Working paper icon

Working paper

Industrial Structure, Executives' Pay And Myopic Risk Taking.

Abstract:

This study outlines a new theory linking industrial structure to optimal employment contracts and value reducing risk taking. Firms hire their executives using optimal contracts derived within a competitive labour market. To motivate effort firms must use some variable remuneration. Such remuneration introduces a myopic risk taking problem: an executive would wish to inflate early expected earnings at some risk to future profits. To manage this some bonus pay is deferred. Convergence in ...

Expand abstract

Actions


Access Document


Files:

Authors


Volume:
571
Series:
Discussion paper series
Publication date:
2011-01-01
URN:
uuid:80ece22e-f47c-4aed-84fe-5a9038373589
Local pid:
oai:economics.ouls.ox.ac.uk:15261
Language:
English

Terms of use


Metrics


Views and Downloads






If you are the owner of this record, you can report an update to it here: Report update to this record

TO TOP