

Heaven on Earth: Explaining Religious Party Formation and Strength

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*Qual è 'l geomètra che tutto s'affige
per misurar lo cerchio, e non ritrova,
pensando, quel principio ond'elli indige*

Table of Contents

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION	6
1.1. THE PUZZLE	6
1.2. EMPIRICAL PATTERNS	10
1.3. THE ARGUMENT IN BRIEF	11
1.3. CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE LITERATURE	16
1.4. TESTING THE THEORY.....	19
1.4.1. <i>Case Selection for Comparative Historical Analysis</i>	21
1.5. PLAN FOR THE THESIS	22
CHAPTER 2: THEORIZING RELIGIOUS PARTY DEVELOPMENT.....	26
2.1. DEFINITIONS	27
2.1.1. <i>Religious Actors</i>	27
2.1.2. <i>Public Goods and Social Services</i>	28
2.2. BUILDING BLOCKS	29
2.2.1. <i>Institutional Differentiation, Political Alliance</i>	30
2.2.2. <i>Religious Supply of Social Goods: Healthcare and Poor Relief</i>	33
2.2.3. <i>Religious Supply of Social Goods: Education</i>	41
2.2.4. <i>Variation in Religious Institutional Autonomy</i>	47
2.2.5. <i>State-Building and the Transformation of the Religion-State Relationship</i>	60
2.3. EXPLAINING CONFESSIONAL PARTY FORMATION	68
2.3.1. <i>A Formal Model of Religious Policy-Making</i>	68
2.3.2. <i>Religious Response to Anticlericalism</i>	79
2.4. EXPLAINING CONFESSIONAL PARTY STRENGTH	82
2.4.1. <i>Infrastructural Power of the State</i>	82
2.4.2. <i>How Religious Charity Leads to Political Power</i>	84
2.5. CONCLUSION.....	91
CHAPTER 3: QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS OF RELIGIOUS PARTY FORMATION AND STRENGTH	92
3.1. OPERATIONALIZATION OF THE DEPENDENT VARIABLES AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS	93
3.1.1. <i>What is a Religious Party?</i>	94
3.1.2. <i>Operationalizing Religious Party Formation</i>	96
3.1.3. <i>Operationalizing Religious Party Strength</i>	100
3.2. ESTIMATION TECHNIQUES FOR THE ANALYSIS OF RELIGIOUS PARTY FORMATION	101
3.3. ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS	107
3.3.1. <i>Structures</i>	107
3.3.2. <i>Ideas</i>	109

3.3.3. <i>Institutions</i>	110
3.4. STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF RELIGIOUS PARTY FORMATION.....	112
3.4.1. <i>Additional Formation Models</i>	120
3.5. STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF RELIGIOUS PARTY STRENGTH	124
3.5.1. <i>Defining and Measuring Infrastructural Power</i>	124
3.5.2. <i>Statistical Analysis</i>	129
3.5.3. <i>Additional Party Strength Models</i>	135
3.6. CONCLUSION.....	139
CHAPTER 4: RELIGIOUS POLICY AND CONFESSIONAL PARTY FORMATION	141
4.1. CLERICALISM IS THE ENEMY! ANTICLERICALISM AND PARTY FORMATION IN FRANCE AND ITALY	144
4.1.1. <i>Making Italians, Unmaking the Church: Italy, 1848-1919</i>	145
4.1.2. <i>Clericalism, There is the Enemy! France, 1814-1905</i>	166
4.2. MIXING GOD WITH CAESAR: PROCLERICALISM AND THE ABSENCE OF RELIGIOUS PARTIES IN SPAIN AND QUÉBEC.....	189
4.2.1. <i>Catholicism and Québécois Exceptionalism, 1763-1959</i>	190
4.2.2. <i>National-Catholicism: Spain, 1810-1931</i>	203
4.3. CONCLUSION.....	219
CHAPTER 5: THE RISE (AND FALL) OF POLITICAL CATHOLICISM IN ITALY AND FRANCE	222
5.1. FRENCH AND ITALIAN POLITICAL CATHOLICISM: A STUDY IN CONTRASTS.....	223
5.1.1. <i>Italy</i>	223
5.1.2. <i>France</i>	239
5.2. FRENCH AND ITALIAN STATE CAPACITY	264
5.2.1. <i>Social Insurance</i>	268
5.2.2. <i>Health Care</i>	278
5.2.3. <i>Education</i>	285
5.3. FRENCH AND ITALIAN CATHOLIC ASSOCIATIONAL DENSITY.....	293
5.3.1. <i>Catholic Welfare Activities</i>	294
5.3.2. <i>Catholic Action</i>	300
5.3.3. <i>Who Votes for the Catholics?</i>	311
CHAPTER 6: STATE, ISLAM, AND POLITICS IN ALBANIA AND TURKEY	327
6.1. JUSTICE AND DEVELOPMENT? POLITICAL ISLAM IN TURKEY.....	330
6.1.1. <i>From Ottomans to Turks: Turkey, 1871-1922</i>	330
6.1.2. <i>The Kemalist Revolution and the Birth of Turkish Anticlericalism, 1923-1937</i>	333
6.1.3. <i>Post-Kemalist Resurgence of Multipartism, 1938-1959</i>	338
6.1.4. <i>From Military Coup to Military Coup, 1960-1979</i>	342
6.1.5. <i>The Meteoric Rise of Political Islam, 1980-2002</i>	346
6.1.6. <i>Who Votes for the Islamists?</i>	360

6.2. RELIGION AND POLITICS IN ALBANIA	364
6.2.1. <i>Albania and Islam before Communism, 1912-1944</i>	364
6.2.2. <i>Communist Albania, 1944-1990</i>	370
6.2.3. <i>Democratic Albania, 1990-</i>	376
6.3. INFRASTRUCTURAL POWER AND RELIGIOUS POLITICS IN ALBANIA AND TURKEY	382
CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION	395
7.1. RETHINKING THEORIES OF RELIGION AND POLITICS	396
7.1.1. <i>Modernization/Secularization Theory</i>	396
7.1.2. <i>Religious Market Theory</i>	399
7.1.3. <i>Ideational Theory</i>	400
7.2. RESEARCH AGENDAS	401
APPENDIX	405
A1. LIST OF RELIGIOUS POLITICAL PARTIES	405
BIBLIOGRAPHY	439

Abstract. Why do some countries have religious political parties while others do not? And why are religious parties electorally successful in some places but flop at the ballot box in others? This dissertation provides a holistic, integrated explanation of religious party development. Religious parties are formed defensively, in reaction to anticlerical campaigns by state-builders to wrest control of public services like education, poor relief, and healthcare, from religious providers. Once they are formed, the strength of religious parties is determined by the infrastructural power of the state. Weak states that fail to provide adequate public services open up space for religious communities to build a dense civil society network of private schools, hospitals, and charities. Recipients of religious largesse then support confessional parties at the ballot box. By contrast, strong states that provide efficient public services squeeze out private providers of welfare, undermining the electoral strength of religious political parties. I find strong empirical support for this argument in a statistical analysis of religious party formation and strength, using a new dataset on all religious parties that participated in national parliamentary elections between 1800 and 2015. Comparative historical analyses of Québec, Spain, Italy, France, Albania, and Turkey, also back my theoretical arguments. My findings have important implications for the literature on party formation, voting, state-building, and private welfare provision.

Chapter 1: Introduction

This is a dissertation about religious political parties. I seek to answer two interrelated, yet distinct, questions: What explains religious party formation? And what explains variations in the strength of religious political parties?

1.1. The Puzzle

These empirical questions require theoretical answers. Many brilliant scholars have contributed to the flourishing academic niche of religious politics, but existing theories either present a partial vision of the topic or, in some cases, simply bear no resemblance with empirical reality. Modernization theory, which argues that economic development is associated with religious decline, can only go so far towards understanding the fate of religious political parties (Berger 1987:109; Fox 2007:1–25; Gorski and Altinordu 2008:55–85). There are simply too many historical and contemporary anomalies that cannot be brushed aside, from the religious vitality in the most developed country of the early twenty-first century, the United States; to the strength of Christian Democracy in the most developed country of late nineteenth-century Europe, Germany; to the tenacious hold on power by an Islamic political movement in the most developed Muslim country, Turkey. These discrepancies between theory and reality are so large that some early prominent advocates of modernization theory have since recognized that the framework needs to be thoroughly revised at best, or is fundamentally flawed at worst (see, for instance, Berger 1999:2; Finke 1992:148; Stark 1999:261; Stark and Finke 2000:79).

As the emergence of Islamist fundamentalism and the renewed strength of the American religious right made modernization theory increasingly untenable, ideational theories of religion and politics enjoyed renewed visibility with the publication of Samuel Huntington's (1996) *Clash of Civilizations*. Unlike modernization theorists, for whom economic development would bury all religious denominations, ideational theorists emphasize the inherent differences in religious doctrines that determine how they react to the political challenges of modernity (Cook 2014:270; Fish 2011:211; Grzymala-Busse 2016:337–39; Wald and Calhoun-Brown 2018:43–54; Weissbrod 1982:265–75; Woodberry and Shah 2004:48). The extent to which ideational theories are valid – something questioned by many scholars (Armstrong 2014:123; Grim and Finke 2007:652–54; Norris and Inglehart 2004:105–30; Prodanov 1996:125–27; Stepan 2000:39–41) - is a question that can only be resolved empirically, which I seek to do in Chapter 3. Either way, ideational theories of religion cannot explain different outcomes *within* the same religious system; for instance, Mediterranean Catholic neighbours like France (with a weak religious party), Spain (with no religious party) and Italy (with a strong religious party) exhibit staggering variation in religious party development that simply does not make sense within the framework of ideational theories.

Nor do religious market theories hold much promise as a way of understanding patterns of confessional party formation and strength. These 'supply-side theories of religion' argue that religious freedom and the accompanying competition between numerous denominations promote religious vitality, while religious homogeneity breeds stultifying complacency and eventual spiritual decline (Andreoni and Payne 2003; Chaves and Gorski

2001; Hungerman 2013; McBride 2008, 2010; McCleary and Barro 2006; Montgomery 2003; Perl and Olson 2000; Stark and Bainbridge 1985, 1987; Stark and Finke 1988, 1992, 2000; Stark and Iannaccone 1994; Warner 1993). As already noted, however, religiously homogenous countries like Italy, France, and Spain (all of which were 97 % Catholic in 1900) witnessed starkly different patterns of religious party development. The overall validity of religious market theory is also a matter for debate (Breault 1989; Chaves and Gorski 2001; Verweij, Ester, and Nauta 1997; Voas, Olson, and Crockett 2002). The subsequent chapters will assess the relative validity of each of these three theories through an eclectic methodology including quantitative and historical analysis.

The theoretical framework of religious party formation and strength presented here draws inspiration from the works of Stathis Kalyvas (1996), Sheri Berman (2003), and Anna Grzymala-Busse (2015), among others. It also incorporates bits and pieces from the existing literature, in an effort to remake these partial views of religious politics into an integrated, coherent whole:

- From modernization theory I borrow the structural-functionalist insight that all religious communities – notwithstanding their doctrinal differences -, are functionally similar organizations that respond to the same incentives and whose behaviour can be explained by a universal theory that applies equally in Rome, Mecca, Varanasi, and Najaf.
- From ideational theory I borrow the insight that, in the real world, religious denominations exhibit different patterns of behaviour that must be accounted for (for instance, Catholic countries are more likely to have religious parties than Protestant


ones). How do I square the circle of *theoretical uniformity* and *empirical diversity*? As explained later in the chapter, I argue that the different propensities for political activism of different religious denominations are not explained by their doctrine but the historical legacies that allowed some religions (like Catholicism) to remain independent of the secular state, while others (like Eastern Orthodoxy) were integrated into state bureaucracies (de Swaan 1988:84–85).

- From religious market theory I borrow the focus on the state as the main determinant of religious party formation and strength. I argue that religious parties are unlikely to exist when successive governments are sympathetic to the interests of religion communities. In such a *proclerical* context, religious groups prefer exercising their influence behind the scenes because they loathe entering into the partisan arena of electoral politics. Only when the alliance of throne and altar collapses and the state turns from ally to antagonist do we find religious groups making the fateful decision to form political parties and use the ballot box to restore their lost influence. In turn, the success of religious parties after they are formed is determined by the infrastructural power of the state. Religious parties thrive when weak states are incapable of providing basic services, leaving a welfare vacuum eagerly filled by religious charities that help the needy, educate the children, and heal the sick. By contrast, strong states who are able to provide the amenities their citizens expect will crowd out religious charities and reduce confessional political parties to little more than bit players.

1.2. Empirical Patterns

Figure 1.1 illustrates the historical trends of religious party development between 1800 and 2015. The left panel depicts the total number of active religious political parties, while the right panel shows the percentage of seats in the lower legislative chamber occupied by religious parties in the same period (both panels show ten-year averages). The graphs are based on an original dataset of religious parties collected for this dissertation, which will be introduced later.

Figure 1.1 - Total Number and Average Seat Share of Religious Parties, 1800-2015



Note: Values reflect smoothed ten-year averages.

Figure 1.1 depicts a fairly steady trend of growth in both the number of religious political parties and their share of parliamentary seats. To the best of my knowledge, the first


explicitly religious party was formed in 1846, when a Catholic group organized to contest Landtag elections in the Grand Duchy of Baden (Freund 1981:65; Herzog 1994:276). The number of religious parties rose steadily from the mid-nineteenth century onward, reaching fifteen in 1900, twenty-seven in 1929, and plateauing in the low thirties until the Third Wave of democratization, when newly competitive elections attracted the attention of religious groups in Latin America, Africa, and Asia (Huntington 1991:46–47). The right panel tells a similar story with regard to the average seat share of religious parties, rising gradually from the 1850s until the crest of the Second Wave of democratization in 1929, declining sharply during the immediate post-war years, and increasing once again with the beginning of the Third Wave in 1974. The sheer pervasiveness of religious political parties and their increasing strength in legislative chambers all over the globe is one of the most significant political developments of the last two centuries.

1.3. The Argument in Brief

In this dissertation, I develop a theory of religious party formation and strength that focuses on government policy and state capacity. Figure 1.2 displays a schematic version of my account. I argue that religious party formation is primarily determined by anticlerical policies put in place by state-building elites (Grzymala-Busse 2015:11). In the absence of a sustained anticlerical campaign, religious communities prefer to reach a *modus vivendi* with the state in which they are given control over key policy areas like education and welfare provision. Claiming that religious policy influences confessional party formation, however, begs a further question: what determines whether governments adopt anticlerical or

proclerical policies? I argue that anticlerical policy adoption is determined by two factors. First, anticlericalism is more likely to occur when religious communities have higher levels of institutional autonomy, that is, when they are organizationally separate from the state (D. Martin 1978a:69; Philpott and Shah 2006:39–40). Sociologists of religion use the term ‘differentiation’ to denote the jurisdictional separation of religion and state (Casanova 1994:11–12), which in practice means that the state exerts no control over religious personnel, finances, doctrines, etc. Institutional autonomy has deep historical roots (Green and Viaene 2012:5–8). The Protestant Reformation in the sixteenth century, for instance, left established Churches like the Anglican Church under the caesaropapist control of the state, while the transnational Catholic Church retained a margin of autonomy that led to epic confrontations with the secular state in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Transnational religious communities with a power base that extends across state borders are more likely to clash with the state – especially during the state-building period, when elites frown upon any challenges to their territorial sovereignty. By contrast, ‘established’ religious groups are dependent on the state – indeed, they *are* an arm of the state – and their subservience and meekness makes them an unlikely object of anticlericals’ wrath (Casanova 1994:22). Following the same logic, organized religious communities with well-defined hierarchies and clear boundaries between members and non-members are more likely to be easily co-opted by the state. In the extreme case of an extremely hierarchical religion, the state only needs to control the head of the religious community to achieve compliance with its wishes. On the other hand, organizationally amorphous religious communities that have no clear boundaries between members and non-members, or between clergy and laity, are much harder for states to control and thus more likely to be the target of anticlerical attacks.

Figure 1.2 - Theory of Religious Party Formation and Strength



As Figure 1.2 suggests, politicians' strategic motivations are the second determinant of whether they pursue an anticlerical or a proclerical religious policy. Anticlericalism is not entirely predetermined by religions' institutional autonomy. The individual decision-making of political leaders is also influenced by their perceptions of how religious policy will help further their careers, promote an ideological agenda, or even serve the well-being of their country. As an extensive literature in political science points out, however, political leaders' foremost goal is to retain office¹ (Laver and Schofield 1990:40; Müller and Strøm 1999:5–6; Riker 1962:33). In order to understand politicians' decisions to adopt anticlerical or proclerical

¹ This does not necessarily mean that political leaders only value holding office because they enjoy the spoils, perquisites, and power that being in government entails. As Budge and Laver (1986:490) note, "office may be valued only instrumentally for the ability that it gives to influence policy outputs." Even the most ideological of politicians would be happy to hold office in order to further her policy agendas.

policies, therefore, we must ascertain whether the adoption of a given policy strengthens or weakens leaders' hold on power. In Chapter 2 I develop a formal model of religious policy-making that looks at the three-way interaction between political leaders, the opposition, and religious communities, to generate specific predictions about the circumstances in which anticlericalism is adopted. Anticlerical policies bring both benefits (expropriation of religious assets) and costs (contestation by clergy and laity) to political leaders. I argue that political leaders adopt anticlerical policies when the benefits of fighting religious communities exceed the costs of engaging in a *Kulturkampf*. The yardstick through which leaders compare costs and benefits is their relative power vis-à-vis the opposition: if they expect that anticlericalism will strengthen their hold on power, they will eagerly adopt it; if they anticipate that a protracted *Kulturkampf* will embolden the opposition, they will reach an accommodation with religious groups (Gill 2008:53; Grzymala-Busse 2015:51).

Thus, the institutional autonomy of religious groups and political leaders' strategic attempts to strengthen their hold on office jointly shape religious policy-making. In turn, anticlericalism is a necessary and sufficient condition for religious party formation. Religious leaders usually loathe partisan politics and would much prefer to exercise their influence over government officials behind the scenes, for two main reasons (Grzymala-Busse 2015:11). First, assuming that religious communities want to maximize their influence and minimize their costs, having direct access to political leaders is preferable to exerting indirect influence through electoral mobilization. Second, there is a basic ideological disconnect between religion's lofty claims to universalism, spirituality, and moral absolutes and the partisanship and messy compromises that form an inevitable part of political life (Kalyvas 1996:48; Turner 2013:1). Religious groups that engage in open partisanship are often censured for being more

concerned with narrow self-interest than with saving souls and pursuing the public good. Therefore, religious communities only sponsor confessional parties once intense anticlerical campaigns leaves them no other channel to influence policy.

Once confessional parties are created, their success or failure is shaped by the infrastructural power of the state, that is, “the capacity of a state ... to actually penetrate society and implement logistically political decisions throughout the realm” (Mann 2012b:13). Weak states are unable to deliver basic public services, forcing citizens to rely on religious charitable associations to educate their children and support them in times of need. When religious organizations fulfil individuals’ social needs, they naturally make their audiences receptive to their pious message. As an Egyptian government minister noted of the Muslim Brotherhood (quoted in Berman 2003:261), Islamists seek to “gain the support of the average Egyptian one by one, inch by inch, through the provision of welfare facilities, Islamic schools, Islamic clinics, technical schools, economic institutions for profit, social insurance, monthly payments for the poor,” and much else besides. Therefore, weak states serve as a fertile soil for flourishing confessional parties, whose power is underpinned by thriving religious charitable networks. By contrast, strong states who fulfil the socioeconomic needs and wants of their citizens effectively squeeze out religious charities and undermine the fortunes of confessional political parties (Zylberberg 1990:88–92).

1.3. Contributions to the Literature

This dissertation surveys confessional party formation and strength over more than two centuries. Although there is a rich and growing literature on the topic, this study is original inasmuch as it presents an integrated theoretical account of religious party development that travels across all denominations, explaining not only the process of party formation but also the divergent electoral fortunes of confessional parties. I make five contributions to the existing literature. First, the dissertation furthers our historical understanding of the conditions of religious party development through the compilation and analysis of a comprehensive dataset on the electoral performance of all religious parties in the world between 1800 and 2015, which will be publicly available for other scholars to use and conduct their own research.

Second, to the best of my knowledge, this is the first attempt to explain confessional party formation and strength across all religious backgrounds and over a long period of time. There is a rich scholarly literature on religious politics, but for the most part it focuses on case studies of single countries or comparative analyses of countries sharing a common religious tradition².

² Some excellent comparative studies across religious traditions include Kalyvas's (2000) comparative analysis of religious parties in Belgium and France; Altinordu's (2010) comparison of confessional parties in Germany and Turkey; Riesebrodt's (1993) parallel analysis of religious fundamentalism in the United States and Iran; and Tepe's (2008) comparison of the politics of religion in Turkey and Israel. While this dissertation is indebted to these path-breaking studies, it is innovative inasmuch as I employ statistical methods to analyse a comprehensive dataset on *all* religious parties, going beyond the case-study pairs of the aforementioned authors.

Third, although social scientific studies of the relationship between religion and politics go back at least to the early twentieth century with the works of Max Weber (1958) and Émile Durkheim (2001), none of the many works on the topic have jointly analysed the issues of religious party formation and durability. I do so here by positing distinct causal mechanisms for the two phenomena. In fact, it is unlikely that the mechanisms that *create* a confessional political party are similar to those that *reproduce* it over time (Levite and Tarrow 1983:299). Explaining the fate of religious political parties after their founding projects are abandoned requires going beyond the theory of why parties begin to craft an account focused on the mechanisms that allow parties to retain the support of considerable portions of the electorate in free and fair elections. Thus, my dissertation purports to explain the two processes of religious party development not on the basis of an artificially monocausal explanation but by clearly distinguishing the two processes at work: anticlerical policies lead to the formation of confessional parties; and weak states favour their continued durability and strength.

Fourth, my theoretical framework goes beyond simplistic dichotomies of presence/absence of religious parties to study the intermediate category of *weak* religious parties, something that scholars have somewhat artificially shunted into one or another binary categorization. For instance, Stathis Kalyvas's otherwise excellent account of religious party formation devotes a chapter to answer the question of "why didn't a confessional party emerge in France?" (Kalyvas 1996:115); while Kimberly Morgan (2003:274) explains matter-of-factly that "the intensity of the clerical-anticlerical cleavage in France also impeded the formation of Christian democratic parties." As we shall see, a confessional party did emerge

in France in 1901 - earlier than it did in Italy, the Christian Democratic country *par excellence* - and became a mainstay of French politics in one guise or another until overrun by the Gaullist juggernaut in the 1960s. My novel theoretical category of weak religious parties allows us to make sense of cases like France, instead of forcing them to conform to a presence/absence dichotomy that is not necessarily realistic.

Finally, my theory also speaks to a broader academic literature on party formation. Aldrich (1995) crafted a theory of 'internally mobilized parties' (to use the terminology in Shefter 1977:417) that develop as alliances of legislators who make coalitions to solve social choice problems that are prevalent in democratic policymaking. But 'externally mobilized parties' – that is, those parties that emerge from bottom-up social groups instead of top-down coalitions of lawmakers – necessarily emerge for other reasons and are confronted with a different set of challenges. The rationalist academic literature on party formation has established that ambitious politicians should not join new disadvantaged or anti-systemic parties (Aldrich and Bianco 1992; Cox 1997; Rohde 1979; Schlesinger 1966, 1991), but on this basis alone, confessional political parties are unlikely to ever form since they represent social groups viewed with suspicion and downright hostility on the part of the anticlerical state. From a rational choice point of view, prospective confessional party activists should simply 'sell out' to the established political parties if they want to have a long and distinguished career in politics. If ambitious politicians desert challenger parties, they will only be able to attract ideological fanatics for whom the trappings of office exert no particular attraction (Greene 2007:10–11). My theory makes it clear that in contexts of weak state capacity, however, start-up parties might actually have advantages over established ones, if like religious parties (or social democratic parties) they can tap into a vibrant civil society

organizational network to provide public services like education and healthcare to mobilize potential voters. Externally mobilized parties therefore do not have to rely exclusively on ideological fanatics; if they can access an extensive social network, they may be able to successfully challenge the mainstream parties that control the state machinery of patronage and therefore provide a more attractive choice for aspiring politicians.

1.4. Testing the Theory

Empirical testing in the social sciences is often characterized by a trade-off between breadth and depth. This dissertation employs both extensive quantitative and intensive qualitative testing, giving us different yet complementary pieces of evidence on which to assess the merits of the theory. Quantitative analysis tests the broadest possible set of cases, providing a fruitful first evaluation of the causal relationship between independent and dependent variables. Large-N quantitative analysis is indispensable to whether the theory travels across cases, with the added advantage that it allows the researcher to test a broader gamut of alternative explanations more carefully than would be possible by qualitative evidence alone (Goldthorpe 1991:214; King, Keohane, and Verba 1994:104; Lijphart 1975:163). Thus, the quantitative analysis of Chapter 3 uses statistical methods to assess whether the theory of religious party development holds up for a large number of observations - as many as ninety-two countries between 1800 and 2015, for a total of 963 observations, building on a dataset of all religious political parties in national legislative elections collected for this dissertation.

In addition to quantitative evidence, I also test the theory through careful comparative historical analysis of select case studies. As the familiar dictum that “correlation is not causation” suggests, quantitative analysis of observational data is insufficient to establish causal relationships. Even if the statistical analysis produces strong evidence in favour of a strong association between two variables, comparative historical analysis is indispensable to identify the mechanisms through which causation occurs. Accordingly, in Chapters 4 through 6 I rely on *process tracing* to tease out the causal mechanisms underpinning religious party development in four Catholic-majority and two Sunni-majority countries (Brady, Collier, and Seawright 2006:255–56; George and Bennett 2005:204–32; Mahoney 2003:360–67; Thelen and Mahoney 2015:10). Process tracing obeys a logic of causation different from statistics (George and Bennett 2005:153–66), which greatly strengthens confidence in the validity of the results if the causal mechanisms uncovered by the qualitative evidence coincide both with theoretical expectations and quantitative findings (Tarrow 2010:178, 2019:10).

Chapters 4 and 5 provide an in-depth test of the theory through comparative historical analyses of France, Spain, Italy, and Québec, while Chapter 6 extends the theory to the Sunni Muslim countries of Albania and Turkey. The case studies help disentangle the causal mechanisms driving the adoption of anticlerical policies, elucidate how confessional party formation is a response to anticlericalism, and examine how weak states incapable of providing public services serve as breeding-grounds for mighty religious political parties.

1.4.1. Case Selection for Comparative Historical Analysis

There are six reasons – both theoretical and practical – why I chose the aforementioned six countries for comparative historical analysis. First, I deliberately selected cases that allow me to rule out alternative hypotheses, which complements the cross-national quantitative analysis of Chapter 3. Second, I analyse four Catholic-majority nations (Spain, France, Québec, and Italy) and two-Sunni Muslim majority countries (Albania and Turkey) to show that the causal mechanisms I put forward are not limited to a specific culture or region. Third, I chose countries where confessional parties emerged early in the twentieth century, like France, together with countries like Turkey where a religious party was formed more recently. This comparison shows that my theory works across vastly different historical periods. Fourth, I selected three cases that did not develop religious political parties (Spain, Québec, and Albania) and three cases that did (France, Italy, and Turkey) to show that differences in the explanatory variables suggested by my theory do in fact account for cross-case variation in religious party formation.

Fifth, the analysis of Chapter 5 focuses on two countries of similar religious background, social structure, and size – France and Italy – to explain why a confessional political party came to dominate trans-Alpine politics but failed to make a dent in Gallic political life. Finally, the choice of Albania and Turkey for the paired comparison of Chapter 6 is explained by the fact that the two countries have a long shared history as two European Muslim-majority nations, together with similar socioeconomic profiles appropriate for a typical ‘method of difference’ comparison (Mill 1875).

1.5. Plan for the Thesis

In the following chapter, I present a general theory of religious party formation and strength. I claim that religious parties are created in reaction to sustained anticlerical campaigns led by state-building elites. I also craft a formal model of anticlerical policymaking that shows how political leaders' decision to embark on an anticlerical course is determined by their overriding objective of remaining in office, which in turn depends on (1) the strength of the opposition and (2) whether an anticlerical campaign will strengthen political leaders' hold on power or end up benefiting the opposition.

Chapter 3 examines the sources of religion party formation and strength through a statistical analysis of a new dataset involving all democratic elections between 1800 and 2015. The analysis shows how my theory accounts for historical trends and processes with a considerable degree of accuracy, while most – but not all – existing theories cannot explain the empirical patterns.

Chapters 4 to 6 move from abstract statistical analyses at high levels of generality to the comparative historical analysis of carefully selected cases. In Chapter 4, I compare four Catholic electoral democracies – France, Spain, Italy, and the Canadian province of Québec - from the second half of the nineteenth century to the end of the First World War. The populations of these four nations were all overwhelmingly Catholic, but religious parties only formed in France and Italy while being conspicuous by their absence in Spain and Québec. At

the root of this divergence lies the different religious policy choices of each nation's state-building elites. Spanish Restoration monarchy politicians and Québec pre-Quiet Revolution elites carefully cultivated the Catholic Church, establishing close links with the ecclesiastical hierarchy and allowing the clergy to control the provision of important public goods, especially education. Catholics had no need to form their own political party: at least in the policy domains they cared about, they controlled *all* existing establishmentarian parties. By contrast, in Third Republican France and Liberal Italy, the state collided with the established prerogatives of the Catholic Church. Faced with a hostile state determined to brook no intermediary bodies between itself and individual citizens, Catholics fought back by creating a counterculture where the faithful could live encapsulated within a pious world, reading religious newspapers, frequenting religious schools, belonging to religious unions, and obtaining loans from religious banks. This vibrant counterculture ultimately served as the foundation for the turn-of-the-century confessional parties in both France and Italy.

Chapter 5 picks up where the previous chapter left off, studying the divergent fates of French and Italian religious parties. In France, political Catholicism had some moments of glory but was unable to maintain its popularity for long; in Italy, by contrast, a Christian Democratic party formed part of all government coalitions from the fall of Fascism until the fall of the Berlin Wall. I show how the strength of Italian political Catholicism and the weakness of the French confessional party were determined by the infrastructural power of the respective states. The Italian state, a patchwork put together in the mid-nineteenth century, is not uniformly inept. Indeed, in some regions – especially in the Piedmontese hinterland around Turin – the Italian state exhibits high levels of infrastructural power. In other areas of the country, however, the state is inefficient and public service provision

extremely lacking, opening up a social vacuum deftly exploited by the Catholic Church and its associated charitable services. In turn, voters grateful for the help they received from the Church underpinned the extraordinary success of the Christian Democrats during the Cold War (Banfield and Banfield 1967:25–26). By contrast, the high-capacity French state of the Third Republic sent *instituteurs* to every corner of the hexagon to impart secular values to children. Faced with an efficient state that crowded out private religious charity, French confessional parties were unable to mobilize sustained electoral support. The only exception to the generalized political weakness of French Catholicism – the years immediately following the Second World War, when a Catholic party topped the polls for the only time in French electoral history – strengthens rather than undermines my theory, for it shows how in a period of state collapse, the Church briefly became an important provider of charity once again and this translated into fleeting support for the French confessional party.

Chapter 6 extends the argument to confessional parties rooted in a different religious tradition: Sunni Islam. I show that my focus on state capacity helps understand the dynamics of religious party triumph in Turkey and failure in Albania. The Albanian state, propped up by decades of a ferociously anticlerical Communist dictatorship, successfully eliminated the independent political power of Sunni Islam in the country and made it impossible for a religious party to emerge. The more open Turkish state crafted by Mustafa Kemal in the post-First World War period also tried to eliminate Islam as a political force, but unlike Albania it was unable to use totalitarian methods to ruthlessly eradicate religion entirely from the public sphere. As a result, a Turkish Islamist party surged back with a vengeance, winning its first election in 2002 and using the new-found power to build its own hegemonic dictatorship.

Chapter 7 concludes by highlighting the theoretical and empirical implications of the argument for our understanding of religious politics and the study of party formation more broadly.

Chapter 2: Theorizing Religious Party Development

“Your first action should be to put your own teachers in the schools to battle the monks for influence among the youth. Teachers and activists must be the direct conduits of your policy. The government must build more water wells to show the people that they, not the monks, are more concerned about their economic needs.”

- Joseph Stalin to Mongolian Prime Minister Peljidiin Genden, 1934 (in Kotkin 2018:363–64).

This chapter develops my study’s theoretical approach to understanding religious party formation and strength. A recent survey of the literature on religion and politics concluded that we “need a richer account of the social and political resonance of religion” (Grzymala-Busse 2012:429). Here I answer that call to arms. My theoretical perspective highlights both long-term institutional forces (religion’s institutional autonomy) and purposeful action (political leaders’ strategic considerations) to explain the adoption of anticlerical policies. Anticlericalism, in turn, drives religious party formation. Variations in the strength of confessional political parties are explained by a long-term structural variable - state capacity. High-capacity states are able to provide social goods that crowd out religious charities and undermine the civil society network associated with confessional parties; low-capacity states are powerless to satisfy their citizens’ demands for public goods, leaving a void eagerly filled by religious associations that underpin successful confessional parties.

2.1. Definitions

The comparative questions asked in this dissertation require a well-defined conceptual framework that, while sensitive to variations between different religious traditions, is sufficiently wide to avoid missing the forest for the trees. Accordingly, in this section I define the central concepts around which my broader theory is built.

2.1.1. Religious Actors

My concern in this dissertation is not with religion *per se*, but with organized groups acting on behalf of religion. Following Stark and Finke (2000:91), *religion*³ is understood here as a collection of ideas that “specify the fundamental meaning of life: how we got here and where we are going.” Meanwhile, organized *religious groups* are “social enterprises whose primary purpose is to create, maintain, and supply religion to some set of individuals and to support and supervise their exchanges with a god or gods” (Stark and Finke 2000:103). Membership of these religious groups is exclusive, as one cannot be simultaneously, say, Christian and Muslim⁴. All organized religious communities have specialized personnel – priests, monks, imams –, whose job is to interpret, explain, and guide the broader group of lay

³ Throughout the dissertation, I will use the terms ‘spirituality’, ‘faith’, and ‘religiosity’ interchangeably despite the somewhat different meanings they might have.

⁴ This definition does not disqualify open religious groups, such as Baptist Christians, whose decentralized belief system admits many different interpretations of the faith. My claim of exclusivity is not doctrinal but organizational, in the sense that being organizationally linked with a specific religious group precludes an individual from joining another religious group.

faithful as they build their personal relationship with a deity or deities. Following Herbert Spencer (1862:viii, 1893), I use the term “*ecclesiastical*” to identify religious specialists, which has the benefit of travelling across different religious traditions.

With rare exceptions, ecclesiastics in the major religious traditions are professionals, whose religious work is their full-time job (Fabbe 2019:18). Like the proverbial bureaucrat seeking to enlarge her government department, ecclesiastics also want their particular religious community to grow as much as possible⁵ (Gill 1999:70–84). For an individual ecclesiastical, professional and personal success depends on her ability to increase the number of souls saved. The theoretical models of this study are built on the core assumption that religious groups’ primary motivation is to capture as many adherents as possible.⁶

2.1.2. Public Goods and Social Services

Before moving on to analyse how religious provision of public goods underpins the strength of confessional political parties, I specify what constitutes a public good and what kind of public goods religious organizations provide. Public goods have two defining characteristics:

⁵ In addition to seeking maximization of adherents, ecclesiastics also they also seek to enforce commitment to the established doctrine. In other words, they care about not only the breadth of religious adherence (number of people) but also about its depth (strength of the beliefs of each individual).

⁶ Not all religions seek to maximize the number of adherents. Some religious cults are highly exclusive and selective, preferring to have a small but very dedicated number of followers rather than a large but shallow pool of occasional churchgoers (Yinger 1970:257). By virtue of their exclusivity, sects are unlikely to form the basis for political parties and thus will not be the subject of study in this dissertation.

they are nonexcludable⁷ (it is unfeasible to exclude certain groups from their use) and nonrivalrous (one user's consumption does not obstruct another's use of the good). Generally speaking, the concept of public goods is fairly extensive and can comprise transport infrastructure, energy, telecommunication networks, markets, and security. While there are certainly examples of religious communities dabbling in these various activities, here I focus on a narrower subset of public goods: social services. These encompass a range of policies devised to redistribute income and mitigate risk (Warner et al. 2015:190). Religious communities are especially involved in the provision of basic services like health care, schooling, or direct income assistance⁸ (Haggard and Kaufman 2008:3). The religious communities examined in this study provide social services directly to citizens through their particular programs and facilities.

2.2. Building Blocks

All social scientific theories rely on assumptions - sometimes explicitly, most often implicitly. In this section I set out the four basic assumptions underpinning my theory of religious parties, allowing readers to judge their plausibility for themselves:

⁷ To the extent that religious communities restrict access to their services to coreligionists, they may be more accurately described as 'club goods,' which are excludable and nonrivalrous (Buchanan 1965).

⁸ A different type of social services mitigate risk through insurance schemes designed to cushion life-cycle and market-based vulnerabilities such as unemployment or ill health. Religious groups have often been involved in insurance systems of this kind, although in this study I focus mainly on the direct provision of health care, education, and poor relief.

1. All across the world on the eve of the nineteenth century, religion and state were institutionally differentiated yet tightly allied with one another.
2. As part of their alliance with the state, religious communities were given a free hand in providing education, healthcare, and poor relief.
3. Despite performing broadly similar functions, religious communities differed in the extent of their institutional autonomy from the state.
4. During the last two centuries, state-building processes gave bureaucratic apparatuses the capacity to provide social services directly to citizens, marginalizing the role of religion in education, healthcare, and poor relief.

I now discuss each in turn.

2.2.1. Institutional Differentiation, Political Alliance

Throughout human history and up to the onset of the nineteenth century, religion and state were institutionally differentiated yet closely allied (Iannaccone and Berman 2006:121; Marshall 2013:10). As a French bishop proclaimed, “*rien n’est plus naturel que l’alliance de la religion avec la politique*” (quoted in Aston 1992:31). This alliance of throne and altar was present in similar forms across the world, with states providing religious groups with legal, financial, and military support in return for the basic legitimacy bestowed to the state by religious groups⁹ (Eisenstadt 1962:283). Both organizations were integrated into “organic,

⁹ The alliance of religion and government was ideologically cemented by the conviction that a single faith was essential to civil order and formed a vital element of the social fabric.

holistic systems of authority” (Toft, Philpott, and Shah 2011:57). One of the consequences of the alliance of throne and altar was that the state voluntarily allowed religious communities to assume key social responsibilities like education, which was tremendously important for religion as a source of self-legitimation and transmission of inter-generational norms (Martin 2005:84).

The alliance between throne and altar assumed strikingly similar institutional configurations across different religious traditions. From Christian Europe to the Muslim Middle East and to Buddhist Southeast Asia, the traditional state-religion relationship all over the globe displayed two similar characteristics: state and religion were institutionally distinct from one another,¹⁰ and they were linked into a mutually beneficial alliance (Koster, Meijers, and Wolf 1991:10). As a recent survey of the state-religion nexus puts it, “varied relationships between religious and political authority over vast periods of history – Buddhist, Muslim, Hindu, and Christian – are impressive for another reason: they show how much these forms of relationship had in common” (Toft et al. 2011:52). A typical example was the relation between the Buddhist ecclesiastical community and the Chinese state in the classical era. The Buddhist hierarchy in China “considered itself to be a community beyond the authority of the secular rulers ... no longer *obliged* to reverence and render homage to the secular rulers of the state” (Chen 1973:65; emphasis added), but simultaneously it cooperated with the government “to ensure that the spiritual forces of the universe would work for the benefit of

¹⁰ By institutional distinctiveness I mean that there were clear organizational boundaries between religion and state. The Vatican state is a contemporary example of a polity in which religion and state are *not* institutionally differentiated.

the empire and not bring about any spiritual mishap” (Chen 1973:109; also Ferejohn and Rosenbluth 2010:2–3; McMullin 1985:16).¹¹

Notwithstanding Huntington’s (1996) claims of the unique propensity of Islam towards theocracy, even Muslim religious communities carved out their own autonomous institutional sphere after the death of Muhammad (Eickelman and Piscatori 2004:46–47). The total merging of religious and political authority in the person of the Prophet “was lost in the early centuries of Islam”¹² (Lapidus 1975:365; also Marín 2011:698; Marshall 2013:11–12; Schneier 2015:11). Even in the early Caliphates, there were recurrent clashes between Islamic ecclesiastics and political rulers due to the eagerness with which the former displayed their independence (Lapidus 1996:8–12). Because the Islamic *ulema* were the repository of sacred knowledge, they were endowed with a moral authority that political and military elites lacked (Richards 1995:36). Yet these elites needed precisely that moral clout to legitimize to their rule, making them dependent upon the cooperation of the *ulema* (Marín 2011:700).

¹¹ Likewise, in Japan, “in the Nara period there developed an understanding of the relation between Buddhism and the state according to which those two phenomena mutually supported and reinforced each other” (McMullin 1985:17).

¹² The Abbasid Empire, which existed between the eighth and thirteenth centuries, presided over a geographic separation of religious and political authority, as the governing bureaucracy was located in Baghdad and the centre of religious scholarship in Mecca (Schneier 2015:11).

2.2.2. Religious Supply of Social Goods: Healthcare and Poor Relief

The functional similarities between different religious communities across the world went beyond the purely political alliance of throne and altar. As suggested earlier, before the nineteenth century religious communities across the world all played a key role in the provision of three public goods: education, healthcare, and poor relief.¹³ For most of human history, states were virtually absent from individuals' daily lives¹⁴ and played no role in social service provision of any kind. Even had they wanted to, pre-modern states simply did not have the infrastructural power to manage the large bureaucracies required to run schools and hospitals on a national scale (Kaspersen and Lindvall 2008:125). Making a virtue out of necessity, states left the task of social provision entirely in the hands of religious communities.¹⁵

Pre-modern states benefitted in many ways from religious efforts to support the poor and the sick, which is why they encouraged the activities of religious charities (de Swaan 1988:20–

¹³ Contemporary academics often call religious providers of public goods as “faith-based organizations” (Bielefeld and Cleveland 2013:468–69).

¹⁴ Except in times of war - which admittedly was a recurrent state of affairs. But even during wars, the state made no effort to provide the social services just mentioned. The doctrine of mercantilism led sixteenth-century European states to intervene in international trade, but even this was done with national security concerns in mind.

¹⁵ As suggested at the beginning of this chapter, religious communities often performed other public roles necessary to ensure social stability and economic efficiency (Pullan 1999:19). In medieval Europe, for instance, the Catholic Church operated financial institutions, regulated economic transactions, organized a legal system for arbitrating property rights and contracts, recorded births, deaths, and family lineages, and even financed military campaigns (Ekelund et al. 1996:85–168). Despite the multifaceted nature of religion's social roles, in this dissertation I will focus mainly on religious provision of poor relief, healthcare, and education.

22). Charity helped keep the poor away from insurrection and criminality, and prompt healthcare stopped people from becoming infected with diseases that might be contagious to others. Religious communities, on their part, looked upon healthcare and poor relief as essential instruments to “control community norms” (Lipset and Rokkan 1967:15) and “build trust among the community of potential followers, encourage participation in the religious organization, and capture revenue” (Gill and Lundsgaarde 2004:406). The paternalistic power of ecclesiastical authority over the well-being of the community underpinned religious influence in society, serving as the primary means of teaching religious values and rituals, thus entrenching the faith deeply in the daily lives of ordinary people (Brasher 2017:12; Fabbe 2019:45; Gill and Keshavarzian 1999:440; Iannaccone 1990:300; Shaw 2001:43). Pre-modern women and men could hardly live their lives without coming into contact with religious authority on a regular basis.

In sum, religious provision of public goods was not merely altruistic but conformed entirely to the long-term self-interest of religious communities. As game-theoretical and rational-choice frameworks taught us, however, just because an action is optimal from the point of view of society does not mean it will automatically take place. According to the religious economics framework, production of collective goods results only from the “self-interested decisions of strictly rational actors” (Iannaccone 1994:1185). If followed to its ultimate consequences, this logic seems to predict that religious communities should not be able to provide any social goods at all because of the free-rider problem, or what is often called the

“tragedy of the commons”¹⁶ (Hardin 1968:1244). In the real world, however, we know that religious communities *do* provide public goods, so they must be able to solve their collective action problems in some way. Rational-choice theory can be made compatible with the empirical reality by considering reputational and other-regarding preferences. As social beings, humans care about what others in their group think of them and fine-tune their behaviour accordingly (Ahmed 2009:368–74; Bulbulia and Sosis 2011:369–70; Putnam, Campbell, and Garrett 2010:455–68). Groups influence individual behaviour partly through norms and expectations.¹⁷ Acts of generosity like donating to charity increase the reputation of an individual within the group (Ahmed and Hammarstedt 2011:900–910; Atran and Henrich 2010:23–25; Hechter 1988:60–62; Lincoln 2003:6). Thus, individuals behave in an altruistic fashion because of group expectations – together with fear of group sanctions if those expectations are unmet (Tsai 2007:356–57). Religious groups in particular strongly value actions they consider moral and just, creating normative expectations that lead to cooperative and prosocial behaviour by group members (Abrams et al. 1990:98; Durkheim 2001:44; Kniss and Numrich 2007:56–57). In other words, religious individuals derive personal satisfaction from the process of helping others and of being seen to help others (Alcorta and

¹⁶ To be more precise, the ‘tragedy of the commons’ refers to the unrestrained consumption of common goods rather than the under-supply of public goods, but the underneath logic is similar. All actors gain when a certain goal is achieved – public good provision - but because the effort of each actor is not required to provide the public good as long as everyone else cooperates, each actor prefers to free ride on the efforts of others. If no one does anything because they expect everyone else to do something, the public good is not provided, making every individual actor worse off than if they had cooperated.

¹⁷ In hierarchical organizations like the Catholic Church, the collective action problem can be solved by third-party enforcement. As we will see in subsequent sections, however, religions like Sunni Islam lack formal hierarchical structures of this kind, and so the fact that they are still able to provide public goods is explained by individual inducements to cooperate of the reputational and normative kind discussed here.

Sosis 2013:577–78; Bulbulia and Sosis 2011:367–70; Collins 2004:42–44; Miller 1999:14; Warner et al. 2018:29). Public good provision by religious communities is entirely compatible with rational-choice theories.

In the remainder of this section I discuss the “overall similarities of practice” (Brown 2005:516) between different religious communities in their approach to social welfare.

2.2.1.1. Catholicism

The concept of helping the poor is deeply rooted in Catholic traditions, having “originated in the earliest days of Christianity” (Brasher 2017:11). As one Catholic cardinal put it, “the hospital is our cathedral” (quoted in Marshall 2013:155). Taking care of those in need was an ecclesiastical responsibility since at least the sixth century, assumed both by monastic institutions and the regular clergy (Horden 2005:370). Relief reached the poor chiefly through two routes: the sharing of alms (usually food or clothing) by churches and monasteries; or hostels/hospitals for pilgrims,¹⁸ for the physically and mentally ill, and for the elderly (Cohen 2005:4–5; de Swaan 1988:21). Either way, charitable institutions in Medieval Europe were operated exclusively by the Catholic Church¹⁹ (Brodman 2009:46).

¹⁸ Middle Ages’ societies did not rigidly separate healthcare and poor relief, as “most late medieval and early modern hospitals offered accommodation and simple bedside care for poor people unable to live on their own: because they were bedridden, old, disabled, and/or suffered from a debilitating disease” (McIntosh 2012:7).

¹⁹ The term “charity” itself, which comes from the Latin word *caritas*, originally referred to the Christian love between oneself and God as well as oneself and neighbours. Helping the less fortunate was a compassionate act that fell within the Christian injunctions to love one’s neighbour, which is how charity gradually acquired the specific connotation of benevolence to the poor (McIntosh 2012:6).

Historically, Catholic charities were highly decentralized, operating at the local level of the parish (Cavallo 1991:50–58; Sharot 2001:167). As early as the Middle Ages, bishops established the habit of cooperating with the laity in charitable associations, inviting lay groups like confraternities and tertiary mendicant orders to aid them in the provision of welfare, in a process not too dissimilar to ecclesiastical encouragement for lay formation of confessional political parties. After the Counter-Reformation, the Catholic Church imposed somewhat greater centralized control over the bewildering array of local hospitals, charities, and almshouses, although many continued to operate locally without interference from higher-ups in the Vatican (Grell and Cunningham 1999:5).

2.2.1.2. Protestantism

Despite all the heated polemics surrounding the Protestant Reformation, the role of religious communities in providing welfare in Protestant countries was essentially similar to their Catholic counterparts²⁰ (Pullan 2005:451). Protestant states delegated the task of providing poor relief to the established Church (Gill and Lundsgaarde 2004:407; Göran 1990:108; Monsma and Soper 1997:155; Pelletier and von Bueltzingsloewen 1999:211). As in

²⁰ Calvinism and Lutheranism, the two major mainstream Protestant currents in Reformed Europe, differed somewhat in their approach to charity. Martin Luther himself wrote the first Protestant poor law for the city of Wittenberg in the winter of 1520-1521, establishing a common treasury at the local level to administer charitable donations. This became a model for poor laws in the Lutheran world. Calvinist reformers, on the other hand, rejected a system of poor 'relief', which they associated with sloth. Instead, the able-bodied poor were put to work in a private, Calvinist-run workhouse (Kahl 2009:270–77). Unlike Lutherans, Calvinists thus did not assign any role to municipalities in the administration of their welfare efforts (Gorski 2003:130).

Catholic countries, the local parish Church was the centrepiece of poor relief efforts, overseeing the work of the able-bodied poor and running the almshouse in which the aged and the infirm were lodged (Polanyi 1944:80–119).

2.2.1.3. Islam

Islamic tradition associates charitable donations with the act of prayer, and deems poor relief to be an important moral duty (Atia 2013:6–7; Bonner 2005:392; Ener 2005:503; Lev 2009:235–36). The basic mechanism of charitable giving - the *zakat* - became a compulsory act of worship when the first Islamic state was founded by Prophet Muhammad. In Islamic doctrine, *zakat* is one of the ‘five pillars’ and must be given by Muslims at a rate of 2.5 percent of their wealth at the end of the year (Kuran 2003:280; Warner et al. 2018:29). Beneficiaries of this mandatory charity are detailed in the Koran: “alms expenditures are only for the poor and the needy” (Surah 9: 60).

Since medieval Islamic states “possessed no system of government-sponsored poor relief” (Arjomand 1998:110; also Cnaan and McGrew 2006:68; Ener 2005:504; Sabra 2000:32), the destitute were wholly dependent upon Islamic pious foundations financed by *zakat*²¹. The earliest historical evidence for the operation of Islamic charities comes from the eighth century, with references to the distribution of money to the poor in Egypt (Pahlitzsch

²¹ Interestingly, some Islamic jurists during the eighth century proposed the development of state-run charitable institutions. However, their operation “proved inefficient and corrupt, and it fell into desuetude” (Arjomand 1998:110). From the ninth century onwards, public charities seem to have completely vanished from the Muslim world.

2009:129). By the tenth century, Islamic charitable associations had become more institutionalized and standardized through the creation of the *waqf*²² (Kuran 2001:844, 2011:110; Lev 2009:245; Singer 2002:25). *Waqfs* were pious foundations financed by *zakat* and private endowments; they were managed by religious authorities under the purview of *sharia* law (Fortna 2002:91; McChesney 1991:14). Governments supported their activities of through tax exemptions, but otherwise left Islamic networks to manage the institution as they pleased. Indeed, a survey of the subject concluded that “there is no reference to a central state bureau regulating and monitoring *wafqs* all over the territory” (Arjomand 1998:127; also Kuran 2016:422–25; McChesney 1991:17). *Wafqs* quickly became ubiquitous in the Muslim world, playing a leading role in the provision of important community services, such as financing education; contributing to the upkeep of public buildings; delivering welfare for the poor and the indigent; financing hospitals and hotels;²³ or even distributing shared tools and utensils (McChesney 1991:3).

2.2.1.4. Judaism

Jewish religious communities played a similar role in the provision of welfare for their members. Medieval charitable enterprises “supported Jewish solidarity and acted as one of

²² The system of *waqfs* appears to be rooted in the charitable institutions of the Sassanid Iranian Empire, which were organized for “pious purposes” and supervised by a “bureau of religious institutions” (Arjomand 1998:110).

²³ Like their Christian counterparts, medieval Muslims did not neatly separate charity from healthcare (Ragab 2015:112). Hospitals operated as charitable institutions as part of “a network of support for the poor, travellers, the sick, and the disabled” (Ragab 2015:5), although medieval Islamic medicine was considerably more advanced than its European counterpart, with patients being cared for by specialized doctors and surgeons (Arjomand 1998:115).

the major agglutinates of Jewish communal life” (Cohen 2005:23). Jewish confraternities were vital corporations serving a multitude of roles, ranging from the dowering of orphan girls, to the teaching of poor children and the provision of medical care (Galinsky 2005:425). Jewish pious foundations (*heqdes*) – similar to the Islamic *waqfs* - functioned as the main institutions of religious charity²⁴ (Cohen 2005:200; Gil 1976:246–51; Green 2012:57; Queen 1996:26–28). For an ethnoreligious diaspora like the Jews, the solidarity provided by poor relief was essential to the maintenance of a sense of community in the midst of strong pressures to merge with the society at large (Bernfeld 2012:78–83).

2.2.1.5. Buddhism

Buddhists also regard charitable endeavours as a key tenet of religious life (Guruge and Bond 1998:92). Begging is considered virtuous in Buddhist tradition, being associated with virtues such as humility and austerity (Cnaan and McGrew 2006:69). In a pattern that is by now familiar to the reader, medieval Buddhist monasteries “received land from devoted donors” (Chen 1973:125) and, in addition to religious duties, served as hostels for travellers, hospitals for the sick, and resting places for the elderly and the destitute²⁵ (Chakravarti 1996:176; Chen 1973:300). Buddhist monks “performed many secular functions – they taught children the rudiments of literacy and math, attended to the villagers’ medical needs, advised

²⁴ Although it seems that only about ten percent of *heqdes* revenues benefited the poor directly, while the vast majority of the income was redirected to pay the wages of teachers or to maintain synagogues (Gil 1976:117).

²⁵ Buddhist ecclesiastical communities also used the income from charitable donations to organize large public works projects, such as building roads and bridges, clearing and deepening river channels, setting up common cloisters, digging wells, and planting trees (Chen 1973:300–301; King 2009:8; Weber 1958:267).

the village elders from a nonpartisan perspective, and counselled individuals – in addition to their more religious functions of teaching the Dharma, setting a moral example, and providing the villagers the opportunity to give and earn merit” (King 2009:9).

2.2.1.6. Hinduism

The role played by Hindu religious communities in poor relief is somewhat different from other religions because of the role of caste in Hindu doctrine (Viswanath 2014:179; Weber 1958:29). Poverty is seen by Hindus as an inescapable individual condition, the karmic result of immoral behaviour in previous life cycles (Cnaan and McGrew 2006:69). Nonetheless, Hinduism also claims that charity is a normatively positive action that will gain merit in the next life, providing the doctrinal justification for giving to those in need – even if the structure of inequality itself should not be interfered with (Gordon 1993:166). Thus, Brahmins in India took a leading role in providing services to the poor, orphans, sick and disabled (Cnaan and McGrew 2006:69–70). Hindus became especially active in the field of poor relief under British colonialism, with movements like the *Swaminarayan* taking over wide-ranging social welfare activities to preserve the identity of Hindus against the perceived dissolute effects of British rule (Marshall 2013:99–100).

2.2.3. Religious Supply of Social Goods: Education

Religious communities everywhere cherished their role as providers of charitable help to the needy, but the most important of all their prerogatives was control of education (Lijphart

1979:442–52; Lipset and Rokkan 1967:15). For millennia, the key role of religion in the worldly sphere was the transmission of knowledge. Education was essential for proselytization and for consolidating the faith - something recognized by the Prussian King Frederick the Great, who thought that Lutheran catechization was essential to ensure his subjects “*doch nicht katholisch werden*”²⁶ (quoted in de Swaan 1988:57). I now briefly discuss the historical evidence for the outsized role played by different religious communities in education.

2.2.3.1. Catholicism

After the fall of the Roman Empire, the Catholic Church founded an Europe-wide network of monastery and cathedral schools in which children were taught to read and write in Latin. Of course, this system included only a small elite²⁷ – but while very few people were educated at the time, almost everyone who did get an education received it from the Church. A study of a typical German medieval city²⁸ found that “ecclesiastical institutions administered all the schools located within the city until the beginning of the sixteenth century” (Sheffler 2008:21). Priests were made responsible for providing at least rudimentary instruction for capable enactment of the liturgy. In 1234, Pope Gregory IX issued a papal edict requiring every parish to employ a cleric qualified to lead a school (Sheffler 2008:22). While the teaching credentials of priests remained dubious and varied substantially from place to place,

²⁶ ‘Don’t become Catholic.’

²⁷ The historical estimates of medieval literacy are extremely uncertain, but the best current knowledge puts the figure of Western European adults who could read between one and five percent (Bowman and Woolf 1994:200).

²⁸ The city is Regensburg.

mendicant orders like the Franciscans and the Dominicans could always be counted on to produce skilled teachers, and for this reason they were frequently employed as private tutors to aristocratic children (Kienzle 2009:45). The educational activities of the Church were substantially expanded during the Counter-Reformation, with the Society of Jesus emerging as a Catholic religious order especially dedicated to education (Green 2013:116; Marshall 2013:111). While overall literacy levels in Catholic countries lagged behind their Protestant counterparts, they still made important strides towards mass elementary education in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The French Catholic Church was particularly ambitious, seeking to establish at least one elementary school per parish (Green 2013:38). The Church financed the enterprise entirely on her own - without help from the French state -, with the parish priest doubling as the teacher and the curriculum consisting exclusively of religious themes (Piettre 2010:30). The French experience was repeated – albeit on a smaller scale – in neighbouring Catholic countries like Portugal, Spain, and the Italian states.

2.2.3.2. Protestantism

From the moment they came into being, Protestant Churches sought to ensure free elementary education in the vernacular language for all children (Green 2013:37). Since Protestant doctrine required individuals to read the Word of God as written in the Bible, the acquisition of basic literacy skills was literally a sacred activity (Eavey 1964:155).²⁹ Both Martin

²⁹ Lipset and Rokkan (1967:15), in their discussion of the expansion of schooling after the Reformation, write that “the established national churches simply became agents of the state and had no reason to oppose” the development of compulsory education. In my view, this is misleading, inasmuch as it implies that the state was in command of the efforts to expand education and that churches were simply passive recipients of the state’s

Luther and John Calvin wrote texts on education, founded schools, and encouraged in every way possible the expansion of literacy to the masses. For Lutheran countries like Sweden and Denmark, Luther's catechism formed the core – and often the only – reading in the curriculum. Similarly, for Calvinist countries, “the state supported the school but the church controlled the aim, the methods, the curriculum, and the organization of education, even the teachers” (Eavey 1964:165).

2.2.3.3. Islam

The Islamic religion valued learning to such an extent that studying the holy texts was considered the highest form of worship (Goldziher 1926:198; Hefner and Zaman 2007:4). Indeed, apart from organizing prayer days, the most important responsibility of Islamic ecclesiastics is the provision of education. Because Islam lacks a initiatic clergy like the Catholic Church, the *ulema* are only given religious authority with the assumption of a teaching role (Marín 2011:679). By the tenth century, there is evidence that the *waqf* charitable institutions financed *madrasas* (Islamic schools) as institutions for learning sciences, Islamic customs, jurisprudence, and theology (Arjomand 1998:111; Marín 2011:686–87; Williamson 1987:26; Zhao et al. 2011:471). *Madrasas* were quite literally situated inside mosques, and the curriculum centred around memorization of the Koran (Gilbert 1980:128; Zhao et al. 2011:321). Because the *ulema* did not receive regular wages,

commands. On the contrary: not only did seventeenth century states lack the infrastructural power to build national education systems by themselves, but it was the religious community itself that led efforts to expand basic literacy to the entire population. It might be better said that the state had no reason to oppose the Church's expansion of education, not the other way around.

they had to supplement whatever income received through private donations by teaching in schools³⁰ and privately tutoring affluent children (Goldziher 1926:202; Gran 1998:77). This system lasted from the Middle Ages to the modern state-building period. As late as the nineteenth-century Ottoman Empire, *ulema* ecclesiastics were “integral” (Fortna 2002:13) to the operation of the school system, working as teachers and designing the course content. Education in the more distant provinces of the Empire, outside of the purview of the central bureaucracy, depended exclusively on travelling *ulema* missionaries.

2.2.3.4. Judaism

Jewish communities in medieval and early modern Europe were instructed in Talmud Torah elementary schools (Bernfeld 2012:98). As the name implies, these were religious schools; the curriculum centred upon analyses of biblical books with the assistance of *halakhic* commentaries³¹ (Bernfeld 2012:99–107; Saperstein 2018:410). Teaching usually started before the age of five - sometimes as early as three -, with an introduction to the Hebrew language of the Pentateuch (Saperstein 2018:412). This education system was not restricted to elites; instead, substantial donations from wealthy Jews allowed schools to cover a

³⁰ The morality of accepting salaries for teaching was an issue often discussed between Muslim jurists, but in the end the practical necessity to ensure that Islamic ecclesiastics had a source of income seems to have outweighed all other considerations (Goldziher 1926:202). Another source of income for the *ulema* was trade, with the ecclesiastics being at the forefront of Islamic expansion in Southeast Asia.

³¹ Although secular disciplines like Latin, mathematics, reading and writing, as well as vocational training, also constituted part of the curriculum.

significant portion of the population, a crucial mechanism to maintain the cohesion of the diaspora.³²

2.2.3.5. Buddhism

The Buddhist ecclesiastical community played a leading role as primary school teachers in medieval India, Myanmar and Sri Lanka, teaching elementary reading and writing skills together with religious instruction (Kahane 1981:358–59; Scharfe 2002:287–88; Weber 1958:242). Education was offered in Buddhist temples and monasteries by monks (*Bhikkus*), even if the students were laypeople (Zhao et al. 2011:469). Buddhist teachers' chief goal was to propagate their religion as a means to achieve liberation (*nirvana*), although the curriculum also comprised a secondary component of practical knowledge.

2.2.3.6. Hinduism

Traditional education in Hindu societies centred around the *guru*, a prestigious religious figure with exclusive access to sacred knowledge and values (Kahane 1981:359). For Hindus, the *guru* was much more than a teacher: he was also a counsellor, a hero, and an overall father figure (Acharuparambil 1980:3–4; Mlecko 1982:34). The *gurus* were almost always *Brahmins*, coming from a very select group of Hindu society's upper castes (Arnold 2000:8; Kahane 1981:358; Zhao et al. 2011:466–67). This narrowed the diffusion of education in

³² For instance, fifteenth-century wealthy Jews in Istanbul funded the education of hundreds of children recently arrived from Portugal and Spain (Saperstein 2018:411).

Hindu countries because the caste system specified that higher castes like *Brahmins* should not become polluted by interaction with lower castes. As a consequence, Hindu education was self-consciously limited to the upper castes,³³ although by the fifteenth century village schools emerged to provide basic instruction to ordinary citizens (Zhao et al. 2011:467). As in other religious contexts, there was a total “lack of state support for education” (Zhao et al. 2011:467), which was placed exclusively in the hands of religious scholars.

2.2.4. Variation in Religious Institutional Autonomy

For ideational theorists, the differences in political behaviour between different religious traditions are rooted in divergent beliefs and attitudes towards the appropriate role of religion in society (Cohen, Siegel, and Rozin 2003:287–95; Warner et al. 2015:193; Weber 1930). While I concur that different religions may exhibit distinct patterns of political activity – some being more associated with political activism, others displaying a record of passivity in political affairs -, I argue that this is not caused by the specific content of their religious doctrines but by their diverse formal institutional structures and rules,³⁴ or ‘polities’ in the terminology of sociologists of religion (McMullen 1994:712). Polities are the systems of norms and rules of ecclesiastical authority and provide the framework through which the

³³ Often lower castes ended up converting to Buddhism, which fiercely condemned inequality of birth (Zhao et al. 2011:468).

³⁴ By institution, I mean the “rules and procedures that structure social interaction by constraining and enabling actors’ behaviour” (Helmke and Levitsky 2004:727; also Meyer, Boli, and Thomas 1987:36–37). This definition dovetails with classic and contemporary works on religion that suggest that religion is an institution “that regulates religious discourse, practices, and community through formal or semiformal structures” (Lincoln 2003:7).

government of each religious community operates. Instead of focusing on immutable doctrines, my approach to the study of relations between religion and state portrays ecclesiasticals as flexible autonomous actors who manoeuvre to further their institutional interests. In particular, ecclesiasticals assume or revise their position vis-à-vis certain public policies given the specific institutional structure of the religion they represent (Gill and Keshavarzian 1999:434–35).

While there are countless institutional features of religious organizations that could influence their propensity to become politically active, here I will focus on the degree of *religious institutional autonomy*, that is, the extent to which the religious organization is independent from the state and impervious to co-optation by state authorities. There are two features conducive to institutional autonomy. First, religious communities are more independent to the extent that they have strong transnational ties that allow them to mobilize resources from outside the country against an anticlerical state (Green and Viaene 2012:8; Nexon 2004:251–53). By contrast, religious communities confined within state borders find it much harder to mobilize resistance against a hostile government – a general phenomenon of political conflict that Edward Gibson (2012:5) calls “boundary control”³⁵ (also Rokkan and Urwin 1983:4). The second factor conducive to religious institutional autonomy is the degree of formal hierarchical organization. Religious communities with weakly-defined hierarchies and low barriers to entry are harder to co-opt by states precisely because of their

³⁵ As Gibson (2012:24) explains, in any political conflict, “the stronger party’s main incentive is to keep the conflict as isolated and private as possible ... doing so maintains the unequal power match between the two, enabling the stronger party to prevail in the conflict ... expanding the scope of the conflict alters the balance of power between the two original parties.”

amorphous nature. Even when states seize control of the formal religious organization, dissidents can easily spring up to mobilize political opposition to the established church. By contrast, religions with well-defined hierarchies and formal organizations with high barriers to entry are easier to co-opt: once the government gains control of the religious leadership, it can easily push through reforms to transform ecclesiasticals into civil servants (Eickelman and Wright 2015:603; Fabbe 2019:6–7). Table 2.1 below shows in schematic form the transnational ties and formal organization of various world religions. I now briefly discuss each in turn.

Table 2.1 - Institutional Autonomy of World Religions

	Transnational Ties	Confined within National Boundaries
Formal Organization	Catholic Church; Shia Islam	Protestant Churches; Orthodox Church; Buddhism (Orthodox)
Amorphous Organization	Sunni Islam; Judaism	Buddhism (Engaged); Hinduism

2.2.4.1. Catholicism

The Catholic Church is one of the oldest and most elaborate institutions in history, possessing a vast international reach and managing countless distinct branches and associated

organizations and networks (Viaene 2012:83). The Church also has the unique feature of being simultaneously a religious organization and a sovereign state. In terms of governance, the Catholic Church is a highly centralized and strictly hierarchical institution³⁶ (O'Reilly and Chalmers 2014:208; Warner et al. 2018:34). From Rome, the Pope governs a tentacular structure that spreads downwards to dioceses (geographical divisions led by a bishop) and to parishes (led by a priest). According to Canon Law, the authority of the Pope is absolute:³⁷ “by virtue of his office, he has supreme, full, immediate and universal ordinary power in the Church, and he can always freely exercise this power” (quoted in Allen 2004:18–19). He also selects the bishops and cardinals who serve as connections between the Vatican and individual Catholics. In sum: the Catholic Church is a highly hierarchical institution beholden to no particular state, giving it the resources to act against anticlerical governments but also

³⁶ This portrait of the Catholic Church is far from complete without discussing the hundreds of associated religious orders. The orders are generally managed with considerable autonomy and have wide-ranging social functions, running schools, hospitals, and charitable institutions (Warner et al. 2018:34–35). One of the reasons why the Papacy makes such extensive use of religious orders is precisely because their transnational mobility makes them less dependent on the patronage and coercion provided by territorial states (Koster et al. 1991:13). What makes the role of congregations in Catholicism distinctive from those of other religions – such as Islamic Sufi orders or Buddhist monasteries – is their strict vertical integration and above all their unequalled ability to mobilize women as social workers, teachers, and nurses. The political success of (mostly) Catholic men was built upon the transnational groundwork in civil society that was carried out (mostly) by Catholic women (Viaene 2012:92).

³⁷ While papal infallibility was only formally proclaimed in 1870 at the First Vatican Council, the undisputed leadership of the Pope within the Church was by and large established in the early modern period (McMullen 1994:712). The Pope has had full executive, legislative, and judicial power over the Catholic Church for centuries.

making it easier for governments to co-opt if they strike a deal with the Papacy³⁸. In the terms of my theoretical framework, it should be moderately likely to engage itself in politics.

2.2.4.2. Protestantism

Protestantism is the most eclectic branch of Christianity, being considerably more divided than the Catholic or Orthodox Churches. There is no organizational unity or central human authority in Protestantism, although some Protestant denominations do have members in all corners of the globe. In Europe, most Protestant Churches were linked to the state as part of the *cuius regio, eius religio* standard adopted in the 1555 Augsburg and 1648 Westphalian Treaties. The three established Protestant Churches in Europe – Anglican, Lutheran, and Calvinist – differed greatly in their doctrinal understandings of Christianity but all were “absorbed and appropriated by the state” (Gorski 1999:149; also Kaspersen and Lindvall 2008:124). Thus, European Protestants by and large lacked the transnational sources of support with which to resist the anticlerical policies of an encroaching state.³⁹ In fact, to the extent that Protestant Churches were incorporated in state bureaucracies, they became in effect an arm of the state and gained a vested interest in supporting its expansion. As Clark and Ledger-Lomas (2012:23) put it, “the first loyalty of many Protestants was to established, territorial churches and to states rather than to an invisible church of true believers.”

³⁸ As we will see in Chapter 5, one striking example of this occurred in Italy when Fascist leader Benito Mussolini cut a deal with the Pope in which the Church was given a series of privileges in return for dissolving the Italian Catholic party.

³⁹ The exception to this rule is Africa, where missionaries from mainline Protestant denominations established a stronghold in the nineteenth century (Clark and Ledger-Lomas 2012:32–34).

Moreover, the mainline Protestant Churches have formal hierarchical institutions that are relatively easy for governments to co-opt. Having well-defined formal organizations but weak transnational ties, my theory predicts that Protestants are unlikely to engage in political activism.

2.2.4.3. Orthodox Christianity

The Eastern Orthodox Church is a communion comprising fifteen separate hierarchical Churches, all of which are autocephalous - that is, governed by their own Patriarch or Metropolitan (Dixon 2012:139–40; Kitromilides 2012:253). While the highest-ranking bishop among the Orthodox is the Patriarch of Constantinople, he has no formal powers over the other Orthodox Churches. Thus, there is no common structure linking the Orthodox; for all practical purposes they are national entities, confined within the borders of their territorial states. The Orthodox Church is frequently described in the literature as ‘caesaropapist’ (led by secular politicians), which must be qualified somewhat as the Church usually retains autonomy from the state over the religious sphere and political leaders do not play a role in doctrinal issues. On the other hand, the state is firmly in control when it comes to civil and public policy issues. In sum, the autocephalous nature of Eastern Orthodoxy, with its international fragmentation and confinement within state borders, provides little resources with which to resist anticlerical assaults by the state (Hovorun 2016:292; Kalkandjieva 2011:600). At the same time, their formal hierarchical organization allows governments to co-opt the religious community (Chumachenko 2002:33–45; Kitromilides 2012:253–54; Leustan 2009:1–10). Orthodox-majority nations are therefore unlikely candidates for the formation of religious parties.

2.2.4.4. Sunni Islam

The differences between Catholics, Protestants, and the Orthodox are partially mirrored in the division between Sunni and Shia Islam. Like Roman Catholicism, Shia Islam has an organized, hierarchical clergy; like the 'low church' and evangelical branches of Protestantism, Sunni Islam is more amorphous and lacks a formal hierarchical organization⁴⁰ (Cammett and Issar 2010:385–86; Richards and Waterbury 2013:363; Sharify-Funk 2015:140–46; Warner and Wenner 2006:461).

Sunni Muslims as a community have no central human organization with authority over the faithful of different countries⁴¹ (Eickelman and Wright 2015:604; Warner and Wenner 2006:458). While the feeling of solidarity is a deep-rooted element of Islam, and the concept of a transnational *Umma* (community) organized under a common spiritual and temporal leadership is sincerely held, throughout history there was seldom an organized political form along these lines (Bennison 2012:163; Robinson 2012:112; Zaman 2005:84–88). This history of political fragmentation does not mean that Islam lacks transnational ties,

⁴⁰ The comparison should not be overdrawn. Shia Islam is a much less hierarchized and centralized religion than Catholicism, while Sunni Islam's almost total lack of formal organization finds no parallel in mainline Protestant denominations.

⁴¹ One important transnational institution for Sunnis is the Al-Azhar University, located in Cairo. The Grand Sheikh of Al-Azhar is considered the highest religious authority for Sunni Islam, and the university is the most prestigious centre of Sunni Islamic learning. Islamic scholars issue *fatwas* (edicts) in response to disputes and queries submitted from all over the Sunni Islamic world. Nonetheless, the Grand Sheikh has no formal authority and his influence over the faithful derives solely from his personal prestige.

however. Rather than viewing the Muslim world through the prism of the modern nation-state, Sunni Islam is better seen as being composed of transnational “knowledge networks than as a disaggregated assemblage of empires, caliphates, sultanates, and fiefdoms” (Robinson 2012:115). This transnational component became visible on the world stage with the emergence of modern fundamentalism in the 1970s, as radical Islamists established horizontal transnational networks to allocate funds, activists, and even fighters to countries such as Afghanistan, Algeria, Egypt, Yemen, the Sudan, and Pakistan (Eickelman and Wright 2015:604; Landau 1990:38, 120, 236).

The authority of Sunni religious leaders derives from socially constructed norms and rules, not from formally organized religious hierarchies. Individual Muslims are free to follow the lessons of a religious scholar based on their own judgment and conscience, and they can change leaders or even choose not to be under the direction of any particular leader at all. While there are formally organized mosques throughout the Sunni Muslim world, they are not arranged in any hierarchy and there is no central institution imposing barriers or standards of entry⁴² (Warner and Wenner 2006:463).

⁴² Sunni Islam does have informal hierarchies; although there are no theologically-based religious hierarchies, historically there were socio-political hierarchies in the Muslim world. For instance, Muslims have historically titled their political leader “caliph,” ruling over the caliphate of all the faithful. The caliph is not a formal theological title, however, and historically caliphs have had little to no role in shaping how Islam is practiced by ordinary Muslims.

Faced with the amorphous nature of Sunni Islam and the lack of a formal organizational structure, many governments have sought to create one⁴³ (Lev 2005:14). Recognising that an amorphous religion is impervious to control by outsiders, governments have attempted to give a shape to Islam and impose an official hierarchy. Usually they place *imams* (the leaders of prayer at mosques) at the bottom of the hierarchy and appoint a government crony to the top (Sharify-Funk 2015:143). Invariably, “the state’s political considerations strongly shape the composition of the hierarchy” (Warner et al. 2018:44).

However, official governmental efforts to give shape to an official Islamic hierarchy have often met with failure. When the state co-opts - and constructs - an official Sunni Islamic bureaucracy where previously there was none, independent activity usually falls in the hands of religious orders and their charismatic leaders⁴⁴ (Bachar et al. 2006:6; Zeghal 1999:396). These orders comprise “a self-conscious group of Muslims who are coordinated through an informal social network and mobilized to fulfil a mission defined in the idiom of Islam” (Yükleyen 2012:57). Anti-government mobilization on the part of dissatisfied Sunni Muslims is relatively easy since anyone can become a religious leader independently of state authority, as long as that person is accepted as so by the public (Sharify-Funk 2015:143). In sum, Sunni Islam combines strong transnational ties with an amorphous organizational structure, making it a religion with a high potential for political activity.

⁴³ As we will see in greater detail in Chapter 6, Turkey is one such example. Since the foundation of the modern Republic of Turkey by Mustafa Kemal, the state’s Directorate of Religious Affairs has overseen religious services. The Directorate controls all the mosques by appointing their *imams* and paying their salaries. The Directorate has a delegate in each Turkish city and a head representative in each province.

⁴⁴ *Tariqah* in Arabic or *tarikât* in Turkish.

2.2.4.5. Shia Islam

Shia Islam⁴⁵ has a highly formalized hierarchical structure with considerable similarities to the Roman Catholic Church (Böttcher 2002:43; Sharify-Funk 2015:144). *Grand Ayatollahs* are situated at the top of the hierarchy,⁴⁶ with *Ayatollahs* just below (roughly equivalent to archbishops), followed by *Hujjat al-Islam* (equivalent to bishops), and ending with *Mullahs* (equivalent to priests) at the bottom. Just like the Catholic Church, in this hierarchical structure policy and authority flow from the top down (Warner and Wenner 2006:463). Also like the Catholic Church, Shia Islam is a transnational religion whose institutional organization does not stop at state borders. The transnational character of Shiism was crucial to the success of Islamic revolutionaries in Iran, whose movement was led by *Ayatollah* Ruhollah Khomeini from the Iraqi holy city of Najaf (Eickelman and Piscatori 2004:49; Skocpol 1982:274).

⁴⁵ Here I focus on Shia Islam of the Twelver variety, which is the largest branch of Shia Islam, comprising about 85 percent of all Shias.

⁴⁶ According to traditional Shia doctrine, *Grand Ayatollahs* have the authority to make decisions not only on religious matters but also on issues of taxation. On the other hand, the lower levels of the hierarchy have much less authority over ordinary Muslims. *Mullahs* have no enforcement mechanisms to obtain obedience from their adherents; no sacraments can be withheld to obtain compliance with their desires.

2.2.4.6. Hinduism

Historically, Hinduism has been intimately associated with the system of castes. Hindu worship leaders, known as *Brahmans*, have until the twentieth century been the nuclear centre of the caste system, with all other social ranks being determined with reference to them (Flood 1996:12; Weber 1958:30). There is no centralized worldwide Hindu bureaucratic structure or even national organization⁴⁷, and the religion is often described as “loosely-structured, centrifugal, and charismatic” (Kahane 1981:358; also Mlecko 1982:33). Hinduism is thus an organizationally amorphous religion with weak transnational ties (Rajagopal 1997:47–48).

2.2.4.7. Buddhism

There is no global authority for Buddhism, with practice and teaching tending to be thoroughly decentralized.⁴⁸ Buddhist *Bhikkhus* (monks) in a certain territory comprise a *Sangha*, but the practical – and even theoretical (Friedlander 2009:12) – authority the *Sangha* exercises varies extensively by country. Max Weber (1958:227) famously argued that Buddhism is “a specifically unpolitical and anti-political status quo religion,” which is only partially correct (Kawanami 2016:86). Unlike Weber’s stereotypical image of unworldly monks who recoil from getting involved in the sordid world of politics, historically Buddhism

⁴⁷ To a degree, spiritual authority is vested in regionally based *Acharyas*, and the *Brahmans* “are the closest Hinduism gets to a legitimizing authority” (Flood 1996:12).

⁴⁸ Here I focus on Theravada Buddhism, which comprises the overwhelming majority of worldwide Buddhists.

has had a “positive orientation towards the political arena” (Eisenstadt 2003:324). But the unique pro-status quo orientation of Buddhism does seem to be justified (Gombrich 1988:50–55; Jerryson and Juergensmeyer 2009:9; Ladwig and Shields 2014:188). Because Buddhist *Bhikkhus* have to be ordained according to the guidelines of the national Buddhist organization, governments are able to co-opt Buddhist ecclesiastics by selecting its leaders (Victoria 1997:3–34). On the other hand, modernist and ‘socially engaged’ forms of Buddhism are more open to the entry of organized Buddhism into the political arena (Chau 2012:208–9). These organizations often create their own *Sanghas* outside of the government’s control. Thus, Buddhism could be classified as a religion with moderate to low potential for political mobilization, although political activism might be increasing over time as ‘socially engaged’ variants become more common.

2.2.4.8. Judaism

For at least two millennia, Judaism was the transnational religion *par excellence*. As an ethnoreligious diaspora, Jews have historically operated within a transnational network (Ray 2008:10–31; Tsur 2012:188–89). Transnational ties among Jews in Europe and the Middle East allowed the Jewish people to retain a sense of their collective identity amidst the larger gentile society (Green 2012:53–54; Leff 2006:1–20). Historically, hierarchy levels have been relatively high as Rabbi authority is a core belief of classical Judaism, although it was considerably weakened by emancipation in modern times (Green 2012:57; Mittleman 2015:83). There is no central global agency among Jews charged with ascertaining or

interpreting core beliefs⁴⁹ (Sandler 2009:130–31). Authority in Judaism rests on the willingness of the population to accept it. Somewhat analogously to Sunni Islam, every Jew has a right to leave her particular community and cannot be compelled by a leader's authority if she chooses not to do so.⁵⁰ Authority is recognised on the basis of expertise, or outstanding achievement in the field of Torah erudition.⁵¹ Different Jewish groups consent to different levels of authority: for Orthodox Jews, the directives of the local Rabbi are authoritative (not only for individual practice but also for communal norms); by contrast, lay non-Orthodox Jews tend to view the opinions of their local ecclesiastics as advisory rather than binding. The diversity of Jewish congregations leads to different requirements for Rabbinic ordinations and differences of opinion regarding who should be accepted as a Rabbi, making it a relatively open system with plentiful opportunities for dissent. The transnational character of Judaism, combined with its amorphous organizational structure, endows Jewish religious communities with a strong propensity for political organization.

⁴⁹ Before the French Revolution, the Jewish Diaspora in Europe was divided in diffuse communities. For their security, Jews devised a strategy of relying upon the local rulers of the host state, integrating themselves into the corporative structure of feudal Europe. After the French Revolution and the popularization of nationalism, nation-states demanded that Jews abandon their separate national identity and merge with the broader national community (Sandler 2009:130–31). Having been influenced by the rise of modern nationalism, the Jews developed their own national movement opting for a return to Zion, leading to the creation of the modern state of Israel. Even in Israel, however, the divisions between Ultra-Orthodox, Modern Orthodox, Conservative, Reform, and other varieties ensures that there is no central Jewish organization and that there remain considerable opportunities for dissent.

⁵⁰ Of course, there are powerful social pressures, particularly in isolated Haredi (ultra-Orthodox) communities, to remain, as well as considerable exit costs for those who wish to leave.

⁵¹ Hasidic Jews are the exception: authority tends to be traditionally passed on a line of family succession, complemented by charismatic and scholarly characteristics.

2.2.5. State-Building and the Transformation of the Religion-State Relationship

As we have seen, at the onset of the nineteenth century the relationship between the state and religious communities was strikingly similar across the globe. The two institutions supported one another, while the state's bureaucratic limitations left the field of social welfare provision entirely in the hands of religious groups. This situation began to change in Europe during the late Enlightenment period, when for both ideological (emergence of anticlerical ideas) and practical (rise in state capacity) reasons state authorities came to regard religion not as an ally but as an unwanted impediment to the legitimate exercise of sovereign authority. Enlightenment intellectuals like Voltaire and Diderot provided the ideological groundwork for the severing of the alliance of throne and altar (Scharzwald 2017:110–15). The cult of reason sponsored by the *philosophes* combined with a mocking tone⁵² towards religious faith did much to discredit religiosity and 'superstition' among political elites. The emergence of nationalism and spread of egalitarian ideas fuelled a novel universalist ideology which argued that the ancient particularistic patchwork of feudal territories, guilds, fiefdoms, free cities, and bishoprics had to be replaced by public policy applying equally to every individual. Invoking a newly discovered 'national interest,' states

⁵² Perhaps the most corrosive – and least acknowledged - aspect of the Enlightenment attack on religiosity was the mocking and sarcastic form in which it was conveyed. An example is Voltaire's entry on Abraham for the 1764 *Philosophical Dictionary*: "Abraham is one of the names famous in Asia Minor and in Arabia, like Thoth among the Egyptians, the first Zoroaster in Persia, Hercules in Greece, Orpheus in Thrace, Odin among the northern nations, and so many others whose fame is greater than the authenticity of their history" (quoted in Burleigh 2005:39).

realised they could not leave vital policy areas like education and healthcare in the hands of institutions over which they had little to no control (Green 2013:84–85).

Most importantly for the development of anticlericalism was the growth in state capacity – giving rise to what historians call the ‘fiscal-military state’ (see Brewer 1989) –, which by the late eighteenth century gave European bureaucracies the possibility of depriving religious communities of their traditional social role as public goods providers⁵³ (Green 2013:11; Hurd 2008:15; Kalyvas 1996:22; Storrs 2009:14–16). Absolutist monarchies in continental Europe developed many of the archetypal features of the modern state, such as central bureaucracies, uniform legal codes, standing armies, and nation-wide systems of taxation (Henshall 1992:187–93; de Swaan 1988:9). Military conflict was the main mechanism through which modern territorial states were built: compelled by the pressure of war, rulers who wanted their states to survive and expand had to increase their military and economic capabilities, and in mobilizing for conflict they built not only bigger armies but also an array of administrative, fiscal, and policing institutions⁵⁴ (Barkey and Parikh 1991:527–28; Bean 1973:204–5; Ferejohn and Rosenbluth 2010:8–10; Frost 2000:18; Hui 2005:38–39; Körner 1995:416; Lewis 1990:9; Tilly 1975:73).

⁵³ Other (less) important developments also played a role in equipping states with the tools for supplanting religion as the main provider of public goods. Urbanization concentrated people in areas with high population density, whose economies of scale made it easier for state bureaucracies to manage hospitals and schools (Green 2013:57–62).

⁵⁴ One of the main spurs to the emergence of the nation-state, indeed, was the *cuius regio, eius religio* principle that spread in Europe after the Peace of Augsburg of 1555. Princes were granted authority over religion in their land and explicitly permitted (and even encouraged) to establish religious uniformity (Philpott 2001:88–89). The modern notion of a homogenous national culture flowed naturally from this first establishment of religious homogeneity.

By the late eighteenth century, therefore, Western European states possessed both the motives (Enlightenment ideas of progress) and the means (expanding infrastructural power) to challenge the social foundations of religious power. And challenged it was. The first signs that the relationship between religion and state was being inexorably transformed were the various efforts by Enlightenment monarchs to expand the power of the state at the expense of the Catholic Church (Blackbourn 1991:779–80). Emperors Joseph II and Leopold of Austria expropriated half the monasteries in the country, abolished the Inquisition, and most importantly for our purposes, nationalized Catholic schools and hospitals and even introduced a rudimentary system of public education and healthcare (Burleigh 2005:31; Clark 2003:13–16; Green 2013:11). The French Revolution magnified these first anticlerical stirrings into a bacchanalia of violence (Marshall 2013:16–17). Jacobin radicals launched a new revolutionary calendar to replace the old Christian one; seized the running of schools⁵⁵ and the right to sanction marriages from the Church; and even attempted to design an entirely new religion in the form of the Cult of the Supreme Being. Indeed, the civil war of the Vendée

⁵⁵ In July 1793, the Jacobin Convention accepted a plan devised by Lepelletier to introduce free and mandatory primary education in common state boarding schools, which would be called *Maison d'Égalités*. The state was tasked with bringing up girls and boys between the ages of five and twelve in these schools, providing them with equal instruction and care. This is the first instance in the recorded history of mankind in which a state proposed creating a uniform, universal, and fully public system of education. In the midst of the revolutionary wars and the fall of the Jacobins a year later, the plan was never implemented (Green 2013:145). Napoleon would later create a national education system characterized by centralization, uniformity, a hierarchical structure, and a standardized curriculum (Bergeron 1981:32–36; Grab 2015:527–28); as Napoleon himself stated in 1806, “of all our institutions, the most important is public education. Everything depends on it, the present and the future” (quoted in Holtman 1967:142).

(1793-1796) can be viewed as the first, extreme instance of a counterattack by religious groups against the radical anticlerical policies of a modern state (Tilly 1961:30–31).

Even though the French revolutionary armies were ultimately defeated at Waterloo, their ideas were not. The monarchical opponents of France were forced to adopt the methods of their revolutionary opponents to survive, increasing the role of the state in citizens' everyday life through such measures as imposing new taxes and regulations to pay for massive standing armies (Cardoso and Lains 2010:2). After the French Revolutionary Wars were over, victors and vanquished states alike were loath to give up on their newfound infrastructural power and unprecedented capacity to mobilize the population. They were also ideologically committed to the principle that “no power, group, or association” (like the Church) “should stand between the individual and the state” (Caramani 2004:27).

The nineteenth century thus witnessed developing nation-states concerning themselves with the provision of education to the masses for the first time in history. State-building elites regarded schools as indispensable to generate the skilled cadres for the bureaucracy and the armed forces (Heinzen 2017:176–215). Most importantly, education was also recognised as a mighty instrument for cultivating political loyalty amongst the people and for crafting a cohesive national culture (Fabbe 2019:3; Flint 1990:7–8; Grab 2015:528; Green 2013:85; Lott 1999:127–30; Weis 2019:30; Zalar 2018:199–200). In the brave new world of the nation-state, educational programs that marginalized religion formed a central part of state-centric initiatives to mould disparate groups of peoples into a unified, culturally

homogenous nation⁵⁶ (Bendix 1977:90; Eisenstadt 1999:122; Tilly 1975:48). Starting from the last quarter of the nineteenth century, states also established public welfare systems to replace religious charities in the provision of poor relief and healthcare (Bartkowski and Regis 2003:49).

So far this discussion has focused only on nineteenth-century Europe, because elsewhere the process of state-formation occurred later. At the same time that European countries were crafting powerful states, they were also busy colonizing much of the rest of the world.⁵⁷ As a result, only after decolonization in the mid-twentieth century did most non-Western countries experience the state-building processes described above⁵⁸ (Atia 2013:30; Clark 2004:11; Fabbe 2019:1–2; McDougall 2011:45). Post-colonial state-formation in the twentieth century led to conflicts between religion and the state for the same reason they did in nineteenth century Europe: aspiring state-builders seek to claim absolute sovereignty

⁵⁶ A prominent example of this was German Chancellor Otto von Bismarck's 1870s *Kulturkampf* to curtail the Catholic loyalties of the southern German population, who had been somewhat hesitant in joining a Prussian-dominated union, and accelerate national unification.

⁵⁷ Of course, there are some notable exceptions to this rule. The Ottoman Empire, for instance, was not subjected to European colonial rule, and developed public welfare policies at roughly the same time as other Mediterranean countries. Late-nineteenth century Sultan Abdul Hamid II was particularly active in expanding the social welfare activities of the state (Ener 2005:510; Provence 2017:18).

⁵⁸ Postcolonial states were not built from scratch, as they inherited from colonial administrators much of the bureaucratic apparatus of government. However, the colonial state's dependence on intermediaries – chiefs and landlords – to rule had the unintended consequence of preventing the total development of the state's infrastructural capacity (Nasr 2001:12). Independence gave indigenous elites the possibility to build the state in ways similar to those of European societies, establishing a direct relationship between the central state and individual citizens over and above local intermediaries. The removal of oversight by a faraway colonial power also established the principle of absolute state sovereignty that would provide the impetus for anticlerical attacks on the intermediary role of religious communities.

for the state, a project that collides with people's traditional attachments to religion and with the autonomous public role played by religious groups⁵⁹ (Benthall and Bellion-Jourdan 2003:23–26; Gill and Keshavarzian 1999:433; Moaddel 2005:325; Nasr 2001:9–13; Philpott 2013:17).

Contrary to claims that the confinement of religion to the private sphere is “a functionalist requirement of modern differentiated societies” (Casanova 2011:71), however, not every instance of modern state-building resulted in anticlericalism. In a significant minority of countries, the arrangements between religion and the state that emerged as a by-product of the strategic interaction between state-building elites and the religious establishment preserved a role for religious providers of social welfare that can be termed *proclericalism*. In proclerical countries, state-builders embedded religious communities in the wider national project, accepting an official role for religion in the provision of poor relief, healthcare, and education⁶⁰ (Al-Ghannouchi 2000:108; Bsaies 1989:286–87; Fabbe 2013:435–39; Hirschl 2010:26–40; Jones 2017:xi–xviii; Sezgin 2013:37–42; Stepan 2011:114–44; Zeghal 1999:374). When governments adopt proclerical policies and engage in the state-building process hand in hand with religious communities, they delegate welfare functions to religious

⁵⁹ The process of state formation in the post-colonial world was so similar to that of the West also because former colonies consciously followed the Western example. The objectives of the founders of new states were to a large extent copied from already successful states and from the hegemonic European nationalist ideologies of the nineteenth century (Migdal 2001:41; Neuberger 1976:241–43).

⁶⁰ There have been a number of recent studies that seek to explain important aspects of political development using the religion-state arrangement as the independent variable (Buckley and Mantilla 2013:328–48; Davie 2012:589–99; Fox 2012:60–94; Fox and Sandler 2003:559–88; Kahl 2005:91–126; Razavi and Jenichen 2010:833–50; van der Veer 2012:721–34).

charities – for instance, by allowing religious groups to run the public school system. In effect, proclerical governments are refashioning the traditional alliance between throne and altar by handing religion a public social role in addition to its private, spiritual purposes.

2.2.5.1. Incompatibility of State and Religious Welfare Provision

States that seek to establish control over public welfare provision typically achieve their goal by taking over existing religious organizations. Anticlerical politicians confiscate religious revenues and assets, appoint a centralized state bureaucracy to direct religious actors and oversee religious doctrine and practice, and expropriate religiously based educational and charitable organizations. In a minority of cases, however, states proceed in a different way. Instead of seizing religious welfare associations, they erect a completely new set of parallel institutions – public schools, hospitals, or charities - running alongside existing private organizations (Streeck and Thelen 2005:19–31). In such a parallel institutional system, say, a brand-new public school can coexist with a centuries-old religious school.

Do these different strategies for crafting a role for the state in the provision of social welfare have different consequences? If states do not expropriate religious welfare organizations but instead craft an entirely new set of parallel institutions, can an autonomous religious welfare system survive? As long as the state is infrastructurally powerful – on which more later -, the answer is no. Whether religious social welfare organizations are appropriated wholesale or simply short-circuited by new public welfare offices, the end result is the same: the state gains a monopoly over welfare provision. While I do not derive a formal

model of this process, it is simple to describe the behaviour assumed to be at work. Consider a model of an economy where individuals belong to religious groups and pay lump-sum taxes to the government. This economy has two privately consumed goods - one secular and one religious - and a public good. The religious good can only be acquired through payments made to the religious group. The government provides the public good with funds obtained through the lump-sum taxes but individuals can also provide the public good themselves via private spending directed to the religious community. Individuals take government tax rates as given when selecting their optimal bundle of goods for consumption.

In the solution for such a model, an increase in the government's provision of the public good leads individuals to decrease private spending on the public good. If the public good is already being provided by the state anyway, individuals are better off spending their income in private consumption rather than duplicating the state's efforts through further donations to religious charitable groups. As Bergstrom and collaborators (Bergstrom, Blume, and Varian 1986:42) note in their seminal article on the private provision of public goods, "the government's contribution results in an equal reduction in the amount of private contributions." While more sophisticated formal models might not necessarily reach the conclusion that the crowding out effect is strictly one-for-one (Diamond 2006:917–18; Ferris and West 2003:399; Hungerman 2009:739; Scheepers and Grotenhuis 2005:461), it seems entirely reasonable to assume that religious welfare provision is always negatively correlated with public welfare provision (Cammatt and Issar 2010:417), and that the greater the capacity of the state, the closer the crowding out effect reaches the one-for-one level. Thus, whether states engage in welfare provision by expropriating religious groups or by establishing their

own parallel systems of welfare, the result will be the same: public welfare provision crowds out religious charitable endeavours.

2.3. Explaining Confessional Party Formation

In this section, I set out in detail the theory of religious party formation that is at the heart of this dissertation. I start by crafting a formal model of religious policy-making to explain why some governments adopted anticlerical policies while others sought to maintain the traditional alliance of throne and altar. I then move on to explain how the response of religious communities to anticlericalism resulted in the formation of confessional political parties.

2.3.1. A Formal Model of Religious Policy-Making

One of the most basic and widely shared assumptions in political science is that political leaders have one priority above all: survival in office (Ames 1987:1; Gill and Keshavarzian 1999:438; Tavits 2006:104). Leaders' survival prospects in turn depend on the strength and tactics of the opposition, whose objective is to overthrow the leader and assume office. Leaders deal with such challenges to their rule in two ways. First, they can attempt to strike a grand bargain with the opposition to share the spoils of office; second, they can refuse any compromise and confront the opposition's challenge head on. When leaders choose between promoting anticlerical or proclerical policies, their decisions should be analysed in light of their relationship with the opposition. If leaders adopt anticlerical policies and

expropriate the assets of religious groups, they are able to transfer part of those spoils to buy off the opposition. Or they can keep the spoils for themselves, investing them in ways that will strengthen their hold on power and transform the opposition's expected payoff to mounting a challenge – in other words, the leader can use the resources expropriated from religious groups to modify the political balance of power between itself and the opposition. Under some conditions, therefore, anticlerical policies of expropriation⁶¹ allow leaders to overcome their opponents. However, it is also possible that entering a conflict with religion might boost the opposition's capacity to mount a successful leadership challenge – for example, a prolonged anticlerical campaign might lead to popular disaffection with the leader.

If a conflict with religion can alter the distribution of political power against the leader – and in favour of the opposition –, it can enact a private cost that would diminish the expected payoff of anticlericalism for the leader. Thus, the nature of the effect anticlericalism has on the balance of political power – whether the opposition is weakened or boosted – should modify the leader's expected utility for engaging in anticlericalism, and thus determine the final decision as to whether a proclerical or anticlerical policy is adopted. I now set out a formal model devised to investigate this possibility.

⁶¹ Throughout the formal model, I assume that anticlerical policies result in the expropriation of religious assets and not in the construction of parallel social welfare organizations of the kind described in the previous section.

2.3.1.1. Formal Model: Building Blocks

The model has three actors: a political leader L , the opposition party C , and a religious community R . The game starts when L and R enter into a conflict over the appropriate role of religion in society. R first proposes a distribution of resources between religion and the state⁶² $h \in [0,1]$ in which L gets h and R gets $1 - h$. These resources can be religious schools, hospitals, charities, and so on. Next, L accepts or rejects. If L accepts, the distribution of assets proposed by R is put in place; this is the proclerical scenario. If L rejects, it triggers an open conflict between religion and the state; this is the anticlerical scenario. In the event of anticlericalism, the state attempts to expropriate religious assets with a variable degree of success. At the end, R keeps a share $s \in (0,1)$ of its resources while L captures $1 - s$. An anticlerical conflict imposes a deadweight loss on the total religious resources available for distribution between religion and state, so that $a_L, a_R > 0$. This can be interpreted as the devaluation of religious assets in the shadow of a religion-state conflict, for instance as donations to charities dry up, students leave religious schools, and so on.

The game ends at this juncture for the religious group, which receives the payoffs R 's payoffs $1 - h$ under proclericalism and $s - a_R$ under anticlericalism. It continues for the leader, however, as L now negotiates with C over how to share the loot extracted from R .

⁶² The model is designed to give R the initiative to make the first offer, which seems plausible: the weaker party to the conflict approaches the stronger party to make a proposal that would settle the dispute. In the real world, religious communities suffering anticlerical attacks did often take the initiative to devise a durable settlement that would concede some prerogatives to the state without utterly eliminating the role of religion as a provider of social goods (Kalyvas 1996:21–22).

The leader can use the resources gained from religion to bribe the opposition and prevent C from launching a bid for power. Let B_k denote the loot, where $k = a$ after anticlericalism and $k = p$ if the leader reached a proclerical settlement with the religious group. If L accepts a proclerical bargain, the total loot available to be shared with the opposition is $B_p = h$. On the other hand, after an anticlerical conflict, the leader obtains the loot $B_a = 1 - s - a_L$, with the deadweight loss mentioned above. L negotiates with C and offers some portion of the loot $\omega_k \in [0,1]$ to keep for itself, while giving $1 - \omega_k$ to the opposition. If the opposition accepts L 's offer, then the agreement is put in place and the game ends with L in power. L gains a final payoff of $B_k \omega_k$ (the share of the loot gained from religion times the share of that loot that goes to the opposition), while C 's payoff is $(1 - \omega_k)B_k$. Should C reject the offer, however, it launches a bid for power to depose L and gain control of the government. C is victorious and replaces the leader with probability $0 < b_k < 1$, obtaining all the loot for itself; however, if the opposition's bid for power fails, L retains all the loot. The probability b_k that the opposition is successful in its bid for power can be interpreted as the political balance of power between L and C , and is dependent on the resources each of the two actors is capable of mobilizing. The costs of C 's bid for power impose a deadweight loss on both the opposition and the leader, or $r_L, r_C > 0$.

Crucially, anticlericalism influences the probability that the opposition is able to topple the leadership. The effects of religious policy are ambiguous, however. It can either affect the balance of political power in favour of the leader or in favour of the opposition. On the one hand, anticlericalism can boost the opposition if the leader gets distracted by a conflict with religion, or if religious groups have generally supported the government and are sympathetic to the status quo. By contrast, anticlericalism can undermine the opposition if religious groups

are antagonistic towards the leader, or if the leader manipulates the bureaucratic machinery used to repress religion towards stifling dissent more generally.

Thus, the course of the initial negotiations between L and R will determine whether C can launch a successful power bid. Intuitively, the leader has a greater chance of holding on to power if it is able to extract more resources from the religious group, which it can use to reward supporters and clients or to build a powerful repressive apparatus. Therefore, the probability that C succeeds in its bid to replace L in the aftermath of anticlericalism is weighted by the loot that L was able to extract from R , or $b_a s$ (because C rejected L 's offer to share the loot in order to launch a bid for power, L retains all the assets expropriated from religion when fending off a challenge from the opposition). Likewise, the resources extracted from R under proclericalism influence the probability of an opposition victory, or $b_p(1 - h)$. As a consequence, $b_p(1 - h) > b_a s$ corresponds to a scenario in which anticlericalism strengthens the leader at the expense of the opposition, while $b_p(1 - h) < b_a s$ has the reverse effect of boosting the opposition's chances of toppling the leader. Thus, under an opposition challenge, the payoffs for L are $(1 - b_p(1 - h))h - r_L$ after proclericalism and $(1 - b_a s)(1 - s - a_L) - r_L$ under anticlericalism. The payoffs for C after a power bid are $(b_p(1 - h))h - r_C$ following proclericalism and $b_a s(1 - s - a_L) - r_C$ after anticlericalism.

2.3.1.2. Formal Model: Subgame Perfect Equilibria

In this subsection I find the model's Subgame Perfect Equilibria. The model takes place in an environment of complete information. My goal is to find the situations in which

anticlericalism results in equilibrium, which should occur when L anticipates that a conflict with R gives it a greater chance of fending off C and holding on to power than a proclerical bargain. Because the game starts with R 's offer to L , anticlericalism can only take place when L 's demands for a proclerical bargain are so extreme that R prefers to withhold those terms and risk a conflict with the state. By contrast, when L anticipates that anticlericalism will strengthen C , it is willing to accept a proclerical bargain with R that is inferior to what L could obtain from an anticlerical campaign. But I begin my analysis at the end of the game and consider the outcome of bargaining between L and C to share the loot obtained from the expropriation of R . In this bargaining subgame, L buys off C with side-payments to forestall a power bid and remain in power.

Proposition 2.1. (Leader and Opposition Reach a Settlement). *When bargaining with the opposition, L offers $\bar{\omega}_p = 1 - b_p(1 - h) + r_c/h$ after proclericalism and $\bar{\omega}_a = 1 - b_a s + r_c/(1 - s - a_L)$ after anticlericalism.⁶³ C always accepts the offer $\bar{\omega}_k$ because $(1 - \bar{\omega}_p)h \geq b_p(1 - h)h - r_c$ after proclericalism and $(1 - \bar{\omega}_a)(1 - s - a_L) \geq b_a s(1 - s - a_L) - r_c$ after anticlericalism.*

L always settles with C and stays in power, because in a game of complete information it anticipates the outcome of a power bid by C and can share the loot from R accordingly. Intuitively, L keeps a bigger portion of the loot as the probability that C launches a successful

⁶³ If $\bar{\omega}_k \geq 1$, L offers $\bar{\omega}_k = 1$.

power bid, b_k , decline and as the costs for the opposition associated with a power bid, r_C , rise. Stronger leaders can afford to make smaller side-payments to the opposition.

If the opposition's costs of engaging in a power bid (r_C) are so high that L knows C is willing to take any offer to avoid a confrontation, we have a special situation in which L offers $\bar{\omega}_k = 1$ (retaining the loot from religion entirely for itself). C has no choice but to accept. Let $\ddot{r}_C$ stand for the threshold above which C is willing to accept any offer from L to avoid launching a bid for power. Thus, when $r_C \geq \ddot{r}_C$, the opposition cannot credibly threaten a power bid; I call this the “no-challenge” scenario. By contrast, $r_C < \ddot{r}_C$ covers instances in which there is a credible threat by the opposition of removing the leader; I call this the “opposition challenge” scenario. By comparing the “no-challenge” with the “opposition challenge” scenarios, I evaluate the impact of having a credible opposition threat on the likelihood that the leader will engage in anticlericalism.

In the ‘no-challenge’ scenario, L accepts any proclerical offer from religion that is at least equal to what it would gain from anticlericalism, or $h \geq 1 - s - a_L$. R then offers precisely $h^* = 1 - s - a_L$, inducing L 's acceptance, because in a game of complete information the two sides prefer to share the loot peacefully without the negative consequences of an anticlerical confrontation between religion and state that devalues the assets in dispute (recall that anticlericalism imposes a deadweight loss of $a_L, a_R > 0$). Therefore, when L knows that C will not launch a power bid, anticlericalism does not take place, and the leader obtains from religion precisely what it would get in the event of anticlericalism, $B_p = 1 - s - a_L$.

Proposition 2.2. (No Anticlericalism without Opposition Power Bid). *When $r_C \geq \ddot{r}_C$, R offers a proclerical bargain of $h^* = 1 - s - a_L$. L accepts because the offer satisfies $h \geq 1 - s - a_L$.*

Anticlericalism is not an equilibrium in the ‘no-challenge’ scenario. Is the same true when the opposition is able to credibly threaten to launch a leadership challenge? Under the ‘opposition challenge’ scenario, L rejects a proclerical offer from R and engages in anticlericalism if

$$(1 - s - a_L) \left(1 - b_a + \frac{r_M}{1 - s - a_L} \right) > h \left(1 - b_p + \frac{r_C}{h} \right). \quad (2.1)$$

This equation compares the leader’s utility from anticlericalism (on the left) with that of proclericalism (on the right), weighted by the leader’s leftover share of the religious loot after bargaining with the opposition under the terms of Proposition 2.1. Knowing this, what can R offer to satisfy L with a proclerical bargain? L agrees to any offer h' that satisfies

$$h' \geq (1 - s - a_L) \left(\frac{1 - b_a s}{1 - b_p(1 - h)} \right) = h^\sim \quad (2.2)$$

What is the difference between L ’s demands as set out in Equation (2.2) – when there is a credible threat to the leadership – from those of Proposition 2.2, in which C rejected making a bid for power under any circumstances? In the “opposition challenge” scenario, the leader’s minimum demands are determined not only by the expected benefits from

anticlericalism, $(1 - s - a_L)$, but also by a comparison of the likelihood of an opposition victory after anticlericalism $(1 - b_a s)$ and after proclericalism $(1 - b_p(1 - h))$. Intuitively, when anticlericalism weakens the opposition (lower levels of $b_a s$), the leader is more unwilling accept a proclerical bargain, demanding that R makes up for the foregone benefits of anticlericalism by offering a greater share of its assets (lower h). By contrast, when $b_p(1 - h)$ is low and proclericalism weakens the opposition more than anticlericalism, the leader is willing to accept less from religion in order to strike a proclerical bargain. Note that according to Proposition 2.1, the opposition will not actually need to launch a challenge to the leader for this logic to unfold, since the distribution of the religious loot between the leader and the opposition will follow exactly the expected outcome of a bid for power. The lower the chances that the opposition will defeat the leader, the more the leader can keep when bargaining with the opposition. This creates an incentive for the leader to strike proclerical or anticlerical bargains, depending on which is more beneficial.

R offers L a proclerical bargain in the lines of Equation (2.2) as long as it gains more from proclericalism than it would under anticlericalism, that is, $s - a_R \leq 1 - h$. When the interests of both religion and the leader coincide, they both prefer a proclerical bargain to the same outcome under anticlericalism that devalues the total loot available from religion. R offers the bare minimum $h' = h^{\sim}$, which L accepts. But what if the interests of R and L are not harmonious, that is, the conditions that satisfy L according to Equation (2.2) are incompatible with R 's bottom line?

Proposition 2.3. (Anticlericalism Adopted to Strengthen the Leader Against the Opposition).

If $r_C < \ddot{r}_C$, R makes an unacceptable offer $h < h^\sim$ that L rejects, leading to anticlericalism, if $s - a_R > (1 - (1 - s - a_L)(1 - b_a s))/(1 - b_p(1 - h))$. This occurs as long as $b_a < (b_p - sb_p + a_R b_p - a_R - a_L)/(s(1 - s - a_L))$ and $(a_R + a_L)/(1 - s + a_R) < b_p \leq (a_R + s + a_L - s^2 - a_L s)/(1 - s + a_R)$. Alternatively, it can occur when $b_p > (a_R + s + a_L - s^2 - a_L s)/(1 - s + a_R)$. If not, R offers $h' = h^\sim$, and L strikes a proclerical bargain.

There are two conditions under which religious groups are unwilling to offer the type of proclerical bargain that would convince leaders to eschew anticlericalism. First, this can happen if proclericalism significantly increases the likelihood that C launches a successful bid for power:

$$b_p > (a_R + s + a_L - s^2 - a_L s)/(1 - s + a_R) \quad (2.3)$$

This can happen, for instance, if religious groups provide material and ideological support of some kind to the opposition party. As the empirical chapters will make clear, this is part of the reason why Mustafa Kemal in Turkey or French Radicals launched anticlerical crusades against their opponents: Kemal feared that Islamic brotherhoods could mobilize support for the deposed Caliph and against his fledgling republican regime, while in *fin-de-siècle* France, the Dreyfus Affair convinced Radical Party leaders that there was a cabal brewing in the army to restore the monarchy, with the support of the Catholic Church and the Jesuits. Kemalists and Radicals thus refused to compromise with religious groups and enacted harsh anticlerical policies designed to prevent them from supporting their political opponents.

The second scenario that makes a proclerical deal between religion and state hard to reach takes place if anticlericalism weakens the opposition to such an extent that it will be unable to launch an effective power bid. This occurs when

$$b_a < (b_p - sb_p + a_R b_p - a_R - a_L)/(s(1 - s - a_L)) \quad (2.4)$$

and when

$$(a_R + a_L)/(1 - s + a_R) < b_p \leq (a_R + s + a_L - s^2 - a_L s)/(1 - s + a_R) \quad (2.5)$$

When L believes that engaging in anticlericalism will weaken the opposition, R has to offer a much better proclerical bargain to induce L to eschew anticlericalism. Strikingly, when anticlericalism strongly undermines C 's potential for a power bid, L 's bottom line to strike a proclerical bargain is higher than if the opposition did not exist at all (what I called the 'no-challenge' scenario). This is the case because when there is a credible opposition threat, the leader can blackmail R into giving up a larger share of the loot; by contrast, the absence of opposition would make L 's blackmail threats not credible because R knows that L would prefer to strike a proclerical bargain rather than engage in anticlericalism and bear the associated deadweight losses. The situation is reversed when anticlericalism favours the opposition at the expense of the leader. If R knows that C benefits from anticlericalism, it is able to offer L an extremely proclerical bargain that the leader is forced to accept. The case studies of Chapter 4 provide two examples of this in late nineteenth-century Spain and

Québec: political leaders were aware that anticlericalism would strengthen their opponents (republicans and socialists in the Spanish case, Canadian Anglophones in Québec), which forced them to concede wide privileges to the Catholic Church over supposedly public services like education.

In sum, the formal model presented in this section has three main conclusions. First, political leaders do not engage in anticlericalism when their position is not threatened by a powerful opposition. When they are secure in power, leaders prefer to extract concessions from religious groups through peaceful negotiations. Second, when a strong opposition movement can credibly threaten to launch a bid for power, leaders engage in anticlerical policies if anticlericalism is expected to strengthen the leader at the expense of the opposition to such an extent that the leader demands a price to avoid anticlericalism that religion is unwilling to pay. Third, by contrast, if anticlericalism changes the balance of power against the leader and in favour of the opposition, the leader prefers to buyoff religious groups with a favourable proclerical bargain.

2.3.2. Religious Response to Anticlericalism

After the adoption of anticlerical policies by political leaders, ecclesiastics and lay activists must combat the persecution of their religious community by engaging in political action. Ecclesiastics are drawn to political activism because, as status-conscious actors, they are instinctively predisposed to challenge the centralizing top-down policies that threaten their social position and influence (vom Hau 2008:337). Ordinary lay men and women, on

their part, become susceptible to political mobilization by ecclesiasticals when confronted with a tangible threat to their religious way of life (Clark 2003:16–18). Unlike other social movements who must build a party organization from scratch, religious activists are able to build upon a dense network of social services and long-established links with the population.

It is important to note that the entry of religious groups into politics is not simply a functional, automatic response to anticlericalism. Religious groups do not have interests or agency in and of themselves, and cannot simply be anthropomorphized as if they were individual human beings with purposeful actions (Brubaker 2004:8). The politicization of religion cannot take place without the actions of individual activists, ecclesiastical and lay alike. Anticlericalism is associated with the politicization of religion because it functions as a political opportunity structure used by political entrepreneurs to mobilize the faithful (Bartholomeusz 2001:177–80; Marshall 2013:107–8; Nasr 2001:16; de Silva 1993:306; Skocpol 1982:274). There are four reasons why anticlerical policies create a favourable environment to the political mobilization of religious activists. First, the feeling of injustice and persecution generated by anticlericalism can politicize religious individuals who might have been apolitical, making them more receptive to mobilization by a confessional party (Ivarsflaten 2008:4–5; Simmons 2014:513–16; Snow and Soule 2010:23; Tilly 1978:134–35). Second, religious elites and political activists become more legitimate in the eyes of individuals in the religious community when they bear the brunt of anticlerical attacks (a typical ‘rallying around the flag’ phenomenon that increases the popularity of political leaders when faced with an outside threat). Third, anticlericalism also binds the religious community closer together, as the experience of facing a mighty adversary suppresses intra-religious differences and emphasizes an ‘us versus them’ mentality. Finally, the mobilization of

religious people in collective activities of protest (demonstrations, mass meetings, rallies, boycotts, and so forth) against the immediate anticlerical threat facilitates the creation of an organizational network that can be deployed more readily even when the crisis subsides.

Anticlericalism and the political mobilization of religious grievances are not necessarily clearly defined processes with a clear beginning and end. They also do not occur in stages within sharply defined temporal limits, since the mobilization of religious activists occurs while the process of anticlericalism is still unfolding. The two processes are actually likely to reinforce one another and provoke a dynamic intensification of the secular-religious cleavage, with a powerful confessional party fostering a counter anticlerical mobilization. Thus, the strategic behaviour of political leaders and religious activists at a given point in time are shaped by what transpired in the past.

Nonetheless, the processes of anticlericalism and religious political mobilization unfold within certain predictable patterns. As the case studies of Chapters 4 through 6 show, religious activists become politicized *after*, and not before, being targeted by anticlerical policies. When these activists craft confessional political parties, they mark the first time in which religion enters politics in an open, organized way. As in any multifaceted social process, it is not always easy to define clearly when anticlericalism ends or the politicization of religion begins; but the formation of a confessional political party can be clearly identified and necessarily entails a thorough restructuring of the national political system.

2.4. Explaining Confessional Party Strength

In this section, I overview how anticlericalism interacts with state infrastructural power to shape the electoral fortunes of confessional political parties. I start by discussing the concept of state capacity or “infrastructural power,” and I move on to explain how the provision of public goods by religious communities translates into electoral support for confessional parties.

My basic argument is that the infrastructural power of the state is inversely correlated with the capacity of religious communities to build networks of social welfare provision that underpin strong religious parties. This argument follows the scholarship on social movements, which posits that social movements emerge and thrive in response to specific characteristics of the political system. Infrastructurally weak states thus provide a political opportunity structure for enterprising religious-political activists to build a strong confessional party underpinned by a dense associational network of religious charities, schools, and hospitals (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001:14–15; Tarrow 2011:26–27).

2.4.1. Infrastructural Power of the State

During the 1990s, the regional government of Southern Italian province of Campania incurred the ire of its citizens for failing in one of its most basic duties: taking out the trash. “Piles of rotting rubbish” (Pasotti 2010:290) spread all over the regional capital of Naples, providing a dramatic visual and olfactory demonstration of the state’s lack of capacity. This catastrophic

situation was caused by governance failures at multiple levels, including “the absence of adequate expertise among governing elites,” the impossibility of enacting effective solutions “due to political obstacles” and even “the influence of organized crime” (Pasotti 2010:293–94).

The blatant incapacity of the Campanian government to fulfil its duties provides a particularly extreme example of a state lacking infrastructural power. Following Michael Mann (2012a:59), infrastructural power denotes “the institutional capacity of a central state, despotic or not, to penetrate its territories and logistically implement decisions ... this is collective power, ‘power through’ society, coordinating social life through state infrastructures.”

Infrastructural power is a dynamic property which states can increase or decrease in even a relatively short period of time. Even high-capacity states can sometimes fall victim to exogenous shocks like wars, economic crises, or pandemics, which entail a proliferation of social demands beyond the state’s capacity to respond. Malfunctioning states play into the hands of religious movements, who can step in – even if temporarily – to meet the needs of distressed citizens. As Berman (2009:113) notes in a study of religious terrorism, “a decline in the ability of government to provide basic services ... will allow religious radicals who provide those services to demand stricter adherence to religious prohibitions” (also Iannaccone and Berman 2006:111).⁶⁴

⁶⁴ As explained in Chapter 5, something similar occurred in France in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War. There had been a Catholic party in France since the turn of the century, but it never polled well in

Infrastructurally weak states are likely to be viewed by citizens as illegitimate, that is, their governmental authority is not accepted as normatively appropriate (Weber 1968:212–16). Illegitimate governments are unable to forge the sense of obligation among the citizenry that is required for everyday voluntary compliance with the law (Kelman and Hamilton 1989:6; Tyler 2006:378; Uslaner 2017:8). By contrast, citizens who accept that the state is a positive force in everyday life that makes a genuine effort to efficiently provide public services (or at least is seen as developing the capacity to do so) are more likely to feel that governmental authority is legitimate (Fjeldstad and Semboja 2000:7, 22; Westergaard and Alam 1995:686). As Levi and Sacks (2009:315) note in their study of the origins of government legitimacy, “one possible basis for the perception that government is meeting its obligations to citizens is provision of those public goods the population requires to ensure at least a minimal level of social welfare.”

2.4.2. How Religious Charity Leads to Political Power

The argument thus far is that religious provision of social services in infrastructurally weak states underpins to strong confessional political parties. But the story lacks a coherent account of the causal mechanisms linking cause and effect. Why, one might ask, would

elections because French citizens were by and large well provided by their high-capacity state. The only (fleeting) period of confessional party success in France occurred in 1945–46, when a Catholic party topped the polls amid widespread deprivation, famine, and physical insecurity caused by the war. Not surprisingly, the Catholic party lost almost half its seats when the next legislative elections were held in 1951.

individuals not simply pocket the largesse of religious charities and vote for another party come election day?

The central arguments of this dissertation are rooted in assumptions about the motives of provider and recipient for distributing and accepting welfare goods. Religious provision of social services is motivated by complex incentives. Religious individuals sometimes engage in charitable endeavours for philanthropic reasons, but their actions still lead to a portrayal of religious communities as the champions of social well-being, which naturally leads to greater support and strengthens religious influence over society. Irrespective of charitable incentives, the provision of social services by religious groups furthers their political purposes, as I show in the empirical chapters.⁶⁵

In effect, religious providers of welfare circumvent the anticlerical state to build an oppositional subculture that can be mobilized during elections. Despite the fact that this strategy of politico-religious movements is often employed across different countries, it has received little scholarly attention (Davis and Robinson 2012:3–4). The literature on social movements seems particularly well-equipped to study the issue, but scholars have mostly focused on political tactics of direct engagement with the state through mass protests, violence, organized boycotts, strikes, petitions, lobbying, or terrorism. On the other hand, scholars have paid little attention to the more long-term and less noticeable tactic of slowly

⁶⁵ The empirical case studies do not explore the impact of services on the beneficiaries, although the remainder of this Chapter presents a theoretical explanation of how they make people more likely to vote for a confessional party. Throughout I do assume that social welfare provision has the potential to generate political support.

constructing alternative subcultural organizations to infuse civil society with religious beliefs (Cress and Snow 2000:1096). Even when scholars recognize the importance of a dense associational network for religious movements, they have often mischaracterized it as a purely philanthropic sideshow without direct bearing on political outcomes (El-Ghobashy 2005:377; Leiken and Brooke 2007:112).

But religious provision of social services and the painstaking creation of a dense associational network is not just a private philanthropic issue; it is a key building block for electoral success (Esposito and Burgat 2003:71). That is why confessional parties who are clearly on the right in cultural and ethical issues usually adopt centrist or even leftist positions on the economy (von Beyme 1985:81–96; Fogarty 1957:3–11; Hanley 1994:4–5; Irving 1979:xvii–xxii; van Kersbergen 1994:31–47; Warner 2012:260). Their support for at least some modest levels of redistribution is not secondary to their main appeal on the cultural cleavage, but is often a central component of their electoral programmes that looks especially credible to voters who have benefited from religious welfare services or know someone who did.

2.4.2.1. Building a Religious Community

It is important to distinguish religious provision of public goods from clientelistic one-shot transactions in which the vote is exchanged for some specific material benefit (Nichter 2008:20; Stokes 2005:315–17). Religious welfare providers do not usually engage beneficiaries in explicitly transactional ways (Hamzeh 2001:176). Indeed, one does not need

to be a direct beneficiary of religious charities to sympathise with their welfare efforts. Knowing that neighbours or family members benefited from religious charities can persuade individuals to support the confessional party. The commitment to care for the most vulnerable generates the esteem and admiration of observers (Hilsenrath 2005:366). Religious welfare providers thus go beyond purely material transactions to generate a wider sense of being part of a solidary community, which is especially valued when weak state institutions are unable to help people cope with difficult times (Davis and Robinson 2012:2–3; Tönnies 2001:36–37). Citizens embedded in these religious social networks regard the religious group as the community's protector – the very link that ties the community together –, which naturally makes religion the object of popular loyalties and affections. Religious charities, schools, or hospitals that are physically located in particular villages, towns, or neighbourhoods tie the religious group even closer to the community since they are visible manifestations of a long-term investment to the people of the area.

Religious providers of welfare thus project an image of logistical power on the ground that bypass the official institutions of government to publicize the norms and values of religion in everyday life (Davis and Robinson 2006:167–71; Williams 1994:820). They permeate the community with religious sensibilities and help nurture the broader cultural hegemony (Gramsci 1971:12; Levitt 2006:2) that underpins an enduring takeover of power. By showing that the religious group is able to bring concrete benefits in a tangible way, the welfare providers dispel any anxiety that the movement is led by religious fanatics with utopian, unrealistic, and unworkable expectations. This is particularly important for an organization that wants to foster an image of reliability and efficiency – characteristics that qualify it to govern the country (Munson 2001:501).

Since the normative expectation is that the state and not a private entity like religion takes the lead in providing public goods, religious welfare efforts automatically invite comparison with prevailing government services. When religious welfare providers are perceived as superior alternatives to their government counterparts, their mere existence speaks a thousand words, constituting an implicit indictment of the incapacity of the state to care for its citizens (Abu-Amr 1994:130–50; Hamzeh 2004:53; Richards and Waterbury 2013:369). The community that benefits from religious welfare services gradually gains a “politicized collective identity” (Simon and Klandermans 2001:319–21) that, to borrow from the Marxist jargon, turns it from a ‘group of itself’ to a ‘group for itself’ with self-conscious collective political objectives.

Of course, not all recipients of religious welfare largesse become dyed-in-the-wool political militants (Iannaccone and Berman 2006:117). While some people do become committed activists, others might be merely passive supporters (Stokes 2007:658). The amount of time and effort devoted to political activities on behalf of the religious community might serve as a barometer of individual partisanship (Davis and Robinson 2012:147). Voting for the confessional party in elections, for instance, is a relatively low-commitment activity. More time-consuming methods of political activism, such as transporting voters to polling stations and participating in party meetings, fall in the middle of the spectrum of partisanship. Repeated and demanding activities such as participating in protests and riots or organizing party meetings and events can be depicted as highly partisan activities (Coser 1974:17).

For these committed partisans, religion is not an accessory part of their lives to be experienced merely once in a while; it encompasses all aspects of life, promising a hopeful future, a blessed present, and protection against the trials and tribulations of life. Committed partisans meet business partners, form friendships, find marriage partners, and socialize their children within the religious social network. They provide the shock-troops of social workers, religious teachers, and political campaigners that help recruit more members to the cause.

2.4.2.2. Individual Beneficiaries

Poorer individuals that fall outside the official safety net are the most likely to seek religious welfare assistance, but poverty is not the only factor accounting for the individual distribution of social benefits. Indeed, the relationship between religious groups and the poor is far from straightforward. As we will see in the empirical chapters, religious schools, for instance, are rarely free of charge. Most often they target the middle-classes in the hope of forming a new social elite infused with religious values, thus excluding the poor (Hamzeh 2004:234). Religious partisan activists are disproportionately composed of the marginalized urban lower middle classes, often small property-owners. These activists in turn engage and mobilize the youth and the unemployed, often succeeding in turning them into passive supporters but rarely into committed partisans.

A vibrant scholarly literature on the phenomenon of clientelism has sought to explain how parties and their intermediaries target individual clients, mostly on the basis of evidence from Latin America. The literature largely agrees that clientelistic parties target poor voters

(Calvo and Murillo 2004:755–57; Scott 1969:1151), but there have been extensive debates about which low-income voters are targeted: since even the richest parties lack the financial clout to provide clientelistic benefits to everyone, they have to focus their limited resources on a select group of voters. Rational political parties might opt to target people who have some previous sympathies for the party in order to get the most bang for their buck (Nichter 2008:18). The literature generally agrees that the parties should not target their own core constituents (who are likely to support the party regardless of clientelistic inducements) nor those of other parties (who should be expensive to persuade, if they are persuadable at all).

By contrast, confessional political parties and their associated charitable organizations often target current in-group members rather than attracting new supporters.⁶⁶ In countries with highly salient religious cleavages where one's presence within or outside a religious social network largely determines one's vote, party programs and policy platforms become secondary to identity cues. Nonetheless, confessional political parties do have to attract some new supporters through welfare outreach to triumph in national elections (Kalyvas 1996:241). Directing at least some welfare benefits to out-group members is also important to establish long-term hegemony over the political system and preserve power for more than a single electoral cycle. Otherwise, confessional party victory in one election may be turned into defeat in the next, swinging religious policy between anticlerical and proclerical extremes. Securely controlling the levers of power requires successful governance of non-religious parts of the population. If a confessional party demonstrates its 'valence' capacity to govern for everyone – irrespective of spiritual beliefs –, it engenders a positive attitude among the non-

⁶⁶ In the terminology of the clientelistic literature, religious parties adhere to a 'turnout-buying' strategy.

religious or even the anti-religious, generating a reservoir of good will that might persuade secular parties to steer clear of anticlericalism when they do return to power. Confessional parties succeed in their goal when their presence in power is not required to ward off anticlericalism.

2.5. Conclusion

In this chapter I crafted a theory of religious party formation and strength that focuses on anticlericalism and the infrastructural power of the state. The formation of confessional parties is a defensive mechanism against what religious groups perceive to be the aggressive and repressive anticlerical actions of state-building elites. The success of confessional political parties, in turn, is built on a dense organizational web of religious charities, schools, and hospitals, which flourishes especially when states are weak and unable to provide those valuable social goods themselves. By contrast, strong states are able to prevent the emergence of a religious civil society network by their efficient provision of social goods. While infrastructurally powerful states might also have religious political parties, the lack of a supporting organizational network virtually guarantees their electoral irrelevance.

Chapter 3: Quantitative Analysis of Religious Party Formation and Strength

In this chapter, I undertake a first empirical test of my theory of religious party development by examining a quantitative dataset collected especially for this dissertation. My goal is to establish preliminary answers to the two primary research questions of the dissertation. What determines the formation of a religious political party? And which factors explain whether a religious party succeeds or fails? The chapter is structured in six sections. The first section provides an operational definition of the two dependent variables – religious party formation and religious party strength - and documents the regional and historical patterns of variation in the dependent variables. In the second section I explain the estimation techniques used in the statistical analysis. The third part of the chapter introduces the set of control variables as well as alternative explanations that deal with ideational differences between denominations, socioeconomic structures, and institutional factors. In the fourth section I present the results of the statistical analysis for religious party formation, where I find a strong relationship between anticlericalism and religious party formation. The fifth section analyses the determinants of religious party strength. The statistical results support the hypothesized interactive relationship between state capacity, anticlerical policy, and religious party strength: anticlerical measures adopted by infrastructurally weak states breed strong religious parties. The concluding section summarizes the implications of these findings.

3.1. Operationalization of the Dependent Variables and Descriptive Statistics

In this dissertation, I study processes that take place in an electoral setting - whether religious parties took part in the electoral contest (religious party formation), and what share of the votes or seats did religious parties obtain (religious party strength). Since elections take place in particular countries in specific years, each election in each year counts as one observation for the empirical analysis.⁶⁷ To simplify, I call each unit of observation an 'election-year.'⁶⁸ The analysis of confessional party formation considers all election-years in democracies – regimes that allow religious political parties to participate in free elections. Including autocracies in the statistical analysis would bias the results, because elections without religious parties in, say, 1970s Poland, cannot tell us whether religious groups did not *want* to form a party or whether the Communist dictatorship *repressed* would-be religious parties. But how can we differentiate between democratic and non-democratic elections? In the following analysis, an election-year is considered democratic when it fulfils two necessary and jointly sufficient conditions, both of which are measured by the Varieties of Democracy dataset (Coppedge et al. 2020): the election is contested by more than one party⁶⁹ and

⁶⁷ Where more than one election for the lower legislative chamber took place in a certain country, I consider that a religious party was present if it participated in at least one of those elections. To analyse religious party strength in those elections, I took the mean of the religious party score on all elections in a given year.

⁶⁸ The data comprises only general national elections for lower houses of parliament, together with elections for constituent assemblies. I do not include election results for subnational bodies, referenda, or higher legislative chambers.

⁶⁹ I counted as multiparty elections those that scored either 3 ("elections are multiparty in principle") or 4 ("elections are multiparty") in V-Dem's variable *v2elmulpar_ord*.

religious parties cannot be banned.⁷⁰ Restricting the empirical analysis to open elections of this sort leaves us with 1,060 election-years that cover 101 countries.

To collect data on all democratic elections taking place between 1800 and 2015, I relied on mainly on the data handbooks of Dieter Nohlen and collaborators, which has an excellent temporal and geographical coverage, showing each party's share of the votes and seats for all national elections from the nineteenth to the twenty-first century (Nohlen 2005a, 2005b; Nohlen, Grotz, and Hartmann 2001b, 2001a; Nohlen, Krennerich, and Thibaut 1999; Nohlen and Stöver 2010). Where necessary, I supplemented the handbooks' data with the election datasets of Mackie and Rose (1991, 1997), Caramani (2000), Hyde and Marinov (2012), and Kollman and collaborators (2019).

3.1.1. What is a Religious Party?

Categorizing political parties - in the sense of crafting a typology into which a variety of organizations in different countries can compellingly fit - is always a complex endeavour (Mair and Mudde 1998:211–29). Thus, it is essential that the category be defined as clearly as possible so that the reader is confident that we are comparing like for like. In this dissertation, I define a religious political party as a formal political group that was formed with the explicit and widely-understood objective of furthering the interests of a specific religious community

⁷⁰ Corresponding to V-Dem's *v2psbantar_1* variable on whether religious parties are banned. Elections that scored 1 on this variable were excluded from the analysis.

(Elman and Warner 2008:6).⁷¹ Two observations follow from this definition. First, I employ a dichotomous classification: a party either is religious or it secular.⁷² Second, the definition classifies confessional parties depending on their *formative* attachments to a religious community; in other words, I do not ask anew at each election whether a certain party is religious but code it as continually religious unless it explicitly renounces its links to organized religion (Caramani 2004:156). My coding is thus based upon the organizational continuity rather than the programmatic content of parties. Therefore, I sidestep the issue of whether a long-lived party like the Italian Christian Democracy or the German Christian Democratic Union became secularized (for a similar approach, see Beck et al. 2000:16). As Kalyvas (1996:256) notes, the repeal of anticlericalism and the decline of the secular-religious cleavage led European Catholic parties to deemphasize the religious content of their platforms and to become “nonclerical, secular organizations.” Independently of the weight of religious issues on confessional party platforms for any particular election, I continually code them as religious if they were created with the explicit objective of furthering the interests of a religious group.⁷³ I only change my coding of a religious party if the party publicly and clearly

⁷¹ A political party can be defined as “any political group that presents at elections, and is capable of placing through elections, candidates for public office” (Sartori 1976:64).

⁷² The alternative would be a continuous approach that assesses the degree of ‘religiousness’ of a political party, which is not only very hard to operationalize but also escapes the purposes of this dissertation, which is based on the linkage of political parties and religious groups and not the strength of that linkage. Obviously, non-religious parties can appeal to religious groups, but ultimately the primary attachment of confessional parties is to a specific religious group, while secular parties regard their religious supporters as just one among their several constituencies (Powell 1982:116).

⁷³ Kalyvas (1996:256) also notes that the secularized European Christian Democratic parties “did not discard religion.”

disowns its former links with a religious group and proclaims its adherence to a secular ideology.⁷⁴

3.1.2. Operationalizing Religious Party Formation

Intuitively, for any country during two successive election-years, the presence or absence of religious political parties yields four possible scenarios. If there are no religious political parties in election-year $t-1$, and the same is true for the following election-year t , this suggests a scenario of *stable religious non-electoral involvement*. By contrast, *religious party formation* takes place if there are no religious parties in election year $t-1$ while in the following election-year t we do observe religious political participation (Hug 2001:14; Laroze 2019:562–63). There are also two other patterns of religious party development that are not my primary concern in this study: *religious party collapse*, which takes place if religious parties participated in the election-year of $t-1$ but disappeared in t ; and *stable religious electoral involvement*, corresponding to two successive election-years in which religious political parties contested the election.

Using this 2x2 matrix, Table 3.1 shows the probability of either of the four scenarios outlined above taking place, conditional on the initial presence/absence of a religious political party. For example, the first row shows the probability of having no religious parties in election-year t given that there were also no religious parties in election-year $t-1$. This matrix

⁷⁴ An example is the Walloon Catholic party in Belgium, which changed its name in 2002 to the Humanist Democratic Centre (Bale and Krouwel 2013:19).

of conjectural probabilities defines a Markov chain outlining the general patterns of religious party development. The last column gives us the number of election-years corresponding to each cell. Out of 1514 election-years without religious political parties, only in 102 cases did religious parties form and participate in the subsequent election. The remaining 1412 election-years present a stable pattern of religious non-involvement. By contrast, out of 856 election-years with religious political participation at time $t-1$, fully 785 of the next elections also had religious parties. This information suggests that there is considerable inertia in the patterns of religious political participation. If we picked a country at random of which we knew nothing except whether a religious party contested elections at time $t-1$, we would only be wrong in predicting if religious parties took part in election-year t less than ten percent of the time.

Table 3.1 - General Patterns of Religious Party Formation

Election-year			Probability of Outcome	N
t-1	t	Pattern		
No Religious Party	No Religious Party	Stable Non-Involvement	0.93	1412
No Religious Party	Religious Party	Party Formation	0.07	102
Religious Party	No Religious Party	Party Collapse	0.08	71
Religious Party	Religious Party	Stable Involvement	0.92	785
Total				2370

Table 3.2 disaggregates the information to display, for different religious denominations and time periods, the proportion of election-year observations in each category (at $t-1$) that remained stable or changed to another category by the subsequent election-year (t). Muslim- and Hindu-majority countries have the highest rates of religious party formation, at 0.21 and 0.29 respectively. As suggested in the discussion about religious institutional autonomy of the previous chapter, Protestant-majority countries are least likely to witness the formation of religious political parties: in only three percent of cases were confessional parties created in time t after being absent in time $t-1$. After religious parties enter the political scene, the probability of party collapse is extremely low across almost all subcategories. The exception are Eastern Orthodox countries, who suffer from an unusually high breakdown rate of 0.38. In terms of time periods, the nineteenth century witnessed a relatively low rate of party formation (0.03) but extraordinary durability for the few religious parties that did exist – in fact there are no episodes of religious party collapse prior to 1919, which was the last election contested by the French Catholic party *Action Libérale Populaire* (see Chapter 5). The twentieth and twenty-first centuries have a similar rate of religious party formation (0.08 and 0.07, respectively), but once formed, confessional parties are more than two-fifths more likely to collapse in the present century than they did in the previous one.


Table 3.2 - Patterns of Religious Party Development by Denomination and Century

	Stable Non- Involvement	Party Formation	Party Collapse	Stable Involvement
Catholic Majority	0.92 (N=500)	0.08 (N=42)	0.07 (N=29)	0.93 (N=384)
Protestant Majority	0.97 (N=429)	0.03 (N=15)	0.12 (N=10)	0.88 (N=72)
Orthodox Majority	0.94 (N=162)	0.06 (N=10)	0.38 (N=12)	0.62 (N=20)
Muslim Majority	0.79 (N=73)	0.21 (N=19)	0.11 (N=9)	0.89 (N=73)
Buddhist Majority	0.91 (N=61)	0.09 (N=6)	0.09 (N=3)	0.91 (N=29)
Hindu Majority	0.71 (N=5)	0.29 (N=2)	0.11 (N=2)	0.89 (N=17)
19th Century	0.98 (N=372)	0.03 (N=9)	0 (N=0)	1 (N=73)
20th Century	0.92 (N=743)	0.08 (N=67)	0.07 (N=40)	0.93 (N=499)
21st Century	0.93 (N=202)	0.07 (N=15)	0.12 (N=21)	0.88 (N=156)

3.1.3. Operationalizing Religious Party Strength

My measure of religious party strength is the vote share obtained by religious political parties for democratic legislative elections. Figure 3.1 provides a brief overview of these parties' strength by showing broad trends in the share of confessional party vote in general legislative elections across six world regions between 1875 and 2015. The images suggest that confessional party support varies considerably across regions as well as within regions over time. The North Atlantic (Western Europe and North America) region has witnessed a relative stability of confessional party support after the interwar period, while in Eastern Europe support for religious parties appears to rise after traumatic events like the end of the First World War and the fall of Communism, but tends to decrease afterwards. Latin America shows a similar inverted-U shape pattern of growing support for religious parties until the 1990s, with a marked fall afterwards. By contrast, Sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East, and South and East Asia show strikingly erratic fluctuations in the electoral fortunes of religious parties, which is partly explained by the paucity of fully democratic elections in those regions.

Figure 3.1 - Average Religious Party Vote Share Across Regions, 1875-2015



Note: Values reflect smoothed ten-year averages.

3.2. Estimation Techniques for the Analysis of Religious Party Formation

In this section, I outline the estimation techniques for the statistical analysis of religious party formation using survival models. Survival analysis techniques have been used in the field of medical research and biostatistics to study the length of time patients survive until they die, and whether the length of survival is associated with covariates of interest like age, nutritional habits, or different medication (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004:7). More generally, survival analysis involves units observed during a certain period of time who are ‘at risk’ of experiencing some event. In the context of this study, the units of interest are countries who

are ‘at risk’ of giving rise to a religious political party. Time is measured in election-years.⁷⁵ Observation ends when a religious political party enters an election. Since the data ends in 2015, countries that have not developed a religious political party by that point are treated as censored, which means that we are agnostic as to whether the event of interest – religious party formation – takes place after the end of the observation period.

Because I have no obvious reason to expect the duration dependency to exhibit some particular form – in other words, I do not have *a priori* assumptions as to whether the likelihood of religious party formation increases or decreases over time -, the statistical analysis employs the Cox proportional hazards model (Cox 1972). The great advantage of this model is that the precise form of the duration dependency is left unspecified (Cox 1975), which is why it widely used in the social scientific field.

The quantitative analysis is designed to test the empirical validity of the theoretical framework of religious party formation outline in the preceding chapter. To put it shortly, my basic argument is that anticlerical policy drives religious groups to organize politically and contest elections. I use the term anticlericalism (and proclericalism) with no normative connotations, taking it to mean simply government policies that disfavour (and favour) religion. To measure this I use the dataset on Government Religious Preference (GRP), which provides a wealth of high-quality information on government policy towards thirty different

⁷⁵ For instance, the United States – a country that holds legislative elections every two years - enters the sample in 1800, with Congressional elections comprising the first election-year; the second election-year is 1802, the third 1804, and so on.

religious denominations (Brown 2002, 2018). The dataset covers 220 countries from 1800 to 2015 and includes the favourability of government policy towards religion across five different domains: official status,⁷⁶ religious education,⁷⁷ financial support,⁷⁸ regulatory burdens,⁷⁹ and free exercise.⁸⁰ I reversed the dataset original coding so that higher (lower) values mean more anticlerical (proclerical) policies, with 4 being the maximum level of anticlericalism and 0 the lowest.

The operationalization of the anticlericalism indicator is not entirely straightforward. As mentioned, the GRP dataset measures government policy towards different religious groups. But there is little to be learned from analysing, say, Saudi Arabia's Catholic policy, or Portugal's policy towards Buddhism. Since the dependent variable of interest is religious party formation, we need an indicator measuring government policy only towards those *religious groups that can plausibly form a political party*. Thus, simply averaging the policy scores for all religious denominations would result in a faulty indicator. We would be giving the same

⁷⁶ The most proclerical policy for this dimension is when the religion is designated as the official and state religion, while the most anticlerical policy is when the religion is singled out for hostility in the constitution or other fundamental law.

⁷⁷ The most proclerical policy for this dimension is when the religion is taught in all schools, whether public or private, while the most anticlerical policy is when the religion is prohibited from being taught in public and private schools.

⁷⁸ The most proclerical policy for this dimension is when the religion receives favourable financial support, while the most anticlerical policy is when the religion is singled out for unfavourable financial treatment.

⁷⁹ The most proclerical policy for this dimension is when at least one major life activity is permitted only for the adherents of a given religion, while the most anticlerical policy is when the adherents of a given religion are subject to regulatory restrictions that effectively exclude them from at least one major life activity.

⁸⁰ The most proclerical policy for this dimension is when only a given religion is allowed to practice publicly, while the most anticlerical policy is when the public and private practice of religion is prohibited.

weight to all denominations when only a few have the demographic and political potential to form their own political party. One alternative to this would be to include each country's level of anticlerical towards the denomination that has the most adherents. Then the indicator for anticlericalism would measure policy towards Sunni Muslims in Saudi Arabia, towards Catholics in Italy, towards Hindus in India, etc. The problem with this is that some religious parties represent minority denominations (for instance, the Centre Party in Germany). So the measure of anticlericalism should have some way of including religious policy towards minority denominations as well. To square the circle, the indicator of anticlericalism used in the regressions is formed by multiplying the anticlerical score towards each denomination by the share of the population that professes that denomination (using data from Brown and James 2019). For instance, in 1871 the population of the German Empire had the following religious demographics: Protestants constituted 64 % of the population, Catholics 33 %, and Sunni Muslims 0.008 percent. On a scale of 0 to 4, anticlericalism towards Protestants was 1.2, towards Catholics was 2, and towards Sunni Muslims was 2.5. So the overall indicator is calculated as

$$\textit{Anticlericalism} = (1.2 * 0.64) + (2 * 0.33) + (2.5 * 0.00008) \quad (3.1.)$$

$$\textit{Anticlericalism} = 1.43$$


More formally, the formula for calculating the anticlericalism score is

$$A_c = \sum_{c=1}^c a_{rc} s_{rc} \quad (3.2.)$$

Where A_c is the overall anticlericalism score for country c , a_{rc} is the anticlerical policy towards religion r in country c , and s_{rc} is the share of the population who professes religion r in country c .

Figure 3.2 illustrates the evolution of the five dimensions of anticlericalism between 1800 and 2015. There is a significant convergence of the scores over time to the midway point of two. The most anticlerical dimension at the outset – with an average score of 3 in 1800 – pertained to regulatory burdens on people professing a certain religion, while the lowest was the dimension on religious establishment, with a mean score for all countries of 1.6. Exemplifying a more general pattern, these two dimensions converged over the course of the decades, to the extent that by the end of the period, the anticlerical score on the dimension of official religion was higher than on that of regulatory burdens.


Figure 3.2 - Five Dimensions of Anticlerical Policy, 1800-2015



Source: Government Religious Preferences V 2.0 (2018).

Figure 3.3 shows the average level of anticlericalism for countries whose majority religion is Sunni Islam, Shia Islam, Roman Catholicism, Protestantism, Orthodox Christianity, and Buddhism.⁸¹ The dotted horizontal line shows the mid-point of the anticlericalism index, which can serve as a rule of thumb to divide proclerical (below the line) from anticlerical (above the line) scenarios. We can see that Orthodox-majority countries are the most consistently proclerical, with Protestant-majority countries in second place. Buddhist- and Sunni-majority countries became markedly more anticlerical during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, while Catholic-majority countries have consistently been the most anticlerical, even if anticlericalism seems to have plateaued in the past hundred years.

Figure 3.3 - Average Level of Anticlericalism by Majority Religion, 1815-2015



Note: Values reflect smoothed ten-year averages.

⁸¹ Hinduism is left out because there are only three Hindu-majority countries, namely Nepal, India, and Mauritius.

3.3. Alternative Explanations

I now outlined the control variables employed in the statistical models to test alternative explanations. As discussed in the introductory chapter, scholars have proposed multiple explanations for the process of religious party formation. To systematise the bewildering array of existing theories, I divide them into three major groups: structural preconditions, ideas and doctrines, and institutional design.

3.3.1. Structures

From the vantage point of the second decade of the twenty-first century, it seems fairly clear that simplistic socioeconomic accounts of religious involvement in politics are wrong. Nonetheless, because many prominent scholars in political science and sociology have argued that economic development is the main determinant of individual religious belief and collective religious organization, I include controls for the two most influential explanations.

3.3.1.1. Modernization Theory: Demand for Religion

The most well-known and influential structural theory of religion is modernization theory (Clark 2003:12). Many prominent scholars and philosophers from Voltaire to Karl Marx and Max Weber have predicted - or claimed to have found - a negative association between socioeconomic development and religious belief (for a discussion, see Bruce 1992:170–94). In this perspective, development undermines the ‘superstitious’ foundations of spiritual faith

by disseminating scientific knowledge, thus eroding religious practices and sapping would-be confessional parties of a voter base (Bruce 2002:36; Dobbelaere 1985:377–87, 1987:107–37, 1999:229–47; Jagodzinski and Dobbelaere 1995:115). If modernization theory is correct, religious parties would be less likely to emerge at higher levels of socioeconomic development.⁸² The regressions thus include a measure of socioeconomic development, operationalized as per capita income in 2011 US dollars. The data comes from the Maddison Project database (Bolt et al. 2018:3). To account for the possibility that the hypothesized effect of wealth on religious belief is non-linear, I use the natural logarithm of income per capita; additional tests (not shown) without the logging the variable do not significantly change the results.

Ronald Inglehart and Pippa Norris (2004) have recently put forward a slightly modified version of modernization theory. The authors argue that religiosity is not correlated with socioeconomic development per se but to existential security. Even very wealthy societies may experience a resurgence of religiosity under the strains of a sudden contraction in income that creates widespread anxiety and panic, leading insecure individuals to value the reassurance provided by religion (Norris and Inglehart 2004:19). To test for this possibility, I include an indicator of yearly change in per capita income (Bolt et al. 2018).

⁸² Socioeconomic ‘development’ is a multifaceted concept, whose relative unfalsifiability might explain the long-term popularity of modernization theory. However, most modernization theorists would agree that modernization is associated with the development of large-scale industry, the growth of a unionized labour force, and the consolidation of professional and white-collar workers in the tertiary sector. These economic developments were linked with higher standards of living, middle-class affluence, and the expansion of education.

3.3.1.2. Religious Market Theory: Supply of Religion

A second group of structural arguments regarding religious vitality emphasizes not the public demand for religion but its supply. Greater religious pluralism, so the argument goes, spurs efficiency-enhancing competition for adherents between different religions and leads to a higher overall level of religiosity among the public (see Chaves and Gorski 2001; Iannaccone 1991; Stark and Iannaccone 1994; for a contrary view, see Voas et al. 2002). To examine the evidence for this proposition, I include in the regressions a Herfindahl index of religious heterogeneity,⁸³ calculated using data from the Religious Characteristics of States Project (Brown and James 2019).

3.3.2. Ideas

The theoretical framework elaborated in the previous chapter contends that the ideological and doctrinal content of religious denominations should have little or no effect on the probability of forming confessional parties. However, I do not expect the rate of party formation to be uniform across religions. Rather, I claim that the differences in religious institutional autonomy outlined in Chapter 2 (transnational ties and organizational structure) increase the

⁸³ The Herfindahl or Hirschman-Herfindahl index is a concentration measure calculated through the sum of squares of the proportion of people belonging to different religious denominations, yielding a result that can range from 0 (everyone in the population professes a different religion) to 1 (everyone belongs to the same religion).

‘elective affinity’ between low-autonomy denominations like Protestantism and Orthodox Christianity and the state, which in turn lowers the likelihood of anticlericalism and religious party formation. By contrast, high-autonomy denominations like Sunni Islam or Roman Catholicism are more likely to trigger the state’s anticlerical hostility. In other words: my argument is that different religions may be more or less likely to be targeted by anticlericalism, but *when faced by the same level of anticlericalism they should have the same incentive to form political parties*. The academic literature on the ideational impact of spiritual beliefs makes a different argument: significant and long-standing differences in socio-political values based on religious doctrines exert an independent causal influence upon individual attitudes and the propensity to participate in politics (Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales 2003:228; Huntington 1996:41–71; Inglehart 1997:222–23; Midlarsky 1998:504; Norris and Inglehart 2004:146–47; Weber 1930:19; Wuthnow 2002:669–75). Thus, ideational theorists would contend that *even controlling for anticlericalism, different religions are unequally predisposed to form political parties*. To test this possibility, I employ indicators measuring the share of the population which is Catholic, Sunni Muslim, Shia Muslim, Protestant, Christian Orthodox, Hindu, and Buddhist.

3.3.3. Institutions

Differences in institutional design between countries can also have an effect on religious party development. Electoral laws, regime type, and the level of democracy structure opportunities for party formation within each country, and in this section I briefly consider each in turn.

3.3.3.1. Electoral System

An extensive literature in political science has established that electoral systems exert a major influence upon the success prospects of new political parties (Cox 1997; Dunleavy and Boucek 2003; Duverger 1954; Lijphart 1994; Rae 1971; Riker 1976; Taagepera 1999). In the famous words of Maurice Duverger, “the simple-majority single-ballot system favours the two-party system” (Duverger 1954:217) while “proportional representation favours multi-partyism” (Duverger 1954:239). New parties seeking to establish themselves on the political scene face formidable obstacles in highly disproportional electoral systems because strategic voting favours the established incumbents (Duverger 1954:226). To assess whether the electoral system does influence the likelihood of religious party formation, I include an indicator measuring the average district magnitude⁸⁴ per election-year (data comes from Colomer 2016; Coppedge et al. 2020).

3.3.3.2. Presidentialism

If the simple-majority electoral system creates pressure to restrict the number of viable parties to two, it stands to reason that presidentialism should exert similar – even if weaker - effects. As Gary Cox (1997:189) argues, “presidential elections will drive the system toward

⁸⁴ This is the average number of legislators returned per district. The average magnitude can range from one in countries with a first-past-the-post system like Great Britain and the United States (where each district returns only one legislator) to 120 in Israel and 150 in the Netherlands (where there is one nationwide district returning all legislators). The higher the average district magnitude, the more proportional the electoral system, which presumably makes it easier for new political parties to form.

national bipartism to the extent that the presidency is a single nondivisible prize elected by rules that approximate a straight plurality fight.” To control for the possibility that presidentialism poses an obstacle to party formation, I include a binary variable measuring whether a country elects its president through a popular vote (data comes from Coppedge et al. 2020).

3.3.3.3. Level of Democracy

The statistical analyses conducted in this chapter include only multiparty elections in countries where religious parties are not legally banned. This is a wide net that includes regimes ranging from full liberal democracies to electoral autocracies. It is plausible that more democratic countries place lower obstacles on the entry of new political parties, or that elections marred by fraud and irregularities discourage new parties from participating. To control for that possibility, the regressions include the combined Polity score. This is a widely used indicator to measure the level of democracy that ranges from -10 to +10 (Marshall and Jaggers 2016).


3.4. Statistical Analysis of Religious Party Formation

This section presents the results of the statistical models of religious party formation. The analysis includes 92 countries with a combined total of 963 election-years, out of which 25 saw the formation of a religious political party (‘failed’ in the terminology of the survival

model employed in the analysis). I first present the general results and then run a series of robustness tests.

Figure 3.4 displays the Kaplan-Meier failure function at three levels of anticlericalism: mean (solid line), two standard deviations below the mean (short-dashed line), and two standard deviations above the mean (long dash). At low levels of anticlerical religious policy, there can be as many as forty elections without religious party formation. By contrast, a majority of countries with high levels of anticlericalism witness the rise of a religious party between their tenth and fifteenth legislative elections. Religious parties appear more gradually in countries with the mean level of anticlericalism, passing the 0.25 mark after twenty elections and the 0.5 mark after forty.

Figure 3.4 - Kaplan-Meier Failure Estimates at Low, Medium, and High Levels of Anticlericalism



Note: The graph plots the Kaplan-Meier failure function at different levels of anticlericalism: two standard deviations below the mean (short dash), mean, and two standard deviations above the mean (long dash).

Table 3.3 presents the results of five proportional hazards survival models in which the outcome of interest is the formation of a religious political party. I start by considering only the effect of anticlericalism (without additional covariates) in Model 3.3.1. As indicated above, my theoretical framework claims that anticlericalism is the main driver of religious party formation. Without controlling for any other factors, it does seem that anticlerical policies are associated with a greater likelihood of confessional party formation.

Now consider how the presence of the structural control variables in Model 3.3.2 (logged per capita income, per capita income growth, and the Herfindahl index of religious homogeneity) affect the likelihood of religious party formation. Per capita income is statistically significant but runs in the direction opposite to that posited by modernization theorists: wealthier countries are *more likely* to spawn religious political parties. However, this effect disappears in the fully specified models, which implies that the positive relationship might be spuriously caused by the fact that Western countries are both richer and more likely to develop religious parties. Per capita income growth is not statistically significant except in Model 3.3.4, where once more it has the reverse effect of that predicted in modernization theory. Overall, the quantitative evidence does not support modernization theory. There seems to be no association between religious party formation and economic development.⁸⁵

⁸⁵ These results are robust to alternative estimation techniques, such as the use of parametric methods.

The religious market hypothesis that competition spurs religious growth does not fare much better. The Herfindahl index of religious homogeneity is statistically significant in Models 3.3.2. and 3.3.3, but once again runs in an unexpected direction. It seems that greater religious homogeneity - not vibrant denominational pluralism - increases the likelihood of religious party formation. The effect disappears on the fully specified models, so rather than focusing too much on the direction of the coefficients, it is more plausible to conclude that there is no clear association between religious competition and party formation.

Table 3.3 - Survival Model for Religious Party Formation, 1800-2015

	3.3.1	3.3.2	3.3.3	3.3.4	3.3.5
Anticlericalism	5.155 (2.107)**	5.365 (1.697)***	5.904 (2.057)***	10.230 (2.943)***	12.354 (4.522)***
Structural					
Log Per Capita Income		0.351 (0.212)*	0.459 (0.426)	0.279 (0.465)	-0.413 (0.923)
Income Growth (pc)		1.659 (2.131)	1.442 (2.167)	4.652 (2.314)**	15.408 (9.584)
Religious Homogeneity		1.840 (0.787)**	1.835 (0.789)**	-0.473 (1.073)	-2.175 (1.457)
Institutional					

Polity Score	-0.717	-2.508	-1.151
	(1.298)	(1.524)*	(3.888)
District Magnitude	-0.010	-0.033	0.006
	(0.014)	(0.032)	(0.076)
Presidentialism	-0.209	-0.458	-1.607
	(0.613)	(0.730)	(1.563)
Cultural			
Share of Catholics		-0.013	-0.000
		(0.009)	(0.012)
Share of Protestants		-0.616	-0.640
		(0.224)***	(0.326)**
Share of Orthodox		-1.073	-38.552
		(0.781)	(14.554)***
Share of Sunnis		0.022	-0.077
		(0.011)*	(0.055)
Share of Shias		-0.148	0.397
		(0.120)	(0.418)
Share of Hindus		0.034	-0.016
		(0.029)	(0.034)
Share of Buddhists		0.001	0.080

				(0.018)	(0.022)***
Sample Cases	All	All	All	All	Only +6 in Polity
Countries	92	92	92	92	60
Observations	963	963	963	963	554

* $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$. Survival regression using Cox proportional hazards model, with the Breslow method for ties. Standard errors were clustered by country. Schoenfeld residual testing showed no covariates violated the proportional-hazards assumption.

Model 3.3.3 suggests that institutional covariates have no significant impact on the likelihood of religious party formation. None of the variables are significant in any model specification, except for the negative association reported in Model 3.3.4 between the Polity score and religious party formation. The finding that electoral system magnitude is irrelevant for the timing of religious party formation is unexpected, running as it does against established political science scholarship. Probing deeper into this matter, I ran the same set of regressions replacing the continuous magnitude variable with a dichotomous indicator measuring whether there was a plurality electoral system in place (results not shown). Although the coefficient for the plurality dummy was in the expected direction (negatively associated with religious party formation), it was still nowhere close to conventional levels of statistical significance. This lack of association between electoral system and our outcome of interest might be explained by the unusual nature of neophyte religious political parties. Unlike new parties based on other social groups (say, social democratic parties that represent

the industrial working-class), confessional parties are not starting from scratch but can quickly mobilize voters through the use of long-standing associational networks embedded in citizens' daily lives. Rather than growing slowly, confessional parties achieve what Kalyvas (1996:95) calls a "breakthrough election" in their first electoral contest. In other words, would-be religious parties are not necessarily deterred by a restrictive electoral system or a high electoral threshold: right out of the gates, they are equipped with the resources required to win seats and compete with the established mainstream parties, which becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy as voters become convinced that their votes will not be wasted by supporting confessional parties.⁸⁶

Equations 3.3.4 and 3.3.5 incorporate the last set of controls: the share of the population who is Catholic, Protestant, Christian Orthodox, Sunni Muslim, Shia Muslim, Hindu, and Buddhist. As indicated above, I use these indicators as a test of the ideational versus my theory of religious party formation: while I expect that these variables will not be statistically significant when controlling for anticlericalism, ideational theorists contend that, even at the same level of anticlericalism, some religious denominations are more likely to get involved in politics than others. Contrary to my expectations, some of these indicators were statistically significant, although only the share of Protestants was significant across model specifications. Even holding the level of anticlericalism constant, the results show that countries where Protestants make up a greater proportion of the population are less likely to

⁸⁶ The case studies of Chapters 5 document how Italian and French Catholic parties did win a significant number of seats in their first elections, quickly becoming among the largest parties on the right. Chapter 6 shows that the Turkish Islamist party had a more gradual – although in the end more durable – electoral rise.

spawn religious political parties. In Model 3.3.4, Sunni Islam is positively associated with religious party formation, but the effect disappears in Model 3.3.5 where the sample was reduced to countries scoring 6 or above in Polity. On the other hand, Orthodox Christianity and Buddhism are statistically significant only in Model 3.3.5, with Orthodox populations showing a negative association with religious party formation while Buddhist populations seem to have a positive association. The share of Roman Catholics, Shia Muslims, and Hindus is not statistically significant in either model.

As mentioned, Model 3.3.5 of the rightmost column includes only countries scoring at least 6 in Polity. Compared to previous models, the number of observations drops by almost half, from 963 in the more permissive models to 554 and from ninety-two countries to sixty. The results in the restrictive model do not change substantially. The chief takeaway from the set of regressions is that the main independent variable of interest – anticlericalism - is statistically significant across all model specifications. Interestingly, the strength of the covariate increases from model to model. In sum, the evidence from Table 3.3 indicates that anticlericalism has a profound impact on religious party formation. When state policy favours religious groups, they feel their interests are best protected behind the scenes; but when governments embrace anticlericalism, religious groups react by supporting political parties and participating in elections.

3.4.1. Additional Formation Models

Table 3.4 reports four alternative models of religious party formation incorporating additional predictors. To account for the possibility that the example of religious party formation in some country might persuade religious leaders in other countries to follow suit, Model 3.4.1 includes an indicator for the year in which the particular election took place. If diffusion is indeed influencing the likelihood of religious party formation, we might expect to see more religious parties form in the twenty-first century – when they have the successful examples of the Italian Christian Democrats or the Turkish Islamists to emulate – than in the nineteenth century, when would-be religious parties trod uncharted waters. Model 3.4.2 addresses the possibility of international diffusion in a different way: it includes an indicator denoting the share of countries in the region⁸⁷ who have religious political parties. Model 3.4.3 includes the rate of urbanization and Model 3.4.4 the average number of years of education among adults (from Clio-Infra 2018). Finally, Model 3.4.5 addresses the possibility that religious parties might be unnecessary in countries with strong conservative parties by including an indicator of the extent to which the current government promotes a conservative ideology (Coppedge et al. 2020).⁸⁸

⁸⁷ Countries can belong to one of ten regions: Eastern Europe; Latin America; Middle East and North Africa; Sub-Saharan Africa; Western Europe and North America; East Asia; Southeast Asia; South Asia; Oceania; and the Caribbean.

⁸⁸ Taken from the V-Dem indicator *v2exl_legitideolcr_2*, the variable measures the intensity of conservative ideology and ranges from a minimum of 0 to a maximum of 1.

Table 3.4 - Additional Survival Model for Religious Party Formation, 1800-2015

	3.4.1	3.4.2	3.4.3	3.4.4	3.4.5
Anticlericalism	8.615 (3.164)***	8.741 (3.107)***	8.519 (3.217)***	8.673 (2.870)***	8.691 (3.130)***
Structural					
Log Per Capita Income	0.098 (0.433)	0.121 (0.407)	0.366 (0.485)	0.410 (0.487)	0.143 (0.381)
Income Growth (pc)	12.975 (2.960)***	13.572 (3.128)***	22.420 (5.491)***	12.885 (2.956)***	13.737 (3.500)***
Religious Homogeneity	-2.319 (1.899)	-1.363 (1.886)	-0.402 (1.582)	-1.680 (1.856)	-1.646 (1.796)
Institutional					
Polity Score	-0.310 (1.619)	-0.556 (1.485)	-0.515 (1.757)	-0.363 (1.367)	-0.432 (1.612)
District Magnitude	-0.017 (0.013)	-0.024 (0.022)	-0.016 (0.012)	-0.016 (0.014)	-0.025 (0.023)
Presidentialism	0.516 (0.773)	0.009 (0.809)	-0.149 (0.938)	-0.008 (0.807)	0.059 (0.805)
Cultural					

Share of Catholics	-0.014 (0.009)	-0.014 (0.009)	0.001 (0.014)	-0.007 (0.011)	-0.013 (0.009)
Share of Protestants	-0.384 (0.355)	-0.351 (0.321)	-0.375 (0.275)	-0.318 (0.273)	-0.287 (0.292)
Share of Orthodox	-1.035 (0.868)	-1.105 (0.872)	-2.152 (1.031)**	-1.203 (0.874)	-0.934 (0.953)
Share of Sunnis	0.028 (0.016)*	0.023 (0.010)**	0.038 (0.012)***	0.022 (0.010)**	0.025 (0.011)**
Share of Shias	-0.059 (0.055)	-0.059 (0.054)	-0.078 (0.062)	-0.054 (0.042)	-0.058 (0.057)
Share of Hindus	0.034 (0.040)	0.030 (0.040)	0.084 (0.097)	0.034 (0.039)	0.033 (0.040)
Share of Buddhists	0.009 (0.024)	0.007 (0.022)	0.017 (0.022)	0.007 (0.022)	0.008 (0.025)
Additional Controls					
Year	-0.008 (0.014)				
Regional Religious Party		0.021 (0.059)			
Urbanization			-0.036		

			(0.026)		
Years of Education				-0.160	
				(0.164)	
Conservative Ideology				0.743	
				(1.338)	
Sample Cases	All	All	All	All	All
Countries	79	79	79	79	79
Observations	760	760	760	760	760

** p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. Survival regression using Cox proportional hazards model, with the Breslow method for ties. Standard errors were clustered by country. Schoenfeld residual testing showed no covariates violated the proportional-hazards assumption.*

None of the additional predictors is statistically significant. In all models, per capita income growth increases the probability of religious party formation, as does having a larger share of Sunni Muslims in the population. Together with anticlericalism, these are the only two covariates that show a systematic empirical association with religious party formation. The anticlericalism variable remains strongly significant and substantively powerful across all models, which is consistent with this dissertation's theoretical framework. The next section evaluates whether the empirical evidence also corroborates my claims about the negative association between state infrastructural power and religious party strength.

3.5. Statistical Analysis of Religious Party Strength

The statistical model of this section analyses the sources of religious party strength. As outlined in Chapter 2, my theoretical model claims that religious parties thrive in infrastructurally weak states that cannot provide basic public services to their citizens. Therefore, I predict that state infrastructural capacity has a systematic negative relationship with confessional party strength, as measured by the share of the votes obtained by confessional parties in elections. I first discuss how infrastructural capacity is operationalized and then present the results of a time-series cross-sectional regression of religious party strength.

3.5.1. Defining and Measuring Infrastructural Power

Infrastructural power and state capacity⁸⁹ are notoriously hard concepts to pin down. Not only does their meaning vary considerably across social scientific research, but there are also further complications resulting from a profusion of terms that refer to interdependent yet conceptually separate attributes of states, such as state strength, state failure, administrative capacity, political capacity, and governance, among others. Moreover, even when scholars

⁸⁹ I use the two concepts interchangeably, although my precise definition borrows from Michael Mann's (2012a:59) definition of infrastructural power as "the institutional capacity of a central state, despotic or not, to penetrate its territories and logistically implement decisions ... this is collective power, 'power through' society, coordinating social life through state infrastructures." When mentioning 'state capacity' I am referring to Mann's 'infrastructural power.'

succeed in clearly conceptualizing state capacity, they are frequently hampered by data limitations and problems of operationalization.

Borrowing mainly from Michael Mann, I define state capacity as the administrative and organizational ability of the state to implement policies (Besley and Persson 2011:6; Fukuyama 2013:350; Guillén and Capron 2016:126; Hanson and Sigman 2011:2; Mann 2012a:59; McAdam et al. 2001:78; Painter and Pierre 2005:2; Sikkink 1991:6; Soifer and vom Hau 2008:220). How should this be empirically measured? Since we cannot directly observe the state's ability to implement its goals, we must necessarily infer the presence or absence of that ability from the state's actions. The successful achievement of stated objectives is one possible measure, but not without some potential pitfalls. Social biases may shape perceptions of policy success and failure, and scholarly appraisals can differ depending on whether they assess state capacity on the short- or long-term (Wildavsky 1980:285). The hindsight appraisal of what constitutes state capacity is shaped by contingent judgments about what is unforeseeable and what is predictable (Bovens and Hart 1996:74–84). Perhaps more problematic, state actions may constitute an imperfect indicator of infrastructural power. For instance, one common measure of state capacity in the literature is the ratio of direct to indirect taxation - the logic being that direct taxes are harder to collect than indirect taxes, and thus states whose revenue sources are composed mainly of direct taxes are considered to be strong. The problem with this logic is that it conflates capacity with intent. An infrastructurally powerful state may well be able to collect direct taxes but for political

reasons rely mainly on indirect taxes for revenue.⁹⁰ In other words, we are unable to distinguish an infrastructurally weak state that relies on indirect taxes because it cannot collect direct taxes from an infrastructurally powerful state that relies on indirect taxes because of a voluntary policy decision.

Faced with the thorny issues of finding an ideal measure of state capacity, my solution is to employ a series of different measures collected from separate data sources. While each indicator on its own can be conceptually and empirically criticized, having all of them point in the same direction would increase confidence that they are measuring the same latent variable of state capacity. Therefore, I use five different measures of state capacity: informational capacity, control of territory, sources of revenue, composite index of national capabilities, and homicide rates. I now briefly discuss each in turn.

3.5.1.1. Information Capacity

As we have seen, one of the main obstacles to an objective measurement of infrastructural power is the difficulty in adequately separating policies from outcomes. To overcome this challenge, Brambor, Goenaga, Lindvall, and Teorell (2020:177) suggest focusing on the inputs of state capacity, that is, the resources that states have at their disposal to implement their policy objectives. They focus in particular on the ‘informational capacity’ of states, or the

⁹⁰ This is the case with the infrastructurally powerful Nordic countries, which prefer to rely on indirect taxes on consumption rather than direct taxes on income to minimize taxation’s distortionary effect on the economy (Lindert 2004a:240–42).

extent to which states are capable of “collecting and processing reliable information about a country’s population and territory” (Brambor et al. 2020:178; also Giddens 1987:180; Mann 1984:189; Polidano 2000:805; Whitehead 1994:46–47). Therefore, the first measure of infrastructural power used in the analysis, *Information*, measures whether states have a statistical agency, publish a statistical yearbook, and have a population register and a civil register. Countries that have none of the above score zero, those that have one of the four score one, and so forth; if they have all four, they obtain the maximum score of four.

3.5.1.2. Control of Territory

Another possible indicator of infrastructural power concerns the percentage of the national territory over which the state has effective control. This is one of the most elementary and consensual criteria according to which state capacity can be estimated. As Skocpol (1979:16) explains, “sheer sovereign integrity and the stable administrative-military control of a given territory are preconditions for any state’s ability to implement policies.” This basic condition is hardly a given, and there are various scenarios in which states might be unable to control the entirety of the territory under its legal jurisdiction. During civil wars, for instance, the claim of the state to sovereign rule is essentially nullified by insurrectionary groups. There are also instances in which warlords rule over some part of the national territory. In failed states like Yemen, Somalia, or South Sudan, the legal government is effectively unable to control little more than a tiny share of the national territory. Thus, the second indicator of infrastructural power, *Territory*, measures the percentage of the national territory over which the state is recognized as the preeminent sovereign authority. Data for this measure comes from the Varieties of Democracy project (Coppedge et al. 2020:176–77).

3.5.1.3. Sources of Revenue

The third measure of state capacity, *Revenue*, also comes from the Varieties of Democracy dataset (Coppedge et al. 2020:177). This is an ordinal measure of the source of the state's fiscal revenue, scoring zero when the state is unable to raise revenue; one when the state is dependent upon external revenue sources, such as foreign aid, to finance its activities; two when the state's revenue relies mainly on the direct exploitation of economic assets, such as natural resource rents; three when the state uses mainly indirect taxes imposed on economic transactions, like sales taxes or tariffs on imports; and four when the state relies on direct taxation upon individuals or corporations, such as taxes on income.

3.5.1.4. Composite Index of National Capabilities

The fourth measure of state capacity is the Composite Index of National Capabilities, or *CINC* (Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey 1972). The *CINC* assesses national material capabilities along three dimensions – military, demographic, and industrial – using two indices for each dimension: national military expenditures and number of military personnel; total population and urban population; and energy consumption and iron and steel production (Greig and Enterline 2017).

3.5.1.5. Homicide Rates

Perhaps the most famous definition of the state is Max Weber's (1968:56): the state is an entity which "successfully upholds the claim to the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force." This definition suggests that an important criterion to assess the infrastructural power of the state concerns its capacity to protect the physical safety of its citizens by monopolizing violence and preventing the illegitimate use of force, particularly in its most extreme form of homicide (Foa and Nemirovskaya 2016:415–16; Richani 2010:436). Therefore, the final measure of infrastructural power, *Homicides*, measures the number of intentional murders per 100,000 inhabitants (Baten et al. 2014:8).

3.5.2. Statistical Analysis

Throughout this dissertation, I claim that confessional parties thrive against anticlerical foes in contexts of weak state capacity in which religious charities and schools provide valuable and valued welfare goods to the population. While infrastructural weakness is an advantage to fledgling confessional parties that have not attained power, however, it might not be so beneficial when religious parties take control of the state. Indeed, confessional parties that reach office and are able to enact policy to suit their preferences would benefit from having a strong state capable of acting on the interests of religion. The case of the Islamist party in Turkey is instructive: for decades after the foundation of the modern Republic of Turkey by Mustafa Kemal, the Turkish state was avowedly anticlerical. Islamists were able to survive - and thrive - during the Kemalist onslaught because the state was unable to provide social welfare goods dearly sought after by the population, creating a social vacuum eagerly filled by Islamist-affiliated charitable networks. When the Turkish Islamists were out of power and religious policy was anticlerical, infrastructural weakness was an advantage. Eventually,

however, the Islamists took over the Turkish state and implemented a proclerical policy, for instance by reintroducing the mandatory teaching of religion in public schools. When the confessional party takes control of the state, it having access to a capable and efficient administrative machinery works to their advantage. When in power, Turkish Islamists certainly wish that the state were able to provide more, not less, schooling, which they use to their benefit in spreading a pious message to the young.

In the statistical analysis that follows, I take into account the conditional effect of infrastructural power on religious party strength by interacting the five state capacity measures outlined above with an index of Proclerical religious policy. This measure of *Proclericalism* is simply the reverse of the Anticlericalism measure used in previous regressions. My expectation is that higher levels of state capacity are associated with lower support for religious parties when proclericalism is low; but when proclericalism is high, state capacity should be positively correlated with religious party strength.

The statistical models also include indicators associated with the alternative hypotheses discussed earlier in the chapter, including the standard socioeconomic variables associated with modernization theory (per capita income and GDP growth); religious market theory (religious homogeneity); institutionalism (presidential system, electoral system magnitude, and quality of democracy); and ideational/cultural theory (the share of the population professing Catholicism, Protestantism, Christian Orthodoxy, Sunni and Shia Islam, Hinduism, and Buddhism).

Table 3.5 presents the results of a time-series cross-sectional OLS regression on religious party vote share for democratic countries between 1800 and 2015. Note that the interaction of the indicators for infrastructural power with the index of Proclericalism changes the interpretation of the coefficients, because the effect of state capacity on religious party strength is different for different values of Proclericalism. The first coefficient shows the impact of infrastructural power when Proclericalism is zero, which is expected to be negative. The second coefficient then shows the linear impact of infrastructural power on religious party strength when Proclericalism increases, which is expected to be positive. Indeed, this is the case for all five measures of state capacity, which are strongly statistically significant in all specifications. The results are particularly impressive considering the state capacity measures capture different aspects of infrastructural power and come from different datasets. The interaction coefficients suggest that high levels of infrastructural power weaken religious parties when proclericalism is low, but they strengthen religious parties when proclericalism is high.

Table 3.5 - Models of Religious Party Vote Share

	3.5.1	3.5.2	3.5.3	3.5.4	3.5.5
State Capacity					
Information	-5.874				
	(0.896)***				
Information × Proclerical	0.322				

	(0.008)***				
Territory	-0.252				
	(0.112)**				
Territory × Proclerical	0.011				
	(0.000)***				
Revenue	-5.308				
	(1.091)***				
Revenue × Proclerical	0.355				
	(0.082)***				
CINC	-6.972				
	(1.557)***				
CINC × Proclerical	0.354				
	(0.017)***				
Homicides	-0.408				
	(0.106)***				
Homicides × Proclerical	0.064				
	(0.019)***				
Structural					
Log Per Capita Income	-1.027	-0.067	1.062	-1.272	2.282
	(0.803)	(0.492)	(0.551)*	(2.247)	(3.657)

Income Growth (pc)	-0.611 (1.976)	-0.673 (1.250)	3.809 (3.264)	4.296 (6.126)	10.082 (5.358)*
Religious Homogeneity	-3.169 (2.095)	-0.043 (1.169)	-1.710 (2.269)	-10.797 (9.188)	-6.855 (12.524)
Institutional					
Polity Score	0.642 (1.005)	0.569 (1.099)	0.942 (1.727)	1.992 (0.433)**	0.465 (0.895)
District Magnitude	0.006 (0.008)	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.011 (0.007)	0.005 (0.011)	0.016 (0.022)
Presidentialism	-0.550 (1.366)	-0.069 (0.815)	0.465 (0.880)	1.086 (3.659)	-2.039 (4.389)
Cultural					
Share of Catholics	-0.025 (0.013)*	-0.006 (0.007)	-0.021 (0.014)	0.131 (0.049)***	0.125 (0.061)***
Share of Protestants	-0.674 (0.481)	-0.254 (0.275)	-0.417 (0.403)	2.182 (1.895)	2.501 (2.708)
Share of Orthodox	-3.309 (1.218)***	0.601 (0.411)	-2.116 (1.330)	-8.506 (4.783)*	-5.974 (3.392)*
Share of Sunnis	-0.044 (0.026)*	0.004 (0.008)	-0.016 (0.020)	0.107 (0.052)**	0.076 (0.060)

Share of Shias	0.035 (0.034)	0.016 (0.034)	0.258 (0.074)***	0.453 (0.110)***	0.695 (0.118)***
Share of Hindus	-0.056 (0.029)*	-0.009 (0.012)	-0.007 (0.021)	0.005 (0.101)	0.051 (0.126)
Share of Buddhists	0.050 (0.223)	0.098 (0.091)	0.088 (0.181)	-0.771 (1.044)	-0.622 (1.130)
Constant	3.471 (17.303)	9.428 (1.102)***	7.403 (6.764)***	-33.067 (51.380)	56.077 (53.460)
Countries	50	83	82	83	72
Observations	587	761	735	715	612

* $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$. Time-series cross-sectional OLS regression on the vote share of religious political parties. Random-effects models with standard errors clustered by country.

None of the other indicators performs as well as the main independent variables of interest. Per capita income and GDP growth are only statistically significant in one model, which could be an artefact of the type of state capacity measure used in that particular specification. Contrary to the claims of modernization theorists, it seems that religious parties can thrive at both higher and lower levels of socioeconomic development. Religious market theory also finds no support in the analysis, as the *Religious Homogeneity* indicator fails to reach conventional levels of statistical significance in the five models. Institutional theories fare little better: electoral magnitude and presidentialism are also statistically insignificant throughout the analysis, while the quality of democracy as measured by Polity is only significant in one model. Once again, the ideational theory fares better than its competitors.

As Huntington (1996) would have predicted, Catholic populations are significantly associated with stronger religious parties, at least in the last two models – although in the first model Catholicism is *negatively* correlated with religious party strength. Also matching the predictions of clash of civilizations theory, Orthodox populations are negatively associated with confessional party strength, in contrast with Shia Islamic societies, which are more likely to have strong religious parties.

3.5.3. Additional Party Strength Models

Table 3.6 shows additional regression models of religious party strength that avoid any possible estimation bias resulting from unobserved country-specific heterogeneity by including country fixed-effects (Cameron and Trivedi 2005:701–2). Even though the small sample and relative invariability over time of some of the indicators make the fixed-effects specification less suitable than the random-effects used in the previous section, it is worth running the additional models to investigate whether variation in state capacity in the same country over time has an impact on religious party strength. The results of Table 3.6 give us a qualified yes. Even though the only two interaction coefficients that reach statistical significance are those for the *Information* measure of state capacity, at least one of the interaction terms is significant for all the others. Moreover, the signs of the interactions are all in the expected direction. While the results are not as clear as those in the random-effects regressions, therefore, it is encouraging that even under the stringent conditions imposed by country-fixed effects we find some support for my theoretical arguments.

Table 3.6 - Religious Party Strength Models with Country Fixed-Effects

	3.5.1	3.5.2	3.5.3	3.5.4	3.5.5
State Capacity					
Information	-4.046 (1.896)*				
Information × Proclerical	7.503 (1.109)***				
Territory		-0.220 (0.249)			
Territory × Proclerical		3.054 (1.165)***			
Revenue			-3.341 (0.708)**		
Revenue × Proclerical			9.246 (8.148)		
CINC				-5.197 (2.315)**	
CINC × Proclerical				1.703 (1.158)	
Homicides					-0.284 (0.008)***

Homicides × Proclerical					1.286
					(0.932)
Structural					
Log Per Capita Income	-0.901	1.146	-0.360	-0.455	-0.086
	(2.201)	(1.968)	(2.053)	(2.143)	(2.227)
Income Growth (pc)	1.872	12.367	9.971	7.773	5.433
	(7.114)	(5.757)**	(5.909)*	(6.149)	(5.949)
Religious Homogeneity	10.632	-13.448	-22.447	-3.354	1.172
	(17.443)	(13.753)	(14.254)	(16.043)	(16.514)
Institutional					
Polity Score	4.463	3.495	5.044	1.848	0.718
	(0.355)***	(9.749)	(5.038)	(0.984)*	(5.221)
District Magnitude	-0.019	-0.018	-0.007	-0.007	0.005
	(0.029)	(0.020)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.020)
Presidentialism	-10.632	13.448	22.447	3.354	-1.172
	(17.443)	(13.753)	(14.254)	(16.043)	(16.514)
Cultural					
Share of Catholics	1.463	3.495	5.044	1.848	3.178

	(5.355)	(4.749)	(5.038)	(5.084)	(5.221)
Share of Protestants	-1.141	-0.722	0.094	-0.193	-0.891
	(2.432)	(2.234)	(2.326)	(2.543)	(2.537)
Share of Orthodox	4.470	2.701	1.288	2.775	3.709
	(4.237)	(3.562)	(3.700)	(4.052)	(4.681)
Share of Sunnis	-1.578	-3.619	-3.319	-3.600	-3.940
	(7.332)	(5.758)	(5.589)	(4.960)	(6.344)
Share of Shias	-1.920	-0.305	-0.356	-1.060	-1.467
	(2.647)	(2.228)	(2.233)	(3.395)	(3.483)
Share of Hindus	-2.090	1.898	2.233	1.532	2.702
	(5.853)	(2.716)	(3.746)	(1.845)	(2.563)
Share of Buddhists	-2.358	-1.351	-2.061	-1.415	-2.713
	(3.250)	(3.206)	(3.193)	(3.353)	(3.303)
Constant	62.880	176.801	34.411	-67.721	-15.597
	(12.911)**	(96.612)*	(89.617)	(105.665)	(93.667)
Countries	49	83	81	83	71
Observations	586	761	734	715	611

* $p<0.1$; ** $p<0.05$; *** $p<0.01$. Time-series cross-sectional OLS regression on the vote share of religious political parties with country fixed-effects.

3.6. Conclusion

This chapter provided strong empirical support for my theory of religious party formation and strength. The statistical analysis of a new dataset comprising all religious parties that participated in democratic elections between 1800 and 2015 showed that confessional parties form when they are subject to anticlerical attacks, and they thrive when anticlericalism is paired with weak infrastructural power. Citizens who rely on religious charities to help them in hard times and who educate their children in religious schools repay their benefactors by lending their support to confessional political parties. Only when the state has the logistical capacity to provide effective alternatives to religious charities and schools do confessional parties fail to attract popular support.

France and Italy are two paradigmatic examples of the dynamics of religious party development suggested by my theory. Italian and French Catholic parties emerged in the first decades of the twentieth century in response to a systematic onslaught on the social role of the Church by anticlerical liberal state-builders. Despite the similarities in the process of religious party formation, the fate of confessional parties in the two Mediterranean neighbours could hardly have been more different. French Catholics were confronted by an infrastructurally powerful state that was able to provide high-quality schools, hospitals, and welfare to citizens, which was a barren soil for a confessional party to flourish. By contrast, Italian Catholics faced a weak state that was powerless to provide the public goods demanded by citizens. Buoyed by a vibrant and dense associational network of religious charities, trade unions, mutual aid societies, schools, rural syndicates, and even banks, postwar Italian

Christian Democrats monopolized control of the government for almost half a century. The next chapter examines the process of anticlerical policy-making in Italy and France, paired with the illustrative proclerical cases of Spain and Québec.

Chapter 4: Religious Policy and Confessional Party Formation

In this chapter, I analyse the religious policy choices of state-building elites in Italy, France, Spain, and Québec, and show how those policies determined whether confessional political parties were formed. Unlike the more deterministic, path-dependent developments highlighted in the next two chapters, the policy decisions described here were contingent and could plausibly have gone in a different direction. The anticlerical or proclerical choices of politicians during the crucial period of late nineteenth century state-formation shaped the political stance of religious groups for decades to come. As politicians jockeyed for position in highly uncertain political contexts – at a time when monarchies and republics rose and fell with bewildering speed –, they sought to craft religious policy in ways that would help entrench them in office and outmanoeuvre the opposition. The triumphant political faction set religious policy for the *longue durée*, leading the Catholic masses to either rally to the regime or form political parties to defend themselves from anticlericalism.

The historical narrative of this chapter highlights the ways in which the choice between anticlericalism and proclericalism was contingent rather than structurally determined, something the scholarly and historical literature often misses (Gould 1999:16–19). As the formal model of Chapter 2 suggests, state-building elites’ attitude towards the Catholic Church was mostly instrumental. Religious policy-making depended upon contingent and highly uncertain judgements as to whether anticlericalism would further leaders’ hold on power (Judson 1996:264–65; de la Cueva 1996:260; Rémond 1976:5). Politicians felt no compulsion about promoting proclerical policies if they believed those policies would cement

their objectives. Italian nationalists of the *Risorgimento*, for instance, had initially placed high hopes upon the Vatican to lead a project of national unity, but the reluctance of Pope Pius IX eventually convinced them that the Church was the major obstacle to their plans. Placing country before religion, they invaded the Holy See's territorial possessions and proceeded to marginalize the Church's influence in the new Kingdom of Italy. By contrast, French political leaders were not divided upon the question of territory but on the issue of regime. When the Third Republic finally emerged in the 1870s as the most stable regime since the Revolution, the heterogeneous coalition of French republicans no longer had the bogeyman of the monarchy to keep them united. Catholicism thus emerged as a suitable *ennemi* that prevented the socialist left from jumping ship and attacking the principle of private property so dearly held by bourgeois republicans. In Spain, the restored monarchy of the 1870s opted instead to tie its fortune to the Catholic Church to keep its own republicans at bay, a seemingly successful strategy until the regime's rottenness led to its spontaneous collapse. Likewise, Québécois politicians maintained a steadfast attachment to the local Catholic Church as a distinctive characteristic of French-speaking Canadians that would prevent their absorption by the Anglophone Protestant majority of the country.

The anticlerical choices made by political leaders in France and Italy during the crucial period of state formation in the nineteenth century explains why a religious political party emerged in these Mediterranean neighbours, while by contrast, a Catholic party did not take root either in Québec or in Spain due to the favourable position of the Church in the two countries. Table 4.1 below provides a brief sketch of the comparative case studies, listing the most important religious policies and policy-makers in France, Italy, Spain, and Québec. The

following sections will explain how religious policy was set in these four countries and the repercussions this had for the politicization of the Catholic Church.

Table 4.1 - Religious Policy in the Period of State Formation

Regime	Key Actors in Religious Policy-making	Key Legislation	Religious Party
French Third Republic (1870-1940)	Léon Gambetta, Jules Ferry, Émile Combes	Ferry Laws (1882) Separation (1905)	ALP (1901) PDP (1924)
Italian Constitutional Monarchy (1861-1922)	Count Cavour, Francesco Crispi, Giovanni Giolitti	Law of Guarantees (1871) Coppino Law (1877)	PPI (1919)
Federal Dominion (1867-1929)	Joseph-Adolphe Chapleau Honoré Mercier Louis-Alexandre Taschereau	Education Act (1875)	N/A
Bourbon Restoration (1874-1923)	Cánovas del Castillo, Antonio Maura, José Canalejas	Moreno Law (1857) Constitution (1876)	N/A

4.1. Clericalism is the Enemy! Anticlericalism and Party Formation in France and Italy

The Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71 simultaneously shaped the liberal regimes that emerged in France and Italy in the last third of the nineteenth century. On September 4, 1870, the humiliating defeat and capture of Emperor Napoleon III led French republicans to proclaim the advent of the republic in Paris; sixteen days later, the troops of the Italian Kingdom forced their way into Rome and annexed the territorial domains of the Pope. These were extraordinary events that made it seem as if anything could happen. As the dust settled on the new regimes of Italy and France, politicians vigorously debated what to do about the Catholic Church.⁹¹ The electorate, longing for stability, initially supported conservative leaders such as Giovanni Lanza and Adolphe Thiers over their left-wing opponents. These cautious moderates sought to galvanize a broad coalition of centrists and conservatives to

⁹¹ The clash between the Catholic Church and liberal governments in France and Italy appears, in hindsight, to have been inevitable. For instance, the French historian René Rémond claims that, as a result of the ultramontanism of the Church, “the conflicts became more irreconcilable” (Rémond 1969:184). The same might be said of Italy, where unification could only occur by sacrificing the centuries-old territorial sovereignty of the Holy See (Papenheim 2003:203). But this view conceals the extent to which religious policy in France and Italy was contested, contingent upon politicians’ judgements as to whether anticlericalism would weaken the opposition. These judgments were highly uncertain and therefore liable to change in light of new events and changing circumstances. It was only in 1905 – nearly four decades after they had come to power - that French republicans came to the conclusion that it was safe to jettison the 1801 Concordat which guaranteed the status of Catholicism as the country’s official religion. In Italy, Cavour’s appeal for a ‘free Church in a free state’ was reluctantly accepted in 1861 by the political elites of the newly unified country (Papenheim 2003:205). After all, was it such a good idea to separate Church from state and therefore allow a dangerous opponent of the liberalism to undermine the regime’s foundations at will? Or should the state maintain a legal link with the Church and give the clergy some privileges that would stop them from threatening the stability of the country? Discussions about the appropriate role of the Church in France and Italy would dominate the first decades of the new polities, shaping their political cleavages and the way the masses were integrated into the political system.

block the rise of radicals, and avoided rocking the boat too much on matters of religion. Ultimately, however, radicalism gained the upper hand and anticlericalism became durably established in both France and Italy, leading the Catholic Church to respond by sponsoring the creation of religious political parties.

4.1.1. Making Italians, Unmaking the Church: Italy, 1848-1919

The Italian nationalist movement and the Holy See were not always fierce antagonists. Between the defeat of Napoleon in 1815 and the nationalist revolutions of 1848, many Italians looked upon the Pope as their natural leader and to the institutional presence of the Catholic Church as the reason why they had a national conscience in the first place, even though they were scattered among half a dozen different states. But Pope Pius IX's refusal to wage a war of Italian unification against Austria in 1848 turned nationalists against the Papacy (Coppa 2006:239), a development shrewdly taken advantage of by the Kingdom of Piedmont-Sardinia to promote its plans for territorial aggrandizement under the soothing mantle of national unity. The conquest of the Papal States in 1870 and the rise of the Italian *sinistra* (left) set religious set Italian religious policy on a markedly anticlerical path and unwittingly erected the framework for the rise of a powerful Catholic political party (Weiss 1992:286). In this section I chart the turbulent history of Church-state relations in Italy from the Congress of Vienna in 1815 to the formation of the Italian People's Party in 1919.

4.1.1.1. The Risorgimento and Italian Unification, 1815-1870

Before the Italian peninsula was unified in the mid-nineteenth century, it was divided into a dozen polities of various sizes, the most of important of which were the Papal States (centred in Rome), the Kingdom of Piedmont-Sardinia (capital in Turin), and the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies (whose capital Naples was the largest city in Italy). After the French ended their military occupation in 1815, the Italian polities restored the traditional juridical privileges of the clergy and “guaranteed the Church a stranglehold over education and censorship” (Davis 2000:11). The early leaders of the Italian nationalist movement – the *Risorgimento* – did not disagree with the proclerical policies of the Italian statelets, placing equally strong emphasis on good relations with the Catholic Church.⁹² They did so not because they were personally devout but because they believed that their political objective could only be attained with the active support of the Papacy (Tyler 1988:99). Vincenzo Gioberti, one of the intellectual leaders of the *Risorgimento*, argued in 1842 that united Italy should be organized as a confederation of states (on the model of the German Confederation) with the Pope as president⁹³ (Coppa 1969:581; Smith 1968:74; Tyler 1988:97). When the moment for decisive action came with the revolutions of 1848, however, Pope Pius IX balked at declaring war against Austria and leading the unification of Italy under the papal banner (Coppa 1969:585, 1992:44). Feeling

⁹² Count Cavour, the political leader that is most commonly associated with the Italian anticlerical campaign against the Church, initially believed that Italian nationalism would have “the support for a truly religious clergy, which is a frank friend of liberty” (quoted in Coppa 1969:594).

⁹³ This project was not as far-fetched as it might appear. Indeed, some elements within the Church sympathized with the aims of the *Risorgimento*. In the Austrian-ruled region of Lombardy, three priests even took part in conspiracies to secede from Habsburg rule and paid for it with their lives (Brunelli 1986:177).

betrayed, liberals murdered Pellegrino Rossi, the Minister of Justice of the Papal States, and took over the city of Rome, which Pius IX fled on 24 November (Kertzer 2017:556). The Pope re-entered his capital in 1850 on the heels of French bayonets, who crushed a motley crew of liberals and adventurers led by Garibaldi. Pius IX – who had earlier flirted with liberalism on his ascent to the Papacy – was now unapologetically against anything that smacked of modernity and was sure to confront Italian nationalism with “uncompromising opposition” (Cardoza 2000:119; also Jemolo 1960:31; Woolf 1979:338).

Watching this spectacle unfold, Count Camillo di Cavour, prime minister of the Kingdom of Piedmont – the most powerful state on the peninsula and, with the Papacy now adamantly opposed to Italian nationalism, the natural leader of an eventual unified state –, reached the same conclusion that Bismarck did in Germany fifteen years later: the forces of nationalism, hitherto seen as revolutionary, could be channelled by shrewd conservatives to further their political ends (Duggan 2014:124). One of the first ways this could be done was to take advantage of the Church’s unpopularity in the immediate aftermath of 1848 to increase the power of the state at its expense (Hearder 1983:236; Jemolo 1960:10; Webb 1958:6). Anticlericalism was also important to moderate political leaders to placate the left, which had been in the ascendance following the revolutions of 1848 and feared that constitutionalism could be overthrown in Piedmont as it had in the rest of Italy (Coppa 1969:597–98). Perhaps more importantly, attacking the Church had a strong propaganda value, because “to undertake an anticlerical campaign was proof positive of the country’s ... determination to continue the anti-Austrian and national program” (Coppa 1969:593).

Piedmontese leaders thus embraced anticlericalism as a “necessary tactic” to further their political ambitions, most notably with the Siccardi Laws of 1850 (Coppa 1973:122).⁹⁴ The laws abolished the separate system of Church courts, removed the clergy’s legal immunity, and transferred the education system from the ecclesiastical to the civil domain, which meant that bishops could no longer prevent individuals from teaching (Coppa 1969:597, 2006:240; Gorresio 1958:25). Most importantly, the Piedmontese state confiscated large swathes of ecclesiastical property (Duggan 2014:137). All this was anathema for Pius IX, who correctly surmised that Piedmont was using Italian nationalism as an instrument of political and territorial aggrandizement (Cardoza 1997:60).

Cavour assumed the office of Prime Minister on November 1852, after a spell as Finance Minister (Coppa 1969:600). Viewing Austria as the greatest obstacle to Piedmont’s plans for territorial aggrandizement, Cavour aligned his country with the French Empire of Louis Napoleon and sought to obtain his support in a war of national liberation. In the spring of 1854, France and Britain were fighting Tsarist Russia in the Crimean War. Since Austria was a close ally of Russia,⁹⁵ Cavour desperately wanted to enter the war on the French side to gain the favour of Napoleon and isolate the Habsburgs. Lacking a majority in parliament, however, Cavour had to negotiate with the Moderate Liberals on the centre-left (Cardoza 1997:61–62). Urbano Rattazzi, their leader, agreed to enter the Crimean War “at a price – and this involved Cavour’s continuous support for the anti-ecclesiastical measures desired by Rattazzi and the

⁹⁴ Named for Count Giuseppe Siccardi, the author of the legislation.

⁹⁵ Austria relied on Russian troops to suppress an Hungarian insurrection in the aftermath of the 1848 revolutions.

left” (Coppa 1969:601). These anticlerical measures were known as the Law of Convents, which envisaged the suppression of over 300 contemplative religious orders (considered useless because they were not dedicated to social activities like education or charity) and the nationalization of their property (Coppa 1973:113; Pacillo 2015:149). Cavour “was not anxious to effect this legislation because he realized that it would provoke unrest” (Coppa 1969:604) but since his political survival and plans for territorial aggrandizement depended on it, he duly accepted Rattazzi’s demands and passed the legislation, placing another brick on the wall of separation between Church and state (Duggan 2014:124–27; Jemolo 1960:219).

Cavour’s lengthy courtship of Napoleon finally bore fruit in a meeting at Plombières, where the two statesmen plotted in July 1858 to wage war against Austria and annex the north of Italy to Piedmont (Coppa 1973:150; Duggan 2014:129). One year later, a combined Franco-Piedmontese army duly defeated the Austrians at Magenta. News of this Italian victory against the foreign oppressor moved revolutionaries in the periphery of the Papal States (Bologna, Ferrara, Umbria, the Marches, Benevento and Pontecorvo) to rebel (Duggan 2014:129–30). Cavour immediately moved to annex the regions, leading the Vatican to declare war on Piedmont and issue a desperate call for international volunteers to help protect the Holy See’s territorial sovereignty (Coppa 1973:179). On 18 September 1860, the ragtag papal army was soundly defeated by the Piedmontese at the Battle of Castelfidardo and the new Italian Kingdom took possession of all the Pope’s territories with the exception of Rome and its environs (Duggan 2014:134; Hearder and Morris 2001:194; Price 2017:167).

While all these extraordinary events were going on, Cavour still had time to shepherd the parliamentary approval of the Casati Laws, according to which the Ministry of Public

Education was given the ultimate supervisory authority over all schools, including religious ones (Coppa 2006:244). This legislation – together with Rattazzi’s Law of Convents, the anticlerical Siccardi Laws, and indeed all laws passed in Piedmont – was extended to all the territories of newly-unified Italy (Dal Lago 2018:51). The extension of the provisions in the Siccardi Laws for expropriating Catholic property and closing monastic houses was bitterly resented by the poor, who were left “without a major source of jobs and more importantly of welfare” (Duggan 2014:137).

4.1.1.2. Church-State Relations in the New Italian State, 1870-1900

At least initially, the unification of Italy did not bring economic benefits. The government struggled to service a massive public debt and had to fight a ferocious separatist rebellion in the south⁹⁶ (Barbagallo 2013:55–63; Dal Lago 2018:74–78; Hearder and Morris 2001:196–97). Indeed, the post-unification period was a perilous one for Italian elites, who “seemed to be assailed by enemies on all sides” (Duggan 2014:139). Desperately searching for sources of revenue, Italian liberals set their eyes upon the wealthiest institution of the country: the Catholic Church. Stepping up the incipient program of expropriation instituted in Piedmont, between 1860 and 1875 the Italian state suppressed more than 2,000 religious congregations and 25,000 ecclesiastical bodies, and confiscated over a million hectares of Church land

⁹⁶ This rebellion was dismissively known as the ‘Great Brigandage,’ as liberal Italian elites “ignored the political identity of their opponents and insisted only on the violent and criminal nature of the insurgents” (de Francesco 2012:101). The revolt was far from merely brigandage, however, with a recent historical survey concluding that it was “a manifestation of mass dissent against the new Italian nation ... spread among large strata of the southern Italian population” (Dal Lago 2018:75–76).

(Duggan 2014:137). This course of action makes sense in light of the formal model of religious policy-making elaborated in Chapter 2: Italian leaders engaged in anticlericalism because they feared the possibility of the opposition making a bid for power in the turbulent decade after unification, and believed that the expropriation of Church property would shore up their political position.

The Holy See held on to the territory surrounding Rome until September 1870, when Italian troops entered the city, lowered the yellow and white flag of the Papal States, and replaced it with the green, white, and red tricolour of the new Kingdom (Duggan 2014:144; Lynch 2009:97; Romani 2012:597–98). King Victor Emanuele II made Rome the capital of his state and became the first ruler of the entire Italian peninsula since the fall of the Roman Empire (Lang 2008:1). Pope Pius IX responded by excommunicating all those involved with the occupation of Rome, withdrawing into the Vatican, and proclaiming himself a prisoner. Giovanni Lanza, the conservative Prime Minister of Italy, sought to conciliate the Church (and international Catholic opinion) by sponsoring a Law of Guarantees that accorded the Pope all the honours of a sovereign, including diplomatic immunity from Italian penal law (Duggan 2014:144; Halperin 1937:7–8; Hearder and Morris 2001:203–4). Ignoring Cavour's exhortation to create 'a free Church in a free state', however, Lanza sought to keep Catholicism under official control by assigning an endowment of three million lire to the Vatican and claiming the right of the government to approve the appointment of bishops and to regulate the publication of apostolic acts (Clark 1984:81–84; Coppa 2006:248; Guasco 1997:77; Jemolo 1960:49–50). Even before the left rose to power in 1876, the government used the provisions of the Law of Guarantees to deny the appointment of hostile bishops. In

1875, more than two thirds of all bishopric nominees had been vetoed by the administration (Penco 1978:337–38).⁹⁷

The Law of Guarantees did little to improve relations between Church and state (Coppa 2014:64; Duggan 2010:340–41; Jemolo 1960:77). The Holy See's intransigence in the face of what Giovanni Lanza considered a magnanimous offer of peace led him and his colleagues to pursue further anticlerical measures. Liberals made religious instruction in public schools optional (July 1871); abolished the chairs of theology in public universities (April 1872); closed the remaining religious orders and nationalized their property (November 1872);⁹⁸ subjected the curriculum of seminaries to governmental supervision (December 1872); and revoked the traditional clerical exemption from military service (January 1876). Faced with this anticlerical onslaught, the stubborn Pius IX refused to yield an inch. The first parliamentary elections since the annexation of Rome were scheduled to take place in November 1874, prompting some grassroots mobilization in favour of forming a Catholic political party that could defend the Church within the halls of parliament (Webster 1960:5). Some weeks before the vote, however, Pius IX publicly reaffirmed the principle of *non expedit*, according to which Catholics had to abstain from participating in Italian political life, both as

⁹⁷ Between 1871 and 1875, 94 bishops applied for government permission and only 28 were successful. A group of 41 bishops simply took up their posts without requesting government authorization, as a result of which they did not receive a public stipend. These bishops were constrained to take up quarters outside of their official residences and became wholly dependent upon subsidies from the Holy See.

⁹⁸ Like many policies in Italy, the closure of religious orders was implemented very patchily owing to the lack of state capacity. A government survey in 1895 found that there were still nearly 4,000 monks and nuns in the city of Rome, scarcely less than the number in 1872 when monasteries were supposed to have been abolished (Duggan 2007:381). Overall, there were 89,329 regular clerics at the turn of the century, compared with 103,161 in 1882 (Kelikian 2002:49).

electors and as elected (*nè eletti nè elettori*). For the Vatican, the formation of a Catholic party would legitimize the “godless” Italian state (Header and Morris 2001:203–4; Kelikian 2002:46–47). The Catholic masses were instead socially organized outside of the Italian political system (Duggan 2007:317; Pollard 2008:25). In response, the conservative administration forcibly removed all those prelates who had occupied their position without having requested the government’s permission, as stipulated by the Law of Guarantees.

Relations between the Catholic Church and the Italian state became even worse after the conservative government was replaced in March 1876 by a *sinistra* (left) cabinet headed by Agostino Depretis, a former *protégé* of Rattazzi (Duggan 2014:159; Header and Morris 2001:204). For Depretis and his followers on the anticlerical left, “the conventional view was that religion was steadily declining in importance, that faith would be ousted by science, and that the school would take the place of the Church” (Jemolo 1960:44). They were determined to hasten the inevitable demise of Catholicism, which they viewed as the major obstacle to the formation of a stronger national consciousness among ordinary Italians (Duggan 2013:179; Forlenza and Thomassen 2017:296). The Church’s refusal to accept the legitimacy of the Italian state convinced Depretis that Catholicism was a threat to national unity that had to be dealt with forthwith (Palomba 1985:362). However, the *sinistra*’s adoption of anticlerical measures owed more to political expediency than ideological conviction. Depretis was notorious for “his lack of strong views” (Duggan 2007:397) and his main objective in attacking the Church seems to have been to appropriate the mantle of Italian nationalism and patriotism that hitherto had been more closely associated with the right (Borutta 2012:207; Malone 2014:386).

The *sinistra*'s first major legislative initiative, the Bill on Clerical Abuses, targeted the clergy as the enemy within: it imposed severe penalties upon priests guilty of disturbing the 'public conscience' and the 'peace of families,' of censuring the laws and institutions of the state, and of encouraging resistance to the acts of the public authorities (Halperin 1939:303). The left also passed an electoral law that "gave anticlerical urban areas dominance over confessional rural areas" (Luebbert 1991:146). Most importantly, the Coppino Laws of 1877 reformed the education system by replacing religious classes in public schools with civics courses⁹⁹ on "the duties of men and of the citizen" (Coppa 1995:140; Gambasin 1973:112; Hearder and Morris 2001:206) and established free and compulsory education for children between the ages of six and nine (Duggan 2013:182). The periodical *Unità Cattolica* raged that the educational reform was "such an enormity that we can scarcely find words strong enough to designate it properly ... a scheme to corrupt the minds and hearts of children" (quoted in Halperin 1939:320).

The Coppino Laws served as the linchpin of Italian education policy until their replacement by Mussolini in 1923. Religion was thus excluded from public schools for almost the entire duration of Italy's constitutional monarchy, precisely at the historical juncture in which the peasantry and the poor were being schooled for the first time. The Church's exclusion from public schools left the dense network of religious charities as the sole remaining material link between Catholicism and the Italian people (Agócs 1988:63–64; Kelikian 2002:45). While the Italian state claimed the right to supervise the Church's

⁹⁹ Although it appears that in practice, Catholic classes were still taught in many schools (especially in the south). The open opposition of many communal administrations to anticlericalism encouraged teachers to flout the law.

charitable institutions, for two decades after unification they were by and large left to their own devices. Catholic charities were key institutions in liberal Italy, being the only safety net for the poor, the needy, and the fallen. Hospitals, orphanages, charities, mental asylums, foundling homes, houses for repentant prostitutes, and many other such institutions were invariably run by Catholics (Quine 2002:55). Religious charities were thus the most valuable social asset of the Church, underpinning the entrenchment of a Catholic subculture in many parts of Italy (Kelikian 2002:48).

Once radical leader Francesco Crispi became Prime Minister in 1887, Catholics all over Italy braced themselves for a renewed anticlerical onslaught (Duggan 2007:317; Hearder and Morris 2001:207; Pollard 2008:39). Crispi was “an anti-Church person with links to Freemasonry ... afraid of reaction and clericalism and fancied that the clergy would make conspiracies ... he did not want a free Church in a free state, but believed that Italy needed to be able to restrain the Church” (Chadwick 1998:236). Shortly after becoming Prime Minister, Crispi amply justified Catholic fears by introducing legislation that would immediately nationalize the assets of the Church’s charitable institutions (Kelikian 2002:47). In the debate preceding the adoption of the law, liberal deputies argued that their ultimate goal was to destroy the social influence of Catholic Church: a senator close to Crispi “spoke of the ‘historic mission’ of liberalism to ‘secularize everything’” (Senator Moleschott, quoted in Quine 2002:54). But Crispi and his colleagues also promoted the legislation so doggedly for more prosaic, self-interested reasons: by placing the vast wealth of religious charities in the hands of the state, they could use them as instruments of “clientelism and electioneering in local communities” (Quine 2002:58). Whatever the motivations of its sponsors, the approval of the law legally removed the clergy from the major role they had played in the distribution of

charity for centuries (Pollard 2008:41), as the state claimed possession of a total of 9,464 pious fraternities (Smith 1959:223).¹⁰⁰

Crispi's nationalization of Catholic charities placed him in confrontation with Pope Leo XIII, who had succeeded Pius IX after his death in 1878. Leo XIII was as intransigent as his predecessor on the issue of the legitimacy of the Italian state, and equally uncompromising in his opposition to liberalism. In 1887, Catholic landowners and aristocrats initiated a campaign to end the *non expedit* and create a religious party that could push back against the left (Webster 1960:7). The vice-archivist of the Vatican archives, Luigi Tosti, published a book calling for reconciliation between the pope and Italy - aptly named *La Conciliazione* (Chadwick 1998:301) – but was fired by Leo XIII for his troubles. Two years later, Bishop Bonomelli of Cremona wrote a pamphlet urging the Church to come to terms with the Italian state; the proposal was immediately placed in the Index of Prohibited Books. While the passage of time gradually reconciled ordinary Catholics to the new country, Leo XIII kept his intransigent opposition to any settlement of the Roman Question.

Unlike Pius IX, however, Leo XIII did not simply lock himself up in the Vatican and wait for God to deliver the Church from her enemies; on the contrary, he devised a strategy to mobilize the Catholic middle classes and put pressure upon the government (Chadwick 1998:284; Clark 1984:87; Kalyvas 1996:217). The new Pope benefited from the spontaneous

¹⁰⁰ As discussed in the next chapter, there was a vast gulf between the Italian state's legal claims and their practical implementation. Catholic charities remained by and large in the hands of the Church for decades after the promulgation of Crispi's reforms.

mobilization of laymen associations that started in the north of Italy as early as the 1860s, built upon the ancient and deeply rooted network of Catholic parishes and dioceses (Duggan 2007:455; Kertzer 2000:197). These groups were dedicated to different purposes: some were charitable associations, others promoted private Catholic schools, a few provided hospitals to care for the poor, many published pamphlets and controlled pro-Catholic periodicals. These were tasks the Church had done for centuries, but laymen associations also had a modern edge to them, forming small savings banks, credit unions, mutual insurance societies, and agrarian cooperatives (Kelikian 2002:51; Pollard 2008:41). Two university students from Bologna, Mario Fani and Giovanni Acquaderni, then organized a national congress that would create a umbrella organization to integrate the bewildering variety of lay Catholic groups: the *Opera dei Congressi* (Gambasin 1969:34; Kelikian 2002:48). The Vatican recognized the existence of the *Opera* and placed it nominally under its jurisdiction (Sassoli-Tomba 1873:27), but under Pius IX it was largely left to its own devices. Leo XIII, by contrast, had great hopes for the laity mobilized by the *Opera*: they were to be “the frontline troops in the Catholic *reconquista* of civil society” (Clark 1984:86). Relaxing the *non expedit* by letting the faithful vote in local elections (even though parliamentary elections remained forbidden), Leo XIII quietly stimulated a partial re-entry of Catholicism into the politics of the liberal state. This quickly bore fruit as Catholics secured control of many local councils and used them to promote religious instruction in public schools (against the prescriptions of the Coppino Laws).

4.1.1.3. The Birth of Italian Political Catholicism, 1900-1913

Relations between the Catholic Church and the Italian state reached their lowest point in the crisis of 1898-1900 (Hearder and Morris 2001:208). The last years of the nineteenth century were extremely tumultuous, as harvest failures and a global recession led to periodic eruptions of spontaneous protest and violence, including the so-called *fasci* revolt in Sicily and a socialist and anarchist insurgency in Milan (Davis 1988:351). The assassination of King Umberto I in 1900 at the hands of an anarchist climaxed the traumatic decade, as the Italian political system seemed “on the brink of collapse” (Duggan 2014:173). Faced with a powerful socialist opposition, liberal elites sought a leader capable of striking back against subversion and eventually settled on General Luigi Pelloux (Adler 1995:9). Named Prime Minister in June 1898, Pelloux cracked down hard on the opponents of the liberal state. Although Catholics had not been implicated in the revolutionary violence, their uncompromising hostility to the very existence of the Italian state placed them – in Pelloux’ eyes – in the same category of ‘subversives’ that included socialists and anarchists. By this time there were nearly 4,000 Catholic lay groups throughout the country, all affiliated with the *Opera*¹⁰¹ (Duggan 2007:455; Kelikian 2002:48). Frightened by the formidable economic and social networks of the Christian social movement, the state cracked down hard. Hundreds of Catholic organizations were shut down and thousands of political prisoners filled Italian jails, including Don Albertario, the editor of the intransigent periodical *L’Ossevatore Cattolico* (Pollard 2008:42).

¹⁰¹ This included “3,982 parish committees, 708 youth sections, 17 university circles, 588 rural cooperative banks, 688 workers’ societies, 24 daily newspapers and 155 journals” (Duggan 2007:455).

This policy of indiscriminate repression was initially supported by the liberal elite, but once the dust settled politicians began to have second thoughts. Pelloux was forced to resign in June 1900 and the new Liberal leader, Giovanni Giolitti, began making overtures to the Church in order to form a common front against the socialist threat. Government officials turned a blind eye to 'clerical abuses' with greater frequency, and Ernesto Pacelli, the main advisor to the pope, met frequently with Giolitti to negotiate a rapprochement. There were three main reasons why Giolitti – a man that “believed that most opponents had their price and could be transformed eventually into allies” (Duggan 2007:451) - sought to use Catholicism as a weapon against socialism. First, the Church viewed socialist working-class associations – with their overt anticlericalism and their policy of class struggle – as a “greater danger than liberalism” (Halperin 1947:19). The creation of Catholic trade unions had been a response to prior socialist initiatives (Bell 1986:56; Duggan 2007:455–56), and even the peasant leagues and rural cooperatives were to some extent formed to prevent socialist expansion to the countryside. Second, the Church was the only institution in Italy capable of matching the organizational might of the socialists (Hearder and Morris 2001:209–10). The *Opera dei Congressi* was a burgeoning network of associations that contained cadres of skilled and aggressive lay activists (Webster 1960:23), and their integration within a parochial structure that had a centuries-long tradition of operating as a social centre gave them an edge over the socialist newcomers (de Rosa 1978:25). Continued anticlerical assaults on the Church would thus destroy the only possible mass alternative to the socialists. As suggested by the formal model of Chapter 2, political leaders adopt proclerical policies if they perceive that anticlericalism would strengthen the opposition at their expense; and there was no doubt to early twentieth century Italian liberals that they “depended on organised Catholicism” to stop the socialist deluge (Duggan 2014:190).

The third reason why the Catholic movement seemed such a useful tool to Giolitti was the fact that the new pope, Pius X, eliminated the left-wing factions within the *Opera* and reformed the organization to make it wholly subordinate to the Vatican's wishes (Duggan 2007:458). In 1903, when Pius X was elected pope after the death of Leo XIII, the *Opera* was falling under the influence of the so-called Christian Democratic faction led by two young priests, Romolo Murri and Luigi Sturzo (Agócs 1973:75; Cunsolo 1993:25). The Christian Democrats favoured a progressive social policy that would help the poor and were behind initiatives to establish Catholic trade unions, as well as all manner of charitable and welfare societies like soup kitchens (Bedeschi 1977:217). They also agitated for the abrogation of the *non expedit* and full participation by Catholics on the political life of the Italian state, judging that the Roman Question was anachronistic (Duggan 2007:458; Giovannini 2002:63). What most worried Pius X about the Christian Democratic group was not their policies, however, but their defiance of the Vatican line on the *non expedit* and other matters. Murri and Sturzo's disobedience was "taken by Pius X not only as a challenge to his authority but an offence against the Roman Catholic faith" (Agócs 1973:87). Therefore, in 1904 Pius X restructured the Catholic movement – now called *Azione Cattolica* (Catholic Action or AC) – and effectively banned the Christian Democrats (Clark 1984:147; Durand 1991:79). The AC was divided into three nationwide groups: the Socioeconomic Union included all social organizations (banks, credit unions, agriculture and consumer cooperatives, mutual aid societies, labour unions, etc.); the Popular Union was responsible for ideological proselytism through its supervision of Catholic schools and the waging of propaganda campaigns; and a newly formed Electoral Union would mobilize lay Catholics to defend the Church at the ballot box (Kelikian 2002:55; Seton-Watson 1967:272–75). This restructuring made an alliance with Catholicism much

more valuable for Giolitti and his liberal colleagues, since now all they had to do was come to terms with one man – the bishop of Rome –, and the whole Catholic movement would be sure to follow (Adler 1995:15–16).

The Electoral Union became the instrument through which Catholic votes were mobilized to support the liberals against the socialist menace. In 1904 Pius X partially lifted the *non expedit* ban on national voting for the first time, with Catholics urged to vote for acceptable liberal candidates that adopted a pro-clerical stance (Baget-Bozzo 1974:28; Binchy 1970:54–55; Caroleo 1976:42; Cunsolo 1993:26; Duggan 2014:189; Kalyvas 1996:219; Kelikian 2002:54; Smith 1959:225). Three Catholics were even elected to parliament, although the Vatican somewhat pedantically insisted that they were mere *deputati cattolici* (deputies who were Catholics) rather than *cattolici deputati* (Catholic deputies). In the subsequent elections of 1909, Giolitti tried to do away with Catholic support but the result was disastrous: the Socialists increased their representation in parliament by more than a third.

The liberal elite became profoundly worried about further Socialist advances in the next elections, especially since they would be the first contested under universal male suffrage (Coppa 1967:219; Duggan 2007:481, 2014:190). As suggested by the formal model of Chapter 2, Italian liberals were forced to embrace proclericalism in order to defeat a strong political opposition. Giolitti negotiated a secret agreement with Count Gentiloni,¹⁰² leader of the Electoral Union, according to which Catholic voters would be mobilized in support of

¹⁰² The pact was supposed to be secret, but Count Gentiloni revealed its existence in a post-election interview with the anticlerical *Giornale d'Italia* (Duggan 2007:482).

liberal candidates who subscribed to a set of conditions, namely: protection of religious orders; support for private schools; reinstatement of catechetical classes in public schools; and opposition to divorce (Clark 1984:156–57; Coppa 1967:226). As the 1913 elections approached, Catholic mobilization in favour of the approved liberal candidates kicked into high gear: “Catholic organizations assisted the coalition behind liberal candidates in introducing the techniques associated with modern electioneering: fund raising, distribution of position papers, posting of banners, extensive use of radio and public address systems, monster rallies, and free transportation to the polls” (Cunsolo 1993:42).

The result was an electoral triumph for Giolitti’s Liberal Union, who secured 270 deputies against 52 for the Socialists, despite the latter having vastly superior organizational capacity compared to the liberals (Brice 2013:60–61). There was no doubt that Giolitti’s victory would never have happened without Catholic support.¹⁰³ The liberals “had no party machine of any kind with which to confront the new mass electorate ... [and they] had depended on organised Catholicism for their relative success” (Duggan 2014:190). This success was a double-edged sword for the liberals, however, because it clearly demonstrated that a future Catholic party could count on a mass electoral base (Clark 1984:146; Jemolo 1960:134–35; Pollard 2008:6; Seton-Watson 1967:395; Warner 2012:262).

¹⁰³ Only one-quarter of the Liberal Union’s parliamentary delegation obtained their seats without having signed the Gentiloni Pact (Pollard 2008:68).

4.1.1.4. The Formation of an Italian Catholic Party, 1913-1919

The Gentiloni Pact and the liberal triumph in the 1913 elections brought the Catholic Church into the political mainstream for the first time since the unification of Italy. Catholics looked forward to implementing the provisions of the Gentiloni Pact and withdrawing the anticlerical policies that had reigned supreme since Italian unification. The arrival of the First World War killed these Catholic projects, just as it would kill 600,000 Italian soldiers (Duggan 2014:193). At the onset of the war, the government actually declared neutrality despite its treaty alliance with Germany and Austria-Hungary (Duggan 2014:191). By mid-1915, the Entente powers promised Italy the territories of Trento, Trieste, Gorizia, Istria and part of Dalmatia if she entered the war of their side (Seton-Watson 1967:430–36), prompting a fierce political conflict between interventionists – the nationalists and the revolutionary socialists associated with Benito Mussolini - and pacifists - the majority of the Socialist Party and the old Christian Democratic group. Caught in between the massive streets demonstrations for and against the war (Webster 1960:44–49), Giolitti and his moderate allies lost control of parliament (Pollard 2008:71). Italy did end up entering the war but its course pleased no one: the Socialists maintained their principled opposition and refused to join a government of national unity, while the nationalists were outraged at the meagre territorial gains received in the Treaty of Versailles (Duggan 2014:193–97). The economic crisis that followed the end of hostilities, combined with the widespread perception that all sacrifices had been for naught, created a situation of chaos in 1918-1920 (Corner 2002:37–40), with peasant uprisings in the south and occupation of factories in the north (Duggan 2007:421).

Against this backdrop of social chaos, Don Luigi Sturzo, the former leader of the Christian Democracy group and current head of the Popular Union (one of the three sections of Catholic Action), travelled to the Vatican on Christmas Eve, 1918, for a secret meeting with Pope Benedict XV (Molony 1977:53). Sturzo requested permission to form a Catholic political party and the Holy See gave its consent (Kelikian 2002:56–57; di Maio 2004:112; Malgeri 1973:276). Why did the Church finally take the fateful step towards creating a religious political party? There were three main reasons. First, the seeming disintegration of social order and the strength of revolutionary socialism was viewed as a mortal threat to Catholicism, especially in light of the Bolshevik takeover of Russia. As the liberal elite was clearly impotent and unable to come to grips with mass politics, there “was only one real force opposed to Bolshevism in the country” (Molony 1977:53): the Church (Duggan 2014:197). Second, the war had radically altered the position of Catholics in Italian society and politics. The contribution of the Catholic masses (the peasantry in particular), combined with the nationalistic mobilization of the clergy and lay associations, helped eliminate the anti-patriotic, anti-Italian stigma that had been attached to Catholicism since the *Risorgimento* (Monticone 1972:xlii–xliv). Finally, lay activists in Catholic Action had been continually pressing for the formation of their own political party and the end of what they saw as the “prostitution” (Don Luigi Sturzo as quoted in Cunsolo 1993:25) of their vote in favour of the Liberals. The death of Pope Pius X, who had been the *bête noire* of the Christian Democrats, and the arrival of the more sympathetic Benedict XV to the throne of Saint Peter created the ideal conditions for the emergence of an independent Catholic party.¹⁰⁴ As

¹⁰⁴ In addition to this, we should note that the Italian annexation of the former Austrian territories of South Tyrol and the Trentino also favoured the creation of a Catholic party. Austria had a decades-old Catholic political party, and the new Italian provinces could provide seasoned politicians like Alcide de Gasperi and a party machine that

Giuseppe Della Torre, the successor of Luigi Sturzo as Popular Union leader, explained, “*Azione Cattolica* had turned, at the end of the war, toward increasingly more intense political activity” (quoted in Howard 1957:109).

In January of 1919, Luigi Sturzo officially announced the creation of the *Partito Popolare Italiano* (PPI – Italian People’s Party). Built upon a powerful Catholic movement that had been expanding for decades in response to the anticlerical policies of the Italian government (van Kersbergen 1995:40), the PPI was formed at the moment in which Catholicism felt most vulnerable to the onslaught of anticlerical socialism. The history of the party ended up being short-lived - Mussolini banned it in 1926 (di Maio 2004:111) - but during the short years of its existence it made a crucial contribution to the democratic life of the country because it was the largest non-socialist party. As we will see in the next chapter, the PPI was resuscitated after the Second World War in the body of the *Democrazia Cristiana* (DC – Christian Democrats), the most successful political party in Western Europe until the fall of the Berlin Wall. All of this was a far cry from the dark days of 1870, when Pius IX, locked in the Vatican and surrounded by hostile Italian troops, raged against the “extraordinary impudence and hypocrisy of this government” and proclaimed Catholics’ eternal rejection of any “conciliation or agreement with Our enemies and invaders” (Pope Pius IX 1870).

strongly backed Luigi Sturzo’s efforts to create an Italian confessional party (Campanini 1981:157–68; Vecchio 1987).

4.1.2. Clericalism, *There is the Enemy! France, 1814-1905*

The history of political Catholicism in France is often misrepresented in the scholarly literature. Perhaps because religious parties in France were much weaker than those in Italy, Belgium, or Germany, scholars have commonly asserted that France had *no* Catholic parties at all. For instance, Morgan (2003:274) claims that “the intensity of the clerical-anticlerical cleavage in France also impeded the formation of Christian democratic parties,” while Manow and Palier (2009:147) assert that “the state-church conflict in France ... did not trigger the formation of a party of religious defence during the Third Republic, between 1871 and 1940.” This is not correct, as we will see in this section. Under siege from the strongly anticlerical Third Republic, French Catholics first organized themselves as a parliamentary group in the last decade of the nineteenth century and institutionalized a separate political party in 1901, the *Action Libérale Populaire* (ALP – Popular Liberal Action).

Like everything else in nineteenth century French politics, the relationship between Church and state was shaped to a large degree by the legacy of the Revolution (McManners 1972:vii; McMillan 2006:217). Just as Italian priests had originally been active in the *Risorgimento*, the French clergy enthusiastically supported the Revolution in its early days, before becoming the most significant counter-revolutionary group during the Jacobin Republic. Notwithstanding the Revolutionary proclamations of the ‘one and indivisible’ French nation, the faultline between Catholics and anticlericals divided the country in two and would culminate in the Separation of Church and state in 1905. The anticlericalism of the Third Republic pushed Catholics into forming a party of religious defence – the ALP -, who

fought a rearguard but ultimately unsuccessful battle to maintain the Church's corporate privileges in education and welfare.

4.1.2.1. Rebuilding the Church after the Revolution, 1814-1848

Napoleon's 1801 Concordat with the Catholic Church had to a significant extent reversed the anticlerical policies of the Jacobins and confirmed Catholicism as the official religion of the French state (McManners 1972:4; Price 2017:34). It was only with the Bourbon Restoration in 1814-15, however, that the Church truly began a period of organizational revival. The new monarchical regime adopted proclerical policies because it understood that only a strong Church would be able to keep the anticlerical revolutionaries out of power (Price 2017:35; Viaene 2001:50–51). During the fifteen years of the Restored Bourbon monarchy (1815 to 1830), the support of the state¹⁰⁵ allowed the French Church to establish as many as forty new religious congregations (Sorrel and Meyer 2001:293) and to increase the number of priests by 4,655 (Boutry 2007:53). Perhaps more importantly, the Minister of Public Instruction, the devout Denis-Luc Frayssinous, energetically promoted the role of the Catholic Church in education, with clerical supervision of lay teachers and public subvention of religious teaching orders (de Lacotte 2013:39–41).

While these proclerical policies were intended to strengthen the monarchy, they ended up alienating moderate liberals and the wealthy bourgeoisie, who began fearing a

¹⁰⁵ The subsidies to the Church during this period grew from 12 million to 33 million francs (Moisset 2013:28).

return of the semi-feudal *ancien régime*. As the formal model of religious policy-making in Chapter 2 suggests, political leaders may misjudge the effect of proclerical policies on the balance of power between government and opposition. In the case of the French Bourbons, they clearly believed that proclericalism would strengthen them, but it ended up contributing decisively to their downfall (Hartman 1972:131; McMahon 2001:182–83). The introduction of the death penalty for religious sacrilege increased liberals’ “fear of a clerical plot and of a reactionary monarchical coup d’état” (Price 2017:43). This led directly to a bourgeois revolution in July of 1830 that removed the Bourbons from the throne and installed Louis-Philippe, the liberal Duke of Orléans, as the new King of the French.

Having come to power partly because of a reaction against the growing influence of Catholicism,¹⁰⁶ Louis-Philippe and his ministers were forced by popular pressure to adopt some mild anticlerical measures to curtail the Church’s prerogatives (Price 1971:344–46). The clergy was removed from the upper chamber of parliament, the law against sacrilege was repealed, and financial assistance to seminarians was cut back (Basdevant-Gaudemet and Imbert 1988:10). Apart from these relatively minor measures, however, the Church maintained a position of power for the entire duration of the July Monarchy. As early as 24 August 1830 - less than a month after the overthrow of the Bourbons -, the Minister of Ecclesiastical Affairs proclaimed the government’s intention to “safeguard everything associated with the true interests of religion” (quoted in Price 2017:44). The revised

¹⁰⁶ The anticlerical mood was starkly displayed on 29 July 1830, at the height of the revolution, when an angry crowd in Paris sacked the archbishop’s palace (Jakobowicz 2009:208).

constitution still recognized the legal primacy of Catholicism,¹⁰⁷ while censorship was quickly revived and many journalists were thrown in jail for spreading the “monstrous doctrines and prodigious errors” of liberalism which pope Gregory XVI fulminated against in his 1832 encyclical *Mirari vos* (Price 2017:53).

Close collaboration between Church and state was enhanced with the 1833 Guizot Law on education, which required that every commune maintain a primary school and that the teacher’s *primary* responsibility was to provide religious and moral instruction (Cholvé and Chaline 1995:20; Price 1987:311). The parish priest was entrusted with leadership of a local supervisor committee to make sure that religious faith was being inculcated correctly. Even this was not enough to fully satisfy the Church, which waged a major campaign in the 1840s to facilitate the formation of private secondary schools in which lay teachers would be thoroughly excluded (de Changy 2005:276). Nonetheless, French Catholics were quite satisfied with the way their privileges had been quickly restored under the July Monarchy, and were once again caught off guard when a Parisian revolt in February 1848 established the Second Republic.

¹⁰⁷ The constitutional text was changed from an acknowledgement of Catholicism as ‘religion of the state’ to ‘religion of the great majority of French people’, but this was simply a symbolic amendment of no practical consequence. Catholic clerics continued to receive public stipends and to be regulated by the Minister of Ecclesiastical Affairs, which was not the case for Protestants or Jews.

4.1.2.2. French Catholicism under Louis-Napoleon, 1848-1870

Unlike the avowedly anticlerical Jacobins of the First Republic, the leaders of its 1848 reincarnation were moderates eager to avoid antagonizing the Church (Dowe 2001:757; Harrison 2014:112). The new batch of republicans understood that anticlericalism would strengthen the forces of reaction and sought to steer clear of religious issues (Price 2017:61). The Minister of Education in the Provisional Government, Hippolyte Carnot, was quickly forced to resign after having introduced legislation that would have replaced catechetical classes with civic instruction and curtailed the right of the parish priest to inspect local schools (Becker and Candar 2004:275). Even socialists in those pre-Marxist days couched their discourse in the language of Christianity, claiming Christ as the first republican (Dougherty 2005:109–12; Dowe 2001:717; Price and Smith 1975:48).

Despite this auspicious start, it did not take long for the Republic and the Church to find themselves at loggerheads. The Provisional Government's intention to establish National Workshops for unemployed workers was received with hostility in Catholic circles, threatening the Church's preeminent role in the provision of charity (Price 1983:446–47). Dominican preacher Lacordaire railed against a public welfare system that would "deny all merit to the benefactor and all gratitude to the grateful" (quoted in Duroselle 1951:303) – a revealing statement that emphasized the instrumentality of charity in the eyes of the Church. Catholic weariness about the Republic led the clergy to mobilize its flock in the elections for the Constituent Assembly of April 1848, which were held under universal male suffrage. Ecclesiastical engagement "certainly helped to ensure a massive turnout of voters" (Price

2017:82), giving conservatives a comfortable majority in the assembly and shifting government policy to the right.

In June, the new conservative government followed the wishes of the Church and closed the National Workshops. This provoked a working-class insurrection in Paris in which the Archbishop of Paris was murdered. The uprising was quelled with brutal force, leading to the deaths of five thousand insurgents. In October, the Assembly approved a constitution in which the social and institutional status of the Church was fully recognized. An education reform designed by the pious Count Falloux strengthened the supervisory role of parish priests over local schools and transferred the responsibility for recruiting teachers from the Minister of Education to municipal councils – an advantageous change for the Church, who could more easily exert pressure over local officials to select suitable teachers (Jacquet-Francillon 1999:178).¹⁰⁸ Most importantly, the Falloux Law lifted restrictions on the establishment of private secondary colleges and even allowed municipalities to subsidize them at the expense of public schools (Harrigan 1973:255, 2001:55–61; Price 2017:111). In sum, once again the French Catholic Church successfully navigated the choppy waters of a regime transition and managed to re-establish its primacy. Catholic support was essential to the election of Louis-Napoleon Bonaparte as President – extracting from him a promise to send an expeditionary force to Rome that would crush the republic and restore the absolute rule of the Pope¹⁰⁹ –, and the Church also welcomed his coup d'état that restored the

¹⁰⁸ The legislation left no ambiguity as to the primacy of the Church. Article 1 stipulated that “the principal duty of the schoolteacher is to provide pupils with religious instruction” (quoted in Price 2017:109).

¹⁰⁹ See the Italian section of this chapter.

hereditary empire on 2 December 1851 (Maurain 1930:5; Price 1972:209, 2001:272; Tudesq 1965:201).

Unlike the regime changes of 1830 and 1848, the Church actively supported the advent of the Second French Empire and eagerly collaborated with Napoleon's rule. Priests and bishops played a key role in legitimizing the conservative and authoritarian policies of the state through routine public prayers, backing for official electoral candidates, and involvement in numerous public ceremonies (Aprile 2004:171–72). In turn, the state increased the religious budget to 50 million francs per year,¹¹⁰ gave cardinals a seat in the Imperial Senate, and did all it could to “protect the Church and Christian civilization against subversives of all kinds” (Gaudemet 1987:64–66; Price 2017:137).

Taking full advantage of the supervisory powers attributed to them by the Falloux Law, parish priests demanded constant proselytization by mayors, local notables, and teachers (Zeldin 1970:102). The Falloux Law allowed municipal authorities to close public schools if there was a viable private Catholic alternative, an irresistible proposition for cash-strapped local councils (Zind 1971:198).¹¹¹ Religious teaching orders experienced a veritable boom during the Second Empire, with the number of regulars authorized to teach growing from 12,507 in 1847 to 43,558 in 1863 (Price 2001:196). In the last year of the Second Republic, 28.8 % of all French schoolchildren were enrolled in Catholic schools; by 1867 that number

¹¹⁰ The budget was spent on the upkeep of religious buildings and on stipends to the clergy (Leniaud 2006:30–31).

¹¹¹ In 1866 total government expenditure on education was little more than half of that spent on stipends to the clergy (Price 2017:228).

had increased to 37.6 %, including three-fifths of girls (Grew and Harrigan 1985:220). Catholic predominance was even more marked in early childhood education: by 1867, fully 73 percent of preschool establishments were run by religious orders, which gave the Church a hegemonic position in the care and socialization of young children (Morgan 2002:128).

The close links between Church and state during the Second Empire did not mean that Catholics were ideologically fond of Napoleon's rule, however. Support for the regime was conditional on a proclerical policy and could be withdrawn if the Church did not get its way (Price 2017:156), as the negative reaction to Napoleon's support of Piedmontese annexation of Papal territory demonstrated (Price 2001:406–8). Despite the tension between Catholics and Napoleon because of the Roman Question, however, the Church did very well under the Second Empire and was utterly unprepared for yet another regime change in 1870, when the Third Republic was proclaimed in Paris following the defeat of France in the Franco-Prussian War.

4.1.2.3. First Wave of Third Republican Anticlericalism, 1870-1889

The Church's reaction to the re-establishment of the Republic was extremely hostile. Unlike in 1848, the new breed of republicans under the leadership of Léon Gambetta – who famously hurled '*Cléricalisme? Voilà l'ennemi!*' in an 1877 speech (Rémond 1976:184) - was unabashedly anticlerical (Larkin 1974:24). Because "anticlericalism provided a basic sense of unity" (Price 2005:225) among the heterogenous group of republicans, it was a crucial ideological weapon in the political struggle against monarchist reactionaries (Hazareesingh

1998:264–65; McManners 1972:42). In other words, anticlericalism was adopted as the republican creed because it provided the doctrinal cement to their fractious coalition, without which they would stand no chance of retaining power.

Of course, the emergence of an anticlericalism regime was anathema to the Church. The experience of the Paris Commune and the capture of Rome by the new Italian state created a perception of an apocalypse for Catholics, which added to the revival of Jacobinism in the Third Republic seemed a mortal threat to the Church. Accordingly, the Church openly backed the restoration of the monarchy during the 1870s (McManners 1972:35–36; McMillan 2003:91), but the ineptitude of the monarchists combined with the successful appeal of the republicans to the middle-classes quashed the Catholic projecting of returning the throne of France to the Bourbons (Passmore 2013:43; Smith 1998:251). The resignation of conservative President MacMahon in January 1879 removed the last obstacle to full republican control of the political system and made it clear that the Third Republic was in France to stay.

Supported by majorities in both legislative chambers and a friendly President in Jules Grévy, French republicans in 1879 were determined to use their moment of triumph to build the republic upon solid foundations and settle the regime question once and for all. Their target were not the remaining monarchist groups in the country, support for which was perceived as shallow and centred on a narrow aristocratic circle. The true adversary of the republic was the Catholic Church,¹¹² the only political force in the right that could boast of

¹¹² As prominent republican Charles Renouvier explained in 1872, “there are two Frances in France, that of the clericals and that of the liberals” (quoted in Weill 1929:229).

mass support (Brown 1974:236; Denis 1977:399–406; Jonas 1994:116–18; Kale 1992:154–64). The clergy had already mobilized in support of the monarchists, engaging “in the kind of grass roots electioneering that the notables could not do themselves” (Locke 1974:243). Jules Ferry, leader of the dominant republican faction during the 1880s, believed that the Church’s strength relied upon religious control of education. To counter that, he implemented reforms that sought to establish the state’s educational dominance and the consequent inculcation of republican values (Berger 1987:113; Kalyvas 1996:115; McManners 1972:50). As historian Maurice Larkin explained, “the battle of Church and State under the Third Republic was largely one for intellectual control of the new generation” (Larkin 1974:24). The share of children educated in Catholic schools had barely changed since the Second Empire: 27 % of all primary school pupils attended a Church-run school in 1881, with the figures increasing to 51 % of the total population of secondary school students (Prost 1968:218; Zeldin 1970:59). Of course, even the children who attended public schools were reared on the catechism due to mandatory religious instruction, and the provisions of the Falloux Law had allowed municipal councils to staff public schools with regular clerics (Grew and Harrigan 1985:231).

Between 1879 and 1886, Jules Ferry put in place a veritable flurry of anticlerical laws that sought to end centuries of religious control over education (Morgan 2002:129). The first target was the Society of Jesus, the most powerful of French religious orders, whose secondary schools were closed in February 1879 (Bush 1975:125–26; McMillan 2003:78)¹¹³. Four months later, Ferry transferred the power to appoint teachers from municipal councils to departmental prefects – local agents of the central state that were not subject to

¹¹³ The Jesuits would be abolished altogether in 1880 (Larkin 1974:27).

democratic control -, with instructions to never nominate religious teachers unless a lay alternative was unavailable (Grew and Harrigan 1985:232). In 1880, republicans abrogated a centuries-old law forbidding work on Sundays and religious holidays (Weber 1976:360). In July 1881, denominational instruction was formally banished from all state primary schools, together with Catholic religious symbols such as crucifixes. Together with laws that made elementary education free (June 1881) and mandatory (March 1882), these measures formed the basis of the *école laïque, gratuite et obligatoire* at the heart of the republican system of education. There was no place in this system for nuns and monks, irrespective of their individual qualities as teachers, and a later law of October 1886 banned members of religious orders from holding posts in state schools (McMillan 2003:78). These measures had nearly instantaneous effects: between 1876 and 1881, the share of public schools with clerical teachers had been cut in half, and in 1886 only two percent of children were enrolled in public schools staffed by clerics (Grew and Harrigan 1985:233–34).

Other anticlerical laws of the 1880s included the legalization of divorce and the end of seminarian exemption from conscription, together with an extensive purge of the administration and judiciary from suspected ‘enemies of the Republic’ (Halévy 1937:378) – a category that included anyone who attended mass regularly (Cabanel 2000:172). French cities and villages were physically and symbolically ‘republicanized,’ as streets were renamed, statues toppled, and new monuments erected that reflected the republican character of the government (Smith 1998:253).

Faced with this anticlerical onslaught, the Holy See sought to mobilize the Catholic masses in support of conservative and monarchist groups (Jones 1985:213–14; Simpson

2001:387). The initial tactic was to create a broad right-wing party that embraced a wide spectrum of conservative opinion, including Catholics, Bonapartists, Orléanists, and Legitimists. The leader of this movement was Count Albert de Mun, whose brainchild, the Catholic Workers' Circles, was envisaged as the nucleus of an "elite-led popular movement for restoration" (Passmore 2013:34). Despite the natural affinity of Catholics and royalists and the fact that their leaders were drawn from similar aristocratic circles, the alliance was a disaster. Monarchists distrusted the commitment of their Catholic allies to the royalist cause and correctly understood that the Church had no special preference for either monarchy or republic as long as it got the policies it wanted (Levillain 1983:452–80). Thus, the first attempt to unite the right "was torn apart by conflict" between Catholics and the different factions of royalists, many of which had no sympathy for a Catholic "fanaticism that excited the passions of the masses" (Passmore 2013:43). Disgusted with their erstwhile allies, the influential Catholic periodical *La Croix* eschewed any further commitment to the monarchy and proclaimed that the Church "must be superior to all forms and all systems of government" (quoted in Grenier 1981:219).

After the failure of attempts to form a unified Catholic-monarchist party on the basis of his Workers' Circles, on September 1885 Count de Mun called for the formation of a Catholic political party autonomous from the rest of the right (B. Martin 1978:58–62; Passmore 2013:56). Religious people of all political persuasions – including republicans – would be welcome to join, as long as they accepted a proclerical program to reverse the Ferry reforms and restore Catholic primacy in education. Free from the "dead body of monarchism" (Byrnes 1950:288), de Mun believed that Catholics would finally be able to punch their weight. La Tour du Pin, a Catholic social activist closely involved with the Workers' Circles,

advocated the adoption of modest social reforms to attract the Catholic masses (Levillain 1983:848–49). Fourteen MPs endorsed de Mun’s project, but the Holy See squelched the initiative because it believed that the division on the right between Catholics and monarchists would favour the anticlerical republicans (Sedgwick 1965:17–18).

In May 1887, parliamentary Catholics voted in favour of Maurice Rouvier’s moderate republican government – named Opportunist because of its willingness to seek support on the right - in exchange for “slowing secularization of schools, concessions in public employment ... and placing the conciliatory Eugène Spuller in the Ministry of Religion” (Passmore 2013:57; also Sedgwick 1965:18–30). Rouvier fell a few months later due to a corruption scandal, however, and this second Catholic attempt at a broad right-wing alliance led to nothing.

4.1.2.4. The Ralliement, 1889-1900

On October 1889, Count de Mun and his allies called once again for the formation of a Catholic party (B. Martin 1978:81). His group of followers in the Legislative Assembly formed a separate parliamentary caucus, intended as the nucleus of the future confessional party. The new caucus was revealingly called the Constitutional Right, emphasizing the separation from the monarchists who did not accept the republican constitution (Passmore 2013:73). Pope Leo XIII endorsed this approach in his encyclical *Au milieu des sollicitudes*, instructing Catholics to accept the republic and to “unite as one to combat, by all lawful and honest means, these progressive abuses of legislation” (Caron 2009:308; Pope Leo XIII 1892). This

policy of rallying to the republic became known as the *Ralliement* (B. Martin 1978:90–97; Sedgwick 1965:40–48).

Building upon the Constitutional Right parliamentary caucus, Catholic leaders Albert de Mun, Étienne Lamy, and Jacques Piou hastened to organize a formal Rallié political group to participate in the 1893 general elections (Larkin 1966:718; Sedgwick 1965:73; Shapiro 1962:20). Despite having little time to prepare for a political campaign, the Catholics were able to set up an impressive electoral machine in time for the elections. The mobilizational capacity of the Ralliés rested upon a group of interlinked political, social, and charitable associations (Ponson 1979:60). The religious Order of the Augustinians of the Assumption – better known as the Assumptionists - had a veritable press empire that it put at the service of Count de Mun. Fathers Picard and Bailly founded the periodical *La Croix* in 1883, which three years later had achieved a circulation of 174,000, while its Sunday version sold over 400,000 copies (Grenier 1981:215–16; Passmore 2013:85). Another influential ecclesiastical, Abbé Grenier, formed a loose federation of electoral committees, cooperatives, friendly societies, banks, and agricultural unions that by the late 1890s claimed over twelve thousand members (Wilson 1975:670). A third organization was a trade union network that originated from the Reims branches of de Mun's Workers' Circles, which was called the *Démocratie Chrétienne* (Brown 1974:237–38). It claimed twenty thousand fee-paying members by 1896 (Rollet 1958:335–36) and it was particularly strong in the industrial areas of the north-east. Despite not being allowed to vote, there were also numerous associations for Catholic women. The Assumptionists created a 'League for Hail Mary' that mobilized female writers to pen tracts in defence of the Church (Marion 1959:440), and the first female trade union in France was formed by Catholic activists in 1896. During the same year the Assumptionists also

formed a more overtly political organization, the Justice-Equality Committee, whose local branches quickly spread all over France (Larkin 1974:67). These associations all lent their support to the Ralliés during election campaigns, using all the trappings of popular religion such as the display of crucifixes and candles on windows, the mobilization of regional saints, traditions, and pilgrimages, and big public gatherings in which Catholic candidates joined priests and bishops to address the masses in colloquial language (Ford 1993:119–20; Mayeur 1966:120–21).

Despite the impressive Catholic electoral machinery, however, the election of 1893 was a massive disappointment, as both de Mun and Piou failed to get elected and only thirty-four Ralliés managed to enter parliament¹¹⁴ (Ford 1993:122–27; B. Martin 1978:96–98; Shapiro 1962:20–26). Despite their small numbers, Rallié parliamentarians held the balance of power between Radical and Opportunist republican factions. The Catholics decided to support the Opportunist republican bloc led by Jules Méline, thus precluding another wave of anticlericalism (Denais 1959:58; Martin 1976:662).

Méline presided over the most proclerical government in the early history of the Third Republic (Stone 1985:73–74). As noted by the formal model of Chapter 2, governments adopt proclerical policies when a strong religious group shifts the distribution of political power in their favour and against the opposition. This was certainly the case for the conservative republicans led by Méline, who needed the support of Catholic parliamentarians to stay in power. The new Education Minister called for a ‘new spirit’ in relations with the Church (Passmore 2013:74), ended discrimination against Catholics on access to state employment

¹¹⁴ Albert de Mun returned to parliament after a by-election in 1894.

(Larkin 1995:75–79) and defeated attempts to halt the construction of a Catholic basilica at the summit of Montmartre, the site of the first insurrection of the Paris Commune (Piou 1926:187). Religious orders were invited back to France, and there was a modest growth of private Catholic schools during the 1890s, which by the end of the decade had almost 20,000 more students than at the outset (Grew and Harrigan 1985:235). Ralliés thus gained some concessions in exchange for their parliamentary support to the Opportunists, but in the end these were limited and the Ferry reforms remained mostly intact. “Most ordinary Catholics perceived little change” (Passmore 2013:80).

As they geared up for the elections of 1898 – the second in which the Ralliés participated as a distinct religious party – Catholic leaders were hampered by the lack of a formal organization, in contrast to the relative dynamism of Catholic civil society. Indeed, at the political level the Ralliés had no organization to speak of – no local party branches, no clear formulation of policy or doctrine, no get-out-the-vote operation, not even a sharp distinction between Catholic MPs and those on the right and far-right. In the parliamentary election of 1898 their electoral organization consisted only of the Assumptionist Justice-Equality Committee (Larkin 1974:65; Sedgwick 1965:131), which was problematic because the Assumptionists had grown disappointed with the policy of collaboration and lashed out constantly against the conservative republican government of Jules Méline (B. Martin 1978:121–24; Sedgwick 1965:40). The modest proclerical achievements during the preceding parliamentary session were not appreciated by the Catholic electorate, which “demanded repeal, not just modification, of the lay laws” (Passmore 2013:97). They ended up winning thirty-eight seats, a slight improvement over the previous election but nonetheless a disappointment for the Rallié leadership, whose support for the government had yielded

little. Catholics felt their cooperation with the Opportunists had been little more than a “dupery” (Larkin 1974:70).

Catholic leaders barely had time to regroup in the aftermath of the 1898 elections when the Dreyfus Affair upended the fragile political system of the Third Republic. The Affair grew out of the army’s false accusation that Captain Alfred Dreyfus - a Jew – was a spy, his conviction on ambiguous and fabricated evidence, and the military’s refusal to rectify the mistake (Burns 1992:123). The Affair brought political emotions to a fever pitch because both the supporters of the army and those of Dreyfus thought their fundamental values were under assault. Even though the Rallié leadership kept largely silent during the crisis (Larkin 1974:79), the strident antisemitism of the Assumptionists and other religious groups identified Catholicism with the anti-Dreyfusard position, which in turn led to a resurgence of anticlericalism in the pro-Dreyfus camp (Caron 2009:325–28; Fitch 1992:66–84; Halpern 2002:203–4; Larkin 1995:8). The polarization of French society in two camps caused the collapse of the alliance between Catholics and Opportunists. “Riding a political tidal wave of moral righteousness, the Left shook free enough [Opportunist] votes” (Martin 1976:663) to form a united government that would protect ‘the Republic in danger’ (Larkin 1974:80; Lebovics 1988:184–92; Passmore 2013:102). The Ralliés thought the whole Affair was a scare tactic blown out of proportion by the Radicals to ruin the centre-right coalition (Piou 1932:165). When Opportunist leader René Waldeck-Rousseau formed a *Bloc de Gauches* (Left Bloc) government in June 1899 with the support of Radicals and Socialists, De Mun indignantly stated in parliament that “religious war has been the cement of your union” (quoted in B. Martin 1978:81).

4.1.2.5. The Formation of a French Catholic Party, 1900-1905

Count de Mun was right: anticlericalism was the glue that held the *Bloc de Gauches* together. In the autumn of 1900 Waldeck-Rousseau banished the Jesuits and the Assumptionists from France, a clear “settling of scores” for their vehement attacks on Dreyfus (Martin 1976:663).¹¹⁵ All Jesuit-run secondary schools – responsible for the education of one in twenty high-schoolers in France - were taken over by the state (Larkin 1995:36).¹¹⁶ Under the terms of the so-called Associations Law, the remaining religious orders were compelled to obtain government authorization to remain in the country, ostensibly because they owed allegiance to a foreign power (Passmore 2013:129). The government was given wide discretion in the application of the Associations Law, being free to expel religious orders at will. This significantly raised the stakes for the upcoming legislative elections: an anticlerical triumph could lead to the banishment of all religious congregations, while a proclerical cabinet would surely refuse to enforce the law. Albert de Mun and the Rallié leadership recognized that the amateurish electoral organization of 1898 could not be repeated (Denais 1959:93). Thus, on June 11, 1901, they announced the transformation of their loose parliamentary group into the first legally constituted (Moon 1921:231) political party in

¹¹⁵ The Assumptionists rhetoric was so venomous and extreme that even the Pope quietly sympathized with their dissolution (Larkin 1974:86).

¹¹⁶ In fact the decree of 1880 that had abolished the Society of Jesus was still in force, but the Rallié-supported governments of the 1890s had turned a blind eye to the reestablishment of the Jesuits (Larkin 1995:36–37).

France: the Popular Liberal Action (ALP – *Action Libérale Populaire*).¹¹⁷ Jacques Piou was selected as party president, with de Mun and Étienne Lamy serving as his deputies.

The leaders of the new Catholic party made a great mobilizational effort for the historic elections of April 1902 (Anderson 1962:90–91). They used polarizing rhetoric, suggesting that the elections were a battle between good and evil (Fuller 1999:36; Nord 1986:467). Jacques Piou admonished a cheering crowd that “today, France is divided in two camps, on one side the savage Jacobins, the sectarians, and collectivists, on the other, the patriots, liberals, and conservatives; the time for hesitation is past: each must choose a side” (quoted in Martin 1976:666). Priests sought to sway their flocks by portraying the electoral contest as a war between Christ and the devil, which led to legal complaints of clerical meddling in almost one in five electoral constituencies (Valentine 1977:126–27).

Because Waldeck-Rousseau had banished the Assumptionists, the influential *La Croix* was bankrupt. The ALP persuaded publishing magnate Paul Féron Vrau to purchase the paper, and it reappeared in November 1901 under the name *Bulletin Action Libérale*. Vrau also created a press trust that acquired fourteen republican regional papers and imbued them with a uniformly pro-Catholic editorial line, which gave the ALP a promotional apparatus capable of saturating all of France (Albert 1972:338). In addition to this, wealthy donors and the Catholic Church itself made massive direct campaign contributions to the ALP (Passmore

¹¹⁷ The name of the party was designed to dissociate liberalism from the anticlericalism of the left, who stood accused of promoting an “illiberal” Law of Associations that restricted freedom of association. The concept of a liberal Church would be a hard sell to the electorate, however, after a century of Catholic attacks on liberalism (Martin 1976:665).

2013:133). Between its creation and the elections of April 1902, the new party spent more than two million francs - an astounding sum in comparison to the customary patterns of French political spending (Martin 1976:666–67). In a short period of time the ALP could boast of having more than seven hundred local committees and 160,000 members, including women (Action Libérale Populaire 1905). Seeking to attract working-class support, de Mun and Piou released a policy program with a markedly social Catholic bent: Sunday rest, retirement pensions, and a corporatist system of unions (Horne 2002:121–23; Passmore 2013:143).

From the beginning, the ALP considered itself more than just a political party. It was envisaged as the central political agency for all Catholic groups in France: the clergy, lay activists, and so forth (Bosworth 1962:23; Flornoy 1907:60–61; Letamendia 1995:39–43). The ALP was a “direct” political party in the sense described by Maurice Duverger, since its adherents belonged directly to the party without intermediaries (Duverger 1954:4–14). Informally, however, its real strength derived from the open support of a multitude of Catholic associations. As ALP leader Jacques Piou claimed, “against the might of the state, French Catholics cannot remain isolated and atomised ... we find salvation in associationism; the association, that is the eternal safeguard of all our moral values” (quoted in Action Libérale Populaire 1909:7). Apart from the Catholic Church itself, there were four important organizations associated with the electoral efforts of the ALP. The first was the Catholic Association of the French Youth (ACJF), which had been created by Albert de Mun in 1886 (Barbier 1924:89–90). The ACJF played a crucial role in the electoral campaign of 1902, mobilizing its members to convey the Catholic program through the local media, word of mouth, placards, and mass gatherings (Mayeur 1968:300); as well as serving as a training

ground for the recruitment of party candidates (Sutton 1982:94; Valentine 1977:55). The second organization was the Liberal Youth, which rendered important services “in a thousand different ways” (Moon 1921:233), which included spreading propaganda, distributing ballots, providing lookouts on election day, and keeping order during mass gatherings. Despite not having the right to vote, Catholic women organized in the Patriotic League of Frenchwomen provided a great boost to the ALP (Barbier 1924:514–16; McMillan 1990:467–80). The League’s 300,000 members strongly backed the party’s efforts with many demonstrations, petitions, and peaceful protests. Finally, Catholic charities were used as “unpaid agents for the right” (Passmore 2013:135), none more so than the Society of Saint Vincent de Paul, which was notorious for its distribution of ‘political charity.’

Against the unprecedented mobilization of the ALP in 1902, the *Bloc des Gauches* ministry employed all the might of the French state.¹¹⁸ The limited opening of the civil service to Catholics during the previous decade was reversed (Winnacker 1937:451). Prime Minister Waldeck-Rousseau undertook a purge of ‘anti-republican’ army officers, civil servants, and judges, often on the flimsiest of charges such as being married to a “reactionary wife” (Larkin 1995:91). The Masonic network of the Grand Orient of France was encouraged to spy on

¹¹⁸ The government also undermined the ALP indirectly by sponsoring the so-called Freycinet Plan to boost the underdeveloped economy of the west of France – a Catholic stronghold - by pouring funds into it. The Plan brought roads and railways to the most remote parts of the country and made improvements to rivers, canals, and port installations. There was also a massive school building program targeted at the west. Catholic activists understood that government largesse was designed to break their political base. As an ALP parliamentarian complained in 1909 after the government had invested yet more funds on a western railway, “they only spent the money because the region is still represented by liberal [ALP] deputies ... the government plans to transform railway employees into an army of civil servants that will vote as they are told and hand the government the majority it seeks” (quoted in *Action Libérale Populaire* 1910:15).

military officers and report those who attended Mass in secret or who sent their children to Catholic schools (Larkin 1995:45). The sanitized civil service that emerged after the purge of Catholics was composed of ideological republicans who used their position to prevent the electoral breakthrough of the ALP. Primary schoolteachers were encouraged to break up opposition rallies,¹¹⁹ and civil servants were issued with warnings that they would be replaced by Catholics in case the ALP won their constituencies (Martin 1976:667). In sum, the elections were marked by “the support of the *préfet*, the departmental administration, and all the logistic of the government in favour of [the ALP’s] republican opponents” (Janet-Vendroux 2007:417).

The titanic confrontation between the ALP and the anticlerical French government in the 1902 elections ended with a decisive victory for the left. The ALP more than doubled its parliamentary representation from thirty-eight to seventy-nine seats, but its gains were mostly at the expense of the monarchist allies on the right (Larkin 1995:58). The republicans won a big parliamentary majority, and – more worrying for Catholics - the balance of power within the *Bloc de Gauches* shifted in favour of the Radicals, who replaced the Opportunists as the largest single party in parliament. Waldeck-Rousseau was forced to resign and his

¹¹⁹ Apart from direct and explicit electoral intervention by teachers, the school was understood by both Catholics and anticlericals to be the best instrument to undermine religious influence over the masses (Green 1990:164; Muzzey 1911:324–25). The school curricula promoted “a secular God: the fatherland and its living symbols ... catechism was replaced by civics lessons ... biblical history, proscribed in public schools, was replaced by the sainted history of France” (Weber 1976:336). For ALP leader Jacques Piou, mandatory schooling was nothing short of “the forced conscription of our youth to those schools where they are taught only what the enemies of religion have decided should be taught ... is there worst tyranny that that of a state which forces our youth to drink, drop by drop, the moral poison of its own materialism?” (quoted in *Action Libérale Populaire* 1910:13).

replacement was Radical firebrand Émile Combes, who hated Catholicism with all the renegade conviction of someone who had once been a candidate for the priesthood – in the Assumptionist order, no less (Larkin 1974:92, 1995:43). Announcing in parliament that “the Liberal Popular Action, that is the enemy!” (quoted in Martin 1976:678), Combes threw himself into the task of “destroying the educational and political influence of the Catholic clergy” (Winnacker 1937:451). Disregarding the fact that almost one third of religious congregations had complied with the 1901 Law of Associations and received governmental authorization to stay in the country, Combes abolished all religious orders (Ford 1990:7; Larkin 1966:720–21) and confiscated their property, valued upwards of 200 million francs. Nearly 200,000 monks and nuns from 3,211 religious orders were forced into exile or secularization (Larkin 1974:98–99). Those who chose a worldly life could not continue their old teaching occupation, because Combes prohibited secularized clergy from teaching in the same municipality as before (Larkin 1974:99). There was not much sense in moving either – the government closed down 10,049 religious elementary schools and discrimination in hiring practices made it impossible for Catholics to land a job in the public sector. As a result of these policies, the percentage of children in religiously run preschools dropped from 72 percent in 1882 to 2 percent in 1912 (Morgan 2002:130). The protests of the Holy See were met with contempt by Combes, who broke diplomatic relations with the Vatican on July 1904 (Valentine 1977:182–83).

The culmination of Combes’s anticlerical assault was the 1905 law separating Church from state. Radicals had long been ambivalent about taking this final step, partly because they feared that severing ties with the Church would let loose a powerful enemy of the state. The main reason for their reluctance, however, seems to be strategic: the Separation would put

the religious question to bed and make it impossible to craft a left-wing coalition on an anticlerical basis (Fuller 2007:243–44; Luebbert 1991:31; Winnacker 1937:460–61). The Radicals were dragged into supporting Separation by Socialist leader Aristide Briand, who drafted the legislation and persisted in presenting it to parliament despite Combes's misgivings. The Socialists were as anticlerical as the Radicals, but they were fully conscious that conflict with the Catholic Church had monopolized the energies of the left at the expense of social reforms. Socialist leader Jean Jaurès claimed during the debate on Separation that “it is time for this great but obsessive problem of the relations of Church and State to be finally settled, so that democracy can devote all its attention to the immense and difficult task of social reform which the proletariat is demanding” (quoted in Larkin 1974:104). On 6 December 1905, the Separation law – “the very thing the ALP had been formed to prevent!” (Valentine 1977:163) - received the approval of both houses of parliament and became the law of the land.

4.2. Mixing God with Caesar: Proclericalism and the Absence of Religious Parties in Spain and Québec

Unlike in Italy and France, the governments of Spain and Québec were largely sympathetic to the Catholic Church. During the period of late state formation, government leaders in these two polities were mostly preoccupied with issues of nationality and identity. For them, the Catholic Church was not a bogeyman against which to forge liberal coalitions but a useful instrument to maintain national unity against centrifugal or centripetal forces. In Spain, the Restoration monarchy (1874-1931) sought the help of the Church against revolutionary

republicans, counterrevolutionary Carlists, and nationalists in Catalonia. The close alliance between altar and throne made it unnecessary for the Church to invest in building a powerful political party, something it would come to regret during the anticlerical Second Republic. The provincial government of Québec similarly tied itself to the Catholic Church to strengthen national identity, in this case vis-a-vis the Anglophone Protestant majority of Canada. Conservative and Liberal parties competed to showcase their attachment to Catholicism until the 1960s, when mass secularization and the transfer of nationalist identity from religion to language led the Québec government to distance itself from the Church.

4.2.1. Catholicism and Québécois Exceptionalism, 1763-1959

4.2.1.1. The Catholic Church in Québec before Confederation, 1763-1867

The Catholic Church in Québec was a weak institution with a precarious future when the British conquered the province from the French in 1763 (Curtis 2012:26; Porterfield 1983:17–18). The Church had relied entirely on the French crown for funding and new personnel (Bothwell 1998:26; Fay 2002:28; Garraghan 1933:30–31) and suffered from a chronic shortage of manpower with which to cover a massive landmass of dispersed inhabitants.¹²⁰ Britain tolerated the practice of Catholicism but prohibited “all Popish Hierarchy” (Fay 2002:30) - a highly ambiguous legal status that did not mask English intentions to transform all French Catholics into proper Anglo Protestants through a variety of carrots and sticks,

¹²⁰ In 1760 there were a grand total of 163 regular and secular Catholic clerics in Québec (Curtis 2012:26).

including the promotion of clerics who married (Shortt and Doughty 1918:604) and the obligation for civil servants to take an oath of allegiance that renounced basic beliefs of Catholic doctrine (Shortt and Doughty 1918:191). Britain did not provide public subsidies to the Church, leaving it severely impoverished. Religious orders were allowed to stay in the colony as long as they provided social services like schools, hospitals, and homes for the aged; but they were forbidden to recruit further members, which ensured their demise in two or three generations (Chaussé 1996:58–66).

Despite all these obstacles, the Catholic clergy was the only Francophone elite group that retained its social position after the Conquest. Catholics used their social prominence to claim responsibility for the social, political, and economic wellbeing of the Québécois people (Brunet 1969:126–27). Ironically, the loss of European subsidies forced the Church to become more socially-rooted and capable of obtaining money and personnel directly from Canada (Falardeau 1964:346–47). The Church began a great recruitment campaign for indigenous clerics and managed to reimpose the tithe without government compulsion, even if payment rates were not particularly high (Christie and Gauvreau 2010:28).

Most importantly, Catholicism was able to cloak itself with the mantle of Francophone nationalism and thus ward off anticlerical challenges from Québécois liberals (Bothwell 1998:30). After Britain granted self-government to Québec in 1791, the Anglophone threat to national identity receded and liberals gathered in the Canadian Party took control of government (Bernier 1988:88–89; Lemieux 1989:11). There was a very real possibility that lay politicians in the legislative assembly could have challenged the ecclesiastical control of the province (Chaussé 1996:86–87), but the two groups united once again in the face of a

common enemy when Britain proposed to end Québec's self-government in 1822 (Fay 2002:40). Francophone liberals initiated an armed insurrection against British rule in 1837 but were swiftly crushed at the Battle of Saint-Eustache (Chaussé 1996:101). From that moment on, the Catholic Church - who had cautioned against rebellion - assumed the role of undisputed leader and advocate for Québec's rights (Fay 2002:75). The expression '*la langue gardienne de la foi*' ('the language protects the faith') came to symbolize the marriage of Catholicism and Francophone national identity (Perin 2001:89).

As in France and Italy, clerics in Québec attached tremendous importance to the provision of social services like welfare and education as the foundation of Catholic power (Bothwell 1998:66–67). Catholics jealously protected their autonomy in these areas from government supervision (Christie and Gauvreau 2010:25–26). A particularly stark example of this occurred in 1832, when an outbreak of cholera combined with a poor harvest to create widespread famine and Catholic priests sought to feed the hungry in their parishes entirely on their own. Only those that "could no longer cope with extraordinary problems would seek government help" (Fay 2002:42). After the Church's denunciation of armed violence in the rebellion of 1837, the British established better relations with the Vatican and allowed the re-entry of religious congregations into Québec (Brodeur and Caulier 1995:110). The offer was eagerly taken by Jesuits, Oblates, Redemptorists, and the French Society of Saint Vincent de Paul, which established numerous orphanages, temperance societies, confraternities, hospitals and other associations (Monet 1969:43–44). Competition from Anglican and Methodist missionaries in Québec also prompted the Catholic hierarchy to create a primary school in every parish (Chaussé 1996:80–81). In sum, by the mid-nineteenth century, the

Catholic clergy had not only survived but thrived under British rule, establishing virtually complete control over hospitals, schools, charities, and a variety of other social services.

4.2.1.2. Catholic Québec in a United Canada, 1867-1887


In 1867, the British colonies of North America were rearranged into the Canadian Confederation, establishing a federal system that is still in place today. The provinces were assigned jurisdiction over education, public health, property, and civil rights – in short, the areas that most immediately affect individuals' daily lives and that most interested the Church (Linteau, Durocher, and Robert 1983:198). Québec obtained a devolved executive and legislature, in which the two dominant parties were the Conservatives and the Liberals. Coming on the heels of Pope Pius IX's condemnation of liberalism in his 1864 *Syllabus of Errors*, Conservative Party leaders sought to gain Catholic support by arguing that voting for the Liberals would constitute a defiance of the Vatican (Bowen 1988:299–301). Church leaders in Québec had no wish to tie their fate to a specific political party, however, since the Liberals were as proclerical as their opponents (Linteau et al. 1983:235). Placing the Church above the political fray, the archbishop of Québec published a pastoral letter urging clerics not to indulge in partisanship and clarifying that Catholics could vote for the Liberals and the Conservatives in equally good conscience (Perin 1980:285). The formal model of Chapter 2 sheds some light upon the proclerical consensus among the two main Québécois political parties: owing to the hegemony of the Church in social service provision and the identification of national identity with Catholicism, both the Liberals and the Conservatives understood that engaging in anticlericalism would only strengthen their opponents at their expense.

The Church's reward for its influence behind the scenes was the extraordinary Education Act of 1875. At the same time that French republicans were firing the first shots in the battle with the Church for control of education, "in Quebec the government was content not even to play an advisory role in the school system" (Linteau et al. 1983:195). The 1875 Education Act abolished the Ministry of Public Instruction and granted the power to oversee state schools to a Council of Public Instruction in which Catholic bishops sitting *ex officio* controlled the majority of votes (Caulier 2006:176). Québec's parliament could not legislate on education without the prior approval of the Council. Not surprisingly, the Church used its privileged legal position to gain total control of both primary and secondary education (Trofimenkoff 1983:121). Crucifixes and pictures of the Virgin were placed in every schoolroom (Caulier 2006:179), and the school curricula was thoroughly revised according to the doctrine of ultramontane theology (Fay 2002:108). A statement of general principles published by the Council of Public Instruction explained that "religion is not merely a subject to be taught in the hours allotted to it; it is also an element in moral and religious development and must be lived every hour of the day" (Council of Public Instruction 1922:55).

Once they had obtained a monopoly on the provision of education, Catholics zealously protected their position from any hint of government interference (Caulier 2006:177). When the Conservative government of Joseph-Adolphe Chapleau proposed the creation of a public agency to sell books and educational materials at cost price to schools, bishops loudly denounced the measure and forced the government to retreat (Linteau et al. 1983:207–8). The Church was also suspicious of lay instructors and strongly promoted the clericalization of teaching through the recruitment of members of religious congregations. Similarly to what

happened in France under the Falloux Law, religious teachers were cheaper to hire than their lay counterparts because they lived communally and had no family obligations. Lay teachers also had to undergo training at normal schools while religious ones were exempt from certification (Linteau et al. 1983:214). This naturally put lay teachers at a disadvantage and ensured their gradual replacement by clerical instructors. As Figure 4.1 shows, the share of elementary school teachers in Québec that belonged to a religious order increased rapidly since 1875, to reach a peak of 48 % in 1888 (Labarrère-Paulé 1965:300, 356, 439).

Figure 4.1 - Clerical Elementary School Teachers in Québec, 1840-1900




Source: Labarrère-Paulé 1965: 300, 356, 439.

While education was always the foremost priority for the Catholic Church, its influence over Québec's government led to the expansion of legal privileges in many other fields. Nineteenth century Québec was a polity "where the government did not play a significant

role, thereby leaving the leadership of the society to the Church” (Bothwell 1998:42). For instance, Liberal and Conservative governments alike supported legislation that exempted Church property from taxation and placed the clergy in charge of registering births, marriages, and deaths (Linteau et al. 1983:199). Publishers could not print books listed on the Roman *Index librorum prohibitorum* (Dickinson and Young 2002:300–301). Religious orders were given exclusive responsibility over social welfare (Fecteau and Vaillancourt 2006:204), with women playing a prominent role - as they did in France, Italy, and Spain. A prominent example was the Congregation of Notre Dame, which provided services for children, the elderly, blind and deaf, managed shelters, and offered instruction to young women (Huntley-Maynard 1998:41). By the late nineteenth century, Québec had more nuns per capita than any other polity in the Catholic world (Danylewycz 1987:171; Perin 2001:91). They were at the forefront of a dense thicket of charitable institutions that ensured a complete monopoly of the Church in this area that was unchallenged into the 1960s. Indeed, the Church had “more human and financial resources than the existing provincial government” (Christie and Gauvreau 2010:164)

Figure 4.2 - Québécois Women in Religious Communities, 1850-1930




Source: Danylewycz 1987: 17

Reversing the historical trend of Protestant proselytism in Québec, the Catholic Church was feeling so secure that it sought to win converts from other Canadian provinces (Bothwell 1998:44). Catholic missionaries – especially those associated with the Oblates of Mary Immaculate – were in the vanguard of imperial expansion in the Canadian northwest, contacting with indigenous settlements, providing the sacraments, building churches, maintaining records, and running schools (Choquette 1995:14–15).¹²¹ This extraordinary expansion was possible because the Church’s “spectacular recruitment” led to a massive

¹²¹ The territory opened by Catholic missionaries was enormous - nearly seventeen times the size of France. Ultimately, however, the Catholic effort to convert the rest of Canada was not successful. Anglophone settlers migrated in very high numbers to the West, and Protestantism became established as the dominant religion outside of Québec.

expansion of the number of clergy (Christie and Gauvreau 2010:58). For example, the number of priests more than doubled between 1860 and 1890 (Linteau et al. 1983:200). Figure 4.3 below shows that the number of priests per capita in Québec steadily decreased in the second half of the nineteenth century, from 1,834 people per priest in 1830 to 510 in 1880 (Hamelin 1961:238). Together with the enthusiastic involvement by common people in manifestations of popular piety such as processions and rogations, the extraordinary growth in the number of clerics clearly demonstrates that “the Catholic Church in Québec was very close to the faithful” (Linteau et al. 1983:202).

Figure 4.3 - Number of Persons per Catholic Priest in Québec, 1800-1950



Source: Hamelin 1961: 238.

4.2.1.3. *La Grande Noirceur: Catholic Hegemony in Québécois Politics, 1887-1959*

The Québécois party system continued to revolve around the Liberal and Conservative parties until the Great Depression. The Conservatives governed the province from 1867 to 1887 and were replaced afterwards when Liberal leader Honoré Mercier rode a wave of nationalism to gain the Premiership. Afraid of the bad reputation the term ‘liberalism’ had among Catholics – even if the Québec Liberal Party had been unfailingly obsequious to the Church -, Mercier was even more proclerical than his Conservative predecessors: he paid a vast sum to the Holy See as compensation for the expropriation of the Society of Jesus by the British more than one hundred years earlier (Linteau et al. 1983:251); participated in a major Catholic congress in Baltimore; and made a much publicized visit to Rome to receive a knighthood from Pope Leo XIII. While Mercier’s Premiership ended in disgrace after revelations of corruption, the Liberals dominated Québécois politics from the 1890s to the 1930s by “establishing comfortable relationships with the Catholic clergy” (Dickinson and Young 2002:238).¹²²

The power of the Church was not diminished by Québec’s industrial take-off in the first decade of the twentieth century (Bothwell 1998:67–68; Hamelin and Gagnon 1984:129; Lord 1984:113). Catholics successfully countered the influence of the secular international trade unions by forming new associations, such as workers’ groups, farmers’ cooperatives, and athletic clubs (Bramadat and Seljak 2008:116; Christie and Gauvreau 2010:54–55; Lacoursière and Philpot 2009:193; Piché 2003:80). Catholic unions had 25,000 members by

¹²² The Church’s hold over politics was immense: in 1893, for example, the Mayor of Montréal refused to meet the officers of the Italian battleship *Etna* in 1893 for fear of offending the Pope.

1931, not far from the 33,000 who belonged to secular – though not anticlerical – unions (Dickinson and Young 2002:227). The Church also sought to intensify popular piety through the adoption of the institutions of Catholic Action (Gauvreau 2005:16–17). As in Italy and France, the ecclesiastical establishment in Québec supported the creation of specialized Catholic youth organizations, targeting the working-class (*Jeunesse Ouvrière Catholique*), college students (*Jeunesse Étudiante Catholique*), the middle-classes (*Jeunesse Indépendante Catholique*) and the rural world (*Jeunesse Agricole Catholique*).

Unlike in France and Italy, where these institutions were created to defend religion against anticlerical policies, Québec's Catholic Action formed in a milieu marked by a "harmonious climate of relations between Catholicism and a 'liberal' state" (Gauvreau 2005:17). The ability of the Church to maintain its "no trespassing" (Fecteau and Vaillancourt 2006:205) signs around the areas of welfare and education remained unchallenged during the first decades of the new century. In 1921, Liberal Premier Louis-Alexandre Taschereau tried to deal with the misery and squalor associated with industrialization through the creation of a public health system, but was immediately forced to retreat in the face of strident "clerical agitation" (Vigod 1979:61). Instead, the government agreed to cover health care fees for the poor but left hospitals and charitable organizations in the hands of religious orders (Dickinson and Young 2002:259; Lacoursière and Philpot 2009:206).

The Great Depression hit Québec extremely hard and shook the foundations of its political system (Dickinson and Young 2002:278). The unemployment rate soared to 31 % by 1932 (Lacoursière and Philpot 2009:209) and the traditional parties could not find creative ideas to tackle the crisis. Taschereau, still in power, refused to adopt public welfare programs

for fear of antagonizing Catholic opinion and instead “urged the wealthy to ‘adopt’ one or more destitute families by channelling regular payments through Church agencies” (Vigod 1979:62).

Ironically, it was the Catholic Church itself who began having second thoughts about the role of the state as a welfare provider. Catholics were shocked by the ravages of the Depression and frightened about the possible growth of Communism (Dirks 1991:4). In 1933, Catholic charitable associations in Montréal were no longer able to cope with the veritable tsunami of unemployed workers asking for help and concluded that they “could be permanently damaged by the loss of prestige” (Vigod 1979:62). They ended up lobbying the Montréal municipal council to set up its own relief administration. State provision of social services was replicated at the provincial level after 1936, when the religious Maurice Duplessis gained power at the head of a new right-wing party, the National Union (Dickinson and Young 2002:292). Duplessis tackled the Depression by extending agricultural credit and embarking on a major public works program to build roads and promote rural electrification. This expansion of state power¹²³ was undertaken hand in hand with the Church. Duplessis pleased Catholics by persecuting Protestant missionaries (most notably Jehovah’s Witnesses) and framing his policies as following “the social legislation demanded by Christian sociology” (Duplessis’s speech on June 14, 1936, as quoted in Dirks 1991:114). Duplessis’s overt

¹²³ The ratio of civil servants to the population increased from 2.51 per thousand in 1933 to 7.13 per thousand in 1960 (Bernier and Boily 1986:373).

Catholicism underpinned his unprecedented popularity in Québec politics,¹²⁴ and he remained in office from 1936 until his death in 1959.¹²⁵

The centuries-old Catholic domination of Québécois society ended with the so-called Quiet Revolution of the 1960s (Gauvreau 2000:803; Warren 2003:97–100). This transformation is symbolized by two epochal events in the early part of the decade: the defeat of the National Union in 1960, which put an end to two decades of conservative political hegemony; and the Second Vatican Council of 1962–1965, which revolutionized Catholicism by rejecting the ancient policy of close ties between state and Church in favour of religious toleration. After the Second Vatican Council, the Church no longer claimed special privileges and indeed accepted a role for the state in the social realm. The Québécois government took note of the changes and acted on them resolutely. The Liberal government of Jean Lesage re-established the Ministry of Education that had been abolished in 1875 and progressively assumed more responsibilities in education and healthcare. The number of practicing Catholics in Québec dropped precipitously, as did ordinations of new priests (Dickinson and Young 2002:336). Québécois nationalism lost its association with religion and became linked to the French language. The Church reacted to all these changes with resignation and sought a secure footing in the brave new world of pluralism and toleration.

¹²⁴ His campaign slogan was *le ciel est bleu; l'enfer est rouge* (the sky is blue [the colour of the National Union]; hell is red [the colour of the Liberals]).

¹²⁵ With the exception of the Liberal government of 1939–1944.

4.2.2. National-Catholicism: Spain, 1810-1931

4.2.2.1. Catholicism in Spain under the First Bourbon Restoration, 1810-1876

Catholicism is an integral part of Spanish national identity (Junco 2013:308–9). The modern nation of Spain was born from the Christian *Reconquista* of the Iberian peninsula from Islam. From that point until the Napoleonic invasions at the start of the nineteenth century, the Catholic Church enjoyed unrivalled political, economic, and social power (Callahan 1984b:162). By 1800, the Church owned around 15 % of Spain’s agricultural land and received more than one fifth of gross national product (Callahan 1984a:45). This vast wealth was spent on ecclesiastical salaries, construction and upkeep of churches and monasteries, and charity (Callahan 1984a:49). The marriage of Spanish national identity and the Catholic religion was reaffirmed during the Napoleonic Wars, when the Church took the lead in resisting French occupation with the moral zeal of a “holy war” (Shubert 1990:145; Winston 1985:12). Clerics were prominent members of the provincial juntas that coordinated local efforts in the fight against the French (González 1979:40–47). A third of the deputies in the Cádiz constituent assembly of 1810¹²⁶ were clergymen, and the constitutional monarchy envisaged by the Constitution of 1812 reflected the “political supremacy of members of the lower secular clergy” (Hamnett 1977:1089).

¹²⁶ The Cádiz constitutional assembly was composed of the provincial juntas that were fighting the French.

After the defeat of Napoleon in 1814, King Ferdinand VII returned to the throne and promptly restored absolutism (Payne 2011:144–45). This decision set off decades of political conflict between liberal partisans of a constitutional monarchy and absolutist forces who wanted to turn the clock back to the eighteenth century (Callahan 1980:219; Sellin 2017:81–82; Shubert 1990:169). When Ferdinand died in 1833, the tensions between the two camps were so high that they led to a civil war between the liberal supporters of the late King's daughter, Isabella II, and the absolutist backers of his brother, Carlos de Borbón, who became known as Carlists (Vincent 2007:10). The Catholic Church was itself divided among liberal and absolutist lines: the secular clergy mainly supported Isabella, while the regulars – especially the Jesuits – were prominent leaders of the absolutist camp (Shubert 1990:146; Winston 1985:14). The liberals won the war and took revenge upon the regular clergy: Prime Minister Juan Álvarez Mendizábal expropriated their property in October 1835, sold it to private investors during 1836, and abolished the male orders in July 1837 (González 1977:149). The amount of land that changed hands after Mendizábal's reforms was staggering: approximately one-third of the entire area of Castille was transferred from the orders to wealthy buyers (Vincent 2007:18). This was not meant as the opening salvo in a broader anticlerical war, however (Callahan 1984a:134). The liberal Constitution of 1837 upheld Catholicism's status as the state religion and pledged to support the secular clergy financially. Spanish liberals sought the partnership of the Church to help maintain public order and "uproot through Christian charity the discord among us" (Longares 1976:287). By 1845, once memories of the Carlist War had receded, the government was quietly returning unsold properties back to the regular clergy (Shubert 1990:147; Winston 1985:15).


Relations between the Church and the Spanish liberal state were so amicable that the Holy See agreed to a Concordat in 1851 (Carr 1966:234). The Vatican recognized the sales of expropriated monastic property, assented to a minor administrative reorganization of parish and diocese boundaries, and accepted the right of the state to veto episcopal appointments. These were all minor concessions that the Church was powerless to oppose anyway – in effect, the Holy See merely assented to the status quo (Vincent 2007:23). In return, the Spanish state allowed the male religious orders to return and extended its pledge of financial support to the regular clergy and to seminaries; promised that public education would confirm to Catholic doctrine; and set the religious budget permanently at 15 % of government expenditures. Although as Figure 4.4 shows, the expenditure promises were honoured in the breach (Comín and Díaz 2005:873–966), the figures spent for the upkeep of the Church were still substantial enough to please the Holy See (Martí 1984:48–49). In sum, Catholics happily discovered “that they could live almost as comfortably with liberal as with absolutist regalism” (Winston 1985:15).

The extraordinary concessions of the Concordat were repudiated in the brief republican regime of 1873-1874.¹²⁷ Led by radical Catalan federalists, the republicans announced a plan to separate Church from state (Cárcel Ortí 1979:514–15; Phillips and Phillips 2016:296–97). There was no support within the country for an attack on the Church, however, which was one of the reasons why the republic fell less than two years after its founding. An army coup in December 1874 reinstalled the Bourbons and set the stage for a veritable “Catholic revival in Spain” (Winston 1985:15).

¹²⁷ Known as the First Spanish Republic.

Figure 4.4 - Share of Public Spending Given to Religion in Spain, 1800-1940

Share of Public Spending Given to Religion in Spain, 1800-1940



Source: Comin & Díaz 2005: 873-966.


4.2.2.2. Catholic Social Hegemony in the Second Bourbon Restoration, 1876-1931

The Restored Bourbon monarchy was given a legal framework in the Constitution of 1876, the brainchild of Conservative leader Antonio Cánovas del Castillo. Cánovas sought to please Spanish liberals by providing for limited religious toleration. The Constitution allowed non-Catholic religions to practice their faith in private but not in public (Colomer 2019:50). The Church accepted this as a minor concession that paled in comparison to the important gains secured for Catholicism in the Constitution (Cortázar 1976:64). The Catholic Alejandro Pidal y Mon - a member of the Constituent Assembly - and articulated the position of the ecclesiastical hierarchy regarding the new regime: the Church accepted the Restoration

monarchy as a *mal menor* (least bad option), which was the best that could be achieved under the circumstances.

In fact, the Restoration was much more than the least bad option for the Church. The 1876 Constitution reaffirmed the Concordat, preserved Catholicism as the state religion, and even handed bishops *ex officio* seats in the Senate. This “arrangement gave the Church an ideal socioeconomic and juridical position from which to launch a program of reorganization and expansion” (Winston 1985:19). As Figure 4.5 suggests, religious orders took immediate advantage of the favourable political climate to increase their activities and recruits (Marín 1975:258). While the number of male religious struggled to recover from the Mendizábal confiscations, female orders expanded considerably to the point where they made up almost half of all the clergy (Jordana and Ramió 2005:973–1026; Mozaz 1976:17–19). No wonder Pope Leo XIII gushed about “the noble and generous Spanish nation ... above all others, and worthy of the highest praise” (Pope Leo XIII 1882). The Church clearly valued the new regime and eagerly took the side of the Restoration monarchy against her Carlist opponents on the right and republicans on the left (Cortázar 1976:78–79; Vincent 2007:24; Winston 1985:23).

Figure 4.5 - Clergy per Thousand People in Spain, 1830-1930




Source: Jordana & Ramió: 973-1026.

As we have seen in the previous case studies, the Catholic Church's foremost policy priority was the control of education (Colomer 2019:49; de Diego 1979:600–601; Junco 2013:313). Spanish education policy was shaped by the Moyano Law of 1857, which made primary instruction mandatory for all children up to the age of nine and free for those unable to bear the costs. The responsibility for implementing the law rested upon local committees made up of prominent citizens and representatives of the Church (Boyd 1997:5; Phillips and Phillips 2016:291; Vincent 2007:67). For all practical purposes, the Moyano Law allowed the Spanish Church to “keep the monopoly of education” (Junco 2013:313; also Salvadó 1999b:14). Just like in the French Third Republic, the system of public education was designed to disseminate the dominant ideology of the regime; unlike in France, where that ideology was republicanism and its opponent was clericalism (Weber 1976:70–72), in Spain the goal was to create a sense of national unity based on Catholicism – the faith of the overwhelming

majority of the population - and overcome the centrifugal tendencies of Galicia, Catalonia, and the Basque Country (Boyd 2002:37–64; Colomer 2019:88; Núñez 2001:495; Payne 2011:150). This combination of nationalism and Catholicism (known in Spanish as *nacionalcatolicismo*) formed the central ideology of the Restoration monarchy (Blanco 2018:249). Restoration governments punished teachers who spoke languages other than Castilian in class (Shubert 1990:182) and portrayed Catalan, Basque, and Galician as provincial patois inadequate to the complex requirements of a modern society (Balcells 1983:171). The proclericalism of the Restoration monarchy can thus be explained in light of the formal model of religious-policy making elaborated in Chapter 2. Restoration leaders feared the disintegration of the country and needed to prop up the Catholic religion as the one cultural element subscribed by Castilian, Catalan, and Basque nationalists alike.

Figure 4.6 - Elementary Education in Spain, 1860-1940




Source: Núñez 2005: 155-244.

Despite the hopes of Restoration leaders that Catholicism could provide the glue uniting the Spanish peoples, the meagre infrastructural capacity of the state undermined any possibility of diffusing a strong national identity through mass education (Colomer 2019:33–34; Vincent 2007:67–68).¹²⁸ Because the Restoration governments were so unabashedly proclerical, the weakness of the Spanish state was detrimental to the Church, which could not fully capitalize upon its educational monopoly. As late as 1912 – more than half a century after the Moyano Law made primary instruction compulsory – only 41 % of children aged between six and ten attended school, and more than a fifth of those who did attended private Catholic schools (Núñez 2005:230). The local committees responsible for implementing the law preferred to subsidize a private school rather than bear the cost of establishing a public one, especially since teachers from religious orders were much less expensive to hire – which as we have seen was also the case in Québec and the French Second Empire (Vincent 2007:67–68). Moreover, onerous examination requirements for lay teachers led to a shortage of skilled personnel that made local authorities even more reliant on religious congregations, whose members were exempt from qualification requirements. Therefore, the Catholic Church dominated the education system of Restoration Spain in three different ways: through its legal supervisory role over the public school curriculum (Lannon 1979:203–4), through the supply of monks and nuns as teachers, and through its own private education system that, as Figures 4.6 and 4.7 show, was responsible for educating a significant minority of Spanish children.

¹²⁸ Josep Colomer (2019:48) argues that the weakness of the Spanish state is rooted upon its dependence on the Church to provide basic social services, likening it to a “crutch.”

Figure 4.7 - Secondary Education in Spain, 1860-1940



Source: Núñez 2005: 155-244.

In a pattern similar to Québec, France, and Italy, Spanish religious orders were very active in the social field, sponsoring a large number of organisations (Lannon 1987:70–71; Salvadó 1999b:14). There were two different types of associations built by Catholic activists: one type sought to recruit a new elite, while another was designed to influence the masses. In terms of elite recruitment, the most important institution was the Jesuit university of Deusto, formed in 1886 with financial support from aristocrats and wealthy industrialists (Lannon 1987:69).¹²⁹ One of Deusto's alumnus, Angel Herrera Oria, was instrumental in establishing the National Catholic Association of Propagandists in 1908: a self-consciously

¹²⁹ The Spanish Church of the Restoration sought to obtain academic degrees for the entire ecclesiastical hierarchy, and successfully lobbied the government to bestow upon seminaries the ability to award bachelor's and doctoral degrees (Cortázar 1976:71).

elitist organization that sought to discreetly but effectively manipulate public opinion (Ordovás 1993:19–82; Vincent 2007:90–91).

To influence and integrate the masses directly upon its social institutions, the Church sponsored the familiar range of Catholic Action associations such as mutual aid societies, savings banks, recreational centres, and agricultural syndicates.¹³⁰ The hierarchy enthusiastically sponsored devotions centred around shrines and Marian cults, especially after the dogma of Immaculate Conception was proclaimed in 1854 (Callahan 1984a:233–35). Another influential propaganda technique was the mass distribution of printed material. In 1891, the Church created an Apostolate for the Press as a holding company to control the 248 religious publications then in existence. In addition to daily newspapers, the Church also printed more accessible texts such as leaflets and catechism sheets. The masses were also reached through a variety of groups formed specifically to propagandise within the working-class, including female orders like the Ladies of the Catechism as well as learning and recreational associations in the mould of Albert de Mun's Workers' Circles in France (Shubert 1990:157).¹³¹

¹³⁰ The Spanish Church also had some unique tricks upon its sleeve that were not applied anywhere else. One of the most successful was the 'internal apostolic mission,' a campaign in which clergy and missionaries went to parishes judged to be insufficiently Christian and used the same techniques that were being applied to convert the indigenous population in Africa and Asia (Shubert 1990:153–54). The missions lasted for two or three weeks and centred around mass preaching, group confessions, and communions (Higueruela 1979:78). There were also festive processions with home-grown images, as well as rosaries and homilies aimed at specific demographic groups such as women, workers, and the young (Lannon 1987:27).

¹³¹ Catholic unions were not very successful in Spain, however. The dogmatic insistence of organizers in retaining close ties to employers (Lannon 1987:160) undermined their appeal to the urban working-classes, who saw the Church as a bulwark of social order in cahoots with the wealthy.

As elsewhere, charity was crucial to maintaining Catholic influence over the poor.¹³² The “conspicuous lack of any effective state-coordinated alternative” to Catholic charity left poor relief entirely in the hands of the Church (Vincent 2007:63). Both religious orders and lay associations involved themselves enthusiastically in charitable activities during the Restoration, forming organizations to distribute food, clothing and medicine to the poor, providing home care for the sick, founding homes for orphans, and workshops for the unemployed (Shubert 1990:164).

While Catholic industrial unionism was never very popular in Spain, the organizational strength of the Church in the countryside was unparalleled (Callahan 1984a:244; Thomas 2017:498–99; Vincent 2007:63). Catholic activists were prolific in setting up rural syndicates, which were grouped together in the National Agrarian Catholic Confederation (CNCA). By 1909 there were almost five hundred syndicates distributed all over the country and especially prominent in the north (Shubert 1990:159). The Church also retained great influence in villages and small towns due to the close connection between the parish priest and local life¹³³ (Behar 2014:164; Christian 1989:180–81). Priests were mostly ‘local lads’ with similar sociological backgrounds to the broader population and were well integrated into the community (Preston 1993:64–65).


¹³² Although in Spain it seems that religious charity also alienated many people because it took place within a very hierarchical framework and demanded “the submissiveness of recipients” (Portero 1978:231).

¹³³ The Church used sticks as well as carrots in its attempt to retain influence among the masses. One of the most significant was the threat of denial of ecclesiastical burial, which was used to coerce people to follow all the precepts of the Church (Linares 2017:664).

To what extent was the Spanish Church able to retain its social influence throughout the Restoration? Data on patterns of religious observance in the nineteenth century is fragmentary, but one study of the northern city of Logroño gives us some indications (Ocáriz 1965:269–88). Measuring Catholic influence through the share of the population that fulfilled Easter duty, Figure 4.8 shows that up until the middle of the nineteenth century religious practice was nearly universal. Observance rates then drop quite rapidly until the 1880s, after which they show some stabilization and even modest growth. By the turn of the century observance rates reached an equilibrium of around three-fifths of the population. Thus, it seems that while the Church was unable to keep its total hegemony over Spanish society, it retained considerable influence over a large majority of the population.¹³⁴

¹³⁴ The great popularity of the Spanish Church did not mean it was free from the threat of anticlericalism. In the so-called 'Tragic Week' of 1909 in Barcelona, a general strike called by socialists and republicans to protest against conscription turned into an orgy of Church burning. Street fighting left more than a hundred dead and fifty religious buildings were burned to the ground (Ullman 1968:227). Popular anticlericalism seems to have been aroused because of the close ties between the Church and the Restoration regime. Catholic legal privilege was a double-edged sword; while it undoubtedly aided the Church in retaining and expanding social influence, it also made Catholicism the opponent of those who sought to topple the regime. The Church would pay a dear price for her cosiness with the Bourbons when the Second Republic was proclaimed in 1931.

Figure 4.8 - Share of Easter Observants in Logroño, 1830-1910




4.2.2.3. Catholicism and Politics in the Second Bourbon Restoration, 1876-1931

The party system of Restoration Spain were structured around the principle of the *turno pacífico* (peaceful turnover). Antonio Cánovas del Castillo, the architect of the 1876 Constitution and leader of the Conservative Party, sought to end the endemic political conflict of the nineteenth century by allowing for the peaceful rotation in power of the main parties (Salvadó 1999a:1). Castillo and King Alfonso XII made a formal agreement with Práxedes Mateo Sagasta, the leader of the Liberal Party, according to which the monarch would from time to time nominate one of the two as Prime Minister, dissolve parliament, and use the state machinery to manufacture a favourable majority (Moreno-Luzón 2007:418; Tusell 1976:31). In other words: instead of having elections to choose a new government, the new government chose to have elections (Shubert 1990:184–85). The administration conveyed

the desired electoral results to local notables,¹³⁵ and they ‘produced’ those results by employing all sorts of clientelistic pressure (Tilly 1984:9–11; Tusell 1976:75). The system functioned particularly well in the countryside, where landowners could force their employees to do their bidding and where social anonymity was non-existent (Ortega 1977:417). Cities, by contrast, were much harder to control. As industrialization and urbanization increased the percentage of people living in cities from 22 % in 1860 to 35 % in 1910, urban, well-organized political parties practicing mass politics steadily gained more and more parliamentary seats (Tafunell 2005:484). As we have seen, the Church was less influential in the cities than in the countryside. Because Catholic charities had an effective monopoly on the provision of welfare, urban workers who lived in squalid conditions and did not receive assistance of any kind grew to resent the Church (Lannon 1987:18; Shubert 1990:151–58; Thomas 2013:77–78; Vincent 1996:12–13).

¹³⁵ Known as *caciques*, after Native American chiefs.

Figure 4.9 - The *Turno Pacífico* in Restoration Spain, 1876-1923



Source: Linz, Montero, and Ruiz 2005: 1027-1054.

As Figure 4.9 shows, the *turno pacífico* was very successful in shutting out anti-systemic parties during the first decades of the Restoration (Linz, Montero, and Ruiz 2005:1027–54). The workings of the system can be glimpsed from the fact that the Conservatives gained 78 % of the seats in the elections of 1879 compared to 20 % for the Liberals, while two years later the results were inverted: the Liberals gained 74 % of seats and Conservatives only 16 %. The *turno* slowly disintegrated with the passage of time, however, as the combined seat share of the Conservative and Liberal parties decreased from 97 % in 1879 to 81 % in 1907 (Salvadó 1999a:3–4). The breakdown of the system and the rise of a Republican opposition had the predicted effects of intensifying the proclericalism of the government in order to mobilize Catholic support for the fragile Liberal-Conservative duopoly. In 1917, for instance, King Alfonso XIII decreed a national holiday for October 12, a date linked

to the miraculous appearance of the Virgin Mary in Zaragoza. Two years later, the King consecrated the nation to the cult of the Sacred Heart of Jesus and proudly unveiled a gigantic statue of the Sacred Heart in Madrid (Lannon 1987:132).

Under the leadership of José Canalejas, the Liberal Party attempted to conciliate the anti-systemic left through some modest secularizing reforms, most notably the Padlock Law of 1910. The legislation placed a moratorium on the formation of new religious congregations for two years, at which point parliament was supposed to pass a new long-term law subordinating religious orders to the civil power of the state (Radcliff 2017:88). Canalejas opened up negotiations with the Vatican but soon found himself outmanoeuvred: the Church simply waited for the two years to pass, knowing that parliament would not dare to pass major religious legislation against Catholic wishes. To ensure that parliamentarians got the message, the Catholic Association of Propagandists organized mass demonstrations throughout the major cities (Cueva Merino 2000:67–68). The whole episode ended when the Padlock Law lapsed in 1912 and religious congregations were allowed to continue their expansion unimpeded. Canalejas was assassinated in November 1912 by an anarchist, a poignant symbol of the regime's failure to broaden its support base (Salvadó 1999b:28). Catholic mass mobilization in these years could have been channelled into a political party as it did in France and Italy, but “the lack of a nationally coordinated assault on Catholicism, especially after the defeat of the Liberal secularization efforts, created insufficient incentive for Catholics to overcome their differences” (Radcliff 2017:93).

The First World War accelerated the collapse of the Restoration system, despite Spain's neutrality. The example of the Russian Revolution led to a wave of factory

occupations, which were severely crushed by the army (Radcliff 2017:100). This in turn increased the autonomous political role of the military, who began organizing as a corporate pressure group in so-called 'defence councils' to obtain perks of various types from weak civilian authorities. In September 1923, Captain General Miguel Primo de Rivera overthrew the parliamentary government and established a military dictatorship. Despite having been the major beneficiary of the Restoration regime, the Catholic Church was by this point frightened of the socialists and it "enthusiastically" welcomed the Primo de Rivera dictatorship (Radcliff 2017:148). Catholics made the mistake of identifying themselves publicly with the unpopular Primo regime, exposing themselves to anticlerical retribution when the Republic triumphed in 1931.

4.3. Conclusion

Between 1870 and 1914, Spain, Québec, Italy, and France built a modern state apparatus capable of influencing the daily lives of their citizens, regardless of whether they lived in the capital or in a remote frontier outpost. Driven more by self-interest than ideology, state-builders in these four polities reached conflicting answers to the question of how to fit the old Catholic Church in the new Leviathan state. The overwhelming objective of political leaders was to establish the primacy of the state and national community over centrifugal forces. French and Italian leaders recognized that anticlericalism was an essential element to foster national unity and regime stability. When Pope Pius IX refused to lead a movement of Italian unification, *Risorgimento* leaders concluded that the Church was the main obstacle to their dream of a unified Italian peninsula. French Republicans used anticlericalism to stabilize

the regime and hold together a fissiparous coalition of liberals and socialists. Spanish and Québécois leaders, by contrast, employed proclerical policies to avoid the dissipation of their respective nations. In Québec, Catholicism was the very core of a separate Francophone national identity, in opposition to the Protestant faith of Anglophone Canada. Catholicism was a useful ally for Spanish nation-builders to bind smaller nationalities like the Basque and the Catalans together with Castilians in a broader political entity named Spain.

When Catholicism was an ally of state- and nation-builders, political leaders co-opted the Church and engaged in proclerical policies by giving religious orders control over key public sectors like education and poor relief. When Catholicism was aligned with anti-national or anti-systemic forces, government leaders found it more advantageous to engage in anticlerical policies and extend the role of the state in the traditional religious domains of education, health care, or poor relief. The two divergent paths led to different patterns of Catholic political involvement. Catholic activists decided to confront anticlerical leaders in France and Italy by building their own political parties and using them as a vehicle to shape policy in their preferred direction. On the other hand, the ecclesiastical hierarchy in both Spain and Québec eschewed the formation of a Catholic party that would make religious policy an element of partisan contention rather than the national consensus they desired.

Religious policy in the four case studies of this chapter was shaped by whether the Catholic Church was a natural ally or an unavoidable obstacle on the path to state- and nation-building. Analysing the cases of Québec, Spain, Italy, and France, I showed how and why political leaders set long-term religious policy on an anticlerical or proclerical basis. Anticlericalism led to the formation of religious political parties, but the extent to which they

succeeded in upholding the interests of the Church differed widely. French political Catholicism failed to shatter the anticlerical consensus of the Third and Fourth Republics, and anticlericalism remained the law of the land. By contrast, Italian Catholics built a well-oiled political machine that won twelve consecutive national elections between 1946 and 1992, replacing the godless anticlericalism of the Kingdom of Italy with the pious Italian Republic. The next chapter will analyse the divergent fortunes of political Catholicism in France and Italy.

Chapter 5: The Rise (and Fall) of Political Catholicism in Italy and France

- *We compare what the teacher gives us with what the priest can give. Well, he gives us more. It's the teacher that has taught us how to read, and that is useful in life. He has taught us how to reckon and that is even more useful ... If we need advice for our taxes, for our business, we just go to see him.*

Anonymous French peasant, 1907. Quoted in Weber (1976:362).

France and Italy are two Catholic-majority, Mediterranean neighbours with deep clerical-anticlerical cleavages and organized confessional parties dating back to the early twentieth century. But their similarities end here. Twenty years after the end of the Second World War, the Italian Christian Democratic party was firmly ensconced in government, having topped the polls at every single postwar election. By contrast, two decades after the war, the French Catholic party decided that its electoral fortunes were so dismal that it should disband. In this chapter, I analyse the development of political Catholicism in France and Italy. Following the logic of what Skocpol and Somers (1980:176) call “parallel demonstration of theory,” I juxtapose the case histories of France and Italy to show that my theory accurately explains the central characteristics of religious politics in the two countries. My goal in the chapter is to craft analytic narratives of religious politics and to test various implications of my argument, thus building a pile of evidence to convince the reader of the plausibility of my theory.

The chapter is divided in three sections. First, I pick up where the previous chapter left off and review the history of French and Italian Catholic political parties from their formation until the 1960s. My analysis ends in 1966, the year in which the French Catholic party was dissolved while its Italian counterpart was thriving. This contrast between dissolution and success captures the singular fates of religious politics in the two countries. In the second section, I analyse state capacity in France and Italy and demonstrate empirically that the French have an infrastructurally stronger state than their Transalpine neighbours. In the third section, I explore the world of Catholic civil society in France and Italy to show how the strength of the French state impeded the development of a dense Catholic associational network, while the weakness of the Italian state created the perfect conditions for a prosperous and vibrant social Catholicism.

5.1. French and Italian Political Catholicism: A Study in Contrasts

5.1.1. Italy

5.1.1.1. The Italian People's Party, 1919-1922

The previous chapter's account of political Catholicism in Italy ended with the formation of the Italian People's Party in the aftermath of the First World War. The new party hit the ground running. The PPI managed to come second in the parliamentary elections of 1920, barely a year after its formation (Clark 1984:211; Kalyvas 1996:216–21; Warner 2000:47–51). A new political party would not have been able to build the organizational

infrastructure required to perform so well in such a short period of time without the support of existing Catholic civil society networks. Catholic Action organizations “became [the PPI’s] chief animators” (Warner 2000:50). Southern Italian Catholic Action circles were directly converted into regional sections of the PPI (Guasco 1997:167). Outside of the south, the two organizations were formally kept separate, although for all intents and purposes northern Catholic Action became the electoral branch of the PPI (Buchanan and Conway 1996:71).

The program of the PPI was shaped by the interests of the Vatican and by the ideology of social Catholicism promulgated by Pope Leo XIII. The party supported religious education and a favourable resolution of the Roman Question. Beyond particular policy issues, the founding document of the PPI put forward the view that it was necessary to do away with “the centralizing state, with its tendency to limit and police every organic power and every civic and individual activity” and replace it with “a truly popular state that keeps within its own limits, that respects the natural cells and organisms of society – the family, ways of life, local governments – that respects individual personality and encourages private initiatives” (quoted in Misner 2015:34). This was essentially a call for a return to a corporatist polity in which private entities like the Church had a quasi-public role in providing some social services.

5.1.1.2. Fascism and Catholicism, 1922-1942

Italy’s short-lived democratic regime came to an end in November 1922, when Benito Mussolini, the leader of the paramilitary *Fasci di Combattimento*, marched on Rome and was called by the king to form a government (Smith 1959:385). Mussolini quickly dispensed with

constitutional niceties. By 1925 the Fascists were running an overt authoritarian regime, in which autonomous media outlets were banned and political opposition was harshly repressed. Mussolini did not dare attack the PPI had on for fear of antagonizing the Church. To eliminate the threat of political Catholicism, the former anticlerical firebrand Mussolini went over the heads of the PPI leadership and made a deal with the Vatican (Borzomati 1972:169; Farneti 1978:22–23; Kelikian 1986:169–74; Webster 1960:119; Wolff 1980:5). As noted in Chapter 2, the hierarchical institutional structure of the Catholic Church makes it a formidable opponent of anticlerical governments, but also ensures that a proclerical bargain between the state and the Pope can be easily reached without having to worry about splinter factions or rebellious groups.

Thus, Mussolini quickly came to terms with the Church, making a series of concessions that had been refused by all the liberal governments of the united Italian kingdom (Ventresca 2016:147). The Fascists agreed to exempt the clergy from military service, financed the building of Churches, re-established religious ceremonial at official functions, reintroduced crucifixes in classrooms, and increased clergy stipends (Falconi 1967:185; Smith 1959:440; Wolff 1980:5–6). In response, the Papacy withdrew support from the PPI, forcing the party to dissolve itself in 1926 (Chassériaud 1965:373–75).

While fruitful, the first agreement between Church and Fascist state did not settle the place of religion in Italian society. Just as Napoleon's Concordat with the Catholic Church symbolized his break with the anticlericalism of the French Revolution, so Mussolini's Lateran Pacts with the Vatican, signed on February 11, 1929, were intended to signal the Fascist regime's ability to solve the Roman Question that had dogged liberal elites since Italian

unification (Delzell 1961:99; Pollard 1985:4–5). The Lateran Pacts gave the Vatican sovereignty over forty-four hectares of land in Rome, thus resurrecting the Papal States (Webb 1958:7). In addition, they made Catholicism the official religion of the state, re-imposed mandatory Catholic instruction in public schools, recognized the diplomas of private Catholic universities, and accepted Church weddings without demanding an additional civil register of marriages (Clark 1984:244–55). The Church retained total control over clerical appointments, but the state was to pay the salaries of priests and bishops. More remarkably in light of totalitarian Fascist ideology, the Lateran Pacts gave Catholic civil society associations considerable autonomy from state intervention (Baget-Bozzo 1974:199; Ceci 2013:90; Magister 1979:78; Webster 1960:22). Catholic Action was allowed to remain separate from Fascist organizations.¹³⁶ Pius XI was thrilled with the Pacts, claiming that they “rendered God to Italy and Italy to God” (quoted in Durand 1991:521).

Despite the Vatican-Fascist lovefest, the Lateran Pacts contained a structural contradiction between the totalitarian pretensions of Fascism and the independence of Catholic Action. Eventually this led to a confrontation between Mussolini and the Church, when the dictator started curbing Catholic Action recruitment, censoring the Catholic press, and obstructing ecclesiastical appointments (Misner 2015:199; Smith 1959:442; Wolff 1980:8–11). Mussolini accused Catholic Action organizations of “carrying on social work in

¹³⁶ According to Article 43 of the Pacts, Catholic Action was to steer clear of any political activity. Its organizations were required to “maintain their activity wholly apart from every political party and under the direct control of the hierarchy of the Church for the diffusion and practice of Catholic principles.” In return, “the Italian State recognizes the organizations forming part of the Italian Catholic Action” thus constituted. The text of the Lateran Pacts is from Pollard (1985:214).

competition with Fascist syndical (sic) and welfare programs” (Delzell 1970:166). More importantly for both the Fascists and Catholics was the perennial issue of education (Wolff 1980:3–5). Who would get to influence the new generations? The Church claimed its right to do so: Pope Pius XI published the encyclical *Non abbiamo bisogno*¹³⁷ in 1931, claiming that the Church did not tolerate “a conception of the state which makes the rising generations belong to it entirely” and cannot accept “the claim that the Church and the Pope must limit themselves to the external practices of religion ... and that all the rest of education belongs to the state” (Pope Pius XI 1931). Meanwhile, the Fascists claimed totalitarian control of the education of youth as a top policy priority and were outraged at Catholic challenges to the totalitarian “cult of the state” (Dagnino 2012:226–27; Durand 1991:20). Regardless of what the provisions of the Lateran Pacts might say, Mussolini was unhappy about Catholics teaching Italian children about non-Fascist ideas (D’Agostino 2004:223–28; Moro 1981:191–211; O’Brien 1982:626–27; Paxton 2004:122–23; Pollard 1985:124–27).

Eventually Mussolini and the Vatican settled their differences with an official accord in September 1931. Catholic Action pledged not to meddle in politics or labour unionism and promised that its youth branches would be restricted to “occupations of a recreational or educational nature with a religious purpose” (Coppa 1999:111; Pollard 1985:216; Webster 1960:138). In practice, however, Catholic Action activities went on as before. The restriction

¹³⁷ Roughly, “we have no need for this.”

of youth groups' activities did not arrest their growth, as they were the only autonomous sphere of civil society under Fascism (de Grazia 1981:19–20).¹³⁸

5.1.1.3. Establishing Political Hegemony, 1942-1948

The falling-out between the Church and Fascism was a blessing in disguise for Catholics in the postwar era, removing the stigma of partnership with a discredited regime. The Church emerged from the ruins of the Second World War “with uncompromised prestige” (Scoppola 1988:30). The cowardly flight of King Vittorio Emanuele III from Rome in the midst of the conflict also helped the Church, because it left the Vatican as the only national institution that could plausibly claim to represent the Italian people (Durand 1991:165–68; Jemolo 1960:280; Ventresca 2004:30). After the fall of Mussolini, Catholic Action associations converted into anti-fascist resistance groups and joined the guerrilla warfare against the German occupiers, which also contributed to wash away memories the Church’s cosiness with the regime¹³⁹ (Taviani 1987:199–200). Once the war was over, Catholics believed that “Italy will find its unique salvation in a Christian social government headed by groups from Catholic Action” (Scoppola 1988:45). Enthusiasm about the postwar future combined with worries concerning the Communist menace to Christianity (Durand 1991:360; Magister 1979:84).

¹³⁸ The Catholic Church was to clash again with Fascism in 1938, when Mussolini imposed legal restrictions on Italian Jews. The Church denounced the provision prohibiting marriage between Aryans and Jews as a violation of the religious freedom provisions of the Lateran Pacts (Moro 1981:334–44).

¹³⁹ Catholic resistance forces were organized in the National Association of the Volunteers for Liberty, under the leadership of Enrico Mattei (Leonardi and Wertman 1989:43–44). Mattei would later become an influential figure of postwar Italy as head of the national oil company, ENI.

In 1942, Catholic intellectuals and industrialists met in Milan to re-found an Italian Catholic party (Rossi 1969:331–35), which they named Christian Democracy (DC – *Democrazia Cristiana*). The new party consisted of “the remnants of the PPI political structure” (Einaudi 1948:356; Leonardi and Wertman 1989:21). Alcide de Gasperi, Luigi Sturzo’s right-hand man and his successor as PPI leader, was the guiding light and leader of the new party¹⁴⁰ (Masala 2004:89; Scoppola 1988:49; Ventresca 2004:46–47).

The DC’s status as a Catholic political party was unambiguously declared shortly after its formation. Its founding document claims that the party represents “the projection of religious life into the political field” and its policy-making would reflect “the traditional Catholic spirit of the Italian people” (quoted in Damilano 1968:45; also Falconi 1956:61). The overwhelming majority of the DC’s activists came from Catholic Action or other Catholic ancillary organizations, especially the Italian Catholic University Federation for undergraduate students¹⁴¹ (Baget-Bozzo 1974:54; Durand 1991:622; Leonardi and Wertman 1989:22; Moro 1979:20–22; Webster 1960:172). While the Vatican was initially somewhat reticent to acknowledge the DC as *the* Catholic Party¹⁴² (Durand 1991:613), by 1946 Pope Pius XII decided

¹⁴⁰ During the Fascist dictatorship, de Gasperi worked in the Vatican Library and maintained close contact with a network of former PPI leaders living in Rome (Ventresca 2004:46–47). This network of Catholic activists served as the foundation for renewed political activity once Mussolini’s regime collapsed (Leonardi and Wertman 1989:24–25).

¹⁴¹ Some of the alumni of the Catholic University Federation were future Prime Ministers Giulio Andreotti, Aldo Moro, Giovanni Leone, Emilio Colombo, and Mario Scelba.

¹⁴² The main bone of contention between the DC and the Vatican was the supposedly leftist stances of the DC leadership, although they merely reiterated long-standing social Catholic policies (Durand 1991:613).

to throw in his lot with de Gasperi and lent his wholehearted support to the Christian Democrats (Candeloro 1972:450; Carrillo 1965:130; Durand 1991:619–20; Malgeri 1985:111–12; Ventresca 2004:47).

The political acumen of de Gasperi was in full display during the referendum on whether to retain the monarchy, which was held in June 1946. Conservatives within the DC were instinctively against a republican form of government, but the party leadership decided it was foolish to get involved on such a divisive issue and instead noted that “the form of government – monarchy or republic – was secondary to the content of governmental action” (Leonardi and Wertman 1989:51). Thus, the DC dodged the central political topic of the immediate postwar era and retained support from both republicans and monarchists (Scoppola 1988:245–62; White 2010:464–65).¹⁴³

In June 1946 Italians voted to abolish the monarchy and also elected a Constitutional Assembly, in their first free election for more than two decades.¹⁴⁴ The Church and the DC had a well-defined wish-list for the Constitutional Assembly, with a series of policies all

¹⁴³ Republican forces eventually triumphed in the referendum, with fifty-four percent of voters supporting the abolition of the monarchy. The referendum polarized Italian political life into two bitterly divided camps, as the south and the islands voted almost two to one in favour of the monarchy, while the result was the reverse in the centre and the north (Ventresca 2004:51–52). The DC’s ability to speak to the two camps was a key part of its success in subsequent elections.

¹⁴⁴ It was also the first time in Italian history that women were enfranchised, which gave a boost to the DC given that males were more de-Christianized than females (Fegiz 1956:34–50). In fact, during the entire Cold War period, the DC was “the only Italian party which ... consistently in survey after survey has a female majority in its electorate” (Leonardi and Wertman 1989:164).

subordinated to the broader objective of infusing society with Catholic values (Falconi 1967:264–75; Miccoli 1976:378). First and foremost, they sought to incorporate the Lateran Pacts directly in the constitution (Casella 1992a:10; Durand 1991:523; Warner 2000:81). Second, the Church wanted the constitution to implement its social teachings, such as the indissolubility of marriage (Clark 1984:381–82; Ginsborg 1990:101). Third, it sought to shore up the Catholic religious monopoly against the threat of Protestantism (Falconi 1956:299–314).

The Church's ambitions were realized in full, thanks to the victory of the Christian Democrats in the Constituent Assembly elections.¹⁴⁵ The DC obtained over 35 % of the votes and 207 seats,¹⁴⁶ and Alcide de Gasperi was duly confirmed as Prime Minister. Even though they lacked a parliamentary majority, Christian Democrats managed to fulfil their wish-list by forging a tactical alliance with the Socialists and Communists (Blackmer and Tarrow 1975:374–77; Durand 1991:616–42; Ginsborg 1990:94–98; Magister 1979:81–82). Catholicism became once more the religion of the state through the wholesale constitutionalization of the Lateran Pacts, with Article 7 of the constitution recognizing the Catholic religion as “the only religion of the state” (LaPalombara 1964:105; Pollard 2008:118). The sanctity of marriage, religious education, and the autonomy of Catholic Action were also incorporated in the Constitution. De Gasperi stayed on as Prime Minister as head of a

¹⁴⁵ The Socialists came second with 20.7 % of votes and 115 seats, followed by the Communists with 18.9 % of the votes and 104 seats. A series of Socialist blunders ultimately allowed the Communists to surpass them and they became the undisputed leaders of the Italian left for the remainder of the Cold War.

¹⁴⁶ More than half of the Christian Democrat parliamentarians were members of Catholic Action (Leonardi and Wertman 1989:54; Warner 2012:264).

tripartite government coalition with the two parties of the left, which ended in May 1947 when the DC complied with the Vatican request to dismiss the Communists from the government (Brogi 2018:153–54; Leonardi and Wertman 1989:55; Ventresca 2004:139–40; Warner 2000:174).¹⁴⁷

Italy's first postwar legislative election under the new constitution, in April 1948, was a formative historical event that decided the shape of postwar Italian political life (LaPalombara 1964:30; Leonardi and Wertman 1989:15). The expulsion of the left-wing parties from the government and the intensification of the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union led to a polarization between Italian Catholics and Communists (Acanfora 2007:310, 2010:202–3; Colarizi and Panvini 2017:58; Magri 1954:314; Melloni 2009:54; Warner 2012:267). It was widely understood that this election was a critical juncture, with the victor setting the tone for the fledgling Italian political regime (Allum 1969:222; Einaudi 1948:358–60). The Vatican believed the very survival of religion was at stake, prophesying that a Communist victory would lead to the “burning and ravaging” of churches and convents (Durand 1991:643; Einaudi 1948:357; Riccardi 1988:90). In a radio broadcast, Pope Pius XII framed the election in Manichean terms: “to be with Christ or against Christ; that is the whole question” (quoted in Falconi 1967:266; also Mammarella 1970:118–19; Ventrone 1996:267).

¹⁴⁷ After the defenestration of the Communists, the DC remained in power with parliamentary support from the monarchists and the far-right *L'Uomo Qualunque* party.

Since the Catholic subculture (including the Church itself and affiliated lay organizations) and the Communist Party were the only two organizational networks operating on a nationwide basis, the 1948 elections witnessed an unparalleled mobilizational effort by the two rivals. This was indeed a “total mobilization” (Ventrone 1996:274), with both sides employing their capillary associational networks to reach voters from all regions of the country and every social class. The Church jettisoned any pretence of neutrality and went to incredible lengths to ensure a Christian Democratic victory, allowing its real estate to be used for DC campaign rallies, directing priests to spread a political message from the pews, denying the sacrament of confession to Communists and other opponents of the Christian Democrats, organizing local campaigns, and playing a leading role in the elaboration and execution of party strategy (Casella 1992a:73–74; Ginsborg 1990:111–12; Leonardi and Wertman 1989:175; Ventresca 2004:101–2; Warner 2000:110). Even the Virgin Mary joined the election campaign: the Vatican organized a pilgrimage in honour of the Virgin one month before the election that mobilized hundreds of thousands of devotees all over the country (Falconi 1967:284; Logan 1998:241–43).

In addition to the blatant politicization of the Church itself, the DC’s electoral campaign also received enthusiastic support from Catholic Action organizations (Casella 1997:454; Leonardi and Wertman 1989:35; Warner 2012:263). The political coordinator of Catholic Action publicly demanded “full support for the DC” (Warner 2000:149). As the Calabria section of Catholic Action explained, “the absolute necessity of the unity of Catholics ... will be most fully realized with unity around the DC” (quoted in Warner 2000:147).

The Italian branch of Catholic Action was structured in a highly hierarchical and centralized manner,¹⁴⁸ making it a “formidable political machine” (Ventresca 2004:178). To marshal the resources and energy of lay activists, Catholic Action leaders replicated the Electoral Union of Count Gentiloni at the turn of the century by creating an organization specialized in the political mobilization of voters, the Civic Committees (CCs – *Comitati Civici*).¹⁴⁹ The Civic Committees were set up as a nationwide capillary network, with local branches in tens of thousands of parishes, from the Alps in the north to the Etna in the south (Gedda 1998:119–20). All of those local offices marched to the tune of the central committee in Rome (Galli 1978:29–30; Ventresca 2004:178). The support of Civic Committees for the Christian Democrats involved countless political activities, including door-to-door canvassing, the distribution of pamphlets, large electoral rallies, physically transporting the aged or ill into the polling station, teaching the illiterates to mark their ballots, and in some cases even the direct buying of votes (Casella 1992a:xxii–xvi; Gambino 1975:443; Ventresca 2004:190–91; Ventrone 1996:274).

While the CCs were only created two months before the elections, they were “instrumental” in unifying Catholic support and countering the organizational might of the Communists, thus preventing a victory of the left (Leonardi and Wertman 1989:211). As a Socialist leader explained, “these committees were obviously responsible for the amazing

¹⁴⁸ Italian Catholic Action was run by a national committee of cardinals with complete control over the appointment of all other officials (Casella 1992a:125).

¹⁴⁹ Another reason for creating the Civic Committees was that the terms of the Lateran Pacts, which had been incorporated wholesale into the Constitution, stipulated that Catholic Action had to remain apolitical (Ventresca 2004:185).

victory registered by the D.C. in the elections of April 18 [1948] ... without the aid of this kind of capillary organization, the left might very well have come out of those elections if not with majorities in the legislature at least as the most powerful political force in Italy” (quoted in LaPalombara 1964:333–34). Indeed, election surveys showed that the strongest correlate of support for the Christian Democrats was the degree of “insertion in the Catholic organizational network” (Barnes 1974:213).

5.1.1.4. Christian Democratic Rule, 1948-1994

Thanks to the herculean efforts of the Church and of the Civic Committees, the Christian Democrats emerged triumphant from the crucial 1948 elections with 49 % of the votes and a large parliamentary majority (Chabod 1965:174; Gambino 1975:369–71; de Grazia 1992:243–45). This allowed the DC to establish its dominance over the Italian political system, laying the foundations for an uninterrupted spell of power that lasted for almost half a century (Ginsborg 1990:141–44; Masala 2004:91; di Palma 1990:178–79). The DC was part of every government and came first in every election from 1945 to 1994, holding the office of Prime Minister from the end of the war until 1981 (Leonardi and Wertman 1989:1). During this period, the Italian party system was permanently structured around the religious-secular cleavage. As Joseph LaPalombara (1964:45) noted in the mid-sixties:

The conflict between organized Catholicism, on the one hand, and anticlerical and laical (sic) groups, on the other, permeates all aspects of society. It is manifested in differences over education, economic organization, civil rights, administrative organization, the development of the visual arts, the evolution of industrial and agricultural worker

organizations. Thus, cutting across all other kinds of social conflict and tensions in the society is the fundamental difference of opinion regarding the role that organized Catholicism should play in spheres other than the strictly religious.

The electoral hegemony of the Christian Democrats was buttressed by the partisan use of the state, employing similar clientelistic techniques to those used in France by anticlerical republicans against the hexagon's Catholic parties (Lynch 2009:90–118; Vinen 1995:29).¹⁵⁰ Whereas anticlericals used the state to persecute Catholic civil society, the DC used the institutions of Catholic Action to colonize the state (Chubb 1982:8; Vinen 1995:165–66). A government official admitted that “Catholic Action can and does determine who will be the higher civil servants in many of the ministries” (LaPalombara 1964:308). Positions in government were distributed to clients of the “most representative” Catholic groups (Bragaglio 1981:184). Banks associated with the Vatican profited from generous public works contracts and other dubious expenditures of public funds (Falconi 1967:280–81).¹⁵¹ A particularly notorious example of clientelism was the public agency for the allocation of agricultural resources, with more than four-fifths of its funds distributed to the National Confederation of Smallholders (better known as *Coldiretti*), a Catholic Action affiliate

¹⁵⁰ Employing the strategy of the carrot and the stick, the Christian Democrats did not hesitate to use threats when inducements were not enough to achieve their goals. A young Neapolitan man explained how “the priest suggested to us that the only party was the DC ... I became a member because they said to me: ‘If you don’t become a party member you can’t find work’ ... I think that the party of which I am a member gives me security of employment, that this party gives me life” (quoted in Allum 1973:161).

¹⁵¹ For instance, DC governments made massive investments in public housing construction projects, many of which were financed “with the aid of the credit institutions, in particular the [Vatican-linked] Banca San Paolo” (Bertoldi 1971:174).

(Cavallaro 1958:23–39). This gave Catholic farmers a huge advantage in terms of access to fuel, feed, seed, and agricultural markets (Manoukian 1968:445–53). Moreover, the DC gave the *Coldiretti* control over the farmers’ medical insurance scheme, which was then used to recruit and maintain supporters (Leonardi and Wertman 1989:216–17). Farmers who refused membership in the *Coldiretti* had to “pay a material price” as they were unable to obtain the subsidies handed to Catholic farmers (LaPalombara 1964:149, 345).

Cinema licensing provides an unlikely example of Christian Democrat favouritism towards the Church. In the first decades after the war, a government licence was required for anyone who wished to open their movie theatre. Between 1945 and 1955, ninety percent of Church requests to open cinemas were granted by the government, against only sixty-five percent for other groups (LaPalombara 1964:351–52). The Church made shrewd use of its cinema networks by sponsoring free movie shows in southern villages, a gesture that was much appreciated by the people, who admired “the fact that there is someone who spends money for them without any motive” (Warner 2000:145).

While 1948 was undoubtedly the highpoint of Catholic political mobilization, Catholic Action maintained close links with the DC for decades. As late as 1980, more than two-thirds of delegates to the Christian Democratic congress were members of at least one Catholic Action affiliate (Parisi 1981:74). A study made during the late 1980s concluded that “the DC – from its electoral base up to its top leadership – continues to draw heavily from the Catholic [organizational] world” (Leonardi and Wertman 1989:196). In addition to the continued politicization of lay Catholic associations, the Catholic Church itself often intervened in the political process directly, agitating on behalf of the DC during elections, liaising with

government ministries, and controlling appointments for the upper echelons of the civil service (LaPalombara 1964:327).

The Italian party system structured around the hegemonic Christian Democrats collapsed with the end of the Cold War. The external pressure of the Soviet Union and the threat of the Italian Communist Party disappeared, relaxing the incentives to vote DC in order to keep the reds out. Judges and prosecutors uncovered a seemingly endless wave of corruption scandals committed by the Christian Democrats during their half-century in government, eroding support for the party and leading important figures like Mario Segni and Luca Orlando to quit the DC. In 1994-96, the Christian Democrats disintegrated for good. A right-wing minority faction split from the party to join the coalition of Silvio Berlusconi, while the left-wing majority joined the ex-Communists in a broader centre-left coalition (Bolzonar 2016:451–52; Masala 2004:97–98).

The collapse of the Christian Democrats did not lead to the marginalization of the Catholic Church, however. The anticlericalism of the nineteenth-century Kingdom of Italy was gone for good, and the religious-secular cleavage disappeared from Italian politics (Garelli 2007:4). Instead, Catholic values were now widespread among Italian political parties of the left and the right (Pombeni 2000:298; Scoppola 2005:13–15). Politicians continued to consult regularly with Catholic charitable organizations before enacting policy, and in 2003 the Church was even allowed to appoint public school teachers in circumvention of the normal recruitment channels (Bolzonar 2016:447–53; Madama 2012:273). Religious values were also widely diffused among the population: for instance, in 2012 more than two-thirds of Italian doctors refused to perform abortion due to conscientious objections (Bolzonar 2016:447).

Unburdened from ties to a specific political party, the Catholic Church became a consensual national institution for the first time in history. As we have seen in Spain and Québec, the absence of a confessional party is often the best symbol of religious strength.

5.1.2. France

5.1.2.1. Political Catholicism from Separation to the Great War, 1905-1914

As we have seen in the previous chapter, the Popular Liberal Action (ALP) was created in 1901 to prevent French republicans from launching further anticlerical campaigns (Quagliariello 2001:246). Despite the unprecedented mobilization of French Catholics, the ALP was a failure (Bernard 1998:107). In 1905-6, political Catholicism in France suffered two blows from which it never recovered: the Separation of Church and state; and the heavy defeat of the ALP in the parliamentary elections of 1906,¹⁵² which ensured that Separation would not be reversed in the foreseeable future (Passmore 2013:149). The Vatican stood by the party in these difficult moments (B. Martin 1978:222–26; Molette 1968:293; Quellien 1986:210–16), and the ALP did retain seats in Brittany and Normandy. Apart from these bright spots, everyone understood that French political Catholicism was in decline and did not constitute a force to be reckoned with.¹⁵³

¹⁵² The ALP lost almost half its parliamentary representation in 1906, when it obtained only twenty seats (Quagliariello 2001:260).

¹⁵³ One symptom of the ALP's decline was the growing intra-Catholic conflict, as the left-wing Catholic *Le Sillon*, associated with Marc Sangnier, sought to limit the authority of the Church hierarchy. The *Sillon* ended up being condemned in the papal letter *Notre charge apostolique* of August 1910. An important minority of the French

As the discussion of the previous chapter made clear, the achievement of Separation marked the high point of the alliance between Socialists and Radicals. The completion of the anticlerical agenda relegated the religious question to the background of French politics, allowing economic cleavages to dominate partisan competition (Horne 2002:165–82; B. Martin 1978:203–13, 274–77; Passmore 2013:144–45; Quellien 1986:178–91). With the emergence of the Socialists as the major force of the French left, the formerly iconoclastic Radicals redefined themselves as free-marketeers, gaining support from conservatives frightened by the prospect of economic redistribution (Gordon 1996:64–75; Sanson 2003:211–13). This further marginalized the ALP, placing it in a peripheral position in French politics (Bernard 1998:200, 2000:152–53; Gordon 1996:144–48; Nord 1986:468; Passmore 2013:169–70; Vavasseur-Desperriers 2000:131–35; Winock 1987:198–201).

Political Catholicism in France was so weak because the anticlerical Radicals weaponized the infrastructurally powerful French state to serve their partisan goals and undermine their opponents (Bernard 1998:195–201; Larkin 1995:75–91; Voilliot 2005:235–41). Government parties received open administrative support in elections (Passmore 2013:156). As a historian of the period noted of elections in the impoverished *massif central*, “if republican rhetoric had failed to lift the consciousness of the peasant voter, the blandishments of government had instructed him in the wisdom of tactical compliance” (Jones 1985:305). A local priest observed that even devout Catholics voted for the anticlerical Radicals, not because they

Catholic movement sympathized with the *Sillon* and the whole episode provoked a storm of controversy (Ford 1993:188–90).

supported their policies, but “in the hope of obtaining favours from the government” (quoted in Jones 1985:306).

Only in those peripheral parts of France where the state was weakest, like Brittany, were social Catholic networks able to offer voters counterincentives powerful enough to induce them to support the ALP (Ford 1993:87–88). Elsewhere - and in contrast to Italy, where Catholic civil society organizations often had a more active presence in citizens’ daily lives than the state -, “the *ad hoc* Catholic groups existing with the ALP were not able to perform this function [of serving as a counterweight to the state]” (Bosworth 1962:24).

The partisan deployment of the state machinery against political Catholicism continued despite the marginalization of the religious-secular cleavage after the Separation of Church and state. Anticlerical circles continued to thirst for clerical blood, as the Masonic paper *Lanterne* made clear after the law was enacted (quoted in Bosworth 1962:15):

Whoever believes that the clerical tribe would willingly accept the laws of the secular state is poorly acquainted with them. And republicans would be wrong to think that the struggle is finished. Tomorrow as yesterday we must defend ourselves against invading clericalism; and if the weapons that the new law gives us are not sufficient, we must forge others ... Down with the Church, and long live the Republic!

One of the premises behind the 1905 Separation had been the old Cavour refrain of ‘a free Church in a free state.’ The state was supposed to refrain from intervening in religious affairs, but after 1905 surveillance of the Church continued unabated. The Parisian police and the

Ministry of the Interior compiled countless surveillance reports on the collective activities of Catholics (Sudda 2019:56). For instance, in September 1907 the Parisian police alarmingly noted that “bishops have been ordering priests to ... act in tandem with the associations and committees acting alongside the political party [ALP]” (quoted in Sudda 2019:61). The rationalisation provided by the police for the surveillance of what were nominally private citizens was that Catholics were the agents of a foreign power, thus posing a threat to national security. Another police report explained that “the leaders of the Catholic political movement are above all Roman. From Rome come all the directions, all the orders, and if they had to choose between the whims of the pope and the veto of [President] Poincaré, they would not hesitate for one second ... Besides, don’t they spout that gibberish about the pope being infallible!?” (quoted in Sudda 2019:64).

5.1.2.2. The End of the ALP, 1914-1919

The polarization between Catholics and anticlericals eased as German armies marched across the French border in the summer of 1914, temporarily laying to rest the country’s old political divisions (Becker 1985:111–22; Bernard 1998:241–43; Misner 2015:41). President Raymond Poincaré announced that “nothing will break the *union sacrée* of the French people” (quoted in Passmore 2013:180), and indeed both monarchists and Catholics rallied in support of the incumbent centre-left government. To retain the support of the Catholic masses, the government imposed a moratorium on private school closures and allowed religious orders to remain in the country, in contravention of the anticlerical laws of 1901-1904 (Larkin

1995:148). ALP member Denys Cochin was included in the government,¹⁵⁴ serving alongside the arch-anticlerical Émile Combes. However, it is important not to exaggerate the extent to which the war buried longstanding political cleavages. The very concept of patriotism was disputed between Catholics and anticlericals, with the former regarding religion as the basis of French national identity while the latter emphasized the republic and the ideas of the French Revolution (Passmore 2013:196). Each side claimed that their own principles were the basis of selfless patriotism and that their adversaries were sectarians seeking to use the war to advance their partisan objectives.

As the war went on and the initial spirit of 1914 dissipated, the Catholic-anticlerical cleavage gradually revived (Fontana 1990:123–66; McMillan 1995:121–27). Catholics believed their wholehearted participation in the conflict¹⁵⁵ had put to rest lingering doubts about their patriotism, and demanded the repeal of the anticlerical laws as a gesture of national reconciliation (Bosworth 1962:32; Bouloc 2000:452; Passmore 2013:196–97). The Radical government steadfastly refused to revise the anticlerical laws, prompting an ALP party leader to claim that “France still lives in the regime of persecution,” (quoted in Passmore 2013:196). Catholics became even more bitterly disappointed when the war was over. With the anticlerical laws still in place, both clerics and laity believed that they had been deceived

¹⁵⁴ He was nominated in October 1915 and given ministerial responsibility for coordinating the naval blockade against the Central Powers (Larkin 1995:149).

¹⁵⁵ More than thirty thousand clerics served in the military during the Great War. Because the law of Separation had ended any special status for priests and monks, they were not exempted from conscription and had to actually serve in the trenches (Buchanan and Conway 1996:40–41). Close to one-fifth of the clergy mobilized during the war were killed (Larkin 1995:149).

into supporting another republican government without securing substantial concessions (Bernard 1998:243; Bon 2000:73–82). Furious ALP members quit the party in droves, in what a modern historian described as a “decimation” of the party (Passmore 2013:199). Deserted by its members, in December 1918 the ALP merged into a heterogenous group of right-wing liberals and monarchists in a new political coalition, the National Bloc (Arnal 1985:95; Le Béguec 1993:48–49; Buchanan and Conway 1996:42; Sanson 2003:426–27; Winock 1987:198–201).

5.1.2.3. The National Bloc, 1919-1924

The National Bloc was an immediate success, coming first in the parliamentary elections of 1919 with 338 out of 613 seats. This was the first electoral victory for the French right since the end of the Second Empire, which seemed to justify the decision of the Catholics to join a broad right-wing coalition (Rémond 1969:258–59). Once again, however, Catholic hopes were dashed. Former ALP elements were a minority faction within the Bloc, which by and large was dominated by former Radicals who were loath to adopt proclerical policies (Maier 1975:7; Rémond 1969:264). In line with the formal model of religious policy-making elaborated in Chapter 2, the leadership of the Bloc eschewed a return to proclericalism because it believed that Catholicism would alienate the urban lower middle-classes. The maintenance of anticlericalism made perfect strategic sense, especially since the ALP had been integrated into the Bloc and Catholics had no other party to vote for anyway.

Instead of repealing the anticlerical laws, therefore, the Bloc sought to sidestep the religious question and focus on other policy issues¹⁵⁶ (Dansette 1948:714; Passmore 2013:213; Paul 1967:87–90; Talbott 1969:68; Wirsching 2003:68). Radical leader Charles Chaumet asked Catholics “not to revive past quarrels by undermining conquests that must now be considered definitive” (quoted in Passmore 2013:219), but former ALP members of the Bloc continually agitated for concessions on the religious sphere (Maier 1975:99; Mayeur 1968:567–71; Paul 1967:97–98). In December 1921 they succeeded in bringing to the floor of the Legislative Assembly a measure to provide public subsidies for private Catholic schools, but the law failed to pass, with only one-third of the Bloc parliamentarians voting in favour (Fuller 1994:525; Mayeur 1968:567–71; Paul 1967:87–90). Prime Minister Alexandre Millerand refused to allow former members of religious orders to become teachers, and Catholics who expected any concession on religious instruction were “deluded” (Rémond 1969:270). By contrast, the Bloc sponsored the passage of a social insurance bill that was bitterly resisted by Catholics because it increased the role of the state in welfare provision (Dutton 2002:19–37). Catholics continued to be discriminated against in state employment (Larkin 1995:158–68), and former members of the ALP received only minor posts in government.

The religious question was also revived by the controversy over whether to apply the anticlerical laws to the provinces of Alsace-Lorraine that France had reacquired from Germany

¹⁵⁶ This benefited Catholics to some extent, allowing them to display their religion on the public sphere once more. In Brittany, for instance, public schools teachers felt able to wear religious garb (Ford 1993:162–63).

in 1918.¹⁵⁷ The two deeply Catholic territories had avoided the 1905 Separation of Church and state because they were part of Germany at the time; religious orders operated freely in Alsace-Lorraine, and the clergy continued to be paid by the state. Radicals agitated to extend the French anticlerical laws to the two provinces, but the National Bloc was wary of antagonizing their religious population and for the time being retained their legal status intact (Larkin 1995:152).

In addition to the temporary exemption of Alsace-Lorraine from the application of the anticlerical laws, Catholics also secured the reestablishment of diplomatic relations with the Vatican (Nord 2003:3). These were the two main concessions made by the National Bloc to their Catholic supporters. The government refused to move beyond those measures, leaving Catholics once more with the feeling of having been duped into propping up a political coalition without receiving substantial concessions in return (Bernard 1998:262–64; Delbreil 1990:16–22; Dutton 2002:57–75; Ford 1993:197–207; Passmore 2013:229).

5.1.2.4. The People's Democratic Party, 1924-1939

The National Bloc was defeated in the general election of 1924, in part because Catholics ran separate lists in some constituencies to demand public subsidies to religious schools and repeal of the anticlerical laws (Goguel 1946:224–26, 1951:45–69; Mayeur 1968:584–94;

¹⁵⁷ The issue of ethnolinguistic particularism was closely associated to the Catholic movement during the interwar era (Delbreil 1990:16–22; Zanoun 2011:246). This was particularly notable in Alsace, where Catholic identity was linked to Germanophone demands for linguistic recognition (Gaines 1993:207). Catholic clerics were also at the forefront of the Breton regionalist movement.

Passmore 2013:233; Viple 1967:226–30). A left-wing coalition returned to power, headed by the veteran Radical leader Édouard Herriot. Faced with mounting financial problems and squabbling among the heterogeneous coalition partners, Herriot sought to divert attention on to the more congenial territory of anticlericalism (Larkin 1995:155; McMillan 1996:152–53). The government announced plans to sever diplomatic relations with the Holy See and to apply the Separation to Alsace-Lorraine. Herriot also brought back the anticlerical politicization of the state machinery by instructing civil servants to keep their children away from Catholic schools (Larkin 1995:155). The most significant policy of the left-wing coalition was the call for free public secondary education to compete with Catholic high schools, which more than anything else “helped to obscure absence of agreement on important questions between the partners in the Cartel” (Talbot 1969:91).

The defeat of the National Bloc and Herriot’s anticlerical plans led to a resurgence of political Catholicism. Frustration within Catholic circles at the secular right’s lack of support for their agenda led to the re-formation of an autonomous confessional party (Delbreil 1990:11–35; Kaiser 2007:50). In November 1924, former members of the ALP, Christian Democrats, and activists from Catholic trade unions seceded from the Bloc and formed the People’s Democratic Party¹⁵⁸ (PDP – *Parti Démocrate Populaire*). The PDP secured the support of fourteen parliamentarians, all but one of whom were from the historically peripheral regions of Brittany, Alsace,¹⁵⁹ and the Pyrenean border with Spain (Buchanan and Conway

¹⁵⁸ The name was a reference to the Italian People’s Party (Buchanan and Conway 1996:45).

¹⁵⁹ The PDP did not operate in the provinces of Alsace-Lorraine, which had its own regionalist Catholic party, the Republican People’s Union (UMP – *Union Populaire Républicaine*). UMP parliamentarians caucused with the PDP

1996:44; Delbreil 1990:11–35). The PDP had five main sources of support in Catholic civil society: the ethno-regionalist movement, peasant syndicates, women’s associations, trade unions, and the mass movement of the National Catholic Federation. I now briefly discuss each in turn.

As the origin of the PDP parliamentarians suggests, ethno-linguistic regionalism was a vital component of the party’s electoral appeal (Passmore 2013:238). Both Catholics and peripheral cultures were resisting the centralizing and homogenising impulses of the French state, making them natural allies (Baechler 1982:239–327; Goodfellow 1999:28–41; Guimar 1970:99–108). The regionalist character of the PDP was intensified with the Herriot government’s campaign to apply the anticlerical laws to Alsace and Lorraine as part of a broader campaign to extirpate ethnic and linguistic particularisms¹⁶⁰ (Bensoussan 2006:78–79). Catholic politicians from the two regions played a crucial leadership role in the PDP, buoyed by their experience and grassroots resources built up on the model of the more successful German Catholic party (Misner 2015:27).

Catholic peasant syndicates were the second main pillar of support for the PDP (Barral 1968:198–202). Historically, French peasants had been unable to pull their weight politically because of their inability to organize and overcome their collective action problem. The war revealed how essential peasants really were to the nation, emboldening them to challenge

so despite the formal separation between the two parties, they can in practical purposes be treated as one single Catholic party (Larkin 1995:157–58).

¹⁶⁰ The Minister of Education declared in 1925 that “in the interests of the unity of France, the Breton language must disappear” (quoted in Passmore 2013:237)

landowners and join rural syndicates. The most influential of these were the Breton Syndicates of Farmer-Growers (SBCC - *Syndicats Bretons de Cultivateurs-Cultivants*), led by the Abbé Mancel and strongly supportive of the PDP. The SBCC appealed especially to tenant farmers and sharecroppers, which antagonized large landowners (Bensoussan 2006; Passmore 1997:47). Rural syndicates like the SBCC sought to insulate their adherents from the anticlerical state by editing their own newspapers, organizing alternative rural schools and conferences, and providing separate welfare services (Bensoussan 2006:217).

Thirdly, Catholic women were among the most active supporters of the PDP (Machen 2017:237; Pedersen 1993:247–48). The death of millions of young men in the front and the prolonged postwar economic crisis forced large numbers of women into the workforce. Unexpectedly, unmarried women in bourgeois professions emerged as a new constituency for political Catholicism. Female professionals were prominent in the Catholic-affiliated Patriotic League of French Women (LPDF - *Ligue Patriotique des Françaises*) (Roberts 1994:11). The LPDF endorsed female suffrage, a stance echoed by the PDP but rejected by the left because of the widely held belief that women were more religious than men. Several measures for female enfranchisement sponsored by the PDP were put forward in the lower house of parliament; one of which did indeed pass in July 1936, only to be defeated by the entrenched Radical majority in the Senate (Larkin 1995:160).

The fourth source of support for the PDP were Catholic trade unions. Catholic unionism made modest inroads since the end of the war, especially among white-collar workers. In November 1919, “spurred on by the example of Italy” (Misner 2015:43), French Catholic unions came together in a national confederation, the French Confederation of Christian

Workers (CFTC – *Confédération Française des Travailleurs Chrétiens*). The leaders of the CFTC were especially close to the PDP and bitterly denounced by the socialist and communist unions because of their rejection of class struggle and advocacy of collaboration between workers and employers (Delbreil 2001:80; Passmore 1997:82–88). In general, social Catholics backed a middle course between capitalism and socialism through collective bargaining free from state intervention (Dutton 2002:97–107). The working-class appeal of social Catholicism resided in Christianity's potential to restrain greedy and selfish behaviour and enable inter-class cooperation (Palau 1995:50, 1996:323–30; Vinen 1995:63). The number of workers affiliated to the CFTC increased during the 1930s, but it never came close to the size of the left-wing unions (Launay 1986:54). Recruits to the CFTC usually came from the Christian Workers' Youth (JOC – *Jeunesse Ouvrière Chrétienne*), a branch of Catholic Action for the working-class youth that was to have greater prominence in the postwar period¹⁶¹ (Whitney 2009:80–106). Despite the relative weakness of the Catholic union movement, it was the only right-wing organization capable of recruiting among the popular classes (Passmore 2013:269).

The last and most important source of support for the PDP was the National Catholic Federation (FNC – *Fédération Nationale Catholique*), the political branch of French Catholic Action formed in 1924 (Bonafoux-Verrax 2004:39–42; Bosworth 1962:35; McMillan 1996:152). The FNC was moulded on the Italian Electoral Union, which as we have seen in the

¹⁶¹ Social Catholics, particularly those with leadership experience in the Association of the French Catholic Youth (ACJF – *Association Catholique de la Jeunesse Française*), were at the forefront of the political struggle against anticlericalism and assumed key roles in the PDP (Wynands 2016:255–56).

previous chapter was a propagandist organization that mobilized Catholic support for Giolitti in exchange for a series of concessions. General Édouard de Castelnau, a former ALP parliamentarian, was the moving force of the FNC (Vallat 1957:139–49). The Federation moved swiftly to the nebulous far-right of French politics, attracting extremists and monarchists because it was not a political party and thus did not require activists to accept the republic (Bonafoux-Verrax 2004:94–129; Kaiser 2007:51; McMillan 1996:156). In turn, far-right activists pushed the FNC to adopt a program to the right of the PDP¹⁶² (Bensoussan 2006:93–95; McMillan 1996:159–60).

The aims of the Federation were threefold: first, to re-Christianize society from below; second, to protect Catholics from the persecution of the anticlerical state; third, to repeal the anticlerical laws and thus restore Christian instruction in public schools (McMillan 1996:156; Wynands 2016:256). To achieve those objectives, the FNC sought to become a highly visible presence on public life, organizing numerous public meetings, mass rallies, and demonstrations (Arnal 1985:133–40; Palau 1995:46–66). These activities made clear that the defence of religion was still a rallying banner for an important minority of French people in the mid-twenties. In the end, however, the Federation's visibility did more harm than good to the Catholic cause and helped give anticlericalism a new lease on life, especially at the local level. For example, anticlerical municipalities prohibited the Federation from parading through the streets and pressured railway companies to prevent the transportation of FNC

¹⁶² Tensions between the FNC and the PDP came to a head in 1928, when the Vatican endorsed the PDP as the official French Catholic party and claimed that the FNC's intransigence compromised the Catholic cause. The FNC duly fell into line and obeyed the PDP's directions from then onwards (Rémond 1958:8–9).

activists (Arnal 1985:143–45; Bonafoux-Verrax 2004:36; Dansette 1948:760–94). After the leftist government's proposal to extend the anticlerical legislation to Alsace-Lorraine was rejected in parliament, the Church urged the FNC to dampen its protests to avoid inviting retaliation (McMillan 1996:161; Passmore 2013:272–73). Even after the moderation of its public activities, the Federation remained the most significant lay Catholic organization in France, playing a key role in the recruitment of PDP candidates and activists (Bonafoux-Verrax 2004:233–44; Chaline 1985:182–83).

In sum, the PDP benefited from the support of various Catholic civil society organizations. Especially in the peripheral regions of Alsace-Lorraine and Brittany, there was a vibrant Catholic subculture capable of mobilizing close to a majority of the population. Elsewhere, however, the PDP failed to have much of an impact. French Catholicism was “in no way comparable in associational density” to neighbouring Italy, Belgium, or Germany (Misner 2015:107). Electorally, the PDP was even less successful than its ALP predecessor. It won seventeen seats in the elections of 1928 (an increase of three), and the apogee of its influence came in 1930 when it supported the conservative government of André Tardieu. The elections of 1932 were a disappointment, however, reducing the number of seats to sixteen (Kaiser 2007:51–52). In the highly polarized Popular Front elections of 1936, the PDP's parliamentary representation shrank to thirteen (Bonafoux-Verrax 2004:302–31; Murphy 1989:7–14). Party membership at this time was around 13,000 (Buchanan and Conway 1996:46–47). In the end, the PDP was a marginal and uninfluential party in French politics. By the end of the thirties, French political Catholicism was going nowhere and stirring no one.

5.1.2.5. Vichy and Catholic Collaboration, 1939-1944

The world of French Catholic was turned upside down when France declared war against Nazi Germany in September 1939. The Germans launched their invasion of France in May 1940, swiftly overwhelming the allied defences and relentlessly marching into Paris, which persuaded Third Republic parliamentarians to vote full powers to Marshal Philippe Pétain, a hero of the First World War (Atkin 2000:99). France was divided into two zones: the northern part was occupied and directly administered by the Nazis, while Pétain presided over the southern half from the resort town of Vichy.

The fall of France came as such a shock that a disoriented public latched on to Catholicism. The decline in religious observance that had been documented during the thirties was suddenly arrested (Atkin 2000:98; Bédarida 1993:126). While the state bureaucracy and public institutions in France disintegrated before the German advance, Catholic civil society networks and organizations remained “intact” (Halls 1985:133). Charitable organizations aided households in poverty, organized large soup kitchens, and managed summer youth camps in the countryside, thus helping many families get through the deprivation caused by the war.

While not exactly a model of personal religiosity himself,¹⁶³ Pétain and his associates sought to redeem France from its comprehensive defeat by propagating Catholic values as

¹⁶³ He was married to a divorcee.

part of a National Revolution (Duquesne 1966:65; Halls 1995:53). Catholicism was at the very core of Vichy's ideological ambitions to remake French society¹⁶⁴ (Bernstein and Milza 1991:325–28; Buchanan and Conway 1996:55; Misner 2015:259). The discourse of the new regime matched the language used by the Church: France needed to strengthen the nuclear family and protect the people from the anticlerical ideologies of Freemasons and liberals. But Vichy's proclericalism went far beyond mere words. It repealed the anticlerical education laws going back to Jules Ferry in the 1880s and infused public instruction with religious values (Halls 1995:87; Weitz 1995:272). Even if welcome, by this point the restoration of religious classes in public schools was a secondary priority for the Church, for whom the greatest importance was placed upon the development of its own schools, where students could imbibe a thoroughly Catholic education in every aspect of the curriculum. Vichy acceded to Catholic wishes, and in addition to the reestablishment of religious teaching in public schools, the regime began funding private Catholic schools at both the elementary and secondary levels (Atkin 1991:18; Warner 2000:179–80; Wright 1970:139–40).

With the Vichy regime being so sympathetic to Catholic concerns, it is not surprising that the Church and lay organizations supported the regime with enthusiasm (Atkin 2000:100; Durand 1989:73–74; Halls 1995:45–67; Jackson 2001:268–71). The Archbishop of Lyon was particularly sycophant in declaring that “Pétain is France and France, today, is Pétain” (quoted

¹⁶⁴ Vichy's sympathy with Catholicism did not preclude the suppression of autonomous Catholic Action associations. A decree of November 1940 banned all civil society organizations and made no exception for those of a Catholic nature (Misner 2015:244). Catholic union leaders joined their socialist counterparts in protesting against the suppression of independent unionism by publishing the *Manifeste des Douze*, which was remarkably courageous in taking a stand against the Vichy dictatorship.

in Nord 2003:11), but this was the sentiment of the Catholic hierarchy in 1940. The Catholic newspaper *La Croix* proclaimed “our gratitude toward the government of Marshal Pétain ... without reserve” (quoted in Duquesne 1966:43; also Halls 1995:375). The senior ranks of the regime were disproportionately composed of individuals with experience in Catholic Action or other civil society associations (Duquesne 1966:83). Catholic Action itself followed the Church’s instructions to collaborate with both Vichy and the German occupiers, which was part of the reason why it was able to provide charity and welfare to so many families (Cointet 1998:276–99; Vinatier 1983:221–52).

5.1.2.6. The Apogee of Political Catholicism in France, 1944-1947

The collapse of Vichy and Nazi Germany did not weaken the French Catholic Church, despite its awkward collaboration with Marshal Pétain. Indeed, at the end of the war, French Catholics were in a stronger position than at any time since the Second Empire and looked forward to playing a leading role in the successor regime to the despised Third Republic (Atkin 2000:113–14). There were three main reasons for this. First, the old rightist parties were disgraced by their enthusiastic embrace of Vichy, while the PDP had been too small to make an active contribution to the regime, which had the unintended consequence of dissociating Catholic political leaders from Pétain. Second, the enactment of female enfranchisement after the Liberation favoured political Catholicism, inasmuch as women were significantly more devout than men (Bichet 1980:220; Dogan and Narbonne 1955:88; Duverger 1955:8–18; Vinen 1995:46–47; Williams 1958:452). Third, while the Church hierarchy by and large supported Vichy until the end, a significant minority of lay activists with ties to the PDP were

active in the Resistance (Halls 1995:199; Holter 1992:40–59). Catholic *résistants* were at the forefront of the postwar revival of political Catholicism (Atkin 2000:112; Bichet 1980:54).

After the Liberation, members of the Catholic Resistance created the third French confessional political party, the Popular Republican Movement¹⁶⁵ (MRP – *Mouvement Républicain Populaire*), under the leadership of Georges Bidault,¹⁶⁶ a former ACJF vice-president and PDP parliamentary candidate (Einaudi and Goguel 1952:116–22; Yates 1958:419–22). The party combined the idealistic values of the Resistance with Catholic religiosity, giving it a particularly messianic tone. As one party founder claimed, “for me, the MRP is not a party, it is a social future for which we act as the apostles” (quoted in Warner 2000:180).

The MRP quickly benefited from much higher levels of support than its PDP and ALP predecessors (Delbreil 2000:132–33). The party was able to set up a complete organization very quickly by drawing upon the network of Catholic Action groups. Of the two hundred MRP deputies elected in the three general elections of 1945–1946, the vast majority had prior

¹⁶⁵ Before the autumn of 1944, the Liberation Republican Movement (MRL – *Mouvement Républicain de la Libération*).

¹⁶⁶ Maurice Schumann was the first President of the MRP during the war, as George Bidault occupied the important position of President of the Resistance Council, in which capacity he coordinated the internal forces struggling against the German occupiers. However, Bidault was widely understood to have been the guiding spirit of the MRP since the start and did indeed occupy the presidency of the party after the war, when Schumann stepped down for him (Irving 1973:45–46).

experience as activists and politicians in the PDP and Catholic Action¹⁶⁷ (Bosworth 1962:37; Saadah 1987:49; Yates 1958:420).

The new Catholic party had little more than a year to prepare for the Constituent Assembly elections of October 1945. For the Church, the number one priority for the new constitution was to protect private Catholic schools by maintaining the state subsidies promulgated under Pétain (Warner 2000:87). Because the return of religious instruction to public schools was highly unlikely, the defence of private schools was seen as the best possible instrument to maintain the social influence of the Church (Dansette 1957:66–67; Deroo 1955:197). As in similar postwar elections in Italy, the Church and Catholic Action pulled out all the stops to mobilize voters (Vinen 1995:149–50). The Archbishop of Paris, for instance, explained that the elections would be of “considerable importance for the future of France” and urged Catholics to “group their votes” in support of politicians that were ready to fight to maintain public funding of private Catholic schools¹⁶⁸ (quoted in Warner 2000:113). This exhortation was published in all Catholic newspapers and read by priests during mass. Catholic Action also “provided MRP with grass-roots support, and, perhaps even more important, with leaders at all levels” (Irving 1973:47). The MRP was so dependent upon Catholic Action that it even mimicked its structure in order to increase the linkage between the two institutions, with specialized MRP teams for workers teaming up with Catholic trade

¹⁶⁷ Three-quarters of members of the MRP’s executive committee in 1946 were simultaneously members of Catholic Action, as were two-thirds of parliamentarians elected by the party in that year’s Constituent Assembly elections (Bazin 1981:2; Irving 1973:79).

¹⁶⁸ If congregants did not understand the message, priests were instructed to make a clear reference to the MRP.

unions, MRP agricultural sections teaming up with rural syndicates, and so forth (Bosworth 1962:246–47).

The 1945 elections were a triumph for the MRP, which became the second largest party in France with 151 seats. Catholics had done so well because of the absence of any competitors on the right, with many conservatives, moderates, and even former Radicals supporting the MRP as the main bulwark against Communism (Buron 1963:12; Delbreil 2000:135; Descamps 1981:139–72; Ott 1978:48; Vinen 1995:25; Williams 1958:79). As in Italy, the party joined the provisional government as part of a tripartite coalition that included Socialists and Communists (Atkin 2005:16; Béthouart 1984:46–53). After the electorate rejected the Constitution proposed by the Assembly in March 1946, new Constituent Assembly elections had to be called for June. The MRP did even better in those, coming in first with 28 % of the votes and 159 seats. In less than a decade, French Catholicism went from political insignificance to electoral triumph (Vinen 1995:164).

The MRP's stunning change of fortunes would not last long, however. June 1946 marked the "peak" of political Catholicism in France (Bichet 1980:219), and the "MRP conspicuously failed to emulate the success of the DC in building a notable base" (Vinen 1995:166). The problems started in the Constituent Assembly itself, where having a plurality of seats, the MRP was isolated as the only party defending the continuation of public funding to private schools (Wright 1970:158–59). In neither of the two versions of the constitution did Catholics secure continued public subsidies for their schools, although the MRP did manage to defeat a Communist proposal to outlaw private education (Manow and Palier 2009:163; Warner 2000:113). The MRP also had limited successes in defeating proposals for

a single social security fund, and secured maternity benefits and incentives for large families that were in line with the pro-natalist ideology of the Church (Bell 2000:103). These were limited gains, however, especially when compared with the loss on school funding.

The constitution establishing the Fourth Republic was approved by a slim majority of voters in October 1946. After this, the MRP quickly establishes itself as a pillar of the regime against the two anti-systemic parties of the right (Gaullists) and left (Communists). The MRP was present in almost all the governments of the Fourth Republic, providing 168 out of 809 cabinet ministers between 1945 and 1958 (Delbreil 2000:137). Following the direction of the Church, the MRP sought above all to influence family, education, and agricultural policy (Bell 2000:108; Béthouart 1996:67; Hanley 2002:132; Irving 1973:57; Letamendia 1995:364–66; Palier 2002:109–11). Its parliamentarians sponsored a generous family-allowance scheme that did much to improve French birth rates¹⁶⁹ (Lenoir 1991:153). The MRP also played an important role in the restructuring of French agriculture (Dansette 1957:389). But the most cherished achievement of the MRP was undoubtedly the resumption of public subsidies to Catholic elementary schools. The Barangé Law of 1951 instituted a scheme whereby the state provided funding for every student in public or private elementary schools (Béthouart 2004:79–80; Hanley 2002:128; Healey 1967:490–91; van Kemseke 1997:183; Lecourt 1978:57; Letamendia 1995:296). While this still fell short of Catholic demands – the law did not cover secondary schools and the grants were relatively small, leaving public schools with

¹⁶⁹ Among other policies, the MRP sponsored child allowances, birth premiums, and prolonged maternity leave (Béthouart 2001:320; Hilaire 1997:431).

considerable financial advantages -, it was the most significant proclerical policy since the fall of Napoleon III.

Buttressed by its early electoral successes, the MRP achieved significant policy gains. But the party never regained the standing it had in the immediate postwar years. Unlike the Communists, who were supported by an impressive organizational network centred on trade unions, the MRP was undermined by the “weakness and relative fragmentation (in comparison, for instance, to what existed in Italy) of the organizations encapsulating the French Catholic community” (van Kemseke 1997:185; Saadah 1987:40). Overall, “the Church had, in Action Catholique organizations, weak tools by which to affect Catholics’ religious, social, and political behaviour” (Warner 2000:155). The associational weakness of the MRP and Catholic civil society was not due to lack of effort (Fogarty 1957:329–39). On the contrary, party leaders laid great emphasis on grassroots organization (Irving 1973:57). The Church also recognized the importance of welfare provision in bolstering a strong political movement. As a rural priest explained in 1946, as long as the Church obtained a monopoly or near monopoly in the provision of charity, “we are unbeatable” (Boulard 1946:38). By this time, however, the infrastructurally powerful French state had reasserted its primacy over welfare provision, leaving little social space for the charitable activities of the Church (Béthouart 2001:316–17; van Kemseke 1997:184–85).

This organizational weakness was noted by observers at the time, even when the MRP was triumphant in the ballot box (Irving 1973:47; Pasture 2001:243). Political scientist Mario Einaudi noted in 1946 that, even though the MRP had just topped the polls in a parliamentary election, “on the basis of newspaper strength alone the MRP could never have achieved the

victory it did" (Einaudi 1946:899–900). Einaudi suggested that the MRP victory was conjunctural, built on the basis of "fickle" voters who "represent an obvious weakness of the party" (Einaudi 1946:921). Another observer noted in 1947 that the MRP's success "will be ephemeral if ... the Church cannot multiply the popular groups to extend their ascendancy over a significant section of the youth" (Priouret 1947:61). Even an MRP politician admitted that the party lacked support from local notables that were "in contact with the country" and could serve as intermediaries between civil society and party organizations (Plantade 1958:119). A political observer noted after the party's electoral victory in June 1946 that "everyone expects a collapse of the MRP" (quoted in Vinen 1995:148).

5.1.2.7. The End of French Political Catholicism, 1947-1966

Since the MRP's initial success was due to the exceptional conditions of the war and the discredit of the French right by association with Vichy, the passage of time was bound to open space for another conservative party to emerge and swamp the votes of the weakly organized MRP (Manow and Palier 2009:162; Vinen 1995:49–50). This indeed is what happened with the formation in 1947 of Charles de Gaulle's personalist party, the Union of the French People (RPF – *Rassemblement du Peuple Français*). While personally Catholic, de Gaulle was "hostile to the [Church] hierarchy due to its complicity with Vichy and was utterly unwilling to let the Church exercise any influence over RPF policies" (Warner 2000:131). Despite – or due to – the bad feeling between de Gaulle and the Church, his RPF rapidly undertook the MRP as the dominant party on the right (Bichet 1980:230; Goguel 1981:109; Letamendia 1995:292–98). In Italy, by contrast, the Christian Democrats were strong enough to monopolize the entire right-wing political spectrum: as one shrewd observer of the two

parties noted, “the clientele of the DC is the same as that of the MRP and French conservatives added together” (Chassériaud 1965:354). That the Italian DC was able to prevent the emergence of right-wing competitors even in a proportional representation electoral system while the French MRP failed to do so in a single-member electoral system confirms the statistical analysis of Chapter 3 that institutions do not necessarily determine outcomes.

The Church hierarchy was hostile to General de Gaulle and did its best to keep the faithful within the MRP fold and away from the RPF (Bosworth 1962:60). The term of the parliament elected in 1946 – in which the MRP had done so well – ended five years later, and during the 1951 electoral campaign, “the local clergy ... very clearly, recommended a vote for the MRP” (Warner 2000:153). The Church succeeded in mobilizing support for the MRP in peripheral areas where Catholicism remained the traditional focus of local life (Williams 1964:109). For instance, the prefect of Aveyron noted how “the clear slide to the right seen in this department was due in part to the very strict instructions given by the clergy” (quoted in Warner 2000:153). The MRP also held its own in Alsace, which had also been a PDP stronghold and where political Catholicism benefitted from the electoral machinery built by the pre-1914 German confessional party (Paira 1990:201; Vinen 1995:165). By contrast, the MRP “made very little impression on the non-Catholic electorate” (Irving 1973:47) and proved unable to go beyond the relatively narrow base of individuals who were connected to the network of Catholic civil society associations (Elgie 2005:127; Michelat and Simon 1977). The 1951 parliamentary election ended up being disastrous for the party, which came in fifth place and lost more than half its previous votes and almost half of its seats (Irving 1973:44; Warner 2000:178). A historian noted that after the 1951 elections, “the MRP was so badly excluded

from networks of local power that it was unable to obtain jobs for its own defeated MPs” (Vinen 1995:167).

French political Catholicism thus collapsed at the same time that the Italian DC was extending its hegemonic control over Italian politics. Despite the electoral debacle of the MRP, the party remained in government as a junior coalition partner for the remainder of the Fourth Republic (Dogan and Campbell 1957:317). In 1958, a crisis over Algeria led to the collapse of the Fourth Republic and the return to power of Charles de Gaulle as head of a new semi-presidential regime. The MRP reluctantly supported de Gaulle in the first years of the new Fifth Republic, but was driven to the opposition benches in 1962 because of its rejection of the Gaullist project to elect the president directly by universal suffrage (Atkin 2005:56; Delbreil 2000:140; Nester 2014:37). The elections of November 1962 showed that conservative voters backed de Gaulle over the MRP, with the party losing more than one million votes and securing only 36 out of 491 parliamentary seats. As Gaullist forces gained a monopoly on the right,¹⁷⁰ there seemed no end in sight to the electoral haemorrhage of the MRP. The party’s deathblow came in 1964 with the decision of the Catholic trade union to transform itself into a secularized group (Berger 1987:120; Duriez 2001:65–66; Groux and Mouriaux 1991:7; Pasture 2001:236–43). It seemed only a matter of time before other Catholic associations followed suit, which “ruined” any hopes of the MRP ever making a comeback (Pasture 2001:243). Seeing the writing on the wall, party leader Jean Lecanuet

¹⁷⁰ One of Charles de Gaulle’s first government measures, the Debré Law of 1959, solved the ‘school question’ once and for all by granting full public financing of private religious schools, both elementary and secondary (Archambault 1997:151–52). De Gaulle thus gave Catholic voters the public subsidization of private schools they were seeking since the 1880s, which may have been the final nail in the coffin for the MRP.

disbanded the MRP in April 1966. Around half of the remaining Catholic parliamentarians joined the Gaullist coalition. The others formed a new centrist party, the Democratic Centre (CD – *Centre Démocrate*), which disavowed the principles of Christian Democracy (Atkin 2005:68; Béthouart 2004:83–84). Thus ended the seven-decade history of French political Catholicism, starting with the *Ralliement* in the 1880s, on to the ALP in the 1900s and the PDP in the 1920s, achieving its heyday with the MRP in the 1940s and disappearing with barely a whimper in the 1960s.


5.2. French and Italian State Capacity

While the policy ambitions of both French and Italian liberal elites in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were strikingly similar – to eliminate the Catholic Church’s role as an intermediary corporate body between state and individual, and to forge a unified national identity out of a patchwork of regional and local loyalties –, the Italian state was less equipped than its French counterpart to carry out those tasks (Capone 2017:432). Put bluntly, Italy did not do the basic work of government as well as France.¹⁷¹ In this section, I examine the infrastructural power of the two states and show that the French state had significantly higher capacity than the Italian state on a wide range of measures.

¹⁷¹ The difference between French and Italian infrastructural power is not merely an artefact of state weakness in the *Mezzogiorno*. Even in the north of Italy, the state was considerably weaker than in France. The homicide rate in late nineteenth century Lombardy, for instance, was more than one-third higher than that of France as a whole, while in Piedmont the homicide rate was four times greater than in France. Almost two thirds of criminal cases in northern Italy were unsolved, compared to merely a third in France (Garfinkel 2017:30–31).

A first hint of the distinct infrastructural power of the two states is given in Figure 5.1, which shows how France has a greater ratio of civil servants to population than Italy between 1870 and 1950 (Flora et al. 1983). This suggests that French authorities have a greater logistical presence on the ground than their Italian counterparts.


Figure 5.1 - Public Sector Employment in France and Italy, 1870-1950



Source: Flora et al. (1983).

As Figure 5.2 makes clear (data from Cardoso and Lains 2010), during the formative period of political Catholicism in the late nineteenth-century, France also devoted a substantially higher share of its gross domestic product to public spending than did Italy.

Figure 5.2 - Public Spending in France and Italy, 1860-1910




Source: Cardoso and Lains (2010).

Focusing specifically on social spending¹⁷² - which, as we have seen, is the area in which the Church is in greater direct competition with the state - France has consistently spent a greater amount of the national product than Italy, although the difference between the two is not large (Lindert 2004b).

¹⁷² Social spending includes, among others, the following areas: health care, old age, incapacity-related benefits, active labour market programs, unemployment, and housing.

Figure 5.3 - Public Social Spending in France and Italy, 1880-1960



Source: Lindert 2004.


Thus, the broad patterns of Figures 5.1 to 5.3 all point to a greater presence of the state in the daily life of French citizens than of Italian citizens. I now examine the development of the French and Italian welfare states in more detail. I focus on the three social welfare areas which anticlerical liberals sought to wrest from the hands of the Church: social insurance (particularly workplace injury and old-age pensions), healthcare, and education. As scholars of European state-building have long noted, the penetration by the state into these realms in the nineteenth-century was a novel historical development, reflecting an unprecedented ability and willingness of elites to regulate social life in their territories (Ziblatt 2006:87–88). Overall, my account strongly suggests that the French state was characterized by high levels of infrastructural capacity, while the Italian state might more easily be described as suffering from infrastructural incapacity.

5.2.1. Social Insurance

As we have seen in the previous chapters, Catholic charities dominated welfare provision in both France and Italy from the Middle Ages until the late nineteenth century. Showing compassion towards the poor was a central element of Catholic doctrine and practice, leading to the spread of various charitable institutions such as homes for penitent prostitutes, foundling houses, hospitals, or soup kitchens (Woolf 1986:26–27). By the last third of the nineteenth century, however, anticlerical French and Italian political leaders “had come definitively to believe that state-building was a solution to social problems” (Quine 2002:6) and welfare should be taken out of the hands of the Church (Cherubini 1977:11–13; Jones 1982:161).


As Figures 5.4 and 5.5 suggest, despite common ambitions to make the state the primary provider of welfare, the French state was able to insure a greater share of its labour force than its Italian counterpart. I now briefly review the emergence of public insurance schemes for occupational injury and disability, as well as pension insurance.

Figure 5.4 - Disability Insurance Coverage in France and Italy, 1900-1960



Source: Flora et al. (1983).

Figure 5.5 - Old-Age Pension Coverage in France and Italy, 1900-1960



Source: Flora et al. (1983).

5.2.1.1. Italy

As political scientist Julia Lynch (2009:102) notes, “the Church in Italy had a near monopoly on charity and institutional care in the late 19th century.” Remarkably, as late as 1880, the total revenue of Catholic charities almost matched state tax revenue (Cherubini 1977:37–38; Répaci 1962:52). In the 1860s, Italian liberals had launched their first tentative attempts to assert control over Christian charitable institutions. Local representatives of the central state (prefects) were made responsible for regulating religious charities and channelling their spending in particular ways, although their efforts were undercut by the lack of financial resources and administrative capacity (Fargion 1997:75; Lynch 2009:102–3; Quine 2002:34, 44). Catholic charities continued much as before, and this early attempt at regulation made little difference on the ground.

These first halting steps towards public regulation of welfare gained momentum in 1898,¹⁷³ when parliament approved the first state-supported social insurance program for private sector workers in Italy (Frascani 1982:713–35). The law passed in spite of Pope Leo XIII’s claim that politicians supporting the bill concealed an “implacable hatred of Jesus Christ” (quoted in Quine 2002:53). The intentions of the authors of the bill were twofold: state social

¹⁷³ The first important welfare bill in Italy had been approved in 1886 to limit the number of hours children could work to eight hours per day and to ban child work in unsafe or unhealthy conditions. However, the law was ineffective. In other European countries, labour legislation was accompanied by new bureaucratic structures to enforce the regulations. In Italy, the factory inspectorate formed to implement the law of 1886 was entirely unable to act as any kind of law enforcement agency because of the lack of personnel and resources (Ballestrero 1979:11–13; Ballestrero and Levrero 1979:30).

insurance served to legitimize the Liberal state in the eyes of the working-classes and to weaken the social power of the Catholic Church, the implacable enemy of the Italian Kingdom (Ferrera 1993:210–11; Gustapane 1989:57).

Politicians were also aware that their legislation would be implemented in a context of “weak state administrative capacities” (Lynch 2009:103; also Quine 2002:295), and thus made membership in the insurance program voluntary. This had the unintended consequence of providing public funding to private voluntary organizations, which were dominated by the Church (Lynch 2009:98). The voluntary component of the insurance model, coupled with the weak capacity of the Italian state, led to very low coverage rates. By 1910, only around 2.5 percent of the dependent workforce was enrolled in state-subsidized voluntary insurance schemes (Sepe 1999:97). Another law of the same period required employers to pay their workers if they were injured in an unsafe work environment, but the lack of an efficient factory inspectorate easily allowed employers to shirk their duties¹⁷⁴ (Cherubini 1977:114–17; Lonni 1982:745–50).

Ironically, the great beneficiary from the policy choices of 1898 was the Church. Catholics had favoured dual worker-owner programs to mandatory state-run insurance all along. The limited social insurance legislation allowed the burgeoning Catholic social movement to retain its hegemony in the field of social assistance. This was particularly true in rural areas, with Catholics making shrewd use of the selective benefits of mutualist

¹⁷⁴ The bill did not specify penalties for employers, and the government lacked the political will to enforce its own guidelines by confronting wealthy capitalists (Ballestrero 1979:26–32).

insurance programs to mobilize agricultural workers (Ferrera 1993:214–15). In contrast to other western European countries, Italian liberals failed to build far-reaching, mandatory, collective arrangements to insure citizens against accidents, poverty, or misfortune (de Swaan 1988:1–12). Private charity rather than public welfare continued to provide the best protection against forced inactivity due to workplace injury or old age.

In the aftermath of the First World War, the social question re-emerged in Italy with particular intensity. Mandatory pensions for blue-collar workers finally came into law in 1919, even though more generous plans to establish a single social insurance system with universal coverage were not approved (Cherubini 1977:319–29; Lynch 2009:99–100; Quine 2002:107). The Italian pension system was thus set from the start on a path-dependent trajectory of occupational fragmentation, with separate funds for different groups like civil servants, blue-collar workers, doctors, lawyers, and so forth (Schludi 2005:109; Vitali 1978:73). A substantial minority of Italian workers lacked insurance for old age until 1964, when a universal flat-rate minimum pension was introduced to cover low-income elderly people without other means of subsistence (Ferrera 1993:262; Mattera 2017:246–47; Pavan 2017:185). The Christian Democrats sponsored the 1964 law and blocked more ambitious proposals to unify Italy's occupation-fragmented pension system, which was an essential clientelistic instrument to retain support from particularistic groups (Ranci 1994:250; Regonini 1984:108, 1996:90–91; Saraceno 1994:63).

5.2.1.2. France

Until recently, the predominant view among historians and social scientists was that the French Third Republic had a “feeble” welfare state and its development was “belated” (Mitchell 1991:294; also Weiss 1983:75–76). During the past three decades, however, a growing literature on the origins of the French welfare state has rehabilitated the standing of the Third Republic in terms of social policy and recognised “the extent and seriousness of the Third Republic’s interventionist ambitions” (Nord 1994:823). Far from being a welfare laggard, nineteenth-century French republicans put in place ambitious and far-reaching social reforms that brought the state into close proximity with people’s everyday lives. Indeed, a recent study notes that “government responsibility in public welfare is a deeply rooted idea in France ... inherited from the *Ancien Régime* and above all from the French Revolution” (Archambault and Boumendil 2002:112).

As in Italy, before the late nineteenth century, the French state did not assist the poor directly. Rather, it left the field of social assistance to religious charities, collaborating, encouraging, and often funding their activities, but without being directly involved in the provision of welfare (Weiss 1983:60). In 1880, for instance, public revenues financed 45 percent of spending in social assistance, with religious charities being responsible for a slight majority (52 percent) of social spending¹⁷⁵ (Smith 1998:249). Public spending on social activities was directed by local welfare bureaus (*bureaux de bienfaisance*), managed by a small committee of local notables with mandatory membership for a representative of the

¹⁷⁵ Private, non-religious associations financed the remaining three percent.

Church, usually the local priest (Weiss 1983:49). The bureaux were quasi-public institutions with wide-ranging autonomy to spend public cash as they saw fit, provided the money was channelled to the poor.

Because the French working-class was relatively small by international standards, during the first decades of the Third Republic there was no strong labour party or trade union movement to demand the creation of a welfare state.¹⁷⁶ Despite the lack of working-class pressure, French republicans began introducing social insurance legislation in the late 1880s, which can only be explained “as an attempt to curtail the social and political role of the Church” (Korpi 1995:639; also Palier 2002:66–67; Renard 1995:15–19) by replacing religious charitable schemes with state-run public assistance.

The French state got directly involved in the provision of welfare for the first time in 1889, when parliament approved a child-protection law committing the state to adopt neglected or abandoned children as its wards (Fuchs 1984:57–61, 1992:92–93; Nord 1994:829). Traditionally, foundling homes for orphans and abandoned children were ran by the Catholic Church, and the republicans who promoted the child-protection bill justified it as the first step in the process of “secularizing social action” (Renard 1995:15).


In July 1893, French republicans approved a law to regularize the system of welfare bureaux by mandating their creation in every municipality and enforcing stricter regulations

¹⁷⁶ Indeed, workers’ movements in France were prohibited by the Le Chapelier Law until 1884.

on the disbursement of funds (Korpi 1995:639; Weiss 1983:62). This law - coupled with a subsequent bill that removed the autonomy of the bureaus and made the central state directly responsible for their operation (Mayeur 1984:137–208) – formed the foundation for the modern French welfare state. Not only did France adopt comprehensive social insurance policies earlier than Italy, it was also able to deliver high-quality social services more efficiently and consistently. French municipalities - like their Italian counterparts – had a mixed record in the provision of social assistance through the welfare bureaus (Ellis 1990:189–90), which was one of the reasons why parliament revoked the autonomy of the bureaus and gave the powerful bureaucracy of the central state direct responsibility for welfare provision (Weiss 1983:62).

The centralization of social assistance led to a marked increase in the coverage of the welfare bureaus. Figure 5.6 shows how the percentage of citizens covered by the bureaus increased steadily between the proclamation of the Third Republic in 1870 and the outbreak of war in 1914. Not only were more French people covered by the public welfare system, but per capita expenditure also increased considerably (approximately 70 percent) between 1876 and 1912 (Milliès-Lacroix 1911:129–38; Weiss 1983:78).

Figure 5.6 - Growth of Public Welfare Bureaus in Third Republican France, 1870-1914



Source: Weiss 1983: 73.

The social assistance legislation of 1893 also endorsed the nationalization of private religious charities in municipalities that did not have a public welfare bureau. In a sense, the growth of the French welfare state suggested by Figure 5.6 was simply a process in which private institutions of poor relief and social assistance were appropriated by the state (Manow and Palier 2009:152; Renard 1995:16, 25).

French republicans continued to pass important welfare laws: in 1898, they approved a “highly developed” (Laroque 1948:572) accident insurance bill that forced employers to pay

the medical costs of employees injured while doing their work¹⁷⁷ (Korpi 1995:639; Laroque 1948:573). The law was enforced by a highly efficient state inspectorate, with inspectors selected by competitive examinations and regarded as professional and competent¹⁷⁸ (Reid 1986:73–74).

In April 1910, French republicans introduced a compulsory old-age pension scheme for all agricultural and industrial workers (Korpi 1995:639). While a significant proportion of French workers were hostile to the concept of public pensions because they were already covered by company-specific schemes, republicans went ahead with the law anyway: their main interest was not increasing coverage but establishing the principle of compulsion in public law and social insurance, which reinforced the primacy of the state over the private sector (Köhler, Zacher, and Partington 1982:117; Quine 1996:71–72, 2002:94). The basic architecture of the French welfare state was completed in 1928, when parliament approved compulsory social insurance for the risks of illness, maternity, death of a family member, and unemployment (Archambault and Boumendil 2002:111; Dutton 2002:64–65, 97; Korpi 1995:641–43; Laroque 1948:572–73).

¹⁷⁷ Once more, the state was replacing Catholic-sponsored institutions with public equivalents. Previously, injured or disabled workers were dependent upon the help of mutual aid societies that were usually linked to the Church; after 1898 they had no need for private disability insurance. Catholic groups in parliament fought strongly against the 1898 legislation and generally sought to prevent the state from assuming a leading role in welfare provision (Dreyfus 1988:57–61; Dumons and Pollet 1994:103–18).

¹⁷⁸ In the single year of 1899, inspectors examined the compliance with the new labour law of more than two-thirds of all French industrial workers (Reid 1986:74).


The legislation of 1928 still left some categories of citizens without social insurance coverage, especially the self-employed and those without prior social security contributions. Social security was eventually extended to all citizens in 1948 (Baldwin 1990:172; Laroque 1948:575). The new system of social security created a unified benefit scheme that covered the whole population, establishing the fundamental principle that the state was responsible for the care of citizens during all stages of life, including birth, illness, unemployment, and retirement. The MRP waged a vigorous campaign to thwart expansion of social security under a single general fund run by the state, instead favouring a complicated scheme in which the state would support private insurance funds (Baldwin 1990:167; Dutton 2002:217–18; Mattera 2017:245–46). In the end, despite some concessions to the MRP,¹⁷⁹ French legislators approved universal social insurance (Baldwin 1990:163–86).

5.2.2. Health Care

The field of healthcare provides another important example of the infrastructural superiority of the French over the Italian state. As Figure 5.7 shows, while neither France nor Italy managed to achieve universal health coverage in the first half of the twentieth century, the French state was able to provide health insurance to a significantly larger share of the population than its Italian counterpart.

¹⁷⁹ While compulsory social insurance was enacted for all French citizens, legislators separated the schemes for middle-class insurance into four different funds, covering liberal professionals, the self-employed, artisans, and landowners (Baldwin 1990:177).

Figure 5.7 - Health Insurance in France and Italy, 1900-1960



Source: Flora et al. (1983).

5.2.2.1. Italy

Between national unification in 1861 and the advent of Fascism in 1922, Italian healthcare was almost entirely reliant upon “centres sponsored by the Catholic Church” (Donatini et al. 2001:13; also Vicarelli 1997:16). Because the state played virtually no role in caring for the sick and injured, Italian healthcare was based on (usually Catholic) private insurance funds. These were local funds, often confined to a single municipality or even a single company, creating a highly fragmented healthcare structure that varied widely across the country.

Italian political leaders ventured into the field of healthcare for the first time in 1898, when parliament approved legislation to provide medical care to those who could not afford it (Donatini et al. 2001:13; Ferré et al. 2014:19; Quine 2002:45). This was “the most important moment in the history of Italian healthcare until the Second World War” (Cosmacini 1987:420). Despite the lofty ambitions of the legislation, it suffered from one fatal flaw: the financial and administrative law burden of caring for the sick was placed entirely on local authorities, whose “regulatory capacity ... was very weak” (Ascoli, Pavolini, and Ranci 2002:139). The central government continued to play no role in healthcare provision besides imposing new obligations upon municipalities that were already stretched thin. As Quine (2002:47) notes, “the representatives of central government in the periphery, the prefects, were incapable of ensuring *buon governo* in the localities.” Not surprisingly when one considers the diversity in financial resources and administrative capacity between north and south (Riall 1998:131–36), the 1898 law increased regional disparities in medical spending and public health outcomes. Overall, it seems that the law was “barely enforced” (Vicarelli 1997:12). Italians continued to rely on private insurance funds for their healthcare needs.

In 1923, the new Fascist government sponsored a new healthcare law that made the central state responsible for the provision of medical care for the poor. For the first time, the government paid the costs of healthcare directly for means-tested beneficiaries. Because the Fascists did not set up a public health insurance fund, in practice the 1923 law led to state funding of Catholic-sponsored private insurance funds. Only in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War did the state create a public health insurance fund open to all workers and their dependents, finally offering an alternative to the private funds (Donatini et al. 2001:13–14). However, this legislation was far from universalistic. Entitlement to medical

care was dependent upon labour market participation, and many private insurance funds were left in place (Brown 1984:76–77; Ferrera 1995:278).

It was only in 1978 - under Christian Democratic rule - that the principle of universal health coverage was established once and for all (Ferrera 1995:279–80). The 1978 reform nationalized all private health insurance funds and created a national health service in which hospitals are owned and managed directly by the state (Brown 1984:78; Piperno and Di Orio 1990:305). By the time the reform was instituted, the conflict between Church and state was dead and buried; the Christian Democrats had monopolized control of government for over three decades. Catholics by and large supported the creation of a nationalized system, since they were in control of the state and expected to derive clientelistic benefits from healthcare provision (Ferrera 1989:120; France and Taroni 2005:174).

5.2.2.2. France

In France, healthcare was traditionally regarded as a component of poor relief rather than independent social field on its own right (Steffen 1987:194; Weiss 1983:51–52). Before the Third Republic, hospitals and hospices were regulated by the same local welfare bureaus – in which the Catholic Church was statutorily entitled to nominate a representative - that directed public funding of charitable associations. The bureaus only regulated a minority of French hospitals, however. Hospitals operated by Catholic religious orders were outside the purview of the state (Cère 1872:201), despite the corporate criticism of secular doctors, who demanded a monopoly on the provision of medicine and complained that monks and nuns

had no right to be treated as doctors (Bonner 1995:192; Ramsey 1984:240). Doctors chafed under the heavy regulatory burden of the French state, which supervised medical education and admission to practice; although other European states had similar regulatory requirements, “the strength of the [French] state and the ... highly centralized and powerful administration” (Ramsey 1984:241) allowed bureaucrats to rigidly enforce those regulations.

As early as 1791, French radicals had developed the idea that healthcare should be a direct responsibility of the state (Léonard 1981:43). The Law Chapelier of June 1791 stated that “it is the business of the nation and its public officials ... to help the sick” (quoted in Hatzfeld 1989:192). French revolutionaries were not in a position to act upon the policies they put forward, however, since the republican regime was faced with constant foreign and domestic wars. It is also doubtful that the late eighteenth-century French state had the infrastructural capacity to set up a public healthcare system on a national scale (Steffen 1987:192). Nonetheless, republicans retained the principle that the state should play a leading role in medical care.

The Third Republic allowed French radicals to put in practice their plans for public healthcare provision. They started by sponsoring the creation of public hospitals to compete with those run by religious orders (Steffen 1987:195). The goal of the reformists was simple: as a prominent anticlerical explained in 1874, a public healthcare system would “remove from the Church its reason for existing ... [,] eliminate the charitable mask behind which the Church hides itself ... and prove that the secular state knows how to fulfil its duties towards the losers of life” (quoted in Smith 1998:261). Public hospitals were expected to compete successfully with insalubrious Catholic clinics by their modernity and hygiene.

Once the monarchist threat to the Third Republic was definitely eliminated, French radicals pushed on with their program of healthcare secularization (Talmy 1962:passim). Although republicans sought to establish a lay monopoly on public welfare, they were for the moment unable to do away with Catholic hospitals and especially Catholic personnel. There were practically no secular nurses in France; “in the 1870s, almost all of the country’s fifteen-hundred-odd hospitals were staffed by about eleven thousand members of active religious orders” (Schultheiss 1995:183). It was impossible to laicize the entire hospital staff of the country in one fell swoop. The replacement of the religious sisters would have to be a gradual process (Archambault and Boumendil 2002:112). Where direct state responsibility could not be put in place, firm supervision over private hospitals was established (Ashford 1986:135–37; Renard 1995:16). An 1893 law brought in free medical assistance for those who could not afford it, requiring doctors to set fees according to the income of their patients (Steffen 1983:248, 1987:195; Weiss 1983:63).

Step by step, the primacy of public, secular activity over any private forms of healthcare provision was established (Archambault 1997:18–19). The creation of secular nursing schools in 1899 led to the formation of qualified, secular personnel, thus obviating the necessity of relying on nuns (Schultheiss 1995:187, 2001:27–41). Only a steady supply of secular nurses could create the conditions for the growth of public hospitals. French republicans’ plan to establish the predominance of secularized over Catholic medicine bore fruit by the end of the First World War, when the number of patients in public clinics surpassed those of religious hospitals (Smith 1998:263).

As discussed in the previous section, the French parliament passed a far-reaching social insurance law in 1928 that included, among other aspects, mandatory health insurance (Dutton 2002:97). The legislation fell somewhat short of universal coverage because only those workers that paid social insurance contributions during the trimester prior to their hospitalization were allowed to benefit from health insurance. This excluded the unemployed and those without regular work (Sandier, Paris, and Polton 2004:7). Nonetheless, by mandating health insurance contributions by both workers and employers, French republicans clearly established the principle that the state had the primary responsibility to provide medical care. The infrastructurally might French state was able to ensure that the law was fully implemented, and that both workers and employers were contributing their fair share: “a 1930 survey of 13,376 firms by labour ministry inspectors revealed that nearly all were conducting their social insurance wage deductions” (Dutton 2002:108).

In 1945, the French government extended compulsory health insurance to all citizens, irrespective of employment status or prior contributions (Baldwin 1990:163–64; Sandier et al. 2004:5). While the British mould of a national health service directly run by the state was not established in France,¹⁸⁰ the 1945 law ensured that the entire cost of medical care would be borne by the public health insurance fund (Laroque 1948:579). Moreover, the French “state rapidly took responsibility for the financial and operational management of health insurance (for example, setting premium levels and the prices of goods and services, etc.)”

¹⁸⁰ There are some publicly operated hospitals in France. At the beginning of the twenty-first century, a little over two thirds of hospital capacity in France belonged to hospitals owned and operated by the state (Sandier et al. 2004:20).

(Sandier et al. 2004:8), giving the state a much more prominent role in the day-to-day administration of health policy than in countries with similar insurance-based systems like Germany or Canada. The French state closely regulates the nominally private hospitals, which for instance require prior state authorization to increase bed capacity or equipment (Sandier et al. 2004:14). The government also directly sets doctors' fees (Immergut 1992:72). Thus, postwar France was able to fulfil the promise of the Chapelier Law of 1791 and involve the state in caring directly for the sick.


5.2.3. Education

Public control of education was the major plank of the liberal political programme in France and Italy, figuring as the chief cause of the conflict between state and Church in the two countries. As a historian of nineteenth-century Germany put it, "there was no more important mission for the state than education" (Sheehan 1989:435). For Catholics, a public education system with a secular curriculum was nothing less than a wicked plot to corrupt the minds and souls of children. By contrast, anticlerical liberals thought the clergy used the classroom to recruit fanatic ultramontanes. They also held steadfast to the notion that secular values were morally superior to religious ones. For liberals, secular instruction was the basis on which a novel, enlightened civil society could flourish (Quine 2002:20). In addition to moral considerations, liberals understood that educating peasants and workers from the periphery was instrumental to build a strong national consciousness and inculcate the regime's values, which would solidify their hold on power (Ferrari 2006:533–34; de Swaan 1988:88).

Despite similar ideological and practical belief sets, the success of liberals in inculcating secular values differed markedly between France and Italy. Figure 5.8 shows how, during the late state-building period, France was able to enrol a substantially higher share of children in public schools than Italy. The reach of the public educational system in France did not only surpass laggards like Italy but even mighty countries like Germany and Britain.¹⁸¹ Indeed, Peter Lindert (2004a:87) notes that “by 1882 France had become an enrolments leader in Europe” while a historian of Italy notes that in the early twentieth century, “literacy levels still compared unfavourably to those of other western European countries” (Dunnage 2002:26). By contrast, Figure 5.9 shows that private education expenditures were significantly higher in Italy than in France. Lacking an effective public school system in the French mould, Italians invested in a private school network largely controlled by the Catholic Church.


¹⁸¹ That France led Europe in primary school enrolments after 1882 has not been adequately emphasized by the modern academic literature. The selection of population denominator for cross-sectional comparisons explains why French public education has been so underestimated: most historians choose the ratio of enrolments to the total population as the denominator, which is misleading. The most suitable benchmark should be the share of children in school, not the share of the total population. This distinction makes a crucial difference when there are cross-country differences in age distribution. For reasons that cannot be discussed here, France was an innovator in contraceptive methods, reducing fertility so much that by 1914 its population was the oldest in the world. The commonly-used ratio of elementary school students to total population is thus misleading. Correcting the ratio for the age distribution shows that France led the world in enrolments per school age children (Lindert 2004a:94).

Figure 5.8 - Public School Enrolment in France and Italy, 1860-1930



Source: Lindert (2004b: 120-135).

Figure 5.9 - Private Spending on Education in Italy and France, 1860-1930



Source: Lindert (2004b: 157-159).

5.2.3.1. Italy

As we have seen in the previous chapter, the leading Italian state of Piedmont had sought to create a secular school system even before unification. As early as 1839, Count Cavour gave his backing to attempts to secularize Piedmontese elementary schools (Tessitore 1911:36). However, it was only with the 1877 Coppino Law that compulsory elementary schooling was introduced in Italy¹⁸² (Halperin 1939:468–71). The Coppino Law mandated that all children attend primary school from ages six to nine and placed the burden of financing schools upon local and regional administrations. The law also excluded religion from the curriculum, although this “reform was more a matter of principle than of practice,” and despite the formal ban on religious education in public schools, “almost all municipalities retained the teaching of religion” (Ferrari 2006:537; also Raponi 1973:29).

Italian liberals’ lofty aims of establishing a mass education system that would educate all school age children from the Alps to Sicily also failed. Politicians struggled to adjust policy and practice and “failed to achieve the desired ends” (Dunnage 2002:25). In 1880, the first census after the passage of the Coppino Law revealed that only one-third of Italians over the age of six knew how to read. As expected, there were wide regional discrepancies. More than four-fifths of the population in the south was illiterate, followed closely by the Veneto with two-thirds of illiterates. Not coincidentally, the south and the Veneto were to be the heartlands of political Catholicism in Italy. By contrast, Piedmont and Liguria had a literacy rate above the fifty percent mark. Primary school provision also varied widely, from twenty-

¹⁸² The earlier Casati Law of 1859 had made the first two years of elementary education mandatory.

six schools per ten thousand inhabitants in Piedmont to six in Sicily and Basilicata. The main cause of the high levels of illiteracy lay in the inability of local governments to fulfil their responsibilities in the provision of education. Especially in southern municipalities, “insufficient funding prevented the enforcement of obligatory primary education” (Dunnage 2002:25).

No major educational reforms were instituted in Italy until the rise of Fascism, when access to public education was extended to enable political indoctrination¹⁸³ (Dunnage 2002:82–83). This effort was successful in the realm of secondary and higher education, with the number of students attending high schools and universities doubling during Mussolini’s rule, although admittedly starting from a low base. By contrast, the influence of Fascist education policies on elementary schooling was much more dubious. Incredibly, the regime’s own census of 1931 revealed that literacy had increased during the past ten years, indicating that Fascism was facing the same obstacles in reaching the peripheral masses as the Liberal regime had before (Dunnage 2002:84).

After the Second World War and the fall of Fascism, Italian Christian Democrats used their uninterrupted five-decade spell in power to simultaneously develop the public education system and establish public funding to support private (almost all Catholic) schools. These two goals were not contradictory but complementary, since the religious education

¹⁸³ Political indoctrination became especially prominent after 1929, in order to counterbalance the effects of the Lateran Pacts signed between Mussolini and the Vatican, which permitted Catholic Action youth activities to continue outside of the aegis of the regime (Charnitzky 1992:424).

was reinstated in public schools (Ferrari 2006:541–42). Indeed, the DC’s education policy went beyond assigning a specific religious instruction class to infusing the whole public school system with Catholic values. A contemporary observer noted how the postwar Italian school system “retains a strong Roman Catholic orientation ... it still serves to inculcate a system of values that is more attuned to conservative Catholic doctrine” (LaPalombara 1964:68).

5.2.3.2. France

As discussed in the previous chapter, the French school system was given its modern shape by anticlerical republicans in the late nineteenth century. In contrast to Italy, the infrastructurally mighty French state was able to forge a comprehensive nationwide school system, operated by an “ambitious education bureaucracy that was imbued with a civilizing and nation-building mission” (Morgan 2002:125).

In the late 1870s, the time when the Third Republic prevailed over its monarchist alternatives, more than three-quarters of French children were already attending elementary schools on a regular basis (Lindert 2004b:124–25; Weber 1976:308). The radical anticlerical governments that came to power after 1879 eagerly sought to build a republicanized education sector under the triple principle of free, compulsory, and secular education (Archambault 1997:35–37; Chadwick 1997:47–48; Willaime 1988:42–43). Jules Ferry, the Minister of Public Instruction, drove a series of reforms that converted the public school into a republican institution designed to erase particularistic religious identities and strengthen the nation-state as the only object of loyalty for French citizens (Ferrari 2006:535–36).

The intense legislative activity of Jules Ferry started with the prohibition of Jesuit schools in 1880; established free access to primary instruction in 1881; and was capped in 1882 by a law which made primary education mandatory for boys and girls between the ages of six and thirteen. Seeking to end the reliance on religious orders for school personnel, Ferry sponsored the formation of secular teacher training colleges. In 1887, school teachers became civil servants whose wages came directly from the public treasury; another law of the same year banned religious instruction in public secondary schools, replacing it with classes on secular morality (Ferrari 2006:536).

The second wave of Third Republican anticlericalism started with an 1901 law requiring state authorization of religious orders, with many of them being arbitrarily expelled (Archambault 1997:76). The 1901 law symbolized the triumph of the Ferry reforms, since the teacher training colleges established under his watch were now churning qualified graduates in such numbers that religious orders were no longer required to staff public schools. Finally, in 1904, a new measure prohibited religious orders from having any educational activity, even in private Catholic schools. Monks and nuns had hitherto formed the overwhelming majority of teachers in private schools, so the 1904 dealt a blow to the ability of the Church to maintain their separate education system. This obviously led to an immediate shortage of teachers and to a precipitous decline in the proportion of children educated in religious schools, which fell from one-quarter of all school age children in 1901 to eighteen percent in 1907 (Halls 1976:9).

Even before the Separation, schoolteachers were widely understood to be the front-line soldiers in the struggle against the social influence of Catholic clergy. For instance, a 1900 survey of teachers in the department of the Manche showed that little more than one in ten were Catholics,¹⁸⁴ in a country in which the overwhelming majority of the population was still nominally wedded to the Church (Magraw 2002:211). Teachers in remote villages sought to eradicate what they regarded as superstitious beliefs, condemning religious pageants and processions and demanding their prohibition (Weber 1976:363).

The infrastructural power of the French state allowed republicans to educate all schoolchildren, even in the most remote periphery. As Halls (1976:8) notes, “by the turn of the century no child, however remote his home, had to walk more than two kilometres to the nearest primary school.” The extensive coverage of the French school system also reached out to working-class families, who were the most likely to drop out of school. Children spent their entire day in school, a policy designed to support working-class mothers who worked outside the home (Morgan 2003:272).

French observers in the early twentieth century were particularly keen to engage in comparisons with Italy, where as we have seen, similar laws for compulsory and secular primary instruction failed to be properly implemented. A French republican noted in 1911 that

¹⁸⁴ This was less than half the number of those who openly claimed to be masons, even though the Freemasonry was an ostensibly secret society (Magraw 2002:211).

in Italy, the Act of 15 July [1877] removed the Catechism and the history of religion from the list of compulsory subjects. Some local authorities took advantage of this provision to give their primary schools a neutral ethos; but most of them maintained traditional religious teaching ... in practice followed by all the students. French legislation is the only one to have established a secular regime in a completely logical manner: secular teaching, secular teachers (quoted in Coutel 1991:220–21).

After the First World War, Catholics were aware that the reestablishment of religious instruction in public schools was extremely unlikely, and they concentrated their political efforts in securing public funding for private Catholic schools (Chadwick 1997:51; Ferrari 2006:539–40). As discussed above, the failure of the National Bloc to support subsidies for private schools was the major reason for Catholic withdrawal from the Bloc and re-formation of a separate political party in the PDP (Halls 1976:10; Talbott 1969:71–72). Subsidies to private education were enacted for the brief duration of the Vichy regime, before being repealed with the advent of the Fourth Republic. It was only with the return to power of General de Gaulle that a religious settlement in education was finally achieved, as the 1959 Debré Law mandated public funding of private schools (Chadwick 1997:53; Halls 1976:14). The law is still in place today.

5.3. French and Italian Catholic Associational Density

In this section, I analyse Catholic civil society associations in Italy and France. I focus first on Catholic welfare activities in both countries, paying special attention to charitable associations and mutual aid societies. I then briefly examine the various specialized Catholic

Action groups in both countries, including trade unions, rural syndicates, women's organizations, mass media, and youth groups. Throughout, I show that Catholic associational density was significantly higher in Italy than in France. At the root of this difference in the strength of Catholic civil society was the higher capacity of the French state compared with its Italian counterpart, which had the effect of crowding out private activities in France but not in Italy.¹⁸⁵ The connection was hinted at by Bosworth (1962:9), who argued that there is a negative correlation between state infrastructural power and religious associational strength, and the extension of the latter would lead to "a withering away of the state because Catholic groups existed to perform all its functions" (see also Fukuyama 2000:8; Salamon and Anheier 1998:239).

5.3.1. Catholic Welfare Activities

5.3.1.1. Italy

As we have seen, during the second half of the nineteenth century, the Italian state did not engage in providing or sponsoring any sort of welfare relief system (Quine 2002:29). Being unable to rely on the state during bad times, Italian workers joined private mutual aid

¹⁸⁵ The mechanisms of the crowding out effect are discussed more fully in Chapter 2. While there is some scholarly debate regarding the extent of the crowding out effect, generally the statistical findings have showed that "the relationship between nonprofit-sector size and the level of government welfare spending turns out to be negative for both the nonprofit sector as a whole and for the combined fields of education, health, and social services" (Salamon and Anheier 1998:239).

societies¹⁸⁶ sponsored by the Catholic Church, which were especially prevalent on the industrial north¹⁸⁷ (Cherubini 1977:46–58). Catholic mutual aid societies and charities had what an observer calls an “empirical monopoly in the provision of welfare services” (Ranci 1994:259).

In 1890, radical politician Francesco Crispi shepherded the passage of a law to the reorganize Catholic charitable institutions, including Church-sponsored mutual aid societies (Ranci 2015:2316). This was the legislative centrepiece of a series of centralizing reforms enacted by the left-wing government between 1887 and 1891, which were intended to craft a state capable of intervening directly in civil society and thus foster a unified sense of national belonging that would reduce the massive regional differences tearing the country apart (Farrell-Vinay 1997:320–24; Peruta 1991:209–13; Ranci 1994:249–50; Romanelli 1979:349–50, 1988). Crispi “called for an immediate nationalization” (Quine 2002:52) of all the assets of Catholic charities, stating that the “duty of the modern state was to expand its social power by usurping the Church’s traditional role in education and beneficence” (Quine 2002:55). At least on paper, the final law did just that: the responsibility for administering charitable organisations was to be transferred to centralized state control.

¹⁸⁶ Mutual aid societies are voluntary associations to protect contributors against the risks of illness, unemployment, and workplace injury. Each member paid was required to pay monthly fees, in exchange for which she or he was entitled to medical care and monetary indemnity in the event of incapacitation or unemployment.

¹⁸⁷ On the other hand, there were thousands of small villages – especially in the south – lacking welfare institutions of any kind (Quine 2002:51).

Despite the lofty hopes Crispi and his colleagues for an interventionist state capable of reaching all nooks and crannies of Italian society, some contemporary observers had their doubts. Antonio Salandra, a future Prime Minister, supported the law but cautioned that “the inexorable weakness in Crispi’s thinking on the social question was the misconception that the state could deliver ambitious reforms” (Quine 2002:56). Events were to prove Salandra right. The 1890 reform called for a survey of all existing charities by newly created prefectural inspectorates, as a prelude to their incorporation into the state. Because of the successful resistance of the Church to bureaucratic encroachments and the Italian state’s infrastructural deficiencies, by 1902 only 144 out of an estimated total of 12,684 charitable institutions¹⁸⁸ – around one percent - had been nationalized (Istituto per la Scienza dell’Amministrazione Pubblica 1990:168; Quine 2002:52). Catholic charities “generally succeeded in staving off ... government interference” (Ipsen 2006:135). The prefectural inspectorates mandated by the 1890 legislation “never really materialized” (Quine 2002:60), which left the burden of surveying the charities in the hands of under-paid and under-staffed regular civil servants (Istituto per la Scienza dell’Amministrazione Pubblica 1990:172–82). Two decades after the law was passed, the Campanian civil service had not even begun to survey the charities in the region (Quine 2002:60). Even in the north of Italy, where public administration was reasonably competent, Catholic charities were able to successfully defy the dictates of the state (Laschi 1899:334–49). As late as 1920, government authorities in Piedmont were still

¹⁸⁸ Well into the twentieth century, the government still knew very little about how many charitable institutions actually existed and what their assets were (Farrell-Vinay 1997:291–95). Since Catholic charities had every incentive to stay underground, in order to avoid nationalization, the numbers cited here almost certainly undercount the real number of charities.

unable to impose any sort of public control over charitable institutions.¹⁸⁹ In sum, Italian anticlerical reformers bit off more than they could chew: they passed grandiose legislation to build a government monopoly over the provision of charity when they did not have a modern state apparatus capable of taking on the task (Davis 1994:293; Rogger and Weber 1965:212–13). As a survey of the relationship between the Italian state and private charities puts it: “strong formal regulation, but weak financial accountability and no valid practical control” (Ascoli et al. 2002:139–40).

5.3.1.2. France

Mutual aid societies became quite popular in France after 1815, helping to fill the void left by the revolutionary closure of confraternities and guilds enshrined in the Chapelier Law (Archambault 1997:34, 2001:208; Rosanvallon 1990:176). These mutual societies “depended on a benefactor, such as the Church ... or a regional patron” (Dutton 2002:40). Throughout the nineteenth century, the Catholic Church viewed mutualism as a vital instrument for maintaining its social influence and fiercely resisted state interference, most notably by pressuring Emperor Napoleon III into abandoning his plan to provide a state-sponsored mutuality in every French municipality (Dreyfus 1996:212).


¹⁸⁹ When local authorities in Piedmont sought to expropriate the assets of the religious charities in their region, they realized that the charities had withdrawn all their liquid assets and invested their capital into the building of churches. Despite the fact that the Interior Ministry was aware of the move, it was unable to prevent the squandering of the charities’ capital (Quine 2002:59).

After republicans returned to power in the 1870s, mutual aid societies and private charitable assistance in general became a politically charged issue. Both Catholics and anticlerical republicans understood that control over philanthropic associations was the key to maintain and extend their influence over society (Smith 1998:250). At stake in the conflict was nothing less than the role of Church and state in public life. Anticlerical republicans “kept a critical eye on any societal movement or organisation that did not belong to the realm of the state” (Archambault, Priller, and Zimmer 2014:517). Thus, they sought to undercut religiously-sponsored mutual aid societies through restrictive legislation and the promotion of alternative state-sponsored associations (Dumons and Pollet 1994:103–18; Dutton 2002:41; Manow and Palier 2009:155; Merrien 1990:191–92). The state provided a financial advantage to public mutual societies by guaranteeing a generous 4.5 % return on capital, which naturally made public associations more attractive to workers (Dreyfus 2015:20). Simultaneously, the state actively suppressed so-called ‘free’ private mutual aid societies by imposing severe regulatory burdens (Archambault 2015:2295; Morgan 2003:273; Saint-Jours, Dreyfus, and Durand 1990:66; Seibel 1990:47; Ullman 1998:46–47). The results of this policy were quickly felt. Between 1882 and 1902, more than one million workers joined publicly sponsored societies while only about a tenth of that number chose to join the free societies. In practice, these policies “broke the back of Church-created voluntary institutions and set a course toward state-sponsored social welfare” (Salamon and Anheier 1998:243).

Figure 5.10 shows the share of mutual aid societies that were sponsored by private entities in France between 1850 and 1910 (data from Guyot 1913; Weber 1908). As the figure suggests, when Napoleon III took over as Emperor in 1852, practically all mutual aid societies in France were independent of the state. The proportion of free mutuals gradually decreased

during the Empire, but they still constituted four-fifths of the total during the 1870s. Due to the financial and regulatory policies pursued by Third Republic leaders, however, the number of state-sponsored mutuals increased exponentially in the last two decades of the century, while free societies were unable to find new members (Dutton 2002:42; Hatzfeld 1989:211–13; Rosanvallon 1990:181). By 1900 only one mutual society in five was independent of state patronage. An organizer of mutual aid societies linked to the Catholic party ALP lamented, “there is a condition that is absolutely necessary for the development of these societies, and that is the exclusion of the state; whenever the state is active, the societies vegetate and perish...” (quoted in *Action Libérale Populaire* 1909:42).

Figure 5.10 - Private and Public Mutual Aid Societies in France, 1850-1910



Source: Weber (1908) and Guyot (1913).

5.3.2. Catholic Action


As discussed in previous sections, the Catholic Church sought to integrate its various lay civil society associations within the organized framework of ‘Catholic Action’ (Casella 1992b:16). While the original formation of Catholic civil society associations dates back centuries, their incorporation into one comprehensive national organization under hierarchical control was largely the work of Pope Pius XI in the interwar years (Chiron 2004:199; Pollard 2012:763–64). Catholic Action was defined by three essential characteristics. First, it encompassed effectively all lay Catholic associations, including sections for youth, students, adults, workers, peasants, women, and so forth. Second, the organization was hierarchically structured to mirror the Church, including parochial, diocesan and national levels. Third, lay officials at each of those hierarchical levels were paired with an ‘ecclesiastical assistant’ (the local priest or bishop) that had the responsibility to supervise their activities¹⁹⁰ (Pollard 2012:761–62). All nominations of lay officers were made by the clergy, with the Pope himself appointing national leaders. The short formula used by Pius IX to describe Catholic Action was the laity’s “participation in the apostolate of the hierarchy” (Chiron 2004:199).

¹⁹⁰ There were national variations regarding the precise balance of power between clergy and laity. French Catholic Action groups were more reliant on the hierarchy than their Italian counterparts, because they were less dynamic and were unable to mobilize many committed lay activists. In France, the parish priest was usually the driving force behind local Catholic Action associations, with laypeople taking on an active role only “in exceptional conditions” (Bosworth 1962:87). Italian laity, by contrast, were more influential in directing the movement than clergy.

Despite the similarity in Catholic Action organizational structure across France and Italy, the associational density of the organization in both countries was very different (see Bouju 1997; Casella 2014; Warner 1994). For instance, in Italy during the 1950s, around five percent of the population belonged to at least one organisation associated with Catholic Action (Casella 1990; Warner 1994:74). This contrasted with France, where membership of Catholic Action organizations averaged less than one percent of the population during the fifties, although recruitment picked up somewhat after the Second Vatican Council (Warner 1994:67). Figure 5.11 shows the percentage of people in Italy and France who belonged to a Catholic Action-affiliated organisation between 1945 and 1965.¹⁹¹ I now briefly discuss the associational density of two important Catholic Action groups in France and Italy: trade unions and rural syndicates.

¹⁹¹ Membership statistics of the Italian branch of Catholic Action are quite reliable, thanks to the work of Mario Casella (1984a, 1984b, 1987, 1990, 1992b, 1992a, 1997, 2014). Data on France's Catholic Action are less precise and should thus be interpreted with caution (Warner 1994:69–71).

Figure 5.11 - Catholic Action Membership in France and Italy, 1945-1965



Sources: Bouju (1997); Casella (2014); Warner (1994).


5.3.2.1. Trade Unions

The industrial working-class is not a group that is usually receptive to the appeals of political Catholicism. In France, no other social class was as de-Christianized and hostile to the Church as urban workers¹⁹² (Bosworth 1962:108). Italian workers, by contrast, were more evenly split between Catholic and left-wing organisational milieus. The international conference of Catholic trade unions of 1919 shows clearly the marked difference in organizational capabilities between French and Italian Catholic unionism. The Italian union

¹⁹² Even in the parliamentary election of June 1946, in which the MRP came first with 28 % of the votes, only around fifteen percent of working-class voters supported the MRP (Irving 1973:55–56).

confederation, with more than a million adherents, “was by far the largest [while] the French lagged far behind ... with some 98,000 union members” (Misner 2015:41–42). Figure 5.12 shows more broadly how Italian Catholic unions captured a much greater share of unionized workers than their French counterparts in the first six decades of the twentieth century.

Figure 5.12 - Catholic Unionism in France and Italy, 1900-1960



Source: Kersbergen (1995).

The Catholic working-class in France was represented by the French Confederation of Christian Workers (CFTC – *Confédération Française des Travailleurs Chrétiens*), which was organized in 1919¹⁹³ (Pierrard 1984:521; Rollet 1955:201; Thormann 1970:67). The CFTC was

¹⁹³ The ancestry of Catholic trade unionism in France goes back to the Catholic Workers’ Circles (OCCO – *Oeuvre des Cercles Catholiques d’Ouvriers*) formed by Count Albert de Mun in 1871 and targeted towards blue-collar

always for the most part a white-collar union, and it was particularly strong in the recruitment of women (Launay 1986:41–42; Thormann 1970:71–72). Having a much lower number of adherents than Socialist and Communist rivals, French Catholic unions were unable to function effectively as a collective bargaining agent, confining their activities to educational events and training of activists. During the interwar period, the French clergy became painfully aware of its inability to reach the working-class and sought to remedy this by forming Catholic Action sections for workers,¹⁹⁴ of which the most significant was the Young Christian Workers (JOC – *Jeunesse Ouvrière Chrétienne*). Despite the relatively small number of members, the JOC quickly developed a reputation as “the most dynamic organization of French Catholic Action” (Misner 2015:233).

Both the JOC and the CFTC maintained close relations with the pre-war Catholic party PDP and the postwar MRP. Eighteen percent of the MRP parliamentarians elected in the first three elections of the postwar era came directly from the CFTC (Bonafoux-Verrax 2004:193–212; Irving 1973:49; Misner 2015:237). Despite the close ties with official Catholic unionism, the MRP never managed to obtain significant working-class support; but whatever popularity it did have with workers occurred “in areas where the CFTC was strong” (Irving 1973:56). Unfortunately for French Catholics, there were not many such areas. Even in the aftermath of the Second World War – the heyday of political Catholicism in France –, the Communist

workers; and the Union of Commerce and Industry Employees (SECI – *Syndicat des Employés du Commerce et de l’Industrie*) for white-collar workers (Berger 1987:119; Misner 2015:8).

¹⁹⁴ French bishops tried frantically to mobilize workers to join the CFTC, as they explained in a 1945 episcopal letter: “we earnestly remind all Catholics that their place is in the Christian trade unions” (quoted in Bosworth 1962:270).

union had eight times more members than the CFTC (Galant 1955:69; Manow and Palier 2009:162). Eventually, the CFTC itself came to the conclusion that close links with the Church were an albatross to expansion. At the 1964 union convention, more than seventy percent of delegates voted to cut the ties with the Catholic Church and transform the CFTC into a secular union (Thormann 1970:92). As discussed above, the shock of the secularization of the CFTC contributed directly to the decision of the Catholic party MRP to disband.

Because the Italian economy industrialized later and to a lesser degree than the French, the development of Catholic unionism in Italy lagged its French counterpart. The reorganisation of Catholic civil society associations by Pope Pius X in 1904 stimulated activists to promote cooperatives and workers' organizations. Before the start of the First World War, Catholic 'labour leagues' had more than one hundred thousand members (Misner 2015:11). These labour leagues were proto-unions that defended the interests of workers in disputes with employers, and occasionally even resorted to strikes. Luigi Sturzo, the founder of the Catholic party PPI, played a prominent role in this early outreach effort to Italian workers.

Despite the organisation of Catholic unions in all but name, Pope Pius X constantly refused to permit the creation of an official Catholic union. His successor Benedict XV had no such qualms (Aubert 1978:543–44; Pollard 1999:177–78). In March 1918, Benedict assented to the formation of the Italian Confederation of Workers (CIL – *Confederazione Italiana dei Lavoratori*), which for the first time aggregated all Catholic labour leagues into a union federation (Misner 2015:40; Traniello and Campanini 1981:213–25; Valente 1978:136–42). Immediately after its creation, the CIL could boast of having more than a million members.

The CIL collaborated enthusiastically with the PPI, and was abolished when Mussolini came to power (Conway 1997:28).

Once the Fascist dictatorship crumbled under the strains of the war, independent trade unionism was able to spring back to life. The long years of dictatorship convinced Catholic workers that working-class disunion was a major obstacle to the furtherance of their interests, and they reached out to Socialists and Communists to forge a united trade union organization (Candeloro 1950:143; Galli and Facchi 1962:361; Leonardi and Wertman 1989:32; Vecchio, Saresella, and Trionfini 1999:79–80). Their efforts bore fruit on June 1944, when the General Italian Confederation of Labour (CGIL – *Confederazione Generale Italiana del Lavoro*) was formed as Italy's single trade union. Working-class unity was short-lived, however, and the CGIL quickly became divided into rival Communist, Socialist, and Catholic factions. The Catholic Association of Italian Workers (ACLI – *Associazioni Cristiane dei Lavoratori Italiani*), a “para-trade union organization” within the CGIL, was set up in August 1944, less than two months after the formation of the CGIL itself (LaPalombara 1964:226; Leonardi and Wertman 1989:33; Manoukian 1968:474). The ACLI was nothing less than the pre-war Catholic union CIL under another name, and it immediately began managing social welfare activities for its members and mobilizing voters to support the Christian Democrats (LaPalombara 1964:224–27). Naturally, Communist and Socialist factions did the same.


Because Catholics were outnumbered in the CGIL by Communists and Socialists, it was only a matter of time until the ACLI faction seceded to form its autonomous organization. This is what happened after the expulsion of the Communists from the government in 1948: the Catholic section split and formed the Italian Confederation of Workers' Unions (CISL –

Confederazione Italiana dei Sindacati dei Lavoratori). The CISL then became a close ally of the DC during the postwar era, which contributing with about thirty union members to the Christian Democratic parliamentary group (Leonardi and Wertman 1989:214; Saba 1996:357–66; Vecchio et al. 1999:238–45; Warner 1994:76–77).

5.3.2.2. Rural Syndicates

While Italian Catholic unionism is vastly more influential than its French counterpart, Catholic movements in the two countries are more evenly matched in terms of their rural organisational density. As Figure 5.13 suggests, Catholic agricultural syndicates in France captured a larger proportion of non-urban inhabitants than their Italian equivalents in the years immediately after the end of the Second World War, although during the fifties French rural syndicates withered while Italian ones flourished. Italy's Catholic rural syndicates had to face the competition of strong left-wing movements in the countryside, while French syndicates by and large had the field to themselves, which explains why the two movements were so evenly matched in the immediate post-war years (Luebbert 1991:9–13). After the stabilization of the postwar political systems, Italian syndicates grew “fertilized by corruption, coercion and Catholicism” (Warner 1994:87) but French syndicates stagnated.

Figure 5.13 - Catholic Rural Syndicates in France and Italy, 1945-1960



Source: Warner (1994: 82-88).

Peasants were more receptive than workers to the appeal of French Catholics. As early as 1884, Catholics began forming syndicates for the defence of agricultural interests (Cleary 1982:127). As the most eloquent members of their communities, priests played a vital role in the formation of early rural collectivities (Cleary 1989:25). In the first two decades of the twentieth century, the French Association of Catholic Youth (ACJF – *Association Catholique de la Jeunesse Française*) was especially active in forming agricultural associations. In the postwar era, the leadership role of the French countryside was passed on to the Christian Rural Youth (JAC – *Jeunesse Agricole Chrétienne*). During the fifties and sixties, the JAC was by far the most impressive branch of French Catholic Action, boasting of a membership close to 300,000 (Bosworth 1962:122; Irving 1973:48). The JAC was able to disseminate the influence of Catholicism in the rural world by assisting peasant-farmers in practical, tangible ways

(D'Haene 1954:95; Durupt 1963:199; Wright 1953:541). For instance, the JAC promoted the formation of cooperatives as a way to achieve economies of scale (Lambert 1985:119–26). We should not exaggerate the extent to which Catholicism dominated the countryside, however. The MRP “failed to build an effective party organization throughout rural France” (Wright 1953:542) and the JAC struggled to translate its influence among the farmers into votes for the MRP.

Italian Catholics also have a long history of organizational success in the countryside. When the working-class union CIL was coming into being in 1918, Italian rural workers and small landowners were already members of a dense network of Catholic associations. These syndicates were popular among sharecroppers, small tenant farmers, and especially small landowners. Even though landless agricultural workers were largely mobilized by the left, PPI leader Guido Miglioli also organized significant pockets of support among the rural proletariat, particularly in Lombardy (Pollard 1997:174). Independent rural unionism was abolished by the Fascists, and only re-emerged after the war. Paolo Bonomi, one of the leaders of the new Christian Democrat party, formed the National Confederation of Smallholders (CNCD – *Confederazione Nazionale dei Coltivatori Diretti*; better known as *Coldiretti*) in 1945 to represent the views of Catholic smallholders (Ginsborg 1990:171; LaPalombara 1964:136). The corresponding organization in France was the National Federation of Smallholder Syndicates (FNSEA – *Fédération Nationale des Syndicats d'Exploitants Agricoles*), which always played a secondary role to the more dynamic JOC (Cleary 1989:88–89). Both the *Coldiretti* and the FNSEA engaged in similar activities, managing educational courses, operating credit and insurance cooperatives, and generally mobilizing

smallholders as an interest group. Neither group allowed landless workers to join¹⁹⁵ (Tavernier 1969:64), and both were affiliated with the respective national branches of Catholic Action.

The Italian *Coldiretti* mushroomed from around seventy thousand associated families in 1945 to more than two million in the late sixties. This growth allowed it to become “one of Italy’s most powerful interest groups” (Leonardi and Wertman 1989:216). *Coldiretti* members figured prominently in Christian Democratic election lists, constituting between seven (1987) and fourteen (1958) percent of all DC members of parliament (Leonardi and Wertman 1989:217). During the long period of Christian Democratic domination of government, the *Coldiretti* always had one of their own holding a position in the Ministry of Agriculture.¹⁹⁶ The influence of the *Coldiretti* within the countryside was always visible in election day, when more than four-fifths of landowners supported the DC (LaPalombara 1964:94–95).

The *Coldiretti* was able to grow so rapidly thanks to the support of a friendly Christian Democratic government (Warner 2000:149–50). In the immediate postwar years, the DC sponsored the formation of quasi-public agricultural consortiums¹⁹⁷ to promote rural economic development by providing a series of benefits¹⁹⁸ (LaPalombara 1964:235–40).

¹⁹⁵ French landless peasants could join the Rural Families’ Movement (MFR – *Mouvement Familial Rural*), a rather less successful version of the FNSEA without class-based restrictions on membership (Irving 1973:48).

¹⁹⁶ Normally the Ministry itself but sometimes also a junior ministerial post.

¹⁹⁷ The consortiums were intended to replicate the Catholic smallholders’ movement of the late nineteenth century, which performed mutual aid functions before being taken over by the Fascist regime.

¹⁹⁸ Such as selling fertilizer, farm machinery, and agricultural raw materials at bargain prices; providing educational seminaries to assist farmers in the use of new technologies; extending lines of credit at low interest


Despite their quasi-public role, in practice the consortiums were treated as appendages of the *Coldiretti*, which created strong pressures for farmers to join the *Coldiretti* or risk missing on the benefits of the consortiums (Cavallaro 1958:23–39; Manoukian 1968:445–53). In addition to running the quasi-public consortiums, the *Coldiretti* also schemed with the Christian Democrats to gain control of the provincial public agencies managing health insurance funds for farmers. These agencies were established by the Christian Democrats in 1954, and set up in such a way that the *Coldiretti* was able to take control of the overwhelming majority of their boards (LaPalombara 1964:241–42).

5.3.3. Who Votes for the Catholics?

The associational superiority of Italian over French Catholicism was reflected in the performance of the two countries' respective confessional parties. The linkage between the two is most evident when considering party membership levels. As Figure 5.14 reveals (data from Leonardi and Wertman 1989; and Letamendia 1995), the DC had a much higher number of party members than the MRP, both in absolute terms and as a share of the electorate.

rates and long maturities; subsidizing legal assistance to farmers during litigation; crop storage; and so forth (LaPalombara 1964:235–40).


Figure 5.14 - Catholic Party Membership in France and Italy, 1945-1965



Source: Leonardi & Wertman (1989); Letamendia (1995).

Figure 5.15 shows that the organizational superiority of the Italian Christian Democrats resulted in sustained electoral success, while the brief triumph of the French MRP in the postwar era turned out to be not more than a flash in the pan.

Figure 5.15 - Catholic Party Vote Share in France and Italy, 1920-1965



Source: Caramani (2000).


In the final section of this chapter, I analyse the association between Catholic organisational density and confessional party support in Italy and France.

5.3.9.1. Italy

Beyond the analytic narratives described thus far, is there any systematic evidence backing the proposition that Italian confessional political parties actually benefited from Catholic civil society networks? Do regional variations in state infrastructural power translate into predictable patterns of confessional party support? Figure 5.16 reveals that in 1948 – the year of the decisive Christian Democratic election victory that set the stage for decades of DC domination - there was broad regional variation in the share of school age children attending

public schools (see right figure), which can plausibly be taken as a proxy for state infrastructural power. This seems to be consistently correlated with DC party vote share (left figure). The Christian Democratic party obtained its strongest electoral support in the northeastern agricultural regions of the Veneto, Friuli-Venezia-Giulia, and Trentino-Alto Adige, and from the rural southern regions of Campania, Basilicata, Calabria, and Sardinia (LaPalombara 1964:91). The DC was strong both in certain areas of the north and of the south, and a glance at the figure reveals that they seem to coincide with the areas in which public schools educated a smaller proportion of children. By contrast, the so-called 'red belt' going from the north-western region of Piedmont to the Communist stronghold of Emilia-Romagna has a very high share of school age children in public schools and a comparatively weak Christian Democratic electoral performance.

Figure 5.16 - Catholic Party Vote Share and Public Schools in Italy, 1948



While Figure 5.16 certainly suggests a basic negative correlation between infrastructural power and religious party vote share, only by controlling for possible

confounders can a plausible causal relationship linking state capacity, Catholic organizational density, and Christian Democratic party success be ascertained. I thus conduct a time-series cross-sectional OLS regression of provincial¹⁹⁹ Catholic party vote in the general elections of 1919, 1921, 1946 and 1948.²⁰⁰ The chief independent variables are the infrastructural power of the state and Catholic associational density. To measure differences in the presence of the Italian state across the territory, I include in the regressions an indicator for the share of children between the ages of six and ten who attended public schools (Istituto Centrale di Statistica 1924b, 1950b). The other key independent variable – Catholic associational density – is measured by two indicators. The first is the per capita charitable expenditure of Catholic charities (Cherubini 1977:42–44); the second is the share of the adult population in each province who are formal members of Catholic Action²⁰¹ (Casella 1992b, 2014). I also control for a set of additional variables: provincial income per capita; share of the population working

¹⁹⁹ Italian provinces are second level institutional bodies, above municipalities and just below the national level. The division of the Italian territory into provinces was put in place immediately after unification in 1861, making the units ideal for time-series analysis.

²⁰⁰ In the first two elections, the Catholic party was the PPI; in the latter two, Catholics were represented by the DC. To control for a possible party-specific effect on the results, I include a dummy variable in all models separating the elections of 1946–1948 from those of 1919–1921 (results not shown). I do not analyse the post-1948 elections because, as discussed above, the Christian Democrats used their control of government to build a patronage machine that sustained further electoral triumphs. Thus, it would be misleading to compare the post-1948 elections with those in which Christian Democrats had to mobilize bottom-up support from civil society without government patronage.

²⁰¹ As we have seen, Italian Catholic Action was divided into distinct sociodemographic sections. The variable used here is the sum of the members belonging to the organizations for girls, boys, men and women. Members could only belong to one of the branches so there is no possibility of double counting. See Casella (2014:5–6) for details.

in agriculture and industry;²⁰² population density;²⁰³ share of Catholics in the population; and landholding inequality²⁰⁴ (Istituto Centrale di Statistica 1922, 1924a, 1950a, 1952). Table 5.1 reports the results for five time-series cross-sectional OLS regressions.

Model 1 of Table 5.1 shows that Catholic charitable spending is significantly correlated with confessional party support in a simple bivariate relationship. The same is true in Model 2, which shows a strong positive bivariate correlation between Catholic Action associational density and confessional party vote share. In Model 3 we see that the bivariate relationship between state infrastructural power and Catholic party strength is strongly significant and in the predicted direction: provinces with higher shares of children in public schools are less likely to vote for the confessional party. Models 4 and 5 add the set of socioeconomic controls to the main independent variables of interest, which retain their high statistical significance. In other words, Catholic organizational networks appear to underpin confessional party success in Italy, above and beyond all other socioeconomic characteristics of the province. Even when controlling for Catholic associational strength, lower levels of infrastructural power – proxied by a smaller share of children attending public schools – is still inversely correlated with confessional party strength.

²⁰² LaPalombara (1964:91) expects DC support to be concentrated in less industrial and more agricultural areas.

²⁰³ LaPalombara (1964:91–92) expects a strongly negative correlation between support for the Christian Democrats and community size, meaning that smaller, closer-knit communities should be more likely to back the DC than the atomized, individualistic public of big cities.

²⁰⁴ Landholding inequality is measured as the share of landless agricultural workers in the rural population.

Table 5.1 - Provincial Vote Share for the Catholic Party in Italy, 1919-1948

		5.1.1	5.1.2	5.1.3	5.1.4	5.1.5
Catholic	Charity	2.039			2.137	
	Spending (PC)	(0.973)**			(0.586)***	
Catholic	Action		0.981			0.878
	Membership (PC)		(0.273)***			(0.161)***
	Public Schooling			-2.035	-1.442	-1.560
				(0.578)***	(0.349)***	(0.348)***
	Income (PC)				0.019	0.007
					(0.011)*	(0.012)
	Agriculture				-0.213	-0.216
					(0.083)**	(0.082)***
	Industry				-0.039	-0.049
					(0.116)	(0.115)
	Population Density				-0.007	-0.005
					(0.006)	(0.006)
	Landholding Inequality				-0.129	-0.102
					(0.050)***	(0.051)**
	Share of Catholics				1.125	1.220
					(0.164)***	(0.167)***
Provinces		91	91	91	87	87

Observations	284	284	284	250	250

* $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$. Time-series cross-sectional OLS regression model, with standard errors clustered by province. Dependent variable is the provincial vote share of the Italian People's Party in the general elections of 1919 and 1921, and the provincial vote share of the Christian Democratic Party in the general elections of 1946 and 1948. PC stands for per capita.

To illustrate the specific effect of Catholic civil society organisations on confessional party support, I simulate the impact of Catholic Action density on Christian Democratic provincial vote share in the 1948 elections. I use Model 5 of Table 5.1 and set Catholic Action density for certain provinces at zero while all other covariates remain at their real values. The purpose of this exercise is to consider the counterfactual. How would the crucial 1948 election play out for the Christian Democrats if they did not have the support of Catholic Action?

As Figure 5.17 suggests, the results would have been very different. The outcome of the elections for some provinces was decisively affected by Catholic Action. For instance, in the southern province of Bari, the observed vote share of the Christian Democrats in 1948 was just over fifty percent of the vote, leading to the election of twelve DC members of parliament.²⁰⁵ Without any Catholic Action membership,²⁰⁶ the vote share of the DC in Bari

²⁰⁵ Italian MPs were not elected at the provincial level but at more aggregate jurisdictions. The province of Bari elected MPs together with the province of Foggia, although Bari had almost three times the number of voters that Foggia did.


²⁰⁶ Catholic Action membership in Bari in 1948 was slightly above the national average at 3.2 percent of the population.

would have more than halved to 19 percent, which would have led to the election of only four Christian Democratic MPs – a two-thirds drop from the actual result! To take a less dramatic but equally instructive example: the province of Udine in the northeast was a firm Christian Democratic stronghold in which 57 percent of voters cast a ballot for the DC in 1948, resulting in the election of nine MPs.²⁰⁷ My counterfactual simulation shows that without any Catholic Action membership,²⁰⁸ the solidly Catholic province of Udine would have become more competitive, with the Christian Democrats dropping to only 44 percent of the vote. Nationally, the actual Christian Democratic vote share in 1948 was 49 percent. In the counterfactual simulation with Catholic Action density set at zero for all provinces, Christian Democratic vote share drops to only 32 percent.

²⁰⁷ The province of Udine shared a constituency to elect MPs with the provinces of Belluno and Gorizia, although Udine contributed more than two-thirds of the voters to the overall constituency.

²⁰⁸ Udine had a very high Catholic Action membership rate at 7.5 percent of the population.

Figure 5.17 - Marginal Effects of Italian Catholic Action on Christian Democratic Vote, 1948




In sum, the regressions of Table 5.1 and the simulations of Figure 5.17 show how Catholic associational density had a strong and statistically significant effect on the electoral performance of Italian confessional parties. By narrowing the focus of the statistical analysis to Catholic Action organizations – to the exclusion of charities, for instance –, the findings reported in Figure 5.17 are likely if anything to minimise the weight of the Catholic organizational world in helping explain Christian Democratic success. Yet even with this narrow focus on a subset of the diverse Catholic associational world, I show that Catholic Action’s bottom-up activism was a key instrument in sustaining the electoral dominance of the Italian Christian Democratic party.

5.3.9.2. France

We have seen how Catholic associational density and the regionally uneven infrastructural power of the Italian state combine to explain the electoral performance of Italian political Catholicism. Is the same true for France? Figure 5.18 begins to address that question by showing the geographical association of regional state capacity – proxied, as before, by the percentage of school aged children attending public schools – with confessional party performance in France. The left map of Figure 5.18 shows the departmental²⁰⁹ vote share for the MRP in the second postwar elections of June 1946, while the right map shows the share of children between the ages of six and ten who attended public elementary schools in 1946. The departments with lower levels of public school attendance belong mostly to the peripheral areas of the country, especially Brittany in the west, the Nord, and the Mediterranean coast. As Figure 5.18 makes clear, this was also by and large the political base of French Catholicism, with the exception of the Mediterranean departments and Corsica.

Figure 5.18 - Catholic Party Vote Share and Public Schools in France, 1946



²⁰⁹ French departments roughly correspond to Italian provinces as an intermediary level of government between municipalities and the national level.

But the question still stands: is Catholic associational density and state infrastructural capacity associated in systematic and predictable ways with the electoral performance of French confessional parties? As in the previous section, I tackle the issue by running a time-series cross-sectional OLS analysis in which the dependent variable is Catholic party vote share in each French department for the general elections of 1902, 1928, 1936, 1945, 1946 (June), 1946 (November), 1951, and 1956.²¹⁰ Since the objective of the analysis is to measure whether Catholic associational density and state infrastructural power are systematically correlated with confessional party performance, I adopt a three-pronged approach similar to the Italian regressions above – measuring state infrastructural power through the share of school age children educated in public schools; and measuring Catholic associational density through two proxy variables.

The first measure of Catholic associational density is simply the number of clerics in each department per one thousand inhabitants. This is intended to measure the strength of the formal Catholic Church organization, as opposed to its ancillary associations linked to Catholic Action (Direction de la Statistique Générale 1947; Institut National de la Statistique et des Études Économiques 1952, 1957; Statistique Générale de la France 1903, 1929, 1931, 1946). The second measure of Catholic associational density that I use is the departmental share of the population who belongs to Catholic Action (Warner 1994, 2000). To assess

²¹⁰ The French Catholic party in the general election of 1902 was the ALP; in the general elections of 1928 and 1936 was the PDP; and in the general elections of 1945, 1946, 1951, and 1956 was the MRP. Regressions results include a nominal variable (not shown) that took a value of zero if the PDP was the Catholic party, one if the PDP was the Catholic party, and two if the MRP was the Catholic party. Thus we can be confident that the results are not the artefact of the differences between the various incarnations of French Catholicism.

whether departmental differences in state infrastructural power influence confessional party support, I include an indicator measuring the share of children between six and ten who attended public elementary schools (Harrigan 1992; Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research 2010).

In addition to the main independent variables listed above, I also include a set of controls for several sociodemographic indicators that might be expected to influence confessional party vote share at the departmental level: per capita income, the share of the workforce employed in agriculture and industry, population density, and landholding inequality.²¹¹ Data for all these variables was obtained from French statistical yearbooks (Direction de la Statistique Générale 1947; Institut National de la Statistique et des Études Économiques 1952, 1957; Statistique Générale de la France 1903, 1929, 1931, 1946).

We are now in a position to see whether my theoretical expectations withstand empirical scrutiny. Table 5.2 presents the results of the time-series cross-sectional OLS regression model. Model 1 shows that there is a strong positive bivariate correlation between the number of clergy per capita and support for the confessional political party at the departmental level. Likewise, Model 2 shows that French political Catholicism was more successful in departments with greater per capita membership of Catholic Action; while Model 3 suggests that there is a strong inverse correlation between confessional party strength and state infrastructural power. In Models 4 and 5 I include additional control

²¹¹ As in the Italian regressions, I measure landholding inequality as the share of landless agricultural workers in the rural population.

variables, which show that even when holding important sociodemographic indicators constant, the main independent variables are strongly statistically significant and in the predicted direction.²¹² All in all, each of the five model specifications show a consistent statistically significant and substantive impact of the three primary variables of interest.

Table 5.2 - Departmental Vote Share for the Catholic Party in France, 1902-1956

	5.2.1	5.2.2	5.2.3	5.2.4	5.2.5
Share of Clergy	3.923 (0.890)***			4.175 (0.913)***	
Catholic Action		1.101 (0.354)***			0.910 (0.366)**
Membership (PC)					
Public Schooling			-0.287 (0.071)***	-0.367 (0.083)***	-0.261 (0.077)***
Income (PC)				-0.143 (0.122)	-0.273 (0.116)**
Agriculture				0.077	0.189

²¹² Interestingly, the control variables for per capita income and population shares in agriculture are only statistically significant in Model 5 (when the main independent variable is Catholic Action membership) but not in Model 4 (when the main independent variable is clergy per thousand inhabitants). This suggests that the stronger support given by poor rural regions to French Catholic parties is mediated by the higher number of clerics in these regions. One possible interpretation of this finding is that poorer rural regions offer less economic opportunities to young men, whose embrace of the priesthood ends up being one of the few alternatives to poverty. It is interesting to note that income and rurality are statistically significant when controlling for Catholic Action membership in Model 5, suggesting that Catholic civil society organizations recruit from a wider spectrum of the population than does the clerical hierarchy of the Church itself.

				(0.056)	(0.064)***
Industry				0.119	0.141
				(0.082)	(0.083)*
Population Density				-0.000	0.001
				(0.001)	(0.001)
Landholding Inequality				-0.173	-0.221
				(0.095)*	(0.094)**
Share of Catholics				0.282	0.155
				(0.155)*	(0.162)
Departments	90	87	87	87	86
Observations	720	696	696	695	688

* $p<0.1$; ** $p<0.05$; *** $p<0.01$. Time-series cross-sectional OLS regression model, with standard errors clustered by province. Dependent variable is the departmental vote share of the Liberal People's Action (ALP) in the general election of 1902; the departmental vote share of the Popular Democratic Party (PDP) in the general elections of 1928 and 1936; and the departmental vote share of the Popular Republican Movement (MRP) in the general elections of 1945, 1946 (June), 1946 (November), 1951, and 1956. PC stands for per capita.

In sum, Table 5.2 shows that even when controlling for sociodemographic indicators, we find that, on average, greater Catholic associational density (whether measured by clergy per thousand people or Catholic Action membership per capita) is positively related to average confessional party vote share. Also, there is evidence that departments in which the state was more present in the daily lives of citizens – those in which children were mainly

educated at public elementary schools – are less hospitable to French confessional political parties.

Chapter 6: State, Islam, and Politics in Albania and Turkey

The previous two chapters illustrated how anticlericalism and state infrastructural power interact to determine the fate of political Catholicism. But does my theory apply only to Catholicism? Is Samuel Huntington (1996:311) right when he asserts that politics in the Christian West are “unique”? With the spectre of Islamic fundamentalism threatening the four corners of the globe, can political Islam really be explained by a universal theory applying to all religions? In this chapter I rely on qualitative case studies of Turkey and Albania to explore the relationship between anticlericalism, infrastructural power, and the emergence of political Islam. The two questions structuring the chapter are the same that animate the dissertation. What explains the formation of religious political parties? And once religious parties are formed, what accounts for their electoral performance and longevity?

Turkey and Albania are nations with many historical commonalities. Both are Muslim-majority countries and successor states to the Ottoman Empire (Black and Brown 1992:2–3; Hourani 1981:17; Provence 2017:6; Todorova 1997:182). Ottoman rule strengthened the social influence of religious communities through the *millet* system²¹³ (Inalcik 1954:122), leaving a legacy of firmly institutionalized religious groups in both Albania and Turkey (Fabbe 2019:36; Macfie 2013:7). In addition to having a common history, Albanians and Turks also

²¹³ The *millet* system can be usefully described as a confederation of theocracies. Each major religious group in the Empire was given substantially religious and cultural autonomy, in exchange for their pliant integration into the broader Ottoman polity (Katsikas 2009:180). This did not mean that the Ottomans treated all religious groups equally. Non-Muslims had an inferior legal status and were required to pay a capitation tax (Schroeter 2002:89).

share contemporary anticlerical policies designed to curtail the public power and social influence of Islam. Despite all these similarities, however, political Islam has taken a widely divergent form in the two countries. Throughout the twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, Turkey has had multiple incarnations of an Islamist political party, which despite the hostility of the secular establishment has proved popular at the polls. Albanian Sunni Islam, on the other hand, is conspicuous for its absence from the ballot box. Despite a social organisation very similar to Catholic Action, Albanian Islam has so far steered clear of politics.

How can we explain the differences in confessional party development between Albania and Turkey? If both countries have a history of anticlericalism, why did political Islam emerge in Albania but not in Turkey? The key to understanding the contrast between the two countries lies in different levels of state infrastructural power. As argued in previous chapters, religious political movements only thrive when faced with a weak state that cannot provide effective public services, but fail when confronted with a well-functioning state. The case studies of this chapter are not intended to be read in isolation, but in the context of the previous chapter's analysis of confessional party development in the Catholic-majority countries of France and Italy. I intend this intra-religious comparison between Catholic and Muslim nations to illustrate how variation in religious doctrine plays a relatively limited role in confessional party development.

Because this chapter analyses Islamic party formation and strength, my case selection guidelines entailed the choice of a Muslim-majority country with a strong Islamic political party and another Muslim-majority nation in which political Islam is a negligible force. The choice of Albania is perhaps puzzling. An economic historian described Albania as the

European “country about which the least is known” (Aldcroft 2006:166). There were three reasons why I chose to compare Turkey with Albania, instead of selecting a different pair among the other roughly five dozen Muslim-majority nations in the world. First, Albania and Turkey were two countries that experienced a reasonably long period of competitive politics and genuine - if not entirely free or fair - multiparty elections. The lack of democratic experience necessarily excluded Arab countries from the analysis, although at the moment of writing Tunisia might arguably have a richer and more pluralist democracy than either Albania or Turkey. Second, to approximate the conditions for a ‘Most-Similar Case’ design (Gerring 2016:131–36), the two case studies should be as similar as possible in background socioeconomic and cultural factors. Turkey and Albania fill that criterion by having an intertwined history as part of the Ottoman Empire, with their two largest cities being separated by only 765 kilometres. Bosnia and Herzegovina, which is even more similar to Albania than Turkey in many respects, has a completely different political system owing to its ethnic divisions and civil war. Third, I had to select a pair that differed in the dependent variable. The Pakistan-Bangladesh and Indonesia-Malaysia pairs were both alike in background characteristics like culture and socioeconomic profile, but they also show similar outcomes in our dependent variable, with moderately strong Islamist parties in all four cases. Albania and Turkey, as we have seen, are not only similar in antecedent causes but they differ in the outcome of interest.

My research strategy in this chapter entails three stages. First, I discuss the historical development of political Islam in Turkey and employ a within-case comparative design to assess the role of my explanatory variables in accounting for regional differences in Islamist party vote share. Second, I provide a narrative of the historical development of the Albanian

state and its relationship with organized religion. Since Albania does not have a religious political party, the sort of within-case analysis employed for Turkey is not feasible. My narrative of twentieth-century Albanian history provides the core reason why political Islam has been conspicuously absent from Albanian lands: Communist totalitarianism created a powerful despotic state, which for all its faults was able to undermine the social power of organised religion. Finally, in the third section of the chapter, I employ an explicit comparison of the infrastructural power of the Albanian and Turkish states, highlighting how the formidable Albanian state has stifled the development of political Islam but the less powerful Turkish state has failed to do so.

6.1. Justice and Development? Political Islam in Turkey

6.1.1. From Ottomans to Turks: Turkey, 1871-1922

The Ottoman Empire was a complex polymorphous polity held together by Sunni Islam (Fabbe 2019:39; Macfie 2013:5; Yavuz 2003:40). The secular leader of the Empire – the sultan – was simultaneously the religious leader of the Sunni Islamic world – the caliph. Ottoman political rule was based on “the unity of religion and the state” (Toprak 1981:26). The Empire was governed by an intricate patrimonial system, in which power was vested in local chieftains and a bureaucracy mostly staffed by religious *ulema*²¹⁴ (Barkey 1994:30; Mardin 1969:259).

²¹⁴ *Ulemas* are scholars of Islam educated in *madrasas*.

The alliance of throne and altar in the Ottoman Empire, as elsewhere, was a mutually beneficial relationship. The support of the Islamic religious community to the secular authorities was the “pillar of their claim to rule” (Schneier 2015:17). In exchange for the legitimacy bestowed upon the sultan, Islamic ecclesiasticals were exempt from taxation and given total control of the judicial and educational systems (Ardıç 2012:170; Barnes 1986:4; Eligur 2010:38; Rubin 2011:19–43; Shaw 2001:57; Zilfi 1988:46). Similarly to Catholic domination of education in France, Italy, Spain and Québec, Ottoman clergy placed great importance on the transmission of Islamic values through the school system (Schneier 2015:17). There were two types of schools in the Empire: *maktabs*, elementary schools in which people learned to read the Koran; and *madrassas*, institutes of higher education attached to mosques which provided the religious instruction required for *ulema*, judges, teachers, and civil servants (Williamson 1987:29). Overall, “it is difficult to overestimate the extent of the ulema’s influence simply by virtue of the fact that they exercised authority ... in so many realms of society and governance” (Fabbe 2019:40).

Pressured by covetous European powers, nineteenth-century Ottoman elites were forced to modernize their administration and centralize their state as part of a series of modernizing reforms known as the *Tanzimat* (Anscombe 2014:87–95; Fabbe 2019:47–48; Heper and Keyman 1998:259; Mardin 2000:169–71). State-building elites turned to Islam to integrate the various peoples of the Empire into a unified Ottoman nation (Anscombe 2014:108; Fortna 2000:375–76, 2012:81; Inalcik 1964:42–63; Schroeter 2002:88–92; Yavuz 2003:43). Sultans began using the title of caliph once again, and sponsored the building of more than ten thousand religious schools (Yavuz 2003:44–45). On the other hand, by promoting centralization and an increase in state infrastructural power, the *Tanzimat* reforms

also had a proto-secularizing element. For the first time in the history of the Empire, reformers created a public educational system running parallel to Islamic schools, which indirectly undermined the status of the *ulema* who until that point had monopolized education provision²¹⁵ (Fabbe 2019:85; Fortna 2000:372; Somel 2001:108). More generally, the *Tanzimat* reforms created a new intelligentsia of secular intellectuals, teachers, civil servants, and career military officers who were at ease with French doctrines of state sovereignty and removal of intermediary bodies between the state and individual citizens²¹⁶ (Bein 2006:283–301; Fabbe 2019:90–91; Hanioglu 1995:10–16, 200–203, 2005:28–116; Zürcher 1984:39).

The Ottoman Empire eventually collapsed after the First World War. Turkey was occupied by the Allies with the goal of ultimately partitioning the state between Armenians, Greeks, and Kurds (Kezer 2015:114; Williamson 1987:89). These plans went awry thanks to Mustafa Kemal, a general who had distinguished himself in the war. Kemal mobilized a nationalist force, expelled the Allies from Anatolia, and formed the modern Republic of Turkey in 1923 (Akmese 2005:36–40). Mustafa Kemal became president of the new state and initiated a hurried nation-building process to create a collective identity out of the plethora

²¹⁵ Islamic schools still had the upper hand as late as 1895, however, when there were 3,970 Islamic schools in the whole Ottoman Empire compared with 2,380 public schools (Karpas 1985:218–22). Moreover, the public schools in question were by no means secular. Islam was at the heart of the curriculum and the *ulema* often served as teachers, leading a scholar to claim that public schools “were actually not so easily distinguishable from the schools run by the religious establishment” (Fabbe 2019:85; also Fortna 2000:373).

²¹⁶ It was from this milieu that the modernizing Young Turk movement arose in 1908 (Ahmad 1969:17–18).

of ethnic – Kurdish, Turkish, Zazas - and religious – Sunnis, Sufis, Alevi²¹⁷ - groups who lived in Anatolia (Heper and Landau 1991:43; Pamuk 2018:47–54; Yavuz 2003:47; Yildirim 2006:87–188). In contrast with the Ottoman *Tanzimat* reformers, however, Kemal did not use Islam as a cement of national unity. The new Turkish nationalism was based on language and territory, not religion (Gülalp 1994:171; Zürcher 2010:149).

6.1.2. The Kemalist Revolution and the Birth of Turkish Anticlericalism, 1923-1937

Once his rule was firmly established and Turkish independence secure, Mustafa Kemal and the bureaucratic-military elite which he led began an ambitious revolution from above with the objective of secularizing and modernizing a fundamentally traditional society (Arat and Pamuk 2019:11; Hanioglu 2001:177; Kinzer 2008:10; Mardin 1973:169–90; Onis 1997:750; Yavuz 2003:48). This elite created a single-party, the Republican People's Party (CHP – *Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi*), to mobilize and indoctrinate the citizenry as part of the reform project (Bein 2017:167; Zürcher 2010:146–47). This revolution from above embraced all aspects of society, from education and religion to dress codes and language (Çagaptay 2006:82–139; Fabbe 2019:83; Zürcher 2017:175–95). Although the Kemalists put in place dozens of significant reforms, five of those were particularly important (for a list of Kemalist reforms, see McLaren 2008:38). First, the Caliphate was abolished - partly because of its ceremonial significance, more pragmatically from apprehension that the continued existence of a Caliph would attract Muslims throughout the world to emigrate to Turkey (Ahmad

²¹⁷ Alevi are Shiites who live in central and eastern Anatolia. They represent around one-fifth of the Turkish population. For more on Alevi, see Shankland (2003) and Olsson et al. (1998).


2003:87; Arat and Pamuk 2019:14; Ardiç 2012:274; Bein 2011:71–72). The abolition of the Caliphate paved the way for the proclamation that Turkey was legally secular (Gürpınar and Kenar 2016:65).

Second, Islamic law was repudiated. *Sharia* courts were abolished in 1924, and customary Islamic law was replaced with European civil and criminal codes imported chiefly from Germany. It is hard to exaggerate the importance of this reform. Because Islam is a religion based on the *sharia* law, the promulgation of a secular code of law meant that centuries of religion and tradition were repudiated in one fell swoop. Polygamy and repudiation²¹⁸ were also prohibited, and in their place came civil marriage and divorce, with equal rights for both parties (Arat and Pamuk 2019:14). Marriages between partners of different faith became legally possible, and citizens were given the legal right to change their religion affiliation. In line with the norms of the Christian West, Sunday was declared a day of rest, even though for Muslims Friday is the day of public worship (Lewis 2002:288). Even people's heads came under the purview of the state, as old-traditional hairstyles and old-fashioned Ottoman hats (the fez) were prohibited, together with the Islamic veil (Aksin 2007:202; Jung and Piccoli 2001:60). Kemalists also outlawed the instrumentalization of religion for political motives, as embodied for example in confessional political parties. The expression of religious demands in politics was explicitly forbidden, and the repressive apparatus of the state remained highly alert to any political attempts to reverse the secularizing reforms.

²¹⁸ Repudiation is the formal act by which a husband divorces his wife in Islam by simply announcing that he 'repudiates' her. This divorce is unilateral and can only be conducted by the husband.

Third, the dual-track system of private Islamic schools and public schools was merged. Existing religious schools were nationalized and integrated into the public education system (Özyürek 2006:12–14). Primary instruction was made free and religious classes were gradually taken off the curriculum (Eligur 2010:51; Fabbe 2019:110; Öcal 2007:191). Figure 6.1 shows the average number of weekly hours of Islamic classes in the Turkish public education system between 1882 and 1940. While religion was already being gradually removed from the curriculum during Ottoman rule, the big drop at the start of the twenties shows the qualitatively different nature of the Kemalist reform. The education system was being thoroughly secularized. Perhaps even more damaging for Islam, Kemalists abolished madrassas and the theology faculties where *ulema* studied, which made it impossible to form new *ulema* and would in time lead to their disappearance (Bein 2011:71; Fabbe 2019:111).

Figure 6.1 - Weekly Hours of Islamic Classes in Turkish Public Schools, 1882-1940



Fourth, the remaining *ulema* lost their customary independence and became wards of the state. They were incorporated as civil servants under a central Directorate of Religious Affairs (*Diyanet Isleri Başkanlığı*) that paid their wages and carefully monitored their actions (Bein 2011:106; Fabbe 2019:10; Kandiyoti 2012:517; Kaymakcan 1997:60–70). Finally and most dramatically, the Kemalists replaced the Arabic with the Latin script as the official Turkish alphabet. While the regime defended the transformation of the script with some spurious arguments about the inadequacy of Arabic to represent the sounds of Turkish phonemes, everyone understood that the change was mainly symbolic and marked the ultimate repudiation with the country's Islamic past (Arat and Pamuk 2019:15). In sum, the Kemalist reforms sought to purge religion from civil life and make Islam subservient to the state (Gülalp 2005:361–62; Parla and Davison 2004:6).

Why did Mustafa Kemal embrace such radical anticlerical policies? The formal model of Chapter 2 suggests a simple answer. With the demise of the Sultan, the two socially organised groups in Turkey were the bureaucratic-military elite led by Kemal and Islam. Thus, the elimination of Islam's independent social power removed the only potential source of political opposition to one-party rule. When the Kemalists came to power, "the caliph was the only possible counterweight to Mustafa Kemal's dominance of the political scene" (Zürcher 2017:168). The elimination of the Caliphate provided a handy excuse for the exile of all family members of the Ottoman dynasty, around which conservatives could coalesce to oppose the republic (Karpas 1959:43–44). After that, the further purge of Islam "was used by the state to eliminate its political opposition, which was often condemned as being anti-revolutionary and reactionary" (Azak 2010:14; also Cizre-Sakallioğlu 1996:236; Farhi 1971:294).

While disoriented by the speed and radicalism of the anticlerical reforms, Islamic ecclesiasticals did muster up some resistance to the Kemalist onslaught. Opposition to Kemalism centred on a dense network of Islamic brotherhoods (*tarikats*). The brotherhoods had close ties with commercial groups, artisans, and merchants, making them a force to be reckoned with (Fabbe 2019:41; Keddie 1972:4; Lewis 2002:404–9). They were especially powerful in the countryside. The brotherhoods’ connections to diverse social groups and their ability to mobilize people made them “potentially the most organized force in society” (Barkey 1994:39). Even more importantly, their informal nature allowed them to escape the prying eyes of the state. The Kemalists tried to bring the brotherhoods into state control in the same way they nationalized the formal Islamic institutions, but by and large failed in their attempts²¹⁹ (Yavuz 2003:56). As we have seen in Chapter 2, the amorphous institutional nature of Sunni Islam makes organisations like the brotherhoods especially hard to co-opt. Even were the Kemalist attempt to nationalize the brotherhoods met with success, it is likely that another informal network would eventually spring up outside of the control of the state.

Thus, once the official institutions of Sunni Islam were brought under state control, the Islamic brotherhoods automatically became the focus of opposition to Kemalist anticlericalism (Fabbe 2019:119; Hanioglu 1995:101–4). In 1925 the brotherhoods launched

²¹⁹ Interestingly, the Ottoman state had made attempts as early as 1812 to bring the informal organizational apparatus of the brotherhoods into a subservient position within the state bureaucracy (Silverstein 2009:195–96). The very informality of the brotherhoods made them a hard target for incorporation into the state, however, and these early nationalization efforts were unsuccessful.

a disastrous armed rebellion to restore the Caliphate and Islamic law²²⁰ (Narli 2003:125). Government forces quickly crushed the ill-prepared rebels and - in a pattern which would reoccur later in Turkish history - used their strengthened position to pass the Law for the Maintenance of Order, an administrative measure that establish a full-fledged dictatorship and banned the Islamic brotherhoods²²¹ (Bein 2011:106; Silverstein 2011:84–88; Zürcher 2017:172–73). In a public speech, Kemal claimed that “the Republic of Turkey cannot be the land of *seyhs*, dervishes, disciplines, and lay brothers ... the heads of brotherhoods will understand this truth that I have uttered in all its clarity, and will of their own accord at once close down their convents, and accept the fact that their disciplines have at last come of age” (quoted in Lewis 2002:410). Mustafa Kemal had definitely established his “complete domination of the political scene” (Zürcher 2017:173).

6.1.3. Post-Kemalist Resurgence of Multipartism, 1938-1959

Mustafa Kemal died in 1938. His successors continued the basic thrust of his nationalist, anticlerical policies, but the loss of Kemal’s charismatic legitimacy combined with the heavy-handed repression of faith “made the government deeply unpopular among the large majority of Turkish citizens” (Eligur 2010:50). In January 1946, conservative parliamentarians led by Adnan Menderes split off from the CHP and formed the Democratic Party (DP – *Demokrat Parti*), the country’s first legally authorized opposition party (Arat and Pamuk

²²⁰ This is known as the ‘Sheikh Said Rebellion,’ after the name of the rebel leader (Fabbe 2019:119–20). In December 1930, there was a smaller Islamist rebellion led by Sheikh Methmet that killed one military officer (Yavuz 2003:53).

²²¹ They would quickly reappear as ‘cultural’ associations (Warner et al. 2018:204–5).

2019:20–21; Azak 2010:19–20; Heper and Landau 1991:15; Sayari 2002:65–85). The Democrats were a conservative and not a religious party, but they did subtly court the Islamic vote by promising to pull back the state from constant intervention in social life (Kandiyoti 2012:518; Karpas 1959:155; Ozbudun 2000:14–15). In reaction to the Democratic threat, CHP leaders made some concessions to Muslim opinion, consenting to a limited number of pilgrimages to Mecca, reforming a faculty of theology at the University of Ankara, establishing some training centres for *imams* and *ulemas*, and even reinstating an optional religious instruction class to public schools (Karpas 1959:281; Sunar 1990:745–57; Yavuz 2003:60). The easing of censorship also opened the way for the emergence of independent mass media with a subtly religious discourse (Karpas 1959:283–84; Mardin 2005:157; Zürcher 2017:214).

Why did the CHP suddenly backtrack on its strict anticlericalism? While Kemalist leaders were aware of their lack of popularity, they were still “shocked” by the outpouring of support for the Democrats (Zürcher 2017:214). Struggling to regain their footing and “afraid of losing [Muslim] voters,” CHP politicians believed that proclerical concessions would be enough to co-opt religious leaders and Islamic public opinion (Karpas 1959:279). At the very least, the removal of some religious grievances would undermine popular support for the Democrats. But the Kemalists were wrong. These late concessions did nothing to ease Islamic resentment of the CHP and could not reverse the memories of two decades of intense anticlericalism. The supposedly illegal Muslim brotherhoods mobilized their members to vote for the Democrats in the parliamentary election of 1950 (Eligur 2010:52; Lewis 2002:318; Yükleven 2008:361). The result was a stunning victory for the Democrats and a rebuke of the anticlerical policies of the CHP: the Democratic Party secured 408 seats in parliament against only 69 for the CHP (Zürcher 2017:227).

Once in power, the Democrats moved cautiously to dismantle some of Kemal's anticlerical policies (Heper and Landau 1991:124; Yavuz 2003:61). To avoid triggering a reaction from the military-bureaucratic elite, they adopted piecemeal proclerical reforms, such as the expansion of religious instruction in public schools;²²² increasing the number of training centres for *imams* and *ulemas*; removing legal restrictions on the sale of religious literature; decriminalizing the radio broadcast of the Islamic call to prayer; subsidizing the building of mosques; and perhaps most significantly, ceasing to enforce the laws banning Islamic brotherhoods, whose capacity to mobilize followers was critical to sustained Democratic ballot box success (Arat and Pamuk 2019:21–22; Eligur 2010:57–58; Yavuz 2003:63).

The liberalization and partial repeal of the anticlerical laws allowed the Islamic brotherhoods to re-emerge as a prominent player in Turkish society (Reed 1957:337–38; Shaw and Shaw 1977:409–10). Unlike France or Albania, Turkish anticlerical policies under Mustafa Kemal and his successors did not destroy the social power of the brotherhoods because they were backed by a state with insufficient infrastructural power. As an observer noted in the mid-fifties, the repeal of the strict anticlerical measures “freed the obscurantist, the charmer, and the entire reactionary group in towns and villages before the modern schools and modern teaching could penetrate even half of them to establish a safe foothold on behalf of secularism” (Karpas 1959:287–88). Three decades of anticlericalism failed to

²²² Previously parents were required to opt in to religious classes, but now those classes would be provided by default and parents who did not want their children to attend had to opt out.

destroy the social power of the brotherhoods, and they emerged from illegality relatively unscathed.

The Democrats ruled Turkey throughout the fifties, during which period the Islamic brotherhoods kept a low profile and focused on nurturing a pious youth through their network of – formally illegal - religious schools. Said Nursi, the leader of the largest brotherhood, planned a ‘long march’ through Turkish institutions by instilling Islamic values in a new generation that would go on to take control of the state (Eligür 2010:56; Yavuz 2003:33). Until that moment arrived, the brotherhoods sought to expand and develop close-knit networks in politics, business, and the media. They also reinforced their own private welfare network, for instance by setting up dormitories for poor students (Ayata 1996:47–49). Some brotherhoods acquired their own mass media companies. Despite this extra-parliamentary focus, the brotherhoods intervened in politics from time to time. The mobilization of brotherhood support provided the electoral base for further Democratic victories in the elections of 1954 and 1957 (White 2008:361; Yavuz 2003:62).

Dissatisfied with the Democrats’ reluctance to embark on a bolder proclerical course, a group of conservatives left the party to form the Nation Party (MP – *Millet Partisi*). This was Turkey’s first Islamic political party²²³ (Reed 1957:338; Shaw and Shaw 1977:404; Zürcher 2017:225–26). The manifesto of the MP demanded “greater emphasis on Islamic mores and

²²³ Some scholars claim that the Nation Party was not overtly Islamic, only very conservative (White 2002:362; Yıldız 2003:187). The MP could hardly be open about its religious inclinations, however, because Kemalist legislation explicitly prohibited the use of religious symbols and rhetoric for political purposes. The Turkish government itself banned the Nation Party in 1953 because of its religious content.

values in social life, greater respect for Islamic institutions, an end to state control of religious organization, [and] the inclusion of courses on religion in the primary and secondary school curricula...” (quoted in Toprak 1981:75). This first spurt of political Islamism was short-lived, however, and the MP was banned in 1953 because it violated the Kemalist prohibition on the use of religious rhetoric in politics. Unfazed, Islamists quickly formed another party, the Republican Nation Party (CMP – *Cumhuriyetçi Millet Partisi*). Fearing an anticlerical crackdown, the Islamic brotherhoods decided to steer clear of both the MP and the CMP and maintained their alliance with the Democrats (Eligur 2010:56). Even without the active support of religious civil society, the CMP gained 14 percent of the votes in the 1961 parliamentary elections, which demonstrated the potential electoral appeal of an overt religious message (Zürcher 2017:243).

6.1.4. From Military Coup to Military Coup, 1960-1979

Despite Democratic caution, “the policies permitting greater religious activities ... convinced the military that the Kemalist program was in danger” (Yavuz 2003:63; also Zürcher 2017:236–41). The military carried out a coup in May 1960, outlawed the DP, and executed Prime Minister Menderes, together with the ministers of finance and foreign affairs²²⁴ (Ahmad 2008:239; Arat and Pamuk 2019:23; Eligur 2010:59). While the military leaders quickly returned power to civilians, they insisted upon the incorporation of the prohibition of the political use of religion into the constitution (Zürcher 2017:250). Once multiparty democracy

²²⁴ Even more gruesomely, the military desecrated the corpse of Said Nursi, who had passed away before the coup (Yavuz 2003:63–64).

was restored, the old Democratic elites quickly returned to politics. Like a game of whack-a-mole, former DP members formed a new movement, the Justice Party (AP – *Adalet Partisi*). The Justice Party was more openly religious than its predecessor,²²⁵ largely because it absorbed the Islamic CMP²²⁶ (Ahmad 1977:382; Toprak 1981:92).

The Justice Party established “direct and lasting relationships with various Islamic groups” (Ayata 1996:44). Building on the old Democratic alliance with the Islamic networks, AP leaders gave the brotherhoods privileged access to public resources and protection against anticlerical threats in exchange for the clientelistic mobilization of votes and political support. After joining a coalition government with the CHP, the AP nominated a party member to head the Directorate of Religious Affairs and used that position to increase funding for mosques and *imam* schools²²⁷ (Arat and Pamuk 2019:25–26; Eligur 2010:60; Yavuz 2003:64; Zürcher 2017:259–60). Islamist brotherhoods took advantage of the AP’s leniency to resume their ‘long march’ through the institutions and strategically sought to infiltrate the bureaucracy, especially at the crucial Education Ministry (Arat and Pamuk 2019:17; Eligur 2010:61–63; Kramer 2000:63–64; Yilmaz 2012:36). They also widened their organisational network, appealing to the people through modern media techniques, such as sound cassettes, alongside the more traditional face-to-face approach. Their communication channels ranged from discussion groups, house calls, video shows, to all sorts of written materiel (Ayata

²²⁵ For example, the party’s slogan during the 1965 election campaign was “we are right of centre and on the path of Allah” (Eligur 2010:63).

²²⁶ The Islamist faction within the Justice Party was formally organized, with a recognized name (the ‘sacredentists’) and leader, parliamentarian Osman Turan (Eligur 2010:65).

²²⁷ A mere four years after the coup, enrolments in *imam* schools had more than doubled (Toprak 1981:92).

1996:50). Support from the Islamic brotherhoods gave the Justice Party a mass electoral base which the anticlerical CHP lacked. This allowed the AP to dominate the Turkish political scene for fifteen years following its landslide triumph in the 1965 elections (Atasoy 2009:120–21; Sakallioğlu 1996:240; Zürcher 2017:253).

Once again dismayed by the cautious proclerical course of the AP government,²²⁸ in 1970 a religious faction led by Necmettin Erbakan split off to form the second incarnation of a Turkish confessional party, the National Salvation Party²²⁹ (MSP – *Milli Selamet Partisi*). While during the fifties the brotherhoods had decided to support the conservatives instead of the religious party, this time they “played an active role” in the formation of the Islamist MSP²³⁰ (Eligür 2010:66; also Yavuz 2003:209; Zürcher 2017:260). Erbakan and the new party depended on brotherhood support if they were to surmount the challenges associated with forming a new political organization capable of competing with the established parties (Ahmad 1991:17). As early as 1971 – one year after being formed –, the MSP already had branches in sixty out of sixty-seven Turkish provinces, as well as its own newspaper²³¹ (Eligür

²²⁸ The AP did conduct a cautious proclerical policy, albeit wary of provoking another military coup. Prime Minister Süleiman Demirel was fond of demonstrating personal piety, for instance by bringing cabinet ministers to pray in mosques and conspicuously travelling to Mecca (Sakallioğlu 1996:240).

²²⁹ The Islamic party was first called the National Order Party (MNP – *Milli Nizam Partisi*), which was closed down by the military in May 1971. In what was fast becoming a routine of Turkish politics, MNP members simply formed a new party, which they called the National Salvation Party. Erbakan had to pretend he was an independent parliamentarian without any formal association with the new party, but everyone understood that he was “the party’s shadow chair” (Eligür 2010:69). The fiction ended when Erbakan joined the MSP in May 1973.

²³⁰ In particular, the dervish brotherhood Naksibendi (Zürcher 2017:260).

²³¹ Called National Newspaper (*Milli Gazete*).

2010:67; Landau 1976:5; Sakallioğlu 1996:241). Erbakan also sponsored the formation of specialized civil society organizations associated with the party that appealed to specific social groups, such as public employees, university students, blue-collar workers, and so forth (Yesilada 2002b:65–67). An informal Islamist network also flourished during the seventies, consisting of unlawful Koranic schools, scientific clubs, youth societies, soup kitchens, student halls, and charitable associations, in loose association with the brotherhoods and holding radical Islamist views (Eligür 2010:71).

The MSP did well in the 1973 general elections, which were the party's first. With twelve percent of the votes and forty-eight seats, it became the third-largest party in parliament. The Islamists secured their electoral support mainly from lower middle-class voters for whom religion was an important part of life (Toprak 1981:97). Post-electoral surveys showed that MSP voters made their choice because of the party's religious character (Eligür 2010:70–71; Toprak 1981:97). Because neither the Kemalists nor the conservatives obtained a majority of seats in the 1973 elections, the MSP held the balance of power in parliament. Profiting from their position as kingmakers, the Islamists joined several short-lived coalition governments between 1974 and 1978, during which they allowed the Muslim brotherhoods to further their infiltration of the state's administrative machinery. Another important achievement of the MSP was the passage of legislation allowing formerly unrecognized alumnae of private religious schools to apply for university (Eligür 2010:108).

This reform gave graduates of *imam* schools the possibility of becoming public school teachers, which they did in substantial numbers.²³²

6.1.5. The Meteoric Rise of Political Islam, 1980-2002

After another military coup in September 1980²³³ that banned the MSP (Heper and Landau 1991:19), Erbakan and the rest of the party formed yet another incarnation of political Islam, this time named the Welfare Party (RP – *Refah Partisi*). Even though the military initially sought to purge Islamists from the body politic, the surprisingly quiescent way in which religious people greeted the coup persuaded the generals that they posed no threat. As one of the leaders of the military plot explained in 2004, “the Islamists, unlike the radical leftists and ultranationalists, were not involved in street violence; they hid themselves well” (quoted in Eligur 2010:91). The military thus ended up leaving the Islamists alone and concentrated in eliminating the short-term danger from the radical left (Çelik 1999:92; Gürpınar and Kenar 2016:62; Lapidot 1997:62–66; White 2013:19; Zürcher 2017:284–85).

²³² By 1995, only twenty years after *imams* were allowed to pursue higher education and become teachers, they were teaching almost half of all religious education classes in public schools. A survey of these teachers showed that nearly three out of four taught that everything written on the Koran was literally true (Eligur 2010:110–12). Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the current President of Turkey, was one of the graduates of a religious high school.

²³³ The military coup was aimed mostly against Communist activism, but the growing strength of political Islam also played a role in the decision by the armed forces to depose the government. A letter by General Kenan Evren, Chief of the General Staff, justifying the reasons for intervention stated that “our nation no longer has the patience for people who sing the communist international instead of our national anthem; or who invite the sharia” (quoted in Eligur 2010:87). Saltik was referring to a notorious Islamist rally in the Muslim stronghold of Konya, in which Necmettin Erbakan reacted to the refusal of the crowd to sing the Turkish national anthem by approvingly shouting “my country is Islam!”


The Islamic brotherhoods profited from the distraction of the Kemalist military-bureaucratic establishment to expand their organizational reach throughout the eighties (Arat and Pamuk 2019:66–67; Lapidot 1997:62; Tapper 1994:10; Toprak 1996:87–118). Their activities at this stage received substantial financial support from ultraconservative Gulf states. Focused on eliminating the leftist threat, bamboozled by the cautious nature of the Islamist advance, and desperately in need of foreign capital to avoid the humiliation of asking for an IMF rescue, the military stood by while wealthy Salafist Islamists from Saudi Arabia financed the mushrooming brotherhoods (Ayata 1996:45; Ozkan 2017:45). Saudi capital was also employed in paying the wages of unofficial *imams*, illegally bypassing the requirement of preachers to register as civil servants. Massive capital inflows fuelled the rise of a deep-pocketed religious bourgeoisie (the so-called Anatolian Tigers) who became key supporters of Turkish political Islam (Eligur 2010:130).

The Islamic brotherhoods used their newfound wealth in a variety of ways, the most significant of which was a program of religious school expansion. As Figure 6.2 shows, the proportion of Turkish high school students who attended a private religious school ballooned between 1985 and 1995.²³⁴ This religious education system was almost entirely controlled by the brotherhoods and constituted an essential component of the influence and social power of Turkish Islam (Ayata 1996:5; Daun and Arjmand 2018:598–605; Özgür 2012:90–132). While the program of the religious schools is not explicitly fundamentalist, their broad Islamic

²³⁴ After 1995, religious secondary schools came under attack by an anticlerical military coup, which I discuss below.

identity and the everyday exchange of religious ideas among students made them fertile breeding-grounds for Islamic activists²³⁵ (Özgür 2012:90–93). The differences in ideological atmosphere between the religious and the public education systems were made clear in an 1998 survey that found that 78 percent of public secondary school students identified Mustafa Kemal as their political role model, compared to only 10 percent in religious schools (Eligür 2010:128–29).

Figure 6.2 - Religious Secondary School Students in Turkey, 1976-2001




Source: Eligür (2010: 127).

²³⁵ Recep Tayyip Erdogan is perhaps the most illustrious alumni of a Turkish Islamic high school.

The rise of political Islam in the eighties cannot be attributed solely to the dynamism of the Islamic brotherhoods. Their success among the public was made possible by a severe economic downturn in 1980 and 1981 that forced the government to slash expenditure on social services and the welfare state in general, destabilizing an already fragile social security system (Gülalp 1992:22–24; Zürcher 2017:303). For instance, Figure 6.3 shows a pronounced decline in the number of hospital beds per capita between 1977 and 1992, matching the years of economic crisis and public sector retrenchment (Turkish Statistical Institute 2019). While public hospitals were in retreat across Turkey, in the fifteen years after the 1980 coup, the number of private religious hospitals increased by 84 percent (Eligur 2010:141). The state was abdicating its social responsibilities and, in line with my theoretical framework, being replaced by religious charitable associations. During the heyday of globalisation in the eighties, the attitude of Turkish politicians towards the poor was one of neglect; as a scholar of social policy noted, “the Turkish state never considered social assistance for the poor an area of public policy ... poverty has always been seen as a problem to be handled by benevolent citizens” (Göçmen 2014:95; also Isik 2014:313).

Figure 6.3 - Hospital Capacity Per Capita in Turkey, 1970-2000




Source: Turkish Statistical Institute (2019).

Even more alarmingly, the welfare state was shrinking at the same time that poverty, especially in the cities, was becoming widespread. In response to the economic crisis of 1980-1981, politicians significantly liberalised the economy, which accelerated the breakneck pace of urbanization in Turkey (Altug, Filiztekin, and Pamuk 2008:393–430; Danielson and Keles 1984:27). Because urban areas and local administrations lacked the infrastructurally capacity to provide adequate housing to migrants from the countryside, the rapid pace of urbanisation inevitably resulted in the mushrooming of shantytowns (Bugra 1998:303–17; Oncu 1988:38–64). As Figure 6.4 shows, not only did the proportion of Turks living in cities²³⁶ rise markedly during the eighties, but so did the share of urban dwellers who lived in shantytowns (Eligur

²³⁶ Defined as areas inhabited by at least ten thousand people.

2010:140; Yüksekler 2009:262–80). Poverty was less of a problem in the countryside – even with an inadequate social welfare net – because family networks of solidarity were able to care for those in need, but traditional kinship ties were unavailable for recent urban migrants (Bugra and Keyder 2006:212; Erder 1999:161–71; Göçmen 2014:95–96; Keyder 1987:135–40). Dissatisfaction and anger at the government steadily built up, and in the early nineties, Turkey’s “malfunctioning state created a deep pessimism among the majority of voters” (Eligür 2010:82; also Ozbudun 2000:79).

Figure 6.4 - Urbanization and Shantytowns in Turkey, 1950-2000



Source: Eligür (2010: 141).

Both the central Turkish state and local authorities were infrastructurally unable to meet the demands of impoverished urban migrants and to provide essential public services such as waste disposal, water, or transportation (Arat and Pamuk 2019:28–31; Eligür 2010:165). State weakness and welfare cuts could have been counterbalanced by strong

economic growth, but jobs were scarce even in the cities during the eighties. Unemployment increased from 0.3 percent in 1976 to 5 percent in 1985 and 9 percent in 1993 (Filiztekin and Tunali 1999:77–106; Pamuk 2008:267–73). In 1991, more than sixty percent of shantytown denizens in Istanbul were out of work, and the numbers were even higher in Ankara and Izmir. Not only did few shantytown residents find stable employment, but those who did inevitably did so in the informal sector and thus were not enrolled in social security (Eligur 2010:166). Because of inflation, even those in work saw a constant decline in real wages throughout the eighties (Altunisik and Kavli 2005:80). In sum: Turkey witnessed the growth of an impoverished urban mass, lying outside of the public welfare net, mixing both anger at the government for letting the economy deteriorate in this way and desperation for a potential saviour.

Unsurprisingly, urbanization and the explosion of shantytowns provided a major opportunity for the Islamist Welfare Party and the Muslim brotherhoods. Their strong organizational networks were able to mobilize the unmoored, impoverished urban masses (Ahmad 1991:19; Eligur 2010:154–81; Onis 1997:743–66; White 2002:273–76; Yavuz 1997:66). Atomized urban migrants, whose rural upbringing implanted conservative but not Islamist values, were prominent targets for recruitment (Demir, Acar, and Toprak 2004:171; Eligur 2010:162–63). Islamic brotherhoods jumped in to “organize relief for the poor, medical centres, and hospitals that offer treatment schemes and child-care programs” (Ayata 1996:51). While left-wing parties also made efforts to appeal to the urban poor, they lacked “the strong organizational networks and entrepreneurial elites of the Islamist social movement” (Eligur 2010:142). During the eighties, Islamists cautiously built up a political organisation in the major cities of Istanbul and Ankara without relinquishing their traditional

rural base, thus creating a formidable rural-urban coalition capable of taking power at the national level (Çarkoglu 2004:117–18; Eligur 2010:81; Isik 2014:311; Narli 2003:127).

As predicted by this dissertation's theoretical framework, Islamists appealed to the urban poor by emphasizing economic more than religious issues (Akinci 1999:78–81; Ozbudun 2000:87; Yavuz 1997:72). To win elections, the Welfare Party needed to mobilize a broad swathe of moderates for whom religion was not a priority, since – as a high-ranking member of the party conceded in private – only one in ten Turkish voters were dyed-in-the-wool Islamists who would back a religious movement in all circumstances (Eligur 2010:148). The two-pronged approach of the party was symbolised by its emblem, which was composed of an Islamic crescent and a sheaf of wheat.²³⁷ Welfare Party leaders shrewdly merged religious with economic concerns by arguing that poverty was caused by greedy capitalism and unrestrained secularism, and offering Islam as a guarantor of social justice (Yavuz 1997:73–74). The RP's ideology was clear yet comprehensive, focusing more on “equality, social security, welfare, and social justice than any other political party, including the leftist parties” (Ayata 1996:55).

Islamist media skilfully depicted the Welfare Party's appeal to a broad sector of the population, beyond religious fundamentalists, by shooting television commercials starring people from all walks of life and shunning the proverbial bearded men and veiled women (Oncu 1995:60–61; Yavuz 1997:74–75). Welfare Party leaders also published a comprehensive economic program that convinced people of their credibility and

²³⁷ The two were displayed in a way reminiscent of the hammer and the sickle in the Communist logo.

competence, dispelling the notion that the party was composed of wild-eyed fanatics. The victorious Welfare Party candidate for the presidency of the city of Istanbul in 1994, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, spent his electoral campaign explaining in detail how he would tackle local problems such as failing public transportation, water pollution and trash disposal (Eligur 2010:161). One observer described a party meeting in an Istanbul shantytown as follows (quoted in Navaro-Yashin 1998:9–10):

Before beginning the interchange, the leader reminded neighbourhood residents that these gatherings were in the model of Prophet Omer's mode of governing in the early centuries of Islam. The attendants were almost exclusively men and voiced their concerns about problems in the neighbourhood: broken pipelines, uncollected garbage, traffic accidents, unpaved roads, lack of water, of electricity, etc.

The striking combination of solemn references to the venerable traditions of Islam and the everyday problems of residents sums up a key element of my theoretical argument: religious party strength was built more on solving the ordinary problems of this world than on promising an extraordinary afterlife in the next.

Thus, during the eighties the Welfare Party built up a dense organisational network that quietly surpassed that of the mainstream parties. By 1990, there was a "a wide consensus in the mass media that the [Welfare Party] supersedes other political parties, not only in the size of its membership, but also in the elaborateness and efficiency of its party organization" (Ayata 1996:52). The RP had tens of thousands of branches throughout the country, sometimes going as far as to having a branch covering a single street. In Istanbul alone, the

Islamists could boast of having more than eighty-five thousand card-carrying activists, with unofficial volunteers amounting to at least three times that number (Eligur 2010:187; Ozbudun 2006:555). Nationally it had close to two million enthusiastic activists (Arat 1999:36) and four million registered members (Yesilada 2002a:173). The Welfare Party organized regular weekly meetings with activists to inform them on the party's policy and teach them how best to approach the electorate (Arat 1999:24; Eligur 2010:192). Many of these activists and volunteers – approximately one-third - were women. The Welfare Party Ladies' Commission employed female activists as part of its large grassroots network (Arat 1999:22; Saktanber 1994:123–24). Muslim women visited ordinary people in their houses and were careful not to alienate their hosts with extremist religious statements, instead conveying the implicit message that Islamist women are not as different from other people as they might have thought (Arat 1999:40).

The enthusiastic and disciplined Welfare Party activists reached out across their local communities, gathering information about voters and crafting policy messages designed to maximize support. Observers noted and appreciated how RP volunteers “offer sympathy, and appreciation of the difficulties of life for ordinary people, respect for their work and their struggles” (Ayata 1996:52). This emphasis on routine, direct contacts was particularly appealing to shantytown dwellers, who often felt looked down upon by those above the social ladder and cherished the feeling of solidarity and belongingness (Bayat 2002:11; Erman 1998:548–49). As the Welfare Party coordinator in Istanbul explained, “we are the closest party to the electorate ... who died, who was born, who got married, we know it all ... according to the situation, we visit for condolences, celebrations, and congratulations”

(quoted in Eligur 2010:193). An Islamist leader was clear about the reasons why the party was increasing in popularity (Eligur 2010:181):

The political regime wants to remove Islam from everyday life; it uses all opportunities of state and government to secularize the Muslims ... The Welfare Party represents the Muslims' demands ... Our party now has powerful and great societal support. This support is not just as a result of the active Welfare Party politicians ... Hundreds of foundations, associations, publishing houses, charities, journals, congregational organizations, and people who spread the party's message travelled all over Anatolia. They were all working for our party. They registered all voters one by one.

As we have seen, in addition to the formal religious party, Turkish Islamists were supported by a dense network of brotherhoods that "effectively encapsulates individual members and creates a distinct political subculture" (Ozbudun 2000:92). By the early nineties, the brotherhoods were among the wealthiest associations in Turkey and owned a large number of newspapers, television, and radio channels; Koran study groups; student dormitories and tutorials for university preparations; charities; organizations for Turkish emigrants;²³⁸ private schools; and even a labour union for employees (*Hak-Is*) and a business

²³⁸ The associations for Turkish emigrants included educational centres in Western European countries like Germany, Austria, and France, where tens of thousands of first- or second-generation Turks "receive Islamic education that frequently attacks Ataturk's secular principles" (Yesilada 2002b:73). Only from Germany, the Welfare Party received around 1.5 million German marks per year from these migrants' associations (Eligur 2010:209).

association for employers (MUSIAD)²³⁹ (Narli 2003:127–33; Yavuz 2003:96). By 1998, the MUSIAD was Turkey’s largest business association, representing the interests of close to ten thousand companies that employed roughly half a million people (Demiralp 2009:315–35; Gülalp 2001:439–40; Narli 2003:40). *Imams* sponsored by the brotherhoods were also “directed to give sermons arguing that Muslims had to vote for the RP” (Eligur 2010:208).

The 1995 general election was a watershed for Turkish political Islam. The Welfare Party came first in a fragmented field with 21 percent of the vote (Arat and Pamuk 2019:47; Jenkins 2003:49). After some clumsy manoeuvres by the mainstream parties to form a government without the Islamists, in June 1996 Necmettin Erbakan became Prime Minister with support from the centre-right. For the first time since Mustafa Kemal abolished the sultanate and made Islam subordinate to the state, a religious party took control of Turkish destinies. Because the rapidly anticlerical military was still intact, the Islamists would have been forgiven for proceeding slowly and avoiding ruffling feathers. Not Erbakan. In less than six months, he moved swiftly to purge civil servants and admit close to 170,000 Islamist brotherhood members to the public administration (Eligur 2010:229–30); planned to reconsecrate the Basilica Saint Sophia in Istanbul to Islam (Kepel 2006:355);²⁴⁰ and hosted dignitaries of the Palestinian Hamas, Algeria’s Islamic Salvation Front - then waging a civil war against the secular government –, and the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood (Yavuz 2003:243). Welfare Party parliamentarians openly admitted that their party aimed to undo secularism in

²³⁹ The first letter of MUSIAD’s acronym is commonly perceived as standing for *Muslim*, which is not correct and would be illegal at the time due to the prohibition of the use of Islam for political activities. The M stands instead for *müstakil* (independent).

²⁴⁰ A long-standing ambition fulfilled by Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Erbakan’s *protégé*, in 2020.

Turkey. One party leader suggested that Erbakan was moving cautiously since “the Prime Minister and other Ministers have certain obligations” but told his listeners that “this system must change ... we will wait a little longer ... and let Muslims keep alive the resentment, rancour and hatred they feel in their hearts” (quoted in European Court of Human Rights 2003:568–69).

With tensions at fever pitch, the breaking point was an incident in January 1997 in which the Islamist mayor of the capital hosted diplomats from the Islamic Republic of Iran and boasted that his party would “infuse the *sharia* into the intellectual sector” (quoted in Eligur 2010:219). The military replied with a coup, dismissing Erbakan and appointing a new government (Zürcher 2017:323–24). With tanks patrolling the streets, military leaders forced the government to enact a series of measures designed to curb the Islamist movement, which included the closure of unregistered religious schools, the introduction of eight years of compulsory primary education, tighter control over capital inflows from Salafist Gulf states, censorship of Islamist media, shutting down the Muslim brotherhoods, and purging the bureaucracy from Islamic fundamentalists (Gülalp 1999:50; Kepel 2006:356–57; Kogacioglu 2004:433–62; Sen, Aksular, and Samur 2009:247–81). The Welfare Party was banned and party leaders Erdogan and Erbakan were prohibited from engaging in politics for five years (Eligur 2010:234–35; Gülalp 1999:53).

Despite the military’s intervention, the Islamist genie was out of the bottle. By 1997, the Islamists’ “strong organizational network and significant political constituency [were] capable of resisting suppression” (Eligur 2010:222). Unlike in the twenties, when Mustafa Kemal easily disposed of a religious armed rebellion, in the nineties the infrastructural power

of the state was evenly matched by Muslim associational density. The military was hard pressed to shut down a Muslim business empire whose tentacles extended to half of Turkey's gross domestic product, including 129 publications, 71 radio stations and television channels, 1100 businesses, 1200 student halls, and 850 schools (Eligür 2010:222; Hendrick 2009:343–68; Yavuz 2003:103–31). As the military began shutting down the Islamist private education system, the brotherhoods mobilized hundreds of thousands of protesters across the country (Eligür 2010:225). One Welfare Party leader warned that “if you attempt to close down the theological colleges ... blood will flow, it would be worse than in Algeria ... and it will be a beautiful thing” (quoted in European Court of Human Rights 2003:569). It seemed that civil war would ensue if the military persisted in trying to shut down the network of Islamic civil society organisations (Eligür 2010:227).

The military backed down from the brink and averted civil war by allowing the Islamists to resume their political activity. Following the usual practice of migrating to a new party whenever its predecessor was banned, Islamists formed a new organization, the Virtue Party (FP – *Fazilet Partisi*). The military allowed the FP to contest elections, even though everyone understood it was the same religious party under another name. Adopting a shrewd campaign message in favour of ‘pluralism’ – by which was meant the right of religious political forces to organize as any other interest group would (Gülalp 1999:53) –, the FP quickly recaptured the old Muslim vote. In June 2001 the Islamist party was banned for the fourth time, being once again reconstituted in a new movement, the Justice and Development Party

(AKP – *Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi*) led by former Istanbul mayor Recep Tayyip Erdogan.²⁴¹

Taking advantage of a profound economic crisis that hit Turkey at the turn of the century,²⁴² the AKP gained an absolute majority of seats in the 2002 general election and has been in power ever since²⁴³ (Keyman and Onis 2007:218; Morvaridi 2013:311–12; Polat 2016:75).

6.1.6. Who Votes for the Islamists?

To analyse the determinants of support for Turkish religious parties, I ran a set of time-series cross-sectional OLS regression models with provincial²⁴⁴ Islamist vote share as the dependent variable (data on election results obtained from Turkish Statistical Institute 2012b). The statistical analysis has three main independent variables of interest: the share of secondary school students who attended a private religious school (data on the number of religious school students from Çakmak 2009; and data on the total number of students from Turkish Statistical Institute 2006); the number of *imams* per thousand adults (from Turkish Statistical

²⁴¹ When he formed the new Islamist party, Erdogan was still serving the five-year ban from politics handed down to the leadership of the Welfare Party in 1997.

²⁴² Gross domestic product fell by almost one third between 1998 and 2001, and the unemployment rate in 2001 reached 10.6 percent.

²⁴³ While the strategies employed by the AKP to consolidate its hold on power are outside the remit of this dissertation, one particularly important tactic was to subsidise private Islamic charitable associations (Göçmen 2014:94; Isik 2014:314). As a scholar of Turkish social policy notes, the “AKP’s strategy to deliver social and economic rights relies increasingly on devolvement of the state’s welfare responsibilities to non-state actors” (Morvaridi 2013:313).

²⁴⁴ Provinces in Turkey are intermediate administrative levels between municipalities and the national level, so the regression models of this section can be directly compared with those for Italy and France (see Chapter 5). Some provinces were created during the 1980s or 1990s, so the total number of provinces differs between elections.

Institute 2012a); and the number of religious charities operating in the province (sourced from Turkish Statistical Institute 2010). Control variables include provincial income per capita (data obtained from Turkish Statistical Institute 2002b); yearly income growth; urbanization rate; logged population; share of primary and secondary sector workers (data on all these indicators obtained from Turkish Statistical Institute 2002a); and the provincial share of ethnic Kurds (sourced from Mutlu 1996). To ease interpretation of the results, all variables were standardized, so that each coefficient shows the effect of one standard deviation change in the independent variable, controlling for the other indicators.

Table 6.1 - Religious Party Vote Share in Turkish Provinces, 1973-2002

	6.1.1	6.1.2	6.1.3
Share of Religious Students	4.761 (0.828)***		2.992 (0.845)***
<i>Imams</i> Per Capita	2.399 (0.459)***		4.552 (0.727)***
Religious Charities	3.428 (0.820)***		2.247 (0.834)***
Income Per Capita		-1.662 (0.197)***	-1.525 (0.211)***
Income Growth		-0.248 (0.632)	-0.449 (0.681)
Urbanization		1.398	0.717


		(0.484)***	(0.500)
Log of Population		-1.489	-0.061
		(0.535)***	(0.665)
Industrial Workers		1.672	1.549
		(0.554)***	(0.551)***
Agricultural Workers		0.423	0.126
		(0.543)	(0.557)
Share of Kurds		0.532	0.201
		(0.402)	(0.499)
Election Year Fixed Effect	Yes	Yes	Yes
Provinces	81	81	81
Observations	515	515	515

* $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$. Time-series cross-sectional OLS regression models with election-year fixed-effects. Dependent variable is the provincial vote share obtained by Turkish Islamist parties in the parliamentary elections of 1973, 1977, 1987, 1993, 1995, 1997, and 2002.

The regression results are shown in Table 6.1. In the table's first model, I include the independent variables of interest without further controls; in the second model, I include only the controls; the third model shows the results with the full set of indicators. To help illustrate the regression results, Figure 6.5 shows the effect of the variables in the third model of Table 6.1 with 95 % confidence intervals. Taking Model 3 as the most reliable guide, the three independent variables of interest are strongly statistically significant and in the predicted

direction. Provinces with a higher share of students in religious schools are more likely to support Turkish Islamist parties, and the same is true for provinces with more *imams* and higher numbers of religious charities. Of the control variables, only income per capita (negatively associated with confessional party vote) and share of the workforce in the secondary sector (correlated with higher support for religious parties) are statistically significant. While urbanisation is not significant at conventional statistical levels, separate regressions for each election-year (results not shown) suggest that urban areas were *less likely* to vote for Turkish Islamists in 1973 and 1977 but *more likely* to do so in 1993 and 1995. These results match the narrative of this chapter – as noted above, Islamists made their great outreach to urban shantytowns during the eighties, when cities were being swelled by migrants from the countryside.

Figure 6.5 - Determinants of Religious Party Vote in Turkey, 1973-2002



6.2. Religion and Politics in Albania

In this section, I analyse the development of the Albanian state throughout the twentieth century and explain why political Islam was unable to gain a foothold in the country. During the long period of totalitarian Communist rule, Albania could plausibly lay a claim to be the most anticlerical country in the world. Even the private practice of religion was prohibited during Communism, with the constitution proscribing mandatory atheism (Schwartz 2009:50). Unlike Turkish generals worried about their reputation in the West, Communists in Albania instituted a brutal totalitarian dictatorship without regard for the loss of life. As a result, the social power of religion was effectively purged from the country before the end of the Cold War and the transition to democracy. During the first two decades of the twenty-first century, Albania was the only democratic Sunni Muslim-majority society in the world without an Islamist political party.

6.2.1. Albania and Islam before Communism, 1912-1944

The Islamization of the Albanian people started in the fourteenth century, with the Turkish occupation of the country (Celá 1992:115; Skendi 1967:7; Young 1999:7). By the sixteenth century, the great majority of Albanians had converted to Islam, although considerable Christian minorities remain to the present day (Skendi 1967:19; Sulstarova 2015:30–31; Trix 1995:533). Out of all Turkish provinces in the Balkans, Albania was by far the most closely

integrated with the Empire²⁴⁵ (Elbasani and Puto 2017:55). No fewer than forty-two (out of approximately two hundred) Grand Viziers of the Empire were ethnically Albanian, and Albanians formed an important part of the Ottoman army and civil service. For these reasons, the Albanians were “last people of the empire” (Elbasani and Puto 2017:55; also Merdjanova 2016:37–38) to develop a sense of nationhood separate from Ottoman rule. Nationalism eventually emerged in the late nineteenth-century, and independence was achieved in November 1912 after a brief revolt (Aldcroft 2006:166; Anscombe 2014:177; Vickers 1999:vii–viii).

During its first decade, the new Albanian state was dominated by the traditional Muslim nobility, whose previous high positions in the Ottoman administration gave them an upper edge over any potential rivals²⁴⁶ (Anscombe 2014:177; Austin 2017:9; Celá 1992:120–21; Vickers 1999:102). For the great majority of the population, life as an independent state was not so different from before. The same people were in charge. Two major political parties quickly sprang up, the Popular Party (*Partia Popullore*) and the Progressive Party (*Partia Përparimtare*). The Popular Party was essentially liberal and pro-secularism, in contrast to the religious traditionalism of the Progressives, although neither of the two was a programmatic party with well-defined programs and mass organizations (Austin 2017:11; Clayer 2007:272–84; Vickers 1999:101). In addition to the parties, some grassroots political organizations emerged at the start of the twenties. Mobilizing religious and class grievances, they sought to

²⁴⁵ Because the majority of Albanians were Sunni Muslims, they lacked the religious antagonisms against the Turks of Christian countries like Serbia and Greece (Skendi 1967:20–21).

²⁴⁶ In 1914, an Islamist movement led by Haxhi Qamili took over the country and imposed Sharia law, but Serbian forces dislodged him after little more than a year in power (Anscombe 2014:177–78).

challenge the dominance of Islamic elites and landowners in the name of the Christian minorities (Austin 2017:11). Although unsuccessful, these early movements suggested that below the surface Albania was quite polarized between a dominant Muslim minority and a bitter Christian minority.

The independent Albanian state was infrastructurally puny. Immediately after the First World War, indeed, “Albania was a state only in name” (Austin 2017:15). This much was admitted by representatives of the League of Nations in 1922, who diplomatically noted the process of state formation was only getting started. There were almost no transport infrastructures in the country, with less than two hundred kilometres of roads. The northern half of Albania was accessible only on foot (Fischer 1984:45; MacMillan 2002:368). As a consequence, the state had practically no control over the north, which was teeming with roving bandits and in a virtual state of anarchy (Pula 2015:645–46; Roselli 2006:2; Vickers 1999:99). Albania had only around six thousand soldiers in the military, and no navy or air force (Austin 2017:15–16). More than four-fifths of the population were illiterate (Aldcroft 2006:166; Kirk 1968:10; Moore 1972:26). To begin building something resembling a modern state, Albania needed a domestic source of steady revenue, but precisely because its state was so inefficient, only an estimated 25 percent of national income was declared to the authorities (Tomes 2007:54). As a consequence, public finances were in shambles (Fischer 1984:48).

Formally, the Albanian Constitution proclaimed freedom of religion, but the first post-independence governments maintained a close alliance with the Islamic religious establishment (Celá 1992:121). Muslims were organized in 1923 into the national Sunni

Organisation, a public corporation tasked with regulating the activities of the hierarchy and supporting the practice of religion through public subsidies for mosque building and the upkeep of *imams* and *ulema* (Endresen 2015a:223; Sulstarova 2015:31). The Organisation soon acquired extensive autonomy and became one of the most influential social actors in the country. In 1924, one year before Mustafa Kemal abolished the caliphate, the Sunni Organisation undertook a major administrative reform by cutting all ties with Turkey and centralizing authority over Albanian clergy into a tight hierarchical structure (Doja 2006:98; Elbasani and Puto 2017:57; Merdjanova 2016:39; Popovic 1986:21). *Sharia* law dominated traditional social relations, especially in the north where the government had almost no infrastructural presence (Tarifa 1995:133).

On January 1925, Ahmed Zogu – a powerful landowner well-connected with the Islamic establishment that governed Albania before and after independence - led a coup d'état and inaugurated a personal dictatorship (Anscombe 2014:178; Hocevar 1987:562; Marmullaku 1975:36–37; Tarifa 1995:134). The new authoritarian government belatedly started to build the state's infrastructural power (Aldcroft 2006:167; Giannakos and Harper 2015:287). Because of the underdevelopment of Albanian civil society and the social fractures between Muslims and Christians and the tribes of the north and the south, "Zogu's authoritarian government was probably the only one which could follow through a solid unification of the country" (Roselli 2006:12). This is indeed what happened. Deploying brutal force, the new administration was able to bring the northern tribes under government control for the first time (Pano 1989:330; Vickers 1999:118). The state embarked on a major public works project to build paved roads that would ease transportation and make it possible to enforce governmental authority in the mountainous peripheries of the country. This road-

building program required cutting into the sides of the mountains, a form of construction which was very labour intensive. In order to recruit workers for such an unenviable job, the state conscripted all men over the age of sixteen to work without pay for ten days (Vickers 1999:126). There were other state-building reforms: in 1925, Zogu created a central bank to attract foreign investment (Roselli 2006:35); and in 1930 he instituted a major program of land redistribution to curtail the power of the Islamic landowner class from which he hailed, although it appears that the results were limited (Crampton and Crampton 1996:45; Marmullaku 1975:36).

The new authoritarian government also made its presence felt in the religious field, where Kemalist anticlerical policies were regarded as a model to be followed. As part of a “strong nation-building” project to eradicate intermediaries standing between the state and individual citizens, Zogu enacted stricter controls on the activity of religious groups (Merdjanova 2016:39; Tomes 2007:148). The government claimed responsibility for providing education in public schools and for supervising private religious schools (Anscombe 2014:179–80; Clayer 2014:291; Clayer and Germain 2008:148; Popovic 1986:28–29; Ramet 2009:111). A Civil Code enacted in 1928 copied some Turkish reforms by abolishing the legal standing of Islamic courts (Clayer and Bougarel 2013:126). Islamic instruction in public schools was abolished in 1930, with a new curriculum imported from anticlerical France and Turkey (Clayer 2014:296). Zogu also took to haranguing Albanians over the supremacy of state over religion, telling his compatriots to “not forget that while fulfilling the holy duty ... the fatherland must be above everything” (quoted in Elbasani and Puto 2017:57).

The Sunni Organisation was forced to comply with government orders. During the thirties, Zogu went against the wishes of the clergy and imposed the use of Albanian in sermons, the integration of all *madrassas* into a national institution controlled by the state, and even the closure of many mosques (Clayer 2009:490–91). In 1937, Zogu aped the Kemalist reforms still further by banning the Muslim veil. By the end of the thirties, the “large-scale reforms to nationalize, modernize and co-opt Muslims into the state’s political vision were so powerful” (Elbasani and Puto 2017:58) that the Sunni Organization meekly obeyed any dictate from above.

Zogu was able to enact this impressive state-building program thanks to funding from Fascist Italy (Aldcroft 2006:169; Berend 1985:204–5; Nötel 1986:264). This was a dangerous policy that gave Italians a foothold in the country. On April 1939, Mussolini invaded the country, deposed Zogu, and set up a puppet government (van Creveld 1972:221). By this point, the Sunni Organization had become so submissive that the Fascist overlords had no serious difficulties in forcing the Muslim establishment to do their bidding (Endresen 2015a:226). Under Mussolini’s direction, the Sunni hierarchy denounced anti-Fascist elements as enemies of Islam (Elbasani and Puto 2017:58). The subordination of religion to the state thus preceded the Communist takeover, although the Communists went much further in their anticlericalism than Zogu or Mussolini.

Italian occupation was resisted from the start by Albanian Communists (Giannakos and Harper 2015:287; Jacques 1995:415–16). Before the Fascist takeover, Communism in the country was tiny, but now it grew significantly thanks to the wave of nationalist indignation and spirit of resistance against foreign occupation (Thomas 1973:107). Party cells and local

organisations mushroomed around Albania. The Communists were the only organised political force when the Axis were expelled from the country in November 1944, and formed a government headed by party leader Enver Hoxha (Abrahams 2015:16; Mëhilli 2017:20).

6.2.2. Communist Albania, 1944-1990

The new Communist government wasted no time in imposing a totalitarian regime. Copying the standard Stalinist model of a highly centralized planned economy, Hoxha nationalised and seized the assets of all private companies in the country (Abrahams 2015:17; Jacques 1995:442–43). ‘Large’ landholdings – defined as those with five hectares or above – were expropriated without compensation (Mëhilli 2017:29–30). In the immediate postwar years, the Communists continued Zogu’s tradition of forcing Albanians to work for free by mobilizing peasants to rebuild roads and bridges. With civil society devastated by the war and no traditions of independent political organisation, the Albanian state had more control over its population than any other Eastern European country (Birch 1971:361; Kajsia 2016:283; Woodcock 2007:51–53). Its totalitarian system was “all-pervasive” (O’Donnell 1995:18).

Enver Hoxha devotedly aped Soviet policies in practically every field, with the exception of religion (Jacques 1995:439). The anticlericalism of Albanian Communists went much further than elsewhere in the Soviet bloc,²⁴⁷ and Tirana often made public criticisms of

²⁴⁷ Enver Hoxha’s personal anticlericalism defies easy explanation. His father was a very devout Sunni Muslim and he himself seems to have been religious in his youth, and his anticlericalism could be regarded as the zeal of the convert (Jacques 1995:429).

the USSR and the other Communist countries for their supposed lenience in dealing with religious communities. Enver Hoxha and his colleagues regarded Islam – correctly – as the only social and moral institution capable of competing with the state for the allegiance of citizens, and sought to eradicate religion from social life (Elbasani and Puto 2017:58; Jacques 1995:447; Vickers 1999:197).

The anticlerical policies of the regime evolved in two stages. First, during the late forties and early fifties, the Communists unleashed an initial crackdown aimed at clearly subordinating religion to the state (Babuna 2004:308; Daniel 1990:18–19; Jacques 1995:448). The regime expropriated all property belonging to the Islamic and Christian religious communities, and banned private charities (Trix 1995:534). Communists integrated all religious bodies in a public agency under government control, and replaced uncooperative ecclesiastics with pliant cronies who could be counted on to toe the party line (Abrahams 2015:17). All forms of religious communication, including sermons, publications, or literature, were heavily censored (Elbasani and Puto 2017:58; Jacques 1995:450).

Muslims meekly acquiesced to these harsh anticlerical policies in the hope that subordination to the Communist regime would allow them to practice their faith in peace. However, these initial measures were only a prelude to Enver Hoxha's "relentless war" against all forms of spiritual belief (Mëhilli 2017:222; Vickers 1999:195). The second stage of Communist anticlericalism started in 1967, when the regime imposed a complete ban on all religious practice (Abrahams 2015:34; Anscombe 2014:250; Elbasani and Puto 2017:58; Prifti 1978:153; Sulstarova 2015:31). The private practice of religion - and even the possession of a Koran - became a crime subject to several years of prison. To enforce these measures, the

police and individual citizens were ordered to spy on one another and inform the government if their neighbour was seen performing religious rituals at home (Jacques 1995:526). Failure to denounce a religious acquaintance was also a crime, which doubtless persuaded many to rat on their neighbours and friends. The government either demolished or converted mosques into profane uses like sports halls, theatres, and public toilets (Jacques 1995:487–88). Secular festivals replaced traditional religious observances²⁴⁸ and tombstones with religious symbols were desecrated (Trix 1995:537). Clerics were forced to publicly repudiate their faith, with those who refused facing execution, forced labour, or a prolonged stay in ‘re-education camps’ (Jacques 1995:439; O’Donnell 1995:20).

This extreme anticlericalism achieved its crowning moment in 1976, when a new Constitution proudly proclaimed Albania to be the world’s first atheist state. Article 37 of the constitution committed the Albanian state to atheist agitprop, claiming that “the state ... supports atheist propaganda for the purpose of inculcating the scientific materialist world outlook” (quoted in Temperman 2010:140–41). Not all religious beliefs and practices could be totally eradicated, however. Some mosques continued to operate underground, holding services for a dwindling number of courageous believers who were well aware that they risked death if caught by the government (Bowers 1984:128–29; Daniel 1990:23; Trix 1995:537). Such religious enclaves developed most notably in Sunni urban strongholds like Shkoder, Durres, and Kavaje (Clayer 2003:294). Nevertheless, what stands out to the observer

²⁴⁸ One curious consequence of the Communist persecution of religion was that parents were discouraged from giving their children names with religious connotations. The regime went as far as to publish official lists with pagan, ‘Illyrian’, or newly-invented names considered adequate for the new cohort of revolutionary Albanians. Marenglen, a corruption of Marx, Engels, and Lenin, became particularly popular (Vickers 1999:196).

is the meekness of religious reaction against such harsh anticlerical policies, especially when contrasted with the vigour of Turkish Islam's opposition to Kemalism. After decades of ruthless totalitarian oppression, Albanian religious communities were too powerless and atomized to challenge the Communist dictatorship in any meaningful way (Jacques 1995:460).

The remarkable absence of resistance to Communist anticlerical policies can also be attributed to the building up of the infrastructural powers of the Albanian state. Indeed, it is strike to note how Albania evolved from one of the weakest states in Europe during the Interwar period to perhaps the state with the closest involvement in citizens' daily lives under Communist rule (Biondich 2011:178; Idrizi 2020:66). Outside observers were struck by the extent to which "party control and influence extends to the most obscure and backward villages" (Birch 1971:363). As Enver Hoxha bragged in 1963, "the Party knows everything about people's lives, knows what each of them thinks" (cited in O'Donnell 1995:21). Before achieving such totalitarian control over people, the Communist regime had to embark on an extensive state-building program (Anscombe 2014:250). Hoxha and his cronies built up a bureaucratic Leviathan and established a modern Communist welfare state, on the one hand, and a repressive totalitarian apparatus of repression, on the other. I now discuss each in turn.

The development of public services in Communist Albania must by all accounts be considered an impressive achievement by an otherwise blood-thirsty and brutal regime. Shortly after coming to power, the Communists established a social security system with mandatory old-age and workplace injury pensions. Free medical treatment was made

available for all citizens, which coupled with the eradication of malaria²⁴⁹ and the building of hospitals and clinics contributed to the increase in Albanians' life expectancy from 54 years in 1950 to 67 by 1970. When an earthquake destroyed more than ten thousand buildings in the district of Shkodra, the state took only five months to repair or replace all the buildings with antiseismic structures, an "incredible" achievement (Jacques 1995:508).

The Communist regime also made considerable efforts to educate – and indoctrinate – the masses. Their successes in the field of education are more impressive when considering the low starting point. In 1945, Albania did not have a single university. Despite Zogu's literacy programs, an estimated 75 percent of the population was unable to read or write (Idrizi 2020:68; Mëhilli 2017:6). Once the Communists came to power, they waged a relentless campaign against illiteracy. Elementary education from ages six to thirteen was made compulsory, and illiterate adults were forced to attend reading classes in night schools and vocational institutes. This resulted in "a phenomenal increase in the literacy rate" (Jacques 1995:471). Naturally, Marxism-Leninism had pride of place in the school curricula, and religion was nowhere to be seen (Birch 1971:367; Bowers 1984:130; Zhllima et al. 2018:56–57).

The infrastructurally powerful Albanian state built by the Communists was not only used for benign purposes like welfare provision, healthcare, and education. Its dark side was a harshly repressive tyranny resembling contemporary North Korea. Censorship was rife. The

²⁴⁹ Malaria was endemic in western Albania because of its swampy lands, which the Communists drained. By the late sixties, malaria was effectively eliminated from the country (Jacques 1995:532).

Communists rigidly controlled all sorts of publications and private correspondence, making it impossible for opponents of the regime to organize (Birch 1971:372–73; Schmidt-Neke 2011:81). A powerful and pervasive secret police (the *Sigurimi*) carefully monitored any threat to the regime (Jacques 1995:509; Pettifer and Vickers 1997:31–34). The police presided over a reign of despotic terror by spreading its network of informers over all the nooks and crannies of the country. Dissidents – real or imagined – were sent to prisons and labour camps in which torture was routine and death an everyday occurrence. American intelligence estimated that one-third of the total Albanian population was at one point or another interrogated or imprisoned by the Communist secret police (O'Donnell 1995:18). Public displays of violence, such as show trials or the use of forced labour in public works projects, served as a demonstration of the supremacy of the state over the individual (Biondich 2011:178).

Perhaps most remarkably of all, the Albanian state was able to survive in perfect isolation after being abandoned by its Yugoslav, Soviet, and Chinese Communist allies. After the breaking of diplomatic relations with neighbouring Yugoslavia in 1948, British and American intelligence services anticipated that the regime would rapidly collapse (Hibbert 1991:235; Mastny 1996:81). The secret police proved the British and the Americans wrong by ruthlessly snuffing out dissent (Mëhilli 2017:46–47). In 1960, Albania quarrelled with the Soviet Union and publicly denounced its claims to leadership of the Communist world (Griffith 1963:47; Lüthi 2008:202). Once again, observers predicted the demise of Hoxha and his cronies (Vickers 1999:185–86). The government survived by adopting a policy of strict austerity and aligning itself diplomatically with Maoist China (Hamm 1963:33; Lüthi 2008:204; Vickers 1999:190–91). This latest alliance lasted until 1978, when Albanian criticisms of the

Maoist alliance with the United States led China to break off diplomatic relations. Completely isolated from the world, with no outside patron, Albania survived through a policy of total self-sufficiency and harsh totalitarian repression (Jacques 1995:509–10; Vickers 1999:209). During the eighties, tiny and impoverished Albania was totally sealed off from the outside world to a degree without modern parallel.²⁵⁰ Yet Communism survived and no opposition movement was able to pose a significant threat to the regime.

6.2.3. Democratic Albania, 1990-

Enver Hoxha died in 1985. His successors at first tried to maintain the isolationism Stalinism of the preceding four decades, but changed course after seeing the fall of neighbouring Communist regimes in 1989 (Abrahams 2015:28). In May 1990, the Communists took the first step towards a tentative liberalisation by legalizing religious worship (Jacques 1995:650–52). While thousands assembled to attend the first prayer sessions for twenty-three years, it was mostly elderly people who took part in the services, as “curious youngsters gathered to watch in silent amazement at the strange antics of their elders” (Vickers 1999:214). Despite some uptick in religious practice, the “legacy of destruction” would prove hard for religious groups to undo (Blumi and Krasniqi 2014:481; Clayer 1997:123; Elbasani and Puto 2017:58–59; Trix 1995:539). Albanian Islam “lacked leaders, schools, buildings and furnishings” (Jacques 1995:662). A survey showed that while 82.4 % of Albanians described

²⁵⁰ Even contemporary North Korea, for all its own splendid isolation, has friendly relations with neighbouring China.

themselves as nominal Muslims, only around forty percent of Albanians reported being personally religious (Krstic, Dinic, and Gavrilovic 2018:2–5).

In December 1990, Albanian leaders took a major step towards democratization by allowing the formation of independent political parties and calling for elections to a Constitutional Assembly. The major opposition party to emerge, the Democratic Party (PD – *Partia Demokratike e Shqipërisë*), was a heterogenous front of anti-Communist groups under the leadership of cardiologist Sali Berisha (Jacques 1995:666–67). While the Communists triumphed in the country's first multiparty elections, they fell from power after a short period of time. The PD won a majority of seats in the 1992 parliamentary elections, thus effectively ending the Communist Party's half-century grip on power (Abrahams 2015:110; Duffy 2000:73–74; Pettifer 1996:388; Szajkowski 1992:124–25).

One of the social groups supporting the Democrats was the Muslim Community of Albania (KMSH – *Komuniteti Mysliman i Shqipërisë*), the new organisation of Sunni Islamic clerics (Clayer and Masud 1997:408; Elbasani 2016:259; Elbasani and Puto 2017:59; Endresen 2015a:223; Jazexhi 2010:9). The KMSH followed the template of the Sunni Organization of the Interwar period, claiming national and sole authority over the Islamic community of Albania (Blumi and Krasniqi 2014:481–82). Among other tasks, the KMSH was responsible for managing Muslim charities, maintaining religious buildings, organizing Islamic schools, and representing the faithful. Although the organization was nominally private, the Democratic government endorsed it as the official representative of Albanian Muslims and provided it with considerable public subsidies. A KMSH representative was also nominated to chair the State Secretariat, which was essentially a Ministry with responsibility for religious affairs.

After coming to power on an anti-Communist wave, the Democrats sought to remain in office by mobilizing the support of Muslims, who constitute a majority of Albanian voters (Clayer and Masud 1997:408; Schmidt-Neke 2011:81–82). People of faith were regarded as a pool of natural voters inclined to support the government’s dismantling of the Communist legacy. Indeed, Muslims quickly became the most prominent grassroots activists of the Democratic Party (Elbasani 2016:259). PD leaders sponsored the creation of Islamic Culture (KI – *Kultura Islame*), an association linking Democratic Party structures, the Sunni hierarchy, and foreign charities to support the revival of Islam in Albania (Blumi 2005:19–20; Elbasani and Puto 2017:59). Sali Berisha promoted Albania’s entry into the Organization of Islamic Conference as a way of attracting investment from wealthy Gulf nations²⁵¹ (Pettifer and Vickers 1997:102; Sulstarova 2015:37).

With the enthusiastic support of the Democratic government, Islamic charities and organizations started pouring in from abroad, running orphanages, providing humanitarian aid, and building mosques and other places of worship (American Foreign Policy Council 2014:540; Clayer 1997:120–23; Kursani 2018:302). Many Albanians were given scholarships to study Islamic theology in foreign countries; Koran study groups mushroomed; and various Muslim publications were distributed for free²⁵² (Elbasani 2016:261; Pettifer and Vickers 1997:100–109). The KMSH eagerly accepted foreign funding, using it to rebuild Islamic social

²⁵¹ Aid from Islamic countries amounted to half of total foreign investment in Albania during the nineties, totalling five percent of national income (Elbasani 2016:261).

²⁵² Between 1992 and 1994, a single Arab charity handed out three million copies of the Koran, which amounted to roughly one Koran per Albanian (Pettifer and Vickers 1997:106–7).

networks from scratch. During the nineties, the KMSH sponsored the construction of over five hundred mosques;²⁵³ established an incipient system of religious education; published a broad variety of periodicals; and invested in several charitable associations that were open vehicles for proselytization (Elbasani and Somer 2019:27–28; Vickers 2008:4). The main targets of this Islamic outreach were the young and the poor, especially those living in the countryside. As the KMSH began strengthening its organizational apparatus, religious leaders “projected a three-stage plan of Islamization: (1) initial financial assistance would lead to (2) the promotion of ‘pure’ Islamic values, which would then lead to (3) the installation of an Albanian Islamic state” (Elbasani and Puto 2017:60).

Plans for an Islamic state in Albania soon acquired more sinister undertones. The eagerness of the Democratic government to attract foreign funding without minimal regulatory requirements allowed various radical Islamist organisations – such as the Algeria Armed Islamic Group and the Egyptian Jihad - to develop terrorist training cells in Albanian soil²⁵⁴ (Pettifer and Vickers 1997:106–7). Foreign intelligence agencies took notice and alerted the Albanian government to the risks of harbouring terrorist organisations (Abrahams 2015:233; International Crisis Group 1999:6–8). After the Socialist Party – the former Communist Party – won the elections of 1997 and returned to office, the state began cracking down hard on radical Islamist organizations (Clayer 2006:39; Elbasani 2015:350–51; Endresen 2015b:63). In collaboration with the CIA, Albanian security forces were able to localize and

²⁵³ Although even with this intense mosque-building activity, Albania still had less than half the number of mosques existing in the country before the Communist takeover (Merdjanova 2016:40).

²⁵⁴ The International Crisis Group (1999:7) claimed Albania “provided a safe and undisturbed refuge for Islamic terrorists.”

arrest or kill the leaders of the jihadist cells in the country (Mayer 2008:114; Wallace, Melton, and Schlesinger 2009:343). Thanks to the heavy-handed intervention of the state, religious fundamentalism's threat to Albania subsided (Elbasani and Somer 2019:28). A recent study noted that "Salafism has been accepted only by a small fraction of the population, which can be estimated as well below two per cent of Albanian Muslims" (Kursani 2018:302).

Overall, the returning Socialists adopted a new, mildly anticlerical regulatory framework that reversed the cosy connections between Islam and the state that had been put in place by the Democrats (Elbasani 2015:339, 2016:263). Borrowing from the Kemalist Turkish model of state control and oversight of religion, the government created a State Committee of Cults (essentially a ministry for religious affairs) that gained formal powers over the KMSH. The head of the Committee of Cults once candidly explained his goal: achieving "state control over Islam" (quoted in Elbasani and Saatçioğlu 2014:468). The Socialists also sponsored legislation pledging to intervene in case Islamic clergy showed signs of "distortions, extremist tendencies, or other aggressive demonstrations" (Venice Commission 2007:12). Public subsidies for religious communities remained in place, although funding was slashed to "very meagre" levels (Elbasani 2015:340; also Pettifer and Nazarko 2006:15). Further limiting the financial autonomy of Islamic organisations, the state refused to return properties expropriated during Communism (Blumi and Krasniqi 2014:502; Sarkissian 2015:164). Religious classes were not reintroduced in public schools, whose curricula remains thoroughly secularized (Blumi and Krasniqi 2014:500; Elbasani and Puto 2017:53).

The abrupt departure of foreign funds after the Socialist crackdown and the post-1997 tight regulation of religious communities ensured that Islamic civil society in Albania never

recovered from the ravages of Communist totalitarianism. Despite the fact that religious communities are legally allowed to establish their own educational institutions, twenty years after the fall of Communism Albania only had seven *madrassas* and two Islamic elementary schools, enrolling a grand total of 1,504 students (Blumi and Krasniqi 2014:498; Daun and Arjmand 2018:816; Sarkissian 2015:164). In contrast to the vitality of Islamic brotherhoods in Turkey despite Kemalist anticlericalism, in Albania most of those brotherhoods “have more or less disappeared due to a lack of funds and followers” (Blumi and Krasniqi 2014:481; also Bria 2019:331). In 2006, a NATO report noted that Albania only had twenty Islamic charities with 820 volunteers nationwide (Pettifer and Nazarko 2006:16).

The shallowness of Islamic civil society accounts for the fact that Albanian Muslims have thus far been unable to form a confessional political party. They did try once. In 2004, the KMSH leadership put forward a project to create a religious party, named Motherland. The projected religious party called for reintroducing religious instruction in public schools and for higher public subsidies to Islam (Sarkissian 2015:167). This party was never able to get off the ground, however, because its sponsors could not find the five hundred signatures required by Albanian law to register new political parties (BBC 2004; Vickers 2008:6).


In sum, after the brief flourishing of Islamic civil society in the early nineties with the help of foreign funds, the Albanian state reasserted its hold over religious groups and prevented their expansion (Elbasani and Saatçioğlu 2014:464). The destruction of religious communities under Communism was not reversed during the past thirty years. Sunni Islamic civil society was simply too shallow to mobilize sufficient numbers of people to form a viable

confessional political party, as the embarrassing debacle over the registration of the Motherland Party made clear.

6.3. Infrastructural Power and Religious Politics in Albania and Turkey

In this section, I compare the infrastructural power of the Albanian and Turkish states to explain why confessional parties failed to emerge in Albania but thrived in Turkey. Since the nineties, both countries have had similar anticlerical policies. None of them adopted a strict separation of religion and state, opting instead to closely supervise the activities of Islamic groups through specialized government departments. As we have seen, the Turkish state exercises control over religious groups through the Directorate of Religious Affairs. In Albania, the Committee of Cults is tasked with essentially similar functions (Elbasani and Saatçioğlu 2014:464; Lakshman-Lepain 2002:41). Both Turkey and Albania have sought to relegate religion purely to the private sphere and remove Islam's historical corporate role as an intermediary between the state and individual citizens. The similarities between the two countries in terms of religious policy are illustrated in Figure 6.6, which shows the average level of anticlericalism against the Islamic religion in Albania and Turkey between 1980 and 2010 (Brown 2018). During the last decade of Communist rule in the eighties, Albanian anticlericalism was close to the maximum score of 4, although in the nineties it essentially equalled the Turkish level.

Figure 6.6 - Anticlericalism Against Islam in Albania and Turkey, 1980-2010



Source: Government Religious Preferences V 2.0 (2018).

If the Albanian state has pursued anticlerical policies as strict as - if not more radical than -, the Turkish state, how can we explain the absence in Albania of a powerful Islamist party in the mould of the Turkish AKP? By all accounts, the Muslim Community of Albania (KMSH) “belongs to the same spectrum of moderate liberal Islamic movements as the AKP” (Bria 2019:320; Elbasani and Saatçioğlu 2014:458) and could plausibly form the nucleus of a confessional political party. The KMSH was unable to sponsor a mighty political force because, unlike Turkish Islam, it did not have the organisational capacity to mobilize large numbers of followers. Religious communities in Albania emerged from the Communist era as shallow organisations (Bria 2019:331–32; Gruda and Gjuraç 1999:545). As a recent study notes, “the regeneration of its [KMSH] organizational capabilities after decades of atheist policies has proven very slow and challenging ... the substantial mass of agnostics, who grew up amidst

anti-religious communist propaganda, has further undermined the level and scope of religious mobilization” (Elbasani and Saatçioğlu 2014:465; also Lakshman-Lepain 2002:4; Pano 2003:152). Another observer claims that Albanian “religious institutions barely manage to have a formal and ceremonial existence, scarcely linked with the culture and the interest of ... society” (Ruli 2003:154). In contrast to the Muslim Community of Albania, the Turkish Justice and Development Party came to power with support from an impressive organizational structure capable of mobilizing millions of voters. As discussed above, political Islam in Turkey was “more active, more highly motivated and more elaborately organized than ... other Turkish political parties” (Hale and Özbudun 2010:49).

Having established that the Turkish and Albanian states had equivalent levels of anticlericalism, and that political Islam in Turkey was organisationally powerful while in Albania it failed to mobilize significant numbers of voters, I now analyse the infrastructural power of the two states. By comparing various measures of state capacity, I show that the Albanian state has higher levels of infrastructural power than its Turkish counterpart, which accounts for the two countries’ disparity in Islamist political success. Before starting the discussion, I emphasize three important caveats. First, my argument is that the Albanian state is more powerful than its Turkish counterpart because of the historical legacies of Communism. While postwar Turkey prided itself on being an electoral democracy, Albania suffered under a totalitarian Communist dictatorship that ruthlessly and remorselessly used all methods at its disposal to control the population. Had Turkey also had a Communist dictatorship, it might well have developed an even more powerful state. In any case, this

dissertation does not focus on the causes of infrastructural power but on its consequences,²⁵⁵ in particular the undermining of religious civil society.

Second, my comparative analysis of infrastructural power focuses on a relatively long time period – between 1970/1975 and 2015/2020, depending on data availability. This is important to contextualise events in Albania. Albanian state capacity was significantly diminished in the aftermath of the fall of Communism (Arsovska 2015:28–29). The sudden disorientation expected of a country transitioning from rigid Marxism-Leninism to a market economy, and the civil war in neighbouring Yugoslavia led to the smuggling of weapons to Albania and the rise of organised criminal mafias, which gave Albania a reputation for violence, lawlessness, and mayhem (Bideleux and Jeffries 2007:72; O’Brennan and Gassie 2009:64; Saltmarshe 2018:149–50). After the chaos of the nineties, however, the Albanian state did succeed in restoring law and order, to the extent that “Albania today is one of the safest countries ... in Europe” (Vickers 2011:66).


Finally, in the following discussion I consider different measures of state capacity, which are not meant to be analysed in isolation but considered holistically. To the extent that a broad array of different indicators all point in the same direction – the Albanian state being consistently rated as able to penetrate society and implement measures more effectively

²⁵⁵ Another factor favouring Albanian over Turkish state capacity might be the size of the territory. Albania is significantly smaller than Turkey, which might make it easier for the state to effectively control the peripheral areas of the country.

than the Turkish state –, the evidence viewed as a whole should strengthen my hypothesis about the infrastructural superiority of the Albanian over the Turkish state.

I start the comparative analysis of state infrastructural power by showing that the Turkish state has significantly greater resources available at its disposal. Figure 6.7 shows that per capita income in Turkey has consistently been higher than in Albania (Bolt et al. 2018). That gap has grown in the twenty-first century: by 2015, Albanian income per capita was less than half of that in Turkey. If national income is an important component of state capacity, all things being equal, the Turkish state should have greater infrastructural power than the Albanian state. But is that really the case?

Figure 6.7 - Per Capita Income in Albania and Turkey, 1975-2015



Source: Maddison Project (2018).

Figures 6.8 and 6.9 look at the share of school age children in Albania and Turkey who are enrolled in elementary and secondary schools, respectively (World Bank 2020). Despite the fact that Turkey is considerably wealthier than Albania, its state has done a poorer job at educating its children. The difference between the two countries was particularly stark in the eighties, when elementary school enrolment rates in Albania were close to one hundred percent, while those in Turkey languished around the 85 percent mark. There is a massive drop in school enrolments in Albania in 2008 as a result of the global financial crisis, which hit the Albanian economy particularly hard (Sufaj 2015). This was no more than a conjunctural blip, however, since Albanian elementary schools soon returned to enrol virtually all school age children. The picture is somewhat similar when comparing Turkish and Albanian secondary school enrolments: there is a long-term pattern of higher enrolment levels in Albania compared with Turkey, with the exception of a brief period in the nineties following the fall of Communism.

Figure 6.8 – Primary Schooling in Albania and Turkey, 1975-2015






Figure 6.9 - Secondary Schooling in Albania and Turkey, 1975-2015



Although Albania has a higher school enrolment rate than Turkey overall, Islamic education is much more prominent in Turkey than in Albania. Of course, Islamic education was banned in Albania during Communism, so naturally Turkish religious schools have a formidable advantage over their Albanian cousins. One way or the other, Islamic education in Turkey was strong and widespread enough to provide committed activists and grassroots support to Turkish confessional parties. No such instrument was available to would-be Albanian Islamists. Figures 6.10 (elementary), 6.11 (secondary), and 6.12 (tertiary) show the percentage of schoolchildren enrolled in private Islamic schools in Albania and Turkey between 1970 and 2020 (Daun and Arjmand 2018; World Bank 2020). Islamic education in Albania lagged behind its Turkish counterpart even after the fall of Communism, notwithstanding the significant investments made by other Muslim countries in the nineties with the goal of stimulating a revival of Albanian Islam. These investments might not have been entirely fruitless. The early twenty-first century shows a rapid increase of Islamic education in Albania, which as Figure 6.11 suggests, even briefly surpassed Turkey in secondary school enrolment shares. The long-term trend of Figures 6.10 to 6.12 is clear, however: private Islamic education is significantly stronger in Turkey than in Albania.

Figure 6.10 - Islamic Primary Education in Albania and Turkey, 1970-2020


Islamic Primary Education in Albania and Turkey, 1970-2020



Source: Daun & Armjand (2018); World Bank (2020).


Figure 6.11 - Islamic Secondary Education in Albania and Turkey, 1970-2020

Islamic Secondary Education in Albania and Turkey, 1970-2020



Source: Daun & Armjand (2018); World Bank (2020).

Figure 6.12 - Islamic Higher Education in Albania and Turkey, 1970-2020



Source: Daun & Armjand (2018); World Bank (2020).

Figures 6.13 and 6.14 compare the healthcare performance of the Turkish and Albanian states (World Bank 2020). As Figure 6.13 shows, hospital capacity in Albania has consistently been higher than in Turkey, although it shows a secular trend downward virtually from the start of the period under analysis (Saltmarshe 2000:330). Hospital capacity in Turkey declined slightly until the mid-nineties, when it increased to record levels – although never quite reaching the hospital capacity available to Albanians. Figure 6.14 also shows that the Albanian state was able to immunize a considerably higher share of its population against Hepatitis B, Diphtheria, Tetanus, Pertussis, and Measles.

Figure 6.13 - Hospital Capacity in Albania and Turkey, 1975-2015








Figure 6.14 - Public Health Measures in Albania and Turkey, 1975-2015



Data collected by political scientists to measure state capacity in a comparative perspective also concurs with the assessment that the Albanian state is endowed with higher levels of infrastructural power than Turkey. The Relative Political Performance Data Set of Kugler and Tammen (2012) seeks to gauge state capacity in two ways. The first is the Relative Political Extraction score, which measures the ability of states to extract revenue; the second, Relative Political Reach, assesses the capacity of governments to mobilize the citizenry to achieve public goals (for instance by bringing children to schools). To maximize comparability, the two scores are normalized, with a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one. Figure 6.15 shows the scores for Albania and Turkey between 1980 and 2010. Once more, the Albanian state displays higher capacity than the Turkish state.

Figure 6.15 - State Capacity in Albania and Turkey



Source: Kugler & Tammen (2012).

To conclude: Turkey and Albania are similar countries in history, culture, and socioeconomic profile, but they differ in terms of state infrastructural power. The Albanian state is more powerful than its Turkish counterpart, preventing the emergence of a strong religious civil society. This explains why political Islam thrived in Turkey but flopped in Albania, which during the first two decades of the twenty-first century has been the only democratic Sunni Muslim-majority society in the world without a confessional political party.

Chapter 7: Conclusion

My purpose in this dissertation was to enrich scholarly understanding of confessional party formation and strength. The current academic literature on religion and politics is certainly fecund with knowledge, although with excessively narrow theoretical perspectives. I borrowed bits and pieces from existing approaches to make a contribution to the literature and develop a broader and more holistic theory of confessional party development. From the seminal works of Lipset and Rokkan (1967) and Kalyvas (1996), I drew the notion of confessional party formation as *defensive*, a reactive move against anticlerical policies promoted by the state in its quest to eliminate corporate intermediary bodies standing between the administration and the individual citizen. From Berman (2003), I gained an understanding of how the social basis for strong and durable religious parties requires weak state capacity and inadequate provision of public services. Weak states allow religious civil society to thrive, encapsulating individuals in a network of religious trade unions, rural syndicates, cooperatives, newspapers, banks, radio and television stations, charities, hospitals, food banks, mutual aid societies, and many other associations. I believe that my integrated, holistic theory is more realistic than competing explanations and that it explains confessional party formation and strength better than alternative approaches.

This chapter undertakes two main tasks. First, I use the knowledge gained from my research to reflect on existing theoretical approaches to the study of religion and politics. To conclude, I lay down suggestions for further research.

7.1. Rethinking Theories of Religion and Politics

7.1.1. Modernization/Secularization Theory

Secularization theory is undoubtedly the most influential theoretical account of religion in the social sciences. Broadly speaking, secularization theory claims that the socioeconomic development associated with modernity leads to the demise of religious belief (Greeley 1969:6). Spiritual faith was pervasive in pre-industrial times because of its function in providing “the reassurance so urgently needed in the face of the perplexities of a too-perplexing world” (Lynd and Lynd 1937:315). In our modern world of electric cars and flying jets, we no longer need the psychological reassurance of spiritual belief. To the extent that religion still exists today, it is as a “useless appendix to the modern cultural repertoire” (Swatos and Christiano 1999:215). Thus, following the propositions of secularization theorists, one would predict that economic development, literacy, and existential security are inversely correlated with confessional party formation and strength.

Being the most prominent social scientific theory of religion, secularization theory has naturally bore the brunt of scholarly criticisms, three of which are worth mentioning. First, some critics question the premise that in pre-industrial times religion monolithically dominated society, when in fact many people were far from devout (Gorski and Altinordu 2008:63–64; Stark and Finke 1992:1–20; Warner 2010:42). Second, secularization theory has all too often been presented in unfalsifiable ways: for instance, growing confessional party strength in wealthy societies – which grows against the basic postulates of the theory - is

explained away as a last burst of energy before the predicted demise of religion (Almond, Appleby, and Sivan 2003:101).²⁵⁶ Finally, the very simplicity of secularization theory has also been criticized for its inability to adequately distinguish between the various dimensions of secularization – religious participation, religious influence in public life, and personal faith -, which may have diverse trajectories (Casanova 2006:7; Hervieu-Léger 2003:115–37; van Kersbergen and Lindberg 2015:784; D. Martin 1978b:1–10; Martin 2005:3–6).

The empirical analysis of this dissertation has shown that there is no simple correlation between economic development and the social and political strength of religion. The statistical analysis of Chapter 3 showed that religious parties were equally likely to form and to attain electoral success in wealthy as in poor countries. Secularization theory also failed to explain outcomes in the case studies of Chapters 4 to 6. France and Italy had religious political parties even though they were wealthier than Spain and Québec. Italian political Catholicism was stronger in the industrialized north-east of the country than in the impoverished south. Political Islamism was also stronger in Turkey than in Albania, despite the fact that income per capita in Turkey is double that in Albania.

How can we explain this obvious mismatch between secularization theory and empirical reality? While it is beyond dispute that individual religiosity in Europe has been in decline for at least a century and that this partial secularization occurred simultaneously with

²⁵⁶ Other examples abound. One scholar claimed that “it is sometimes possible to show secularization and the intensification of religion occurring simultaneously” (Sommerville 1998:250) while another recent study was titled ‘Can *Rising* Rates of Church Participation be a Consequence of Secularization?’ (Philips 2004).

industrial and post-industrial socioeconomic development, there is no necessary causal relationship between the two (van Kersbergen 2008:275). Correlation does not equal causation. Thus, Inglehart and Norris's contention that "secularization has generally been sweeping through affluent nations, in politics as well as in society" (Norris and Inglehart 2004:212) must be heavily qualified if not rejected outright. The Netherlands, for instance, is perhaps the most post-materialist country in the world in terms of cultural orientation and the premium placed on individual choice in matters of morality (van Kersbergen 2008:262), but that did not preclude the continued success of the Dutch Christian Democratic Appeal.²⁵⁷ Dutch Christian Democrats coped with the post-materialist tide not by jettisoning their confessional roots but "by continuously underlining its Christian inspiration and re-translating its fundamental Christian values into a politically useful ideology" (van Kersbergen 2008:273–74).

Thus, the findings of this dissertation call for an overhaul of secularization theory that takes into account the different dimensions of secularization. Even if socioeconomic development is correlated with lower levels of *individual* religiosity, that does not necessarily undermine the *social* strength of religious communities. Religious organizations continue to provide incentives for their members in the form of quasi-public services but also social network embeddedness and a sense of community, as Durkheim (2001:322–23) recognized. Just as contemporary Islamist terrorists are often personally impious,²⁵⁸ so supporters of

²⁵⁷ The Christian Democrats led the government between 2002 and 2010, and are the third largest party in parliament at the moment of writing (2020).

²⁵⁸ For instance, the plane hijackers involved in the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the United States visited strip clubs and drank alcohol regularly.

confessional political parties do not all need to be intensely devout; many, indeed, might have shallow spiritual beliefs but find in religion a sense of belonging, of social embeddedness, and of cultural identity. This is often reason enough to vote for a religious party.

7.1.2. Religious Market Theory

Religious market theory argues that the competition between different denominations to capture adherents – which occurs if they are not encumbered by state regulations - creates a vibrant religious culture (Finke 1990:622). The statistical analysis of Chapter 3 found no support for this argument, and the comparison of Albania (multiple religions and no confessional parties) with Turkey (homogenously Muslim with a strong religious party) in Chapter 6 suggests, if anything, that religious heterogeneity discourages confessional party formation. Of course, these findings by no means invalidate religious market theory, although they do suggest two problems with it. First, the theory simply transplants the competitive behaviour of firms in an economy to the religious field without regard to the differences between the two (Becker 1986:112–14; Beckford 1985:349; Berger 1974:129; Bruce 1993:194; Stark and Finke 1992:122). However, choosing a religion is not a fluid or costless choice like buying a pencil. Religious market theorists assume that conversions are relatively easy from one denomination to the other. However, this dissertation has suggested that strong religious organizations often organize social life, determining not only citizens' vote choice but also their labour unions, welfare services, schools, or even marriage partners. Boundaries between religious and secular subcultures can be so strict that proselytization and conversion are unthinkable.

Second, religious market theories fail to appreciate the importance of state infrastructural power in mediating the interaction between religious policy (anticlerical or proclerical) on the one hand, and religious vibrancy on the other. The contention by religious market theorists that state regulation precludes thriving religious communities can only be true to the extent that states have the infrastructural capacity to actually implement their policies. As the case studies of Italy in Chapter 5 and Turkey in Chapter 6 show, weak states might attempt to implement anticlerical policies only to be overwhelmed by a vibrant religious civil society. By contrast, France and Albania provide examples of two countries with strong states that were able to snuff out religious opposition.

7.1.3. Ideational Theory

The ideational theory of religious politics contends that differences in religious doctrine produce distinctive models of confessional politics. Unlike modernization and religious market theories, the statistical analyses in Chapter 3 found at least partial support for the contentions of ideational theory. Roman Catholicism and Shia Islam were associated with higher rates of confessional party formation and with stronger religious parties. However, the case studies of Chapters 4 to 6 find no support for the contention that there is a ‘clash of civilizations’ between Sunni Islam, which is particularly disposed to getting involved in politics, and Christianity, which by and large respects the separation of Church and state. We have seen more similarities than differences in the successful confessional parties of Turkey and

Italy as well as in the weakness of political religion in France and Albania (Berkes 1964:63–67; Kalyvas 2000:392–93; Kuru 2009:202–35).

As discussed in Chapter 2 and alluded to in the case studies, the major difference between Catholicism and Islam lies in their institutional structures, not on their doctrinal predisposition to intervene in politics. Because Catholicism is hierarchically organized, it can be co-opted by political leaders if they strike a deal with the Pope, which is indeed what happened in Fascist Italy. Islam, by contrast, is organizationally amorphous, and the attempts of Turkish Kemalists to create an official version of religion subordinated to the state failed because of the proliferation of Muslim brotherhoods manned by grassroots activists. However, the example of Albania shows that even this institutional difference is far from unsurmountable. The Albanian state made use of its infrastructural powers and despotic ruthlessness to coerce Islamic clergy and grassroots believers into accepting a state-sponsored organization, which they have thus far not attempted to subvert.

7.2. Research Agendas

The findings of this dissertation open up a multidirectional research agenda. I focus here on five possible topics. First, future research could evaluate the distinct effects of different types of public goods provided by religious organizations. Throughout the dissertation, I discussed religious provision of welfare services in aggregate form. But healthcare or education can come in a variety of guises. For instance, attending an elementary religious school is likely to influence the worldviews of individuals in a different way than attending a religious university

(which probably attracts only committed believers). Likewise, receiving routine medical care from a religious hospital provides lower opportunities for indoctrination and propaganda than a prolonged stay in intensive care units or a long-term relationship with a religious doctor or clinic (Chen and Cammett 2012:1–8). It could thus be fruitful to probe the ways in which enduring ties between religious communities and individuals are cemented, as opposed to one-off connections between someone using a religious food bank but otherwise having no further relationship with the religious group.

A second topic that warrants further research is the quality of religious welfare provision, either considered in isolation or in comparison with the quality of social welfare provided by the state. Contemporary scholars often contend that Muslim grassroots organisations provide public services much better than governments (Alterman 2000:107–12; Bayat 2002:11; Berman 2009:19; Clarke 2006:843–44; Ferguson et al. 2007:272; Hamzeh 2001:175–76; Harik 1994:10–23; Iannaccone and Berman 2006:119; Ismail 2001:34–39; Keyman and Onis 2007:215–16; Walsh 2003:32–36). Given the current political strength of radical Islamist organizations in the Middle East, it is worth analysing whether in fact Islamists provide high-quality social services and whether their popularity can be undercut by an effective welfare state (Clarke 2006:837). If the claims of my dissertation are correct, policymakers would be wise to invest their resources not on a ‘war on terror’ but on strengthening the infrastructural powers of Middle Eastern states so that they can effectively conduct a ‘war on poverty.’

Third, future research could study in greater detail the causal mechanisms linking religious welfare provision to support for confessional parties. Throughout the dissertation, I

have assumed that religious groups gain political support when providing social welfare (Alterman and Hippel 2007:1–20; Hilsenrath 2005:370; Iannaccone and Berman 2006:118; Milton-Edwards 2006:167). But I have not delved into the question of how exactly is it that welfare provision influences recipients' behaviour. Is it the actual provision of services that leads to support for the religious community, or merely a sense of gratitude? (Levi and Sacks 2009:312–14; Levi, Sacks, and Tyler 2009:359–60). Does welfare provision affect all individuals equally, or are there variations depending on gender, income, or other sociodemographic characteristics?

Another research agenda opened up by this dissertation concerns the relationship between state infrastructural power and religious provision of welfare. I have claimed that weak state capacity leads to the growth of private social welfare services, although it is possible that the relationship between the two is endogenous or multidirectional (Cammett and MacLean 2011:5). Current literature generally tends to suggest that private welfare provision might damage the infrastructural power of the state by limiting government efforts to raise revenue from its citizens (Cammett 2014:227; Ghani, Lockhart, and Carnahan 2005:10; Hungerman 2005:2249; Khan 1999:4; Obiyan 2005:321). A minority of scholars have a different vision, claiming that private providers of welfare can strengthen the infrastructural power of the state by allowing the government to transfer resources to other areas and by generating synergies between civil society and the state that enhance the ability of governments to deliver services (Brinkerhoff 1999:63; Brown 1998:228–31; Warner 2013:34). Whether religious charities and schools increase or decrease state infrastructural capacity, it is likely that state capacity has an effect on private welfare provision and that private welfare

provision has some effect on state capacity. Future researchers would do well to disentangle the causal relationships involved.

Finally, it could also be worth applying the arguments of my dissertation to analyse secular political movements. Religious groups are not the only social actors that use networks of welfare provision as a springboard for political activism. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, European social democratic parties encapsulated their constituents by offering important economic benefits, such as mutual aid schemes, cooperatives, night schools, or burial societies (Scarrow 2015:170). During their heyday in the sixties, the American Black Panthers provided a series of social services to inner city supporters, including food banks, an alternative education system, hospitals, or social housing (Abron 1998:177–92; Holder 1990:90–108). Future research could investigate the similarities and differences between religious and secular political mobilization through welfare provision.

Appendix

A1. List of Religious Political Parties

The following is the full list of all religious political parties that contested a national parliamentary election after 1800 (see Chapter 3 for a discussion of sources and coding criteria). This is part of a new dataset on confessional political parties collected for the dissertation, and contains information about the religion represented by the party, the name of the party, and the elections contested by the party. Parties that changed names but maintained the same organization are coded as if they were the same party. Party mergers were treated as new parties, unless one party was clearly predominant in the merger and was widely understood to have absorbed the other party or parties. The statistical analysis of Chapter 3 was based on this list, although I also include here parties contesting non-democratic elections (which were excluded from the regressions).

Table A.1 – List of Religious Political Parties, 1800-2017

Country	Religion	Party Name	Elections
Afghanistan	Sunni	Islamists	1965, 1969
	Sunni	Jamiat-e-Islami	2005, 2010
	Sunni	Hezbi Islami	2005, 2010
	Sunni	Dawat-e Islami	2005, 2010
	Sunni	Naveen	2005, 2010

	Shia	Harakat-e Islami	2005, 2010
Algeria	Sunni	Movement for a Society of Peace	1991, 1997, 2002, 2007, 2012, 2017
	Sunni	Islamic Renaissance Movement	1991, 1997, 2002, 2007, 2017
	Sunni	Islamic Salvation Front	1991
	Sunni	Movement for Democracy in Algeria	1991
	Sunni	Movement for National Reform	2002, 2007, 2017
	Sunni	Justice and Development Party	2012
Argentina	Catholic	Christian Democratic Party	1963, 1965, 1973, 1983, 1985, 1987, 1989, 1991, 1993
Australia	Evangelical	Call to Australia / Christian Democratic Party	1990, 1993, 1996, 1998, 2001, 2004, 2007, 2010, 2013, 2016
	Evangelical	Family First	2004, 2007, 2010, 2013, 2016
Austria	Catholic	Christian Social Party / Austrian People's Party	1891, 1897, 1900, 1907, 1911, 1919, 1920, 1923, 1927, 1930, 1945, 1949,

			1953, 1956, 1959, 1962, 1966, 1970, 1971, 1975, 1979, 1983, 1986, 1990, 1994, 1995, 1999, 2002, 2006, 2008, 2013, 2017
	Catholic	German Clerical Conservative Party	1891, 1897, 1900
	Catholic	Slovenian Clerical Party / Slovenian Christian Social Party	1897, 1900, 1907, 1911
	Catholic	Polish Clerical Party	1897, 1900, 1907, 1911
	Catholic	Italian Clerical Party	1897, 1900, 1907
	Catholic	Catholic People's Party	1897, 1900
	Catholic	Czech Clerical Party / Catholic-National Conservative Party	1900, 1907, 1911
Baden	Catholic	Catholics (parliamentary group)	1846, 1847, 1848, 1850, 1851, 1854, 1855, 1857, 1859, 1861, 1863, 1865, 1867, 1869

Bahrain	Sunni	Islamic Forum / Islamic Society	2002, 2006, 2010, 2014
	Sunni	Al-Asalah	2002, 2006, 2010, 2014
	Shia	National Islamic Society	2006, 2010
Bangladesh	Sunni	Jamaat-e-Islami	1979, 1986, 1991, 1996, 2001, 2008
	Sunni	Islami Oikkya Jote	1991, 1996, 2001, 2008
Bavaria	Catholic	Catholics (parliamentary group)	1848, 1849, 1855, 1859, 1869
Belgium	Catholic	Catholic Party / Christian Social Party	1870, 1872, 1874, 1876, 1878, 1880, 1882, 1884, 1886, 1888, 1890, 1892, 1894, 1896, 1898, 1900, 1902, 1904, 1906, 1908, 1910, 1912, 1914, 1919, 1921, 1925, 1929, 1932, 1936, 1939, 1946, 1949, 1950, 1954, 1958, 1961,

			1965, 1968, 1971, 1974, 1977, 1978, 1981, 1985, 1987, 1991, 1995, 1999, 2003, 2007, 2010, 2014
	Catholic	Christian Democratic Party	1894, 1896, 1898, 1900, 1902, 1904, 1906, 1908, 1910, 1912, 1914, 1919, 1921, 1936
	Catholic	Christian People's Party	1904, 1921
	Catholic	Catholic Flemish People's Party	1939, 1954
	Catholic	Christian Social Rally of Liberty	1954
	Catholic	Christian People's Party / Christian Democratic & Flemish	1971, 1974, 1977, 1978, 1981, 1985, 1987, 1991, 1995, 1999, 2003, 2007, 2010, 2014
Bolivia	Catholic	Social Christian Party / Christian Democratic Party	1958, 1962, 1964, 1979, 1980, 1985, 2014
	Catholic	Christian Democratic Community	1966

Bosnia	Sunni	Party of Democratic Action	1996, 1998, 2000, 2002, 2006, 2010, 2014
Brazil	Catholic	Christian Democratic Party	1945, 1950, 1954, 1958, 1962, 1986, 1990
	Evangelical	Social Christian Party	1990, 1994, 1998, 2002, 2006, 2010, 2014
Bulgaria	Orthodox	Bulgarian Christian Coalition	1997
Cambodia	Buddhist	Buddhist Liberal Democratic Party	1993, 1998
	Buddhist	Buddhist Liberal Party	1998
Canada	Calvinist	Protestant Protective Association	1896
	Christian (general)	Christian Heritage	1988, 1993, 1997, 2000, 2004, 2006, 2008, 2011, 2015
Chile	Catholic	National Falange / Christian Democratic Party	1941, 1945, 1949, 1953, 1957, 1961, 1965, 1969, 1973, 1989, 1993, 1997, 2001, 2005, 2009, 2013, 2017

	Catholic	Social Christian Conservative Party	1949, 1953, 1957
	Catholic	Christian National Party	1953, 1957
	Catholic	Christian Left	1973
Colombia	Catholic	Christian Union Movement	1990, 1991, 1994
	Catholic	Christian National Party	1991, 1994, 2002
	Evangelical	Movement of Absolute Renovation	2002, 2006, 2010, 2014
Comoros	Sunni	National Front for Justice	1992, 1996
	Sunni	Party for National Salvation	1992
Costa Rica	Catholic	Catholic Union / Democratic Union Party	1894, 1906
	Catholic	Christian Democratic Party / Social Christian Unity Party	1970, 1974, 1978, 1982, 1986, 1990, 1994, 1998, 2002, 2006, 2010, 2014
	Evangelical	Christian National Alliance	1986, 1990, 1994, 1998, 2002
	Evangelical	Renewal Party	1998, 2002, 2006, 2010, 2014
	Evangelical	National Restoration Party	2006, 2010, 2014
	Catholic	Christian Democratic Alliance	2014

Croatia	Catholic	Christian Democratic Union	1992, 1995, 2000, 2015, 2016
	Catholic	Christian Democratic Party	1995
Czech Republic	Catholic	Christian and Democratic Union	1990, 1992, 1996, 1998, 2002, 2006, 2010, 2013, 2017
	Catholic	Christian Democratic Movement	1990, 1992
Czechoslovakia	Catholic	Czechoslovak People's Party	1920, 1925, 1929, 1935, 1946, 1948
	Catholic	German Christian Social Party	1920, 1925, 1929, 1935
	Catholic	Provincial Christian Social Party	1920, 1925, 1929, 1935
	Catholic	Hungarian Christian Democratic Party	1990, 1992
Denmark	Lutheran	Danish Unity	1939, 1943, 1945, 1947
	Lutheran	Christian People's Party	1971, 1973, 1975, 1977, 1979, 1981, 1984, 1987, 1988, 1990, 1994, 1998, 2001, 2005, 2007, 2011, 2015

DR Congo	Catholic	Convention of Christian Democrats	2006, 2011
	Catholic	Christian Democratic Party	2006, 2011
	Catholic	Alliance of Christian Democrats	2006, 2011
	Catholic	Federalist Christian Democracy	2006, 2011
	Catholic	Social Christian Party	2006
Dominican Republic	Catholic	Social Christian Revolutionary Party / Social Christian Reformist Party	1962, 1966, 1970, 1974, 1978, 1982, 1986, 1990, 1994, 1998, 2002, 2006, 2010, 2016
	Catholic	Christian Democratic Party	2002, 2006, 2010, 2016
	Catholic	Christian People's Party	2006, 2010, 2016
East Timor	Catholic	Christian Democratic Party	2002, 2007, 2012
	Catholic	Christian Democratic Party of Timor	2002
	Catholic	National Unity Party	2007, 2012
Ecuador	Catholic	Christian Democratic Action / Civic Christian Action / Social Christian Party	1960, 1962, 1968, 1979, 1984, 1986, 1988, 1990, 1992, 1994, 1996, 1997, 1998, 2002, 2006,

			2007, 2009, 2013, 2017
	Catholic	Popular Democracy / Christian Democratic Union	1984, 1986, 1988, 1990, 1992, 1994, 1996, 1997, 1998, 2002, 2006, 2007, 2009
Egypt	Sunni	Ittihad Party	1926
	Sunni	New Wafd Party / Islamic Alliance / Muslim Brotherhood / Freedom and Justice Party	1984, 1987, 2000, 2005, 2010, 2011
	Sunni	Islamic Bloc / Al-Nour	2011, 2015
	Sunni	Al-Wasat	2011
El Salvador	Catholic	Christian Democratic Party	1961, 1964, 1966, 1968, 1970, 1972, 1974, 1982, 1985, 1988, 1991, 1994, 1997, 2000, 2003, 2006, 2009, 2012, 2015

	Catholic	Authentic Christian Democracy / Social Christian Renewal Party / Social Christian Union	1991, 1994, 1997, 2000, 2003
Estonia	Lutheran	Christian Democratic Party / Christian People's Party	1919, 1920, 1923, 1926, 1929
	Lutheran	Christian People's Party / Party of Estonian Christian Democrats	1999, 2003, 2007, 2011
Fiji	Evangelical	Christian Democratic Alliance	1999
Finland	Lutheran	Finnish Christian League / Christian Democrats	1966, 1970, 1972, 1975, 1979, 1983, 1987, 1991, 1995, 1999, 2003, 2007, 2011, 2015
France	Catholic	Ralliés / Popular Liberal Action / Popular Democratic Party / Popular Republican Movement	1893, 1898, 1902, 1906, 1910, 1914, 1924, 1928, 1932, 1936, 1945, 1946, 1951, 1956, 1958, 1962
Georgia	Orthodox	Christian Democratic Party	2008, 2012
	Orthodox	Christian Democratic Alliance	2008

Germany	Catholic	Centre Party	1870, 1871, 1874, 1877, 1878, 1881, 1884, 1887, 1890, 1893, 1898, 1903, 1907, 1912, 1919, 1920, 1924, 1928, 1930, 1932, 1949, 1953
	Catholic	Christian People's Party / Christian Social Reich Party	1920, 1924, 1928, 1930
	Lutheran	Christian Social People's Service	1930, 1932, 1933
	Christian (general)	Christian Democratic Union	1949, 1953, 1957, 1961, 1965, 1969, 1972, 1976, 1980, 1983, 1987, 1990, 1994, 1998, 2002, 2005, 2009, 2013, 2017
Greece	Sunni	Fate	1989, 1990, 1993
	Sunni	Trust	1989, 1990, 1993
	Orthodox	Popular Orthodox Rally	2004, 2007, 2009, 2012

Guatemala	Catholic	Guatemalan Christian Democracy	1955, 1958, 1959, 1961, 1970, 1974, 1978, 1982, 1984, 1985, 1990, 1994, 1995, 1999, 2003, 2007
Haiti	Catholic	Social Christian Party	1988
	Evangelical	Christian Democratic Party / Christian National Movement / Christian Movement for a New Haiti	1990, 1995, 2000, 2006, 2010
	Evangelical	Christian National Union	2006
Honduras	Catholic	Christian Democratic Party	1981, 1985, 1989, 1993, 1997, 2001, 2005, 2009, 2013, 2017
Hungary	Catholic	Catholic People's Party / Christian National Union / Christian Economic and Social Party	1896, 1901, 1905, 1906, 1910, 1920, 1922, 1926, 1931, 1935, 1939
	Catholic	Christian Social and Economic Party	1920, 1931
	Catholic	Christian Socialist Party / Christian National Front	1920, 1922, 1931, 1935

	Catholic	Alliance for Christian Unity	1922
	Catholic	Christian Opposition	1922, 1931, 1935
	Catholic	Christian Democratic People's Party	1990, 1994, 1998, 2002, 2006, 2010, 2014
India	Hindu	Bharatiya Jana Sangh / Janata Party / Bharatiya Janata Party	1951, 1957, 1962, 1967, 1971, 1977, 1980, 1984, 1989, 1991, 1996, 1998, 1999, 2004, 2009, 2014
	Hindu	Akhil Bharatiya Hindu Mahasabha	1951, 1957, 1962
	Hindu	Akhil Bharatiya Ram Rajya Parishad	1951, 1957, 1962
	Sunni	All India Majlis-e-Ittehadul	1989, 1991, 1996, 1998, 1999, 2004, 2009, 2014
Indonesia	Sunni	Nahdatul Ulama	1955, 1971
	Sunni	Indonesian Islamic Union Party	1955, 1971
	Sunni	Islamic Education Association	1955, 1971
	Catholic	Catholic Party	1955, 1971
	Calvinist	Indonesian Christian Party / Prosperous Peace Party	1955, 1971, 1999, 2004, 2009

	Sunni	United Development Party	1971, 1977, 1982, 1987, 1992, 1997, 1999, 2004, 2009, 2014
	Sunni	Masyumi Islamic Party	1999
	Sunni	Nahdlatul Umma Party / Ulema National Awakening Party	1999, 2004, 2009
	Sunni	National Mandate Party	1999, 2004, 2009, 2014
	Sunni	Crescent Star Party	1999, 2004, 2009, 2014
	Sunni	Justice Party / Prosperous Justice Party	1999, 2004, 2009, 2014
	Sunni	National Awakening Party	1999, 2004, 2009, 2014
	Sunni	Reform Star Party	2004, 2009
Iran	Shia	Learned Council	1914
	Shia	Society of Muslim Warriors	1952
	Shia	Islamic Republican Party / Association of Combatant Clerics / Democratic Front	1980, 1984, 1988, 1992, 1996, 2000, 2004, 2008, 2012, 2016

	Shia	Combatant Clergy Association	1988, 1992, 1996, 2000, 2004, 2008, 2012, 2016
	Shia	Monotheism and Justice Front	2012
Iraq	Shia	United Iraqi Alliance / Sadrist Front	2005, 2010, 2014
	Sunni	Kurdistan Islamic Union	2005, 2010, 2014
	Sunni	Iraqi Accord Front / Muttahidoon	2005, 2010, 2014
	Shia	State of Law Coalition	2010, 2014
	Sunni	Islamic Group of Kurdistan	2010, 2014
	Shia	Islamic Virtue Party	2014
	Shia	National Reform Trend	2014
	Shia	Citizen Alliance	2014
Israel	Jewish	United Religious Front / Hapoel HaMizrachi / National Religious Party / The Jewish Home	1949, 1951, 1955, 1959, 1961, 1965, 1969, 1973, 1977, 1981, 1984, 1988, 1992, 1996, 1999, 2003, 2006, 2009, 2013, 2015

	Jewish	Agudat Yisrael / Religious Torah Front / United Torah Judaism	1951, 1955, 1959, 1961, 1965, 1969, 1973, 1977, 1981, 1984, 1988, 1992, 1996, 1999, 2003, 2006, 2009, 2013, 2015
	Jewish	Poalei Agudat Yisrael	1951, 1961, 1965, 1969, 1977, 1981, 1984
	Jewish	Shas	1984, 1988, 1992, 1996, 1999, 2003, 2006, 2009, 2013, 2015
	Jewish	Degel HaTorah	1988, 1992
Italy	Catholic	Italian People's Party / Christian Democracy	1919, 1921, 1924, 1946, 1948, 1953, 1958, 1963, 1968, 1972, 1976, 1979, 1983, 1987, 1992
	Catholic	Social Christian Party	1946, 1948
	Catholic	Christian Democratic Centre	1994, 1996, 2001, 2006, 2008, 2013

	Catholic	Christian Democracy for Autonomy	2006
Jamaica	Evangelical	Christian Conscience Movement	1983
Japan	Buddhist	Komeito	1967, 1969, 1972, 1976, 1979, 1980, 1983, 1986, 1990, 1993, 1996, 2000, 2003, 2005, 2009, 2012, 2014, 2017
Jordan	Sunni	Umma Party / Hizb ut-Tahrir	1954, 1956
	Sunni	Muslim Brotherhood / Islamic Action Front / Muslim Centre Party	1956, 1961, 1962, 1963, 1967, 1989, 1993, 1997, 2003, 2007, 2010, 2013, 2016
Kosovo	Sunni	Justice Party	2008, 2010
	Catholic	Christian Democratic Party of Kosovo	2008
Kuwait	Sunni	Muslim Brotherhood	1963, 1967, 1971, 1975, 1981, 1985, 1992, 1996, 1999, 2003, 2006, 2008, 2009, 2012, 2013, 2016

	Shia	Shiites (parliamentary group)	1963, 1967, 1971, 1975, 1981, 1985, 1992, 1996, 1999, 2003, 2006, 2008, 2009, 2012, 2013, 2016
Latvia	Catholic	Christian Peasant and Catholic Party	1920, 1922, 1925, 1928, 1931
	Catholic	List of Lithuanians and Catholics / Polish-Catholic Union	1920, 1922, 1925, 1928, 1931
	Lutheran	Christian National Union	1920, 1922, 1925, 1928, 1931
	Jewish	Agudas Israel	1922, 1925, 1928, 1931
	Orthodox	Old Believers' Central Committee / United List of Old Believers	1922, 1925, 1928, 1931
	Orthodox	Party of the Orthodox	1925, 1928, 1931
	Christian (general)	Christian Democratic Union	1993, 1995, 1998, 2002, 2006, 2010, 2011, 2014
Lebanon	Maronite	Phalanges Party	1951, 1953, 1957, 1960, 1964, 1968,

			1972, 1996, 2000, 2005, 2009
	Sunni	Islamic Group	1992, 1996, 2000, 2005, 2009
	Sunni	Al-Ahbash	1992, 1996, 2000
	Shia	Hezbollah	1992, 1996, 2000, 2005, 2009
Libya	Sunni	Justice and Construction	2012, 2014
	Sunni	Homeland Party	2012
	Sunni	Moderate Ummah Assembly	2012
Lithuania	Catholic	Christian Democratic Party	1920, 1922, 1923, 1926
	Calvinist	German Evangelical Party	1926
	Catholic	Christian Democratic Party / Homeland Union Christian Democrats	1992, 1996, 2000, 2004, 2008, 2012, 2016
	Catholic	Lithuanian Christian Democrats	1992, 1996, 2000
	Catholic	Christian Democratic Union / Christian Conservative Social Union / Christian Party	2000, 2004, 2012
Luxembourg	Catholic	Party of the Right / Christian Social People's Party	1915, 1918, 1919, 1922, 1925, 1928,

			1931, 1934, 1937, 1945, 1948, 1951, 1954, 1959, 1964, 1968, 1974, 1979, 1984, 1989, 1994, 1999, 2004, 2009, 2013
Macedonia	Orthodox	Christian Democratic Party	1991, 1994
	Sunni	Party of Democratic Action	1994
Madagascar	Catholic	Christian Party / Christian Democratic Union	1960, 1977, 1983, 1989, 1993
Malaysia	Sunni	Malaysian Islamic Party	1959, 1964, 1969, 1974, 1978, 1982, 1986, 1990, 1995, 1999, 2004, 2008, 2013
	Sunni	Muslim People's Party	1986, 1990, 1995
Mauritania	Sunni	Muslim Brotherhood	2006, 2013
Mauritius	Sunni	Muslim Committee of Action	1968
	Sunni	Mauritian Islamic Party	1982
	Sunni	Party of God / Mauritian Solidarity Front	1995, 2000, 2010, 2014

	Sunni	Muslim People's Front	1995
Mexico	Catholic	National Action Party	1943, 1946, 1949, 1952, 1955, 1958, 1961, 1964, 1967, 1970, 1973, 1976, 1979, 1982, 1985, 1988, 1991, 1994, 1997, 2000, 2003, 2006, 2009, 2012, 2015
	Evangelical	Social Encounter Party	2015
Moldova	Orthodox	Christian Democratic People's Front / Christian Democratic People's Party	1994, 1998, 2001, 2004, 2009, 2010, 2014
	Orthodox	National Christian Party / Christian Democratic Union / Christian Democratic Peasants	1994, 1998, 2001
	Orthodox	Christian Democratic Peasants' Party	1998, 2001, 2005
	Orthodox	Christian Democratic Female League	1998
Morocco	Sunni	Constitutional Democratic Party	1970, 1977, 1984, 1997, 2002, 2007, 2011, 2015

	Sunni	Party of Renaissance and Virtue	2007, 2011, 2016
Myanmar	Buddhist	Burma Democratic Party	1956, 1960
	Buddhist	People's Freedom League	1960
	Buddhist	Arakan League for Democracy / Arakan National Party	1990, 2010, 2015
Nepal	Hindu	Rastriya Prajantantra	1991, 1994, 1999, 2008, 2013, 2017
	Hindu	Rastriya Prajantantra (Thapa)	1991, 1999, 2008, 2013
	Hindu	Rastriya Prajantantra (Democratic)	2017
Netherlands	Calvinist	Anti-Revolutionary Party	1850, 1853, 1860, 1866, 1868, 1871, 1877, 1879, 1883, 1887, 1888, 1891, 1894, 1897, 1901, 1905, 1909, 1913, 1917, 1918, 1922, 1925, 1929, 1933, 1937, 1946, 1948, 1952, 1956, 1959, 1963, 1967, 1971, 1972

	Catholic	Catholics (parliamentary group) / Catholic Party / Catholic People's Party	1868, 1871, 1877, 1879, 1883, 1887, 1888, 1891, 1894, 1897, 1901, 1905, 1909, 1913, 1917, 1918, 1922, 1925, 1929, 1933, 1937, 1946, 1948, 1952, 1956, 1959, 1963, 1967, 1971, 1972
	Calvinist	Christian Historical Party / Christian Historical Union	1894, 1897, 1901, 1905, 1909, 1913, 1917, 1918, 1922, 1925, 1929, 1933, 1937, 1946, 1948, 1952, 1956, 1959, 1963, 1967, 1971, 1972
	Calvinist	Reformed Political Party	1922, 1925, 1929, 1933, 1937, 1946, 1948, 1952, 1956, 1959, 1963, 1967, 1971, 1972, 1977,

			1981, 1982, 1986, 1989, 1994, 1998, 2002, 2003, 2006, 2010, 2012, 2017
	Calvinist	Reformed Calvinist State Party	1925, 1929, 1933, 1937
	Catholic	Roman Catholic People's Party	1925, 1929, 1933, 1937
	Catholic	Catholic National Party	1948, 1952
	Calvinist	Reformed Political League / Christian Union	1952, 1956, 1959, 1963, 1967, 1971, 1972, 1977, 1981, 1986, 1989, 1994, 1998, 2002, 2003, 2006, 2010, 2012, 2017
	Catholic	Catholic Party of the Netherlands	1972, 1977, 1981, 1982
	Calvinist	Reformatory Political Federation	1977, 1981, 1982, 1986, 1989, 1994, 1998
	Christian (general)	Christian Democratic Appeal	1977, 1981, 1982, 1986, 1989, 1994,

			1998, 2002, 2003, 2006, 2010, 2012, 2017
New Zealand	Evangelical	Ratana	1928, 1931, 1935
	Calvinist	Christian Heritage	1990, 1993, 1996, 1999, 2002, 2005
	Evangelical	Future New Zealand / United Future	1999, 2002, 2005, 2008, 2011, 2014, 2017
Nicaragua	Catholic	Popular Social Christian Party	1967, 1984, 1990
	Catholic	Social Christian Party	1990, 1996
	Evangelical	Party of the Christian Path	1996
Norway	Lutheran	Christian People's Party	1933, 1936, 1945, 1949, 1953, 1957, 1961, 1965, 1969, 1973, 1977, 1981, 1985, 1989, 1993, 1997, 2001, 2005, 2009, 2013, 2017
	Lutheran	The Christians	2013, 2017
Pakistan	Sunni	Jamaat-e-Islami	1970, 1977, 1985, 1988, 1990, 1993, 2002, 2013

	Sunni	Jamiat Ulema-e-Pakistan	1970, 1977, 1990, 2013
	Sunni	Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam	1970, 1977, 1988, 1990, 1993, 1997, 2002, 2008, 2013
	Sunni	Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (Darkhasti)	1988
	Sunni	Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (S)	1997
	Sunni	Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (Nazryati)	2013
Panama	Catholic	Christian Democratic Party / People's Party	1964, 1968, 1980, 1984, 1989, 1994, 1999, 2004, 2009, 2014
Papua New Guinea	Evangelical	Christian Democratic Party	2002, 2017
	Evangelical	Triumph Heritage Empowerment	2012, 2017
Paraguay	Catholic	Christian Democratic Party	1989, 1991, 1993, 1998
Peru	Catholic	Christian Democratic Party	1956, 1962, 1963, 1978
	Catholic	Christian People's Party / National Unity	1978, 1980, 1985, 1990, 1992, 1995, 2000, 2001, 2006, 2011, 2016

	Evangelical	Agricultural People's Front	1990, 1992, 1995, 2000, 2001, 2006
	Evangelical	National Restoration	2006
Philippines	Ecumenical	Lakas	1992, 1995, 1998, 2001, 2004, 2007, 2010, 2013, 2016
	Sunni	Ompia	1998
	Catholic	Centrist Democratic Party	2013, 2016
Poland	Catholic	Catholic People's Party / Christian Union for National Unity / Polish Catholic Bloc	1919, 1922, 1927, 1930
	Catholic	Catholic Union of Western Lands	1928
	Catholic	Catholic-Social Association	1989
	Catholic	Christian-Social Union / Christian Democracy	1989, 1991
	Catholic	Party of Christian Democrats	1991
	Catholic	Catholic Electoral Action	1991, 1993
	Catholic	National Christian Bloc	1997
Portugal	Catholic	Portuguese Catholic Centre	1915, 1918, 1919, 1921, 1922, 1925

Prussia	Catholic	Catholic Party	1852, 1855, 1858, 1861, 1862, 1863, 1866, 1867
Romania	Orthodox	National Christian Defence League	1926, 1928, 1931, 1932, 1933, 1937
	Orthodox	Christian Democratic Peasants' Party	1990, 1992, 1996, 2000, 2004, 2008, 2012
Rwanda	Catholic	Centrist Democratic Party	2003, 2008, 2013
Serbia	Orthodox	Christian Democratic Party	2000, 2003, 2007, 2008, 2012, 2014
Singapore	Sunni	Malaysian Islamic Party	1959, 1963
Slovakia	Catholic	Christian Social Union	1993, 1994
	Catholic	Christian Democratic Movement	1993, 1994, 1998, 2002, 2006, 2010, 2012, 2016
	Catholic	Hungarian Christian Democrats	1993, 1994
Slovenia	Catholic	Slovene Christian Democrats / New Slovenia – Christian Democrats	1992, 1996, 2000, 2004, 2008, 2011, 2014
	Catholic	Christian Socialists / Christian Social Union	1992, 1996

	Catholic	Christian Democratic Party	2008
Solomon Islands	Evangelical	Christian Fellowship Group	1993
	Evangelical	Christian Alliance Party	2006
Somalia	Sunni	Muslim Democratic Party	1969
South Africa	Evangelical	African Christian Democratic Party	1994, 1999, 2004, 2009, 2014
	Evangelical	United Christian Democratic Party	1999, 2004, 2009, 2014
South Korea	Evangelical	Christian Liberal Party	2016
South Vietnam	Buddhist	Citizens' Assembly	1956, 1963, 1966, 1967, 1971
Spain	Catholic	National Action / Federation of the Autonomous Right	1931, 1933, 1936
	Catholic	Christian Democratic Team	1977
	Catholic	People's Democratic Party	1982, 1986
Sri Lanka	Sunni	Sri Lanka Muslim Congress	1989, 1994, 2000, 2001, 2004, 2010, 2015
	Buddhist	National Heritage Party	2004, 2010, 2015
Sudan	Sunni	Umma Party / Collective Leadership Umma Party	1958, 1965, 1968, 1986, 2000, 2015

	Sunni	Islamic Charter Front / National Islamic Front / National Congress	1965, 1968, 1986, 1996, 2000, 2010, 2015
	Sunni	National Umma Party	1986, 2015
	Sunni	Popular Congress Party	2010
	Sunni	Federal Umma Party	2010, 2015
	Sunni	Umma Renewal and Reform / Umma Reform and Development	2010, 2015
	Sunni	United Umma Party	2015
Sweden	Lutheran	Clerical People's Party	1932
	Lutheran	Christian Democratic Unity / Christian Democratic Society Party / Christian Democrats	1964, 1968, 1970, 1973, 1976, 1979, 1982, 1985, 1988, 1991, 1994, 1998, 2002, 2006, 2010, 2014
Switzerland	Catholic	Catholics (parliamentary group) / Catholic People's Party / Conservative People's Party / Christian Social Party / Christian Democratic People's Party	1848, 1851, 1854, 1857, 1860, 1863, 1866, 1869, 1872, 1875, 1878, 1881, 1884, 1887, 1890, 1893, 1896, 1899,

			1902, 1905, 1908, 1911, 1914, 1917, 1919, 1922, 1925, 1928, 1931, 1935, 1939, 1943, 1947, 1951, 1955, 1959, 1963, 1967, 1971, 1975, 1979, 1983, 1987, 1991, 1995, 1999, 2003, 2007, 2011, 2015
	Calvinist	Calvinists (parliamentary group) / Evangelical People's Party	1848, 1851, 1854, 1857, 1860, 1863, 1866, 1869, 1872, 1875, 1878, 1881, 1884, 1887, 1890, 1893, 1919, 1922, 1925, 1928, 1931, 1935, 1939, 1943, 1947, 1951, 1955, 1959, 1963, 1967, 1971, 1975, 1979, 1983, 1987, 1991,

			1995, 1999, 2003, 2007, 2011, 2015
Syria	Sunni	Islamic Socialist Front / Muslim Brotherhood	1949, 1953, 1954, 1961, 1973
Taiwan	Lutheran	Faith and Hope League	2016
Tajikistan	Sunni	Islamic Renaissance Party	2000, 2005, 2010, 2015
Thailand	Buddhist	Dharmacracy Party	1976
	Buddhist	Palang Dharma Party	1988, 1992, 1995, 1996
Tunisia	Sunni	Renaissance Party	2011, 2014
	Sunni	National Salvation Front	2014
Turkey	Sunni	Nation Party / Republican Nation Party	1954, 1957
	Sunni	National Salvation Party / Welfare Party / Virtue Party / Justice and Development Party	1973, 1977, 1987, 1991, 1995, 1999, 2002, 2007, 2011, 2015
	Sunni	Felicity Party	2002, 2007, 2011, 2015
Ukraine	Orthodox	Christian Democratic Party	1994, 1998

	Orthodox	Forward Ukraine / Christian Democratic Union	1998, 2002, 2006, 2007
United Kingdom	Calvinist	Democratic Unionist Party	1974, 1979, 1983, 1987, 1992, 1997, 2001, 2005, 2010, 2015, 2017
Uruguay	Catholic	Christian Democratic Party	1962, 1966
Venezuela	Catholic	COPEI	1947, 1958, 1963, 1968, 1973, 1978, 1983, 1988, 1993, 1998, 2000, 2010
Württemberg	Catholic	Centre Party	1848, 1868, 1870
Yemen	Sunni	Al-Islah	1988, 1993, 1997, 2003
	Shia	Party of Truth	1993, 1997, 2003
Yugoslavia	Catholic	Croatian People's Party	1920, 1923, 1925, 1927
	Catholic	Slovene People's Party	1920, 1923, 1925, 1927
	Sunni	Dzemijet	1920, 1923, 1925
	Sunni	Yugoslav Muslim Organization	1923, 1925, 1927

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