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From the electoral battleground to the parliamentary arena: understanding intra-elite bargaining in Uganda's National Resistance Movement

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ABSTRACT

Following the Uganda's 2005 multiparty transition, observers expected the country's legislature – an unusually assertive body by regional standards – to lose its bite, muzzled due to newly re-instated party disciplinary measures. This article explains why – contrary to these expectations – executive-legislative tensions persist and, more fundamentally, what this tells us about the nature of one-party and executive dominance in Uganda. Inspired by a comparative politics literature on parties as well as an older generation of Africanist scholarship, the analysis centres on the nexus linking political finance, party-building and legislative independence. The article argues that the legacy of Uganda's 'no-party' Movement system endures, perpetuated through the highly personalized and contentious nature of electoral mobilization. By failing to recentralize control of campaign finance, the National Resistance Movement (NRM) leadership has left parliamentary candidates largely to their own devices while undermining its own nascent efforts to ensure greater party institutionalization. The consequence of this failure to institutionalize the ruling party plays out in a more assertive legislature, where NRM MPs – who form the overwhelming majority – frequently rebel against the party line. Unable to enforce partisan discipline, Museveni is compelled to buy back legislators' support through executive patronage. While he generally succeeds in subduing Parliament, especially towards the end of a legislative term, this success is by no means automatic. As such, the Ugandan legislature is best understood as an arena for intra-elite bargaining, its independence contingent on the push-and-pull between President Museveni and unruly NRM MPs.

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On 19 May 2016, newly inaugurated parliamentarians convened to elect the Speaker and Deputy Speaker of Uganda's 10th Parliament. Given the overwhelming majority of the ruling National Resistance Movement (NRM), victory for its two official candidates should have been a foregone conclusion. Yet a large faction of NRM parliamentarians was rumoured to support the Independent candidate, Mohammed Nsereko, over the preferred candidate of the NRM Central Executive Committee, Jacob Oulanyah. Nsereko's apparent popularity was especially irksome for the party leadership, given the

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MP's status as an erstwhile NRM 'rebel' expelled from the party in 2013. Sensing the possibility of an embarrassing defeat, President Yoweri Museveni called a snap meeting of the NRM parliamentary caucus. He used this gathering to exploit MPs' pecuniary interests, promising to reconsider a notorious Income Tax Bill, which he blocked after MPs sparked a public outcry by exempting their allowances from taxation. Seemingly fearful that money might not speak loudly enough, Museveni took a further, unprecedented step. On 19 May, the President attended the parliamentary session in person, a watchful and intimidating presence as MPs voted for their Deputy Speaker. In the end, the official NRM candidate won comfortably with 300 out of 415 votes. This was nevertheless a costly victory, doing more to reveal the disunity in the NRM camp at the start of a new parliamentary term than to demonstrate its would-be hegemonic strength.[1]

This disunity is symptomatic of a recurring pattern of executive-legislative tensions in Uganda. Despite the NRM's large majority in the House, clashes between Parliament and President Museveni have remained a common occurrence since the 2005 multiparty transition. The aim of this article is to explain why.

The assertiveness of the Ugandan Parliament – cited as one of the strongest on the continent[2] – is puzzling both from the perspective of the wider Africanist literature and specifically Uganda-centred research. The consensus view on executive-legislative relations in Africa is that powerful, directly elected presidents easily override weak legislatures.[3] This imbalance is attributed to, among other factors, the centralization of patronage within the Presidency, the lack of constitutional checks and balances and the tendency towards one-party dominance.[4] Echoing several of these themes, scholars of Uganda suggest that, after 30 years in power, President Museveni has achieved an 'extreme centralization of power',[5] His dominance results from the abuse of state resources, attacks on formal legislative and judicial institutions, manipulation of security forces, and the consolidation of an ostensibly 'no-party' 'Movement' system into a *de facto* single-party regime and finally, after 2005, a hegemonic ruling party.[6]

There is a small, alternative literature emerging that takes African legislative power seriously, at least in so far as it explores whether parliaments can contribute to democratic change. But this literature too does not explain the enduring truculence of the Ugandan legislature. The most influential analysis to date maintains that African parliaments strengthen where a bi-partisan coalition of progressive MPs mobilizes in favour of a reform agenda.[7] Analysis of early instances of legislative activism under the NRM regime in Uganda builds on this notion, suggesting that one unintended consequence of the Movement system was that MPs freed from party constraints could unite in challenging the executive.[8] Museveni responded, however, with new strategies to ensure discipline among NRM-aligned MPs while legislators also became more polarized in anticipation of the 2005 multiparty transition. Pointing to these factors, the literature predicts that the introduction of a party whip after 2005 would further sap Parliament's strength, ensuring a reliably disciplined majority.[9] President Museveni himself, after previously lamenting having to fight 'wars' with MPs, commented that the return to multiparty competition meant, 'We shall pass all the amendments in Parliament that we want. The period of beseeching is over.'[10]

Yet as implied above, neither the literature nor Museveni were right, at least not entirely. In this article, I address this gap in our understanding while pushing back

against misleading assumptions in the wider literature. My overarching argument is that the continued assertiveness of Uganda's NRM-dominated Parliament post-2005 is due to the fragmented distribution of power within the NRM and its resultant failure to institutionalize as a cohesive party capable of commanding legislative discipline. I explain my reasoning in two parts, drawing insight for each from a political parties literature focused on 'organizational power', as well as an older generation of Africanist scholarship. First, I relate the distribution of power within the party to the structure of political finance, that is, who pays for election campaigns. I demonstrate how a partially decentralized, highly personalized mode of campaign finance inherited from the Movement system now subverts formal party structures and procedures, thereby preventing the *de jure* return to multiparty politics from furthering ruling party consolidation. NRM parliamentary candidates are left to self-fund with only limited and largely *ad hoc* support from Museveni and his political allies, who wield discretionary power over party finance.

Second, I argue that the NRM's internal divisions and continued organizational weakness fuel executive-legislative tensions. After paying their way to Parliament, NRM MPs express their sense of relative political independence through episodic backbench rebellions. President Museveni is then compelled to respond accordingly, compensating for low party unity with a variety of financial carrots and, where need be, sticks. This executive reaction generally succeeds in subduing the legislature, particularly towards the end of a parliamentary term when MPs face mounting personal debts and a looming re-election campaign. But it takes a concerted effort on Museveni's part to achieve this outcome. As such, the Ugandan legislature can be understood as an arena for intra-elite bargaining, its independence contingent on the push-and-pull between President Museveni and unruly NRM MPs.

What does this argument then tell us about the Africanist literature, and more specifically, about how to understand Museveni's regime? There are three points worth highlighting. First, there is a need to nuance our analysis of the centralization of power – and especially patronage – in the hands of the President. Without denying Museveni's obvious pre-eminence, it is important to recognize that political organization and mobilization in Uganda is – to a large extent – not directly controlled by the President, but rather mediated through decentralized patronage networks. Refining how we view the distribution of these networks should, in a second instance, complicate our assessment of one-party dominance and its significance. Not all dominant parties are made equal. While the NRM fits the category, it lacks internal coherence, becoming an unruly catch-all for aspiring political elites. In this regard, it differs from other, more cohesive African ruling parties.[11] Finally, my analysis calls for a different approach to the study of legislative power, one that emphasizes the importance of patronage distribution and party organization in shaping intra-elite relations and, thus, executive-legislative politics.

The article is divided into two sections – a first focused on campaign finance and NRM party institutionalization, and a second linking this discussion with an analysis of executive-legislative tensions. The data used here comes from doctoral research and includes over 60 interviews with MPs, party officials and political observers, as well as press reviews and archival research.

Patronage and party-building in Museveni's Uganda

When the NRM first took power in 1986, it introduced the Movement or 'no-party' system. Multiparty competition was banned ostensibly to avoid sectarian conflict while creating room for a unique form of 'broad based' governance, direct popular participation in Local Councils, and the election of representatives based on 'individual merit'. An initial period of enthusiasm ensued amidst heightened expectations of a new, pluralist politics in Uganda. Events on the ground, however, turned sceptical observers into outright critics, pointing to a gradual consolidation of power within Museveni's inner circle and the emergence of a de facto single-party state.[12] Moreover, scholars saw the 2005 return to multiparty politics – a process instigated and micromanaged by the NRM top leadership – as designed to 'silence […] the opposition groups *within* as well as outside the Movement',[13] providing 'more freedom [for the NRM] to operate as the party it had already become while the environment remained hostile to other parties'.[14] Then Vice President Gilbert Bukenya said of the newly rechristened NRM-Organization (NRM-O), 'I would like the NRM-O to become […] like CCM of Tanzania', referring to one of the longest ruling and most highly institutionalized parties on the African continent.[15]

A decade after Uganda's multiparty transition, though, the NRM-O – or NRM for short – is far from the strong, institutionalized party its leaders anticipated, plagued instead by persistent organizational weaknesses and internal divisions.[16] In this section, I present this outcome as a Movement hangover. I argue that the decentralized pattern of electoral mobilization and campaign finance introduced under the Movement system has become still more entrenched as a feature of especially *intra-party competition* post-2005. I then show how this legacy underpins the continued failure of the NRM to institutionalize.

In making this argument, I draw inspiration from a literature on political parties focused on 'organizational power'. This literature explains 'the functioning and activities of [party] organizations' as shaped by 'alliances and struggles for power' across elite party actors.[17] Among the key factors seen to influence the outcome of such power struggles is the structure of party finance. Where control over resources is concentrated in the hands of the top leaders and centrally redistributed, a party organization can strengthen. Conversely, where funds are scattered among well-endowed party members and their networks, a party's organizational coherence suffers.[18] Interestingly, an older generation of Africanist literature also emphasizes the significance of party finance. It contrasts, for instance, the central control over funds and powerful organizational apparatus of Tanzania's CCM post-Independence and the more fragmented, personalized control over resources exercised by an array of party elites within the organizationally weak and fractious Kenya African National Union.[19]

Campaign finance and electoral mobilization

Three key elements underpin the NRM's decentralized campaign finance regime, particularly for parliamentary elections. First, starting under the Movement system and continuing into the multiparty period, aspiring NRM MPs have individually mobilized resources to win elections, and at an ever more inflated cost. Relatedly, financial support from President Museveni and other NRM leaders is limited and largely *ad hoc*, disbursed in line

with the personal political interests of the NRM top brass. Finally, tensions within Museveni's inner circle and systematic embezzlement of funds, which benefits first and foremost those closest to the President, further undermines the regulation of party finance and centralization of patronage networks. Ultimately, this situation suites Museveni's apparent preference for discretionary spending in response to immediate political imperatives over any genuine effort to routinize NRM party finance.

First, the Movement principle of 'individual merit' along with the personalized, highly competitive campaigning it entails have fuelled a trend towards more decentralized resource mobilization by individual parliamentary candidates. Starting with the first direct parliamentary elections in 1996, candidates – who all ostensibly fell under the same 'Movement' umbrella – were largely left to fight out their campaigns among themselves at the local level. With minimal coordination from the centre, they relied instead on 'personal campaign machines'.[20] The cost of running these 'machines' rose quickly in line with growing competition, which by the second parliamentary elections in 2001 had jumped to an average of over four candidates per constituency.[21]

Following the 2005 multiparty transition, NRM-aligned parliamentary candidates have continued to spend heavily, and most notably, to counter *other NRM-affiliated candidates*.[22] Parliamentary aspirants first wage a costly battle in the NRM party primaries, discussed further below.[23] These primaries are nevertheless inconclusive as competition in the general elections is often fiercest between the official NRM flagbearers and NRM-leaning Independents who lost the primaries. In 2016, 909 Independents participated in the parliamentary elections versus only 262 candidates fielded by Uganda's largest opposition party, the Forum for Democratic Change, and this for a total of 402 directly elected parliamentary seats.[24]

Assessing the actual cost of these fractious campaigns is difficult due to a lack of reliable data. That said, a survey of MPs in the newly elected 10th Parliament found that, for the 113 MPs willing to provide an answer out of 185 MPs surveyed, the average declared spending per MP was approximately Ush219m or about $61,000, with a range stretched from USh10m up to USh1b – or $280,000, a huge amount in a country where the ~~GNI~~ per capita is $670.[25] The reported expenditure was highest among NRM MPs, followed by Independents and then Opposition. Crucially, when asked about the source of this money, 89% of respondents said they relied on 'personal resources' while 34% said that 'donations from friends' were the second most significant source. Given the low response rate for these questions, the results are only indicative, but if anything, they likely understate the actual sums involved. MPs interviewed around the 2016 elections suggested average campaign expenditure was closer to USh400m per candidate. Whatever the true figure, these MPs were quick to lament the financial burden they face due to rising campaign costs. One interviewee referred to the 'commercialization' of politics as a 'cobweb we have found ourselves entangled in'.[26] Another whose experience stretches back to the 1994 Constituent Assembly averred that spending by parliamentary candidates 'has grown and become […] an elephant difficult to control'.[27]

While individual candidates largely self-fund increasingly expensive campaigns, there is nevertheless a second category of cases in which select parliamentary candidates receive support from President Museveni or one of the wealthy inner circle of the NRM 'aristocracy'.[28] This discretionary support is motivated primarily by factional rivalries or a desire to eliminate oppositional MPs. On the first point, observers were already concerned about

spending by top NRM leaders in the 1996 elections. A long-serving major in the army, for instance, criticized NRM heavyweights for 'undermining the election', objecting that, 'The injection of money into the campaigns by some leading figures in the Movement is turning politics into a business.'[29] This practice has continued, with some of the wealthiest individuals in Uganda – many of whom have served in Cabinet for decades – either propping up candidates to oust rivals in neighbouring constituencies or else accusing each other of fronting candidates in their own constituencies to orchestrate their electoral defeat.[30]

Attempts to 'de-campaign', as it is called in Uganda, incumbent MPs who have broken with Museveni personally also began under the Movement system. The 2001 parliamentary elections were a watershed moment as MPs aligned with Dr Kizza Besigye were vigorously countered by President Museveni, using both the security forces and patronage.[31] In the post-2005, multiparty era, President Museveni has continued to back select candidates including by pitting rival contenders against troublesome incumbents, and this *within* the ruling party. One NRM MP, interviewed in summer of 2016 following a gruelling but successful re-election campaign, offered additional insight into how this 'system' operates.[32] He noted that, when it comes to MPs who are 'objective' and criticize government, 'They don't want us to come back.' There was allegedly a list of 78 (NRM) MPs who 'were not meant to come back', yet of whom 10 managed. In his case, he not only struggled to overcome his reputation as an FDC-sympathizer, but also offended one of the 'untouchables', a minister with close family ties to Museveni. In 2016, he managed to scrape through in the primary, but then in the general election, he claims 'they' gave Ush900m to an independent candidate to derail his campaign. He was then forced to take out additional loans and seek credit from business partners, endangering the future of his own commercial interests. During this period, he tried to contact Museveni directly, but only spoke with his 'machinery', getting promises of money that never came.

Finally, to the extent that there are more systematic efforts to support NRM flagbearers through official party channels, these tend to fall flat, undercut due to inadequate resources and unchecked corruption in the NRM Secretariat. The NRM as a party does not raise its own funds but instead relies on President Museveni, who in turn resorts to the diversion of public funds and donations from a pro-regime business constituency, among other means.[33] This money is then channelled primarily through the President's more informal campaign taskforce or 'machinery', as labelled by the above-cited MP.[34] Relatively little is redirected through the NRM Secretariat, which is ostensibly responsible for overseeing the party's campaign finance and mobilization efforts. As such, NRM parliamentary flagbearers received only Ush25m per constituency MP in 2016, a sum MPs dismissed as 'peanuts', 'paltry', 'nothing'.[35] What's more, the funds overseen by the Secretariat in many instances never reach their destination, embezzled en route or repurposed to suit some informal campaign agenda.[36] This misappropriation of funds further weakens the Secretariat, and with it, the entire NRM bureaucracy. For instance, the failure of party officials to account for Shs28b earmarked for the 2016 elections split the Secretariat into rival camps while staff on the party's payroll – from grassroots to national level – went for months without receiving their salaries.[37]

In sum, mobilising resources for parliamentary campaigns in the NRM remains a largely personal effort orchestrated by individual candidates amidst sporadic funding from the 'centre', which encompasses – broadly speaking – Museveni, his fractious inner circle, and a weak party Secretariat.

Party-building, or not

The NRM's largely decentralized and politically fraught system of campaign finance has important consequences for party institutionalization efforts. Already the above discussion points to some of the organizational weaknesses regarding the party primaries and Secretariat. I now focus on the parliamentary primaries to better gauge the extent of NRM party institutionalization. The primaries are a strategic focus given that candidate selection is a core function of any political party – and arguably *the* core new function of the NRM-O as it switched from 'individual merit' to partisan-based competition. The nomination process is also a powerful indicator of a party's organizational strength.[38] As noted by Kent, a party organization 'can lose its candidates time after time in the general election without greatly diminishing its strength or losing the grip of its leaders … But […] any organization that cannot carry the primary election is a defunct organization'.[39] I assess the NRM primaries using two of Huntington's oft-referenced criteria for party institutionalization. I show how the *complexity* and *coherence* of the NRM's candidate selection procedure is consistently undermined, and this because of the distribution of campaign finance within the party, reinforced by NRM leaders' contradictory desires to oversee party institutionalization while retaining their discretionary powers within the party.[40]

First, Huntington defines organizational complexity as 'both the multiplication of organizational sub-units, hierarchically and functionally, and the differentiation of separate types of organizational subunits'.[41] Complexity as it relates to a party's candidate selection procedure can thus refer to the number of subunits involved and their role differentiation in the nomination process, for instance whether they have an advisory or decision-making power. Regarding the NRM, it started out already with a relatively simple selection procedure. In 2005, directly elected parliamentary candidates were selected by electoral colleges consisting of members of the sub-county and parish party conferences within the constituency, except for district women representatives who were selected by colleges comprising members of the party district and sub-county conferences.[42] This method for nominating candidates did not last, though, and by 2010 was replaced by an even simpler system of selection. Candidates are now chosen based on universal adult suffrage with no mediation by official party organs. This change was meant to help curb the widespread bribery and allegations of rigging that succeeded the 2005 primaries. As one former Minister explained, 'Few people can be bribed and swayed but you can't do this to the majority'[43] – that is, the local party conferences are vulnerable, but an entire electorate is beyond the reach of any one candidate's purse. From an early stage, therefore, factional infighting among well-resourced parliamentary aspirants and their support networks effectively undermined the complexity of the NRM candidate selection procedure. Party leaders sought to defuse conflict by simply removing the party organizational units – as much as possible – from involvement in the process, leaving factions to fight it out before the electorate.

This attempt at a procedural quick fix did not achieve the intended results, as becomes clear through further consideration of the NRM's internal 'coherence'. According to Huntington, organizational coherence requires consensus as to the 'functional boundaries' of the group and 'the procedures for resolving disputes which come up within those boundaries'.[44] He further specifies that 'autonomy' is 'a means to coherence' as it allows for 'the

development of organizations and procedures that are not simply the expressions of the interests of particular social groups'.[45] Going by these definitions, the NRM has a very low level of internal coherence. For one, it has all but given up formally resolving disputes over the nomination process. The primaries in 2010 were, if anything, more controversial than in 2005 as disgruntled candidates again pointed to widespread bribery, vote rigging, violence and intimidation as reasons to contest the official primary results.[46] The same set of accusations and counter-accusations then resurfaced in 2015. After repeated threats from NRM top officials to apply disciplinary measures, the party ultimately allowed defeated parliamentary aspirants to campaign as Independents without any sanction. In each instance, President Museveni – who also serves as the NRM Chairman – assumed the role of final arbiter. Despite at first joining other party officials in demanding discipline and respect for primary results, he ultimately acquiesced to Independents' demands. They were thus allowed to participate in the general elections and even to identify themselves with the NRM, using the party colours and, crucially for Museveni, supporting the President's campaign.[47]

While the NRM thus sacrifices formal procedure in favour of informal dispute resolution, further consideration of the primary process itself and its management reveals the extent to which it is, to use Huntington's phrase, an 'expression of the interests of particular social groups'. The 'functional boundaries' of the party organization are eroded due to factional infighting and the decentralized, largely informal nature of party finance that fuels such power plays. The NRM parliamentary caucus released in 2014 a damning report on the 2010 primaries, which further illustrates this point.[48] It notes that, when 'redundant' party structures are reactivated ahead of elections, they suffer from a general lack of funding.[49] During the 2010 primaries, the party operated with a budget of only USh4b despite a planned expenditure of USh18b, or roughly $1.8m instead of $8m.[50] As a result, there was 'no facilitation or meagre resources supporting grass roots party officials' as well as officials from the NRM Electoral Commission.[51] This left them 'vulnerable […] to bribery by candidates' while the primaries generally remained 'highly monetized'.[52] The report also cites the 'indiscipline' of the party leadership, observing that, 'Some senior party leaders support and facilitate particular aspirants during primaries and independents or even opposition candidates during the general elections against the party flag bearers.'[53] It thus paints a picture of a nomination procedure and, more generally, a party organization co-opted by private interests with the financial wherewithal to compensate for the absence of adequate central party resource mobilization.

In sum, the NRM's official nomination procedure lacks both complexity and coherence. The end result is a partial abdication of the party's core function to select and promote its flagbearers, who instead face a messy array of NRM-aligned Independents in the general election. A major reason for the party's failure to institutionalize rests with its fragmented internal distribution of power and resources. The NRM leadership plays a contradictory role in perpetuating this status quo. On the one hand, the party Chairman and other officials call for more discipline – insisting, for instance, that NRM-aligned independents will be sanctioned. On the other hand, Museveni and his close political allies – many of whom do not occupy any party office – cling to their discretionary powers, waving rules when it suits them and manipulating campaign funds in line with their immediate political interests. This discretion comes at a cost, however, as any aspiration towards a consolidated, more disciplined ruling party – a CCM of Uganda – is largely forfeited.

An ongoing tug-of-war with parliament

As noted in the introduction, President Museveni saw the multiparty transitioning as heralding the end of his 'wars' with Parliament, a cessation of undignified 'beseeching'. Yet these expectations – and the expectations of many observers of Ugandan politics – have not been met. A major reason for enduring executive-legislative tensions in Uganda is the decentralized control over resources within the NRM and its consequent failure to institutionalize and form a more cohesive party.

In making this claim, I again draw on a political parties literature, which after first examining the 'alliances and struggles for power' within parties, moves on to analyse how these struggles influence party leaders' ability to discipline their members in parliament. Where legislators rely on personal resources or informal factional support to advance their political careers, they retain more independence from the party leadership in the House and more frequently rebel against a party line. The reverse is true where MPs' political and material security depends on their close association with a formal party apparatus and the resources it provides.[54]

In addition to this comparative literature, I also return to an older generation of Africa-centred research, which I briefly referenced at the start of the previous section. This research corrects for many of the weaknesses of the more recent Africanist literature, particularly on parliaments. The recent work dismisses 'neo-patrimonial' politics – including MPs' spending on campaigns and constituency service – as degrading their legislative contributions.[55] There is some truth to these claims, particularly in so far as pressure on MPs to spend makes them more vulnerable to executive co-optation, a point discussed further below. Blanket references to the nefarious effects of 'neo-patrimonialism' are, however, misleading.[56] Crucially, they ignore important cross-country variation in the structure of patronage networks and the extent of party institutionalization. Consequently, they fail to appreciate the significance of this variation for understanding differences in legislative activity. An older generation of mostly single case study research, however, echoes the comparative literature on political parties and parliaments through its nuanced analysis of the nexus linking political finance, party-building and legislative independence.[57] For instance, scholars found that the relatively strong control over political finance exercised by Tanzania's ruling CCM party – particularly during parliamentary elections – curtailed the ability of its MPs to emerge as prominent local patrons, and thereby helped ensure party cohesion both inside and outside of Parliament. By contrast, Kenya's ~~KANU~~ party, in a manner more closely resembling Uganda's NRM, allowed for its incumbent and aspiring MPs to wage expensive and divisive electoral campaigns without the party playing any significant role as mediator. This fractious intra-party competition allowed, in turn, for a far more restive parliament with frequent executive-legislative clashes.[58]

I adopt the above-outlined analytical focus to explain persistent executive-legislative tensions following Uganda's 2005 transition. I first briefly summarize trends in the performance of the Ugandan Parliament, highlighting continuities from the Movement period through to the most recent parliamentary session (2011–2016). I then demonstrate how the nature of political finance within the NRM – along with the party's organizational weakness – erodes party cohesion, creating room for a more assertive legislature. Finally, I indicate how the source of Parliament's strength also determines the tools available to

Museveni as he seeks to reassert his executive do
lacking, Museveni can exploit legislators' financial
dency to accumulate large debts. This nevertheless
cise, requiring continual intra-elite bargaining as t
cajole his MPs with ever more generous patronag

The performance of the Ugandan parliament

The first parliament elected after the ratification o
sixth Parliament (1996-2001) – is widely remembe
cipled legislative body. MPs united to challenge
gations, censured ministers, and passed key
Administration of Parliament Act (1997) and th
started as private member's bills and contributed
capacity and powers of the legislature.[59] President
ing the more independent-minded Speaker, inst
Caucus, and more aggressively monitoring MPs'
the sixth Parliament, and the apparent further we
overall impression of gradual authoritarian retrenc
perhaps reached its nadir in 2005 when MPs ame
dential term limits, and this after the majority of

Closer scrutiny of Parliament's actual performa
tive of uninterrupted legislative decline. Across a r
bution has remained stable, or even grown, from th
instance, of the 436 bills introduced in the four pa
the ninth Parliament, 43 were private member's b

it does, however, provide an important corrective in so far as it suggests continuity in parliamentary activity pre- and post-2005. It is this continuity – and the persistent executive-legislative tensions which accompany it – that I now seek to explain.

Perpetuating 'individual meritism'

The enduring pattern of highly personalized and individually funded campaigns by NRM candidates – and the relative absence of formal party involvement in the electoral process – is a first major factor underpinning continued parliamentary assertiveness post-2005. It can be a challenge to directly link parliamentarians' experiences as candidates and their subsequent behaviour in the legislature. However, the subjective observations of both parliamentarians and party officials help affirm this connection, as does evidence from legislative debates.

In interviews, MPs routinely cite their campaigns as evidence that they won based on 'individual merit', thereby directly associating their experience with the pre-transition Movement system. One MP suggested that 'individual meritism' is still the prevailing system, recognized by voters and candidates alike. In her view, it couples personal independence with a primary responsibility to answer to voters:

> As an NRM MP, you are accountable to your party but also to all those other people who elected you. If anything, I put my electorate first because if my electorate drops me then I won't be here and I won't be useful to my party.[65]

Other NRM MPs stressed how they would sell their candidacy to voters through an explicit promise to challenge the party. Referring to his primary stump speech, one MP recalled,

> I told [people] I will strive to fight corruption. That was number one on the agenda. […] I was very clear that I am not coming to please leaders. I am coming to lead people and to represent their views.[66]

This insistence on political autonomy and the specific invocation of individual merit can be interpreted as an ideological legacy of the Movement period. Indeed, many MPs and observers express nostalgia for the Movement system and lament the new restrictions on open debates. As already implied, however, the political economy of electoral politics in Uganda today is a major reason for the continued relevance of the 'individual merit' idea. A party official working in the Office of the Government Chief Whip (OGCW) in Parliament made this point explicitly in a statement, which is worth citing in full:

> *People still have a hang-over of individual merit* where they could offer themselves as individuals, come to parliament and talk as they want, debate as they want and arrive at whatever position they want as individuals. So disciplining them to toe the party line is a serious problem. *One of the reasons is that it is a little bit expensive for someone to finance himself or herself to come to parliament* to the tune of about Shs400 m ($120,000), but the party contributes between Shs20 m and Shs25 m, less than 10% of what this person is spending to come to parliament. So when this person comes to parliament, *owning him or her becomes difficult*, so therefore disciplining him or her is difficult, much as he is carrying the party flag.[67] (emphasis added)

The earlier-cited parliamentary caucus committee report on the 2010 NRM primaries arrives at a similar conclusion. It notes that, in the absence of reliable financial support

from the party, 'Candidates are subject to the vagaries of personally funding campaigns, *which dilutes party control over members*.'

Another oft-cited reason for an individual merit hangover is the electoral hegemony of the NRM, which effectively concentrates competition within the party as a catch-all for aspiring politicians. In this vein, party officials cite MPs from the South and West of the country, the historic NRM heartland, as among the most unreliable:

> In the West of the country, if you are not in the NRM, it is a bit difficult for you to win a constituency. So you may find that someone may not believe in the NRM, but because he wants to come to parliament, he will go with NRM.[68]

This observation recalls the earlier discussion of intra-party competition – notably during NRM primaries – as far surpassing inter-party competition between NRM flagbearers and their opposition party opponents.

It is difficult to trace specific instances of indiscipline to MPs' heavy spending during campaigns, or to the related financial burden associated with meeting constituents' more routine demands. The link is nevertheless more direct with regards to budgetary issues. MPs frequently refer to the added pressure they face from constituents where government fails to deliver essential services. As one interviewee recalled,

> I've had to give a pick-up to my local health centre. If the health centre were well facilitated, this wouldn't happen. It ends up coming down to practicing politicians to do the role that government should have done.[69]

Constituents' expectation that MPs should compensate for poor services also creates an incentive to lobby government more aggressively for improvements in local service delivery, as noted by several interviewees:

> The main challenge I have seen is that access to social services […] Of course as MPs we need to raise this to the government so that government can […] provide the services in a better way[70]

> The moment you step in your constituency, you may find it hot. And they tell you, 'This is what we want.' So eventually you generate a change mood from within a constituency. […][71]

Annual parliamentary debates over the national budget further indicate how this 'change mood' can filter through to influence members in their consideration of government policy. For instance, in 2012, MPs from both the opposition and ruling party side jointly pushed for an increase in the funds allocated to the Ministry of Health, a move which was partially successful, leading to the additional allocation of approximately $16m and the recruitment of 10,000 new health workers. During the heated debates over the proposed amendments, NRM MPs were explicit in linking the continued popularity of the NRM government to the provision of quality public services:

> Yesterday we lost a seat to the Opposition in Butambala District. This was because of poor service delivery in hospitals and health units. Even in Gombe Hospital, there is a polling station within the staff quarters and they have about 200 staff, but we got 10 percent of the votes.[72]

> The key commitment that Government made to the people of Uganda was to improve service delivery. It is in this spirit that I want to appeal to Government to heed to the concerns of the members. This is what will enhance the popularity of our Government.[73]

Beyond the fortunes of the NRM party, MPs also referenced their own struggles to meet constituents' expectations, thereby indicating personal motivations for demanding relief from government:

> Pity MPs from areas like mine. We have now resorted to buying ambulances; facilities are not there; hospitals are nowhere within our areas. So, we need to allocate some good amount of money to the health sector.[74]

> In this country, the calamity and condemnation we face is all about life. So if we do not come out strongly to increase the health budget, we will continue being victimised, especially we Members of Parliament where the failure of service delivery bounces back to us.[75]

These statements, both regarding the popularity of the NRM as a party and concerning MPs' own individual popularity in their constituencies, help illustrate how pressure from voters to act as a local patron can fuel bi-partisan legislative opposition to government policy, and this amidst staunch opposition from President Museveni. Indeed, the President called multiple NRM parliamentary caucus meetings over the course of the 2012 budget debates, at one point walking out on MPs after declaring that he would not 'sacrifice the defence budget for anything', referring to Parliament's recommendation that Government re-allocate money from defence to health.[76] MPs nevertheless held their ground, even as the prospect of a government shutdown loomed.

MPs' tenacity in this instance provides an example of how the personalized nature of campaign finance – of which constituency service is an extension – can prompt legislators to prioritize constituents' demands over the NRM party line, even if this involves a direct confrontation with Museveni. However, the 2012 budget debate was also fuelled by another side-effect of the NRM's poorly coordinated electioneering, namely intra-elite factionalism. Backbench attacks on an aloof and self-interested Frontbench were a regular feature throughout, seemingly feeding off a divide between rank-and-file MPs and Museveni's privileged inner circle. As one especially vocal first-term MP intoned,

> These members here on the frontbench do not know what is happening down there. When they even have a slight headache, they are flown outside for treatment. […] I wish they could go down on the ground and see what people go through. We had a tour of the Eastern Region and the whole Kibuku District does not even have a doctor. [HON. MEMBER: 'Tell them'].[77]

This larger schism aside, more personal enmities also enflamed the debate. The then Prime Minister Amama Mbabazi, the Leader of Government Business and chief defender of the official party line, was a principal target for the ire of several MPs with whom he had less than cordial relations. One particularly outspoken contributor was an NRM legislator, Chris Baryomunsi, whose own constituency bordered Mbabazi's in the western district of Kanungu. The two were locked in a factional war in the area, which spilled over onto the national stage. Baryomunsi not only criticized Mbabazi's official proposal for not addressing the core issue of health worker recruitment, but individually shamed the Prime Minister for his alleged failure to attend to his own constituents in Kanungu, commenting:

> This is a very good example of a very bad statement brought by the Prime Minister (*Laughter*). I have six patients from Kanungu in my house and two of them are from the Prime Minister's constituency because they cannot get service in Kanungu. […] There is only one medical doctor serving the whole of Kanungu.[78]

Mbabazi had another, more high-profile critic in the Speaker of the House, Rebecca Kadaga, who was seen to resent the Prime Minister and, at various stages, accused him of funding rival candidates in her Kamuli constituency. Kadaga allowed the debate to drag on and also personally intervened, again directly challenging Mbabazi. For instance, she questioned his claims that there was no money to redirect towards the health sector budget, noting:

> Prime Minister, I have been here for some time and do remember that at some point, when it became necessary to fund the war in the North, the Government directed that every ministry surrenders some money and I passed the vote – and we all did, and found the money. (*Applause*) I do not know. Because we were able to do that when we had less money, why can't we do it now? Think about it.[79]

The 2012 budget debates were certainly not the only time NRM MPs' electoral concerns, constituency pressure or individual resentment undermined party discipline. Other budgetary issues – notably regarding teachers' salaries, ~~VAT~~ for everyday consumer goods and tax on agricultural inputs – also prompted NRM MPs to abandon the party line. Debates over particularly controversial pieces of legislation were another source of executive-legislative tensions, notably two Petroleum Bills introduced by government – following Parliament's prompting – to regulate Uganda's emerging oil and gas sector.

AQ9

Buying back loyalty

The above discussion examines the politics behind legislative opposition in the post-2005 period, highlighting the significance of NRM MPs' personalized campaigns and intra-party tensions. This then leaves the question of what strategies President Museveni can use to pacify the NRM parliamentary majority and thereby reassert his executive dominance.

Unsurprisingly, partisan disciplinary tools do not work particularly well. Caucus meetings with MPs are admittedly one way to beat them into line, but this generally requires an additional sweetener, as discussed below. In 2013, the NRM disciplinary committee expelled four 'rebel' MPs from the party – the first ever expulsions – but this does not appear to have set any meaningful precedent. Indeed, ahead of the 2016 elections, President Museveni invited all four renegades back into the NRM fold, seemingly fearful of an alternative situation whereby they each win as Independents or else back Amama Mbabazi – by then Museveni's rival for the presidency. Two of the MPs accepted to run on the NRM ticket while all four returned to the 10th Parliament.

With the partisan coherence of the NRM seemingly growing ever weaker – for instance, Independents now caucus with NRM legislators – President Museveni relies primarily on financial inducements to win over troublesome MPs. In this regard, individual MPs' campaign spending is a double-edged sword: it both inspires legislative independence and exacerbates MPs' vulnerability to executive co-optation.

The nature of this vulnerability is reflected in the way parliament becomes more docile towards the end of a parliamentary term. This relative decline coincides both with the approach of a new campaign season and the deteriorating financial position of individual MPs. The expense of campaigns, and of continued constituency service, pushes many parliamentarians into debt. There are also aggressive loan sharks who target newly elected

MPs with the promise of cheap credit while they are still enthralled by their new salary and allowances.[80] MPs' indebtedness is widespread, and in the worst cases, has resulted in arrests.[81]

President Museveni, meanwhile, has been known to gloat over MPs' financial woes, observing that only 50 MPs in the ninth Parliament had an independent source of income.[82] As one parliamentarian remarked, 'Museveni calls MPs "internally displaced",' referring to the way some of his colleagues elude creditors by hiding in their offices.[83] The President then makes a show of bailing out distressed parliamentarians, both from the ruling party and opposition, while trips to State House are another opportunity for MPs to lobby the President for financial assistance.[84]

If MPs do not access Museveni directly, they can go via the OGCW. The funding for the Office comes from both the parliamentary budget and the budget of the Office of the Prime Minister. In practice, however, it draws on classified expenditure – primarily from Defence and State House – to provide extra, off-budget support for MPs as a way of ensuring their loyalty.[85] As one official clarified, there is a need to draw on classified expenditure to assist MPs with 'personal problems'. He noted,

> Assume you are facilitating a member of parliament who has lost a loved one, a chairman. How are you going to account for the money? Are you going to call it a donation? But you see, facilitating that member is very important *such that he knows that he belongs to a party that cares*. So you see the challenge there is in terms of accountability. How are you going to make someone account for that money?[86] (Emphasis added)

The official made clear that this business of ensuring an MP 'knows that he belongs to a party that cares' is a direct effort to counteract the widespread indiscipline in the House. He went on to describe exactly what role the office can play, commenting:

> [We intervene], for instance, by informing the rest of members that a person has lost a very important person, maybe a relative, a mother, a father or a campaign manager. Two, we mobilize some resources in terms of contributions to funeral arrangements and to ensure that members attend to condole the bereaved. Or if it's a fundraising, we encourage members to join the colleague maybe for a church, a school or a SACCO [Savings and Credit Cooperative].[87]

In addition to addressing 'personal problems', the OGCW can also serve as a conduit for linking MPs to Ministers such that they access funds for constituency service. This is a routine practice, but it can be especially effective as a strategy for quelling opposition to government budget proposals. As the official explained,

> There have been people who have come here and said, 'We have been trying to meet the Minister of Works about roads in our constituency but we have not managed to meet him, so why should we support his ministerial policy statement?' […] So when the Chief Whip calls them, listens to them, addresses such issues, then they get back to the fold.[88]

As is clear from these statements, MPs' financial stress and constituency pressure provide a direct means for the party to buy back their loyalty. At the same time, the use of classified expenditure and discretionary access to budgetary assistance from various ministries creates a powerful incentive for MPs to forego aggressive oversight of the government budget. The steady increase in the amount of money allocated to classified expenditure has raised concerns; however, parliament continues to rubber-stamp

controversial supplementary budgets to defence and state house, among other sectors.[89] Ultimately, on the issues where MPs seemingly have the greatest incentive to challenge government – namely regarding the allocation of public funds, notably to social services – they also appear the most susceptible to bribery and co-optation.

MPs' votes are, nevertheless, not always for sale, as the previously discussed examples illustrate. They also do not sell their votes cheaply, forcing President Museveni to satisfy an inflationary trend in legislative patronage. The earlier mentioned bribe of Ush5m – roughly $3000 – to ensure MPs remove presidential term limits in 2005 was met with shock nationwide, not least because of the gravity of the issue at stake. At the beginning of the current 10th Parliament, as noted at the start of this article, Museveni acquiesced to USh45b – or $13.4m – in tax exemptions for MPs, and this merely to ensure the election of his preferred candidate for Deputy Speaker of Parliament.[90] The cherry on top came when – following the announcement of victory for the official NRM candidate, the current Speaker, Rebecca Kadaga, addressed Museveni. 'Your Excellency', she said, 'the MPs want to have a party at Guvnor tomorrow', referring to a popular club. She then added, 'We want your [financial] assistance, as usual.' Museveni only nodded, apparently submitting as the tail wagged the dog.[91]

Conclusion

Executive-legislative tensions in the post-2005 period reflect a process of intra-elite bargaining within Uganda's poorly institutionalized and fractious ruling party. While many observers expected the NRM to consolidate into a more cohesive and disciplined organization following the multiparty transition, the formal change in Uganda's statutes brought about no such transformation. Instead, the Movement-era political legacy endures, perpetuated through the highly personalized and contentious nature of electoral mobilization and campaign finance. By failing to recentralize control of campaign spending and leaving parliamentary candidates largely to their own devices, the NRM leadership undermines its own nascent efforts to ensure greater party institutionalization. The consequences of this failure to build a strong ruling party play out in a more assertive legislature where NRM MPs – who form the overwhelming majority in the House – frequently rebel against the party line. Unable to enforce partisan discipline, Museveni is compelled to buy back legislators' support through executive patronage, 'bargaining' with MPs whose concerns range from principled to personal to purely acquisitive. Admittedly the opposition parties also play an important role in the multiparty Parliament, at times galvanizing legislative debate, but it is the internal NRM politicking that determines whether the legislature has an impact or not.

This analysis challenges several core assumptions in the recent Africanist and Uganda-centred literature, notably regarding centralized executive control over patronage, the nature of ruling party hegemony, and the extent of executive dominance. It builds on an alternative comparative politics literature and older generation of Africanist scholarship to refocus attention on the political economy of electoral politics and party-building. This emphasis, in turn, helps clarify the nature of intra-elite relations and how these then affect executive-legislative politics.

More comparative research is needed to examine variation in the distribution of power within ruling parties and its implications for party institutionalization and legislative

autonomy. In the meantime, this analytical approach helps clarify some of the structural constraints and trade-offs affecting Museveni's power within the NRM. He often appears the omnipotent President to the extent that even the weakness of the ruling party becomes an advantage. As argued by Wilkins in this issue, Museveni manipulates factional competition to deflect popular frustration over poor service delivery, while preserving his own status as the immovable patron-in-Chief. But there is a flip-side to the NRM's decentralized campaign finance and factionalism. Museveni cannot allow this situation to endure yet still aspire to transform the NRM into a 'CCM of Uganda', taming intra-elite conflict and subduing executive-legislative tensions. He cannot have his cake and eat it. Rather, barring some highly unlikely re-engineering of intra-party politics, Museveni will remain a President who cannot escape 'beseeching' his own MPs, and at an ever-greater cost.

Notes

1. Accessed 28 November 2016: http://www.observer.ug/news-headlines/44305-how-gen-museveni-tamed-mps-on-oulanyah.
2. Barkan, *Legislative Power in Emerging African Democracies*.
3. van de Walle, "Presidentialism and Clientelism," 309; Mozaffar and Scarrit, "The Puzzle of African Party Systems."
4. Doorenspleet and Nijink, *One-Party Dominance*; Nijink et al., "Parliaments and the Enhancement of Democracy."
5. Carbone, "'Populism' visits Africa," 13.
6. Tangri and Mwenda, *The Politics of Elite Corruption*, 67; Tripp, *Museveni's Uganda*; Makara, Rakners and Svasand, "Turnaround"; Oloka-Onyango, "New Wine in New Bottles?"; Kasfir, "'Movement' Democracy in Uganda"; Rubongoya, *Regime Hegemony in Museveni's Uganda*.
7. See especially Barkan, *Legislative Power in Emerging African Democracies*; Cited in Nijink et al., "Parliaments and the Enhancement of Democracy."
8. Carbone, *No-Party Democracy?*; Kasfir and Twebaze, "Uganda's No-Party Parliament."
9. Ibid; Rubongoya, *Regime Hegemony in Museveni's Uganda*.
10. Cited in Carbon, "'Populism' Visits Africa," 9; cited in Kasfir and Twebaze, "Uganda's No-Party Parliament," 104.
11. For instance, Tanzania's ~~CCM~~, Namibia's SWAPO or Botswana's ~~BDP~~.
12. Carbone, "'Populism' Visits Africa"; Oloka-Onyango, "New Wine in New Bottles?"; Kasfir, "'Movement' Democracy in Uganda," 67–8.
13. Makara, Rakner, and Svasand, "Turnaround," 193–4. Emphasis added.
14. Tripp, *Museveni's Uganda*, 113.
15. Cited in Kiiza, Svasand, and Tabora, "Organising Parties," 227.
16. Izama and Wilkerson, "Museveni's Triumph and Weaknesses."
17. Panebianco, *Political Parties*, xii.
18. Michels, *Political Parties*, highlights this point through a comparison of European socialist parties at the turn of the twentieth century.
19. Okumu and Holmquist, "Party and Party System Relations."; Baylies and Szeftel, "The Zambian Business Class"; Hyden and Leys, "Elections and Politics in Single-Party Systems."
20. Carbone, *No-Party Democracy?*, 149–52.
21. Carbone, *No-Party Democracy?*, 138 and 150.
22. Vokes and Wilkins, this issue.
23. The Alliance for Campaign Finance Monitoring (ACFIM) final report on the 2016 presidential and parliamentary elections notes that, 'The NRM primary elections for MP flagbearers for 2016 turned out to be the most expensive for contestants in the history of the party' (13).

24. The Electoral Commission, "List of Nominated Candidates for 2016 General Elections," accessed 25 November 2016: http://www.ec.or.ug/?q=info/list-nominated-candidates.
25. Accessed 25 November 2016: http://data.worldbank.org/country/uganda.
26. Interview 1, NRM MP.
27. Interview 2, NRM MP (Byarugaba).
28. Accessed 28 November 2016: http://africanarguments.org/2015/06/29/family-therapy-dynasty-and-change-in-uganda-by-angelo-izama/.
29. Cited in Oloka-Onyango, "New Wine in New Bottles?," 59.
30. Tangri and Mwenda, *The Politics of Elite Corruption,* especially chapter 8. See also: Accessed 25 November 2016: http://www.newvision.co.ug/new_vision/news/1230439/kutesa-ssekikubo-divide-sembabule; Accessed 25 November 2016: http://www.observer.ug/special-editions/40127-kadaga-mbabazi-is-targeting-me.
31. Carbone, *No-Party Democracy?*, 141–2.
32. Interview 3, NRM MP.
33. Tangri and Mwenda, *The Politics of Elite Corruption*, 116.
34. ACFIM, "Extended Study on Campaign Financing."
35. Recurrent theme in interviews with NRM MPs.
36. Tangri and Mwenda, *The Politics of Elite Corruption*, on embezzlement of NRM funds in the 2001–2011 elections (115). ACFIM, "Extended Study on Campaign Finance." Accessed 25 November 2016: http://www.monitor.co.ug/News/National/NRM-probes-party-officials-over-stolen-campaign/-/688334/3127560/-/8wlk2hz/-/index.html.
37. Accessed 25 November 2016: http://www.newvision.co.ug/new_vision/news/1428752/todays-vision-nrm-campaign-money-kazibwes-au-bid; Accessed 25 November 2016: http://www.observer.ug/news-headlines/45280-nrm-officials-miss-salaries-for-3-months.
38. Rahat and Hazan, "Candidate Selection Methods"; Masket, *No Middle Ground.*
39. Kent, *The Great Game of Politics*, 11.
40. I use Huntington's criteria of complexity and coherence and leave aside his reference to adaptability – which by his definition is less relevant in this context – and autonomy, which I see more as a cause rather than an effect or indicator of party institutionalization.
41. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies*, 18.
42. "Constitution of the NRM," as adopted 22 May 2003.
43. Accessed 25 November 2016: http://www.newvision.co.ug/new_vision/news/1243431/nrm-leaders-constitution-review.
44. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies*, 22.
45. Ibid, 21.
46. Accessed 25 November 2016: http://www.newvision.co.ug/new_vision/news/1281546/nrm-vows-eliminate-independents.
47. Accessed 15 June 2016: http://www.observer.ug/news-headlines/41369-museveni-now-backs-nrm-independents.
48. See, "Final report of the NRM parliamentary caucus select committee on NRM primary selections," July 2014. This report was only compiled after MPs – frustrated by the NRM Secretariat's failure to probe irregularities in the party primaries – insisted that President Museveni allow them to investigate.
49. Ibid.
50. Ibid.
51. Ibid.
52. Ibid.
53. Ibid.
54. Michels, *Political Parties*; Masket, *No Middle Ground.*
55. Barkan, *Legislative Power in Emerging African Democracies.* Note that this contrasts with Barkan's earlier research, which was more sensitive to the analytical approach adopted here.
56. This focus on pervasive 'neopatrimonialism' reflects a general trend in the Africanist literature of the 1990s and 2000.

57. Barkan and Okumu, "Linkage Without Parties"; Gertzel, *The Politics of Independent Kenya,* esp. Chapter 5; Kjekshush, "Parliament in a One-Party State." Recent doctoral theses also refer to this literature: Cheeseman, "Civil-authoritarianism in Africa"; Opalo, "Institutions and Political Change."
58. Ibid.
59. Kasfir and Twebaze, "Uganda's No-Party Parliament"; Carbone, *No-Party Democracy?*
60. Ibid.
61. Private members' bills are a barometer of the executive's ability to monopolize the legislative agenda, although the executive may occasionally orchestrate the introduction of a Private Members' Bill for strategic reasons as appeared to be true, for instance, of NRM MP Sseki-toleko's constitutional amendment bill. Accessed 12 September 2016: http://www.observer.ug/news-headlines/46398-unmasking-kafeero-ssekitooleko.
62. Kasfir and Twebaze, "Performance and Efficacy."
63. Ibid.
64. Tangri and Mwenda, *The Politics of Elite Corruption.*
65. Interview 4, NRM MP.
66. Interview 5, NRM MP.
67. Interview 6, Official in OGCW.
68. Interview 6, OGCW.
69. Interview 7, NRM MP.
70. Interview 8, NRM MP.
71. Interview 9, NRM MP.
72. *Hansard*, NRM MP, 13 September 2012.
73. Ibid.
74. Ibid.
75. Ibid.
76. Accessed 28 November 2016: http://www.monitor.co.ug/News/National/Museveni-storms-out-of-meeting/688334-1511336-u3i90hz/index.html.
77. Ibid, 18 September 2012.
78. Ibid.
79. Ibid.
80. Accessed 25 November 2016: http://www.monitor.co.ug/News/National/Legislators-loans-as-swearing-in-enters-/-/688334/3207688/-/qsyn1xz/-/index.html.
81. Accessed 15 June 2016: http://www.observer.ug/news-headlines/37701-heavy-debt-mps-named; This issue was raised by several interviewees.
82. Accessed 15 June 2016: http://www.observer.ug/component/content/article?id=24180:president-says-only-50-mps-can-sustain-themselves.
83. Interview 10, NRM MP.
84. Accessed 15 June 2016: http://www.observer.ug/news-headlines/33244--state-of-emergency-as-mps-get-bailed-out-.
85. Interview 6, OGCW.
86. Ibid.
87. Ibid.
88. Ibid.
89. Additional Supplementary Budgets were passed just prior to the 2016 elections: ACFIM, "Extended Study," Chapter 11.
90. Accessed 15 June 2016: http://www.monitor.co.ug/News/National/URA-lose-MPs-tax-exemption/-/688334/3214448/-/3gjs33/-/index.html.
91. Accessed 15 June 2016: http://www.observer.ug/news-headlines/44338-how-oulanyah-survived-nrm-mps.

Disclosure statement

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AQ11 Bibliography

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