The Emergence of Regional Security Organisations in Africa.

A Comparative Study on ECOWAS and SADC.

Hélène Gandois, Saint Antony’s College, University of Oxford

Trinity Term 2009

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I wish to thank, first and foremost, Claudio, my husband, for standing by my side, for telling me that no one can take away what I learnt in the process of writing this dissertation and for always being attentive and supportive. My thanks also go to my parents who have taught me to look forward to the next challenge in my life and who have always supported me in my choices. This dissertation would also still be in the works without the advice and support of my supervisor, Louise Fawcett. I am truly grateful to her as she enabled me to develop a project that is truly my own. Last but not least, my thanks go to Jean-Marc Coicaud who encouraged me to pursue a Ph.D. in the first place and to Carolyn Haggis for reading my chapters and giving me advice.
The Emergence of Regional Security Organisations in Africa.  
A Comparative Study on ECOWAS and SADC.  

Hélène Gandois, Saint Antony’s College

Dissertation submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in international relations  
Trinity Term 2009

– ABSTRACT –

The emergence of regional security organisations during the 1990s in Africa proved to be of great significance for the lives of many Africans, including those living in conflict-torn countries such as Liberia, Sierra Leone, Côte d’Ivoire or the Democratic Republic of Congo, but, at the same time, this phenomenon has been understudied. This dissertation explores why regional security organisations with an agenda of democratic governance emerged in Africa in the 1990s. This question is answered with two in-depth case studies on the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC). Driven by an empirical puzzle, this study is both hypothesis-testing and hypothesis generating. The study starts by laying out the different possible factors put forward by several bodies of theory in international relations to explain the emergence of ECOWAS and SADC as security organisations. These hypotheses are then tested throughout the history and the evolution of ECOWAS and SADC in order to highlight the circumstances of their creation and their qualified failure as economic communities. This is followed by a comparative analysis of the security and democracy mandates entrusted to ECOWAS and SADC by its member states based on the study of the legal texts that outline the specific objectives of each regional security organisation and the tools they were given to implement their mandates. The study finally analyses the implementation records of ECOWAS and SADC in order to assess the commitment of their member states to their new democracy and security mandate. The research concludes with the two following hypotheses: 1) A security agenda cannot emerge without the involvement of the regional hegemon. 2) What the regional hegemon can do, including affecting the speed of the transformation, is constrained by the acceptance of its leadership by its neighbours (legitimacy) and by state weakness (capability).
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AAFC</td>
<td>Allied Armed Forces of the Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AAPC</td>
<td>All-African Peoples Conference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACOTA</td>
<td>African Contingency Training Assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACP</td>
<td>African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACPP</td>
<td>Africa Conflict Prevention Pool (UK)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACRF</td>
<td>African Crisis Response Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACRI</td>
<td>African Crisis Response Initiative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AEC</td>
<td>African Economic Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFRICOM</td>
<td>United States Africa Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AHSG</td>
<td>Authority of Heads of State and Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIDS</td>
<td>Acquired immune deficiency syndrome</td>
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<tr>
<td>ALF</td>
<td>Africa Leadership Forum</td>
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<tr>
<td>AMIB</td>
<td>African Union Mission in Burundi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMU</td>
<td>Arab Maghreb Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANAD</td>
<td>Accord de Non-Agression et de Défense (Non-Aggression and Defense Agreement)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANC</td>
<td>African National Congress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AOF</td>
<td>Afrique Occidentale Française (French West Africa)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APEC</td>
<td>Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APRM</td>
<td>African Peer Review Mechanism</td>
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<tr>
<td>ARO</td>
<td>African Regional Organization</td>
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<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Name</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASAS</td>
<td>Association of Southern African States</td>
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<tr>
<td>ASF</td>
<td>African Standby Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASPA</td>
<td>American Service-Members’ Protection Act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>BCEAO</td>
<td>Banque Centrale des Etats d’Afrique de l’Ouest (Central Bank of West African States)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BLS</td>
<td>Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland</td>
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<tr>
<td>BPST</td>
<td>British Peace Support Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEAO</td>
<td>Communauté Économique de l’Afrique de l’Ouest (West African Economic Community)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEMAC</td>
<td>Communauté Économique et Monétaire de l’Afrique Centrale (Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CEN-SAD</td>
<td>Community of Sahel-Saharan States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEP</td>
<td>Committee of Eminent Person (ECOWAS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEPGL</td>
<td>Communauté Économique des Pays des Grands Lacs (Economic Community of the Great Lake Countries)</td>
</tr>
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<td>CILSS</td>
<td>Comité permanent Interétat de la Lutte contre la Sécheresse dans le Sahel (Permanent Inter-States Committee on Drought Control in the Sahel)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMA</td>
<td>Common Monetary Area (Southern Africa)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CoM</td>
<td>Council of Ministers of the OAU/AU</td>
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<tr>
<td>COMESA</td>
<td>Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa</td>
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<td>CONSAS</td>
<td>Constellation of Southern African States</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSCE</td>
<td>Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe</td>
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<td>Acronym</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSSDCA</td>
<td>Conference on Security, Stability, Development, and Co-operation in Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>DFID</td>
<td>Department for International Development (UK)</td>
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<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
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<tr>
<td>DSC</td>
<td>Defence and Security Commission (ECOWAS)</td>
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<tr>
<td>EAC</td>
<td>East African Community</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECCAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of Central African States</td>
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<td>ECF</td>
<td>Electoral Commissions Forum (SADC)</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECOFORCE</td>
<td>ECOWAS Peacekeeping Force in Côte d’Ivoire</td>
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<td>ECOMILI</td>
<td>ECOWAS Mission in Liberia</td>
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<td>ECOMOG</td>
<td>ECOWAS Cease-fire Monitoring Group</td>
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<td>ECOSAP</td>
<td>ECOWAS Small Arms Control Project</td>
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<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States</td>
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<td>EEC</td>
<td>European Economic Commission</td>
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<td>EISA</td>
<td>Electoral Institute of Southern Africa</td>
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<td>ESF</td>
<td>ECOWAS Standby Force</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>EUCOM</td>
<td>United States European Command</td>
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<td>FCO</td>
<td>Foreign and Commonwealth Office (United Kingdom)</td>
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<td>FLS</td>
<td>Front Line States</td>
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<tr>
<td>FRELIMO</td>
<td>Frente de Libertação de Moçambique – Mozambique Liberation Front</td>
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<td>FTA</td>
<td>Free Trade Agreement</td>
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G77  Group of 77
GDP  Gross Domestic Product
GPOI  Global Peace Operations Initiative
HIV  Human immunodeficiency virus
IANSA  International Action Network on Small Arms
ICC  International Criminal Court
IGAD  Intergovernmental Authority on Development
IMF  International Monetary Fund
IO  International Organization
IOC  Indian Ocean Commission
IPA  Interim Political Authority
IPA  International Peace Academy
IR  International Relations
ISDSC  Inter-State Defense and Security Committee (SADC)
ISPDC  Inter-State Politics and Diplomacy Committee (SADC)
KAIPTC  Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Center
LDF  Lesotho Defense Force
MCPMRPS  Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security (ECOWAS)
MERCOSUR  Mercado Común del Sur (Southern Common Market)
MMA  Multilateral Monetary Agreement (Southern Africa)
MOD  Minister of Defense (UK)
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<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
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<tr>
<td>MPLA</td>
<td>Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola)</td>
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<td>MRU</td>
<td>Mano River Union</td>
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<td>MSC</td>
<td>Mediation and Security Council (ECOWAS)</td>
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<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>NEPAD</td>
<td>New Partnership for African Development</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-governmental organisation</td>
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<td>NIEO</td>
<td>New International Economic Order</td>
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<td>NPFL</td>
<td>National Patriotic Front of Liberia</td>
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<td>NRA</td>
<td>New Regionalism Approach</td>
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<td>OAU</td>
<td>Organisation of African Unity</td>
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<tr>
<td>OIC</td>
<td>Organization of Islamic Conferences</td>
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<tr>
<td>OMVS</td>
<td>Organisation pour la Mise en Valeur du Fleuve Sénégal (Senegal River Basin Development Authority)</td>
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<td>ONUB</td>
<td>United Nations Operation in Burundi</td>
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<td>OPDS</td>
<td>Organ on Politics, Defense and Security</td>
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<td>OPDSC</td>
<td>Organ on Politics, Defense and Security Cooperation</td>
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<tr>
<td>P3</td>
<td>Permanent Three: United States, United Kingdom, France</td>
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<tr>
<td>PECASEC</td>
<td>Programme de Coordination et d’Assurance pour la Sécurité et le Développement (Coordination and insurance program for security and development) (UN)</td>
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<td>PSI</td>
<td>Pan-Sahelian Initiative</td>
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<td>PSC</td>
<td>Peace and Security Council of the African Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>RCD</td>
<td>Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie (Congolese Rally for Democracy)</td>
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<td>REC</td>
<td>Regional Economic Community</td>
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<tr>
<td>RECAMP</td>
<td>Renforcement des Capacités Africaines de Maintien de la Paix – Reinforcing of African Peacekeeping Capacities</td>
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<td>RENAMO</td>
<td>Resistência Nacional Moçambicana (Mozambican National Resistance)</td>
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<td>RISDP</td>
<td>Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (SADC)</td>
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<td>RMA</td>
<td>Rand Monetary Area</td>
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<td>RPTC</td>
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<td>RSCT</td>
<td>Regional Security Complex Theory</td>
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<td>SAACC</td>
<td>Southern African Aid Coordination Conference</td>
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<td>SACP</td>
<td>Southern African Communist Party</td>
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<td>Southern African Customs Union</td>
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<td>Southern African Development Community</td>
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<td>Southern African Development Coordination Conference</td>
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<td>SADC-CNGO</td>
<td>SADC Council of NGOs</td>
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<td>SADC-PF</td>
<td>SADC Parliamentary Forum</td>
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<td>SANDF</td>
<td>South African National Defense Force</td>
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<td>SAP</td>
<td>Structural Adjustment Program</td>
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<td>SATCC</td>
<td>Southern African Transport and Communications Commission</td>
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<td>SEOM</td>
<td>SADC Election Observer Mission</td>
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<td>SIPO</td>
<td>Strategic Indicative Plan of the Organ (SADC)</td>
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<td>SMC</td>
<td>Standing Mediation Committee (ECOWAS)</td>
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<td>SNC</td>
<td>SADC National Committees</td>
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<tr>
<td>SSA</td>
<td>Sub-Saharan Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>SWAPO</td>
<td>South West African People’s Organization (Namibia)</td>
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<tr>
<td>TNC</td>
<td>Transnational Corporation</td>
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<tr>
<td>TSCTI</td>
<td>Trans-Saharan Counter Terrorism Initiative</td>
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<td>UA</td>
<td>Unit of Account</td>
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<tr>
<td>UDEAO</td>
<td>Union Douanière des Etats d’Afrique de l’Ouest (Customs Union of West African States)</td>
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<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNECA</td>
<td>United Nations Economic Commission for Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNIOSIL</td>
<td>United Nations Integrated Office in Sierra Leone (January 2006 – ongoing)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNITA</td>
<td>União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMIL</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in Liberia (September 2003 – ongoing)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNOA</td>
<td>United Nations Office in Angola (February 1999 – August 2002)</td>
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<td>UNOCI</td>
<td>United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (February 2004 – ongoing)</td>
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<td>Acronym</td>
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<td>UNOGBIS</td>
<td>United Nations Peace Building Support Office in Guinea-Bissau (April 1999 – ongoing)</td>
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<td>UNOMSA</td>
<td>United Nations Observer Mission in South Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNU-CRIS</td>
<td>United Nations University – Comparative Regional Integration Studies</td>
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<td>UNSC</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>United States</td>
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<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>Union of Soviet Socialist Republic</td>
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<td>WAANSA</td>
<td>West African Action Network on Small Arms</td>
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<td>WAEMU</td>
<td>West African Economic and Monetary Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>WANEP</td>
<td>West African Network for Peacebuilding</td>
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<td>ZANU</td>
<td>Zimbabwe African National Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>ZAPU</td>
<td>Zimbabwe African People’s Union</td>
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CHAPTER 1

THE PUZZLE:

WHY ENTRUST A SECURITY AND DEMOCRACY MANDATE TO A FAILING REGIONAL ORGANISATION?

How do you avoid a new Rwanda? How do you address conflicts in the Congo, in Darfur or in Côte d’Ivoire? This question has been haunting the United Nations (UN) and the international community at large with a special urgency since the 1994 Rwandan genocide. Concerns have been particularly high for Africa, a continent ridden by conflicts. The end of the Cold War is believed to have precipitated a ‘security vacuum’ (Adebajo and Landsberg, 2003, p.171) in Sub-Saharan Africa and to have contributed to the steep rise in the number of conflicts in the 1990s on the continent. The UN tried to step in, but sometimes shamefully failed, as in Rwanda. Throughout the 1990s and the early 2000s, sub-Saharan countries that remained completely untouched by conflicts were the exception rather than the rule. Conflicts were not necessarily always extremely violent as in the cases mentioned above. Nevertheless, a significant proportion of the African populations has encountered warfare, civil war or humanitarian emergencies. The sad litany of sub-Saharan conflicts has made the headlines throughout the years: Angola, Mozambique, Liberia, Somalia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Darfur, Côte d’Ivoire, Chad, Zimbabwe, etc. And these are the conflicts that the Western media know about. Events within the Central African Republic or the Great Lakes region rarely make headline news. What transpires from this is that with the end of
the Cold War came a dire need to find a way to stem the ravages of conflict on the continent.

A possible answer to these conflicts lies with multilateral and regional security institutions. During the past decade, regional security organisations, as part of a ‘new wave of regionalism’ in security affairs, have received increasing attention as a major potential force for global change. (Lake and Morgan, 1997, Fawcett and Hurrell, 1995, Gamble and Payne, 1996, Mansfield and Milner, 1997, Hettne and Inotai, 1994, Söderbaum and Shaw, 2003) With the aim of contributing some knowledge that could prove useful for conflict management in Africa, this study examines the existing evidence and offers some conclusions about the reasons behind the emergence of regional security organisations in Africa. Learning why these organisations were created and how they operate can only further our understanding of their realistic potential to prevent another Rwanda.

After a rapid overview of the regionalist trend today, this introductory chapter clarifies what concepts are used and analysed in this study: notably what does one mean by regional security organisation? Once a clear understanding of the object of the research has been reached, this chapter presents the research question focusing on how and why African economic regional organisations, namely the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC), emerged as security institutions, an issue rarely and indirectly addressed in the existing literature. Finally, a quick outline of the study follows the layout of the methodology used for this research.
A new regionalist wave?

The emergence of regional security institutions in Africa such as ECOWAS and SADC are not a unique and isolated phenomenon, but are part of a broader trend.

Regionalism, a global phenomenon

Since the early 1990s, an explosion of regionalist projects can be witnessed all over the world. According to UNU-CRIS,¹ of the 58 regional groupings they listed, 20 were created after the end of the Cold War, and out of the 191 Member States of the United Nations,² only 9 are not part of regional arrangements. The *Yearbook of International Organisations* witnesses the same trend, albeit with a less restrictive definition of regional organisation. The number of regional organisations keeps rising: from 3782 in 1983-84, the number of ‘regionally delimited conventional international bodies’ reached 4955 in 2001-02. The regionally oriented membership organisations represented 75.09% in 2001-02 of all conventional international bodies.³

Regionalist projects have clearly increased in number, but also in scope (number of members) and diversity (number of areas covered or functions performed: from macroeconomic convergence to election monitoring for instance) since the 1990s. In the twenty-first century, the trend towards regionalism looks set to continue as part of an increasingly complex world order.

¹ See the Regional Integration Information System put together by the Comparative Regional Integration Studies Programme of the United Nations University (UNU-CRIS) at http://amantoin.brinkster.net/ri/site/index.htm
² 191 was the official number of Member States of the United Nations in 2002.
³ The nomenclature used here is that of the *Yearbook of International Organisations*. See UNION OF INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATIONS. (2005) *Yearbook of international organizations*, Brussels, Union of International Associations., p.33.
A dominant trend in Africa

The phenomenon of regionalism is especially strong among developing countries, if judged just by the sheer number of regional organisations that signal the interest of developing countries in this type of institution. Africa is a good example because of its rather vocal enthusiasm for regionalism. In his 2004 New Year message, Alpha Oumar Konaré, Chairperson of the Commission of the African Union, stated his faith in the new African Union: ‘To each and everyone of you, to Men and Women of Africa and to all of you from the Diaspora, we say this: in the Union, we trust!’

Since the 1960s, Africa has been at the forefront of this regionalist trend. The 1960s are considered by some as ‘the halcyon years of African integration.’(Asante, 1997, p.35) This enthusiasm was dampened in the 1970s by the lack of success and decline of several regional groupings. The 1990s was a decade of revival with the idea of ‘new regionalism,’ a term that refers not only to the phenomenon itself but also to its study. Old regional organisations were revitalised and new ones created. In Africa, this revival was linked to the broadening of institutional agendas with a new emphasis on security and on the globalisation of the world economy. (Bach, 2004, p.70)

Besides this rich regionalist history, the high number of African regional organisations today is a telling indicator. Even if some are mere paper tigers, the persistent commitment

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4 For the complete speech, see the African Union’s website at [http://www.africa-union.org/home/Welcome.htm](http://www.africa-union.org/home/Welcome.htm)

to regionalism shows that some countries do find them useful. There is not one African country that is not a member of at least two regional organisations. African regional organisations (AROs) have also broadened their scope into economic, social and political areas, a trend that has led to the drafting of new Charters in ‘historical’ regional organisations such as ECOWAS, SADC, or the OAU (Organisation of African Unity).

Within this global trend, this study focuses on the specifics of the African case and seeks to explain the changes that have taken place. As ECOWAS and SADC emerged as security institutions, how and why did these two organisations change – both institutionally and normatively? What are the motivations for change?

**Getting the labels right**

Before elaborating further on this issue, it is necessary to clarify what is meant by region, regionalisation, regionalism and security organisations throughout the study.

**From region to regionalism vs. regionalisation**

‘Region’ is an ambiguous term variously used in international relations. Stemming from the Latin word *regio* meaning ‘direction, point of the compass,’ a region was defined as the territory controlled by a regent and his regiment. (Aronsson, 1995) As a consequence, a region had indeterminate boundaries. This uncertainty of boundaries remains relevant to our contemporary understanding of the concept. Different definitions enable analysts to identify different regions, and no two researchers fully agree. Regions are not preordained, given, or natural. Some argue that regions can be found at all territorial
levels: there are regions within nation-states, cross-border regions on a sub-national level, as well as regions above the nation-state. This study only considers macro-regions – called international regions by Bruce Russett – composed of different states. (Russett, 1967)

Regions have been delineated on economic, social, cultural and political grounds. Bruce Russett has tackled this definitional problem by listing five criteria: social and cultural homogeneity, similar attitudes or external behaviour, political interdependence, economic interdependence, and geographic proximity. However, there was no area within which the inclusions and exclusions were the same for all the criteria tested. (Russett, 1967, p.168) Each set of criteria outlined different regions. For their part, Cantori and Spiegel consider regions ‘to be areas of the world which contain geographically proximate states forming, in foreign affairs, mutually interrelated units.’ (Cantori and Spiegel, 1970, p.1) Barry Buzan defines a region as ‘a spatially coherent territory composed of two or more states.’ (Buzan et al., 1998, pp.18-19) However, what is meant by ‘spatially coherent’ seems unclear. A classical definition is provided by Joseph Nye: ‘An international region can be defined broadly as a limited number of states linked by a geographical relationship and by a degree of mutual interdependence. Which of the large number of potential regions become relevant in international politics depends on political decisions.’ (Nye, 1968, p.vii) Joseph Nye rightfully insists on the geographical criteria. Although regions are not naturally constituted geographical units, they cannot exist without having a physical

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6 Oran Young argues that without physical contiguity as a necessary condition, ‘the term “region” is apt to become so inclusive that it is useless.’ YOUNG, O. R. (1969) Professor Russett: Industrious Tailor to a Naked Emperor. *World Politics: A Quarterly Journal of International Relations*, 21., p.488.
reality. Thus, territoriality is a sine qua non of regions. But geography is just an indicator, as it does not identify which country should be included in a region.\footnote{Quite often the delineation problem is sidestepped by identifying a region’s ‘core area’ and its ‘periphery’ with sometimes ‘intrusive’ outsiders. See CANTORI, L. J. & SPIEGEL, S. L. (1970) *The international politics of regions*, Englewood Cliffs, N.J, Prentice-Hall., chap.1.}

The main point here is that regions define themselves. They are only identifiable ex post facto. There is no use in looking for one or several universal criteria that define a region. In Nye’s words, it is political or economic decisions that eventually define a region. Regions become ‘visible’ by patterns of interaction between neighbouring states. A region is composed of different states linked by a geographical relationship that decide to identify themselves as a region in their discourses and actions. In the case of Africa, it is especially important to insist on the fact that regions are constructed by the actions of states. The division of Africa in five regions – North Africa, West Africa, Central Africa, East Africa and Southern Africa – is not in any way a given. Some insist on geographical criteria, others, like Kenneth Grundy, define five regions based on major features of political and economic life. (Grundy, 1985, Deng, 1996) In short, it is only through the actions of states that we can identify for instance West and Southern Africa. Cameroon generally swings between Central and West Africa, while Tanzania, after the collapse of the East African Community, redefined itself as a Southern African State. (Deng, 1996, p.135) The constructed character of African regions is thus obvious.

It is hence necessary to take a closer look at the actions of the states and how they can be described and qualified. Regionalisation and regionalism are often confused and look interchangeable. One word is often used for the other. But a distinction should be made ‘between regionalisation, which refers to the regional concentration of economic flows, and regionalism, […] a political process characterised by economic policy cooperation
and coordination among countries.’ (Mansfield and Milner, 1999, p.591, emphasis in original.) The key here is the differentiation between a bottom-up approach characterised by undirected economic and social interactions between non-state actors, be it individual, companies, or non-governmental organisations, and a top-down approach that occurs at a political decision-making level, as a political project that may concern economic policy coordination, but also other areas like peace and security, research and development, etc. Björn Hettne defines ‘new regionalism’ as a ‘political cooperation on the regional level to promote the region as a viable economic, cultural, and ecological unit.’ (Hettne, 1990, p.25) The distinction between top-down (regionalism) and bottom-up (regionalisation) is important for the present study but the understanding privileged here is broader as the distinction also applies to security issues. Regionalism is above all a political project, often informed by the bottom-up influence of regionalisation.

Regionalism, as it is understood in this study, differs from the notion of international regimes or of regional systems. A security regime can be defined as ‘those principles, rules and norms that permit nations to be restrained in their behaviour in the belief that others will reciprocate,’ (Jervis, 1983, p.173) while regional systems can be defined as a regular pattern of interaction among independent political units in a region. (Holsti, 1967, p.27) These notions refer to a regional environment structured by an unstated set of rules, norms, and practices. While both bodies of literature are relevant here, the working definition of regionalism for this study focuses on stated norms and goals that are part of a common political project shared by different states. Finally, while the distinction between regionalisation and regionalism is important, this study addresses ‘hard regionalism,’ the more concrete, formalised and institutionalised manifestation of
regionalism, i.e. regional organisations, as opposed to ‘soft regionalism’ referring to the promotion of a sense of regional awareness.⁸

Regional security organisations

Numerous definitions of regional organisations can be found in the existing literature. To the question ‘What is a regional organisation?’ Joseph Nye answers that he refers ‘to organisations based on (1) formal agreement among governments (2) possessing diplomatic forums and (3) assisted by an associated international bureaucracy.’ (Nye, 1971, p.5) Thomas Franck offers other criteria and defines a regional organisation as ‘any grouping of states in some defined geographical context with historic, ethnic or socio-political ties, which habitually acts in concert through permanent institutions to foster unity in a wide range of common concerns.’ (Franck, 1970, p.832) Thomas Franck also insists on a geographical principle. Indeed, the term ‘regional organisation’ can be used for any organisation that is not global in its membership, no matter how geographically dispersed the members are, such as the Organisation of Islamic Conferences (OIC). However, as our definition of region made clear, only organisations that restrict membership on the basis of geographical contiguity are considered.

This definition leaves open the question of the distinction between regional institutions and regional organisations. (Duffield, 2006, p.635) While institutions can sometimes refer to inter-subjective norms or ‘sets of rules meant to govern international behaviour,’ (Simmons and Martin, 2003, p.194) Oran Young makes a clear distinction between the two with organisations being ‘material entities possessing physical locations (or seats),

offices, personnel, equipment, and budgets.’ (Young, 1989, p.160) Similarly, Keohane includes formal organisations as a sub-category within his definition of international institutions. (Keohane, 1988, pp.3-4) In this study, the focus is on *formal* organisations. However, the terms ‘regional organisation’ and ‘regional institution’ are used interchangeably.

Finally, it might be useful to set up a list of criteria for regional (intergovernmental) organisations inspired by the *Yearbook of International Organisations*.9

- They are international organisations.
- Member states have a certain degree of geographic contiguity.

The Commonwealth and the ACP group (African, Caribbean, and Pacific Group of States) are hence excluded.

- They have a ‘regionalist project’.

As explained above, this means that they share an explicit political project that aims at creating a viable political, economic and cultural region. On these grounds, numerous organisations can be excluded: ‘identity’ organisations like the Francophonie or the Organisation of Islamic Conferences (OIC), and functional organisations like the Permanent Inter-State Committee on Drought Control in the Sahel (CILSS – Comité permanent Interétat de la Lutte contre la Sécheresse dans le Sahel). The notion of

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9The list provided by the *Yearbook* is useful because it draws a clear distinction between international organisations and other organisations whose status might be unclear, like ad hoc committees or organisations of international character that are aiming at making a profit like business enterprises, investment houses or cartels… The eight criteria are the following:

1) Aims: They must be genuinely international in character, with the intention to cover operations in at least three countries.

2) Members: Voting power must be such that no one national group can control the organisation.

3) Structure: There must be permanent headquarters.

4) Officers: Officers should not all be of the same nationality.

5) Finance: At least three countries make substantial contributions to the budget.

6) Relations with other organisations: The organisation should lead an independent life.

7) Activities: Evidence of current activities must be available.

8) Other criteria.

‘regionalist project’ is an important discriminatory factor to the extent that it allows to significantly narrow down the number of eligible cases. The focus here being on normative and institutional change, only organisations that are more political in nature, i.e. not subject to a technocratic approach, are relevant.

The United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) has identified 15 regional and sub-regional organisations:10

| AMU (Arab Maghreb Union),  |
| AU (African Union),  |
| CEPGL (Communauté Economique des Pays des Grands Lacs / Economic Community of the Great Lakes Countries),  |
| CEMAC (Communauté Economique et Monétaire de l’Afrique Centrale / Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa),  |
| CEN-SAD (Community of Sahel-Saharan States),  |
| COMESA (Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa),  |
| EAC (East African Community),  |
| ECCAS (Economic Community of Central African States / CEEAC – Communauté Economique des Etats d’Afrique Centrale),  |
| ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States),  |
| IGAD (Intergovernmental Authority on Development),  |
| IOC (Indian Ocean Commission),  |
| MRU (Mano River Union),  |
| SACU (Southern African Customs Union),  |
| SADC (Southern African Development Community),  |
| WAEMU (West African Economic and Monetary Union).  |

For reasons of precision and economy, the study focuses on formal state-based regional organisations. More precisely, this study analyses the emergence of regional security

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10 The United Nations refer to the African Union as a regional organisation and SADC and ECOWAS as sub-regional organisations. However, seen from the African continent, West and Southern Africa are considered as regions and smaller areas within West Africa such as WAEMU are considered as sub-regions. For the purpose of this study, SADC and ECOWAS are qualified as regional organisations.
organisations. This leads on to a further set of questions: how does one define security and how does a regional organisation become a security institution?  

Certain regional organisations are created to maintain security. But ‘whose security?’ (Bøås, 2000) There are two answers to this question: state security vs. people’s (human) security.  

Simply put, state security means that the regional organisation ensures peaceful relations between member states and the eradication of the recourse to war between these countries. (Russett and Oneal, 2001) Most of the literature focuses on security complexes, security regimes, security communities and the transition between them. A security complex is ‘a group of states whose primary security concerns link together sufficiently closely that their national securities cannot realistically be considered apart from one another.’ (Buzan, 1991, p. 190) The notion of security complex is included in the very definition of region chosen here as geographically contiguous and mutually dependent states. As such, one state cannot divorce its security concerns from that of the others. As mentioned earlier, security regimes are not the main focus of the study but are not altogether ignored as unstated rules, norms and practices – such as those of the FLS (Front Line States) – can inform and influence the evolution of regional organisations. Finally, a security community is, according to Deutsch, ‘a group of people which has become integrated,’ where integration means having a sense of community and ‘dependable expectations of peaceful change.’ (Deutsch, 1957, p.5) The concept was developed a few years later by Adler and Barnett. Nevertheless, the central tenet of

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11 This study does not address the debate about whether regionalism should be considered as a stepping stone towards global security or as complementary and secondary to the United Nations that has the ‘primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security.’ (UNITED NATIONS, Charter, 26 June 1945, Chapter 5, Article 24§1) See PUGH, M. & SIDHU, W. P. S. (Eds.) (2003) The United Nations & regional security : Europe and beyond Boulder, Colo., Lynne Rienner Publishers.

12 This corresponds to the widely accepted distinction to be found in most academic works. However, state security is sometimes hijacked by the Head of State. In that case, state security is equated to security of the leader with national interest meaning the leader’s interest to hold on to power.
peaceful change, i.e. the abandonment of war as a means of change within the security community, remains the same. (Adler and Barnett, 1998b) It is too early to address the question of whether ECOWAS and SADC are security communities. The issue being debatable, they are simply considered as regional security organisations.

The other understanding of security, human security is a somewhat more amorphous concept as it argues that the proper referent for security should be the individual. Each individual should be free from want and free from fear; and the regional organisation would then help its member states achieve this goal. This is an arduous task, but numerous regional organisations are attempting to do just that. As a consequence, both meanings of the concept of security are kept and used throughout this study as it corresponds to the very mandate some regional organisations have assigned to themselves: ensuring peace between its member states, but also making sure that the populations that live in their member states do not suffer from want, such as the effects of droughts or other natural catastrophes, or from fear, such as a genocide perpetuated by their own government or fear from a ruthless dictator, thus allowing us to include the agenda of democratic governance of these organisations.13

Finally, what is meant by security organisation is rather strictly defined. A security organisation is ‘an organisation whose charter contains an explicit reference to security provisions through the coordination of defence, security and foreign policy at some level.’ (Fawcett, 2007, p.311) In general, these security provisions are designed to respond to external (collective security arrangement à la NATO corresponding to the definition of

13 Governance is understood here as ‘spheres of authority at all levels of human activity […] that amount to systems of rules in which goals are pursued through the exercise of control.’ ROSENAU, J. N. (1997) Along the Domestic-Foreign Frontier: Exploring Governance in a Turbulent World, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press., p.145.
security as state security) or internal (common security, i.e. risks of civil wars for the population corresponding to the definition of security as human security) threats. The diversity of security threats explains the scope and diversity of functions performed by security institutions.

| Defence of sovereignty and territorial integrity |
| Confidence building measures                     |
| Early warning and preventive diplomacy           |
| Mediation and good offices                       |
| Peaceful settlement of disputes                  |
| Peace enforcement, peacekeeping and peace building|
| Foreign policy coordination                      |
| Resolution of border disputes                    |
| Disarmament and arms control                     |
| Joint-training of troops                         |
| Combating terrorism, drugs, weapons and human trafficking |
| Election monitoring                               |

TABLE 1.2: Possible security activities of regional organisations

The object of this study is thus African regional security organisations, i.e. African international organisations whose members are geographically contiguous and with a regionalist project that contains an explicit security provision.

**Research question and theoretical approach**

This study attempts to discover why certain African regional security organisations, namely ECOWAS and SADC, emerged in the 1990s. The answer is not necessarily self-evident as very little work has been done in this area.
The emergence of security out of economics

In the 1990s, all regional organisations throughout the world have witnessed significant changes, both institutionally and normatively. But each region had its own logic and dynamic underlying such a move. The analysis here focuses on Africa and especially on the two most dynamic embodiments of the 1990s revival of African regionalism: ECOWAS and SADC. These two cases are especially interesting because they are the only two African organisations that launched peacekeeping operations, besides the OAU and its heir the African Union. Not only did ECOWAS and SADC member states introduce security provisions, they also entrusted the regional organisation with a mandate of democracy promotion and democratic governance. While these two agendas could be considered as separate mandates, these two issues were linked by the regional organisations themselves. Both organisations took a new direction focusing on security and democracy issues as opposed to their past technocratic and economic mandate. This transformation was so radical that it also entailed profound institutional reforms to allow the weak regional organisation to implement its new mandates. This is the reason why these two security and democracy mandates are analysed together in this study. The reasons behind the choice of ECOWAS and SADC will be addressed more in depth later.

The Economic Community of West African States – whose current members include Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Côte d’Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo\textsuperscript{14} – was created in 1975 with the specific goal of encouraging economic cooperation and developmental regionalism (Adedeji, 2004) and was later transformed into an organisation with a

\textsuperscript{14}Mauritania withdrew from ECOWAS in December 2000.
broader agenda including ‘the establishment of an economic union in West Africa,’ the ‘maintenance of regional peace, stability and security,’ and the ‘promotion and consolidation of a democratic system of governance in each Member State’ with the revised Cotonou treaty of 1993. (Cf. articles 3 and 4 of the ECOWAS treaty of 1993) ECOWAS, like other African regional organisations, increasingly cites democracy as a fundamental norm against which state behaviour will be measured. (Bundu, July 19-25, 1993, De Costa, 1991) This turn towards security and democratic governance was later confirmed with the 1999 Protocol relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peace-keeping and Security and the 2001 Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance, Supplementary to the 1999 Security Protocol.

Similarly, the Southern African Development Community was first created as the Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC) in April 1980 with the main goal of reducing the Member States’ economic dependence, particularly on apartheid South Africa. The Windhoek treaty of 1992 – signed by Angola, Botswana, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe\textsuperscript{15} – mentions new objectives such as to ‘consolidate, defend and maintain democracy, peace, security and stability.’\textsuperscript{16} This was later reinforced by the 2001 Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation and the 2004 SADC Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections.

\textbf{Why did ECOWAS and SADC emerge as regional security organisations in the 1990s?}

\textit{Specifically, why were these failing economic regional organisations transformed in}

\textsuperscript{15} Madagascar joined SADC in 2005.
\textsuperscript{16} Cf. article 5 of the SADC treaty of 1992.
security organisations? The analysis starts from the fact that many African regional organisations were created as economic communities, failed as such, were later transformed into security institutions and have started addressing other issues such as human rights or promotion of democracy. Why entrust a politically sensitive mandate to a failing organisation? A similar pattern can indeed be drawn across several AROs, be it ECOWAS, SADC, IGAD, or lately with the transformation of the OAU into the African Union. The dual shift highlights both an institutional – reform of the Secretariat – and a normative – new mandate enforcing new norms – change within these organisations. The normative shift is especially striking as both ECOWAS and SADC introduced a right of humanitarian intervention within their protocols.

This transformation seems at first counterintuitive since it is not clear why states would put such a heavy burden on the shoulders of an organisation that is failing. This study addresses this puzzle. Although this kind of transformation is not new or unique to Africa, this shift is especially significant within the context of African politics. Reaching back through time, what in the history of these organisations and of these regions can explain this shift? What was behind the creation of these institutions in their specific form? How can we explain their qualified failure as economic communities? How significant is such a change in the life of these organisations? What type of security provisions have these regional organisations adopted and why? Has it led to a real commitment of the member states to these new functions of the regional organisation?
My central hypothesis is that, in the African case, state weakness, the presence of a regional hegemon\(^{17}\) and marginalisation from the international scene are important explanatory factors, among others, to explain this change. While not unique to Africa, these three explanatory factors are of special importance in the cases studied here. Based on the analyses of ECOWAS and SADC, this study generates some parsimonious hypotheses explaining the emergence of regional security organisations in Africa. These can be later tested against other cases within Africa or in other continents. The core argument rests on the three factors mentioned above with a particular emphasis on the role of the regional hegemon.

This study first explores and assesses how different schools of thought in international relations explain the emergence of these regional security institutions. According to mainstream theoretical approaches in International Relations, institutional development and security cooperation between states can be explained by three different drivers. A first explanation highlights the shifts in the structure of the international system, namely the end of the Cold War, which led to a re-assessment of global and regional balances of power. This is illustrated by the timing of the change this study is examining. This corresponds to a neo-realist explanation. A related driver is the role of the regional hegemon that can harness the regional organization to shape its own region. Second, states value institutions as tools of cooperation. While the impetus for change might come from global or regional leaders, institutions retain their usefulness by providing predictable bases for cooperation and negotiation, thus becoming tools of diplomacy. This liberal argument rests on the belief that ‘self-help can be enhanced by collective action.’

\(^{17}\)The concept of hegemon might be rather amorphous and difficult to pinpoint. However, in both cases here, one can argue that you know one when you see one, notably due to the significant disparity in terms of economy, military and demography between Nigeria and South Africa on the one hand and their respective neighbours on the other.
(Fawcett, 2008b, p.13) Finally, a constructivist approach focusing on regional ideas and identity would argue that security cooperation is rooted in common values and identities shared at the regional level. This would then be reflected in the institutional design. My purpose is to apply the different causal explanations put forth by these theories to the two case studies of ECOWAS and SADC in order to better understand the roots of this transformation from economics to security. These competing explanatory factors can include for instance the primacy of state interests and of balance-of-power politics (an argument coming from the realist school of thought), the advantages of international cooperation and the virtuous circle of trust arising from it (a possible liberal explanation), a strong regional identity, similar ideologies during the Cold War and beyond (a more constructivist approach), the existence or not of a favourable international environment during the Cold War and after, etc.

International relations theory, as its name clearly indicates, traditionally focuses on the international relations between states. It hence looks for the explanations of the emergence of regional security organisations either at the international (or systemic) level or at the regional level. In order to provide a complete picture of the issue at hand, this study takes the analysis a step further and opens the black box of the state. Arguably, international relations theory now starts to deconstruct the state and also focuses on non-state actors. It asks for instance whether the nature of the member states of a regional organisation – whether they are democracies or not, (Doyle, 1986, Pevehouse, 2005) , whether they have strong leaders or not – can have a causal impact on the adoption of security provisions within a regional organisation. At the domestic level, the concept of state weakness as mentioned in the Third World focused literature, however vague and

\[^{18}\text{There is however a long tradition of foreign policy analysis within the international relations literature and this study taps into it.}\]
multifaceted it may be, is brought in to understand the relationship between regional organisations with a security provision and states that sometimes have difficulties maintaining peace and security within their own borders. This study attempts to formulate a relationship between regionalism and state weakness: for instance, regional organisations can give a greater voice to weak states – this was the idea behind the G77 –, but they can also help strengthen and develop their member states like the European Union did in Greece. The study tests this hypothesis throughout the history of two different AROs – ECOWAS and SADC. Can a regional organisation strengthen its member states? This study aims to demonstrate the utility of the ‘state weakness approach’ by integrating it in the overall narrative alongside other potential explanatory factors put forth by different schools of thought in international relations. By building upon earlier insights and the history of the regions studied, this research hopes to bring a new perspective that can provide meaningful explanations about the issue at hand.19 The added value of this analysis resides in its analysis of the domestic level and of its relationship with the regional level.

Contribution to the literature

This study intends to fill a gap in the existing literature by focusing on a neglected but nevertheless surprising development of regionalism in Africa: why are regional organisations created, why do they fail or change courses towards security? (Deutsch, 1988) Why would member states give greater responsibilities, including that of launching peacekeeping operations, to an organisation widely recognised as a failure? This research attempts to achieve three goals. First, this study will describe empirically the institutional

and normative change within ECOWAS and SADC by gathering some new empirical data on the causes, the circumstances and the negotiations that led to the transformation of AROs from economic to security organisations. It is one of the very few sustained comparative studies on ECOWAS and SADC.\(^{20}\) As such, it is quite unique in the existing literature. Second, it will shed some new light on different schools of thought in international relations by testing their relevance for the study of African politics within the broader context of the Third World problematic in IR. (Ayoob, 1995, Moon and Azar, 1988, Job, 1992, Tickner, 2003, Lemke, 2003) While the discipline of international relations is traditionally organised around the analysis of the successes and failures of the main actors on the world scene,\(^{21}\) this study explores the potential of institutionalised regional cooperation for the weakest actors of the international system.\(^{22}\)

Byers and Chesterman usefully point out that legal developments in the Third World – such as the adoption of a right of humanitarian intervention – usually go unnoticed by Western scholars. (Byers and Chesterman, 2003) This study also goes against a certain trend in the regionalist literature, within which analyses usually start off from the European model and then are expanded to developing countries. (Mattli, 1999) (This is arguably changing.) The starting point here is the specificity of certain African states, the specific problems weak states are facing and their relationship with regionalism. While a limited number of studies on regionalism in Africa do exist, they usually compile different case studies.

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\(^{22}\) It hence addresses one of the issues that Stanley Hoffman denounced as being left in the dark by the students of international relations: the functioning of international hierarchy, the nature of the relation between the weak and the strong. It is also trying to move away from the perspective of rich and strong actors of the international system toward that of the weak. What really matters here is to move away from an analysis principally focused on great powers and to look at power relations from another angle. See HOFFMANN, S. (1987) *Janus and Minerva: essays in the theory and practice of international politics*, Boulder, Colo ; London, Westview., p.22.
studies and do not consider state weakness as an important factor. (Grant and Söderbaum, 2003, Asante, 1997, Bach, 1999, Lavergne, 1997) Finally, by establishing a link between state weakness, regional hegemony, marginalisation and regional security organisations, this research aims to draw both narrow and wider lessons on which practices have the greatest potential for conflict management in Africa. Indeed, a clear understanding of the motivations behind the transformation of ECOWAS and SADC should shed light on the likelihood that regional security organisations will intervene in the future.

With the overall direction of the study now being set, a few words are needed the theoretical approach privileged by this study even though this is discussed in further details in chapter 2.

**Theoretical tools.**

Most of the theoretical tools available to the IR student were apparently not designed for the study of African politics. (Ayoob, 2002, Acharya and Buzan, 2007) Realism, liberalism and constructivism can provide interesting insights on the analysis of institutions and on change (see chapter 2), but, by their often systemic approach, they neglect to problematise the state as not all African states necessarily correspond to the Weberian or Westphalian ideal-type of the state.

Realism and neorealism can shed an interesting light on the dynamics at play within regional organisations, notably by its focus on hegemony. Nigeria’s and South Africa’s status as regional hegemons is notably important in order to test the explanatory potential of realism. (Buzan and Wæver, 2003, Myers, 1991, Adebajo and Landsberg, 2003) The
overall relevance of realism and neorealism is however limited because it rarely analyses the dynamics of institutions once they are established and because it is only marginally interested in change. A greater interest in institutions characterises liberalism and especially neoliberal institutionalism. It analyses all forms of international cooperation, including formalised institutions. It can hence be a source of interesting insights on the puzzle at hand.

Among the regionalist literature, inter-governmentalism attempts to explain change within regional organisations by focusing on inter-state bargains. However, by doing so, it neglects the processes and activities internal to regional organisations between formal inter-state negotiations (for instance the work and influence of the European Commission between the Single European Act in 1986 and the Maastricht Treaty in 1992). The neo-functionalist branch of the regionalist literature has also some shortcomings. Like inter-governmentalism, it has a strong Euro-centric bias. Also, the neo-functionalist distinction between low and high politics is less relevant to African politics, economic issues being so sensitive that they belong to the realm of high politics. Overall, both traditional theories of international relations are of limited interest for this study since they focus on systemic issues. They also share the same conception of the state and take it as granted, a problematic approach when applied to Africa. (For more detailed discussions on these issues, see chapter 2.)

Constructivism and the new regionalism approach (NRA) of Björn Hettne (Hettne and Inotai, 1994, Grant and Söderbaum, 2003) put forth a pertinent analysis of African regionalism. However, the 1990s literature on new regionalism was a multilevel activity and did not always dovetail the Hettne approach. It nevertheless points in the direction of
important developments of regionalism as a global (and often North-South) phenomenon and of the fainter distinction between economic and political regionalism. The NRA’s specificity is that it goes beyond a focus on states and opens up the analysis to new actors. However, because it is also mostly a systemic theory and focuses on norms, ideas, and identity,23 constructivism neglects the importance of domestic material capabilities in African politics. At a minimum, this analysis is interested in other actors beyond states, including individuals. (For further discussion, see chapter 2.)

It is important to note here that the purpose of this study is not to undermine the importance of material factors as dependent variables. However, it does bring other factors in. While state interests are compelling causal factors, they can be gainfully supplemented by different analyses, such as that proposed by the Third World focused literature or constructivism. State weakness is only an add-on to the other explanations. But, despite these misgivings, the different independent variables explaining the emergence of regional security organisations in Africa are deduced from these different schools of thoughts (see chapter 2).

A problem-driven hypothetico-deductive approach

The approach within this study is primarily problem-driven rather than theory-driven. The main goal is quite simply to understand why ECOWAS and SADC took on this security and democracy mandates. In order to provide a broad and substantial understanding of the recent developments within ECOWAS and SADC, this study reaches out through their history from their creation until today. A historical institutionalist approach is apposite

23 Identity is understood here as the distinguishing character of a group of people. (Source: Merriam-Webster Dictionary, www.m-w.com)
here as the study focuses on the institutional transformation of two regional organisations. (Bogdanor, 1999, Hall and Taylor, 1996, Immergut, 1998, Koelble, 1995, March and Olsen, 1984, Liebowitz and Margolis, 1995, Thelen, 1999) Historical institutionalism is neither a theory nor a specific methodology. (March and Olsen, 1984) Steinmo probably best described historical institutionalists as ‘the environmental biologist who believes that in order to understand the specific fate of a particular organism or behaviour, she must explicitly examine that organism or behaviour in the ecology or context in which it lives.’ (Steinmo, forthcoming December 2008) One might add that the historical institutionalist does so over time. Historical institutionalism sees institutions as the legacy of historical processes and as embedded in a specific political and social setting. (Thelen, 1999, p.382) It insists on path dependency. But this does not mean that institutional development is totally constrained by past trajectories. It does not exclude change and does not overlook the importance of critical junctures. (Ikenberry, 1994) It looks at processes unfolding over time and how different levels, be it national, regional or global, unfold in relation to one another. (Thelen, 1999, p.390) In short, historical institutionalism contends that knowing how institutions were created provides insights into how they might evolve and I do think there are obvious merits in using this approach throughout this study. With this approach in mind, the analysis starts at the creation of ECOWAS and SADC and follows the two institutions throughout its early years of existence leading to the transformation of their mandate. By going into the details of the history of regional organisations, the study gains in accuracy and perspective. Various ‘thick descriptions’ of key cases are needed in order to make the difference between a wink and a twitch, as in the parable related by Geertz. (Geertz, 1993) To solve the puzzle at hand, understanding where the institution comes from is necessary to explain where it is today.
However, while predominantly problem-driven, this study also addresses some theoretical issues. Driven by an empirical puzzle, this study is both hypothesis-testing and hypothesis generating. In order to make some causal claims as to the shift from economic to security organisations and to identify causal processes, hypothesis-testing for the schools of thought in international relations and process tracing are used in two in-depth comparative case studies focusing on ECOWAS and SADC. This hypothetico-deductive method notably explains why there are a significant number of explanatory variables and only two case studies.\footnote{A quantitative analysis would have had a limited number of variables and a high number of case studies.} However parsimonious different schools of thought in international relations attempt to be, the multiplicity of potential causal factors is not something than can be reduced at the beginning of the study as it might lead to the exclusion of potentially important variables. Again, to fully understand the problem, it should be addressed from all available angles to then, later on, generate a more parsimonious answer. This study hence comes to a close by generating definite hypotheses explaining the emergence of regional security organisations to be later tested by other scholars among a larger number of cases. Nevertheless, if the choice is ‘between knowing more about less and knowing less about more,’ (Gerring, 2004, p. 348) then the choice here is clear: the study focuses on explaining particular events and makes a limited attempt at generalisation on the relationship between state weakness, hegemony\footnote{These two notions will be examined at length in chapter 2. Suffice it to say that regional hegemons are considered as regional powers that have a deliberate policy of exercising their leadership in their respective region. State weakness is defined in a rather limited manner and a weak state is a legitimate state with limited capabilities. Other types of states are also covered such as states with greater capabilities but with limited internal legitimacy.} and regional security organisations. (Beck, 2006)
Methodology

After having outlined the overall approach giving this study, it is now necessary to address how and on what bases the research will be performed. Why only focus on ECOWAS and SADC? How useful a comparative approach can be in order to address the puzzle at hand? What methodological problems has the research encountered?

Case selection

The case selection is limited in that it focuses exclusively on Africa and then on ECOWAS and SADC. The rationale behind it is that the continent has an increasing number of regional organisations and a striking number of weak states. ECOWAS and SADC were selected as case studies because they share the same pattern. They both have moved from an economic integration agenda that more or less failed to a much broader one focusing not only on security issues, but also on more normative issues such as the promotion of democracy and human rights. Not only are these two organisations the most vital and dynamic of the existing AROs with a history of peacekeeping efforts, they are also the most prominent in terms of academic and journalistic attention. Indeed, both regions contain a state that is traditionally labelled in the literature as a ‘regional hegemon,’ Nigeria in ECOWAS and South Africa in SADC. The African Union has been excluded as a case study per se because it is difficult to compare a continental organisation to regional ones and also because it lacked the original focus on economy at its creation. It has always been a political organisation. However, the AU is not completely absent from the analysis as both Nigeria and South Africa are key players within the AU and thus have an indirect impact on ECOWAS and SADC. IGAD has
undergone a comparable transformation as ECOWAS and SADC but has no obvious regional hegemon and has no real history of actual peacekeeping. It focuses mainly on mediation. Furthermore, in order to understand the complexities of the political dynamics at the regional level, there is a need to restrict the number of case studies.

Based on these two case-studies, this research design could easily be seen as having a major weakness, i.e. a no-variance design (on the dependent variable). This concern is addressed the three following ways: there is in fact variance on the dependent variable; this study broadens the horizon of the research by comparing ECOWAS and SADC to the AU and the UN; and finally counterfactual analysis is employed throughout the study. First, while they share the same pattern, the empirical unfolding of the cases is different. It is in these different patterns and trajectories that lies the potential and the usefulness of a comparative approach. Why did they evolve differently? For instance, in the case of SADC, the dynamics of the region were significantly altered when South Africa joined in 1994 the regional organisation that had been built against it. Furthermore, both the content of their security and democratic governance mandate and their implementation record differ (see chapters 5 and 6). Second, the performance of ECOWAS and SADC is compared to that of the African Union and of the United Nations in chapter 6. This comparison is necessary in order to address the critique that the very object of study, the adoption of a new security and democracy mandate, is pure rhetoric and can only be found on paper. It is not enough to assume that ECOWAS and SADC are indeed regional security organisations because they adopted security and democracy protocols. This study analyses their implementation records and compares it to other organisations that had the mandate to mediate or intervene in West and Southern African conflicts, namely the AU

26 For critics on no-variance designs, see KING, G., KEOHANE, R. O. & VERBA, S. (1994) Designing social inquiry : scientific inference in qualitative research, Princeton ; Chichester, Princeton University Press.
and the UN. Based on this analysis, one can then claim with greater certainty whether ECOWAS and SADC are regional security organisations. This comparison of the implementation records of ECOWAS and SADC also allows the study to look at dogs that do not bark and assess in which cases security organisations, be it regional, continental or global, intervene and in which cases they do not. Finally, to mitigate for the no-variance design, the use of counterfactuals is present throughout the research. For instance, what if Nigeria and South Africa had been absent from the regional scene? Would there have been a transformation of ECOWAS and SADC had the Cold War not come to an end? Etc. (Collier and Mahoney, 1996, pp. 73-74) Overall, the main added-value of this study is telling the story of the emergence of ECOWAS and SADC as security organisations, but the no-variance design is not considered as an obstacle to making claims about causation or to generating hypotheses.

A comparative study

The research is structured around a comparative case study. The case study approach is justified by the limited number of cases that have the outcome of interest here, namely the emergence of security organisations out of economic ones. The approach is comparative in nature and is understood as ‘a method of discovering empirical relationships among variables, not as a method of measurement.’ (Lijphart, 1971, p. 683) Despite facing the obvious problem of ‘many variables, small number of cases,’ (Lijphart, 1971, p. 685) process tracing can help identify a causal chain that links independent and dependent variables. This study examines causal factors that this set of cases have in common in order to assess whether these factors can plausibly be understood as producing the outcome. ‘Causation is not established through small-\(n\) comparison alone […] but
through uncovering traces of a hypothesised causal mechanism within the context of a historical case or cases. (Bennett and Elman, 2006, p. 262) Indeed, a detailed and holistic analysis of sequences in historical cases facilitates the search of omitted variables and allows for the study of interaction within a few cases.

The privileged methodological approach is Mill’s method of agreement.\textsuperscript{27} (Ragin, 1987, Thelen, 1999, Lijphart, 1971) Quite obviously due to the framing of the question, Mill’s indirect method of indifference\textsuperscript{28} is excluded as there are no case studies on an institution that has decided to remain a purely economic organisation. Yet, one can overcome this obstacle by using other comparisons. To enrich the comparison, truly assess the effectiveness of the regional organisation, and provide a certain amount of counterfactual analysis, the performance of ECOWAS and SADC has been compared to that of other organisations with the same mandate, namely the AU and the UN. Third, a Boolean approach,\textsuperscript{29} though tempting, is not a viable option due to the limited number of cases and to the important number of potential independent variables. Furthermore, the binary approach (yes or no this variable has played a role in this case study) tends to oversimplify the analysis. This leaves us with Mill’s method of agreement, a method often decried as unscientific by many authors of methodological treatises. (Lieberson, 1991, Savolainen, 1994, Lieberson, 1994, King et al., 1994) While such an approach indeed severely restricts one’s chances of reaching a hypothesis that could be easily and

\textsuperscript{27} ‘If two or more instances of the phenomenon under investigation have only one circumstance in common, the circumstance in which alone all the instances agree, is the cause (or effect) of the given phenomenon.’ MILL, J. S. (1867) A System of Logic: Ratiocinative and Inductive, New York, Harper & Brothers., p.255.

\textsuperscript{28} ‘If an instance in which the phenomenon under investigation occurs, and an instance in which it does not occur, have every circumstance in common save one, that one occurring only in the former; the circumstance in which alone the two instances differ, is the effect, or the cause; or an indispensable part of the cause, of the phenomenon.’ Ibid., p.256.

\textsuperscript{29} Introduced by Charles Ragin as a synthetic strategy, the Boolean method is designed to draw causal inferences from comparing configurations of the selected causal variables across a moderate number of cases. See RAGIN, C. C. (1987) The comparative method : moving beyond qualitative and quantitative strategies, Berkeley ; London, University of California Press.
correctly generalised to other cases, it allows us to clarify which independent variable should be considered as more important than others and also allows one to better pinpoint which level – or which image: Man, State or War (Waltz, 2001) – is the most relevant plane for explaining the evolution of these two institutions within West and Southern Africa. Furthermore, one should note that by adopting a comparative approach, both between cases and within cases chronologically, as well as doing a parallel comparison with the AU and the UN, one should have enough information to highlight one or a set of independent variables that will most likely play a role in the transition from economics to security and governance. By conducting a comparison between ECOWAS and SADC, this study allows us to evaluate which independent variable(s) is or are common to both case studies despite different geopolitical environments. Indeed, at the creation of ECOWAS, West Africa was composed of independent countries, while Southern Africa in 1980 was locked into a fight against apartheid and lingering colonisation. An independent variable constant over time and common to the two case studies despite differing geopolitical circumstances would be a good candidate to explain the transformation of the institutions in the 1990s.

Sources

The primary sources of the study are official documents of regional organisations and of their member states, state statistics, internal government reports, and the evaluation and assessment reports issued by AROs themselves (in French and English), but also by international organisations such as the United Nations, the World Bank, and other regional organisations like the European Union or others. These sources should help in bringing a keener understanding of the history of the regional organisations, their
performance throughout the years, but also in shaping and assessing the reality of the change that occurred in the 1990s. While fieldwork to the headquarters of ECOWAS and SADC gave us access to key records that could not be found elsewhere, records were incomplete. Specifically, the press releases of ECOWAS on the regional organisation’s website were only available starting in 1999. Only the Annual reports of 2000, 2002, 2005 and 2006 were brought back as the others could not be located. For SADC, the records of the Council of Ministers and of the Summits of the Heads of State and Government were almost fully available from 1994 until 2006. The records of a few Extraordinary Summits, quite often focusing on peace and security issues, were not included in this package provided by the SADC Secretariat. Also, the records of the ISDSC (Inter-State Defence and Security Committee) that would have been particularly pertinent for the issue at hand were also not to be located. For the OAU/AU, most of the records could be found online. For the United Nations, all the required information was readily available online.

The secondary sources consist in books and analyses written specifically on certain AROs. The comparative literature on regionalism, on institutional change and on state weakness in Africa is another secondary source. These should put the events surrounding the two case studies in a broader historical and theoretical perspective. Fieldwork has been undertaken to provide some insights on the actual negotiations that took place leading to the change in mandate of these regional organisations. Access to the officials of ECOWAS and SADC, to the diplomats of the member states, as well as to the documents issued by the two regional organisations is crucial in order to identify the changes in direction and the choices made by these institutions. During the fieldwork at the headquarters of ECOWAS in Nigeria and of SADC in Botswana, archival research
and fact-finding semi-structured interviews were privileged. It is worth noting early that access to ECOWAS officials proved to be much easier than access to SADC officials.

Caveats

Any research design involves some trade-offs and this study is no exception. There are obvious limitations concerning the scope of the study. The number of case studies is restricted. When it comes to the research methods used, there is a need for caution due to the difficulty of measuring certain variables, access to information, and to the quality of certain data sources, especially concerning Africa. Finally, the difficulty of making causal claims should also be highlighted. In a continent as interconnected – formally and informally – as Africa, it is difficult to isolate specific effects or explanations from others.

One should also take into account the position of the social scientist vis-à-vis his work. As Max Weber clearly stated, ‘we are cultural beings endowed with the capacity and the will to take a deliberate attitude towards the world and to lend it significance.’ (Weber et al., 1949, p.81) Since all knowledge is historically and politically based, there is no such thing as ‘value-free’ inquiries.\footnote{As Cox famously stated: ‘Theory is always for someone or for some purpose. All theories have a perspective. Perspectives derive from a position in time and space. The world is seen from a standpoint definable in terms of nation or social class, of dominance or subordination, of rising or declining power, of a sense of immobility or of present crisis, of past experience, and of hopes and expectations for the future.’ See COX, R. W. (1987) Production, power and world order : social forces in the making of history, New York ; Guildford, Columbia University Press., p.207.} This means being aware of one’s own cultural and intellectual background in order to attain greater detachment, i.e. rigorous and undiscriminating scepticism. Africa being very diverse and not a single entity, analyses should therefore avoid too broad generalisations. However, one does not want to go to the other extreme and claim that African international relations are exceptional and have
nothing in common with the rest of the world. These considerations are taken into account when carrying out the project.

Structure of the thesis

The following chapter (chapter 2) endeavours to lay out the different possible factors put forward by several bodies of theory in international relations to explain the emergence of ECOWAS and SADC as security organisations. Each of these theories puts emphasis on different factors in order to explain change in institutions and their evolution through time. Chapter 2 proposes a wide spectrum of potential explanatory variables. But a particular emphasis is placed on the role of the regional hegemon, state weakness and the marginalisation of Africa after the end of the Cold War. These possible causal factors are then put to test throughout the following chapters.

Understanding the shift within ECOWAS and SADC in the 1990s entails a short analytical history of West and Southern Africa. Chapters 3 and 4 provide a short background on the history and evolution of the Economic Community of West African States and of the South African Development Community in order to highlight the circumstances of their creation and their qualified failure as economic communities. These two chapters also analyse the specific form and extent of the normative and institutional change in ECOWAS and SADC. To what extent has that change had an impact in practice? Beyond providing historical depth, chapters 3 and 4 are a first step in the analysis and highlight factors that proved key at critical junctures for ECOWAS and SADC, thus providing an early insight as to which factors could explain the emergence of regional security organisations.
Chapter 5 is a comparative analysis of the security and democracy mandates entrusted to ECOWAS and SADC by its member states based on the study of their legal texts – the founding treaties and relevant protocols – that outline the specific objectives of each regional security organisation and the tools they were given to implement their mandates. This chapter provides greater substance to the notion of regional security organisation, highlights the different approaches between ECOWAS and SADC and is a first assessment of the commitment of each region’s member states to their security and democracy mandate with an analysis of how much leeway was given to each regional organisation to implement their mandate.

Chapter 6 analyses the implementation records of ECOWAS and SADC in order to assess the commitment of their member states to their new democracy and security mandate. Are ECOWAS and SADC regional security organisation only on paper or are their member states ready and willing to commit troops and money to manage conflicts and to monitor elections in their region? Obvious examples come to mind such as the intervention of ECOWAS in Liberia and of SADC in Lesotho. However, this chapter takes the analysis a step further by first analysing all instances in which the regional security organisation could have intervened, and, second, by comparing their commitment to that of other institutions, namely the OAU/AU and the UN for peacekeeping, and the European Union, the OAU/AU and the Carter Centre for election monitoring. The aim in this chapter is to measure the political will of the region’s member states and to assess its performance compared to other institutions.
Chapter 7 tests the different hypotheses provided by the main theories of international relations and tries to weigh in each argument against the evidence provided by each case study. It evaluates which explanatory factor put forth in chapter 2 is the most useful to understand the emergence of ECOWAS and SADC as security organisations. Based on the explanatory factors that proved key at critical junctures of ECOWAS and SADC, the nature of their mandate and of their institutional tools, and their performance record, the three most important explanatory factors mentioned here, namely state weakness, marginalisation of Africa due to the end of the Cold War and the role of the regional hegemon, all proved of significant importance throughout the history of both regional organisations. Chapter 7 concludes the study by generating two hypotheses explaining the emergence of ECOWAS and SADC as regional security organisations and reassesses the implications of this study for the different bodies of theory in international relations by taking position on the broader question of which school of thought best explains African politics and international relations.
FIGURE 1.1: Major regional organisations in Africa


Key:
- AMU
- CEMAC / CEPGL / ECCAS
- COMESA / IOC
- ECOWAS / WAEMU / MRU
- EAC / IGAD
- SACU / SADC

NB: The membership of certain regional organisations has changed since then.
CHAPTER 2

WHY DO REGIONAL SECURITY ORGANISATIONS EMERGE?

Theories are important because they help us decide which facts matter and which do not. One of this study's aims, besides accounting for the emergence of a regional security organisation out of a failed economic institution in ECOWAS and SADC, is to test the hypotheses offered by different schools of thought to then decide which body of literature offers the most convincing explanation of the puzzle at hand. This chapter goes beyond the mainstream approaches expected to explain the success and failure of regional organisations, namely realism with the idea that regional organisations are the product of the balance of power, and liberalism with at its core the idea that collective action enhances self-help when states share common interests. As mentioned earlier, based on a hypothetico-deductive method, this chapter outlines what reality should look like according to each school of thought of International Relations theory. As each school of thought puts the onus on specific factors at the expense of others, one might end up with a long and potentially overwhelming list of factors. The approach chosen here retains material factors, while highlighting other features that are pertinent to constructivism and Third World focused literature.

In order to simplify and put some order within this multiplicity of explanations, one can break down the factors according to the level of analysis: at the international, regional and domestic levels. At the international level, three explanatory factors are outlined: the
impact of the Cold War and its end that operated a change at the systemic level, the role of great world powers, especially France, the United Kingdom and the United States and the role of key continental players, namely Nigeria, South Africa, Libya and the African Union. This last explanatory factor is very close to one that is located at the regional level. This focus on power corresponds to a realist approach to the issue. At the regional level, other explanations for the emergence of ECOWAS and SADC as security institutions are the role of the regional hegemons, South Africa and Nigeria, the adoption of a security provision because it is in the common interest of all member states or because the regional organisation had started to be perceived as an institutional source of common identity. The explanations put forth at the regional level bring a broader range of theories to the fore: realism, but also liberalism and constructivism. Finally, at the domestic level, the analysis focuses on the role of individual leaders and the nature of the state: democratic or not, weak or not. This level, by its focus on the state, highlights other theories: liberalism with the democratic peace theory and the Third World focused literature with the interesting concept of omnibalancing. (David, 1991, David, 1998)

Each school of thought mentioned above is analysed to see how each explains change within a regional framework. This approach rejects any sharp distinction between International Relations theory and the regionalist literature as most of the regionalist literature can be associated to different schools of thought. While their main object of study, i.e. regionalism and regionalisation, differs, their assumptions and methodology are usually similar. In this chapter, both the explanatory power as well as the limitations of the different bodies of theory are exposed. No single theory is probably able to deliver a perfect explanation of the issue at hand, but they provide useful indicators and analytical devices to solve the puzzle. In practice, they are often in contact and mutual dialogue with
each other. These categories are not mutually exclusive, and the most persuasive interpretations are likely to draw from more than one theoretical tradition. While every approach is not considered here, the most fertile theoretical traditions for the issue at hand were called upon.

The goal of this chapter is to provide a series of hypotheses explaining the emergence of ECOWAS and SADC as regional security organisations that will then be tested in the following chapters against the historical reality of the evolution of the two institutions.

* Regionalism and security, a multilevel game

African politics has historically been of little interest to global powers. But systemic changes and the foreign policy of great powers at the international and continental level have an impact on regional African politics, so do the internal developments within each member state. This section outlines each set of potential factors explaining the emergence of ECOWAS and SADC as security institutions at the international, regional and domestic levels. (Singer, 1961)

The international environment

At the international level, three factors could explain the transformation of ECOWAS and SADC in security organisations in the 1990s: the end of the Cold War that changed the entire structure of international relations at the time, the specific role of global powers
World politics drastically changed at the end of the Cold War with a structural shift from a bipolar to a unipolar world that took away the Cold War ‘overlay’ that had constrained African international relations since independence. The end of the Cold War had a drastic effect around the world as it changed the number of great powers in the system. African regional dynamics had been trumped by Cold War concerns and local conflicts had become proxy wars between the United States and the Soviet Union. Besides bringing these proxy wars to an end, the collapse of the Soviet Union had two major consequences in Africa: it triggered or contributed to the wave of democratisation and led to a greater marginalisation of the continent on the world stage. Aid started to dry out as it became more difficult to play the donors off against each other, notably in the domain of security. Even today, the African continent remains at the margins of world politics. Has this state of affairs opened the political space necessary to develop regional security institutions?

Regional security organisations might have emerged out of ECOWAS and SADC because the great powers pushed for it or because they neglected African security. The main three international players on the African continent in the domain of security – including the training of African troops – are France, the United Kingdom and the United States (Permanent 3 or P3). France and the UK have longstanding ties with numerous

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31 This study focuses primarily on the P3 as they are the only three that have had a more or less constant interest in the region. This is due to their colonial past for the United Kingdom and France and due to its unique position in world politics for the United States. While the USSR did play a significant role on the African continent during the Cold War, it withdrew in the 1990s. China’s role is increasingly significant but its involvement was still barely noticeable in the 1990s. Finally, the role of the United Nations is considered
African countries due to their colonial past. The United States, as the sole superpower, has interests that span the whole globe, including Africa. The attention of these great powers was focused elsewhere during the 1990s: on Eastern Europe for France and the UK and in Kuwait and Iraq for the US. As a consequence, they favoured a burden-shifting approach to the question of security in Africa. The P3 have been scaling down their involvement in Africa, each for its own particular reasons. The European Union is another actor worth exploring as its role in Africa and its commitment to the promotion of regionalism around the world make it an increasingly important player. Other countries, such as China, Russia and increasingly Brazil, have started to get involved in African politics; but, due to their restricted means and their relatively recent interest, their impact is only limited.

How significant an impact did the foreign policies of the P3 (and the EU), as such or through the Security Council of the UN, have on regional politics and the decision to create security institutions?

The other international powers that could have had an impact on ECOWAS and SADC are the key continental players. There is an overlap between continental and regional powers such as Nigeria and South Africa, the hegemon in their respective region, as they are also key players in the continent. It is nevertheless important to make an independent and separate analysis of the continental level as, for instance, the continental policies put forth by South Africa such as NEPAD (New Partnership for African Development) or the APRM (African Peer Review Mechanism) have an indirect impact on ECOWAS and SADC. Both Nigeria and South Africa try to control the continental agenda. Furthermore, developments in West and Southern Africa do not take place in a vacuum and influence the other region’s decision and evolution. Other important players are Libya, Gaddafi but, in the domain of security, decisions were mainly taken at the level of the UN Security Council and thus among the P3.
being often a wild card in African international relations thanks to his large financial resources, and the African Union as an institution and as the voice of its fifty-three member states. The AU itself did also adopt clearer security provisions in 2001. In short, did the impetus to create regional security organisations come from Libya, South Africa and Nigeria through the African Union or did the idea emerge independently at the regional level in West and Southern Africa?

The regional dynamics

At the regional level, there are three different ways to look at the relations between the member states of ECOWAS and SADC. The main causal factor behind their transformation in security organisations could be found in the foreign policy of the major power, the regional hegemon, i.e. Nigeria and South Africa, or in the overall interaction, in a virtuous circle of cooperation between all member states or in the regional organisation as an institutional source of common identity and common values. Each approach points in the direction of different triggers: power (realism), cooperation (liberalism) or common interests and values (constructivism).

Particular attention should obviously be paid to the regional hegemon: Nigeria in West Africa and South Africa in Southern Africa. Leadership is key for any institution to evolve and the inclusion of a security provision in the charter of a regional organisation cannot be done without the benediction of the regional hegemon. Indeed, Nigeria and South Africa were the leaders of the interventions in Liberia in 1990 and in Lesotho in 1998 respectively. Nevertheless, their actions have to be put in perspective by the acceptance or not of their leadership by the other member states. How much does the
regional hegemon need the other member states to advance its power? At a deeper level, how and why does a hegemon need a regional security institution? Is there a difference in attitude and approach between Nigeria and South Africa? The leadership role of both Nigeria and South Africa would need to be examined carefully not only during the negotiations around the transformation of ECOWAS and SADC in security organisations, but also in the implementation of the security agenda of these organisations.

The emergence of a security institution can also be the outcome of negotiations between member states who found a common interest in the change from economic to security. Their common interest could have been the main driver of change. This approach allows for the in-depth analysis of the regional dynamics within ECOWAS and SADC. It brings into the spotlight the foreign policy not only of the regional hegemon but also of the other main players, namely Senegal, Côte d’Ivoire, Mali and Ghana in ECOWAS, and Zimbabwe, Angola, Botswana and Namibia in SADC. This approach leads to the exploration in greater details of the fault lines that run across each region: be it the Francophone vs. Anglophone divide, the FLS vs. apartheid divide, the pacific vs. militarist approach to international relations, etc. What was the external logic, the recognised common interest that guided the adoption of security provisions within the existing regional organisations? An analysis of the regional dynamics lays out the security complexes in each region and how a regional security organisation could provide a possible solution to these issues.

Ultimately, the regional organisation itself could also have had, directly or not, a say in the broadening of its mandate to security issues. The Secretariat or Commission, by highlighting its independent and non-partisan expertise, could have had an impact in the
shaping of the security agenda of the regional organisation. This argument is often made with regards the European Commission and it is worth exploring whether this is also the case within ECOWAS and SADC. The regional organisation per se could be a source of change, be it through spillover or through the achievement of greater integration, thus enhancing the common regional identity. This approach asks whether a regional identity actually exists in West and Southern Africa, whether it was created or strengthened by the regional organisation and whether it was a necessary factor in the decision to transform ECOWAS and SADC in security institutions. States were maybe not the only actors in the decision to create a security institution. The importance of norms is also emphasised here as a certain amount of mutual trust would be necessary to the emergence of any security institution. Can the decision to create a security institution be traced back to common values and an atmosphere of trust fostered by the regional organisation?

The domestic level: Analysing the African state

The search for possible causal factors has been so far limited to the foreign policies of different states, be it the US, Nigeria or small Lesotho. But this does not address the question of how foreign policy is formulated and who articulates what the national interest of a specific country should be. An analysis at the domestic level highlights other potentially significant factors: the role of the individual leaders, the fact that they are democracies or not and how strong or weak each state is.

African international relations are traditionally organised around big summits that bring together Heads of State and Government (HoSG) who often take crucial decisions over the head of their own governments and administrations. This is also linked to the fact that
a number of African countries are not democracies and in that case, the head of state usually has sole decisional power. Even within democracies, foreign policy is not something over which parliaments have a good oversight. Were there some specific individuals, be it heads of state like Mandela of South Africa or Obasanjo of Nigeria or even Executive Secretaries of ECOWAS and SADC that drove the process and whose efforts truly made a difference in the evolution of these institutions? Within the negotiations that led to the adoption of security provisions was there a key player whose belief in the regionalist project won the others over? It is slightly difficult to distinguish a body of literature that specifically focuses on this possible factor as it is by definition difficult to generalise the role that individual leaders can play. It is nevertheless an important factor to be considered as was repeatedly pointed out during the fieldwork.

The nature of the member states of the regional organisation could also provide an interesting clue as to why security provisions were adopted. A very broad definition of security was privileged in the introductory chapter covering both state security and the security of the people. Many argue that the best way to avoid conflict is to promote democracy within member states as democracies do not go to war against each other. (Doyle, 1986) Concretely, this means that ECOWAS and SADC do not only engage in mediation or peacekeeping, but also democracy promotion through election monitoring and the condemnation of gross violations of human rights that could trigger a military intervention by the regional organisation. Why have they decided to adopt this broad understanding of security? A possible explanation could be found in the increasing number of member states that are democracies. There is an increasing body of literature more or less loosely based on democratic peace theory that focuses on the relationship between democracy, democratisation and regionalism – and institutions in general – that
would bring interesting insights to the analysis. (Pevehouse, 2005) Another realist take on this would however see the democracy promotion agenda as a way of signalling their changed democratic nature to Western countries in order to obtain aid.

A final possible reason that is put forward here for the adoption of security provisions at the regional level could lie in the weakness of the African state. The notion of state weakness of course needs to be further explored, but the possible relationship to be tested between state weakness and regional security organisation is rather straightforward: weak states turn to the regional organisation because they cannot maintain security by themselves. This relationship could be articulated in two possible ways:

- The greater the number of weak states, the greater the devolution of security matters to the regional organisation?
- Can weak states, by themselves, create a regional security organisation? Are they too weak to do so?

These hypotheses would of course have to be tested in both ECOWAS and SADC.

Each one of these potential explanations for the emergence of security institutions in ECOWAS and SADC takes its roots into a different school of thought of international relations. Each one of these approaches is explored further in order to take a first step towards evaluating their potential explanatory power for the cases at hand. The following sections go over the main tenets of each school of thought and explore how they explain change as change within a regional organisation is at the heart of this study.
Realism or the power behind change

Realism and regional institutions

States live in an anarchical system without a central governing authority. The state, as a rational actor individually responsible for its own security, turns to self-help to protect its national interest, to minimise its losses and maximise its gains relative to other actors. (Waltz, 1979) Wars are the natural outcomes of this self-help logic with states seeking power and security. Power consists here of material capabilities such as military power, control over resources, be it natural resources, markets, or capital, and economic and technological advantage. In these circumstances, cooperation is rare and evanescent with alliances forming and disintegrating quickly. Order is obtained through the establishment of a balance-of-power, both at the international and at the regional level. To maintain order, states shift from one alliance to the other in order for a balance to be achieved.

Beyond these basic tenets of realism, there is a mosaic of – sometimes contradictory – discourses and analyses on all aspects of international life. Realism is not monolithic and, even though it is a gross simplification, can be separated between neorealism and classical realism. Neo-realism is the less promising option to explain our puzzle. Few neo-realists consider that ‘institutions matter.’ Mearsheimer claims that institutions ‘matter only on the margins’ and ‘have minimal influence on state behaviour.’ (Mearsheimer, 1995, p.7) The same cannot be said of classical realists who ‘did recognise that institutions are a vital part of the landscape of world politics.’ (Schweller and Priess, 1997, p.2) Classical realists accept that institutions matter, but not that they are autonomous from the states that constitute them: ‘Realists usually argue that institutions
are largely effects and are established when and only when decision-makers believe that there are mutual benefits to be gained. They are tools of statecraft, important ones to be sure, but mainly a reflection of state interest.’ (Jervis, 1999, p.63) States can use institutions to lock in their predominance through the strategy of ‘binding,’ in which a state attempts to exert control over a group of state by incorporating them into a web of institutional arrangements. Institutions are hence used as a way to maintain and perpetuate a situation of dominance. (Ikenberry, 2001) In this research, this describes the regional hegemon or an external hegemon whose global reach affects the region studied.

It is through this approach towards institutions that realism can address the issue of regionalism, an approach especially useful for this study. Realism notably explores the relationship between hegemony and regionalism, and more precisely the role of the hegemon as a stimulus or catalyst to the creation of regional institutions. A realist approach to hegemony highlights the importance of material factors, be it neorealism (Layne, 1993, Mearsheimer, 2001), theories of hegemonic stability (Gilpin, 1983, Keohane, 1980, Keohane, 1984, Kindleberger, 1981, Kindleberger, 1986) or long-cycle theories. (Modelski, 1987, Modelski and Thompson, 1996, Rasler and Thompson, 1994)

One can define regional hegemony by contrasting it to other terms that are widely used in the literature. The concept of “middle power” is usually associated with rich and democratic states such as Australia and Canada that contribute to the stabilisation and legitimisation of the global order through multilateral initiatives. (Cooper et al., 1993) Sometimes applied to South Africa, Brazil or India, the analyses focus however on the contribution of these countries to the global order and less on their role within their respective regions. It is thus not apposite here. Regional hegemony is a type of regional power, defined as the relative preponderance of a state within a region. But regional
hegemony is defined by the type of relationship between the regional power and its neighbours, that relationship being set between the two poles of domination and lack of control and defined by the acceptance of the leadership of the regional hegemon by its neighbours. 32

Andrew Hurrell identifies four roles for the hegemon. (Hurrell, 1995a, pp.342-343) First, it can be perceived as a threat by its neighbours, hence triggering the formation of a regional organisation, like SADCC against South Africa or MERCOSUR against the United States. Second, its neighbours try to control the hegemon through the creation of a regional institution. It is created as a constraint for the most powerful through the establishment of rules and procedures each state has to follow. A classic example of ‘regionalist entrapment’ is the inclusion of Germany within the European Community. The overall realist logic claims that ‘many regionalist groupings are basically the natural response of weak states trapped in the world of the strong.’ (Hurrell, 1995a, p.341, Pugh and Sidhu, 2003, Adebajo and Rashid, 2004, Rothchild, 1987) Third, its neighbours decide to bandwagon with the regional hegemon in the hope of receiving political or economic rewards. The hegemon is then perceived as a source of security and protection, leading weaker, secondary states to seek protection under the hegemon. Fourth, it seeks to expand or maintain its power through an institution that could serve as an amplifier of its interests. This is notably the case of France with regards to its involvement with the European Union. In the African case, this was also duly noted by Sylvanus Olympio, Togo’s first leader: ‘political unification is only desired by those political leaders who believe they could come out on top in such unions.’ (Olympio, 1961, quoted in Herbst, 2000, p.101)

The role of the hegemon seems hence pivotal not only for the creation of regional organisations but also for its subsequent change in form and outreach. The key for institutional change is the regional hegemon, i.e. Nigeria and South Africa, or if and when interested, global powers such as the United Kingdom, the United States and France. But how does the hegemon bring change? What are the mechanisms of change? How does the hegemon obtain compliance?

**Realism and change**

War is the mechanism of choice to explain change for realism. ‘Although resolution of a crisis through peaceful adjustment of the systemic disequilibrium is possible, the principal mechanism of change through history has been war, or what we shall call hegemonic war (i.e., a war that determines which state or states will be dominant and will govern the system).’ (Gilpin, 1983, p.15) Among the classical realist approach, Robert Gilpin is among the few who puts forth a theory of change in international relations. Change comes after a hegemonic war that leads to a new order reflecting the new distribution of power capabilities.

Over time, the balance of power between the actors on the international scene changes as a result of economic, military, or technological developments. The actors who benefit most from a change in the international system and who have gained the power to effect such a change will launch a hegemonic war to shape a new order that reflects the new distribution of power. (Gilpin, 1983, p.9) The root of the causal mechanism for change can be found in the ‘realist law of uneven growth’ that states that ‘as the power of a group
or state increases, that group or state will be tempted to try to increase its control over its environment.’ (Gilpin, 1983, p.94)

The differential in growth of power has its sources in domestic developments, be it economic growth, demographic change, major military or technological innovations in transportation and communication. This differential will in turn lead to a usually confrontational readjustment of the system, in order to reach a new balance of power. Within this framework, institutions like regional organisations are essentially ‘arenas for acting out power relationships.’ (Evans and Wilson, 1992, p.330)

While Gilpin keeps a strict realist line by emphasising coercion and material incentives for change, other theorists, such as Ikenberry and Kupchan, broaden our understanding of hegemonic power by introducing the notion of socialisation. While not entirely new since Gilpin also addressed the question of legitimacy under the term ‘prestige,’ (Gilpin, 1983, pp.12, 29-34) this approach aims at explaining why a hegemonic order can persist even after the power of the hegemon has declined. It is also known as the theory of hegemonic stability. Going beyond the idea of coercion, they analyse a subtler component of hegemonic power at the level of substantive beliefs where ‘acquiescence is the result of the socialisation of leaders in secondary nations.’ (Ikenberry and Kupchan, 1990, p.286)

These two ways of exercising power, and thus of changing the international system, go hand in hand and are difficult to clearly distinguish: ‘rule based on might is enhanced by rule based on right.’ (Ikenberry and Kupchan, 1990, p.286) Within this context, institutions are used as a way to lock in power. According to Ikenberry, the remarkable stability of the post-World War II order is due to the fact that hegemony and power balances have been locked in institutions such as the United Nations or NATO.
Their more refined analysis fits within the broader pattern set up by Gilpin since they posit that ‘socialisation occurs primarily after wars and political crises.’ (Ikenberry and Kupchan, 1990, p.284)

The limitations of a realist approach

The realist approach to change having been outlined, the question still remains of its relevance to the issue at hand. Being a generalising and tentatively universal theory, the interest of realism in regionalism can only be secondary or ‘at the margins.’ This is especially true of neo-realism as a systemic theory stressing the material constraints linked to the anarchical nature of the international system. But a systemic neo-realist approach is not completely out of place here as this study looks at the consequences of the end of the Cold War on African politics. The source of change is left outside Waltz’s theory, and to a lesser extent outside of Gilpin’s theory, and is contained at the domestic level. This calls for looking inside the state and for an in-depth analysis at the domestic level of each potential hegemon in order to characterise its power, potential or real. Furthermore, one can argue that the link between power or capabilities and interests is ambiguous. (Haggard and Simmons, 1987, p.501)

This leads us to the question of hegemony. One of the main problems with the realist approaches is that most of them assume a certain degree of automaticity between unequal distribution of power and hegemony. Realism seems to equate the will and power of the regional hegemon to that of the regional organisation, thus neglecting the reality of intricate negotiations within regional institutions. Furthermore, the hegemon in regional institutions is also constrained by the global context. It tends to oversimplify the
complexity of the regionalist phenomenon in Africa. While realism in its crudest form can be useful to describe the ‘ugly and brutal side of international life’ (Wendt, 1995, p.76) in Africa, it does not always propose the most useful explanation to phenomenon of cooperation beyond coercion or socialisation.

**Liberalism or how do states cooperate**

Liberalism is the school of thought of reference for the study of institutions and should at first sight offer the most interesting insights. Studies of security regimes all refer directly or indirectly to liberalism. It is thus important to go in details into the liberal argument and its limitations when it comes to explaining change.

**Neoliberal institutionalism, intergovernmentalism and neofunctionalism**

While realism focuses on war and domestic capabilities as the source of change, liberalism, understood here as neoliberal institutionalism, intergovernmentalism and neofunctionalism, focuses on cooperation, especially through the creation of international institutions, such as regional organisations. Cooperation occurs ‘when the policies actually followed by one government are regarded by its partners as facilitating realisation of their own objectives, as the result of a process of policy coordination.’ (Keohane, 1984, pp.51-52) This policy coordination should lead to a new situation with

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33 Liberalism is understood here as neoliberal institutionalism. According to Moravcsik, there is however another understanding of liberalism, also known as republication liberal theory, that stresses ‘the impact of varying domestic political institutions – in particular, the scope and bias of political representation – on foreign policy.’ MORAVCSIK, A. (2000) The origins of human rights regimes: Democratic delegation in postwar Europe. *International organization*, 54, 217-252. This includes democratic peace theory. Although not addressed under the label of liberalism, this study does take a look at domestic factors in the following sections of this chapter. His approach is in the end comparable to the one of David who is quote in Moravcsik’s article. See section below on the Third World focused literature: DAVID, S. R. (1991) Explaining Third World Alignment. *World Politics: A Quarterly Journal of International Relations*, 43, 233-256.
all actors being better off than had they acted independently. (Alagappa, 1995, p.362) In short, cooperation benefits all, while confrontation benefits a few at the expense of the others.

Institutions are instances of cooperation and facilitating tools for cooperation. Institutions, defined by Robert Keohane as ‘persistent and connected set of rules (formal and informal) that prescribe behavioural roles, constrain activity, and shape expectations’ (Keohane, 1989, p.3) and by John Mearsheimer as ‘a set of rules that stipulate the ways in which states should cooperate and compete with one another,’ (Mearsheimer, 1995, p.8) are key to overcome dilemmas of collective action. ‘These rules are negotiated by states, and […] are typically formalised in international agreements, and are usually embedded in organisations with their own personnel and budgets,’ (Mearsheimer, 1995, pp.8-9) for instance, a regional organisation. Cooperation and the creation of institutions are the result of policies by actors who are assumed to be rational, self-interested, strategic, and opportunistic in an international anarchical environment with no outside actor stepping in to enforce agreements. Regime theory, game-theoretic and functional approaches share these basic assumptions.

Most of these theories – including regime theory – explain the creation of institutions as a response to problems of collective action, incomplete or asymmetrical information, high transaction costs, enforcement problems, and other barriers to Pareto efficiency and welfare improvement for their members. (Barnett and Finnemore, 1999, p.699) Functionalist theories have drawn heavily from the economic literature on transaction costs. ‘In this literature, organisations […] evolve as solutions to the opportunism, uncertainty, information costs, measurement problems, and difficulties of contract
enforcement.’ (Haggard and Simmons, 1987, p.507) The work of Robert Keohane draws especially from functionalist approaches that emphasise the efficiency reasons for rules and agreements among regime participants. (Keohane, 1984)

Game-theoretic and functional approaches focus on helping solve the prisoners’ dilemma. Institutions help put to rest concerns about cheating by creating rules that constrain states. Mearsheimer outlines four ways institutions can help states overcome collective action problems: institutionalised iteration, issue-linkage, provision of information, and reduction of transaction costs. (Mearsheimer, 1995) All these mechanisms are fairly self-explanatory, except for institutionalised iteration. The key here is that institutions lengthen the ‘shadow of the future,’ (Gowa, 1986, Snyder and Diesing, 1977) thus allowing states to expect future gains, pay-back a cheater in the future and build their reputation. This temporal factor was, and to a lesser extent still is, particularly relevant for African regional organisations, especially ECOWAS whose leaders of member states are at risk of being deposed by a coup d’état in their respective countries. Provision of information is also a key service offered by institutions as it helps resolve distributional conflicts ‘by assuring states that gains are evenly divided over time.’ (Keohane and Martin, 1995, pp.45-46) This is key to their effectiveness.

Neoliberal institutionalism gives us the broad picture about regional organisations, for what purposes they were created and what tasks they are supposed to achieve. Intergovernmentalism and neofunctionalism take us a step further to discover who drives the process of cooperation and thus who drives change.
Intergovernmentalism is very much in line with the statist assumptions of neoliberal institutionalism. Indeed, regional cooperation and integration is driven by the states themselves ‘and how far the integration process would go depended upon the strategies and decisions of key states. In essence, integration was an intergovernmental phenomenon.’ (Farrell, 2005, p.7) Intergovernmentalism argues that regional integration can be best understood as a series of bargains among the political leaders of the major states in a region. (Moravcsik, 1998) The bargains are the result of converging preferences among these states. The focus here is on states’ national interests and on power-related variables.

The focus of neofunctionalism (Haas, 1958, Lindberg, 1963) differs significantly. In order to explain the process of integration, it does not put emphasis on states, but on ‘spill-over.’ Functional, mainly economic, spillovers would lead to economic and political integration. In particular, in those areas where high levels of interdependence actually or potentially exist, spillover integration will be difficult to resist. During the process of European integration itself, this has often been referred to as the Monnet method. But spillover was just a means towards a greater end. Their approach is teleological since they ‘are interested in tracing progress toward a terminal condition called political community.’ (Haas, 1961, pp.366-367) Loyalties and expectations of actors would be transferred away from the nation-state towards new supranational organisations through a learning process. The theory ascribes a dynamic role to political actors at both the national and supranational levels, be it individuals or interest groups.
In realism, the agent and process of change are rather straightforward. By simplifying their argument, we can posit that the main agent of change is the most powerful state that obtains the change it desires by waging a hegemonic war, or by socialisation. Neoliberal institutionalism and intergovernmentalism also focus on states as agents of change, albeit not in such a one-dimensional way as realism. Change is brought about through (peaceful) interstate bargains. Neofunctionalism highlights the role of other agents, the regional organisation itself, individuals, and interest groups who influence the process of spillover.

Intergovernmentalism squarely insists on the pivotal role of international negotiations shaping the future of regional organisations. However, neoliberal theory points in the direction of a possible role for institutions. Institutions can have an indirect impact on change by influencing states. Institutions can have two effects. First, they can modify state power by channelling and constraining state actions. Second they can alter the ways in which states identify and pursue their interests. By altering state preferences, they therefore change state behaviour. At a broader, more abstract level, institutions can also help build trust. For instance, it seems fair to say that France trusts that Germany will not attack it despite the tumultuous history between the two countries. Doubtless, the European Union had a key role in smoothing differences and allaying fears. Concretely, this means that besides state bargains, change comes from a convergence in expectations between states. Institutions make cooperation more likely in the future and this increasingly becomes the default pattern of interaction between states, thus making war unlikely.
Change, according to neofunctionalist arguments, is a shift from economic functional organisations to political communities. (Nye, 1971, Senghor, 1990) Regional organisations designed to facilitate economic and technical cooperation become the basis for increasing political interaction. Spillover is described as a process without a subject, while at the same time, individuals and interest groups have a role to play in this evolution. ‘By virtue of their participation in the policymaking process of an integrating community, interest groups and other participants were hypothesised to “learn” about the rewards of such involvement and undergo attitudinal changes inclining them favourably toward the integrative system.’ (Martin and Simmons, 1998, p.735) Examples of these agents of change are ‘epistemic communities,’ i.e. ‘a professional group that believes in the same cause-and-effect relationships, truth tests to assess them, and shares common values.’ (Haas, 1990, p.55) This seems to be another way to underline the importance of elites for change. These ‘interest groups’ can also be corporate interests that lobby for more favourable policies at the regional level. Or another agent could even be a private individual such as Jean Monnet. Neofunctionalism thus encourages us to look beyond the state to look for agents of change. But we will see that spillover is not what happened in our two case studies.

The limitations of a liberal approach

Despite these insights, neoliberal institutionalism and intergovernmentalism suffer from several shortcomings. A first critique would focus on their statist approach. ‘Ontologically, [realism and liberalism] are theories about states. They provide no basis for imputing interests to IOs beyond the goals states […] give them.’ (Barnett and
For example, by focusing solely on episodes of interstate bargains, the theory cuts into on-going economic, legal, and social processes that precede or follow interstate bargains. (Moravcsik, 1998) Indeed, they offer little explanation or analysis about the nature of regional cooperation once it has been established, and how this sustained cooperation might lead to new forms of institutional structures.

Another critique could be directed towards their assumption that cooperation brings mutual gains and convergence. Functional theories assume convergent interests – they are deemed necessary for cooperation to take place – and neglect exploring how institutions and regional organisations may institutionalise inequalities. (Haggard and Simmons, 1987, p.509) International agreements can have divergent effects in each country.

The final most potent critique against neoliberal institutionalism is its neglect of domestic factors. (Milner, 1992, p.488) Like in realism, this level is left outside the theory. ‘The domestic processes affecting payoff structures are frequently black boxed as “exogenous.”’ (Haggard and Simmons, 1987, p.506) Indeed, domestic political and economic conditions create incentives to comply to and collaborate with the regional organisation. According to Haggard and Simmons, there are two reasons for the neglect of the domestic level. ‘One is the centrality of anarchy as the condition for differentiating between domestic and international politics; the other is the use of game theory, with its assumption of unitary, rational actors.’ (Milner, 1992, p.489) Nevertheless, an analysis of domestic politics would be essential in providing information about the construction of national interests – the reasons behind the strategies adopted by each state –, and about the implementation and enforcement of international agreements. (Milner, 1992, p.493) All this underlines the need for a theory of domestic politics to explain change.
Neofunctionalism does not suffer from the same shortcomings. Beyond its eurocentrism, critiques concentrate on the concept of spillover finding particularly problematic the automaticity of the process. They also highlight the teleological nature of the theory. (Farrell, 2005, p.7) As has been made clear by the experience of the East African Community, economic integration does not necessarily or automatically lead to political cooperation. On the contrary, it may reinforce political differences. (Deng, 1996, p.164) Indeed, it can be argued that, rather than technocratic solutions, regional integration in developing countries can lead to over politicisation. (Nye, 1966, Nye, 1970) Indeed, neofunctionalism and neo-liberalism do not account for key aspects of African politics. For instance, it makes a difference between matters of ‘low’ politics, meaning economic issues that can be subject to technocratic management, and matters of ‘high’ politics. This distinction is irrelevant for African countries, for which economic and developmental issues are of such importance that they immediately belong to the sphere of ‘high’ politics. There is ‘practical inseparability of the economics of integration from the politics of integration’ according to the then Executive Secretary of ECOWAS, Abass Bundu. (ECOWAS, 1990) Furthermore, due to the relative weakness of the countries taking part in regionalist projects in Africa, the external context and influence can in no way be cast aside like neo-functionalism does.

Overall, the main critique that can be levelled against liberalism as a whole is that it assumes that cooperation and institutions are usually successful. It disregards instances where institutionalised cooperation has failed to bring mutual gains, a case that seems particularly important for developing countries. They are thus in a difficult position to
explain why member states would give greater security tasks to failing economic organisations.

**Constructivism or the transformative power of norms**

*Normative transformation*

The core insight of conventional constructivism is that cooperation and regionalism cannot be understood or explained without reference to the role of ideas, norms and emerging regional identities, as opposed to merely material factors. (Wendt, 1999) The values of actors, the beliefs they hold about the importance of the issues they are negotiating, and their identity are key variables in explaining cooperation and change within international institutions. (Haggard and Simmons, 1987) This approach is partly shared by the ‘English School.’ (Bull, 1977, Buzan et al., 1998)

Constructivists posit that interests in an issue cannot be unambiguously deduced from domestic capabilities and relative power at the international level. ‘Although rationalist approaches are generally powerful for explaining how policy preferences change when external constraints or information conditions change, alternative approaches, such as constructivism, are necessary for explaining more fundamental, internal changes in actors’ goals.’ (Martin and Simmons, 1998, p.743) Constructivism also proves especially useful in explaining structural changes in the state system such as the emergence of Westphalian sovereignty. (Philpott, 2001) Namely, states can change the rules of the game. (Kratochvil, 1995)
Constructivists understand institutions, such as regional organisations, as diffuse and socially constructed worldviews that bound and shape the strategic behaviour of states. They define the interests, identities and actions of states, as well as their understanding of the problems at hand. They provide normative and cognitive maps for interpretation and action and affect the identities and social purposes of states. ‘Actors come to internalise external norms via institutionalised interaction leading to changes in both interests and identity.’ (Hurrell, 2005, p.47) Regional organisations can effectively promote norms because they are considered as legitimate, their legitimacy being derived from the neutral, professional, and rational-legal authority they embody. (Weber et al., 1998, Barnett and Finnemore, 1999, Barnett and Finnemore, 2004)

More specifically, there has been as of yet few constructivist analysis of regionalism. (Higgott, 1998, Checkel, 2001, Wind, 2001, Acharya, 2004) These analyses claim that, regarding regional integration, ‘the member states are far from “in control” of the process.’ (Wind, 2001, p.30) Richard Higgott, applying constructivism to East Asia argues that ‘in a regional context, questions of regional awareness and regional identity become important factors,’ as they have a transformative influence on the member states of the regional organisation. (Higgott, 1998, p.46) He later highlights another potential contribution of constructivism that ‘alerts us to the possibility that systemic regional interaction may transform identity.’ (Higgott, 1998, p.56)

The idea of ‘security communities’ put forth by Adler and Barnett follows broadly the same line of argument. (Adler and Barnett, 1998b) They posit that a community exists at the international and regional levels and that security politics are profoundly shaped by it. The actors of this community share values and norms, have a social identity, and their
repeated cooperation creates a community of trust. Security communities develop the following way: as cross-border interaction increases, more values and norms are shared forming a common identity, thus making war less likely. Indeed, beyond this insistence on norms, their argument is also not very far from the democratic peace tradition. (Doyle, 1986) ‘To be a member of the community of democratic states in the contemporary era, for instance, requires certain war-avoidance practices.’ (Adler and Barnett, 1998a, p.34, see also Buzan and Wæver, 2003)

The new regionalism approach (NRA) is the main current within the regionalist literature that shares part of the social-constructivist theoretical perspective. (Hettne and Inotai, 1994) The new regionalism approach considers regionalism ‘to have a strategic goal of region-building, of establishing regional coherence and identity.’ (Farrell, 2005, p.8) With its reaction against a state-centric approach – something not shared by conventional constructivism –, the new regionalism approach (NRA) seems to be particularly apposite in order to understand the phenomenon of African regionalism. (Clapham, 1999, p.53)

The NRA refuses to privilege state actors and aims at showing the importance of non-state actors, approach often referred to as ‘informal regionalism’ or ‘regionalism from below.’ The NRA explores the state-corporation-society ‘triangular’ relations and the interplay between states, organisations, and micro-players that account for the complex nature of regionalisation processes. (Grant and Söderbaum, 2003, p.198) This approach includes a wide range of non-state actors and activities, such as transnational corporations (TNCs), ethnic business networks, civil societies, think-tanks, private armies, development corridors, and the informal border politics of small-scale trade, bartering, smuggling and crime.
Constructivism and change

Constructivism clearly points at a radically different set of tools to explain change. Leaving material capabilities aside, they insist on the role of ideas, norms and identity. (Philpott, 2001) Change comes through (elite-) learning or, in a slower process, through the transformation of identity. How does this phenomenon concretely take place and how can we analyse it? Finnemore and Sikkink propose a model known as norm cascade that explains the emergence and internalisation of a norm, such as human rights norms. Norms are taken up and shaped by norm entrepreneurs who try to persuade certain states and international organisations to adopt them. Once a significant number of key states has adopted it, there is a norm cascade, meaning it becomes increasingly prominent and widely accepted. The last step is the internalisation and institutionalisation of the norm at the domestic level. (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998)

Another useful model to understand the puzzle we are focusing on has been formalised by Amitav Acharya. (Acharya, 2004) It focuses on norm localisation and institutional change in Asian regionalism. In short, transnational norms are promoted by transnational norm entrepreneurs and are then adopted by local agents. The reaction to these norms can be threefold: resistance, localisation, i.e. the adaptation of the norm to local reality, or norm displacement, i.e. the replacement of the local norm by the transnational norm. (Acharya, 2004, p.254) This model is more refined because it allows for complexity and a multiplicity of outcomes. It is also all the more relevant to explain the normative change in ECOWAS and SADC towards democratic governance with respect of human rights to the extent that these norms are usually considered as ‘transnational norms.’
The limitations of constructivism

One of the main limitations of constructivism is the difficulty it has to posit generalisable and falsifiable hypotheses. Their main contention that norms and identities matter is in many instances a valid and fruitful insight, but how they matter is difficult to clearly define in the constructivist literature. Sorting out the autonomous influence of norms and values can prove difficult during the analysis, since actors, including states, of greater or lesser power, usually endorse these norms. How do you differentiate between the influence of the norm-carrier and that of the norm itself? Is the norm carrier promoting this norm truly because it is convinced of its value or because it has other egoist motives to do so? This question becomes all the more weighty when it is a great power or the regional hegemon that is the main norm-carrier. ‘Sorting out the autonomous influence of knowledge and ideology can prove extremely difficult in practice, particularly where there is congruence between ideology and structural position.’ (Haggard and Simmons, 1987, p.512)

Linked to the critique above, constructivism tends to have a too broad research agenda. When it comes to norm promotion, should we only focus on elites following in that Adler and Barnett? (Adler and Barnett, 1998b) This approach is criticised by Morten Bøås who claims that the security these elites are promoting is not that of the population, but their own security and their grip on power. (Bøås, 2000, p.311) Or, should we focus on norm entrepreneurs like Finnemore and Sikkink argue, or on local agents, as Acharya proposes? (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998, Acharya, 2004)
The problems of this very broad agenda are similar for the new regionalism approach. Since, unlike conventional constructivism, it rejects a state-centric approach, the NRA has to face a definitional problem: who do you include as a non-state actor of regionalisation? Regional NGOs, warlords, transnational corporations, ethnic trade networks, individual smugglers, drug-dealers, and women associations: the list can be very long. Once one starts deconstructing the state, where does one stop?

A final critique would focus on the teleological nature of constructivism when applied to regionalism. Like neofunctionalism that interprets the developments within a regional organisation as the move towards a ‘political community,’ constructivism can be seen as understanding any greater interaction at the regional level as a step towards the creation of a new regional identity. Sometimes, on the contrary, increased interaction can lead to increased confrontation under certain circumstances.

**Third World focused literature or the re-conceptualisation of the state**

**The redefinition of key concepts**

Third World focused literature does not directly address the question of the emergence of regional security organisations. At its core, it is a critique of the applicability of international relations theory to developing countries, and especially to Africa. (Tickner, 2003, Neuman, 1998a, Dunn, 2000c, Dunn and Shaw, 2000, Ayoob, 1995, Brown, 2006) It challenges the great power bias of international relations theory and the universal
applicability of these theories. Can they truly and fruitfully be applied to states like Malaysia or Costa Rica?\textsuperscript{34}

The critique Third World focused literature addresses to international relations theory can be reconstructed along the following three-pronged approach. Some critiques are shared by other traditions of international relations; others are unique to the Third World focused literature. First, realism and liberalism traditionally consider the Third World as irrelevant. The universality of these theories is on shaky ground as they are relying on a very incomplete universe of sample data. (Ayoob, 2002, p.30) Second, all main traditions in international relations are deemed to entertain an important Eurocentric or Western cultural bias. (Neuman, 1998b, p.2) This can go as far as claims of neo-colonialism and neo-imperialism: ‘International Relations reflects and reproduces the inequality present in the disposition of material capabilities in the international system.’ (Ayoob, 2002, p.27) This also recalls the literature on dependency theory, where most Third World states are economically and militarily dependent on powerful states like the United States or the former colonial powers. The third critique is more precise and focuses on a list of ‘concepts that do not fit:’ (Neuman, 1998b, p.2) anarchy, the international system, rational choice, the state, sovereignty, or alliances. It is worth pausing to uncover how some of these concepts are being redefined, especially when confronted with African politics.

‘International relations specialists would do well to abandon the notion that the state is the state.’ (Thomson, 1994, quoted in Ayoob, 2002, p.43) The state, understood in the classical Weberian sense of a monopoly of legitimate physical violence over a

\textsuperscript{34} Waltz claimed that it would be ‘ridiculous to construct a theory of international politics based on Malaysia and Costa Rica.’ WALTZ, K. N. (1979) Theory of international politics, New York ; London, McGraw-Hill.
population in a specific territory, is not an unproblematic primary category of international relations. (Biersteker and Weber, 1996) It is argued that the Westphalian state system that emerged in Europe is qualitatively different from what can be found in the developing world. (Malaquias, 2000, p.13) The state is deemed an artificial colonial imposition. (Jackson, 1990, Zartman, 1995, Reno, 1998, Reno, 2000, Bayart, 1996) Third World states are different. To describe this phenomenon, Kevin Dunn provides an interesting list of the labels attached to the African state (Dunn, 2000a, p.46): ‘failed’ (Leys, 1976), ‘lame’ (Sandbrook, 1985), ‘fictive’ (Callaghy, 1987), ‘weak’ (Rothchild, 1987), ‘collapsing’ (Diamond, 1987), ‘quasi’ (Migdal, 1988), ‘invented’ and ‘imposed’ (Jackson, 1990), ‘shadow’ (O’Brien, 1991), ‘overdeveloped’ and ‘centralised’ (Davidson, 1992), ‘swollen’ (Zartman, 1995), ‘soft’ (Herbst, 1997), ‘extractive’ and ‘parasitic’ (Clark, 1998), ‘premodern’ (Buzan et al., 1998), and ‘post-state’ (Boone, 1998). All these different adjectives are mere indications that the nature of the African state should be explored. The term ‘state weakness’ is defined in a rather restrictive manner here, as a typology of the domestic characteristics and specific problems of the African state is put forth.

The explanation of the change within ECOWAS and SADC calls for a more refined analysis of the characteristics of the African state. According to Barry Buzan, the state includes: (1) a physical base, comprised mainly of population and territory, (2) an institutionalised expression of this physical base, consisting of all government machinery, as well as the laws and procedures that regulate their operation; and (3) an ‘idea of state,’ embodying a legitimating idea based upon ideology, national identity, values, among others, shared by wide sectors of the population. (Buzan, 1991, p.65) State weakness is defined at the domestic level and should not necessarily be equated to weakness on the
international scene. At first sight contradictory, this difference is important and has been made clear by Barry Buzan. He differentiates weak or strong states that have a greater or lesser degree of socio-political cohesion, from weak or strong powers, i.e. ‘the traditional distinction among states in respect of their military and economic capability in relation to each other.’ (Buzan, 1991, p.97) There is no necessary correlation between a strong state and a strong power. Thus, Nigeria and South Africa are arguably strong powers, especially within their regions, but are not that strong as states at the domestic level. (Migdal, 1988)

In this study, the two key variables defining the African state, or any state, are legitimacy and capability. Legitimacy and capability work in tandem with capable delivery of public goods usually enhancing government legitimacy. (See table below)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CAPABILITY</th>
<th>LEGITIMACY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Able and legitimate</td>
<td>Able and legitimate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>→ Westphalian / Weberian state</td>
<td>→ Authoritarian state</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low capability and legitimate</td>
<td>Low capability and illegitimate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>→ Weak state</td>
<td>→ Failed / collapsed state</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE 2.1: Defining the African state

A Westphalian or Weberian state controls its territory and provides security to its population. It has the monopoly of legitimate physical violence. Security threats come from outside a state’s border. Most Western democracies belong to this category. An authoritarian state controls its territory and can be the main source of security or insecurity for its population as there is no real internal control – checks and balances –
over how and against whom violence is used. Nigeria and Zimbabwe are two examples.\footnote{Both countries are rarely compared in the literature and both are classified as partly free according to Freedom House. The main point here is that while both governments have the capabilities to ensure security and order within their borders, their hold on power is not always legitimate.}

A weak state, according to this classification, is considered legitimate by its population and is usually a democracy. However, when faced with crises, be it political or a natural catastrophe, it has difficulties providing security to its population. Of course, lack of capabilities and incompetence can lead to lack of legitimacy as the state does not deliver the public goods it is supposed to. Benin and Botswana are two possible examples as they enjoy strong democratic legitimacy. A failed or collapsed state has neither the legitimacy nor the ability to provide security to its population. In most instances, there is no government as such – unless there are several governments – and no security. Rebels or simple bandits roam freely inside its borders. Liberia, Sierra Leone and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) are typical examples although they are now slowly recovering. These are ideal types and many countries are difficult to categorise as weak or authoritarian and are often a combination of the two. Nevertheless, this classification provides an answer to the critics who would argue that it is ridiculous to call Nigeria a weak state. It might not be military weak but it still vulnerable and constantly faces the spectre of a military coup due to its limited internal legitimacy and corruption. (Migdal, 1988) The main point here is that the analysis needs to focus on the internal characteristics of the African state, on where its weaknesses lie, whether lack of capabilities or lack of legitimacy, and see how this impacts the regional organisation.

‘Sub-Saharan Africa has always been a challenge to International Relations (IR) theory, and this is also true for Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT).’ (Buzan and Wæver, 2003, p.219) In the Third World, security becomes a primarily domestic rather than international concern. (Moon and Azar, 1988, Buzan, 1991, Ayoob, 1995, Ayoob, 2002,
Rothstein, 1977, Ayoob, 1991, Job, 1992) Domestic threats can take many forms including military (or civilian) coups d'état, guerrilla or secessionist movements, mass uprisings or natural catastrophes. The assumptions of the traditional security dilemma metaphor are thus violated. Some have even argued that African states live in a reversed Hobbesian world. It is however arduous to separate external security concerns from those of internal security. ‘The domestic and the international dynamics are both essential to security analysis, as is the complex relationship between them.’ (Buzan, 1991, p.61) The global economic, technological, and military asymmetry between North and South also adds to the insecurity of the Third World states and makes them highly permeable to a large number of external actors, ranging from great powers to international financial institutions and transnational corporations. (Ayoob, 1992) No one level will, by itself, be adequate to understand the security problem as a whole, and the full meaning of each will only become clear when it is seen in relation to the others. Because most threats are more dangerous and potent over short-distances, security relations with neighbours tend to be of first concern, hence underlying the importance of the regional dimension of security.

State weakness and change

How would the Third World focused literature focusing on state weakness explain change at the regional level? When addressed, change is mainly explained through the logic of power politics at the domestic level or through the logic of state building, the two logics being linked. Change thus seems to reside at the domestic level where competing actors confront each other, some of them intent on achieving their personal benefits, (Bayart et al., 1997, Reno, 1998, Taylor, 2004) others intent on building the state. (Ayoob, 1995) It is striking to notice that realist power politics can be applied at the domestic level in many
Third World countries, thus bringing further complexity and clout to the explanatory power of realism. According to David, one should take into account the domestic situation in a country – and notably how strong or contested a hold on power the leader has – to explain foreign policy decisions. He argues that regime – if not leader – survival is the paramount value. The domestic threat, as it hits closer to home, is always the primary one in Third World states. (David, 1991, David, 1998, Herbst, 2007, See also Clark, 2000 on regime security.) This is debatable but nevertheless points to another factor to explain security decisions.

What is the impact of this domestic struggle at the regional level? The degree of the weakness of each member state of a regional organisation can help in explaining the orientation of its foreign policy that will be shaped by the perception of its own vulnerability and by who holds the most political clout at any given time. In this context, the regional organisation can be seen as a remedy to state weakness. This is arguably not unique to Africa since many states form regional organisations in order to find a solution to what is their perceived weakness at the time, be it economic to create a bigger market, or security concerns leading to collective security arrangements. Europe is the first and obvious example. Overall, the regional organisation could be seen as a way to strengthen the voice of its member states on the international scene, hoping that the whole would speak louder than the sum of its parts. This was notably the aim of the Third World movements such as the New International Economic Order (NIEO) or the G77. However, the form taken here is unique and the institutional and normative change within ECOWAS and SADC seems to responds to the specific insecurity dilemma of weak states. Regionalism and region building can be considered as an instrument of state building by providing security, not only at the borders but also at the domestic level.
Indeed, the regional organisation had been created and tailored to ensure the security of the state.

The question ‘whose security?’ remains. It seems that its answer has changed over time: it was first geared towards the security of the regime and its incumbents, and then with the move towards democracy, the security of individuals is increasingly taken into account. Indeed, regional organisations can be seen as modes of ‘regional shadow governance’ or as ‘sovereignty-boosting regional governance.’ (Söderbaum, 2004) ‘Regional shadow governance’ refers to a system of governance, for instance through a regional organisation, that is geared towards providing benefits to the leaders of the member states. In this case, the security of the Heads of State and Government (HoSG) is the key concern. On the other hand, a regional organisation can also be seen as contributing to state building through ‘sovereignty-boosting regional governance.’ At first, state building seems to have been a domestic issue, but it has now arguably reached the regional level. Due to marginalisation of West and Southern Africa after the end of the Cold War, this task has to be achieved at the regional level. In this case, the regional organisation is used to strengthen one’s own and the neighbours’ weak states. ‘Regional interventions are carried out to increase state stability, strengthen sovereignty, and maintain the existing order so as not to disrupt existing or future economic relationships in the region and with the outside world.’ (Söderbaum, 2004, pp.427-428) In this mode of regional governance, the security of individuals becomes increasingly important. Whether this type of regional governance also promotes broader norms, such as democracy and human rights, remains an open question. (Pevehouse, 2005)
In short, the regional organisation could be seen as a way to 1) strengthen institutions inside the state; 2) give a voice to its member states; and 3) legitimise the actions of authoritarian states, both towards their domestic constituency and towards the outside world. This has been previously evoked under the idea of socialisation and hegemonic stability.

The limitations of the Third World focused literature

The limitations of the Third World focused literature are threefold: it tends to reject international relations theory, while some elements, like the institutionalist literature, can be useful; it runs the risk of being accused of exceptionalism, thus denying any attempt at generalisation; and finally it does not make a convincing case of the uselessness of the state and sovereignty as key concepts in international relations theory.

It is worth questioning the ultimate aim of the Third World focused literature considered here. It can either call for a new international relations theory that takes into account and analyses seriously and thoroughly the experience of the Third World. (Dunn, 2000b, p.5) Or it can call for a new theory for the Third World, thus running the risk of further marginalising the study of these countries. Overall, the attack on international relations theory has been rather one-sided and tends to focus mainly on neo-realism and its disconnect from the reality of Third World politics. Arguably, the same could be said for neo-liberalism. But theory does not describe reality; it provides keys to explain it. It is obvious that these theories were not formulated with the Third World in mind but it does not mean that they cannot be tested to see their relevance. One might argue that it is important for IR theory and for Africa that this challenge be met. The literature on
domestic and international institutions can also provide useful tools to understand African politics and international relations.

Furthermore, the dichotomy posited between European and African history often tends to ‘essentialise’ them and does not allow enough space for analysis of the specificities of each individual state history and project. (Brown, 2006, p.127) To a certain extent, the literature on Africa suffers from the same problem that they accuse international relations theory of having: they often over-generalise their findings. ‘Rather too often, the worst cases of political breakdown are cited as if they are permanent characteristics of the countries concerned and representative of the entire continent.’ (Brown, 2006, p.135, emphasis in original text) Not all states are collapsed…

But also, is the critique of the state as a primary category of international relations unique to and only relevant for the Third World? Is the state truly unproblematic in Europe? Even though it is the birth place of the Westphalian state, the continent has been struggling with that notion throughout its history and its numerous wars and now seems to be exploring new horizons with the European Union project. At the same time, the state, while artificial and imposed from outside, has become a crucial part of the international relations of the Third World. Sovereignty can even be regarded as a premium by many African states. Waltz himself hinted to that reality: ‘Who is likely to be around 100 years from now – the United States, the Soviet Union, France, Egypt, Thailand, and Uganda? Or Ford, IBM, Shell, Unilever, and Massey-Ferguson? I would bet on the states, perhaps even on Uganda.’ (Waltz, 1979, p.95) And after sixty years of existence, Uganda is still around and not likely to be erased from the map. Overall, while providing very thorough and useful descriptions of politics within developing countries, the Third World focused
literature does not offer a very refined theory of change beyond pointing in the direction of domestic politics.

* *

This analysis of different scholarly traditions in international relations has clarified which elements could be useful in explaining the changes in ECOWAS and SADC: the international context and the role of the regional hegemons for realism, the importance of interstate bargains and the role of the regional organisation itself for liberalism, the importance of regional identity and the role of norm entrepreneurs for constructivism and finally the impact of state weakness and marginalisation for the Third World focused literature. The synthesised analysis is presented in the table below. These explanatory factors are the products of competing theories of international relations and can in practice provide complementary perspectives on the institutional and normative change we are trying to explain. This review of the relevant literature points in the direction of different leads that we can follow, but it is only through the in-depth analyses of the two case-studies that we will know which factor should bear more weight in the explanation.

This study starts from the assumption that the regional hegemon, the marginalisation of Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) and the phenomenon of state weakness all played a role in the emergence of regional security organisations. The choice of these factors is rather intuitive: both ECOWAS and SADC have a regional hegemon; the transformation occurred after the end of the Cold War and the disengagement of the global superpowers; and many African states have to face the challenges of state weakness, sometimes leading to total state collapse as in Liberia or the DRC. Which level of analysis is predominant –
the international level with the marginalisation of the continent, the regional one with the regional hegemon, or the domestic one with the consequences of state weakness –, how these different factors relate to each other and how important their role is: all this is explored in the following chapters. However, the analysis provided in this chapter enabled us to remain open and alert to other potential factors throughout the analysis.

The matrix below is used throughout the study and these hypotheses are confronted to the empirical data in chapters 3 through 6. The matrix is also used at the end of the study to determine which factors and schools of thought provide the best explanation for the emergence of ECOWAS and SADC as regional security organisations. The next two chapters focus on the history of ECOWAS and SADC since we can only explain change if we have a clear vision of historical continuity and discontinuity.
### Table 2.2: Matrix of possible causal factors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LEVEL OF ANALYSIS</th>
<th>CAUSAL FACTORS</th>
<th>SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **INTERNATIONAL** | - Systemic change: end of Cold War  
                      - Role of great world powers  
                        o France  
                        o UK  
                        o US  
                        o EU  
                        o UN  
                      - Role of continental players  
                        o AU  
                        o Nigeria  
                        o South Africa  
                        o Libya | ⇒ Structural neo-realism  
                      ⇒ Classical realism |
| **REGIONAL**      | - Regional hegemon  
                      o South Africa  
                      o Nigeria  
                      - Common interest of member states  
                      - Regional organisation as an institutional source of common identity | ⇒ Classical realism  
                      ⇒ Liberalism  
                      ⇒ Constructivism |
| **DOMESTIC**      | - Role of individual leaders  
                      - Democratic peace  
                      - State weakness | ⇒ Liberalism  
                      ⇒ Third world theory: omnibalancing |
CHAPTER 3

ECOWAS, THE TOOL OF PAX NIGERIANA?

‘Our country [Nigeria] is the largest single unit in Africa. […] The whole black continent is looking up to this country to liberate it from thraldom.’ (Jaja Wachuku, First Minister of Foreign Affairs of Nigeria, House of Representatives Debates (Lagos), January 1960, col. 54, quoted in Shaw and Fasehun, 1980, p.551) One of key questions addressed in this chapter and the following on SADC is the role of the hegemon throughout the history of the regional organisation. Nigeria has the ambition to be a major player within regional politics. Was ECOWAS a means to an end (Pax Nigeriana)?

The following historical chapter tells the story of ECOWAS from its origins until today in order to provide the necessary background information to understand the emergence of ECOWAS as a regional security organisation before comparisons are made later on with SADC. The first step is to question the economic character of the organisation: to what extent was ECOWAS – from 1975 to 1990 – a truly economic regional organisation? Its 1975 mandate, inspired by the Treaty of Rome creating the European Economic Community, was geared towards economic issues, be it trade, freedom of movement, infrastructure, etc. Yet, its history and development was fraught with political clashes. By telling the history of ECOWAS, this chapter sheds a first light on the causal factors that influenced the creation and evolution of ECOWAS into a regional security institution. What role did the regional hegemon play? Was there an already existing West African
identity? Etc. This historical chapter informs the theoretical findings that will be drawn out at length in chapter 7.

The chapter first delves into the deep roots of regionalism that range from pan-Africanism as a longing towards African unity to the colonial legacy especially in Francophone Africa that triggered repetitive attempts to establish West African (Francophone) unity. These disparate tendencies were then catalysed during the process and negotiations that led to the creation of ECOWAS. As the years went by, ECOWAS took its first shaky steps while encountering numerous problems and challenges, both economic and political in nature. Finally, the steps and nature of the transformation of ECOWAS, alongside the role the P3 played during this period, are described and explored in details thus providing the building blocks for the detailed comparative analysis of the shift in the following chapters 5 and 6.

* 

**The roots of West African regionalism**

The roots of West African regionalism can be found in pan-Africanism and the legacy of colonialism, predominantly in Francophone West Africa. Colonial times had a strong impact on West African states. Throughout the 1960s and up to the 1975 creation of ECOWAS, pan-Africanism and the more particularistic project of Francophone regionalism can be considered as means towards the end of overcoming balkanisation and promoting unity within the region. The importance of pan-Africanism at the beginnings of West African regionalism illustrates the idea that identity can be a fertile soil on which
institutions grow. This seems to validate the constructivist argument. On the other hand, it is striking to note that the first instances of regionalism in West Africa, namely the attempts of the Francophone bloc, were not only based on identity, but also materially and financially influenced by a great power, France. This seems to indicate that a common identity is not a sufficient condition to create a regional organisation and that it needs to be backed by material factors, such as a common currency.

Pan-Africanism

‘Africa must unite or disintegrate individually.’ Kwame Nkrumah, President of Ghana.

To understand the emergence of ECOWAS, we need to understand the evolution of the pan-African movement as one of the underlying ideological support and one of the arguments for West African regionalism. (Gambari, 1991) A complex notion, pan-Africanism has a long history dating back to the nineteenth century leading to several institutional embodiments such as the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) and the UN Economic Commission for Africa (ECA).

Pan-Africanism is a multifaceted concept with a long history. At one level, it is the definition of the African Self against the European Other. At another level, it is a reaction against the fragmentation, marginalisation and alienation of Africans, both within their own continent and within the Diaspora. Its purpose is to unify Africans across continents and work towards political and economic independence understood as collective self-reliance, social and political equality, and economic development. (Murithi, 2005) Pan-Africanism and African unity as a movement can be traced back to the nineteenth century with the 1893 Congress in Africa held in Chicago. In 1958, Kwane Nkrumah and George
Padmore organised an All-African Peoples Conference (AAPC) in Accra, a founding moment for the OAU.

Kwame Nkrumah first launched the idea of a Pan-African permanent institution with his November 1960 proposal of creating an African High Command. (Imobighe, 1985, Imobighe, 1980) The establishment of a continental defence arrangement was however considered too radical by most African countries and the debate shifted towards the nature of an African continental organisation. African states were divided into two camps. The Casablanca group comprised ‘radical’ African states advocating immediate political unification within a federalist framework. This view was championed by Presidents Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, Sekou Toure of Guinea and Modibo Keita of Mali in West Africa and was partly identified to the socialist ideology. The opposing Monrovia group comprised more ‘moderate’ states such as Côte d’Ivoire, Liberia and Nigeria. They favoured an incremental and functional cooperation that avoided any immediate transfer of sovereignty. Within this group, several West African states were particularly suspicious of Nkrumah’s desire for continental leadership. (Jaye, 2003) A vast majority of African political leaders preferred the slow incremental approach as it better enabled them to consolidate national political independence and to enjoy the taste of power recently acquired. The OAU was thus created in 1963 around the principles of functional economic cooperation and integration and of national sovereignty and non-interference and territorial integrity. (Senghor, 1990) The United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (ECA), created in 1957, was also heavily influenced by the pan-Africanist debate and soon became a key advocate of regionalism within Africa, especially within West Africa. It convened in 1966 and 1967 two ministerial meetings in Niamey and Accra on
West African integration. The West African regionalist project did not develop in isolation from the other continental movements.

The early debates around continental pan-Africanism impacted significantly upon West African regional politics as it divided them and alliances were formed in the early 1960s across the linguistic divide. West Africa had a long history of attempts at political unions and was the region of origins of several father figures of pan-Africanism, including among others, Kwame Nkrumah, Sekou Toure and the scholar Cheikh Anta Diop. (Diop, 1960) Failure of a political union at the continental level had not dampened the interest in unification at the regional level. Nkrumah proposed the founding of a Continental Union Government, i.e. a political union of West African states. This plan was unable to reach fruition as Nigeria resisted such a bold move and favoured a gradualist economic approach that would put Nigeria at the centre of the newly created industrial regional market. (Ojo, 1980) The project of political union was thus pursued at a smaller scale with the Ghana-Guinea union of 1958, which Mali joined in 1960. This union was however more symbolic than effective and soon collapsed in 1963. Several countries persisted and were able to create a somewhat more stable institution with the foundation of the Mano River Union (MRU) bringing together Liberia and Sierra Leone in 1967. Guinea joined in 1973. Its objectives focused on economic cooperation rather than political unification and included the establishment of a common external tariff, the harmonisation of duties and the promotion of joint manufacturing projects. (Onyemelukwe and Filani, 1983)

West African integration and its latest embodiment, ECOWAS, have its roots in the fertile humus of pan-Africanism. At independence, African governments inherited a spirit
of, an approach to, and a methodology for organising cooperation. This had long-lasting implications beyond independence. Many constitutions of the 1960s made a reference to West African unity. The few prominent torchbearers mentioned above – or norm entrepreneurs in another context (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998) – that made a significant imprint with their rhetoric, framed the political debate around the nature of the African and West African identity. There was however few concrete applications, except the ones mentioned above. The record is somewhat slightly different in Francophone West Africa.

**The experience of the Francophone bloc**

The most active pole of regionalism could be found in Francophone West Africa. The French colonies were administered at a federal level until independence. This colonial legacy contributed to keeping the project of West African unity alive, notably by highlighting to Anglophone countries the potential power of such groupings. The French colonial federalist institutions created a favourable environment for the independence leaders to launch several regional attempts.

France established in 1895 a federalist framework of institutions known as the West African Federation (Afrique Occidentale Française – AOF) aimed at simplifying the administration of its colonies. The federation was both political with a centralised administration, but also economic with a customs union and a common external tariff. The monetary arrangements of the Franc zone had far reaching and unifying effects: Funds could be transferred freely and the currencies were fully compatible. After World War II, the federation was slightly modified and a limited representation was introduced
with a regional assembly set up in Dakar. This contributed to the development of political parties at a federal level. At the time of independence, the federalist institutions collapsed.

Nevertheless, the French ‘regionalist’ colonial legacy had lasting effects. On the one hand, the Francophone West African unity that appeared to exist before independence was only an illusion. ‘It was a unity imposed from outside for the administrative convenience of the colonial power – it was a unity of Europe in Africa, reflecting the hegemony of the metropolitan country over its various colonies.’ (Hazlewood, 1967) Dependency of the colonies on each other was only a superficial side effect of this policy. On the other hand, the French colonial legacy had a significant socialising effect on the Francophone elites. This common background arguably bred and facilitated cooperation. In a broader sense, there was a similarity in political systems and elite culture and values. More specifically, much of the Francophone elite attended common educational institutions such as the Ecole Normale William Ponty in Senegal. (Jalloh, 1973) At the political level, Africans who participated in French parliamentary bodies felt the need to elaborate common positions. They thus got to know each other and develop personal ties at the regional level. Soon after independence, the impetus for economic integration came from the realisation that numerous slender ties to France bound them and that a better economic balance should be achieved. Both constructivistic and realist ideas can be tapped into to explain the creation of Francophone regional organisations: the balancing act against France was reinforced and facilitated by the common background shared by Francophone West African political elites.

The history of regionalism in Francophone West Africa is a story of false starts and trials and errors. It first saw the rapid failure of political unions. The 1959 agreement between
Senegal and Mali to create the Mali federation soon collapsed in 1960. (Foltz, 1965) 1959 also saw the creation of a more stable organisation, the Entente Council, by Benin, Côte d’Ivoire, Niger and Burkina Faso with the aim to coordinate economic and foreign policies in fields of taxation, customs union, public administration, public works and communication networks. Togo joined in 1966. It allowed for a measure of redistribution but was still far from a political union. (Yansane, 1977) At the regional level, the Union Douanière des Etats d’Afrique de l’Ouest (UDEAO) and the Banque Centrale des Etats d’Afrique de l’Ouest (BCEAO) were also created in 1959. The UDEAO remained largely on paper and did not evolve to become a working organisation. The BCEAO being functionally limited and instrumental for the management of the common currency remained and is still active to this day. In general, functional organisations proved somewhat more successful with the 1968 Organisation of the Senegal River States, including Guinea, Mali and Senegal aiming to develop the Senegal River Basin. The countries also envisioned larger and integrated industrial development, trade, and even a possible political union. (Yansane, 1977) These grand ambitions were not felicitous for the organisation that was dissolved in 1971 to be replaced by the less ambitious OMVS (Organisation pour la Mise en Valeur du Fleuve Sénégal) in 1972. Beyond these rather limited cooperation agreements, the Francophone states reached a breakthrough in the early 1970s when they decided to revive the customs union UDEAO that had collapsed in 1969. ‘This project was immediately encouraged by President Georges Pompidou of France, who went so far as to declare that the francophone states should co-ordinate their efforts in order to counterbalance the heavy weight of Nigeria.’ (Bach, 1983) This statement raises the question of whether the Francophone states were balancing against France or against Nigeria. The Communauté Économique de l’Afrique de l’Ouest (CEAO) was created in January 1974 following a series of consultations between 1970
and 1973 among Côte d’Ivoire, Niger, Mali, Mauritania and Senegal. The organisation was set up primarily to promote trade, harmonise customs practices and employ part of the customs revenue to bring about equitable development of the economy of member states. (Onyemelukwe and Filani, 1983)

The motivations of the Francophone states were threefold. It was first aimed at fostering economic cooperation and development, an endeavour already pursued through more functional organisations. Second, these regional organisations enabled the member states to present a common front to France in their economic relations, thus increasing their bargaining power. Finally, the CEAO must be analysed in the context of West African regional politics and understood as a reaction against or a way of counterbalancing the overwhelming weight of Nigeria in the region, both economically or politically. It was within this context that the negotiations leading to the creation of ECOWAS took place. CEAO was useful to ECOWAS at two levels: it first showed that agreement about regional integration could be reached and second, as it was perceived as a threat by Anglophone states, it demonstrated the potential power of such groupings.

ECOWAS was no *deus ex machina* and was influenced intellectually by pan-Africanism and more directly by the French colonial legacy. Pan-Africanism provided an approach, an ideology and a common identity, while Francophone regionalism contributed as a sort of trial and error period and provided past hands-on experience that could be built upon for the creation of ECOWAS.
The creation of ECOWAS

In the early 1970s, the West African states had been independent for approximately a decade and Nigeria had emerged from its civil war that lasted from July 1967 to February 1970. The idea of West African integration first touched upon during the ECA meetings of 1966 and 1967 was taken up again. Within the context of the Cold War, the region was not considered of any particular strategic importance and was thus left to develop its own initiatives. However, Europe maintained a keen interest in the region mainly under French leadership as the United Kingdom would only join the European Community in 1973. The timing is indeed quite striking as the Lomé Convention with the ACP countries was signed in February 1975 and the ECOWAS founding treaty in May 1975. The creation of ECOWAS was overall predominantly the result of regional dynamics, with negotiations with Europe as a prod. The issue rose again to prominence with the July 1970 publication of ‘Prospects for Regional Cooperation in West Africa’ by Adebayo Adedeji and came to fruition after several years of negotiations on May 28, 1975 with the signature of the treaty establishing the Economic Community of West African States in Lagos. (Adedeji, 1970) By first describing the negotiating process and then by exploring the motivations of the member states for signing on the Lagos treaty, this section points to the importance of an individual level of analysis as well as that of the liberal and realist arguments to explain cooperation, namely the existence of common interests, the hope of creating institutions that would allow its members to have a greater voice on the international scene, but also regionalism as a way for the regional hegemon to put right behind might. Finally, a further analysis shows us that individual dictators might have their own personal security reasons for making their countries join ECOWAS and align with Nigeria. (David, 1998)
The negotiations

Presented in a simplified way, the negotiations were driven by Nigeria and resisted by Francophone West Africa with Nigeria proposing and the Francophone states refusing until the package was deemed convincing enough. Anglophone states were overall ready to follow Nigeria’s lead and ‘to work hand-in-hand most cooperatively with Nigeria … for the achievement of this most desirable and worthy goal.’ (Ambassador Lafayette Diggs of Liberia, 1973, Quoted in Ojo, 1980) The debates around the issue were first played out within Nigeria with Professor Adebayo Adedeji providing an intellectual map for West African integration and rallying the Nigerian political and economic elite around it. He then tried to improve the regional political climate and to convince the other West African states of the utility of such an endeavour. At the time, Nigeria was in a position of strength due to the oil windfall.

Professor Adedeji took the leading role both intellectually and diplomatically. In his 1970 ‘Prospects for Regional Cooperation in West Africa,’ he outlined seven basic requirements for effective economic cooperation with the number one requirement being political commitment. (Adedeji, 1970, Adedeji, 1985) The objectives were economic but the means to achieve them were political. Following his appointment in late 1971 as Nigeria’s Federal Commissioner for Economic Reconstruction and Development, Adedeji was offered the opportunity to put his project in practice. As an economic development minister, he was in a position to start building a coalition within Nigeria supporting his project of a West African economic community. (Ojo, 1984) This coalition was composed of high-level public servants, Chief Henry Fajemirokun, President of the
Nigerian Chamber of Commerce, Industry, Mines and Agriculture and most prominently of General Yakubu Gowon, Head of the Federal Military Government. Thanks to his previous position as director of the Institute of Administration at the University of Ife, Adedeji had tremendous influence over Nigerian civil servants and technocrats. More directly instrumental to his project was his personal friendship with Chief Henry Fajemirokun who was able to enlist the support of the Nigerian Chamber of Commerce, Industry, Mines and Agriculture. This support even spread beyond Nigeria with the creation in November 1972 of a Federation of West African Chambers of Commerce, Industry and Agriculture that had an explicit commitment in the article 3(e) of its constitution to push for an economic community and common market. (Asante, 1991)

Consensus having been achieved within Nigeria, a diplomatic offensive aimed at convincing the other West African states of the advantages of a West African Economic Community was launched. The first step was to improve the political climate of the region by allaying the fears of Nigerian domination. To do so, Nigeria enlisted the support of Togo, introduced a Nigerian phenomenon called ‘spraying’ into regional diplomacy (Ojo, 1980) and used the EEC-ACP (African Caribbean and Pacific countries) negotiations to develop trust in the Nigerian leadership. Its leadership of the ACP countries during the negotiations proved crucial in raising the profile and prestige of Nigeria. In April 1972, General Gowon and General Eyadema announced the creation of an embryonic West African Economic Community (WAEC). The Nigerian-Togolese union was to have a ‘demonstration effect’ to show that a small, relatively poor country could engage in an economically rewarding relationship with Nigeria and demonstrate that official language difference did not constitute an insurmountable barrier to trade.

36 This is a mere summary of the formation of ECOWAS. For more details, see OJO, O. J. B. (1980) Nigeria and the Formation of ECOWAS. *International organization*, 34, 571-604.
Togo, financially benefiting from the WAEC, was instrumental in convincing the Francophone states to join ECOWAS. In July-August 1973, Nigeria and Togo, with a draft proposal ready, launched a two-pronged campaign at the ministerial level and at the level of the Chambers of Commerce and Industry. Linked to this shuttle diplomacy, Gowon had been travelling to visit several of its neighbours and had written cheques to finance whatever projects the head of state deemed important (spraying). (Ojo, 1980) Finally, the EEC-ACP negotiations played an important role to warm the other countries to the Nigerian project. Nigeria’s attitude and leadership during the negotiations contributed to establish its bona fides. (Ojo, 1980) General Gowon was able to convince the other African states that ‘it is better for a united Africa to talk to a united Europe.’

The EEC-ACP negotiations were the last building block consolidating the case for West African cooperation with the idea that a united Africa would be taken more seriously and get a better deal.

This diplomatic offensive was designed to convince the Francophone West African states. They had already created their own regional grouping and preferred to enlarge it to other countries rather than create a new one. President Senghor of Senegal even called the CEAO the ‘first step towards the creation of a vast regional entity stretching from Mauritania to Angola.’ (Quoted in Asante, 1985) The Chairman of the CEAO, President Hamani Diori of Niger made his own attempt at shuttle diplomacy and visited Nigeria, Benin, Togo, and Ghana in May 1973 to no avail. Following the failure of the enlargement project, the CEAO member states then considered the ECOWAS project. Unwilling to abandon their membership and their previous commitment, they nevertheless decided to join ECOWAS. On May 28, 1975, the treaty creating the

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Economic Community of West African States was signed in Lagos by Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo. On June 23, the ECOWAS treaty became effective when the required minimum of seven members countries had ratified it. Cape Verde joined in 1977.

**The motivations**

Attempts at creating regional organisations are carried out by actors and serve their interests. But which interests? Here, a quick analysis of the motivations of the member states proves useful to weigh the economic and political motives of the different parties. It is important to start here by Nigeria’s motivations, as it is the country that almost single-handedly promoted the project before delving more deeply in the motivations of the Francophone states.

While Nigeria shared some of its motivations with the other West African states, some were unique to its situation. First, Nigerian leadership in West Africa was and still is considered by most of the elite as the ‘manifest destiny’ or the birthright of the country on account of its size. (Shaw and Fasehun, 1980) Second, the Nigerian civil war of 1967-1970 had a significant impact on its foreign policy. During the civil war, France and Côte d’Ivoire recognised Biafra. Benin allowed the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) to fly from its territory to deliver relief to Biafra. (Jaye, 2003) From this episode, Nigeria realised that, being surrounded by Francophone states, good relations with its neighbours were crucial for its security. Reducing and balancing the influence of France in the region also became a high priority. (Gambari, 1991) Finally, economic self-interest,
a motivation important for all member states also played a role. In the Nigerian case, the country wanted to become ‘the industrial heart of an African Common Market’ (Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1965, Quoted in Ojo, 1980) as a way to overcome the economic tensions between Nigeria and Côte d’Ivoire. (Musah interview, 30 August 2007)

Nigeria also shared the following three motivations with the other member states: the desire to achieve economic decolonisation and collective self-reliance, to emulate the success of the EEC and to achieve greater international bargaining power. It was an economic rationale that can explain the desire to emulate the success of the EEC. ‘The apparent success of the EEC did influence Third World countries to attempt economic integration schemes of their own.’ (Gambari, 1991) The final common motivation was the hope to increase the bargaining power of the region. This was both true for Nigeria that needed the backup of other countries to increase its clout, but this was all the more true for smaller states. Material factors, rather than ideas, seem to have been the major concern of member states in their decision to create ECOWAS: it was a way to balance against the former colonial powers and achieve economic independence. It was also seen as a way to achieve a greater voice on the international scene. They also found a common interest in their desire to create a bigger West African market.

Besides Nigeria, the other states were faced with another economic and geopolitical configuration that explains their specific motivations to join the regional organisation. First of all, each country joined out of its own perceived economic self-interest. As mentioned above, it was the Francophone countries that needed the most convincing. Through Nigerian ‘spraying,’ the countries would benefit financially from joining ECOWAS. Furthermore, while CEAO had been created as a way of balancing against
Nigerian influence, the economic position of Nigeria was strengthened compared to its neighbours following the 1973 oil shock. Throughout the negotiations, the Francophone states were able to maintain a strong cohesive front and were able to obtain a significant concession from Nigeria in the form of a derogation to Article 20 of the founding treaty. Article 20 states that “Member States shall accord to one another in relation to trade between them the most favoured nation treatment and in no case shall tariff concessions granted to a third country under an agreement with a Member State be more favourable than those applicable under this Treaty.” By securing a derogation to this Article, the Francophone states were part of ECOWAS while at the same time keeping all the advantage they had accrued within CEAO.

Beyond economic reasons, each country had its own geopolitical reasons to sign on to ECOWAS. Togo had never really felt part of the Francophone community and was uncertain about the support of France. Its good relations with Nigeria dated back to 1963 when Nigeria intervened to protect Togo from Ghana following the assassination of President Sylvanus Olympio. Nigeria reacted to this Ghanaian interference in Togolese affairs by stating that ‘for purposes of security Nigeria considers that its boundary extends to the Ghana-Togo border.’ (Thompson, 1969) More than Togo, Guinea was never part of the Francophone community and was suspicious of Senegal that could have been complicit in a Portuguese-backed invasion of the country in November 1970. (Ojo, 1980) Niger had to have such cordial relations with its neighbouring giant because of its dependence on Nigeria for access to the sea and of the tight ethnic links between Northern Nigeria and Southern Niger. The relationships of Nigeria with its neighbours quickly warmed following the October 1972 coup by Major Kerekou in Benin and the April 1974 coup by Lt. Col. Seyni Kountche in Niger. The remaining Francophone states
did not have such geopolitical ties and interests with Nigeria. However, seeing the project moving forward, it was in their interest to be included in the organisation, rather than excluded from it. In short, many Francophone leaders had immediate security reasons to join ECOWAS as it would help them stay in power. This is where the Third World focused literature and the concept of omnibalancing come into play. Furthermore, it seems that the common undemocratic nature of these states made reaching a common understanding relatively easy…

Despite this multiplicity of reasons to join ECOWAS, some have argued that the ECOWAS treaty was merely ‘a detailed declaration of interest and not a record of a negotiated agreement.’ (West Africa, May 19, 1975, p. 588. Quoted in Gambari, 1991) According to the 1990 ECOWAS report, ‘membership has seemed to have been sought as a sign of being a good neighbour, in expectation of reaping benefits without much sacrifice, and as a means of obtaining additional external development assistance.’ (ECOWAS, 1990) Member states were definitely hoping to reap some economic benefits. But the signature of the ECOWAS treaty should be considered in the geopolitical context of the time and had the main role of signalling the countries’ willingness to go beyond the Anglophone-Francophone divide in a spirit of good neighbourliness. Indeed, while both Francophone and Anglophone states joined the organisation for their own respective reasons, the feat was to launch an organisation that went beyond that divide. ‘There was a feeling among most member states of ECOWAS that much had been achieved just by the act of signing and ratifying the treaty.’ (Gambari, 1991)
The early steps of ECOWAS

The 1975 signature of the ECOWAS treaty in Lagos was only the first step of a long process. The development and the achievements of the regional organisation are crucial in order to understand the true goals of the institution. The ECOWAS treaty could have been a mere piece of paper useful for signalling the geopolitical balance of the region at one given time. But it withstood the test of time and went beyond the ‘paper phase.’ This section first analyses the track record of ECOWAS from its creation in 1975 to 1990, which corresponds to the date when ECOWAS started getting involved in security issues. It then delves a step further into the political and economic problems the regional organisation had to face. While the major motivating factors behind the creation of the institution seem to remain unchanged, this section illustrates that, despite the signature of the 1975 treaty, member states were reluctant to cede their sovereignty, expecting immediate benefits at no or little cost for themselves. These first few years also show that domestic concerns, relative gains and Cold War politics took precedence over their regional commitment, thus proving the point made by realists.

The track record from 1975 to 1990

Rather than a comprehensive history of all the projects undertaken by ECOWAS, the key here is to outline the different milestones of its history and the major factors motivating its evolution. An analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of the treaty is necessary as a way to outline what ECOWAS was designed to do or not to do. With a slow start in 1975-1980, the regional organisation was then able to find its place within the regional landscape and pursue its projects despite a few setbacks.
The ECOWAS treaty was the product of the contradictory pulls of its member states agreeing on seven principal objectives:

1. elimination of customs duties;
2. elimination of quantitative and administrative restrictions on trade;
3. establishment of a common customs tariffs and a common trade policy;
4. elimination of obstacles to the free movement of persons, services, and capital;
5. harmonisation of agricultural and industrial policies;
6. establishment of a compensation mechanism through the creation of a fund for cooperation;
7. harmonisation of monetary policies.

According to the former Executive Secretary, Dr. Abass Bundu, the three main weaknesses of the treaty were the following. First, there was no express provision for political cooperation or regional peace and security. Second, there was no provision establishing a binding effect of the decisions of the Authority of Heads of State and Government (AHSG). This left the member states free to implement the decisions of ECOWAS according to their short-term domestic priorities. Finally, the Executive Secretariat was granted very little power and authority, especially compared to the European Commission. There was also no provision to establish an ECOWAS parliament, thus ensuring that all the decisions remained in the hands of the AHSG. Consultation with the broader public or the private sector was inexistent, a strange shortcoming considering the role played by the West African Chambers of Commerce and Industry at its creation. (Asante, 1990) Overall, it seemed that the ECOWAS treaty was designed to give little power to ECOWAS as an independent institution. Another shortcoming was the absence of a redefinition of the economic relationship of ECOWAS
with the outside world with no reference to the recent EEC-ACP Lomé convention. The ECOWAS Secretariat was not empowered to enter into negotiations on behalf of the Community. The ambition of gaining more clout in international negotiations was thus nipped in the bud. (Asante, 1991)

Due to the limitations of the treaty, the organisation was slow to take off and ECOWAS remained dormant until November 1976. Even after the signature of the treaty, the question of membership still had not been solved. During the first eighteen months, Senegal and Côte d’Ivoire tried to enlarge ECOWAS to Francophone states such as Zaire in an attempt to counterbalance the power of Nigeria. (Robson, 1983) To complicate matters further, the two Nigerian torchbearers of ECOWAS, Professor Adebayo Adedeji and General Yakubu Gowon both left the West African political scene with Adedeji being chosen as the new Executive Secretary of the ECA and with General Gowon being removed from power following a coup in August 1975. After the decision of Zaire not to join ECOWAS (Gambari, 1991), the deadlock was broken at the second summit in November 1976 and the first five crucial protocols were signed on the budget of ECOWAS, the re-exportation within ECOWAS of goods imported from third countries, the Fund for Cooperation, Compensation and Development, the assessment of loss revenue by member states as a result of trade liberalisation and the definition of the concept of products originating from member states. It was also decided that the Secretariat of the community would be in Lagos and the headquarters of the Fund in Lomé. Dr. Aboubakar Ouattara of Côte d’Ivoire was appointed the first Executive Secretary of ECOWAS.
After these first steps, the interest of Nigeria in ECOWAS started to wane again. According to Daniel Bach, geopolitically, the climate had improved between Nigeria and its neighbours through bilateral links with the Francophone states, changes in France’s policy and an acceptance of ECOWAS by the CEAO. (Bach, 1983) Overall, the region remained rather unstable with the existence of several territorial conflicts and of military coups. The traditional Anglophone / Francophone divide was still real, if less obvious. The first few years were overall positive if not with regards to the economic achievements at least with regards to the political climate of the region: ‘In January 1977, when I assumed office, some of the West African countries were not even talking to each other. Today it is a thing of the past,’ said Executive Secretary, Dr. Ouattara. (West Africa, June 1, 1981, p. 1209) Of course, the relationship between the West African states was also influenced by their alignment with the West or the East and the intensification or the détente of the Cold War, as well as by the international economic environment.

More concretely, ECOWAS was able to achieve some progress on several fronts, be it trade liberalisation, the free movement of persons or more technical matters. May 1979 marked the first stage of the trade liberalisation process. In May 1983 came the adoption of the single trade liberalisation scheme. In 1990, ECOWAS launched the trade liberalisation program. On another front, the Protocol on the Free Movement of Persons, Right of Residence and Establishment was signed in May 1979 with the first phase on visa requirements coming into force in August 1980. This ECOWAS project was however dealt a severe blow in January 1983 when Nigeria decided to expel up to two million aliens, including community citizens, with fourteen days notice. While probably legal, this definitely derogated from the spirit of ECOWAS. (Onwuka, 1982, Afolayan, 1988, Brown, 1989) In July 1986, the second phase of the Free Movement Protocol on
right of residence was signed and came into force in 1989. ECOWAS citizens are now able to travel within the region without a visa. At a more technical level, on issues such as agriculture, transport, telecommunications and finance, ECOWAS was also able to make some progress.

Overall, the track record of the first fifteen years of existence of ECOWAS was mixed. Domestic priorities took precedence in the mind of regional leaders who were unwilling to take unpopular measures at home for the common regional good. The economic agenda thus seems less important than the regional organisation being used as a political forum. The regional organisation was notably unable to overcome the various obstacles thrown in their way, be it by member states or by international financial institutions and the external environment, especially during the 1980s Structural Adjustment Programme decade. This situation was far from unique to Africa and was widespread outside Europe.

Political and economic hurdles

While economics should not be underestimated, the political situation was the major obstacle to overcome. Since ‘politics is the art of the possible,’ the West African states strove for the impossible but settled for the unsatisfactory, i.e. the lowest common denominator.

The actions of ECOWAS were not only hampered by the political tensions between its member states, but also by the overall political environment. The recent independence and different political-economic orientations of member states led to a certain political instability in the region that made the task of reaching coordinated policies all the more
difficult. Trust was not easy to come between smaller and bigger countries. Another 
background condition that rendered cooperation difficult was the existence of overlapping 
regional organisations and hence the multiplicity of membership that led to competing 
demands. CEAO member states notably hung to the derogation they had obtained from 
Article 20 of the ECOWAS treaty that required all member states to accord to one another 
the most favoured nation treatment. The preferential treatment would thus remain at the 
level of the CEAO rather than that of ECOWAS. This clearly undermined the very 
rationale of ECOWAS. Again, this seems to indicate that ECOWAS was created more as 
a political forum for West African states, rather than an economic technocratic institution.

Lack of political will and commitment by its member states was the core problem 
ECOWAS had to confront. The member states did sign the ECOWAS treaty and its 
supplementary protocols after lengthy negotiations, but it seemed like their commitment 
stopped there. Achieving the ratification of the protocols, the implementation of the 
policies and decisions and the payment of budgetary contributions was an uphill battle. 
The situation did not show any drastic progress between 1983 and 1990. The issue was 
taken up by President Shagari of Nigeria himself as he remarked that ‘protocols and 
decisions are not being ratified as fast as reasonably expected. Even those ratified are 
hardly implemented to the spirit and letter.’ (1980, Quoted in Robson, 1983) ‘Regional 
economic cooperation is hardly reflected in national policies and development 
programmes.’ (Asante, 1990) Indeed, the coordination between national units and the 
ECOWAS Secretariat was ineffective, reflecting the lack of policy-implementing 
machinery. A low level of participation in meetings accompanied this. Member states 
were characteristically slow in the payment of their financial obligations. (Ezenwe, Dec. 
12-16, 1983, Quoted in Gambari, 1991) All this foot-dragging seems to bolster a realist
argument about cooperation remaining superficial, happening only at the margins, at a specific moment within a specific geopolitical setting, and not sustainable over time.

But beyond its member states, ECOWAS also had its own management problems. As the organisation developed, the ECOWAS bureaucracy grew in numbers, if not in quality and professionalism while the pace of implementation slowed. Most of the recruitment was based on political appointments, thus putting in doubt the professionalism of the ECOWAS civil servants. Between these difficult background conditions, the lack of political will of its member states and the structural managerial problems faced by the Secretariat, it should come as no surprise that any progress by ECOWAS was slow.

As poor developing countries heavily dependent as a source of government revenue and locked in unfavourable terms of trade, the member states of ECOWAS faced the hostile international environment of the world economy. Any trade reform would have dire consequences on the revenue of these governments, thus making change unlikely. Furthermore, there was little regional trade on any appreciable level and their economies tended to be competitive rather than complementary. At the international level, the donor community did not favor the creation of regional economic communities and gave directly to the governments rather than regional organisations. At the regional level, there were further marked disparities in size and (potential wealth) between countries. A final economic obstacle for ECOWAS was the currency issue: its proliferation, overvaluation, and inconvertibility leading to exchange control and payment difficulties. The inconvertibility of the currencies limited investment in the ECOWAS region as a whole. Those were the main hurdles ECOWAS was supposed to tackle. As seen above, the
political conditions were not ripe for ECOWAS to have a fair chance to efficiently tackle those structural issues.

But beyond these deep-rooted problems, another economic issue took the forefront of the debate and proved to be a very sharp thorn in the side of ECOWAS: the question of redistribution, an issue that the Fund for Cooperation, Compensation and Development was created to tackle. Its aim was to promote the equal development of all its member states by redistributing funds from the member that profited the most from the community to those that profited the least. Expressed in political terms, the ECOWAS member states were facing a problem of relative gains. ECOWAS and its member states were thus caught between a rock and a hard place. Playing the game of redistribution had a fair chance of being unsatisfactory for both less developed states that would consider they were not getting enough and the more developed ones that consider they were paying too much. But not contributing fully to the Fund would leave the poorer member states behind. The more developed member states apparently chose the latter. The problem here was one of political perception rather than pure economics, but nevertheless sustains the point made by realists that states are more interested in relative rather than absolute gains.

Individually, the obstacles each West African state faced were challenging, be it consolidating the state or achieving growth. This was one of the reasons they decided to unite to address at least their economic problems jointly. But the mistrust between them and the lack of readiness to sacrifice short-term interests for the long-term greater good of all seemed to spell doom for the community.
The catalyst of the Liberian civil war

The transformation of ECOWAS in the 1990s was not caused by a slow spillover phenomenon, but triggered by a violent crisis that almost tore the institution apart. The regional organisation overall lunged forward following regional crises such as the Biafra war that prompted its creation or the Liberian war that prompted its transformation. It adapted to changing international circumstances. This section recounts the events that led to the decision by ECOWAS to intervene in Liberia and how it was taken within the broader post Cold War context. Looking at the motives behind this intervention brings a first indication as to why security provisions were later adopted. Arguably, ECOWAS had touched upon security issues with its 1978 Protocol on Non-Aggression and 1981 ECOWAS Defence Pact, but the real trigger was the 1990 Liberian war. The fact that wars are the catalyst for change seems at first to correspond to the realist playbook. However, since these were civil wars, this changes somewhat the dynamic and raises the question of the link between state failure and regionalism. Indeed, a domestic level analysis is crucial here to understand the reaction of individual countries to the Liberian civil war. Furthermore, the marginalisation of the region due to the system change brought about by the end of the Cold War gave the regional states, and especially the hegemon, the breathing space needed to take the initiative.

The decision to intervene in Liberia

ECOWAS member states soon raised the issue of security shortly after its inception with the 1978 Protocol on Non Aggression and the 1981 ECOWAS Defence Pact. In the domain of security, the first move came from the Francophone states, namely Senegal,
Côte d’Ivoire, Burkina Faso, Mali, Mauritania, Niger and Togo, that signed a non-aggression treaty in 1977 (ANAD – Accord de Non-Agression et de Défense). This was probably triggered by the 1974 tensions between Mali and Burkina Faso, tensions that were renewed in 1985 in the border region of Agacher. (Musah interview, 30 August 2007) This conflict was appeased within the ANAD framework. It was again Togo in 1978 that served as a bridge between the two language blocs. According to Senghor, ‘there is hardly any need for me to demonstrate the fact that development cannot be secured in a climate of insecurity. This being so, we must among ourselves, establish a genuine West Africa solidarity pact to guard against external aggression.’\(^{38}\) Beyond this rhetoric, Togo also had an ulterior motive. Having secured a non-aggression pact with its Francophone neighbours, it needed an ECOWAS-wide treaty, as it was very suspicious at the time of Ghana harbouring political opponents to President Eyadema. (Boko interview, 6 May 2008) Member states took a further step with the 1981 Protocol on Mutual Assistance in Defence stating that an armed threat or aggression directed against a member state was considered as a threat or aggression against the whole community. Member states agreed ‘to place at the disposal of the Community ear-marked units from the existing National Forces’ which ‘shall be referred to as the Allied Armed Forces of the Community (AAFC).’ (Economic Community of West African States, 29 May 1981, Article 12) But it remained a dead letter.

Despite their lack of enforcement, it was in these two protocols that ECOWAS found the basis – or pretext – for intervention in Liberia. (Laloupo interview, 21, 22, 23 and 30 August 2007) The Liberian civil war started in December 1989 when rebel leader, Charles Taylor, at the head of the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), invaded

Liberia from its base in Côte d’Ivoire to overthrow the government of Samuel Doe. Other rebels, such as Prince Johnson soon joined the rebellion. (Vogt, 1992, Jaye, 2003, Adeleke, 1995, Adebajo, 2002, Adibe, 1997, Aning, 2004, Levitt, 1998) Rather than a purely internal civil war, one can argue that the conflict was internationalised early on, thus warranting the use of the 1978 and 1981 protocols to justify the intervention. First, the actors of the conflict did not respect state boundaries. Taylor was first based in Côte d’Ivoire and later invaded Sierra Leone in April 1991. The traffic of diamonds fuelling the conflict was yet another transborder activity. Second, neighbouring countries were involved in the conflict, be it Côte d’Ivoire by allowing Taylor to have a base in its territory, Libya or Burkina Faso. Libya was a major source of funding and training for the NPFL. Burkina Faso also initially supported the NPFL. Third, foreigners were deliberated targeted at the early stage of the conflict via kidnappings, hostage taking or the killing of foreign nationals and journalists. Finally, the large flows of refugees leaving the country threatened the stability of the neighbouring countries. Ghana and Nigeria, although not immediate neighbours of Liberia attracted a lot of refugees due to the proximity of language. Overall, ECOWAS considered that the Liberian war represented a threat for the whole region.

The first reactions were rather meek with individual and collective appeals for calm, restraint and talks, to no avail. With the war intensifying, ECOWAS leaders decided to take a more proactive approach in order to find a regional solution to the crisis at the Banjul summit on May 28, 1990 under the chairmanship of Blaise Compaoré of Burkina Faso. At this gathering, President Ibrahim Babangida of Nigeria presented his blueprint for the ECOWAS Standing Mediation Committee (SMC). (Akabogu, 1992) The summit

accepted the proposal and the SMC was formed of the Gambia, Ghana, Mali, Niger, Nigeria and Togo. Between 1990 and 1994, the SMC later added the two neighbours of Liberia, Guinea and Sierra Leone, as de facto members. The SMC first met at the ministerial level in Freetown from 5-20 July 1990 to agree on a peace plan that included an immediate ceasefire, the establishment and deployment of the ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) to monitor the ceasefire and the establishment of an interim government pending nationwide elections. During the same month, the Liberian Ambassador to the UN tried to bring the conflict to the attention of the UN Security Council to no avail. (Allain, 2004, p.260) The ECOWAS Peace Plan was adopted at the first session of the SMC at the level of the AHSG held in Banjul on 6-7 August 1990 under the chairmanship of Sir Dawda Jawara of the Gambia. Jerry Rawlings of Ghana, Lansana Conté of Guinea, Ibrahim Babangida of Nigeria and Joseph Momoh of Sierra Leone were present, while Mali and Togo were represented at the ministerial level. The Secretary-General of the OAU, Salim Ahmed Salim, was also present. ECOMOG was composed of military contingents drawn from the member states of the SMC as well as from Guinea and Sierra Leone with Ghana’s General Arnold Qainoo as commander. (ECOWAS Standing Mediation Committee, August 6-7, 1990) ECOMOG has a very limited mandate and was not expected to become directly involved in combat. But the warring factions received the ECOWAS Peace Plan unfavourably. As a result, ECOMOG, under constant artillery attack, was in the difficult position of trying to keep a peace that did not exist. The force was finally instructed to start enforcing the ceasefire on September 12, 1990 and was increased from three to six thousand men. A detailed description of the events of the Liberian civil war is not necessary here. Suffice it to say that the war spilled over in Sierra Leone with ECOMOG intervening in 1997. Due to state
failure in Liberia and the state weakness of its neighbours that were unable to hermetically seal their border, the conflict spilled over.

Liberia, a microcosm of post Cold War West African problems?

In the specific case of ECOWAS, one way to understand why the organisation transformed itself into a regional security organisation would be to understand why its member states decided to intervene in Liberia in the first place. According to the officially declared reason, ECOMOG was created on humanitarian grounds within the legal framework of the 1978 and 1981 Protocols. ECOWAS officials now recognise that these protocols were used as a legal pretext as intervention in the internal affairs of a member state is far from the spirit of the two protocols. (Laloupo interview, 21, 22, 23 and 30 August 2007, Vogt interview, 25 June 2008) There is thus the need to delve deeper in the motivations of the ECOWAS member states within the broader context of the early 1990s.

The crisis in Liberia erupted shortly after the fall of the Berlin Wall. The attention of the emerging sole superpower was thus directed towards Russia and later on towards Kuwait after its invasion by Iraq. Due to the historical ties between the US and Liberia, many Liberians expected the US to intervene. It declined. (Senior Western diplomat interview, 3 June 2008) UK and France were also starting to downgrade Africa in their priority list with most of their diplomatic efforts being spent in the Middle East or Eastern Europe. At the top of their agenda were the reunification of Germany and the beginning of the crisis in Yugoslavia. This indifference of the P3 towards the plight of Liberia was reflected at
the level of the UN Security Council.\textsuperscript{40} Some five months after the ECOWAS intervention, the Security Council endorsed a local response, (United Nations Security Council, 22 January 1991) while, at the same time, France profited from the conflict in Liberia through trade in iron ore, timbers, logs and diamonds. (Sirleaf, 2003, p. 60) Despite the endorsement by the Security Council, France was also worried that a successful intervention would raise the profile and prestige of Nigeria within the region. (Bouquet interview, 11 June 2008, Fournier interview, 23 July 2008)

Other actors could have taken the lead, namely the main continental players: Libya, South Africa and the OAU at the time. Libya could have hardly brought an end to this conflict as it was part of it, supporting Charles Taylor’s NPFL. South Africa was still under apartheid and thus had no legitimacy to intervene. This left the OAU as a whole as a potential mediator and peacekeeper. This was before it seriously started to question its raison d’être and at a time when it was still described as a forum of dictators by some. It is nevertheless interesting to note than the then Secretary General of the OAU, Salim Ahmed Salim, participated in the ECOWAS talks. It was Salim who took the OAU to the African Union, from an institution keen to uphold the principle of sovereignty as non-interference to an institution that asserted for itself the right to intervene in case of gross violation of human rights. Salim argued at the time of the Liberian crisis that ‘nowhere in the OAU Charter does it refer to the term “non-interference” as meaning indifference to the plight of our people.’ (Quoted in Sirleaf, 2003, p. 50)

In the end, West African countries were left to settle the crisis on their own as it elicited a very limited interest beyond their own region. Here an analysis of each country’s motives

\textsuperscript{40} See the last section of this chapter for a summary of the policies of the P3 towards ECOWAS.
is necessary as most were not neutral bystanders to the conflict. (Yoroms and Aning, 1997, p. 17) Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire and Libya supported Charles Taylor’s NPFL for different but not entirely dissimilar reasons. Blaise Compaoré of Burkina Faso was in a rather delicate position at the regional level at the time, as he needed to redeem himself from his unpopular military coup and assassination of the former leader of Burkina Faso, Thomas Sankara. It was also a way for him to be recognised as a major player in West African political affairs. Finally, Compaoré was also the son-in-law of President Houphouët-Boigny of Côte d’Ivoire, another major supporter of the NPFL. Côte d’Ivoire, under Houphouët-Boigny, was the major supporter of all failed attempted coups against Samuel Doe. More than a supporter of Charles Taylor, Houphouët-Boigny was simply applying the age-old principle that the enemy of my enemy is my friend. Boigny’s opposition to Doe dates back to the 1980 coup during which Doe killed the then leader of Liberia, William Tolbert, and his son who was married to Houphouët Boigny’s daughter. She later remarried President Compaoré. For both Burkina Faso and Côte d’Ivoire, besides immediate economic advantages linked to the exploitation of Liberian natural resources, many analysts point to the personal motivations of each leader to explain their position. When it comes to Libya, its leader Muammar Gaddafi was following the policy that any pro-Western African nation was to be considered as an enemy of African solidarity. Liberia under Doe, with its alignment on US policy, was a case in point as it was one of the first African countries to support the American call to boycott the 1981 OAU Summit in Libya. (Sirleaf, 2003, p. 51) Arguably, the Liberian civil conflict could also have been seen by Gaddafi as a way to become a major player in West African politics, thus thwarting Nigeria’s ambitions.
Liberia’s other neighbours either had a neutral approach or strongly preferred a solution that would bring peace and security and thus reverse the flow of refugees they had to accommodate. President Jawara of the Gambia took the lead of the SMC. As a neutral and small country with limited interest in the conflict, it had a chance to play a major political and mediatory role that would be accepted by the different sides of the conflict. Guinea and Sierra Leone as immediate neighbours of Liberia had a very strong stake in reaching a peaceful solution to the civil war. Finally, Nigeria was the lead state behind the intervention with Ghana who provided the first commander of the ECOMOG force. Nigeria had been at the time marginalised by the international community, notably because of the lack of respect for human rights by the military dictatorship. It was President Babangida who decided to launch ECOMOG while Nigerians were quite sceptical of the intervention. In the fall of 1990, six Nigerian organisations called for troop withdrawal. (Sirleaf, 2003, p. 47) Analysts and observers of the region have suggested three possible reasons for Babangida’s decision: (1) He was close to Doe and would help him stay in power. (2) Because of its ‘manifest destiny’ within West Africa – and in Africa at large –, Nigeria could not stay indifferent to such a catastrophe within its sphere of influence. (3) Babangida was trying to redeem himself in the eyes of the international community by bringing a solution to this humanitarian crisis.

All these possible motivations explaining the decision to create and send a peacekeeping force are a very coarse summary of different analyses put forth in the literature. (Adeleke, 1995, Howe, 1996-1997, Nwolise, 1992, Vogt, 1992, Aboagye, 1999, Magyar and Conteh-Morgan, 1998, Akabogu, 1992, Aboagye and Bah, 2005, Sirleaf, 2003) What they bring to the analysis is the domestic and sometimes personal layer that is crucial to understand the regional dynamics, of course against a backdrop of system change that left
West Africa below the radar of the great powers. Not every member state was supporting the ECOMOG intervention, although it is worth noting that the regional organisation still proceeded with its plans. While the humanitarian grounds for the intervention were not contested regionally, several states were concerned about the actual implications of the intervention in terms of precedent and as upsetting the balance of power in the region.

The institutional transformation of ECOWAS

The adoption of security provisions within ECOWAS was clearly the product of the civil wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone. A few years after the decision was taken to intervene, member states were able to take a step back and rethink the rationale of their regional organisation. It was time to shift from an emergency response logic to a long term building logic by integrating these changes into the mandate of the organisation. In this section, the institutional transformation of ECOWAS into a regional security organisation is quickly outlined as this is analysed in depth in chapters 5 and 6. The overhaul of ECOWAS and the adoption of new security protocols not only confirm the role of the regional hegemon, but the actual process points in the direction of other actors who played a key role, namely Togo and the Secretariat itself, thus bolstering more liberal positions. But the implementation difficulties ECOWAS faces illustrate the weakness of the institution itself, as a mirror of the weakness of its member states. It is this problem of weak capabilities that then allows the P3 as discussed later to step in and play a major role in the implementation of the security mandate of ECOWAS.

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41 Bouquet refers to ECOWAS as a ‘pompier de service’ (local fireman).
Security provisions within ECOWAS

Nothing in the history of ECOWAS had prepared it to set up a peacekeeping force within one of its member states. ‘ECOWAS was caught with its pants down’ (Okae interview, 27 August 2007) As a regional economic organisation; it lacked the institutions and procedures that would allow it to take the political and security decisions required by the Liberian crisis. Furthermore, the decision to get involved in Liberia had greatly destabilised ECOWAS and reinforced the Anglophone / Francophone divide.

To address these shortcomings, a Committee of Eminent Persons (CEP), chaired by Nigeria’s former head of state, General Yakubu Gowon, was established in April 1991. Its members were drawn up from within and outside governmental circles in the region. The CEP’s work was supported by the International Peace Academy (IPA) that had taken an advocacy role for the creation of regional security mechanisms in Africa and acted as policy experts. (Vogt interview, 25 June 2008) Based on their work, the revised ECOWAS treaty was adopted in Cotonou on July 24, 1993, changing ECOWAS institutionally and giving it an explicit security and democracy mandate. The revised treaty underlined the need to ‘establish a regional peace and security observation system and peace-keeping forces where appropriate’ (Article 58(f)) and to ‘provide, where necessary and at the request of Member States, assistance to Member States for the observation of democratic elections’ (Article 58(g)), restating the member states’ interest in democracy that had already been declared during the July 1991 Abuja meeting with the ECOWAS Declaration of Political Principles stating their common belief in the observance of democratic principles and respect for fundamental human rights. This was considered at the time as nothing more than an official acknowledgment of the changes
that had occurred in the region. (Laloupo interview, 21, 22, 23 and 30 August 2007) The 1993 revised treaty also addressed the institutional limitations of ECOWAS and brought four major innovations. First, to ensure greater efficiency and implementation, the principle of supra-nationality in the application of decisions was introduced. Second, supra-national institutions to monitor the application of decisions and arbitrate as necessary were established, namely the Court of Justice, the Parliament and the Economic and Social Council. Third, the scope of the Community programs was extended to other areas such as the harmonisation of economic and financial policies. Finally, a community levy was introduced in order to ensure a self-financing budget. The community levy was a community tax of 0.5% on goods from third countries to generate resources for financing regional integration.

According to the CEP report, the triggers for the reform were 1) the slowness of the pace of the regional integration, 2) the recrudescence of economic blocs, especially the emergence of a Single Market in the European Community in 1992, 3) the ongoing democratisation process combined with the introduction of the free market economy; and 4) the establishment of the African Economic Community. (ECOWAS, 1993) This clearly highlights the role of the international level, especially from the point of view of the reformers behind ECOWAS.

On the issue of security, the foreign, defence and interior ministers of ECOWAS met in Yamoussoukro in March 1998 to discuss the establishment of a permanent mechanism for conflict management in the region. The ministers agreed that ECOMOG should constitute the backbone of peacekeeping in the region and established an expert group to consider the exact shape of such a mechanism. It was again President Eyadema of Togo who took
the lead on this issue, thus showing a great consistency in his approach and support to the issue of security since 1978. (Boko interview, 6 May 2008, Laloupo interview, 21, 22, 23 and 30 August 2007, Musah interview, 30 August 2007) The result was the 1999 Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security (MCPMRPS) that laid out the criteria and objectives of ECOWAS’ intervention into its member states.

The main organ of the MCPMRPS was the Mediation and Security Council (MSC) composed of nine countries elected for a two-year period with no permanent seats. The MSC only needed approval from six of its nine members to take action. From its original nine members, the MSC was soon enlarged to include all fifteen member states. The reasons for this de facto enlargement were rather unclear. Apparently, an error was made when the first list of member of the MSC was drafted as it contained ten countries instead of nine. Of course, no country on the list was willing to volunteer to step down. Furthermore, the countries of the Mano River Union (MRU) argued they should by right be members of the MSC as the MRU was the major area of potential conflict in the region. In practice, the MSC is now functioning with fifteen members and mainly at the level of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs. (Laloupo interview, 21, 22, 23 and 30 August 2007)

The other two organs of the Mechanism were technical and advisory bodies. The Defence and Security Commission (DSC) was in charge of administrative issues and logistical requirements for peacekeeping. The other body, the Council of Elders, appointed by the MSC, was to be used primarily for conflict mediation and election monitoring. This institution was an original way of adapting to African realities with prominent and
respected personalities intervening as mediators. It was originally composed of nine elders but, just like the MSC, it was enlarged to fifteen: one elder per member state. To support these organs, a Deputy Executive Secretary for Political Affairs, Defence and Security was established. The 1999 Protocol and the resolution of the ECOWAS member states were quickly put to the test with the military coup of General Guei on December 24, 1999 in Côte d’Ivoire. The MSC met on December 29, 1999 and quickly intervened in the conflict. (For more details on the role of ECOWAS in Côte d’Ivoire, see Bouquet, 2007, Sada, 2003)

ECOWAS made further attempts at improving the security of the region. In March 1999, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of ECOWAS issued a declaration on child soldiers, showing that they were aware of the acute problem that came along the conflicts in Liberia and Sierra Leone. At a more concrete level, the AHSG signed in October 1998 a moratorium on small arms and light weapons that was renewed in November 2001 and in 2004. In 2004, the ECOWAS Small Arms Control Project (ECOSAP) was launched. In June 2006, ECOWAS member states took a step beyond the moratorium and signed a Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons, their Ammunition and Other Related Materials, yet to be ratified. This work on small arms was part of an overall effort focusing on conflict prevention. (Agnekethom interview, 24 August 2007)

On the ground, ECOWAS countries have made commitments to contribute substantial troops and materiel to an ECOMOG standby unit. ECOWAS was slow to implement the military component of the 1999 Protocol as it was at first focusing on the establishment of an early warning system. The AU brought in a new impetus to the process by creating an African Standby Force that relied on regional building blocks or pillars in its July 2002
Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union. The ECOWAS Standby Force (ESF) truly started to make some progress in 2003 (Lai interview, 29 August 2007, Okae interview, 27 August 2007). 2003 was also a key year because of the crises emerging in the region: Liberia and Sierra Leone witnessed some unrest thus threatening the whole Manor River region and the ongoing crisis in Côte d’Ivoire itself had an impact on its neighbours due to arms trafficking and to the presence of mercenaries. In April 2005, the Defence and Security Commission adopted the roadmap for an ECOWAS Standby Force (ESF).

Security was not the only direction ECOWAS took and it made also significant efforts to improve the rule of law and promote democracy within its member states and within the ECOWAS institutions themselves. In August 1994, the Protocol Relating to the Community Parliament was initialled in Abuja. It came into force in 2000 and the Parliament was inaugurated in November of the same year. In 2001, ECOWAS adopted a wide ranging Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance that addressed several far-reaching topics such as constitutional convergence principles (section I), elections (section II), election monitoring (section III), the role of the armed forces, the police and the security forces in a democracy (section IV) or rule of law, human rights and good governance (section VII). The ECOWAS Secretariat encountered severe difficulties with several states being very reluctant to accept this Protocol. The Secretariat decided to approach Togo that was one of the countries that would have felt threatened by this Protocol as its President Eyadema had seized power through a violent coup in 1967. Having convinced Togo to endorse the idea to lay out convergence principles on democracy, the Secretariat was then able to get the other member states on board. (Laloupo interview, 21, 22, 23 and 30 August 2007, Boko interview, 6 May 2008)
It seems that the role and profile of the ECOWAS Secretariat has raised significantly in the period since 2000, notably because of its proactive approach towards issues such as democracy, good governance and corruption, but also thanks to the increased powers the AHSG has granted to the institution by transforming it into a Commission in January 2005, headed by a President assisted by a Deputy and seven other Commissioners. Some have argued this reform was pushed for by smaller Francophone states such as Burkina Faso, Mali and Senegal as a way to control Nigeria’s influence within the organisation. (Fournier interview, 23 July 2008) ECOWAS has also adopted a new legal regime for Community Acts based on the system of the European Union that puts to the fore the principle of supranationality and should strengthen the power of the Commission. Overall, following the catalytic episode of Liberia and Sierra Leone, ECOWAS undertook a major overhaul not only of its mandate, but also of its institutions in order to be ready to address security crises within the region. But adopting protocols, while useful, is not enough to assess whether ECOWAS has truly emerged as a regional security organisation.

**Strengthening ECOWAS**

With the legal framework in place, it was time to go beyond the stopgap policies of the past. The first concrete change came with the establishment of an Early Warning System, then with a peacekeeping department in charge of the ESF and other peacekeeping-related activities, including small arms control. ECOWAS also ventured in the promotion and protection of democracy and rule of law mainly by focusing on election monitoring and mediation between opposing parties. To implement this broad mandate, success in the
institutional reform is also key to the success of the regional security organisation as a whole.

The idea of establishing an Early Warning System dates back to the 1993 revised ECOWAS Treaty (article 25(g)) and was picked up again in the 1999 Protocol. In 2003, the early-warning indicators were chosen and covered not only security or political indicators as the number political murders or mass violence, but also the price of key staple food such as rice as a rise in price could lead to protests and riots. West Africa was separated in four sub-regions or observation and monitoring zones. The zonal headquarters as well as ECOWAS Secretariat in Abuja collect the information sent by their two focal points in each country: one from civil society – part of WANEP (West African Network for Peacebuilding) – and one from the government, thus enabling ECOWAS to compare the information on different incidents and its ninety-four indicators from two different sources. After analysis of the data, the early-warning unit reports to the Secretary-General of ECOWAS who decides to act on it or not. One of the system’s originalities resides in the fruitful partnership established between ECOWAS and civil society. (Kone interview, 24 August 2007)

If early-warning and diplomacy fail, ECOWAS is setting up the ESF that would be ready to intervene in the region under short notice. The 2005 roadmap and conceptual framework was finalised with the help of the P3 with the size of the force being later modified from 1500 to 2773 by the Committee of Chiefs of Staff. (Lai interview, 29 August 2007, Okae interview, 27 August 2007, Toure interview, 27 August 2007) The goal is to have the ESF certified in 2010, thus following the AU guidelines with a 2008 exercise focused on logistics and following UN standards to facilitate the re-hatting of the
force. Each member state earmarked some troops for the ESF. Recently, ECOWAS decided to develop a civilian component to the force with a special interest in political affairs and police work as interventions are taking less of a military structure. Originally built with the scenario of Liberia and Sierra Leone in mind, ECOWAS now realises it could be asked to undertake a preventive deployment or disaster relief. This is linked to a more holistic vision of security. (Okae interview, 27 August 2007, Toure interview, 27 August 2007)

ECOWAS is also developing another aspect of conflict prevention and security with its work on small arms, especially since the 1998 Moratorium on small arms and light weapons. At the time, it did not have the means to do so and agreed to work with PECASEC of the UN (Programme de Coordination et d’Assurance pour la Sécurité et le Développement). While learning from the UN experience, it was in charge of the request for exemption to the Moratorium by member states and developed a good working relationship with the countries part of the Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies. In 2003, it was decided that ECOWAS should have its own unit dedicated to small arms and in June 2006 ECOSAP (ECOWAS Small Arms Control Program) based in Bamako was launched. ECOWAS has been working closely with civil society to push for the ratification – still to come – of the Convention on Small Arms. ECOWAS is also notably working with WAANSA (West African Action Network on Small Arms) and IANSA (International Action Network on Small Arms) for advocacy campaigns and on the implementation of the Convention. (Agnekethom interview, 24 August 2007)
Some within ECOWAS argue that now that these tools focusing on conflict prevention and peacekeeping are being put in place, there are only limited chances to have a repeat of Liberia or Sierra Leone. The real challenge facing ECOWAS is now the promotion of democracy and good governance. Most of the activities of ECOWAS in this area are centred on election monitoring and mediation when someone’s claim to power is contested with violent means. There are two possible ways to see the role of ECOWAS with regards to democracy promotion: one strategy would be more long term focusing on the rule of law and the other would be a name and shame approach, something usually privileged by civil society. ECOWAS has clearly opted for the first approach arguing for instance that elections are not rigged on the day of the election but long before that with citizenship laws, electoral laws, voter registration, etc. Furthermore, cancelling elections is not politically feasible as it could lead to the intervention of the military. ECOWAS does not have the capacity for long-term observation but does send fact-finding missions two or three months before the election and during the election itself. (Musah interview, 30 August 2007) The recent elections in Nigeria are a case in point as ECOWAS did find some irregularities with the elections but their criticism did not go further. Instead, they recommended some changes – based on the 2001 Protocol – be made within the Nigerian electoral system, changes that were then picked up by the newly elected president Yar’Adua. (ECOWAS, 24 April 2007)

Beyond fact-finding missions, ECOWAS can also call upon the Council of Elders. Former Nigerian President Babangida, although formally not part of the Council was successfully sent in February 2007 in Guinea to ‘facilitate the implementation of the agreement reached between the Government of Guinea, the trade unions and other political stakeholders.’ (ECOWAS, 1 February 2007) Former Gambian President Sir
Dawda Jawara was the leader of the ECOWAS Observer Mission for the April 2007 elections in Nigeria. (ECOWAS, 24 April 2007) These are but the most recent instances of the members of the ECOWAS Council of Elders being used to promote democracy, peace and security within the region.

ECOWAS overall seems to have significantly increased its activities in the domain of security and good governance but does it have the institutional wherewithal and capacity to fully carry its security mandate? The answer is dubious as there are in practice no sanctions for non-compliance to ECOWAS regulations. ECOWAS work is based on consensus. At the level of the Commission, ECOWAS has also an important human resources management problem, both at the top level of management and in its everyday activities. The problem starts right at the recruitment phase that is based on a quota system. There is no guarantee that the expert chosen by the member state matches the position. Furthermore, the absenteeism of the top management due to their numerous travels is a real impediment to the smooth running of the institution. The Vice-President, whose role is to administer and manage ECOWAS, is apparently travelling as often as the President of Commission, Dr. Mohammed Ibn Chambas. Top management is usually appointed for four years and uses its position as an opportunity to do some regional or international networking and to cash very substantial per diem during their travels. This has several negative consequences as there is no delegation of authority. (Fernandes interview, 20 August 2007, Western consultant to ECOWAS interview, 30 August 2007) Many meetings are organised at the last minute, allowing no time for planning or preparation. These are not the only difficulties the Secretariat has to overcome: management and human resources in general are badly organised. A huge amount of documents regularly gets lost. There is a dire need to reorganise the registry and the
archival of documents, to reinforce the accounting unit and to establish a procurement unit. A few simple examples are telling: the library has no real system of classification and the ECOWAS email addresses and landlines very rarely function. Considering these important capacity problems, it is quite striking that ECOWAS has been able to implement so many of its security provisions.

This implementation gap clearly illustrates the limitations of ECOWAS as an institution composed of states with weak capabilities and thus itself very weak. There is a clear political will among member states to contribute to ECOWAS efforts, (Toure interview, 27 August 2007) but capability remains an issue. This is where the West, more specifically, the US, the UK and France, plays a key role through its support to the ESF. Military advisers from the P3 and recently from Germany have been sent to ECOWAS. The very presence of these military advisers highlights the importance of the ESF in the eyes of the West and the support they are willing to bring. They are the lead partners for peacekeeping training.

**The establishment of a partnership with the West**

This interest for ECOWAS among the P3 is quite recent, dating from the late 1990s. This renewed interest can be attributed to the political will and commitment demonstrated by ECOWAS member states. (Chaveas interview, 23 July 2008) This section focusing on the impact of the P3 allows us to broach the topic of international pressure on ECOWAS to take charge of its own security. It allows us to test the structural realist argument that the main explanation for the emergence of ECOWAS as a regional security organisations can be found at the international level.
‘Constructive disengagement’

The overall trend common to the P3, France, the United Kingdom and the United States, throughout the 1990s can be characterised as ‘constructive disengagement,’ (Berman and Sams, 1998) with each country reaching independently the conclusion that they would not intervene in African conflicts anymore and should as an alternative focus their efforts on peacekeeping training for African troops. (Senior Western diplomat in the region at the time, 3 June 2008, Chaveas interview, 23 July 2008) 1997 proved to be a turning point for all P3 countries, albeit for different reasons. 1997 was the year the US and French peacekeeping training programmes were launched and the year Tony Blair was elected in the UK.

The United States traditionally neglected Africa with its policy towards the continent being shaped by the Cold War logic. (Schraeder, 1995) The end of the Cold War had a significant impact on the Bush Administration that decided to intervene alongside the United Nations in Somalia in December 1992. In 1994, the death of eighteen Rangers led to the withdrawal of US troops from Somalia and from the continent as a whole. This was made clear by the Presidential Decision Directive of May 1994 that listed several restrictive factors to be considered for US forces to participate in UN peace operations. (White House, May 1994) Following this disengagement and with the risk of Rwandan-style genocide in Burundi in 1996, (Chaveas interview, 23 July 2008) the US decided to launch a peacekeeping training program for African forces, the African Crisis Response Force (ACRF). The aim was to establish a standing force of 10,000 African troops with logistics and training provided by the US. This proposal was rejected by the heavy-
weights of the African continent, namely Nigeria, South Africa and Kenya who saw it as an ‘external imposition.’ (Bah and Aning, 2008, p.120) The US proposed another program in 1997, the African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) that focused on the training of African forces for peacekeeping – Chapter VI operations – on a bilateral basis. This proposal was welcomed by certain African states such as Malawi. (Chaveas interview, 23 July 2008) Others, including Nigeria and South Africa, criticised it as it was seen both as a sign of neocolonialism and a symbol of the increased marginalisation of the continent with Western countries refusing to send their own troops. Other criticisms focused on the content of the program: ‘ACRI has more to do with what the US felt it could provide than what African countries necessarily needed.’ (Berman, 2004)

At the turn of the century, the events of September 11, 2001 had an impact on the US policy on Africa and led to greater involvement: ‘The events of September 11, 2001, taught us that weak states […] can pose as great a danger to our national interests as strong states.’ (White House, 2002, p.4) This increased interest in Africa led to the launch of the more muscular African Contingency Training Assistance (ACOTA) replacing ACRI in 2004. This however did not mean that the United States was ready to send troops. ACOTA, still a bilateral program, also allows for the possibility of support to regional and sub-regional organisations. Using the Programme of Instruction (POI) sanctioned by the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, it is now focused on Chapter VII operations and peace enforcement training. (Mpyisi, 2007, p.38) In total, under ACRI and ACOTA, 16,000 troops were trained in Benin, Botswana, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Senegal and Uganda. (Serafino, 11 June 2007, p.2) In May 2003, the US established a base of 1,800 troops at Camp Lemonier in Djibouti. (Bah and Aning, 2008, p.126) This was then followed by the Global Peace
Operations Initiative (GPOI) launched at the G8 summit in Sea Island in 2004 with the G8 countries pledging to train at least 75,000 personnel for peace operations by 2010 with a special focus on Africa and support for the command structure and multilateral staff of ECOWAS and the AU. (Mpyisi, 2007, p.39) Also in 2005, the United States announced the establishment of the Pan-Sahelian Initiative (PSI) and the Trans-Saharan Counter-Terrorism Initiative (TSCTI) that sought to ‘deny “Africa’s ungoverned spaces” to potential terrorists.’ (Bah and Aning, 2008, p.126) The latest embodiment of the increased US interest in Africa is the announcement of the creation of US Africa Command, Africom, in February 2007. It is clear that US interest in African security has increased, an interest mainly triggered by concerns over oil and terrorism. ‘The geopolitics of energy resources is competing with the grand narrative of the “war on terrorism”.’ (Kraxberger, 2005, p.61, Bershinski, 2007, Prendergast and Thomas-Jensen, 2007) In 2007, the United States imported more crude oil from Africa than the Middle East. (Bah and Aning, 2008, pp.124-125) However, this interest in Africa is limited by the fact that the United States is not ready to commit troops on the ground.

In the case of France and the United Kingdom, due to their colonial history, both countries were already heavily involved in the continent, but both took a step back and slowly disengaged.

France was traditionally considered as the ‘gendarme’ of Africa due to its numerous interventions to prop up client regimes during the post-independence and Cold War years. The famous speech of President Mitterrand at La Baule in June 1990 (Mitterrand, 20 June 1990) was a first sign of change as it established a link between aid and development, a sign that France would slowly impose conditionalities on its aid, following the North
American lead. (Gouttebrune, 2002, p.1040) The importance of this speech should not be over-emphasised as real change only came with a change of guards and the nomination of Lionel Jospin as Prime Minister in 1997. (Banégas et al., March 2007) This led to what came to be known as the ‘doctrine Jospin’ namely ‘ni ingérence, ni indifférence’ (‘neither interference, nor indifference’). (Bouquet interview, 11 June 2008) This formulation was probably influenced by the genocide in Rwanda in 1994 as the French policy at the time was accused of both interference and indifference. On the ‘ni indifférence’ side, this new direction was given a concrete institutional outlet with the launch of RECAMP (Renforcement des Capacités Africaines de Maintien de la Paix – Reinforcement of African Peace-Keeping Capacities). The RECAMP program was placed under UN auspices and coordinated with the OAU/AU and other African regional organisations. Unlike the American programs, the French program has only had minor modifications throughout the years with a specific focus, from the start, on Chapter VI operations. Following performance reviews, it later on tried to put to greater and better use the French forces stationed in Africa and focused on prevention. The program consists of three components: individual peacekeeping training of African soldiers, field peacekeeping training in large sub-regional exercises – the first one, Exercise Guidimakha, taking place in 1998 –, and the equipment for units engaged in peacekeeping. Supplies are positioned on three French bases in Africa. (Bagayoko-Penone, 2003) RECAMP has already seen five cycles of training that involved ECOWAS, ECCAS and SADC countries. As of 2007, the RECAMP program is being slowly Europeanised as France is trying to shift the financial burden to the European Union. (Fabre interview, 2 August 2007, Fournier interview, 23 July 2008, and Spinoza interview, 28 April 2008)
The RECAMP program is the expression of the French ‘constructive disengagement’ as the country is increasingly reluctant to send its troops into harm’s way. France did intervene in Côte d’Ivoire in 2002, but was keen on getting ECOWAS involved. But overall, France will always remained involved in Africa as Francophone African countries represent a group of about thirty countries that it can count on within international organisations such as the United Nations. This allows France to play a greater role on the international scene than is warranted by its own capabilities. (Marchal, 1995, p.904)

The same evolution can be witnessed in the United Kingdom as it went from bilateral defence agreements to bilateral peacekeeping training. The UK is unique in that it prefers a bilateral approach. After independence, Britain, just like France, kept military links via defence agreements with its former colonies like Kenya, Nigeria and South Africa, albeit without a strong British military presence. (Jackson, 2006, pp.353-354) However, the Defence Pact with Nigeria was never ratified and never took effect. During the early 1990s, under the conservative government of John Major, the British foreign policy towards Africa can be seen, according to Tom Porteous, as ‘policy drift, caution and inaction verging, in the case of Rwanda, on negligence.’ (Porteous, 2005, p.284) Post Cold-War and, later, post 9/11 realities led to a reappraisal of Africa’s significance in terms of security for the UK. This occurred at the same time as the advent of the new British government of Tony Blair in 1997, a government ‘keen to emphasise the ethical dimensions of foreign policy and be seen as a ‘force for good’ in the world.’ (Jackson, 2006, p.356) This new turn of the British policy was made clear by the 1998 Strategic Defence Review and the 2001 New Chapter. (Jackson, 2006, p.356) Due to the internal structure of the British government and its division between the Foreign and
Commonwealth Office (FCO), the Ministry of Defence (MOD) and the Department for International Development (DFID), it was difficult for the UK to establish a common tool to support African peacekeeping efforts. This was finally achieved in 2001 with the creation of the Africa Conflict Prevention Pool (ACPP) supported by the Treasury and coordinated at ministerial level by the Cabinet Office. (African Conflict Prevention Pool Secretariat, 2004) The ACPP works through staff in Whitehall and the defence attaché network in Africa along with four Regional Conflict Advisers. Just like within the US and France, the UK is now factoring in the regional dimension in its outreach to Africa. The core of the UK African Peacekeeping Training Support Program is to ‘train the trainer.’ British military personnel are embedded within the military institutions of host countries to assist them in the restructuring of their armed forces and the development of their peacekeeping capabilities. (Jackson, 2006, pp.362-363) The UK also provides funds to regional peacekeeping centres such as the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC) in Ghana that opened in 2004. Although in a somewhat more discrete manner and according to its own diplomatic traditions, the UK has adopted overall the same policy as France and the United States with the idea of building the peacekeeping capabilities of African countries to avoid sending its own troops.

As their overall approach is similar, the P3 have tried to coordinate their actions in this domain on a bilateral basis, but also at the level of the EU and the UN. They started consulting on this issue in May 1997 at the United Nations leading to the so-called P3 agreement. (Bagayoko-Penone, 2003) In 1998, UK and France also sought better coordination on Africa through the St Malo agreement on Franco-British cooperation on Africa. (Porteous, 2005, p.293) In 2001, coordination took place at the EU level with the EU Council Common Position on 14 May 2001 concerning conflict prevention,
management and resolution in Africa. (Council of the European Union, 15 May 2001) The role of the EU has kept growing in this domain, notably with the establishment of the EU Peace Facility in 2003 that has provided €250 million to help finance African peacekeeping operations. (Ramsbotham et al., 2005, p.327) But policy coordination even among close allies is not easy to achieve and most analysts argue that these coordination attempts have remained rhetorical and intentional. (Porteous, 2005, Bagayoko-Penone, 2003)

**ECOWAS, a unique centre of attention for the P3**

The foreign policies of the P3 towards ECOWAS followed the overall guidelines outlined above. The position of West Africa, and by extension of ECOWAS, is unique in the African continent as all three major powers are involved and support the regional organisation. (Thom interview, 10 June 2008) As outlined above, the P3 started showing an increasing interest in peacekeeping support for African troops around the same time and they all sent military advisors to ECOWAS between 2002 and 2003. France, after taking a step back during the conflicts in Liberia and Sierra Leone, had come to terms with the increasing role of Nigeria in the region. It even offered Nigeria to participate in RECAMP and offered to support the ECOWAS Standby Force (ESF). (Adebajo, 2000, p.193) France supported the deployment of ECOMOG in Guinea Bissau financially and logistically in 1999 and directly intervened in Côte d’Ivoire in collaboration with ECOWAS in 2002. The UK is also still very much involved in West Africa as its intervention in Sierra Leone in May 2000 clearly illustrates. However, for the UK, the shift towards a regional logic has been a bit slow as West Africa as a whole is not as important compared to Nigeria, Ghana or Sierra Leone as former colonies. Furthermore,
there is a perception that in West Africa, problems tend to come from the Francophone countries. (Thom interview, 10 June 2008) Nevertheless, one of the four Regional Conflict Advisers is based in Abuja and the UK is committed to build a Peacekeeping Wing at the Infantry School in Jaji. (Jackson, 2006, p.363) ‘In 2003, the ACPP supported ECOWAS peace support deployments by contributing £3.5 million for the deployment of Ghanaian forces to Côte d’Ivoire, and contributed £400,000 towards the running costs of Nigerian forces in Liberia.’ (Jackson, 2006, p.368) But overall, support to ECOWAS is still seen as support to Nigeria or other former British colonies. The same tendency can be witnessed within the United States but with an emphasis on Nigeria. The US foreign policy towards Africa is based on a three-pronged approach that focuses on pivotal states in each region – Nigeria, South Africa, Kenya and Ethiopia – (Chase et al., 1996), on enhanced coordination with the P3 and international organisations and on capacity building for African states and regional organisations. (Bah and Aning, 2008, p.122) There is a bipartisan consensus within Congress that the United States should help the professionalisation of the Nigerian military and enhance their peacekeeping training. (Bagayoko-Penone, 2003) The United States were also key in supporting the peacekeeping operations in Liberia and Sierra Leone. (Bah and Aning, 2008) In 2000, the US launched Operation Focus Relief that concretely meant training Nigerians so that they could participate in the peacekeeping mission in Sierra Leone. (Chaveas interview, 23 July 2008, Perlez, 9 August 2000, Berman, 2004) Beyond this punctual support, the US is also assisting ECOWAS in the establishment of the ESF via its military advisors. Lately, the US–Nigerian relationship has been strained since the announcement of AFRICOM as Nigeria seems ‘to be spearheading a concerted strategy through ECOWAS and the AU to ensure that the US did not establish a base on the Gulf of Guinea.’ (Bah and Aning, 2008, p.128)
Thanks to the presence of military advisors from the P3 countries within ECOWAS headquarters in Abuja itself and sharing the same offices, the coordination that was declared at a political level started to take shape. Of course, each member of the P3 had different ways to react and deal with issues in the region. Nevertheless, a sort of division of labour was established between the members of the P3. Each military attaché came with its own set of priorities but by sharing this information, they strove to avoid redundancy and money squandering. The UK focused on the constitution of the Task Force for the ESF and on the roadmap and the definition of the ESF with France. The US focused on logistics and offered to ECOWAS the Hastings depot in Liberia with about $42 million worth of equipment. (Hardy interview, 23 August 2007) All of the military attachés reported back not only to their immediate military superiors but also to rather high-level diplomatic instances in each capital, an indication of the importance of ECOWAS in the eyes of the P3. Nevertheless, as the plan for ACOTA and RECAMP were drawn within the capitals, it was often more difficult to reach a successful collaboration for peacekeeping training. (Fernandes interview, 20 August 2007, Casanova interview, 28 May 2008, Thom interview, 10 June 2008, Senior military Western advisors to ECOWAS interviews, 23 August 2007) Indeed, beyond this day-to-day collaboration, there were regular ECOWAS-donor meetings to ensure effective coordination. (Ramsbotham et al., 2005, p.337) ECOWAS, because it already has a long peacekeeping record, attracts foreign donors, including Germany that sent a military advisor in 2007 and increasingly the European Union, and can be considered as an example of successful collaboration between the P3 to assist and support the emerging peacekeeping capabilities of an African regional organisation. It is also worth noting that the initiative remains in the hands of ECOWAS and the P3 keep to their advising and supporting role. At a
political level, the commitment of the P3 is strong and clear, at a practical level, the military advisers have a few doubts about the future of the force. (Casanova interview, 28 May 2008, Thom interview, 10 June 2008, Senior military Western advisors to ECOWAS interviews, 23 August 2007)

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The origins of ECOWAS can be traced back to the fertile soil of pan-Africanism from which the regional organisation was able to rise with the Francophone regionalist experience acting as a fertiliser and a stimulus. However, the creation of the regional organisation in itself was not an easy and painless process due in part to the Anglophone / Francophone divide that shaped West African politics. Nevertheless, Nigeria threw its weight in the balance and was able to win the support of all West African states. The first fifteen years of the regional organisation demonstrate that West African unity is not in any way spontaneous or natural. But ECOWAS has ploughed forward with its economic projects despite recurrent political tensions between its member states, be it about frontier disputes, broader foreign policy disputes about South Africa for instance or the question of redistribution within ECOWAS. As recognised by its Executive Secretary, the balance sheet of ECOWAS in 1990 was barely positive with very few successes, notably due to the lack of political will of its member states leading to implementation problems. The year 1990 and the Liberian civil war served as a catalyst for change and the international context led to the broadening of the ECOWAS mandate to security and democratic governance issues. Overall, it seems that regional crises, such as the Biafra war or the Liberian war, have prompted responses at the regional level, entrusting wider responsibilities to the regional organisation.
If one wants to make a first assessment of what driving factors shaped the evolution of ECOWAS, it seems that the regional hegemon was the motor for regional integration, both at the inception of ECOWAS and during its transformation. *Pax Nigeriana* is indeed the agenda of Nigeria in West Africa. Nevertheless, other actors, like Togo, played throughout the history of the institution a role out of proportion with their physical power. While these might be the key actors that influenced the evolution of ECOWAS, changing background conditions, namely the end of the Cold War and the state collapse of Liberia, were necessary for Nigeria and others to take action. Beyond these background conditions, the actual shape ECOWAS took as a security institution was strongly influenced by the weakness of its member states that was reflected in the regional organisation itself and that led to the involvement of the P3. This quick historical overview proves the relevance of the three factors outlined at the beginning of this study: the marginalisation of the region after the end of the Cold War, the pervading impact of state weakness and the role of the regional hegemon. No predominant factor can really be separated from the rest but it seems that Nigeria is the key player that has the clout to bring different actors together to move the agenda forward. We will see in the next chapter whether South Africa plays a similar role within SADC before proceeding with the comparative analysis of the security and democracy roles of both institutions in chapter 5.
CHAPTER 4

THE EMERGENCE OF SADC

OR ‘WHAT TO DO WITH BIG BROTHER?’

If ECOWAS can be considered by Nigeria as a way to achieve *Pax Nigeriana*, SADCC was originally created to contain its regional hegemon. The ups and downs of the Southern African region have been dictated by the internal developments of South Africa, of ‘big brother.’ The Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) was created as the economic wing of the fight against apartheid South Africa.

‘Our unity of effort in the struggle for economic independence for our peoples becomes the necessary condition to guarantee our own sovereignty and security…’ (President Jose Eduardo Dos Santos, President of Angola, Maputo, 11 July 1983. Quoted in SADCC, 1988, p.3)

Contrary to the case of ECOWAS, political cooperation between the members of SADCC was already a given at the time of its creation to the extent that they were all united against the threat of apartheid South Africa. The creation of SADCC went rather smoothly and entailed fewer negotiations than ECOWAS as the threat of a common enemy brought these countries together. The creation of a regional organisation as a balance against the threat of South Africa follows the realist playbook. (Walt, 1987)

Before delving any further into a comparative approach, one should look at the Southern African experience as a whole and assess it in its own right. Only a deep understanding of the historical dynamics influencing the region, be it at the regional or international level,
can put the emergence of SADC out of SADCC into perspective and point to the key factors that influenced its creation and evolution, be it the regional hegemon, the existence of a culture of solidarity between the countries fighting apartheid South Africa or the impact of international events on the region. Just like the chapter on ECOWAS, this chapter informs the theoretical findings that will be outlined in chapter 7.

This chapter explores the roots of SADCC, be it pan-Africanism or the struggle against apartheid with the Front Line States (FLS), and explains how such an economic organisation came about. Early on, the organisation was almost brought to a halt by South African destabilisation techniques that played on the existing problems and tensions between SADCC member states. At the same time, the organisation was supported from outside by international donors. Following the end of the Cold War and the early signs of the end of apartheid, SADCC started to transform itself and emerged in 1992 as the Southern African Development Community (SADC). This was but the first step of a long drawn-out path towards its transformation into a security and governance organisation, an endeavour doggedly pursued from 1992 until now, often without the help of the West. This chapter provides a solid background for the in-depth analysis of the change within SADC and ECOWAS in chapters 5 and 6 by highlighting causal factors that influenced SADCC and then SADC throughout its history.

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The roots of Southern African regionalism

Just like in West Africa, the roots of regionalism run deep in Southern Africa. Southern
Africa as a region was profoundly impacted by the experience of colonialism characterised by large white-settler populations and by its independence struggle. A common experience of and resistance to settler colonialism leading to the emergence of a common identity – a constructivist argument – seems to be a necessary but insufficient condition for the establishment of a Southern African regional organisation. Indeed, the triggering factor came from the threat of apartheid that needed to be balanced against, thus supporting a realist explanation of the roots of SADCC.

**Southern Africa, a region shaped by colonialism**

Southern Africa was a region defined by colonialism and the white settlers that transformed this part of Africa. Colonialism in Southern Africa had four unique characteristics that brought disparate countries together. (Bauer and Taylor, 2005, pp.3-5) First, colonialism in Southern Africa lasted far longer than anywhere else in Africa. The first white (Portuguese) settlements in Southern Africa were established during the seventeenth century and Portugal kept its colonies until 1975. As a consequence, Southern African countries were granted independence much later and have had less time to develop and grow as independent countries. Second, not only did the colonisers stay longer but they also settled in greater numbers in Southern Africa. The presence of large white settler populations in the region is an issue that still dominates contemporary politics and debates within SADC. South Africa is the obvious example, but Zimbabwe is also facing difficulties due to the continued presence of settler interests in the country. Third, independence was often not a peaceful process with liberation movements resorting to armed struggles. These were long, drawn-out conflicts that often lasted decades with newly independent countries helping and supporting their neighbours still
under colonial rule. This was especially true for Angola, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa. The common anti-colonial and anti-apartheid struggle fostered interconnectedness among the peoples and the states of the region. Fourth, beyond ideological and political solidarity, Southern Africa was also economically and socially interconnected and interdependent with a region-wide migrant labour system that gravitated around South Africa. During the mid-nineteenth century, fifty to eighty thousand migrants came to work on the Kimberley diamond mines and later on the gold mines on the Witwatersrand. The informal movement of people across borders for work had a long history in Southern Africa and should not be forgotten when discussing economic regional integration. (Williams, 2006, pp.4-5)

History and the legacy of colonialism helped constitute Southern Africa as a region. The development of infrastructure also had its importance as it was organised in such a way that it increased the dependence of the hinterland on the railways that brought goods back and forth to the South African coast. The economic and infrastructural ties inherited from colonisation were so strong that the economic role of South Africa toward its ‘natural’ economic hinterland was institutionalised in several organisations. In 1974, the Rand Monetary Area (RMA) agreement was signed between South Africa, Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland. It was later superseded by the Common Monetary Area (CMA) in 1986 and led to the Multilateral Monetary Agreement (MMA) of 1992 that also included Namibia. (Mills, 1995, pp.2-3) Besides this monetary agreement, SACU (Southern African Customs Union) was another institutional pillar strengthening the ties between South Africa and its smaller neighbours. The agreement dated back to colonial times in 1910 and provided for the duty free movement of goods and services between member countries and a common external tariff. With South Africa collecting the common
external tariff, the member states agreed on a formula for distributing excise duties between them. (Mills, 1995, pp.2-3) The BLS countries (Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland) shared a currency and a customs union throughout the years of apartheid. The economic ties established during the colonial period were so strong that they could not be severed, notably due to the lack of a strong alternative. Providing such an alternative was the raison d’être of SADC.

With the independence of several Southern African states under black majority rule and the entrenchment of apartheid in South Africa, the economic and political flows seemed to be pulling in opposite directions. Now free to decide their own foreign policy, the newly independent countries endeavoured to counter the political and economic influence of South Africa, thus leading to the creation of the FLS and of SADCC. The fight against colonialism, based on a common black identity, was prolonged by the fight against apartheid and was made all the more urgent as the political and economic independence of these states was threatened by South Africa, the realist logic of self-preservation backing a more constructivist and normatively based reason to resist South Africa.

The anti-apartheid front

History created a Southern African region economically and socially interconnected. But later developments separated the region in two along ideological and political lines. Later on, political solidarity against apartheid also took an economic form.

The two opposing forces of apartheid in South Africa and pan-Africanism led to the split of the region. By 1970, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Swaziland, Tanzania and Zambia
had achieved independence, while Namibia, Zimbabwe and South Africa were under white minority rule. At that time, pan-Africanism was a thriving movement and the Organisation of African Unity had been active for seven years. As mentioned earlier, pan-Africanism was essentially a movement against colonisation. After the wave of independence of the 1960s, the attention of the OAU was focused on Southern Africa. At its inception, it established a Standing Liberation Committee to channel economic and military assistance to the liberation movements. The 1969 Lusaka Manifesto, originally signed by thirteen governments and later endorsed by the OAU, was used as a formal declaration of its policy towards the remnants of colonialism in Africa. (Legum, 1982, pp.124-125) The anti-colonial and anti-apartheid struggle became a defining feature of the Southern African region, thus explaining the inclusion early on of Tanzania as part of the region. Tanzania had been throughout the years adamant in its fight against apartheid South Africa and for the full liberation of the continent.

In April 1974, a military coup in Portugal toppled not only the dictatorship but also brought to an end the political status quo in Southern Africa. The independence of the Portuguese colonies changed the balance at the regional level as white-dominated Zimbabwe and South Africa could no longer rely on these states to act as buffer zones against independent black Africa. In their eyes, the danger was right at their borders. The Southern African states of Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia first joined forces politically in 1975 by establishing the Front Lines States following the independence of Angola and Mozambique. The FLS was a bid to rid Southern Africa of the twin scourges of apartheid and colonialism. The cohesion of the Front Line States was notably forged in the struggle for the independence of Zimbabwe achieved in 1980. However, other countries of the region declined to join the informal grouping. Lesotho
and Swaziland stayed out ‘on the grounds that their security would have been too compromised.’ (Cawthra, 1997, p.5) As to Malawi, it was the only country in the region that had openly maintained fairly close political links with South Africa. Malawi’s President, Hastings Banda, also maintained excellent diplomatic relations with Western governments and South Africa became Malawi’s main purchaser of tea and tobacco, while South African investors built roads, railways and a new capital city in Malawi. (McMaster, 1974) Lesotho, Swaziland and Botswana were walking on a tight rope because of their membership in SACU that concretely meant that these countries depended on South Africa that collected all customs and excise in the common customs area and then redistributed the revenue.

The FLS operated very informally and consisted mainly of meetings at the level of Heads of State. ‘Most of the FLS leaders knew each other personally and agreements were struck with little recourse to the niceties of diplomacy or bureaucratic process.’ (Cawthra, 1997, p.5) Due to the informal nature of the organisation, prime importance was given to consensus-building. In line with their agenda of struggle against white minority rule, the presidents of the two main liberation movements, the South West African People’s Organisation (SWAPO) of Namibia and the African National Congress (ANC) of South Africa, sat in on FLS meetings. At a structural level, ‘the FLS included a military coordinating structure now known as the Inter-State Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC), the functions of which expanded over time to include coordination of training and intelligence, but not joint control of operations.’ (Cawthra, 1997, p.5)

While united in their common goal, the relations between the five presidents of the Frontline States, Neto of Angola, Khama of Botswana, Machel of Mozambique, Nyerere
of Tanzania, and Kaunda of Zambia were not always free of tension or conflict. They notably supported different Zimbabwean liberation movements. While Kaunda backed Nkomo’s ZAPU (Zimbabwe African People’s Union), Nyerere and Machel supported Mugabe’s ZANU (Zimbabwe African National Union), a fact that was source of tension not only between these presidents, but subsequently between Kaunda and Mugabe after the latter reached power. Despite these tensions, the five Front Line States were able to display a uniform front during the decisive preliminary negotiations prior to the Lancaster House Conference that facilitated Zimbabwe’s independence in 1980. (Zehender, 1983, p.6)

Furthermore, they were nominally on opposite sides of the Cold War and thus differed considerably in terms of development strategies. Angola, Mozambique and Zimbabwe followed a socialist ideology, while Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi and Swaziland followed some form of capitalist and free trade policies. In the middle were Tanzania that had formulated its own version of African socialism and Zambia that propagated the ideology of ‘humanism.’ (Tostensen, 1982, p.118) Nevertheless, anti-colonialism and anti-apartheid were powerful ideologies that united people of Southern Africa against minority rule, in Namibia and South Africa. As a realist would say, the enemy of my enemy is my friend. But this political struggle left the reality of economic dependence intact.

Thanks to the numerous consultations leading to the liberation of Zimbabwe, the Frontline States were able to work through some of their political differences. This augured well for the ability to move on to economic considerations. In July 1974, with the independence of Mozambique and Angola in sight, President Kaunda of Zambia proposed a ‘transcontinental belt of independent and economically powerful nations, from Dar Es
Salaam and Maputo on the Indian Ocean to Luanda on the Atlantic.’ (Dar Es Salaam, 7 July 1974. Quoted in SADCC, 1988, p.4) Economic cooperation was not a new phenomenon between the Front Line States as during the negotiations on Zimbabwean independence, numerous bilateral economic agreements were signed between the Front Line States between the Lusophone states but also between Tanzania and Mozambique. (Thompson, 1985, pp.260-261) After independence, the two countries established trade relations and set up a Mozambique – Tanzania Permanent Commission of Cooperation. (Thompson, 1985, p.275)

Against the common threat represented by Namibia and economically powerful South Africa, Southern African states decided to cooperate not only politically but also economically by creating a rival economic bloc to liberate themselves from their dependence on South Africa.

The creation of SADCC

Colonial history and the necessity to balance against the threat of apartheid having brought together the independent countries of Southern Africa, the creation of SADCC as such was precipitated by a specific set of circumstances both at the regional and the international level that created the right conditions for its emergence. While the impetus for its creation can be traced in the short run to specific regional or international events, its structure was influenced by longer term trends specific to African regionalism and by lessons from previous regional experiments. The immediate background conditions leading to SADCC seem to support two different versions of realism: a Waltian balance of threats understanding of international relations on the one hand, and classical realism
with an important role played by great world powers, on the other. The existence of common economic interests also lends support to a liberal explanation of the creation of SADCC. Finally, the actual shape taken by the regional organisation shows that member states privileged functionalism, low institutionalism and respect for sovereignty.

**SADCC between regional and international pressures**

There are two main schools of thought with regard to the creation of SADCC. Some argue that the establishment of SADCC was precipitated by two events that changed the regional scene: the independence of Zimbabwe under majority rule and the Constellation of Southern African States (CONSAS) proposal by South Africa. Others argue that SADCC was established following pressure from international donors, mainly the United States. Whether the United States played a significant role or not, there is no doubt that the Nordic countries and the European Community played a key supporting role for SADCC.²

If one considers SADCC a direct continuation, through economic means, of the Front Line States, (Seiler, 1980, Amin et al., 1987, Khadiagala, 1994) then the decision to form SADCC was taken at a meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the FLS in Gaborone in May 1979. It was agreed to convene a major conference in Arusha in July 1979 with donor governments and institutions to discuss a regional program of economic development for Southern Africa. (Tostensen, 1982, p.93) Such a turn towards economic

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² "While external participation in regional subsystems inhibits the autonomy of small-state alliances, this very participation is, more significantly, an opportunity they seize in strengthening their relative position vis-à-vis the regional power." (Khadiagala, 1994, p.45) For further documents on SADCC, see MATTISON, S. & ÖHLUND, S. (1988) The Norsad Fund, Report by the Joint Nordic-SADCC Team set up to Review the Nordic Proposal, Gaborone. And SADCC SECRETARIAT (1985) SADCC's First Five Years, Gaborone.
issues was probably triggered by the harassment campaign orchestrated by South Africa against the Front Line States. In its struggle against the FLS, South Africa used all the tools at its disposal, be it political and diplomatic or economic. (Thompson, 1985, p.261)

The July 1979 Arusha conference gathering Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia explained to potential international donors the main rationale behind the creation of SADCC:

- ‘the reduction of economic dependence, particularly, but not only, on the Republic of South Africa;
- the forging of links to create a genuine and equitable regional integration;
- the mobilisation of resources to promote the implementation of national, interstate and regional policies;
- concerted action to secure international cooperation within the framework of our strategy for economic liberation.’ (SADCC, 1980, p.2)

It was also agreed that the other majority-ruled countries of Southern Africa would be invited to participate: Lesotho, Malawi, Swaziland and independent Zimbabwe after the successful conclusion of the Lancaster House negotiations join subsequently the FLS. In April 1980, the Lusaka Summit that brought together Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe adopted the Lusaka Declaration entitled ‘Southern Africa: Toward Economic Liberation’ as well as a Program of Action.

The importance of a region-wide anti-South African economic cooperation was highlighted by the South African counter-proposal of CONSAS. Hoping Zimbabwe

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would become independent under a government not unsympathetic to Pretoria, Prime Minister P. W. Botha, in a November 1979 speech to prominent businessmen, announced his plan to create of ‘constellation of states’ bound closely to South Africa by ‘joint planning and action, as well as the pooling of resources.’ (Carter, 1985, p.45) This was supposed to be South Africa’s solution to poverty and underdevelopment in the region and was envisaged to include South Africa and Rhodesia, the SACU states – Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland – and the four ‘independent’ Bantustans as separate nations – Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei. The term ‘constellation’ was purposefully used in order to ward off any fear that this organisation would be closer to a solar system with smaller countries rotating around South Africa. However, no clear institutional infrastructure was formulated. (Tostensen, 1982, p.121) The South African proposal was flatly rejected by all independent Southern African states, including the members of SACU. ‘The main bone of contention for these states was that accepting the “homelands” as partners would make these “presentable” as such; their acceptance would therefore ultimately be tantamount to their accepting the South African policy of apartheid.’ (Zehender, 1983, p.10) If CONSAS was not at the source of the idea of SADCC, it did precipitate its establishment. At the 1980 Lusaka Summit, President Kaunda of Zambia declared that SADCC was formed as a response to the South African proposal. The SADCC was thus established as the economic pillar of the anti-colonial and anti-apartheid struggle of the region. It is notably for this reason that the Southern African liberation movements, namely the South West Africa People’s Organisation (SWAPO) of Namibia, the African National Congress (ANC) and the Pan-Africanist Congress of Azania of South Africa were welcomed by SADCC as observers.

Furthermore, the independence of Zimbabwe acted as a catalyst for the creation of SADCC on two counts: it lifted the burden of war from the economies of the FLS and it brought the entire independent transport network and options for improving it within the reach of the FLS. ‘As the hub of the transportation network north of the Limpopo River, Zimbabwe was the key to the success of any serious endeavor to promote economic liberation from South Africa.’ (Khadiagala, 1994, p.225) Moreover, the Southern African countries relied more and more on interstate consultative mechanisms that had gradually expanded between them. (Khadiagala, 1994, p.220)

The analysis focused until now on the regional dynamics. However, some scholars argue that the push for the creation of SADCC came from outside. Far from being solely an initiative of the FLS, Western countries, and specifically the United States, offered ‘a kind of “Marshall Plan”.’ (Tostensen, 1982, Amin et al., 1987)

‘These initiatives date back to April 1976 when, following MPLA’s victory in Angola, special national security adviser to then US President Richard Nixon, Henry Kissinger, made a speech in Lusaka stating that the USA supported self-determination and majority-rule in southern Africa, and adding that massive aid would be made available by the USA as part of a 10-point programme to solve the ‘Rhodesian problem’. […] Under Jimmy Carter further concrete steps were taken to give substance to rather vague policy statements. In late 1978 USAID commissioned a number of fairly detailed studies discussing a wide range of issues, the purpose of which being the formulation of a comprehensive and coherent aid policy for the region as a whole.’ (Tostensen, 1982, p.93)

In this perspective, Tostensen noted the coincidence of the US initiative and that of the FLS. However, along the same line of thought, it is also worth noticing that 1980 was the
year the OAU announced the Lagos Plan of Action that encouraged the principle of sub-regional economic cooperation as building blocs for a continental economic union and 1981 was the year of the creation of the Preferential Trade Area for Eastern and Southern Africa (PTA), the predecessor of COMESA. (Oosthuizen, 2006, p.61) While a direct link between the US project and the creation of SADCC is somewhat difficult to convincingly establish,\textsuperscript{44} it was nevertheless true that ‘the SADC idea has been dependent on the blessings of imperialism in general.’ (Amin et al., 1987, p.8) The EEC notably also encouraged the concept of economic liberation through the creation of regional organisations. The promise of support of the Nordic countries that later signed in 1986 a Nordic-SADCC agreement and of the European Community that contributed 3,200 million Eco from 1975 until 1990 (Holland, 1995, p.266) proved essential. ‘Without EC and other international support SADCC would have been stillborn.’ (Holland, 1995, p.265) As the first ten years of SADCC made clear, dependence on aid was a key feature of the organisation. While international donors might have had a say in the creation of SADCC, the structure it adopted was definitely influenced by past regional and continental experiences.

The original structure of SADC

The actual structure that was adopted for SADCC was not influenced by the political concerns of international donors, but seemed to have been based on lessons learnt from similar experiences within the region and within the African continent at large. The structure of SADCC had two rather unique characteristics: it had no formal agreement and it was a functional organisation. Faithful to a predominantly realist approach, member

states preferred low grade institutionalism with a small and weak regional organisation, thus preserving their sovereignty, a structure quite typical of many early regional organisations.

SADCC cooperation would be ‘built on concrete projects and specific programs rather than on grandiose schemes and massive bureaucratic institutions.’ (Statement by President Khama of Botswana as SADCC Chairman in April 1980. Thompson, 1985, p.105) This approach came to be emblematic of SADCC. The very fact that SADCC was called a conference rather than an organisation or a community was a clear indication of the informal nature of the agreement and the looser form of cooperation privileged.\footnote{There are many examples of this in other regional organizations such as the CSCE (Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe) or APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation).} Just as no formal agreement underpinned the establishment of the FLS, no formal treaty was signed to create SADCC.

The not so indirect critique of other regional arrangements across the continent was obvious. (Zehender, 1983, p.8) The experience of the East African Community (EAC) that had ceased to exist in 1977 was brought to the negotiating table by one of its former members, Tanzania. The free trade model adopted by the EAC had had a polarisation effect between its member states, with Tanzania and Uganda perceiving Kenya as the only one benefiting from the trade community. Such an approach was avoided by SADCC whose aim was not to create a large market by promoting trade and industry but rather to provide immediate benefits to its member countries by cooperation in projects and programs.
While the EAC was probably seen as a counter-example, while the Mozambique-Tanzania Permanent Commission is considered a direct precursor of SADCC. It was ‘referred to as the model of agreement in several of the SADCC papers.’ (Thompson, 1985, p.276) Formed in 1976, the Mozambique-Tanzania Commission decided to collaborate in specific areas: education and culture, agriculture and natural resources, trade and finance, communications and transport, etc. According to Thompson, there were similar terms of cooperation between the Mozambique-Tanzania Commission and SADCC:

a) ‘political experience as the basis of economic accord;

b) transformation of the colonial infrastructure and colonial patterns of exchange;

c) reduction of competition within the area;

d) rationalisation and complementarity of industry;

e) coordination of national development plans.’ (Thompson, 1985, p.279)

Compared to the EAC, priority was given to simple coordination of national development plans rather than supra-national projects.

Institutionally, SADCC had three major governing bodies: the Summit, the Council of Ministers, and the Standing Committee of Officials made up of Permanent Secretaries. The Summit, composed of the Heads of State or Governments of all the member states, was the supreme body of SADCC responsible for the general direction and control of activities. (Memorandum of Understanding of the Southern African Development Coordination Conference adopted at the Summit Meeting in Salisbury on 20 July 1981) They elected every year among themselves a chairman. The Summit met at least once a
year and took its decisions by consensus.\textsuperscript{46} The Council of Ministers, consisting of one minister from each member state, was responsible for the overall policy, coordination and supervision of the activities of SADCC. (Tostensen, 1982, pp.105-106)

The creation of a secretariat was not envisaged at first. Botswana had volunteered to undertake certain secretarial functions and was helped in that by a London-based Liaison Committee that consisted of High Commissioners and Ambassadors of SADCC posted in London or to the EEC in Brussels. This was again a clear sign of the importance of international donors for SADCC. Due to the increasing administrative burden, a Permanent Secretariat was established in Gaborone in July 1982. SADCC seemed to have learnt a historical lesson and steered clear from supra-national institutions in the spirit of Nkrumah but also from informal regionalisation via spontaneous social forces such as markets.

But the Secretariat was only the second permanent institution set up by SADCC, the first one being the Southern African Transport and Communications Commission (SATCC) headquartered in Maputo. This sectoral commission, as the first permanent institution of SADCC, highlighted the priority given to transport and communications. Each member state was assigned responsibility for a specific sector and was supposed to put together project proposals that would then be approved at the Council or Summit level. (See Table 4.1 below) The functioning of SADCC organs and projects was carried out by national officials. In the words of Mr. Emang Maphanyane of the Botswana Ministry of Finance, ‘SADCC work is national work.’ (Quoted in Carter, 1985, p.66) The logic behind this decentralised approach was based on the assumption that certain countries had special

\textsuperscript{46} Consensus means both general agreement and ‘group solidarity in sentiment and in belief,’ and thus is somewhat less demanding than unanimity that means ‘being of one mind.’ (See Merriam Webster Dictionary, \texttt{www.m-w.com})
qualifications to propose and manage projects in specific sectors and on the will to
distribute equitably the burden of work. The two basic criteria for acceptance as SADCC
projects were ‘an existing foreign exchange gap in its funding, and products that benefit
more than one member state.’ (Carter, 1985, p.60)

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
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<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>Energy</td>
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<td>Botswana</td>
<td>Crop research and animal control</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lesotho</td>
<td>Soil conversation and land utilisation</td>
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<td>Malawi</td>
<td>Fisheries, wild life and forests</td>
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<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>Transport and communications</td>
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<td>Swaziland</td>
<td>Manpower development and training</td>
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<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>Industrial development</td>
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<td>Zambia</td>
<td>Mining and development funding</td>
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<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>Food security and printing of banknotes</td>
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TABLE 4.1: Sectoral responsibility of SADCC countries

Put in the terminology of regional integration theory, SADCC was decidedly a functional
organisation, starting with concrete projects on a limited scale and then developing a
denser web of functional relationships between member states with the ultimate goal of integration.

SADCC was created and based on two rejections, not only of CONSAS and South Africa
but also of previous patterns of regional integration. SADCC, as it was conceived, was thus at the crossroads: between rejection of old patterns of regionalism while displaying other typical characteristics of African regional organisations, i.e. respect of sovereignty but also dependence on foreign aid, a dire need that became prominent in the early years of SADCC.
First challenges and setbacks

In 1980, SADCC was but a declaration of nine Southern African states. But projects and actions were soon put in place in the 1980s. It however had to face an arduous and unfriendly regional and international environment throughout the 1980s as South Africa stepped up its destabilisation policy and as the economic international environment grew more difficult for poor indebted countries. The early years of SADCC are better understood from a realist perspective with most countries focusing on their immediate national interests and with South Africa presenting a major obstacle to the development of the regional organisation. Its role as hegemon was felt economically and militarily by all Southern African countries. But Third World focused literature also highlights a key factor explaining the limited success of SADCC, namely the fact that the weakness of the member states were reflected in the regional organisation as illustrated by the organisation’s dependency on external funding and its weak institutional capacities.

From 1980 to 1990: a first balance

In the early years, SADCC had two main activities: it coordinated sectoral projects and worked at attracting foreign aid and investment. The first significant steps of SADCC consisted of organising annual conferences with international donors – mainly from Europe and North America. At its very creation in 1980, nine bilateral donors took part in the conference, as well as several multilateral agencies such as the World Bank, the Commonwealth Secretariat, the EEC, the African Development Bank and the UN Economic Commission for Africa, as well as other UN bodies. (Tostensen, 1982, p.96)
The second summit conference (SADCC2) held in November 1980 in Maputo was organised in order to convince international donors to make pledges after ‘some 97 projects were listed from rehabilitation and upgrading of the region’s railways to development of basic industries.’ (Pape et al., 2000, p.13) This pledging conference was not very successful as the Southern African countries were only able to secure a pledge of $600 million, far from the target of $1.5 billion needed for the sole transport and communications sector. (Carter, 1985, p.69) But the Nordic countries – Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden – did agree to finance and staff the Southern African Transport and Communications Commission (SATCC). (Tostensen, 1982, p.101) The US privileged a selective country approach and much of its pledges were allocated to Zimbabwe. (Tostensen, 1982, p.136) The organisation of pledging conferences continued throughout the early 1980s. ‘As a result of project development and negotiations, 24 percent ($678 million) of total projects were committed with $450 million under discussion by January 1984.’ (Thompson, 1985, p.282) But overall, contributions from donor countries have steadily decreased.

The Southern African countries faced the misfortune to seek international aid at a time of world recession with monetary crises in Mexico and Brazil. This could be a possible explanation for the limited pledges of support for SADCC projects. Not only did the pledges not correspond to SADCC expectations, but payment was slow and cumbersome to obtain. SADCC had obviously to face different financial bottlenecks and bureaucratic red tapes from the donor countries. This was but a minor problem as the more serious reason could possibly have been a deliberate withholding of funds due to political or other disagreements with the recipients. ‘The EEC is, for example, known to have had qualms about financing projects in non-signatories to the Lomé Convention, i.e. Angola and
Mozambique.’ (Tostensen, 1982, p.99) SADCC tried to reduce its dependence on South Africa but soon replaced it by increased dependence on foreign aid. (Thompson, 1985, p.282) Not only were funds difficult to obtain but, at the same time, SADCC witnessed a significant increase in the number of projects.

But soon after its creation, SADCC had to change. The late 1980s was the time of the continental negotiations that would lead to the 1991 Treaty of Abuja and of Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) in six SADCC member countries – Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. (Pape et al., 2000, p.14) The SAPs came after SADCC member states experienced severe droughts and economic recession due to ‘the collapse of global primary commodity prices, declining terms of trade, and rising debt levels.’ (Bauer and Taylor, 2005, p.7) Member states having lost control over part of their economy via SAP-imposed privatisations became increasingly unable to pursue sectoral coordination that supposed a stronger role of the state in the economy. These domestic changes were soon reflected at the level of SADCC by the end of the 1980s and the African regional organisation started to slowly abandon its original functional model.

As seen above, the success of SADCC was limited and it was forced to adapt to the rapidly changing international environment. Not only had the organisation some difficulties in raising funds and implementing projects, but its overarching aim of reducing dependence on South Africa was not reached. SADCC not only failed to achieve its aim of reducing dependence on South Africa but also was plagued with other problems rather typical of African regional organisations.
Challenges from within and from without

SADCC failures are to a certain extent mainly centred on the structural weakness of member states being mirrored by the regional organisation.

First, SADCC was heavily dependent on external funding, thus limiting its autonomy. According to the Africa Institute, 90% of total funds came from international donors. (Cilliers, 1995, p.9) Due to the ebb and flow of donor interest, the organisation was underfunded, a condition that was in no way made up for by the member states that often failed to pay their membership fees. (Hughes, 2003, p.30)

Second, these limited resources had an impact on the management of SADCC that apparently had ‘an unenviable reputation for poor strategic planning, poor communication, slow decision making.’ (Hughes, 2003, p.30) The Secretariat was deliberately kept small and did not have sufficient resources to perform its task. Most of the management was fragmented into up to twenty one different sectors resulting in organisational inertia, especially as the task of managing the sectoral projects fell onto already heavily burdened national officials. (Malan, 1998b, p.2) Management was not the only issue as the disparity in resources between different countries meant disparate results between sectors. (Hughes, 2003, p.30)

Third, not only was management inefficient but some argue that the structure of SADCC itself was the source of significant problems and hurdles. The decision-making process by consensus severely limited the capacity of action of SADCC. This meant in practice that member states agreed on the lowest common denominator. ‘Throughout its 13 years of
existence, SADCC allowed the pace and intensity of regional cooperation to be dictated by the speed of the laggards.’ (Tsie, 1996, p.86) This limited form of cooperation proved also limited in its results with priority being given to national interests.

Fourth, the economic relations between SADCC member states were far from seamless. There were trade related disputes throughout the 1980s.

‘These included the dispute between Botswana and Zimbabwe over the local content of textile manufacturing, attempts by Tanzania to impose high harbour handling tariffs on Zambian goods exported on the Tanzam line, the failure of Zimbabwe to renew a hydroelectricity purchasing agreement with Zambia and the dispute between Zimbabwe and Mozambique over the Beira oil pipeline tariffs.’ (Mills, 1995, p.4)

Furthermore, the impact of SADCC projects on the economic development of its member states was deemed to be only marginal. (Chimanikire, 2002, p.6)

Above all, SADCC was unable to lessen the dependence of the Southern African states on South Africa as it remained the dominant economy both in terms of size and trade flows. (Ahwireng-Obeng and McGowan, 1998) Southern Africa faced a unique challenge as the regional hegemon was not trying to bring the region together like Nigeria with ECOWAS, but was effectively sabotaging the SADCC project. South Africa’s regional policy had as its goal to ‘ensure the survival of white rule.’ (Vale, 1987, p.178) In order to achieve this goal, it applied both economic carrots and ‘military’ sticks.

On the incentives side, South Africa was successful in maintaining a certain degree of economic ties with its Southern African neighbours, despite the collapse of the CONSAS
project. It first benefited from the already existing regional organisations, the Common Monetary Area that constituted a powerful politico-economic linkage between South Africa, Lesotho and Swaziland. (Maasdorp and Whiteside, 1992, p.177) SACU was also another way of influencing Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland as South Africa could offer to change the SACU revenue distribution formula in favour of the BLS states. Economic cooperation within the Southern African region also continued through more informal and bilateral means. (Mills, 1995, p.3) Strikingly, the South African Department of Foreign Affairs had an entire division responsible for railway affairs, an unusual characteristic that highlights the importance of infrastructure in South Africa’s relation with its neighbours. (Tostensen, 1982, p.124) South Africa was apt at exploiting the tensions of SADCC member states but also their greater or lesser degree of dependence on the South African economy: the greater the dependence, the less virulent the anti-apartheid stance. The most conservative and dependent countries were Malawi and Swaziland while the more radical ones like Angola and Mozambique were more outspoken. (Tostensen, 1982, pp.117-118) Thus, South Africa was able to maintain its economic dominance of the region, despite its own economic problems such as increasing international sanctions in January 1986 with the US Congress passing the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act. The South African economy was weakened, but was still the dominant economy of the region with a high impact and pull for its neighbours.

On the sticks’ side, South Africa also waged a full fledged ‘destabilisation policy’ against its neighbours. During the 1980s, the South African military and security establishments exerted a significant influence on the regional policy. ‘It was a time when our rare dealings in foreign affairs “ranged from the unmentionable to the illicit” (to paraphrase exiled South African author, Christopher Hope).’ (Maasdorp and Whiteside, 1992, p.179)
The destabilisation policy was triggered by the electoral victory of Robert Mugabe in Zimbabwe and took different forms. The two intertwined conflicts of Angola and Namibia soon dominated the regional scene. But the South African military interventions were not limited to these conflicts as it also attacked Zambia and Botswana. Throughout the 1980s, South Africa accused SADCC states of providing bases for the ANC and financed commando raids attacking new SADCC railways and other infrastructures including oil pipelines and storage tanks. If not directly sending troops as in December 1982 when it launched an air attack against the capital of Lesotho, South Africa acted by proxy by financing Jonas Savimbi’s UNITA (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola) in Angola and RENAMO (Mozambican National Resistance) in Mozambique. The attacks on Angola hampered the country’s contribution to SADCC energy resources with its abundant oil. The attacks in Mozambique aimed to cut off SADCC vital transport links to its ocean ports, Nacala, Beira and Maputo. (Carter, 1985, p.47)

Violence subsided a little in 1984 following the signature of the N’Komati Non-Aggression Pact between Mozambique and South Africa. Each government pledged that it would no longer provide sanctuary and support for the organisations attacking the other. But elements within the Southern African security establishment continued their support to RENAMO. (Maasdorp and Whiteside, 1992, p.180) Shortly after, Swaziland announced it had entered the same type of agreement with South Africa two years earlier. (Carter, 1985, p.48) However, Lesotho and Botswana refused to enter in similar agreements even though Lesotho’s position was particularly vulnerable as it was embedded in South African territory.
After 1988, South Africa seemed to have realised that its earlier policy had actually weakened its position regionally and domestically. It hence adopted a policy that recognised the limits of South African power and relied on non-violent policies, such as diplomacy and economic cooperation. This change of heart of South Africa occurred at the time of the early negotiations that would lead to the end of apartheid in South Africa, a radical change in the region that would also change the face of SADCC.

**From conference to community**

The transformation of SADCC into the Southern African Development Community took place in two major stages. The first step, taken in 1992, led to the renaming of the organisation and its enlargement to Namibia and South Africa, the last two states of the region to overcome white minority rule. The new community announced at this time its intention to tackle security and governance issues. This section first puts the decision to transform SADC in a wider regional and international context. It analyses what were the key factors leading to the establishment of a new and reformed SADC. It was changes at the regional level that triggered the transformation of the Southern African regional organisation but these changes were themselves strongly influenced and enabled by changes within the global structure of international relations, namely the end of the Cold War. This illustrates the fact that the regional and international levels cannot be analysed independently. While security and governance issues were first mentioned as early as 1992, the implementation of this new mandate took years of negotiation and the adoption of further protocols and institutions. These developments in the later 1990s described below were a painstakingly slow process that raises several important theoretical issues.
that will be outlined in the following section before being analysed further in chapters 5 and 6.

**Between end of the Cold War and end of apartheid**

The end of the Cold War and of apartheid generated great expectations of peace, stability and development among Southern African countries. The Heads of State and Government expressed confidence that recent events such as the independence of Namibia and the end of apartheid in South Africa ‘will take the region out of an era of conflict and confrontation, to one of cooperation; in a climate of peace, security and stability. These are prerequisites for development.’ (SADC, 17 August 1992a, p.2) Just as the creation of SADCC was triggered by the independence of Zimbabwe, its transformation into SADC had Namibian independence as a catalyst. But the 1990 independence of Namibia did not happen in isolation. 1990 also marked the end of the Cold War and South Africa’s move towards democracy and the end of apartheid.

The end of Cold War radically changed the international and the regional scene. Thanks to the East-West strategic competition, Southern African countries had been able to play one side against the other in order to obtain development assistance. As this leeway was eliminated by the end of the Cold War, African states found themselves increasingly unable to resist the new political conditionalities attached to loans coming from Western governments. Southern African countries had to readjust not only their overall economic orientations but also, at least rhetorically, commit to greater political liberalisation and democracy. (Tsie, 1996, p.78) The ‘second wave’ of democratisation linked to the changes in the international scene passed through Southern Africa and partly changed the
rules of the game. The end of the Cold War thus indirectly influenced the orientation taken by the new SADC. More concretely and as a direct consequence of the end of the Cold War, Cuban and South African troops withdrew from Angola. A ceasefire was reached in Mozambique and democratic elections were held for the first time in several countries. ‘The end of the Cold War brought a peace dividend.’ (Martin interview, 30 July 2007)

At the regional level, the transformation of SADC was also obviously shaped by the future of South Africa after the end of apartheid and the emergence of democracy in this country. In February 1990, President de Klerk removed the ban on the African National Congress, the Pan-Africanist Congress and the South African Communist Party (SACP) and released Mandela after twenty-seven years of imprisonment. What followed was more than three years of negotiations principally between the ANC and the Nationalist Party. The 1993 interim constitution came into effect after the elections on April 27, 1994. (Bauer and Taylor, 2005, p.246) These signs of change in South Africa gave an even greater impetus to the SADCC reform process. It meant that SADCC had to get ready to incorporate the new democratic country in its midst. (Mills, 1995, p.6) The hope was that the emergence of a democratic South Africa would lead to mutually beneficial and ‘non-hegemonic’ regional relations.

Faced with these changes on the international and regional scene, member states signed the Treaty of Windhoek in August 1992 replacing SADCC with the Southern African Development Community. The first obvious radical change was the transition from ‘coordination conference’ to ‘development community’ in the name of the organisation. The use of the term ‘community’ was far from innocent and referred to a desire to
establish a ‘society of states’ that have common interests, values and norms binding them together. (See Bull, 1977) The hope here was for an organised community able to face the deep-seated political, economic and military challenges of the region. (Landsberg, 2002, p.5) The change from ‘development coordination’ to ‘development community’ also signalled the much broader mandate entrusted to the reformed organisation with the aim of achieving full economic integration and trade liberalisation. (Mhlongo interview, 1 August 2007)

A new structure was put in place shortly after the signature of the Windhoek Treaty. SADC did not undergo radical changes, except for the creation of a Tribunal to settle disputes between Member States arising from the interpretation of the Treaty. (SADC, 17 August 1992b) Just as in SADCC, the Summit was the supreme authority of SADC and took its decisions by consensus. The new Treaty tried to address what it considered the most serious problem in its implementation, i.e. the fact that ‘the decentralised structures had no clear lines of authority and accountability in the implementation of regional programmes.’ (Mandaza and Tostensen, 1994, p.109) While the project coordination approach remained, external driving forces pressured the reformed organisation to, at least in theory, focus on regional integration and trade liberalisation. (Schoeman, 2002, p.6) The international donors were also keen on ensuring that the region would strive to mobilise its own resources, potential and capacity. Other changes could be witnessed in the modus operandi of the new SADC. The Treaty notably provided for imposing sanctions on any of its member states which ‘persistently fails, without good reason, to fulfil obligations under this Treaty.’ (SADC, 17 August 1992b, Article 33) This provision was drafted to cater to the need of achieving greater efficiency and coordination within SADC.
In its new form, SADC grew to reach fourteen members. The original ten members that signed the 1992 Windhoek Treaty – Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe – were soon joined by South Africa in 1994, Mauritius in 1995, the DRC in 1997 and Madagascar in 2005. The presence of South Africa within SADC enhanced the desirability for other states to belong to SADC at the expense of other regional groupings. SADC was seen as an area of prosperity thanks to the vigour and strength of the South African economy and other smaller or weak countries such as Mauritius, Madagascar and DRC joined in a desire to bandwagon and reap some mainly economic benefits. Arguably, these states, minding their national interest, followed a realist logic for joining SADC.

Despite a new security and governance agenda, SADC did not neglect its original economic mandate. In 1995, SADC signed for the first time a binding agreement: the Protocol on ‘Shared Water Course Systems.’ The next year, demands for increased liberalisation were met in Maseru in 1996 by the Protocol on Free Trade, an agreement to achieve a free trade area in the region within eight years. The implementation was much slower than expected as it was only ratified in September 2000. (Schoeman, 2002, p.6) Progress was also slow on another major SADC endeavour. The negotiations about a protocol ensuring the free movement of people in Southern Africa started in July 1993, but it was only in August 2005 that a Protocol on the Facilitation of the Movement of Person in SADC was finally approved. (Williams, 2006, p.7)

The Treaty of Windhoek formalised three major changes to SADCC: SADC includes the regional hegemon; beyond cooperation, the aim is now regional integration and the
mandate of SADC extends to the security and governance spheres. (Nathan, November 2004) ‘For it [SADC] to be a living organ, it needs to have two legs: an economic and a political leg.’ (Maundi interview, 19 June 2007) This new interest in security and governance issues was reflected in the state objectives of the organisation. (See table 4.2 below)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regional economic development and integration</th>
<th>Political, Defence and Security Cooperation</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Achievement of development and economic growth</td>
<td>Evolution of common political values, systems and institutions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Promotion of collective self-reliance and interdependence</td>
<td>Promotion and defence of peace and security</td>
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<tr>
<td>Achievement of complementarity</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Maximisation of employment and utilisation of natural resources</td>
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<tr>
<td>Protection of environment</td>
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<tr>
<td>Consolidation of historical, social and cultural links among the people of the Region</td>
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TABLE 4.2: Objectives of SADC (SADC, 17 August 1992b, Article 5)

The change from SADCC to SADC was influenced by three factors: the end of the Cold War and apartheid, but also the real transnational problems and challenges that needed to be addressed at the regional level. To summarise, the end of the Cold War had a three-pronged impact on the Southern African region. It led to an increased marginalisation of the region and of Sub-Saharan Africa in general. It led to the second wave of democratisation. Finally, it also led to fewer conflicts but not to the eradication of all conflicts in the region. The USSR stepped out of the region but this did not eliminate the causes of conflict. The region then had to step in. The successful end of apartheid also played a crucial role in pushing for the transformation of SADCC into SADC. Indeed, the prospects would have been quite different had South Africa collapsed into civil war, as seemed likely at times during the transition period. The end of apartheid and the South African membership in SADC forced its neighbours to drastically reconsider their foreign
policy towards South Africa and to re-assess the existing regional security complex, a change that was reflected in the SADC treaty. A final factor that should not be forgotten is the fact that member states shared objective common interests that would be better addressed at the regional level: exacerbated poverty, low rates of economic growth, food insecurity, the need for infrastructure as well as globalisation.

All these potential factors point convincingly to two different IR theories and less convincingly to another school of thought. The clear impact that the structural changes at the global level had on the regional organisation and the role great powers played, if indirectly, are strongly supporting a neo-realist and realist interpretation. On the other hand, the existence of objective common interests supports a liberal argument. Finally, the impact of the end of apartheid entailed two major changes for South Africa: it became a democracy and its hegemony within the region became acceptable, if not immediately legitimate. As a consequence, theories focusing on the importance of the internal regime of states – ‘democracies do not behave like dictatorships in their foreign policy’ – cannot be ignored. It is however difficult to separate the effects of the democratisation of South Africa from the change in threat perception by its neighbours. Overall, whether democratic or not, the role of the regional hegemon still remains predominant in the early 1990s and later throughout the definition of the security and governance mandate of SADC.

Birth pains of an emerging security organisation

The institutional transformation and evolution of SADC was initiated in 1992 and continued in earnest throughout the 1990s and early 2000s. This section focuses
particularly on the reform of SADC institutions and the expansion of its mandate to security and governance. It is necessary to recount the multiple and sometimes confusing steps taken by the regional organisation before analysing the motivations of SADC member states in the following section.

At the birth of SADC in 1992, while a desire to address security and governance issues was clearly expressed in the founding treaty, no institutions had been created to address these issues. The political and security affairs of the region were still dealt with at the level of the FLS and more specifically within the Inter-State Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC), created in 1983 under the aegis of FLS. The FLS as such dissolved itself on 30 July 1994 to ‘become the political and security wing of SADC,’ (Quoted in Malan, 1998a, p.1) while the ISDSC persisted and was expanded to include South Africa, Lesotho, Malawi and Swaziland. (Mills, 1995, p.14) Meanwhile, SADC was exploring its options. (Cawthra, 1997, p.10) Between 1992 and 1994, the role of the Secretariat in proposing policy options was especially important with for instance a July 1994 Workshop on ‘Democracy, Peace and Security’ composed of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Defence, Security and Police, as well as parliamentarians and representatives of political parties. (Mills, 1995, p.9) It advocated an approach that went beyond traditional military security to include human security. (SADC, 1993, Nathan, 2006) Its role declined after that.

The need to have a working and efficient institution in charge of security and governance issues within SADC was made clear early on August 1994 when Lesotho was the victim of military coup. It soon returned to democracy following pressures of South Africa, Botswana and Zimbabwe under the auspices of the ISDSC. (Cawthra, 1997, p.32) But the
need to be able to address these crises at the regional level was clear. In March 1995, the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs proposed to establish an Association of Southern African States (ASAS) independent from the SADC secretariat and reporting directly to SADC Heads of State. It preserved the highly informal modus operandi of the FLS. This proposal was however soon buried, in part because of the reluctance of Zimbabwe’s Mugabe. (Cilliers, 1995, pp.12-13)

The task was not left at that and the SADC summit in Blantyre in 1996 announced the creation of the SADC Organ on Politics, Security and Defence (OPDS) that would incorporate the existing ISDSC and conserve the informal nature of ASAS. The Organ would operate at a summit level independent of other SADC structures, as well as at ministerial and technical levels. (Cawthra, 1997, Chesterman and Kornegay, 2000, Fisher and Ngoma, 2005, Malan and Cilliers, 1997, Malan, 1998a, Landsberg, 2002, Nathan, 2006) The SADC Organ had three operational committees:

- the Inter-State Politics and Diplomacy Committee (ISPDC);
- the Inter-State Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC); and
- the Committee of Chiefs of Defence Staff. (Fisher and Ngoma, 2005, p.4)

Robert Mugabe became the first chair of the Organ for five years, until 2001 when he was forced to give it up. (Solomon and Ngubane, 2003, p.3) Plagued by a variety of problems, the OPDS never became properly operational due to opposing viewpoints about the content and extent of the organisation’s new security and governance agenda. The 1996 announcement of the OPDS was just that, an announcement. It lacked a legal instrument – protocol – setting out its tasks, responsibilities and the scope of its powers. (Hammerstad, 2005, p.79, Nathan, 2006, p.609)
Soon thereafter, SADC decided to launch a review of the operations of SADC institutions. (SADC Secretariat, April 2001) Member states pursued the restructuring process of SADC institutions. In 2001, they agreed on the following:

- Centralisation of operations at the Secretariat;
- Grouping of the 21 sectors into five main clusters,
  - Politics, Defence and Security,
  - Trade, Industry, Finance and Investment,
  - Infrastructure and Services,
  - Food, Agriculture and Natural Resources, and
  - Social and Human Development;
- Development and approval of the Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (RISDP) and Strategic Indicative Plan of the Organ (SIPO); and
- Establishment of SADC National Committees (SNCs) to coordinate the SADC programmes and activities of individual member states.

The restructuring of SADC also changed the funding of the organisation with the adoption of a new formula based on the ability of member states to pay their dues and their per capita GDP. Previously, the fee was set at a flat rate of US$800,000 per country per year. (Games, 2002, p.34) This reform of SADC institutions was the achievement of the movement first outlined in the 1992 treaty.

Despite these reforms, the SADC Secretariat remains very weak today. Member states deliberately entrusted limited powers to the Secretariat. (Malin interview, 23 July 2007) This is quite understandable as 60% of SADC budget comes from donors.\(^{47}\) Garth Le

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\(^{47}\) ‘If one looks at the outlook budget for 2007/8, member states are expected to contribute 39%, while its international partners are expected to put in 61%.’ MOGAE, F. G. (17 August 2006) Remarks by the President of the Republic of Botswana on the Occasion of the Official opening of the SADC Summit of Heads of State and Government Maseru, Kingdom of Lesotho.
Pere and Khabele Matlosa refer to the fact that more is expected from SADC while at the same time it is not given the means to do so as ‘SADC schizophrenia.’ (Le Pere and Matlosa interview, 19 July 2007) The SADC Secretariat is a technical body. (Maundi interview, 19 June 2007) While it was able in the early 1990s to propose different reforms, it was later left out of several negotiations, including the crucial ones on political and security issues. (South African official, 8 July 2008) The Secretariat also suffers from numerous managerial woes – just like the ECOWAS Commission –, thus seriously impacting its work performance. ‘The SADC Secretariat is small, bureaucratic and politically weak. It has little power or resources to implement or enforce regional decisions. SADC decisions are made strictly by consensus. This has led the annual Summit meetings to function as a talking club for political leaders, and not as a supranational decision-making organ.’ (Hammerstad, 2005, pp.72-73) The SADC Secretariat also has a human resources problem. It had difficulties in 2007 filling high level posts. The posts for South African citizens are not filled as candidates can find more competitive salaries and a better location than Gaborone. (Senior Western Diplomat to Botswana interview, 30 July 2007) Also, just like in ECOWAS, SADC suffers from ‘the syndrome of the travelling Secretariat’ as the per diem of SADC staff members is based on UN rates, thus offering a good complementary income. (Martin interview, 30 July 2007, Müller-Glodde interview, 24 July 2007) Beyond the problem of absenteeism, SADC staff has been drastically reduced in recent years. In 2001, 350 people were working on SADC issues in all the member states’ sectoral units. With the restructuring, a leaner structure was put in place. In 2007, from 135 up to 160 positions were approved, support staff included. The Secretariat now has more responsibility but only one third of the people. (Müller-Glodde interview, 24 July 2007) The lack of competent staff is especially striking in the section in charge of servicing the SADC Organ that consists
only of three professionals who have to go meeting through meeting. (Orbon interview, 25 July 2007) The SADC Secretariat is not the only weak institution as the SADC National Committees that were supposed to be the mirror of the Secretariat at the national level (Müller-Glodde interview, 24 July 2007) proved to be empty bureaucratic shells with no sense of ownership. (Le Pere and Matlosa interview, 19 July 2007, Müller-Glodde interview, 24 July 2007)

It also took some time to give shape to the security and governance mandate of SADC. While OPDS as a structure was pretty much an empty shell, SADC countries did organise in 1997 a SADC peacekeeping exercise ‘Blue Hungwe’ in Zimbabwe in 1997 and a follow-up exercise ‘Blue Crane’ in 1999 in South Africa. In 1999 in Swaziland, the ISDSC decided that SADC would create a brigade-size peacekeeping force over five years. (Fabricius, 2002, p.41) The Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation was adopted only in August 2001 in Maputo. It entered into force after ratification in March 2004. The SADC Organ was renamed the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation (OPDSC) and became an integral part of SADC. The OPDSC had three main goals:

‘first, to address human security needs in Southern Africa during intra- and interstate conflicts and general political instability; second, to advance a common regional foreign policy, political cooperation, and democracy; and third, to respond to sub-regional conflicts through peacemaking, peacekeeping, or peacebuilding measures.’ (Bekoe, 2002, p.5)

The protocol combines the traditional military approach to security and human security in the same document. It addresses concerns about sovereignty and ‘posits the threat of military invasion by a foreign power as its main concern.’ (Hammerstad, 2005, p.80)
Also, the first specific objective, beyond that of promoting peace and security in the region is to ‘protect the people and safeguard the development of the Region against instability arising from the breakdown of law and order, intra-state conflict, interstate conflict and aggression,’ a human security goal of promoting long term peace and stability within states. (SADC, 14 August 2001, Article 2, paragraph 2(a)) In 2004, a five-year program, the Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ (SIPO) was adopted in order to operationalise the OPDSC. While on paper, human security was listed as the first of (too) many objectives, some argue that ‘so far, SADC has skewed this balance [between military and human security] towards traditional military security.’ (Hammerstad, 2005, p.81)

It is again this concern for interstate military security that led to the adoption in 2003 by the Heads of State and Government of a Mutual Defence Pact in Dar Es Salaam. Following intense debates, the Defence Pact was watered down. The draft version stated that ‘an armed attack against a State Party shall be considered a threat to regional peace and security and such an attack shall be met with immediate collective action by State Parties.’ (SADC, 23 August 2002, Quoted in Hammerstad, 2005, p.81) The final pact stated that ‘each State Party shall participate in such collective action in any manner it deems appropriate,’ (SADC, 26 August 2003, Article 6) thus leaving each member state free to react – or not – to a military attack on another member state. This could be interpreted as a way to preserve state sovereignty and the individual decision power of member states by rejecting any automaticity in the reaction required following a military attack. Despite the weakness of the Pact, they nevertheless decided to announce the creation of a SADC peacekeeping brigade in August 2007 to contribute to the AU’s standby capacity for peace support operations on the continent. For now, the SADC
Brigade only exists on paper. Just like ECOWAS, they need to overcome problems of compatibility, communications and logistics and it does not have a permanent état major unlike ECOWAS. (Fabre interview, 2 August 2007)

Overall, it took more than ten years to provide SADC with the necessary tools – both institutional reform and protocols – to implement the mandate that was first entrusted to the regional organisation in 1992. The following and last section attempts to understand why it took so long – compared to ECOWAS – to reach this point.

**The long road toward security and democracy**

On paper, SADC has set up a strong and impressive Southern African security architecture that consists of the Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation of August 2001, a Mutual Defence Pact of August 2003 and an Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation whose role is to implement the 2001 Protocol and the 2003 Defence Pact. But, in reality, the emergence of SADC as a security organisation was bedevilled throughout the years by acrimonious disputes between member states about the content and extent of its new security and governance agenda. ‘There are two key lines of division: between pacific and militarist approaches to regional security, and between democratic and authoritarian orientations.’ (Nathan, 2006, p.606) These tensions among member states are the result of different threat perceptions, differing national interests and an ‘absence of common values,’ (Nathan, 2006, p.614) among which the lack of a strong commitment towards democracy at the regional level. The reasons behind the differing visions of security and democracy among member states can refer back to several schools of thought, among which realism, but also constructivism due to the
absence of common values. Constructivism also directs the analysis to look inside the
black box of the state to determine whether democracies and autocracies act alike.
Finally, the differences between SADC member states went beyond mere vision or
opinion and led to conflicts over military interventions and to policy paralysis, notably
over Zimbabwe.

**Differing visions of security and democracy**

SADC throughout the 1990s was sharply divided over the issue of security and
governance and two opposing poles soon emerged with significantly different visions for
the regional organisation and the role it should play in security and governance matters. A
word of caution is called for here as SADC member states are highly sensitive about the
confidentiality of their internal debates, especially on security issues, and finding reliable
information about each country’s position can be somewhat arduous. Nevertheless,
corroborating accounts can help us outline the two following schematic positions as ideal
types. (Hammerstad, 2005, p.70)

On the one hand, SADC was to be entrusted with a traditional collective defence mandate
against external and internal enemies focusing on military and regime security. The
inclusion of internal enemies is especially significant as leaders facing rebellions – as in
the DRC – were thus able to call on fellow SADC member states to assist them in
suppressing these armed challenges to their hold on power. (David, 1998) Seen from a
different angle, many democracy and human rights activists saw such a provision as a
way for dictators to help each other stay in power. This traditional military common
security approach championed by Zimbabwe’s Mugabe seems to have the preference of
the majority of Southern African states including Angola, Namibia and the DRC. (Fabricius, 2002, p.43)

On the other hand, a common security approach was advocated by another group of states. Common security was understood as a way to ‘overcome mutual animosities and fears between states and to create and strengthen mechanisms to prevent and resolve political conflicts, within or between states, by peaceful means.’ (Hammerstad, 2005, p.70) Such an approach was supported by Mandela’s South Africa along with Botswana, Mozambique, Mauritius and Lesotho, although with lesser enthusiasm. (Fabricius, 2002, p.43)

This normative incongruence translated in a legal tussle over the SADC Organ and, arguably in a power struggle between South Africa and Zimbabwe ‘and through them a struggle between the region’s old revolutionary authoritarianism, embodied by the FLS and Zimbabwe, and the new spirit of democracy and legalism, represented mainly by South Africa’ (Fabricius, 2002, pp.42-43) For South Africa, the SADC Organ was to be part and parcel of SADC and answer to the SADC Summit. Zimbabwe rejected this approach and saw it as ‘evidence of persistent desire in South Africa’s foreign policy … to destroy the rich legacy of the FLS.’ (Tapfumaneyi, 1999b, p.3) Zimbabwe wanted the Organ to function independently from SADC under a separate and permanent chairmanship to go to the longest serving Head of State, i.e. Robert Mugabe himself. The idea was to keep the flexible and informal basis of the FLS. (Malan, 1998b, p.6) It was also a way for Zimbabwe to maintain at least part of the dominance it had enjoyed before Mandela reached power in South Africa. The 1996 OPDS seems a clear victory of Mugabe as the OPDS was in effect separate from SADC structures with Mugabe as its
chair for the first five years. Tensions came to a head the following year at the 1997 SADC Summit in Blantyre. It is reported that Mandela threatened to resign as chairperson of SADC. (Tapfumaneyi, 1999b) Perversely, the Organ that was supposed to bring SADC countries together proved to have a divisive effect. Tensions continued throughout the early 2000s even though the OPDSC was brought back to the fold of SADC with the 2001 Protocol. Essentially, the South African viewpoint had prevailed. For instance, ‘the right to use force to resolve internal conflicts is significant, according to South African officials, who say this was not in the first drafts of the Protocol and was included largely at the insistence of South Africa.’ (Fabricius, 2002, pp.46-47) This shows that intervention in the internal affairs of a state could be supported by states that have opposing viewpoints – one that would use this provision to ensure regime security or rather the security of a leader in power and another that would use it for (hopefully) more humanitarian purposes. Later, the negotiation of the Mutual Defence Pact was another source of dissent. Again, member states were only able to agree on the smallest common denominator and adopted a watered down defence pact. Watering down the Pact was necessary as member states had already failed to adopt it once in 2002. Member states also disagreed about governance and democracy and about the role SADC should take in these matters.

It is worth noting that a significant number of authors tend to gloss over the tensions in the region and consider SADC as an emerging security community. (Ngoma, 2003, Lund and Roig, 1999, Söderbaum, 1998, Shaw, 1998, Shaw, 2000) But the tensions around the Zimbabwean crisis seem to qualify this as a premature judgment. There are different takes on why such disagreements arose: one focuses on the power relations within the region and points mainly to the contestation by Zimbabwe of South Africa’s regional hegemony;
(Adebajo and Landsberg, 2003, Cilliers and Malan, 1996) the other focuses on norms, be it sovereignty or the absence of common values. (Nathan, 2006) The first explanation is realist and interprets the repeated clashes between Zimbabwe and South Africa as a rebellion by a country that dominated the region before the end of apartheid and the now respectable hegemon. Or, seen from the perspective of the individual, ‘after the end of apartheid, everybody forgot about Mugabe.’ (Melber interview, 31 July 2007) However pertinent, this realist approach is of limited use to explain the current South African ‘quiet diplomacy’ towards Zimbabwe. Furthermore, for a realist, the collective defence approach within SADC failed because ‘there are no material incentives, in the form of common enemies outside the alliance or a coercive hegemon within it, to make SADC policy makers commit to each other’s defence and convince the rest of the world that their commitment is credible.’ (Hammerstad, 2005, p.84) At the other end of the spectrum, a constructivist approach highlights that progress on security issues is very difficult to obtain in a region that does not share common values. (Le Pere and Matlosa interview, 19 July 2007, Orbon interview, 25 July 2007) Indeed, Adler and Barnett identify the ‘existence of common values as the wellspring for close security cooperation.’ (Adler and Barnett, 1998a, p.4) In other words, without common values, ‘states are unable to build trust, develop common policies, resolve or transcend their major disputes and act with common purpose in crisis situation.’ (Nathan, 2006, p.606) Nathan argues this is the case in Southern Africa. Beyond common values and trust, sovereignty is also a prickly issue as member states are reluctant to surrender it to a security regime that encompasses binding rules. ‘The member states have the power in their pocket and they want to keep it there.’ (Mhlongo interview, 1 August 2007) Arguably, both realist and constructivist logics can be used to explain the slow progress
within SADC. But beyond security, concerns for sovereignty also restrict the development of a democracy and governance mandate in SADC.

On the democratic and governance front, the road at first sight seemed to be rather less bumpy and eventful. The issue was to a certain extent left aside during the 1990s as the front stage was occupied by the security issue. The SADC Parliamentary Forum (SADC-PF) was created in June 1996. It later adopted in 2001 the SADC Parliamentary Forum Norms and Standards to monitor elections. (Mashumba and Scott, 2005, p.32) It is worth mentioning here that the SADC-PF is considered by SADC member states as an inter-parliamentary organisation totally separate and autonomous from SADC per se and that the parliamentary forum does not speak in the name of SADC. The refusal to recognise SADC-PF as a bona fide SADC institution can also be attributed to the fact that the parliamentary forum was substantially funded by USAID (United States Agency for International Development) and was thus suspect of collusion with the West in order to impose democracy on SADC countries. (Tungwarara, 2004, p.415) Following this logic, SADC Heads of State and Government adopted, in August 2004, its own SADC Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections inspired by the July 2002 OAU/AU Declaration on the Principles Governing Democratic Elections in Africa. In a nutshell, the SADC principles and guidelines have five main components:

- Basic elements for levelling the election playing field (full participation, freedom of association, political tolerance, etc. Article 2 paragraph 1);
- Creation of SADC Election Observer Missions (SEOMs) (Article 3);
- Guidelines for the observation of elections (Article 4);
- The code of Conduct and rights and responsibilities for SEOMs (Articles 5 and 6);
- Responsibilities of member states holding elections (Article 7).
These provisions were severely criticised by civil society that feels excluded and marginalised from SADC proper. (SADC-CNGO (SADC-Council of NGOs), 14-16 August 2006) SADC being a ‘state-driven institution,’ (Maundi interview, 19 June 2007) member states were reluctant to build upon the already existing guidelines proposed by civil society, the SADC Parliamentary Forum norms and standards or the election principles developed jointly by the EISA (Electoral Institute of Southern Africa) and ECF (Electoral Commissions Forum) of SADC countries. (Matlosa, 2005, p.5) Unwilling to be perceived as rejecting the ‘democratic trend’ for regional organisations, especially as the AU adopted its principles in 2002, SADC member states decided to draw their own principles. What is striking however is that the tenets outlined in the Protocol are subject to domestic law and only require observation by request, i.e. it is necessary for a country to invite SADC to observe its elections. (Hendricks, 2006, pp.53-60) This means that in the case of a conflict between the SADC principles and domestic law, the latter prevails. (Matlosa, 2005, p.6) This was clearly expressed by the Zimbabwean Minister of Justice, Legal and Parliamentary Affairs, Patrick Chinamasa, who referred to the principles as merely a political roadmap without a legal force.48 (See chapter 5)

The reason behind the toothless Protocols can again be found in the absence of common democratic values among SADC member states. Indeed, the state of democracy in the region is varied. (Tungwarara, 2004) ‘While most SADC states have embraced liberal democracy, in practice, they are implementing electoral practices that are essentially a narrower form of liberal democracy.’ (Matlosa, 2005, p.1) Angola, Swaziland, the DRC and Zimbabwe are not democratic and most of the other member states can be described

48 See http://allafrica.com/stories/200411180530
as democracies in transition with all the limitations that this entails: limited political
tolerance, especially towards the opposition, a powerful executive that parliaments have a
hard time to stand up to and often a limited respect for human rights, due process and the
rule of law. According to Freedom House, only Mauritius and South Africa can be
considered as full-fledged democracies (highest score of 1 for political representation).
Considering these differences, it is hardly surprising that SADC member states have some
difficulty agreeing on a common path for the promotion of democracy in the region.
Promotion of democracy by SADC can be described as ‘a bridge too far.’ (Senior
Western Diplomat to Botswana interview, 30 July 2007) And even then, their
understanding of good governance is limited to elections and neglects other areas such as
corruption or civil society relations. (Kaunda interview, 27 July 2007) But disagreement
on norms and treaties did not stop there, member states also implemented treaties and
protocols based on their own national interests.

Lack of agreement, lack of implementation

The conflicts between member states did not remain at the level of clashing visions or
ideas. They also failed to adopt common positions on the different security challenges
arising throughout the 1990s and early 2000s. This section analyses SADC reaction or
lack thereof to the main conflicts in the region, namely the Angolan civil war (1992-
2002), the region-wide conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) (1996 and
ongoing), the election disputes and mutiny in Lesotho in 1998 and the continued violence
and political and economic crisis in Zimbabwe (2000 and ongoing), the main bone of
contention or thorn in the side of SADC. There are other cases where SADC could have
intervened. Whether a regional organisation intervenes or not is an interesting and valid
question that will be explored further in chapter 6. At this point, the analysis of SADC responses to these key conflicts illustrates that lack of consensus does lead, depending on the case at hand, to lack of implementation or colliding reactions. This seems to vindicate both a constructivist approach – ‘no trust, no common security policy’ – and a realist approach as SADC member states have repeatedly intervened in their neighbours’ internal affairs based on their own national interests.

The military interventions in Lesotho and DRC, however different in nature, size and intensity, should be seen through the same prism as they are both ‘SADC interventions.’ The intervention of SADC in Lesotho was triggered by contested elections and civil unrest, albeit not civil war. In the fall of 1998, Lesotho experienced massive unrest in response to controversial elections in May. The elections had been pronounced free and fair by local and international observers. Nevertheless, the opposition political parties rejected the results. Opposition protests in the country intensified, culminating in a peaceful demonstration outside the royal palace in August 1998. The unrest generated over the May election was also followed by a mutiny within the Lesotho Defence Force (LDF). After a number of violent public demonstrations and open threats of a coup against Prime Minister Mosisili, South Africa and Botswana decided in September on a military intervention to bring calm to Lesotho and preserve the democratic regime. Tensions with South African National Defence Force troops were high, resulting in fighting. The initiative was described as a SADC intervention – ‘SADC fig leaf’ (Southall and Melber interview, 31 July 2007) – based on the community’s established democratic principles. By May 1999, the troops had been replaced by an advisory team mandated to help retrain and restructure the LDF. An Interim Political Authority (IPA), charged with reviewing the electoral structure in the country opted for a system of proportional
representation. Elections were held under this new system in May 2002. For the first time, opposition political parties won significant numbers of seats, and despite some irregularities and threats of violence, Lesotho experienced its first peaceful election.

The reasons behind the intervention can be questioned. South Africa possessed strategic as well as normative goals in the Lesotho intervention. Having a civil war in a neighbouring state would do nothing to help the economic or political climate in South Africa. Furthermore, with the Lesotho Highlands Water Project, Lesotho controlled a crucial source of water for South Africa. South Africa and Botswana were both the guarantors of Lesotho’s democracy according to a 1994 agreement. They chose to enact it under the auspices of SADC in order to increase the legitimacy of this intervention.

The intervention in Lesotho was relatively consensual compared to that in the DRC. There the emergence of two camps within SADC became clear. (Tapfumaneyi, 1999a, p.23) In May 1997, Laurent Désiré Kabila toppled Mobutu Sese Seko and seized power. The new regime was however soon challenged by Kabila’s former allies, Rwanda and Uganda, in August 1998 with the Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie (RCD - Congolese Rally for Democracy) launching a rebellion movement. DRC, a recent SADC member turned to the regional organisation for assistance.

‘In his capacity as Chair of the Organ, Mugabe immediately convened a meeting in Victoria Falls of heads of state from Angola, the DRC, Namibia, Rwanda, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia. He excluded South Africa, which held the Chair of SADC at the time, because of the tension with Pretoria over the Organ. Mugabe subsequently referred the matter to an ISDSC meeting in Harare, at the conclusion of which he declared that SADC had decided unanimously to meet Kabila’s
appeal. The following day Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia announced that they would deploy troops in the DRC on behalf of SADC. The intervening states justified the deployment as an act of collective defence against the alleged invasion of the DRC by Rwanda and Uganda.’ (Nathan, 2006, p.613)

On the other hand, the other SADC countries, South Africa, Botswana, Mozambique and Tanzania, were promoting and pursuing a diplomatic solution. The ‘SADC’ military intervention was efficient in maintaining Kabila in power – before his assassination in January 2001 – and short-lived at the same time as Angola, the DRC, Namibia, Rwanda, Uganda, Zimbabwe and two rebel movements signed the Lusaka agreement in July 1999. It called for a ceasefire, the withdrawal of foreign forces and an Inter-Congolese Dialogue among all (Congolese) warring parties. Strikingly and quite understandably as SADC member states were part of the conflict, the negotiations were led by the AU and not SADC. In February 2000, the UN deployed a peacekeeping mission in the DRC that is still in place today. As a clear indication of the division in two camps, before the signature of the Lusaka agreement, Angola, DRC, Namibia and Zimbabwe signed in July 1999 a defence treaty stating that an armed attack against one of the signatories was an attack against all. (Nathan, 2004, p.17) Nevertheless, the SADC Summit rubber-stamped the two interventions in Lesotho and the DRC giving them regional legitimacy post facto.

The reasons behind the interventions were multifold, but protection or promotion of democracy cannot be one of them and collective defence seems a doubtful reason. Congo’s rich natural (water) and mining resources are an obvious attraction for its neighbours, be it Zimbabwe, its main backer or Namibia. (Osei-Hwedie interview, 24 July 2007) ‘The intervention was based on greed.’ (Kaunda interview, 27 July 2007) This was one possible explanation as Eastern Congo was rich in mineral resources and there
had been reports of contracts between Mugabe and Kabila. Zimbabwe also most likely intervened to prop up a friendly regime (regime support) and to create a diversion from the internal difficulties faced by President Mugabe. Angola probably intervened to deny bases to UNITA on the other side of its borders. (International Crisis Group, 1998) Just like the intervention of South Africa and Botswana in Lesotho, it seems that the military intervention in the DRC was primarily motivated by the material interests of the intervening parties. In both cases, states have behaved as realists and ignored the existing norm of sovereignty as non-interference and SADC in general, except as a rubber stamp for their actions.

On the contrary, there was and is no intervention of SADC in Zimbabwe and very limited diplomatic pressure on the country. In certain instances, SADC even defends Zimbabwe from foreign/Western interference. ‘In Luanda during August 2002, the ISDSC expressed “serious concern” – not about the Zimbabwean government’s abuses, but about the “continued foreign interference in the internal affairs of some Member States, especially Zimbabwe which has embarked on an agrarian reform process aimed at addressing the problem of poverty.”’ (ISDSC (Interstate Defence and Security Committee), 7-9 August 2002, Quoted in Fabricius, 2002, p.52) In general, SADC offers a common front rejecting international sanctions against Zimbabwe, with South Africa taking the lead.

The origins of the current Zimbabwean crisis can be found in the land issues that have plagued the country since independence: the white population constituting a small minority in the country owned a disproportionate share of the arable lands – exact figures are disputed. In 2000, Mugabe started compulsory land redistribution. Land was mainly used to reward his loyal followers and veterans and as a way to distract the population
from the already unfavourable economic situation at the time. The chaotic implementation of the land reform led to a sharp drop in agricultural exports, the country’s main source of revenue. This is in turn led to a severe currency shortage and hyperinflation and thus to severe economic hardships. In 2005, Mugabe launched ‘Operation Murambatsvina,’ essentially the wiping out of slums in different cities with the idea to promote decent housing for the population. The problem was that new housing was not ready for the now homeless urban poor. Zimbabwe’s current economic and food crisis has worsened every year and Mugabe has at the same time been cracking down on the opposition. The Zimbabwean crisis is thus twofold: it concerns both the economy and the governance of the country and entails severe suffering for its population.

A military intervention of SADC in Zimbabwe would be very difficult to justify as Zimbabwe is not the victim of an aggression by an external power or in the midst of a civil war. It is however in the midst of a humanitarian crisis. This could indeed be a legal anchor to justify an intervention, based on articles 2 and 11 of the 2001 Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation. However, intervention on this basis against the will of the country is not a well-established norm. There is also probably no intervention because no country in the region considers it is in its national interest to intervene in Zimbabwe. As had been made clear by Lesotho and DRC, sovereignty is wilfully set aside when countries have a real interest at stake.

Intervention does not seem a viable option and SADC member states are unwilling to break ranks.\(^49\) SADC as an institution of Heads of State and Government has repeatedly

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\(^{49}\) Indeed, when the Southern African states meet within SADC and despite the existing protocols allowing intervention, the consensus that emerges is that of non-interference. SADC as an institution allows the most conservative opinion to prevail. The Lesotho and DRC interventions, for instance, occurred outside SADC without prior consultation and under the leadership of a ‘coalition of the willing.’
refused to condemn the 2002 and 2005 elections in Zimbabwe. ‘In contrast to international and non-African delegation such as the Commonwealth, Norway and Japan, all of which pronounced the [2002] election neither free nor fair, most of the African delegations concluded that the election was free and fair, with the exceptions of the Parliamentary Forum and Ghana.’ (Tungwarara, 2004, p.419) Similarly, the Election Observer Mission, mainly supported financially by South Africa and Mauritius – two democracies –, found that Zimbabwe’s March 2005 elections could be considered free and fair. Arguably, SADC member states are probably avoiding to criticise a fellow member state and thus set an uncomfortable precedent as most of them are themselves not full-fledged democracies and could be one day on the receiving end of that stick. (Henwood interview, 2 August 2007) This reaction can also be explained by the culture of solidarity that prevails in the region. (Maundi interview, 19 June 2007) Furthermore, SADC member states have no vital national interest to do so, the consequences in terms of refugees and of the reduced SADC budget as donors do not want any of the aid given being spent in Zimbabwe are still manageable.

Constructivists and realists both bring valid explanations to the slow progress of SADC. Even though in nature, both theories focus on radically different issues, it seems that both are needed to have a good understanding of why progress has been so slow in the development and elaboration of a security and governance mandate for SADC. Indeed, lack of consensus and lack of leadership mean policy paralysis. But SADC member states are not the only players in town, the analysis has until now focused solely on the regional level and it is now time to assess the role of the P3 in the Southern African region.
The disillusionment of the P3

The overall direction of the foreign policies of France, the United Kingdom and the United States described at length in chapter 3 is also valid for Southern Africa. This section focuses on the specific P3-SADC relations. Overall, their role is not as predominant as in ECOWAS, a fact that can be explained by the greater clout of South Africa, but also by the lack of political will perceived by the P3 in SADC. (Chaveas interview, 23 July 2008)

Limited interest

The overall description of the foreign policy of the P3 – the United States, the United Kingdom and France – as ‘constructive disengagement’ (Berman and Sams, 1998) remains valid for the Southern African region. The idea of ‘constructive disengagement’ can be understood as the desire of the P3 to avoid as much as possible the involvement of their own troops in African conflicts while training African forces for peacekeeping. But the circumstances being rather different, this overall trend translated into a slightly different policy. In short, because SADC has a very limited experience in peacekeeping and has made very little progress in recent years, there is far less involvement by the P3, with the notable exception of the UK. This is especially the case with France as it has historically very little links with countries of Southern Africa. Southern Africa is not part of its area of influence in Africa (‘pré carré’). It would be a waste of money to try and become the leader in the region. (Fabre interview, 2 August 2007) As a case in point, the French embassy in Gaborone, where the headquarters of SADC are based, has only been
opened recently. But France is not completely absent of the region and has extended RECAMP to Southern African countries. France never worked directly with SADC but has trained the military personnel of different SADC countries and declared itself willing to assist in the set-up of a SADC Standby Force once some progress is made. (Fabre interview, 2 August 2007) The United States, considering the limited results of SADC in the security area and the crisis in Zimbabwe, has offered limited assistance to SADC. Only Botswana and Mozambique, out of the fourteen SADC countries, have benefited of the training offered by ACRI or ACOTA. In 2001, Zimbabwe stopped paying its debt to the US and this led to funding restrictions in 2002 that were dictated by the Brooke Amendment. The Brooke Amendment prohibits assistance to any country that has been in default for more than one year on loans funded under the annual Foreign Operations, Export Financing and Related Programs Appropriations Acts. (Senior Western Diplomat to Botswana interview, 30 July 2007) This led to a rocky relationship between SADC and the United States. The US insisting on not providing assistance to Zimbabwe led to the SADC Secretariat refusing to sign agreements with the regional mission of USAID. Furthermore, the US policy of focusing on pivotal states such as South Africa has backfired in this region. In 2002, the American Service Members Protection Act (ASPA) cut off military assistance to state parties of the International Criminal Court (ICC) that have not signed Article 98 agreements with the US government exempting US nationals on their soil from prosecution by the ICC. (Bah and Aning, 2008, p.122) As a consequence, military training in South Africa was severely curtailed thus defeating the purpose of using pivotal states. Overall, the US approach towards SADC is to focus on Angola as it is a petroleum-exporting country and on democracy promotion by funding the SADC Parliamentary Forum. US involvement in security and peacekeeping training is therefore minimal within SADC.
The predominance of the UK

The United Kingdom is the only P3 member that remains heavily involved in the region. The UK used to be close to Zimbabwe and was asked in 1980 to help Zimbabwe restructure its military after a decade of civil war. ‘Until the deterioration of Anglo-Zimbabwean relations in the late 1990s, Zimbabwe was Britain’s major Southern African defence partner and home to the region’s British Peace Support Team (BPST).’ (Jackson, 2006, p.355) The SADC Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre (RPTC) was also based in Harare, Zimbabwe and was supported at its creation in 1996 by Denmark and the UK. Things changed significantly in the late 1990s, early 2000s. Britain turned to South Africa and signed a defence agreement in August 2004 that provided for the training of SANDF in the field of peacekeeping. It was destined to bolster a country that was already involved in peacekeeping operations in Burundi and the DRC. ‘Britain is [also] supporting the establishment of the region’s African Standby Force Brigade, contributing to infrastructure, early warning, and command and control elements.’ (Jackson, 2006, p.366) The UK also has other country-specific programs in the region. ‘In 2003, for example, Britain conducted a training needs analysis for the Malawian Armed Forces, and undertook joint field training with the Botswana Defence Force.’ (Jackson, 2006, p.366) This approach remains characteristic of the bilateral preference of the UK.

Overall, SADC member states have benefited from several joint training exercises: Blue Hungwe (1997), Blue Crane (1998), Tulipe (1999) and Tanzanite with RECAMP (2000). (Ramsbotham et al., 2005, p.333) However, as Britain tried to unsuccessfully put pressure on Zimbabwe through the Commonwealth and SADC, relations became tense. It is
significant that Blair regretted that military intervention in Zimbabwe was not politically feasible. (Stothard, 2003, p.42) With the Zimbabwe crisis still unfolding and paralysing the Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre and no significant progress on the SADC Standby Force, no serious commitment by the P3 will occur. This is also the reason why no P3 military advisors have been detached to SADC. The EU remains closely involved with SADC but on issues of ‘human security’ such as de-mining and small arms control.

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Southern African regionalism, like in West Africa, had deep roots and was nourished by its tumultuous past characterised by its unique form of colonialism. Geography and infrastructure also played an important role in shaping the region and bringing it together under the ‘hegemony’ of South Africa. While Southern Africa formed an interdependent economic whole, its political evolution with the adoption of white minority rule in South Africa and Namibia led to its polarisation in the 1970s. This tension was consumed by the split of the FLS and later SADCC countries on the one hand and South Africa and Namibia on the other. But the decade of the 1980s and the first steps of SADCC as the economic arm of the anti-apartheid struggle cannot be summarised as a simplistic split. SADCC did not evolve in a vacuum and numerous economic links to South Africa could not be severed. Furthermore, South Africa was not ready to give up its economic hegemony without a fight – literally. Leery of the past experience of other African regional organisations, Southern African states opted for a functional organisation that kept cooperation at the project level. Overall, SADCC had but a very limited success in its project as the economic dependency of its member states on South Africa remained. Faced with an adverse international economic environment and the radical political
changes of the end of the Cold War and of apartheid, SADCC was pushed to transform itself into a regional organisation with a new economic integration agenda, but also a security and governance mandate in order to incorporate democratic South Africa. As the timeline above clearly showed, the change was not an easy or obvious one in any way.

If one wants to make a first assessment as to what driving factors shaped the evolution of SADC, just like in West Africa, the regional hegemon plays a pivotal role. However, contrary to West Africa which was politically and economically divided but had a regional hegemon which attempted to bring it together under its leadership, Southern Africa was politically united against South Africa until the end of apartheid, while at the same time economically dependent on it. The weight of South Africa, while significant, is being resisted by several SADC member states, especially Zimbabwe. South Africa is thus a contested and a reluctant hegemon. (Le Pere interview, 19 July 2007) The shift from apartheid big brother to black big brother cannot conceal the fact that South Africa remains big brother in its region. The other two important factors outlined in the introduction appear less prevalent in the Southern African region. More than marginalization or state weakness, the absence of trust and common values between member states has been a real impediment to the development of SADC’s ability to face the real security challenges of the region. This chapter thus puts to the fore a constructivist concern for norms and values that was not obvious in the West African case.

The intention of these two chapters has been to provide a comprehensive overview of the history and transformation of ECOWAS and SADC. The analysis now proceeds with a more systematic comparison of both regional organisations with a specific focus on the
exact nature of their security and democracy mandate (chapter 5) and on their implementation record (chapter 6).
CHAPTER 5

THE SECURITY AND DEMOCRACY ROLES OF ECOWAS AND SADC COMPARED

Have ECOWAS and SADC member states truly created a new gendarme sworn to defending law, order and democracy in their region? Was it in fact their intention? This study has until now analysed change within ECOWAS and SADC in abstracto by merely pointing out the main stages of the transformation process. The previous historical chapters were both important and necessary as they presented the different actors, their stakes in their region and point to different factors that were relevant throughout the history of both organisations. To have a true understanding of the transformation of both organisations, the next step is to analyse in details the content of the new mandates entrusted to the two organisations. This detailed analysis is important on two counts: it describes in details and compares the new security and democracy roles adopted by the regional organisations and shows that the change was profound as it entailed both a normative and an institutional transformation of ECOWAS and SADC.

According to their member states, what kind of regional security organisations were ECOWAS and SADC supposed to be? In order to answer this question, this chapter proceeds with a comparative analysis of the legal texts of ECOWAS and SADC. For ECOWAS, the key texts are the 1991 Declaration of Political Principles of ECOWAS, the 1993 Revised Treaty of ECOWAS, the 1999 Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for
Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security and the 2001 Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance. For SADC, these texts are the 1992 Treaty of SADC, the 2001 Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation and the 2004 SADC Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections. The 1978 Protocol on Non-Aggression and the 1981 Protocol on Mutual Assistance Defence of ECOWAS and the 2004 SADC Mutual Defence Pact were left aside on the ground that a defence pact does not necessarily substantially change a regional organisation and can be signed between countries without necessarily leading to the creation of an international organisation. On the other hand, the security protocols have the potential of leading to intervention and to the establishment of standby forces, while the democracy protocols can lead to the establishment of electoral observation missions. Furthermore, the 1978 and 1981 ECOWAS Protocols have remained dead letter almost from the time of their signature.

A textual analysis of the legal instruments adopted by ECOWAS and SADC is useful on several counts. First, it is a way to track what values member states hold as important. Second, through the evolution of different drafts, it uncovers the hurdles member states had to overcome, hurdles that might appear again during an implementation phase. Third, it clearly outlines the mandate entrusted to the regional organisation, thus facilitating the later part of this study in its attempt to precisely measure the implementation of the peace, security and democracy mandate against the stated goals and objectives of the organisation. This textual analysis is also comparative in nature and illustrates that the words in each treaty and protocol matter and that the differences in implementation can be traced back to the legal instruments that were adopted.
In order to highlight the similarities and the differences between the legal instruments of ECOWAS and SADC, this chapter first focuses on the principles and objectives of the two regional organisations with a specific focus on the touchy issue of sovereignty. It also highlights the fact that ECOWAS and SADC share a common vision of security. The next section outlines which norms each regional organisation was designed to defend, be it democracy or basic human rights. The defence of norms is limited to intervention in case of gross violation of human rights. The defence of any norm beyond this minimal understanding stands on shaky ground. Finally, the last section of this chapter analyses the tools, both institutional and financial given by the member states to the regional organisation to enforce its new mandate. The analysis of the ratification rate of protocols by member states and of the budget is a first take on the political commitment of each region’s member states.

*The principles and objectives of ECOWAS and SADC*

The first key comparative point is the principles and objectives of the institutions. The precise formulation of the principles notably provides some insights into the values and norms considered as important by each institution. Similarly, the precise terms used for the objectives and their evolution are also important as they give some indication as to members’ understanding of the security and democracy mandate. The analysis also provides a clear picture of the areas covered by the different protocols and illustrate the understanding of security by each regional organisation: whether it includes small arms, human and drug trafficking, police cooperation, etc. Without going into an in-depth
analysis, it will also be useful to mention other protocols and legal instruments that relate to the notion of security.

**Different answers to similar challenges**

The shift towards security started with the rewriting of the founding treaty of both institutions. In the case of ECOWAS, the analysis is informed by the ‘Review of the ECOWAS Treaty. Final Report of the Committee of Eminent Persons.’ A similar document or an earlier draft of the 1992 treaty was not found for SADC.

Before going into the details of the principles and objectives outlined by ECOWAS and SADC, a quick look at the preamble of the two rewritten founding treaties offers some worthwhile insights. First and not surprisingly, both preambles refer to the Lagos Plan of Action and to the Treaty establishing the African Economic Community thus acknowledging that their regional organisation is part of a broader continental framework. Second, both are aware that these reformed regional organisations are now acting ‘in an increasingly interdependent world’ (SADC Preamble) with ECOWAS laying out this fact in much stronger language: ‘Aware that the review of the treaty arises, inter alia, from the need for the Community to adapt to the changes on the international scene in order to derive greater benefits from those changes.’ (ECOWAS Preamble) ECOWAS thus admits, in a straightforward manner, that changes such as the end of the Cold War and the 1992 creation of a single market within the EEC with the signature of the Maastricht treaty played a significant role in their decision to reform the West African regional organisation. Finally, ECOWAS comes to terms, in its preamble, with the fact that a certain degree of supranationality might be necessary to enhance the effectiveness of the
institution, an idea that is nowhere mentioned in the SADC treaty and a difference in approach that is crucial between the two organisations: ‘Convinced that the integration of the Member States into a viable regional Community may demand the partial and gradual pooling of national sovereignties to the Community within the context of a collective political will.’ (Emphasis added) Out of the comparison of the preambles of the revised treaties of ECOWAS and SADC, the following conclusions can be drawn: the decision to rewrite the founding Charters should be put in a broader perspective that includes the renewed interest in regionalism in the 1990s at the continental level in Africa, but also at the global level and in Europe. These concerns about evolving trends at the global level focused specifically on the signature of the Maastricht treaty that prompted the need for African states to strengthen their regional organization as they were facing ‘fortress Europe’. But the EU did not only act as a perceived external threat, but also wanted to act as a role model pressuring each regional organization into further integration. While difficult to trace at the time, this European policy orientation came to the fore in Article 156 of the Lomé IV Convention signed in December 1989.  

One could also mention that the end of the Cold War and the signs of the end of apartheid in South Africa could lead to flows of aid being redirected towards East European states and post-apartheid South Africa, the revitalized regional organizations thus acting as a kind of incentive in order to keep the aid flows running.  

To come back to the preambles, ECOWAS, unlike SADC, declares itself ready to reconsider the notion of sovereignty, an

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50 Article 156 reads as follows: “1. The Community shall support the ACP States' efforts through regional cooperation and integration to promote long-term collective and self-reliant, self-sustained and integrated social, cultural and economic development and greater regional self-sufficiency. 2. Community support shall be given within the framework of the major regional cooperation and integration objectives which the ACP States have set or will set for themselves at regional, inter-regional and international level.” ACP-EEC (15 December 1989) Fourth ACP-EEC Convention, Lomé.

51 In the case of aid flows being redirected to the ‘new’ South Africa, concerns must have been somewhat limited as the right to approve agreement with third countries was given by the 1996 Single European Act to the European Parliament that had a strong anti-apartheid record. In fact, South Africa officially requested the opening of negotiations with the EEC only in December 1994. HOLLAND, M. (1995) South Africa, SADC, and the European Union: Matching Bilateral with Regional Policies. The Journal of Modern African Studies, 33, 263-283.
element that cannot be found within SADC.

The same differences are also present within the principles as outlined in the articles 4 of the treaties of ECOWAS and SADC.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ECOWAS: Article 4</th>
<th>SADC: Article 4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The high contracting parties, in pursuit of the objectives stated in Article 3 of this Treaty, solemnly affirm and declare their adherence to the following principles:</td>
<td>SADC and its Member States shall act in accordance with the following principles:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a) equality and inter-dependence of Member States;</td>
<td>a) sovereign equality of all Member States;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) solidarity and collective self-reliance;</td>
<td>b) solidarity, peace and security;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c) inter-State cooperation, harmonization of policies and integration of programs;</td>
<td>c) human rights, democracy, and the rule of law;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d) non-aggression between Member States;</td>
<td>d) equity, balance and mutual benefit;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e) maintenance of regional peace, stability and security through the promotion and strengthening of good neighborhood;</td>
<td>e) peaceful settlement of disputes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f) peaceful settlement of disputes among Member States, active Cooperation between neighboring countries and promotion of a peaceful environment as a prerequisite for economic development;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>g) recognition, promotion and protection of human and peoples’ rights in accordance with the provision of the African Charter on Human Peoples’ Rights;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>h) accountability, economic and social justice and popular participation in development;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>i) recognition and observance of the rules and principles of the Community;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>j) promotion and consolidation of a democratic system of governance in each Member State as envisaged by the Declaration of Political Principles adopted in Abuja on 6 July, 1991; and</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>k) equitable and just distribution of the costs and benefits of economic cooperation and integration.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

TABLE 5.1: Principles as stated in the 1993 ECOWAS and 1992 SADC treaties

The same principles can be found in both articles, albeit in a slightly different order and in a much more succinct form in SADC. They both mention ‘peace and security’ in their principles. Both sets of principles start with the equality of member states; but the omission of the term ‘sovereign’ in the ECOWAS formulation is significant. ECOWAS member states even added ‘inter-dependence.’ This is not a different way of expressing the same idea. Indeed, the most common expression at the time was that chosen by
SADC: ‘sovereign equality of states.’ The formulation chosen by ECOWAS refers back to their acceptance of supranationality being a necessary option. Again, ECOWAS seems open to the idea of rethinking the notion of sovereignty, while SADC is not.

Now coming to the core of the question, it is striking to discover that SADC has a peace and security goal in its list of objectives, while ECOWAS does not mention it. This is particularly surprising as ECOWAS offers a much more exhaustive list of objectives than SADC and as ECOWAS troops were in Liberia at the time. SADC states quite simply that ‘The objectives of SADC shall be to: […] promote and defend peace and security.’ (Article 5 paragraph c) It is mentioned early on in the list of objectives: after achieving growth and ‘evolving’ common political values. The vocabulary chosen, namely the choice of the verb ‘defend,’ is rather strong as the usual formulation is ‘promote and maintain peace and security.’ This peace and security mandate is again referred to in Article 21, paragraph g: ‘In accordance with the provisions of this Treaty, Member States agree to cooperate in the areas of: […] politics, diplomacy, international relations, peace and security.’ The absence of the terms ‘peace and security’ within the objectives of ECOWAS is significant but is counterbalanced by the article 58 entitled ‘Regional Security’: ‘Member states undertake to work to safeguard and consolidate relations conducive to the maintenance of peace, stability and security within the region.’ The article on regional peace could not have been relegated towards the end of the treaty by mistake and this probably shows that the inclusion of this article was either an afterthought or a deliberate decision to focus on the economic integration role of ECOWAS. Nevertheless, however late it might be in the treaty, article 58 goes into much more detail as to what maintaining peace and security in the region means. The inclusion of ‘stability’ in the objective is significant and is probably due to the ongoing crisis in
Liberia destabilising its neighbours. The detailed mechanisms described in article 58 are not groundbreaking and focus on enhancing cooperation and consultation between member states. It has two new provisions that will later prove important: one establishing an early warning system and authorising peacekeeping forces: ‘f) establish a regional peace and security observation system and peacekeeping forces;’ and another establishing electoral observation missions: ‘g) provide, where necessary and at the request of Member States, assistance to Member States for the observation of democratic elections.’ (Article 58 paragraphs 2f and 2g) It also announces that the details of the peace and security mandate of ECOWAS should be laid out in a later protocol. (Laloupo interview, 21, 22, 23 and 30 August 2007) These provisions prove to be far-sighted as they correspond to mechanisms – early-warning and peacekeeping – that will be key parts of the security and democracy mandates of regional organisations. In both cases for ECOWAS and SADC, the mandate of peace, security and democracy is mentioned almost incidentally with the idea that this prickly issue would be dealt with later on, on its own.

While it is obvious that the 1999 ECOWAS Protocol and the 2001 SADC Protocol address the same issue, the difference in title is already a first indication that SADC focuses on cooperation and ECOWAS on implementation with a mechanism set in place to achieve specific goals. The title of the 1999 ECOWAS Mechanism is rather cumbersome but gives a precise idea of what the member states want to achieve in a way as thorough as possible. Again, before delving into the specific objectives of the protocols, it is worth reviewing the preambles as the differences in principles already mentioned between ECOWAS and SADC seem to have been reinforced at the end of the 1990s. Article 2 outlines the principles within the ECOWAS Protocol, while these can be found in the Preamble in the SADC Protocol.
**TABLE 5.2: Principles as stated in the 1999 ECOWAS and 2001 SADC protocols**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ECOWAS (article 2)</th>
<th>SADC (Preamble)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Member States reaffirm their commitment to the principles contained in the Charters</td>
<td>Bearing in mind that Chapter VIII of the UN Charter recognizes the role of</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>of the United Nations Organization (UNO) and the Organization of African Unity</td>
<td>regional arrangements in dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(OAU) and to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, as well as to the African</td>
<td>of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charter on Human and People’s Rights, particularly the following fundamental</td>
<td>Recognizing and reaffirming the principles of strict respect for sovereignty,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>principles:</td>
<td>sovereign equality, territorial integrity, political independence, good</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>neighborliness, interdependence, non-aggression and non-interference in</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>internal affairs of other States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a) that economic and social development and the security of peoples and States are</td>
<td>Recalling the 1964 Resolution of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>inextricably linked;</td>
<td>of the Organization of African Unity, declaring that all Member States pledge</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>to respect the borders existing on their achievement of national independence;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Further reaffirming the primary responsibility of the United Nations Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Council in the maintenance of international peace and security, and the role of</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>the Central Organ of the Organization of African Unity Mechanism for Conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Prevention, Management and Resolution;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Convinced that peace, security and strong political relations are critical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) promotion and reinforcement of the free movement of persons, the right of</td>
<td>factors in creating a conducive environment for regional cooperation and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>residence and establishment which contribute to the reinforcement of good</td>
<td>integration;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>neighborliness;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c) promotion and consolidation of a democratic government as well as democratic</td>
<td></td>
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<td>institutions in each Member States;</td>
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<td>d) protection of fundamental human rights and freedoms and the rules of international humanitarina laws;</td>
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<tr>
<td>e) equality of sovereign States;</td>
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<tr>
<td>f) territorial integrity and political independence of Member States.</td>
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</table>

Sovereignty is again prominent for SADC, or to be more precise, ‘strict respect for sovereignty’ is prominent. It is the first principle and is repeated throughout under different formulations such as ‘non-interference in internal affairs of other States.’ A slight modification from the November 2000 draft to the final protocol points in the same direction. The preamble of the November 2000 draft read ‘Convinced further that such SADC Organ constitutes an appropriate institutional framework by which SADC States would coordinate their policies and activities in the area of politics, defence and security.’
In the final version, ‘could’ replaced ‘would’ in such a way that countries did not necessarily have to cooperate, but cooperation was an option they could choose. This weak formulation can again be attributed to respect for state sovereignty and to the reluctance to impose anything on member states. On the contrary, in the ECOWAS protocol, equal sovereignty and political independence – substantially different from non-interference – are mentioned last and after the promotion of democracy and human rights. The divide between the two on this issue seems to have grown. (Laloupo interview, 21, 22, 23 and 30 August 2007)

A broad understanding of security

The peace and security mandates were then finally and fully laid out in the 1999 Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security for ECOWAS and in the 2001 Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation for SADC. In the case of ECOWAS, the analysis is informed by the ‘Proposed Mechanism for Conflict Resolution, Management and Peacekeeping’ done in Banjul on July 24th, 1998. For SADC, there were numerous attempts of the member states trying to develop the issues that were just mentioned in 1992. The first one was the organisation by the SADC Secretariat of Workshop on Democracy, Peace and Security from 11 to 16 July 1994 (SADC, 26-27 August 1994, pp.777-785) which was then followed by the ‘Terms of Reference for the SADC Sector on Political Cooperation, Democracy, Peace and Security’. (SADC, 31 January 1995, pp.179-192) In 1996, the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security was created but no records were found as to which specific mandate was entrusted to it. It is only in 2001 that the stalemate was broken with a draft of the 2001 Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation
being found in SADC records and dating back to November 23rd, 2000. (SADC, 9 March 2001, pp.81-93)

An analysis of the stated objectives in the protocols shows that, though couched in a different language, both institutions share the same broad goals that include conflict prevention, management and resolution, among others. (See article 3 of the ECOWAS treaty and article 2 of the SADC treaty)\textsuperscript{52}

\textsuperscript{52} The close formulation in the legal texts suggests that the regional organizations influence each other. It is however difficult to substantiate this intuition as ECOWAS insists it provided the first draft that the others took inspiration from. (Laloupo interview, 21, 22, 23 and 30 August 2007)
The objectives of the Mechanism shall be as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ECOWAS (article 3)</th>
<th>SADC (article 2)</th>
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<tr>
<td>a) prevent, manage and resolve internal and inter-State conflicts under the conditions provided in Paragraph 46 of the Framework of the Mechanism ratified as per Decision A/DEC.11/10/98 of 31 October 1998;</td>
<td>a) protect the people and safeguard the development of the Region against instability arising from the breakdown of law and order, intra-state conflict, inter-state conflict and aggression;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) implement the relevant provisions of Article 58 of the Revised Treaty;</td>
<td>b) promote political cooperation among State Parties and the evolution of common political values and institutions;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c) implement the relevant provisions of the Protocols on Non-Aggression, Mutual Assistance in Defense, Free Movement of Persons, the Right of Residence and Establishment;</td>
<td>c) develop common foreign policy approaches on issues of mutual concern and advance such policy collectively in international fora;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d) strengthen cooperation in the areas of conflict prevention, early-warning, peacekeeping operations, the control of cross-border crime, international terrorism and proliferation of small arms and anti-personnel mines;</td>
<td>d) promote regional coordination and cooperation on matters related to security and defense and establish appropriate mechanisms to this end;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e) maintain and consolidate peace, security and stability within the Community;</td>
<td>e) prevent, contain and resolve inter- and intra-state conflict by peaceful means;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f) establish institutions and formulate policies that would allow for the organization and coordination of humanitarian relief missions;</td>
<td>f) consider enforcement action in accordance with international law and as a matter of last resort where peaceful means have failed;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>g) promote close cooperation between Member States in the areas of preventive diplomacy and peacekeeping;</td>
<td>g) promote the development of democratic institutions and practices within the territories of State Parties and encourage the observance of universal human rights as provided for in the Charters and Conventions of the Organization of African Unity and United Nations respectively;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>h) constitute and deploy a civilian and military force to maintain or restore peace within the sub-region, whenever the need arises;</td>
<td>h) consider the development of a collective security capacity and conclude a Mutual Defense Pact to respond to external military threats;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>i) set up an appropriate framework for the rational and equitable management of natural resources shared by neighboring Member States which may be causes of frequent inter-State conflicts;</td>
<td>i) develop close cooperation between the police and state security services of State Parties in order to address:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>j) protect the environment and take steps to restore the degraded environment to its natural state;</td>
<td>j) observe, and encourage State Parties to implement United Nations, African Union and other international conventions and treaties on arms control, disarmament and peaceful relations between states;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>k) safeguard the cultural heritage of Member States;</td>
<td>k) develop peacekeeping capacity of national defense forces and coordinate the participation of State Parties in international and regional peacekeeping operations; and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>l) formulate and implement policies on anti-corruption, money laundering and illegal circulation of small arms.</td>
<td>l) enhance regional capacity in respect of disaster management and coordination of international humanitarian assistance.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE 5.3: Objectives of the ECOWAS and SADC security protocols
In the case of ECOWAS, quoting the titles of different chapters within the Protocol would clarify its objectives:

- Sub-regional peace and security observation system (early warning) (Chapter IV);
- Conflict management (Chapter VI);
- Humanitarian assistance (Chapter VIII);
- Peace-building (Chapter IX);
- Sub-regional security (Chapter XI).

Chapter XI on ‘Sub-regional Security’ includes control of transborder crime, anti-corruption measures, measures against money laundering, control of the proliferation of small arms, preventive measures against the illegal circulation of small arms.

Both organisations contemplate the possibility of intervening militarily and both have a very broad understanding of security, close to what many scholars call human security. (United Nations Development Programme, 1994) For ECOWAS, security includes internal conflicts, inter-state conflicts, control of cross-border crimes, international terrorism, the proliferation of small arms and anti-personnel mines, anti-corruption and money laundering. It also the protection of the cultural heritage of Member States and of the environment and the equitable management of natural resources, a concern easily understandable considering the role diamonds played in the conflict afflicting the countries of the Mano River Union. All this was mentioned in the 1999 Protocol and was later completed with the 2001 Protocol on the Fight Against Corruption and the 2006 Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons. On the other hand, SADC’s understanding of security includes the breakdown of the rule of law, intra-state conflict, inter-state conflict, aggression, the development of democratic institutions and practices,
cross-border crimes, proliferation of arms and disaster management. Different aspects of this notion of security were emphasised by the adoption of the following protocols: the 1996 Protocol on Combating of Illicit Drugs, the 2001 Protocol on Corruption and the 2001 Protocol on the Control of Firearms, Ammunition and other Related Materials. One might add that SADC has also worked on the proliferation of anti-personnel mines, notably in Mozambique and Angola, with the European Union. A noticeable difference, SADC includes the development of democratic institutions and practices, a concern that cannot be found within ECOWAS. However, the link between security and democracy will be clearly exposed by ECOWAS later on with the 2001 Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance.

**Which norm to defend: democracy or basic human rights?**

The broad vision of security by ECOWAS and SADC thus also encompassed concern for democracy, basically subscribing to the democratic peace theory. But how much of a threat was lack of democracy in the eyes of each regional organisation’s member states? Did it justify interference in the internal affairs of its member states? What tools did each regional organisation have to promote democracy? It seems that military intervention was limited to cases of gross violation of human rights – such as war crimes or genocide – that can more easily be linked to a threat to regional stability. This section explains what ECOWAS and SADC understand by democracy and what it encompasses. It also examines the exact formulation of a right of humanitarian intervention and how it has evolved throughout the successive drafts.
A democracy mandate?

The democracy mandate of both institutions was noticeably addressed in separate protocols: the 1991 Declaration of Political Principles and the 2001 Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance for ECOWAS, and the 2004 SADC Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections, although SADC did mention democracy as an objective in the security protocol of 2001.

The first obvious difference between ECOWAS and SADC is the fact that ECOWAS started tackling this issue as early as 1991, at a time when the wave of democratisation that swept through the African continent had barely begun. The decision to write this Declaration of Political Principles was triggered by the intervention of ECOMOG in Liberia and the desire to clarify their position as a whole, considering the wave of democratization that swept through the region at the time. (Laloupo interview, 21, 22, 23 and 30 August 2007) Despite being signed by four generals and one lieutenant-colonel, the declaration reaffirmed the commitment of ECOWAS to promote democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms: ‘we believe in the liberty of the individual and in his inalienable right to participate by means of free and democratic processes in the framing of the society in which he lives. We will therefore strive to encourage and promote in each our countries, political pluralism and these representative institutions and guarantees for personal safety and freedom under the law that are our common heritage.’ (Paragraph 6) The commitment of ECOWAS member states can be seriously put in doubt due to the nature of the states that signed the declaration at the time. The main rationale behind this declaration is most clearly found in the preamble: ‘Reaffirming the objectives of promoting better relations among ourselves by ensuring a stable and secure political
environment, in which our peoples can live in freedom under the law and in true and lasting peace, free from any threat to or attempt their security.’ While not necessarily outlining a democracy mandate for ECOWAS, this declaration represents a first attempt to outline common values between member states that were divided, at the time, over the issue of Liberia.

The most relevant legal instruments to be compared to understand what a democracy mandate is are the 2001 ECOWAS Protocol and the 2004 SADC Protocol. The aim of both protocols is radically different. ECOWAS tries to be all-encompassing and covers a wide range of topics including: constitutional convergence principles, elections, election monitoring and ECOWAS assistance, the role of the armed forces and the police and the security forces in a democracy, poverty alleviation and promotion of social dialogue, education, culture and religion, rule of law, human rights and good governance, and women, children and the youth. These issues are not addressed by SADC. The main rationale behind this difference is that ECOWAS establishes a direct link between democratic principles and its peace and security mandate, an approach illustrated by the fact that the Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance is Supplementary to the Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security. Democracy and good governance are part of a broader reflection on what needs to be done in the long term to avoid conflicts. ECOWAS, just like SADC and specifically post-apartheid South Africa, subscribes to the democratic peace theory. Quite clearly, ECOWAS states in its preamble that it is ‘concerned also about the increasing incidence of conflicts caused by religious intolerance, political marginalisation and non-transparent elections.’ In the case of SADC, while the link between democracy and security was made in previous legal instruments, this link is
nowhere to be found in the 2004 Protocol. This protocol is limited in scope and again strives to uphold the respect for the sovereignty of its member states by making the creation of electoral observer missions contingent upon an invitation by the member state that holds the election and by stating clearly that, in case of contestation, national law prevails. Zimbabwean Minister of Justice, Legal and Parliamentary Affairs, Patrick Chinamasa, referred to the SADC principles as merely a political roadmap without a legal force. On the contrary, in the section on ‘Election monitoring and ECOWAS assistance,’ while an ECOWAS Member State can ask for assistance, the Executive-Secretary can also decide to dispatch a monitoring team. (Article 12) Again, the same core disparity between ECOWAS and SADC remains a constant throughout the protocols. SADC is more protective about the sovereignty of its member states and refuses to address issues that could be considered as interference in the internal affairs of a state, such as the role of the armed forces in a democracy. On the other hand, ECOWAS is willing to address these issues, within limits.

**A right of humanitarian intervention**

Democracy is not the only norm that is defended by ECOWAS and SADC. One of the most groundbreaking measures is the adoption of a right of humanitarian intervention. Humanitarian intervention is understood here as a ‘military intervention in a state without the approval of its authorities, and with the purpose of preventing widespread suffering or death among its inhabitants.’ (Roberts, 1996, p.19) There is a significant difference between ECOWAS and SADC. For ECOWAS, no significant changes in formulation can be found between the 1998 draft and the 1999 protocol. The language of SADC

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documents has evolved from 1994 to 2001 towards with the SADC Secretariat having less and less say in the matter.

Article 25 of the 1999 ECOWAS protocol reads as follows:

‘The Mechanism shall be applied in any of the following circumstances:

a) In cases of aggression or conflict in any Member State or threat thereof;
b) In case of conflict between two or several Member States;
c) In case of internal conflict:

that threatens to trigger a humanitarian disaster, or

that poses a serious threat to peace and security in the region;
d) In event of serious and massive violation of human rights and the rule of law;
e) In the event of an overthrow or attempted overthrow of a democratically elected government;
f) Any other situation as may be decided by the Mediation and Security Council.’

ECOWAS thus claims a right of intervention for itself that is much broader than humanitarian intervention – see Article 25 paragraph f that gives great discretion to the Mediation and Security Council. State consent, although desirable, is not considered as being a necessary pre-requisite.

For SADC, the final formulation chosen for its right of humanitarian intervention is the following:

‘The Organ may seek to resolve any significant intra-state conflict within the territory of a State Party and a ‘significant intra-state conflict’ shall include:
(i) large-scale violence between sections of the population or between the state and sections of the population, including genocide, ethnic cleansing and gross violation of human rights;

(ii) a military coup or other threat to the legitimate authority of a State;

(iii) a condition of civil war or insurgency; and

(iv) a conflict that threatens peace and security in the Region or in the territory of another State Party.’ (Article 11, paragraph 2b)

This could then trigger an ‘enforcement action’ that would be authorised by the Summit. Summit decisions are taken by consensus.

In both cases, intervention can be warranted in cases of:

- massive violation of human rights, including genocide and ethnic cleansing;
- military coup;
- conflict that threatens peace and security in the region.

The difference in formulation with regards the case of the coup d’État is interesting. ECOWAS distinctly refers to ‘democratically elected government,’ while SADC uses the term ‘legitimate authority of a State.’ The definition of legitimate authority can be significantly more expansive than that of democratically elected government and poses the risk of being applied as a way to help a leader – who was not necessarily democratically elected – stay in power because its claim to power is recognised as legitimate by its fellow Heads of State and Government.\(^54\) The SADC Protocol does not address the question of who decides when a government is ‘the legitimate authority of a

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\(^{54}\) Independent confirmation of this insight has not been provided by SADC member states’ officials. However, this argument is often made in the secondary literature. See CHIMANIKIRE, D. P. (2002) *Southern African Development Community: the role of the Organ on Politics, Defense and Security (OPDS)* Harare, Hivos. See also SOLOMON, H. & NGUBANE, S. (2003) *One step forward, two steps back: reflections on the SADC organ on politics, defence and security co-operation* Braamfontein South African Institute of International Affairs.
State.’ Also potentially far-reaching is the rather broad provision that both regional organisations adopt with regards to conflict that constitute a threat to the peace and security of the region. However, a strong precedent can be found with the practice by the United Nations Security Council to declare a situation as constituting a threat to international peace and security as a way to trigger Chapter VII operations. ECOWAS and SADC are simply following the steps of the UN Security Council.

Both organisations have been contemplating the option of adopting a right of humanitarian intervention for themselves since the early 1990s. This rethinking of norms should be put in the broader context of the intellectual debates that took place within the African continent during the early 1990s, notably with the Africa Leadership Forum (ALF) and the Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation in Africa (CSSDCA). (Zartman and Deng, 2002, Obasanjo and Mosha, 1993) Furthermore, the OAU adopted in 1993 the OAU Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution. While not outlining a right of humanitarian intervention per se, it could be considered as a stepping stone towards a re-conceptualisation of sovereignty and intervention. Coming back to ECOWAS and SADC, ECOWAS claimed that its 1990 intervention in Liberia should be considered as a humanitarian intervention. SADC, on the other hand, has records that clearly show that the issue was touched upon as early as 1994 with the Workshop on Democracy, Peace and Security that took place in Windhoek, Namibia from 11 to 16 July 1994. Under the point entitled ‘The Evolution of Protocols on Peace, Security and Conflict Resolution for Southern Africa,’ the end of paragraph 5.5.4 reads ‘In exceptional circumstances such as where there has been a breakdown of law and order, the Committee may decide, on the basis of sufficient consensus, to intervene in an internal crisis of a member country.’ (SADC, 26-27 August 1994, p.780) The same issue
was taken up again in 1995 within the draft terms of reference of a SADC Sector on Political Cooperation, Democracy, Peace and Security:

‘Intra-state conflict, which could prompt a regional response, includes:

- large scale violence between sections of the population or between the state and sections of the population;
- systematic and forcible suppression of the population or a section of the population;
- systematic abuse of human rights;
- a threat to legitimate authority (such as a military coup or threat of a coup by armed forces);
- any crisis that could threaten the peace and security of other member states in the region.’ (Paragraph 5.5.3 (a) (i)) (SADC, 31 January 1995, pp.186-187)

This document, written by the SADC Secretariat even mentioned the possibility of allowing decision-making by a two-thirds majority vote (SADC, 31 January 1995, p.187)

As seen above, SADC member states backtracked on this issue so that in the 2001 Protocol adopted by member states, decisions were to be taken by consensus, not two-thirds majority voting.

The thorny issue that took several years in both regions to solve was not the idea of intervention in case of gross violation of human rights per se as there was an overall consensus that a new Rwanda should not be allowed to happen again on the African continent. The thorny issue was state consent. While not differing dramatically in their formulation of a right of humanitarian intervention, ECOWAS and SADC interpret it differently and thus do not draw the line between sovereignty and intervention in exactly the same place. In the case of ECOWAS, intervention without state consent is more likely
in part because of the decision-mechanism and because of the precedent of the intervention in Liberia. In contrast, SADC insistence on the ‘strict’ respect for sovereignty and non-interference in the internal affairs of a state in the preamble of the 2001 protocol and the rejection of the proposal by the SADC Secretariat of a two-thirds majority vote denote a stricter interpretation of the provisions of their 2001 protocol that would lean towards requesting state consent before any intervention: ‘The Organ shall respond to a request by a State Party to mediate in a conflict within the territory of that State and the Organ shall endeavour by diplomatic means to obtain such a request where it is not forthcoming.’ (Article 11, paragraph 4d)

Finally, ECOWAS’ desire to ‘police’ its own region and to claim for itself a right of humanitarian intervention is evident in its challenge to the hierarchy of norms. According to public international law, the United Nations has the primary responsibility for peace and security. This is nowhere explicitly recognised by ECOWAS. It is in fact indirectly challenged in the 1999 protocol. ECOWAS will ‘collaborate with’ (Article 23), ‘submit reports to’ (Article 27) and ‘cooperate with’ (Articles 41 and 52) the United Nations. ‘In accordance with Chapters VII and VIII of the United Nations Charter, ECOWAS shall inform the United Nations of any military intervention undertaken in pursuit of the objectives of this Mechanism.’ (Article 52 paragraph c) With the OAU Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution, ECOWAS will ‘fully cooperate.’ (Article 52 paragraph b) In plain terms, ECOWAS will not wait for authorisation by the United Nations Security Council to intervene. (Laloupo interview, 21, 22, 23 and 30 August 2007) In contrast, SADC clearly stipulates that it would need an authorisation by the United Nations Security Council prior to any authorisation. ‘The Summit shall resort to enforcement action only as a matter of last resort and, in accordance with Article 53 of
the United Nations Charter, only with the authorisation of the United Nations Security Council.’ (Article 11, paragraph 3d) This almost doctrinal dichotomy with regards the hierarchy of norms and the relationship to the UN probably has its roots in the unique experience of conflict within each region throughout the 1990s as we shall see in the next section. This, of course, has been a major issue for UN authority as regards relations with regional institutions. ECOWAS, faced with the disinterest of the UN and of the major powers, decided to intervene in the countries of the Mano River Union, while, in Southern Africa, the UN was heavily engaged in Mozambique and Angola. ECOWAS decided not to depend on a UN authorisation that might be slow to come. (Laloupo interview, 21, 22, 23 and 30 August 2007, Vogt interview, 25 June 2008)

The tools to enforce their mandate

Another comparison focuses on the implementation mechanism that would trigger the involvement of the regional organisation and see whether decisions are made by consensus or not. What tools are at the disposal of the regional organisation to enforce its mandate? How much power was entrusted to the regional organisation and more specifically to its Secretariat to implement its mandate? Finally, in order to offer a first take on the commitment of member states, this section asks whether these legal instruments entered into force at their signature or whether they had to be ratified. This is complemented by an update of the status of ratification of the protocols relating to peace, security and democracy. Going beyond the legal instruments, this section also takes a closer look at the budget of both institutions in order to measure the commitment of member states vis-à-vis the institution and second to assess which mandate is privileged in the budget: the economic one or the one focusing on peace and security?
An institutional reform to enhance implementation

The issue of enforcement power given to the regional organisation is key to understanding the reach of the security and democracy mandate entrusted to it. Clearly, the scope encompasses a plethora of issues ranging from inter-state conflicts to cross-border crime. What tools can the regional organisation use to address these issues and how are decisions made? The first indication can be found in the founding treaties that provide some insight on the differing positions of ECOWAS and SADC with regards to supra-nationality. The acknowledgment by ECOWAS member states in the preamble of the 1993 revised treaty of the possible need for a partial and gradual pooling of national sovereignties was followed through in the body of the treaty itself. As stated in Article 9 paragraph 2, ‘unless otherwise provided in this Treaty or in a Protocol, decisions of the Authority shall be adopted, depending on the subject matter under consideration by unanimity, consensus, or by a two-thirds majority of the Member States.’ This choice to adopt different modes of decisions according to the subject matter refers back to the decision by the European Union to divide its domain of competence in several ‘pillars.’

Most importantly, this denotes openness towards supra-nationality and the refusal to consider sovereignty as a notion that is rigid. In reality, it is unclear which subject matter can lead to a decision with a two-thirds majority. In practice, just as in SADC, decision-making by consensus prevails. Within SADC, ‘unless otherwise provided in this Treaty, the decisions of the Summit shall be by consensus and shall be binding.’ (Article 10, paragraph 8) This provides the overall framework in which decisions are taken within ECOWAS and SADC.
With regards their security provisions, the 1999 and 2001 protocols of ECOWAS and SADC stipulate their own decision-making processes. The Mechanism set up by ECOWAS comprises three institutions: the Authority (of Heads of State and Government), the Mediation and Security Council (MSC), and the Executive Secretariat. (Article 4) The Authority is the Mechanism’s highest decision-making body, but ‘mandates the Mediation and Security Council to take, on its behalf, appropriate decisions for the implementation of the provisions of this Mechanism.’ (Article 7) The MSC, composed of nine member states, takes its decisions by a two-thirds majority vote. (Article 9) In short, among other things, the MSC can decide to intervene militarily in an ongoing conflict with a two-thirds majority vote. The MSC shall

‘a) decide on all matters relating to peace and security;

b) decide and implement all policies for conflict prevention, management and resolution, peacekeeping and security;

c) authorise all forms of intervention and decide particularly on the deployment of political and military missions;

d) approve mandates and terms of reference for such missions;

e) review the mandates and terms of reference periodically, on the basis of evolving situations;

f) on the recommendation of the Executive Secretary, appoint the Special Representative of the Executive Secretary and the Force Commander.’ (Article 10)

For its peace and security mandate, ECOWAS accepted and built in a certain degree of supra-nationality in its protocol with the decision to intervene in the affairs of a member state being made with a majority vote. This even extends to the Executive Secretary: ‘The Executive Secretary shall have the power to initiate actions for conflict prevention,
management, resolution, peace-keeping and security in the sub-region. Such actions may include fact-finding, mediation, facilitation, negotiation and reconciliation of parties in conflict.’ (Article 15) In practice, the Executive Secretary, now President of the Commission, can indeed send fact-finding missions, even though doing so against the will of a member state would be politically very difficult. This would however be true of any international organisation, be it the United Nations or the African Union. Regarding the MSC, its composition has been extended in practice to all the member states of ECOWAS. But overall, however tentative and clumsy in its attempts, ECOWAS tries to overcome ‘strict’ sovereignty to gain in efficiency in the implementation of its mandate, at least with regards to its legal instruments.

On the other hand, SADC remains very respectful of the sovereignty of its member states and decisions are taken at summit level by consensus. There is no real delegation of powers. The SADC Organ is composed of the Chairperson of the Organ, the Troika, a Ministerial Committee, an Inter-State Politics and Diplomacy Committee (ISPDC) and an Inter-State Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC). (Article 3, paragraph 2) The Chairperson of the Organ reports to the Summit where decisions are taken by consensus. The Chairperson of the Organ has a certain degree of autonomy as he or she ‘shall be responsible for the overall policy direction and the achievement of the objectives of the Organ.’ (Article 4, paragraph 4) Yet, the Chairperson of the Organ cannot as such decide on a military intervention as this decision should be taken at summit level. The Secretariat has no real power of initiative, unlike ECOWAS: ‘The SADC Secretariat shall provide secretariat services to the Organ.’ (Article 9) The structure of the Organ proved to be the most divisive issue within SADC and was resolved by the establishment of a Troika as a type of checks and balances on the Chairperson of the Organ who ultimately reports to
the Summit. The dominating feature of the SADC Organ is the insistence on consensus and thus respect for the sovereignty of its member states. The differences first outlined between ECOWAS and SADC are also present in their decision-making processes.

A first take on commitment: ratification and budget

Until now, the analysis of the legal instruments has suggested two institutions with different values, albeit with, at first sight, similar goals. Before looking at their implementation record in the following chapter, a final step in the analysis looks at the political will of the member states of each regional organisation as seen through the ratification rate of their security and democracy protocols and through the tools put at the disposal of the regional organisation, namely its budget.

Although important, giving meaning to the ratification of specific protocols, or lack thereof, is not an obvious task as there could be numerous reasons explaining why a country can take more or less time to ratify international legal instruments: among others, a slow ratification process in front of parliament, a full domestic agenda making the ratification of protocols a low priority, a cumbersome bureaucratic process, etc. A caveat is also necessary here as no records were found for SADC after 2005, thus preventing a real comparison between ECOWAS and SADC.

Notwithstanding the above, two observations can be made on the ratification process in ECOWAS and SADC. First, ratification is very slow in ECOWAS with only six countries out of fifteen having ratified the 1999 Protocol on security as of June 1, 2007, and only eight countries for the 2001 protocol on democracy. (See table below) However, the 1999
protocol had a provision that allowed it to ‘enter into force provisionally upon signature by Heads of State and Government.’ (Article 57) By extension, the 2001 Protocol, supplementary to the Protocol relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security, also entered into force provisionally upon signature. Ratification was slow but implementation started upon signature. On the ratification itself, it can be quite surprising that more countries would have ratified the more controversial protocol on democracy. A possible explanation could be that ratifying the Protocol would be for these countries a way to signal to the international community their commitment towards democracy.\textsuperscript{55}

\textsuperscript{55} The question of ratification did not seem to be a great concern among ECOWAS officials who argued that they had the authorisation needed to implement their mandate. (Laloupo interview, 21, 22, 23 and 30 August 2007, Toure interview, 27 August 2007)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR OF RATIFICATION</th>
<th>BENIN</th>
<th>BURKINA FASO</th>
<th>CAPE VERDE</th>
<th>CÔTE D’IVOIRE</th>
<th>THE GAMBIA</th>
<th>GHANA</th>
<th>GUINEA</th>
<th>GUINEA-BISSAU</th>
<th>LIBERIA</th>
<th>MALI</th>
<th>NIGER</th>
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<th>SENEGAL</th>
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<tr>
<td>Convention on Small Arms and Lights Weapons signed in 2006</td>
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<td>2007</td>
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Source: Commission de la CEDEAO, Etat de Ratification du Traité révisé de la CEDEAO, des Protocoles et Conventions au 1er juin 2007, Abuja, Nigeria : CEDEAO.

**TABLE 5.4:** Ratification of key protocols by ECOWAS member states
Second, for SADC, ratification was faster, but was necessary. As of August 24, 2003, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa and Tanzania had ratified the 2001 protocol. (SADC, 23-24 August 2003, p.119) No data was available on the ratification of the 2004 SADC Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections. The 2001 protocol on security entered into force on March 2, 2004. (See table below) What this 2004 ratification date concretely means is that SADC was only able to implement its security mandate starting in 2004, while ECOWAS was able to do so five years earlier. Overall, less than three years to ratify the 2001 SADC protocol on security seems reasonable and the slow ratification in ECOWAS should not be surprising or seen as a lack of political will from the part of its member states as the protocol had provisionally entered into force. Thus, there is overall no obvious difference between the two regional organisations, except maybe in the nature of power relationships in the two institutions.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of Instrument</th>
<th>Date of Signature</th>
<th>Date of Entry into Force</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Protocol on the Control of Firearms, Ammunition &amp; Other Related Materials in SADC</td>
<td>14 August 2001</td>
<td>8 November 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protocol Against Corruption</td>
<td>14 August 2001</td>
<td>6 July 2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mutual Defence Pact</td>
<td>26 August 2003</td>
<td>Not yet in force</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: SADC, Major Achievements and Challenges: 25 Years of Regional Cooperation and Integration, Gaborone: SADC, 2005, p.34. (SADC, 2005, p.34)

TABLE 5.5: Status of SADC Signature and Entry into Force of certain SADC legal instruments as at 18 August 2005

More can be learned from the budget of both institutions. Analysing the budget of any institution is always illuminating. In this case, the analysis compares the 2005 budgets of ECOWAS and SADC, 2005 being the only year with both ECOWAS and SADC budgets
being available and when both institutions had already started implementing their peace and security mandate. Each institution follows different accounting rules. SADC fiscal year begins in 2004 and ends in 2005, probably in August, in time for the annual summit of Heads of State and Government.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>2004/2005 Projected Outturn*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>INCOME:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Member contributions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donors &amp; Grants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Income</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>EXPENDITURES</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administration costs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capital</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SUB-TOTAL</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Programmes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* In US dollars.

**Source:** SADC, Major Achievements and Challenges: 25 Years of Regional Cooperation and Integration, Gaborone: SADC, 2005, p.20. (SADC, 2005, p.20)

TABLE 5.6: Budget for SADC Secretariat
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INCOME</th>
<th>2005</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Own resources</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community Levy Receipts</td>
<td>49,619,767</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contribution Arrears</td>
<td>1,221,441</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Income</td>
<td>124,661</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Own resources</strong></td>
<td><strong>50,965,869</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>External resources</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japanese Government</td>
<td>99,423</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World Bank</td>
<td>75,156</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>116,862</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Union / Commission</td>
<td>616,219</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canadian Government / CIDA</td>
<td>81,494</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACBF / SIDA</td>
<td>620,905</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algerian Government</td>
<td>331,410</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>French Government</td>
<td>40,899</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sights Savers Internation</td>
<td>38,836</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>363,959</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total External resources</strong></td>
<td><strong>2,385,163</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL INCOME</strong></td>
<td><strong>53,351,032</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EXPENDITURE</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Administrative expenditure</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Executive Secretariat</td>
<td>9,616,693</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community Parliament</td>
<td>3,606,334</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community Court of Justice</td>
<td>2,439,777</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West African Health Organisation</td>
<td>1,039,381</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total administrative expenditure</strong></td>
<td><strong>16,702,185</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Programme expenditure</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health programmes</td>
<td>1,186,216</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy harmonisation programmes</td>
<td>1,643,029</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integration programmes</td>
<td>1,607,622</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peace &amp; Security Programmes</td>
<td>2,377,998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutional Capacity Building</td>
<td>278,540</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>1,335,065</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total programme expenditure</strong></td>
<td><strong>8,428,470</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL EXPENDITURE</strong></td>
<td><strong>25,130,655</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Surplus</strong></td>
<td><strong>28,220,377</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*1 UA = US$1.43 (average throughout 2005). UA stands for Unit of Account.

TABLE 5.7: Budget for ECOWAS for the period 1st January – 30th September 2005
Four points are worth highlighting. First, although this cannot be derived from the two budgets above, ECOWAS and SADC share a common increasing trend as both plan to significantly increase their income – to US$ 36,874,134 for SADC and UA 66,803,626 for ECOWAS – and their expenditure – to US$ 36,874,134 for SADC and UA 29,666,360 for ECOWAS – in the following year. This denotes that both institutions intend to expand and intensify their activities. Second, ECOWAS has a much bigger budget than SADC, the difference in income – UA 53,351,032 for ECOWAS vs. US$ 16,399,422 for SADC – being especially striking. This could be interpreted as a sign of greater commitment on the part of ECOWAS member states towards the regional organisation. But it is also the result of the adoption of a 0.5% community levy (cf. Article 72 of the 1993 Revised Treaty) that, although slow and cumbersome to implement due to the reluctance of member states to relinquish their hold on this income, proved to be pivotal in bringing increased resources to the regional organisation. Third, on paper, SADC is more dependent on donors and grants than ECOWAS with approximately 40% of its income coming from external resources. This was confirmed during the fieldwork with different foreign officials quoting the percentage of 60%. In ECOWAS, only 5% of its income comes from external resources. However, this result has to be mitigated by the fact that ECOWAS continues to actively search for external funding and that the resources coming from the community levy are disbursed by member states at a very slow and trickling pace. Finally, peace and security seem to be more of a priority for ECOWAS than for SADC with about 30% of its total program. For SADC, the budget itself does not provide an indication of the amount spent on peace and security programs. However, according to the operational budget for 2003-2007, US$ 350,000 was to be allocated to the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security. (SADC, 23-24 August 2003, p.294) Even though this does not correspond exactly to the year 2005, a rough estimate
would assess that between 5 and 10% of total program expenditures is allocated to peace
and security within SADC, a proportion significantly below that of ECOWAS. While this
is of course a rather cursory analysis, it provides some insight on the apparently greater
commitment to the regional organisation and its peace and security mandate by
ECOWAS. SADC is clearly not so generous or all encompassing when it comes to good
governance. The main logic behind adopting such a Protocol is probably to signal to the
international community that SADC is committed to democracy, while the control
mechanisms are de facto very restrained. (Le Pere and Matlosa interview, 19 July 2007)
In West Africa, behind the adoption of the 2001 Protocol, there is probably a real concern
that a military coup can be very disruptive to the whole region. (Boko interview, 6 May
2008) But again, West Africa has had more coups than most, if not all, other African sub-
regions.

Overall, the analysis and comparison of the legal instruments of ECOWAS and SADC
lead to the six following insights. First, ECOWAS and SADC do not share the same
values or the same understanding of sovereignty with SADC interpreting sovereignty as a
strict adherence to the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of another state.
That being said, they do share a broad understanding of security that can include, among
others, the proliferation of small arms, cross-border crime, etc. They probably share the
same perception of security threat. Third, ECOWAS and SADC member states also have
differing expectations towards their democracy mandate; SADC again having a restrictive
approach by focusing only on what rules should govern democratic elections in its region.
ECOWAS has a much broader mandate but it remains to be seen whether its acts on it.
Fourth, the difference in values has led to a difference in the implementation mechanisms
of the respective regional organisation. ECOWAS entrusts far greater power to its
Secretariat and now the Commission as part of its decision-making process and allows for a two-thirds majority, while SADC takes its decisions at Summit level by consensus and the Secretariat performs secretariat functions. Fifth, both regional organisations have adopted a right of humanitarian intervention but with SADC probably putting a greater onus on state consent. A humanitarian intervention in ECOWAS would be more likely due to its values and its decision-making process. Finally, based on the analysis of the budget more than on the ratification, ECOWAS appears more committed than SADC to its peace and security mandate.

* Both institutions acknowledge in their own texts that the need for a new treaty can be traced back to changes in the international and regional scene in the early 1990s. ECOWAS even mentions the emergence of the Single Market in Europe. The answer to these changing circumstances proved to be slightly different. They do share a common and broad understanding of security issues and security threats. This understanding of security as human security establishes a link with their democracy mandate with a minimal respect for democracy and basic human rights acting as a guarantee of stability and security in their respective region. The main difference that has had an impact at different levels throughout the legal texts concerns the issue of sovereignty. SADC’s insistence on a ‘strict’ respect for sovereignty and non-interference can explain the more restrictive interpretation of its right of humanitarian intervention, the limited powers entrusted to its Secretariat, its smaller budget, in general and for security issues, compared to ECOWAS, and its insistence on consensus during SADC Summits, while ECOWAS has agreed on a two-thirds majority voting. This also has had an impact on the democracy
mandate of the regional organisation as it proved less intrusive than that of ECOWAS. This of course does not mean that ECOWAS has embraced a full-fledged democracy promotion agenda, far from it. A regional security organisation, according to ECOWAS and SADC, is thus an organisation in charge of maintaining stability in their region irrespective of the type of threat they are facing – external aggression, circulation of small arms, or genocide. They are supposed to respond to whatever crisis that arises.

What does this comparative analysis teaches us about the three factors outlined in the introduction: marginalisation, the role of the regional hegemon and of state weakness? First, marginalisation, or to use the words of the regional organisations, the changes on the international scene did play a significant role behind their adoption of a new mandate. Second, their broad understanding of security as human security can be traced back to concerns about the state weakness of ECOWAS and SADC members. This chapter does not tell us much about the regional hegemon except it was closely involved in all the negotiations, something that should not come as a surprise. The most important outcome of this comparative analysis of the legal texts of ECOWAS or SADC is the importance of the pivotal norm of sovereignty and how it is viewed differently in each regional organisation. This reinforces a constructivist take on the issue. In the following chapter, we will see whether the conclusions drawn from the textual and budget analysis are confirmed by an analysis of the implementation record of both institutions.
CHAPTER 6

COSMETIC CHANGE OR CHANGE OF HEART?

We now have a good understanding of the history and of the precise security and democracy roles of ECOWAS and SADC, it is time to assess whether the transformation of these two regional organisations correspond to a real commitment of its member states or whether it had only signalling purposes. A realist reading the preceding chapter analysing the legal texts of ECOWAS and SADC would argue that the existence of these protocols has not changed in any way the regional balance of power and does not constrain the foreign policy choices of its member states. Realists would be especially dismissive of the democracy protocols and would consider their adoption as a way to signal to Western countries their changed democratic nature to obtain aid. In order to counter these claims, it is crucial to analyse the performance of ECOWAS and SADC in the implementation of their new security and democracy roles.

Are ECOWAS and SADC mere paper tigers? Are the legal texts analysed in the previous chapter the result of international pressure while ECOWAS and SADC member states still expect the United Nations or the African Union to intervene whenever a crisis arises? A close analysis of the treaties and protocols of ECOWAS and SADC has shown that, while their overall security and democracy mandate is quite similar, their differences over the importance of the norm of sovereignty allows us predict possible different levels of commitment between ECOWAS and SADC. The aim of this chapter is to evaluate the
commitment of the member states of ECOWAS and SADC to their new mandates. The objective here is to go beyond mere rhetoric and to effectively measure change. This step is crucial in order to answer the research question, to understand why ECOWAS and SADC adopted a new security and democracy role. Knowing whether ECOWAS and SADC member states are truly committed to their new security and democracy mandate or not will shed some light as to why they adopted this mandate in the first place. To uncover their true motivations, we need to know whether the change was skin-deep or a change of heart.

Did the institutional transformation of ECOWAS and SADC lead to changes in reality and in the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts in their respective region? To discover whether the member states of ECOWAS and SADC demonstrated a real commitment to maintain security and promote democracy within their region, an analysis of the implementation record of both institutions is necessary. When a crisis arises or when democratic governance is being challenged, by a military coup for instance, did the regional organisation react in their respective regions? Did it take leadership to solve the crisis or was the crisis being predominantly handled or managed by another organisation? How exactly did the regional organisation react? Based on all the possible cases that could potentially have represented a threat to the security, stability or good governance of the region, this section evaluates the performance of ECOWAS and SADC as a regional organisation with a security and democracy mandate. This cannot be done in abstracto and a comparison with the United Nations and the African Union will bring a valuable perspective to the work done by both regional organisations. The rationale behind this comparison is explained in detail below. Suffice it to say that these are three international organisations that could intervene in West and Southern Africa, the regional organisation,
the continental organisation, the African Union, and the global one, the UN. To assess the performance of ECOWAS and SADC, the relevant comparative units are organisations that have intervened, are intervening and will intervene in African regional crises.

The sections below assess the performance of ECOWAS and SADC as regional security organisations by first outlining which criteria are to be used to evaluate their implementation record and then by applying these criteria to their work on security and democracy issues, namely on peacekeeping operations and election monitoring.

*Methodology*

This section addresses the challenge of elaborating a set of criteria to assess the performance of ECOWAS and SADC as regional security organisations with a democracy and good governance mandate. This is not an easy task as there are not widely agreed upon way of measuring their performance. Once those criteria have been outlined, it then presents the data gathered, its sources and its limitations.

*How to measure performance*

This section puts forth its own set of criteria based on the comparison of the performance of ECOWAS and SADC to that of the AU and of the UN. The rationale behind this comparative analysis is simple. Criteria to measure the performance of SADC and ECOWAS are highlighted by the introduction of relevant comparative elements. The AU
and the UN have been chosen for the following four reasons. First, as one cannot compare apples and oranges, the relevant comparative elements are international organisations, as opposed to states or a coalition of the willing, as all IOs face the same challenges in their decision-making processes. Second, the AU, the UN and the regional security organisation share the same broad security mandate. Both the AU and the UN are claiming responsibility for the maintenance of peace and security in West and Southern Africa as included in its global mandate for the United Nations, especially that of the Security Council with its mandate of maintaining or restoring international peace and security, and in its continental mandate for the African Union with all SADC and ECOWAS member states also belonging to the AU. Third, they all have intervened, militarily or diplomatically, in the West and Southern African regions in the past. Finally, the stark difference in financial and logistical means between the United Nations and the regional security organisation allows us to raise the question of whether this difference in means truly has a significant impact on the decision to send peacekeeping operations and on the unfolding of the operation itself. It is also with the aim of finding relevant comparative elements that the performance of ECOWAS and SADC on election monitoring will be compared to that of the African Union, the European Union and of the Carter Centre as these are the organisations of reference when it comes to monitoring elections in Africa.

The analysis in this chapter offers some insights into the following questions:

- What triggers the involvement of the international community, be it the regional, the continental or the global organisation? It is important here to also look at the dogs that do not bark. The Conflict Barometer is apposite to the task as it separates the conflicts between interstate and intrastate conflicts. It also classifies
them according to their intensity. This thus highlights two factors, the nature of the conflict as interstate or intrastate and its intensity to explain the involvement of the international community.

- Who reacts when a crisis erupts? The regional organisation, ECOWAS or SADC, the AU or the UN? What organisation takes the lead in managing the crisis? Is it systematically the regional organisation, the continental organisation, or the UN, or does it vary according to the region or to the conflict? Is the regional organisation the default forum for crisis management in the region? Which channel is privileged?

- How does the organisation dealing with the crisis react? What type of action does it put in place? Is there a difference in approach between the regional organisation, the UN or the AU? Based on the data gathered in the official records of all four organisations (ECOWAS, SADC, AU and the UN), this section proposes a scale of possible reactions that simplifies the data gathered and makes it more easily readable. An organisation can decide not to react to a crisis, described in Tables 6.1 and 6.2 as a white or empty square. (see below) It can also keep itself briefed on the developments and offer its mediation and good offices: this is denoted by a yellow square. As a step up, it can condemn certain actions, impose some sanctions or an embargo and can send some predominantly civilian or unarmed staff to monitor the situation on the ground: this is denoted by an orange square. Finally, the organisation can decide to intervene militarily: this can be a more traditional peacekeeping operation that entails the monitoring of a ceasefire for instance, or a more robust mission that includes peace enforcement. In both cases, this means having boots on the ground, i.e. sending military personnel. This is described by a red square. From white to yellow to orange to red, the table below
aims to visually describe the degree of involvement of each organisation in a specific conflict. The measures and steps taken by each organisation are summarized. Their reactions are also colour-coded for clarity.

- Overall, this section explores what type of commitment ECOWAS and SADC member states have vis-à-vis their peace and security mandate. Is the regional organisation usually involved when tensions arise? How much are ECOWAS and SADC member states ready to sacrifice (money and men) to implement the peace and security mandate of their regional organisation?

As regards the democracy mandate of ECOWAS and SADC, this is still a relatively new phenomenon even though both protocols were adopted shortly after those on peace and security. The mandate of both regional organisations is much more restrictive and is limited to the monitoring of elections. This is a new trend that pervaded the whole continent as the AU Executive Council decided to establish an Election Monitoring Unit in 2002 at its meeting in Durban, South Africa (CM/Dec.687). ECOWAS decided to establish its Electoral Assistance Unit in 2005. (ECOWAS Executive Secretariat, 2005, §273) Nevertheless, the same logic is applied here: the tables below make a list of all the parliamentary, legislative and presidential elections that took place from 1998 until 2007 in West and Southern African countries. The source used here is the Election Guide of the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) that compiles all presidential, parliamentary and legislative elections around the world and their results. The dataset only starts in 1998 and there is no data available before that. This does not represent a problem for the analysis as both ECOWAS and SADC started implementing their democracy mandate in the early 2000s. The tables 6.3 and 6.4 below show whether these

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56 For more information, see [http://www.electionguide.org/index.php](http://www.electionguide.org/index.php).
elections were monitored by the regional organisation and what its assessment was. To provide a point of comparison, the table also tracks the reports issued by the AU, the EU and the Carter Centre on these same elections. The analysis offers some insight on the same issues as the peace and security mandate: how committed are ECOWAS and SADC member states to the implementation of their democracy mandate? More specifically, how often does the regional organisation monitor elections? How does its assessment compare to that of other institutions? Are ECOWAS and SADC ready to sanction instances of bad governance within their midst?

The data and its limitations

Concretely, the analysis will focus on a time period from 1992 until 2007. While both organisations changed their mandate in 1999 and 2001, ECOWAS and SADC started getting involved in the area of peace and security as soon as the end of the Cold War with 1992 being the year SADCC was transformed in SADC with a new mandate of peace and security. By 1992, ECOWAS was already militarily involved in the Liberian civil war and by 1994 SADC had started its reflection on the content of its peace and security mandate with the organisation by the SADC Secretariat of Workshop on Democracy, Peace and Security from 11 to 16 July 1994.

To analyse their performance and their effectiveness in managing emerging crises in their regions, a list of all the conflicts in the region is assembled. This list goes beyond wars and conflicts and also includes tensions – not necessarily resulting in outright conflict – that would warrant the intervention and involvement of the regional organisation to fulfil its conflict prevention mandate. The selection of the different instances that could have
incurred a reaction from the regional organisations is based on their disruptive potential for the peace and security of the region and includes instances of bad governance such as the rigging of elections. The source used to compile this data is the Conflict Barometer of the Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research.\textsuperscript{57}

The first step in the analysis was the gathering of instances of unrest and tensions in West and Southern Africa. The choice of the Conflict Barometer of the Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research is based on the two following reasons. It is not limited to inter-state conflicts and includes intra-state conflicts. Second, it includes instances of unrest and measures the intensity of conflict. The Conflict Barometer only started measuring the intensity of conflicts in 1996. From 1996 until 2003, 1 meant latent conflict, 2 meant mostly non-violent conflict, 3 meant violent crisis and 4 meant war. In 2003, the typology changed with 1 meaning latent conflict: ‘A positional difference on definable values of national meaning is considered to be a latent conflict if respective demands are articulated by one of the parties and perceived by the other as such.’ 2 meant manifest conflict: ‘A manifest conflict includes the use of measures that are located in the forefield of violent force. This concerns for example verbal pressure, threatening publicly with violence, or the imposition of economic sanctions.’ 3 meant crisis: ‘A crisis is a tense situations in which at least one of the parties uses violent force in single incidents.’ 4 meant severe crisis: ‘A conflict is considered to be a severe crisis if violent force is repeatedly used in an organised way.’ 5 meant war: ‘Wars are a type of violent conflicts in which violent force is used with a certain continuity in an organised and systematic way. The conflict parties apply extensive measures, according to the situation. The amount of destruction is vast and of long duration.’ (Heidelberg Institute on International

\textsuperscript{57} For more information, see http://www.hiiik.de/en/konfliktabrometer/index.html.
Whatever the typology privileged, a conflict ranked as 1 is particularly interesting as it can include instances of bad governance.

While useful, the data from the Conflict Barometer is not without its limitations and some caveats should be mentioned here. First, different cases of unrest were addressed either by ECOWAS or SADC and were not mentioned by the Conflict Barometer. For instance, it does mention the assassination of the President of Niger in 1999, but does not include it in its charts. This assassination was strongly condemned by ECOWAS. Also mentioned in ECOWAS records and not to be found in the Conflict Barometer are a 2002 mutiny in Niger, border tensions between Benin and Burkina Faso in 2006 and an attempted coup in The Gambia also in 2006. In the case of SADC, the Conflict Barometer does not mention the tensions and constitutional crisis in 1994 in Lesotho. Second, the quality of the data improved over time. It became more precise, a positive development, but this also means that it only treated major instances of conflict at the beginning of the dataset in the 1990s. This does not necessarily mean that the regions were more peaceful but rather that the Conflict Barometer did not take note of certain conflicts. There was not necessarily an increase in conflict, but rather an increase in the details, accuracy and a broader scope of inclusion of the Conflict Barometer.

The data used to assess the reaction of ECOWAS, SADC, the AU and the UN is also not without its problems. For ECOWAS, the press releases on the regional organisation’s website were only available starting in 1999. However, derived from the secondary literature, we are still able to track when and where ECOWAS intervened militarily. It is somewhat more difficult to track down ‘softer’ types of reaction during the period 1990-1999. From the fieldwork, only the Annual reports of 2000, 2002, 2005 and 2006 were
brought back as the others could not be located. Overall, the analysis is based on a rather patchy record for ECOWAS. For SADC, the records of the Council of Ministers and of the Summits of the Heads of State and Government were almost fully available from 1994 until 2006. The records of a few Extraordinary Summits, quite often focusing on peace and security issues, were not included in this package provided by the SADC Secretariat. Also, the records of the ISDSC (Inter-State Defence and Security Committee) that would have been particularly pertinent for the issue at hand were also not to be located. For the OAU, the analysis is based on the resolutions and the decisions taken by the OAU and later by the AU at the level of the Heads of State and Government, but also at the level of the Council of Ministers as, apparently, the follow-up of different conflicts was mainly done at the Council of Ministers level. The records were available from 1992 onwards. Most of the documents (press releases, communiqués and meeting record) were available online on the AU website. However, a few were missing. At the level of Heads of State and Government, the records of the summits in Lomé, Togo, on July 10-12, 2000, in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, on July 6-8, 2004, and in Abuja, Nigeria, on January 30-31, 2005 were not available. At the level of the Council of Ministers, the records of the meetings taking place in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, on February 19-24, 1990 and in Algiers, Algeria on July 8-10, 1999 were also not available. For the United Nations, the analysis is centred on the resolutions taken by the Security Council from 1992 until 2007. These were fully available online.

As a final caveat, the colour-coding used below in order to simplify the reading of the tables also has its inherent limitations. Quite often, the institutional involvement should be seen as a continuum and colour-coding is rather arbitrary. For instance, in the case of rehatting of ECOWAS troops with the UN blue helmets, ECOWAS remains very much
involved with boots on the ground and is still involved in the negotiations. Nevertheless, the UN becomes the leading organisation and this should be expressed in the colour-coding, hence the downgrading to orange. The aim here is to discover overall patterns and trends.

The performance of ECOWAS and SADC as security organisations

As outlined above, this section provides a list – as exhaustive as possible – of all instances of unrest within West and Southern Africa that could have triggered a reaction by ECOWAS, SADC, the African Union or the United Nations. The analysis starts with ECOWAS, then continues on SADC before outlining the pattern of reaction of each regional security organisation and thus its performance compared to the AU and the UN.

ECOWAS as a regional leader
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Intensity</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Reaction of ECOWAS</th>
<th>Reaction of the OAU</th>
<th>Reaction of the UN</th>
<th>Leadership</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Liberia (civil war)</td>
<td>Intrastate</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>ECOMOG intervention</td>
<td>CoM resolution</td>
<td>Arms embargo</td>
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As seen from the previous table, out of the nineteen conflicts or instances of tension and unrest that shook West Africa from 1992 until 2007, ECOWAS was involved, in one way or another, in seven of them, namely the conflict in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Côte d'Ivoire, the unrest and struggle for power in Guinea, Guinea-Bissau and Togo and in 2001 during a flare-up of the Casamance secession movement in Senegal that spilled over in neighbouring countries. ECOWAS did not get involved in any interstate conflict or tension and in any internal tensions that did not reach the level of violent conflict. As can be seen clearly from the table above, ECOWAS has been active in the resolution of the most violent intrastate conflicts in its region. This result should of course be qualified by the fact that many of these conflicts had spill-over effects and repercussions in other countries. This partially explains why the arc of conflict including, from West to East, Guinea-Bissau, Guinea, Sierra Leone, Liberia and Côte d’Ivoire, is often thought of as the conflict of the Mano River region, as one conflict cannot be solved independently from the others. ECOWAS intervened militarily in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea-Bissau and Côte d’Ivoire and deployed troops along the Guinea/Liberia/Sierra Leone border. Its involvement scaled up and down according to the intensity of the conflict and to the increasing involvement of the United Nations in the conflicts of the region. ECOWAS did not only react to erupting crises by sending boots on the ground: its reaction ranged from assessment tours, mediation efforts with the establishment of Mediation Committees, the organisation of emergency meetings to condemnation of military coups, election monitoring and the deployment of troops. In the case of Guinea and Guinea-Bissau, with both of these conflicts staying clear from extreme instances of violence, ECOWAS privileged a ‘soft’ approach that focused on mediation and conflict prevention, or at least preventing the conflict from escalating. A similar approach
was used in Togo following the death of President Eyadema that was followed by bloodless
coup by his son, Faure Gnassingbé Eyadema, who claimed power for himself. The Heads of
State of the region gathered together and asked him to step down and to organise elections
that Faure Gnassingbé Eyadema won. Beyond mediation, good offices and election
monitoring, ECOWAS rarely resorted to sanctions as a way of putting pressure on conflicting
parties.

SADC inability to unite
### TABLE 6.2: The performance of SADC as a security organisation from 1992 until 2007: A comparison with the AU and the UN.

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<td>Year</td>
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<td>Reaction of the OAU</td>
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Out of the sixteen conflicts in the Southern African region from 1992 until 2007, SADC was involved in nine, namely in Angola, Mozambique, the transition from apartheid in South Africa, the DRC, Lesotho, the tensions over the Caprivi strip, the tensions between Angola and Zambia and in Zimbabwe. All these were intrastate conflicts except for the tensions between Angola and Zambia over UNITA that were defused by the ISDSC. (Fabricius, 2002, p.41) Just as in ECOWAS, SADC decides to react to a conflict based on the intensity of it and scales down its involvement as the UN steps in. However, contrary to ECOWAS, SADC intervened militarily only twice in Lesotho and the DRC and as was explained in the historical chapter (chapter 4), these interventions were only labelled SADC interventions post facto. As a constant, SADC privileged a ‘soft’ approach and rarely intervenes in a forcible manner. This can be partially attributed to a political culture based on ‘quiet diplomacy,’ a term often used to described South African diplomacy, and meetings behind closed doors and thus dominated by secrecy that makes the reporting of SADC efforts in conflict management quite arduous. In its official documents, SADC remains seized of the question and is regularly briefed on the situation. SADC quite systematically begins its statements with positive considerations and does not only address the problems in its own region. It also follows quite closely what is happening in the Great Lakes region, albeit without the mandate or legitimacy to intervene there. For instance, SADC can congratulate Rwanda for its elections, express deep regrets at the death of Sergio Vieira de Mello, etc. In 2002, the Summit focused on the changes taking place at the AU level. SADC also held several talks with the European Union about the political and security situation in the region. ECOWAS limits its comments to its own region. In general, SADC uses very mild language in its official documents and most of its negotiation and mediation attempts are not described in details in its records. It resorted to sanctions only in the case of Angola and, in that case, followed the sanctions
imposed by the UN. It also strongly condemned UNITA and its leader, Jonas Savimbi, who was called a ‘war criminal’ in 1998. The only other condemnation came in 1999 with the condemnation of the secessionist attack on Katima Mulilo in the Caprivi region in Namibia. The difference in the tools used by ECOWAS and SADC are thus striking.

These tables also track the reactions of the OAU and later the African Union and of the United Nations Security Council. In both regions, the OAU/AU is not very present. It does follow the developments of the biggest crises in the region and can be part in certain cases of mediation efforts, as was the case in 2006 in Côte d’Ivoire but it rarely takes the lead in crisis management in each region. In essence, the AU gets briefed on the issues and follows the developments but rarely takes decisions. It has only started recently contributing financially to sub-regional actions, notably thanks to the funds provided by the European Union. In contrast, the role of the UN is much more prominent as it has sent troops on the ground in most of the conflicts in West Africa and in Southern Africa. This strong involvement of the UN can be partially explained of course by its mandate but also by the means it has at its disposal that do not compare with the very limited means, be it financial means or logistical capabilities, of ECOWAS and SADC. The UN Security Council is also the institution through which sanctions are levied. Sanctions are by definition more effective if taken at the level of the global institution, especially for arms and diamonds embargoes.
Assessing ECOWAS and SADC leadership

Beyond this quick description of the results found in the tables above, the following insights can be deduced in order to assess the leadership of ECOWAS and SADC in their own region on security issues.

What triggers the involvement of the international community in West and Southern Africa? Counter-intuitively, the international community, be it the regional, continental or global organisation, gets predominantly involved in intrastate conflicts. This means that interference in a country’s internal affairs, a move against any definition of sovereignty, is the norm in these regions. This result has to be pondered alongside the other factor these tables include, i.e. the intensity of the conflict. A more reliable way of predicting intervention is the intensity of the conflict. Regardless of the interstate or intrastate nature of the conflict, the international community gets involved when conflicts become violent (intensity 3, 4 and 5 in the tables). It appears as if intervention is needs driven. In ECOWAS, of the 19 conflicts, there are only 5 interstate conflicts. In SADC, out of the 16 conflicts, only 4 are interstate conflicts. The predominant type of conflict in both regions is intrastate and this tends to be the most violent. According to the tables, ECOWAS and SADC almost never interfere in inter-state conflicts, even though such conflicts do spill over borders. The only instance of interstate conflict that led to a regional organisation getting involved – Angola vs. Zambia over UNITA in 1999 and 2000 – was not even mentioned in the records provided by SADC as they did not include ISDSC records. This information was found in the secondary literature. (Fabricius, 2002) Overall, interstate conflicts, that quite often involve border issues, rarely lead to significant outbursts of violence. The international community thus gets involved in
violent intrastate conflicts in both regions. But intervention by the international community is not automatic. This is where looking at the dogs that do not bark can prove useful. Neither ECOWAS, nor the AU, nor the UN have even mentioned the tensions that routinely erupt in Nigeria and that can prove quite violent (often intensity 4 in the tables). When a violent intrastate conflict occurs within the regional hegemonic state like Nigeria, it does not trigger any involvement by the international community. Nobody can intervene in Nigeria unless the country collapses. The final answer is that the international community intervenes in violent intrastate conflicts when such a conflict can lead to state collapse or when the afflicted country is unable to address the violence.

Now that we know under what circumstances the international community gets involved in West and Southern Africa, the next question is: who reacts to the emerging crisis? The answer to this question reveals a big difference between West and Southern Africa. ECOWAS is quite often the leading institution whenever a crisis emerges in its region. At the minimum, ECOWAS is always present in one capacity or another. However, leadership in West Africa varies. From the table, we could assume that there is an emerging pattern of the regional organisation acting as a first responder during a regional emergency with the UN taking over later on and staying in the long run. ECOWAS is the organisation that has to respond by default because the UN does not respond quickly to problems in West Africa. The emergence of ECOWAS as a first responder has its roots in the West African disappointment in the United Nations. This disillusionment is notably expressed in the ECOWAS security protocol in which intervention by ECOWAS does not require prior UN authorisation. This is not the case of SADC where most interventions and leadership comes from the United Nations, be it in Angola, Mozambique or the DRC. When there is intervention by SADC, it seems that these interventions were triggered by
the interests of key member states. Usually, for crisis management in Southern Africa, the UN takes the lead. While ECOWAS is a pivotal organisation in the region towards which member states, the AU and the UN turn when there is a crisis; SADC is not the gatekeeper in Southern Africa. In West Africa, the political tensions are systematically addressed and discussed at the regional level almost exclusively through ECOWAS. ECOWAS is the forum of choice. In Southern Africa, the hard work is done by the United Nations. The role of the regional hegemon can partially account for this difference as South Africa is often accused of privileging the AU with the intervention in Burundi as a case in point.\(^{58}\) This is a striking difference between the two regional organisations.

When the international community gets involved in a crisis, how does it react? What tools do the regional organisations use to implement their peace and security mandate? Beyond this major difference in terms of leadership within their respective region, ECOWAS and SADC do share a common concern for early warning and conflict prevention. This corresponds again to the ‘quiet’ diplomacy approach that consists of sending prominent and respected leaders to a country that shows signs of unrest to unruffle feathers. This is true for both ECOWAS and SADC and can be sometimes difficult to track. However, in the case of SADC, since the crisis in Zimbabwe, there are clear signs of the limitations of this approach, at least within Southern Africa. Conflict prevention is not always successful but is usually performed at the regional level with the AU getting involved from time to time and the UN very rarely, at least in West and Southern Africa. The main difference between both organisations is that, schematically, ECOWAS picks a mediator, quite often a current or former Head of State, and sends him or her to the country in crisis,

\(^{58}\) South Africa sent some troops in Burundi in 2001 following the ceasefire agreement brokered by President Mandela. (See [http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/1627807.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/1627807.stm)). It was then the lead nation of AMIB (African Union Mission in Burundi) in 2003 that was followed in 2004 by ONUB (United Nations Operation in Burundi) with a South African commander still at the head of the United Nations’ forces.
while, in SADC, a president often decides to offer its good offices and is then later endorsed by the regional organisation. The involvement of regional leaders exists but they act a lot more like individuals who find common grounds depending on the crisis. They do not exactly act as representatives of the regional grouping. Beyond conflict prevention, when a crisis erupts, both SADC and ECOWAS have used the whole range of diplomatic and military tools at their disposal: from simple follow-up to military intervention. However, ECOWAS is much more prone to intervene militarily and in a much more forceful manner. This difference in methods can be linked to the difference in leadership between the two regional organisations. Again, SADC prefers ‘quiet’ diplomacy, while ECOWAS is ready to escalate to military intervention. When military intervention is warranted due to the intensity of the conflict, SADC welcomes the UN stepping in and sending troops while ECOWAS tends to act as a first responder and later have its troops re-hatted by the United Nations, whether by choice or by default due to the slow response of the UN, it is difficult to tell. The difference in approach cannot be attributed to the lesser intensity of the conflicts in the Southern African region, with the conflict of the DRC having remained violent throughout the period studied. However, the relative lack of interest in investing heavily in peacekeeping in the DRC can maybe be attributed to the fact that the DRC, being such a giant within Africa, can belong to different regions of the continent. It arguably could be another regional organisation’s responsibility to intervene. In fact, its identity as a Southern African nation can easily be called into question. Overall, as of 2007, SADC is reluctant and does not have the capacity, as a regional organisation, to intervene militarily in its own region. South Africa does have the capacity, but the work, planning and training to create a regional force has not been achieved. This stands in sharp contrast to the ECOWAS willingness to send soldiers and to its efforts to build its Standby Force.
The final question to be addressed is: how committed are ECOWAS and SADC to their peace and security mandate. When they have interests in common, countries can always find a way to cooperate in order to achieve their common goals. What difference can a regional organisation then make? It may be the ‘usual’ or ‘default’ way countries collaborate. It can be the default venue or instrument they use. This is arguably the main difference between ECOWAS and SADC. As seen above, West African countries see ECOWAS as the forum of choice to address the security crises in their region and seem ready to make greater sacrifices, in terms of peacekeeping operations and peace enforcement, than SADC. However, the reality of their limited capacities cannot be ignored and their commitment in this domain cannot exclude that of the United Nations as they need the financial and logistical help of the global institution. The P3 – the United States, the United Kingdom and France – also remain involved, especially France in Côte d’Ivoire. On the other hand, SADC does not take the lead in matters relating to the peace and security of its region. While individual Heads of State and Government are indeed involved when crises erupt, SADC does not seem to act as a regional organisation, but much more as a coalition of different interests. The slow development of a SADC common voice can also probably be attributed to the crisis in Zimbabwe that has brought SADC to a stalemate. There is of course also a plurality of voices and interests within West Africa but ECOWAS seems somehow to hammer out a common position on different crises, an achievement SADC seems unable to achieve for now. As the crisis in

59 Nigeria, under the leadership of newly elected President Obasanjo, decided to withdraw its troops from Sierra Leone in 1999. Such a decision puts in question the commitment of Nigeria to ECOWAS and of ECOWAS as a whole, under the leadership of the regional hegemon, to its peacekeeping mandate. It is worth highlighting here that Nigeria’s decision to withdraw was based on predominantly domestic reasons, with Obasanjo running on this platform for the presidency. Nevertheless, Nigerian foreign policy still pushed forward for the adoption of the 1999 Protocol institutionalizing the peacekeeping mandate of ECOWAS and thus allowing a better burden-sharing within the regional organisation. Nigeria had also established contacts with the United Nations to ensure that there would be no power vacuum as they withdrew. See UNITED NATIONS (1999) Letter dated 23 December 1999 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council. S/1999/1285. New York, United Nations.
the DRC clearly shows, the peace and security of the Southern African region, whenever a conflict becomes violent, is still very much in the hands of the United Nations.

**The performance of ECOWAS and SADC in democracy promotion and election monitoring**

The peace and security mandate of ECOWAS and SADC is only one of the elements that this research considers. The aim of this section is also to evaluate the commitment of the two regional organisations with regard to their good governance and democracy mandate. Following the same logic as above, the two tables below compare the judgment by the regional organisation on different elections that took place in their region to the assessment of other institutions, namely the OAU/AU, the EU, the Carter Centre and the APRM (African Peer Review Mechanism) reports. In the table on ECOWAS, the election statements of the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI) will be used, when available. None, with the exception of pre-election surveys in Zimbabwe, are available in SADC countries. In the table on SADC, the election assessment reports of the SADC Parliamentary Forum (SADC-PF) will also be used, when available. The same sources for ECOWAS, SADC and the African Union were used. For the European Union, the Carter Centre, the National Democratic Institute, the APRM reports and the SADC-PF, the assessment of these elections was taken from their website. In many instances, neither the Carter Centre, nor the European Union has

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60 The APRM reports are used a mere complements as out of the 29 countries that are part of the APRM process, only six have gone through the whole process. Only three countries from ECOWAS and SADC have issue reports: Benin, Ghana and South Africa.
For the National Democratic Institute: [http://www.ndi.org/resourcecontent/Statement](http://www.ndi.org/resourcecontent/Statement)
For the APRM reports: [http://www.aprm-international.org/](http://www.aprm-international.org/)
issued statements on the elections happening in Africa and these spaces remain blank in the tables below. After looking at the reports issued by the International Crisis Group and Human Rights Watch, they were not included in the tables below as neither organisation actually had electoral observers on the ground at the time of the elections, even though they did have staff in the countries. Furthermore, since these organisations focus on conflicts or human rights issues, elections and election observation proved to be only a secondary issue in these reports.

A summary of ECOWAS and SADC election monitoring reports
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Election</th>
<th>Evaluation of ECOWAS</th>
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<th>Evaluation of the EU</th>
<th>Evaluation of the Carter Center</th>
<th>Evaluation of the National Democratic Center</th>
<th>Evaluation in the APRM reports</th>
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<td>ECOWAS election observation for elections deemed “fair, peaceful and transparent” (ECOWAS 2000 report, §363)</td>
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<td>Evaluation of the EU</td>
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<td>2000</td>
<td>Côte d’Ivoire</td>
<td>Presidential</td>
<td>“Announcement of elections results […] is completely incomprehensible and in total violation of democratic principles and ideals. ECOWAS […] strongly condemns this coup d'etat which is merely a re-enactment of the first.” (PR83/2000)</td>
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<td>Four-man ECOWAS delegation to monitor the elections at the invitation of The Gambian government (PR78/2001)</td>
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<td>2002</td>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>Presidential</td>
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<td>Widespread procedural irregularities</td>
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<td>Burkina Faso</td>
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<td>Evaluation of the Carter Center</td>
<td>Evaluation of the National Democratic Center</td>
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<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>Presidential and Legislative</td>
<td>30-member ECOWAS delegation to monitor elections in Sierra Leone. (PR29/2002)</td>
<td>Transparent and reasonably well administered voting process, considering the circumstances.</td>
<td>Smoothly and rather transparent</td>
<td>Peaceful and transparent</td>
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<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>Presidential and Parliamentary</td>
<td>ECOWAS 15-member Election Monitoring Mission satisfied over conduct of elections: generally free, fair and transparent with insignificant hiccups. (PR25/2003 and PR33/2003)</td>
<td>Marred by serious irregularities and fraud - in a certain number of States, minimum standards for democratic elections were not met.</td>
<td>Unfolded more positively than expected but with fundamental flaws and serious irregularities</td>
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<td>2003</td>
<td>Togo</td>
<td>Presidential</td>
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<td>Year</td>
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<td>Election</td>
<td>Evaluation of ECOWAS</td>
<td>Evaluation of the AU</td>
<td>Evaluation of the EU</td>
<td>Evaluation of the Carter Center</td>
<td>Evaluation of the National Democratic Center</td>
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<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Guinea-Bissau</td>
<td>Presidential</td>
<td>Election deemed fair and transparent and &quot;facilitated the return of political normalcy.&quot; (ECOWAS 2005 report, §243)</td>
<td>Generall well organized, in a transparent and inclusive manner, and met essential international principles for democratic elections</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Burkina Faso</td>
<td>Presidential</td>
<td>Elders sent to observe elections in Burkina Faso (ECOWAS 2006 report, §304)</td>
<td>Positive with few irregularities</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Cape Verde</td>
<td>Presidential and Parliamentary</td>
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<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Benin</td>
<td>Presidential</td>
<td>Elders sent to observe elections in Benin (ECOWAS 2006 report, §304)</td>
<td>Model for democracy in Africa but concerns about reliability of voters' list</td>
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<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Election</td>
<td>Evaluation of ECOWAS</td>
<td>Evaluation of the AU</td>
<td>Evaluation of the EU</td>
<td>Evaluation of the Carter Center</td>
<td>Evaluation of the National Democratic Center</td>
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<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Gambia</td>
<td>Presidential</td>
<td>&quot;ECOWAS fact-finding mission to The Gambia advises opposition against boycotting election.&quot; (PR89/2006) 40-member ECOWAS observer mission endorses the election as generally peaceful, free, fair and transparent. (PR95/2006)</td>
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<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>Gambia</td>
<td>Legislative</td>
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<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>Presidential</td>
<td>60 ECOWAS electoral observers sent to Senegal and endorse presidential election as sufficiently free and transparent. (PR11/2007 and PR13/2007)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>Benin</td>
<td>Legislative</td>
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<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Election</td>
<td>Evaluation of ECOWAS</td>
<td>Evaluation of the AU</td>
<td>Evaluation of the EU</td>
<td>Evaluation of the Carter Center</td>
<td>Evaluation of the National Democratic Center</td>
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<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>Presidential</td>
<td>60 ECOWAS observers deployed. (PR38/2007)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>Burkina Faso</td>
<td>Parliamentary</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>Presidential and Legislative</td>
<td>ECOWAS lauds elections in Sierra Leone as adequately free, peaceful and credible. (PR74/2007, PR76/2007, PR77/2007 and PR82/2007)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Largely calm and orderly election day despite increased tension during the campaign period</td>
<td></td>
<td>Transparent, credible and largely peaceful</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>Togo</td>
<td>Parliamentary</td>
<td></td>
<td>Les Togolais ont participé massivement aux élections législatives du 14 Octobre, démontrant une volonté de construire une démocratie pluraliste.*</td>
<td></td>
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</table>

* Translation from the French provided by the author.

Original in French: ‘Les Togolais ont participé massivement aux élections législatives du 14 Octobre, démontrant une volonté de construire une démocratie pluraliste.’
TABLE 6.4: Elections within SADC countries from 1998 until 2007. An assessment by SADC, the AU, the EU, the Carter Center, the SADC-PF and based on the APRM reports.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Election</th>
<th>Evaluation of SADC</th>
<th>Evaluation of the AU</th>
<th>Evaluation of the EU</th>
<th>Evaluation of the Carter Center</th>
<th>Evaluation of the SADC-PF</th>
<th>Evaluation in the APRM reports</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>Lesotho</td>
<td>Parliamentary</td>
<td>Committee of Experts set up &quot;to investigate the validity or otherwise of allegations that the elections were fraudulent.&quot; (Communique of the 1998 SADC Summit)</td>
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<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>Swaziland</td>
<td>Parliamentary</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>Parliamentary</td>
<td>Congratulations by SADC Summit to President Mogae for his victory at the polls. (2000 SADC Summit final communiqué)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>Parliamentary and Presidential</td>
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<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>Botswana</td>
<td>Parliamentary</td>
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<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>Namibia</td>
<td>Presidential</td>
<td>Congratulations by SADC Summit to President Nujoma for his victory at the polls. (2000 SADC Summit final communiqué)</td>
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<td>Year</td>
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<td>Evaluation of the Carter Center</td>
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<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>Presidential and Legislative</td>
<td>Congratulations by SADC Summit to President Chissano for his victory at the polls. (2000 SADC Summit final communique)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Very positive</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>Referendum and Legislative</td>
<td>Congratulations by SADC Summit to President Mugabe for his victory at the polls. (2000 SADC Summit final communique)</td>
<td></td>
<td>&quot;The scale of violence and intimidation in the run-up to the campaign and during the election period marred the final result. […] The Office of the Registrar-General did not operate in an open and transparent manner.&quot;</td>
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<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Election</td>
<td>Evaluation of SADC</td>
<td>Evaluation of the AU</td>
<td>Evaluation of the EU</td>
<td>Evaluation of the Carter Center</td>
<td>Evaluation of the SADC-PF</td>
<td>Evaluation in the APRM reports</td>
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<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>Presidential and Parliamentary</td>
<td>&quot;Summit congratulated President Benjamin Mkapa of the United Republic of Tanzania for [his] victory at the polls.&quot; (2001 SADC Summit final communique)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>Presidential and Legislative</td>
<td>&quot;We are not confident that the declared results represent the wishes of the Zambian electors on polling day.&quot;</td>
<td>Electrical irregularities</td>
<td>We are confident that in spite of the problems experienced particularly on voting day, the just-ended tripartite elections afforded the people of Zambia an opportunity to exercise their constitutional right.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Election</td>
<td>Evaluation of SADC</td>
<td>Evaluation of the AU</td>
<td>Evaluation of the EU</td>
<td>Evaluation of the Carter Center</td>
<td>Evaluation of the SADC-PF</td>
<td>Evaluation in the APRM reports</td>
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<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>Presidential</td>
<td>“free, fair and democratic Presidential elections” (Final communique of the Extraordinary Summit held in Dar-Es-Salaam, United Republic of Tanzania, 28-29 March 2007)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>The electoral process could not be said to adequately comply with the Norms and Standards for Elections in the SADC region.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>Lesotho</td>
<td>Parliamentary</td>
<td>“The Extended Troika of SADC undertook a mission to observe elections in that country. […] The Troika declared the elections free and fair.” (Record of the Review Committee on the Implementation of the Restructuring of SADC Institutions held in Blantyre, Malawi, 30 May 2002, SADC/C2/2002/4)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>The election was peaceful, free, fair, and transparent, and thus a true reflection of the will of the people of Lesotho.</td>
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<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Swaziland</td>
<td>Parliamentary</td>
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<td>Year</td>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Election</td>
<td>Evaluation of SADC</td>
<td>Evaluation of the AU</td>
<td>Evaluation of the EU</td>
<td>Evaluation of the Carter Center</td>
<td>Evaluation of the SADC-PF</td>
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<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>Presidential and Parliamentary</td>
<td>&quot;Summit congratulates Malawi and South Africa for holding peaceful elections this year.&quot; (Final communiqué of the Summit held in Grand Baie, Mauritius, 16-17 August 2004)</td>
<td>Elections &quot;were organized and conducted fairly and in a professional and transparent manner.&quot; (Report of the AU Observer Team on the National and provincial elections in the Republic of South Africa, held on 14 April 2004)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>All elections subsequent to 1994 conducted peacefully with high levels of participation [...] and accepted by all as free and fair in their conduct and results</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>Presidential and Parliamentary</td>
<td>&quot;Summit congratulates Malawi and South Africa for holding peaceful elections this year.&quot; (Final communiqué of the Summit held in Grand Baie, Mauritius, 16-17 August 2004)</td>
<td>&quot;The conduct of the elections was free and peaceful. [...] The counting of the ballots was transparent and peaceful.&quot; (Report of the AU Observer Team on the Presidential and Parliamentary Elections in the Republic of Malawi held on 20th May 2004)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>&quot;Elections were conducted in a generally peaceful environment and provided a wide choice of political contestants.&quot;</td>
</tr>
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</table>

"Summit congratulates Malawi and South Africa for holding peaceful elections this year." (Final communiqué of the Summit held in Grand Baie, Mauritius, 16-17 August 2004)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Election</th>
<th>Evaluation of SADC</th>
<th>Evaluation of the AU</th>
<th>Evaluation of the EU</th>
<th>Evaluation of the Carter Center</th>
<th>Evaluation of the SADC-PF</th>
<th>Evaluation in the APRM reports</th>
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<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Botswana</td>
<td>Presidential and Parliamentary</td>
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<td>2004</td>
<td>Namibia</td>
<td>Presidential and Parliamentary</td>
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<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>Presidential and Parliamentary</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>&quot;Elections met most international and regional standards.&quot;</td>
<td>Recognize overall results</td>
<td>The electoral process had been conducted in a free, fair and transparent manner and in compliance with most of the regional norms and guidelines.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>Parliamentary</td>
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<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Mauritius</td>
<td>Parliamentary</td>
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<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>Presidential and Legislative</td>
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<td>Year</td>
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<td>Election</td>
<td>Evaluation of SADC</td>
<td>Evaluation of the AU</td>
<td>Evaluation of the EU</td>
<td>Evaluation of the Carter</td>
<td>Evaluation of the SADC-PF</td>
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<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>Referendum</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>&quot;Overall, the vote took place calmly and allowed the Congolese voters that came in great numbers to freely make their choice.&quot;*</td>
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<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>Presidential and Legislative</td>
<td>&quot;The Summit congratulated the people of the DRC for the peaceful and orderly manner in which they exercised their democratic right to vote.&quot; (Final communiqué of the Summit held in Maseru, Lesotho, 17-18 August 2006)</td>
<td>&quot;The elections of July 30, 2006, enabled the Congolese population to express itself in great numbers in a generally calm environment despite some tensions and imbalances observed throughout the campaign.&quot;**</td>
<td>OK but some procedural flaws</td>
<td>The election was a great success and took place in a peaceful, transparent and well- orderly atmosphere. In accordance with SADC regional electoral norms.***</td>
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* Translation from the French provided by the author.
Original in French: ‘Le vote s'est généralement déroulé dans le calme et a permis aux électeurs congolais, venus en nombre d'exprimer librement leur choix.’

** Translation from the French provided by the author.
Original in French: ‘Les scrutins du 30 juillet 2006 ont permis à la population congolaise de s'exprimer en nombre dans un climat généralement apaisé, en dépit des tensions et déséquilibres observés lors de la campagne.’

*** Translation from the French provided by the author.
Original in French: ‘Une élection qui a connu un grand succès et qui a eu lieu dans une atmosphère paisible, transparente et bien ordonnée. […] Conforme aux normes électorales régionales de la SADC.’
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<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Election</th>
<th>Evaluation of SADC</th>
<th>Evaluation of the AU</th>
<th>Evaluation of the EU</th>
<th>Evaluation of the Carter Center</th>
<th>Evaluation of the SADC-PF</th>
<th>Evaluation in the APRM reports</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>Presidential and Legislative</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>&quot;Generally well-administered elections demonstrate significant progress.&quot;</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>Legislative</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>Lesotho</td>
<td>Parliamentary</td>
<td>&quot;The Extraordinary Summit recalled that the Kingdom of Lesotho recently held successful, peaceful and democratic elections.&quot; (Final communique of the Extraordinary Summit held in Dar-Es-Salaam, United Republic of Tanzania, 28-29 March 2007)</td>
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</table>
Assessing ECOWAS and SADC commitment to democracy promotion

Consistently from 1998 until 2007, ECOWAS has covered more elections than SADC. Out of the forty-eight elections that took place in West Africa during this period, ECOWAS covered in one way or another twenty-two of them. In at least nineteen instances, ECOWAS physically sent some staff or some Elders to monitor the elections. Out of the twenty-seven elections that took place in Southern Africa during the same period, thirteen are mentioned in SADC records. However, this did not mean that SADC had sent election observation missions. In most instances, SADC congratulates the winner of the elections even though no SADC records indicate that observation missions were set up. What can account for the decision to monitor certain elections and not others?

Overall, there seems to be a trend in both regions to address the most contentious elections, thus explaining why the AU, the EU and the Carter Centre are also sending their own observers. Election observation in SADC countries that are deemed stable and democratic such as Mauritius or South Africa is not considered necessary neither by the regional organisation nor by the other election monitoring bodies. An initial conclusion of the comparison of these tables is that ECOWAS seems more committed to its democracy mandate than SADC, mainly because it seems more likely to send some staff to observe elections within its region. This first result should be mitigated by the fact that election monitoring is relatively new in both regional organisations with an Electoral Assistance Unit established in 2005 in ECOWAS and none existing in SADC. Nevertheless, both organisations started monitoring elections in an *ad hoc* manner with the trend becoming stronger within ECOWAS after 2001. There seems to be no real increased commitment within SADC throughout the years studied.
If ECOWAS monitors more elections, this does not necessarily mean that its reports on these elections are as critical as those of the Carter Centre or the European Union. Overall, both ECOWAS and SADC are not ready to criticise head on and publicly their fellow member states. This tendency is very clear in SADC notably with its staunch defence of successive elections in Zimbabwe that were considered by most foreign observers as neither free nor fair and the elections ‘did not operate in an open and transparent manner.’ (EU Election Observation Mission, 2000) SADC considered the Presidential elections of 2002 as ‘free, fair and democratic’ while the EU was not invited by Zimbabwe to observe the elections. (SADC, 28-29 March 2007) On the other hand, ECOWAS is slightly more critical than SADC. It is still however much more lenient on its member states than the EU or the Carter Center. The case of the elections in Nigeria in 2007 is of particular interest. The elections took place within the regional hegemonic state, i.e. the most significant contributor to ECOWAS and where the headquarters of ECOWAS are based. Most outside observers agree that the elections ‘fell far short of basic international and regional standards.’ (EU Election Observation Mission, 23 August 2007) ECOWAS deemed that the elections were relatively free and peaceful with serious logistic problems and sporadic violence and thuggery. (ECOWAS Observer Mission to Nigeria, 17 April 2007) It did also call for major electoral reforms. (ECOWAS Observer Mission to Nigeria, 24 April 2007) ECOWAS is walking a tight rope as it cannot criticise head on the Nigerian elections but it is also unwilling to give up completely its democratic mandate and does put forth some limited criticisms. In SADC, criticism of elections, in Zimbabwe for instance, is highly unlikely. In the latest developments in Zimbabwe, SADC has remained involved in the negotiations between the challenger Morgan Tsvangirai and President Mugabe, but without calling for Mugabe to step down
or even sharply criticising his handling of the crisis, with the notable exception of Botswana.62

Overall, ECOWAS is more committed, within reason, to its democratic mandate. This conclusion can be reached based on its commitment to send numerous electoral observers: 200 observers were sent in Nigeria in 2007 compared to the 66 long-term observers sent by the European Union. In the case of SADC, democracy has not trumped sovereignty and while election observation is part of its new mandate, criticising elections of a fellow member state still constitutes unacceptable interference. Since 1993 and its revised Treaty, ECOWAS seems more willing to consider a new understanding of sovereignty and this is again illustrated here by its approach vis-à-vis election monitoring. According to the fieldwork done here, many within ECOWAS are convinced that elections that go awry represent a security threat. (Boko interview, 6 May 2008, Thom interview, 10 June 2008, Musah interview, 30 August 2007) According to the President of the ECOWAS Commission, Dr. Chambas, the monitoring of elections is necessary because ‘when poorly or fraudulently managed, [they] often lead to crisis.’ (United Nations Security Council, 2003a, p.33) By sending election observation missions, ECOWAS hopes to bring stability and legitimacy to the elected Head of State. The presence of ECOWAS can be interpreted as a signal to would-be rebels that, if they are tempted to contest the elections by force, they would probably not find a base in a neighbouring country as ECOWAS as a whole gives its imprimatur to the new leader. Just as for their peace and security mandate, despite somewhat similar legal instruments, ECOWAS’ commitment towards its good governance and democracy mandate appears more serious and believable than that of SADC.

The reach and the scope of the change within ECOWAS and SADC differ. They more or less have the same reach to the extent that they both claim a security mandate that is almost all-encompassing and not limited to military affairs. The definition of their democracy mandate differs with SADC offering a much more restrictive interpretation of the notion. But the main difference lies in the scope of the change: change is much deeper within ECOWAS. For both regional organisations, their record as security organisations shows that implementation never goes as far as the legal instruments’ provision, which is not a surprising result. Beyond this commonality, ECOWAS has apparently had a partial change of heart while change, in SADC, has been merely cosmetic so far. There is a real desire to exercise leadership in its region with the caveat that, in order to do so, ECOWAS member states have to reconcile sometimes contradictory national interests and to address the recurring problem of capabilities. They are however working on becoming the leading security organisation in their region with the help of the P3 and the United Nations. This is also a partial change of heart because of the prudent way ECOWAS enforces its democracy mandate. The key for this partial success is that no ECOWAS member state holds on to a strict vision of sovereignty. The change is cosmetic in SADC because of its focus on sovereignty and the absence of common values. (Nathan, July 2004) This lack of consensus came to the fore most notably during the intervention in the DRC that split the regional organisation into two camps, a division they are still attempting to mend. Zimbabwe especially insists on the strict respect of sovereignty and, with Mugabe in power, there will be no breaking of the stalemate. With no consensus arising at the regional level, the UN takes the lead in the implementation
phase for Southern Africa. Overall, the differences previously noted throughout the history of both organisations persist in the adoption and the implementation of their new security and democracy mandate.

Now that these patterns of responses to conflicts have been established, this study will move on to assess which factor(s) can explain these results. First, marginalisation was relative as the United Nations did remain partly engaged in both regions. The main bone of contention, especially for West Africans, is the slow decision-making process within the UN that expresses its reluctance to intervene. Even when an intervention was ordered, it was often limited to Chapter VI operations and thus did not prevent massive losses of human life. This (justified) disillusionment with the UN and thus the marginalisation of West Africa can explain the creation of a regional security mechanism within ECOWAS. The UN was more involved in Southern Africa and thus the SADC mechanism played a lesser role. Second, the role of the regional hegemon was pivotal in the decision to implement the security and democracy mandates. But the followership differed in each region with the South African leadership being challenged by Zimbabwe. Finally, state weakness proved to have an indirect impact on the implementation record of ECOWAS and SADC as a cause of state collapse and of regional conflict and as a constraint on the regional organisation’s capabilities. Beyond this quick conclusion, the following chapter gathers all the explanatory variables outlined here and in the previous chapter to provide an explanation as to why regional security organisations emerged within ECOWAS and SADC.
CHAPTER 7

WHY DO REGIONAL SECURITY ORGANISATIONS EMERGE?

THE ROLE OF THE CONSTRAINED HEGEMON

The previous chapters have focused on the history of ECOWAS and SADC, on the precise form the institutional change towards a security and democracy mandate took and on their implementation record in these areas. Looking at and comparing past trends and the current evolution of both organisations provides a full overview of the issue at hand. The aim of this chapter is to extract out of this data a parsimonious explanation as to why ECOWAS and SADC emerged as security organisations with a democracy mandate. This broad theoretical enquiry was outlined in a series of questions: Why entrust a politically sensitive mandate to a failing organisation? What in the history of these organisations and of these regions can explain this shift? What drove the creation of these institutions in their specific form? How can we explain their qualified failure as economic communities? How significant is such a change in the life of these organisations? What type of security provisions have these regional organisations adopted and why? Are member states truly committed to these new functions of the regional organisation? To what extent has that change had an impact in practice? Are ECOWAS and SADC regional security organisations only on paper or are their member states ready and willing to commit troops and money to manage conflicts and to monitor elections in their region? Are there any new hypotheses generated from the study of these two African cases? In order to answer these questions, this chapter brings together the insights provided in the previous four
chapters to propose a parsimonious and convincing explanation to the puzzle studied here.

As this chapter is meant to reach the core of this comparative study of ECOWAS and SADC, a quick reminder of the methodology used here is necessary. First, ECOWAS and SADC are comparable units of analysis as they are both African regional organisations and security institutions as outlined in the introductory chapter. Second, the privileged methodological approach is Mill’s method of agreement. This method allows us to evaluate which independent variable(s) is or are common to both case studies despite different geopolitical environments. An independent variable constant over time and common to the two case studies despite differing geopolitical circumstances would be a good candidate to explain the transformation of the institutions in the 1990s.

Based on the list of potential factors that had first been outlined in the theoretical chapter (see chapter 2, table 2.2), this first part of the concluding chapter extracts from the analysis in chapters 3 and 4 a set of factors that proved dominant throughout the history of both institutions. We look to past trends to explain the present transformation. The historical comparative approach highlights the dominant factors (independent variables) that shaped the creation of SADC and ECOWAS under their specific institutional form and their rather dismal performance as economic organisations. Taking a long hard look at the creation of both institutions is important as a parallel can potentially be traced between the moment of creation and the moment of transformation that concretely meant the re-writing of the founding document of the institution. Factors that shaped the creation of ECOWAS and SADC can also play a role in their transformation. These factors should also be put in perspective by taking into consideration the international environment at
the time. It helps answer the question of whether these institutions have their own internal or regional logic or whether they change and fluctuate with Cold War politics or other external factors. This chronological approach also allows us to do a within case comparison at different periods of time and thus pinpoint where change comes from: from an exogenous shock such as the end of the Cold War or from an internal – regional – institutional logic?

The second step is to look at the present, be it the current legal texts that regulate the regional organisation or their implementation to explain the organisations’ decision in the 1990s to take on a new, broader mandate encompassing peace, security, and democracy. This section extracts the independent variables that shape the implementation record of both regional organisations and thus relies heavily on the data presented in chapters 5 and 6. This section takes the analysis a step further by highlighting which causal factor or set of causal factors can explain the content of the legal arsenal put in place and the performance of both regional organisations in the realm of security and democracy in the 1990s and early 2000s. Out of these comparisons throughout their history and their transformation, the third section brings together the results of the two previous sections to discover which factor or combination of factors best explain the transformation of ECOWAS and SADC in security organisations with an agenda of democratic governance.

A final concluding section elaborates on the insights of this study on regional hegemony in Africa. First, to solve the puzzle studied here, it proposes two hypotheses focusing on the role of the constrained regional hegemon. As mentioned earlier, this study is not only problem-driven but also aims at generating hypotheses to be tested in other cases. This concluding section also re-evaluates the relevance of international relations theory to
African politics and examines whether the critics of the Third World focused literature are indeed justified and useful in helping our understanding of the reality of African politics.

Finally, this chapter looks into the future and offers some insights on the prospects of ECOWAS and SADC as regional security organisations with a democracy and security mandate, on the future of peace in Africa considering the weakness of several African states, and proposes different possible areas of future research.

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**Looking at the past to explain the present**

This first section considers the question of where the institution comes from in order to explain where it is today. It thus raises the issue of path dependency. How much of the evolution towards security and democracy has been embedded and locked in at the creation of both institutions? Is the transformation within ECOWAS and SADC due to the internal institutional logic of each institution? This argument implicitly draws on the neofunctionalist approach of Haas and Schmitter that considers political integration as the ultimate aim of regionalism. (Haas, 1961, Schmitter, 1969) Or, to what extent is this a ‘natural’ institutional evolution or the result of shocks, be it regional or international shocks, that forced the institution to adapt itself to new external circumstances? It is in part to address these questions that a summary of the findings of the historical chapters 3 and 4 is presented here. Recapping why ECOWAS and SADC were created and why they failed as economic organisations will help highlight the driving forces behind each
in institution, thus allowing us to formulate an initial hypothesis as to which factors influenced their transformation.

The regional organisation as support for or balance against the regional hegemon

ECOWAS was created in 1975 for two reasons: because Nigeria wanted to create a region-wide organisation and because the Francophone countries found some economic as well as political interest justifying their alliance with Nigeria. These were the two necessary and sufficient conditions behind the creation of the regional organisation: a leader, in this case, the regional hegemon and a set of common interests binding the countries together. Two determining factors can explain the decision of Nigeria to push and campaign for the creation of ECOWAS. The bloody civil war in Biafra from 1967 to 1970 which threatened to break the country apart was in part sustained by its Francophone neighbours, especially Côte d’Ivoire. Nigeria, composed of a multiplicity of ethnic groups more or less tempted by secession, was always at risk of having one of its neighbours helping rebels or secessionist movements within its territory. To avoid future ‘Biafras,’ Nigeria had to mend its relations with its neighbours, i.e. to put right behind might. The idea behind ECOWAS was thus one of legitimising the position of Nigeria in the region and making it less threatening to its neighbours. (Hurrell, 1995b) The other determining factor for Nigeria was the Adedeji/Gowon team. The role of these individuals and the leadership they provided was key in moving the project forward and in bringing all member states to sign the 1975 founding treaty. Of course, Nigeria was not alone in this venture as Eyadema’s Togo played a pivotal role. (Boko interview, 6 May 2008) The other states decided to join in mainly for two reasons. It was economically interesting for them as Nigeria was a significant oil producer and the biggest market in
the region. An alliance with Nigeria was also a way to counterbalance the influence of France in the region. Finally, the attempt to create a region-wide organisation was facilitated by the emerging consciousness of the existence of a common pan-African identity following the fight for independence and in the footprints of some major African intellectuals such as Kwame N’Krumah of Ghana, Jomo Kenyatta of Kenya and Cheick Anta Diop of Senegal.

In short, while a liberal approach focusing on why states cooperate can partly explain the creation of ECOWAS, the onus should be put on the regional hegemon and the role it played because Nigeria was the country that launched the idea of ECOWAS and convinced its neighbours to sign on. Realism is, for now, the most parsimonious theory to make sense of the issue at stake. Without the regional hegemon taking the lead, there would have been no ECOWAS. However, this does not mean that concerns such as legitimacy or identity were overlooked at the time. They did facilitate the Nigerian project, but were not a sufficient condition for the establishment of ECOWAS. We find here the limits to a constructivist approach: there is always the need for an agent to tap into the existing values or common identities to actualise them into an institution. Constructivism overall neglects the issue of agency, provided here by the regional hegemon.

For its part, SADCC was created mainly for one purpose: to counter apartheid South Africa. The threat of a common enemy brought the Southern African countries together, first under the aegis of the FLS and then under SADCC. This corresponds to another possible understanding of the regional hegemon as an enemy for its neighbours to balance against. (Walt, 1987, Hurrell, 1995b) However, uniting against South Africa was not the
only thing that brought the SADCC countries together. They also had genuine economic interests in common and projects that could only be achieved through economic cooperation. The idea here was to put economic might behind their rightful combat against apartheid and against their economic dependence on South Africa – might behind right. As mentioned earlier in chapter 4 on SADC, some authors have proposed an alternative explanation to the creation of SADC. (Tostensen, 1982) Tostensen argued that the United States played a pivotal role in bringing the Southern African countries together. However, it is difficult to independently corroborate this alternative explanation.\textsuperscript{63} Even if it were true, this would only support a realist approach to the issue, albeit centred on the international level instead of the regional level. Beyond this question, the international level did play a role as financial support from the Nordic countries and the European Community proved to be crucial to an organisation that can be considered as a ‘forum essentially geared towards the capture and coordination of international aid to infrastructural projects.’ (Bach, 2005, p.141) Finally, just as in ECOWAS, concerns about the role of individuals and identity should not be excluded. Indeed, the FLS, the ‘mother’ organisation of SADCC was clearly based and relied on the personal relationship established between the presidents and leaders of the FLS countries. Furthermore, their common experience of settler colonialism and the solidarity ties they developed during their fight for independence persisted throughout the years as a strong background condition that facilitated the establishment of SADCC. Finally, it is also worth noting that a significant political development in the region triggered the establishment of SADCC as was the case in West Africa with the Biafran war. Albeit not of the same proportion as the Nigerian civil war, the independence of Zimbabwe did act as a catalyst in the region resulting in the establishment of SADCC. Zimbabwe proved to

be a strong supporter of SADCC.

Just as in ECOWAS, classical realism seems to put forth the most convincing scenario for the creation of SADCC. In both cases, the regional hegemon played a pivotal role. Whereas in the case of ECOWAS, the hegemon created the regional organisation in order to bolster and strengthen its position in the region, in the Southern African case, the regional organisation was created to balance against the regional hegemon. Similarly, the liberal argument that SADCC states shared some economic interests can be put forth as a complement to the realist explanation. The constructivist approach focusing on the existence of a common identity forged in the struggle against colonialism and apartheid, while not negligible, cannot be considered as a sufficient condition in the case of SADCC.

What comes out of the comparison of the creation of both regional organisations is that a classical realist explanation centred on the role of the regional hegemon is best to explain both cases. For both ECOWAS and SADC, identity can be considered as a background condition but it was not sufficient in itself to lead to the establishment of the regional organisations. Identity did help however in the negotiations and smoothed the process. It is also based on their rejection of apartheid and on their identity as independent black governments that Southern African leaders rejected the South African proposal of CONSAS (Constellation of Southern African States), even though joining CONSAS might have brought some economic gains. Finally, both regional organisations were established as a response to dramatic political events, the Biafran war in the case of West Africa and the independence of Zimbabwe in the case of Southern Africa.
Back to business as usual

At the time of the creation of both regional organisations, regional crises, whether the Biafran war or the independence of Zimbabwe had stirred the countries of West and Southern Africa into action. But once the founding treaties of the AROs were signed, in both cases, implementation was slow and countries went back to business as usual. The track record of both regional organisations for their economic projects was poor. In fact, business as usual meant that structural issues and problems that member states faced were also mirrored at the regional level and pervaded the work of the regional organisation. Priority was given to state-building and member states had little money left to spend on the regional organisation.

The core reason why ECOWAS was unable to take significant steps forward towards reaching its economic goals can be traced back to the fact that its member states privileged their own national economic interests at the expense of the regional project, a common feature in explaining slow growth of cooperation. This national or domestic priority was expressed in four different ways. First, member states were reluctant to cede their sovereignty to the regional organisation. Indeed, several states saw the signing of the treaty as a sign of goodwill and as a way to signal their position towards their neighbours. But implementation proved to be more demanding and more controversial. This reluctance to admit and embrace what the existence of ECOWAS implied for their sovereignty can be linked to the second way of expressing their priority towards domestic issues: as newly independent countries, the member states of ECOWAS focused on state building. Most of the countries of the region had made the transition from colony to independent state a mere fifteen years prior to the creation of ECOWAS. Governments’
control over their territory, administrative and fiscal reach and economic independence were limited at the time of the founding treaties of the AROs. Most of the regional leaders’ efforts were spent on these issues and on keeping their hold on power. Regional economic projects that could prove costly in the short term were not favoured by West African leaders. In fact, a third point is that the priority given to national issues and national interest led to a problem of relative gains: less developed states in the AROs considered that they were not getting enough in terms of redistribution, while the more developed states considered that they were paying too much. By deciding not to contribute fully to the Compensation Fund, the more developed states left the regional organisation with little resources to achieve its mandate. The relative gains problem was compounded by the lack of trust that predominated in the region. While the 1975 signature of the Lagos treaty was indeed a start towards mending bridges, the Francophone/Anglophone divide still remained very much alive.

Overall, a broader realist narrative focusing on the importance of national over regional interests can explain the poor economic performance of ECOWAS. However, this has to be mitigated by constructivist concerns and inputs from the Third World focused literature. Concerns for norms such as sovereignty were not pure rhetoric, but real and crucial for West African leaders for two reasons: because of their sometimes shaky hold on power and because of their dependence on foreign patrons, whether France or countries on different sides of the Cold War. Furthermore, priority given to state building over regional projects is a factor strongly highlighted by the Third World focused literature. (Ayoob, 1995) These inputs just fine-tune the overall realist explanation.

SADCC also faced a rather dismal economic performance. This poor track record can be
attributed to three factors that are quite similar to the ones just outlined for ECOWAS. In
Southern Africa as in West Africa, following the creation of the regional organisation,
member states decided to focus on their immediate national interests. Domestic priorities
were deliberately put forth as a justification for the states’ limited engagement in the
regional projects. Second, the poor economic performance of SADCC can also be directly
attributed to the destabilisation policy of South Africa that cost millions to Southern
African countries. Just like in West Africa, SADCC member states had also recently
achieved independence and many of them had just come out of bloody liberation wars.
This was notably the case for the former Portuguese colonies, Angola and Mozambique.
Sustaining such devastating losses at the hands of South Africa proved very difficult for
these already weak countries, and thus their attention was devoted to defending and
strengthening their own countries. This is of course linked to the third factor explaining
the ‘failure’ of SADCC: the weak institutional and financial capacities of its member
states carried over to the regional organisation thus making it dependent on external
funding from the West.

Overall, realism supplemented by the insights of Third World focused literature can
explain the first years of SADCC. The physical destruction of SADCC states by South
Africa and the concomitant importance of material interest dealt a severe blow to the
regional project. In other words, the SADCC case verifies the realist insistence on
material factors and national interest as explanatory factors. However, the weakness of
Southern African states also had an impact on the poor performance of SADCC. Just like
ECOWAS, member states prioritised building and strengthening their own states over the
regional project. Interestingly, lack of trust, a more constructivist concern even though the
issue is also present in the classical realist literature (Walt, 1987), did not seem to play in
SADCC the role that it did in ECOWAS.

Realism, as was the case for the creation of both organisations, seems to offer the most parsimonious guidelines to understand the first years of ECOWAS and SADCC. However, the regional hegemon’s role changed in subsequent years. In the case of ECOWAS, Nigeria faded in the background. But in Southern Africa, South Africa remained the pivotal state in region as its destabilisation policy had a significantly negative impact on the performance of the regional organisation. The realist argument focusing on the importance of national interest best explains the early years of both regional organisations. However, the analysis would not be complete without the input of the Third World focused literature that underlines the more structural problems both Southern and West African states have to face. In short, the weakness of states cannot but carry over to the regional organisations themselves, and this helps explain their poor implementation record.

What lessons can we draw from the past to shed light on the 1990s transformation?

What the historical comparison of ECOWAS and SADC teaches us is that particular attention should be paid to 1) the role of the regional hegemon; 2) the pervasive impact of state weakness on the regional organisation; 3) the importance of national interest; but also 4) the importance of norms and values such as trust, solidarity (pan-Africanism), legitimacy and sovereignty. It is interesting to note that the international level, especially the Cold War, had a limited impact on both regional organisations throughout their history. But the international level does provide a background that cannot be

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64 Lessons learned about the benefits from cooperation, either from pre- or post-colonial experience, while important, have been discarded at this stage of the analysis as this factor is more relevant to the West African experience and not so much to the Southern African one.
ignored. This does not necessarily disprove a structural realist approach, but shows that greater leeway and autonomy came with lack of interest of great powers. A final point worth noting is that the creation of both institutions seems to have been triggered by shocks, at the regional level and less because of Cold War politics. Path dependency can for now be set aside, but should not be completely excluded altogether as it did play a role at the minimum because there was not any other viable region-wide organisation that could take on a new mandate of security and democracy. (Fawcett, 2008a)

A summary of past findings can be tabulated as follows.\(^6^5\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INDEPENDENT VARIABLES (IV)</th>
<th>International Factors</th>
<th>Regional Factors</th>
<th>Domestic Factors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cold War politics</td>
<td>Role of great powers</td>
<td>Regional hegemon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Creation</td>
<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>LOW</td>
<td>MEDIUM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SADC</td>
<td>LOW</td>
<td>LOW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poor economic performance</td>
<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>MEDIUM</td>
<td>LOW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SADC</td>
<td>MEDIUM</td>
<td>LOW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hypothesis for transformation</td>
<td>MEDIUM</td>
<td>LOW</td>
<td>LOW</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE 7.1: Hypothesis as to which factor was predominant in the transformation of ECOWAS and SADC based on a comparative historical analysis

Looking at the present to explain the past

Were these factors predominant in the transformation of ECOWAS and SADC? This section focuses on the transition years and on the implementation record of the two new security organisations roughly defining the present era from 1990 until 2007 in order to

\(^6^5\) The great number of independent variables is explained by the fact that this study is testing hypotheses of different schools of thought of international relations. Of course, the HIGH/LOW measurement is subjective but is based on the data provided in previous chapters.
understand why SADC and ECOWAS decided to take on their security and democracy mandate in the early 1990s. It thus looks at the present to explain the past. This chronological approach provides another stepping stone for the within case comparison performed here. At first sight, the quick overview of the transformation of ECOWAS and SADC presented in chapters 3 and 4 seems to corroborate the emphasis on the regional hegemon, the importance of common interest and the structural impact of state weakness. By bringing together the results outlined in chapter 5, this section helps highlight the driving forces behind each institution in recent years, thus allowing us to make a second attempt at identifying which factors influenced their transformation. The early years of ECOWAS and SADC as security and democracy organisations demonstrate that two other sets of factors should not be neglected: trust and common values, a constructivist argument and the persisting relevance of the international level, a structural realist argument.

**The need for a common response**

The transformation of ECOWAS was not the story of a slow spillover, as per neofunctionalism, but that of a sudden change following the Liberian civil war. Just like the Biafran war, change was triggered by an external shock, a war to be more precise, thus following a realist logic. (Gilpin, 1983) However, this realist logic also has to take into account what the Third World focused literature has to bring to the analysis with its emphasis on state weakness. Third World focused literature points out that state weakness can lead to state collapse and civil war. This notably explains the fact that it was an intra-state war in Liberia and not an interstate war that triggered change within ECOWAS. The development of the Liberian civil war called for a reaction and we can account for the fact
that it was ECOWAS – and not the African Union or the United Nations – that responded to this security crisis based on the following three factors: the regional hegemon, Nigeria, was ready to foot the bill and field soldiers, member states had a common interest in avoiding a spillover of the conflict\textsuperscript{66} and, due to the end of the Cold War, West Africa was marginalised from the international community’s core concerns and the UN was not ready to intervene. Finally, the precise unfolding of the events and the decision to intervene highlights the role of specific individuals such as Salim Ahmed Salim, the Secretary-General of the OAU and Yakubu Gowon, among other West African elders.

Within SADC, the catalyst that led to change at the regional level was the end of apartheid, a turning point that was itself linked to the end of the Cold War. Two other regional shocks later led to the adoption and formalisation of a new security and democracy mandate, namely the interventions in Lesotho and in the DRC in 1998 and 1999. While the global scene with the end of the Cold War did play a role in the transformation of SADC, the regional level remains predominant. An important trigger was civil wars in the region that illustrated the need for a mechanism to manage regional security crises. This need was met under the leadership of the regional hegemon that also played a key role in the reform of the regional organisation. Beyond these commonalities that correspond to the independent variables that were deducted from the comparative historical analysis, a unique feature of the transformation of SADC is the role played by identity, solidarity and the need for ‘big brother’ South Africa to legitimise its claim to hegemony. The tense relations between South Africa and Zimbabwe are only the most

\textsuperscript{66} It is sometimes problematic to explain outcomes merely by citing the existence of a common interest. Interest-based explanations are often incomplete and fail to explain the specific design of an agreement. Other variables, such as the ability to build coalitions and the need for mediators, intervene to make an agreement possible. Interests are broad parameters but not imperatives that inevitably produce an agreement. IKENBERRY, J. G. (1993) Creating Yesterday's New World Order: Keynesian "New Thinking" and the Anglo American Postwar Settlement. IN GOLDSTEIN, J. & KEOHANE, R. O. (Eds.) Ideas and foreign policy: beliefs, institutions, and political change Ithaca, Cornell University Press.
obvious expression of the general lack of trust existing between most Southern African countries and South Africa. This lack of trust is key in understanding the difficult emergence of a common security agenda. This ‘absence of common values’ (Nathan, July 2004) should be read in correlation with an analysis focusing on the role of individual leaders. Indeed, the tense relations between Mandela, and later Mbeki, and Robert Mugabe are also another reinforcing factor for the argument that lack of trust played a key role in the slow development of the SADC security mandate. The difference in speed of the development of the regional mandate is an indication of the degree of cohesion within the region. While cohesion was lesser in Southern Africa, the regional organisation remained important in managing relations. The role that norms and identity play in the Southern African region should remain prominent in our mind to gain a fuller understanding of prevailing regional dynamics.

Three potential factors are most apposite to explain why ECOWAS and SADC evolved to have the security roles that they did: the end of the Cold War that indirectly led to state collapse, a combination of a structural realist and of Third World focused literature argument, the leadership of the regional hegemon, a classical realist argument and the contributing role of trust and common values, a constructivist argument. This latter factor is the one that stands out from the analysis of the legal texts.

In both cases, the end of the Cold War, a major structural change in the neorealist Waltzian sense of the term, led to the marginalisation of Africa. Disengagement of the USSR and of the P3 concretely meant that these states were highly unlikely to intervene financially or militarily to prop up a client regime. Indirectly, this contributed to the state collapse in Liberia and the DRC. Within SADC, it also indirectly facilitated the end of
apartheid. The realist argument that war is behind change within international relations is justified here. However, the Third World focused literature amends this statement by conveying the idea that transformational power of war can also be associated to intra-state conflict, as was the case in Liberia and the DRC. Overall, the international level and the end of the Cold War had an indirect impact on the transformation of ECOWAS and SADC and represent a necessary but not sufficient condition for their institutional change. In both cases, instances of state collapse served as a catalyst for the adoption of a new security mandate. The other two factors that both cases have in common are the role of the regional hegemon and that of trust and common values. This suggests that a security agenda cannot be put in place without the involvement of the regional hegemon. But what the regional hegemon can do is constrained by the acceptance of its leadership by its neighbours. This accounts for the differing evolution within ECOWAS and SADC. In both instances throughout the 1990s, most West and Southern African countries were suspicious of their respective regional hegemons. The key here is how each country addressed this latent hostility. Nigeria proved on the ground that it was ready to sustain severe financial loss and casualties to achieve regional peace and stability. It proved to other West African leaders that they could trust the engagement of Nigeria within ECOWAS. This was not demonstrated by South Africa throughout the 1990s. On the contrary, South Africa mainly sent troops for peacekeeping missions through the OAU/African Union and the United Nations, outside SADC. The lack of trust and the absence of common values inherited from the apartheid era persisted. South Africa was notably unpopular because it appeared inconsistent as it sent troops to Lesotho or Burundi but not to the DRC, for instance. Its neighbours are also suspicious of South Africa putting the AU and the NEPAD agenda before SADC. This again had an impact on the speed of transformation within SADC.
While it is difficult to discern the ultimate motives of the member states in signing a treaty or a protocol, what the analysis of the legal texts can indicate is which values members consider important. The answer in one word is sovereignty. Throughout their legal texts, SADC and ECOWAS exhibit two different views of sovereignty. SADC’s concern for a strict respect of sovereignty can be seen throughout its legal texts, notably in the preamble of the 2001 Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation mentioning the ‘strict respect for sovereignty.’ Even the SADC Protocol on democracy was drafted in such a way that it reduced the interference potential of election monitoring with national law prevailing in the case of contested elections. This respect for the sovereignty of member states is also reflected in the limited tools of enforcement granted to the SADC Secretariat. The contrast with ECOWAS could not be starker. While equal sovereignty of states and non-interference are indeed mentioned in its legal texts, ECOWAS member states declared in their 1993 revised treaty that they would be open to supranationality, introducing a two-thirds majority vote and entrusting greater powers to the Secretariat. Member states most notably agreed to set aside a community levy that would directly finance the work of ECOWAS. ECOWAS and SADC had to choose between two values: respect for sovereignty and the maintenance of security in the case of intrastate conflict. Their answer differed in substance, if not radically in form.

As an aside here, one might ask why ECOWAS and SADC have such diverging points of view on sovereignty. While this would warrant a full individual study by itself, we can propose three potential explanations. First, West and Southern Africa did not share the same colonial history. That statement is particularly valid for the Francophone countries that were gathered into a federation in West Africa. Even after independence, some of
them kept their currency pegged on the French franc. Because of this experience, they might not have such a rigid definition of sovereignty and might see it more as layers that could be shed and shared. Second, Southern Africa went through a longer, more violent and gruesome struggle for independence than West Africa. Independence cost Southern African states dearly and they are less ready to tamper with their newly acquired sovereignty. Finally, and returning to a common theme, the acceptance of (partial) supranationality by ECOWAS member states suggests a greater amount of trust between member states than exists within SADC. While there might not necessarily be more commonalities between ECOWAS states, notably because of the Francophone/Anglophone divide, there are at least less obvious hostilities as no West African conflict has reached the intensity of the different wars in Southern Africa.

In short, the different steps of the transformation of ECOWAS and SADC and the analysis of their new mandate point to the significance of the following factors: the end of the Cold War and the increasing marginalisation of Africa as a background condition, a neo-realist argument; instances of state collapse that made the need to adopt a security mandate even more urgent – at this point, the insights of neo-liberal institutionalism with the need for a common institutional approach to deal with common problems and of the Third World focused literature prove useful (David, 1998, Herbst, 1997, Zartman, 1995); the importance of trust and norms in the shaping of the new mandate and finally, the pivotal role of the regional hegemon, sometimes helped, sometimes constrained by charismatic individual leaders.
Implementation: revealing states’ ulterior motives

The analysis of the implementation records of ECOWAS and SADC in chapter 6 allowed us to discover the greater commitment of ECOWAS to both its security and democracy mandate compared to SADC by looking at how much financial means, diplomatic efforts and military personnel ECOWAS member states were ready to commit compared to their SADC counterparts. ECOWAS as a whole proved much more likely to intervene militarily and remain involved at length than SADC, which preferred ‘quiet diplomacy’ and a soft approach to issues. ECOWAS has established itself as the default forum for peace and security issues in the region with a working collaboration with the UN, but also with the P3, most notably France and the United Kingdom. For SADC, the UN has taken the leadership in crisis management for the region. In terms of the democracy and good governance mandate, while ECOWAS seems at first sight more involved, the difference between the two regional organisations is not so drastic. During the 2007 Nigerian presidential elections, the ECOWAS assessment stands mid-way between the very critical stance adopted by the EU and the absolving assessment made by SADC in the case of Zimbabwe during the 2002 elections. But this apparently greater commitment of ECOWAS towards democracy should be mitigated by the fact that elections are perceived as dangerous periods that could bring further unrest and violence to a country. Election monitoring, more than being about promoting democracy, means ensuring that the conduct of the elections and the results are convincing enough to be accepted by the population. (Boko interview, 6 May 2008) From these results, we can then surmise a factor or set of factors can explain the track record of both organisations in the domain of peace and security and democracy. The independent variables that appear to matter include: the involvement of the international community, namely the UN or the P3, the
role of the regional hegemon and how it overcomes the constraints it is facing, be it the lack of trust or state weakness that negatively impacts the capabilities of the regional organisation, and finally, the role of individual leaders.

The most significant result from the analysis of the implementation record – compared to the previous historical analyses – is that the international level is not just a background against which the crises in West and Southern Africa unfold. International actors, namely the UN and the P3, play a crucial role in both regions in explaining the success or the failure of the implementation of the democracy and security mandate. The United Nations has had long peacekeeping operations that involved a large number of troops in both West and Southern Africa. France, the UK and the US are indeed reluctant to send troops with the notable exception of the UK in Sierra Leone in 2000 and in France in Côte d’Ivoire in 2002. Nevertheless, France still has up to 12,000 troops prepositioned in Africa and the US now has close to 2,000 troops in Djibouti. Far from abandoning the continent, the P3 prefer to remain involved at the multilateral level as members of the UN Security Council which decides to send peacekeeping operations and as supporters and trainers for African peacekeeping efforts and initiatives. But the global-regional relationship differs between these two different sub-regions of Africa. Within West Africa, ECOWAS and the UN have established a partnership that entails burden-sharing between the two institutions and ECOWAS acting as a first responder. Another dynamic prevails within Southern Africa with the UN bearing the brunt of the military interventions and of the peacekeeping, most notably in Mozambique, Angola and the DRC. SADC, in other words, plays a lesser role in its sub-region than ECOWAS does in its region. Regional intervention occurs more often in a region where there is less of a UN presence. This

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dynamic is also self-reinforcing. Once a sub-region, like ECOWAS, starts to implement its own mechanism, outside bodies are usually slower to respond as they know there are local fire-fighters.

Another key factor explaining the implementation record of ECOWAS and SADC is the role of the regional hegemon and how it addresses the constraints to its action. In both cases, due to the very nature of their relationship with their neighbours, the actions of Nigeria and South Africa have always been considered with suspicion. The key in explaining the implementation record of ECOWAS and SADC is not whether the regional hegemon wanted to intervene but rather whether it was ready to make the sacrifice that would convince its neighbours of the seriousness of its commitment. These sacrifices were made, both in cash and in casualties, by Nigeria during the Liberian war. On the other hand, South Africa is perceived as having privileged the continental and global level at the expense of the regional one with its African renaissance agenda, its insistence on NEPAD and the APRM. Economically, the negotiation of a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with the European Union in 2000 also worried its neighbours and was interpreted as South Africa turning to the West at the expense of its Southern African neighbours. This did not help South Africa in gaining the trust of its neighbours. While Nigeria has at least partially been able to do this, it is facing another set of constraints linked to state weakness, as its own limited capabilities and that of its neighbours negatively impact the capabilities of ECOWAS itself. Overall, the realist argument that the most parsimonious explanation should focus on the power of the regional hegemon remains true for the implementation of the security mandate. But this hegemony is constrained by different factors such as lack of trust, an argument put forth by constructivists and state weakness, an input from the Third World focused literature.
A final third potential factor that plays an important role if one wants to understand the implementation record of ECOWAS and SADC in terms of their democracy and security mandates is the leadership that key individuals have demonstrated in times of crisis. This is especially true of the leaders of the regional hegemonic states who, if they demonstrate strong leadership, can win over other leaders to their position. Quantifying such a factor is of course very difficult, but the role of individual leaders and the personal relations between leaders, whether amicable or not, has been repeatedly mentioned as crucial throughout the fieldwork interviews. Much of the regional decision-making takes place at closed summits between Heads of States and Governments and personality and charisma can definitely be a tipping factor. This is not only true for Southern Africa, but is also the case for West Africa with, for instance, General Diarra, the first Deputy Executive Secretary for Politics, Defence and Security, having a decisive impact on the establishment of the ECOWAS Standby Force. (Thom interview, 10 June 2008, Casanova interview, 28 May 2008) International Relations in general shows a bias towards studying institutions as they are deemed to be the most persistent actors on the international scene. However, the low and recent levels of institutionalisation in African regional organisations point to the fact that individuals play a bigger role than in other settings. This is also one of the reasons behind the difference between ECOWAS and SADC, as no charismatic leader has stood out within the SADC Secretariat.

What lessons can we draw from the most recent years of ECOWAS and SADC?

What we learn from the comparison of the implementation record of ECOWAS and SADC is that key factors explaining their record from 1992 and 2007 include 1) the role
of the regional hegemon; 2) the importance of the international level, more specifically the UN and the P3; 3) the importance of norms and values such as sovereignty and trust; and 4) the impact of state weakness on the regional organisations. The most striking lesson learnt from these implementation years is that the international level, as demonstrated by the arguments of structural realism and realism, cannot be written off. Despite the end of the Cold War and the marginalisation of Africa, a closer look at the role of great powers, by themselves or as part of the UN, shows that their impact on the security of West and Southern Africa is still significant as the presence of tens of thousands of UN peacekeepers demonstrates. The main constant factor, however, is the role of the regional hegemon. However, this realist approach has to be tempered by other concerns such as state weakness and the importance of trust to successfully implement a security mandate.

A summary of the most recent findings can be tabulated as follows:

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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1990s and mandate</th>
<th>Implementation record</th>
<th>Hypothesis for transformation</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>INDEPENDENT VARIABLES (IV)</strong></td>
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<td><strong>International Factors</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Cold War politics</strong></td>
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<td>MEDIUM</td>
<td>MEDIUM</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Role of great powers</strong></td>
<td>LOW</td>
<td>LOW</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Role of continental players</strong></td>
<td>HIGH</td>
<td>HIGH</td>
<td>HIGH</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Regional Hegemon</strong></td>
<td>HIGH</td>
<td>HIGH</td>
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<td><strong>Common Interest</strong></td>
<td>MEDIUM</td>
<td>MEDIUM</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Common Identity</strong></td>
<td>HIGH</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Role of individual leaders</strong></td>
<td>MEDIUM</td>
<td>MEDIUM</td>
<td>MEDIUM</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Democratic nature of the state</strong></td>
<td>LOW</td>
<td>LOW</td>
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<td><strong>State weakness</strong></td>
<td>HIGH</td>
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<td><strong>Hypothesis for transformation</strong></td>
<td>LOW</td>
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<td><strong>Mandate</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Implementation record</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Hypothesis for transformation</strong></td>
<td>HIGH</td>
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TABLE 7.2: Hypothesis as to which factor was predominant in the transformation of ECOWAS and SADC based on a comparative analysis of their mandate and implementation record
Re-evaluating the explanatory factors

The approach adopted here argues that decisions are taken neither in a geographical vacuum – i.e. developments occurring in other regions or in the rest of the world have an impact on the regions examined – nor in a historical vacuum as past and continuing institutional developments and regional dynamics can all shed some light on why ECOWAS and SADC transformed themselves into security organisations with an agenda of democratic governance. The past sections have extracted those factors that were key in explaining first the early years of both institutions, roughly from their creation until 1990, and the later years of the regional organisation when they started tackling security and democracy issues, with or without the legal mandate to do so, from 1990 until 2007. It is worth repeating here again that Mill’s method of agreement is privileged as the study focuses on the factors common to both ECOWAS and SADC despite their differing historical paths. Before articulating a parsimonious hypothesis explaining the phenomenon at hand, this section walks through every potential factor and attempts to weigh its respective role and importance in the changes we have described throughout this study.

The international level as backdrop

Are realists and neorealists correct when they argue that the most parsimonious explanation can be found in an analysis of the structure of global politics and of the role of major powers, be it at the global level or at the continental level?

The first specific argument outlined in chapter 2 was that change in ECOWAS and SADC
was caused by the end of the Cold War. This is only partially and indirectly true. The end of the Cold War very concretely meant two things. In case of flare-ups of violence, neither bipolar power would intervene. But, at the same time, it was also an opportunity for other actors, be it the UN or African states, to go to the roots of the conflict and address the belligerents’ grievances and ambitions. The end of the Cold War also had an indirect impact on the West and Southern African regions. The disengagement of Cold War powers meant it stopped propping up weak and, more often than not, brutal and dictatorial leaders of African countries. The end of the Cold War led eventually to the collapse of Mobutu and contributed to the Liberian conflict as the US withdrew its support to the Doe regime. It exposed the weakness of numerous African states where the lack of legitimacy of the regime was previously mitigated by the financial and military support of external powers. Take away the Swiss bank accounts and the weapons, the dictator falls, often leading its country to civil war in the process. The end of the Cold War thus indirectly contributed to the eruption of crises that none of the external powers were ready to quell. It left the field wide open for others to step in. Overall, the end of the Cold War provided the background to the change witnessed in ECOWAS and SADC. It did not cause the change as proven by the fact that other regions in Africa experienced similar background conditions but did not evolve in the same way as SADC or ECOWAS. It presented a window of opportunity for different actors, but did not choose these actors or dictate in any way how they would address the problems arising. The end of the Cold War was therefore a necessary but not a sufficient condition to explain the transformation of ECOWAS and SADC.

The argument that Africa has been marginalised since the end of the Cold War has to be mitigated by an analysis of the foreign policy of the P3 and by an analysis of the role of
the United Nations. A structural realist approach would argue that ECOWAS and SADC took on a peace, security and democracy mandate because the P3 exerted pressure on them to do so. This was not the case. In the post-Cold War era, the expression ‘constructive disengagement’ summarises best the approach of the P3: they have been unwilling to send troops – France being somewhat of a historical exception –, but have proved willing to remain partly engaged via their peacekeeping training programs and the United Nations. The UN’s involvement in African conflicts has had some highs and lows throughout the 1990s and 2000s, both in terms of its presence on the ground and in terms of performance. But the constant presence and the leadership of the UN in the Southern African region prove that it is a factor to be considered.

What can we learn of the relationship between the United Nations and the two regional organisations? Did the UN push for ECOWAS and SADC to take on part of its burden? Overall, the UN has been more reactive than proactive and has been trying to come to terms with the new peacekeeping reality that arose and developed in Africa with, for instance, retroactive approvals of interventions by the Security Council such as the ones in Liberia and Sierra Leone. With the first intervention in Iraq and later on the Somali debacle, the UN was throughout the early 1990s less likely to send peacekeeping troops in Africa, most notably because of the reluctance of the P5. The cooperation phase started in 1993 with the invitation by the Security Council to regional organisations to study ways of strengthening their functions of peace and security. (Graham and Felicio, 2006, p.64) This was then followed by a series of six high-level meetings from 1994 to 2005 with the first four meetings focusing on conflict prevention and the last two held in

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2003 and 2005 (United Nations, 2005) taking into account the changed security environment and introducing some procedural innovations, even though implementation of these decisions have lagged behind.\(^6\) (Graham and Felicio, 2006, p.65) It was only in 2005 that the first concrete steps were taken to establish a ‘regional-global security mechanism.’ The OAU, and later the AU, participated in all the meetings, ECOWAS in four of them and SADC in only two. (Graham and Felicio, 2006, p.69) Following these high-level meetings devoted to developing a framework of cooperation between the UN and the regional organisations, the Security Council also started convening meetings with regional organisations: a closed counter-terrorism meeting in March 2003 (United Nations Security Council, 2003b), one open meeting in April 2003 (United Nations Security Council, 2003a), and a thematic debate in July 2004. (United Nations Security Council, 2004) Overall, this quick overview of the regional-global relationship shows that some joint peacekeeping missions were slowly being put together, for instance in Sierra Leone in 1997 (ECOWAS/UNOMSIL), in Côte d’Ivoire in 2002 (ECOFORCE/Licorne/MINUCI) or in Darfur with the African Union more recently. However, there is still no clear framework of cooperation and most joint-interventions are organised on an ad-hoc basis. Furthermore, the UN has stronger ties with the AU and its predecessor the OAU, which was a General Assembly general observer from 1965 onwards (S/RES/199, 30 December 1964), while ECOWAS and SADC were only granted observer status in 2004. (Graham and Felicio, 2006, p.135) It is worth noting that ‘ECOWAS has one of the closest relationships with the UN of all sub-regional agencies, in or outside Africa, having regularly briefed the Council in its own right.’ (Graham and Felicio, 2006, pp.159-160) Ties between the UN, ECOWAS and SADC do exist but are

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\(^6\) The United Nations has recently had some difficulties in filling the position of Chief of the Unit for Cooperation with Regional Organisations.
recent. In other words, these ties followed but did not lead the transformation of ECOWAS and SADC. However, any subsequent analysis of these two institutions as security organisations will have to take into account their budding relationship with the AU and the UN.

This now leaves us to investigate the role of the P3. While direct pressure from the US, the UK or France is difficult to trace, all three countries, and most clearly France and the US, had been signalling that 1) they were not ready to send troops during an African crisis, and 2) they were ready to provide training, financial and logistical support to African peacekeepers. This was notably made explicit by the 1997 launch of RECAMP and ACRI, but also by the unfolding of the crises in West Africa with financial and logistical support being sporadically provided by the P3. The involvement of the P3 in the Southern African region is less obvious but peacekeeping training, notably via the UK, was also offered to Southern African states. The role of the P3 and the ‘friendly nudge’ or inducement pushing ECOWAS and SADC to find ‘African solutions to African problems,’ while important, was not the determining factor in the transformation of the regional organisations as a counterfactual analysis clearly shows. The ‘constructive disengagement’ policy of the P3 and their advocacy and support of ‘African solutions to African problems’ did not lead to a proliferation of security organisations throughout the African continent in the 1990s. Strikingly, ECCAS and IGAD only started thinking about security issues in the early 2000s after the transformation of the OAU in the AU.

If neither the P3 nor the UN were the main causal factors behind the transformation of ECOWAS and SADC, what about the continental players? Did they cause the change in these two regional organisations? The first difficulty that we run into for this argument is
the problem of identifying the continental players. We can do so by considering the
debates within the African Union and the role of specific countries in its transformation
and in the launch of NEPAD. (Haggis, forthcoming 2009) Most analysts agree on the
following five major continental powers: Libya, Egypt, Kenya, South Africa and Nigeria.
(Murithi, 2005, Haggis, forthcoming 2009) However, this list illustrates the limits of a
level of analysis approach as the key continental players are also the key regional players.
Nigeria and South Africa, major powers at both levels, can decide to pursue their foreign
policy in both arenas. They even have ambitions of joining the UN Security Council. We
will explore later on in details the role of Nigeria and South Africa in their respective
regions. It is worth noting here, however, that there is a difference in approach between
the two powers as Nigeria seems to privilege ECOWAS as its forum of choice, while
South Africa prefers playing at the continental level within the AU, NEPAD and the
APRM. South Africa notably participated in the first AU peacekeeping mission in
Burundi as the lead nation. (Adebajo, 2000, Nathan, 2005) Overall, the historical analysis
has not been able to provide any substance to the idea that the other major continental
powers, namely Libya, Egypt and Kenya, had any influence on the developments of
ECOWAS and SADC. What about the African Union? Again, there seems to be a
common trend between all organisations towards a security and democracy mandate. But
a common trend does not establish causality. On the contrary, the AU could have
perceived the emergence of other security mechanisms during the 1990s as a threat and
competition to its own attempts with the 1993 OAU Mechanism for Conflict Prevention,
Management and Resolution and could have attempted to discourage it before, later on,
co-opting it and using it as blocks for its African Standby Force. (Obasanjo and Mosha,
1993) Or, it could have perceived the emergence of other security mechanisms as
potential grounds for collaboration. On balance, we cannot establish a direct causal link
between developments within the AU and the transformation of ECOWAS and SADC. Nevertheless, debates on security issues within the AU did inform and influence the debates within West and Southern Africa. For instance, the OAU invited the International Peace Academy (IPA) in 1994 to study and devise recommendations for the transformation of the continent’s security architecture. IPA presented its findings to both ECOWAS and the OAU. Based on this evidence, the OAU and IPA might have influenced the changes in ECOWAS notably by presenting policy proposals that shaped the language of cooperation. (Vogt interview, 25 June 2008) However, Nigeria and South Africa, as both continental and regional players, are a much more likely cause of change.

The regional level

This study quite logically highlights the importance of the regional level since the object of the research is regional organisations. But just like at the international level, different factors can be privileged, be they the role of the regional hegemon, which denotes an interest in material factors, the existence of common security interests that bring together member states or the existence of common values, norms and identity.

The main insight from the three previous chapters is that, at every single step of the way, the role of the regional hegemon has been pivotal either as an obstacle or as the engine behind the regional process. A closer look at the material capabilities of Nigeria and South Africa with respect to their neighbours is a strong demonstration of their status as (potential) regional hegemons. A realist approach to hegemony highlights the importance of material factors, whether neorealism (Layne, 1993, Mearsheimer, 2001), theories of hegemonic stability (Gilpin, 1983, Keohane, 1980, Keohane, 1984, Kindleberger, 1981,

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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Nigeria</th>
<th>Rest of ECOWAS</th>
<th>South Africa</th>
<th>Rest of SADC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Superficy (km²)</td>
<td>923,768</td>
<td>4,189,135</td>
<td>1,219,912</td>
<td>8,663,047</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population (in millions)</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>132.7</td>
<td>43.8</td>
<td>206.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP (in billions USD 2006)</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>69.09</td>
<td>255</td>
<td>112.55</td>
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<tr>
<td>Human Development Index (average in 2005)</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td>0.458</td>
<td>0.674</td>
<td>0.525</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Capabilities (active personnel in 2008)</td>
<td>80,000</td>
<td>117,370</td>
<td>62,334</td>
<td>362,784</td>
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<tr>
<td>Defence budget (in millions USD 2008)</td>
<td>768</td>
<td>915.7</td>
<td>3510</td>
<td>3,198</td>
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</table>

TABLE 7.3: Nigeria and South Africa as regional hegemon: comparing their weight with that of the rest of ECOWAS and SADC

From the table above, the asymmetry in power between Nigeria and its ECOWAS neighbours and between South African and its SADC neighbours is clear, in terms of population, GDP – the Human Development Index being another way to measure a country’s prosperity, and in terms of military capabilities. They are thus without a doubt regional powers. But, as mentioned earlier in Chapter 2, regional hegemony is defined by the type of relationship between the regional power and its neighbours. Indeed, one of the main problems with the realist approaches is that most of them assume a certain degree of automaticity between unequal distribution of power and hegemony. What is often lacking is an explanation as to when a potential hegemon adopts a hegemonic role. (Prys, 2007)

This is where a liberal understanding of hegemony might prove useful as the core feature of the liberal literature on hegemony is its focus on the followership of secondary states.

For a country to lead, it needs other countries to follow its lead. (Ruggie, 1992, Ikenberry, 2001, Triepel, 1938) The argument advanced here is that while it is true that there would
be no security or democracy mandate within ECOWAS or SADC without the active participation and leadership of Nigeria and South Africa, for the mandate to be efficient, other states must follow the hegemon’s lead.

An analysis of the other regional and domestic factors is thus warranted in order to understand under what circumstances and how Nigeria and South Africa exercise their hegemonic leadership. Indeed, while no transformation of ECOWAS and SADC would have been possible without Nigeria or South Africa, a simple convergence of national interests is also a possibly convincing explanation. That is, all states perceive the creation of a regional security organisation as being in their national interests. The necessity for all member states to approve of the new security arrangement is key as the whole purpose of the regional security organisation would be defeated if one country withholds consent. Common security interests rest on a common perception of threats and the analysis of the legal texts agreed on within ECOWAS and SADC demonstrates that member states have indeed subscribed to a common definition of security that is broad and encompasses several aspects, including the control of light weapons for instance. The fact that member states face the same type of threats has played a significant role in the adoption of the security protocol. But sharing a common interest is no guarantee that an agreement will be reached. (Ikenberry, 1993) Here the concept of agency is crucial as individual Heads of State, policy experts or even norm entrepreneurs are needed to create momentum to hammer out an agreement. In fact, neoliberal institutionalists would argue that the existence of the regional organisation allows for a way to overcome problems of collective action, incomplete or asymmetrical information, high transaction costs, enforcement problems, and other barriers to Pareto efficiency and welfare improvement for their members, thus making the outcome of a successful agreement more likely.
(Barnett and Finnemore, 1999) ECOWAS was indeed the forum around which all gathered, be it President Obasanjo of Nigeria, President Eyadema of Togo, the ECOWAS Secretariat and policy experts. The analysis of the implementation of the protocols proved that this was not the case for SADC due to the sensitivity to security issues, the intervention in the DRC being a case in point as it split the regional organisation in two. Furthermore, reciprocity was possible within ECOWAS. The major regional actors de facto agreed that if an intervention is possible in Liberia then it should also be possible in Côte d’Ivoire – with the sometimes violent unrest in Nigeria and the insurrection in the Casamance region of Senegal being the only conflicts that were out of bounds. Overall, the liberal argument is of rather limited use as it explains better one case than the other. ECOWAS has been able to actualize its shared interest, while SADC was barely able to move beyond the paper phase. This leads to the broader question of how national interests are constituted.

Maybe ECOWAS and SADC perceived the establishment of a security organisation as being in their common interest because they share common values, norms and identity. There were widespread debates throughout the 1990s in Africa about issues such as security, stability or humanitarian intervention. These issues were discussed over and over in venues such as the CSSDCA (Conference on Security, Stability, Development, and Co-operation in Africa) (Obasanjo and Mosha, 1993), the Kampala Forum, the Africa Leadership Forum (Zartman and Deng, 2002) or within IPA that was acting as a consultant to the OAU, (Vogt interview, 25 June 2008) etc. The ideas and the different norm entrepreneurs found in these fora did influence the perception of their interest by ECOWAS and SADC member states. This constructivist argument is however also

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70 These exceptional cases can be explained by the fact that these two strongest states in the region will not welcome interference in their internal affairs.
limited because, while it is successful in explaining the differing implementation records of ECOWAS and SADC, it does not successfully explain why ECOWAS and SADC were transformed in the first place. The lack of common values within SADC, the strict respect for sovereignty and the respect earned by Mugabe from the liberation struggle are serious impediments to the implementation of the SADC security mandate in general, and in Zimbabwe in particular. On the contrary, the analysis of the legal texts of ECOWAS proved that agreement on certain norms and values was made among West African states. But again, the constructivist logic is limited when it comes to explaining the transformation within both regional organisations, as it fails to offer a convincing alternative to materialist accounts.

**Digging deeper: the domestic level**

This leaves us with the domestic factors as other potential explanations to be assessed: the role of individuals, the democratic nature of member states and the question of state weakness.

Recurrently throughout the history of both institutions, prominent individuals came to the fore and their actions were absolutely pivotal at the critical junctures of each institution. (Ikenberry, 1994) For ECOWAS, one can mention Yakubu Gowon, the Nigerian leader at the origin of the institution in 1975 along with Adebayo Adedeji. Another Nigerian, President Obasanjo was also key. The name of President Eyadema of Togo should also be mentioned here as he kept pushing for an expansion of the mandate of the regional organisation towards security issues. (Boko interview, 6 May 2008) Several interviewees also insisted that the role that certain Executive Secretaries or other ECOWAS staff
played or failed to play throughout the years are factors at least partially explaining the evolution of the institution. (Fernandes interview, 20 August 2007, Musah interview, 30 August 2007, Thom interview, 10 June 2008) Within SADC, individual leadership did not come from the Secretariat as very limited powers were entrusted to it, but from individual Heads of State or Government such as Nelson Mandela and later Thabo Mbeki, but also Robert Mugabe that all took the lead during the negotiations of key protocols. If leadership is provided by key Heads of States and if they agree on a common approach as was the case for Lesotho, then SADC can move forward. If not, SADC stalls. While insisting on the role of individuals is overall a valid argument, weighing its importance compared to other potential factors is difficult. Would the transformation of ECOWAS and SADC as security organisations have taken place regardless of the leaders in power at the time? The answer is probably affirmative as each regional organisation was faced with a set of crises that called for a decision on their part. Would the timing of change and the content of the mandate have differed if there had been other leaders at the time? Probably. On balance, while important, the role of individuals is neither a necessary nor a sufficient factor to explain the change within SADC and ECOWAS. Individuals explain how and when changes are made, but not whether they are made.

Another potential domestic factor derived from the democratic peace theory focuses on the democracy mandate of the regional organisation and argues that member states decided to take on this mandate because a substantial number of them were themselves democracies. At a minimum, most of them were part of the third wave of democratization that occurred in the 1990s. A closer look at the implementation of this democracy mandate has provided some insight on how fragile and skin-deep this democratic commitment is in many of these African states. The analysis of the legal texts has also

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proven that, at the time of the signature of their democracy protocols, eleven out of fifteen ECOWAS countries and ten out of fourteen SADC states were considered as partly free or not free by Freedom House. The democracy argument is not a factor that counts in the issue at hand. ECOWAS and SADC member states probably adopted these democracy provisions as a sign of goodwill towards the international community, with ECOWAS interpreting its democracy mandate as a way to maintain stability in its own region.

Finally, state weakness is a pervasive factor throughout the history of both institutions. It is however doubtful it had a direct causal impact on the transformation of ECOWAS and SADC, because of its lack of agency. State weakness is the problem that both SADC and ECOWAS are trying to solve. As a quick reminder, state weakness was defined earlier in chapter 2 as lack of capabilities.

State weakness has an impact on the regional organisations at different levels. State weakness and, in its extreme form, state collapse are of course a major causal factor of the conflicts that arise, be it in the DRC, Liberia, Sierra Leone or Côte d’Ivoire, and their violent intrastate nature. State weakness and state collapse are at the source of the security problems that ECOWAS and SADC, as security organisations, were established to solve. Furthermore, state weakness, besides being a cause of conflict, also explains the common threat perception shared by member states and their broad definition of security. However, state weakness is too indeterminate a variable. All regions in Africa, albeit to varying degrees, are plagued by state weakness. But not all have developed peace and security mandates as part of their regional organisations. State weakness is a general factor that is not specific enough to provide the explanation for the particular sort of institution which emerged. For change to take place, agency is needed. The regional
hegemon, within each region, proved to be the key agent

So why did ECOWAS and SADC adopt a security and democracy mandate in the early 1990s? *A parsimonious answer focuses on the regional hegemon as the agent of change with the end of the Cold War and state weakness as contributing factors, i.e. as necessary but not sufficient conditions to explain the change.* The end of the Cold War and state weakness were background conditions, while the regional hegemon was the agent of change. All three levels of analysis are thus necessary to explain the institutional transformation of these two African regional organisations. The end of the Cold War represented a window of opportunity for African states to take hold of their own destiny. At the same time, it contributed to the multiplication of violent intrastate conflicts quite often caused by state collapse. With the end of the Cold War, ‘regions were “set free,”’ and regional logics came to predominate both in the *production of insecurity* – both traditional and, especially, non-traditional – and in the *management of insecurity*, with increased incentive for states within a region to deal with their own problems and a decreased incentive for outside powers to intervene or become involved.’ (Hurrell, 2007, p.131, emphasis in the original)71 Change within ECOWAS and SADC was thus reactive to these wars and these shocks to the region. The end of the Cold War did indirectly force change on these regions, but it did not provide the direction or the form of this change. The nature of the institutional transformation of ECOWAS and SADC was also heavily influenced by the nature of the conflicts plaguing each region. ECOWAS and SADC did not face the same challenges on the ground. Prior to 1990, West Africa was relatively peaceful, notwithstanding the military coups. Violent intrastate conflicts multiplied after

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71 The concept of freedom here is interesting: regions were set free, but only because they were neglected in a way that they had not been before. It is probably another kind of more negative freedom. See BERLIN, I. (1961) *Two concepts of liberty, an inaugural lecture delivered before the University of Oxford on 31 October 1958*, Oxford, Clarendon Press.
the end of the Cold War. The conflicts in which the UN intervened in Southern Africa had started before the 1990s and were a prolongation of the liberation struggle in which the UN got involved before the 1990s, including the DRC. The direction and form of change was provided by the regional hegemon, the main agent of change. But in both cases, its hegemonic leadership was constrained by its ‘followers’ that did not necessarily trust the hegemon (SADC) or whose weakness meant that the brunt of the security mandate had to be borne by the hegemon (ECOWAS). In short, change within ECOWAS and SADC occurred because the regional hegemon seized the opportunity represented by the end of the Cold War and the presence of violent intrastate crises.

Regional hegemony, African style

The aim of this last section is to highlight the contribution to the literature offered by this study by outlining the two hypotheses generated by this research focusing on the role of the constrained hegemon. It also argues that classical realism proved to be the most useful international relations theory to explain the puzzle studied here.

Two hypotheses

The core of the puzzle examined in this study gravitates around the idea of regional hegemony in Africa or hegemony, African style. Put parsimoniously, ECOWAS and SADC emerged as regional security organisations with a democracy mandate because the regional hegemon decided to use the existing regional organisation to establish a security mechanism addressing the challenges spurred by the end of the Cold War and by state

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72 I would like to thank my supervisor Louise Fawcett for suggesting this title.
weakness. This explains why regional security organisations capable of intervening in violent conflicts emerged, but it cannot explain their success in implementing their agenda or lack thereof. Instead, implementation is explained by the nature of regional hegemony.

In sum, this study has generated two hypotheses.

1) A security agenda cannot emerge without the involvement of the regional hegemon.
This statement has been illustrated throughout the history of both regional organisations. Nigeria was at the origins of ECOWAS in 1975 and also proved instrumental to its transformation in the 1990s. South Africa was first the regional bully against which the FLS states balanced and later engineered the creation of the SADC Organ by transitioning FLS mechanisms to SADC. This hypothesis also answers a question raised in the introduction about state weakness. This research hypothesised at first that the greater the number of weak states in a region, the greater the devolution of security matters to a regional organisation. This proved not to be the case as the devolution of security matters to the regional organisation depends on the leadership of the regional hegemon in creating a regional security mechanism.\(^7\)

2) What the regional hegemon can do, including affecting the speed the transformation, is constrained by the acceptance of its leadership by its neighbours (legitimacy) and by state weakness (capability).
While the transformation was overall rather smooth within ECOWAS, the road was bumpier within SADC. Its emergence as a regional security organisation suffered from

\(^7\)It would be interesting to explore the implications of this hypothesis in the case of the EU and ASEAN.
severe delays from 1994, when the idea of including a security mandate was first seriously considered by the SADC Secretariat, until 2001 with the adoption of the SADC security protocol. Throughout those years, Zimbabwe and, to a lesser extent, Angola tried to highjack the South African project, in the end, to no avail.

At the heart of these hypotheses lies the question of the regional hegemonic style. With the regional organisation being a way to consolidate, institutionalise and legitimise its hegemony.

Different hegemonic styles

Regional hegemony is based on two fundamentals: the existence of a significant power asymmetry within a region – this is obvious in both the Nigerian and South African case – and the way this power is used. It can either be enforced – even though this is a costly solution both militarily and financially and a solution that does not seem viable in the long term – or it can be a form of consensual (Hurrell, 2007) or cooperative (Pedersen, 2002) hegemony.\footnote{A good explanation of the concept of hegemony can be found in PRYS, M. (2007) What makes a Regional Hegemon? A Comparison of Indian and South African Foreign Policy \textit{Annual Convention of the International Studies Association}. Chicago. See also the idea of hegemonic security order in FRAZIER, D. V. \& STEWART-INGERSOLL, R. (26-29 March 2008) Regional Powers and Security: A Framework for Understanding Order within Regional Security Complexes. \textit{Annual Convention of the International Studies Association}. San Francisco, CA. According to Pedersen, cooperative hegemony can be achieved thanks to 1) power sharing which includes acceptance of constraints by the regional hegemon; 2) power aggregation by the regional hegemon which involves psychological factors and leadership; and 3) commitment to a long term realist policy strategy. PEDERSEN, T. (2002) Cooperative hegemony: power, ideas and institutions in regional integration. \textit{Review of International Studies}, 28, 677-696.} In the latter cases, the regional hegemon needs to build trust\footnote{‘At root, trust refers to an actor’s willingness to place something valued under another actor’s control.’ HOFFMAN, A. M. (2006) \textit{Building trust: overcoming suspicion in international conflict}, Albany, State University of New York Press., p.4.} and enhance its legitimacy among its neighbours to ensure they follow its lead. There are three ways the regional hegemon can build this trust: by proving its long term
commitment to the region, by accepting some constraints through the regional organisation and by sharing some key values with its neighbours.

On all three counts, South Africa has been found wanting compared to Nigeria. Proof of long term commitment is key in creating a sense of predictability within the region. The issue of long term commitment is especially tricky as a long term trusting relationship is especially difficult to establish with a leader that is often insecure domestically and could be deposed any time by a military coup. This notably explains the very personal nature of relationships between Heads of State in Africa as a way to establish trust on a personal rather than an institutionalised level. Many would argue that the democratic nature of a state should ensure a certain amount of predictability based on shared values, such as the protection of human rights, etc. But, strong, well-established democracies are rare in Africa. At the opposite end of the political spectrum, one can find predictability in the long hold on power of old dictators. With the democratisation process still underway in Africa and with the transition in many countries from old dictators to new democracies, predictability and trust are a rare phenomenon. Nigeria has however been able to send a clear message to its neighbours. It has proved with money and boots on the ground its commitment to the security agenda of ECOWAS and has allowed ECOWAS to send observers during its latest presidential elections. This commitment to ECOWAS has been constant despite changes in government. During the negotiations of the ECOWAS security protocol, roughly from December 1998 until December 1999, Nigeria underwent two changes of government: from Abacha who died in June 1998, to General Abubakar who ruled for a year, to President Obasanjo who was elected in May 1999. But its commitment to the security protocol remained steadfast. While South Africa has not seen such dramatic changes after its transition from apartheid, its commitment to SADC has
proved flaky. While Nigeria has made clear that it considers its ‘manifest destiny’ to be a leader within the African continent and within West Africa in particular, South Africa has always denied hegemonic aspirations, though often belied by its foreign policy. Furthermore, South Africa seems to privilege the continental scene with its NEPAD and APRM agenda at the expense of its region. ‘The more Thabo Mbeki plays on the larger AU stage, the stronger will anti-South African sentiment grow.’ (Herbert, 2002, p.67)

According to Hoffman, ‘trusting relationships develop in response to institutions (i.e. norms, principles, and rules) that effectively eliminate the two threats that states fear most: the threat of domination to outside parties and the threat of political loss to internal parties.’ (Hoffman, 2006, p.136) This concretely means that the regional hegemon should allay fears of domination and its neighbours will only follow the regional hegemon if doing so does not threaten their hold on power. In order to allay fears of domination, the regional hegemon should be ready to accept some restraints within the regional organisation. Nigeria has done so by the adoption of a two-thirds majority voting and by its acquiescence of the launch of military interventions under the leadership of other countries such as the one in Guinea-Bissau in 1999 under the leadership of Senegal. From the point of view of weaker states in the region, the regional organisation is a way to control the unilateralism of Nigeria (and of Senegal). (Fournier interview, 23 July 2008) Similar constraints on South Africa cannot be found within SADC. Furthermore, the cost of non-cooperation of South Africa within SADC is minimal: it has not taken the steps necessary to increase the cost if the regional hegemon does not comply. Overall, Nigeria seems to need its neighbours more than South Africa, which is able to play a significant role at both the continental and international levels on its own. It remains to be seen whether this will change over time.
Finally, the Southern African region does not seem to share the same values as South Africa – the little it has in common, its ‘culture of solidarity,’ being historically directed against the regional hegemon. Without shared values, trust is even more difficult to build. SADC member states – even the democratic ones – are deeply suspicious of South African hegemony. The perception is that South Africa might have a black government but it is still following colonial-style policies. (Henwood interview, 2 August 2007) ‘If Big Brother transforms itself from racist to “companion,” it is still Big Brother.’ (Melber interview, 31 July 2007) This often leads to resistance that takes the form of more consultation, delays and ‘other forms of quiet obfuscation.’ (Herbert, 2002, p.67) This approach is reinforced by the culture of solidarity that prevails in the region. (Maundi interview, 19 June 2007) The need to maintain a front of unity and solidarity is inherited by the history of the liberation struggles and reinforced by Western powers’ interference. (Butler interview, 26 July 2007, Malin interview, 23 July 2007, Orbon interview, 25 July 2007, Müller-Glodde, 24 July 2007) ‘They are brothers in arms.’ (Kaunda interview, 27 July 2007) Mugabe, still considered a hero of independence, has been especially skilful at blowing on the still glowing charcoals of anti-imperialism and anti-neo-colonialism.

Nigeria, a recent and still uncertain democracy with a history of military rule, has been able to assert its leadership in its own region, while South Africa, a well-established democracy – compared to Nigeria – has not. This is partly due to the fact that South Africa’s neighbours perceive SADC as ranking low on South Africa’s list of priorities, but more than anything it is due to the shadow of the past that has not yet dissipated and that clouds the attempt of South Africa to establish itself as a legitimate leader for
Southern Africa. In West Africa, the leader has found its followers, in Southern Africa, it is still looking for them.

**A manifesto for classical realism?**

The previous sections have highlighted the pivotal role played by the regional hegemon both in ECOWAS and SADC. To go back to the core hypothesis outlined in the introduction of this study, in the African case, state weakness, the presence of the regional hegemon and marginalisation from the international scene were deemed to be important explanatory factors to explain the emergence of regional security organisations within ECOWAS and SADC. While not unique to Africa, these three explanatory factors were considered of special importance in the cases studied. This proved to be the case albeit with a different weight assigned to each factor. The regional hegemon proved to be pivotal agent of change, while marginalisation and state weakness were background conditions. However, these three factors have to be complemented by the addition of the role of common values and of individuals. The lack of common values mostly explains the limited performance of SADC as a regional security organisation with a democracy mandate. Similarly, individual Heads of State pulling in opposite directions, some would also call it a clash of personalities, can also account for the slow development within SADC. In West Africa, a common flexibility towards the concept of sovereignty and the key role played by specific individuals can explain the relative success of ECOWAS as a regional security organisation.

Based on these factors, which school of thought of international relations best accounts for the emergence of regional security organisations with a democracy and security
mandate? Surprisingly, the most comprehensive and flexible answer is classical realism. Classical realism encompasses of course a variety of theories and approaches, all of which share a belief that states are primarily motivated by the desire for military and economic power or security, rather than ideals or ethics. One can argue that classical realism best explains the emergence of regional security organisations within ECOWAS and SADC based on the five following arguments.

First and obviously, classical realism focuses on power relations among states. While structural neorealism would show little interest in ‘Uganda’ (Waltz, 1979, p.95) or other insignificant and weak states, classical realism simply focuses on relations between states and thus on regional relations.

Second, the emphasis on states, as opposed to non-state actors, is justified by this study. The exact shape, content and nature of the state are indeed open to discussion and to sometimes dramatic variations or interpretations in Africa. But states remain the main actors of international relations and are the commonly accepted medium through which African political leaders interact on the international scene. There are no other valid alternatives. (Biersteker and Weber, 1996)

Third, classical realism traces back its roots to the writings of Sun Tzu, Thucydides or Machiavelli, thus demonstrating that its principles are valid whether the Westphalian state exists or not. The Third World focused literature correctly argues that the concept of state is problematic when applied to many African states. But this does not eclipse the reality of power relations between states or ‘would-be’ states. Indeed, contrary to the neoliberal institutionalist argument that requires either a strong (or persistent) international
institution or at a minimum a strong (or persistent) state so that the benefits of international cooperation can be made evident by repetitive interactions through time, classical realism is adaptable to political crises and coups that shorten the shadow of the future.

Fourth, while focusing on power relations – just like this study that has come to the conclusion that the regional hegemon was the agent of change within ECOWAS and SADC –, classical realists do not neglect the role of legitimacy, trust and socialisation, usually by the hegemon. Gilpin raises the issue of ‘prestige,’ (Gilpin, 1983, pp.29-34) while Ikenberry and Kupchan describe ‘the socialisation of leaders in secondary nations.’ (Ikenberry and Kupchan, 1990, p.286) Ruggie also uses the term ‘social texture’ to distinguish between classical and neo-realism. (Ruggie, 1998, p.7) Establishing trust and using the regional organisation as a way for the regional hegemon to institutionalise in the long term its dominance in its region are two issues that stood out from this study.

Fifth, classical realism focuses on agency and individuals. It asks the question ‘who did what?’ This highlights the limitations of constructivism: norms and values only matter if they have agents that carry them and often, quite literally, fight for them. The most efficient norm entrepreneur could be the strongest state. Finally, due to the very limited institutionalisation of both ECOWAS and SADC, individual leaders advocating the creation of regional security mechanisms in their respective regions were important to the process. There is no school of thought of international relations theory that specifically focuses on individuals, but classical realism with its focus on agency does suggest recognition of the importance of individuals. Authors such as Morgenthau and Carr do
insist on the role of individuals in their discussions of foreign policy. (Morgenthau, 1985, Carr, 1939)

While the study was not intended from the outset to be a manifesto for classical realism, the case studies brought strong arguments in favour of this school of thought, the most crucial being that it has the flexibility to adapt to the nature of African politics. While the Third World focused literature is correct on pointing to the limitations of realism, this study has uncovered its persistent use in deciphering the puzzle it was attempting to solve.

For the broader study of international relations and of regionalism, this study has illustrated the claim that African cases should be included in the mainstream study of international relations for the following reasons. First, new developments arise in this continent. Africa is developing its own unique institutions without necessarily having to go through the Westphalian stage. Second, if the study of international relations is about war, then Africa and Asia should be considered as important case studies. Finally, Africa is also a continent where the challenges and opportunities of globalization are played out. Since the beginning of the 21st century, all the emerging global players have started to become involved, be it China, but also Brazil, notably through its link with Lusophone states. This conclusion about the usefulness of African cases to the development of IR theory can be broadened to area studies that should be pursued with the idea of making a contribution to the study of international relations as a whole.

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Conclusion: Looking towards the future

As this study comes to a close and now that the main theoretical claims have been outlined, it is now time to look at the future of ECOWAS and SADC and the prospects for peace in Africa. Finally, since looking for answers always leads to more questions, this chapter finishes on a possible future research agenda.

The future of ECOWAS and SADC as regional security organisations

The question was raised early in the introduction whether ECOWAS or SADC were security communities. A security community was originally defined by Deutsch as ‘a group of people which has become integrated,’ where integration means having a sense of community and ‘dependable expectations of peaceful change.’ (Deutsch, 1957, p.5) Adler and Barnett developed the idea, but the core of the concept remained the same: the abandonment of war as a means of change within the security community. (Adler and Barnett, 1998b) The historical chapters describing the creation and development of ECOWAS and SADC have proven that neither regional organisation has ever been, or is today, a security community. While it is indeed correct to assume that the outbreak of conflict between member states is unlikely, it is nevertheless a possibility. Paradoxically, there is a greater likelihood of a conflict erupting within a member state rather than between them. This state of affairs nevertheless does not justify the qualification of ECOWAS or SADC as security communities as war does remain a means of change within states. The focus of both regional organisations has been first and foremost to limit conflict between their own member states, but it has also extended to the prevention of civil war. In order for ECOWAS and SADC to become security communities, the first
step is to establish security communities within states and to replace war as a means of political change by elections. This is one of the rationales behind the democracy mandate of these institutions as election monitoring is a way for the regional organisation to ensure that the elections and their aftermaths remain peaceful. Overall, it would be difficult to describe either ECOWAS or SADC as a security community when war (or a coup d’état or violence) remains a means to achieve change within the state.

Even though ECOWAS and SADC are not security communities, how likely are they to succeed in the implementation of their security and democracy mandate? ECOWAS and its regional hegemon, Nigeria, have proven their commitment to the security and democracy agenda. The main obstacle here is that of capability. While not described at length in this study, this issue remains crucial in the eyes of most observers, be it among the P3 or the UN. During most ECOWAS interventions, the boots on the ground were provided by ECOWAS member states while the logistics were provided by Western states. The priority for the High Command of the ESF in 2008 was the organisation of a logistics exercise. Logistics and training of troops are two obstacles ECOWAS has to overcome in order for the regional organisation to have the appropriate capabilities to enforce its mandate. This is an uphill battle considering the financial limitations they have. By comparison, NATO with a budget far greater than that of ECOWAS is still struggling with this issue. However, because ECOWAS and its member states have demonstrated their commitment to the security agenda, the P3 have decided to step in and to support as much as possible the West African efforts. (Chaveas interview, 23 July 2008)

The short term answer to the capability problem of ECOWAS is the P3. The long term answer would entail a strengthening of its member states, notably with a security sector reform that would enhance the professionalisation and the accountability of
ECOWAS armies. But the jury is still out about whether ECOWAS will be able to strengthen the capabilities of its member states – a question raised at the beginning of this study. Overall, the future of ECOWAS lies with the deepening of its integration at all levels. In the short term, one can argue that should a new crisis arise, it will not be ignored and will be met by ECOWAS within its limited means and with the help of the P3.

A similar assessment cannot be made for SADC with the same level of confidence. The main obstacle SADC is facing is that of legitimacy. The recent history of SADC has repeatedly shown that its member states have only been able to agree on the lowest common denominator and that each country tends to buttress itself behind its sovereignty. The question of leadership by the regional hegemon remains unresolved and until now SADC interventions have been the product of agreement between a few SADC member states that were then later on rubber-stamped as a SADC intervention (Lesotho and the DRC), to preserve the façade of unity. The leadership of South Africa has been repeatedly challenged by Zimbabwe and to a lesser extent by Angola. There is no short term fix for this problem. Throughout the fieldwork, numerous interviewees have pointed that the only way for SADC to move forward would be after a change of guard which lessens suspicions against South Africa. The leadership of key Southern African states are still the leaders of the liberation struggles. In Angola, President Dos Santos has been in power since 1979 and is likely to be re-elected in 2008 for another term. Mozambique’s president, Armando Guebeza, recently elected in 2004, is the current head of FRELIMO (Frente de Libertação de Moçambique – Mozambique Liberation Front). Zimbabwe’s Mugabe is another obvious example, while President Pohamba of Namibia is a founding member of SWAPO. Despite recent transitions of power in several Southern African
states, most of the leaders currently in power have spent their formative years in liberation movements and their regional outlook is still strongly influenced by these first experiences and can explain their persistent suspicion towards South Africa. The future of SADC as a regional security organisation remains dependent on its member states and on their ability to foster a working relationship with their regional hegemon. Some argue that this will only be possible when a change of guard happens and when the leaders in power will come from the post liberation generation. (Sidiropoulos interview, 3 August 2007) Until then, it is unlikely that SADC will make significant progress on its security and democracy agenda.

Peace in Africa?

What does this tell us about conflict management in Africa in general? This study started with the opening question: how do you avoid a new Rwanda? Are African states now ready to avoid a new genocide? It is worth highlighting the fact that, beyond ECOWAS and SADC, the AU and ECCAS have also adopted a right of humanitarian intervention. Following the 1994 Rwandan genocide, African states have indeed tried to come together to make sure that there would be no more Rwandas. (Haggis, forthcoming 2009) While the 1994 genocide represented a real wake up call for African leaders, concerns about foreign intervention remained. The adoption of this right of humanitarian intervention within African organisations is symptomatic of the fact that African intervention is preferable to non-intervention. (Bellamy, 2005, Haggis, forthcoming 2009) However, a close analysis of the texts adopted within ECOWAS and SADC has shown that the adoption of a right of humanitarian intervention is pitted against concerns about sovereignty. Legally, this right does exist. But are African states ready to act on it?
Concerns for peace in Africa remain powerful. Based on this study, one might argue that a full-blown genocide is less likely to occur in West or Southern Africa. In these regions, conflicts or civil wars should hopefully never reach genocide proportions as the regional hegemon would have to deal with the opprobrium of letting genocide occur in its own backyard. One might argue that this concern was prominent in the decision by South Africa to intervene in the conflict in Burundi even though the country was not part of SADC. Genocide is less likely in West or Southern Africa not because local conditions or ethnic tensions differ radically from the rest of Africa, but because, thanks to the presence of a regional hegemon, it is likely that any violence or massacre will be stopped before it becomes genocide.

Beyond West and Southern Africa, the prospects for peace in Central and East Africa look rather bleak. It should not come as a surprise that conflicts in Sudan or the DRC have reached a point where they could be described as genocide. In both cases, the conflicts are taking place in countries that could act as hegemons within their region due to their sheer size and their resources – oil for Sudan, mineral resources and water for the DRC – but have been unable to hold their countries together. The comparison stops here as the DRC is a collapsed state, while Sudan remains a strong state despite the fact that the central government is at war with several of its provinces. Due to the military power of Sudan, as well as the political shrewdness of its leadership and diplomacy, intervention in Sudan has proved very difficult to organise. There is no other strong regional power that has a strong interest in promoting intervention and that has enough influence to impose it on Sudan. The scenario is different in the DRC as it is not in a position to resist any intervention. However, there is no regional hegemon that has a strong stake in
propping up the DRC as a viable state. South Africa has been involved in the DRC conflict, but its impact has not been enough to make a difference in the country.

Overall, the prospects for peace are not very good in Central and East Africa due to the absence of a regional hegemon. The only other alternative is the AU stepping in. But agreement between fifty-three member states can be difficult to reach. Sub-Saharan Africa stands at the crossroads today. The roadmap adopted at the AU level describes five regional economic communities (RECs) as pillars to the African security infrastructure. But progress within those RECs differed dramatically with, for instance, the AMU (Arab Maghreb Union) being dormant. The AU can either stick to the original plan or accept the existing diversity within the RECs, letting ECOWAS and SADC take the lead in their respective regions with the AU and concentrating its efforts on Central and East Africa. East Africa could potentially also have a strong regional security organisation in IGAD, if Ethiopia is able to overcome hostility in the region and consolidates itself internally. Today, some clarity needs to be achieved within Africa between all the different security actors on the continental scene if a coordinated and efficient security architecture is to be put in place.

Future research

As outlined in the introduction, based on the hypotheses generated here, future research would of course broaden the field of study to IGAD and ECCAS, but also other regions of the world, to explore whether the hypotheses hold true in these cases. But beyond this obvious point, this study has raised three questions that call for future research.
The first area of research would consider how much an external agent can help a state consolidate itself. Most of the literature on this topic has focused on the role of aid and international financial institutions at the expense of regional organisations. In the African case, research would obviously focus on African regional organisations, but also cover a variety of topics ranging from public finances to election monitoring and security sector reform. Do African regional organisations have a comparative advantage compared to other international organisations? Are they limited by their capabilities? The broader question here is of course: can a state be ‘built’ from the outside?

A second and related area of research would focus on the legitimacy of regional organisations, compared to international organisations, but also compared to states. Does the authority of the regional organisation only come from the consent of its member states? Do regional organisations have moral authority? What is the basis of this moral authority? If it is only based on the norms it is defending, how is a regional organisation different from a non-state actor such a civil rights association or an NGO? How does a regional organisation gain or lose legitimacy? Who judges the legitimacy of a regional organisation? Are legitimate regional organisations consistently more efficient than other organisations? The issue of legitimacy is often mentioned en passant in many studies, but has never been the object of a full-fledged comparative study.

Finally, this study has proved that concerns about genocide and other gross violation of human rights do matter in African politics. This conclusion begs the further question of how these norms have emerged within the African continent. Are African states merely ‘norm-takers’ or are they also ‘norm-setters’? This area of research would focus on how a right of humanitarian intervention has emerged within African regional organisations.
Was it carried by norm entrepreneurs or was it imposed from outside? How can one measure normative change? Has this normative change in Africa truly made a new Rwanda impossible?
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Dr. Ademola Abass, Professor of Law, University of Brunel. Personal interview conducted in London, England, 24 October 2007.


Dr. Cyriaque P. Agnekethom, Head of Division, Small Arms, ECOWAS. Personal interview conducted at ECOWAS headquarters, Abuja, Nigeria, 24 August 2007.

Lieutenant Colonel Simon Bacon, UK military adviser to ECOWAS. Personal interview conducted at ECOWAS headquarters, Abuja, Nigeria, 23 August 2007.

Mr. Timothy Baines, Regional Cooperation, Conflict Prevention / Good Governance, Delegation of the European Commission in Nigeria. Personal interview conducted at the delegation in Abuja, Nigeria, 31 August 2007.

Dr Dorina Bekoe, Senior Research Associate, Center for Conflict Analysis and Prevention, United States Institute of Peace. Email interview conducted on 23 May 2008.

Mr. François Boko, Lawyer, Former Minister of Interior and of Decentralization of Togo. Personal interview conducted in Paris, France, 6 May 2008.

Prof. Christian Bouquet, Professor of Political Geography, University of Bordeaux. Telephone interview conducted on 11 June 2008.


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Ambassador Frank Martin, UK High Commissioner to Botswana. Personal interview conducted at the UK Embassy, Gaborone, Botswana, 30 July 2007.


Dr. Themba Mhlongo, Researcher, Southern Africa Trust. Telephone interview conducted on 1 August 2007.

Dr. Helmut Müller-Glodde, advisor to Executive Secretary of SADC, Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ). Personal interview conducted at GTZ offices, Gaborone, Botswana, 24 July 2007.

Dr. Abdel-Fatauh Musah, Conflict Prevention Adviser, ECOWAS. Personal interview conducted at ECOWAS headquarters, Abuja, Nigeria, 30 August 2007.

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Dr. Bertha Osei-Hwedie, Dean, Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Botswana. Personal interview conducted at the University of Botswana, Gaborone, Botswana, 24 July 2007.


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