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Extended preferences and interpersonal comparisons of well-being

Abstract:

An important objection to preference-satisfaction theories of wellbeing is that these theories cannot make sense of interpersonal comparisons of well-being. A tradition dating back to Harsanyi (1953) attempts to respond to this objection by appeal to so-called extended preferences: very roughly, preferences over situations whose description includes agents’ preferences. This paper examines the prospects for defending the preference-satisfaction theory via this extended preferences program. We...

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Publication status:
Published
Peer review status:
Peer reviewed
Version:
Accepted manuscript

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Publisher copy:
10.1111/phpr.12334

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Department:
Oxford, HUM, Philosophy Faculty
Role:
Author
More by this author
Department:
Oxford, HUM, Philosophy Faculty
Role:
Author
Publisher:
Wiley Publisher's website
Journal:
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research Journal website
Volume:
96
Issue:
3
Pages:
636-667
Publication date:
2016-11-07
Acceptance date:
2016-05-20
DOI:
EISSN:
1933-1592
ISSN:
0031-8205
Pubs id:
pubs:629286
URN:
uri:83d7ea0a-e506-4525-8f8c-15082e6f33e4
UUID:
uuid:83d7ea0a-e506-4525-8f8c-15082e6f33e4
Local pid:
pubs:629286

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