical gap in the literature.

Questions about the kind of power a rising China will become and how it will deal with its relations with the US and Japan relate, in part, to questions about China's identity. Debates about what kind of player China will be in the international arena have been turbulent since the early 1990s in parallel with China's increasing economic growth and power. At the moment there is no consensus about whether the interests of rising China will necessarily bring it into conflict with other major powers such as the Unites States. In addition, China is the first great power to develop within the era of globalization, which according to some interpretations makes it even harder to compare this historical moment to any previous ones. Still, in the so-called "China's rise" literature the deterministic realist understanding that a rising power will cause systemic imbalance and is likely to cause war has been predominant.

Since the 1990s, the "China Threat Theory" (*Zhongguo weixie lun* 中国威胁论) identified factors such as China's economic development, lack of democracy, rising nationalism and anti-Western attitudes as indicators of increased likelihood of aggressive

[10] Hao, Yufan. 2013. "Domestic Chinese Influences on U.S.-China Relations." In David Shambaugh (ed.), *Tangled Titans. The United States and China*. Plymouth: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 126.

behaviour in the future.[11] More recently scholars such as John Mearsheimer have continued to advocate this interpretation.[12] However, many Chinese and Western scholars have disputed the realist understanding in which rising China is seen as a threat. Liu Yongtao finds that China has been seen as a threat because the US tends to construct itself enemies for domestic political reasons.[13] According to Qin Yaqing, "China has been experiencing a redefinition of its national identity, i.e. a transformation from a revolutionary state to a status quo state, from an outsider to a member of international society." Moreover, unlike many observes think, Qin argues that the government legitimacy in China does not rely on extreme nationalism but on economic development.[14] Shi Yinhong holds that China should defend its interests but work within the existing international order.[15] Rosemary Foot has emphasised China's new international role as a responsible power.[16] John Ikenberry reminds us that China has to work in the international system in which the West has created the most important international organizations and rules, and even though China has become an increasingly important player

[11] Herbert Yee and Ian Storey offer an analysis of the China threat discourse in *The China Threat: Perceptions, Myths and Reality,* London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2002, 2–5. They give five reasons for China threat perceptions: 1) China's fast economic growth, 2) its authoritarian political system, 3) growing military capacity, 4) possibility of political and economic collapse in the PRC and 5) rising nationalism and anti-foreign sentiments. For examples of academic publications that adopt a threat perspective on China, see Huntington, Samuel. 1996. *Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order.* New York: Simon & Schuster. Academics who concentrate on Chinese nationalism and stress its aggressive nature include Allen Whiting and Maria Hsia Chang. See Whiting, Allen. 1995. "Chinese Nationalism and Foreign Policy after Deng." *The China Quarterly* 142 (2), 295–316; Chang, Maria Hsia. *Return of the Dragon – China's Wounded Nationalism*. New York: Westview Press.

[12] Mersheimer, John. 2010. "The Gathering Storm: China's Challenge to US Power in Asia." *The Chinese Journal of International Politics* 3 (4), 381–396; Mersheimer, John. 2006. "China's Unpeaceful Rise." *Current History* 105 (690), 160–162. For other scholars using similar type of argumentation, see Ikegami, Masako. 2009. "China's Grand Strategy of 'Peaceful Rise': A Prelude to a New Cold War?" In Hsin Huang, Michael Hsiao and Cheng-yi Lin (eds.), *Rise of China. Beijing's Strategies and Implications for the Asia-Pacific*. London: Routledge, 21–54; Swaine, Michael D. and Ashley Tellis. 2000. *Interpreting China's Grand Strategy: Past, Present and Future*. Santa Monica, CA: Rand; Shirk, Susan. 2007. *China. The Fragile Superpower*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 4–9.

[13] Liu, Yongtao. 2010. "Jiangou anquan 'weixie': Meiguo zhanlue de zhengzhi xuanze" (Constructing Security 'Threats'-U.S. Strategy and Political Options). *Shijie jingji yu zhengzhi (World Economics and Politics)* 6, 118–128.

[14] Qin, Yaqing. 2010. "Why Is there No Chinese International Relations Theory?" In Acharya, Amitav and Barry Buzan (eds.), *Non-Western International Relations Theory. Perspectives on and Beyond Asia*. London: Routledge, 45; Qin, Yaqing. 2008. "International Factors and China's External Behaviour." In Pauline Kerr, Stuart Harris, and Qin Yaqing (eds.), *China's "New" Diplomacy. Tactical or Fundamental Change?* New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 33–54.

[15] Shi, Yinhong. 2006. "Zhongguo de bianqian yu zhongguo waijiao zhanlue fenxi" (China's Transformation and its Diplomatic Strategy – an Analysis). *Guoji zhengzhi yanjiu* (*International Politics Quarterly*) 1, 31–44.

[16] Foot, Rosemary. 2001. "Chinese Power and the Idea of a Responsible State." *The China Journal*, 45, 1–19.

in the international arena, it cannot simply abolish the existing system and create a new more suitable one.[17] Iain Johnston also finds China's institutional participation as an important perspective to note in the context of China's rise. As China's relative power has grown from the 1970's on, China has become more deeply involved in the US-dominated global order than ever before since 1949.[18] In addition to the institutional perspective, Ikenberry notes that analysing China's security interests from purely material perspective is flawed as these clearly include non-material components such as subjective considerations of prestige and authority.[19]

In addition to the systemic level, understanding China's foreign policy aims lacks perspective also when analysed at the domestic level. The vast literature on China's rise takes rising nationalism in China as one of the key indicators of increased likelihood for aggressive behaviour in the future. Some scholars even claim that China's foreign policy orientation turned more assertive in 2009-2010, and in these foreign policy changes "rising nationalism" is identified as an important contributing factor.[20] Apart from nationalism, the wider domestic context has often been seen irrelevant for foreign policy formulation because of China's authoritarian political system.

Although recent research has been keen to point out that Chinese nationalism is "on the rise," the claims of rising nationalism in China often lack both empirical evidence and historical perspective. Iain Johnston argues that "in both the scholarly and political punditry worlds, the conclusions about "rising" Chinese nationalism ... come mostly from anecdotal evidence or relatively unsystematic reliance on high profile, popular publications in China."[21]

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[17] Ikenberry, John. 2008a. "The Rise of China and the Future of the West." *Foreign Affairs* 87 (1), 23–37.
[18] Johnston, Iain. 2012. "What (If Anything) Does East Asia Tell Us about International Relations Theory?" *Annual Review of Political Science* 15, 59.
[19] Ikenberry, John. 2008b. "The Rise of China. Power, Institutions, and the Western Order." In Robert S. Ross and Zhu Feng (eds.), *China's Ascent. Power, Security, and the Future of International Politics*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 107.
[20] This claimed assertive turn is discussed in Chapter Three.
[21] Johnston, Iain. 2004. "Chinese Middle Class Attitudes towards International Affairs: Nascent Liberalization?" *The China Quarterly* 179 (3), 605.

Also the recent claims of increased assertiveness in 2009–2010 using nationalism as a cause for China's "assertive turn" fail to provide any reliable indicators of rising nationalism just before 2010.[22] Allen Carlson agrees and states that neither those who have warned about rising nationalist sentiment nor those who argue that the trend has been exaggerated have a "great deal of empirical substance."[23] In addition, proponents of the nationalism argument do not have a theory on how nationalist sentiments of the public turn into foreign policies in an authoritarian country.[24]

The thesis concentrates on the construction of national identity by analysing what the societal processes through which the dominant national identity is formed are, as well as how the identity looks like both in terms of content and contestation. In this context understanding "othering" is an important part of national identity construction. David Campbell goes as far as conceptualizing foreign policy as a political practice that defines certain actors and events as "foreign," thus shifting the emphasis from relations *between* ahistorical preexisting states to the establishment of the boundaries that constitute the "state" and the "international system." For Campbell "it is an impoverished understanding to regard foreign policy as a bridge between preexisting states with secure identities."[25] To take into account the role of other in national identity dynamics, this thesis concentrates on three thematic entities from the domestic perspective: Chinese discourse on its role in the world, Sino-Japanese relations and Sino-US relations. For China, its relations with Japan and the US are among the most important ones both politically and economically. China, Japan and the US form a triangle, in which bilateral relations between each two countries affect their relations with the third state. From a strategic perspective Sino-Japanese relations would be hard to understand without taking account of the US military role in the Pacific. In evaluating

[22] Johnston, Iain. 2013. "How New Is China's New Assertiveness?" *International Security* 37 (4), 37.
[23] Carlson 2009, 21.
[24] Johnston 2013, 37–38.
[25] Campbell, David. 1998. *Writing Security*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 61.

China's position in the world, Chinese people tend to compare their country to the US and Japan.[26] These bilateral relations also highlight certain domestic aspects of Chinese foreign policy making, such as the room available for the wider net of new domestic groups to influence foreign policy making, because China's relations to the US and Japan are the most likely to get public attention among all China's bilateral relations. During the Hu era and after 2012, Sino-Japanese relations have been turbulent and evoked strong response from the Chinese public, which can help to analyse the state-society nexus in Chinese foreign policy formulation. Often the domestic audience expects certain actions to take place in the international realm, and that these actions should reflect China's status.

Following the recent literature on new Chinese foreign policy actors and the pluralisation of Chinese foreign policy making specified below, this thesis concentrates on three domestic groups in China which have taken a distinctive role in shaping the context of Chinese foreign policy making. These groups include 1) academics in IR, 2) students in elite universities and 3) public opinion more widely.[27] I call these groups collectively **foreign policy context shapers**. Although the influence foreign policy context shapers have on politicians is mostly indirect, it is nonetheless important. Foreign policy context shapers contribute to national identity construction and debates on foreign policy ideas. During Hu Jintao's leadership, the importance of foreign policy context shapers on foreign policy making has grown significantly, although this importance is likely to vary depending on issue areas.

These three groups are some of the least understood actors in the context of Chinese foreign policy making, because most scholarship on Chinese foreign policy tends to

[26] Please see Chapter Three and Chapter Six for more details.
[27] Naturally these three groups are not the only ones one could choose to analyse in this context, but in order to understand the role of these groups as fully as possible, some other groups must be left outside of the framework. Others have suggested similar frameworks. For example, Fewsmith and Rosen mention three levels of opinion that may affect Chinese foreign relations in the domestic context: elite, sub-elite, and popular. Fewsmith and Rosen 2001, 152.

focus on the state level in analysing policy-making.[28] How and why the importance of these groups in shaping Chinese foreign policy context might be growing, is a rather new field within studies of Chinese foreign policy and this research seeks to contribute to this nascent but growing literature. I will now briefly explain *why* these groups matter, but the question of *how* they matter will be explained in more detail in the next chapter and in the following empirical chapters.

International Relations Academics

In China, academic elites have close connections to the political elite.[29] Their work provides top decision makers a way to learn about foreign ideas and both international and domestic debates.[30] Researchers based at universities and think tanks contribute to the public debate through their publications and commentary, sometimes independently and other times at the request of the Party. For example some professors at major universities in Beijing and Shanghai are tasked to provide analysis to policy makers.[31] The top leadership also consults academics in foreign policy decision-making and invites them to government meetings and seminars.[32] It is not uncommon that scholars' career paths lead from a research institution to a

[28] See Fewsmith and Rosen 2001; Liu, Alan. 1996. *Mass Politics in the People's Republic. State and Society in Contemporary China*. Boulder: Westview Press, 2; Glaser, Bonnie and Evan Medeiros. 2007. "The Changing Ecology of Foreign-Policy Making in China: The Ascension and Demise of the Theory of 'Peaceful Rise'." *The China Quarterly* 190 (2), 310. The argument that Chinese public opinion and its impact on foreign policy is understudied is made in e.g., Christensen, Thomas J., Iain Johnston, and Robert R. Ross. 2006. "Conclusions and Future Directions." In Iain Johnston and Robert S. Ross (eds.), *New Directions in the Study of China's Foreign Policy*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 405.

[29] See, for example, Cabestan, Jean-Pierre. 2009. "China's Foreign- and Security Policy Decision-making Processes under Hu Jintao." *Journal of Current Chinese Affairs* 38 (3), 86; Jakobson, Linda and Dean Knox. 2010. "New Foreign Policy Actors in China" *SIPRI Policy Paper*, 26.

[30] Lagerkvist, Johan. 2008. "Internet Ideotainment in the PRC: National Responses to Cultural Globalization." *Journal of Contemporary China* 17 (54), 121–140.

[31] Glaser, Bonnie and Phillip Saunders. 2002. "Chinese Civilian Foreign Policy Research Institutes: Evolving Roles and Increasing Influence." *The China Quarterly* 171 (3), 604; Author's interviews with Chinese scholars, see Chapter Four.

[32] Jakobson and Knox 2010; Zhu, Xufeng, 2009. "The Influence of Think Tanks in the Chinese Policy Process. Different Ways and Mechanisms." *Asian Survey* 49 (2), 340; Li, He. 2002. "The Role of Think Tanks in Chinese Foreign Policy." *Problems of Post-Communism* 49 (2), 38–39; Author's interviews with Chinese scholars, see Chapter Four.

government department as a policy decision maker or to a Chinese embassy abroad.[33]

Students at Elite Universities

Students influence politics both outside and inside the CCP. Student activism has played a large role in shaping modern Chinese politics and even foreign policy.[34] After the Tiananmen protests the government launched a patriotic education campaign directed at the students.[35] On the other hand, students have increased their proportion in the CCP during the 2000s and form the largest professional group of new Party members, which was 29.7 percent in 2006.[36] According to Xinhua, in 2011 the amount of student Party members reached 2.77 million and those below the age of thirty-five amounted to 20.6 million or 25 per cent of the total membership. In addition, 39 per cent (31.9 million) of the total body of members had been educated at the college level or above.[37]

Public Opinion

As the communist ideology has failed to function as a base for CCP's legitimacy, legitimacy depends nowadays largely on three factors: economic growth, stability and nationalism.[38] As

[33] Zhu 2009, 340; Zhu, Xufeng and Lan Xue. 2007. "Think Tanks in Transitional China." *Public Administration and Development* 27 (5), 456; Li 2002, 38.
[34] Wasserstrom, Jeffrey. 1991. *Student Protests in Twentieth-Century China. The View from Shanghai*. Stanford: Stanford University Press; Liu 1996, chapter 4; Zhao, Dingxin. 2003. "Nationalism and Authoritarianism: Student-Government Conflicts during the 1999 Beijing Student Protests." *Asian Perspective* 27 (1), 5–34.
[35] Zhao, Suisheng. 2000. "Chinese Nationalism and Authoritarianism in the 1990s." In Suisheng Zhao (ed.), *China and Democracy. Reconsidering the Prospects for a Democratic China*. New York: Routledge, 257–258. Patriotic education campaign will be discussed in Chapter Seven.
[36] In 2005, some 2.47 million applicants were admitted to the Party across the country, up 2.4 percent from 2004. Of these, 734,000 were college students. The proportion of student Party membership increased 5 percentage points year on year, making this the most noteworthy growth among all profession groups in the Party. Yan, Wei. 2007. "Young Blood. Under-35s are Infusing New Life to the Party." *Beijing Review* 50 (26), 18–19. Party members with post-secondary education or above amounted to 22.2 million in 2006, about 30.7% of the total membership. See Zheng, Yongnian. 2010. *The Communist Party as Organizational Emperor. Culture, Reproduction and Transformation*. London: Routledge, 5. For the professional composition of the CCP, see ibid., 144.
[37] Xinhua. 2012. "China Communist Party Members Exceed 82 mln,"12 June 2012, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2012-06/30/c_131686357.htm. Accessed 11 February 2013.
[38] Laliberté, André and Marc Lantaigne. 2008. "The Issue of Challenges to the Legitimacy of CCP Rule." In André Laliberté and Marc Lanteigne (eds.), *The Chinese Party-State in the 21st Century. Adaptation and Reinvention of Legitimacy*. London: Routledge, 8–13; Seckington, Ian. 2005. "Nationalism, Ideology and

James Reilly has argued, because of the CCP's need for political legitimacy, public opinion can have a greater impact on foreign policy in authoritarian states like China in comparison to democracies.[39] The grown influence of public opinion is recognised also in Chinese academic literature.[40] Some scholars describe CCP's style of accommodating public pressures, influencing the public and sometimes using repression against it as *responsive authoritarianism*, which is one of the key factors that keeps the CCP in power.[41] When opinion is mobilized around a given issue, it becomes very difficult for the Chinese leaders to adopt a policy that would go against it.[42] An argument often presented in the 2000s is that public opinion is narrowing the space for the foreign policy elite to operate despite the political organization of China as an authoritarian state, which forces the Chinese leadership to listen to the public and its nationalist voices in foreign policy making. CCP leaders are well aware that their right to rule depends on public support exemplified in the recent amendments to the Party constitution: in 2002 the concept of the CCP as "the Party in power" was added.[43]

China's 'Fourth Generation' Leadership." *Journal of Contemporary China* 14 (42), 25; Fewsmith and Rosen 2001, 158. See also Zheng 1999, 2.

[39] Reilly, James. 2010. "Online Chinese Nationalism Toward Japan." In Simon Shen and Shaun Breslin (eds.), *Online Chinese Nationalism and China's Bilateral Relations*. Plymouth: Lexington Books, 53. Also Jessica Weiss has emphasised that authoritarian leadership does not mean that the domestic audience and domestic politics would be irrelevant in authoritarian countries' foreign policy. Weiss, Jessica. 2013. "Authoritarian Signaling, Mass Audiences, and Nationalist Protest in China." *International Organization* 67 (1), 4. Many others, such as Jin Qiu and Yinan He, have emphasised the growing role of public opinion in Chinese foreign policy making. Qiu, Jin. 2006. "The Politics of Historical Memory in China-Japan Relations." *Journal of Chinese Political Science* 11 (1), 25–53; He, Yinan. 2007a. "History, Chinese Nationalism and the Emerging Sino-Japanese Conflict." *Journal of Contemporary China* 16 (50), 2–4.

[40] Shi 2006, 40.

[41] Reilly, James. 2012. *Strong Society, Smart State*, *The Rise of Public Opinion in China's Japan Policy*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1–2; Weller, Robert P.. 2008. "Responsive Authoritarianism." In Bruce Gilley and Larry Diamond (eds.), *Political Change in China: Comparisons with Taiwan.* Boulder: Lynne Reinner Publishers; Stockmann, Daniela and Mary E. Gallagher. 2011. "Remote Control: How the Media Sustain Authoritarian Rule in China." *Comparative Political Studies* 44 (4), 436–467. See also Wright, Teresa. 2010. *Accepting Authoritarianism. State-Society Relations in China's Reform Era*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

[42] Reilly, James. 2008. "Harmonious World and Public Opinion in China's Japan Policy." In Suijian Guo and Jean-Marc Blanchard (eds.), *"Harmonious World" and China's New Foreign Policy*. Plymouth: Lexington Books, 190.

[43] "Having gone through the revolution, reconstruction and reform, our Party has evolved from a Party that led the people in fighting for state power to a Party that has led the people in exercising the power and has long remained in power." Jiang, Zemin. 2002. "Jiang Zemin's Report at the 16th Party Congress," 18 September 2002, http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200211/18/eng20021118_106983.shtml. Accessed 15 March 2013.

Despite all this, our knowledge of Chinese public opinion and other domestic actors possibly affecting foreign policy formulation is limited.

Research Questions and Key Concepts

This thesis uses a multi-level interdisciplinary approach to analyse **the main research question**:

- How does national identity frame Chinese foreign policy making toward the United States and Japan?

'Framing' in this thesis is understood as the social construction of foreign policy making context in the sense that groups outside of the top politicians participate in the national identity formation, which may have policy implications. As will be explained in more detail in the following chapter, the analytical framework adopted to analyse this question concentrates on the elements of national identity and does not make direct causal claims between the described identity and the actual foreign policies conducted between 2002 and 2012. More precisely, the question of how national identity frames foreign policy making is operationalized through the conception that behaviour is a function of perception, the elements of which can be further analysed. In other words, the relationship between action and national identity as a whole is seen as constitutive rather than causal.

The main research question is related to the following sub questions:

- How do the Chinese government, academic elite, elite university students and public opinion characterize China's position in the international system?

- What kind of characterisations of Chinese national identity are dominant in the Chinese national identity discourse?
- How do these characterizations shape Chinese perspectives on the country's relations with United States and Japan?

When national identity construction is looked from a domestic perspective including actors outside of the CCP, we note that the top-down perspective that has dominated national identity research on China gives an overly simplified picture on the process of national identity construction. This is first, because in the global information age control over information is increasingly out of CCP's hands and second, because the CCP itself takes bottom-up input into account in its policy-making. In addition, analysis at the individual level reveals that some of the previously presumed associations between national attachment and foreign policy preferences are simply flawed. As the core issues of different national identities vary, it is important to study them from an empirical perspective without assuming that the mechanisms that have been proven to work in one part of the world necessarily function the same way somewhere else.[44]

By emphasising identity construction at the domestic level I wish to question the view that states are unitary purposive actors, as the governmental actors even in authoritarian countries are influenced by their respective societies. In the words of Jack Snyder, "Not all successful modern states are democracies, but with very few exceptions, all have to find some way to attract the active loyalty of the majority of their people."[45] Oftentimes a sharp distinction between state and society simplifies matters too much. Nations require ideas that signify to their members what they stand for and ideas to guide them in their interactions in

[44] This is to say that identities can be studied with same research tools in different national contexts after certain cultural adjustments have been taken into account, but one should not assume too much on any national case before analysing the evidence.
[45] Snyder, Jack. 2000. *From Voting to Violence. Democratization and Nationalist Conflict*. New York: Norton, 46.

the international arena. In trying to understand the role of domestic politics in the evolution of China's international relations, it is necessary to look at what theories and ideas are being used in China. All leaders, even powerful leaders in an authoritarian state like China, operate in a broader national context in which collective ideas and dominant values often constrain their attitudes and tint foreign policy issues with national colour. Dominant national ideas play coordinating and legitimizing functions and are difficult to manipulate for short-term strategic purposes.[46]

As a concept, **national identity** is useful for an analysis concentrating on the links between domestic and foreign spheres because it bridges the gap between domestic and foreign policy. A government's foreign policy behaviour is shaped by what the particular national identity defines as possible and legitimate behaviour. According to the classic levels-of-analysis question foreign policy is shaped by factors at external (structural), internal (domestic) and individual level.[47] In analysing foreign policy context and national identity formulation, this work looks at China's international position through a domestic lens (national level) and the international systemic level is mostly present from the perspective of how the Chinese see they are treated internationally.[48] In the domestic context I follow Montserrat Guibernau in defining **national identity** as "a collective sentiment based upon the belief of belonging to the same nation and sharing most of the attributes that make it distinct from other nations."[49] In the international sphere national identity refers to China's status in international society. **Dominant foreign policy ideas** on China's international role can be seen as parts of national identity in the international realm. They refer to notions about how to engage the international system and are collective and inter-subjective in nature, not simply

[46] Legro, Jeffrey. 2005. *Rethinking the World. Great Power Strategies and International Order*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
[47] Singer, David. 1961. "The Level-of-Analysis Problem in International Relations." *World Politics* 14 (1), 77–92; Hollis, Martin and Steve Smith. 1990. *Explaining and Understanding International Relations*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
[48] Jeffrey Legro has argued that if the most immediate concern is foreign policy, attentions on notions embedded in national communities may well be justified. See Legro 2005, 181.
[49] Guibernau, Montserrat. 2007. *The Identity of Nations*. Cambridge: Polity Press, 11.

those that are held by particular individuals. Individuals and their interactions naturally influence collective ideas, but they also must confront them as "facts."[50]

Timeframe

The era under Hu Jintao's leadership is an important period of time in which to examine China's foreign policy. Hu era is different from previous periods because of China's changed position in the international system, leadership style change within China and the impact of globalization. China's power and influence in the international sphere have grown during the Hu era, but the current leadership style is very different from earlier strong leaders such as Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping.[51] Weaker top-leadership and a more pluralistic policy environment have made possible a steady increase in voices that can influence foreign policy-making both inside and outside the CCP, which justifies an approach concentrating on the ideational surroundings of the top leadership instead of solely analysing a few elite politicians.[52] Another characteristic of the selected timeframe is the impact of globalization and development of information technologies, which shape the mechanisms of national identity construction. The role of the state has diminished, which implies that state actors might have less power to influence identity construction, as barriers posed by time and place are lowered thanks to new transportation and communication technologies. Although the CCP can exercise media control, it is much harder to control all information flows and online communities.

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[50] Legro 2005*,* 42.

[51] Doak Barnett described the post-Mao policy-making shift as a change "from individual to collective decision making." Barnett, Doak. 1985. *The Making of Foreign Policy in China: Structure and Process*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 16.

[52] On increased number of actors in Chinese foreign policy, see Zhu, Zhiqun. 2011. "Chinese Foreign Policy: External and Internal Factors." *China: An International Journal* 9 (2), 185–194; Lanteigne, Mark. 2009. *Chinese Foreign Policy*. London: Routledge, 19–20; Nathan, Andrew. 2003. "Authoritarian Resilience." *Journal of Democracy* 14 (1), 6–17; Jakobson and Knox 2010. On academics' influence on China's foreign policy, see Glaser and Saunders 2002, 597; Liao, Xuanli. 2006. *Chinese Foreign Policy Think Tanks and China's Policy towards Japan*. Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press; Cabestan 2009, 86. On the CCP's internal reforms, see Zheng 2010, chapters 3, 4, and 8.

This research helps in understanding the category of Chinese **foreign policy context.** The main purpose of this project is not to show causally how public and elite opinion direct foreign policy, but rather to inquire more broadly what kind of attitude climate prevails regarding China's position in the world and its relations with Japan and the United States, and what can be said about the structures of foreign policy thinking and argumentation in the elite segment of the population. This approach acknowledges that the wider attitude climate matters even in authoritarian countries, but also notes the difficulties associated with the study of possible influences on China's top decision-makers and proving these causal links. Although the timeframe ends in 2012, the themes of this thesis are relevant also during Xi Jinping's reign. The fact that the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands dispute remains in the headlines at the time of writing shows that the links between domestic dynamics, nationalism and foreign policy continue to be topical in Sino-Japanese relations.

Naturally there are many directions in which to look when answering the question of who and what frames China's foreign policy making today and this research can only offer one answer. However, in the following sections I try to be as explicit as possible on how I came to choose my framework and what other viewpoints are available. I present some of these other perspectives, that is debate on the theme of Chinese national identity in the context of foreign policy making, in the following literature review. I conclude by outlining the remaining chapters.

Literature Review on Chinese National Identity

In the previous section I argued that contemporary forms of Chinese national identity construction are best understood in the interaction of domestic and international realms, and thus the domestic sources of identity construction should be included in the analysis. When

analysing the domestic context of identity formation, I emphasised the need to recognise how both societal actors as well as the CCP participate in identity formation. In the following literature review, I concentrate on analysing how existing scholarship has dealt with the domestic sector and actors at various levels.

Top-down and bottom-up dispute

In understanding contemporary Chinese national identity construction, extant literature has concentrated on the role of nationalism as a political ideology aiming to form a common national identity.[53] Those who adopt a top-down perspective on national identity construction emphasise the legitimacy deficit the CCP faced after the Tiananmen demonstrations and see China's new nationalism as a tool for the government to build up its legitimacy.[54] The CCP's concern about its legitimacy deficit and attempt to overcome it by shaping national identity can be seen in Jiang Zemin's patriotic education policies. The "top-down approach" has been dominant in the debate on national identity construction starting from Lowell Dittmer and Samuel Kim's seminal book *China's Quest for National Identity* in which they argue that "The state, with its legitimate monopoly of violence and its controlling interest in terms of manipulating the national symbol system, plays a determining role in the construction and management of national identity dynamic."[55]

[53] Review of extant literature does not limit itself to journal articles and books concentrating solely on contemporary Chinese national identity. This is first, because such literature is quite limited and second, most of the literature on Chinese nationalism takes national identity into account and it is often difficult to tell what the research is about only by looking at the title. Moreover, some of nationalism centred literature takes stance on the role of different actors in identity construction, which is of interest for this research.

[54] Downs, Erica and Phillip Saunders. 1998–1999. "Legitimacy and the Limits of Nationalism." *International Security* 23 (3), 120; Zhao 2004a, 262; He 2007a, 6; He, Yinan. 2009. *The Search for Reconciliation. Sino-Japanese and German-Polish Relations since World War II*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 244–245; Laliberté and Lanteigne 2008, 11–13; Zheng, Yongnian. 2008. "Nationalism. Dynamics of Domestic Transformation and International Relations in China." In Gongwu Wang and Yongnian Zheng (eds.), *China and the New International Order*. New York: Routledge, 33; Shirk 2007, 62.

[55] Dittmer, Lowell and Samuel S. Kim. 1993. "Whither China's Quest for National Identity." In Lowell Dittmer and Samuel S. Kim (eds.), *China's Quest for National Identity*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 244.

Researchers who lean towards the top-down perspective include Suisheng Zhao, Yongnian Zheng and Yinan He. Suisheng Zhao sees the development of nationalism in recent decades as a function of its utility to the communist state in response to domestic and external pressures.[56] Yongnian Zheng argues that the role of state and other institutions have been under-emphasised in the reconstruction of national identity and nationalism.[57] Yinan He's research focuses on how history issues matter in identity construction and reconciliation. In her book *The Search for Reconciliation* He examines China's bilateral relations with Japan with the emphasis on both systemic structural constrains and elite manipulation of history as reasons behind the lack of deep reconciliation in Sino-Japanese relations after World War II.[58] Although He acknowledges that elite's manipulation of public opinion is only possible when the public shares some of the views with the ruling elite to begin with, her stress on elite agency places her work more on the top-down end of the spectrum of national identity analysis.[59] Zheng Wang's recent book *Never Forget National Humiliation* also takes a top-down approach accusing the CCP's education policies for the "rising nationalism among young people" in China.[60]

In the discussion about contemporary Chinese national identity, authors who adopt a bottom-up perspective to national identity have criticized the top-down perspective for seeing national identity only as something that can be instrumentally manipulated. According to Peter Gries, Western scholars tend to see contemporary Chinese nationalism only as a result of Party propaganda and the elite's manipulation:[61] "Many Western China experts continue to focus on government repression, dismissing popular opinion as irrelevant

[56] Zhao 2004a; Zhao, Suisheng. 2013. "Foreign Policy Implications of Chinese Nationalism Revisited: The Strident Turn." *Journal of Contemporary China* 22 (82), 535–553.
[57] Zheng 1999, 12.
[58] He 2009.
[59] He, Yinan. 2007b. "Remembering and Forgetting the War. Elite Mythmaking, Mass Reaction, and Sino-Japanese Relations, 1950-2006." *History and Memory* 19 (2), 45–48.
[60] Wang, Zheng. 2012. *Never Forget National Humiliation. Historical Memory in Chinese Politics and Foreign Relations.* New York: Columbia University Press, 10–11.
[61] Gries, Peter H.. 2001. "Tears of Rage: Chinese Reactions to the Belgrade Embassy Bombing." *The China Journal* 2 (46), 28.

both to Chinese politics in general, and to Chinese nationalism in particular."[62] Gries and Stanley Rosen also state: "Chinese popular opinion is not an oxymoron. The Chinese people – peasants, workers, students– are increasingly contesting the legitimacy of the current regime; analysts would be wise not to ignore them."[63] Since the 1990s so-called second wave of popular nationalism has activated online, and it has had more influence than the first elite-directed wave.[64] Popular opinion is very far from irrelevant in China, and government's attempts to influence public opinion only speak for its relevance.

William Callahan has also highlighted the bottom-up perspective in the identity discourse by examining how nationalism is consumed. Callahan regrets that "much of the discussion of Chinese nationalism has a very narrow, top-down view of identity and politics, typically redefining nationalism first as official nationalism, then as statism."[65] Still, he acknowledges the role of the state by citing Suisheng Zhao and stating that "rather than seeing China's new nationalism as simply an expression of popular feeling, we also need to understand this nationalism in the context of the cultural governance."[66] In his book, *China. The Pessoptimist Nation*, Callahan moves towards highlighting the interconnectedness of domestic and foreign politics and elite and mass segments in the society.[67] Benjamin Darr's doctoral thesis adopts a well-needed quantitative perspective to national identity construction at the individual level, which aims to avoid some of the pitfalls of recent literature by providing a description of variance among individuals and their responses to societal processes shaping national identity. Darr rightly notes the alarmist baseline of most studies on

[62] Gries, Peter H.. 2004. *China's New Nationalism. Pride, Politics, and Diplomacy*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
[63] Gries, Peter H.. and Stanley Rosen. 2004. "Introduction: Popular Protest and State Legitimation in 21st Century." In Peter H. Gries and Stanley Rosen (eds.), *State and Society in 21st Century China. Crisis, Contention and Legitimation*. New York: Routledge, 5.
[64] Gries, Peter H.. 2005. "China's New Thinking on Japan." *The China Quarterly* 184 (4), 831–850. For a more recent analysis of Internet nationalism, see Shen and Breslin 2010.
[65] Callahan, William. 2004. "National Insecurities: Humiliation, Salvation, and Chinese Nationalism." *Alternatives* 29 (2), 201–202.
[66] Callahan, William. 2006. "History, Identity and Security, Producing and Consuming Nationalism in China." *Critical Asian Studies* 38 (2), 185.
[67] Callahan, William. 2010. *China. The Pessoptimist Nation*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 13.

Chinese nationalism, dominating elite perspective that "reinforces stereotypes of Chinese politics as completely top-down affair" and failing to account for individual differences among people responding to processes of national identity construction. Unfortunately he then makes a very problematic assumption that a "stronger sense of national identity" will lead to higher perceived legitimacy of the regime, which is too simplistic a claim and in my eyes questions some of his subsequent results.[68]

In discussing the political elite's manipulation of national identity in China, it is necessary to remember that national identity politics entail an embedded hegemonic discourse in any country, meaning that China is not an exceptional case. According to Michael Billig "The battle for nationhood is a battle of hegemony, by which a part claims to speak for the whole nation and to represent the national essence. The triumph of a particular nationalism is seldom achieved without a defeat of alternative nationalism and other ways of imagining peoplehood."[69] Socializing citizens to national culture and customs from a very early stage on makes people accustomed to the nation-state system and to adopt nationality as a category that defines them.[70]

The national identity framework adopted in this research makes it possible to include both the top-down and the bottom-up perspective into the framework as they participate in national identity construction and are in constant interaction. This interaction has intensified in the global information age during which the role of Chinese media has changed. Foreign policy issues are increasingly discussed in the Chinese media giving people more information but also influencing their thinking. On the other hand, commercialised media has to think about revenues, which encourages it to write about news that increase

[68] Darr, Benjamin. 2011. "Nationalism and State Legitimation in Contemporary China." PhD diss., University of Iowa, 24–26. On the connection between national identity and state legitimacy, Darr writes: "A stronger sense of national identity will lead one to believe in the legitimacy of the regime, simply because the regime is *the* national regime." (emphasis in original). Ibid., 59.
[69] Billig, Michael. 1995. *Banal Nationalism*. London: Sage, 27–28.
[70] Prasenjit Duara goes as far as calling modernity "hegemonic" because he sees it as the key context that led to naturalizing the nation-state's demand on the individual. Duara, Prasenjit. 2009. *The Global and Regional in China's Nation-Formation.* London: Routledge, 15.

sales. The CCP has less ability to hide news from the public and difficulties in controlling social media such as Weibo.

Emphasis on domestic vs. international sphere

In addition to the "top-down bottom-up dispute" on the domestic level, researchers analysing Chinese national identity can be roughly divided into those who emphasise China's international role, those who concentrate more on the domestic side of identity and to those who intend to combine the two levels of analysis. Suisheng Zhao sees adapting to international systemic pressures as key in understanding China's foreign policy and emphasises the reactive nature of Chinese foreign policy and pragmatic approach adopted by Chinese leaders.[71] In contrast to Zhao, Susan Shirk describes Chinese foreign policy as driven mainly by domestic concerns, because China's domestic insecurities make it impossible for Chinese leaders ever to make international considerations a priority.[72] Also the works of Gries, Callahan and Reilly concentrate on analysing the domestic side of nationalism, national identity and foreign policy. However, in their works the role of popular opinion and civil society actors has been taken into account.

Most writers adopt a multi-level analysis of some kind, although they tend to focus on different levels. Even though maintaining that both domestic and international levels matter in China's foreign policy analysis especially when it comes to identity issues, scholars who focus on the "domestic level" sometimes refer only to elite actors whereas society's role is often more vague, or in some cases declared as irrelevant. Samuel Kim sees foreign policy formulation as a function of domestic (societal) and external (systemic) structures, but recommends a behaviour-centred approach because "what really matters is manifest

[71] Zhao, Suisheng. 2004b. "Chinese Foreign Policy: Pragmatism and Strategic Behaviour." In Suisheng Zhao (ed.), *Chinese Foreign Policy. Pragmatism and Strategic Behaviour.* Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 4.
[72] Shirk 2007, 8.

behaviour of state actors, not the underlying elite perceptions and motivations."[73] Yongnian Zheng holds that changes in the national or international identity have impact on China's international relations, but on the other hand changes in the international environment can affect Chinese national identity. Thus, both international and domestic determinants of foreign policy need to be taken into account. However, Zheng does not see societal factors such as popular opinion and rising civil society as influential.[74] Allen Carlson's analysis on sovereignty and China's international role focuses on identity construction in the international level, but the aim of his book is to analyse "how and why Chinese foreign policy and national security makers and analysts have attempted to draw the line between what is inside China and what is outside."[75] The focus is therefore not solely on the international systemic level. Quansheng Zhao uses "micro-macro linkage approach" in interpreting Chinese foreign policy. Like Carlson's description of the sovereignty discourse, Zhao's analysis concentrates on the state-level actors and foreign policy elite.[76] Yong Deng sees China primarily as a status seeker whose foreign policy is driven by the interaction between domestic and international politics. Although Deng's focus lies in China's quest for international status, he has chosen this concentration because "status sensitizes us to the domestic and international politics behind the country's dynamic interaction with the outside world."[77] Despite acknowledging the interaction between domestic and foreign politics in shaping China's international behaviour, Deng's analysis concentrates on China's great power aspirations and multilateral relations. Simon Shen's theoretical stand in *Redefining Nationalism in Modern China* represents multi-level analysis and integrates domestic and international levels by using an actor-based

[73] Kim, Samuel S.. 1998. "Chinese Foreign Policy in Theory and Practice." In Samuel S. Kim (ed.), *China and the World. Chinese Foreign Policy Faces the New Millennium*. Bolder, Colorado: Westview Press, 11.
[74] Zheng 1999, 12.
[75] Carlson, Allen. 2005. *Unifying China, Integrating with the World: Securing Chinese Sovereignty in the Reform Era*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2.
[76] Zhao, Quansheng. 1996. *Interpreting Chinese Foreign Policy. The Micro-Macro Linkage Approach*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
[77] Deng, Yong. 2008. *China's Struggle for Status. The Realignment of International Relations*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2–8.

framework in which the party-state is the "top," intellectuals the "intermediary" and ordinary citizens the "bottom."[78] Inclusion of the bottom level shows best that Shen sees societal factors as relevant.

Table 1.1. Level of analysis in existing research.

	International level	Both Int. & Dom. levels	Domestic level
Top-down (state-centred)	Suisheng Zhao	Allen Carlson Yong Deng Yinan He Samuel Kim Quansheng Zhao Yongnian Zheng	Susan Shirk Wang Zheng
Bottom-up (includes societal actors)		Simon Shen William Callahan	Peter Gries James Reilly Benjamin Darr

This thesis positions itself towards the bottom level of the right column because on the domestic level, actors outside the state are also included. Only by acknowledging that China is not a unitary actor and that different actors have different agendas and different understandings of national identity, can we better see what is meant by national identity on various levels and how these understandings shape the context of Chinese foreign policy making. Thus, the "top-down bottom-up" debate of Chinese nationalism that has dominated recent scholarly contributions, in which national identity dynamics are seen as either something elites can use to manipulate popular opinion or as "genuine" expressions of the public, is not the best way to understand contemporary national identity dynamics.

[78] Shen, Simon. 2007. *Redefining Nationalism in Modern China.* New York: Palgrave Macmillan, chapter 1.

Why has the domestic context been largely ignored?

In spite of a few examples such as James Rosenau's work from the late 1960s and Robert Putnam's "logic of two-level games" from late 1980s,[79] the domestic context of foreign policy making has been largely ignored especially in the Chinese case but also more generally.[80] There are a number of reasons why the role of domestic factors affecting foreign policy making and national identity construction remain understudied. First, the study of national identities has suffered from two types of disciplinary problems. In the field of IR identities have only started to be seen as important since the end of Cold War and the constructivist turn in IR.[81] Much of the literature in IR has assumed, tacitly or explicitly, that national identity, in the study of the conduct of politics among states, is irrelevant, epiphenomenal, or fixed. Also the sharp distinction between "domestic" and "foreign" policy dominant in the discipline used to pose a barrier for understanding how "domestic" issues such as national identity matter in the international realm. Despite the fact that IR is highly dependent on "nations" in its "inter-nationality" and that the emergence of nation-states and national identities in their modern forms are related to the formation of the international system, nation-states were largely taken

[79] Rosenau emphasised the importance of domestic politics in the analysis of foreign policy in 1967 and wrote about "linkage politics" in 1969. Putnam argues that an adequate account of the domestic determinants of foreign policy and international relations must stress politics: "parties, social classes, interest groups, legislators, and even public opinion and elections, not simply executive officials and institutional arrangements." Rosenau, James. 1967. *Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy*. New York: Free Press; Rosenau, James. 1969. *Linkage Politics: Essays on the Convergence of National and International Systems*. New York: Free Press; Putnam, Robert. 1988. "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games." *International Organization* 42 (3), 432.

[80] Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and Alastair Smith state that domestic context has been often excluded from the analysis and see including the domestic context as very beneficial for research results: "The empirical evidence strongly suggests that by attending to the interests of leaders and the domestic conditions under which they serve, researchers have improved predictive and explanatory power, addressing additional dimensions not previously investigated. This implies that further delving into the nexus between domestic politics and international affairs will prove fruitful. We conclude that international relations are not 'high politics' separated from domestic politics, as some have suggested." Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce and Alastair Smith. 2012. "Domestic Explanations of International Relations." *Annual Review of Political Science* 15, 177.

[81] Lapid, Yosef and Friedrich Kratochwil (eds.). 1996. *The Return of Culture and Identity in IR Theory*. London: Lynne Rienner.

as settled political entities.[82] In the 1990s a growing literature started to argue that domestic politics are an important part of the explanation for the foreign policies of states, and that it is important to understand their influence more precisely.[83]

The second disciplinary problem concerns area studies, in which Chinese national identity construction has been seen mainly in the nationalism framework, although it should be seen in its multidimensional form. Discussion on Chinese national identity in area studies should be better linked with research on other national identities and broader theoretical discussions.[84] In short, when the Chinese case is analysed in the wider international context in IR, there is often a lack of understanding of historical perspective, whereas the area studies approach tends to focus too much on country-specific characteristics. These approaches should be combined to reach better understanding on contemporary national identity construction and the role foreign policy context shapers play in the process of foreign policy formulation.

Second, in addition to disciplinary challenges, research on national identities faces conceptual problems. One can reasonably argue that there is limited understanding of any national identity because there is no agreement on how to define "national identity," the core concept of the scholarship, and there has been a tendency to use definitions that have been unoperationalizable or without links to other existing definitions.[85] This makes comparing results and building new research on existing one very difficult. In the research

[82] Griffiths, Martin and Michael Sullivan. 1997. "Nationalism and International Relations Theory." *The Australian Journal of Politics and History* 43 (1), 53–66.
[83] Fearon, James. 1998. "Domestic Politics, Foreign Policy, and Theories of International Relations." *Annual Review of Political Science* 1, 289–313; Zakaria, Fareed. 1992. "Realism and Domestic Politics: A Review Essay." *International Security* 17 (1), 177–198.
[84] Carlson 2009, 20–35; Callahan, William. 2005. "Introduction: China, Ltd." *Journal of Contemporary China* 14 (42), 1–10.
[85] Abdelal, Rawi, Yoshiko M. Herrera, Iain Johnston, and Rose McDermott. 2005. "Identity as a Variable," 22 July 2005, http://www.ucd.ie/euiteniba/pdf/Identity%20as%20a%20Variable.pdf. Accessed 28 April 2008, page 6. A shorter version of the article was later published in *Perspectives on Politics*, 4 (4), December 2006, 695–711. Abdelal et al. base their opinion on a review of a universe of 165 articles on identity published in eight IR journals (European Journal of International Relations, International Affairs, International Organization, International Security, International Studies Quarterly, Review of International Studies and World Politics).

using Chinese nationalism as its framework, a great deal of literature mixes up concepts of national pride and nationalism, which often leads to false conclusions about potential aggression based merely on national pride. Partly due to conceptual confusion, methodological problems, which form the third category of challenges in research of national identities, have followed.

From the methodological perspective, the lack of a sound empirical dimension is a clear disadvantage of studies on national identity.[86] According to one perspective, in the IR literature the vast majority of research on identity since 1990 has relied either on individual case studies or on surveys, without taking advantage on cross-disciplinary research or new methodological options.[87] In addition, Henk Dekker, Darina Malová and Sander Hoogendoorn claim that in studying national identity scholars rarely combine general theoretical elements to empirical material. Concentration on theoretical debates without empirical data implicate the difficulties in operationalizing research questions related to national identity, but these problems are not insurmountable, although there is a clear need of improvement of research strategies.[88]

There are also false, flawed or one-sided statements about Chinese nationalism and national identity circling around the academia. For example Wang Zheng argues in *Never Forget National Humiliation* that "it is the young –and not the old- who seem to be at the vanguard of this growing nationalism." This idea seems to derive from the fact that the CCP launched its patriotic education campaign in the 1990s. However, as Wang's materials concentrate on the youth and government policies and not the views in the wider population in

[86] According to Peter Katzenstein, Ernest Gellner, Benedict Anderson, and Ernst Haas see national identities as crucial for understanding politics and agree that national identities cannot be stipulated deductively but must be investigated empirically in concrete historical settings. Katzenstein, Peter (ed). 1996. *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics*. New York: Columbia University Press. See also Lapid, Yosef. 1996. "Culture Ship: Returns and Departures in International Relations Theory." In Yosef Lapid and Friedrich Kratochwil (eds.), *The Return of Culture and Identity in IR Theory*. London: Lynne Rienner, 9; Dekker, Henk, Darina Malová, and Sander Hoogendoorn. 2003. "Nationalism and Its Explanations." *Political Psychology* 24 (2), 346; Carlson 2009, 24.
[87] Abdelal et al. 2006.
[88] Dekker et al. 2003, 346.

more detail, his materials actually do not allow him to compare the views of young people to those of older generations –digging off ground of his claim that young people in China are *more* nationalistic than the old.[89] Wang's book offers many important and useful viewpoints on how historical memory matters in national identity construction in contemporary China, but in the above-mentioned respect he stretches his results to cover areas, which they do not cover. Also Wan Ming argues in his book *Sino-Japanese Relations* that "polls conducted in China generally support the fact that youth are more nationalist." He then cites two surveys of which he takes the attitude of "not feeling close to Japan" as a measure for nationalism partly because one of the reasons young people gave for not feeling close to Japan was Japan's treatment of the past.[90] To me this is a very problematic measure of nationalism for many reasons. Although different materials and approaches naturally yield different kinds of results which can all be valid at the same time, researchers using only one type of material – especially qualitative material, should be careful when making generalisations. The survey materials collected for this thesis as well as representative survey samples collected in China do not support the claim that young people in China would be more nationalistic than the old –rather the opposite seems to be the case. On the other hand researchers using quantitative data also sometimes err to make bold statements on issues their own data does not cover. Robert Hoffman and Jeremy Larner present as a general fact in their *China Quarterly* article that "internationalism (also global openness or cosmopolitanism)…is negatively correlated with both nationalism and patriotism."[91] This may be true in the United States, but as Peter Gries's work and my following analysis shows, in China this pattern does not hold.

This study includes an empirical dimension in the study of Chinese national identity and its implications on foreign policy. Although it owes much to many of works

[89] Wang 2012, 10–11.
[90] Wan, Ming. 2006. *Sino-Japanese Relations: Interaction, Logic and Transformation*. Washington: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 160.
[91] Hoffman, Robert and Jeremy Larner. 2013. "The Demography of Chinese Nationalism: A Field-Experimental Approach." *The China Quarterly* 213 (1), 194.

presented above, the theoretical framework, combination of research materials and selected timeframe allow this study to give a new perspective on analysing contemporary Chinese national identity and foreign policy formulation.

There are three contributions to be made in this thesis. On a broader theoretical level this thesis engages with the discussion on how the role of domestic context in foreign policy making should be understood especially in authoritarian countries. With interviews conducted with elite scholars often consulted by government actors, I classify routes through which scholars and other experts can bring their views in the attention of the top policy makers. Another part of understanding the role of the domestic context in foreign policy making deals with the dynamics of national identity construction and engages with at least two debates. By analysing national identity formation I aim to bring forward perspectives neglected by the "China's rise literature," which tend to understand Chinese nationalism in narrow terms solely in the context of how it will direct China's foreign policy into more assertive direction. The tendency of "China's rise literature" to see strong national attachment in negative terms links with a broader debate of the nature of national attachment and its implications. Proponents of liberal nationalism hold that deep attachment to the nation does not necessary lead to chauvinism, but in fact people become more likely to cooperate when their basic dignity is secured. Their opponents however, emphasize that deep attachment is likely to lead into increased readiness to fight for the nation and decrease cooperation.[92] My research takes a stance in this debate from China's perspective, which links my research with broader theoretical considerations.

My empirical evidence supports the liberal nationalist argument by showing that national attachment is more complex than assumed in the "China's rise literature." Analysing two sets of survey material with statistical methods I show that most things discussed as

[92] Herrmann, Richard; Pierangelo Isernia and Paolo Segatti. 2009. "Attachment to the Nation and International Relations: Dimensions of Identity and Their Relationship to War and Peace." *Political Psychology* 30 (5), 721–754.

"nationalism" in China studies literature can be analytically separated into at least two components, each with different foreign policy relevant correlates. Contrary to the presumptions held by most scholars, "patriots" support an internationalist stance in contrast to "nationalists" who favour more assertive behaviour towards Japan and the US as well as generally protectionist economic policies.

In addition to taking part in the theoretical discussion on the nature of national attachment on a general level, this project aims to diversify the picture given of formation of Chinese national identity and its foreign policy implications in Chinese studies and China-centred international relations literature. First, this research contributes to describing the general atmosphere in which Chinese foreign policy formulation takes place. Although the loudest online nationalists have gained a lot of attention, there is no overreaching consensus that China should take a more assertive approach towards Japan and the United States. Rather, various different views exist in all societal levels. To show this variance, I will provide a descriptive account of the content of academic elite's views as well as public and student opinions about China's role in the world and its relations with the US and Japan.

Second, I emphasise the evolving nature of national identity construction, which requires including domestic actors at different levels into the framework. In the constructivist understanding power operates through relationships rather than possessions of capabilities, which is why understanding the process in which national identity is formed is important.[93] Most of the literature dealing with Chinese national identity has favoured the top-down approach, which neglects both the bottom-up perspective and the process nature of national identity construction –that is that the bottom level can also affect elite and state actors. The analysis at the individual level makes it possible to estimate how much top-down propaganda, media and other factors influence opinion formation, which is a perspective very much

[93] Klotz, Audie and Cecelia Lynch. 2007. *Strategies for Research in Constructivist International Relations*. New York: M.E. Sharpe, 11.

neglected in the studies concentrating on the elite perspective. In other words, survey material enables the analysis of background factors associated with higher levels of nationalist attitudes, which reveals that in China as elsewhere chauvinistic nationalism associated with strong anti-foreign attitudes is more common among the less educated parts of the public living or coming from the rural areas. Thus, the picture painted in the literature of a young nationalist living in the city as the forerunner of Chinese nationalism is flawed. It also shows that media content strongly affects threat perceptions even within the very educated part of the population, although people with higher level of education are usually less influenced by external messages than others who receive the message.

Structure of the Thesis

The remainder of this dissertation is divided into seven chapters. **Chapter two** presents a constructivist analytical framework to study national identity and the ways it matters in making foreign policy. Developing an empirically testable conceptualisation of national identity is the central task of chapter two. In addition, chapter two introduces methods and sources.

Chapter three concentrates on providing answers to the first subquestion on how Chinese government and public opinion characterise China's position in the international system and the question of what kind of descriptions of Chinese national identity are dominant in domestic discourses. Chapter three presents Hu Jintao's leadership's position in national identity discourses and describes the old and new elements with which the Hu regime aimed to define China's international position. Most important of the old elements is the dichotomy of China's rise and on the other hand of its victim mentality. Both of these narratives have long-reaching historical links, have been propagated by the CCP and have

been widely influential in shaping Chinese national identity and Chinese people's perceptions on China and its foreign relations. In addition to engaging with elements that have been present in Chinese national identity discourses since the reform and opening up or even before that, the Hu leadership has increasingly aimed to increase national cohesion.

Regarding the non-ideational factors this thesis also aims to study, chapter three further highlights the need to include China's domestic context into analyses of its foreign policy. In chapter three this is justified from the following two perspectives. First, both external and internal perceptions of China as a foreign policy actor affect its foreign policy. Chapter three thus describes Chinese leadership's position between internal and external expectations. It starts by discussing the external perceptions of Chinese foreign policy in the Hu Jintao period as presented in the most recent "China threat literature" claiming that China's foreign policy changed into more assertive in 2009–2010. In addition, it provides a general description of the opinion climate in China during Hu era by describing what kind of expectations Chinese people have regarding China's position in the international system and people's perceptions of Japan and the United States according to opinion polls, as these are arguably the most important countries among China's bilateral relations. Second perspective highlighting the need to understand the domestic context emphasises the fact that China's foreign policy goals and national interests as phrased by the Hu leadership are tightly linked with domestic issues. As its material, chapter three uses governmental policy papers, speeches and legislation to find out the terms with which the party-state engages in national identity discourse, justifies China's foreign policy actions and frames China's international position. Description of the domestic expectations is based on opinion polls collected between 2002 and 2012.

Chapter four contributes to answering the same subquestion chapter three discussed from political elite's and publics' perspectives, namely how scholars in

international relations describe China's position in the world and how these descriptions shape their views on China's policies towards the US and Japan. More precisely, chapter four analyses the academic discourses of Chinese elite scholars in the 2000s that are arguably important drivers of China's international identity formation to find out whether there is evidence for widespread nationalistic views on China's international role. Contrary to the views defining Chinese domestic discourses as increasingly nationalistic, Chinese elite scholars describe China's rise in rather moderate terms and emphasise China's domestic challenges such as problems related to governance. Regarding China's foreign policy approach, Deng Xiaoping's idea of "keeping a low profile but taking a more prominent stance when feasible" gets support. Thus, among elite scholars who are most often also those consulted by the government, highly nationalistic views supporting a significantly more assertive foreign policy are rare. The diverse opinions expressed in the scholarly community implicate that China does not have any one dominant international identity to guide its actions, which is important to take into account when evaluating China's behaviour as a rising power.

On the question of how domestic context matters in Chinese foreign policy making in more material terms, chapter four updates and compliments descriptions of the channels through which scholars can influence foreign policy establishment in order to better understand some of the contemporary mechanisms domestic actors use to influence Chinese foreign policy. As its material chapter four uses articles in the leading international relations journals and interviews conducted with scholars.

Chapter five investigates how core values or patriotic and nationalist attitude clusters deriving from national identity frame Chinese policy preferences and thus concentrates on answering the main research question. It uses two sets of elite student survey data collected by the author in 2007 and in 2011–2012 and a representative survey from 2008.

First, chapter five improves our understanding of Chinese national attachment by showing that contrary to what is often assumed in the academic literature on China, there is more than one "nationalist sentiment." Second, chapter five contributes to our understanding of how cultural differences matter when analysing the relationship between core values and foreign policy preferences as unlike some evidence from the United States indicates, in China nationalism and patriotism are different constructs and they have different types of links with foreign policy preferences. In the Chinese data nationalism had a stronger link with foreign policy preferences than patriotism, and respondents with higher nationalism were less likely to favour international cooperation and more likely to prefer protectionist policies. These results offer one example of the differences domestic context can produce on foreign policy attitudes, which can affect foreign policy conduct as well. Third, analysis in chapter five shows that both in the 2007 and the 2011–2012 datasets CCP members were more nationalistic than non-members. The question of whether CCP membership is associated with foreign policy orientations has not been thoroughly researched as a topic, so these results help to fill in a gap in the literature.

Chapter six concentrates on the construction of the "other" by analysing Chinese threat perceptions of the US and Japan. Strong threat perceptions can give national leaders political support for assertive foreign policy and help to mobilise people behind actions against a perceived enemy country. Chapter six looks at the attitude structures behind higher levels of perceived threat from the United States and Japan and tests whether factors such as gender, age, place of origin, CCP membership, media consumption, foreign travel or others are associated with threat perceptions. The construction of perceived threat is analysed with the 2011–2012 student data.

The results show that media consumption was strongly associated with threat perceptions. Respondents who followed conventional media were more likely to perceive

both the US and Japan as threatening. Also those who preferred a more prominent stance for China in world affairs were more likely to view the US and Japan as threatening. In addition, dissatisfaction to life was associated with higher level of perceived threat from Japan. Potential explanatory factors of threat perceptions were explored with linear regression models. The strong impact of media on threat perceptions is interesting especially in the elite student population, because people with higher level of education should be hard to persuade.

Chapter seven looks at historical consciousness and its relevance in national identity construction. Nationalist historical beliefs are thought to form a vital part of Chinese national identity. How is the temporal dimension of Chinese national identity understood today? Which stories are emphasized in Chinese history and how do they direct China's future behaviour? Chapter seven places the history question in identity construction in the context of state legitimacy deficit and discusses the ways Chinese leadership has attempted to intentionally shape national identity construction with cultural governance and patriotic education. In the latter half of the chapter, nationalist historical beliefs are situated within a larger attitudinal identity framework using the 2011–2012 elite university survey. To uncover the linkages between different issue areas discussed in the previous chapters, the complex relationships between nationalist and patriotic core values, media consumption patterns, threat perceptions, views of China's role in the world and nationalistic historical beliefs and their links to foreign policy preferences are analysed with structural equation modelling (SEM).

Historical memory has an impact on politics through perceptions and can influence the views of whether a given nation or group of people should be seen in mainly positive or negative terms. Chapter seven shows with structural equation modelling that nationalist historical beliefs are linked with humiliation narrative in the case of Chinese views of the US, and via it also positively connected to tougher foreign policy preferences towards the US. In the case of Chinese views on Japan, nationalist historical beliefs are connected to

the preference of enhancing China's relative position in the international system and via this view, also connected to supporting tougher policy stance towards Japan.

Chapter eight concludes by summarizing the main results and discusses their implications both in theoretical and empirical contexts. Finally, it briefly outlines areas that were not covered in enough detail and estimates the need of further research.

2. Chapter
Chinese National Identity and Foreign Policy Context. A Multilevel Understanding.

> *If we want to understand China's external behaviour, it is necessary to examine the change in its national identity.* Qin Yaqing 2008[1]
>
> *Diplomacy is no longer the business of a few elite people. It is increasingly embedded in the public and public opinion.*
> Vice Foreign Minister Cui Tiankai 2010[2]

The analysis of national identity in the foreign policy context has been fundamentally hindered by empirically untestable conceptualizations of national identity. In the introductory chapter I emphasised the need to analyse Chinese foreign policy making by including the domestic realm into the analysis and brought up the problematic tendencies to either ignore the domestic dynamics of foreign policy formulation or to approach the domestic level and national identity construction from an overly state-centric perspective. In this chapter I clarify how I approached the analysis of Chinese national identity in the foreign policy making context and offer explanations on the various methodological choices made. The aim is to define national identity in such a way that it is empirically operationalisable. The basis of this conceptualisation is the notion that behaviour is principally a function of perception. Internal beliefs shape the interpretation of the external situation, and this interpretation directs behaviour. The described conceptualisation is necessary in order to answer the main research question on how Chinese national identity frames its foreign policymaking towards the US and Japan.

[1] Qin, Yaqing. 2008. "International Factors and China's External Behaviour." In Pauline Kerr, Stuart Harris, and Qin Yaqing (eds.), *China's "New" Diplomacy. Tactical or Fundamental Change?* New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 50.
[2] David Shambaugh's interview with Cui Tiankai 6 July 2010. In Shambaugh, David. 2013. *China Goes Global. The Partial Power*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 66.

I apply this perception-centred conceptualisation to the Chinese case and develop a research design that should be able to uncover links between the core elements of national identity and foreign policy. For analytical purposes I have divided the components of perception hierarchically, and the empirical part of the thesis deals mostly with values and attitudes deriving from national identity rather than identity as a whole. The interdisciplinary approach adopted in this thesis draws mainly from international relations, social and political psychology, area studies and political philosophy. The ontological and epistemological premises of this study derive from what can be defined as the constructivist school of International Relations.

Why National Identity Matters in the Foreign Policy Context

Constructivists argue that the distribution of capabilities in the international system alone does not determine state preferences; rather a state's identity shapes and motivates its interests and behaviour. Constructivism holds that agents and structures are mutually constructed. In this "world of our making" ideational factors matter because meaningful action is only possible within an inter-subjective social context. These meanings derive from identities, and meaning behind behaviour makes it "action." In short, the material world needs to be interpreted before it can be meaningful and ideas are an important element of behavioural explanation.[3] In foreign policy formulation national identity influences in the background by framing the possible actions that are in harmony with "who China is," in other words, what kind of roles China can take in a given situation. National identity can be defined as a discursive universe that makes certain behavioural manifestations possible. It can also serve as a link between the

[3] Hopf, Ted. 1998. "The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory." *International Security* 23 (1), 171–200; Wendt, Alexander. 1999. *Social Theory of International Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

individual holding a particular national identity and the international level. Different actors both participate in shaping the content of national identity and are affected by it because no single actor alone can define national identity in any historical moment. The relationship between foreign policy actors and national identity is thus mutually constitutive.[4]

State identities have been formed in different kinds of historical and cultural circumstances, and when state actors interpret the international situation and define state interests, they see it through their country's individual historical and cultural perspective. A systemic theory will not help us to understand why individual states act as they do, as all actors do not perceive the world in the same way.[5]

Constructivism is an actor-oriented approach and identity is one of its key concepts. Identity defines interests because we cannot know what we want if we do not know who we are. This statement holds for foreign policy as it does for personal preferences.[6] Constructivism disputes the idea that any state could have a single eternal identity across time and space, and assumes instead that state identities are variable; they likely depend on historical, cultural, political and social contexts.[7] Thus, national identities should not be understood as "natural" or "permanent," but as constructed and changing.[8]

In understanding state behaviour in the international context, national identity and ideas on how to approach the international society are important. In the words of

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[4] Wendt 1999, 224; Lapid, Yosef. 1996. "Culture Ship: Returns and Departures in International Relations Theory." In Yosef Lapid and Friedrich Kratochwil (eds.), *The Return of Culture and Identity in IR Theory*. London: Lynne Rienner,
10; Bukh, Alexander. 2010. *Japan's National Identity and Foreign Policy. Russia as Japan's "Other."* Oxon: Routledge, 12.

[5] Onuf, Nicholas. 1989. *World of Our Making: Rules and Rule in Social Theory and International Relations*. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press; Adler, Emanuel. 1997. "Seizing the Middle Ground: Constructivism in World Politics." *European Journal of International Relations* 3 (3), 322.

[6] Campbell, David. 1998. *Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity*. Minneapolis: University of Minneapolis Press.

[7] Hopf 1998, 175.

[8] Özkirimli, Umut. 2005. *Contemporary Debates on Nationalism. A Critical Engagement*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 171; Billig, Michael. 1995. *Banal Nationalism*. London: Sage; Duara, Prasenjit. 2009. *The Global and Regional in China's Nation-Formation*. London: Routledge, 97–98; Dittmer, Lowell and Samuel S. Kim. 1993. "In the Search of a Theory of National Identity." In Lowell Dittmer and Samuel S. Kim (eds.), *China's Quest for National Identity*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 13.

Christopher Hill and William Wallace, "*effective foreign policy rests upon a shared sense of national identity, of a nation-state's 'place in the world,' its friends and enemies, its interests and aspirations.*"[9] How states see themselves and other states is central to understanding what states actually do, so how Chinese government and people see China's future in relation to the existing world order shapes the way issues are interpreted and policy goals and approaches are defined.[10] Much of China's foreign policy is formulated based on discourses that happen in the domestic realm and serve as a prism for interpreting the international context and China's position in it.

In the late 1970s China's reform and opening up policies dramatically changed China's official approach to the outside world and created a need for redefinition of China's identity. Years of radical Maoism were behind, but there was uncertainty of the alternative. China's adaptation to the post-Mao era in the late 1970s and early 1980s has sometimes been described as a national identity crisis.[11] But more changes were on their way. The collapse of the Cold War system and the end of the Soviet Union, the Tiananmen massacre, huge economic growth in the 1990s, and the decreasing ideological value of communism as the legitimization of the Communist Party's leadership all affected Chinese people and made them rethink their national identity. Some locate the main identity crisis to the early 1990s arguing that the economic transition towards a capitalist economy generated a pair of identity crises in the PRC: a *national identity crisis*, caused by being one of the few remaining socialist countries in the world; and a *Party identity crisis*, due to the weakening public

[9] Hill, Christopher and William Wallace. 1996. "Introduction: Actors and Actions." In Christopher Hill (ed.), *The Actors in Europe's Foreign Policy*. London: Routledge, 8.
[10] Wan, Ming. 2006. *Sino-Japanese Relations: Interaction, Logic and Transformation.* Washington: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 158; Legro, Jeffrey. 2005. *Rethinking the World. Great Power Strategies and International Order*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, chapter 1; Katzenstein, Peter (ed.). 1996. *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics*. New York: Columbia University Press; Deng, Yong. 2008. *China's Struggle for Status*, *The Realignment of International Relations*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 54; Suny, Ronald. 1999-2000. "Provisional Stabilities. The Politics of Identities in Post-Soviet Eurasia." *International Security* 24 (3), 140; Prizel, Ilya. 1998. *National Identity and Foreign Policy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 14.
[11] Brady, Anne-Marie. 2012. "The Velvet Fist in a Velvet Glove. Political and Social Control in Contemporary China." In Anne-Marie Brady (ed.), *China's Thought Management*. New York: Routledge, 58.

support.[12] Since the early 1990s there has been a strong need to find something to bind Chinese society together and it is often thought that a unified national identity could serve that purpose. But how this new identity is defined and who can define it is an ongoing discussion. Some scholars such as David Shambaugh find that China is currently experiencing another national identity crisis because it possesses a number of competing identities.[13]

The idea that national identity influences foreign policy because it defines the parameters of what a polity considers as its national interests takes away some of the rationality often considered to describe state actors as national identities have emotional and even irrational qualities to them.[14] What makes this identification to one's nation so powerful and relevant for international relations is **national identification**, which is a psychological aspect of political integration and means in practice that if the population shares the same national identification, they can be mobilised to support certain external or domestic policies even if there are few visible rewards attached.[15] During Mao's time this identification was successfully used to motivate Chinese people to participate changing state projects. Today, the CCP aims to shape national identity to bind different layers of society together and to maintain its own legitimacy.[16] Despite acknowledging this top-down perspective of using nationalist sentiments for Party's political purposes three things are important to remember in this context. First, using nationalism to increase legitimacy is not a new phenomenon in the Chinese political context, nor is it especially Chinese. Second, the form of nationalism the Hu government promoted is not the only one there is. Different forms of nationalism have in turns dominated the discourse from the late Qing times to the present day and there are always alternatives even in authoritarian contexts such as China. Third, the mere existence of

[12] Law, Wing-Wah. 2006. "Citizenship, Citizenship Education, and the State in China in a Global Age." *Cambridge Journal of Education* 36 (4), 607.
[13] Shambaugh, David. 2011. "Coping with a Conflicted China." *Washington Quarterly* 34 (1), 7–27; Shambaugh 2013, 14.
[14] Prizel 1998, 14.
[15] Bloom, William. 1990. *Personal Identity, National Identity and International Relations*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
[16] This theme is discussed in chapter seven from the perspective of the patriotic education campaign.

nationalist government propaganda does not tell much about its reception at the grassroots level. Thus, to get a fuller picture of how nationalism is understood at different levels of society, we need to include analysis at the individual level into the research framework. In the next section I will further elaborate these points.

Top-down and Bottom-Up: National Identity Construction and Level of Analysis

If we wish to take human consciousness seriously in the context of foreign policy analysis it is necessary to think about how national identities are formulated. Any model of identity formation must include multiple levels of analysis.[17] More precisely we should think about the processes and factors affecting identity formation at the individual level. Analysis of identity structures is easier to operationalise at that level, in addition to which individuals are also the most important actors because groups do not have a common will: nations do not act, individuals as groups do.

As discussed in the literature review in the previous chapter, there are both researchers who find the top-down perspective as more important as those who emphasise the bottom-up level of identity formation. From the perspective of identity construction, the top-down approach often tacitly assumes that state actors exert strong influence on citizens and leaves less room for individual agency. The bottom up perspective emphasises agency at the individual level, as well as collective agency of actors at the grassroots level. Neither perspective alone provides a full picture, as naturally all identities are formed in the interaction of structural contextual elements and individual agency.

[17] Giddens, Anthony. 1984. *The Constitution of Society: Outline of the Theory of Structuration*. Cambridge: Polity Press; Onuf 1989.

Elements affecting national identity construction can be divided into factors at the collective level as well as at the individual level. In modern societies factors at the collective level relate largely to media and information and include issues such as how the media portrays one's nation, strengthens its national symbols and places it vis-à-vis other nations in the international system. Modern mass communication infrastructure has made exercising state's symbolic power more efficient and greatly increased the returns of scale of normative influence. This large-scale influence reduces the likelihood for militarized challenges to state rule and enhances societal stability.[18] In the Chinese context the content of media is also dependent on CCP's propaganda goals and censorship despite the process of media marketisation. In this thesis these two issues are discussed in more detail in chapter six. Finally, compulsory education transmits values related to the nation. I analyse one form of education, namely the patriotic education campaign in the seventh chapter.

At the individual level people's interests and capacity to process information direct their attention. This theme is discussed in chapter six in more detail, but still it is worth briefly describing the central association between exposure to messages and their reception. According to *exposure-acceptance model*, there is a curvilinear relation between attentiveness and persuasion power of the message transmitted, which means in practice that well-informed people are hard to persuade because they have strong prior views on issues and better ability to critically evaluate external messages. Poorly aware citizens for their part are hard to persuade because they do not pay attention to external messages such as the media. Thus, most likely to be persuaded are people who have some prior knowledge on the issue area in

[18] Warren, Camber. 2014. "Not by the Sword Alone: Soft Power, Mass Media, and the Production of State Sovereignty." *International Organization* 68 (1), 111–141.

question, but whose opinions have some flexibility.[19] Often the level of awareness can be linked with level of education.

The empirical part of my analysis studies identity construction at the individual level and treats formation of national identity as an empirical question. However, before going there it is important to describe the societal context in which the individual level identity construction takes place, in other words discuss the role nationalism plays in national identity construction. The national identity framework adopted in this thesis analyses nationalism both as an ideological component (nationalism as a political ideology) and as a sentimental or attitudinal component (nationalism as a value). I treat nationalism as a political ideology by discussing the ways CCP tries to influence national identity construction from above, and on the other hand as a value at the individual level.

Nationalism and State-Building

The Chinese government sees national identity, Chinese history and culture, and people's perceptions of these as security issues, which is why it feels the need to actively participate in the identity formation process. As Benedict Anderson famously phrased, a nation is an imagined community, meaning that people's connection with the collective have to be constructed to their imagination and nationalism is an ideology that serves this purpose.[20]

Nationalism has been an important political ideology in China during the whole 20th century, which is sometimes forgotten in the alarmist literature discussing how "new" Chinese nationalism will force Chinese foreign policy on a hard-line track. The top-down approach in which nationalism in contemporary China is seen mainly as a tool for the

[19] Converse, Philip. 1962. "Information Flow and the Stability of Partisan Attitudes." *Public Opinion Quarterly* 26 (4), 578–599. See also Zaller, John. 1992. *The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
[20] Anderson, Benedict. 1991. *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism*. London: Verso, 6.

Communist Party to maintain its legitimacy omits the contested nature of Chinese nationalism. Moreover, the current situation in which the CCP needs nationalism to legitimate its rule is a phase in a longer historical continuum. During the whole post-dynastic era, nationalism has been an important building block of state legitimacy.

Thus, to understand nationalism as a political ideology in the Hu Jintao period and beyond, it is worth noting the roots of nationalism in China. Knowing how the "Chinese nation" was formed is important because nation formation process describes a shift in political legitimacy and identity politics. In the China studies literature, Chinese transformation into modern nation-state is often described with the Culturalism-to-Nationalism Thesis.[21] Culturalism-to-Nationalism Thesis claims that Chinese empire was more durable than other pre-modern systems thanks to strong cultural identity serving as a uniting force. Before the nineteenth century it was mainly Chinese culture that held the empire together.[22] The Chinese felt traditionally no particular identification with the state: loyalty to the family and clan came first, locality second, and the state last.[23] Modernization introduced nationalism to China and China started to move towards an era of a new type of political organization. Culturalist dominance (Imperial China) was succeeded by a transition period (c. 1860–1919), after which nationalism formed the basis of political legitimacy (post–1919).[24]

[21] Both culturalism and ethnicity define the boundaries of community, but what differentiates culturalism from ethnicity is the assertion that Chinese values are superior but, significantly, not exclusive. People born outside the community could get admission if they were willing to accept Chinese values and traditions. Duara 2009, 101. However, culturalism as a term is problematic because it does not appear in standard dictionaries and seems little used outside the China field, which gives scholars the liberty to use it as they please. Townsend, James. 1996. "Chinese Nationalism." In Jonathan Unger (ed.), *Chinese Nationalism*. New York: M. E. Sharpe, 8.
[22] Zhao, Suisheng. 2000a. "Chinese Nationalism and Its International Orientations." *Political Science Quarterly* 115 (1), 4 and Fung, Edmund. 2000. "Chinese Nationalism in the Twentieth Century." In Colin Mackerras (ed.), *Eastern Asia. An Introductory History*. New South Wales: Longman.
[23] Fung 2000, 141; Ferguson, Yale and Richard Mansbach. 1996. "The Past as Prelude to the Future? Identities and Loyalties in Global Politics." In Yosef Lapid and Friedrich Kratochwil (eds.), *The Return of Culture and Identity in IR Theory*. London: Lynne Rienner, 25.
[24] Townsend 1996, 11. Townsend bases his arguments on significant parts of writings of Joseph Levenson and James Harrison.

In modern China, identity politics became the core of societal security and the need to control information was raised at a totally new level. In Imperial China elite was the main focus of control and its identification with the desired values was achieved through schooling, which was not available for the masses.[25] Mass organizations, mass education and mass media came only during Communist rule that penetrated all levels of society from cities to the smallest villages. In order to maintain a sufficient inner stability, the modern Chinese state had to control not only the elite but the whole people as well. Loyalty to the state had to be turned into popular support. The ruling elite needed to define a national identity as means to regenerate a strong and unified state and nationalism emerged as part of new state formation.[26]

According to James Townsend, the "rising tide" of nationalism was a constant factor in China's revolutionary era and during Mao's time nationalism was a factor that kept people loyal to the state.[27] In other words, "the very essence of the legitimacy of the communist state was not Marxism but nationalism."[28] Naturally the content of state-led nationalism has evolved during different historical periods and one crucial factor has been the amount of emphasis laid on communist ideology. Between 1949 and 1976 the communist revolution in all its evolving forms was the main legitimating project of the Party-state.[29] During the period of Reform and Opening Up, communist ideology was placed more in the background and economic growth became the functional legitimation instead of continuously

[25] Stockman, Norman. 2003. *Understanding Chinese Society*. Cambridge: Polity Press and Blackwell Publishing, 149–153.
[26] Fitzgerald, John. 1995. "The Nationless State: The Search for a Nation in Modern Chinese Nationalism." *The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs* 33, 75–104.
[27] Townsend 1996. See also Zhu, Tianbao. 2001. "Nationalism and Chinese Foreign Policy." *The China Review* 1 (1), 1–27.
[28] Zhao, Suisheng. 2004a. *A Nation-State by Construction: Dynamics of Modern Chinese Nationalism*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 209.
[29] Brady 2012, 184.

changing ideology-driven campaigns.[30] "Socialism with Chinese characteristics" was not a sufficient basis of legitimacy –not even when combined with economic growth. Going on after Mao was not easy in the circumstances where more and more socialist countries ceased to exist in the aftermath of the Cold War. To avoid basing its legitimacy solely on economic development and other performance related criteria, the Party has had to search for means to broaden its legitimacy base. Especially after Tiananmen protests (1989) nationalism has been strongly involved in the state-society legitimacy dynamics and the Party has adjusted its rhetoric and behaviour to be better in tune with popular interests.[31]

Despite the intensifying government measures to spread its message and to control information flows, it has never had a complete monopoly over defining nationalism. Suisheng Zhao divides the main forms of Chinese nationalism into three types: nativist, antitraditionalist and pragmatist.[32] Despite their differences regarding means, all the forms of nationalism are based on the same goal of restoring China's national greatness and establishing a politically, economically and culturally united nation-state.[33] The main aims of nativist nationalism are the restoration of traditional Confucian values and the avoidance of foreign influences, and historically it refers to the ethnic (even xenophobic) strain of nationalism opposing imperialism and Manchu rule during the Qing dynasty. During the Boxer Rebellion in 1900 and the Cultural Revolution in the late 1960s nativist nationalism was predominant. Antitraditionalism holds that traditional culture is the reason for China's weakness and that the country should abandon traditional culture and adopt foreign development models in order to gain back the lost national strength. The May Fourth Movement in 1919 represents a typical era of antitraditionalism. Pragmatism sees foreign

[30] Burton, Charles. 2008. "The 'Beijing Consensus' and China's Quest for Legitimacy in the International Stage." In André Laliberté and Marc Lanteigne (eds.), *The Chinese Party-State in the 21st Century. Adaptation and the Reinvention of Legitimacy*. London: Routledge, 146–161.
[31] Gries, Peter. 2005c. "Chinese Nationalism: Challenging the State?" *Current History* 104, 251–256.
[32] In his book from 2004(a), Zhao Suisheng calls these types liberal nationalism, ethnic nationalism and state nationalism, which I interpret as an effort to unify China-specific terminology with the general terminology used in nationalism related research.
[33] Zhao Suisheng 2000a.

economic exploitation and cultural infiltration as problems and encourages further societal modernization in China. For example the self-strengthening Movement in 1861–1895 and post-Mao reforms in the late 1980s can be seen as demonstrations of pragmatism.[34]

In the reform era, patriotism has been emphasised in many official political documents such as the Constitution of People's Republic of China, which states in its 24th article that "the state advocates the civic virtues of love for the motherland, for the people, for labour, for science and for socialism; it educates the people in patriotism, collectivism, internationalism and communism and in dialectical and historical materialism."[35] Hu Jintao has emphasised patriotism in many of his speeches during different times of his reign. For example in 2005 Hu spoke at a gathering to commemorate the 60th anniversary of the victory of the Chinese People's War Against Japanese Aggression and stated "We must carry forward our national spirit with patriotism at its core so as to provide powerful spiritual support to the Chinese people --- to make concerted efforts for a prosperous and strong China."[36] In 2006 patriotism was defined as one of the core values of the so-called socialist core values system.[37] Also in 2012, Hu Jintao's report to the 18th CPC National Congress defines patriotism as a core socialist value that unites China. Under the heading "Strengthen core socialist values" Hu states: "We should vigorously foster China's national character and promote the underlying trend of the times, intensify education in patriotism, collectivism and socialism, and enrich people's cultural life and enhance their moral strength."[38]

In its current emphasis the Party wishes to have a monopoly of defining what is patriotic and what is not. This is evident for example from the documents on patriotic

[34] Zhao Suisheng 2004a.
[35] Chinese government. 1982. The Constitution of the People's Republic of China, adopted on December 4, 1982. http://english.gov.cn/2005-08/05/content_20813.htm. Accessed 25 January 2014.
[36] People's Daily Online. "Hu Jintao Calls for Unity of Chinese Nation," 3 September 2005, http://english.people.com.cn/200509/03/eng20050903_206345.html. Accessed 12.4.2013.
[37] Chinese government. 2006. "New Moral Yardstick: '8 honors, 8 disgraces'," 5 April 2006, http://english.gov.cn/2006-04/05/content_245361.htm. Accessed 9 December 2013.
[38] Hu, Jintao. 2012. "Report of Hu Jintao to the 18th CPC National Congress," 16 November 2012, http://www.china.org.cn/china/18th_cpc_congress/2012-11/16/content_27137540_6.htm. Accessed 6 December 2012.

education, in which it is emphasised that "patriotism is essentially identical to socialism."[39] As the regime knows that nationalist ideology can be used for various purposes, it has made a distinction between god and bad patriotism. Today, the Communist party of China has a negative view of the concept *minzuzhuyi* (民族主义), "nationalism" (or *xia'ai minzu zhuyi,* 狭隘民族主义 "narrow nationalism"), because it is linked with ethnic nationalism and the possible separatist movements among Chinese minorities. *Aiguozhuyi* (爱国主义), patriotism, which literally means "loving the state/country" is a more favourable term for the CCP, and is often interpreted as an uncritical devotion not only to the state and its institutions, but also to the leadership of the CCP.[40] In other words, patriotism as a Chinese word has connotations that make it almost indistinguishable from the Chinese state.[41] This distinction can be found already from Zhou Enlai's writings from the early 1950s.[42]

By making an equals sign with the Party and the nation, the regime tries to make criticism of the Party an "unpatriotic act."[43] According to some observes marrying patriotism Marxist terminology and nationalist rhetoric is not simple. State-centric nationalism and the language of Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought requires Chinese leaders to place the Party at the centre of nationalist sentiments, which according to Ian Seckington is a "restrictive interpretation vulnerable to criticism."[44] Although the Party has used nationalism as part of its legitimacy since its establishment, at least two things make the post-Tiananmen and Hu Jintao's eras different from the previous times. The level of public awareness on

[39] Central Committee of the Communist Party of China. 2006 (23 August 1994). "Aiguozhuyi jiaoyu shishi gangyao" (Action Plan for Patriotic Education). *Chinese Education and Society* 39 (2), 7–8.
[40] Yahuda, Michael. 2000. "The Changing Faces of Chinese Nationalism. The Dimensions of Statehood." In Michael Leifer (ed.), *Asian Nationalism*. London: Routledge, 27–34; He, Yinan. 2007. "Remembering and Forgetting the War. Elite Mythmaking, Mass Reaction, and Sino-Japanese Relations, 1950-2006." *History and Memory* 19 (2), 56.
[41] Zhao Suisheng 2004a, 31.
[42] Zhou, Enlai. 1990. "Women de waijiao fangzhen he renwu" (Our Diplomatic Guidelines and Tasks, 1952). In *Zhou Enlai waijiao wenxuan (Selected Articles on Diplomacy by Zhou Enlai)*. Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 55. As cited in Chen, Zhimin. 2005. "Nationalism, Internationalism and Chinese Foreign Policy." *Journal of Contemporary China*, 14 (42), 41.
[43] Zhao Suisheng 2000a, 20.
[44] Seckington, Ian. 2005. "Nationalism, Ideology and China's 'Fourth Generation' Leadership." *Journal of Contemporary China* 14 (42), 25 (22–33).

international issues is much higher than before due to globalisation and media reforms and the leadership style has changed from "strong man politics" into collective leadership, which makes it more challenging for the current leadership to use nationalism for political purposes.

While government's position since the 1980s may be described as pragmatic – always defining "patriotic acts" as those supporting government's stance and state interests in any given moment, popular forms of nationalism are diverse and sometimes contending with the official discourse of patriotism.[45] In the 1990s Chinese intellectuals became a driving force in the so-called first wave of popular nationalism, which was anti-American.[46] The second wave focuses on Japan and is largely Internet-based. Internet nationalism (*wangluo minzuzhuyi,* 网络民族主义) has been seen as more influential than the first wave, because it has been able to better convert popular opinion into political action. Internet petitions in 2003 and 2004 related to among other rail contacts and mustard gas drums left by the Japanese occupation demonstrated that well over a million Chinese netizens participate in new internet nationalism.[47] Popular forms of nationalism can be critical towards state-nationalism and in the 1990s and 2000s they have asked for stronger actions against the US and Japan and claimed that the government policies are too weak.[48] In this context it is important to remember, however, that most of what is written online never leads to any action. In some ways nationalist discourse in China has become a channel for different actors to advance their personal and group interests and gain more influence through participating in the discourse on nationalism. Simon Shen sees much of nationalist rhetoric as a coded way of directing dissent

[45] Chen 2005, 50.
[46] Zhao, Suisheng. 1997. "Chinese Intellectuals' Quest for National Greatness and Nationalistic Writing in the 1990s." *China Quarterly* 152 (4), 725. According to Peter Gries, events like the US involvement in the 1996 Taiwan Strait crisis, the 1999 bombing of Chinese embassy in Belgrade, and the 2001 spy plane collision were sources of protest in the first wave nationalism. However, the division between the first and the second wave is not clear-cut.
[47] Gries, Peter H.. 2005b. "China's 'New Thinking' on Japan." *The China Quarterly* 184 (4), 831–850. For a more recent analysis of Internet nationalism, see Shen, Simon and Shaun Breslin. 2010. *Online Chinese Nationalism and China's Bilateral Relations*. Plymouth: Lexington Books.
[48] Gries, Peter. 2004. "Popular Nationalism and State Legitimation in China." In Peter H. Gries and Stanley Rosen (eds.), *State and Society in 21st Century China. Crisis, Contention and Legitimation*. New York: Routledge, 182; Gries 2005c, 251–256.

at the Chinese state itself and finds that the possibility to participate in the nationalist discourse can, counterintuitively, have a stabilizing function regarding China's domestic context.[49]

Defining National Identity for Empirical Research

After discussing the top-down perspective of how the Party promotes its version of national attachment, it is time to move on to the question of how to empirically analyse national identity in the foreign policy context in a way that takes into account identity construction at the individual level. Analysing national identity and using it in the context of understanding foreign policy formulation is not an easy task. There is an abundance of definitions of national identity, but many of them offer little help for empirical analysis. The use of vague language made Rogers Brubaker and Frederick Cooper to argue that it is time to let go of the concept of identity altogether, as according to Brubaker and Cooper, it obscures more than reveals.[50] Difficulties of defining national identity relate partly to some common disagreements among scholars researching various types of collective identities. As there is no agreement of the nature of national identity, what it is identity is supposed to do, it is hard to define it in such a way that would suit most scholars.

Holding a particular identity does not necessarily translate into acting in a certain way because of it. In addition, mutually constitutive nature of agents and structures combined with slow evolution of national identities do not make identities an easy subject of inquiry. There has been debate about whether identity research should be able to demonstrate

[49] Shen, Simon. 2007. *Redefining Nationalism in Modern China. Sino-American Relations and the Emergence of Chinese Public Opinion in the 21st Century*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2.
[50] Brubaker, Rogers and Frederick Cooper. 2000. "Beyond Identity." *Theory and Society* 29 (1), 1–47.

more precisely how identity directs action.[51] Constructivists with a more positivist research orientation have attempted to respond to this critique. One recent initiative to measure identity and treat it as an independent variable is the Harvard Identity Project, which led to publishing an edited volume *Measuring Identity: A Guide for Social Scientists* in 2009.[52] On the other hand, many especially critical constructivists strongly disagree that causal links between a certain identity and action can be made because of the constitutive nature of ideas. For example Yosef Lapid finds that the "variable-approach" as applied to culture and identity has been disappointing.[53]

Regarding national identity research, the positivist post-positivist division may suffer from exaggeration of differences as regarding empirical studies, there is more overlap between epistemological positions than might be expected. Too often the need to identify a "gap in existing research" in academic publishing leads to emphasising differences and lacks rather than similarities. As Audie Klotz and Cecelia Lynch have explained, all constructivist researchers engage in interpretation as the basic staring point of constructivism is the mutual constitution of structures and agency which leads to rejection of existence of objective facts from the concepts that give them meaning. The constructivist epistemological spectrum varies from positivist end in which these meanings are treated as more or less stable, to the post-positivist end in which no essential properties are attached to social facts. According to Klotz and Lynch the (in)stability of intersubjective understandings should be treated as an empirical question rather than presuming supremacy of either end of the epistemological spectrum.[54] As the first part of chapter three will show, there is evidence suggesting that contemporary

[51] Goldstein, Judith and Robert O. Keohane. 1993. *Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change*. New York: Cornell University Press, 6.
[52] "Throughout this volume, most of the authors treat identity as an independent variable, a factor to be measured and examined for its impact on other important variables and outcomes." Abdelal, Rawi, Yoshiko Herrera, Alastair Ian Johnston, and Rose McDermott. 2009. "Introduction." In Abdelal, Rawi, Yoshiko Herrera, Alastair Ian Johnston, and Rose McDermott (eds.), *Measuring Identity: A Guide for Social Scientists*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 3.
[53] Lapid 1996, 10.
[54] Klotz, Audie and Cecelia Lynch. 2007. *Strategies for Research in Constructivist International Relations*. New York: M.E. Sharpe, 11–14.

Chinese national identity has elements that can be regarded as stable and important enough to impact Chinese foreign policy making. These components relate broadly to the dichotomy of China's rise and on the other hand of its victim mentality in the foreign policy context.

To answer the research questions posed in the introductory chapter, national identity has to be defined as carefully and precisely as possible. We need a notion of national identity that is distinguishable from other variables and captures what national identity is supposed to do, that is, defines the relationship between identity and behaviour.[55] To meet these definitional criteria, I start by defining national identity through its social nature and content. This content has been formed and is constantly reformed in a process, which can be studied and the evolution of national identity traced. The rest of the space before introducing methods and sources is dedicated to defining the relationship between identity and behaviour and more specifically defining the linkage between core values deriving from identities and attitudes leading to action.

Content of national identity

National identities are *social* and shared identities among those who feel they belong to the same nation. Identity defines the relationship between entities in a manner that asserts a certain degree of sameness.[56] The idea of "community of sentiment" or "imagined community" is central in the definition of national identity, thus the first part of the definition

[55] Iain Johnston has used similar criteria to define strategic culture. Johnston, Alastair Iain. 1995. *Cultural Realism. Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 35–36.
[56] Wodak, Ruth, Rudolf de Cillia, Martin Reisigl, and Karin Liebhart. 2009. *The Discursive Construction of National Identity*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 11.

of national identity utilised emphasises the *belief* of belonging to the same group.[57] Montserrat Guibernau defines national identity as "*a collective sentiment based upon the belief of belonging to the same nation and sharing most of the attributes that make it distinct from other nations.*"[58]

The second part of the definition links nation and state. *National identity is the relationship between nation and state that obtains when the people of that nation identify with the state.*[59] But this identification to state is *socially constructed*. To create the nexus between the nation with which people identify, and the state, politics often play an important role. The way the content of national identity is presented in the official sphere including the education system and the media frames people's perceptions.

In more practical terms, factors increasing in-group identification include cultural, territorial and historical issues as well as shared values and norms. *Cultural factors* such as common myths play an important role in national identity.[60] *Constitutive norms* refer to the formal and informal rules that define group membership. National identities are linked with a certain *territorial* space or homeland, though a part of the population might have only a vague idea of some parts of their nation and gain knowledge on territorial issues only through media and education.[61] Identities also have a *temporal* aspect to them. The emergence of national identities is a historically located phenomenon, thus the contemporary forms of national identities should not be treated without acknowledging their historical roots. Temporal aspect of national identity highlights its changing character and continuity over

[57] This definition is similar to Max Weber's definition of ethnic group. Weber defines ethnic groups as "those human groups that entertain a subjective belief in their common descent." Weber, Max. 1978. *Economy and Society*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 389. See also Anderson 1991.
[58] Guibernau, Montserrat. 2007. *The Identity of Nations*. Cambridge: Polity Press, 11.
[59] Dittmer and Kim 1993, 13.
[60] Smith, Anthony. 1998. *Nationalism and Modernism: a Critical Survey of Recent Theories of Nations and Nationalism*. London: Routledge; Smith, Anthony. 2009. *Ethno-symbolism and Nationalism: a Cultural Approach.* London: Routledge.
[61] Guibernau 2007, 21.

time, as well as importance of historical roots.[62] History or at least certain important events are often highlighted in the national narratives. National identity also has a future orientation, so it does not only refer to the past.[63] Members of a nation are connected by *common goals* such as increasing national wealth, obtaining symbolic recognition or increasing influence in the international community.

Identity and action

How does shared identification to nation shape behaviour? My attempt to define the complex relationship between national identity and action emphasises three separate factors: multi-causal explanation or INUS causation as a general approach in dealing with complex issues such as human behaviour, the nature of "othering" and the importance of separating cognitive and affective dimensions of national identity. Regarding the debate on whether one should even mention causation in relation to national identity research, I wish to state that I recognise the constitutive nature of ideas and mutual construction of structures and agents, that is to say that ideational factors such as national identity are "built in" both structures and agents which has holistic consequences. Treating national identity as a whole as an independent variable often risks oversimplification of reality. Identities do not translate into action directly, and although they matter, they can seldom be regarded as the only causes for actions. Actors' worldviews affect everything they do and in practice it may often be hard to operationalise all the possible mechanisms that are in effect at the same time. On the other hand national identity is visible and more easily measurable in values and attitudes that derive from it, which allows the use of attitudinal research tools. By studying the construction of values and

[62] Guibernau, Montserrat. 1996. *Nationalisms*. *The Nation-state and Nationalism in the Twentieth Century*. Cambridge: Polity Press, 131; Guibernau 2007, 10.
[63] Wodak et al. 2009, 26. Guibernau 2007, 10.

attitudes related to national identity, we can discover structures of attitudes and find out associations between different clusters of attitudes, which can bring us closer to understanding the links between identity and action.

From a practical perspective, operationalisation of national identity as a whole to show causal effects is often impossible because explaining human behaviour is very complex. Here, I find John Mackie's idea that effects have typically multiple causes useful. National identity can be defined as an INUS cause, which refers to a cause that is neither individually necessary nor individually sufficient for an outcome, but together with other INUS causes can explain the end result.[64] An often-used illustration of INUS causation is the idea that a house can burn down for various reasons, including a combination of short circuit and wooden framing. But also other combinations of different causes can produce the same end result.

When looking at those processes related national identity that can be operationalised, it is important to note the INUS causal nature of national identity, that is that there are often also other causes that need to be taken into account when explaining behaviour. For the final behavioural outcome, it is the combination of causes that matters. However, even when the dominant national identity may be only one of the causes for China's foreign policy in a given situation, it is nonetheless important to understand how it matters both in terms of degree and direction. In addition, an estimation of how changing material conditions in a given society may affect national identity's influence is important for grasping the complexity of societal dynamics potentially influencing foreign policy. There may be factors that strengthen or weaken the effect of dominant national identity components such as those of nationalism and patriotism, which can be defined as the most foreign policy relevant core values in China. These other elements include various things of different kind such as the role of the media, content of education and organisational diversification of the

[64] Mackie, John. 1980. *The Cement of the Universe: A Study of Causation*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

foreign policy making structure, which will be discussed in the methods section as well as in the empirical chapters.

Another important aspect of national identity with behavioural implications is "othering." National identity defines the limits of in-group and out-group and thus, includes *relational comparisons*. Identities are ontologically dependent on the existence of other identities and identity involves the creation of boundaries that separate self from the other.[65] This boundary drawing brings in the international perspective, as national identities are not pre-social but constructed in the international reality in relation to other national identities, and the international system of nation-states is the precondition of the existence of any national identity.[66] In national identity formation there are necessarily multiple "others" with which the "self" or "selves" are in constant interaction. Some "others" may be more important at times, and the importance may vary according to issue areas.

Although there may be a general tendency to see one's in-group in more positive terms than the out-groups, Peter Gries has rightly pointed out that "othering" does not have to be done in negative terms. In-group identification leads invariably to positive evaluation of the in-group, but it does not inexorably lead to intergroup competition, let alone conflict.[67] Still, as certain amount of in-group cohesion is necessary for a functioning society and especially for social mobilisation, there is a risk that out-groups are slandered in order to increase in-group cohesion when it is otherwise hard to acquire. According to David Campbell, intensity of discourses on danger and threats increases when the cohesion and

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[65] Neumann, Iver B.. 1996. "Self and Other in International Relations." *European Journal of International Relations* 2 (2), 139–174; Citrin, Jack and David O. Sears. 2009. "Balancing National and Ethnic Identities." In Abdelal et al. (eds.), *Measuring Identity*: *A Guide for Social Scientists*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 147–150; Abdelal, Rawi, Yoshiko M. Herrera, Alastair Iain Johnston, and Rose McDermott. 2009. "Identity as a Variable." In Abdelal et al. (eds.) 2009, 19, 23–24.; Billig 1995, 61; Wodak et al. 2009, 2; Guibernau 2007, 11; Woodwell, Douglas. 2007. *Nationalism in International Relations*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 13.
[66] Giddens, Anthony. 1987. *Social Theory and Modern Sociology*. Cambridge: Polity Press, 171; Wendt 1999.
[67] Gries, Peter H.. 2005a. "Social Psychology of the Identity Conflict Debate: Is a 'China Threat' Inevitable?" *European Journal of International Relations* 11 (2), 239; Billet, Jaak, Bart Maddens, and Roeland Beerten. 2003. "National Identity and Attitude Toward Foreigners in a Multinational State: A Replication." *Political Psychology* 24 (2), 242.

clarity of identity decreases.[68] This brings in the need to study threat perceptions and style of "othering."

Finally, for defining national identities and their behavioural implications, it is necessary to distinguish among the *cognitive and affective dimensions* of national identity. In the words of Jack Citrin and David Sears, "the act of self-categorisation answers the cognitive, who am I? question, but the emotional significance of a social identity varies."[69] This idea is in line with social identity theory (SIT) and the concept of *salience of identities*: "When a social identity is salient, group identity becomes part of the self and becomes represented in the individual's self-concept…. To the extent we associate with a certain group, we gain 'collective self-esteem' from that group's accomplishments."[70] In other words, motivational impact of national identity depends on how important this identity is for its beholder.

To sum up, national identity consists of elements that define its content and relation with other national identities. From behavioural perspective, national identities function in at least two ways. First, they shape worldviews and perceptions and frame acceptable foreign policy behaviour. Second, the nature of othering in combination with the strength of affective attachment to one's nation defines national identity's impact on behaviour. This research studies both the content and structures of national identity by analysing dominant discourses in the foreign policy and elite contexts as well as by looking at the individual level how the core elements of national identity are linked with attitudes. Deriving from my starting point of seeing behaviour as a function of perception, I have operationalised national identity and its possible behavioural implications through values and attitudes. Figure one describes these relations. In the next section, I define in more detail how core values deriving from national identity are linked with attitudes on foreign policy.

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[68] Campbell 1998, 70.
[69] Citrin and Sears 2009, 147.
[70] Gries, Peter H., 2001. "Tears of Rage: Chinese Nationalist Reactions to the Belgrade Embassy Bombing." *The China Journal* 2 (46), 34; Wendt 1999, 230.

Figure 2.1. Linking identity and behaviour.



Core Values, Knowledge and Foreign Policy Preferences

Social cognition theories state that people have needs for understanding and perceptual order and will spontaneously develop perceptions and cognitions to simplify their complex environment.[71] Social psychological theories about values argue that core values are important determinants of subsequent political orientations and behaviour.[72] They also theorise that values are organised as value structures based on individual's perceived salience of values.[73] Although scarce, some empirical studies have shown that individual's general value choices have direct relevance for understanding their issue attitudes.[74]

Core values approach can be traced back to Milton Rokeach's work from the early 1970s, in which he divided values into two categories: instrumental values concerning

[71] Sears, David, Leonie Huddy and Robert Jervis. 2003. "The Psychologies Underlying Political Psychology." In Sears, David, Leonie Huddy and Robert Jervis (eds.) *Oxford Handbook of Political Psychology*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 7. See also Fiske, Susan and Shelley Taylor. 1991. *Social Cognition*. New York: McGraw-Hill.
[72] Feldman, Stanley. 2003. "Values, Ideology and the Structure of Political Attitudes." In David Sears, Leonie Huddy, and Robert Jervis (eds.), *Oxford Handbook of Political Psychology*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 477–508.
[73] Rokeach, Milton. 1973. *The Nature of Human Values*. New York: The Free Press; Schwartz, Shalom. 1992. "Universals in the Content and Structure of Values: Theoretical Advances and Empirical Tests in 20 Countries." *Advances in Experimental Social Psychology* 25 (1), 1–65.
[74] Jacoby, William. 2006. "Value Choices and American Public Opinion." *American Journal of Political Science* 50 (3), 721.

desirable modes of conduct and terminal values on desirable end-states of existence.[75] Core values approach defines a set of poles around which opinions might be based, but the list of potential core values is enormous. Thus, in studies linking core values and specific attitudes, it is necessary to define which core values matter most in the issue area under scrutiny.[76]

In the context of understanding links between values and foreign policy attitudes, John Hurwitz and Mark Peffley developed a hierarchical model of foreign policy belief systems in 1987. According to this model, general foreign policy core values such as patriotism constrain more general foreign policy beliefs such as postures and images of other nations, which constrain attitudes toward specific foreign policies.[77] In addition to the United States, the model was tested also in Costa Rica with the conclusion that general beliefs and core values constrained foreign policy attitudes –although the constraining foreign policy postures were different from those relevant in the United States.[78]

However, attitude formation is a complex process and core values are not the only factors that have influence on issue specific attitudes. Michael Alvarez and John Brehm propose an approach, which takes account both the influence core values have on constraining attitudes as well as the effect knowledge and attentiveness on certain types of information have on attitude formation. Thus, they acknowledge Philip Converse's critique on the approach concentrating solely on values, as without a necessary level of issue specific knowledge, respondents who can specify the values most important to them can still have non-attitudes on issues they have no knowledge about.[79] In short, the basic idea behind this

[75] Rokeach 1973.
[76] Alvarez, Michael and John Brehm. 2002. *Hard Choices, Easy Answers. Values, Information, and American Public Opinion.* Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1–12.
[77] Hurwitz, John and Mark Peffley. 1987. "How Are Foreign Policy Attitudes Structured? A Hierarchical Model?" *The American Political Science Review* 81 (4), 1099–1120. See also Hurwitz, John and Mark Peffley. 1990. "Public Images of the Soviet Union: The Impact on Foreign Policy Attitudes." *The Journal of Politics* 52 (1), 3–18.
[78] Hurwitz, John and Mark Peffley. 1993. "Foreign Policy Belief Systems in Comparative Perspective: The United States and Costa Rica." *International Studies Quarterly* 37 (3), 245–270.
[79] Alvarez, Michael and John Brehm. 2002. *Hard Choices, Easy Answers. Values, Information, and American Public Opinion.* Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1–12.

approach is that people attach importance to certain issue specific attitudes because the links these issues have with their core values. Still, there needs to be a certain level of issue specific knowledge to make these links with values in the first place. People can gain issue specific knowledge via many means, perhaps the most important sources being educational institutions and the media. My operationalisation of national identity dynamics and their relationship with foreign policy preferences takes into account both the constraining effect of core values as well as factors related to issue attentiveness such as level of education and media consumption.

Nationalism and patriotism: core values in attitudinal research

The strong emphasis on history makes nationalism and patriotism especially important values in the Chinese context.[80] Nationalism and patriotism as part of Chinese national identity represent core values most relevant in the foreign policy context. Deriving from the ideas presented above that from a behavioural perspective it is important to separate affective elements and the style of othering, I claim that most things discussed in the China studies literature and in the wider "China's rise" discourse as "nationalism" can be analytically separated into at least two components, each with different foreign policy relevant correlates. In this thesis I emphasise the analytical distinction of national attachment, which includes only feelings toward one's country and such attachment, which compares one's country and nation to other countries and sees one's own country almost always superior than others. I call the first type of attachment "**patriotism**," feeling of pride in one's country and emotional attachment to it and the second type as "**nationalism**," an attitude according to which one's

[80] This theme is discussed in more detail in Chapter Seven.

country is better than other countries with uncritical support of its actions.[81] This categorization is commonly used in national identity related research.[82] In addition to these attitudinal components, nationalism and patriotism include value judgements. Patriotism is a value, because it implies that it is good, moral and important to feel close to one's nation, whereas nationalism's chauvinistic undertone may be used to justify aggressive actions against others.

In the China context this distinction is especially important to make. Treating Chinese national attachment as a monolithic entity easily leads into misleading conclusions. Many studies seem to straightforwardly assume that strong attachment to the in-group necessarily implies negative feelings towards out-groups. The reality is more complicated than that, which will be shown in my empirical chapters. Pride in one's country should not result in classifying anyone as "nationalist," and it should also be recognized that people who are proud of their country can also be ashamed of their country at the same time. People are capable of integrating both positive and negative feelings on the same subject so national pride and its implications especially in the context of othering should not be simplified too much.[83] In the Chinese national identity, themes of national humiliation and pride are both

[81] In Chapter Five I analyse the type of attachment to China and its relation to foreign policy preferences, which will further clarify this point.
[82] Herrmann, Richard; Pierangelo Isernia and Paolo Segatti. 2009. "Attachment to the Nation and International Relations: Dimensions of Identity and Their Relationship to War and Peace." *Political Psychology* 30 (5), 721–754.
[83] I want to make this point explicit because some models of national pride assume that pride and shame are mutually exclusive. For example, Dekker, Malová, and Hoogendoorn have made a hierarchical conceptualization of national attitudes and state that "if there is an absence of positive national attitudes, negative national attitudes can be found." This might be true in some cases, but observing positive attitudes toward one's nation does not mean negative attitudes are automatically nonexistent. Particularly in China's case it seems likely that people are proud of such elements as China's ancient cultural heritage and recent economic development, but simultaneously ashamed of backwardness in other sectors. In the national humiliation discourse feelings of shame actually make nationalism stronger. Dekker, Henk, Darina Malová, and Sander Hoogendoorn. 2003. "Nationalism and Its Explanations." *Political Psychology* 24 (2), 346.

present, and poor domestic governance and domestic vulnerability are seen at least partly as reasons for the "century of national humiliation."[84]

Methods and Sources

As stated above, the starting point of my analysis is that behaviour is a function of perception in combination with other factors and I analyse foreign policy relevant national identity content mainly through perceptions and attitude structures. In the limits my relatively short timeframe of 2002-2012 allows, I evaluate also the possible changes that have happened regarding these perceptions and attitudes.

In the introductory chapter I briefly described the three domestic groups—academics in the field of international relations, students at elite universities and public opinion more widely—which I intend to look at more closely in addition to the state level. These groups from different levels of society can be categorised to represent different levels of analysis of national identity formation. Each of the levels of analysis and the chapter dealing with the level in question focuses on some aspects of identity construction, which I have indicated below. Moreover, it is important to specify the angle from which I look at identity construction at each level. Within the limits defined above regarding the connections between identity and action, identity can be treated as an independent or dependent variable. To get a fuller picture of the process of identity construction, this research approaches national identity from both angles. At the state and elite levels identity is examined mainly as a dependent variable, as the CCP and scholars aim to define who China is. Naturally, national identity construction builds on existing content with historical roots, but state and elite actors

[84] Callahan, William. 2010. *China. The Pessoptimist Nation*. Oxford: Oxford University Press; Nathan, Andrew and Robert Ross. 1997. *The Great Wall and the Empty Fortress*. *China's Search for Security.* New York: Norton, 34.

can have power to emphasise or strengthen certain elements. At the individual level (public and student opinion), identity is treated as an independent variable, a factor to be examined for its impact on other important variables or outcomes. At this level my analysis concentrates on defining how adoption of a certain type of national identity affects perceptions on foreign policy issues.

To analyse the role of foreign policy context shapers in constructing Chinese national identity and the set of connections between actors at different levels, I use a mixed methods approach combining qualitative and quantitative elements. Quantitative and qualitative traditions have different approaches to scientific explanation, but these traditions can be seen as complementary rather than exclusionary.[85] Mixed methods research can help to answer questions that cannot be answered by qualitative or quantitative research alone, and complex identity dynamics tend to form such kind of questions.[86] Moreover, mixed methods design triangulates research material, which helps to increase the reliability and validity of results because each method to investigate identity has its own strengths and weaknesses, which are usually different from other methods.

In the introductory chapter I explained briefly why the domestic groups I concentrate on matter in understanding the wider context of foreign policy making. Next I explain how they matter regarding the foreign policy making context and how they shape national identity and are affected by it. I present also sources that are used to study each group and explain why these sources have been chosen.

[85] Mahoney, James and Gary Goertz. 2006. "A Tale of Two Cultures: Contrasting Quantitative and Qualitative Research." *Political Analysis* 14 (3), 227–249.
[86] Creswell, John and Vicky Plano Clark. 2007. *Designing and Conducting Mixed Methods Research*. London: Sage, 9.

State level: Party state

Although the main focus of the thesis lies on the foreign policy context shapers, the governmental perspective cannot be ignored either as the government has the power to execute foreign policy. By "state," I mean an organizational actor "possessing sovereignty and a territorial monopoly on the legitimate use of organized violence," in the Weberian sense.[87] In the Chinese case it is important to note the close connection between the CCP and the state, as the state cannot be analysed without the Party component. Naturally the state is not a unitary actor either, but given the relatively centralised characteristics of the Chinese foreign policy decision-making process, focusing on the top leadership of the state who usually have the final say over decision-making as well as the Foreign Ministry is justified.[88]

The institutional actors with foreign policy making capacities defined by state and governmental structures include CCP's Politburo and especially its Standing Committee, the Central Committee Foreign Affairs Leading Small Group (FALSG), the Central Committee Foreign Affairs Office, the CCP International Department, the State Council ministries closely related to foreign affairs, and the People's Liberation Army (PLA). These are institutionally the main players defining China's foreign policies. From these institutions, Politburo's Standing Committee (PSC) and FALSG have most power. PSC is the ultimate foreign policy decision-making body, and it is believed to meet every 7 to 10 days. PSC's or FALSG's agenda's are not public and even FALSG's memberships are not publicised, although sometimes official media mentions leaders in connection with their FALSG activities.[89] Linda Jakobson and Dean Knox argue that because none of the nine members of

[87] Weber, Max. 1947. *The Theory of Social and Economic Organization.* New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 154.
[88] Lu, Ning. 1997. *The Dynamics of Foreign Policy Decisionmaking in China*. Boulder: Westview Press.
[89] Jakobson, Linda and Dean Knox. 2010. "New Foreign Policy Actors in China." *SIPRI Policy Paper* 26, 4–5; Hui, Sylvia. 2011. "Engaging an Emerging Superpower: Understanding China as a Foreign Policy Actor." Chatham House: Asia Programme Paper ASP 2011/05.

the Standing Committee between 2007 and 2012 had an exclusive foreign policy portfolio, it gave more opportunities to other actors to try influencing PSC members (Table 2.1.).[90] According to Susan Lawrence's interviews conducted in April 2011, the members of FALSG may have not met at all between 2009 and 2011. If this is true, it may indicate that PSC leaders have felt they can manage without FALSG's policy recommendations or get the recommendations from somewhere else.[91]

Table 2.1. Members of the Politburo Standing Committee between 2003-2012.[92]

Members of the Politburo Standing Committee elected in the 16th Party Congress (rank order) Members whose name is followed by an asterisk did not continue in their posts after the 17th Party Congress		
Name	Province of origin	University degree, if any
Hu Jintao	Anhui	Tsinghua University, hydraulic engineering
Wu Bangguo	Anhui	Tsinghua University, elecrical engineering
Wen Jiabao	Tianjin	Beijing Institute of Geology, geology
Jia Qinglin	Hebei	Hebei Engineering College, elecrical engineering
Zeng Qinghong*	Jiangxi	Beijing Institute of Technology, engineering
Huang Ju*	Zhejiang	Tsinghua University, electrical engineering
Wu Guanzheng*	Jiangxi	Tsinghua University, thermal engineering
Li Changchun	Liaoning	Harbin Institute of Technology, industrial enterprise automation
Luo Gan*	Shandong	Beijing Steel and Iron Institute, metallurgical engineering
Members of the Politburo Standing Committee elected in the 17th Party Congress to replace Wu Guanzheng, Luo Gan, Huang Ju and Zeng Qinghong		
Xi Jinping	Shaanxi	Tsinghua University, Marxist theory and ideological education (Doctor of Laws)
Li Keqiang	Anhui	Peking University, economics (Doctor of Economics)
He Guoqiang	Hunan	Beijing Institute of Chemical Engineering, inorganic engineering
Zhou Yongkang	Jiangsu	Beijing Petroleum Institute, geophysical exploration

[90] Jakobson and Knox 2010, 4–5.
[91] Lawrence, Susan. 2011. "Perspectives on Chinese Foreign Policy." Testimony before the US-China Economy and Review Commission Hearing.
[92] China.org.cn. 2012. "Who is Who in China's Leadership," http://www.china.org.cn/features/leadership/node_1086673.htm. Accessed 11 January 2012. Lai, Hongyi 2010. *The Domestic Sources of China's Foreign Policy: Regimes, Leadership, Priorities and Process*. London: Routledge, 134–155.

The analysis of state level actors concentrates on the ways the Chinese state aims to influence national identity construction. Social structures can affect the adoption of specific identities via the education system, control of the media, campaigning etc. CCP in control of the Chinese state has many means to influence national identity formation. In its white papers, political speeches, legislation, five-year plans and other official papers the CCP has defined what kind of Chinese it perceives as good citizens (*norms*), what are its *core values*, where it wishes to direct the country in the future (*social purposes*), and how it sees China's position vis-à-vis other states in the international system (*relational comparisons*). The importance of national identity discourses can be seen in the use of language in CCP's official documents. Although the CCP might want to, it cannot dictate its views or force people to internalise its version of Chinese national identity. Thus, despite its efforts to influence identity construction, the state is also constrained by "rival" or alternative national identities sometimes expressed strongly in demonstrations or online. As nationalism has become increasingly important for CCP legitimacy, it is more responsive to societal demands in this regard.

Regarding sources, Chinese party-state perspective is investigated with China's foreign policy guidelines, foreign policy statements and foreign policy objectives, as articulated in public statements, key official documents concerning national objectives and definitions of international situations in official speeches. Legislation and policy papers related to education and rights and duties of citizens are used, but also other laws in which basic values of the nation-state are expressed.

Elite level: **Academic elite**

In this thesis elite level is analysed through academics in the field of international relations. The role of intellectuals in foreign policy formulation processes in China has grown since the reform and opening up (1978), and part of this change can be located to the Hu Jintao period.[93] Intellectuals form the intermediary layer working as mediators between the party-state level and the bottom levels consisting of elite university students and public opinion.[94] This mediating role between the Party level and societal levels means in more precise terms that scholars advise policymakers and comment on international events and domestic policies in the media. Thus, they are both opinion leaders and mediators of public views. This is important, because nowadays public discourse has a growing impact on leaders when they choose among competing policy options.[95] Moreover, during Jiang Zemin's rule and before that Chinese foreign policy used to be more concentrated on a few countries, but China's rise and diversified interests have expanded the scope of foreign policy. Chinese interests and tasks related to foreign policy are so numerous and diverse that the conventional foreign policy institutions cannot handle the workload. This practical need has increased the amount of policy related work done in universities and research institutes.[96]

In China the purpose of international relations discipline used to be merely to offer background information for policy-makers and research was quite restricted, but today intellectuals and academics have their independent role in many issues. Still in the 1990s the

[93] Tang, Wenfang. 2005. *Public Opinion and Political Change in China*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 163; Zhao, Quansheng. 1992. "Domestic Factors of Chinese Foreign Policy. From Vertical to Horizontal Authoritarianism." *Annals of the American Academy of Political Science* 519 (1), 170–171; Glaser, Bonnie and Phillip Saunders. 2002. "Chinese Civilian Foreign Policy Research Institutes: Evolving." *The China Quarterly* 171, 597–616.
[94] Shen 2007, 27.
[95] Glaser, Bonnie and Evan Medeiros. 2007. "The Changing Ecology of Foreign-Policy Making in China: The Ascension and Demise of the Theory of 'Peaceful Rise'." *The China Quarterly* 190 (2), 302–307.
[96] This idea was expressed in almost all of the 15 interviews I conducted with academics in China in 2011–2012.

official Party views came through also in academic writing.[97] However, there has been an increasingly clear separation of policy interpretation and academic research during the past 15 years.[98] Despite growing independence and expertise, social sciences in general and certain sensitive topics in particular are tightly controlled by the government.[99] In the extreme cases entire academic journals have been closed down as happened to *Strategy and Management* after it published a daring article on China's North Korea policy.[100] There are no independent research institutes concentrating on foreign policy issues, as most operate under a State Council ministry, a Central Committee department or the PLA.[101] Most academics concentrate on academic work, which is not apolitical in the Chinese context. Moreover, there are scholars who deliberately write for a broader audience and position themselves as articulators of public opinion.[102]

In sum, academic elite matters in foreign policy making in at least three ways. First, through their writings and media presence, academics in international relations take stance to issues related to Chinese foreign policy and national identity construction, which may affect other actors in the broader societal level or in the foreign policy establishment. There are nowadays a number of popular talk shows focusing on international issues, which increases public awareness of international politics and helps keeping up public interest.[103] Second, academics work as policy advisors to government institutions both in ad hoc as well

[97] Chan, Gerald. 1999. *Chinese Perspectives on International Relations: A Framework of Analysis*. Basingstoke: Macmillan, 162–165.
[98] Qin, Yaqing. 2010. "Why Is there No Chinese International Relations Theory?" In Acharya, Amitav and Barry Buzan (eds.), *Non-Western International Relations Theory*. London: Routledge, 33. For a historical review of international relations as an academic discipline, see ibid. and Chan 1999. For a historical review of research done in international relations think tanks, see Shambaugh, David. 2002. "China's International Relations Think Tanks: Evolving Structure and Process." *The China Quarterly* 171 (3), 575–596.
[99] For a more detailed analysis how social sciences are controlled, see Brady, Anne-Marie. 2008. *Marketing Dictatorship. Propaganda and Thought Work in Contemporary China*. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 117–119.
[100] Tkacik, John. 2004. "China's 'S&M' journal Goes too Far on Korea." *Asia Times Online*, September 2, 2004, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/FI02Ad06.html. Accessed 6 August 2013.
[101] Shambaugh 2002, 579.
[102] Li, Rex. 2009. *A Rising China and Security in East Asia. Identity Construction and Security Discourse*. New York: Routledge, 38.
[103] Wang, Jianwei and Xiaojie Wang. 2014. "Media and Chinese Foreign Policy." *Journal of Contemporary China* 23 (86), 224.

as in systematic fashion. In the recent years the grown expertise of scholars and diversified field of Chinese foreign relations have made the party institutionalise some of its consulting channels. Third, some scholars work in foreign embassies or other governmental institutions as part of their career and universities offer special training programmes for junior officials.

As actors, Chinese intellectuals aim at influencing official thinking by directing their views upward to the policy elite. In addition to policy suggestions that are not so often present in academic publications rather mostly offered through private channels of consultation, academics in international relations participate to the wider discourses related to Chinese national identity. As identities consist of beliefs, values and attitudes, ideas are an important part of the analysis of national identity formation. To analyse foreign policy ideas, their spread and dominant ideas in discourses relevant to national identity construction, elite level is important to include into the analysis of Chinese foreign policy context.

To analyse the views of intellectuals I use two types of sources. The first type consists of articles from Chinese academic journals related to China's international positioning, China-Japan and China-US relations as well as texts with links to national identity construction. According to Yong Deng "a systematic analysis comparing official view and scholarly analyses is called for."[104] Texts are treated as representations of identity discourse in China, which can be used to highlight the general trends in the identity discourse both in relation to China's position in the world and its relation to "others" such as Japan and the US -within officially sanctioned boundaries. Articles make causal arguments such as X causes Y showing how basic positions and worldviews are correlated with policy positions. Although there is more freedom to express one's views in the academic field in comparison to

[104] Deng, Yong. 1998. "The Chinese Conception of National Interests in International Relations." *The China Quarterly* 154 (2), 309. Academic journals have been used as primary sources in Yong Deng's book *China's Struggle for Status* and James Reilly's *Strong Society, Smart State* but in these works both the timeframe and focus of research differ from mine. Deng, Yong. 2008. *China's Struggle for Status, The Realignment of International Relations*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Reilly, James. 2012. *Strong Society, Smart State*, *The Rise of Public Opinion in China's Japan Policy*. New York: Columbia University Press.

mass media such as television, my analysis of these texts takes into account that censorship applies. Unlike in some text analysis methods, here the authorship of the texts is not ignored, because in addition to the effect of different IR paradigms, in some cases also institutional affiliations and personal ties with the government might have an effect on formulation of the texts.

The second type of sources consists of 15 interviews with prominent academics and a few younger scholars. These interviews were conducted between November 2011 and May 2012. Given the nature of censorship and limited academic freedom in China, it is extremely important to also engage in interviews with Chinese academics to understand the political background to which scholars published certain articles. Interviews address issues that cannot be published in the academic journals and questions that rise from the journal articles. In addition to complementing analysis of journal articles, interviews can be useful in learning details of a particular analyst's background and connections with policy makers.[105] Some scholars who have analysed Chinese think tanks even find that interviews are often more valuable than published works especially when dealing with specific issues.[106]

Individual level: **Public and student opinion**

The individual level of national identity construction consists of public and student opinion, which form the bottom layer of the research framework. To be able to understand the discourse of the elites, it is necessary to investigate its reception and recontextualisation in other domains of society, namely on the grassroots level.[107] The main focus here is to analyse

[105] Glaser and Saunders 2002, 615.
[106] Liao, Xuanli. 2006. *Chinese Foreign Policy Think Tanks and China's Policy Towards Japan*. Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 14.
[107] Wodak et al. 2009, 3.

how adoption of a certain type of national identity affects perceptions on foreign policy issues.

Second, the analysis of public and student opinion hopes to create a view of the wider societal context and foreign policy perceptions. Currently research on societal influence on Chinese policy concentrates too much on protests, whether online or on the streets, because it is easier to show links between Internet signature campaigns and demonstrations on policy.[108] From a methodological perspective, differentiating causal relationships in the interaction of different actors can be very challenging especially if actors react to each other's behaviour or to a changed international situation quickly.[109] In China, a precise measurement of how public and student opinion influence the policy elite would be difficult to formulate, as the Chinese policy-making process remains opaque. Although the public has more direct consequences when mobilized, I find it relevant to inquire more broadly about public and student opinion on foreign policy issues rather than being satisfied with gathering information from those who themselves bring it forward by demonstrating or participating in discussion forums online. If we focus only on demonstrations, the views of the majority of people are left out of the analysis.[110]

Especially in countries such as China where media censorship applies, there is a need to conduct surveys and interviews on issues that are likely to be partly or fully censored from the official media or from the Internet. In addition, certain parts of the national identity discourse are so personal they are not likely to be fully covered in the media in any case. One such issue is emotional attachment to the nation, which places the whole identity discourse

[108] Shen and Breslin 2010; Lagerkvist, Johan. 2008. "Internet Ideotainment in the PRC: National Responses to Cultural Globalization." *Journal of Contemporary China* 17 (54), 121–140; Liu, Shih-Diing. 2006. "China's Popular Nationalism on the Internet. Report on the 2005 Anti-Japan Network Struggles." *Inter-Asia Cultural Studies* 7 (1), 144–155.
[109] Bloom 1990, 81.
[110] Demonstrations usually involve only a fraction of "the public." For example of 1500 Americans surveyed near the height of protest against the Vietnam War, only eight respondents said that they had taken part in an anti-war demonstration. Verba, Sydney and Richard Brody. 1970. "Participation, Policy Preferences, and the War in Vietnam." *Public Opinion Quarterly* 34 (3), 325–332.

into context. If people do not see national identity as relevant for their personal identity, we are talking more about a much more passive form of self-categorization than in the case where people feel that national identity is important for them. The higher national identity is placed among individuals "identity salience hierarchy," the more likely it will be activated in a certain situation.[111]

Public opinion

I follow Bernard Barelson in defining public opinion as "people's response (that is, approval, disapproval, or indifference) to controversial political and social issues of general attention," and analyse Chinese opinions in the context of an authoritarian political system and interaction between different societal actors.[112] In China, government policies can be affected by public opinion, and government officials continuously cite public opinion as a factor to consider in foreign policy formulation.[113] Sometimes even top politicians chat online with netizens as Hu Jintao did in 2008 stating that he takes people's opinions seriously.[114] Still, the government also seeks to control public opinion.[115] Examples of control vary from patriotic education campaigns to continuous control of media and the Internet and restrictions on establishing non-governmental organizations, which makes institutionalised forms of lobbying often impossible.[116]

According to a commonly held belief public opinion does not matter in authoritarian China because the missing electoral link between public opinion and

[111] Strycker, Sheldon. 1980. *Symbolic Interactionism: A Social Structural Version*. Menlo Park, California: Benjamin/Cummings Publishing Company, 60–61.
[112] Barelson, Bernard. 1961. "Communication and Public Opinion." In Wilbur Schramm (ed.), *The Process and Effects of Mass Communication*. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 343.
[113] He, Yinan. 2009. *The Search for Reconciliation. Sino-Japanese and German-Polish Relations since World War II*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 282; Reilly 2012, 37–39.
[114] Thornton, Patricia. 2010. "Censorship and Surveillance in Chinese Cyberspace. Beyond the Great Firewall." In Peter Gries and Stanley Rosen (eds.) *Chinese Politics: State, Society and the Market*. London: Routledge, 179.
[115] Jakobson and Knox 2010, 1.
[116] For an analysis of media control in China, see Brady 2008.

government's decision-making.[117] It is true that the character of the state decides the way public opinion influences policy, which means that different sections of "the public" are weighted differently depending on the political system.[118] Still, even in the Chinese case it would be ahistorical to claim that the fact that elites often take public opinion into account would somehow be completely new. The Mao-era mass line entailed studying what the masses think and then trying to influence their views in favour of the Party line. The top-down part of the process was often first shaped by views from the grassroots level. That is, the process was not unidirectional.[119]

Interaction between different societal groups has naturally evolved and changed over time, and the relevance of public opinion naturally depends on how the policy elite perceives it. On issues of high salience elites often feel that public support is necessary for successful conduct of the policy.[120] In Western democratic countries correlational studies have been able to demonstrate a connection between public opinion and policy shifts, which happen predominantly in direction favoured by the public.[121] According to Benjamin Page and David Shappiro's analysis on American surveys, policy tends to move in the same direction as public opinion most often when the opinion change is large and when it is stable. Page and Shappiro also found that contrary to expectations that the public would care more for the domestic policy issues and congruence of opinion and policy should thus be more frequent in domestic issues, public opinion was as influential in domestic and foreign policy

[117] Fewsmith, Joseph and Stanley Rosen. 2001. "Domestic Context of Chinese Foreign Policy: Does 'Public Opinion' Matter?" In David Lampton (ed.), *The Making of Chinese Foreign and Security Policy in the Era of Reform, 1978-2000*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 172; Tang 2005.
[118] Liu, Alan. 1996. *Mass Politics in the People's Republic*. *State and Society in Contemporary China*. Oxford: Westview Press, 9; Reilly, James. 2010. "Online Chinese Nationalism toward Japan." In Simon Shen and Shaun Breslin (eds.), *Online Chinese Nationalism and China's Bilateral Relations*. Plymouth: Lexington Books, 45–72.
[119] Thornton, Patricia. 2011. "Retrofitting the Steel Frame: From Mobilizing the Masses to Surveying the Public." In Sebastian Heilmann and Elizabeth J. Perry (eds.) *Mao's Invisible Hand: the Political Foundations of Adaptive Governance.* Cambridge Mass.: Harvard University Press, 237–268.
[120] Foyle, Douglas. 1997. "Public Opinion and Foreign Policy: Elite Beliefs as Mediating Variable." *International Studies Quarterly* 41 (1), 141–169; Weiss, Jessica. 2008. "Powerful Patriots: Nationalism, Diplomacy, and the Strategic Logic of Anti-Foreign Protest." PhD diss., San Diego: University of California.
[121] For Chinese public opinion studies in comparison to those conducted in the West, see Chen, Jie. 2004. *Political Support in Urban China*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2. For correlation studies, see Fewsmith and Rosen 2001, 172.

content.[122] Paul Midford's research found similar results in the Japanese context. According to Midford, persistent opinion majorities over 50 percent not affected by the survey question wording show greatest policy impact.[123] Although it is difficult to specify how exactly public opinion affects policy-making even in democracies, research has reached consensus that public opinion provides "broader limits" or "boundaries of the permissible" for politicians.[124] Thus it is important to study public opinion in order to understand the background of policy-making.

A view that is becoming more and more widespread holds that public opinion plays an increasingly important role in China.[125] There are several reasons for this. First, as an extreme example, the people in any country have the power to overthrow the government because of their greater number. The will of the people cannot be ignored anywhere despite differences in political systems.[126] According to Alan Liu, public opinion in China has played an important role in shaping major political outcomes.[127] In China where peasant rebellions brought down dynasties for centuries, the political elite is well aware of the saying "the state is like a vessel and the people are water. Water can carry or sink the vessel" (*shui neng zai zhou, yi neng fu zou*, 水能载舟亦能覆舟).

Second, although large mass movements targeted against the government have been absent in China since the Tiananmen incident (1989), new information technologies in

[122] Page, Benjamin I. and Robert Shappiro. 1983. "Effects of Public Opinion on Policy." *The American Political Science Review* 77 (1), 175–190.
[123] Midford, Paul. 2011. *Rethinking Japanese Public Opinion and Security*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 21.
[124] Fewsmith and Rosen 2001, 172.
[125] Johnston, Alastair Iain. 2004. "Chinese Middle Class Attitudes towards International Affairs: Nascent Liberalization?" *The China Quarterly* 179 (3), 604; Gries, Peter H. and Stanley Rosen. 2004. "Introduction: Popular Protest and State Legitimation in 21st Century." In Peter H. Gries and Stanley Rosen (eds.), *State and Society in 21st Century China. Crisis, Contention and Legitimation*. New York: Routledge, 5; Tang 2005, 196; Christensen, Thomas J., Alastair Ian Johnston, and Robert R. Ross. 2006. "Conclusions and Future Directions." In Alastair Iain Johnston and Robert S. Ross (eds.), *New Directions in the Study of China's Foreign Policy*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 405; Shirk, Susan. 2007. *China. Fragile Superpower*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 44; Shen 2007, 188.
[126] The Arab Spring is telling example of this. For public opinion's power, see Bloom 1990, 81; Lang, Kurt. 2008. "The Use of Opinion Polls. What Polls Can and Cannot Tell us about Public Opinion." *International Journal of Public Opinion Research* 20 (1), 6.
[127] Liu 1996, 3; Zhao Quansheng 1992, 162.

combination with increasingly decentralized policy-making have opened space for new actors to influence decisions.[128] In his book *Strong Society, Smart State. The Rise of Public Opinion in China's Japan Policy*, James Reilly argues against the view that public opinion is unlikely to influence authoritarian states' foreign policy.[129] Recent interviews with Chinese policy-makers reveal public opinion as a factor difficult to bypass especially in high salience issues such as those related to Japan.[130] Research has been able to show that Internet signature campaigns and mass demonstrations have played a role in policy-formulation in Sino-Japanese relations (e.g. the Beijing-Shanghai high-speed rail road project in 2003) and the Diaoyu Islands case.[131] Some scholars also find that public opinion plays a role in China's relations with the US, although Sino-US relations are categorically very different from Sino-Japanese relations. Catherine Kayser and Su Lin find that the rise of anti-American sentiment and intensification of anti-American activities in the mid-1990s marked the emergence of public opinion as a force shaping China's side in US-China relations.[132] Finally, the CCP collects survey material for internal use, which can have policy implications and indicates that the CCP finds it relevant to know what the people think.[133]

Trends in the public and Chinese national identity and their impact on China's foreign policy form a changing terrain, which we have only started to map out. This is first because access to public attitudes has been severely restricted in China and second, because the impact of public opinion on foreign policy in China has not been considered relevant until recently.[134] Iain Johnston writes that although there is lack of systematic studies on the relationship between nationalist public opinion and foreign policy, we can hypothesise that

[128] Lanteigne, Mark. 2009. *Chinese Foreign Policy*. London: Routledge, 19–20.
[129] Reilly 2012.
[130] He 2009, 279–282; Jakobson and Knox 2010.
[131] I will return to this theme in Chapter Seven. Gries, 2005b, 846–847; He 2009, 282.
[132] Kayser, Catherine and Su Lin. 2007. "Conceptualizing Foreign Policy: The 'Peaceful Rise' Debate among China's Scholars." In Sujian Guo and Shiping Hua (eds.), *New Dimensions of Chinese Foreign Policy*. Plymouth: Lexington Books, 45.
[133] Reilly 2012, 29.
[134] Johnston, Alastair Iain and Robert S. Ross. 2006. "Introduction." In Alastair Iain Johnston and Robert S. Ross (eds.), *New Directions in the Study of China's Foreign Policy*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2.

the more public opinion is emotional and mobilized, the more likely leaders will take it into account. The regime could be more sensitive to nationalist opinion because of at least the following three reasons: fear of anti-foreign protests turning into anti-CCP protests, normative beliefs about need to respect people's views and elite political struggle.[135]

International research projects the data of which is publicly available, conducted in China in the 2000s to study the trends of public opinion on foreign policy issues include Asia-Europe Survey (2000), Asia Barometer (2004), World Values Survey (2001 and 2005), Pew Global Attitudes Project (2006, 2008, 2010), Committee 100 survey on Sino-American Relations (2007), Texas A&M University's China survey (2008) and Lowy Institute's China Poll (2009).[136] Of these, the 2008 China survey is the most useful one as it is partly based on the ISSP (International Social Survey Programme) National Identity II survey and has questions relevant to the study of national identity construction.[137]

Students at elite universities

Not all the sections of the public are equally influential or capable of making the policy makers care about their views. In China as in other countries the more educated people tend to have more saying. Chinese students at elite universities are opinion leaders and many of them will take on leading roles in society after graduating.

The college-educated form a small and privileged part of the Chinese

[135] Johnston, Iain. 2013. "How New Is China's New Assertiveness?" *International Security* 37 (4), 37–38.
[136] "Nationally representative" in the Chinese case usually refers to a "national probability sample," which is a type of cluster sampling; Localities such as counties are selected nonprobabilistically within which surveyors use probability sampling selection methods. If counties are used as units, Tibet is almost always left out of surveying. Manion, Melanie. 2010. "A Survey of Survey Research in Chinese Politics." In Allen Carlson, Mary Gallagher, Kenneth Kieberthal, and Melanie Manion (eds.), *Contemporary Chinese Politics. New Sources, Methods and Field Strategies.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 182–183, 187. For concrete examples, see fieldwork reports from Asia-Europe Survey (can be downloaded from http://www.asiaeuropesurvey.org/download.html) or Asia Barometer (data accessed via International Consortium of Political and Social Research, ICPSR, http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/ICPSR/).
[137] China participated in the International Social Survey Programme's Social Inequality survey collected in 2009, which will hopefully be publicly available in 2014, as there is usually a five-year delay for public availability. Before that China has not been part of any of the ISSP surveys. National identity III survey has been planned to be collected in 2013, which means the data is publicly available sometime in 2018.

population.[138] This is despite the fact that secondary education has become less exclusive as university enrolment has grown rapidly during the past two decades. In 2008 the total enrolment of students in higher education excluding Internet-based courses was 27.4 million, about 2.1 percent of the population.[139] The student population may be small in comparison to the Chinese population as a whole, but student activism has played a large role in shaping modern Chinese politics during the May Fourth Movement, the Cultural Revolution, and more recently, demonstrations at Tiananmen in 1989, which changed the direction of China's foreign policy for many years.[140] Chinese governments at different times have had to react to student activism, and after the Tiananmen protests the government launched a patriotic education campaign directed at the students.[141] In addition to ideological campaigning, the Ministry of Education sharpened distinctions between universities after the Tiananmen Incident and designated a small number of elite schools, headed by Tsinghua and Peking universities, which receive more funding in comparison to other universities– a factor that can increase student satisfaction and decrease the mood of protest.[142]

Because of student activism, students form a special opinion group, to which the CCP devotes particular attention. The CCP sees students and young people in urban areas the most likely to join in protest movements over foreign policy issues, which makes this segment

[138] Alan Liu used students as one of the four groups of that according to his definition comprised "public opinion." The other groups were peasants, workers, and ethnic minorities. Liu 1996, 2–3.
[139] China Statistical Yearbook 2009, National Bureau of Statistics of China, accessed via University of Michigan China Data Center.
[140] Naturally students have demonstrated in various other occasions as well, in 1925, 1935, 1945, 1985, 1986-1987, etc. and dominant student attitude has varied between primarily anti-Western during the Red Guard Movement to those demanding domestic political reform. Wasserstrom, Jeffrey. 1991. *Student Protests in Twentieth-Century China. The View from Shanghai*. Stanford: Stanford University Press; Liu 1996, chapter 4; Zhao, Dingxin. 2003. "Nationalism and Authoritarianism: Student-Government Conflicts during the 1999 Beijing Student Protests." *Asian Perspective* 27 (1), 5–34.
[141] Zhao, Suisheng. 2000b. "Chinese Nationalism and Authoritarianism in the 1990s." In Suisheng Zhao (ed.), *China and Democracy. Reconsidering the Prospects for a Democratic China*. New York: Routledge, 257–258.
[142] Rosen, Stanley. 2009. "Contemporary Chinese Youth and State." *The Journal of Asian Studies* 68 (2), 359–369; Zheng, Yongnian. 2006. "The Party, Class and Democracy in China." In Kjeld Eric Brodsgaard and Yongnian Zheng (eds.), *The Chinese Communist Party in Reform*. New York: Routledge, 250. Economic hardship and slim career prospects were partly behind student protests in the 1980s. See Liu 1996, 168.

of population "most likely of greatest concern to Chinese leaders."[143] According to James Reilly, Chinese leaders are most concerned about the potential for widespread public protests, and unlike democratic leaders, they do not have to think about the "middle voter" or the average citizen as much as democratic leaders.[144] What CCP probably fears is that certain activist groups such as students may start larger scale mobilisation of the public. It does not always take a majority to respond, as sometimes a critical mass of citizens strategically located in the polity suffices to start political change.[145]

Another reason for special attention is that the Party would like these students to become CCP members. Students have increased their proportion in the CCP during the 2000s and form the largest professional group of new Party members, which was 29.7 percent in 2006.[146] In 2007 the official Xinhua news agency proclaimed that between 2002 and 2007, 32.5 percent of new CCP members were college graduates.[147] The proportion of university students who are CCP members rose from 0.8 percent in 1990 to nearly 8 percent in 2001. By 2000, 28.2 percent of graduate students were Party members. Further, in 2001, an estimated 33 percent of those attending college had applied to join the Party.[148] In 2011, the amount of student Party members reached 2.77 million and those below the age of thirty-five amounted to 20.6 million or 25 per cent of the total membership. In addition, 39 per cent (31.9 million)

[143] Reilly 2012, 126.
[144] Reilly 2012, 37.
[145] Lang 2008, 9.
[146] In 2005, some 2.47 million applicants were admitted to the Party across the country, up 2.4 percent from 2004. Of these, 734,000 were college students. The proportion of student Party membership increased 5 percentage points year on year, making this the most noteworthy growth among all profession groups in the Party. Yan, Wei. 2007. "Young Blood. Under-35s are Infusing New Life to the Party." *Beijing Review* 50 (26), 18–19. Party members with post-secondary education or above amounted to 22.2 million in 2006, about 30.7% of the total membership. See Zheng, Yongnian. 2010. *The Communist Party as Organizational Emperor. Culture, Reproduction and Transformation*. London: Routledge, 5. For the professional composition of CCP, see ibid., 144.
[147] Wright, Teresa. 2010. *Accepting Authoritarianism. State-Society Relations in China's Reform Era*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 69.
[148] Rosen, Stanley. 2010. "Chinese Youth and State-society Relations." In Peter Gries and Stanley Rosen (eds.), *Chinese Politics: State, Society and the Market*. London: Routledge, 168; Rosen 2009, 168.

of the total body of members had been educated at the college level or above.[149] Campaigning to recruit students is the most rigorous in the elite university campus areas, and Party membership is also most common among students from prestigious universities.[150]

Finally, looking at elite university students' opinions at large can be helpful for the study of the views of the well educated. In the Chinese context there is a paradox regarding nationalist attitudes, as the global trends would suggest that those with low education levels tend to support chauvinistic nationalist views – a tendency that then decreases with increasing educational attainment.[151] However, young people in the Chinese context, including those studying at universities, are often portrayed as forerunners of nationalism because the claimed implications of the patriotic education campaign.[152] The fact that Chinese university education entails both elements that are likely to decrease the effects of Party messages as well as elements that do exactly the opposite makes students an interesting group to analyse.[153]

In addition, students' views can help to contextualise the widely reported phenomenon of China's "angry youth" and netizens' opinions on foreign policy issues. While that image has tended to dominate discussions in the western media, it has been difficult to determine the relative numbers of such youth, or to estimate their influence within China.[154] Online opinions and their possible influence is a complex issue. On the one hand new technologies enable people to share their views with a greater number of people faster, which

[149] Xinhua News. 2012. "China Communist Party Members Exceed 82 mln," 30 June 2012, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2012-06/30/c_131686357.htm. Accessed 11 February 2013.
[150] Gang, Guo, 2005. "Party Recruitment of College Students in China." *Journal of Contemporary China* 14 (43), 390.
[151] Schatz, Robert T., Ervin Staub, and Howard Lavine. 1999. "On the Varieties of National Attachment: Blind Versus Constructive Patriotism." *Political Psychology* 20 (1), 151–174; Nincic, Miroslav and Jennifer Ramos. 2012. "The Sources of Patriotism: Survey and Experimental Evidence." *Foreign Policy Analysis* 8, 373–388.
[152] Yang, Lijun and Yongnian Zheng. 2012. "Fen Qings (Angry Youth) in Contemporary China." *Journal of Contemporary China* 21 (76), 637–653; Wang, Zheng. 2012. *Never Forget National Humiliation. Historical Memory in Chinese Politics and Foreign Relations*. New York: Columbia University Press.
[153] Kennedy, John. 2009. "Maintaining Popular Support for the Chinese Communist Party: The Influence of Education and the State-Controlled Media." *Political Studies* 57, 517–536.
[154] Rosen 2010, 168.

has been well-noted by the propaganda officials. The "2010 Society Blue Paper" published by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences described the internet as an important public arena for debate and defined those netizens who are closely concerned with news and current affairs and often express their views online as the "new opinion class" (*xin yijian ceng,* 新意见层).[155] The number of Chinese netizens reached 564 million or around 42 percent of the population by the end of December 2012.[156]

On the other hand netizens still do not represent the whole population. According to the 2012 report published by the China Internet Network Information Centre, 55.9 percent of Internet users are male, over 50 percent of them are under 30 years old and less than 20 percent are over 40 years old, and the largest occupational category is formed of students (30.2%) followed by the self-employed (16.0%) and office workers (9.9%).[157] According to Beijing-Tokyo poll conducted in 2012, 46.9 percent of the respondents representing the general public felt that opinions expressed online do not correctly represent how "the majority" thinks, whereas 43.8 percent thought that online opinions can be taken to represent public opinion. In contrast to these views, of university students only 16 percent thought that online opinions represent public opinion well, whereas 62.7 disagreed.[158] Against this background, looking at student opinion at elite universities can help us to judge how widely shared these often quite nationalist opinions presented online are among those who will most likely form China's new elite in the future.

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[155] Zhu, Huaxin, Xuegang Shan and Jiangchun Hu. 2010. "2009 Zhongguo Hulianwang Yuqing Fenxi Baogao." (2009 China Internet Public Opinion Analysis Report). In *2010 Shehui Lanpishu* (2010 Society Blue Paper). CASS. Available at http://yq.people.com.cn/htmlArt/Art392.htm. Accessed 12 July 2014.

[156] Zhongguo hulianwangluo xinxizhongxin (China Internet Network Information Centre, CNNIC). 2013. "Di 31 ci Zhongguo hulianwangluo fazhan zhuankuang tongji baogao" (The 31st Report of China's Internet Development Statistics), 15 January 2013, http://www.cnnic.cn/hlwfzyj/hlwxzbg/hlwtjbg/201301/t20130115_38508.htm. Accessed 10 December 2013.

[157] Zhongguo hulianwangluo xinxizhongxin (China Internet Network Information Centre, CNNIC). 2012. "Di 29 ci Zhongguo hulianwangluo fazhan zhuankuang tongji baogao" (The 29th Report of China's Internet Development Statistics), 16 January 2012, http://www.cnnic.cn/research/bgxz/tjbg/201201/t20120116_23668.html. Accessed 3 May 2012.

[158] The 8th Beijing-Tokyo poll. 2012. "Overview of the Survey" (in Japanese), June 2012, http://tokyo-beijingforum.net/index.php/survey/8th-survey. Accessed 1 April 2013.

There are a few surveys conducted on a student population on foreign policy relevant issues.[159] There are also some Chinese researchers based in China who have concentrated on mapping out university students' views on various foreign policy related issues. For example Chen Shengluo from China Youth Politics University and Wang Zhaohui from Jilin University have analysed student attitudes on Sino-American relations with survey data.[160] The Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) has also collected student surveys.[161]

To analyse student opinion I conducted two surveys in China with a modified version of ISSP National Identity II questionnaire. Chinese elite university students (N=1346) took part in a survey in Beijing in the spring 2007 and second time in the autumn 2011-spring 2012 (N=771). The first sample was collected in Renmin University of China, Peking University, and Tsinghua University between April and June 2007. The second sample was conducted in Shanghai Jiaotong University, Fudan University, Nanjing University and Zhejiang University in November and December 2011, and in Renmin University of China, Peking University, and Tsinghua University in March 2012. Except for Renmin University of China, these universities belong to the C9 league (*jiuxiao lianmeng*, 九校联盟) of Chinese top universities.[162] Although Renmin University is not part of the C9 league, it is high in Chinese University rankings and has rather close relations with the CCP.[163] Between 2002

[159] These are presented in more detail in chapter five.
[160] Cheng, Shengluo. 2002. "Liangge meiguo: zhongguo daxuesheng de meiguo guan" (Two Americas: Chinese University Students' Views of the United States). *Qingnian yanjiu (Youth Studies)* 6, 1-8; Wang, Zhaohui. 2007. "Young Chinese Look at America after 9-11: A Poll from Jilin University." In Simon Shen (ed.), *China and Antiterrorism*. New York: Nova Science Publishers, 195–200.
[161] CASS Institute of World History Special Topics Group, "A Brief Analysis of a Survey of Young Students with Regard to Belief Systems on 21 Important Questions." *Zhongguo shehui kexueyuan: Lingdao canyue 中国社会科学院要报: 领导参阅 (The Chinese Academy of Social Sciences: Reference Reading for Leaders)*, July 5 2007. Cited in Rosen 2009, 365–366.
[162] A more detailed description of the samples and rational behind choosing these universities is provided in Chapter Five.
[163] Chinese university rankings can be found from Zhongguo xiaoyouhui wang 中国校友会网 (Chinese Alumni Network). 2013. "Zhongguo xiaoyouhui wang 2013 zhongguo daxie paihangbang 100 qiang" 中国校友会网 2013 中国大学排行榜 100 强 (The Top 100 Chinese Universities by Chinese Alumni Network in 2013), http://www.cuaa.net/cur/2013/01.shtml. Accessed 14 December 2013.

and 2007 Renmin University ranked highest among non-governmental institutions in the amount of scholars asked to lecture at the Politburo's collective study sessions.[164]

Collecting my own surveys allowed me to design a questionnaire that could best provide answers to my research questions and allow a combination of attitudinal and background variables that enabled me to analyse attitudinal structures with multivariate models. Although my sampling methods were not as sophisticated as in some of the large international projects, the ability to analyse the relationships of different attitude clusters helps to fill in a gap in existing research.[165] According to Iain Johnston not even the Beijing Area Studies datasets from which he has published so far provide enough data for multivariate models, which necessarily limits the depth of our understanding of how for example attitudes toward the US are constructed and with which other attitudes hostile foreign policy views are associated.[166] Although there are shortcomings in the analysis of poll data with statistical methods, multivariate models remain the best method to analyse construction of complex attitude structures of large number of people.[167]

To sum up, the combination of the materials and methods used in this thesis can make the following contributions. First, surveys and interviews can give information of the content of opinions in wider terms than analysis of Internet nationalism, which is often chosen as material when investigating public opinion, because people who do not participate in the discussion online will also be taken into account. Second, survey data on national identity can be analysed with statistical methods such as factor analysis, linear regression analysis and

[164] Lu, Yiyi. 2007. "The Collective Study Sessions of the Politburo: A Multipurpose Tool of China's Central Leadership." University of Nottingham: China Policy Institute's Briefing Series, 27.
[165] The sampling methods are explained in detail in Chapter Five.
[166] Johnston, Alastair Iain. 2006. "The Correlates of Beijing Public Opinion toward the United States, 1998-2004." In Johnston, Alastair Iain and Robert S. Ross (eds.), *New Directions in the Study of China's Foreign Policy*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 347; Johnston, Alastair Iain and Daniela Stockman. 2007. "Chinese Attitudes toward the United States and Americans." In Peter J. Katzenstein and Robert Keohane (eds.), *Anti-Americans in World Politics*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 165.
[167] Problems of poll data include issues such as ready structured response formats which do not necessarily give the respondent the option best corresponding his or her ideas, varying definitions and understandings of concepts among respondents, respondents tendency to agree with statements framed in a positive manner (response agreeing bias), and so forth.

structural equation modelling to see how opinion clusters relate to each other and to foreign policy preferences. Third, analysis of academic journals in the 2000s will provide a view of the main themes of the Chinese national identity discourse and their development.

3. Chapter
China's Foreign Policy Outlook, 2002–2012. Balancing Between Foreign Interpretations and Domestic Expectations of China's Rise

> *The Chinese increasingly believe that the West does not want China to develop and become an equal player in the international community as Western countries do, nor does it want to recognize Chinese power. This is the perceptional basis of Chinese nationalism*. Zheng Yongnian 1999[1]
>
> *While most foreign policy decisions are made with little regard to public opinion, Chinese officials are aware that dissatisfaction can give rise to questioning the Party's ability to govern. Hence, leaders' actions can be constrained in international crises, particularly when the United States or Japan are involved.* Linda Jakobson and Dean Knox 2010[2]

National identity defines the limits of in-group and out-group and necessarily includes relational comparisons. These relational comparisons happen in the international realm, in which China also aims to achieve its foreign policy goals. As discussed in the introductory chapter, dominant foreign policy ideas on China's international role represent national identity in the international realm. This chapter analyses how Chinese government and public opinion characterise China's position in the international system and what kind of descriptions of Chinese national identity are dominant in domestic discourses.

Despite its role as an official opinion leader, not even the CCP is clear-minded in identity-related discourse: on the one hand CCP officials emphasise mutual trust and cooperation to build a more "harmonious world." On the other hand the public is reminded not to forget the "century of national humiliation." The CCP's mixed messages highlight its difficult position between external and internal expectations and manifest some of the ways

[1] Zheng, Yongnian. 1999. *Discovering Chinese Nationalism in China. Modernization, Identity and International Relations*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 18.
[2] Jakobson, Linda and Dean Knox. 2010. "New Foreign Policy Actors in China." *SIPRI Policy Paper* 26, vii.

perceptions matter in international relations. Because of these external and internal influences, we need to understand contemporary Chinese foreign policy making as a multi-level process including the domestic and international spheres, as the domestic context necessarily influences China's foreign relations.

This chapter aims to place the rest of the chapters concentrating on the views, ideas and attitude structures related to foreign policy into context by describing Chinese leadership's position between external and internal expectations regarding foreign policy. It is important to start by positioning the government regarding China's international identity and describe how "domestic" issues matter in China's foreign policy priorities. What are the messages it conveys to the outside world and on the other hand promotes for the domestic audience? How do Chinese state leaders speak and act regarding the distribution of power globally or regionally? What is known of the public views on China's position in the world and its relations with Japan and the United States during Hu Jintao's reign? What are the general trends?

To address these questions, this chapter is divided into three parts the first of which outlines China's position in the international system. As foreign policy is executed in an evolving international context, the way other countries perceive and interpret China's external behaviour and aims affect China regardless of whether these interpretations are accurate. I will thus start the discussion of China's position in the international system by describing briefly how other players have characterised China's foreign policy in recent years, which links to the discussion on the China threat theory presented in the introductory chapter. After this I will move on to analyse China's foreign policy objectives and their domestic links. Most of China's key long-term foreign policy goals and national interests as also phrased by the Hu leadership have direct links with the China's domestic issues. Finally, the third part describes public opinion trends towards the US and Japan.

In sum, this chapter finds that despite some of the characterisations of China's "newly assertive foreign policy," China's international orientation or most important foreign policy goals did not change between 2002–2012. On the level of methods used to achieve the main goals some changes have happened compared to Jiang Zemin's years. One notable change in the official rhetoric was that in the end of Hu's term the government defined China's core interests and laid more emphasis on maintaining domestic stability and securing China's political system, which has foreign policy implications although the goal itself concentrates on the domestic realm. Regarding Chinese long-term goals and preferences, China has for long spoken in favour of "multipolarity" in world affairs, which means it would like to see lessening US dominance. Finally, the brief outline of public opinion polls shows that we have some evidence that the anti-Japanese sentiments have grown between 2002 and 2012 whereas the amount of anti-American attitudes has fluctuated but stayed generally on a lower level compared to the anti-Japanese sentiments.

Rising and Increasingly Assertive China?

China's international orientation and long-term foreign policy goals are formed of a few relatively persistent elements. The domestic discourses of China's rise and its victim mentality are essential in understanding China's complicated relationship with the outside world. These contradictory discussions emphasise the opposite sides China's relationship with external powers and both have their roots in history. On the one hand China has a history of being an ancient civilisation, and the early advances of this civilisation form a source of pride. In the Chinese discussion China's rise is often referred to with the terms "revitalisation" (*fuxing*, 复兴) or "rejuvenation" (*zhenxing*, 振兴), which emphasise the perspective that China's position as a great power is nothing new and the current rise is actually more of a

return. This brings a degree of entitlement to the current circumstances.[3] Victim mentality derives mainly from the legacies of the so-called "century of national humiliation" period (*bainian guochi*, 百年国耻).[4] China's position in the international system was weak from the Opium Wars in 1840 to the establishment of People's Republic of China in 1949, and being forced to open up to the outside world caused strong feeling of victimhood.[5] The Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, which form the basis of China's "independent foreign policy of peace" and which China wishes to "serve as the basis for setting up new international and economic order" were introduced in 1954 and have been in use since.[6] They reflect the "century of national humiliation" during which China was deprived from sovereign rights to control its territory and execute independent foreign policy.[7]

This period also has its geographical legacy, as Taiwan remains separated from the mainland. These themes play important roles in Chinese national identity dynamics and entangle with the legitimation of CCP's political power. In the narrative promoted by the CCP, China was able to overcome the century of national humiliation because of the CCP, and the Party is also the one Chinese people should thank for the long economic boom which started after the reform and opening up period (1978) and transformed the way of living for most Chinese.[8]

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[3] Medeiros, Evan. 2009. *China's International Behaviour. Activism, Opportunism, and Diversification*. Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 7–9.
[4] Wang, Zheng. 2012. *Never Forget National Humiliation. Historical Memory in Chinese Politics and Foreign Relations.* New York: Columbia University Press, 7–8.
[5] Mitter, Rana. 2003a. "An Uneasy Engagement: Chinese Ideas of Global Order and Justice in Historical Perspective." In Rosemary Foot, John Lewis Gaddis, and Andrew Hurrell (eds.), *Order and Justice in International Relations*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 211–213.
[6] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China. 2003. "China's Independent Foreign Policy of Peace," 18 August 2003, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjdt/wjzc/t24881.shtml. Accessed 18 April 2013; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of People's Republic of China. 2000. "China's Initiation of the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-Existence," 17 November 2000, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/ziliao/3602/3604/t18053.htm. Accessed 8 June 2013.
[7] Guo, Suijian and Jean-Marc Blanchard. 2008. "Introduction." In Suijian Guo and Jean-Marc Blanchard (eds.), *"Harmonious World" and China's New Foreign Policy*. Plymouth: Lexington Books, 6.
[8] The Constitution of People's Republic of China (full text after amendment on March 14, 2004). http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Constitution/2007-11/15/content_1372962.htm. Accessed 3 July 2013; Chinese government. 2011. "China's Peaceful Development White Paper," September 2011, http://english.gov.cn/official/2011-09/06/content_1941354.htm. Accessed 15 December 2013.

Contrary to the positive characterisation of China's rise in the Chinese context, its rise has caused a lot of worry elsewhere. Despite China's "charm offensive" (*meili gongshi,* 魅力攻势) attempts and political rhetoric used to convince the world of the peaceful nature of its foreign policy, China's socialist political system and poor human rights records define China as an outlier or negative "Other" in the Western liberal system.[9] External responses to China's rise have varied from encouraging China to become a responsive stakeholder in the international society to statements claiming that China's foreign policy has turned aggressive –implying that its rise will not be peaceful. Urging China to become a responsible power started in 2005 when US Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick stated that China should become a "responsible stakeholder" in the international system. Although Zoellick expressed a view according to which China does want to overturn the international system and that China and the US have common goals, his ideas were not wholeheartedly well-received in China because of the implied laundry list imposed on China.[10]

Other reactions have directly questioned the peacefulness of China's peaceful rise. As described in the introductory chapter, in recent extensive literature on China's rise the realist logic utilising power-transition theory has been one of the most popular frameworks. This framework predicts conflicts because of China's rise. In 2003 Iain Johnston published an article titled "Is China a Status Quo Power?" in which he criticised much of this literature of making two problematic assumptions. First, that there is an "international community" sharing common norms and values which is sufficiently well defined so that we can clearly state who is part of it and who is not. Second, that we will simply recognize a revisionist state when we see one. According to Johnston, the terms of "revisionist" state and "status quo" state are undertheorised and too vague as terms to enable scientific analysis. Johnston's

[9] Suzuki, Shogo. 2007. "The Importance of 'Othering' in China's National Identity: Sino-Japanese Relations as a Stage of Identity Conflicts." *The Pacific Review* 20 (1), 33–34.
[10] Zoellick, Robert. 2005. "Whither China: From Membership to Responsibility?" 21 September 2005, http://2001-2009.state.gov/s/d/former/zoellick/rem/53682.htm. Accessed 22 November 2013. On the reception of the "responsible power" concept in China, see Chapter Four.

conclusion is that to the extent that we can identify a community on major global issues, China is more integrated in it than ever before.[11] Also Avery Goldstein has questioned the usefulness of defining a state as a status quo power because in reality everything changes all the time.[12] Jeffrey Legro finds that the two arguments that have dominated discussion on China's rise, one concentrating on the threat of China's growing power and the other on the growing economic interdependence, neglect an important domestic perspective to China's international orientation. Legro points out that estimation of the level of "satisfaction" of a country's position in the world is not unilaterally defined by power, which is why we should pay attention to a possible "purpose transition" in China by which Legro refers to the question of wheter China has changed the way it intends to use its power.[13] The amount of power China has does not in itself translate into anything, rather the ways China decides to use its power derive from its national interests and goals.

Although not all scholars using a realist framework of some kind come to the gloomy conclusion that China's rise will necessarily lead to war, those emphasising security aspects tend to predict more conflicts than those emphasising political economy or domestic political constrains.[14] In the course of time China threat theory has taken new forms. From 2009 onwards scholars in the west found that China's foreign policy had suddenly turned more assertive. *China Leadership Monitor* published series of articles mostly written by Michael Swaine tackling the different perspectives of China's new assertiveness. In the first

[11] Johnston, Alastair Iain. 2003. "Is China a Status Quo Power?" *International Security* 27 (4), 5–56. See also Johnston's book *Social States*, in which he concludes that Chinese actors have socialised many of the norms and practices of the international institutions China is a member of. Johnston, Alastair Iain. 2000. *Social States. China in International Institutions, 1980-2000*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
[12] Goldstein, Avery. 2008. "Parsing China's Rise. International Circumstances and National Attributes." In Robert S. Ross and Zhu Feng (eds.), *China's Ascent. Power, Security, and the Future of International Politics*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 85.
[13] Legro, Jeffrey W.. 2008. "Purpose Transitions. China's Rise and the American Response." In Robert S. Ross and Zhu Feng (eds.), *China's Ascent*, *Power, Security, and the Future of International Politics*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 168–169.
[14] Charles Glaser argues that a "nuanced version of realism" provides grounds for optimism and that conflict between the United States and China is not predetermined. Glaser, Charles. 2011. "Will China's Rise Lead to War?" *Foreign Affairs* 90 (2), 81. According to Robert Ross and Zhu Feng, every power transition is a unique event and thus war is not an inevitable outcome. Ross, Robert and Zhu Feng. 2008. "Introduction." In Robert S. Ross and Zhu Feng (eds.), *China's Ascent*, 2.

article Swaine points out that he is not looking at factual assessment of foreign policy change, but rather takes "perception as reality."[15] In the latter three articles he examines increased assertiveness on certain sectors of China's foreign policy and takes nationalist sentiments as a factor contributing to Chinese aggressive actions in the East China Sea.[16] Also prominent scholars such as David Shambaugh argued, "2009-2010 will be remembered as the years in which China became difficult to deal with."[17] Moreover, Barack Obama's "pivot to Asia" policy, which Hilary Clinton presented in an article published in Foreign Policy in 2011, has been interpreted as a US countermeasure against China's "new assertiveness."[18]

Problems of terminology remain in a large part of the literature on China's rise and its claimed new assertiveness. Analysis on the "China's new assertiveness after 2009" argument often points out that China became more assertive after the 2008 economic downturn which increased China's relative power in the international system.[19] This argumentation indicates that the "rising China" thesis expects foreign policy ambitions to grow with relative power, but as Jeffrey Legro has pointed out, China was most eager on revising the international system between 1949 and 1954 when it was weakest (not strongest), which is the opposite of what the "rising China" thesis would expect.[20] Naturally when looking at short time periods, small or indicative changes can be made look bigger than they actually are, and with use of vague language and utilising terms such as "assertiveness" without properly defining it to allow comparison, the analysis will give expected results. Something that is also quite common in many problematic articles is the shortage or lack of

[15] Swaine, Michael. 2010. "Perceptions of an Assertive China." *China Leadership Monitor* 32, 1–19.
[16] Swaine 2010; Swaine, Michael. 2011. "China's Assertive Behaviour. Part One: One 'Core Interests'." *China Leadership Monitor* 34, 1–25; Swaine, Michael and Taylor Fravel. 2011. "China's Assertive Behaviour. Part Two: The Maritime Periphery." *China Leadership Monitor* 35, 8; Swaine, Michael. 2012. "China's Assertive Behaviour. Part Three: The Role of the Military in Foreign Policy." *China Leadership Monitor* 36, 1–17.
[17] Shambaugh, David. 2011. "Coping with a Conflicted China." *The Washington Quarterly* 34 (1), 7.
[18] Clinton, Hillary. 2011. "America's Pacific Century." *Foreign Policy* 189, 56–63; On the interpretation of the "pivot to Asia," see Rigger, Shelley. 2013. "Taiwan in US-China Relations." In David Shambaugh (ed.), *Tangled Titans. The United States and China*. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 309.
[19] See, for example, Christensen, Thomas. 2011. "The Advantages of an Assertive China." *Foreign Affairs* 90 (2), 54.
[20] Legro 2008, 169.

empirical data. If in the analysis of quite recent phenomena the conclusions are drawn from only a few cases or unsystematically chosen anecdotes their reliability should be questioned. It is quite rare to find empirically grounded analysis related to China's rise, which does more than mentions a few events that have taken place recently.

In 2013 Johnston wrote another article similar in style with the 2003 text criticising the most recent turn in the China threat literature claiming that China turned more assertive after 2009. He analysed some of the most often mentioned cases of China's claimed new assertiveness; Copenhagen climate change negotiations, Taiwan arms sales in January 2010, South China Sea as a "core interest," response to US deployment of carrier to the Yellow Sea in July 2010, the Senkaku/Diaoyudao boat incident in September 2010 and the claimed rare earth embargo after the incident as well as the response to DPRK shelling of Yeongpyeong island in November 2010. His conclusion was that new assertiveness occurred only in the South China Sea, although it was not defined as China's core interest as some of the "new assertiveness" literature claimed, and the rest of the cases show no across-the-board trend of new assertiveness. Based on his analysis Johnston emphasised that this claimed "new" assertiveness is not new at all. According to Johnston, most of the literature claiming that China turned more assertive in 2009-2010 ignores China's assertiveness prior to 2009 and 2010 including missile firings during Taiwan crisis in 1995-96 and considers only confirming evidence. There were also no dramatic changes happening in the official discourse on sovereignty in 2010. According to Johnston, "2010 was not a watershed in Chinese diplomacy toward sovereignty and territorial integrity issues."[21]

Evidence questioning the China threat theory include patterns of leadership travel during Hu's reign as well as China's increased participation in international organisations. Scott Kastner and Philipp Saunders use leadership travel as an indicator of the

[21] Johnston, Alastair Iain. 2013. "How New Is China's New Assertiveness?" *International Security* 37 (4), 7–48.

direction and goals of Jiang's and Hu's politics. They compared Jiang's and Hu's trips abroad between 1998 and 2008 to find out whether China's leadership trips abroad were more consistent with the characterisation of China as a status quo or a revisionist state. Although travels to foreign countries do not show whether relations are good or bad, they imply that they are a priority to Chinese leaders. A status quo state should not for example prioritise relations with "rogue" states. The overall pattern of foreign travels of top Chinese leaders between the ten-year period indicates that status quo characterisation fits better.[22] Furthermore, China has increasingly participated in international institutions and according to Rosemary Foot and Andrew Walter who examined Chinese and American consistency with global norms in different policy areas ranging from non-proliferation of nuclear weapons to financial regulation, there has been a broad trend in China's international behaviour towards rising level of behavioural consistence supporting the normative frameworks, although some important exceptions remain. In addition, China's commitment to a number of global norms seems to be influenced by its wish to be seen as a responsible power.[23]

Although we can question the claimed assertive turn in China's foreign policy in 2009-2010, China's overall position in the international system remains an ambiguous one. The vibrant and evolving China threat thesis discussed above has forced the Chinese leadership to react to counter this perception of China as a threat. Another reaction is that the view according to which the United States and Japan try to "contain" China becomes more widespread.[24] In the next section I will look at China's international orientation from China's perspective by discussing China's long-term foreign policy goals and foreign policy adjustments done during Hu Jintao's era.

[22] Kastner, Scott and Philipp Saunders. 2012. "Is China a Status Quo or Revisionist State? Leadership Travel as an Empirical Indicator of Foreign Policy Priorities." *International Studies Quarterly* 56, 163–177.
[23] Foot, Rosemary and Andrew Walter. 2011. *China, the United States and Global Order*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 280–292.
[24] Lieberthal, Kenneth and Wang Jisi. 2012. "Addressing U.S.-China Strategic Distrust." Washington: John L. Thornton Monograph Series 4, March 2012.

Change and Continuity in China's Foreign Policy

To describe China's current position in the international order with conceptual tools that allow to place changes happened during ten years of Hu's reign into context, I adopted Charles Herrmann's categorisation of foreign policy change. According to Herrmann, the most extreme form of foreign policy change is change of *international orientation*. This form of policy change involves a fundamental shift in actor's international role and activities, and China's foreign policy went through international orientation change after reform and opening up in 1978, but since that no change in China's basic orientation has happened. Another yet slightly milder change occurs when main foreign policy *goals are changed*. Although the Communist Party has not officially admitted it, in practice China has given up the goal to reach communism, which also changed the ways foreign policy has been conducted after 1978.[25] *Programme changes* relate to the methods or means by which the goal is addressed. *Adjustment changes* are defined in terms of the scope of recipients and level of effort.[26] The main changes between Hu's foreign policy compared that of Jiang were a move from traditional state-to-state relations into more multilateral or issue-oriented foreign policy.[27] During Hu's reign China's national interests became more varied, which perhaps led to a more cross-regional diplomacy compared to that of Jiang, who concentrated on Asian states and big powers such as the United States and Russia.[28] During Hu's period China established China-Africa forum, China-Arab forum, China-Latin America forum and China-South Pacific

[25] The Constitution of the Communist Party states that "The realization of communism is the highest ideal and ultimate goal of the Party." The Constitution of the Communist Party of China (amended and adopted in the 17th CPC National Congress on October 21, 2007). http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2007-10/25/content_6944738.htm. Accessed 15 December 2013.
[26] Herrmann, Charles. 1990. "Changing Course: When Governments Choose to Redirect Foreign Policy." *International Studies Quarterly* 34 (1), 5–6.
[27] Wang, Jisi. 2011. "China's Search for a Grand Strategy." *Foreign Affairs* 90 (2), 68–79.
[28] Lanteigne, Mark. 2009. C*hina's Foreign Policy: An Introduction.* New York: Routledge, 22.

forum. This cross-regional tendency and broader scope can also be seen if we analyse the destinations of Chinese leaders' state visits and other foreign travels.[29] If analysing the patterns of top leaders' state visits from 1978 to 2006, there is a general increase in amount of trips and in the geographical distribution, both greater diversification of destinations and at the same time concentration to Asian region with the exception of Japan, which tells about regional emphasis in China's diplomatic priorities.[30] Another tendency beginning to strengthen during Hu's years was the "two-level game" issue due to diversification of foreign policy actors and growing foreign policy awareness of the Chinese public. The leadership increasingly emphasised or noted connections between China's domestic and foreign policy interests and even synchronised some of the key foreign policy terminology according to the domestic political agenda. Hu Jintao expressed the need to integrate domestic and international political levels for example in his speeches at the CCP Central Committee foreign affairs meeting in August 2006 and in the 11th ambassadorial meeting in July.[31] In 2007 Hu also stressed that leading cadres at all levels must continue to improve the ability to co-ordinate domestic and international situations.[32]

Despite the bold characterisations of China present in the China's rise discourse, it seems that China is still searching for its place and role in the international system. Feng Zhang states that in contrast to Imperial China, which stood for Confucian civilization and Maoist China, which aimed at advancing proletariat revolution, today's China "is unable to clarify what it stands for."[33] China has not published any document that would comprehensively define its strategic goals and ways to achieve them.[34] In short, although

[29] Kastner and Saunders 2012, 163–177.
[30] Zhang, Qingmin and Bing Liu. 2008. "Shounao chufang yu Zhongguo waijiao" (Summit Trips abroad and Chinese Diplomacy). *Guoji zhenzhi yanjiu* (*International Politics Quarterly*) 2, 1–20.
[31] As cited in Zhang, Feng. 2012. "Rethinking China's Grand Strategy: Beijing's Evolving National Interests and Strategic Ideas in the Reform Era." *International Politics* 49 (3), 329–330.
[32] Hu, Jintao. 2007. "Hu Jintao's Report at 17th Party Congress," 15 October 2007, http://www.china.org.cn/english/congress/229611.htm. Accessed 14 December 2013.
[33] Zhang 2012, 339.
[34] Wang 2011, 68–79.

China issues five-year-plans, a Chinese "grand strategy" in a form of a detailed plan regarding its foreign policy goals sometimes desired by the domestic audience remains to be written. On the other hand, broadly speaking some policy goals have very long roots. As David Shambaugh put it, some of the core themes that have been present in the Chinese political agenda since the Self-Strengthening movement in the 1870s are still there. As before, building national wealth and power, aiming to improve China's international image and preventing internal chaos and to a certain extent, using nationalism for preserving unity continue to be the most important goals of the current leadership.[35]

In addition, a few more specified key goals have been central to China as of the beginning of the reform and opening up era. Next I will briefly discuss the key foreign policy goals of modernisation and economic development, national unification with Taiwan and preference for a multipolar world and analyse new features that appeared during Hu Jintao's era, namely defining maintenance of China's political system as a core interest and the increased use of Confucian terminology in the political context. The key goals form a somewhat heterogeneous group, as some are involved in a very active and tangible policy conduct whereas others seem to remain merely political slogans. Most analysts agree that compared to other sectors, China has been rather proactive in its economic policies during Hu Jintao's era. In contrast, concrete policies to achieve "multipolarity" in the international system are harder to find. Terms such as "multipolarity" in the international system, "peaceful development" and "harmonious world" appear often in official foreign policy documents such as speeches of top leaders describing foreign policy ideals China claims to be advancing in its foreign policy conduct, but we can reasonably ask if any of these slogans has had any measurable effect on foreign policies on the practical level. Still, in the Chinese hierarchical political context, which still adheres to socialist political culture and practices at least in

[35] Shambaugh, David. 2008. *China's Communist Party. Atrophy and Adaptation*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 169.

principle, repeatedly mentioning these concepts is not merely empty talk but has to be understood in the context of identity and Chinese visions for its future status. It is also worth to note that all the above-mentioned foreign policy goals have clear footing in both in the domestic and foreign policy realm, as will be explained in more detail in the following sections.

Continuous: Modernization and economic development as top priorities

During Hu Jintao's reign China's foreign policy has continued to be driven by the two main goals that have been important in China's foreign policy since the beginning of reform and opening up, modernisation and economic growth. These goals are defined both in the Constitution of People's Republic of China as well as in the Constitution of the Communist Party of China.[36] In addition to mentioning economic issues as a priority in political documents, this priority can also be seen in China's participation in global economic decision making in institutions such as the World Trade Organisation and International Monetary Fund as well as in its diplomatic agenda, in which especially safeguarding strategic economic interests related to energy supplies play an increasingly important role. More than half of Hu Jintao's trips to foreign countries between January 2005 and July 2010 were to places in which at least one of the three big oil companies had business interests.[37]

To secure an international environment that supports China's economic goals and to argue against the China threat theory, China has had to reassure other states that its rise will not harm others. Talk on China's "peaceful development" (*heping fazhan,* 和平发展) appeared in the political vocabulary in late 2003, although it was first called "peaceful rise"

[36] The Constitution of People's Republic of China defines socialist modernisation as the basic task of the nation. The Constitution of People's Republic of China 2004.
The Communist Party of China lists fulfilling the "three historical tasks of advancing the modernization drive, achieving national unification, and safeguarding world peace and promoting common development" as its main goals. The Constitution of the Communist Party of China 2007.
[37] Jakobson and Knox 2010, 27.

(*heping jueqi,* 和平崛起). Soon after its formal acceptance, the leadership realised that "rise" might have a slightly aggressive undertone and in the spring of 2004, peaceful rise was replaced with peaceful development in official papers.[38] Peaceful rise holds that China will support a stable international order and refrain from aggressive actions against other countries in order to continue its economic development over the next half a century. For example foreign minister Li Zhaoxing used "peaceful development" in August 2005.[39] Its use continued during the whole Hu era, and in September 2011 China released *China's Peaceful Development* white paper, which states: "China does not seek regional hegemony or sphere of influence, nor does it want to exclude any country from participating in regional cooperation. China's prosperity, development and long-term stability represent an opportunity rather than a threat to its neighbours." In addition, the white paper claims China's rise "has broken away from the traditional pattern where a rising power was bound to seek hegemony" and that China is a "responsible member of the international community," the latter of which refers to Western quests for China to become a responsible stakeholder.[40] Indeed, in addition to terms of harmounious world and peaceful development, Chinese politicians' references to China as a "responsible country" have increased. For example in 2008, premier Wen Jiabao defined China as a responsible developing country (*fuzeren de fazhanzhong daguo,* 负责任的发展中大国) in a meeting on the UN millennium development goals.[41]

[38] Glaser, Bonnie and Evan Medeiros. 2007. "The Changing Ecology of Foreign Policy-Making in China: The Ascension and Demise of the Theory of 'Peaceful Rise'." *The China Quarterly* 190, 291–310.
[39] Li, Zhaoxing. 2005. "Banner of Diplomacy Stressed," 23 August 2005, http://english.people.com.cn/200508/23/eng20050823_204109.html. Accessed 8 June 2013 (Original source: *China Daily*).
[40] China's Peaceful Development White Paper 2011.
[41] Li, Dongyan. 2011. "Cong guoji zeren de rending yu tezheng kan Zhongguo de guoji zeren" (Defining China's International Responsibility from the Perspective of Definition and Characterization of International Responsibility). *Xiandai guoji guanxi* (*Contemporary International Relations*) 8, 54.

Continuous: Preference for a multipolar world

Maintaining that China did not change its international orientation during Hu Jintao's period does not mean that it would be completely satisfied with all the aspects of current international order. China's preference for "multipolarity" (*duojihua,* 多极化) has often been interpreted as a sign of dissatisfaction. Discussion on China's preference for a multipolar world started after the Cold War and has continued since.[42] "Multipolarity" of the international system refers to China's wish that all states would have a more equal say and no country would be predominant.[43] Although multipolarity seems slightly in contradictory with the aim of reassuring the world of China's benevolent intentions, China has continued to hold a "multipolar world" as an ideal as well as articulated its opposition against another related concept, "hegemonism" (*baquanzhuyi,* 霸权主义). In the beginning of Hu's term, China defined its foreign policy as "independent foreign policy of peace" consisting of the main components of independence, opposing hegemonism and acting according to the five principles of peaceful coexistence.[44] These same ideas were mentioned in the Constitution of People's Republic of China and in the Constitution of the Communist Party of China, which was amended and adopted in the 17th Party Congress in 2007.[45]

While multipolarity discussion is often interpreted as China's opposition to the dominant role of the US in world affairs, it is probably not a sufficient indicator of the revisionist intentions of Chinese leaders. Iain Johnston has argued that use of "multipolarity" in official documents may also be directed to a section of the domestic audience and multipolarisation as a goal might be a tactic utilised by the moderates to respond to hardliners

[42] Zhang 2012, 326.
[43] China.org.cn. 2006. "China's 2006 Defence White Paper," http://www.china.org.cn/english/features/book/194486.htm. Accessed 4 September 2012.
[44] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China 2003.
[45] The Constitution of People's Republic of China 2004; The Constitution of the Communist Party of China 2007.

who would like to balance against the United States.[46] In addition, Chinese officials have many times emphasised that China is rising peacefully and its foreign policy is not directed against the US.

Continuous: Taiwan and the goal of national unification

The Taiwan issue is a concrete reminder of the past issues that have not been resolved and plays an important role in Chinese national identity. Taiwan was separated from China and ceded to Japan by the treaty of Shimonoseki, which concluded the Sino-Japanese War in 1895. From 1895 Taiwan was under Japanese rule until the Kuomintang came in 1945. For many Chinese, national division from Taiwan is the last symbol of national humiliation. From a domestic perspective, the Taiwan issue is one of the few topics that unites Chinese in the post-1989 era.[47]

From the establishment of People's Republic China, national unification has been its foreign policy goal. Its primacy is manifested in its placement in the Chinese constitution, which states in its preamble: "Taiwan is part of the sacred territory of the People's Republic of China. It is the inviolable duty of all Chinese people, including our compatriots in Taiwan, to accomplish the great task of reunifying the motherland."[48] Keeping Taiwan within China is seen as crucial for CCP's legitimacy.[49] In addition to the legitimacy issue, the government's fears that if Taiwan is not unified with the mainland, it could further provoke separatist claims in Tibet, Xinjiang and possibly elsewhere. Beijing also finds it

[46] Johnston 2003, 33.
[47] Brady, Anne-Marie. 2008. *Marketing Dictatorship. Propaganda and Thought Work in Contemporary China*. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 102.
[48] Preamble of the Constitution of People's Republic of China 2004.
[49] Zheng, Yongjin. 2008. "Anticipating China's Future Diplomacy: History, Theory, and Social Practice." In Pauline Kerr, Stuart Harris, and Qin Yaqing (eds.), *China's "New" Diplomacy. Tactical or Fundamental Change?* New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 131–149.

uncomfortable that it has lost control over the conduct of cross-Strait relations, because it has to react to changes in Taiwan's domestic politics, which are mostly out of its grip.[50]

The Taiwan issue has an important international aspect to it. It remains one of the most difficult issues in the Sino-American bilateral relations because of the US support for Taiwan including military backing and repeated arms sales, which continued during the whole Hu leadership.[51] To make matters even more complicated, Japan as a US ally in Asia is also involved in the Taiwan problem due to its geographical proximity to the island. Japan's involvement in the Taiwan issue deepened after 1997 because the concept of "situation in areas surrounding Japan" was added into Japan's security agreement with the US, officially called the Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation.[52] Although currently the situation between China and Taiwan is relatively stable, the risk factors of having the US and China on the opposite sides in the Taiwan issue that is a top political priority to the Chinese and geographically 180 kilometres from the Chinese border makes Taiwan one of the few locations in the world most likely to be involved in a major power armed conflict.[53] Robert Ross argued in 2006 that the mutual deterrence between the US and China is quite stable in the Taiwan case as Chinese military technology would not be capable of winning against the US in the Taiwan theatre. As the US, China and Taiwan all recognize the devastating effects a military conflict would bring to all of them, status quo is likely to hold.[54]

Taiwan has remained important during the Hu era, and especially the first half of Hu leadership was a turbulent period in the Cross-Strait relationship. Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao asserted on December 8, 2003 at the White House that China was prepared to pay "any

[50] Yahuda, Michael. 2004. *The International Politics of the Asia Pacific*. London: Routledge, 307.
[51] Kan, Shirley. 2013. "Taiwan: Major U.S. Arms Sales since 1990." CRS Report for Congress, 1–58.
[52] Ajemian, Chris. 1998. "The 1997 U.S.-Japan Defense Guidelines under the Japanese Constitution and their Implications for U.S. Foreign Policy." *The Pacific Rim Law and Policy Journal* 7 (2), 323–350.
[53] You, Ji. 2008. "China's 'New' Diplomacy, Foreign Policy, and Defense Strategy." In Pauline Kerr, Stuart Harri, and Qin Yaqing (eds.), *China's 'New' Diplomacy. Tactical or Fundamental Change?* New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 81.
[54] Ross, Robert S.. 2006. "Comparative Deterrence – The Taiwan Strait and the Korean Peninsula." In Alastair Iain Johnston and Robert S. Ross (eds.), *New Directions in the Study of China's Foreign Policy*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 13–49.

price" to resist Taiwan independence.[55] The Taiwan issue was defined as a "sensitive core interest" in Wen Jiabao's speech in the US in 2003.[56] In March 2005 the National People's Congress passed the Anti-secession law to safeguard Chinese territorial integrity, in which the PRC states that it will use force if Taiwan attempts to become formally independent.[57] Relations between China and Taiwan eased up slightly after Kuomintang reclaimed power in Taiwan in 2008 and Ma Ying-jeou adhered to an anti-independence stand.[58] Still, China's message is that it will not ease up its position on the Taiwan issue. If one goes over speeches of Hu and Wen between 2002-2012 which have links to the US, the Taiwan issue is always mentioned as an issue making it more difficult to enhance Sino-US relations.

New: Confucian rhetoric

During the Hu Jintao era a growing trend in the evolution of CCP's ideology has been to draw Confucian influences in developing new concepts and terminology. Hu Jintao introduced the harmonious world (*hexie shijie,* 和谐世界) concept in his speech at the 60th anniversary summit of the United Nations in September 2005.[59] Hu expressed his wish to "build a harmonious world with permanent peace and common prosperity" which "is tolerant of and incorporates all civilizations."[60] "Harmonious world" is an extension of "harmonious society,"

[55] People's Daily, 10 December 2003. As cited in Zhu, Feng. 2008. "China's Rise Will be Peaceful. How Unipolarity Matters." In Robert S. Ross and Zhu Feng (eds.) *China's Ascent. Power, Security, and the Future of International Politics*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 51.
[56] Wen, Jiabao. 2003. "Working together to Write a New Chapter in China-US Relations," 9 December 2003, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjdt/zyjh/t55971.shtml. Accessed 12 March 2013.
[57] Xinhua. 2005. "Fan fenlie guojia fa" (Anti-Secession Law), 14 March 2005, http://news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2005-03/14/content_2694168.htm. Accessed 15 December 2013.
[58] Rigger 2013, 302.
[59] Blanchard, Jean-Marc and Suijian Guo. 2008. "Introduction: Harmonious World and China's New Foreign Policy." Lanham: Lexington Books, 2.
[60] Hu, Jintao. 2005. "Build towards a Harmonious World of Lasting Peace and Common Prosperity," 15 September 2005, http://www.un.org/webcast/summit2005/statements15/china050915eng.pdf. Accessed 8 June 2013.

which was mentioned the first time in 2002 in the resolution of the 16th Party Congress and defined in September 2004.[61]

"Harmonious world" and "harmonious society" are considered to be Hu's central legacy comparable to the "three represents" Jiang Zemin initiated. In addition, they are a manifestation of the leadership's efforts to synchronise foreign policy concepts with those used in the domestic realm and to increase social stability. Reintroducing Confucianism can be seen to part of the identity problem of how to be "modern" and "Chinese" at the same time. More than about China's actual foreign policy conduct or its goals, these slogans probably tell about CCP's persuasion tactics. The use of "harmonious" tells that the CCP tries to make its political language more lucrative to the domestic audience.[62] Some analysts also argue that harmonious world indicates that China is now increasingly confident and ready to take greater responsibilities in international affairs.[63]

Confucianism has also been part of China's soft power programme directed to other countries. Since 2004 China has established Confucius Institutes to teach Chinese language and culture and these institutes can be now found worldwide.[64] Professor Jin Canrong from Renmin University sees the establishment of Confucius Institues as a turning point in Hu Jintao's reign, because it showed a clear outreaching and active orientation in Hu's policy.[65]

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[61] Renmin Ribao (People's Daily). 27 September 2004. "Zhonggong zhongyang guanyu jiaqiang dang de zhizheng nengli jianshe de jueding" (Resolution of the CCP Central Committee on Strengthening the Construction of the Party's Governing Capacity), 17 November 2004, http://www.people.com.cn/GB/40531/40746/2994977.html. Accessed 15 December 2013.
[62] Brady, Anne-Marie. 2012. "State Confucianism, Chineseness, and Tradition in CCP Propaganda." In Anne-Marie Brady (ed.), *China's Thought Management*. New York: Routledge, 57–75.
[63] Zheng, Yongnian and Sow Keat Tok. 2007. "'Harmonious Society' and 'Harmonious World': China's Policy Discourse Under Hu Jintao." *Briefing Series* Issue 26, China Policy Institute at the University of Nottingham.
[64] Hanban (Chinese National Office for Teaching Chinese as a Foreign Language) website. http://english.hanban.org/node_10971.htm. Accessed 5 July 2013.
[65] Interview with Professor Jin Canrong, Renmin University of China, 2 March 2012.

New: Chinese socialist political system as a core interest

In 2010 the leadership authorised a clarification of Chinese priorities and redefined the purpose of its foreign policy laying more emphasis on domestic stability. In December 2010 Dai Bingguo, the state councillor for external relations stated that China's core interests (*hexin liyi*，核心利益) were first, stability of the political system and socialism with Chinese characteristics, second sovereign security, territorial integrity and national unification and third, China's sustainable economic and social development.[66] This order notably places CCP's leadership as the first priority and indicates that anything that might violate this first priority will be taken very seriously. The list of China's "core interests" was presented again in the 2011 China's Peaceful Development white paper, which states that "China is firm in upholding its core interests which include the following: state sovereignty, national security, territorial integrity and national reunification, China's political system established by the Constitution and overall social stability, and the basic safeguards for ensuring sustainable economic and social development."[67]

Professor Wang Jisi from Peking University sees domestic instability in Tibet in March 2008 and in Xinjiang in July 2009 as key reasons influencing this new emphasis on domestic stability.[68] In addition to domestic instabilities and protests that occurred in 2008 and 2009, some analysts suggest that the personal experiences of the fourth generation leadership who lived through the Cultural Revolution turmoil and the Sino-Soviet split emphasized their appreciation of stability and order and thus increased sensitivity to domestic turbulence.[69] Moreover, the Chinese leadership wanted to clarify confusion caused by an article published in the *New York Times* in the spring of 2010. This article created a widespread common understanding that China had included the South China issue into its

[66] Dai, Bingguo. 2010. "Jianchi zou heping fazhan daolu" (Adhering to the Road of Peaceful Development), 7 December 2010, http://www.chinanews.com/gn/2010/12-07/2704984.shtml. Accessed 18 April 2013.
[67] China's Peaceful Development White Paper 2011.
[68] Wang 2011.
[69] Lanteigne 2009, 22.

core interests, although the text only cited unofficial sources. In fact no official sources had defined South China Sea as China's "core interest."[70]

Public opinion

Against the backdrop of increased emphasis on domestic stability, public opinion issues seem particularly relevant. In 2013 China spent more on internal security (769.1 billion yuan) than on national defence (740.6 billion yuan), which manifests the government's fear of domestic unrest of any kind.[71] The number of "mass incidents" per year has grown from around 8700 in 1993 to over 90000 in 2010.[72] As discussed in the previous chapter, people's expectations on China's foreign policy behaviour shape foreign policy makers' understanding of what can be regarded as acceptable or legitimate foreign policy conduct despite China' authoritarian political system. It is increasingly common in the China studies literature to state that rising nationalism influences China's foreign policy primarily by questioning the legitimacy of the CCP.[73]

Insider views from China support the view of public opinion's increasing influence. Professor Qin Yaqing who is a member of the Chinese Foreign Policy Advisory Council says that public opinion matters in China and its influence has been in the increase in recent years. According to him, influence of public opinion is not that different between China and democratic countries. But attentive publics are more important than public opinion

[70] Swaine 2011, 8–10; Johnston 2013, 17–20.
[71] Chinese government draft budget for 2013 is available at http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/BudgetReport_Chn_2013.pdf. Accessed 23 June 2014.
[72] Reuters. 2013. "China Hikes Defense Budget, to Spend More on Internal Security," 5 March 2013, http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/03/05/us-china-parliament-defence-idUSBRE92403620130305. Accessed 13 November 2013.
[73] See Chapter One.

at large in terms of foreign policy, as their voices are louder.[74] In addition to Qin, all my other interviewees felt that public opinion had increasing influence on foreign policy.[75]

Means of trying to influence policy makers vary from expressing one's views online to participating in demonstrations. There are also innovative approaches such as sending calcium supplements to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs with the implied message that the policymakers should have stronger bones to pursue tougher foreign policy.[76] As discussed in the previous chapter, it is also likely that even unmobilised opinion majorities may have some effect. Public opinion research done in democratic countries shows that large and stable opinion majorities are needed for public opinion to have an impact on foreign policy. Next I will provide an overview of the results from public opinion surveys conducted in China first regarding uncritical support for the government and then regarding China's position in the world and relations with Japan and the US. This overview helps to characterise the opinion climate in which Hu Jintao leadership conducted their foreign policy in 2002-2012. In addition, I descibe in what ways respondents' background factors such as age or educational and income levels affect their views according to the available data.

Uncritical support for the government

With China's ever–increasing budget for internal security and the large propaganda apparatus in mind it is useful to try to somehow evaluate the level of unconditional support for the government. According to Beijing Area Study's (BAS) data from 2007, 35 percent of respondents agreed that one should support his or her government even if it is wrong. In 2009 this share increased to 46 percent, though a majority still disagreed with this statement.[77] A similar question with slightly different wording was included in a nationally representative

[74] Interview with Professor Qin Yaqing, Beijing Foreign Affairs University, 15 March 2012.
[75] Interviews conducted between November 2011 and May 2012.
[76] Interview with Dr. Yu Yingli at the Shanghai Institute for International Studies, 30 November 2011.
[77] Johnston 2013, 37.

public opinion survey from 2008 and two student surveys from 2007 and 2011-2012 collected by the author.[78] In Texas A&M University's 2008 China Survey (N=3526), 38 percent of the respondents either agreed or strongly agreed that "People should support their country even if the country is in the wrong," 11 percent neither agreed nor disagreed, 37 percent disagreed and 14 percent disagreed strongly.[79] If we compare these shares of uncritical support to two samples of elite university students, we note that in comparison to public opinion polls, elite university students report very low levels of uncritical support for their country. In the 2007 student survey (N=1323), respondents who agreed or strongly agreed with the statement "People should support their country even if the country is in the wrong" amounted to 16 percent, 30 percent could not choose, 43 percent disagreed and 11 percent disagreed strongly. In 2011-2012 (N=761) only five percent of respondents agreed or strongly agreed with the statement "I support my country whether its policies are right or wrong," 23 neither agreed nor disagreed, 47 percent disagreed and 25 percent disagreed strongly. Here the wording of the statement was slightly different the second time, which may account for a small amount of the differences between the distributions. However, based on these two surveys, uncritical support is more likely to be decreasing rather than increasing.

China's role in the world and power position

From the public opinion surveys conducted in China in the 2000s we can observe two overall trends concerning China's international position and status. First, the Chinese expect China's rise to continue. Although the US is regarded as the most powerful country at the moment, large shares of the respondents expect China to surpass the US at some point in the future. In two surveys collected in 2007 and 2008 the majority of respondents expected China to surpass

[78] These three samples are described in more detail in Chapter Five. It is possible that the BAS data are not entirely comparable with these surveys because the word "government" was used in the question rather than "country," which may increase the likelihood of political correctedness, but for the purposes of rough estimates, this small difference in wording should not be too severe.
[79] These three samples are described in more detail in Chapter Five.

the US whereas in two other surveys from 2006 and 2009 less than 40 percent expected China to overtake the US as the dominant power. Finally, considerable shares of the respondents in two surveys did not feel that China receives an adequate amount of respect internationally.

Asia Barometer conducted in China in February-March 2005 asked how much influence the respondents thought China, the US, Japan and some other countries had in the world. Unsurprisingly, the Chinese respondents rated the US as the country with most influence measured on a scale from 0 to 10. Only around 17 percent of the respondents evaluated US influence with values below eight with the remaining 83 percent scoring the US influence as eight or higher. Ratings of China were also quite high. Only around 36 percent gave China a value below eight meaning that the remaining 64 percent saw China influential in the global context. Japan's influence was estimated as considerably lower compared to China or the US. The vast majority (62 percent) rated Japanese influence with values below eight.[80]

Chinese expectations of the future global order and China's place within it have been inquired in multiple surveys. In the Asia Barometer 30 percent of the respondents felt that the US would continue to be the world's leading power in the next 50 years, whereas 38 percent responded that another state will become as powerful as the US and according to the evaluation of the remaining 32 percent of respondents, the US will be surpassed by another power.[81] The Pew Global Attitudes Survey project has inquired about the switching power balance many times since 2005. According to the 2006 Pew survey, 4 percent of Chinese see China replacing the US as dominant power during the next ten years, 13 percent see this possible within the next 20 years and 20 percent within the next 50 years.[82] In the Pew 2008

[80] International Consortium of Political and Social Research (ICPSR). 2004. "Asia Barometer," http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/ICPSR/. Accessed 15 December 2013. The China sample in the Asia Barometer consisted of 1000 respondents from mainly urban areas. The proportion of urban rural was 8:2.
[81] Asia Barometer 2004.
[82] Pew Research Global Attitudes Project. 2006. "Publics of Asian Powers Hold Negative Views of One Other," 21 September 2006, http://pewglobal.org/2006/09/21/publics-of-asian-powers-hold-negative-views-of-one-

survey, the majority of the respondents (53%) expected their country to eventually overtake the US as the dominant power, whereas 23 percent felt that China would never replace the US.[83] Perhaps because of the financial crisis the Chinese were more pessimistic in their evaluations in the 2009 Pew survey in which only 34 percent believed that China would surpass the US at some point. In comparison, this time 41 percent of the respondents were of the view that China will never surpass the US.[84] The Committee 100 survey on Sino-American Relations (2007) reveals that less than 40 percent of the Chinese respondents felt that the US would remain the world superpower in twenty years time. A majority of the general public (55%) and business leaders (53%) believe China will be the leading global superpower in twenty years, and 31 percent of the opinion leaders agree.[85] These high expectations on China's international position do not reflect on foreign policy priorities however, which were asked in the Chicago Council of Foreign Affairs poll from 2006: Chinese respondents rated promotion of economic growth (69%) and protecting the jobs of Chinese workers (71%) as top foreign policy priorities whereas building superior military power in Asia received support only from 40 percent of respondents. However staying out of world affairs was not seen as an option and almost 93 percent felt that China should take actively part in world affairs.[86]

The Asia-Europe Survey (2000) inquired how respondents felt about their

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another/. Accessed 19 February 2011. The samples were collected in six cities and surrounding rural areas, and the total sample size was 2180 people. Pew's datasets can be downloaded from http://www.pewglobal.org/category/datasets/.

[83] Pew 2008.

[84] Pew 2009.

[85] Committee 100. 2007. "2007 C-100 Interactive Report: American & Chinese Attitudes toward Each Other; Survey on Sino-American Relations," http://survey.committee100.org/2007/. Accessed 20 February 2011. Opinions of *general public* were constructed using multi-stage random sampling method, including respondents from seven cities, seven towns and ten villages with total sample size of 4104 people. *Opinion leaders* (n=203) comprised of 60 social sciences experts from universities and research institutions, 62 senior journalists and editors, 44 senior managers from NGOs and 37 senior professionals from different fields. Sample of *business elite* (n=156) consisted of senior decision makers and executives from corporations in different sectors.

[86] The Chicago Council on Global Affairs. 2006. "Global Views 2006: The United States and the Rise of China and India," http://www.thechicagocouncil.org/files/Surveys/Global_Views_2006/files/Studies_Publications/POS/POS2006/RiseofChinaandIndia.aspx?hkey=722cd929-b952-497b-970b-1ae469b88983. Accessed 15 December 2013. The survey was conducted by Chinese polling firm GlobeScan with a sample of 2000 respondents.

country's international position. 41 percent of the Chinese respondents replied that China was not treated fairly in international economic and political affairs, and 27 percent implied that China was not respected in other countries as much as it ought to be.[87] Lowy Institute's China Poll from 2009 shows that younger Chinese people and those with higher education levels are more likely to perceive that China receives "less respect" internationally than it deserves compared to elder respondents and those with lower education levels. In addition, younger people in the Lowy Institute's poll also saw the US more threatening than older people.[88]

Chinese views of the US and Sino-US relations

Chinese public's views of the US include both admiration of the economic advancements and societal freedom, but on the other hand the US is regarded as hegemonic and aggressive. These mixed feelings have been present in Chinese public views for a longer time although there has also been some fluctuation in the general impressions towards the US. Earlier studies report a shift from a positive sentiment towards the US in the 1980s into an increasingly negative one in the 1990s.[89] Before the Hu Jintao's period there were also a few occasions of large anti-American demonstrations because of the Belgrade embassy bombing in 1999 and the EP-3 incident in 2001, but between 2002 and 2012 there have not been any similar events.

Iain Johnston analysed the Chinese feelings toward the US with a feeling thermometer with the BAS datasets from 1998 to 2004 and found out that there was a clear

[87] Sinnott, Richard. 2008. "Identity, Inequality and Globalisation." In Takahashi Inoguchi and Ian March (eds.), *Globalisation, Public Opinion and the State.* London: Routledge, 128.
[88] Hanson, Fergus and Andrew Shearer. 2009. "China and the World. Public Opinion and Foreign Policy," *Lowy Institute Poll 2009*, http://www.lowyinstitute.org/Publication.asp?pid=1193. Accessed 19 February 2011, 3–4. This survey was conducted via telephone interviews with 1200 respondents based on a stratified multi-stage random sample.
[89] Fewsmith, Joseph and Stanley Rosen. 2001. "Domestic Context of Chinese Foreign Policy: Does 'Public Opinion' Matter?" In David Lampton (ed.), *The Making of Chinese Foreign and Security Policy in the Era of Reform, 1978-2000*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 151; Kayser, Catherine and Su Lin. 2007. "Conceptualizing Foreign Policy: The 'Peaceful Rise' Debate among China's Scholars." In Sujian Guo and Shiping Hua (eds.), *New Dimensions of Chinese Foreign Policy*. Plymouth: Lexington Books, 45.

downward trend in the Chinese perceptions of the US probably because of the 1999 embassy bombing and 2001 plane collision. However, the level of amity towards the US in 1998 in the BAS dataset was relatively high when taken into consideration that some Chinese polls and scholarly views suggested largely positive views in the 1980s and increasingly negative views in the 1990s. In addition to an overall negative trend in the Chinese sentiments, Johnston identified respondents with higher level of education, travelling experiences, more interest in the external world, higher incomes and those who were younger more likely to express higher levels of positive feelings toward the US.[90] Later Johnston reported that in the BAS samples from 2007 and 2009 the share of respondents finding the perceived warlikeness of the US remained in the 34 percent on both years indicating no change in the attitudes.[91]

Other survey results support Johnston's findings on the associations of education and wealth with more positive views of the US. The Committee 100 survey (2007) inquired respondents' general impressions of the US. Business leaders held very favourable views (94%) and only six percent of them described their general feelings towards the US as very or somewhat unfavourable. In the category of "opinion leaders" 86 percent held positive views of the US and the remaining 11 percent described their views as negative. In contrast to these two groups, the general public was much less enthusiastic about the US. Although the majority held favourable views (60%), 26 percent held unfavourable views and 14 percent declined.[92]

The BAS data between 1998 and 2004 showed a negative trend in the Chinese sentiments. Pew Global Attitudes Project has inquired general impressions of the US in the Chinese population since 2005 and in the Pew datasets we cannot identify any overall trend. Rather the sentiments have fluctuated from generally more negative in 2005 into slightly

[90] Johnston, Alastair Iain. 2006. "The Correlates of Beijing Public Opinion toward the United States, 1998-2004." In Alastair Iain Johnston and Robert S. Ross (eds.), *New Directions in the Study of China's Foreign Policy*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 340–378.
[91] Johnston 2013, 37.
[92] Committee 100 Survey 2007.

more positive in 2006, then back to more negative from 2007 until 2010, when the positive sentiments peaked before sliding back down to more negative impressions in 2011 and 2012. Despite these fluctuations it is notable that in contrast to Chinese people's views on Japan presented below, general impression of the US have been occasionally more positive than negative during the time period 2005-2012. Development of Chinese general impressions of the US are presented in Figure 3.1.

Figure 3.1. Chinese respondents general impressions of the US in the Pew Global Attitudes Project's polls 2005–2012. Figures are percentages of respondents holding positive or negative impressions of the US.[93]



[93] Figures are compiled from datasets available at http://www.pewglobal.org/. Accessed 11 November 2013.

In the addition to their general impressions of the US, multiple polls have inquired about respondents views on the state of Sino-US relations and whether these two countries should be characterised as more rivals or partners. In the Asia Barometer collected in 2004 the majority (57.5 percent) of respondents felt that the Sino-US relations were improving, 29 percent thought they were staying about the same and a minority of 13 percent of the respondents evaluated the relations to be worsening.[94] A few years later in 2006 in the Chicago Council of Foreign Affairs poll the majority of Chinese respondents (52%) described the two countries as rivals whereas 39 percent thought they were partners. Despite this characterisation 53 percent were of the view that China's relations with the US were improving (53%), 27 percent thought the relations remained about the same as before and 15 percent felt they were worsening.[95]

Public views on Japan and Sino-Japanese relations

Ming Wan argues that negative sentiments have been prevalent in the Sino-Japanese relationship after 1989. In addition, positive events counterbalancing the negative ones have been absent in the 1990s and in the early Hu Jintao period. According to Wan, only the Japanese emperor's visit to China in 1992 evoked strong positive sentiments.[96] For the early 2000s, Liu Zhiming, director of the Media Research Center of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, has been conducting a series of surveys on how Japan is perceived by the Chinese. His survey in 2004 indicated that the percentage of Chinese who disliked or somewhat disliked Japan, compared to 2001, had decreased about 10 points to 40.2 percent. In addition Liu's research shows that the percentage of those who liked or somewhat liked Japan was much higher among the youth than among the middle-aged and the old, and more than 10

[94] Asia Barometer 2004.
[95] The Chicago Council on Global Affairs, Global Views 2006 survey.
[96] Wan, Ming. 2006. *Sino-Japanese Relations: Interaction, Logic and Transformation*. Washington: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 153–154.

points higher in Shanghai and Guanzhou, where the "Japan fever" phenomenon was more salient.[97]

If there really was some improvement in Chinese perceptions of Japan between 2001 and 2004, it certainly faded away by 2005. In 2005 tens of thousands of anti-Japanese protesters took the streets to manifest their anger against Japan's efforts to obtain a permanent seat in the UN Security Council and Japanese history textbooks, which whitewashed Japan's wartime atrocities. The government had to calm down the masses and face the accusations that it was not being patriotic enough to meet people's expectations.[98] More anti-Japanese demonstrations took place in 2010 and 2012. In September 7th 2010 a Chinese trawler and two Japanese cost guard ships collided near the Diaoyu Islands. Japan arrested the crew, which provoked small scale protests in China.[99] 2012 marked the 40th anniversary of normalization of Sino-Japanese relations, but it will be remembered as a problematic year in Sino-Japanese relations. In 2012 Japanese government bought the disputed Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands in order to prevent Tokyo's rightist mayor Shintaro Ishihara from buing the islands. [100] Beijing reacted by quickly sending six maritime enforcement vessels to patrol the area and anti-Japanese protests occurred around the country.[101]

Against the background of these recent negative events further emphasising historical controversies, it is not surprising that Chinese perceptions of Japan have remained negative after 2005. In the BAS samples the share of respondents finding Japan warlike

[97] Akio, Takahara. 2008. "A Japanese Perspective on China's Rise and East Asian Order." In Robert S. Ross and Zhu Feng (eds.), *China's Ascent. Power, Security, and the Future of International Politics*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 225.
[98] Qiu, Jin. 2006. "The Politics of History and Historical Memory in China-Japan relations." *Journal of Chinese Political Science* 11 (1), 25–53; Reilly, James. 2006. "China's History Activism and Sino-Japanese Relations." *China: An International Journal* 4 (2), 189–216.
[99] Beukel, Erik. 2011. "Popular Nationalism in China and the Sino-Japanese Relationship. The Conflict in the East China Sea." *DIIS (Danish Institute for International Studies) Report* 2011 (11), 16–17.
[100] Takenaka, Kiyoshi and Sui-Lee Wee. 2012. "Japan infuriates China by agreeing to buy disputed isles." Reuters. http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/09/10/china-japan-idUSL3E8KA3PP20120910. Accessed 11 July 2014.
[101] Jakobson, Linda. 18 September 2012. "These Anti-Japan Protests Are Different." *The Wall Street Journal Asia* 13.

increased from 41 percent in 2007 to 52 percent in 2009, which according to Johnston can be taken as sign of increased anti-Japanese sentiment.[102] In the Genron NPO and China Daily's polls on Chinese and Japanese perceptions of each others' countries, the overwhelmingly negative impressions of Japan in the Chinese data remained the overall trend between 2005 and 2012, although there is also some variation in the share of negative vs. positive perceptions.[103] In 2005 the unfavourable views of Japan started off high after negative incidents in the bilateral relations. Then negativity decreased gradually and reached its lowest point in 2007. After 2007 negativity at large increased until 2012 although there was a small dip in 2010 in negative sentiments. In contrast to Chinese people's views on the US presented above, general impression of Japan remained more negative than positive during the whole time period 2005-2012. Development of Chinese general impressions of Japan are presented in Figure 3.2.

[102] Johnston 2013, 37.
[103] The Genron NPO is an independent think tank. The Genron NPO. http://www.genron-npo.net/english/. Accessed 28 November 2013.

Figure 3.2. Chinese respondents general impressions of Japan in the Beijing-Tokyo polls 2005-2012. Figures are percentages of respondents holding favourable or unfavourable impressions of Japan.[104]



As with the case of Sino-US relations, multiple polls have inquired about respondents' views on the state of Sino-Japanese relations and whether these two countries should be characterised as more rivals or partners. In the Asia Barometer (2004) the majority (55 percent) of respondents felt that the Sino-Japanese relations were worsening, 21 percent thought they were staying the same and 24 percent held a positive view and responded that the relations were improving.[105] In the Chicago Council of Foreign Affairs poll from 2006 the largest percentage of Chinese respondents were of the view that China's relations with Japan

[104] Beijing-Tokyo Polls. http://tokyo-beijingforum.net/ (in Japanese). Accessed 1 April 2013.
[105] Asia Barometer 2004.

were worsening (49%), 21 percent thought the relations remained about the same as before and only 25 percent felt they were improving. When asked whether China and Japan should be considered more as partners or rivals, 65 percent described the two countries as rivals whereas 26 percent thought they were partners. To the question how to resolve tensions between China and Japan, 26 percent thought both sides should compromise more, 4 percent felt that China should change its policies, 12 percent were really pessimistic and felt that the differences between China and Japan cannot be resolved while the majority (54%) laid the blame on Japan and responded that Japan needs to change its policies.[106]

Conclusion

This chapter has highlighted the role of perceptions in foreign policy both from external and internal perspectives as well as the need to understand the domestic context when analysing Chinese foreign policy because of the close links Chinese foreign policy interests have with its domestic issues as articulated by the government. Regarding the power of perceptions, the Chinese leadership is in a difficult position between internal and external expectations as there seems to be a gap between domestic and external understanding of the speed and implications of China's rise. The claims about China's assertive turn and its details such as the widely spread view that China had defined the South China issue as its core interest when in fact no such statement can be found from any official sources manifest the strenght of suspicion on China outside of its borders. People, including pundits and scholars, seem to believe rather easily negative claims made on China. The Chinese side for its part does not seem to have ways to get its messages through and stop rumours from spreading. Mere talking about peaceful development is clearly not doing the job. In case political leaders also believe

[106] The Chicago Council on Global Affairs, Global Views 2006 survey.

in China's assertive turn and adjust their policies accordingly, it can lead to increasing perceptions of strategic rivalry and arms racing.

During Hu Jintao's period China's socialist political system was defined as China's core interest and the funds directed to internal security are ever increasing. Large shares although less than the majority of the public have showed uncritical support for the government in public opinion surveys, but this tendency is very low in the elite student population that is much more educated and younger than the average respondent in a public opinion poll. Although only one survey question on uncritical support is not sufficient to reveil respondents' likelihood of taking part in protests if the governmnet does something that they do not approve of, there are reasons to assume that uncritical support will decrease among the wider public in the coming years when the educational level increases.

According to the polls cited, Chinese expect China's rise to continue but are more cautious on their predictions on if and when China will surpass the US as the dominant power in the international system. Although the majority of respondents in 2008 thought that China would surpass the US as the dominant power, a year later only around 34 percent thought so. In addition, the public perceptions as identified from available public opinion polls show strong anti-Japanese sentiment and somewhat fluctuating perceptions on the US. This strong negativity against Japan makes it harder for the government to compromise on Chinese interests in any Japan related foreign policy issue.

4. Chapter

Domestic Drivers of China's International Identity. Perceptions of China's Rise among Chinese Intellectuals

> *Western scholarship on the domestic sources of Chinese foreign policy, including elite images and perceptions, is conspicuous by its absence.*
> David Shambaugh 1991[1]

> *Who is the Chinese nation, what is China vis-a` -vis the Western-dominated international system and how can China achieve its national goals of becoming a powerful and prosperous nation? These are the fundamental questions and major concerns of the Chinese International Relations (IR) community.* Qin Yaqing 2011[2]

In recent years, observers have increasingly depicted rising China as a threat. Underlying this ascription is not only the steep increase in China's material capabilities, but also the idea that China has abandoned some of its earlier support for the global and regional order and nationalist sentiments are rising on all layers of the society. The claims of increasing assertiveness are also used to describe academic research in China. Academics and public intellectuals have a growing role in China's foreign policy formulation and debates on international relations can give us a sense of the context from which foreign policies rise and the ways "self" and "other" are delineated. Related to the research questions posed in the introductory chapter, this chapter discusses how scholars in international relations describe China's position in the world and how these descriptions shape their views on China's policies towards the US and Japan.

[1] Shambaugh, David. 1991. *Beautiful Imperialist: China Perceives America, 1972-1990*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 26.
[2] Qin, Yaqing. 2011. "Development of International Relations Theory in China: Progress through Debates." *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific* 11 (2), 231.

"Rising nationalism" in China worries observers outside of China and has been identified as one factor behind China's claimed turn towards more assertive foreign policy.[3] Intellectuals and academics can influence both the general public and elite politicians, which is why their opinions can offer an interesting perspective into foreign policy formulation in China. Moreover, intellectuals have historically been a driving force in nationalist movements and continuously contribute to defining the category of "nation" and its symbolic significance.[4] In China, intellectuals, students and other better-educated Chinese played a crucial role in the May Fourth Movement in the beginning of the 20th century.[5] When the Party-state "reintroduced" nationalism in the beginning of the 1990s, intellectuals became an important part of nationalist discourse, which redefined China's position in the world and its relations with the West and Japan.

Zheng Yongnian and Zhao Suisheng emphasise the role of intellectuals in the "new nationalism" of the 1990s. The role of the intelligentsia was especially strong in the so-called first wave of popular nationalism, which manifested itself through books and magazines including the famous *China Can Say No* (Song et al. 1996) and following "say no-books" (*China that Can Still Say No*, *China is Unhappy* etc.). These books were not serious scholarly publications, but according to Zhao, still reflected the state of mind of many in the new generation of intelligentsia.[6] Zheng agrees that national identity crisis was especially strong among intellectuals in the 1980s and in the 1990s nationalism became the dominant discourse among them. However, in contrast to the 1980s, in the 1990s many argued that Western influences had a negative impact on China.[7] Zhao identifies the end of the Cold War,

[3] Please see the discussion in the three previous chapters.
[4] Breuilly, John. 1994. *Nationalism and the State*. Manchester, Manchester University Press, 91.
[5] Chow, Cezong. 1960. *The May Fourth Movement: Intellectual Revolution in Modern China*. Cambridge, Mass. Harvard University Press.
[6] Zhao, Suisheng. 1997. "Chinese Intellectuals' Quest for National Greatness and Nationalistic Writing in the 1990s." *China Quarterly*, 152 (4), 738–740; Zhao, Suisheng. 2004ab. *A Nation-State by Construction: Dynamics of Modern Chinese Nationalism*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 11.
[7] Zheng, Yongnian. 1999. *Discovering Chinese Nationalism in China. Modernization, Identity and International Relations*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 50–51, 71; Zhao Suisheng 1997.

China's lost bid for the 2000 Olympic games and anti-Chinese publications in the West as causes for the rise of nationalist discourse.[8] In other words, both Zheng and Zhao highlight the role of external factors behind increased amount of nationalist publications implicating that the new nationalism in the 1990s was reactive in nature –but reactive to the external situation, not so much to the changes in domestic politics: Zhao continues that although the rise of nationalist writings among Chinese intellectuals grew at the same time as the government's rhetoric and political campaigns also turned towards nationalism, he sees the change of mood among intellectuals largely as an independent phenomenon. According to Zhao, intellectuals who advocated nationalism in the 1990s came from different political backgrounds implicating that the surge of nationalist writings was largely independent of official propaganda.[9]

Ideas on China's place in the world and foreign policy preferences promoted by Chinese academics and public intellectuals have continued to puzzle Western academics after the 1990s. Allen Carlson describes Chinese thinking about international order as more fluid and contested than it was a decade ago. Alongside a dominant pragmatic approach to international order, which accepts US hegemony, elites have engaged in the *tianxia* (天下) concept that supports benevolent international hierarchy.[10] Carlson notes that although the *tianxia* system and the normative structure of international relations it promotes is not mainstream in Chinese international circles, it signals that a broader reconsideration of international order and China's place therein is taking place, which could have far-reaching implications for Asian security dynamics later.[11]

[8] Zhao Suisheng 1997, 738–739.
[9] Zhao Suisheng 2004a, 10–11.
[10] Carlson, Allen. 2011."Moving Beyond Sovereignty? A Brief Consideration of Recent Changes in China's Approach to International Order and the Emergence of the Tianxia Concept." *Journal of Contemporary China*, 20 (68), 91.
[11] Carlson, Allen. 2011, 89–102.

William Callahan's take on the *tianxia* system has a slightly more concerned undertone. According to Callahan, *tianxia* system explored by some Chinese scholars such as Zhao Tingyang and Wang Gongwu imposes a new hegemony "whereby imperial China's hierarchical governance is updated to the twenty-first century." Callahan sees *tianxia* ideals as contradictory with the China's official policies of peaceful development, because the official rhetoric emphasizes that China's rise will not challenge the structures and norms of the existing international system.[12] However, the *tianxia* ideas promote Chinese solutions to world problems, which also links with the discussion on how China could be a responsible power. According to Callahan, Zhao Tingyang's writings imply that it is the "yellow man's burden" to "pacify and civilize the world," meaning developing Chinese system of world governance and in practice replacing Eurocentrism with Sinocentrism.[13] Callahan continues that although many Chinese writers have criticized Zhao's works, he has discursive power, as he has been able to set the agenda on how others now discuss and think about China's past, present and future. A telling example of the influence of Zhao's writings is that one of Zhao's texts was placed as the lead chapter of the edited volume *Zhongguo xuezhi kan shijie: Guoji zhixu chuan* (*Chinese Scholars view the World: International Order)*, which was edited by Professor Qin Yaqing and published in 2006.[14]

In addition to the broad and long reaching visions associated with the *tianxia* ideals, other scholars have expressed concern over the direction scholarly discourse is going concerning shorter term goals. David Shambaugh analysed different perspectives present in Chinese scholarly community in 2011 and concluded that the centre of gravity in the discourses on China's international identity has shifted towards the realist and even nativist

[12] Callahan, William. 2011. "Tianxia, Empire, and the World: Chinese Visions of World Order for the Twenty-First Century." In William Callahan and Elena Barabantseva (eds.) *China Orders the World. Normative Soft Power and Foreign Policy*. Washinghton: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 92–93.
[13] Callahan 2011, 102–105. Callahan refers mainly to Zhao Tingyang''s book *Tianxia tixi: Shijie zhidu zhexue daolun* (The Tianxia System: A Philosophy for the world institution) published in 2005.
[14] Callahan 2011, 108–109.

end of the spectrum, represented by scholars such as Yan Xuetong, Zhang Ruizhuang and Shen Dingli. As according to Shambaugh the Chinese leadership is increasingly sensitive to these nationalist voices promoting hard-line policies, the shift in discourse implicates problems for Sino-US relations.[15] Dingding Chen and Jianwei Yang write that outside observers see China's approach to its foreign relations as arrogant after the financial crisis in 2008 and there has been a widespread view that Chinese elites have abandoned *tao guang yang hui* (韬光养晦), a moderate foreign policy tactic promoted by Deng Xiaoping, as the guiding principle in foreign policy formulation. Somewhat in contrast to Shambaugh's views, they note that the reason why outside observers see such a big difference between China's former and current debates on foreign policy issues is partly just due to the fact that now more attention is paid to Chinese domestic discourses. Different voices some of which have suggested tougher foreign policy have existed for a long time but nobody in the West paid any attention to them then. Now the existence of similar arguments cause worry about rising assertiveness.[16]

This chapter reviews Chinese academic foreign policy discourses on China's international role and its relations with the United States and Japan. It analyses the question of how Chinese scholars have understood China's international role and what principles guide their arguments on Chinese foreign policy. As stated in chapter two, academics and scholars are both opinion leaders through their media presence and other societal influence, as well as mediators of public views to the top leadership through various consultation channels, some of which are described below. These roles scholars have are important in the processes of national identity construction.

[15] Shambaugh, David. 2011a. "Coping with a Conflicted China." *Washington Quarterly* 34 (1), 7–27.
[16] Chen, Dingding and Jianwei Wang. 2011. "Lying Low No More? China's New Thinking on the Tao Guang Yang Hui Strategy." *China: An International Journal* 9 (2), 195–216.

A key aim of this chapter is to find out what kind of perceptions of China's international role dominate among top scholars. To approach these questions, the analysis of China's perceived position in the world is divided into a general part and a part concentrating on China's bilateral relations with the US and Japan. This chapter starts by briefly explaining how scholars can influence foreign policymaking and then providing a broader picture of the ways China's position in the world and its relations with the US and Japan have been dealt with in the Chinese academic journals. The latter part concentrates in more detail in writings and opinions of a smaller number of academics most of whom are known to have been officially part of the foreign policy establishment or are frequently consulted by the government. In addition to being the most influential part of scholars, analysis of works of top scholars helps to better contextualise the voices advocating more assertive foreign policy actions.

This chapter concludes that the diverse opinions on China's international position expressed in the scholarly community imply that China does not have any one dominant international identity to guide its actions, which is important to take into account when evaluating China's behaviour as a rising power. Contrary to the widely held view that China has changed its approach to how it plans to use its growing power, the analysis of China's goals and policies on a global level does not find strong evidence of a purpose transition.

Influence of Scholars in Foreign Policy

How can scholars influence Chinese foreign policy making? How can academic discourse help us to better understand Chinese foreign policy making context? Chinese scholars rarely give direct policy advice in their academic publications and certainly avoid directly criticising

any specific policies, but they do offer recommendations privately. Still, in a context in which government officials only speak the Party line, IR discourse can offer a way to understand official policy thinking.[17]

Research on American leaders has shown that politicians with less foreign policy experience are more likely to rely on political advisors' views as a basis for decision-making.[18] Moreover, leaders' organisational interests influence the ways they form perceptions on other political entities. Concentrating on leaders' assessment of adversaries' intentions in the cases of the collapse of the détente 1977–80, the end of the cold war (1985–88) and the interwar period 1934–39, Keren Yarhi-Milo found support for "selective attention thesis." According to the thesis, decision-making is affected by individual leaders' perpetual biases and their organisational interests which influence what kind of indicators leaders regard as credible signals of adversaries' intentions. Thus, military capacities or non-capacity related actions alone do not explain how the perception of adversary's aggressive intentions comes into being, which has important implications for understanding how threat perceptions matter both in longer term policy planning as well as in conflict situations.[19]

An increasing number of scholars work as foreign policy advisers, which is a new feature in Chinese foreign policy making. Consultation has become routine.[20] Professor Jin Canrong sees three main reasons behind this development. First of all, leadership style has transformed from "strongman politics" into collective leadership (*Zhonggong lingdao jiti* 中共领导集体), which also means sharing responsibilities more widely. Second, China's foreign policy environment has become more complex and diverse creating a need for a larger amount of workforce dealing with foreign policy issues. Third, the main expertise of the top

[17] Shambaugh, David. 2013. *China Goes Global. The Partial Power*. Oxford: Oxford University Press 2013, 15–16.
[18] Mintz, Alex and Karl DeRouen Jr. 2010. *Understanding Foreign Policy Decision Making*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 31–32.
[19] Yahri-Milo, Keren. 2013. "In the Eye of the Beholder. How Leaders and Intelligence Communities Assess the Intentions of Adversaries." *International Security* 38 (1), 7–51.
[20] Interview with professor Qin Yaqing, Foreign Affairs University, Beijing, 15 March 2012.

leadership does not lie on foreign policy, which increases the need to involve scholars into the preparations of policy decisions.[21] In addition, as noted by Dr. Wu Chunsi, Deputy Director of Department of American Studies at the Shanghai Institute for International Studies, as China's foreign policy turns more proactive, it needs to think strategic issues more carefully, which requires profound understanding of the international system. With such issues scholars can help government officials.[22]

Research has started to acknowledge the role researchers at research institutes and universities play in Chinese foreign policy formation. As an attempt to start building an understanding of the domestic context of Chinese foreign policy making, David Shambaugh's pioneering study on the content and variation of perceptions of the United States 1972-1990 among Chinese scholars was published in 1991.[23] In 1992 Zhao Quansheng noted the increasingly important role of think tanks and intellectuals.[24] Gerald Chan's book *Chinese Perspectives on International Relations: A Framework of Analysis* deepened our knowledge on international relations scholarship in China and its links to foreign policymaking.[25] In the 2000s these somewhat isolated academic contributions published in the 1990s were followed by a growing number of books and articles such as *the China Quarterly*'s September 2002 special issue concentrating on the form and function of various types of think tanks and

[21] Interview with professor Jin Canrong, Renmin University of China, Beijing 2 March 2012. The decentralisation trend in foreign policy administration is also noted in Shi Yinhong. 2006. "Zhongguo de bianqian yu Zhongguo waijiao zhanlue fenxi" (China's Transformation and Its Diplomatic Strategy- An Analysis), *Guoji zhenzhi yanjiu* (*International Politics Quarterly*), No. 1, 38.
[22] Interview with Dr. Wu Chunsi at the Shanghai Institute for International Studies, 12 December 2012.
[23] Shambaugh 1991.
[24] Zhao, Quansheng. 1992. "Domestic Factors of Chinese Foreign Policy. From Vertical to Horizontal Authoritarianism." *Annals of the American Academy of Political Science* 519 (1), 158–175. Even before Zhao Quansheng's book Harish Kapur's edited volume *As China Sees the World: Perceptions of Chinese Scholars* provided translated articles from Chinese scholars in international relations. It however, did not analyse the possible links between scholarly works and policymaking. Kapur, Harish (ed.) 1987. *As China Sees the World: Perceptions of Chinese Scholars*. London: Frances Pinter.
[25] Chan, Gerald. 1999. *Chinese Perspectives on International Relations: A Framework of Analysis*. Basingstoke : Macmillan.

Xuanli Liao's book *Chinese Foreign Policy Think Tanks and China's Policy Toward Japan* to name but a few.[26]

However, it seems that think tanks have thus far received most attention with regards to scholarly influences on policymaking whereas specifying the role of research done at universities has been somewhat neglected in this context. Bonnie Glaser and Phillip Saunders note in the their article published in 2002 that "at present, university input to the policy-making process remains infrequent and sporadic" although they add that many Chinese analysts expect the role of university professors and university research institutes to grow in the coming years.[27] Some more recent analyses conclude that the relative influence of think tanks may be declining as the Communist Party Central Politburo study sessions have recently increased the amount of contributors outside of think tanks and several influential scholars who used to work in think tanks have moved to universities, who can compensate them better.[28] One factor that may increase the influence of small group of university professors from the top institutions is their role as commentators of China's foreign policy in television, newspapers and in their private blogs. In his 2013 evaluation of academics' influence on foreign policy Yunfan Hao pays attention to precisely this scholarly impact on the wider social environment implying that it is not only the direct channels to policy makers mostly reserved to policy institutes administratively under state ministries that matter.[29] With the increasing role of the media in attitude formation and mediation between the public and the government this point is crucial regarding the Hu Jintao period and beyond.

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[26] *The China Quarterly* 171 (3); Liao, Xuanli. 2006. *Chinese Foreign Policy Think Tanks and China's Policy Towards Japan*. Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press.

[27] Glaser, Bonnie and Phillip Saunders. 2002. "Chinese Civilian Foreign Policy Research Institutes: Evolving Roles and Increasing Influence." *The China Quarterly* 171 (3), 604.

[28] On Politburo's study sessions, see Morris, Michael. 2012. "China's Foreign Policy Research Institutes: Influence on Decision-Making and the 5th Generation Communist Party Leadership." *Yale Journal of International Affairs* 7 (2), 77–86. On scholars moving from think tanks to universities, see Shambaugh, David. 2011b."International Relations Studies in China: History, Trends, and Prospects." *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific* 11 (3), 359–360.

[29] Hao, Yufan. 2013. "Domestic Chinese Influences on U.S.-China Relations." In David Shambaugh (ed.), *Tangled Titans. The United States and China*. Plymouth: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 136.

Despite growing interest in the roles scholars may play related to foreign policy formulation, estimating the precise influence of scholarly input on policy is hard or impossible in most cases, because the key policy debates over most significant foreign policy decisions are still not open to the public.[30] However, description of the increased amount of institutionalised and informal channels for upward input offer a rough indicator of the general trends. In addition, bureaucratic position, personal connections and issue-specific knowledge or experience certainly play a role when it comes to estimating the role of individual scholars.[31] For example, Yang Jiemian worked as the director of Shanghai Institute for International Studies (SIIS) until 2012 and his brother Yang Jiechi was foreign minister between 2007-2012, which gave SIIS scholars better access to policymakers. Top scholars and policymakers have often studied together in China's top institutions allowing scholars to use their contacts.

For the evaluation and contextualisation of scholarly contributions analysed in the latter part of this chapter, I will start by providing a brief outlook of how and through which channels scholars based in universities and other research institutions can influence foreign policymaking. Another aim is to complement the earlier research on think tanks and their links to foreign policy establishment with the connections universities and their staff have as this area seems somewhat neglected in the scholarship despite the fact that the views and ideas of a group of prominent scholars are often cited domestically in China and even in the Western media and research.

1. Productive power (normal academic work)

First, Chinese academics matter in the sense of productive power because they shape the ideas and discourses from which foreign policies rise. The processes of idea formation are a critical

[30] Hao 2013, 137.
[31] Glaser and Saunders 2002, 608.

terrain regarding national identity and its possible foreign policy implications because Chinese national interests are defined and redefined in these domestic discourses. Through their writings academics in international relations take stance to issues related to Chinese foreign policy, which may affect other actors in the academia, policy-making communities and the wider societal context. Academics writing primarily for the academic community influence the discourse of that community, which itself can be important.[32] In addition, their work helps to relay foreign ideas and both international and domestic debates to top decision makers.[33] In the broadest sense scholarly writings are also part of the wider societal discourses in which collective ideas related to national identity and national interests are formed. National identities evolve in the course of time when new ideas rise and formerly dominant ideas are replaced or updated to better serve new needs.[34]

In addition to the broader national identity construction, ideas have more direct links to the policymaking realm. Scholars develop and test concepts, which are later used in the official foreign policy context to justify leaders' policy choices. For example the concept of peaceful rise, the precedent of now commonly used term "peaceful development" (heping fazhan, 和平发展) was first presented by a political theorist Zheng Bijian.[35] China's "core interests" (hexin liyi, 核心利益) which received enormous attention in 2009 and 2010 in relation with the claims that China had turned more assertive in its foreign policy were first applied to China's foreign policy context in early 2002 in an article written by professor Wang Jisi.[36] Sometimes academics are also sent to try out new ideas on behalf of the political

[32] Fewsmith, Joseph and Stanley Rosen. 2001. "Domestic Context of Chinese Foreign Policy: Does 'Public Opinion' Matter?" In David Lampton (ed.), *The Making of Chinese Foreign and Security Policy in the Era of Reform, 1978-2000*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 154.
[33] Lagerkvist, Johan. 2008. "Internet Ideotainment in the PRC: National Responses to Cultural Globalization." *Journal of Contemporary China* 17 (54), 121–140.
[34] Legro, Jeffrey. 2005. *Rethinking the World. Great Power Strategies and International Order*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
[35] Glaser, Bonnie and Evan Medeiros. 2007. "The Changing Ecology of Foreign Policy-Making in China: The Ascension and Demise of the Theory of 'Peaceful Rise'." *The China Quarterly* 190, 291–310.
[36] Swaine, Michael. 2011. "China's Assertive Behaviour. Part One: On "Core Interests". *China Leadership Monitor* 34.

leadership. Professor Shi Yinhong and Ma Licheng, a member of the editorial board of the People's Daily, were involved in the so-called "New Thinking" debate related to China's Japan policy and it was speculated that the new ideas on China's Japan policy originated from the incoming Hu Jintao-Wen Jiabao leadership who wanted to test the reception of their ideas prior to policy implementation.[37]

Analysis of foreign policy debates can show what kinds of ideas are available as "new ideas" showing up in the official discourse often rise from the existing pool of concepts developed earlier.[38] In addition, as some of the seeds of the forthcoming foreign policy orthodoxy can be found from the present discourses, it makes sense to look also for potential replacement ideas.[39] Despite the fact that scholars play a role in the development of new foreign policy concepts and strategies, one should be cautious when making causal relations between concepts used in the scholarly and policymaking communities, as the origin of a certain concept might not be self-evident. At times, researchers put forward concepts that are later used by politicians, in other times politicians request scholars to try out new concepts for them, or they might bounce an idea back and forth many times.

Finally in the context of understanding links between academic work and politics in China, it is worth noting that writings directed mainly to academic audiences in social sciences are not apolitical, but considered to be "ideological work" which needs to be "guided" by the propaganda authorities.[40] The fact that almost all Chinese official news agencies in central and local governments collect and analyze policy ideas from academic and

[37] Gries, Peter. 2005b. "China's 'New Thinking' on Japan." *The China Quarterly* 184 (4), 831–850; Reilly, James. 2010. "Online Chinese Nationalism Toward Japan." In Shen, Simon and Shaun Breslin. *Online Chinese Nationalism and China's Bilateral Relations*. Plymouth: Lexington Books, 59. Reilly, James 2012. *Strong Society, Smart State. The Rise of Public Opinion in China's Japan Policy*. New York: Columbia University Press, 170; Beukel, Erik. 2011. "Popular Natinalism in China and the Sino-Japanese Relationship" DIIS Report 1/2011, 19.
[38] Legro 2005, 35.
[39] Legro, Jeffrey 2008. "Purpose Transitions. China's Rise and the American Response." In Robert S. Ross and Zhu Feng (eds.), *China's Ascent. Power, Security, and the Future of International Politics*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press 2008, 171–184.
[40] Brady, Anne-Marie. 2008. *Marketing Dictatorship. Propaganda and Thought Work in Contemporary China*. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 28, 117–119.

general publications as part of their normal work, allows intellectuals to transfer their ideas to the policy elite even without direct contact.[41]

2. Writing internal reports

In addition to their independent academic work, academics have adopted roles that are more directly related to foreign policy making. Part of the normal work of policy relevant research institutes is to write internal reports for the government officials and sometimes scholars working in universities are tasked to do the same.[42] Such research projects are often given to two research institutions at the same time, which allows the officials to compare the end product and select the advise they find most suitable regarding the task at hand.[43] Reports give a general overview of an issue area and often make policy recommendations. Some reports are written on a regular basis and some prior to foreign visits, or concerning unexpected events in the international affairs.[44] Ministries related to foreign affairs write annual reports to which scholars contribute. Scholars are also asked to provide general evaluations on China's foreign policy in some area, for example on China's foreign policy in the Middle East in 2011.[45] In most cases reports written by academics circulate through lower ministerial levels and only very few are sent to higher levels. According to Glaser and Saunders, some CASS (Chinese Academy of Social Sciences) institutes have been permitted to submit their work to the Central Committee's Foreign Affairs Office, and some institutes are tasked directly by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.[46] Often reports written by scholars from universities go first to

[41] Zhu, Xufeng. 2009. "The Influence of Think Tanks in the Chinese Policy Process." *Asian Survey* 49 (2), 340–341.
[42] Glaser, Bonnie and Phillip Saunders. 2002. "Chinese Civilian Foreign Policy Research Institutes: Evolving Roles and Increasing Influence." *The China Quarterly* 171 (3), 604; Author's interviews with Chinese scholars.
[43] Interview, Wu Chinsi.
[44] Liao 2006, 63–64.
[45] Interview, Jin Canrong.
[46] Glaser and Saunders 2002, 599–600. For a more detailed description of think tanks, see ibid.

the Ministry of Education from where some of them are directed forward.[47] For historical reasons some institutions have special privileges such as Xinhua Centre for World Affairs (*Xinhuashe shijie wenti yanjiu zhongxin*), which according to Jin Canrong can submit its reports directly to the Politburo.[48]

3. Formal and informal policy advising and consulting

An increasing number of academics work as policy advisors to government institutions both in ad hoc as well as in systematic fashion. The formal consultation channels include briefings organised by think tanks, departments of the Foreign Ministry or other official foreign policy actors in the form of small group (*xiaozu,* 小组) policy meetings, the Foreign Policy Advisory Council (FPAC), lecturing at the Politburo's collective study sessions and consultation work by named special advisers. Think tanks provide regular briefings to the top leaders regarding specific foreign policy issues and keep the leadership informed about the topical issues in international affairs and the policy positions held by foreign governments.[49] CICIR (China Institute of Contemporary International Relations) gives daily foreign intelligence briefs to the government.[50] Foreign Ministry Policy Planning Department convenes biweekly sessions with scholars.[51] In the small group policy meetings experts offer their views either in the form of formal briefings or informal comments.[52] Often small groups work concentrates on some very specific issue. For example, one professor was asked to join a small group evaluating and giving advice on how China should respond to the UN Security Council reform in 2009.[53] In 2004 the foreign ministry established the Foreign Policy Advisory Council and expanded it

[47] Interviews with Professor Pan Zhongqi at Fudan University, 15 December 2012 and Dr. Cui Shoujun at Renmin University of China, 2 March 2012.
[48] Interview, Jin Canrong.
[49] Liao 2006, 63–64.
[50] Glaser and Saunders 2002, 605.
[51] Shambaugh 2011b, 369.
[52] Glaser and Saunders 2002, 607.
[53] Interview with the professor in question.

in 2008 to include some of the leading IR scholars.[54] Currently the Foreign Policy Advisory Council consists of 22 former ambassadors and 13 other members most of whom are IR scholars. For example Cui Liru (CICIR), Qin Yaqing (CFAU), Wang Jisi (dean of the School of International Studies at Peking University), Yang Jiemian (SIIS) and Zhang Yuyan (CASS/IWEP) are members.[55] The Politburo's collective study sessions started in 2002 when Hu Jintao came to power and they consist of two 40-minute lectures given by experts from the governmental circles or universities. Study sessions are publicised widely.[56] Between 2002 and 2007 most lecturers came from government research institutes, and Renmin University of China, Peking University and Tsinghua University were the non-governmental institutions sending most lecturers.[57] For example one professor lectured at the Politburo's collective study session in 2004 on world order and China's security environment. He mentioned in an interview with the author that when he was preparing a draft of the lecture some people did not appreciate the fact that he had used the term "global governance" in his text. Even though these people tried to convince him not to use this at the Politburo, he insisted and noticed later that the term became widely used.[58] Although exceptional, some individual scholars have been named as special advisers for the government. In February 2011 Professor Shi Yinhong from Renmin University was appointed as counsellor for the State Council, which is a clear sign that his work and views are well noted and appreciated by China's political elite.[59] In December 2011 Professor Wang Jisi received special thanks from the Department of North

[54] Jakobson, Linda and Dean Knox. 2010. "New Foreign Policy Actors in China." *SIPRI Policy Paper* 26, 36.
[55] Waijiao Zhengce Zixun Weiyuanhui Chinese Foreign Policy Advisory Council. 2012. List of current members of the Foreign Policy Advisory Council can be found from [http://fpag.fmprc.gov.cn/chn/zwhjj/]. Accessed 8 November 2012.
[56] Lu, Yiyi. 2007. "The Collective Study Sessions of the Politburo: A Multipurpose Tool of China's Central Leadership." University of Nottingham: China Policy Institute's Briefing Series, 27.
[57] Lu 2007.
[58] Interview with the professor in question.
[59] Guowuyuan canshishi (Councellor's Office of the State Council). http://www.counsellor.gov.cn/cns/csintro/2012-04-13/1150.shtml. Accessed 30 January 2014.

American and Oceanian Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs for his work.[60]

In addition to these more formal channels the top leadership also invites academics to discuss foreign policy issues in various kinds of informal settings. Scholars are invited to government meetings and seminars, which offer a more informal surrounding to exchange views.[61] Some of the most prominent scholars have been invited to meetings of the political inner circle and even to Hu Jintao's home. During the last years of his term Hu Jintao invited three to four senior foreign policy specialists from universities and research institutes to participate in an annual session with the so-called inner circle assessing China's foreign policy successes and failures. For example Wang Jisi and Jin Canrong, vice-president of the School of International Studies at Renmin University of China have attended these sessions.[62] A small group of scholars have personal ties with the leadership. Hu Jintao invited scholars to spend a weekend with him in his house with the rational to be able to talk informally with the scholars. A few scholars were invited to these weekends four times, but most just once.[63]

4. Media presence: Mediating between the general public and the government

Media is increasingly important in opinion formation, as media commercialisation has widened the availability of different types of media outlets to match the needs of various consumer groups.[64] Researchers based at universities and think tanks contribute to the public debate independently and sometimes at the request of the Party. Professors and other scholars from leading universities such as Peking University, Tsinghua University, Renmin University

[60] Center for International and Strategic Studies at Peking university, http://www.ciss.pku.edu.cn/EN/DocumentView.aspx?id=813. Accessed 25 February 2012.
[61] Zhu 2009, 340; Author's interviews with Chinese scholars.
[62] Jakobson and Knox 2010, 35.
[63] Interview, Jin Canrong.
[64] Chinese media reform was discussed in the previous chapter and the impact of media on opinion formation will be analysed in Chapter Six.

and Fudan University are often asked to present their analyses in the media.[65] According to Linda Jakobson and Dean Knox, researchers are sometimes intensely pressured to support the government stance publicly. There are cases in which the scholar who has first rejected to write the requested commentary finds out later that an editor has published the text under his name without asking for permission.[66]

5. Working for the foreign policy establishment in the embassies

Some scholars both from universities and think tanks work in foreign embassies or other governmental institutions as part of their career.[67] For example professor Pan Zhongqi and professor Wang Yiwei from Fudan University worked for the EU mission in 2008, professor Ren Xiao from Fudan University was based at the Chinese embassy in Tokyo from 2010 to 2012 and professor Pang Zhongying from Renmin University worked in the Chinese embassy in Indonesia in the 1980s. Renmin University of China has sent younger scholars to places such as Moscow.[68] Embassies employing people from outside of the MFA are usually among the big embassies, especially one of China's 19 key embassies. These key embassies have more workload than regular embassies.[69]

A few scholars have even been promoted as congressmen or ministers. During Hu Jintao's period, for example Minister of State Security Geng Huichang used to be the President of the China Institute of Contemporary International Relations, an influential think

[65] Zhao, Quangsheng. 2005. "Impact of Intellectuals and Think Tanks on Chinese Foreign Policy." In Hao, Yufan and Lin Su (eds.) 2005. *China's Foreign Policy Making: Societal Force and Chinese American Policy*. Aldershot, Ashgate, 128.
[66] Jakobson and Knox 2010, 45.
[67] Zhu 2009, 340; Zhu, Xufeng and Lan Xue. 2007. "Think Tanks in Transitional China." *Public Administration and Development* 27 (5), 456; Li, He. 2002. "The Role of Think Tanks in Chinese Foreign Policy." *Problems of Post-Communism* 49 (2), 38.
[68] Jakobson and Knox 2010, 37; authors interviews with Pan Zhongqi, Ren Xiao (Fudan University 7 March 2012), Pang Zhongying (Renmin University 16 March 2013) and Jin Canrong.
[69] Intervie with a professor based in Shanghai.

tank.[70] Lu Yongxiang, the vice-chairman of the National People's Congress was a former president of the Chinese Academy of Sciences.[71] Wang Huning, the head of Policy Research Office associated with the CPC Central Committee accompanied Hu Jintao in all of his overseas trips between 2008 and 2010. Wang is a former Fudan University professor of international politics, and was elected as a member of the 18th Politburo in November 2012.[72] This "revolving door" between academia and governmental institutions is not an isolated phenomenon, as groups such as the business elite rotate widely between business and politics. In addition, all the important positions in Chinese society are included in the CCP's nomenklatura system, also non-cadre positions such as presidents of major universities.[73] Thus, the CCP has a way to manage all the important positions.

6. Universities run training programmes for junior officers

Peking University has a contract to train officers from the foreign ministry, whereas Renmin University trains officers from the International Department of the Central Committee of the CCP (*Zhongguo gongchandang zhongyang duiwai lianluobu* 中国共产党中央对外联络部) every two years.[74] Fudan University has a research programme for mid-career diplomats, which has been in function since 2007. During their research period, diplomats are expected to write a research paper and interact with faculty members and students.[75]

[70] Xinhua News, [http://news.xinhuanet.com/ziliao/2008-01/02/content_7353860.htm]. Accessed 18 February 2013.
[71] Chinese government's homepage, http://english.gov.cn/links/npc.htm. Accessed 18 January 2013; People's Daily http://politics.people.com.cn/GB/shizheng/252/9667/9685/6587023.html. Accessed 18 January 2013.
[72] Jakobson and Knox, 6.
[73] Brodsgaard, Kjeld. 2012. "Cadre and Personnel Management in the CPC." *China: An International Journal* 10 (2), 69–83.
[74] Interview, Jin Canrong.
[75] Interview, Ren Xiao.

Methods for Analysing Chinese Scholarly Views

The following analysis focuses on describing the views of some of China's most prominent scholars and researchers from key institutions. The selection criteria for articles in the more detailed analysis were subject and time of publication of the text, author and his or her affiliation and journal in which the text was published.

The rationale behind this approach is that first, regarding the potential impact on policymakers, prominent scholars from key institutions are much more likely to have their views heard compared to others. This is more or less a universal phenomenon. Jeffrey Legro has suggested that new foreign policy ideas arise out of the relationship between existing ideas and experienced events, but that the relative influence of new ideas "often depends on their interaction with other factors," such as the political influence of domestic elites.[76] Thus, it matters greatly who puts the idea forward. In my selection of research materials I have therefore selected articles from scholars who belong to "foreign policy elite" to use Allen Carlson's term and I also interviewed some of them in Beijing and Shanghai. This group of scholars is affiliated with important government sponsored research institutes, think tanks, and universities within China that are involved with analyzing China's foreign relations and other issues in international politics.[77] In addition, they are often consulted in the media and may have official advisory positions within the foreign policy establishment. Key institutions include, but are not limited to China Institute of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR) institutionally under the Ministry of State Security, China Institute of International Studies (CIIS) associated with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, CASS (Chinese Academy of Social Sciences) and especially its Institute of Economics and Politics, Shanghai Institute for International Studies (SIIS), Peking University, Tsinghua University and Fudan University

[76] Legro 2005, 40.
[77] Carlson, Allen. 2006. "More Than Just Saying No." In Iain Johnston and Robert Ross (eds.) *New Directions in the Study of China's Foreign Policy.* Stanford, Stanford University Press, 218 footnote 6.

the three of which belong to the C9 league (*jiuxiao lianmeng*, 九校联盟) of Chinese top universities, Renmin University of China, which has close connections with government organisations for historical reasons, and China Foreign Affairs University, which trains diplomats and whose leadership is often consulted in issues related to foreign affairs.[78] Despite the fact that sometimes institutional affiliation may open doors, different viewpoints in the scholarly community depend more on individuals than the institutions they work for, which is why the primary criteria for selecting scholars has been their publications, influence and views, not the institution they work for.[79]

Second, Chinese journals in international relations have different kinds of research profiles and vary greatly in quality. For the purposes of this chapter, only journals that cover the whole world or area studies journals concentrating on Japan or the US are relevant. One indicator of varying quality is that blind peer review was not previously used at all in IR journals, and only some journals have started to introduce it with varying weight given to the review. Often connections with the editor matter most.[80] Despite these shortcomings, the best journals have best chances to select the best available works. Most prominent scholars some of whom are also consulted by the government publish mainly in these top tier journals. Moreover, the lower tier journals tend to publish articles that follow strictly the Party line and oftentimes it is hard to sift the author's own opinion and contribution in these texts. As my aim in this chapter is to analyse scholarly contributions to foreign policy making, it is justified to select the journals in which authors tend to express their own views and have a more identifiable individual contribution. The above-mentioned problems have been recognised also in China. In 2008 *World Economics and Politics* published a report discussing the state of IR in China and came to the conclusion that many of

[78] For Glaser and Saunders 2002; Shambaugh, David. 2002. "China's International Relations Think Tanks: Evolving Structure and Process." *The China Quarterly* 171 (3), 575–596; Shambaugh 2011b.
[79] Shambaugh, David. 2013. *China Goes Global. The Partial Power*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 15.
[80] Li 2002, 42; Shambaugh 2011b, 368.

the publications still focus on complementing and disseminating government propaganda and very few offer policy suggestions or recommendations before policy implementation.[81]

In addition to quality of journals, administrative affiliation of the publisher matters. Some of the Chinese think tanks administratively directly under state ministries publish academic journals, which are considered to provide important insights into policy debates and can even offer "early warning indicators" of future policies.[82] There is no consensus however, which journals are most important or influential. *World Economics and Politics* (*Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi,* 世界经济与政治) has for long been regarded as a journal with probably the highest academic quality, but some scholars find that its quality has been in decline in the recent years. David Shambaugh finds *Contemporary International Relations* (*Xiandai Guoji Guanxi,* 现代国际关系) the "premier policy-related contemporary IR journal" in China.[83] According to He Li, *International Studies* (*Guoji Wenti Yanjiu,* 国际问题研究) has become "the most authoritative semi-official mouthpiece elaborating China's position on vital international issues" because it is published by China Institute for International Studies (CIIS) affiliated with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.[84] However, some find that the overall importance of the foreign ministry is in decline, which would then give relative advantage to other journals.[85] In the following analysis I concentrated on publications from *World Economics and Politics,* (CASS journal) and *Contemporary International Relations* (CICIR journal) in addition to which there are some articles from other journals such as *International Studies* (CIIS journal) and *International Politics Quarterly* (*Guoji Zhengzhi Yanjiu*, 国际政治研究 published by Beijing University). Thus, my selection includes articles both from

[81] Editorial team of the World Economic and Politics. 2008. "2007 Nian Zhongguo Guiji Guanxi Xueke Fazhan Baogao." *Shijie jingji yu zhengzhi* (*World Economics and Politics*), No. 3, 65–79.
World Economics and Politics 3, 77.
[82] Shambaugh 2002, 581.
[83] Shambaugh 2011b, 360–361.
[84] Li 2002, 36.
[85] Jakobson and Knox 2010, 8. Interview, Jin Canrong; Godement, Francois. "China Debates its Global Strategy." China Analysis: European Council on Foreign Relations, 6.

journals associated with state institutions and those published by academic institutions. Concentrating on two journals however makes it possible to say also something about topics discussed in these journals and the change in topics covered between 2002 and 2012. In a short chapter tracing any such overall trends would be difficult if more journals were included. In the final selection of articles author affiliation was foreign policy think-tank in slightly over 30 percent and academic institution in around 70 percent of the texts.

Third reason to have a non-random selection of journal articles is that other scholars have recently conducted random or semi-random sampling based analyses using CNKI database and I can reasonably well contextualise my findings with this existing scholarship. Wang Jisi analysed academic journals between 1996 and 2001 and found that 49 percent of articles dealt with area studies but mere 5 percent with great power relations.[86] Qin Yaqing categorised over one thousand articles from five leading IR journals from 1978 to 2007 and found that after 1990, Marxist orientation has been taken over by realist, liberal and constructivist approaches. Despite significant development, Qin regrets that Chinese international relations community has not yet been able to make significant theoretical innovations for which Qin thinks Chinese history, culture and unique experiences would provide necessary sources.[87] David Shambaugh's article provides a broad overview of the areas of interest for Chinese IR scholars between 2005 and 2009. He found that American Studies dominate the field and there are also indicators of the dominance of realist approach as use of key words such as "international structure" associated with realism are more common than others.[88] James Reilly's contribution is especially relevant in the context of Sino-Japanese relations. He selected randomly approximately 20 articles per year between

[86] Wang, Jisi. 2001. "International relations studies in China today." *In International Relations Studies in China, A Review of Ford Foundation Past Grantmaking and Future Choices*. Beijing: Ford Foundation Office, 113. Cited in Shambaugh 2011b, 345.
[87] Qin Yaqing. 2008. "Zhongguo guoji guanxi lilun yanjiu de jinbu yu wenti." (Study of International Relations Theory in China. Progress and Problems) *Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi* (World Economics and Politics) No. 11, 13–23.
[88] Shambaugh 2011b.

1997 and 2007 from CNKI via keyword searches on China-Japan relations. He then assessed each article's overall threat perception on Japan on a scale of 1-10 and found that a large percentage of Chinese scholars hold negative views on Japan and see it threatening China. However, a substantive although not equally large percentage of articles expressed a more nuanced view on Japan's security politics and acknowledged the domestic constrains of Japanese policies. Moreover, history issues were left out from more than 40 percent of articles analysed, which indicates a widening gap between views held by scholars and the wider public whose views of Japan tend to be heavily determined by the history issue.[89]

China's Place in the World

If the *tianxia* ideals presented in the beginning of this chapter are not mainstream or held by most scholars consulted by the government, how do elite scholars characterise China's position in the world order? Regarding the overall research questions of this thesis, it is important to know how elites perceive China's role in the world and for example assess the international system and China's treatment within it. Is China's treatment seen as just and if this is not the case, does the elite perceive China to have the capability to change the order into what is considered more just? In short, the question is whether Chinese scholarly elite's approach to the current order can be described as more status quo or revisionist.

China's approach to international order and finding its place therein has been a complex process the whole of 20th century and this process continues actively, which can be seen in the vivid discussion of China's rise outside and inside of its borders.[90] Professor Qin Yaqing (CFAU, member of the Foreign Policy Advisory Council) calls China's identity and

[89] Reilly 2011, 163–164.
[90] China and its problematic relationship with the West in the beginning of the 20th century was very briefly discussed in chapter two, and the outsiders' perspectives to China's rise in chapter three.

its relation to international society after 1840 as the "century-puzzle" of the Chinese.[91] After its founding, the PRC adopted a radical revolutionary identity and signalled that it rejected the status quo definition of international society given by Western powers. In its foreign policy in the 1950s and early 1960s China presented itself as a voice of the developing world and drew a deep line between "colonialist" and "revolutionary" powers.[92] The big change of PRC's international orientation took place in 1978 when Deng Xiaoping launched the reform and opening up period and China started gradually to open up to the outside world. According to professor Zhu Liqun (CFAU), around this time Chinese description of the "distinctive features of our times" was changed from revolution into peace and development. These changing perceptions can also be seen in the domestic debates of how to approach the world and to develop China, which in the late 1970s concentrated on how to establish a criterion of truth after Mao's time during which anything Mao said was to be taken as truth. In the late 1980s the main theme of the domestic debate revolved around market economy and its suitability for a socialist country. In the 1990s the third big debate was about whether the reform and opening up policy was taking China into the right direction, which required Deng Xiaoping to do his Southern tour to Guangzhou, Shenzhen and Zhuhai in order to convince the Chinese about the necessity of reforms.[93]

In the 2000s the main debate has been about the nature of China's rise and what kind of power China should be. This theme is clearly reflected in the content of the two leading Chinese academic journals in International Relations, *World Economics and Politics* (WEP) and *Contemporary International Relations* (CIR), introduced in the previous section. More precisely, internal debates related to China's current position in the international system

[91] Qin, Yaqing. 2005. "Guoji Guanxi Lilun de Hexin Wenti yu Zhongguo Xuepai de Shengcheng." (The Core Problematic and the Emerging of a Chinese School of IR) *Zhongguo Shehui Kexue* (*Social Sciences in China*), 3, 165–176.
[92] Foot, Rosemary. 2001. "Chinese Power and the Idea of a Responsible State." *The China Journal* 45 (1), 1–19.
[93] Zhu, Liqun. 2010. "China's Foreign Policy Debates." Chaillot Papers, 121. *European Union Institute for Security Studies,* 1–75.

and its rise include themes such as whether China should adopt a grand strategy, what are the main changes in the international distribution of power (*guoji geju*， 格局) and where China is placed within the system, in other words has the system become multipolar or is the United States still strongest in all aspects of power, what being a responsible power or rising peacefully mean and whether China should aim to become a truly global power.[94]

Contemporary International Relations dedicated most of the October 2005, September 2008 and 2010 special issues on discussing what kind of role China should play in the world. In addition, it had theme issues on the US global strategy, which naturally mirrors also China's position within the US-led system, on Sino-Japanese relations, financial crisis, the international position of the renminbi, China's "going out" strategy, North Korea and costal waters.[95] *World Economics and Politics* did not publish articles on China in the international system as theme issues, but the theme was present in a few texts in almost all of the issues between 2002 and 2012. Instead, WEP had two theme issues on IR research in China as well as issues on Sino-Japanese relations and the financial crisis. As both of these journals also deal with regional dynamics, topical issues such as conflicts all around the world, the UN, theoretical perspectives in IR, political economy (especially WEP) and many other themes, the amount of content concentrating on the structure of the international system and well as China's position within it is notable. Regarding more specific topics related to China's position in the international system analysed with CNKI's subject search function which combines titles, abstracts and keywords, between 2002 and 2012 China's grand strategy was discussed in 143 articles in CIR and in 47 articles in WEP, China's peaceful rise and peaceful development in 104 articles in CIR and in 101 articles in WEP, China's international responsibility questions in 43 articles in CIR and in 32 articles in WEP and

[94] For an overall descriptions of themes discussed in Chinese IR in the 2000s, see Qin 2008; Shambaugh 2011b and Hao 2013, 135.
[95] My definition for a "theme issue" is that over half of the articles in a journal issue deal with the same topic.

finally, international distribution of power in 202 articles in CIR and in 59 articles in WEP. As subject search function is not always perfectly reliable, these numbers should be taken only as rough estimates.

However, as will be shown in more detail below, I do not think that merely by counting the amount of articles discussing structural viewpoints or China's international position can be taken as proof of a turn towards increased realism. At least this numerical data should be backed up with some more detailed analysis of the content of some of these "realist" texts to avoid misunderstandings as in fact many of them are quite sober in their assessment of China's rise. In other words, a mere talk about distribution of power in the international system does not tell enough of scholarly positions in these debates. My reading of Shambaugh's articles from 2011 is that his conclusion that the discourse has shifted heavily towards realism, which in turn is unfortunate for the Sino-Us relations, is largely based on counting the keywords in CNKI, which might not give us a full picture of the discourses.[96] Moreover, if scholarly contributions are analysed in the context of their possible foreign policy implications as Shambaugh does, the analysis should take better account the influence of the viewpoints presented, as not all scholars are equally influential and connected with the foreign policy establishment.[97]

China's international power position, distribution of power (guoji geju)

Defining China's international power position clearly divides Chinese scholars. Professor Qiao Mu from Tsinghua University predicted in 2002 that a multipolar international system will emerge in the next 20 to 30 years.[98] Fu Mengzi, Assistant President of China Institute of Contemporary International Relations found in 2007 that multipolarity was very much on its

[96] Shambaugh 2011a; Shambaugh 2011b.
[97] Shambaugh 2011a. In Shambaugh's *Washington Quarterly* text the institutional perspective is missing, although in the end he draws quite strongly negative conclusions.
[98] Qiao Mu. 2002. "Duojihua qushi buhui gaibian." (The Trend of Multipolarisation Will Not Change) *Dangdai Yatai* (*Contemporary Asia-Pacific Studies*) No. 6, 10–13.

way and the US power started to decline already after the end of Cold War.[99] Cui Liru, president of CICIR and member of the Foreign Policy Advisory Council also describes the world power structure as multipolar. Another trend has been deepening interdependence, which makes it even harder than before to define other countries either as competitors and partners as many are both at the same time. Finally, the power has not been shifting just between state actors but also from state actors to non-state actors who nowadays play an increasingly important role.[100] Professor Shi Yinhong (Renmin University, also councillor for the State Council) emphasises the economic side of power structure in his work and stated in 2009 that the financial crisis in terms of declining US power can be compared to the collapse of the Soviet Union.[101] In 2013 Shi wrote that Asians blame the US for the 2008 economic crisis, but acknowledge that they are themselves partly responsible for the developments in the financial markets. He continues that the global financial crisis and economic recession "have been widely regarded as a historical turning point" starting a new period in world politics.[102]

Somewhat in contrast to these views, professors Hu Angang from Tsinghua University and Men Honghua from Central Party School and Tsinghua University do not see the power structure as multipolar but note instead that the power gap between the US and China as well as with the US and any other country in the system remains large. In their article published in the journal *Strategy and Management* in 2002 Men and Hu compared China's comprehensive national power (CNP, *zonghe guoli* 综合国力) with those of the US, Japan, Russia and India between 1980 and 1998. Their measurement of CNP consisted of

[99] Fu Mengzi. 2007. "Meiguo chuyu buqingyuan de zhanlue yitui zhizhong" (The U.S. in a Reluctant Strategic Retreat) *Xiandai guoji guanxi* (*Contemporary International Relations*) No. 1, 21–23.
[100] Cui Liru 2011. "Guanyu Zhongguo guoji zhanlue de ruogan sikao" (Some Thoughts about China's International Strategy) *Xiandai guoji guanxi* (*Contemporary International Relations*) No. 11, 1–3.
[101] Shi Yinhong. 2009a. "Jinrong da weiji yu guoji da geju" (Financial Crisis and International Structure) *Xiandai guoji guanxi* (*Contemporary International Relations*) No. 4, 13–15.
[102] Shi Yinhong. 2013. "Power, Soft and Hard: The US, China and Northeast Asia in the Financial Crisis and the North Korea Problem." Niklas Svanström and Ryosei Kokubun (eds.) *Sino-Japanese Relations. Rivals or Partners in Regional Cooperation?* New Jersey: World Scientific, 194.

economic resources, human capital, natural resources, capital resources, knowledge and technology resources, government resources, the military and international resources by which they refer to trade and patent issues. The conclusion of their analysis was that the relative gap between China and the US narrowed between 1980 and 1998, but the gap remains large. For 1998 Hu and Men gave the US CNP score 22.8 whereas China got 7.8.[103] Zhen Bingsi from China's Institute of International Studies argues that China has a long way to go before it can bypass the US in terms of comprehensive national power. At the moment the US remains the world's only superpower.[104] Professor Pang Zhongying from Renmin University sees US as a major power that is in the slow process of decline in comparison to China, which is rising. However, the details and future direction of this process are complex and currently there is a large gap between US and China's capabilities.[105] In an article published in 2011 by professor Wang Jisi, Dean of the School of International Studies at Peking University and member of the Foreign Policy Advisory Council, also finds the power gap between Chinese and American power remains large. He argues that rather than constantly comparing China to other states, it would be more useful for the Chinese to concentrate on their domestic development, which according to him is the key factor in the development of China's international status. [106]

Most scholars find serious challenges in China's current situation and problems in the expectations of its future international position. Professor Zhang Qingmin from Peking University characterises China as a global player but not a global power. He sees both the expectations of China's rising position as well as the cautions about the pace of development

[103] Hu Angang and Men Honghua. 2002. "ZhongMeiRiEYin youxing zhanlue ziyuan bijiao -Jian lun zhizai "fumin qiangguo" de Zhongguo da zhanlue" (Comparing strategic resources in China, the U.S., Japan, Russia and India) *Zhanlue yu guanli* (*Strategy and Management*) No. 2, 26–41.
[104] Zhen Bingxi 2008. "Shijie xin geju xia Meiguo shili di bianhua" (The Changing Power of the United States in the New Global Posture) *Guoji wenti yanjiu* (*International Studies*) No. 4, 32–39.
[105] Interview, Pang Zhongying.
[106] Wang Jisi 2011a. "Zhongguo de guoji wenti yu taguang yanghui yousuo zuowei de zhanlue sixiang" (The International Positioning of China and the Strategic Principle of "Keeping a low profile while getting something accomplished"), *Guoji wenti yanjiu* (*International Studies*) No. 2, 4–9.

proportionate to China's current stage as justified.[107] Professor Pan Zhongqi from Fudan University and Huang Renwei, the Director of Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences write that although China's international status was significantly upgraded after the financial crisis in 2008 and international system is turning towards multipolarity, the US remains world's dominant power. In addition, China security environment has changed and China is now faced with US strategic expansion in Asia and geopolitical containment.[108] Dr. Lian Degui from Shanghai Institute for International Studies also describes China's future development in moderate terms. He predicts that in the next 50 years China will become a medium level developed country (*zhongdeng de fada guojia,* 中等的发达国家).[109] Wang Jisi descibes China's problematic position in Asia and warns that celebrating China's rise is too simplified to fully understand China's current international situation. Although the power gap between China and the west has narrowed, there have also been other changes in the international environment and China has not been the only rising actor. Despite of China's Asian identity its rise has not helped it to become the spokesperson of Asia. Rather, it has difficult political problems with most of its neighbours. Thus, for China, the international environment is not necessarily any better than it was 20 years ago.[110] Professor Yang Jiemian who was the director of the Shanghai Institute of International Studies as well as brother of the then foreign minister predicted many challenges for China in 2012. He saw that scarcity of resources increases the likelihood of international conflicts. He also noted that social unrest is likely to increase because of global political awakening and spread of extremist ideologies. He continued that improper management of social unrest can lead to external interference, which remains in the Western toolkit for managing conflicts –and although not mentioned in the

[107] Interview with Zhang Qingmin, Turku, Finland 15 May 2012.
[108] Pan Zhongqi and Huang Renwei 2011."Diyuan zhengzhi yu anquan zhanlue" China's Geo-Political and Security Strategy) *Shehui kexue* (*Social Sciences in China*) No. 10, 4 –11.
[109] Interview with Dr. Lian Degui at Shanghai Institute for International Studies, 1 December 2011.
[110] Wang Jisi 2011a.

paper, also goes against Chinese foreign policy principle of not interfering into other countries domestic issues. These views reflect Chinese anxiety on its domestic development.[111]

Professor Yan Xuetong, the Director of the Institute of International Studies at Tsinghua University, analyses the world power centre based on two conditions. Before a region can become central it has to meet the two conditions of having the world's most influential country in its area and also other countries that possess military capability and cultural power need to be located in the region. Second, this area would also be an area in which international conflicts are concentrated. Historically Europe was such a centre in the 19th century and continued to be central during the cold war, when the Soviet Union and the US competed for influence there. Now the centre is shifting to Asia for reasons that have more to do with Europe's decline than changes in the US power position, as the US continues to be the world's leading power. When considering China's position in the system, Yan implies that ability to shape global norms makes a difference between the leading power and the rest and observes that China's ideological impact remains small. Thus, the Chinese should concentrate their efforts in developing new international norms.[112]

Despite the limitations of China's power some scholars emphasise that the external expectations on China change China's international position whether it feels ready to take a more prominent position or not. Professor Zhu Feng from Beijing University finds that after the Olympics it has been difficult for China to maintain a "developing country status" even though this might be a general domestic understanding of China's international position. China should act upon the global expectation that it will have more power in the future –a fact

[111] Yang Jiemian 2012. "Zhongguo zouxiang quanqin daguo he qiangguo de guoji guanxi lilun zhunbei" (Preparing an international relations theory on China becoming a big and strong country) *Shijie jingji yu zhengzhi* (*World Economics and Politics*), No. 8, 149–155.
[112] Yan Xuetong 2012. "Quanli zhongxin zhuanyi yu guoji tixi zhuanbian" (The Shift of World Center and the Change of the International System)," *Dangdai Yatai* (*Contemporary Asia-Pacific Studies*) No. 6, 4–21.

that has already created more international space for China at the present moment.[113] Cui Liru notes that China's international status has changed recently partly because it reached the second place in the world GDP ranking. Although China is not quite ready for its enhanced international position, the process towards greater influence is inevitable. To be best able to adapt to the changing situation, China should move towards strategic clarity and abandon the strategic ambiguity it used in the past.[114]

Professor Zhu Liqun from China Foreign Affairs University finds it hard to describe China's international position accurately with general terms and criticises the ways Western systemic theories tend to analyse China's rise. According to Zhu, it is important to note the increasingly complex nature of the environment in which Chinese foreign policies are made. China's internal development does not always happen at the same pace in all foreign policy relevant areas. Zhu thus underscores the reality in which China's mode of participation into the international system also varies in different issue areas. Zhu also speaks for a generally more process-oriented way of understanding foreign policy change and China's participation in the international system. It would be hard to justify a claim that China is a revisionist state, but also the claim that China is a status quo state. "In the rapid change of the international system all actors need to constantly adjust their strategies to cope with change."[115]

China's foreign policy goals and the need for a grand strategy

Deng Xiaoping's framing of Chinese foreign policy goals as keeping a low profile but taking a proactive role when possible (*taoguang yanghui yousuo zuowei,* 韬光养晦有所作为),

[113] Zhu Feng 2008. "Zai taoguang yanghui yu yousuo zuowei zhijian qiu pingheng" (Finding the balance between "keeping a low profile" and "taking a proactive role when feasible"). *Xiandai guoji guanxi*, No. 9, 28.
[114] Cui Liru 2012. "Bian hai wenti yu Zhongguo dui wai zhanlue tiaozheng" (The Issue of Seaside Strategic Adjustment) *Xiandai guoji guanxi* (*Contemporary International Relations*) No. 8, 7–9.
[115] Zhu Liqun. 2011. "Zhongguo canyu guoji tixi de shijian jieshi moshi" (Explaining China's Mode of Participation into the International System) *Waijiao Pinglun* (Foreign Affairs Review), No. 1, 22.

which is sometimes problematically translated as hiding one's capabilities and biding one's time, continues to be discussed in the 2000s. Thus, references to China's low international profile are frequent. Professor Wang Yizhou, Associate Dean in the School of International Studies at Beijing University, described China's foreign policy as a combination of meeting the needs for development, sovereignty, and international responsibility as well as keeping a low profile at international stage but trying to moderately reform the international regime.[116] Wang Jisi suggests that for the foreseeable future, China must adhere to keeping a low profile in its foreign policy. This means that China should set itself rational strategic goals, avoid comparing itself to the United States and instead use its own stage of development as a reference point when evaluating its development.[117] In a Foreign Policy article Wang states that "if an organising principle must be established to guide China's grand strategy, it should be the improvement of Chinese people's living standards and welfare through social justice."[118] Cui Liru shares Wang's view that China should continue its foreign policy with a modest attitude. However, some changes should also be made as Chinese politics have recently been too much driven by economic issues, which has lead to shelving difficult political problems. Because of lack of a comprehensive and clear political and security strategy, Chinese Foreign Ministry has difficulties in responding to the changed international environment.[119]

Most scholars describe China's approach to the international system as accommodative. Shi Yinhong talks about China's new internationalism. In an article on China's diplomatic strategies, Shi writes that China's diplomatic goals can be described as placing the economy first (*jingji diyi*, 经济第一) and being increasingly integrated into the international system (*yuyi bingru shijie tixi*, 愈益并入世界体系) despite that the international

[116] Although when this article was published, Wang was still working at CASS as the deputy director of the Institute of World Economics and Politics.
[117] Wang Jisi 2011a.
[118] Wang, Jisi. 2011. "China's Search for a Grand Staregy." *Foreign Affairs*, 90 (2), 68–79.
[119] Cui Liru 2011.

political and economic order is far from fair. Integrating these new ingredients into the traditional setting consisting of traditional ideology of Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong thought, nationalism and realipolitik approach to international politics complicated China's foreign policy toolkit. [120] In an article published in 2009, Shi calls the idea that it is useful for China to be part of the international system as "new internationalism" (*xin guoji zhuyi,* 新国际主义), which also entails a general belief in the value of international cooperation. According to Shi, this new internationalism is manifested in terms such as the "new security concept" (*xin anquan guan*，新安全观) and "harmonious world" (*hexie shijie*，和谐世界).[121] However, despite its somewhat idealist echo, harmonious world concept does not merely present an ideal, but reflects a major shift taking place on a global level from territory and military based understanding of security into a conceptualisation that incorporates also economic and soft power issues. As a consequence, the effectiveness of war as a means to reach national interests has been devalued according to Shi. [122] Similarly, peaceful development has its strategic side: in order to avoid the common fate of many powers in modern history of first rising quickly but then dropping rapidly, China needs peaceful development for sustainable power. According to Shi, economic issues will be most important in defining the future power structure and he finds that in this economic race China should aim for the ultimate top.[123] Yang Jiemian presents a similar argument on the meaning of peaceful development. According to him, peaceful development presents a way for China to

[120] Shi 2006.
[121] Shi Yinhong. 2009b. "Dangdai Zhongguo de duiwai zhanlue sixiang –yishi xingtai, genben zhanlue, dangjin tiaozhan he Zhongguo texing" (Strategic Thinking in Contemporary China's Foreign Relations -Ideology, Strategy, Challenges, and the "Chineseness") *Shijie jingji yu zhengzhi* (*World Economics and Politics*), No. 9, 19.
[122] Shi 2009b, 20.
[123] Shi 2009b, 20.

break the monopoly of Western dualist theories for explaining the international system and provides an explanation model in which rise can happen in peaceful means.[124]

Professor Jin Canrong, adviser to the top leadership from Renmin University, describes China's approach to the international system as accommodative in that China has decided to adapt to the existing system.[125] Professor Pang Zhongying from Renmin University shares Jin's view in that China is not challenging the US-led international system, but should be defined as a status quo power (*xianzhuang qiangquan*，现状强权). China's economy is very much integrated into the world economic system, so challenging the US would not be in China's interest. Pang's policy recommendation for China would be to promote Asian regional integration.[126] According to Liu Kai (Central Party School), Wang Yunhai and Li Feng China (both from Foreign Economy and Trade University) will not be a challenger of the current international system, because it does not even posses the required capacities in military, economic and cultural sectors to become a challenger. More importantly challenging the system is not in China's interest as it benefits from it. The lessons of Germany and Japan in the past showcase that major power wars will only lead to destruction.[127] Hu Jian from Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences notes that peaceful development means that China will not fundamentally change the international system.[128] Professor Men Honghua frames peaceful rise as China's response to the negative China threat and China collapse theories (*Zhongguo bengkui lun*，中国崩溃论). Still, he finds that despite external suspicion of China's future development, China should not slow down the pace of its rise. In the security

[124] Yang Jiemian 2011. "Shilun heping fazhan guan de fazhan he tiaozhan" On the concept of peaceful development and challenges in the development of *Xiandai guoji guanxi* (*Contemporary International Relations*) No. 5, 1–4.
[125] Jin Canrong 2010. *Daguo de zeren*. Beijing: Zhongguo Renmin Daxue Chubanshe (Beijing: Renmin University Press).
[126] Pang Zhongying. 2005. "Yazhou diqu zhixu di zhuanbian yu Zhongguo" (China and transformations in East Asian Regional Order) *Waijiao pinglun* (*Foreign Affairs Review*) No. 83, 41–49.
[127] Liu Kai, Wang Yunhai and Li Feng. 2006. "Guoji tixi zhong de quanli zhuanyi yu Zhongguo heping fazhan zhanlüe zhanwang", Guoji guanxi xueyuan xuebao, no. 4, 55.
[128] Hu Jian 2007. "'Zhongguo zeren' yu heping fazhan daolu" (China's responsibility and the road of peaceful development) *Xiandai guoji guanxi* (*Contemporary International Relations*) No. 7, 44.

sector Men suggests China to increase its military spending moderately and invest in military technology in order to be prepared to win regional wars in which high tech is used. In addition to backing China militarily, Men emphasises the need to establish stable security mechanisms in the Asia-Pacific area and to promote multilateral security cooperation.[129]

As mentioned in chapter three, China has not published any document that would comprehensively define its strategic goals and ways to achieve them. Thus, China does not have a public grand strategy and the question of whether such strategy would be necessary divides scholars. There are a number of scholars who feel that China should be more active in formulating a grand strategy to guide its foreign policy. Concentration on China's regional strategy is not inconsistent with the idea that also a grand strategy may be needed. According to Shi Yinhong, in addition to part of the elite, the public expresses a need for a more proactive and outward looking foreign policy.[130]

There are several examples in academic journals of articles emphasising the need for a grand strategy as well as descriptions of how such strategies should look like. Professor Tang Shiping from Fudan University expressed his ideas on China's grand strategy in 2001 in *Strategy and Management,* an article which was later discussed in *References for Leaders* (*Lingdao Canyue,* 领导参阅), a magazine specially tailored for the Chinese top leadership. In his 2001 evaluation Tang was rather pessimistic about China's capability to influence the international system and found that the power gap between the US and China is so big that China cannot realistically become a maritime power. He also emphasised that greater status and power come with greater responsibilities.[131] Tang's text started a heated debate on the components of China's grand strategy including discussion on weather China

[129] Men Honghua 2004. "Zhongguo heping jueji de guoji zhanlue kuangjia" (Peaceful Rise: A Framework for China's International Strategy) *Shijie jingji yu zhengzhi* (*World Economics and Politics*), No. 6, 14–19.
[130] Shi 2006.
[131] Tang, Shiping. 2001. "Zai lun Zhongguo de da zhanlue" (Once again on China's Grand Strategy), *Zhanlue yu guanli* (*Strategy and Management)* No. 4, 29–37.

should aim to become a maritime power or remain essentially as a continental power.[132] The debate about need for a grand strategy has continued for the whole Hu period. Recently there have been articles encouraging China to develop its maritime forces, although most of these texts suggest gradual build up which is not directed against the US but rather justified for the purpose of ensuring China's sovereignty and territorial integrity. For example Pan Zhongqi and Huang Renwei find that China should strive for building itself as a great maritime power (*zhengqu chengwei haishang qiangguo,* 争取成为海上强国), as this would also help in breaking the US containment in the surrounding maritime areas.[133]

Professor Pang Zhongying from Renmin University of China has been speaking for the need of a grand strategy. Pang finds that if China wants to be actively involved in the process of international systemic change, it should have a grand strategy. Currently the world suffers from a serious leadership crisis and as China has to deal with the existing international system, it should try to reform it in such a way that allows China to have more decision making power.[134] In contrast to Pang's view, some find a grand strategy unnecessary in the current circumstances, and according to one of his colleagues China "does not have means for a good strategy".[135] Wang Jisi reminds that grand strategies entail problems, and especially because China does not have a very long tradition in talking about international strategies, some precautions are necessary. Before the reform and opening up not even the concept of "national interest" existed. Wang Jisi finds that China should learn from some mistakes the US has made with its grand strategy. Even though the US strategy has been value-laden, China should acknowledge the problems of promoting its values or policy priorities to other countries. For example, although Chinese foreign policy places the economic development

[132] Li, Rex. 2009. *A Rising China and Security in East Asia*. London: Routledge, 193.
[133] Pan Zhongqi and Huang Renwei 2011, 10.
[134] Pang Zhongying. 2010. "Xiaoguo buzhang de duobian zhuyi he guoji lingdao chizi –Jianlun Zhongguo zai guoji jiti xingdong zhong de lingdao zeren" (Ineffective multilateralism and international leadership deficit: Discussion on China in the international collective action leadership responsibilities) *Shijie jingji yu zhengzhi* (*World Economics and Politics*), No. 6, 14–18.
[135] Interview with the professor in question.

and national unification as priorities, it does not mean all other countries would equally value economic development and national unity as they may place other things as priorities.[136]

Although China's active role is promoted, many researchers emphasise that China is weak and strong at the same time, which poses challenges to its widening foreign policy agenda. Many scholars highlight the domestic constrains of China's rise and the limitations or concerns they have on the implementation of China's widening foreign policy agenda. For many, for example for Dr. Cui Shoujun from Renmin University and for Dr. Gao Lan from Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences number one concern in China's future development is domestic instability. Gao sees China especially unequal wealth distribution as a possible obstacle for China's rise.[137] Cui worries about how the foreign policy establishment can take care of China's growing interests abroad. For example China's dependence on overseas resources such as oil, which comes partly from politically unstable areas and needs to be transported via long sea routes creates difficult challenges for the foreign policy establishment.[138]

Wang Yizhou describes China as both powerful and vulnerable (*ji qiangda you cuiruo,* 既强大又脆弱).[139] Wang Jisi shares this characterisation and has a rather moderate take on China's power position and its ability to catch up with the United States. Despite its rise, China remains a weak country. [140] Wang underlines the dangers of being too optimistic on China's rise as it may endanger international stability and consequently China's domestic development.[141] Moreover, for developing and implementing China 's grand strategy, China

[136] Wang Jisi 2007. "Zhongguo de guoji zhanlue yanjiu: fanshi de fanshi yu goujian" (China Strategic and International Studies: Reflection and Construction of Paradigms) *Guoji zhenzhi yanjiu* (*International Politics Quarterly*) No. 4, 1–5.
[137] Interview with Dr. Gao Lan at Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences, 9 March 2012.
[138] Interview, Cui Shoujun.
[139] Wang Yizhou 2008. "Zhongguo waijiao shi tese –jianlun dui waijiao yanjiu de qishi" (Ten Features of China's Diplomacy in a Reform Era), *Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi* (*World Economics and Politics*) No. 5, 12.
[140] Wang Jisi 2011a.
[141] Wang Jisi 2011a.

should confront the difficult task of improving its domestic policy coordination.[142] Dr. Yu Yingli, a researcher at the Shanghai Institute for International Studies finds that China does not want to be the most influential country in the international system, because it cannot bear the attached responsibilities. For ordinary Chinese China's internal problems are more important than international position and consequently many find for example that China should not lend money to European countries that suffering from financial difficulties in the late 2000s.[143]

Responsible power?

Scholars seem to agree that free riding in the international system is not an option for a country as big as China, although some scholars express critical views on the Western definition of the responsibilities China should shoulder. According to Men Honghua China has taken more international responsibilities after the Asian financial crisis in 1997 and as its rise continues, China should also provide more global and regional public goods. The further China's rise continues, the more impossible it will be for China to participate passively in the common issues in the international system, as there is no country that could provide free ride for a country as large as China.[144] The head of China Institute of International Studies and former ambassador to United Kingdom, Ma Zhengang is rather critical of the Western statements urging China to become a responsible power. According to Ma, these expressions often echo arguments presented by the China threat theory and China collapse theory and their starting point is to unjustly define China as somehow "irresponsible".[145] Professor Pang Zhongying finds that China has played a limited local leadership role. But to fully assume the leadership role China should have according to its size, it should adopt a more prominent role.

[142] Wang Jisi. 2011b."Zhongguo dazhanlue qiusuo" *Lingdao wencui* (*Leadership collections*) No. 20, 23–25.
[143] Interview with Dr. Yu Yingli at the Shanghai Institute for International Studies, 30 November 2011.
[144] Men Honghua 2004.
[145] Ma Zhengang 2007."Zhongguo de zeren yu 'Zhongguo zerenlun' (China's Responsibility and "China Responsibility Theory") *Guoji wenti yanjiu* (*International Studies*) No. 3, 1–3.

Pang writes that because China does not favour international hegemony it has falsely also avoided talking about international leadership although leadership and hegemony are quite different things. But Pang sees it important that China does not look like a free rider, so it should assume more leadership in some specific issue areas in certain regions, which Pang does not specify in detail although he mentions the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in this context.[146] In an interview he added that in many cases China has been internationally active, it has been because the international community has pressed China to "assume responsibility". During Hu Jintao's era China has still been too reactive in its foreign policy regarding political and security sectors. In result the international community has been able to pressure China to take measures for example in the Darfur and Sudan cases. In the economic and financial sectors China has managed to be more proactive in its actions.[147]

Hu Jian from Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences is critical of the externally imposed definition of China's responsibilities. He notes that Western countries tend to focus on China's international responsibilities, although China's domestic responsibilities should be its priority. When the western powers raise concerns about China's domestic development, they often just criticize China for its poor human rights development and lack of democracy and transparency in order to gain moral superiority and push China to assume more international responsibilities. In addition, talking about responsibilities is closely linked with the China threat theory and China collapse theory as the West seems uncertain of what kind of impact China's rise will have on them and tries to define and control China's international role.[148]

Research Director Li Dongyan from CASS emphasises the need to pay attention to definition of different concepts related to China's responsibilities. Instead of talking about

[146] Pang Zhongying 2010.
[147] Interview, Pang Zhongying.
[148] Hu Jian 2007. "'Zhongguo zeren' yu heping fazhan daolu" (China's responsibility and the road of peaceful development) *Xiandai guoji guanxi* (Contemporary International Relations) No. 7, 43–47.

"responsible powers" and international responsibility he suggests to use terms such as "international contribution" (*guoji gongxian,* 国际贡献) or "common international responsibility" (*guoji gongtong zeren,* 国际共同责任) because international responsibility has multiple controversial meanings and it is constantly evolving. When referring to international responsibilities, the meaning of the term should be based on the basic principles of international law and the UN charter.[149]

Jin Canrong has written a book on big power responsibilities (*Daguo de zeren*, 大国的责任) in which he defines China's rise as an unavoidable reality. According to Jin, enhanced international status comes with greater responsibilities. In order to meet these new requirements, China should adopt a great power mentality (*daguo xintai,* 大国心态) and try to get rid of the "century of national humiliation" complex (*bainian guochi qingjie,* "百年国耻"情结). Second, China should devote more energy to improving its domestic governance. Third, China should balance its external and internal responsibilities. Finally, it should be more proactive in selecting some international tasks and taking them voluntarily, without being first pressured from other actors. However, it should still acknowledge its limits and avoid taking too many responsibilities at the same time.[150]

Academics' Views on Sino-American Relations in 2002-2012

Next I will briefly discuss China's bilateral relations with the US and Japan and how Chinese top scholars have studied them. First, it is necessary to point out that the study of international relations in China concentrates heavily on studying the United States and China's relations

[149] Li Dongyan 2011. "Cong guoji zeren de rending yu tezheng kan Zhongguo de guoji zeren" (Defining China's international responsibility from the perspective of definition and characterization of International responsibility) *Xiandai guoji guanxi* (*Contemporary International Relations*) No. 8, 52–57.
[150] Jin Canrong 2010.

with the US. This trend materialises in the institutional landscape of universities and other research institutions if we look at the amount of research staff specialised in studying the US versus the number of staff studying Japan or other subjects.[151] Thus, it is hardly surprising that the amount of research articles on Sino-US relations has been higher than those on Sino-Japanese relations, China's foreign relations in general or big power relations (Figure one).

Figure 4.1. Frequency of international relations articles that are about Sino-US relations, Sino-Japanese relations or great power relations in Chinese academic journals, 2002-2012.



The highest peak in the amount of articles on Sino-US relations comes after the financial crisis in 2008, which brought forth discussion on the US decline. The US pivot to Asia policy was announced in November 2011, which might be one of the reasons behind the

[151] Shambaugh 2011b.

2012 peak. What comes to the amount of published texts on Sino-Japanese relations, 2005 anti-Japanese demonstrations related to Japan's request for a permanent seat in the UN security council and disputes on the content of Japanese history textbooks, 2007 Hu's state visit to Japan and the 2012 Diaoyu-Senkaku island dispute seem to reflect in the amount of articles written on Sino-Japanese relations, but the 2010 fishing boat incident did not cause a peak. Articles on big power relations and China's foreign affairs were mainly included in this figure to contextualise the number of articles on Sino-US and Sino-Japanese relations. However, the fact the study of China's foreign affairs shows a growing tendency is interesting because critically analysing China's own foreign policy has been one of the most persistent "no go zones" and probably led avoiding the subject altogether to a certain extent. The 2007 peak in the graph links to the coming Olympics, but a new increase starts right after the drop in 2008.

As China's relations with the US were already discussed earlier in this chapter with regards to China's power position in the international system in which the US is the dominant power, this section will just briefly raise a few points more directly related to Sino-US relations. It is quite difficult to separate these two discussions, and it is often not done in the Chinese academic texts either. For example Professor Ren Xiao from Fudan University has noted that because of the increasingly global nature of Sino-US relations, the study of US-China relations should not limit itself to only the bilateral relations but also aim to cover regional and international issues that matter for both parties. [152] And this has increasingly been the direction of research.

Chinese scholarly approaches to the US show mixed feelings which was already the case in David Shambaugh's study of Chinese images of the US from the 1970s to

[152] Ren Xiao 2007. "ZhongMei guanxi yanjiu youdai liange chaoyue" (Research on Sino-US Relations should Reach Beyond the Bilateral Relation) *Guoji wenti yanjiu* (International Studies) No. 2, 13–14.

1990s.[153] Although overall during Hu's era Sino-US relations have been more stable than the Sino-Japanese relations, scholars point out multiple problems in China's relations with the US as well. Many note that China and the US have conflicting interests and that the US side interprets China's behaviour in negative terms. Zhang Qingmin finds that US domestic politics highly influence its policy towards China, which means that China sometimes becomes the scapegoat for US domestic problems. However, in May 2012 Zhang did not see indications for major changes in the US-China relations despite the US presidential elections.[154] In 2006 Shi Yinhong estimated that long-term structural contradictions between the US and China were becoming more severe than before, because "US government officials had raised the threat assessment of Chinese military."[155] Yang Jiemian finds that building strategic mutual trust between China and the US has a long way to go.[156]

The Chinese are not applauding the US Pacific Pivot and it is interpreted from a wide range of angles ranging from milder reactions to the accusation that it constitutes an unjustified containment of China. Pang Zhongying presents a viewpoint from the more critical end. According to Pang, the US Asia policy is not legitimate but colonialist and imperialist and he states that China simply cannot accept US dominance in the Asia Pacific. He finds that the US presence may hinder cooperation and reconciliation between Asian countries. Many of security problems among Asians actually have to do with Washington rather than the two Asian countries per se. Based on the experiences of the past 50 years, the US hegemonic order has not helped to solve problems Japan has with other Asian countries, which manifests the problems with US order. For solving practical problems in Asia in an effective way, it would be better to strengthen Asian integration rather than continuing the US

[153] Shambaugh 1991.
[154] Interview, Zhang Qingmin.
[155] Shi 2006, 41–42.
[156] Yang Jiemian 2012.

leadership.[157] The US leadership continues to weaken after the financial crisis. In addition, the US has refused to participate in important international agreements and treaties such as founding of the International Criminal Court, which shows lack of global leadership capacity.[158] Pan Zhongqi fears that because the US has decided to strengthen its presence in Asia, there will be more conflicts between China and the US in the future because of the South China Sea issue, Taiwan, the US approaching Myanmar, problems in North Korea, Pakistan, Afganistan and other places.[159] Also Gui Yongtao writes that United States has participated in creating tensions in East Asia, which helps to strengthen its dominance in the area.[160]

The Taiwan issue is one obvious and persisting problem. Professor Wu Xinbo from Fudan University interprets that because the US takes China as its potential rival, it decided to take a more prominent role in the Taiwan affairs after the Cold War in tandem with China's rise.[161] Professor Yang Jiemian regrets that although Sino-US relations have developed in many ways during the past thirty years, the Taiwan issue remains essentially unchanged. For China, unification with Taiwan is a symbolic sign that would show China has developed into a world class power.[162]

Yan Xuetong has a theory, which aims to explain fluctuation in Sino-US relations. In 2010 he described the Sino-US relationship with a "superficial friendship theory" arguing that because both the US and Chinese side insist on describing their bilateral relationship more friendly than it actually is, they will continuously get disappointed which leads to increased instability in the relationship. According to a database Yan has collected on

[157] Pang Zhongying 2005.
[158] Pang Zhongying 2010.
[159] Interview, Pan Zhongqi.
[160] Gui Yongtao 2013. "Dongya minzuzhuyi boxing yu Zhongguo zhoubian guanxi de zhuanxing" (Rise of Nationalism in East Asia and the Changing Relations between China and Its Neighbors) *Guoji anquan yanjiu* (International Security Studies) No. 2, 74 –87.
[161] Wu Xinbo 2008. "Meiguo dui Taiwan shiwu de yingxiang: Xianzhuang yu zouxiang"(America's Influence to Taiwan Affairs- the Current Situation and Tendency) *Xiandai guoji guanxi* (*Contemporary International Relations*) No. 6, 13–20.
[162] Yang 2011.

events related to the Sino-US relations, the relations were more stable in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s than after the Cold War. Yan argues that if the US and China would openly acknowledge the problem issues and describe the relationship more realistically, it would result in increased stability and enhanced relationship.[163]

Regardless of these problems, many scholars suggest a pragmatic approach of avoiding confrontation. Despite the US geopolitical containment of China and its strategic expansion in Asia, Pan Zhongqi and Huang Renwei find that in order to secure peaceful rise, China must try to cope with the US and aim to building stable, constructive and cooperative relations with the US.[164] Shi writes that "China has determined to cooperate with the US in East Asia widely but selectively."[165] Huang Renwei thinks that China can learn from the British-American peaceful power transition and try not to become America's number one enemy by avoiding to challenge the US core interests. In addition, increasing interdependence with the US, avoiding excessive pursuit of developing sea power and taking more responsibility in global governance by providing public goods would help China to enhance the Sino-US relations.[166] In another text Huang emphasises that because of deep economic interdependence between the US and China, US pivot to Asia policy should not be interpreted as a comprehensive strategy to contain China.[167] Cui Liru finds that a "neither enemy nor friend" (*feidifeiyou,* 非敌非有) approach seems realistic and plausible in the Sino-US

[163] Yan's theory was published in Chinese in World Economics and Politics. Yan Xuetong 2010. "Dui Zhongmei guanxi buwendingxing de fenxi" (The Instability of China-US Relations) *Shijie jingji yu zhengzhi* (*World Economics and Politics*), No. 12, 4–30. It was also published in English in the Chinese Journal of International Politics. Yan Xuetong 2010. "The Instability of China-US Relations." *The Chinese Journal of International Politics* 3, 263–292.
[164] Pan Zhongqi and Huang Renwei 2011.
[165] Shi 2013, 198.
[166] Huang Renwei 2012a. "Cong Meiguo zouxiang baquan de guocheng kan dangqian ZhongMei guanli zhuanyi" (Looking the current Sino-US power shift from the perspective of United States' history of attaining hegemony) *Meiguo yanjiu* (*American Studies Quarterly*) No. 3, 126–127.
[167] Huang Renwei 2012b. "Meiguo yazhou zhanlue de zai pingheng yu Zhongguo zhanlue youshi zai pinggu" (U.S. Asia strategy rebalancing and re-evaluation of China's strategic advantage) *Xiandai guoji guanxi* (*Contemporary International Relations*) No. 8, 35–36.

relations under the current circumstances.[168] He sees US-China strategic competition as inevitable, but notes that the manner in which competition takes place is important. China needs to be prepared to face harsh circumstances and this requires it to strengthen its navy. Yet this strategic adjustment still does not equal to challenging the United States.[169] Even Yan Xuetong who is often described as using hard-core rhetoric in his analyses argued in 2004 that because of strong mutual deterrence, war between the US and China is unlikely. To rule out the possibility however, China should invest in its military capacity.[170]

Academics' Views on Sino-Japanese Relations in 2002-2012

In terms of academic research on Sino-Japanese relations, Hu Jintao's period started in unusual circumstances with the so-called "New Thinking" debate, mentioned in the beginning of this chapter in which Shi Yinhong and Ma Licheng were involved in. [171] Ma wrote a controversial article arguing that the apology question in Sino-Japanese relations has been resolved and China should look into the future in its bilateral relations with Japan. After Ma received harsh criticism Shi Yinhong defendend Ma's position in two articles published in 2003. In an article in *Strategy and Management*, Shi pointed out that rapprochment with Japan could pave the way for a Sino-Japanese semi-alliance against US "hegemonism".[172] In another article published in the *World Economics and International Politics* Shi expressed his fear that emotions are gaining too much ground in Sino-Japanese relations and emphasised

[168] Cui Liru 2008. "Zhongguo heping jueqi yu guoji zhixu yanbian" (China's peaceful rise and evolution of the international order) *Xiandai guoji guanxi* (*Contemporary International Relations*) No. 1, 4.
[169] Cui Liru 2012. "Bian hai wenti yu Zhongguo dui wai zhanlue tiaozheng" (The Issue of Seaside Strategic Adjustment) *Xiandai guoji guanxi* (*Contemporary International Relations*) No. 8, 7–9.
[170] Yan Xuetong. 2004. "Heping jueqi yu baozhang heping –Jian lun Zhongguo jueqi de zhanlue yu celue" (Peaceful rise and safeguarding peace -on strategy and tactics of China's peaceful rise)," Guoji wenti yanjiu (International Studies) No. 3, 12–16; description of Yan's scholarly orientation, see Shambaugh 2011a.
[171] Gries 2005; Reilly 2010, 59; Reilly 2012, 170; Beukel 2011, 19.
[172] Lam, Willy Wo-Lap. 2006. *Chinese Politics in the Hu Jintao Era. New Leaders, New Challenges*. New York: M.E. Sharpe, 202.

the need to guide public opinion on Japan. The debate was very important, but as it is well documented also in English, I will not go in any more details here but rather briefly discuss writings that came after this famous debate.[173]

Even though both Ma and Shi were criticised because of their writings in the early 2000s, Shi continued to advocate a moderate position towards Japan and argued for the beneficial effects improving the bilateral relations would have for China. In 2006 Shi estimated that political and strategic rivalry and competition between China and Japan was in the increase.[174] Shi describes the period from Shinzo Abe's visit to Beijing in October 2006 and the following Wen Jiabao's visit to Tokyo in April 2007 as a remarkable improvement, although this improvement in Sino-Japanese relations unfortunately did not continue. He proposed that the so-called "1972 framework" including the history issue and Taiwan as Chinese interests that Japan should respect, should be expanded and for example some kind of crisis management mechanisms should be established.[175] He continues that with the precondition that Japan respects China, China should accept Japan's goal of becoming a "normal state."[176]

Dr. Lian Degui from Shanghai Institute for International Studies finds that recently there have been five main obstacles in Sino-Japanese relations, namely differing views about history, Taiwan sovereignty, the Diaoyu islands, East China Sea and general mutual distrust between the peoples.[177] To resolve some of these issues, Pang Zhongying promotes regional integration. According to Pang, the European example shows that with increased integration Europe managed to solve the German problem so it should be possible

[173] For more details on the "new thinking debate", see Gries 2005; Shen Simon and Mong Cheung. 2007. "Reshaping Nationalism: Chinese Intellectual Response Towards Sino-American and Sino-Japanese Relations in the Twenty-First Century." *The Pacific Review* 20 (4), 475-497; Reilly 2012, chapter five.
[174] Shi 2006, 43.
[175] Shi 2013, 204.
[176] Shi 2013, 205–206.
[177] Interview, Lian Degui.

in Asia as well.[178]

Despite Japan's decline and China's rise, some scholars are worried about Japan's attempt to become a "normal power" especially because of the US-Japan alliance. Pang Zhongying defined Japan as a rising power in 2005 because of Japan's process of becoming a "normal power," which indicates increasing political and military power in addition to economic power. For the US, Japan is the Britain of the Far East. [179]

Conclusion

Based on the works cited above, two tentative conclusions are in order. First, this review of scholarly writings does not give evidence of any general support for a significantly more assertive position in the international system among elite scholars despite some worries presented in the Western scholarship. On the contrary, it seems that despite the high external evaluations of China's power, most scholars express rather moderate views on China's rise at least in writing. They raise several domestic concerns China should deal with for example related to its mode of governance in order to be able to continue its rise. It is naturally likely that scholars may sometimes apply self-censorship in publications, but my experiences after reading their articles and speaking with some of them in person did not provide any evidence that they would generally speak one thing and publish something very different. Many of the writers cited above do find that China should play a more prominent role in international affairs, but none of them, including those who are generally very critical of US engagements in Asia, think surpassing the US or comprehensively changing the international system would be possible for China any time soon or even desirable. Perhaps only Yan Xuetong's 2012

[178] Pang Zhongying 2005.
[179] ibid.

article echoes the nationalist writings mentioned in the beginning of the chapter.

Second, the diverse opinions on China's international position expressed in the scholarly community implicate that China does not have any one dominant international identity to guide its actions, which is important to take into account when evaluating China's behaviour as a rising power. Chinese academic elite remains divided on the issues related to China's relative position in the international system, feasibility to take a more prominent international stance and the means to enhance its power position. Finally, a few sporadic voices express adjustments on China's foreign policy agenda directed largely by economics. They find that in the course of China's rise, it will need to sometimes place economics as a second order question in order to enable other political goals.

Regarding the more technical aim of this chapter concerning various consultation channels Chinese policy-makers are currently using and developing further, a point often made in the articles evaluating the influence of think tanks on policymaking is that semi-official think tanks with clear administrative connections with the government are most influential.[180] I would urge future research to reconsider this claim in the light of the growing influence of the media and the composition of international relations scholars taking a more visible public role. Based on the interviews I conducted in Beijing and Shanghai in various universities and a few research institutes, the policy consultation performed by academics at universities are taking wide-ranging forms and many of the most active commentators on foreign policy issues seem to come from universities, which clearly increases the influence of these scholars.

[180] Zhu and Lan 2007, 462; Zhu 2009, 338.

Note: The 2007 part of the analysis was published in the *China Quarterly* in December 2013.[1] The author thanks *China Quarterly* for the permission to include the published materials here.

5. Chapter
Anti-foreign Nationalists and Internationalist Patriots. Nationalism and Patriotism as Core Values Shaping Foreign Policy Preferences

> *Personally I think that some content in our education is wrong, and in some respects the government's behavior is not correct. For example, regarding the often-mentioned question about Japan, I feel that it's not right to enhance patriotic education by highlighting anti-Japanese ideas. The government uses us and that is not right. We should have our own ideas, and get them by reading books and some stuff on our own. We should not completely follow the government. I feel China is very wrong in this aspect.*
> (Male law student from Renmin University, age 26, spring 2007)[2]

Chinese nationalism and national identity construction have gathered attention in recent years.[3] Pro-China demonstrations in 2008 during the Olympic torch relay and anti-Japanese demonstrations in the spring of 2005, in September 2010 and September 2012 have raised concern abroad about the nature of Chinese nationalism and national identity. Will China become an assertive and expansionist power as a result of its decades long economic boom and growing number of nationalist voices?

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[1] Sinkkonen, Elina. 2013. "Nationalism, Patriotism and Foreign Policy Attitudes among Chinese University Students." *The China Quarterly* 216 (4), 1045–1063.

[2] The original quote in Chinese is: 而且我个人认为我国有些教育的内容也是不对的，政府有些行为是不对的。讲的比较多的日本，我感觉不能够通过反日来提高爱国教育。我们是被政府利用，这样是不对的，我们应该有自己的想法，应该通过自己阅读书籍，看一些东西来有自己的想法，不能完全跟着官方走，感觉这方面中国很不对。

[3] Zheng, Yongnian. 1999. *Discovering Chinese Nationalism in China. Modernization, Identity and International Relations*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Gries, Peter H., Qingmin Zhang, H. Michael Crowson, and Huajian Cai. 2011. "Patriotism, Nationalism, and China's U.S. Policy: Structures and Consequences of Chinese National Identity." *The China Quarterly* 205, 1–17; Tang, Wenfang and Benjamin Darr. 2012. "Chinese Nationalism and Its Political and Social Origins." *Journal of Contemporary China* 21 (77), 811–826.

Most analysts agree that nationalism is a powerful source of legitimacy for the CCP.[4] Because of its legitimacy needs, the Chinese leadership is increasingly sensitive to public opinion or at least opinion of urban elites.[5] As explained in more detail in chapter two, students form one part of these urban elites, and influence politics both outside and inside the CCP. On the one hand, the CCP sees students and young people in urban areas the most likely to join in protest movements over foreign policy issues, which makes this segment of population a concern to Chinese leaders.[6] On the other hand, the Party has especially targeted the young and the highly educated for recruitment and the amount of highly educated Party-members is increasing rapidly.[7]

Students have been active in the Chinese nationalist movement, but still we know little about their opinions –perhaps with the exception of those who are active online. This is part of a bigger problem. Recent research has been keen to point out that Chinese nationalism is "on the rise," but in addition to conceptual disarray discussed in chapters one and two, lack of a sound empirical dimension is often identified as a clear disadvantage of studies on nationalism.[8] Some studies that have analysed young Chinese and their national attachment tend to portray young urbanites as forerunners of nationalism or the "most nationalistic" part of the population as a result of patriotic education campaign.[9] A very few others have provided evidence to problemize the assumptions of rising nationalism and

[4] Downs, Erica and Phillip Saunders. 1999. "Legitimacy and the Limits of Nationalism: China and the Diaoyu Islands." *International Security* 23 (3), 118; Laliberté, André and Marc Lantegne. 2008. *The Chinese Party-State in the 21st Century*. New York: Routledge, 11.
[5] Reilly, James. 2010. "Online Chinese Nationalism toward Japan." In Simon Shen and Shaun Breslin (eds.), *Online Chinese Nationalism and China's Bilateral Relations*. Plymouth: Lexington Books, 53; Johnston, Alastair Iain. 2004. "Chinese Middle Class Attitudes towards International Affairs: Nascent Liberalization?" *The China Quarterly* 179 (3), 604.
[6] Reilly, James. 2012. *Strong Society, Smart State. The Rise of Public Opinion in China's Japan Policy*. New York: Columbia University Press, 126.
[7] Guo, Gang. 2005. "Party Recruitment of College Students in China." *Journal of Contemporary China* 14 (43), 371–393.
[8] Dekker, Henk, Darina Malová, and Sander Hoogendoorn. 2003. "Nationalism and Its Explanations." *Political Psychology* 24 (2), 346.
[9] Wang, Zheng. 2012. *Never Forget National Humiliation. Historical Memory in Chinese Politics and Foreign Relations.* New York: Columbia University Press.

students and young people as the "most nationalistic" part of the population.[10] Portraying university students as nationalists is a one-sided and flawed view for reasons the following analysis will show.

Using two sets of survey material collected by the author in 2007 and in 2011-2012, this chapter provides a quantitative perspective to analyse nationalism and patriotism and their links to foreign policy attitudes in China. It makes three contributions. First, although there is a substantial qualitative literature addressing questions related to Chinese nationalism and patriotism, the quantitative perspective has been largely neglected.[11] In this context it is worth repeating a point mentioned in chapter two that not even the Beijing Area Studies datasets, which are regarded as one of the best if not the best datasets available on Chinese public views on issues related to foreign policy, have so far provided enough data for multivariate models on foreign policy issues. This seriously limits the depth of our understanding on how foreign policy attitudes are associated with other attitudes.[12] More precisely, quantitative research can offer us important evidence to understand that pro-China attitude alone does not indicate anti-internationalism or aggressive nationalism. National attachment should not be treated as a one-dimensional concept.

Second, both in the 2007 and the 2011-2012 datasets CCP members were more nationalistic than non-members. The question of whether CCP membership is associated with certain foreign policy orientations has not been thoroughly researched as a topic, so these results contribute to filling in a gap in the literature. Third, this chapter contributes to our understanding of how cultural differences and domestic context matter when analysing

[10] Dingxin Zhao noted that peer influence was one of the strongest motivator for students to participate in the anti-US demonstrations in 1999. Zhao, Dingxin. 2002. "Student Nationalism in China." *Problems of Post-Communism* 49 (6), 22–24; Gries et al. 2011.
[11] Gries et al. 2011.
[12] Johnston, Alastair Iain. 2006. "The Correlates of Beijing Public Opinion toward the United States, 1998-2004." In Alastair Iain Johnston and Robert S. Ross (eds.), *New Directions in the Study of China's Foreign Policy*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 347; Johnston, Alastair Iain and Daniela Stockman. 2007. "Chinese Attitudes toward the United States and Americans." In Peter J. Katzenstein and Robert Keohane (eds.), *Anti-Americans in World Politics*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 165.

foreign policy preferences. The fact that in China nationalism and patriotism are different constructs and they have different types of links with foreign policy preferences differentiates the Chinese case for example from the United States, where some evidence indicates that nationalism and patriotism may not be different constructs. Core values related to hierarchical foreign policy belief systems have cross-cultural variance, which also affects the wider context of foreign policy making in the respective countries. Analysis of core values and foreign policy attitudes in the Chinese context extends the application of hierarchical model of foreign policy belief systems developed by John Hurwitz and Mark Peffley in 1987, which was discussed in more detail in chapter two.[13]

Nationalism and Patriotism as Concepts

For conceptual clarity it is important to determine whether patriotism and nationalism can be treated as two different constructs. This is subject to continuous debate. This research treats "nationalism" and "patriotism" as attitudinal clusters. In the survey research presented below, "nationalism" is defined as a view according to which one's country is superior to other countries and that provides for uncritical support of the home country's actions; "patriotism," on the other hand, is defined as a feeling of pride and emotional attachment to one's country. The key difference between the concepts is that "nationalism" compares one nation's qualities with those of other nations, whereas "patriotism" relates only to internal qualities.

Scholars such as Walker Connor have insisted on treating nationalism and patriotism strictly as separate concepts, but others, such as Anthony Smith, hold that the concepts have significant overlap. Others, like Michael Billig deny that "nationalism" and

[13] Hurwitz, John and Mark Peffley. 1987. "How Are Foreign Policy Attitudes Structured? A Hierarchical Model?" *The American Political Science Review* 81 (4), 1099–1120.

"patriotism" can be treated as separate concepts.[14] In 1989, Rick Kosterman and Seymour Feshbach published one of the first widely cited pieces of research analysing patriotism and nationalism empirically with survey material. Their conclusion, based on principal factor analysis, was that patriotism and nationalism can be regarded as empirically distinct. Kosterman and Feshbach define patriotism as feelings of attachment to one's country and nationalism as the view that one's country is superior and should be dominant.[15]

Items from Kosterman's and Feshbach's patriotism and nationalism scales have been borrowed by many to study nationalism and patriotism in the Chinese context and elsewhere. Robert Schatz, Ervin Staub and Howard Lavine used some of Kosterman's and Feshbach's items and some of their own in a questionnaire filled in by American undergraduates, and found that blind patriotism (defined as uncritical positive evaluation of one's country associated with nationalism) and constructive patriotism (meaning support for questioning and criticism of current group practices that are intended to result in positive change) represent distinct constructs.[16] Richard Herrmann's, Pierangelo Isernia's and Paolo Segatti's research on national identity in Italy and the US also used similar conceptual framework.[17] In the context of Chinese nationalism and patriotism, Kosterman's and Festbach's statements have been applied by Peter Hays Gries et al. and Gregory Fairbrother.[18]

In 2009 Peter Gries, Qingmin Zhang, H. Michael Crowson and Huajian Cai were interested in what the nature of Chinese patriotism and nationalism is, how it differs

[14] Connor, Walker. 1994. *Ethnonationalism: The Quest for Understanding*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, chapter 4; Smith, Anthony. 2009. *Ethno-symbolism and Nationalism. A Cultural Approach.* London: Routledge, 62; Billig, Michael. 1995. *Banal Nationalism*. London: Sage Publications, 55–59.
[15] Kosterman, Rick and Seymour Feshbach. 1989. "Toward a Measure of Patriotic and Nationalistic Attitudes." *Political Psychology* 10 (2), 261.
[16] Schatz, Robert T., Ervin Staub, and Howard Lavine. 1999. "On the Varieties of National Attachment: Blind Versus Constructive Patriotism." *Political Psychology* 20 (1), 151–174.
[17] Herrmann, Richard; Pierangelo Isernia and Paolo Segatti. 2009. "Attachment to the Nation and International Relations: Dimensions of Identity and Their Relationship to War and Peace." *Political Psychology* 30 (5), 721–754.
[18] Gries et al. 2011; Fairbrother, Gregory. 2003. "The Effects of Political Education and Critical Thinking on Hong Kong and Mainland Chinese University Students' National Attitudes." *British Journal of Sociology Education* 24 (5), 605–620; Fairbrother, Gregory. 2008. "Rethinking Hegemony and Resistance to Political Education in Mainland China and Hong Kong." *Comparative Education Review* 52 (3), 381–412.

from American patriotism and nationalism, and what impact patriotism and nationalism have on Chinese foreign policy attitudes. Three surveys were conducted in China and the U.S. in the spring and summer of 2009. In the Chinese data, consisting of 161 university students from Peking University and Renmin University and 202 Zhongshan University students, Gries et al. were able to differentiate nationalism and patriotism as distinct factors based on principal axis factoring (PAF). Another central finding was that nationalism but not patriotism clearly has an impact on Chinese foreign policy preferences. Although Gries et al. used statements from Kosterman and Feshbach's nationalism and patriotism scales, unlike in the Chinese sample, in the American sample patriotism was associated with nationalism. This may imply that national identity construction has cultural variants and Chinese case should not be analysed based on the American/Western constructs. On the other hand, it is also possible that the nationalism-patriotism distinction is more or less universal. Kosterman and Feshbach's original survey was also conducted in the United States with results supporting the separation of nationalism and patriotism. Using survey material from Italy and the US from 2004, Herrmann, Isernia and Segatti also found that national attachment and national chauvinism should be regarded as separate constructs. More importantly, national attachment was associated with positive feelings toward foreign countries and support for international cooperation, whereas chauvinism had a strongly negative association with cooperation.[19] In the Chinese sample an association between patriotism and internationalism was found, which can have important implications regarding the debate on the nature of Chinese national identity and assertive nationalism, namely whether the arguments of the liberal nationalist camp or its opponents gain more empirical support.[20]

Another question central to the research related to nationalism and patriotism in China is whether CCP members differ from other respondents. Previous research on the

[19] Herrmann et al. 2009.
[20] Gries et al. 2011.

relation between Party membership and attitudes yields contradictory results. In the context of CCP membership and foreign policy attitudes Gries et al. found that non-members preferred a slightly tougher U.S. policy than did Party members, but the sample size was too small to make far-reaching conclusions. According to Gries et al., more research is needed to see if CCP membership affects foreign policy orientations.[21] In terms of ideological orientation Gang Guo reports that surveys conducted at universities show that Party members and non-members are hard to distinguish.[22] Jackson Woods and Bruce Dickson whose "patriotism" measure roughly corresponds to the "nationalism" measure used here, did not find CCP membership to be associated with higher levels of nationalism using an urban probability sample collected in 2010.[23] In a more recent piece based on the same sample, Dickson did not find Party members to be more likely to support state institutions on the local level although membership did increase their support for the central state institutions.[24] In contrast, based on three surveys on urban respondents Jie Chen found that CCP members were more supportive of the regime's norms and institutions than non-CCP members were.[25] Wenfang Tang's and Benjamin Darr's analysis on the 2008 China Survey data showed that CCP members were more nationalistic than the public, although in my view the construction of their "nationalism" variable is problematic. By just taking out one statement with poor face value from their nationalism scale, this association becomes insignificant. My analysis using the 2008 China Survey data can be found below.[26]

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[21] Ibid., 13.
[22] Guo 2005, 388.
[23] Woods, Jackson and Bruce Dickson. 2012. "Victims and Patriots: Disaggregating Nationalism in China." Conference paper presented at the Comparative Politics Workshop at Political Science Department, the George Washington University.
[24] Dickson, Bruce. 2014. "Who Wants to Be a Communist? Career Incentives and Mobilized Loyalty in China." *The China Quarterly* 217 (1), 42–68.
[25] Chen, Jie. 2004. *Popular Political Support in Urban China*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 94.
[26] In addition to the three statements presented on page 7, Tang and Darr's nationalism scale included the following statement: "It makes me proud when my country does well in international sports." Tang and Darr explain that they measure public or mass nationalism, but I find including this statement problematic even for such a definition. Almost everyone will agree with this statement, perhaps even more in the Olympic year of 2008 when the survey was collected. Unlike the other three statements on the scale, this statement does not make a comparison between China and other countries. I would find it unjustified to classify a respondent who is

This chapter analyses the construction of Chinese national identity and examines whether Chinese who are more nationalistic or patriotic differ from less nationalistic or patriotic Chinese in their foreign policy attitudes. This is to highlight the multidimensionality of nationalist and patriotic attitudes and dispositions. Based on previous research presented above, I make the hypotheses that

H1) Nationalism and patriotism can be regarded as different constructs in China.

H2) Nationalism and patriotism have different type of links to foreign policy preferences.

These hypotheses are linked with the main research question in that in this thesis, the possible behavioural implications of national identity are understood to function through core values, which together with knowledge factors such as level of education and media consumption patterns direct issue specific attitude formation and finally behaviour. As explained in the introductory chapter, one of the aims of this thesis is to examine, whether the materials collected for this thesis support the liberal nationalist argument that does not treat strong national attachment as necessarily chauvinist, or its opponents. For this purpose we need to find out whether the two proposed types of national attachment, nationalism and patriotism can be regarded as different constructs (H1) and whether there is a form of attachment that does not take a chauvinist position towards other nations (H2).

Second, this chapter tests whether it is possible to distinguish CCP members from other respondents, a question related to the exposure-acceptance model. Party members receive additional political education, which may impact their attitudes. Third, we are interested in knowing whether there are any other factors that are associated with higher levels of nationalism or patriotism to better understand the societal processes of identity

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proud of China's sport victories as a "nationalist". In addition, when I tested the Cronbach's alpha measure of internal consistency for Tang and Darr's nationalism scale, the value was 0.45, which indicates that the scale is not internally consistent and should be rejected. For obvious reasons Tang and Darr have not reported the Cronbach alpha in the article, which is something the referees of Journal of Contemporary China should have asked for. Tang and Darr 2012.

formation. Regarding these two areas, previous research does not provide enough information to make it possible to pose hypotheses about elite student populations. Thus, regardless of what my results are, they are valuable in helping to better understand the construction of national attachment in contemporary China.

Methods

Samples

To find out student opinions on different aspects of national identity, I conducted two surveys in China. The first sample was collected together with Julie Tomaszewski in Renmin University of China, Peking University, and Tsinghua University between April and June 2007 (N=1346). I conducted the second sample (N=771) in Shanghai Jiaotong University, Fudan University, Nanjing University and Zhejiang University in November and December 2011, and in Renmin University of China, Peking University, and Tsinghua University in March 2012. Except for Renmin University of China, these universities belong to the C9 league (*jiuxiao lianmeng*, 九校联盟) of Chinese top universities. These universities were chosen because of their prestige and the likelihood that the students would assume leading roles in society after graduating. Other scholars have selected these same universities as sampling sites for similar reasons.[27] As the samples were taken from elite universities, the results cannot be directly generalized to all Chinese students, not to mention the general population compared to which the participants were much more educated and younger. However, this sample gives us information on views of China's future elite and enables us to study the relationships between variables, which can be later tested with other type of samples.

[27] Zhao, Dingxin. 2003. "Nationalism and Authoritarianism: Student-Government Conflicts during the 1999 Beijing Student Protests." *Asian Perspective* 27 (1), 11; Chen, Shengluo. 2011. "Survey Study on Chinese University Students' Perceptions of the Political Systems of China and the United States." *Chinese Education and Society* 44 (2-3), 13–57.

The questionnaire used in the research was a modified version of the ISSP (International Social Survey Program) National Identity II questionnaire, which is an international standardized questionnaire used in 34 countries in 2003.[28] ISSP National Identity II questionnaire was chosen as the starting point because its content fits well with the overall research goals of this study and the extensive number of participant countries offers a wide general context for the results. As National Identity II questionnaires had not previously been used in China, some cultural adjustments were needed.[29] The Taiwanese ISSP 2003 National Identity questionnaire was an important reference in making the adjustments. Before the questionnaire was used, it was pre-tested on 12 students studying international relations, economics, history, science and technology, and law. Based on student feedback, small adjustments were made. For the second sample, the questionnaire was changed to include elements from questionnaires used by Gries et al. and Fairbrother.[30]

Owing to the political sensitivity of the research topic, both surveys were conducted as convenience samples in the university lecture halls used for studying when no teaching is going on.[31] To see whether the 2007 student sample resembled the entire student population in the selected universities, we need to compare the student profile of the sample with that of the student body at the three universities. Based on a *China Daily* article, we know that, in 2006, 20 percent of Tsinghua University's undergraduates were Party members, as were half of the graduate students.[32] In our Tsinghua sample approximately 17 percent of undergraduates and 51 percent of graduate students were Party members. The 2007 edition of

[28] The list of countries that participated in ISSP 2003 National Identity survey, as well as the National Identity II questionnaire, can be found from International Social Survey Programme Data Archive/GESIS Data Archive. 2003. "National Identity survey 2003," http://www.gesis.org/en/services/data/survey-data/issp/modules-study-overview/national-identity/2003/. Accessed 18 January 2012.
[29] National Identity III questionnaire was planned to be used first time in China in 2013, but the results are not yet available. Ibid.
[30] Gries et al. 2011; Fairbrother 2008.
[31] Almost all Chinese university students live in the campus area in dormitories, where four to eight people generally share a room. This makes it almost impossible to study in the dormitory, so the great majority of students study and do their homework in the empty lecture halls between lectures.
[32] China Daily. 2006. "Party Now Has 70.8 Members," 1 July 2006, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2006-07/01/content_630773.htm. Accessed 19 January 2012.

Tsinghua University's yearbook shows that in 2006, 6.5 per cent of all students belonged to one of the ethnic minorities.[33] In our sample the percentage of students from ethnic minorities was 5.5. Also, in 2005, the percentage of female students at Beijing University was 45.2; in our Beijing University sample, the percentage of female students was 47.3.[34] Based on this information, the make-up of the sampled students resembled that of the entire student population at Tsinghua University and at Beijing University.[35] The 2011-2012 sample was collected from seven different universities, which makes it harder to compare the samples with the student populations in the respective institutions as each sample is smaller. However, the 2011-2012 samples cover a wider range of universities and are not only limited to Beijing, which is also valuable.

Sample characteristics of the first sample

In the 2007 data, response rate was approximately 95 per cent and we obtained 1346 valid responses. Of these 1270 (94.4%) were collected by Julie Tomaszewski and the author and 76 (5.6 %) by Chinese students. The possible effect of who collected the questionnaire was examined with linear regression models, which showed that who collected the data (ourselves or Chinese students) was not statistically significant regarding any of the statements, which is why no further data is presented here. This indicates that our foreign background did not influence students' responses.

The participants' gender ratio was approximately 50-50 (692 men and 641 women), 21 percent were from Tsinghua University (N=275), 32 per cent from Peking University (N=419), 38 per cent from Renmin University of China (N=507) and 9 per cent

[33] Tsinghua University. 2008. *Qinghua daxue nianjian 2007 (2007 Yearbook of Tsinghua University)*. Beijing: Tsinghua University Press, 536.
[34] Liu, Yunshan and Zhiming Wang. 2009. "Women Entering the Elite Group: A Limited Progress." *Frontiers in Education in China* 4 (1), 37.
[35] Dingxin Zhao conducted a survey on student protests in 1999 in the same universities as the author. He made a similar comparison of his Beijing University sample and student population at Beijing University, of which he was able to get necessary student composition data. Zhao 2002, 18.

from other universities (N=129).[36] The respondents had studied on average for 3 years (range from 1 to 7 years), 270 (21%) of them were members of the CCP, 34% had applied or were planning to apply for the membership, and 590 (45%) were not members. Most of the students were studying technology related majors (N=522, 39%) and economics (22.5%). Of the participants 233 (18%) had grown up in the countryside, 515 (39%) in a town or small city, 279 in a medium-sized city (21%) and the rest (N=282, 21.5%) had had an urban upbringing. 577 (44%) reported that at least one of their parents had higher education (*gaodeng jiaoyu,* 高等教育) and they classified their own social status as, on average, 5.8 on a 10-point scale (from 10 low to 1 high). Their ethnic background was most often Han Chinese (N=1231, 93%), whereas 91 respondents (7%) classified themselves as belonging to an ethnic minority.

Sample characteristics of the second sample

For the 2011-2012 sample the possible effect of collector's foreign background was not tested, as I assume the conditions were similar enough to those in 2007. Response rate of the latter sample was approximately 93 per cent and we obtained 771 valid responses. The participants' gender ratio was approximately 56-44 (416 men and 325 women), 14 percent were from Fudan University (N=94), 14 per cent from Shanghai Jiaotong University (N=94), 15 per cent from Nanjing University (N=104), 21 per cent from Zhejiang University (N=142), 8 percent were from Tsinghua University (N=76), 11 per cent from Peking University (N=76), 9 per cent from Renmin University of China (N=63) and 8 per cent from other universities (N=51).[37] 12 per cent of respondents refused to report their home institution (N=96). The respondents were in average 21 years old (range from 17 to 34 years), 182 (25%)

[36] These students from other universities happened to be at one of the three selected universities when the sampling was done.
[37] These students from other universities happened to be at one of the three selected universities when the sampling was done.

of them were members of the CCP or probationary members, 205 (28%) had applied or were planning to apply for the membership, and 347 (47%) were not members. Most of the students were studying engineering (N=140, 19%) and economics (N=101, 14%). Of the participants 131 (18%) had grown up in the countryside, 306 (42%) in a town or small city, 150 in a medium-sized city (20%) and the rest (N=151, 21%) had had an urban upbringing. 269 (37%) reported that their father had university education and 212 (29%) that their mother had university education. Respondents classified their own social status on average 5.7 on a 10-point scale (from 10 low to 1 high). Their ethnic background was most often Han Chinese (N=695, 93%), whereas 48 respondents (7%) classified themselves as belonging to an ethnic minority.

2008 China Survey

To contextualise the two student samples, I examined parts of Texas A&M University's 2008 China Survey, which also used the ISSP questionnaire as its reference point. Unfortunately it only allows a very partial comparison, but at the moment there is no better suitable data available. The multi-stage stratified random sample contains 3989 respondents from 75 counties and county level urban districts scattered across the seven official geographic regions of China. The response rate was 72.2 per cent. In the unweighted data, participants' gender ratio was approximately 52-48 (2065 women and 1924 men), 87.4 per cent were Han Chinese and 12.6 per cent belonged to another ethnic group, 27 per cent (N=1078) were under 35 years old, 26 per cent (N=1055) were between 36 and 45 years old, 19 per cent (N=754) were 46 to 55 years olds, 15 per cent (N=604) were 56 to 65 years olds and 13 per cent (N=498)

were over 65 years olds. 330 respondents (8.3%) were CCP members whereas around 92 per cent were not members (N=3643).[38]

Rough Assessment of General Level of Nationalist and Patriotic Attitudes in China

It is hard to reliably compare the level of nationalist or patriotic sentiments in China to those elsewhere, not only because of the definitional issues presented above but also because China has only recently joined international survey programmes. With international datasets some estimations have been conducted on level of national pride based on the International Social Survey Programme's national identity study. Tom Smith and Seokho Kim made an international comparison of the dimensions of national pride, which also contains a ranking list of national pride in the participant countries. In Smith's and Kim's work national pride is divided into two parts: domain-specific national pride and general national pride of which the latter roughly corresponds the nationalism measure used in this study because the general national pride measure implies that one's country is superior to other countries. In this study using ISSP data from 2006, the US had second highest nationalism scores after Venezuela.[39] Wenfang Tang and Benjamin Darr did a similar international comparison using the ISSP national identity data from 2003 and Texas A&M University's 2008 China Survey data for China to place China in international context with regards to level of nationalism. According to their results, the level of nationalism was highest in China among the participant countries but the US, which was the second country in the world ranking of nationalist attitudes, did not

[38] More information on the Texas A&M University's China Survey done in collaboration with the Research Center for Contemporary China (RCCC) at Peking University can be found from The China Survey at Texas A&M University. http://thechinasurvey.tamu.edu/html/overview.html. Accessed 13 February 2013.
[39] Smith, Tom W. and Seikho Kim. 2006. "National Pride in Cross-National and Temporal Perspective." *International Journal of Public Opinion Research* 18 (1), 128.

follow very far behind.[40]

From BAS data we can have another rough indicator of the level of nationalist views in China. In 2008 74 percent of the BAS respondents agreed that "in general China is better than most other countries," the figure of which jumped to 93 percent in 2009.[41] Although no far-reaching conclusions can be drawn based on a single statement, it is notable that results from more than one survey show similar trends. The Committee 100 survey on Sino-American Relations (2007) inquired about respondents' self-assessed level of patriotism. The results reveal that the general public describes themselves as less patriotic than opinion leaders or business leaders. 91 percent of business leaders and 86 percent of opinion leaders chose four or five on a self-assessment scale from one to five, whereas only 71 percent of the general public reached this level of patriotism.[42]

Measures

Nationalism and patriotism

In the 2007 survey nationalism and patriotism were both measured using three items and participants responded to these items on a five-point Likert scale from 5 ("strongly agree") to 1 ("strongly disagree"). Statement two on the patriotism scale was measured on a scale in which 4 indicated "very close" and 1 "not close at all." Statement 3 on patriotism scale also had a 4-item scale from 4 ("very proud") to 1 ("not proud at all"). All of these statements are modifications of the Taiwanese version of the 2003 ISSP National Identity II questionnaire.

[40] Tang and Darr 2012, 816. Tang and Darr used the slightly problematic measure for nationalism discussed above, which had one statement less than the general pride measure used by Smith and Kim.
[41] Johnston, Alastair Iain. 2013. "How New Is China's New Assertiveness?" *International Security* 37 (4), 37.
[42] The Committee 100. 2007. "2007 C-100 Interactive Report: American & Chinese Attitudes toward Each Other; Survey on Sino-American Relations," http://survey.committee100.org/2007/. Accessed 20 February 2011. Opinions of *general public* were constructed using multi-stage random sampling method, including respondents from seven cities, seven towns and ten villages with total sample size of 4104 people. *Opinion leaders* (n=203) comprised of 60 social sciences experts from universities and research institutions, 62 senior journalists and editors, 44 senior managers from NGOs and 37 senior professionals from different fields. Sample of *business elite* (n=156) consisted of senior decision makers and executives from corporations in different sectors. In this survey item in question, "patriotism" was not defined in the question wording.

Eldad Davidov, Kosterman and Feshbach, Gries et al., Fairbrother and Tang and Darr have used similar statements to measure nationalism and patriotism.[43]

The English translations below are done to capture the content of the Chinese sentence in as much detail as possible.

The items in the 2007 nationalism scale were (Cronbach's alpha 0.55):

1. If people from other countries learned from Chinese people, the world would change for the better.

(如果世界上其他国家的人民更多地向中国人学习，那么世界将变得更美好。)

2. Generally speaking, compared to other countries, China is a better country.

(一般讲，比起其他国家中国是一个更好的国家。)

3. People should support their country even if the country is doing something that is incorrect.

(人民应该拥护他们的国家，即使国家在做不正确的事情。)

Wording of the 2008 China Survey's nationalism items was almost identical to the 2007 nationalism scale.

The items in the 2007 patriotism scale were (Cronbach's alpha 0.52):

1. To what degree do you feel close to the PRC?

(你对中华人民共和国的亲密程度怎么样？)

2. If you are a Chinese person, how proud are you of being Chinese?

(如果你是中国人，作为中国人你有多自豪？)

[43] Davidov, Eldad. 2009. "Measurement Equivalence of Nationalism and Constructive Patriotism in the ISSP: 34 Countries in a Comparative Perspective." *Political Analysis* 17 (1), 1–19; Kosterman and Feshbach 1989, 263–264; Gries et al. 2011; Fairbrother 2008; Tang and Darr 2012.

3. I would like to proud of my country, but in reality I do not have any way of feeling proud. (Reverse coded).

(我想要为我的国家感到自豪，但是现实常常让我没有办法为之感到那么自豪。)

In the 2011-2012 survey nationalism and patriotism were both measured using seven items and participants responded to these items on a five-point Likert scale from 5 ("strongly agree") to 1 ("strongly disagree"). Only statement seven on the patriotism scale was measured on a scale in which 4 indicated "very close" and 1 "not close at all." Of these, statements three, four and seven on the nationalism scale and statements two and seven on the patriotism scale are essentially the same as those used in nationalism and patriotism scales in 2007. Thus, only statement three on the 2007 patriotism scale does not have an exact equivalent on the 2011-2012 scales. Of the rest of the statements in the 2011-2012 scales, statements one, two, four and six on the nationalism scale and statements one, four and five on the patriotism scale were borrowed from the questionnaire used by Gries et al.[44] Statement five on nationalism scale and statements two, three and six were borrowed from the questionnaire used by Fairbrother.[45]

The rationale behind adding statements to the latter scales was to reduce the possibility that factor analysis results from 2007 showing that nationalism and patriotism were separate constructs was there by chance. Also, the longer scales make the definitional distinction between "nationalism" as an attitude according to which one's country is better than other countries with uncritical support of its actions, and "patriotism" as a feeling of pride in one's country and emotional attachment to it, clearer than with the shorter scales used in 2007. Moreover, the Cronbach's alpha values for the 2007 scales cannot be considered

[44] Gries et al. 2011.
[45] Fairbrother 2008. The Chinese versions of the statements are not included in the published version of Fairbrother's work, but he emailed the questionnaire to me.

"good" and they are significantly better for the latter scales, which can be taken as one indicator of scale improvement. However, Cronbach's alpha values improve partly because presuming that the items measure the same thing, Cronbach's alpha values in general tend to increase with longer scales, which is why it is better to include also other measures of internal consistency to be sure that the good alpha value is not merely a result of increased amount of items per scale. [46] Thus, the final conclusion of the internal consistency of the scales should be made considering also the results of exploratory and confirmatory factor analyses presented below.

The items in the 2011-2012 nationalism scale were (Cronbach's alpha 0.77):

1. China's policy decisions are almost always right. (中国的决策几乎都是正确的 。)

2. China is the best country in the world. (中国是世界上最好的国家 。)

3. The world would be a better place if people from other countries were more like the Chinese. (如果全世界其他国家的人都更像中国人，这个世界会更好。)

4. I support my country whether its policies are right or wrong.
(无论我国的政策对错与否, 我都予以支持。)

5. I think that the Chinese people are the finest people in the world.
(我认为中华民族是世界上最优秀的民族。)

6. Chinese foreign policies are almost always morally correct.
(中国的外交政策基本上都是正义的 。)

7. Generally speaking, China is a better country compared to most other countries.
(一般来讲，比起大多数其他国家，中国是一个更好的国家。)

[46] Tavakol, Mohsen and Reg Dennick. 2011. "Making Sense of Cronbach's Alpha." *International Journal of Medical Education* 2, 53–55.

The items in the 2011-2012 patriotism scale were (Cronbach's alpha 0.82):

1. I am glad to be Chinese. (我很高兴自己是中国人。)

2. I am very proud to be a Chinese. (作为中国人我感到很自豪。)

3. I love my country. (我爱我的祖国。)

4. I often regret that I am Chinese. (Reverse coded.) (我经常遗憾自己是中国人。)

5. Being Chinese is an important reflection of who I am.

(作为中国人对我的自我认同很重要。)

6. I would like personally to help my country attain its goals.

(我愿意亲手帮助我的祖国去实现她的目标。)

7. How close do you feel to the following? –China

(您认为下列地区与您的密切关系如何？中国)

Foreign policy attitudes

Foreign policy attitudes were measured using statements related to international cooperation and protectionism, which were measured with the same statements in 2007 and in 2011-2012. In 2007, two statements enquired about China's international role, and in 2011-2012 these items were replaced with statements linked more directly with China's relations with the US and Japan. In both samples one item on the Taiwan issue was included. Items on international cooperation and protectionism were from the ISSP questionnaire, except for statement four on international cooperation, which was borrowed from Gries et al.[47] Items on China's international role in the 2007 survey marked with an asterisk (*) were composed for this research and statements on China's relations with the US and Japan were borrowed from

[47] Gries et al. 2011.

Gries et al. except for statement 3, which was from Fairbrother's questionnaire.[48] The response format ranged from 5 ("strongly agree") to 1 ("strongly disagree"). In order to avoid acquiescence response bias, some questions in the questionnaire were negated. Statement one on international cooperation was one of these originally negated statements and it was reverse coded for the purposes of the further analysis to be in line with nationalism and patriotism scales.

The items on international cooperation were:

1. For certain problems like environmental pollution, international bodies should have the right to enforce solutions. (Reverse coded). (就某些问题来讲，诸如环境污染，国际组织应该有权强制执行解决方案。)

2. International organizations are taking away too much power from the Chinese government. (国际组织的权力使得中国政府失去了很多管理国家事务的能力。)

3. China should follow its own interests, even if this leads to conflict with other nations. (中国应该根据自身利益（制定外交政策），即使这将导致同其他国家的冲突。)

4. Our children should be taught to support the welfare of all of humanity. *(Only used in the 2011-2012 questionnaire)*
(我们应该教育我们的子孙后代不仅为中国而为全人类的福祉做贡献。)

Two statements were used to measure protectionism:

1. China should limit the import of foreign products in order to protect its national economy. (为保护民族经济，中国应该限制对外国产品的进口。)

2. Large international companies are doing more and more damage to local businesses in

[48] Ibid.; Fairbrother 2008.

China.

(大型跨国公司对中国本土经济的损害越来越严重。)

Statements on China's international role in the 2007 data included the following:

1. China should play a more active role in meetings of the UN Security Council. (中国应该在联合国安全理事会上扮演更积极的角色。)*

2. Human rights and similar moral issues should not be discussed amongst international governments. (人权问题及类似的道德问题不应在国际政府间讨论。)*

3. If the province of Taiwan declares independence, China should use military force against Taiwan. (如果台湾省宣布独立，中国应对台湾使用武力。)*

Statements on foreign policy preferences used in the 2011-2012 data were:

1. The Chinese government should adopt tougher foreign policies towards the US. (中国政府应该对美国采取更强硬的外交政策。)

2. The best way to deal with the US is to build up our military and seek to contain US influence throughout the world. (应对美国的最好方式是增强我国的军备, 削弱美国在世界范围的影响。)

3. China should take stronger action in the Diaoyutai dispute. (在钓鱼台岛问题上中国应当采取更强硬的立场。)

4. The Chinese government should adopt tougher foreign policies towards Japan. (中国政府应该对日本采取更强硬的外交政策。)

5. In case the Taiwan province declares independence, China should use armed forces against Taiwan. (如果台湾省宣布独立，中国应对台湾使用武力。)

Statistical analysis

The overall structural validity of the nationalism and patriotism measures were conducted first using exploratory factor analyses (EFA) with varimax rotation.[49] EFA is a statistical technique used to discover latent variables ("factors") from a pool of observed variables – in this case, the survey items. We used Eigenvalues (the amount of variance in the original set of variables accounted for by a factor) with a cut off point of one to decide the reasonable number of factors.[50] We confirmed the structural validity of the final solution by using confirmatory factor analyses (CFA) / structural equation modelling (SEM) with the LISREL 8.52 software for the 2007 data and SAS 9.3 for the 2011-2012 data. The goodness-of-fit of the models was judged by (a) the X^2 test, where the higher the P value the better fit of the data; and (b) root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA), with lower values indicating better fit. We also used a number of other indices that are less sensitive to large sample size: Normed Fit Index (NFI), Non-Normed Fit Index (NNFI), Adjusted Goodness of Fit Index (AGFI). Testing was conducted in two stages. First, the measured variables were loaded to one general latent variable (null model). Second, the two-factor solution was fitted to the data and significance of the fit change was tested.

The associations between nationalism, patriotism and other explanatory variables were tested using multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA). The associations of nationalism and patriotism on foreign policy attitudes, and the contribution of potential other explanatory factors to the relationship between nationalism, patriotism and policy attitudes was explored with linear regression models. First, nationalism and patriotism were included; second, gender; and third, gender and all the rest of the potential explanatory factors: university in which the respondent was studying, field of study, years studied, parents'

[49] In factor analysis factors are rotated to help the interpretation of the factors. Varimax rotation is the most common (orthogonal) rotation method.
[50] Eigenvalues of at least one are often used as a criterion for judging how many factors best represent the data.

educational background, self assessed societal ranking, place of origin (rural/urban), membership in the Communist Party and ethnic background. The regression analyses for the 2007 data were performed using SAS 9.2 and for the 2011-2012 data SAS 9.3.

Results

In both datasets the results of the exploratory factor analyses supported the two-factor solution, in which patriotism and nationalism were separate factors. In the analysis of the 2007 data Eigenvalues of the factors were 2.13, 1.12 and 0.88 and there was no steep drop after that. In the 2011-2012 dataset Eigenvalues of the factors were 4.68, 1.96 and 0.92 and there was no steep drop after that. In both datasets all of the items had the strongest loading on the corresponding factor, patriotism items loading on factor 1, "patriotism" and nationalism items loading on factor 2, "nationalism" (Table 1 and Table 2). In the 2007 dataset, the means of the summed up nationalism and patriotism variables were 3.10 (SD 0.64) and 3.79 (SD 0.55), respectively. In the 2011-2012 dataset, the means of the summed up nationalism and patriotism variables were 2.98 (SD 0.58) and 4.08 (SD 0.50), respectively. The correlation between the two variables was modest and positive (2007 sample: $r=0.28$, $p<0.001$, 2011-2012: sample $r=0.42$, $p<0.001$) which indicates that they were relatively independent of one another.

Table 5.1 Patriotism and nationalism factors of the 2007 data. (Exploratory factor analysis with varimax rotation). Chinese versions of the items are presented in the main text

	Factor loadings	
	Patriotism	Nationalism
Items		
1. If you are a Chinese person, how proud are you of being Chinese?	**0.747**	0.265
2. To what degree do you feel close to the PRC?	**0.735**	0.048
3. I would like to proud of my country, but in reality I do not have any way of feeling proud. (Reverse coded).	**0.673**	0.015
4. If people from other countries learned from Chinese people, the world would change for the better.	0.130	**0.808**
5. Generally speaking, compared to other countries, China is a better country.	0.212	**0.786**
6. People should support their country even if the country is doing something that is incorrect.	-0.017	**0.557**
Eigenvalues	2.12	1.13

Table 5.2. Patriotism and nationalism factors of the 2011-2012 data. (Exploratory factor analysis with varimax rotation). Chinese versions of the items are presented in the main text.

	Factor loadings	
	Patriotism	Nationalism
Items		
1. I am glad to be Chinese.	**0.766**	0.289
2. I am very proud to be a Chinese.	**0.766**	0.324
3. I love my country.	**0.702**	0.117
4. I often regret that I am Chinese. (Reverse coded.)	**0.701**	-0.033
5. Being Chinese is an important reflection of who I am.	**0.675**	0.091
6. I would like personally to help my country attain its goals.	**0.579**	0.242
7. How close do you feel to the following? –China	**0.528**	0.008
1. China's policy decisions are almost always right.	-0.014	**0.714**
2. China is the best country in the world.	0.219	**0.714**
3. The world would be a better place if people from other countries were more like the Chinese.	0.116	**0.670**
4. I support my country whether its policies are right or wrong.	-0.111	**0.635**
5. I think that the Chinese people are the finest people in the world.	0.232	**0.622**
6. Chinese foreign policies are almost always morally correct.	0.246	**0.544**
7. Generally speaking, China is a better country compared to most other countries.	0.335	**0.530**
Eigenvalues	4.68	1.96

CFA of the 2007 data (using latent variables for nationalism and patriotism) showed the following results. The two factors solutions offered significantly better fit (X^2 (8) = 6.08 p = 0.64, RMSEA = 0.001, NFI=0.99, NNFI=1.00, AGFI=1.00) to the data compared to one factors solution (X^2 (9) = 433.94 p = 0.000, RMSEA = 0.19, NFI=0.80, NNFI=0.67, AGFI=0.77).[51]

Corresponding indexes for the 2011-2012 data showed also that the two factors solution offered significantly better fit (X2 (76) = 283.37 p<0.001, RMSEA = 0.062, NFI=0.93, NNFI=0.92, AGFI=0.92) to the data compared to one factors solution (X2 (77) = 763.4, p<0.0000, RMSEA 0.112, NFI 0.76, NNFI 0.72, AGFI, 0.76). Thus, compared to the 2007 model, the fit indices for the 2011-2012 model were not equally good: NFI and NNFI did not reach the > 0.95 threshold, and p-value was small. In confirmatory factor analysis, p-value is not resistant to large sample sizes (over 500-600 respondents) and signals too easily that the model does not fit the data.[52] Another reason for worse fit indices is that the 2011-2012 model was much more complex and included seven items per factor compared to the 2007 model in which there were only three items per factor. Unlike EFA, CFA assumes that items load only on their corresponding factor, but with increasing number of items (attitude statements) there will almost always be some correlations between item loadings, in this case on nationalism factor and items loading on patriotism factor. By increasing the item/factor ratio, we also increase the amount of error, which results in poorer fit indices. Thus, taking into account the larger item/factor ratio in the second model, greater AGFI value than the 0.90 threshold, p-value's poor resistance to sample size, the fact that sometimes 0.90 threshold is

[51] X^2 = chi-square and p = significance level, where the higher the P value the better fit of the data
RMSEA = Root Mean Square Error of Approximation: Threshold for acceptable model fit is 0.06 or less.
NFI= Normed Fit Index, threshold > 0.95, sometimes > 0.90 is used. NNFI= Non-Normed Fit Index, threshold > 0.95. AGFI= Adjusted Goodness of Fit Index: Values of 0.90 or greater indicate well fitting models
[52] Stommel, Manfred, Sping Wang, Charles Given, and Barbara Given. 1992. "Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) as a Method to Assess Measurement Equivalence." *Research in Nursing and Health* 15 (5), 402.

used for NFI and RMSEA's closeness to the 0.06 threshold, the fit indices of the 2011-2012 data can be regarded as satisfactory.

In the 2007 data the loadings of the items on the corresponding factors ranged from 0.30 to 0.94 and the correlation between the factors was 0.53. In the 2011-2012 data the loadings of the items on the corresponding factors ranged from 0.40 to 0.85 and the correlation between the factors was 0.57. This correlation between the latent variables (factors) is higher than that of the sum variables that were done according to the exploratory factor analyses with varimax rotation. In CFA, the loading structure is definite and the association between factors free. (Figure 1 and Figure 2)

Figure 5.1 Factor structure of the 2007 data in confirmatory factor analysis



The items in the 2007 nationalism scale were:

1. The world would be a better place if people from other countries were more like the Chinese.

2. Generally speaking, China is a better country than most other countries.

3. People should support their country even if the country is in the wrong.

The items in the 2007 patriotism scale were:

1. How proud are you of being Chinese?

2. How close do you feel with China?

3. I am often less proud of China than I would like to be (reverse coded).

Figure 5.2 Factor structure of the 2011-2012 data in CFA



The items in the 2011-2012 nationalism scale were:

1. China's policy decisions are almost always right.

2. China is the best country in the world.

3. The world would be a better place if people from other countries were more like the Chinese.

4. I support my country whether its policies are right or wrong.

5. I think that the Chinese people are the finest people in the world.

6. Chinese foreign policies are almost always morally correct.

7. Generally speaking, China is a better country compared to most other countries.

The items in the 2011-2012 patriotism scale were:

1. I am glad to be Chinese.

2. I am very proud to be a Chinese.

3. I love my country.

4. I often regret that I am Chinese. (Reverse coded.)

5. Being Chinese is an important reflection of who I am.

6. I would like personally to help my country attain its goals.

7. How close do you feel to the following? –China

Sociodemographic variables and nationalism in the 2007 data

In the 2007 data the results from MANOVA revealed that of the other explanatory variables, the university that participants studied at ($p=0.008$), CCP membership ($p<0.001$) and whether participants were from the countryside or not ($p<0.001$) were significantly associated with

nationalism. Self-ranked social status, gender, field of study, parents' educational background or ethnic background did not have a statistically significant relationship with nationalism.

Compared to the other universities, the lowest nationalism scores were held by students at Peking University (3.01). The scores among other universities were: 3.07 (Renmin University of China), 3.10 (Tsinghua University), and 3.27 (some other university). The differences between universities could be related to the type of majors mostly studied in each, although field of study itself was not proven to be associated with nationalism. Moreover, Peking University has a reputation of being quite liberal, which can be seen when assessing the attitudes held by its students. For example in Chen Shengluo's research students from Peking University evaluated the US political system significantly higher than students from Renmin University, Tsinghua University, Beijing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics and Beijing Normal University.[53]

Those who were members of the CCP scored themselves lower (mean 3.13) on the nationalism scale than those who had applied or were planning to apply for membership (means 3.20 and 3.16). Those who were not members ranked themselves lower than others (mean 2.95). Those who classified their place of origin as rural had the highest score in nationalism (mean 3.27), compared to students from urban areas. The score for students from small cities was 3.12, those from medium sized cities 3.07 and those from urban areas 2.99.

Sociodemographic variables and nationalism in the 2011-2012 data

In the 2011-2012 data the results from MANOVA revealed that of the other explanatory variables CCP membership ($p<0.001$), whether participants were from the countryside or not ($p=0.05$), gender ($p=0.003$), satisfaction to life ($p<0.001$), self-ranked social status ($p=0.02$) and mother's education level ($p=0.02$) were significantly associated with nationalism.

[53] Chen 2011.

Performance in studies, ethnic background, age, father's education level, level of study, the university that participants studied at or field of study did not have a statistically significant relationship with nationalism.

Nationalism was highest among students who had planned to apply for CCP membership (mean 3.21). Those who were members of the CCP scored themselves slightly lower (mean 3.08) on the nationalism scale than probationary members (mean 3.15). Those who had applied for membership had second lowest nationalism scores (mean 3.07). Those who were not members ranked themselves lower than others (mean 2.82). Those who classified their place of origin as rural had the highest scores in nationalism (mean 3.05), compared to students from urban areas. The score for students from small cities was 2.99, those from medium sized cities 2.98 and those from urban areas 2.86. Nationalism was highest among respondents whose mother had attended only primary school (mean 3.15) after which it gradually decreased down to students whose mother had studied at the university level (mean 2.91 for those whose mother had university education and 2.92 for those whose mother had university education at the gradual level). The mean score of women was slightly higher than that of men (women 3.04, men 2.91, although for men the dispersion was larger than for women). Those more satisfied to life were more nationalistic than others. Mean of "very satisfied" respondents was 3.30 and that of "very unsatisfied" 2.77. The lowest nationalism scores were held by respondents who were "not too satisfied" with their life (mean 2.68). Those who ranked themselves highest on the social status scale also had the highest nationalism scores (mean 3.86) and there was a steep drop after the highest category.

Sociodemographic variables and patriotism in the 2007 data

CCP membership ($p<0.001$), a rural background ($p=0.03$), and self-ranked social status ($p=0.001$) were associated with patriotism. Parents' educational background, gender, field of

study or ethnic background did not have a statistically significant relationship with patriotism. Those who were members of the CCP scored higher (mean 3.88) than those who had applied for the membership (mean 3.86), those who had planned to apply for membership (mean 3.83) or those who were not members (mean 3.70). Patriotism was highest among respondents with a rural upbringing (mean 3.90), after which it gradually decreased from students from small or medium-sized cities (range 3.80 to 3.83), to those brought up in urban areas (3.74). Self-ranked social status was negatively associated with patriotism: those who classified themselves higher in the social hierarchy were less patriotic.

Sociodemographic variables and patriotism in the 2011-2012 data

CCP membership ($p<0.001$), satisfaction with life ($p<0.001$), age ($p=0.009$) and father's educational background ($p=0.034$) were associated with patriotism. Whether from countryside or not, self-ranked social status, mother's educational background, gender, field of study, ethnic background, university or performance in studies did not have a statistically significant relationship with patriotism. Patriotism was highest among probationary Party members (mean 4.23). Those who were members of the CCP scored themselves lower (mean 4.04) on the patriotism scale than those who had applied for membership (mean 4.16) or those who had planned to apply for membership (mean 4.21). Those who were not members ranked themselves lower than others (mean 4.00). Those more satisfied to life were more patriotic than others. Mean of "very satisfied" respondents was 4.31 and that of "very unsatisfied" 4.12. The lowest patriotism scores were held by respondents who were "neither satisfied nor unsatisfied" with their life (mean 3.90). Patriotism was highest among the youngest respondents and gradually decreased with increasing age.[54] Patriotism was highest among respondents whose father had attended only primary school (mean 4.27) after which it

[54] Age was measured as a continuous variable, which is why no means are provided here.

gradually decreased down to students whose father had studied at the three year college level (mean 4.02) and increased slightly again for those whose father had university education (mean 4.04) and for those whose father had university education at the gradual level (mean 4.06).

Sociodemographic variables and nationalism in the 2008 China data

The reason for including the 2008 China survey in my analysis is to contextualise the elite student samples, as elite student populations are quite different from the general Chinese population. However, although I was able to construct the nationalism scale from the same components as in my 2007 student dataset, not all the same background variables were available, and in a few cases the wording of the question makes the variable incomparable or hard to include in MANOVA. For example educational background was asked with nine separate dichotomous questions instead of one question and place of origin with five questions, which is why these were left out of the analysis. Satisfaction to life was measured with a 11-point scale, which was recoded into a five-point scale to allow comparison with the latter student sample.

In the 2008 nationally representative sample, father's educational background ($p<0.001$), mother's educational background ($p<0.001$), ethnic background ($p<0.001$), satisfaction to life ($p<0.001$) and age ($p<0.001$) were associated with nationalism. CCP membership, gender and self-ranked social status did not have a statistically significant relationship with nationalism. Respondents, who reported that their parents had little or no formal education when they were 14 years olds, had the highest nationalism scores, which decreased gradually in line with increasing educational levels. The mean value for father's educational level was 2.90 and mother's 2.09, both of which in the question with 11 response options locate between "no formal education but literate" and "less than elementary school."

Nationalism was highest among respondents who classified their ethnic background as Han Chinese (mean 3.50), compared to those who belonged to an ethnic minority (mean 3.21). Those more satisfied to life were more nationalistic than others. Mean of "very satisfied" respondents was 3.71, that of "satisfied" 3.50, that of "neither satisfied nor unsatisfied" 3.41 and that of "very unsatisfied" 3.36. The lowest nationalism scores were held by respondents who were "not too satisfied" with their life (mean 3.31). Age was measured as a continuous variable, and nationalism (mean 3.47) was highest among the oldest respondents with a decreasing trend towards the younger respondents.

Table three summarises the results from these three surveys regarding biographical variables that were significantly associated with nationalism and patriotism.

Table 5.3 Summary of the MANOVA results. √ = significantly associated with, 0 = not significantly associated with, - = not asked in the survey

	Nat 2007	Nat 2008	Nat 2011	Pat 2007	Pat 2011
CCP membership	√	0	√	√	√
Place of origin	√	-[55]	√	√	0
Gender	0	0	√	0	0
Self-ranked social status	0	0	√	√	0
Field of study	0	-	0	0	0
Parents' educational background	0	√	√	0	√
Ethnic background	0	√	0	0	0
University	√	-	0	0	0
Satisfaction to life	-	√	√	-	√
Age	-	√	0	-	√
Level of study	-	-	0	-	0
Performance in studies	-	-	0	-	0

Tables four, five, six and seven present linear regression models, which show the adjusted associations of nationalism and patriotism with foreign policy attitudes and the contribution

[55] Place of origin was asked in a very complicated manner, which cannot be compared with the questions used in the other surveys.

of potential confounders to the relationships. In the 2007 results, the association between nationalism and all attitudes, except for the statement "For certain problems like environmental pollution, international bodies should have the right to enforce solutions" in the univariate test, were significant and positive. In the 2011–2012 results the association between nationalism and all attitudes, except for the statements "For certain problems like environmental pollution, international bodies should have the right to enforce solutions,""Our children should be taught to support the welfare of humanity, not just China's" and perhaps surprisingly, statement "China should take stronger action in the Diaoyutai dispute," were significant and positive. With statement "Large international companies are doing more and more damage to local businesses in China" the last model with gender and all the rest of the potential explanatory factors turned non-significant, but in the first two models associations were significant and positive. In other words based on both samples, respondents with higher nationalism were less likely to favour international cooperation and more likely to prefer protectionist policies and a more prominent international stance. In addition, results from 2011–2012 data showed that nationalists preferred tougher foreign policy towards the US and Japan. Associations between nationalism and foreign policy attitudes were also quite robust to adjustments for all covariates considered. None of the covariates, or their combination, accounted for more than a small portion of the relationship.

Table 5.4 The associations of nationalism and patriotism with statements related to international cooperation (both 2007 and 2011–2012 datasets).

Adjusted for gender and third, gender and all the rest potential explanatory factors: university in which the respondent was studying, field of study, years studied, parents' educational background, self assessed societal ranking, place of origin (rural/urban), membership in the

Communist Party and ethnic background. In addition to these background factors, age was also included in the analysis of the 2011–2012 data. The figures are standardized regression coefficients, t-values and p-values. Results from the 2007 data are presented in the left column and figures in italics are results from the 2011–2012 data. The last statement in table four was only included in the 2011–2012 questionnaire.

		STD-Beta		t-value		p-value	
		For certain problems like environmental pollution, international bodies should have the right to enforce solutions. (This statement was reverse coded.)					
Adjusted for							
1. None							
Nationalism		-0.05	*-0.04*	-1.88	*-0.99*	0.060	*0.32*
Patriotism		0.11	*0.39*	3.82	*10.45*	<0.001	*<0.001*
2. Gender							
Nationalism		-0.07	*-0.03*	-2.52	*-0.80*	0.012	*0.43*
Patriotism		0.12	*0.39*	4.20	*10.42*	<0.001	*<0.001*
3. Gender and all the rest potential explanatory factors							
Nationalism		-0.07	*-0.005*	-2.40	*-0.11*	0.016	*0.91*
Patriotism		0.12	*0.37*	3.87	*8.74*	<0.001	*<0.001*
R2		0.04	*0.14*				
		International organizations are taking away too much power from the Chinese government.					
Adjusted for							
1. None							
Nationalism		0.23	*0.27*	7.88	*7.16*	<0.001	*<0.001*
Patriotism		-0.01	*-0.11*	-0.26	*-3.04*	0.797	*0.002*
2. Gender							
Nationalism		0.22	*0.26*	7.64	*6.67*	<0.001	*<0.001*
Patriotism		-0.00	*-0.11*	-0.14	*-2.80*	0.890	*0.005*
3. Gender and all the rest potential explanatory factors							
Nationalism		0.25	*0.24*	8.24	*5.39*	<0.001	*<0.001*
Patriotism		-0.01	*-0.10*	-0.41	*-2.32*	0.680	*0.02*
R2		0.06	*0.05*				
		China should follow its own interests, even if this leads to conflict with other nations.					
Adjusted for							
1. None							
Nationalism		0.17	*0.10*	5.87	*2.52*	<0.001	*0.01*
Patriotism		-0.08	*-0.11*	-2.71	*-2.75*	0.007	*0.01*
2. Gender							

Nationalism		0.16	*0.12*	5.42	3.12	<0.001	*0.002*
Patriotism		-0.07	*-0.12*	-2.47	-2.92	0.014	*0.004*
3. Gender and all the rest potential explanatory factors							
Nationalism		0.18	*0.11*	6.00	*2.49*	<0.001	*0.01*
Patriotism		-0.09	*-0.10*	-2.81	*-2.16*	0.005	*0.03*
R2		0.05	*0.05*				
		Our children should be taught to support the welfare of humanity, not just China's. (Only 2011–2012 data.)					
Adjusted for							
1. None							
Nationalism		*-0.07*		*-1.83*		*0.07*	
Patriotism		*0.32*		*8.34*		*<0.001*	
2. Gender							
Nationalism		*-0.06*		*-1.52*		*0.13*	
Patriotism		*0.31*		*7.83*		*<0.001*	
3. Gender and all the rest potential explanatory factors							
Nationalism		*-0.08*		*-1.83*		*0.07*	
Patriotism		*0.30*		*6.79*		*<0.001*	
R2		*0.10*					

In the 2007 results, patriotism was statistically significantly associated with five statements out of eight. These associations, except for the statements, "For certain problems like environmental pollution, international bodies should have the right to enforce solutions" and "If the province of Taiwan declares independence, China should use military force against Taiwan," were negative. The adjustments for all of the potential confounders did not significantly change these associations. With the statements "International organizations are overly interfering with the Chinese government," "China should play a more active role in meetings of the UN Security Council" and "Human rights and similar moral issues should not be discussed amongst international governments," no statistically significant relationship between patriotism and the statement was found.

Table 5.5 The associations of nationalism and patriotism with statements related to protectionism (both 2007 and 2011–2012 datasets)

Adjusted for gender and third, gender and all the rest potential explanatory factors: university in which the respondent was studying, field of study, years studied, parents' educational background, self assessed societal ranking, place of origin (rural/urban), membership in the Communist Party and ethnic background. In addition to these background factors, age was also included in the analysis of the 2011–2012 data. The figures are standardized regression coefficients, t-values and p-values. Results from the 2007 data are presented in the left column and figures in italics are results from the 2011–2012 data.

		STD-Beta		t-value		p-value	
		China should limit the import of foreign products in order to protect its national economy.					
Adjusted for							
1. None							
Nationalism		0.18	*0.29*	6.24	*7.70*	<0.001	*<0.001*
Patriotism		-0.06	*0.02*	-2.14	*0.53*	0.032	*0.59*
2. Gender							
Nationalism		0.17	*0.29*	5.97	*7.52*	<0.001	*<0.001*
Patriotism		-0.06	*0.01*	-2.07	*0.29*	0.038	*0.77*
3. Gender and all the rest potential explanatory factors							
Nationalism		0.19	*0.28*	6.07	*6.31*	<0.001	*<0.001*
Patriotism		-0.06	*0.01*	-2.00	*0.28*	0.046	*0.78*
R2		0.03	*0.01*				
		Large international companies are doing more and more damage to local businesses in China.					
Adjusted for							
1. None							
Nationalism		0.17	*0.10*	5.77	*2.36*	<0.001	*0.02*
Patriotism		-0.12	*0.05*	-4.15	*1.27*	<0.001	*0.21*
2. Gender							
Nationalism		0.16	*0.10*	5.48	*2.23*	<0.001	*0.03*
Patriotism		-0.12	*0.06*	-4.00	*1.36*	<0.001	*0.17*
3. Gender and all the rest potential explanatory factors							
Nationalism		0.17	*0.07*	5.42	*1.47*	<0.001	*0.14*

Patriotism		-0.12	*0.06*	-3.96	*1.27*	<0.001	*0.20*
R2		0.04	*0.01*				

In the 2011–2012 results, patriotism was statistically significantly associated with six statements out of eleven. Of these associations, statements "For certain problems like environmental pollution, international bodies should have the right to enforce solutions" "Our children should be taught to support the welfare of humanity, not just China's," "If the province of Taiwan declares independence, China should use military force against Taiwan" and "China should take stronger action in the Diaoyutai dispute" were positive. Associations in statements "International organizations are taking away too much power from the Chinese government" and "China should follow its own interests, even if this leads to conflict with other nations" were negative. "China should limit the import of foreign products in order to protect its national economy," "Large international companies are doing more and more damage to local businesses in China," "The Chinese government should adopt tougher foreign policies towards the US" and "The Chinese government should adopt tougher foreign policies towards Japan," no statistically significant relationship between patriotism and the statement was found. With statement "The best way to deal with the US is to build up our military and seek to contain US influence throughout the world" associations with patriotism in the first two models were not significant, but the last model with all potential confounders turned significant. Except for the statements on policy preferences towards the US, the adjustments for all of the potential confounders did not significantly change these associations. Based on both samples, patriotism was associated with an internationalist stance. I discuss this finding in more detail in the *Conclusion* section below.

Table 5.6 The associations of nationalism and patriotism with various statements on China's international role (both 2007 and 2011–2012 datasets)

Adjusted for gender and third, gender and all the rest potential explanatory factors: university in which the respondent was studying, field of study, years studied, parents' educational background, self assessed societal ranking, place of origin (rural/urban), membership in the Communist Party and ethnic background. In addition to these background factors, age was also included in the analysis of the 2011–2012 data. The figures are standardized regression coefficients, t-values and p-values. Results from the 2007 data are presented in the left column and figures in italics concerning the last statement in table six are results from the 2011–2012 data.

		STD-Beta	t-value	p-value
		China should play a more active role in meetings of the UN Security Council. (2007 data)		
Adjusted for				
1. None				
Nationalism		0.15	5.13	<0.001
Patriotism		0.05	1.77	0.08
2. Gender				
Nationalism		0.15	5.06	<0.001
Patriotism		0.05	1.88	0.06
3. Gender and all the rest potential explanatory factors				
Nationalism		0.14	4.53	<0.001
Patriotism		0.04	1.41	0.16
R2		0.02		
		Human rights and similar moral issues should not be discussed amongst international governments. (2007 data)		
Adjusted for				
1. None				
Nationalism		0.16	5.57	<0.001
Patriotism		0.06	1.91	0.06
2. Gender				
Nationalism		0.16	5.51	<0.001
Patriotism		0.06	1.96	0.05
3. Gender and all the rest potential explanatory factors				
Nationalism		0.15	4.99	<0.001

Patriotism		0.05		1.67		0.10	
R2		0.03					
		If the province of Taiwan declares independence, China should use military force against Taiwan. (Both datasets)					
Adjusted for							
1. None							
Nationalism		0.14	*0.15*	4.73	*3.73*	<0.001	*<0.001*
Patriotism		0.16	*0.11*	5.44	*2.72*	<0.001	*0.01*
2. Gender							
Nationalism		0.12	*0.14*	4.35	*3.15*	<0.001	*0.002*
Patriotism		0.17	*0.11*	5.88	*2.60*	<0.001	*0.01*
3. Gender and all the rest potential explanatory factors							
Nationalism		0.12	*0.14*	4.14	*3.06*	<0.001	*0.002*
Patriotism		0.17	*0.11*	5.88	*2.56*	<0.001	*0.01*
R2		0.08	*0.07*				

The relationship between nationalism and foreign policy statements was generally stronger than that of patriotism and foreign policy statements. In both datasets, "patriots" and "nationalists" differed in their views in all other foreign policy statements except for the statement concerning Taiwan, which indicates that the Taiwan issue seems to unite people with otherwise different views. In a survey from 1996 almost 100 percent of the respondents suggested that they would support the government's decision to use force against Taiwan.[56] The year 1996 was marked by the Taiwan Straits crisis, which was widely reported in the media, but it seems that at least the opinions of university students have not become more moderate since then. In the 2007 data, only 6.8 percent of respondents were against or strongly against the use of force if Taiwan declared independence.[57] In the 2011–2012 data the percentage of those who were against or strongly against use of force rose to 16.0 percent.[58]

[56] Survey cited in Zheng 1999, 100.
[57] If Taiwan were to declare independence, 41.2 percent were strongly in favour of the use of armed force, 35.2 percent agreed on the use of the army, 16.7 percent could not decide whether to use the armed force or not, 5.3 were against the use of the military and 1.5 percent were strongly against the use of armed force in 2007.
[58] If Taiwan were to declare independence, 31.3 percent were strongly in favour of the use of armed force, 29.2 percent agreed on the use of the army, 23.5 percent could not decide whether to use the armed force or not, 13.9 were against the use of the military and 2.1 percent were strongly against the use of armed force in 2011-2012.

Table 5.7 The associations of nationalism and patriotism with various statements on China's international role (only 2011–2012 data)

Adjusted for gender and third, gender and all the rest potential explanatory factors: age, university in which the respondent was studying, field of study, years studied, parents' educational background, self assessed societal ranking, place of origin (rural/urban), membership in the Communist Party and ethnic background. The figures are standardized regression coefficients, t-values and p-values. The analysis presented in table seven is based only on the 2011–2012 dataset.

		STD-Beta	t-value	p-value
		The Chinese government should adopt tougher foreign policies towards the US.		
Adjusted for				
1. None				
Nationalism		0.12	3.15	0.002
Patriotism		0.07	1.84	0.07
2. Gender				
Nationalism		0.11	2.81	0.01
Patriotism		0.08	1.86	0.06
3. Gender and all the rest potential explanatory factors				
Nationalism		0.11	2.49	0.01
Patriotism		0.04	0.98	0.33
R2		0.02		
		The best way to deal with the US is to build up our military and seek to contain US influence throughout the world.		
Adjusted for				
1. None				
Nationalism		0.20	5.17	<0.001
Patriotism		-0.06	-1.43	0.15
2. Gender				
Nationalism		0.19	4.81	<0.001
Patriotism		-0.05	-1.31	0.19
3. Gender and all the rest potential explanatory factors				
Nationalism		0.20	4.37	<0.001
Patriotism		-0.09	-2.08	0.04
R2		0.04		

		China should take stronger action in the Diaoyutai dispute.		
Adjusted for				
1. None				
Nationalism		0.02	0.60	0.55
Patriotism		0.17	4.18	<0.001
2. Gender				
Nationalism		0.03	0.75	0.45
Patriotism		0.16	4.04	<0.001
3. Gender and all the rest potential explanatory factors				
Nationalism		0.03	0.57	0.57
Patriotism		0.15	3.37	<0.001
R2		0.05		
		The Chinese government should adopt tougher foreign policies towards Japan.		
Adjusted for				
1. None				
Nationalism		0.10	2.57	0.01
Patriotism		0.04	1.09	0.28
2. Gender				
Nationalism		0.10	2.67	0.01
Patriotism		0.04	0.99	0.32
3. Gender and all the rest potential explanatory factors				
Nationalism		0.10	2.31	0.02
Patriotism		0.03	0.73	0.47
R2		0.05		

The linear regression models tested explained a relatively small amount of the variance in the foreign policy attitudes (range 3% to 14%). These outcomes are complex and multifactorial and it is not expected that these two variables would explain much of their variance. The reason for a relatively small amount of variance explained by the models in this chapter is likely to be because of the large sample sizes. In general, studies with larger n (over 1000) tend to yield more conservative results than studies with smaller n. Strong associations found in small n studies are more likely to reflect the impact of random error, and combined with the fact that smaller studies with weak associations are seldom published, publication bias

increases the possibility that results from smaller studies are more often reported when extreme.[59]

Conclusion

In the context of Chinese foreign policy making and understanding the mechanisms of public pressure on foreign policy makers, it is valuable to know that Chinese national attachment is more complex than often assumed in the academic literature, and the processes of "othering" seem to operate differently than, for example, in the United States. This chapter has seven main findings.

First, based on MANOVA results of the 2008 China data, students or young people were less nationalistic than older generations. Thus, although young Chinese are often portrayed as forerunners of nationalism, this picture seems flawed and is probably mostly caused by a small number of people who have been active online. Naturally it is also true that the general level of nationalist attitudes in China is high in international comparison meaning that many young people hold nationalist views. However, based on the available evidence, it seems flawed to claim that young people in China are *more* nationalistic than older generations.

Second, in the Chinese context nationalism and patriotism are empirically distinct, which confirms my first hypothesis. This result came from two separate surveys collected with a four-year interval, and the same result was found in Gries's research. Foreign policy belief systems have cultural variants, which creates a need to study these systems on

[59] Ioannidis, John, Thomas Trikalinos, Evangelia Ntzani, and Despina Contopoulos-Ioannidis. 2003. "Genetic Associations in Large versus Small Studies: An Empirical Assessment." *The Lancet* 361 (February 15), 567–571; Huxley, Rachel, Andrew Neil, and Rory Collins. 2002. "Unravelling the Fetal Origins Hypothesis: Is There Really an Inverse Association between Birth Weight and Subsequent Blood Pressure?" *The Lancet* 360 (August 31), 659–665.

national level without assuming that a model that works for example in the United States necessarily works anywhere else.

Third, nationalism has stronger links with foreign policy preferences than patriotism. Despite the fact that more items were added to the latter (2011-2012) nationalism and patriotism scales, this trend was the same in both of the samples and was also found in the study of Gries et al. There may be other sectors where patriotism constrains opinions more than nationalism. The question on Diaoyu islands added to the 2011-2012 version of the questionnaire and the strong position of the "patriotic" respondents indicate that although patriotic respondents did not support hard-line policies towards other countries as did nationalists, they might have strong views on territorial issues, which are considered "domestic" in China. This possibility should be studied with a questionnaire inquiring more broadly on territorial issues and including some questions on Tibet and Xinjiang in addition to questions on Taiwan and Diaoyu islands.

Fourth, the answer to the research question of whether Chinese who are more nationalistic or patriotic differ from less nationalistic or patriotic Chinese in their foreign policy attitudes is yes. I can thus confirm also my second hypothesis. This research has shown that compared to nationalism, patriotism in China is associated with more cooperative and internationalist attitudes, whereas nationalistic Chinese supported economic protectionism and a more prominent international stance. All these results support the findings of Gries et al..[60] Although this result was according to my expectations, it was against the impression conveyed in the majority of China studies literature touching upon nationalism, where national attachment is mostly and misleadingly treated as a one-dimensional entity. This chapter has shown that different kinds of foreign policy core values, in this case nationalistic or patriotic, constrain specific foreign policy attitudes in different ways. In other words,

[60] Gries et al. 2011.

because different kinds of foreign policy preferences were associated with nationalism and patriotism, it should be remembered in the nationalism discussion that pro-China attitude alone does not indicate anti-internationalism or aggressive nationalism. The nature of national attachment and "othering" are more complex than often assumed in the "rise of Chinese nationalism" discourse.

Fifth, the Taiwan question unites people who otherwise respond differently from each other. The CCP has for long made clear its position in the Taiwan question by emphasising one-China principle in diplomatic circles as well as promulgating the anti-secession law in 2005, in which it is clearly stated that China will use force against Taiwan if it deems such necessary.[61] Chinese university students agree with the government that Taiwan should not be let become independent, and these results are consistent with other survey results on the Taiwan issue.[62]

Sixth, satisfaction with one's life is associated with higher levels of nationalism and patriotism, which I find rather puzzling. Regarding the link between patriotism and satisfaction, one can of course assume that improving living conditions and economic growth in China increase the level of happiness and one can be proud of these developments. However, as human happiness as a phenomenon is extremely complex, this explanation does not seem to be fully satisfactory. I am even more puzzled with the finding that the more satisfied the respondent was with his or her life, the more nationalistic they tended to be. The link between nationalism and satisfaction to one's life was found in both my latter student sample and in the nationally representative 2008 China data. Moreover, Woods and Dickson whose "patriotism" measure roughly corresponds to the "nationalism" measure used here, had

[61] Xinhua. 2005. "Fan fenlie guojia fa" (Anti-Secession Law), 14 March 2005, http://news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2005-03/14/content_2694168.htm. Accessed 15 December 2013, article 8.
[62] Survey cited in Zheng 1999, 100.

the same finding using an urban probability sample collected in 2010.[63] According to my expectations, satisfaction with one's life should not correlate with a chauvinistic indicator of national attachment. I would expect the need to portray one's nation as superior than others in all aspects and supporting it even if it does something wrong to be linked with low self-esteem and overly increased need for security, which for their part should lower one's level of happiness. With the available data I am currently unable to fully explain what is behind this association. One possibility is that those who hold chauvinistic views feel the need to report satisfaction to their lives more than others, which skews the data. To fully understand the complexities related to this association, satisfaction to life should be measured more comprehensively and in a manner that evaluates the weight given to different components of "satisfaction" as in the surveys presented above there was only one question measuring "satisfaction" and each respondent responded to it according to their own standards. I will get back to this problematic in the next chapter, where my analysis shows another type of connection between satisfaction to one's life and perceived threats from the US and Japan.

Seventh and perhaps the most significant contribution was the finding that Party membership and place of origin separate respondents in elite student populations. CCP members and students with rural background were more nationalistic and patriotic than non-members and students with urban upbringing. Because CCP membership and rural background are associated with two attitudinal clusters with opposite foreign policy preferences, it seems that there is some link between nationalism and patriotism after all, even though factoring demonstrated "nationalism" and "patriotism" as separate constructs.

Moreover, the association between Party membership and nationalist and patriotic attitudes does not reveal the direction of causality between CCP membership and these attitudes. It is possible that students with more patriotic and nationalist attitudes tend to

[63] Woods and Dickson 2012.

join the Party more often than others, or that application procedures and training as well as activities organized for members shape students' attitudes. Also, as nationalist and patriotic attitudes were related to opposite opinions in all the other foreign policy statements excluding the Taiwan question, Party membership alone does not help in predicting foreign policy preferences. Thus, further research is needed to identify individual and societal factors that promote patriotism and nationalism in China.

Gries et al. did not get similar results in their surveys on associations between nationalism, patriotism and foreign policy views, and other reliable research on these issues is sparse if not non-existent. Attitudes toward foreign policy have been examined very little compared to data on attitudes towards domestic economic and social issues, and when they have, Party membership of respondents have often not been asked.[64] This is definitely an issue that warrants further research, because further research may show that there are other latent explanatory variables behind Party membership.

[64] Regarding research on foreign policy issues, see Johnston 2004, 606. Zhao asked about party membership in his 1999 survey, but CCP membership was not relevant in explaining participation in the anti-US demonstrations, so it was not further analysed. Zhao 2002, 20–21. Chen Shengluo, who surveyed Chinese students' perceptions of the political systems in China and in the United States specifically regretted he did not ask about party membership. Chen 2011, 55–56.

6. Chapter
Afraid of the Other. Chinese Perceptions of Threats from the United States and Japan

> *Enemies are those who are defined as such, and if one acts upon that interpretation, it is more than likely that the original definition will be confirmed.* Ole Holsti 1967[1]

This chapter concentrates on the construction of the other by analysing threat perceptions. Threat perceptions have for long been regarded as an important subject in the study of international relations, but there remains widespread disagreement on the factors that contribute to fear of other states –not to mention the possible cultural variation among these contributors.[2] How much do material factors such as strength of armies matter with regards to threat perceptions? How does the domestic societal context contribute to the formation of perceptions of foreign threats? What kinds of attitude structures in China are behind higher levels of perceived threat from the United States and Japan? Are factors such as gender, age, place of origin, CCP membership, media consumption, foreign travel or others associated with threat perceptions?

Mass perception of threat can significantly influence a country's foreign policy, because high degree of perceived threat can first, give support to "hard line" policies against a perceived enemy country and second, help to mobilise people in dealing with the perceived threat.[3] As wars are caused by misperceptions of the adversary's capabilities as well as intentions, it is important to understand the construction and reasons behind threat

[1] Holsti, Ole. 1967. "Cognitive Dynamics and Images of the Enemy." *Journal of International Affairs* 21 (1), 16.
[2] For early studies of threat perceptions in international relations, see Holsti, Ole. 1962. "The Belief System and National Images: A Case Study." *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 6 (3), 244–252; Holsti 1967, 16–39; Jervis, Robert. 1976. *Perception and Misperception in International Politics*. Princeton: Princeton University.
[3] Chen, Jie. 2001. "Urban Chinese Perceptions of Threats from the United States and Japan." *Public Opinion Quarterly* 65 (2), 254.

perceptions.[4] Because of the CCP's need for political legitimacy, public opinion has increasing impact on foreign policy, and especially issues related to Japan seem to evoke strong response from the public.[5] Even though public views matter, Chinese attitudes toward foreign policy have been examined very little compared to data on attitudes towards domestic economic and social issues.[6] Jie Chen's analysis from 2001 and Iain Johnston's and Daniela Stockmann's work on anti-American attitudes based on BAS data, are some of the few examples on Chinese views on the US and Japan.[7]

There are several factors that create distrust in China's bilateral relations with the US and Japan. The political systems in the US and Japan differ from the Chinese political system, and for some Chinese they present the antithesis of the Chinese system. Ideological differences between China and the US have long historical roots and for example Japanese atrocities during the Second World War and the US and Chinese positions in the Korean War are far from forgotten. US arms sales to Taiwan have continued even after the Kuomintang came to power in Taiwan in 2008, and in addition there are the issues on the Diaoyutai Islands, Tibet and Xinjiang.[8]

In this chapter I examine what kinds of attitude structures in China are behind higher levels of perceived threat from the United States and Japan. In addition to evaluating the attitude climate regarding the United States and Japan, factors associated with threat perceptions can inform us about the contemporary processes of identity formation including the role of the media. I start by briefly presenting previous work on threat perceptions, and then describe the methods and results from statistical analysis. I conclude by evaluating the

[4] Levy, Jack. 1983. "Misperception and the Causes of War. Theoretical Linkages and Analytical Problems." *World Politics* 36, 76–99.
[5] For a more detailed discussion, see Chapter Two.
[6] Johnston, Alastair Iain. 2004. "Chinese Middle Class Attitudes towards International Affairs: Nascent Liberalization?" *The China Quarterly* 179 (3), 606.
[7] Johnston, Alastair Iain and Daniela Stockman. 2007. "Chinese Attitudes toward the United States and Americans." In Peter J. Katzenstein and Robert Keohane (eds.), *Anti-Americans in World Politics*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 157–195.
[8] The overall opinion climate on Chinese views on the US and Japan was discussed in Chapter Three.

results and the need of further research.

Threats and Their Non-Material Components

For a long time international relations literature equated threat to power, but in the 1980s scholars began increasingly to look at intention as a source of threat.[9] According to Stephen Walt's influential characterisation, states balance against threats rather than against power. Walt defines threat as a function of four elements: military power, offensive capability, geographical proximity and aggressive intentions.[10] In other words, threats are formed of both material and psychological components. In this chapter external threat is defined as perceived intention and capacity to harm China.

But how do we decide who has "aggressive intentions"? Constructivist research suggests that shared identity may be an important factor in assessing such questions. A shared identity must draw the lines between "us" and "them." Identities are ontologically dependent on the existence of other identities and identity involves the creation of boundaries that separate self from the other.[11] Although groups that are different from one's own are not automatically viewed in negative terms, the more similar a country is to one's own, the less threatening people feel it is. David Rousseau's research based on analyses of experiments and

[9] Stein, Janice Gross. 2013 (forthcoming). "Threat Perception in International Relations." In Leonie Huddy, David O. Sears, and Jack Levy (eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Political Psychology*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
[10] Walt, Stephen, 1987. *The Origins of Alliances*. New York: Cornell University Press, 22.
[11] Neumann, Iver B.. 1996. "Self and Other in International Relations." *European Journal of International Relations*, 2 (2), 139–174; Citrin, Jack and David O. Sears. 2009. "Balancing National and Ethnic Identities." In Abdelal, Rawi, Yoshiko M. Herrera, Alastair Iain Johnston, and Rose McDermott (eds.), *Measuring Identity. A Guide for Social Scientists*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 147–150; Abdelal, Rawi, Yoshiko M. Herrera, Alastair Iain Johnston, and Rose McDermott. 2009. "Identity as a Variable." In Abdelal et al. (eds.), *Measuring Identity*, 19, 23–24; Billig, Michael. 1995. *Banal Nationalism*. London: Sage, 61; Wodak, Ruth, Rudolf de Cillia, Martin Reisigl, and Karin Liebhart. 2009. *The Discursive Construction of National Identity*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2; Guibernau, Montserrat. 2007. *The Identity of Nations*. Cambridge: Polity Press, 11; Woodwell, Douglas. 2007. *Nationalism in International Relations*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 13.

simulations shows that threats are constructed in social interaction and a sense of shared identity is negatively correlated with threat perception.[12]

In addition to a lack of a shared or similar identity with the countries that are perceived as threatening, lack of a coherent identity of the self can increase the need for external threats. According to David Campbell, intensity of discourses on danger and threats increases when the cohesion and clarity of identity decreases.[13] As othering can be used to increase in-group coherence, it is important to evaluate the level of threat perceptions and mechanisms that contribute to their intensity. Threat perception and their formation can inform us about the state-society dynamics related to identity construction and help us to understand how these dynamics might affect Chinese foreign policy making. In the late 1970s China encountered an identity crisis after the years of radical Maoism and the start of reform and opening up, as market economic reforms questioned China's identity as a socialist state and the future looked uncertain. China's tremendous societal changes after the reform and opening up period have decreased cohesion of Chinese national identity despite CCP's campaigning. Growing differences in living standards have brought Chinese people further apart from each other, and revolution of information technology has increased the awareness of how people live in other parts of China as well as abroad, which further emphasizes the differences among Chinese. As discussed in chapters two and three, CCP is constantly searching for new ways to increase China's societal coherence in both ideational and material terms, and othering is one tool in the toolkit advancing this aim.

China's national identity construction processes involve multiple others of which United States and Japan are arguably the most significant ones in the current power political context.[14] This is quite clear in the governmental documents and scholarly articles

[12] Rousseau, David. 2006. *Identifying Threats and Threatening Identities*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
[13] Campbell, David. 1998. *Writing Security*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
[14] In the 1960s after the Sino-Soviet split, most Chinese probably categorised the Soviet Union as an important "other." Othering is a constantly evolving process.

analysed in chapters three and four. Chinese views of the United States are mixed including both admiration and negative views. Views on Japan tend to be generally more negative, but Japan's economic development evokes some admiration according to recent polls conducted in China.[15]

The US and Japan are also viewed as threats to China. Results from surveys conducted in 1995 and 1997 in Beijing show that Chinese respondents selected the US and Japan as the most threatening countries to China from a list of countries.[16] Based on results from a dataset collected in Beijing in 1999 Jie Chen found that an overwhelming majority of respondents considered the US and Japan as threats to China in terms of both intention and capability.[17] Pew surveys have inquired about whether respondents characterise the US as China's partner or competitor. In the 2009 poll six percent labelled the US as "partner," 24 percent as "competitor" and the majority (66%) as both partner and competitor. In the 2012 questionnaire the question was worded differently from 2009 asking whether the relationship between China and the US is one of cooperation, hostility or neither. Then 38 percent chose cooperation, 28 percent hostility and 21 percent neither.[18] The Chicago Council of Foreign Affairs poll from 2006 inquired whether China and Japan should be considered more as partners or rivals, 65 percent described the two countries as rivals whereas 26 percent thought they were partners.[19] There have been efforts to improve Sino-Japanese relations. For example in March 2005 Premier Wen Jiabao defined Sino-Japanese relations as China's most important bilateral relation and proposed China and Japan to resume high-level visits in order

[15] For a general evaluation of Chinese views of the US and Japan, please see Chapter Three.
[16] Yu, Guomin. 1998. "Zhongguoren yanzhong de riben he qita guojia: Zhongguo gongzhong dui riben ji qita guojia yinxiang de daocha fenxi baogao" (Japan and other countries in the eyes of Chinese people: Surveys of the Chinese public's images of Japan and other countries). *International News Media*, 21–31. As cited in Chen 2001, 254.
[17] Chen 2001, 255–256.
[18] Pew Research Global Attitudes Project. 2009 and 2012. http://www.pewglobal.org/category/datasets/. Accessed 10 December 2013.
[19] The Chicago Council on Global Affairs. 2006. "Global Views 2006: The United States and the Rise of China and India," http://www.thechicagocouncil.org/files/Surveys/Global_Views_2006/files/Studies_Publications/POS/POS2006/RiseofChinaandIndia.aspx?hkey=722cd929-b952-497b-970b-1ae469b88983. Accessed 15 December 2013.

to improve the bilateral relations.[20] In May 2008 Hu Jintao and Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda signed a joint statement according to which China and Japan are not threats to each other, but it had no effect on Chinese threat perceptions of Japan.[21] In all of the Beijing-Tokyo forum polls conducted between 2008 and 2012 Japan and the US were perceived as more threatening compared to any other country. In the 2012 poll 61 percent of respondents saw the US as a military threat and 45 percent perceived Japan as a military threat.[22] The trends of Chinese threat perceptions in the Beijing-Tokyo forum's polls are presented in figure one.

Figure 6.1. Chinese perceptions of military threat from the US and Japan in the Beijing-Tokyo forum polls. Figures are percentages of respondents who feel that the US and Japan pose military threats to China.



[20] Xinhua 14.3.2005. 温家宝：中日关系必须遵守三原则 (ZhongRi guanxi bixu zunshou sanyuanze "Wen Jiabao Sino-Japanese relations must comply with three principles") http://politics.people.com.cn/GB/1024/3241516.html. Accessed 4.7.2014.
[21] Xinhua. 2008. "China, Japan Sign Joint Statement on Promoting Strategic, Mutually Beneficial Ties," 8 May 2008, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2008-05/08/content_8124331.htm. Accessed 25 November 2013.
[22] Beijing-Tokyo Poll. 2012. "The 8th Beijing-Tokyo Poll," http://tokyo-beijingforum.net/index.php/survey/8th-survey. Accessed 1 April 2013. The other poll results can be accessed via http://tokyo-beijingforum.net/ (in Japanese).

When survey respondents are asked about their threat perceptions and are only given a list of traditional military threats, the picture can be misleading as many may actually find that China's most important threats are not other countries. Thus, Iain Johnston contextualised US threat perception in the Beijing Area Studies datasets from 2000 to 2004 with other internal and external security threats to see how many of the respondents felt that the US was China's main security threat when placed among other options including options not related to specific countries. 20.8 percent of the respondents chose the US military power as then main threat in 2001 survey and when the total amount of options were increased from five to seven, the amount of respondents choosing the US as the main threat to China declined first to 16.5 percent in 2002 and then to 12 percent in 2003. From the background variables significantly associated with threat perceptions in the BAS data, level of education gave contradictory results. In the 2001 data university education predicted lower levels of perceiving the US as a threat whereas in 2003 this relationship turned in the exact opposite direction. With other variables no consistent associations were found.[23]

Attitude Structures and Perceptions of External Threat

Although threat perceptions are important and foreign policy relevant as such, when analysed in the context of wider identity formation processes and value structures, they become even more interesting. As discussed in the second chapter, national identity formation necessarily involves relational comparisons and a degree of othering in order to separate the self from the

[23] Johnston, Alastair Iain. 2006. "The Correlates of Beijing Public Opinion toward the United States, 1998-2004." In Alastair Iain Johnston and Robert S. Ross (eds.), *New Directions in the Study of China's Foreign Policy*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 360–364. The other options given in addition to "US military power" were Taiwan independence, Japanese militarism, global economic decline, domestic social unrest, Russian military power, and global problems, the last two of which were added to the 2002 and 2003 datasets.

other. The way othering is done has behavioural implications to the way interaction with others is conducted.

Threat perceptions have links to people's core values and attitudes on other issues. According to the hierarchical model of foreign policy belief systems developed by John Hurwitz and Mark Peffley in 1987, attitudes toward specific foreign policies are constrained by more general foreign policy beliefs, which in turn are constrained by even more general foreign policy core values.[24] In other words, attitudes toward specific foreign countries or foreign policies are influenced by people's subjective values, predispositions and behavioural patterns. In the Chinese case the constraining effect of core values can be seen for example when analysing the relationship between the core values of nationalism and patriotism, and foreign policy preferences as shown in chapter five. Similarly we can assume that threat perceptions are influenced by values, predispositions and behavioural patterns. For example, juxtaposing China's identity as a socialist country with the US and Japanese democratic political systems may contribute to the formation of threat perceptions among the Chinese. Building on Jie Chen's work on Chinese threat perceptions and more recent work on the Chinese conditions I test three hypotheses, which are presented below.

H1) The more people believe that China should play an important role in the world, the more likely they are to see the US and Japan as threats to China.

Simply put, status and power position in the international system are relative to the other actors, and China's rise implies that some other actor must decline in relative terms if China rises. In evaluating China's position in the world, Chinese people tend to compare their country to the US and Japan, because United States is currently the most powerful

[24] Hurwitz, John and Mark Peffley. 1987. "How Are Foreign Policy Attitudes Structured? A Hierarchical Model." *American Political Science Review* 81 (4), 1100–1120. The work of Hurwitz and Peffley and the concept of core values were discussed in more detail in Chapter Two.

country in the world and Japan is a US ally and China's regional point of comparison. Chinese respondents in numerous polls reported both in the third chapter and above that they hold negative views on the US and Japan and also perceive these countries as threats to China. Thus, it is natural to assume that if the US and Japan are perceived as China's adversaries, they are not likely to be perceived supporting China's aim to increase its importance in the world. A more prominent stance also potentially increases the likelihood for conflicts with China's adversaries and consequently the feeling of being threatened by the US and Japan.

Many Chinese feel that especially after the 2008 global financial crisis, China has ascended to be a first-class power in the world and should be treated as such.[25] According to polls the majority of Chinese expect China to play an increasingly important role in world politics. In the Pew opinion polls percentage of respondents agreeing with the statement "China has already replaced or will eventually replace the US as world's leading superpower" has been over 60 after 2009. In the 2013 poll 66 percent of the Chinese respondents agreed that China will replace or has already replaced the US as the number one power, which shows that there are domestic expectations for China's rise.[26]

H2) Those who follow "mainstream" media such as television, People's Daily or Party publications are more likely to view the US and Japan as threats.

As explained in the theoretical framework, core values are not the only factors contributing to attitude formation. Also issue specific knowledge is important and without any knowledge of a particular issue, it is hard to make the connection with one's core values. Media transmits

[25] Lieberthal, Kenneth and Wang Jisi. 2012. "Addressing U.S.-China Strategic Distrust." Washington: John L. Thornton Monograph Series 4, 8.
[26] Pew 2013. http://www.pewglobal.org/2013/07/18/americas-global-image-remains-more-positive-than-chinas/. Accessed 16 April 2014. For more poll results, please see Chapter Three.

issue specific knowledge and certain types of perceptions depending of the type of media outlet in question. As described below, Chinese traditional media tends to portray the US and Japan as threats to China, which makes it more likely for people who repeatedly receive this message to start adopting this perception.

Chinese "mainstream" media is strictly controlled and China was number 174/179 in press freedom index for 2011–2012.[27] Chinese media cannot report freely on all issues, which poses challenges for independent opinion formation. Like in other countries, media provides a channel for the public to interpret international events and foreign relations. It also directs people's attention and frames what to think about. Chinese media mostly portrays the US and Japan if not as actual threats, at least as potential threats to China. At the very least Japan and the US are described as being against China's re-emergence. Moreover, the Chinese mainstream media emphasises a kind of pro-China attitude according to which China's economic development has benefitted the whole world and China should this receive more respect in the international community.[28] Via media censorship the government can manipulate public opinion.

Before economic reforms in 1978 all media were owned and governed by the state.[29] Even today China does not have a fully commercialised and truly private media, as all major newspapers, radio and television stations are required to be registered under state organisations. [30] A gradual process of media marketization, deregulation and commercialisation started in the beginning of the reform era (1978). In line with the

[27] Reporters without Borders. 2012. "Press Freedom Index 2011/2012," http://en.rsf.org/press-freedom-index-2011-2012,1043.html. Accessed 15 December 2013. See also Brady, Anne-Marie. 2008. *Marketing Dictatorship. Propaganda and Thought Work in Contemporary China*. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers; Shirk, Susan. 2011. "Changing Media, Changing Foreign Policy." In Susan Shirk (ed.), *Changing Media, Changing China*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1–37.
[28] Wang, Jisi. 2010. "The China-Japan-US Triangle: A Power Balance Analysis." In Gerald Curtis, Ryosei Kokubun, and Wang Jisi (eds.), *Getting the Triangle Straight. Managing China-Japan-U.S. Relations*. Tokyo: Japan Center for International Exchange, 23–24.
[29] Zhao, Yuezhi. 1998. *Media, Market and Democracy in China: Between the Party Line and the Bottom Line.* Urbana: University of Illinois Press.
[30] Stockmann, Daniela. 2010. "Who Believes Propaganda? Media Effects during the Anti-Japanese Protests in Beijing." *China Quarterly* 202, 269–289.

marketization and increase of the number of media outlets, the Propaganda Department developed guidelines to facilitate supervision of newspapers and other types of media. Newspapers for example can be roughly divided into nonofficial papers, which rely exclusively on advertising revenues, and so-called official papers, which still get limited government subsidies.[31] Depending on the content of news, topics are divided into sanctioned and nonsanctioned and nonofficial papers are supposed to cover nonsanctioned topics and leave sanctioned topics mostly to official papers.[32] Still, nonofficial papers cover sensitive news stories.[33] Political sensitiveness of the question defines how freely papers can write about it. According to Anne-Marie Brady, mentioning topics classified as "sensitive," such as domestic politics, national unity or social stability, can lead to warnings from Central Propaganda Department and eventually closing down the media organization in question. For example academic journal *Strategy and Management* (*Zhanlue yu guanli,* 战略与管理) and China Youth Daily's weekend issue, *Freezing Point* (*Bingdian*, 冰点) were closed down in 2004 and 2006 respectively because they failed to follow the Party line.[34] Moreover, most of Chinese journalists belong to the Party, which means they are personally subject to Party discipline.[35]

Brady writes that general media guidelines restrict reporting on negative issues – especially those that cannot be easily resolved– and advice promoting "positive issues."[36] For example in October 2004, Zhao Qizhen, the Director of China's State Council Information Office, admitted that state organisations were guiding public reporting on Japan making sure

[31] Stockmann, Daniela. 2011. "Race to the Bottom: Media Marketization and Increasing Negativity toward the United States in China." *Political Communication* 28, 270.
[32] Stockmann 2011, 272; Stockmann, Daniela. 2012. *Media Commercialisation and Authoritarian Rule in China*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 31.
[33] Stockmann 2011, 280.
[34] Brady 2008, 59; Tkacik, John. 2004. "China's 'S&M' Journal Goes too Far on Korea." *Asia Times Online*, 2 September 2004, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/FI02Ad06.html. Accessed 6 August 2013.
[35] Brady 2008, 106.
[36] Brady 2008, 95–98.

major news organisations did not publish anti-Japanese reports on their websites.[37] In the context of China-US relations, Daniela Stockmann argues that the Propaganda Department tries to shape public views of the United States into more positive direction.[38] Negative coverage concentrates on the nonsanctioned topics, and the sanctioned topics are reported following the Party line. Thus, commercialised papers are able to serve both the public demands and follow the government restrictions.[39] Overall, there is evidence that media marketization has lead to increased number of negative stories on the US and Japan, because these stories attract consumers and increase sales, as also the Party papers are increasingly dependent on sales.[40] This complicates the analysis of the impact different media sources have on shaping people's attitudes, but generally it has been established that the tone of reporting on the US and Japan has turned more negative.

Moreover, what is said in the news and how it affects different types of people is not straightforward. Chinese are well aware of the government restrictions and interpret the messages from different types of media sources accordingly. Ordinary people have a rather detailed understanding of different types of media sources and their level of commercialisation and credibility.[41] Messages in the commercial media are regarded as more trustworthy, but as the government can apply press restrictions in times of crisis, this fact can be used in CCP's advantage: When the message the government wants to convey is transmitted through the commercial media, it is more effective than when the same message comes from the non-commercialised media.[42]

In addition to media content and perceived credibility of the media outlet transmitting the information, people receiving the message have different backgrounds, which

[37] *AsiaMedia Archives* 4 October 2004. "Beijing tightens controls on domestic reporting on Japan." , http://www.asiamedia.ucla.edu/article-eastasia.asp?parentid 1⁄4 15491 (accessed 10 March 2012).
[38] Stockmann 2012, 98–99.
[39] Stockmann 2011; Stockmann 2010.
[40] Stockmann 2011; Hao, Yunfan. 2013. "Domestic Influences on US-China Relations." In David Shambaugh (ed.), *Tangled Titans. The United States and China*. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 133.
[41] Stockmann 2010, 275.
[42] Stockmann 2010.

affect how they interpret information. In his classic study on attitude change in election campaigns among the American electorate, Philip Converse laid the ground for what has later been called *exposure-acceptance model*. In his study exposure to political communications is positively associated with political awareness, and uncritical reception of the messages is negatively associated with awareness. Converse found that well-informed citizens were the hardest to persuade, because they had more stable opinions prior to campaigning and were reluctant to change these pre-existing attitudes. Poorly aware citizens were also hard to persuade, because they paid little attention to politics, whereas moderately aware people were most likely to be persuaded because they exposed themselves to political communications but did not have strong prior opinions.[43] Thus, there is a curvilinear relationship between attentiveness and persuasion power of the message transmitted. In some of the later applications of the model political awareness has been replaced by level of education.[44]

The model has also been tested outside of democratic political systems. Barbara Geddes and John Zaller found that exposure-acceptance model prevails also in authoritarian regimes, such as Brazil at the height of its authoritarian period in early 1970s.[45] Using the World Values Survey from 2000, John Kennedy was able to demonstrate the non-linear relationship between education and regime support in China. Those who had completed compulsory education and exposed themselves often to political news displayed the highest level of regime support whereas those who continued to study beyond this level showed lower

[43] Converse, Philip. 1962. "Information Flow and the Stability of Partisan Attitudes." *Public Opinion Quarterly* 26 (4), 578–599. See also Zaller, John. 1992. *The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

[44] McGuire, William. 1968. "Personality and Susceptibility to Social Influence." In Edgar Borgatta and William Lambert (eds.), *Handbook of Personality Theory and Research*. New York: Rand-Mcnally, 1130–1187; Kennedy, John. 2009. "Maintaining Popular Support for the Chinese Communist Party: The Influence of Education and the State-Controlled Media." *Political Studies* 57, 517–536.

[45] Geddes, Barbara and John Zaller. 1989. "Sources of Popular Support for Authoritarian Regimes." *American Journal of Political Science* 33 (2), 319–347.

levels of support.[46] Thus, we can form a well-founded presumption that well-educated people in China are harder to influence than other groups.

People who use different types of media even in China are more likely to encounter different perspectives on foreign policy issues and be able to contextualise the message received from one source. Chinese public in general relies heavily on television as a source of information. Because of its popularity, television is one of the most controlled media in China.[47] In the Beijing area studies 2004 dataset 89 percent of respondents reported watching news programs on TV often and 81 percent said they often read newspapers, but only 17 percent responded that they read news online.[48] 78 percent of respondents in the 2006 Beijing-Tokyo forum's China poll reported television as their main source of information regarding Japan.[49] Also in the Pew Global Attitudes Project survey from 2008 the vast majority (88%) reported getting most news from television. Newspapers were the second most popular source after television for 51 percent of the respondents. Over 61 percent of respondents did not use the Internet even occasionally and only 36 percent owned a computer. In the Pew 2009 poll television remained the most important source of information for 72 percent of Chinese respondents and the second most important source was still newspapers, but the share of respondents who chose newspapers as the second most important source of information dropped from 51 to 35 percent.[50]

Compared to the Chinese population as a whole, elite university students have much better and wider access to information than the public. In addition, young people and

[46] Kennedy, John. 2009. "Maintaining Popular Support for the Chinese Communist Party: The Influence of Education and the State-Controlled Media." Political Studies 57, 517–536.
[47] Reilly, James. 2012. *Strong Society, Smart State. The Rise of Public Opinion on China's Japan Policy*. Columbia University Press, 184. Brady, Anne-Marie. 2012. "The Velvet Fist in a Velvet Glove. Political and Social Control in Contemporary China." In Anne-Marie Brady (ed.), *China's Thought Management*. New York: Routledge, 194.
[48] Beijing Area Studies data are not publicly available, but Daniela Stockmann was kind enough to send me the raw data regarding media consumption patterns, of which these figures derive.
[49] Beijing-Tokyo Poll. 2006. "The 2nd Beijing-Tokyo Poll," http://tokyo-beijingforum.net/index.php/survey/2nd survey. Accessed 1 April 2013.
[50] Pew Global Attitudes Project China surveys from 2008, 2009, and 2010. Pew's datasets can be downloaded from http://www.pewglobal.org/category/datasets/. Accessed 10 December 2013.

students in particular use the Internet much more than the Chinese in average, which may diversify the type of information they find regarding foreign policy. According to the 2012 report published by the China Internet Network Information Centre, 56 percent of Internet users are male, over 50 percent of them are under 30 years old and the largest occupational group is students (30.2%).[51] The 2006 Beijing-Tokyo poll found that for university students Internet was the primary source of news on Japan (53.4%) and in 2012 over 60 percent of students reported Internet as one of the main sources of information on Japan (61.5%).[52]

Jie Chen found that exposure to "conventional" media was associated with higher levels of perceived threat from the US and Japan.[53] This is one reason why it is interesting to see whether these results apply also to a sample of respondents with higher level of education, such as elite university students. Exposure-acceptance model classifies highly educated and politically aware people as a group that is quite hard to persuade, so in case we can establish that elite university students are "politically aware" and still affected by the media, the overall influence of the media on Chinese threat perceptions must be very strong.

H3) Those who are interested in politics are more likely to view the US and Japan as threats.

Exposure-acceptance model does not have unanimous support among researchers. According to some studies, better educated and more aware citizens are likely to adopt prevailing regime's norms because schooling socialises people to adopt "mainstream" political values.

[51] Zhongguo hulianwangluo xinxizhongxin (China Internet Network Information Centre, CNNIC). 2012. "Di 29 ci Zhongguo hulianwangluo fazhan zhuankuang tongji baogao" (The 29th Report of China's Internet Development Statistics), 16 January 2012, http://www.cnnic.cn/research/bgxz/tjbg/201201/t20120116_23668.html. Accessed 3 May 2012.
[52] Poll results accessed through Beijing-Tokyo forum (in Japanese). www.tokyo-beijingforum.net. Accessed 1 April 2013.
[53] Chen 2001.

Geddes and Zaller call this one-dimensional explanation as the *mainstream model*.[54] The mainstream model can be partly contradictory with the two-dimensional exposure-acceptance model, because it does not acknowledge that the highly educated can be hard to persuade if their views differ from those of the political elite. In addition, the elite may not always be united enough to provide a mainstream view.

Jie Chen's study on Chinese threat perceptions follows the logic of the mainstream model and associates interest in politics with political support. In his analysis there was a statistically significant positive correlation between interest in national and international affairs and perceived threat from the United States and Japan. Chen explains that this is because interest in politics is likely to indicate political support of the CCP, and the US and Japan are portrayed as threats to China in the media, which presents mostly CCP's views on foreign policy issues.[55]

Regarding "mainstream" views, Chinese government's position on potential threats from Japan and the US is quite clear, and we can thus assume that people know what the government's view is. Chinese national defence white papers have described the US-Japan military alliance in negative terms and expressed concern about Japanese defence policy. In addition, as explained in chapter three the Chinese government has repeatedly spoken for a multipolar world and opposed hegemony in international affairs. Although the United States is not named here, it is quite clear that China's anti-hegemonic position is a criticism against the US.[56]

In addition to Chen's 2001 article, information gathered from various surveys including questions on political support indicates that there might be a connection between political support and interest in politics. Youngest respondents report lowest levels of support

[54] Geddes and Zaller 1989, 320.
[55] Chen 2001, 259.
[56] China.org.cn. 2006. "China's 2006 Defence White Paper," http://www.china.org.cn/english/features/book/194486.htm. Accessed 4 September 2012.

for the government and lowest interest in politics, whereas the oldest age groups report most support and interest in politics. In Jie Chen's Beijing surveys conducted in 1995, 1997 and 1999, almost 100 percent of respondents aged over 65 reported a "medium" or "high" level of support for the regime.[57] In the youngest age group 18 to 25 years olds, percentage of respondents who expressed low support for the regime was 34 in 1995, 35 in 1997 and dropped to 30 in 1999.[58] With regard to occupation, college students and state-owned enterprise workers reported slightly less regime support than did white-collar professionals and private entrepreneurs, and support rose with economic status.[59]

Regarding interest in political matters, in the Texas A&M University's 2008 China Survey the biggest generational differences in interest in politics were found among the respondents who responded to be "very interested" in political matters.[60] The largest share of "very interested" respondents within their age group were in the category of over 66 years olds (20.9%), from which interest in politics gradually decreased to those aged between 18 and 25 (8.5% of "very interested" respondents). Most young people selected either one of the middle options, "somewhat interested" (31.3%) or "not very interested" (44.8%). Slightly more than 15 percent of under 25-years olds described themselves as "not at all interested" in politics.[61]

Despite the above, I am sceptical that interest in politics is associated with political support among the educated. Chen's analysis may not give us the full picture of the associations related to interest in politics and threat perceptions. The mainstream model simplifies too much. Especially in the well-educated end of the spectrum a variety of pre-held attitudes and knowledge affects and complicates the reception of new messages and thus, the

[57] Chen, Jie. 2004. *Popular Political Support in Urban China*. Stanford: Stanford University Press. Each of the samples consisted of over 700 respondents and response rates were over 93 percent.
[58] Chen 2004, 79.
[59] Chen 2004, 86–92.
[60] The general description of Texas A&M University's China Survey is presented in Chapter Five.
[61] The China Survey at Texas A&M University. http://thechinasurvey.tamu.edu/html/overview.html. Accessed 13 February 2013.

exposure-acceptance model is more likely to predict correctly how people deal with new information. Those who find political issues interesting and important and have the capacity to critically process new information form a heterogeneous group in which some support the current government and some do not. I do not see where the association between interest in politics and support of CCP comes from among the highly educated if we follow the exposure-acceptance logic.

The reason why Chen got statistically significant results following the mainstream model's logic, in which simply more exposure to certain messages will lead to their acceptance, is probably because he used a public opinion survey somewhat small in size. The sample size of 720 adults is not likely to contain enough highly educated respondents to show statistically significantly how the well-educated respondents process the messages promoted by the government –not even when the sample consisted of people living in Beijing who have higher level of education than the Chinese population in average. With a larger amount of educated respondents we would see that exposure does not straightforwardly lead to acceptance. The elite student population is ideal for testing which theory is more plausible, because it contains a big enough number of highly educated respondents unlikely to be found in the surveys that concentrate on the Chinese population as a whole.

In sum, there are some theoretical uncertainties associated with hypothesis three, and perhaps it should be regarded more as a question than a hypothesis. Because existing research on Chinese threat perceptions is scarce and Chen's analysis supports the mainstream model despite its possible limitations explained above, I will test if his results hold in my elite student population.

Methods

Sample

To analyse the construction of Chinese threat perceptions, I use the latter survey described in chapter five, which was collected in the autumn 2011 and spring 2012 (total N=771). The general sample characteristics as well as variables relevant for the analysis of threat perceptions presented below are summarised in Table 6.1.[62]

Table 6.1 Sample characteristics

	N (%)	Mean	SD
Gender			
Male	416 (56.1%)		
Female	325 (43.9%)		
Age	707	20.83	2.54
17-19	254 (36.0%)		
20-24	393 (55.6%)		
25-34	60 (8.4%)		
Place of origin			
Rural	131 (17.7%)		
Town/small city	306 (41.5%)		
Medium-sized sity	150 (20.3%)		
Urban	151 (20.5%)		
Dissatisfaction with life			
Very unsatisfied	7 (0.9%)		
Not too satisfied	76 (10.3%)		
Neither satisfied nor unsatisfied	165 (22.3%)		
Satisfied	428 (57.7%)		
Very satisfied	65 (8.8%)		
Self-assessed social ranking on a scale of 1 to 10			
3 top levels	54 (7.4%)		
3 middle levels	395 (54.5%)		
4 bottom levels	276 (38.1%)		
Travel abroad during the past three years[63]			
Has been abroad	107 (14.4%)		
Has not been abroad	634 (85.6%)		
CCP membership			

[62] Although the 2007 survey data is not used in this chapter, to allow comparison of background factors with the 2007 dataset, the available background data can be found in the Appendix.
[63] In comparison to the 2007 student survey, the share of students who have been abroad has increased a lot. In 2007 less than two percent of the respondents had been abroad either as exchange students or for other reasons.

CCP member	111 (15.1%)		
Probationary member	71 (9.7%)		
Not a member, but has applied for membership	140 (19.1%)		
Not a member, but has planned to apply for membership	65 (8.8%)		
Not a member	347 (47.3%)		
Perceived threat from the US	750	3.63	0.67
Perceived threat from Japan	751	3.63	0.78
Beliefs about China's role in world affairs	755	3.60	0.66
Media consumption	743	3.68	0.60
Interest in politics	769	3.28	0.70

Measures

Threat perceptions

Perceptions of threat from the United States and Japan were measured with three items and two items respectively. Participants responded to these items on a five-point Likert scale from 5 ("strongly agree") to 1 ("strongly disagree"). John Hurwitz and Mark Peffley have used similar statements to measure threat perceptions in their analysis of perceived Soviet threat in the United States and Jie Chen applied this conceptualization to the Chinese context using a dataset collected in Beijing in 1999.[64]

The items measuring perceived threat from the US were:

1. America has hostile intentions against China. 美国对中国有敌对意图。

2. America poses a threat to China in the military front. 美国在军事上对中国构成威胁。

3. A growing American military is bad for China. 美国军事发展对中国不利。

The items measuring perceived threat from Japan were:

1. Japan has hostile intentions against China. 日本对中国有敌对意图。

[64] Hurwitz, John and Mark Peffley. 1990. "Public Images of the Soviet Union: The Impact on Foreign Policy Attitudes." *Journal of Politics* 52 (1), 3–28; Peffley, Mark and John Hurwitz. 1992. "International Events and Foreign Policy Beliefs: Public Response to Changing Soviet-US Relations." *American Journal of Political Science* 36 (2), 431–461; Chen 2001.

2. Japan poses a threat to China in the military front. 日本在军事上对中国构成威胁。

Tables two and three present distributions of responses to statements measuring perceived threat from the US and Japan. Table two shows that that the majority of students (63%) were of the view that the US has hostile intentions against China, and only 6 per cent did not see the US having hostile intentions. Even greater number of students saw Japan as having hostile intentions against China (70%), with only 5 per cent of respondents disagreeing. Many respondents were indecisive on this question and chose the middle option "neither agree nor disagree" regarding both the US and Japan (31% in the case of the US and 25% in the case of Japan).

Table 6.2 Perceptions of hostile intentions from the US and Japan

	Agree strongly (%)	Agree (%)	Neither agree nor disagree (%)	Disagree (%)	Disagree strongly (%)	Total (%)
America has hostile intentions against China.	18 (138)	45 (337)	31 (234)	5 (36)	1 (5)	100 (750)
Japan has hostile intentions against China.	26 (191)	44 (332)	25 (187)	4 (33)	1 (5)	100 (748)

Total numbers (N) are in parentheses.

Although many respondents refused to pick a side on the question of whether the US and Japan pose a military threat to China (29% chose "neither agree nor disagree" on the question of US threat and 36% did the same on the question on the Japanese threat), the majority of those who did choose a side felt that both the US and Japan pose a military threat to China. The threat from the US was considered generally more severe than that of Japan. 64 per cent of respondents felt that the US poses a military threat to China, whereas 44 felt that way about Japan.

Table 6.3 Perceptions of military threat from the US and Japan

	Agree strongly (%)	Agree (%)	Neither agree nor disagree (%)	Disagree (%)	Disagree strongly (%)	Total (%)
America poses a threat to China in the military front.	20 (154)	44 (329)	29 (216)	6 (46)	1 (5)	100 (750)
A growing American military is bad for China.	11 (85)	28 (209)	47 (356)	13 (95)	1 (3)	100 (748)
Japan poses a threat to China in the military front.	14 (107)	30 (226)	36 (266)	17 (129)	3 (21)	100 (749)

Total numbers (N) are in parentheses.

To place the threat perceptions on the US and Japan into context it is notable that the same students most of whom found the US and Japan as threatening to China as presented above, did not see war as a likely challenge for China in the future. Instead, when asked to rate different future obstacles separately, environmental issues (93%), aging population (82%), economic instability (77%), shortage of raw materials (77%), domestic instability (71%), and even international terrorist operations (49%) were rated as somewhat or very challenging by a larger share of students compared to those who found war (34%) as a likely obstacle for China in the future.

Beliefs about China's role in world affairs, interest in politics and media consumption

Beliefs about China's role in world affairs and interest in politics were both measured with two items. The response format ranged from 5 ("strongly agree") to 1 ("strongly disagree") except for the item on interest in international politics, which was measured on a scale in which 4 indicated "very interested" and 1 "not at all interested." Media consumption was compiled from answers to one question measuring the frequency of following different types of media sources. Here the response format ranged from 5 ("every day") to 1 ("never"). The

more the respondent followed these media sources, the higher their score was on the media measure.

The items measuring beliefs about China's role in world affairs were:

1. China should strive for power in the world. 中国应当在国际事务中寻求更大的实力。

2. In view of China's long history and glorious culture, it is natural that China should lead East Asia. 鉴于中国具有悠久的历史,光辉的文明, 中国自然应该领导东亚。

Table four presents respondents views on China's role in world affairs. Notable in the distributions below is that the overwhelming majority (86%) of the respondents felt that China should strive for power in the world. Views on China's leadership in East Asia were more divided and many respondents opted for the middle option "neither agree nor disagree."

Table 6.4 Perceptions of China's role in world affairs

	Agree strongly (%)	Agree (%)	Neither agree nor disagree (%)	Disagree (%)	Disagree strongly (%)	Total (%)
China should strive for power in the world.	32 (238)	54 (409)	13 (95)	1 (6)	0 (1)	100 (749)
In view of China's long history and glorious culture, it is natural that China should lead East Asia.	12 (89)	12 (90)	46 (347)	27 (205)	3 (20)	100 (751)

Total numbers (N) are in parentheses.

The items measuring interest in politics were:

1. I do not have much interest in national affairs. (Reverse coded) 对国家事务我没有多少兴趣。

2. How interested would you say you personally are in international politics? 您个人对国际政治感兴趣程度怎样?

Contrary to the views of young people in general presented earlier in this chapter, elite university students can be described as quite interested in both domestic and international politics, and thus, politically aware. 72 percent reported to be fairly or very interested in international politics.

Table 6.5 Respondents' level of interest in politics

	Agree strongly (%)	Agree (%)	Neither agree nor disagree (%)	Disagree (%)	Disagree strongly (%)	Total (%)
I do not have much interest in national affairs.	1 (9)	10 (73)	26 (198)	50 (385)	13 (100)	100 (765)
	Very interested (%)	Fairly interested (%)	Not so interested (%)	Not at all interested (%)	Total (%)	
How interested would you say you personally are in international politics?	21 (154)	51 (377)	26 (197)	2 (16)	100 (744)	

Total numbers (N) are in parentheses.

Items measuring media consumption were:

How often do you use the following media? 您接触以下媒介的频度如何?

1. Television 电视

2. Domestic radio 广播

3. Newspapers 报纸

4. Magazines 杂志

5. People's Daily 人民日报

6. Party newspapers or publications other than People's Daily 《人民日报》以外的党报、党刊

Table six summarises the frequencies of consumption of different types of media sources. Compared to the media consumption patterns of the whole Chinese population presented earlier in this chapter, we find that as expected, elite university students follow rather different consumption patterns especially when we look at the use of Internet and television. Only five percent of the students watch television almost every day or every day, and the large majority of them only watch television occasionally. Internet is the most popular media among students, of which 70 percent use the Internet daily or almost every day. Internet is not part of the "conventional media" measure, but its consumption is shown here to provide the fullest picture possible of the elite university students' media consumption habits. Moreover, as described earlier, there is research covering the content and style of conventional media and how Japan and the US have generally been represented in the media during the Hu Jintao period. In comparison, evaluating the impact of the Internet on students' views would require more detailed questions on the sites visited, which was not part of my questionnaire.

Table 6.6 Media consumption by media type

	Never (%)	Occasionally (%)	Often (%)	Almost every day (%)	Every day (%)	Total (%)
Television	5 (38)	64 (474)	27 (198)	3 (22)	2 (11)	100 (749)
Domestic radio	28 (208)	58 (432)	11 (82)	2 (14)	1 (7)	100 (743)
Internet	0 (2)	3 (20)	27 (197)	30 (226)	40 (298)	100

						(743)
Newspapers	5 (39)	55 (406)	29 (217)	8 (56)	3 (25)	100 (743)
Magazines	4 (33)	53 (390)	36 (270)	5 (35)	2 (14)	100 (742)
People's Daily	52 (382)	42 (311)	5 (40)	1 (6)	0 (3)	100 (742)
Party newspapers or publications other than People's Daily	61 (452)	33 (250)	4 (28)	1 (6)	1 (6)	100 (742)

Total numbers (N) are in parentheses.

In addition to reporting their media consumption, respondents were asked about the perceived effect they think media has to their opinions. 26 percent disagreed or disagreed strongly with the statement "The way I think about China has a lot to do with what I hear on television or read in the newspaper." Almost a third of respondents were indecisive on this matter (27%) but the largest share of elite university students agreed (47%) that media does influence their views on China. Despite admitting the influence of media on their own views, the vast majority (58%) agreed or strongly agreed with the statement "Television and newspapers are biased in what they report about national affairs." 37 percent of respondents refrained from answering by choosing "neither agree nor disagree" and only five percent disagreed or strongly disagreed with this statement. Regarding influence from other people most respondents (47%) agreed or strongly agreed with the statement "I usually make up my own mind about what I think about China rather than being greatly influenced by others." 34 percent neither agreed nor disagreed and around 19 percent disagreed or disagreed strongly.

Finally, previous research suggests that in some cases consumption of different types of media produces a cumulative effect.[65] In other words, receiving the same message from different media outlets will cumulatively increase the likelihood of accepting the message transmitted. If there are signs of cumulative effect, the media consumption scale should be squared for further analysis to grasp this effect. To see if the data showed signs of cumulative effect, respondents were divided into three groups according to their level of conventional media consumption and I studied the distributions and means of perceived US threat and perceived Japan threat in these groups. As higher level of media consumption did not indicate cumulatively higher level of perceived threat, media consumption scale was not squared.

Statistical analysis

The analysis was conducted in three steps. First, correlations of threat perceptions and explanatory variables (beliefs about China's role in the world, interest in politics and media consumption) were tested. Second, the associations between threat perceptions and beliefs about China's role in world affairs, interest in politics and media consumption were tested using multivariate linear regression models. Third, the associations of beliefs about China's role in world affairs, interest in politics and media consumption on threat perceptions, and the contribution of potential other explanatory factors to the relationship between beliefs about China's role in world affairs, interest in politics and media consumption and threat perceptions were explored with linear regression models. All the analyses were performed using SAS 9.3 (SAS Institute Inc. Cary, North Carolina, USA) statistical package.

[65] Stockmann, Daniela and Mary Gallagher. 2011. "Remote Control: How the Media Sustain Authoritarian Rule in China." *Comparative Political Studies* 44 (436), 453.

Results

Table seven shows that perceived threat from the United States and Japan were positively correlated. As expected, beliefs about China's role in world affairs were positively correlated with both perceived threat from the United States and Japan. Consumption of media was positively correlated both with perceived threat from the United States and Japan and beliefs about China's role in world affairs. Interest in politics was positively correlated with perceived threat from the United States and Japan, beliefs about China's role in world affairs and media consumption.

Table 6.7 Correlation matrix on threat perceptions and proposed explanatory variables

	USA threat	Japan threat	China's role	Media	Interest in politics
USA threat	1.000	-	-	-	-
Japan threat	0.50***	1.000	-	-	-
China's role	0.33***	0.28***	1.000	-	-
Media	0.36***	0.60***	0.33***	1.000	-
Interest in politics	0.18***	0.11**	0.20***	0.11***	1.000

*p < .05.
**p < .01.
***p < .001.

Multivariate models (Table 8) revealed that all the explanatory variables, beliefs about China's role in world affairs ($p<0.001$), media consumption ($p<0.001$) and interest in politics ($p<0.001$) were significantly associated with perceived threat from the US. Beliefs about China's role in world affairs ($p < 0.01$) and media consumption ($p<0.001$) were significantly associated with perceived threat from Japan, whereas interest in politics was not significantly associated with perceived Japan threat.

Table 6.8 Multivariate models of perceived threats from the United States and Japan

	Perceived threat from the United States	Perceived threat from Japan
Beliefs about China's role in world affairs	0.24/0.23 (0.04)***	0.12/0.10 (0.04)**
Media consumption	0.37/0.27 (0.05)***	0.89/0.56 (0.05)***
Interest in politics	0.09/0.10 (0.03)***	0.03/0.03 (0.03)
Constant	1.10 (0.20)***	-0.21 (0.20)
R2	0.19	0.37
Adj. R2	0.19	0.36
N	735	736

Note: Entries are unstandardized/standardized coefficients with standard errors in parentheses.
*p < .05.
**p < .01.
***p < .001.

In stage three, significant associations found in multivariate models were tested further. Table nine presents linear regression models, which show the adjusted associations of beliefs about China's role in the world and media consumption with perceived threat from the US and Japan, and interest in politics with perceived threat from the US and the contribution of potential confounders to the relationships. Perceived threat from the US was significantly associated with beliefs about China's role in the world and media consumption even when control variables were entered into the model. However, at this stage interest in politics turned statistically insignificant. In other words, those who felt that China should take a more prominent stance in world affairs and consumed more conventional media were more likely view the US as a threat to China.

Perceived threat from Japan was associated with beliefs about China's role in world affairs and media consumption, and from the control variables, dissatisfaction with life was found to be statistically significantly associated with perceived threat from Japan. Those who felt that China should take a more prominent stance in world affairs, consumed more conventional media and were dissatisfied with their lives were more likely to view Japan as a

threat to China. In general, threat perceptions from both the US and Japan and explanatory variables were quite robust to adjustments for all covariates considered.

The linear regression models tested explained a relatively large amount of the variance of perceived threat from the US (18%) and Japan (39%). Media consumption was the strongest predictor of perceived threat from both countries, and in the case of Japan threat, this association was extremely strong. Beliefs about China's role in world affairs were more strongly associated with US threat than with Japan threat. Dissatisfaction with life in the Japanese case had the weakest still significant association with perceived threat from Japan.

Table 6.9 Multivariate models of perceived threats from the United States and Japan including all available explanatory factors

The figures are standardized regression coefficients, t-values and p-values.

		STD-Beta	t-value	p-value
		Perceived Threat from the United States		
Beliefs about China's role in world affairs		0.25	6.31	<0.001
Media consumption		0.26	6.59	<0.001
Interest in politics		0.07	1.88	0.06
Gender		0.02	0.56	0.58
Age		0.04	0.98	0.33
Place of origin		-0.04	-0.94	0.35
Dissatisfaction with life		0.04	1.13	0.26
Self-assessed social ranking		0.03	0.77	0.44
Travel abroad		<0.01	0.02	0.98
CCP membership		0.02	0.50	0.62
University		-0.05	-1.37	0.17
R2		0.21		
Adj. R2		0.20		
		Perceived Threat from Japan		
Beliefs about China's role in world affairs		0.10	2.91	0.004
Media consumption		0.59	17.42	<0.001
Gender		-0.02	-0.47	0.63
Age		0.02	0.53	0.60
Place of origin		-0.03	-0.88	0.38

Dissatisfaction with life		0.07	2.02	0.04
Self-assessed social ranking		-0.02	-0.56	0.57
Travel abroad		<0.01	0.02	0.98
CCP membership		-0.02	-0.67	0.51
University		<0.01	-0.23	0.82
R2		0.41		
Adj. R2		0.40		

Conclusion

This research confirmed two hypotheses of the three presented in the beginning. First, the more people believe that China should play an important role in the world, the more likely they are to see the US and Japan as threats to China. Second, those who follow "mainstream" media such as television, *People's Daily* or Party publications are more likely to view the US and Japan as threats. Hypothesis three, according to which interest in politics should increase the likelihood to perceive Japan and the US as threats was not confirmed.

Confirming the first hypothesis shows that lack of a shared identity plays a role in the construction of threat perceptions in China. The US and Japan are seen as China adversaries, and the vast majority of respondents saw both the US and Japan as having hostile intentions against China. The US was also seen as a military threat according to 64 percent of the students, and Japan by 44 percent of the students. On the other hand almost 90 percent of the respondents thought that China should strive for power in the world. Thus, China playing an important international role along the US and Japan was not seen as plausible.

Regarding the second hypothesis on the effects of media consumption on threat perceptions, the exposure-acceptance model predicts that elite university students should be hard to influence by views presented in the media. Media consumption had a stronger association with threat perceptions compared to beliefs of China's place in the world, and the

background variables did not change these relationships. Moreover, the multivariate models explained a rather large part of the variance, which further emphasises the explanatory power of media consumption with regards to threat perceptions on Japan and the US. Combined with previous research suggesting that the government tries to promote positive media coverage on both the US and Japan, the strong explanatory power of media consumption in the formation of Chinese threat perceptions of the US and Japan raises the question of whether media marketization has started a vicious circle of negative news coverage resulting in deteriorating images of the US and Japan. As those with high level of education and probably best opportunities and knowledge to access a wide range of sources of information seem to be strongly affected by the media, we can expect the overall effect of media to be even stronger outside the student population.

In the first stage of multivariate modelling interest in politics was still significantly associated with the US threat, but when background variables were included, the relationship turned insignificant. Although interest in politics was not associated with threat perceptions on Japan even in the first stage, the fact that association of US threat perception and interest in politics turned insignificant with a small margin only in the second stage does not give clear answer to hypothesis three. Thus, at this point we do not have a definitive answer whether the exposure-acceptance model or the mainstream model is more plausible. Examining the results on the non-significant association between interest in politics together with the results of media exposure, where more exposure was especially influential on seeing Japan as a threat may suggest that interest in politics overlaps too much with media exposure. In the multivariate models all variables in the model are estimated simultaneously and held constant, which means that if media exposure variable and interest in politics are too similar, the effect will only be seen in the stronger combination.

Finally, dissatisfaction with life was associated with viewing Japan as threatening. This might be an indication of projecting negative feelings to the "other." Although the following cannot be proved with this data, previous research has argued that anti-Japanese demonstrations work as a safety valve, which helps people to let out anger they feel about many things in their society, not only on negative feelings towards Japan.[66] If Japan has become the scapegoat for all that people feel is wrong -part of which people cannot freely express in authoritarian China- it certainly does not make it easier to improve China's relations with Japan.

As recent research on Chinese media suggests that both commercial and non-commercial media outlets produce news in which Japan and the US are shown in more negative light than before, we have to ask how much the images of the US and Japan conveyed in the media are in CCP's control. If the commercialisation and marketization have led the media leading a life of its own, the processes of formulating threat perceptions are quite different than suggested for example in Jie Chen's 2001 article on Chinese threat perceptions, in which the views presented in the media were directly taken to represent CCP's views. More research needs to be conducted on the complicated relationships between media exposure, support of mainstream political views and interest in politics.

[66] Reilly 2012, 41–42.

7. Chapter
Politics of Memory, National Identity and Foreign Policy Preferences

The carrying of concealed weapons is usually forbidden, but no weapon is so dangerous as the art of remembering.
Søren Kierkegaard 1959[1]

记忆驱使人类行动,其作用一般超过甚或远远大于意识形态。Jiyi qushi renlei xingdong, qi zuoyong yiban chaoguo shenhuo yuanyuan dayu yishi xingtai. Memory drives human action. Usually its role exceeds or even greatly surpasses that of ideology.
Shi Yinhong 2006[2]

The temporal dimension plays a crucial role in national identity construction, as the interlinked and changing dimensions of past, present and future help societies to make sense of the world. How is the temporal dimension of Chinese national identity understood today? Which stories are emphasized in Chinese history and how do they direct China's future behaviour? Nationalist historical beliefs are thought to form a vital part of Chinese national identity. The top-down approach of the top-down bottom-up dispute on Chinese national identity construction discussed in the introductory chapter frames the instrumental use of the past as one important factor with which the Party aims to enhance a common identity and increase its own legitimacy. Institutional channels to propagate the official version of history include but are not limited to school curricula, commemoration activities and cultural propaganda. Because both the people and the Party pay attention to historical issues, they play an important role especially in China's difficult relations with Japan. For example in a survey

[1] Kierkegaard, Søren. 1959. *Either/Or*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 289.
[2] Shi, Yinhong. 2006. "Zhongguo de bianqian yu Zhongguo waijiao zhanlue fenxi" (China's Transformation and Its Diplomatic Strategy – An Analysis). *Guoji zhengzhi yanjiu* (*International Politics Quarterly*) 1, 38.

from 2006 collected by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS), Chinese respondents listed dealing with the history issue as more important for the development of good Sino-Japanese relations than economics and trade.[3] Thus, along with the growing political roles of new foreign policy actors including public opinion, historical remembering and interpretations of the past have important links to China's foreign policy conduct.

This chapter looks at the roles historical legacies (especially the Anti-Japanese War) play in national identity construction and influence foreign policy preferences. It concentrates on the political side of collective memory and historical consciousness, because the patriotic education campaign has often been named as one of the reasons behind rising nationalism in China affecting especially students. As mentioned in the introductory chapter, younger people now in their twenties have received patriotic education most of their lives and are sometimes described as the "generation of patriotic education" with the inclination that this generation is more nationalistic than some previous generations.[4] Thus, it is useful to analyse their opinions in the context of state policies with empirical data.

When thinking about political uses of the past it is important to note variation at the individual level. As discussed in the previous chapter, individuals respond very differently to external messages and attempts of persuasion. In addition, despite its authoritarian political system, the Chinese Party-state does not have a monopoly in defining historical information or collective memory. On a more general level, I agree with Shogo Suzuki that history should not be presented as something that matters only when used by members of the elite.[5] It is not in the scope of this chapter to thoroughly analyse all possible factors affecting historical consciousness nor those views challenging the predominant state narrative of Chinese history.

[3] Survey cited in Reilly, James. 2010. "Online Chinese Nationalism toward Japan." In Simon Shen and Shaun Breslin (eds.), *Online Chinese Nationalism and China's Bilateral Relations*. Plymouth: Lexington Books, 52.
[4] Wang, Zheng. 2008. "National Humiliation, History Education, and the Politics of Historical Memory: Patriotic Education Campaign in China." *International Studies Quarterly* 52 (4), 800.
[5] Suzuki, Shogo. 2007. "The Importance of 'Othering' in China's National Identity: Sino-Japanese Relations as a Stage of Identity Conflicts." *The Pacific Review* 20 (1), 33–34.

However, I wish to note that although this chapter takes the political aspect of collective memory as its focus, this is only one angle to look at historical consciousness and naturally leaves out many areas of life, which are likely to influence students' views on history in addition to school curriculum and patriotic education. Some of these other areas such as media consumption patterns are included in the structural equation models presented in the end of the chapter, but other areas such as respondents' family histories, although important, are left out here.

This chapter proceeds as follows. In the first section I discuss the concepts of collective memory, historical consciousness and how they matter in national identity construction. Studying historical consciousness and its evolution offer one perspective to grasp some of the process nature of national identity formation and help to answer to the questions of how identities are reproduced across time and how they change. I then move on to analyse how the Chinese Party-state has tried to shape the understanding of China's past to increase its own legitimacy. I start by describing how the Party changed the main Other in the dominant historical narrative from the Kuomintang and the US-led capitalist system to Japan, and as a specific case of this strategy by targeting students with the aim to create uncritical national attachment through the patriotic education campaign. Finally, to analyse whether and how nationalist historical beliefs are linked with foreign policy preferences and to uncover more broadly the linkages between attitude constructs analysed in the two previous chapters, the complex relationships between nationalist and patriotic core values, media consumption patterns, threat perceptions, views of China's role in the world and nationalistic historical beliefs and their links to foreign policy preferences are analysed with structural equation modelling (SEM) in the elite student population.

Collective Memory, Historical Consciousness and National Identity

Research uses terms such as collective memory and historical consciousness to conceptualise the ways past is understood and matters at present. This field of research has been largely focused on Europe. Maurice Halbwachs' work from the 1920s and John Lucacs's book *Historical Consciousness: Or, the Remembered Past* published in 1968 concentrating on the theoretical and conceptual aspects of collective memory and historical consciousness, as well as Pierre Nora's three volumes of *Les Lieux de mémoire* from the late 1980s and early 1990s dealing with places important for the French national memory are among the pioneering works.[6] In the words of Maurice Halbwachs, "Every group develops the memory of its own past that highlights its unique identity vis-à-vis other groups. These constructed images provide the group with an account of its origin and development and thus allow it to recognize itself through time."[7]

In short, the concept of and research on collective memory often refers to ways ordinary people understand the past as a collective and differs significantly from historiography and professional practice of history. Still, professional history writing is not detached from collective memory and thus, memory and history are not independent forms of confronting the past.[8] While individual autobiographical memories are often unreliable and shaped by later experiences, the collective memory is also strongly influenced by *post hoc* social processes within its possessor's group. It is the outcome of a selection of shared memories, which are passed on by the group's members, and that are meaningful to its (aspired) identity. In the processes of selecting what is forgotten and what is remembered "the

[6] Laville, Christian. 2004. "Historical Consciousness and Historical Education: What to Expect from the First and the Second." In Peter Seixas (ed.), *Theorizing Historical Consciousness*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 167–168; Olick, Jeffrey. 2008. "Collective Memory." In William Darity (ed.), *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences.* Detroit: Macmillan Reference, 7–8.
[7] Halbwachs, Maurice. 1980. *The Collective Memory.* New York: Harper & Row, 86.
[8] Wydra, Harald. 2012. "Dynamics of Generational Memory. Understanding the East and West Divide." In Eric Langenbacher, Bill Niven, and Ruth Wittlinger (eds.), *Dynamics of Memory and Identity in Contemporary Europe.* New York: Berghahn, 35.

past is being continually re-made, reconstructed in the interest of the present," as Frederic Bartlett puts it in his seminal study *Remembering*.[9]

Historical consciousness (*Geschichtsbewusstsein*) is often understood in quite similar terms to collective memory. For example the Centre for the Study of Historical Consciousness at the University of British Columbia defines historical consciousness as "individual and collective understandings of the past, the cognitive and cultural factors which shape those understandings, as well as the relations of historical understandings to those of the present and the future."[10] In the German literature historical consciousness is often linked with the political uses of history (*Geschichtspolitik*).[11] Some scholars also link historical consciousness with critical historicism and emphasise the historicity of events in contrast to memory, which arguably has no sense of passage of time.[12] However, Peter Seixas warns that although the idea that the past is more part of the present in the concept of collective memory compared to historical consciousness makes sense, one must be careful not to rate populations based on their level of "achieved" or "well-developed" historical consciousness, which encompasses a flawed Eurocentric model of progress. Seixas thus suggests adopting an inclusive concept of historical consciousness incorporating everything included in the concept of collective memory, which is applicable to any cultural context.[13] In the following sections I aim to use the term historical consciousness in this way.

[9] Bartlett, Frederic. 1932. *Remembering: A Study in Experimental and Social Psychology*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 309.
[10] Centre for the Study of Historical Consciousness, University of British Columbia. 2014. "Definition of Historical Consciousness," http://www.cshc.ubc.ca/about/. Accessed 5 January 2014.
[11] Olick 2008, 8.
[12] Novick, Peter. 1994. *The Holocaust in American Life*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 4. Cited in Seixas, Peter. 2004. "Introduction." In Peter Seixas (ed.), 2004. *Theorizing Historical Consciousness*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 9.
[13] Seixas 2004, 9.

Historical legacies are studied in comparative politics and area studies and have generally received less attention from students of international relations.[14] Since the late 1990s there has emerged a growing interest in the role of collective and historical memory in international relations because new academic schools have redefined the field and broadened the scope of issues regarded as relevant in the study of international relations, which now include issues related to identities. Constructivism emphasises the role of identities in international relations and the Copenhagen School places identity politics to the heart of the security dilemma and broadens the definition of security beyond the traditional territorial matters of physical security.[15] Because the modern nation-state is legitimated in terms of cultural narratives that produce identity as "national," security is not about defending us so much as telling us who we must be.[16] On a more specific level some scholars have argued that memories and their associated historical lessons can legitimize and delegitimize certain foreign policies and can thus play an instrumental role in foreign policy conduct.[17]

Historical consciousness functions in multiple ways in the processes of national identity construction both at the individual and at collective levels. First, it enhances in-group identification and groups' self-understanding. Historical narratives strengthen in-group identification and define the boundaries of in-group and out-groups.[18] The very notion of identity depends on the idea of memory and vice versa. According to Anthony Smith, there cannot be an identity without memory.[19] A common past, preserved through institutions,

[14] Goldstein, Avery. 2008. "Parsing China's Rise. International Circumstances and National Attributes." In Robert S. Ross and Zhu Feng (eds.), *China's Ascent. Power, Security, and the Future of International Politics*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 74.
[15] Williams, Michael. 2003. "Words, Images, Enemies: Securitization and International Politics." *International Studies Quarterly* 47 (4), 511–531.
[16] Callahan, William. 2006. "History, Identity and Security. Producing and Consuming Nationalism in China." *Critical Asian Studies* 38 (2), 182.
[17] Gustafsson, Karl. 2013. "Memory Politics and Ontological Security in Sino-Japanese Relations." *Asian Studies Review*, 1–16. See also Banchoff, Thomas. 1997. "German Policy towards the European Union: The Effects of Historical Memory." *German Politics* 6 (1), 60–76; Berger, Thomas. 1997. "The Past in the Present: Historical Memory and German National Security Policy." *German Politics* 6 (1), 39–59.
[18] Seixas 2004, 5–6.
[19] Smith, Anthony. 1996. "Memory and Modernity: Reflections on Ernest Gellner's Theory of Nationalism." *Nations and Nationalism* 2 (3), 383.

traditions, and symbols, is a crucial instrument in the construction of collective identities in the present. Jeffrey Olick sees the processes of remembering and forgetting as performative: simultaneously as people remember as members of a group, the act of *re-member-ing* constitutes these very groups.[20]

Second, representations of the past and aspirations for the future are interlinked. The temporal aspect of national identity is not limited to the past in that a shared past opens up possibilities for a common future. In other words, collective memory means widely shared perceptions of the past, which shape the narrative people tell about themselves, linking past, present and future.[21] The present is constructed by the past and it is the past that gives the present its felt sensibility. It is felt important that the past gives reasons why the present is the way it is, because this gives a feeling of security and more importantly, a feeling that the future is likely to follow the same rules and preconditions as before unless something extraordinary happens.

Third, the constructed nature of the past reveals important information on national values and perceptions, which have behavioural consequences. What nations choose to remember and forget are telling examples of their values and perceptions.[22] Thus, from the perspective of values and perceptions, felt or perceived history matters more than chronological or factual history.[23]

Fourth, representations of the past can help to mobilise people through political usage, education, reparation claims and entertainment to name but a few.[24] Remembering and forgetting structures vary according to national conditions and shape the ways history issues

[20] Olick, Jeffrey. 1999. "Collective Memory: The Two Cultures." *Sociological Theory* 17 (3), 342.
[21] Bell, Duncan. 2006. "Introduction. Memory, Trauma and World Politics." In Duncan Bell (ed.), *Memory, Trauma and World Politics*. New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2.
[22] Gong 2002, 26.
[23] Guibernau, Montserrat. 2007. *The Identity of Nations*. Cambridge: Polity Press, 12.
[24] Seixas 2004, 10.

affect policy.[25] Regarding history education there is also a wide range of national practices and goals. Christian Laville describes the goals of history education in most liberal democracies as educating citizens that are able to think critically in contrast to the past ideas of using history to develop the nation-state and create citizens who respect the establishment. However, in many socialist states as well as in the US, and sometimes in other countries as well authorities support the idea of teaching didactic history with predisposed values in order to enhance national unity.[26] Still, the state institutions such as schools cannot have a monopoly of information production in the information age. The role of the mass media in disseminating information related to history has changed the ways history is present in people's everyday life and participated in creating new uses for history as a cultural product. For example in the French and British cases there is a connection between economic growth and growing demand on cultural products related to history and memory, because increased amount of leisure time and income have made it possible to consume history.[27] In China, red tourism concentrating on visiting places significant in the history of Chinese communism, has been in the increase since the early 2000s.[28]

Fifth, there is variation at the individual level on what kind of role historical consciousness plays in national identity construction depending for example on education level and age. Different generations often have different approaches to the national past especially when dealing with traumatic content such as wars. Although many factors in the social environment shape the ways people approach the past, it is often generalised that survivors are too close to the events to begin working with mourning and overcoming the

[25] Gong 2002, 30.
[26] Laville 2004, 165–182.
[27] Winter, Jay. 2006. "Notes on the Memory Boom. War, Rememberance and the Uses of the Past." In Duncan Bell (ed.), *Memory, Trauma and World Politics*. New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 68.
[28] Li, Yiping and Zhiyi Hu. 2008. "Red Tourism in China." *Journal of China Tourism Research* 4 (2), 156–171.

events, but the second generation has another chance to process the issues and to come in terms with the past.[29]

The Political Use of the Past and CCP's Legitimacy

Political legitimacy is strongly linked with historical memory, which can be even more emphasised in non-democratic political systems. In the discussions on how the past matters in China, it is often argued that the so-called history question remains a critical issue for the Chinese national self-understanding. Although it is not always well specified, the history question is often defined as comprising the history of World War II including the Nanjing massacre as one of most severe atrocities performed by the Japanese and the way Japan's occupation in China has been represented in Japan, for example in history textbooks. Also official visits to Yasukuni Shrine are interpreted by the Chinese as a problematic and insulting approach to history.[30]

In China, the past is very relevant with regards to legitimacy of the Communist Party. This is visible in many official documents such as the Chinese constitution, Party plans and official commemoration activities. Unlike constitutions of most Western liberal democracies, the preamble of the Chinese constitution does not start with defining individuals' liberties and rights or a value-laden description of the kind of society the state institutions aim to create. Instead it starts with a historical account of China's development since 1840 and explains how China became a socialist country. The description of the desired society comes only after the historical narrative, and is defined in terms of socialism with Chinese characteristics. The preamble manifests that history is relevant for the legitimacy of

[29] Wydra 2012, 31.
[30] Fan, Yongming. 2008. "Searching for Common Interests between China and Japan – A Chinese View." *Journal of Contemporary China*, 17 (55), 376; Gong 2002, 33. On the textbook controversy, see Rose, Caroline. 2005. *Sino-Japanese Relations. Facing the Past, Looking to the Future*. New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 50–68.

the Communist Party.[31] Moreover, the Party is often engaged with various commemoration activities. For example the Politburo's collective study sessions are sometimes used to commemorate historical events to demonstrate the Chinese leadership's attitude towards history.[32] The establishment plays also continuous attention to history and patriotic education. In October 1996 the Fourteenth Party Congress drafted a fifteen-year plan (from 1996 to 2010) to improve China's spiritual civilisation using patriotism as a unifying force and emphasising political education of the youth as a "matter of concern for China's destiny."[33]

Because of the role history plays in forming the legitimacy of the CCP, information and presentations of history are subject to governance and history especially when it deals with anything even distantly related to the CCP. The need to control national history in China however, has long roots, and it is by no means something that the CCP started. During China's dynastic period from the Zhou dynasty (771–256 BC) onwards, the emperor ruled under the Mandate of Heaven, which meant that his duty according to the Confucian cosmology was to perform rituals and ceremonies in order to preserve harmony in nature and society. If the ruler did not fulfil his duties, the people had the right to revolt because it was seen in such a case the emperor had lost the Mandate of Heaven.[34] Thus, according to Vivienne Shue, the emperor's legitimacy lied first and foremost in his claim to possess the knowledge of performing the rituals properly, for which he had studied astronomy and other relevant sciences.[35] This functional, performance-based legitimation of rite performing had to be accompanied with a historical legitimation: the emperor had to be either

[31] The Constitution of People's Republic of China (full text after amendment on 14 March 2004). http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Constitution/2007-11/15/content_1372962.htm. Accessed 3 July 2013.
[32] Lu, Yiyi. 2007. "The Collective Study Sessions of the Politburo: A Multipurpose Tool of China's Central Leadership." University of Nottingham: China Policy Institute's Briefing Series, 27.
[33] Xuanchuan wenhua zhengce fagui bianweihui (eds.). 1999. *Xuanchuan wenhua zhengce fagui* (Policies and Regulations of Propaganda and Culture). Kunmin: Yunnan renmin chubanshe (Yunnan People's Publishing House). As cited in Brady, Anne-Marie. 2008. *Marketing Dictatorship. Propaganda and Thought Work in Contemporary China*. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 51.
[34] Fairbank, John and Merle Goldman. 2006. *China. A New History*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 40–63.
[35] Shue, Vivienne. 2005. "Legitimacy Crisis in China?" In Peter Gries and Stanley Rosen (eds.), *State and Society in 21st Century China: Crisis, Contention and Legitimation*. New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 30.

a son of the previous emperor or someone starting a new dynasty with the precondition that the previous dynasty had lost the Mandate of Heaven. The need to have an official version of succession brought the need to control historians.[36] Moreover, the Confucian tradition started a practice of adding moral lessons to history, sometimes with the cost of objectivity. According to Jin Qiu, "history in Chinese tradition largely exists in its functional mode –to serve a link between the past and present and as a mirror for the future." Because of these ethical and political frameworks attached to writing history in China, Qiu defines Chinese historiography as "ahistorical."[37]

As described in the introductory chapter, the Chinese Communist Party bases its legitimacy partly on nationalism, the roots of which are in the past. From the foreign policy perspective, the key in the interrelationship of CCP's legitimacy and nationalism lies in the nature of the version of nationalism the Party promotes and more precisely in the dominant style of "othering" this state-centred nationalism endorses. Looking at the use of nationalism in Chinese state-building from a historical perspective two things stand out: as described in chapter two, nationalism has been part of modern state-building from the beginning of the 20th century and the locus of the main "Other" has changed back and forth between groups of people inside China and foreigners. Although some of the current themes aimed at building social cohesion emphasise "Chineseness,""Chinese tradition" and consumerism and are thus not directed against anyone, othering is also used. Regarding othering, one general trend has been that the main subject of othering shifted from one within China to those outside of China

[36] Lary, Diana. 2008. "The Uses of the Past: History and Legitimacy." In André Laliberté and Marc Lanteigne (eds.), *The Chinese Party-State in the 21st Century. Adaptation and the Reinvention of Legitimacy*. New York: Routledge, 131–133.
[37] Qiu, Jin. 2004. "History and State: Searching the Past in the Light of the Present in the People's Republic of China." *Historiography East & West* 2 (1), 17–18.

in the state-directed discourse in the 1990s.[38] This point becomes clearer if we look at the shift in what has been recently emphasised in Chinese history.

Defining an official version of history remained important after the Communist Party came to power in 1949. Especially the period after the Opium Wars was tightly controlled.[39] Surprisingly also the Anti-Japanese War (1931–1945), which partly legitimated the rule of the Communist Party, became an unwanted topic from the government's perspective. As Peter Gries noted in 2004, "the newly established People's Republic did not wish to dwell on Chinese suffering."[40] Although estimates of casualties during the war reach up to 20 million and around 100 million Chinese were dislocated at some point of the war, the war was dealt in a cursory manner publicly and in education during the Mao years.[41] For Mao the Chinese grand strategy was to balance against American imperialism and counter the US and Kuomintang emphasising the necessity of unification with Taiwan. Thus, the central themes the communists highlighted in their ideological and historical frameworks were ideological differences with capitalists i.e. the US and Kuomintang. Regarding Japan the official narrative of the anti-Japanese war made a clear distinction between a small number of militarists and the Japanese people, who were regarded as victims of militarists as well.[42] Moreover, in the 1960's after the Sino-Soviet split, China needed Japan to balance against the Soviet bloc, and in 1972 the normalization of Sino-Japanese relations created an atmosphere

[38] Please see the section on the new coming of Confucian rhetoric in Chapter Three. Also see Brady, Anne-Marie. 2012. "Introduction: Market-friendly, Scientific, High Tech, and Politics-lite: China's New Approach to Propaganda." In Anne-Marie Brady (ed.), *China's Thought Management*. New York: Routledge, 5.
[39] Weigelin-Schwiedrzik, Susanne. 2006. "In Search of a Master Narrative for 20th Century Chinese History." *The China Quarterly* 188 (4), 1073.
[40] Gries, Peter. 2004. *China's New Nationalism: Pride, Politics and Diplomacy*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 73.
[41] Mitter, Rana. 2003b. "Old Ghosts, New Memories: China's Changing War History in the Era of Post-Mao Politics." *Journal of Contemporary History* 38 (1), 118–119.
[42] He, Yinan. 2009. *The Search for Reconciliation. Sino-Japanese and German-Polish Relations since World War II*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 134–135.

where discussion on Japanese wartime atrocities were suppressed as harmful to the bilateral relations.[43]

Discussion of the war started gradually in the mid-1980s in scholarly circles and ended up in a flood of publications in the academia as well as popular spheres, which were also accompanied by television programmes and other media.[44] In 1982 the Chinese also protested against history writing in the Japanese textbooks and more textbook controversies followed. These kinds of actions highlighting Chinese suffering had been impossible during the years of Cultural Revolution.[45] Although in the 1980s the main emphasis of the dominant historical narrative was still on the CCP's contribution, it became gradually accepted to recognise the Kuomintang's role in the war.[46] What is more, the new narrative gradually shifted the role of the Kuomintang from the main enemy into an ally fighting with the communists against the Japanese enemy. There were various political reasons behind changing Kuomintang's role in the Chinese historical narrative, and China's wish to unify Taiwan was one of them.

In the 1990s, decades of Maoist "victor narrative" about heroic Chinese victories over Western and Japanese imperialism were replaced with the "victim narrative" about Chinese suffering during the "century of humiliation" (*bainian guochi*, 百年国耻).[47] This turn from "victor" to "victim" happened parallel to rhetoric of China as a great power, which indicates a change in national identity.[48] Although there is an identifiable shift in the dominant historical narrative in the 1990s, it is notable that themes of pride and humiliation

[43] Reilly, James. 2006. "China's History Activism and Sino-Japanese Relations." *China: An International Journal* 4 (2), 192; Reilly, James. 2004. "China's History Activists and the War of Resistance against Japan: History in the Making." *Asian Survey* 44 (2), 278.
[44] Coble, Parks. 2007. "China's 'New Remembering' of the Anti-Japanese War of Resistance, 1937–1945." *The China Quarterly* 190 (2), 397–398.
[45] He, Yinan. 2007b. "Remembering and Forgetting the War. Elite Mythmaking, Mass Reaction, and Sino-Japanese Relations, 1950-2006." *History and Memory* 19 (2), 51.
[46] Mitter 2003b; Coble 2007.
[47] Gries, Peter. 2005. "China's New Thinking on Japan." *The China Quarterly* 184 (4), 846–847; Callahan 2006, 188–193.
[48] Mitter 2003b, 120.

related to history have been present in the Chinese national identity a lot before the 1990s. In the Republican era there were even national humiliation days (*guochi ri*, 国耻日), that is, established anniversaries of events that were considered as humiliating, which formed a significant part of national remembering.[49] Moreover, poor domestic governance and domestic vulnerability are seen at least partly as reasons for the "century of national humiliation" implying that reasons for national humiliation are not entirely projected outside of China.[50] Still, Japan is especially important related to the Chinese victim mentality because traumatic experiences resulting from Japan's invasion in the 1930s help in highlighting China's moral legitimacy within the international society, as China has suffered from of its portrayal as an outlier in the western dominated international system.[51]

Top politicians were involved in promoting the new narrative. In January 1995 Jiang Zemin revealed an eight-point plan for national unification. In this context he reminded people of the fifty years occupation of Taiwan by the Japanese and stated: "The Chinese people will never forget this humiliating chapter in their history."[52] Jiang also took part in the "numbers game" in 1995 by raising the estimate of casualties from slightly over 9 million people –a figure established in 1949– to 35 million manifesting a shift in the official narrative of the anti-Japanese war.[53] Another number debate concerns the Nanjing massacre, which was not publicly commemorated before 1982 but is now an essential part of the new remembering, the Chinese side sticking to the number of over 300 000 victims.[54]

Rana Mitter lists four political reasons for Chinese leadership to leverage the Sino-Japanese war in the late 1980s and 1990s. First, the need to provide something to fill in

[49] Cohen, Paul. 2002. "Remembering and Forgetting. National Humiliation in Twentieth-Century China." *Twentieth Century China* 27 (2), 1–39; Callahan 2006, 187–201.
[50] Callahan, William. 2010. *China. The Pessoptimist Nation*. Oxford: Oxford University Press; Nathan, Andrew and Robert Ross. 1997. *The Great Wall and the Empty Fortress*. *China's Search for Security.* New York: Norton, 34.
[51] Suzuki 2007, 23–47.
[52] Jiang, Zemin. 1995. "Continue to Promote the Reunification of the Motherland," 30 January 1995, http://www.china-un.org/eng/zt/twwt/t28921.htm. Accessed 9 January 2014.
[53] Gries 2004, 80.
[54] Reilly 2004, 278.

the gap left by the fading legitimacy of Marxism; second Beijing attempted to persuade Taiwan into an agreement for unification in which the sudden elevation of Chiang Kai-shek as a patriotic leader was a propaganda element; third, the aim to reduce US and Japanese power in East Asia; and fourth, fighting the diffusive societal processes driving the society apart.[55] To these, Parks Coble adds the instrumental reason that academic life was freer during the reform and opening up period enabling the "new remembering." Most importantly however, Coble sees the rise of nationalism behind this new boom of research and commemoration.[56]

According to Allen Carlson, Chinese collective memory focuses currently on three aspects in Chinese past, namely on the greatness of Chinese empires, on the so-called "century of national humiliation" and on the CCP's role as China's saviour against both domestic opponents and Japanese aggression and Western imperialism.[57] However, in the course of time using Japan as the "other" has ended up being a double-edged sword for the Party. James Reilly argues that when China's "benevolent amnesia" on Japan's wartime atrocities started to erode in the early 1980s and people who had been denied public space to discuss history issues related to Japan were now suddenly given the opportunity, it resulted in strong public reactions, which entail the possibilities of getting out of control or turning critical to the establishment.[58] As mentioned in chapter three, Chinese protested against Japan many times in the 1980s, 1990s and 2000s and in these occasions the history issue is always mentioned. When analysing the links between CCP's legitimacy and historical consciousness it is important to ask what is the past the CCP wants to commemorate and how is it linked with wider discourses on nationalism and national identity construction in the Chinese society. These questions are very complex, because in addition to the state actors also private

[55] Mitter 2003b, 121.
[56] Coble 2007, 402–403.
[57] Carlson, Allen. 2009. "A Flawed Perspective: The Limitations Inherent within the Study of Chinese Nationalism." *Nations and Nationalism* 15 (1), 22.
[58] Reilly 2006, 192–193.

citizens are involved when we talk about historical consciousness, and often the government and public realms are in constant interaction influencing each other.

Private citizens have been active in trying to make Japan acknowledge the Chinese perspective to the history question, which arguably can also affect the CCP because the CCP does not want to be seen as too weak in the eyes of the people when dealing with Japan. On the other hand, the discussion on the history question in public has only been possible since the 1980s, which indicates that the CCP had to first widen the scope of topics to cover the history issue before it could be openly discussed. "History activists" in China include online activists such as people involved in establishing the "Alliance of Patriots" website and collecting petitions for various Japan-related causes, academics wishing to raise awareness of wartime victims as well as the redress movement comprising of wartime victims.[59] The Chinese state has allowed most of this activism. Although in establishing bilateral relations with Japan in 1972 the Chinese state gave up the right to claim war reparations, it has allowed individual citizens to claim compensation from the late 1980s onwards both from the Japanese state and Japanese companies involved in war crimes.[60] Groups and individuals that have been part of the compensation movement in the 1990s include former forced labourers, former comfort women and victims and their relatives filing suit for damages caused by Japanese biological weapons and their testing.[61] However, as the amount of activism has risen and it has included public demonstrations more than once, during the Hu Jintao's period the government has increasingly had to suppress some forms of activism and tighten media guidelines on how to report on issues that have to do with Japan and history.[62]

[59] Reilly 2004, 276–294; Reilly 2006, 192; Reilly, James. 2011. "Remember History, Not Hatred: Collective Remembrance of China's War of Resistance to Japan." *Modern Asian Studies* 45 (2), 463–490.
[60] Rose 2005, 47.
[61] Rose 2005, 69–98.
[62] Reilly 2011.

Despite the problems associated with political use of history, politicians still use the history issue both in domestic and in foreign policy rhetoric from white papers to speeches. For example in late 2012 when the Diaoyu Island dispute was a hot topic, vice foreign minister Song Tao visited Finland on the 29th of October 2012 and took part in a roundtable at the Finnish Institute of International Affairs, where he first gave a speech and afterwards responded to questions from the audience. Although Song's main remit is China-EU relations and he was visiting a EU member state when giving his talk, a considerably long part of his speech was dedicated to explaining China's position in the Diaoyu Island dispute. He repeated the main points presented in official Chinese statements on the issue. In addition, he said that Europe and China were both victims of the Second World War, which has increased the appreciation of peace in both sides. Song emphasised that in the Asia Pacific area Japan still refuses to confront the past, lets its leaders to visit the Yasukuni shrine and attempts to rewrite the history. "Japan's actions should put all peace loving countries in alert." According to vice foreign minister Song, "the current tensions in the Sino-Japanese relations are caused solely by the Japanese side."[63]

Patriotic Education Campaign in China

Schooling can be a powerful instrument of cultural hegemony. In China, schools and universities have a legal obligation to transmit specific socio-political values to students, and teachers are required to assess how well students have absorbed the required information.[64] Teachers and their attitudes and values are also under surveillance: Chinese Ministry of Education undertakes surveys on their attitudes to find out their views on the principles of

[63] Vice foreign minister Song Tao, 29 October 2012. Talk at the Finnish Institute of International Affairs, Helsinki, Finland.
[64] Law, Wing-Wah. 2006. "Citizenship, Citizenship Education, and the State in China in a Global Age." *Cambridge Journal of Education* 36 (4), 609; Fairbrother, Gregory. 2005. "Raising a New Generation of Patriots: Patriotism in the Eyes of Chinese Educators and Students." *GIS Working Paper* 14, 1–29.

socialism with Chinese characteristics.[65] Along with the general trends of cultural governance in China, also history education reflects political climate. Thus, similarly as in the wider society, the historical narrative presented to students saw the rebirth of the humiliation narrative in 1990s. Moreover, the patriotic "victim narrative" replaced the old class-struggle-centred history in school textbooks.[66] According to William Callahan: "The patriotic education policy aims to control memory as a way of shoring up regime legitimacy."[67]

Political education in itself is nothing new in China. Since 1949, when the PRC was established, students at all educational levels have taken part in compulsory political education and the Party controlled history education since the early 1950s. Despite ideological education in schools beginning in 1950s, China had no systematic curriculum for citizenship education before the late 1970s. However, steps towards patriotic education were constantly taken already before the 1990s. In 1985 the government resumed "Five Love Education" (love for the motherland, people, work, science and public properties) which has roots in the 1950s and emphasis on teaching history of resisting foreign aggression.[68] Also the amount of hours dedicated to history was on the increase before the Tiananmen Incident, as seen in the 1988 Teaching Plan on compulsory education.[69]

In addition to the general difficulties the legitimacy of the CCP faced in the late 1980s and early 1990s, there were specific reasons for targeting students with the patriotic education campaign. Loyalty to the socialist state weakened in the 1980s especially among younger people. In a national survey with over 4000 respondents the results of which were published in 1989, only 28 percent of people aged 18 to 30 agreed that loving the socialist motherland was the most important basic morality, whereas only in the age group of people

[65] Zhang, Wenbin and Yong Liu. 2005. "A Survey of the Ideology of College and University Teaching Faculty." *Chinese Education and Society* 38 (5), 85.
[66] Wang 2008, 784.
[67] Callahan 2006, 185.
[68] He, Yinan. 2007a. "History, Chinese Nationalism and the Emerging Sino-Japanese Conflict." *Journal of Contemporary China* 16 (50), 7.
[69] Jones, Alisa. 2002. "Politics and History Curriculum Reform in Post-Mao China." *International Journal of Educational Research* 37 (6–7), 558.

over 61 years the majority agreed with this statement.[70] More importantly, university students played a key role in demonstrating the discontent of the people in the 1989 Tiananmen Incident, and the students themselves believed that it was their duty to fight in the forefront.[71] After the Tiananmen demonstrations in 1989 the government realized that there was something wrong with the attitudes of students towards the Communist Party and its legitimacy. It responded by starting a patriotic education campaign, seeking to formulate a coherent national identity for the citizens with the help of education policies. The aim of the campaign was that "young people should be educated to possess a sense of responsibility to the nation and encouraged to link their personal interests with the future and destiny of the nation."[72] Wing-Wah Law argues that the Tiananmen Square Incident manifested not only the CCP's legitimacy crisis, but also the crisis of citizenship education, which was supposed to produce students who would be obedient to the Party.[73] The government did not want more demonstrations and bad international publicity, so something needed to change. In consequence, new patriotic education curriculum was designed and implemented.

Policy change in education started in a wider scale in the early 1990s, and in 1993 the State Education Commission launched the "Program for China's Education Reform and Development," which defined patriotism as the guiding principle for China's educational reform. In 1994, a national conference on education released the "Guidelines for Patriotic

[70] Zheng, Yongnian. 1994. "Development and Democracy: Are They Compatible in China?" *Political Science Quarterly* 109 (2), 243.
[71] Chan, Adrian. 2003. *Chinese Marxism*. London: Continuum.
[72] Central Committee of the Communist Party of China. 2006 (23 August 1994). "Aiguozhuyi jiaoyu shishi gangyao" (Action Plan for Patriotic Education). *Chinese Education and Society* 39 (2), 12; Zhao, Suisheng. 1998. "A State-Led Nationalism: The Patriotic Education Campaign in Post-Tiananmen China." *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 31 (3), 287–302; Fairbrother, Gregory. 2008. "Rethinking Hegemony and Resistance to Political Education in Mainland China and Hong Kong." *Comparative Education Review* 52 (3), 381–412; Sinkkonen, Elina. 2009. "Isänmaallisuuskasvatuksen kampanja opiskelijoiden mielipiteiden muokkaajana." In Raisa Asikainen, Teemu Naarajärvi, and Juha Vuori (eds.), *Pekingin kevät 1989. Tiananmen ja kiinalaisen aktivismin rajat*. Helsinki: Helsinki University Press, 196–212.
[73] Law 2006.

Education," which used patriotic themes from the 1993 program and was passed to all educational institutions from kindergartens to universities.[74]

Zhao Suisheng names three themes that have been dominant in the patriotic education campaign: 1) Chinese tradition and history, 2) territorial integrity and 3) national unity.[75] Cultural governance in all its forms is the core of patriotic education. According to Zhao, the study of China's modern history underlined things such as being invaded by imperialists, and China's national characteristics (*guoqing,* 国情), especially as they are purported to be incompatible with Western democratic values.[76] For example, in the "I am Chinese" program, launched in 1994 in universities, the long history of China and China's cultural achievements were emphasized.[77] The climax of the patriotic education campaign was reached when the Central Committee published the "Action Plan for Patriotic Education."[78] It states that "Patriotism is the banner that mobilizes and inspires the Chinese people to unite and struggle, a great force that moves the social history and our nation forward, and a common spiritual component of all our country's nationalities." ---Patriotism has different meanings depending on the different phases and time periods in the development of socialism. *In contemporary China, patriotism is essentially identical to socialism.*[79]

In the 1990s, after the Party's new education guidelines were made, new history textbooks came out and the theme of national humiliation became emphasized more. The first history textbook since 1937 emphasizing national humiliation was published in 1990 as part of a "History, Patriotism, and Socialism" books.[80] In line with the CCP's general approach to history, in the 1950s and 1960s textbooks emphasised the victors of the Communist troops

[74] Zhao, Suisheng. 2000. "Chinese Nationalism and Authoritarianism in the 1990s." In Zhao Suisheng (ed.), *China and Democracy. Reconsidering the Prospects for a Democratic China*. New York: Routledge, 258.
[75] Zhao, Suisheng. 2004. *A Nation-State by Construction: Dynamics of Modern Chinese Nationalism*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 9.
[76] Zhao 2004, 223–231.
[77] Zhao 2000, 257–258.
[78] Zhao 2000, 257–258. Zhao uses the translation "Outline for Conducting Patriotic Education" for "Action Plan for Patriotic Education."
[79] Central Committee of the Communist Party of China 2006, 7–8. My Italics.
[80] Callahan 2006, 186.

and downplayed the Kuomintang's role in fighting against the Japanese. The main emphasis was on slandering the Kuomintang rather than condemning the Japanese actions.[81] This emphasis shifted in the 1990s and memories of Japan's past aggression have since been systematically used as part of the patriotic education campaign to shift the focus of the youth from domestic problems and redirect protest toward the foreigner as an enemy, as an external "other."[82] In addition to new history books, the patriotic education campaign uses special education bases such as museums and memorials to transmit its message. Students in secondary schools participate in school trips to "patriotic education bases," which include for example Yuhuatai Martyrs' Memorial and the Nanjing Massacre Memorial.[83]

Scholars disagree about the effects of the new patriotic education campaign: Zhao Suisheng claims that the patriotic education campaign has been the CCP's most successful mass movement and William Callahan shares his views.[84] On the other hand Chan Che-Po and Gregory Fairbrother argue that students are very critical of patriotic education, and in Chan's opinion CCP's patriotic education campaigns have not proved to be effective.[85] The main reason for this ineffectiveness is the continuing trend of secularization, which started after the economic reform and opening up period, and made people turn to individualism instead of collectivism. Secularization has been especially strong among university students, and during the 1990s students became more and more self-centred and denied authority.[86]

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[81] He 2009, 136–138.
[82] Callahan 2006, 185–186; Hughes, Christopher. 2006. *Chinese Nationalism in the Global Era.* New York: Routledge, 147.
[83] Fairbrother 2005.
[84] Zhao 2004, 241; Callahan 2006, 197.
[85] Fairbrother, Gregory. 2003. "The Effects of Political Education and Critical Thinking on Hong Kong and Mainland Chinese University Students' National Attitudes." *British Journal of Sociology Education* 24 (5), 605–620; Chan, Che-Po. 2000. "The Political Pragmatism of Chinese University Students at the Dawn of the Twenty-First Century." In Zhao Suisheng (ed.), *China and Democracy. Reconsidering the Prospects for a Democratic China*. New York: Routledge, 227.
[86] Chan 2000, 208.

Even though it is challenging to assess the level of critical thinking towards patriotic education, Chinese elite university students (N=763) are well aware of the cultural governance and censorship, which applies to education at all levels. Almost 38 percent of elite university students who participated in the survey collected by the author in 2011–2012 disagreed or disagreed strongly (288) with the statement "What we learn in school about China is basically in accordance with the real situation," whereas over 40 percent (308) chose neither agreed nor disagreed probably because of sensitivity reasons. Only 22 percent (167) agreed that school gives a basically accurate picture of China. Despite the sceptical view of information transmitted in schools, the majority of students (463 or 61%) still finds that "My university education has had an important effect on the way I think about China" –although this "university education" can naturally encompass a variety of things. To this statement 27 percent (204) responded "neither agree nor disagree" and 13 percent (97) disagreed or disagreed strongly.

Elite University Students' Historical Consciousness

As described above, education can affect historical consciousness. Jin Qiu argues that "most young people in China today remember modern Chinese history only as 'a hundred years of humiliation,' which is epitomized by such events as the Opium War, the burning of the imperial palace of Yuan Ming Yuan, and the Japanese invasion of China."[87] This claim however, has not been studied empirically in much detail.[88] In Europe there have been large-scale research projects on young people and their historical consciousness such as *Youth and*

[87] Qiu, Jin, 2006. "The Politics of History and Historical Memory in China-Japan Relations." *Journal of Chinese Political Science* 11 (1), 41.
[88] Some surveys such as the Genron-NPO poll on Sino-Japanese relations include questions inquiring what comes to respondents' mind when they think of Japan, a question which often brings up the history question. This phasing, however, deals only with Japan and does not answer to the question, how the respondents see the role of Sino-Japanese war in the context of the whole Chinese history. Genron NPO's polls are cited in Chapter Three.

History. A Comparative European Survey on Historical Consciousness and Political Attitudes among Adolescents, but similar projects are nonexistent in China.[89]

As part of the two surveys on elite university students described in chapters five and six, I used an open-ended question in which the students were asked to name one to five events or periods that first came to their mind when they thought of Chinese history. Similar open-ended questions have been used in other surveys concentrating on social representations of history and historical consciousness.[90] The aim here was to contribute something regarding the question on students' historical consciousness without using structured questions. To inquire about historical consciousness from a sample of people that is large enough to show that the views presented are not just views of some individual people poses a methodological challenge. Structured survey questions may not be the best option, as the options given might limit the respondents thinking and not allow giving answers unavailable in the ready-made options. On the other hand, open-ended format is time-consuming to handle and report.

In the case of the student surveys, after getting a rough understanding of the responses given, the events mentioned were coded under categories such as "Ming dynasty" and "Anti-Japanese War 1931–1945." In case some events were too specific or not mentioned by more than five students, they were left out of coding. In total we had 20 categories of historical periods.[91] In the 2007 sample (N=1346) over 99 percent of those students who otherwise filled in the questionnaire responded to this question. The 2011–2012 (N=771) questionnaire was considerably longer and contained more complex issues, which is probably

[89] Laville 2004, 174.
[90] Liu, James, Rebekah Goldstein-Hawes, Denis Hilton, Li-Li Huang, Cecilia Gastardo-Conaco, Emma Dresler-Hawke, Florence Pittolo, Ying-Yi Hong, Colleen Ward, Sheela Abraham, Yoshihisa Kashima, Emiko Kashima, Megumi Ohashi, Masaki Yuki and Yukako Hidaka. 2005. "Social Representations of Events and People in World History Across 12 Cultures." *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology* 36 (2), 171–191.
[91] Historical events and periods were coded into the following categories: Pre Qin (up to 221 BC), Qin dynasty (221-206 BC), Han dynasty (206 BC-220 AD), Three Kingdoms (220-280 AD), Sui dynasty (581-618 AD), Tang dynasty (618-907 AD), Song dynasty (960-1279 AD), Yuan dynasty (1279-1368 AD), Ming dynasty (1368-1644 AD), Qing dynasty 1 (positive issues) (1644-1911AD), Qing dynasty 2 (negative issues), Opium Wars (1839-1842 and 1856-1860), Republic of China (1912-1949), Anti-Japanese War (1931-1945), Civil War (1927-1950), Foundation of the People's Republic of China (1949), Cultural Revolution (1966-1976), Period of Reform and Opening Up (1978-), Tiananmen Incident (1989), and joining the WTO (2001).

why the response rate for this unstructured question dropped to 72 percent of those who responded to other questions.

In the 2007 data, the clearly most mentioned category was the Tang dynasty, which was mentioned 672 times. Events related to the Anti-Japanese war were second most-mentioned, with 514 mentions. 69 of the students even mentioned several events that belonged to this category. Other often-mentioned categories were the Qing dynasty and the Opium wars (mentioned 251 times), the period before the Qin dynasty (242), the Qin dynasty (233), Han dynasty (226) and the Cultural Revolution (223). On the other hand, the Tiananmen incident and joining the World Trade Organization were mentioned only a few times.

In 2011–2012 the most mentioned period was the Anti-Japanese war, which was mentioned 260 times. Second most mentioned category was Qing dynasty especially with regards to violent events and foreign aggression (mentioned 256 times). In the latter survey, Tang dynasty which was the most often mentioned period in 2007, was the third most mentioned category in 2011-2012 with 155 mentions. The following most often mentioned options were the Cultural Revolution (131), Republic of China (123) and Period of Reform and Opening Up (111).

Based on these two surveys, consciousness of history seems to be divided into narratives of glory and humiliation, good and bad. In the negative side the Anti-Japanese War is strongly present in students' historical consciousness, but also the Tang dynasty, during which Chinese culture and trade bloomed and which is thus regarded mostly as a positive period, was often mentioned.

Structural Equation Models

Attitude structures are often quite complex and hard to analyse comprehensively with methods designed for analysing association between individual variables or processes. Thus, we need a method capable to analyse association between elements that we are not able to measure directly with one indicator (often called as latent variables). Furthermore, the method should allow us to the study mediated relationships among them. In other words, in order to analyse how the various elements of national identity relate to each other in a larger setting, we need to use structural equation modelling (SEM). Most structural equation models can be described as having two main aims. First, SEM tries to understand the patterns of correlation/covariance among a set of variables and second, to explain as much of their variance as possible with the model specified.[92] In addition to the capability to encompass a large set of variables, SEM also has other advantages. It explicitly specifies error while traditional methods assume that measurement occurs without error.[93] Moreover, a graphical language used to describe SEM models provides a convenient and powerful way to present complex relationships.

The use of SEM models in understanding Chinese national identity construction and foreign policy preferences has been rare so far, as the available datasets for such analyses are limited and hard to obtain.[94] I am only aware of one such example. Peter Gries, Qingmin Zhang, H. Michael Crowson and Huajian Cai analysed the construction of Chinese national identity with structural equation models in order to understand how nationalism, patriotism, nationalist historical beliefs, military threat perception and so-called humiliation threat

[92] Kline, Rex B.. 1998. *Principles and Practice of Structural Equation Modelling*. New York: The Guilford Press. In more technical terms the goal is to "achieve a parsimonious model with a few substantive meaningful paths and a nonsignificant chi-square value close to the saturated model value of zero." See Schumacker, Randall and Richard Lomax. 2010. *A Beginner's Guide to Structural Equation Modelling*. New York: Routledge, 75.
[93] Schumacker and Lomax 2010, 7.
[94] The issues related to Chinese survey data on foreign policy preferences were discussed in Chapter Two.

predicted preferences for a tougher US policy. In their model, nationalist historical beliefs turned out to be the strongest predictor of both perceptions of military threat and humiliation threat. In addition, the humiliation threat was a stronger predictor of preferences for tougher US policy than perceived military threat from the US.[95] As the study of Gries et al. was one of the first of its kind if not the first, I wanted to test whether their results would hold also in my elite university student dataset from 2011–2012, which is described in more detail in chapter five.

In addition to further testing and validating results from previous research, another aim of the following analyses was to see how all of the different elements of national identity analysed separately in the two previous chapters fit together. Thus, nationalism and patriotism measures whose direct associations with various foreign policy preferences were analysed in chapter five, as well as threat perceptions of the US and Japan, explained with media consumption patterns and views of China's role in the world in chapter six were all entered into SEM models predicting preferences for tougher policies towards the US and Japan. In addition, two new variables on the humiliation threat and on nationalist historical beliefs were added into the models. The theoretical background supporting the inclusion of nationalist historical beliefs was explored in broader terms in the beginning of this chapter and it was important to include into the analysis more precisely because nationalist historical beliefs were the strongest predictor of both military and humiliation threat in the model by Gries et al. analysing the construction of preferences for tougher US policy. The statements included in the nationalist history tap beliefs about two distinct periods, one related to China's encounter with the West and the other on commemorating Japanese aggression (The December 9th Movement to Resist Japan and Save the Nation). The first statement is directly from the research by Gries et al., who for their part borrowed it from the preface of "Never

[95] Gries, Peter, Qingmin Zhang, H. Michael Crowson, and Huajian Cai. 2011. "Patriotism, Nationalism, and China's U.S. Policy: Structures and Consequences of Chinese National Identity." *The China Quarterly* 205 (1), 1–17.

Forget National Humiliation" book series.[96] The humiliation threat also derives from the earlier study by Gries et al.[97]

To allow comparability, this research inquired into perceptions of military threat, humiliation threat and preferences for tougher US policy with almost identical set of questions as Gries et al. However, the models were not entirely identical because the results from chapter six informed me about the significant effects media consumption patterns have on threat perceptions. As shown in chapter six, consumption of conventional media was strongly associated with a tendency to perceive both the US and Japan as threatening to China. Thus, I decided to complement the model by Gries et al. with media consumption patterns of the respondents. Moreover, Gries et al. only studied tougher policy preferences toward the US. In addition to testing how different elements of national identity reflect on policy preferences towards the US, I inquired also how these same elements predict policy preferences toward Japan with the exception that in the model on Japan, the humiliation threat was replaced by view of China's place in the world –a measure that was also used in the previous chapter.

Measures

For both models, nationalist historical beliefs were measured with the following statements.

Nationalist historical beliefs were measured with the mean score on the following statements:

1. China's early modern encounter with Western imperial powers was a history of humiliation in which the motherland was subjected to the insult of being beaten because we were

[96] Gries et al. 2011, 7.
[97] Gries et al. 2011. 12–13.

backwards.

中国近代与西方帝国主义列强的历史就是祖国蒙受可耻大辱落后挨打的惨痛史。

2. I think it is very important to keep the history alive by commemoration activities such as commemoration of the December Ninth Movement and the like.

我认为通过诸如纪念一二九运动纪念等活动赋予历史当下的现实意义非常重要。

Nationalism and patriotism were measured with shortened versions of nationalism and patriotism scales used in chapter five. The selection criteria for these measures was highest factor loading in factor analysis. Factoring results explained in chapter five can be regarded as measurement models for nationalism and patriotism constructs in the following SEM analyses.

Nationalism

1. China's policy decisions are almost always right. 中国的决策几乎都是正确的 。

2. China is the best country in the world. 中国是世界上最好的国家 。

3. The world would be a better place if people from other countries were more like the Chinese. 如果全世界其他国家的人都更像中国人，这个世界会更好。

Patriotism

1. I am glad to be Chinese. 我很高兴自己是中国人。

2. I am very proud to be a Chinese. 作为中国人我感到很自豪。

3. I love my country. 我爱我的祖国。

As in chapter six, **perceived military threat from the US** was measured with the mean score on the following statements:

1. America has hostile intentions against China. 美国对中国有敌对意图。

2. America poses a threat to China in the military front. 美国在军事上对中国构成威胁。

3. A growing American military is bad for China. 美国军事发展对中国不利。

Humiliation threat from the US was measured with the mean score on the following statements:

1. American criticisms of Chinese human rights are really just attempts to humiliate China. 美国政府批评中国人权问题实际上是在羞辱中国。

2. American support of Taiwan and Tibet is really about insulting the Chinese people. 美国支持台湾和西藏独立势力是在羞辱中国人民。

Policy preferences towards the US were measured with the mean score on the following statements:

1. The Chinese government should adopt tougher foreign policies towards the US. 中国政府应该对美国采取更强硬的外交政策。

2. The best way to deal with the US is to build up our military and seek to contain US influence throughout the world. 应对美国的最好方式是增强我国的军备, 削弱美国在世界范围的影响。

As in chapter six, **perceived threat from Japan** was measured with the mean score on the following statements:

1. Japan has hostile intentions against China. 日本对中国有敌对意图。

2. Japan poses a threat to China in the military front. 日本在军事上对中国构成威胁。

As in chapter six, **China's role in the world** was measured with the mean score on the following statements:

1. China should strive for power in the world. 中国应当在国际事务中寻求更大的实力。

2. In view of China's long history and glorious culture, it is natural that China should lead East Asia. 鉴于中国具有悠久的历史, 光辉的文明,中国自然应该领导东亚。

Policy preferences towards Japan were measured with the mean score on the following statements:

1. The Chinese government should adopt tougher foreign policies towards Japan. 中国政府应该对日本采取更强硬的外交政策。

2. China should take stronger action in the Diaoyutai Island dispute. 在钓鱼台岛问题上中国应当采取更强硬的立场。

Items measuring media consumption were:

How often do you use the following media? 您接触以下媒介的频度如何?

1. Television 电视

2. Domestic radio 广播

3. Newspapers 报纸

4. Magazines 杂志

5. People's Daily 人民日报

6. Party newspapers or publications other than People's Daily 《人民日报》以外的党报、党刊

Statistical analyses

To estimate the relationships of different elements affecting the formation of foreign policy preferences simultaneously, we fitted structural model in which patriotism, nationalism, nationalist historical beliefs and media consumption patterns were treated as co-varying exogenous variables predicting US military and humiliation threat in the US case, and Japanese military threat and view of China's position in the world in the Japanese case, which in turn predicted policy preferences towards the US and Japan (depicted in Figure 7.1, Figure 7.2 and Figure 7.3.). The analyses were performed using STATA/SE v.12.0® [StataCorp, 2005].

Goodness-of-fit of the SEM models were evaluated using the following fit indices: chi-square, the root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA), Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC), comparative fit index (CFI) and Tucker-Lewis Index (TLI). Non-significant chi-square value indicates that the model fits the data. However, chi-square is highly sensitive to sample size. RMSEA values less than .05 and .10 represent a good and acceptable fit, whereas CFI values above .90 and .95 and TLI values greater than .95 indicate an acceptable and good fit.[98] In comparing between alternative models, a statistically significant improvement in the chi-square value indicated a better fit of the model. Also the Bayesian information criterion (BIC) was used in order to compare to goodness-of-fit of the alternative models (smaller values indicate better fit).

[98] Hooper, Daire, Joseph Coughlan, and Michael Mullen. 2008. "Structural Equation Modelling: Guidelines for Determining Model Fit." *The Electronic Journal of Business Research Methods* 6 (1), 53–60; Byrne, Barbara M.. 1998. *Structural Equation Modelling with Lisrel, Prelis, and Simplis.* Mahwah: L. Erlbaum Associates.

Results

US models

The first model predicting tougher US policy preferences was drafted according to the model in Gries and al. supplemented with media consumption patterns (Figure 7.1.). It showed an acceptable fit ($X^2(4)= 17.40$, RMSEA = 0.07, BIC = 9739.801, CFI = 0.98, TLI = 0.93). Media consumption patterns were the strongest predictor of perceived military threat (standardized coefficient 0.32, z= 9.58, p = 0.000), followed by nationalist historical beliefs (standardized coefficient 0.17, z= 4.58, p = 0.000), patriotism (standardized coefficient -0.08, z= -2.34, p = 0.02) and nationalism (standardized coefficient 0.08, z= 2.02, p = 0.04). Humiliation threat was predicted almost equally by nationalist historical beliefs (standardized coefficient 0.28, z= 8.68, p = 0.000), media consumption patterns (standardized coefficient 0.27, z= 8.58, p = 0.000) and nationalism (standardized coefficient 0.21, z= 6.75, p = 0.000). Finally, unlike in the model reported by Gries et al., in this data perceived military threat was the strongest predictor of tougher policy preferences (standardized coefficient 0.28, z= 7.43, p = 0.000), followed by media consumption patterns (standardized coefficient 0.18, z= 5.22, p = 0.000) and humiliation threat (standardized coefficient 0.17, z= 4.37, p = 0.000).

Figure 7.1 SEM model on the US



After testing the full model including all the theoretically relevant paths, the path from nationalism to perceived military threat with weak coefficient was removed and the path from patriotism to military threat was changed to one from patriotism to humiliation threat, the model produced significantly better fit ($X^2(5)= 14.62$, RMSEA = 0.51, BIC = 9730.43, CFI = 0.99, TLI = 0.96) (Figure 7.2.).

Figure 7.2 Improved US SEM model



Japan model

The model predicting tougher policy preferences towards Japan was drafted as a modified version of the US model (Figure 7.3.). It showed an acceptable fit ($X^2(6)= 18.89$, RMSEA = 0.05, BIC = 9299.226, CFI = 0.99, TLI = 0.97). Media consumption patterns were the strongest predictor of perceived military threat (standardized coefficient 0.57, z= 23.68, p = 0.000), followed by nationalist historical beliefs (standardized coefficient 0.17, z= 5.40, p = 0.000) and patriotism (standardized coefficient -0.07, z= -2.38, p = 0.02). China's role in the world was predicted almost equally by nationalism (standardized coefficient 0.24, z= 7.49, p = 0.000), media consumption patterns (standardized coefficient 0.23, z= 7.15, p = 0.000) and nationalist historical beliefs (standardized coefficient 0.25, z= 7.43, p = 0.000). Finally, media consumption patterns were the strongest predictor of tougher policy preferences (standardized

coefficient 0.58, z= 19.65, p = 0.000), followed by perceived military threat (standardized coefficient 0.09, z= 2.61, p = 0.009) and view of China's role in the world (standardized coefficient 0.08, z= 2.81, p = 0.005).

Figure 7.3 SEM model on Japan



Table 7.1. Fitness statistics.

	χ^2	df	p> χ^2	RMSEA	BIC	CFI	TLI
USA1	17.40	4	0.002	0.07	9739.8	0.982	0.933
USA	14.62	5	0.012	0.051	9730.4	0.987	0.961
Improved Japan	18.89	6	0.004	0.054	9299.0	0.987	0.968
"Good fit" conventions				<.05 /<.10	In comparing models, lower value indicates better fit	>.90 /> .95	> .95

Conclusion

This chapter presented the wider context of historical consciousness and some of the political factors affecting contemporary national identity construction in China. Although the purpose of the chapter was not to test whether patriotic education campaign has been effective or not – in fact, such an enterprise would be very challenging if not impossible to conduct as we do not have Chinese young people living in China who have not been imposed to the patriotic education to serve as a reference group– it is interesting to see that with two surveys which had four years in between, the most mentioned historical events remained about the same in 2007 and 2011–2012. The narrative of China's past emphasising both glory and humiliation characterises quite well historical consciousness of the elite university students, although based on this material we cannot determine whether this narrative is to some degree a result of the CCP's propaganda or whether it is mostly unrelated to schooling.

Although it is not the same thing to be conscious of the anti-Japanese war and to hold negative views of the present day Japan, consciousness of the humiliation narrative promoted by the government can strengthen negative feelings Chinese people still have against the Japanese, but at the same time humiliation discourse undermines the problematic parts of communist history, e.g. the Cultural Revolution. Denying China's own problematic moments and concentrating only on the external "other" risks creating an atmosphere in which it is acceptable to project all negative emotions against the Japanese as discussed in the previous chapter. That being said, in this context it is also notable that humiliation narratives play a role in other national identities in addition to the Chinese, showing that China is not an exception. Steven Mock has shown that symbols of defeat in the construction of national

identity are used for example in Israeli, Serbian and French national mythologies.[99] For attaining deeper reconciliation in Sino-Japanese relations it would be beneficial to propagate a tolerant historical consciousness that accepts the possibility of multiple pasts, meaning that both sides should acknowledge that it is not realistic to require the exactly same understanding of the war from the other party involved.[100]

While the results of the open-ended survey question on historical events most mentioned by the students gave somewhat expected results, the same cannot be said of the structural equation models. First, although in the US models by Gries et al. humiliation threat predicted tougher policy preferences better than perceived military threat, this result did not hold in my model, which had slightly different measure for nationalist historical beliefs and included a measure for media consumption patterns. Although I had more variables in the model, which usually lowers the values of the coefficients, my coefficients were not very different form those of Gries et al. Moreover, I did not have any insignificant paths in my US models, although the model of Gries et al. had some. That may be because of my larger sample size, but in any case I find the results comparable and would thus conclude that adding the media variable made a significant difference into looking at how nationalism, patriotism and nationalist historical beliefs are related to tougher US foreign policy preferences.

Second, comparing the US model to the Japan model shows clearly how much more the media consumption variable matters in the Japan model. Although the coefficients of variables predicting tougher US policy were similar in the US model, there was a big difference between the media variable and military threat and China's role in the world variables in the Japan model. Thus, combined with the results from chapter six, there seems to be some indication that even well educated university students are influenced by external

[99] Mock, Steven. 2012. *Symbols of Defeat in the Construction of National Identity*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
[100] Bleiker, Roland and Hoang Young-ju. 2006. "Remembering and Forgetting the Korean War: From Trauma to Reconciliation." In Duncan Bell (ed.), *Memory, Trauma and World Politics*. New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 195–212.

messages more in the case of Japan as compared to the US. These dynamics and the underlying causalities warrant further research.

8. Chapter
Conclusion

This thesis has emphasised that we should be nuanced about how to assess nationalism, public opinion and foreign policy formation. In this concluding chapter, I would like to briefly summarize the key findings and reflect upon the strengths of this research as well as areas where further investigation is needed. I also aim to place the results in a wider context of research on contemporary Chinese foreign policy and contemplate some of the practical and possibly policy-relevant implications of my findings.

The world has been producing a hype about China's rise for years but there are areas in which we still lack deep understanding on the actual implications of this development. As I have discussed in this thesis, one such area includes the ways in which China's domestic context affects its foreign policy formation. According to the often used logic, a rise of a state in the international system increases the likelihood of conflicts and the "rise of nationalism" in China is seen as contributing to China's perceived assertiveness in its foreign policy. On the other hand, the implications of domestic context for foreign policy in authoritarian regimes are not well understood and it is often thought that public opinion does not have any impact on policies in authoritarian states. This is in contradiction with the idea that rising nationalism leads to more assertive foreign policies in China.

Chinese nationalism and its possible foreign policy implications continue to be topical after the Hu period. China's policies toward Japan have hardened and in November 2013 China established the East China Sea Air Defence Identification Zone, which

overlapped with the Japanese ADIZ and covered the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands.[1] In January 2014 the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences website contained estimates of the likelihood of military clash between China and Japan, which was estimated to be 50 percent in an article posted on the 2nd of January.[2] Also the Japanese side has adopted a harder position against China. In December 2013 Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe visited Yasukuni shrine, which infuriated the Chinese. Moreover, Japan is rising its military spending and deepening security cooperation with the US. These recent developments entail a risk of blaming rising nationalism or China's rising international position for these hardening policies. Despite the hardened positions on both the Chinese and Japanese sides, it is worth noting that Chinese foreign policy is formed in a complex interaction between external and internal elements and it is unlikely that any one factor such as nationalism could comprehensively explain China's foreign policy behaviour towards Japan or any other country. Although I am aware of that such frameworks are in the making, at the moment we lack systematic understanding of how public opinion affects foreign policy in China and how factors such as leadership change and internal elite struggles fit into the picture.

The content of this thesis has focused mainly on issues related to how opinions and perceptions are formed and only in the beginning of chapter four did I discuss in precise terms the ways scholars can influence foreign policy making. If the scholarship of Chinese foreign policy can reach a more precise and systematic understanding of how societal input influences foreign policy making in China, it will add value also to the results of this study and help to explain in more detail under what conditions the opinion structures described in

[1] Xinhua 2013. "Statement by the Government of the People's Republic of China on Establishing the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone," 23 November 2013, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2013-11/23/c_132911635.htm. Accessed January 23 2014.

[2] Zhongguo shehui kexueyuanwang (Chinese Academy of Social Sciences Online) 2.1.2014. "Xuezhe: Zhongri chongtu dui renmin mei haochu jingti mouxie ren tiao shi." (Scholar: Sino-Japanese conflict does not benefit the people and we should be aware of those sowing discord) http://www.cssn.cn/zt/zt_xkzt/zt_jsxzt/jjdyd/dyd_xsjl/201401/t20140103_935683.shtml. Accessed 25 January 2014.

the thesis are taken into account in the Chinese leadership. However, although the connection of public opinion and foreign policy is not comprehensively understood at the moment, this research has regardless made some useful contributions to the existing scholarship. Next, I will go over what my research has contributed to understanding Chinese national identity structures and their consequences.

This research has highlighted the importance of including the bottom-up layer of national identity construction into analyses of national identity dynamics. Because the overwhelming majority of studies on Chinese nationalism and national identity tend to adopt top-down perspective to national identity dynamics, we lack understanding of some aspects of the content and formation of contemporary Chinese national identity and their foreign policy implications. The Party-state limits information on issues that could undermine its legitimacy and propagates its message especially in mass media such as television. On the other hand, it is hard to block off information from people who want to find it despite the great firewall. Because of the changing state-society relations, possibilities for independent opinion formation are also changing. Although both top-down and bottom-up perspectives are important for a comprehensive understanding of national identity construction, in today's globalised world with advanced information technologies available for an increasing amount of Chinese consumers, we cannot ignore the fact that the Party has lost some of the control it once had on the population. Thus, approaches including both top-down and bottom-up perspectives and also those concentrating only on the bottom-up perspective are justified. Moreover, the ongoing pluralisation of Chinese foreign policy establishment gives more space to domestic input from various levels of society, which brings in even greater need to better understand national identity dynamics.

I have showed in the thesis that culture specific values deriving from national identities shape attitude structures and affect the whole thinking and conceptualisation related

to foreign policy with wide-ranging consequences. These culture specific features associated with the context of foreign policy making emphasise that states are not functionally indifferent, as the domestic context affects both in material and ideational terms how national interests and foreign policies are defined. On a more specific level, this thesis has essentially made three empirical contributions related to first, different types of national attachments in different cultural contexts, second, showing variation at the individual level and indicating factors that are associated with higher level of nationalist attitudes and third, contextualising online nationalism among a wider group of people who form the largest group of internet users.

Complexity: difference between nationalism and patriotism

Chinese national attachment cannot be understood according to the simplified assumptions that stronger national attachment automatically leads to uncritical support for the government or anti-foreign policy preferences present in much of the research conducted from a top-down perspective. In the context of Chinese foreign policy making and understanding the mechanisms of public pressure on foreign policy makers, it is valuable to know that Chinese national attachment is more complex than often assumed.

I showed in this thesis that most phenomena discussed as "nationalism" in China studies literature can be analytically separated into at least two components, each with different foreign policy relevant correlates. Analysing two sets of survey material with statistical methods I showed that the type of national attachment in China constrains foreign policy preferences in a different way than often assumed in the literature: "patriots" support an internationalist stance in contrast to "nationalists" who favour more assertive behaviour towards Japan and the US as well as generally protectionist economic policies. These types of national attachment operate differently for instance in the United States where "patriotism"

and “nationalism” seem to be overlapping and are not associated with opposite foreign policy preferences.

As reported in chapter three, in the elite student samples the uncritical attitude of “for China no matter what” is quite low. Descriptions of elite scholars’ views in chapter four for their part show that China’s international position is characterised in rather moderate terms showing ample consideration for various challenges to China’s rise. Based on the materials used in this thesis, elite components of the population did not show high levels of nationalism. As higher level of patriotism is much more common among elite university students than nationalistic views, the implications of strong national attachment changes after understanding the different foreign policy preferences associated with nationalism and patriotism.

Only once the distinction between the types of national attachment (and their possible cultural variation) is understood, can we begin to model the structure of national identity in terms of the relationships among its components and their links to foreign policy preferences. Especially because perceptions are so powerful in shaping behaviour, it seems important to acknowledge that in China mere positive feelings or pride of one’s country are not associated with foreign policy preferences hostile to other countries.

A short answer to my research question presented in the beginning of the thesis on the kind of foreign policy implications Chinese national identity has (on the individual level), would be that it depends on the type of national attachment. Moreover, power relations, international status, historical experiences and increasingly media play important roles in the construction of threat perceptions in China. Still, different factors were associated with preferences for tougher policy towards the US and Japan. While the perceived military threat from the US was the strongest variable predicting preferences for tougher policies toward the US, in the case of Japan perceived military threat played only minor role in

predicting tougher policy preferences towards Japan. Instead, media consumption patterns had the biggest effect on tougher policy preferences in the case of Japan. This may partly be because the Japanese military is not as strong as the US, but on the other hand the US military alliance with Japan could be thought to dilute or diminish the difference between a perceived military threat from the US and Japan, although this idea did not get support from the datasets used in this research. Finally, regarding the policy preferences toward Japan, this thesis found some indications that emotional content affects foreign policy preferences towards Japan more than they do on the US. As shown in chapter six, lack of satisfaction with one's life was associated with tougher foreign policy preferences towards Japan although the same did not hold in the US case.

Analysis at the individual level matters

Moreover, this study has tried to underline the need to conduct research at the individual level where national identity construction and opinion formation takes place. Individuals have agency to direct their attention and acquire knowledge on issues that interests them, which affects their attitudes on foreign policy issues. On the other hand, studying attitudes at the individual level reveals how certain background factors are associated with attitude structures. As showed in chapter five, Communist Party members and students who came from the countryside held more nationalistic and patriotic attitudes compared to their fellow students from more urban origins.

Second, contrary to the assumption present in literature dealing with online nationalism and patriotic education campaigns, younger Chinese are not more nationalistic compared to older age groups based on a representative survey collected in 2008. Rather, the opposite seems to be the case. This is important to note, as sometimes research concentrating on rising nationalism in China treats young people and even Chinese people as a whole as a

monolithic group, which they are clearly not, when it comes to level of nationalist attitudes or foreign policy attitudes in general. As in other countries, people's socio-economic and educational backgrounds as well as their interests influence opinion formation. This point is further elaborated if we think of the effects media consumption patterns had in the construction of foreign policy preferences. Following conventional media had tremendous effect on tougher foreign policy preferences towards Japan. Thus, if we really want to understand processes of opinion formation and discover who are more likely to adopt nationalistic or anti-foreign attitudes, adopting a research design, which incorporates the individual level seems to be essential.

Moreover, when profiling young people as nationalistic, not enough attention has been paid to the reasons young people have for participating in demonstrations against Japan or against other issues. True nationalist motivations are only one reason among many others. As Dingxin Zhao showed in his research dealing with students who took part in demonstrations against the US in 1999, significant reasons for participation were peer pressure and wish to have an experience of participating in a demonstration, as these occasions do not come every day.[3] We would definitely need more up-to-date information on people's motivations for participating in the more recent demonstrations to be able to estimate the wider implications of the protests for the general opinion climate in China.

Finally, the results of this research showed that nationalistic historical beliefs were not as strongly associated with other relevant national identity components as compared to media consumption patterns. The size of effects of media consumption patterns was somewhat surprising in the elite student population, which should be somewhat resistant to influences from external messages. However, it is naturally possible that respondents who

[3] Zhao's research was cited in Chapter Five.

follow conventional media channels fit also in other ways to the profile of people who tend to have tougher foreign policy preferences.

Contextualising online nationalism

In the literature on Chinese nationalism, online communities have been found important for spreading nationalist views and naturally modernisation of technology offers new ways of public mobilisation, which is important to take into account. Still, our knowledge of the extent online views represent public opinion or even the age group that has been identified as most active in using the Internet is limited. As cited in chapter two, students form the largest group of Internet users according to state authorities, and this research has contributed to contextualising online opinions with elite student polling data for example by identifying background factors associated with higher levels of nationalist attitudes. As we have very limited knowledge of backgrounds and motivations of people who post nationalist writings online, these profiles can provide a starting point to further analyses on online nationalism.

Limitations of this research and ideas for further research

There is still lack of studies analysing national identity construction and its implications for foreign policy preferences meaning that our understanding of the mutual relationships between attitudinal structures is limited. This research has contributed to analysing these relationships with elite student survey data, which is justified in circumstances in which elite students' national attachment is thought to form a specific subgroup –in this case one with higher level of nationalist attitudes than the general population– and in which we lack public opinion survey data that would make it possible to construct meaningful multivariate models to analyse what kind of attitudes are linked to certain types of foreign policy preferences, for example those supporting harder US or Japan policies. The distinction between nationalism

and patriotism has been now tested at least three times with student survey material in China during different years and the distinction has held. As presented in chapter five, Peter Gries and his co-writers tested the nationalism and patriotism constructs in 2009. Although the results from these three surveys point to the same direction, it would be essential to use similar questionnaires to the one used in the 2011-2012 sample also with more representative samples. It is possible for example that elite university students are more moderate in their views because a larger share of them come from urban origins –a background factor which even according to the elite university samples was associated with lower levels of nationalist attitudes.

Often perceptions matter more than the facts. Failing to acknowledge this can lead to costly diplomatic failures. As the discussion on China's assertive turn shows, perceptions can quickly have concrete foreign policy implications. If future research is able to show that the patterns found from elite university students national identity construction hold in the wider population as well, it will further emphasise the need to avoid drawing conclusions too fast on who Chinese "nationalists" are and where they would like to direct China's foreign policy.

Appendix 1
Survey Research in China

Survey research was introduced in China in the late 1970s, but questions regarding China's foreign relations have always been politically sensitive. It was only in the late 1980s Chinese researchers could conduct surveys containing questions related to foreign countries.[1] Polling in China is not yet very developed as a field, and there is a shortage of random sample surveys and systematic datasets, which makes finding comparative referents to analyse change in variables sometimes quite challenging.[2] In addition a few individuals, organizations that conduct surveys in China include government and quasi-government units such as State Statistical Bureau, the Ministry of Civil Affairs, academic organizations such as Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) and universities, and survey companies such as Horizon (*Lingdian yanjiu gongsi,* 零点调查公司).[3] Surveys are sometimes used to strengthen CCP's legitimacy rather than to measure public opinion, especially when results of CCP commissioned polls are reported in the national (CCP controlled) media to show that "people" support CCP and its policies.[4]

For foreigners, survey research in China has been even more restricted than for Chinese scholars. Because of restrictions and difficulties in finding Chinese partners for cooperation, only two surveys were conducted in 1980s by scholars based outside of mainland

[1] Fewsmith, Joseph and Stanley Rosen. 2001. "Domestic Context of Chinese Foreign Policy: Does 'Public Opinion' Matter?" In David Lampton (ed.), *The Making of Chinese Foreign and Security Policy in the Era of Reform, 1978-2000*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 155–156.
[2] Johnston, Alastair Iain. 2004. "Chinese Middle Class Attitudes Towards International Affairs: Nascent Liberalization?" *The China Quarterly* 179 (3), 603–628.
[3] Tang, Wenfang. 2003. "An Introduction to Survey Research in Urban China." *Issues and Studies* 38 (1), 272–273.
[4] Chan, Che-Po. 2000. "The Political Pragmatism of Chinese University Students at the Dawn of the Twenty-First Century." In Suisheng Zhao (ed.) *China and Democracy. Reconsidering the Prospects for a Democratic China*, New York: Routledge, 209.

China. Conditions changed rapidly during the 1990s and by mid-2008, some sixty articles, books and book chapters drawing from original representative sample surveys from Chinese politics appeared.[5] However, more than half of these publications concentrate on village elections, which has been the single most popular topic among foreign trained scholars doing surveys in China.[6] Foreign policy attitudes have been examined very little with representative samples compared to data on attitudes towards domestic economic and social issues.[7] Iain Johnston's analysis on Chinese middle class attitudes towards international issues based on the Beijing Area Study (BAS) data and Johnston's and Daniela Stockmann's work on anti-American attitudes, also based on BAS data, are some of the few examples.[8] Private polling companies such as Horizon and the PDO sometimes collect samples on foreign policy attitudes for international projects such as Pew surveys, but less so for academics.[9]

Research permissions for certain politically sensitive topics are difficult to get, and sometimes research questions regarding limited populations such as university students can be answered with convenience samples. Scholars such as Dingxin Zhao, Gregory Fairbrother and Peter Gries have used convenience samples consisting of students, and their contributions were discussed in chapter five.[10]

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[5] Manion, Melanie. 2010. "A Survey of Survey Research in Chinese Politics." In Allen Carlson, Mary Gallagher, Kenneth Kieberthal, and Melanie Manion (eds.), *Contemporary Chinese Politics. New Sources, Methods and Field Strategies.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 181.
[6] Manion 2010, 181-193.
[7] Johnston 2004, 606.
[8] Johnston 2004; Johnston, Alastair Iain and Daniela Stockman. 2007. "Chinese Attitudes toward the United States and Americans." In Peter J. Katzenstein and Robert Keohane (eds.), *Anti-Americans in World Politics*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 157–195.
[9] Manion 2010, 191.
[10] Zhao, Dingxin. 2003. "Nationalism and Authoritarianism: Student-Government Conflicts during the 1999 Beijing Student Protests." *Asian Perspective* 27 (1), 5–34; Fairbrother, Gregory. 2003. "The Effects of Political Education and Critical Thinking on Hong Kong and Mainland Chinese University Students' National Attitudes." *British Journal of Sociology Education* 24 (5), 605–620; Gries, Peter, Qingmin Zhang, H. Michael Crowson and Huajian Cai. 2011. "Patriotism, Nationalism, and China's U.S. Policy: Structures and Consequences of Chinese National Identity." *The China Quarterly* 205 (1), 1–17. See also Gries, Peter. 2010. "Experimental Methods and Psychological Measures in the Study of Chinese Foreign Policy." In Allen Carlson, Mary Gallagher, Kenneth Kieberthal, and Melanie Manion (eds.), *Contemporary Chinese Politics. New Sources, Methods and Field Strategies.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 69–87.

Appendix 2

Sample Characteristics of the 2007 Survey

Table A1. Field of study and grade.

Field of study	**Grade (percent)**						**Total**
	1st year	2nd year	3rd year	4th year	Master's student	Graduated	
International relations	21.1	36.8	26.3	7.9	5.3	2.6	100.0 (N=76)
History	4.8	29.0	46.8	11.3	4.8	3.2	100.0 (N=62)
Economics	19.7	22.7	25.8	11.9	15.3	4.7	100.0 (N=295)
Technology	35.3	24.7	20.2	7.1	9.1	3.7	100.0 (N=519)
Law	15.9	25.4	12.7	11.6	18.5	15.9	100.0 (N=189)
Other	26.2	22.0	19.0	14.9	12.5	5.4	100.0 (N=168)
Total	25.5	24.9	21.8	10.1	11.8	5.8	100.0 (N=1309)

Table A2. Place of origin.

Place of origin	**Frequency**	**Percent**
Rural area	233	17.8
Town/small city	515	39.3
Medium sized city	279	21.3
Urban area	282	21.5
Total	1309	100.0

Table A3. Field of study by gender.

Field of study	**Gender (percent)**		**Total (N)**	**Percent of total**
	female	male		
International relations	55.3	44.7	76	5.8
History	73.4	26.6	64	4.8
Economics	56.0	44.0	298	22.5
Technology	29.5	70.5	522	39.4
Law	57.2	42.8	194	14.7
Other	67.6	32.4	170	12.8
Total	100 (N=636)	100 (N=688)	1324	100

Table A4. Membership in the Communist Party of China.

Membership in the CCP	**Frequency**	**Percent**
Member	270	20.6
Not a member, but has already applied for membership.	296	22.6
Not a member, but is planning to apply for membership.	152	11.6
Not a member.	590	45.1
Total	1308	100.0

Table A5. Self-assessed social ranking on a scale of 1 to 10.

Self-assessed social ranking on a scale of 1 to 10	Number	Percent
3 top levels	95	7.4
3 middle levels	798	61.2
4 bottom levels	409	31.4
Total	1302	100.0

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