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Scandal, Protection, and Recovery in the Cabinet.

Abstract:

Empirical evidence suggests that a prime minister benefits from firing ministers who are involved in political scandals. We explore a model in which scandals are positively related to policy activism, so that a prime minister may wish to protect a minister from resignation calls. We find that protection can sometimes discourage activism: it enhances the value of a minister's career and hence encourages him to "sit tight" by moderating his activities. On the other hand, an exogenous increase i...

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Journal:
American Political Science Review
Volume:
101
Publication date:
2007-01-01
URN:
uuid:81dbc7cf-ef70-438c-89a7-573855e28dfe
Local pid:
oai:economics.ouls.ox.ac.uk:10320
Language:
English

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