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A Model of Delegated Project Choice With Application to Merger Policy.

Abstract:

We present a model in which a principal delegates the choice of project to an agent with different preferences. A project's characteristics are verifiable once presented to the principal, but the principal does not know how many projects are available to the agent. The principal chooses the set of projects which the agent can implement. Three frameworks are considered: (i) a static setting in which the set of available projects is exogenous to the agent but uncertain; (ii) a dynamic setting i...

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Volume:
347
Series:
Discussion Papers
Publication date:
2007-01-01
URN:
uuid:81e5e58e-0b1d-4105-99ba-83191475ab28
Local pid:
oai:economics.ouls.ox.ac.uk:12124
Language:
English

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