Journal article
Leakier wires: exploiting FPGA long wires for covert- and side-channel attacks
- Abstract:
-
In complex FPGA designs, implementations of algorithms and protocols from third-party sources are common. However, the monolithic nature of FPGAs means that all sub-circuits share common on-chip infrastructure, such as routing resources. This presents an attack vector for all FPGAs that contain designs from multiple vendors, especially for FPGAs used in multi-tenant cloud environments, or integrated into multi-core processors. In this article, we show that “long” routing wires present a new s...
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- Publication status:
- Published
- Peer review status:
- Peer reviewed
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Authors
Bibliographic Details
- Publisher:
- Association for Computing Machinery Publisher's website
- Journal:
- ACM Transactions on Reconfigurable Technology and Systems Journal website
- Volume:
- 12
- Issue:
- 3
- Article number:
- 11
- Publication date:
- 2019-08-15
- Acceptance date:
- 2019-03-26
- DOI:
- EISSN:
-
1936-7414
- ISSN:
-
1936-7406
Item Description
- Keywords:
- Pubs id:
-
pubs:985128
- UUID:
-
uuid:88318935-511e-4cde-b62c-aeb4b059bf77
- Local pid:
- pubs:985128
- Source identifiers:
-
985128
- Deposit date:
- 2019-03-27
Terms of use
- Copyright holder:
- Giechaskiel et al
- Copyright date:
- 2019
- Notes:
- © 2019 Copyright held by the owner/author(s). Publication rights licensed to the Association for Computing Machinery. This is the accepted manuscript version of the article. The final version is available online from Association for Computing Machinery at: https://doi.org/10.1145/3322483.
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