

INDIFFERENCE TO PAST HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN CHILE:

The Impact on Transitional Justice Success, 1990-2017

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ABSTRACT

INDIFFERENCE TO PAST HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN CHILE:
THE IMPACT ON TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE SUCCESS, 1990-2017
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The purpose of this thesis is to explain how and why a sector of the Chilean population is indifferent to past human rights violations committed during the dictatorship of General Augusto Pinochet (1973-90), and also what the consequences of that indifference are in Chile today. An explanatory sequential and non-nested mixed methods design has been applied: the quantitative analysis is based on the *2013 National Bicentennial Survey* (N=2,004), and the qualitative analysis is carried out from fifty-three in-depth and semi-structured interviews to indifferent and non-indifferent individuals. It is argued that indifference to past human rights violations is the result of various processes of socialization that influence the individual, being relevant life experiences and social interactions related to political issues. According to the survey, 16.02 percent of the sample is indifferent to past atrocities. Regarding the causes of indifference, binomial logistic regression highlights four variables: political orientation, socio-economic status, generational cohort, and perception of social conflict. The analysis of in-depth interviews shows that the three most common sets of variables that explain indifference to past human rights violations are: the predominant emphasis on search for family and personal well-being, discomfort with politics, and fear of a recurrence of the pre-coup d'état crisis and post-coup authoritarian experiences. Qualitative analysis shows that indifference is dynamic and visible. There are also different intensities in the spectrum of indifference. As the indifferent are a heterogeneous group, distinctions between disillusioned, submissive, depoliticized, and resigned indifferent are presented. It is also argued that the indifferent cynics are a problematic group for transitional justice, democratic consolidation, and the rule of law. Regarding the social consequences, the indifferent may actively promote social indifference in their interactions; indifference has become a socially accepted norm by other sectors, and indifference facilitates the persistence of the culture of impunity over time.

DECLARATION

I hereby certify that this doctoral thesis is the result of my own work except where otherwise indicated and due acknowledgment is given.

HugoRojas

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5 October 2017

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ABBREVIATIONS

ANEF	National Association of Public Employees
CASEN	National Socioeconomic Characterization Survey
CEP	Centre of Public Studies
CERC	Centre for Contemporary Reality Studies
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency (United States of America)
CNI	National Information Centre
CNTV	National Television Council
CORFO	Production Development Corporation
DINA	National Intelligence Directorate
ECLAC	Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean
FPMR	Manuel Rodríguez Patriotic Front (*Frente*)
IC	Christian Left Party
ILO	International Labour Organisation
INDH	National Institute of Human Rights
INE	National Statistics Institute
IPHRV	Indifference to past human rights violations
MAPU	Unitary Popular Action Movement
MIR	Revolutionary Left Movement
OECD	The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
PNUD	Programa de las Naciones Unidas para el Desarrollo
PC	Communist Party
PS	Socialist Party
PUC	Catholic University of Chile
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
UP	Popular Unity (*Unidad Popular*)

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For my family

Chapter 1: Indifference Matters

Ours is a time of uneasiness and indifference.

—C. Wright Mills

1. RESEARCH PROBLEM

In the last fifty years Chilean society has been described as a deeply divided and polarised society (Moulian 1997; Jocelyn-Holt 1998; Ensalaco 2000; Loveman & Lira 2000; Loveman & Lira 2002; Piper 2005; Lazzara 2006; Stern 2006; Policzer 2009; Stern 2010; Hidalgo 2011; Bucciferro 2012; Winn 2013; Carvacho et al. 2013; Collins 2014; Stern & Winn 2014; Borzutzky 2017). This polarisation has been mainly political-ideological, although there are also deep socio-economic contrasts among the different social sectors (Fermandois 2013: 235-6; PNUD 2017: Ch. 2). This thesis argues that, in the context of deep polarisation, there is also an *indifferent* population that needs to be carefully examined. Indifference is a problematic social phenomenon because the indifferent person does not feel empathy with victims of human rights violations. Indeed, the human capacity to feel or care for another is less developed in those indifferent to human rights than in people who are more empathic with the suffering of others. When a significant sector of the population has indifferent attitudes and opinions, building a strong human rights culture may become an elusive goal.

This thesis explains the roots of indifference towards past human rights violations committed during General Augusto Pinochet's dictatorship in Chile (1973-90). It identifies the groups of indifferent people, when they pose obstacles for transitional

justice—the search for truth regarding the human rights violations; judicial investigation, prosecution, conviction, and punishment of the perpetrators; reparation for victims and family members; and encouragement of social memory regarding the human rights violations—, and how those obstacles might be overcome. The main objective is to analyse the phenomenon of the indifference of citizens to human rights abuses committed by the past dictatorship in a society that has gone through a period of political transition towards a fully democratic regime. By explaining the causes and impact of social indifference to truth-seeking, criminal prosecution, reparation of victims, and memory of past state violence (Barahona de Brito 2001; Gahima 2013: Ch. 1; Skaar et al. 2015), this thesis contributes theoretically and empirically to the fields of human rights, memory studies and transitional justice.

Literature review led to the formulation of a theoretical framework on social indifference in modern society to human rights violations committed in an authoritarian past. A set of research questions formed the basis for explaining how and why a sector of society reacts indifferently to past human rights violations during a political transition, and what the social consequences of that indifference are. Three central and guiding questions will be answered throughout this thesis: 1) Who are the people that are indifferent to human rights violations committed during the dictatorship? 2) What are the main explanations for that indifference? 3) What are the social consequences of that indifference in Chile today?

The case study selected for this sociological research corresponds to the experience of the long-lasting and incomplete Chilean transition, which began in 1990 (Linz & Stepan 1996: Ch. 13; Borzutzky 2017: 219). Original data collected in Chile in different periods from 2013 to 2016 has been analysed to answer the guiding questions. For various reasons—which will be discussed in this dissertation—Chile offers insights

into the phenomenon of *indifference to past human rights violations* (hereinafter IPHRV). In some respects, Chile can be considered as a paradigmatic case of transition from authoritarian rule to liberal democracy. The academic literature on political transitions highlights the Chilean transition as a successful example of democratic consolidation, economic development, and strengthening of the rule of law (Angell 1993a; Altman 2006; Navia 2007). Despite its undeniable achievements, the Chilean transition presents a set of constraints that deserve to be carefully examined (Moulian 1994; Barton & Murray 2002). Public opinion surveys show that a significant sector of Chile's population is not interested in the search for truth, criminal justice, reparation or the memory of the traumatic past (Huneeus 2003: Ch. 5; INDH 2013; INDH 2015). The indifferent represent an understudied population with regard to transitional justice and the ultimate goals of social reconciliation and *Never Again*—that is, avoiding any future massive violations of human rights.

This investigation may be useful for researchers who are analysing how societies process and settle accounts with their traumatic past in different regions. For example, despite the recognition of a 'dominant memory' that values human rights in Argentina (Catela da Silva 2010; Garbero 2017), there are also social sectors that since the 1970s have been more passive and opt for silence and oblivion, forgetting the past (Lessa 2013: 81-2; Carassai 2014: 4; Gates-Madsen 2016: 4). The case of post-authoritarian Brazil is even more complex since the denial of human rights violations has been more widespread than in Argentina (Schneider 2010) and the opposing memories are highly disputed in the public sphere (Aarão Reis 2004). Regarding the Spanish case, there exists a persistent and ongoing tension between memory and oblivion of the Civil War (1936-39) and the dictatorship of Francisco Franco persists (Aguilar 2007: 65). For the Spanish right-wing, the reference to historical memory is synonymous with revenge and

endangers the foundation of the functional agreements of democracy, whereas for the political left it is essential to remember the repression of the Franco regime and compensate victims and their relatives (Aguilar 2008: 76-8). Due to fear and self-censorship, the silence of many has been the consequence of a deliberate pact of oblivion shared by the vast majority of Spaniards (Aguilar & Payne 2016: 3). Evidently there are many countries in which intolerance and political polarisation have triggered acts of barbarism and state terrorism in recent decades. Recalling and interpreting the meaning of past human rights violations can be the subject of discord, and not all members of a given society may be interested in sharing their views on those events.

Research on transitional justice today focuses attention on victims and perpetrators (e.g., Etcheson 2005; Elster 2006: Ch. 5 and 6; Lazzara 2006; Payne 2008; Boesten 2010; Lira 2010; Nalepa 2010; Haider 2011; Rimé et al. 2011; Robins 2011; Gahima 2013; Jara 2013; Lessa 2013; Caswell 2014; Davidovich 2014; Aguilar & Payne 2016). An important contribution in recent years represents numerous interdisciplinary studies on the effectiveness and efficiency of transitional justice mechanisms (e.g., Hayner 2008; Moon 2008; Thoms et al. 2008; Olsen et al. 2010; Sikkink & Michel 2013; Skaar et al. 2016). However, research on the social sectors that have indifferent behaviours, attitudes or opinions regarding the events of the past are still scarce (e.g., Cohen 2002; Tester 2002; Robeen 2004; Fletcher 2005; Carassai 2014; Nussio et al. 2015). While transitional justice scholarship has dealt with social polarisation (e.g., Valencia & Páez 1999; Moser & Clark 2001; Barsalou 2005; Lazzara 2006; Aguilar et al. 2011; Haider 2011; Lessa 2013; Rožič 2014; Nussio 2015), it has not sufficiently considered the impact of social indifference on the processes of dealing with the past. Indeed, transitional justice studies tend to be premised on the notion of two memories, that of the victims and that of the perpetrators. This memory struggle

does not consider a relevant social group that chooses not to have memory or that gives little importance to past human rights violations: *the indifferent*. Literature fails to provide explanations about who these individuals are, how they can be indifferent to a shocking past, and what this means in terms of building a *Never Again* human rights culture. Consequently, by understanding IPHRV, this thesis seeks to contribute towards filling a gap in transitional justice studies. It should be noted that there are also other social sectors that choose not to remember, as happens in those cases where trauma, guilt, or genuine support for the policies of past authoritarian regimes may push some to avoid concern for violations of human rights without being indifferent.

There is an underlying assumption that social actors care about their past—either to defend or condemn past actions—and engage in efforts to promote their views. But what if that assumption is incorrect and a significant portion of the population really is not concerned with the past at all, with no interest whatsoever in either defending or condemning human rights violations? In *Democracy in America*, Alexis de Tocqueville argues that democratic governments do not easily learn from the past (1988 [1835]: Ch. 5). For example, after World War II ended, collective amnesia prevailed in the Federal Republic of Germany (Herf 2008; La Rocca 2010: 8). At first German society attributed the responsibility for the Final Solution to Hitler and a small number of Nazi leaders. Only in the 1960s did the New Left trigger a process of self-criticism about the horrors of the Nazi era in German society. Whether in Germany, or more recently South Africa and a number of Latin American countries, in regard to transitional justice goals, nations can learn from their past experiences (Elster 1988: 93-9; Elster 2006: 15). But that is not always the case. How likely are transitional justice processes to fulfil their goal of addressing past wrongs if a significant proportion of the population is indifferent to that goal?

In the second section of this chapter the concepts of social indifference, transitional justice, and IPHRV are briefly explained. Although these notions are discussed with more detail in chapter 3, it is convenient to anticipate here the most relevant concepts underlying this research. The third section of this chapter briefly explains the importance of investigating the Chilean transition in-depth. The historical roots of indifference in the era of the dictatorship and in the Chilean transition are explained in chapter 2. However, it is appropriate, at the outset, to provide a general overview of the Chilean context and the particularities of this negotiated, incomplete, and supposedly exemplary political transition. Additionally, in this section the selection of the case study is justified. In the fourth section of this introductory chapter the main arguments that justify this research are provided. Then, the research design and methods selected and applied are briefly explained. A complete methodological chapter is provided which further discusses the quantitative and qualitative components of this investigation. The final section offers a general outline of the content of each thesis chapter.

2. CONCEPTS

a) Indifference

The word indifference derives from the Latin expression *indifferentia*, which means not making any difference: *in* (not)–*dis* (divergence)–*ferre* (to carry). According to the *Oxford English Dictionary*, indifference is the quality that characterises the indifferent (1989: 864). Indifference is conceived as the midpoint between appreciation and contempt. An indifferent person is one who does not appreciate the difference or the

distinction, the importance of something or someone. Therefore, being indifferent means not feeling passion or compassion for (or against) someone or something. From an inter-subjective point of view, indifference is the attitude or frame of mind of nonchalance of an individual towards another individual whose presence is not of interest or concern (Tester 2002: 177). As the indifferent person does not recognise and ignores the other (Arteta 2012: 72), his presence takes the form of absence. Since in many situations people are expected to be supportive, sensitive, empathetic and compassionate, indifference to pain or the needs of others may be subject to moral and social criticism (Bauman 1991: Ch. 1).

C. Wright Mills argues in *The Sociological Imagination* that indifference is the signal feature of our era: "Ours is a time of uneasiness and indifference—not yet formulated in such ways as to permit the work of reason and the play of sensibility" (2000 [1959]: 11). In the post-World War II era, Mills argued that sociology should be especially interested in understanding indifferent people, and particularly those who felt no indignation at barbarism and horror. Mass society can shape the subject into a morally insensitive being who accepts or condones atrocities committed by state agents. In addition, the rationalisation of modern society is highlighted as one of the causes of social indifference (Herzfeld 1992; Hibou 2015). It is a threat to democracy when "the individual becomes the spectator of everything but the human witness of nothing" (Mills 1958: 78). As indifference is one form of social interaction in modern society (Sutton & Norgaard 2013: 499), prominent sociologists have tried to explain its origins and meanings. According to Ulrich Beck, labour and professional specialisations generate indifference (2001). Division of labour and hyper specialisation make people lose interest in participating in social relations in which we intervene in everyday life. Indifference can also be linked to self-preservation mechanisms adopted by the

individual as a condition of survival or protection (Giraud 2008: 56). As Anthony Giddens warns, it is not possible to dissociate indifference from the fear that a person may experience because of social or state repression (1999). For Zygmunt Bauman moral indifference (*adiaphoron*) is one of the most sensitive issues of the times in which we live (2015: 55). In his lecture *The Perils of Indifference*, Elie Wiesel has argued that indifference makes a human being inhuman (1999). According to Mills, "the social scientist's foremost political and intellectual task [is] to make clear the elements of contemporary uneasiness and indifference" (2000 [1959]: 13).

The social consequence of indifference is also a subject that needs to be investigated by social scientists. It is perfectly possible that indifference may be one of the causes of social fragmentation in contemporary society, since indifference weakens social cohesion and trust. If indifference is seen as the lack of interest or concern for others, indifference becomes a pattern in social relations when members of a political community are neither interested in the other nor in the future of the community. In that sense, it may well be said that indifference has a destructive potential, because social ties are weakened by the lack of mutual trust and solidarity.

b) Transitional Justice

The notion of transitional justice became widespread in social sciences after Ruti Teitel coined the term in the early 1990s, referring to "the conception of justice associated with periods of political change, characterised by legal responses to confront the wrongdoings of repressive predecessor regimes" (2003: 69). Transitional justice has been conceived as a process that comprises all judicial, non-judicial, and public policies implemented by societies in transition after a dictatorship, a totalitarian regime, or an armed conflict (Lessa 2013: 10-12). More specifically, the United Nations has defined

transitional justice as the "full range of processes and mechanisms associated with a society's attempts to come to terms with a legacy of large-scale past abuses, in order to ensure accountability, serve justice and achieve reconciliation" (UNSC 2004: 4). These mechanisms can be promoted by international organisations, the state, and civil society, to ensure that political communities face the atrocities and conflict situations of the past (Skaar & Malca 2015: 1), including cases of human rights violations and state terrorism. These measures include truth commissions, trials, amnesties, pardons, reparations, vetting, memorials, and museums, among other devices (Posner & Vermeule 2004: 766). Such mechanisms are promoted by public authorities, political leaders, and civil society to achieve more ambitious political goals: the preservation of peace, social reconciliation and cohesion, promotion of democracy, human rights, and the rule of law. As Barahona de Brito et al. point out "varying degrees of political, social, and institutional constraints affect the solutions adopted or limit opportunities to deal with the past" (2001: 1).

Transitional justice is also conceived of as a recent interdisciplinary academic project which analyses those political transitions that occur mainly after civil wars or authoritarian regimes. The reflection focuses on how societies in transition face their violent past and, at the same time, achieve democracy and the rule of law in a new era of political coexistence. During transitional periods "societies are struggling with how to transform their political, legal, and economic systems" (Teitel 2000: 11). From the last decades of the twentieth century, and parallel to the end of Latin American dictatorships and totalitarian regimes, this academic project has been specialising and consolidating as a particular interdisciplinary topic in the field of social sciences (Aguilar et al. 2011: 1398; Lessa 2013: 10-12; Stan 2013: Ch. 1). Through recent research on transitional justice processes it has been possible to analyse

systematically—and generalise from empirical evidence—the impact of various mechanisms that are being used by transitional regimes to confront the past (e.g., Olsen et al. 2010a; Olsen et al. 2010b; Kim & Sikkink 2010; Sikkink 2013; Cárdenas et al. 2014; Lessa et al. 2014; Jeffery & Kim 2014; Stan 2014; Skaar et al. 2015). From a theoretical point of view, this does not mean that there is consensus in the literature on the frameworks of transitional justice (Subotić 2009: 25-26; Schneider & Esparza 2015: xiv). Moreover, as political conflicts persist in every continent, the different models of transitional justice applied by governments or developed by academia require constant review and refinement. For example, the emphasis on the occurrence of a political transition in the concept of transitional justice is questionable.

It is noteworthy that transitional justice studies began after the crimes against humanity committed during the Second World War (Teitel 2000: 31-6), although in the last three decades we have seen a proliferation of this type of research. Transitional justice literature is characterised by combining theoretical and practical aspects (e.g., Olsen et al. 2010b; Loyle & Davenport 2015). Many members of the academic community dedicated to transitional justice research pay attention to accountability and how societies take responsibility for fundamental rights abuses committed in the past (e.g., Hilbink 2007; Collins 2010; Sikkink 2013). Some research has focused on measuring and comparing the social impact of truth commissions, trials, amnesties and pardons (e.g., Hayner 2008; Moon 2008; Olsen et al. 2010; Sikkink & Michel 2013). This type of knowledge examines and monitors the impact of the application of various mechanisms and devices of criminal justice—judicial investigation, prosecution, conviction, punishment—, truth, reparation of victims and their relatives, and memory on societies in transition. Some experts on transitional justice are associated with the developments—in particular in the arts and humanities—of memory studies (e.g.,

Hirsch 1995; Wilde 1999; Hite 2012; Jelin 2003; Stern 2004; Lazzara 2006; Gómez 2006; Lessa & Druliolle, eds. 2011; Lessa 2013). Other authors interested in political transitions have focused their sights on the processes and mechanisms to ensure the consolidation of democracy and prevent authoritarian reversals (e.g., O'Donnell et al. 1986; Mainwaring et al. 1992; Linz & Stepan 1996; Barahona de Brito 1997; Elster 2004). Consequently, the concept of transitional justice refers to (1) the interdisciplinary and systematic academic *study* of how societies confront human rights violations committed during previous authoritarian or totalitarian regimes, or because of wars or civil wars (Corradetti et al. 2015: 2), and (2) to the actual political and social processes and public policies adopted, from country to country, in response to past human rights violations.

In the case of societies that have lived under military dictatorships and then began a process of institutional democratisation, transitional justice mechanisms that are used during the years of political transition can be quite varied. As Méndez points out, the idiosyncratic features of transitional justice mean that no specific formulas or recommendations must be strictly followed when dealing with the past, as each society in transition corresponds to a unique experience (Mezarobba 2007). As the atrocities committed in the past are a crucial matter for society and the process of transition to democracy, it is imperative to answer the following four questions: 1) What mechanisms are being used to seek "the truth" regarding the nature and extent of human rights violations or crimes against humanity? 2) What steps have been taken to judicially investigate such crimes, combat impunity, and punish those who are responsible? 3) What policies or mechanisms have been taken by the government and civil society to repair the damage caused to victims and their families during the years of repression? 4) How are the horrors of the past being remembered and commemorated

in the name of *Never Again*—that is, in the hope of preventing such human rights violations in the future? A brief description of each of these four interdependent components that constitute the core of transitional justice is presented below: truth; justice—as judicial proceedings, punishment, deterrence (in the form of avoiding impunity)—reparation, and public memory to avoid future human rights violations.

i. Truth-seeking

Victims may be interested in obtaining financial compensation so that they can put their lives back together, but generally what they most want is that "the truth" be known, preferably as a result of judicial investigation and prosecution. Both victims and society are entitled to know the facts about human rights violations, the identity of victims, the scale and types of violations, identification of sites of repression, and the names and positions of victimizers (Gómez 2006: 37-38). But those who ordered or committed human rights violations often take measures to prevent the truth regarding human rights violations and other crimes from being known (Elster 2006: 281). To avoid leaving records or evidence of the crimes, frequently orders are given verbally by high-rank officials to destroy files and documents that might be useful to clarify the circumstances pertaining to human rights violations. One of the most egregious measures for not leaving traces of the crimes committed is the clandestine disposal or "disappearance" of victims' corpses. This inhumane and extreme decision continues causing pain over time and prevents the grieving process by the relatives of those who have been executed (Castillo 2013: Ch. 5; Norambuena 2015). Without the body of the disappeared it is neither possible to perform the funeral rite nor to acknowledge the death of a loved one (Lira 2015: 568). The search for the bodies of the disappeared is not only a goal of the immediate family, but a drama that affects the whole population (García 2011: 113). In

addition, seeking the truth also matters to those who survived political imprisonment or torture (Lira 2010: 16).

One mechanism widely used in the last thirty years to investigate the traumatic past is the appointment of official "truth commissions" entrusted to elucidate and produce official reports regarding human rights violations. The reports of truth commissions serve to publicly acknowledge past abuses, removing to some extent the veil of denial and silence (Hayner 2008: 55). However, the legal mandates of such commissions have been quite varied, making their findings difficult to compare and their political effects from country to country quite controversial.

ii. Criminal Justice

To avoid impunity and social forgetting of human rights violations, advocates of transitional justice call for judicial investigation and prosecution of the victimizers. Criminal justice is associated, in general, with judicial investigation, prosecution, conviction, and sentencing of the perpetrators. However, perpetrators have used various means to escape justice: self-amnesties, statutes of limitations on crimes, self-exile, etc. There is some consensus in the international community on condemning these attempts to avoid responsibility, and the jurisprudence of international tribunals has been clear: amnesty or statutes of limitations cannot be invoked in cases of genocide, torture, and crimes against humanity (Inter-American Court of Human Rights 2001; Inter-American Court of Human Rights 2006).

The pursuit of criminal justice is a complex and tense affair for many societies in transition. The optimum result is that crimes are investigated and that the accused are sentenced by national or international courts with jurisdiction. But reality has shown that the legal system can be manipulated by those who hold de facto rule, ensuring their

impunity during the transition years. For example, according to Judge Juan Guzmán, in the first years of the Chilean transition, perpetrators were confident in the impunity that 'authoritarian enclaves' in the political system provided them: "The system had been absolutely ordered by the military before handing over the power to civilians" (2005: 135). To strengthen the rule of law, it may be necessary for societies in transition to introduce changes in the judiciary, the legal culture, the constitution, and other sources of law (Fuenzalida 2003). But applying such changes *retroactively* raises questions about the legitimacy and legality of ex post facto applications of criminal law—a theme raised in Chilean legal debates during the military dictatorship and since 1990.

iii. Reparation

Ideally, the abuse, harm, and loss suffered by victims should be fully repaired, but such complete reparation is never possible. However, a variety of policies offer compensation and indemnity to victims of state violation of human rights. These may include: financial compensation; restoration of confiscated property; reassignment to jobs lost due to purges and persecution in the public administration; restoration of citizenship (where this has been taken away by the authoritarian regime), health and mental health services; counselling, scholarships, and social assistance from the state (Gómez 2006: 58-59), among others. Obviously, all of these measures are palliative and can never fully repair the profound consequences of human rights violations. But they are also symbolic, because the state is officially recognising the existence of victims who have been identified and is committed, through public policy, to reparation for the harm caused. Furthermore, measures such as the recovery of citizenship, the formulation of public apologies, and the dissemination of commemorative works, among others, restore the dignity of victims. Along with boosting reparation policies, it

is equally important, and more difficult still, that victims have the perception that they have received reparation or at least that society has made efforts to compensate for the damages caused (Lira & Loveman 2005: 9).

iv. Memory

The notion of memory is identified with public acknowledgement and diffusion of knowledge in diverse arenas of the human rights violations. This may include public apologies—thus adding restoration of dignity (symbolic reparation)—, museums, memorials, etc. The memory of human rights violations contributes to the *Never Again* political project. Indeed, memory—in addition to criminal prosecutions, truth, and reparations—may help to prevent similar atrocities from happening again (Stern 2010: 19; Lessa 2013: 16).

Societies, like individuals, reconstruct versions of the past in the present. It is important to become aware of how societies remember the traumatic past under authoritarian or totalitarian regimes. From a sociological point of view, to investigate the diverse and sometimes competing collective memories that exist within a political community involves answering what, how, when, and why certain past events are remembered by social actors. In divided and polarised societies, disputed memories are likely to coexist (cf. Borzutzky 2017: viii), so collective memories are not universally shared and may be conflictive. As Elizabeth Jelin argues, memory can be a subject of controversies and political struggles among different sectors (2002: Ch. 3). Memory gives meaning to the past and may be a mobilising source in the present (Hite 2013: 20).

A relevant political and public policy challenge is to offer a society in transition an interpretative framework or narrative of the past that is socially shared (Jelin 2002: Ch. 4). Social actors in every society in transition not only have the right to know what

happened but also have the right to recall what happened. This issue is particularly sensitive for victims, survivors and their relatives, as the collective narrative of remembrance affects how others value and recognise them as human beings. The lack of recognition of the victims is an attack against their dignity. Moreover, museology, and memory sites are devices for remembrance, but they are also necessary mechanisms for the intergenerational transmission of the memory of the traumatic past. Because of that, memory initiatives cannot be left solely in the hands of civil society and memory entrepreneurs; the state should also fund initiatives of memorialization. However as political control over the state changes, such memorialisation becomes more and more a focus of political conflict. And such memorialisation may re-emerge as a political issue many years later. Memory struggles do not disappear; the past has numerous resurrections, in different versions, as current political ammunition.

c) Indifference to past human rights violations

To prevent political violence from happening again, the processes of transition to democracy should be as complete and successful as possible (O'Donnell & Schmitter 1995: 64; Olsen et al. 2010: 16). There are many variables that allow us to assess whether a transition has been successful or not. Among the main ones are the preservation of social peace, democratic stability, recognition of human rights, and respect for the rule of law (Orentlicher 1991: 2539). It is therefore desirable that trust is restored and progress towards social reconciliation between antagonistic sectors is reaffirmed (Kritz 1995: xx; Loveman & Lira 2002: 438). Along with strengthening and consolidating democratic institutions during the political transition, it is equally important to move towards an increasingly democratic culture in civil society (Linz & Stepan 1996: 9).

While pertinent research has been carried out at the institutional level, perceptions of public opinion are also necessary for understanding unexplored aspects of the sometimes fragile processes of transitional justice (Aguilar et al. 2011). In societies that have gone through periods of violence, civil wars, authoritarian or totalitarian regimes, and that are now in the phase of transition to democracy, it is necessary to understand the role, values, attitudes and opinions of people (Cárdenas et al. 2013). As José Zalaquett points out, "a policy to deal with the abuses of the past must be approved in a manner that reflects the will of the people" (1989). It is therefore relevant to pay attention to the perceptions and expectations of citizens and their level of commitment to the progress that can be achieved during the political transition (Backer 2003; Aguilar et al. 2011; Olsen, et al. 2012). According to Cárdenas et al. (2013; 2014), the consequences of collective political violence in Chile have not been overcome in the transition to democracy, and the limitations of a possible reconciliation among the different sectors persist. The issue is tremendously complex in cases where political violence has been of great magnitude, as the consequences of that violence extend into the future, even to several generations who did not directly experience repression (Arnoso et al. 2012: 7).

The indifference of the population to the human rights atrocities that were committed in the past is a problematic issue for the political transition process. IPHRV will be primarily understood as the lack of willingness and interest of people to be informed and to engage over state responsibility for human rights atrocities. If people have no interest in human rights—or are indifferent to the core elements of transitional justice—, that may adversely affect the outcomes of the political transition to democracy. The lack of sensitivity and empathy with victims and survivors of the state repression is an essential factor for the understanding of the limits and opportunities of

transitional justice processes in societies in transition. Citizens who are indifferent are often in favour of turning the page of the past—because they are not sensitive to the past horrors—and thereby they would not support public policies or judicial action to delve into it. Consolidation of democratic culture may be problematic if a considerable sector of the population is indifferent to a set of values and standards that should always be protected and safeguarded as fundamental rights. It is plausible to assume that indifference encourages impunity of criminals, introduces social forgetting and silence on the events of the past, and undermines the desire for reparation for victims. IPHRV is an obstacle to social ties among human beings and weakens social cohesion.

To be successful, political transition processes require social legitimacy, and citizens' indifference may undermine this essential basis of legitimacy. When social IPHRV is visible in a political transition to democracy, the attitude of unconcern or lack of interest of a person to what happened to others inevitably affects the main themes of transitional justice. The greater the level or degree of social indifference, the more likely animosities and political divisions of the past will persist during the political transition. If social divisions persist, the political climate may lead to new scenarios of violence and repression. Therefore, a complex political scenario is created when profound social and ideological differences on how to settle accounts with the past exist (Backer 2003; Robins 2011). For example, in polarised and divided societies it may be that some social sectors want to turn the page and forget, while other groups support the widest possible diffusion of what happened (Lazzara 2006: 13). IPHRV may hurt victims precisely because their pain is denied or falsely recognised. In the field of social relations indifference also may impede the construction of shared collective memory and the identity of a political community in a transitional period.

Consequently, IPHRV is a phenomenon that deserves to be carefully investigated in any political transition towards democratic stability. Explaining the factors contributing to such indifference and assessing the consequences in political transitions has been neglected in most studies of political transitions and transitional justice. Indifference may lead to social consequences in transitional societies that we still have not been able to fully understand. For example, if citizens do not care for truth-seeking, criminal sanctions, victims' reparations or memory of past atrocities, authorities and policy makers may neglect or defer in time the transitional justice agenda. Public opinion may influence decision-making at the institutional level, and the decisions made by public authorities and political leaders influence, positively or negatively, in the progress of the transitional justice agenda. The greater the indifference to the pain of the victims and their relatives, the more difficult it may be to reconcile the different sectors. Because indifference problematises the constraints of political transitions, this thesis reflects on a set of propositions concerning the on-going transitional justice process that takes place in Chile today. Beyond the academic project of transitional justice and the concrete processes of political transitions, as Tester (2002) argues, indifference to human rights atrocities is an eminently moral problem.

To recap, this research focuses on the indifferent people in a long-lasting and unfinished process of political transition, and tries to explain the causes and consequences of their indifferent behaviours, attitudes, and opinions regarding past human rights violations and atrocities perpetrated by state agents.

3. CHILEAN TRANSITION

The Chilean case has been selected to approach the phenomenon of IPHRV. From an academic standpoint, the Chilean transition is particularly interesting for four reasons: (1) Chilean society continues to be politically polarised; (2) it is a pacted or negotiated transition, characterised by the veto powers of the supporters of the former dictatorship and the persistence of authoritarian enclaves (Fuentes 2012: 17); (3) it is a transition of long duration: despite having started twenty-seven years ago, there are still important political debates and institutional conflicts over the past (1970-1990), and (4) it is considered to be an example of successful transition. The indifference of a considerable sector of the population could be one of the reasons why the Chilean transition has been so long. A demobilised citizenry for much of the 1990s may have been one of the causes explaining why it has not been possible to approve a new political constitution and accelerate the search for truth and justice in cases of human rights violations. It is therefore important to understand the role played by the phenomenon of IPHRV in the unfinished political transition to democracy.

a) Political polarization

Forty-four years after the military coup of 11 September 1973, Chilean society continues to be deeply divided and polarised (Brodsky 2013: 112; Wilde 2013; Huneeus 2014; Stern & Winn 2014). For example, whereas in 2006 43 percent of Chileans believed reconciliation among different political sectors was a reachable goal, within the next ten years that percentage decreased to 31 percent in 2015 (Irarrázaval 2015: 49). The current political division is partly a legacy of the ideological divisions of the 1960s

and 1970s, but during the political transition initiated in 1990 other socio-cultural changes have emerged, such as political disaffection, distrust of political parties, corruption, and lack of transparency in the financing of political campaigns, etc. It is worth making a critical reflection of the deeper and latent processes of the Chilean transition and thus revealing other socio-cultural aspects that are not normally considered in academic research, such as social indifference. The Chilean context and the roots of the expressions of IPHRV, both in the dictatorship and in the transition to democracy, are discussed in more detail in chapter 2.

However, it is useful at the outset to outline the dimensions of human rights violations in Chile from 1973 to 1990. State agents systematically and brutally violated fundamental rights of sectors of the Chilean population (National Commission on Truth and Reconciliation 1991; National Commission on Political Imprisonment and Torture 2004). Official sources document 3,065 political executions, some of whom are still "missing" (*desaparecidos*); 40,018 people have been officially recognised as victims of torture and political imprisonment (Presidential Advisory Commission for Qualification of the Disappeared, Executed Political Prisoners and Victims of Political Imprisonment and Torture 2011); about 12 thousand people sought asylum in embassies, at least 1,132 torture centres have been identified throughout the country; more than 200 thousand Chileans lived in exile; and 58 thousand people were dismissed from jobs for political reasons (Elster 2006: 84; Lowden, 1996). Of the 1,102 disappeared detainees (Corporación de Reparación y Reconciliación 1996: 580; Peñaloza 2015: 114), the state has only been able to identify the remains of 158 people (Norambuena 2015; UDP 2017: 58). By December 2015, a total of 1,373 former state agents have been prosecuted, accused or convicted, and 344 of them have been convicted by the Supreme Court (Ministerio del Interior 2015). Of the total convictions, 155 former state agents

have served time in prison. At the moment 117 people are serving their sentences in prison, and 1,328 cases of human rights violations are awaiting a court ruling (UDP 2017: 71). In comparison with other countries in the region, such as Argentina, Uruguay or Brazil, the extent of investigations, convictions, and punishment in Chile could be considered as impressive. However, given the scale of the atrocities committed, it is noteworthy that a sector of Chilean society now chooses to stand apart from what happened at the time, prefers not to be informed, and argues in favour of turning the page (PUC & Adimark-GfK 2013; Frei 2017: 15).

There are no recipes for how a society in transition should assume or overcome political violence, state terrorism, and past human rights violations. Once democracy was restored in 1990, like any country in transition to democracy, Chilean society was at a crossroads and had to solve a complex set of dilemmas to adequately confront the stormy past (Zalaquett 1992: 1426; Elster 1998; Lira & Loveman 2005: 14; Hayner 2008: 30). At the beginning of the Chilean transition there was a set of political concerns that were not easy to answer: Would it be possible that all Chileans could live in peace in the same territory? Would it be possible to heal the wounds of the past and dream of a shared future? Would it be possible to investigate and find the truth regarding events during the dictatorship? Would it be possible to punish the perpetrators of the atrocities and their accomplices? Would it be necessary to sacrifice the search for truth and criminal justice for political stability? Would it be possible to live in a democracy without fear of a return to authoritarianism? These dilemmas were formidably exposed by Ariel Dorfman in the epilogue of his play *Death and the Maiden* (1991), premiered on Broadway and London and then made into a film by Roman Polanski.

> As I began to write I found the characters trying to figure out the sort of questions that so many Chileans were asking themselves privately, but that hardly anyone seemed interested in posing in public. How can those who were tortured co-exist in the same land? How to heal a country that has been traumatised by repression if the fear to speak out is still omnipresent everywhere? And how do you reach the truth if lying has become a habit? How do we keep the past alive without becoming its prisoner? How do we forget it without risking its repetition in the future? Is it legitimate to sacrifice the truth to ensure peace? And what are the consequences of suppressing that past and the truth it is whispering or howling to us? Are people free to search for justice and equality if the threat of a military intervention haunts them? And given these circumstances, can violence be avoided? And how guilty are we all of what happened to those who suffered the most? And perhaps the greatest dilemma of them all: how to confront these issues without destroying the national consensus, which creates democratic stability?
>
> (Dorfman 1994: 48-9)

The main objective of the government of Patricio Aylwin (1990-4) was to achieve political reconciliation in the country (Otano 1995: 118; Loveman & Lira 2002: 15). Despite the efforts of the governments of the *Concertación* coalition and the permanent mobilisation of human rights organisations to advance the transitional justice agenda, the fact is that the political-economic system was/is controlled by a powerful elite, much of which was associated with the military regime (Matamala 2015; PNUD 2017: Ch. 10). Indeed, the conservative elite largely managed to preserve the constitutional and legal status quo inherited from the dictatorship.

As the years of the political transition progress, the marked left-right polarisation of the 1960s and 1970s may have declined, as political apathy has gradually increased in the last decades (Carlin 2006; Solimano 2012: 47). In this sense, the attitudes of indifference in the population do not promote social change but rather contribute to maintaining the status quo, characterised by a high concentration of wealth and the political and social exclusion of those who are not part of the elite.

b) Pacted transition

The Chilean transition is a typical case of negotiated or pacted transition between the new democratically elected authorities and the authorities who ruled the country during the dictatorship (Barahona de Brito 1997: 107; Lechner 2002: 67; Sanchez 2003; Garretón 2007: 42; Rubio 2013: 242; Spooner 2013: 3). More precisely, it is a transition that has been negotiated between the elites of political parties and the high command of the armed forces (Fuentes 2012). Such negotiations were conducted behind closed doors, and even a very important one triggered the 1989 referendum to amend the 1980 Constitution (Aldunate 1991; Andrade 1991). The political framework within which the political transition was carried out, has counted on the approval of the political and business elites (Fuentes 2012: Ch. 1). In that sense, the boundaries that were drawn in the early 1990s for the political transition were not the result of a participatory process. On the contrary, right wing and moderate political parties tended to demobilise the population with the intention of not affecting the fragile fledgling democracy. The left of the coalition and the human rights organisations and the victims' families, and their international allies kept the transitional justice agenda active. Indeed, opposition from these sectors, and others, prevented imposition of a Full stop law (*punto final*).

Of all the Latin American transitions that have occurred in the last three decades, Chile's transition is the one with the most authoritarian enclaves or institutional constraints on constitutional and legal reforms (Garretón 1991: 104; Garretón 2007: 109; Elster 2006: 84). The notion of authoritarian enclaves refers to non-democratic or non-majoritarian features of the 1980 Constitution, such as appointed senators, veto by the National Security Council over policy, extraordinary majorities required to approve certain types or legislation and constitutional reform, a Constitutional Court that could

declare proposed legislation unconstitutional, whose decisions were not subject to appeal, etc. For example, General Pinochet remained in power as commander in chief of the Army in the first eight years of the transition and then assumed the position of senator for life until he resigned in 2002. Notwithstanding the constitutional reforms adopted since 1989, the constitution in force in Chile remains the constitution approved in a referendum in 1980, under the dictatorship, without minimal electoral guarantees. The 1978 Amnesty law remains in effect, and is symbolically powerful, even if it has been circumvented in practice (Payne et al. 2015). The only way to move forward in the public decision-making process during the Chilean transition has been by finding broad consensus between the opposition and the government (Strasma 2010: 21). This feature has meant that the Chilean transition is characterised by its politics of consensus (Wilde 1999: 476). This consensus often did not take into account some of the demands of human rights organisations, victims' families, and the victims themselves.

Moreover, it is a transition that has recognised the existence of an unparalleled veto power given to the supporters of the dictatorship, in relation to what has happened in other transitions in Latin America. It should be noted that the ties between the right-wing opposition, the *Pinochetistas*, and the economic elite are quite close. The right-wing has practically exercised a veto power to prevent the progressive reforms pursued by the *Concertación* coalition (now called New Majority). For example, the supra-majority quorums established by the 1980 Constitution for constitutional reform are too high to allow modification of provisions of great political and economic importance. This ultimately has meant a standstill or blocking of some reforms that have been demanded by the most vulnerable and progressive sectors of Chilean society (e.g. the pension system reform, the approval of a new political constitution, the recognition of indigenous peoples, etc.). However, it would be unfair not to recognise that the leaders

of *Concertación* and New Majority have managed to carry out a set of social reforms for the benefit of the population (e.g. the public health reform, the reform to the payment system of university education, etc.), to the extent that such reforms have been supported by the economic elite or some right-wing politicians whose votes were needed in parliamentary debates.

c) Incomplete transition

Chile's political transition began the day that General Augusto Pinochet handed the presidential sash to Patricio Aylwin, on 11 March 1990. After twenty-seven years Chilean society is still immersed in the process of Transition to democracy, with the debate on past human rights violations still alive. The rule of law has not been interrupted, and seven governments have been democratically elected since 1990: Patricio Aylwin (1990-4), Eduardo Frei R. (1994-2000), Ricardo Lagos (2000-6), Michelle Bachelet (2006-10), Sebastián Piñera (2010-14), Michelle Bachelet (2014-18), and Sebastián Piñera (2018-22). It could be argued therefore that the Chilean transition is not only incomplete but also that the political transition cycle shows signs of attrition (Tironi 2010; Hidalgo 2011: Ch. 4; Colodro 2013: 296). Some authors have argued that the transition concluded in the early 1990s (Barton & Murray 2002: 331; Garretón 2000: 154; Heine 2001: 355; Garretón 2007: 78), so at the moment Chile would be experiencing a post transition phase. However, the majority of social scientists who study Chilean society and its institutions consider that the political transition cycle is not yet over (Moulian 2002 [1997]; Jocelyn-Holt 1998; Portales 1999; Heine 2001: 355; Loveman & Lira 2002: 13; Elster 2004; Lazzara 2006; Huneeus 2014; Borzutzky 2017: 166-7). Interestingly, this long duration of the Chilean transition allows us to explore a political cycle in its various transitional phases: early, intermediate, and late or mature.

The cultural background of a long-lasting political transition can be analysed synchronously in each of its various stages, but it is also possible to make a diachronic reflection of the whole process.


d) Successful transition

In the eyes of the international community, the Chilean transition has been classified as successful (Bucciferro 2012: xvi), even in terms of achievements in the field of transitional justice (Huneeus 2014: 27; Skaar et. al, eds., 2016). In fact, in these twenty-seven years, Chilean society has gradually progressed in condemning the guilty, repairing the victims, memorialising, and clarifying the truth of what happened during the dictatorship (Borzutzky 2017). However, the Chilean transition has important constraints and unsettled accounts (Moulian 2002 [1997]; Garretón 2007: 108). For various reasons—to be discussed in this thesis—many ordinary citizens are not satisfied with the outcomes of the political transition that has taken place. Although there is consensus in the global community about the importance of fundamental rights, Chilean citizens are not fully committed to their observance and protection (Huneeus 2013: 245-7). In an optimal scenario, accounts with the past should be settled in the first years of the political transition (Nino 1996; Elster 2004), but various experiences, including the Chilean transition, show that this does not always happen, as the rhythms of the transitional justice agenda can be accelerated (or decelerated) in more mature or late stages of the political transition.

It is also striking that the Chilean economy during the years of transition to democracy has generally performed well and the country is more prosperous that it was in 1990. Chile has weathered global economic crises in the last two decades relatively well. Indeed, since 1985 Chile has accelerated its annual average GDP growth rate by

nearly 2.5 percent above the 1940-1985 period (Solimano 2013: 323), reducing poverty from 38,6 in 1990 to 7,8 percent in 2013 (CASEN 2013). There are worrying indicators in terms of the concentration of wealth and income, and levels of corruption in the political class (Corral & Orcés 2013: 10; PNUD 2017: Ch. 10), but in general it can be argued that the economy has been performing relatively well in Chile. Some have even argued that Chile is an example of political maturity and civility (Silva 2016). This trait is not always present in political transitions, because in addition to political tensions, economic difficulties can be a threat to institutional stability.

Figure 1
Evolution of Poverty in Chile, 1990-2013 (%)




Source: Ministerio de Desarrollo Social (CASEN 2013).

The figure below shows the evolution of household income in Chile between 1990, 2000, and 2013. In general terms all social classes have increased their income, but this is particularly evident in the wealthiest sectors of society (known as A, B1, B2, C1a,

and C1b). Another important conclusion is that during the political transition, the size of the middle class (C2 and C3) has grown, while the size of the extreme poverty and lower classes (D, E1 and E2) has decreased.

Figure 2
Evolution of income distribution in Chile, by social class, 1990, 2000, 2013 (%)



Source: Allan (author's interview, 22 May 2016).

4. RELEVANCE

First, a detailed analysis of the indifference towards the traumatic past in Chile should contribute to a better understanding of the phenomenon of indifference in modern society. Second, this work can be understood as a specific contribution to the *Never Again* politics in countries in transition. Third, it seeks to promote the formulation and implementation of more effective public policies on memory and human rights. Fourth, in recent decades there has been an unprecedented boom in memory studies (Huyssen 1995: 5), but insufficient attention has been given to those people who do not want to remember or commemorate human rights atrocities. Fifth, this thesis can also be a

contribution to the strategies and policies to be implemented in societies in transition to deepen empathy, tolerance, and democratic values in the population.

a) Understanding indifference in modern society

It is crucial for social science to understand the social production of indifference in modern times (Mills 2000 [1959]: 13). We have reasonable grounds to be suspicious of the modern claim of rationality and emancipation of the individual. The emergence of multiple forms of political and social domination has long repressed and prevented the emancipation of the modern man (Adorno & Horkheimer 1979 [1944]; Foucault 1984: 46). Paraphrasing Ian Kershaw, the Holocaust and the Final Solution in Europe, the Dirty War of the military dictatorships in Latin America, and many other horrors committed during the twentieth century, occurred because of the cruelty of some but the indifference of many (1983: 277). Christopher Browning revealed that not only sadistic minds but also ordinary people can lose their ability to react against evil (1992; cf. Arendt 2001 [1963]).

Max Weber was the first sociologist to suggest that modern man is trapped in an Iron Cage (*Stahlhartes Gehäuse*) due to progressive processes of instrumental rationality (1958 [1905]: 181). In *Moral Blindness* (2015 [2013]), Zygmunt Bauman and Leonidas Donskis reflect on the loss of compassion in modern society: people have reduced their ability to respond to evil, and have become increasingly insensitive. In our epoch we live in fear, panic, and lack of protection; indifference operates as an anaesthetic against horror and cruelty (Suzunaga 2013: 246). In these increasingly complex, diverse and global societies, social ties fade easily and are more fragile and unstable (Bauman 2000). Bureaucratic, authoritarian, and technocratic personalities would be more likely to get caught by indifference (Hikal 2009; Hibou 2015: Ch. 4). As

will be seen in chapter 3, this thesis identifies different independent variables that could explain the phenomenon of IPHRV. In sum, academic research on indifference should help us to better understand the dilemmas facing modern society.

b) The development of a Never Again *culture*

From a moral point of view, how societies face their traumatic past is a matter of primary importance as it relates to the sensitive issue of human dignity. After the horrors experienced during the twentieth century, humankind has learned that the lack of condemnation of human rights atrocities can lead to increasing levels of atrocity in the future (cf. Gahima 2013: 6-7). To prevent state violence from happening again in the future it is essential that societies become aware and learn from past abuses (Peterson 2009). It is very difficult for a society in transition to develop a *Never Again* culture if impunity prevails over truth and justice, and if oblivion prevails over memory. When indifference becomes a widespread attitude of a considerable sector of the population, the struggle for transitional justice inevitably loses social support. Indifference to the traumatic past facilitates oblivion and affects the younger generations' necessary reflection on the cruelties committed by their predecessors. Any reference to the traumatic past may become a social taboo. It is problematic, controversial and dangerous when citizens are not capable of condemning military coups, human rights violations or state violence (Panizza 1995: 170). The backdrop behind this research is the importance of adequately sensitising Chilean society on the respect and promotion of human rights of all citizens, so that *Never Again* do ordinary citizens have to suffer state abuses as the ones committed during Pinochet's dictatorship. If Chileans want to build a *Never Again* and human rights culture, then all citizens should learn the lessons

from the past and commit to the search for truth, criminal justice, reparation, and memory.

c) More effective policies on memory and human rights

Before the design, implementation, and evaluation of public policies on human rights, it is necessary to have reliable public opinion polls. If policy makers do not have a correct diagnosis of the reasons as to why many people are not concerned or are disinterested in human rights and transitional justice, improvised, ineffective or poorly targeted initiatives could be implemented. Since this thesis seeks to explain the IPHRV in Chile today its findings can also be useful when reviewing the content, strategies and ways in which human rights are taught at schools and universities, and discussed in the public arena. This issue is important because both indifference and hostility towards human rights increase the frustration and pain of victims and their relatives by the lack of social understanding of their concerns. A better explanation of social indifference in Chile today can also contribute to more effective policies of memory. To promote the *Never Again* project, both nationally and internationally, indifferent sectors that are currently ignoring or want to forget the repressive past need to be involved (Achugar, 2004: 121-6; Clark & Payne, 2011: 102). The indifferent do not engage in the debates over memory; their failure to engage, however, blocks, rather than advances, *Never Again* memory politics. Even if people do not act on the basis of their political beliefs, knowledge, and recognition of human rights violations is considered essential to the defence of democratic values against possible threats in the future (Zalaquett 1989). It is easy to ignore the indifferent opinions and attitudes in the population, precisely because they are often invisible or do not receive attention via public opinion or the mass media. However, such perceptions should be measured and discussed. There is no doubt that

those who are hostile to human rights issues impede the development of a *Never Again* culture. But it may also be that the indifference of some sectors of the population affects the development of a culture of human rights in a given country.

d) Expanding memory studies

This research may also be seen as a theoretical and empirical contribution to the emerging field of memory studies. The main novelty of the boom of studies on collective memory in the last three decades has been to provoke reflection on why, what, and how we remember the past. Just as there are points of connection between historians and sociologists when analysing the past, the main difference lies in the object of study and research methods. Sociology of memory is interested in showing how a given society assumes its past and integrates it in the present. If the temporary status of any act of memory is always in the present, as Huyssen suggests, then collective memory is essentially a sociological concern (1995: 3). As the act of remembering is always selective, there is information that can be discarded and forgotten by society. Instead of investigating what we remember and commemorate, this thesis pays attention to the reasons why social groups are sometimes indifferent to the consequences of the traumas of the past. Memory entrepreneurs have not sufficiently examined their successes and failures to overcome the indifferent memory, and instead easily allocate their energies and resources preaching to the choir. Indifference may be the seed that later becomes social silence and collective amnesia. To understand indifference from a sociological point of view it is necessary to conceptualise its dimensions and verify preliminary hypotheses with empirical data. This thesis will contribute to the identification of the variables that best explain the causes and impact of indifference in fragmented societies like Chile's today. Such explanations may be

relevant for understanding similar attitudes in other transitional or post-transitional societies.

e) Promoting democracy

This thesis also contributes to studies on social democratisation and democratic deliberation. It is perfectly possible that a society has a formal democracy, but with a deep deficit in terms of the values that underpin the political system, especially tolerance, freedom, and human rights. The main suggestion made by the United Nations Development Programme in relation to Latin American democracies is to move from a democracy of voters to a democracy of citizens (PNUD 2004). In fact, one of the main challenges of societies in transition aiming to consolidate democracy as a political system is expanding the democratic culture of its citizens. Psychological studies show that when individuals exhibit high levels of tolerance, flexibility, empathy, and interpersonal trust, the support for democratic values is more likely to be stronger (Miklikowska 2012). Indifference and citizens' apathy towards political and public affairs are obstacles for democracy, because low levels of participation and commitment end up damaging the legitimacy of the political order (Macedo 2005: Ch. 1). It is unlikely that the politics of memory will have positive results if they have no impact on the vast majority of the population. The promotion of memory contributes to the expansion of the democratic culture and, consequently, the strengthening of a democratic system. This reflection may also be of interest to other researchers and community leaders fighting against social indifference and political apathy in societies in transition or post-dictatorship. In that sense, this study may lead to future interdisciplinary and comparative research in countries such as Germany, Brazil, the Czech Republic, Peru, Romania, Spain, South Africa, and Uruguay, among others.

Indifference, rather than mobilization, best describes the challenges faced by most societies emerging from authoritarian rule.

5. METHODS

a) Mixed methods

To explain the characteristics, causes, and impact of social indifference on past human rights atrocities in Chile's transition to democracy, a mixed methods design has been selected. More specifically, the study uses a sequential and non-nested mixed methods design. As Small points out, "sequential studies have exploited several of the advantages of mixed methods studies, such as the ability to understand the mechanisms behind newly discovered associations or to test emergent hypotheses" (2011: 67). It is not a nesting data collection design because obtaining quantitative and qualitative data from the same individual units was impractical (id.: 70). The combination of semi-structured interviews, participatory observation, and statistical analysis of a national survey is appropriate for an empirically-informed and critical analysis of the phenomenon investigated. All data collected through qualitative and quantitative methods helps to obtain greater insight into the research questions than would be obtained by either type of data independently (id.: 64). In addition, secondary sources, audio-visual documentaries, and archives located in different documentation centres and institutions have been analysed during an extensive period of fieldwork in Chile. Chapter 4 explains and justifies in more detail the decisions related to the research design and the different research techniques applied.

b) Quantitative research methods

The statistical analysis has been based on the *2013 Bicentennial National Survey* (*N*=2,004), conducted by the Centre for Public Policy and the Institute of Sociology of the Catholic University of Chile (PUC) and Adimark-GfK. Through descriptive and inferential statistics, the profiles and types of the indifferent and the set of independent variables that best explain that indifference is presented in chapter 5. The statistical analysis includes descriptive statistics, contingency tables (Chi-squared tests, T-tests), and logistic regressions.

c) Qualitative research methods

The qualitative design is inferential and comparative. This qualitative research includes a set of interviews (test interviews, in-depth semi-structured interviews, and expert interviews), participatory observation, and the revision of archives in Chile. In-depth interviews include both people who are indifferent and non-indifferent to past human rights violations in Chile today. Although the spectrum of interviewees is quite broad—from former agents of the National Intelligence Directorate (DINA) to former members of the Manuel Rodríguez Patriotic Front (FPMR)—most of them are ordinary citizens. These interviews build process-tracing by exploring people's socialisation processes and the causes of their indifference, and the consequences that such experiences, behaviours, and attitudes have in their current lives. The qualitative material collected is analysed in accord with *Grounded Theory* (Strauss 1987; Strauss & Corbin 1990; Charmaz 2006). In order to become more familiar with the subject and understand the historical context of the dictatorship and the Chilean transition, participatory

observation in memory sites and the revision of historical archives and mass media has been conducted in Chile.

6. CHAPTER OUTLINE

In chapter 2 the roots of the IPHRV are contextualised within the recent history of Chile. This chapter provides an account of the most important political and institutional milestones from 1964 to 2017. Via the literature review, four different stages of indifference to past atrocities are analysed: 1) Indifference during the years of the dictatorship (1973-1990); 2) Indifference in the early transition (1990-1998); 3) Indifference in the intermediate transition (1998-2006), and 4) Indifference during the post-Pinochet transition (2006 up to date).

The goal of chapter 3 is to construct a theoretical framework with the most relevant concepts to properly approximate the notion and types of IPHRV. Different comparative experiences are mentioned in this chapter but only to illustrate application of some of the leading concepts. From a theoretical point of view, the social causes and consequences of indifference are also explained.

Chapter 4 describes and justifies the mixed research method design to properly answer the research questions. The chapter explains why this research is limited to one country, rather than opting for a comparative approach between different political transitions. The *2013 National Bicentennial Survey* is also explained, including background information on the questionnaire, sample, and the descriptive and inferential statistical analysis conducted. This chapter ends with the description of the qualitative research methods applied in this thesis. The objectives of the in-depth semi-structured interviews, including tests interviews, are also explained. The selection of

interviewees, and the themes or conversational nodes for the interviews are reported. In addition, some explanations of the observation and field notes taken in Chile during fieldwork are included.

Chapter 5 reports the results of the quantitative research analysis based on the *2013 National Bicentennial Survey*. This section aims to explain who the indifferent are with regard to the atrocities committed during Pinochet's dictatorship. The main characteristics of the Chilean citizens who are indifferent to past human rights violations are also presented here. In addition, the profile of the indifferent is compared with non-indifferent people (hostile to human rights, pro human rights, and ambivalent people). In consideration of the political heterogeneity of the indifferent, four types or dimensions of indifference—disillusioned, submissive, depoliticised, and resigned indifferent—are compared.

Chapter 6 presents the results of the qualitative analysis of original data collected by the author in Chile to complement the quantitative findings presented in the previous chapter. The findings of the quantitative research have been complemented with the qualitative analysis of fifty-three in-depth interviews. Along with overcoming some of the limitations of the interpretation of the national survey, the interviews have advanced understanding of the phenomenon of IPHRV in Chile today.

The most important conclusions of this doctoral research are summarised in chapter 7. In addition, in this chapter some final reflections are formulated and recommendations made to reduce the current levels of IPHRV in Chile that could be useful for other societies dealing with past atrocities.

Chapter 2: Contextualizing Indifference

Indifference, after all, is more dangerous than anger and hatred.

—*Elie Wiesel*

1. INTRODUCTION

It is not possible to understand the current indifference in Chilean society to past human rights violations without regard to the historical context. In half a century Chile has gone through very different and even opposing political experiments and regimes: Revolution in Liberty (1964-70), Chilean Road to Socialism (1970-3), Military Dictatorship (1973-90), and Transition to Democracy (1990 to present). Drastic political changes since the 1960s have affected the identity and culture of Chileans (Bucciferro 2012: Ch. 2). Different generations of ordinary Chileans have had to adapt to these dramatically evolving political scenarios and unstable institutional settings. These antagonistic and abrupt shifts have defined a set of responses to the past. This chapter aims: 1) to search for and explain the historical roots of the phenomenon of IPHRV and the transitional justice agenda in Chile, and 2) to situate the phenomenon of IPHRV in the context of present-day Chile.

Social reforms promoted by Presidents Frei M. and Allende between 1964 and 1973 were accompanied by mobilisations of peasants, workers, and progressive groups. But in those years, there were also counter-mobilisations of conservative sectors and opponents to the processes of social change. After the 1973 military coup, the massive repression of the dictatorship provoked fear, distrust and social demobilisation (Frei

2017: 69). Repression—applying national security laws, censorship laws, arms control laws, and reactionary labour legislation, etc.—had a long history in Chile (Lira & Loveman 2014). In the 1973-90 period the military expanded the state repression and systematically and institutionally violated the human rights of the left and centre-left. There were social sectors that agreed with the state repression, but there were others that were likely indifferent to human rights violations and many others that did not get involved and remained silent out of ignorance, disbelief or, especially, fear.

This chapter shows how the dictatorship influenced the culture of the Chilean people, who became increasingly individualistic, politically apathetic, and hedonistic (Moulian 1997). During the dictatorship the bonds of collaboration and membership in Chilean society were weakened. With the transition to democracy after 1990 the elite's pragmatic politics of consensus and demobilisation favoured the narrative of reconciliation and economic growth rather than prioritising the agenda of transitional justice, including prosecution of perpetrators of human rights violations. Since 1990, social ties have been diluted even more because of the deepening of commodification in all spheres of life (Lechner 1998: 238). Nevertheless, in the last decade, many young people have decided to protest in the streets because of their displeasure with the quality of education and the political-economic model (Mayol 2012; Segovia & Gamboa 2012; Figueroa 2013; Jackson 2013; Venegas 2016). In the post-Pinochet transition the search for transitional justice has been more intense than in the first decade of the transition. But this does not mean that all people are sensitive to the abuses committed during the dictatorship. Chileans have multiple memories that not only coexist but some of them are permanently in dispute and tension (Lazzara 2006; Stern 2004; Stern 2006).[1] At

[1] For a sector of the Chilean population it is necessary to preserve and promote memory sites so the recurrence of state abuses never happen again. In contrast, another sector is indifferent to the issue and would rather forget, as if it was possible to turn the page and overcome the past (Huneeus 2003: 195; Frei

present, it is not easy to understand the subjectivities of Chilean adults because it is a society with deep political and ideological divisions (Huneeus 2003; Lechner 2002; Huneeus & Ibarra 2013; Lira 2013: 7). There is not a shared collective memory among Chileans about how to interpret what happened during the seventeen years of the dictatorship and how to understand these twenty-seven years of transition to democracy (Brodsky 2013: 112).

2. PRE-COUP EPOCH

In its first two hundred years as an independent country, Chile was one of the Latin American countries that enjoyed substantial political and democratic stability. There were no military coups in the nineteenth century; and only a small number of "civil wars" (1830-31; 1850-51; 1857; 1891). Its long democratic tradition was interrupted by political turbulence in three different periods during the twentieth century: 1924-5, 1931-1932, and 1973-90. Clearly the last institutional breakdown is the one that has had the greatest impact on contemporary Chilean society. Before the military coup of 11 September 1973, the portrait of Chilean society presented the following characteristics:

State-centrism. Before 1973, Chilean society depended heavily on the state. In fact, the notion of the Chilean nation was created by the republican state and not vice versa (Góngora 1988: 11). After the world economic crisis of the 1930s, the economic growth strategy adopted by Chile for the next four decades has been known as inward-looking growth (*desarrollo hacia adentro*), which deeply depended on import-

2017: 15). For example, those who ignore or are indifferent to the traces of the past usually have little interest in visiting memory and trauma sites. This hermeneutic fragmentation causes controversy over the existence of memory sites: in the *2013 National Survey on Human Rights*, 25 percent of respondents claimed to be indifferent to the existence of monuments or sites of memory for victims, which reflects an increase of six percentage points in comparison with the *2011 National Survey on Human Rights*.

substitution-industrialisation statist-led policies (Kay 2000: 126). In the 1950s**,** the theories of development—formulated by the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLA, then ECLAC)—gave a new impulse to the developmental-state model applied in Chile. Moreover, the state was the major employer of the middle class in public services, state-owned companies, public schools, infrastructure, armed forces, and police, etc. It should be noted that the project of economic modernisation via industrialisation did not achieve the expected effects on production processes and, ultimately, Chile had low levels of manufacturing efficiency and technological development.

Agrarian society. From colonial times**,** Chilean society was basically a traditional agrarian regime (Bengoa 1988; Bellisario 2006: 168). Agricultural land ownership strongly marked the hierarchical, servile, and pre-capitalist social relations (Bellisario 2006: 170). In the 1930s**,** capital was mobilised to industrialise Chile, but landowners managed to defend their economic interests in the political sphere. Indeed, for several decades landlords delayed land reform and prevented unionisation laws that favoured peasants (Loveman 1976, xxviii; Crispi 1982: 482; Pinto & Salazar 1999: 105). American and British investments that depended on foreign markets—first nitrate and then copper—played a significant role in the Chilean economy during the twentieth century. But the structures of domination continued to be more related to the land rather than industry or the financial sectors. In 1960, 80 percent of agricultural land corresponded to large estates (*fundos*, *haciendas* or *latifundios*) owned by 2.1 percent of the population (Bellisario 2006: 179).

Unequal society. The means of production and wealth were heavily concentrated in a small number of economic groups or clans (Lagos 1960), comprised of bankers, urban manufacturers, and landlords. The proletarianisation of labour-rent tenants

(*inquilinos*), their family members, and salaried workers generated internal migration processes from rural to urban areas, where workers and employees were also living in impoverished conditions and barely subsisted (Robles 2003: 69). Oligarchs, businessmen, and landlords controlled the lives of workers and their families, who did not have sufficient resources to satisfy basic needs. In addition, the indigenous populations in northern and southern Chile were socially and economically marginalised.

Mobilised society. From the 1960s until the military coup, as in most of Latin America, different social sectors were mobilised towards the improvement of their living conditions, trying to put an end to decades of marginalisation and social exclusion. The governments of Eduardo Frei M. (1964-70) and Salvador Allende (1970-3) dealt with the social demands of vulnerable sectors, for example, increasing the coverage of education and public health. Social and political mobilisation of workers, peasants, and indigenous peoples challenged the stability of the old order, provoking reactive social mobilisation of political and economic elites, defending their wealth, income, and privileged positions in society. Between the late 1960s and 1973, Chileans lived through the climax of the polarisation of the class struggle and political turmoil and the outcome was even more violent (Frei 2017: 71). As Alfredo Jocelyn-Holt points out, this was the most convulsive period on Chilean history:

> Nothing before compares to the last thirty years. Neither density, drama, surprise endings, needless to say euphoria and chaos, dizziness and tear, fear and paralysis, anger and despair, or currently, complacency and self-flagellation, forgetfulness and apathy.
>
> (Jocelyn-Holt 1998: 255).

Culture of impunity. The polarisation of Chilean society and numerous political conflicts during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries are well documented (Pinto & Salazar 1999: Ch. 3). The vast majority of the political and ideological conflicts were resolved through policy compromises and constitutional reforms, but also with state repression, pardons, and amnesty laws (Loveman & Lira 2000: 544; Lira & Loveman 2014: 350). According to Elizabeth Lira and Brian Loveman, the rule of law and impartial criminal justice were permanently subordinated to the search for political stability and governability, which basically means that many generations had no expectation that justice would be done after a political conflict (Lira & Loveman 2000; 2002; 2014). The pattern of a culture of impunity accompanied the polarisation of the country since independence.

Legalistic or formalistic society. The Chilean legal culture was characterised by a pre-eminence of the written law. For example, for 140 years only two constitutions were in force in the country: the 1833 and the 1925 Constitutions. The legal actors paid excessive attention to the sources of law (Manson 2002: 355) and lawyers played a leading role in public debates (Baraona 2010). Most of the time in the history of Chile the state repression was carried out in accordance with the legal system. The public authority approved and applied sources of law to validate their decisions, even at the expense of the repressed sectors. The elite that governed Chile gave special priority to public order and security, even at the expense of citizens' constitutional guarantees. Most of the time courts were the "everyday arena for the outcome and containment of political and ideological conflicts in a country so polarized" (Lira & Loveman 2014: 275). In general, the lack of independence of judges prevented them from questioning the decisions of the executive branch.

a) Revolution in Liberty

As a reaction to the 1959 Cuban revolution, two years later the Kennedy administration announced an "Alliance for Progress" as its new Latin American policy. In the context of the Cold War, the purpose of the US administration was to prevent left-wing parties from reaching power or emulating the Cuban Revolution (Haslam 2005: 12-3). In the 1964 Chilean presidential election, the CIA financed the Christian Democrat's campaign with US$2.6 million, and additionally spent US$3 million to prevent Socialist Salvador Allende from winning (Kornbluh 2004; Haslam 2005; Gustafson 2007). With 56 percent of the votes, reformist and moderate Christian Democrat Eduardo Frei M. not only won the election but also garnered the support of the majority of the members of the National Congress in the 1965 parliamentarian election. The promise of a Revolution in Liberty combined a bourgeois modernisation political program with the populism of social-Christian inspiration (cf. Bellisario 2007: 2). Basically, the Frei M. government sought to revitalise the economy through land reform, *chilenización* of copper mining, and housing construction, among other measures led by the state. The reformist ideas aimed to decrease the uneven income distribution, and increase productivity. Christian Democrats strongly believed that reforms should be made according to the rules of democracy and respecting the rule of law, but also introduced important constitutional reforms regarding property rights, eminent domain, and agricultural land tenure. In addition to the support of the urban middle classes, peasants, and Catholic sectors, the great ally of Frei was the White House.

Based on the Alliance for Progress agreements, during the previous government the Agrarian Reform Law No. 15,020 (1962) was approved, but its impact on land redistribution was minimal. At the time, there was a consensus between the political

leaders of the centre and left parties on the need to implement an agrarian reform that could end the high levels of concentration of land ownership. In July 1967, a new law that promoted the agrarian reform in Chile—Law No. 16,640—was enacted. According to this law, all *fundos* and *latifundios* of more than 80 basic irrigated hectares were subject to expropriation if the agricultural land was underutilised or inefficiently farmed.[2] Landowners were only able to retain up to 80 hectares (*reserva*).

To carry out the land reform in the country implied the need for a substantial reform in Chilean society. The reforms introduced changes in the agrarian social structure, because peasants and less privileged sectors of society could own land and then form an agrarian middle class (Crispi 1982: 481; Góngora 1988: 129). The sequence was as follows: first the inefficient large estate was expropriated, then a cooperative farm known as *asentamientos* was created (with small private plots for each family and most of the farm worked in common), and later the land would be redistributed among peasants. As compensation, the landlord received state bonds payable in the future. Parallel to the agrarian reform, the Christian Democratic government adopted new labour and unionisation legislation that promoted great expansion of the unionised labour force in industry and agriculture. This legislation and government support for labour mobilisation greatly disrupted traditional industrial relations, especially in the agricultural sector.

Another transcendental reform implemented by the Christian Democrat administration was the *chilenización* of large copper mines, such as, El Teniente, Chuquicamata, El Salvador. In the 1960s, copper represented 60 percent of Chile's foreign exchange, and American companies Anaconda and Kennecott owned 85 percent of the copper industry (Sands 1982: 54). After exhausting negotiations, the State of

[2] "Basic irrigated hectares" was a table of equivalencies applied to the agrarian reform, meant to adjust for farm size and economic potential in comparison with irrigated farms in the central valley.

Chile purchased 51 percent of the larger copper mines. Two additional relevant social reforms were implemented during the government of President Frei M.: the educational reform brought an increase of 46 percent in the total enrolment of students between 1964 and 1970—from 1.6 million to 2.2 million primary and secondary students—, and about 250 thousand houses were built and transferred mostly to the poor. As it can be seen, the reforms implemented during the Revolution in Liberty years benefitted social sectors that until that moment had limited possibilities for education, housing, and economic progress.

Despite the progress made by the Christian Democrats, the electorate did not favour them in the 1970 presidential election, as the other two political options seemed more attractive. The financial support provided by the United States since the signing of the Alliance for Progress and the tax revenues made it possible to fund major state-led initiatives (Sands 1982: 43), but the electorate was not convinced (Winn 2013: 40-1). Alan Angell summarises the situation of the Christian Democratic Party in 1970 as follows: "For some the transformation was too slow, for others too fast" (1971: 87). *El pueblo* (the people) were waking up and, despite the Christian Democrat promises to accelerate the pace of the reforms, in his fourth attempt Salvador Allende triumphed in the 1970 presidential election, supported by the Communist Party and other leftist parties and movements in the Popular Unity (*Unidad Popular*) coalition.

b) The Chilean Road to Socialism

Socialist senator Salvador Allende, candidate of the Popular Unity (UP) coalition, narrowly defeated both the conservative right-wing and the reformist Christian Democrat candidates in the 1970 presidential election (Winn 2013: Ch. 4). Reaching 36.6 percent of the 2.9 million valid votes and after being ratified by the Congress, on 3

November 1970 Allende became the first freely elected Marxist president in the world (cf. Fermandois 2013: 427). The main political challenge of the UP project was novel at the time: moving towards socialism through bourgeois democracy, discarding violent or revolutionary means. But it would not be an easy task as, unlike Frei, Allende did not have the support of the majority in Congress. However, the UP parties rapidly increased their electoral support, reaching 48.6 percent in the 1971 local elections, and 44 percent in the 1973 parliamentary elections. Therefore, nearly half of Chilean voters were in favour of accelerating the processes of social transformation. In the 1973 elections, 55.49 percent of the 3.687.105 votes supported the candidates of the opposition.

The opposition had hoped to reach a favourable result in the 1973 parliamentary elections, but did not obtain the necessary seats to impeach and remove President Allende. It should be noted that 81.75 percent of adults registered to vote participated in the 1973 parliamentary elections. Despite the political tension that existed in the country, and the importance of the 1973 election, 18.25 percent of adults registered to vote chose not to do so. In all societies there is always a percentage of political apathy, but that figure also shows that even at a time of high political tension there is a sector of citizens relatively indifferent to public issues, or at least unmotivated to vote in an important election.

Through the implementation of its political program, the UP government sought to radically change the social, political, and economic structures of domination in Chilean society. On 11 July 1971, the constitutional reform and Law No. 17,450 of nationalisation of the large mining sector was unanimously approved. From that moment the main mines of the country became state owned (Amorós 2013: 355-9). American investors were not fully compensated in the takeover, as they had been compensated in unpaid taxes for years. As expected, the Nixon administration

responded with outrage at these attacks against American's strategic and economic interests. A second step was the nationalisation of private banks: the state bought shares of banks and by the end of 1971 controlled 90 percent of the banking sector (Winn 2013: 55). A third measure expected by the left was the radicalisation of the agrarian reform: the expropriation processes and new forms of peasants' organisations would speed up (Bellisario 2007). During the governments of Frei and Allende, 59 percent of the agricultural land was expropriated (5,809 estates, near 10 million hectares) (Crispi 1982: 483; Grupo de Investigaciones Agrarias 1979; Bellisario 2006: 199). This benefited near 61 thousand peasant households and 15 thousand single men who worked directly on the new land units or small-sized family farms (Bellisario 2007). If unionised peasants in 1964 were only 1,658, in 1972 that figure rose up to 283 thousand in the country. The main impact of agrarian reform was to change property relations in the agrarian sector and dismantle the old *hacienda* social structure. As expected, the fury of the bankers and former landlords was immediate. The fourth major objective was the development of a social sector of the economy that included ninety strategic companies (each with more than one million dollars capital) (Bitar 1995: 218). Most of these industries were intervened, according to supreme decrees passed in the 1930s—known as legal loopholes (*resquicios legales*)—, and thus forced the owners to sell to the state (Novoa 1992).

As a result, the government of Allende began to develop a socialist economy by controlling the mining, financial, and relevant industrial sectors. Additionally, the process of agrarian reform was accelerated with violent *tomas* (squatting) on farms (Bellisario 2007: 13). Allende adopted a state-centrist planning approach to coordinate the decision-making process along the country (Medina 2011). Public authorities of the UP were empowered by the idea of creating a new society by transforming socio-

economic structural conditions. The development of a socialist economy had the support of the most vulnerable, neglected, excluded, and marginalised sectors of Chilean society: workers, indigenous population, and peasants. After so many years of abuse and hopelessness, it was the first time that many of them felt dignified. For example, 70,795 students were registered in the eight universities along the country in 1970, and three years later that number increased to 146,451 students (Brunner 1986).

The traditional elite, transnational corporations, right-wing political parties, conservative press, and the White House, not only opposed the program of UP, but also contributed to the destabilisation of the economy and the exacerbation of tempers (Kornbluh 2003b; United States Senate 1975). These forces were behind a number of destabilising efforts: 76-day strike at El Teniente copper mine—which produced more than US$300 million per year (Ruiz-Tagle 1973: 217)—, the track owners strike of 27 days in 1972 and 1973—which the CIA financed with more than US$2 million—, 253 terrorist attacks in 1973, street violence, supply problems, galloping inflation, *El Mercurio* received US$4,165,000 from the CIA to misinform the population and cause fear (Agüero 2008; Skoknic 2013). These events put urban and middle classes on alert. Women from the upper class protested in the streets with their pots and pans (*cacerolazos*). President Allende sought a political solution incorporating the armed forces in the government, but negotiations with the leaders of the Christian Democratic Party were unsuccessful. At the end of 1972, Allende personally asked the Soviet Union for economic and military support, but returned to Chile with empty-handed.

On 22 August 1973, the Chamber of Deputies declared that the UP government had violated the 1925 Constitution (Winn 2013: 120). Feeling besieged, Allende chose to play his last card: to call a plebiscite for the population to state whether or not the government had the support of the electorate. But the same day that Allende had

scheduled to address the country, the military coup took place. The political and economic crisis led to a violent outcome that, as a chronicle of a death foretold, all sectors presaged what would happen (Angell 1993: 72; Kornbluh 2003b; Policzer 2009: Ch. 3; Guardiola-Rivera 2013; Harmer 2013: Ch. 7). While nearly half of the voters were willing to support the democratically elected government, it could not prevent the bombing of La Moneda presidential palace and Allende's death. That fateful 11 September 1973 marked forever the lives of 10 million Chileans. For the left, the coup marked the end of the romantic dream of living in a more equal society (Lagos 2012: Ch. 2). The right-wing and the majority of the Christian Democrats thought that the armed forces were going to re-establish order and convene new elections within a reasonable time (Winn 2013: 126). Naively, former President Frei M.—then President of the Senate—thought that the military would call him promptly to preside over the country. It should take into consideration that 822,955 adults registered to vote chose not to do so in the 1973 elections. Until today this group has not been studied.

3. INDIFFERENCE IN THE DICTATORSHIP

The military dictatorship produced profound transformations in the economic, social, political, and cultural dimensions of social life in Chile (Moulian 1997; Jocelyn-Holt 1999). The armed forces and the secret police services strongly suppressed the popular movement and the social and political leaders who for a decade had managed to introduce reforms and structural transformations in the Chilean society. Basically, what happened between 1973 and 1990 was a counter-revolution led by the armed forces and right-wing civilians, which their supporters cynically called a silent revolution (Lavín 1987). The armed forces implemented a neoliberal economic program, dismantled the

precarious welfare state, privatised most state-owned companies—although the old large production copper mines remained owned by the state—, changed the pension and health systems, and labour and employment laws were modified according to neoliberal postulates. As David Harvey points out in *A Brief History of Neoliberalism*, Chile was the first neoliberal experiment ever implemented in the world (2007: 7). Developmental theories and socialist economic policies were abandoned, and the foundations of a free-market economy based on private capitalism were established. The counter-revolution would not have been possible in a democracy, since in the population coexisted competing views or models for the future of Chile. Neoliberalism and the new institutionalism were imposed by force. The opposition was absolutely neutralised by repression and fear, and more harshly in the first ten years of the dictatorship. The imposition of the re-founding project for the country required the complicity of the civilian sectors that supported the military. These civilians were not opposed to, or were actively involved in, the commission of human rights violations (Rebolledo 2015; Carvallo 2016).

a) The iron fist years (1973-1983)

The 1973 coup marked the disruption of a long-lasting democratic and republican tradition, and the life of Chileans suffered an enormous turnaround (Bastías 2013: 23). The armed forces not only put an end to democracy but also wanted to lay the foundations of the new institutions of the country and to change the Chilean culture (Stern 2013: 13; Winn 2013: 131-5). From then on society was controlled by the armed forces, the police, and the secret police. The Congress was immediately dissolved and political parties were banned. The dictatorship imposed fear and severely repressed their opponents; it also dismantled the welfare state (Goicovic 2013). Fear neutralised

citizens, who had no space for protesting when civil and political liberties began to be violated. For a sector of the Chilean society those years were necessary stages for the institutional and political-economic re-foundation of modern Chile (Stern 2013: 13; Frei 2017: 42). However, for other sectors those were years of a severe *manu militari* state repression and, for them, the aftermath of the tragedy still persists in Chilean society.

The armed forces spared no resources to install an official narrative and interpretation of what was happening in the country (Stern 2013: 13; Stern & Winn 2014: 206). For example, to justify the repression of the left immediately after the coup the existence of the alleged *Plan Zeta* was informed through the media (Loveman & Lira 2000: 404; Stern 2013: 14). Under that imaginary plan, the leaders of the right, the armed forces, and the wealthy sectors of society would be killed by left-wing extremists and their property would have been usurped, to move towards the dictatorship of the proletariat (Stern 2006: 80-97). According to Steve Stern and Peter Winn, "the false Plan Z was a typical disinformation campaign. It facilitated the formation of a climate of war and indifference toward, the repression...in that sense, Pinochet was the saviour of the nation" (2014: 206). Therefore, for the supporters of the dictatorship, the armed forces prevented a civil war between Chileans, the dictatorship of the proletariat, and Chile from becoming a second Cuba in Latin America.

The armed forced and their secret police services—first the National Intelligence Directorate (DINA) and then the National Information Centre (CNI)—controlled civilians in all dimensions of life. Many officers of the armed forces were trained in the US School of the Americas and learned the National Security Doctrine (Gill 2005). The military not only repressed the opposition to the dictatorship but also frightened the whole society (Politzer 1985; Lira & Castillo 1991). Leaders and members of the parties that formed the UP—Socialist Party (PS), Communist Party (PC), Christian Left Party

(IC), and Unitary Popular Action Movement (MAPU)—and the extreme left (MIR) were persecuted. The description of the state machine of horror has received numerous academic and journalistic investigations (Cavallo et al. 1989; Verdugo 1989; Constable & Valenzuela 1991; Ensalaco 2000; O'Shaughnessy 2000; Kornbluh 2003a; Policzer 2009; Rojas 1988; Salazar 2011; Salazar 2012; Spooner 2011). The armed forces "widely and systematically kidnapped, tortured, and subsequently and secretly murdered (and hid the bodies of) opponents as an instrument of state terror" (Sanabria 2007: 363). During the transition, human rights abuses have been officially investigated: 3,216 people were executed or are still disappeared (Collins et al. 2013: 46; Collins 2013: 88), 40,018 people have been recognised as victims of political imprisonment or torture, 12 thousand people sought asylum in embassies, 1,132 torture centres have been identified throughout the country (Presidential Advisory Commission for the Qualification of Disappeared Detainees, Political Executed, and Victims of Political Imprisonment and Torture Report 2011), 200 thousand lived abroad in exile and began the Chilean diaspora throughout the world (Wright & Oñate 2007; Lira 2012), and only a quarter of them have returned to the country. These figures show the magnitude of state terrorism in a country of just 10 million inhabitants at the time of the coup (Moulian 2002: 31). Moved by rancour or ideological reasons, civilians identified and reported or actively collaborated in the arrest and torture of those who were persecuted (Rebolledo 2015; Carvallo 2016).

The documentation of human rights violations has taken decades and much remains to be known (Lira 2013: 6). In 2008, Wally Kunstman and Victoria Torres published a set of victims' testimonies in the collective book *A Hundred Voices Break the Silence*. The numerous testimonies of the victims that have been documented or published are shocking (e.g. Valdés 1996 [1974]; Cassidy 2002 [1977]; Montealegre

2003; Policzer 2009: Ch. 5; Becker 2011; Casassus 2013). The cruelty and sadism of state agents, the inhumane conditions of the detentions, the permanent attacks on the dignity of the victims, and their lack of recognition by various sectors of Chilean society, mean that deep wounds are still open (Rojas 2012: 391). The traumatic consequences of torture remain devastating and the bodies of missing detainees continue to be sought by their relatives (García 2011). But the season in hell did not only happen in concentration camps or detention centres, because once freedom was recovered, many victims felt rejected and were stigmatised by society as if they were lepers. The pain has not only been caused in captivity, but also the social exclusion suffered by the victims of human rights violations by the rest of society has amplified their deep anguish.

The agrarian reform was reversed during the first years of the dictatorship. Three-fifths of the expropriated land was granted back to former landowners, auctioned off in the private market or given to public or non-profit organisations. The remaining two-fifths were assigned to 46 thousand peasant families while another 29 thousand peasant families lost the land (Crispi 1982: 487; Bellisario 2006: 199; Bellisario 2007). Because the dictatorship sought to create a new syndicalism in Chile, trade union activities were restricted and through corporatist formulas, the government tried to depoliticise and co-opt them (Álvarez 210: 326). On several occasions trade union leaders denounced the dictatorship in the International Labour Organisation (ILO) for violating freedom of association and human rights, forcing the government to respond but also to consider the recommendations made by the ILO (Lira & Rojas 2009). The reform of labour legislation (*Plan Laboral*), imposed in 1979, deregulated the labour market, limited the

right to strike, and decreased the representative power of trade unions.[3] A process of ideological and bureaucratic clearance was conducted in eight universities and all public services, severely affecting the incomes of thousands of Chilean families (Brunner 1986: 141; cf. Póo 2016). Repressive operations were also performed abroad, under the so-called "Condor Operation"—a secret police alliance between Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay, and Uruguay (O'Shaughnessy 2000: 103-6; Dinges 2004; Lessa 2015: 4)—, expanding the fear of Chileans even in exile. The defence of human rights was almost impossible and the vast majority of the habeas corpus writs (*recursos de amparo*) were rejected by courts. Paraphrasing Cardinal Raúl Silva Henríquez, the activities of the Committee for Peace first and then the Vicariate of Solidarity were "the voice of those without a voice" (Lagos 2012: 61). In 1978 the dictatorship approved a self-amnesty decree law that prevented the vast majority of criminal investigations in the following years.[4]

What can explain the brutality of the repression of the population in those years? At least ten factors should be considered in a rational explanation of the irrational and inhuman: 1) the interest of the high command of the armed forces to completely transform the country from its foundations (Lira 2013: 8; Borzutzky 2017: 11); 2) the arrogance and vanity of the high command of the armed forces to be historically recognised as the saviours of the motherland who defeated the internal enemy in the Cold War era (Valdés 2009: 244); 3) the support of the oligarchy and the large economic groups to the foundational project of the armed forces; 4) the intention of the armed forces to avoid at all costs Marxist doctrines' influence on the culture of the popular sectors, 5) the conviction of the leaders of the dictatorship of the importance of

[3] *See* Decree Law No. 2,200, Labour Code (15 June 1978); Decree Law No. 2,756, Trade Unions Law (3 July 1979); Decree Law No. 2,758, Collective Bargaining Law (6 July 1979).
[4] *See* Decree Law No. 2,191, Amnesty Law (19 April 1978).

preserving internal order (Gill 2005), despite strong restrictions on civil liberties; 6) the power ambition of opportunist civilian accomplices and senior officers of the armed forces; 7) the lack of political-institutional control that could stop the escalation of human rights violations; 8) the complicity and passivity of the Judiciary with the issue of human rights violations; 9) the hatred of the leaders of the dictatorship for the sectors of the left, conceived as enemies to be destroyed; and 10) the fact the secret police and the armed forces neutralised, with devastating efficiency, any attempt of political or military resistance. As Borzutzky points out, the repression "was the result of a well-planned and structured process coordinated at the highest level of government by two men [Augusto Pinochet and Manuel Contreras] determined to eradicate Marxists and Marxism from the face of Chile" (2017: 20). Without the possibility of defending themselves, the Chilean people were left to the drift of the arbitrariness of the secret police and armed forces. Even though there was awareness of the dictatorship's repression and the extreme right agreed with the authoritarian measures, other sectors opted to remain silent. Fear partly explains that phenomenon (Rojas 2017), but there was also conformity and indifference. It did not matter to them because those who were picked up were assumed to be subversives or enemies of Chile's progress.

During the late 1970s and 1980s, Chilean society became the subject of another social engineering experiment, this time of Neoliberalism (Stern 2013: 19). Chicago School economists and neoliberal technocrats, in association with the military, implemented the structural changes towards capitalist modernity (Bellisario 2006: 168; Lavín 1987). The 1975 National Economic Recovery Program had three goals: reduce inflation, balance the public budget with a severe austerity program, and introduce free-market initiatives. For example, tariffs had been lowered, interest rates were freed, elimination of price distortions and foreign investments were encouraged by tax

stability and repatriation of profits, etc. (Sigmund 1983: 43). The second generation of structural reforms known as The Seven Modernizations were imposed in 1979 and included: deregulation of labour and employment relations (*Plan Laboral*), privatisation of the pension system, privatisation of the educational system, privatisation of health care, decentralisation and modernisation of the public administration, agrarian modernisation, and transformation of the judiciary (Foxley 1982: 83-7; Silva 1991: 395). In this new neoliberal capitalist phase, the mediating role of the state in labour disputes disappeared. In fact, the aim of the Chicago Boys was that the state interfered as little as possible in the economy and that explained why over a hundred state owned companies were privatised in the 1980s. However, during 1982-3 Chile experienced its worst economic crisis since the Great Depression. For example, the GDP fell to -14.5 percent in those years (Huneeus 2000: 508).

At the institutional level, the 1925 Constitution was abolished and the armed forces internally imposed a new social pact with the 1980 Constitution, approved in a dubious referendum without any electoral guarantees (Barros 2002: 172-3; Fuentes 2013). With this new fundamental charter, the armed forces aimed to provide stabilisation and legitimacy to the Military Junta and its decisions. Indeed, the new constitution established the architecture of the new institutions (Huneeus 2000: 500). It strongly protects the right to property, establishes the subsidiary role of the state, states that the armed forces were the guarantors of the institutional order, prohibits the existence of Marxist political parties—in the infamous Article 8, derogated nine years later (Aldunate 1991; Boeninger 2007: 26-7)—, and sets authoritarian enclaves and the timetable for the transition to democracy. However, the Chilean people continued living under states of constitutional exception for several years. There was no freedom of the press and the media were permanently controlled and censored (Sorensen 2011: 400).

In conclusion, during the first ten years of the dictatorship people of the centre-left were severely repressed. Fear pervaded Chile and civil society demobilised. The secret police and state agents committed human rights violations with impunity, not only in Chile but also in other countries. But there were also civilians who identified or reported to the armed forces members of the parties of the Popular Unity and MIR, were aware or participated in the raids, acts of torture, executions or disappearances of persecuted persons. They are the active and passive accomplices of the dictatorship that today attempt to evade justice or social criticism. The military imposed the reforms towards the neoliberal economic model and enacted a new constitution. All of these changes weakened social and community organisations, atomising and fragmenting the population. Citizens lost the possibility of having collective imaginaries, and the pre-coup solidarity was replaced by individualism. Through the resulting fear of repression and the consequential individualism of the neoliberal model, the dictatorship fostered citizens' indifference (cf. Jara 2013: Ch. 4).

b) The awakening of the dictatorship's opposition (1983-1990)

The severe economic crisis in Chile in 1981-2 triggered a series of national protests in rejection of the dictatorship (Silva 1991: 397; Huneeus 2000: 519). From 11 May 1983, copper workers, trade unions, university students, human rights movements, grassroots organisations, and political leaders called for a set of national protests on the streets of the major cities (Bravo 2017: Ch. 7). As they did not have authorisation, the police, the military, and CNI agents repressed protesters, conducted raids, and systematically violated the human rights of opponents of the dictatorship (Bastías 2013: 229). The number of dead and missing was lower than in the first phase of the dictatorship, but the levels of political imprisonment and torture remained considerable. For example, the

Truth and Reconciliation Report (1991) recognised a total of 345 cases of death or disappearance between 1983 and 1990. However, there were crimes that shocked the population which included: the Slit-Throat Case (*Caso Degollados*) in 1985 (Salazar 2012: 205-14), the Case of the Burnt (*Caso Quemados*) in 1986 (Salazar 2012: 236-42), the murder of Tucapel Jiménez, President of the National Association of Public Employees (ANEF) in 1982 (Huneeus 2000: 504), the Albania Operation in 1987 (Tricot 2015: 77-86), among other cases of brutal repression (Escalante et al. 2013). At that time, there was a combination of underground resistance on the one hand, and repression and fear on the other.

In the short term the von Hayek-Friedman-Harberger neoliberal economic reforms made by a group of Catholic University-Chicago Boys did not achieve the expected results (Sanhueza 1999). The main causes of the crisis were not only international economic factors but also errors in the domestic economic policy (Hojman 1996: 77). With eight banks bankrupted, interventions were made in the financial sector: free floating exchange rates replaced the US dollar fixed exchange rate, the unemployment rate exceeded 23 percent—the highest in the last fifty-five years and, reaching 32 percent if emergency and precarious employment programmes are included (Contreras & Ffrench-Davis 2012: 2)—, the real income of wage decreased, Chile's external debt rose to 17 billion (one of the highest debts per capita in the world). All this resulted in an increase of poverty and a sense of insecurity and economic instability in Chilean society. A new technocratic economic team appointed by Pinochet had to make drastic adjustments, including trade liberalisation, financial deregulation, privatisation of state enterprises at low prices (Rosende & Reinstein 1986), recapitalisation of firms and banks, etc. The economy began to recover in 1984 and since 1985 the international community has highlighted Chile's sustained economic growth (Barandiarán &

Hernández 1999: 2), even labelling it *Die chilenische Wirtschaftswunder* (The Chilean Miracle). For example, if 45.1 percent of Chileans were under the poverty line in 1987, that figure was reduced to 13.7 percent in 2006 (Contreras & Ffrench-Davis 2012: 11).

Despite the political recess declared by the Junta immediately after the 1973 coup, from 1983 many political parties begin to organise. New political magazines and newspapers were created. They opposed the military regime and faced difficulties in circulation despite a population who were avid for news. During the mid-1980s the centre-left amalgamated an alternative political project and a dissident memory (Tironi 2013; Stern & Winn 2013: 209). In 1983 different sectors of the centre-left—mainly Christian Democrats and Socialists—were reunited in the *Alianza Democrática* (Democratic Alliance). This was the direct political antecedent that made it possible for political parties to seal a political commitment to form the Coalition of Parties for the No, simply known as *Concertación* (Aylwin 1998; Lagos 2012). Despite being on opposite sides in 1973, a convergence of interests between the Christian Democrats and most of the centre-left parties was possible in the mid-1980s (Ortega 1992). However, some sectors of the left did not agree with the idea of following the rules set by the military for the transition and opted for the armed resistance, such as the Manuel Rodríguez Patriotic Front (FPMR), MIR, and MAPU-Lautaro. In the decisive year of 1986, the FPMR clandestinely smuggled weapons by boat, but much of the arsenal was discovered in Carrizal Bajo, a fishing village located in northern Chile (Tironi 2013: 129). On 7 September 1986, the FPMR carried out an ambush on the outskirts of Santiago with the intention to assassinate Pinochet, who was saved unharmed but five of his bodyguards were killed and eleven were injured (Verdugo & Hertz 1990). The repression intensified after the attack on Pinochet and, the extreme left was brutally persecuted (Tricot 2015).

On April 1987 John Paul II visited Chile for six days. Pinochet did everything possible to get political dividends from the visit of the Pope. For the opposition, the visit was also an opportunity to convey a message towards democracy, peace, and reconciliation. When the Pope met with the youth in the National Stadium, he asked them not to fall into the apathy about what appeared to be impossible (Tironi 2013: 176). Chilean people needed to hear words of hope and peace, and that narrative was precisely what guided social scientists and electoral experts of the *Concertación* in the 1988 televised marketing campaign (Otano 2006: Ch. 4; Tironi 2013: Ch. 22; Larraín 2012). In 1987 the Political Parties Law was enacted and electoral registers were opened for voting in the referendum of 5 October 1988. According to the Constitution, people had the opportunity to choose between the permanence of Pinochet in power for another eight years (the *Yes*-option) or have free presidential elections within a year after the referendum (the *No*-option). Despite the doubts, the leaders of *Concertación* considered it possible to defeat Pinochet according to the rules that he had set in 1980, and called on the population to register on the electoral rolls. In the first live interview with Ricardo Lagos on a television set, he courageously challenged General Pinochet on camera, and invited the undecided to trust in the project of *Concertación* (Lagos 2012: Ch. 1). The *No* campaign was not only a turning point but an epic feat that inspired adults to register in the electoral rolls and vote in favour of holding democratic elections (Tironi 2013: Ch. 19 and 22). Society was strongly polarised in the year of the referendum: this time between supporters and opponents of Pinochet. The anti-dictatorial political project triumphed in the referendum called by Pinochet: 55.99 percent of the valid votes said *No* while the remaining 44.01 percent said *Yes*. In addition to those adults who did not register to vote (10 percent), 2.47 percent registered adults did not vote and, 2.27 percent were null or invalid votes. It remains striking that

even in an event as important as the 1988 plebiscite about 15 percent of adults had shown a politically apathetic or indifferent behavior. Interestingly, there is a high correlation between the *No*-vote and the votes obtained by Patricio Aylwin in the presidential election of December 1989: 55.17 percent. But it should be noted that "almost 82 percent of eligible Chileans cast valid votes in the 1989 legislative elections" (Carlin 2006: 636).

The fact that 44 percent of voters supported Pinochet in 1988 deserves an explanation. The armed forces designed and implemented a political campaign of fear, warning Chileans that the triumph of the *No*-option would imply returning to the chaos of the UP. It should also be taken into account that censorship, control of the media, and restrictions to freedom of expression continued to govern in the country (Tironi & Sunkel 2000: 165). In addition, macroeconomic figures were optimistic, inflation was being controlled, and economic growth was visible for all sectors in the increase of exports. After fifteen years of dictatorship, it was evident that political propaganda in favour of Pinochet and the armed forces persuaded some undecided voters to prefer what was known at the time rather than what was unknown or uncertain. Therefore, Pinochet invited the electorate not to be tempted by utopian projects such as the experience of the UP, reflected in the political manifesto of the parties that formed the *Concertación*. Although the electoral result was narrow, finally the republican culture of the majority of voters prevailed over the authoritarian culture of those who enthusiastically supported Pinochet.

4. INDIFFERENCE IN THE TRANSITION

A long process of transition to democracy began on 11 March 1990, the day in which General Augusto Pinochet handed the presidential sash to Christian Democrat Patricio Aylwin, the newly elected President and main leader of the *Concertación*. The Chilean transition is characterised as a case of pacted or negotiated transition between the armed forces and the democratic leaders that recovered democracy (Barahona de Brito 1997; Lechner 2002: 67; Fuentes 2012; Spooner 2013: 3). Since 1990 there have been seven democratically elected governments in a political transition that has lasted longer than anyone could have predicted: Patricio Aylwin (1990-4), Eduardo Frei Ruiz-Tagle (1994-2000), Ricardo Lagos (2000-6), Michelle Bachelet (2006-10), Sebastián Piñera (2010-4), Michelle Bachelet (2014-8), and now Sebastián Piñera (2018-22). From an academic point of view, it is possible to distinguish three different phases or moments in the Chilean transition to democracy: First, an Early Transition, from 1990 until the arrest of Pinochet in London; Second, the Intermediate Transition, from 1998 until the death of Pinochet in 2006; Third, the Late or Post-Pinochet Transition, from 2006 until the present day.

a) Early Transition (1990-1998)

The rhetorical understanding of the government of Patricio Aylwin was based in the notion of social reconciliation among Chileans (Loveman & Lira 2000: Ch. 9). The program of the government of Eduardo Frei R.-T. was structured in the discourse of modernisation of the country. These were the mega-narratives by which the parties of *Concertación* gave sense to their political actions in leading the country in the complex

years of the early transition. After nearly seventeen years of dictatorship, the goal of re-democratising society and public institutions was not a simple task for the new democratically elected authorities. In terms of the search for reconciliation and transitional justice, with pragmatism and moderation the government moved to the extent possible, i.e., as far as the de facto powers allowed.[5] Indeed, the concept of social reconciliation gradually replaced the notion of human rights that had been gravitating in the narrative of the *Concertación* in the 1988 referendum (García 2011: 139; Collins 2014: 148). On 2 June 1990, twenty bodies of executed political prisoners in 1973 were found in a mass grave located in the cemetery of Pisagua, in the far north of Chile.[6] At that time the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (*Comisión Rettig*) was in session under the strictest secrecy. The main objective of the Commission was to investigate the executions of political prisoners and the situations of the disappeared detainees, excluding other kinds of human rights violations committed during the dictatorship (Ensalaco 1994: 659). When the Commission's report was released on March 1991, Aylwin addressed the country and apologised to the victims and their relatives and called on the military to make gestures of recognition (Lira & Loveman 2004: 520). However, the armed forces, the judiciary, and the right-wing parties declared that the report did not offer an objective and complete interpretation of what had happened in the country since the late 1960s (Lira & Loveman 2005: 132). Steve Stern and Peter Winn refer to this reaction as the wall of military silence (2014: 214). Until this day Chileans do not have access to the transcripts of the sessions of the Commission. The

[5] The expression 'justice to the extent possible' was coined by Patricio Aylwin on 31 December 1990 when explaining how much justice could be accomplished in human rights cases. The expression *poderes fácticos* (de facto powers) was made by Andrés Allamand when referring to the armed forces, the business elite, and *El Mercurio* (Drake & Jaksic 1999: 28).

[6] The Martial Court closed the case in 1993, applying the Amnesty Law (Martorell 1998: 161). On 2013, Judge Carroza accused seven members of the army for the homicides of eight political prisoners and the kidnappings of three disappeared detainees.

diffusion of the report was overshadowed by the assassination of the Senator from Santiago and Pinochet's ideologist, Jaime Guzmán, on 1 April 1991, by the FPMR (Nino 1996: 38; Verdugo 2004: 53; Lira & Loveman 2005: 132; Otano 2006: Ch. 11 and 12; Stern & Winn 2014: 218-9; Peñaloza 2015: 70). The fragility of democracy was evident in two military movements that frightened the population on 19 December 1990, and 28 May 1993 (Cavallo 1998: Ch. 8 and 20; Jocelyn-Holt 1998: 276-7; Huneeus 2014: 15). Pinochet dared to say that if one of his men was touched, that would be the end of the rule of law (Agnic 2006: 40). For many, the desire for reconciliation and consensus implied the primacy of silence and oblivion over the memory of human rights violations (Lazzara 2006: 1). As Gomez-Barris points out, "reconciliation as a form of concealment operated through patriarchal pacts of transition, forcing closure over what had yet to be revealed" (2009: 25).

In order to prevent modifications to the institutional and political-economic model, the 1980 Constitution included a set of authoritarian enclaves—institutions and processes that made constitutional and political reform extremely difficult (Garretón 1991: 104 and 108). Practically, the leaders of *Concertación* required political agreements with the right-wing parties to address strategic or politically sensitive issues, including past human rights violations (Strasma 2010: 21). The armed forces and right-wing parties were over-represented in both chambers of the National Congress, as the electoral law established a binomial system and the Constitution provided for nine appointed senators.[7] In accord with this electoral system, the opposition only needed 34 percent of the valid votes in each electoral district to reach half of the elected parliamentary seats. Consequently, the electoral legislation prevented Concertación coalition from controlling legislation and constitutional reform. Requiring high quorums

[7] The appointed senators were eliminated in the constitutional reform of 2005 and, in 2015 the binomial electoral system was replaced by a proportional model (*see* Law No. 20.840, 5 May 2015).

in Congress to introduce structural changes gave the opposition an impressive veto power (cf. Boeninger 2007: 255). To prevent the closure of human rights cases, Aylwin asked the Supreme Court to reinterpret the Amnesty Law, allowing judges to continue *investigating* human rights violations even if, eventually, they would be required to apply the amnesty decree (Stern & Winn 2014: 216). It is noteworthy that Pinochet remained as Commander in Chief of the Army until 11 March 1998, when he became senator-for-life.

In retrospect, perhaps in the early years of political transition the leaders of *Concertación* exercised an excess of political prudence (Wilde 1999: 476). But many of them were afraid that the conflicts and hatreds of the past could have been reactivated, thus jeopardising democratic governability (Hite 2000). Obviously, the constant search for consensus among sectors that interpreted the past diametrically differently had tremendous political and cultural costs. Indeed, the cost of moving towards the consolidation of democracy was demobilising society, accepting the veto power of the right-wing and the armed forces, and renouncing the introduction of significant changes in the economic-political model. Alex Wilde refers to the transition's public life as the conspiracy of consensus, among the political elite but permeating in the whole society caused by a profound fear of conflict, even of a new military coup to protect the interests of the armed forces and their civilian allies (1999: 476). After President Aylwin inexplicably announced in 1991 that the transition was over, in military circles there was a tacit pact of silence regarding human rights violations and corruption from 1973 to 1990 (Lazzara 2006: 19; Frei 2017: 15).

With 58 percent of the votes, Christian Democrat Eduardo Frei R.-T. was elected President for the period 1994-2000. Frei R.-T. had the ambition to consolidate economic growth, further internationalise the economy, reduce poverty, reform the educational

system and modernise the state (Silva 2008: 182-3). Once again, the economic and technocratic discourse had a tremendous influence on the political agenda (Joignant 2002: 89-90). The search for high rates of economic growth required the development of an entrepreneurial culture in the country, where innovation and self-confidence were overvalued (Lechner 1998: 235). The growth of the economy between 1990 and 1998 was remarkable, with a growth rate that averaged more than 7 percent per year (Jadresic & Zahler 2000: 3). If 38.6 percent of the population lived in poverty in 1990, that figure was reduced to 21.7 percent in 1998 (Larrañaga & Rodríguez 2014: 17). A country accustomed to historical defeats, Chilean society began to appreciate signs of triumphalism and arrogance (Jocelyn-Holt 1998: 281). For example, at the 1992 Universal Exposition in Seville, Spain, Chile tried to impress the world by showing a 60-ton iceberg brought from Antarctica. The iceberg metaphor meant that Chile was not a tropical or banana republic, but a modern, disciplined, and efficient country (Subercaseux 1997).

Marcelo Ríos—who in 1998 reached the first place in the world's tennis ranking—coined the indifferent expression *no estoy ni ahí* (I couldn't care less). Those who were indifferent during the dictatorship simply remained silent, but in the 1990s the indifferent people began to openly say that they were not interested in the country's affairs. In other words, the attitude of indifference was verbalised: *No estoy ni ahí* was the mainstream motto of the 1990s and meant a lifestyle that promoted indifference. The depoliticisation and discomfort with politicians and political activity was manifested as *no estoy ni ahí con la política* (I could not care less about politics) (Joignant 2002: 91; Venegas 2016: 16): in this competitive, consumerist, and individualistic society, the only things that matter are my own efforts and plans. The growing disinterest in politics was evident in regular public opinion surveys, in particular in the younger generations

(Tironi & Agüero 1999: 164). If in 1993 19 percent of citizens did not answer or did not know when asked about their political self-identification on a spectrum from right to left, that figure rose to 56 percent in 1998 (Joignant 2002: 93). As Lechner remarks, "old solidarities [were] displaced by a negative individualism" and social ties weakened (1998: 238).

Figure 3
Expressions of *No estoy ni ahí* in popular culture



The passivity of the criminal courts with past atrocities was interrupted in 1995 when the Supreme Court ruled against Manuel Contreras and Pedro Espinoza, for their participation in the assassination of Orlando Letelier in Washington, D.C., on 21 September 1976 (Stern & Winn 2014: 223). Because of its political and international implications, and pressures on the military junta by the U.S. government, the Letelier Case was expressly excluded from the application of the 1978 Amnesty Law.

Despite the apparent success of the Chilean transition, some voices of dissent began to echo in the public sphere. Tomás Moulian lucidly warned about the constraints of the transition in *Chile Actual: Anatomy of a Myth* (1997), a sociological essay that exceeded all sales expectations. Moulian denounced the depoliticisation of politics, economic neoliberalism, and the prevailing individualistic and consumer culture in society. According to Moulian, the depoliticisation of politics was observable in a

"strong indifference to institutional politics" and in the discredit of politicians (2002 [1997]: 9). As for human rights, Moulian warned that in Chilean society the agreed public "forgetting", the planned silence, and impunity for "reasons of state" prevailed (2002 [1997]: Ch. 2): "The consensus became an injunction of silence" (2002 [1997]: 44).[8] According to Collins, "the dead and disappeared in Chile vanished from the eyes of many people who were not directly linked to this cause, so naturally other concerns took their place" (2014: 148). But then, an unforeseen event occurred. The arrest of Pinochet in London on 16 October 1998 changed the course of the Chilean transition (Amorós 2013: 512).

In summary, during the early transition economic growth and commodification of society, governance and strengthening of democracy was favoured. The veto power of the right and the armed forces defined the realm of possibility in the transitional justice agenda. The political elites privileged the search for consensus and social reconciliation (Barahona de Brito 1997: 107), which demobilised and depoliticised a society increasingly disinterested in public life and focused on private interests. In this context, political activity did not recover its preferential place within society (Lechner 1998: 233). Chileans exhibited a widespread aversion to conflict and low levels of social trust (Wilde 1999: 476). Families increased their income and their levels of consumption and focus on private pleasure (Jocelyn-Holt 1998: 284; Tironi 1999).

The leaders of the *Concertación* were partly responsible for citizen frustration and annoyance with the limited achievements during the transition. Indeed, the centre-left political leaders who played important roles before the coup were extremely cautious in their political behaviour once they returned to power in the 1990s (Hite 2000). In the 1990s disinterest in politics was gradually increasing and the idea of 'let's turn the

[8] On 31 August 2015, Tomás Moulian received the prestigious National Award for Humanities and Social Sciences.

page' of the past began to spread in society. In the early transition years there was an atmosphere of IPHRV (Collins 2014: 144), as if human rights issues were of concern to victims and perpetrators, but not necessarily of the whole society (Agnic 2006: 15). There was disappointment and frustration in the *Concertación* electorate: a new Constitution was not passed, the population had limited access to the truth of the abuses, and the vast majority of the perpetrators were eluding prosecution and punishment for human rights violations. The early transition (1990-98) ended when senator-for-life Augusto Pinochet was arrested at the London Clinic, which coincided with an economic crisis in Asia that affected the Chilean miracle. Steve Stern and Peter Winn summarise the dilemma in which society was at that time in the following terms:

> In a society of divided memory and devoid of significant initiatives, the feeling of frustration and abandonment was powerful for civil society activists. Measures taken against oblivion could occur in a very restricted level but seemed stuck in a dead end—the indifference, ambivalence, the *impasse*—in the whole political body.
>
> (Stern & Winn 2014: 225-6)

b) The Intermediate Transition (1998-2006)

We have seen that in the early transition citizens' indifference increased, partly as a result of the political elite's politics of consensus, and the veto power of the right and the armed forces (Huneeus 2014: Ch. 1). Chileans gave primacy to individualism and consumption. Nevertheless, after Pinochet's arrest in London the course of transitional justice changed (Wilde 1999: 474; Verdugo 2004: 53; Collins 2014: 157; Peñaloza 2015: 74-9). Between August 1999 and June 2000, the *Mesa de Diálogo* (The Dialogue Roundtable), an initiative of Frei's government, was convened. In collaboration with the Armed Forces, the main objective of the Dialogue Roundtable was to find the corpses of

the disappeared detainees or valuable information to clarify their fate (Zalaquett 2000; Wilde 2013: 71-2; Collins 2014: 159; Peñaloza 2015: 79-84). Beyond being an instance for civilian-military talks—that helped to channel the political tension over Pinochet's arrest—, the fact is that its results were disappointing for human rights organisations (Lagos 2003: 8). On January 2000, Ricardo Lagos was elected President with 51.3 percent of the votes in a disputed *ballotage* (Spooner 2011: 184).[9]

After 502 days under house arrest, Pinochet was declared unfit to stand trial by the British government and returned to Chile on 3 March 2000 (Hawkins 2009: 249). The tension associated with the Pinochet case triggered unexpected scenarios not only for public authorities but more importantly for ordinary citizens. Some issues that had been silenced for years began to receive public attention. On March 2001, Felipe Agüero, then associate professor of international and comparative studies at the University of Miami, denounced Emilio Meneses, professor of political science at the Catholic University of Chile, for torturing him at the National Stadium in 1973 (Easterbrook 2001; Spooner 2011: 190-1; Stern & Winn 2014: 237). The theme of torture during the dictatorship had been postponed in the early transition but emerged as a pending issue in the intermediate transition. To commemorate thirty years of the coup there was an "explosion of memory" in September 2003 (Huneeus 2003: Ch. 7; Stern & Winn 2014: 235). Intellectuals and some centre-left politicians criticised the democratic transition and the slow pace of transitional justice (e.g. PNUD 1998; Garretón 2000: Ch. 6; Lechner 2002). Lagos proposed a new policy on human rights in *No Hay Mañana Sin Ayer* (There is no tomorrow without yesterday, 2003), including new reparation measures and the creation of a Commission on Torture and Political Imprisonment. For

[9] The right-wing candidate, Joaquin Lavín—Chicago Boy, former economic editor of *El Mercurio*, Mayor of Las Condes—got 48.7 percent of the votes. Despite his support of Pinochet, people were willing to support him because he represented technocracy, efficiency, modern management, and economic growth. After the experience of the UP, moderates were not yet ready to support a socialist candidate.

example, to give visibility to the taboo of torture in Chilean society, on 2004 Patricia Verdugo edited the collective book *De la tortura NO se habla: Agüero versus Meneses* (Torture is not talked about: Agüero versus Meneses). Memory entrepreneurs began to have more prominence and, human rights memorials and initiatives of remembrance were inaugurated all over the country in the intermediate transition (e.g., Villa Grimaldi Peace Park, Londres 38, Paine Memorial, Women Victims of Human Rights Violations Memorial, and 132 other memory sites at the time). As a result of the work of the Commission on Torture and Political Imprisonment, the official identification of victims was released in 2004, and then supplemented in 2005 and 2011. Despite these advances, these issues remain partially silenced in society. For example, by agreement of the government the testimonies given by victims to the Commission on Torture must be kept secret until 2054, unless the victims consent to the disclosure of the testimony.[10]

One of the ambitions of Ricardo Lagos was to complete the transition to democracy, in which case it was necessary to settle accounts with the past. As Lagos wanted to put an end to authoritarian enclaves, he opened a constitutional discussion with political parties and explored the possibility of replacing Pinochet's Constitution (Garretón 2000: 166-8). Lacking sufficient votes in Congress to approve a new Constitution, Lagos could only adopt a text which partially amended the 1980 Constitution. As Lagos recognised, the transition was not going to be complete if the main non-democratic features of the constitution remained untouched, especially the binomial electoral system (SQC 2012).

In regard to Pinochet, himself, after his return to Chile he faced judicial investigation not only for the commission of human rights violations but also for the commission of tax fraud (known as the *Riggs Case*). However, after eight years of legal

[10] *See* Law No. 19,992, 24 December 2004.

battles in courts, Pinochet died on 10 December 2006, managing to avoid conviction for the commission of atrocities or any other crimes in which he participated. Paradoxically, the extreme right defended Pinochet's innocence in human rights cases, but stopped supporting him when his tax offenses were revealed on 2004 (Collins 2014: 149; Stern & Winn 2014: 244). At his funeral Pinochet did not receive state honours; he was cremated, and his ashes are in one of his homes, where his family members and closest followers pay him tribute regularly (Joignant 2013).

To summarise, in the period 1998-2006, the transitional justice agenda was reactivated after the arrest of Pinochet in London. The centre-left intellectuals and some political leaders strongly criticised the outcomes of the first decade of transition. As Lechner concludes, there is no doubt that "the traumatic experience of Chile has remained unhealed" (2002: 44). In fact, the memory of the past was more stubborn than expected by the elites and emerged in multiple ways, despite the efforts to impose oblivion and the taboos in Chilean society (Wilde 2013: 74). The victims of torture and political imprisonment were officially recognised as such after fourteen years of transition. Ricardo Lagos had the political will to end the transition, but failed to convince all political actors to move in directions that would fully replace the political system imposed in 1980-81. Despite the progress in transitional justice, the political-economic-institutional model remained as the main legacy of Pinochet (Huneeus 2014: 44; Siavelis 2014: 49). After 1998 Chilean society had more knowledge of what had happened between 1973 and 1990 and, denial of human rights violations were less widespread or defended. State violence and crimes committed during the dictatorship were no longer considered isolated excesses, but institutional and systematic. A larger number of memory entrepreneurs arose and memory sites were inaugurated across Chile. As Pinochet was not convicted by courts (Peñaloza 2015: 79), there was

uneasiness in the sectors that had fought against him. Given the memory boom in the intermediate transition and the testimonies of the victims in the Torture and Political Imprisonment Commission, it may be that some Chileans have become 'saturated' with the issue of human rights, either because they do not want to know more, cannot handle the cruelty of the information, or want to avoid eventual re-victimization.

c) The Late or Post-Pinochet Transition (2006 to date)

After a disputed *ballotage*, Socialist Michelle Bachelet became the first woman popularly elected head of state in Chile with 53.5 percent of the votes. A phenomenon of large-scale protests of secondary students from all sectors marked the beginning of her administration. The 2006 student movement was known as the March of the Penguins, because of the black and white appearance of the compulsory uniforms worn by students in Chile. Unlike the previous generations, those students were born during the transition years and did not share the experience of living under the dictatorship. As they did not know the repression of the dictatorship, they were not afraid of protesting in the streets (Sepulveda et al. 2015: 107). The leaders of the movement expressed their dissatisfaction with the poor quality of public education. As Sofía Donoso points out, "the hundreds of thousands of students that mobilised in 2006 articulated a heartfelt discontent with the segregating effects of the education system" (2013: 2). Another worrying issue that faced the Bachelet government were the tax fraud scandals in political campaigns through the presentation of false invoices to receive public funds (e.g., *Publicam Case*). Bachelet created a Commission on Integrity and approved an agenda of reforms in transparency, integrity and prevention of corruption, which included the Transparency and Freedom of Information Law (2008) and the creation of

the Council for Transparency.[11] The popularity of the *Concertación* vanished when *Transantiago* became operational in February 2007 (Mardones 2008: 113). The new public transport system in Santiago caused great inconvenience for users and to this day involves a huge public expense (Weeks & Borzutzky 2012: 110-1). Despite all these difficulties, Bachelet enjoyed a tremendous popularity based on her personal credibility (Fernández & Vera 2012: 17-18). At the end of her administration Bachelet had favourable ratings from 85 percent of the population (Stern & Winn 2014: 246).

In terms of human rights, a particularly significant event during the first Bachelet presidency was the inauguration of the Museum of Memory and Human Rights in February 2010. There has been some controversy over what is exhibited in the museum as the most conservative sectors have said that it does not offer a complete historical overview of the entire era (Mallea 2013; Serracino 2013; Basaure 2014a; Basaure 2014b; Meirovich 2015: 232; Borzutzky 2017: 190). Supporters of the museum argue that the exhibitions consider the broad public in providing information on human rights violations during the dictatorship (Opotow 2015: 237).

After another disputed *ballotage* in 2010, this time the right-wing candidate Sebastián Piñera, one of Chile's wealthiest men, won the presidential election with 51.61 percent of the votes. The first year of his rule was aimed at rebuilding the country after an 8.8 earthquake and tsunami hit the coast of central Chile. Also, the national and global media attention was focused on the rescue of thirty-three miners trapped 2,300 feet underground during sixty-nine days at the San José mine, in northern Chile (Jiménez-Martínez 2014). However, the protests articulated by university and secondary school students in 2011 are an important phenomenon to understand Chilean society today. During seven months thousands of students filled the streets of the main cities in

[11] *See* Law No. 20,285, 20 August 2008.

the country (Cabalin 2012: 219). The massive student movement expressed deep dissatisfaction with the political-economic model, the commodification of education, and the poor quality of education (Figueroa 2013). According to Alberto Mayol, the main cause of the college students' riots was the uneasiness with the existing economic model (2012). More specifically, the movement can be considered as a form of rebellion of the indebted middle classes against the fiasco of state sponsored private market of college loans (Guzmán-Concha 2012: 408-9). The criticism made by college students was also a protest against the unequal distribution of wealth, social segregation, and inequality of opportunity in Chilean society. The main leaders of the movement—Camila Vallejo, Giorgio Jackson, Karol Cariola, and Gabriel Boric—continue challenging the political establishment as they were elected in the 2013 parliamentarian elections and re-elected in the 2017 parliamentarian elections.

Chileans commemorated the fortieth anniversary of the coup on 11 September 2013 with a set of political, cultural, and academic events organised in Chile and abroad in August and September 2013. Once again it became clear that Chileans do not share a common collective memory regarding the events of the past (Huneeus 2003: Ch. 5 and 7; Manzi et al. 2004; Lazzara 2006: 24; Tocornal 2008; Huneeus 2014: 423-31). On the contrary, segmented memories in dispute coexist among different social groups (Stern 2010; Wilde 2013). Unlike previous commemorations of the coup, in 2013 civil society had a much more prominent role. In part, this may be due to the uncertainties and difficulties that the commemoration of the forty years generated within Piñera's right-wing government. The publication of biographies of victims and survivors, journalistic investigations, documentaries and television series on human rights—e.g., *Los 80s*, *Los Archivos del Cardenal*, *Imágenes Prohibidas*, *Ecos del Desierto*, etc.—, memory sites and commemorative events proliferated in the country.

Notwithstanding a proliferation of information and media attention to human rights violations from 1973 to 1990, an important sector of the population still believes that the armed forces saved Chile from becoming a second Cuba in Latin America. It may be that some of those who adhere to this view have developed a more critical position and now question past human rights violations. This distance could be partly due to a greater knowledge of the truth, although Pinochet's prestige in this sector decreased considerably after reports on his bank accounts abroad and illicit enrichment activities were released. However, in general terms, this sector is still grateful to the armed forces and supports the structural changes imposed during the dictatorship. As they applaud the replacement of the socialist economic model with a neoliberal one, they are also in favour of maintaining the 1980 Constitution. Another sector is critical of the dictatorship, and many of these opponents even question the progress made by the different governments during the transition. Different opinion polls show that a significant number of Chileans are upset with the way the traumatic past has been faced, and demand more truth, justice, reparation, and memory (Huneeus 2003: Ch. 5; INDH 2013; INDH 2015). But there is another group of Chileans that considers these issues unimportant. They simply do not matter to them and prefer not to participate in political discussions. Despite all the barrage of images, stories, and testimonies, in Chilean society there persists a significant percentage of indifferent people (Huneeus 2014: 444). It seems that, for the indifferent, concern for events of the 1973-90 period is not a priority as they normally argue that human rights issues belong to the past. Not only do they have no interest in learning from the past, they also do not care if the younger generations are taught about what happened in Chile in the 70s and 80s.

The electoral system deserves an explanation because it has not contributed to the strengthening of democracy in Chile. According to the 1980 Constitution, voting was

mandatory for life for registered citizens. Additionally, the 1980 Constitution established a binominal electoral system to democratically elect 120 deputies and thirty-eight senators. The other nine senators were appointed by certain public institutions, which allowed Pinochet and the right-wing parties to block many legislative initiatives (Siavelis 2005: 58). Pinochet was appointed senator for life in 1998, but resigned in 2002. The design of the electoral system has affected the population's representation in Congress. The binominal model allows the two main coalitions be overrepresented in Congress, to the detriment of minority political sectors. As the transition progressed, the number of adults who enrolled in the electoral registers gradually decreased. Many young people ceased to register to vote in political elections. For example, in the 1988 plebiscite 90 percent of those aged eighteen or older went to the polls, but that figure decreased to 64 percent in the 2009 elections (Contreras & Navia 2013). On January 2012 the Congress eliminated the compulsory voting rule and established the automatic enrollment of citizens in the electoral register (Law No. 20.568). Michelle Bachelet easily won the presidential election in 2014. The Bachelet's administration sought to fulfil the promises made during the campaign, such as, the discussion of a new Constitution, and the reform of labour and employment laws. Bachelet's administration approved a tax reform and, more recently, eliminated university tuition fees for low-income students. However, since September 2015, corruption scandals and illegal financing of campaigns and political activities by some sectors of the business community and politicians from various political parties have been under judicial investigation (Matamala 2015). Some political actors have acknowledged their guilt. The economic stagnation and the real estate business of Bachelet's son and daughter-in-law (e.g., *Caval Case*) have affected her credibility and popular support, which in September 2017 barely reached 30 percent.

5. CONCLUSIONS

As can be seen from this brief account of the recent history of Chile, the country experienced a profound ideological polarisation and economic divisions between different social sectors. Despite the relative institutional stability for 150 years (1822-1973, with civil wars in 1830, 1851, 1859, 1891, and two years of political chaos, 1931-32), political conflicts were often silenced by a blanket of impunity through pardons, amnesties and a condescending judiciary (Lira & Loveman 2014).

The Chilean case is extremely interesting to analyse in detail because in the last fifty years it has gone through very different regimes of government. Until the late 1960s the *developmentalist* and welfarist model applied by public authorities in Chile contributed to a series of social reforms. However, the left disagreed with the slow path and gradual reforms planned by the Christian Democrats. The left believed it was necessary to radicalise the long-awaited political and economic transformations. Chile was the first country in the world to try to build a socialist society within the rules of liberal democracy. At the time of the coup, Chilean society was polarised as never before in its history.

For many, especially in retrospect, the institutional breakdown was inevitable. The oligarchy and part of the middle classes were unhappy with the changes that the UP was implementing in the socio-economic structures. They favoured the intervention of the armed forces to put an end to the popular mobilisation. Another sector, however, felt for the first time incorporated into a national project and valued their participation in national affairs and decision-making in the farms and industries. The UP experience dignified the most marginalised and vulnerable sectors in Chilean society: *el pueblo* felt called to prepare the road for the constitution of a new society, a new Chile. But the

emergence of the masses in politics caused a deep discomfort in the economic and business elite.

It is a misconception that the indifferent sectors have not always been present in Chilean society. Even in the moments of greatest political-electoral tension, as in the 1973 elections and in the 1988 plebiscite, a percentage of the adult population chose not to register to vote, not to vote or spoil their ballots. Analysts tend to divide Chilean society into two main groups: those who were in favour or against Allende in 1973, those who were in favour or against Pinochet in 1988. For example, Ricardo Lagos points out that "by 1973, there wasn't a household in Chile that wasn't fervently in favour of Allende or against him" (2012: 26). But that claim is only partially correct, since not all adults registered to vote, nor voted, and some voters deliberately spoiled their ballots. On the contrary, it is correct to say that in 1973 and 1988 the percentage of indifferent adults was significantly lower than in the present. In the peak years of political upheaval in Chile, most of the elite, the middle class, and *el pueblo* took sides and were involved in public affairs under discussion in Chile.

Coup instigators, such as the National Party and the Fatherland and Freedom Movement (*Patria y Libertad*), spared no efforts to get the support of the Christian Democratic middle class and initiated a crusade against the UP. The extreme right sabotaged the economy and incited violence in the months before the coup (González 2012). At the same time, the Revolutionary Left Movement (MIR) called members to defend the government even with weapons (Amorós 2014: 228-35). In those years the intolerance, hatred, polarisation, and violence undermined *la vieille amitié civique et républicaine* (the old civic and republican friendship) among Chileans. From that moment, there was no longer *animus societatis* among Chileans. The marks of those political differences and resentments persist until today.

A coup by the armed forces not only prevented that revolutionary project from taking place, but it also proposed to carry out a counter-revolution and re-found the country's institutions and national myths. The coup and the subsequent military dictatorship had a tremendous impact on Chilean society. The worst aspects were the systematic and institutional violations of human rights committed by the armed forces, secret police units, and state agents. Additionally, Chile was the first country in the world in which neoliberal economic theories were imposed and applied. For any society, it is complex to adapt to opposing political-economic paradigms in a short period of time. After sixteen and a half years of military dictatorship, society had changed drastically. One of the explicit objectives of the armed forces was to depoliticise and demobilise society (Lechner 1998: 233). As never before in its history, Chilean society had experienced intense fear. During the first decade of the dictatorship human rights violations were so brutal and savage that opposition social groups were paralysed and neutralised. Dissenting voices were silenced or had to go into exile abroad. The surveillance society imposed by Pinochet's secret police created social relations characterised by mistrust among individuals. Another sector, more extensive than one might think, was satisfied with the actions of the armed forces and was grateful for the public order, the repression of the left, and had hopes in the benefits of the neoliberal economic model. There were also sectors that chose not to engage with opponents or supporters of the armed forces and remained silent.

After 1983, Chileans were increasingly willing to protest in the streets against the military regime, because they were having financial difficulties and were tired of so many state abuses. The results of the 1988 referendum showed that at the end of the dictatorship there remained a deep social division and animosity among the sectors that were opposed or supported the armed forces.

If, before 1973, the economy was highly politicised, during the dictatorship the economic discussion was depoliticised and technocratic. This chapter explained how macroeconomic theories of Friedrich von Hayek, Milton Friedman, and Arnold Harberger were imposed and implemented without democratic deliberation (Valdés 1995; Edwards 2016). The neoliberal model began to transform the culture of Chilean society in the 1980s. As the modest pre-coup welfare state was dismantled and public goods were privatised, Chileans had to assume that their welfare and quality of life now depended heavily on what each individual could achieve by himself. Society was gradually commodified in all dimensions of life: market dynamics began to determine behaviour, expectations, and preferences of people (Lechner 1998: 234). The magnitude of the political and economic reforms undermined and reformulated virtually the entire social system: education, pension, housing, and electoral systems; the regulation of mining activities; labour legislation, etc. Indeed, the role of the state was transformed according to the logics of the neoliberal free-market economy. Individualism became an increasingly growing feature in Chilean society. Social research conducted in those years confirmed that individualism was also increasing in urban *poblaciones* or *quartiers populaires pauvre* (Dubet et al. 2016 [1989]: 108), where once social ties had been much more supportive. In this context, it is not surprising that a sector of the population adopted indifferent behaviours, attitudes, and perceptions to the pain or difficulties experienced by others. In the mid-1980s half of the Chilean population lived under the poverty line and the first concern at that time was to survive and pay the bills at the end of the month. In the aftermath of the dictatorship fear, poverty, distrust, and despair continued, but people had expectations about what might happen during the transitional years.

The transition has not finished and when it will end is not in sight. The various governments of the political transition had to respond to a number of social, political and economic pending demands. Along with strengthening the democratic system and ensuring economic growth, one of the most difficult challenges was to achieve justice and compensate victims and their relatives of past human rights violations. As the Chilean transition progresses, insecurities and fears of a return to authoritarianism are vanishing, but many accounts with the past remain outstanding.[12] Considering the multiplicity of visions that coexist among Chileans, the politics of memory remains complex to grasp and interpret (Lazzara 2006; Garretón 2007: 221-3; Lira 2010). The remembering of human rights violations committed in the past is at a crossroads in Chile today. There is no social consensus on the importance and the role that memory can play in the process of consolidating democracy in Chile (Garretón 2014; Stern & Winn 2014). The absence of a minimum consensus on collective memory about a common past is the gateway to more complex phenomena of fragmentation and social exclusion. Carlos Nino (1996) and Jon Elster (2004) argue that demands of transitional justice are higher when memories of atrocities are fresh. It is interesting to confront this argument with the Chilean case as these demands in the last years seem to be stronger than in the 1990s.

Another interesting aspect of the Chilean transition is the evolution experienced by the population with regard to politics. Early transition is characterised by demobilisation and depoliticisation of people, so the indifference to politics had a greater presence. However, in the intermediate and late transitions distrust and

[12] It seems that there is consensus among Chileans that progress towards full democracy requires approval of a new constitution, a new political pact that is the result of a broad process of deliberation. As it is not healthy for any society to experience the feeling of living in a permanent and uncomplete transition, it seems that Chilean society will eventually have to perform a ritual or a symbolic act by which puts an end to the transition. *See* https://www.ccobservadores.cl/.

disaffection with politics gradually increased. Figure 4 shows the evolution of the emotions of Chileans regarding politics between 1993 and 2008.

Figure 4
What kind of emotions does politics produce in you? (Multiple response) (%)

	Oct-93	Sep-95	Sep-97	Sep-98	Sep-99	Sep-00	Sep-01	Sep-03	Sep-04	Oct-05	Aug-06	Jul-07	Jul-08
Neutral emotions													
Indifference	40	33	38	34	35	30	41	39	33	35	30	34	28
Tedium	31	30	34	30	32	27	29	40	31	34	28	30	28
Positive emotions													
Interest	27	22	25	18	21	23	14	18	15	15	18	16	18
Commitment	16	12	14	10	13	13	9	13	12	13	11	8	7
Enthusiasm	15	7	9	6	8	8	6	8	5	7	6	6	5
Passion	2	2	3	2	3	4	2	5	1	2	2	2	2
Negative emotions													
Distrust	33	28	39	35	39	36	39	40	41	45	43	41	41
Dislike	8	14	21	16	17	18	20	19	22	19	17	19	19
Irritation	8	10	16	15	16	18	14	18	21	18	17	20	18
N	*1240*	*1240*	*1200*	*1188*	*1200*	*1200*	*1200*	*1200*	*1200*	*1200*	*1200*	*1200*	*1200*
	63%	67%	67%	67%	70%	70%	70%	70%	70%	70%	70%	70%	70%

Source: Huneeus 2014: 444 (based on *Barómetro CERC*, July 2008).


During the years of the political transition, Chile has been characterised by the continuity of its political-economic strategies of development, improving the quality of life of the vast majority of the population. Indeed, Chile has grown economically in the last thirty years and is an example for many countries in terms of institutional stability and democratisation (Boeninger 2007: 250-1). For example, Chile has signed twenty-six free trade agreements with more than sixty countries from all continents, and has been the first Latin American country invited to participate as a member of the OECD. GDP has grown at an average rate of 5.6 percent in the last twenty-five years (Friedman & Hofman 2013), and the income per capita has quadrupled, going from US$4,700 in 1990 to US$20,000 in 2015. Poverty has decreased from 38.6 in 1990 to 7.8 percent in 2013 (Ministerio de Desarrollo Social, CASEN 2013). According to the Human Development Index (HDI) of the United Nations, Chile should be considered the best case of all Latin American countries. However, with a Gini coefficient of 0.50 (OECD

2014: 111), Chile is a country with severe economic inequalities (Engel & Navia 2006; see Figure 5 below). Pinochet's free-market ideology continues to have a strong influence in La Moneda's economic decision-making, and the presidential election of 2017 reconfirmed the victory of neoliberalism in Chile.

The *Concertación*, Piñera, and *Nueva Mayoría* governments focused on macroeconomic stability, but at the cost of income inequality (Solimano 2012). As Boeninger points out, between 1990 and 2006, "the country has permanently lived the tensions between continuity and change; between state, market and regulation; between national coherence and decentralization; between growth and equity" (2007: 250). The 2006 and 2011 protests of the generation of the transition against the political-economic model inherited from the dictatorship should be analysed carefully by Chilean society. The protests are a call to discuss the kind of country in which Chileans want to live in the future.

Again, there are sectors that favour a model of an equitable society, while other sectors prefer a model in which individual freedom, consumerism, and "the market" are the fundamental values. While the political-economic model imposed by Pinochet remains, in time a significant sector of Chilean society will continue anchored in the conflicts of the past. In this complex historical-political context, and for various reasons, there are Chileans who have adopted indifferent behaviours, attitudes and perceptions on matters of public interest as relevant as human rights abuses committed during the dictatorship.

Figure 5
Household Monthly Income (percentiles)



Source: Ministerio de Desarrollo Social (CASEN 2013) (US$1 = 696 Chilean pesos)

Chapter 3: Theorizing Indifference

> This, this was the thing I had wanted to understand ever since the war. Nothing else. How a human being can remain indifferent.
>
> —*Elie Wiesel*

INTRODUCTION

The social phenomenon of indifference in modern society has been little investigated. However, several authors have argued that it is a phenomenon that deserves to be empirically investigated by social scientists. In *The Sociological Imagination*, C. Wright Mills argues that we live in an age of indifference, and the social indifference toward barbarism is particularly troublesome (2000 [1959]). According to Mills, "the social scientist's foremost political and intellectual task [is] to make clear the elements of contemporary uneasiness and indifference" (id.: 13). The first part of this chapter critically discusses the main theories of social indifference in modern society. In the second part, the notion of IPHRV is formulated from the contributions of Hannah Arendt, Aurelio Arteta, Zygmunt Bauman, Ulrich Beck, Anthony Giddens, Claude Giraud, Michael Herzfeld, Béatrice Hibou, Karl Jaspers, Tomás Moulian and Keith Tester. The third part distinguishes among disillusioned, submissive, depoliticised, and resigned indifference. Then, the impact and possible social consequences of IPHRV in a transitional justice process are discussed.

1. SOCIAL THEORIES ON INDIFFERENCE

This section presents and critically discusses the main social theories on the phenomenon of indifference. Numerous acts of barbarism during the twentieth century have triggered strong criticism against totalitarian regimes and state terrorism (Arendt 2006 [1951]). Several authors have contributed to a better understanding of the risks that humanity faces in modern times, e.g. Jaspers (1946), Arendt (1963), and Arteta (2010), among others. Despite the sociological contributions of authors like Bauman, Beck, Giddens and Giraud, this section argues that none of these social theories can properly explain why people adopt behaviours or attitudes of indifference to human rights violations, both in the present and in the past.

A few months after the end of the Second World War Karl Jaspers argued in *The Question of the German Guilt* that, for the political and cultural reestablishment of Germany—a nation of writers and thinkers—, citizens should be self-critical (2001 [1946]): 22). Regardless of their actual level of involvement in the war crimes, according to Jaspers, Germans were collectively guilty of the horrors that occurred between 1933 and 1945. Jaspers distinguishes four levels of guilt: criminal guilt, political guilt, moral guilt, and metaphysical guilt (2001 [1946]). The first is attributable to persons who committed crimes or made decisions, while the other forms of guilt are extended to all German citizens. Those who knew what was happening and were indifferent have moral guilt. Those who were not compassionate to people persecuted by the Nazis have metaphysical guilt.

> There exists a solidarity among men as human beings that makes each co-responsible for every wrong and every injustice in the world, especially for crimes committed in his presence or with his knowledge. If I fail to do whatever I can to

> prevent them, I too am guilty. If I was present at the murder of others without risking my life to prevent it, I feel guilty in a way not adequately conceivable either legally, politically or morally. That I live after such a thing has happened weighs upon me as indelible guilt…
>
> (Jaspers 2001 [1947]: 26)

Hannah Arendt revealed in *Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil* (2001 [1963]) that not only sadistic minds but also ordinary people can lose their ability to react against evil. Indeed, she believed that political responsibility is strongly linked with people's bureaucratic mentality and ideology. For example, Adolf Eichmann did not seem to be the egregiously wicked and sadistic person she expected to observe at court but a superficial individual incapable of thinking (Arendt 2001 [1963]: 46; Arendt 2002 [1978]: 30). The extreme bureaucratic mind is an example of the loss of the ability to discern, and shows the risk of a lack of critical and independent thinking. As Eichmann said in his defence: "Officialese [*Amtssprache*] is my only language" (Arendt 2001 [1963]: 79). In her controversial thesis on the banality of evil, Arendt explains how thoughtlessness predisposes the subject to become criminal: "such remoteness from reality and such thoughtlessness can wreak more havoc than all the evil instincts taken together which, perhaps, are inherent in man" (2001 [1963]: 434-5).

In *Mal Consentido* (2010), Aurelio Arteta distinguishes between: (1) Active executor or who commits evil, (2) Active accomplice or who contributes to the commission of evil, for example, by providing the means for the active executor, (3) Indifferent bystander, and (4) Victim who suffers evil (2012 [2010]: 14). Arteta pays special attention to those ordinary people who adopt indifferent attitudes towards barbarism. The indifferent are conceived as indolent subjects who do nothing to prevent a person from being affected by another subject. They do nothing to prevent or mitigate the damage, they do not take sides or compromise: they are passive accomplices who

choose to look elsewhere (id.: 16). The indifferent prefer not to speak to avoid problems or polarisation. The indifferent do not intend to commit evil, but they agree implicitly that it takes place. The indifferent prefer not to report or impede the aggressor; however, they remain in the grey zone of society. To avoid having to take sides, the indifferent prefer not to judge the situation of injustice (id.: 59). The indifferent want to get along with everyone because they seek to be safe, even if this should devalue the political dimension of their lives.

According to Arteta, four factors explain why people assume the condition of indifferent bystander: (1) *Fear* is one of the most basic human passions (id.: 91). As a basic survival strategy, some individuals do not intervene while others are being harmed (id.: 52). But fear is also reflected in silence, avoiding confrontation with others. (2) *Ignorance* is deliberately used by the indifferent to avoid not only intervention but also the consequences and responsibilities of that omission. In this case, "the average citizen craves that routine is still routine, and prevents by all means that the different and dissonant breaks the order by which we subsist" (id.: 94). (3) *Subjection to the group:* fear of isolation and loneliness make people less reflective and conscious of their decisions to behave according to the expectations of the group: "The elusive attitude of the bystander is more expected when many submissive people are in the group" (id.: 100). (4) Finally, *moral insensitivity* also explains indifference, as the feelings of compassion and solidarity with other human beings who are victims of abuses are neutralised. The indifferent use various excuses and modes of justification or self-deception to block their emotions. For example, ideology is a powerful mechanism to justify inaction and indifference. Bureaucratisation of the mind, routinisation of behaviours, and the emphasis acquired by instrumental rationality in everyday life make individuals more insensitive and less aware of their choices and preferences.

Zygmunt Bauman is one of the sociologists who tried to explain the social phenomenon of indifference. In *Modernity and the Holocaust* (1991 [1989]), he argues that in convulsed or critical historical moments, it is possible to observe processes of social production of moral indifference (id.: Ch. 1). His more concrete contributions to the understanding of indifference have been revised in *Moral Blindness: The Loss of Sensitivity in Liquid Modernity* (2015 [2013]), a dialogue with Leonidas Donskis. Bauman appropriates the Greek word ἀδιάφορον (*adiaphoron*) to denote indifference to the other. Adiaphorisation of social action means that people have put aside ethical judgment in their interpersonal relationships (Bauman 2015: 57). In modern times, the human condition has been under new threats never seen before, partly because of the progressive social adiaphorisation. It is worrying if social actors are not sympathetic to those who suffer, as this weakens the feelings of human solidarity towards victims (id.: 61). For example, Bauman notes that modern technology has been misused in order to commit crimes against humanity on the scale of Hiroshima or Auschwitz (Bauman 1991 [1989]). Those who participated or were aware of the commission of these acts did not consider the ethical implications of their behaviour. Moreover, Bauman's social theory highlights that bureaucratic processes and market-oriented consumerism trigger social adiaphorisation. It may be argued that the greater individualism and concern with self-realization of the subject, the greater his indifference to the rest of society (Bauman 1993). If members of a community become indifferent and insensitive beings, it is likely that social ties will be increasingly weak and elusive. A society of indifference leads to distrust, uncertainty, and ambiguity in social interactions.

Claude Giraud is another renowned sociologist who has paid attention to indifference. He argues that indifference is characterised by the lack of differentiation, i.e., the inability to make distinctions (2008: 111). When indifference falls within the

scope of interpersonal relationships and socialisation processes, the difference is trivialised (id.: 109). Indifference then operates as a standard or norm of behaviour in social relations. Indifference is a dehumanising device because it involves not recognising, seeing or hearing the other individual, ignoring him completely as if he did not exist or did not matter. The indifferent closes his eyes and refuses to look. By not taking sides or assuming any commitment, the indifferent subject is not compassionate and caring, and does not feel the duty of participating in building society (id.: 45 and 65). Indifference is supported by "the feeling of having nothing to share with others" as if they belonged to different worlds (id.: 52). The indifferent often overestimates his own world at the expense of the identity and culture of the subject that is ignored (id.: 57). This is the case of an indifferent person who classifies people, placing them at lower levels, or in the worst case, not recognising the human condition of the other. When socially widespread, indifference can reach extreme cases where a sector of society is deprived of their human condition. For example,

> The indifference showed by Nazis or those who in fact assimilated to them had no ideal or perspective. It was the indifference of those who did not feel troubled by the suffering and by the despicable things they saw and to which they contributed to make real. It was the indifference of barbarism.[13]
>
> (Giraud 2008: 120-121, own trans.)

Indifference is an adaptive behaviour of a subject influenced by selfishness, unable to differentiate and recognise the subjectivity and individuality of the other. This lack of commitment and insensitivity becomes even more troubling and problematic when the other is being unjustly disturbed or suffers. In terms of responsibility, if indifference

[13] "La indiferencia que mostraban los nazis o los que de hecho se asimilaban a ellos no tenía ideal ni perspectiva. Era la indiferencia de quienes no se sentían turbados por el sufrimiento y por lo despreciable de lo que veían y de lo que se contribuían a hacer real. Era la indiferencia de la barbarie" (Spanish trans.).

allowed the commission of evil, then passive or active complicity is plausible to be discussed, depending on the circumstances. According to Giraud, indifference can be the result of a conscious decision—voluntary or strategic—, but it may also be due to the subject's state of alienation (2008: 45). Several factors can influence how indifference is manifested, for example, the place where social interaction occurs, duration, risks, apprehensions and affections, etc. (id.: 55). In some minor cases indifference may be linked with decorum, but it may also be due to more complex phenomena such as routinization at work (administrative indifference), individualism or the imposition of the instrumental rationality model and hyper specialisation (id.: 59). In addition to conceptualizing indifference, another significant contribution of Giraud to the understanding of this social phenomenon is the identification of what he considers to be its three constituent elements:

> The first is the tactic and norm. We will ask ourselves about the production of a norm of indifference by a social group and we will try to understand how indifference becomes a tactic or a quiet adaptive behaviour in particular contexts of action. The second element is the lack of differentiation. It means indifference extends as a disqualification of difference and social belonging as sources of social relations. The third element is the chain of events, which makes indifference as consequence and as cognitive adaptation.
>
> (Giraud 2008: 99, own trans.)

In *The Bureaucratization of the World in the Neoliberal Era* (2015), Béatrice Hibou argues that neoliberal bureaucracy produces social and political indifference. What happens in the field of social relations in a context of neoliberal bureaucracy is that the citizen-consumers lose interest in each other (Hibou 2015: Ch. 4). Indeed, being indifferent to the other implies not paying attention to his rationality, preferences, motivations, needs, and worldview. The bureaucratic mentality blurs human differentiation and leads to indifference: citizens are reduced to a number or to being a

client to be efficiently handled. Production of indifference takes shape through bureaucratic structures prevailing in various social institutions such as schools, hospitals, public agencies, etc. The bureaucratic phenomenon has spread beyond markets as the modern world has been plunged into the bureaucratisation of all activities carried out by people. As Béatrice Hibou clarifies, "indifference is the result of depoliticization via bureaucratization in the police, humanitarian, judicial, and juridical domains, as well as in those of medicine and psychology" (Hibou 2015: 109).

What all these authors contribute to the academic debate on indifference is to consider this social phenomenon as a feature that characterises modern society. The main conclusion that can be drawn from the literature is that bureaucracy, individualism, instrumental rationality, fear, and ignorance could be the main factors behind the phenomenon of indifference in today's world. A criticism that can be made of these investigations is that they do not have an empirical basis. If these approaches were considered research assumptions, then it would be appropriate to ask why *everyone* is not indifferent. For example, Tomás Moulian argues that the indifference of Chileans to such important topics as human rights is related to the phenomenon of consumerism and trivialisation of the media in the period of transition to democracy (1997; 1998). But why aren't all Chileans subject to that phenomenon and therefore indifferent regarding past human rights violations? As these factors are present in many societies today, the variation between countries with a high degree of indifference and those with a low degree requires more investigation. It is not enough to say that indifference is caused by any of these factors in particular or that it is a multi-causal phenomenon. What is required is empirical corroboration of the causes and consequences of IPHRV. In the following sections a theoretical explanation of IPHRV in Chile is presented, referring to causes, types, and impact.

2. INDIFFERENCE TO PAST HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS

IPHRV is the state of mind of those people who have no interest in understanding the atrocities committed and don't feel empathy for the victims who suffered the horrors or their relatives or, more generally, for the agenda of transitional justice. Human rights violations may have been committed by state agents or civilians against people who did not have the chance to defend themselves legally or to prevent the criminal acts perpetrated against them. Such abuses may be committed in any type of political regime, including democratic systems. Evidently, human rights violations are more frequent during armed conflicts, civil wars, totalitarian or authoritarian regimes, where the rule of law does not prevail or public control mechanisms are ineffective. Despite the foregoing, this thesis focuses only on the perceptions of indifference of citizens in a period of transition to democracy for human rights violations committed by state agents and their allies during the previous years of military dictatorship. In other words, the focus is on measuring and explaining citizen indifference *at the present time* with respect to human rights violations committed during a particular period (1973-90) in the past.

Michel Foucault has explained the microphysics of power that occurs in daily human interactions (1979; 2005 [1975]). According to Foucault, disciplinary power straightens and causes behavior, through "humble modalities, minor procedures, as compared with the majestic rituals of sovereignty or the great apparatuses of the state" (2005 [1975]:175). Microphysics of power operates in an interactive network of power relations among individuals. As Taylor explains, "given its productive, ubiquitous,

dynamic and relational character, the pernicious effects of modern power are more difficult to identify, and therefore to counter, than the sovereign's power to take his subjects' lives in overtly violent and public ways" (2011: 3-4). Microphysics of power is exercised daily in interpersonal relationships and emanates from manifold sources that continuously change the behaviors and beliefs of individuals. Foucault's original approach allows a better understanding of the exercise of power beyond the state. In everyday life it is possible to recognise a network of interconnections that are structured around the power exercised by some subjects over others. For example, in work routines, family relationships, educational systems, etc., the microphysics of power are crystallized (Vázquez 2009). In social relations, different types of micro-powers are exercised by taboos, censorship, repression, etc. (Vázquez 1995: 139; Gates-Madsen 2016: 4-15). People who have positions for or against on such sensitive issues as human rights violations often express their views to others undecided in order to persuade or pressure them. For example, language can be used aggressively to pressure the individual to take sides (O'Donnell 1984: 2). But people who do not have high levels of confidence in their ideas and beliefs may choose to keep quiet.

IPHRV may be due to several factors, but there is a dimension that needs special attention: individual resistance to social pressure. When societies are polarised and there is resentment and hatred between the extremes, ordinary people react to this polarisation in different ways. There is a possibility that people choose to take sides, adhere to a sector and express their opinions openly. But there is also the possibility that people choose to avoid taking sides and not get involved. These people who choose to appear neutral or disinterested prefer not to challenge past human rights violations, in part, to avoid criticism from the sectors that support(ed) the repressor agents or from those who condemn(ed) the repression and seek justice. Adopting a position of indifference means

prioritising personal tranquillity to avoid being hurt or pressured by people who do have an overt opinion. Indifference, in this context, means giving up the idea of analysing, morally, what has happened.

Faced with the polarisation, indifference could be understood as the result of social adaptation mechanisms that provide individuals the possibility of retreat without having to leave their comfort zone. The indifferent know that if they identify with a particular sector this may generate social costs, and this could explain why they prefer to avoid the debate. In that sense, it can be argued that the indifferent have other priorities in life that for them are more important than the respect, promotion, and defence of human rights of other persons. Accordingly, it is possible to argue that indifference is an attribute or stance of the individual that can be linked to the fragility and vulnerability felt by the human being to the social pressure produced by groups who express their opinions or perceptions. It is therefore interesting to pay attention to the effects of the exercise of power and domination that occurs in social interactions, particularly when it triggers IPHRV.

Regarding the Chilean case, IPHRV can partly be explained as a reaction of a sector of the population that seeks to avoid disapproval or confrontation with the more ideologically and politically active sectors. In this sense, IPHRV can be understood as a tactic by a segment of the population to protect themselves against social pressures usually pursued by those seeking to condemn or justify that repression. For example, those who are hostile to the issue of human rights violations and defend Pinochet's regime in their conversations tend to question those with other approaches. Thus, those who do not have a formed opinion and remain silent are invited to share the perceptions of the *pinochetistas*. Social pressure inhibits people who feel uncomfortable with this topic of conversation. The easiest reaction to avoid a conflict is simply not contradicting

the statements made by the supporters of Pinochet. In contrast, those who are interested in promoting the transitional justice agenda also try to influence the indifferent so they finally take sides supporting their cause. Similarly, the indifferent are uncomfortable with that social pressure and choose to remain silent.

Another explanation for indifference in Chilean society, and perhaps replicable in other countries, has to do with the feeling of living in a society where the culture of impunity has prevailed over time (Lira 2009; Lira & Loveman 2014). In this case, people are disappointed with the permanent lack of justice against the abuses committed by state agents, from independence to the present day. IPHRV may be associated with the despair felt by ordinary citizens regarding the abuses committed by the most powerful people, including state agents who have committed crimes in the past with impunity. When citizens perceive that justice is not done, they normally lose confidence in the judiciary, political parties, and democratic institutions. Despite the above, it cannot be ruled out that in a society as divided as the Chilean—by social, economic, political, and ethnic factors—other independent variables may help to explain IPHRV. There are nuances that need to be taken into account: Who are the indifferent in regard to past human rights violations in Chile? What is the source of their IPHRV? How do we explain their IPHRV? What are the social consequences of that indifference in Chile today?

Regarding human rights violations committed in the past, there are different and even conflicting views or perceptions in dispute in the Chilean population. Some sectors are hostile to the transitional justice agenda and still view favourably the Pinochet regime as saviour of the country from communist tyranny. This group wants society to "turn the page" on human rights violations and look to the future (Frei 2017: 15). Others, however, consider it appropriate for society to know the truth, punish those

responsible, compensate the victims and their families, and memorialise them through appropriate public policy (e.g., human rights education, museums, public monuments, etc.). And, there is also a sector that claims to be indifferent, which neither rejects nor supports the demands for "justice."

3. TYPES OF INDIFFERENCE TO PAST HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS

To understand indifference it is necessary to distinguish and analyse various types of indifference and the social context of those who express it (Cohen 2002: 203). Categorisation and the use of types are sociologically relevant when corresponding to exercises in social theory building. The notion of types refers to theoretical concepts that simplify the interpretive understanding of social actions. Types are useful to reduce the complexities and diversities of social phenomena under investigation (McKinney 1968: 16).

Previous empirical research demonstrates that political orientation/beliefs, including political party identification, is a strong predictor of attitudes towards human rights and civil liberties (Fetchenhauer & Bierhoff, 2004; Crowson & DeBacker 2008; Cohrs et al. 2007; Swami et al. 2012). For example, people identified with right-wing parties and ideologies tend to favour order and social control, even at the expense of civil liberties (Narby et al. 1993; Cohrs et al. 2007). According to Aguilar et al., the individual characteristics that best explain the perceptions towards transitional justice are: ideology, family victimisation, and geographic location (2012: 1397). Victims and regional or local groups that have been repressed are rarely indifferent; on the contrary,

they usually have clear perceptions on human rights. Because perceptions of IPHRV have been little investigated in comparative experiences, it is relevant to explore the social and political characteristics of those indifferent to human rights violations, and what explains the similarities and differences of people who can be classified as indifferent.

To understand IPHRV it is appropriate to make distinctions among the indifferent. Within the category of indifferent people there are important variations on a number of political and social dimensions. It is not possible to generalise and build a unique profile of all persons indifferent to past human rights violations. Political orientation and beliefs are crucial to understand the attitudes of indifferent Chileans about what happened and how to interpret the past. Political orientation and ideology of the indifferent, in a context of authoritarian repression or political transition, is a fundamental variable that should be taken into account when examining who the indifferent are. Compared to non-indifferent groups—i.e. hostile and pro human rights—, indifferent people might be a more heterogeneous group in terms of political orientation. Ideology does not solely explain or define the indifference of a person but, from the political orientation of the indifferent, it is possible to construct a profile of those indifferent to past human rights violations. According to the political orientation of the indifferent, there are particular mechanisms and social processes that explain the emergence of four types or dimensions of IPHRV: disillusioned, submissive, depoliticised, and resigned indifference. An important aspect to mention is that these categories are not necessarily exclusive, since individuals can fit into more than one of these categories or dimensions.

a) Disillusioned Indifferent

The link between individuals and the commission of human rights violations allows distinctions. A first group consists of those who committed the crimes (perpetrators). In general terms, many perpetrators choose to remain silent, but exceptionally some of them break the pacts of silence or denial (Payne 2008: Ch. 2; Aguilar & Payne 2016). A second group includes all of those who actively collaborated in the commission of such crimes (active accomplices). Normally active accomplices of human rights violations try to evade justice and social recriminations (Navarrete 2013: 323). A third group includes those who were aware of the commission of some crimes, and did nothing to stop them, i.e. passive accomplices of repression (Navarrete 2013: 320). These three groups are legally and morally responsible (ibid.). Normally these three groups can be considered hostile to the transitional justice agenda, although it may also be that some of these people deliberately choose to adopt indifferent attitudes to past human rights violations.

A fourth group includes those people who had no knowledge of specific crimes, although in general terms they agreed with the repression of a sector of society (Brodsky 2013: 107; Navarrete 2013: 319). Those who are part of this group have no criminal responsibility because there is no causal relationship between what happened and their behaviour. Unlike the three previous cases, in this group it is not possible to find evidence proving that the conduct of bystanders caused concrete violence. Bystanders do not have any kind of criminal participation in the events; however, they are morally guilty (Jaspers 2001 [1947]). It is relevant to analyse in more detail the attitude of the people who form part of this fourth group. Once the truth and the magnitude of what happened begins to be known, a sector of bystanders can agree with

what happened without condemning past atrocities (Stern 2009: 131; Navarrete 2013: 320). In that sense, this sector can maintain or adopt hostile postures to transitional justice. However, another sector of bystanders can be self-critical about their attitude of indifference or carelessness in the past against the horrors that others unjustly suffered (Brodsky 2013: 108-9). Precisely because today they regret the sympathy or support given to repressive state agents and their accomplices, they feel remorse and do not want to be socially rebuked.

It is plausible that a sector of the people who previously participated, condoned or justified the commission of human rights violations, now feel remorse for their actions or opinions. Over time some of these people have begun to know the magnitude of the horror of the atrocities committed in the past. Some of them choose to keep hostile positions towards transitional justice, while others choose to be indifferent to these issues. Cynicism and opportunism may be behind this IPHRV, but it is also possible that the cause of this indifference may be based on the disappointment and disillusionment they feel with those people or authorities whom they trusted and supported in the past. Those who have something to hide may wish to erase that part of their past through IPHRV. Perhaps they were indifferent to the suffering of others because they considered themselves superior (Bayntun 2005: 6) or devalued, ignored or dehumanised others (Monroe 2008: 704-5). Nowadays they avoid the debate on human rights issues so that they are not socially condemned for their opinions or past behaviours. Because they want to avoid social reprisals and recrimination, they present themselves and behave indifferently regarding the issues of transitional justice (Philips 2011: 412). Indifference is deliberately used by these morally and perhaps legally guilty individuals to protect themselves from the social stigma of having tolerated or participated in the commission of past horrors suffered by victims. Consequently, they

are in favour of turning the page, collective amnesia, silence, and oblivion. As can be seen, the disillusioned indifferent emerge in social sectors that tolerated, participated in, or agreed with the commission of human rights violations in the past. They morally avoid the subject of human rights in social settings, and try to evade social stigma for their past beliefs or inaction. In general terms, the disillusioned indifferent did not personally participate in the commission of crimes or human rights violations, although this group may also include cases of perpetrators or accomplices who have taken indifferent positions towards human rights issues.

Regarding the case of Chile, the judiciary has investigated more than a thousand members of the armed forces or state agents who participated in the commission of human rights violations (Accatino & Collins 2016: 82). They make up the list of perpetrators and active accomplices of the dictatorship. Obviously, the number of people who participated in the abuses is much higher but to the present (2017) it has not been possible to demonstrate or prove their criminal responsibility. The names of these people are mentioned in the archives of the dictatorship, and databases of non-governmental organisations and human rights organisations.[14] Many of these names have been mentioned in statements to the Rettig and Valech Commissions, but must remain secret by law until 2054. For example, the book *Cien voces rompen el silencio* (*One hundred voices break the silence*) identifies seventy-nine perpetrators and accomplices (Kuntsman & Torres 2008). Passive accomplices of the dictatorship have evaded justice all these years, but recent investigations are reporting their behaviours and omissions (González 2012; Rebolledo 2015).

The disillusioned indifferent are a group of people who in the past were supporters of the Pinochet regime, but now prefer not to express their old sympathies.

[14] *See* Alberto Hurtado University Interdisciplinary Program on Memory and Human Rights, https://memoriayderechoshumanosuah.org/links/.

Take into consideration that Pinochet was supported by 43 percent of adults who voted in the 1988 referendum. The vast majority of the disillusioned indifferent have not been subject to criminal or journalistic investigations (Mansuy 2013: 304). Their names do not appear in the human rights archives; they are ordinary people who simply sympathised with Pinochet's dictatorship (Navarrete 2013: 319). In the past, these people said or believed that the alleged atrocities were an invention of the international Marxist propaganda, aimed to weaken the legitimacy of the military government. They also had a negative perception of the people from the left, whom they blamed for the 1973 crisis of democracy (Illanes 2013: 141; Mansuy 2013: 302). They considered legitimate and justified the military coup of 11 September 1973 (Pino-Ojeda 2011: 223). They also commonly observed that Communists and Socialists who died 'were not holy doves' (Navarrete 2013: 319). They believed the different versions and explanations of the civil and military authorities (Mansuy 2013: 302; Cofré 2013: 61). For example, they thought that the UP leaders had developed the Zeta Plan (*Plan Zeta*) with the intention of eliminating businessmen, right-wing politicians, and the high command of the armed forces in order to establish the dictatorship of the proletariat. According to Stern, *Plan Zeta* was a fiction used by the armed forces to justify the repression of the left (Stern 2013: 90). These people believed that there were 15 thousand trained Cubans in Chile prepared to carry out a Communist revolution. They also believed that the execution, disappearance and/or torture of these people would have been the lesser evil to the possibility of civil war, i.e. the cost that the country had to pay to live in normality. They believed that human rights violations were isolated events and not the result of institutional decisions and planning by the armed forces.

As judges have condemned the accused and media have shown part of the truth, former supporters of Pinochet and those who are indifferent today have moderated their

fanaticism and sympathy for the military regime. Most now accept that human rights were violated and may even be willing to say that those crimes were an error. After the terrorist attacks in the USA on 11 September 2001, Pinochet's accounts in foreign banks were investigated. There are sectors of the Chilean right that never condemned past human rights violations, but were disappointed when they learned of Pinochet's illicit enrichment. The disillusioned indifferent are uncomfortable when talking about these issues. From a demographic point of view, one might think that in general they were born before 1973. Although it could also be that different socialisation processes have influenced younger people who, for example, share the way their grandparents or parents approach the issue. That is, people less than forty years old whose families were in favour of Pinochet but having known the magnitude of what happened, have chosen to remain silent and avoid talking about past human rights violations. In general terms it can be argued that these people are identified today with political parties from the right. They recognise that there are certain aspects of the old regime that are not attractive, such as corruption or human rights violations. That is why they have taken some distance from what happened in the past, although they have not made a radical break with the military regime they supported. They are indifferent because they do not want to have more discussions about the past, especially with people they recently met or with people who have a different interpretation of contemporary Chilean history.

It is worth considering the differences between those who are disillusioned indifferent and those who are hostile to the issue of human rights. Hostile people also supported Pinochet, but they still identify themselves with his regime and argue in favour of the legacy of Pinochet in Chilean society and culture (Navarrete 2013: 318). Hostile people have not changed their minds, nor have they moderated their speech and continue to justify what happened in Chile between 1973 and 1990.

b) Submissive Indifference

The submissive indifferent are ordinary people who have chosen, both in the past and in the present, not to speak about or get involved in any aspect or dimension related to the issue of human rights. In the difficult years, the submissive indifferent chose not to take sides with any particular sector, adopting neutral positions within society (Fletcher 2005: 1027; Elster 2006: 281). Indeed, they chose to close their eyes, without questioning what was happening in the country. Inadvertently, the neutrality of the submissive indifferent facilitated the commission of immoral and illegal acts by leaders or authorities of the authoritarian regime against individuals or persecuted social groups (Staub 1989). Because of their passivity they not only avoided any repercussions at the time but also continue as passive bystanders to these sensitive issues in the present (Gobodo-Madikizela, 2003: 111). If they did not intervene in the past, they are not going to engage now as their participation or opinions are not expected by their relatives, friends or peers. It may be that later—once democracy was restored and institutional normality recovered—they have acquired some level of knowledge of the evil committed and now recognise that the commission of human rights violations cannot be justified. However, when the stormy past appears in the present, they are uncomfortable and avoid any discussion about the past in their daily lives. As has been noticed with respect to the Spanish Transition (1975-8), the submissive indifferent would rather not know what happened and argue, like the disillusioned indifferent, that it is preferable that society moves on and turns the page of the past (Richards 2013: Ch. 10).

Neutral attitudes of this group of indifferent are not caused by remorse or repentance, but fear may have been the main cause that generated their paralysis and

neutrality (Bunster 1988: 486). Silence and oblivion about the events of the past is because of fear, insecurity or simply to avoid conflicts. It is a defensive reaction because these people shun conflict and prefer to avoid a past that disturbs or frightens them (Pino-Ojeda 2011: 216). Submissive indifference can also manifest in people who faced possible repercussions regarding their jobs, personal safety or well-being (Navarrete 2013: 323). Potential threats to personal safety or job security may also affect the rest of the family, especially the children, who could develop fearful or passive positions on human rights issues (Faúndez et al. 2014: 2010). It is well-known that fear immobilises individuals (De la Parra 1988: 41).

Regarding the Chilean case, submissive indifferent are those who favour their personal security and tranquillity both during the dictatorship and in the years of transition to democracy. Those who lived through the dictatorship chose at that time, as a protective measure, not to be involved with any of the sectors that had clear ideological positions at a time of social polarisation. The submissive indifferent chose not to be controversial in the years of the dictatorship and remained silent. They chose not to take risks to express their views on the streets or other environments and, in general, they chose to devote their energies to study, work or family. They were aware that "anyone could accuse, anybody could be the enemy" (Bisama 2013: 46). As in the past, the submissive indifferent are moderate, prudent people, who tend to identify themselves with political orientations of the centre in the political spectrum. They are not opinion leaders or avant-garde intellectuals; rather they are people who have a conformist profile about what happens in the country. They prefer to be socially considered and recognised as people who are not problematic or conflictive (Cofré 2013: 61). In addition, they transmit to their children, relatives and friends a preference to stay out of politics and not get involved. Political messages to their children seek

prudence and moderation. This group may feel that talking about politics, and a controversial issue such as human rights, is inappropriate and wrong. For them discussing human rights violations is taboo in their social relations. They keep their political opinions in reserve and share them only with people they can trust (Cofré 2013: 60; Costamagna 2013: 70). Instead, they can express interest in the future of the country, promoting broad political consensus and reconciliation among different sectors. They believe that Chileans should overcome their stormy past (von Baer 2004).

IPHRV is also partly explained by fear of conflict, which is more likely to be present in those people who are indifferent than in non-indifferent people. Indifferent people are more likely to avoid controversy and conflict than non-indifferent people. They prefer to remain silent in times of interpersonal tension, adopt conformist positions, and do not seek to modify the status quo.

c) Depoliticised Indifference

Depoliticised indifference corresponds to those indifferent who are politically apathetic. The notion of apathy finds its origin in Greek words *a*–without, and *patheia*–emotion. Apathy has been defined as "the state of mind wherein there is a lack of feeling, passion or interest, or as a type of behaviour indicating the lack of participation and lack of action" (Davis 2009:152). Several decades ago the concept of political apathy was reduced to electoral abstention, i.e., a politically apathetic citizen was someone who was not enthusiastic about and preferred not to vote in popular elections (Dean 1960: 187). However, today this concept has expanded to refer not only to electoral abstention but also to the lack of motivation, interest, involvement or participation in public affairs and political activities. Political apathy is a state of passivity, alienation, and lack of interest towards political phenomena (Sani 2005: 76).

The causes of political apathy can be diverse. First, the mistrust felt by apathetic citizens towards democratic institutions could be due to a deep discomfort with the social system. Personal frustration over inequalities and injustices experienced can be the cause of that discomfort. Patterns of political apathy could be seen in people who, despite being sympathetic to certain political ideas, have lost hope in the fulfilment of the social changes they would like to occur (Gordon & Taft 2011: 1516; Rosenberg 1954-5: 354). In this case, political apathy finds its reason in the despair felt by the person. Secondly, political apathy could also be related to the fact that these individuals do not find their most important satisfactions in collective life, but in private experiences (Pino-Ojeda 2011: 50). In the latter case apathy could be inserted within a broader phenomenon of commodification, triviality, hedonism, and perhaps consumerism.

These people can be categorized as depoliticised indifferent, as the indifference of these ordinary citizens is the crystallisation of larger cultural and structural forces. The depoliticised indifferent are likely to be those who are politically apathetic, do not tend to vote in elections, are individualistic and consumption-oriented, and ignore the past because they view the debate as irrelevant, pre-modern, or without bearing on their day-to-day lives. As they are indifferent to politics and public affairs, the depoliticised indifferent are not interested in knowing about past atrocities and its aftermath. It is likely that depoliticized indifferent do not identify themselves with any political party. They consider that some of the most important things in life are personal effort and entrepreneurship. Individualism is a trait so marked in their personalities that they are not able to give high importance to the human rights of others.

It is likely that these individuals have been formed in an apolitical environment (Dowse 1971; Gordon & Taft 2011). Those people who have not been members or

sympathisers of political parties or who have not participated in social movements are more likely to be apathetic than individuals who have that experience. It is known that parents' political attitudes, knowledge and orientations play a significant role in the political socialisation processes of their children (Atkin 1981; Weintraub et al. 2001: 225). For example, politically cynical parents are more likely to produce disaffected children who in the future will avoid politics or public affairs (Weintraub et al. 2001: 221). The role played by friendship in social interaction is also an important factor of interpersonal political influence (Hilliard 2011). In that sense, it is more likely that friends and peers of the politically apathetic have also not been engaged in politics. It could also be that in the schools they attended participation was not promoted and democratic discussion did not prevail (Fernández 2013: 103), affecting the development of their civic competence and interest in politics (Almond & Verba 1963; Ehman 1980: 110-4). Empirical evidence shows that authoritarian schools produce lower levels of political efficacy and civic tolerance rather than in schools where democratic climate and organisation prevails (Ehman 1980: 111-2). In adulthood, those who are politically apathetic usually favour occupations or working environments where politics is not a relevant factor. As can be seen, the lack of interest in political issues is linked to the processes of socialisation where these apathetic individuals have been involved. Not surprisingly, the politically apathetic may look with an attitude of suspicion, disapproval or disgust to those interested in politics. It is likely that those who are politically apathetic, who prefer not to take a stand on political or public interest issues, distrust politics and public institutions, are more likely to be indifferent to past human rights violations than those who have interest or participate in politics.

d) Resigned Indifference

Contrary to what *prima facie* one might think, there are people who belong to groups or sectors that have been repressed by state agents and now adopt indifferent positions. After the repression, victims react in different ways: some narrate what happened and are actively involved in efforts to prevent recurrence of human rights violations (Levi 1987 [1947]), while other survivors are so traumatised by human rights violations that they choose not to speak about their experiences or engage in activities to promote the transitional justice agenda (cf. Agamben 2010: 14). Some victims feel guilty or ashamed, as if they had been the ones responsible for the crimes committed (Roizblatt et al. 2014: 26). For example, for decades many of those who survived the Holocaust as children in hiding rarely spoke publicly about it, because they knew that many other children had not survived (Greenspan 2014: 234). There are survivors who remain silent because they want to reintegrate into a society still complicit with the horrors of the past and that considers them as suspects (Pollak 2006; Stern 2009: 129; Davidovich 2014: 20). This drama is formidably explained by Jorge Semprún in *L'Écriture ou la Vie* (1994). He was unable to write about the tragedy he lived in Buchenwald for more than forty years: "I chose oblivion...the strategy of collective amnesia, cruelly systematic" (1995: 244).

It is certainly important for many victims that the rest of society recognises them as such, the truth is revealed to the public, and those responsible are sanctioned (Lira 2001: 115; Lira 2010: 16-7). However, it is also legitimate that some victims adopt passive positions and have less faith in the potential progress of the transitional justice political agenda. The magnitude of the atrocities can reach the point of neutralising, frightening or traumatising victims—including those persons close to them—on a

permanent basis. It stands to reason that resigned indifferent are likely to be victims or their relatives who prefer to forget the horrors of the past (Arnoso et al. 2012: 8-9). In that sense, this type of indifference may be understood as a mode of survival or a defence mechanism to lessen the pain and move forward (Giddens 1999). Relatives and descendants of victims of repression are also influenced by the experiences of their loved ones. Victim status is transmitted within the family through socialisation processes. For example, family members may transmit the trauma and fear to the descendants who, despite not having directly experienced the abuse committed, witness its aftermath and sequelae (Roizblatt et al. 2014: 26-7; Bezo & Maggi 2015).

This group of frustrated or resigned indifferent is also formed by those who shared the characteristics of the repressed sectors of society (e.g. race, ethnicity, religion, political ideas, political affiliation, etc.). These people have lost hope that the judiciary will punish the defendants.[15] Memory of the stormy past disturbs these individuals who are saturated with the theme of the search for justice. For these individuals the constant memory of the traumatic past could have been made routine and ritualised (Jelin 2002: 51; Payne 2008: 37). Over the years they have distanced themselves from those political struggles of the past (González-Enríquez 2001: 220; Kiss 2006: 937-9). Rather, they want to overcome the past and to do so they are increasingly adopting passive or neutral positions on these matters. Regarding the Chilean case, these sectors are identified with the left, i.e. with the political groups that were persecuted by the military dictatorship. Usually these sectors are not indifferent, but in today's Chile there are also people from the left who are indifferent to past human

[15] In the first twenty-five years of the transition, 344 state agents and military personnel have received sentences, while more than one thousand are on trial. As of 2015, 163 of those 344 convicted of human rights violations were in prison (Borzutzky 2017: 221).

rights violations. They are the resigned indifferent who prefer to forget and look toward the future.

4. IMPACT OF INDIFFERENCE TO PAST HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS

The phenomenon of indifference to past human rights violations has important social implications. The behaviour and opinions of indifferent people constitute an obstacle for those who are non-indifferent and have clear positions regarding the need for effective transitional justice. Clearly, indifference is an obstacle to the transitional justice agenda, as it discourages the search for truth, prosecution of victimisers, reparation, and social memory and public memorialisation of victims of past human rights violations. Contrary to what one might think without further information, indifference does not necessarily mean neutrality or passivity in social interaction. Indeed, indifferent people promote, through their behaviours and opinions, that such indifference is spread and shared by others in society. Some research suggests that what might be called "escalation of indifference" has motivationally contagious qualities and "perceivers who become indifferent may, in turn, become a source of indifference to others" (Leander et al. 2014: 244-5).

Indifference affects the progress that can be achieved in terms of transitional justice and the ultimate goal that *Never Again* the horrors of the past will be repeated. If the number of indifferent people is considerable, progress on the agenda of human rights promoters will be more difficult. Indeed, indifference helps those who are hostile to human rights achieve their goal of turning the page, limiting reparation and

suppressing social memory of past human rights violations. Since the hostile prefer to suppress the issue of human rights, indifference contributes to oblivion, the denial of what happened, silence, and affects the recognition expected by victims, while slowing down or de-emphasising public policies such as human rights education in public schools and financing for public memorials and sites of memory. In addition, the transitional justice agenda will likely be slowed or postponed in time if the number of indifferent people increases. The supposed neutrality of the indifferent leaves an open space for disputes between those hostile to transitional justice and supporters of human rights. The indifferent become bystanders of the ideological struggles among the extremes or those who have opinions regarding the issue of human rights violations. The magnitude of the impact of IPHRV depends largely on the percentage of people who adopt positions of indifference. The four types presented in the previous section have in common the lack of interest in the issue of human rights violations in Chile. However, the causes behind the attitudes of indifference in those groups are different. The way these four groups approach the issue of human rights is also different. Consequently, the impact of each of these groups in the process of transitional justice in Chile is also different.

Behaviours, attitudes, and opinions of the disillusioned indifferent contribute to the persistence of ideological intolerance and exclusion in social relations. A greater presence of disillusioned indifference would normally be associated with the maintenance of the status quo. Since these people are rather conservative and close to the political right, the presence of disillusioned indifferent in the Chilean context implies the unwillingness to change the constitutional order and the political-economic model imposed by Pinochet.

The silence of the submissive indifferent facilitates the emergence of taboos in society, as if talking about human rights issues would not be appropriate. These indifferent promote and argue for moderation and prudence in society. They are people who do not promote social change or major structural changes. These indifferent, however, are characterised by their lack of commitment or involvement in the concerns of others, and their search for personal tranquillity and security. The submissive indifferent often express their fears to others. For example, they tell young people not to march in the streets, not to protest against public authorities, or not to participate in political parties or social movements. Therefore, it can be said that they are a group of people who adopt conformist positions in society. These indifferent consider it too risky to express a statement or position on the issue of human rights, because 'you never know what can happen' in the future. The impact that these positions may have in the field of transitional justice is to facilitate the conditions for the culture of impunity to last over time.

The impact of the depoliticised or apolitical indifferent is related to the process of privatisation of social relations. This type of indifference affects the political system by weakening the commitment to democratic values. Those who are politically apathetic can affect the quality of democracy. For example, citizens with an indifferent attitude towards politics have low levels of political participation in campaigns and elections (Yoo 2010: 170). Apolitical indifferent are precisely those that will not be defending the democratic system and the rule of law against threats from any sector that does not respect the legal system. Because the apolitical indifferent do not condemn past human rights violations, they may be an obstacle to the consolidation of a democratic culture of tolerance and respect in Chile. Indifference reinforces social taboos in Chilean society

that prevents deliberation and moral or political engagement with rights-based democracies.

The phenomenon of resigned indifference is related to distrustful social relations in societies in transition. This group of people lost or do not have faith in the mechanisms and components that form part of transitional justice. The reference to the past has lost its meaning for them, because they feel resignation about what happened and frustration with the limitations of the political transition. Hopelessness and the lack of meaning in life contribute to the effectiveness of the culture of impunity in society. But what empirical evidence exists that people indifferent to human rights violations are more likely to promote social indifference than any other group in a divided society over the traumatic events of the past? What evidence exists that people indifferent to past human rights violations are more likely to facilitate the culture of impunity and the persistence of open wounds in society than those who are non-indifferent?

CONCLUSION

Indifference to politics and, in particular, to past human rights violations, is a phenomenon that has received little attention in social science, although it is present in modern societies. Indifference is the inability of the subject to recognise the other individual as equal in dignity and rights. In that sense, indifference is the loss of sensitivity and interest in the other. Regarding human rights violations, indifference means lack of interest and empathy for the pain and tragedy suffered by others. This phenomenon is cross and multi-causal. Social theories have indicated that indifference is due to routinisation, bureaucratisation, depersonalisation of social relations, but also because of the primacy of individualism, instrumental rationality, fear of conflict, and

social pressure. Behaviours and opinions of the indifferent can be understood as a way to relate to others, avoiding the pressure from sectors that have clear positions on the events of the past and its meaning in the present. It seems that the indifferent should be politically apathetic and disinterested political subjects, but this should be confirmed empirically. It is also reasonable to argue that the indifferent are not a homogeneous group, and this can be seen more clearly when their political orientations and affiliations are analysed.

This chapter distinguishes four types of indifference: disillusioned, depoliticised, submissive, and resigned indifference. These types of indifference correspond to theoretical constructs empirically explored in this research (see chapters 5 and 6). Different explanations exist for each of these types or dimensions of indifference. The disillusioned indifferent favoured or tolerated the repression and now feel remorse and take distance from the atrocities. They have chosen to evade social sanctions and remain silent, and thus avoid being morally recriminated by their opinions, acts or omissions in the difficult times. The submissive indifferent are ordinary and moderate citizens who avoid the subject because of fear or to avoid conflicts, and they normally identify themselves with the centre of the political spectrum. The depoliticised indifferent are politically apathetic people who find satisfaction in consumption and private life, rather than in participating in public initiatives. The resigned indifferent succumbed to the lack of justice in the Chilean transition, they are often people from the left who are saturated with the issue of human rights and would prefer to turn the page, even though they share many views and values with the victims of state repression. However, the four types of indifferent do not seem to be exclusive categories. Some of those indifferent to past human rights violations exhibit several types of indifference, making the origins of indifference a complex sociological research question.

Finally, regarding the impact of indifference, it can be argued that this social phenomenon promotes the preservation of the culture of impunity in the present. IPHRV is also an obstacle to the process and mechanisms of transitional justice in a society going through a political transition.

Chapter 4: Researching Indifference

I chose oblivion ... the strategy of collective amnesia, cruelly systematic

—*Jorge Semprún*

1. PRESENTATION

This chapter describes the research design and methods that have been selected to answer the research questions formulated in this thesis. It also provides explanations on how data has been collected, analysed, and interpreted. This chapter also explains why this research is only limited to one country, rather than opting for a comparative approach among different transitions to democracy. An important aspect of the methodology is the selection of a mixed methods approach. This chapter explains the *2013 National Bicentennial Survey*, including background information on the questionnaire, sample, and descriptive and inferential statistical analysis conducted. The chapter ends with the description of the qualitative research methods applied in this research. The objectives of the interviews, including test interviews, the criteria of the selection process of interviewees, the main themes or conversational nodes for semi-structured interviews, the coding process, and the analysis technique of transcripts of the interviews are reported. Some of the interviews have provided the life trajectories of some people whose profiles are representative of the various types of IPHRV. In addition, participatory observation and field notes taken in Chile during fieldwork are explained.

Social research has been defined as "any process of activity oriented to obtaining empirical-rational knowledge about the causes, nature and consequences of social interactivity" (Bericat 1998: 91). As indicated in the first chapter, this research seeks to explain why and how people are indifferent to past human rights violations in Chile. Consequently, this study explores the dimensions, associations, and impact of this indifference. Empirical examination focuses on the Chilean case, and explores the aftermath of gross human rights violations committed during Pinochet's dictatorship (1973-90). As explained in the introductory chapter, the main research questions this thesis seeks to answer are what the roots of IPHRV are, who comprises the indifferent people in Chile today, and what the social consequences of this indifference are. This empirically-informed research seeks to overcome the limitations of the existing literature in explaining the particular Chilean dynamics around IPHRV.

2. MIXED METHODS

This research complements existing quantitative and qualitative research methods to answer the questions just mentioned. The analytical framework formulated in the theoretical chapter is being tested using this mixed methods approach. In the last fifty years researchers have employed mixed methods because of the complementary strengths of both traditional quantitative and qualitative methods (Small 2011: 61). As Johnson et al. point out, "mixed methods research is the type of research in which a researcher…combines elements of qualitative and quantitative research approaches…for the purposes of breadth and depth of understanding" (2007: 123). Without ignoring the contributions of each of the traditional methods of sociological research to the understanding of social phenomena, sociological research based on

multiple and diverse data sources aims for triangulation (Brewer & Hunter 1989). Mixed methods "involves the collection or analysis of both quantitative and/or qualitative data in a single study in which the data are collected concurrently or sequentially, are given a priority, and involve the integration of the data at one or more stages in the process of research" (Creswell et al. 2003: 2012). All data collected through quantitative and qualitative techniques selected in this research helps to obtain greater insight into the research questions than would be obtained by either type of data independently (Morse 2003: 191). Mixed methods design has three major advantages over a single research methods design: "Mixed methods research can answer research questions that the other methodologies cannot. Mixed methods research provides better (stronger) inferences. Mixed methods provide the opportunity for presenting a greater diversity of divergent views" (Teddlie & Tashakkori 2003: 14-15).

The combination of semi-structured interviews, participatory observation, and statistical analysis of a national survey is appropriate for an empirically-informed and critical analysis of IPHRV in Chile. An explanatory sequential mixed methods design is being used, as quantitative data has been first analysed, and then the qualitative data has been analysed (Creswell & Plano Clark 2011: 66 and 81-6). Indeed, the sequential mixed methods design "is characterized by the collection and analysis of quantitative data followed by the collection and analysis of qualitative data. Priority is typically given to the quantitative data, and the two methods are integrated during the interpretation phase of the study" (Creswell et al. 2003: 223). The results of the quantitative data analysis in this research are followed up with the results of the qualitative data analysis. An additional revision and interpretation of the data collected has been necessary as the individuals who participated in the qualitative phase were not the same individuals who participated in the quantitative phase. Therefore, a non-nested

design has been determined, as for various reasons it has not been possible to interview the respondents of the survey: it was not mentioned to survey respondents that follow-up in-depth interviews would form part of this study; survey respondents lived in all regions of the country, and practical difficulties existed in identifying survey respondents that meet the profile of those identified as indifferent to past human rights violations. However, according to Small, the strength of not nesting data collection lies in its flexibility (2011: 71).

Quantitative research methods have been applied to characterise the indifferent adults to human rights abuses in Chile. The survey analysis allows a better understanding of the explanations sustaining IPHRV. The survey analysis has contributed to the exploration of some of the associations that could explain the phenomenon of indifference. As explained in the theoretical chapter, IPHRV in Chile is related to multiple causes. Also, the survey has been useful to show the differences between people who are indifferent and non-indifferent to past human rights violations in Chile. Among those who are indifferent, the survey has helped to explore and distinguish the features of the four different sub categories of IPHRV.

On the other hand, qualitative methods provide a more in-depth approach to the phenomenon of IPHRV. Preliminary test interviews conducted first in the United Kingdom and then in Chile helped to refine the conversational nodes. A total of fifty-three persons have been interviewed in Chile: thirty-five indifferent persons and eighteen non-indifferent persons but with similar life trajectories to the indifferent ones. All the people interviewed are of Chilean nationality and are adults. The objective of these interviews has been to complement the statistical analysis with more robust explanations on the causes and impact of IPHRV. As qualitative enquiry unveils more profound social mechanisms and processes, it allows a better and clearer understanding

of the dynamics involved in the phenomenon of social indifference. This information cannot be found solely in national surveys currently available to the interested audience on human rights issues. An extensive revision of documents and archives in Chile has been carried out with the aim of building triangulation. The analysis of secondary sources has allowed a better understanding of the socio-cultural context in which the phenomenon of IPHRV is inserted.[16] Reports and archives have been used to make the analysis, explanations, and interpretations more robust (Jick, 1979).

3. CASE STUDY

This research focuses only on one country that has been chosen to favour the density of the analysis instead of a comparison among different realities. The in depth analysis of the Chilean case allows consideration of multiple facets of recent Chilean history and the political transition from military rule to elected civilian government.

If indifference as a social phenomenon has been understudied, IPHRV has also received little attention in the social sciences. The originality of this thesis is to try to explain how a society in transition, like Chile, is dealing with citizens' indifference to the troubled recent past. According to Gerring, "single case studies may be more useful than cross-case studies when a subject is being encountered for the first time or is being considered in a fundamentally new way" (2007: 40). The selection of a single case study allows it to be holistically approached, which is not only an advantage for

[16] Archives and documents had been reviewed in the following institutions: Catholic University of Chile, Alberto Hurtado University, Museum of Memory and Human Rights, Vicarage of Solidarity Foundation, Londres 38 detention centre, and Villa Grimaldi Park for Peace. The results of various surveys have also been reviewed; in particular the public opinion polls conducted by Centro de Estudios Públicos (CEP), the United Nations Human Development Program (UNDP), Latinobarómetro, Catholic University of Chile and Adimark-GfK, Centro de Estudios de la Realidad Contemporánea (CERC), the National Institute of Human Rights, and Diego Portales University.

researchers but also for readers interested in knowing the various dimensions of the researched phenomenon and the context in which it is inserted. As Lavinia Stan suggests, "case studies represent key building blocks of theory development" (2013: 4). This research can be exploited in the future as a starting point for making comparisons with other countries in transition and for the development of new theoretical approaches on indifference in modern society. This thesis seeks to properly balance the descriptive and explanatory aspects related to the Chilean case with the expectation of theory building in the social sciences.

In the introductory chapter the arguments justifying the selection of the Chilean transition were mentioned. The persistent polarisation of politics in Chile along with a well-known level of IPHRV among some segments of the population justifies the selection of the case study. It has been twenty-seven years since the restoration of democracy in Chile and the transitional process remains open. It was/is a pacted or negotiated transition that has given enormous power to former supporters of Pinochet, the military, and the business elite. Many of the transitional justice demands were not met in the early years of the transition, to prevent weakening the still fragile democracy or a return to authoritarian rule. But as the transition evolved over more than a quarter of a century, demands for effective transitional justice have emerged with greater intensity. Because Chile is a paradigmatic case for the study of political transitions, it is worth examining in detail the presence of IPHRV in Chilean society today.

4. RESEARCH QUESTIONS

As was mentioned in the previous chapter, this thesis tries to answer research questions related to the profile, types, explanations, and impact of IPHRV in Chile:

a) *Profile of the indifferent:* Who are the indifferent to past human rights violations in Chile today?

b) *Types and explanations of indifference:* Are the indifferent to past human rights violations a politically homogeneous group of people in Chilean society? If not, what variables account for different political orientations of those indifferent to past human rights violations? To what extent does political orientation or political affiliation of the indifferent account for IPHRV?

c) *Impact of indifference:* What are the social consequences of indifference to crimes against humanity committed during the military dictatorship in Chile today?

5. QUANTITATIVE RESEARCH METHODS

a) Objectives

The use of quantitative data analysis in this project aims to 1) identify and understand factors explaining people's IPHRV, and 2) build comparative insights to discover socio-political sources of that indifference. This should contribute to a better understanding of the causes, associations, and consequences of IPHRV in Chile today.

b) Survey and data base

Since 2006, the Pontifical Catholic University of Chile (PUC) and Adimark-GfK have conducted a national survey to determine the perceptions of Chileans on various topics every year. The *National Bicentennial Survey* is coordinated by the Centre for Public Policy and the Institute of Sociology at PUC, and has the support of *El Mercurio* and

Channel 13.[17] The national surveys meet high methodological standards, so they have contributed to the realisation of numerous academic investigations in various subjects on Chilean reality. The *8th National Bicentennial Survey* (2013) is the starting point to identify and characterise the people who could be considered indifferent to what happened in Chile in the recent past. The questionnaire is applied using face-to-face interviews in households in all regions of the country.

c) Data

The 2013 version of the questionnaire was applied between 25 June and 20 August 2013. It is important to note that a relevant political event occurred during the time of the survey: the presidential primaries on 30 June 2013. This involved the candidates of the major political alliances: the New Majority (the centre-left coalition ruling the country at that time) and the Alliance for Chile (the centre-right coalition that ruled the country previously and elected a president again in December 2017).

During August 2013, the information on the commemoration of the forty years of the military coup gradually increased. Although that theme had more presence in the public agenda between late August and mid-September 2013, it is important to note that the survey was applied in a year in which there was an explosion of memory on human rights issues. This implies that the people who responded indifferently to the questions of the survey on human rights issues are indeed indifferent people. The amount of information released and the dissemination of artistic-cultural events that took place in those months was abundant. Consequently, the vast majority of Chileans knew that the country was commemorating the forty year anniversary of the 1973 military coup.

[17] For more information about this survey, *see* http://encuestabicentenario.uc.cl. *Vid*. El Mercurio, pages A1, E1, and E9, Sunday 8 September 2013.

d) Sample

The population consists of men and women eighteen years of age or older, from all socio-economic levels, taking into account the 2002 Population Census. The sample design of the *2013 Bicentennial Survey* is probabilistic and stratified, in four stages of random selection. The questionnaire was applied to a national sample of 2,004 people. The margin of error for the survey is ±2.2% at a 95 percent level of confidence. The sample is proportional to the number of inhabitants, by location in the country. The sample was stratified into sixteen groups or strata according to population size and geographic location. The size of population differs among four categories of municipalities: (A) large: more than 200 thousand inhabitants (fourteen municipalities, 27.2 percent of the population), (B) medium-large: between 100 and 200 thousand (twenty-four municipalities, 31.1 percent of the population), (C) medium-small: between 20 and 100 thousand (thirty municipalities, 29.8 percent of the population, and (D) small: less than 20 thousand (eighteen municipalities, 11.9 percent of the population). With respect to their geographical location, four main areas are distinguished: North (I to IV and XV regions), Centre (V to VII regions), Metropolitan region (Santiago), and South (VIII to XI and XIV regions). The sample of the population living in areas of difficult access was not included, but this represents less than one percent of the total population. The data base included a variable to weight the cases according to the 2002 Population Census. The following table shows the composition of the sample, depending on the population size of municipalities and geographical location:

Figure 6
Sample Composition (%)

	North	Centre	South	Metropolitan Region	*Total*
A. 200,000 or more (14)	3.4	5.2	4.9	13.7	*27.2*
B. 100,000 to 200,000 (24)	5.2	2.8	6.1	17.0	*31.1*
C. 20,000 to 100,000 (30)	1.8	8.9	9.8	9.3	*29.8*
D. 20,000 or less (18)	1.4	4.3	5.6	0.6	*11.9*
Total	*11.8*	*21.2*	*26.4*	*40.6*	*100*

Source: PUC & Adimark-GfK (2013).

In conclusion, this survey meets the highest academic standards in terms of validity, reliability, and representativeness.[18]

e) Types of questions

i. Survey questions

The 2013 survey questionnaire consists of eighty-nine questions, and includes a total of 313 variables. In the final report the results of these questions are grouped into five sets of information: (1) Society; (2) Family and Work; (3) Religion; (4) Chile and the World; (5) Forty years after 11 September 1973. To compare the results from year to year, most of the questions are repeated in the survey. However, those in charge of the survey, in order to maintain space flexibility, have opted to incorporate some questions of particular research interest or that may be of interest to the public. That is precisely what occurred in the 2013 version, when September of that year marked the fortieth anniversary of the 1973 military coup.

The questions included in the 2013 survey tap are about the following dimensions: friendship, participation in associations, knowledge of political leaders, confidence in

[18] Appendix 1 offers more socio-demographic information.

politicians, confidence in institutions (e.g., churches, universities, banks, retail, schools, universities, parliamentarians, corporations), collective goals (e.g., reduction of poverty, development, protection of environment, reconciliation, quality of education, wealth distribution), marriage and civil unions, abortion, religion, social conflicts (e.g., rich *v.* poor, employers *v.* employees, government *v.* opposition, Mapuche people *v.* Chilean state, Santiago *v.* other regions, Chile *v.* neighbour countries), habits, political orientation, opportunities and meritocracy, violence, democratic institutions, libertarian *v.* egalitarian, human rights and transitional justice, working mothers, distribution of housework, working conditions, conflict with Bolivia, knowledge of Presidents of other countries, level of education, marital status, family members, family income, goods, and ethnicity (indigenous ancestry).

ii. Specific questions regarding human rights and transitional justice

The preliminary version of the questionnaire did not include questions about human rights. In order to incorporate questions for measuring IPHRV, during the first half of 2013 I worked with the team in charge of the national survey.[19] The first proposal I made to the team in charge of the 2013 survey included seven questions and twelve variables. Figure 7 reproduces the original questions that initiated the discussion with the 2013 survey team. This proposal was reviewed and discussed internally at the Catholic University of Chile, other views and considerations were taken into account, and then the questionnaire applied in the pilot plan was refined.

[19] *See* email exchanges with Professor Eduardo Valenzuela (Head of the Social Science Division) and Professor Ignacio Irarrázaval (Director of the Centre for Public Policy) on 11 November 2012, 12 November 2012, 18 November 2012, 19 November 2012, 25 November 2012, 26 November 2012, 28 November 2012, 22 March 2013, 26 March 2013, 27 March 2013, 28 March 2013, 30 March 2013, 8 April 2013, 16 April 2013, 17 April 2013, 19 April 2013, 22 April 2013, 4 June 2013, 25 June 2013, 9 September 2013. Meetings with Professors Valenzuela and Irarrázaval took place on 5 April 2013 and 18 April 2013.

Figure 7

Original proposal of set of questions about memory and human rights (April 2013)

1: In your opinion, the state should fund memorials or monuments to pay tribute to the victims of human rights violations?

1. *Yes*
2. *No*
3. *I am indifferent*
4. *Do not know / No answer*

2: In your opinion, is it important to teach in schools what happened in Chile between 1973 and 1990?

1. *Yes*
2. *No*
3. *I am indifferent*
4. *Do not know / No answer*

3: In your opinion, what is the proper way to refer to what happened on 11 September 1973?

1. *Military coup*
2. *Military pronouncement*
3. *I am indifferent*
4. *Do not know / No answer*

4: The period from 11 September 1973 to 11 March 1990 should be identified as?

1. *Dictatorship*
2. *Authoritarian regime*
3. *Military regime*
4. *I am indifferent*
5. *Do not know / No answer*

5: How much do you agree with the following statements?

	Strongly agree	*Agree*	*Disagree*	*Strongly disagree*
a. The problem of human rights violations does not have a solution				
b. It is preferable to turn the page and overcome the past				
c. Reconciliation is possible in Chile				
d. Chileans have learned the lessons of the past				
e. The transition to democracy is completed				
f. Chile needs a new Constitution				

6: On a scale from 1 to 10, being 1 "very left" and 10 "very right", in which political position do you situate yourself? *

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10

7: Do you plan to vote in the next elections?

1. *Yes*
2. *No*
3. *Do not know / No answer*

* A similar question was included in the final version of the questionnaire (Question No. 44).

The pilot survey was conducted in May 2013, and its preliminary results were analysed in June 2013. Because in general the questions asked by the survey team worked well, the final version of the questions on memory and human rights were included in the

survey questionnaire and then applied nationally. Because of my participation, the final version of the questionnaire incorporated seven variables related to the matters of memory and human rights, which are mentioned in the following figure.

Figure 8
Variables about memory and human rights included in the 2103 Bicentennial Survey

QUESTION 49: Forty years have passed since the 11 September 1973. Could you tell me how much you agree with the following statements?

	Strongly agree	*Agree*	*Neither agree nor disagree*	*Disagree*	*Strongly disagree*	*Do not know, No answer*
1. The State should fund memorials or monuments that pay tribute to the victims of human rights violations.						
2. The Chilean State should insist on new forms of reparation to the relatives of the disappeared.						
3. It is important that in schools it is taught what happened in Chile between 1973 and 1990.						
4. The Catholic Church played a key role in defending victims of human rights [violations] during that period.						
5. The Chilean government has done enough to repair victims' damages.						
6. The military condemned for human rights violations should have access to the same prison benefits provided for any convicted.						
7. The country should turn the page and not continue to confront what happened in 1973.						

Source: PUC & Adimark-GfK (2013).[20]

[20] Original questions in Spanish: "49. Este año se cumplen 40 años del 11 de septiembre de 1973. ¿Podría decirme qué tan de acuerdo está Ud. con las siguientes afirmaciones?

1. El Estado debe financiar memoriales o monumentos que rindan homenaje a las víctimas de violaciones a los derechos humanos.
2. El Estado chileno debería insistir en nuevas formas de reparación a los familiares de los detenidos desaparecidos.
3. Es importante que se enseñe en los colegios lo que sucedió en Chile entre 1973 y 1990.
4. La Iglesia Católica jugó un papel clave en la defensa de las víctimas de los derechos humanos en ese período.
5. El Estado chileno ya ha hecho lo suficiente para reparar el daño que se infringió a las víctimas
6. Los militares condenados por violaciones de los derechos humanos deberían tener acceso a los beneficios penitenciarios establecidos para cualquier condenado.
7. El país debería dar vuelta la página y no seguir enfrentándose a causa de lo que ocurrió en 1973."


Unfortunately these questions were not incorporated in the later versions of the *Bicentennial Survey*.

The preliminary results of these questions were released a few days before the fortieth anniversary of the 1973 military coup. It was important for the country to have an opinion poll in which matters related to the forty years commemoration were addressed. On Sunday 8 September 2013, *El Mercurio* presented the preliminary descriptive results on its front page and on two additional pages in its political section.[21]

It is known that survey instruments should use item reversals because (1) they ensure fuller measurement of an attitude or opinion, (2) they keep respondents from answering carelessly, and (3) help correct for *agreement bias.*[22] To avoid this, the direction of some of the questions was changed (*Q49.5* and *Q49.7*). In addition, questions should not be formulated in terms too obvious or suggesting the answer, because respondents could answer what might be expected of them as politically correct. It could be argued that there is no question in the survey that explicitly invites respondents to say whether they agree or not with the idea that perpetrators of human rights violations should be brought to justice. However, the expression 'turn the page' has been associated with the idea of closing all the pending investigations and prosecutions in cases on human rights violations. In this way, those who agree with the idea of turning the page consider that it is not convenient to continue investigating and punishing the guilty. From a theoretical point of view, these five questions cover what here is considered to be the core of transitional justice in a country like Chile. The figure below shows how the five specific questions are related to the four main components of transitional justice presented in the introductory chapter.

[21] *El Mercurio*, Sunday 8 September 2013, pages A1, D1, and D9.
[22] There is a vast literature on survey research design and implementation, both theoretical and practical. *See* Alwin & Krosnick 1991; Fowler 2009; Groves et al. 2009; Iarossi 2006; Lavrakas 2008; Sapsford 2007; Saris & Gallhofer 2007; Saris et al. 2010; Stopher 2012; Visser et al. 2000.

Figure 9
Components of Transitional Justice reflected in the 2103 Survey Questions



It should be noted that Questions *49.4* and *49.6* were excluded from the statistical analysis. The question about the role played by the Catholic Church during the dictatorship is not relevant to the understanding of current indifference of Chileans towards human rights violations. As was mentioned in chapter 2, the Catholic Church played a key role in the defence of human rights of those people who were persecuted, detained, fired from their jobs, etc. But to refer to the level of agreement of respondents about the role that a particular institution may have had in the past does not necessarily inform current perceptions on human rights issues. The question about the benefits perpetrators of human rights violations receive in jail also exceeds the phenomenon investigated. It is a very technical debate—that ordinary citizens may have misunderstood—about the treatment and conditions of common prisoners in jail versus the treatment and conditions of former state agents convicted of human rights violations and confined in special detention facilities.

In order to answer the research questions indexes were built, which required recoding different variables to make new calculations. Some of these indexes worked as dependent variables in the different analyses carried out:

The *Index of Indifference* places each respondent as either 'indifferent' or 'non-indifferent' to past human rights violations. The index was built by identifying the questions in item *49* (see Figure 9) that more directly inform people's position toward past human rights abuses. Respondents identified as 'indifferent' chose the answer 'Neither agree nor disagree' in three or more of the five questions in item *49* (i.e. *Q49.1*, *Q49.2*, *Q49.3*, *Q49.5*, and *Q49.7*). It was possible to classify as indifferent people those who claimed 'not to know' or 'did not answer' these questions but, it was preferable to be more precise and only consider as indifferent those who expressly answered that they 'Neither agree nor disagree' with the statements presented to them. As reported in the quantitative chapter, 16.02 percent of the sample was considered 'indifferent' according to the *Index of Indifference* constructed. If the index had included those who did not respond as indifferent, that figure would have been slightly higher.

The construction of two other indexes followed a similar procedure using the same survey questions in item *49*. The first one is the *Index of hostility to human rights issues*, which is meant to express people's rejection toward human rights and transitional justice goals. This index places each respondent as hostile or not hostile. It was built gathering the responses that suggested a rejection of further and enhanced reparation for victims of past human rights abuses and the effort to construct a stronger public-government sponsored historical memory regarding past violations. Hence, disapproving answers (i.e., 'Disagree' and 'Strongly disagree') in *Q49.1*, *Q49.2*, and *Q49.3*, and approving answers in *Q49.5*, and *Q49.7* (i.e., 'Agree' and 'Strongly agree') were merged for each question. These answers were defined as expressing a rejecting

attitude toward human rights issues. Respondents that answered three or more of these five questions in a rejecting manner were categorised as hostile to transitional justice regarding human rights violations. The second one corresponds to the *Pro Human Rights Index*. This index was built exactly as the *Hostility Index*, but selecting respondents that answered three or more of the five selected questions approving the assertion of transitional justice measures regarding human rights. That meant selecting answers 'Agree' and 'Strongly agree' for *Q49.1*, *Q49.2*, and *Q49.3*, and answers 'Disagree' and 'Strongly disagree' for *Q49.5*, and *Q49.7*.

In addition to these indexes, a *Typology of Indifference* was created. These types were theoretically defined using the different political orientations of the people who were categorised as indifferent. *Question 44* asked respondents to situate themselves in the political spectrum, from one (left-wing) to ten (right-wing). Four types of indifferent were created: 1) Disillusioned indifference: those who were identified as indifferent and identify themselves with the right-wing in the political spectrum (answers six to ten on *Q44*); 2) Submissive indifference: those who were identified as indifferent and identify themselves with the political centre (answer five on *Q44*); 3) Depoliticised indifference: people that are indifferent and do not identify themselves with any political orientation or did not answer the question; 4) Resigned indifference: respondents that were identified as indifferent and identify themselves with the left-wing in the political spectrum (answers one to four on *Q44*).

Additionally, a set of indexes was constructed to act as independent variables. The *Individualism Index* was constructed by calculating the average of the scores for each respondent in three questions (item *48* in the survey). These questions asked respondents to choose a position on a scale between two poles (ten possible values). One of these poles (value '1' in the questions) includes the following statements: 'Each

person should be concerned and take responsibility for their own well-being' (*Q48.1*); 'The State's assistance should be focused only on the poorest and most vulnerable segment of society' (*Q48.2*), and 'The best way of progressing in life is making efforts to implement entrepreneurial projects, train oneself and work hard' (*Q48.3*). This side of the questions describes a highly individualistic ideal type of citizen, who thinks of social progress predominantly in individual terms and with no assistance from institutional entities or social networks. The other pole in these questions involved a set of statements describing social progress as a public matter, that involves the whole community, and which should be institutionally supported by the State. These statements are: 'The State should care and be responsible for people's well-being' (*Q48.1*); 'All citizens must receive the same assistance from the State' (*Q48.2*), and 'To achieve progress in life people require the State's support, which should provide good education and jobs' (*Q48.3*). While the index does not provide a comprehensive measure of people's individualism, these questions assess the respondents' tendency to a more individualistic view of society. Respondents that marked values between one and 3.99 were considered 'highly individualistic.' Those responding with values between four and 6.99 were categorized as 'medium individualistic,' and the values between seven and ten were categorized as 'low individualistic.'

The *Conservatism Index* was built using the questions *Q26.2*, *Q26.3*, *Q26.4*, and *Q26.5* of the survey. Item *26* in the survey gathers questions on conservative views by asking about the level of agreement with the statements 'Marriage is a commitment for life' (*Q26.2*), 'Couples living together should get married when they have children' (*Q26.3*), 'Homosexual couples should have the right to get married' (*Q26.4*), 'When there are children, parents should stay together, even when they do not get along'

(*Q26.5*)[23]. The level of agreement in these questions is ordinal (one to five), starting with 'Strongly agree' and ending in 'Strongly disagree'. In order to obtain a single measure of conservatism, the average of the scores in these answers was calculated and recoded into a new variable (the opposite direction of *Q26.4* was acknowledged and recoded accordingly). The new variable synthesised the values in *Q26.2*, *Q26.3*, *Q26.4*, and *Q26.5* with values from one (Strongly agree) to five (Strongly disagree). That variable was recoded to have only three possible values ('High,' 'Moderate,' and 'Low').

The *Social Conflict Index* was built using questions from item *41* in the survey. These questions asked respondents about their perception of conflict between rich and poor (*Q41.1*), workers and business owners (*Q41.2*), and indigenous people and the Chilean state (*Q41.4*). Respondents had three possible answers in each question: 'Great conflict,' 'Minor conflict,' and 'No conflict.' An average of the answers to these questions was calculated for each respondent and the new variable was recoded with the following categories: 'High perception of conflict,' 'Moderate perception of conflict,' and 'Low perception of conflict.'

Index of Trust in Public Institutions: this index was created using questions in item *47* in the survey. These questions asked respondents about their level of trust in public institutions contributing to democracy. Three alternatives were provided for answers on the democratic contribution of each type of institution: 'Strengthens', 'Neither strengthens nor weakens', and 'Weakens.' The types of institutions considered in these questions were: Congress (*Q47.1*), Political parties (*Q47.2*), Courts (*Q47.3*), Municipalities (*Q47.4*), Police (*Q47.8*), and Armed forces (*Q47.9*). An average for all of these answers was calculated, creating a new variable. This variable was recoded into

[23] *See* item *26* in the questionnaire, available at http://encuestabicentenario.uc.cl/.

three categories expressing the level of trust toward public institutions: 'High confidence,' 'Neither high nor low,' and 'Low confidence.'

Index of Trust in Institutions of Security and Order: this index was obtained using the same procedure as the *Index of Trust in Public Institutions.* In this case the questions considered were only *Q47.8* and *Q47.9*, referring to the police and the armed forces. The resulting categories are: 'High confidence,' 'Neither high nor low,' and 'Low confidence.'

f) Limitations

While the *2013 Bicentennial Survey* includes items that are useful to explore IPHRV in Chile, it was not designed to produce more specialised, in-depth knowledge of this issue. Therefore, the survey provides valuable information to identify the profile and characteristics of those people who are indifferent to past human rights violations, and it also includes relevant variables to study this phenomenon (e.g., variables on politicisation, socio-demographic variables, socio-economic variables, etc.). However, it does not include a full set of theoretically defined predictors of social indifference. Consequently, a comprehensive range of hypotheses involved in explaining the causes and consequences of indifference cannot be tested using solely the data provided in this survey. The fact that questions on transitional justice do not approach the phenomenon of indifference comprehensively impeded conducting multiple correspondence analyses. It is not possible to answer the research questions by relying solely on the statistical analysis of a public opinion survey. To overcome the constraints of the data provided by the survey, qualitative social research techniques have been applied. The identification of the different profiles of people who could be classified as indifferent to human rights violations has been complemented with qualitative data collected in Chile. The profiles

give substantial insights into certain attributes of those indifferent to past human rights violations, distinguishing among disillusioned, submissive, depoliticised, and resigned indifferent. Lack of previous survey data comparable to that in the 2013 survey limits analysis of the research questions from 1990 until 2017.

The inferential quantitative tools used in this research are Pearson Chi-square and Logistic Regression. It must be pointed out that the statistical analyses carried out as part of this project have their own limitations. First, the Pearson Chi-square is a type of analysis that is not useful for predicting specific outcomes. Instead, it provides comparative insights among groups based on the association of a grouping variable and a second variable. Although researchers define one of these variables as independent and the other as dependent, the direction or causality of this interaction remains statistically indeterminate. Inferring the association only between a given pair of variables in the population, the Chi-square does not provide the opportunity to control for other variables as is possible with regression analyses. Comparing groups with a more descriptive goal using Chi-square was necessary in order to begin building defining patterns regarding types and sources of indifference. Secondly, logistic regression analyses conducted as part of this project do not provide models with a strong predictive power (Pseudo R-square < 0.1). Consequently, it has not been used as a way of defining predictive causal variables, but as a method of testing explanatory factors influencing the emergence of indifference in a particular society.

g) Data analysis

The *Index of Indifference* has been used as dependent variable. The following independent variables have been considered:

Figure 10
Independent variables

Variable	Description	Measure
Age	Age of respondent in years.[24]	*Continuous*
Generational cohort	Segmentation responding to different generational group.[25] Categories: Young adulthood (18-24 years), Early adulthood (25-39 years), Middle adulthood (40-59 years), Late adulthood (60 or more years).	*Nominal*
Political orientation	The political orientation to which each respondent self-identified.[26] Categories: Left, Right, Centre, Apolitical.	*Nominal*
Population municipality size	The number of inhabitants in municipalities is segmented in four categories: Large (200,000 or more), Medium large (100,000 to 200,000), Medium small (20,000 to 100,000), and Small (20,000 or less).[27]	*Ordinal*
Gender	Gender of the respondent.[28] Categories: Male and Female.	*Nominal*
Religiosity	Self-identification with religion.[29] Categories: Yes and No.	*Nominal*
Cohabitation	Whether the respondent lives with a partner or not.[30] Categories: Yes and No.	*Nominal*
Individualism	Respondents' level of individualism[31]. Categories: High, Moderate, and Low.	*Ordinal*
Educational level	Educational level achieved.[32] Categories: Primary and no education, Secondary education, Technical education, and University education.	*Ordinal*
Socio-economic status	This variable was recoded in three categories.[33] Categories: Upper class (*ABC1*), Middle class (*C2* and *C3*), and Lower class (*D* and *E*).	*Nominal*
Valuation for entrepreneurship	Level in which respondents see entrepreneurship as a successful tool to set up an independent business in Chile.[34] Categories: High, Neither high nor low, and Low.	*Ordinal*

[24] This variable can be found in the group called *Classification Data* in the 2013 Bicentennial Survey.
[25] This variable was obtained recoding the original variable 'Age' in the Classification Data in the survey.
[26] Variable created using item *44* in the 2013 Bicentennial Survey. This question asked respondents for their political orientation in a scale from one to ten, one being left-wing and ten being right-wing. The answers to this question were recoded into three categories: right (6-10), centre (5), and left (1-4).
[27] This variable can be found in the group called *Classification Data* in the 2013 Bicentennial Survey.
[28] This variable can be found in the group called *Classification Data* in the 2013 Bicentennial Survey.
[29] Variable created using question *Q29.1* in the 2013 Bicentennial Survey. This question originally asked respondents for their religious self-identification using the following categories: 'Catholic,' 'Evangelic,' 'Protestant or a historical/traditional Church (Anglican, Lutheran, Presbyterian),' 'Other religion, such as Jehovah's Witnesses, Mormon, Jewish, Muslim, Orthodox, or any other,' 'Atheist,' and 'None.' These alternatives were recoded into two categories defining whether respondents were religious or not ('Yes' and 'No').
[30] This variable can be found in the group called *Classification Data* in the 2013 Bicentennial Survey.
[31] Variable created using questions of item *48* in the 2013 Bicentennial Survey. See description of the *Individualism Index* above for further details.
[32] This variable can be found in the group called *Classification Data* in the 2013 Bicentennial Survey. The variable was recoded in order to build only four categories of educational attainment.
[33] This variable can be found in the group called *Classification Data* in the 2013 Bicentennial Survey. The variable was recoded in order to build only three categories of socioeconomic status.
[34] Variable created using item *45* in the 2013 Bicentennial Survey. The original question asked respondents 'what are the chances or likelihood in this country that anyone can initiate their own business and establish themselves independently?' The alternatives provided to answer were from 'Very high' (1) to 'Very low' (5). These answers were recoded and reversed, so that high values were associated to high valuation of entrepreneurship. Additionally, the variable was recoded into the categories 'High' (four and five), 'Neither high nor low' (three), 'Low' (one and two).

Perception of social violence	Level of violence perceived by people.[35] Categories: High, and Moderate/low.	*Ordinal*
Projection of future reconciliation	People's projection of whether the country will or will not advance or achieve higher levels of reconciliation in the future.[36] Categories: Yes, and No.	*Nominal*
Interpersonal trust	Level to which respondents trust other people living in their proximities.[37] Categories: High, Moderate, and Low.	*Ordinal*
Conservatism	Level of respondents' conservative vie.[38] Categories: High, Moderate, and Low.	*Ordinal*
Perception of social conflict	Perceptions of social conflict in Chile.[39] Categories: High, and Moderate/Low.	*Ordinal*
Trust in public institutions	Level of trust toward public institutions, such as Congress, local government, police, and others.[40] Categories: High, Neither high nor low, and Low.	*Ordinal*
Trust in institutions of security and order	Level of trust toward public institutions that contribute to national security and order, namely the Armed forces and the Police.[41] Categories: High, Neither high nor low, and Low.	*Ordinal*

Descriptive statistical analyses for each of the variables mentioned were carried out, starting with univariate analyses and then bivariate analyses, using indifference variables as dependent variables. This was useful in order to explore the data.

[35] Variable created using item *46* in the 2013 Bicentennial Survey. Questions have been recoded hierarchically in order to obtain respondents' perception on violence. The original question asks people for which sentence they agree more with: 'Violence exists in the country, but emerges from groups with no importance' (1), 'Violence exists in the country, and we must give importance to it, but without exaggerating' (2), 'Violence exists in the country, and we must treat it with the highest importance because it threatens with destroying our institutions' (3), and 'There is no violence in this country, we should not give importance to isolated incidents' (4). The process of recoding organised the answers hierarchically in this order: four (1st), one (2nd), two (3rd), three (4th). Finally, answers were divided into 'High' (4th) and 'Moderate/low' (1st to 3rd).

[36] Variable created recoding question *Q25.4* in the 2013 Bicentennial Survey. The original variable asked respondents about their perception about the possibility to reach social reconciliation within the next ten years. It included four categories: 'It will be reached' (one), 'There will be developments' (two), 'It will be the same' (three), 'It will deteriorate' (four). These alternatives were recoded into two categories: 'Yes,' there will be progress toward reconciliation (one and two), and 'No,' there will not be any progress toward reconciliation (three and four).

[37] Variable created recoding question *Q3.4* in the 2013 Bicentennial Survey. Originally the question was 'How much do you trust people in your neighbourhood or area of residence?' Including consecutive alternatives from 'A lot' (one) to 'Nothing' (five). The variable was recoded to turn categories around assigning higher values to greater trust and lower values to less trust, and to create three categories: 'High' (four and five), 'Moderate' (three), and 'Low' (one and two).

[38] Variable created using questions from item *26* in the 2013 Bicentennial Survey. See description of *Conservatism Index* above for further details.

[39] Variable created using questions of item 41 in the 2013 Bicentennial Survey. See description of the Social Conflict Index above for further details.

[40] Variable created using questions of item 47 in the 2013 Bicentennial Survey. See description of the Index of Trust to Public Institutions above for further details.

[41] Variable created using questions of item 47 in the 2013 Bicentennial Survey. See description of the Index of Trust in Institutions of Security and Order above for further details.

The main analyses aimed to seek explanations to IPHRV. A regression model has been built with that goal, testing a set of hypotheses that pointed to the role of variables such as individualism, political orientation, socioeconomic status, and generation as predictors of indifference. Other variables were included as control variables. Finally, other variables were incorporated in the model to assess the role of more attitudinal variables in explaining indifference. Therefore, the quantitative analysis identifies the variables affecting the presence of indifferent positions on past human rights abuses in Chile.[42]

Additionally, two large tables comparing frequencies of groups have been incorporated in the analysis. In order to assess the statistical significance comparing groups' frequencies, Pearson Chi-square tests were applied. These tables include the statistically significant association ($p<0.05$) between variables theoretically defined as explanatory (e.g. political orientation, gender, generational cohort, individualism, perception of social conflict, etc.) and different groups that include those indifferent to past human rights abuses. One of these tables, for example, synthesises the analyses carried out to compare the groups of indifference, hostility, and pro human rights. These analyses allow this comparison to complement the results obtained in the regression from a more descriptive perspective.

[42] During the first semester of 2013 I held meetings with the National Institute of Human Rights (INDH). During 2011 and 2013, the Institute conducted the First and the Second National Surveys on Human Rights in Chile (INDH 2011; INDH 2013). I conducted a thorough review of the first survey, and formulated a set of recommendations for improving the design of the second survey (Rojas 2014). Many of my methodological observations were incorporated into the second survey. Unfortunately, the Institute did not accept my suggestions to incorporate specific questions in order to measure the levels of Chilean indifference towards human rights violations during the dictatorship. However, after reviewing the databases of both surveys, for various reasons I came to the conclusion that such surveys would not be useful for this research.

A second set of analyses compares the same explanatory variables with the types of indifference (disillusioned, depoliticised, submissive, and resigned).[43] These analyses aim at providing descriptive insights on the particularities and the associations and explanations underlying these types of indifference. This is why the analyses have also included a comparison with the groups of hostile and pro human rights respondents. Profiles might be similar when comparing, on the one hand, hostile and disillusioned indifferent respondents, and on the other, pro human rights and resigned indifferent respondents.

6. QUALITATIVE RESEARCH METHODS

a) Objectives

Qualitative methods aim to explain the profiles, causes and consequences of IPHRV. In order to assess the impact that those consequences have in transitional justice processes and mechanisms, interviewees are conceived of as social actors. In other words, interviewees are understood as people whose opinions and daily decisions might be shaping the dynamics and processes of transitional justice and human rights issues in Chile today. Arguably, indifference determines the ways in which people interact with others, avoid or engage in public discussions, the values and contents that these people foster in socialization processes, their political leaning, their political and electoral participation, etc. Therefore, qualitative data also elucidates the consequences or impact of IPHRV in Chilean society nowadays.

[43] In this case, political orientation was excluded from the analyses because it is already incorporated into the construction of the profiles or types of IPHRV.

b) Design

In order to discriminate between particular types of indifference this research takes an inferential approach that involves comparing different groups among those who are indifferent to past human rights violations. The theoretical framework in this project suggests the presence of four different groups of indifferent (disillusioned, resigned, submissive, and depoliticised indifferent). The *Method of Agreement*, proposed by Theda Skocpol and Margaret Somers (1980), has been used to create a comparative approach between groups that, sharing the same outcome (indifference) and having similar socio-demographic characteristics, differ in the causes of that outcome. While the common causes in these cases strengthen the explanations of IPHRV, the differences between them inform on the specificities of each one of these four types of indifference. Additional interviews with non-indifferent persons have been included, to test whether these factors can be conceived of as causes of indifference, thus strengthening the design's robustness. In addition, process-tracing in in-depth interviews allows understanding of the consequences or impact of IPHRV in social relations in which the different types of indifferent persons intervene.

c) Test interviews

Before conducting the in-depth interviews, twenty-one test interviews of adult Chileans were conducted in the United Kingdom and Chile. These interviews provided insight into the phenomenon of IPHRV. These test interviews explored indifference as a result of fear of social conflict and violent rupture in Chilean civil society, distrust of political and military authorities, familial and school backgrounds, ideological orientation, and knowledge about past human rights violations. The interviews have contributed to this

research in four general aspects: 1) To become aware of the diversity of motivations and perceptions of Chileans when analysing the recent history of the country, including the issue of human rights violations between 1973 and 1990; 2) To identify and refine the main conversational nodes discussed during the in-depth interviews; 3) To identify key informants who offered their support to get in touch with indifferent persons willing to participate in this project as interviewees; 4) To realize the importance of expanding the range of the people to be interviewed in terms of age, political spectrum, activities, and socio-economic level. Test interviews have been conducted with victims and their relatives, former state agents under investigation for human rights violations, bystanders who supported Pinochet, Chileans in exile, persons who participated in or favoured armed resistance to the dictatorship, and ordinary citizens from all political sectors. Open questions have invited respondents to talk about the main conversational themes of this research. Responses have spontaneously triggered new questions to better understand the perceptions and motivations of the interviewees. The average duration of each test interview was three hours.

d) In-depth interviews

In-depth interviews record better than surveys how people arrive at their perceptions and motivations. In-depth interviews with people who self-identify as indifferent to past human rights violations and transitional justice mechanisms are essential to understanding the deep causes and impact of that indifference. While this does involve selecting on the dependent variable, in combination with other research techniques it ameliorates the problems associated with such a method. It also allows the use of in-depth interview techniques to explore dimensions, features, causes, and consequences that are not emerging from the quantitative analysis.

Between June and December 2016 fifty-three people were interviewed, until a saturation point was reached (Mason 2010). In general terms, interviewees reported different explanations for their indifference. It should be noted that at the beginning of this research the plan was to identify the interviewees using the snowball technique (Noy 2008), but then I realised that my social networks in Chile were more useful for identifying the different categories of interviewees. In order to cover a relatively broad and diverse range of interviewees, participants were selected taking into consideration their political orientation (right, left, centre, and apolitical), generational cohort (18-39 years, 40-59 years, sixty or more years), socio-economic level (upper class, middle class, and lower class), and gender. The original intention was to have men and women similarly represented in the sample, but based on the recommendations made by personal contacts a larger number of men were finally interviewed. At the end of the interview, and only if it was not possible to confirm the socio-economic status of the interviewee, questions on social class were asked. Further details on the composition and sociodemographic characteristics of the interviewees are explained later in chapter 6. All the people interviewed signed the consent form approved by the Research Ethics Committee of the Department of Sociology.

At the beginning of each interview items *44*, *47*, and *49* of the 2013 Bicentennial Survey were asked. It was explained to each interviewee that this set of questions corresponded to a national survey previously administered in the country and that it only served to identify with more precision the type of questions that were to be formulated during the in-depth interview. Obviously, these questions were useful in the process of categorisation of the people interviewed. The idea was to distinguish those who were effectively indifferent following the same criteria used in the quantitative analysis from those who were non-indifferent. Of the fifty-three interviewees, thirty-five

have been categorised as indifferent to past human rights violations, while the other eighteen correspond to people who have been considered non-indifferent to past human rights violations. Interviews with non-indifferent people have contributed to a comparative analysis between both groups, strengthening the inferential design. The interviews had an average duration of three hours and were carried out at a place determined by the interviewee, usually their homes. However, on thirteen occasions it was necessary to agree on a second or third appointment in order to cover the different aspects of interest. The total number of interviews was sixty-nine.

To carry out the in-depth interviews four major themes were identified, on which interviewees were invited to reflect responding to open-ended questions: (1) life stories, (2) social relations, (3) socialisation processes, and (4) political attitudes and opinions (see Figure 11). The structure of questions presented below was flexible and interactive. As some respondents incorporated new topics into the conversation, the scope of the interviews was expanded to other unforeseen categories. It should be noted that during the conversations with direct or indirect victims and victims' relatives, the details of traumatic events were not asked, but some interviewees referred to those events. Before conducting the interviews, it was explained that the goal of the interview was not to cause any stress or discomfort.

Figure 11
Questions for in-depth interviews

1. Life story
Who are you?
What are your habits, aims, expectations, dreams?
How is your daily life?
Could you please describe a typical day in your life?
What are the most significant events in your life?
What are your most important achievements?
What are your frustrations?
What are your dreams for the future?
What are your main concerns in life?

2. *Social relations*
Who are important for you? What people are important for you in your life? Why are they important for you? Who are less important for you? Why they are less important for you? What is important in your family? What is important in your university/job? What is important in your friendships? Why are the things you mention important for you?
3. *Socialisation processes*
How was the education you received? How was your school/university? What are the most important things you learnt from your parents? What are the most important lessons you transmit to your children? (or would like to transmit them in the future) How do you get informed? How much time do you dedicate to reading newspapers or listening to radio or viewing television, etc.? How important has religion been in your life?
4. *Political attitudes*
Do you vote? Did you vote in the last presidential election? What do you think about politics? What do you think about politicians? What do you think about political parties? What do you think about the student movement? Do you participate in political activities? Why or why not? How do you evaluate the Popular Unity? How do you evaluate the military regime or dictatorship? How do you evaluate the transition? Do you speak about politics in your family? Why or why not? Do you speak about politics at work/university? Why or why not? How do you see the country today? What concerns you about the country?

e) Data analysis

It is well known that the core of qualitative analysis lies in the continuous and iterative processes of describing data, classifying, and interconnecting concepts (Dey 1993: 30 and 265). The qualitative data collected in this research has been analysed according to Grounded Theory (Glaser & Strauss 1967; Strauss 1987; Strauss & Corbin 1990; Charmaz 2006). Each interview transcript has been compared with other transcripts, and each category with another, finding emerging patterns (Wing Leung et al. 2011). As has been recommended by Charmaz, Grounded Theory has been used flexibly and not

mechanically (2006: 178). The formulation of analytical questions has helped to approach meanings and subjectivities, finding what interviewees have in common and how they differ. Line-by-line coding and microanalysis has shaped the preliminary analytic frame, and the analytical categories, including their properties and relationships (cf. Strauss & Corbin 2002: 73 and 183; Charmaz 2006: 45 and 50). The analysis has comprised the steps through which the data has been fragmented, conceptualised, and re-articulated. Consequently, concepts, categories, properties, and dimensions emerged from the process of coding. Following Taylor and Bogdan, the analysis required an intimate and profound knowledge of the data collected (1987: 175). The process of coding has been used as a systematic way for developing and refining the interpretations of the qualitative data collected (cf. Taylor & Bogdan 1987: 167).[44] Open and axial coding of all interviews helped to regroup data, allowing subcategories, dimensions, interactions, and concepts to emerge (cf. Strauss & Corbin 2002: 134-5).[45] To achieve sufficient analytical distance, past experiences and previous theoretical knowledge were taken into consideration when interpreting the transcriptions of the interviews. Simultaneously, process-tracing was considered when examining specific chains of events that led interviewees to become indifferent to past atrocities and transitional justice. Process-tracing has strengthened the analysis and understanding of causal interaction between life events and IPHRV in Chile.

[44] "*Codes* are tags or labels for assigning units of meaning to the descriptive or inferential information compiled during a study" (Miles & Huberman 1994: 56).
[45] *N-Vivo* software was used for coding the transcriptions, and searching for emergent categories.

f) Participant observation and meetings with experts

Participant observation has been defined as "the systematic description of events, behaviours, and artefacts in the social setting chosen for study" (Marshall & Rossman 1989: 79). In order to be familiar with the issues investigated, participant observation in trauma and memory sites and public spaces was conducted between 2013 and 2016. Villa Grimaldi Park for Peace, the National Cemetery, the Museum of Memory and Human Rights, Londres 38 torture centre, Salvador Allende Foundation, Pinochet Foundation, the ovens and memorials of Lonquén, the Army Museum, the War Academy, the Navy Museum, and the Jaime Guzmán Memorial are some of the memory sites that were visited during fieldwork. Additionally, meetings with teachers and secondary students took place at four schools in Santiago and Reñaca (V region). Numerous ceremonies and cultural-artistic events were attended in Chile during fieldwork, including the commemorations of the fortieth anniversary of the military coup in 2013 and the funeral of Carlos Berger in 2014.[46] In September 2015 a detention centre for former members of the military who are under judicial investigation was visited. As many academic seminars, conferences, and workshops as possible were also attended between 2013 and 2016. Street protests and violent riots in Downtown Santiago, mainly organised by college students, were observed with prudence and respect. Field notes and photographs taken at these locations have contributed valuable material that complements the analysis of the primary sources collected through in-depth interviews.[47] Additionally, I was able to discuss my work with opinion shapers,

[46] Lawyer and journalist Carlos Berger, director of *El Loa* radio station, was arrested in Calama on 11 September 1973, and executed by the Caravan of Death led by General Sergio Arellano on October 1973. His remains were disappeared for over forty years, and his funeral took place at the General Cemetery of Santiago on 13 April 2014.

[47] Appendix 5 provides a summary of the memory sites and schools visited during fieldwork.

intellectuals, memory entrepreneurs, human rights activists, professors and doctoral students. The objective of these meetings was to share with experts the aim of this research project and some of the preliminary findings, and then to invite them to give their points of view on the subject of IPHRV in Chile's political transition.[48] These informal and academic conversations provided valuable information for understanding the broader socio-cultural context of Chilean transition to democracy.

[48] I discussed my research and held meetings with Víctor Hugo Allan, Oriana Bernasconi (Alberto Hurtado University), Douglass Cassel (University of Notre Dame), Juan Emilio Cheyre (Catholic University of Chile), Christine Cervenak (University of Notre Dame), Simón Escoffier (University of Oxford), Pumla Gobodo-Madikizela (University of the Free State), Manuel Guerrero (University of Chile), Juan Guzmán (former judge of the Court of Appeals of Santiago), Boris Hau (Diego Portales University), Katherine Hite (Vassar College), Daniela Jara (Andrés Bello University), Jeff Kelly Lowenstein (Columbia College), Ignacio Irarrázaval (Catholic University of Chile), Francesca Lessa (University of Oxford), Elizabeth Lira (Alberto Hurtado University), Bernardo Mackenna (Catholic University of Chile), Aldo Mascareño (Adolfo Ibáñez University), Gabriel Pereira (University of Oxford), Alejandro Solís (former judge of the Court of Appeals of Santiago), Eduardo Valenzuela (Catholic University of Chile), Juan Carlos Oyanedel (Andrés Bello University), Darío Páez (Vasque Country University), Yanira Reyes (Inter American University), Paula Salvo (National Institute of Human Rights), among other experts.

Chapter 5: Quantitative Analysis of Indifference

> L'individu qui ne veut pas oublier ses parents disparus, et s'obstine à répéter leurs noms, se heurte assez vite à l'indifférence générale.
>
> —*Maurice Halbwachs*

1. INTRODUCTION

The aim of this chapter is to explain who the indifferent to past human rights violations are, and what the main characteristics are that differentiate indifferent persons from non-indifferent persons regarding past atrocities in Chile. This chapter also explores the causes and associations that might explain this indifference. Using data from the *2013 National Bicentennial Survey*, a profile of the people who are indifferent will be provided. In addition, socio-demographic and attitudinal characteristics of the indifferent will be compared with people who expressed views hostile to the transitional justice agenda, and also with people who value human rights and transitional justice. People who are indifferent are not a homogeneous group; therefore, the last section of this chapter carefully examines their political orientations and perceptions of society. The theoretical differentiation between disillusioned indifferent, depoliticised indifferent, submissive indifferent, and resigned indifferent is empirically explored. As Cohen points out, to understand indifference it is necessary to analyse the similarities and differences among various types of indifference and the social context of those who express it (Cohen 2002: 203). The results of the survey analyses provide valuable information for the qualitative component of this mixed methods doctoral research: in order to properly respond to the research questions presented in the introductory and


methodological chapters, the results of the quantitative analysis discussed are complemented with the results of the qualitative data analysis.

2. INDIFFERENCE

The statistical analyses presented in this chapter are based on the *8th National Bicentennial Survey* (PUC & Adimark-GfK 2013). Five questions of the survey have been selected to build the dependent variable on IPHRV. As mentioned in the methodological chapter, these five questions correspond to a Likert scale with five attributes: 'Strongly agree,' 'Agree,' 'Neither agree nor disagree,' 'Disagree,' and 'Strongly disagree,' in addition to 'Does not know' and 'Does not respond.' Figure 12 shows the univariate descriptive statistics. The analysis focuses on those who expressly have an indifferent opinion. It is appropriate to distinguish between those who responded 'Neither agree nor disagree'—answers that for purposes of this research are considered indifferent—and those who expressly 'Agree' or 'Disagree' with the different statements, which are considered non-indifferent responses. In order to be more rigorous in identifying the indifferent people, non-responses ('Do not know' and 'Do not answer') are not considered as indifferent responses. Indifferent responses in the following graph are represented in green. The range of indifference goes from 15.7 percent (on the question about teaching in schools what happened in Chile) to 30.8 percent (when asking if the state has done enough to compensate victims). The average of indifferent responses in these five questions is 23.7 percent, while the average of non-indifferent responses is 73.3 percent, and an average of 3 percent of missing values.

Figure 12
Frequencies on questions about human rights in the 2013 National Bicentennial Survey

	Strongly agree	*Agree*	*Neither agree nor disagree*	*Disagree*	*Strongly disagree*	*Do not know / No answer*	*Total*
A. The State should fund memorials or monuments that pay tribute to the victims of human rights violations.	166 (8.3)	528 (26.3)	505 (25.2)	568 (28.3)	174 (8.7)	63 (3.1)	2,004 (100)
B. The Chilean State should insist on new forms of reparation to the relatives of the disappeared.	221 (11.0)	675 (33.7)	491 (24.5)	438 (21.9)	123 (6.1)	56 (2.8)	2,004 (100)
C. It is important that at schools it is taught what happened in Chile between 1973 and 1990.	511 (25.5)	812 (40.5)	314 (15.7)	237 (11.8)	87 (4.3)	43 (2.1)	2,004 (100)
D. The Chilean government has done enough to repair victims' damages.	123 (6.1)	496 (24.8)	617 (30.8)	560 (27.9)	125 (6.2)	83 (4.1)	2,004 (100)
E. The country should turn the page and not continue to confront what happened in 1973.	397 (19.8)	631 (31.5)	448 (22.4)	364 (18.2)	108 (5.4)	56 (2.8)	2,004 (100)



N = 2,004. Own source, based on the *2013 Bicentennial Survey*.

3. PROFILING THE INDIFFERENT


IPHRV is the result of different socialisation processes and life experiences. Indifference is an attitude learned through life by individuals, manifested as a particular way of relating to others in a given society. Indifference is not synonymous with passivity, as the indifferent people interact and promote indifference in their social relations. Indeed, more than in the private sphere, indifference is also present in the social sphere, in the interpersonal or relational dimension of life. This thesis argues that IPHRV is a multi-causal phenomenon, since several variables contribute to explain why an individual adopts neutral or indifferent positions to human rights violations committed in the past (Arteta 2012: 99; Leander et al. 2014). Indifference emerges through social interaction, but individual characteristics and life experiences also have to be taken into account. Previous research suggests that age, gender, and marital status contribute little to understanding IPHRV (Arnoso et al. 2012; Gidengil et al. 2008; Fraile 2014: 262). Instead, indifference is explained by a set of perceptions and attitudes that for various reasons people adopt in a given society. Such perceptions and attitudes are related to how the individual interprets and understands social life (Ekman 2013: 4). Some of these attitudes may have been learned early, as happens when parents transmit to their children their political views and ideologies (Styskal & Sullivan 1975; Atkin 1981; Allan 1998: 693; Weintraub et al. 2001; Verkuyten 2002; Zuckerman 2005; Dostie-Goulet 2009: 417; Jennings et al. 2009; Pesquera Menéndez 2011; Roizblatt et al. 2014; Bezo & Maggi 2015; Reidy et al. 2015: 13). But there are attitudes that are the result of socialisation processes in adult life (Dey 1997; Pahl 2002: 421; Dostie-Goulet 2009: 418; Sinclair 2012; Giddens 2013: 339; Jones et al. 2014: 55; Parsons 2014: 681; PUC & Adimark-GfK 2015: 33; Reidy et al. 2015; Yi 2015: 266). In such an

ideologically polarised society as the Chilean case, indifference can be understood as the way in which individuals react that choose not to intervene or express opinions regarding matters as delicate and complex as human rights violations committed during Pinochet's dictatorship**.** It is a neutral and disinterested response to avoid debating about responsibility and guilt.

It is possible to build a profile of people who are indifferent to past atrocities in Chile today. But the generalisations regarding the indifferent should also be compatible with the formulation variation in certain attributes among the indifferent. An *Index of Indifference* has been constructed from the responses to these five questions. If a respondent expressly declares that he/she 'neither agrees nor disagrees' in at least three of these five questions, then this respondent is considered as an indifferent person. For purposes of analysis, if the person responds with indifference less than three times to these five questions, then he/she is counted as a non-indifferent respondent. Figure 13 shows the frequency of responses for those five questions. As can be seen, from this sample the number of indifferent people to past human rights violations corresponds to 321 (16 percent), and 1,683 people can be considered as non-indifferent (84 percent).

Figure 13
Frequencies of indifferent and non-indifferent responses on transitional justice

	Relative frequency	*Accumulative frequency*	*Percentage*	*Accumulated percentage*
5 indifferent responses	80	80	3.99	3.99
4 indifferent and 1 non-indifferent responses	84	164	4.19	8.18
3 indifferent and 2 non-indifferent responses	157	321	7.84	16.02
2 indifferent and 3 non-indifferent responses	303	624	15.12	31.13
1 indifferent and 4 non-indifferent responses	562	1,186	28.04	59.17
5 non-indifferent responses	818	2,004	40.82	100
Total	2,004	-	100	-



N = 2,004. Own source, based on the *2013 Bicentennial Survey*.

a) Binomial Logistic Regression

To explain the causes of IPHRV in Chile today, the results of the following binary logistic regression show that self-defined political orientation (on a left to right continuum), socio-economics status, and generational cohort have a significant effect over indifference. Perceptions of political violence and social conflict in Chile have also a significant effect on indifference.

Figure 14
Binomial logistic regression model explaining indifference to human rights in Chile

Variable	*Coeff.*	*Odds Ratio*	S.E.	95% C.I. Lower	95% C.I. Upper
Individualism[a]					
Low	0.143	1.154	0.198	0.784	1.700
Medium	0.134	1.143	0.175	0.811	1.612
Political orientation[b]					
Apolitical	0.983	2.672*	0.581	0.856	8.338
Right-wing	0.575	1.777	0.590	0.559	5.652
Left-wing	-1.347	0.260**	0.629	0.076	0.893
Generation[c]					
Young adults (18-24 years)	-0.479	0.619**	0.209	0.411	0.932
Middle adults (40-59 years)	-0.525	0.591***	0.158	0.434	0.806
Late adults (60 or more years)	-0.095	0.909	0.179	0.640	1.291
Socio-economic status[d]					
Lower class (D and E)	0.528	1.696**	0.254	1.031	2.789
Middle class (C2 and C3)	0.738	2.091***	0.250	1.280	3.414
Perception of social violence[e]					
High	-0.168	0.845	0.239	0.529	1.350
Perception of social conflict[f]					
High	-0.872	0.418***	0.160	0.305	0.572
Gender[g]					
Male	0.178	1.195	0.129	0.927	1.539
Municipality population size[h]					
Medium small (20,000-100,000)	-0.215	0.807	0.227	0.517	1.259
Medium large (100,000-200,000)	0.252	1.287	0.212	0.849	1.951
Large (over 200,000)	-0.024	0.976	0.226	0.626	1.522
*Political orientation * P. social violence*[i]					
Apolitical by violence	-0.861	0.423**	0.367	0.206	0.868
Right-wing by violence	-0.411	0.663	0.351	0.333	1.320
Left-wing by violence	0.625	1.868*	0.372	0.900	3.877
Constant	-0.420	0.657	0.627		
Nagelkerke R Square				0.075	
Cox & Snell R Square				0.043	
N				2,004	

Own source, based on the 2013 National Bicentennial Survey.
***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.10.

[a] Reference category: High
[b] Reference category: Centre
[c] Reference category: Early adults (25-39 years)
[d] Reference category: Upper class (ABC1 group)
[e] Reference category: Low and moderate
[f] Reference category: Low
[g] Reference category: Female
[h] Reference category: Small (less than 20,000)
[i] Reference category: Centre by perception of violence

Figure 14 shows a logistic regression that explains the likelihood of IPHRV in Chilean society today. Four variables—individualism (Beck & Beck-Gernsheim 2001: 22; Wagner 2002; Elliott & Lemert 2006: 3), political orientation (Lee et al. 2012; Carvacho et al. 2013), generation, and socio-economic status (Pasipanodya 2008; Robins 2011)—have been theoretically defined and, according to previous researchers, act as explanatory factors of indifference (Schuman & Scott 1989; Valencia & Páez 1999; Aguilar et al. 2011; Swami et al. 2012; Leander et al. 2014; Nussio et al. 2015). They have been included in this model in order to test those previous findings. The null hypotheses are that these variables' coefficient will be equal to zero. Variables such as perception of social violence and perception of social conflict have not yet been theoretically identified in the literature analysed as explaining indifference. However, they have been included in this model to test the theoretical assumption built into this thesis suggesting that indifference does not only result from purposive institutional socialisation processes, such as family, education, and peers (Dey 1997; Haav 2008; Scarlett 2009: 174; Bronson 2012; Byrd 2012: 1074-5; Sinclair 2012; Parsons 2014). More attitudinal, these two variables—perception of social violence and perception of social conflict—express the impact that less systematic experiences can have in people who become indifferent to past human rights violations. Representing people's views of their immediate social and political reality, perceptions of social violence and conflict may change depending on variations in the media or on positive and negative experiences with discussions in social settings. The variables gender and size of municipality population (e.g. large or small municipalities) are intended to work as control variables in this model (Aguilar et al. 2011). While municipalities with a larger amount of population tend to be urban areas, small ones with fewer people tend be more isolated, rural areas. By using the size of population municipality as a control variable,

the model explains the relationship between explanatory variables and indifference in all areas of the country. Therefore, this multiple logistic regression was calculated to explain indifference based on measures of individualism, political orientation, generation, socio-economic status, perceptions of social violence and social conflict, gender, and municipality population size. A significant regression equation was found with a Pseudo R-square of 0.075. The number of cases that the model is capable of correctly explaining corresponds to 84.8 percent.

Contrary to what was expected, individualism does not show a statistically significant relationship to indifference, both controlling for other variables and in a model containing individualism as the only explanatory variable. Instead, controlling for all other variables, political orientation has a significant effect over indifference. People in the central political orientation are less likely to be indifferent to past gross human rights violations than apolitical respondents (B: 0.983; 95%CI: 0.856-8.338). These findings do not provide enough evidence to suggest that being in the centre of the political spectrum is associated with more IPHRV than being right-wing. But those who are left-wing are less likely to be indifferent (B: -1.347; 95%CI: 0.076-0.893).[49] Controlling for all other variables, generational cohort also has a statistically significant impact on IPHRV. Young adults (B: -0.479; 95%CI: 0.411-0.932) and middle adults (B: -0.525; 95%CI: 0.434-0.806) are less indifferent than early adults (age 25-39). In the case of socio-economic status, when controlling for all other variables, being in the category 'Upper class' is associated with being less likely to explain IPHRV than being in the categories 'Lower class' (B: 0.528; 95%CI: 1.031-2.789) or 'Middle class' (B:

[49] *See* Figures 15 and 16 in section 4. As will be discussed later, political orientation could be conceived as an important predictor of position regarding past human rights violations in Chile. Indifference is distributed more or less the same across all political orientation categories (apolitical, centre, left, right), but pro-human rights is distributed much differently from left to right. Of 497 people who identify themselves with the left, 53% are pro-human rights; for the political centre this falls to 39.5%, and for the right this falls to 20,7%.

0.738; 95%CI: 1.280-3.414). The model also shows that, keeping all other variables constant, the perception of social conflict as 'High' (B: -0.872; 95%CI: 0.305-0.572) has a statistically significant impact on IPHRV. While gender and municipality population size do not show a statistically significant impact on indifference—evidence does not sustain rejecting the null hypothesis—, they work as control variables in the model.

Finally, the model includes an interaction involving political orientation and the perception of social violence. Both variables in this interaction are attitudinal. However, they differ in the durability of the attitudes that they express. In other words, a respondent's political orientation is associated with a durable political view and is rooted in a longstanding political socialisation. People's perception of social violence is, on the other hand, much less durable because it can change with their access to more current experiences (e.g. media exposure). In this model, the interaction shows that the way in which violence affects IPHRV varies according to the political orientation of the respondent. In comparison to people who identified with the political centre, this occurs specifically with those who are apolitical and those who are left-wing. In the case of apolitical people, the perception of high social violence makes it less likely to explain IPHRV (B: -0.861; 95%CI: 0.206-0.868). In the case of left-wing people, the perception of high violence makes them more likely to be indifferent to past human rights abuses (B: 0.625; 95%CI: 0.900-3.877). This finding invites deeper reflection into what happens within the group identified with the left, as not all of them express positive views toward human rights.

b) Discussion

This chapter challenges a set of assumptions connected to IPHRV. This chapter questions the generally shared assumption that indifference results from an increasingly atomised society, in which highly individualistic, passive citizens avoid engaging in public issues. Several authors have attributed indifference to people's abandonment of the public realm, and their seclusion in their private sphere (Bauman 1993; Moulian 1998: 60; Giraud 2008: 59; Bauman & Donskis 2015; Hibou 2015: Ch. 3). Instead, this research argues that people's disposition towards either individualism or collective processes does not account for variations in IPHRV.

This chapter also questions previous research arguing that younger generations should be more indifferent because they are temporally more distanced from the past traumatic events than older generations. Some authors argue that younger generations who did not live during the period of time when atrocities were committed are more reluctant to discuss the recent history and engage in human rights initiatives. This analysis shows that the most indifferent generation corresponds to those who are between twenty-five and thirty-nine years old (early adults). One possible explanation for this phenomenon is that this generation is more indifferent than the other generations because of the restrictions and silences of the cultural context in which they were educated (1980s and 90s). The least indifferent generation in Chile corresponds to those who are between forty and fifty-nine years old (middle adulthood), followed by those who are between eighteen and twenty-four years old (young adulthood) and older than sixty (late adulthood). This result is slightly different than the findings in Spain, where

the younger generations are more likely to support transitional justice measures than the older generations (Valencia & Páez 1999; Aguilar et al. 2011).[50]

The regression model indicates that, at least partially, IPHRV is explained by political orientation. In fact, when controlling for other variables, the relationship between indifference and being apolitical on the one hand, and being from the left on the other hand is statistically significant when compared with those in the centre of the political spectrum. In comparison with being from the political centre, being apolitical predicts more indifference and being from the left predicts less indifference to past human rights violations.

An interesting finding in this research is related to citizens' political orientation. Despite original assumptions, political orientation only partially explains IPHRV. Thus, understanding how these two variables interact is relevant. The Chilean indifferent vary in their political orientations along the full spectrum from left to right, including those who define themselves as politically apathetic. It was expected to find that being in the centre of the political spectrum is a strong predictor of IPHRV in comparison to all other political orientations. However, results suggest that the likelihood of being indifferent to past human rights violations does not significantly differ between people in the centre and those who identify with the political right. However, political orientation is associated with indifference in the case of apolitical and left-wing individuals: while being apolitical makes it more likely to be indifferent than people in the political centre, left-wing individuals are less prone to be indifferent than those in

[50] The fact that a young generation gives importance to human rights does not necessarily mean that the members of that generation are less indifferent than other generations. Indeed, it may happen that pro-human rights and indifferent attitudes are present in the same generation. In other words, a younger generation may be more supportive of human rights and also be more indifferent, particularly in a place like Spain where there is very little support for transitional justice. Variation in generational attitudes may be very low in Spain, with indifference represented in each generation. The highest support for transitional justice may be in one of those generations without changing the fact that the generation still has a high degree of indifference.

the centre (see Figures 14, 15, and 16). Additionally, the regression shows that the effect of being apolitical and left-wing is mediated by people's perception of social violence. In the case of apolitical respondents, this interaction between apolitical position and indifference becomes significant only when the variable of perception of social violence is included in the model. While the interaction between perception of political violence and apolitical orientation is negatively associated with indifference, by itself apolitical orientation associates positively with indifference. Despite the fact that the frequency of indifference for apolitical people is lower than people in the centre, for those apolitical people indifference may be working as a reaction to their perception of social violence.

4. INDIFFERENT, HOSTILE, AND PRO HUMAN RIGHTS

Based on the answers given on item *49* in the survey (*Q49.1, Q49.2, Q49.3, Q49.5, Q49.7*), three indexes were created. According to the *Index of Indifference* previously explained, 16.02 percent of the survey's respondents could be identified as indifferent to past human rights violations. The *Index of Hostility* helps to identify 27.79 percent of respondents as hostile to human rights and transitional justice's issues in Chile today. The *Pro Human Rights Index* identifies 37.77 percent of respondents as those who favour the truth to be known, prosecution of the victimisers, memory and memorialisation of human rights violations, and victims' reparations. The remaining 18.41 percent has ambivalent positions on human rights, as their opinions do not follow any of the three previous patterns (e.g., they combine indifferent, hostile, and/or pro

human rights responses in the set of questions selected).[51] Figure 15 shows the frequencies of indifferent, hostile, ambivalent, and pro human rights respondents. It also distinguishes the different political orientations of the respondents in each of these groups, in the spectrum from left to right, including those who did not expressly identify themselves with any political ideology (*Q44*). In the case of the indifferent, 54 percent identify themselves with the political centre or are apolitical (30.52 and 23.36 percent, respectively). In accordance with what was expected, 36.27 percent of those who have hostile positions to human rights issues identify themselves with the political right. Also, as expected, 35 percent of those who are pro-human rights form part of the political left.

Figure 15
Frequencies of positions toward human rights issues, by political orientation

	Left	Centre	Right	Apolitical	Total
Indifferent	68 (3.4)	98 (4.9)	80 (4.0)	75 (3.7)	321 (16.02)
Hostile	87 (4.3)	131 (6.5)	202 (10.1)	137 (6.8)	557 (27.79)
Pro Human Rights	265 (13.2)	217 (10.8)	94 (4.7)	181 (9.0)	757 (37.77)
Ambivalent	77 (3.8)	104 (5.2)	79 (3.9)	109 (5.4)	369 (18.41)
Total	497 (24.8)	550 (27.4)	455 (22.7)	502 (25.0)	2004 (100)

Own source, based on the *2013 Bicentennial Survey*.

[51] Some people may favour some of the elements of transitional justice and ignore others. For example, a person might support prosecutions and judicial investigations but oppose victims' reparations.

Figure 16
Positions towards human rights abuses and political orientation

Position towards human rights abuses	Political Orientation	Frequency	%
Indifferent	*Left*	68	21,2
	Centre	98	30,5
	Right	80	24,9
	Apolitical	75	23,4
	Total	321	100,0
Hostile	*Left*	87	15,6
	Centre	131	23,5
	Right	202	36,3
	Apolitical	137	24,6
	Total	557	100,0
Pro Human Rights	*Left*	265	35,0
	Centre	217	28,7
	Right	94	12,4
	Apolitical	181	23,9
	Total	757	100,0
Ambivalent	*Left*	77	20,9
	Centre	104	28,2
	Right	79	21,4
	Apolitical	109	29,5
	Total	369	100,0

Political Orientation	Position towards human rights abuses	Frequency	%
Left	*Indifferent*	68	13,7
	Hostile	87	17,5
	Pro Human Rights	265	53,3
	Ambivalent	77	15,5
	Total	497	100,0
Centre	*Indifferent*	98	17,8
	Hostile	131	23,8
	Pro Human Rights	217	39,5
	Ambivalent	104	18,9
	Total	550	100,0
Right	*Indifferent*	80	17,6
	Hostile	202	44,4
	Pro Human Rights	94	20,7
	Ambivalent	79	17,4
	Total	455	100,0
Apolitical	*Indifferent*	75	14,9
	Hostile	137	27,3
	Pro Human Rights	181	36,1
	Ambivalent	109	21,7
	Total	502	100,0

Own source, based on the *2013 Bicentennial Survey*.

To complement the regression model, the construction of profiles uses statistics with a descriptive emphasis. While this section includes inferential statistics, their value is not in explaining or predicting IPHRV, but in building profiles. The previously presented regression predicts IPHRV controlling a set of other variables. Instead, the analysis of profiles is not calculated controlling variables. Therefore, the results presented in this section complement the regression model, in spite of the fact that in some occasions they may seem contradictory.

Figure 17 synthesises the relationship between different independent variables and the perceptions of people towards past human rights violations. The analysis presented below seeks to differentiate and characterise the different groups or clusters of people according to their perceptions on human rights issues. As was mentioned previously, it is possible to distinguish four categories in terms of appreciation of or disposition to human rights issues: 1) those who are indifferent to past human rights violations; 2)

those who are hostile to human rights issues; 3) those who value human rights, and 4) those who are not classifiable because they combine features of two or three of the above categories (these latter people have ambivalent positions on human rights issues). The independent variables—shown in the rows of the table—are: individualism; political orientation; generational cohort; socio-economic level; appreciation of entrepreneurship; conservatism; perception of national reconciliation's possibilities to be achieved within ten years; perception of social conflicts in the country; trust in public institutions; trust in the armed forces and police; size of municipality population**;** and educational level. The goal of the calculations in this table is to compare the groups emerging from these dispositions towards past human rights violations, contributing also to define IPHRV. Only the relationships in which it is possible to infer a statistically significant association ($p<0.05$) between the variables have been included.

Figure 17
Comparison between Indifferent, Hostile, and Pro Human Rights (%)

	Hostile to HR	Indifferent to HR	Pro HR	Ambivalent	Total
Percentage	**27.79**	**16.02**	**37.77**	**18.41**	100
Political orientation					
Apolitical	27.3	14.9	36.1	21.7	100
Right-wing	44.4	17.6	20.7	17.4	100
Centre	23.8	17.8	39.5	18.9	100
Left-wing	17.5	13.7	53.3	15.5	100
Generational cohort					
Young adults (18-24)	21.1	15.6	41.1	22.2	100
Early adults (25-39)	22.6	19.9	37.7	19.9	100
Middle adults (40-59)	35.4	12.7	35.4	16.4	100
Late adults (60 or more)	26.5	16.7	39.3	17.5	100
Socio-economic status					
High (ABC1)	36.2	12.4	32.4	19.0	100
Middle (C2 and C3)	29.1	16.7	37.7	16.5	100
Low (D and E)	23.4	16.0	39.5	21.1	100
Municipality population size					
Large	25.7	15.8	41.1	17.4	100
Medium large	28.3	19.6	34.0	18.1	100
Medium small	29.9	12.7	37.3	20.1	100
Small	26.1	15.5	41.2	17.2	100
Educational level					
University	32.0	16.3	35.9	15.9	100
Technical	32.1	16.2	32.4	19.3	100
Secondary	26.8	16.9	37.3	19.0	100
Primary and no education	22.6	14.0	44.1	19.3	100
Individualism					
High	31.3	15.7	35.7	17.3	100
Moderate	28.2	16.7	35.2	19.9	100
Low	24.0	14.9	44.6	16.5	100
Entrepreneurship					
High	31.5	13.0	38.3	17.1	100
Neither high nor low	25.7	18.7	35.8	19.8	100
Low	24.4	16.2	41.9	17.5	100
Conservatism					
High	30.8	15.1	37.2	16.9	100
Moderate	29.3	17.1	34.5	19.1	100
Low	23.6	15.6	41.7	19.1	100
Social reconciliation					
Yes	25.0	14.1	40.1	20.8	100
No	29.1	16.8	37.1	17.0	100
Social conflicts					
High	34.4	27.8	21.1	16.7	100
Moderate and low	26.6	13.8	40.9	18.6	100
Trust in public institutions					
High	26.7	13.8	43.0	16.6	100
Moderate	28.9	18.5	34.1	18.6	100
Low	29.7	14.4	38.6	17.3	100
Trust in armed forces, police					
High	29.4	13.1	39.7	17.9	100
Moderate	30.3	20.7	32.3	16.6	100
Low	19.9	15.3	46.9	17.8	100

N=2,004. The relationships between variables in this table are statistically significant ($p<0.05$) using Chi-Square tests. Colours in the table: above the statistically expected value is marked in red; below the expected value is marked in blue; if count was not over one percent higher or lower than the statistically expected value is marked in black.

a) Political orientation. Those who are indifferent to past human rights abuses are over the expected values in the political centre and the right-wing. Contrary to previous expectations, IPHRV is below the expected values in the case of those who do not declare a particular political orientation (apolitical). The fact that IPHRV is also below the expected value among left-wing people is, on the other hand, quite reasonable considering that Chileans on the left of the political spectrum are usually associated with strong concerns over human rights. Those who are hostile to human rights issues are clearly more frequent among right-wing people. On the other side of the political spectrum, both centre and left-wing people are more concerned with human rights issues. People that do not fit in any of these three groups with a particular disposition toward past human rights violations are the only group in which being apolitical is more frequent than expected.

b) Generational cohort. These results show that the frequency of IPHRV is higher than expected among early adults (25-39 years old) and it is lower than expected among middle adults (40-59 years old). This tendency clearly differs from people who belong to the pro human rights group. Indeed, pro human rights people are higher than expected among young adults (18-24 years old) and late adults (60 or more years old). Those hostile to human rights issues are over expected values among the middle adults (40-59) and seem to be rare among young and early adults. People with a less clear standing on human rights are clearly more frequent in those younger generations (young and early adults).

c) Socio-economic status. Figure 17 suggests that the tendency within indifferent people is to be less frequent than expected in the higher socio-economic status (upper class or ABC1 group). In the upper (ABC1) and middle (C2 and C3) socioeconomic status, the number of people in the hostile group is evidently larger than presupposed.

Members of the hostile group do not reach the expected value in the lower economic status (D and E economic groups). At the same time, the group in favour of human rights is less frequent than expected in the upper socio-economic status and more frequent in the lower socio-economic tier. The latter is also the case for those who did not provide a clear perspective on human rights issues.

d) Type of municipality. IPHRV is more common than expected in people living in medium-large municipalities (100,000 to 200,000 inhabitants), and is below expected values in people living in medium-small municipalities (20,000 to 100,000 inhabitants). This is quite different for all other groups. The hostile group is especially large in medium-small municipalities, and its representation is smaller than expected in the largest (over 200,000 inhabitants) and smallest municipalities (below 20,000 inhabitants). Those with undetermined opinions on human rights also show municipality frequencies that are higher than expected in medium-small municipalities and lower than expected in small ones. The presence of people that are pro human rights is higher than expected in the largest and smallest municipalities and it is significantly underrepresented in medium-small municipalities. Large municipalities are unusual in Chile, and they usually coincide with important urban centres (e.g., Valparaíso, Antofagasta, Rancagua, Puerto Montt, Las Condes, Puente Alto, Maipú, La Florida, etc.). Conversely, small municipalities are more numerous; they are often rural; and they tend to be more isolated and scattered in the Chilean territory (e.g., Melipeuco, San Fabián, etc.).

e) Educational level. IPHRV only seems to be less frequent than expected among people who solely reached primary education or who received very little formal education. This is very different compared to the other groups mentioned in Figure 17. People who are in favour of human rights are more prevalent than expected among

those who received primary education and those without education. This group is significantly less prevalent in the upper educational tiers, namely technical and university education. Hostility toward human rights is especially prevalent in the higher sections of the educational ladder, and is rather scarce among people with primary or less education.

f) Individualism. Referring to the more attitudinal variables, groups formed by attitudes towards past human rights violations differ with statistical significance in their responses on individualism. Unlike people in the groups of hostiles and pro human rights, those indifferent to past atrocities do not show a strong clear tendency regarding individualism. IPHRV seems only less frequent than expected among people with a low level of individualism. However, that frequency escapes the expected value only in 6.1 percent, which is a rather small difference. Instead, all other groups express a clearer position toward individualism. People who are hostile to human rights issues show a greater appreciation for individualism than all other groups. Conversely, the pro human rights group shows a very clear tendency to be less individualistic. Those that do not fit any of these groups demonstrate a tendency for a moderate level of individualism, and their frequencies are below the statistically expected values in high and low levels of individualism.

g) Appreciation of entrepreneurship. Unlike all other groups, indifferent people do not seem to take a particular position regarding the valuation of entrepreneurship. They show particularly low prevalence in high appreciation for entrepreneurship. But, their numbers are above the expected values in the category 'neither high nor low.' This means that they do not take a positive or negative position regarding this aspect**.** Hostile and pro human rights groups represent the opposite scenario: while hostility is higher than expected among those who highly value entrepreneurship, pro human rights are

more prevalent among people with low valuation of entrepreneurship. Only the unspecified or ambivalent group has a similar distribution compared to the indifferent group.

h) Conservatism. Indifference also does not take a marked position regarding conservatism. It is only lower than expected among highly conservative people. The unspecified or ambivalent group exhibits the same attitudinal structure regarding conservatism. Pro human rights people are clearly low in their conservatism, and those hostile to human rights are more prevalent among people with moderate and high levels of conservatism.

i) Possibility of social reconciliation. When projecting the possibility of national reconciliation in the country within the next ten years, hostile and pro human rights groups stand at opposite poles. While hostility is associated with a pessimistic view, pro human rights people have a more optimistic profile. Ambivalent people also seem to be determined to conceive reconciliation as a possibility in the near future. IPHRV takes a rather undefined distribution: indifference is less prevalent than expected among those that see a reconciliatory future as possible, but it is not higher than expected in any of the categories.

j) Perception of social conflicts in Chilean society. When perceiving social conflict, this lack of definition marking most of indifference's comparative frequencies changes. In this case, IPHRV is associated with a high level of perception of social conflicts in the country and it matches the frequencies of hostility to human rights issues. Those in favour of the transitional justice agenda have a different opinion: they perceive social conflict only as moderate and low.

k) Trust in public institutions, armed forces, and security and public order agencies. IPHRV is associated with a moderate position toward confidence in public

institutions. Indeed, Figure 17 shows that IPHRV tends to be more frequent than expected among people who show moderate levels of trust to public institutions. People supporting human rights issues have a different opinion on this matter: they highly regard and trust public institutions, but—as expected—a section of these people seem to also distrust the police and the armed forces. Chilean police and the armed forces still maintain a strong authoritarian tradition and many of their members still praise the dictatorial government and some even admire Pinochet's historical legacy. Consequently, it is not surprising that people in favour of human rights tend not to trust the main institutions responsible for such abuses.

The table below summarizes the tendencies of the main findings regarding the comparison between these four groups of people (indifferent, hostile, pro human rights, and ambivalent positions):

Figure 18
Comparison between indifferent, hostile, pro human rights, and ambivalent groups

	Indifferent	Hostile	Pro Human Rights	Ambivalent
Political orientation	Right & Centre	Right	Left	Apolitical & Centre
Generation	Early	Middle	Young & Late	Young & Early
Socio-economic status	Medium	High & Medium	Low	Low
Municipality	Medium large	Medium small	Large & Small	Medium small
Educational level		Univ. & Technical	Primary or less	
Individualism		High	Low	Moderate
Entrepreneurship	Moderate	High	Low	Moderate
Conservatism		High & Moderate	Low	
Reconciliation		Pessimistic	Optimistic	Optimistic
Social conflicts	High	High	Moderate & Low	
Trust institutions	Moderate	Moderate & Low	High	
Trust armed forces	Moderate	High & Moderate	High & Low	

5. TYPES OF INDIFFERENCE

This thesis argues that people indifferent to human rights violations are not a homogeneous group. It is difficult to offer a unique profile of the indifferent to past atrocities in Chile today. Within the group of people who have been categorised as indifferent**,** it is possible to make distinctions. Since the indifferent people identify themselves with different political orientations or ideologies, it is possible to classify them according to whether they feel identified with the right, left, centre, or have apolitical preferences. From a theoretical point of view, the political orientation of the indifferent has been associated with a type of indifference in particular, distinguishing between disillusioned, depoliticised, submissive, and resigned indifferent. This section describes and compares the different types of indifference, in consideration of the same independent variables previously analysed. In order to offer a broader perspective, these four sub categories of indifference are also compared to those people who are non-indifferent (hostile and pro human rights). As was mentioned, 18.41 percent of respondents are considered ambivalent with respect to human rights issues. This means that 369 persons of the sample of 2,004 have ambiguous positions about truth, prosecution, memory, and reparation of human rights violations committed in the dictatorship, so it is not possible to consider them either indifferent or non-indifferent (hostile or pro human rights). In order to compare the non-indifferent with the different types of indifferent, the ambivalent people are not considered in the following analysis.[52]

[52] In the qualitative chapter the situation of complex cases where individuals belong in more than one category is explained. The results of the qualitative research show that in some cases the categories are overlapping.

Figure 19
Comparison between Types of Indifferent, Hostile, and Pro Human Rights (%)

Variables	Hostile to HR	*Types of indifference*				Pro HR	Total
		Disillusioned	Submissive	Depoliticised	Resigned		
Percentage in the sample	**34.07**	**4.89**	**5.99**	**4.59**	**4.16**	**46.30**	100
Socio-economic level							
Upper (ABC1)	44.7	4.1	4.1	2.4	4.7	40.0	100
Middle (C2 and C3)	34.8	5.0	5.7	5.5	3.9	45.2	100
Lower (D and E)	29.7	4.9	7.1	3.9	4.4	50.0	100
Valuation of entrepreneurship							
High	38.1	4.3	5.1	2.9	3.4	46.2	100
Neither high nor low	32.1	6.0	7.2	5.4	4.6	44.6	100
Low	29.6	3.7	4.7	6.3	5.0	50.8	100
Perception of social conflict							
High	32.7	3.6	5.4	4.5	3.4	50.3	100
Moderate and low	41.3	11.4	9.1	4.9	8.0	25.4	100
Trust in public institutions							
High	32.0	3.7	5.2	4.8	2.9	51.5	100
Moderate	35.5	6.4	7.9	3.6	4.7	41.9	100
Low	36.0	3.6	3.2	4.7	5.9	46.6	100
Trust in police & armed forces							
High	35.8	3.9	4.5	4.3	3.2	48.3	100
Moderate	36.3	7.2	8.5	4.3	4.9	38.8	100
Low	24.3	3.4	6.3	3.0	6.0	57.1	100
Individualism							
High	37.9	4.7	3.3	5.8	5.0	43.2	100
Moderate	35.2	5.8	6.8	4.3	4.0	43.9	100
Low	28.8	3.2	6.7	4.2	3.7	53.4	100
Municipality population size							
Large	31.1	3.8	7.3	4.0	4.0	49.8	100
Medium-large	34.5	8.0	7.5	2.0	6.5	41.6	100
Medium-small	37.4	2.5	4.2	7.1	2.1	46.7	100
Small	31.5	5.1	3.6	6.6	3.6	49.7	100
Educational level							
University	38.0	5.2	6.3	2.2	5.7	42.6	100
Technical	39.7	5.1	5.6	4.7	4.7	40.2	100
Secondary	33.1	5.4	6.5	4.7	4.4	46.0	100
Primary, no educat.	28.0	3.6	5.2	6.6	1.9	54.7	100

N=1,635. The relationships between variables in this table are statistically significant ($p<0.05$) using Chi-Square tests. Colours in the table: above the statistically expected value is marked in red; below the expected value is marked in blue; count was not over 1% higher or lower than the statistically expected value is marked in black.

The most interesting aspects of the above table are as follows:

a) Socioeconomic status: the frequency of the submissive indifferent is higher than expected for people of low socioeconomic status. The frequency of the depoliticised indifferent is higher than expected in people of middle socioeconomic status. The frequency of the resigned indifferent is higher than expected in people of

high socioeconomic status. The frequencies of the disillusioned, submissive, and depoliticised indifferent are lower than expected in the case of people of the upper class (ABC1 economic group).

b) Appreciation of entrepreneurship: The frequency of all types of indifferent is lower than expected in the case of people who value entrepreneurship. Instead, the frequencies are higher than expected in the sectors who give a medium value to entrepreneurship in all categories of indifference, except in the case of resigned indifferent, where no significant differences were observed. Regarding those who give little value to personal entrepreneurship, the observed frequencies of the disillusioned and submissive indifferent are higher than expected; while in the case of depoliticised and resigned indifferent**,** the frequencies observed are lower than expected.

c) Perception of social conflicts: There are no significant differences in the case of indifferent that have a high or moderate/low perception of social conflicts in Chile. Instead, the observed frequency of the indifferent who believe that there are low levels of conflict in Chile are higher than expected in the other three categories of indifferent. This is especially noticeable in the case of the disillusioned indifferent. Instead, the observed frequencies are lower than expected in those who believe that there are high levels of conflict. The frequencies of disillusioned and submissive indifference are similar to what happens in the case of those who are hostile to human rights: lower than expected in those who have a high perception of social conflict and lower than expected in those who have a moderate/low perception of social conflict.

d) Trust in public institutions: In the case of disillusioned, submissive, and resigned indifferent**,** the frequencies observed in the medium levels of trust in public institutions are higher than expected. In contrast, the frequencies of the depoliticised indifferent are the opposite (lower than expected). Regarding those who have high

levels of trust in public institutions, the observed frequencies are lower than expected in the disillusioned, submissive and resigned indifferent, while in the case of the depoliticised indifferent there are no significant differences. In the case of those with low level of trust in public institutions, the observed frequencies in the disillusioned and submissive indifferent are lower than expected**;** in the case of the depoliticised indifferent there are no differences**;** and regarding the resigned indifferent**,** the frequencies are higher than expected.

e) Confidence in the armed forces and police: In the case of disillusioned, submissive, and resigned indifferent**,** the frequencies observed in those who have medium levels of trust in the armed forces and police are higher than expected. The opposite situation occurs with respect to those who have high levels of trust in armed forces and police: the frequencies are lower than expected in these types of indifferent. The situation is more varied among the four types of indifferent in the case of people who have low levels of confidence: it is higher than expected in the resigned indifferent and lower than expected in the disillusioned and depoliticised indifferent.

f) Individualism: The observed frequencies of depoliticised and resigned indifferent are higher than expected in people with high levels of individualism, while in the same case the frequencies are lower than expected in the submissive indifferent. The situation of disillusioned and submissive indifferent shows that the frequencies are higher in people with medium levels of individualism.

g) Municipality population size: Submissive and resigned indifferent are more present in large and medium-large municipalities. Depoliticised indifferent have more presence in small and medium-small municipalities. The frequency of disillusioned indifferent is considerably higher than expected in medium-large municipalities, and lower than expected in large and medium-small municipalities.

h) Educational level: The observed frequencies of resigned indifferent are higher than expected in the case of persons with university or technical education, and much lower than expected in the case of those without education or primary education. This situation is completely different in the case of the depoliticised indifferent: frequency is higher than expected in those people with low levels of education. Disillusioned and submissive indifferent occur more often than expected in those with secondary education, and less than expected in the case of those with low levels of education.

As there are no significant differences between observed and expected frequencies, other independent variables that could have been reported were not included in the previous table.

Figure 20
Comparison between disillusioned, submissive, depoliticised, and resigned indifferent

	Disillusioned	Submissive	Depoliticised	Resigned
Political orientation	Right	Centre	Apolitical	Left
Socio-economic status		Low	Middle	High
Entrepreneurship	Moderate	Moderate	Moderate	Low
Social conflicts	Moderate & Low	Moderate & Low		Moderate & Low
Trust institutions	Moderate	Moderate		Moderate & Low
Trust armed forces	Moderate	Moderate		Moderate & Low
Individualism	Moderate	Moderate	High	High
Municipality	Medium large	Large & Med. large	Small & Med. small	Medium large
Educational level	Secondary	Secondary	Primary or less	Univ. & Technical

6. CONCLUSIONS

From a statistical standpoint, it has been argued that 16 percent of Chilean adults are indifferent to past human rights violations. The phenomenon of IPHRV is multi-causal, but the *2013 Bicentennial Survey* has shown that the main predictors of indifferent

attitudes toward past human rights violations in Chile today are: 1) political orientation, 2) socio-economic status, 3) generational cohort, and 4) perception of social conflict. People from the left and apolitical people are less indifferent than those identified with the right or the political centre. It seems that people with higher incomes are less indifferent than people with lower socio-economic status. In terms of age, it is especially interesting to note that people who are between twenty-five and thirty-nine years old (early adulthood) are the most indifferent group compared to other generations. The less indifferent group corresponds to those between forty and fifty-nine years old (middle adulthood). In the case of left-wing people, the perception of high levels of social conflicts in the country makes them more likely to express IPHRV in answering the 2013 national survey. Contrary to the specialised literature on transitional justice, empirical evidence shows that indifference is not predicted by respondents' individualism as measured in the survey.

In order to describe the profile and characteristics of the indifferent, this chapter also compared indifferent respondents with non-indifferent people (i.e. hostile, pro human rights, and ambivalent). Interestingly, the profiles of hostile and pro human rights people are much more identifiable than in the case of the indifferent and ambivalent groups. The analysis of the political thinking of the left-wing shows prevalence with positions that favour human rights, while the people from the right-wing are more likely to be hostile to human rights issues. There is a tendency in the ambivalent group to identify themselves with the political centre or declare apolitical positions. In contrast, the indifferent people have varied political orientations, and are the most heterogeneous group of all. The hostile group shows high levels of individualism and valuation of entrepreneurship, while the pro human rights group has the opposite perceptions. These previous variables are not relevant when analysing the

indifferent and ambivalent groups. As for the socio-economic status, these groups also differ: the tendency of the middle class is indifference, the hostile group is more prevalent in the upper and middle classes, while the pro human rights and ambivalent groups are more prevalent in the lower class. It is interesting to note that generations have different perceptions on human rights. The young and late adults are clearly more concerned with past human rights violations than the early adults. In other words, the early adults are the most indifferent generation. The most polarised generation between right and left positions is the middle adults group, which has the lowest percentage of indifferent.

In consideration of the political heterogeneity within the indifferent group, an effort was made to distinguish between disillusioned, submissive, depoliticised, and resigned indifferent. When analysing with more detail each of these groups, it has been possible to understand why it has been so difficult to offer a unique profile of the indifferent. Indeed, people who form part of these four groups have dissimilar perceptions in most of the variables analysed. Consequently, people who are indifferent differ greatly among themselves. For example, in the submissive indifferent group there is a prevalence of people from the lower classes; in the depoliticised indifferent group, the middle class prevails; and in the resigned indifferent group, the majority is upper class. As for individualism, the disillusioned and submissive indifferent have moderate levels of individualism, whereas depoliticised and resigned indifferent have high levels of individualism. In terms of level of education, resigned indifferent are more likely to have technical or university education; while in the case of depoliticised indifferent, people without education or only with primary education are more prevalent than in the other groups. The disillusioned and submissive people have higher frequencies of people reaching secondary education. It is precisely the dispersion of perceptions and

attitudes between different types of indifference that complicates further specification of the causes and characteristics of all indifferent to past human rights violations.

It should be noted that in subsequent versions of the *Bicentennial Survey*, the questions that have allowed this quantitative analysis have not been incorporated; therefore, it has not been possible to compare or corroborate these findings. However, the results of the quantitative analysis are valuable as initial explorations of perceptions of indifference towards the issue of human rights violations committed during the Pinochet dictatorship. The next chapter tries to overcome the limitations of the survey through the qualitative analysis of original data collected in Chile, deepening the density of explanations about the causes and consequences of such indifference.

Chapter 6: Qualitative Analysis of Indifference

> L'indifferenza è abulia, è parassitismo, è vigliaccheria, non è vita. Perciò odio gli indifferenti.
>
> —*Antonio Gramsci*

INTRODUCTION

This introduction explains the limitations of the quantitative component of this research and then presents the relevance of the qualitative analysis for a better understanding of IPHRV. The conclusions of the quantitative analysis have been valuable for a preliminary approach to the investigated phenomenon. These previous findings will be complemented with a detailed review of indifferent attitudes and behaviours of a sector of Chilean society today. The qualitative component of this research is essential to understand with more density and depth the main causes and consequences of IPHRV.

a) Overcoming the limitations of quantitative analysis

The 2013 survey has allowed for the exploration of some of the causal dynamics that explain the phenomenon of IPHRV. The quantitative analysis corroborates the multi-causality of IPHRV, but also shows the heterogeneity and diversity of the indifferent group. There are statistically significant differences between different generations, with the middle adults (40-59 years old) being the least indifferent and the early adults (25-39 years old) being the most indifferent. People's perceptions regarding political violence and social conflict are also relevant in the explanation of IPHRV. Those who

believe that there is a high level of violence or conflict in the country are more likely to be indifferent than those who have opposite perceptions regarding the levels of violence and social conflict. The survey has also shown that there are indifferent people across the political spectrum. It is true that people from the right and the political centre tend to be more indifferent than people from the left or apolitical sectors, but in all political groups it is possible to find people indifferent to past human rights abuses. The socio-economic level of individuals must also be taken into account, since people with low socio-economic status are more indifferent than people who belong to the upper social class (ABC1 economic group). Another interesting finding is that the level of individualism is not a variable that helps to explain IPHRV.

Despite these findings, quantitative analysis is insufficient to understand in depth the mechanisms and processes underlying the phenomenon of IPHRV. Although the survey contributes to understanding the perceptions of Chileans on many topics of interest, it is not intended to capture the social context or processes of socialisation in which indifferent people have been involved in their lives. One of the central arguments of this thesis is that attitudes and positions of IPHRV are learned. It is not simple for Chileans to evade what happened in the country during the military dictatorship, as if they could abstract their lives from the society to which they belong. In general terms, Chileans have received multiple, diverse, and also contradictory information about human rights violations in their homes, schools, conversations with their friends, through the media and cultural industry, etc. Another limitation of the survey is that it does not provide enough information on how Chileans are dealing with that traumatic collective past in their daily lives.

Since there are indifferent people across the political spectrum, it is appropriate to understand and compare the reasons for this indifference among people with opposite

political views. For example, the explanation of why a right-wing person may be indifferent to human rights violations should differ from the explanation of a left-wing person who is also indifferent. It could also be that a person has modified his political thinking, so it is perfectly possible that the traits of his indifference have also mutated. It seems then that the relation between political orientation and IPHRV needs to be complemented with qualitative analysis. Chileans' perceptions regarding human rights are not permanent or static over time. On the contrary, it seems that Chileans can review and update their beliefs and perceptions regarding human rights violations in Chilean society. Individuals move over time, in and out of IPHRV, in and out of different types of indifference, and these dynamics will be considered in this chapter. One important limitation of this unique and original survey is that it only offers a synchronic perspective. However, the diachronic perspective is essential to capture the essence of the phenomenon investigated, as the indifference in one moment can perfectly mutate into another way of conceiving the past in the present time. Qualitative data and analysis allows, at the least, speculative consideration of dynamic rather than static forms of IPHRV.

The survey does not allow reaching significant conclusions regarding the social consequences of IPHRV. This qualitative research explores if that indifference may have a negative impact on the transitional justice process occurring in Chile post-Pinochet. For example, the phenomenon of IPHRV may facilitate impunity over time. Since IPHRV is relational, a central argument in this thesis is that the indifferent promote social indifference. In their behaviours and commentaries, the indifferent are not neutral on the subject of human rights. On the contrary, the indifferent expect that people, with whom they interact at home, at work or in other environments, are also indifferent.

b) Towards a qualitative explanation of indifference

In an issue as sensitive as the position one chooses to adopt regarding human rights, life experiences and personal views need to be fully analysed. Qualitative analysis complements and facilitates the understanding of IPHRV, since interviewees have been consulted on the reasons that could explain how they think about and how they perceive Chile's recent history. The main qualitative research technique applied has been in-depth and semi-structured interviews. During 2016, fifty-three people were interviewed in Chile. In some cases, follow-up meetings were necessary, so the total number of interviews conducted was sixty-nine. Deep interaction with interviewees brings new understandings of IPHRV, which the limitations of the survey do not allow. The voices of the interviewees reveal and unravel the deep motives of their indifferent attitudes and behaviours. Indeed, in-depth interviews facilitate a detailed understanding of the processes in which IPHRV has been socialised into the lives of indifferent and non-indifferent people. Interviews are also appropriate to show the vitality, visibility, dynamism, and diachronic character of IPHRV in Chilean society. Interviews give insight into how in some sectors indifference is being tolerated and may even be socially preferred to those cases that take a position on such controversial issue as violation of human rights. Qualitative approaches are more appropriate to answer how in some social sectors IPHRV has become a politically correct or valued position over the approaches of Pinochet's supporters or anti *pinochetistas*. Qualitative research also sheds light on those people who prefer to be socially classified as indifferent to past human rights violations, despite being hostile or even supporters of human rights.

Specifically, the qualitative component of this research pursues the following objectives: (1st) To understand the different socialisation processes—in their families,

schools, workplaces, etc.—of people who are currently indifferent to past human rights violations. Is IPHRV the result of different socialisation processes and life experiences? Is IPHRV an attitude learned through life by individuals? Does IPHRV emerge solely through social interaction or do individual characteristics also have to be taken into account? Are those who have been socialised in contexts of IPHRV more likely to develop attitudes of IPHRV? (2nd) To analyse whether indifferent attitudes and behaviours are persistent over time, or whether they are reviewed and even modified over the years**,** and what factors might be influencing such changes. To understand whether people enter or leave states of indifference, or whether they also enter or leave the various types of indifference, requires analysing indifference and non-indifference from a diachronic perspective. In addition, this chapter explores the social consequences of IPHRV in Chile today.

Twenty-one test interviews conducted in 2013 and 2015 helped to refine the set of questions and topics to be discussed with respondents, and also to simplify the previously elaborated filter questions. Test interviewees were a snowball sample suggested by personal contacts (cf. Noy 2008; Hamill 2011: 7). Once the structure for the interviews was more refined, the project was then presented informally to personal contacts from different backgrounds, who were consulted regarding people who might be considered indifferent to past human rights violations. These intermediaries often collaborated by providing the contact details of the people they had identified as potential respondents. In spite of the good intentions of the intermediaries, on some occasions their perceptions regarding the supposed IPHRV of some of the selected people was erroneous, as during the interviews it was noticed that they were not as indifferent as previously suggested. Interviews with people who are not indifferent have also been useful, not only for control purposes but also for understanding the cases that

have evolved from indifference to non-indifference. The process of discovering that people who, for my informants, had been categorised as indifferent, but who turned out to be less indifferent than expected during the interview, was revealing. Also, informal conversations facilitated identifying people who were later formally interviewed, taking into consideration some criteria that ensured variability. Therefore, it made no sense to conduct a random sample of interviewees, since doing so would have greatly hindered the possibility of knowing in depth the causes and consequences of indifference. A random sample would not have guaranteed valuable information for this project and therefore was discarded from the beginning.

As in other societies that have experienced moments of political polarisation and traumatic events, the variety of the stories is enormous. The range of stories includes interviewees who knew first-hand the magnitude of the atrocities, but also people who never knew or who deliberately did not want to know what was happening in the country. The topics covered in the interviews are sensitive for many Chileans and it was necessary to slowly open the Pandora's Box of lived experiences, deep emotions, and perceptions. As main conversational nodes are sensitive—in particular for the indifferent—and there are unresolved or conflicting stories, in most cases taking notes was preferred to recording. The presence of a tape recorder could have been misinterpreted. Sometimes it was impossible to write so fast and it was necessary to rely on memory to complete missing words or phrases after the interview ended. To ensure confidentiality, real names have been replaced by one or two letters of the alphabet, from A to ZZ. To further ensure their anonymity, the ages of those interviewed have been slightly and systematically modified so that they did not get moved from one age cohort to another. In the first part of the interview, it was necessary to create a bond of trust with each respondent, asking later about political and historical issues once a space

of trust was reached. The fact that interviews were obtained with the intermediation of personal contacts was an essential aid because those interviewees had a good predisposition to respond frankly. Also, informal conversations with interviewees' relatives or friends allowed triangulating and corroborating data collected. Figure 21 shows the socio-demographic characteristics of the indifferent and non-indifferent participants interviewed, distinguished by their region, gender, political self-identification (left, centre, right, apolitical), age, social class, and level of individualism.

Figure 21
Socio-demographic characteristics of indifferent and non-indifferent interviewees (*N*=53)

Dimension	Category	Indifferent	Non-indifferent	Total
Region	*North*	11	2	13
	Metropolitan	15	15	30
	South	9	1	10
Gender	*Male*	23	11	34
	Female	12	7	19
Political self-identification	*Right*	10	0	10
	Centre	12	7	19
	Left	5	11	16
	Apolitical	8	0	8
Age	*18-24 years*	1	1	2
	25-39 years	4	5	9
	40-59 years	18	7	25
	60 or more years	12	5	17
Individualism	*High*	8	10	18
	Medium	15	4	19
	Low	12	4	16
Social class	*Upper*	13	7	20
	Middle	17	11	28
	Lower	5	0	5

To ensure variability, the selection process of respondents took into account their region, social class, gender, age, and political orientation self-identification. Regarding their geographical location, thirty are from the Metropolitan region while thirteen are from the northern regions (II, IV and V) and the other ten remaining participants

identified themselves with southern regions (VI, VII, VIII, X and XIV).[53] The average age of the interviewees is 51.1 years (5.8 more years than the average of the survey's respondents), ranging from eighteen to eighty-two years. As for gender, thirty-four respondents are men while nineteen are women.

Figure 22 systematises the relevant variables considered in the conversations carried out with interviewees. It is pointed out how each interviewee has been categorised, distinguishing between non-indifferent, disillusioned indifferent, depoliticised indifferent, resigned indifferent, and submissive indifferent. In addition to socio-demographic background, the level and quality of education received is reported. Some personality traits of the interviewees are also included, to the extent that such traits appeared or were observed during the interview. The figure also indicates whether interviewees expressed critical comments on the UP government, the dictatorship (*Junta de Gobierno*, 1973-1990) or the transition (post-1990 governments). It also indicates whether respondents said that they were interested in politics, and their political self-identification. From the point of view of priorities in life, the levels of individualism detected in the interviews are also reported; particularly if family, education, work, economic stability, and public order were among those priorities. Regarding social concerns, it is also indicated if interviewees showed interest on the levels of delinquency and political corruption, and if they are worried about the future of the country.

[53] 40.3 percent of the Chilean population lives in the Metropolitan region (Santiago), while 48 percent of the population lives in the II, IV, V, VI, VII, VIII, X and XIV regions. The sample did not include people from regions I, III, IX, XI, XII and XV, mainly because these regions only represent 9.7 percent of the total population estimated in 2010 but also because of their distance from Santiago (cf. Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas 2010: 96).

Figure 22
Comparative analysis of interviewees (*N*=53)


									Education			Personality						Perception of politics						Priorities in life						Soc. concerns		
Number	Interviewee	Interviews	Indifference / Non-indifference	Evolution	Genre	Age	Region	Class	Level of Education	Quality of Education	Victim of bullying	Structured	Aggressive	Introvert	Cheerful	Frustrated	Proud	Critic of Popular Unity	Critic of dictatorship at the time	Critic of Transition	Critic of politicians	Interest in politics	Political orientation	Level of individualism	Family	Education	Work	Order	Economic stability	Delinquency	Political corruption	Future of Chile
1	**Mr A**	1	Di		M	68	IV	M	L	L		Y	Y				Y	Y		Y	Y	N	R	M	Y		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	
2	**Ms A**	1	Di	N	F	82	IV	M	M	M		Y		Y	Y		Y	Y	N		Y	N	R	L	Y			Y		Y		
3	**Mr B**	1	Di	Y	M	68	M	U	H	M		Y	Y						N		Y	N	R	M	Y		Y					
4	**Mr C**	1	Di		M	37	IV	M	M	L			Y		Y			Y			Y	N	R	L			Y	Y	Y	Y		Y
5	**Ms B**	1	Di	Y	F	45	II	M	H	L		Y	Y			Y		Y	N	Y	Y	Y	R	L					Y		Y	Y
6	**Mr D**	2	Di		M	48	M	U	M	L			Y				Y	Y		Y	Y	N	R	M	Y		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
7	**Mr E**	1	Di	Y	M	70	M	U	H	H		Y	Y					Y	N	Y	Y	Y	R	M	Y		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
8	**Mr F**	1	Di		M	68	IV	M	L	L	Y						Y	Y		Y	Y	Y	R	L	Y			Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
9	**Mr G**	1	Di		M	69	M	U	H	H		Y					Y					Y	R	L			Y	Y	Y	Y		
10	**Ms C**	1	Di	Y	F	43	M	M	L	L	Y					Y		Y		Y	Y	N	R	M	Y		Y		Y	Y	Y	Y
11	**Mr H**	1	S	Y	M	36	M	U	H	H		Y		Y								N	C	H	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
12	**Ms D**	1	S		F	36	M	U	H	M		Y		Y				Y			Y	N	C	M	Y		Y	Y	Y	Y		
13	**Ms E**	1	S		F	18	M	M	L	M											Y	N	C	L	Y				Y	Y	Y	Y
14	**Mr I**	1	S	Y	M	45	M	M	L	L	Y					Y	Y			Y	Y	Y	C	M	Y		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
15	**Mr J**	3	S	Y	M	44	VI	U	M	L	Y	N	N		Y	Y			N			N	C	M	Y		Y	Y	Y	Y		Y
16	**Mr K**	1	S	Y	M	45	VI	M	H	H		Y		Y							Y	N	C	L			Y		Y		Y	Y
17	**Mr L**	3	S	Y	M	33	M	U	H	H	Y											N	C	H	Y	Y	Y		Y			
18	**Ms F**	1	S		F	42	IV	M	M	M				Y				Y			Y	N	C	M	Y		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
19	**Mr M**	2	S	Y	M	52	M	U	H	H		Y			Y		Y	Y	N				C	H	Y	Y	Y					Y
20	**Mr N**	1	S	Y	M	49	VIII	L	H	H	Y							Y			Y	Y	C	H	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
21	**Ms G**	1	S	Y	F	44	VII	U	H	H		Y		Y				Y			Y		C	H	Y	Y	Y		Y			
22	**Mr NN**	1	S		M	45	VI	U	M	M	Y				Y			Y	Y	Y	Y	N	C	M	Y		Y		Y		Y	Y
23	**Mr O**	2	D		M	46	VI	U	L	L					Y		Y				Y	N	A	M	Y		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
24	**Mr P**	1	D		M	43	IV	M	L	L													A	M	Y		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
25	**Mr Q**	1	D	N	M	78	IV	M	H	H	Y	Y		Y			Y					N	A	L			Y					
26	**Mr R**	1	D		M	59	II	M	L	L													A	M	Y		Y					
27	**Mr S**	1	D		M	80	X	M	M	M		Y		Y			Y		N		Y	N	A	L			Y	Y	Y			
28	**Ms H**	1	D		F	55	IV	L	L	L													A	M	Y		Y					
29	**Ms I**	1	D		F	60	M	M	M	M		Y					Y					N	A	L			Y					
30	**Mr T**	2	D		M	60	VI	L	L	L				Y	Y		Y					N	A	M	Y		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
31	**Ms II**	1	R		F	60	M	L	L	L												N	L	L	Y			Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
32	**Ms N**	1	R	Y	F	56	XV	L	L	L				Y		Y			Y		Y	N	L	M	Y		Y	Y	Y		Y	
33	**Ms O**	1	R		F	43	V	M	M	M		Y		Y					Y			N	L	L	Y				Y	Y	Y	Y
34	**Mr WW**	2	R	Y	M	77	M	U	H	H	Y	Y		Y			Y		N				L	H	Y	Y	Y					
35	**Mr X**	1	R		M	50	M	M	H	H							Y		Y			Y	L	H	Y	Y	Y					
36	**Mr XX**	1	N		M	50	M	U	H	H							Y		Y			Y	L	H	Y	Y	Y				Y	Y
37	**Mr Y**	3	N		M	33	M	U	H	H							Y					Y	L	H	Y	Y	Y				Y	Y
38	**Mr YY**	2	N		M	44	M	M	H	H							Y		Y			Y	L	L			Y		Y		Y	Y
39	**Ms P**	1	N		F	46	M	U	H	H									Y			Y	L	L		Y					Y	Y
40	**Ms Q**	2	N		F	38	M	U	H	H							Y		Y			Y	L	H	Y	Y	Y				Y	Y
41	**Mr TT**	1	N		M	45	M	M	H	H							Y		Y			Y	L	L			Y		Y		Y	Y
42	**Mr Z**	1	N		M	79	M	M	H	H							Y		Y			Y	L	L			Y	Y				
43	**Mr ZZ**	1	N		M	45	M	M	H	H							Y		Y		Y	Y	L	H	Y	Y	Y				Y	Y
44	**Ms R**	1	N		F	48	VIII	M	H	H							Y		Y			Y	L	H	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
45	**Mr VV**	1	N		M	35	II	M	H	H							Y					Y	L	H	Y	Y	Y		Y			Y
46	**Mr W**	1	N		M	46	M	M	H	H							Y		Y			Y	L	H	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y		Y	Y
47	**Ms J**	1	N		F	50	M	U	H	H					Y		Y						C	H	Y	Y	Y					
48	**Mr U**	2	N		M	24	M	M	H	H				Y			Y					Y	C	M		Y	Y	Y	Y		Y	Y
49	**Ms K**	1	N		F	29	M	M	H	H							Y						C	H	Y	Y	Y					
50	**Ms L**	1	N		F	35	II	M	H	H							Y						C	H	Y	Y	Y		Y			Y
51	**Ms M**	1	N		F	68	M	M	H	H							Y		Y			Y	C	M	Y		Y					Y
52	**Mr UU**	2	N		M	65	M	U	H	H							Y		Y			Y	C	H	Y	Y	Y					Y
53	**Mr V**	2	N	Y	M	70	M	U	H	H							Y	Y	Y			Y	C	M	Y		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y

Being, M for male, F for female in Gender; M for Metropolitan Region; U for upper, M for middle, and L for lower in Class; H for high, M for medium, and L for low in Education, Y for yes, and N for no; R for right, C for centre, L for left, and A for apolitical in Political Identification; D for Depoliticized Indifferent, Di for Disillusioned Indifferent, S for Submissive Indifferent, and R for Resigned Indifferent. Indifferent interviewees are highlighted in grey cells.

It should be noted that each of the fifty-three interviewees was previously identified by personal contacts and collaborators in this research as an indifferent individual to past human rights violations. However, in-depth interviews showed that there are different degrees or intensities of indifference, which allows for distinctions in the spectrum of IPHRV. This topic could not be known only through the analysis of the survey data, which corroborates how the interviews complement the previous findings. It was surprising to note that some interviewees were not really indifferent, although to my personal contacts they behaved as indifferent people. In order to be more precise in the analysis of IPHRV, it was considered that of the fifty-three interviewees selected only thirty-five were, as defined in this thesis, indifferent to past human rights violations. As in the analysis of the national survey (mentioned in the previous chapter), the selection of subjects identified as indifferent has been rigorous. If the same reasoning is used as in the quantitative chapter, all interviewees could be classified according to their political orientation. Figure 23 organises all interviewees, distinguishing between indifferent and non-indifferent, according to their current political orientation. As can be seen, on the edges of *Set N* it is reported whether interviewees feel more identified with the right, left, centre or apolitical sectors. *Set I* includes those thirty-five interviewees who correspond to the four types of indifference previously described: disillusioned, submissive, depoliticised, and resigned indifferent. Later this chapter also covers how and why some interviewees have varied their political opinions over time. The current identification with a political sector may have changed in relation to the political identification that the person had during UP, Pinochet's dictatorship**,** or the transition to democracy. Indeed, the political evolution of some interviewees may have influenced the intensity of the indifference found in this research. In Figure 23 apolitical interviewees are marked in black, those who identify themselves with the right are in

blue, those who belong to the political centre are in green, and in red are those who identify themselves with the left, according to the characterisation described in the previous figure regarding each interviewee.

Figure 23
Types of indifference and political orientation (*N*=35)



Being, *Set N* for non-indifferent interviewees, and *Set I* for indifferent interviewees.

Figure 24
Identification of respondents according to their type of indifference and gender (*N*=35)

Disillusioned (*10*)	*Male*	Mr A, Mr B, Mr C, Mr D, Mr E, Mr F, Mr G
	Female	Ms A, Ms B, Ms C
Submissive (*12*)	*Male*	Mr H, Mr I, Mr J, Mr K, Mr L, Mr M, Mr N, Mr NN
	Female	Ms D, Ms E, Ms F, Ms G
Depoliticised (*8*)	*Male*	Mr O, Mr P, Mr Q, Mr R, Mr S, Mr T
	Female	Ms H, Ms I
Resigned (5)	*Male*	Mr X, Mr WW
	Female	Ms II, Ms O, Ms N

The analysis of the contents of the interviews was carried out according to *Grounded Theory* (Glaser & Strauss 1967; Strauss & Corbin 1990). At the descriptive stage, the interviews were transcribed verbatim and then coded. At the analytical stage, relations were established between the different categories and codes, forming associations that facilitated the understanding of the causes and consequences of indifference. The qualitative analysis is inferential and the study of the causal mechanisms is based on the strategy of process-tracing (Tarrow 2004: 173-4; Beach & Pedersen 2013: Ch. 1). It is known that interviews are recommended for process-tracing approaches to case study research (Tansey 2007). From qualitative data collected, the traces of the causal mechanisms and dynamics behind IPHRV are identified. As Collier points out,

> process tracing can make decisive contributions to diverse research objectives, including: (a) identifying novel political and social phenomena and systematically describing them; (b) evaluating prior explanatory hypotheses, discovering new hypotheses, and assessing new causal claims; (c) gaining insight into causal mechanisms; and (d) providing alternative means—compared with conventional regression analysis and inference based on statistical models—of addressing challenging problems such as reciprocal causation, spuriousness, and selection bias. Thus, qualitative tools can add leverage in quantitative analysis.
>
> (Collier 2011: 824)

To fully understand the phenomenon of IPHRV, a complete mastery of the social context in which it is inserted is required. In addition to interviews, this research

included extended time in fieldwork: more than eighty informal conversations and participatory observation in memory sites, street demonstrations, commemorative events, and high schools were registered as fieldwork notes in different periods between 2013 and 2016. To properly capture the political climate, newspapers, magazines, television news, documentaries, films, blogs and social networks, and archival documents at the Museum of Memory and Human Rights and the Documentation Centre of the Vicariate of the Solidarity were reviewed. This extended period of fieldwork has been necessary to adequately understand the social climate in Chilean society today.[54]

Fieldwork in Chile helped to corroborate that social indifference appears in the public domain as a censor of uncomfortable topics. For example, a memorial in Providencia, Santiago, was inaugurated on 29 March 2016. Exactly three decades before the police illegally detained three members of the Communist Party: Santiago Nattino, José Manuel Parada and Manuel Guerrero. They were savagely murdered and their bodies were found on the outskirts of Santiago. Fundación Elefante and local authorities managed to build a memorial in the exact place where two of them were arrested. However, the upper-class building community Espacio Los Leones opposed the construction of the memorial and made use of all legal actions they could to prevent it. According to the neighbours, the commemorations in the memorial could affect their security and integrity, and would diminish the commercial value of their homes. Finally, on 19 May 2016 the Third Chamber of the Supreme Court upheld the decision of the Court of Appeals of Santiago, rejecting the remedy of protection (*recurso de protección*) filed by neighbours, and approving the existence of the memorial. The day of its inauguration, a multitudinous artistic event was carried out. That same night the

[54] For a general description of fieldwork notes and their contribution, see Appendix 5.

Chilean football team played a qualifying match for the next World Cup. Those who were in the tribute could see the residents in the building enjoying time with their friends on their terraces, living rooms and bedrooms, all watching the football game. The residents were indifferent to the speeches of relatives, artistic shows, and candles lit by the attendants. It is probable that the causes that explain the indifference of the different neighbours are diverse but, not only were they indifferent, the inauguration of the memorial had little coverage in the press. This example shows the social power of indifference, to the point of refusing to see the inauguration of a memorial of three innocent victims at the front of the house in which they live.

Fieldwork in Chile also allowed understanding the influence of the media on human rights issues. For example, indifferent characters are also interpreted in popular culture and in the film and television industries. There is a scene in the film *No*—directed by Pablo Larraín in 2012—showing the attitude of people who want to forget and erase the past. The group of creative publicists in charge of designing the television campaign to beat Pinochet in the 1988 referendum brainstormed in a beach town, which actually happened in reality. Marketing experts ask Mrs. Carmen, a shy and humble woman in charge of cooking and cleaning the house (nanny), why she supports the *Yes*-option. She simply responds that she is fine, so are her children. One of the publicists persists and enquires about her indifference to the tortured and disappeared persons. She simply answers: "It's not that I do not care, but that's from the past, now we have democracy ahead. That is why my General says that we will all be able to give an opinion when we vote." This scene shows an argument that is usually used by the indifferent in their social conversations: "it's been a long time," "let's not talk about these things," "it's better to turn the page." Such statements are often used by the

indifferent as a mechanism of social control, so that their interlocutors have to change the subject.


The first part of this chapter presents the main findings of the qualitative component of this research. A deeper analysis of the main causes of IPHRV that leads to new interpretations is presented. The second part presents new problematisations of IPHRV that have emerged from analysis of the interviews. It is explained why a group of indifferent people—the indifferent cynics—is the more problematic one for the future of democracy and the rule of law in Chile. This part also refers to the dynamics and the spectrum of indifference. In the third part of this chapter the exploratory findings and preliminary results of the analysis on social consequences of IPHRV are presented. The last segment highlights the main conclusions and also identifies some key concerns that will be further developed in the concluding chapter when proposals to prevent IPHRV in Chile today are discussed.

1. NEW UNDERSTANDINGS OF INDIFFERENCE

Of all the thematic nodes present in the interviews, it is possible to distinguish three broad sets of categories of causal dynamics in the thirty-five cases of indifferent subjects analysed: 1) Excessive priority given to personal well-being; 2) Fear of the past, and in particular the UP; 3) Political apathy and malaise with contemporary political activity. Individuals do not necessarily fall into one of these three categories, as these categories are in some cases mutually constitutive. For example, a person who overemphasises his personal well-being may also be extremely disappointed with politics. The three broad sets of categories are explained separately and examples of interviewees representing the respective causal dynamics are included. The situation of

those interviewed in which two or three of these sets of categories are combined is explained below, including representative examples. To facilitate the understanding of the cases to be explained, the following figure shows the location that has been given to the thirty-five indifferent interviewees in the broad sets of categories. The indifference of each interviewee mentioned in this chapter is also explained in detail. It is interesting to note that in general there is a relationship or association between the type of indifference and the set of categories or predominant variable. In the case of resigned indifferent (left-wing) the tendency of discomfort with politics is more strongly appreciated. In half of the disillusioned indifferent (right-wing), their fear of the past is more prevalent than other explanations for their IPHRV; although in the other half there are combinations with other sets of categories. In general, the submissive indifferent (centre) are more interested in their individual well-being, although there are also cases in which the other sets of categories are also operating. The situation of the depoliticised indifferent (apolitical) is interesting because there is a mix between the search for individual well-being and a discomfort with politics. Five cases that correspond to situations in which there is cynicism on the subject of human rights are highlighted in the figure and will be explained separately.

Figure 25
Sets of categories of causal dynamics and indifferent interviewees (*N*=35)



In black colour appear apolitical interviewees, in blue those who are identified with the right, in green those who belong to the centre, and in red those who identify themselves with the left.

a) Pre-eminence of private life or predominant search of well-being

In twenty-four of the thirty-five indifferent interviewees, there was a higher interest in their private lives over the issues of public interest. This is a significant difference with non-indifferent people, who may also give a high value to their private lives, but are rather interested in the recent history of the country and collective issues. The predominant attention of the indifferent to their private lives is especially concentrated in the family and education/work environment, over other dimensions of life. Their

personal fulfilment is closely linked to what happens inside their homes. With less intensity, although recurrent in several interviews of indifferent people, has been the importance some of them give to the fight against crime, and to the search for order and security. As these people pay predominant attention to their personal affairs, traumatic collective events of the recent past are not a relevant concern in their lives. Below are presented two cases of respondents who have maximised their energies in their private lives. It is also explained for each of these cases the reasons why they have not given relevance to other issues of less importance for them, in particular human rights.

Ms G (age 45, VII region, lawyer, political centre) was born in a southern town in Chile when her mother was fifteen years old. Her father was just starting his college education and supported UP, and after the coup he abandoned them and left the country forever. Ms G lived with her mother and grandmother, both conservative and *pinochetistas*, who motivated her to always be the best student in her class. After graduating from high school, she moved to Santiago to study law in a prestigious university. To keep her scholarship in college she knew she had to study more than all her peers, and that was precisely what she did. Political ideas transmitted to her in her maternal family were of the right-wing, and during her university studies she could have participated in the youth organisations of the right-wing parties. But she did not because she had no choice but to keep her scholarship to finance her studies. Without financial support from her biological father, a mother with low-paid jobs, and old grandparents living far away, the only way she could get a job and make sure she had a better future was to get the highest marks in her class. She thought she could not afford to spend some of her valuable time on sports, political or social activities, and she did not care either. She had barely graduated from college and got married, and soon her children

were born. If it had been education before, then her family became her priority. Again, she did not have time to either understand politics or revise her political thinking.

However, as years have passed Ms G has been stepping back from the political ideas she was taught at home and school. In the last fifteen years, she has come to know different points of view and has distanced herself from the political ideologies of her mother and grandmother. Ms G is an example of submissive indifference, since she has slowly questioned some of the political beliefs she had in the past. Ms G feels that she forms part of the centre (or centre-right). Indeed, she has separated herself from the military dictatorship and now situates herself in the moderate centre of the political spectrum. This social sector no longer defends the political accomplishments of Pinochet's government with the same devotion of the 90s, but shares the Chicago Boys' socio-economic achievements. People like Ms. G are cautious when they talk about politics with people from other sectors. Since they do not share everything the armed forces did when they controlled the country, they are also in an awkward situation when they talk about politics with people identified with political extremes. Ms. G recognises that turning her energies into study and her family has also been an excuse to avoid conversations and political discussions about the past. If she takes a more critical stance on human rights violations, those who are more inclined to the right-wing will question her loyalty and political coherence over time. Despite having an opinion about what happened during the dictatorship, it is easier for Ms G to navigate these issues in her daily life by simply avoiding them.

> I am not willing to commit myself politically...I do not vote for political parties, but I vote for candidates and that is a big difference...I feel that the different political sectors have made me feel as if I were a pariah person. I say this because people in different sectors have excluded me all the time.
>
> (Ms G: 25 and 26)

Another interviewee who has been distancing himself from his youthful *pinochetismo* is Mr I (age 45, centre-right, Metropolitan region, unemployed). One event drastically changed the course of his life: the separation of his parents when he was an adolescent. That meant that he had to leave his upper-class private school and enrol in a public high school, where he was constantly a victim of bullying. His mother could never overcome her marriage breakdown, never again smiled at home, and became an alcoholic. Mr I remembers that his mother was drunk every weekend and in particular at festivities, but she always remained sober on her workdays. For several years Mr I not only felt sorry for his mother but also was embarrassed seeing her drunk, alone, and depressed. Without proper advice or support, Mr I failed in his university studies. With many difficulties, he finally received a technical degree. He defines himself as a hard-working person, although he has been dismissed innumerable times from different jobs. Now he is unemployed and performs sporadic repairs and maintenance work in upper class homes as a handy man. He is a person who has been financially strapped since adolescence and repeatedly has difficulty paying the bills at the end of the month. He has not had time to worry about others because most of the time he is concerned with his own financial problems and giving stability to his wife and daughters. Unfortunately, his unemployment has been affecting his marriage lately and a separation or divorce could eventually occur in the near future.

As for his political thinking, Mr I has slowly moved from the right to the centre. His interest in politics has always been reserved to the level of private conversation in an atmosphere of trust. He has never participated in a street protest, nor has he joined a political party, and normally votes for those candidates who seem to him to be honest and credible, regardless of their political orientation. In recent years, he has begun to

take a slightly more critical view of Pinochet's dictatorship for two reasons: he does not want civil rights to be violated again and he believes that in those years Chilean society was too repressed in terms of values, which gave rise to the fact that "in the Transition the country fell into debauchery" (Mr I: 58 and 60). However, his level of knowledge and interest in learning from Chile's recent past is still low and he is in favour of 'turning the page' and thinking about a better future. Despite being more interested in how the future of Chile will be than in the past, his vision is pessimistic. Indeed, he considers that there is too much corruption in politics and also in corporations: "Chile is an uncultured country and a cultural transformation is needed from the grassroots" (Mr I: 74). But this concern for Chile's future is more a personal concern for his own economic stability and for the future of his daughters. He is aware that if Chile enters a phase of economic recession, his employment instability will inevitably be greater. In Mr. I's case it is possible to see traces of disillusioned and resigned indifference, although the main causal dynamic of his IPHRV is his interest in achieving the levels of well-being that he has never had. His personal frustrations have led him to distance himself from what might be affecting other people. Since his sad years of adolescence, he has internalised a spirit of survival despite adversity. As personal problems of other people are not of his concern, it seems that empathy and compassion for others reaches low levels of development in his personality. On the one hand, Mr I is not a person who enjoys knowing that other people have suffered or who have been victims of human rights violations. On the other hand, he is not a person who will commit to improve the situation of a victim of human rights violations. On the contrary, he is primarily preoccupied with his own well-being and prefers not to get involved in other people's situations.

> My biggest frustrations in life are job instability and lack of money. I have never had an economic level that would allow me to live quietly, or a job that allows me to develop professionally…I have been fired many times, despite the energy that I have put in the job market.
>
> In Chile, life is expensive and I worry that I will not be able to pay the college education of my daughters…Also, I have not been able to travel and know the world. I would love to travel more with my family because it entertains me.
>
> (Mr I: 20 and 22)

b) Fear of the past

Research confirms that people who avoid conflict because of fear are more likely to develop indifferent attitudes and perceptions on human rights issues (Arteta 2012 [2010]: 91 and 100). For example, the violence of the guerrillas, the army, and drug trafficking in the past fifty years in Colombia would not have been possible without the indifference, and sometimes consensual participation and explicit support of ordinary citizens (Velásquez 2008). According to Cohen, the absence of objections from indifferent citizens may be interpreted as acceptance or support of the acts performed against repressed sectors of society (2002: 194). In order for a person to make the conscious decision to not question state terrorist actions against other citizens, a substantial justification is required. One of the justifications that has been recurrent in many of the interviews is the economic difficulties that they or their families lived during UP. These interviewees have bad memories of UP because they went hungry, their lands were expropriated, they lost their jobs, or they could not buy basic goods, etc. It was possible to corroborate the following argument made by Bucciferro in many interviews: "The generalized disorder and lack of access to goods and services that characterized those years [1970-3] are one of the most prevalent memories passed down to the new generations, by both media representations and oral histories" (2012: 29).

It is true that during UP there were problems of shortages, for several reasons. On the one hand were the boycott of national businessmen and foreign investors whose economic interests were threatened by Allende's government program and the sabotage of the White House and the CIA (Haslam 2005; Wolf 2008: Ch. 7). For example, strikes of truck owners paralysed the distribution of goods in the country. On the other hand, the lack of clarity in the government and parties regarding how the macroeconomic policies were to be applied, in addition to the poor economic results obtained in 1972-3 (Oppenheim 1980: Ch. 7). For example, by the emission of paper currency, inflation rose wildly. The Allende government tried to rationalise the delivery of food and tried to solve the serious problem of shortages that plagued the population (Manzi et al. 2004: 161). In particular, the experience of not being able to get goods and food was traumatic for many people and they want to avoid at all costs the repeat of that situation. To this day, the fear of not covering basic needs has made a sector of Chilean society contrary to socialist and communist ideas. Several of the interviewees referred to the problem of shortages because they suffered it themselves. As there were few goods for sale in stores, people queued up in lines or turned to the black market to get food (Fermandois 2013: 584-91). Other younger interviewees also referred to this point, despite not having lived it personally but having heard the stories that have been passed on to them in their families. The fear of lacking basic supplies has provoked in them feelings of anger or annoyance towards UP (id.: 584). Some of the interviewees also recall the years of UP as a period in which there were too many conflicts in Chile, both in urban and rural areas.

It is critical to understand how indifferent people evaluate the past, in particular their perceptions of what happened during UP and the military dictatorship. For example, of the thirty-five indifferent interviewees, eighteen of them have a critical

evaluation of UP and do not want the political and economic difficulties of that time to be repeated in the country. Some interviewees have frequently felt disappointment about what really happened during the dictatorship, as it is increasingly recognised that human rights violations should not happen again. However, UP was so traumatic for them that if it were necessary to restrict citizens' freedom to ensure order, they would have no problem approving it. In fact, they consider that human rights violations during the dictatorship were the lesser evil. For many indifferent interviewees, discussions about Chile's recent history are too polarised, thus they prefer to avoid such conversations and reflections. In these cases, it is often argued that it is preferable to turn the page and not to continue discussing human rights violations. This does not mean that they promote such atrocities, but neither does it mean that they condemn such violations if they consider that in order to regain security and public order, drastic measures could be taken against the population. The deep fear they feel for the past that they personally experienced as traumatic leads to half of the indifferent interviewees to be indifferent to past human rights violations.

Ms A (age 82, IV region, housewife, right-wing) has bad memories of the days of UP: "I suffered a lot in UP…I was pleased with the military pronouncement [coup]" (Ms A: 23). She remembers that she got up several times in the middle of the night to get in line and thus have food for her family. One of the worst experiences was on one occasion she had taken turns on the street for two days to try to buy meat. Besides the lack of food, she did not like the 'mess' she saw in the country. That is why she agreed that the military 'put order' in Chile. However, 11 September 1973 was also a traumatic event for her because at the time she lived one block away from President Allende. When the Hawker Hunters bombed the former presidential house at Tomás Moro Avenue in Santiago, she did not know what was happening. She hid with her young

daughters under their beds. They thought they were in a war and did not dare to walk out and find out what was going on: "We thought we were going to die. It was the most terrible day of my life. We felt the bombing as if it had been next to us" (Ms A: 22).

Beyond this incident, the fact is that she agreed with the role played by the armed forces in what she considers to be the reconstruction of Chile. She believes that UP was the worst moment in Chile's history and she does not want the country to suffer any shortages: "It is unfortunate that human rights have been violated, but the country had no way out…It was like the current situation of Venezuela" (Ms A: 25). All these years Ms A has never been interested in politics and has not bothered to keep informed on national reality or public affairs. She is a very withdrawn person who shares with few people and would hardly formulate political comments in a social conversation. Ms A does not question human rights violations, she prefers to remain silent and avoid any controversy on the subject, so it is possible to find in her the typical features of disillusioned indifferent.

More than anything, Mr E (age 70, Metropolitan region, engineer, right-wing) is concerned about the future of the country. He feels uncomfortable with politicians and condemns the poor education of Chileans. With the passage of time he has been moving from a hostile position towards human rights to a more disillusioned indifference. He does not regret having supported Pinochet, but now avoids mentioning it in his social relationships. For example, he thinks his boss is a communist and they seem to be able to work perfectly together, but Mr E has not shared his political beliefs and opinions with his boss. It is possible to argue that Mr E stopped transmitting hostility towards human rights in the last decade and now in his conversations he rather transmits pessimism about the future of the country and acts with indifference to what happened in the past. This case shows how a person, who in the past was a strong supporter of

Pinochet and his legacy, has evolved towards increasingly indifferent positions and attitudes. During the dictatorship Mr E was a hostile person to the issues of human rights, leftist parties and even the Christian Democratic Party. However, as public information on human rights violations has increased over the years, Mr E has moderated his comments and perceptions. Recently he has been able to recognise that under Pinochet's government arbitrary errors, injustices, and unjustifiable crimes were committed. Those who feel remorse for their complicity during the dictatorship are likely to develop indifferent attitudes to past human rights violations. In his personal life Mr E is still part of social groups that sympathise with the extreme right, but he now has a better predisposition to relate to people who think differently.

The death of his brother in an accident had a profound impact on his family. It has been more than forty years and Mr E still accepts without question the version of the accident given by the armed forces. The roots of his anger toward the left may be associated with this delicate family situation. Mr E blames the left-wing for the political and economic crisis of 1973, and also for the death of his brother. Consequently, for Mr E the military coup was not only legitimate, but also fully justified. This situation triggered a strong ideological preference, which explains his permanent support for right-wing parties and candidates. Mr E has recently begun to question human rights violations and Pinochet's corruption, and is leaning towards disillusioned indifference.

> I'm not told stories. I remember UP so well. It was terrible. I know that the theme of UP is a subject on which people have different visions...The situation was chaotic. There was so much inability.
>
> I now see something similar to what happened before, in the time of Allende, a general discontent. It is too easy to be a delinquent in this country...This goes from bad to worse. I do not see anyone trying to sort things out today. There are pure fights for nonsense...Bachelet is like taking a Valium, a tranquilizer; because she does absolutely nothing, nothing...The crime is unleashed.
>
> (Mr E: 73 and 101)

As can be seen, Mr E (age 70) is tremendously critical of UP. In his own words, at that time "in Chile there was shit everywhere" (Mr E: 130). To meet basic needs, he remembers that they had to exchange goods with other desperate families:

> For example, my mom asked me to try to exchange oil for toilet paper...Once my girlfriend [at the time] asked me to go with her to the warehouses of La Moneda [presidential palace] where one could find everything. It was incredible, and all of us starving. Nobody is going to come to tell me stories; I saw it with my own eyes, my friend.
>
> (Mr E: 78 and 79).

Mr E believes that human rights violations were a mistake, but he also argues that unfortunately they were necessary to restore order in society. In his opinion, such was the chaos in the country that Chile had to go through an authoritarian stage. He is grateful for the work carried out by the armed forces; otherwise Chile would not have reached the levels of development and prosperity in the last decades. Now he observes with resignation how politicians have undermined democracy by putting their personal interests above the interests of the country.

The story of Mr F (age 68, IV region, retired salesman, right-wing) provides the gaze of the person on the other side of the counter. He and his father owned a store in a small town in northern Chile. Mr F remembers that they did not have goods to sell during Allende's government, although they made great efforts to obtain products. Their customers were not sympathetic; they did not believe them and unjustifiably blamed them for the lack of merchandise in the store. Mr F remembers that people reproached him and told him that they were hiding goods from the public (Mr F: 78). He felt the hatred and annoyance of customers, but there was nothing he could do to calm their exacerbated moods.

> For me the UP was a black episode. It was useless...We were not going anywhere. Allende was making us the second Cuba. I knew that the thing [the country] was going in the wrong direction...If I remove the subject of human rights, the military government changed the country's physiognomy. Pinochet's economic revolution was and still is very important.
>
> (Mr F: 19)

> At that time [1973] I was a Christian Democrat and I agreed with the military coup.
>
> (Mr F: 22)

> Left parties have done a lot of damage to the country. The left in Chile did much damage in exacerbating the class difference. That comes from the time of nitrate plants in the north...During UP the theme of the class struggle was exacerbated.
>
> (Mr F: 75 and 77)

In general, the opinion of a significant group of respondents is negative regarding UP's economy. Mr T (age 60, VI region, apolitical) was hungry on several occasions and for that reason he evaluates the Allende government badly: "I saw many people frustrated because they did not have what to buy, there was no food" (Mr T: 57). The parents of Ms B (age 45, right-wing, II region, unemployed, psychologist) told her they had nothing to eat at home but canned mackerel, something they now loathe to eat (Ms B: 30). Ms C (age 43, Metropolitan region, right-wing, secretary) was born in 1973 and her mother has told her that there was nothing to buy, that there were queues in the shops at all times. Mr J (age 44, bank officer, political centre, VI region) also has a bad opinion of the economy during the UP (Mr J: 54 and 56). Mr M (age 52, army officer, Metropolitan region, political centre) remembers that in his childhood he had to queue with his older brothers to buy anything that they were able to find: "I saw that there was no food in the house" (Mr M: 42). He also remembers the frustrated faces of his parents, uncles and grandparents (Mr M: 42). The grandparents of Ms G (age 44, VII region,

lawyer, political centre) also told her that they had had a horrible time between 1970 and 1973.

c) Malaise with contemporary politics

In the municipal elections of October 2016 only 35.8 percent of the electorate voted (PNUD 2016a: 8). One of the explanations of such a low level of electoral participation is the disenchantment of citizens with political activity, and especially with politicians. Indeed, citizens are increasingly distancing themselves from politics. According to UNDP, the main reason why Chileans are not voting is because "politics does not interest them" (PNUD 2016b: 250). In addition to the lack of interest, political disaffection has gradually increased during the Transition, and more consistently in the last two years. In fact, a series of corruption scandals linked to the financing of political campaigns or illicit enrichment of politicians or their relatives are under investigation, e.g. the *Penta*, *SQM*, and *Caval* cases, among others. The sustained trend of declining credibility of politicians has led to negative attitudes towards political activity. Political apathy is more prevalent among young people, who see politicians more interested in protecting their own interests instead of adequately representing citizens (Venegas 2016: 89). For example, it is worrying that only 20 percent of the young people between eighteen and twenty-nine years old voted in the last local elections. But this disaffection with politics not only occurs in the case of young people. According to Venegas, that disaffection "would be occurring throughout Chilean society" (2016: 90). It is not only young people who are more likely not to participate politically or vote in elections, as evidence also indicates that modest sectors of the population are increasingly suspicious of political parties and democratic institutions (Escoffier 2015: 205-6; PNUD 2016a).

> Chilean citizens, particularly young people, are showing high and increasing levels of disengagement from politics and a high distrust of the country's political institutions, which has led to the fact that this group has high levels of *political disaffection*.
>
> (Venegas 2016: 15)

The main student leaders and young left-wing politicians of *Frente Amplio* are critical of the political-economic model that governs the country. These leaders are aware that the most important political rules were established during the dictatorship (e.g. the 1980 Constitution, the educational system, employment laws, the pension system, etc.). In chapter 2, it was explained why during the Transition it has been so difficult to modify the main political-economic rules as authoritarian enclaves persisted. It is true that there has been progress, such as the constitutional reforms of 1989 and 2005, but the perception of young people is that the neoliberal model has accentuated the unequal distribution of income and opportunities in Chilean society. For example, the student movements of 2006 and 2011 have shown the deep inequalities in education. There is no doubt that student leaders have made the population pay more attention to the cost and quality of education. The pressure of the student movement has allowed congressional approval of increased public funding for middle and lower-class college students. But the impact of university education on the lives of more modest and vulnerable people requires several years. For now, there are young people living in slums where they feel discrimination, inequality and lack of opportunities (Escoffier 2015). Musician Andi Ferrer Millanao (Portavoz) has captured the feeling of postponement of young people living in poor neighbourhoods, especially in the song *El Otro Chile* (The Other Chile):

> Su discurso de unidad nacional / solo son esos, discurso, / porque otra es la realidad. / Vivimos en una sociedad segrega[da] / y no es casualidad, siempre / lo quiso así la clase acomoda[da].[55]

It has been important to explore the level of knowledge of politics and the attitudes of these people towards political activities. In the indifferent there is a tendency towards low levels of political formation and participation. Chilean adults know that political polarisation is a central feature of Chile's recent history, and especially between 1970 and 1990. For example, all adults have heard of Salvador Allende and Augusto Pinochet in their homes, the school, the media, etc. Some sectors of society have taken sides and expressly identify themselves with a political party and have quite clear positions on what happened in the past. But there are also sectors of society that prefer to evade the issue. The interesting point is that every Chilean adult has been at the crossroads of having to determine ideologically and strategically how to socially navigate the issue of human rights violations. For example, when, how, with whom, and how intensely it is advisable to talk about the stormy past are questions who's first responses Chileans usually begin to learn from an early age. A significant group of respondents consider it preferable to simply turn the page and overcome the past. These people believe that the traumatic experiences of the past deeply divided Chilean society and that it is preferable to unite to start a better future among all. It should be remembered that 49 percent of the survey respondents indicated that it is preferable to turn the page and not be further divided by the conflicts experienced in the past (*Q49.7*).

There are those who prefer to avoid having social problems in college, within the family or in the workplace. Expressing an opinion about the past can have social costs,

[55] "Your discourse of national unity / that is just that, talk / because there is another reality. / We live in a segregated society / and it's no coincidence, the upper class always / wanted it like that." The song *El Otro Chile*—available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Qgq3Qr41wRk—has 12 million visits on YouTube, which is a considerable figure for a country of only 18 million inhabitants.

because peers may disagree and formulate their concerns. Social sanctions can be subtle; for example, isolating or ignoring the person who has expressed his political views in a social gathering. But sanctions can also be more aggressive; for example, by blocking an application for a job, defaming the person in social networks or through interpersonal campaigns, etc. So, it should not be surprising that a group of Chileans prefer to avoid discussing the recent and problematic historical events. It is worth mentioning that getting interviews with this group of people has been difficult because they avoid the subject, do not respond to emails, and prefer not to explain why they reject the interview. They always have something more important to do than talking about a topic that they have eluded for years and that bothers them.

There is a popular saying that is deeply rooted in Chilean society: "At the table we do not talk about politics, football or religion" (Valenzuela 2015). For example, it is common that when a person begins to talk about some controversial issue, someone invokes that phrase to change the subject. Thus, in Chile it is usual to avoid talking about abortion, immigration, gay marriage, as well as UP or the dictatorship, etc. That phrase is conveyed to elude discrepancy, but it has a nefarious effect which is the lack of motivation to encourage respectful debate and critical thinking. To prevent people from exchanging opinions that could upset them, then any controversy is prevented by pointing out in advance that they will not talk about politics or religion.

The situations of those people who for many years were anti *pinochetistas* and who in recent times have been adopting increasingly indifferent positions should also be mentioned. They are usually people who have become disillusioned with democracy. In these cases, it is possible to notice traits of hopelessness, disappointment, anger or discomfort. Ms N (age 56, maid, XV region, left-wing) is quiet and avoids talking about politics. She believes it is better and safer to stay silent. During the years of the

dictatorship she saw the repression of the armed forces and police agencies in her *población*. Ms N still remembers the violence of arrests in her poor neighbourhood, and the uncontrolled abuses of the military and police. She evaluates the dictatorship as the most difficult days and considers that the social cost for modest people was too high. She regrets the damage done to the lives of the victims and feels that the country has a debt to them. She identified herself with the *Concertación* and centre-left candidates and parties. She always voted for the candidates of the *Concertación* and was pleased when Michelle Bachelet won two presidential elections. She thought the *Concertación* would do more for the most vulnerable people and now is disappointed with the outcomes of the political transition. According to Ms N, the leaders of the *Concertación* did not keep their promises, justice was only reached to the extent possible, and many violators of human rights are free in the streets. But now she has lost hope in the possibility of achieving the social changes needed by the lower classes. She has also lost hope for the judicial condemnation of those who committed human rights abuses. As years go by, resignedly Ms N contemplates how the promises made by the *Concertación* on human rights issues dissolve. Her life has not changed substantively all these years, and her work as a maid prevents her from seeking other options in life. This case shows the evolution that has taken a person who relied on the *Concertación* coalition, moving from a pro human rights to an indifferent attitude. After several years without seeing substantial progress in human rights, Ms N feels hopeless, frustrated, and resigned to what has been achieved in Chile. She thought that things would change in democracy, but the people of her *población* remain poor and marginalised. When she listens on television to left-wing politicians talking about human rights, now she simply does not believe them. She realises that discomfort and indifference to political issues has been taking over her way of being and thinking. If human rights were now being

violated, she does not know how she would react because she does not trust anyone who engages in politics.

> And what are we going to do? Nobody does anything. There is corruption, crime, injustice, discrimination, and nobody does anything. I do not know where we go if we continue like this...It's a shame, but little progress was made on human rights.
> (Ms N: 72 and 73)

When Ms O was a teenager (age 43, V region, teacher, left-wing), she was a supporter of the *No* campaign in the 1988 plebiscite. Her parents sympathised with the Christian Democratic Party, so they were proud of being considered by others as moderate people in the centre-left of the political spectrum. She remembers having moments of family joy when the *No*-option won, and also when Patricio Aylwin was elected president. But these were always moderate joys, from the path of those who observed that new times were coming. The feeling they had was that the worst had happened and that the Transition to Democracy—led by *Concertación* leaders—augured hope for a better Chile. The discourse of moderation of her parents convinced her not to get involved in political activities during her university studies. The fear of her parents was justified, as they witnessed how political debates in universities became more intense in the late 60s and early 70s: "My parents always told us not to get into politics and to be careful" (Ms O: 5). In spite of her initial enthusiasm with the electoral triumphs of the *Concertación* candidates, her sympathy for democratic politicians gradually faded. During her university studies she learned of bad practices carried out by young politicians at the local level. Subsequently she was informed by the press of acts of corruption and secret arrangements between politicians. For example, she felt joy when Pinochet was arrested in London, but later became disillusioned when he was not extradited to Spain, and later

the Chilean Supreme Court declared, on humanitarian grounds, that he could not be tried for his crimes.

Slowly she lost interest in politics, mainly because the conduct of professional politicians and electoral machinery disappointed her. At the moment, she has a very critical view of politicians; she does not believe anything they say. Such is her annoyance with politicians that she is analysing for the first time the possibility of abstaining from voting in the next presidential elections. In her opinion politicians are taking advantage of people, because they promise things that later they will not fulfil. Although she regrets that human rights of innocent people have been violated in Chile, she believes that there are political sectors that are trying to gain political advantage over the issue of human rights. She believes that people who once spoke about human rights and democracy have now forgotten the basic needs of the most vulnerable people in the country. She prefers not to be distracted by talking about politics with her family and friends. She has lost hope in political leadership, as scandals of corruption and abuse are increasingly frequent.

> Politics is a dirty activity. They [politicians] are only interested in getting support in their campaigns. Politics is disgusting. Politicians cheat people…Politicians are a caste separated from the rest of society. Politicians fill their mouths with the issue of human rights, but they do nothing.
>
> (Ms O: 10)

d) Combinations of the above categories

About fifteen of the thirty-five indifferent interviewees show a stronger connection to one of the previous three sets of categories. However, it has also been possible to observe that in the other twenty indifferent interviewees, two or even three sets of categories are operating (see Figure 25). For example, in some cases there has been an

emphasis on personal well-being and political apathy. In other cases, the search for well-being and fear of the past are of equal importance. There are also indifferent interviewees combining fear of the past with political apathy. Finally, there is a group of interviewees in which the three sets of categories discussed above are similarly valued. These four subgroups in which it has been possible to identify combinations of sets of categories are explained below, with their respective examples.

1. *Well-being and malaise with politics.* Mr Q (age 78, IV region, retired engineer, apolitical) was born and raised in the north of Chile. To study at the university he obtained a scholarship that included tuition and accommodation. In order to maintain his scholarship, he had to reach excellent academic results. That is why during his university studies he did not allow himself any distraction. In addition to his shy and introverted personality, his social isolation was accentuated by working in a laboratory and then in the construction of civil works in the most remote places of Chile. The few times that he took vacations; he chose to travel alone abroad. Mr Q is a person who has lived completely isolated most of the time: he does not read the newspaper, he does not have Internet, he does not answer his mobile phone if he does not know the number of the person who is calling him, and he rarely watches the news on television. Since his wife died, he has practically no one to talk to since he has never had friends. He worked for fifty years with great dedication in infrastructure that has contributed to the development of the country, such as Santiago's subway, airports, bridges, and tunnels, etc. His disconnection with people has been of such a magnitude that he never wondered what was going on in the country. He considers that there is no difference between a democratic government and a dictatorship, a right-wing or left-wing government: "People at work asked me if I did not care if there was a democratic or military government, and I told them that I did not care because I was not affected at

all" (Mr Q: 1). He is a person who defines himself as politically apathetic, although curiously he has always voted. He also defines himself as a person completely indifferent to others. However, now that he is an older man approaching the twilight of his life, he acknowledges that he has been too selfish and indifferent.

> I do not care about politics, I'm selfish. I consider that I'm in a good situation. I have been fine in either regime [UP, dictatorship or transition]…There is something simplistic. There is some comfort. Maybe I should get involved, but I do not. I do not have to give an account to anyone. I have chosen to stay in the comfort zone. I admit it is not right and I am not going to save myself from hell.
>
> I am selfish, inconsiderate with others. I have received much from society. Maybe I should be more aware and give back some of the benefits I have received. I have had a calm life, without problems, thanks to society.
>
> (Mr Q: 22 and 31)

Mr Q always prioritised his work over any other activity in life. Mr Q was aware that human rights violations were being committed. For example, his chauffeur informed him that after the coup he was forced to drive a truck carrying bodies of prisoners thrown from a river bridge in southern Chile. At the time Mr Q gave no credit to the story that his chauffeur told him, thinking that his subordinate was only trying to impress him. For all these years, Mr. Q has preferred not to know and has blocked his mind to the possibility that in Chile human rights abuses were occurring. Although the person who drove him from one place to another in the south of Chile every day informed him about the fate of people who at that time were desperately sought by their relatives, he did nothing to collaborate in the search for the disappeared detainees in that area. Mr Q acknowledges that he was perhaps too naïve:

> I could not conceive that such evil was possible. To this day I cannot explain how it is possible for a person to want to harm another human being. That is just beyond my imagination.
>
> (Mr Q: 49).

Another case of full dedication to work is the history of Mr S (age 80, retired engineer, X region, apolitical). While he worked for many years on engineering projects in practically every region of the country, his wife and daughters always stayed at home. Since he was alone, he spent all his time at work. Mr S recalls that he often worked twice as many hours as he had to by contract, because he simply loved working. He always had a high sense of duty. He learned this from his farming parents in southern Chile: "My father got up every day at 5 am and worked as hard as any of his workers in the farm, with rain or heat" (Mr S: 19). He also learned from his immigrant parents to be discreet and not to meddle in the lives of others. He defines himself as an apolitical and sullen person but not apathetic.

> In my house, I was educated in a very particular way. They taught me not to ask [personal] questions, not to be curious, not to get into the lives of others. My parents told us that we did not have to ask other people about their lives. Maybe that's why I never ask other people for their lives and maybe that's why I have so few friends. Just as I did not ask anyone about their problems or activities, I also do not let them ask me about my private life…I do not invite anyone to my house because I do not like to attend to anyone.
>
> (Mr S: 1 and 40)

2. *Well-being and fear of the past.* Mr M (age 52, Metropolitan region, army officer, political centre) entered the Military School at a very young age, where he was indoctrinated and trusted his superiors when they told them that human rights violations were not being committed. Once democracy was restored and the first television reports on human rights violations were exhibited, he began a long and lonely process of self-

reflection. He acknowledges that it has taken him more than twenty-five years to reformulate his thinking on the subject of human rights. Even today he is able to realise that the homicides of communists—for the mere fact of being communists—were inhuman: "What happened is that in the army I was taught that communists were not human beings, but our enemies, and that was a deep part in our academic formation. Just now I realize that it was wrong to do something against communists" (Mr M: 58). According to him, the topic of human rights was not an issue that could be openly and frankly discussed with comrades-in-arms. He prefers not to talk to his wife about these issues, but when they have done so he has always been very prudent because his in-laws are also linked to the armed forces. He had deep convictions supporting Pinochet, but the pillars of that support have been falling as human rights violations and cases of corruption committed during the dictatorship have become more public. These processes of change are very profound and self-criticism can be heart-breaking. In the case of Mr M, these processes have been slow and the changes seemed to be gradual. He still feels that he has to forgive himself for being so passive or naïve in the past. He is also concerned that other people in the armed forces may be experiencing deep internal transformations without proper professional attention.

3. *Fear of the past and malaise with politics.* For more than forty years, Mr R (age 59, II region, apolitical, miner) has worked in the same mining company, located in the north of the country. He is a person of humble origin but thanks to his effort he has given a better quality of life to his family than he received in his youth. His parents were modest workers living in a poor neighbourhood. His father worked for the railroad company, while his mother washed and ironed the clothes of upper-class families. During the UP years they were hungry because they did not have work and food was in short supply. Their parents were not militants of UP parties, consequently they found it

difficult to get enough food on the table. Indeed, in many informal conversations it is possible to hear stories of people who during UP were able to obtain more goods than others in the informal market because of their social or political contacts. Due to economic necessity Mr R began working as a miner at the age of fifteen.

After the coup, Mr R's mother was trained by CEMA Chile (Chilean Mothers' Centres), where she learned to sew clothes. CEMA Chile is a private organisation created in 1954 to offer training courses and economic assistance to women. During the dictatorship CEMA Chile was used to infiltrate civilian life by indoctrinating and co-opting women (Bunster 1988: 487). Lucía Hiriart, wife (now widow) of Pinochet, was president of CEMA Chile between 1973 and August 2016.[56] Mr R's mother was always grateful to Pinochet's wife, because she personally handed her a sewing machine. Thanks to the sewing courses and the sewing machine she received at CEMA Chile, Mr R's mother was able to improve the living conditions of her family from the mid-70s onwards. However, some of Mr. R's brothers were opposed to Pinochet and were arrested on more than one occasion. During the 1980s, whenever politics was discussed at family gatherings there were intense conflicts. Ms L (age 35, physician, political centre, non-indifferent), daughter of Mr R, remembers that in those meetings her grandmother ended up very distressed by the political polarisation in the family.

> My grandmother and my right-wing aunts sat on one side of the table, while my left-leaning uncles sat at the other end of the table. It struck me that my father was always in the centre. Whenever politics was discussed it ended in chaos and my grandmother crying…I was a girl but I remember very well that everyone was angry.
>
> (Ms L: 7)

[56] At the time of writing, Judge Guillermo de la Barra is conducting a criminal investigation against Lucía Hiriart for misappropriation of public funds in CEMA Chile.

Mr R took the decision to never talk about politics. He knew that his siblings were politically disagreeing, but it was more important for him to appease the spirits and stay together. Seeing his sad mother obviously made him feel sorry, but he also understood that his siblings were affected. Since he did not want his children to get involved in politics, he refused to talk about politics with them. Politics became a taboo at home. If politics had affected family coexistence, one way of preventing political discussions was simply by blocking any comment or reference to politics at home. For example, Mr R's children never knew whether he voted or who he would vote for: he was silent and it was impossible to persuade him to speak on the subject. He also did not express opinions on political news. Ms L recalls that in moments as controversial as the arrest of Pinochet in London her father did not discuss the situation with them. According to Mr R's children, their father deliberately showed himself to be indifferent to anything that might be of a political nature, and especially to the recent history of Chile. If Mr R never talked about politics, much less would he talk about the issue of human rights. Political polarisation within his family is an important cause of his IPHRV. More than the hunger during UP, his lack of education and the fact of having to work since he was fifteen years old, the event that triggered his passivity and lack of opinion was the intolerance and the heated discussions between his siblings and mother. As Mr R did not want to hurt the feelings of his mother and brothers, he chose to remain silent and not get involved with any sector.

4. *Well-being, fear of the past, and malaise with politics*. Although Mr T (age 60, VI region, apolitical, cleaning person) has lived disconnected from society, never had a partner and has worked practically all his life, his IPHRV is explained by the difficulties that he has experienced. Mr T was twelve years old when he had to leave school to start working in a southern mining town in Chile: "My father was an alcoholic

and money was needed in the house, that's why I had to go to work" (Mr T: 35 and 39). He never cared about politics, and he did not understand politics. Although many of his family and friends were left-wing, he never wanted to express a political opinion. He also learned about situations related to human rights violations and acts of terrorism during the dictatorship. For example, Mr T had a communist friend who after the military coup disappeared and was never found. He was also a friend of another young communist who was involved in the murder of a doctor who had participated in torture sessions. He never asked questions about cases where his friends had been involved. He simply chose to remain silent and continue to work cleaning the homes of upper-class families. His personal fulfilment and joys are at work, but also in his family. For him the meaning of life is not in the realisation of social or political projects, but in personal tranquillity.

> I am happy, I am happy in my work; it is true that it is a bit tiring, but I am happy and I do not suffer bitterness. I am happy with what I do, with the family I have, with the people I work with.
>
> (Mr T: 76)

One of the interviewees who made the most trips around the world is Mr J (age 44, centre, VI region, bank officer). Mr J points out that he is an enjoyer of life, a person who likes to have fun and get the most out of every moment: "My philosophy is that every moment is wonderful, without expecting anything in return. I learned that by traveling" (Mr J: 2). His relatives were all supporters of Pinochet, so he always heard comments against the left and in favour of the armed forces. His school experience was negative, because he was a permanent victim of bullying. Along with giving little importance to school grades during school days he developed an attitude of avoiding conflicts, trying to be friendly with everyone. He considers that he is not a

confrontational person and that is why he has never given importance to politics: "I prefer to get along with everyone, I do not say nasty things" (Mr J: 62). Until a couple of years ago he owned a furniture store, but a customer defrauded him and unfortunately his business went bankrupt. To pay his debts he had to obtain a bank loan. Practically all his salary is destined to pay the debts of the store and he is financially supported by his wife.

Just as in the past his priority was to travel the world and leave Chile aside, now his priority is to recover financially and strengthen his marriage. Curiously, he is not critical of what happened in Chile during the dictatorship, but he is critical of some close people who remain *pinochetistas*. In general terms, Mr J is not interested in the collective memory of the country, and he does not speak about issues that divide Chileans. He still believes in a set of myths that the right-wing has maintained on UP, such as, "in Chile there was a parallel army," "important decisions were being taken in Cuba," "Chileans were in a civil war in 1973," etc. His wife is also politically apathetic, so at home they do not talk about politics: "politics is filthy; there are selfish interests and personal interests that prevail and end up making politics very dirty" (Mr J: 46).

> I think we are very divided by the theme of Pinochet. That separated us and keeps us apart. We cannot stay stuck in such old things. You have to look ahead, instead of always looking back…There is a lot of anger, hatred and resentment. We are still very polarized. I'm worried about popular resentment. We should be a happier society.
>
> Why do we have to talk about this [past human rights violations]? It is a subject too touchy. They keep releasing movies. When they talk about it on television, I switch channels immediately. The subject gives me repulsion. That shit is over exposed. The only way to turn the page is to look forward. We cannot stay in the same thing. That is typical of our culture. We have a hard time overcoming the issue...I never speak about this subject. I talk about it at the most a couple of times a year. I have overcome the subject. I understand that there are people who have not overcome it because they had to suffer, and that's why it is in the Chilean unconscious.
>
> (Mr J: 48, 50 and 56)

In addition to the pursuit of financial stability, the indifference of Mr J is also associated with his attitude of avoiding conflicts. Indeed, Mr J is very sociable and likes to interact with all kinds of people, both in Chile and abroad. He does not want to be identified as a person who is part of a particular social sector. On the contrary, he presents himself as a person who has travelled all over the world and enjoys life. He has made the decision not to judge anyone, and declares he is tolerant and respectful to all people. The attitude Mr J takes every day is getting along with his wife, his parents and siblings, friends, co-workers and clients. As politics and the recent history of Chile have been the subject of conflicting interpretations, Mr J does not speak of controversial issues. In that sense, Mr J could be considered a superficial person, but for him to radiate joy and optimism is an attitude of life learned especially traveling in Asia.

> I like to enjoy with friends...I enjoy every second, here and now. I like to give time to all the people I'm with. I like to make them feel special. One comes to this life to love others.
>
> I am happy with simple things...I laugh like nuts and think positively. I think that those who are always complaining the only thing they do is simply calling more discomfort...I do not think of shortage but in abundance.
>
> I do not expect anything in return, I prefer to give, and things are born to me from the heart. The real happiness is in giving, not in receiving.
>
> (Mr J: 2, 10 and 16)

2. NEW PROBLEMATISATIONS OF INDIFFERENCE

In addition to identifying sets of categories that explain indifference, from the interviews' analysis, novel and unforeseen aspects have been identified. 1) There is a dynamic process by which individuals move in and out of IPHRV, even from one type

of indifference to another. For example, people who were previously indifferent to human rights may have evolved and modified their ideas and perceptions. Consequently, the dynamics of change also need to be discussed. 2) Qualitative analysis has shown that a group of people is consciously adopting IPHRV as a form of socialisation in Chile today, despite being hostile or pro human rights. It is a group of people that is cynical on the subject of human rights and who prefers to appear to be indifferent. This particular situation of those who were thought to be indifferent but who in fact were not also needs to be carefully explained. 3) Qualitative analysis has been appropriate to highlight the existence of a spectrum of IPHRV, with extreme and almost ideological adherence to indifference on one end and a more accepting indifference on the other.

a) Dynamics of indifference

The way an adult person understands the context and meaning of past human rights violations is not always consistent in the passage of time. It is perfectly possible for people to evolve and modify their interpretations of the facts of the past. For example, a person could step out of the radius of IPHRV and adopt hostile positions or in favour of human rights. In other words, attitudes of indifference can evolve into non-indifferent stages. Likewise, it is also possible for a person in favour or against human rights to acquire the features of IPHRV. For example, people who previously gave special importance to human rights over the years may lose that initial commitment and adopt increasingly indifferent positions. Consequently, it is necessary to explain why these movements occur, in and out of states of IPHRV. Therefore, this section explains the vitality and dynamism of IPHRV. Thus, how and why some interviewees have evolved in their way of referring to human rights violations is analysed.

1. *From indifference to non-indifference*. Juan Guzmán—the Chilean judge who investigated Pinochet after being authorised by the British government to return to Chile—has stated in his autobiography that he celebrated the 1973 coup d'etat with champagne (2005: 81-2). Guzmán has repeatedly pointed out that he was the son of a conservative poet and diplomat, which influenced him in his youth to be a conservative and right-wing person (id.: Ch. 10; Farnsworth & Lanfranco 2008). He has also acknowledged that during the dictatorship he wrote sentences rejecting the habeas corpus writs (*recursos de amparo*) presented by victims or their relatives (2005: 102-7). However, Guzmán's reflection has been very different from that of ordinary citizens. In this case Guzmán has known from first-hand sources the truth of the horrors of the past and has been scandalized. That is why in the last fifteen years he has been a great promoter and defender of human rights. This case exemplifies the importance of an adequate socialization of the issue of human rights violations for a society. As long as these issues are ignored in schools, the media, and the public arena in general, citizens are more likely to be indifferent to past human rights violations.

2. *From hostility to indifference*. Mr D (age 48, Metropolitan region, right-wing, engineer) was not in Chile at the time of the coup. His parents had made the decision to seek new opportunities in Argentina and Brazil, as they had lost their jobs for political reasons. Indeed, Mr. D's parents were public officials sympathetic to the right-wing National Party, who were forced to give up their jobs during UP. Mr D recalls that his family had a hard time starting again abroad, so they lived austerely. Unfortunately, his father was ill and passed away when Mr D was still a child. It is not easy for Mr D to talk about the history of his family and still today he blames UP parties for the difficulties that they experienced in the 70s and 80s. He has tried not to pass on his angry feelings to his children and has encouraged them to value the free-market. He is a

person with some aggressive traits in his personality and believes the current government should be more authoritarian. When consulting him on human rights issues in Chile, he considers that the abuses were an 'excess' of the armed forces and should not be repeated. Surely this would not have been his opinion a couple of decades ago, when he was absolutely identified with Pinochet. Some years ago Mr D was hostile to the demands of transitional justice. But all the news on human rights violations that has been reported since Pinochet's arrest in London and profound conversations with his wife, have contributed to gradually changing his personal beliefs. It seems that he has softened his political opinions to the extent that the media have revealed the magnitude of human rights violations. He remains very critical of the UP experience, but now also criticises human rights violations committed during the dictatorship, and has a bad opinion of current politicians. Despite being a person who rather sympathises with the right, he prefers that the rest identify him as apolitical and indifferent to the past. He does not want the UP experience to be repeated, he privileges his well-being, and emphasises that he is less and less interested in politics. It seems that in recent years he has been moving from *pinochetismo* to indifference. This tendency may be reinforced more and more, moving on the spectrum towards levels of greater indifference.

> I used to be a *pinochetista* and I do not regret that. Now we simply have to turn the page. But we cannot remain trapped in the past. We have to convince ourselves that we should look and move forward.
>
> Look, what happens is this: the problem I see now is that the politicians we have are all liars. I'm worried about the dirt I see in politics. You cannot trust anyone in politics. They are all bandits. The truth is that I don't believe them at all.
>
> (Mr D: 19 and 27)

b) Cynical Indifference

It has been mentioned previously that of the fifty-three interviewees, only thirty-five people have been classified in this research as indifferent to past human rights violations. The number of those interviewed who are properly indifferent has been reduced to the maximum, as this thesis seeks to fully understand how the indifferent to past human rights violations are and what they think about the atrocities committed in Chile. It should be noted that a significant number of those fifty-three people who were interviewed were previously identified by my contacts as individuals who had indifferent traits. At least that was the impression that my contacts had formed with respect to several individuals who behave with IPHRV in their interpersonal relationships. In-depth interviews made it possible to distinguish between those individuals who are really indifferent and those who are not, but who have confused others by making them think they are indifferent. This is especially revealing in the case of people who are hostile to the transitional justice agenda and who make an effort to show themselves to others as (disillusioned) indifferent. People who relate daily with them realise that they are closer to the ideas of the right-wing, but have opted in the last two decades to appear to be indifferent to past human rights violations. There have also been identified cases of individuals who claim to be apolitical and who act with IPHRV, while in fact their real intentions are to evade the subject of human rights violations. However, these latter people are much more passive and less dangerous to democracy than the cases of hostile people interviewed in this research who opportunistically are adopting behaviours, attitudes, and gestures of IPHRV.

This is why the issue of properly interpreting signals in social interactions becomes important in this research. As Bacharach and Gambetta (2001) have explained,

signals are intentional features of agents that are informative to observers or receivers. There are subjects in Chile who are giving sequences of signals to others of being indifferent people, although in reality they are not. These sequences of signals are shown both in the public and private spheres of life, with the intention of confusing the receivers with respect to the true intentions in matters as delicate as human rights and the recent past of Chile. These sequences of signals of IPHRV are executed to reduce the risks of social confrontation as they know that defending the legacy of Pinochet in Chile is increasingly politically incorrect. Their convictions with democracy, the rule of law, and the defence of human rights are undoubtedly weaker than their condemnation of UP, their support for the coup d'état of the armed forces, and their positive evaluation of the military government. Evidently, mimetic effort has the incentive of avoiding social penalties by persuading others and preserving their trust in daily interpersonal relationships (cf. Gambetta & Hamill 2005: 6). As it is unpopular to defend Pinochet, then some hostiles have opportunistically chosen to remain silent and act as if they were indifferent to past human rights violations.

The indifferent cynics prefer to make statements that are politically correct and that an ordinary person would have no problem supporting. But when digging deeper in five of the interviews, discrepancies and intolerances with political diversity unconsciously emerged. Subtly, the language and the gestures that a group of interviewees used showed that, at the slightest provocation, they were able to remove the mask and veils of indifference. The members of this sub group have strong personalities and they seem to be comfortable with authoritarian systems of social control. When they keep silent about the conflicting past it is not because they have no opinion, but that they are trying not to be discovered and thus avoid a conflict or tense situation with people who think differently. In the Chilean case, these people are either

from the right or the extreme right-wing, precisely because human rights violations were mainly suffered by those on the left or centre-left on the political spectrum. These people who are strategically silent in interviews and social settings are strictly willing to renounce the rule of law and democracy if their interests or major concerns are being affected. This makes them especially dangerous to the democratic system, because under certain circumstances they are willing to support the illegitimate use of force. In concrete terms, this could be seen by consulting them on the importance of public order, economic growth, and personal security. These three values seem to be more important to them than the consolidation of democracy and the validity of civil liberties.

People who know Mr. B (age 68, Metropolitan region, right-wing, supposedly disillusioned indifferent, entrepreneur) suggested that he had to be interviewed in this research, since in their opinion he was an extreme case of IPHRV. Despite his attentive manners and politeness, during the interview it was possible to notice that he was not an indifferent person, but rather a person hostile to human rights policies and in particular to the left. What happened was that he avoided talking about the issue of human rights, precisely because he had been an army officer in his youth and was partly aware of DINA's operations. He adopted the strategy of making others believe that he was indifferent to the subject, and thereby avoided questions about his past or what he knew. The fact that some people camouflage themselves in Chilean society as indifferent, forces analysis with detachment whether that indifference is genuine or fictitious. In cases where indifference is fictitious or cynical, it is clear that the intensity of respect for human rights and promotion of transitional justice is low. As Mr B may be under criminal investigation in the future, he has taken various measures to avoid being disturbed. That is why he lives with his family in a gated upper-class condominium in

the hills of Santiago, has become an entrepreneur in the field of information technology, and avoids at all times expressing opinions on the Chilean past.

At times, it has been difficult to distinguish between cynical indifferent and disillusioned indifferent. Ms B (age 45, unemployed psychologist, II region, right-wing, supposedly disillusioned indifferent) adequately exemplifies this complexity. Ms B was quite elusive about accepting being interviewed in this investigation. In fact, it was necessary to reschedule her interview on six occasions. Arrogantly Ms B showed that her time was too valuable to be wasted on an interview with a doctoral student, and that she only gave the interview because she owed a favour to a person in common. As the interview progressed, contradictions emerged in her own explanations of her preferences and political opinions. She showed herself to be a direct, careless, irreverent, aggressive, and defiant person, but also eager to receive affection. She is a woman who knows she is physically attractive, and her manner of presenting herself reflects that she cares about her wardrobe and body. At the moment, her priority is to find a man with sufficient economic resources to maintain and finance all her expenses. In return she is willing to please him sexually and admire his professional achievements. The feeling thatremains at the end of the interview is that much of her life she has been *pinochetista* and hostile to human rights, but in recent years she has moderated her fanaticism for Pinochet. It is difficult to explain why she has distanced herself from Pinochet, although it cannot be ruled out that it is for mere convenience. It seems that in her search for a man who can finance her expenses, she has realised that it is not in her best interest to reveal her original right-wing political views. It is more important for her to find a suitable man than to make political statements that could annoy attractive potential candidates. On the one hand, being indifferent to human rights is socially accepted in Chile. On the other hand, being extreme left or extreme

right can have social repercussions. In the search for a partner or friends, it would seem that in many social circles indifferent positions are more socially accepted than being a Pinochet supporter or a Communist Party militant.

Ms B used to smoke and drink alcohol every night in her flat, but a year ago she decided to change her way of life and now leads an increasingly healthy life. She pointed out that she is receiving psychiatric treatment and that she is also improving her communication skills thanks to the private sessions she has with a professional coach.

> What I want is to have a partner, to have a relationship with someone mature, cosmopolitan, educated, whom I can admire, intelligent. I'm on social networks looking for that man. I do not want a mediocre Chilean, I want someone who reads, has his economic life resolved, and no problems with an ex-wife or kids…
>
> That's why in Tinder [software application] I discard men who do not live in the upper-class district, who do not know how to write a message...I want a man to sustain me, so I can read, practice yoga, sleep late, travel...Sometimes I go to lobbies in hotels, I ask for a coffee and I settle down to read, and I get to know men...I'm very aware of the type of man I'm looking for.
>
> (Ms B: 10 and 12)

One of Ms B's uncles was an army General who belonged to Pinochet's inner circle. Ms B's father took advantage of that contact in order to get a job in the area of human resources at a state-owned company during the dictatorship. Ms B knows that her dominant and manipulative father was a trusted *pinochetista* by the military, but she does not know that he also had access to information about all the workers of the company, and in particular of those who sympathised with the democratic opposition. Ms B. recalls that in the late 70's her family received threats from MIR and General Manuel Contreras, DINA's former Director, offered police protection. Thus, policemen checked her family car and took them to school every morning. Ms B recalls that when her uncle visited them, she tried to find out information related to human rights

violations but never succeeded. Obviously, her family strongly supported Pinochet in the 1988 plebiscite.

Ms B. enjoys talking about politics and is well informed about what is happening in the country. She condemns all types of corruption, including corruption during the dictatorship. She now considers that human rights violations were completely unnecessary. At the moment, it is not clear if she is a person who is moving from hostility to disillusioned indifference or someone who is trying to mimic that evolution. Despite being a person close to the right-wing, she does not share many of UDI's values and principles. She considers herself as a more liberal person than the conservative politicians of UDI and increasingly feels less represented by them. She is tremendously critical of political parties and has a bad opinion of politicians in general. With despair Ms B thinks that the future of Chile is in danger and that it is going down a bad road.

Another complex case is Mr E (age 70, Metropolitan region, engineer, right-wing, supposedly disillusioned indifferent). He tolerated the transgressions to human rights because certain ends such as national security were fully justified (see Crowson & DeBacker 2008; Swami et al. 2012). An important concern in his life is security in his neighbourhood, because he fears being a victim of burglary at his home. In order to support each other, he organised a WhatsApp group for crime prevention. His conversations with his neighbours are almost exclusively around issues of security. He has a registered gun at home and is willing to use it if criminals try to enter his house. He believes that the fight against crime is lost and would like a much stronger government. He is not disturbed if the country is governed with authoritarianism, because for him public order is a value that should be above other collective aspirations. He is a very critical person of Allende and UP, which he recalls as a disastrous stage in the history of Chile. He is also critical of history books, the media, and the political

class. He has a pessimistic view of the country because he believes that Chile could repeat the UP: "Where are we going to stop? I do not know where we're going! I see with great concern how [criminals] assault...It is sad; respect for authority has been lost." (Mr E: 26 and 32). He believes that the reduction of crime and corruption requires strong political leadership that knows exactly how to lead the country. For many years Mr E was an enthusiastic *pinochetista*. However, he is aware that "terrible things were done that I do not want to be repeated" (Mr E: 101). He continues to identify himself with the right-wing and acknowledges he is an anti-communist and anti-socialist person. He is uncomfortable acknowledging that there were people who unjustly suffered human rights violations. For him, "those victims are the cost that Chile had to pay to get back on its feet and get out of the mess it was in 1973" (Mr E: 102).

As can be seen, there is a grey area between hostile to human rights, cynical indifference, and disillusioned indifference that is difficult to unravel. But it can also happen that a person of the (extreme) left would like to appear in front of others as an indifferent subject. For example, during his youth Mr X (age 48, Metropolitan, left-wing, professor) formed part of the *Frente Patriótico Manuel Rodríguez* (FPMR or Front), an armed group of the extreme left that in the 1980s sought to end the dictatorship through armed conflict. Mr X did not have a leading role in the Front. On the contrary, his tasks were always supportive so members of higher rank could perform clandestine operations of resistance.

> Apart from those who integrated the cell that I supported in the Front, only two people know that I was five years in the Front. Now you are the third to know and I ask you to keep this information absolutely confidential, please.
>
> (Mr X: 113)

Once democracy was restored, the Front was disarticulated by the new democratically elected authorities. Mr X soon realised that his clandestine activities were unnecessary in the new political context of the Transition (Mr X: 115). Additionally, now that he had finally finished his university studies, he felt he had to find a permanent job and form a family. For this reason, he decided more than twenty years ago that he had to hide that revolutionary period of his life. If the institutions in which he worked had known that he participated in the Front, he would probably not have been hired. In order to prevent third parties from asking him about his political opinions or his past, he adopts indifferent positions and eludes a conversation about the dictatorship or human rights issues. It seems to be the case that after two decades pretending to be indifferent, Mr X has gradually adopted some traits of resigned indifferent people. For example, in his conversations he emphasises his professional and academic interests, he claims to be against politicians, and avoids references to the past.

c) Spectrum of indifference

The interviews have shown an additional relevant aspect regarding the investigated phenomenon: the spectrum of IPHRV. The magnitudes of IPHRV are diverse, from high intensity at one end to faint indifference at the other end. As previously reported, in a considerable group of interviews it was possible to conclude that IPHRV as an attitude of life has persisted for at least two decades (e.g., Ms A, Ms C, Mr I, Mr J, Mr K, Ms G, Mr Q, Mr S, Mr T). It has also been corroborated that in other cases IPHRV may have low intensity and even the boundaries of hostile positions or in favour of human rights may be diffuse. The best example of this has been observed in the indifferent cynics, who for several years have given signs to others of being indifferent (Mr B, Ms B, Mr C, Mr G, and Mr X). Consequently, the location of each indifferent in the spectrum is

not static in time. On the contrary, it is perfectly possible for an indifferent person to move along the spectrum.

1. *From higher to lower levels of indifference*. Previously it was mentioned the case of Mr S (age 80, X region, apolitical, retired engineer). He always prioritised work over other concerns. It is true that he was in favour of the 1973 military coup, because in his opinion the situation in the country was too chaotic. But he never made political comments at work. According to his account, for many years he was extremely indifferent to what was happening in the country. He thought that human rights violations that could have been committed had to have been isolated acts. However, in 1990 he read the book *Los Zarpazos del Puma* by Patricia Verdugo (1989) and its contents impacted him. This book tells the activities of the so-called Caravan of Death, a squad led by General Sergio Arellano Stark accused of the killings of ninety-seven victims held in military garrisons, between 30 September and 22 October of 1973. Then he decided to read all the books written by Verdugo and that has been the way in which he has learned of some of the events that happened during the dictatorship. It seems that he has revised his thinking and now considers that it was a serious mistake to commit human rights violations. As a solitary man, he is not interested in reflecting with other people about what happened in Chile. He prefers to have his own opinion about it and recognises that he has evolved, although without great conviction. It may be said that the knowledge which he has acquired by reading these books has diminished his IPHRV. The curiosity he has felt for knowing the truth has softened his indifference, so he has shifted on the spectrum of IPHRV. It is relevant to understand the people who were extremely indifferent to human rights violations during the dictatorship and who gradually have been getting to know what really happened in the country. Some of these people have slowly adopted less indifferent positions, moving even closer to those who

promote human rights. Evidently, this transition has required an acute capacity for self-criticism.

2. *From lower to higher levels of indifference*. The case of one interviewee exemplifies the evolution in the last three decades from low indifference to increasing levels of IPHRV. Politics and the recent history of Chile do not have importance for Mr K (age 45, VI region, dentist, political centre). In the house of his parents there was practically no talk of politics during the dictatorship, although his parents voted for the *Yes*-option in the 1988 referendum as they identify themselves with the right-wing. From an early age, he had a preference for scientific courses, wildlife and sports. He opted to work in a rural public hospital in the south of Chile because this would allow him to obtain scholarships for his specialiation courses in Chile and abroad. Mr K is a shy, quiet, routine, and orderly person; he avoids all kinds of conflicts and has a few trusted friends. His former wife was more interested in politics and belonged to the left. After his divorce, he focused on his personal well-being and has become indifferent to others. He considers that politics is an activity that is discredited in Chile and that politicians take advantage of voters to live comfortably. Politicians' corruption annoys him and that is why when he votes he does it for alternative candidates who are not part of the political establishment. He keeps his political opinions under reserve and rarely makes any comments in favour of any candidate or public policy. He remembers that he was in the last year of high school when the plebiscite of 1988 occurred and that many members of his class were outraged for political reasons, although they had known each other since they were kids. Over the years his IPHRV has increased because he has privileged his professional career and personal joy. Instead, his younger sisters still sympathise with right-wing parties and express their political views, both privately and on Facebook.

3. CONSEQUENCES OF INDIFFERENCE

Just as in the previous sections the main causes of IPHRV have been explained, it is now necessary to explore the social consequences of such indifference. The detailed review of the interviews allows arguing that the three most important consequences of IPHRV are: (a) the crystallization of IPHRV as a socially accepted norm in Chile; (b) the permanent promotion of social indifference by the attitudes and behaviours of indifferent people, and (c) the development of a culture of impunity that undoubtedly contributes to postponing the fulfilment of the objectives pursued by transitional justice in a society still struggling with the trauma of the past.

a) Indifference as social norm

IPHRV is socially accepted and tolerated in Chile. Those who adopt indifferent positions—and are effectively indifferent—are usually not socially sanctioned by the rest of the population. In many ways, for a subject who wants to dodge the debate about the recent past in Chile, it is preferable to be identified by others as an indifferent person. In fact, the vast majority of the interviews show that the indifferent can carry out their life projects without receiving reproaches from other social sectors. The ways of being, acting, and thinking of indifferent people seek to achieve peace and tranquillity in the face of the usual activism deployed by those who promote memory in one direction or another. In fact, the attitudes and behaviours of IPHRV are conceived as prudence or moderation in the public sphere in which the opposing poles of memory are constantly confronted. The positions in favour or against human rights in Chile involve the decision to be part of the controversy or social tension with people who

have opposing opinions. For example, Mr M (age 52) pointed out that many years ago he had been indifferent to the subject of past human rights violations. Since he joined the army as a teenager, his family chose not to speak in his presence of political or controversial issues that could offend and distance him. Only two years ago he learned that his mother could never forgive him for joining the army in the midst of the military dictatorship. According to him, still today in the army there is very little talk about human rights violations and there is fear of being misinterpreted, so caution is highly recommended before stating any political opinion (Mr M: 48).

Those who are indifferent to past human rights violations do not hide their indifferent ways of being, thinking, and acting in Chilean society. Postures of indifference—that identify the indifferent to past human rights violations—are recognised by their interlocutors in everyday life. In fact, IPHRV is socially visible and expressed in many different ways. For example, in a family or social gathering, indifferent people may intervene by suggesting that it is better to avoid discussing controversial historical issues. The indifferent tend to be more in favour of the search for those aspects that tend to unify Chileans, instead of fomenting dissent and debate of diverse political orientations. Given that IPHRV has been socially accepted for more than four decades in Chile, it is perfectly possible to argue that over the years IPHRV has crystallised as a social norm. For example, in his interview Mr. Q (age 78) pointed out that, despite his age, he has never talked about politics and at work he always preferred to have cordial and strictly professional relations. “I got so much into work that everything around me did not matter to me. Everything slipped. I find that those who think that way are thinking well” (Mr Q: 1). Mr Q has not felt any reproach from any social sector, not even from his closest relatives. For example, he mentioned that very recently he was informed by his relatives that one of his brothers was a member of

MIR in the 1970s. Although his brother lived in exile for ten years, they never talked about politics and his brother never reproached him for his lack of interest or for not offering him the financial help needed in difficult times.

Being indifferent to past human rights violations seems to be the simplest option to avoid problems with other citizens. The 'banality of indifference' functions in Chilean society as an accepted social norm. For example, Ms E (age 18, Metropolitan region, political centre, student) noted that most of her friends had no opinion of the past and are not interested in discussing what happened during UP or the dictatorship: "my friends simply repeat what they hear at home and speak without fundamentals" (Ms E: 24), "at school teachers never told us about human rights violations" (Ms E: 35). Several interviewees mentioned that in their respective schools teachers avoided talking about human rights violations in Chile; probably because during the 1980s and 1990s they knew that the subject was too sensitive and controversial in the families of their students. The banality of indifference implies the decision to avoid questioning about the problematic past. For example, Mr J (age 44) was interviewed three times and always said that it is very important for him to "enjoy life and be happy with simple things" (Mr J: 10). When the subject of human rights appears in his conversations with other people, he usually points out that "we cannot stay stuck in such old things. You have to look ahead rather than always looking back" (Mr J: 48). "If we [Chileans] keep talking about this [human rights violations], the more we separate...I prefer not to talk about politics...There is no agreement...We are still very polarized" (Mr J: 56 and 62).

b) Social promotion of indifference

For victims, perpetrators, activists and those who take sides, obviously collective memory is a space in dispute. But the promotion of oblivion and silence can also be

conceived as another possible position in the political trench of confronting the past. It can be argued that the facts of the past are present in the individual memory of the majority of Chileans born before 1960, and that the memory of those facts are gradually fading away as the date of birth approaches these days. It is also reasonable to think that many people silence those memories, and in their daily lives they shelter them in the intimate sphere. After a long period of fieldwork in Chile it can be argued that when having a space of intimacy, trust and respect, people are willing to talk about the facts of the past, and do not bother sharing their intimate lives and what happened to them in those years. Informal conversations and interviews revealed that Chileans who are over 50 years of age perfectly remember what they were doing, for example, on 11 September 1973. Evidently human rights violations are a topic that problematises Chileans from all social sectors and political spectrum. Every Chilean has had to define how to deal with that stormy past. For some it may be relevant to investigate and remember what happened, but others have chosen to distance themselves from the facts, either by denying them or by avoiding them. As can be seen, the memory of human rights abuses is not a peaceful issue and there is no consensus among Chileans on how they should assume that past. For example, the construction and inauguration of the Museum of Memory and Human Rights in Santiago in 2010 triggered a political controversy.

It should be recalled that parents are the most important force in transmitting political attitudes and identification (Styskal & Sullivan 1975; Atkin 1981; Weintraub et al. 2001: 225). The IPHRV of some interviewees is partly explained by the worldview that their parents taught them. For example, the parents of Ms C (age 42) divorced when she was little. Without financial help and affection from her father, her mother had to work very hard to provide what was needed by her children. Although the mother was a

hard worker, at the end of the day she did not have the energy or the knowledge to encourage her children to study or become interested in other subjects. The lack of a father figure, and depending on an always tired, ignorant, and unconcerned single-mother, resulted in Ms C being unaware of any issue of public interest. Ms C recognises her educational deficiency and has therefore been concerned that her teenage daughters are always informed about what is happening in the country and have opinions on current issues. As her intellectual curiosity was not stimulated in her childhood or adolescence, today she realises that one of her main frustrations is not having a profession: "I would have liked to have studied business administration or economics. I like numbers and I always read the financial section of the newspaper" (Ms C: 18). Perhaps because of her permanent lack of economic security, even to this day, but also because of the absence of a father, she considers that the most important thing in her life is the well-being of her family. She defines herself as an average woman, but totally devoted to her family. After the well-being of her daughters and her marriage, all other issues are secondary to Ms C.

> My mom did not talk about politics. Politics was not a subject at home. There was never much talk in general, of anything. There was no talk of public opinion. Maybe my mother could not do it or was very ignorant...Due to my mother's ignorance there was never a conversation about current issues.
>
> (Ms C: 38)

The traumatic event of the separation of her parents has provoked in this interviewee an absolute commitment with each of the members of her family. It could be thought that the lack of economic resources made her seek a couple with attractive income, but that was not the case. For Ms C, family stability is much more important than the income they can generate each month. It is true that throughout her entire life she has not been

able to save enough money and that she would like to travel more with her family, but economic restrictions have shown her that it is possible to be happy living with simplicity. Ms C is proud of her family and recently celebrated her twentieth wedding anniversary with a holiday in the hills of Valparaíso. She knows that she is an average person in terms of knowledge, although perhaps she is too critical of her mother for not having stimulated her more to read, discuss, and strive to learn. She never really cared what kind of government there was in Chile. She also did not want to find out if it was true or not that the human rights of the people of the centre-left and left were violated. Now she is trying to make up for wasted time, getting more information and talking to her daughters so that in the future they are well-educated women. Perhaps in a few years, when her daughters go to college, she will have a more mature opinion of the recent history of Chile. It seems that in the future she will slowly move towards a slightly more informed knowledge on contemporary Chile.

Shadow crevices of the past are dwelling in the present (Gómez-Barris 2009: 28 and 36). But engaged memories and victims' healing processes are in constant tension with other sectors' silence, denial, repression, taboos, or oblivion. These tensions are not only at the level of interpersonal relations, but also in the individual self. For example, in her doctoral research on memory of the second generation of victims of state violence, Daniela Jara had to recognise her own internal contradictions before interviewing other Chileans:

> …through the exercise of biographical writing I realized, for instance, that I rarely talked with my peers about my family experiences, that I would become angry at people when they showed support for the dictatorship and that I felt really uncomfortable when telling people (even friends) that my grandfather was imprisoned and tortured by the military. Although the dictatorship was part of my everyday life during my childhood, I had never talked about it personally. In some ways, my parents' generation's experience of the coup was a taboo for me: it

> belonged to them, not to me. I realized how a political fact which was a family secret affected my way of doing interviews and listening to the second generation. (Jara 2013: 76)

In addition to being silent and uninformed about the history of Chile, the indifferent are often active promoters of IPHRV. For example, it was previously explained why Mr R (age 59) felt in a stressful situation when his family discussed politics. Mr R has been an active transmitter of indifference not only to the past but also to issues of public interest that could trigger a passionate discussion within his family. His daughter, Ms L (age 35, physician), was educated in a family environment that stimulated IPHRV. It took her some years to abandon her youthful IPHRV and develop her own critical opinion on human rights violations. However, her father still does not talk to her about any issue of political-historical importance. To this day her father considers that family peace is more important than political ideologies.

c) Culture of impunity

Social IPHRV is affecting the process of transitional justice in Chile. If people are not interested in the subject of human rights, it is likely that the demands that form part of the corpus of transitional justice are resisted and delayed over time. IPHRV not only affects the achievement of the main objectives of transitional justice, but also facilitates the persistence of the 'culture of impunity.' The social expectation with the implementation of transitional justice mechanisms is to rebuild the social tissue, heal wounds, peacebuilding, and move towards social reconciliation (Oduro 2007; Lambourne 2009; Ngari 2012; Haider 2014). In this sense, this research corroborates the thesis of the permanent culture of impunity in Chilean society, raised by Lira and Loveman (2014) and Borzutzky (2017: 49). If social actors intentionally promote the

patterns of impunity, then the notion of 'architecture of impunity' might be applicable in the Chilean case (cf. Theidon 2014: 86).

A sensitive issue is that attitudes of indifference toward human rights and human rights violations can postpone the processes and mechanisms of transitional justice. Indeed, if society is not interested that the truth be known, to punish the guilty, and repair and remember the victims, transitional justice is hindered. Most of the indifferent interviewees believe it is best for the country to close the judicial cases against military personnel accused of committing human rights violations. In general terms, they also believe that is not good for the country to keep talking about what happened in Chile more than forty years ago. For them the past divides Chileans, and they regret that there has been so much hatred and intolerance in society. The balance they make of the recent political history of Chile is negative, although they recognise that Chile has progressed economically. None of them is willing to support coups of the armed forces but, they are not available to support policies that promote radical social changes. The indifferent do not consider visiting the Museum of Memory and Human Rights or other memory sites. They are not concerned about the situation and condition of victims of human rights abuses in Chilean society. Moreover, IPHRV allows the culture of impunity to settle in a society in transition, leaving unresolved conflicts over time.

Regarding the so-called military family, one might think that most officers would have to be *pinochetistas*, but this is not necessarily so. Mr B (age 68) joined the army at the age of sixteen during the Cold War and with the Cuban revolution resounding in Latin America. He was never interested in politics, but always wanted to be a military man. He was an athlete, obtained good marks, and had a promising military career. He attended courses at the School of the Americas of Panama and after the coup he was an

agent of DINA. Despite judicial investigations against him, he has denied any participation in human rights violations.

> I am a military man. I have been trained as a military man. I was taught to fulfil military objectives. If they gave me a task, my job was to fulfil the assigned goal. I am obedient and they taught me not to question the orders I received from my superiors. In war the orders are fulfilled, they are not discussed. I always wanted to be prepared to defend Chile and that's what I did.
>
> (Mr B: 5)

Mr B was never interested in political discussion and did not talk politics with his wife and children. But he knows many people in the military family and comrades in arms who have been accused and convicted for the commission of human rights violations. Although he does not refer to these issues at home, his wife and one of his children consider that in Chile a great injustice is being committed against the military. Some of his close relatives argue that the judiciary and the government are taking revenge and condemning former military men for executing the orders they received from the high command. He knows that in the military family there is anger and discomfort with the judiciary and the victims' relatives. Some of their children—all adults and professionals—feel hatred, while others are indifferent to past human rights violations. Among those who hate, one is active in social networks and posts messages in favour of the armed forces, such as: "Let's end injustices against the military." Those who are indifferent know that they are in a hostile environment towards human rights, so they prefer to remain silent and do not argue with those who are hostile.

CONCLUSIONS

The qualitative analysis has expanded the reflection on the phenomenon of IPHRV towards new understandings and problematisations. Along with expanding the analysis, in-depth interviews have made it possible to understand the main sets of categories that explain the indifference and to explore the main consequences in Chilean society today. Interviews have revealed that IPHRV is much more than a current attitude of disinterest or disregard of a sector of the adult population for the state violence in the recent past. Indeed, IPHRV is also a posture or way of approaching the traumatic and conflictive past that is acquired or assimilated by the individual through the combination of various processes of socialisation. There is no doubt that the perceptions and political opinions of close relatives have a strong impact on the way in which Chileans refer to the memory of human rights violations committed during the Pinochet dictatorship. Interviews with indifferent and non-indifferent people confirm previous studies on the power of the transmission of political ideas by parents to their children. But it is also necessary to consider the role played by the media, educational establishments, friends, peers, and co-workers in the socialisation of IPHRV. This qualitative study has highlighted the relational dimension of the phenomenon investigated: IPHRV is primarily the result of various processes of socialisation and social interactions that occur in the subject's life.

Taking into consideration that the community that lives within the Chilean territory is politically and ideologically divided and polarised, it is inevitable that in social interactions political identification plays a central role. In this wide range that exists between those who are in favour or against the transitional justice agenda and respect for human rights, it cannot be ignored that there is a social group that prefers not

to take sides in the most important discussion of Chilean society in the last four decades. Regardless of the political colour of each social actor, the social interaction that takes place in Chile cannot ignore the presence of IPHRV. This is why it has been argued that IPHRV is socially visible. In this chapter, it has been shown that the various sectors coexist with groups in which there is a marked IPHRV. This social acceptance suggests that the social order of Chilean society is configured considering the presence of IPHRV as a social norm. In fact, the interviews of indifferent and non-indifferent people (including hostile, pro human rights, and ambivalent positions) show that people who are indifferent to past human rights violations or human rights in general are not socially reproached. Indeed, the social costs of IPHRV are relatively low, compared to the social costs of people who are clearly identified with a particular political sector. For example, memory entrepreneurs in everyday interactions can easily receive criticism from people who adhere to antagonistic interpretations of the past. Instead, the indifferent can easily circumvent or avoid the social pressures of those sectors that are in favour or against human rights.

Given that IPHRV is characterised by being relational, socially accepted, and visible, then the sociologist's role is to interpret and understand its profound meaning. IPHRV should not be seen or conceived as a whim of the social actor; on the contrary, it is full of meaning. The individual is permanently under the pressure of powerful social forces seeking to convince him of the convenience of taking sides in the political polarisation that has marked social life in the last fifty years. IPHRV can be understood as a way of escaping the social pressure exerted by opposing poles in the politics of memory. In this sense, IPHRV can be conceived as a strategy of the social actor in the multiplicity of social interactions referred to memory, politics, and human rights. As the indifferent feel uncomfortable in front of people who take sides, they seek social

support to neutralise or subtly sanction those who disagree with them. Interviews showed that the indifferent often try to censor or block debates about Chile's contemporary history. In social conversations, the indifferent argue that it is better to turn the page and overcome the past. They are also not particularly interested in collective projects, public affairs, collective memory, and definitely prefer not to argue about the past.

Just as the political ideas of people can evolve over time, the IPHRV that could be appreciated at one point is also contingent and open to possible mutations. For example, in the 1988 plebiscite the vast majority of Chilean adults chose between the *Yes*-option and the *No*-option. All recent quantitative research shows that political participation in Chile has gradually declined since the return to democracy in 1990. Polls show that political apathy has been increasing over the years, decreasing the levels of identification of people with political parties. IPHRV is equally dynamic: depending on their social interactions, personal reflections, and life experiences, people can enter or leave the state of IPHRV. In any case, the experience of some interviewees shows that perceptual changes in human rights issues are slow and gradual. For example, an actor can take many years to process, question, and abandon his IPHRV. In turn, it may take a person several years to change his way of thinking about the traumatic past that divides Chileans to this day.

An important conclusion of this qualitative analysis is that IPHRV is not only dynamic but also has different levels of intensity. The interviews show that there is a wide range of possibilities regarding the intensity of IPHRV, from extremely indifferent to very low levels of indifference. Along with admitting that there is a diversity of intensities among the indifferent, in the interviews it has also been found that the persistence of IPHRV over time can be variable. In that spectrum, indifferent people can

move between the different poles of intensity. The movements in the spectrum of IPHRV are related to the processes of socialisation, the information received and analysed, and the circumstances and life experiences that can influence the adjustments that the individual is able to make in the realm of his values and beliefs.

Among the causes of IPHRV, the qualitative analysis carried out in this chapter has allowed the identification of three variables especially recurrent in the interviews: 1) emphasis on the search for personal or family well-being, 2) discomfort or malaise with political activity, and 3) fear of the past, and especially of the UP experience. In some interviewees, it is possible to identify more clearly one of those three causal explanations that have an impact on how Chile's politics and recent past are being conceived. However, in a considerable percentage of interviews it is seen that two or three causal explanations can coexist in indifferent individuals. It is for this reason that the conclusions of the causal dynamics must be carried out with caution. Instead of trying to identify an independent single cause that could explain IPHRV, it is preferable to consider the multi-causality of IPHRV. These factors can be diverse in their possible combinations. It must also be considered that certain events in people's lives may have an impact on the development of hostile, indifferent or pro human rights positions. It is true that in some cases variables with greater explanatory value can be identified, but the combinations of variables are common.

Qualitative analysis corroborates that the indifferent are a heterogeneous group of individuals. It has been extremely valuable to note that there is a certain association between the different sets of variable categories and the four types of indifference. Thus, it is appreciated that those who have been identified as disillusioned indifferent manifest a certain fear that the events of the past could happen again. This group of indifferent people is very critical of UP but gradually they have also been more critical

of the atrocities that happened in the dictatorship. Right-wing people often exacerbate the negative features of Allende's government in their interpretations of the institutional breakdown in Chile, and generally consider that human rights violations were the lesser evil for the country. It has also been possible to recognise an association between the resigned indifferent and the discontent with politics. Individuals who identify with the left and who are not satisfied with the achievements of the *Concertación* and New Majority governments can also generalise their dissent and distance themselves from the values they defended during UP and the dictatorship. Those who have been classified as submissive indifferent, because they tend to identify themselves with political orientations of the centre, tend to favour the search for individual or family well-being over other concerns or preferences. In the case of depoliticised indifferent and politically apathetic individuals, there is a certain tendency in them to combine the search for individual or family well-being with malaise with politics.

Another relevant finding is that some individuals prefer to be identified as subjects indifferent to human rights violations, despite not being truly indifferent. That is why it has been important to properly interpret the signals of these people in their social interactions. After those who are hostile to human rights, indifferent cynics are a group that could be dangerous to democracy and the rule of law because they are not completely honest or are somewhat confused about their emotions and perceptions on issues as important as human rights. It may be that these people pretend to be indifferent for mere convenience, because it might be socially more profitable to appear indifferent than to inform others of their deepest convictions on the subject of human rights. These people give sequences of signals to society on the desirability of staying out of the debate on human rights violations and the contemporary history of Chile. They also seek to maintain trust and social bonds of friendship, thus avoiding issues that are both

internally and socially conflicting. As has been argued in this chapter, the disillusioned indifferent are a group that must be investigated more closely, as some of them are in fact hostile to human rights and dangerous to the democratic system. Despite the atrocities of the past, still a significant percentage of Chilean adults do not rule out the option of an authoritarian government if in their opinion certain political-economic difficulties of the country require it.

As for the social consequences, the interviews with indifferent people have allowed us to conclude that they actively transmit their IPHRV in their social relations. If human rights are not a relevant issue for indifferent people, then they have no incentive to discuss or reflect on state violence and human rights violations committed in the dictatorship. Chilean society may experience an escalation of IPHRV if those who are indifferent to human rights violations become a source of indifference to others. A common trait of indifferent interviewees is their willingness to turn the page and forget about the past. As Brian Loveman and Elizabeth Lira (2014) have shown, displeasure with a transitional justice agenda, including prosecution of victimisers, is not a new attitude in the history of Chilean society. The historical attitude of public authorities after each political conflict has been to forgive those accused, leaving in oblivion the differences of opinion and the abuses committed by state agents. However, human rights violations in Pinochet's dictatorship were so enormous that several sectors have fought against oblivion. Indeed, victims and human rights organisations have fought for years against the culture of impunity. Despite these efforts, a sector of Chileans remains indifferent to the issue. But IPHRV is also a lack of acknowledgment of victims' dignity, which causes more pain and social stigma. If this indifference spreads in the population, it can clearly be an obstacle to the search for transitional justice. Indeed, the generalisation of IPHRV in the population contributes to

perpetrators' impunity and harms transitional justice processes. IPHRV does not diminish the fracture in society but increases mistrust among its members.

What measures can be taken to reduce the increasing levels of IPHRV in Chilean society? In other words, what should be done to ensure that the culture of human rights prevails in citizenship rather than the culture of IPHRV? From a public policy point of view, in such a sensitive area as human rights, political authorities and public officials in charge of the design, implementation and evaluation of plans or programs cannot improvise. In Weberian terms, policy makers cannot rely on the ethics of values either. Quite the contrary, policy makers must act in accordance with the ethics of responsibility, considering the aims pursued, the appropriate means, and the social consequences of those plans or programs on human rights. In addition to prudence, it is imperative to improve the mechanisms for assessing the impact of public policies aimed at promoting a human rights culture in Chilean society. For example, evaluation tools should measure objectively and scientifically the social costs and benefits of public policies that seek to promote and protect human rights.

School teachers and the media can trigger people's processes of criticism and reflection. But the messages to be transmitted must be selected and refined in an extremely responsible manner. From the interviews, it is plausible to conclude that the contents of history texts and pedagogical activities carried out in schools must be reviewed and refined. This is a subject that has generated such controversy among the different political sectors that unfortunately the way in which human rights violations are treated in school texts is superficial (Infante 2015: 83). An important lesson learned is that people may evolve on these issues. In the Chilean case these changes have been partially due to the greater information exposed on the facts of the past. According to Sorensen, "the contemporary position of the media in Chile plays an important role in

determining how Chileans face the problem of human rights violations that occurred during the dictatorship, as well as those that still exist today" (2015: 20). For example, television series, press reports, court rulings, political debates, etc., have had a social impact in Chilean culture. However, it is difficult to accelerate changes in personal attitudes regarding past human rights violations. Quite the contrary, a critical reflection on how a particular person thought two or three decades ago can take many years and even decades to evolve. Some interviewees have slightly modified what they thought before, but others have gone through deeper review processes. The qualitative analysis of the interviews has revealed that changes in adults on human rights issues are slow and gradual. The National Television Council (CNTV) and the Production Development Corporation (CORFO) have supported the production of documentaries and television series on human rights that could not have been financed without state funding. It is imperative that the state of Chile continues to support audio-visual projects that invite citizens to confront and reflect on the recent past of the country. To reduce IPHRV in the school-age population, it is also important for teachers to be properly trained on issues of memory and human rights. In addition, these issues should be addressed appropriately and unambiguously in school textbooks.

The inauguration, dissemination, and preservation of memory sites are a contribution to the promotion and protection of fundamental rights. What all memory sites have in common is the intention of evoking the past with the explicit purpose that subjects and social groups do not forget the past and reflect on their lives. If it is sought that the visit to memory sites is a significant experience for the social actor, then it is fundamental to pay close attention to what the site means and to the contents that are intended to transmit to the visitor. For example, for a sector of the Chilean population it is necessary to preserve and promote memory sites so the recurrence of state abuses

never happen again. In contrast, another sector is indifferent to the issue and would rather forget, as if it were possible to turn the page and overcome the past (Huneeus 2003: 195). Still others reject the memory sites as a distortion of history, a denial of the Marxist threat that was overcome by the military coup of 1973.

Those who ignore or are indifferent to the traces of the past usually have little interest in visiting memory and trauma sites. This hermeneutic fragmentation causes controversy over the existence of these sites, such as the Museum of Memory and Human Rights in Santiago. Evidently, memory sites can be used for educational purposes, so younger generations learn from the mistakes committed in the past. They can also contribute to pursue social reconciliation among citizens of a country to overcome the hatreds of the past. It may be that the justification for the preservation of the site is in the interest of creating or strengthening a culture of promotion and respect of human rights, particularly if they were violated in the past (Hite 2013: 163).

The National Institute of Human Rights (INDH), created in 2009, is the main agency responsible for promoting and protecting the human rights of people living in the territory of Chile.[57] The Secretariat for Human Rights was created in 2016 and its main function is to design and elaborate policies, plans, and programs related to the promotion and protection of human rights, including the National Human Rights Plan.[58] To reduce IPHRV and promote respect for human rights in the present, both agencies should increase their social visibility and privilege the effectiveness and inter-institutional coordination of public policies, pilot plans, and social interventions carried out by various public agencies. It is therefore essential that both institutions have the necessary resources to lead and monitor the public policies on human rights of various public agencies. The judiciary must also continue to investigate past human rights

[57] *See* Article 2, Law No. 20,405 (10 December 2009).
[58] *See* Article 8, Law No. 20,885 (5 January 2016).

violations, increasing the number of judges with full-time dedication to human rights cases. Subject to legal regulations within the criminal procedure system, the judiciary could perhaps consider the development of existing databases and computer software to facilitate rapid updates and effective information sharing between cases. This could make it easier for evidence from previous human rights judgements to be considered in pending cases.

Chapter 7: Conclusions

> The struggle of man against power is the struggle of memory against forgetting.
>
> —*Milan Kundera*

The main novelty of this thesis has been to explain current social indifference to human rights violations committed in Chile's dictatorial past. The thesis contributes to the construction of a modern theory on social indifference. The warning formulated by C. Wright Mills in 1959 about the difficulty of understanding the social causes and consequences of social indifference remains valid in the twenty-first century. Since it is a difficult phenomenon to capture and empirical investigations on the subject are scarce, the singular case study has been privileged in the methodological design.

It would be an exaggeration to conclude that indifference defines and characterises order or social cohesion in present-day Chile. It is true that in Chilean society there is an ideological polarisation and a strong inequality in the distribution of wealth. But this research has shown that IPHRV is a component that deserves to be understood and interpreted as part of the political-social interaction of Chileans. In fact, Chileans learn from an early age that for several decades there has been a political divide between the left and the right. But they also learn that it is possible to stay out of political discussion, adopting indifferent or politically apathetic positions. As political trends of social actors are recognisable or identifiable in their social relations, Chileans have also learned to identify the ways of being that differentiate those who do not take sides and are indifferent to the issue of past human rights violations.

Chilean IPHRV has been investigated in depth through the political evolution the country in the last fifty years, including a period of dictatorship of seventeen years and a pacted and unfinished transition of twenty-seven years (1990-2017). The characteristics of the brutality and mass repression of the dictatorship have been explained to provide context and identify the roots of IPHRV.

After 1973, much of the population lived in fear, in particular the popular sectors and the militants or sympathisers of political parties who opposed Pinochet. The effects of the structural changes carried out during the dictatorship have also been included in the historical explanation of IPHRV, as the imposition of neoliberalism profoundly transformed Chile. After the recovery of democracy, society was demobilised and depoliticised, gradually increasing political apathy and criticism against the *Concertación* governments. However, it must also be recognised that in the last thirty years the Chilean economy experienced significant growth, poverty has declined; social plans have increased the opportunities of the most deprived sectors of society and also the middle class. The international community has recognised the many achievements of the transition years and, in particular, social modernisation and political-institutional maturity. In Chile, the rule of law prevails and democracy is consolidated as a political system. There is a consensus on the importance of periodic and democratic elections and there is little risk of authoritarian regressions, although there is concern about the influence of economic elites on the political system. It should also be taken into account that there are currently unsatisfied demands regarding human rights issues, especially of the victims and their relatives. Precisely because the process of transitional justice remains open, it is important to understand how IPHRV is affecting the transitional justice agenda. The detailed analysis of IPHRV in Chile may also be useful, in varying

degrees, for other societies in post-conflict transitions from authoritarian to democratic regimes.

THEORETICAL CONTRIBUTIONS

Indifference is an attitude or state of mind of nonchalance of an individual who has no interest or concern towards another person, matter or object. In interpersonal relationships, the attitude of indifference operates as a neutralisation of the feelings of compassion or interest in the other (Arteta 2010). From a moral point of view, indifference to the pain suffered by a person is contrary to human solidarity (Bauman & Donskis 2015 [2013]: 61). That insensitivity and lack of recognition of the other is contrary to human dignity. When the attitude of indifference is shared by a group of individuals and is visible by the other actors, it implies that the analysis can be carried out both at the individual and at the social level. The indifference of the population weakens social ties and affects social cohesion. Contemporary scholars have tried to explain the main causes of social indifference. Theories argue that indifference could be due to excessive bureaucratisation, routinisation, fear, ignorance, consumerism, and individualism. If it is a divided or fragmented society—for political, ideological or historical reasons—social indifference will hardly contribute to the recomposition of the social fabric. Research exists on varying efforts to make collective decisions about how to settle accounts and deal with past abuses. If past human rights violations are irrelevant to a sector of the population, the generation of a collective project around a set of values and shared norms becomes a complex and even difficult goal to achieve.

An important theoretical contribution of this thesis has been to conceptualise IPHRV. When people have no interest in understanding the atrocities committed and

don’t feel empathy for the victims, then there is social IPHRV. In an issue as delicate as human rights, exhibiting an indifferent attitude can be a tactic by individuals to avoid getting involved in social confrontations in polarised societies. The individual may feel socially pressured not only by poles in constant dispute, but also by pragmatic groups that actively promote indifference in their ordinary social relations. Thus, in order to fully understand the causes of IPHRV, it is imperative to investigate the processes of socialisation of individuals and the microphysics of power in their everyday social interactions. It is a mistake to think that all the people who are part of the indifferent social group are homogeneous and that the causes of their IPHRV are necessarily similar. The phenomenon of IPHRV must be understood taking into account the diversity of identities and plurality of worldviews of the population. In a society as polarised as the Chilean, it is not desirable to try to isolate the social phenomenon of IPHRV from the political orientation of individuals. Rather, the variable political self-identification on a left-right continuum is so important in the social fragmentation among Chileans that it is necessary to incorporate it into the conceptual operationalization of IPHRV. For this reason**,** four types of IPHRV have been presented: disillusioned indifferent (right-wing persons who have distanced themselves from Pinochet); resigned indifferent (left-wing persons who are critical of the *Concertación*); depoliticised indifferent (apolitical persons); submissive indifferent (persons identified with the political centre). These categories are not exclusive and overlapping must be considered. This classification is useful to explain the features of the subgroups of indifferent people who are part of the broader group of indifferent to past human rights violations.

QUANTITATIVE FINDINGS

The survey has shown that those indifferent to past human rights violations are a more heterogeneous group than originally anticipated. Of the 2,004 respondents to the *2013 Bicentennial Sur*vey, 321 have been estimated as indifferent respondents (16.02 percent), 557 as hostile to human rights (27.79 percent), 757 as pro human rights (37.77 percent), and 18.41 as ambivalent (18.41 percent). These four subgroups were compared and it was possible to identify a set of well-defined differences. The profiles of those who are hostile to human rights or in favour of human rights are more precise and accurate than the profiles of those who are indifferent or have ambivalent perceptions. For example, the indifferent group is the most dispersed of the four subgroups in terms of political orientation. The most polarised group between right-wing and left-wing is the middle adults group, which has the lowest percentage of indifferent.

The literature suggested that individualistic people might be more indifferent than people with lower levels of individualism. Whether or not that variable had a significant effect over indifference was analysed. Contrary to what was preliminarily thought, the level of individualism does not have a significant statistical effect. Instead, the survey has shown that political orientation, socio-economic status, and generational cohort have a significant association with IPHRV. Regarding political orientation, people who declare to be left-wing or apolitical are less likely to be indifferent than those who define themselves as right-wing or belong to the political centre. This result was surprising, since apolitical groups were expected to be more indifferent. As for the socio-economic level, members of the upper class are less likely to be indifferent than members of the middle and lower classes. Regarding age, middle adults and young adults are less likely to be indifferent than the other generations (early and late adults).

Initially, it had been theorised that the most indifferent sectors would be the youngest, but this was not confirmed in analysis of the survey data. The model presented has also shown that the way in which the perception of violence in the country affects IPHRV varies according to the political orientation of the respondent. The perception of high violence in those who are apolitical makes it less likely to explain IPHRV. Instead, the perception of high violence by left-wing people makes it more likely for them to express indifference in regard to past human rights violations.

The quantitative findings have indicated that various combinations of causes and associations could explain IPHRV, so it would be a multi-causal phenomenon. In addition, the lack of social and political homogeneity among indifferent people has been demonstrated when comparing the four types of indifferent.

QUALITATIVE FINDINGS

The critical and detailed review of the processes of socialisation during the life of individuals has been fundamental to understanding the profound meaning of IPHRV. The analysis of interviews has allowed the capture of a set of dynamics that take place in the daily political conversations of Chileans about the recent past of the country. The different sectors of Chilean society are accustomed to dealing with social groups that are indifferent to past human rights violations. This indifference was not only socially visible during the dictatorship but still persists in the unfinished political transition (2017). Interviews have shown that there are three main sets of categories that explain IPHRV: predominant emphasis on a search for individual or family well-being, malaise with politicians, and fear of a return to the past, meaning the conflictual experience of the UP period, 1970-73. The analysis of the interviews has shown that individualism is

more present in the submissive indifferent; political apathy and the search for well-being have an important role in the explanation of the depoliticised indifferent; the fear of UP is a factor that has affected the disillusioned indifferent, and the discomfort or frustration with the governments of the *Concertación* explains the resigned indifference. However, it should also be mentioned that in almost one-third of the interviewees the causal dynamics correspond to combinations of two or three of the just reiterated sets of categories.

The qualitative analysis has also revealed some new problems that have not been addressed in previous research or specialised literature. Firstly, it has been shown that IPHRV is dynamic. Individuals can review and modify their beliefs, values, perceptions, and explanations regarding human rights violations. People can change the sense of the past through new interpretations, and that ability to alter attitudes and opinions makes the future always uncertain and unpredictable and, in systemic terms, open to contingency. For example, it is perfectly possible that a person who was indifferent in the past eventually ceases to be so afterwards. Likewise, a person who was not indifferent in the past may later adopt attitudes and postures of IPHRV. These developments are not only explained by the persuasion and transmission of opinions in social interactions, but also by the quantity and quality of the information available. Indeed, editorial decisions and informational content of the mass media can influence people's concerns about past human rights violations. In any case, the interviews have shown that in adults with formed opinion changes in human rights perceptions are intimate, slow and gradual. Secondly, IPHRV admits a diversity of gradations, from very high intensity to very low intensity. Indeed, the interviews have shown a broad spectrum of IPHRV, in which subjects can also shift in one direction or another. Thus, in some moments of life there are people who have been highly indifferent to past

human rights violations, while at other times their indifference has eroded. A third problematic aspect corresponds to those interviewed who have adopted behaviours and ways of relating to others as if they were indifferent, even though they are not. Since the social costs of being categorised as indifferent to past human rights violations are low, there are people who for various reasons simulate indifference.

The categorisation of people in different subgroups depends to a large extent on the sequences of signals they emit and that others interpret. In chapter 6, it has been shown that the boundaries between indifferent cynics and non-indifferent persons are not always clear. It has also been explained that along with people hostile to human rights policies the cynical indifferent are a group to which special attention should be given as their commitment to the rule of law, human rights, and democracy may be low.

Regarding the social consequences of IPHRV, the qualitative analysis has provided some insights on this complex subject. The three main conclusions that have been reached in this research are the following: social indifference to human rights violations committed in a dictatorial past is an obstacle to the transitional justice agenda; the culture of indifference facilitates the consolidation of a culture of impunity, leaving atrocities in the mantle of oblivion; and those who are indifferent to past human rights violations may be active promoters of indifference in society, both in the macro and micro levels of social interactions. IPHRV has become a socially accepted norm in some sectors of Chilean society. The indifferent also enter the arena of political disputes over the official and social memory of the recent past, promoting social and political indifference. For example, the indifferent may censor or prevent debates on human rights violations, imposing taboos, excluding and sanctioning socially non-indifferent, among other expressions in the everyday microphysics of power.

FINAL REMARKS

In societies that have experienced violent conflicts and collective trauma, IPHRV should be measured and monitored permanently. It would be extremely valuable to compare the results reported in this thesis with future empirical investigations of IPHRV. For example, the inclusion of questions to measure human rights perceptions of citizens in various national surveys would inform the evolution of trends over time. The construction of objective and scientifically valid social diagnoses is an essential requirement for the design, implementation, and evaluation of the impact of public policies that promote a culture of human rights and the consolidation of democracy. In the specific field of public policies, effective memory sites, history texts, activities on human rights in schools and universities, and the state promotion of documentaries and journalistic reports are some of the mechanisms that may contribute to the reduction of social IPHRV. All of these activities should not be the object of improvisations of successive governments, but should be properly coordinated and monitored by the main agencies in charge of the human rights public agenda in the country (e.g. National Institute of Human Rights, Ministry of Justice and Human Rights, Museum of Memory and Human Rights). Although Chileans interpret the recent past in a variety of ways, it is important that they develop a minimum consensus on the existence and unacceptability of the atrocities committed and that all sectors promote the *Nunca Más* project. It must also be considered that, as time goes by, the actors who knew or participated directly in the traumatic events of the past are aging, and the next generations will have to determine how they will resolve the unsettled accounts and remember what happened in past.

Three or four decades have passed since the commission of human rights violations, and many victims and perpetrators are dying. The judiciary is currently charged with investigating and promptly resolving pending cases. If criminal justice is slow or does not sanction the perpetrators, it is likely that popular dissatisfaction with the work of the judges will contribute to increase the levels of IPHRV. Since IPHRV is the result of socialisation processes and is eminently relational, in a few years it will also be necessary to investigate the intergenerational memory/indifference (cf. Jara 2013; Achugar 2016). In addition to carrying out research on this matter in different periods of time, it would also be interesting to amplify the findings of this research with comparative research. Indeed, explanations about who are the indifferent, and what are the causes and consequences of Chilean IPHRV may be useful to other societies that have experienced traumatic situations, e.g. Angola, Argentina, Brazil, Cambodia, Colombia, Congo, Germany, Guatemala, Kosovo, Peru, Rwanda, South Africa, Spain, Syria, Ukraine, Uruguay, among other nations in all continents.

Finally, and despite being mentioned at the end of the investigation, it is evident that the target audience of this thesis is not the indifferent. This thesis has not been written to persuade the indifferent to engage in the promotion, protection, and defense of human rights. Quite the opposite, this thesis has simply tried to contribute to a better understanding of the people who, for various reasons, are indifferent to the human rights violations committed by state agents and those who held political power from 1973 until 1990.

Appendices

QUANTITATIVE DATA

Appendix 1: Socio-demographic statistics

		Total sample	Indifferent
Age (mean)		45.3	44.5
Gender	Male	860 (42,9)	134 (41.7)
	Female	1144 (57.1)	187 (58.3)
	Total	2004 (100)	321 (100)
Socio-economic status	Upper class (ABC1)	210 (10.5)	26 (8.1)
	Middle class (C2-C3)	1077 (53.7)	180 (56.1)
	Lower class (D-E)	717 (35.8)	115 (35.8)
	Total	2004 (100)	321 (100)
Level of education	University	435 (21.8)	71 (22.2)
	Technical	290 (14.5)	47 (14.7)
	Secundary	821 (41.1)	139 (43.3)
	Primary or no education	451 (22.6)	63 (19.7)
	Total	1,997 (100)	320 (100)

Frequencies and percentages.

Appendix 2: Regression Model

Figure 1

Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients

		Chi-square	df	Sig.
Step 1	Step	26.000	7	.001
	Block	26.000	7	.001
	Model	87.359	19	.000

Figure 2

Model Summary

Step	-2 Log likelihood	Cox & Snell R Square	Nagelkerke R Square
1	1610.078[a]	.043	.075

a. Estimation terminated at iteration number 5 because parameter estimates changed by less than .001.

Figure 3

Classification Table[a]

			Predicted		
			COMP. INDIFFERENT. Indifferent=2 Non-indifferent=1		Percentage Correct
	Observed		Non-indifferent	Indifferent	
Step 1	COMP. INDIFFERENT. Indifferent=2 Non-indifferent=1	Non-indifferent	1683	2	99.9
		Indifferent	301	2	.6
	Overall Percentage				84.8

a. The cut value is .500

Figure 4

Variables in the Equation

	B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)	95% C.I.for EXP(B)	
							Lower	Upper
INDIVIDUALISMO			.663	2	.718			
INDIVIDUALISMO (1)	.143	.198	.527	1	.468	1.154	.784	1.700
INDIVIDUALISMO (2)	.134	.175	.581	1	.446	1.143	.811	1.612
POLIT_ ORIENTATION			14.956	3	.002			
POLIT_ ORIENTATION (1)	.983	.581	2.865	1	.091	2.672	.856	8.338
POLIT_ORIENTATION (2)	.575	.590	.950	1	.330	1.777	.559	5.652
POLIT_ORIENTATION (3)	-1.347	.629	4.581	1	.032	.260	.076	.893
GENERACION_EA1st			13.737	3	.003			
GENERACION_EA1st (1)	-.479	.209	5.267	1	.022	.619	.411	.932
GENERACION_EA1st (2)	-.525	.158	11.063	1	.001	.591	.434	.806
GENERACION_EA1st (3)	-.095	.179	.283	1	.595	.909	.640	1.291
NSE			9.359	2	.009			
NSE(1)	.528	.254	4.327	1	.038	1.696	1.031	2.789
NSE(2)	.738	.250	8.691	1	.003	2.091	1.280	3.414
VIOLENCIA	-.168	.239	.495	1	.482	.845	.529	1.350
CONFLICT_LH	-.872	.160	29.651	1	.000	.418	.305	.572
MALE	.178	.129	1.891	1	.169	1.195	.927	1.539
TIPO_COMUNA			7.859	3	.049			
TIPO_COMUNA (1)	-.215	.227	.895	1	.344	.807	.517	1.259
TIPO_COMUNA (2)	.252	.212	1.412	1	.235	1.287	.849	1.951
TIPO_COMUNA (3)	-.024	.226	.011	1	.915	.976	.626	1.522
POLIT_ ORIENTATION * VIOLENCIA			15.253	3	.002			
POLIT_ ORIENTATION (1) by VIOLENCIA	-.861	.367	5.495	1	.019	.423	.206	.868
POLIT_ORIENTATION (2) by VIOLENCIA	-.411	.351	1.368	1	.242	.663	.333	1.320
POLIT_ORIENTATION (3) by VIOLENCIA	.625	.372	2.817	1	.093	1.868	.900	3.877
Constant	-.420	.627	.450	1	.502	.657		

a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: MALE, TIPO_COMUNA, POLIT_ORIENTATION * VIOLENCE.

QUALITATIVE DATA

Appendix 3: Consent form and descriptions

Cover letter

Department of Sociology
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Project Title: Indifference to human rights in Chile: the impact on transitional justice success

Researchers: Hugo Rojas Corral (Doctoral candidate in Sociology)
Professor Leigh Payne (Supervisor)

To whom it may concern,

As previously discussed, you have been invited to participate in an interview for the above titled project. Please read the attached Participant Information sheet. For reasons of ethical compliance, please can you also read the attached participant declaration and sign it if you are happy to give consent for your participation in the research.

Please don't hesitate to ask any questions or request for further information.

I look forward to working with you.

Kind regards,

Hugo Rojas Corral

Participant Information Sheet

1. Background and aims of the study: The aim of this research project is to explain the causes and consequences of social indifference of a segment of the Chilean population with regard to human rights violations committed during the military government of General Augusto Pinochet (1973-90).

2. Do I have to take part? You can ask questions about the study before deciding to participate. You choose whether to participate and, even if you agree, you may later withdraw yourself and your data from the study without penalty at any time by advising the researcher of this decision.

3. What will happen in the study? An interview will be conducted at a location of mutual convenience. The interview will be openly structured: it will start off with standard questions after which we can move onto related issues you might come up with (see attached document). The interview will likely last for the duration of 2 hours.

4. What happens to the research data provided? Any resulting recordings and transcripts will be anonymised and stored in encrypted drives. This data will only be accessible to the researchers alone. A transcript of the interview will be stored on an encrypted USB-stick and then transferred to a personal computer at the Department of Sociology, University of Oxford.

5. Will the research be published? The research may be published in academic journals, books, a dissertation and/or media articles.

6. Who has reviewed this project? This project has been reviewed by, and received clearance through, the University of Oxford Central University Research Ethics Committee.

7. Who do I contact if I have a concern about the study or I wish to complain? If you have a concern about any aspect of this project, please speak us in the first instance and we will do our best to answer your query. We should acknowledge your concern within 10 working days and give you an indication of how we intend to deal with it. If you remain unhappy or wish to make a formal complaint, please contact the chair of the Research Ethics Committee at the University of Oxford (using the contact details below) who will seek to resolve the matter in a reasonably expeditious manner:

   Chair, Social Sciences & Humanities Inter-Divisional Research Ethics Committee; Email: ethics@socsci.ox.ac.uk; Address: Research Services, University of Oxford, Wellington Square, Oxford OX1 2JD)

Participant Declaration:

I, the participant, declare that,

- I have read the participant information sheet;
- I have had the opportunity to ask questions about the study and have received satisfactory answers to questions, and any additional details requested;
- I understand that I may withdraw from the study without penalty at any time by advising the researcher of this decision;
- I understand that any information given will be reported anonymously (unless I give express consent otherwise) and, other than what is written up, the researchers will keep the data confidential and in secure files;
- I understand that this project has been reviewed by, and received ethics clearance through, the University of Oxford Central University Research Ethics Committee;
- I understand that the research will be written up and may be published in the University of Oxford's digital archive, academic journal articles, a dissertation, books and/or media articles;
- I agree to participate in this study;
- I understand how to raise a concern and make a complaint.

Signature of Participant	Signature of Researcher
	Hugo Rojas Corral
Printed Name of Participant	Printed Name of Researcher
Date	Date

Appendix 4: Interview format and questions

1. Life story

How do you describe yourself?

What are your main characteristics?

What do you do on a regular basis?

What are your habits/hobbies/activities?

What are your most important aims?

What are your most important expectations?

What are your most important dreams?

How is your daily life?

Could you please describe a typical day in your life?

What are the most significant events in your life?

What are your most important achievements?

What are your frustrations?

What are your dreams for the future?

What are your main concerns in life?

2. Social relations

Who are important for you?

Why are they important for you?

Who are less important for you?

What is important in your family?

What is important in your university/job?

What is important in your friendships?

Why are they important for you?

3. Socialization processes

How was your childhood?

How were your parents?

How was your education?

How do you judge the education you received?

How was your school/university?

What are the most important things you learnt from your parents?

What are the most important lessons you transmit to your children? (or would like to transmit them in the future)

How do you get informed?

How much time do you dedicate to media revision?

How important has been religion in your life?

4. Political attitudes

Do you vote? Why or why not?

Did you vote in the last presidential election?

What do you think about politics?

What do you think about politicians?

What do you think about political parties?

What do you think about the students' movement?

Do you participate in political activities? Why or why not?

How do you evaluate the Popular Unity?

How do you evaluate the military regime or dictatorship?

How do you evaluate the Transition to Democracy?

Do you talk about politics in your family? Why or why not?

Do you talk about politics at work/university? Why or why not?

How do you see the country today?

What concerns you about the country?

Appendix 5: Participant observation

1. *Museum of Memory and Human Rights* (8 visits).

   The museum is located in Santiago, but in a non-strategic location, across the street from the Quinta Normal Park, accessed easily from the Quinta Normal subway station. The museum website provides descriptions of the permanent exhibitions and images of the interior of the museum (*see* https://ww3.museodelamemoria.cl/exposicion-permanente/).
   It would have been a better decision to build the museum in Downtown Santiago, for example, next to a memory or emblematic site. It is a modern construction. As for the collections, the museum has graphic and audio-visual material. People who are guides are not survivors or victims of torture. They are young people who have been trained to explain the museum to groups of visitors, both in English and Spanish. About 200 thousand people visit the museum each year. It is increasingly more common for schools to organize visits to the museum. Most of the people are walking alone in the halls, sometimes with a relative, or in groups. They look at pictures and watch the videos. Unfortunately, the museum does not offer instances for reflection or group discussion. There are many initiatives that could be taken to improve the museum. Next to the museum there is a conference room, normally used for academic purposes and events.

2. *Ovens of Lonquén memory sites* (1 visit).

   It is not possible to access the site where the ovens were located. A new owner of the farm where the ovens were located had them destroyed in 1980. Neighbours do not go to the site of memory. They know what happened there, but they are not interested to learn more about it. The police dungeon in Isla de Maipo where the victims had been detained is now a memory site located in the municipality and can be visited. No further explanations exist that serve the visitor to understand the tragedy of what happened in Paine. The memorial for the victims is in a conspicuous place in the main Santiago cemetery. The monolith on the bridge is in bad shape, and nobody visits it.

3. *Villa Grimaldi Torture Centre and Memory Site* (5 visits).

   The most important headquarters of DINA was located in Villa Grimaldi. Before the end of the dictatorship, the place was virtually destroyed by bulldozers. Today it is a park and there are replicas of some buildings and cells. It is a place of memory used in mass commemorations and events. During the National Heritage Day Villa Grimaldi was well visited. The guides were people who were detained in Villa Grimaldi and explained to the visitors what happened there and what happened to them. People were silent and listened to the explanations. Few people consult the Oral Archive of Villa Grimaldi.

4. *Londres 38* (2 visits).

   The site corresponds to a former barracks of DINA where prisoners were tortured and killed. Located in the centre of Santiago, it was closed in 1974. Now it is a place of memory. Halls and offices do not have furniture or collections. Visitors have to imagine what happened there. Guides are prepared to tell the story of the memory site. Londres 38 keeps an archive of human rights. It is not a busy place, and most of the visitors are foreigners. In the sidewalk there are bronze plaques with the names of people who died at the place.

5. *General Cemetery* (2 visits).

   In the General Cemetery is located the Memorial of the Disappeared, the Memorial Patio 29, the Víctor Jara Memorial, the Miguel Enríquez Memorial, the tomb of Salvador Allende, etc. Major events and commemorations take place in the cemetery. Every time the corpse of a disappeared detainee is found, a mass funeral is organized. I witnessed the funeral of Carlos Berger, a journalist murdered by the Caravan of Death in 1973.

6. *Museum of Solidarity Salvador Allende* (1 visit).

   The museum was a former DINA intelligence centre. In the basement wiretapping activities were conducted by DINA's agents. On the upper floors there are art galleries and a collection of objects belonging to Salvador Allende and explanations regarding his political life. There is also a documentation centre. Few people visit the place.

7. *Augusto Pinochet Foundation* (1 visit).

   The house has no sign identifying it as the Augusto Pinochet Museum. To visit the site it is necessary to first contact the Foundation. Pinochet's supporters organize visits, normally arriving in private buses. At the Museum, decorations and objects owned by Augusto Pinochet are exhibited. It is a place rarely visited, located in an exclusive neighbourhood of Santiago.

8. *Navy Museum*, Valparaíso (1 visit).

   In the second floor of the Nay Museum there is a room dedicated to honour the life of Admiral José Toribio Merino, member of the military Junta between 1973 and 1990.

9. *Memorial Caso Degollados*, Santiago (1 visit).

   On 29 March 2016, the Memorial to honour Santiago Nattino, Manuel Guerrero, and José Manuel Parada, kidnapped and killed by the police in 1985, was inaugurated at Avenida Los Leones with El Vergel (Providencia, Santiago). Neighbours presented legal actions in court in efforts to prevent construction of the memorial. The Supreme Court did not accept their petitions, so the memorial was built and inaugurated. The initiative was the result of the work of the NGO Elephant City and was authorized by Providencia's Municipal Council. On the opening day an artistic event took place which was attended by a large group of people.

Conclusion

Of all these places of memory, the only one that really moves the visitor and allows a deeper reflection on the causes and consequences of human rights violations in Chilean society is Villa Grimaldi, although the achievements of the Museum of Memory and Human Rights in Santiago is also worth noting.

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