Perception, Justification, and Identity: Kumārila's Theory of Universals in the *Ākṛtivāda* Chapter of the *Ślokavārttika*



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Abstract

This thesis examines the theory of universals expounded by the seventh century Mīmāṃsā philosopher, Kumārilabhaṭṭa, in the *Ākṛtivāda* chapter of his *magnum opus*, the *Ślokavārttika*. Kumārila's innovative conception of universals constitutes an important chapter in the history of Indian philosophy. Through a close reading and philosophical analysis of the text, I argue that Kumārila provides a sophisticated epistemological framework for his theory of universals and makes daring propositions about the ontology of universals in the *Ākṛtivāda*. Ultimately, I aim to show that it is Kumārila's epistemological arguments for universals that underpin his contention that universals are real existences and that universals and particulars share a certain level of identity.

My approach to study the *Ākṛtivāda* in this thesis is twofold. My first objective of is to present what Kumārila's theory of universals entails and how he expounds his theory of universals in the *Ākṛtivāda*. My second objective is to understand the transmission and critical reception of Kumārila's theory of universals in a historical context. To achieve the first goal, I prepare a new edition of the *Ākṛtivāda* in Chapter 2 by using four published editions and five manuscripts, and then I provide an annotated translation of the *Ākṛtivāda* in Chapter 3. The second goal is met by the- analytical chapters of this thesis (Chapter 4-6), with each chapter showcasing how Buddhist, Jaina, and Vedānta philosophers engage with Kumārila's theory of universals, respectively. Given that Kumārila's theory of universals was composed at a time in which Indian inter-religious debate regarding metaphysics and epistemology reached a new stage, I argue that the legacy of Kumārila's theory of universals must be viewed in context of that inter-religious debate. As a result, each of the analytical chapters will address the impact of Kumārila's theory on different philosophical traditions in classical India: in Chapter 4, I will consider the effect on the Buddhist logico-epistemological

school , in Chapter 5, the effect on Jaina philosophers, and finally in Chapter 6, the effect on the non-Mīmāṃsā Brahmanical tradition.

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Abbreviations

AbhiP	*Abhiprāyaprakāśikā*, of Citsukhamuni
ĀM	*Āptamīmāṃsā*, of Samantabhadra
AP	*Apohaprakaraṇam*, of Jñānaśrīmitra
AVN	*Anekāntavādanirāsa*, of Jitāri
BhāŚ	*Bhāvaśuddhi*, of Ānandapūrṇamuni
BSi	*Brahmasiddhi*, of Maṇḍanamiśra
BSiV	*Brahmasiddhivyākhyāna*, of Śaṅkhapāṇi
JN	*Jātinirākṛti*, of Jitāri
MS	*Mīmāṃsāsūtra*, of Jaimini
NK	*Nyāyakandalī*, of Srīdhara
NM	*Nyāyamañjarī*, of Jayantabhaṭṭa
NS	*Nyāyasūtra*, of Gautama
NVār	*Nyāyavārttika*, of Uddyotakara
NVVi	*Nyāyaviniścayavivaraṇa*, of Vādirājasūri
PDS	*Padārthadharmasaṃgraha*, of Praśastapāda
PKM	*Prameyakamalamārtaṇḍa*, of Prabhācandra
PrP	*Prakaraṇapañcikā*, of Śālikanātha
PSV 1	*Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti*, Svārthānumāna, of Dignāga
PSV 5	*Prāmāṇasamuccayavṛtti*, Apoha, of Dignāga
PV 1	*Prāmāṇavārttika*, Svārthānumāna, of Dharmakīrti
PV 3	*Prāmāṇavārttika*, Pratyakṣapariccheda, of Dharmakīrti
PVSV	*Prāmāṇavārttikasvavṛtti*, of Dharmakīrti
PVSVṬ	*Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛttiṭīkā*, of Karṇakagomin
RN	*Ratnakīrtinibandhāvalī*, of Ratnakīrti
ŚBh	*Śābarabhāṣya*, of Śabara
ŚV	*Ślokavārttika*, of Kumārilabhaṭṭa
ŚVNR	*Nyāyaratnākara* of Pārthasārathimiśra
ŚVKāś	*Ślokavārttikakāśikā* of Sucaritamiśra
ŚVŚar	*Ślokavārttikaṭīkāśarkarikā* of Jayamiśra
TS	*Tattvasaṃgraha*, of Śāntarakṣita
TSP	*Tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā*, of Kamalaśīla
TV	*Tantravārttika*, of Kumārilabhaṭṭa
ViV	*Vibhramaviveka*, of Maṇḍanamiśra

Chapter 1: Introduction

> Although the modern philosopher may initially be inclined simply to reject Kumārila's system out of hand as completely antiquated, especially in light of its defense of scripture as a valid means of knowledge (but it is a rigorously reasoned defense!), while at the same time attempting to salvage bits and pieces of it that might be shown relevant to contemporary philosophy (for it would be rude to imply that the Indians weren't really smart!), in fact, in order to do full justice to a thinker like Kumārila, one must attempt to enter fully into his world, antiquated notions and all, and see things through his eyes - and see whether "it is good".
>
> — John Taber, *A Hindu Critique of Buddhist Epistemology*, 43

> All awarenesses have the tendency to produce in us an initial conviction of their own truth; this is simply what awarenesses do.
>
> — Lawrence McCrea, *Justification, Credibility and Truth*, 113

1.1 Subject and Scope

The problem of universals is a stubbornly persistent topic that faces philosophers in Indian philosophy and Western philosophy alike. In both traditions, the discourse on universals revolves around the reality of universals, i.e. whether universals are real entities or are just mental conceptualisations. Philosophers' motivation for investigating the nature of universals comes from their desire to understand what accounts for the phenomena of general terms and generic properties—how are we able to use the same word in different propositions to mean the same thing, and what does it mean when we say that numerically distinct individuals with all their specifications have the same, recurring properties? In the classical Indian context, the problem of universals is no matter of frivolity or intellectual recreation. It is, rather, a central topic in the arena of inter-religious philosophical debates—one that yields far-fetching implications for the defenders of different religious traditions. Classical Indian philosophers articulate their understandings of universals in defence of their accounts of cognitive awareness, truth, and language. In turn, those accounts are used to uphold the

authority of their corresponding religious scriptures, and ultimately, the authority of their religions.

Against this backdrop, the seventh century Mīmāṃsā philosopher Kumārilabhaṭṭa (ca. 600-660 CE) revolutionises Mīmāṃsā philosophy by advocating one of the most distinctive theories of universals in Indian philosophy in the *Ākṛtivāda* chapter of his *magnum opus*, the *Ślokavārttika* (ŚV).[1] His theory, which is the focus of this thesis, is distinctive for several reasons. Kumārila is one of the first Brahmanical authors to articulate a theory of universals within an elaborate epistemological framework, at a time when Sanskrit philosophy was witnessing an epistemological turn. This turn came a crucial time for the orthodox Brahmanical philosophical circle, as they faced an unprecedented intellectual challenge from the emerging Buddhist logico-epistemological school (*pramāṇavāda*). On the other hand, Kumārila makes daring propositions about the ontology of universals. He argues that the distinction between universals and particulars upheld by many philosophers is, in fact, not absolute; rather, universals and particulars are always fused together in reality and every entity has a dual nature that comprises both a universal aspect and a particular aspect. The innovations that Kumārila presents in his theory of universals create a unique philosophical identity for Bhaṭṭa Mīmāṃsā and constitute an important chapter in the history of Indian philosophy. However, Kumārila's theory of universals remains disproportionally understudied, especially in light of the growth of the literature on classical Indian philosophy and the amount of impact Kumārila had in the history of Indian philosophy.

The main goal of this thesis is to explicate this important but still-missing chapter in Indian philosophy by addressing the questions of what Kumārila's conception of universals

[1] For Kumārila's date, see Frauwallner (1961), Thrasher (1993), Taber (2005), Kataoka (2011), and Kataoka (2021). It is beyond the scope of this thesis to present any revisions to Kumārila's date, especially since the date of Kumārila is dependent on a number of Brahmanical and Buddhist philosophers' dates in the second half of the first millennium. Chauhan (2023) provides the most recent article examining the issue of Kumārila's date, and it assigns Kumārila's *terminus ante quem* to 676 CE, the date of a Jaina narrative, *Padmacarita*, which, according to Chauhan (2023), records and responds to Kumārila's philosophy.

entails and how he expounds his theory of universals in the *Ākṛtivāda*. My central argument is that Kumārila's theory of universals in the *Ākṛtivāda* is embedded in a sophisticated epistemological framework where a nexus of his epistemological theories are employed. Specifically, I intend to demonstrate the following two points. First, while Kumārila's arguments for the existence of universals seem deceptively simple, they are intimately associated with Kumārila's sophisticated theory of knowledge and involve a complex account of perception and justification. Second, Kumārila's unique understanding of the identity between universals and particulars, i.e. his dual nature theory, also finds its root in his epistemological arguments for universals, despite the ontological character of the dual nature argument. With these two points, I argue that the main themes of Kumārila's theory of universals—perception, justification, and identity—are all closed intertwined in Kumārila's realist Mīmāṃsā philosophy.

The other goal of the thesis is to shed light on the transmission and critical reception of Kumārila's theory of universals by examining how classical Indian philosophers of different traditions react to his distinctive conception of universals. In doing so, this thesis aims to contribute to the wider scholarly pursuit of understanding how Indian metaphysics and epistemology are debated in interreligious contexts during the second half of the first millennium. In particular, I aim to show an important implication of the simple principle that understanding the arguments of a philosopher properly is crucial in fostering a proper understanding of his later critics. This will be demonstrated when I discuss how Buddhist, Jaina, and Vedānta philosophers, respectively, engage with Kumārila's theory of universals. By having a philosophically accurate account of Kumārila's theory of theories, this thesis intends to strengthen the view that Kumārila's theory of universals represents an assertive apologetics of his realist epistemology and one that compels Dharmakīrti to improve his own theories (Chapter 4). It demonstrates that other Indian philosophers' readiness to associate

Kumārila's dual nature theory with Jainism not only neglects Kumārila's epistemological arguments for the theory but also neglects the protests of Jaina philosophers such as Prabhācandra and Vādirājasūri (Chapter 5). Finally, this thesis revises the current scholarly understanding of Maṇḍana's critique of Kumārila's theory of universals (Chapter 6).

Before I undertake the project of critically analysing Kumārila's arguments in the *Ākṛtivāda* and understanding the critical reception of the theory, I first present a new edition (Chapter 2) and an annotated translation (Chapter 3) of the text of the *Ākṛtivāda* in order to offer a philologically accurate account of Kumārila's theory of universals. Although there are at least five different modern editions of the ŚV, and although the entire *Ślokavārttika* was translated into three different languages, there are two reasons that warrant a fresh philological investigation of the *Ākṛtivāda* chapter.[2] The first reason comes from a text-critical perspective, and the second comes from a historical-philosophical one.

From the text-critical perspective, the existing editions of the *Ślokavārttika* are all in an unsatisfactory condition. I will elaborate on the details of each edition in Chapter 2, but for now, it is sufficient to mention that the existing editions often report different readings throughout the text and do not consistently report their manuscript evidence, if at all. This has resulted in a situation in which it is a common practice for scholars working on any chapters of the *Ślokavārttika* to consult at least two published editions of the text, and then, to resolve any discrepancy between the editions based on their own philological knowledge and understanding of the text. More importantly, the Madras edition by C. Kunhan Raja seems to present a non-trivial recession of the ŚV relative to all the other published editions. Without the support of manuscripts and without conducting a thorough philological investigation, it seems to me that any means to resolve the discrepancies between editions would be more or less subject to doubt. Furthermore, the *Ākṛtivāda* portion of Sucaritamiśra's (c. 950)

[2] See Kataoka (2011a: II.7). The entire Ślokavārttika was translated into English by Jhā (1983a), into Hindi by Jhā (1979), and into Japanese by Honda (1996).

important commentary on the ŚV, i.e. the *Ślokavārttikakāśikā*, has long been inaccessible to scholars, due to the discontinuation of the Trivandrum publication. As I will show in the following chapters, Sucarita's commentary on the *Ākṛtivāda* not only provides valuable evidence to determine accurate readings of the ŚV, but also often offers lucid interpretation of Kumārila's arguments. Thus, this thesis aims to provide a new edition of the *Ākṛtivāda* chapter of the ŚV as well as a first edition of the *Ākṛtivāda* chapter of the *Kāśikā*, not only in order to lay a solid foundation for an accurate annotated translation, but also as a future reference point for anyone who wants to study the chapter.

My philological work also aims to remedy deficiencies in the existing translations of the ŚV from a historical-philosophical perspective. Although the entire ŚV has been translated a number of times, existing translations either do not provide enough annotations to shed light on the often obscure arguments of Kumārila or do not provide enough historical background for readers to understand what is at stake for Kumārila to argue in the way that he does. More importantly, the translations are out of date in light of the new attention paid to their contents. The most recent translation of the entire ŚV is almost three decades old (Honda 1996), and the only dedicated translation of the *Ākṛtivāda* chapter is more than five decades old (Yamasaki 1967). In the ensuing time, these works, like the research on Kumārila's philosophy and Indian philosophy in general, have undergone deep transformations, and our understanding of Kumārila, his interlocutors, and his commentators has become much more refined. It is, therefore, high time for a new translation of the *Ākṛtivāda* that benefits from and reflects the progress in the field.

While I will elaborate more on the structure of the ŚV and the place of the *Ākṛtivāda* within Kumārila's work in the sections to follow, it is worth mentioning here that in the ŚV, Kumārila dedicates three consecutive chapters to the issue of universals: the *Ākṛtivāda*, *Apohavāda*, and *Vanavāda*. In the *Ākṛtivāda*, Kumārila focuses on proving the existence of

universals and expounding the relationship between universals and particulars. In the *Apohavāda*, Kumārila works to refute the theory of exclusion (*apohavāda*) proffered by the Buddhist *pramāṇa* tradition, an influential theory that is nominalist in nature and which, therefore, holds that universals do not really exist. Lastly, in the *Vanavāda*, Kumārila defends the reality and perceptibility of universals by addressing various objections to the Mīmāṃsā stance on the issue. Notably, in each of these chapters of the ŚV, Kumārila does not discuss the relationship between his conception of universals and crucial issues of the philosophy of language; that is, discourse on what constitutes the denotation of words. Instead, the discussion of these linguistic issues is limited to his *Tantravārttika*. Therefore, to have a complete understanding and assessment of Kumārila's theory of universals would require a thorough investigation of the three relevant chapters of the ŚV as well as the relevant sections in the TV—a task that is not only too ambitious for a doctoral project, but also practically unfeasible. This is the case because we lack satisfactory editions and annotated translations for all of these additional sources, except for the *Apohavāda*. It is my belief, however, that one has to start from somewhere. With that in mind, I envisage this thesis as part of an ongoing effort to produce a full account of Kumārila's theory of universals. I hope that this thesis, especially my new edition of the *Ākṛtivāda* and my annotated translation of it, serves as a stepping stone and encourages others to join the research effort.

In order to situate Kumārila's theory of universals in a historical context, I proceed by presenting an overview of Kumārila's works and his philosophical system, as well as an introduction to how the issue of universals is debated by Indian philosophers. These introductions will help us understand the place of Kumārila's arguments in the *Ākṛtivāda* in relation to the rest of his Mīmāṃsā system. They will also make clearer what interventions Kumārila's theory of universals makes to the discourse on universals in classical Indian philosophy.

1.2 Kumārila and his Mīmāṃsā Philosophy

As in the case of many other classical Indian philosophers, we unfortunately know next to nothing about Kumārila's life, except for some legends whose authenticity remains dubious. Establishing a historical picture of Kumārila's life as an intellectual thus primarily relies on understanding how his works are positioned within the Mīmāṃsā tradition and with respect to other classical Indian philosophers. While the date of Kumārila's life and works is still subject to debate and revision, a majority of scholars concur that the date of 600-660 CE approximately reflects Kumārila's active period. This is the date that was first assigned to Kumārila by Frauwallner (1961). We know that Kumārila commented on the entire *Śābarabhāṣya* with three works dedicated to different sections of the *Mīmāṃsāsūtra*, namely, the *Ślokavārttika* (on MS 1.1.1-1.1.32), the *Tantravārttika* (on MS 1.2.1-3.8.44), and the *Ṭupṭīkā* (on MS 4.1.1-12.4.47), and we also know that Kumārila must have composed a treatise called the *Bṛhaṭṭīkā* that is lost and only survived through fragments from quotations.[3] Within the Mīmāṃsā tradition, Śabara (c. 500-560 CE) is perhaps the most important intellectual figure before Kumārila. Although Kumārila's texts often disagrees with Śabara's interpretation of the MS, they do directly establish Śabara's work as the primary foundation of the Mīmāṃsā system. Another significant figure in Mīmāṃsā is Prabhākara (c. 620-680 CE), who establishes a different commentarial tradition on the *Śābarabhāṣya* around the

[3] Most scholars agree that the BṬ is a more mature work of Kumārila that covers similar topics to the ŚV. See Frauwallner (1962), Steinkellner (1997), Kellner (1997), Krasser (1999), and Kataoka (2011). One major dissenting opinion from this mainstream view comes from Franco (2018). Franco (2018: 132-137) argues that the ŚV is the more mature work of Kumārila based on the fact that all known Mīmāṃsā commentaries on Kumārila are on the ŚV rather than the BṬ. In addition, he argues that since there is little evidence showing that Dharmakīrti had substantial knowledge of the ŚV, Dharmakīrti's knowledge of the Kumārila-like positions (or, ŚV-like positions) must come from the BṬ. Franco contends that the best theory to make sense of the situation is that the BṬ is Kumārila's earlier work, and that Dharmakīrti is only familiar with this earlier work of Kumārila, rather than the ŚV. However, it is worth noting that the theory presented in Franco (2018) cannot explain the fact that many verses in the BṬ have an argument that is more refined than how the same topic is treated in the ŚV, as shown in Frauwallner (1962) and Kataoka (2011: I.27-46). While Franco (2018) asks a legitimate question as to why commentators of Kumārila choose to comment on the ŚV rather than the BṬ if the BṬ is the more matured work of Kumārila, it may be explained by postulating that since the BṬ is likely an incomplete treatise, the commentarial tradition has preferred to comment on a text that is complete.

same time that Kumārila does.[4] Outside of the Mīmāṃsā system, Bhartṛhari (c. sixth century CE) and his grammarian tradition is one important opponent for Kumārila when it comes to linguistic issues. However, much of Kumārila's epistemology is dedicated to defending Mīmāṃsā's system against Dignāga's (c. 480-540 CE) Buddhist philosophy, the arguments of which pose a significant challenge to many doctrines that are central to the Brahmanical orthodoxy.[5] Kumārila's extensive critique of Dignāga and of Buddhist philosophy in general prompts Dignāga's most famous intellectual successor, Dharmakīrti (c. seventh century), to take up the task of defending the Buddhist doctrines by launching a substantial attack on Kumārila's Mīmāṃsā system.[6]

1.2.1 The Place of the *Ākṛtivāda* in Kumārila's Philosophy

The structure of the ŚV follows the framework of the first *pāda* of the first *adhyāya* of the *Jaiminisūtra* that is commonly termed the Tarkapāda. The *Ākṛtivāda*, the main subject of this thesis, is located in the middle of Kumārila's commentary on the *Mīmāṃsāsūtra* 1.1.5 which declares that the relationship between a word and its meaning is natural. The following table lists the 25 chapters of the ŚV:

1. ŚV *Pratijñā* ad MS 1.1.1
2. ŚV *Codanā* ad MS 1.1.2
3. ŚV *Nimitta* ad MS 1.1.3

[4] For different scholarly opinions and hypotheses on the relation between Prabhākara and Kumārila, see Kataoka (2011: 15-20). There is a consensus that Prabhākara and Kumārila were contemporaries, but there is a debate with respect to which one is senior to the other.

[5] For the date of Dignāga, see Frauwallner (1962). Hattori (1961) assigns the date 470-530 CE to Dignāga. Recently, Deleanu (2019) has revised Dignāga's date to 430-500 CE.

[6] The date of Dharmakīrti (600-660 CE), assigned to by Frauwallner (1961), has been subject to heated debate for more than two decades. In particular, Krasser (2012a)'s novel proposal of placing Dharmakīrti at 550 CE based on evidence from the Bhāviveka, while accepted by some (Steinkellner 2013, Balcerowicz 2016), has only intensified the debate (Franco 2018, Eltschinger 2019, Deleanu 2019, Kataoka 2021). The most recent proposed dates of Dharmakīrti, e.g. 550-660 CE by Eltschinger (2019) and 570-640 CE by Deleanu (2019), are the result of attempts to reconcile the many extant opinions on the issue. Pending new evidence that is more decisive, I decide to follow the established convention that places Dharmakīrti in the beginning of the seventh century.

4. ŚV *Pratyakṣa* ad MS 1.1.4
5. ŚV *Autpattika* ad MS 1.1.5
    6. ŚV *Vṛttikāragrantha*
    7. ŚV *Nirālambana*
    8. ŚV *Śūnya*
    9. ŚV *Anumānna*
    10. ŚV *Śabda*
    11. ŚV *Upamāna*
    12. ŚV *Arthāpatti*
    13. ŚV *Abhāva*
    14. ŚV *Citrākṣepa*
    15. ŚV *Saṃbandhākṣepa*
    16. ŚV *Sphoṭa*
    17. ŚV *Ākṛti*
    18. ŚV *Apoha*
    19. ŚV *Vana*
    20. ŚV *Saṃbandhākṣepaparihāra*
    21. ŚV *Citrākṣepaparihāra*
    22. ŚV *Ātman*
23. ŚV *Śabdanityatā* ad MS 1.1.6-1.1.23
24. ŚV *Vākya* ad MS 1.1.24-1.1.26
25. ŚV *Vedanityatā* ad MS 1.1.27-1.1.32

As I have already mentioned in the last section, the *Ākṛtivāda*, the *Apohavāda*, and the *Vanavāda* constitute the three chapters in the ŚV in which Kumārila's theory of universals is the main topic. Kataoka (2014: 358-356) argues that Kumārila may have intended these three chapters to be read as a single section, since there are no non-*anuṣṭubh* verses—which Kumārila usually uses at the end of each of his chapters—between the *Ākṛtivāda* and the *Apohavāda*.[7] Nor is there one between the *Apohavāda* and the *Vanavāda*. Understanding the place of the *Ākṛtivāda* within the ŚV has two important implications. First, given that Kumārila provides his extensive critique of Dignāga's *apoha* theory in the chapter immediately succeeding the *Ākṛtivāda*, it makes sense that in the *Ākṛtivāda*, Kumārila never once mentions this rival theory that poses a significant challenge to his theory of universals.

[7] For instance, there is an *indravajrā* verse at the end of the *Sphoṭavāda* that immediately precedes the *Ākṛtivāda*, marking a clear division between chapters. Kumārila uses a *mālinī* verse at the end of the *Vanavāda*, which may suggest that he considers there as the end of the chapter on universals. See Kataoka (2014: 357).

Instead, as we will see in the following chapters, Kumārila is focused on presenting on an independent theory of universals in the *Ākṛtivāda* and only occasionally introduces views from opponents. Second, the fact that the *Ākṛtivāda* is a rather late chapter of the ŚV allows Kumārila to make use of many of his theories articulated in the earlier chapters of the ŚV without providing further proof for them.

The *Ākṛtivāda* is a relatively understudied chapter of the ŚV. Up to this point, Taber (2015) offers the most comprehensive account of Kumārila's theory of universals in the *Ākṛtivāda* with a neat, though sometimes discursive, summary and a convincing demonstration of its epistemological relevance. McCrea (2013) analyses some of Kumārila's arguments in the *Ākṛtivāda* to illustrate how Kumārila revolutionises Mīmāṃsā tenets. The analyses of Bhatt (1962) and Dravid (1972) provide some helpful knowledge for understanding Kumārila's writing in the *Ākṛtivāda*, but they do not contribute much detailed study of the text. Otherwise, D'Sa (1980) and Scharf (1996) explore Kumārila's theory of universals in the *Ākṛtivāda* from the angle of philosophy of language, and Harikai (1997) sheds light on the ontological issues surrounding the *Ākṛtivāda*.

1.2.2 Kumārila's Philosophy: Universals, Epistemology, and Religious Goals

While Kumārila declares at the beginning of the *Ākṛtivāda* that his main objective in the chapter is to prove the existence of universals, it is more appropriate to say that Kumārila not only aims to provide proof for the existence of universals, but also to explain what kind of ontological entity universals are. To prove that universals are real existences, Kumārila's strategy consists in demonstrating that universals can be directly perceived in our cognitions and in justifying that such cognitions are valid. On the other hand, Kumārila's ontological account of universals involves presenting his dual nature theory, which essentially holds that there is a certain level of identity between universals and particulars. To justify that

universals are indeed both different from and identical to particulars, Kumārila again resorts to his epistemological theories by arguing that these ontological attributes of universals are clearly extant because our perception presents them to us as such.

To see how Kumārila's theory of universals fits into his Mīmāṃsā system, it is necessary to first have an overview of the main positions and features of Kumārila's philosophy. When describing the characteristics of Kumārila's Mīmāṃsā philosophy, the adjectives frequently used by modern scholars are "orthodox", "empiricist", and "radical".[8] At first glance, it may seem paradoxical that a philosophical system can simultaneously hold these often contradictory attributes, but the Mīmāṃsā system to which Kumārila belongs is full of quirky counterintuitiveness from the very beginning. Mīmāṃsā, at its root, is a system that aims to provide a thorough hermeneutics of the Vedas and thus to uphold the authority of the Vedic scripture. However, in order to achieve that goal, Mīmāṃsā philosophers also tenaciously argue for a number of seemingly "anti-fideist" positions (Taber 1992: 205). For instance, Mīmāṃsā philosophers argue that the deities mentioned in rituals do not indicate the actual existence of the gods and that the mantras invoked during rituals do not really have magical powers. The names of deities and the recitation of mantras, instead of having a connection to something supernatural are viewed simply as mnemonic devices that help people memorise the ritual actions.[9] Thus, it is perhaps not an exaggeration to say that the Mīmāmsā philosophy is one of a kind in the classical world; combining a fervent defence of a scriptural authority with a categorical denial of theistic beings and supernatural powers is certainly unusual to say the least.[10]

[8] For the description of Kumārila's "orthodoxy", see Halbfass (1992), McCrea (2009) and Eltschinger (2012), although Eltschinger (2012: 7) prefers the term "orthopraxy" than "orthodoxy". For the description of "empiricist", see Taber (1992). For the description of "radical", see McCrea (2012).
[9] See Taber (1992), Clooney (1988), and Yoshimizu (2014).
[10] For an overview of the Mīmāṃsā system, see Jhā (1964), Clooney (1990), McCrea (2000), and Yoshimizu (2008).

Inheriting these Mīmāṃsā commitments, Kumārila's philosophy is also of seemingly contradictory spirits. Kumārila is an "orthodox" philosopher in the sense that he, as a Brahmin, is defending a philosophical system whose chief aim is to continue the Brahmanical tradition of upholding the authority of the Vedic scriptures. Specifically, Kumārila contends that the statements regarding *dharma* in the Vedic scripture are infallible because the eternal (*nitya*) and authorless (*apauruṣeya*) nature of the Vedas means that it cannot possibly contain any mistakes. That is to say, the primary religious goal of Kumārila's philosophy is, like his Mīmāṃsā predecessors, to defend the orthodoxy of the Vedic laws, customs, and ethics, as well as to argue that the Vedic scripture is the infallible source of religious knowledge. However, it is when we pay attention to how Kumārila proceeds to defend these "orthodox" propositions that the spirit of Kumārila's philosophy rapidly shifts into "empiricist". Instead of resorting to a creator deity or some convoluted ontological arguments to demonstrate that the Vedic scriptures—in fact, *only* the Vedic scriptures—are the reliable source for knowledge about transcendental religious matters such as *dharma*, Kumārila defends the authority of the Vedic scriptures in a decisively epistemological way. In particular, his account has a strong focus on defending a commonsensical account of ordinary perception. In order to do so, Kumārila firstly develops a sophisticated theory of intrinsic validity that holds that a cognition has innate validity unless and until it is overturned by any subsequent contradicting cognition. Situating his defence of the Vedic scriptures in this epistemological theory, Kumārila argues that since our cognitions of the Vedic statements are never found to be overturned by contradictory experience, the Vedic statements should be always taken as true and valid. Secondly, Kumārila stresses that perceptual experience is only concerned with objects that exist in the present.[11] Like his Mīmāṃsā predecessors, Kumārila contends that the defining characteristic of *dharma* is that it always refers to a future state of affairs, because

[11] For Kumārila's rejection of Yogic perception, see Taber (2005) and McCrea (2009).

dharma is concerned with the connection between present actions and future rewards. Given the nature of *dharma*, it is not possible to obtain knowledge about *dharma* through our ordinary perception. Thus, Kumārila argues that only the Vedic scriptures have access to transcendental matters like *dharma*.

The "empiricist" spirit of Kumārila's arguments is especially strong when we note Kumārila's strategy to discredit his religious opponents. Buddhists and Jains, in particular, deny the validity of Vedic scriptures and instead posit that an omniscient Buddha or Jina composed scriptures that are valid.[12] Kumārila's categorical rejection of the possibility that any human being can achieve omniscience or can be endowed with supernatural abilities such as yogic perception relies on his appeal to ordinary perception: we never see any omniscient beings or humans with supernatural powers now, therefore we should not assume that there were omniscient beings in the past. Even if Buddha or Jina were omniscient, ordinary people, who can only rely on ordinary perception, cannot verify whether these alleged omniscient human beings are telling the truth or not. When refuting the credibility of other religions, Kumārila's empiricist agenda even manages to turn one of the most difficult theses of Mīmāṃsā—that the Vedas are authorless—into an effective weapon to both undermine the authority of rival religions and bolster the authority of the Vedas at the same time. Kumārila argues that any statements made by human beings regarding transcendental religious matters are subject to doubt and errors, because human agency does not have access to transcendental issues. In fact, Kumārila goes as far as to say that human beings, in most cases, are liars.[13] Compared to human judgement that can only be a source of error for religious statements,

[12] For the issue of omniscience and religious authority among different traditions in classical India, see McClintock (2010: 38-42).

[13] Cf. ŚV *Codanā* 144:
sarvadā cāpi puruṣāḥ prāyeṇānṛtavādinaḥ |
yathādyatve na visrambhas tathā kālāntare 'py abhūt ||
"And, at any time, human beings are liars in most cases. Just as [we] do not have confidence [in the statements of people] today, in the same way, it was also the case in the past." (Based on Kataoka 2011a: II. 379-380).

Vedic scriptures have infallible validity precisely because they were not composed by persons.

We have seen that the empiricist arguments of Kumārila are closely associated with his orthodox religious goals, that is, that the authorless Vedas are the only reliable source for the knowledge of *dharma*. However, there are also aspects of his work that have led him to be called "radical". In particular, Kumārila often pushes the boundaries of previously existing Mīmāṃsā thought and commits his philosophical system to new propositions regarding issues that Mīmāṃsakas before him are silent about. One of the most noteworthy examples is that when Kumārila defends the position that there is a fixed and natural relationship between word and its meaning—which is central to his argument for the eternality and authorlessness of the Vedas—he launches an extensive critique of various soteriological issues ranging from the existence of a creator god to the cycle of worlds. By pushing his own premises as far as possible, Kumārila's line of argument eventually leads him not only to a complete denial of a creator god but also to the rejection of the cycle of destruction and recreation of the world. McCrea's (2012: 121) remark on Kumārila's arguments in the *Sambandhākṣepaparihāra* puts it well: "There are many adjectives that might be applied to this rather extraordinary document, but it seems to me that 'orthodox' is not really among them". Indeed, these "radical" propositions that Kumārila pursues in his Mīmāṃsā system often clash with the accepted philosophical or spiritual principles that are widely held by advocates of other traditions, defenders of the Vedic authority and opponents of that authority alike.

While cognitive dissonance can often occur when recognising Kumārila's role as a staunch defender of the Vedas—in which regard applying the label "Brahmanical orthodox" seems appropriate—and recognising Kumārila's unusually empiricist and even radical philosophical propositions in the ŚV—which in isolation lead one to think that there is nothing "orthodox" about Kumārilar—ultimately, one should keep in mind that Kumārila is

an innovative philosopher with different faces. So, where does Kumārila's theory of universals situate itself among these different philosophical complexions of Kumārila? In my view, Kumārila's theory of universals in the *Ākṛtivāda* sits squarely at the junction of all three dimensions of Kumārila's philosophy just discussed. It is "orthodox", because Kumārila's strenuous efforts to prove the existence of universals are concerned with upholding the authority of the Vedas. For Kumārila and his Mīmāṃsā system, universals are the denotations of words. The meanings of the Vedic statements are true and not subject to change because there is a natural and eternal relationship between words and their meanings, which is viewed as a fact ensured by the permanent (*nitya*) nature of universals. Kumārila's theory of universals is also "empiricist", because Kumārila put significant emphasis on the role of perception and justification when arguing for both the existence of universals and the ontology of universals. Many of Kumārila's arguments boil down to his conviction that a justified perceptual experience is the ultimate judge for what is real and unreal, and for what is contradictory or not contradictory. Finally, Kumārila's theory of universals is also "radical", especially when it comes to his proposal on the ontology of universals, namely, his dual nature theory that claims that universals are both different from and identical to particulars. Kumārila's dual nature theory offers a position that is almost universally opposed in Indian philosophy. When we read Kumārila's theory of universals in the *Ākṛtivāda* throughout this thesis, it is important to remember these different spirits that Kumārila's philosophy embodies.

1.3 The Problem of Universals in Indian Philosophy

We have seen how the issue of universals fits into Kumārila's broader system as well as how it relates to his Mīmāṃsaka commitments. Now, we will have a look at how the problem of universals is debated in Indian philosophy before the time of Kumārila. In

particular, we will examine how the pioneering Buddhist philosopher Dignāga changes the landscape of the problem of universals. As we will see, the problem of universals is traditionally situated at the junction of linguistics, ontology, and epistemology in Indian philosophy. In the linguistic context, the centre of the debate is concerned with whether universals or particulars should be understood as the denotation of words, that is to say, whether the meaning of a word should refer to a universal or an individual object. In the ontological context, we find discussions of how one should understand universals as a distinct ontological category. Finally, the epistemological context of the problem of universals is concerned with how we have access to knowledge about universals. In what follows, I will show that Dignāga's revolutionary *apoha* theory brings about drastic challenges to how the problem of universals is addressed with respect to all three philosophical foci. This will provide a historical context for Kumārila's theory of universals and help us understand what is at stake for Kumārila to articulate his theory of universals in the ways that he does, since Kumārila's theory of universals is a direct Brahmanical response to Dignāga's challenge.

Before we review the problem of universals, it is important to clarify the terminology used by different Indian philosophers when it comes to universals. Among the proponents of universals, the terms *sāmānya* ("universal"), *jāti* ("universal", "class", "genus"), and *ākṛti* ("configuration", "universal") are found to often be used interchangeably. Usually, there is only a marginal difference between the terms *sāmānya* and *jāti*; the choice of words seems to be largely due to preferred style. In the Vaiśeṣika literature, the preferred term is always *sāmānya*. While the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* only uses the term *sāmānya* to denote universals as one of the six ontological categories, it is *jāti* that features prominently in the relevant discussion in the *Nyāyasūtra*, despite a very similar understanding of universals in the early Vaiśeṣika and Nyāya literature.[14] In early Nyāya literature and Vyākaraṇa accounts such as Patañjali's, *ākṛti*

[14] As observed by Halfbass (1993: 121), later Vaiśeṣika authors sometimes draw a distinction between *sāmānya* and *jāti* by arguing that the former denotes all universals whereas the latter only denotes real universals. That is to say, the word *sāmānya* includes both *jāti* (real universals) and *upādhi* (adjunct property). For instance,

is defined as a mark (*liṅga*) of a universal (Halbfass 1993: 121), whereas it has received little attention in the early Vaiśeṣika literature. By contrast, Mīmāṃsakas use the term *ākṛti* as a synonym of *sāmānya* and *jāti* and argue that all of these terms refer to the universals themselves.

With the issue of terminology made clearer, we shall start with discussing the linguistic context of universals in more detail. It is customary to review the issue of the denotations of words in Indian philosophy by beginning from Patañjali's (c. second century BCE) discussion of whether "configuration" (*ākṛti*) or "substance" (*dravya*) should be the meaning of words in his *Mahābhāṣya*, a commentary on Pāṇini's grammar of classical Sanskrit. As argued by Scharf (1992, 1996), Patañjali's usage of the word *ākṛti* has at least two senses: first in the sense of a form (*saṃsthāna*) of things, and in the second sense, a class property (*jāti*) that is in contrast to concrete particulars. After discussing different alternatives, Patañjali eventually concludes that words must denote both *ākṛti* and *dravya*, depending on the context (Scharf 1996: 88). In a similar vein, Nyāya philosophers argue that the meaning of a word comprises three components: individual (*vyakti*), universal (*jāti*), and configuration (*ākṛti*).[15] In different circumstances, one of these components will be prioritised as the dominant one, while others stay subordinate. In contrast to these dialectic approaches, the Mīmāṃsā position in the MS is that words denote only universals (*ākṛti*). This is expounded by both Śabara and Kumārila. Despite the difference in the solution offered to the problem of the denotations of words, the similarity underlying the approaches of different Brahmanical traditions is that they all wish to establish a fixed relation between words and their meanings. If words do not have a stable connection to something like a universal that is eternal and permanent, it is difficult to maintain that the meaning of words would not undergo

substancehood (*dravyatva*) is a real universal, whereas cook-ness (*pācakatva*) is only an imposed property, i.e. *upādhi*. Such a specific usage of the words *sāmānya* and *jāti*, however, is not found in either Vaiśeṣika or Nyāya literature that were composed before Kumārila's time.

[15] Cf. NS 2.2.68: *vyaktyākṛtijātayas tu padārthāḥ*. Details on the Nyāya position can be found in Dasti (2017, 2020).

constant changes. For Mīmāṃsakas, this is a particularly urgent issue. While Kumārila decides not to discuss the issue of word-meaning relation in the *Ākṛtivāda*, it is easy to understand the reason why Kumārila takes defending the existence of universals as a priority: the Mīmāṃsā tenet that words denote universals only is closely associated with another essential Mīmāṃsā doctrine that the relationship between word and its meaning is natural (*autpattika*) and permanent (*nitya*). These theories are then used by Mīmāṃsakas to demonstrate how a scripture without an author is linguistically possible and that the meanings of Vedic statements cannot be altered by human conventions.

Against this backdrop, Dignāga's *apoha* theory presents a serious challenge to how the Brahmanical philosophers debate the issue of word-meaning relation.[16] Dignāga argues that general terms that are applied to things that share commonality do not refer to real universals. Rather, general terms are applied to things in a negative way by referring to an exclusion of other things that are not similar to the things in question. That is to say, the word "cow" does not refer to a universal "cow-ness"; rather, it refers to an exclusion (*apoha*), i.e. negation, of things that are not cows. One of Dignāga's famous arguments in support of his *apoha* theory is that all of the realist theories of word-meaning relation cannot satisfactorily account for the linguistic phenomenon of coreferentiality (*sāmānādhikaraṇya*), namely, how two expressions with different meanings can be applied to the same thing at the same time. The problem of coreferentiality lies in the difficulty of explaining how two well-defined general terms, for example, "existing" and "pot", can be used together in one and the same expression "an existing pot", given that the denotation of the word "existing", i.e. existence, and the denotation of "pot", i.e. potness, do not have overlaps. Dignāga contends that no matter whether a realist philosopher holds that a general term refers to a universal (*jāti*), a

[16] Hattori (1968), Hayes (1988), and Kataoka (2022) offer a good overview of Dignāga's system. For Dignāga's *apoha* theory, see Hattori (1980), Siderits (1985), Katsura (1991), Pind (2015), Taber and Kataoka (2017), and Kataoka (2020). For a summary of the key development of the *apoha* theory after Dignāga and Dharmakīrti, see McCrea and Patil (2006) and McCrea and Patil (2010).

relationship (*sambandha*) of universals, or a thing in possession of a universal (*tadvat*), they cannot overcome the problem caused by coreferentiality. On the other hand, Dignāga argues that his own *apoha* theory can easily solve the issue of coreferentiality, because exclusions are essentially a negation, i.e. an absence (*abhāva*). Since exclusions are ontologically not substantial, it is easy for one expression to have two exclusions combined together.

This aspect of Dignāga's *apoha* theory illustrates that his theory is not only a fundamental challenge to how the philosophy of language is viewed within the Brahmanical philosophical circle, but is also an affront to how the ontology of universals is discussed. According to Dignāga, only unique particulars (*svalakṣaṇa*) are ultimately real; any linguistic terms, concepts, and labels are merely constructs in our mind—this includes universals (*sāmānyalakṣaṇa*).[17] This represents a serious challenge to the ontology of universals in Brahmanical philosophy. The most elaborate ontological conceptualisation of universals in Brahmanical philosophy comes from the Vaiśeṣika system. The primary claim held by Vaiśeṣikas, which is supported by allied Naiyāyikas, is that all entities can be listed and classified within a certain six principle categories (*padārtha*), and this list of categories is supposed to be complete and hence exhaustive. These six fundamental categories, according to *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* and Praśastapāda's *Padārthadharmasaṅgrah* which gives it its authority in the Vaiśeṣika commentarial tradition, are substance (*dravya*), property (*guṇa*), motion (*karman*), universal (*sāmānya*), particularity (*viśeṣa*), and inherence (*samavāya*). According to the Vaiśeṣika system, universals account for how recurring properties can reside in numerically different individual entities (Halbfass 1993: 71). Universals are also understood to be in a hierarchical order. Substancehood (*dravyatva*) is a higher universal than animality

[17] According to Pind (2015: 1, n.1), although Dignāga never gives an explicit definition of *sāmānyalakṣaṇa*, we can infer that Dignāga takes *sāmānyalakṣaṇa* as equivalent to generic properties (*sāmānya*). Pind argues that in the PSV I.2, Dignāga is taking *sāmānyalakṣaṇa* as comparable to generic properties such as colourness (*varṇatva*) and impermanence (*anityatā*). PSV I.2: *svasāmānyalakṣaṇābhyāṃ hy avyapadeśyavarṇatvābhyāṃ varṇādi gṛhītvānityatayā cānityaṃ varṇādīti manasā saṃdhatte*. "For having apprehended a colour and so on through its individual and general characters, i.e., through what is not denotable and colourness, [respectively], as well as through [the general property] impermanence, one combines [the two] at the thought: 'Colour, and so on, is impermanent.'"

(*paśutva*), which in turn is a higher universal than cow-ness (*gotva*), according to the principle that a higher universal is more inclusive than the lower universal (Matilal 1991: 380). The highest universal is existence (*sattā*) insofar as it is a universal that occurs in every existent thing, i.e. in all substances, properties, and motions. The relationship between particulars and universals is held to be by means of inherence (*samavāya*), in a manner that is different from any other type of connection, as inherence is supposed to be eternal and indestructible. While Kumārila's Mīmāṃsā system is often critical of Vaiśeṣika's ontology, Kumārila's ontology of universals directly inherits the ontological framework laid down by Vaiśeṣika to a large extent. Ultimately, as representatives of realist philosophical traditions within the Brahmanical circle, Vaiśeṣika, Nyāya, and Mīmāṃsā philosophers all share a common interest in defending the reality of universals, i.e. the thesis that a universal is a self-substantially independent ontological category rather than a secondary superimposition. Dignāga's *apoha* theory in the sixth century CE thus posed the biggest philosophical threat to date to the standard Brahmanical understanding of the ontology of universals.

Furthermore, it is important to note that Dignāga's *apoha* theory not only offers novel solutions to the problem of universals with respect to both the philosophy of language and ontology, it also provides an innovative epistemological framework for dealing with the problem of universals. At the beginning of the PS(V), Dignāga states that there are two types of objects, in correspondence with two types of means of knowledge: particulars (*svalakṣaṇa*), which are the objects of perception (*pratyakṣa*), and universals (*sāmānyalakṣaṇa*), which are the objects of inference (*anumāna*). Dignāga then moves on to define perception as that which is devoid of conceptualisation (*kalpanāpoḍha*). Conceptualisation, as Dignāga argues, is a process that has association with names, universals, etc (*nāmajātyādiyojanā*). Dignāga's framework effectively transforms the discussion of the reality of universals into a debate about the nature of perception and

therefore the nature of the foundation of our knowledge system. According to Dignāga, universals are only mental constructs, not real entities, precisely because they are not the objects of perception. In other words, universals are not real, because we are not able to have access to the knowledge of universals with the most fundamental means of knowledge, perception. This aspect of Dignāga's *apoha* theory was such a challenge to the pre-existing Brahmanical manner of thinking about universals that it brought about an epistemological turn in Sanskrit philosophy. This means Sanskrit philosophers after Dignāga from all traditions were increasingly aware of the necessity to formulate their own theory of knowledge, as well as to reformulate old ontological questions into epistemological issues (McCrea and Patil 2010, McCrea 2013).

As mentioned in the first section of this chapter, one of the central arguments in this thesis is that Kumārila is one of the first philosophers from the Brahmanical circles to realise the urgency of proposing a defence of the reality of universals that is situated in an epistemological context. The epistemological dimension of Dignāga's *apoha* theory shows that it is no longer sufficient only to debate about what qualities universals have—including the question of whether or not universals exist. To counter Dignāga's philosophy, one is expected to articulate how we actually *know* universals have the characteristics that one claims they have, which is exactly what Kumārila aims to achieve with his arguments in the *Ākṛtivāda*. To view Kumārila's innovation in context, we can consider how two other important Brahmanical philosophers deal with the issue of universals, namely, Kumārila's Mīmāṃsā predecessor, Śabara (c. 500-560), and Kumārila's senior contemporary, Uddyotakara (c. 540-600), a Naiyāyika who also attempts to resolve the challenge of Dignāga's revolutionary *apoha* theory. In the *Śābarabhāṣya*, Śabara does not provide much proof for the existence of universals; his writing indicates that he is taking the existence of universals as granted because they are directly perceptible. In the *Nyāyavārttika*, while

Uddyotakara provides a substantial critique of Dignāga's *apoha* theory in terms of the issue of the denotations of words, he does not elaborate on how we know that universals really exist objectively other than providing a few lines of simple arguments supporting the claim that universals are perceptible.[18] Brahmanical philosophers who wrote before Kumārila but after Dignāga's challenges still tended to focus on the ontological and linguistic aspects of the topic, while devoting few arguments to explaining why one should accept the reality of universals from an epistemological perspective. The theory of universals in the *Ākṛtivāda*, therefore, represents a powerful response to Dignāga's rejection of the reality of universals in the PS(V), arguably the very first one.

To summarise the context in which Kumārila composed his theory of universals: among the three philosophical fields that the problem of universals is rooted in—philosophy of language, ontology, and epistemology—it is the latter two fields that Kumārila's theory of universals in the *Ākṛtivāda* is primarily concerned with. While Kumārila disagrees with some aspects of the Vaiśeṣika-Nyāya ontology of universals and instead presents his own unique understanding of universals in the *Ākṛtivāda*, Kumārila's main agenda in the *Ākṛtivāda* is to provide a robust defence of the reality of universals—a thesis that is shared by many Brahmanical philosophical traditions—against the challenges posed by Dignāga. The defining innovation of Kumārila's theory of universals, which lies in his epistemological framework for universals, should be understood as both influenced by Dignāga's epistemology and as a response to Dignāga's epistemology.

1.4 Methodology: How to Study Classical Indian Philosophy?

Having presented the historical context in which Kumārila's theory of universals is produced, I would like to now discuss how I approach the study of the main subject of this

[18] For a summary of Uddyotakara's critique of the *apoha* theory, see Taber (2021: 180-193).

thesis, i.e. the *Ākṛtivāda*. As explained, my study of the *Ākṛtivāda* consists of two main components: on the one hand, I work on an annotated translation of the *Ākṛtivāda* based on an improved edition of the text; on the other hand, I work to critically analyse the arguments in the *Ākṛtivāda* with an emphasis on later critics' reception of Kumārila's theory. This thesis is guided by the principle that any interpretive studies of classical Indian philosophical theories, including any philosophical engagement from a contemporary philosophical point of view, should be based on a solid philological foundation that consists of a satisfactory edition of the text and an annotated translation that is close to the original text. The structure of the thesis—which places my chapters providing the edition and annotated translation before my interpretative chapters, rather than at the end of the thesis—already reflects this methodological stance.

My approach to the *Ākṛtivāda* reflects the two movements in the study of Indian philosophy that have become prominent in the last two decades: the movement towards focusing on the original text, and the movement towards reconciling philological methodologies with philosophical ones. The first movement, represented by scholarship such as McCrea and Patil (2010), Kataoka (2011), Eltschinger et al. (2012), Eltschinger et al. (2018), McAllister (2019), and Kataoka and Taber (2021), calls for focusing on understanding the original text when studying Indian philosophy, thereby emphasising historical context, instead of reusing the arguments of Indian philosophers in the service of producing a contemporary philosophical theory.[19] The second movement calls for bridging

[19] This means that some research on Indian philosophy "concerns less the actual theories of Indian authors than reconstruction of them by inventive modern scholars" (Kataoka and Taber 2021: xiv). Eltschinger et al. (2018: 6) present a strong argument to illustrate the importance of studying primary texts: "One need only pose these questions in order to realise how a serious student of philosophy, eager to encounter one of the greatest thinkers in the history of philosophy, would answer them. Do not give me a copy or simulacrum, she will say - something already processed and digested by you. Give me something in plain English, as close to the original as possible, and I will figure it out! This, after all, is what philosophers and serious students of philosophy demand for the most difficult figures of the Western canon - Aristotle, Kant, Hegel, Heidegger - whose writings require intense study in order to yield up their secrets. That is to say, we demand translations of their writings (if we do not command the languages of the originals) which reflect what they thought accurately enough, in particular, which bring out the nuances and subtleties of their thought with sufficient clarity, so that those translations themselves may serve as materials as exegesis, analysis, and interpretation. Why should we demand

the traditional gap between philological research and interpretive research into Indian philosophy. As demonstrated by works such as Taber (2005), Eltschinger et al. (2018), and Kataoka and Taber (2021), there is no intrinsic barrier between providing a scientific annotated translation of the text that can satisfy the scrutiny of Indological specialists and offering a philosophically lucid interpretation of the text that is accessible to a general philosophy audience that is non-specialist.

My work in this thesis follows the spirit of these two movements. The annotated translation of the *Ākṛtivāda* presented in Chapter 3 is a good example of how I work to balance different approaches to the study of Indian philosophy. My decision to present the annotated translation before any interpretative research reflects my goal of presenting a full picture of Kumārila's original arguments without any fragmentation. When translating the often elliptical text of the *Ākṛtivāda*, I translate the verses as literally as possible with the use of square brackets to meet the requirement of producing a philologically accurate translation. This approach to translation inevitably means that non-specialists will sometimes have difficulty following the text in English. However, to compensate for that, each verse, or each unit of verses, is followed by my commentary that provides a plain and clear explanation of what Kumārila says in the preceding text.

As shown in the sections above, Kumārila's theory of universals in the *Ākṛtivāda* carries huge historical significance in Indian philosophy, but it has received relatively little scholarly attention. In this regard, the fate of the ideas in the *Ākṛtivāda* is that of many other historically important and interesting Indian philosophical theories that routinely escape the attention of Indologists because of poor text conditions and escape the attention of comparative philosophers because of the lack of access to a reliable translation. Another common feature underlying these understudied Indian philosophical theories is that these

anything less when it comes to an Indian philosopher? And why should we expect the translation of a profound and difficult work of Indian philosophy to be immediately more accessible than Aristotle's *Metaphysics* or Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*?"

theories tend to have less relevance to contemporary philosophical debate.[20] For example, the main aspects of Kumārila's conception of universals are completely outside of the mainstream contemporary philosophical consensus on universals. For example, the following is an excerpt from a contemporary analytical philosopher's discussion on the way that abstract universals and concrete entities can be distinguished: "Abstract entities are supposed to lack observational, causal, and spatio-temporal properties, i.e. they are (i) in principle imperceptible, (ii) incapable of causal interaction, and (iii) not located in space-time" (Szabó 2005: 17-18). As we will see, Kumārila argues that universals are real existences precisely because they are perceptible, can have causal effects, and are only located in concrete particulars that occupy space-time. It is thus unfortunate that many Indian philosophical theories like Kumārila's theory of universals are neglected because they do not seem to fit within the microscope through which contemporary philosophers look for inspirations.[21] While scholars sometimes attempt to address this problem by exploring the contemporary philosophical relevance of neglected Indian theories, I believe that such an approach is missing the important point that Indian philosophy has the right to be studied in its own terms. It has its own complex history that needs to be appreciated, if its theories are going to be understood well. Moreover, Indian philosophy did not exist just waiting for its relevant truth to be discovered and be made useful for comparative philosophers.

It should be acknowledged that the method of comparative philosophy is still inevitable when it comes to the study of classical Indian philosophy, as expressed by Matilal

[20] Sometimes, concentrated scholarly interest in a certain philosophical topic can emerge even if there is a lack of the access to the basic textual resources, so long as the Indian theory in question can demonstrate a strong relevance to contemporary philosophy. For example, this has happened with the Buddhist *apoha* theory. Many philosophical reconstructions of the development of the *apoha* theory from Dignāga to Dharmakīrti were attempted even when Dignāga's PS(V) 5 was only accessible through a poor-quality Tibetan translation, before Pind (2015) provided a restoration of the original Sanskrit text. Cf. Kataoka and Taber (2021: vii): "The theory of exclusion (*Apohavāda*) has long been an object of fascination for philosophers and Indologists despite—perhaps even because of it—lack of access to the most important sources for understanding it. This is not the only time in the field of Indian philosophy when inadequate knowledge of the primary sources has bestowed an aura of mystery upon an, in principle, readily intelligible idea."

[21] See Panaccio (2012) for a similar sentiment.

(1971: 12): "I believe that anyone who wants to explain and translate systematically from Indian philosophical writings into a European language will, knowingly or unknowingly, be using the method of comparative philosophy". Such a claim indicates that since the process of translating a Sanskrit text would require the translator to understand the precise denotations of Western philosophical terms and to properly assign them to the corresponding concepts in Sanskrit, it is unavoidable that the translations would be conditioned by translator's understanding of the pertinent philosophical problems in a comparative way.[22] The challenge of translation becomes even more complicated when one notes that philosophical phrases and idioms are rarely immune to changes, within classical India and within the Western community; rather, their connotations vary considerably depending on the climate of the thoughts, on the era of the thinkers, and sometimes on personal style. To address this issue, I discuss in detail in Chapter 3 how I weigh the various competing demands when translating difficult Sanskrit philosophical terms.

These different methodological concerns—philology, philosophical analysis, and to some extent comparative philosophy—will thus underlie the study of the *Ākṛtivāda* in this thesis.

1.5 Chapter Summary

The remainder of this thesis consists of five chapters. Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 present a new edition of the *Ākṛtivāda* and an annotated translation of the *Ākṛtivāda*, respectively. Chapter 4, Chapter 5, and Chapter 6 present interpretative research on Kumārila's theory of universals, with each chapter showcasing how Buddhist, Jaina, and Vedānta philosophers engage with Kumārila's theory of universals, respectively.

[22] Thus, the method of comparative philosophy is employed in this thesis in its minimal sense, i.e. the editorial decisions behind using readily available Western philosophical terminologies to translate Sanskrit philosophical terms or using available Western philosophical concepts to describe corresponding Sanskrit concepts. For an alternative account of comparative philosophy, see Patil (2009: 3-24).

In Chapter 2, I present a new edition of the *Ākṛtivāda* chapter of the ŚV. It provides an analysis of the qualities of the existing published editions of the *Ākṛtivāda* to demonstrate the urgent need for a new, reliable edition of the text. By consulting four published editions and five manuscripts, and especially the testimony of Sucaritamiśra's *Kāśikā* regarding the *Ākṛtivāda* chapter (which has previously been unavailable in print), I am able to significantly improve the quality of the text of the *Ākṛtivāda*. This new edition lays a solid foundation for a more accurate annotated translation of the *Ākṛtivāda* and analytical study of Kumārila's philosophy. In Chapter 2, I also present a first edition of Sucaritamiśra's *Kāśikā* that has never been published previously.

Chapter 3 offers an annotated translation of the *Ākṛtivāda* chapter. My translation of Kumārila's verses is accompanied by a running commentary that helps readers better understand the often dense and elliptical arguments that Kumārila makes. My comments that concern more technical details, such as the challenges of translating difficult phrases and the extant reporting disagreements between commentators, are allocated to the footnotes to promote a smoother experience when reading the translation. My annotations have consulted the commentaries of Bhaṭṭa Jayamiśra (date unknown), Sucaritamiśra (c. 950 CE), and Pārthasārathimiśra (c. 1075 CE).

Chapter 4 consists of a detailed analysis of the main features of Kumārila's epistemological arguments for the existence of universals in the *Ākṛtivāda* and their connections to Kumārila's wider philosophical system. It aims to show how Kumārila's epistemological theories expounded in other chapters of ŚV serve as the foundation for his theory of universals in the *Ākṛtivāda*. By situating Kumārila's theory of universals in the context of an interreligious debate with the Buddhist logico-epistemological school of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti, this chapter argues that Kumārila's theory of universals in the

Ākṛtivāda is a motivating factor for Dharmakīrti to revise and improve his account of the cognition of commonness.

Chapter 5 turns to Kumārila's unique ontological understanding of universals, i.e. his dual nature theory that universals are both different from and identical to particulars. This chapter contextualises the dual nature theory within Kumārila's Mīmāṃsā system and argues that the strength of his dual nature theory lies in Kumārila's epistemological arguments for universals. This chapter also aims to shed light on the extent to which Kumārila's dual nature theory shares affinity with Jaina ontology—a common perception that is shared by both classical Indian philosophers and contemporary scholars. By supplementing existing analysis with readings of often neglected Jaina authors, namely Prabhācandra and Vādirājasūri, this chapter seeks to overcome contemporary scholars' over-reliance on Buddhist testimonies on this issue and to present a more thorough investigation of the relationship between Kumārila's dual nature theory and Jaina understandings of universals.

Kumārila's innovations in his theory of universals attracted much criticism in the ensuing centuries. Chapter 6 focuses on providing a detailed analysis of Maṇḍanamiśra's influential critique of Kumārila's dual nature theory in the *Brahmasiddhi*. I challenge the current consensus on Maṇḍanamiśra's critique of Kumārila's dual nature theory—that Maṇḍana distorts Kumārila's theory to such an extent that Maṇḍana's refutations in the *Brahmasiddhi* are trivial and uninteresting. This chapter argues that Maṇḍana rather accurately captures the core of Kumārila's theory of universals, and therefore, it is not appropriate to dismiss Maṇḍana's portrayal of Kumārila in the BSi as a distortion or mere philosophical gambit. This chapter also highlights the benefits of studying the *Ākṛtivāda* independently. A detailed study of Kumārila's theory of universals offers a reference point from which we can assess other Indian philosophers' reception of Kumārila's theories.

Chapter 2: A New Edition of the *Ākṛtivāda* Chapter of the *Ślokavārttika* and a First Edition of the *Ākṛtivāda* Chapter of the *Ślokavārttikakāśikā*

2.1 Introduction: The Need for a New Edition

The text of the *Ākṛtivāda* chapter of the ŚV is available in four published editions: the Pandit edition (1878, hereinafter E_P), the Chowkhamba edition by Tailaṅga Rāmaśāstrī (1898, E_C), the Madras edition by C. Kunhan Raja (1946, E_M), and the Varanasi edition by Swāmī Dvārikadāsa (1978, E_D). Despite the wide circulation of the text of the ŚV via these editions, the text-critical studies of the ŚV are unfortunately still in their infancy. As I have mentioned in the introduction chapter of this thesis, the quality of the published editions of the *Ākṛtivāda* is less than optimal. In particular, one cannot produce a reliable annotated translation of the text based on these editions alone. In this chapter, I present a new edition of the *Ākṛtivāda* that seeks to overcome the flaws of the existing editions by reconciling the numerous variant readings among them with the help of manuscripts. This edition serves a foundation for my translation and analysis of the *Ākṛtivāda* in the rest of my thesis.

To justify producing a new edition of a text that has been published so many times, I point to two main problems that exist in the published editions of the *Ākṛtivāda*. The first problem is that most of them do not indicate their textual sources. That is to say, most editors did not provide information as to what manuscripts and what other editions they consulted when producing their edition. They also either do not report variant readings of manuscripts or do so sporadically in a rather inconsistent manner. These factors mean that there is significant difficulty in ascertaining the value of the editions' adopted readings, especially when one edition contradicts another. As Kataoka (2011: I.xxv-xxxvii) has convincingly demonstrated based on his study of the *Codanāsūtra* of the ŚV, in the case of E_P, E_C , and E_D,

the editors of later editions tend to consult earlier editions uncritically. He noted how this results in a clear line of mistakes being passed on from edition to edition, in addition to the new mistakes that were created by each editor. An analysis of the readings of the *Ākṛtivāda* from these three editions, which I will present in the following section of this chapter, corroborates Kataoka's (2011) finding that the testimonial value of these three editions can be more or less reduced to one testimony.

The second problem with the existing editions lies in the fact that there exists considerable difference between the editions of E_P, E_C, and E_D on the one hand and E_M on the other hand. Among the 76 and half verses of the *Ākṛtivāda*, E_M reports 40 variant readings that are different from the shared readings adopted by E_P, E_C, and E_D. Compounded by the problem that E_P, E_C, and E_D provide little to no information about their textual sources, it is often impossible to reconcile the difference between these two recensions without the help of further manuscript evidence. The reason why E_M is such an outlier from the other published editions is that the ŚV verses published in $E_M$come from the only surviving manuscript of Jayamiśra's *Śarkarikā* that includes the full verses of the ŚV. While E_P, E_C, and E_D either do not report which manuscripts they rely on or simply did not consult any manuscripts independently, one can deduce that the manuscripts consulted by those editions must be different from the *Śarkarikā* manuscript used by E_M, since E_M reports distinct readings that cannot be found in the other published editions. In turn, this implies that the *Ākṛtivāda* verses recorded in Jayamiśra's commentary amount to a very different recension compared to the *Ākṛtivāda* verses found elsewhere.

Due to the varying quality of the published editions and the various differences found among them, it has been a scholarly custom, especially among specialists on Mīmāṃsā, to consult at least two published editions when quoting the ŚV. However, this is less the case among general Indologists and scholars specialising in other Indian philosophical traditions,

and E_D remains to be the most generally popular edition due to its more widespread availability. As I will demonstrate in the next section, the quality of E_D is, in fact, the worst among all the published editions, thus relying on this single edition for reference can cause various problems for studying Indian philosophy.

Moreover, even if one aims for a more accurate text by laboriously comparing the different published editions whenever a disagreement emerges, the quality of the editions may mean that that labour is in vain. There is no guarantee that one can necessarily reach the best conclusion in terms of weighing variant readings against each other without the support of manuscript evidence. For instance, when Taber (2015: 259) translates *Ākṛtivāda* 3, he compares E_M and E_D, and he prefers the reading of *prāha* from the E_M to the reading of *prāhur* from E_D.[23] Judging from the context itself, Taber's choice of reading is sensible and philologically sound. The third person singular would make Kumārila's predecessor Śabara be the subject of the sentence, and it is indeed Śabara's view that universals are just called as *ākṛti*. However, if one turns to the testimonies of manuscripts, it becomes clear that the majority of the manuscripts, in fact, have the reading *prāhur*. This example highlights the limitation of exercising philological judgement based only on contextual evidence, but that judgement is also the only criterion one can rely on when one only has different published editions the readings of which to compare.

To remedy the current situation, I think it is justified and, in fact, highly desirable that a new edition of the *Ākṛtivāda* be produced. My current edition aims to produce a more accurate text of the *Ākṛtivāda* by taking into consideration the four published editions, as well as five manuscripts. It hopes to offer a reliable and unified edition that can be used by other scholars in the future when studying or quoting the *Ākṛtivāda* without the absolute need to compare individual editions case by case.

[23] Cf. *Ākṛtivāda* 3:
jātim evākṛtiṃ prāhur vyaktir ākriyate yayā |
sāmānyaṃ tac ca piṇḍānām ekabuddhinibandhanam || 3

2.2 Previous Editions of the *Ākṛtivāda* Chapter of the *Ślokavārttika*

Before presenting my new edition, it is necessary to examine the value of the previously published editions of the *Ākṛtivāda*. This is especially important since most of these editions do not provide their textual sources, i.e. the editors did not make it clear whether they consulted other published editions, or how many manuscripts they consulted. In what follows, I present the results of my investigation of the relationship between the four published editions.

E_P (1878)

E_P is the earliest published edition of the *Ākṛtivāda*. Unlike the editions of other ŚV chapters published in *The Pandit (New Series)*, the edition of the *Ākṛtivāda* does not report any variant readings. It is unclear, therefore, whether the editor checked more than one manuscript. Several mistakes found in E_P correspond with mistakes only found in my manuscript N (8ab, 25d, 37d, 45a, 56a), but there are also mistakes in E_P that cannot be found in manuscript N (13a, 43b, 44b, 71ab, 74c) and a mistake that can also be found in other manuscripts (49a). Based on this limited textual evidence, it cannot be ascertained whether E_P consulted manuscript N. The only certain thing about E_P is that since it is the earliest published edition, the source of its readings can only be from manuscripts rather than from other published editions. Unfortunately, though, there is no manuscript information reported by E_P.

E_C (1898)

Analysing E_C's edition of the ŚV chapter, the *Codanāsūtra*, Kataoka (2011: I.xxviii) finds that E_C inherits mistakes from the earlier edition E_P on 9 occasions and that there are 6

inferior readings shared by E_C and E_P that are not in the manuscripts that he consulted. With respect to the editions of the *Ākṛtivāda* provided, E_C inherits two mistakes from E_P that are not found in my manuscripts (41c, 66b). There are also 9 cases in which E_C and E_P share inferior readings that are found in my manuscripts (7b, 52d, 54b, 58b, 65cd, 68d, 70b, 70c, 71b) and there is one case in which E_C and E_P share an inferior reading that cannot be found in my manuscripts (36b). This corroborates Katatoka's suggestion that E_C consulted E_P in addition to an unknown number of manuscripts. E_C differs from E_P on 18 occasions (6a, 8a, 12d, 13a, 23c, 25d, 36c, 37d, 42b, 44b, 45a, 49a, 56a, 58c, 69b, 71ab, 73a, 74c). Sometimes E_C improves upon E_P by adopting a better reading (8a, 13a, 23c, 25d, 69b) or by correcting its mistakes (37d, 44b, 45a, 49a, 56a, 71ab, 74c). In other cases, however, E_C either adopts the inferior readings instead (6a) or creates new mistakes (12d, 36c, 42b, 58c, 73a). However, E_C only reports its readings that are different from E_P in the footnotes under 6a, 37d, 69b. Other than in those three occasions, it is difficult to determine whether the editor of E_C changed the reading of E_P based on some manuscript evidence that he did not report, or out of his personal discretion.

E_M (1946)

E_M is the only edition that provides us with information about its textual sources. The editor C. Kunhan Raja explains in the preface that the ŚV verses in his edition are from a single manuscript of Jayamiśra's commentary, the *Śarkarikā*. The same manuscript also contains Umbeka's *Tātparyaṭīkā* that was published in the same series as E_M. According to the testimony of the editor, it is clear that the original manuscript contains all the words of the ŚV verses rather than just the *pratīkas*.[24] Therefore, the ŚV verses recorded in E_M have unique testimonial value.

[24] See C. Kunhan Raja (1946: ii): "The text and the commentary are now presented here exactly as they appear in the manuscript, where the text is taken up only for such portion as forms an idea-unit and then that portion is commented on. In this way, the text and the commentary appear interspersed."

There is another valuable feature about E_M that is often neglected by scholars working on the ŚV. In the introduction of the edition, Kunhan Raja noted that the initial edition was prepared by him based on a transcript that he had obtained of a manuscript, rather than based on consulting the manuscript directly. However, when he managed to check the manuscript personally in the library, he realised that the transcript available to him earlier, in fact, had a number of mistakes, and he was unable to correct these mistakes as the edition was already in print. As a result, Kunhan Raja decided to report all the differences between the transcript and the manuscript in the appendix of the edition. This testimony from Kunhan Raja effectively means that the reading in the appendix should always be preferred whenever there is a difference between the text in the edition and the notes in the appendix. The reading in the appendix is the original manuscript reading and is unmediated by the transcript.

Altogether, there are 40 cases in which the adopted reading in E_M is different from the readings found in E_P, E_C, and E_D (1d, 3a, 3b, 5d, 7b, 12c, 16c, 20c, 23c, 28a, 29b, 29d, 30b, 32d, 33c, 36b, 39c, 41c, 43c, 44d, 46a, 50d, 51d, 52c, 52d, 54b, 57d, 58b, 59b, 61b, 62a, 65cd, 66b, 68d, 69cd, 70b, 70c, 71b, 73b, 76f). On 15 occasions, E_M has adopted better readings than the readings shared by E_P, E_C, and E_D (1d, 3a, 7b, 36b, 41c, 52d, 54b, 58b, 59b, 65cd, 66b, 68d, 70b, 71b, 76f). In most of these cases, the readings from E_M concur with the readings from the majority of my manuscripts (36b, 52d, 54b, 58b, 59b, 65cd, 66b, 68d, 71b). Thus, the independent value of the manuscript consulted by E_M cannot be emphasised enough.

E_D (1978)

E_D is currently the most popular edition of the *Ākṛtivāda* due to its wide availability, but it is, unfortunately, also the most problematic edition available. E_D not only inherits the

ill-guided overcorrection done by the editor of E_C; it also introduces new mistakes by overcorrecting the text that cannot be supported by manuscript evidence.

The case that E_D has consulted E_C is rather straightforward, since the editor himself declares that his edition is mainly based on E_C. However, E_D has relied heavily on E_C. E_D has simply copied all the 20 footnotes found in E_C (6a, 13a, 18b, 21a, 29d, 36b, 37d, 42b, 46b, 47a, 51d, 52d, 54b, 54d, 58b, 59b, 69b, 70b, 71a, 71b). There are only two other footnotes in the *Ākṛtivāda* section of E_D (12d, 51d) that are not in E_C. The footnote under 12d, which has an abbreviation of *mu. pā.* (*mudritapustakapāṭhaḥ*), reports a reading of *vācyaśakti* that can only be found in E_C among all the published editions. The footnote under 51d with the same abbreviation reports a reading that is shared by all other published editions, including E_C. Hence it is difficult to establish whether the editor of E_D has consulted any other published editions other than E_C for the *Ākṛtivāda*.

In 36c, 42b, and 73a, E_D seems to simply copy the mistakes of E_C without consulting any new materials. The readings adopted by E_C in 36c, 42b, and 73a cannot be found in any of my manuscripts, and they are most likely a result of the editor mistakenly modifying the texts he consulted in pursuit of correcting the text. For example, in the case of 36c, the accepted reading of *animittāpi* in my edition seems beyond dispute. The editor of E_P correctly follows the reading of *animittāpi* that is found in all my manuscripts as well as in E_M. The case for adopting *animittāpi* is especially strong as it is additionally supported by the *pratīka* in Sucarita's commentary.[25] It seems that the editor of E_C makes a personal conjecture to change *animittāpi* to *animitte 'pi*. An educated guess here is that the editor thought that changing the phrase to *animitte 'pi* would make it correspond to the locative phrase *keṣu cid* in 36b, without realising that the phrase is actually supposed to modify *buddhir* in 36d. This

[25] Cf. ŚVKāś ad *Ākṛti* 35-36: ***animittāpīti*** *svabhāvātiriktanimittāntaraśūnyāpīty arthaḥ*.

overcorrection is taken for granted by the editor of E_D without checking any manuscripts and thus appears again in his edition.

On the other hand, a prominent example of how E_D introduces new mistakes by overcorrecting the text itself can be found in 51d. In this verse, all the other published editions and all my manuscripts share the adopted reading of *kiṃ cit tenaupacārikam*. The editor of E_D reports in the footnote that the reading of *kiṃ cit tenaupacārikam* is found in other published editions, before changing the text to *varaṃ tenaupacārikam*. Presumably, this happens because the editor wants to correct the *mūla* text to *varaṃ* so that it is in accordance with how Pārthasārathi interprets the sentence (ŚVNR 559,15-16: *varaṃ pūrvoktau bhrāntyupacārāv evāśritāv iti*). Perhaps unbeknownst to the editor, this sentence of Pārthasārathi is likely a reproduction of a sentence in Sucarita's commentary (ŚVKāś ad *Ākṛti* 51-52: *pūrvoktau bhrāntyupacāravādāv eva varam āśritau*). In any case, there is no evidence suggesting that the use of the word *varaṃ* is not simply a gloss by the commentators. It is not advisable to change the *mūla* text to *varaṃ* when all my manuscripts of ŚV unanimously support the reading of *kiṃ cit*.

Based on this analysis, I conclude that E_D does not have much independent testimonial value, since it derives most of its value from E_C, only with new mistakes.

Conclusion

The result of my analysis of the published editions of the *Ākṛtivāda* corroborates Kataoka (2011)'s finding on the relationship between different ŚV editions based on the *Codanāsūtra* chapter. That is, E_C relies heavily on the earliest edition E_P, and E_D in turn relies heavily on E_C. It is highly likely that the editor of E_D did not consult any manuscripts when preparing E_D. While the editor of E_C probably consulted an unknown number of manuscripts, in most cases he simply copies the mistakes of E_P, similar to what Kataoka (2011) has found

in the *Codanāsūtra* chapter of E_C. Given this situation, the testimonial value of E_P, E_C, and E_D can be largely reduced to the testimonial value of the earliest edition, E_P. On the other hand, E_M has valuable testimonies that are independent of other published editions, a fact that is often underappreciated in the scholarship.

2.3 The Present Edition

Having analysed in detail the quality of the published editions, I hope I have demonstrated the urgency for a new, reliable edition of the *Ākṛtivāda*. In order to reconcile the numerous variant readings between E_M on the one hand and E_P, E_C, and E_D on the other hand, it is necessary to consult manuscripts. Therefore, to edit the *Ākṛtivāda* chapter of the *Ślokavārttika*, in addition to consulting the four published editions, I have collated the following five manuscripts:

Manuscript B_1 and B_2

These two manuscripts are preserved in the Bodleian Libraries, Oxford. Their catalogue numbers in the *Catalogi Codicum Manuscriptorum, Bibliothecae Bodleianae. Pars Octava, Codices Sanskritiocos* by T. Aufrecht are No. 520 and No. 532, respectively. They are also designated with the shelfmarks Ms. Wilson 325 and Ms. Wilson 277a, respectively.

Manuscript B_1 is written in Devanāgarī script on Indian paper, with 111 folios of size 30 cm × 9.5 cm. This manuscript has both the ŚV text and the text of the *Tantravārttika*, but only the ŚV text is complete. According to Aufrecht's catalogue, the date of the manuscript B_1 is estimated to be around 1530 CE. Manuscript B_1 has been bound into a book, but it is unfortunately not bound in the correct order.

Manuscript B_2 is also written in Devanāgarī script on Indian paper, with 38 folios of size 33 cm × 9 cm. Manuscript B_2 comprises only the text of ŚV, but it is incomplete. In

Aufrecht's catalogue, Manuscript B_2 is supposed to contain 118 folios, but the manuscript currently available at the Bodleian Libraries only comprises 38 folios in total. It is unclear whether the figure of 118 folios was a typo in the catalogue or whether some folios have been lost since the catalogue was prepared. The date of manuscript B_2 is estimated to be in the sixteenth century CE.

Manuscript I_1 and I_2

These two manuscripts belong to the India Office collection that is kept at the British Library, London. Both are recorded in the *Catalogue of the Sanskrit and Prakrit Manuscripts in the Library of the India Office* by A. B. Keith, in which they have the catalogue numbers 7976 and 2149, respectively. They also have selfmarks I.O. 3739 and I.O. 1449b, respectively. Manuscript I_1 is written in Devanāgarī script on European paper, with 89 folios of size 21.5 cm × 17.5 cm. It is bound in book form. On the last folio of the manuscript, the date 1857 CE is written. The ŚV text in this manuscript is complete. Although A. B. Keith notes in the catalogue that the copy of the *Ākṛtivāda* contained in the manuscript "is not very correct", this is mistaken. The readings of the *Ākṛtivāda* in Manuscript I_1 are actually of high quality.

Manuscript I_2 is also written in Devanāgarī script on European paper. It comprises 139 folios of size 24 cm × 8 cm. It has not been dated in the catalogue. The ŚV text in this manuscript is also complete.

Manuscript N

This manuscript, which is preserved in the National Archives, Kathmandu, was microfilmed by the Nepal-German Manuscript Preservation Project (NGMPP). The numeric identifier for the manuscript in the Nepalese German Manuscript Cataloguing Project

(NGMCP) is 67389, and its microfilm number is B 43/11. The description of the manuscript given in the scanned catalogue card is so faded that it is essentially illegible. The NGMCP website, however, provides some basic information about the manuscript: it is written in Devanāgarī script on paper, with 108 folios of size 32 cm × 10 cm. The manuscript only contains the verses of the ŚV, and it is complete.

The importance of consulting manuscripts for the *Ākṛtivāda* chapter can be demonstrated by the fact that there are three occasions in which the better, adopted readings in my edition are found in my manuscripts but are not reported in any of the four published editions (13a, 56a, 70c). See, for instance, the following case in the *Ākṛtivāda* 56ab:

***kena cic cātmanaikatvaṃ nānātvaṃ cāsya kena cit* |**

kena cic cātmanaikatvaṃ] I_1I_2 ; *kena cid dhy ātmanaikatvaṃ* E_{CD} ; *kena cit tvātmanaikatvaṃ* E_M ; *kena cid vyātmanaikatvaṃ* E_PN ; *kina cidvyātmanaikatvaṃ* B_2 ; *kena ci(jñā?) ++katvaṃ* B_1

In this case, the reading *vyātmanaikatvaṃ* adopted by E_P is clearly a mistake. One can conjecture that the editor of E_C modified the reading from E_P to *kena cid dhy ātmanaikatvaṃ*, which was then copied by the editor of E_D. Although the reading from E_C and E_D would make sense grammatically, this reading cannot be found in any of my manuscripts. Instead, the reading of *kena cic cātmanaikatvaṃ* from I_1 and I_2 emerge to be the best reading, especially since this is how this verse is quoted by Karṇakagomin in the *Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛttiṭīkā*.

Another important feature of the present edition lies in my ability to consider the testimony of Sucaritamiśra's *Kāśikā*. While the full text of the *Kāśikā* is available in manuscripts, its *Ākṛtivāda* chapter has never been published. In a few cases (1d, 7b, 49a, 70b,

70c, 76f), the testimony of the *Kāśikā* shows that my adopted readings are the better ones, even if they are present in a minority of the available manuscripts. The reason why Sucarita's *Kāśikā* can often offer decisive evidence is twofold.

Firstly, among the three commentators on the *Ākṛtivāda* chapter, Sucarita offers the most elaborate and extensive commentary on Kumārila's verses. Compared to Pārthasārathimiśra, who is often too concise and simple for us to gather much information as to how he understands Kumārila's verse, Sucarita tends to explain the verses in greater detail, and is therefore often able to offer valuable insight into the readings of ŚV. The following case in the *Ākṛtivāda* 76ef can illustrate how the *Kāśikā* helps adopt a better minority reading:

***tena nātyantabhinno 'rthaḥ sārūpyam iti varṇitam* || 76cd**

***granthe vindhyanivāsena bhrāntaiḥ sādṛśyam ucyate* || 76ef**

76f. *bhrāntaiḥ*] $E_M I_2$; *bhrānteḥ* $E_{CDP} B_1 B_2 I_1 N$

In the *Ākṛtivāda* 76f, three of the published editions have the reading of *bhrānteḥ*, as do four of my manuscripts. On the other hand, E_M has the reading of *bhrāntaiḥ*, which is supported by Jayamiśra's commentary (ŚVŚar 23,9-10: *bhrāntais tu tadīyam abhiprāyam ajānānair anyādṛśam eva tad vyākhyātaṃ ity āha*). Pārthasārathi's rather concise commentary on this verse does not offer us any information as to what reading of verse 76f he presupposed. However, Sucarita's commentary makes it clear that he shares the same understanding with Jayamiśra (ŚVKāś ad *Ākṛt* 76cd-76efi: *tadgranthas tu yathāvad ajānānais sādṛśyaṃ sāmānyam iti kalpitam ity āha—teneti*). This helps us determine that *bhrāntaiḥ* is the better reading, and this is only one of several cases in which Sucarita's insightful commentary illuminates the readings.

Secondly, Sucarita's *Kāśikā* often serves as a tie-breaker, so to speak, when Jayamiśra's readings differ from those of Pārthasārathi. Consider the following example:

***tadanyeṣu hi gobuddhir na syād asadṛśeṣv api* |**

***dṛśyate sā na cānyat te gorūpaṃ tatra vidyate* || 70**

70b. *syād asadṛśeṣv api*] $E_M B_2$; *syāt susadṛśeṣv api* $E_{CDP} I_2 N$; *syāt susadṛśeṣv ipi* B_1 ; *syād visadṛśeṣv api* $I_1 E_C^{var}$

In *Ākṛtivāda* 70b, all the editions except for E_M adopt the reading *susadṛśeṣv api*. Their decisions to adopt this reading are likely influenced by Pārthasārathi's gloss (ŚVNR 564,10-11: *tato 'nye ye śābaleyena susadṛśāḥ piṇḍāḥ teṣv abhrāntānāṃ yathā śābaleyabuddhir nāsti*). In E_M, Jayamiśra's gloss confirms that he understands the ŚV verse to contain *asadṛśeṣv* (ŚVŚar 21,16-17: *ataḥ śābaleyavilakṣaṇeṣu gobuddhir nirālambanaiva te prāpnoti*). Without consulting Sucarita's commentary, it is difficult to decide which reading one should follow when Pārthasārathi and Jayamiśra disagree. Fortunately, in this case, Sucarita provides a straightforward gloss that indicates that he presupposes the reading *asadṛśeṣv* (ŚVKāś ad *Ākṛti* 69-70: *api cāstu tāvat sadṛśeṣu gobuddhiḥ. asadṛśeṣu gobuddhau nibandhanaṃ vaktavyam*). Taking into consideration Sucarita's testimony, together with manuscript evidence, it is clear that *asadṛśeṣv* is a better reading for *Ākṛtivāda* 70b.

2.4 Conventions in the Present Edition

The present edition has consulted the following four published editions and five manuscripts. The published editions are represented by the symbol E with a corresponding subscript letter (e.g. E_P), while the manuscripts are represented by a letter with a subscript number (e.g. B_1):

E_P *The Pandit (New Series)*, Vol.III, 1878, pp.453-459

E_C *The Mīmāṃsā-Śloka-vārtika of Kumārila Bhatta with the Commentary Called Nyāyaratnākara by Pārtha Sārathi Miśra*. Ed. Rāma Śāstrī Tailaṅga, Benares: Chowkhambā Sanskrit Book-Depot, printed by Freeman and Co., Ltd., 1898

E_M *Ślokavārttikaṭīkā (Śarkarikā) of Bhaṭṭa Jayamiśra*. Ed. C. Kunhan Raja, Madras: University of Madras, 1946

E_D *Ślokavārttika of Śrī Kumārila Bhaṭṭa: with the Commentary Nyāyaratnākara of Śrī Pārthasārathi Miśra*. Ed. Swami Dwarikadas Shastri, Vārāṇasī: Tārā Pablikeśansa, 1978

B_1 A manuscript preserved in the Bodleian Library, Oxford, Ms. Wilson 325 (Catalogue No. 520), Devanāgarī script, Paper, 30 cm × 9.5 cm, 111 folios.

B_2 A manuscript preserved in the Bodleian Library, Oxford, Ms. Wilson 277a (Catalogue No. 521), Devanāgarī script, Paper, 33 cm × 9 cm, 38 folios.

I_1 A manuscript preserved in the British Library, London, I.O. 3739 (Catalogue No. 7976), Devanāgarī script, Paper, 21.5 cm × 17.5 cm, 89 folios.

I_2 A manuscript preserved in the British Library, London, I.O. 1449b (Catalogue No. 2149), Devanāgarī script, Paper, 24 cm × 8 cm, 139 folios.

N A manuscript preserved in the National Archives Kathmandu, Kathmandu, NGMCP: B 43/11 (Old Record 67389), Devanāgarī script, Paper, 32 cm × 10 cm, 108 folios.

In this edition, each page has three layers. The first layer, which is at the top, contains the edited text. The second layer contains quoted passages, parallel passages, internal cross-reference within the *Ślokavārttika*, and testimonies from the commentaries. The third layer contains the critical apparatus for variant readings. The accepted reading is preceded by

the verse number and *pāda* number, and is followed by a lemma sign ( ]). The lemma sign is then followed by the siglum of the editions and/or manuscripts that contain the accepted reading. Variant readings will then be reported, followed by the siglum of the editions and/or manuscripts that contain the variant readings. Semicolons are used to separate the variant readings.

I take some discrepancies between the editions and manuscripts as non-substantive variants and therefore do not note them as variant readings in this edition. These include the substitution of a nasal with *anusvāra*, any additional *anusvāra* before homorganic nasals, the non-application of *sandhi*, and simple orthographic variants such as the gemination and degemination of consonants.

The following is a list of the conventions and abbreviations used in this edition:

ac Readings before correction (*ante correctionem*), e.g. B_1^{ac}.

pc Readings after correction (*post correctionem*), e.g. B_1^{pc}.

E Published editions in contrast to manuscripts, e.g. E_C refers to the Chowkhambā edition.

note In the case of E_M, the editor prepared his edition based on a transcript; he was only able to check the manuscripts after he finished the edition, and he reported the original manuscript readings in notes at the end of the book, e.g. E_M^{note}.

var The variant readings reported by E_C and E_D in their footnotes, e.g. E_C^{var}.

\+ Lacuna. The number of this mark approximately corresponds to the number of missing letters, e.g. ++ refers to two missing letters.

– (Especially in Manuscript N) The mark that is intentionally left by the scriber to indicate a missing letter.

° This symbol is used when only one part of the word in question is being compared with variant readings, e.g. when only the *vyakti* part of *vyaktimātrakam* has variant readings, *vyakti*° will be used.

(X?) The letter in the bracket with a question mark is not read from the manuscripts with certainty, e.g. *(jñā?)*.

(unmetrical) The variant reading is unmetrical.

2.5 Sanskrit Text of the *Ākṛtivāda* Chapter of the *Ślokavārttika*

***ākṛtivyatirikte 'rthe sambandho nityatāsya ca* |**
***na sidhyetām iti jñātvā tadvācyatvam iheṣyate* || 1**
***tatsadbhāvaprasiddhyartham atra tāvat prayatyate* |**
***vācyatve vakṣyate yuktir vyaktyā saha balābale* || 2**
***jātim evākṛtiṃ prāhur vyaktir ākriyate yayā* |**
***sāmānyaṃ tac ca piṇḍānām ekabuddhinibandhanam* || 3**
***tannimittaṃ ca yat kiñ cit sāmānyaṃ śabdagocaram* |**
***sarva evecchatīty evam avirodho 'tra vādinām* || 4**

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1. Cf. *Śābarabhāṣya* ad MS 1.1.5: *atha gaur ity asya śabdasya ko 'rthaḥ. sāsnādiviśiṣṭākṛtir iti brūmaḥ.* and *Śābarabhāṣya* ad MS 1.3.33: *ākṛtiḥ śabdārthaḥ. kutaḥ. kriyārthatvāt.*
1d. ***iheṣyate***] ŚVKāś ad *Ākṛti* 1: *tadartharūpacintāpi ihaiva pradeśe yuktetīheṣyata ity uktam iti.*
2c. Cf. *Tantravārttika* A 308 4-14: *ākṛter abhidheyatvapratijñā kevalā kṛtā | tatredānīṃ sahetutvaṃ tasyā evābhidhīyate || yathā cākṛtir ityādau bhāṣyakāreṇa coditam | punar asyāḥ pratijñāyā hetur apy abhidhāsyate || yad voktas tatra sadbhāvaḥ śabdārthatvam ihocyate | yā tu śabdārthatā proktā seha siddhā na cintitā || ukte vāpy abhidheyatve jāteḥ sadbhāvasiddhaye | vyaktir vācyā na vety etad agatārthaṃ vicāryate || etac cintāprasiddhyartham idaṃ tāvad vicāryate | śabdārthau laukikau vede kim anyāv iti saṃśayaḥ ||*
3a. Cf. *Śābarabhāṣya* ad MS 1.3.30: *kim ākṛtiḥ śabdārtho 'tha vyaktir iti. kā punar ākṛtiḥ, kā vyaktir iti. dravyaguṇakarmaṇāṃ sāmānyamātram ākṛtiḥ.*
3. Quoted in *Nyāyamañjarī* II 47.13-14

1a. *ākṛti*°] $E_{CDMP}B_1B_2I_1I_2$; *ākṛta*° N
1c. *jñātvā*] $E_{CDMP}B_1I_1I_2N$; *jñātitvā* B_2 (unmetrical)
1d. *tadvācyatvam*] $E_{CDMP}B_2I_1N$; *tatadvācyatvam* B_1 (unmetrical) ; *tadvācyamiti* I_2
1d. *iheṣyate*] B_2E_M *note* ; *ihocyate* $E_{CDMP}B_1I_1I_2N$
2c. *vakṣyate*] $E_{CDMP}B_1I_1I_2N$; *ca kṛte* B_2 *vācyatve ca kṛte yukti* repeated just before 3a.
2d. *vyaktyā*] $E_{CDMP}B_1I_1I_2N$; *vyaktā* B_2
3a. *prāhur*] $E_{CDP}B_1B_2I_2N$; *prāha* E_MI_1
3b. *vyaktir ākriyate*] $E_{CDMP}B_1I_1I_2N$; *vyaktivākriyate* B_2 ; *vyaktir ākriya¯* N
3b. *yayā*] $E_{CDP}B_1B_2I_1I_2N$; *'nayā* E_M
4b. *sāmānyaṃ*] $E_{CDMP}B_1{}^{pc}B_2I_1I_2$; *sāmānyaṃ vyakte* $B_1{}^{ac}$
4c. *evecchatīty evam*] $E_{CDMP}B_1B_2I_1I_2$; *evecchatī¯vam* N

sarvavastuṣu buddhiś ca vyāvṛttyanugamātmikā |
jāyate dvyātmakatvena vinā sā ca na sidhyati || 5
viśeṣamātradṛṣṭe ca na sāmānyamatir bhavet |
sāmānyamātrabodhe tu nirnimittā viśeṣadhīḥ || 6
na cāpy anyatarā bhrāntir upacāreṇa veṣyate |
dṛḍhatvāt sarvadā buddher bhrāntis tadbhrāntivādinām || 7
mukhyayoś cāpy adṛṣṭatvān nopacāreṇa kalpanā |
bāhyārthaviṣayatvaṃ ca buddhīnāṃ pratipāditam || 8
anyonyāpekṣitā nityaṃ syāt sāmānyaviśeṣayoḥ |
viśeṣāṇāṃ ca sāmānyaṃ te ca tasya bhavanti hi || 9

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5. Quoted in *Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛttiṭīkā* 115.15-16, *Nyāyamañjarī* II 8.4-5, Kataoka (2011b: 606, § 4.5.1)
5. Quoted in *Nyāyaviniścayavivaraṇa* II.46: *sarvavastuṣu buddhiś ca vyāvṛttyanugamātmikā | jāyate dvyātmakatvena vinā sāpi na yuktimat ||*
5. Cf. *Ślokavārttika Pratyakṣapariccheda* v. 118: *nirvikalpakabodhe 'pi dvyātmakasyāpi vastunaḥ | grahaṇaṃ lakṣaṇākhyeyaṃ jñātrā śuddhaṃ tu gṛhyate ||*
7. Quoted in *Nyāyamañjarī* II 8.8-9, Kataoka (2011b: 605, § 4.5.1)
7b. ***veṣyate***] ŚVŚar 2,24-25: *kiṃ tu anyataravādibhir anyatarasāmānyabhedavāsanānibandhanā bhrāntiḥ aupacārikī vety uktam* ; ŚVNR 547,11-12: *nanv ekasya sāmānyaviśeṣātmakatvavirodhād anyatararūpaṃ bhrāntam aupacārikaṃ vā.*
8cd. Cf. *Ślokavārttika Nirālambanavāda* v. 30cd: *pratijñādoṣam evāhuḥ kecit pratyakṣabādhanam ||* See also *Nirālambanavāda* v. 79cd-80ab: *bāhyārthālambanā buddhir iti saṃyak ca dhīr iyam | bādhakāpetabuddhitvād yathā svapnādibādhadhīḥ ||*

5b. °*anugamātmikā*] $E_{CDMP}B_1I_1I_2N$; °*anugamākāṃ* B_2
5c. *dvyātmakatvena*] $E_{CMP}B_1B_2I_1I_2N$; *dvyātmatvena* E_D ; *dvātmakatvena* $E_M{}^{note}$
5d. *vinā sā ca na*] $E_{CDP}B_1B_2I_1I_2N$; *vināsau ca na* E_M ; *vinā sādhana* B_2
6a. °*mātradṛṣṭe*] $E_PB_1B_2I_1NE_{CD}{}^{var}$; °*mātre dṛṣṭe* I_2 ; °*mātra iṣṭe* E_{CDM}
6c. *tu*] $E_{CDMP}B_1B_2I_2$; *ca* I_1 ; ¯ N
6d. *viśeṣadhīḥ*] $E_{CDMP}B_1B_2I_2{}^{pc}$, *viśeṣata*|| $I_2{}^{ac}$
7a. *cāpy anyatarā*] $E_{CDMP}B_1I_1N$; *cāpyuparata*° I_2 ; *cāpy anyatavārītir* B_2
7b. *veṣyate*] $E_MI_1B_1$; *ceṣyate* $E_{CDP}B_2I_2N$
7c. *buddher*] $E_{CDMP}B_1I_1I_2N$; *budher* B_2 ; *tadbhrānti*° $B_2{}^{pc}$ *tadbhrānti*° $B_2{}^{ac}$
7d. *bhrāntis tadbhrānti*°] $E_{CDMP}B_1B_2I_1I_2N$; *stad bhrānti* omitted $E_M{}^{note}$
8ab. *cāpy adṛṣṭatvān nopacāreṇa*] $E_{CDM}B_1I_1I_2$; *cātha drṣṭatvān nopa*° E_PN ; *cāpy adṛṣṭatvānnannopa*° B_2
8c. °*viṣayatvaṃ*] $E_{CDMP}B_1I_1I_2N$; *viviṣayatvaṃ* B_2
9c. *viṣeṣāṇāṃ*] $E_{CDMP}B_1I_1I_2N$; *viśeṣaṇāṃ* B_2

nirviśeṣaṃ na sāmānyaṃ bhavec chaśaviṣāṇavat |
***sāmānyarahitatvāc ca viśeṣās tadvad eva hi* || 10**
tadanātmakarūpeṇa hetū vācyāv imau punaḥ |
***tena nātyantabhedo 'pi syāt sāmānyaviśeṣayoḥ* || 11**
sāmānyabuddhiśaktatvaṃ viśeṣeṣv eva yo vadet |
***vinā vastvantarāt tena vācyā śaktis tu kīdṛśī* || 12**
grāhyā kiṃ vāpy asamvedyā bhinnaikā vā tathaiva ca |
***gṛhyate yadi saikā ca jātir evānyaśabdikā* || 13**
bhaven nirviṣayā buddhir yadi śaktir na gṛhyate |
***na hi sadbhāvamātreṇa viṣayaḥ kaś cid iṣyate* || 14**
parasparavibhinnatvād viśeṣā naikabuddhibhiḥ |
***gṛhyante viṣayāsattvāc chaktiś caiṣāṃ na vidyate* || 15**

10ab. Quoted in *Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛttiṭīkā* 295.28: *nirviśeṣaṃ na sāmānyaṃ bhavec chaśaviṣāṇavat*, and *Apohaprakaraṇam* 216.1: *nirviśeṣaṃ na sāmānyaṃ bhavet śaśaviṣāṇavat iti nyāyāt*.
11cd. Cf. *Ślokavārttika Pratyakṣapariccheda* v. 141cd: *sthitaṃ naiva hi jātyādeḥ paratvaṃ vyaktito hi naḥ* ||
12. Cf. *Nyāyamañjarī* II 38.13-14, Kataoka (2010: 184, § 3.4.1): *viśeṣātmana eva vastunaḥ sāmānyajñānajananaśaktiyuktatvāt kiṃ sāmānyakalpanayeti.*
13-15. Cf. *Nyāyamañjarī* II 39.3-5, Kataoka (2010: 183, § 3.4.2): *kā ceyam anuvṛttijñānotpādikā śaktiḥ. viśeṣebhyo 'vyatiriktāvyatiriktā vā nityānityā vā tadāśritā svatantrā vā pratyakṣā parokṣā* (*vā…parokṣā* missing in Mysore Edition) *veti vikalpyamānā vācoyuktyantareṇa jātir eva kathitā bhavati, na vā kiñcid iti yat kiñcid etat.*

10a. *na*] $E_{CDMP}B_1I_1I_2N$; *ca* B_2
10b. *chaśaviṣāṇavat*] $E_{CDMP}B_1B_2I_1I_2$; *chaśiviṣāṇavat* N
11c. *'pi*] $E_{CDMP}B_1B_2I_1N$; *hi* I_2
11c. *bhedo*] $E_{CDMP}B_1I_2I_1N$; *bhede* B_2
12a. *śaktatvaṃ*] $E_{CDMP}B_1I_1I_2N$; *śaktitvaṃ* B_2
12b. *yo*] $E_{CDMP}B_1B_2I_2N$; *yau* I_1
12c. *tena*] $E_{CDP}B_1B_2I_1I_2N$; *tana* E_M
12d. *vācyā śaktis*] $E_{DMP}B_1B_2I_1I_2$; *vācyaśaktis* $E_CNE_D^{var}$
13a. *vāpy asamvedyā*] $B_1B_2I_1I_2^{pc}E_{CD}^{var}$; *vāpy asambodhā* E_{CDM} ; *vātha samvedyā* N ; *vātha sambodhā* E_P ; *vā samvedyā* I_2^{ac} ;
13cd. *saikā ca*] $E_{CDMP}B_1I_1I_2N$; *saivānta* B_2 ; *caikā ca* E_M^{note}
13d. *jātir evānyaśabdikā*] $E_{CDMP}I_1B_2N$; *jātir ekānyaśaktatā* I_2 ; *jātir evānyaśabditā* B_1^{pc} *jātir evānyaśaktatā* B_1^{ac} ; *jātir evānyaśabditā* E_M^{note}
14a. *bhaven*] $E_{CDMP}B_1B_2I_2N$; *naven* I_1
15b. *naika*] $E_{CDMP}B_1B_2I_1I_2$; *neka* N

bhinnatve vāpi śaktīnām ekabuddhir na labhyate **|**
viśeṣaśaktyabhede ca tāvanmātramatir bhavet **|| 16**
bhinnā viśeṣaśaktibhyaḥ sarvatrānugatāpi ca **|**
pratyekaṃ samavetā ca tasmāj jātir apīṣyatām **|| 17**
tenātmadharmo bhedānām ekadhīviṣayo 'sti naḥ **|**
sāmānyam ākṛtir jātiḥ śaktir vā so 'bhidhīyatām **|| 18**
nanu bhinne 'pi sattādau sāmānyam iti jāyate **|**
buddhir vināpi sāmānyād anyasmāt sā kathaṃ bhavet **|| 19**
vanopanyāsatulyo 'yam upanyāsaḥ kṛtas tvayā **|**
bhrāntitvena hi naitasyā bhrāntir gotvādidhīr api **|| 20**

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19. Cf. *Nyāyamañjarī* II 39.11-12, Kataoka (2010: 182, § 3.4.4): *nanu cānuvṛttibuddhiḥ vinā 'pi sāmānyāntareṇa sāmānyeṣu* (*sāmānyāntareṣu* Mysore Edition) *dṛśyata eveti ko 'tra visraṃbhaḥ.*
20. Cf. *Nyāyamañjarī* II 39.13-15, Kataoka (2010: 182-181, § 3.4.4): *yadi hi senāvanādipratyayāḥ karituragadhavakhadirādivyatiriktam artham anapekṣya jāyamānā mithyā bhavanti, kim etāvatā ghaṭādi pratyayair api mithyā bhavitavyam.*

16a. *bhinnatve*] $E_{CDMP}B_1B_2I_1I_2^{pc}N$; *bhinnatvai* I_2^{ac}
16a. *śaktīnām*] $E_{CDMP}B_1^{pc}B_2I_1I_2$; cancelled and unreadable before °*nām* B_1^{ac}
16c. °*śaktyabhede ca*] $E_{CDP}B_1I_1N$; °*śaktibhede ca* E_M ; °*śaktyābhede ca* I_2 ; °*śaktibhedāt tu* B_2
16d. °*mātramatir*] $E_{CDP}B_1B_2I_1I_2N$; °*mātragatir* E_M ; °*mātramatir* E_M^{note}
17a. *śaktibhyaḥ*] $E_{CDMP}B_1^{pc}B_2I_1I_2N$; *bhaktibhyaḥ* B_1^{ac}
17b. *anugatāpi*] $E_{CDMP}B_1B_2I_1I_2$; *anumatāpi* N
17d. *jātir apīṣyatām*] $E_{CDMP}B_1I_1I_2N$; *jātiḥ parīkṣatāṃ* B_2
18a. *tenātmadharmo*] $E_{CDMP}B_1I_1I_2N$; *tenātmabhedodhārmo* B_2 (unmetrical)
18b. *ekadhīviṣayo 'sti naḥ*] $E_{CDMP}B_1I_1I_2N$; *moṣadhīr viṣayo janaḥ* B_2 ; *ekadhīviṣayo 'sti yaḥ* I_1 ; *ekadhīviṣayo 'sti va* E_C^{var} ; *ekadhīviṣayo 'sti vā* E_D^{var} ; *ekaviṣayo 'sti naḥ* E_M^{note} (unmetrical)
18d. *so 'bhidhīyatām*] $E_{CDMP}B_1B_2I_1N$; *sābhidhīyatām* I_2 ; *sābhidhīyatām* E_M^{note}
19a. *nanu*] $E_{CDMP}B_1B_2I_1I_2$; *manu* N
19ab. *sattādau*] $E_{CDMP}B_1I_1I_2N$; *sattvādau* B_2
19cd. *sāmānyād anyasmāt sā*] $E_{CDMP}B_1B_2I_1N$; *sāmānyāt asmānyat sā* I_2
20a. *vano°*] $E_{CDMP}B_1B_2I_1I_2$; *yeno°* N
20a. °*nyāsatulyo*] $E_{CDMP}B_1B_2I_1I_2^{pc}N$; °*nyātulyo* I_2^{ac}
20b. *kṛtas tvayā*] $E_{CDMP}B_2I_1I_2N$; *kṛtaḥs tvayā* B_1
20c. *bhrāntitvena*] $E_{CDP}B_1B_2I_1I_2N$; *bhrāntatve na* E_M
20c. *naitasyā*] $E_{CDMP}B_1I_1I_2N$; *naitasyār* B_2

śabdāt pūrvaṃ hi sarveṣu gavādāv iva naikadhīḥ |
***vastutvaṃ cātra sāmānyaṃ dharmaṃ ke cit pracakṣate* || 21**
evaṃ tu kalpyamāne syāt sāmānyānām anantatā |
***punas tena sahānyeṣu sāmānyamatir asti hi* || 22**
viśeṣeṣv api vastutvāt sāmānyam iti dhīr bhavet |
***sattādiṣv iva tenaitat sāmānyaṃ nopapadyate* || 23**
tasmād ekasya bhinneṣu yā vṛttis tannibandhanaḥ |
***sāmānyaśabdaḥ sattādāv ekadhīkaraṇena vā* || 24**
piṇḍeṣv eva ca sāmānyam nāntarā gṛhyate yataḥ |
***na hy ākāśavad icchanti sāmānyaṃ nāma kiñ cana* || 25**

21ab. Cf. *Nyāyamañjarī* II 40.1-2, Kataoka 2010: 181, § 3.4.4: *tatra sattādau sāmānyāntaravirahān mithyā pratyayā upādhinā kenacit pravartate, na tv evaṃ gavādāv iti yat kiñcid etat.*
24. Quoted in *Nyāyamañjarī* II 40.4-5, Kataoka 2010: 181, § 3.4.4, *Nyāyaviniścayavivaraṇa* II.77, and *Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛttiṭīkā* 299.18-19
25. Quoted in *Nyāyaviniścayavivaraṇa* II.38, II.62, II.77
25. Quoted in *Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛttiṭīkā* 301.4-5: *piṇḍeṣv eva ca sāmānyam nāntarā gṛhyate yataḥ | na hy ākāśavad icchanti sāmānyaṃ nāma ke cana ||*

21a. *pūrvaṃ*] $E_{CMP}B_1I_1I_2N$; *pūvaṃ* E_DB_2
21a. *sarveṣu*] $E_{CDMP}B_1I_2N$; *sarve* B_2 ; *sarveṣāṃ* $I_1E_{CD}{}^{var}$
21b. *naikadhīḥ*] $E_{CDMP}B_1I_1I_2N$; *naiṣa dhīḥ* B_2
22a. *evaṃ tu*] $E_{CDMP}B_1I_1I_2N$; *evaṃs tu* B_2
22a. *kalpyamāne*] $E_{CDMP}B_1I_1$; *kalpamāne* B_2I_2N
22b. *anantatā*] $E_{CDMP}I_1I_2$; *anatatā* B_1 (unmetrical) ; *atatvatā* B_2 ; *anantata* N
22c. *punas*] $E_{CDMP}B_1I_1I_2N$; *puras* B_2
23c. *sattādiṣv iva*] $E_{CDM}I_1$; *sattādiṣv api* E_PI_2N ; °*ttā*° damaged in B_1 ; *satādiṣv iva* B_2
23c. *tenaitat*] $E_{CDP}B_1B_2I_1I_2N$; *tenaiva* E_M
23d. *nopapadyate*] $E_{CDMP}B_1B_2I_1I_2{}^{pc}N$; *nyo*° $I_2{}^{ac}$; *nopalabhyate* $E_M{}^{note}$
24b. *yā vṛttis tannibandhanaḥ*] $E_{CDMP}B_1B_2I_1I_2{}^{pc}N$; *vṛttis tanni*|*bandhanaḥ* $I_2{}^{ac}$ (unmetrical)
24c. *sattādāv*] $E_{CDMP}B_1B_2I_1I_2{}^{pc}N$; *sattādov* $I_2{}^{ac}$
24d. °*karaṇena*] $E_{CDMP}B_1I_1N$; °*kāraṇena* B_2I_2
25d. *sāmānyaṃ*] $E_{CDM}B_1B_2I_1I_2$; *sāmānye* E_PN

yad vā sarvagatatve 'pi vyaktiḥ śaktyanurodhataḥ |
śaktiḥ kāryānumeyā hi vyaktidarśanahetukā || 26
tena yatraiva dṛśyeta vyaktiḥ śaktaṃ tad eva tu |
tenaiva ca na sarvāsu vyaktiṣv etat pratīyate || 27
bhinnatve 'pi hi kāsāñ cic chaktiḥ kāś cid aśaktikāḥ |
na ca paryanuyogo 'sti vastuśakteḥ kadā cana || 28
vahnir dahati nākāśaṃ ko 'tra paryanuyujyatām |
na cānyā mṛgyate yuktir yathā saṃdṛśyate tathā || 29
na hi yuktyantaraṃ nāstīty etaj jñānam anarthakam |
dharmaś cāvyabhicāry asya na mṛgya upalakṣaṇe || 30

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26. Quoted in *Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛttiṭīkā* 301.27-28: *yad vā sarvagatatve 'pi vyaktiḥ śaktyanurodhataḥ | śaktiḥ kāryānumeyādi vyaktidarśanahetukā ||*
26-29. Quoted in *Nyāyaviniścayavivaraṇa* II.37
27-29ab. Quoted in *Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛttiṭīkā* 302.7-11

26b. *vyaktiḥ*] E_{CDMP} ; *vyakti* $B_1B_2I_1N$; *vyatti* I_2
26b. *śaktiḥ*] $E_{CDMP}B_1B_2I_1N$; *śakti* I_2
27b. *vyaktiḥ*] $E_{CDMP}B_1B_2I_1N$; *vyakti* I_2^{pc} *vyāpti?* I_2^{ac}
27b. *eva tu*] $E_{CDMP}B_1I_1I_2N$; *eva tat* B_2
27c. *ca na*] $E_{CDMP}B_2I_1I_2N$; *na ca* B_1
28a. *hi*] $E_{CDP}B_1B_2I_1I_2N$; *ca* E_M
28b. *kāś cid*] $E_{CDMP}B_1I_1I_2N$; *kāḥś cid* B_2 ; *kaścid* E_M^{note}
28c. *na ca*] $E_{CDMP}B_1B_2I_1I_2^{pc}N$; {*na ca yuktyaṃtaraṃ* (*raṃ* in the margin) *nāstīsvetaj jñānam anarthakaṃ| dharmaś cāvyabhicāryasya*} *na ca* I_2^{ac}
29b. *paryanuyujyatām*] $E_{CDP}B_1I_1I_2$; *paryanuyojyatām* E_M ; *paryanuyujyate* B_2 ; *parya¯nujyate* N
29c. *mṛgyate*] $E_{CDMP}B_2I_1I_2N$; *dṛśyate* B_1
29d. *yathā saṃdṛśyate*] $E_{CDP}I_2N$; *yathaitad dṛṣyate* E_MB_1 ; *yathā tad dṛṣyate* $B_2I_1E_{CD}^{var}$
30b. *anarthakam*] $E_{CDP}B_1B_2I_1I_2N$; *nirarthakam* E_M

***nānumānāvagamyaṃ tat pratyakṣe lakṣaṇena kim* |**
***svābhāvikaś ca sambandho jātivyaktyor na hetumān* || 31**
***tenaitasya prasiddhyarthaṃ nānyat sāmānyam iṣyate* |**
***śaktisiddhivad etasya svabhāvo 'tra na vāryate* || 32**
***yad vā naimittikatve 'pi tāvanmātrapratīkṣaṇāt* |**
***viśeṣeṣūpalabdheṣu keṣu cin nānyavāñchanam* || 33**
***na vyañjanty apare kasmād yatas teṣu na dṛśyate* |**
***tebhyo 'pi na nivṛttyarthaṃ mṛgyo hetuḥ svabhāvataḥ* || 34**
***sāmānyaṃ nānyad iṣṭaṃ cet tasya vṛtter niyāmakam* |**
***gotvenāpi vinā kasmād gobuddhir na niyamyate* || 35**
***yathā tulye 'pi bhinnatve keṣu cid vṛttyavṛttitā* |**
***gotvāder animittāpi tathā buddhir bhaviṣyati* || 36**

31ab. Cf. *Ślokavārttika Pratyakṣapariccheda* v. 120: *tataḥ paraṃ punar vastu dharmair jātyādibhir yayā | buddhyāvasīyate sāpi pratyakṣatvena sammatā* ||
32d. ***vāryate***] ŚVKāś ad *Ākṛti* 32-33: *evam etasyāpi tādātmyasaṃbandhasya kṛte na svabhāvo hetutayā vāryata ity āha—śaktīti.*
36b. ***vṛttyavṛttitā***] ŚVKāś ad *Ākṛti* 35-36: *vṛttiśabdena vṛttimantaṃ lakṣayati, na vidyate vṛttir asyety avṛttiḥ, tayor bhāvo vṛttyavṛttitā.* ŚVŚar 11,13-14: *sāmānyasya viśeṣe vṛttyavṛttiprakāraḥ śakyo buddhāv eva darśayitum ity āha.*
36c. ***animittāpi***] ŚVKāś ad *Ākṛti* 35-36: *animittāpīti svabhāvātiriktanimittāntaraśūnyāpīty arthaḥ.*

31b. *pratyakṣe*] $E_{CDMP}B_1I_1I_2N$; *prakṣe* B_2
31d. *hetumān*] $E_{CDMP}B_1B_2I_1I_2N$; *hetumāni iti* E_M^{note} (unmetrical)
32c. °*vad etasya*] $E_{CDMP}B_1^{pc}B_2I_1I_2N$; °*ved eta* B_1^{ac}
32c. °*siddhi*°] $E_{CDMP}B_1B_2I_1I_2N$; °*siddha*° E_M^{note}
32d. *'tra na vāryate*] $E_{CDP}B_2I_2N$; *na nivāryate* $E_MB_1I_1$
33c. *viśeṣeṣūpalabdheṣu*] E_M ; *viśeṣeṣv eva labdheṣu* $E_{CDP}B_1B_2I_2N$
33d. *cin nānyavāñchanam*] $E_{CDMP}B_1B_2^{pc}I_1N^{pc}$; *ca | nānyabādhanaṃ* B_2 ; *cin nānyavāṃchitaṃ* I_2^{pc} *cin nāmanyavāṃchitaṃ* I_2^{ac} (unmetrical) ; *cintyanyavāṃchanaṃ* N^{ac} (unmetrical)
34. *kasmād*] $E_{CDP}B_1B_2I_1I_2N$; *tasmād* E_M
34a. *vyañjanty*] $E_{CDMP}B_1B_2I_1I_2$; *vyañjati* N
34c. *'pi na*] $E_{CDMP}B_2I_1N$; *nanu* B_1I_2
34d. *mṛgyo hetuḥ*] $E_{CDMP}B_1I_1I_2N$; *mṛgyo hetu* B_2 ; *mṛgye hetuḥ* E_M^{note}
35c. *vinā kasmād*] $E_{CDMP}B_1B_2I_1^{pc}I_2N$; *vinā smād* I_1^{ac} (unmetrical) ; *vinā kasmāt* I_2
36b. *vṛttyavṛttitā*] $E_MB_1B_2I_1I_2NE_{CD}^{var}$; *vṛttyapekṣitā* E_{CDP}
36c. *animittāpi*] $E_{MP}B_1B_2I_1I_2N$; *animitte 'pi* E_{CD}

viṣayeṇa hi buddhīnāṃ vinā notpattir iṣyate |
viśeṣād anyad icchanti sāmānyaṃ tena tad dhruvam || 37
tā hi tena vinotpannā mithyā syur viṣayād ṛte |
na tv anyena vinā vṛttiḥ sāmānyasyeha duṣyati || 38
aniṣyamāṇe sāmānye vṛttiḥ śabdānumānayoḥ |
naiva syān na hi sambandho bhedair ānantyato bhavet || 39
anubhūtatayā cāsau puruṣasyopayujyate |
jātivyaktyos tu sambandhe nānubhūtyā prayojanam || 40
siddhe viṣayarūpe ca gotvādāv indriyaiḥ punaḥ |
arthāpattyupalabdhā syāc chaktir ekā niyāmikā || 41

37-38. Quoted in *Prameyakamalamārtaṇḍa* 474
37-38. Quoted in *Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛttiṭīkā* 320.12-15: *viṣayeṇa hi buddhīnāṃ vinā notpattir iṣyate | viśeṣād anyad icchanti sāmānyaṃ tena tad dhruvam || tā hi tena vinotpannā mithyā syur viṣayād ṛte | na tv anyena vinā vṛttiḥ sāmānyasyeha duṣyati ||*
38. Cf. *Ślokavārttika Nirālambanavāda* v. 117cd-118: *tasmād yad anyathāsantam anyathā pratipadyate || tannirālambanaṃ jñānam abhāvālambanaṃ ca tat | bhāvāntaram abhāvo 'nyo na kaś cid anirūpaṇāt ||*
39. Cf. *Ślokavārttika Apohavāda* v. 35cd-36ab: *prāg antyebhyo viśeṣebhyo na kiṃcid vastu labhyate || na cāntyair vyavahāro 'sti śakyaṃ naiṣāṃ nirūpaṇam |* See also *Apohavāda* v.38: *sāmānyaṃ vasturūpaṃ hi buddhyākāro bhaviṣyati | śabdārtho 'rthānapekṣo hi vṛthāpohaḥ prakalpitaḥ ||*
41ab. Cf. *Śābarabhāṣya* ad MS 1.1.5: *nanv ākṛtiḥ sādhyāsti vā na veti. na pratyakṣā satī sādhyā bhavitum arhati.*

37c. *anyad*] $E_{CDMP}B_2I_1N$; *anyam* B_1I_2
37d. *sāmānyaṃ tena*] $E_{CDM}B_1B_2I_1I_2$; *sāmānyatvena* $E_PNE_{CD}^{var}$
37d. *tad dhruvam*] $E_{CDMP}B_1I_1I_2^{pc}$; *ta dhṛvam* B_2 ; *ta dhruvam* N ; *tad dhṛvam* I_2^{ac}
38a. *tena*] $E_{CDMP}B_1B_2I_1N$; *tāna* I_2
38a. *vinotpannā*] $E_{CDMP}B_1I_1I_2N$; *vinotpannpā* B_2
38b. *syur*] $E_{CDMP}B_1B_2I_1I_2$; *syu* NE_M^{note}
38d. *duṣyati*] $E_{CDMP}B_1B_2I_2N$; *duḥṣyati* I_1
39a. *aniṣyamāṇe*] $E_{CDMP}B_1B_2I_1N$; *aniḥpramāṇe* I_2
39c. *naiva*] $E_{CDP}B_1B_2I_1I_2N$; *na hi* E_M
40a. *cāsau*] $E_{CMP}B_1I_1N$; *vāsau* $E_DB_2I_2$
40c. *°yos tu sambandhe*] $E_{CDMP}B_2N$; *°yoś ca sambandhe* B_1I_2 ; *°yoś ca sambandho* I_1
40d. *prayojanam*] $E_{CDMP}B_1I_1I_2N$; *prayājanam* B_2
41c. *arthāpattyupalabdhā*] E_{CDP} ; *°upalabdhyā* E_MB_1 ; *athāpatyupalabdhā* B_2 ; *arthāpati°* I_1I_2
41d. *ekā*] $E_{CDMP}B_2N$; *eṣā* $B_1I_1I_2$

na cātmahetum evāsau siddhā bādhitum arhati |
***śaktiś ca naitayā buddhyā nendriyaiḥ sā hi gṛhyate* || 42**
sāmānyāntarayogānām aniṣṭhā yā ca varṇyate |
***tayā sāmānyanāśaḥ syāt sa ca dṛṣṭena bādhyate* || 43**
sambandhas tasya hetur vā tadgrahe na ca kāraṇam |
***svarūpato gṛhīte 'rthe paścād etad vikalpyate* || 44**
sāsnādyekārthasambandhi gotvam ity upalakṣaṇam |
***na ca svasamavāyy eva kevalaṃ cihnam iṣyate* || 45**
sāsnādibhyas tu piṇḍasya bhedo nātyantato yadā |
***sāmānyasya ca piṇḍebhyas tadā syād etad uttaram* || 46**
kasmāt sāsnādimatsv eva gotvaṃ yasmāt tadātmakam |
***tādātmyam asya kasmāc cet svabhāvād iti gamyatām* || 47**

43b ***aniṣṭhā***] ŚVKāś ad *Ākṛti* 43-44: *idānīṃ yad uktaṃ saṃbandhagrahaṇe sāmānyāntarābhyupagame aniṣṭheti.*
48-49. Cf. *Ślokavārttika Vanavāda* v. 9-11: *gṛhyamāṇe tu gotvādau nāntarīyakahetukaḥ | sāsnādeḥ kasya cid bodhas taddeśatvena jāyate || tadanatyantabhedād vā tadviśiṣṭeti kīrtyate | bādhaḥ parānumānasya na pratyakṣeti bodhyate || pareṣāṃ sādhanaṃ hy atra nākṛtiḥ piṇḍataḥ pṛthak | taddhīhānāv avijñānāt paṅktiyūthavanādivat ||*

42a. °*hetum*] $E_{CDMP}B_1B_2I_1N$; °*hetur* I_2
42b. *siddhā*] $E_{MP}B_1B_2I_1N$; *siddham* E_{CD} ; *siddho* I_2 ; *siddhām* E_{CD}^{var}
42d. *sā hi*] $E_{CDMP}B_1B_2I_1I_2N$; *sābhi* E_M^{note}
43a. *sāmānyāntara*°] $E_{CDMP}B_1B_2I_1I_2$; *sāmānyāṃ¯ta*° N
43b. *aniṣṭhā*] $E_DI_1NE_M^{note}$; *aniṣṭā* E_{CMP} ; *aniṣṭhe* B_1I_2 ; *adhiṣṭhā* B_2
43b. *yā ca varṇyate*] $E_{CDMP}B_1I_1$; *yā ma varṇyate* B_2 ; *yaṃ ca varṇyate* I_2 ; *yām ca varṇyate* N
43c. °*nāśaḥ syāt*] $E_{CDP}B_1I_1I_2N$; °*nāśaś ca* E_M ; °*nāśa syāt* B_2
44a. *hetur vā*] $E_{CDMP}B_1B_2I_2N$; *hetuś ca* I_1
44b. °*grahe na* $E_{CDM}B_1B_2I_1I_2N$; °*graheṇa* E_P
44d. *etad vikalpyate*] $E_{CDP}B_2I_1I_2$; *etad dhi kalpyate* E_MB_1 ; *etad vikalpate* N
45a. *sāsnādy*] $E_{CDM}B_1B_2I_1I_2$; *sāsnā hy* E_PN
46a. °*yas tu*] $E_{CDP}B_1B_2I_1I_2N$; °*yaś ca* E_M
46b. *nātyantato*] $E_{CDMP}B_1I_2N$; *nātyantaro* B_2 ; *nātyantiko* $I_1E_D^{var}$; *nātyantika* E_C^{var}
46c. *piṇḍe*°] $E_{CDMP}B_1B_2I_1I_2^{pc}N$; *piṇḍo*° I_2^{ac}
47a-47d This verse is missing in I_2
47a. *kasmāt*] $E_{CDMP}B_1B_2I_1N$; *tasmāt* $E_M^{note}E_{CD}^{var}$
47b. *tādātmyam asya*] $E_{CDMP}B_1I_1N$; *tadātmakasya* B_2 ; *tā+++sya* B_1
47b. *svabhāvād iti*] $E_{CDMP}B_2I_1N$; *svabhā++ti* B_1

***upalabdhyanusāreṇa vyavasthāsiddhir īdṛśī* |**
***svato gotvādibhedas tu na tu vyañjakabhedataḥ* || 48**
***mā bhūd drutādivan mithyā vyañjakasya tu kiṃkṛtaḥ* |**
***bhedo hastyādipiṇḍebhyaḥ svataś ced iha tat samam* || 49**
***vyaṅgyajātiviśeṣāc cet prāptam anyonyasaṃśrayam* |**
***tasmāt svābhāviko bhedo jātivyaktyoḥ pratīyate* || 50**
***anekānanyavṛttittvān na sāmānyaviśeṣayoḥ* |**
***ekavastvātmatā yuktā kiṃ cit tenaupacārikam* || 51**
***bhinnebhyaś cāpy abhinnatvād bhedas tat svātmavad bhavet* |**
***ekasmād vāpy abhinnatvād vyaktyekatvaṃ prasajyate* || 52**

49a. ***mā bhūd drutādi***] ŚVKāś ad *Ākṛti* 48-49: *kāraṇam āha—**mā bhūd iti**. yadi vyañjakabhedanibandhano 'yam ākṛtīnāṃ bhedo bhavet, **drutādaya iva** śabdadharmā vyañjakadhvanyupādhikā mithyā syāt.*

48a. *upalabdhyanusāreṇa*] $E_{CDMP}B_1B_2I_2N$; *upalabdhānusāreṇa* I_1
48c. °*bhedas tu*] $E_{CDMP}B_1B_2I_1I_2N$; °*bhedaś ca* E_M^{note}
49a. *bhūd drutādi*°] $E_{CD}B_1$; *bhūd dutādi*° E_M ; *bhū drutādi*° $E_PB_2I_1N$
49b. *tu kiṃkṛtaḥ*] $E_{CDMP}B_1N$; *ca kiṃkṛtaḥ* B_2 ; *tu kiṃkṛtāṃ* I_1 ; *na kiṃkṛtaḥ* I_2
49d. *svataś*] $E_{CDMP}B_1B_2I_1N$; *tataś* I_2
50a. °*viśeṣāc*] $E_{CDMP}B_1I_1I_2N$; °*śeṣāc* B_2 (unmetrical) ; °*viśeṣā* E_M^{note}
50b. *prāptam anyonya*°] $E_{CDMP}B_1I_1I_2N$; *bhaved anya*° B_2 (unmetrical) ; *bhaved anyonya*° E_M^{note}
50c. *tasmāt svābhāviko*] $E_{CDMP}B_2I_1N$; *ta+++viko* B_1 ; *tasmātasmāt svābhāviko* I_2 (unmetrical)
50d. °*vyaktyoḥ pratīyate*] $E_{CDP}B_2N$; °*vyaktyoḥ pratīyatām* E_MI_1 ; °++ *pratīyatāṃ* B_1 ; °*vyaktyo pratīyatām* I_2 ; °*vyaktyoḥ prateyate* E_M^{note}
51a. *anekānanya*°] $E_{CDMP}B_1B_2I_1I_2^{pc}N$; *anekānānya*° I_2^{ac}
51c. *ekavastvā*°] $E_{CDMP}B_1B_2I_1I_2N^{pc}$; *ekavastvo*° N^{ac} ; *ekastvā*° E_M^{note} (unmetrical)
51d. *kiṃ cit te*°] $E_{CMP}B_1B_2I_1I_2^{pc}NE_D^{var}$; *varaṃ te*° E_D ; *kiṃ cit to*° I_2^{ac}
51d. °*cārikam*] $E_{CDP}B_1B_2I_1I_2N$; °*cārikī* E_M ; °*cārakam* E_M^{note}
52b. °*vad bhavet*] $E_{CDMP}B_1I_1I_2N$; °*bhedavat* B_2
52c. *vāpy*] $E_{CDMP}B_1I_1I_2N$; *vāky* B_2
52c. *abhinnatvād*] $E_{CDP}B_2I_2N$; *ananyatvād* $E_MB_1I_1$
52d. *vyaktyeka*°] $E_{CDMP}B_1B_2I_1N$; *vākyaika*° I_2 ; *vyaktyaika*° E_M^{note}
52d. *prasajyate*] $E_MB_1I_1I_2NE_{CD}^{var}$; *pratīyate* $E_{CDP}B_2$

ekānekatvam ekasya tathānyānanyatā katham |
***tat sāmānyaṃ viśeṣaś cety evamādi ca duṣkaram* || 53**
virodhas tāvad ekāntād vaktum atra na śakyate |
***sāmānyānanyavijñāte viśeṣe naikavṛttitā* || 54**
sāmānyānanyavṛttitvaṃ viśeṣātmaikabhāvataḥ |
***evañ ca parihartavyā bhinnābhinnatvakalpanā* || 55**
kena cic cātmanaikatvaṃ nānātvaṃ cāsya kena cit |
***sāmānyasya tu yo bhedaṃ brūte tasya viśeṣataḥ* || 56**
darśayitvābhyupetavyam viśeṣaikyaṃ ca jātitaḥ |
***yathā kalmāṣavarṇasya yatheṣṭaṃ varṇanigrahaḥ* || 57**
citratvād vastuno 'py evaṃ bhedābhedāvadhāraṇā |
***sāmānyāṃśaṃ tu niṣkṛṣya bhedo yena prasādhyate* || 58**

54ab. Cf. *Āptamīmāṃsā* 61: *kāryakāraṇanānātvaṃ guṇaguṇyanyatāpi ca* | *sāmānyatadvadanyatvaṃ caikāntena yad iṣyate* ||
56ab. ***kena cic cātmanaikatvaṃ***] Quoted in *Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛttiṭīkā* 295.29: *kena cic cātmanaikatvaṃ nānātvaṃ cāsya kena cit* |
57cd-58ab. Quoted in *Tattvasaṃgraha* 1745: *yathā kalmāṣavarṇasya yatheṣṭaṃ varṇanigrahaḥ* | *citratvād vastuno 'py evaṃ bhedābhedāvadhāraṇe* || and *Nyāyamañjarī* II 33.12-13, Kataoka (2010: 193, § 3.1): *yathā kalmāṣavarṇasya yatheṣṭaṃ varṇanigrahaḥ* | *citratvād vastuno 'py evaṃ bhedābhedāvadhāraṇā* ||
57cd-58ab. Quoted in *Jātinirākṛti* 36.5-6

53a. °*tvam ekasya*] $E_{CDMP}B_2I_1I_2$; °*tvanekasya* B_1 ; °*tvam ekatva* N
53c. *cety*] $E_{CDMP}I_1I_2N$; *ced* B_1B_2
53d. *evamādi ca duṣkaram*] $E_{CDMP}B_2I_1I_2N$; *eva++++karam* B_1
54ab.°*tād vaktum*] $E_{CDMP}B_2I_1I_2N$; damaged in B_1
54b. *śakyate*] $E_MB_1B_2I_1I_2E_{CD}^{var}$; *yujyate* $E_{CDP}N$
54c. °*vijñāte*] $E_{CDMP}B_1B_2I_1I_2N$; °*vijñāne* E_M^{note}
54d. *naikavṛttitā*] $E_{CDMP}I_1I_2N$; *anekavṛttiā* $B_1E_{CD}^{var}$; *nanyavṛttiā* B_2
55a. *sāmānyā*°] $E_{CDMP}B_1B_2I_1I_2N$; *sāmānye*° E_M^{note}
56a. *kena cicc*°] I_1I_2 ; *kena cid dhy* E_{CD} ; *kena cit tv* E_M ; *kena cid vy* E_PN ; *kina cidvy* B_2 ; *kena ci(jñā?) ++katvaṃ* B_1
56b. *cāsya*] $E_{CDMP}B_1I_1I_2N$; *vāspasya* B_2
56c. *tu*] $E_{CDMP}B_2N$; *ca* $B_1I_1I_2$
56d. *viśeṣataḥ*] $E_{CDMP}B_2I_1I_2N$; *vi+++* B_2
57d. °*nigrahaḥ*] $E_{CDP}B_1B_2I_1I_2NE_M^{note}$; °*vigrahaḥ* E_M
58b. °*dhāraṇā*] $E_MB_1I_1I_2E_{CD}^{var}$; °*dhāraṇam* $E_{CDP}B_2N$
58c. °*yāṃśaṃ tu*] $E_{MP}B_1I_1N$; °*yāṃśas tu* B_2 ; °*yāṃśe tu* $E_{CD}I_2$; °*yāśan tu* E_M^{note}
58d. *yena*] $E_{CDMP}B_1I_1I_2N$; *yeyena* B_2 (unmetrical)

tasya hetor asiddhatvaṃ siddhaś cet siddhasādhyatā |
bhedebhyo 'nanyarūpeṇa sāmānyaṃ gṛhyate yadā || 59
tadā viśeṣamātreṇa vastu pratyavabhāsate |
tadudbhūtyā ca sāmānyaṃ tadbodhānuguṇaṃ sthitam || 60
sad apy agrāhyarūpatvād asadvat pratibhāti naḥ |
viśeṣān api sāmānyād yadābhedena buddhyate || 61
tadā sāmānyamātratvam evam eva pratīyate |
yadā tu śabalaṃ vastu yugapat pratipadyate || 62
tadānyānanyabhedādi sarvam eva pralīyate |
na ca tat tādṛśaṃ kaś cic chabdaḥ śaknoti bhāṣitum || 63

61cd-63ab. Cf. *Ślokavārttika Pratyakṣapariccheda* 112-113: *asti hy ālocanājñānaṃ prathamaṃ nirvikalpakam | bālamūkādivijñānasadṛśaṃ śuddhavastujam || na viśeṣo na sāmānyaṃ tadānīm anubhūyate | tayor ādhārabhūtā tu vyaktir evāvasīyate ||*
62cd-63ab: Quoted in *Tattvasaṃgraha* 1745 and *Jātinirākṛti* 36.7-8
62cd-63ab: Quoted in *Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛttiṭīkā* 295.30-296.6: *yadā ca śabalaṃ vastu yugapat pratibhāsate | tadānyānanyabhedādi sarvam eva pralīyate ||*

59ab. °*tvaṃ si*] $E_{CDMP}B_2I_1I_2N$; damaged in B_1
59b. °*sādhyatā*] $E_MB_1I_1I_2E_{CD}^{var}$; °*sādhanam* $E_{CDP}B_2N$
60b. °*avabhāsate*] $E_{CDMP}B_1I_1I_2N$; °*avase* B_2 (unmetrical)
60c. *ca*] $E_{CDMP}B_1I_1I_2N$; *ra* B_2
60d. *tadbodhā*°] B_1I_2 ; *tadbhāvā*° $E_{CDMP}B_2I_1N$; *sthitam* overwritten in B_1
B_1 *viśe* in *viśeṣamātreṇa* is damaged
61a. *sad*] $E_{CDMP}B_2I_1I_2N$; *tad* B_1
61a. *agrāhya*°] $E_{CDMP}B_1B_2I_1N$; *agraha*° I_2
61b. *pratibhāti naḥ*] $E_{CDP}B_1B_2I_1I_2NE_M^{note}$; *pratibhāsate* E_M
61c. *sāmānyād*] $E_{CDMP}B_1B_2I_1N$; *sāmānyā* I_2 (an insertion sign before *yadā* is visible, but what is inserted is unclear)
61d. *bhedena budhyate*] $E_{CDMP}B_1I_1I_2^{pc}N$; *bhedo nubaddhyate* B_2 ; *bheṣadena baddhyate* I_2^{ac} (unmetrical)
62a. °*mātratvam*] $E_{CDP}B_1B_2I_1I_2NE_M^{note}$; °*tantratvam* E_M
62a. *yugapat*] $E_{CDMP}B_1B_2I_2N$; *yuyapat* I_1
63b. *pralīyate*] $E_{CDMP}B_1B_2I_1N$; *pratīyate* I_2
63cd. *kaś cic chabdaḥ śaknoti*] $E_{CDMP}B_2I_1N$; *śabdaḥ kaś cic chaknoti* $B_1I_1I_2$ (*kno* overwritten in I_2)

sāmānyāṃśān apoddhṛtya padaṃ sarvaṃ pravartate |
samastavastvapekṣāṃ ca padārthānām apoddhṛtim || 64
ke cid āhur asadrūpām aṃśatvaṃ tu na vāryate |
sārūpyam eva piṇḍānāṃ sāmānyaṃ yena kalpyate || 65
tena sārūpyaśabdena kiṃ punaḥ pratipādyate |
samānarūpabhāvaś cej jātiḥ sāsmābhir iṣyate || 66
sādṛśyam atha sārūpyaṃ kasya keneti kathyatām |
na tāvac chābaleyena bāhuleyādayaḥ samāḥ || 67
viśeṣarūpato ye 'pi tatsaṃsthānādibhiḥ samāḥ |
śābaleya iveti syāt tatra buddhir na gaur iti || 68

65cd. ***piṇḍānāṃ sāmānyaṃ***] ŚVKāś ad *Ākṛti* 65cd-67ab: *vindhyavāsinā kila sārūpyam eva piṇḍānāṃ sāmānyam iti svatantre nirūpitam*
67. Quoted in *Nyāyaviniścayavivaraṇa* I.456,24-25: *sārūpyam atha sādṛśyam kasya keneti kathyatām | na tāvac chābaleyena bāhuleyādayaḥ samāḥ ||*
68-71ab. Quoted in *Nyāyaviniścayavivaraṇa* I.456,26-457,5.
68. Cf. *Ślokavārttika Apohavāda* v. 30cd: *tac cāvayavasāmānyād vināpy etena lakṣyate ||*
68d. ***iti***] ŚVŚar 21,5-6: *api ca yatrāpi tad asti tatrāpi 'sa iva' iti sādṛśyanibandhanā pratītiḥ syāt. na punaḥ 'sa eva' iti.*

64a. *apoddhṛtya*] $E_{CDMP}B_1B_2I_1I_2$; *apoddha(vya?)* N
64b. *padaṃ*] $E_{CDMP}B_1I_1I_2^{pc}N$; *pada* B_2 ; *pakṣaṃ* I_2^{ac}
64b. *pravarttate*] $E_{CDMP}B_1B_2I_1N$; *pratiyate* I_2
64c. *samasta°*] $E_{CDMP}B_1B_2I_1I_2N$; *samamasta°* E_M^{note} (unmetrical)
64c. *°apekṣāṃ*] $E_{CMP}B_1B_2I_1I_2N$; *°apekṣā* E_D
65ab. *°rūpāṃ aṃśatvaṃ*] $E_{CMP}B_1I_1N$; *°rūpam aṃśatvaṃ* E_D ; *°rūpām asiddhaṃ* B_2 ; *°rūpāṃ matrātvaṃ* I_2
65b. *na vāryate*] $E_{CDMP}B_2I_1I_2N$; *nivāryate* B_1
65c. *eva*] $E_{CDMP}B_1I_1I_2N$; *ava* B_2
65cd. *piṇḍānāṃ sāmānyaṃ*] $E_MB_1I_1I_2$; *sāmānyaṃ piṇḍānāṃ* $E_{CDP}B_2N$
65d. *kalpyate*] $E_{CDMP}B_1B_2I_1$; *kalpate* $I_2^{pc}N$; *kalpalpate* I_2^{ac} (unmetrical)
66b. *pratipādyate*] $E_MB_1B_2I_1I_2N$; *pratipadyate* E_{CDP}
66c. *samāna°*] $E_{CDMP}B_1B_2I_1N$; *sāmānya°* I_2
66cd. *sāmānyaṃ narabhavabhāvaś cet jātiḥ sāsmānniriṣyate* E_M^{note} (unmetrical)
67a. *atha*] $E_{CDMP}B_2I_1I_2N$; *api* B_1
67b. *keneti*] $E_{CDMP}B_1B_2I_1I_2^{pc}N$; *keti* I_2^{ac}
67d-68b. *°dayaḥ samāḥ… tatsaṃsthānā°* is inserted in the upper margin in B_1^{ac} (eyeskip)
68a. *'pi*] $E_{CDMP}B_1B_2I_1N$; *'pipi* I_2
68cd. *iveti syāt tatra*] $E_{CDMP}B_1B_2I_1$; *iti syāt te tatra* I_2 ; *iveti syaḥt tatra* N
68d. *iti*] $E_MB_1B_2I_1I_2$; *iva* $E_{CDP}N$

śābaleyo 'yam iti vā bhrāntyā gaur iti nāsti dhīḥ |
***śābaleyasvarūpaṃ ca na gaur ity avatiṣṭhate* || 69**
tadanyeṣu hi gobuddhir na syād asadṛśeṣv api |
***dṛśyate sā na cānyat te gorūpaṃ tatra vidyate* || 70**
na cānyo gauḥ prasiddho 'sti yatsādṛśyena gaur bhavet |
***na cāpi sa iti jñānaṃ sadṛśeṣv asti sarvadā* || 71**
sarvapuṃsām ato bhrāntir naiṣā bādhakavarjanāt |
***sarvajñānāni mithyā ca prasajyante 'tra kalpane* || 72**

70b. ***asadṛśeṣv***] ŚVKāś ad *Ākṛti* 69-70: *api cāstu tāvat sadṛśeṣu gobuddhiḥ. asadṛśeṣu gobuddhau nibandhanaṃ vaktavyam.* Jayamiśra: *ataḥ śābaleyavilakṣaṇeṣu gobuddhir nirālambanaiva te prāpnoti.*
70c. ***sā na cānyat te***] ŚVKāś ad *Ākṛti* 69-70: *na hi tatrānyad aparaṃ gotvaṃ bhavadbhir abhyupagatam.*
71cd-74ab. Quoted in *Nyāyaviniścayavivaraṇa* I.456,25-457,2.
72. Cf. *Ślokavārttika Codanā* v. 52-53: *yadā svataḥ pramāṇatvaṃ tadānyan naiva mṛgyate | nivartate hi mithyātvaṃ doṣājñānād ayatnataḥ || tasmād bodhātmakatvena prāptā buddheḥ pramāṇatā | arthānyathātvahetūtthadoṣajñānād apodyate ||*

69a. *iti*] $E_{CDMP}B_1B_2I_1I_2$; *ati* N
69b. *nāsti dhīḥ*] $E_{CDM}B_1I_1$; *nāsti tu* $E_PB_2NE_{CD}^{var}$; *nāsya dhīḥ* I_2
69cd. *ca na*] $E_{CDP}B_1B_2I_1I_2^{pc}$; *tu na* E_M ; *ca* I_2^{ac}
70a. *hi*] $E_{CDMP}B_1I_1I_2N$; *ca* B_2
70b. *syād asadṛśeṣv api*] E_MB_2 ; *syāt susadṛśeṣv api* $E_{CDP}I_2N$; *syāt susadṛśeṣv ipi* B_1 ; *syād visadṛśeṣv api* $I_1E_C^{var}$
70c. *sā na cānyat te*] I_1 ; *sā na cānyatra* $E_{CDP}B_1$; *sāpi nānyat te* E_M ; *sā na cānyaṃ te* B_2N ; *sā na cānyartte* I_2 ; *sā ca nānyaṃ te* E_M^{note}
71a. *gauḥ*] $E_{CDMP}B_1I_1I_2N$; *goḥ* B_2
71ab. *prasiddho 'sti*] $E_{CDM}N$; *prasiddhāsti* E_P ; *prasiddhas te* $B_1I_1I_2E_{CD}^{var}$; *prasiddhesti* B_2
71b. *yatsādṛśyena*] $E_{CMP}B_1B_2I_1I_2N$; *tatsādṛśyena* E_D ; *matsādṛśena* E_M^{note}
71b. *gaur*] $E_MB_1B_2I_1I_2E_{CD}^{var}$; *dhīr* $E_{CDP}N$
71c. *jñānaṃ*] $E_{CDMP}B_2I_1N$; *prajñā* B_1I_2
71d. *sadṛśeṣv asti*] $E_{CDMP}B_2N$; *sadṛśeṣv api* $B_1I_1I_2$
72a. °*puṃsām ato*] $E_{CDMP}B_1I_1N$; °*pūṃsām ato* B_2 ; °*pūṃsāṃ yato* I_2
72b. *bādhaka*°] $E_{CDMP}B_1I_1I_2N$; *bāhyeka*° B_2
72c. *mithyā*] $E_{CDMP}B_1I_1I_2N$; *thyā* B_2
72d. *'tra kalpane*] $E_{CDMP}B_1B_2I_1^{pc}I_2$; *'tra kalpano* I_1^{ac} ; *prakalpano* N

***viśeṣagrahaṇābhāvād eko gauḥ kaś ca kathyatām* |**
***babhūva yady asau pūrvam asmadādes tadagrahāt* || 73**
***sādṛśyāvadhṛtir nāstīty ato godhīr na labhyate* |**
***na cāvayavasāmānyair vinā sādṛśyakalpanā* || 74**
***sāmānyapratyayotpādo na viśeṣeṣu jāyate* |**
***vyaktitaś cātireko 'sya syān na veti vicārite* || 75**
***sāmānyam eva sādṛśyaṃ bhaved vā vyaktimātrakam* |**
***tena nātyantabhinno 'rthaḥ sārūpyam iti varṇitam* || 76**
***granthe vindhyanivāsena bhrāntaiḥ sādṛśyam ucyate* || 76ef**

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74. Cf. *Ślokavārttika Upamāna* 21: *na dharmā eva sādṛśyaṃ bhūyastā vā tadāśrayā | bhūyastvavad dhi jātyādi sadṛśatvena dṛśyate ||*
76f. ***bhrāntaiḥ***] ŚVKāś ad *Ākṛti* 76cd-76ef: *tadgranthas tu yathāvadajānānais sādṛśyaṃ sāmānyam iti kalpitam ity āha—teneti.* Jayamiśra: *bhrāntais tu tadīyam abhiprāyam ajānānair anyādṛśam eva tad vyākhyātaṃ ity āha*.

73a. *°bhāvād eko*] $E_{MP}B_1B_2I_1I_2N$; *°bhāvād eva* E_{CD}
73b. *kathyatām*] $E_{CDP}I_1I_2N$; *kalpyatām* E_MB_1 ; *kalpatām* B_2
73cd. *pūrvam asmadādes tad°*] $E_{CDMP}I_1N$; *pūrvam asmad bhedas tad°* B_1I_2 ; *pūrvaṃ masmad bhedas tad°* B_2 ; *pūrvam amasadādes tadagrahaṇāt* E_M^{note}
74a. *°dhṛtir*] $E_{CDMP}B_2N$; *°gatir* $B_1I_1I_2$
74c. *na*] $E_{CDM}B_1B_2I_1I_2N$; *nā* E_P
74cd. *°yair vinā*] $E_{CDMP}B_2I_1I_2N$; *°yai virnā* B_1
75b. *viśeṣeṣu jāyate*] $E_{CDP}B_1^{pc}B_2I_1I_2NE_M^{note}$; *viśeṣeṇa jāyate* E_M ; *viśeṣeṣu jāte* B_1^{ac}
75d. *syān na*] $E_{CDMP}B_2I_1I_2N$; *syān na nna* B_1
76b. *bhaved vā vyakti°*] $E_{CDMP}B_1I_2N$; *bhavedā vyakti°* B_2 ; *bhaved vā va°* I_1
76e. *granthe vindhyanivāsena*] $E_{CDMP}B_1B_2N$; *svagranthe vindhyavāsena* $I_1E_{CD}^{var}$; *granthya vindhyanivāsena* I_2
76f. *bhrāntaiḥ*] E_MI_2 ; *bhrānteḥ* $E_{CDP}B_1B_2I_1N$

2.6 A First Edition of Sucaritamiśra's *Ślokavārttikakāśikā*, the *Ākṛtivāda* Chapter

In this section, I present the first edition of the *Ākṛtivāda* chapter of Sucaritamiśra's *Ślokavārttikakāśikā*. Sucarita's commentary on the ŚV was published in Trivandrum in three parts (1926, 1929, 1943), but the publication was unfortunately discontinued. Although the text of the entire *Kāśikā* is available in manuscripts, the Trivandrum edition stops at the end of ŚV *Saṃbandhākṣepa*. This means the remaining portion of the *Kāśikā*, including the *Ākṛtivāda* chapter, has never been available for modern scholars to consult. Sucarita's *Kāśikā* is a particularly important commentary for understanding Kumārila's verses in the *Ākṛtivāda*, not least because the *Kāśikā* often offers more detailed and extensive explanation of Kumārila's arguments than other commentaries do, but also because the oldest commentary on the ŚV, i.e. Umbeka's *Tātparyaṭīkā*, does not cover the *Ākṛtivāda*.

The edition presented here is thus the first time that the *Ākṛtivāda* section of the *Kāśikā* is available in print. To prepare this edition, I have consulted the following two manuscripts:

A A manuscript preserved in the Adyar Library, Chennai, TR 66-7, No, 63361, Devanāgarī script, Paper, pp. 2543-2612.

G A manuscript preserved in the Government Oriental Manuscripts Library (GOML), Chennai, R. 3778, S.R. 2126, Devanāgarī script, Paper, pp. 358-389.

For the information about both manuscripts and their relationship to other manuscripts of the *Kāśikā*, see Shida (2013).

Sanskrit Text of the *Ślokavārttikakāśikā*, the *Ākṛtivāda* Chapter

ŚV *Ākṛti* 1

atrānantaram atha gaur ity atra kaḥ śabdārtha iti pṛṣṭvā sāsnādiviśiṣṭākṛtir ity uttaraṃ dattam. tad ayuktam, siddhāntaviruddhatvāt. na hy ayaṃ pakṣaḥ sthāyī bhaviṣyati yad ākṛtir eva sarvatra śabdārtha iti. vyaktivacanatāpi hi pācakodbhidādīnāṃ[26] *lokavedayor dṛṣṭaiva. atha prakṛtodāhṛtagośabdābhiprāyam uttaram, evam api na saṃbandhautpattikatvasiddhāntopayoga ākṛtir vyaktir vā bhavatu śabdārthaḥ. nautpattikatve kaś cid upayogaḥ.*

*syād etat. vyaktipakṣe na nityatā saṃbandhasyeti kā kathā vācakādiṣu tatra kriyopalakṣaṇam iti ced atrāpy ākṛtir bhaviṣyati. tasmān mandaprayojanam evākṛtivācyatvāthayaṇam ata āha—**ākṛtir iti**—ayam abhiprāyaḥ—na brumaḥ sarvatrākṛtiḥ śabdārtha iti vyaktau vā śabdārthena saṃbandhotpattikatvam iti. kriyārthatvāc chabdaprayogasya, vyaktau ca kriyāsaṃbhavāt, vyaktir eva sarvatra śabdavācyā, nākṛtiḥ, amūrtatvena kriyāyogānarhatvād iti kecit. tatredam ucyate, yadi hy ākṛtivyatiriktā vyaktir eva sarvatra śabdārtho bhavet, ānantyavyabhicārābhyāṃ saṃbandha eva tāvan na sidhyati, dūre nityatvam. sati tv ākṛtau śabdārthe, tām evopalakṣaṇīkṛtya vyakter api yaugikeṣu pācakādiśabdeṣv iva śabdārthatvam upapadyate, yathoktaṃ—*

ānantye 'pi hi bhāvānām ekaṃ kṛtvopalakṣaṇam |
śabdas sukarasaṃbandho na ca vyabhicariṣyati || iti.[27]

*upalakṣaṇatvam ākṛter ākṛtyadhikaraṇe nirākariṣyata eva, na tāvad apratītākṛtir upalakṣaṇaṃ bhavati. na ca śabdād ṛte 'nyaḥ śābdavyavahāre pratītihetur asti, sā cet prathamaṃ śabdena pratipāditā, astu tatsaṃvādena vyaktipratyayaḥ, kiṃ tadabhidhānakalpanayā. ananyalabhyo hi śabdārtho bhavatīty ākṛtivācyatvam avaśyābhyupagamanīyam iti nityaikavyaktivācināṃ tu keṣāṃ cid evākāśādiśabdānāṃ sidhyed api nityaḥ saṃbandhaḥ, na bhūyasām. kriyāṅgabhāvas tv ākṛter vyaktidvārako vakṣyata eva, ataḥ prakṛtasaṃbandhautpattikatvasiddhāntopayoginīyam antarā cintā, śabdarūpacintāvat, tadartharūpacintāpīhaiva pradeśe yukt**etīheṣyata** ity uktam iti.*

ŚV *Ākṛti* 2

*nanv etad ākṛtivācyatvam ākṛtyadhikaraṇe vakṣyate jaiminināā, ataḥ kiṃ mudhaiva bhedena pratipādyetāta āha—**tatsadbhāveti**. ākṛtau hi siddhāyāṃ vācyatvanirūpaṇaṃ yuktam, asti hi keṣāñ cit sadbhāve 'pi vivādaḥ, atas tannirākaraṇārtham atra prayatyate, parastāt tu labdhātmikāyā vācyāvācyatve nirūpayiṣyete, iha tu tatsiddham eva vācyatvaṃ saṃvyavahārāyānīya prakṛtopayogitayopanyastam, **vyaktyā saha balābala** iti. vyaktivācyatvaṃ balavad ākṛtivācyatvam iti veti yuktir ākṛtivācyatve ākṛtyadhikaraṇe vakṣyata iti.*

ŚV *Ākṛti* 3

*nanu ca saṃsthānam ākṛtir iti prasiddham, tac ca prakṛtivyaktibhinnam iti tasya vyaktipakṣavad ānantyavyabhicārāv aparihāryau, ato vṛthaiva tadvācyatvādaraḥ, ata āha—**jātim iti**—ākriyate nirūpyate vyajyata iti yāvad iti. yadi jātir ākṛtiḥ kim evaṃ jātam.*

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[26] *pācakodbhidādīnāṃ*] G ; *pācakādbhidādīnāṃ* A
[27] *Tantravārttika ad* MS 3.1.12, v.21

*ata āha—**sāmānyam iti**—jātir hi piṇḍānāṃ sāmānyam ekākārāyā buddher nibandhanam ekam iti.*

ŚV *Ākṛti* 4
*tad evaṃ saty api kiṃ siddham. ata āha—**tannimittam iti**—tasyā ekākārāyā buddher nibandhanam. yad eva kiñ cid ekaṃ sārūpyānyanivṛttyātmakam api sāmānyam iṣyate, tatrānantyavyabhicārāsaṃbhavāc chabdagocaratvaṃ sidhyaty eva, arthabhede hi tau doṣāv āpadyete naikārthye, tad idaṃ sarvavādināṃ avivādasiddham eveti.*

ŚV *Ākṛti* 5
*tatsaṃbhavārtham atra prayatyata ity uktaṃ tatropapattim āha—**sarveti**. saṃvinniṣṭhā hi no vastuvyavasthitayaḥ, anugatavyāvṛttākārā ca nas saṃvid upajāyate, ato dvyātmakam eva vastu vyavasthāpayati, ākṛtisadbhāva eva nāntareṇa viśeṣam upapadyata iti, tatsadbhāvapratipādanapratijñayaiva viśeṣasadbhāvo 'py arthāt pratipādyatayā pratijñāyata iti yuktam eva dvyātmakatvapratipādanam iti.*

ŚV *Ākṛti* 6
*anyatarāpalāpavādināṃ tv anyatarabuddhir nopapadyata ity āha—**viśeṣeti**—nanv astīyam ubhayarūpā buddhir na tūbhayātmakatvam ekasya ghaṭate, nānātvaikatvayor virodhād viruddhadharmādhyāsasya dharmiṇo bhedāpādakatvān, na hi tad eva bhinnam abhinnam anugataṃ vyavṛttaṃ ceti śakyam avasātum. evaṃ sati parasparaviruddhātmanām api bhāvānām itaretarasaṃkarāpatter ekasvarūpam eva jagaj jāyeta, ato 'nyatarad atrālīkam iti prāpte kaiś cit sanmātrādvaitavādibhis sarvatra sadākārānugamād ekasya cānekatvavirodhāt sad eva somyedam agra āsīd ekam evādvitīyam iti śruteḥ. ekam eva tattvam anekadhā bhrāntair avasitam ity āśritam, dṛṣṭaṃ hy ekam eva mukham ādarśopādhibhedād anekadhā bhāsamānam. na[28] caikatvam alīkaṃ bhedāḥ pāramārthikā iti yuktam āśrayitum, śrutivirodhād anekakalpanāpātāc ca. na caikatve 'pi pramāṇāntaravirodhaḥ, pratyakṣasya vidhātur itaretarāsaṃkaro vyāpārāt. tad api sanmātragocaram evāto 'nādyavidyāsaṃskārānuviddham ekam eva tattvaṃ bhrāntair anekākāram avasīyata ity eke.*

anye tv anyatarāpalāpe prāpte ekatvam eva bhāvānām[29] apalapanti, te hy āhuḥ—vilakṣaṇasvabhāvā eva bhāvāḥ pratyakṣam upalabhyante naiṣām eka ātmā svābhāvikāspadaṃ labhate, sa hi na tāvad ebhyo nirvibhakto 'ṃgulibhya ivāṃguṣṭho dṛśyate, avibhāge ca tanmātrāpātaḥ. bhedābhedau caikasmād ekasya virodhād anupapannau.

api caikam anekatra vartate na vā, kathaṃ tāvad avartamānaṃ tatropalabhyate vartamānaṃ kārtsnyena bhāgaśo vā vartate. na tāvat kṛtsnam ekam ekadānekatra vartate, bhāgaśo vṛttis tu tadanabhyupagamād evāyuktā. tadabhyupagame vā, tatrāpi vartituṃ parāparabhāgābhyupagame 'navasthāpātaḥ. ato bhrāntir ekāvagraha aupādhiko vā, ekārthakriyākāritvāt. ekajātīyābhidhāneṣv[30] aupaniṣadā ivaikatvavādā iti. tad atraikatvaṃ bhrāntam aupacārikaṃ vā nānātvaṃ vā, śilāputrakasya deha itivat kalpayituṃ yuktam.

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[28] *na*] G ; *na* omitted in A
[29] *bhāvānām*] em. ; *bhāvanām* A, G
[30] *ekajātīyābhidhāneṣv*] conj. ; *ekajātīyābhimateṣu* A, G

ŚV *Ākṛti* 7
*dvyātmakatvāśrayaṇaṃ tu virodhād anupapannam evāta āha—**na cāpīti**—yathā tāvan na bhrāntis tathā darśayati—**dṛḍhatvād iti**—sarvadā hi sarveṣāṃ sarvatra dvyākārā buddhir upajāyate, sā kathaṃ bhrāntir bhaviṣyati, na hy asati kāraṇadoṣajñāne bādhakapratyaye vā bhrāntitvakalpanā yuktā, sarvamithyātvaprasaṅgāt. bhedābhedau tv ekatra saṃvidbalād evātropapādayiṣyāmaḥ. vṛttiparicodanām api vanopanyāsāvasare pariharişyāmaḥ. aupaniṣadās tv ekatvavādāḥ pratyakṣavirodhād aupacārikā vyākhyātavyāḥ, yathā ca pratyakṣaṃ bhedāvadhāraṇe samarthaṃ tat pratyakṣasūtre varṇitam.*

na ca dṛṣṭabhedāśrayaṇe gauravaṃ doṣāya, na hi dṛṣṭe 'nupapannaṃ nāma. kalpye hy anekakalpanālāghavena śakyate paribhavitum, na tu dṛṣṭe. ato 'nyatarabuddhibhrāntivādinām eva bhrāntir iti.

ŚV *Ākṛti* 8
*upacāraṃ nirākaroti—**mukhyayor iti**—asyābhiprāyaḥ—kva cid dṛṣṭaṃ hi rūpaṃ kva cid rūpe upacaryate. na cānyatarasatyatvavādinām anyatarat kva cin mukhyaṃ siddham, yenānyataran nopacaryeta mukhyayoḥ sāmānyaviśeṣayor ity arthaḥ.*

*nanu kim atrānyataradarśanena jñānākāra evāvidyāvatāṃ bahir iva prakāśate ata āha—**bāhyārtheti**. evaṃ hi manyate—sa khalv ākāra āntaro 'pi sann asan vā? na tāvad asato gaganakusumasyeva prakāśo yuktaḥ. saṃs tu jñānād bhinno 'bhinno vā? bhede tāvat bahirbhāvena kim aparāddham? asaṃbandhāviśeṣeṇānyatarasyāpi prakāśād bhinnasya prakāśāyogāt. varaṃ hi pratibhāsabalena bahir evāsāv astu. abhede tv ekasya karmakartṛbhāvānupapatteḥ prakāśāyoga eva. na hy aṃgulyagram ātmanātmānaṃ spraṣṭum*[31] *arhati. ato bahir bhāsamāna ākāro bāhya iti siddham.*

ŚV *Ākṛti* 9
*evaṃ tāvat pratītibalenobhayoḥ satyatvam uktam. idānīm ekasiddher evāparam antareṇāsaṃbhavād ākṣepato 'py aparam eṣitavyam ity āha—**anyonyeti**. sāmānyaṃ viśeṣān apekṣate viśeṣāś ca sāmānyam. ata ekasiddhāv arthād aparasiddher iti. atra kāraṇam āha—**viśeṣāṇām iti**. samānānāṃ hi bhāvaḥ sāmānyaṃ, tat kathaṃ bahūn viśeṣān antareṇātmānaṃ labhate. idaṃ hi viśeṣāṇāṃ viśeṣatvaṃ yat samānātmano bhāvān viśiṃṣanti. yathā dravyatvenaikajātīyāḥ pṛthivyādayaḥ pṛthivītvādibhiḥ parasparato vyāvartyante, ato viśeṣā api sāmānyasya bhavantīti te 'pi tadantareṇātmānam alabhamānās tad ākṣipanti. **hi**śabdo hetāv iti.*

ŚV *Ākṛti* 10
*tad evam upapāditam. dvyātmakatvaṃ prayogeṇa darśayati—**nirviśeṣam iti**. nirviśeṣaṃ paraparikalpitaṃ sāmānyam asat, nirviśeṣatvāt, śaśaviṣāṇavad iti, tathā paraparikalpitā niḥsāmānyā viśeṣā na santi, sāmānyarahitatvāc chaśaviṣāṇavad evety āha—**sāmānyeti**—tayor eva sādhyayos tāv eva sāmānyarahitatvād viśeṣarahitatvāc ceti. hetusāmānyātmakatvād viśeṣānātmakatvād ity anena rūpeṇa vācyāv ity āha—**tadanātmaketi**.*

[31] *spraṣṭum*] conj. ; *sprṣṭum* A, G

ŚV *Ākṛti* 11

*kiṃ punar evaṃ vacane phalam ata āha—**teneti**—yo hi manyate santu viśeṣāḥ sāmānyavantas. tadvat, kin tv atyantabhinnāv etau yathā kāṇādair abhyupagatam iti taṃ prati tadanātmakarūpeṇa hetuvacanena tādātmyaṃ sidhyati. yadā hi sāmānyānātmakatvād viśeṣā na santi, śaśaviśāṇavad iti sādhyate, tadā sāmānyānātmakatvasyāsattvena vyāptatvāt satāṃ viṣeṣāṇām avaśyam eva sāmānyātmakaṃ siddham iti. evam eva viśeṣānātmakatve 'pi darśayitavyam iti.*

ŚV *Ākṛti* 12

atra bauddhā vadanti—kim atra vastvantarābhyupagamena, santu viśeṣā eva ekabuddhihetavaḥ. katham anekākārāṃ dhiyam upajanayantīti ced, ekaṃ vā kathaṃ janayiṣyati. asti hi tasya ko 'pi śaktibhedo yathā janayiṣyatīti cet, śakyaṃ viśeṣeṣv api vaktum. kāryadarśanabalena hy ekasminn ivānekeṣām apy ekabuddhau śaktiḥ śakyate samarthayitum, dṛṣṭaṃ cānekeṣām apy ekakāryakaratvam, auṣadhabhedānām iva gadabhedapraśamanam, na ca "bhedāviśeṣāt kim iti ke cid evaikabuddhihetavo na vijātīyā" iti vācyam. śakter aparyanuyogyatvāt, yathā bhedā viśeṣe 'pi ke cid evauṣadhabhedāḥ kāryam ekam upajanayitum alam, na sarve. ataḥ kiṃ vṛttyādivikalpaparāhatayā jātyā, yadi viśeṣā evaikabuddhiṃ janayiṣyantīti.

*tat tāvad upanyasyati—**sāmānyeti rādantena**—evam upanyasya dūṣaṇābhidhitsayā vikalpayati—**teneti**. ayam arthaḥ—sā khalu viśeṣāṇāṃ śaktigrāhyā na vā. yadi gṛhyate, tadāpi hy ekānekā veti.*

ŚV *Ākṛti* 13-14

*tatraikā gṛhyate cety abhyupagame tāvaj jātir eva śabdāntareṇābhyupagatā bhavatīty āha—**gṛhyata iti**. agrāhyatve tu śakter anālaṃbanaivaikabuddhir āpadyate, tac ca nirākṛtam ity abhiprāyeṇāha—**bhaved iti**. nanv asti tāvac chaktiḥ, saivālaṃbanaṃ bhaviṣyati. ata āha—**na hīti**. nimittam api hi rūpādidhiyam, anālaṃbanaṃ ca kṣurādi svākārasamarpaṇe. na hi sarvaviṣayāṇām ālaṃbanatvam. ataḥ kathaṃ sanmātrā śaktir ālaṃbanaṃ bhaviṣyatīti.*

ŚV *Ākṛti* 15

*nanu viśeṣā evaikākārāyā buddher ālaṃbanaṃ, nimittaṃ tu śaktiḥ, ataḥ katham aviṣayatvam, ata āha—**paraspareti hyante'ntena**—viśeṣāṇām ālaṃbanatvaṃ, nānākāropahitā hi viśeṣās tadrūpām eva buddhim upajanayituṃ samarthā iti. ekaṃ tu kim api rūpaṃ ekabuddher viṣayo yuktaḥ, sa ca viśeṣeṣu bhavadbhir neṣyata ity ata āha—**viṣayāsattvād iti**. śaktis tv ekābhyupagatāpy agrāhyatvād aviṣaya evety utkam evety āha—**śaktir iti**.*

ŚV *Ākṛti* 16

*bhinnā gṛhyata ity atra dūṣaṇam āha—**bhinnatveneti**. api ca śaktis tadvadbhyo bhidyate vā na vā. na tāvad bhinnā nirbhāsate, bhinnā ca satī kathaṃ viśeṣān ekākārayā buddhyā bodhayati. abhede tu viśeṣamātrāpātaḥ. te ca nānātmāno naikabuddher viṣayā ity uktam evety abhiprāyeṇāha—**viśeṣeti**.*

ŚV *Ākṛti* 17

nanu kim idaṃ bhinnām eva śaktim aṅgīkṛtya vārttikakṛtā vikalpyate. na hi bauddhair bhāvasvabhāvātiriktā śaktir iṣyate. vilakṣaṇasvabhāvā eva tu ke cid eva svalakṣaṇabhedā ekākāravikalpahetava iti tair uktam. eta eva ca śaktaya ity ucyante. nanu tebhyo bhinnam abhinnaṃ vā śaktitattvam aparam asti, kiñ cit satyam aniṣṭam api tair āpadya vārttikakṛtā dūṣitam. evaṃ hi manyate, kathaṃ vyāvṛttasvabhāvā bhāvā anugatākārabuddhihetavaḥ. na ced, anugatam api rūpam eṣām asti kiñ cit. vyāvṛttātmāno hy ete vyāvṛttyavagrahahetavaḥ, te 'pi cet anuvṛttibuddher hetuḥ, tām eva janayeyuḥ. na hy ekajātīyakāryanirmāṇaṃ kāraṇaṃ vijātīyakāryanirmāṇāya prabhavati. uktaṃ hi—tair eva tadatadrūpiṇo[32] *bhāvās tadatadrūpahetujā*[33] *iti.*

api ca vilakṣaṇasvabhāvā bhāvā ity eva kutaḥ. vailakṣaṇyabodhād iti cet, atas tarhi sālakṣaṇyabodhātmalakṣaṇatvam api vailakṣaṇyaviruddham, sālakṣaṇyam aśakyam abhyupetum iti cet, itarad vā, kiṃ na tena virudhyate. mithyātvahetudvayābhāvas tu dvayor api samāna iti samānadvayam.

yat tu bhinnānām api bheṣajabhedānām ekaṃ kāryam ity uktam, tan na, kāryabhedāt. mustāmalakādayo hi svaśaktyanusāreṇaikaikadoṣam upaghnantaḥ pittādisamutthaṃ rogam upaghnantīti. na tatra kāryam ekam anekeṣām, kṣīraśarkarayor apy ekapittopapaśam anena kāraṇabhāvaḥ. dravyadvayānuyāyinaḥ śītamadhuratvasyaikakāryatvāt[34]*. rasasparśayor api tadāśritayor dhātugatarasasparśadoṣanivāraṇena bhinnakāryatvāt. ato na kva cid atyantabhinnajātīyānām ekajātīyaṃ kāryam. asti vā kāryāntaram ekam api vijātīyānām. buddhis tu naikajātīyā vijātīyair upajanyamānā dṛśyate, na hi ta eva bheṣajabhedā ekajātīyāṃ buddhim upajanayanto dṛśyante. tasmād eṣitavyasvalakṣaṇeṣu ko 'py ekātmāyam ekākārabuddhir gocarayatīty āpādya vikalpya śaktāv utkā doṣā ity ato viśeṣāṇāṃ śakter vaikabuddher anāspadatvāt tebhyo bhinnā tadviparyayabhūtā jātir eṣitavyety āha—**bhinneti**.*

*nanu iṣṭāpy asau yatraiva piṇḍe samavetā tatraiva svākārāṃ buddhim upajayatīti kathaṃ piṇḍāntare buddhir ata āha—**sarvatreti**. sarvapiṇḍānugatā hy asau, atas sarvatra bodho vānupapanna iti.*

*nanv evam ekaikatra kṛtsnabodho nopapadyate, na hi pratyekaṃ samāpto guṇa upalabhyate. 'ta āha—**pratyeketi**. pratyekaṃ kṛtsnaparisamāptā hy asāu, ataḥ pratyekaṃ kṛtsnabodho nānupapannaḥ. tathā saty ekatvam upariṣṭād vadiṣyata iti.*

ŚV *Ākṛti* 18

*ato 'sti viśeṣāṇām ātmīyo dharmabhedaḥ ko 'py ekabuddhiviṣaya iti siddham. sa tu yathāruci śaktijātyādiśabdenābhidhīyatām ity upasaṃharati—**teneti**.*

ŚV *Ākṛti* 19-20

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[32] *tadatadrūpiṇo*] G ; *tadetadrūpiṇo* A
[33] PV 3.251ab
[34] *śītamadhuratva*] A ; *maghura* G

*atra codayati—**nanv iti**. asyārthaḥ—asaty api sāmānyāntarayoge parāparasāmānyeṣu tāvad dravyatvādiṣu sāmānyaṃ sāmānyam ity ekākārā buddhiḥ jāyamānā dṛṣṭā, atas tadvaj jātyādibuddhir bhrāntir eveti atra dūṣaṇam āha—**vaneti**. asyārthaḥ—yathā jātipratyayamithyātveva na dhiyo mithyātvam. upadarśitam evam etad apīti kathaṃ tulyatvam ata āha—**bhrāntitveneti**—yathā vanadhiyo mithyātvena na jātibuddhir mithyā, evaṃ sāmānyeṣv api sāmānyam ity anugatākārabuddher mithyātvena gotvādibuddhir mithyā, bādhakābhāvād iti.*

ŚV *Ākṛti* 21
*kiṃ punas tadbhrāntitvena gotvādibuddhir bhrāntir ata āha—**śabdād iti**. sattādau hy ekasāmānyaśabdaprayoganibandhano 'yam ekāvasāyaḥ. śabdāt pūrvam anavagateḥ. ato vṛkṣādiṣv iva nānātmasv ekavanaśabdanibandhanā sattādiṣv apy ekasāmānyaśabdanibandhanaikabuddhiḥ bhrāntir iti yuktam. iha tu gavādāv aśabdajo 'py ekam ākāraṃ budhyata iti naikaśabdanibandhanatayā śakya upapādayitum, ato 'sti nūnam asyā buddher eko viṣayo yo jātir ity ucyata iti siddhaṃ sāmānyam iti. anyat tu matam asti sāmānyeṣv api parāparabhinneṣv ekaṃ vastutvaṃ sāmānyaṃ, tannibandhanāv ekaśabdaprayogapratibhāsāv iti. tad upanyasyati—**vastutvam iti**.*

ŚV *Ākṛti* 22-23
*idaṃ nirākaroti—**evaṃ tv iti**. ayam abhiprāyaḥ—na tāvat sāmānye 'py ekākāro bhāsate, yadi paraṃ kalpanāmātram idam. evaṃ ca kalpyamāno 'nantasāmānyakalpanāpāta iti katham ānantyam ato āha—**punas teneti**. tena vastutvena sahānyeṣu gotvādiṣu sāmānyaśabdaprayogāt sāmānyamatir astīti tatsiddhyartham aparasāmānyakalpanā. evaṃ ca tatra tatra prasaṅgena sāmānyānantyaprasaṅga iti. vastuparyāye ca sāmānyaśabde viśeṣāṇām api vastuśabdagocaratvāt, sattādivat sāmānyatvāpāta ity āha—**viśeṣeti vāntena**. ato naitad vastutvaṃ sāmānyam upapadyata ity āha—**teneti**—kathaṃ tarhy anekeṣu sāmānyeṣv ekaḥ śabdo vartate.*

ŚV *Ākṛti* 24
*nanv evam anantās tasya śaktayaḥ kalpanīyā bhaveyur ata āha—**tasmād iti**. yato na jātiśabdo 'yam ity upapāditam, ata ekaṃ kiñ cin upādhim āśrityānekeṣv ekaḥ śabdo vartata ity āśrayaṇīyam. asti cāsāv upādhiḥ yeyam ekasyānekatra vṛttir ekadhīkaraṇaṃ vā. sarvaṃ khalv api sāmānyam ekaṃ sad anekatra vartate, ekākārāṃ ca dhiyaṃ kārayatīty upapannam ekopādhikam ekaśabdavācyatvam. **karaṇeneti** bhāve lyuḍ iti.*

ŚV *Ākṛti* 25
*atra vaiśeṣikair ākāśādivat sarvagataṃ sāmānyam āśritam, tatsadbhāvapratipādanaprasaṅgena dūṣayati—**piṇḍeṣv iti**. piṇḍadvayāntarāle hi pratyakṣābhāvan nirākṛtaḥ sāmānyasadbhāvo dūrābhyupagama iti. hetvantaram āha—**na hīti**. na khalu sāmānyaṃ nāma kiñ cid ākāśāditulyaṃ tattvam api tarhi rūpam eva, tadvatāṃ samānānāṃ bhāvaḥ sāmānyam iti hi nirūpyate, tat katham asatsv āśrayeṣu bhaviṣyatīti.*

ŚV *Ākṛti* 26-27

*śakyaṃ tv idam api sarvagatatvam upapādayitum ity anvāruhyavādenāha—**yad veti**. sarvagatasya vyaktayo 'bhivyañjakāḥ. ato yatraiva tāḥ santi, tatraivābhivyaktiḥ nāntarā gṛhyata iti pūrvoktena saṃbandha iti. kathaṃ punar vyakter eva tadabhivyaktiśaktir avagamyate 'ta āha—**śaktir iti**. kāryadarśanasamadhigamyā hi śaktiḥ. abhivyaktidarśanaṃ cātra kāryam. ato yatraivābhivyaktir upalabhyate, **tad eva hi** tadabhivyaktau **śaktaṃ**, vyaktiṣu cābhivyaktir upalabhyata iti. tā eva tacchaktā ity avagamyanta iti.*
*nanv evam api mā nāma svatantram upalabhyatām, vyaktiṣv eva tu vā sarvāsu kiṃ naikaṃ sāmānyam upalabhyate 'ta āha—**tenaiveti**. vyaktiśaktyanurodhenety arthaḥ.*

ŚV *Ākṛti* 28
*vyaktiśaktyanuparodham eva sphuṭayati—**bhinnatve 'pīti**. parasparabhedāviśeṣe 'pi kāś cid eva vyaktayaḥ kiñ cid eva sāmānyam abhivyañjanti na sarvās sarvam iti. śaktito vyavasthāsiddhir iti. śaktivyavasthaiva kiṃkāritety avācyam eva, aparyanuyojyatvāt bhāvaśaktinām ity āha—**na ceti**.*

ŚV *Ākṛti* 29
*atraiva dṛṣṭāntam āha—**vahnir**[35] **iti**. jalādibhūtāviśeṣe 'pi vahnir eva dahanaśakto nākāśam iti kasya hetor iti na kaś cit paryanuyoktuṃ śakyata iti, na cātra darśanātiriktaṃ yuktyantaram arthanīyam, api tu yathādarśanam evābhyupeyam ity āha—**na ceti**.*

ŚV *Ākṛti* 30
*katham asati yuktyantare darśanam eva pramāṇam iti ced ata āha—**na hīti**. nirākṛtaṃ hi saṃvādataḥ prāmāṇyam, ataḥ kiṃ yuktyantareṇa. anarthakam arthaśūnyam apramāṇam iti yāvad iti. aṅgīkṛtaṃ tāvat ke cit vyaktibhedāḥ*[36] *kiñ cit sāmānyam abhivyañjantīti. kena ca cihnenedam upalakṣaṇīyam "anenedaṃ sāmānyam abhivyajyata" iti, na hy avyabhicāriṇā dharmeṇa vinā śakyam upalakṣayitum, na ca sāsnādaya eva gotvādīnām upalakṣaṇam iti yuktam, teṣām api sāmānyātmanām upalakṣaṇāntareṇa vinopalakṣayitum aśakyatvāt. evaṃ cānavasthāpāta ity āśaṅkyāha—**dharma iti**.*

ŚV *Ākṛti* 31
*kathaṃ na mṛgyo 'ta āha—**nānumāneti**—na hi tat sāmānyam anumānagamyaṃ yena lakṣaṇam apekṣyate. anumānaṃ hy avyabhicāriṇā cihnena vinātmānam alabhamānaṃ tad apekṣate, sāmānyaṃ tu pratyakṣasamadhigamyaṃ tad yatraivendriyasannikarṣād avagamyate, tatraiva tad iti kim atropalakṣaṇeneti. kathaṃ punaḥ pratyakṣaṃ sāmānyam. na hi tat sannikṛṣṭam anubhūyate. nānātmānas tu viśeṣā aikarūpyeṇāvagamyanta iti atasmiṃs*[37] *tadgrahaṇād bhrāntir eveyaṃ śuktirajatajñānavat. pramāṇaṃ ca vastusthitaye prabhavati nābhāsam. ata eva vaiśeṣikair anumeyam eva sāmānyam iṣyate. te hi nirbījabhrāntyayogād eva tadbījatayā sāmānyānumānam āhuḥ. ataḥ katham ucyate nānumānāvagamyaṃ tad iti.*

[35] *vāhnir*] G ; *vāhnar* A
[36] *ke cit vyaktibhedāḥ*] em. ; *ke…ktibhedāḥ* A, G
[37] *atasmiṃs*] em. ; *tasmiṃs* A, G

atrocyate—nātrānyad anyākāreṇānubhūyate, ekānekarūpatvād[38] *vastunaḥ. anyarūpasaṃbhinnaṃ hy anyad anubhūyamānam pratyakṣaṃ bhavati, na nityaṃ tenaiva. ata indriyasaṃbandhānusārād aparokṣanirbhāsāc ca sāmānyaviśeṣayor abhinnaṃ pratyakṣatvam. idaṃ ca savikalpakasiddhau vistareṇopapāditam eva.*

*na ca bhrāntibījatayā śakyānumānaṃ sāmānyaṃ. bhrāntiḥ svapnādāv adṛṣṭakāritāpi bhavati, dṛṣṭam api ca sādṛśyam ekārthakriyākāritvaṃ ca bhedānām abhedabhramahetutayā pariplavata eveti na bhrānter aikāntikaṃ sāmānyānumānam iti sūktaṃ—**nānumānāvagamyaṃ tad** iti.*

nanv asaṃbandhayor jātivyaktyos tadrūpabodhānupapatter avaśyaṃ saṃbandhahetunā kena cid bhavitavyam. na ca viśeṣā eva saṃbandhahetava iti sāṃpratam. kathaṃ hi vyāvṛttasvabhāvā viśeṣā ekam anugatākāraṃ niyantum utsahante, tathā sati ta eva dhiyam apy ekākārāṃ janayeyuḥ. ato 'vaśyaṃ sāmānyāntaram evāparasāmānyaviśeṣasaṃbandhahetur iti vācyam, tad api sāmānyaṃ sāmānyāntarāsaṃbandham asamartham saṃbandhaṃ kartum ity anena krameṇa parāparasāmānyābhyupagame sāmānyānavasthāpātaḥ.

*tad etat sarvam āśaṃkyāha—**svābhāvikaś ceti**. ayam abhiprāyaḥ—nātra rajjughaṭayor iva jātivyaktyor atyantabhinnayoḥ saṃbandhaḥ, api tarhi tādātmyam eva. vyaktir hi svakāraṇato jāyamānaiva tattadākārā niṣpadyate, ataḥ svābhāvike tādātmye kasya kena saṃbandho yo 'nyanibandhano bhavet. saṃbandhapadena cātra tādātmyam evābhipretam, tathā copariṣṭād vakṣyati. tādātmyam eva kasmāc ced ity āha—**teneti**[39]. svābhāvike saṃbandhe na tatsiddhaye sāmānyāntaram eṣitavyam ato nānavastheti.*

ŚV *Ākṛti* 32-33
*yathā ca kāś cid eva vyaktayaḥ svabhāvataḥ kiñcitsāmānyābhivyaktiśaktā ity uktam, evam etasyāpi tādātmyasaṃbandhasya kṛte na svabhāvo hetutayā vāryata ity āha—**śaktīti**. astu vā vaiśeṣikādivad bhinnayor eva jātivyaktyor anyanimittakas saṃbandhas tathāpi tāvad anavasthā supariharety āha—**yad veti**. jātivyaktyor hi saṃbandhe dṛṣṭe yāvatā tad upapadyate, tāvanmātram eva pratīkṣyate, na tv adṛṣṭaṃ saṃbandhakāntaram api labhyante ceha svābhāvikaśaktiśālinaḥ kecid eva viśeṣāḥ ye kiñ cid eva sāmānyam ātmani vartayanti, atas tāvataiva nirākāṃkṣye jāte nānāsthā yukteti.*

ŚV *Ākṛti* 34
*atra codayati—**na vyañjantīti**. ayam abhiprāyaḥ—yadi viśeṣā eva sāmānyātmani vṛttihetavas tadā sarve sarvasya prāpnuyur bhedāviśeṣāt. iha ca na vyañjantīti vyaktyā vṛttim upalakṣayati tat phalatvāt tasyā iti. pariharati—**yata iti**. yata eva hetos teṣv apareṣu vijātīyaviśeṣeṣu sarvagatasāmānyapakṣe vartamānāpi jātir na dṛśyate, ata eva na vartata iti. tam eva hetum abhivyanakti—**tebhyo 'pīti**. yathā teṣu satyām api vṛttau svabhāvata eva na dṛśyate, evaṃ tebhyo nivṛttyartham api svabhāvato 'nyo hetur na mṛgyaḥ. svabhāvata ity*

[38] *ekānekarūpatvād*] G ; *rūpatvatvād* A
[39] *kasmāc ced ity āha—teneti*] conj. ; *kasmāc ced iti tena* G ; *kasmāc ceti tena* A

anyā yadi saty anyayoganimittā pañcamīti. nivṛttir avṛttiḥ. etad uktaṃ bhavati – svabhāvahetukaiva keṣāṃ cit sāmānyānāṃ kebhyo viśeṣebhyo nivṛttir iti.

ŚV *Ākṛti* 35-36
*atra codayati—**sāmānyam iti** dvayena. ayam arthaḥ—yadi tu nānātmāno viśeṣā ekarūpasāmānyavṛttihetavaḥ, santv ekākārāyā gotvādibuddher hetavaḥ, kiṃ gotvādisāmānyagraheṇa. yathā hi bhedāviśeṣe 'pi kasya cit sāmānyasya keṣu cid viśeṣeṣu svabhāvād eva nimittāntaranirapekṣā vṛttiḥ, tathā gotvādibuddhir api keṣu cit svabhāvād eva bhaviṣyati. vṛttiśabdena vṛttimantaṃ lakṣayati, na vidyate vṛttir asyety avṛttiḥ, tayor bhāvo vṛttyavṛttitā. **animittāpīti** svabhāvātiriktanimittāntaraśūnyāpīty arthaḥ.*

ŚV *Ākṛti* 37
*pariharati—**viṣayeṇeti**. ekākārā hi naḥ śābaleyādibhedeṣu buddhir upajāyate, na ca nirviṣayā buddhir ātmānaṃ labhate, ato viśeṣād anyat sāmānyam eṣitavyam iti.*

ŚV *Ākṛti* 38
*nanu viśeṣā evaikabuddheḥ svabhāvād ālaṃbanaṃ bhaviṣyanty ata āha—**tā hīti**—nānātmāno viśeṣā*[40] *ata ekabuddher ālaṃbanaṃ yujyante, svākārārpaṇenālaṃbanatvāt, na ca nānātmanām ekākārabuddhijananasvabhāvatvam upapadyate, svarūpanāśāpātāt. buddhinibandhanaṃ hi bhāvānāṃ nānātvam ekatvaṃ ca. ataḥ katham ekadhīgocarā nānā bhaviṣyanti, yadi ca bhinnānām ekadhījananasvabhāvatvam, nānābuddhir idānīṃ kena janayitavyā. sāpi tair eva. yathā hy ekānekasvabhāvam ekam, evam ubhayavidhabuddhijananasvabhāvam api kiṃ neṣyate. astu tāvat. tat tu vyāvṛttam anugataṃ ceti pramāṇabalābala…nta*[41] *ubhayaṃ samarthayāma ity uktam eva. atas tā ekarūpā buddhayas tenaikena sāmānyena vinā bhinneṣu jāyamānā atasmiṃs tadgrahā mithyā bhaveyuḥ. tac ca hetudvayābhāvād ayuktam ity abādhitākārā buddhir eva svagocaram ekam upakalpayatīti.*
*nanu yathaikena vinā viśeṣeṣu buddhir ekā nopapadyata iti sāmānyam iṣyate, evam ekasya vṛttir anekeṣv ekaṃ vinā nopapadyata iti taddhetur apy eṣitavyo bhaved ata āha—**na tv anyeneti**. svākārārpaṇena hi viṣayabhāvo bhavati na vṛttihetutvam apīti bhāvaḥ.*

ŚV *Ākṛti* 39
*api ca viśeṣānugataṃ hi sāmānyam anicchatā śabdānumānayor aprāmāṇyam āpadyata ity āha—**aniṣyamāṇeti syād-**antena. kuto na syād ata āha—**na hīti**. saṃbandhāvadhāraṇādhīnā śabdānumānayor vṛttiḥ. na ca bhedaiḥ saṃbandho 'vagantuṃ śakyate, teṣām ānantyād iti.*

ŚV *Ākṛti* 40
*yady evaṃ jātyā vṛttyānantyāt saṃbandho durgraha iti kathaṃ tābhyo jātiḥ pratyeṣyate. athātra sanmātratayā saṃbandha upayujyate, samānam idam anumāne 'pīty āha—**anubhūteti**. anumāne hi saṃbandho 'nubhūta eva pramāṇodaye kāraṇam, ata eva jñātasaṃbandhasyety uktam.*

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[40] *viśeṣā*] em. ; *viśeṣān* A, G
[41] This part is damaged in both A and G.

ŚV *Ākṛti* 41

*pratyakṣā tu jātir uktā, na tasyā vyaktyā saha saṃbandhānubhave prayojanam iti yadi tarhi bhinnānām eva keṣāñ cid viśeṣāṇām ekasāmānyaniyāmikā śaktir iṣṭā, astu tarhi saivaikākārabuddher ālaṃbanam, kiṃ sāmānyāntarābhyupagamenāta āha—**siddha iti** sārdhena. asyārthaḥ—na sāmānyāntarānapekṣā śaktir jātibuddher viṣayaḥ śakyate 'vagantum, śakter eva gotvādisiddhim antareṇāvagantum aśakyatvāt. arthāpattyupalabdhā hi śaktiḥ. sā ca kāryadarśanasamadhigamyā. iha gotvādisāmānyajñānam eva kāryam anupapadyamānaṃ tanniyāmikāṃ śaktim upakalpayati, ataḥ kathaṃ tatprasūtā śaktis tad eva bādhitum arhati, tadbādhe hi na sāpy ātmānaṃ labheteti.*

ŚV *Ākṛti* 42

*nanu syād evam, yadi gotvādisāmānyasiddhipurassarī śaktisiddhir bhavet, adya punaḥ śaktir eva gavādisaṃvidāṃ gocara iti kaḥ svahetubādho 'ta āha—**śaktiś ceti.** naitayā gavādibuddhyā gṛhyata iti vakṣyamāṇena saṃbandha iti. kim iti na gṛhyate 'ta āha—**nendriyais sā hi gṛhyata iti**. yathā śakter anaindriyakatvaṃ tathārthāpattāv uktam, grāhyatve ca tasyā vikalpya dūṣaṇam uktam iti.*

ŚV *Ākṛti* 43-44

*idānīṃ yad uktaṃ saṃbandhagrahaṇe sāmānyāntarābhyupagame 'niṣṭheti viśeṣaśaktyabhyupagamena ca parihṛtaṃ "viśeṣeṣv eva labdheṣu" iti[42], tatraiva dūṣaṇāntaram āha—**sāmānyeti**.*

*asyārthaḥ—sāmānyāpalāpārthaṃ hi sāmānyāntarayogānām anavasthā codyate, na cāpāditāpy anavasthā tannāśāya prabhavati, pratyakṣadṛṣṭasāmānyāpalāpasya duṣkaratvāt varaṃ pramāṇabalād āyātas sāmānyapravāho 'bhyupagato na tu dṛṣṭasāmānyanāśa iti. evam api tāvad dṛṣṭabādhaḥ pratyuddhriyeta, yadi tu saṃbandhataddhetvapekṣas sāmānyagraho bhavet. tadā hi tatkalpanātaḥ pūrvam apratiṣṭhitaṃ sāmānyajñānaṃ nānavasthayā sāmānyanāśaṃ śaknoti bādhitum. iha punas tannirapekṣam eva labdhātmakaṃ sāmānyajñānam iti kim anavasthāparicodanā kariṣyatīty āha—**saṃbandheti**.*

ŚV *Ākṛti* 45

*nanu sāsnādibodhāyattam eva sāmānyajñānaṃ darśayati— nāgṛhītaviśeṣaṇā viśeṣye buddhir yataḥ, evaṃ ca tadbodhasyāpi parāyattatvād anavasthā prāpnoty evety ata āha—**sāsnādīti**. asyārthaḥ—kaś śabdārtha iti pṛṣṭe tam upalakṣayituṃ sāsnādy upalakṣaṇaṃ bhāṣyakāreṇoktam. etad uktaṃ bhavati— sāsnādimatyāṃ vyaktau yo 'yam ākāraḥ pratyakṣaṃ prathate, sa śabdārtha iti. nanu parāyattā saṃvid etāvatā sāmānyasyocyate, upalakṣaṇatvaṃ ca sāsnādes tadekārthasaṃbandhitvād gotvasyopapannam eveti[43]. kathaṃ punas sāmānyāsamavetaṃ sāsnādi tasyopalakṣaṇaṃ. dravyasamavāyinā hi śuklādinā guṇenopalakṣaṇaṃ dṛṣṭam, śuklāṃ śāṭīm ānayeti yathā, ataḥ katham upalakṣaṇam ata āha—**na ceti.** nāvaśyaṃ svasamavetam eva cihnam iṣyate, saṃbandhamātranibandhanatvāc cihnabhāvasya. bhavati kuṇḍalam asamavetam api kaṭhasya cihnaṃ "kuṇḍalī kaṭhaḥ" iti.*

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[42] Cf. ŚV *Ākṛti* 33cd: *viśeṣeṣv eva labdheṣu keṣu cin nānyavāñchanam* ||

[43] *upapannam eveti*] G ; *upapannayeti* A

ŚV *Ākṛti* 46-47

*abhedapakṣāśrayaṇena vā jātivyaktyor vyaktau samavetam ākṛtau samavetam ity api śakyam upalakṣayitum ity āha—**sāsnādīti**. bhedavādimatāśrayaṇenāsmābhiḥ saṃbandhahetvanapekṣaṇena prāg anavasthā parihāro 'bhihitaḥ. paramārthena tūbhayātmakatvād vastunaḥ kasya kutra vṛttir yatra tatsiddhaye hetvantarāpekṣā syād ity āha—**kasmād iti**. asyārthaḥ—sāsnādimatsv eva kasmād gotvam upalabhyata iti pṛṣṭe tādātmyenottaraṃ deyam iti. tādātmyaparyanuyoge 'pi svabhāva evottaram ity āha—**tādātmyam iti**. etac ca "svābhāvikaś ca saṃbandhaḥ" ityatroktam api saṃbandhapadena vyāmohitam, bhedāśrayatvāt saṃbandhasya. iha tu spaṣṭam eva tādātmyam uktam ity apaunaruktyam iti.*

ŚV *Ākṛti* 48-49

*kiṃ punaḥ svābhāvikyām ākṛtivyaktivyavasthāyāṃ pramāṇam, ata āha—**upalabdhīti**. darśanapramāṇakā hi vayaṃ yathādarśanam eva bhāvānāṃ rūpam ātiṣṭhāmahe ity ayaṃ gaur iti pratibhāsabalena tādātmyam eva vyaktyākṛtyor avasthāpayāma iti.*

*atra ke cit pāramārthikam eva vyaktyākṛtivibhāgam iṣṭvākṛtīnām avāntarabhede vivadante. evaṃ hi vadanti—sattā jātir ekā gavāśvādivyañjakapiṇḍabhedabhinnā prakāśate, sarvaṃ hi jagad ekākāreṇābhinnam avabhāsate, ataḥ kim avāntarasāmānyāśrayaṇena. mahān khalv ayaṃ kleśo yad ekasya nityasyānekāsv anityāsu vyaktiṣu vṛttyabhyupagamaḥ. sa varam ekatraivāśrīyatām. dṛṣṭā ca vyañjakabhedānuvidhāyinī bhedabuddhiḥ, śabdādīnām iva śrotrādyupādhikā, mukhasyevādarśopādhiketi. tān praty āha—**svata iti**. kāraṇam āha—**mā bhūd iti**. yadi vyañjakabhedanibandhano 'yam ākṛtīnāṃ bhedo bhavet, drutādaya iva śabdadharmā vyañjakadhvanyupādhikā mithyā syāt. na ca tadvad eva mithyaivāyam iti śakyate vaktum, bodhakābhāvād iti bhāvaḥ. vyañjakabhedanibandhane ca vyaṅgyabhede vyañjakabhedaḥ kiṃkṛto vaktavyaḥ. svābhāvikaś cet kim aparāddhaṃ vyaṅgyabhedena hetvantarābhyupagame 'navasthānam, ata eva ca nendriyādibhedanibandhano rūpādibhedo buddhibhedanibandhanatvāt. mukhe tu bādhakabalena yuktam ādarśopādhikatvāśrayaṇam.*

ŚV *Ākṛti* 50

*tad etad āha—**vyañjakasyeti**. yadi tu vaiyātyād vyañjakabhedaṃ vyaṅgyabhedanibandhanaṃ brūyād anyonyāśrayatvaṃ labhata ity āha—**vyaṅgyeti**. yataś cāyaṃ na paropādhiko jātibhedo ghaṭate, tasmād vyaktibhedavat svābhāvikaḥ pratīyatām ity āha—**tasmād iti**.*

ŚV *Ākṛti* 51-52

*atra codayati—**aneketi**. yad etad ubhayātmakatvam ekasya vastuna uktam, tad ayuktam. kathaṃ hi viruddhadharmāv eko dharmī pratīcchati, bhedanibandhanatvāt tasya. dvyātmakatvāśrayaṇe cāvaśyam ekasya viruddhadharmatvam. anekavṛttir hi sāmānyam ananyavṛttayo viśeṣāḥ, tayor ekatvenetaretaradharmasaṃkarāpattiḥ. ananyavṛttināṃ viśeṣāṇām anekavṛttitā, anekavartinaś ca sāmānyasyānanyavṛttitvam iti virodhaḥ. ataḥ kathaṃ viruddhobhayadharmakam ekam iti. pūrvoktau bhrāntyupacāravādāv eva varam āśritau. ko hi pramāṇavirodhe viśeṣa iti. ekātmakatvāśrayaṇe cānyatararūpāpahārāpattir iti.*

*prayogeṇa darśayati—**bhinnebhyaś ceti.** sāmānyātmā bhinnaḥ, bhinnebhyo viśeṣebhyo 'nanyatvād, viśeṣātmavat. vyaktīnāṃ vaikatvam, ekasmād gosāmānyād ananyatvāt, sāmānyātmavad iti.*

ŚV *Ākṛti* 53
*virodhāntarāṇy upanyasyati—**eketi**. katham ekam eva vastu ekam anekam, anyad ananyat[44], sāmānyaṃ[45] viśeṣa iti ca śakyāvagamaḥ. ādiśabdopāttāś ca sthityutpattivināśa-sadasadbhāvagocarā virodhā darśayitavyāḥ. sthāyinī hi jātir iṣyate 'sthāyino viśeṣāḥ, utpattidharmakā viśeṣā anutpattidharmakaṃ sāmānyam, sāmānyam anaśvaraṃ naśvarā viśeṣāḥ, tad anayor ekātmakatvaṃ duṣyati. ato virodha ity alam anena.*

santu viśadāvabhāsino viśeṣā evākṣajāyāṃ buddhau bhāsamānāḥ, kim apramāṇakena jātyabhyupagamena. nānātmāno viśeṣāḥ katham ekākārāyā buddher ālaṃbanaṃ bhaviṣyanti. tad asyā eva buddher draḍhimnaḥ kāraṇabhūtam aparaṃ viśeṣānugataṃ rūpaṃ kalpayāma iti cet, tan na. kāryabhūtā hi buddhiḥ kāraṇam ākṣipantī yadanantarabhāvinī tatkāraṇī kārayati, svalakṣaṇadarśanasamanantarabhāvinī ca seti vyaktaya eva saṃsavedanadvāreṇa tasyāḥ kāraṇam. nanv anānābhūtās tā ekasmai kāryāya na ghaṭanta iti sāṃpratam. dṛṣṭaṃ hi bhinnānām api cakṣurālokādīnām ekaṃ rūpādijñānātmakaṃ kāryam.

yat tu kathaṃ nānātmanām ekākārabuddhiviṣayatvam iti, "viṣayeṇa hi buddhinām" ity[46] atroktam. kena vā tāsāṃ viṣayatayā kāraṇatvam āśrīyate, viśadāvabhāsinyo hi tāḥ, ekākārā ca dhīr aviśadaviṣayā abhilāpasaṃsargayogyaviṣayatvāt. abhilāpānāṃ ca viśadāvabhāsahetubhāvāsaṃbhavād abhilāpāntare tathā darśanāt. iha tu

samasamayabhāvini vikalpakasvalakṣaṇaviṣayaviśadadarśanabhāvitvāt tathāvabhāsaḥ, tadabhāve tathānupalaṃbhāt. kasya tarhi gaur iti buddhāv ākāraḥ prathate. na kasya cid, vikalpākāra evāyam iti vadanti. iyaṃ ca dhīr ekākārā svākāreṇābhedabhājā nitāntabhedavatīnām api vyaktīnām ākāraṃ saṃvṛṇotīti saṃvṛtir iti gīyate.

kim idānīṃ jñānākāra evāyam āpannaḥ. tathā nāmeti kecit. na tv evam api bahiravabhāsāt, na cārthagata evānekatvavirodhāpātāt, kin tu asann eva jñānaṃ bhāsamānam anubhāsate, śabdam iva pratiśabda ity anye. katham asadarthā dhīr arthakriyākāraṇam iti cen na, pāraṃparyeṇārthapratilaṃbhāt. svalakṣaṇadarśanaprabhavā hi vikalpās tadgrahaṇābhimānino jātās tatra naraṃ pravartayanto vyavahārāṃśaṃ bhavanti. svayaṃ cāsaty api vastupratilaṃbhe paraṃparayā tatpratibandhāt tal laṃbhayanti. maṇidhīr iva maṇiprabhāviṣayāyāḥ. maṇidhiyo 'sadarthatayā mithyātvāviśeṣe 'pi pāraṃparyeṇārthapratilaṃbhāt tatpratilaṃbhahetutayā viśeṣyāḥ. yathāhuḥ—
maṇipradīpaprabhayor maṇibudhyābhidhāvatoḥ |
mithyājñānāviśeṣe 'pi viśeṣo 'rthakriyāṃ prati || iti.[47]

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[44] *ananyat*] G ; *anantyat* A
[45] *sāmānyaṃ*] em. ; *sāmānya* A, G
[46] Cf. ŚV *Ākṛti* 37ab: *viṣayeṇa hi buddhīnāṃ vinā notpattir iṣyate* |
[47] PV 3.57

śāstracintakānāṃ caiṣa vivekaḥ, pratipattāras tu nirvikalpakadṛśyābhilāpavikalpyāv ekīkṛtya bāhyam evābhimanyamānā vyavahāre pravartante. pravṛttāś cārthapratilaṃbhenāvisaṃvādaṃ manyante, dṛśyavikalpyaikatāvasāyaś cātadākāravyāvṛttisāmyāt. yathā dṛśyākārasyātadvyāvṛttiḥ, evaṃ vikalpasyāpi tad ayaṃ jātipratyayo vikalpamātram, paramārthatas tu na jātir nāma kā cid iti.

api ca nityā jātir iti jātivādino manyante. na ca nityaṃ sat kasmai cit kāryāya paryāptam. śaktasvabhāvaṃ hi tat sadaiva kāryam ārabhetāśaktasvabhāvaṃ vā, svabhāvanāśe nityatāpātāt. sad apy acikitsanīyasvabhāvam eveti svajñānam api na janayet. yathāhuḥ—
nityaṃ śaktir aśaktir vā yā svabhāvena saṃsthitā |
nityatvād acikitsyasya[48] kas tāṃ kṣapayituṃ kṣamaḥ || iti.[49]

api ca yo jāter āśrayatvenābhimato 'vayavī so 'pi vṛttyādivikalpaparāhata ity āśrayānupapattyāpi duḥsthitaivotthitā iti nāstheyeti.

ŚV *Ākṛti* 54-55
*atra parihāram āha—**virodha iti**. ayam abhiprāyaḥ—evam ayaṃ jātyapalāpavādī vaktavyaḥ—asti jātipratyayo na vā. yadi nāsti, kiṃ virodhādyanupapattiprapañcena, abhāvād eva tadapalāpasiddheḥ. athāsti nānātmasu piṇḍeṣv ekarūpāvasāyaḥ, nāyam anālaṃbanaḥ svāṃśālaṃbano veti varṇitaṃ vijñānavāde. ihāpi ca pratisaṃhitaṃ "viṣayeṇa hi buddhīnām" iti.[50] tad asyā eva buddher draḍhimno 'nupapattiṃ pariharişyāmaḥ. na hi dṛṣṭe kiñ cid anupapannaṃ nāma. svalakṣaṇālaṃbanatvaṃ cāsyā aviśadaviṣayatvād bhavadbhir api neṣyata eva. yat tv aviṣayabhūtānām api viśeṣāṇāṃ paraṃparayā tatkāraṇatvam iti, tad astu tāvac cakṣurādivan nimittatayā. ākāras tu kasyāyam avabhāsata iti vaktavyam eva.*

nanūktam asann eva na kasya cid iti, tan na, asato gaganakusumasyeva bhāsanāyogāt, yathāhuḥ— asac cakāsti na vyomakusumam | iti.[51]

*pratiśabdabodhe 'pi dhvanayo bodhānuvartino labdhapracayāḥ śabdaṃ bhāsayantīti nāsadviṣayatvam. yat tu vikalpākāro 'yam iti, na vidmaḥ ko 'yaṃ vikalpo nāma. yadi kalpanābhiprāyaḥ jñānākāras tarhi tac cāyuktam anākāratvāt saṃvidām. aniṣṭaṃ caitad ekeṣām. atha gavādayaḥ śabdā vikalpāḥ, tan na, anekavarṇākāratvāt[52] teṣāṃ, gādyākārā hi te. atha mithyāparyāyo vikalpaśabdaḥ, tan na, deśakālanarāntareṣv asyā buddher avisaṃvādāt. uktañ ca—sarveṣāṃ sarvadā yatra[53] iti. etad evābhipretya **ekāntād ity** uktam,*

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[48] *acikitsyasya*] em. ; *acikitsāsya* A, G
[49] PV 3.22:
***tasya** śaktir aśaktir vā yā svabhāvena saṃsthitā |*
nityatvād acikitsyasya kas tāṃ kṣapayituṃ kṣamaḥ ||
[50] Cf. ŚV *Ākṛti* 37ab: *viṣayeṇa hi buddhīnāṃ vinā notpattir iṣyate |*
[51] Cf. ViV 2ab: *asac cakāsti na vyomakusumaṃ na tathotthitam |*
[52] *anekavarṇākāratvāt*] conj. ; *anevamākāratvāt* A, G
[53] Cf. ŚV *Vṛttikāragrantha* 24ab: *sarveṣāṃ sarvadā yatra dhīḥ syāt tatra na bādhanam |*

ekānto nirṇayaḥ, yata ekāntiko bhavati. etad uktaṃ bhavati—asmād eva jātau nirṇayātmano jñānād virodhodbhāvanam akiñcitkaram. uktañ ca—jātyādiṣu yadā jāter[54] *iti.*

api cāyam ākāraḥ pratibhāsajanmani vyāpriyate vā na vā. na tāvad avyāpriyamāṇaḥ śaśaviṣāṇavat prakāśeta. vyāpārābhyupagame vārthakriyālakṣaṇatvāt sattvasyāstv apratikṣepaḥ. yāpi ca paraṃparayā vastulābhād arthakriyāsthitir uktā, sāpy ayuktā. vastumatī[55] *khalu maṇiprakāśavilīnā saṃvid yuktā yaṃ maṇiṃ pratilaṃbhayatīti vikalpākāras tu sāṃprataḥ kathaṃ kena cit pratibadhyeta, na tadākārabuddhir vastumatī svalakṣaṇadarśanaprabhavatayā tatpratilaṃbhāt tatpratilaṃbhayatīti cec, cakṣurālokādibhir vā nimittakāraṇabhūtaiḥ kiṃ na saṃvṛttiḥ saṃbadhyeta yad asau tān api na pratilaṃbhayet.*

yā tu prativaktṛṇām atadvyāvṛttyā dṛśyavikalpayor ekatāpattir uktā, sā khalu dṛśyasya gaganakusumasyāpy atyantāsato vyāvṛttyaviśeṣāt syāt. kā ceyam atadvyāvṛttiḥ. tadā samabhivyāhṛto nañ tadabhāvānyavirodhino 'bhidadhyād, abhāvābrāhmaṇādharmeṣu tathā darśanāt tredhāpi tadartho vaktavyaḥ. na tāvad asādhāraṇaḥ, vikalpānāspadatvāt tattvāntarānabhyupagamāc ca. tac caitad apohavyākhyānāvasare vistareṇābhidhāsyate.

api caikāntavādābhyupagame virodho bhavati, yadi hi sāmānyātmakam eva viśeṣaikasvabhāvaṃ vā vastu saṃgīyate, tato 'nyatararūpāsattvaprasaṃgo bhavet, anekāntavādinas tu vayam, ato miśram eva vastu miśre ca vastuni yathopalaṃbhaṃ saṃbhāvanīyam[56] *eva sarvam iti na kiñ cid anupapannam. āśrayānupapattis tu vanopanyāsaparihārāvasare pariharişyate, nityatve 'pi cārthakriyāśaktiṃ kṣaṇabhaṃganirākaraṇe darśayişyāmaḥ.*

yatra yat tāvad uktam "anekānanyavṛttitvān na sāmānyaviśeṣayor ekatvam" iti[57]*, tat pariharati—**sāmānyeti**. yadā hi sāmānyānanyatayā viśeṣā vimṛśyante, tadā teṣām anekavṛttitvam işyata eva. evaṃ sāmānyasyāpy ananyavṛttitvaṃ viśeṣātmanaikabhāvata ekatvād işyata eva. na ceṣṭam eva doṣatayāpādayituṃ yuktam iti bhāvaḥ.*

*yad apy uktam, katham ekasyānyānanyateti, tat pariharati—**evaṃ ceti**.*

ŚV *Ākṛti* 56-57ab
*yathā parihartavyā tathā darśayati—**kena cid iti**. sāmānyātamanā bhinnatvaṃ viśeṣātmanā nānātvam. saṃkhyāvirodho 'py ekānekatvam ity anenokta evam eva parihartavya iti. yad api sāmānyaṃ bhinnaṃ bhinnebhyo 'nanyatvād vyaktayo vābhinnā ekasmād ananyatvād ity uktam, tat siddhasādhanatvāpādanena dūşayati—**sāmānyasyeti**.*

ŚV *Ākṛti* 57cd-59ab

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[54] Cf. ŚV *Vṛttikāragrantha* 25ab: *jātyādiṣu yadā jātā buddhiḥ paścād asambhavāt* |
[55] *vastumatī*] G ; *vastuvatī* A
[56] *saṃbhāvanīyam*] G ; *svabhāvanīyam* A
[57] Cf. ŚV *Ākṛti* 51:
anekānanyavṛttittvān na sāmānyaviśeṣayoḥ |
ekavastvātmatā yuktā kiṃ cit tenaupacārikam || 51

*citraṃ hi tad vastu, ato yad eva tatra rūpaṃ darśayitum iṣyate tad eva śakyaṃ yathāvad varṇayitum. yathā kalmāṣavarṇe vastuni ya eva nīlādivarṇaviśeṣo gṛhītum iṣyate, sa eva gṛhyate. na ca nānāvarṇaghaṭitam ekaṃ citrarūpam astīty avayavarūpāṇām asatyatvam, evam ihāpi śabale vastuni sarvam eva bhedādi pāramārthikaṃ darśayitavyam ity āha—**yatheti**. bhinnagraho nigraha iti niṣkṛṣya tu sāmānyāṃśasya bhedasādhane bhinnebhyo bhinnatvād iti hetor asiddhatvam ity āha—**sāmānyeti tvam-antena.** siddhe tu*[58] *hetau siddhasādhanam uktam evety āha—**siddha iti**.*

ŚV *Ākṛti* 59cd-61ab
*kiṃ punar bhedebhyo 'nanyarūpeṇa sāmānyātmani gṛhyamāṇe sāmānyātmāpi prakāśate. nety āha—**bhedebhya iti**. bhedā eva tadodbhūtā gṛhyante na sāmānyam, abhibhūtatvād iti. yady evam ajñāyamānaṃ tad asad eva syād ata āha—**tadudbhūtyeti**. udbhūteṣu hi viśeṣeṣu gṛhyamāṇeṣu sāmānyaṃ viśeṣabodhānuguṇam abhibhūtaṃ sthitam apy agrāhyarūpatvād asad iva cakāsti, nanu paramārthato nāsty eva, na hi jñānavyāptā vastunas sattā yat tannivṛttyā sāpi nivartata iti.*

ŚV *Ākṛti* 61cd-63ab
*nanu mā nāma sattā nivartatām, ajñāyamānasya tu sadbhāve 'pi pramāṇaṃ vācyam, ata āha—**viśeṣān apīti**. ayam abhiprāyaḥ—yadi hi tan na kadā cit pratīyate, tato na syād api. yadā tu tad evodbhūtaṃ viśeṣāś vābhibhūtā bhavanti, tadā tad eva paraṃ prakāśate na viśeṣāḥ, ato nānyatarad api hātuṃ śakyata iti. iyaṃ ca savikalpakajñānāvasthāsmābhir uktā. nirvikalpakajñānadaśāyāṃ tu saṃmugdham eva pralīnanikhilasāmānyaviśeṣabhedābhedādi-vikalpaṃ śabalam eva vastu pratyavabhāsata ity āha—**yadā tv iti**. ekam idaṃ nānā vā pūrvasmāc caitad anyad ananyad vety evamādi sarvaṃ pralīyata ity arthaḥ.*

ŚV *Ākṛti* 63cd-65ab
*nanv evamātmake vastuni katham ākṛtiḥ śabdārtha iti bhāṣyakāro bravīti. yathāvasthitaṃ hi vastu śabdena vaktavyam anyathā tu vadann arthāsaṃsparśī syād, ata āha—**na ceti**. ayam abhiprāyaḥ—śaktyapekṣayā śabdo 'bhidheye vartate, na ca tādṛśe vastuni śabale kasya cic chabdasya śaktir asti bhāgāvalaṃbitvāc chabdānām iti. yādṛśaṃ tu śabdaḥ pratipādayati tad darśayati—**sāmānyeti**. apoddhṛtya niṣkṛṣyety arthaḥ. yata eva yathāvasthitaḥ śabdo na spṛśati ata eveyaṃ padārthānām apoddhṛtir vibhāgakalpanā mithyaiveti ke cid bhrāmyantaḥ pratipannā ity āha—**samasteti rūpāmantena**. kim idānīṃ bhrāntir eveyam, nety āha—**aṅgitvam iti**. sabhāgaṃ hi tad vastu, na tatra bhāgo mithyeti śakyate vaktum. abādhitabuddhiviṣayatvāt. ataḥ svaśaktim anurudhyamānāḥ śabdā yadi vastuvibhāgān vigāhante, kim atra kurmo naitāvatā teṣām arthāsaṃsparśiteti.*

ŚV *Ākṛti* 65cd-67ab
*evaṃ svamatena sāmānyarūpaṃ pratipādya paramate dūṣaṇam āha—**sārūpyam iti** dvābhyāṃ. vindhyavāsinā kila sārūpyam eva piṇḍānāṃ sāmānyam iti svatantre nirūpitam, tad vikalpanīyaṃ kim idaṃ sārūpyam iti. kiṃ samānarūpatā, ekaparyāyaś ca samānaśabdaḥ, sā tarhi tathāvidhā jātir asmābhir iṣyate.*

[58] *siddhe tu*] G ; *siddheti* A

ŚV *Ākṛti* 67cd-68

*sādṛśyārthe tu sārūpyaśabde na vidmaḥ kasya kena sādṛśyam iti. nanu yeṣām eva piṇḍānāṃ sāmānyam iṣyate, teṣām eva sādṛśyaṃ bhaviṣyaty ata āha—**na tāvad iti viśeṣarūpata ityantena**. viśeṣarūpeṇa hi śābaleyādayaḥ piṇḍā api visadṛśā eva prakāśanta iti. nanv asti tāvat keṣāṃ cit saṃsthānasāmānyam, atas tatsādṛśyaṃ bhaviṣyaty ata āha—**ye 'pīti**. śābaleyasaṃsthānavato hi piṇḍasya śābaleya iveti buddhyā bhavitavyam.*

ŚV *Ākṛti* 69-70

*na tu sa evāyaṃ gaur iti buddhau nibandhanam astīti yadi tu sādṛśyanibandhano 'yaṃ bhrama ity ucyate, evaṃ tarhi śuktir iva rajatatayā śābaleyo 'yam iti piṇḍāntaraṃ grahītavyam āpatet. gaur iti tu bhrame na kiñ cin nimittam upalabhyata ity āha—**śābaleyo 'yam iti**. śābaleyasādṛśye ca gotve śābaleye tadabhāvad gotvaṃ na syād ity āha—**śābaleyeti**. api cāstu tāvat sadṛśeṣu gobuddhiḥ. asadṛśeṣu gobuddhau nibandhanaṃ vaktavyam. na hi tatrānyad aparaṃ gotvaṃ bhavadbhir abhyupagatam, yadbaleneyaṃ gobuddhiḥ dṛśyamānopapadyate. tad etad āha—**tadanyeṣv iti**.*

ŚV *Ākṛti* 71-72

*yadi tūcyate na śābaleyasādṛśyātmakaṃ gotvaṃ kiñ tu anya eva kaś cit gavārthaḥ sakalagopiṇḍasadṛśaḥ. atas tatsādṛśyāt sarve gāvo bhaviṣyanty ata āha—**na cānya iti.** na hi gotvākṛtiḥ kva cid api bhavataḥ siddheti.*

*api ca sarvapuṃsām evedaṃ sarvadā ca "sa evāyaṃ gaur" iti jñānaṃ jāyamānam upalabdham, ato na tāvad etad bhrāntiḥ abādhitarūpatvāt. na cātrāsya tatsādṛśyam anubhūyate, ato nedaṃ sādṛśyagocaram jñānam ity abhiprāyeṇāha—**na cāpīti**. yadi tv īdṛśaṃ jñānam api bhrantir ity ucyate, na kena cid apy āśvāsitavyam ity āha—**sarveti**.*

ŚV *Ākṛti* 73-74

api ca ko 'sāv eko gaur yatsādṛśyād apare[59] *gāva iti viśeṣahetvabhāvād api na vivektuṃ śakyata ity āha—**viśeṣeti**. yadi tūcyate jagadādāv eko gaur āsit tatsādṛśyād anye gāva iti, tatas tasyāsmābhir agrahaṇād asati sādṛśyāvadhāraṇe 'smadādīnāṃ gobuddhir nopapadyata ity āha—**babhūveti**. api cāvayavasāmānyāny eva sādṛśyam iti pūrvam uktam.*[60] *sarvasāmānyāpalāpavādināṃ tu tad api nāstīti kiṃ sādṛśyaṃ bhaviṣyatīty āha—**na ceti.***

ŚV *Ākṛti* 75-76ab

yadi tv asatsv[61] *eva gavādisāmānyeṣu viśeṣā eva ke cid anādivāsanāsahāyā avayavādisāmānyabuddhim avakalpayantaḥ sādṛśyabuddhim utpādayantīty ucyate, tan na, asati sāmānye viśeṣāṇām ekākārabuddhijanakatvāsaṃbhavasya pūrvoktatvād ity abhiprāyeṇāha—**sāmānyapratyayeti**. tattvāntaraṃ tu sādṛśyaṃ vyatirekādivikalpākṣamatvād anupapannam ity*[62] *āha—**vyaktita iti**.*

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[59] *apare*] G ; *apara* A
[60] Cf. ŚV *Upamāna* 18cd: *bhūyo 'vayavasāmānyayogo jātyantarasya tat* |
[61] *asatsv*] M ; *asavatsv* A
[62] *ity*] M ; *itṣ* A

***sāmānyam eva sādṛśyaṃ bhaved vā vyaktimātrakam* |**
na sāmānyātiriktaṃ sādṛśyaṃ nāma vyaktito vilakṣaṇaṃ kiñ cid upalabhyate. idaṃ copamāne vistarena varṇitam iti.

ŚV *Ākṛti* 76cd-76ef
*vindhyavāsino 'pi sārūpyaṃ sāmānyam iti vadato vyaktīnām aikarūpyam eva sāmānyaṃ na vaiśeṣikādīnām ivārthāntaram ity abhiprāyaḥ. tadgranthas tu yathāvad ajānānais sādṛśyaṃ sāmānyam iti kalpitam ity āha—**teneti**.*

ity upādhyāyasucaritamiśrkṛtau kāśikāṭīkāyām ākṛtigranthe.

Chapter 3 An Annotated Translation of the *Ślokavārttika*, *Ākṛtivāda* Chapter

3.1 Introduction and Notes for Translation

This chapter presents an annotated translation of the *Ākṛtivāda* chapter of the ŚV. There are three main layers of my translation. The first layer is the translation itself of the verses of the *Ākṛtivāda*. These are clearly marked with a verse number and are in larger font. The verses are divided into ten main sections according to my understanding of the structure of the *Ākṛtivāda*, and the ten section headings are marked in bold with numbers. Following a verse or a group of verses is the second layer, where I present a running commentary of the verse(s). The understanding of Kumārila's arguments in my interpretive notes are largely derived from how classical Mīmāṃsā commentators, namely, Jayamiśra, Sucaritamiśra, and Pārthasārathimiśra, understand the *Ākṛtivāda* verses. The text in the footnotes constitutes the third layer of the present annotated translation. Here, I provide more detailed information about either the translation of the verses or the commentary. These include justifying my translation of the difficult phrases in the *Ākṛtivāda* verses with reference to classical commentators' paraphrases and explaining how I arrive at the conclusion of my interpretive notes based on the classical commentaries. In the footnotes, I also report issues that I think are important for the understanding of the *Ākṛtivāda* verses, such as disagreement between Kumārila's classical commentators in how they interpret and contextualise the verses.

Translating a Sanskrit philosophical text as complex as the *Ākṛtivāda* requires one to be careful about how to render important philosophical concepts in English. The challenge usually consists in ensuring that the philosophical nuances found in the original Sanskrit are not lost in translation. In what follows, I will list a few examples that illustrate my approach to translating such nuances.

First of all, there is the problem of how to consistently translate different synonyms. In the *Ākṛtivāda*, we have *ākṛti*, *jāti*, and *sāmānya* on the one hand, and *viśeṣa*, *vyakti*, and *piṇḍa* on the other hand as two groups of concepts that denote opposite ontological phenomena. Do the words in the same group all refer to the same concept, or do they carry subtle differences? Let us first have a look at the terms that denote "universal". Despite the title of his chapter, Kumārila uses *sāmānya* and *jāti* more often in the *Ākṛtivāda* when referring to universals than he uses the term *ākṛti*. The term *ākṛti* is usually translated as form or configuration, but Kumārila uses it as a synonym of *sāmānya*, which is the standard terminology for universal. Kumārila also does not distinguish *jāti* (genus, class, or natural kind) from *ākṛti* and *sāmānya*, as he unequivocally states in the ŚV *Ākṛti* 3 and ŚV *Ākṛti* 18.[63] Since Kumārila specifically states that he means to use these terms without any distinction between them, in this thesis I will translate *ākṛti*, *jāti*, and *sāmānya* all as "universal". On the other hand, the various terms for particulars (*viśeṣa*, *vyakti*, and *piṇḍa*) have slightly different emphasis in the *Ākṛtivāda*, although Kumārila also seems to occasionally employ them interchangeably. Kumārila's usage of these terms is in accordance with the standard Śāstric Sanskrit, in which *viśeṣa* and *vyakti* are used to refer to an individual object as opposed to an universal, and *piṇḍa* is used to emphatically denote a concrete entity that has corporeal dimensions. In the *Ākṛtivāda*, Kumārila often pairs *viśeṣa* with *sāmānya* as opposites, and *vyakti* with *jāti*, but this seems to be largely a stylistic choice or for metrical considerations. Therefore, I will translate *viśeṣa* and *vyakti* as "particular" or "individual" depending on the context, while translating *piṇḍa* as "concrete particular".

Another group of synonyms that Kumārila uses in the *Ākṛtivāda* without significant distinction between them comprises *jñāna, dhī,* and *buddhi*. These terms all refer to a

[63] Cf. ŚV *Ākṛti* 3: *jātim evākṛtiṃ prāhur vyaktir ākriyate yayā* |
sāmānyaṃ tac ca piṇḍānām ekabuddhinibandhanam ||
and ŚV *Ākṛti* 18: *tenātmadharmo bhedānām ekadhīviṣayo 'sti naḥ* |
sāmānyam ākṛtir jātiḥ śaktir vā so 'bhidhīyatām ||

cognition. In the context of the *Ākṛtivāda*, these mostly denote a perceptual cognition. In recent scholarship, many have endeavoured to translate these terms as "cognitive awareness" or "cognitive episode". While there is undoubtedly a benefit of employing these terminologies borrowed from contemporary analytical philosophy to better reflect the nuances in what one is cognisant of , I choose to use the standard translation of "cognition" for these three synonyms for the sake of simplicity.

Some terms whose meanings are relatively straightforward in Sanskrit might not be easily translated into English. This is usually the case when the English translation would not be able to flexibly carry the same range of meanings that the Sanskrit term has. For instance, *vastu* is such a concept. The meaning of *vastu* varies considerably in different texts of classical Indian philosophers because it is an all-encompassing term without a fixed, standard connotation. It can be used to denote real, external objects, or to denote mental entities that are not real. In the *Ākṛtivāda*, when Kumārila uses the word *vastu*, he seems to want to convey *bāhyārtha*, "an external object". Therefore, when Kumārila says that all things (*sarvavastu*) have a dual nature, what he really means is that all external objects (which exist independently of our mind) have the nature of having both a universal aspect and a particular aspect. However, Kumārila does not spell out this underlying logic in an explicit way. Hence, instead of translating *vastu* as "real external objects", I translate the term simply as "thing" in accordance with the causal manner in which Kumārila uses the term. In a similar vein, I translate the word *vastutva* in the *Ākṛtivāda* as "thing-ness". This is a concept that Kumārila deems as fictitious, and while "thing-ness" sounds quite awkward in English, this literal translation can ensure that the concept of *vastutva* is not confused with similar-sounding but vastly different concepts, such as *sattā* ("existence") and the Vaiśeṣika concept of *astitva* ("is-ness", "objectivity").

bādhaka (or *bādha*) is a rather tricky term to translate, not only because it represents a difficult concept in Kumārila's epistemology, but also because finding a suitable English translation that can indicate the connection of this term to Kumārila's ritual hermeneutics is not an easy task. In Kumārila's famous theory of intrinsic validity, the concept of *bādhaka* refers to the subsequently arising cognition that contradicts and overturns the earlier cognition that holds the initial and innate validity. Because of this primary meaning of the term *bādhaka* in Kumārila's epistemological arguments, translating the term *bādhaka* as "defeater" has gained traction among scholars of Indian philosophy because of its ability to neatly correspond to the similar notion in contemporary analytical philosophy. No doubt, this translation would make readers who are familiar with contemporary debates on epistemology immediately understand what Kumārila is trying to convey, but it is not without a price. Firstly, the translation of "defeater" fails to capture the fact that *bādhaka* is a concept that has a rich and complex history in Kumārila's ritual hermeneutics, in which he uses the same word to refer to a hermeneutical device that can temporarily suspend the validity of a ritual command when it is in contradiction with another command. It is reasonable to speculate that the reason why Kumārila builds up his epistemology with such a heavy emphasis on the notion of *bādhaka* is because he is already very familiar with this notion from Mīmāṃsā hermeneutics. Secondly, "defeater" renders the meaning of a final, irreversible epistemological invalidation, which does not seem to correspond with Kumārila's intended meaning of *bādhaka*. As demonstrated by McCrea's (2018) meticulous analysis of all the available commentaries on ŚV *Codanā*, it is possible that to Kumārila, *bādhaka* does not offer the final "defeat". Rather, Kumārila may only see it as suspending the validity of the earlier cognitions, just as *bādhaka* in a ritual context only temporarily suspends the validity of a Vedic command rather than outright cancels it. I do find that McCrea's (2018) translation of *bādhaka* as "blocking awareness/cognition" very neat in that its ambiguity can potentially

bridge the two meanings of *bādhaka* found in different parts of Kumārila's system. However, I eventually compromise by translating *bādhaka* as "(subsequently) invalidating cognition", in most cases, since it more directly renders the intended meaning than simply saying "blocking cognition" does.

Lastly, sometimes a balance needs to be struck between translating a Sanskrit word literally and making the English translation more intelligible. This especially applies to some of the negative terms that Kumārila uses, such as *aneka* and *ananya*. Instead of translating them as "non-singular" and "not other than", which would make the English translation much more cumbersome, I usually translate them as "many" and "identical" when I deem doing so suitable.

3.2 Synopsis of the *Ākṛtivāda*

1. Universals, as the denotations of words, are real existences. (v.1-2)
2. Definition of universals. (v.3-4)
3. Universals are real because our cognitions can grasp them. (v.5-11)

   3.1 Perceptual cognitions grasp both universals and particulars. (v.5-8)

   3.2 Universals and particulars are mutually dependent—one cannot exist without the other. (v.9-11)
4. Capacities (*śakti*) cannot substitute real universals in causing a unitary cognition. (v.12-18)
5. There is no such thing as universal-ness (i.e., the universal of universals). (v.19-24)
6. Universals reside in corresponding particulars only—no further reasoning is needed for this perceptible fact. (v.25-31ab)

   6.1 Universals only pervade particulars. (v.25-27ab)

6.2 Since universals can be perceived, there is no need to resort to inference to establish the existence of universals. (v.27cd-31ab)

7. No other universal is needed to explain the relationship between universals and particulars as well as the occurrence of universals. (v.31cd-44)

   7.1 The relationship between universals and particulars is natural and does not require another cause. (vv.31cd-34)

   7.2 There is no need to postulate another universal to explain the occurrence of universals. (v.35-38)

   7.3 Direct perception of universals is the most fundamental factor for determining the reality of universals. (vv.39-44)

8. The identity between universals and particulars is due to their nature. (v.45-50)
9. Universals and particulars are both different from and identical to each other. (v. 51-65ab)
10. Real universals cannot be replaced by the concept of similarity. (v.65cd-76)

3.3 Annotated Translation of the *Ākṛtivāda*

1. Universals, as the denotations of words, are real existence. (vv.1-2)

1. If the meaning [of the words] were different from universal, the connection [between word and meaning] and its permanence could not be established. Having realised this, it is desired here (*iheṣyate*) that that [universal] is [established as] what is denoted [by the word].

2. Here, we first make an effort to establish the existence of that [universal]. The reasoning [for the universal] to be the denotation [of words] will be discussed [later in the *Mīmāṃsāsūtra* 1.3.33], together with the strength and weakness [of universal being the denotation compared] to the individual.

Kumārila starts the *Ākṛtivāda* chapter by emphasising the central Mīmāṃsā tenets that words denote universals rather than particulars.[64] If the denotation of words is something other than a universal, as Kumārila sees it, then a permanent relationship between word and its meaning would be impossible to establish. He then clarifies that the purpose of the *Ākṛtivāda* is not to debate why the denotations of words are universals; rather, it is to prove that universals really exist.[65] This is because, in order to show that universals are indeed the

[64] Cf. *Mīmāṃsāsūtra* 1.3.33: *ākṛtis tu kriyārthatvāt.* "Rather, [it is] *ākṛti* that is [the denotation of word], because [an injunction] is for the purpose of action."

[65] The composition of the ŚV *Ākṛti* 2 indicates a hermeneutical concern that Kumārila might have had in mind, i.e. since the *Mīmāṃsāsūtra* will have stated that we should understand *ākṛti* as the denotation of word, one may think that the efforts for the composing the *Ākṛtivāda* here under *Mīmāṃsāsūtra* 1.1.5 are pointless, because it repeats the conclusion of a later *sūtra*. All three commentators laboriously attempt to dispel the notion that the composition of the *Ākṛtivāda* is useless. As argued by Jayamiśra, Sucarita, and Pārathasārathi, the purpose of the *Ākṛtivāda* is not to discuss what should be regarded as the denotation of word—this will be discussed in the

denotations of words, one needs to first establish that universals are real existences—a claim that is in dispute among philosophers.

The contention that words denote universals is very important for Kumārila's philosophical project, because it helps build up the ultimate Mīmāṃsā theory that the Vedic scriptures, which are the only valid sources for gaining knowledge about *dharma*, are authorless. In order to explain how an authorless scripture is linguistically possible, Kumārila offers a complex philosophy of language. The two central tenets—that words denote universals and that the relationship between a word and its meaning is permanent—together with the theory of the eternality of phonemes, provide Kumārila with a framework to argue that linguistic expressions (*śabda*) are possible without a speaker, and therefore, that an authorless Veda is plausible.[66]

Mīmāṃsāsūtra 1.3.33—but rather, to discuss the existence of *ākṛti*, since the very existence of universals are in dispute.

[66] Sucarita argues that a connection by particulars cannot be established because there is the issue of infinity and deviation. Cf. ŚVKāś ad *Ākṛti* 1: *ānantyavyabhicārābhyāṃ saṃbandha eva tāvan na sidhyati*. It is worth noting that Sucarita uses the same two reasons that Dignāga employs in the PSV to argue against the position that words denote particulars. Cf. PSV 5.2ab: ***na jātiśabdo bhedānāṃ*** *vācaka iti vakṣyate. jātiśabdas tāvat sadādir dravyādīnāṃ na vācakaḥ,* ***ānantyāt****. ānantye hi bhedānām aśakyaḥ sambandhaḥ kartum… kiṃ ca,* ***vyabhicārataḥ****. yathā hi sacchabdo dravye vartate tathā guṇādiṣv apīti vyabhicārāt saṃśayaḥ syāt, nābhidhānam* (Pind 2015: I.2-3): "A general term does not denote, as will state, particulars. For, it is impossible to tell the connection of particulars [with a general term] if they are infinite… Moreover, [a general term does not denote particulars] because there is deviation. For, just as the word "existent" applies to substance, in the same way, it also [applies] to quality and so on. Therefore, there will be doubt because there is deviation, [and] there will be no denotation." (Translation based on Pind 2015: II.8-11. For a justification to translate *kartum* as "to tell", see Pind 2015: II.9, n.23.) On the other hand, Jayamiśra argues that a connection by particulars is not possible because particulars are perishable and countless. Cf. ŚVŚar 1,9-10: *kṣaṇikābhir anantābhiś ca vyaktibhiḥ sambandha eva na tāvat kartuṃ śakyaḥ.* Compared to the view that particulars should be the denotation of word mentioned by Dignāga, Sucarita records another argument: individuals should be the denotation of the word, because a universal cannot be possibly connected with an action. ŚVKāś ad *Ākṛti* 1: *na brumaḥ sarvatrākṛtiḥ śabdārtha iti vyaktau vā śabdārthena saṃbandhotpattikatvam iti. kriyārthatvāc chabdaprayogasya, vyaktau ca kriyāsaṃbhavāt, vyaktir eva sarvatra śabdavācyā, nākṛtiḥ, amūrtatvena kriyāyogānarhatvād iti kecit*: "Some people argue [this]: we should not say that universal is the meaning of the word in every case…the application of word is for the purpose of action, and [only] an individual is possible [to be connected with] an action. [Therefore,] individual is what is denoted by word in every case, not the universal, because [universal] is without a physical form and thus unable to be connected with an action." This argument might have belonged to some pre-Śabara Mīmāṃsakas.

2. Definition of universals. (vv.3-4)

3. They say that *ākṛti* is just universal, [because] the individual is formed (*ākriyate*) by that [universal]. And that is the universal, which is the cause of a single cognition (*ekabuddhinibandhanam*) of the concrete particulars.

Kumārila clarifies here that he is using the word *ākṛti* in the same sense as *jāti*, i.e. a universal itself, rather than using *ākṛti* in the sense of a configuration or form. Kumārila justifies that one can draw this equivalence by offering how he sees the word *ākṛti* as being derived: each particular is formed (*ākriyate*) by the corresponding universal.[67] Later in the *Ākṛti* 18 Kumārila will further clarify that he is taking the words *sāmānya, jāti*, and *ākṛti* as synonyms to describe the same thing: a generic property that has real existence. Kumārila also defines a universal by presenting one of the essential characteristics of a universal: a universal is something that can produce a single, unified cognition of differentiated entities.[68] Without universals, we would only be able to cognise different particulars as being different from each other.

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[67] Both Sucarita and Pārathasārathi gloss the word *ākriyate* as *ni√rūp*. Cf. ŚVKāś ad *Ākṛti* 3: *ākriyate nirūpyate vyajyata iti.* And ŚVNR 546,11: *ākriyate nirūpyata ity arthaḥ.* While Śabara indeed unequivocally states that he takes *ākṛti* as *sāmānya* itself (Cf. *Śābarabhāṣya* ad MS 1.3.30: *dravyaguṇakarmaṇāṃ sāmānyamātram ākṛtiḥ*), justifying such usage by resorting to the derivation rule seems to be Kumārila's own innovation. While Kumārila no doubt is full aware of Śabara's way of equating *ākṛti* with *sāmānya*, it is difficult to ascertain whether Kumārila had other people in mind when composing this verse, since he uses "they say" (*prāhur*) rather than "he says" (*prāha*). It could be that Kumārila is respectfully referring to Śabara by using the third person plural, but it is also possible that Kumārila contends that philosophers from the grammarian tradition such as Patañjali would also agree that *ākṛti* is synonymous with *sāmānya*.

[68] According to Sucarita, it is the singular form (*ekākārā*) in the cognition that makes the cognition of universal "singular" (*eka*). Cf. ŚVKāś ad *Ākṛti* 3: *jātir hi piṇḍānāṃ sāmānyam ekākārāyā buddher nibandhanam ekam iti.* "For, *jāti* is an universal, which is unitary and is the cause of a cognition that has a single form among [diverse] concrete particulars." Pārthasārathi paraphrases *ekabuddhinibandhanam* as *ekabuddhyālambanam*, i.e. universals are the support that functions as stimulants to a unitary cognition. Cf. ŚVNR 546,12-13: *bhinneṣu piṇḍeṣu ekabuddhyālambanaṃ sāmānyaṃ jātir na pratipiṇḍaṃ bhidyata iti.* "A *jāti* is an universal, [which] is the support of a single cognition among differentiated concrete particulars, [which itself] is not differentiated among concrete particulars."

4. And everyone acknowledges that the cause of that [single cognition] is some universal that is the referent of words. Therefore, there is no conflict among the disputants here [in this matter].

Kumārila takes a bullish stance here and says that, in fact, all philosophers would acknowledge that the cause of a unitary cognition is something akin to a universal. That is to say, we all have some preliminary understanding that something is responsible for the production of a unitary cognition among differentiated entities. Different people may have different conceptions of what exactly this "something" is, but, as Kumārila argues, these different conceptions all have the same function that universals do.[69]

3. Universals are real because our cognitions can grasp them. (v.5-11)

3.1 Cognitions grasp both universals and particulars. (v.5-8)

5. And, in regard to all things, cognition arises in the form of both exclusion and continuity. Without the things having a dual nature, that [cognition with a dual nature] cannot be established.

Kumārila puts forward his main thesis here: our cognition of everything always includes both an exclusive aspect—which distinguishes one thing from another thing, and an

[69] As Pārthasārathi puts it: *ekabuddhinimittaṃ yat sāmānyaṃ jātirūpaṃ sārūpyarūpam apoharūpaṃ tasya śabdavācyatvaṃ sarvavādinām avivādaṃ, tatsvarūpe tu vivāda iti*: "There is no dispute that every proponent [holds] that what is denoted by word is that which is the cause of a unitary cognition, in the form of universal, [or] in the form of genus, [or] in the form of similarity, [or] in the form of exclusion. What is in dispute is the own-form of that [cause of a unitary cognition]." (ŚVNR 546,15-17)

inclusive aspect—which reveals the continuity between one thing and other similar things. The reason why our cognitions have such dual aspects, Kumārila argues, is because entities themselves have a dual nature, i.e. every entity is characterised as having a universal aspect and a particular aspect. It is due to the dual nature of entities that we are able to cognise one thing as different from other things while simultaneously recognising each thing's similarity with the same species.

6. If merely the particular is perceived, there would not be a conception of the universal; and if merely the universal is perceived, the cognition of the particular [would be] without any ground.

If one were to suggest that we only cognise things as particulars, then we would not be able to perceive one thing as similar to another; we would only be able to cognise things as distinct from each other. This is because without universals, the notion of one thing being similar to another is not possible. On the other hand, if one were to suggest that we only cognise universals, then it would become impossible for us to perceive anything as an individualised entity.[70]

[70] Pārthasārathi identifies the opinions at the two ends of the spectrum, i.e. real things are only particulars or a universal, as belonging to Buddhist and Vedantins, respectively. ŚVNR 546,17-547,8: *yadi tāvad asādhāraṇaṃ svalakṣaṇam eva vastu syān na sāmānyaṃ, yathā saugatair ucyate, tato 'yaṃ gaur ayam apīti sāmānyabuddhir na syāt. yadi tu gotvādiśābaleyādiviśeṣān anuvṛttavyāvṛttātmano 'pahnutya mahāsāmānyaṃ sanmātram eva vastv aṅgīkriyate, yathā vedāntavādibhir ucyate, tato gaur ayam aśvo 'yaṃ śābaleyo 'yaṃ bāhuleyo 'yam iti viśeṣabuddhir na syāt*. "First of all, if the real entity would only be particular[s] (*svalakṣaṇam*) [that are] not common [to each other], rather than universal[s]—just like the Buddhist says—then there would not be a cognition of universal in the form of 'this is a cow, this is also [a cow]'. However, if the real entity were to be accepted as only the mere being, i.e., the great universal, after concealing the particulars such as cow-ness and śābaleya and so on, which is characterised by in inclusion and exclusion—just like the Vedāntins say—then there would not be a cognition of particulars in the form of 'this is a cow, this is a horse, this is a spotted cow (*śābaleya*), this is a black cow (*bāhuleya*).'" The Advaita Vedāntin position, famously advocated by Maṇḍanamiśra, argues that perception only grasps the highest universal existence (*sattā*) which is identical with Brahman. However, since it is all but certain that Maṇḍanamiśra came after Kumārila, it seems unlikely that in the *Ākṛti* 6cd Kumārila is referring to an Advaita Vedāntin view. When analysing ŚV *Pratyakṣapariccheda* 114-119 where Kumārila refutes the position that the objects of perception are only universals, Taber (2005: 205-206, n.8) suggests that Bhartṛhari, as an earlier representative of a similar doctrine, may have been the opponent in Kumārila's mind.

7. And, neither of the two [aspects of the dual-natured cognition] can be accepted as an illusion or by taking it as figurative, because the cognition [of either aspect] is constantly firm (*dṛḍhatvāt*), [so] the illusion is of those who assert that [the dual-natured] cognition is an illusion.

Apparently invoking his theory of intrinsic validity, Kumārila argues here that since both the universal and the particular aspects of a cognition are never found to be sublated, it is not appropriate to think that either the particular or the universal aspect of the cognition is an illusion. The key concept of Kumārila's theory of intrinsic validity is that a cognition that is always firm (*dṛḍha*), i.e. that is never sublated or is invalidated by subsequent contradictory cognitions, should always be regarded as holding innate validity.[71] As Kumārila summarises his theory of intrinsic validity: "Therefore, that [cognition], which is firm, has arisen, and does not contradict with another [later] cognition, should be regarded as valid." [72] Since our cognitions of universals pass the above-mentioned test, there is no reason for one to suspect the validity of such cognitions.

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[71] Elaborating on how Kumārila's theory of intrinsic validity supports this line of arguments, Sucarita cites two factors that can lead to an invalidation of cognition, i.e. when there is a cognition of a invalidation (*bādhakapratyaye*) or when there is a cognition of defects in the cause (*kāraṇadoṣajñāne*). This seems to correspond to the two reasons that Kumārila mentions in ŚV *Codanā* v.53 that the innate validity of a cognition is only cancelled because the object of the cognition turns out to be other than the way it really is, or when cognising the defects that arise from the cause (*arthānyathātvahetūtthadoṣajñānād*). Cf. ŚVKāś ad *Ākṛti* 7: *sarvadā hi sarveṣāṃ sarvatra dvyākārā buddhir upajāyate, sā kathaṃ bhrāntir bhaviṣyati, na hy asati kāraṇadoṣajñāne bādhakapratyaye vā bhrāntitvakalpanā yuktā, sarvamithyātvaprasaṅgāt. bhedābhedau tv ekatra saṃvidbalād evātropapādayiṣyāmaḥ*. "Since a cognition that has a dual-form is produced everywhere, for everything, all the time, how will that [cognition] be an illusion? For, the concept of illusion is not logical when there is no cognition of faults in the cause, nor a perception of an invalidating cognition, due to the undesired consequence that everything would be an error [if we did not follow this rule]. But, we will teach here that, exactly because of the strength of experience, [both] difference and non-difference [can reside] in one single locus." and Cf. ŚV *Codanā* 53 (Kataoka 2011: I. 12-13): *tasmād bodhātmakatvena prāptā buddheḥ pramāṇatā | arthānyathātvahetūtthadoṣajñānād apodyate ||*

[72] ŚV *Codanā* 80 (Kataoka 2011: I. 20-21): *tasmād dṛḍhaṃ yad utpannaṃ na visaṃvādam ṛcchati | jñānāntareṇa vijñānaṃ tat pramāṇaṃ pratīyatām ||*

8. Also, because [in your doctrines] the two primary forms [of particular and universal] are never observed, [we say] there cannot be a [false] conception of [one of them] being secondary; it has already been explained that cognitions have external things as their objects.

Kumārila now moves to deal with another opposing argument to his dual nature theory. Here, he anticipates that some opponents may argue that only one of the two entities—particulars or universals—is real, and the other is just a secondary notion. Kumārila argues that this is not the case, because in order to say that universals are just a figurative notion based on particulars, one has to be acquainted with universals independently in their primary form, or vice versa. The principle that Kumārila is applying in this line of argument is from his philosophy of language—namely it is that one needs to have a grasp of the direct, primary meaning (*mukhya*) of a word before attributing a figurative, secondary meaning (*aupacārika*) to it. In the case of particulars and universals, one cannot say either of the concepts is secondary if one has not already directly perceived both universals and particulars. If one can indeed directly perceive both universals and particulars, then it makes no sense to speak of them figuratively.

3.2 Universals and particulars are mutually dependent—one cannot exist without the other. (vv.9-11)

9. The mutual dependence of universal and particular must exist permanently, for the universal belongs to the particulars, and the particulars to the universal.

10-11. A universal without particular[s] would not exist, just like hare's horn; likewise, particulars [could not exist] due to being without a universal, just like that [hare's horn]. Again, these two should be stated as the reasons: [particulars cannot exist] due to not having the nature of [universals, and universals cannot exist due to not having the nature of particulars]. Therefore, there is also no absolute difference of universal and particular.

Kumārila explores the ontological relationship between universals and particulars in order to show that universals must exist, because the concepts of universals and particulars are indeed mutually dependent. A universal unifies the differentiated particulars, and the different particulars are the individualised instances of a universal. Kumārila also aims to show the other side of the same coin: since universals cannot even exist without the nature of particulars—and vice versa—that means the nature of universals and the nature of particulars are intimately connected with each other. Therefore, Kumārila goes on to say that there is, in fact, no absolute difference between universals and particulars. This is another central theme that he will continue to elaborate later in the chapter.

4. Capacity (*śakti*) cannot substitute universals as what causes a unitary cognition. (v.12-18)

From vv.12-18, Kumārila tackles the objection, which evidently is from his Buddhist opponents, that it is the capacities (*śakti*) of individuals, rather than real universals, that are the cause of unitary cognitions.

12. One who would claim that the capacity [to give rise to] cognition of universal [lies] in the particulars without [postulating] another entity—but he [has to explain] what kind of capacity it is?

13-14. Is [this capacity] grasped or not grasped, and is it one or many? If it is grasped and has unity, it is just universal by another word. If the capacity is not grasped, the cognition would be without an object. For, it [should not] be accepted that something is the object [of the cognition] by its mere existence.

15. Due to being different from each other, particulars cannot be grasped by unitary cognitions, because of lack of object (*viṣayāsattvāt*), and the capacity does not exist in these [particulars].

The Buddhists argue that one does not need to postulate the existence of universals to explain the phenomenon of why different things of the same class present commonality to our mind. The main Buddhist proposition is that particulars themselves have the capacity to produce a cognition that is singular, and, therefore, it is unnecessary to postulate universals as another kind of entity. Kumārila presses the opponent to answer the following two questions, one epistemological and one ontological. Epistemologically, can this capacity itself be grasped by our cognition? Ontologically, is this capacity a singular entity or manifold? These two binary questions lead to four conjoint alternatives:

	Singular	Manifold
Grasped	A	B
Not Grasped	C	D

Kumārila first points out that if one adopts alternative A, then this capacity proposed by the Buddhists is just a universal by another name, since the universals postulated by the Mīmāṃsakas have the same quality of being grasped by cognition while being singular. Kumārila then dismisses alternatives C and D as impossible. If the capacity cannot be grasped by our cognition, it would mean that the cognition would be devoid of any objects—which is resolutely rejected by Kumārila as an epistemological realist. One needs something as the object of a unitary cognition. Kumārila argues that it cannot be the particulars, because particulars are diverse and manifold. It also cannot be the capacity, since the premise of the alternatives C and D is that capacity is not grasped in the cognition.

16. If the capacities were different [from the particulars], a single cognition would not be obtained, and if the capacities of particulars were identical [with the particulars], then there would be a cognition of only them [i.e. particulars] (*tāvanmātramatir*).

If this capacity, which is held by diverse particulars, differs in each particular rather than being an unified entity, we would not be able to grasp this capacity in a singular cognition. In this case, the cognition of this capacity would become equivalent to the

cognition of the manifold particulars themselves. This would render the notion of capacity completely useless.

17. Therefore, universal also should be acknowledged, which is different from the capacities of the particulars, and yet carries over as common to all [the particulars], and inseparably inhering in every particular.

Kumārila now concludes that it is not possible to postulate *śakti* as a substitute for real universals.[73] Kumārila reiterates that universals are both different from and identical to particulars. On the one hand, universals should be recognised as a type of entity that is different from particulars and their capacities; on the other hand, universals are closely infused with particulars and cannot exist without particulars.[74]

[73] Sucarita makes a rather interesting diversion when commenting on this verse, with the aim to refute Dharmakīrti. Sucarita decides to use Dharmakīrti's own verse to work against him. Sucarita first asks: how can beings (i.e. *śakti*) that have the intrinsic nature of being exclusive become the causes of inclusive cognitions? (ŚVKāś ad *Ākṛti* 17: *kathaṃ vyāvṛttasvabhāvā bhāvā anugatākārabuddhihetavaḥ*). He then argues that a cause can only lead to the corresponding effect that is of the same kind; cause X can only lead to the production of effect X, and not to the production of effect non-X or effect Y, so to speak. (ŚVKāś ad *Ākṛti* 17: *na hy ekajātīyakāryanirmāṇaṃ kāraṇaṃ vijātiyakāryanirmāṇāya prabhavati.* "For, the cause that [leads to] the creation of an effect of one kind is not able to [lead to] an effect of a different kind"). He then quotes Dharmakīrti's PV 3. 251ab to support his argument: "Beings that have the nature X or the nature non-X [arise] from the causes that have the nature X or the nature non-X, [respectively]" (ŚVKāś ad *Ākṛti* 17: *tair eva tadatadrūpiṇo bhāvās tadatadrūpahetujā*). It is worth noting that in its original context, PV 3.251 is not directly concerned with the issue of universals. There, Dharmakīrti is debating on the nature of pleasure (*śukha*) with a Vaiśeṣika opponent, and PV 3.251ab is employed to argue that a cognition can only be caused by another cognition. See Yiannopoulos (2020: 424-427). Thus, Sucarita's manoeuvre consists in taking advantage of Dharmakīrti's verse to argue that since cause X can only lead to effect X, the capacities of the particulars can never lead to the production of a unitary cognition as the Buddhists claim, because capacities and particulars do not share the same nature of unitary cognitions, which can only be caused by real universals.

[74] Jayamiśra glosses the phrase *samavetā* as *kṛtsnasamavāyinī*, i.e. "entirely inhering" (ŚVŚar 5,21). Arguably, Kumārila himself might want to avoid using the term *samavāyin* here, since in the ŚV *Pratyakṣa* chapter Kumārila has explicitly rejected the Vaiśeṣika notion of inherence to account for the relationship between universals and particulars. Kumārila's own wording in verse 17c may well reflect his desire to keep a distance from the term that is commonly associated with the Vaiśeṣika philosophy.

18. Therefore, for us, the differences have a property that belongs to themselves, which is the object of a unitary cognition. You may name it as "*sāmānya*", "*ākṛti*", "*jāti*" or "*śakti*".

Kumārila contends that as long as the notion in question refers to the entity that causes a unitary cognition among different particulars, he does not mind what terminology people prefer to use to describe such a phenomena. Thus, this verse alludes to the fact that according to Kumārila, the words that are commonly used by different Indian philosophers when discussing generic properties, such as *sāmānya*, *ākṛti*, *jāti*, or even *śakti*, are all synonyms that carry the same philosophical connotation.[75]

5. There is no such thing as universal-ness (i.e., the universal of universals). (v.19-24)

In what follows, Kumārila aims to settle a challenge that faces all Indian philosophical traditions upholding the reality of universals: if one were to accept the existence of universals, one had to accept a higher level universal, i.e. universal-ness, to account for the similarity among different universals. The basic idea behind this line of objection is that there is a common feature among all universals, e.g. existence, cow-ness, and horse-ness, insofar as they all have the property of *being a universal*. For philosophers such as Dignāga who argue

[75] The word *ātmadharmo* in verse 18a is quite difficult to translate. My translation of the phrase, "a property that belongs to itself", follows the way Sucarita paraphrases verse 18ab: *ato 'sti viśeṣāṇām atmīyo dharmabhedaḥ ko 'py ekabuddhiviṣaya iti siddham*. "Therefore, it is established that the particulars have something that belongs to itself, has a different property, and is the object of a unitary cognition" (ŚVKāś ad *Ākṛti* 18). Kumārila's peculiar way of phrasing here, in fact, already anticipates what he will argue later in the *Ākṛtivāda* that the relationship between universals and particulars are natural (*svābhāvika*). In a way, Kumārila is presenting universals as a type of property that is innately infused with particulars themselves.

against the existence of universals, accepting a higher level universal-ness would cause two problems. Firstly, this would mean universal-ness—which itself is a universal—can reside in universals, which goes against the principle held by Kumārila, Vaiśeṣikas, and Naiyāyikas alike that universals cannot reside in universals. Secondly, one can potentially postulate an even higher level universal, i.e. universal-ness-ness, to account for universal-ness and other universals. This would lead to infinite regress.

19. An objection is raised here (*nanu*): a cognition occurs that there is a universal in [universals] such as existence despite [their] difference [i.e., cow-ness is different from pot-ness] without another universal, [but] how would that [cognition] occur?

The opponent here spells out the problem at stake: even though cow-ness, pot-ness, and existence are very different universals indeed, it seems that we are able to have a cognition that there is commonality among all the different universals. How is this cognition possible, asks the opponent, if there is not a universal like "universal-ness" to account for the commonality among universals?

20-21ab. [Answer:] You have illustrated this [case] which is comparable to the illustration of the forest, for even if this [universal of universals] is an illusion, the concept of [universals such as] cow-ness and the like is not an illusion. For, prior to [the utterance of] the word [universal], there is no concept of a single [notion] among all [universals], [un]like [cow-ness] in the case of cows and the like.

Kumārila's solution to the problem of "universal-ness" is largely linguistic in nature. Kumārila puts forward a simple analogy here: even if the notion of an aggregate as a real entity is an illusion—insofar as the aggregate is nothing but the totality of individual parts—it does not follow that the individual parts of that aggregate are unreal, too. In the example of a forest, trees are not illusions even though the notion of forest is. Likewise, as Kumārila argues, one can reject the notion of universal-ness on the one hand while maintaining the reality of universals on the other hand.[76] Kumārila then elaborates that the commonality of all different universals is purely due to a linguistic application, i.e. there is no real commonality among universals except for the fact that they are all denotations of the word "universal". Therefore, when the word "universal" is not applied, this commonality does not exist. In the case of a real universal, however, the notion of commonality would persist even without a linguistic trigger.[77]

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[76] Kumārila did not make it explicitly clear how exactly the case of universal-ness is comparable to the case of forest. Among the commentators, Pārthasārathi gives the most straightforward explanation: "For, just because the cognition of forest is an illusion, the cognition of trees or the cognition of cow-ness and the like are not illusion[s]." (ŚVNR 550,18-19: *yathā hi vanabuddher mithyātvād vṛkṣabuddher gotvādibuddher vā na mithyātvaṃ*). To make Pārthasārathi's explanatory note into a table:

Illusions (i.e. unreal)	Universal of universals	Forest
Real	Universals such as cow-ness	Trees

Jayamiśra and Sucarita, on the other hand, offer further reasonings as to why trees and universals such as cow-ness should be accepted as real on the one hand, and forest and universal-ness should be regarded as unreal on the other hand. Both of them resort to the notion of a subsequently invalidating cognition (*bādhaka*) that is central in Kumārila's theory of intrinsic validity to illustrate the point. That is to say, the cognitions of universals such as cow-ness are not illusions because there is no invalidation of these cognitions, whereas the cognition of the alleged universal-ness would certainly be sublated. Cf. ŚVKāś ad *Ākṛti* 19-20: *evaṃ sāmānyeṣv api sāmānyam ity anugatākārabuddher mithyātvena gotvādibuddhir mithyā, bādhakābhāvād iti.* "Even though the cognition that has inclusive form as 'a universal in a universal' is an illusion, the cognition of cow-ness and the like is not an illusion, because there is an absence of an invalidating cognition".

[77] Again, Kumārila did not make it explicit how exactly the case of universal-ness is different from the case of universals such as cow-ness. Indeed, one may argue (especially if one is Buddhist) that the commonality among all the cows, much like the pseudo commonality among all the universals, is also only caused by the linguistic application of the word "cow", rather than by a real universal cow-ness. Jayamiśra provides insightful explanation to this hypothetical challenge by pointing to the important criterion by which we can tell apart pseudo commonality and real commonality: perception. According to Jayamiśra, in the case of real universals such as cow-ness, we can perceive the commonality of all the cows even without the application of the word "cow". However, in the case of universals, there is no commonality to be perceived, and the alleged commonality held by the "universal-ness" is only caused by the linguistic application of the word "universal". Cf. ŚVŚar 6,22-24: *śabdena vinā tatpratīpattyabhāvāc chabdanibandhano 'yaṃ pratyayaḥ na vastunibandhana ity anvayavyatirekābhyāṃ bādhakapratyayaṃ darśayann*. "An invalidating cognition [for the universal of

21cd-22. Some people claim here in this case, universal is [just] the property "thing-ness" (*vastutvaṃ*). But if such [claim] were posited, there would be endless universals; since, again, there is cognition of a universal of that ["thing-ness"] in common with other [things].

23. There would be cognition of [this] universal [i.e. thing-ness] even in particulars, due to them [also] being things, just as in the case of existence and the like. Therefore, this universal [i.e. thing-ness] is not possible.

Now Kumārila turns to deal with another claim which holds that instead of the problematic concept of "universal-ness", one should adopt the concept of "thing-ness" to account for our experience that there is a commonality among universals. Kumārila argues that the concept of "thing-ness" should also be rejected, in that it would lead to a creation of endless universals. Moreover, Kumārila points out that "thing-ness" is actually a rather messy concept, because it would not only cover universals, but also include all the particulars—since particulars are real things too. Based on these reasons, Kumārila dismisses this alternative of interpretation.

24. Therefore, the occurrence in different things of a single entity is the basis of [use of] the word "universal" in the case of existence and the like; alternatively, the word "universal" is used because it produces a unitary concept.

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universals] is shown from positive and negative concomitance that the notion [of the universal of universals] is caused by the word ['universal'] and not caused by any real entity, because there is an absence of the perception of that [universal-ness] without the word ['universal']".

Thus, Kumārila reaches a conclusion after discussing the problem of "universal-ness". Kumārila's final stance is that the only common feature among all different universals is that they all have a connection to the word "universal". Kumārila lists two definitions of universals that are acceptable to him: something is called a universal if that thing has singularity while residing in many different things, or, if that thing can bring about a concept that is single, i.e. undifferentiated.[78]

6. Universals reside in corresponding particulars only—no further reasoning is needed for this perceptible fact. (v.25-31ab)

6.1 Universals only pervade in particulars. (v.25-27ab)

25. And a universal is just [residing] in the individuals, because [a universal] is not grasped in the interval [between the individuals]; for, we do not admit anything named as universal like the space [that is all-pervasive].

Kumārila now moves on to discuss a new issue. One key characteristic of universals that is usually in dispute among different philosophical systems in classical India is whether

[78] While Kumārila himself did not employ the notion of adjunct property (*upādhi*) to conclude his solution to the problem of universal-ness, both Jayamiśra and Sucarita use the word *upādhi* to explain Kumārila's strategy. We can understand that both commentators wish to emphasise that what Kumārila has described are just adjunct properties, i.e. accidental characteristics, of universals that do not themselves justify a further universal. Cf. ŚVŚar 7,20-21: *ekopādhikṛto 'yaṃ naikasāmānyakṛto yataḥ. kaḥ punar asāv upādhiḥ. bhinneṣv abhinnasya vartanaṃ nāmaikākārabuddhikaraṇatvam.* "Because this [word 'universal' that connects all the universals together] is not caused by a [real] universal that has singularity, [rather] it is caused by the adjunct property of singularity. Again, what is that 'adjunct property'? It is the property of bringing about a cognition that has a singular form and staying undifferentiated in different [things]." ŚVKāś ad *Ākṛti* 24: *ata ekaṃ kiñ cin upādhim āśrityānekeṣv ekaḥ śabdo vartata ity āśrayaṇīyam. asti cāsāv upādhiḥ yeyam ekasyānekatra vṛttir ekādhīkaraṇaṃ vā.* "Therefore, it should be followed that one word [denoting universal] refers to many ["things"] relying on some adjunct property that is one but occurs in many or causes one singular concept."

universals are all-pervasive like the space, or are only pervasive in corresponding particulars. Here, Kumārila puts forward his position that universals only reside in particulars.

26. Or, even if the universal were to have omnipresence, [its] manifestation is in accordance with its obliging the capacity of the [corresponding individual]. For, the capacity is inferred from the effect, on the ground of the observation of the manifestation [in the individual].

27ab. Therefore, in which [individual] the manifestation of the universal is observed, that alone is capable [of the manifestation].

Even if universals were omnipresent, it would not be possible for universals to occur in between particulars, because the locus of the manifestation of universals is restricted to the locus of particulars. That is to say, given that only particulars can give rise to the manifestation of universals, it is not possible that universals can be found outside the locus of particulars. Therefore, Kumārila concludes that universals can only occur in particulars.

6.2 Since universals can be perceived, there is no need to resort to inference to establish universals. (v.27cd-31ab)

27cd-28. For this very reason, this [universal] would not be perceived in all the individuals. For, even if [each and every individual are] different, some of [the individuals] have the capacity [to manifest a certain universal] and some

others are without that capacity, [generally] there is never any questioning possible of the capacity of real entities.

Whether or not a universal occurs in a certain particular depends on whether this certain particular has the capacity to give rise to the universal in question. For instance, a particular cow has the capacity to give rise to cow-ness, but it does not have the capacity to give rise to horse-ness. Since particulars only have capacity to give rise to corresponding universals, it makes sense that universals are not all-pervasive everywhere. Moreover, one should not question why different particulars have different capacities, because that is a matter of the nature of things.[79]

29. To whom we question [why] "fire burns, space does not"? And no other argument is sought [for this fact]; it is just so as it is observed.

[79] Kumārila does not make it clear what he is comparing with by the phrase *bhinnatve 'pi*. Sucarita and Pārthasārathi offer two different interpretations of the phrase. Sucarita understands the phrase as *parasparabhedāviśeṣe 'pi* (ŚVKāś ad *Ākṛti* 28), i.e. particulars are equally different from each other. Pārthasārathi, on the other hand, thinks that Kumārila meant to say that particulars are equally from universals insofar as they are particulars, not universals. Cf. ŚVNR 552,16-18: *yady api sarvebhyaḥ sāmānyebhyaḥ sarvā vyaktayo bhinnāḥ, tathāpi kāścid eva kasya cid abhivyaktau śaktā, na sarvāḥ sarveṣām iti.* "Even if all the individuals are [equally] different from all the universals, only some [individuals] are capable of giving rise to manifestation of some [universals], [and] not all [individuals are capable of giving rise to manifestation] of all [universals]". Superficially, Pārthasārathi's interpretation seems to fare better than Sucarita's. However, my translation follows the interpretation of Sucarita not only because I think Sucarita's interpretation may be closer to what Kumārila originally intended, not also because Sucarita's interpretation is actually more philosophically insightful. Later in the *Ākṛti* 36ab, Kumārila has a similar expression *yathā tulye 'pi bhinnatve keṣu cid vṛttyavṛttitā.* "Just as the occurrence and non-occurence [of the universal such as cow-ness] is only in some [particulars but not in others] even though [the particulars] are equally different". This indicates that Kumārila might similarly have intended to say particulars are equally different from each other when he wrote *bhinnatve 'pi* in the *Ākṛti* 28. Philosophically, Kumārila also makes a rather insightful point: even if numerically different particulars are able to give manifestation to a singular universal, they are only able to do so if they belong to the same class. For example, imagine there are six different individual animals. If they are six different cows, they are able to give rise to the cognition of a universal cow-ness; if they are three different cows and three different horses, on the other hand, they will not give rise to cow-ness or horse-ness, even if they are of course different individuals.

When we observe that a fire is burning, we do not question whether it is the fire itself that is burning, or if it is the space that is burning instead. By illustrating this everyday scenario, Kumārila aims to emphasise that one does not need to question the validity of perceptible fact.[80] In the same way, since perception informs us that particulars only give rise to corresponding universals, we do not need further reasoning to justify why that is so.

30. That there is no other reason [for the fact that fire burns] does not [make] this cognition [of the fire burning] invalid (*anarthakam*).[81] In the case of observation of something that never deviates, no [indicating] property needs to be sought.

When something is already established by a perceptual cognition, there is no need to pursue another reason for further justification. More importantly, the lack of a further reason does not make a perceptible fact invalid, because perception itself is a valid means of knowledge.[82]

31ab. That [universal] is not to be understood from an inference. What is the point of inferential mark in the case of an object of perception?

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[80] Cf. ŚVŚar 9,9: *yato darśanam evātra pramāṇam.* "Because here, perception itself is the valid means of knowledge."

[81] Both Sucarita and Pārthasārathi paraphrases *anarthaka* as *apramāṇa*, "invalid". Cf. ŚVKāś ad *Ākṛti* 30: *anarthakam arthaśūnyam apramāṇam iti yāvad iti.* And ŚVNR 553,12-13: *anarthakam apramāṇakam ity arthaḥ.*

[82] Commenting on ŚV *Ākṛti* 30, Pārthasārathi quotes ŚV *Codanā* v.81 which goes: "And that speech and so on are means of valid cognition (*pramāṇatā*) should not be established on the basis of inference lest all [means of valid cognition] be established by means of other means of valid cognition (*pramāṇāntarasādhyatā*)." (Translated by Kataoka 2011: II.292). Cf. ŚVNR 553,11-12: *darśitaṃ hi codanāsūtre svataḥprāmāṇyavāde na cānumānataḥ sādhyā śabdādīnāṃ pramāṇateti.* Kumārila's verse in the ŚV *Codanā* contends that one should not argue that the validity of *śabda* as a means of a knowledge is dependent on inference, which is another means of knowledge. Otherwise, there would be an undesired consequence that the validity of each means of knowledge would depend on another means of knowledge, leading to an infinite regress.

Thus, Kumārila concludes that one should not attempt to establish the existence of universals by means of inference when the existence of universals can be proved directly by perception.

7. No other universal is needed to explain the relationship of universals and particulars as well as the occurrence of universals.

7.1 The relationship of universals and particulars is natural and does not need further reasons. (vv.31cd-34)

31cd-32. And, the relation of the universal and the individual is natural (*svābhāvikaḥ*); it is without a cause (*na hetumān*). Therefore, no other universal is expected for establishing that [relation between universal and particular]. Like in the case of the establishment of capacity, the intrinsic nature of this [relation between universal and particular] here cannot be denied.

Kumārila puts forward his unique understanding of the relationship between universals and particulars—that there is a natural relation between them and that the relation

is not caused by any other factors.[83] One should not postulate another factor or entity to account for the relationship between universals and particulars.[84]

33. Or, even if that [relation] had some cause, because of the expectation of just that much [as the cause] (*tāvanmātrapratīkṣaṇāt*), [at least] when certain particulars are perceived, there is no need for anything else [to explain the relation].

34. Why do [other particulars] not manifest [other universals]? It is because [that universal] is not seen in those particulars. Also, we do not need [any] reason for the non-occurrence [of that universal] from those [other particulars], because of the intrinsic nature [of the particulars].

Kumārila circles back to address a problem that was already discussed in ŚV *ākṛti* 27cd-28, but with a new angle. Earlier, Kumārila argues that the reason why particulars only give rise to corresponding universals is because this is perceived as such, and one does not need to resort to further reasoning to explain this phenomenon beyond perception. Now, having explained that the relationship between universals and particulars is natural, Kumārila

[83] ŚVKāś ad *Ākṛti* 31: *nātra rajjughaṭayor iva jātivyaktyor atyantabhinnayoḥ saṃbandhaḥ, api tarhi tādātmyam eva. vyaktir hi svakāraṇato jāyamānaiva tattadākārā niṣpadyate, ataḥ svābhāvike tādātmye kasya kena saṃbandho yo 'nyanibandhano bhavet.* "Here, the relationship between universal[s] and particular[s] is not like [the relationship] between a rope and a pot, which are absolutely different from each other. But rather, there is just identity [between universals and particulars]. For, an individual arising from its own causes is produced with this or that form. Therefore, when [their] identity is natural, what [thing A] has a connection with what [thing B] that can be caused by something else?"

[84] According to Sucarita, the most serious issue that would emerge if one did not accept that there is a natural relationship between an universal and a particular in the form of identity is that one would have to postulate another universal (*sāmānyāntara*) to regulate the relationship between universals and particulars, which would lead to an infinite regress. Cf. ŚVKāś ad *Ākṛti* 31: *svābhavike saṃbandhe na tatsiddhaye sāmānyāntaram eṣitavyam ato nānavastheti.*

offers another perspective to explain why universals only manifest in corresponding particulars: due to their own intrinsic natures, particular cows can only give rise to the universal cow-ness, rather than horse-ness.

7.2 There is no need to postulate another universal to explain the occurrence of universals. (v.35-38)

35-36. [Objection:] If another universal is not held as the restrictive cause (*niyāmakam*) of its occurrence, why is the cognition of cow not restricted [to certain particulars] without cow-ness? Just as the occurrence and non-occurence of cow-ness and the like is only in some [particulars but not in others] even though [the particulars] are equally different, in the same way, even without [another] cause, the cognition of [cow] will arise.

Now the opponent raises a fresh challenge. In the preceding verses, Kumārila argues that given that the relationship between universals and particulars is natural, we do not need to postulate another reason nor another entity to explain why only certain particulars can manifest corresponding universals. Here, the opponent is trying to take advantage of this ontological position of Kumārila to make an epistemological argument. The opponent askes: if, ontologically, the occurrence of universals in corresponding particulars does not require a cause, then, epistemologically, why does the cognition of universals require a cause?[85]

[85] Cf. Kāśikā ad *Ākṛti* 35-36: *yadi tu nānātmāno viśeṣā ekarūpasāmānyavṛttihetavaḥ… kiṃ gotvādisāmānyagraheṇa. yathā hi bhedāviśeṣe 'pi kasya cit sāmānyasya keṣu cid viśeṣeṣu svabhāvād eva nimittāntaranirapekṣā vṛttiḥ, tathā gotvādibuddhir api keṣu cit svabhāvād eva bhaviṣyati. vṛttiśabdena vṛttimantaṃ lakṣayati, na vidyate vṛttir asyety avṛttiḥ, tayor bhāvo vṛttyavṛttitā.* ***animittāpīti*** *svabhāvātiriktanimittāntaraśūnyāpīty arthaḥ.* **"**For, if particulars, which have the nature of multiplicity, are the causes for the occurrence of universals that have singular forms…what is the point of grasping [real] universals

Without another type of universal to function as a kind of controlling factor, the opponent argues, there is no guarantee that we only cognise cow-ness in things that have cow-ness. The universal "cow-ness" could even occur in particulars that are devoid of "cow-ness", such as in horses. Essentially, the opponent is proposing that the cognition of universals—much like the ontological nature of the universals—does not need a cause. If the cognition of universals indeed does not require a cause, then why cannot things devoid of cow-ness give rise to the cognition of cow-ness?

37-38. [Answer:] For, it is not accepted that the arising of cognitions can be without an object. Therefore, it is firm that we need a universal that is distinct from the particular[s]. For, those [cognitions] arising without that [corresponding object] must be illusions, because [they are] without objects. On the other hand, the occurrence of a universal without another [universal] does not cause any fault here [in our system].

Kumārila's strategy to tackle this challenge is to reiterate his epistemological realist stance. Since every cognition must have a corresponding object as its content, the fact that we are able to cognise the commonality among many different things indicates that there is a type of entity that functions as the support for such cognitions. One is not able to cognise cow-ness when one sees a horse, because a horse is devoid of cow-ness. Only that which has cow-ness can give rise to a cognition of cow-ness. This entity must also be different from particulars, because particulars are only able to help us cognise the individual distinctness of

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such as cow-ness and the like? For, just as even if [particulars] are equally different [from each other], some universals are in certain particulars, [and] the occurrence is not dependent on another ground, just due to intrinsic natures; in the same way, the cognition of cow-ness and the like, also, is in certain [particulars], will be due to intrinsic nature."

things. Therefore, Kumārila concludes that the existence of universals is necessary to explain our daily experience.

7.3 Direct perception of universals is the most fundamental factor for determining the reality of universals. (vv.39-44)

39. If universal is not admitted, there would be no function of verbal activity and inference, for there could be no connection with the different [individuals], because they are endless (*ānantyato*).

Words can function only if the relationship between words and what they denote is established; similarly, inference can function only if the relationship is established between an inferential mark and the property to be proved. Kumārila asserts that only universals are able to help establish these relationships that are essential for language and inferential reasoning, because there are an endless number of particulars and a connection with particulars is impossible.

40. And, that [relation with individuals] is useful for people, as it is experienced [so], but in the case of the relation of universal and individual, there is no purpose of being experienced.

There is no need for one to experience the relationship between universals and particulars, because such a relationship is natural and without a cause. That is to say, the

relationship does not need to be established by being experienced, or perceived, or being reasoned by inference. On the other hand, the relation among individual objects that one has to perceive before making an inferential reasoning is essential, because in everyday life we need to use inference, and this is an indisputable fact.

41-42. Again, when the form of object such as cow-ness and so on is established by sense faculties, obtaining presumption [leads to that] the capacity would be [established as] the singular restrictive factor. But that [capacity], being so established, cannot cancel its own cause [i.e. the cognition of universals]. And the capacity [is not grasped] by that cognition, for it is not grasped by sense faculties.

One cannot actually perceive the capacity that individuals allegedly have that can give people a singular, unified cognition of different things. Such capacities are, in fact, only inferred by *arthāpatti*. On the other hand, the existence of universals can be established by direct perception and thus does not require inference. Therefore, the cognition of universals is more primary than the inference of capacities. The reasons why the capacity of individuals cannot be grasped by sense faculties was already discussed by Kumārila in *Ākṛti* vv.12-17.

Sucarita argues that one should take the cognition of universals as the basis for any other conceptions of universals, such as the relationship of universals and particulars, as well as the question of how universals only occur in the corresponding particulars. Sucarita's reasoning seems to rely on the fact that since the cognition of universals is perceptual, and therefore more primary, it does not require another reason to explain it.

43. And that infinite regress of the association of another universal illustrated by you would [lead to] the destruction of universals, and [such association] is invalidated by the perception [of the universals].

Kumārila acknowledges that there is a theoretical concern that if the existence of a universal requires the existence of a further, higher-level universal, that would lead to an undesirable infinite regress. However, Kumārila asserts here that this theoretical concern does not pose a problem in his system, given that universals can be directly perceived.

44. And, neither the relationship of that [universal and particular] nor the cause [of that relationship] is the means for the cognition of that [universal]. When the object is grasped in its own-form, that [relationship between universal and particular and its cause] is conceptualised.

The cognition of universals, i.e. the perception of the universals, serves as the foundation for us to talk about the relationship between universals and particulars, as well as for us to talk about the issue of what the cause of the manifestation of universals is. That is to say, to establish the existence of universals, one only needs to resort to perceptual cognition. All the other questions come in a secondary order.

8. The identity between universals and particulars is due to the nature of universals. (v.45-50)

45. This is a characterisation (*upalakṣaṇa*) that cow-ness is connected with a single object that has [marks] such as dewlaps. We do not desire that only a self-inhering characteristic can be a mark.

In the *Śābarabhāṣya* ad *Mīmāṃsāsūtra* 1.1.5, Śabara makes the following statement: "Then, what is the denotation of the word 'cow'? We say that [the denotation of the word 'cow' is the universal that is characterised by [features] such as dewlaps and the like."[86] Commenting on this statement made by Śabara, Kumārila emphasises that the dewlaps of the cows merely serve as indications of cow-ness. That is to say, even though whatever has dewlaps is the locus of cow-ness, it does not necessarily follow that dewlaps are intrinsic natures of the universal cow-ness.

46-47. When [it is agreed that] there is no absolute difference between individual [cow] and [its characteristics] such as dewlaps, and [no absolute difference] between universal [i.e. cow-ness] and individual [cow], then this would follow: "Why is there cow-ness only in those [individuals] which possess dewlap and so on?" "Because cow-ness has such a nature." If [you have a doubt] how it [i.e. cow-ness] has identity [with them], [we say:] "you should understand that [it is so] because of its own nature."

The reason why a universal cow-ness only occurs in individuals that have dewlaps is because the universal cow-ness has an identity with individual cows. Although individual

[86] *Śābarabhāṣya* ad *Mīmāṃsāsūtra* 1.1.5: *atha gaur ity asya śabdasya ko 'rthaḥ. sāsnādiviśiṣṭākṛtir iti brūmaḥ.*

cows have the intrinsic nature of having dewlaps, it is the identity between cow-ness and cows, instead of the relationship between cow-ness and dewlaps, that determines that cow-ness only resides in individual cows rather than in other things.

48. Such convention is established in accordance with perception. The difference [among different universals] such as cow-ness is due to its own [nature], rather than due to the difference of its manifesting factor.

The difference between, for instance, cow-ness and horse-ness, is because of their own respective natures, rather than due to the differences between a particular cow and a particular horse.

49. [The distinction of universals such as cowness] cannot be false like the case of quick [or fast] pronunciation [of phonemes]. 'But, what causes the distinction of manifesting factors?' If [you say] the distinction among concrete particulars, for example, the distinction of a cow from an elephant and so on is due to its own [nature], that is the same here in our case of universals such as cowness.

Kumārila compares the difference between universals with the difference between concrete particulars. The reason why an elephant is different from a cow is because elephants and cows are two kinds of things that have different natures. In the same way, an universal cow-ness is different from an universal horse-ness, because these two universals have

different natures. One does not need to resort to another regulating factor to explain why a certain universal is different from another universal.

50. If [it is claimed that the difference] is due to the particularities of the universals being manifested, there would be mutual dependence. Therefore, the difference of universals and [the difference] of particulars should be perceived as natural.[87]

Following his argument in the ŚV *Ākṛti* 49, Kumārila nonetheless adds that one should not assume that the difference between universals is due to the difference of the particulars that manifest these universals. That is to say, it is not appropriate to say that cow-ness is different from pot-ness because individual cows are different from individual pots, since this would lead to a mutual dependence—the difference between cows and pots being due to the difference between the corresponding universals, and the difference between cow-ness and pot-ness being due to the difference between the corresponding particulars. Therefore, Kumārila argues that the difference between universals should be taken as natural in the same way in which we view the difference between particulars. We never ask the question as to why a cow is different from a pot; the difference is due to their own intrinsic natures. Similarly, the difference between cow-ness and pot-ness is also due to the respective natures of those universals.

[87] Kumārila's phrase *bhedo jātivyaktyoḥ* in the ŚV *Ākṛti* 50c is confusingly vague and thus very difficult to translate. Its literal meaning, "the difference of universals and particulars", does not make much sense given the context. Based on Sucarita's very helpful gloss (ŚVKāś ad *Ākṛti* 50: *yataś cāyaṃ na paropādhiko jātibhedo ghaṭate, tasmāt vyaktibhedavat svābhāvikaḥ pratīyatām ity āha—**tasmād iti***.), I interpret Kumārila's phrase as expressing the difference among universals and the difference among particulars, since his main argument in the ŚV *Ākṛti* 50 is that the difference among universals, just like the difference among particulars, should be taken as due to their intrinsic natures.

9 Universals and particulars are both different from and identical to each other (v. 51-65ab)

51. [Objection:] Because [universal] occurs in many places (*aneka*) and [particular] occurs in none other [than the perceived individual] itself (*ananyavṛtti*), it is not logical that universal and particular are the same thing. Therefore, it [must be] somewhat (*kiṃ cit*) figurative.

From the ŚV *Ākṛti* 51 onwards, Kumārila tackles the objection that it is not possible that universals and particulars are identical to each other since they have contradictory natures. Given that it is not logical for universals and particulars to be one and the same thing, the opponent suggests that the identity between universals and particulars alleged by Kumārila can only be figurative.[88]

52-53. Since [the universal] is not different from the different individuals, it would just be difference [that has multiplicity], like the own-nature of things. Or, since [particular] is not different from [universal] that is single, the unity of individuals would be the undesired consequence. How is it [possible] that one thing has [both] singularity and non-singularity? And likewise, how can one

[88] If we only follows Kumārila's verse, it seems natural that the opponent in the ŚV *Ākṛti* 51 is suggesting that the identity between universals and particulars must be somehow figurative, since they cannot be identical to each other in reality given their contradictory natures. According to Sucarita and Pārthasārathi, the opponent's suggestion here echoes the objection in the ŚV *Ākṛti* 7, where the opposition view is that one of the two concepts—universals or particulars—must be either an illusion (*bhrāntir*) or a figurative usage (*upacāra*). Therefore, Sucarita and Pārthasārathi construe the phrase "somewhat figurative" (*kiṃ cit tenaupacārikam*) as "being an illusion and being figurative" (*bhrāntyupacārāv*). Cf. ŚVKāś ad *Ākṛti* 51-52: *pūrvoktau bhrāntyupacāravādāv eva varam āśritau.* ŚVNR 559,15-16: *varaṃ pūrvoktau bhrāntyupacārāv evāśritāv iti.*

thing have [both] otherness and the absence of otherness? Given these, it is difficult to have that [one thing] that is both a universal and a particular.

The opponent further develops their objection that it is ontologically impossible for one thing to be both a particular and a universal, because that is contradictory in terms. A universal, by definition, is that which has singularity; a particular, on the other hand, is that which has multiplicity. In fact, a universal and a particular have all the following opposite characteristics, as listed by the opponent:

Universal (*sāmānya*)	Particular (*viśeṣa*)
Occurring in many places (*anekavṛtti*)	Occuring in itself (*ananyavṛtti*)
Has singularity (*eka*)	Has multiplicity (*aneka*)
Indicating otherness (*anyatā*)	Indicating the absence of otherness (*ananyatā*)

If one thing is both a particular and a universal, it would mean that the essence of a particular can trespass to the essence of a universal, and vice versa. In that case, a universal would harbour the quality of particulars and become diverse and non-singular, and a particular would harbour the quality of a universal and become singular. Therefore, the opponent concludes that Kumārila's proposal that one thing is both a universal and a particular is not plausible.

54-55. [Answer:] First of all, it cannot be said that contradiction is here [in this context] in an absolute sense. When a particular is cognised as identical

with a universal, it does not occur only in one place, [and] due to its identity with the nature of a particular, a universal does not occur in others (*ananyavṛttitvaṃ*). And thus your postulation of [how one and the same thing can be] both different and non-different (*bhinnābhinnatvakalpanā*) should be abandoned as such.

56-57ab. And, in some way, it has singularity; in some other way, it has multiplicity. For someone who says that universal has difference, it should be shown to him that [the difference of universal] is due to [its having the form of] the particular, and [such difference should be] admitted, and [also] that the unity of particulars is due to [its form as] universal.

While it is true that universals are characterised by being one and singular and particulars are characterised by being multiple and diverse, universals can assume the characteristics of particulars and that is how universals can sometimes be perceived as being multiple and diverse.

57cd-58ab. Just as the variegated colour suppresses every individual colour (*varṇanigrahaḥ*) as appropriate, by the virtue of it being a variegated colour, in the same way, there is ascertainment of difference or non-difference of a thing.

Kumārila compares real entities consisting of both universal and particular aspects to something that has a variegated colour. If a thing has a mixed nature, one can suppress any one aspect of the mixed nature and focus on the other aspect instead.[89] This process itself would not negate the fact that the thing in question truly has diverse natures.

58cd-59ab. But, for one who wants to prove the difference after extracting (*niṣkṛṣya*) the aspect of universal [alone], his reason would be unestablished. If [the reason] is established, it would be proving the already proved [and thus become redundant].

For anyone who wishes to prove that only difference, i.e. particulars, is real, one would need to extract and discard the universal aspect from the dual-natured entity. However, in doing so, one would need to acknowledge that real things indeed consist of two aspects before one can extract the universal aspect. Without acknowledging this, the premise of extraction would be unestablished. On the other hand, if one does accept the premise, that means that Kumārila's own position—that one thing has both particular and universal aspects—has already been accepted.

[89] Kumārila's choice of word, suppression (*nigrahaḥ*), may seem odd at first glance. One could think that a more natural way of expressing the intended idea of Kumārila's metaphor is to say that one can pick out (*vigrahaḥ*) any aspects of a mixed-natured thing. Indeed, *vigrahaḥ* is the reading adopted by Jayamiśra, and the way Sucarita glosses ŚV *Ākṛti* 57ab appears to lean in the same direction (*yathā kalmāṣavarne vastuni ya eva nīlādivarṇaviśeṣo gṛhītum iṣyate, sa eva gṛhyate*). However, *nigrahaḥ* is more likely to be the originally intended word of Kumārila, after all. There are two main reasons to support this reading. Firstly, according to the internal logic of the ŚV *Ākṛti*, Kumārila does seem to emphasise the idea of "suppression" when he provides a detailed account of how a mix-natured thing can appear to have only one aspect in the ŚV *Ākṛti* 59cd-61ab. When Kumārila says "Despite [still] being really existing, [the universal] appears to us as if it was non-existent, due to its form being not graspable [at that time]" (ŚV *Ākṛti* 61ab), it seems that when a mix-natured thing is perceived only as a particular, the universal aspect is indeed suppressed, since it becomes as if it was non-existent. Secondly, the reading of *nigrahaḥ* is also how this verse is quoted in both *Tattvasaṃgraha* 1745 and *Nyāyamañjarī* II 33.12-13. It is noteworthy that Jayanta paraphrases *nigrahaḥ* as *upamardaḥ*, suggesting that he indeed understands Kumārila's original verse as containing *nigrahaḥ* rather than *vigrahaḥ*. Cf. NM 193.2-3: *ata eveha mithyātvam eti nānyatarā matiḥ | na hy anyonyopamardena buddhidvitayasaṃbhavaḥ ||*

59cd-61ab. When universal is grasped as identical with the individuals, then the object appears only as particular. And after that [cognition of the particular] becomes powerful, the universal is still present while conforming to the cognition of that being [i.e. particular]. Despite [still] being really existing (*sad apy*), [the universal] appears to us as if it was non-existent (*asadvat*), due to its form being not graspable [at that time].

Here, Kumārila provides a more detailed account of how real entities—although they have both universals and particulars in their nature—can sometimes appear only as particulars or only as universals. Kumārila explains that when we focus on the particular aspect of a real entity, we will have a cognition of that entity as a particular. Meanwhile, the universal aspect of that entity conforms to the characteristics of a particular, i.e. the universal aspect will also be perceived as multiple and diverse like a particular.[90] Kumārila especially stresses that universals remain extant in this situation, even if universals appear as if they are non-existent when they assume the characteristics of particulars.[91]

61cd-62ab. Likewise, when one cognises particulars as non-different from universal—at that time, it is only just the universal nature that is perceived.

[90] Sucarita explains that when universals are perceived as having the characteristics of particulars, they are "defeated", i.e. the particular aspect has become the dominant aspect of a dual-natured entity. Cf. ŚVKāś 59cd-61ab: *sāmānyaṃ viśeṣabodhānuguṇam abhibhūtaṃ*.

[91] The commentators on the verse, like Kumārila, endeavour to stress that in this scenario, universals are still real existences. Answering the objection as to how universals are not non-existent on the ultimate level, Sucarita draws the distinction between "not being in the domain of cognition" (*jñānavyāptā*) and "non-existing" (*asat*). The former does not necessarily lead to the latter, as Sucarita argues. Cf. ŚVKāś 59cd-61ab: *nanu paramārthato nāsty eva, na hi jñānavyāptā vastunas sattā yat tannivṛttyā sāpi nivartata iti.*

In a similar way, particulars will conform to the qualities of universals when we focus on the universal aspect of a real entity. In this situation, particulars will have the characteristics of universals, i.e. being one and singular. Needless to say, according to Kumārila, particulars still really exist in this situation, too.

62cd-63ab. However, when a thing is perceived as mixed [i.e., universal and particular] simultaneously—at that time, everything such as the distinction of other and non-other (*anyānanyabhedādi*) just disappears.

While Kumārila does not explicitly say so in this verse, here, he expressed his position that the state in which universals and particulars are simultaneously perceived together is the stage of non-conceptualised perception.[92] While both universals and particulars are present in a non-conceptualised perception, we cannot tell them apart insofar as we can tell nothing apart in the non-conceptualised stage of perception.

63cd-64ab. But no word is able to describe that [state] as such, [because] all words operate after extracting (*apoddhṛtya*) the universal aspect [from this mixed state]

[92] Jayamiśra quotes the beginning of ŚV *Pratyakṣa* 118 to provide context for this verse (*nirvikalpakāvasthāyāṃ pralīnasamastabhedābhedavikalpaṃ vicitrarūpaṃ vastu pratibhātīty uktam—nirvikalpakabodhe 'pi—ity atra.*) The full verse of ŚV *Pratyakṣa* 118 goes: *nirvikalpakabodhe 'pi dvyātmakasyāpi vastunaḥ | grahaṇaṃ lakṣaṇākhyeyaṃ jñātrā śuddhaṃ tu gṛhyate* || "Even in a cognition that is non-conceptualised, there is a grasping of a thing that has a dual nature, which is to be known indirectly. However, by the cogniser, [the thing] is grasped as pure."

64cd-65ab. Some people say that the extraction of the meaning of words that has an expectation for the whole entity is unreal, but it cannot be denied that [universals] are the aspects [of the entity].

The reason why we are not able to use any words to describe the state when universals and particulars are mixed together is because all words denote universals, which is Kumārila's fundamental Mīmāṃsā stance. If there is a state in which we cannot even tell universals apart from particulars, then no language can operate on that level. In the ŚV *Pratyakṣa*, Kumārila already argues that language does not function in the non-conceptualised stage of perception. No word can describe the non-conceptualised stage of perception insofar as all words can only proceed to function in the conceptualised stage of perception.

10. Real universals cannot be replaced by the concept of similarity. (v.65cd-76)

65cd-66ab. Whoever conceptualises that the universal is nothing but similarity of concrete particulars, [we ask him:] again, what is meant by him by the word "similarity"?

Having explained how it is logical that universals and particulars are both different from and identical to each other, Kumārila now moves on to tackle another line of objection. The opponent here suggests that the concept of a universal is equivalent to the concept of

"similarity". Since universals are found in things that are similar to each other, i.e. cow-ness is found in cows, it seems that a universal is just a notion that denotes similarity among things. Responding to this objection, Kumārila indicates that he will investigate what this claim actually entails.

66cd. If [this similarity] is the state of the same form (*samānarūpabhāvaś*), it is [just] universal maintained by us.

Kumārila argues that if the notion of similarity proposed by the opponent just means that there is one and the same generic property that underlies all things that belongs to the same class, then this notion of similarity is not different from the notion of universals accepted by the Mīmāṃsakas.[93]

67-68. Now, [if you mean] similarity [as having] similar appearances, then you should explain what appears similar to what. First of all, a bāhuleya cow and so on are not similar to a śābaleya cow in terms of the particular forms. Even if bāhuleya cows are similar [to a śābaleya cow] due to their bodily structure and so on, the cognition [of the similarity] regarding them would be "they are like a śābaleya" (*śābaleya iveti*), but not as "a cow" (*na gaur iti*).

Kumārila suggests that if, however, the notion of similarity means that individuals simply have similar appearances, there would be a problem. Kumārila points out that

[93] Sucarita understands "the state of having the sameness [of individuals]" as one and the same thing recurring in different individuals. Cf. ŚVKāś 65cd-67ab: *kiṃ samānarūpatā, ekaparyāyaś ca samānaśabdaḥ, sā tarhi tathāvidhā jātir asmābhir iṣyate.*

bāhuleya cows do not have a similar appearance with *śābaleya* cows in terms of what they look like, and therefore one cannot say that there is a notion of similarity between these two types of cows. On the other hand, the notion of universals does not encounter such difficulties. Cow-ness can be found in both *bāhuleya* cows and *śābaleya* cows, because it is not about their physical resemblances, but rather, it is concerned with their natures of being a cow.

Now, even if one makes concessions by saying that there is a certain degree of similarity between *bāhuleya* cows and *śābaleya* cows—insofar as the physical features of a *bāhuleya* cow are more similar to those of a *śābaleya* cow compared to those of a horse—one is only able to have a cognition that is in the form of "something looks like a *śābaleya* cow" instead of "it is a cow *in general*". This is because the point of reference is limited to *śābaleya* cows, but *śābaleya* cows cannot represent all the other types of cow. Therefore, the notion of similarity cannot replace that of a universal.

69. Or, [even] by a mistake, the cognition "this is a *śābaleya*" is not [the same as] the cognition "this is a cow". [Because] the nature of *śābaleya* is not [the nature of] cow [in general].

70. For, [if the nature of a *śābaleya* cow is the same as cow in general], the cognition of cow would not [occur] in [cows] other than *śābaleya* cows. [But] that [cognition of cow] (*sā*) is observed (*dṛśyate*) also in [other types of cow] dissimilar to [*śābaleya* cows], and for you (*te*) no other cow-ness has been accepted, [because] the nature of cow is found there.

If one were to claim that the nature of *śābaleya* cows is equivalent with the nature of being a cow in general, it would lead to the undesired consequence that cow-ness would only occur in *śābaleya* cows exclusively.

71. There is no other [archetypal] cow known, by the similarity of which there would be [a general notion of] "cow". Also, regarding similar things, there cannot constantly be the cognition "this [one] is the same with that [one]".

Kumārila rejects another proposal put forward by the opponent, namely, that there is an archetypal cow based on which our notion of cow-ness is produced. This means that there was an archetypal cow C_0, and the reason why all the other cows in the world, i.e. C_1, C_2, C_3, etc, are found to have cow-ness is because of their similarity to this archetypal cow C_0. Kumārila investigates this claim further in ŚV *Ākṛti* 73-74ab. For now, Kumārila points out that a cognition in the form of "A is the same with B" cannot be produced based on the notion of similarity. The notion of similarity is only able to produce cognitions as in "A is similar to B".

72. All human beings have [the notion/cognition of universals such as cow-ness], and so, it cannot be an illusion, because there is no sublation (*bādhakavarjanāt*). If it is imagined [that our cognitions of universals were false], then all cognitions would have the undesired consequence of being false.

Referring to his theory of intrinsic validity again, Kumārila shows that since our cognitions of universals are not sublated and are never challenged by any subsequent cognitions, it is not appropriate to claim that universals such as cow-ness are only illusions.

73-74ab. Because we do not have the grasping of particular [characteristics of it], you should explain what the unique cow is. If [you say] that [unique cow] existed previously (*babhūva*), [we disagree,] because that is not grasped by people like us [of today], [and thus] we cannot ascertain what similarity is. Therefore, we cannot obtain the notion of cow [on the basis of similarity].

Kumārila now returns to the opponent's proposal that the notion of cow-ness is based on things being similar to an archetypal cow. Kumārila's empiricist stance makes him press the opponent to describe what this archetypal cow is, since people of today never observe this alleged archetypal cow. Kumārila also suggests that it is not appropriate to say that this archetypal cow existed a long time ago and now no longer exists, because there is no evidence to support that, since no one has ever observed that. In fact, we can never ascertain whether a cow nowadays is similar to this archetypal cow or not, since we do not know the features of the archetypal cow, because we have never seen it.

74cd. Neither can similarity [of a cow with 'your' archetypal cow] be imagined without knowing the commonness of their [body] parts.

75-76ab. The arising of the notion of universal is not [just] regarding particulars. If we reflect on the question whether it [i.e. similarity] goes beyond individuals or not, similarity would be nothing but the universal or merely the individual.

76cd-76ef. Therefore, the identical form [among individuals] that has been described by Vindhyavāsa[94] is not a thing that is really different [from universal], [but] confused people (*bhrāntaiḥ*) have called it similarity.

Kumārila now concludes that one should not substitute the notion of universals—which are real entities—with the notion of similarity. As Kumārila argues, the notion of similarity proposed by Vindhyavāsa is, in fact, not different from his own understanding of universals; both denote the phenomenon that one and the same thing recurs in different individuals. One should not regard similarity as a separate kind of real entity.

[94] Vindhyavāsa (or Vindyavāsin) is a Saṃkhya philosopher estimated to be active around 300-400 CE. Vindyavāsa likely came before Iśvarakṛṣṇa (c. 350-450 CE), who was the final synthesiser of the classical Saṃkhya system. For the discussion of Vindhyavāsa's date and his relation to other classical Saṃkhya philosophers, see Larson and Bhattacharya (2014: 141-146).

Chapter 4: Proving the Existence of Universals: Kumārila's Epistemology on Universals

4.1 Introduction: An Epistemological Account of Universals

As we saw in Chapter 3, Kumārila presents his theory of universals in the *Ākṛtivāda* in a rather discursive way. Kumārila's two main philosophical claims that comprise his theory of universals, i.e. that universals are real existences and that universals and particulars share a certain identity, are scattered in different parts of the *Ākṛtivāda*. In this chapter, we will first turn to Kumārila's arguments for the existence of universals, which is the main objective of the *Ākṛtivāda* as proclaimed by Kumārila in the ŚV *Ākṛti* 2. Once we piece together all of Kumārila's proof for the existence of universals offered in the *Ākṛtivāda*, we will find that his main point is, in fact, quite simple and straightforward: that the perceptual cognition of universals is an indisputable source of authority for the very existence of universals. In other words, Kumārila argues that universals exist, and are clearly real entities, because we can perceive them. For this line of argument to work successfully, Kumārila relies upon three theories. He first uses his theory of perception to explain how universals are perceived by us in our cognition. He then employs epistemological realism to explain what the relationship between the content of our cognition and the external object cognised is. Finally, Kumārila uses his theory of intrinsic validity to explain how we should assess the epistemic validity of our perceptual cognition.

Noticeably, in the *Ākṛtivāda*, Kumārila does not discuss why one should accept these three main epistemological theories that serve as the pillars for his arguments for the existence of universals. When reading the *Ākṛtivāda*, it is easy to gain an impression that Kumārila seems to take these important issues for granted and that Kumārila's arguments for the existence of universals rely on some significant leaps of faith. However, it is important to

note that this problem is largely caused by the structure of the ŚV. As the *Ākṛtivāda* is a later chapter of the ŚV, Kumārila takes these epistemological theories as given because he has already provided philosophical explanation and justification for them in the earlier chapters. While this issue does not damage the integrity of Kumārila's arguments for the existence of universals, it does mean that, as readers of Kumārila's theory, we need to understand Kumārila's main argument in the *Ākṛtivāda* in relation to his defence of conceptualised perception and the perceptibility of universals in the *Pratyakṣapariccheda* and the *Vanavāda* chapters, his rejection of idealism in the *Nirālambanavāda* chapter, and, perhaps most importantly, his advocacy of the theory of intrinsic validity (*svataḥ prāmāṇya*) in the *Codanāsūtra* chapter.

As I have argued in the introduction chapter, one of the most noteworthy characteristics of Kumārila's arguments for the existence of universals is that he argues them within an elaborate epistemological scheme. In the first part of this chapter, I will give a close examination of how Kumārila articulates a systematic theory of universals by assembling his theory of perception, his theory of epistemological realism, and his theory of intrinsic validity. My goal in this chapter is to show that Kumārila's arguments for the existence of universals in the *Ākṛtivāda* represents his uncompromising assertion of a Mīmāṃsā realist epistemology that is in direct opposition to the epistemology advanced by Dignāga, the founder of the Buddhist logico-epistemological school whose philosophical system Kumārila dedicates most of his philosophy to arguing against. As I will demonstrate, Kumārila's development of each of the three epistemological theories just mentioned are also, in and of themselves motivated by countering the challenges posed by Buddhist philosophy, especially Dignāga's system. I will show how Kumārila expounds his different epistemological theories in the ŚV against the backdrop of Dignāga's philosophy and analyse the relevant verses from

the *Ākṛtivāda* to examine how Kumārila applies those theories to argue for the existence of universals.

In the second part of this chapter, I will turn to situate Kumārila's theory of universals in the *Ākṛtivāda* in the context of how it interacts with the work of Dharmakīrti, the co-founder of the Buddhist logico-epistemological school and Dignāga's most influential intellectual successor. While the relationship between Kumārila and Dignāga is easy to establish, since the former argues against various theories of the latter, the relationship between Kumārila and Dharmakīrti is far less clean-cut. In this chapter, I aim to shed light on the impact of Kumārila's theory of universals on the Buddhist logico-epistemological school by investigating the relationship between some of Kumārila's arguments in the *Ākṛtivāda* and Dharmakīrti's theory of unitary cognition in the PV(SV) 1. I hope to use this case study to further strengthen the current scholarly understanding that Dharmakīrti likely had specific arguments of the ŚV in mind when composing the PV despite the fact that Dharmakīrti never explicitly references Kumārila in the PV. Overall, I hope that this chapter will demonstrate that it is vital to understand Kumārila's epistemology on universals in the context in which it was produced, namely, the lasting rivalry between Kumārila's Mīmāṃsā system and the Buddhist philosophers.

4.2 Kumārila's Epistemology, in Context

Kumārila's overarching argument for the existence of universals in the *Ākṛtivāda* is reconstructed in the following formulation, based on the internal logic of Kumārila's arguments:

Thesis: Universals are real entities.

(a) We are able to directly perceive universals in our cognitions via our ordinary sense faculties (especially, our visual faculty).

(b) Whenever there is an arising of a cognition, there must be a corresponding external object. In other words, it is impossible that our cognition can have something unreal or non-existent as its content. Therefore, the fact that universals are in our cognitions means that universals are real objects.

(c) Our cognitions should always be taken as valid unless they are proven invalid by subsequent cognitions. Our cognitions of universals are constantly firm and are never challenged by contradictory cognitions, hence, these cognitions are valid.

Conclusion: Universals exist independent of our mind.

Each one of these steps requires further philosophical explanation and justification. Kumārila does offer reasons as to why his premises in this argument are philosophically sound, but these reasons are scattered in various parts of the ŚV rather than in the *Ākṛtivāda*. In what follows, I will go through each one of the premises that Kumārila explicitly or implicitly employs in the *Ākṛtivāda* and discuss Kumārila's dispersed defences of each premise. I will especially pay attention to how Kumārila develops these epistemological theories to provide a robust defence of his Mīmāṃsā system against Buddhist philosophers.

4.2.1 Theory of Perception

A key premise in Kumārila's writings on universals is that universals are perceived in our cognitive awareness. In the *Ākṛtivāda*, Kumārila seems to take it for granted that universals are present in our cognitions. Even in the *Vanavāda* and *Pratyakṣapariccheda* chapters, in which the perception of universals is the central topic discussed, Kumārila's

general attitude towards the issue is that his stance is an obvious one proved by our everyday experience. For instance, in the *Vanavāda* 12-14, Kumārila plainly explains that the perceptibility of universals is universally accepted by everyone, using a somewhat sarcastic tone:

> No proof needs to be stated for ourselves (*svayam*) because [our position that universals are perceptible] is universally accepted by all the people. But, one should state to those others who are denying it that [their denial] is in contradiction with the universally understood [notion] of it [i.e. universal]. (v. 12)
>
> [Objection:] We would not see any disagreement if universals were perceptible. [Answer:] Since even concerning valid means of knowledge there is disagreement among argumentative people, from where does this [doubt arise]? (v. 13)
>
> For, they have disputes even concerning [objects] such as external forms which are agreed upon [by everyone] as perceptible. In fact, nobody in the world has any disagreement concerning the universals. (v. 14)[95]

Here, Kumārila holds that universals are perceived by external sense faculties, e.g. vision, rather than by some kind of mental perception.[96] This notion, while indeed uncommon in the history of Western philosophy, is not an invention of Kumārila and is widely accepted

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[95] ŚV *Vana* 12-14
sarvalokaprasiddhatvān (ŚV$_M$, *sarvatra lokasiddhatvān* ŚV$_C$) *na vācyaṃ sādhanaṃ svayam* |
niṣedhatāṃ pareṣāṃ tu virodhaṃ lokato vadet || 12
visaṃvādo na dṛśyeta yadi pratyakṣatā 'kṛteḥ |
pramāṇe 'pi visaṃvādāt tārkikeṣu kuto 'stv iyaṃ (ŚV$_C$, *idam* ŚV$_M$) || 13
rūpādāv api teṣāṃ hi pratyakṣatvena saṃmate |
vivādo naiva lokas tu jātau vipratipadyate || 14

[96] Kumārila's position on this issue is in contrast to Jayanta Bhaṭṭa, who seems to accept that universals can sometimes be perceived by mental perception (*mānasapratyakṣa*), while also insisting that universals are the objects of direct senses in the non-conceptualised stage of perception. See Taber (2015: 254) and Kataoka (2010: 201-194).

by different philosophical traditions in classical India. Most anti-nominalist schools, that is, schools that propound the reality of universals, such as Vaiśeṣika, Nyāya, and Prābhākara Mīmāṃsā, agree with Kumārila's claim that universals are directly perceptible.[97] This idea was first laid down by the Vaiśeṣika school and its acceptance in other schools was likely a continuation of that tradition.

In the *Pratyakṣapariccheda*, Kumārila offers an argument regarding the perceptibility of universals that relies less on an appeal to common experience. Here, the kind of objection he deals with is concerned with the nature of perception itself: how can a cognitive awareness still be regarded as a perception if it includes universals in its content? In other words, the objection is that it does not seem intuitively correct that the content of a perception, which is a type of cognitive awareness that is only concerned with pure sensory experience, should include universals, which seem to involve a conceptualisation process before being cognised. Kumārila's answer to this objection is that conceptual cognition, i.e. an awareness that contains conceptual construction, should also be regarded as perception, so long as such conceptual cognition arises from the way our sense faculty functions in regard to the relevant object. In the *Pratyakṣapariccheda* 111, Kumārila says:

> But that [claim] that there is no grasping of inferential mark and so on by perception because there is no conceptualisation—that is not so, since a conceptualised cognition that assists in [grasping] the form of the object [should also] be accepted [as perception].[98]

A few verses later, in the *Pratyakṣapariccheda* 120, Kumārila reaffirms his position:

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[97] See Taber (2015) and Chadha (2014) for discussions of the perceptibility of universals and its philosophical implications in regard to Western philosophy.

[98] ŚV *Pratyakṣapariccheda* 111:
pratyakṣāgrahaṇaṃ yat tu liṅgāder avikalpanāt |
tan neṣṭatvād vikalpasyāpy artharūpopakāriṇaḥ ||

Then, again, that [cognition], by which a thing is ascertained through [its] properties such as universal and so on, is also considered as perception.[99]

In classical Indian philosophy, the nature of perception is a perennial debate. The Buddhist epistemological tradition of Buddhists established by Dignāga and Dharmakīrti propounds that perception is characterised by non-conceptualisation; this is also held by some Advaita Vedāntins such as Maṇḍanamiśra. That is to say, they hold that only those cognitions devoid of conceptualisation should be regarded as perception *per se*. On the other hand, the tradition of grammarians, e.g. Bhatṛhari, contends that there is no such thing as a non-conceptualised cognition; they hold the view that all cognitions that we have are conceptualised, and therefore, perception is also always characterised by conceptualisation. Between these two polarised positions, Mīmāṃsākas, Naiyāyikas, and Vaiśeṣikas argue that perception involves both a non-conceptualised stage and a conceptualised stage, with the latter dependent on the former.

The defence that Kumārila offers in the *Pratyakṣapariccheda* chapter for the existence of conceptualisation perception should be read as a response to Dignāga's highly original theory of perception that poses a huge challenge to the Mīmāṃsa understanding of perception. In the *Pratyakṣapariccheda* chapter, Kumārila gives an extensive refutation of Dignāga's position that perception cannot involve conceptualisation. As a result, Kumārila might have considered the issue of the perceptibility of universals sufficiently defended. Therefore, in the *Ākṛtivāda*, he takes this important premise as already proven.

4.2.2 Epistemological Realism

[99] ŚV *Pratyakṣapariccheda* 120:
tataḥ paraṃ punar vastu dharmair jātyādibhir yayā |
buddhyāvasīyate sāpi pratyakṣatvena sammatā ||

Kumārila, as an epistemological realist, holds that there exists an external world independent of our mind and that our cognitive awareness always has an external object as its support.[100] This position, especially the latter aspect that cognitions always have corresponding external support, is one of the most cited reasons by which Kumārila argues for the existence of universals in the *Ākṛtivāda*. For instance, in the *Ākṛtivāda* 37-38ab, Kumārila explains that we all have the perceptual experience that some things are common to some other things. Therefore, according to his realist stance, there must exist some real entities behind all these perceptual experiences that serve as external supports allowing us to have a single cognition about many different things. These experiences, then, are just the proof needed for the existence of universals. As Kumārila argues:

> It is not accepted that the arising of cognitions can be without an object, and cognitions [that grasp the common features among things] expect [i.e. require] universal[s] that [are] other than particular[s]. Therefore, that is certain. (v. 37)
> For, those [cognitions] arising without that [corresponding object] must be false, because [they are] without objects. (v. 38ab)[101]

To put it simply, according to Kumārila, the reason why we can perceive universals in our cognitions is that universals are real existences. If universals did not exist, we would not be able to perceive them. Kumārila's realist stance is in stark opposition to the idealist

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[100] The term "realism" is a nebulous notion from Western philosophy. In this thesis I use the term only in the epistemological sense, i.e. that we are able to directly perceive mind-independent external objects in perception. The opponents of the epistemological realists are called *epistemological idealists*. Technically, the term realism can also be applied when it comes to the problem of universals. In this context, realists are the ones advocating the existence of universals, while the opponents, the *nominalists*, believe that there is no such thing as universals. To avoid confusion, I use the term *anti-nominalist* to describe the position that is in favour of the existence of universals.

[101] ŚV *Ākṛti* 37-38ab:
viṣayeṇa hi buddhīnāṃ vinā notpattir iṣyate |
viśeṣād anyad icchanti sāmānyaṃ tena tad dhruvam || 37
tā hi tena vinotpannā mithyāḥ syur viṣayād ṛte | 38ab

position held especially by Yogācāra Buddhists, who claim that cognitive awareness does not, in fact, arise from external objects, and, by implication, claim that there is no way for us to ascertain the reality of an external world. This includes the reality of universals. Therefore, Kumārila spends considerable efforts in the *Nirālambanavāda* and *Śūnyavāda* chapters refuting Buddhist idealism in order to defend his realist position.[102] In turn, his discourse on the idealist stance serves as an important support for the arguments in the *Ākṛtivāda*. In the *Nirālambanavāda* 107cd-109ab, Kumārila argues that every single cognition that we have must have external support, even in the case of a dream scenario:

> For, it is not at all the case that in cognitions like dreams and the like an external [support] is not desired. Everywhere, there is a support that is external, which is characterised by being at another place or time. The object of the cognition in the dream is [something that exists] in one birth or different [births], at [one time] or another time, at that place or another place.[103]

Interestingly, similar to what he has done in the *Ākṛtivāda*, Kumārila sometimes employs his theories from other chapters of the ŚV to support his arguments in the *Nirālambanavāda*. For instance, Kumārila resorts to his understanding of intrinsic validity to prove that every single cognition must have an external object:

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[102] See Taber (1994, 2010) for Kumārila's arguments against the Buddhist idealists. Freschi (2010) analyses how Kumārila's unique conception of absence (*abhāva*) plays a role in his refutation of epistemological idealism. For an account of Buddhist idealism and its development, see Kellner and Taber (2014) and Kellner (2017a, 2017b).

[103] ŚV *Nirālambana* 107cd-109ab:
svapnādipratyaye bāhyaṃ sarvathā na hi neṣyate ||
sarvatrālambanaṃ bāhyaṃ deśakālānyathātmakam |
janmany ekatra bhinne vā tathā kālāntare 'pi vā ||
taddeśo vānyadeśo vā svapnajñānasya gocaraḥ |

> And this notion that cognition has an external object as its support is proper, since it is a cognition that is devoid of cancellation, such as a notion that cancels a dream and so on.[104]

What Kumārila does not explicitly state here is that he takes the validity of any cognition to be intrinsic; that is to say, unless a cognition is cancelled by a later cognition, we should always take a cognition to be intrinsically true. In the *Nirālambanavāda* 79cd-80ab, Kumārila reminds us that since the notion that all our cognitions have external objects is never rebutted by any subsequent cognitions, we need to take this notion as intrinsically valid. By contrast, the cognitions in our dreams are always contradicted by the cognitions that we have after we wake up from them, and therefore, cognitions in dreams do not have validity. This is just one example of how ubiquitous the application of the theory of intrinsic validity is in the ŚV. I will explain how it is applied in the *Ākṛtivāda*, as well as its philosophical importance, in the following sub-section.

4.2.3 Intrinsic Validity

The theory of intrinsic validity, expounded by Kumārila in the *Codanāsūtra* chapter, is one of the most central tenet of Kumārila's philosophy.[105] While, in the *Codanāsūtra*

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[104] ŚV *Nirālambana* 79cd-80ab:
bāhyārthālambanā buddhir iti saṃyak ca dhīr iyam |
bādhakāpetabuddhitvād yathā svapnādibādhadhīḥ ||

[105] Kumārila's theory of intrinsic validity has been studied extensively by modern scholars. Taber (1992) lays down the foundation of how to understand the theory of intrinsic validity, echoed by a more sophisticated philosophical treatment by Arnold (2005: 57-114). Kataoka (2011a: II, 60-98) provides an impressive philological account of the theory of intrinsic validity in the ŚV. The recent article of McCrea (2019) critically analyses how the three main commentators on Kumārila, i.e. Umbeka, Sucarita, and Pārthasārathi, differ when interpreting Kumārila's theory of intrinsic validity. McCrea (2019) contends that the analysis of Taber (1992) and Arnold (2005) relied too much on Pārthasārathi's commentary while neglecting Sucarita's arguably more faithful interpretation of Kumārila. For how Dharmakīrti responds to Kumārila's theory of intrinsic validity, see Taber (2019).

chapter, it is mainly utilised to defend the authority of the Vedas, Kumārila's application of his theory of intrinsic validity extends far beyond this initial scope.[106]

According to Kumārila, the validity of a cognition is always intrinsic, i.e. a cognition always has an innate validity by virtue of its arising. In the *Ākṛtivāda*, Kumārila invokes the principle of intrinsic validity to tell his readers that since we never observe that our cognition of universals is cancelled by any other cognitions, the validity of our cognition of universals should not be challenged; otherwise, we would never be able to have any valid cognitions at all:

> Since all human beings [have the concept of universals such as cow-ness], it cannot be a mistake, because it is devoid of cancellation [by other cognitions]. If one postulates [that our cognitions of universal are false], then all cognitions would have the undesired consequence of being false.[107]

In the *Codanāsūtra* chapter, Kumārila takes up the task of examining all the logical possibilities of how the validity of a cognition can be ascertained. The first option is that both the validity and the invalidity of a cognition are intrinsic; the second option is that both the validity and the invalidity of a cognition are extrinsic; the third option is that the validity of a cognition is extrinsic while the invalidity of a cognition of a cognition is intrinsic; finally, the fourth option, which is Kumārila's position, is that the validity of a cognition is intrinsic while the invalidity of a cognition is extrinsic. One of the main arguments employed by Kumārila to support his position is that if the validity of a cognition were extrinsic, we would end up having an infinite regress of epistemic justification. That is to say, if a cognition X is

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[106] See Taber (1992: 218-221).
[107] ŚV *Ākṛti* 72:
sarvapuṃsām ato bhrāntir naiṣā bādhakavarjanāt |
sarvajñānāni mithyā ca prasajyante 'tra kalpane ||

not innately valid, then the validity of cognition X depends on the arising of a second cognition Y. However, since the validity of the cognition Y is also not intrinsic, the ascertainment of its validity would depend on the third cognition Z; this process would have to carry on forever, and we would still be unable to ascertain the validity of the initial cognition X. On the other hand, if we accept that the validity belongs intrinsically to the cognition itself, such infinite regress can be avoided. As Kumārila proposes, we should accept the validity of cognition at face value until and unless a subsequent cognition arises to challenge the initial cognition:

> When the validity [of a cognition] is intrinsic, at that time, another [means of cognition] is not sought for. For, the falsehood [of the cognition] disappears effortlessly since defects [in it] are not cognised. (v. 52)
>
> Therefore, the validity of a cognition, which has resulted from its having the nature of a cognition, is rejected [only] on the ground of the object [of the cognition] being other than [the way it really is], or on the ground of cognising the defects that arise from the cause. (v. 53)[108]

One may question whether Kumārila's understanding of intrinsic validity does indeed assist him escape from the problem of epistemic uncertainty. After all, despite the initial innate validity of cognitions, it seems that all cognitions are still in constant danger of being invalidated by another later cognition; such being the case, it seems that the validity of cognition is never ascertained, given that this never-ending scrutinising process results in its own infinite regress.

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[108] ŚV *Codanā* 52-53:
yadā svataḥ pramāṇatvaṃ tadānyan naiva mṛgyate |
nivartate hi mithyātvaṃ doṣājñānād ayatnataḥ ||
tasmād bodhātmakatvena prāptā buddheḥ pramāṇatā |
arthānyathātvahetūtthadoṣajñānād apodyate ||

Anticipating this concern, Kumārila emphasises in the *Codanāsūtra* 59-61 that the principle of intrinsic validity demands that we should have no doubt about the validity of a cognition *unless and until* there is a subsequent cognition that would challenge the initial cognition. Kumārila also explains a more epistemically complicated case to show that after three or four instances of scrutinising processes, we will usually have a certain conclusion about the validity of a cognition. The scenario examined by Kumārila is as follows: suppose there is a first cognition X, which has initial validity of its own but is later invalidated by a second cognition Y. This second cognition Y, however, later turns out to be erroneous, as proved by a third cognition Z. In this case, because cognition X is cancelled by cognition Y which is proved erroneous by cognition Z, the validity of cognition X can be taken as restored, i.e. cognition X should be regarded as retaining its original innate validity. Therefore, one should not be concerned that the theory of intrinsic validity would pose any epistemic uncertainty for cognitions:

> [The second cognition Y remains valid only] if [one] neither cognises further a defect [in that second cognition Y], nor is there a [third] cognition Z cancelling [the second cognition Y]. When [either of] the two happens, the first cognition X [is revived as] valid, because the second [cognition] Y is invalid. (v. 59)
>
> For, the validity even in that [first cognition X] is still intrinsic, because there is no cognition of defects there. For, as long as a cognition of defects [in the first cognition X] has not arisen, one should not have a doubt regarding it without valid ground. (v. 60)

> In such a way, after three or four cognitions arise, no further cognition is to be sought for. And now, one [of the two conflicting cognitions] enjoys its intrinsic validity. (v. 61)[109]

After understanding what Kumārila means by intrinsic validity, it is clear how this theory becomes a useful tool for Kumārila to formulate his argument for the existence of universals. According to the theory of intrinsic validity, since every cognition enjoys innate validity as it arises, we should not doubt its validity unless we have another cognition contradicting it. Given that we are able to perceive universals constantly and given that such experiences are never extrinsically invalidated by contradictory experience, we should accept the validity of these perceptual experiences.

It may now be a good moment to summarise how Kumārila assembles his different philosophical theories to support his arguments for the existence of universals in the *Ākṛtivāda* chapter. Kumārila first resorts to common experience as a proof that we are all able to perceive universals. The arguments from the *Pratyakṣaparicccheda* chapter help clarify that a cognition with a conceptualised component should still be accepted as a perceptual awareness. Next, Kumārila deploys his epistemological realist stance, which he develops in the *Nirālambanavāda* chapter, to show that all cognitions have external objects as supports; the fact that we can perceive universals is the proof that universals actually exist. Finally, by pointing to the theory of intrinsic validity that he expounds in the *Codanāsūtra* chapter, Kumārila argues that we should not doubt the validity of our perception of universals, since

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[109] ŚV *Codanā* 59-61:
tatra doṣāntarajñānaṃ bādhadhīr vā parā na cet |
tadudbhūtau dvitīyasya mithyātvād ādyamānatā ||
svata eva hi tatrāpi doṣājñānāt pramāṇatā |
doṣajñāne tv anutpanne nāśaṅkā nispramāṇikā ||
evaṃ tricaturajñānajanmano nādhikā matiḥ |
prārthyate tāvad evaikaṃ svataḥ prāmāṇyam aśnute ||

such perception has innate validity and since we never find any other cognitions challenging the validity of such perception.

4.3 Kumārila, Dharmakīrti, and the Buddhist Logico-Epistemological School

As we have seen in the previous section, Kumārila's theory of universals presented in the *Ākṛtivāda* is a systematic assertion of his realist philosophy. While Kumārila's assertions regarding universals are likely motivated by Dignāga's PS(V), Kumārila's efforts in the *Ākṛtivāda* push the issue of universals beyond the boundaries of semantics and the philosophy of language—in which Dignāga's *apoha* theory is grounded—to a relentless emphasis on epistemology. When we read the theory of universals of Dharmakīrti, who is Dignāga's most influential successor and the co-founder of Buddhist *pramāṇa* school, it is difficult not to have an impression that Dharmakīrti is responding to the challenges posed by Kumārila by adding an elaborate epistemological and ontological framework to Dignāga's initial *apoha* theory and thereby providing detailed arguments against the reality of universals.[110]

While Dharmakīrti's various rejections of universals in both PV 1 and PV 3 provide many tantalising examples that remind one of Kumārila's arguments for universals in the ŚV, mapping Dharmakīrti's rejection of universals onto Kumārila's arguments in the *Ākṛtivāda* has proved to be challenging, as Kumārila and Dharmakīrti seem to keep talking over each other on the issue of universals. On the one hand, Dharmakīrti's refutation of universals is not only concerned with refuting Mīmāṃsakas, but also with refuting Vaiśeṣikas and Naiyāyikas (e.g. PV 1.52-54 and PV 3.19-21). On the other hand, some of Dharmakīrti's arguments against universals, while they appear to combat Kumārila's account, are so generic that it is difficult to argue that Dharmakīrti is specifically targeting Kumārila (e.g. PV 3.41-42).[111]

[110] Dreyfus (1997), Franco (1997), Tillemans (1999), Dunne (2004), and Taber (2022) provide a good introduction to Dharmakīrti's philosophy in general.
[111] For Dharmakīrti's refutation of universals in the PV 3, see Notake (2011) and Franco and Notake (2014).

Establishing a clear chronological relation between Kumārila's writings and those of Dharmakīrti is often a notoriously challenging task, given that Dharmakīrti never refers to his opponents by name, as part of his idiosyncratic style. As Taber (2021: 207) put it well: "Most scholars have held the view that, as Ernst Steinkellner once felicitously put it, Dharmakīrti 'was in dialogue with Kumārila'. That is to say, when discussing not only points directly related to known Mīmāṃsā teachings such as eternality and authority of the Veda, but also more general issues of logic and philosophy of language, Dharmakīrti often had in mind, not some generic representative of Mīmāṃsā, nor even some specific Mīmāṃsā or Mīmāṃsakas whose names and works are lost to us, but the only Mīmāṃsaka of the same period whose name we know and some of whose works we have, namely, Kumārila."

Many scholars of classical Indian philosophy have analysed the relationship between Kumārila's ŚV and Dharmakīrti's PV regarding a number of issues. Overall, there is growing evidence suggesting that Dharmakīrti's PV presupposes Kumārila's ŚV. For example, Krasser (1999) argues that Dharmakīrti's rejection of the Naiyāyika proof of the existence of Īśvara in the PV 2.10 seems to draw upon Kumārila's own rejection of Naiyāyikas on that issue in the ŚV *Sambandhākṣepaparihāra* 74-82ab. When it comes to the issue of scriptural authority (*āgama*), some of Dharmakīrti's arguments in the PV(SV) can also be understood as responding to the challenges posed by Kumārila in the ŚV. Meanwhile, Kataoka (2011: 47-60) demonstrates that in the PV 1, Dharmakīrti appears to respond to Kumārila's arguments in the ŚV *Codanā* that Buddha, who is a person free of desire (*rāga*), cannot undertaking the action of teaching, because undertake any actions requires a desire to obtain a certain goal. Dharmakīrti answers Kumārila's challenge by pointing out that there is a logical fallacy in assuming a causal relation between desire and the action of teaching, and by supplementing that Buddha can teach out of compassion rather than desire. In another instance, Krasser (2012b) argues that Dharmakīrti revises Dignāga's position that scripture

can simply be reduced to inference (*anumāna*) and instead acknowledges that while scripture can be regarded as a type of inference, it is an inference that can suffer from the problem of being a *śeṣavadanumāna* when it comes to transcendental religious matters.[112] Krasser (2012b: 115) argues that the motivating reason for Dharmakīrti to interpret Dignāga's position on *āgama* in such a way is likely because Dharmakīrti was "troubled by Kumārila rather than by his own appeal to the Buddha's transcendent knowledge". Krasser's (2012b: 114-118) analysis shows that Kumārila's criticism of *ekadeśasaṃvādānumāna* in the ŚV *Codanā*, in which he rejects the possibility of omniscience, represents a serious challenge to Dignāga's definition of *āgama* in the PS 2.5ab. He also shows that Dharmakīrti's arguments in the PV(SV) 1 should be understood as a response to Kumārila's critique.

More recently, further philological studies on Dignāga's *apoha* theory (Pind 2015), Dharmakīrti's *apoha* theory (Eltschinger et al. 2018), and Kumārila's rejection of the *apoha* theory in the ŚV *Apoha* (Kataoka and Taber 2021) have contributed to a more refined understanding of the relationship between these three authors on the issue of *apoha*. Taber (2021: 206-221) convincingly suggests that Dharmakīrti's improvement of Dignāga's *apoha* theory in the PV 1 should be construed as his response to Kumārila's comprehensive and damaging critique of Dignāga's *apoha* theory in the ŚV.

To summarise, Dharmakīrti's writings in the PV on the issues of Īśvara, religious authority, and the *apoha* theory seem to warrant an understanding that he had Kumārila's

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[112] Cf. PVSV 109,20-22: *tad etad agatyobhayathāpy anumānatvam āgamasyopavarṇitam, varam āgamāt pravṛttāv evaṃ pravṛttir iti. na khalv evam anumānam anapāyam, anāntarīyakatvād artheṣu śabdānām iti niveditam etat.* "Thus, this scripture has been explained in both ways to be inference for want of [any other] possibility (*agatyā*), [having in mind:] 'Given that one has to proceed on account of scripture it is still better (*varam*) to proceed in such a way.' However, inference in such a way indeed is not without problems (*na…anapāyam*), for words are not invariably concomitant with [their] objects. This [we already] have explained [in PV 1.213]." Translated by Krasser (2012b: 101). The stock example of illustrating *śeṣavadanumāna* as a type of fallacious inference consists in the fallacy of one inferring that a whole pot of rice is well-cooked based on the fact that a small portion of rice in the pot is checked to be well-cooked. Dharmakīrti's concern for the fallacy of *śeṣavadanumāna* leads him to concede that although the authority of scripture can be verified by perception or empirical inference, ultimately there is no way to establish a pervasion between a credible person and their speech about transcendental religious matters, since transcendental things cannot be observed and tested.

specific arguments in the ŚV in mind. In some cases, Dharmakīrti presumes knowledge of some of Kumārila's arguments in the ŚV (Krasser 1999). In other cases, Dharmakīrti either directly answers Kumārila's challenge (Kataoka 2011) or modifies Dignāga's system as a response to Kumārila's criticism (Krasser 2012b, Kataoka and Taber 2021). Of course, the greatest difficulty in ascertaining the relationship between Kumārila and Dharmakīrti lies in the fact that in some instances, Dharmakīrti shows a conspicuous lack of knowledge about Kumārila or only a rudimentary understanding of Kumārila's ideas. Examples of these cases range from the issue of perception (Taber 2001) to details about Mīmāṃsā exegesis (Taber 2012).[113] A valuable lesson that can be learnt from past scholarship is that Kumārila was likely not the only Mīmāṃsaka that Dharmakīrti knew of; as a result, one should not expect every Mīmāṃsa opponent in Dharmakīrti's writing to espouse the exact positions of Kumārila. In the same vein, one should hesitate to draw equivalence between the statement that Dharmakīrti knew Kumārila's ideas and the statement that Dharmakīrti knew Kumārila's ideas *well*. Taber (2012, 2018) provides good examples of how sometimes Dharmakīrti is familiar with Kumārila's system but fails to grasp the full depth of some of Kumārila's theories.

It is with these important caveats in mind that I will investigate Kumārila's arguments in the ŚV *Ākṛti* 12-16 with regard to Dharmakīrti's arguments in the PV 1.107-109. I think that these two sets of verses present a rare case in which it is reasonable to believe that Dharmakīrti was at least familiar with Kumārila's arguments about universals in the *Ākṛtivāda*. In the ŚV *Ākṛti* 12-16, Kumārila launches an investigation of the opponent's proposal that instead of postulating universals as real entities, one can simply postulate that the capacities (*śakti*), which lie in the particulars themselves, can generate a cognition of

[113] Taber (2001: 85) points out that when it comes to the issue of perception, Dharmakīrti's statement in the PVin I.6 seems to miss out the points made by Kumārila in the ŚV *Pratyakṣa* 126-127 that goes against Dharmakīrti's own position, while Taber (2012: 148) concludes that "while Dharmakīrti exhibits broad knowledge of problems of Mīmāṃsā exegesis in the PV(SV) 1.312-340, he displays nothing like an expert's command".

commonness among different individuals. Kumārila's opponent's proposal in the ŚV *Ākṛti* 12-16 instantly reminds one of the theory elaborated by Dharmakīrti in various places in the PV(SV) 1. As an essential part of his theory of *apoha* in the PV(SV) 1, Dharmakīrti explains in detail how diverse and irreducibly distinct particulars—which are the only entities that ultimately exist in Dharmakīrti's ontology—can nonetheless give rise to a judgement of sameness (*ekapratyavamarśa*) that enables us to grasp the commonness among distinct particulars through the fact that the same effect (*ekakāryatā*) is produced by them.

Both classical Indian commentators and modern Indologists alike note the connection between the *śakti* theory that is criticised by Kumārila and the concept of *ekapratyavamarśa* that is expounded by Dharmakīrti. In what follows, I will present a detailed analysis of the relevant passages found in the PV(SV) I. My conclusion is that on the balance of probability, it is more likely than not that Kumārila's arguments in the ŚV *Ākṛti* 12-16 are presupposed by Dharmakīrti, because (a) Dharmakīrti's account of how diverse particulars can give rise to a cognition of sameness is much more sophisticated than the simplified version that Kumārila demonstrates familiarity with in the *Ākṛtivāda*, which indicates the posteriority of Dharmakīrti's theory, and because (b) Dharmakīrti's key strategy in the PV(SV) 1 relies on employing the notion of *ekakāryatā* that seems to mirror Kumārila's solution to the problem of universal-ness in the ŚV *Ākṛti* 19-24.

4.3.1 Kumārila's Arguments on the Capacity of Particulars

Let us first have a closer look at what Kumārila's arguments are in the ŚV *Ākṛti* 12-16. In these verses, Kumārila says that one needs to examine the characteristics of the capacity that can allegedly produce a unitary cognition. Two characteristics that Kumārila thinks are important are whether the capacity itself can be grasped by a cognition, and whether the capacity is a singular or manifold entity. Combining these two factors, Kumārila

gives four alternatives for how to conceptualise the capacity: (a) it is graspable and singular, (b) it is graspable and manifold, (c) it is not graspable and it is singular, and (d) it is not graspable and it is manifold. For Kumārila, if the alleged capacity fits the definition of alternative (a), then it does not have any difference from the real universals proposed by Kumārila himself. Kumārila then quickly rejects alternatives (c) and (d) in the ŚV *Ākṛti* 14, as he argues that if the capacity cannot be grasped in a cognition, that would make the unitary cognition in question devoid of having an object as its content—something that Kumārila's epistemological realism stance firmly opposes to.

In the ŚV *Ākṛti* 15, Kumārila argues that because particulars are different from each other, a unitary cognition is not able to grasp them as unified. The underlying epistemological principle that Kumārila relies on in this line of argument is again his epistemological realism. He holds that, for a unitary cognition to function, it has to have a single, unified object to grasp. Precisely because particulars are diverse, it is not possible for particulars to be the object of a unitary cognition. When we read Dharmakīrti's arguments in the PV(SV) 1 later, we will find that Dharmakīrti's theory of *apoha* argues the exact opposite view: *despite the fact that* particulars are distinct from each other, they can indeed produce a unitary judgement.

Finally, in the ŚV *Ākṛti* 16, Kumārila explores alternative (b) and argues that, like alternatives (c) and (d), it is not possible for the alleged capacity to have this set of characteristics either. Since the capacity is manifold, one should ask whether the capacities among the particulars are different from the particulars or identical to the particulars. If the former, then the capacities cannot produce a unitary cognition of the particulars, because they are different from the particulars. If the latter, it means that the capacities are just like particulars, and therefore, any cognitions of the capacities would just be like any cognitions

of particulars. As Kumārila has argued in the ŚV *Ākṛti* 15, particulars therefore cannot produce a unitary cognition.

By the end of this set of arguments, Kumārila's conclusion is that it is impossible to have individualised capacities that give rise to a cognition of commonness among distinct particulars. Thus, Kumārila concludes that only real universals can account for our experience of cognising common features among different particulars. Following this argument, given that in the ontology of the Buddhist logico-epistemological school, which holds that only undividable particulars (*svalakṣaṇa*) are ultimately real existences, the Buddhist opponent not only needs to explain how we can have a cognition of commonness from the distinct particulars, but also to provide an conceptual framework to explain how a conceptual cognition that entails a unified form of distinct particulars is indeed grounded in reality, which consists of unique entities. In the next subsection, I will present Dharmakīrti's ambitious solution to this problem, before turning again to analyse why it is more reasonable to assume that Dharmakīrti's arguments postdate that of Kumārila's.

4.3.2 Dharmakīrti's Arguments in the PV(SV) 1

Dharmakīrti's idea about how distinct particulars can give rise to a unitary judgement is not very difficult to understand when presented clearly; the challenge lies in trying to understand Dharmakīrti's ideas in his own enigmatic wording. Let us first have a look at how Dharmakīrti introduces his conception of how diverse individuals can nonetheless give rise to a unitary cognition in the PV 1.69-70 and PVSV 38,17-20:

> Based on distinct entities, a cognition that has a singular object [arises] by which its own nature is concealed with another nature (PV 1.68). The diversity of entities, being concealed by that [unitary cognition, which is what is called]

concealing, [these] entities, [although] themselves distinct, appear in a certain form as if [they are] not distinct [from each other] (PV 1.69). Due to the influence of the reference of that [unitary cognition], a real universal is named. However, it is not ultimately real in the [same] way it is conceived by the cognition (PV 1.70). A conceptual cognition indeed arises based on entities that are distinct from [entities] other than them. Conforming to the nature of its own mental impression, it presents them [i.e. distinct entities by] unifying them, after hiding their distinct nature and ascribing its own undifferentiated appearance [to them]. And such is the nature of the entities that differ from others by having the same effect and means, and of the mental impression of this concept, that this [cognition] arising from them appears in this way.[114]

In Dharmakīrti's ontology, only distinct particulars are ultimately real. Each particular is unique, i.e. the nature of each does not mix with that of another.[115] In the above argument, Dharmakīrti put especial emphasis on the "concealing" (*saṃvṛti*) effect that a unitary cognition has on the diverse particulars it contains. Dharmakīrti argues that real entities always have distinct natures even when a unitary cognition grasps them as if they are unified; it is the unitary cognition that conceals the true, distinct natures of particulars and ascribes an unreal, undifferentiated form to them. According to Dharmakīrti, the so-called real universals

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[114] *pararūpaṃ svarūpeṇa yayā saṃvriyate dhiyā* |
ekārthapratibhāsinyā bhāvān āśritya bhedinaḥ || PV 1.68
tayā saṃvṛtanānārthāḥ saṃvṛtyā bhedinaḥ svayam |
abhedina ivābhānti bhāvā rūpeṇa kenacit || PV 1.69
tasyā abhiprāyavaśāt sāmānyaṃ sat prakīrtitam |
tad asat paramārthena yathā saṃkalpitaṃ tayā || PV 1.70
PVSV 38,17-22: *buddhiḥ khalu tadanyavyatirekiṇaḥ padārthān āśrityotpadyamānā vikalpikā, svavāsanāprakṛtim anuvidadhatī bhinnam eṣāṃ rūpaṃ tirodhāya pratibhāsam abhinnam ātmīyam adhyasya tān saṃsṛjantī saṃdarśayati. sā caikasādhyasādhanatayā anyavivekināṃ bhāvānāṃ tadvikalpavāsanāyāś ca prakṛtir yad evam eṣā pratibhāti tadudbhavā.* My translation follows Eltschinger et al. (2018: 75-77).

[115] PVSV 24,24-25: *sarva eva hi bhāvāḥ svarūpasthitayaḥ. te nātmānaṃ pareṇa miśrayanti.* "All [real] beings are fixed in their own natures. They do not mix their natures with another."

held to exist by other philosophers and worldly people only refer to the unreal, undifferentiated forms in the unitary cognitions that arise from real, distinct entities.

Why, then, can certain things give rise to a unitary cognition? Dharmakīrti notes that even if each particular entity is indeed unique, certain things are different from other things by "having the same effect and means" (*ekasādhyasādhanatā*). In the PVSV 41,1-6 ad PV 1.73, Dharmakīrti gives a few examples that explain what he means by this: even though there is no connection among different types of trees, all trees can be used for the purpose of being used as wood, which then can be used to build a house or burn with fire. Even if there is also no connection between water and a tree, given that water cannot perform the same function as being wood, our conceptual cognition does not group water as belonging to the same category as trees. Dharmakīrti also illustrates that in order to produce a visual cognition, several different and unrelated factors need to come together, such as eyes, the object, light, and mental attention. According to Dharmakīrti, this also proves that distinct things can have one and the same effect without the necessary existence of any universal.[116]

Now, we have considered two important concepts that build up Dharmakīrti's theory: the concealing effect of a unitary cognition, and entities that produce one and the same effect. The first concept explains that a false, common appearance can arise from diverse entities and in turn hides the true, distinct natures of entities, while the second concept explains why

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[116] *ekapratyavamarśārthajñānādyekārthasādhane* |
bhede 'pi niyatāḥ ke cit svabhāvenendriyādivat || PV 1.73
PVSV 41,1-6: *yathendriyaviṣayālokamanaskārā ātmendriyamanorthatatsaṃnikarṣā vā asaty api tadbhāvaniyate sāmānye rūpavijñānam ekaṃ janayanti evaṃ śiṃśapādayo 'pi bhedāḥ parasparānanvaye 'pi prakṛtyaivaikam ekākāraṃ pratyabhijñānaṃ janayanti anyāṃ vā yathāpratyayaṃ dahanagṛhādikāṃ kāṣṭhasādhyām arthakriyām na tu bhedāviśeṣe 'pi jalādayaḥ śrotrādivad rūpādijñāne.*
"Certain [things], even though they are different [from each other], are determined by nature to accomplish one [and the same] purpose such as a unitary judgement or the [direct] cognition of an object, like sense organs, etc. (PV 1.73). Just as a sense organ, an object, light and attention, or, a self, a sense organ, a mind, an object and their contact [as believed by the opponents], [all] generate a single cognition of [something] visible even though there is no universal [in them] bound to that nature; similarly, particulars such as *śiṃśapā* [, *khadira* and *nyagrodha* trees], even though they are not connected with each other, bring about by nature a recognition with a single form, or according to [specific causes and] conditions, another purpose that can be realised by wood, such as burning or a house, but [things] such as water, even though they are just as different, do not [perform the function of wood], just as the ear, etc., [are incapable] of cognising [something] visible, etc." Translation follows Eltschinger et al. (2018: 84-85).

certain things can produce a unitary cognition—it is not because there is a real universal; rather, it is because certain different things can produce the same effect. We will now consider a third concept that Dharmakīrti uses to weave the other two concepts together: mental impression (*vāsanā*). The concept of mental impression provides a powerful psychological account of how exactly a unitary cognition can arise from diverse entities. As Dharmakīrti says:

> [Our thesis is that the everyday] use of universal, coreference, and property and property bearer [only] pertains to the object as it appears in [conceptual] cognition. That conceptual cognition is produced based on a mental impression left by a direct [perceptual] experience that grasped the intrinsic nature of a real thing. [This conceptual cognition appears] as if it has this [real thing] as its object, although [in fact] it does not have it as its object. It is ascribed (*adhyavasita*)[117] the own nature of [external] existence, due to the nature of it arising [directly] from a mental impression left by the experience of that [real thing]. [This conceptual cognition appears] as if it was grasping a common object (*abhinnārtha*) due to [it] arising from objects that have the same effects (*abhinnakārya*).[118]

[117] My translation of the word *adhyavasita* follows (Eltschinger et al. 2018: 9). The translators of the passage justify the case of translating *adhyava√so*, which is commonly translated as "ascertain", as either "interpret" or "ascribe" in the PV 1. As the translators have convincingly argued, the verb *adhyava√so* has a very specific meaning in the PV 1, namely, "it is used to refer to a particular aspect of a conceptual cognition, namely, its tendency to represent the various features a thing appears to have in that cognition—being common with others, having multiple properties, and also being distinct from those properties (i.e., a distinct 'property-bearer/possessor')—as having the same status as the object itself; that is to say, it makes these features seem as if they are not merely mental appearances but 'external'." (Eltschinger et al. 2018: 9). Given that Dharmakīrti uses the word *adhyava√so* to describe an erroneous cognitive process, it would be misleading to translate the verb as "ascertain" in this context, since ascertainment indicates a veridical success.

[118] PVSV 42,11-16: *jñānapratibhāsiny arthe sāmānyasāmānādhikaraṇyadharmadharmivyavahārāḥ. yad etaj jñānaṃ vastusvabhāvagrāhiṇānubhavenāhitāṃ vāsanām āśrityavikalpakam utpadyate, atadviṣayam api tadviṣayam iva, tadanubhavāhitavāsanāprabhavaprakṛter adhyavasitatadbhāvasvarūpam, abhinnakāryapadārthaprasūter abhinnārthagrāhīva.* Translation follows Eltschinger et al. (2018: 88).

According to Dharmakīrti, the unitary cognition, even if it is false, has its root in our direct perceptual experience of real, distinct entities. Because certain things produce one and the same effect, our mind cognises them as being different from other entities that do not produce those effects. The mental impression that things that yield the same effect belong to one category of things is left in our minds by direct experience with real entities. This mental impression then triggers the arising of an erroneous unitary cognition from those really distinct entities, and the unitary cognition in turn conceals the true diverse natures of the entities.

Finally, in the PVSV ad PV 1.109, Dharmakīrti adds the fourth piece, the concept of a unitary judgement (*ekapratyavamarśa*), to his theory. Although Dharmakīrti has already introduced this term in the PVSV ad PV 1.73 when explaining how different things can produce one and the same effect, it is in the following passage that he offers an elaborate account of how the unitary judgement functions. In the PVSV ad PV 1.108cd, Dharmakīrti allows the opponent to ask the question, how can different things have one and the same effect? The opponent argues that even if distinct particulars can produce the same effect, e.g. different pots can all carry water, it seems that our cognition of the effect "carrying water" would still differ in each particular instance. That is to say, pot A can produce an effect "carrying water" A_1, and pot B would produce an effect "carrying water" B_1. Even if effects A_1 and B_1 are superficially the same effect, they are still differentiated. Therefore, it seems that different things cannot have one and the same effect, which contradicts Dharmakīrti's assertion that that is the case and is the basis for the arising of a unitary cognition.[119] To answer this challenge, Dharmakīrti argues as follows:

[119] PVSV 56,11-15: *katham ekakāryāḥ. tad dhi tāsāṃ kāryaṃ tac ca bhidyate. yad apy udakāharaṇādikam ekaṃ ghaṭādikāryaṃ tad api pratidravyaṃ bhedād bhidyata eveti naikaṃ bhedānāṃ kāryam asti.* "[Objection:] How [can different particulars] have the same effect? For, that [cognition] is the effect of those particulars and that [cognition] is differentiated. Whatever is the same effect of [things] such as a pot [and] such as carrying water, that thing is differentiated because of the difference according to the thing. Therefore, different [things] do not have the same effect."

There is no such fault, because: being the cause for the same judgement, a cognition is without difference. By being the cause for the same cognition, the particulars, also, are not differentiated (PV 1.109). It was [already] presented [earlier] how there is no mixing of the own natures of the real entities. Regarding [these real entities] (*tatra*), a cognition that has a mixed form is just an error. And, different objects, which are the causes of conceptualisation, indirectly generate those [cognitions that have a mixed form] due to [their] own nature. However, this distinction from the natures causing non-same effects is called the undifferentiated difference of those [real entities], because it is the cause of some [effect] that is singular, such as [singular] cognitions. That [singular effect], also, appears as undifferentiated even though it is differentiated in accordance with entities, because it is by its nature the cause for a unitary judgement that covers [different things] with non-difference. Due to [particulars] being the cause for a purpose such as a cognition which is the cause for such a judgement and has a appearance of non-difference, even particulars, due to their own nature, [can] generate the same cognition that [has] a form that is mixed and the difference which is [the object's] own nature is ultimately real. This has been repeatedly said. Therefore, the non-difference of real beings only [lies in the fact that they] have the same effect.[120]

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[120] PVSV 56,15: *naiṣa doṣaḥ. yasmāt.*
ekapratyavamarśasya hetutvād dhīr abhedinī |
ekadhīhetubhāvena vyaktīnām apy abhinnatā || PV 1.109

PVSV 56,18-57,7: *niveditam etad yathā na bhāvānāṃ svabhāvasaṃsargo 'stīti. tatra saṃsṛṣṭākārā buddhir bhrāntir eva. tāṃ tu bhedinaḥ padārthāḥ krameṇa vikalpahetavo bhavanto janayanti svabhāvata iti ca. sa tv eṣām abhinno bheda ity ucyate jñānādeḥ kasya cid ekasya karaṇāt atatkārisvabhāvavivekaḥ. tad api pratidravyaṃ bhidyamānam api prakṛtyaikapratyavamarśasyābhedāvaskandino hetur bhavad abhinnaṃ khyāti. tathābhūtapratyavamarśahetor abhedāvabhāsino jñānāder arthasya hetutvād vyaktayo 'pi saṃsṛṣṭākāraṃ svabhāvabhedaparamārthaṃ svabhāvata ekaṃ pratyayaṃ janayantīty asakṛd uktam etat. tasmād ekakāryataiva bhāvānām abhedaḥ.*
See Dunne (2004: 120-126) and McAllister (2019:302-303) for alternative translation of the passage.

In this rather challenging passage, Dharmakīrti acknowledges that the cognitions that are directly produced by distinct particulars are indeed different from each other, but he resorts to the concept of unitary judgement as something that functions at a higher level than the cognitions directly produced by the particulars to explain how these cognitions are nonetheless viewed as the same. According to Dharmakīrti, even though entities are ultimately truly unique, they nonetheless have "undifferentiated difference" (*abhinno bhedaḥ*). A certain group of things is different from things outside of that group insofar as the group of things is not different from one another because they produce the same effect but the things outside that group do not do so. That is to say, the non-difference of diverse entities lies in the fact that they are all different from things that do not cause the same effect. Dharmakīrti notes that the common effect in question can be as simple as producing the same cognition. However, the cognitions directly produced by the distinct particulars are the same not because they are truly ontologically the same, but because there is an ascertainment that judges these cognitions as the same (*eka*).

By employing the concept of a unitary judgement, Dharmakīrti conveniently avoids a problem of mutual dependence in his theory. Namely, he is able to avoid stating the two circular ideas that the effects of multiple particulars are the same because the cognitions produced by these particulars are the same, and that the sameness of the cognitions is due to the effects being the same.[121] Now, if we recall what Dharmakīrti says in the PV 1.68-70 in terms of how a unitary cognition conceals the true distinct natures of real entities, it seems that Dharmakīrti only tells a partial story there. In its full account elaborated in the PVSV ad PV 1.109, Dharmakīrti, in fact, says that the cognitions directly produced by distinct

[121] Dunne (2011: 96) also observes: "Dharmakīrti's initial problem is that objects are unique, so the sameness required by language and concepts must be accounted for by sameness of effect. But if he turns to the phenomenal forms produced by those objects, he has the same problem because those cognitions, like the objects themselves, are unique. If he now turns to the claim that those phenomenal forms are the same because they produce the same judgement, then he appears to have fallen into an infinite regress."

particulars are themselves the causes of a unitary judgement, which in turn covers those cognitions with an undifferentiated appearance. This is good moment to summarise the arguments of Dharmakīrti that I have presented so far:

(1) The diversity of particulars can be concealed (*saṃvṛta*) by a unitary cognition, which ascribes a common appearance to them despite the fact that particulars are all unique in reality. (PV 1.68-70)
(2) A unitary cognition can arise from certain particulars that have the same effect (*ekakāryatā*/*abhinnakāryatā*). (PV 1.73)
(3) Mental impressions (*vāsanā*) are left from the direct experience with real particulars that have the same effect. The awakening of these mental impressions then causes us to hold the distinct particulars in a conceptual cognition that presents them as having a common form. (PV 1.75)
(4) It is the unitary judgement (*ekapratyavamarśa*) that ascertains that the effects produced by distinct particulars are the same. (PV 1.109)

4.3.3 Does Dharmakīrti Know Kumārila's Arguments?

When we compare Kumārila's arguments in the ŚV *Ākṛti* 12-16 and Dharmakīrti's arguments in the PV 1, it is rather clear that Dharmakīrti's account of unitary cognition in the PV 1 is much more sophisticated than the version rejected by Kumārila in the ŚV. Although the core idea of Kumārila's opponent in the ŚV *Ākṛti* 12-16 mirrors Dharmakīrti's proposal—i.e. distinct particulars are able to give rise to a cognition of commonness without the need to postulate a real universal—Kumārila seems completely unaware of the complex system devised by Dharmakīrti in the PV(SV) 1. In the entire ŚV, Kumārila shows no awareness of any of the important concepts employed by Dharmakīrti in his account of a

cognition of commonness (*saṃvṛti*, *ekakāryatā*, *vāsanā*, and *ekapratyavamarśa*). Moreover, it is not just the case that Dharmakīrti has more complex theories involving ideas that are unknown to Kumārila; it is that Dharmakīrti's theory of unitary cognition to a large extent circumvents Kumārila's scrutiny in the ŚV *Ākṛti* 12-16 while posing a significant challenge to Kumārila's own theory of universals. Dharmakīrti's arguments in the PV(SV) 1 manage to show that, contrary to Kumārila's suggestion, unique particulars can indeed produce a unitary cognition through a complex psychological process that is still grounded in our direct experience of reality. Dharmakīrti also laboriously argues that it is the concept of *ekakāryatā* that enables us to group diverse particulars into natural kinds, rather than it being real universals that allow us to do so. Both lines of arguments present a direct opposition to Kumārila's conviction throughout the *Ākṛtivāda* that a unitary cognition must correspond with an object that has singularity, namely, a universal. Given that Dharmakīrti provides such a strong account of unitary cognition that directly challenges the very basis of Kumārila's theory of universals, it seems implausible that Kumārila would choose to attack a strawman version of those arguments, if he had actually be familiar with them. Thus, on the balance of probability, it seems more likely than not that Dharmakīrti's arguments post-date those of Kumārila's, based on the fact that Dharmakīrti's arguments on unitary cognition are more mature than the similar but much less demanding arguments known to Kumārila.

Now I would like to have a closer look at one of the key concepts used by Dharmakīrti in the PV(SV) 1, namely, the concept of *ekakāryatā*. By taking entities having the same effect as the defining characteristic that allows us group together diverse things, Dharmakīrti escapes from having to postulate real universals to explain why our mind grasps certain things as similar to things of the same type. Interestingly, when Kumārila attempts to solve the problem of universal-ness in the ŚV *Ākṛti* 24, he essentially employs the same strategy of appealing to *ekakāryatā*. In the ŚV *Ākṛti* 24, Kumārila argues that one does not

need to postulate a higher level universal-ness to account for the similarities among all the real universals. The only common feature among all the real universals is that they all have a connection to the word "universal". One of the definitions provided by Kumārila is that if something can bring about a unitary cognition (*ekadhīkaraṇena*), then that thing has a connection to the word "universal". We can construe Kumārila's arguments in the ŚV *Ākṛti* 24 as follows: although there is no universal-ness that accounts for the similarity among all the real universals, universals are similar to each other insofar as they all can produce the same effect, i.e. a unitary cognition.

Viewed from this perspective, it seems that there is a non-trivial similarity between Kumārila's solution to the problem of universal-ness and Dharmakīrti's solution to the problem of unitary cognition. Indeed, at least some classical Indian philosophers have made the same observation. As Kataoka (2010: 216-215) reports, the similarity between Kumārila's strategy in the ŚV *Ākṛti* 19-24 and Dharmakīrti's application of *ekakāryatā* is noted by Jayanta Bhaṭṭa (c. 9th century CE) in the *Nyāyamañjarī*. Moreover, it seems that such a strategy has its root in Mīmāṃsā hermeneutics. Kataoka (2010: 216) mentions briefly that Kumārila's solution in the ŚV *Ākṛti* 24 is "a natural application of the Mīmāṃsā device *arthaikatva* or *ekārthatā*, i.e. having a single purpose" and points to the *Mīmāṃsāsūtra* 2.1.46 that is concerned with the hermeneutical device *ekārthatā*. Let us have a look at the relevant passage in the *Śābarabhāṣya* ad *Mīmāṃsāsūtra* 2.1.46:

> Now, in the case of Yajurvedic formulas that are recited in a mixed way, how is it to be understood that this much is one Yajurvedic formula? [Answer:] To the extent that a collection of words is employed for a sacrificial action, to that extent, [a collection of words] is regarded as one sentence. To what extent is [a collection of words] employed for a sacrificial action? [Answer:] Insofar as [a

collection of words] provides facilitation for a sacrificial action, to that extent that collection is a sentence because that much is to be communicated. That is why it is declared by the *sūtra*: "Due to [words] serving a single purpose, [a collection of words] is regarded as one single sentence".[122]

No doubt, Kumārila would have been very familiar with this Mīmāṃsā hermeneutical technique. It is reasonable to speculate that Kumārila might have considered the effectiveness of this hermeneutical device when finding a solution to the problem of universal-ness. Indeed, there are a few other instances in the ŚV that indicate that Kumārila connects Mīmāṃsā hermeneutics with his epistemological system; for instance, his usage of the term *bādhaka* and his motivation for developing the dual nature theory.[123] Thus, it seems plausible that Kumārila's solution in the ŚV *Ākṛti* 24 is indeed "a natural application of the Mīmāṃsā device", as suggested by Kataoka (2010). Meanwhile, it is difficult to find a root in the Buddhist cannons from which Dharmakīrti develops the concept of *ekakāryatā* in his theory of unitary cognition. This seems to suggest that Dharmakīrti was likely influenced by Mīmāṃsā when adopting the concept of *ekakāryatā* in his system.

When we consider the fact that (a) Dharmakīrti's theory of unitary cognition is much more sophisticated than the version refuted by Kumārila in the ŚV *Ākṛti* 12-16 and that (b) one of Dharmakīrti's key concepts, *ekakāryatā*, mirrors the strategy employed by Kumārila to solve the problem of universal-ness, the relationship between Dharmakīrti and Kumārila does seem to conform to the description that Taber (2021: 221) provides: "Dharmakīrti almost certainly had Kumārila's critique of Dignāga in front of him when he set out to defend and elaborate the Apohavāda. He may, however, not have known Kumārila's system - as vast,

[122] ŚBh ad MS 2.1.46: *atha praśliṣṭapaṭhiteṣu yajuḥṣu katham avagamyeta iyad ekaṃ yajur iti. yāvatā padasamūhenejyate, tāvān padasamūhaḥ ekaṃ yajuḥ. kiyatā cejyate? yāvatā kriyāyā upakāraḥ prakāśyate, tāvad vaktavyatvād vākyam ity ucyate. tenābhidhīyate,* ***arthaikatvād ekaṃ vākyam iti****.*

[123] For Kumārila's usage of the term *bādhaka*, see section 3.1 of Chapter 3. For the connection between Kumārila's dual nature theory and his Mīmāṃsā hermeneutics agenda, see section 5.1 of Chapter 5.

difficult, and complex as his own - thoroughly and in detail… Kumārila was a mountain on the landscape that Dharmakīrti, probably already educated in Mīmāṃsā in his youth, had neither the time nor desire to scale". Indeed, while it seems likely that Dharmakīrti knows some of Kumārila's arguments in the *Ākṛtivāda*, Dharmakīrti does not seem to be aware of how pervasive and important the theory of intrinsic validity is to Kumārila's theory of universals. As I have shown in the first section of this chapter, this epistemological principle forms one of the strongest arguments for Kumārila's conception that universals are objectively real existences. Nonetheless, based on the analysis above, it seems appropriate to conclude that Dharmakīrti's knowledge of Kumārila's theory of universals in the *Ākṛtivāda* is only limited to a certain portion of Kumārila's arguments.

4.4 Conclusion

This chapter has shown that in order to understand Kumārila's arguments for the existence of universals, one needs to appreciate the epistemological framework that Kumārila devises to support his position on universals. The primary purpose of this chapter is to uncover how Kumārila's positions for different epistemological issues presented in other chapters of the ŚV help him to construct his arguments for the existence of universals in the *Ākṛtivāda*. In the first section of this chapter, I have shown how the three major epistemological stances held by Kumārila—his theories of perception, epistemological realism, and the intrinsic validity of cognitions—serve as the foundation for his arguments for the existence of universals in the *Ākṛtivāda*. Kumārila contends that universals are real existences because they are present in our cognitions and never get invalidated by contradictory experience. Kumārila calls on his epistemological theories elaborated in earlier chapters of the ŚV to demonstrate his point. The theory of perception informs us that our perception involves both a non-conceptualised stage and a conceptualised stage, and

therefore, a sensory experience that includes a universal should still be regarded as a perception. The epistemological realism stance shows that the content of a cognition always has a corresponding external object as its support. Finally, the theory of intrinsic validity holds that every cognition that arises has innate validity unless overturned by a subsequent contradictory experience. Thus, according to Kumārila, our experience that there is commonness among things that belong to the same group is the very proof that universals are real existences.

This chapter has also demonstrated the importance of reading Kumārila's arguments in the *Ākṛtivāda* in the context of Kumārila's rivalry with the Buddhist logico-epistemological school championed by Dignāga and Dharmakīrti. The scholarship in the last three decades on the ŚV has demonstrated that much of Kumārila's philosophy in the ŚV is formulated in a head-to-head battle with his Buddhist rivals. The problem of universals is no exception to this general observation. As I have already shown in the introduction chapter of this thesis, Kumārila's efforts in the *Ākṛtivāda* to prove the existence of universals should be understood as his attempt to counter Dignāga's epistemology that holds that universals are not real existences. The second section of this chapter examines the ways in which Dharmakīrti responds to Kumārila's arguments against Dignāga's epistemology by providing a sophisticated framework to explain how a unitary cognition can arise despite the fact that universals are not real existences. By comparing Dharmakīrti's theory of unitary cognition in the PV(SV) 1 and Kumārila's arguments in the *Ākṛtivāda*, I conclude that Dharmakīrti was likely aware of some of Kumārila's arguments for the existence of universals in the *Ākṛtivāda*.

As Eltschinger (2012: 7) has argued, while Dignāga's philosophy is revolutionary in many aspects, a number of his tenets are primarily focused on logic and the philosophy of language; it is Dharmakīrti who gives Dignāga's philosophy a full account of ontology,

psychology, and soteriology. Kumārila's wide-ranging critique of Dignāga's philosophy is one of the biggest motivating factors for Dharmakīrti to provide a robust defence of Buddhist philosophy. Understanding Kumārila's theory of universals is thus indispensable for understanding the intellectual debate between Mīmāṃsā philosophers and their Buddhist interlocutors in the seventh century CE.

Chapter 5: Kumārila's Dual Nature Theory in the *Ākṛtivāda*

5.1 Introduction: What is at Stake for Kumārila?

Following his argument for the existence of universals, one of Kumārila's central contentions in the *Ākṛtivāda* is that external objects have a nature that is both universal and particular. This claim is closely associated with Kumārila's insistence throughout the *Ākṛtivāda* that we should view universals and particulars as both different from and identical to each other. Commonly termed by modern scholarship as the "dual nature theory",[124] this position of Kumārila may strike anyone with a background in either Indian philosophy or Western philosophy as strange. Indeed, there appears to be a plain ontological incongruence at hand in the contention that any kind of identity between universal and particular exists; the terms universal and particular are meant to describe two opposite metaphysical phenomena. That which is particular is the factor that makes an individual object *individualised*, while that which is universal is widely regarded as the factor that accounts for enabling a single notion to be associated with different individual things. Furthermore, we may intuitively believe that the nature of one thing should be self-consistent; it seems implausible that the nature of one thing can consist of two factors that are opposite to each other. How, then, is it

[124] In modern scholarship, Kumārila's dual nature theory is sometimes described as a form of "difference-cum-non-difference" theory (*bhedābheda*). In general, I tend to avoid using this terminology to describe Kumārila's theory of universals. This is mainly because the Sanskrit term *bhedābheda* ("difference and non-difference") has more than one connotation in the history of classical Indian philosophy and is a very fuzzy term. While it is most usually associated with Bhedābheda Vedānta, the term *bhedābheda* has also been used to describe the Jaina and Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsā theories on the nature of universals. For Bhedābheda Vedānta, *bhedābheda* is a concise summary of their fundamental doctrine that *brahman*, as the ultimate principle of the world, can transform itself into the diverse phenomena of our experienced world despite its singularity. In this way, while *brahman* is the only entity that really exists, it is both different from and identical to the phenomenal world, in that the world is the result of its change and transformation. This fundamental position of Bhedābheda Vedānta is in direct opposition to the Vedānta of more renowned Advaitins, who insist that *brahman* is absolutely devoid of any changes and the diversity of the world is only an illusion consisting in *brahman*. In terms of the application of the term in Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsā, however, Kumārila himself might have some misgivings about the attempts to characterise his theory on universals as *bhedābheda*. A more appropriate term to summarise the gist of his theory would probably be *dvyātmaka*, i.e. entities having a dual nature.

possible that the nature of an object, as one single entity, can be both universal and particular, and why would one argue for such a position?

Before we dive into the details of how Kumārila defends his dual nature theory with both ontological arguments and epistemological arguments, it is worthwhile to discuss the potential reasons why Kumārila commits to such a peculiar philosophical position and makes strenuous efforts to defend it. The first factor that we should consider is that Kumārila does not have the Vaiśeṣika-Nyāya concept of inherence (*samavāya*) at his disposal to explain the relationship between universals and particulars. In fact, he resolutely rejects the concept of inherence, which is one of the six ontological categories advocated by Vaiśeṣika philosophers. Providing a systematic account of the relationship between universals and particulars has always been a major concern for all realist traditions in classical India, especially due to the fact that this issue is constantly picked up and attacked as the weakest link in any theories of universals by nominalist traditions such as those of Buddhist philosophers. To Vaiśeṣika and Nyāya philosophers alike, the reason why particulars are always found to have their corresponding universals is because they are connected by the relationship of inherence. While universals and particulars, as well as substances (*dravya*) and qualities (*guṇa*), are indeed distinct entities, inherence connects them together and makes them inseparable from each other. In vv. 146-150 of the ŚV chapter *Pratyakṣa*, Kumārila argues in detail that the Vaiśeṣika account of inherence is not coherent and therefore should be rejected. Given Kumārila's position on inherence, he is left to find his own solution to explain why universals and particulars can be associated with each other. The dual nature theory is his answer to this problem.[125]

In addition to Kumārila's rejection of some aspects of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika ontology inevitably motivating him to find way to explain the relationship between universals and

[125] Taber (2005: 108-112).

particulars, we can glean another potential reason for Kumārila to embrace the dual nature theory from some of his writings in the *Tantravārttika*. There, one can find how the dual nature theory conveniently helps Kumārila tackle objections that universals cannot have a connection to ritual actions. In the *Tantravārttia* ad *Mīmāṃsāsūtra* 1.3.30-1.3.33, where Kumārila discusses why the denotations of a word are universals rather than particulars, one opponent raises the following objection: if universals were the denotations of words, then no Vedic injunctions could function, since the objects of actions needed to be performed at the sacrifice cannot possibly be universals. Given that universals are incorporeal and eternal, they cannot have connection which involves corporeal particulars. For instance, the injunction "sprinkle the rice" requires grains of rice (*vrīhi*) as concrete particulars to be sprinkled; if the meanings of words denote universals, then the word rice in that injunction only denotes "rice-ness" (*vrīhitva*). The opponent frames this a problem because no one can ever sprinkle rice-ness.[126] In response, Kumārila uses his dual nature theory to argue that since universals and particulars are not completely different from each other, it is not problematic for words to denote universals in the Vedic injunctions while still having a connection to particular objects. As Kumārila says:

> "There is no undesired consequence that there would be a defect based on [the universals] being incorporeal, because a universal is not completely distinct [from a particular]. For, that universal is perceived as having an extracted form, but it is united with an action and is indeed possessed of an individual. Still,

[126] Cf. TV 300,20-23 ad *Mīmāṃsāsūtra* 1.1.30: *ākṛtir yadi śabdārthaḥ kasya syuḥ prokṣaṇādayaḥ | kena cejyeta na tyāga ākṛter upapadyate || amūrtā hy ākṛtir nityā nāvaghātādibhājanī | tadvidhiḥ pratiṣedho vā tenāsya nāvakalpate* || "If the denotation of a word is a universal, what would be [the object] of [actions] such as sprinkling and the like? And, what would be [the object] with which one would perform sacrifice? [Surely] no offering of universals is possible. For, a universal, which is incorporeal and eternal, is not proper for [actions] such as threshing and the like. Therefore, the injunction of that [action] or the prohibition [of that action] is not fit for that [universal]." See Kataoka and Taber (2021: 192) for a discussion of how Kumārila's arguments in the *Tantravārttika* ad *Mīmāṃsāsūtra* 1.3.30-33 relate to the broader issue of coreference and qualification.

[actions] such as washing and so on are not at all impossible [when the denotations of words are universals]."[127]

Thus, according to Kumārila, if one accepts his dual nature theory, one would not encounter any difficulties when performing the injuncted actions. While words denote universals, the identity between universals and particulars ensures that the agent of the ritual actions understands that it is the particular objects, rather than the incorporeal and eternal universals, that are required in the sacrifice.[128]

Having examined why Kumārila might have wanted to take up the position entailed by his dual nature theory, one of the main goals of this chapter is to examine how Kumārila presents the dual nature theory in the *Ākṛtivāda*. In the *Ākṛtivāda*, Kumārila devises several arguments to defend his dual nature theory. While the dual nature theory, in its essence, is an ontological position that seeks to explain the relationship between universals and particulars, it is important to note that Kumārila comes up with both ontological arguments and epistemological arguments to defend his position. Kumārila's ontological arguments aim to dispel the notion that universals and particulars, as seemingly contradictory entities, cannot plausibly both be the nature of a singular thing. By contrast, Kumārila's epistemological arguments seek to answer *why* we should accept that the dual nature theory is true. They consider *how* we know that real entities in the world indeed have dual natures. Kumārila

[127] TV 304,28-29: *anatyantavyatirekāc cākṛter amūrtatvādyāśrayadoṣāprasaṅgaḥ. sā hi pratīyate niṣkṛṣṭarūpā, kriyāyoginī tu vyaktyupetā bhavaty eveti prokṣaṇādi tu na kathaṃ cin na saṃbhavati.*

[128] With a somewhat disturbing example, in the sentences following TV 304,28-29, Kumārila further suggests that certain ritual actions, such as cutting up an animal, would not be possible at all if universals were completely distinct from particulars. Kumārila argues that when sacrificial animals are dismembered, it is not possible to have a cognition of the dismembered animals as particulars, since they do not have any specific features in that state. Rather, one cognises them as having a form of universal that is qualified by the action having been cut up. This example is found in Kataoka and Taber (2021: 192, n.209). Cf. TV 305: *viśasanādy api tu vyaktyavyatirekāpekṣayā saṃbhavaty eva. tathā hi paśvādiṣv apanītāṅgeṣu viśeṣabuddhyabhāvāt sāmānyarūpaiva viśasanādiviśiṣṭā buddhir dṛṣṭā.* "But yet, [actions in injunctions] such as cutting up [a sacrificial animal] and so on are only possible [to be done] by being dependent on [universals] being not completely distinct from individuals. That is to say, in the case of dismembered sacrificial animals, one observes a cognition that is qualified by [the action of] cutting up and so on and has a form of universal, because there is an absence of cognition of the specific [features of the dismembered animals]."

seems to be well aware that answering how to ascertain the dual nature of entities is as important an issue as presenting a descriptive account of how it is ontologically possible for one thing to have both a universal and a particular nature.

Given how peculiar the dual nature theory is as an ontological position, the classical and modern scholars of Indian philosophy who have come after Kumārila have both tended to focus on analysing Kumārila's ontological arguments for his dual nature theory, rather than focus on his epistemological arguments. In particular, efforts have been made to uncover the relationship between Kumārila's perspectivist arguments for the dual nature theory and Samantabhadra's (ca. sixth to seventh century CE) conception of universals that is embedded in the Jaina theory of *anekāntavāda*. While this is indeed an important issue to investigate—and the second analytical section of this chapter will be devoted to discussing Kumārila's relationship with Jaina philosophy—this focus on the ontological aspects of Kumārila's dual nature theory has lead to a neglect of his epistemological arguments for the dual nature theory. Based on my novel analysis of those arguments, I will assert in this chapter that Kumārila's epistemological arguments for his dual nature theory are not substantially different from his arguments for the existence of universals that I presented in Chapter 4 of this thesis. They share a fundamentally similar structure that requires the same theoretical support from Kumārila's arguments in other chapters of the ŚV. Specifically, Kumārila's epistemological realist stance and his theory of intrinsic validity, which function as the important proof for the existence of universals, continue to serve as the theoretical backdrop for Kumārila's arguments for his dual nature theory.

In this chapter, I will take a close look at the different aspects of this peculiar theory of Kumārila. In terms of the relationship between Kumārila's ontological arguments for the dual nature theory and Jaina ontological theories, I will argue two points specifically. The first is that while there is evidence that Kumārila's ontology on universals shares affinity with

Samantabhadra's conception of universals, one should not conflate Samantabhadra's conception of universals with all Jaina theories of universals, as has been claimed by Buddhist rivals. The second point that I intend to demonstrate is that the similarity between Kumārila's and Jainas' conception of universals remains at the level of ontology. If we uncover the epistemological considerations at hand, which, as I have shown, form the core part of Kumārila's argument for the dual nature theory, then it will become clear that Kumārila's underlying strategy and philosophical orientation is very different from that of Jainas. Ultimately, I argue that while Kumārila does provide a few ontological arguments for the dual nature theory, the strength of the theory in fact lies more in his epistemological argument.

In the first section of this chapter, we will initially go through Kumārila's different ontological arguments for the dual nature theory in the *Ākṛtivāda*. In the second section, I will give a thorough examination of the relationship between the ontology entailed by Kumārila's dual nature theory and that of the Jaina theory of *anekāntavāda*. In the third and final section, I will observe that, whereas *anekāntavāda* is grounded in a sophisticated ontological framework, Kumārila's dual nature theory is grounded in his network of epistemological theories. In that section I will also provide a thorough account of Kumārila's epistemological arguments for the dual nature theory in the *Ākṛtivāda*.

5.2 Kumārila's Ontological Arguments for the Dual Nature Theory

In the *Ākṛtivāda*, Kumārila's conception of the dual nature theory is presented in the context of tackling a number of ontological issues surrounding the nature of universals. Two of these issues are: What is the relationship between universals and particulars? Why do universals only occur in the corresponding particulars? Philosophically, the undesired consequence of postulating any other entity to regulate either the relationship between

universal and particular or the fact that cow-ness only resides in cows is that one then would have to postulate another entity to explain any such regulating factors, thereby causing infinite regress. Kumārila seems to be aware of this issue, which might have motivated him to deviate from the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika concept of *samavāya*. As a result, Kumārila repeatedly emphasises that there is no need for a higher-level regulating factor to explain the relationship between universals and particulars (ŚV *Ākṛti* 31cd-32), nor a need for such a factor to account for the fact that universals only occur in corresponding particulars (ŚV *Ākṛti* 27-28, *Ākṛti* 34-36, and tangentially *Ākṛti* 46-47).

Throughout these arguments, Kumārila stresses that there is a certain level of identity between universals and particulars. In the ŚV *Ākṛti* 31cd, Kumārila contends that the relationship between universals and particulars is natural (*svābhāvika*) and is not caused by any external factor (*na hetumān*). Although Kumārila has not yet presented his dual nature theory in details prior to these verses, Kumārila's wording in the ŚV *Ākṛti* 31cd already suggests that he considers universals to be part of the nature of an entity. Similarly, in the ŚV *Ākṛti* 32, Kumārila argues that it is because of the intrinsic nature of a particular that a certain thing is connected with a corresponding universal, and in the ŚV *Ākṛti* 34, he argues that it is also because of the intrinsic nature of particular that a certain thing does not manifest a different universal. It is not until in the ŚV *Ākṛti* 45-50 that Kumārila starts to present the main position of his dual nature theory and take a new look at the ontological question of the relationship between universals and particulars. In particular, in the ŚV *Ākṛti* 47, Kumārila offers his answer to the question of why cow-ness only occurs in individual cows. His remedy is that the universal cow-ness "has the nature of that [individual endowed with dewlaps]" (*tadātmaka*). Kumārila then goes on to say that this identity (*tādātmya*) between the universal cow-ness and the particular cow is due to the intrinsic nature of universals (*svabhāvāt*).

The dual nature theory, of course, entails two different propositions: that universals and particulars have identity, and that universals and particulars are different from each other. As we have seen, Kumārila understandably undertakes more effort in the *Ākṛtivāda* to demonstrate this first proposition, since the proposition, unlike the second one, is contrary to common belief. By arguing that there is a level of identity between universals and particulars, Kumārila manages to offer a significantly streamlined realist account of universals. While other realist accounts of universals require certain convoluted notions to explain the relationship between universals and particulars, Kumārila allocates the role of such notions directly to the identity between universals and particulars. Since this identity lies in the intrinsic nature of universals, Kumārila is also free from having to provide a detailed account of why universals such as cow-ness are only manifested in cows rather than horses. To Kumārila's convenience, this question can be easily explained by the nature of particulars themselves, since universals and particulars share an identity.

However, for all of these analytical benefits brought out by the dual nature theory, the theory does incur significant costs that Kumārila must pay. Namely, the theory requires that he provide a thorough account of how universals can be both identical to and different from particulars. It seems that Kumārila does not forget his claim in the ŚV *Ākṛti* 11cd that there is no "absolute difference" (*atyantabheda*) between universals and particulars, acknowledging that apart from the identity, there is indeed difference between universals and particulars. While Kumārila rejects several aspects of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika realist account of universals, one aspect that Kumārila's theory of universals does have in common with the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory is that universals exist nowhere outside particulars. That is to say, unlike Western philosophy's belief in Platonic universals that are merely abstract entities, the realists in classical Indian philosophy emphasise that particulars are the only locus where universals manifest and exist. Thus, Kumārila's claim that there exists an identity between

universals and particulars can be directly translated into the statement that a concrete particular has the nature of both a universal and a particular—a very difficult position to defend at first glance, especially since Kumārila does acknowledge that there is also a level of difference between universals and particulars.

Kumārila seems to be well aware that the burden of proof for this assertion rests entirely on him. In the *Ākṛtivāda* 51-52, Kumārila lets the opponent voice an objection that it is impossible for universals and particulars to have an identity, because they have conflicting natures. While universals have the characteristics of occurring in many loci (*anekavṛtti*), particulars can only occur in themselves (*ananyavṛtti*); while universals have unity (*ekatva*), particulars have diversity (*nānātva*). If one object has both universal and particular aspects to its nature, that would essentially mean that there exists an identity between the universal and the particular. If that were the case, then the nature of the universal would clash with the nature of the particular: the universal would just become an individualising factor like the particular, and the particular would just become the single notion that connects different things together.[129] The opponent concludes in the *Ākṛti* 53 that one and the same thing cannot hold these contradictory properties at the same time, and therefore, Kumārila's dual nature theory is untenable.[130]

From ŚV *Ākṛti* 54 onwards, Kumārila sets out to provide a comprehensive framework for the relationship between universals and particulars that overcomes the obstacles mentioned in the objection above. Kumārila's key strategy is to argue that it is not contradictory for one and the same entity to have both a universal aspect and a particular aspect because we do not experience these two aspects simultaneously. Kumārila's arguments

[129] Cf ŚV *Ākṛti* 51-52
anekānanyavṛttittvān na sāmānyaviśeṣayoḥ |
ekavastvātmatā yuktā kiṃ cit tenaupacārikam || 51
bhinnebhyaś cāpy abhinnatvād bhedas tat svātmavad bhavet |
ekasmād vāpy abhinnatvād vyaktyekatvaṃ prasajyate || 52
[130] Cf. ŚV *Ākṛtivāda* 53:
ekānekatvam ekasya tathānyānanyatā katham |
tat sāmānyaṃ viśeṣaś cety evamādi ca duṣkaram || 53

in the ŚV *Ākṛti* 54-57ab aim to show that the nature of universals does not clash with the nature of particulars, as the opponent claims in the ŚV *Ākṛti* 52, since we view an entity only either as a particular or as a universal at any one time.[131] When an entity is cognised as a particular, it will have the characteristics of a particular, that is, being diverse and occuring only in itself; when an entity is cognised as a universal, it will have the characteristics of a universal and have unity.

Thus, Kumārila's main ontological defence of his dual nature theory lies, in effect, in asking us to accept a perspectivist attitude when viewing universal and particular as the nature of an object. Here, Kumārila seems to understand universal and particular more or less as two aspects of any object's nature. In the famous analogy offered by Kumārila in the ŚV *Ākṛti* 57-58ab, he argues that the dual nature of the object should be taken as an object of variegated colour.[132] Since both universal and particular aspects exist in the nature of any object, when we need to cognise that it is similar to other things, we suppress the particular aspect of the dual nature and focus on the universal aspect; when we need to cognise that it is distinct from other things, we suppress its universal aspect. In what follows, Kumārila provides us with some further explanations as to how this process functions:

> When universal is grasped as identical with the individuals, then the object appears only as particular. And after that [cognition of the particular] arises, the universal is still present while conforming to the qualities of that being [i.e.

[131] ŚV *Ākṛti* 54-57ab:
virodhas tāvad ekāntād vaktum atra na śakyate |
sāmānyānanyavijñāte viśeṣe naikavṛttitā || 54
sāmānyānanyavṛttitvaṃ viśeṣātmaikabhāvataḥ |
evañ ca parihartavyā bhinnābhinnatvakalpanā || 55
kena cic cātmanaikatvaṃ nānātvaṃ cāsya kena cit |
sāmānyasya tu yo bhedaṃ brūte tasya viśeṣataḥ || 56
darśayitvābhyupetavyam viśeṣaikyaṃ ca jātitaḥ | 57ab
[132] ŚV *Ākṛti* 57cd-58ab:
yathā kalmāṣavarṇasya yatheṣṭaṃ varṇanigrahaḥ || 57
citratvād vastuno 'py evaṃ bhedābhedāvadhāraṇā | 58ab

particular]. Despite [still] being really existing (*sad apy*), [the universal] appears to us as if it was non-existent (*asadvat*), due to its form being not graspable [at that time]. (vv. 59cd-61ab)

Likewise, when one cognises particulars as non-different from universal—at that time, it is only just the universal nature that is perceived. (vv. 61cd-62ab)

However, when a thing is perceived as mixed [i.e., universal and particular] simultaneously—at that time, everything such as the distinction of other and non-other (*anyānanyabhedādi*) just disappears. (vv. 62cd-63)[133]

In this set of supplementary notes, the argument in vv. 60cd-61ab is particularly interesting. Kumārila takes this opportunity to stress that even when we focus on the particular aspect of the dual nature, i.e., when we only perceive an object as distinct from other things, the universal in that object still exists, albeit not in an evident way. We may interpret the situation described by Kumārila in vv. 60cd-61ab as follows: when we focus on cognising the particular aspect of the object, the universal aspect still firmly exists in the object in a manner similar to a potential state. That said, Kumārila does not seem to be keen on resorting to the language of potentiality and actuality here; he must have carefully chosen the wording in v. 61ab (especially the pair of *sad api* and *asadvat*) to maintain his realist stance even in the context of a highly dialectical argument.

Having seen how Kumārila carefully constructs an ontological account of his dual nature theory, we now move on to examine the relationship between Kumārila's strategy and

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[133] ŚV *Ākṛtivāda* 59cd-63ab:
bhedebhyo 'nanyarūpeṇa sāmānyaṃ gṛhyate yadā || 59cd
tadā viśeṣamātreṇa vastu pratyavabhāsate |
tadudbhūtyā ca sāmānyaṃ tadbhāvānuguṇaṃ sthitam || 60
sad apy agrāhyarūpatvād asadvat pratibhāti naḥ |
viśeṣān api sāmānyād yadābhedena buddhyate || 61
tadā sāmānyamātratvam evam eva pratīyate |
yadā tu śabalaṃ vastu yugapat pratipadyate || 62
tadānyānanyabhedādi sarvam eva pralīyate | 63ab

Jaina conception of *anekāntavāda*, another famous theory that emphasises a perspectivist attitude towards the nature of the reality and whose point-of-view is often conflated with the dual nature theory.

5.3 The Affinity between Kumārila's Dual Nature Theory and Jaina Ontology

Scholars such as Taber (2005: 218, n.40) and Halbfass (1993: 121-122) have noted that one of Kumārila's main ontological defences of the dual nature theory—i.e. that it is not contradictory for one entity to have both a universal aspect and a particular aspect as long as they are viewed from different perspectives—is quite reminiscent of how Jaina philosophers present their views on universals within the *anekāntavāda* framework (doctrine of many-sidedness). They have noted that it is especially evocative of the account advocated by Samantabhadra. The principal stance of Jaina *anekāntavāda* is that nothing is exclusively one way or the other, e.g. something can be permanent from one point of view but ever-changing when viewed from another perspective. This perspectivist understanding of reality thus seems to be fairly consistent with Kumārila's dual-nature theory, as the latter also emphasises the importance of relativity by arguing that there is no contradiction for one singular thing to have both universal aspect and particular aspect because they seen when viewed from different, respective perspectives.

While Kumārila never refers to the source of inspiration for his dual nature theory—and his classical commentators are equally reticent about this issue—one fascinating aspect of the dual nature theory is how readily Kumārila's rivals in classical India identified his theory with Jaina doctrine. In the *Brahmasiddhi*, Maṇḍanamiśra (660-720 CE) turns to discuss the concepts of *syādvāda* and *anekāntavāda* in Jainism right after criticising dual nature theory. Maṇḍana's ontological framework also categorises Jainas and Kumārila as holding the same opinion on the nature of universals and particulars, i.e. that universals and

particular are both identical to and different from each other. In the *Tattvasaṃgraha*, Śāntarakṣita (725-788 CE) gives his refutation of Kumārila's dual nature theory in the middle of the chapter in which the Jaina theories of *syādvāda* and *anekāntavāda* are also refuted. Śāntarakṣita quotes verses from the ŚV (ŚV *Ākṛti* 57cd-58ab, ŚV *Ākṛti* 62cd-63ab, ŚV *Vana* 21-23) when he needs to elaborate on Jaina *syādvāda* and *anekāntavāda*, suggesting that Śāntarakṣita thinks that Kumārila and Jaina authors are advocating the same doctrine. What is perhaps the most startling example comes from the Buddhist opponent in the *Nyāyamañjarī* of Jayantabhaṭṭa (ca. 870 CE). The opponent brutally claims that Kumārila's dual nature theory is just the food remnants of Jainas (*jainocchiṣṭam*).[134] However, given that this line comes from the Buddhist opponent, it is not clear whether Jayanta is just reporting the idea or if he also holds similar beliefs.[135]

Later Buddhist commentators on Buddhist logico-epistemological tradition after Śāntarakṣita also have a tendency to quote Kumārila's verses from the ŚV when discussing Jaina theories that these commentators think share similarity with Kumārila's dual nature theory. Specifically, they tend to note the similarity between Samantabhadra's writing and Kumārila's verses in the *Vanavāda* of his ŚV. In the *Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛttiṭīkā*, Karṇakagomin (ca. 800 CE) quotes ĀM 59, ŚV *Vana* 23, ĀM 60, and ĀM 57 as a single set of ideas that advocate reality as endowed with three characteristics: origination, destruction, and stability. In his *Jātinirākṛti*, Jitāri (ca. 940–1000 CE)[136] claims that Jainas and Mīmāṃsakas hold the same view when it comes to the issue of universals.[137] He then quotes a number of verses in the following sequence: ĀM 59 and 57, ŚV *Ākṛti* 57cd-58ab and 62cd-63ab, then ŚV *Śūnya* 219cd-220ab. This suggests that Jitāri thinks that Samantabhadra

[134] Cf. NM II 9.1-2 and Kataoka (2011b: 604, § 4.5.2): *tad eva sāmānyaṃ sa eva viśeṣaḥ, tad evaikaṃ tad eva nānā, tad eva nityaṃ tad evānityaṃ, tad evāsti tad eva nāstīti jainocchiṣṭam idam ucyate.*
[135] See Freschi & Keidan (2017: 207, n. 35) for an interpretation of this line in the NM.
[136] For the date of Jitāri, see Chu (2020: 547).
[137] Cf. JN 35, 20-21: *bhinnābhinam eva hi sāmānyaṃ jainajaiminīyāḥ pratijānate.*

and Kumārila have close ties. In another work of his (the *anekāntavādanirāsa*), Jitāri groups ĀM 59, ŚV *Vana* 23, and ĀM 57 together in a single set of quotes.

These Buddhist testimonies do need to be taken with some reservation; as I will present later in this section, some Jaina philosophers would clearly reject the characterisation portrayed by the Buddhists. However, these testimonies nonetheless reveal a certain amount of truth about the relationship between Kumārila's dual nature theory and Samantabhadra's theory. In this section, I will argue that it is reasonable to speculate that Kumārila reticently adopts Samantabhadra's position in order to expound his dual nature theory. I will argue this by reviewing the evidence from both the *Ākṛtivāda* and the *Vanavāda* of the ŚV and finding that they do, indeed, show significant similarity with Samantabhadra's writings. However, I will also caution that the testimonies of classical Indian philosophers on this issue, especially those of Buddhists, should be taken with a grain of salt. This will become clear when I present two refutations of Kumārila's dual nature theory from later Jaina philosophers, namely, Prabhācandra and Vādirājasūri. These complicate the story at hand by indicating that later Jaina authors seem to reject the Buddhist characterisation that the Jaina theory of universals is essentially the same with Kumārila's dual nature theory.

5.3.1 Similarity between Kumārila's ŚV and Samantabhadra's ĀM

Before we embark on comparing Kumārila's dual nature theory with Samantabhadra's theory, it is helpful to first give a review of Samantabhadra's theory of universals. Samantabhadra's conception of universals is expounded throughout the complex Jaina ontological network that involves the *anekāntavāda* (the doctrine of many-sidedness, or the doctrine of the multiplexity of reality), the *syādvāda* (the sevenfold modal description, also known as *saptabhaṅgī*, the seven-figured model), and the *nayavāda* (the theory of viewpoints). The basic principle of Jaina ontology is that real entities have infinite

characteristics, and it is also a tenet that this principle means real entities can have contradictory characteristics.[138] Defined by Umāsvāti and elaborated by Pūjyapāda, all real entities have the nature of being a substance (*dravya*). Substances, in turn, possess various qualities (*guṇa*) and modes (*paryāya*). While the qualities of a substance account for the intrinsic nature of that substance that do not change through time, the modes of a substance account for the temporary attributes that a substance may have at one point but lose at a later time. Given that all substances have innumerable qualities and modes, the *syādvāda* contends that in regard to each real entity, "one can express an infinite number of true sentences, which can be formally standardised into seven basic figures due to their structural properties" (Balcerowicz 2015: 90).[139] Each of these seven parameters is called the viewpoint (*naya*). Jaina philosophers argue that each of the seven statements derived from the *syādvāda* is true. While each statement is true only in regard to one certain aspect of the reality, as qualified by *syād* ("in a certain sense", or "from a certain perspective"), together each statement made constitutes the totality of the truth. Aided by the *syādvāda* and the *nayavāda*, the *anekāntavāda* contends that the reality is not of any one specific aspect (*an-eka*); rather, it is the totality of all the descriptions made under one certain condition.

It is with this complex ontology in mind that Samantabhada argues in the ĀM 61 that one should not view an effect as absolutely distinct from its cause, a quality as absolutely distinct from a thing qualified by this quality, nor a universal absolutely distinct from the

[138] See Shah (1999: 5-6) and Koller (2000).

[139] Balcerowicz (2015: 90-91) provides a full scheme for the *syādvāda*:

1. "In a certain sense, x [indeed] is P"—*syād asty [eva]*.
2. "In a certain sense, x [indeed] is non-Q"—*syān nāsty [eva]*.
3. "In a certain sense, x [indeed] is P and, in a certain sense, [indeed] is non-Q"—*syād asty [eva] syān nāsty [eva]*.
4. "In a certain sense, x [indeed] is inexpressible"—*syād avaktavyam [eva]*.
5. "In a certain sense, x [indeed] is P and, in a certain sense, [indeed] is inexpressible"—*syād asty [eva] syād avaktavyam [eva]*.
6. "In a certain sense, x [indeed] is non-Q and, in a certain sense, [indeed] is inexpressible"—*syān nāsty [eva] syād avaktavyam [eva]*.
7. "In a certain sense, x [indeed] is P, in a certain sense, [indeed] is non-Q and, in a certain sense, [indeed] is inexpressible"—*syād asty [eva] syān nāsty [eva] syād avaktavyam [eva]*.

particular possessing a universal aspect.[140] It seems to me that Samantabhadra's writings in the ĀM 61 are most similar to Kumārila's similar expression in the ŚV *Ākṛti* 11, where Kumārila argues that there is no absolute difference between universals and particulars. Nonetheless, none of the Buddhist commentators seem to be interested in citing this similarity between Kumārila and Samantabhadra in their works. Their attention is primarily focused on the striking similarity between ĀM 57, 59 and 60 on the one hand, and ŚV *Vana* 20cd-23 on the other hand. Let us have a look at these two sets of verses:

ĀM 57, 59 and 60	ŚV *Vana* 20cd-23
From the universal aspect, an entity neither originates or perishes, because it follows clearly that [the universal aspect has the continuation]. From the specific aspect, it originates and perishes. A real existence is the origination and so on (i.e. origination, continuation, and destruction) that exist together in one and the same locus. (v.57) If there is destruction [of a golden jar], a production [of a golden crown], and a continuation [of gold itself], one who desires the jar behaves sorrowfully, one who desires the crown behaves joyfully, and one	And a universal gold-ness can be perceived in all these different [things made of gold]. (v.20) When, by destroying a golden dish, a golden necklace is made, at that time, one who desires the former is sorrowful but one who desires the latter is happy. However, one who desires the gold [itself] is indifferent. Therefore, real entity has a triple nature. (v.21-22ab) If [entities] did not have origination, stability, and destruction, there would not be

[140] Cf. ĀM 61
kāryakāraṇanānātvaṃ guṇaguṇyanyatā 'pi ca |
sāmānyatadvadanyatvaṃ caikāntena yad iṣyate ||

who desires the gold behaves indifferently. [These three states, i.e. origination, continuation, and destruction] have their own causes. (v.59) One who vows to only have milk does not eat curd, one who vows to only have curd does not drink milk, and one who vows not to have any products from cows does not eat either of the two. Therefore, reality has a triple character. (v.60)[141]	three beliefs [i.e. sorrow, happiness, and indifference]. (v.22cd) There is no sorrow without destruction, no happiness without origination, and no indifference without stability. Therefore, universal[s] must be permanent. (v.23)[142]

While the two sets of verses have different intentions—Samantabhadra is arguing that entities can be both permanent and non-permanent without contradictions, whereas Kumārila is arguing that universals are permanent—the examples they use (gold-ness versus golden objects) and the structure of the verses (especially ĀM 60d: *tasmād tattvaṃ trayātmakam* and ŚV *Vana* 23d: *tena sāmānyanityatā*) show significant resemblances. Both Uno (1999) and Shiga (2017) provide extensive analysis of the similarity between the ĀM verses and the ŚV *Vana* verses. Uno (1999: 428) remarks that "clearly verse 59 of the *Āptamīmāṃsā* says much

[141] ĀM 57, 59, and 60:
na sāmānyātmanodeti na vyeti vyaktam anvayāt |
vyety udeti viśeṣāt te sahaikatrodayādi sad ||
ghaṭamaulisuvarṇārthī vināśotpādasthitiṣv ayam |
śokapramodamādhyasthyaṃ jano yāti sahetukam ||
payovrato na dadhy atti na payo 'tti dadhivrataḥ |
agorasavrato nobhe tasmād tattvaṃ trayātmakam ||

[142] ŚV *Vana* 20cd-23:
bhinneṣu caiṣu sāmānyaṃ suvarṇatvaṃ pratīyate ||
varddhamānakabhaṅgena rucakaḥ kriyate yadā |
tadā pūrvārthinaḥ śokaḥ prītiś cāpy uttarārthinaḥ ||
hemārthinas tu mādhyasthyaṃ tasmād vastu trayātmakam |
notpādasthitibhaṅgānām abhāve syān matitrayam ||
na nāśena vinā śoko notpādena vinā sukham |
sthityā vinā na mādhyasthyaṃ tena sāmānyanityatā ||

the same thing as verse 21 of the *Vanavāda*", while Shiga (2017: 1124-1125) argues that Kumārila likely had Samantabhadra's verses in mind when composing the ŚV *Vana* 21-22ab. I concur with Shiga (2017)'s main argument that Kumārila's verses in the ŚV *Vana* are more logically organised than Samantabhadra's verses in the ĀM, suggesting that the former is based on the latter.[143]

Another tantalising example in the *Ākṛtivāda* that seems to suggest Kumārila's affinity with Samantabhadra's theory in the ĀM comes from the ŚV *Ākṛti* 55cd-56ab. Here, the language Kumārila uses to describe how one thing can have both singularity and multiplicity shares considerable similarity with the framework of Jaina *syādvāda* as expressed by Samantabhadra in the ĀM 14. Compare:

ĀM 14	ŚV *Ākṛti* 55cd-56ab
Due to the application of viewpoints (*naya*), in a certain sense (*kathañ cit*), [something] indeed is accepted as existent; in a certain sense (*kathañ cit*), [something] indeed is non-existent. [In a certain sense, something] is indeed both, [in a certain sense, something] is indeed indescribable. It is not	And thus should be answered [as to how one and the same thing] can be conceptualised as both different and non-different. And, in some way (*kena cit*), it has singularity; in some way (*kena cit*), it has multiplicity.[145]

[143] Specifically, Shiga (2017: 1124) argues that "the correspondence relations among the elements of the three compounds seen in ĀM 59abc (*ghaṭa-mauli-suvarṇa-arthin, vināsā-utpāda-sthiti, śoka-pramoda-mādhyasthya*) are not necessarily apparent, whereas the relations among the elements are clarified in ŚV (*Vanavāda*) 21-22a (*vardhamānaka-bhaṅga-śoka, rucaka-kriyate* [*utpāda*]*-prīti, hema-*[*sthiti*]*-mādhyasthya*). From this fact, we can assume that the contents of ĀM 59abc are paraphrased or expounded in ŚV (*Vanavāda*) 21-22a". Shiga (2017: 1124-1125) also points out that the three emotions mentioned in the ĀM 59d (sorrow, joy, and indifference) are arranged more logically in the ŚV in correspondence with the three states mentioned (destruction, origination, and stability).

[145] ŚV *Ākṛti* 55cd-56ab
evañ ca parihartavyā bhinnābhinnatvakalpanā ||
kena cic cātmanaikatvaṃ nānātvaṃ cāsya kena cit |

in an absolute fashion.[144]	

Given all the textual similarity that we have seen, is it correct to assume that the testimonies from the Buddhists on the relationship between Kumārila's dual nature theory and Jaina (specifically Samantabhadra's) conception of universals are correct, namely that the two theories are the same? There are, of course, more nuances to explore. As is usually the case when considering evidence from commentators in Indian philosophy, some of these testimonies need to be treated with caution. The testimonies that compare Kumārila's and Samantabhadra's theories all come from classical authors who are rivals of both Mīmāṃsā and Jainism. In a polemical context, when an author is trying to attack ideas from other schools, there is usually a tendency to gloss over or collapse the often discernible differences between rival schools, either because it would be easier for the author to attack these ideas when they are re-grouped into labels, or because the author is indifferent to the nuance that differentiates the theories. In other words, while these Buddhist philosophers correctly observe the similarity between Kumārila's and Samantabhadra's writings, they also hide an important truth that not all Jaina philosophers hold the same view on the issue of universals.

5.3.2 Evaluating the Buddhist Testimonies: What do Jaina Philosophers Say about Kumārila?

Contemporary scholars on Jaina studies often complain that the voices of Jaina authors are often neglected both by classical Indian authors and by modern scholars of classical Indian philosophy. Unfortunately, this sentiment accurately reflects the scholarly situation when it comes to exploring the relationship between Kumārila's dual nature theory and similar Jaina theories. While the Buddhist remarks on the affinity between Kumārila's

[144] ĀM 14
kathañ cit te sad eveṣṭaṃ kathañ cid asadeva tat |
tathobhayam avācyaṃ ca nayayogān na sarvathā ||

dual nature theory and the Jaina conception of universals have been analysed in a few studies, there is almost no literature at all that examines how Jaina authors respond to Kumārila's dual nature theory nor how they respond to the Buddhist characterisation that the Jaina theory is identical to Kumārila's theory. One key factor that complicates this issue is the language used by these Brahmanical and Buddhist philosophers. When the similarity between the ŚV and the ĀM is noted by these authors, the authors often go on to claim that the Jaina conception of universals is essentially the same as Kumārila's dual nature theory—as if there exists no internal disagreement among Jaina philosophers on the issue of universals. Their quotations themselves are evidence that they only note an affinity between Kumārila and Samantabhadra, while failing to consider any affinity or disagreement between Kumārila and all other Jaina philosophers.

In what follows, we shall consider writings by two Jaina philosophers from the eleventh century, namely, Prabhācandra (980–1065 CE) and Vādirājasūri (c. 1025 CE). Both philosophers make use of numerous quotations from Kumārila's ŚV, including the *Ākṛtivāda*, and in general, they show a comprehensive knowledge about Kumārila's system. However, the arguments that I will present from Prabhācandra and Vādirājasūri show that they are both critical of Kumārila's dual nature theory and would clearly object to the Buddhist characterisation that the Jaina theory of universals is the same thing as Kumārila's theory of universals.

The first example comes from Prabhācandra's *Prameyakamalamārtaṇḍa* (PKM), which is a commentary on the *Parīkṣāmukha* (PM), a treatise composed by Māṇikyanandin (c. 9th century CE) and which entails a streamlined presentation of Akalaṅka's philosophical system (720–780 CE).[146] In this passage, Prabhācandra rejects Kumārila's conception of universals on the basis that an eternal and all-pervasive universal is not plausible:

[146] For an overview of Akalaṅka's system and his commentators, see Shah (1967), Clavel (2008: 6-29), Balcerowicz (2005), and Balcerowicz (2016b).

Thus, that is said by Kumārila: "Since it is not accepted that the arising of cognitions can be without an object, we need universal that is other than particular. Therefore, it is firm. For, those [cognitions] arising without that [corresponding object] must be illusions, because [they are] without objects. The occurrence of universal here [in our system] is not faulty just [because it is] without another [universal]." That [i.e. Kumārila's theory of universals] has been refuted, because we have already taught that [the theory of] an eternal (*nitya*) and all-pervasive (*sarvagata*) universal which is either completely different from its locus [i.e. the particular] or completely identical with its locus [i.e. the particular] suffers from many fatal flaws, since it is well-established that the cognition of inclusion (*anugata-pratyaya*) is caused by similar transformations (*sadṛśapariṇāma*) [of multiple particulars]. That similar transformation is impermanent (*anitya*), not all-pervasive (*asarvagata*), and has many forms insofar as it constitutes the nature of many different particulars, and is established by means of perception itself just like visual form [is established by perception].[147]

Prabhācandra's theory of universals follows the doctrines of Māṇikyanandin, and are therefore distinctly different from early Jaina theories of universals, such as those of Samantabhadra. According to Prabhācandra, universals are just similar forms that are transformed from particulars. While Prabhācandra no doubt still upholds that universals are

[147] PKM 474,10-19: *tato yad uktaṃ kumārilena—*
viṣayeṇa hi buddhīnāṃ vinā notpattir iṣyate |
viśeṣād anyad icchanti sāmānyaṃ tena tad dhruvam || ŚV *Ākṛti* 37
tā hi tena vinotpannā mithyā syur viṣayād ṛte |
na tv anyena vinā vṛttiḥ sāmānyasyeha duṣyati || ŚV *Ākṛti* 38
iti. tan nirastam. nityasarvagatasāmānyasyāśrayād ekāntato bhinnasyābhinnasya vānekadoṣaduṣṭatvena pratipāditatvāt. anugatapratyayasya ca sadṛśapariṇāmanibandhanatvaprasiddheḥ. sa cānityo 'sarvagato 'nekavyaktyātmakatayānekarūpaś ca rūpādivat pratyakṣata eva prasiddhaḥ.

real existences—unlike the Buddhist philosophers—Prabhācandra's solution to the ontological problem of the relation between universals and particulars diverges significantly from Samantabhadra's strategy. Instead of focusing on utilising the Jaina *anekāntavāda* to explain how universals can be connected to particulars, Prabhācandra chooses to redefine universals as similar transformation of particulars so that he can largely avoid the traditional problem of how an eternal universal, which holds properties that are contradictory with the properties of particulars, can reside in the corresponding particular.

Now let us have a look at a second example of later Jaina thought on universals. This example comes from the *Nyāyaviniścayavivaraṇa* (NVVi) of Vādirājasūri, who wrote an impressively extensive commentary on Akalaṅka's *Nyāyaviniścaya*. In the following passage, Vādirājasūri's strategy for arguing against Kumārila's dual nature theory is to quote two different verses of Kumārila from ŚV *Vana* and ŚV *Ākṛti*, respectively, in order to show that there is inconsistency in Kumārila's own statements:

> Furthermore, if [you say that] this form of inclusion, being somehow established, is not distinct from particulars, [and] particulars [themselves] would have inclusion, because of such a form of non-distinction, [we answer:] this is not so [i.e. particulars should not have inclusion], because there is no understanding that hornless cows and etc (*muṇḍādi*) are the same with cows with half-grown horns (*khaṇḍādi*), and because of the mistake of a mixture of entity. If [you say] that [particulars and universals] are not absolutely distinct [from each other] because they also have [some] distinction, [we answer that] no, [it is not the case], because there would be undesired consequence of [one entity become] a composite as having both intrinsic natures [of universals and particulars]. And this not [what your own verse] said: "The absence of [universals] being

omnipresent and having parts are proved to be just like sound." Because there is a contradiction with [the verse]. If [you say] that [universals] are distinct [from particulars], [we say] that is not the case, [because in another verse of yours, you have said:] "And, in regard to all things, cognition arises in the form of both exclusion and inclusion. Without the things having a dual nature, that [cognition with a dual nature] also cannot be logical." Because there is a problem with [that verse], since it is already stated [by you] that universals are not distinct from particulars.[148]

Vādirājasūri first rejects the view that universals can have identity with particulars, before moving on to refute Kumārila's dual nature theory. Unlike the traditional Buddhist arguments against Kumārila's dual nature theory, which usually consist in the contention that one and the same thing cannot possibly have two contradictory properties, Vādirājasūri argues that Kumārila's dual nature theory is contradictory with Kumārila's own statement that universals do not have parts. Vādirājasūri notes that, if that is the case, universals cannot be part of a dual-natured composite, despite Kumārila's other statements to the contrary. Finally, Vādirājasūri quotes Kumārila's verse from the *Ākṛtivāda* to contend that it is also logical for Mīmāṃsakas to say that there is a distinction between universals and particulars, since Kumārila already states that entities have a dual nature.

I use these two examples to demonstrate that the Jaina conception of universals is not homogeneous. At least some Jaina philosophers were acutely conscious of Kumārila's dual

[148] NVVi II.46,18-25*: kiñ ca, ayam anugamarūpatayā kutaś cit sidhyan viśeṣād avyatiriktaś cet, viśeṣasyaivānugamaḥ syāt avyatirekasyaivaṃrūpatvāt. na caivam, khaṇḍādir eva muṇḍādir ity apratipatteḥ, vastusāṅkaryadoṣāc ca. naikāntenāvyatirekaḥ vyatirekasyāpi bhāvād iti cet, na, ubhayasvabhāvatayā sāvayavatvāpatteḥ. na cedam ucitam—*
vibhutvāvayavābhāvau pratipādyau ca śabdavat (ŚV *Vana* 31cd)
ityasya virodhāt. vyatiriktaś cet, na.
sarvavastuṣu buddhiś ca vyāvṛttyanugamātmikā |
jāyate dvyātmakatvena vinā sāpi na yuktimat || (ŚV *Ākṛti* 5)
ityasya vyāpatteḥ, anenāvyatirekasya pratipādanāt.

nature theory and wished to keep a clear distance from it, as is reflected in their writings that contain detailed refutation of the theory. The writings of Prabhācandra and Vādirājasūri suggest that the Buddhist authors largely conflate the Jaina conception of universals with Kumārila's dual nature theory by oversimplifying both accounts. However, the oversimplification of Kumārila's dual nature theory by the Buddhist authors does not stop here. The Buddhist philosophers also fail to appreciate that Kumārila provides sufficient epistemological arguments for the dual nature theory, alongside his ontological arguments that share similarity with Jaina theories. We will explore this aspect of dual nature theory in the next section.

5.4 Kumārila's Epistemological Arguments for the Dual Nature Theory

When Samantabhadra presents his conception of universals, he does so with the backing of a sophisticated Jaina ontology. Samantabhadra is able to show that the reason why universals and particulars are not absolutely different from each other is because each perspective from which we view reality only reveals a partial truth. Universals and particulars, therefore, are not two categorically distinct entities; rather, they are simply two partial aspects of reality. Although Kumārila models his key ontological defence of the dual nature theory after the Jaina conception of *anekāntavāda*, it is rather clear that Kumārila would not go as far as to accept most of the Jaina ontological theories into his Mīmāṃsā system. Since Kumārila comes to a similar conclusion as Samantabhadra but without accepting the latter's reasoning, the question remains as to how Kumārila justifies using a perspectivist attitude to argue that all objects in the world have a dual nature.

As I will argue in this section, Kumārila's core argument for why we should accept his dual nature theory lies beyond his ontological reasonings; instead, Kumārila provides a robust framework of epistemological arguments in the *Ākṛtivāda* in order to back the dual

nature theory. That is to say, Kumārila does not rely on analysing the ontology of universals and particulars to convince his readers how one and the same thing can have both of these aspects; rather, he argues that entities have a dual nature because our perceptual cognition informs us that reality is so. To Kumārila, our empirical experience should triumph over any metaphysical reservation about how universals and particulars are different entities. If our valid perceptual cognitions reveal to us that one thing can have both a universal aspect and a particular aspect, that must be because things really are so.

Kumārila's epistemological arguments for the dual nature theory share essentially the same structure of reasoning that we have seen him utilise when arguing for the very existence of universals in Chapter 4. This is clear in the reconstruction of his main argument for why we should accept the dual nature theory that I now present:

Thesis: Every entity has both universal and particular aspects in its nature.

(a) Our cognitions always present objects as both distinct from other objects and common with certain other objects. For instance, when we see a cow, we perceive it as a distinct individual cow that is different from cows, horses, and etc.; at the same time, we perceive it as having common features with other cows.

(b) The reason that we are able to perceive objects as having both universal and particular aspects is because objects themselves have a dual nature. That is to say, our cognitions are always in correspondence with the objects.

(c) We should take the validity of these cognitions at face value. Since our cognition of objects constantly presents to us that objects have dual nature, and since such cognitions are never found to be overturned by subsequent cognitions, these cognitions should be taken as valid.

Conclusion: things in the world have a dual nature that is both universal and particular.

Similar to what has been discussed in Chapter 4, Kumārila more or less takes proof (a) as an evident point that is agreed upon by everyone, since we all have such perceptual experiences.[149] Proof (b), on the other hand, plays an important role here. The reason why we are able to perceive an object as both distinct from and common to other objects, in Kumārila's view, is that the object itself must have both particular and universal in its nature. Indeed, this is how Kumārila formulates his main argument for the dual nature theory:

> And, about all things cognition arises in the form of both exclusion and inclusion. Without the things having a dual nature, that [cognition with a dual nature] cannot be established.[150]

One of Kumārila's main arguments for the existence of universals shares the exact same logic as illustrated here: since each of our cognitions should have an external object as its support, that a cognition that has a dual nature can arise must be due to the fact that the object itself has a dual nature. In a similar vein, Kumārila argues:

> Also, because [in your doctrines] the two primary forms [of particular and universal] are never observed, [we say] there cannot be a conception of [one of

[149] What is worth noting is that in the *Pratyakṣapariccheda* 118, Kumārila states that the dual nature of the object already exists in the non-conceptualised stage of perception: *nirvikalpakabodhe 'pi dvyātmakasyāpi vastunaḥ | grahaṇaṃ lakṣaṇākhyeyaṃ jñātrā śuddhaṃ tu gṛhyate* || "Even in a cognition that is non-conceptualised, there is a grasping of a thing that has a dual nature, which is to be known indirectly. However, by the cogniser, [the thing] is grasped as pure."

[150] ŚV *Ākṛti* 5:
sarvavastuṣu buddhiś ca vyāvṛttyanugamātmikā |
jāyate dvyātmakatvena vinā sā ca na sidhyati ||

them] being secondary; it has already been proved that cognitions have external things as their objects.[151]

These verses constitute proof (b), which, as I see it, is just another application of Kumārila's well-known epistemological realist stance: if objects did not have a dual nature, we would not be able to perceive them as both distinct and common. Following this understanding, the dual-natured cognitions that we have are the very proof for objects having dual nature in reality. However, is it possible that this dual-natured cognition, which we rely upon to ascertain the dual nature of an object, is itself subject to doubt? In other words, how do we ascertain the validity of this dual-natured cognition? In the *Ākṛtivāda* 7, Kumārila applies the conclusion from his theory of intrinsic validity to argue that we should accept the validity of our dual-natured cognition at face value. This functions as the final proof (c):

Neither of the two [aspects of the dual-natured cognition] can be accepted as a mistake by taking it as figurative, because the cognition [of either aspect] is constantly firm, [so] the mistake is of those who asserts that [the dual-natured] cognition is a mistake.[152]

The key term used in this verse—a cognition that is firm (*dṛḍha*)—is a pivotal concept that Kumārila employs when explicating his understanding of intrinsic validity. As Kumārila summarises his theory of intrinsic validity in the *Codanāsūtra* 80:

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[151] ŚV *Ākṛti* 8:
mukhyayoś cāpy adṛṣṭatvān nopacāreṇa kalpanā |
bāhyārthaviṣayatvaṃ ca buddhīnāṃ pratipāditam ||
[152] ŚV *Ākṛti* 7:
na cāpy anyatarā bhrāntir upacāreṇa ceṣyate |
dṛḍhatvāt sarvadā buddher bhrāntis tadbhrāntivādinām ||

> Therefore, that [cognition], which is firm, has arisen, and does not contradict another [later] cognition, should be regarded as valid.[153]

By resorting to the theory of intrinsic validity, what Kumārila aims to argue here is that while the notion of a dual-natured cognition may strike one as counter-intuitive at first glance, we should resist the temptation to characterise the dual-natured cognition as false, because there is no epistemic ground to justify any doubt about the dual-natured cognition when such cognition never gets invalidated. In other words, since the validity of the dual-natured cognition is intrinsic, the content of that cognition, i.e., that a thing has both universal and particular aspects in its nature, should be recognised as true.

As I have shown, Kumārila presents two kinds of arguments for the dual nature theory: one is ontological and the other one is epistemological. The ontological argument aims to dispel the notion that his dual nature theory leads to ontological contradiction. Its goal is to offer a relativist explanation of how universal and particular aspects both can exist in the nature of one object. The epistemological argument, on the other hand, is designed to explain why we should accept that things, in reality, have a dual nature. The framework employed by Kumārila in his epistemological arguments is essentially the same as the one he articulates to prove the existence of universals.

5.5 Conclusion

In this chapter, I have examined different aspects of Kumārila's dual nature theory—one of the most distinctive features of his theory of universals in the *Ākṛtivāda*. I have started with providing the philosophical context of the dual nature theory: a rejection of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika ontological notion of inherence and a hermeneutic concern with

[153] ŚV *Codanāsūtra* 80:
tasmād dṛḍhaṃ yad utpannaṃ na visaṃvādam ṛcchati |
jñānāntareṇa vijñānaṃ tat pramāṇaṃ pratīyatām ||

explaining how ritual actions can be enjoined are both possible motivations for Kumārila's characterisation of universals as both different from and identical to particulars. After reviewing how Kumārila presents his ontological arguments for the dual nature theory, I have proceeded to analyse the claim that Kumārila's ontological conception of universals shares considerable affinity with Jaina conceptions of universals, specifically those of Samantabhadra. This claim has been made by both classical Indian commentators and modern scholars. Analysing the textual similarity between Kumārila's text in the *Ākṛtivāda* and *Vanavāda*, I maintain that there is a reasonable ground to suggest that Kumārila's dual nature theory was influenced by Samantabhadra's conception of universals, despite the fact that Kumārila never reveals the source of his inspiration.

There are, however, two important caveats to make with respect to this claim. First of all, it is not appropriate to read the Buddhist testimony regarding the relationship between Kumārila's dual nature theory and the Jaina theory of universals uncritically. As shown, the Buddhist philosophers unreasonably interpret the similarity between Kumārila and Samantabhadra as implying similarity between Kumārila and all Jaina philosophers. As it stands, the Jaina conception of universals is not a monolithic entity. My presentation of Prabhācandra's and Vādirājasūri's critiques of Kumārila's theory of universals shows that Jaina authors have misgivings about the Buddhist characterisation that Kumārila's dual nature theory and the Jaina theory of universals are effectively the same. Secondly, despite the superficial similarity, Kumārila's dual nature theory is based on a completely different theoretical foundation than Samantabhadra's theory of universals is. While Samantabhadra's conception of universals is saturated in his complex Jaina ontological framework, Kumārila focuses on building an epistemological case to prove that entities indeed have a dual nature. Kumārila utilises the same epistemological theories that he employs in his arguments for the existence of universals to contend that our perceptual experience is the ultimate proof that the

dual nature theory is valid. In this way, Kumārila's theory of perception, his epistemological realism, and his theory of intrinsic validity play a vital role one more—this time in his dual nature theory.

While the Buddhist opponents seem to have largely missed the underlying epistemological nature of Kumārila's dual nature theory, there are other Indian philosophers who accurately capture Kumārila's epistemological arguments for the dual nature theory while still being critical of Kumārila's theory. In the next chapter, we will see how Maṇḍanamiśra, a prominent Advaita Vedāntin philosopher, refutes the dual nature theory in such a way.

Chapter 6 Maṇḍanamiśra's Critique of Kumārila's Theory of Universals

6.1 Introduction: What Makes Maṇḍanamiśra's Critique Special?

Kumārila's theory of universals, especially his dual nature theory, has received various criticisms throughout the history of classical Indian philosophy.[154] Among the classical critiques, the refutation offered by Maṇḍanamiśra (c. 660-720), the famous Advaita Vedāntin, is a particularly interesting case.[155] There are a few factors that make Maṇḍana's critique of Kumārila stand out. First of all, Maṇḍana's critique of Kumārila's dual nature theory in the *Brahmasiddhi* is one of the most systematic and sophisticated critiques. In the BSi II.17-21, Maṇḍana presents Kumārila's theory in great detail before offering numerous refutations of the theory from different theoretical angles.[156] The depth to which Maṇḍana engages with Kumārila's dual nature theory is unmatched by the later opponents of the theory. Secondly, it is worth noting that Maṇḍana's prose presentation of Kumārila's work is one of the earliest interpretations of Kumārila's dual nature theory—certainly earlier than most of, if not all of, Kumārila's classical commentators on the *Ākṛtivāda*. In addition, Maṇḍana's own background as a classical Indian philosopher who had substantial knowledge about both Mīmāṃsā and Vedānta systems adds significance to his treatment of Kumārila's

[154] Noteworthy examples include ones in Kamalaśīla's *Tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā* vv. 1744-1749 (602-603), Śālikanātha's *Prakaraṇapañcikā* Jātinirṇaya (71.6-73.2 and 93.7-94.3), and Śrīdhara's *Nyāyakandalī* (748.14-752.6).

[155] For the date of Maṇḍana, see Schmithausen (1965), Biardeau (1967), Thrasher (1993), and David (2013). Maṇḍana's date is established by his knowledge of Kumārila, Prabhākara, and Dharmakīrti on the one hand, and Umbeka's (730-790)'s knowledge of Maṇḍana on the other hand.

[156] Acharya (2006: xxxiii-xxxv) argues that Maṇḍana originally divided the BSi into three chapters, which is supported by the earliest commentary on the BSi by Vācaspatimiśra, as well as internal evidence within the BSi. On the other hand, all later commentators on the BSi, namely, Citsukha, Ānandapūrṇa, and Śaṅkhapāṇi, divided the BSi in four chapters. In general, I find the arguments for the BSi originally having only three chapters quite convincing. However, in this thesis, I will still use the fourfold division and the corresponding verse numbers that appear in Sastri (1937) just for the sake of reference convenience. Therefore, BSi II.17-II.20 here refers to the second chapter of BSi, i.e., Tarkakāṇḍa verse 17 to verse 20.

theory of universals.[157] As argued by Thrasher (1993: 129-133), Maṇḍana's two important Mīmāṃsā works, the *Bhāvanāviveka* and the *Vidhiviveka*, were written before he composed the BSi, suggesting that Maṇḍana studied Kumārila, as well as broader Mīmāṃsā topics, extensively in his early career. Maṇḍana also engages with Kumārila frequently in the BSi—with fifteen quotations of the ŚV and one quotation of the *Tantravārttika*. In my view, these factors suggest that we should take Maṇḍana's understanding of Kumārila in a serious manner.

Despite the philological and philosophical significance of Maṇḍana's criticism of the dual nature theory, Maṇḍana's critique of the theory has not been studied in great detail and our current scholarly understanding of Maṇḍana's refutations is far from satisfactory. To this date, the most comprehensive study on the issue remains Nicholson (2001, 2002). One of Nicholson's (2002: 577) main remarks on the quality of Maṇḍana's refutations of Kumārila's dual nature theory is that "Maṇḍana's characterisation of his opponents' positions, particularly those of the Vaiśeṣikas and Bhāṭṭas, is so simplistic as to make his arguments totally unconvincing". However, there are evident shortcomings in the research that supports that claim. Nicholson (2002) seems to only have examined Maṇḍana's final argument against dual nature theory, in the BSi II.21 (66.10-67.5), while ignoring the fact that Maṇḍana presents three other arguments against dual nature theory in BSi II.17-20. These additional three arguments by Maṇḍana are important to study because they have a quite different philosophical complexion compared to his concluding argument in the BSi II.21.

This chapter offers an alternative interpretation of Maṇḍana's refutation of Kumārila's dual nature theory and in doing so challenges the conclusions of Nicholson (2002). I argue that Nicholson's verdict on the quality of Maṇḍana's refutations does not apply to Maṇḍana's arguments against dual nature theory in BSi II.17-20. As I have argued in Chapter 5,

[157] The articles in Bronkhorst (2007), as well as Saito (2020), provide good examples of how Maṇḍana's detailed knowledge of Mīmāṃsā is sometimes instrumental in building up his Advaita Vedānta arguments.

Kumārila offers significant epistemological arguments for his dual nature theory, in addition to his ontological arguments, and these epistemological arguments share a fundamentally similar structure with Kumārila's arguments for the existence of universals and require the same theoretical support from Kumārila's arguments in other chapters of the ŚV as those arguments for the existence of universals. Specifically, Kumārila's epistemological realist stance and his theory of intrinsic validity continue to serve as the theoretical backdrop for Kumārila's arguments for his dual nature theory. In the BSi II.17-20, Maṇḍana's refutations of Kumārila's dual nature theory exhibit a strong epistemological orientation that is evocative of Kumārila's epistemological arguments in the ŚV. Even though there is no direct reference to those arguments in the BSi, Maṇḍana's discourse indicates that he may well have had Kumārila's theory of intrinsic validity and understanding of perception in mind when formulating his response to Kumārila's dual nature theory. On the surface, Maṇḍana only focuses on refuting Kumārila's dual nature theory in a simple way, but Maṇḍana, in fact, accurately captures the epistemological core of Kumārila's arguments. That is to say, while Maṇḍana's rejection of Kumārila's ontology indeed consists of his deliberate refusal to accept the nuances of *what* Kumārila dual nature theory is, Maṇḍana accurately records Kumārila's epistemological arguments for *why* the dual nature theory is true. This chapter argues that, overall, Maṇḍana's critique of Kumārila's dual nature theory indicates genuine engagement with Kumārila's original arguments in the ŚV. Therefore, Maṇḍana's critique should not be regarded as an oversimplification of Kumārila's theory.

In what follows, I first present the context of Maṇḍana's critique of Kumārila in the BSi. Next, I give a close examination of Maṇḍana's arguments in the BSi II.17-20 in order to demonstrate that Maṇḍana presents the core of Kumārila's dual nature theory rather accurately and gives a robust refutation of the theory based on that accurate presentation. Finally, I will discuss the significance of studying Maṇḍana's critique of Kumārila.

6.2 Maṇḍanamiśra's Position on Universals in the *Brahmasiddhi*

Before we dive into the details of Maṇḍana's arguments, it is important to contextualise Maṇḍana's refutation of Kumārila's dual nature theory in the BSi. In particular, it is helpful to first understand what is at stake for Maṇḍana in composing his critique of Kumārila's dual nature theory. Maṇḍana's discussion on the nature of universals appears in the Tarkakāṇḍa section of his BSi, in which he launches an extensive investigation into the nature of perception. One of the most distinctive features of Maṇḍana's Advaita Vedānta system lies in his detailed analysis of perception that works to demonstrate the non-duality of reality. According to Maṇḍana, only non-difference (*abheda*) is given in a perceptual cognition, and difference (*bheda*) is merely a mental construction that does not ultimately exist. Eventually, Maṇḍana aims to show that perception is an inferior means of knowledge compared to scriptural authority, and also show that the ultimate, non-dual reality, i.e. Brahman, is already present in our daily perception. Our perception of the diversity in the world, therefore, is nothing but an illusion that is superimposed by the beginningless ignorance (*avidyā*).

From BSi II.12 onwards, after numerous arguments on how it is not possible for difference to be the nature of entities, Maṇḍana moves on to investigate what the objects of our perceptual cognitions are. In the following passage, Maṇḍana demarcates different schools of thought on this issue into four main groups:

> Furthermore, in the case of these two [kinds of] cognitions [i.e. cognitions grasping particulars and cognitions grasping universals], there are four theories. [The first theory is that] there are two real entities by division of universals and individuals due to the difference of cognitions, so say the proponents of conjunction. Or, [the second theory is that] the real entity is singular and has the

nature of [both] universals and particulars, so say the proponent of non-absolutism. Or, [the third theory is that] the real entities are just particulars. Since they are not able to ascertain the absolute difference, non-difference, which is in the domain of imaginative cognitions, is just the object of that [cognition] and the material cause of [that cognition]. For example, there is a conceptualisation of non-difference as forest in the difference [of individual trees]—so say the proponent of absolute difference. Or, [the fourth view is that] non-difference is the ultimately real object. As it [i.e. non-difference] is unlimited and infinite, it does not have the capacity to be ascertained, [and] due to the beginningless ignorance, there are conceptions of difference as the object of that [cognition] and the material cause of that [cognition]. For example, due to the difference of waves, there is a conceptualisation of a difference in the same moon.[158]

In this fourfold scheme, Maṇḍana enumerates four alternative stances regarding on the nature of reality and the ontology of universals and particulars: (a) universals and particulars are two real types of entities, (b) entities exist that consist of both universals and particulars, (c) only particulars are real, while universals are mental constructs, and (d) only universals are real, while particulars (i.e. difference) are mental constructs. According to Maṇḍana, Kumārila's dual nature theory belongs to group (b) that holds that perception is able to grasp a single object that has both universal and particular aspects. Maṇḍana's own position belongs to group (d) that holds that the objects of perception are universals only.

[158] BSi (60,10-17): *api ca jñānadvaye 'smiṃś catasraḥ kalpanāḥ saṃbhavanti—jñānabhedāt sāmānyavyaktivibhāgena vastudvayam, yathāhuḥ saṃsargavādinaḥ. ekaṃ vā sāmānyaviśeṣātmakaṃ vastu, yathāhur anekāntavādinaḥ. viśeṣā eva vā vastūni. teṣām ātyantikabhedaniścayāsāmarthyāt tadupādānas tadviṣaya evābhedaḥ kalpanājñānagocaraḥ. dṛṣṭā hi bhinneṣv abhedakalpanā vanam iti—yathāhur ātyantikabhedavādinaḥ. abhedo vā paramārthaḥ. tasyānavacchinnasyānantasya tathā niścetum aśakter, anāditvāc cāvidyāyās tadupādānās tadviṣayā bhedaparikalpanāḥ. dṛṣṭā hi taraṅgabhedād abhinne candramasi bhedakalpanā*.

Nicholson (2002: 577) is right in observing that Maṇḍana's demarcation of different schools in the above passage "effectively conceals the considerable influence of the Buddhist school of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti on Maṇḍana's thinking". By portraying the Buddhists as proponent of absolute difference (group c) and the Advaita Vedānta as the proponent of absolute non-difference (group d), Maṇḍana makes special efforts to distance his Advaita Vedānta stance from the Buddhist one by putting the two schools at the two ends of the spectrum, despite the fact that Maṇḍana's theory of perception is almost a mirrored product of the theory of perception advocated by Dignāga and Dharmakīrti.

6.3 Maṇḍana's Critique of Kumārila in the *Brahmasiddhi*

As mentioned in the introduction of this chapter, the primary conclusion of Nicholson (2002) in terms of Maṇḍana's refutation of Kumārila's dual nature theory is that Maṇḍana trivialises Kumārila's theory. Nicholson (2002: 581) writes: "Maṇḍana's argument against the Bhāṭṭa position reduced the Bhāṭṭas's subtle 'difference-and-identity' (*bhedābheda*) relation between universal and particular to the view that only particulars are real (*bhedavāda*)." Nicholson (2002: 581-582) then summarises Maṇḍana's argument: "The argument is rather straightforward. The thing or individual is a composite of universal and particular aspects. If the universal aspect is defined as that which is common to (*anugama*) other individuals, while, conversely, the particular aspect as that which is not common, then what are we to make of the composite entity, the thing itself?...That which is common to other individuals, namely, the universal aspect minus the particularising aspect, does not possess the character of 'thinghood' (*vastutva*), and so is thus merely a mental construct. Thus, that which is common to many…is not the real thing (*vastu*), and the real thing is not the universal…The *vastu* is the *viśeṣa*, and the Bhāṭṭa theory of the composite *vastu* is merely another name for the doctrine of difference." According to Nicholson's footnote, his summary of Maṇḍana's

argument against Kumārila is mainly extrapolated from the commentary under BSi II.21, although in that footnote Nicholson only quotes a couple of scattered sentences. Let us have a look at the full passage from the BSi that Nicholson's summary seems to correspond to:

> For, the nature of entity is neither universal nor difference [i.e. particular], but is just mixed (*citra*). Because of the non-succession of that [entity], this, in other words, is just the doctrine of difference. (BSi II.21)
>
> For one who [holds] that the thing, while being one, has both nature [of universal and particular], universal alone is not the nature of that thing, nor is particular alone, because there would be undesired consequence of having [splitting] difference in the thing if it has only [one of the two] as its nature. Therefore the nature of thing is mixed that has the form of both being blended. There is no continuation of this mixed thing over another [thing], and [if] there is continuation of that, it cannot be the [true] form of the thing. And thus, resorting to a different way of wording, it is propounded that differences alone are real; Or, due to a [certain] reason (*hetu*) that is [a need of] different wording, [it is propounded that] a single thing has dual nature. For, since what continues has the nature of non-entity, it is the object of conceptualisation.[159]

If this were the sole refutation that Maṇḍana gives against Kumārila, then Nicholson's over-arching characterisation of Maṇḍana's critique of the dual nature theory would not be inaccurate. It would be correct to say that Maṇḍana's argument essentially "impose[s] upon

[159] *sāmānyaṃ na hi vastvātmā na bhedaś citra eva saḥ |*
tasyānanvayato bhedavādaḥ śabdāntarād ayam || BSi II.21
BSi II. 21 (66,12-17): *yasyaikam ubhayātmakaṃ vastu na tasya sāmānyamātraṃ vastuna ātmā na viśeṣamātram. tanmātratve vastubhedaprasaṅgāt. tasmāt saṃbhinnobhayarūpaḥ śabalo vastvātmā. na ca śabalasyānyatrānugamaḥ. yasya tv anugamaḥ sa vasturūpaṃ na bhavati. tathā ca śabdāntaram avalambya bhedā eva satyā ity etat pratipādyate, śabdāntareṇa vā hetunā dvyātmakam ekam iti, anugantur avastusvabhāvatve kalpanāviṣayatvāt.*

the Bhāṭṭa position a false choice: either the *vastu* is the universal or it is the particular" (Nicholson 2002: 582). From reading Nicholson's analysis, it is easy to have impression that this is the main, if not the only, argument that Maṇḍana has in stock to argue against Kumārila's dual nature theory. However, as I will show in the rest of this section, Maṇḍana devises three other, more sophisticated arguments in the verses that precede the BSi II.21. For some reason, the arguments in the BSi II.17-20 have largely escaped scholarly attention, but I will argue that these arguments hold important evidence that Maṇḍana has a refined understanding of the details of Kumārila's dual nature theory and that Maṇḍana rather accurately and faithfully presents these details in the BSi.

As I will show in this section, these three other refutations have a strong epistemological orientation and suggest Maṇḍana's awareness of Kumārila's epistemological arguments for the dual nature theory.[160] In the first set of arguments (BSi II.17), Maṇḍana argues that a dual-natured cognition, which according to Kumārila is a valid cognition, cannot in fact be epistemically distinguished from a doubtful cognition. In the second set of arguments (BSi II.18-19), Maṇḍana establishes a binary demarcation between the definition of universal and the definition of particular, before questioning whether Kumārila's alleged dual-natured cognition can indeed conform to an object that has a dual nature. In the third set of arguments (BSi II.20), Maṇḍana argues that a valid cognition would be prevented from performing its basic function of acquiring new knowledge if one were to accept Kumārila's dual nature theory. Let us examine these arguments sequentially.

6.3.1 The Arguments in the BSi II.17

[160] One of the difficulties at hand when understanding Maṇḍana's refutations of Kumārila lies in the fact that Maṇḍana never directly quotes Kumārila in the relevant section. Maṇḍana also tends to use his own language to paraphrase Kumārila's arguments instead of using Kumārila's terminology itself. This adds another layer of difficulty to the process of connecting Maṇḍana's refutation to corresponding statements made by Kumārila. I find the commentaries on the BSi not particularly helpful in this regard, since the commentators also refuse to make clear statements about the provenance of the opponent's arguments.

In the BSi II.12-17, Maṇḍana refutes the Vaiśeṣika contention that universals and particulars are two types of entities (*dve vastunī*) that are connected through inherence (*samavāya*). Then, he begins to discuss the opinion that the nature of single objects is both universal and particular. Maṇḍana lets the opponent describe the position first:

> [Objection:] Then let this be the case: one [thing] has two natures, for, in such a way, the perception of mutual nature of universal and particular is possible, and a superior capacity of the object, which is contrary to things, should not be conceptualised. Ordinary usage has things as its cause; there is no function of practical knowledge that is not in conformity with the object.[161]

Here, Maṇḍana rather accurately presents one of the key arguments of Kumārila.[162] Then, he proceeds to discuss the metaphysical incongruence of one thing having both universal and particular natures:

> [Answer:] Let this be: one single thing having two natures is contradictory. It is one thing and has two natures; [these two facts] are opposed [to each other]. Moreover, a universal is that which continues in other differences [i.e. differences that are other than itself], and difference is that which has the intrinsic nature of

[161] BSi II.17 (63: 4-6): *astu tarhy ekaṃ dvyātmakam, evaṃ hi parasparātmapratipattiś ca sāmānyaviśeṣayoḥ kalpate, vastuviparītaś ca nārthasāmarthyātiśayaḥ kalpayitavyaḥ. vastunibandhano vyavahāraḥ, na vyāvahārikajñānānām ayathārthā vṛttiḥ.*

[162] It should be noted here that it is interesting that Maṇḍana allows the opponent to say that the dual nature theory is better than the Vaiśeṣika theory that universals and particulars are two distinct entities. This statement reflects Maṇḍana's underlying philosophical hierarchy in which the Vaiśeṣika notions of universal and particular occupy a less favourable position than those of Kumārila. However, what is particularly noteworthy here is that Maṇḍana allows the opponent to faithfully present one of the most fundamental arguments for the dual nature theory, i.e. that we should accept that one thing has both universal and particular in its nature because we perceive that to be so and because our cognitions of objects have external support.

being excluded. Hence, the unity of these two cannot be brought about due to the contradiction.[163]

While Maṇḍana seems to want to lead the debates in a more metaphysical direction, the opponent, surprisingly, is allowed again to continue pursuing an epistemological direction in what can be regarded as an elaboration of his first statement. The opponent states:

> [Objection:] This is not the point. Where do we have the notion that that which stands contrary to the valid means of knowledge is contradictory? But, for that which is known according to the valid means of knowledge, if that thing, still being such, is designated as contradictory, based on what cause would this person decide on contradiction and non-contradiction? And [in this case], valid means of knowledge makes it understood that one thing has both universal and particular as its nature, because there is the difference of perceived forms through exclusion and inclusion, and because there is understanding of them referring to one and the same thing.[164]

The opponent suggests that one must rely on a valid means of knowledge to decide what is contradictory and what is not. Therefore, if our cognition of one thing having two seemingly contradictory natures is acquired through a valid means of knowledge—in this case, a valid perception—then this can only mean that the apparent contradiction between the two natures is, in fact, not a real contradiction. In our cognition of a single object, we can

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[163] BSi II.17 (63: 7-9): *syād etat—ekasya dvyātmakatā virodhavatī. ekaṃ ca dvyātmakaṃ ceti vipratiṣiddham. api ca sāmānyaṃ bhedāntarānuyāyi. tato vyāvṛttasvabhāvo bhedaḥ. tayor ekatvaṃ hi virodhād aśakyāvaham.*
[164] BSi II.17 (63: 9-13): *naitat sāram. viruddham iti naḥ kva saṃpratyayaḥ, yat pramāṇaviparyayeṇa vartate. yat tu yathā pramāṇenāvagamyate, tasya tathābhāve viruddhatvābhidhāne, kaṃ batāyam āśritya hetuṃ viruddhatvāviruddhatve vyavasthāpayet. pramāṇaṃ caikasya sāmānyaviśeṣātmakatām avagamayati, vyāvṛttyanuvṛttibhyāṃ prakhyārūpabhedāt aikādhikaraṇyāvagamāc ca.*

perceive that the object is both different from other objects (exclusion) and is simultaneously common to things that are similar to itself (inclusion). Our cognition also informs us that this single object is the locus of both exclusion and inclusion. The opponent argues that all of these observations are pieces of evidence obtained by a valid means of knowledge, and therefore, that we should trust them. In other words, what we acquire through a valid means of knowledge should triumph over any abstract speculations; if we perceive entities that can hold two seemingly opposite natures together in one locus, then we should not doubt that our world is not so. If we do profess this doubt, the opponent claims that, because our notions of contradiction have to be derived from valid means of knowledge as well, we will never be able to tell what is contradictory and what is non-contradictory.

It is rather clear that the argument put forward by the opponent here is what Maṇḍana understands as the core of Kumārila's dual nature theory. Even though Maṇḍana does not use Kumārila's terminology, this is still a fairly faithful representation of Kumārila's epistemological argument for the dual nature theory. At this point, Maṇḍana decides to take up the challenge posed by the opponent's argument. Maṇḍana's rejection of the opponent's proposal comes as follows:

> [Answer:] This is inappropriate, because such kinds of cognitions whose objects oppose each other (*vipratiṣiddhārthajñānānāṃ*) are not appropriate to have validity (*prāmāṇyam*), just like a doubtful cognition. Otherwise, the object of the doubt would also have a dual nature [and you would accept that the dual nature of the doubt is valid], because it has a dual appearance and because there is co-referentiality of those two appearances [e.g. of a post and a person, which refer to the same doubtful cognition].[165]

[165] BSi II.17 (63: 13-16): *tad idam asāṃpratam, yato nedṛśāṃ vipratiṣiddhārthajñānānāṃ prāmāṇyam eva yujyate saṃśayajñānavat. anyathā saṃśayaviṣayo 'pi dvyātmā syāt, dvyābhāsatvāt tasya, sāmānādhikaraṇyāc ca tadavabhāsayoḥ.*

Here, Maṇḍana introduces the concept of a doubtful cognition. A doubtful cognition, Maṇḍana argues, also consists of two objects, like the dual-natured cognition proposed by Kumārila. In the stock example of a doubtful cognition of mistaking a post as a person, there are two appearances arising in a single cognition, i.e. the appearance of a post and the appearance of a person. In a veridical scenario, i.e. when we perceive the post correctly, there should be a single appearance in a single cognition. In the case of a doubtful cognition, however, a single cognition contains two contradictory forms, resulting in a cognitive mistake. Maṇḍana identifies the two primary features of a doubtful cognition as containing two appearances that are contradictory to each other and containing an apparent co-referentiality of the two appearances. Following this definition, one cannot actually distinguish the dual-natured cognition proposed by the opponent from a doubtful cognition, insofar as both cases are characterised by the same two features. Therefore, according to Maṇḍana, a dual-natured cognition is, therefore, nothing more than a cognitive error. Now, Maṇḍana allows the opponent to offer a quick rebuttal:

> If [the objection] has this idea: in the case of the contents of the doubt, there is no understanding that the [two] forms are joined together like in the case of [a cognition] having [both] universal and particular, because [in case of doubt] there is the notion "it is this or it is that", [our answer is:] let there not be joining together [but] an alternative.
>
> [Objection:] That is not [right] either, because it is impossible for real things to have an alternative.
>
> [Answer:] Then, a single thing cannot have two natures, because of the contradiction for a single thing to have two natures. Just as a doubtful cognition

there is not a valid means of knowledge because of the opposition [of the contents to each other], in the same way, the perception of universal and particular [in one and the same thing] is also [not valid], because they refer to the one and the same thing.[166]

The opponent here attempts to make a clarification by resorting to the concept of "joining together" (*samuccaya*). This notion of "joining together" seems a bit philosophically messy and does not actually appear in Kumārila's writings—this seems to be Maṇḍana's own interpretation of Kumārila's dual nature theory. The basic idea of the opponent is that the feature of "joining together" is what distinguishes a dual-natured cognition, which is an epistemologically valid cognition, from a doubtful cognition, which is an error. The opponent suggests that in the case of a dual-natured cognition, the two appearances that are manifest in our cognition are more closely fused together than the two appearances that are manifest in a doubtful cognition. However, in his subsequent response, Maṇḍana simply dismisses the explanation offered by the opponent and restates his previous verdict that a dual-natured cognition is the same thing as a doubtful cognition.

In the previous passages, Maṇḍana defines a doubtful cognition as a cognition that has two contradictory appearances as its content. Maṇḍana now moves on to offer an alternative definition of a doubtful cognition, with the aim to show that a dual-natured cognition is still as invalid as a doubtful cognition under the alternative definition:

Let it be this way: a doubtful cognition is not a valid means of knowledge not because of the opposition [of the contents to each other], but because of its being

[166] BSi II.17 (63: 17-21): *atha matam—na saṃśayite rūpasamuccayāvagamaḥ, yathā sāmānyaviśeṣavati, ayaṃ vā, ayaṃ vā iti pratīteḥ. mā bhūt samuccayaḥ, vikalpaḥ syāt. so 'pi na, vastuno vikalpānupapatteḥ. ekam api tarhi na dvyātmakam, ekasya dvyātmakatāvirodhāt. tatra yathā saṃśayajñānaṃ vipratiṣedhād apramāṇaṃ, tathā sāmānyaviśeṣapratipattir api, aikādhikaraṇyāt.*

invalidated (*bādhanāt*) by the ascertained cognition. Then, where there is no ascertainment, let there be a state characterised by alternatives. Moreover, just as when there is cancellation [of the doubtful cognition by the ascertained cognition] there is invalidity of one [cognition] because of rejection, in a similar way in [the situation of] contradiction when two [cognitions] apprehend contradictory forms or one of them [apprehends contradictory forms]—due to mutual rejection of the understandings of those two forms—when one [of the two cognitions] is rejected, there is ascertainment from the other one, but when there is mutual rejection, in the situation of equal strength, there is doubt [resulted]. [Thus,] the perception of universal and particular for one single thing cannot be distinguished from a doubtful cognition.[167]

In this argument, Maṇḍana seems to take into consideration Kumārila's preferred way of understanding the issue of cognitive validity and invalidity, namely, his own theory of intrinsic validity. As I have shown in Chapter 4 of this thesis, according to Kumārila, all perceptual cognitions carry innate validity by virtue of their having arisen; the invalidity of a perceptual cognition can only be discovered by a subsequent cognition that contradicts the initial cognition. If the subsequent cognition is valid, then the validity of the initial cognition is cancelled; if the subsequent cognition turns out invalid, the validity of the initial cognition is restored. What Maṇḍana aims to show in this argument is that the concept of a dual-natured cognition still cannot be distinguished from a doubtful cognition if we follow Kumārila's own understanding of cognitive validity.

[167] BSi II.17 (63: 22 - 64: 2): *syād etat—na saṃśayajñānaṃ vipratiṣedhād apramāṇam, nirṇayajñānena tu bādhanāt. yatra tarhi na nirṇayas tatra vikalpātmatā syāt. api ca yathā bādhāyām ekasyāprāmāṇyaṃ nirākaraṇāt, evaṃ virodhe 'pi dvayor ekasya vā jñānasya viruddharūpopagrahe tadrūpādhigatyor anyonyanirākaraṇāt, tatraikanirākaraṇe itarasmān niścayaḥ, parasparanirākṛtau tulyabalatve saṃdeha iti. na saṃśayajñānād ekasya sāmānyaviśeṣapratipattir viśiṣyate.*

Maṇḍana plays a rather clever trick here: he combines the principle of intrinsic validity together with his own understanding of contradiction. Maṇḍana argues that when a cognition has two contradictory forms in its content, there has to be a process by which we can reject one and not the other—just as Kumārila's theory of intrinsic validity tells us. We can only ascertain which one is true and which one is false when one form rejects the other form; in the case of a dual-natured cognition, however, the two contradictory forms, i.e. universal and particular, do not reject each other as they remain equally powerful. This dual-natured cognition, according to Maṇḍana, is then not different from a doubtful cognition, which is also characterised by having two contradictory forms of equal power.

Here concludes Maṇḍana's first argument against the dual nature theory. Maṇḍana's writing in this argument is indicative of his knowledge about how Kumārila's theory of intrinsic validity supports his dual nature theory. As we have seen, Maṇḍana presents one of the core epistemological arguments of Kumārila in a generally accurate way. In response, Maṇḍana's comparison of dual-natured cognitions with doubtful cognitions can be understood as a strategy to undermine Kumārila's claim that dual-natured cognitions are valid. Maṇḍana's usage of the word *bādhanāt* in the BSi II.17 (63,23), which is the key term in Kumārila's theory of intrinsic validity, is particularly decisive evidence that Maṇḍana does not trivialise Kumārila's epistemological arguments for his dual nature theory, given how much Kumārila and his classical commentators repeatedly emphasise the role of intrinsic validity throughout the presentation of Kumārila's theory of universals. We will see that the next refutation by Maṇḍana also puts an emphasis on the epistemological aspect of the dual nature theory.

6.3.2 The Arguments in the BSi II.18-19

We may recall that one of Kumārila's arguments for his dual nature theory is that objects have a dual nature because we have a dual-natured cognition of objects. He argues that without the dual nature of objects existing in reality, such dual-natured cognitions would not be possible. The second argument made by Maṇḍana against the dual nature theory seems to be directed at this line of argument from Kumārila.

Before showing us what kind of problem he thinks Kumārila's notion of dual-natured cognition has, Maṇḍana first presents his definition of universal and particular:

> This opponent (*anena*) making an effort to settle between difference and non-difference of the objects must explain the definition of difference and non-difference [and say] to what extent the universal is non-different and the particulars are differentiated. Here, the definition of difference is the contradiction of forms, i.e., reciprocal absence, [and] the definition of non-difference is the opposite. For, particulars are differentiated because of the contradiction of forms, which [in other words] is [the] synonym of reciprocal absence. Even when they [i.e., particulars] are being differentiated (*bhidyamāneṣv api teṣu*), the universal is non-different, because of [the definition of the universal as] being opposite [to that of the particular].[168]

According to Maṇḍana, the defining characteristic of a particular is difference (*bheda*), the main feature of which consists in the contradiction of forms (*rūpavirodha*). The defining characteristic of a universal, on the other hand, is the opposite, i.e. a non-difference (*abheda*) that has a non-contradiction of forms (*rūpāvirodha*). Maṇḍana paraphrases these

[168] BSi II.18 (64: 6-10): *avaśyam anena padārthānāṃ bhedābhedau vyavasthāpayatā, yathā tāvat sāmānyam abhinnaṃ viśeṣā bhidyanta iti, bhedābhedayor lakṣaṇaṃ vācyam. tatra rūpavirodho 'nyonyābhāvo bhedalakṣaṇam, viparyayo 'bhedalakṣaṇam. rūpavirodhād dhy anyonyābhāvaparyāyād viśeṣā bhidyante. bhidyamāneṣv api teṣu sāmānyam abhinnam, viparyayāt.*

characteristics as reciprocal absence (*anyonyābhāva*) and mutual identity (*parasparātmatā*), respectively. What Maṇḍana attempts to do here is rather obvious: by imposing a binary definition of universal and particular—which Kumārila would be unlikely to accept—Maṇḍana hopes to expose an internal inconsistency in the dual nature theory. Maṇḍana makes this analytical move right after he gives his definition of universal and particular:

> Now, if there is contradiction of the own forms of the universal and particular in terms of reciprocal absence, they cannot have unity, like the differences [do not have unity] with one another. Now if the contradiction of the own forms is admitted because of the arising of cognitions of universal and particular with reference to one and the same thing, then one thing cannot have dual nature. For, duality is impossible when difference does not exist (*asati bhede*) thanks to the absence of contradiction between the own forms of universal and particular. Just as neither the universal aspect nor the particular aspect has a dual-form because of the absence of contradiction of forms[169]—because there is no duality when in each [locus] it is excluded [from the other]—in the same way, also in the case of the universal and particular, if there is no contradiction of forms because of the cognition of co-referentiality, there is no absence of mutual identity. [Thus,] duality is not logical. And if there is a contradiction of forms, unity [is not logical].[170]

[169] Maṇḍana makes a rather interesting point in this respect. One thing is always in conformity with itself as long as its own form persists, and such persistence is due to a lack of the production of contradictory forms. Following this logic, one would never claim that the universal aspect alone or the particular aspect itself has a dual-form when each aspect is in conformity with its own single form.

[170] BSi II.18 (64: 10-16): *tatra sāmānyaviśeṣayor yadi svarūpavirodho 'nyonyābhāvaḥ, naikatvaṃ bhedānām iva parasparam. atha sāmānyaviśeṣabuddhyor aikādhikaraṇyenotpatteḥ svarūpavirodho 'bhyupeyate, na tarhy ekaṃ dvyātmakam. sāmānyaviśeṣayoḥ svarūpavirodhābhāvād asati bhede dvitvānupapatteḥ. yathā na sāmānyāṃśo dvirūpo viśeṣāṃśo vā rūpavirodhābhāvāt—tatraikasmin nirbhakte dvitvābhāvāt—tathā sāmānyaviśeṣayor api sāmānādhikaraṇyabuddher yadi na rūpavirodhaḥ, na parasparātmābhāvaḥ. dvitvaṃ na yujyate. atha rūpavirodhaḥ, naikatvam iti.*

In this passage, Maṇḍana sets a logical trap for the opponent: either universals and particulars do not have unity—because there is contradiction of forms between them—in which case, they cannot both exist in the nature of the object; or, universals and particulars do have unity—supported by the fact that there is co-referentiality between universals and particulars—in which case, one thing does not have a dual nature: it just has a single nature since universals and particulars are the same thing.

Up to this point, Maṇḍana's argument has maintained a strong ontological focus by trying to maintain a binary ontological distinction between non-difference and difference, as well as between universal and particular. Now, Maṇḍana gives voice to the opponent who tries to bring the epistemological issue back to the centre of the debate:

> If this is the idea [of the objection]: it is not the case that multiplicity is due to contradiction of own forms and unity is due to the absence of that—by which, due to the absence of contradiction of the own-forms of universal and particular, there would be no duality, like [one thing does not have duality] caused by its either part. However, [multiplicity and unity] are due to difference or non-difference of the forms belonging to the cognition. Even if the contradiction of own forms, characterised by reciprocal absence, does not exist, since the universal and particular are perceived as mutually identical, there is duality because of the difference of forms belonging to the cognition. But the unity is due to the non-difference of the form in one aspect. Therefore, one thing can have dual nature due to being grasped by a cognition that has two forms.[171]

[171] BSi II.18 (64: 17-21): *yadi matam—na svarūpavirodhān nānātvaṃ tadabhāvāc caikatvam, yena sāmānyaviśeṣayoḥ svarūpavirodhābhāvād dvitvaṃ na syād anyatarasyeva bhāgasya. kiṃ tu buddhe rūpabhedābhedābhyām. sāmānyaviśeṣayoś ca parasparātmatvena pratipatter asaty apy anyonyābhāvalakṣaṇe svarūpavirodhe buddhe rūpabhedād dvitvam. aṃśe tu rūpābhedād ekatvam. ato vastuno dvirūpabuddhigrāhyatvād dvyātmateti.*

The point that the opponent aims to show here, as far as I understand it, is that the forms grasped by our cognitions are of higher authority than any logical argument regarding whether or not there is a contradiction of forms in the object itself. The opponent acknowledges that when we perceive universals and particulars as having mutual identity there is a lack of a contradiction of forms. Indeed, otherwise we would not have perceived their mutual identity. The opponent, however, points out that even when universal and particular natures are perceived as identical, our cognition still grasps them as having different forms. It is the difference of forms in our cognition that is the deciding evidence for the dual nature of the object. The fact that one single object is able to give rise to two forms in our cognition proves that one single thing has a dual nature. While Maṇḍana's rather obscure phrasing in this argument creates some difficulties for ascertaining the exact point intended by the opponent, I believe that the reasoning presented by the opponent here largely follows Kumārila's epistemological argument that our cognition is the ultimate authority to understand the dual nature of an object. Kumārila would agree with the opponent's reasoning here by adding that if an object does not have dual nature, we would not perceive two different forms of that object in our cognition.

In the next paragraph, Maṇḍana counters this challenge from the opponent by investigating the nature of the cognition of an object:

> If the non-difference of one aspect [of a thing] is due to the fact that cognition has the nature of grasping a single form, the thing [itself] is to be discussed. Even there, [it should be discussed first:] Does cognition have the nature of grasping a single form, or not? In that context, if the cognition does not have the nature of grasping a single form in a thing—for every thing has both universal and

particular as its nature—a thing is to be grasped by a cognition that has a dual form, how singularity of a thing is [grasped]? For, the defining characteristic of non-difference, which is non-difference of the forms in the cognition, is absent, but the defining characteristic of difference, which is the difference of the forms [in the cognition], is present. If, on the other hand, the cognition does grasp a single form in a thing, [a thing] does not have dual nature, just like an aspect.[172]

Here, Maṇḍana seems to target Kumārila's argument for his dual nature theory that is based on Kumārila's epistemological realist stance. Kumārila argues that the reason why we are able to have a dual-natured cognition is because things have dual nature, since our cognition of an object is always in correspondence with the object. Maṇḍana's argument seems to focus on exposing the paradox underlying this line of argument: if one thing indeed consisted of two natures, then our cognition of it would always consist of two distinct forms in correspondence with the dual nature of the thing. In that case, we will never be able to grasp the singular form of the thing; in other words, the unity of the two natures would never be perceived in our cognition, and one single thing would just appear as two distinct things. On the other hand, if the opponent wishes to avoid this paradox by saying that our cognition only grasps a single form, then the opponent's previous defence that the dual nature of object is due to the difference of forms in cognition becomes invalid. Maṇḍana is again giving the opponent two choices: either a thing has two distinct natures that do not have unity, or a thing only has unity without duality.

It is noteworthy that even in this argument, in which Maṇḍana has a stronger ontological focus than the preceding one, he still chooses to incorporate Kumārila's

[172] BSi II.19 (64: 24 - 65: 5): *yadi tarhi buddher ekarūpopagrāhitvād abhedo 'ṃśasya, vastu vicāryam—tatrāpi buddhiḥ kim ekarūpopagrāhiṇī na veti. tatra yadi naikarūpopagrāhiṇī vastuni buddhiḥ—sāmānyaviśeṣātmakaṃ hi vastu—tad dvirūpabuddhyupagrāhyam, katham ekatvaṃ vastunaḥ. buddhirūpābhedasyābhedalakṣaṇasyā-bhāvāt, rūpabhedasya ca bhedalakṣaṇasya bhāvāt. athaikarūpopagrāhiṇy eva vastuni buddhiḥ, na dvyātmakatvam aṃśavad eva.*

epistemological argument into the section. This feature confirms Maṇḍana's awareness of Kumārila's emphasis on the authority of cognition in his dual nature theory. In the next argument, we will see that Maṇḍana continues to challenge the idea that dual-natured cognitions should be regarded as evidence for objects having dual nature.

6.3.3 The Arguments in the BSi II.20

The third set of arguments contains the most obscure refutation of the dual nature theory in the BSi. In them, Maṇḍana refutes Kumārila's dual nature theory by stressing that objects having dual natures could not result in a cognition that fulfils its necessary function of obtaining understanding of what is not yet understood (*anadhigatādhigama*). The difficulty of understanding Maṇḍana's refutation here not only lies in the fact that the argument does not seem to correspond to any statements that Kumārila makes in the ŚV. Difficulty also lies in his extremely convoluted language. I will attempt to make sense of this argument by exploring the possibility that Maṇḍana is considering a statement of Kumārila's from his lost work, the *Bṛhaṭṭīkā*.

First, let us take a look at how Maṇḍana puts forward his argument:

> It is the application of another cognition that removes [the possibility that] universal and particular have the nature of being one thing. For, that [i.e., another cognition] has meaning in the state of having multiplicity like in the case of differences, because of its understanding of what is not understood [i.e., the other cognition can acquire what is not acquired by the first cognition]. However, if [universal and particular] have unity, just as one does not seek another cognition that is distinct from the divisions of universal and particular that are reached by one's own cognition, in the same way, for the understanding of particular, another

> cognition that is distinct from that cognition which captures universal would not be sought. Likewise, for the understanding of universal, [another cognition that is distinct from] that cognition which captures particular [would not be sought].[173]

In this argument, Maṇḍana rejects the possibility that universal and particular natures can lie in one thing by referring to a conception that a cognition is only valid if it contains knowledge that is not yet known.[174] Following this definition, Maṇḍana argues that if universals and particulars were to have unity, we would not need to cognise universals and particulars separately; when we have already cognised a universal, it would be redundant to cognise a particular, since the cognition of the particular would not bring us new information when the universal and the particular are the same thing. This is an undesired consequence for the opponent. At this point, Maṇḍana allows the opponent to modify his position, before launching a refutation of the modified position, in turn:

> [Objection:] Then, there is no absolute non-distinction between universal and particular, but there ***is*** a distinction (emphasis added). It is because of this distinction that there is meaningfulness.[175]

The statement of the opponent here is a rather accurate representation of Kumārila's position. Kumārila would indeed say that the difference between universal and particular is

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[173] BSi II.20 (65: 19-23): *buddhyantarapravṛttir eva sāmānyaviśeṣayor ekavastvātmatām apākaroti. sā hi nānātmatve bhedeṣv ivārthavatī, anadhigatādhigamāt. ekatve tu yathā sāmānyaviśeṣavibhāgayoḥ svabuddhisamadhigatayor na vilakṣaṇaṃ buddhyantaram arthyate, tathā sāmānyabuddher na buddhyantaraṃ vilakṣaṇaṃ viśeṣādhigamāya prārthyeta. tathā viśeṣabuddher na sāmānyādhigamāya.*

[174] The notion that a valid cognition should consist in cognising a previously unapprehended object seems to have been widely accepted by most Brahmanical schools at Kumārila's time, such as Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, and Saṃkhya. This stance is in accordance with the fact that these Brahmanical schools never admit memory or recollection as a valid means of knowledge (See Franco 1997: 62).

[175] BSi II.20 (65: 23-24): *atha nātyantam avyatirekaḥ sāmānyaviśeṣayoḥ. vyatireko 'pi tu. tatra vyatirekād arthavatteti.* Maṇḍana seems to use the phrase "meaningfulness" (*arthavattā*) in the sense of "having a purpose", i.e. due to the proposed distinction between universals and particulars, cognising particulars would not make cognising universals redundant.

not absolute, which leads to his well-known conclusion that universals and particulars should be regarded as both different from and identical to each other. Maṇḍana's following rebuttal, however, shows that he does not think that the opponent's clarification resolves the issue at hand:

> And it is a general rule that if there is absence of cause, the absence of result is established intrinsically. The exception to that rule is: if there is presence of cause, there is presence of result.
>
> Now, if [universal and particular] have non-difference, due to the presence of cause, it is logical that both are understood by one and the same cognition. If [universal and particular] have unity, it cannot be said that the cause of understanding the other does not exist [when one is understood]. Even if somehow it is said that it does not exist, then [we insist that] it does exist, because of unity. Here, because of the presence of the cause [in the unity of the two], there would be presence of the result [i.e., both universal and particular can be understood by a single cognition], due to it being the cause of that [result].[176]

In this argument, it seems that Maṇḍana aims to point out a logical contradiction that the dual nature theory allegedly has. I am not sure if Maṇḍana's own exposition is logical enough,[177] but we can still manage to construe the gist of his argument as follows: an

[176] BSi II.20 (66: 2-6): *autsargikaś ca hetvabhāve phalābhāvaḥ svabhāvasiddhaḥ. tasya hetubhāve phalabhāvo 'pavādaḥ. tatrābhede hetubhāvād ekayaiva buddhyobhayādhigamo yuktaḥ. naikatve 'nyatarādhigamahetur nāstīti śakyaṃ vaktum. athāpi kathañ cin nāstīty ucyeta. tathāpy asti tāvat, ekatvāt. tatra hetubhāvāt phalabhāvaḥ syāt, tasya kāraṇatvāt.*

[177] It is not immediately clear what Maṇḍana means by *tasya hetubhāve phalabhāvo 'pavādaḥ*. Śaṅkhapāṇi's commentary on this sentence does not shed much light on why exactly this proposition is *apavādaḥ*. Citsukha and Ānandapūrṇa feel even less the need to elaborate on this sentence. As far as I understand it, Maṇḍana is making an exceptional case for *hetubhāve phalabhāvo* to be applicable here, since the proposition that the presence of cause leads to the presence of result is not necessarily true from the logical perspective. Unless a cause is, in itself, sufficient to produce the corresponding effect, circumstantial factors can obstruct the relationship between the cause and effect, meaning that the presence of the cause does not imply the presence of the effect. Maṇḍana says it is an exception here, which means that he takes the unity of universals and

exception to the general rule dictates that where there is the presence of cause, there is the presence of result. In the case of the dual nature theory, since the non-difference of universal and particular is admitted—even if this non-difference only allegedly accounts for one aspect of the relationship between universal and particular—this unity of universal and particular still exists. Maṇḍana suggests that this unity should be understood as a cause, and the result of this cause is that we do not need another cognition to grasp the universal and particular aspects of an object separately. This is because another cognition would not be "meaningful"; that is, a second cognition would not be able to provide any new knowledge that has already been covered by one single cognition.

As mentioned earlier, this argument by Maṇḍana does not seem to be directed at any statements that Kumārila makes in the ŚV. However, the notion that a valid cognition should fulfil the requirement of obtaining new knowledge is, in fact, clearly expressed by Kumārila himself, in his *Bṛhaṭṭīka*. A verse in the *Bṛhaṭṭīka* reads as follows:

> There, a cognition, which cognises a new object (*apūrvārthavijñānaṃ*), is determined (*niścitam*), is devoid of cancellation (*bādhavarjitam*), and brought by causes that are without defects (*aduṣṭakāraṇārabdham*), is accepted in the world as valid.[178]

We will recall that the definition of a valid cognition given by Kumārila in the ŚV requires that a valid cognition has three qualities: it is firm (*dṛḍhaṃ*), it has arisen (*utpannaṃ*), and it does not contradict another cognition (*na visaṃvādam ṛcchati*

particulars as a sufficient cause that can guarantee the presence of the result. However, this is a rather arbitrary move, especially since Maṇḍana does not provide further proof to justify it.

[178] *Ratnakīrtinibandhāvalī* 106.10-11: *tatrāpūrvārthavijñānaṃ niścitaṃ bādhavarjitam | aduṣṭakāraṇārabdhaṃ pramāṇaṃ lokasaṃmatam* || Ratnakīrti introduces this verse with the phrase *tathā bṛhaṭṭīkāpi*. This verse of *Bṛhaṭṭīkā* is also quoted by Prajñākaragupta in his *Pramāṇavārttikālaṃkāra*. See Krasser (2001) for a discussion of the relationship between Dharmakīrti's *Pramāṇavārttika* and *Hetubindu* and this verse from the *Bṛhaṭṭīkā*. Also see Kataoka (2011a: II, 290-291, n. 284) for the same issue.

jñānāntareṇa vijñānaṃ). By contrast, the definition of a valid cognition made in the *Bṛhaṭṭīka* is clearly a more refined version of that presented in the ŚV.[179] However, even if Maṇḍana did not know this verse from the *Bṛhaṭṭīka*, he may have acquired this notion of valid cognition from Kumārila's similar expressions in the ŚV. As shown in Kataoka (2003: 94) and Kataoka (2011a: II, 209, n.122), Kumārila considers the idea of a valid cognition as one that obtains new information when discussing the issue of *anumāna* and *upamāna*.[180] It would not be unreasonable to think that Maṇḍana may have extrapolated the notion that a valid cognition should be concerned with new objects from these expressions of Kumārila in the ŚV.

Whichever scenario is true, I think the most plausible explanation for understanding Maṇḍana's third argument against the dual nature theory is that Maṇḍana aims to use Kumārila's own understanding of valid cognition to discredit the soundness of the dual nature theory. Maṇḍana was likely aware of Kumārila's modified definition of valid cognitions in the *Bṛhaṭṭīka*, or at least aware of this notion from Kumārila's writings in the *Anumāna* and *Upamāna* chapters of the ŚV. Thus, Maṇḍana's goal in his third argument against the dual nature theory is to show that Kumārila's insistence that universals and particulars are the same thing must mean that the cognitions of universals and particulars fail to pass his own definition of a valid cognition. While this line of Maṇḍana's criticism does not seem to correspond to Kumārila's writings in the *Ākṛtivāda*, I think it at least serves as further evidence that Maṇḍana takes Kumārila's epistemological positions into consideration while refuting the dual nature theory.

6.4 Conclusion

[179] See Kataoka (2003: 95-96) and Kataoka (2011a: II, 289-290, n. 284) for a comparison between Kumārila's definition of *pramāṇa* in the ŚV and that in the *Bṛhaṭṭīkā*.
[180] Also see Franco (1997: 62) and Krasser (2001: 194, n. 75) for Kumārila's expression in the ŚV *Autpattika* chapter.

Having examined all three of Maṇḍana's neglected arguments against the dual nature theory, I think there is sufficient textual evidence to conclude that Maṇḍana is well aware of the underlying epistemological arguments that Kumārila employs to support his dual nature theory as an ontological claim. The arguments made by Maṇḍana that I have analysed in this chapter show that Maṇḍana must have considered Kumārila's epistemological arguments when formulating his refutations. Maṇḍana's refutation of Kumārila contains discussion of several important aspects of Kumārila's epistemology—the theory of intrinsic validity, the nature of cognition, and the definition of a valid means of knowledge—in the three sets of arguments analysed above. Although Maṇḍana is ultimately critical of Kumārila's dual nature theory, he does accurately grasp Kumārila's core arguments for the dual nature theory in the BSi; he does not always oversimplify Kumārila's theory as previous scholarship had concluded.

Making sense of Maṇḍana's critique of Kumārila's dual nature theory has an important implication, as it demonstrates the importance of understanding Kumārila's theory deeply. Without grasping the epistemological core of Kumārila's argument for the dual nature theory, it would be difficult to assess the accuracy of Maṇḍana's description of Kumārila's positions. It seems to me that the previous verdict on the quality of Maṇḍana's refutation of Kumārila not only misses some important passages of the BSi, but also fails to understand the essence of Kumārila's dual nature theory.

As mentioned in the introduction section of this chapter, the fact that Maṇḍana has an intimate knowledge of Kumārila in general urges us to take Maṇḍana's critique of the dual nature theory more seriously. Maṇḍana's unique background in the history of Indian philosophy means that his critique of Kumārila's dual nature theory is an indispensable part of the intellectual history of Kumārila's theory. Maṇḍana's presentation of Kumārila offers us

a unique perspective from which we can form a more comprehensive understanding of Kumārila's theory overall, and it deserves more attention from scholars of Indian philosophy.

Conclusion

> Let the learned ones gracefully receive it [i.e. the Ślokavārttika] with calm minds and ears, for one who is free of jealousy receives loving words. (v. 3)
> And here, the mind should not be obligated to find faults, For, even a non-existent fault appears to those whose mind is focused on [finding] that. (v. 4)
> How can the learned scholars find a fault in the statements of a man like me? How can one make an error himself when he does not desire [errors] even in the statements of others? (v. 5)
> Or, where in the world can we observe [everyone] having the unity and errorless quality of a statement? (i.e. it is not possible to find people agreeing on issues and thus having one voice, or not finding faults in others' statements). Since, there are some people who have bad statements even regarding liberation and heaven. (v. 6)
> And, since I am following the scripture, I am not to be reproached even if I am slipping [i.e. making errors]. For one who goes on the path of truth cannot be reproached regarding his slippings. (v.7)[181]

Tomlinson (2019: 5) puts elegantly: "When we devote years to the study of a certain philosopher's work, we all, I submit, develop ideas about who our authors are. We find playfulness and a sense of humour in a certain author's prose, or stodgy logical precision in another's. We find a pious religious traditionalist, or an eccentric sceptical gadfly. We slowly develop a sense of who our authors are, the sorts of things they might and might not say, the sorts of things that are and are not in character". As is usually the case for Indian philosophers, the lack of historical records means we can *only* glean the personality and character of a philosopher from their writing. So, what does the above quotation from the

[181] ŚV *Pratijñā* 3-7:
tad vidvāṃso 'nugṛhṇantu cittaśrotraiḥ prasādibhiḥ |
santaḥ praṇayivākyāni gṛhṇanti hy anasūyavaḥ ||
na cātrāvīva kartavyaṃ doṣadṛṣṭiparaṃ manaḥ |
doṣo hy avidyamāno 'pi taccittānāṃ prakāśate ||
kuto vā gṛhṇate doṣaṃ sūrayo madvidhoktiṣu |
neṣyate yaḥ parastho 'pi sa svayaṃ gṛhyate katham ||
nirdoṣatvaikavākyatvaṃ kva vā lokasya dṛśyate |
sāpavādā yataḥ ke cin mokṣasvargāv api prati ||
āgamapravaṇaś cāhaṃ nāpavādyaḥ skhalann api |
na hi sadvartmanā gacchan skhaliteṣv apy apodyate ||

beginning of the ŚV tell us about Kumārila's personality? It seems to me that the way Kumārila chooses to open his treatise reflects a sense of victorious conviction and suggests that he is the kind of philosopher who radiates self-confidence. This sense of victorious conviction also extends to when Kumārila presents his theory of universals in the *Ākṛtivāda*. We have seen that Kumārila repeatedly appeals to the authority of perception when he tackles various objections to his theory of universals. Kumārila's conviction that his theory of universals correctly reflects the reality of the world is derived from the empiricist spirit of his epistemology: if our ordinary perception informs us that universals are real and have such and such characteristics, then the reality must really be so. In a sense, one can say that Kumārila's epistemological arguments underlying his theory of universals are just trying to persuade his readers to trust their ordinary perception: one does not need cumbersome theories to either defend the reality of universals or to imagine that universals are merely mental constructs when one can see with their own eyes that universals are real.

Now, it is time to review what I have achieved in this thesis. The first objective of the thesis was to present what Kumārila's theory of universals entails and how he expounds his theory of universals in the *Ākṛtivāda*. The second objective was to understand the transmission and critical reception of Kumārila's theory of universals in a historical context. To achieve the first goal, I have presented a critical edition of the *Ākṛtivāda* in Chapter 2 by using four published editions and five manuscripts, followed by an annotated translation of that critical edition in Chapter 3. To achieve the second goal, I have presented the three analytical chapters of this thesis (Chapter 4-6). Given that Kumārila's theory of universals was composed at a time in which Indian inter-religious debate regarding metaphysics and epistemology reached a new stage, I have argued that the legacy of Kumārila's theory of universals must be viewed in context of that inter-religious debate. As a result, my analytical chapters have addressed the impact of Kumārila's theory of universals on different

philosophical traditions in classical India: in Chapter 4, I consider the effect on the logico-epistemological school of Buddhism (primarily Dharmakīrti), in Chapter 5, the effect on the Jaina philosophers (Vādirājasūri and Prabhācandra), and finally, in Chapter 6, the effect on the Brahmanical tradition (Maṇḍanamiśra's Advaita Vedānta).

By analysing how philosophers of different traditions engage with Kumārila's theory of universals, I argue that Kumārila's efforts to situate his theory of universals in a well-articulated epistemological framework represent an uncompromising apologetics of his realist Mīmāṃsā philosophy that compels later philosophers to engage with it. That is to say, Kumārila's theory of universals had a lasting impact on later Indian philosophers, and his conception of universals became something that later philosophers could not avoid discussing when they proposed their own theories of universals. In Chapter 4, I have analysed how Dharmakīrti improves Dignāga's rejection of universals by proposing a novel framework to explain the nature of a unitary cognition that, in turn, can circumvent Kumārila's critique of the Buddhist theory. In Chapter 5, we have seen how later Jaina philosophers try to distance themselves from Kumārila's theory of universals, despite the Buddhist characterisation that their positions are similar. In Chapter 6, I have elucidated how Kumārila's dual nature theory is a main target of criticism when Maṇḍana constructs his own theory of universals within the Advaita Vedānata system.

However, in order to understand these philosophers' responses to Kumārila's theory, we need to first make sense of Kumārila's arguments on their own terms. To obtain a full picture of what Kumārila is arguing for in the *Ākṛtivāda*, one has to dive into the fine details of Kumārila's text. This is the primary goal in mind when I present the annotated translation of the *Ākṛtivāda* in Chapter 3. Some portions of Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 also aim to clarify the overarching arguments of Kumārila in the *Ākṛtivāda*. In both chapters, I have argued that the two main components of Kumārila's theory of universals in the *Ākṛtivāda*, i.e. the

existence of universals and the dual nature theory, encompass a wide range of epistemological issues. The arguments for the existence of universals and the arguments for the dual nature theory are both connected to some of his main epistemological stances elaborated in different chapters of the ŚV. One needs to understand these epistemological stances in order to have a full grasp of Kumārila's argument in the *Ākṛtivāda*. In particular, it is important to understand how Kumārila's theory of perception, his epistemological realist stance, and his theory of intrinsic validity are indispensable elements in his theory of universals, especially despite them not being expounded in the *Ākṛtivāda* itself.

In Chapter 5, I have emphasised that Kumārila's dual nature theory—one of the most distinctive features of his theory of universals—has a strong epistemological orientation, despite the ontological nature of the theory. The fact that Kumārila ultimately relies on his epistemological arguments to convince his readers that the dual nature theory is valid seems to have largely escaped the scholarly understanding of Kumārila's theory of universals. In that regard, it is perhaps not a mystery why Maṇḍana's critique of Kumārila's dual nature theory—which accurately records Kumārila's epistemological understanding of his dual nature theory—not only gets neglected but also is misunderstood, as I have considered in Chapter 6. This case highlights the significance of the principle that I mentioned in the introduction chapter of this thesis: understanding the arguments of a philosopher properly is crucial to gaining a proper understanding of their later critics. Therefore, establishing high quality editions and annotated translations of the texts of Indian philosophers is vital for scholars trying to construct a reliable history of Indian philosophy. In this regard, many chapters of the ŚV are still in need of proper philological and philosophical investigation. It is my hope that this thesis not only provides its readers with an insightful presentation of Kumārila's theory of universals in the *Ākṛtivāda*, but also with an encouragement to

undertake future efforts to uncover the philosophical ingenuity of the many other theories of Kumārila that remain to be studied in depth.

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ĀM — See Shah (1999)

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AP — See McCrea and Patil (2010).

Anekāntavādanirāsa, of Jitāri.

AVN — See Bühnemann (1982).

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BhāŚ — See *Abhiprāyaprakāśikā*.

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JN — See Bühnemann (1982).

Mīmāṃsāsūtra, of Jaimini.

MS — See *Śābarabhāṣya*.

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NM_K *Nyāyamañjarī*, See Kataoka (2010) and Kataoka (2011)

Nyāyasūtra, of Gautama.

NS See *Nyāyavārttika*.

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PDS See *Nyāyakandalī*.

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PKM Mahendra Kumar Shastri, ed. *Prameyakamalamārtaṇḍa by Shri Prabha Candra*. Delhi: Sri Satguru Publications, 1990.

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PSV 1 *Pramāṇasamuccaya*(*vṛtti*) *Svārthānumāna*. See Hattori (1968).

PSV 5 *Prāmāṇasamuccayavṛtti Apoha*. See Pind (2015).

Prāmāṇavārttika, of Dharmakīrti.

PV 1 *Prāmāṇavārttika Svārthānumāna*. See PVSV.

PV 3.1-63 *Prāmāṇavārttika Pratyakṣapariccheda*, verse 1-63. See Franco and Notake (2014).

PV 3 *Prāmāṇavārttika Pratyakṣapariccheda*.

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Śābarabhāṣya, of Śabara.

ŚBh Subbāśāstrī, ed. *Śrīmajjaiminipraṇītaṃ mīmāṃsādarśanam.* 6 *bhāgas*. Poona: Ānandāśramamudraṇālaya, 1929-34.

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$ŚV_T$ K. Sāmbaśiva Śāstrī (vols. 1–2) and V. A. Rāmasvāmī Śāstrī (vol. 3), ed. *Mīmāmsā Ślokavārtika with the Commentary Kasika of Sucaritamiśra*. Parts I & II, Trivandrum: CBH Publications, 1926–1943.

ŚV *Ākṛti* *Ślokavārttika Ākṛtivāda*. See Edition in Chapter 2.

ŚV *Apoha* *Ślokavārttika Apohavāda*. See Kataoka and Taber (2021).

ŚV *Codanā* *Ślokavārttika Codanāsūtra*. See Kataoka (2011a).

ŚV *Pratyakṣa* *Ślokavārttika Pratyakṣaparricheda*. See Taber (2005).

Nyāyaratnākara, of Pārthasārathimiśra.

ŚVNR See $ŚV_C$.

Ślokavārttikakāśikā, of Sucaritamiśra.

ŚVKāś See $ŚV_T$.

ŚVKāś *Ākṛti* *Ślokavārttikakāśikā Ākṛtivāda*. See Edition in Chapter 2.

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ŚVŚar See $ŚV_Ś$.

Tattvasaṃgraha, of Śāntarakṣita.
TS See TSP.

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ViV See Schmithausen (1965).

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