- Abstract:
-
Individuals from two populations of bargainers are randomly matched to play the Nash demand game. They make their deman ds by choosing best replies based on an incomplete knowledge of the precedents and occasionally they choose randomly. There is no common knowledge. Over the long run, typically one division will be observe d almost all of the time. This "stochastically stable" division is close to the Nash solution when all agents in the same population ar e alike. When the populations are h...
Expand abstract - Publisher copy:
- 10.1006/jeth.1993.1009
-
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- Journal:
- Journal of Economic Theory
- Volume:
- 59
- Issue:
- 1
- Publication date:
- 1993-01-01
- DOI:
- URN:
-
uuid:87164744-5995-45a6-95bd-8df4217b811f
- Local pid:
- oai:economics.ouls.ox.ac.uk:10968
- Language:
- English
- Copyright date:
- 1993
Journal article
An Evolutionary Model of Bargaining.
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