Journal article
An Evolutionary Model of Bargaining.
- Abstract:
-
Individuals from two populations of bargainers are randomly matched to play the Nash demand game. They make their deman ds by choosing best replies based on an incomplete knowledge of the precedents and occasionally they choose randomly. There is no common knowledge. Over the long run, typically one division will be observe d almost all of the time. This "stochastically stable" division is close to the Nash solution when all agents in the same population ar e alike. When the populations are h...
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Bibliographic Details
- Publisher:
- Elsevier
- Journal:
- Journal of Economic Theory
- Volume:
- 59
- Issue:
- 1
- Pages:
- 145 - 168
- Publication date:
- 1993-01-01
- DOI:
- ISSN:
-
0022-0531
Item Description
- Language:
- English
- UUID:
-
uuid:87164744-5995-45a6-95bd-8df4217b811f
- Local pid:
- oai:economics.ouls.ox.ac.uk:10968
- Deposit date:
- 2011-08-16
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- Copyright date:
- 1993
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