Working paper
A Model of Delegated Project Choice With Application to Merger Policy.
- Abstract:
-
We present a model in which a principal delegates the choice of project to an agent with different preferences. A project's characteristics are verifiable once presented to the principal, but the principal does not know how many projects are available to the agent. The principal chooses the set of projects which the agent can implement. Three frameworks are considered: (i) a static setting in which the set of available projects is exogenous to the agent but uncertain; (ii) a dynamic setting i...
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Bibliographic Details
- Publisher:
- Department of Economics (University of Oxford)
- Series:
- Discussion Papers
- Publication date:
- 2007-01-01
Item Description
- Language:
- English
- UUID:
-
uuid:81e5e58e-0b1d-4105-99ba-83191475ab28
- Local pid:
- oai:economics.ouls.ox.ac.uk:12124
- Deposit date:
- 2011-08-16
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- Copyright date:
- 2007
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