‘see ourselves as others see us’

A Phenomenological Study of James Joyce’s *Ulysses* and Early Cinema

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ABSTRACT

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This thesis examines James Joyce’s *Ulysses* (1922) and early cinema (c. 1895-1920) through Merleau-Pontian phenomenology. Instead of arguing for lines of direct influence between specific films and particular parts of *Ulysses*, I show that Joyce’s text and selected early films and film genres exhibit parallel philosophies. *Ulysses* and early cinema share similar ideas on the embodied nature of perception, the close relationship between mind and body, the intermingling of the human and the mechanical, intersubjectivity, and the subject’s inherence in the world. All of these shared ideas are inherently phenomenological. My phenomenological position on the Joyce-and-cinema relationship is at odds with a popular strain of scholarship which cites impersonality, neutrality, and automatism as the key linking factors between early cinema and modernist literature (including Joyce).

‘Joyce-and-cinema’ studies is a relatively large, and growing, field; as is ‘modernism-and-cinema’ studies. As well as ploughing my own path through an already crowded area, I analyse the different trends present (both historically and currently) in each area of study. I also add to the scholarship on phenomenological film theory by analysing the work of phenomenologically inflected film-philosophers and suggesting some new ways in which Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology might be used in the analysis of films and literature.

I provide close analyses of several episodes of *Ulysses* and pay particular attention to ‘Ithaca’, ‘Circe’, ‘Nausicaa’, and ‘Wandering Rocks’. Several of Charlie Chaplin’s Mutual films are analysed, as are a select number of films by George Méliès. I also look at other trick-films, Irish melodrama, panoramas, ‘phantom rides’, and local actuality films (especially Mitchell and Kenyon’s *Living Dublin* series). Proto-cinematic devices – the Mutoscope and stereoscope – are also included in my analyses.

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INTRODUCTION

**ULYSSES; EARLY CINEMA; PHENOMENOLOGY**

My title quotation – ‘see ourselves as others see us’ – unites the three strands of this thesis: James Joyce’s *Ulysses*; early cinema; phenomenology. The multi-layered connotations of this phrase are discussed in detail in my last chapter. However, I introduce the phrase now, as it provides a good way into some of the leitmotifs of this thesis. The phrase appears in literary, filmic, and philosophical contexts. In the ‘Nausicaa’ and ‘Lestrygonians’ episodes of *Ulysses*, Bloom ponders what we learn when we ‘see ourselves as others see us’ (*U* 13.1058 & 8.662). Similarly, in Merleau-Pontian phenomenology, when ‘I see myself as others see me’, I am able to learn more about myself and about the other. In early cinema, the phrase enticingly offered viewers the opportunity to ‘see yourselves as others see you’, fairly literally in local actuality films (see fig. 1, below) or, less directly, in trick-films or physical comedy films.


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In all three contexts, the phrase offers a new way of seeing, enhanced perception, self-reflection, and the chance to contemplate the relationship between self and other, subject and object. These are some of the main preoccupations of this thesis. As well as discussing ways of seeing, I consider ways of being, especially the embodied and engaged forms of being which, I argue, are reflected in and prompted by *Ulysses*, early cinema, and phenomenology. The manner in which the three strands of this thesis intertwine is detailed across chapters one and two. So, for now, I shall merely offer a brief introduction to each strand.

**Ulysses**

Joyce wrote *Ulysses* between 1914 and 1922, across three different European cities: Trieste, Zurich, and Paris. From March 1918 to September 1920, *Ulysses* (still unfinished) was serialised in the *Little Review*. However, certain episodes (‘Lestrygonians’, ‘Scylla and Charybdis’, ‘Cyclops’, and ‘Nausicaa’) were confiscated and burned by the US Postal Authorities before many subscribers were able to read them. The *Egoist* successfully published and distributed edited (less obscene) versions of several *Ulysses* episodes. In 1920, Joyce befriended Sylvia Beach who offered to publish *Ulysses* – in its entirety – under the imprint of her Paris bookshop, Shakespeare and Company. Joyce agreed to Beach's offer; after many revisions before and during the proof stages, the first copies of *Ulysses* were published on Joyce's fortieth birthday – 2/2/’22.²

² This biographical sketch is drawn from an online biography which was, in turn, drawn largely from Richard Ellmann's *James Joyce*: Cleo Hanaway, ‘James Joyce: A Biography’, *Great Writers Inspire*, <http://writersinspire.org/content/james-joyce-biography>, [accessed August 2012].
Although *Ulysses* was published in 1922, it is set on 16 June 1904, the day on which Joyce first went out with his long term partner, Nora Barnacle (JJ 156). Although – as I explain in chapter two – this thesis is not a study of direct influence, I do focus on films which could have been seen by Joyce’s characters (pre-1904 films) or Joyce, during the period in which he was writing and/or revising *Ulysses* (pre-1922 films). This choice also (in part) dictates my decision not to look at Joyce’s later work, *Finnegans Wake* (1939). As well as requiring more space than this thesis will allow, a discussion of *Finnegans Wake* and cinema would involve a different variety of questions, issues, and themes, as the late 1920s ushered in sound films and the 1930s saw the rise of Hollywood cinema and the establishment of its avant-garde counterpart.

**EARLY CINEMA**

So, in the context of this study, ‘early cinema’ refers to silent films produced in the late nineteenth century up until the first two years of the 1920s. Throughout this thesis I use the terms ‘cinematic’ and ‘filmic’ synonymously, to mean anything which is, in some way, like films, film-making apparatus, or the experience of watching a film. I also use the term ‘proto-cinematic’ to refer to devices which form part of cinema’s history. In particular, I look at the Mutoscope and the stereoscope, both of which are mentioned in *Ulysses*.

The stereoscope does not always figure prominently in the history of cinema as it created the illusion of depth rather than of movement. In this sense, the stereoscope is part of cinema’s history but not – perhaps – the history of ‘moving pictures’. The stereoscope was a direct precursor to several early film genres – including actualities, phantom rides, and erotic cinema – which aimed to portray life in all its full, bodily, sensual glory. These
films utilised film’s ability to convey movement, but not as an end in itself; they were interested in movement as a form of vitality or veracity. As William Uricchio explains, ‘many pre-1906 actualités adapted the compositional conventions of the stereograph’ while other film-makers developed the stereoscope’s ‘illusion of depth’ by ‘moving the camera towards the vanish point’ (as in ‘phantom ride’ films) or by ‘allowing traffic to move towards the camera’ (as in Lumière’s famous train-arriving film, discussed in chapter five).\(^3\) Jonathan Crary observes a relationship between stereoscopy and erotic cinema and even suggests that ‘the very close association of the stereoscope with pornography was in part responsible for its social demise as a mode of visual consumption’.\(^4\)

Rather than seeing early cinema as photography-plus-movement, or as proto-narrative cinema, this thesis sees the initial years of film-making as a cinematic art which is better referred to as ‘living pictures’, a term popularly used in the early 1900s (note fig. 1’s use of ‘Living Portraits’ and see fig. 2, overleaf).\(^5\)


\(^5\) My term ‘living pictures’ embodies several of the elements that Tom Gunning identifies in what he calls ‘cinema of attractions’. However, whereas Gunning is interested in the ‘cinema of attractions’ as a non-narrative precursor to later films in which narrative is bought to the foreground, I am interested in ‘living pictures’ in themselves, as a form of cinema which prompts audience engagement, non-cognitive reflection, physical sensations, and/or the feeling of immersion. For more on the ‘cinema of attractions’, see André Gaudreault and Tom Gunning, ‘Le cinéma des premiers temps, un défi à l’histoire du cinéma?’, in J. Aumont, A. Gaudreault, and M. Marie (eds.), *Histoire du Cinema: Nouvelles Approches*, (Paris: La Sorbonne nouvelle, 1989); Tom Gunning, ‘The Cinema of Attractions: Early Film, Its Spectator and the Avant-Garde’, in Thomas Elsaesser and Adam Barker (eds.), *Early Film Space Frame Narrative*, (London: British Film Institute, 1990); Tom Gunning, ‘“Now You See It, Now You Don’t”: The Temporality of the Cinema of Attractions’, in Richard Abel (ed.), *Silent Cinema*, (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1995).
This review-advertisement highlights the liveliness of ‘living pictures’. Although the term was sometimes used more specifically, to refer to actuality films, this 1906 advertisement attests to the fact that ‘living pictures’ described any films which engaged the audience and prompted a powerful – often physical – reaction. The films show ‘exciting incidents’ and ‘produce hearty laughter’; there ‘is not a dull moment during the performance’ and there was ‘no doubt that the audience thoroughly appreciated the excellent programme’. Throughout the passage, there is a clear focus on the animate nature
of both the films and the audience; the actualities are praised for their realism and the comedies for their ability to provoke laughter.

PHENOMENOLOGY

In the nineteenth century ‘phenomenology’ referred to the ‘metaphysical study or theory of phenomena in general’ or, more generally, to the ‘division of any science which is concerned with the description and classification of its phenomena, rather than causal or theoretical explanation’. As early as 1907, however, the term ‘phenomenology’ (with the accompanying noun ‘phenomenologist’) was being used in a specific sense, to describe a particular philosophical method, originally developed by the German philosopher Edmund Husserl (1859-1938). Husserl’s method involves ‘the setting aside of presuppositions about a phenomenon as an empirical object and about the mental acts concerned with experiencing it, in order to achieve an intuition of its pure essence’. In other words, Husserl’s phenomenological method aimed to see things directly, without artificially splitting them up into ‘empirical object’, sense data, and the ‘mental acts’ used to perceive them. As Katherine Morris explains, ‘phenomenology for Husserl may be called the systematic study of consciousness’. Although this might make ‘Husserlian phenomenology’ sound like a synonym for ‘psychology’, there is one key difference. As Husserl explains,
psychology is concerned ‘with consciousness from the empirical standpoint’, whereas phenomenology is concerned with ‘pure consciousness’ – consciousness as it happens.\(^{10}\)

Martin Heidegger (1889-1976) followed in Husserl’s phenomenological footsteps and produced one of phenomenology’s definitive texts – *Being and Time* (1927). Heidegger’s text takes phenomenology in an ‘existential’ direction; it focuses on the existence of the individual and that individual’s experience with the world and other people. Whereas Husserl was interested in ‘pure consciousness’, Heidegger was fascinated by the humanness of consciousness, the ways in which consciousness acts in different environments and human beings. These existential elements of Heidegger’s phenomenology are embodied in his famous phrase, *being-in-the-world*. This phrase highlights the idea that the world is not a separate, neutral entity; the world always has a certain significance for us, as human beings.

This thesis focuses on the work of Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1908-1961), a French phenomenologist who combines elements of both Husserl’s and Heidegger’s philosophies. In particular, Merleau-Ponty appropriates two seemingly contradictory features: Husserl’s ‘setting aside of presuppositions’ and Heidegger’s notion that the world always already has a certain significance for us. How can we see things in an unbiased way if things are always seen subjectively, through a human being who is inextricably connected to the world in which they live? As I explain in chapters two and three, for Merleau-Ponty, the answer to this question lies in a series of interlinked concepts, including *pre-conscious perception*, *embodiment*, *enworldedness*, and *intentionality*. Essentially, Merleau-Ponty reconciles Husserl’s and Heidegger’s phenomenologies by showing that consciousness is embodied, rather than purely cerebral. It follows that, if consciousness is embodied, perception of the

world need not require a separate set of ‘mental acts’; we perceive the world directly and non-cognitively. So, for Merleau-Ponty, it makes sense to see ourselves as being always already part of the world that our bodies inhabit.

While Merleau-Ponty acknowledges that his ideas are based on earlier phenomenologies (as well as several other modes of thought, including science, Gestalt psychology, early French philosophies, and various art forms), he also states that phenomenology is a way of thinking rather than a particular philosophical school or movement. As Merleau-Ponty states, ‘phenomenology can be practised and identified as a manner of thinking’; ‘it existed as a movement before arriving at complete awareness of itself as a philosophy’. 11 Following Merleau-Ponty, I suggest that phenomenological ideas can be traced in non-philosophical mediums, including early cinema and Ulysses.

**THESIS STRUCTURE**

As this thesis explores three different strands (Ulysses, early cinema, and Merleau-Pontian phenomenology), the first three chapters are mainly concerned with articulating the ways in which these strands intertwine. In the last two chapters (chapters four and five), through close analyses of Ulysses and selected early films, I detail particular instances of the strands intertwining.

Chapter one details Joyce’s experience of cinema, discusses previous ‘Joyce-and-cinema’ studies, and considers the parallels between early cinema and Joyce’s earlier works – *Dubliners* (1914) and *A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man* (1916). I pay particular attention to prevalent leitmotifs in Joyce-and-cinema studies, including Joyce’s Volta

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Cinema; Joyce’s meeting with Sergei Eisenstein; and the cinematic elements in the ‘Nausicaa’ and ‘Circe’ episodes of Ulysses. Throughout the chapter, I highlight points of convergence and divergence between previous scholarship and my own phenomenology-focused thesis.

Chapter two investigates the different ways in which scholars have figured the relationship between modernist literature and early cinema. My analysis of these different approaches reveals the pervasive presence of one particular film-philosopher – André Bazin. I show that, by careful analysis of Bazin’s ideas, scholars can better understand the thinking behind several influential modernism-and-cinema studies. I also examine the extent to which my own phenomenological view of modernism-and-cinema is reflected in previous scholarship on both cinema and modernism. I explain that I employ phenomenology because its concepts match those found in Joyce’s texts and because it enables scholars to provide a sophisticated and much-needed counterpart to what I have referred to as the ‘non-human’ or ‘impersonal’ view of modernism-and-cinema.

Chapter three details the specifics of my phenomenologically informed approach. The chapter is split into two parts. Part one examines Merleau-Ponty’s ideas of film and perception and looks at the ways in which his ideas have been appropriated by recent film-philosophers. In part two, I identify two strains of early film-philosophy which I consider to be proto-Merleau-Pontian: perception-focused (including the work of Max Wertheimer, Hugo Münsterberg, and Rudolf Arnheim) and haptic-focused (including the work of Victor Freeburg, Sergei Eisenstein, and Siegfried Kracauer). Before analysing these two strains, I explore the work of Henri Bergson, as his film-philosophy has played a significant role in both Merleau-Pontian and non-Merleau-Pontian film theories. Although my thesis is not a study of influence, I end this chapter by considering the extent to which Joyce would have
been aware of early phenomenology and proto-film-phenomenologies. I am primarily interested in the ways in which phenomenology permeated literary modernist and early film consciousnesses.

Chapter four presents an alternative to the popular critical vein which sees Joyce’s *Ulysses* and certain early films as conveying a mechanical and non-human view of the modern world. I argue that, like modern theorists and philosophers, *Ulysses* and certain strains of early cinema were engaged, naively or otherwise, in a systematic exploration of Cartesian dualism, and that a re-evaluation of the mind/body binary entailed a reformulation of the human/machine binary. As artists and entertainers, Joyce and filmmakers do not present logical proofs for their alternative theories of the mind/body and human/machine binaries. Instead, they show the impossibility of reducing humans to a mechanical body or an immaterial mind. By depicting integrated mind-bodies, I argue, Joyce and selected early film-makers go beyond thinkers such as Henri Bergson and Wyndham Lewis and anticipate Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s later notion of the ‘body-subject’, of humans as neither purely mechanical, nor solely cerebral.

I show that, for the philosophers, writers, and film-makers, comedy played an important role in their revaluation of the mind/body problem. Thus, chapter four is also (in part) an examination of humour in *Ulysses* and early cinema, with a particular focus on the physical comedy of Bloom and Charlie Chaplin. More serious forms of cinema are also considered later on in the chapter; Irish melodrama and religious trick-films are analysed alongside George Méliès’s surreal comedy films in my discussion of gesture and embodiment in *Ulysses*. 
Chapter five looks at the relationship between the film and the viewer. I consider the extent to which early cinema interacted with spectators’ bodies and argue that, like early film-makers, Joyce was interested in perception and embodied experience, especially the relationship between sight and touch. By analysing Ulysses and certain early cinema genres in the light of phenomenological theory, I am able to examine the ways in which modern literary and filmic preoccupations are linked to explorations of binaries such as inner subject/external world, seeing/feeling, and self/other. I begin by looking at Ulysses’ direct reference to the stereoscope and the indirect allusions to stereoscopy in Bloom’s musings on parallax. I consider the three-dimensionality and haptic\textsuperscript{12} effects of stereoscopic seeing in relation to Bloom’s and Gerty’s encounter in ‘Nausicaa’ and show how stereoscopy, depth perception, and haptic seeing are usefully examined through the Merleau-Pontian concepts of ‘flesh’ and ‘intercorporeity’. I continue to contemplate embodied perception in my analysis of panoramic vision and virtual film-worlds; in particular, I consider Ulysses’s ‘phantom rides’ and the vertiginous effects of ‘Wandering Rocks’’s interpolations. Finally, I return to the relationship between the self and the other in my exploration of parallels between Ulysses and the viewing situation of Mitchell and Kenyon’s Living Dublin films.

My conclusion reflects on the issues covered in this thesis and briefly considers what further avenues of research this study opens up. I suggest that Joyce’s Finnegans Wake adds to early 1930s discussions surrounding the emergence of sound film, particularly those played out across the pages of the film journal, Close Up. I conclude by returning to Ulysses. I briefly examine the Reisman-Zukofsky screenplay of Joyce’s text and suggest ways in which it draws upon the kinds of ideas that this thesis expresses.

\textsuperscript{12} The term ‘haptic’ refers to all of the different sensations associated with the sense of touch, including tactile encounters and the feeling of one’s body moving through space.
CHAPTER 1

JAMES JOYCE AND CINEMA

Given the increasingly large body of work on the relationship between cinema and the writing of James Joyce, ‘Joyce-and-cinema studies’ is now a field in its own right, rather than merely a sub-field of modernism-and-cinema studies. As Keith Williams states, ‘Joyce was at the epicentre of literary Modernism’s encounter with the new medium’; ‘intertextuality with film is one of the more energizing drives in [Joyce’s] Modernist project’. Paul Tiessen argues that, ‘so strong is the “Joycean” current within scholarship assessing literary modernism’, ‘that it seems actually to colour and determine the direction even of the most general of surveys of 20th-Century “literature-and-film” connections’. Indeed, Joyce, himself, remarked that Ulysses ‘could not be translated into another language, but might be translated into another medium, that of film’ (JJ 561). As early as April 1922, readers made connections between cinema and Joyce’s writing: an anonymous reviewer disparagingly suggested that Ulysses was written in ‘the new fashionable kinematographic vein, very jerky and elliptical’. A decade later, in Ulysses’s U.S. obscenity trial, the Honorable John M. Woolsey noted virtuous analogies between cinema and Joyce’s writing: ‘What [Joyce] seeks is not unlike the result of a double or, if it is possible, a multiple

exposure on a cinema film which would give a clear foreground with a background visible but somewhat blurred'.

More recently, scholars have moved beyond using cinema connections to put a negative or positive spin on Joyce’s writing. In 2006 the Zürich James Joyce Foundation devoted its annual workshop to the theme of ‘Cinematographic Joyce’; in the same year the *James Joyce Quarterly (JJQ)* published a special section on ‘Joyce and Cinema’. 2010 saw the publication of John McCourt’s edited collection, *Roll Away the Reel World: James Joyce and Cinema*. McCourt’s book includes contributions from thirteen international scholars and displays the wide variety of approaches in current Joyce-and-cinema studies.

In general, unlike broader modernism-and-cinema studies (such as Trotter’s *Cinema and Modernism* and Spiegel’s *Fiction and the Camera Eye*, which will both be discussed in detail in chapter two), Joyce-and-cinema studies tend to focus on specific ideas, arguments, or findings, rather than on an overarching thesis. Indeed, despite the great interest in Joyce and cinema, there is currently only one book-length Joyce-and-cinema study – Thomas Burkdall’s *Joycean Frames* (2001). Instead of presenting a comprehensive thesis on Joyce’s relationship with cinema, Burkdall proffers a series of distinct arguments based on close readings of Joyce’s texts via different film theories. Like Burkdall, I employ film theory in my analyses but, unlike *Joycean Frames*, my Joyce-and-cinema thesis uses one specific strain of film theory – Merleau-Pontian film-phenomenology – in order to present a sustained investigation into the parallels between the proto-phenomenological elements underlying both early cinema and *Ulysses*.

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17 Keith Williams is currently researching for a monograph provisionally entitled *James Joyce and Cinematicity*. His published work on Joyce and cinema is discussed in this chapter.
There are numerous Joyce-and-cinema approaches, but it is possible to isolate a small number of prevalent research strands. Many of these strands stem from the pioneering work of Harry Levin. According to Levin, ‘Ulysses has more in common with the cinema than with other fiction’.\(^{18}\) Firstly, Levin notes the importance of biographical factors: ‘Joyce’s unrewarded attempt to establish the first motion-picture theatre in Ireland is only another chapter in the history of his misunderstandings with his country, but he finally understood the technical possibilities of the new medium; he ‘keenly perceived’ that ‘cinema is both a science and an art’.\(^{19}\) Secondly, he draws analogies between film’s techniques and the techniques of Ulysses: ‘Bloom’s mind is neither a tabula rasa nor a photographic plate, but a motion picture, which has been ingeniously cut and carefully edited to emphasize the close-ups and fade-outs of flickering emotion, the angles of observation and the flashbacks of reminiscence’.\(^{20}\) In particular, for Levin, Ulysses ‘involves the crucial operation of montage’; Joyce’s ‘transitions from the objective to the subjective and back – in the opinion of Sergei Eisenstein, the film director and brilliant exponent of montage – constitute one of the most effective applications of this technique’.\(^{21}\)

Another prevalent approach concentrates on links between specific films and specific sections of texts.\(^{22}\) A number of scholars use Joyce’s relationship with cinema as an in-road to an exploration of the visual and/ or popular culture in which Joyce was writing.\(^{23}\)


\(^{19}\) Ibid.

\(^{20}\) Ibid.

\(^{21}\) Ibid. pp. 82 and 96. Levin’s italics.

\(^{22}\) Philip Sicker is the most prominent proponent of this approach; in particular see ‘Evenings at the Volta: Cinematic Afterimages in Joyce’, JJQ, 4/ 3:1-4, (2004-2006), 99-132; and ‘Mirages in the Lampglow: Joyce’s “Circe” and Méliès’ Dream Cinema’, in Roll Away the Reel World: James Joyce and Cinema, ed. John McCourt (Cork: Cork University Press, 2010), pp. 69-85. Marco Camerani is also a foremost scholar of this approach; of particular interest are Joyce e il Cinema delle Origini: ‘Circe’, (Fiesole: Cadmo, 2008); and ““Circe”’s Costume Changes: Bloom, Fregoli and Early Cinema, in Roll Away the Reel World, pp. 103-121.

\(^{23}\) In particular, see the work of Katy Mullin and Carla Marengo Vaglio, including their respective chapters in Roll Away the Reel World, Mullin’s James Joyce, Sexuality and Social Purity, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003) and Vaglio’s ‘Cinematic Joyce: Mediterranean Joyce’, in Joyce in Trieste: An Album of Risky
while other scholars use a variety of critical and/or film theories to analyse Joyce’s writing as one would analyse a film. As well as taking a particular approach, Joyce-and-cinema studies often revolve around key events, figures, or film genres, including Joyce’s role in opening the Volta Cinematograph in Dublin in 1909; Joyce’s meeting with Eisenstein in 1929; the trick-films of Georges Méliès; Charlie Chaplin; Mutoscope and erotic films; film versions of Joyce’s own texts and Joyce-inspired films. The majority of these approaches and key areas are discussed in this chapter, in relation to my own Merleau-Pontian approach. However, my discussion of Chaplin-and-Joyce studies will be left until chapter four and, due to the restricted length of this thesis – and my focus on early cinema – I am unable to provide detailed analyses of research into Joyce adaptations or Joyce-inspired films.

Ulysses is the key text for most Joyce-and-cinema studies. The ‘Circe’ and ‘Nausicaa’ episodes of Ulysses are particularly well covered, with ‘Wandering Rocks’, ‘Proteus’, ‘Aeolus’, ‘Lestrygonians’, and ‘Lotus Eaters’ also receiving significant critical attention. Scholars’ analyses of ‘Nausicaa’ and ‘Circe’ are discussed in detail in this chapter, while the


24 Scholars do, of course, mix approaches; for example, Philip Sicker’s studies often employ psychoanalytic theory (these articles are discussed in more detail below). Thomas Burk dall’s study employs different theories for different episodes of Ulysses (including Mulvey, Doane, and Bazin). Daniel Shea applies Walter Benjamin’s theories to ‘Nausicaa’: “‘Do They Snapshot Those Girls or Is It All a Fake?’: Walter Benjamin, Film, and ‘Nausicaa’”, JJQ, 4/ 3:1-4, (2004-2006), 87-98.


other five episodes are considered in chapters four and five. My discussion focuses on the extent to which these scholars engage with areas of my own research. As I explain in more detail in chapters two and three, my film-phenomenological approach concentrates on the intermingling of mind and body and human and machine; subject and object interaction; and embodied experience. While some Joyce-and-cinema scholars touch on aspects of these key areas, they do not approach them in the manner in which I do – through Merleau-Pontian film-phenomenology.

This chapter begins with an outline of Joyce’s own experience of cinema, including his role in setting up one of Dublin’s first cinemas – the Volta Cinematograph. Next I consider possible parallels between Joyce and Eisenstein, before discussing research on ‘Nausicaa’, ‘Circe’, and cinema. Finally, I discuss the relationship between cinema and Joyce’s other works. I do not go into detail on Joyce’s poetry, *Stephen Hero, Exiles, Giacomo Joyce, or Finnegans Wake*, but I do briefly examine Joyce’s short-story collection and his earlier novel. However, I argue that, while proto-film-phenomenological elements are discernible in *Dubliners* and *A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man*, these elements only really come to fruition in *Ulysses*.

**THE VOLTA CINEMATOGRAPH**

Whilst staying with her brother in Trieste, Joyce’s sister, Eva, was homesick for Ireland and found solace in the local cinema theatres. Eva was impressed by the large number of cinemas in Trieste and found it odd that Dublin, a much larger city, had no cinemas at all (*JJ 300*). Joyce immediately recognised the money-making potential of a Dublin cinema and quickly set up a meeting with three businessmen: Antonio Machnich,
Guiseppe Caris, and Giovanni Rebez. At the business meeting, Joyce teasingly declared: “I know of a city of 500,000 inhabitants where there is not a single cinema” (JJ 301). As film historian Luke McKernan details, the Triestine businessmen – who between them already managed two cinemas in Trieste and one in Bucharest – demanded to know the identity of this technologically-backward city and, when Joyce revealed that it was Dublin, they jumped at the chance of setting up a new cinema. Nicolò Vidacovich, a lawyer, and good friend of Joyce, quickly drew up contracts for the new Dublin cinema. Two days after signing the contract, and less than two months after Eva’s catalytic comment, Joyce had found a suitable building for the new cinema at 45 Mary Street.

On 20 December 1909 Joyce’s cinema – the Volta Cinematograph – opened its doors to a large invited audience. The opening night programme received a positive review in the Evening Telegraph (December 21st 1909): ‘Mr. James Joyce, who is in charge of the exhibition, has worked apparently indefatigably in its production and deserves to be congratulated on the success of the inaugural exhibition' (JJ 302-3). Although Joyce returned to Trieste just over a month after the Volta opened, he continued to manage the promotional work and sent advice to the new manager, a Triestine man named Lorenzo Novak. McKernan conjectures that ‘[d]espite Joyce’s early departure, he may have been familiar with the films shown in the months that followed’. However, McKernan is keen to stress that we ‘do not know whether [Joyce] had any special interest in any of the Volta

27 Erik Schneider, ‘Dedalus Among the Film Folk: Joyce and the Cinema Volta’, in Roll Away the Reel World, pp. 30-34.
29 Erik Schneider, ‘Dedalus Among the Film Folk’, p. 37. Schneider notes that Novak’s first names often erroneously given as ‘Francesco’, probably due to Stanislaus Joyce’s misremembering his name in his interviews with Ellmann, Joyce’s biographer.
31 Ibid.
32 Erik Schneider, ‘Dedalus Among the Film Folk’, pp. 38-9.
films’, but ‘one would expect Joyce to have checked on what his cinema was showing from
time to time, and there is some evidence to indicate that he did witness a few films at
least’. 34 Charles Duff fondly recalls viewing films at the Volta as a fifteen-year-old truant
schoolboy. He remembers Joyce sitting beside him, enjoying the flickering images on the
screen. 35 Despite the initial positive reviews and happy memories, in April 1910 the Volta
was forced to close due to financial difficulties probably caused by the combination of the
long-distance nature of the business operations, competition from other venues, and the
audience’s desire for American and British films rather than the predominantly French and
Italian titles that the Volta showed. Although the films were silent, the intertitles were not
translated, so Joyce would hand the audience his own translations on slips of paper. 36

Despite the short life-span of Joyce’s cinema, the Volta programmes have provided a
useful starting point for research into the Joyce and cinema relationship. Each Volta
programme comprised a variety of genres, including trick-films, travelogues, actualities,
documentaries, slapstick-comedies, and historical dramas. Philip Sicker argues that ‘[c]areful
examination of the [...] one hundred and thirty-nine films known to be included in the
Volta’s thirty-three programs and, more important, viewing most of the twenty-two films
that still survive [...]], reveal the ways in which particular works and genres contributed to
Joyce’s art’. 37 Further, Sicker suggests that ‘[r]ecent studies have done much to disprove
Alan Spiegel’s contention that we have no “right” to claim that Joyce’s art “was consciously
influenced by film”’. 38 As I explain in chapter two of this thesis, my own line of argument is
not dependent upon any direct – conscious or unconscious – influence of specific films upon

McKernan states that twenty-seven of the Volta films survive; twenty of those are archived in the BFI (see
Joyce’s writing, nor is it based on the presence of analogous techniques. Instead, I follow David Trotter’s lead and suggest that the relationship between Joyce’s writing and early cinema is one of ‘parallel histories’ or, more accurately, *parallel philosophies*.

Given that Joyce suffered recurrent iritis which – at times – left him only partially sighted, one has to be cautious when formulating arguments that posit a correspondence between Joyce’s writing and the visual content of specific films. As Roy Gottfried notes, Joyce’s ‘second attack [of iritis], somewhat ironically, arose in 1909 while Joyce was in Dublin for the second of his visits having to do with the establishment of the Volta cinema’.  

However, despite these reservations, I agree that the Volta programme provides a useful starting point when thinking about the kinds of early film that were being made in the early 1900s. And, as I stress in chapters four and five, it is perverse to actively omit possible lines of influence if they suggest themselves; but these lines of influence are neither sufficient nor necessary for my argument, as I contend that the strongest and most remarkable parallels between *Ulysses* and early cinema are philosophical rather than purely visual or stylistic.

**JOYCE AS FILM VIEWER AND FILM THEORIST**

Joyce was a frequent cinema-goer, as evidenced in friends’ recollections and in Joyce’s own letters. Mario Nordio, one of Joyce’s English language students, described his

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teacher as an ‘ardent admirer’ of cinema – ‘[n]o films escaped him’. In a 1904 letter from Joyce to his brother Stanislaus, we read that Joyce and his partner Nora attended a travelling film show – Lifka’s Bioscope – whilst in Pola. Nora was particularly enthralled by one of the films; Joyce describes the viewing experience vividly in his letter: ‘In the last [scene] Lothario throws [Gretchen] into the river and rushes off, followed by a rabble. Nora said, “O, policeman, catch him”’ (LII, 75). As Erik Schneider notes, early ‘cinema was not merely a passive “looking at” but a powerful interactive experience’; Nora’s exclamation perfectly exemplifies this point.

As well as recognising the powerful effects that early film had on viewers, Joyce observed a relation between cinema and consciousness: ‘the Italian imagination is like a cinematograph, observe the style of my letter’ (7 December 1906: LII, 203). Joyce’s letter overflows with swift topic changes and personal musings, reflecting the cinematograph’s ‘sixty-miles-an-hour’ speed and its capacity to satisfy ‘heightened emotiveness’ (1 March 1907: LII, 217). In a letter to Harriet Shaw Weaver, Joyce links cinema and the brain; he describes a reoccurring vision: ‘I see a cinematograph going on and on and it brings back to my memory things that I had almost forgotten’ (27 June 1924: LI, 216). So, for Joyce, cinema was an interactive medium that reflected and affected the body and mind. Indeed, as I explain in the proceeding chapters, I argue that both early cinema and Ulysses explore the intermingling of mind and body; they conjure a Merleau-Pontian mind-body or ‘body-subject’.

Unlike some of his literary modernist contemporaries – including Virginia Woolf, Dorothy Richardson, Wyndham Lewis, and D. H. Lawrence – Joyce never wrote any critical

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pieces on cinema. However, Joyce’s critical writings do include one short note on cinema. In his *Trieste Notebook*, Joyce states: ‘Pornographic and cinematographic images act like those stimuli which produce a reflex action of the nerves through channels which are independent of esthetic perception’. Although Joyce sees ‘cinematographic’ images as un-aesthetic, the large body of Joyce-and-cinema work is testament to the fact that such images make it into Joyce’s own art works in some form or another. Indeed, throughout this thesis I argue that it is precisely these aspects of cinema – the human, sensual, embodied, stimulating, and haptic aspects – that make their way into *Ulysses*.

**JOYCE’S MEETING WITH EISENSTEIN**

Although some scholars rightly note that Joyce’s meeting with Eisenstein is overvalued in Joyce-and-cinema studies, it is worth briefly outlining the details of the event. As I explain below, while the Joyce-Eisenstein meeting cannot have had any influence on *Ulysses* (as it occurred seven years after its publication), there are certainly

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some instructive parallels between the work and ideas of the two modern artists. Gösta Werner’s 1990 JJQ article on Joyce and Eisenstein is particularly useful on the details of the pair’s famous meeting at Joyce’s Paris apartment on 30 November 1929. The meeting was set up by Boris Lyakhovskyi, ‘a young Russian film technician who lived in France 1925-1931’, via Sylvia Beach, publisher of Ulysses and owner of the Shakespeare and Company bookshop. During the meeting, Joyce played Eisenstein a recording of Anna Livia Plurabelle, which had been published as a short book in October 1928.

According to a letter from the film-maker to Léon Moussinac, Eisenstein had already read A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man, Ulysses, and Herbert Gorman’s James Joyce, His First Forty Years: A Critical Study (1924). It is unlikely that Joyce had seen any of Eisenstein’s films; during the meeting he expressed an interest in seeing some of Eisenstein’s work, specifically Potemkin and October. However, Joyce’s eyesight was very poor around the time of the meeting, so he would have been unlikely to be able to see the films clearly. Recalling the meeting in his memoirs, Eisenstein writes: ‘why is [Joyce] waving his hands and groping so strangely?’; ‘I spent the whole evening with a man who was almost blind – without my understanding, feeling’ “seeing” it!’. Joyce appears to have seen Eisenstein’s films later on, or at least to have had them explained to him in more detail. As Werner notes, ‘Joyce later told his friend Eugene Jolas, the editor of transition, that for a possible future filming of Ulysses he could only think of two persons who were qualified as directors: Eisenstein and Walter Ruttmann, the German documentary film director’.

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47 Léon Moussinac was a French journalist, film critic, and friend of Eisenstein.
Eisenstein would often refer to Joyce’s work – particularly *Ulysses* – in his lectures and publications.\(^{51}\) Emily Tall’s 1987 *JJQ* article helpfully provides a verbatim report of Sergei Eisenstein’s 1934 lecture specifically on James Joyce.\(^{52}\) The lecture – given at the State Institute of Cinematography in Russia – is partly a response to the criticism that Joyce received from the Soviet writer Karl Radek. Radek saw Joyce’s writing as a ‘heap of dung, teeming with worms and photographed by a motion-picture camera through a microscope’.\(^{53}\) In his lecture, Eisenstein directly alludes to Radek’s critique, but brings out the unintended positives – rather than the overt negatives – in the writer’s assertion: in James Joyce, for ‘the first time you have [...] a literary discovery of almost the same scope as the possibility of seeing the human texture under a microscope for the first time, which was of tremendous importance for physiologists’.\(^{54}\) In making links between Joyce and Eisenstein, scholars tend to focus on the scientific ‘microscope’ rather than ‘human texture’ aspect of the lecture; Eisenstein is seen to be praising Joyce for his detail and abstraction, rather than his representation of human nature. For most scholars, Eisenstein’s fondness for abstraction is most clearly seen in his famous ‘montage of attractions’ film technique.\(^{55}\) Indeed, for Edward Murray (writing in 1972), montage is the key to Joyce’s artistic relationship with cinema; the film-maker and writer use analogous montage techniques.\(^{56}\)


\(^{54}\) Emily Tall, ‘Eisenstein on Joyce’, p. 137.


Werner argues that both Joyce’s literary methods and Eisenstein’s montage techniques are based on scientific ‘abstractness’: ‘the primary purpose was not emotional but intellectual’. For Burkdall, Joyce and Eisenstein both appropriate Japanese-style abstraction: they subordinate naturalism to intellectual considerations. Quoting Eisenstein, Burkdall argues that “it has been left to James Joyce to develop in literature the depictive line of the Japanese hieroglyph”. Spiegel, like Werner and Burkdall, sees Eisenstein’s (and therefore Joyce’s) montage as a form of abstraction: ‘Eisenstein’s methods were essentially a means of conveying an argument graphically, of transforming physical surfaces into a dimension of abstract discourse’. According to Spiegel, ‘[d]ialectical montage [...] provides Joyce with a way of abstracting from his concretized form without ever really departing from it, of creating an atmosphere of intellection and symbolic resonance while working in and through a series of concretized actions’. Spiegel sees Joyce’s adoption of such techniques most clearly exemplified in the synchronic structure of ‘Wandering Rocks’, the portmanteau words of *Finnegans Wake*, and the juxtapositions of Homer and modern Ireland in *Ulysses* as a whole.

For Karla Oeler, Eisensteinian montage is purely abstract, but Joycean montage also engages with human nature; the ‘chief difference between them seems to be that Eisenstein does not bestow inner speech on his characters, but rather treats them as components of his stylized sets, whereas Joyce’s characters appear as full-blown

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59 Alan Spiegel, *Fiction and the Camera Eye*, p. 172.
60 Ibid., p. 173.
61 Ibid., p. 172-4.
subjectivities’. Other scholars argue that both Eisenstein’s and Joyce’s montage produce a juxtaposition of the abstract and the human (and the external and the internal, and the object and the subject) rather than valorisation of abstraction. In his 1991 edited collection on film and contemporary writing, Keith Cohen asserts: ‘[p]erhaps the best example of perspectival montage is Joyce’s *Ulysses*, because this novel deals not only with external actions of Leopold Bloom, Stephen Dedalus, and other characters, but also with internal events’; ‘[t]hese events, internal as well as external, are juxtaposed in a piecemeal fashion to create a jigsaw narrative in which we skip back and forth between characters, inside and outside of characters’. Similarly, R. Barton Palmer argues that Joyce employs ‘a technique that is a kind of [Eisensteinian] montage since he juxtaposes the “display of events” with the “particular manner” of their processing within human consciousness’. However, Palmer is careful to distinguish between the different types of juxtapositional montage that Joyce and Eisenstein produce. According to Palmer, Joyce ‘goes further than Eisenstein in using a montage defined by a “conflict of discourse in which the oppositions available in the juxtaposed discourses are contradictory and in conflict”’.

**JOYCE, EISENSTEIN, AND AFFECT**

Although Eisenstein’s montage can easily be seen as a juxtapositional technique (as it involves placing images next to each other, either in time or space), there is evidence to suggest that – philosophically speaking – instead of *juxtaposing* the human and the abstract

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65 Ibid., p. 79.
(or the subjective and objective, or inner and outer), Eisenstein shows that the two terms are blurred. Eisenstein, like Joyce, shows that events, the environment, and human consciousness are all inextricably linked. In ‘Joyce and Cinema’ (1978), Ruth Perlmutter argues that both Eisenstein and Joyce strive to depict ‘a more direct mediation with the phenomenal world’. Perlmutter also sees both artists as depicting the blurring of mind/body and inner/outer: the ‘Joycean “ultra-lyricism”, as Sergei Eisenstein called the “almost palpability” of the Joycean method, achieves a merging of external events with consciousness’; Eisenstein rightly described Joyce’s style as a “literary method of abolishing the distinction between subject and object”.

Further, Perlmutter suggests that both Eisenstein and Joyce aimed to present an embodied view of the world; both ‘sought physiological correlatives of sensation, affect and cognition’.

In his autobiography, Immoral Memories, Eisenstein states: ‘What is so fascinating in Ulysses?’; ‘[t]here is the inimitable sensuousness of the text’. As Thomas Sheehan asserts, ‘Eisenstein’s theory is most clearly described by the word “affective”’; he wants his films to have a direct, sensuous effect on his audience. In ‘Montage 1938’, Eisenstein states that he wishes to convey images with “the same force of physical perception” with which they faced the author in his moments of creative vision’. As I discuss in more detail in chapter three of this thesis, as well as seeing perception as ‘physical’ – rather than wholly mental – Eisenstein saw thought as being ‘sensual’; Eisenstein was interested in the physicality of seeing and being. As DiBattista acknowledges, for Eisenstein, ‘most fugitive thought originates [in consciousness], not as abstract processes but as specific and embodied mental

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67 Ibid., pp. 482 & 493.
68 Ibid., p. 493.
70 Thomas Sheehan, ‘Montage Joyce’, p. 73.
In Eisenstein’s words, the ‘image conceived by the author has become flesh of the flesh of the spectator’s image’; ‘the process is creative not only for the author, but also for me, the spectator’. In this assertion, Eisenstein anticipates Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological ideas on the reciprocal relationship between object and subject, film and film-viewer. Indeed, as Perlmutter states, ‘Merleau-Ponty [like Eisenstein] has noted the appropriateness of cinema in representing this fusion of inner and outer reality’; Joyce’s *Ulysses* reflects this Eisensteinian/ Merleau-Pontian ‘blurring of the distinction between subjective and objective discourse, between inner and outer reality, between the conscious and the unconscious’.

With the foregrounding of Eisenstein’s ideas on embodiment and reciprocal seeing, and the acknowledgement of parallels with phenomenology, Perlmutter’s approach is similar to my own, but there are key differences. Firstly, while Perlmutter mediates her analysis of film and *Ulysses* through literary-rhetorical structures and theory, I look at *Ulysses* and selected films through film-phenomenology (both pre- and post-Merleau-Pontian). Secondly, while I concentrate on early film (1895-1920), Perlmutter argues for parallels between *Ulysses* and films of the late 1920s – *Berlin* (1927) and *Man with a Movie Camera* (1929) – and Jean-Luc Godard’s films of the 1960s. Thirdly, while Perlmutter only briefly mentions Merleau-Ponty in support of her ideas, I offer a comprehensive Merleau-Pontian approach to *Ulysses* and cinema parallels, drawing on film-phenomenologies – including the work of Sobchack, Spencer, Barker, and Marks – that were not available to Perlmutter when she wrote her article in 1978. However, both Perlmutter and I, unlike other Joyce-and-cinema scholars, see Eisenstein’s proto-phenomenological ideas – his focus...
on embodiment, the senses, and subject-object blurring – as a basis for the most enlightening parallel between Joyce and cinema. Indeed, these proto-phenomenological ideas form the basis of my interpretation of the Joyce-cinema relationship and will be discussed in more detail throughout this thesis.

‘NAUSICAA’ IN JOYCE-AND-CINEMA STUDIES

Due to its overt references to the Mutoscope (a popular proto-cinematic device) and its emphasis on looking, ‘Nausicaa’ has become a favourite with Joyce-and-cinema scholars. As Burkdall states, the “Nausicaa” episode of Ulysses is one of the most cinematically compelling pieces of Joyce’s work, so can usefully be read alongside film theory. For Burkdall, ‘Nausicaa’ perfectly exemplifies Laura Mulvey’s film spectatorship theories of scopophilia and voyeurism and Mary Ann Doane’s masquerade-based feminist film theory. Although Burkdall notes Bloom’s Mutoscope reference, his discussion mainly revolves around the later Hollywood films that are discussed by Mulvey and Doane: The Postman Always Rings Twice (1946), To Have and Have Not (1944), Caught (1949), Rebecca (1940). Instead of seeing ‘Nausicaa’ as an episode that blurs subject and object, viewer and viewed (as I argue in chapter five), Burkdall (via Mulvey and Doane) sees Gerty as an object both for Bloom and herself; Gerty has no real subjectivity.

Like Burkdall, Daniel Shea employs film theory to support his thesis that ‘Nausicaca’ is an objective, inhuman episode. Shea argues that by using ‘[Walter] Benjamin’s essay on the implications of [film], we come to recognize the cinematic perspective as an inherently

75 Thomas Burkdall, Joycean Frames, p. 81.
76 Ibid., p. 85-90.
mechanical and dehumanizing one, denying a sense of authenticity to the subject’. For Shea (via Benjamin), the ‘quality of *eros* as a connection between people is lost within the fragmented mechanical essence of modern life’, and it is ‘precisely the severed gaze (*sexus* from *eros*) that Bloom needs for his gratification’. Shea states that a ‘genuine gaze would have involved Bloom’s recognition of Gerty’s separate and authentic existence; instead he reduces her to the status of a sex object’. However, Shea argues that Joyce *does* allow some subjectivity to shine through in ‘Nausicaa’, but only after Bloom and Gerty have finished their programme of cinematic gazes: ‘Bloom’s innate humanity, though challenged by this experience, finally manages to reassert itself over the socially determining gaze’ when, at the end of the episode, he affectionately calls Gerty ‘dear’ (U 13.1272).

Prefiguring Burkdall and Shea, in his 1999 *JJQ* article, “Alone in the Hiding Twilight”, Philip Sicker employs film theory to demonstrate Bloom’s objectifying role in ‘Nausicaa’. He suggests that the ‘operation of Bloom’s visual pleasure […] bears a striking resemblance to pioneering models of male spectatorship advanced by Christian Metz and Laura Mulvey’; reflecting Metz’s and Mulvey’s theories, ‘Bloom’s auto-erotic excitement clearly depends upon his maintaining the male subject/female object dichotomy’. According to Sicker, ‘Bloom craves the scopic regime of the early cinema’, where each male viewer is like ‘Peeping Tom’ (U 13.794). For Sicker, Bloom’s erotic experience is ‘built upon a fiction of his own controlling privacy and the eroticized object’s unawareness’; ‘[b]y temporarily suppressing his sense of Gerty as a gazing subject, Bloom can even enhance his pleasure’.

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77 Daniel Shea, “‘Do They Snapshot Those Girls or Is It All a Fake?’”, p. 87.
78 Ibid., p. 90.
79 Ibid., p. 90.
80 Ibid., p. 95.
82 Ibid., p. 829.
83 Ibid., p. 831.
Maintaining his Freudian view, Sicker argues that ‘[e]ven indirect evidence that the glimpsed female has become aroused through a reciprocal glance is sufficient to induce castration panic in Bloom’.\(^8^4\) Indeed, as Sicker notes in later articles, castration is tackled more directly in ‘Circe’ when the Nymph attacks Bloom’s loins.\(^8^5\)

In his 2004 article, ‘Unveiling Desire’, Sicker complicates his argument by focusing on Gerty; while Bloom maintains the subject/ object binary, asserts Sicker, Gerty blurs it. Contrary to his earlier article, here Sicker argues that the film theories of Mulvey, Doane, and Metz are too essentialist to be used in a comprehensive reading of ‘Nausicaa’; Joyce’s ideas on sexuality and subjectivity cannot be explained through these reductive theories. Instead, Sicker employs the ideas of Jessica Benjamin, a current feminist psychoanalytic theorist who argues that all relationships rely on intersubjectivity rather than objectification. For Benjamin, relationships necessarily involve a ‘subject who could find pleasure with another subject’.\(^8^6\) For Sicker, Gerty is such a subject, but Bloom is not; so their encounter is not truly reciprocal. This modified view of Sicker’s is closer to my own Merleau-Pontian view of the episode, but I go further and argue that both Bloom and Gerty are simultaneously integrated viewing subjects and viewed objects.

Echoing Sicker’s later article, Katherine Mullin argues that ‘Nausicaa’ defies Mulvey’s and Metz’s understanding of the film spectator as absent and the film image as object, as ‘Nausicaa’ includes ‘reciprocal voyeurism’ and ‘mutual longing’.\(^8^7\) Mullin also highlights a theme that I discuss in more detail in chapter five of this thesis – the close relationship between sight and touch. According to Mullin, the ‘mutoscope’s associations with

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\(^{8^4}\) Philip Sicker, ‘“Alone in the Hiding Twilight”’, p. 837.  
\(^{8^5}\) In particular, see Philip Sicker, ‘Mirages in the Lampglow’, pp. 76-7.  
\(^{8^7}\) Katherine Mullin, James Joyce, Sexuality and Social Purity, pp. 156-65.
prostitution blurred a distinction between looking and touching also compromised in "Nausicaa".  

In her chapter in *Roll Away the Reel World*, Mullin insightfully links the tactile vision in ‘Nausicaa’ to early erotic films and the blind man passage from ‘Lestrygonians’ (*U* 8.1125-31); for Mullin, both episodes express ‘Bloom’s synaesthetic fantasy of a mode of touch that could become a form of sight’. In chapter five of this thesis I argue that this emphasis on early cinema and touch is inherently phenomenological and can be traced throughout *Ulysses*.

Like Mullin, Marco Camerani argues that the relationship between Bloom and Gerty is reciprocally voyeuristic: Bloom ‘peeps at Gerty who knows she is being peeped at; moreover she plays with Bloom by glancing back at him and performing a sort of strip tease’. Like Gerty’s friend, Bertha Supple, who peeps at her lodger whilst he views erotic pictures (*U* 15.706-7), Gerty is a voyeur just as Bloom is. For Mullin and Camerani then, the male-subject/ female-object binary is challenged, as both Bloom and Gerty are subject-voyeurs. However, the subject/ object binary itself is not completely dissolved or intermingled, as voyeurism involves seeing the other purely as an object; both characters fail to see the other as a fellow subject, even though the reader is shown that both practise subjective looking. For DiBattista voyeurism is characteristic not just of ‘Nausicaa’ but of *Ulysses* as a whole: ‘Bloom and the reader [...] become watchers summoned into the voyeuristic regime of cinema itself’. So neither Mullin’s nor Camerani’s take on the episode (nor DiBattista’s general statement on *Ulysses*) chimes with Sicker’s Jessica.

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88 Katherine Mullin, *James Joyce, Sexuality and Social Purity*, p. 149.
Benjamin quotation – a ‘subject who could find pleasure with another subject’ – or, indeed, with the Merleau-Pontian theories of intersubjectivity that I use in my own thesis. I do not go into detail on ‘Nausicaa’ s seemingly voyeuristic passages in this thesis but, elsewhere, I suggest that the episode is a parody, rather than an emulation, of early voyeuristic films.93 My analysis of ‘Nausicaa’ – in chapter five – focuses on the parallels between Gerty and Bloom’s relationship and on early films which engage the viewer’s sense of touch, films which break down the boundary between film-body and human-viewer-body, between viewed-object and viewing-subject.

‘CIRCE’ IN JOYCE-AND-CINEMA STUDIES

‘Circe’ is set out like a play script, complete with character names, scene settings, and stage directions. However, despite its theatrical style, it would be very difficult to faithfully perform the fantastical episode on stage, as it includes a talking severed head (U 15.2638); several transformations, including a double gender change - Bloom turns into a woman and back again twice (U 15.2985-2986 & 1798-1821); and numerous animated, human-acting objects, including an erotic painting, a pair of boots, a cap, a door handle, a fan, and a bar of soap. The apparent technical difficulty of staging ‘Circe’ has led to scholars increasingly evoking cinema, rather than drama, in relation to the episode. As Williams notes, ‘[c]inema was perhaps more able than any other narrative medium hitherto to visualise magical and instantaneous shifts (the “art” of “Circe”, according to the Gilbert schema for Ulysses, was also magic)’.94 While, as Williams notes, the Gilbert schema denotes

93 Cleo Hanaway, ““See Ourselves as Others See Us”: Cinematic Seeing and Being in Ulysses”, in Roll Away the Reel World, pp. 124-27.
'Circe’’s art as ‘magic’, the Linati schema designates the episode’s technic as ‘vision animated to bursting point’. For several scholars, this coupling of magic and animated vision evokes the trick-films of the famous magician-turned-film-maker, Georges Méliès.

As I explain in more detail in chapter two, my own thesis concentrates on parallel philosophies in Ulysses and early cinema rather than on the direct influence of specific films, but I do recognise the importance of acknowledging biographical connections when they are apparent; I see direct influence as a useful starting point, rather than as an end in itself. Thus, it is worth noting that Joyce is likely to have seen at least some of Méliès’ films. Up until 1904 Joyce was based in Dublin, except for a short stay in Paris - Méliès’ home town. Between 1900 and 1903, Dublin screenings of Méliès’ films took place at the Rotunda music hall, the Tivoli and Empire theatres, and various bazaars. According to Sicker, ‘Joyce’s dwelling place during his first sojourn to Paris, the Hotel Corneille, was less than two miles from the Theatre Robert-Houdin, where Méliès showed his films’. If he missed seeing Méliès’s films in Dublin or Paris, Joyce would have had plenty more opportunities in Trieste, a town so enthusiastic about film that it had twenty one cinemas. Even if Joyce failed to see any of Méliès’s own work, he would have had the chance to see several Méliès-inspired trick-films at the Volta.

As well as often sharing a focus on Méliès, a lot of the scholarship on ‘Circe’ and cinema revolves around the discussion of binaries. In chapter four, I focus on the mind/
body and the related human/thing binary in ‘Circe’, employing Merleau-Pontian phenomenology to aid my analysis. Scholars also explore internal/external, self/other, and imagined/real. Williams argues that the imagined and the real exist simultaneously: ‘naturalistic and phantasmagoric aspects are [...] “granted equal authenticity”; ‘they co-exist as in the dual Lumière-actuality/ Méliès-fantasy tradition as if there were no ontological contradiction between them’. Several scholars explore the imagined/real and internal/external binaries through Freudian theory. DiBattista sees ‘Circe’’s fantastical transformations and visions as ‘uninhibited and charismatic agents of the Id’. For Burkdall, ‘Circe’ is an episode with a proto-surrealist ‘free associational’ mix of reality and dream fantasies. Similarly, for Spiegel, the animated objects in ‘Circe’ are externalised interiors of characters; with ‘the soap’, ‘we enter the world of dreams, demonology, and surrealist fantasy modes (cinematically represented in the early work of Buñuel, Clair, Epstein and Cocteau) [...] where inanimate things do indeed seem to represent the locks and keys of deeper, darker forces just beneath their surfaces’.

Projection, both in the Freudian and cinematic sense of the word, plays a key role in the work of several scholars. Spiegel states that, in ‘Circe’, ‘Joyce projects the unconscious life of his protagonists outward, and all memory and desire seem to shift and glide before the eye of the reader in a dramatic and fully externalized form’. Likewise, for Sicker, ‘Bloom’s and Stephen’s minds operate as film projectors, casting up memories, fantasies and waking dreams from various depths and blending them with external objects’.

100 Keith Williams, ‘Odysseys of Sound and Image’, p. 169.
102 Thomas Burkdall, Joycean Frames, pp. 68 & 74.
103 Alan Spiegel, Fiction and the Camera Eye, p. 141.
104 Ibid., p. 168.
Williams goes further, casting ‘Circe’’s narrator as a ‘mock-psychoanalytic animator’ who psychoanalyses ‘Circe’ as the projection of ‘repressions, complexes and wishfulfilments’.

‘Circe’’s fantastical transformations are also discussed in terms of the self/other binary. In his seminal paper on ‘Circe’ and cinema, Austin Briggs briefly considers the ways in which the episode’s cinema-style metamorphoses might prompt us to think about identity and the nature of the self. For Briggs, ‘[h]owever radically costumes and roles change from film to film, we almost always see actors on the screen as themselves’; similarly, in ‘Circe’ ‘individuality triumphs over all other roles.’ According to Briggs then, the self – in ‘Circe’ – is unambiguous and is not altered by bodily transformations. For Camerani on the other hand, the self is ambiguous and mutable. Camerani convincingly argues that, when writing ‘Circe’, Joyce was influenced by the film and music hall quick-change artiste Leopoldo Fregoli. He suggests that the ‘Circe’’s Fregoli-style transformations make us ‘question our commonsensical views as to what identity is’; they ‘challenge us to question the boundaries between the genders and between human and the animal, to question the role of the body and of physical appearance in defining the human being’.

These questions feed into chapters four and five of my thesis. In chapter five I consider the extent to which, for Joyce, the self and the other are really distinct.

For DiBattista, in ‘Circe’, identity is located in the mind/soul; ‘Circe’’s and Méliès’s transformations and dismemberments flaunt ‘disregard for the intactness of the “natural” body and of its psychic counterpart – the integrated personality coordinating both its bodily

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and spiritual motions’. According to DiBattista, in both Méliès’s films and Joyce’s ‘Circe’ souls take up new bodies [...] without any substantial change to spiritual identity; ‘Bella/Bello Cohen and Bloom, the new womanly man, may change their sex, but not the selves they ineluctably are destined to become’. Similarly, Williams notes that in both early films and ‘Circe’, objects are often given a mind, while humans have their minds taken away; minds/souls can imbue and object with identity or take a human’s identity away. For Williams, these kinds of mind/body mutations hark back to the Latin roots of the word ‘animation’ – animatus – which is related to ‘anima’ which means soul or the non-rational part of the mind. So, animated pictures – including early cartoons and acted cinema – are inherently concerned with the displacement and/or replacement of the human mind. Indeed, as the early film-philosopher, Vachel Lindsay, notes in 1915, the ‘photoplay imagination [...] is able to impart vital individuality to furniture’; early films ‘invest’ objects ‘with an inner life’.  

In chapter four of this thesis, following DiBattista and Williams, I consider ‘Circe’’s animated objects in relation to trick-films and the mind/body binary. I look at how ‘mind’ is linked to ‘human’ and ‘body’ is linked to ‘machine’; I argue that, in ‘Circe’ and trick-films, although human-mind and body-machine are often separated, the two sides of the binary are, ultimately, shown to be indissoluble. Like DiBattista and Williams, I read the animated objects in the episode and the films as objects-plus-a-human-mind and, conversely, I see

‘Ithaca’’s seemingly-mechanical gestures as humans-minus-a-mind. Through reference to theories of comedy offered by Henri Bergson and Wyndham Lewis, I argue that these instances of mind/ body separation are comically parodic; the separations merely serve to reaffirm the interconnectedness of mind and body and human and machine.

**CINEMA IN JOYCE’S OTHER WORKS**

Although film-related allusions and techniques have been discerned in several of Joyce’s works, including *Finnegans Wake, Dubliners, Giacomo Joyce*, and *Stephen Hero*, I have chosen to focus on *Ulysses*. As suggested above, and advanced throughout this thesis, in *Ulysses* cinema can be seen to express a particular philosophical outlook or set of ideas. It would require a separate study of at least this length to fully explore the possible philosophical grounding(s) of Joyce’s use of cinema in *Finnegans Wake*, for example. However, it is possible to trace some of the cinema parallels in *Ulysses* back to two of Joyce’s other major works – *Dubliners* (1914) and *A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man* (1916). Thus, the remainder of this chapter briefly looks at film allusions, phantom rides, camera-style narration, and early renderings of ‘Nausicaa’, in both of these earlier works.

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114 As I explain in chapter two, both Trotter and I see cinema as playing a philosophical role in literary modernism; Trotter argues that cinema is used to express a philosophy of neutrality while I argue that it is used to express ideas which find parallels in Merleau-Pontian phenomenology (including subject/ object and mind/ body intermingling and embodied and enworlded perception).

115 In *Finnegans Wake*, for example, there are several film-related references including ‘cinemen’; ‘roll away the reel world’; ‘Shadows by the film folk’; ‘A phantom city, phaked of philik pholk’; ‘magic lantern’; and ‘the celluloid art!’ (FW 6, 64, 221, 264, 421, 534) – but it would take another thesis or book-length study to explore the possible connections between them. I do, however, briefly examine the *Wake* in my conclusion.
Although there is only one overt mention of cinema in *Dubliners* – the proto-cinematic ‘magic-lantern’ in ‘Grace’ (*D* 134), the short-story collection (arguably) contains several other film-related allusions. And while the ‘magic-lantern’ is rather scathingly linked to fakery (via allusion to the controversy surrounding the 1879-80 visions of the Blessed Virgin Mary at Knock, County Mayo), *Dubliners*’s other film-related references often provide a more positive view of the new medium. Indeed, as Williams notes, although Joyce refers to ‘the *literature* of the Wild West’ (*D* 11), in the *Dubliners* story ‘An Encounter’, the schoolboy’s cowboy and Indian fantasies ‘correspond to one of the earliest popular film genres, dating at least from Edwin S. Porter’s 1903 *Great Train Robbery*’. Young Dubliners may even have had the opportunity to view Wild West films as early as 1894, possibly in the Capel Street Mutoscope parlour that Bloom mentions in *Ulysses*. Thomas Edison produced a series of ‘Buffalo Bill’s Wild West’ films (1894) for his popular peep-show device, the kinetoscope. As Denis Condon notes, these films were available for view at Dublin’s Kinetoscope Company headquarters in Dame Street on 4 April 1895, as well as at various local fairs and bazaars in the same year; so the films could have been seen by visitors to bazaars such as the one featured in ‘Araby’.

The style of the story itself is arguably more cinematic – or visual, at least – than literary. The boys’ truant adventures are largely relayed through the boys’ sights. We are shown the boys ‘pleas[ing] themselves with the spectacle of Dublin’s commerce’, watching a stranger, watching a friend chase a cat, then meeting ‘the gaze of a pair of bottle-green eyes

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117 Keith Williams, ‘Short Cuts of the Hibernian Metropolis’, p. 156.
118 These films can be seen at the National Film Preservation Foundation, <http://www.filmpreservation.org/preserved-films/screening-room/buffalo-bills-wild-west>, [accessed September 2011].
peering at [them]’ (D 15-17). For Williams, the boys’ viewpoint ‘mobilizes into a tracking shot: “We followed him with our eyes and saw that when he had gone on for perhaps fifty paces he turned about and began to retrace his steps”’ (D 15).  

While *Ulysses* refers to the Mutoscope and *Dubliners* mentions the magic lantern, *A Portrait* references ‘a diorama’ (P 210). As Jeri Johnson notes, the diorama is ‘a precursor of the cinema’ (P 288). Dioramas comprised overlaid painted scenes which, when cross-lit, appeared to magically move and change; ‘[t]ypical diorama scenes involved transitions from peaceful to stormy landscapes, and daytime scenes to romantic, moonlit scenes’, but the diorama that Stephen saw featured current affairs – ‘pictures of big nobes’, among them ‘William Ewart Gladstone, just then dead’ (P 210). It is possible that Stephen (and/or Joyce) is making a point about Ireland’s propensity to romanticise political figures; by appearing in a medium that is normally used to convey natural phenomena or romantic scenes, Gladstone is immediately associated with both nature and romance. This assertion supports Zack Bowen’s remarks concerning the reference to the song ‘Oh! Willie, We Have Missed You’: he suggests that Stephen’s recollection is triggered – partly at least – by ‘the Irish tendency to sentimentalize over departed leaders, even British oppressors’. So, while Bloom alludes to the Mutoscope and its erotic subject matter, Stephen references the diorama and its romanticism. However, despite the differences in genre, both Bloom and Stephen feel a connection between themselves and the film-like image; there is ‘a kind of language’ between Bloom and the Mutoscope-like Gerty (U 13.944), and the diorama.

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provokes a dream epiphany in which images ‘peer’ at Stephen – ‘their eyes seem to ask [him] something’ (P 211).

A Portrait also appears to reference specific early films and film genres. As Williams notes, ‘Stephen’s distinctly monochrome nightmare in A Portrait’ is reminiscent of the film Beware of Goat’s Milk (1909), which was shown at Joyce’s Volta cinema 5 February 1910.123 The film shows a respectable gentleman drinking a glass of goat’s milk then magically sprouting horns, before setting off on a mischievous adventure, chasing and butting everything and everyone he encounters. In his dream, Stephen is terrified by similar ‘Goatish creatures with human faces, hornybrowed’, ‘grey as indiarubber’ (P 116). The goat-creatures circle ‘closer and closer’, ‘thrusting upwards their terrific faces’ (P 116); in Williams’s words, they ‘close lustfully on [Stephen] in a weed-choked field, a location also used in much of the film’.124

Echoing the boys’ love of escapist adventure-fiction in ‘An Encounter’, in A Portrait, Stephen recalls how he ‘pored over a ragged translation of The Count of Monte Cristo’ (P 52). However, Stephen’s remembered narrative is more visual than textual; Joyce offers an almost-cinematic translation of the novel. Stephen begins by creating a physical collage-based storyboard for Monte Cristo: ‘he built up on the parlour table an image of the wonderful island cave out of transfers and paper flowers and coloured tissue paper and strips of the silver and golden paper in which chocolate is wrapped’ (P 52). Next Stephen conjures up his own cinematic images in his mind: ‘bright pictures of Marseilles’; ‘sunny trellisses’; a ‘whitewashed house in the garden of which grew many rosebushes’; ‘a long

123 Keith Williams, ‘Joyce and Early Cinema’, p. 1. The satyrs in the field derive from another of Joyce’s early dream epiphanies written down in his notebooks (1902-04) and reworked in A Portrait. Thus, it is possible the re-working might be influenced by Beware of Goat’s Milk. However, as elsewhere, I am not attempting to assert any direct influence here; I am merely noting parallels.

124 Ibid., p. 1.
train of adventures, marvellous as those in the book itself’ (P 52). Stephen casts himself in the leading role: ‘there appeared an image of himself, grown older and sadder, standing in the moonlight garden with Mercedes’ (P 52).\footnote{The image recurs on p. 83 of A Portrait.}

There were two film versions of The Count of Monte Cristo in 1908, one Italian (directed by Luigi Maggi) and one American (directed by Francis Boggs and Thomas Persons). A few years later, a further two American film versions were released as Monte Cristo; a 1911 version was produced by Powers Picture Plays and starred Stuart Holmes, Paul Panzer and Pearl White (director unknown), and a 1912 version produced by Selig Polyscope Company, starred Hobart Bosworth, Tom Santschi, and Herbert Rawlinson, and was directed by Colin Campbell. Given the many cinemas in Trieste, and Joyce’s love of cinema-going, it is not unlikely that Joyce would have seen one of these films. There was also an American 1913 film called The Count of Monte Cristo, directed by Joseph A. Golden and Edwin S. Porter. This Edwin Porter version was shown at Dublin’s Phoenix Picture House in June 1913; the story was ‘depicted with clearness’ and those ‘witnessing the film were frequently carried away by enthusiasm’.\footnote{The Irish Times, 2 June, 1913, p. 7.} Although Joyce was in Trieste at the time of the showing, there is always a possibility that a friend or family member could have told him about the film.
‘PHANTOM RIDES’ IN DUBLINERS AND A PORTRAIT

In A Portrait, Stephen’s train ride from Dublin to Cork is conveyed vividly:

He saw the darkening lands slipping past him, the silent telegraphpoles passing his window swiftly every four seconds, the little glimmering stations, manned by a few silent sentries, flung by the mail behind her and twinkling for a moment in the darkness like fiery grains flung backwards by a runner (P 73).

Stephen’s sights are reminiscent of a particular genre of early film – ‘phantom rides’. Phantom ride films presented a dynamic string of images from the perspective of a passenger in a train, tram, boat, or motor car. As film historian Christian Hayes notes, during the 1890s and early 1900s, the train and the cinema developed a symbiotic relationship: ‘through the train carriage window, passengers were offered a cinematic experience years before the emergence of cinema itself’; ‘[w]ith the “phantom ride”, these two technologies [the train and the cinema] were fused together to produce an all-new cinema spectacle.’127

As Williams notes, the car – as well as the train – was ‘culturally symbiotic’ with ‘cinema’s mechanical art’; attaching film-cameras to cars allowed early film-makers to create phantom rides, ‘speeding-up the mobilized virtual gaze beyond the merely pedestrian’.128 For Williams, in Dubliners’s ‘After the Race’, as in A Portrait, Joyce ‘devised a literary equivalent of the “phantom ride”’, this time from the point of view of racers in a motor car.129 While Stephen sees ‘telegraphpoles passing his window swiftly every four seconds’, the racing-car passengers experience an ever faster version of reality as they drive ‘by the crowd, blended now into soft colours’ (D 33). Echoing the excitement of phantom ride films, one of the racers declares that ‘[r]apid motion through space elates one’ (D 31).

129 Ibid., p. 160.
As Condon notes, phantom rides aimed to recreate the ‘visceral effects of a fairground attraction’; the films were designed to have a physical impact on the viewer’s nervous system. Given the sensory impact of the films, another of the racer’s comments can apply just as easily to a phantom ride as to actual motor racing: the ‘journey laid a magical finger on the genuine pulse of life and gallantly the machinery of human nerves strove to answer the bounding courses of the swift blue animal’ (D 32).

In *Ulysses*, phantom ride-like experiences are explored more deeply – they become part of an investigation into the embodied and enworlded nature of human experience. In chapter five I discuss phantom ride films in relation to ‘Wandering Rocks’, ‘Hades’, ‘Lotus Eaters’, and ‘Lestrygonians’. Local actuality film-makers Mitchell and Kenyon made several phantom rides, using various modes of transport. One of their films – *Ride from Blarney to Cork on Cork & Muskerry Light Railway* (1902) – is particularly reminiscent of Stephen’s train journey in *A Portrait*; the film shows stations and railway workers yet, because of the railway’s proximity to the town centre, instead of seeing telegraph poles we see pedestrians, horse-drawn carts, and electric trams. We do not know whether Joyce ever saw a Mitchell and Kenyon phantom ride film. However, we do know that the exhibition of Mitchell and Kenyon’s *Living Dublin* films coincided with Joyce’s brief return to Dublin during his first stay in Paris. Phantom rides were very popular, so there is also the possibility that Joyce could have seen an example of the genre at a Triestine cinema. In chapter five, I also discuss early films which played on the kinaesthetic sensation of collisions and crashes, films

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such as Cecil Hepworth’s *How it Feels to be Run Over* (1900) in which motor car “‘dashes full into the spectator, who sees “stars” as the picture comes to an end’”.

**FILM-CAMERA-STYLE NARRATION IN DUBLINERS AND A PORTRAIT**

In her article on cinema in the work of Flaubert and Joyce, Scarlett Baron describes one of the writers’ shared cinematographic methods as ‘a technique that subjectivizes the visual description of the outside world’ which, in ‘noting its prevalence in Flaubert’s works’, Pierre Danger calls “caméra subjective”. Following Baron, in chapters three and five of this thesis, I argue that, in *Ulysses*, this automatic subjectivizing of the world is inherently phenomenological and that this phenomenological way of perceiving is paralleled in early cinema. As I explain in chapter three, one way in which cinema automatically subjectivizes the world is through what Spencer Shaw calls ‘camera-intentionality’, which is intimately related to Vivian Sobchack’s idea of the camera being the viewer’s virtual ‘second body’. In basic terms, these film-phenomenological ideas emphasise the embodied nature of the film-camera’s perspective, the fact that the film-camera is either operated directly by a human, fulfils the vision of a human director, or takes the place of a human (as it does in phantom ride films). According to this phenomenological view, the camera’s perspective is always embodied and always subjective, although there will always remain a slight aspect of otherness as the perspective of the viewer and that of the original camera are not, of course, identical.

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A literary form of camera-intentionality is discernible throughout *A Portrait* and, to a lesser extent, in *Dubliners*. According to Jeri Johnson, in *A Portrait*, ‘[w]hile there is still a third-person narrator, that narrator presents Stephen’s perceptions: the attitudes towards others and events are his; they are “seen” by or “focalized” by him’ (*P* xiii). Johnson’s explanation of narrative techniques in *A Portrait* could also be used to explain the simultaneously third-person and subjective perspective of camera-intentionality; both Joyce’s narrative technique and camera-intentionality present a subjective perspective that is simultaneously other. This form of embodied-and-subjective-yet-third-person narration is seen particularly clearly in *A Portrait*’s first description of Dublin: ‘Dublin was a new and complex sensation’; the ‘vastness and strangeness of the life suggested to him by the bales of merchandise stocked along the walls or swung aloft out of the holds of steamers wakened again in him the unrest which had sent him wandering in the evening from garden to garden in search of Mercedes’ (*P* 55). Readers are presented with the physical reality of Dublin’s busy Docklands industry, but the steamers and their merchandise are immediately presented as vast and strange. Dublin is not shown as a collection of neutral objects; rather, it is presented subjectively, through Stephen, yet via a third-person lens. Reading this passage is not unlike watching a film directed and filmed by Stephen; readers are presented with Stephen’s subjective experience, through the camera’s objective lens. Interestingly, this ‘complex sensation of Dublin’ causes Stephen to recall his own cinematic images of Mercedes from *The Count of Monte Cristo*.

Similarly, in *Dubliners*’ ‘A Little Cloud’, it is as if Dublin is seen from the subjective perspective of Little Chandler, mediated through a third-person panoramic shot: ‘he looked down the river towards the lower quays and pitied the poor stunted houses’; they ‘seemed to him a band of tramps, huddled together along the river-banks, their old coats covered
with dust and soot, stupefied by the panorama of sunset’ (D 55). Echoing ‘A Little Cloud’, ‘Eveline’ presents readers with a subjective panorama shown through a camera-like lens: ‘Home! She looked round the room, reviewing all its familiar objects which she had dusted once a week for so many years, […] yet during all those years she had never found out the name of the priest whose yellowing photograph hung on the wall above the broken harmonium beside the coloured print of the promises made to Blessed Margaret Mary Alacoque’ (D 25). As Johnson notes, the story is ‘focalized through Eveline herself: we see what she sees, and cannot see what she does not see or avoids seeing’ (D xxv). We are shown the photograph of the priest but, as we have no access to information outside Eveline’s experience, we – like Eveline – do not know his name; we only see what we experience through Eveline’s intentional gaze, her subjective, embodied perspective.

As I explain in chapter five, a similar embodied-and-subjective-yet-third-person narration is used in the ‘Wandering Rocks’ episode of Ulysses. However, instead of emphasising the psychological or intellectual impact of Dublin, the episode focuses on the impact that the city has on a character’s body, especially on his gaze and personal space. In the first section of ‘Wandering Rocks’, the reader is positioned near Father Conmee. Echoing Dubliners and A Portrait, it is almost as if the reader is seeing through a camera operated by Father Conmee. We follow the protagonist’s path and gaze: ‘Father Conmee walked down Great Charles street and glanced at the shut up church on his left’ (U 10.68-9). And all of the action in this first section takes place from Conmee’s point of view: he is ‘saluted by Mr William Gallagher’ (U 10.86); the onelegged sailor walks ‘towards the very reverend John Conmee S. J.’ (U 10.9-10), and ‘towards him came the wife of Mr David Sheehy’ (U 10.17).\textsuperscript{136}

\textsuperscript{136} My emphasis.
Despite the similarities between Joyce’s three books, there is one major difference between the narrative modes of *A Portrait* (which is focalized purely through Stephen) and *Dubliners* (which offers a series of individual perspectives) and *Ulysses* (which offers different perspectives in quick succession). In *Ulysses*, Bloom’s perception of Dublin (together with the perceptions of minor characters such as Father Conmee) exists in parallel to Stephen’s. Indeed, as I argue in chapter five, this device of offering parallel embodied perspectives, is also film-like or, to be more precise, *proto*-film-like. Parallel seeing is a fundamental feature of the stereoscope, a popular pre-cinematic device which was first invented to prove the existence of binocular vision – the fact that each of our eyes perceives the world from a slightly different perspective. Parallel seeing becomes a major philosophical concern in *Ulysses*, voiced largely through Bloom’s musings on parallax and parallactic vision.

**PREFIGURING ‘NAUSICAA’ IN DUBLINERS AND A PORTRAIT**

In both *Dubliners* and *A Portrait*, characters are often watching or being watched. In *Ulysses*, a whole episode – ‘Nausicaa’ – is dedicated to the dynamics of watching and being watched. As noted above, in chapter five, I argue that the kinds of watching in ‘Nausicaa’ parallel the film/spectator relationships of a mixture of early film genres and devices (including early erotic films and the stereoscope). In paralleling these forms of early cinema, ‘Nausicaa’ blurs the subject/object binary and the line between sight and touch. In *Dubliners*, the subject/object binary tends to remain intact, and little attention is paid to touch, but there are hints at the possibility of blurring these binaries. In *A Portrait*, there is little blurring of the subject/object binary, but sight and touch already begin to intermerge.
On the opening page of *Dubliners*, in ‘The Sisters’, there is both watching and being watched. We are told that the young male protagonist ‘studied the lighted square of window’ and ‘gazed up at the window’ whilst knowing that he ‘was under observation’ himself (*D*3). Unlike Gerty who, in ‘Nausicaa’, answers her watcher’s gaze, the young boy refuses to look up: ‘Old Cotter looked at me for a while’; ‘I felt that his little beady black eyes were examining me but I would not satisfy him by looking up from my plate’ (*D*4). The boy, unlike Gerty, appears to feel empowered by remaining the object of Old Cotter’s gaze, or maybe he is just more interested in watching the film-like spectacle in the lighted window. The boy is both seeing and seen – he is both the subject and object of sight – but, since the two watchers (the boy and Old Cotter) focus on different sights (the window and the boy respectively), the subject/object binary is not blurred to the extent that it is in ‘Nausicaa’, where Gerty and Bloom are simultaneously each other’s seeing and seen subject and object.

One of Joyce’s most famous depictions of watching occurs in ‘The Dead’, when Gabriel looks up at his wife, Gretta:

He was in a dark part of the hall gazing up the staircase. A woman was standing near the top of the first flight of stairs, in the shadow also. He could not see her face but he could see the terracotta and salmonpink panels of her skirt which the shadow made appear black and white. It was his wife. (*D* 165)

Almost twenty years before John Huston’s famous rendering of this scene in his film, *The Dead* (1987), Paul Deane recognised the cinematic nature of this black and white shadow play; he goes as far as to suggest that Joyce had particular camera shots – consciously or unconsciously – in mind: the ‘reverse angle, the
upward shot, is employed as Gabriel gazes up the stairs at his wife’. Gabriel’s gaze objectifies Gretta: she is merely a faceless ‘woman’ – in this moment, Gabriel fails to see Gretta as Gretta. At the end of the passage, Gabriel sees Gretta as ‘his wife’, but still does not see her as a fellow subject. For Gabriel, Gretta is merely ‘a symbol of’ something (D 165).

At the end of ‘The Dead’, owing to the sight of his own reflection coupled with the revelation of Gretta’s young (dead) love, Michael Furey, Gabriel finally recognises that he is simultaneously a subject for himself and an object for others; he is ‘assailed’ by ‘a shameful consciousness of his own person’ – ‘the pitiable fatuous fellow he had caught a glimpse of in the mirror’ (D 173). In other words, to use an already-borrowed phrase from Ulysses, Gabriel sees himself as others see him. As I explain in chapter five, although the Ulysses phrase ‘see ourselves as others see us’ (U 13.1058 & 8.662) is usually attributed to Robert Burns’s poem ‘To a Louse’, it was also used in publicity campaigns by the early actuality film-makers Mitchell and Kenyon. They filmed real people going about their daily business and then screened the films exclusively for those same people, thus allowing people to see themselves. As McCourt notes, in this context ‘Joyce’s aspiration [for Dubliners] to offer the Irish people the possibility of “having one good look at themselves in my nicely polished looking-glass” (LI, 64 [23 June 1906]) takes on a new dimension’ as cinema was ‘the most innovative and arguably the most effective and appealing “looking glass” of the time’.  

137 Paul Deane, ‘Motion Picture Techniques in James Joyce’s “The Dead”’, p. 235.
Dubliners contains several further instances of seeing oneself in a looking-glass, including Mrs Mooney’s appreciation of her own ‘decisive expression’ as she ‘surveyed herself in the pier-glass’ in ‘The Boarding House’ (D 49), and Maria’s ‘quaint affection’ for her ‘nice tidy little body’ as she stands ‘before the mirror’ in ‘Clay’ (D 77-8). In A Portrait, Stephen longs to see himself as others see him, but cannot (both literally, due to the lack of a looking-glass or actuality film and metaphorically, due to his tendency towards solipsism): ‘he began to wonder whether it might not really be something in his face which made him look like a schemer and he wished he had a little mirror to see’ (P 44). Seeing oneself as others see one is also a key facet of Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy of human interconnection and intersubjective seeing; Phenomenology of Perception contains two variations on the Ulysses/ Mitchell and Kenyon phrase: saw ‘themselves through the eyes of others’ and ‘see myself as others see me’.\textsuperscript{139} In chapter five, I argue that these three instances of the phrase – in Joyce’s work, actuality films, and phenomenology – are intimately linked; these filmic and literary experiences of seeing oneself as others see one are usefully read phenomenologically.

In ‘The Dead’ then, we move from an objectifying gaze to an intersubjective gaze – a gaze that is both gazing and being gazed at, a reflective gaze that begins to blur the boundaries between subject and object and self and other. In ‘An Encounter’, a young boy finds the experience of meeting a fellow subject’s gaze somewhat disturbing: I ‘involuntarily glanced up at his face’ and ‘met the gaze of a pair of bottle-green eyes peering at me from under a twitching forehead’; ‘I turned my eyes away again’ (D 17). Like the protagonist of ‘The Sisters’, the young boy in ‘An Encounter’ prefers to remain an object of vision. The old

\textsuperscript{139} Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, pp. 434 & 353.
man, on the other hand, enjoys being a voyeur: there ‘was nothing he liked more, he said, so much as looking at a nice young girl, at her nice white hands and her beautiful soft hair’ (D 16). In ‘Araby’ the adolescent male protagonist spends a great deal of the story ‘looking at a nice young girl’. As in ‘The Sisters’, the boy is often watching through a lit window or illuminated in some other way: he sees the woman’s ‘figure defined by the light from the half-opened door’ and partially lit by some ‘distant lamp of lighted window’; the ‘light from the lamp opposite our door caught the white curve of her neck, lit up her hair […] and, falling, lit up the hand upon the railing’ (D 21-22). Prefiguring Bloom’s erotic sightings in Ulysses (particularly ‘Calypso’, ‘Lotus Eaters’, ‘Lestrygonians’, and ‘Nausicaa’), ‘Araby’ s protagonist watches the girl’s ‘dress [swing] as she move[s] her body and the soft rope of her hair tossed from side to side’ and glimpses ‘the white border of a petticoat, just visible as she stood at ease’ (D 20-21).

Although, unlike Bloom, the boy briefly talks to the object of his gaze, it is always the girl’s image, rather than this actual engagement that occupies the boy’s thoughts, suggesting that the boy’s pleasure is mainly voyeuristic: ‘her image came between me and the page I strove to read’; I saw ‘nothing but the brown-clad figure cast by my imagination, touched discreetly by the lamplight’ (D 22). However, there does seem to be the beginnings of a possible relationship between sight and touch: the boy pays particular attention to the woman’s ‘soft rope of hair’, just as the older man in ‘An Encounter’ is especially fond of looking at ‘beautiful soft hair’, and the boy imagines the woman ‘touched […] by the lamplight’.

The close relationship between touch and looking is also hinted at in ‘Two Gallants’, when Lenehan begs Corley to let him ‘have a squint at’ his girlfriend (D 40). Squinting was a cheap way of viewing stereographs – two photographs of the same (often erotic) view,
taken from slightly different angles so that, when they are squinted at (or looked at through a purpose-built stereoscope), they appear as a single three-dimensional image. As stereograph photographer and stereoscope maker Oliver Wendell Holmes explains, stereograph ‘pictures are two, and we want to slide them into each other, so to speak, as in natural vision, that we may see them as one’; we ‘can do this in two ways’ - first, ‘by squinting as we look at them’, but ‘this is tedious, painful, and to some impossible, or at least very difficult’, so we ‘shall find it much easier to look through a couple of glasses that squint for us’.\textsuperscript{140} In stereoscopic images, the sensation of touch is enhanced – stereoscope viewers felt that they could reach out and touch the seemingly-three-dimensional image, and that the image was simultaneously reaching out towards them. When Lenehan views Corley’s girlfriend the tactile and three-dimensional aspects of the woman are, indeed, emphasised: the ‘great silver buckle of her belt seemed to depress the centre of her body’, the smooth mother-of-pearl buttons are contrasted with ‘a ragged black boa’, and her ‘two projecting front teeth’ seem to jut out right towards Lenehan (\textit{D 41}). In chapter five, I suggest that, in ‘\textit{Nausicaa}’, echoing Lenehan, Bloom sees Gerty stereoscopically – her tactile qualities and three-dimensions are highlighted.

\begin{quote}
Vision’s tactile aspect, its intimate relationship with touch, is explored further in \textit{A Portrait}. Early on in the novel, when Stephen is a young boy, the relationship between touch and sight is of an innocent nature: it ‘was nice and warm to see the lights in the castle’ (\textit{P 7}).\textsuperscript{141} Later on, however, the merging of touch and sight causes the early stirring of adolescent sexuality, prefiguring ‘\textit{Nausicaa}’s complex form of tactile seeing which parallels the reciprocal relationship between early films and their viewers. When looking at Bloom,
\end{quote}


\textsuperscript{141} My italics.
Gerty feels ‘a warm flush’, ‘tingling in every nerve’, and ‘kind of a sensation rushing all over her’ (U 13.365, 514, & 560). Bloom feels the same and is aware of the parallel feelings that he causes in Gerty; ‘Daresay she felt I’, he exclaims - ‘[w]hen you feel like that you often meet what you feel’ (U 13.827-8). In a similar – yet more innocent – encounter in A Portrait, Stephen catches sight of a young lady, whose image causes his heart to beat faster: ‘her glance travelled to his corner, flattering, taunting, searching, exciting his heart’ (P 57). The sight of this young lady physically excites Stephen, but he is confident that no one will have noticed his stimulated state: ‘[n]ow, as then, he stood listlessly in his place, seemingly a tranquil watcher of the scene before him’ (P 58). Later on in A Portrait, it is Stephen who is being looked at: he ‘saw her serious alluring eyes watching him from among the audience and their image at once swept away his scruples, leaving his will compact’ (P 71).

Both looking and being looked-at cause a bodily response in Stephen, just as they do in Bloom and Gerty. Because of the physical effects of looking, during his devotional phase, Stephen is keen to avoid visual encounters: in ‘order to mortify the sense of sight he made it his rule to walk in the street with downcast eyes’; his ‘eyes shunned every encounter with the eyes of women’ (P 127). As he is coming out of his devotional phase, Stephen experiences unerotic and unpleasant tactile seeing as he watches his childhood tormenters swimming: it ‘was a pain to see them and a swordlike pain to see the signs of adolescence that made repellent their pitiable nakedness’ (P 142). Despite these powerful experiences, in the final chapter of A Portrait, Stephen scorns tactile seeing; to be more precise, he argues that tactile seeing has no place in art. Stephen asserts that true, aesthetic art should be static and inert: the ‘feelings excited by improper art are kinetic, desire or loathing’ and the ‘arts which excite them, pornographical or didactic, are therefore improper arts’ (P 172).

142 My italics.
Stephen’s aesthetic theory closely resembles Joyce’s own aforementioned ideas on pornography and cinema: ‘[p]ornographic and cinematographic images’ cannot be considered aesthetic as they ‘act like those stimuli which produce a reflex action of the nerves through channels which are independent of esthetic perception’. As I noted above, if Joyce sees his own writing as art, then his theory of aesthetic neutrality is invalid; both A Portrait and Ulysses (and Dubliners, to a lesser extent) contain (and arguably prompt, in some readers) nervous excitement, desire, loathing, and other sensuous responses – the very same responses that occurred in early cinemas, stereoscope viewing venues, and Mutoscope parlours. And one would presume that Joyce would call his own work ‘art’.

CONCLUSION: A NEW AVENUE IN JOYCE-AND-CINEMA STUDIES

In this chapter, I have examined prevalent Joyce-and-cinema themes and areas of interest – the Volta Cinema; Joyce’s own experiences and opinions of cinema; Eisenstein; ‘Nausicaa’ and ‘Circe’ – and highlighted the points of convergence and divergence between this previous scholarship and my own phenomenology-focused thesis. I suggested that the beginnings of Joyce’s film-phenomenological approach can be seen in his earlier work, especially Dubliners and A Portrait. By employing phenomenological film-philosophy to uncover latent proto-phenomenological elements in the parallels between Ulysses and early cinema, my thesis builds both upon and against previous Joyce-and-cinema scholarship. As I explain further in chapter two, my thesis goes against the view that the Joyce and cinema parallel is one which favours neutrality, objectivity, solipsism, rationality, sight, and the mechanical. I build upon scholarship which foregrounds the more human aspects of the

Joyce-and-cinema parallel – the subjective and embodied nature of the film camera, film spectatorship, and Joyce’s writing; the emphasis on touch in film spectatorship, films, and Joyce’s textual world; and the blurring of mind/ body, self/ other, subject/ object, and human/ machine binaries.
CHAPTER 2

APPROACHES TO MODERNISM AND CINEMA:

WHERE DOES PHENOMENOLOGY FIT IN?

The modernism-and-cinema relationship, like the Joyce-and-cinema relationship, can be approached in several different ways. Some scholars aim to uncover direct lines of influence between a specific film and a specific text, while others point out analogies between cinematic techniques and literary techniques, or they suggest parallels between factors underlying both cinema and literary modernism, such as history or prevailing ideas. Whatever their approach, but particularly in the ‘parallels’ approach, each scholar’s angle on the modernism-and-cinema relationship depends on their personal philosophy of cinema (early cinema, in particular). If they see early cinema as reducible to an impersonal, mechanical recording device, they will see modernist literature as ‘cinematic’ if it exploits objective narrative structures or abstraction techniques, in order to detach the reader from the action. Conversely, if scholars see early cinema as an engaged and engaging medium, they will see texts as ‘cinematic’ if they encourage or display intersubjectivity and reciprocal forms of seeing. I see cinema as encapsulating these latter qualities which, I argue, are inherently phenomenological.

This chapter investigates these different ways of figuring the modernism-and-cinema relationship and explains how and where my own phenomenological approach fits with previous scholarship. First, I compare the main approaches – which I have called ‘influence’, ‘analogy’, and ‘parallels’ – and explain that my own thinking is closest to the ‘parallel histories’ approach. Second, I highlight the ubiquity of film-philosopher André Bazin in the
‘parallels’ approach and show what a strong force he has been in shaping dominant views of cinema, including seeing cinema as an impersonal medium, seeing cinema as a human medium, and seeing cinema as mimesis. I show that, by demystifying Bazin, modernism-and-cinema scholars can better understand the thinking behind much of the relevant scholarship on both modernism and cinema. Third, I observe the extent to which my own phenomenological view of the modernism-and-cinema relationship is already reflected in previous scholarship on both cinema and modernism, in monographs and articles relating to both films and texts (and other modernist arts, such as painting). I end by focusing in on some of the recent modernism-and-phenomenology studies and explain how these have been useful for my interdisciplinary project.

**INFLUENCE, ANALOGY, OR PARALLELISM?**

One of the most obvious ways to investigate the relationship between literary modernism and cinema is to analyse the ways in which specific early films directly influenced particular modernist texts. As noted in chapter one, this direct influence approach is particularly popular in Joyce-and-cinema studies; Philip Sicker argues that ‘[r]ecent studies have done much to disprove Alan Spiegel’s contention that we have no “right” to claim that Joyce’s art “was consciously influenced by film”’.¹⁴⁴ My personal stance is somewhere in between Spiegel’s and Sicker’s; I do not ignore or discount the possible influence of particular films that Joyce is likely to have seen, but nor do I use these probable lines of influence as the basis for my arguments. The direct influence approach is only ever going to be based on speculation, as there is no definitive list (in either diary or letter form)

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of all the films that Joyce actually saw. So, while influence (or possible influence) can be a useful starting point, it cannot be an end in itself – it requires too much conjecture and, even if we did have access to comprehensive lists of films that particular modernists saw, this would still not tell us if, why, or how specific films influenced specific writers. Even if direct influence can be established, scholars still need to provide a particular angle on the nature of the relationship between modernist writers and early films.

There are a variety of alternative approaches to the literary modernism and early cinema relationship – some are very specific and concentrated, while others are widespread and heterogeneous. Laura Marcus’s comprehensive study, *The Tenth Muse: Writing about Cinema in the Modernist Period* (2007), fits into the latter category: it offers wide-ranging analyses of early film criticism and theory, early films, and modernist literature, and finds multiple connections between the three disciplines. Due to the broad and extensive nature of the book, *The Tenth Muse* does not offer any specific angle on the modernism and cinema relationship. Instead, Marcus’s exploratory monograph examines ‘discourse about the cinema’ in ‘tandem with’ ‘cinema’s presence in literary texts’.145 This double and intertwined exploration throws up a variety of shared issues, including ‘time, repetition, movement, emotion, vision, sound, and silence’, but offers no singular thesis or slant.146 *The Tenth Muse* explores texts that ‘directly commented on the new medium’ of film alongside writing on which film had a ‘more diffuse impact’, such as Virginia Woolf’s *To the Lighthouse, Mrs Dalloway, and The Waves*.147 For Marcus, ‘diffuse impact’ refers to the ways in which ‘modern’ and ‘modernist’ literary texts explore themes and ideas which are also

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146 Ibid., p. 2.
147 Ibid., p. 11.
expressed in/ through the medium of film or in early film criticism; such topics include time, movement, and the origins of life and consciousness.¹⁴⁸

Marcus sees her multilateral approach – her inclusion of texts that directly comment on film, as well as texts which explore one or more topics which are also explored in early film or early film criticism – as a much needed antidote to the popular analogous techniques approach: the ‘impact of film on literature was of course place and time specific, demanding a more particularized and less abstract model of the “cinematographic” than has been offered in many accounts of the film-literature relationship’.¹⁴⁹ In his 1976 monograph, Fiction and the Camera Eye: Visual Consciousness in Film and the Modern Novel, Spiegel employs the term ‘cinematographic’ to describe the shared formal aspects of film and literary modernism (from Flaubert to Joyce), which – in general terms – are best described as ‘montage’. While early analogies and montage approaches – such as those expounded by Harry Levin (1960), George Bluestone (1961), Robert Richardson (1969), William Jinks (1971), and Edward Murray (1972) – did not really go beyond noting that some films and some literary texts use similar formal strategies, Fiction and the Camera Eye offers a more pervasive argument.

As Spiegel states, early ‘narrative technique’ approaches focused solely on formal analogies: they ‘told us only about technique [...], and have ended by reducing technique to trickery and effect’.¹⁵⁰ Although, like the early ‘narrative techniques’ proponents, Spiegel’s approach is based on film and literature sharing certain practices and styles, he claims to go beyond these initial analogies theses by attempting to ‘establish a common metaphysics

¹⁴⁸ Laura Marcus, The Tenth Muse, p. 11.
¹⁵⁰ Alan Spiegel, Fiction and the Camera Eye, p. xv. Spiegel’s italics.
between the film and the novel’.\footnote{Alan Spiegel, \textit{Fiction and the Camera Eye}, p. xiv.} By the vague umbrella term ‘common metaphysics’, Spiegel appears to mean a variety of things, including shared ideas, philosophies, methods and, even, a complete shared culture. For Spiegel, film technique ‘embodies values and attitudes which are vital \textit{outside} of film’; film technique ‘relates to a way of thinking and feeling’ which ‘has become part of the mental life of an entire epoch’ – any artist could learn ‘all about montage by simply trying to keep up with what was happening all around one’ and ‘be influenced by film and know all about it simply by being alive and visually alert’.\footnote{Ibid., p. xii-xiii. Spiegel’s italics.}

Published three years after Spiegel’s study, Keith Cohen’s \textit{Film and Fiction} (1979) presents a similar line of argument. Like Spiegel, Cohen argues that cinema and modern literature are linked via analogous techniques, ‘most of all, the techniques of discontinuity and montage’.\footnote{Keith Cohen, \textit{Film and Fiction: The Dynamics of Exchange}, (New Haven, CT and London: Yale University Press, 1979), p. 2.} Similarly both Spiegel and Cohen argue that montage exists outside of film. Cohen takes a semiotic approach to montage, arguing that ‘one set of codes became the common tools of artists working in widely disparate fields’\footnote{Ibid., p. 10.}. For Cohen, rather than sharing a common metaphysics, filmic and literary montage share a ‘global system of meaning’.\footnote{Ibid., p. 3.} In Cohen’s thesis, literary and filmic montage are united through their shared semantics. However, according to Cohen, their common semantic goal is not a singular denotation; rather, it is defamiliarization and self-referentiality. As Cohen states, ‘the techniques of montage […] insist that the spectator pay at least as much attention to the film’s process of production as to its unfolding fiction’, so any work of modern fiction ‘that values this foregrounding of the apparatus must at some point hold its underlying tenets
over against cinema’. Like Spiegel, Cohen links cinema and literary modernism via a form of montage which simultaneously exists inside cinema (as a cinema-specific device) and outside cinema (as a concept or set of ideas).

While Spiegel’s and Cohen’s theses are an improvement on earlier (more reductive) analogies approaches, their account of the film and literary modernism relationship is still problematic. Indeed, in suggesting that film techniques can be found and be influential outside of film itself, both writers end up defining a relationship between film techniques and literary modernism rather than film and literary modernism. As Harris Ross points out, it is unreasonable to presume that particular techniques – such as montage – are univocal, that they automatically play the same role in both film and literature: it ‘seems dubious that narrative techniques have meaning outside their use in particular works of art and their place in particular narrative traditions’. This is not to say that film and literary modernism never exhibit parallel techniques – sometimes, and in particular ways, they do. Indeed, in chapter five of this thesis, I discuss the ways in which the literary techniques of Ulysses parallel the filmic techniques of panoramas and phantom rides. However, I also highlight the differences between the film and literary versions; Joyce’s panoramas and phantom rides have similar techniques in the sense that their devices are directed to a similar end (they create a similar effect to their film parallels), but they are created by different, specifically literary, means.

Some cinema-and-modernism studies go beyond Spiegel’s and Cohen’s already wide-ranging definition of montage; they see montage neither as a technique nor as a concept. Instead, scholars such as P. Adams Sitney and Michel Wood use ‘montage’ as a

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156 Keith Cohen, *Film and Fiction*, p. 9.
157 Harris Ross, *Film as Literature, Literature as Film: An Introduction to and Biography of Film’s Relationship to Literature*, (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1987), p. 42.
general, all-encompassing term; for Sitney and Wood, montage refers to the modernist
literary and cinematic works stress vision as a privileged mode of perception, even of
revelation, while at the same time cultivating opacity and questioning the primacy of the
visible world’.\footnote{Ibid., p. 2.} For Sitney, there are many different types of cinematic and literary
‘modernist montage’ and these different types do not necessarily have analogous
techniques; instead they have parallel ideas on vision, image, and representation. As Sitney
states, in ‘literary and cinematic modernism […] the status of vision takes quite complex
turns’; ‘the artists I discuss [Mallarmé, Stein, Man Ray, Duchamp, Vertov, Dreyer, Bergman,
Brakage, Eisenstein, and others] formulated their theories of vision in isolation from each
other, seldom realizing the centrality of their speculations to their concepts of their own
creativity’.\footnote{Ibid., p. 4.} Similarly, for Wood, montage is ‘quintessentially modernist’ in the sense that it
expression is epitomised in Ezra Pound’s modernist poetics and in Virginia Woolf’s 1926
essay, ‘The Cinema’. In her essay, Woolf states that films show us ‘life as it is when we have
no part in it’, when we are abstracted from it.\footnote{Woolf quoted in: Michael Wood, ‘Modernism and Film’, p. 222.} For Sitney and Wood, whether in film or
literature, montage is primarily a theory of, and method for representing, abstraction.

Instead of considering filmic and literary montage from an analogous techniques
point of view, Sitney and Wood see abstraction as the link between the two mediums; for
both film-makers and modern writers, montage is used to express and/ or represent
abstraction. David Trotter also sees abstraction as a key linking factor, but his arguments do
not focus on montage. Trotter abandons ‘the model of [...] transferable techniques’ and the broader focus on montage-as-abstract-expression in favour of a ‘model of parallelism’; he argues that modern literature and cinema are ‘best understood as constituting and constituted by parallel histories’. Trotter’s ‘parallelism’ thesis is grounded in the ideas of André Bazin, an influential French film theorist writing in the 1940s and ‘50s. Bazin asserts that there is a ‘certain aesthetic convergence’ between film and literary texts; this ‘convergence’ is due to a shared technological and social history. Modern novels and cinema share ‘a certain vision of the world, a vision influenced doubtless by man’s relation with a technical civilization’. As MacCabe explains, for Bazin (and Trotter), ‘cinema and literature are linked less by any simplistic model of causality, than by a general horizon of technological and mass production’.

Like Trotter, I favour a model of parallelism; instead of arguing for direct influence, analogous techniques, or a shared use of montage-as-abstract-expression, I suggest that Ulysses and early cinema express parallel philosophies. This is not to say that my thesis disregards the possible insights of alternative approaches; I do look at direct influences (such as films that Joyce is likely to have seen when working at the Volta cinema) and analogous techniques (such as phantom ride virtual movement techniques). Crucially however, I do not use these investigations as ends in themselves (more as inroads to further research), and I am careful to distinguish between filmic techniques and literary techniques, even when noting similarities in intention (again, see my section on phantom rides in chapter five). What I am interested in, like Trotter, is shared ideas and outlooks. These

165 Ibid., p. 63.
parallel ideas may happen to stem partly from direct influence, but they are just as likely to originate in a shared history or in shared concerns.

My approach is perhaps closest to that of Andrew Shail. In his recent study, Shail articulates a broad form of ‘influence’ which marries Trotter’s idea of ‘parallelism’ with the notion that impact and inspiration can sometimes be indirect and unacknowledged: this ‘version of influence concerns changes in the everyday mental landscape of whole populations, changes in such basic conceptions as the substance of thought, the function of the senses, the nature of time, the dividing line between consciousness and matter’.¹⁶⁷ Unlike Shail, however, I do not see the rise of early cinema as separate from other concurrent events such as ‘the birth of relativity in physics’ or ‘notions of collective consciousness’; like Trotter, I see changes in thinking and philosophies as occurring parallel to the cinema.¹⁶⁸ Ultimately, I take my cue from Merleau-Ponty, who argues that art, technology, and philosophy inhabit the same intellectual and cultural climate, so the different disciplines and art-forms inevitably engage in similar themes and ideas: ‘if philosophy is in harmony with the cinema, […] it is because the philosopher and the moviemaker share a certain way of being, a certain view of the world which belongs to a generation’.¹⁶⁹

‘BAZINIAN’ MODERNISM

Trotter’s ideas are (partly) grounded in his own particular reading of Bazin. Like Bazin, Trotter argues that cinema and literary modernism are linked via their shared

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¹⁶⁸ Ibid., p. 3.
technological histories, in particular, technology’s ability to reproduce a mimetic representation of the real world. For Trotter, both cinema and modern literature coveted what Bazin describes as ‘the instrumentality of a nonliving agent’. Trotter sees Bazin as advocating a view of cinema-as-pure-recording-machine. Following Bazin, Trotter argues that, when ‘modernist writers thought of cinema, they thought of an image of the world made automatically’; ‘what fascinated modernist writers about cinema was the original, and perhaps in some measure reproducible, neutrality of film as a medium’. To use Trotter’s phrase, modern literature and cinema shared a ‘will-to-automatism’. The camera-eye enabled this automaton-like mode of perception; it permitted early cinema audiences ‘to see only as a machine sees’.

In Cinema and Modernism, Trotter states that he aims to ‘reconstruct a Bazinian [D. W.] Griffith’. He starts by quoting Bazin’s take on Eric von Stroheim, an Austrian-born film-maker who worked from the 1910s to the 1950s:

> He has one simple rule for direction. Take a close look at the world, keep on doing so, and in the end it will lay bare for you all its cruelty and its ugliness.

Trotter interprets this Bazin quotation in a particular way; he sees Bazin as emphasising the mechanical and automatic aspects of Stroheim’s work, rather than merely its ‘close look’: ‘It is the machine’s-eye view which [...] has laid the world bare in all its cruelty and ugliness’. Trotter also ignores one important aspect of the quotation; he notes that Stroheim’s films ‘lay bare’ the filmed-world, but he does not recognise the

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170 David Trotter, Cinema and Modernism, p. 3.
171 Ibid., pp. 4-5.
172 Ibid., p. 11.
173 Ibid., p. 95.
174 Ibid., p. 61. My italics.
175 Bazin quoted in David Trotter, Cinema and Modernism, p. 79.
176 Ibid., p. 79.
importance – for Bazin – of the following two words: ‘for you’. Trotter ignores the significance of the audience – the ‘you’ – and overemphasises the ‘close look’ and ‘lay bare’ to the point where cinema is reduced to an impersonal mechanical eye.

It is fairly easy to see how one might make this reading of Bazin. In ‘Theater and Cinema – Part Two’, Bazin states: ‘A film calls for a certain effort on my part so that I may understand and enjoy it, but it does not depend on me for its existence’. Trotter interprets this Bazinian idea in the following way: cinema presents a neutral, automatic, and objective picture of the world, therefore, films do not require, or encourage, the active involvement of human, subjective spectators. Although Trotter does not quote this statement directly, there are echoes of it – of his interpretation of it – throughout Cinema and Modernism, especially in relation to Virginia Woolf’s assertion that, in films, we ‘see life as it is when we have no part in it’. According to Trotter, ‘film’s original neutrality as a medium’ may ‘have helped Woolf to imagine the eyeless leer’. In his foreword to Cinema and Modernism, MacCabe argues that Trotter, like Bazin, looks at the ways in which cinema can present ‘a world in which representation without an intervening consciousness is possible’.

Trotter’s reading of Bazin is not the only possible reading; I offer an alternative interpretation. Earlier on in ‘Theater and Cinema – Part Two’, Bazin compares cinema to a mirror: ‘It is false to say that the screen is incapable of putting us “in the presence of” the actor’; it ‘does so in the same way as a mirror – one must agree that the mirror relays the presence of the person reflected in it – but it is a mirror with a delayed reflection, the tin foil

178 Woolf quoted in David Trotter, Cinema and Modernism, p. 168.
179 David Trotter, Cinema and Modernism, pp. 176 and 172.
of which retains the image’. For me, these lines provide a useful gloss on Bazin’s analysis of Erich von Stroheim, quoted above, in particular, the cinema ‘does not depend on me for its existence’ line. If, like Bazin, we think of a film as a mirror, we can understand how it both exists as a unity in itself (as a mirror hanging in an empty room) but takes on a fuller existence when it is projected in front of an audience (when a person stands in front of the mirror and sees his/her reflection). Theatre, on the other hand, is more like a painting. Unlike a mirror, which reflects whatever happens to be in front of it, plays, like a painting, always represent a certain something. A theatre audience is required to work out what this ‘something’ is – audience members may, of course, disagree about exactly what is being represented by the actors – but that ‘something’ always exists apart from the audience who perceive it. In contrast, the viewer’s reflection is only present in the mirror when he or she looks at it, when he or she engages with it. Thus, Trotter’s view of cinema is actually closer to Bazin’s view of theatre.

For Bazin, like a mirror, a film has its own unity, its own existence as a reflective surface. It is in this sense that cinema ‘does not depend on me for its existence’. However, for a set of projected moving images to exist as cinema, a film requires an audience, just as a mirror requires a human presence in order to be a mirror for the person looking at it. As well as seeing cinema as a mirror, Bazin sees it as universe, as a world in its own right. Again, this may make it sound as if Bazin is advocating a view of cinema as neutrality, cinema as impersonality. Somewhat counter intuitively, it is cinema’s supposed ‘neutral’ existence, its status as a self-contained unified universe that enables it to be a truly interactive and immersive medium. In the theatre, audience members are not presented with a unified universe or world – they see actors representing something. In films, the actors are

181 André Bazin, What is Cinema?, vol. 1, p. 97.
something – they constitute a film-world. Because cinema creates its own world, viewers are able to become part of it, in the sense that the person in the mirror becomes part of the physical mirror as it hangs on the wall. As Bazin explains, it is not ‘the realism of subject matter or realism of expression but that realism of space without which moving pictures do not constitute cinema’.  

For Bazin, cinema is *cinema*, rather than a set of images, precisely because, unlike theatre, it creates its own space, its own world in which film-viewers can temporarily live. This is the vital difference between Bazin’s vehicle (a mirror) and his tenor (cinema): while a mirror merely reflects a person, cinema can incorporate him/her. This is what Bazin means when he says that cinema is ‘a mirror with a delayed reflection, the tin foil of which retains the image’. So, for Bazin, unlike Trotter, spectators become so engaged in a film that they become part of its world – each spectator (or an image of each spectator, at least) is retained in the film’s ‘tin foil’; films are not neutral and impersonal – they are immersive and intersubjective.

Trotter’s reading of Bazin is not an uncommon one. As Hervè Joubert-Laurencin recognises, ‘what is often misunderstood […] is that in cinema, recording is not in fact a product of its mechanics’; for Bazin, ‘mechanics are necessary but not sufficient for cinematic recording’. Joubert-Laurencin is especially keen to emphasis Bazin’s appreciation for the role of the audience in a film’s formation – the aspect of cinema which Trotter discounts on supposedly Bazinian terms: Bazin ‘wrote out of his experience as a member of the audience; so he realised again and again the distinction between an event and its “mechanical recording”’.

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182 André Bazin, *What is Cinema?*, vol. 1, p. 112.
184 Ibid., p. xiii.
CINEMA AND IMPERSONALITY

Despite there being alternative ways of reading Bazin, a number of modernism-and-cinema scholars offer interpretations which are very similar to Trotter’s. For all of these scholars, Bazin is linked with cinematic impersonality. These scholars do not rely on Bazin to the extent that Trotter does, but they all refer to Bazin at some point in their arguments. In Multimedia Modernism (2009), Julian Murphet overtly builds upon Trotter’s interpretation of Bazin: what ‘Trotter engagingly presents is an image of modern literature [...] permeated by the figure of an apparatus beholden to impersonal automatisms’; for Trotter, it is ‘within the familiar but forgotten space of Bazin’s “certain aesthetic convergence” [...] that the proper logic of remediation can be discerned’. After outlining his view of modernism as ‘a structural adjustment within a given social and historical media ecology’, Murphet quotes Bazin at length, placing particular emphasis on his assertion that “it is the novel that has discovered [...] an almost mirror-like objectivity”. For Murphet, Bazin’s mirror is objective, rather than intersubjective. Once again, Bazin is emblematic of the view that cinema is a neutral recording device.

Similarly, in Camera Works (2005), Michael North evokes Bazin to corroborate his thesis on the camera’s propensity to dehumanize what it records: the ‘fact, commented on most famously by André Bazin, that photography mummifies its subjects [...] means that the very rage for seizing the instantaneous that motivates much interest in recording will also lumber the modern world with an ever-increasing stack of recorded corpses’. Spiegel also

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186 Ibid., p. 10.
refers to Bazin in support of his view of cinema as ‘passive’ and ‘affectless’: 189 ‘[m]y sense of the way the camera works has been inspired by André Bazin’s brilliant essay “The Ontology of the Photographic Image”’: “between the originating object and its reproduction there intervenes only the instrumentality of a nonliving agent”; “an image of the world is formed automatically, without the creative intervention of man”. 190 For Spiegel, the camera is ‘both instrument and machine, specifically a recording machine’ – it ‘can perform its service in place of its operator and is not dependent upon his presence for whatever it has been asked to do’. 191 According to Spiegel, this impersonal, film-style perception is particularly clear in Joyce’s work: there is ‘a very special kind of estrangement that manifests itself in Joyce’s characteristic coldness of vision, a kind of spiritual separateness that begins with a passive, affectless eye and will never permit the observer total rapport with his visual field’. 192

Echoing Spiegel, Sara Danius, via a quick nod to Bazin, equates non-cerebral vision with autonomized vision and cinema: ‘optical space, as Bazin puts it, is centrifugal; vision is framed; the seen is divided into parts and autonomized; and so on’. 193 However, whilst being machine-like, this automatism is actually human. For Danius, modernism’s ‘autonomized’ perception is human in the sense that it is bodily: ‘perception, in Joyce as in most other modernist writers, artists, and practitioners, is fundamentally located in the physiological infrastructure of the individual, that is, in the subject’s irreducible corporeality’. 194 According to Danius, in modernist literature, each bodily organ acts as an independent mechanism: ‘eyes in Ulysses […] claim autonomy for themselves, not just from

189 Alan Spiegel, Fiction and the Camera Eye, p. 82.
190 Ibid., p. 86.
191 Ibid., p. 86.
192 Ibid., p. 67.
194 Ibid., p. 173.
the other senses and the human body at large but also from a central processing instance, the hermeneutic switchboard called the brain’. 195

So, when Danius states that Stephen and Bloom ‘perceive the world “cinematically”’, she means that they perceive in an autonomized yet bodily manner. Danius picks out various moments in *Ulysses* to support her case but pays particular attention to Bloom’s rumination on blindness in ‘Lestrygonians’ and his visual encounter with Gerty in ‘Nausicaa’. For Danius, these passages emphasise the fragmented, autonomous nature of perception, particularly eyesight: ‘Bloom’s excursus on the consequences of blindness ultimately testifies to the sublime importance of sight – in Bloom’s own world as well as in the Joycean universe at large’. 196 Similarly, in ‘Nausicaa’, according to Danius, Bloom’s gaze is detached from his mind and the rest of his bodily senses – Bloom’s eyes are like a neutral camera lens, framing Gerty’s body. 197 For me, as I explain in chapter five, these two passages convey the opposite philosophical position; they highlight the interconnectedness of the bodily senses – especially sight and touch.

There are a couple of caveats within Danius’ thesis of bodily fragmentation and autonomism. Firstly, she suggests that, while *Ulysses*’ male characters see in an autonomized/ cinematic manner, its principal female characters (Gerty MacDowell and Molly Bloom) see organically and, therefore, not cinematically. Instead of being machine-like and objective, Gerty’s and Molly’s vision is epistemological and subjective: their ‘gaze carries a hermeneutics and projects knowledge onto the object seen’. 198 Bloom’s gaze is neutral, whereas ‘Gerty’s visual world is one of recognition, habit, bias, prejudice, received knowledge, and banal assumptions, all illuminated by her attempts to read Bloom’s gaze.

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196 Ibid., p. 176.
197 Ibid., p. 176.
198 Ibid., p. 177.
and external appearance’. Secondly, Danius makes the point that, although perception is fragmented within *Ulysses*, taken as a whole, Joyce’s book is synesthetic: by incorporating ‘cinematographic modes of reproducing the visual’, ‘phonographic modes of reproducing the aural’, ‘newspaper headlines and musical scores’, *Ulysses* ‘attempts to offer the textual equivalent of’ synaesthesia. Joyce’s characters have fragmented perception but his readers enjoy a synesthetic experience.

Like Danius, I note that Joyce’s structure/ form is sometimes at odds with his content/ theme; in chapter four I argue that ‘Ithaca’’s mechanical, formulaic structure, and the seemingly robot-like gestures of its characters, belie the humanness of the episode. Unlike Danius, I see both the female characters and male characters as perceiving an always already subjectivized horizon rather than neutral, objective reality. However, for me, as I show throughout this thesis, this hermeneutic type of seeing can be accurately described as ‘cinematic’ in the sense that it parallels elements of early cinema. I also suggest, contra Danius, that *Ulysses* is synesthetic at the level of content and of individual characters’ perceptions (rather than merely from the reader’s point of view, as Danius suggests). I argue that, in *Ulysses*, sight and touch are intimately connected (especially in ‘Nausicaa’ and Bloom’s meditation on blindness in ‘Lestrygonians’).

Sara Danius uses Heidegger’s ideas to highlight the reductive nature of prevalent theories of the technology/ human relationship: ‘[a]s Martin Heidegger argues in “The Question of Technology” (1953), the problem with instrumentalist definitions of technology stems from a more profound dilemma: those unreflected notions of determinism and

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200 Ibid., p. 185.
201 See chapter five of this thesis.
causality that commonly underlie such views’. Instead of directly engaging with these phenomenological ideas on technology and humanness, Danius states: this is ‘not the place to delve into Heidegger’s thoughts on causality’; it ‘should be enough to point out that a crucial component of the founding myth of modernism – the split between technologized and nontechologized – presupposes a deterministic view where the nature and operations of technology tend to be seen in mechanistic and instrumentalist terms’. Although Danius goes on to eloquently discuss the human/technology relationship and its relation to modernist literature and cinema, she never returns to Heidegger; for me, an in-depth discussion of Heidegger’s – and other phenomenologists’ – useful ideas on the matter would have greatly aided Danius’s analysis. In the following three chapters of this thesis (and my conclusion), I show how engagement with phenomenology can benefit modernism-and-cinema studies.

CINEMA AND HUMANISM

Thomas Burkdall depicts a more humanist and phenomenological Bazin and, consequently, more human form of cinema. In his discussion of Joyce’s *Dubliners*, Burkdall writes: for ‘Joyce and Bazin both phenomenology and immanence [...] are important’. Quoting Bazin, Burkdall suggests that both Joyce and realist film-makers treat reality “according to its phenomenological integrity”. Burkdall does not go into much detail explaining exactly what he means by these assertions. However, reading between the lines, it seems that he is suggesting that, rather than presenting an impersonal view of the world,

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203 Ibid., p. 39.
204 Thomas L. Burkdall, *Joycean Frames*, p. 41.
Joyce presents a human, subjective view of reality. As Burkdall states, in Joyce’s work, subjective perspectives are ‘not imposed upon [reality] in the manner of the naturalists’; instead of consciously impressing his own viewpoint onto a seemingly neutral reality, Joyce represents reality as he (a subjective human being) automatically sees it. This may seem like a subtle difference but, philosophically speaking, it is huge; it is the difference between seeing the world as neutral and completely unconnected with humanity, and seeing the world as always already human-tinted.

As Burkdall explains, both Bazin and Joyce believe that the real world has “a fundamental humanism”; whether looking through a film camera, viewing a film, or reading realist prose, we are never seeing reality in the way that a machine would see it. Commenting on the work of Italian neorealist film director Roberto Rossellini, Bazin writes: ‘his consciousness, like that of everyone else, does not admit reality as a whole, but the selection that does occur is neither logical nor psychological; it is ontological, in the sense that the image of reality it restores to us is still a whole’ – ‘the neorealist director filters reality’. Interestingly, this filtered way of seeing sounds quite like Danius’s description of Gerty’s non-cinematic ‘organic’ seeing; it is the opposite of Bloom’s objective, atomized ‘cinematic’ seeing.

Like Burkdall, Francesco Casetti associates Bazin with the ‘real’ and ‘human’ elements of cinema. For Casetti, Bazin’s criticism of montage and découpage editing techniques rests largely on his concerns regarding the techniques’ propensity for alienating human subjectivity, for dictating a certain point of view to the audience. For Bazin, according to Casetti, it is crucially important that spectators play an active role in film

viewing: it is important that ‘we perform [a point of view] on the film instead of the film performing it for us’, instead of ‘waiting for the director to impose a particular vision’.²⁰⁹ Even when Bazin appears to be advocating a view of film as mechanical and inhuman, he is in fact describing ‘a machine that fulfils a profoundly anthropological desire, and is thus very human’.²¹⁰ As Casetti explains, for Bazin, cinema ‘is a machine’ only in the sense that the ‘filmic image is made by itself, automatically’.²¹¹ Despite being created through a machine, cinema’s automatic reproductions are far from inhuman; the filmic image is ‘profoundly human – it is part of our intimate nature to try to keep with us an image of what is no more’.²¹² For Bazin and Casetti, film’s humanity is also apparent in its extreme realism: ‘[a]s André Bazin showed’ all ‘film is part pornographic’ – ‘it exhibits the body of things and its own body as “wounded” by reality’.²¹³ Film is human because of its inherent physicality.

Philip Rosen shares this human-focused view of Bazin: ‘for Bazin, the cinematic apparatus is inseparable from a relation to something exterior to its technology’; ‘the special character of cinema is not reducible to a technologically determined objectivity but derives also from a drive of human subjectivity’.²¹⁴ Further, Rosen explains that, in Bazin’s film-philosophy, ‘cinema enables a model of transaction between the world and its apprehension, between the inhuman and human, between the physical and value, between object and subject’.²¹⁵ Rosen’s version of Bazinian film-philosophy is fairly close to my own Merleau-Pontian view of cinema. Echoing Rosen’s Bazin, Merleau-Ponty states: ‘the movies are peculiarly suited to make manifest the union of mind and body, mind and world, and the

²¹⁰ Ibid., p. 91.
²¹¹ Ibid., p. 91.
²¹² Ibid., p. 91.
²¹³ Ibid., p. 140.
²¹⁵ Ibid., p. 111.
expression of one in the other’. As Dudley Andrew notes, Bazin was interested in phenomenological theory and had ‘actual encounters’ with several phenomenologists, including Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, and Gabriel Marcel.

### CINEMA AS MIMESIS

According to Karen Jacobs, ‘Bazin understood the truth of the photographic image as the twin consequence of the mechanical, “automatic” nature of its production and its “indexical” relation to the real.’ Bazin recognises both the machinic and the real elements of film. For Jacobs, it is the camera’s blurring of ‘machine’ and ‘human’, and its ‘intersubjective relations’ with reality, which ‘literary modernism inherits’. For Jacob’s Bazin (and Jacob), it is cinema’s mimetic quality (its ability to make exact reproductions of reality) which, somewhat counter-intuitively, makes it truly human.

Jennifer Gosetti-Ferencei proffers a similar argument, minus direct references to Bazin or cinema. Through an examination of *trompe l’oeil* art (which, like realist cinema, presents the illusion of reality), Gosetti-Ferencei considers the phenomenological dimensions of mimetic representation. She uses the example of Andy Warhol’s *Brillo Box* (1964), ‘a true-to-scale structure made of wood and paint, indistinguishable from a box that would contain a well-known kitchen cleaning implement made of steel wool and soap’.

For Gosetti-Ferencei, ‘[*trompe l’oeil* [including Warhol’s *Brillo Box*] highlights mimesis as a

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219 Ibid., p. 25.
problem of subjectivity’; the realisation that real-looking trompe l’oeil art objects ‘are merely representations of objects [...] parallels and enables a phenomenological reflection’.  

The *Brillo Box* ‘challenges the viewing subject’s sense of familiarity with and control of the representational field’; the art object’s ‘[m]imesis challenges the viewing consciousness, alienated from its quotidian familiarity with the appearance of ordinary objects’.  

The mimetic nature of Warhol’s *Brillo Box* (the way in which it closely imitates an actual Brillo box) causes the observer to reassess the nature of perception; observers are forced to step outside of the ordinary perceptual stance in order to see the box afresh (as not-a-Brillo-box, an almost-Brillo-box, and an art object). It is in this sense that trompe l’oeil art provokes phenomenological reflection; observers are forced to perceive pre-consciously, to view *Brillo Box* non-rationally, without any preconceived ideas.

As Gosetti-Ferencei notes, the type of phenomenological reflection provoked by aesthetic mimesis is also apparent in modernist literature. *The Ecstatic Quotidian* focuses on the literary work of Sartre, Baudelaire, Rilke, Kafka, and Hugo von Hofmannsthal but more canonical modernists are mentioned in relation to the notion of pre-conscious seeing: ‘Modern writers – and one could also point to James Joyce, Virginia Woolf, and Stein – present the world with a defamiliarized perceptual eye, and ponder the experiential and ontological consequences of this estrangement’. It is important, here, to distinguish between the objective neutrality that Trotter attributes (via Bazin) to cinema, and the truly phenomenological ‘defamiliarized [...] estrangement’ to which Gosetti-Ferencei refers.

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223 Ibid., p. 223.
224 Ibid., p. 25.
Echoing Gosetti-Ferencei, Danius asserts that ‘Proust and Joyce can be said to pursue something like a phenomenology of pure perception’; ‘Remembrance endeavours to articulate a phenomenology of visual perception, an innocent and unbiased mode of seeing that is at the core of the narrator’s aesthetic apprenticeship’. Although both scholars employ the term ‘phenomenological’, they use it in different ways. For Danius, pre-conscious or ‘pure’ phenomenological perception entails a certain distance from reality; it entails a detached, neutral, objective viewpoint. For Gosetti-Ferencei, in contrast, phenomenological pre-conscious perception may start from an estranged perspective, but this estrangement soon provokes a greater level of engagement.

Ariane Mildenberg explores modernism’s predilection for pre-conscious perception through reference to Edmund Husserl’s practice of epoché or ‘bracketing’. As Mildenberg explains, epoché is designed to ‘put out of play preconceived objectivity, uncover the world’s essential structure and provide an exact description of things as these [are] met with in immediate experience’. Mildenberg argues that the aesthetic goals of Virginia Woolf, Gertrude Stein, and Wallace Stevens are similar to Husserl’s phenomenological goals; broadly speaking, they all aim to present life as it is directly experienced, by an always-already-subjective being. Subjectivity, for phenomenologists, does not entail bias or cognitive judgements. To see pre-consciously is to see without false objectivity, to see things as we immediately experience them.

Following Gosetti-Ferencei and Mildenberg, I argue that Joyce depicts (and enables in readers) pre-conscious seeing; in fact, in chapter five of this thesis, I discuss the ways in which Joyce’s use of mimesis parallels the mimetic images in local actuality films – films in

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which viewers are presented with images of themselves on screen. When looking at the
*Brillo Box*, observers are provoked into pre-conscious seeing; they automatically reassess
the box’s relation to an actual Brillo box. When watching films of themselves, as well as re-
establishing the screen images’ relations to reality (reassessing the connection between
‘actual’ and ‘copy’), viewers are also prompted to pre-consciously reflect on the status of
‘self’ and ‘other’, the relation between the on-screen self and the off-screen self. We are
prompted, in Joyce’s words, to ‘see ourselves as others see us’ (*U 13.1058 & 8.662)*.

This kind of engaged pre-conscious re-evaluation – the kind provoked by actuality
films – is hinted at by Gosetti-Ferencei in her brief discussion of Mark Tansey’s *The Innocent
Eye Test* (1981) and René Magritte’s *La Reproduction interdite* (1937). In Tansey’s painting a
cow gazes at a painting of a bull, and in Magritte’s work a man looks at a mirror, but the
view he sees is his back, rather than his front. In both paintings mimesis is problematised;
the subjects of the paintings are also the objects of the paintings, just as in actuality films.
As Gosetti-Ferencei states, when viewing these paintings (as well as other similar artworks),
the observer is ‘provoked to question his or her position as a perpetual subject vis-à-vis the
seen world’; viewing such paintings – like viewing actuality films – ‘not only bears analogy to
phenomenological reflection but it also provokes and enables it’. 227

Gosetti-Ferencei’s phenomenological conception of mimesis offers a viable
alternative to Trotter’s notion of mimesis as mechanical reproduction. For Trotter, works of
modernist literature and early films are ‘at once an enactment and a critique of mimesis’;
they ‘lay bare the automatism within mimicry, not to dispel it, but rather to explore its
(often fatal) attraction’. 228 Charlie Chaplin is the epitome of modernist mimesis as, according

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228 David Trotter, *Cinema and Modernism*, p. 182.
to Trotter, he performs ‘hypermimesis’ – mechanical ‘mimicry for mimicry’s sake’. Once again, Trotter takes Bazin as his starting point. In ‘Charlie Chaplin’ (1948), Bazin pays particular attention to Chaplin’s 1918 film, Shoulder Arms. In the film, in order to escape capture, Chaplin hides behind a piece of canvas painted to look like a tree. In describing the scene, Bazin first writes: Chaplin ‘camouflages himself as a tree’. In the following sentence, Bazin qualifies himself: ‘“Camouflage” is not really the right term; it ‘is more properly a form of mimicry’; one ‘might go so far as to say that the defense reflexes of Charlie end in a reabsorption of time by space’. A couple of lines on, Bazin compares Chaplin’s ‘form of mimicry’ to ‘those little stick-like insects that are indiscernible in a clump of twigs or those little Indian insects that can take on the appearance of leaves’; the ‘sudden vegetable-like immobility of Charlie-the-tree is like an insect playing dead’.

Given his thesis of filmic objectivity and mechanism, Trotter focuses on the impersonal side of Bazin’s analysis; the words ‘vegetable-like’, ‘immobility’, and ‘dead’. For Trotter, Bazin paves the way for a mechanical view of mimesis. The tree is a ‘tree-machine’; Chaplin ‘disguises himself as a machine disguised as a tree’ before becoming a ‘machine’ himself. Trotter sees Chaplin’s actions as a series of mechanical reproductions, as mimicry for mimicry’s sake. For Trotter, Chaplin is ‘a mechanism rather than a persona’ – ‘a mechanism [...] consistently exposed as mechanism by acts of hypermimesis’; he suggests that ‘Bazin almost says as much, by comparing the man-myth to an insect’. For me, the most salient words in Bazin’s analysis are: ‘a reabsorption of time by space’. Here Bazin makes the point that Chaplin’s (and the insects’) form of mimesis is spatial rather than

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229 David Trotter, *Cinema and Modernism*, p. 183.
231 Ibid., p. 149.
232 Ibid., p. 149.
233 David Trotter, *Cinema and Modernism*, p. 194.
234 Ibid., pp. 193-94.
temporal; by mimicking the tree Chaplin (and the insects) become part of the space which signifies ‘tree’. Chaplin (and the insects) do not become a copy of the tree; there is no temporal relation between the original/real tree and the Chaplin-tree (or insect-leaf), as both are present at the same time. Thus, we cannot (in Bazin’s terms) see ‘Charlie-the-tree’ as a mechanical reproduction of a real tree, as both the canvas tree and the surrounding actual trees exist contemporaneously.

This idea of spatial mimesis relates Bazin’s ideas on Chaplin back to his general thesis on filmic mimesis, and also to Gosetti-Ferencei’s Brillo Box example. As Thomas Elsaesser notes, Bazin employs the terms “trace” and “imprint”, rather than truth and likeness; ‘Bazin’s ontology of cinematic realism is above all a theory about the inscription and storage of time, rather than what we usually understand by image, namely mimesis and representation’. 235 Bazinian mimesis involves the real becoming part of the image; like Chaplin and the insects, the real must imprint itself (or leave a trace of itself) in the image (or the tree/leaf). Bazinian mimesis, like the Brillo Box and local actuality films, blurs the boundaries between imitation and actual, subject and object, self and other. For Bazin, true mimetic realism is not repetition, imitation, or reproduction; it is far more complicated and elusive. As Tom Gunning explains, Bazin contrasts pseudorealism, which involves “duplicating the world outside”, with true realism, which aims to present “the world in its own image”. 236 Bazinian mimesis is ‘more than a complex process of duplication’ – it is ‘the world in its own image’ which, for Gunning, is ‘equivalent to the phenomenological concept (used by both Merleau-Ponty and Heidegger) of the worldhood of the world’. 237

I discuss the worldhood of the world (or ‘enworldedness’) in more detail in the forthcoming chapters. For now, it is just worth noting that, like pre-conscious perception, enworldedness is subjective yet non-rational and immediate; it is, as Gunning notes, ‘the phenomenological image of the world bounded by a horizon’. Bazinian mimesis, like pre-conscious perception and enworldedness, highlights and enables the blurring of subjectivity and objectivity, film and spectator, real and imitation, mechanical and organic. For Bazin, mimesis is not mechanism and not reproduction; it is intersubjectivity, immersion, and simultaneity. Just as Chaplin becomes immersed in the tree’s space, the film spectator becomes immersed in the film’s space, just as human subjectivity is always already immersed in the space of the world.

Admittedly, Trotter leaves Bazin early on in his Chaplin chapter; he recognises that Bazin’s ideas on mimesis are not as mechanistic as his own: ‘Bazin cannot altogether approve of the conclusion that […] Charlie has developed a liking for automatism’. For Trotter, mechanical reproduction is part of, but not entirely constitutive of, Bazinian mimesis; Bazin recognises mechanical reproduction in Chaplin’s actions, but sees it as ‘“a sin”’ or a temporary ‘“cramp”’. After leaving Bazin, Trotter moves through Roger Caillois (a 1930s naturalist whose writing on animal mimicry is, according to Trotter, a possible model for Bazin’s insect analogy) and Stanley Cavell (who, in Trotter’s words, calls attention to cinema’s ‘constitutive automatism’). Despite the fact that Bazin writes proficiently on Chaplin, it is difficult to see why Trotter bothers to mention Bazin; is Bazin’s presence in cinema-and-modernism studies necessary at every juncture? As I have already shown, Bazin does, indeed, appear to play a crucial role in current studies, being presented alternately as

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239 David Trotter, Cinema and Modernism, p. 195.
240 André Bazin, quoted in David Trotter, Cinema and Modernism, p. 195.
241 David Trotter, Cinema and Modernism, p. 194-6.
an advocate of mechanical cinema or as a humanist or film-phenomenologist. While Bazin’s comments on Chaplin are perceptive and worthy of discussion, in my discussions of Chaplin and Bloom, in chapter four of this thesis, I find more value in the phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty, especially his ideas on gesture, intimacy, and intersubjectivity.

**CINEMA AS INTERSUBJECTIVE**

Instead of seeing cinema as either objective or subjective, some scholars (myself included) see it as an inherently inter-subjective medium. Casetti explores cinema’s intersubjectivity through reference to ‘one of the manifestos of the modern gaze’ — Jean-Paul Sartre’s chapter on ‘The Look’ in *Being and Nothingness* (1956).

As Casetti explains, in *Being and Nothingness* ‘I discover the reversibility between myself and the other’; ‘I discover the possibility that the other I see watching me is the subject, as well as object, of my gaze’; ‘I also discover the possibility that I, seeing myself watched, am an object, in addition to being the subject of a gaze’. For Sartre, there is no clear distinction between the seeing subject and the seen object. Through analyses of three films — Edwin S. Porter’s *Uncle Josh at the Moving Picture Show* (1902); King Vidor’s *The Crowd* (1928); Michelangelo Antonioni’s *Blowup* (1966) - Casetti convincingly argues that Sartre’s ideas can be applied to the film/ spectator relationship, to the ‘sense of closeness and interaction that is established between theatergoers and what is onscreen’.

Following Casetti, I use phenomenology in my analyses of the actuality film/ local spectator relationship — and parallel relationships in *Ulysses*. However, instead of

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243 Ibid., p. 161.
244 Ibid., p. 163.
concentrating on Sartre, I focus on Merleau-Ponty’s ideas of intersubjective seeing which, I argue, go beyond Sartre’s and are better equipped to tackle the complexities of early cinema and modernism. Casetti notes that Sartre’s ideas ‘resurface in Merleau-Ponty’, but he clearly has a preference for Sartre. Jacobs, on the other hand, like me, sees Sartre as a conservative phenomenologist; his philosophy maintains old-fashioned power relations. In contrast, Merleau-Ponty (and Blanchot) proffer a more ‘revisionary’ form of modernism; they argue for intersubjectivity, while Sartre advocates a relatively ‘rigid conception of subject/object relations’.

For Jacobs, ‘Sartre emphasizes the violence of the subject’s objectification through the Other’s eyes’, whereas Merleau-Ponty’s theory of the gaze ‘depends on his rejection of the bifurcation of subject and object’. Although Sartre problematizes the gaze, his theory still includes objectification. Merleau-Ponty’s theory rejects objectification; subject and object become inextricably intertwined. As Jacobs explains, in Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology, ‘the binary codes of seeing and being seen collapse under the weight of truly multiple determinacy’. As well as blurring the boundaries between the seen object and the seeing subject, Merleau-Pontian phenomenology recognises the embodied nature of perception: ‘Merleau-Ponty understands sight, like touch, to reside foremost in the body, so that the act of seeing produces a “double belongingness” to the order of subject and object, distance and proximity, at once’. For Jacobs, phenomenological (and proto-phenomenological) brands of embodied and intersubjective seeing provided modernists with credible alternatives to mechanical and inhuman theories of vision: what ‘distinguishes

247 Ibid., p. 94.
248 Ibid., p. 17.
249 Ibid., p. 18.
250 Ibid., p. 18.
the modernist literary response from its predecessors stems from a crisis in belief in the continuity between seeing and knowing, and a commensurate cognizance of the subjective mediations of embodied visuality'.\textsuperscript{251}

Echoing Jacobs, Ulrika Maude notes that the modernist interest in subject/object and self/other blurring is often bound up with an interest in visual phenomena; this is particularly true, according to Maude, in the case of Samuel Beckett: ‘Beckett develops his early interest in the subject-object relationship [...] in the most famous of his writings on the visual arts’; the ‘challenge for Beckett’s writing would not only be to reimagine the relationship between subject and world, and hence to outline a new phenomenology of perception, but to create a mode of expression in which these reimaginings could be represented’.\textsuperscript{252} As well as painting, Beckett was interested in cinema. Beckett actually made a film called \textit{Film} (1964). Although Beckett describes \textit{Film} as an ‘interesting failure’,\textsuperscript{253} I suggest that it can be seen as an important part of his attempt to ‘create a mode of expression’ suitable for exploring – in a phenomenological manner – perception and subject/object relationships.

I suggest that it could be argued (although I do not have the space to do so in full here) that \textit{Film} engages with these Bazinian-phenomenological ideas of cinema as an intersubjective medium in which the spectator is present. Beckett’s film is a twenty-five-minute, almost-silent, black and white exploration of perception. Echoing the ‘Proteus’ episode of \textit{Ulysses} (in which Stephen considers George Berkeley in relation to the stereoscope, a pre-cinematic device),\textsuperscript{254} Beckett’s screenplay begins with a nod to

\textsuperscript{251} Karen Jacobs, \textit{The Eye’s Mind}, p. 19.
\textsuperscript{252} Ulrika Maude, “Material of a Strictly Peculiar Order”, pp. 80 and 85.
\textsuperscript{254} I discuss this passage in detail in chapter 5 of this thesis.
Berkeley’s *A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge* (1710): Beckett writes, ‘*Esse est percipi*’ (a variant of Berkeley’s ‘*Esse is percipi*’). For Berkeley, God is the perceiving presence who guarantees being and ensures that objects exist when no human eye is looking at them. In *Film*, the perceiving presence is represented by ‘E’. Indeed, the film essentially consists of ‘O’ (played by Buster Keaton) attempting to hide from ‘E’ (the perceiving presence).

When asked to explain the film in simple terms, Beckett stated: it is ‘a movie about the perceiving eye, about the perceived and the perceiver – two aspects of the same man’. While Beckett’s summary may suggest that *Film* might lend itself most naturally to psychoanalytic analysis (with the ‘two aspects of the same man’ being the id and the ego, the ego and the superego, or the ego and an alter ego), the movie is more complex; it also looks at the perception of the Other, in the form of other (minor) characters and the film audience. As Sylvie Debevec Henning notes, Beckett’s précis is an oversimplification: ‘E is both part of O and not part of O; E is also the camera and, through the camera, the eye of the spectator as well’; ‘E is also self, not merely O’s self but the self of any person or people, specifically that of the other characters’. So, Beckett’s *Film*, like his written works, uses perception to explore the intricate relationship between self and other and subject and object. In chapters four and five of this thesis, I argue that for Joyce, films offered something similar – a mode for exploring self/other relationships. As I explain in chapter three,

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257 Sylvie Debevec Henning, ‘*Film: A Dialogue Between Beckett and Berkeley*, *Journal of Beckett Studies*, 7 (Spring 1982), 89-99, p. 90.
according to Merleau-Ponty, films are the perfect medium for showing the ‘bond between [...] subject and others’.  

**CINEMA AS AN EMBODIED EXPERIENCE**

As well as exploring and prompting intersubjectivity, films can explore and prompt embodied experiences. For Casetti, moving film-images ‘create contact between the spectator and what is depicted on screen: observer and observed are brought side by side’, which provokes ‘nearness and interaction’. The contact between film and spectator is ‘almost physical, and it is immediately transformed into a moral intimacy’. Tim Armstrong also looks at the tactile relationship between film and spectator, referencing film theorists Walter Benjamin and Siegfried Kracauer. For Armstrong, the physicality of film is almost violent; it is based on ‘shocks’ rather than ‘touch’. These ‘“shocks”’ are ‘the bodily effects which result from the collision of the bodily (perceptive) and the technological (film)’.

I discuss Kracauer’s physical, bodily theory of film in more detail in the next chapter; I show how it relates to phenomenological theories of film. Although Armstrong does not discuss phenomenology in relation to Kracauer or cinema, he does suggest that Merleau-Pontian (or proto-Merleau-Pontian) ideas on the human body play a crucial role in modernist thought: ‘modernist interventions in the body are pragmatic, moving into the world of embodied thinking’; the ‘tradition which has, from William James to Merleau-Ponty, attempted to define this penumbra of semi-conscious embodied thinking, is itself

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260 Ibid., p. 146.
another version of the modernist desire for clarification’. Later on in his monograph, Armstrong states that ‘the insistence on the ontological priority of the body which we see in many modernist writers is the opposite of materialism (the same might be argued of the phenomenological insistence on the reality of the body)’: the body is not reduced to its material components – it is not seen in Cartesian terms (as the material counterpart to a non-material mind), but as an integrated subject-object inextricably linked to the world. This anti-Cartesian strain in modernist thinking is explored in detail in chapter four of this thesis, focusing on physical comedy, trick-films and the mind/ body blurring that occurs throughout *Ulysses*.

In chapter five of this thesis, I look at the ways in which *Ulysses* and early cinema incorporate the spectator’s body into the action. Echoing Bazin’s view of cinema as immersive space, Martin Leer suggests that early cinema was predominantly spatial rather than temporal: ‘[b]odily movement entering representational space was of course one of the defining characteristics of modernist art from the invention of cinematography’. Leer views cinematic and painterly space phenomenologically. Echoing my above discussions (especially my discussion of the *Brillo Box* example), Leer explains that there is significant ‘crossover between the observer, vision and the view, and between the senses like vision and touch’; once an artist has recognised the observer as an embodied and enworlded subject, ‘a classic perspectival landscape is no longer possible’ – ‘one cannot assume a fixed position of the observer’.

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263 Ibid., p. 105.
265 Ibid., pp. 282 and 293.
Leer employs the complex Merleau-Pontian concept of ‘flesh’, which I discuss in detail in the next chapter. As well as quoting Merleau-Ponty directly (at some length), Leer looks at how ‘flesh’ has been appropriated by ecological theorists and philosophers of space. He discusses Edward Casey’s use of ‘flesh’ in his analyses of natural landscapes. As Casey explains, Merleau-Pontian ‘[f]lesh is not only my flesh; flesh ‘also belongs to my circumambient setting experienced as “landscape world”’ – the landscape’s ‘flesh intertwines with my flesh, and each is continuous with the other’. Just as we can become intertwined with a human Other, we can become inextricably interlinked with our landscape. Leer takes this ecological dimension of Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology and argues that it is equally applicable to representations of landscapes, or representations of any type of space or place. While I argue that cinema presents a particularly powerful form of immersive space, Leer suggests that modern paintings are just as able to simultaneously incorporate and be incorporated by the spectator; in particular, he references Giacomo Balla’s *Dynamism of a Dog on a Leash*, Marcel Duchamp’s *Nude Descending a Staircase* (both from 1912), Franz Marc’s *The Fate of the Animals* (1913), and Braque’s and Kandinsky’s landscape paintings.

**LITERARY MODERNISM AND PHENOMENOLOGY**

As stated in the introduction to this chapter, how a scholar sees the modernism and cinema relationship depends on how they see cinema. Like some of the other scholars discussed above, I see cinema as human, intersubjective, and embodied, rather than impersonal, neutral, and automaton-like. Thus, when arguing for parallels between *Ulysses*

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266 Edward Casey quoted in Martin Leer, “‘I Already Live in the Landscape’, p. 289. Casey’s italics.
267 Ibid., p. 293.
and early cinema, I focus on the ways in which the films and the text convey, explore, and prompt intersubjectivity and embodied ways of seeing. While some scholars just focus on cinematic instances of these qualities, others only focus on textual instances. Both film-focused and text-focused approaches are relevant to my interdisciplinary study. Modernism-and-phenomenology studies are particularly pertinent, even when they concentrate solely on literature. It is to these types of studies that I now turn.

Michael O’Sullivan’s *The Incarnation of Language* (2008), specifically explores *linguistic* ways of conveying and incorporating embodiment in modernist texts. According to O’Sullivan, ‘Joyce was eager to unsettle all received narrative strategies by making manifest the body in the word’; in ‘like manner, phenomenology’s concern to describe how states […] are made manifest to consciousness has privileged the body’s role in mediating experience’. O’Sullivan makes a helpful and valid point in defence of his phenomenological approach: ‘post-structuralist and deconstructive criticism of Joyce has all too often focused on disembodied accounts of difference and alterity in bringing the fruits of phenomenology to bear on his work’. O’Sullivan’s phenomenological account of Joyce’s work, like my own, is distinctly *embodied*. O’Sullivan argues that Joyce was fascinated by incarnation, as evidenced most clearly in Molly and Leopold Bloom’s obsession with the word ‘metempsychosis’ and Stephen’s visitations from his dead (yet corporeal) mother.

For O’Sullivan, Joyce’s *Finnegans Wake* (1939) is a body: ‘textual work is represented as an extension of the work of the body’. He compares Shem’s author-God-text-body to Gilles Deleuze’s (arguably) phenomenology-inflected “body without organs”, a body which is not derived from a “Man-God” but is, instead, “an inclusive disjunction that carries out the

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269 Ibid., p. 60.
270 Ibid., p. 105.
This Deleuzian approach is based largely on the fact that Shem describes his body as ‘a dividual chaos [...] common to allflesh, human only, mortal’ (FW 39). I would argue that this Joycean form of incarnation is actually closer to Merleau-Ponty’s concept of ‘flesh’, and its interrelated sub-notions: ‘chiasm’, ‘reversibility’, and ‘incorporeity’. These complex notions are explored in detail in chapter three of this thesis, and employed in my discussions of Ulysses and early cinema, in chapters four and five.

For O’Sullivan, while Finnegans Wake is, in itself, a body, Ulysses encourages the bodies of its readers to become part of the text: Joyce ‘wishes to inaugurate a circuitry of reciprocation between the body of the reader and the body suggested in the words on the page, an incarnation of sorts’. Although O’Sullivan argues that this form of reader incarnation occurs throughout Ulysses, he focuses on the ‘Penelope’ episode: when reading Molly’s monologue, the ‘reader takes up the role of communicant in the text, discovering and enacting a readerly “auto-revelation” through what she realises is the expression of a means of achieving such self-awareness’. Indeed, as O’Sullivan states, for Joyce, ‘reading creates its own world – the book as world’; the reader ‘becomes incarnated in the moments of the text’. In chapter five, I explore similar phenomenological ideas of incarnation in relation to early cinema’s ‘phantom ride’ and panorama films and the ‘Wandering Rocks’ episode of Ulysses. I suggest that, rather than copying cinema’s embodiment and incorporation techniques, Joyce employs his own literary versions.

While O’Sullivan talks about readers being ‘incarnated’ in texts, Cheryl Herr discusses the ways in which Joyce prompts embodied experience outside of the text: ‘Joyce manipulates language in order to have the reader experience his/her own encounter with

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273 Ibid., p. 76.
274 Ibid., pp. 64 and 84. O’Sullivan’s italics.
reality’. Herr examines the ways in which Joyce emphasises the embodied nature of being. She briefly mentions Merleau-Ponty’s theories of embodiment, but mainly discusses Heidegger’s ideas. As Herr explains, ‘Heidegger wanted to grasp and describe the everyday routines that coordinate embodiment and embeddedness in a given world, that elude the naïve belief that the subject is here and the object is there’. ‘Embeddedness’ is the Heideggerian idea that we are always already embedded in the world as embodied subjects – the world is not a separate object, but something that we are part of and inhabit. This idea of embeddedness, coupled with embodiment and the consequent blurring of subject and object, is what Heidegger refers to when he uses the term ‘Being-in-the-world’.

As Herr points out, ‘Being-in-the-world’ is not something obscure or unfamiliar: it simply consists in our everyday, unreflective abilities, abilities we employ in getting on with others and making use of ordinary things’.

For Herr, Joyce’s depiction of shaving – which opens *Ulysses* – is particularly phenomenological as it portrays an embodied and embedded subject: when ‘Joyce depicts shaving, he invokes a state beyond even stream-of-consciousness in which the shaver is fully, wordlessly engaged’. Buck Mulligan ‘brings all of his physical attention and embodied knowhow to the task of preparing his face for the day’; the ‘tonsorial tools of his masculinity help to create Mulligan’s identity, his intimate lifeworld’. Joyce’s textual visualisation of the shaving scene adds to its phenomenological rendering. Herr suggests

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276 For mentions of Merleau-Ponty, see ‘Joyce and the Art of Shaving’, p. 5, and ‘Being in Joyce’s World’, p. 171.
280 Ibid.
that the real subject of the scene is not Mulligan; it is his shaving bowl, razor, and brush: ‘I
suggest that we refocus – to move character into the background and to bring Mulligan’s
shaving equipment front and centre’; this subject/object reversal places us on the way
towards a post-dualistic view of Being-in-the-world’.\(^\text{281}\) By emphasising the object
(Mulligan’s shaving equipment) and deemphasising the subject (Mulligan), Joyce shows that
the world is not a separate object – the shaving equipment and Mulligan are reciprocally
engaged in Being-in-the-world. Interestingly, Herr likens the passage to a film, but does not
discuss this parallel any further: ‘Stephen enters the scene through his association with the
razor’; in ‘cinematic terms, a cut from razor to Stephen Dedalus and back again would make
the connection’.\(^\text{282}\)

Joyce’s literary navigations of Dublin are, for Herr, equally as phenomenological as
his depiction of shaving. She argues that, in \textit{A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man}, ‘the
streets of Dublin and the practice of walking in the city not only transform Stephen’s sense
of the world but also materially shape his emergent Being-in-the-world’.\(^\text{283}\) Dublin actually
becomes part of Stephen’s body: the ‘roads that he has traveled have etched themselves
into his brain’; ‘his skeleton map is indelibly part of his physical comportment’.\(^\text{284}\) As well as
portraying walking, Joyce depicts tram and carriage rides – in the \textit{Dubliners} story ‘Clay’ and
in the ‘Hades’ episode of \textit{Ulysses}. Both depictions present fully embodied characters
engaging the world through moving through it. As Herr notes, whilst writing \textit{Dubliners}, Joyce
wrote home to his Dubliner aunt (Josephine) to ask for ‘tram-tickets, advts, handbills,
posters papers, programmes &c’.\(^\text{285}\) Herr suggests that Joyce used these artefacts to create

\(^{281}\) Cheryl Temple Herr, ‘Joyce and the Art of Shaving’, p. 12.
\(^{282}\) Ibid.
\(^{284}\) Ibid., p. 420.
a fully human experience of the world, rather than to create a historically accurate depiction of early 1900s Dublin: ‘Although [in ‘Clay’] Maria is not shown purchasing her ticket, is it not likely that Joyce wanted to possess a proper ticket as a way to get in touch with the embodied and embedded experience of riding a tram in Dublin?’.

Again, early cinema – particularly ‘phantom rides’ – would be a useful parallel here.

According to AnnKatrin Jonsson, Anglo-American modernism as a whole displays ‘a phenomenological manner of thinking’, in the sense that it challenges traditional binaries of self/other, subject/world, and mind/body. Jonsson’s Relations, like this thesis, appeals to phenomenology in order to offer an alternative to the view of ‘modernism as a poetics of depersonalization or anti-subjectivism’. Jonsson is particularly interested in phenomenological ethics, specifically the work of Emmanuel Levinas: to ‘some extent, my study reads the three novels through Levinasian ethics, as I want to indicate how modernist literature interrupts the complacency of the self as same, and instead relates or enacts an openness and exposure towards the world and the other’. Despite Jonsson’s focus on ethics, her monograph and my thesis focus on similar phenomenological topics, and both pay particular attention to Joyce’s Ulysses. Indeed, I agree with Jonsson’s assertion that Joyce’s novel is phenomenological in the sense that it ‘moves away from a view of the subject as cogito’ and ‘represents an embodied subject who relates with the world and the other’.

Like Jonsson, I do not argue for any direct link between Ulysses and phenomenology but, instead, suggest that Joyce is likely to have been aware of phenomenological (or proto-

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288 Ibid., p. 23.
289 Ibid., p. 32.
290 Ibid., p. 188.
phenomenological) ideas. As Jonsson states, the ‘beginnings of phenomenology were contemporaneous with modernism and were engaged in similar questions’; ‘it is known that Joyce read works of philosophers, both pre-modern and modern, as well as theologians and mystics, it is hardly useful to ascribe straight lines of influence’.\(^{291}\) Despite the similarities between our projects, Jonsson’s study concentrates solely on literature. Although Jonsson asserts that ‘modernism’ is both a ‘cultural force’ and an ‘aesthetic project’, interlinked with ‘social, political, technological, and philosophical discourses’, her focus is on the written word; she does not, for example, discuss cinema, photography, or art.\(^{292}\)

Significantly, however, Jonsson sees Joyce’s depictions of mirrorings in Ulysses as being particularly important. She states that, for Joyce, reflections are ‘always an imagination or partial seeing, since I cannot really see myself the way others see me’.\(^{293}\) This is strictly true, of course. As noted above, and discussed in more detail in chapter five of this thesis, we can actually gain a fairly good insight into how others might see us by watching ourselves on screen, especially if we are filmed going about our everyday business in our local environment, as in Mitchell and Kenyon’s Living Dublin films (1902-3). Interestingly, after asserting that ‘I cannot really see myself the way others see me’, Jonsson gives a substantial amount of space to an examination of a passage which has close affinities with pre-cinematic projection, specifically shadow plays. She discusses a scene in which Stephen momentarily steps outside of himself and views his shadow as ‘me’: ‘His shadow lay over the rocks’; ‘Me sits there’ (U 3.408-10). This would certainly appear to be a case of seeing oneself as others sees one, and a proto-cinematic one at that. In chapter five, I discuss this

\(^{292}\) Ibid., p. 22.
\(^{293}\) Ibid., p. 68.
cinematic idea of *seeing ourselves as others see us* in more detail; I also explore the extent to which this othered form of perception is inherently phenomenological.

As Kevin Hart notes, ‘[f]ew artists in the modernist age were finely attuned to phenomenology in a technical sense’. 294 However, it does not follow that modernists were uninterested in phenomenology’s insights, nor does it preclude the – conscious or unconscious – presence of phenomenological ideas in modernist works. Ariane Mildenberg explains that she ‘does not examine the direct influence of phenomenology on the modernist aesthetic project but calls attention to their kinship of method and concern’. 295 By drawing attention to phenomenologically resonant elements and ideas in texts, images, buildings, and pieces of music, the collection verifies the existence of a phenomenological vein in modernism. As Mildenberg and Carole Bourne-Taylor perceptively note, ‘modernism and phenomenology steadfastly crystalize the same preoccupations: dislodging [subjectivity] from the hegemony of rationalism, realism and objectivity, they bespeak a crisis of values and scientific foundations that lead to a reappraisal of the self’. 296

Given that modernism and phenomenology have so many shared concerns, it seems strange that the intersection between the two fields has not been more widely researched. Herr criticises Joyce scholars for neglecting phenomenology in favour of deconstruction and poststructuralism: given ‘that Derrida and other poststructuralists have routinely testified to Joyce’s powerful influence on their thought, contemporary Joyceans have been reluctant to return to pre-poststructuralist perspectives in order to understand Joyce’s role in the history of phenomenology’. 297 According to Herr, the ‘deconstructionist/poststructuralist reception

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296 Ibid., p. 5.
of Joyce has left us poorly equipped to appreciate the fact that his writing fundamentally privileges metaphysical speculation’. 298 Indeed, for Herr, Joyce is a philosopher himself, in the sense that ‘his writing was motivated by issues that he encountered as metaphysical issues’. 299

Hart suggests that ‘we can [now] begin to read literary works with more subtlety than had been possible for an earlier generation for whom phenomenology was no more than “criticism of consciousness”’. 300 This comment brings to mind a related assertion voiced by Ulrika Maude and Matthew Feldman, the editors of Beckett and Phenomenology: ‘as a result of the overwhelming prominence in the 1960s and 1970s of existentialist analyses across the range of modern literature, followed by Derrida’s critique of the “phenomenology of presence”, [...] phenomenology was reduced either to its transcendent form or glossed over as existentialism and, as a consequence, avoided if not spurned’. 301 My thesis builds upon this new, more considered, more phenomenologically sophisticated, approach to modernism-and-phenomenology by focusing in depth on the concepts of Merleau-Ponty and on how they help us to illuminate the parallel preoccupations of early cinema and Joyce’s Ulysses.

CONCLUSION: A PHENOMENOLOGY OF JOYCE AND EARLY CINEMA

Rather than positing direct links between Joyce and cinema or Joyce and phenomenology, I argue for parallel philosophies or ideas. Like other phenomenologically-

299 Ibid., p. 3.
300 Kevin Hart, ‘Preface’, p. xii.
inclined scholars, I see phenomenology as a useful and timely alternative to related-yet-distinctive poststructuralist and existential approaches. Primarily, however, I employ phenomenology as its concepts match those found in Joyce’s texts and because it enables scholars to provide a sophisticated and much-needed counterpart to what I have referred to as the ‘non-human’ or ‘impersonal’ view of modernism and cinema. Phenomenology is particularly useful for investigating embodiment, enworldedness, and binaries such as mind/body, incorporeal/corporeal, machine/human, self/other, subject/object, presence/absence, film/spectator, and reader/text. The ‘non-human’ approach either ignores these areas or favours one side of the binary over another.

This chapter has also shown how certain figures and concepts come to play a fundamental – yet often unchallenged – role in modernism-and-cinema study. Bazin is a key example. I have shown the diverse guises that Bazin can take; for proponents of the ‘non-human’ approach, Bazin is an advocate of cinematic impersonality and mechanism whilst, for more human-focused approaches, Bazin praises machine-human interaction and embodied intersubjectivity.

Bazin is often at the centre of one critical and prevalent mistake – the equation of mechanical seeing and pre-conscious perception. As I have begun to explain, perception which is immediate and non-rational is not necessarily mechanical and automatist; it can usefully and appropriately be seen as the product of our pre-conscious, ever-present phenomenal field. Similarly, the concept of mimesis (an important part of Bazin’s film-philosophy) has been shown to be a key concept for both ‘human’ and ‘non-human’ approaches. For Trotter, mimesis (or ‘hypermimesis’) is pure mechanical reproduction; it is entirely automatic and inhuman. However, following Gosetti-Ferencei and Jonsson, I have suggested that mimesis and mirroring highlight and enable the blurring of subjectivity and
objectivity, film and spectator, real and imitation, mechanical and organic. For Bazin, mimesis is not mechanism and not reproduction; it is intersubjectivity, immersion, and simultaneity. In short, Bazin is much closer to phenomenology than has previously been recognised, so his film theories should not and cannot be (unthinkingly) used in support of ‘non-human’ approaches.

Having explained the background to my research, in terms of Joyce-and-cinema studies, modernism-and-cinema theories, and phenomenological accounts of modernist writing, in the next chapter I provide a fuller explanation of the specifics of my phenomenological approach. I look at the ways in which phenomenological ideas have provided film theorists from the late nineteenth century onwards with concepts for understanding and interpreting early cinema.
CHAPTER 3

MERLEAU-PONTIAN FILM-PHENOMENOLOGY:

PHILOSOPHIES OF FILM FROM THE 1890s TO THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY

As already noted, my thesis provides a phenomenological perspective on the film/literature relationship. This chapter details the specifics of my phenomenologically-informed approach. My stance is Merleau-Pontian, rather than Husserlian, Heideggerian, or Sartrean. Thus, in part one of this chapter, I detail Merleau-Ponty’s ideas on cinema, as expressed in his 1945 essay ‘The Film and the New Psychology’. I then work outwards from Merleau-Ponty’s essay, and explain how his ideas on cinema relate to his wider philosophy and, conversely, how some of his key philosophical ideas can be related back to cinema. I also look at the ways in which recent film-philosophers have used Merleau-Ponty’s theory to build their own film-phennomenologies.

In part two, I examine proto-Merleau-Pontian film-philosophies. Film-philosophy did not exist as a distinct scholarly field during the period in which early film-makers were working (circa. 1895 to the early 1920s), but from the early 1900s onwards critics and theorists began to think carefully about, and write articulately on, film and film-making. I identify two strains of early film-philosophy which I consider to be proto-Merleau-Pontian: perception-focused (including the work of Max Wertheimer, Hugo Münsterberg, and Rudolf Arnheim) and haptic-focused (including the work of Victor Freeburg, Sergei Eisenstein, and Siegfried Kracauer). Before analysing these two strains, I explore the work of Henri Bergson, as his film-philosophy is significant for both perception-focused and haptic-focused approaches, although he does not directly follow either approach. Although my thesis is not
a study of influence, I end this chapter by considering the extent to which Joyce would have been aware of early phenomenology and proto-film-phenomenologies. I am primarily interested in the ways in which phenomenology permeated literary modernist and early film consciousnesses.

I: MERLEAU-PONTIAN FILM-PHENOMENOLOGY

Merleau-Ponty has been a driving force in film-phenomenology. However, he only ever wrote one essay on cinema - ‘The Film and the New Psychology’. The essay was originally presented as an invited lecture at l’Institut des Hautes Etudes Cinématographiques in 1945. In the essay, Merleau-Ponty uses film to help him think through and explain his ideas on perception and the self. He pits cinematic perception – which is simultaneously a model for his own theory of perception – against classical explanations of perception. The ideas expressed in the essay reverberate in Merleau-Ponty’s wider work. As I explain below, for Merleau-Ponty, perception is embodied, ‘enworlded’, and intersubjective. Films perfectly display real-life perception as, according to Merleau-Ponty, ‘the movies are peculiarly suited to make manifest the union of mind and body, mind and world, and the expression of one in the other’. Films also show us how we relate to others: ‘[t]hey directly present to us that special way of being in the world, of dealing with things and other people’.

Merleau-Ponty’s three interrelated ideas on film’s successes – film’s ability to show the intermingling of mind and body, mind and world, and self and other – will structure my

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303 Ibid., p. 58.
discussion of Merleau-Pontian film-phenomenology. Within each of these three subsections, I explain key Merleau-Pontian and film-phenomenological terms: the ‘body-subject’, Gestalt theory, and the perception of moving images, in the ‘mind and body’ section; ‘intentionality’, the ‘phenomenal field’, and the enworlded camera-body, in the ‘mind and world’ section; and gesture, ‘flesh’, and haptic seeing, in the ‘self and other’ section.

MAKING MANIFEST THE UNION OF MIND AND BODY

According to Merleau-Ponty, films ‘make manifest the union of mind and body’ that exists in real life. It is important to note that the ‘union of mind and body’ is not an accepted given. Merleau-Ponty’s anti-dualist theory of the mind/ body relationship – which films are supposed to ‘make manifest’ – is highly contentious; it opposes classical psychology and philosophy. Mind/ body dualism, most famously propounded by René Descartes (1596 – 1650), has tended to be the preferred theory. In general terms, dualism is the view that mind and body are distinct and divisible entities. For Descartes, the mind is an immaterial thinking thing, and the body is a material non-thinking thing. Because they are such different entities, it is perfectly possible for a mind to exist without a body. According to Descartes, ‘the machine of our body’ can ‘be moved [...] with no help from the soul’; our body and mind can work independently and are divisible. For Merleau-Ponty, on the other hand, mind and body are indivisible; ‘[i]nside and outside are inseparable.’

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305 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, p. 407.
Merleau-Ponty writes in ‘The Film and the New Psychology’, ‘[p]yschology did not begin to develop until the day it gave up the distinction between mind and body’.  

‘BODY-SUBJECT’ VS. MECHANICAL BODY

According to Merleau-Ponty, a human being cannot be reduced to either an immaterial mind, or a purely mechanical body. However, humans do contain mechanical elements; Merleau-Ponty describes these elements as ‘the inhuman secret of the bodily mechanism’ – our organ-system and anatomy. Film also has a mechanical side, although it is normally hidden from the spectator’s view in the finished, screened film. Film’s ‘secret’ internal bodily organs include its metal, glass, celluloid or nitrate form. Film’s projector and screen parallel a human being’s external bodily organs. As the contemporary film-phenomenologist Vivian Sobchack notes, like materialist theories of the body, materialist theories of film assume that ‘perception and expression can be reduced to their anatomical and physiological material’; they ignore ‘the transcendent function of that anatomy and physiology’. Phenomenology, on the other hand, recognises that, while mechanics may allow perception and expression to occur, they are not the only necessary elements; the body’s and the film’s mechanical elements are enabling, but they do not constitute the body or film – they are just part of the body or film.

As Sobchack rightly states, ‘[w]hat needs emphasis here is the difference between living one’s body and seeing it’; ‘for both the film and for us, living the body [...] as me and

for me, is not perceptively or perceptibly the same as living “one’s body” in its material existence for others, or as I might see my body if it were not mine’. In the *Phenomenology of Perception*, Merleau-Ponty explains the difference between our body as an object, and our body as it is lived: ‘our body is not an object for an “I think”, it is a grouping of lived-through meanings’. Our body is not just a collection of mechanisms, as it may appear to be when it is laid out on an operating table. Our body is us; it is our muscle memories and our habits. This is how we are able to perceive directly through our bodies – because our bodies are more than collections of mechanisms.

As Merleau-Ponty explains, ‘my body and my senses are precisely that familiarity with the world born of habit, that implicit or sedimentary body of knowledge’. Our bodies are subjective; they are knowledgeable. In a useful essay on Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy of subjectivity, Eric Matthews elucidates the link between Merleau-Ponty’s anti-dualism and his theory of embodied perception: Merleau-Ponty sees ‘human beings neither as disembodied minds nor as complex machines’; ‘we experience living human bodies [...] not as bits of machinery, but as the expression of a human person and his or her mode of being in the world’. Matthews, like most Merleau-Ponty commentators, uses the term ‘body-subject’ as shorthand for Merleau-Ponty’s complex notion of embodied subjectivity. While this term does not perfectly capture Merleau-Ponty’s notion, it will be used throughout my thesis from this point onwards. Neither the term ‘body-subject’ nor its French equivalent *corps-sujet* is ever used by Merleau-Ponty himself, but commentators often use the expression as short-hand for Merleau-Ponty’s theory of mind/body mingling. The hyphen in

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311 Ibid., p. 238.
‘body-subject’ highlights the fact that, unlike theories which separate the body from the subject (where the subject is situated in the mind), Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy posits an intermingled relationship between the two entities. As Merleau-Ponty explains in his film essay, the disregard for the lived nature of subjectivity, and the failure to recognise that subjectivity is experienced in and through a body-in-the-world, are the key failings of dualist theories; ‘classical psychology abandoned the lived world for the one which scientific intelligence succeeded in constructing’.313

GESTALT PERCEPTION

For classical psychologists, perception involves two separate stages, one carried out by the body and the other performed, subsequently, by the mind; first the body senses objects, then the mind understands them. A Merleau-Ponty explains, according to classical psychology, our visual field is constructed by intelligence and memory; ‘[e]ven the objects right in front of me are not truly seen but merely thought’.314 For example, we do not immediately see a cube as a cube. Our eyes see one particular surface of the cube, then our minds restore the hidden surfaces so that we can perceive it as a cube: ‘I cannot see a cube as its geometrical definition presents it’; ‘I can only think it’.315 According to Merleau-Ponty films do not conform to this classical model, as ‘a movie is not thought; it is perceived’.316 Indeed, for Merleau-Ponty, everything is perceived rather than thought. In this sense, films mirror reality.

314 Ibid., p. 50.
315 Ibid., p. 50. My italics.
316 Ibid., p. 58.
In ‘Film and the New Psychology’, Merleau-Ponty suggests that it is the ‘gestalt’ quality of films which enables them to be immediately perceived rather than indirectly thought. Instead of offering a collection of unconnected images which the viewer must then fit together using his or her intellect, cinema presents a ‘temporal gestalt’; film viewers perceive a unified, immediately comprehensible whole. In gestalt theory, there is no second step – no secondary meaning-making or intellectual judgement. As Merleau-Ponty notes, gestalt theory ‘teaches us to stop distinguishing [...] between what is sensed and what is judged’; in reality, both perceptual operations occur simultaneously and automatically. Real-life perception is like cinematic perception; ‘a movie has meaning in the same way that a thing does’. Contrary to what classical psychology tells us, whether we are at the cinema, or out in the world, we immediately perceive a unified whole (a gestalt) which makes sense in itself and does not require secondary input from our intellect.

Gestalt perception is a form of ‘pre-conscious’ perception: it does not require separate, rational analysis. As explained in chapter two, for Merleau-Ponty, pre-conscious perception – or ‘primary perception’ – is ‘pre-objective’ and ‘non-thetic’ (or ‘non-positing’); instead of enlisting the rational mind, pre-conscious perception is immediate. Merleau-Ponty illustrates cinema’s pre-conscious, gestalt quality through reference to the film-making techniques of Vsevolod Pudovkin. Taken as separate images, the elements of Pudovkin’s montage do not make sense, and our intellect cannot help us to decipher their combined meaning. Pudovkin’s cinematic montage is a type of temporal gestalt; we perceive its meaning immediately, without thinking: the ‘succession of scenes creates a new

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318 Ibid., p. 50.
319 Ibid., p. 58.
320 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, p. 242.
reality which is not merely the sum of its parts’. In the montage sequence that Merleau-
Ponty describes, Pudovkin alternates a close-up of a face displaying a blank expression with
a bowl of soup, a women lying in a coffin, and a child playing with a teddy-bear. The
immediate sense that these images make as part of a temporal gestalt (a unified sequence)
is incomparable with the separate meanings that each individual image might once have
had. The ‘meaning of a shot […] depends on what precedes it in the movie’; each image’s
meaning is created by what surrounds it. Viewers automatically perceive – rather than
cogitate – this relational, gestalt meaning.

EMBODIED MOVEMENT-PERCEPTION

Tellingly, Merleau-Ponty uses moving images to illustrate his gestalt-inspired theory
of perception. According to Merleau-Ponty, all moving images (whether on or off screen)
are perceived as moving images, not thought of as – or intellectually understood to be –
moving images. In ‘The Film and the New Psychology’, this idea is illustrated using the real-
life image of a steeple and clouds: ‘[s]ometimes I see the steeple motionless against the sky
with clouds floating above it, and sometimes the clouds appear still and the steeple falls
through space’, ‘[b]ut […] the choice of the fixed point is not made by the intelligence’. Instead of employing a separate intellect, we perceive motion – or apparent motion –
directly, through our united mind-body or ‘body-subject’. In Phenomenology of Perception,
Merleau-Ponty elucidates his ideas on perception through considering the movement of a
thrown stone. If we watch a stone flying through the air, we do not comprehend its motion;
instead, we simply and immediately perceive its motion: ‘[t]he stone is not conceived, but

322 Ibid., p. 54.
323 Ibid., p. 52.
seen in motion’; ‘I cannot force myself to see the stone as motionless, and the garden and myself as in motion’.

For Merleau-Ponty, movement is not ‘one of those “psychic phenomena”, as classical psychologists would have us believe. The stone moving through the air, or the moving clouds and/or steeple, is perceived instantaneously through our enmeshed mind-body. Merleau-Ponty argues that we cannot, through inner mental activity, force ourselves to see separate frames rather than continuous movement. To see the steeple, rather than the clouds, move, or to perceive still film-frames rather than the moving images, would require an adjustment of our position in the world, not merely a new mental judgement. As Merleau-Ponty explains, the ‘relation between the moving object and its background passes through our body [which is always body-subject, a subjective body]’; ‘[w]hat makes part of the field count as an object in motion, and another as the background, is the way in which we establish our relations with them by the act of looking’. It is in this respect (in his view that perception is embodied), that Merleau-Ponty differs from other gestalt theorists. As explained in section two, below, Gestaltists Max Wertheimer, Hugo Münsterberg, and Rudolf Arnheim, propose a less bodily – yet still pre-conscious – theory of perception.

According to Merleau-Ponty then, we are able to perceive movement immediately and automatically because we are melded mind-bodies (or body-subjects) and because we are also melded with the world, because we are body-subject-worlds. In short, perception (both in real life and at the cinema) is dependent upon our relationship with the world, as well as the mind’s relationship with the body. It is to this amalgamation – of body-subject and world – that we turn next.

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325 Ibid., p. 271.
326 Ibid., p. 278.
As well as showing the embodied nature of subjectivity, Merleau-Ponty’s two explanations of movement perception demonstrate the intimate interconnections between a person and their environment. As phenomenological scientist Joseph Rouse explains, ‘[p]erceived movement is rooted in the bodily grasp we have upon the world as a situation into which we project ourselves’; ‘[m]ovement is a solicitation to our body to track the moving thing against a field in which we are already established’. In other words, we perceive movement – and non-moving objects for that matter – by automatically anchoring our perceiving bodies (our mind-bodies or body-subjects) at one particular point in the world.

As Merleau-Ponty states in the *Phenomenology of Perception*, ‘[t]o see an object is [...] to concentrate on it’ and, ‘[w]hen I do concentrate my eyes on it, I become anchored in it’ The concentration of the perceiver is not cerebral, nor is it solely bodily in the traditional – materialist – sense; perceiving requires a subject which is both embodied and enworlded. For Merleau-Ponty, ‘to look at the object is to plunge oneself into it’. This plunging involves both intent towards the object of perception and an established relationship with all of the objects in one’s immediate environment. In Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology, this intent is called ‘intentionality’ and the already established relationship with worldly objects is called the ‘phenomenal field’.

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329 Ibid., p. 67.
'INTENTIONALITY’, ‘ATTENTION’, AND THE ‘PHENOMENAL FIELD’

*Intentionality* and *attention* form part of Merleau-Ponty’s Gestalt-inspired theory of perception; these concepts help to explain how we automatically organise what we perceive (our *phenomenal field*). As summarised by Sobchack, perception, for Merleau-Ponty, ‘is a gestalt, the organising activity of an embodied intentionality’; our ‘operational choices’ are effected by the ‘attention’ we pay to the world and the ‘grounded figures that we have actively “taken up” and signified without a conscious thought’. In a way, intention and intentionality are confusing words to use as, in normal speech, intent often implies a cognitive input – if we intend to do something we think about it using our minds. However, Merleau-Pontian intentionality is non-cognitive and immediate. As Merleau-Ponty states, ‘intentionality [...] is [...] not a matter of “I think that” but of “I can”’. It is through our non-cerebral intentions towards an object (our automatic ‘I can’ motions towards them), that the object in question immediately has meaning for us.

As explained above, it is not our intellect that allows us to perceive a cube as a cube; we do not see it as an undetermined shape then use our judgement to decide what it is. We perceive the cube as a cube immediately and automatically because we have a non-cognitive intention, or innate directedness, towards our perceptual object. In his explanation of intentionality, the phenomenological sociologist Nick Crossley uses the example of driving a car: ‘[m]y feet intend the pedals of my car’; the ‘pedals exist for me by way of my use of them’. Things only exist for us, or have meaning for us, because of our automatic intentions towards them and because of their already established position in our world – because they are part of our ‘phenomenal field’.

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331 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, p. 137.
The term ‘phenomenal field’ describes our world as it appears to us, as enworlded body-subjects. As Merleau-Ponty explains, the ‘phenomenal field is not an “inner world”’, nor is it a neutral, objective world.333 Because the world is necessarily perceived through body-subjects who are always already entrenched in their environment, the world is our phenomenal field. As Merleau-Ponty commentator Taylor Carman explains, ‘the “phenomenal field” is neither a representation nor a locus of representations, but a dimension of our bodily embeddedness in a perceptually coherent environment’.334 The phenomenal field enables our intentionality, and intentionality allows us to perceive things coherently and instantaneously. However, our phenomenal field is not immediately apparent to us – sometimes we need to articulate it through the act of ‘attention’.

As Merleau-Ponty explains, the ‘first operation of attention is […] to create for itself a [phenomenal] field’ which ‘can be “surveyed”’.335 Merleau-Pontian ‘attention’ is a creative “knowledge-bringing event” which helps us to cement our phenomenal field and, thus, allows us to distinctly perceive an object or a scene.336 As Merleau-Ponty states, to ‘pay attention is not merely further to elucidate pre-existing data, it is to bring about a new articulation of them by taking them as figures’, rather than background.337 Attention is an inventive process: it is ‘neither an association of images, nor the return to itself of thought already in control of its objects, but the active constitution of a new object which makes explicit and articulate what was until then presented as no more than an indeterminate horizon’.338 In short, attention is the process which (when required) articulates the phenomenal field, enabling intentionality to be forged. In future instances of similar

333 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, p. 57.
335 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, p. 29. Merleau-Ponty’s italics.
336 Ibid., p. 30.
337 Ibid., p. 30.
experiences, the articulations created through attention can be immediately perceived through intentionality.

Merleau-Ponty uses the example of ‘the act of attention whereby [one] locate[s] a point on [one’s] body which is being touched’. At first, the tactile sensation is merely a ‘vaguely located spot’ on the edges of our perceptual horizon. The sensation is not, at first, part of our phenomenal field; we are dimly aware of it existing, but it does not yet have a place for us – it does not have a location or a cause. The act of attention allows us to locate and articulate this particular instance of touch. In Merleau-Ponty’s words, the ‘act of attention can localize or objectify this invariable factor because it has stepped back from the changes of appearance’. This secondary aspect of attention (the specifying action which follows the field-creating action) was discussed earlier – it is the same as the process used to perceive movement. Recall the steeple and clouds and stone and background example above; ‘[w]hat makes part of the field count as an object in motion, and another as the background, is the way in which we establish our relations with them by the act of looking’. In the case of being touched, it is feeling (rather than looking) which brings a certain area of skin to the foreground, locating and elucidating our hitherto imprecise sensation. Both processes involve creative – yet non-cerebral – processes that draw attention to certain factors above other factors. The act of attention occurs naturally and immediately whenever a body-subject is presented with a perceptual object or scene which is not yet part of his/ her phenomenal field, an object or scene which is not yet graspable or articulable.

340 Ibid., p. 29. Merleau-Ponty’s italics.
341 Ibid., p. 29.
342 Ibid., p. 278.
CAMERA-INTENTIONALITY

The film-philosopher Spencer Shaw expands upon Merleau-Ponty’s ideas on moving images, intentionality, attention, and the phenomenal field; he shows how cinema enacts all four of these key phenomenological notions. As Shaw explains, ‘[o]ne could not describe the process of recording like a sense organ bombarded by a series of atomistic sensa’; ‘[r]ather, film in movement explores the chimerical quality of the phenomenal field and shows a remodelling of the environment by establishing an interlocking system of matrices and contexts’.

Filming, like perceiving, involves intentionality (of the camera and/ or cinematographer) taking place in a phenomenal field (the film set or filming location). The film-camera, like the body-subject, does not understand a cube as a cube by receiving and the cogitating ‘atomistic sensa’; the camera records a cube as cube automatically, because of its place and innate significance on the set (or in its phenomenal field). The camera only records a moving train as a moving train if it is anchored in a particular spot (if it is placed on a tripod, for example). If the camera follows the moving train, at the exact speed that the train is moving at (if the camera is attached to another moving train, next to the moving train that is being filmed, for example), the filmed train will appear to be stationary.

THE CAMERA AS A ‘SECOND BODY’

For Merleau-Ponty, the supposed person/world dichotomy is just as artificial as the classical psychologists’ mind/body dichotomy. The world is always already part of our bodily horizon and is perceived (though intentionality or attention) as part of our phenomenal field. As Merleau-Ponty states, human beings are ‘through and through

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compounded of relationships with the world'.\textsuperscript{344} A person and his/ her environment are entirely enmeshed; one does not make sense without the other: ‘I am conscious of my body \textit{via} the world’, and am ‘conscious of the world through the medium of my body’.\textsuperscript{345} In his film essay, Merleau-Ponty suggests that ‘the movies are peculiarly suited to make manifest the union of [...] mind and world’, to show the ‘inherence of the self in the world’ and ‘the bond between subject and world’.\textsuperscript{346} For Merleau-Ponty, ‘describing the mingling of consciousness with the world [...] is movie material \textit{par excellence}'.\textsuperscript{347}

Despite Merleau-Ponty’s clear admiration for cinema’s ability to show the interconnectedness of mind, body, and world, he does not give any examples of \textit{how} cinema presents this interconnectedness (apart from his aforementioned movement perception example). However, in the \textit{Phenomenology of Perception}, Merleau-Ponty provides some hints at how cinematic enworldedness might work. According to Merleau-Ponty, ‘my body itself is a thing which I do not observe’; ‘in order to be able to do so, I should need the use of a second body which itself would be unobservable’.\textsuperscript{348} Because our body is never purely an object (it is always a body-subject enmeshed in the world), we can never neutrally observe it going about its business. Indeed, if we \textit{could} observe our body in this way, it would be reduced to an object and Merleau-Ponty’s theory would be proved false. We can never stand back and observe our body’s interactions with the world and others, so we can never observe our self as an enworlded body-subject. For some film-philosophers, cinema offers this ‘second body’, with which to observe our real body and habits – this is how cinema ‘makes manifest the union of mind and world’.

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\textsuperscript{344} Maurice Merleau-Ponty, \textit{Phenomenology of Perception}, p. xiii.
\textsuperscript{345} Ibid., p. 82.
\textsuperscript{346} Maurice Merleau-Ponty, ‘The Film and the New Psychology’, p. 58.
\textsuperscript{347} Ibid., p. 59.
\textsuperscript{348} Maurice Merleau-Ponty, \textit{Phenomenology of Perception}, p. 91.
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For Shaw, ‘the camera eye serves to create images that subsequently become the spectator’s temporary habituation as virtual body’. The camera serves as the ‘second body’ that Merleau-Ponty posits; spectators cannot usually observe the camera-body at work (during filming), but they can observe how and what it sees (the finished film). Instead of trying to understand perception by attempting to reveal the inside workings of the mind or body (as classical psychology and science attempt to do), cinema allows us to observe subjective perception, without objectifying the perceiving body-subject that we watch. As Sobchack explains, the film-camera is, itself, both embodied and subjective: the ‘camera is itself substantial and thus can inhabit and move about in that world among other substantial and sensible phenomena with which it can relate existentially’.

As explained above, the real-life body-subject perceives by anchoring itself – through intentionality – at a particular point in the phenomenal field. For Shaw, cinema works in a similar way: ‘[t]he way the spectator is included in this filmic circuitry of vision is comparable to the immersion of sentient beings in the phenomenal field’; ‘[e]ach move of the film camera is likewise an adjustment of depth and the figure-ground correlation, a readjustment of the seen and the seeing’. The film camera provides an observable representation of the enworlded body-subject’s interactions with the world.

PRESENTING THE BOND BETWEEN SUBJECT AND OTHERS

According to Merleau-Ponty, films also show the ‘bond between [...] subject and others’. In ‘The Film and the New Psychology’, Merleau-Ponty discusses Alexandre

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349 Spencer Shaw, *Film Consciousness*, p. 56.
Astruc’s review of the 1941 film *Le Défunt recalcitrant*. The film tells the story of a boxer who dies in a plane crash then is reincarnated as a banker. Astruc’s review focuses on the relationship between the reincarnated protagonist and the other people that he interacts with: the ‘man remains the same for himself but is different for others, and he cannot rest until through love a girl recognizes him despite his new exterior and the harmony between *for itself* and *for others* is re-established’.

For Merleau-Ponty, Astruc’s review is pertinent, as film, in general, is particularly good at presenting subject/other relationships; film is good at ‘describing the mingling of consciousness with the world, its involvement in a body, and its coexistence with others’.

However, Astruc’s view on subject/other relations is based on Jean-Paul Sartre’s phenomenology, which differs from Merleau-Ponty’s.

Sartre, like Merleau-Ponty, argues that our relationships with others are affective rather than epistemic – they are based on feelings rather than reason or fact. Also, *contra* Edmund Husserl, both Sartre and Merleau-Ponty assert that subject/other relationships are based on direct recognition, rather than analogy; we instantly recognise the other as a fellow person, without needing to infer it by reasoning that, because they look and behave like us, they must be a person like us. However, unlike Merleau-Ponty, Sartre’s theory of subject/other relations is antagonistic and oppositional. For Sartre, the other is always an object: ‘comprehension of my own selfness […] can and must serve as my motivation for constituting the Other as an object’.

For Merleau-Ponty, on the other hand, recognising a person as other does not entail downgrading them to object status: ‘posing the other does not reduce me to the status of an object in his field, nor does my perception of the other

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354 Ibid.
reduce him to the status of an object in mine’.\textsuperscript{356} So, according to Merleau-Ponty, the kind of subject/other relationships that films are best at showing are the kind we experience in real life – relationships where the other is instantaneously recognised as a fellow body-subject.

Because others are fellow subjects they, like us, experience certain subjective (personal) feelings and emotions. Like us, others are also \textit{embodied} subjects. Therefore, another’s emotions and feelings are not part of some separate cerebral inner life – they are always already bodily. As Merleau-Ponty states in ‘The Film and the New Psychology’, ‘a man’s body and “soul” are but two aspects of his way of being in the world’; as explained above, there is no material distinction between body and mind.\textsuperscript{357} Thus, bodily manifestations of emotions (crying, for example) and the emotions themselves (sadness) are identical with one another; crying and sadness are just two aspects of the same emotion. Emotions ‘exist on this face or in those gestures’; ‘[a]nger, shame, hate, and love are not psychic facts hidden at the bottom of another’s consciousness’ – ‘they are types of behaviour or styles of conduct which are visible from the outside’.\textsuperscript{358} Although we do not \textit{personally} experience another’s emotions (as they are subjective), we can recognise them – immediately – in another’s bodily stance, actions, or body-language (as emotions are always already bodily). For Merleau-Ponty, ‘emotion is not a psychic, internal fact but rather a variation in our relations with others and the world which is expressed in our bodily attitude’.\textsuperscript{359}

\textsuperscript{356}Maurice Merleau-Ponty, \textit{Phenomenology of Perception}, p. 352.
\textsuperscript{357}Maurice Merleau-Ponty, ‘The Film and the New Psychology’, p. 53.
\textsuperscript{358}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{359}Ibid., pp. 52-53.
THE EMBODIED LANGUAGE OF GESTURE

Although he never explicitly says so, it seems that Merleau-Ponty prefers silent films or, at least, that he is not a fan of dialogue or description based films. He suggests that the ‘spare use of words, their richness or emptiness, their precision or affection reveal the essence of a character more surely than many descriptions’.\(^{360}\) He adds that films are ‘frequently overwhelmed by dialogue’.\(^ {361}\) According to Merleau-Ponty then, silent films are particularly effective at demonstrating the body-subject’s experience of emotion, and the other’s recognition of that (body)subjective experience: films ‘directly present to us that special way of being in the world, of dealing with things and other people, which we can see in the sign language of gesture’.\(^ {362}\) For Merleau-Ponty gesture is the most effective method of filmic expression: ‘[i]f a movie wants to show us someone who is dizzy, it should not attempt to portray the interior landscape of dizziness’; ‘[w]e will get a much better sense of dizziness if we see it from the outside, if we contemplate that unbalanced body […] or that unsteady step’.\(^ {363}\) As I explain in chapter four, gesture is crucial in silent films – especially slapstick. Comedians, such as Chaplin, directly – and automatically – convey their emotions through their bodily being. As Merleau-Ponty states, ‘[t]his is why the movies can be so gripping in their presentation of man’; ‘they do not give us his thoughts, as novels have done for so long, but his conduct or behaviour’.\(^ {364}\)

In the *Phenomenology of Perception*, Merleau-Ponty situates his notion of gesture within his wider philosophy. Like our experience of perception, our understanding of another’s gestures is made possible through intentionality – the intentionality of the other:

\(^{360}\) Maurice Merleau-Ponty, ‘The Film and the New Psychology’, p. 56.
\(^{361}\) Ibid., p. 57.
\(^{362}\) Ibid., p. 58.
\(^{363}\) Ibid.
\(^{364}\) Ibid.
the ‘gesture which I witness outlines an intentional object’, and this ‘object is genuinely present and fully comprehended when the powers of my body adjust themselves to it and overlap it’, when the intentionality of the other becomes part of my phenomenal field.\footnote{Maurice Merleau-Ponty, \textit{Phenomenology of Perception}, p. 185.} To help explain gestural communication, Merleau-Ponty employs metaphorical language: ‘[i]t is as if the other person’s intention inhabited my body and mine his’.\footnote{Ibid.} However, while in the \textit{Phenomenology of Perception} intercorporeal mingling is merely a simile (an ‘as if’ or ‘like’), in Merleau-Ponty’s later writings, which were posthumously collected and published as \textit{The Visible and the Invisible}, intercorporeity is a reality.


In the \textit{Phenomenology of Perception}, Merleau-Ponty states that the body-subject is ‘both an object for others and a subject for [oneself]’.\footnote{Ibid., p. 167.} In later writings, Merleau-Ponty presents a radicalised version of subject/object intermingling. He argues that it is impossible to distinguish between ‘subject’ and ‘object’ and ‘seer’ and ‘seen’. In ‘Eye and Mind’ (1961) the body-subject ‘simultaneously sees and is seen’.\footnote{Maurice Merleau-Ponty, ‘Eye and Mind’ (1961), in Richard Kearney and David Rasmussen ed., \textit{Continental Aesthetics}, (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers Ltd, 2001), p. 290.} In Merleau-Ponty’s posthumously published work, \textit{The Visible and the Invisible}, ‘the seer and the visible reciprocate one another and we no longer know which sees and which is seen’.\footnote{Maurice Merleau-Ponty, \textit{The Visible and the Invisible}, trans. Alphonso Lingis, ed. Claude Lefort, (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1968), p. 139.} In earlier works the seer and the seen remain as separate beings; it is merely their perceptual perspectives and subject statuses that are intermingled. However, in Merleau-Ponty’s later writings there is real intercorporeity between the seer and the seen. But the seer and seen
do not fully intermerge; they are still not quite one-in-the-same being. Seer and seen are more akin to the two sides of one coin. To help explain this intercorporeity (which is not quite, but is almost, an identity relationship), Merleau-Ponty employs three innovative notions: ‘flesh’, ‘chiasm’, and ‘reversibility’.

Merleau-Ponty’s ‘flesh’ is a ‘general thing’, rather than something which belongs to a particular being.[^370] Flesh is ‘neither wholly “material” nor wholly “spiritual”’; it is more like an ‘element’ in the sense that the Ancient Greeks used to use in reference to air, water, earth, and fire.[^371] Merleau-Ponty argues that, during perception and/ or engagement with others, flesh enacts a ‘chiasm’. The term ‘chiasm’ refers both to ‘chiasma’ (a criss-cross pattern, like in weaving) and ‘chiasmus’ (the grammatical inversion of parallel phrase, such as ‘when the going gets tough, the tough get going’).[^372] This second aspect of chiasm – the inversion of parallels – merges into Merleau-Ponty’s notion of ‘reversibility’. For Merleau-Ponty, reversibility refers to the constant destabilising of the seer/ seen terms, enabled by the flesh’s chiasmatic actions; reversibility describes the constantly shifting reversal of the seer and seen, so that the seer becomes the seen and the seen becomes the seer, and vice versa, ad infinitum. Like the process that they describe, Merleau-Ponty’s three notions are completely intertwined. As Merleau-Ponty commentator Fred Evans notes, ‘Merleau-Ponty equates “flesh” with his notions of “chiasm” and “reversibility”’.[^373]

The chiasmic action of flesh produces reversibility, which enables intercorporeity. Merleau-Pontian incorporeity is not the intermingling of the material flesh of two separate bodies; it is the process in which Merleau-Ponty’s general flesh coils back upon itself by first

[^371]: Ibid.
dividing itself into the ‘flesh of the body’ and the ‘flesh of the world’, then touching itself by
touching the body-flesh with the world-flesh and *vice versa*. However, the self-dividing (or
‘dehiscence’) actions of a shared general flesh does allow *individual* body-subjects to
experience *almost*-incorporeity. As Evans explains, ‘[b]ecause we are established by the
dehiscence of the same flesh, we can *almost* see through each other’s eyes’, but ‘no sooner
do I take up your perspective than it becomes mine and no longer yours’, so full unification
(of seer and seen) is always imminent, but never fully achieved. The flesh enables the seer
and the seen to take up each other’s positions, but they never become one-in-the-same
person; the reversibility between the seer and the seen is fluid and constant, but they never
quite – but always almost – intermerge.

To illustrate his ideas of flesh and intercorporeity, Merleau-Ponty uses the analogy of
hands touching: ‘[i]f my left hand can touch my right hand while it palpates the tangibles,
can touch it touching, can turn its palpitation back upon it, why, when touching the hand of
another, would I not touch in it the same power to espouse the things that I have touched in
my own?’ In other words, the action of my right hand touching my left hand (whilst it is
also touching an object), is not so very different from touching someone else’s hand whilst it
touches an object. According to this thinking, incorporeity with another is almost-possible;
the relationship between the toucher and the touched is reversible and chiasmic, but not
ever a complete identity relationship.

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375 Ibid., p. 154.
376 Fred Evans, ‘Chiasm and Flesh’, p.192.
HAPTIC SEEING: TOUCHING HANDS/ TOUCHING FILM

Merleau-Ponty’s hands touching analogy, and its suggested potential for reversible interrelationships based on touch, has been embraced by contemporary film-philosophers. For Laura Marks, ‘Merleau-Ponty posits a primordial subjectivity, an immanent knowledge of the body, that “fleshes out” specular alienation’; ‘Merleau-Ponty [...] defini[es] a relationship between self and world that is symbiotic, indeed mimetic’. Marks uses Merleau-Ponty’s notions of flesh and reversibility to advance her haptic film theory, her thesis on the primacy of touch in film spectatorship: ‘[t]actile visuality draws upon the mimetic knowledge that does not posit a gulf between subject and object, or the spectator and the world of film’. Marks’s theory is, in part, based on Sobchack’s post-Merleau-Pontian film-phenomenology. While several aspects of Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy directly influenced Sobchack’s thinking, his notion of flesh is paramount. In The Address of the Eye, Sobchack writes: the ‘entailment of incarnate consciousness and the “flesh” of the world of which it is a part will be described as the basis for the origination of the general structures of cinematic signification’. According to Sobchack, ‘we need to [...] posit the film viewer’s lived body as a carnal “third term” that grounds and mediates [...] subjective vision and objective images – both differentiating and unifying them in reversible (or chiasmatic) processes of perception and expression’. In other words, we must see the spectator’s body and the film’s body as ‘flesh’ (in the Merleau-Pontian sense of the term).

This fleshy view of film is elucidated in Sobchack’s later work, Carnal Thoughts. In her chapter entitled ‘What my Fingers Knew: The Cinesthetic Subject, or Vision in the Flesh’,
Sobchack evokes Merleau-Ponty’s hand analogy and shows how it can be realised in film viewing. She argues that we can experience the chiasmic actions of the flesh in our own bodily flesh (the flesh of the body) via the flesh of the film screen (the flesh of the world). To illustrate her ideas, Sobchack describes the haptic experiences that she had whilst watching *The Piano* (1993): the film ‘not only “filled me up” and often “suffocated” me with feelings that resonated in and constricted my chest and stomach, but it also “sensitized” the very surfaces of my skin – as well as its own – to touch’.  

In *The Tactile Eye: Touch and the Cinematic Experience*, Jennifer Barker builds upon Sobchack’s and Marks’s ideas; she also revisits Merleau-Ponty’s hand analogy directly. Like Sobchack, Barker stretches the analogy towards (but not all the way to) literalisation. As M. C. Dillon notes, for Merleau-Ponty, there is a difference between touching your own hand and touching a table: ‘[r]eversibility obtains in both cases, but I cannot experience the table touching me in the same way the hand touched can take up the role of touching’; the ‘plain fact of the matter is that the table is neither part of my body nor sentient in the way my body is’. Barker suggests that although film, like the table, is not a sentient being, the tactile relationship between a film and its spectator parallels human-to-human intercorporeity. According to Barker, the spectator and the film ‘are in a relation of reversibility and sensual connection that exists somewhere between that of hand-touching-table and right-hand-touching-left-hand’. The film/ spectator relationship is more intimate than a skin-to-(non-human)-object relation, but less intimate than a fully fleshy skin-(of the human self)-to-skin-(of the same human self) relation.

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382 Vivian Sobchack, *Carnal Thoughts*, p. 61.
384 Ibid.
Barker draws upon Merleau-Ponty’s notion of flesh to construct her own notion of ‘skin’. As Barker explains, ‘[i]f we take “skin” to mean the literal fleshy covering of a human or animal body, then a film couldn’t possibly have a skin’, but ‘if, as Merleau-Ponty said of touch, “skin” also denotes a general style of being in the world, and if skin is […] also a mode of perception and expression […], then film can indeed be said to have a skin’. Crucially, Barker’s ‘skin’ (of the body and of the world) ‘display[s] the trait of reciprocity and reversibility that is a hallmark of [Merleau-Pontian] flesh’.

**MECHANICAL FILMS AND HUMAN SPECTATORS**

While Merleau-Ponty, himself, does not specifically talk about the film/ spectator relationship in terms of flesh and reversibility, he does see film as the perfect medium for displaying the bond between subject and others and consciousness’s ‘coexistence with others’. In *The Visible and the Invisible*, Merleau-Ponty paves the way for film/ spectator reversibility by suggesting that subject/ object reciprocity – or reversibility – can exist between artworks and art viewers: ‘as many painters have said, I feel myself looked at by the things, [and] my activity is equally passitivity’. Sobchack takes this suggestion as her starting point for her own interrelated theories on the reversible interrelationships between film-screen, film-camera, film-projector, and spectator. Whereas Barker theorises the film/ spectator relationship through the very human and fleshy – though somewhat, yet not completely, metaphorical – notion of ‘skin’, Sobchack is attentive to the fact that film-

385 Jennifer Barker, *The Tactile Eye*, p. 27.
387 Ibid., p. 27.
389 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, p. 139.
390 Sobchack quotes Merleau-Ponty’s passage about paintings and painters at length on p. 118 of *The Address of the Eye*.
screens, film-cameras, and film-projectors are not flesh and blood. As Sobchack notes, ‘the film’s body is made of a material quite different from the human flesh of our lived-bodies’. Film cameras are skinless, yet ‘embodied’, machines. However, for Sobchack, and for Merleau-Ponty, the fact that things are mechanical, rather than human (or even organic), does not prevent them from engaging in reversible relationships with humans. In Sobchack’s words, ‘whatever its material difference from the human body, the film’s body functions like our own, evolving through its perceptive activity an expressed bodily style of being in the world’.  

Sobchack’s theories on film/ spectator reversibility are, in part, influenced by Don Ihde’s philosophy of technology. For Ihde, both the machine (a microscope, for example), and the human who uses it (a scientist, let us say) have the same intentional object – the thing under the microscope slide (bacteria, for instance). Because the human and the machine have a shared intentional object, they have an embodied relationship – the body of the microscope and the scientist are both directed towards the bacteria, so their bodies necessarily intermingle. As Ihde explains, because of the ‘correlational structure of intentionality’, when using a machine, I ‘experience something other than the machine being used’; ‘my experiencing is extended through the machine for [...] intentional fulfilment’. In Sobchack’s words, ‘the machine enables the perceptive act and the person appropriates or incorporates the machine as an extension of his or her own body’. Both the machine and the human are situated in the world and, therefore, are directed towards – are intentionally involved with – an object. Humans can also forge intercorporeal

391 Vivian Sobchack, *The Address of the Eye*, p. 211.
392 Ibid., p. 212.
393 Ihde quoted Ibid., p. 180.
394 Ibid.
relationships with machines by allowing/enabling them to become extensions of their own bodily organs.

As noted above, Merleau-Ponty’s discussions of cinema do not extend to analysis of the film (machine)/spectator (organic) relationship. However, he does make some relevant comments when discussing the relationship between a blind man and his cane. In the *Phenomenology of Perception*, Merleau-Ponty argues that the ‘blind man’s stick has ceased to be an object for him, and is no longer perceived for itself; its point has become an area of sensitivity, extending the scope and active radius of touch’. The blind man’s stick is not an intermediary between a physical object and a mental image – the stick directly allows perception by becoming ‘an area of sensitivity, [by] extending the scope and active radius of touch’. Merleau-Ponty’s ideas can be applied to early cinema; most obviously, to forms of pre-cinema which involve direct physical contact. As Barker explains, the ‘situation presented by early cinema viewing machines [...] demonstrates the remarkable extent to which the human body is figured as an intimate and integral component of the cinema’. The physical tactility of the Mutoscope hand-crank creates a haptic encounter based on prosthetic interaction. In Mutoscope or stereoscope viewing, the hand-crank becomes part of the viewer’s body, an extension of his own sense of touch and feeling. Just as the blind man incorporates his stick ‘into the bulk of [his] own body’, the Mutoscope or stereoscope viewer incorporates the hand-crank.

396 Ibid.
FILM AS A HUMAN-MACHINE INTERFACE

For Sobchack, the relationship between film and spectator is even closer (and more interactive) than the relationship between a blind person and their cane or a scientist and their microscope. As Sobchack explains, ‘the film experience calls for a communication model of instrument-mediation – a model that can describe the double perception and the reversible structure of cinematic instrumentality which enable instrument-mediated perception to be commuted to and exist as instrument-mediated expression’.³⁹⁹ Cinema’s value lies in its capacity for reversibility – the reversibility of perception and expression, spectator and film, and self and other. Despite being a material recording device, film cameras (and the films that they produce) enable a form of ultra-intersubjectivity, where subjects not only interact but intermingle as well.

For Merleau-Ponty, cinematic ultra-intersubjectivity, or ‘reversibility’, is merely a reflection of our experiences in real-life. As already noted, Merleau-Ponty argues that the enworlded body-subject ‘simultaneously sees and is seen’.⁴⁰⁰ It is ‘both an object for others and a subject for [oneself]’.⁴⁰¹ By upsetting the subject/other binary, cinema models and enables this real-life reversibility, this seer/seen intermingling. As Sobchack states, a film ‘is as much a viewing subject as it is also a visible and viewed object’.⁴⁰² Cinema, unlike classical psychology, allows us to view the other’s perceptions without objectifying them. Film viewers recognise that the images shown on screen are the perceptions of another; they also recognise that this other is a subject, just like them. For Sobchack, perception is reflexive, and cinema demonstrates this fact: ‘cinema provide[s] [...] objective insight into

⁴⁰¹ Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, p. 167.
the subjective structure of vision and thus into oneself as always both viewing subjects and visible objects’. Cinema enables us to recognise ourselves and others as both subjects and objects simultaneously.

II: PROTO-MERLEAU-PONTIAN FILM-PHENOMENOLOGY

As I have shown, Sobchack’s film-phenomenology is firmly grounded in Merleau-Pontian phenomenology. Barker, Shaw, and Marks are also heavily influenced by Merleau-Ponty’s work. In contrast, other recent film-philosophers (Gilles Deleuze most obviously) have returned to proto-Merleau-Pontian ideas. I focus on two strands of proto-Merleau-Pontian film-philosophy: perception-focused theories (including the work of Max Wertheimer, Hugo Münsterberg, and Rudolf Arnheim) and haptic-focused theories (including the work of Victor Freeburg, Sergei Eisenstein, and Siegfried Kracauer). Before analysing these two strains, I explore the influential film-philosophy of Henri Bergson. Contemporary film theorists often come to Bergson through the commentaries and theories of Gilles Deleuze. Therefore, I discuss Deleuze’s ‘Bergson’ alongside my own interpretation of Bergson’s works, in order to recover a less Deleuzian – and more Merleau-Pontian – Bergson. The fact that early film-philosophers were already thinking along Merleau-Pontian lines means that it is not anachronistic to look at early films through a phenomenological lens. Although this thesis is not a study of influence, at the end of this chapter, I do briefly consider the extent to which Joyce was likely to have been aware of these proto-Merleau-Pontian currents in early film-philosophy.

403 Vivian Sobchack, Carnal Thoughts, p. 149.
BERGSON, PHILOSOPHY, AND FILM

Bergson was one of the first philosophers to assimilate film into philosophical discourse. Joyce was aware of Bergson’s philosophy; his first sojourn in Paris, during December 1902 (JJ 112-16), coincided with a lecture that Bergson gave at the Société française de philosophie. Joyce returned to Paris in January 1903 (JJ 119-21), the month in which Bergson’s ‘Introduction to Metaphysics’ was published in the prestigious French journal Revue de métaphysique et de morale. Two of Bergson’s major works – L’évolution créatrice [Creative Evolution] (1914) and The Meaning of the War: Life & Matter in Conflict (1915) – were amongst Joyce’s philosophy collection in his Trieste library. Merleau-Ponty was also very much aware of Bergson’s ideas; several of his concepts and theories build directly on Bergson’s work.

In Creative Evolution, Bergson uses cinematographical apparatus as an analogy for how the ‘intellect’ understands reality. For Bergson, the intellect is purely analytic; it divides reality into different perspectives, then synthesises the different perspectives together in order to makes sense of things. The intellect remains outside of the object or experience that it comprehends; it does not engage with reality – it is merely an observer. The intellect ‘behaves in much the same way as the movement [...] of the cinematographical film, a movement hidden in the apparatus and whose function it is to superpose the successive pictures on one another in order to imitate the movement of a real object’.

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405 Ibid., p. 141.
For Bergson then, when we use our intellect, we view the world cinematographically: ‘the mechanism of our ordinary knowledge is of a cinematographical kind’ (Bergson’s italics).\textsuperscript{408} When we comprehend something (either in reality or on film), ‘[i]nstead of attaching ourselves to the inner becoming of things, we place ourselves outside them in order to recompose their becoming artificially’; ‘[w]e take snapshots, as it were, of the passing reality, and […] string them on a becoming abstract, […] situated at the back of the apparatus of knowledge’.\textsuperscript{409} According to the analogy then, the intellect is like cinema in the sense that it is a mechanism which relies on division and abstraction. By allying cinema with the mechanistic, reductive, and abstract intellect, Bergson criticises cinema. Indeed, \textit{Creative Evolution} is, in part at least, a rebuttal of the prevailing mechanistic theories of evolution that, according to Bergson’s descriptions, both the abstracting ‘intellect’ and the cinema reflect. This anti-mechanisation thread runs throughout Bergson’s philosophy, with its most curious manifestation appearing in \textit{Laughter: An Essay on the Meaning of the Comic} (1900), in which Bergson argues that the supreme comic image is ‘something mechanical encrusted on something living’.\textsuperscript{410}

By associating cinema with the intellect, Bergson pits cinema against ‘intuition’, intellect’s less mechanistic counterpart. According to Bergson, intellect can never provide absolute knowledge as it never participates in the experience it analyses. To attain absolute knowledge, we need intuition. In Bergson’s philosophy, intuition and intellect both correspond to different tendencies of human thought. Intuition, for Bergson, involves seeing the experience as it is in itself, rather than from several different perspectives. As Leonard

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item \textsuperscript{408} Henri Bergson, \textit{Creative Evolution}, p. 306.
\item \textsuperscript{409} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{410} Henri Bergson, \textit{Laughter: An Essay on the Meaning of the Comic}, trans. Cloudesely Brereton and Fred Rothwell, (Rockville, Maryland: Arc Manor, 2008), p. 33. Chapter 4 of this thesis provides a deeper examination of this essay and considers Bergson’s mistrust of mechanical modernity alongside \textit{Ulysses}, the theories and ideas of Wyndham Lewis, early Chaplin and trick films, and Merleau-Pontian phenomenology.
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Lawlor and Valentine Moulard explain, ‘Bergsonian intuition [...] consists in entering into the thing, rather than going around it from the outside’. Because it focuses on the experience itself rather than reasoned abstract and systematic impressions of the particular experience, for Bergson, intuition corresponds to spirit and emotion, rather than matter and mechanism. As Bergson asserts, intuition ‘introduces us into spiritual life [and] at the same time, it shows us the relation of the life of spirit to the life of the body. Thus, cinema, because it is an analogy for the intellect, is everything that intuition is not; cinema is unspiritual, unengaged, and dispassionate.

**DELEUZE’S BERGSON**

Given that Bergson only employs cinema as an analogy, and a negative one at that, it seems wrong to call him a film-philosopher. However, Bergson has had a remarkable impact on film-philosophy, largely due to Gilles Deleuze’s appropriation of Bergson’s ideas in his 1980s works, *Cinema 1: The Movement-Image* and *Cinema 2: The Time-Image*. It is not necessary, for my purposes, to go into Deleuze’s complex ideas in any great depth, but it is useful to see how Bergson’s ideas can be transformed into a coherent film-philosophy. Crucially, Deleuze argues that despite Bergson’s ‘rather overhasty critique of the cinema’, ‘nothing can prevent an encounter between’ Bergson’s philosophy and the cinema. Deleuze focuses on Bergson’s notion of the ‘image’ which he presents in *Matter and Memory* (1896). In very basic terms, Bergson’s ‘image’ is an intermediary between realism

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and idealism; the ‘image’ is ‘more than that which the idealist calls a representation, but less
than that which the realist calls a thing’. For Bergson, both idealists and realists fail in
their conceptions of matter; idealists mistakenly ‘reduce matter to the perception we have
of it’ and realists erroneously make matter into a ‘thing able to produce in us perceptions’
but is made of different stuff than perceptions are made of.

Deleuze takes Bergson’s reappraisal of matter a step further; he suggests that
Bergson’s ‘image’ can be equated with light: ‘[t]he identity of the image and movement has
as its reason the identity of matter and light’ – ‘[t]he image is movement as matter is
light’. By associating the ‘image’ with light, Deleuze builds his film-philosophy; he links the
Bergsonian ‘image’ (which he has already linked to light) to the cinematographic image.
Based on his reading of Bergson, Deleuze posits three different types of ‘image’ then
associates each image type with a specific type of camera shot. As explained above,
Bergson’s ‘image’ can be seen as an interval, or a living centre of indetermination, so
Deleuze’s three image types each relate to different planes of a concept that is already
between planes, a concept that (in its own right) occupies a liminal space. As well as being
between idealism and realism, the ‘image’ is always in between different flows of matter; it
is a gap in the continuous flow of matter that makes up the universe. As Bogue notes,
because it is an interval, the ‘image’ has ‘two “sides”, one incoming and one outgoing, the
first related to perception per se, the second to an ensuing action’.

Deleuze’s first image type, the ‘perception-image’, relates to the first ‘side’ of the
interval, as it is to do with incoming data; it is, essentially, a framing process, whereby

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415 Ibid.
416 Gilles Deleuze, *Cinema 1*, p. 62.
certain elements are filtered out through our perception of them.\textsuperscript{418} Deleuze’s second image type, the ‘action-image’, relates to the outgoing ‘side’ of the interval, as it relates to possible courses of action that can result from our perception.\textsuperscript{419} Deleuze’s third image type, the ‘affection-image’, is related to Bergson’s idea that although sensations and perceptions are distinct, they are not qualitatively different. For Bergson, perception involves the body, so there is no perception without bodily sensation or, as Bergson terms it, ‘no perception without affection’.\textsuperscript{420} Affection is ‘that part or aspect of the inside of our body which we mix with the image of external bodies’.\textsuperscript{421} Deleuze moves from Bergson’s ideas of inside/external mixing to subject/object mixing. For Deleuze, the affection-image ‘marks the coincidence of the subject and the object in a pure quality’.\textsuperscript{422} As Bogue notes, ‘[a]ffection occupies the interval between incoming perception and outgoing action’; it links the object of perception and the perceiving subject, so links the possible actions that would emanate from either.\textsuperscript{423} After detailing his three types of images, Deleuze argues that long-shots relate to the perception-image, medium-shots to the action-image, and close-up shots to the affection-image.

By considering cinema through Bergson’s ideas on perception, Deleuze reconstructs Bergson as a film-philosopher. Deleuze shows that Bergson’s philosophy can be deemed film-philosophy, even if Bergson, himself, failed to recognise it as such. Bergson’s failure to move beyond using cinema as mere analogy was, according to Deleuze, due largely to the primitive state of cinema in the time in which he was writing. Deleuze argues that early cinema’s emphasis on the fixed frame, and its lack of montage and narrative intricacy,

\textsuperscript{418} Gilles Deleuze, \textit{Cinema 1}, pp. 62-78.
\textsuperscript{419} Ibid., pp. 66-72 and 145-182.
\textsuperscript{420} Henri Bergson, \textit{Matter and Memory}, p. 58.
\textsuperscript{421} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{422} Gilles Deleuze, \textit{Cinema 1}, p. 68.
\textsuperscript{423} Ronald Bogue, \textit{Deleuze on Cinema}, p. 37.
prevented Bergson from seeing cinema’s true philosophical potential – its ability to demonstrate and elucidate his ideas on perception and time. For Deleuze, the ‘evolution of the cinema, the conquest of its own essence or novelty, was to take place through montage, the mobile camera and the emancipation of the view point, which became separate from projection’; later, ‘cinema would rediscover that very movement-image of the first chapter of *Matter and Memory*. In these passages, Deleuze fails to recognise Bergson’s main reason for using cinema in his philosophical discourse and underestimates the complexities of early cinema.

Above all else, for Bergson, cinema is a useful analogy for the mechanistic processes of the intellect; it serves his argument well. If Bergson was to start using cinema in a different manner in his philosophy, he would contradict his earlier work, and his intellect analogy would fail. So even if Bergson had held a more positive view of cinema’s philosophical potential, he may have purposefully decided to leave cinema out of further philosophical works. Indeed, in a 1914 interview published in *Le Journal*, Bergson remarked: ‘I realised that [cinema] could suggest new things to a philosopher’; ‘it might be able to assist in the synthesis of memory, or even in the thinking process’. It is significant that, although this remark suggests that Bergson did have a positive view of cinema’s potential, cinema never made it into his later works.

The fact that Bergson did appear to have a positive view of cinema around – and possibly before – 1914, casts doubt on Deleuze’s argument concerning the prohibitively primitive nature of early film. Indeed, despite Deleuze’s protestation, early cinema *did* use mobile cameras, employed montage techniques, and exploited close-ups which, according

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424 Gilles Deleuze, *Cinema 1*, p. 3.
to Deleuze, epitomise the affection-image. As Tom Gunning notes, ‘special apparatuses for moving the camera, such as dollies and tracks, generally did not appear until [around 1914]’ but ‘a variety of means for moving the camera were found prior to the mid-1910s’. These means included mounting cameras on various modes of transport including boats, trains, subway carriages, motor cars, and trams. According to Gunning, one of the earliest examples of this method was the 1897 Lumière film of Venice’s Grand Canal, shot from a moving boat. Indeed, this method of camera movement became its own genre – the phantom ride. This genre of early film presented a moving view of the world, making film viewers feel like passengers. Early on, film cameras were fitted with mobile heads, allowing them to pivot and create panning shots. According to Barry Salt, panning shots first occurred in Robert W. Paul’s 1897 film of Queen Victoria’s Jubilee.

Earlier film-philosophers recognised the power of cinema. Indeed, while Deleuze does not recognise early cinema as a medium capable of expressing Bergson’s philosophical ideas (or Deleuze’s interpretation of Bergson’s ideas, at least), early film-philosophers were more optimistic. As Paul Douglass notes, in 1918, the French film-maker and theorist Marcel L’Herbier argued that ‘Bergson’s critique of the camera in no way undermined his profoundly cinematic conception of time and experience’. And in 1916 and 1917, in a series of articles in the newspaper Le Temps, film and music critic Emile Vuillermoz used Bergson’s ideas as a basis for his own film-philosophical ideas. Vuillermoz saw Bergson’s ideas...
philosophy as ‘a perfect apologia for cinégraphie’.\textsuperscript{430} In particular, for Vuillermoz, like Deleuze, cinema reflected Bergson’s notions of flowing matter and life as movement. In 1917 Vuillermoz wrote: cinema brings us ‘face to face with reality itself’; it ‘seizes in flight [...] the fleeting moment when nature possesses genius’.\textsuperscript{431} Merleau-Ponty also saw potential in Bergson’s ideas, and in cinema. Like L’Herbier and Vuillermoz (and Deleuze), Merleau-Ponty sees cinema as more than an analogy.

BERGSON AND MERLEAU-PONTY ON FILM: SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES

Deleuze is credited with creating a coherent Bergsonian film-philosophy, based largely on Bergson’s non-cinema-focused ideas. Instead of building his film-philosophy out of Bergson’s cinema analogy in Creative Evolution, Deleuze founds his theory on Bergson’s Matter and Memory, which aims to ‘lessen greatly, if not overcome, the theoretical difficulties which have always beset dualism’.\textsuperscript{432} In this sense, Deleuze mirrors Merleau-Ponty; both philosophers found their film-philosophies on anti-dualist principles. Indeed, Bergson’s philosophy, Deleuze’s Bergsonian film-philosophy, and Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology, all involve a challenge to mind/ body dualism. All three philosophies also posit sensation as an integral part of perception and see movement as an indivisible whole rather than as separate slices of static movement artificially spliced together. However, there are also clear differences in the way each philosopher theorises these three areas (dualism, perception, and movement).

\textsuperscript{432} Henri Bergson, Matter and Memory, p. 9.
There are two main differences between Bergson’s and MerleauPonty’s treatment of the mind/body binary. Firstly, while Merleau-Ponty challenges dualism by positing an intermingled mind-body or body-subject, Bergson disrupts the binary by rethinking the terms ‘mind’ and ‘body’. As Bogue explains, ‘[f]requently Bergson insists on the illusory nature of the corpuscular view of matter, according to which the world is made up of various combinations of solid, impenetrable bodies’.433 Bergson reimagines matter as unsubstantial and volatile, rather than solid and stable; ‘[m]atter thus resolves itself into numberless vibrations’.434 As noted above, Bergson employs the concept of the ‘image’ to explicate this idea of matter as vibrations. According to Bergson, ‘the material world’ is a ‘system of images’, where ‘image’ refers to ‘an existence placed halfway between the “thing” and the “representation”’, between solidity and ethereality.435 For Bergson, the material body is merely ‘the particular image which I adopt as the center of my universe and as the physical basis of my personality’.436 According to Bogue, the ‘vibrational whole of the universe […] is at once mind and matter’, as ‘mind’, for Bergson, is merely some degree of dynamic contraction of a past into a present toward a future.437

In Bergson’s philosophy, the body does not function as the material counterpart to the immaterial mind, as materiality itself is called into question. In Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy, on the other hand, the body is material and, since the mind (or subjectivity at least) is always already part of the body, the mind is material too. Indeed, the second main difference between Bergson’s and Merleau-Ponty’s views on the mind/body binary rests on the two philosophers’ treatments of subjectivity. For Bergson, unlike Merleau-Ponty, the

433 Ronald Bogue, Deleuze on Cinema, p. 16.
434 Henri Bergson, Matter and Memory, p. 208.
435 Ibid., p. 57 and 9.
436 Ibid., p. 61.
437 Ronald Bogue, Deleuze on Cinema, p. 20.
body is not subjective in itself. Indeed, for Bergson, subjectivity does not even inhabit the body. For Merleau-Ponty, the Bergsonian ‘body remains for [...] what we have called the objective body’. As Bogue explains, for Bergson, ‘even the most microscopic of subatomic events exhibits some form of consciousness’. Bergsonian subjectivity does not require a situated enworlded I; it is simply present in the contractions in the vibrations of the world. As Merleau-Ponty rhetorically asks of Bergson’s philosophy, ‘[w]here do we find the I?’ The Bergsonian body is a non-subjective, non-situated, non-extended image; it is merely the ‘office of the centripetal nerves’, ‘a center of action’ (Bergson’s italics). In Merleau-Ponty’s words, the Bergsonian ‘body does not succeed in being a subject – though Bergson tends to give it this status – for if the body were subject, the subject would be body, and this is something Bergson does not want at any price’.

For Merleau-Ponty, Bergson was ‘clearly seeking to involve consciousness in the world’, but he fails to explain how it would work, as he is unwilling to see the body as the seat of consciousness (my italics). Interestingly, in The Visible and the Invisible, Merleau-Ponty provides a similar critique of his own earlier work; he admits that his own privileging of consciousness may have been overzealous: ‘[w]hat I call the tacit cogito [innate subjectivity] is impossible’; ‘[t]o have the idea of “thinking”, [...] to make the “reduction”, to return to immanence and the consciousness’ is a false move. Accordingly, Merleau-Ponty posits ‘flesh’ which, like Bergson’s image, lies somewhere between materiality and immateriality and does not belong to a particular individual: the ‘flesh is not matter, in the

438 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, p. 78, n. 2.
439 Ronald Bogue, Deleuze on Cinema, p. 20.
441 Henri Bergson, Matter and Memory, pp. 21 and 20.
442 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, The Incarnate Subject, p. 94.
443 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, p. 78, n. 2.
444 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, The Visible and the Invisible, p. 171.
sense of corpuscles of being’, nor is it ‘some “psychic” material’. While some Merleau-Ponty commentators, such as Leonard Lawlor and Dorothea Olkowski, see Merleau-Ponty’s flesh as a marked departure from the body-subject, there are definitely still similarities. The flesh is still more bodily and more subjective than Bergson’s images and vibrations, just not in such a straightforward way as the body-subject is. Although the flesh is not part of an individual body, it is still ‘incarnate’ and capable of feeling sensations; it is the ‘generality of the Sensible in itself’, it is the ‘anonymity innate to Myself’. So later Merleau-Pontian subjectivity is closer to Bergson, but retains its key, differentiating elements – its incarnate nature and its subjectivity.

Bergson’s view of the body has repercussions for his theory of perception. Both Bergson and Merleau-Ponty see sensation as part of perception but, for Bergson, sensations do not require an individual, subjective body; perception is bodily, but not embodied. For Merleau-Ponty, on the other hand, perception is embodied; perception involves subjective sensations and an enworlded body-subject. According to Bergson, ‘affective sensation […] does not spring spontaneously from the depths of consciousness to extend itself, as it grows weaker, in space; it is one with the necessary modifications to which […] the particular image that each one of us terms his body is subject’. In simpler terms, sensation is not felt in a body, especially not a solid, corpuscular body. But neither is sensation completely immaterial; sensation can be seen as more bodily than other worldly vibrations, but merely in the sense that it is more influenced by the privileged body-image than by any other image. Because sensations do not directly affect a physical body, Bergson has to explain

447 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, p. 139.
senses such as hearing and sight by positing organs of ‘virtual sensation’, including a ‘mental ear’ and a ‘virtual retina’ which are ‘exactly symmetrical with the organs of sense’ in the physical body.\textsuperscript{449}

For Merleau-Ponty, as already explained, the body is always already a body-subject, so sensations are both bodily and subjective by default. These body-subject sensations directly stimulate perception through our relationship with the world: ‘my body and my senses are precisely that familiarity with the world born of habit, that implicit or sedimentary body of knowledge’.\textsuperscript{450} For Merleau-Ponty, unlike Bergson, there is no need to postulate a mental ear to parallel the physical ear, as sensation and the senses are already bodily and the physical ear is always already subjective: ‘[t]he sensor and the sensible do not stand in relation to each other as two mutually external terms, and sensation is not an invasion of the sensor by the sensible’.\textsuperscript{451} As Merleau-Ponty points out, ‘the subject of sensation [...] need not be a pure nothingness with no terrestrial weight’.\textsuperscript{452} Indeed, the Merleau-Pontian body-subject is, necessarily, embodied and extended in space and time: the ‘person who perceives is not spread out before himself’; ‘he has historical density’ (Merleau-Ponty’s italics).\textsuperscript{453}

It is this density that enables the Merleau-Pontian body-subject to perceive. As the Bergsonian body does not have a density, it cannot situate itself in the world and cannot perceive in a Merleau-Pontian manner. In other words, Bergsonian perception cannot work through intentionality. As explained in chapter two, Merleau-Pontian intentionality is a kind of bodily, non-cognitive movement towards our object of perception. The Bergsonian body

\textsuperscript{449} Henri Bergson, \textit{Matter and Memory}, pp. 129-130.
\textsuperscript{450} Maurice Merleau-Ponty, \textit{Phenomenology of Perception}, p. 238.
\textsuperscript{451} Ibid., p. 214.
\textsuperscript{452} Ibid., p. 215.
\textsuperscript{453} Ibid., p. 238.
can be said to have intentionality of sorts, as it is ‘an object destined to move other objects’, but it cannot be intentional in the Merleau-Pontian sense, as it lacks physicality, spatiality, and any connection with the world.\textsuperscript{454} As noted in the previous chapter, a simple example of Merleau-Pontian intentionality is the way my feet intend the pedals of my car; my feet automatically intend towards pushing down the pedals at particular moments, as the pedals already have a particular significance for my feet – they are already part of my phenomenal field.\textsuperscript{455} The term ‘phenomenal field’ simply describes our world as it appears to us, as enworlded body-subjects. The phenomenal field is a gestalt – it is a unified perceptual whole, a totality which is irreducible to the sum of its parts.

The notion of a gestalt is key to Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology of perception. Gestalt theory – and gestalt film theory in particular – will be explained in more detail later on in this chapter. For now, it suffices to say that, for Gestaltists, the perceived world has – always already – a certain form or configuration that is automatically and involuntarily provided by the perceiver. The perceived world cannot be analysed by breaking it down into individual parts, objects, or atoms; it makes sense in itself, as a whole, without requiring any further input from the intellect, previous experience, or any other source external to the perceiver. Indeed, as film theorist Dudley Andrew points out, gestalt theory’s ‘experimental method is close to a phenomenology in employing naïve subjects or ridding experienced subjects of their preconceptions’.\textsuperscript{456} In his film essay, and in the \textit{Phenomenology of Perception}, Merleau-Ponty explicitly employs gestalt concepts, especially in his explanations of the phenomenal field. For Gestaltists, and Merleau-Ponty, the key to perception lies in

\begin{footnotes}
\item[454] Henri Bergson, \textit{Matter and Memory}, p. 20.
\item[455] Nick Crossley, ‘Sociology’, p. 231.
\end{footnotes}
the irreducibility of the perceived world; the ‘perceptual “something” is always in the middle of something else, it always forms part of a “field”. 457

For Olkowski, ‘Bergson explicitly rejects Merleau-Ponty’s notion of a phenomenal field’. 458 The Bergsonian body cannot have a phenomenal field, for two reasons: firstly, it is neither present in space (in the traditional sense), nor connected to a physical world; secondly, it is not subjective, so it is not capable of having a conscious relation to the world. The Bergsonian world is merely a collection of changing vibrations, and the Bergsonian body is merely an image. The phenomenal field requires both consciousness and spatiality; the Bergsonian body lacks both. As Olkowski explains, the Bergsonian body ‘is not naive, but operates according to [...] the principal of action, so that even the Gestalt – which Merleau-Ponty claims is simply found in the body’s encounter with the world – is nothing but the result of this principle of action’. 459 For Bergson, it is automatic ‘virtual action’ – rather than bodily intentionality or enworldedness – that drives the body and enables perception. The Bergsonian body is ‘always turned toward action’ and ‘our perception, which exactly measures our virtual action on things, thus limits itself to the objects which actually influence our organs and prepare our movements’. 460 This virtual action does not require a phenomenal field and cannot be seen in gestalt terms. The action impulse is innate within matter-in-general, not within a certain configuration, a particular perceptual whole or gestalt; this virtual action – or movement – only happens to emanate from the body as the Bergsonian body is the junction at which movement changes tracks and has an effect on other entities.

Bergson’s and Merleau-Ponty’s differing views of perception impact upon their understanding of movement. Both philosophers see movement as indivisible, but for different reasons. For Bergson, movement is indivisible because there is no distinction between motion and that which moves; ‘[e]very movement, inasmuch as it is a passage from rest to rest, is absolutely indivisible’ (Bergson’s italics).\(^{461}\) Due to this lack of distinction, motion cannot be made up of separate static moments or instants; the ‘indivisibility of motion implies […] the impossibility of real instants’.\(^{462}\) In other words, because Bergson argues against the existence of solid, corpuscular bodies and objects, he cannot see movement as the passage of one particular entity. There is no movement of something; there is only movement itself. And because movement is not a moving-something, movement cannot be split up into instants; there is no moving body to halt, or make a passage through space, no solid body to create separate static moments in space. Rather than conceiving of movements as a passage from A to B, Bergson argues that ‘[r]eal movement is rather the transference of a state than of a thing’.\(^{463}\)

According to Bergson, we observe true movement through our senses, rather than through our intellect: the ‘senses, left to themselves, present to us the real movement’; the ‘division is the work of our imagination’.\(^{464}\) Similarly, for Merleau-Ponty, if we watch a stone flying through the air, we do not comprehend its motion; instead, we simply and immediately perceive its motion: ‘[t]he stone is not conceived, but seen in motion’.\(^{465}\) However, while for Bergson, the senses are to be privileged because they present a more real picture than the rationalising intellect, for Merleau-Ponty, there is no separate intellect,

\(^{461}\) Henri Bergson, *Matter and Memory*, p. 188.
\(^{462}\) Ibid., p. 191.
\(^{464}\) Ibid., p. 189.
so perception is intellect-free. As explained in chapter two, according to Merleau-Ponty, we perceive movement as movement because of our bodily anchoring in the phenomenal field; ‘the choice of the fixed point is not made by the intelligence’.\textsuperscript{466} In Merleau-Ponty’s words, ‘[w]hat makes part of the field count as an object in motion, and another as the background, is the way in which we establish our relations with them by the act of looking’.\textsuperscript{467} For Merleau-Ponty, then, unlike Bergson, movement’s indivisibility is due to its gestalt nature, its connection to the phenomenal field and bodily anchoring.

BERGSONIAN FILM-PHILOSOPHY: PROTO- OR ANTI- MERLEAU-PONTIAN?

As I have just shown, the main divergences in Bergsonian and Merleau-Pontian film-philosophy revolve around the role of the body in perception and the body’s relationship to its environment. These same key philosophical divergences also impact upon Bergsonian and Merleau-Pontian film-philosophies. According to Deleuze, Bergsonian film-philosophy ‘differs from that of phenomenology’, as phenomenology sees ‘the cinema as breaking with the conditions of natural perception’.\textsuperscript{468} For Merleau-Ponty, as explained above, everyday or ‘natural’ perception involves the body-subject anchoring itself – through intentionality – at one point in the phenomenal field. Deleuze argues that cinematographic perception opposes Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy of natural perception, as cinematographic perception is not embodied; it is neither anchored nor enworlded: ‘[t]he cinema can, with impunity,

\textsuperscript{466} Maurice Merleau-Ponty, ‘The Film and the New Psychology’, p. 52.
\textsuperscript{467} Maurice Merleau-Ponty, \textit{Phenomenology of Perception}, p. 278.
\textsuperscript{468} Gilles Deleuze, \textit{Cinema 1}, p. 2.
bring us close to things or take us away from them and revolve around them’, therefore the
film ‘suppresses both the anchoring of the subject and the horizon of the world’.\textsuperscript{469}

In his analysis, Deleuze overstates both the differences between Bergson and
phenomenology and the discrepancy between phenomenological natural perception and
cinematographic perception. As Michael Kelly notes in \textit{Bergson and Phenomenology} (2010),
Deleuze ‘read Bergson precisely otherwise than phenomenologists had read him’; Deleuze
found his philosophy, partly at least, on a purposefully un-phenomenological reading of
Bergson.\textsuperscript{470} The late twentieth-century Bergsonism that Deleuze initiated ‘engaged
Bergson’s theory of time and “self” contra Sartre and Husserl’ and ‘Bergson’s theories of
pure-perception and memory \textit{vis-à-vis} Merleau-Ponty’s theory of perception’.\textsuperscript{471} This
method of reading Bergson against phenomenology knowingly obscures the similarities
between the two approaches.

Media-philosopher Mark Hansen argues that Deleuze understates Bergson’s
commitment to embodiment; Deleuze ‘brackets Bergson’s embodied conception of
affection’.\textsuperscript{472} There are, indeed, points in \textit{Matter and Memory} that seem to controvert
Bergson’s view of the body as unextended and immaterial, his view that the body is not ‘a
mathematical point in space’.\textsuperscript{473} For example, Bergson writes: the ‘body is [...] in the
aggregate of the material world’, and is ‘a portion of space which is both perceived and

\begin{footnotes}
\item[469] Gilles Deleuze, \textit{Cinema 1}, \textit{p. 59}.
\item[471] Ibid.
\item[473] Henri Bergson, \textit{Matter and Memory}, \textit{p. 58}.
\end{footnotes}
felt’.\textsuperscript{474} For Hansen, passages such as these strongly suggest that ‘Bergson correlates perception with the concrete life of the body’.\textsuperscript{475}

If we accept this view of Bergsonian embodiment, it is possible to see Bergson as a proto-Merleau-Pontian thinker. If the Bergsonian body occupies space and is ‘both perceived and felt’, it can be easily carried over into Merleau-Pontian film-phenomenology; it can be transformed into a camera-body with camera-intentionality. As explained in chapter two, although Merleau-Ponty never details the exact ways in which film achieves embodiment, he clearly states that film \textit{is} embodied: ‘the movies are peculiarly suited to make manifest the union of mind and body, mind and world, and the expression of one in the other’.\textsuperscript{476} It is the later Merleau-Pontian film-phenomenologists who have turned Merleau-Ponty’s initial ideas into comprehensive film-philosophies. For Sobchack, the film-camera is, itself, embodied: it is ‘substantial and thus can inhabit and move about in that world among other substantial and sensible phenomena with which it can relate existentially’.\textsuperscript{477} For Shaw, the film camera has intentionality and parallels body-subject perception; ‘film in movement explores the chimerical quality of the phenomenal field and shows a remodelling of the environment by establishing an interlocking system of matrices and contexts’.\textsuperscript{478} If we agree that the Bergsonian body is embodied and enworlded, it would not be a giant leap to proffer a Bergson-inspired film-philosophy along phenomenological lines, to advance a Bergsonian film-philosophy based on a parallel between an extended sentient, sensible body and a body-subject film camera.

\textsuperscript{474} Henri Bergson, \textit{Matter and Memory}, pp. 19 and 57.
\textsuperscript{475} Mark Hansen, \textit{New Philosophy for New Media}, p. 3.
\textsuperscript{476} Maurice Merleau-Ponty, ‘The Film and the New Psychology’, p. 58.
\textsuperscript{477} Vivian Sobchack, \textit{The Address of the Eye}, p. 209.
\textsuperscript{478} Spencer Shaw, \textit{Film Consciousness}, p. 57.
Interestingly, Merleau-Ponty seems to find less embodiment in Bergson’s philosophy than Hansen does. And Bergson is conspicuously absent from Merleau-Ponty’s ‘The Film and the New Psychology’, even though, as noted above, from the 1910s onwards, Bergson was often referred to in discussions of cinema. So Merleau-Ponty, himself, does not choose Bergson as a starting point for an embodied film-philosophy. For Merleau-Ponty, Bergson started on the right path with his theory of the body but ‘sank into realism’ so reintroduced the subject ‘in realist terms, as a non-being’, and reconfigured the body as mere mechanism.\(^\text{479}\) However, according to Merleau-Ponty, if we were to ignore Bergson’s realist relapse and were to ‘to follow the [non-realist] Bergsonian thesis to its ultimate conclusions, the body would become privileged’ and we would have an embodied subject who could freely make use of perspective’ and ‘perceive from here and not from elsewhere’.\(^\text{480}\)

Why, then, is Bergson absent from Merleau-Ponty’s film essay, when Merleau-Ponty saw potential in his ideas on the body and when so many other philosophers have used Bergson in their film-philosophies? Instead of employing Bergson, in ‘The Film and the New Psychology’, Merleau-Ponty builds on gestalt theory. As explained above, Bergson’s philosophy is incompatible with gestalt theory, as he denies the phenomenal field. Indeed, although I suggested that Bergson’s re-evaluated theory of embodiment could allow for camera-intentionality, in actual fact, it could not, as it is the phenomenal field that explains the enworldedness that is necessary for intentionality of humans and cameras. For Bergson, even if the subject is embodied, there can be no intentional relationship with the world, as

\(^{479}\) Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *The Incarnate Subject*, p. 90.

\(^{480}\) Ibid. Merleau-Ponty’s italics.
the world is merely a collection of vibrations. It is to Gestalt theory, the phenomenal field, and embodied cinema, that I now turn.

EARLY PERCEPTION-FOCUSED FILM THEORIES

Following on from Bergson, and anticipating Merleau-Ponty, certain early film philosophers became interested in the links between cinema and perception. For Hugo Münsterberg (1863-1916) and Rudolf Arnheim (1904-2007), films only made sense in the minds of spectators; they were of little value in themselves. For both thinkers, each film is an indivisible perceptual whole which cannot be (meaningfully) split up into separate images. In other words, a film is a gestalt. While Arnheim explicitly drew on the gestalt theories of his tutor, Max Wertheimer (1880-1943), the gestalt nature of Münsterberg’s ideas was only implicit. However, as Joseph and Barbara Anderson demonstrate, Münsterberg’s work ‘shows the direct influence of Wertheimer’s short-circuit theory and other current hypotheses of movement perception’.

Wertheimer was a founding member of the Gestalt school of psychology. According to Kurt Koffka, Wertheimer’s colleague, it is a ‘well-known fact that a paper on perceived motion was the beginning of Gestalt psychology’. This influential ‘paper’ was Wertheimer’s 1912 study of movement perception which developed the notion of the ‘phi-phenomenon’ and the aforementioned ‘short-circuit’ theory. There is not enough space, here, to go into the details of Wertheimer’s studies, but it should suffice to explain the

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481 In the preface to Film as Art (1932), Arnheim states: ‘my teachers Max Wertheimer and Wolfgang Köhler were laying the theoretical and practical foundations of gestalt theory at the Psychological Institute of the University of Berlin, and I found myself fastening on’. (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1957), p. 3.
482 Joseph and Barbara Anderson, quoted in Laura Marcus, The Tenth Muse, p. 207.
extent to which these new theories differed from previous ones. As Joseph and Barbara Anderson explain, Wertheimer’s ‘phi-phenomenon’ offered an alternative to the hitherto accepted ‘persistence of vision’ theory. ‘Persistence of vision’ theory states that we perceive film images as movement (rather than as a series of still photographs) because each still image’s after-image ‘remains on the retina of the eye or is stored by the brain for approximately one twenty-fifth of a second before it decays and is supplanted by the next’ image’s after-image so, to the spectator, there is no time-delay between images – the images appear to be moving.

Wertheimer’s theory does not involve after-images or any type of stored visual data. His experiments showed that, when spectators see two static lines presented at spatial intervals (and shown at speeds of between 60 and 200 Hz), they perceive this as a single line moving from left to right, rather than as two (spatially and temporally) separate lines. There is no visual cue (no after-image or anything similar) to make spectators see things in this way; it is just the way that our minds work. Given the right conditions (the required speeds and spacing), we automatically see the two lines as one single moving line. In Wertheimer’s words, ‘the experience of uniform movement is bound to [the two lines] in just as ordered and (physically) immediate a manner, as a corresponding sensation to the action of a single stimulus’. For Wertheimer, the ‘immediate’ nature of movement perception is key; there is no intermediary factor (no secondary step), either physical or psychical, involved in

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484 Although Wertheimer’s work, particularly his 1912 paper, has been (and still is) highly influential, there is no definitive English translation of his body of work. However, MIT press are due to publish a Wertheimer reader, including translations and synopses of his major studies (those from 1912 and 1923) in September 2012: Lothar Spillmann (ed.), *Max Wertheimer: On Perceived Motion and Figural Organization*, (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2012).

485 Joseph and Barbara Anderson, quoted in Laura Marcus, *The Tenth Muse*, p. 207.


perceiving motion. This immediate perception of movement is what Wertheimer calls the ‘phi-phenomenon’. The ‘phi-phenomenon’ is what we immediately perceive, the moving figure which our minds automatically construct from the two visual stimuli (the two lines). Wertheimer describes this perceptual process as a ‘short-circuit from a to b’, where a refers to the first line and b to the second. Together, the phi-phenomenon and the short-circuit theory describe gestalt perception. In seeing movement, we perceive a gestalt, in the sense that we perceive more than the total sum of the parts; we see more than two separate lines – we see movement. As Koffka states, movement perception, like all perception, is a gestalt, ‘a unitary total process resulting, as a whole, out of the single excitations’.

In the *Phenomenology of Perception*, Merleau-Ponty discusses Wertheimer’s experiments in a positive light. For Merleau-Ponty, like Wertheimer, the *immediacy* of perception is fundamental: ‘what, in the last resort, does Wertheimer mean? He means that the perception of movement is not secondary to the perception of the moving object, that we have not a perception of the latter here, then there, followed by an identification linking these positions in succession’. Returning to the thrown-stone example detailed above, Merleau-Ponty reiterates the gestalt aspect of Wertheimer’s theory – the fact that the whole that we perceive is greater than the sum of its parts: it ‘is not because I find the same stone on the ground that I believe in its identity throughout its movement’; it is ‘because I perceived it as identical during that movement […] that I go and pick it up’; we ‘shall not find in the stone-in-movement everything that we know in other ways about the stone’. Merleau-Ponty shows that real motion, just like apparent motion, is *immediately*, and

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491 Ibid., p. 273.
unquestionably, perceived as movement (rather than as two temporally and/or spatially distinct stones).

Like Wertheimer and Merleau-Ponty, Münsterberg disagreed with the persistence of vision theory. In The Photoplay: A Psychological Study (1916), Münsterberg states: ‘afterimages of the successive pictures are not sufficient to produce a substitute for the continuous outer stimulation; the essential condition is rather the inner mental activity which unites the separate phases in the idea of connected action’. As shown in the italicised parts of the quotation, Münsterberg advocated a gestalt view of filmic motion; the movement which we perceive equals more than the sum of the ‘successive pictures’ – the movement is created through ‘inner mental activity’ which ‘unites’ the picture, creating the impression of ‘connected action’. Similarly, for Arnheim (1932), ‘the motion picture is not a synthetic agglomeration of individual images’; film ‘is more than a fundamental variation of the immobile images, obtained by multiplication’. Arnheim also agrees that it is the spectators, rather than the film itself, who create the movement: ‘in film, the single pictures of the sequence exist only technically, not in what is experienced by the audience’; for the audience, ‘there is no synthesis of phases but an invisible continuum’.

In his work on film – Film as Art (1932), Arnheim does not go into detail on exactly how the audience perceives motion. However, his broader work on art and psychology offers some answers. In Art and Visual Perception (1954), Arnheim, like Merleau-Ponty and Wertheimer, stresses the immediacy of perception, the way in which things immediately make sense for us, without a secondary step: ‘Perceiving achieves, at the sensory level, what

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494 Ibid., p. 169.
in the realm of reasoning is known as understanding’. Arnheim explains that gestalt theory allowed him to see that ‘even the most elementary processes of vision do not produce mechanical recordings of the outer world but organize the sensory raw material creatively’. According to Arnheim, this creative organising process is mirrored in both film-making and film-watching.

In contrast to Arnheim, Münsterberg spends a significant portion of his film work explaining perceptual processes. Münsterberg employs the term ‘attention’ to explain the way in which our consciousness makes sense of things by selecting certain visual elements to focus on: our ‘attention must be drawn now here, now there, if we want to bind together that which is scattered in the space before us’. There are two types of ‘attention’: ‘voluntary’ and ‘involuntary’. ‘Voluntary attention’ involves wilful focus on something of our choice, whereas ‘involuntary attention’ is cued from outside of us – it is unwilled. For Münsterberg, film must elicit our involuntary attention by the gestures and movement of the actors, costumes, scenery, and setting. Close-ups are particularly good at commanding the spectator’s (involuntary) attention; they also provide an analogue for how attention works: the ‘close-up has objectified in our world of perception our mental act of attention and by it has furnished art with a means which far transcends the power of any theater stage’.

Münsterberg’s concepts of voluntary and involuntary attention may sound very much like Merleau-Ponty’s ‘attention’ and ‘intentionality’. However, as was stressed above, for Merleau-Ponty, gestalt perception is an operation of the body-subject. For Münsterberg,

496 Ibid., p. 5.
497 Rudolf Arnheim, *Film as Art* (1932), p. 3.
498 Hugo Münsterberg, ‘Chapter 4: Attention’, in *The Photoplay* (Gutenberg online version).
499 Ibid.
on the other hand, attention forms part of our ‘inner mental activity’, part of our ‘mental mechanism’.\(^{500}\) Similarly, for Arnheim, ‘the mind organizes the material of the world’.\(^{501}\) Having made this distinction, it is worth pointing out that, at certain points, Münsterberg seems to get closer to an embodied view of perception. As Marcus notes, ‘Münsterberg hypothesized a future for film in which […] a rocking camera would give to every motion “an uncanny whirling character”, creating in “the mind of the spectator unusual sensations which produce a new shading of the emotional background”; he ‘thus sent, for a moment, an embodied, corporealized perception into whirling vertiginous space before returning to the “laws” of aesthetics – “isolation” and “detachment”’.\(^{502}\) Later on in his ‘Attention’ chapter, Münsterberg links perception to ‘attraction’ and, in doing so, once again, appears to describe an embodied form of seeing: ‘we are passing along the street, we see something in the shop window and as soon as it stirs up our interest, our body adjusts itself, we stop, we fixate it, we get more of the detail in it, the lines become sharper, and while it impresses us more vividly than before the street around us has lost its vividness and clearness’.\(^{503}\) Perhaps if Münsterberg had not died in 1916 (the same year in which The Photoplay was published), he might have veered away from pure Gestaltism and towards Merleau-Pontian phenomenology.

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\(^{500}\) Hugo Münsterberg, ‘Chapter 3: Depth and Movement’ and ‘Chapter 7: The Purpose of Art’, in The Photoplay (Gutenberg online version).


\(^{502}\) Laura Marcus, The Tenth Muse, p. 209.

\(^{503}\) Hugo Münsterberg, ‘Chapter 4: Attention’, in The Photoplay (Gutenberg online version).
EARLY HAPTIC-FOCUSED FILM THEORIES

While Wertheimer, Münsterberg, and Arnheim anticipate Merleau-Ponty’s gestalt view of cinema, they do not – with the possible exception of Münsterberg – share Merleau-Ponty’s interest in embodiment, or the post-Merleau-Pontian interest in haptics. One of the first film-philosophers to show an interest in cinema’s bodily, interactive capacity was Victor Freeburg (1882-unknown). In The Art of Photoplay Making (1918), which was composed between 1915 and 1917, Freeburg argues that cinema is so realistic that spectators feel as if they can reach out and touch what is shown on screen: ‘the illusion of the screen is so great that for the time the spectator feels that he is in direct contact with the reality’. Spectators also experience a strong connection with the film’s characters: the ‘illusion of personal contact with the characters is especially strong’. Crucially, for Freeburg, this connection creates film’s aesthetic quality; it makes film beautiful: the ‘spectator easily imagines that he is in direct contact with the beautiful reality itself, and forgets that the camera has intervened’.

As Marcus notes, Freeburg’s ideas on film are based on the work of art historian and aesthetician Vernon Lee (the pseudonym of Violet Paget, 1856-1935), who argued that aesthetic quality is based on connection and empathy rather than separation and detachment. Carrie Lambert-Beatty sees Lee’s work on empathy as a forerunner of

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504 Despite a thorough search, I have been unable to discover a date of death for Freeburg.
505 In his foreword, Freeburg tells us that some of his ideas have already been ‘expressed publicly in a series of lectures delivered at Columbia University between the autumn of 1915 and the spring of 1917, and in newspaper articles published during the same period’. Victor O. Freeburg, The Art of Photoplay Making (1918), (London: The Macmillan Company, 1918), Viewed online via the Internet Archive, at: <http://archive.org/details/artphotoplaymak00freegoog>, [accessed August 2012].
508 Ibid., p. 11. My italics.
509 Laura Marcus, The Tenth Muse, p. 216.
Merleau-Ponty’s more ‘radical revision of the subject/ object dualism’. Indeed, this idea of connection (as expressed by both Lee and Freeburg) is crucial to existential-phenomenology’s theory of self/ other intermingling – particularly Merleau-Ponty’s aforementioned ideas on touch and intercorporeity. However, whereas, for Freeburg, film-spectator contact remains a convincing illusion, for the Merleau-Pontian film-phenomenologists discussed above (Marks, Sobchack, Shaw, and Barker) the connection is more than mere metaphor. Similarly, for later film-philosophers, especially Sergei Eisenstein (1898-1948) and Siegfried Kracauer (1889-1966), the spectator and the film engage in a genuine, physical relationship.

As noted in chapter one, for Sergei Eisenstein (1898-1948), like Freeburg, a successful film is one in which there is significant spectator engagement. Indeed, for Thomas Sheehan, ‘Eisenstein’s theory is most clearly described by the word “affective”’; he wants his films to have a direct, effect on his audience’s senses. As J. Dudley Andrew explains, Eisenstein aimed to produce an effect as close as possible to a ‘synaesthetic experience in the viewer’. In ‘Montage 1938’, Eisenstein states that he wishes to convey images with “the same force of physical perception” with which they faced the author in his moments of creative vision. The ‘image conceived by the author [becomes] flesh of the spectator’s image’; ‘the process is creative not only for the author, but also for [...] the spectator’. Eisenstein described this interactive process as a ‘montage of attractions’; the film-maker edits the film images in such a way as to attract – or cause a shock in – the spectator. The

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511 Thomas Sheehan, ‘Montage Joyce’, p. 73.
514 Ibid., p. 310.
spectator must make the link between the two (or more) juxtaposed images that have provoked this initial attraction.

Thus, as well as having a direct physical effect on his spectators, Eisenstein wanted his films to engage the spectators’ minds. As Andrew explains, for Eisenstein, during film-viewing ‘the senses perceive attractions, but cinematic meaning is generated only when the mind leaps to their comprehension by attending to the collision of these attractions’. However, he was not attempting to engage the rational mind. Instead, Eisenstein aimed both to convey and provoke what he called ‘sensual thought’ – a form of ‘image-sensual’, ‘pre-logical’, ‘inner speech’ (1935). Like Merleau-Ponty, Eisenstein felt that film was particularly good at showing the intimate connections between the mind and the body. As Robert Stam states, Eisenstein simultaneously sees the film-maker as a ‘Pavlovian lab technician’, purposefully causing pre-determined physical responses in his viewers, and as the promoter of “pathos” and a ‘feeling of oneness with others and the world’.517

For Kracauer, like Eisenstein, film-viewing involves bodily experience: the ‘unknown shapes that [the spectator] encounters involve not so much his power of reasoning as his visceral faculties’; the film images ‘lure him into dimensions where sense impressions are all-important’. Films have a direct physical effect on spectators: cinema’s ‘representations of movement do cause a stir in deep bodily layers’; ‘the sight of it seems to have a “resonance effect”, provoking in the spectator such kinaesthetic responses as muscular reflexes, motor impulses, or the like’. Rather than being the result of contact, or

515 J. Dudley Andrew, The Major Film Theories, p. 52.
519 Ibid., p. 158.
Eisensteinian *attractions*, these haptic experiences are due to the spectator’s *immersion* in the film. In thinking through his ideas on the effects of film movement, Kracauer quotes a ‘perceptive French woman’: “In the theater I am always I, [...] but in the cinema I dissolve into all things and beings”.\(^5\) For Kracauer, in cinema, there is a blurring of the subject (‘I’) and the object (film).

This is not the case in theatre, where the actors remain as viewed objects. This distinction anticipates Bazin’s ideas on cinema, discussed in chapter two. For Bazin, like Kracauer, cinema creates a film-world which spectators can become part of: it is not ‘the realism of subject matter or realism of expression but that realism of space without which moving pictures do not constitute cinema’.\(^6\) These ideas of film incorporating the spectator also prefigure Merleau-Pontian ideas on cinema and perception, especially the aforementioned concept of ‘flesh’. Indeed, although Kracauer does not directly refer to phenomenology, his film-philosophy was influenced by phenomenological ideas, particularly the theories of Gabriel Marcel (1889–1973), whose work is discussed below.\(^7\)

**PROTO-PHENOMENOLOGY AND JOYCE**

It is difficult to gauge the extent to which Joyce would have been aware of early film-philosophies. As detailed in chapter one, Joyce briefly managed a cinema, so we know that he was familiar with the film business (to a certain extent at least). Although the business of showing films did not directly interlink with the practice of analysing films, there were some points of overlap. As Geoff Brown observes, *The Bioscope*, one of UK and Ireland’s leading

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\(^5\) Siegfried Kracauer, *Theory of Film*, p. 159.

\(^6\) André Bazin, *What is Cinema?*, vol. 1, p. 112.

\(^7\) Marcel is quoted four times in Kracauer’s *Theory of Film*. 

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trade journals for showmen, published detailed film reviews; this was ‘not yet rigorous film
criticism’, but ‘it shows some sign of a commentator standing back, observing, and weighing
in the balance’. 523

As well as publishing analytical film reviews, The Bioscope included a book reviews
section. The books were often trade related, but there were some scientific and
philosophical titles. In a February 1909 issue, for example, the reviewer focused on Lionel
Lawrence’s The Eye, its Elementary Anatomy, Physiology, and Optical Constants. 524 The
review is detailed and positive, going into great depth on afterimages persistence of vision
theory. This enthusiasm indicates that early film showmen had a genuine interest in the
perceptual processes behind film viewing. This contention is supported by a brief look at The
Bioscope’s regular ‘Items of Interest’ section. In the 4 November 1909 issue, a short
paragraph sub-headed ‘Why Pictures Live’ considers the link between cinema and human
thought. Quoting ‘Spectator’ from the ‘New York Dramatic Mirror’ the reporter argues that
the ““motion picture lives and grows”” because it has successfully provided an ““immensely
attractive vehicle for conveying thought”” and a ““new and universal language””. 525 ‘In short’,
the report continues, film is ‘a new literature’ – ‘easy to comprehend and tremendously
strong in effective results on the human mind’. 526 While we cannot be certain that Joyce
read any trade journals, it is clearly the case that film-philosophy and film-science
permeated the cinema business around the time that Joyce ran the Volta. It is also
important to note that, although these reviews and opinions reveal an interest in

523 Geoff Brown, ‘Criticism: The Birth of the Kinematograph’, BFI Screenonline,
525 ‘Items of Interest’, The Bioscope, 4 November 1909, p. 15. I discuss the idea of film as a ‘universal language’
in chapter four, in relation to Stephen’s assertion that gesture ‘would be a universal language’ (U 15.105-6).
526 Ibid.
spectatorship and the affective nature of cinema, the film-philosophies displayed in *The Bioscope* were not inherently proto-phenomenological; they offered various perspectives.

It is possible, of course, that Joyce was inspired by proto-phenomenological ideas which had no links with film practice or film-philosophy. In ‘Cyclops’ Bloom is described as a ‘distinguished phenomenologist’ (*U* 12.1822), so we know that Joyce was at least aware of the term. Indeed, there were several phenomenological and proto-phenomenological thinkers writing prior to and during the period in which Joyce wrote *Ulysses* (1914-1922). Such thinkers include Franz Brentano (a German philosopher/psychologist writing between 1867 and 1911); William James (an American psychologist/philosopher – and colleague of Münsterberg – writing between 1878 and 1910); Gabriel Marcel (a Parisian existentialist – quoted by Kracauer – writing between 1904 and 1973); and Edmund Husserl (principal founder of phenomenology, who published influential works between 1900 and 1938). I have been unable to find any evidence to suggest that Joyce read the work of any of these philosophers. However, it is still worth briefly assessing the extent to which proto-phenomenological philosophers and psychologists permeated literary modernism and modern culture more generally. It is also interesting to note similarities between Joyce and these proto-phenomenologists, if only to show that parallel ideas do not necessarily entail direct influence.

In her monograph on ‘empiricist psychology’ and literary modernism, Judith Ryan argues that writers as diverse as Franz Kafka, Robert Musil, Gertrude Stein, Henry James, Rainer Maria Rilke, Virginia Woolf, and Marcel Proust mirrored the ideas of psychologist-

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527 Judith Ryan uses the term ‘empiricist psychologists’ to designate a diverse group of psychologists who were engaged in ‘arguing against nineteenth-century positivism’ and attempting ‘to revive in newly modified forms ideas that had been espoused in the eighteenth century by [Empiricist philosophers such as] Berkeley, Hume, and Locke’. See *The Vanishing Subject: Early Psychology and Literary Modernism* (Chicago, IL and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1991), p. 2.
philosophers. According to Ryan, in the ‘decades around the turn of the century, empiricist ideas were very much “in the air”’; William James’ lectures ‘helped spread the ideas among the educated public’ in Britain and America and Franz Brentano’s ideas were a ‘regular part’ of the school philosophy syllabus in Austria and Southern Germany.\footnote{Judith Ryan, \textit{The Vanishing Subject}, pp. 4 and 11.} Although ‘there are documented examples of writers who studied the work of nineteenth-century empiricists’, Ryan is keen to stress that ‘the relation of empiricist thought to modern literature should not be regarded as a one-way “influence”’.\footnote{Ibid., pp. 4 and 3.} Instead, literary modernists ‘respond[ed] creatively to some of the questions posed by […] philosopher-psychologists’ such as Brentano and James.\footnote{Ibid., p. 3.}  

Ryan uses Joyce – along with Hugo von Hofmannsthal, Arthur Schnitzler, Alfred Döblin, and Hermann Broch – as an example of a writer who ‘took issue with empiricism and sought new ways of consolidating the self’.\footnote{Ibid., p. 5.} Although Ryan admits that ‘Joyce was, to the best of [her] knowledge, unfamiliar with empiricist psychology’, she suggests that the aesthetic theories in \textit{A Portrait} and philosophical meditations on perception in \textit{Ulysses} (especially in ‘Proteus’) challenge empiricist psychology through their engagement with the early empiricism-inflected ideas of Walter Pater.\footnote{Ibid., p. 138.} As I discuss in chapter five, as well as alluding to Pater, ‘Proteus’ contains references to several other philosophers, particularly those who espouse theories of perception: Aristotle, Descartes, and Berkeley. Rather than concentrating on Pater, Ryan might justifiably have looked at Franz Brentano, a primary focus throughout the rest of her book. There are (arguably) more similarities than dissimilarities between the ideas of Brentano and Joyce; such parallels threaten to
problematize Ryan’s reading of Joyce as a writer who was primarily against empiricist philosopher-psychologists.

Like Joyce, Brentano was a lapsed Catholic. Unlike Joyce, in 1864, Brentano was ordained as a Catholic priest. However, Brentano opposed papal infallibility and soon lost his faith. He resigned his ordination in 1873. As already mentioned, Joyce suffered chronic eye problems. Brentano’s eye problems were so bad that, from 1903 onwards, he was completely blind. As well as sharing a Catholic education and visual disabilities, after having lived in various different parts of Europe, Joyce and Brentano both died in Zurich; Brentano passed away in 1917 and Joyce in 1941.533

Aristotle plays a key role in both Joyce’s fiction and Brentano’s philosophy. As mentioned above, Aristotle’s ideas are considered at length by Stephen in ‘Proteus’. In chapter four, I discuss Stephen’s allusion to Aristotle’s concept of ‘entelechy’ in ‘Circe’. For Brentano, Aristotle was a philosophical hero: ‘I had to apprentice myself to a master’ but ‘since I was born when philosophy had fallen into most lamentable decay, I could find none better than old Aristotle’.534 Brentano’s doctoral thesis was entitled On the Manifold Senses of Being in Aristotle (1862). In 1865 Brentano expanded on his thesis in his philosophical treatise, Psychology of Aristotle. Brentano argues that, rather than seeing the mind or soul as the processor or rationaliser of sensations, Aristotle suggests that this job is done by a bodily meta-sense which analyses sensory input from all other bodily senses: ‘the sensing

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subject is something bodily and corruptible, that the sensory faculty is a form that is mixed with matter, a *logos enhyllos* [an embodied thinking].\textsuperscript{535}

For Merleau-Ponty, if sensations can be experienced and understood without recourse to a rationalising intellect, we must presume that *there is no separate intellect*; all subjectivity and thinking is embodied – we are body-subjects. For Brentano, the existence of a meta-sense merely implies that our immaterial soul/ mind has a separate function – it does not *interpret* sensations. Instead, according to Brentano, the mind creates an objective presence of the phantom-presence sensed via our bodily sense organs. Unlike the sensory phantom-presences, the objective presences that occur in our mind always contain a judgement, recollection, opinion, or emotion. It is this idea which forms the basis of Brentano’s famous theory of intentionality. For Brentano, these objectively present mind-objects *intentionally inexist*. By this, Brentano means that these objects are in existence (rather that they are non-existent) and that we have an intentional (or ‘directed’) relationship with them – these objects automatically have an emotive, aesthetic, or ethical meaning for us.

As already explained above, Merleau-Ponty develops his own theory of intentionality, which stems from Brentano’s ideas. However, once again, whilst Brentano’s theory is designed to uphold mind/ body dualism, Merleau-Ponty’s theory advocates the view that our intentional relationship with objects is entirely embodied as *there is no separate immaterial mind*. As I show in the next two chapters, *Ulysses* features explorations of both mind/ body relations and intentionality; I suggest that, although Joyce and Brentano are closer in terms of chronology and biography, Joyce’s depiction and discussions of

philosophical theories are closer to Merleau-Ponty’s than Brentano’s. Like Merleau-Ponty, Joyce describes embodied subjectivity.

As Ryan notes, the philosophical-psychological ideas of William James quickly became influential in English-speaking literary circles: ‘William James is identified as the creator of the term “stream of consciousness” and thus as an important influence on writers whose techniques are in fact as different as those of Dorothy Richardson, Virginia Woolf, and James Joyce’. So, although there is no evidence that Joyce read any of James’ work, the two writers are often linked via the term ‘stream of consciousness’, which was first used by James in his *Principles of Psychology* (1890). For James, ‘stream of consciousness’ refers to the personal, transitive, continuous, ever-changing, world-dependent nature of consciousness. This last aspect of consciousness – its world-dependent nature – is decidedly phenomenological. For James, consciousness is not merely an inner thing which occurs in our mind; it is intimately bound up the ‘world of sense’ – our bodily sensations and the worldly objects which stimulate us. As James Edie notes, by ‘the “world of sense” James does not mean the chaotic mass of dumb “stimuli” […] but the concretely experienced “life-world” to which Merleau-Ponty, for his part, accords “the primacy of perception”’.

This sense of subject-world intermingling is evident in ‘Penelope’ – the *Ulysses* episode most often described as having a ‘stream of consciousness’ style. Far from being a purely interior monologue, echoing its Homeric namesake (‘Penelope’, the weaver), the episode interweaves thoughts, objects, places, memories, and bodily sensations. Although certain sensations are not objectively present, they are subjectively felt by Molly as she calls them to mind. In some passages, it is unclear whether certain phenomena are happening in

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the present or are part of past memories. Molly’s ‘stream of consciousness’ occurs when she is in bed with Bloom and, presumably, drifting in and out of sleep. Thus, when Molly is conscious of thunder waking her up, this could be actually present thunder, or a strongly sensual memory of thunder, or an interweaving of (equally haptic) present and past sensations: ‘I felt lovely and tired myself and fell asleep as sound as a top the moment I popped straight into bed till that thunder woke me up God be merciful to us I thought the heavens were coming down about us to punish us when I blessed myself and said a Hail Mary like those awful thunderbolts in Gibraltar’ (U 18.132-36). As Eugene Taylor notes, Jamesian ‘stream of consciousness’ is a ‘stream of thought and feeling’; this is exactly what we find in ‘Penelope’.\(^{538}\) This interweaving of the cerebral and the bodily/worldly is decidedly proto-phenomenological. Indeed, as James maintained in a letter to C. S. Peirce written in 1904 (the year in which Ulysses is set), ‘psychology is always constructed out of phenomenology’.\(^{539}\)

In Paris, 1937, Joyce attended lectures organised by Gabriel Marcel, a phenomenological writer and philosopher (\(JU\ 699\)).\(^{540}\) These lectures took place fifteen years after the publication of Ulysses, so cannot have influenced the text. However, Joyce’s interest in Marcel could well have developed earlier on in life. Marcel and Joyce certainly seemed to share a phenomenological outlook. Marcel argued that, despite what scientists would have us believe, we can never view the world purely objectively. Thomas Anderson provides a succinct summary of Marcel’s phenomenological stance: ‘Man is not apart from

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\(^{539}\) Ibid., p. 125.

being but is immersed in it and so cannot render an objective definition of it’. As Seymour Cain explains, Marcel argued that literature has the power to model this phenomenological view of the world as being always already subjectively rendered: writers are able to make ‘life “speak out” to us’ – ‘it is an acting-out or bodying-forth, not a mere illustration of general truths’.

Although Joyce never formally presented a philosophy of literature, as I show in chapters four and five of this thesis, *Ulysses* is very much a Marcellian ‘acting-out or bodying-forth’ – human experiences of the world are vividly shown rather than described. Joyce shows us Dublin as it is experienced by enworlded and embodied subjectivities. As Marcel states, ‘to say I exist is to say I am bodily, I am an “incarnate being”’.

Although Marcel never wrote a philosophy of film, he did not dismiss the idea that it could be a philosophical medium: ‘literature [. . .] is so full of philosophical thought’; ‘[t]his is true not only of the essay and the novel, but also of the theater and the cinema’. Marcel’s dictum – ‘Existence is participation’ – fits very well with the spectator-film blurring present in phenomenological film theories. For Marcel, as Anderson explains, ‘my basic experience of myself as existing is *not of a private subject observing the world of objects as detached spectator* but as an incarnate being *immersed in and interacting* with a world’.

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As noted above, there is no evidence that Joyce read any of Marcel’s texts. However, my research has uncovered a letter that suggests that Marcel read (or at least intended to read) Joyce’s *Ulysses*. In 1929, Adrienne Monnier, publisher of the first French translation of *Ulysses*, sent a copy of Joyce’s translated text to Marcel. In a letter to Monnier (dated 23 February 1929), acknowledging receipt of the French *Ulysses* (*Ulysse*, trans. MM. Auguste Morel and Stuart Gilbert), Marcel writes: ‘I have never dared tackle the original as I thought I might get drowned in it. I very much look forward to reading this translation which is, by all accounts, admirable’. Marcel was clearly flattered to have been sent a copy of the French *Ulysses* and seems genuinely excited to read Joyce’s text, made less daunting when translated into his mother tongue. It is, of course, impossible to tell whether Marcel was interested in *Ulysses* merely as an interesting work of literature or whether he was hoping to find a kindred phenomenological spirit.

As detailed in chapter two, O’Sullivan argues for an interrelation between Joyce and Edmund Husserl, the grandfather of phenomenology: ‘[w]hile it is unlikely that Joyce ever read Husserl’s work in the libraries of Trieste, Pula or Paris, Husserl’s conversion from Judaism to Christianity in 1886 did coincide with another Christian movement’ – the ‘Neo-Thomist Scholastic revival [...]’, led by Cardinal Desiré Mercier. According to O’Sullivan, it is ‘likely that Mercier’s neo-Thomistic revival, elements of which Joyce incorporated into his early aesthetic theory, had close affinities with the philosophy of Husserl’. Famously, Jacques Derrida also links Joyce and Husserl, via the pair’s shared interest in language and meaning. Derrida first refers to Joyce in the introduction to his French translation of

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550 Ibid.
Husserl’s *Origin of Geometry* (1962). According to Derrida, both Husserl and Joyce seek a univocal language. For Derrida, ‘Husserl’s project’ in *Origin of Geometry* is ‘the transcendental “parallel” to Joyce’s’.\(^{551}\) In reducing language to its ‘ideal objectivity’,\(^{552}\) Husserl aims to offer consciousness an ‘escape from language’s externality’.\(^{553}\) In contrast, according to Derrida, Joyce aims to ‘repeat and take responsibility for equivocation itself’.\(^{554}\) As Alan Roughley usefully surmises, ‘Joyce strives for an overdetermined equivocity; Husserl, for a pure univocity’.\(^{555}\)

As John Caputo notes, ‘Derrida was taken not by the more engaging Husserl of “life-world” phenomenology, to which Merleau-Ponty had given so much currency […], but by the most rigorous and abstract, the most scrupulous, even tedious analyses of signs, meaning, and ideality to be found in Husserl’s *Logical Investigations*’.\(^{556}\) Contra Derrida, I suggest that, the relation between Husserl and Joyce, it is to be found here – in Husserl’s linking of person and world, and his ideas on visual images. Like Marcel, Husserl does not offer a philosophy of film, but he does mention the Mutoscope and,\(^{557}\) according to John Brough, other ‘texts suggest that [Husserl] accepted film as a form of art, and that he intended what he says about the essential nature of images to apply just as much to film as to painting’.\(^{558}\) Brough, notes that cinema, like Husserlian phenomenology, unites subjectivity and the physical world: unlike Merleau-Ponty, Husserl ‘refuses to collapse

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\(^{555}\) Alan Roughley, *Reading Derrida, Reading Joyce*, p. 5.


consciousness and world, insisting on maintaining the integrity of both, but he emphatically affirms the inseparable bond between them, which film confirms again and again’.\(^{559}\) As I have already argued (and will offer illustrations for in the following chapters), Joyce does not merely *link* subjectivity and world; anticipating Merleau-Ponty, Joyce (and several early filmmakers) shows that body-subjects and the world are intimately and inseparably intertwined.

**CONCLUSION: USING MERLEAU-PONTIAN FILM-PHENOMENOLOGY**

It is worth reiterating, at this point, that I am not arguing for direct influence between proto-phenomenology or proto-*film*-phenomenology and Joyce’s work. I am using *film*-phenomenology to help analyse the similarities between the complex ways in which both early cinema and *Ulysses* explore seeing and being. Film-phenomenology provides a sophisticated way of thinking about and exploring ideas and concepts such as: perception; spectatorship; human-machine interaction; haptic experience; and mind-body, subject-object, self-other, and person-world intermingling. Whether or not Joyce was aware of proto-*film*-phenomenology, it is not anachronistic to employ its concepts, as film-philosophers were beginning to use phenomenologically resonant concepts from the late 1800s. The next two chapters put theory into practice, as I analyse *Ulysses* and early cinema through Merleau-Pontian film-phenomenology.

\(^{559}\) John B. Brough, ‘Showing and Seeing: Film as Phenomenology’, p. 197.
This chapter presents an alternative to the popular critical vein which sees Joyce’s
*Ulysses* and certain early films as conveying a mechanical and non-human view of the
modern world.\(^{560}\) I argue that, for modern writers and film makers, the human/ machine
binary is inextricably linked to the mind/ body binary. This pair of binaries is also at the
centre of modern theories of comedy, especially those of Henri Bergson and Wyndham
Lewis. When laughing at machine-like humans or human-like machines, modern readers and
viewers were – often unintentionally – laughing at the absurdity of detachable minds and
bodies. I suggest that, like modern theorists and philosophers, *Ulysses* and certain strains of
early cinema were engaged, naively or otherwise, in a systematic exploration of Cartesian
dualism. As artists and entertainers, Joyce and the film-makers do not present logical proofs
for their alternative theories of the mind/ body problem. Instead, they *show* the
impossibility of reducing humans to a mechanical body or an immaterial mind. By depicting
integrated mind-bodies, I argue, Joyce and selected early film-makers go beyond Bergson
and Lewis and anticipate Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s later notion of the ‘body-subject’, of
humans as neither purely mechanical, nor solely cerebral.

As I show, the comedy in *Ulysses* and the early films that I investigate can be split
into three different types: (1) straightforwardly Bergsonian and/ or Lewisian comedy, in
which humans behave like machines or *vice versa*; (2) juxtapositional comedy, in which a

\(^{560}\) I discussed this critical vein in depth in chapter two.
mechanical writing or performance style is juxtaposed with human sentiment and intimacy; (3) revelatory comedy, or comic relief, in which humans are shown to be more than mere machines. Sometimes each type is present simultaneously, but audiences or readers may only recognise one or two types, depending on their critical opinions and/ or knowledge base. Examples of straightforwardly Bergsonian/ Lewisian comedy include ‘Ithaca’’s mechanical style, Bloom’s late-night pratfalls, and Chaplin’s Mutual films, such as One A. M. (1916) and The Fireman (1916), as well as the animate objects and body swaps of ‘Circe’, coupled with Méliès’s trick-films, such as Four Troublesome Heads (1898) and The Clown and the Automaton (1897). The second type of comedy is also present in Joyce’s ‘Ithaca’, and in some of Chaplin’s other films - In the Park (1915) and Shoulder Arms (1918), in particular. Through a discussion of different kinds of imitation (including social mirroring, Bazinian mimesis, and mechanical reproduction), I highlight the comedy inherent in juxtaposing the mechanical and the human. My analysis of the third type of comedy, which I have called ‘comic relief’, comprises explorations of Merleau-Ponty’s concepts of ‘flesh’ and the ‘body-subject’ in relation to Stephen and Bloom’s simultaneous urination and intermingling (as they become ‘Stoom’ and ‘Blephen’ in ‘Ithaca’); Chaplin’s The Floorwalker (1916), with its mirroring, mannequin, and prosthetic leg; Chaplin’s cane, Stephen’s ashplant, and the blind stripling’s stick; and Chaplin’s emotional waiter in The Rink (1916).

The final two sections of this chapter move from the comic to the melodramatic and religious. I show that ideas of embodiment and non-human-human interaction were carried across into more serious genres of early cinema; I look at The Colleen Bawn (1911), a film based on Dion Boucicault’s famous Irish melodrama, and Sister Angelica (1909), a popular film at Joyce’s Volta cinema, in relation to the ‘Circe’ episode of Ulysses.
MECHANICAL MODERNISM

As explained in chapter two, there has been a surge in research on the relationship between modernism and mechanical technologies. Tim Armstrong set the cogs in motion with *Modernism, Technology, and the Body: A Cultural Study* (1998), and was followed by Sara Danius, in 2002, with *The Senses of Modernism: Technology, Perception, and Aesthetics*. Both studies analyse the ways in which modern technologies affected the human body, and how these effects influenced literary modernism. Beatrice Monaco’s 2008 study, *Machinic Modernism: The Deleuzian Literary Machines of Woolf, Lawrence and Joyce*, and Julian Murphet’s 2009 study, *Multimedia Modernism: Literature and the Anglo-American Avant-Garde*, are less concerned with modern machinery’s effects on the body, and more concerned with the direct effects of technology on modernist art and literature. For Monaco, modernist novels are machines; in ‘Ithaca’, particularly, ‘it is almost as if we are right inside modernity’s machine of rationality and watching its workings’.\(^{561}\) For Murphet, modernist art-works and literary texts are sites of conflict, where new media technologies (material, mechanical technologies) and old media technologies (immaterial, non-mechanical technologies) continually enact a ‘dialectic of convergence-differentiation’.\(^{562}\)

In his valuable study, *Cinema and Modernism* (2007), instead of analysing the influence of the technologically contoured body on modernist literature, or the mechanical and/or material aspects of the texts themselves, David Trotter considers the ‘will to automatism’ that is, supposedly, shared by cinema (as a mechanical recording machine) and literary modernism. Trotter sees Charlie Chaplin as the epitome of this modernist ‘will to automatism’; in the character of The Tramp, Chaplin ‘created a mechanism rather than a

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persona’. Chaplin’s jerky, mechanical movements reflect modern mass production. The films of Chaplin (and of other silent film comedians) are also the subject of Tom Gunning’s 2010 essays: ‘Mechanisms of Laughter: The Devices of Slapstick’ in Slapstick Comedy, and ‘Chaplin and the Body of Modernity’ in Early Popular Visual Culture. According to Gunning, the comedy in slapstick is mechanical; modern machines are funny. In slapstick films the viewer’s laughter is triggered when some mechanical device malfunctions; an exploding automobile, a collapsing mechanical bed, or any ‘machine misused or turned against itself becomes a gag’. For Gunning, the ‘body of modernity’, ‘the uncontrolled, explosive body’ – as epitomised by Chaplin – is also a comic entity. In Machine-Age Comedy (2009), North takes a similar view; modernist humour is intrinsically mechanical, and Chaplin’s ‘robotic’ movements are inherently funny. As Mark Wollaeger and Kevin Dettmar observe in their foreword to Machine-Age Comedy, ‘North argues that modern writers and artists found something inherently comic in […] industrial mass production, mechanical reproduction, and a growing suspicion of the fundamentally machinic nature of human beings’. It is this last aspect of technological modernity – the seemingly machinic nature of human beings – that is the focus of this chapter.

Unlike Monaco’s and Murphet’s studies, this chapter is concerned with the body (and the mind), and how modern technology affected human beings. Rather than analysing the machinic nature of modernist texts, or the influence of the modern media machine, this chapter considers the ways in which new body/ technology relations inspired literary modernism. Whereas Armstrong’s and Danius’s body-focused studies concentrate on the

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567 Ibid., p. v.
effects that modern machines had on modern bodies (or, more specifically, on modern senses, in Danius’s study), this chapter analyses the modern reconceptualisations of the body that occurred as a result of mechanical modernity. I analyse the ways in which modern technology led literary modernists and film professionals – Joyce, Chaplin, and Méliès specifically – to question (often implicitly and/or unconsciously) not only the status of the body, but the body’s relation to the mind, soul, or other interior, non-material human essences.

North touches on this modernist tendency to reconsider René Descartes’s mind/body dualism, but he does not address it in any depth. According to North, Wyndham Lewis – a leading modernist artist, writer, and founder of the Vorticist movement – reviewed the Cartesian mind/body problem, but remained confused; in Lewis’s *The Wild Body* (1909-1927), at some points the non-mechanical mind and the mechanical body appear to be separate, and at other points ‘the Wild Body appears as an intimate amalgam of mind and body’. Trotter implicitly addresses the modernist reshaping of the mind/body binary when he asserts that Chaplin’s ‘Tramp is all imitation’. In the technological world of modernity that Chaplin’s Tramp inhabits, there is no need for human consciousness, subjectivity, or a mind; the Tramp ‘wants to behave like a machine’, to inhabit technological modernity as a mechanical, mind-less body. Like North and Gunning, I suggest that modernists (both literary and filmic) found something inherently comic in mechanical modernity. Specifically, I argue that modernists found humour in the aforementioned re-evaluations of the mind/body binary that mechanical modernity prompted. This argument is developed over the course of this chapter, through an examination of philosophical

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569 David Trotter, *Cinema and Modernism*, p. 182.
570 Ibid., p. 198.
theories of comedy and the mind/body problem and through close analyses of *Ulysses* and early films. Ultimately, I argue that Joyce and the film makers present an – unconsciously – Merleau-Pontian reconceptualisation of the mind/body problem that builds up on, yet goes beyond, the anti-Cartesian theories of Bergson and Lewis.

**THE MECHANICS OF COMEDY: BERGSON AND LEWIS**

In *Laughter: An Essay on the Meaning of the Comic* (*La rire*, 1900), the philosopher Henri Bergson argues that the supreme comic image is ‘something mechanical encrusted on something living’. 571 In other words, we find it funny when something non-mechanical – especially a human being – appears machine-like and inhuman; ‘[w]e laugh every time a person gives us the impression of being a thing’ (Bergson’s italicisation). 572 For Bergson, ‘THE ATTITUDES, GESTURES AND MOVEMENTS OF THE HUMAN BODY ARE LAUGHABLE IN EXACT PROPORTION AS THAT BODY REMINDS US OF A MERE MACHINE’. 573 It is the rigidity – or *raideur* – and automatic aspects of machine-encrusted-humans that makes them comical; ‘it is really a kind of automatism that makes us laugh – an automatism [...] closely akin to mere absentmindedness’. 574 According to Bergson then, we laugh when a human body acts absentmindedly, when someone appears to move mechanically and automatically, without the input of a human mind.

Although not a philosopher himself, Wyndham Lewis, a modernist artist and writer, was clearly inspired by Bergson’s philosophy of comedy. Despite publicly deriding

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572 Ibid.,
574 Ibid., p. 15.
Bergsonian ideas, describing Bergson as ‘the great organizer of disintegration in the modern world’, in a letter to Theodore Weiss, Lewis noted that he attended Bergson’s lectures at the Collège de France, Paris, and found him to be ‘an excellent lecturer’. Whilst in Paris, Lewis was, according to North, ‘trying to master the art of “the French joke”’; it seems likely that Lewis ‘became familiar at this time with Bergson’s book on laughter’. Lewis’s debt to Bergson’s laughter essay is seen, most clearly, in *The Wild Body* (1909-1927) a short story collection including two explanatory articles: ‘Inferior Religions’ (1917) and ‘The Meaning of the Wild Body’ (1927). Although Lewis describes these explanatory pieces as ‘articles’, the fact that they appear alongside works of fiction (short stories) makes readers dubious of their status as non-fiction polemics. I refer to the ideas in these articles as being part of Lewis’s ‘theory of comedy’, but this assertion always comes with the caveat that the ideas expressed may not be directly attributable to their real-life author in the sense that Bergson’s philosophical ideas are to Bergson.

There are clear parallels between the comedy theories of Lewis and Bergson. However, while Bergson argues that we laugh when a *person acts like a thing*, Lewis suggests that we laugh when a *thing acts like a person*; ‘[t]he root of the Comic is to be sought in the sensations resulting from the observations of a *thing* behaving like a *person*’. For Bergson, a comedian is necessarily mind-less: the ‘comic person is unconscious’. For Lewis, in contrast, comedy is to be found in things (matter), not in people. Things are comic when they appear to be mind-full, when they seem to possess

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consciousness; ‘[t]he movement or intelligent behaviour of matter, any autonomous movement of matter, is essentially comic’. 581 As an example, Lewis imagines observing a non-human thing reading a book – ‘Flaubert’s Salammbo, or Plutarch’s Moralia’, perhaps. For Lewis, this image is hilarious, as things do not normally possess the intelligent minds that are required for the comprehension of texts. 582

Both Bergson and Lewis find comedy in the discrepancy between machine-like thingness and humanity (or, more precisely, between a mechanical body and a human mind). According to Bergson, we laugh when a human body acts absentmindedly, when someone appears to move around mechanically, without the input of a human mind. According to Lewis, we laugh when an intelligent human mind appears to operate through an inhuman thing or automaton. In On Humour (2002), Simon Critchley suggests that ‘everything becomes laughably absurd when I begin to detach myself from my body, when I imagine myself, my ego, my soul, or whatever, in distinction from its corporeal housing’. 583 In both Bergson’s and Lewis’s theories, humour is found in exactly this – in the seeming distinction between, or apparent dislocation of, a non-material mind and a material body.

For Bergson, ‘[w]here matter [...] succeeds in dulling the outward life of the soul, [...] it achieves, at the expense of the body, an effect that is comic’; comedy is produced when the body disassociates itself from the mind (or soul). 584 Bergson illustrates this crucial idea with the image of an orator who sneezes in the middle of an important, serious talk: ‘[w]hy do we laugh at a public speaker who sneezes just at the most pathetic moment of his speech?’; the comedy ‘lies in the fact our attention is suddenly recalled from the soul to the

582 Ibid., p. 158.
584 Henri Bergson, Laughter, p. 21.
Here, the body seems to act independently of human intellect and human subjectivity; the body appears to become a machine, a sneezing automaton. Similarly, for Lewis, comedy occurs when a ‘man’s body [is] not him’, when a person fails to identify with their body, as if their body has been severed from their mind. To illustrate his point, Lewis describes a taxi driver whose body has – metaphorically, at least – become his taxi, whilst his mind (his subjectivity or self) remains separate; ‘[h]is taxi for him stood for his body’, but ‘[h]e did not identify himself with his machine’. In both Bergson’s and Lewis’s illustrations, the body detaches itself from the mind and, in doing so, acts independently of human intellect or subjectivity; the body becomes a machine, a sneezing automaton or a taxi. However, as Lewis emphasises, it was not the becoming-a-machine that, in itself, produced the comedy in the taxi driver illustration; ‘[i]t was the detachment [of mind from body, or vice versa], in any case, that gave the episode a comic quality’. For both Bergson and Lewis, comedy is located in the separation of mind and body.

CARTESIAN DUALISM AND THE MERLEAU-PONTIAN BODY-SUBJECT

In laughing at mind/ body separation, Bergson and Lewis are mocking Cartesian dualism. In the Cartesian model, the mind (which is completely non-material) is separate from the body (which is wholly material). Emotions and intelligent thought occur in our mind, while our mechanical body controls walking, eating, and all other internal mechanisms and corporeal interactions with the objective world. According to Descartes (1649), ‘the machine of our body’ can ‘be moved [...] with no help from the soul’; our bodily

587 Ibid. My italics.
588 Ibid.
movements ‘depend only on the arrangement of our members, [...] in the same way in which a watch’s movements is produced by the sheer force of its spring and the shape of its wheels’. 589

Descartes’s image of the body as a watch is comparable to Bergson’s sneezing orator and Lewis’s taxi-bodied taxi driver; all three images highlight the mechanical nature of bodily processes. However, each image serves a different function. Descartes’s watch metaphor shows that the body is merely a set of automatic mechanisms. Conversely, Bergson’s sneezing automaton image shows us that the body is not just an automated machine. Sneezing represents a rare moment in which bodily mechanisms appear to override – or disconnect from – the mind, so Bergson’s sneezing image emphasises the interrelation of the mind and body. Similarly, Lewis’s taxi driver is usually a coherent human being with an integrated mind and body. But when he drives a passenger somewhere, the taxi driver’s human mind takes a back seat and detaches itself from his machine-like taxi-body.

Bernard Lafourcade describes Lewis’s philosophy as ‘black Cartesianism’, 590 and Michael Levenson calls Lewis ‘an inverted Cartesian’. 591 According to Levenson, ‘whereas Descartes [...] attempts to prove that human essence is an immaterial soul only accidentally linked to an embodied form, Lewis sees humanity as essentially (and comically) bound to the body.’ 592 There are, indeed, hints of disdain towards mind/ body dualism (and favourability towards a more unified model) at various points in Lewis’s work. In ‘Inferior

592 Ibid.
Religions’, Lewis sees the act of laughing as an event in which mind and body are integrated: ‘[l]aughter is the brain-body’s snort of exultation’; ‘it is all that remains physical in the flash of thought’. 593 Similarly, in Lewis’s novel, Tarr (1918), the live human body is a ‘thoughtful body’, as opposed to the dead body, which ‘can be treated as an object’. 594

Despite these few hints towards an anti-dualist – and more Merleau-Pontian – view of the mind/body relationship, there a few moments in Lewis’s writing which seem to contradict this progressiveness. At the beginning of ‘The Meaning of the Wild Body’, Lewis asserts: ‘to assume the dichotomy of mind and body is necessary here, without arguing it’. 595 Later on in the same article, Lewis problematizes this assertion by stating that humans are ‘autonomously and intelligently moving matter’; this could either mean that we are merely a thing with an added mind or that our bodies are always already intelligent, always already conscious and subjective. It is hard to tell whether Lewis is suggesting that we are Cartesian watches with a detachable (and addable) mind or Merleau-Pontian body-subjects. As mentioned above, Lewis is not attempting to write a philosophical theory, so there is no real need to avoid ambiguity. The ideas expressed can be described as philosophical, but they appear as articles at the end of a short story collection, rather than as part of a philosophical treatise. In contrast, Bergson produces a more coherent reconceptualization of the mind/body problem, and his ideas shed some light on the seeming-ambiguities of Lewis’s ideas.

As Suzanne Guerlac notes, readers who are familiar with Bergson ‘will recognize that the terms of Bergson’s apparently casual analysis in Laughter are derived from [...] Matter

and Memory’. In Matter and Memory: Essay on the Relation of the Body to Mind (Matière et mémoire, 1896) Bergson details a complex explanation of mind/body interrelation. He states that his ideas are ‘frankly dualistic’ but he also, seemingly contradictorily, states that he aims to ‘lessen greatly, if not overcome, the theoretical difficulties which have always beset dualism’. These lines mirror the ambiguity of Lewis’s ideas.

Whereas Lewis makes little attempt to clarify his ambiguous ideas, Bergson explains himself in great detail. For Bergson, the main problem with mind/body dualism is that the body is always associated with matter or solidity and the mind is always associated with spirit or immateriality. Consequently, Bergson attempts to resolve dualism by disassociating mind and body from spirit and matter. This entails reimagining matter in more spiritual terms, and spirit in more material terms. Thus, for Bergson, matter is unsubstantial and volatile, rather than solid and stable; it is a collection of ‘numberless vibrations’. And all of these ‘vibrations’ are spiritual (or cerebral), in the sense that they are conscious (to a certain degree at least). As Ronald Bogue notes, in Bergson’s philosophy ‘even the most microscopic of subatomic events exhibits some form of consciousness’. For Bergson, then, the body cannot be reduced to a set of automatic moving parts, as each separate part of the body – and each separate particle of each body-part – is imbued with a certain degree of consciousness. This idea may be close to what Lewis was trying to convey with his ambiguous ‘autonomously and intelligently moving matter’ image.

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598 Ibid., pp. 9-11.
599 Ibid., p. 208.
Although Bergson propounds a thorough and intricate theory of spirit/matter intermingling, he is less articulate regarding his views on the mind/body relationship itself. In *Matter and Memory*, the body still appears to be somewhat mechanical. It is pictured as an engine room, as the ‘office of the centripetal nerves’, ‘a center of action’.\(^{601}\) According to Merleau-Ponty, Bergson always *intended* to keep the mind and body separate: ‘Bergson wants to show that there is [...] “something” which cannot be explained by the body’.\(^{602}\) As noted in chapter three, for Merleau-Ponty, the Bergsonian ‘body does not succeed in being a subject [...] for if the body were subject, the subject would be body, and this is something Bergson does not want at any price’.\(^{603}\) Bergson wanted to affirm subjectivity – or consciousness – as *the* force which is present in everything (including humans, animals, and machines). Therefore, subjectivity could not be expressly linked to the body; subjectivity needed to be separate from the body. The Bergsonian body is merely ‘a place of rendez-vous’ for corporeal sensations (or ‘Pure Perception’) and mind-dependent thoughts (or ‘Pure Memory’); it is simply the casing which holds together numberless vibrating particles of subjectivity, it is the substance that ‘fixes our mind [*esprit*]’.\(^{604}\) In short, Bergson – and probably Lewis, too – does not – and, according to Merleau-Ponty, does not want to – posit a ‘body-subject’.

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\(^{603}\) Ibid.

BODY-SUBJECT AND MACHINE-HUMAN

As noted in the previous chapter, neither the term ‘body-subject’ nor its French equivalent corps-sujet is ever used by Merleau-Ponty himself, but commentators often use the expression as short-hand for Merleau-Ponty’s theory of mind/ body mingling. The hyphen in ‘body-subject’ highlights the fact that, unlike Bergson and Lewis, Merleau-Ponty’s anti-dualist philosophy posits an intermingled relationship between mind and body. Eric Matthews emphasises the fact that Merleau-Ponty’s anti-dualism is also anti-mechanistic; paralleling Bergson and Lewis, Merleau-Ponty felt that issues relating to the mind and the body needed to be discussed in relation to the human and the mechanical. Thus, as well as offering a solution to the mind/ body problem, the body-subject provides an answer to the human/ machine problem. According to Merleau-Ponty, ‘we experience living human bodies […] not as bits of machinery, but as the expression of a human person and his or her mode of being in the world’; Merleau-Ponty sees ‘human beings neither as disembodied minds nor as complex machines’. 605

Merleau-Ponty’s interest in the machine/ human binary is reflected in the title of the journal that he founded along with Jean-Paul Sartre and others - Les Temps Modernes (Modern Times). The Left-leaning philosophy and criticism journal, founded in 1945, was named after the anti-machine-age Charlie Chaplin film of the same name (Modern Times, 1936). 606 As Tom Gunning states, Modern Times (1936) ‘stresses the dark side of the [human/ machine] equation’. 607 Echoing Bloom’s call for ‘Electric dishscrubbers’ in ‘Circe’ (U 15.1689), in Modern Times, an automatic feeding device reduces Chaplin’s body to a mere food receptacle; the human body becomes the final mechanism in the food-producing,

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food-despatching, food-consuming machine. The device includes a mechanical food
shoveller, a machine-arm that pushes the food into the eater’s mouth, and a soup plate with
an air-blower attachment. The recorded marketing message that the feeding device plays
emphasises the mechanisation of the body with the words: ‘no breath necessary, no energy
required to cool the soup’. 608 As Gunning states, Modern Times is merely an intensified
version of earlier presentations of the automatic body in films such as One A.M. (1916),
which is discussed below in relation to the ‘Ithaca’ episode of Ulysses. 609

Despite naming his journal after an overtly anti-mechanistic film, Merleau-Ponty was
neither anti- nor pro-mechanisation: his view of machines, the mechanical, and the
machine/human binary was complex. According to Merleau-Ponty, the Cartesian dualism of
mind (human and non-material)/body (mechanical and material) is based on a
misunderstanding of how modern machines work. Factory machines, motor cars, and film
cameras are not fully automated devices (such as the parody laden automatic feeding
device in Modern Times); they are machine-human interfaces. Merleau-Ponty illustrates his
point through the image of a very simple interface – a blind man and his cane: ‘the stick is
no longer an object perceived by the blind man, but an instrument with which he perceives’;
it ‘is a bodily auxiliary, an extension of the bodily synthesis’. 610 As Don Ihde and Evan
Selinger make clear, just because ‘Cartesian thought reads materiality mechanically’, it does
not mean that materiality (or corporeality) is mechanical; ‘technological materiality is not
itself mechanistic, but is human-technology interactive’. 611 Similarly, for Merleau-Ponty, the
body (which is always already a body-subject) is not a set of mechanisms; it is mechanical in
the sense that it has materiality, and its movements are partly caused by bodily procedures,

608 Charlie Chaplin, Modern Times (1936), MK2 DVD.
but the Merleau-Pontian body – the body-subject – is not *reducible* to these automatic processes. The same is true of the machine-human relationship; the interface cannot be reduced to either machine or human, or mechanisms (fleshy or metallic) or mind (human or mechanical). Merleau-Ponty does not argue against the mechanisation of the body; instead, he aims to show how humans and machines, minds and bodies, can – and do – interrelate.

To summarise then, unlike Bergson and Lewis who – despite their anti-Cartesian leanings – keep the (human) mind/ (mechanical) body binary intact, Merleau-Ponty destroys dualism by positing the body-subject. In the remainder of this chapter, I show that Joyce and selected early film-makers share Merleau-Ponty’s anti-dualist, anti-mechanistic philosophy. By mocking mind/ body separation and/ or depicting the integration of minds and bodies, *Ulysses* and the early films convey the *co-existence* of – rather than a fight between – humans and machines, and minds and bodies. Like Merleau-Ponty, but unlike their contemporaries (Bergson and Lewis), Joyce and the early film-makers posit a body-subject.

**THE MIND/ BODY PROBLEM ACCORDING TO JOYCE, LEWIS, CHAPLIN, AND MÉLIÈS**

Before analysing particular instances of machine-human and mind-body mingling in *Ulysses* and selected early films, it is important to reiterate my position on the modernism/cinema relationship. As I explained in chapter two, whether or not Joyce or the film professionals *intentionally* engaged with the mind/ body problem, or with philosophy more generally, is of little consequence for my project. As already noted, I take my cue from Merleau-Ponty, who argues that art (including film and literature), technology, and philosophy inhabit the same intellectual and cultural climate, so the different disciplines and art-forms inevitably engage in similar themes and ideas: ‘if philosophy is in harmony with
the cinema, [...] it is because the philosopher and the moviemaker share a certain way of being, a certain view of the world which belongs to a generation’. Trotter’s ‘model of parallelism’ is also useful here; modernist literature and early film are best ‘understood as constituting and constituted by parallel histories’. Like Merleau-Ponty, Trotter recognises that film and literature are both (often unconsciously) engaged in the philosophies that underlie technological modernity (including cinematic technologies). As explained in the chapter two, we can learn more about modernism and modernity by analysing emerging ways of thinking about and perceiving the world, rather than by attempting to isolate specific, singular causes.

Nevertheless, it is perverse to ignore the presence of noteworthy relationships, as these relationships can help us to understand the parallel thinking and ideas that were present in the modern period. Bergson’s theory of comedy could well have influenced Joyce’s ideas on the mind/ body binary, as Joyce was aware of Bergson’s philosophy. Joyce’s first stay in Paris, during December 1902 (JJ 112-16), coincided with a lecture that Bergson gave at the Société française de philosophie, and Joyce returned to Paris in January 1903 (JJ 119-121), the month in which Bergson’s ‘Introduction to Metaphysics’ was published in the prestigious French journal Revue de métaphysique et de morale. Joyce’s Trieste library contained two of Bergson’s major works: L’évolution créatrice [Creative Evolution] (1914) and The Meaning of the War: Life & Matter in Conflict (1915). I am not the first to suggest a possible link between Joyce and Bergson. Spiegel asserts that Joyce’s ‘fragmented postures’ and ‘stop-motion technique’ are precise examples of ‘Bergson’s famous formula

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613 David Trotter, Cinema and Modernism, p. 3. I explain Trotter’s ideas in detail in chapter two.
614 J. Alexander Gunn, Bergson and His Philosophy, p. 142.
615 Ibid., p. 141.
616 Michael Patrick Gillespie, James Joyce’s Trieste Library, p. 46.
for the comic effect’. However, as I show, Joyce could just as easily have been influenced by Chaplin’s laughable mind/body splits, or the mind/body integration that he uses to convey his jokes.

We know that Joyce saw at least one Chaplin film prior to the publication of *Ulysses*, as he mentions so in a letter to his friend Valery Larbaud, on 6 November 1921, Joyce wrote: ‘[e]xpected to see you last night at *The Kid*’ (*LIII*, 53). Joyce’s daughter, Lucia, adored Chaplin. At parties, she would often impersonate Chaplin’s ‘Tramp’ character (*JJ* 611). In 1921, Joyce and the fourteen-year-old Lucia, managed to catch a glimpse of Chaplin as wandering through the streets of Paris, promoting *The Kid*: at first Lucia failed to recognise him; it was ‘his gestures and attitudes’ which ‘finally unmasked him’. At the age of seventeen Lucia wrote an essay on Chaplin’s bodily movements and expressive eyes; it was published in the French journal *Le Disque vert* (1924), alongside articles by the likes of Jean Cocteau, Blaise Cendrars, and René Crevel. As several scholars have noted before me, Joyce was, himself, a big fan of Chaplin; so much of a fan, in fact, that he wanted Chaplin to play the role of Bloom in a possible film version of *Ulysses*. Interestingly, Joyce’s own drawing of Bloom (doodled alongside his notes for *Ulysses*), bears a remarkable resemblance to Chaplin’s Tramp character (see figures 3 and 4 overleaf). It is harder to discover the extent to which Chaplin was aware of Joyce. In his Chaplin biography, Gerith

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617 Alan Spiegel, *Fiction and the Camera Eye*, p. 97. Also see Philip Sicker’s ‘Evenings at the Volta’: the ‘laughter generated’ by *Ulysses* and early cinema is ‘purely Bergsonian’; ‘human beings exhibit the absentmindedness of machines’ and inanimate objects are invested with ‘sentience and volition’, p. 122.

618 Joyce was still adding to certain episodes of *Ulysses* during the proofing stages. He was still adding to ‘Ithaca’ (one of the primary episodes that I analyse below) from November 1921 to January 1922. See Luca Crispi, ‘Manuscript Timeline 1905–1922’, *Genetic Joyce Studies*, 4 (Spring 2004), <http://www.antwerpjamesjoycecenter.com/> [accessed December 2011].


620 Ibid., p. 87.

Von Ulm notes that Chaplin ‘read omnivorously’, but there is no evidence to suggest that he read any of Joyce’s work.\footnote{622}

Lewis, a direct contemporary and dining/ drinking partner of Joyce, was also an admirer of Chaplin’s work.\footnote{623} According to North, Lewis would regularly ‘drag acquaintances to a movie theater where it was possible to see Chaplin two-reelers for tuppence’.\footnote{624} For Lewis, Chaplin was ‘the only creative personality that cinema had produced’; he was ‘the swan-song of the English clown’.\footnote{625} In Creatures of Habit and Creatures of Change, Lewis calls Chaplin ‘the greatest figure on the stage today’\footnote{626} and, in Time and Western Man, ‘the

\footnote{622} Gerith Von Ulm, Charlie Chaplin: King of Tragedy, (London: Caxton, 1940), p. 272-273.
\footnote{623} As Richard Ellmann notes, Joyce was ‘pleased to discover that he shared his birth year, 1882, with Eamon De Valera, Wyndham Lewis, and Frank Budgen’ (JJ 23). Joyce, Eliot, and Lewis dined and/ or drank together, on several occasions, whilst in Paris (JJ 494). Joyce and Lewis fell out in the late 1920s after Lewis mocked Joyce in Time and the Western Man (1927) and was then critical of Finnegans Wake (1939) (JJ 595).
\footnote{624} Michael North, Machine-Age Comedy, pp. 113-114.
greatest screen artist’. Elsewhere, however, Lewis is less appreciative of Chaplin. Instead of reading Chaplin’s art in terms of his ‘Wild Body’ comedy theory, Lewis criticises Chaplin for being the epitome of the ‘infant-cult’, for exploiting the ‘pathos of the small’.  

According to Anthony Paraskeva, Lewis’s conflicting opinions of Chaplin are due to the artist’s change of style. In the early films (up until 1915), Chaplin’s characterisation was fluid and authentic but, as his ‘Tramp’ character evolved and began to stick, Chaplin’s movements became repetitive and angular, ‘as though Chaplin were merely operating the mechanical figure of the Tramp’. Unlike Lucia Joyce who, in 1921, still recognised emotion and authenticity in Chaplin’s eyes, Lewis saw later Chaplin as artificial and machine-like. Paraskeva does not mention Lewis’s comedy theory, but he does discuss Lewis’s satire of Bergson’s theory of duration; he sees Lewis’s 1927 novel, The Childermass, as a continuation of his anti-Bergson piece in Time and the Western Man (also 1927). Paraskeva also suggests that, for Lewis, Chaplin is emblematic of the pessimistic ‘Vorticist machine gesture’ and its basis in an apparent split between ‘the empathy of the organic and the lifelessness of the mechanical’. In this sense, Chaplin would also be the inverse of Lewis’s theory of comedy – Chaplin is a person acting like a machine. Chaplin is the epitome of Bergson’s theory. For Lewis, Chaplin is a mechanical body, dislocated from a human mind.

As explained in chapter one, the trick-films of Georges Méliès can also be seen to explore the mind/ body binary. Below I suggest several points at which selected Méliès films intersect with philosophical ideas concerning consciousness, embodiment, and selfhood.

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628 Ibid., pp. 66 & 64.
630 Ibid., p. 229.
631 Ibid., p. 223.
Although there is no conclusive evidence to prove that Joyce saw any of Méliès’s films (no letters or diary entries, for example), given Méliès’s fame and the ubiquity of his films (and films using similar trick techniques), it seems highly likely that he would have seen at least one. Even if Joyce failed to see any of Méliès’s own work, as noted in chapter one, he would have had the opportunity to see several Méliès-inspired trick-films at his own Volta cinema, including *Petit Jules Verne* (1907), *Le Chateau Hante* (1908), *Come Cretinetti I Paga Debit* (1909), *Les Guirlandes Merveilleuses* (1909), *La Valise du Policier* (1909), and *Visions!* (date unknown).632

There is no evidence that Méliès or Chaplin read Bergson’s ideas on the mind/body relationship, although they were both French nationals, and Bergson’s popularity may have enticed them to read some of his work. As Leonard Lawlor and Valentine Moulard note, Bergson’s ‘international fame reached cult-like heights during his lifetime’.633 Rather than purposefully expressing Bergsonian ideas (or anticipating Lewisian and/or Merleau-Pontian ideas), Méliès’s comedy is more likely to have stemmed from the film-maker’s innovative techniques, such as stop-motion trickery, and their views on modern life.634 Méliès’s films are not funny because we recognise them as Bergsonian, Lewisian, or Merleau-Pontian; like Chaplin’s films, Méliès’s films are comedic in themselves.

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634 As Ezra notes, although Méliès claimed to have discovered stop-motion animation, and related techniques (such as substitution splicing), ‘it has been suggested that Méliès would probably have known about an earlier example of substitution splicing carried out by Thomas Edison in his 1895 *Execution of Mary Queen of Scots*’, in Elizabeth Ezra, *Georges Méliès: The Birth of the Auteur*, (Manchester and New York, NY: Manchester University Press, 2000), p. 28.
FROM BERGSONIAN TO MERLEAU-PONTIAN COMEDY

As noted in the introduction to this chapter, the comedy in *Ulysses* and the early films which I investigate can be split into three different types: (1) straightforwardly Bergsonian and/ or Lewisian comedy, in which humans behave like machines or *vice versa*; (2) juxtapositional comedy, in which a mechanical writing or performance style is juxtaposed with human sentiment and intimacy; (3) revelatory comedy, or comic relief, in which humans are shown to be more than mere machines. Without prior awareness of the third type of comedy, the first type of comedy cannot be conceived of in Merleau-Pontian terms, as humans are not seen as body-subjects; they are laughably reduced to machines. Similarly, taken in isolation, the second type of comedy is still more Bergsonian than Merleau-Pontian; the co-existence of the human mind and body is recognised, but the mind is still seen as the separate and immaterial seat of human emotions. The third type of comedy, however, is decidedly Merleau-Pontian; humans are shown to be fully fledged body-subjects. If the audience accepts the interconnectedness of mind and body (and recognise themselves as body-subjects), the first and second types of comedy gain an extra dimension; humans behaving like machines and the juxtaposition of the mechanical and the human are humorous not just in themselves, but also in their opposition to the accepted (proto-Merleau-Pontian) theory of machine/human and body/mind unity. As noted above, I concentrate on explorations of the mind/ body problem in slapstick comedies, such as those produced by Chaplin, and trick-films, such as those made by Méliès.

As Andrew Stott notes, slapstick comically highlights the ‘dysfunction of the mind/ body dualism that emphasizes the dividedness of human experience’[^635]. Stott references the slapstick historian Alan Dale, who ‘reads the beleaguered hero as a reconfiguration of the

relationship between the mind and the body’. For Dale, ‘slapstick achieves accord [of mind and body] here on earth by a comic concession to the body at its most traitorous’; ‘slapstick seeks a temporal acceptance of physicality by a cathartic exaggeration of its very limitations’. In other words, by amplifying the physicality of life, slapstick’s awkward, mechanical-seeming gestures reinstate the (usually inferior) ‘body’ side of the mind/body binary. Humour is provoked when the audience realise that the body has been purposefully overstated in order to highlight the true intermingled nature of the mind and the body; humour is generated from the recognition that the terms ‘mind’ and ‘body’ are illusory and meaningless, as we are all integrated body-subjects.

Stott and Dale do not appear to have influenced the main scholarly trend as, on the whole, critics have tended to class Chaplin’s films and Joyce’s *Ulysses* as first level comedy; they locate comedy – or reader/viewer interest – in machine-like gestures and mechanical techniques. They focus exclusively on mind/body and human/machine separation, or argue that the human body becomes entirely mechanised. North describes Chaplin’s routines as ‘robotic’, Trotter sees them as mechanical ‘mimicry for mimicry’s sake’, and Gunning notes how, at times, Chaplin’s body completely ‘transforms itself into the mechanical’. For Trotter, Chaplin’s mechanical gestures are totally inhuman; they have little, or nothing, to do with emotion, human behaviour, communication, or interpersonal engagement: ‘[t]he stylisation that went into [Charlie Chaplin’s] Tramp created a mechanism rather than a persona’.

636 Andrew Stott, *Comedy*, pp. 93-94.
machinic assembly, rather than an organic whole’, or a human being. Similarly, for Spiegel, Joyce and silent slapstick stars ‘helped to shape a moment in the cultural history of the modern sensibility by creating viable comic images of human assimilation into a mechanized and technocratic landscape’.643

CHAPLIN, BLOOM, AND MÉLIÈS: INHUMAN HUMANS AND HUMAN MACHINES

The ‘Ithaca’ episode of Ulysses echoes the mechanical, inhuman nature that North, Totter, and Gunning attribute to Chaplin. For Frank Budgen, ‘Ithaca’ is ‘the coldest episode in an unemotional book’.644 In a letter to Claud W. Sykes, dated spring 1921, Joyce described ‘Ithaca’ as a ‘mathematico-astronomico-physico-mechanico-geometrico-chemico sublimation of Bloom and Stephen’ (LI 164). The episode places emphasis on, and creates comedy out of, the mechanical and the machinic. Bergsonian comedy can be seen in Bloom’s machine-like movements. On arrival at his house, Bloom ‘insert[s] his hand mechanically into the back of his trousers to obtain his latchkey’, only to find that it is missing (U 17.72–3, italics added). Some pages later, Joyce gives a very technical/mechanical description of Bloom bumping his head: ‘The right temporal lobe of the hollow sphere of his cranium came into contact with a solid timber angle’ (U 17.1275–6). Here Bloom’s bodily movements are overtly mechanical, and do not appear to reveal any distinctly human emotions or feelings. This reduction of Bloom, his reincarnation as a set of mechanisms, is particularly comical because, throughout Ulysses, Bloom has been painted

643 Alan Spiegel, Fiction and the Camera Eye, p. 98.
as a full blooded, sensual man, who defecates, masturbates, and eats ‘with relish the inner organs of beasts and fowls’ (U 4.1–2).

As Jesse McKnight notes, ‘Ithaca’’s mechanical-comic gestures – Bloom misplacing his key, then failing to properly navigate his way past his furniture – echo Chaplin’s 1916 film, One A.M. (see figure 5, overleaf).⁶⁴⁵ Indeed, in a description that unintentionally evokes ‘Ithaca’, film-theorist Alex Clayton describes One A.M. as an ‘Odyssean journey to get some rest’, in which Chaplin finds himself ‘vying with doors, tables, rugs and beds, each of which refuse to submit to his ascendancy’.⁶⁴⁶ According to Clayton, Chaplin’s ‘vision of malevolent objects in One A.M.’ suggests that he ‘shares something of the camera’s propensity to flatten out the distinction between people and [...] objects’.⁶⁴⁷ Indeed, several of Chaplin’s 1916-1917 films feature similar mechanical, objectifying gestures. In The Fireman, Chaplin pours motor-oil on himself to try to alleviate a crick in his neck and, in Behind the Screen, Chaplin fails to open a stiff trap-door, so oils the lever-mechanism and then his own elbow, not knowing whether it is his elbow, or the lever, which is the problem (see figures 6 and 7, overleaf). The mechanical style of ‘Ithaca’ has a similar effect: Bloom’s falling body is reduced to its ‘known weight of eleven stone and four pounds in avoirdupois measure, as certified by the graduated machine for periodical selfweighing’ (U 17.91-92), and Bloom’s head is merely a ‘hollow sphere’, comparable with the ‘solid timber’ that he bumps into (U 17.1275-1276).

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⁶⁴⁷ Ibid., p. 34.
Figure 5: Two stills from Chaplin's *One A. M.* (1916). Sourced from *Charlie Chaplin: The Mutual Films*, Vol. 2, (BFI).


Figure 7: Still from Chaplin's *Behind the Screen* (1916). Sourced from *Charlie Chaplin: The Mutual Films*, Vol. 1, (BFI).
In a similarly Bergsonian manner, in ‘Hades’, bodies are mere mechanical pumps: Bloom thinks of ‘[a] pump [...], pumping thousands of gallons of blood every day. One fine day it gets bunged up: and there you are. [...] Old rusty pumps’ (U 6.674). In ‘Aeolus’, there is a Lewisian reversal of roles; printing machines behave like humans: ‘Slt. Almost human the way it slt to call attention. Doing its level best to speak’ (U 7.175–6). Lewisian comedy is also present in ‘Circe’, when all manner of usually inanimate objects appear to be imbued with minds of their own: ‘The Soap’ praises Bloom (U 15.338); ‘The Cap’ discusses race and identity (U 15.2097); ‘Virag’s Head’ shouts ‘Quack!’ (U 15.2638); ‘The Fan’ flirts with Bloom (U 15.2755–2803); and ‘The Boots’ mock the other characters whilst ‘jogging’ around (U 15.3733). The comedy of these scenes is located in the Lewisian sense of surprise we feel when we see usually inanimate objects coming to life and acting like conscious humans.

The animation of inanimate objects was ubiquitous in early trick films. As Vachel Lindsay recognises in The Art of the Moving Picture (1915), ‘[t]he photoplay imagination [...] is able to impart vital individuality to furniture’. In Méliès’s L’Auberge ensorcelée (The Bewitched Inn, 1897), a man’s boots and hat shuffle off independently, anticipating the walking, talking cap and boots in ‘Circe’. Virag’s animate unscrewed head reflects Méliès’ Un homme de tête (Four Troublesome Heads, 1898) and Le mélomane (The Music Lover, 1903); both films involve Méliès detaching his head, replicating it several times, and getting his duplicate heads to sing (see figures 8 and 9, overleaf). The humour in these films fits with

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648 Although ‘The Boots’ refers to the boot-blacking boy from the Ormond Hotel (who first appears in ‘Sirens’), the lines also conjure up an image of disembodied animated footwear.


650 As noted in chapter one, I am not the first to note the similarities between ‘Circe’ and Méliès’s films but, as far as I am aware, critics have not previously viewed the Méliès/ ‘Circe’ relationship in the light of Lewisian anti-Cartesianism. For analyses of the Méliès/ ‘Circe’ relationship, see: Austin Briggs, “‘Roll Away the Reel World, the Reel World’”, pp. 145-56; Thomas Burkdall, Joycean Frames, pp. 68-70; Keith Williams, ‘Ulysses in Toontown’, pp. 96-121; Philip Sicker, ‘Mirages in the Lampglow’, pp. 69-85.
both Bergson’s and Lewis’s ideas. The mind (represented by the head) is literally, and comically, separated from the body; it is funny to see headless bodies robotically going about their business without human heads (and therefore minds) to guide them. As noted in chapter one, for Keith Williams, these kinds of mind/ body dislocations and transfers hark back to the Latin roots of the word ‘animation’ – *animatus* – which also gives us ‘*anima*’ which means soul or non-rational mind. Early films were often referred to as animated pictures, so even acted films – such as Méliès’ – have their roots in this notion of the mobile, detachable *anima* or mind.

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Figure 8 (above): A still from *Four Troublesome Heads* (1898). Sourced from *Méliès the Magician*, DVD, (Arte Video, 1997).

Figure 9 (above): A still from *The Music Lover* (1903). Sourced from *Méliès the Magician*, DVD, (Arte Video, 1997).

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As well as imbuing inanimate objects with souls or minds, Méliès’ films depict bodies devoid of minds. Prefiguring both Chaplin and ‘Ithaca’, in an early film called *Gugusse et l’automate* (*The Clown and the Automaton, 1897*), Méliès comically exaggerates the similarity between humans and machines; a circus performer creates a mechanical human who chases a clown (who overstates his mechanical side through machine-like gestures), and is eventually killed when the clown wallops him with a primitive form of machine – a mallet. In *Chirurgien américain* (*A Twentieth Century Surgeon, 1897*), a surgeon manages to replace his body, thus comically conveying the detachable and expendable nature of the human corpus. In ‘Circe’, bodies are replaced several times; amongst others, Bloom is given the body of a woman and a baby, while Paddy Dignam is given a dog’s body and Black Liz is granted the body of a hen. Their bodies are substituted, but their subjectivities – represented by their names – remain intact; their subjective minds are comically severed from their ever-changing objective bodies.

In the *Ulysses* episodes (‘Ithaca’, ‘Hades’, ‘Aeolus’, and ‘Circe’) and early films (by Chaplin and Méliès) that have been discussed so far, the comedy is purely Bergsonian and/or Lewisian; humour is to be found in humans acting like machines, or machines (or inanimate objects) acting like humans. There are no Merleau-Pontian body-subjects, and no humans that cannot be reduced to machines. However, despite placing emphasis on the mechanical and the machine-like, *Ulysses* and early films have a complexity that can be uncovered by delving deeper into the workings of their comedy and their use of the mechanical. In the next section I analyse points at which Joyce and Chaplin go beyond straightforwardly Bergsonian or Lewisian comedy; I look at moments when a mechanical body manages to co-exist with an emotional mind. In recognising co-existence, Joyce and

652 Unfortunately, it seems that both of these early Méliès films are lost. I have relied on plot outlines from the *Internet Movie Database* (IMDb): <http://www.imdb.com/name/nm0617588/>, [accessed December 2011].
Chaplin move closer toward Merleau-Pontian thinking. However, in this second level of comedy, while bodies are not reducible to machines, they are still not fully integrated body-subjects.

**CHAPLIN, BLOOM AND STEPHEN: IMITATION AND INTIMACY**

For North, the mechanical nature of Chaplin’s gestures does not negate the possibility of a human element: ‘the tramp finds a certain humanity in mechanical routines’. North goes on to suggest that modernism-as-a-whole can be seen as an ‘imbalanced mixture of [...] the human and the mechanical’. ‘Ithaca’ and Chaplin’s films can certainly be seen in this way, as comprising both the human and the mechanical. So far I have purposefully only considered the most reductive elements in *Ulysses* and Chaplin’s films, moments when Bloom and Chaplin seem to be more machine than human. However, just because ‘Ithaca’’s style is somewhat mechanical, it does not mean that the episode is entirely ‘unemotional’. ‘Ithaca’ deals with the nature of humanity and interpersonal relations, the very same themes that Chaplin’s films examine. At times this is where we find the comedy – in the ‘imbalanced mixture’ or, more accurately, in the juxtaposition of mechanical movement and human emotion, or imitation and intimacy.

In his analysis of Chaplin’s film *In the Park* (1915), Trotter acknowledges that there is ‘intimacy’ and ‘profound mutual understanding’ in the Tramp’s encounter with the thief, but he does not see this as human engagement: there is ‘never for an instant the mutual regard which might become the basis of relationship’. For Trotter, the intimate gestures

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653 Michael North, *Machine-Age Comedy*, p. 188.
654 Ibid., p. 23.
655 David Trotter, *Cinema and Modernism*, p. 190.
are merely mechanical imitation; Chaplin’s gestures only create first level (Bergsonian/Lewisian) comedy. However, if we consider Chaplin’s mechanical imitation alongside other elements in his films, it is possible to see something more. Chaplin’s own actions may appear to lack humanity, and to be purely imitative or mechanical, but when juxtaposed with the actions of other characters and the surrounding scenery, a certain intimacy and humanity is revealed.

In *In the Park*, Chaplin’s encounter with the thief displays more intimacy and engagement than the preceding, somewhat clichéd and affected, gestures of the genteel couple on the park bench. The couple make awkward advances towards each other, then kiss and hug in a rather contrived, automatic manner. This juxtaposition helps to create the film’s comedy; mechanical-intimacy (the clichéd couple) is pitted against intimate-mechanical imitation (Chaplin and the thief). Chaplin and the thief become intimate, but in a less manufactured, more natural way. Chaplin’s gestures are, indeed, mechanical; he imitates the thief’s movements exactly, as if he were mechanically reproducing them. However, as the encounter progresses Chaplin’s gestures become less imitative and more intimate. The thief’s initial pick-pocketing gesture is at first copied exactly, but then becomes an affectionate hand-in-each-other’s-pockets moment. At first there is no eye contact between the pair: Chaplin mirrors the thief without acknowledging him. But then, despite the thief’s apparent blindness, Chaplin and the thief look right at each other. Chaplin then acknowledges the thief with a doff of his hat. In a non-imitative gesture, Chaplin roughly caresses the back of the thief’s neck with a match, in order to smoke the thief’s already half-smoked cigarette (see figure 10, overleaf).
There is imitation in the encounter between Chaplin and the thief, but there is also human emotion and engagement. Machines repeat movements (often reproducing actions that were previously carried out by humans) in order to produce goods, whereas humans imitate each other in order to get close to another person (whether we are mocking the other person, or flirting with them). 1903, the year proceeding Ulysses’s 1904 setting, saw the publication of the first English translation of Gabriel Tarde’s *The Laws of Imitation* (1890). As Carrie Noland notes, Tarde’s book inspired later work on embodiment and interaction, such as Merleau-Ponty’s *Phenomenology of Perception*. Tarde argued that

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society can be ‘defined as a group of beings who are apt to imitate’. We tend only to imitate people with whom we would like to form some kind of relationship (be it a sexual relationship, a working relationship, or friendship); ‘when there are practically no relations at all, there is no tendency to imitate him’. In Chaplin’s film, this is where the comedy lies; in human (not mechanical) imitation. Humans act like machines (the clichéd couple and Chaplin’s mechanical movements), and this is funny in the Bergsonian sense. But humans also act like humans (they imitate each other in order to form relationships) whilst appearing to be machine-like, only in the sense that they are reproducing human movements. Humour is to be derived from Chaplin acting in a seemingly machine-like manner whilst also behaving like/ as a human.

As explained in detail in chapter two, Trotter’s view – that Chaplin’s gestures are instances of mechanical reproduction – is based on his idiosyncratic interpretation of André Bazin’s film-philosophy. According to Trotter, Bazin emphasises the mechanical and automatic aspects of cinema, including its tendency to represent mechanical imitation or ‘mimesis’. As noted above, for Trotter, Chaplin’s Tramp character is mechanical imitation par excellence; he is ‘mimicry for mimicry’s sake’, the epitome of Bazinian ‘hypermimesis’. In his 1948 essay, ‘Charlie Chaplin’, Bazin does, indeed, use the word ‘mimicry’ in relation to Chaplin’s actions. He suggests that Chaplin’s tree disguise in Shoulder Arms (1918) ‘is a form of mimicry’; he defines this ‘form of mimicry’ as ‘a reabsorption of time by space’. In order to explain this idea, Bazin refers to ‘those little stick-like insects that are indiscernible

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658 Ibid., p. 392.
659 David Trotter, Cinema and Modernism, p. 183.
660 André Bazin, ‘Charlie Chaplin’, p. 149.
661 Ibid.
in a clump of twigs or those little Indian insects that can take on the appearance of leaves'; the ‘sudden vegetable-like immobility of Charlie-the-tree is like an insect playing dead’.  

According to Trotter, Bazin’s ‘form of mimicry’ implies a mechanical view of mimesis. For Trotter’s Bazin, Chaplin’s tree disguise is a ‘tree-machine’. In reference to Bazin’s analysis of Shoulder Arms, Trotter asserts: ‘one might once again want to say that the mechanism in the [tree] machine has brought about the mechanism in Charlie’; ‘Bazin almost says as much, by comparing the man-myth to an insect’. In order to form this interpretation of Bazin, Trotter focuses on words ‘vegetable-like’, ‘immobility’, and ‘dead’. As stated in chapter two, for me, the most salient words in Bazin’s analysis are the following: ‘a reabsorption of time by space’.  

For Bazin, Chaplin’s (and the insects’) form of mimesis is spatial rather than temporal; by mimicking the tree Chaplin (and the insects) become part of the space which signifies ‘tree’. Chaplin (and the insects) do not become a copy of the tree; there is no temporal relation between the original/ real tree and the

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662 André Bazin, ‘Charlie Chaplin’, p. 149.
663 David Trotter, Cinema and Modernism, p. 194.
664 Ibid., pp. 193-94.
Chaplin-tree (or insect-leaf), as both are present at the same time. Thus, we cannot (in Bazin’s terms) see ‘Charlie-the-tree’ as a mechanical reproduction of a real tree (in the temporal sense of re-production), as both the canvas tree and the surrounding actual trees exist contemporaneously.

It is worth pointing out that Trotter recognises that Bazin’s ideas are not as mechanistic as his own: ‘Bazin cannot altogether approve of the conclusion that [...] Charlie has developed a liking for automatism’. For Trotter, Bazin’s ideas merely imply mechanical reproduction. For Jennifer Bean, Bazin’s ideas imply a human, non-mechanical form of mimesis. Bean focuses on Bazin’s assertion that Chaplin’s ‘mode of being’ is ‘suited to one instant’ and, as Bean emphasises, ‘one instant only’. For Bazin, ‘that is what is meant by “repetition”’. For Bean’s Bazin, ‘Charlie’s incapacity to act in any way other than what the “instant” allows warps [...] the well-oiled tyranny of the assembly line or the rationalizing imperative of industrial capitalism, in which the repetitive cadence of the machine produces endless configurations of the same’. Echoing my own suggestion that Chaplin’s imitative performances are both (seemingly) machine-like and very human, Bean states: ‘Charlie’s penchant for inhabiting the moment both mimics and ingenuously mocks the larger machinery of modernity’.

While, for Bean, Bazin’s account still retains a certain temporality, in the sense that she defines Bazin’s ‘instant’ as a moment in ‘time’, as explained in chapter two, for me,

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666 André Bazin, ‘Charlie Chaplin’, p. 151.
668 André Bazin, ‘Charlie Chaplin’, p. 151.
670 Ibid.
Bazin’s film-philosophy – more broadly – is spatial in character.\textsuperscript{671} This spatiality is phenomenological in character. As Dudley Andrew notes, Bazin was interested in phenomenological theory and had ‘actual encounters’ with several phenomenologists, including Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, and Gabriel Marcel.\textsuperscript{672} This phenomenological link between spatiality and cinema can be taken in two directions: one focusing on the spatial relationship between film and viewer (which I discuss in chapter five) and the other looking at the movements of the film actors in the film-world. It is in this second direction that I now turn.

**BLOOM, STEPHEN, AND CHAPLIN: COMIC RELIEF AND ‘FLESH’**

As well as comparing Chaplin’s imitative actions to those of insects, Bazin states that ‘Charlie hides behind appearances like a crab burying itself in the sand’.\textsuperscript{673} As Bazin notes, ‘this is no mere metaphor’; at the beginning of *The Adventurer* (1917), we see Chaplin ‘emerging from the sand in which he was hiding, and burying himself again when danger returns’.\textsuperscript{674} This image of burying confirms the spatial nature of Bazinian mimesis. Rather than *copying* the sand, Chaplin *becomes* it. Chaplin inhabits the same space as the thing he is imitating; he does repeat it in the *temporal* sense of the word. It is this style of mimesis – the spatial sense – which we find toward the end of ‘Ithaca’. Like Chaplin and the thief, Bloom and Stephen imitate each other’s actions in a *seemingly* mechanical manner: ‘first sequent, then simultaneous’, ‘their sides contiguous, their organs of micturition reciprocally rendered invisible by manual circumposition’ (*U* 17.1186-1187). Here, echoing the seemingly machine-like imitation in *In the Park*, Joyce describes Bloom and Stephen’s

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\textsuperscript{673} André Bazin, ‘Charlie Chaplin’, p. 149.
\textsuperscript{674} Ibid.
urinations using pseudo-scientific language which appears to reduce their imitative actions to mechanical processes. In a manner which is, again, reminiscent of *In the Park*, in ‘Ithaca’ the mechanical presentation belies the more human, emotional, and intimate aspects of the encounter. Just before Bloom and Stephen’s mechanically presented urination encounter, Bloom ruminates on the nature of humanity and decides that ‘the painful character of the ultimate functions of separate existence’ is an ‘integral [part] of the human whole’ (*U* 17.996-998); to be human is to experience intimacy and loss of intimacy. Stephen affirms Bloom’s thesis of dejection, then Bloom apprehends Stephen’s affirmation, ‘[n]ot verbally. [s]ubstantially’ (*U* 17.1017).

It is possible to read the joint urination as the ‘substantial’ – or bodily – affirmation to which the above lines refer. The fact that Bloom and Stephen have just been considering what it is to be human (and what it is to be intimate) makes it hard not to see the urination as an intimate, emotional gesture, rather than as a mechanical imitation. Their ideas on the importance of self-Other relationships are put into practice when Bloom and Stephen – like Chaplin and the thief – engage in non-mechanical imitation that is presented in a pseudo-scientific/mechanical manner. First both men connect by recognising each other and themselves as both subjects (with minds capable of emotional connection) and objects (with bodies capable of human interaction) simultaneously: ‘[s]ilent, each contemplating the other in both mirrors of the reciprocal flesh of theirhisnothis fellowfaces’ (*U* 17.1183-1184).

Stephen and Bloom’s imitations are ‘reciprocal’ actions, rather than mechanical reproductions. They see themselves as ‘fellowfaces’, rather than as two unconnected objects. Here Joyce goes beyond Bergson and prefigures Merleau-Ponty. According to Merleau-Ponty, we are simultaneously both a ‘seeing body’ and a ‘visible body’, we are both mind-subject and body-object; and ‘[t]here is a reciprocal insertion and intertwining of one
in the other’ (my italics). Bloom and Stephen’s ‘intertwining’ is present in ‘theirhisnothis fellowfaces’ and their ‘reciprocal flesh’. In this intimate, proto-Merleau-Pontian encounter ‘their’ cannot be separated from ‘his’ and the two men are ‘mirrors of reciprocal flesh’. Here Stephen and Bloom also prefigure Bazin’s Chaplin-in-the-sand image; they are not merely *copying* each other, they are *becoming* each other, they are inhabiting each other’s space.

As well as prefiguring Bazin’s Chaplin-in-the-sand image, Joyce comes very close to describing what Merleau-Ponty terms ‘flesh’ – the site at which self-other intertwining occurs. Merleau-Ponty redefines ‘flesh’ as ‘an “element” of being’ which is neither wholly ‘“material”’ nor wholly ‘“spiritual”’. ‘Flesh’ is related to the ‘body-subject’, as both concepts help to explain intermingling of the materiality (and the mechanical nature) of the body and the non-materiality (and the emotion creating qualities) of the mind. For Merleau-Ponty, ‘flesh is a mirror phenomenon’, an ‘I-my shadow relation’. ‘Flesh’, like the body-subject, necessarily and automatically relies on interaction with other people and with the world. ‘Flesh’ is not the human, bodily flesh that we would normally associate with the word; ‘flesh’ does not belong to an individual being – it is the space in which the self and other intermingle.

As well as providing a useful gloss on Bloom and Stephen’s urination encounter, this Merleau-Pontian mirroring, or reciprocating ‘flesh’, helps to provide a revealing analysis of Chaplin’s 1916 film, *The Floorwalker*. In the film, Chaplin encounters a shop assistant who is his spitting image. At first, both men think that they are looking at their own reflection in a mirror. They (seemingly mechanically) imitate each other’s movements, still confused as to whether the man opposite is a reflection or another person. The pair then realise that they

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675 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, pp. 138-139.
676 Ibid., p. 139.
677 Ibid., p. 255. Merleau-Ponty’s italics.
are separate beings who are connected due to their physical similarities. As a result of this realisation, the pair’s gestures become less imitative and more intimate, just like in *In the Park*. The assistant touches Chaplin’s cheek, Chaplin kisses the assistant, and then they exchange clothes (see figure 12, below). According to Trotter, this ‘pseudo-coupling [...] has no point’; the mechanical ‘imitation is [...] an end in itself’, ‘a reason to come together’. It is true that both men seem to enjoy imitating each other so, in that sense, the imitation can be seen as an end in itself. However, if we take note of two other striking examples of bodily imitation in *The Floorwalker*, it is possible to see Chaplin’s relationship with the shop assistant as more Merleau-Pontian than mechanical.


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678 David Trotter, *Cinema and Modernism*, p. 191.
In *The Floorwalker*, there is a female mannequin, with whom Chaplin attempts, but fails, to engage (see figure 13, overleaf). Like the shop assistant who mirrors Chaplin, the mannequin mirrors a real woman; but the parallel ends there, as the ‘woman’ is unable to move or to interact with others. Chaplin’s encounter – or failed encounter – with the mannequin-woman provokes humour, as we (the audience) recognise that she will be unable to reciprocate as the shop assistant did, due to the obvious fact that she is merely an imitation-human, a mechanical reproduction. The mannequin lacks the uniquely human capacity for recognition and interaction. The mannequin is just a mechanical body, not a ‘body-subject’; she is devoid of a human mind, human emotion, and the capacity to reciprocate. As Merleau-Ponty states, the ‘comprehension of gestures comes about through [...] reciprocity’, through the body-subject’s ability to relate to others.\(^{679}\) This gestural reciprocity is, according to Merleau-Ponty, expressed particularly clearly on the cinema screen: films ‘directly present to us that special way of being in the world, of dealing with things and other people, which we can see in the sign language of gesture’.\(^{680}\) Bearing Merleau-Ponty’s ideas in mind, we can, once again, distinguish between Chaplin’s human encounters and the inhuman – or mechanically-styled – encounters that are present elsewhere in his films. As in ‘Ithaca’, the mechanical style of the gestures belies their essentially human nature.

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\(^{679}\) Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, p. 185.

As well as the imitation-woman, *The Floorwalker* features an imitation-leg. It is hard to ignore the prosthetic leg that fascinates shopper after shopper (including Chaplin). Just as the mannequin is not a real woman, the prosthetic leg is not a real leg; it is a machine-leg. When not attached to a human body, the prosthetic leg is merely an inanimate object. Tim Armstrong suggests that there are two types of prosthetics at work in modernist literature and art: there is a “negative” prosthesis which involves the ‘replacing of a bodily part, covering a lack’, and a “positive” prosthesis which involves a more utopian version of technology, in which human capacities are extrapolated. The positive form of prosthetics is associated with ‘mechanical extension’ and superhuman powers, while the negative form is linked to ‘fragmentation of the self’ and the ‘systematic subordination’ of humans by machines. In *The Floorwalker*, the prosthetic leg does not to conform to either of these types: it is not replacing a lost or damaged body part or signalling any utopian possibilities of

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682 Ibid., p. 101.
extending human ability into superpowers. The leg only plays a minor role in the film – a ‘bit part’, if I may. Chaplin picks up the leg and looks at it quizzically. In a rather quick, somewhat ambiguous, gesture, Chaplin lifts his cane up slightly, towards the shop assistant. To my mind, in this small body movement, Chaplin could either be indicating that he would like to buy the leg, or asking the shop assistant if the leg, itself, is a type of cane. In reply to whatever Chaplin has ‘said’, shaking his head, the shop assistant explains what the leg is for by pointing to his knee and showing how prosthesis would be attached (see figure 14, below).


Whether or not Chaplin is asking if the leg is a cane, it is worth exploring the link between the prosthesis and Chaplin’s famous bamboo walking-cane. For Clayton, the cane is ‘part of’ the Tramp; the Tramp’s props ‘are so constructive of his identity that they seem of a piece with his body’. 683 Indeed, as Chaplin, himself, states, ‘a cane and a derby hat […] made me feel the person he was’; ‘I felt he was a reality, a living person’. 684 When discussing prosthetic legs, Vivian Sobchack (a film-phenomenologist who is also an above-the-knee

amputee), makes a similar assertion; instead, of seeing her prosthetic leg as an object that is added to her body, like Chaplin and his cane, she sees her leg as being part of the person she is: a prosthetic is ‘incorporated not “into” or “on” but “as” the subject’. Returning to canes (this time for those with impaired vision, rather than impaired mobility), Merleau-Ponty, asserts: the ‘blind man’s stick has ceased to be an object for him, and is no longer perceived for itself’. In all three instances (Chaplin’s cane, Sobchack’s leg, and Merleau-Ponty’s stick), the prosthesis is not an object or a machine it is the person who uses it, just as a fleshy leg (or a ‘real’ leg) is the person who uses it. The cane/leg do not make its user/wearer superhuman or machine-like; it becomes part of them. Thus, Chaplin’s cane is funny because it acts as though it is a fifth limb; we laugh because Chaplin has so wonderfully incorporated the cane into his own body-subject.

There are two canes in *Ulysses*, neither of which is particularly comical: the blind stripling’s cane in ‘Lestrygonians’, and Stephen’s ashplant walking-cane. Despite not sharing Chaplin’s comedy, like the Tramp’s cane, both of *Ulysses*’s canes have a phenomenological relationship with their user. Bloom observes the ‘blind stripling’ and contemplates what a ‘[q]ueer idea of Dublin he must have, tapping his way round by the stones’ (*U* 8.1110-11). Like Chaplin’s cane, Sobchack’s leg, and Merleau-Ponty’s stick, the blind stripling’s cane is part of him. It is part of his perceptual apparatus; the cane is a sense organ which allows him to see through touch: the ‘blind stripling tapped the curbstone and went on his way, drawing his cane back, feeling again’ (*U* 8.1104-5). Stephen sees his ashplant as his ‘familiar’: ‘ashplant by his side. Its ferrule followed lightly on the path, squealing at his heels. My familiar, after me, calling, Steeeeeeephen!’ (*U* 1.627-9). As Raven Grimassi explains, a witch’s familiar (usually an animal, but not always) allows her to ‘interface with

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the *intelligence* of Nature*. The ‘Familiar also benefits from having a relationship with the Witch’; ‘[m]erging with human consciousness provides the familiar with an expanded view of reality’. According to this definition, by calling his ashplant his ‘familiar’, Stephen is saying that it is an interface between him and nature – it is both him and not-him, both subject and object simultaneously. The ashplant’s ‘consciousness’ merges with his own, but it remains slightly othered; unlike Chaplin’s cane or the blind stripling’s stick, Stephen’s ashplant does not become part of him.

Stephen’s relationship with his ashplant is phenomenological in another sense. Instead of being a prosthetic (fully-incorporated) part of Stephen, the ashplant is a machine-human interface. As explained in chapter three, for phenomenologist Don Ihde, if a human and a machine have a shared intentional object, they will – necessarily – have an embodied relationship, whilst still remaining as two separate entities. Ihde uses the example of a scientist and a microscope: the body of the microscope and the scientist are both directed towards the bacteria, so their consciousnesses necessarily intermingle. As Ihde explains, because of the ‘correlational structure of intentionality’, when using a machine, I ‘experience something other than the machine being used’; ‘my experiencing is extended through the machine for [...] intentional fulfilment’. Stephen and his ashplant have the same intentional object; in this case it is an action, rather than an object – to move from one place to another.

Sobchack builds upon Ihde’s ideas in her phenomenological theory of the relationship between the film and the film-viewer. Like Stephen’s ashplant, ‘the film’s body

688 Ibid.
is made of a material quite different from the human flesh of our lived-bodies’. These material differences do not negate the possibility of reciprocal relationship. According to Sobchack, ‘we need to [...] posit the film viewer’s lived body as a carnal “third term” that grounds and mediates [...] subjective vision and objective images’. Just as Stephen is the ‘third term’ between the wooden cane and that which it touches, the film-viewer is the ‘third term’ between the cinema’s material-mechanical body (its camera, projector, and reels) and the scene filmed through the eyes of the cinematographer. In the next chapter, I discuss phenomenological ideas of film spectatorship in more detail; I look at how this ‘third term’ can be reimagined as a ‘second’ or ‘virtual’ body which allows viewers to feel what the screen shows.

BLOOM, CHAPLIN, AND MELODRAMA: FROM BODILY HUMOUR TO EMOTIONAL GESTURES

As I have shown, for Chaplin, Joyce, and Merleau-Ponty, there is no simple machine (body) vs. human (mind) binary; the human and the mechanical, and the mind and the body, are interlinked in a variety of ways. As Noël Carroll notes, for Merleau-Ponty, it is the artist’s job to express this interlinking, in ‘Indirect Language and the Voices of Silence’, Merleau-Ponty sees painting as the painter’s way of ‘expressing his communication with the world’. Film artists are no different. As a silent film actor, Chaplin needed to effectively convey this link between mind and body and, in particular, between emotions and body movements, without using words. This meant using gestures. As Méliès stated in a 1907

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690 Vivian Sobchack, The Address of the Eye, p. 211.
692 Noël Carroll, Comedy Incarnate: Buster Keaton, Physical Humor, and Bodily Coping, (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2009), p. 8. While Carroll uses Merleau-Ponty and phenomenological theory in his analysis of Keaton’s films, he argues that Chaplin’s movies are not phenomenological as, instead of looking at mind/ body and self/ other blurring, they focus on ‘themes of the alienated individual, the alienated consciousness, the isolated imagination’ (p. 134).
693 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Signs, p. 54.
Annual article, ‘in the cinematograph [...] gesture is everything’. Despite the fact that gesture was necessary, silent film-makers seemed to recognise the superior qualities of the gestural method – they seemed to appreciate its special corporeality. As Clayton perceptively notes, in The Rink (1916), Chaplin is ‘[i]n a situation where he is expected to conceal [his] feelings’. Chaplin plays a waiter; waiters are supposed to be mechanical, almost robot-like, and are not supposed to show emotions such as disdain or annoyance. However, Chaplin’s ‘weary apathy is directly apparent in the very attitude of his body’; Chaplin gives one customer a mock-salute, waddles rather than smartly walks, and slouches while he talks to the customers. Chaplin’s gestures effectively convey his body-subject status.

For the silent film comedians, and for Joyce, gesture retained a bodily, essentially human quality, which everyday language seemed to have lost. As explained in chapter three, Sergei Eisenstein argued that good cinema recognises and utilizes ‘sensuous thought’. As film theorist, Greg Smith, explains, ‘[f]or Eisenstein the blend of sensory and bodily movement in art creates [...] emotion’, so feelings are best expressed through a gesturing body. Here Eisenstein prefigures Merleau-Ponty’s theory of bodily emotion. For Merleau-Ponty, and Eisenstein, thoughts and feelings are not immaterial; they are ‘sensuous’ and corporeal. As Merleau-Ponty states in his film essay, emotions ‘exist on this face or in those gestures’; gestural meaning is created ‘in the same way that the body

694 Georges Méliès, ‘Cinematographic Views’, trans. Stuart Liebman, October, 29 (1984), 28. This is a translation of the article published in La Revue du Cinema (October 15, 1929). The original was published in the 1907 issue of the Annual.
696 Ibid.
incarnates a manner of behaviour’. Like Bloom and Stephen, who express themselves through ‘reciprocal flesh’ and the movements of their ‘fellowfaces’, Chaplin and Merleau-Ponty (and possibly Eisenstein, to a certain extent), see gesture as directly expressing the feelings of a body-subject, not merely a non-material mind or a non-thinking, mechanical body.

Joyce wrote ‘art of gestures’ in his notes for ‘Circe’, strongly suggesting that bodily attitudes and movements were to play an important role in the episode. As ‘Circe’ is laid out like a play, characters’ gestures are described in Joyce’s stage directions. Although there are many lines of speech in ‘Circe’, several characters are silent for parts, or all, of the episode. Stephen’s dead mother is seen ‘uttering a silent word’ and is followed by a ‘choir of virgins and confessors’ who ‘sing voicelessly’ (U 15.4161). Bloom’s dead son reads ‘inaudibly’ as Bloom ‘calls inaudibly’ after him (U 15.4959-62). Bloom ‘shakes his head in mute mirthful reply’ (U 15.4912-13). Early on in ‘Circe’, Stephen states that ‘gesture […] would be a universal language’, suggesting that body-language is more articulate than the spoken word (U 15.105-6).

Paraskeva convincingly argues that, for Joyce, ‘Circe’ is a statement against the artificial, overblown gestures of nineteenth-century melodrama, Revivalist theatre, and pre-1913 dramatic films. He suggests that ‘Circe’’s smaller, more natural gestures are directed specifically against, Dion Boucicault (an Irish playwright, director, and acting theorist), Yeats (who refused to put on Joyce’s play, Exiles – 1915), and direct stage-to-film versions of classical subjects, such as Vitagraph’s Francesca de Rimini (1907), shown at Joyce’s Volta.

700 Philip Herring, Joyce’s Ulysses Notesheets in the British Museum, (Charlottesville, VA: University of Virginia Press, 1972), p. 288. Joyce was thinking about gestures as early as A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man, in which Stephen makes a ‘sudden gesture of a revolutionary nature’ (P 213), ‘an angry abrupt gesture’ (P 200), a ‘vague gesture of denial’ (P 177), and remembers his ‘sadly proud gesture of refusal’ (P 83).
As Paraskeva explains, nineteenth-century melodramas, Revivalist theatre, and very early drama films adhere to the “‘histrionic code’” of acting: ‘actors are shown in full length, and their bodies speak with exaggerated extended gestures of the arm’. Dion Boucicault wrote *The Art of Acting* (1855) a manual which commends the histrionic code and deplores ‘gesticules, or little gestures’. As noted by Paraskeva, in ‘Lestrygonians’, Boucicault is mentioned, alongside other Irish dramatists who worked at the same, often renamed, theatre: ‘the Empire. Gone. […] Where Pat Kinsella had his Harp theatre before Whitbred ran the Queen’s. […] Dion Boucicault’ (*U* 8.599-601). Some of Boucicault’s most famous plays are mentioned elsewhere in *Ulysses*: in ‘Cyclops’, ‘Arrah na Pogue’ (*Arrah-na-Pogue*, 1864) and ‘the Colleen Bawn’ (*The Colleen Bawn or The Brides of Garryowen*, 1860) appear in a list of ‘many Irish heroes and heroines of antiquity’ (*U* 12.176-94); ‘The colleen bawn. My colleen bawn’ appears in ‘Oxen of the Sun’ (*U* 14. 1512).

As mentioned above, for Paraskeva, *Francesca de Rimini* (1907) is a good exemplar of the histrionic gestural style: the ‘performance consists of a series of codified gestures’; ‘hands on both sides of the face indicate despair, and resolution’, as the histrionic code suggests, is displayed with “‘a fist clenched in the air, and then brought down sharply to the side of the body’”. Paraskeva finds parodies of this artificial, overstated acting style throughout ‘Circe’, including the deaf-mute idiot who is ‘shaken in Saint Vitus’ dance’ (*U* 15.15, Joyce’s italics), and the Hobgoblin who is seen ‘kangaroohopping with outstretched clutching arms’ (*U* 15.2157-8, Joyce’s italics). While *Francesca de Rimini* fits the bill, and it is likely that Joyce would have seen it (with it being shown at the Volta), it is also worth

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702 Anthony Paraskeva, “‘In the Beginning Was the Gest’”, p. 121.

703 Ibid.

704 Ibid.
returning to Dion Boucicault. Popular film versions of several of Boucicault’s plays were
produced by the Kalem Film Manufacturing Company of New York (known in the Irish press
as the ‘O’Kalems’) who, between 1910 and 1913, had a unit based in Ireland in order to film
in actual locations suggested in Boucicault’s scripts.\footnote{Denis Condon, Early Irish Cinema 1895-1921, p. 98.}

As Denis Condon notes, the O’Kalem films retain Boucicault’s theatrical formula:
‘their costumes, actions, and gestural acting establish them as stock melodramatic
characters’.\footnote{Ibid., p. 100.} The stock characters of melodrama include hero, villain, heroine, old man,
old woman, comic man, and comic woman.\footnote{Ibid., p. 101.} The comic man, as Condon explains, was
‘often a friend or loyal retainer of the hero and is frequently responsible for saving the hero
and/or thwarting the villain’; the comic man is ‘usually a member of the working class and
thus closely identified with this audience’.\footnote{Ibid.} In ‘Circe’, Bloom is a caricature of the
melodramatic comic man. He follows Stephen into Nighttown in order to (ostensibly, at
least) protect him from danger and, in a parody of hero-saving/villain-thwarting, saves
Stephen from being fleeced by prostitutes. ‘Circe’ also contains a particularly stereotypical
‘old woman’ character: Old Gummy Granny. Although she only has a minor role, Old Gummy
Granny establishes herself as a parody of melodramatic Irishness; she ‘appears seated on a
toadstool, the deathflower of the potato blight on her breast’ (U 15.4579-80), is seen praying
and ‘Rocking to and fro’ like a mad person then (U 15.4585), in a particularly overblown
gesture, ‘Thrusts a dagger towards Stephen’s hand’ (U 15.4737).

Prefiguring the overblown gestures of ‘Circe’, the O’Kalems’ film of The Colleen Bawn
(1911) includes various histrionic devices. Conversational gestures, which Roberta Pearson
usefully describes as ‘the gestural equivalent of “shifters”’, are greatly exaggerated: the
actors place their hands on their chests to signify ‘I’ and use wide outward movements of the hands and arms to signify ‘you’ or ‘there’. The characters’ emotional gestures are similarly overblown. When Myles, who is in love with Eily (the ‘colleen bawn’), sees the object of his affections return her marriage certificate to her husband instead of keeping it hidden (as she had agreed), he expresses his anger through violently grabbing the certificate out of Eily’s hand, making a fist with both hands, crumpling up the certificate in one fist and then, with his other arm, making a strong and fast downward movement from just above his head down to his thigh (see figure 15, below).

Figure 15: Still from The Colleen Bawn (1911), dr. Sidney Olcott. Sourced from Irish Silent Films on the Internet: A Film Restoration Project of Irish Film and TV Research Online, Trinity College Dublin: <http://youtube.com/watch?v=FwR94ukHDdQ>

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710 The Colleen Bawn (1911) can be viewed online via Irish Silent Films on the Internet: A film Restoration Project of Irish Film & TV Research Online, Trinity College Dublin: <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FwR94ukHDdQ>, [accessed August 2012].
These histrionic gestures are almost mechanical; actors are reduced to puppets, to
plot-conveying machines that merely reproduce movements from books such as
Bouicault’s *The Art of Acting*. Their grand, emotional gestures are far removed from the
emotions that they supposedly convey. As Paraskeva perceptively notes, Bloom’s gestures
are ‘distinct from the ritualized histrionics he is forced to observe’; his body movements are
more natural and understated.\(^{711}\) In ‘Circe’, despite parodying a stock melodrama character,
Bloom is not an acting-machine; he does not rely on histrionic gestures. Rather than making
large arm movements, Bloom often employs small hand movements: ‘*Bloom with his hand
assuralooms Corny Kelleher that he is reassuraloomtay*’ (*U* 15.4919-18); ‘*He brushes the
woodshavings from Stephen’s clothes with light hand and fingers*’ (*U* 15.4938); ‘*He places a
hand in his waistcoat, posing calmly*’ (*U* 15.2728-9); he ‘*Rubs his hands cheerfully*’ (*U*
15.1913); he passes a ‘*slow hand across his forehead*’ (*U* 15.959); and he holds ‘*a prismatic
champagne glass tilted in his hand*’ (*U* 15.452-3). Instead of gesticulating for the sake of
creating action, Bloom usually makes fairly subtle movements and is often almost-
motionless: ‘*Silent, thoughtful, alert he stands on guard, his fingers at his lips in the attitude
of secret master*’ (*U* 15.4955). Bloom ties Bella’s shoelace ‘*With desire, with reluctance*’ (*U*
15.2805); caresses Zoe ‘*dubiously*’ (*U* 15.1993); ‘*breathes softly*’ (*U* 15.1968); ‘*stands aside
at the threshold*’ (*U* 15.2027) and, again, ‘*stands aside*’ (*U* 15.4030). Bloom has expressive
eyes which could rival Chaplin’s: ‘*with a smile in his eye*’ (*U* 15.1962); ‘*With a tear in his eye*
(*U* 15.1964); ‘*He gazes far away mournfully*’ (*U* 15.1966); ‘*three tears falling from his left
eye*’ (*U* 15.1880). Bloom, himself, recognises the articulacy of his eyes: ‘*In my eyes read that
slumber which women love*’ (*U* 15.2772).

\(^{711}\) Anthony Paraskeva, ‘‘In the Beginning Was the Gest’’, p. 122.
Unlike Bloom, Stephen employs several histrionic gestures, suggesting that he favours a more theatrical acting style and/or that his bodily movements are somewhat disconnected from his true emotions. Unlike Bloom, Stephen is not yet (or not always) a coherent body-subject. Stephen ‘Gabbles with marionette jerks’ (U 15.3881): he ‘claps hat on head and leaps over to the fireplace where he stands with shrugged shoulders, finny hands outspread, a painted smile on his face’ (U 15.3876-8). He ‘Throws up his hands’ (U 15.4568); is seen ‘Grimacing with head back, laugh[ing] loudly, clapping himself’ (U 15.3900) and ‘Choking with fright, remorse and horror’ (U 15.4187); he ‘whirls giddily’ (U 15.4151); ‘runs to the piano and takes his ashplant, beating his foot in tripudium’ (U 15.4012); ‘throws his ashplant on the table and seizes Zoe round the waist’ (U 15.4027-8); and ‘arming Zoe with exaggerated grace, begins to waltz her round the room’ (U 15.4029-30). However, it appears that Stephen would prefer to act in Bloom’s more naturalistic style: ‘(Looks up to the sky) How? Very unpleasant. Noble art of selfpretence. Personally, I detest action. (He waves his hand) Hand hurts me slightly’ (U 15.4413). Stephen does not like the artifice of acting (the ‘Noble art of selfpretence’) or its exaggerated ‘action’, such as his upward head-tilt or the vigorous waving much which makes his hand hurt.

Paraskeva suggests that Joyce’s preference for subtle gestures (especially of the hands and eyes) is influenced by Freud’s work on symptomatic actions.\(^\text{712}\) For Freud, ‘states of mind are manifested […] in the tensions and relaxations of facial muscles, in the adaptations of the eyes, […] and in the movements of limbs and in particular of the hands’.\(^\text{713}\) As Paraskeva notes, for Freud, human gestures are ‘suggestive nonverbal

\(^{712}\) Anthony Paraskeva, “‘In the Beginning Was the Gest’”, p. 124.

phenomena’ which ‘let slip an unconscious intention’, emotion, or other feeling.\textsuperscript{714} I suggest that ‘Circe’’s gestures (Bloom’s, in particular) are proto-Merleau-Pontian rather than Freudian. As noted above (as explained in detail in chapter three), like Freud, Merleau-Ponty sees gestures as a direct form of language, conveying feeling and emotion. Unlike Freud, however, Merleau-Ponty does not separate the mind from the body; gestures directly express the feelings of the body-subject, rather than those of an unconscious mind, only incidentally connected to a body.

For Merleau-Ponty, emotions ‘exist on this face or in those gestures’; ‘[a]nger, shame, hate, and love are not psychic facts hidden at the bottom of another’s consciousness’.\textsuperscript{715} As we know from Joyce’s conversations with Budgen, Joyce was dubious about Freud’s theory of unconscious emotions; he felt that feelings are expressed, sometimes in complex ways, through the conscious body: ‘Why all this fuss and bother about the mystery of the unconscious?’; ‘What about the mystery of the conscious?’\textsuperscript{716} In ‘Circe’, there are several points which suggest that gestures are direct expressions of a body-subject, rather than an indirect revelation of a hidden unconscious. As shown above Bloom’s emotional gestures are subtle yet direct; they appear to be unmediated by a separate unconsciousness. As if to stress the point, Joyce writes that Bloom has ‘apologetic toes’ (\textit{U} 15.957); his toes do not \textit{reveal} the apologetic feelings of a separate unconscious mind – they directly express an apology. In Merleau-Ponty’s terms, the apology exists \textit{in} the movement of the toes. Joyce does something similar in ‘Sirens’, ‘Scylla and Charybdis’, ‘Nausicaa’, and his \textit{Trieste Notebook}: Bloom is granted ‘reflecting fingers’ (\textit{U} 11.863), so he can have a ‘fingerponder’ (\textit{U} 9.1062), and later recalls a maiden with a ‘pensive bosom’ (\textit{U}

\textsuperscript{714} Anthony Paraskeva, “‘In the Beginning Was the Gest’”, p. 124.

\textsuperscript{715} Maurice Merleau-Ponty, ‘The Film and the New Psychology’, p. 53.

13.858), while ‘Rogers (Marcellus)’ ‘laughs with happy teeth’. Instead of giving Bloom a machine-body which is controlled by a separate human mind, Joyce makes Bloom an interconnected body-subject.

**BLOOM, STEPHEN, AND SISTER ANGELICA: THE BODY-SUBJECT IN ALL SERIOUSNESS**

My analysis of machine-human/ body-mind comedy has revealed Bergsonian and/or proto-Merleau-Pontian elements in the work of Joyce, Chaplin, and Méliès. I would like to augment my analyses by briefly looking at some less comedic instances of the body-subject in the ‘Circe’ episode of *Ulysses* and in one particular trick-film. We know that Joyce intended to depict integrated body-subjects in *Ulysses* as, in conversation with Frank Budgen, he asserted: in ‘my book the body lives in and moves through space and is the home of a full human personality’; if ‘[my characters] had no body they would have no mind’ – ‘it’s all one’. In ‘Ithaca’, Bloom affirms the body-subject status of human beings; people cannot be reduced to mechanical bodies or immaterial minds: a man is ‘a bodily and mental male organism’ and a woman is ‘a bodily and mental female organism’ (*U* 17: 2157).

As noted above, in ‘Circe’, Stephen argues for body-subject communication: gesture is ‘a universal language’ which ‘render[s] visible not the lay sense but the first entelechy’ (*U* 15.105-7). As Jeri Johnson notes, ‘entelechy’ is taken from Aristotle. As the philosopher John Cottingham explains, ‘Aristotle did not [...] regard the psyche [or entelechy] as a separate non-material entity, but merely as the “form” or organizing principle of the

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body’. For Stephen then, ‘entelechy’ refers to a soul (or mind) which is not purely non-material, a soul (or mind) that is somewhat corporeal and rendered directly visible through gestures. In this sense, ‘entelechy’ shares certain characteristics with Merleau-Ponty’s non-material yet non-immaterial ‘flesh’ and his not solely bodily yet not solely cerebral body-subject. As Herr explains, ‘Joyce’s thinking about human activity began from quasi-Aristotelian’ ideas; like ‘Martin Heidegger’ – and other phenomenologists – Joyce ‘revisited Aristotle in order to rethink the philosophical tradition’, in order to challenge Cartesianism.

The idea of a body-subject is also discernible in another passage in ‘Circe’, when Bloom’s erotic painting of a nymph comes to life. The nymph is ‘stonecold and pure’ and appears ‘eyeless, in nun’s white habit’ (U 15. 3393, 3434, Joyce’s italics). As well as echoing the inanimate-to-animate transformations in the Méliès’ films (as discussed above), this scene is reminiscent of a popular religious trick-film shown at Joyce’s Volta Cinematograph: 

\textit{Sister Angelica, a Legend of Lourdes} (dr. Michel Carré, Pathé, 1909). Indeed, as if to highlight the allusion, the Nymph speaks of ‘Lourdes’ and ‘Sister Agatha’, a close echo of ‘Sister Angelica’ (U 15.3435–6). Set in medieval times, the film tells a tragic love story. Long before taking her vows, a nun had been in love with a warrior, but the young couple went their separate ways. One day the warrior is mortally wounded in battle and sends a message to the nun, begging her to comfort him on his death bed. The nun is forbidden to leave her convent, so she must choose between her religious beliefs (her mind/soul) and her lover’s impulses (her body/sensations): ‘although her heart yearns to obey the prayer of the dying


\footnotesize{722} \textit{Sister Angelica} was first shown on 31 March 1910 and was so popular that it was repeated at least twice. See John McCourt, ‘Introduction’, in \textit{Roll Away the Reel World}, p. 4.
soldier, [she] is obliged to stifle her longings’. But then a miracle occurs: a statue of the Virgin Mary comes to life, echoing ‘Circe’’s Nymph who, like the statue, is ‘stonecold and pure’. The statue then takes the nun’s place in the convent, leaving her free to comfort her dying sweetheart.

On one level, *Sister Angelica* appears to resolve philosophy’s troublesome mind/body dichotomy. The nun is spared the difficult task of choosing between mind and body; her convent life has no need for a body, so her mind separates from her body and makes do with a stone statue, while her body escapes to her lover. Sister Angelica turns her convent-self into a cerebral praying-automaton, and her real body into a sensation-feeling-machine. However, the Cartesian dualism is still in place; the nun’s desire is incomplete without her mind, and the reunion between her and her lover is not a happy one, indicating that mind/body separation is never truly possible and, reiterating the fact that we are all body-subjects. The film prefigures Merleau-Ponty’s statement that ‘the subject that I am [...] is inseparable from this body and this world’.  

Like Sister Angelica, the nymph in ‘Circe’ fails to separate body and mind. She calls for ‘[n]o more desire’; ‘[o]nly the ethereal’ (*U* 15.3436–7). Then she tries to kill off desire by destroying one of its bodily manifestations: ‘*she draws a poniard and, clad in the sheathmail of an elected knight of nine, strikes at [Bloom’s] loins*’ (*U* 15.3460, Joyce’s italics). But Bloom is a ‘Cat o’ nine lives’ and his capacity for desire is unharmed by the nymph’s physical violence (*U* 15.3463). He recognises that, just as in Sister Angelica’s case, the mental and the physical cannot be separated; you cannot divide the nun from the slut, as everyone comprises elements of the ethereal and the bodily. In reply to ‘The Nymph’ and ‘The Sluts’,

724 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, p. 408.
Bloom makes his point using a rhetorical question: ‘[i]f there were only the ethereal where would you all be, postulants and novices?’ (U 15.3449–50). As Joyce writes in his Trieste Notebook, ‘Pornography fails because whores are bad conductors of emotion’; genuine desire requires a reciprocal relationship between the physical and the emotional. For Merleau-Ponty, and for Joyce, true desire is an intermingling of urges, conscious cravings, the body, and the world: ‘[s]exuality is neither transcended in human life nor shown up at its centre by unconscious representations’, it ‘is at all times present there like an atmosphere’. The nymph’s apparent allusion to Sister Angelica reminds readers of the artificiality of the mind/ body divide, and the truth of the body-subject.

CONCLUSION: THE BODY-SUBJECT AS A RESPONSE TO MECHANICAL MODERNISM

Joyce and the film-makers that I have discussed found comedy in the seeming dislocation of mind and body that the machine age brought about. Modernity, with its automobiles, film camera, and mechanical methods of production, threatened to divorce the mind from the body by transforming the human organism into a machine, either through humans imitating machines or through the supersession of human elements by mechanical elements. This threat impelled modernists to reconsider the seemingly rigid machine/ human and mind/ body binaries. Bergson laughed at Cartesian dualism and the mechanical elements that threaten to overthrow humanity, but he attempted to redefine, rather than integrate, ‘human’ and ‘machine’ and ‘mind’ and ‘body’. Lewis was also amused by the absurdity of machine/ human reversals, and mind/ body dislocation, but his overall philosophy remained somewhat conflicted. In Ulysses, and in some of the early films that I

726 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, p. 168.
have looked at, we are shown integrated human-machines and mind-bodies; we are presented with humans that cannot be reduced to mere automatons or mere minds – we are shown body-subjects.
While the previous chapter focused on what was on early cinema screens, this chapter looks at the relationship between the screen and the viewer. Following on from my discussion of cinema and prosthesis, I consider the extent to which early cinema interacted with spectators’ bodies. I expand my brief analysis of Bazinian spatial mimesis and human imitation into a discussion of early 3-D effects and the mirroring of audiences in local actuality films. I argue that, like early film-makers, Joyce was interested in perception and embodied experience, especially the relationship between sight and touch. In order to help theorise the various approaches to embodiment and perception explored in *Ulysses* and early cinema, I refer, once again to Merleau-Pontian phenomenology. By analysing the text and early cinema genres in the light of phenomenological theory, I am able to examine the ways in which modern literary and filmic preoccupations are linked to explorations of binaries such as inner subject/external world, seeing/feeling, and self/other.

I begin by looking at *Ulysses*’ direct reference to the stereoscope and the indirect allusions to stereoscopy in Bloom’s musings on parallax. I consider the three-dimensionality and haptic effects of stereoscopic seeing in relation to Bloom’s and Gerty’s encounter in ‘Nausicaa’ and show how stereoscopy, depth perception, and haptic seeing are usefully examined through the Merleau-Pontian concepts of ‘flesh’ and ‘intercorporeity’. My discussion of parallactic seeing and stereoscopy focuses on the embodied nature of binocular vision and the proto-phenomenological roots of the stereoscope; I look at
astronomical stereoscopic images, including photographs of the moon taken in 1902 and 1904. I continue to contemplate embodied perception in my analysis of panoramic vision and virtual film-worlds; in particular, I consider Ulysses’s ‘phantom rides’ and the vertiginous effects of ‘Wandering Rocks’s’ interpolations. My analysis employs Gestalt psychology, the Merleau-Pontian concepts of ‘attention’ and ‘intention’, and the post-Merleau-Pontian concept of ‘camera-intentionality’. Finally, I return to the relationship between the self and the other in my exploration of parallels between Ulysses and the viewing situation of Mitchell and Kenyon’s Living Dublin films.

HAPTICS AND THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF TOUCH

Western philosophy has generally privileged sight over all other sensations, but there are a few notable exceptions: Aristotle’s arguments for the primacy of touch in De Anima and De Sensu et Sensibilibus (c. 350 B.C.); Descartes’ thought experiments on blindness and seeing with one’s hands in Dioptrique (1637); Berkeley’s discussion of touch and sight in Essay Towards a New Theory of Vision (1709). All three philosophies of touch are alluded to in Ulysses. More recently, phenomenologists – particularly Maurice Merleau-Ponty and later Merleau-Pontian thinkers – have placed touch at the centre of their philosophies. Merleau-Ponty was intrigued by ‘how the world touches us’ and argued that ‘touch opens on to a setting at least analogous to that of visual data’. Phenomenology’s investigations of touch have had a significant impact on film-philosophy,
prompting several film-phenomenologists to focus on what have been termed the ‘haptic’ elements of cinema.\textsuperscript{729}

The term ‘haptic’ refers to the sense of touch in all its various manifestations. As Abbie Garrington perceptively notes, the haptic ‘is the combination of an intentional reaching and touching with the human skin, in addition to the appreciation of movement by the body as a whole’.\textsuperscript{730} In her influential study, \textit{Atlas of Emotion: Journeys in Art, Architecture and Film} (2002), Giuliana Bruno explains that ‘the Greek etymology tells us [that] haptic means “able to come into contact with”; ‘the haptic – the sense of touch – constitutes the reciprocal contact between us and the environment’.\textsuperscript{731} This ‘reciprocal contact’ can – and does – occur in non-organic relationships such as the relationship between film spectator and film. Indeed, as Bruno states, haptics – or reciprocal contact – ‘invests the very process of film reception, for we are moved by the moving images’.\textsuperscript{732}

This chapter examines two different aspects of haptics in \textit{Ulysses} and early cinema: \textit{tactility}, the most commonly recognised type of touch, defined as the sensation of pressure on the skin, and \textit{proprioception}, which encompasses \textit{kinaesthesia} (the bodily sensation of moving through space) and \textit{vestibular} sensations (the perception of balance, body position, acceleration and deceleration, obtained from the ear’s inner canals).\textsuperscript{733}

\textsuperscript{729} Film-philosophers focusing on the phenomenological and haptic aspects of cinema include Vivian Sobchack, Laura Marks, Jennifer Barker, and Giuliana Bruno. All are discussed below.


\textsuperscript{732} Ibid., p. 254.

STEREOSCOPY AND TACTILITY

The stereoscope is a pre-cinematic device which produces an apparently three-dimensional image by superimposing two photographs (or drawings) of the same scene, taken from slightly different perspectives. In ‘Proteus’, the stereoscope helps Stephen to think through Bishop Berkeley’s early eighteenth-century philosophy of depth perception:

The good bishop of Cloyne took the veil of the temple out of his shovel hat: veil of space with coloured emblems hatched on to its field. Hold hard. Coloured on a flat: yes, that’s right. Flat I see, then think distance, near, far, flat I see, east, back. Ah, see now! Falls back suddenly, frozen in stereoscope. Click does the trick. (U 3.416-20)

In this passage, Stephen describes the procedure for stereoscope-viewing: the viewer must ‘Hold hard’ onto the apparatus then wait for the ‘flat’ 2-D images to transform into seemingly 3-D objects, to fall ‘back suddenly, frozen in stereoscope’. It is the ‘Click [that] does the trick’; it is the adjustment of focal length – achieved through sliding the stereogram image along the crossbar then clicking it into place once the correct position is found – that brings the 3-D image into focus (see figure 16, overleaf).  

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734 For details of stereoscope-viewing in the period in which Ulysses is set (1904), see: Theodore Brown, Stereoscopic Phenomena of Light & Sight: A Guide to the Practice of Stereoscopic Photography and its Relation to Binocular Vision, (1903), re-produced as a facsimile (Culver City, CA: Reel 3-D Enterprises, 1994).
For Stephen, stereoscopic perception provides an accurate illustration of Berkeley’s theory of depth perception. According to Berkeley – or the ‘good bishop of Cloyne’ as he is dubbed in the above passage – it is our thought, rather than our vision, which allows us to perceive depth and three-dimensionality. As Berkeley states in his 1709 work, *Essay Towards a New Theory of Vision*, the ‘proper objects of sight [are] not without the mind, nor the images of anything without the mind’. For Berkeley, and for Stephen, we see objects and the world as flat then we add distance onto that flatness with the power of our minds. As Stephen states in the above passage, ‘Flat I see, then think distance’. In other words, for both Berkeley and Stephen, three-dimensionality is mental rather than physical. Given this mind-dependent view of perception, it is somewhat surprising to find that Berkeley was also interested in bodily sensation, particularly tactility. Indeed, his *Essay Towards a New Theory of Vision* was in part an investigation into the relationship between sight and touch: the

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'question, whether there is any IDEA common to sight and touch'.

For Berkeley, all perception is cerebral (it occurs in the mind), but bodily experience does hold some sway – at the very least, it has a significant impact on our mental ‘idea’ of space: the ‘tangible magnitude of an OBJECT [is] more heeded than the visible’.

The stereoscope was a major player in the debate between mind-dependent and body-dependent theories of perception; it was actually invented to prove the corporeal nature of three-dimensional seeing. As Jonathan Crary observes, the proliferation of new optical devices in the mid-nineteenth-century – including the stereoscope and the phenakistiscope – signalled a shift from ‘the geometrical optics of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries to physiological optics’; ‘knowledge was accumulated about the constitutive role of the body in the apprehension of a visible world’. So, in its original guise, the stereoscope goes strongly against Stephen’s cerebral view of depth perception: ‘Flat I see, then think distance’. The stereoscope was created by Sir Charles Wheatstone, in 1838, to investigate 3-D vision. Previous theories of vision held that our two eyes functioned as one, that light stimulated each retina equally. Wheatstone disproved this theory by proving binocular vision, by showing that the left and right eye each see from different perspectives, and that these differing perspectives contribute to our perception of depth. As he states in his 1838 Royal Society paper, the ‘preceding experiments render it evident that there is an essential difference in the appearance of objects when seen with two eyes, [...]
and that the most vivid belief of the solidity of an object of three dimensions arises from
two different perspective projections of it being simultaneously presented'.

As Laura Schiavo notes, by ‘approaching the issue of binocular vision from the
perspective of the body’s awareness of depth [...] these experiments were
phenomenological in nature’. Indeed, in the *Phenomenology of Perception*, like
Wheatstone, Merleau-Ponty uses the stereoscope to illustrate his ideas on the bodily nature
of vision. He states: ‘When I look in the stereoscope, a totality presents itself in which
already the possible order takes shape’. For Merleau-Ponty, the 3-D images that
stereoscopes present are immediately perceived in 3-D due to our body’s automatic
repositioning of itself, rather than through a separate action of the intellect. As Merleau-
Ponty explains, ‘when I walk along an avenue, I cannot bring myself to see the spaces
between the trees as things and the trees themselves as a background’. In other words,
we cannot, through any conscious act of our mind, bring the spaces to the foreground and
the trees to the background; this optical illusion, like the three-dimensionality of
stereoscope images, can only be caused by a change of focus prompted by a change of
body-position. Using the stereoscope as an illustration, both Merleau-Ponty and
Wheatstone contend that three-dimensionality is caused by bodily perspective, rather than
mental reasoning.

So, despite Stephen’s allusion to Berkeley and the mental nature of perception, it
seems that the stereoscope was intimately bound up with bodily sensation. Stephen seems
to recognise this fact; just a few lines on from the ‘stereoscope’ passage, Stephen muses on

740 Charles Wheatstone, *Contributions to the Physiology of Vision—Part the First. On some remarkable, and
hitherto unobserved, Phenomena of Binocular Vision* (1838), §9, viewed online at
741 Laura Burd Schiavo, ‘From Phantom Image to Perfect Vision’, p. 117.
742 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, p. 262.
743 Ibid., p. 263.
tangibility and tactility. For Stephen, like Berkeley, objects are more aptly described using tactile – as opposed to visual – terminology; Stephen’s descriptions of his surroundings focus on the haptic, rather than the optic: he lies back onto ‘sharp rocks’, amongst the ‘gumheavy’ plants and ‘milkoozing fruits’ and describes himself as being ‘caught in [a] burning scene’ (U 3.437-443). Stephen wants to touch and be touched: ‘Touch me. Soft eyes. [...] O, touch me soon, now. [...] Touch, touch me’ (U 3.434-36). Berkeley ultimately denies any connection between sight and touch: ‘There is no idea, or kind of idea, common to both senses’. Conversely, Stephen posits an intimate relationship between looking and touching/feeling: the eyes can be felt (they are ‘soft’), and they can also cause feelings (they can ‘touch’ Stephen just by looking at him).

Bloom also muses on the relationship between looking and feeling. As noted in the previous chapter, in ‘Lestrygonians’, Bloom observes a blind stripling. He wonders how the blind man knows the position of the van, and surmises that touch must be translated into sight: ‘Must have felt it. See things in their forehead perhaps: kind of sense of volume’ (U 8.1108-9); ‘when he touches with his fingers must almost see the lines, the curves’ (U 8.1128-9). Bloom contemplates what a ‘[q]ueer idea of Dublin [the blind man] must have, tapping his way round by the stones’ (U 8.1110-11). Bloom’s ruminations echo the thoughts of Descartes in Dioptrique (1637). Like Bloom, Descartes concludes that blind people must ‘see with their hands’. However, whereas Bloom conjectures that blind people see things ‘in their forehead perhaps’, Descartes goes a step further and suggests that, despite the physical tactility involved in blind perception, perception ultimately occurs not in the forehead but in an immaterial mind. Bloom’s theory of blind touch-vision is more corporeal

than Descartes’ – the relationship between the *touching* fingers and the *seen* lines is more immediate.

This bodily immediacy is apt considering Bloom’s own acute corporeality. As noted in the previous chapter, Bloom is depicted as a full blooded, sensual man. Earlier in ‘Lestrygonians’, in an experience which is almost the inverse of the blind man’s, Bloom experiences tactile feelings which are prompted by visual cues; the ‘Flimsy China silks’ in the window of Brown Thomas silk merchants causes a ‘warm human plumpness’ to settle ‘on [Bloom’s] brain’ (*U* 8.621 & 637). Bloom’s corporeal theory of blindness is closer to Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological analysis than Descartes’. As noted in chapter three, for Merleau-Ponty, the blind man’s stick is not an intermediary between a physical object and a mental image – the stick directly allows perception by becoming ‘an area of sensitivity, [by] extending the scope and active radius of touch’. While, for Descartes, touch is an impoverished analogy (and replacement) for sight, for Merleau-Ponty ‘touch opens on to a setting at least analogous to that of visual data’.

According to Crary, despite the physiological optics behind the stereoscope, its focus was on the eye (and seeing) rather than on touch (and feeling): the ‘dislocation of touch from sight occurs with a pervasive “separation of the senses” and industrial mapping of the body in the nineteenth century’; the ‘loss of touch as a conceptual component of vision meant the unloosening of the eye from the network of referentiality incarnated in tactility and its subjective relation to perceived space’. However, as I show, tactility, tangibility, and the closeness of seeing and touching were key to the stereoscope’s commercial success.

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In an 1859 article, stereoscope maker Oliver Wendell Holmes\textsuperscript{749} emphasised the \textit{tactile} nature of stereoscopic \textit{seeing}: when we look through a stereoscope we ‘clasp an object with our eyes, as with our arms, or with our hands, or with our thumb and finger, and then we know it to be something more than a surface’\textsuperscript{750}. William Dickson, one of Thomas Edison’s film assistants, also noted the haptic qualities of stereoscope-viewing: to see ‘stereoscopically’ is to see in ‘pleasing rotundity’\textsuperscript{751}.

The word ‘stereoscope’ conjoins two Greek words: \textit{skopion}, meaning ‘to see’, and \textit{stereo}, meaning ‘solid’.\textsuperscript{752} ‘To see solid’ is to perceive tactile objects, objects that one can (seemingly at least) reach out and touch. So the idea of tactile seeing is already in the stereoscope’s definition. As Ray Zone notes in \textit{Stereoscopic Cinema and the Origins of 3-D Film 1838-1952} (2007), the stereoscope paved the way for early films that focused on the haptic experience of depth and three dimensions – such as films of on-coming trains and motorcars, and early erotic films which attempted to show female flesh in all its sensual rotundity.\textsuperscript{753} Stereoscopic seeing – including its later incarnations in early projected cinema – simulates a haptic experience through seeing rather than feeling; viewers \textit{feel} through \textit{looking}.

Holmes’ nineteenth-century account of stereoscope viewing emphasises one particularly haptic moment: an almost-physical, seemingly-aggressive encounter between Holmes and the stereograph-tree. According to Holmes, the ‘scraggy branches of a tree in

\textsuperscript{749} Holmes was the original inventor of what became known as the ‘Holmes-type’ stereoscope. See Fig. 1.
the foreground run out at us as if they would scratch our eyes out’. Correspondingly, when Stephen thinks about the stereoscope and touch, he also thinks about encounters – sexual encounters. He contemplates the touch of a woman – ‘her gentle hand’, ‘a woman to her lover clinging’ – and the possibility of kissing at a distance: ‘[h]is lips lipped and mouthed fleshless lips of air’ (U 3.424, 422-3, 401). In ‘Nausicaa’, Bloom experiences what Stephen imagines; he engages in a very haptic and erotic, yet distanced, encounter with Gerty MacDowell.

**MUTOSCOPE OR STEREOSCOPE?**

Katherine Mullin has argued convincingly that Gerty and Bloom’s encounter reflects the style and techniques of the Mutoscope, a pre-cinematic peepshow device sometimes known as a ‘what the butler saw’ machine. Indeed, in ‘Nausicaa’, post-masturbation, Bloom directly refers to the Mutoscope: he recalls some of the ‘for men only’ ‘Mutoscope pictures’ that he viewed in ‘Capel street’ (U 13.794). The Mutoscope was a development of the flick-book principle; a viewer looked through the aperture and turned a hand-crank at their desired speed in order to rotate a sequence of photographs attached to a drum, thus creating the cinematic illusion of moving pictures (see figure 17, overleaf).

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754 Oliver Wendell Holmes, ‘The Stereoscope and the Stereograph’.
According to David Trotter, although Bloom directly refers to the Mutoscope, and Gerty’s erotic display is reminiscent of the displays performed by Mutoscope protagonists, it is hard to see the Mutoscope as a model for ‘Nausicaa’ because the Mutoscope is not a haptic device: what ‘the mutoscope did not do [...] was foreground the haptic–contingent’, the illusion of tangible and tactile 3-D images. Trotter makes a pertinent point; Mutoscope pictures are not stereoscopic, but ‘Nausicaa’ is. Throughout the episode, Joyce places emphasis on the tangible three dimensions of Gerty’s body: her ‘shapely limbs’; her

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‘soft body’; ‘her every contour’; her ‘delicately rounded’ legs; and the ‘Swell of her calf’ (U 13. 170, 929, 440, 564, & 699).

Despite Trotter’s valuable interpolation, I contend that the Mutoscope can be seen as a model for ‘Nausicaa’ as the device was haptic in two different respects: firstly, I have discovered that some of the Mutoscope titles were shot using stereoscopic cameras; secondly, the way in which the Mutoscope was operated – through the turning of a hand-crank – is tactile in a very direct way.

Ray Zone describes a 1908 stereoview card produced by the original Mutoscope makers and film providers – the American Mutoscope and Biograph Company: ‘it is no. 4 in a set and titled “Give Them to Me”’. As shown overleaf (see figures 18 and 19), I have found another stereoscopic photo-series by the American Mutoscope and Biograph Company, dated 1904, the year in which Ulysses is set. The 1904 stereoview cards depict a story which closely echoes Bloom’s erotic encounter with Gerty – particularly, Bloom’s distanced watching and his memories of the Mutoscope film ‘Peeping Tom’ (U 13.794). Figure 18 shows a Bloom-like character – a ‘JACK, THE PEEPER’ as opposed to a Peeping Tom. Figure 19 depicts the object of Jack’s peeping – ‘THE GIRLS BEHIND THE SCENES’.

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757 Ray Zone, Stereoscopic Cinema and the Origins of 3-D Film 1838-1952, p. 46.
Figure 18: 1904 stereocard by the American Mutoscope and Biograph Company. Series 106, no. 11. Reproduced with permission from a private collector.

Figure 19: 1904 stereocard by the American Mutoscope and Biograph Company. Series 106, no. 6. Reproduced with permission from a private collector.
The costumed actresses in these stereocards echo Gerty’s own theatrical display, inspired by the stage soubrettes – particularly ‘skirtdancers’ (U 13.732). So, in Capel Street, Bloom could well have seen stereoscopic pictures, seen through a Mutoscope machine. Given the haptic qualities of stereoscopic seeing, these mildly erotic stereo-Mutoscope titles closely parallel the tactile encounter between Gerty and Bloom. Crary notes that there were also some truly pornographic stereoscope pictures; some have ‘speculated that the very close association of the stereoscope with pornography was in part responsible for its social demise as a mode of visual consumption’. 758

As well as simulating tangibility and tactility through stereoscopy, the Mutoscope required a direct tactile engagement with its viewer: in order to view the moving pictures, the viewer had to drop a coin in the slot then turn the hand-crank continually. As Mullin notes, the Mutoscope ‘blurred a distinction between looking at touching’; the touching involved was decidedly erotic, as ‘the handcrank was positioned suggestively at groin level’. 759 Mutoscope-viewing engendered intercorporeal relationships between the body of the viewer, the body of the machine, and the body of the film protagonist. For film-phenomenologist Jennifer Barker, the ‘situation presented by early cinema viewing machines [...] demonstrates the remarkable extent to which the human body is figured as an intimate and integral component of the cinema’. 760 As shown below, non-Mutoscope-branded stereoscopes were also around in 1904 (the year in which Ulysses was set); note that the hand-crank is still the same, rather suggestive, position (see figure 20, overleaf). The physical tactility of these hand-cranks creates a haptic encounter based on prosthetic interaction.

759 Katherine Mullin, James Joyce, Sexuality and Social Purity, pp. 149-150.
As noted in the previous chapter, echoing Bloom’s ruminations on the blind stripling’s stick (as well as Stephen’s ashplant and Chaplin’s cane), Merleau-Ponty considers the tactility of prostheses through an examination of the blind man and his seeing-device: the ‘blind man’s stick has ceased to be an object for him, and is no longer perceived for itself; its point has become an area of sensitivity, extending the scope and active radius of touch’. Similarly, in Mutoscope-viewing, the hand-crank becomes part of the viewer’s body, an extension of his own sense of touch and feeling. Just as the blind man incorporates his stick ‘into the bulk of [his] own body’, the Mutoscope-viewer incorporates the hand-

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crank. The tactile reciprocity between the Mutoscope-viewer and the Mutoscope (both machine and film-image) mirrors the haptic relationship between Gerty and Bloom.

**STEREOSCOPY AND PARALLAX**

As well as involving the body by creating a tactile relationship between machine and viewer, stereoscopes promoted proprioceptive engagement. As explained above, *proprioception* encompasses *kinaesthesia* (the bodily sensation of moving through space) and *vestibular* sensations (the perception of balance, body position, acceleration and deceleration, obtained from the ear’s inner canals). The stereoscope engages the vestibular sense by modifying the viewing-body’s position in space and the kinaesthetic sense by artificially creating the sense of moving from one viewing-spot to another. As already noted, in the *Phenomenology of Perception*, Merleau-Ponty uses the stereoscope to illustrate his ideas on the bodily nature of depth perception. He also refers to the stereoscope to aid his discussion of his related ideas on the situatedness the body. Merleau-Ponty states: ‘when I walk along an avenue, I cannot bring myself to see the spaces between the trees as things and the trees themselves as a background’. This optical illusion, like the three-dimensionality of stereoscope images, can only be caused by a change of focus prompted by a change of body-position; we cannot, through any conscious act of our mind, bring the spaces to the foreground and the trees to the background.

This physiological and phenomenological view of stereoscopic vision finds correspondences in Bloom’s thoughts. Although Bloom does not consider the stereoscope directly, his ruminations on ‘parallax’ engage directly with late-19th-century and early-20th-

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763 Ibid., p. 263.
century debates surrounding depth perception and the body’s role in vision. The word ‘parallax’ refers to the ‘[d]ifference or change in the apparent position [...] of an object as seen from two different points’ in space. The word is commonly used in astronomy, where it refers specifically to ‘a difference or change in the position of a celestial object as seen from different points on the earth’s surface or from opposite points in the earth’s orbit around the sun’. Parallax is also used in stereoscopy; stereoscopes are built on the effects of parallax. Parallax describes how stereoscopic vision works; we see things in 3-D because each of our eyes sees the same object from a different perspective, from a slightly different point in space. In other words, stereoscopic perception is parallactic perception. Despite their different subject fields, each definition of ‘parallax’ emphasises the embodied and situated nature of perception. Thus, parallax is related to the haptic sensation of proprioception. By allowing the observer to artificially switch from one position in space to another – or by allowing them to see from two different positions simultaneously – the stereoscope induces the kind of haptic sensations that we would get when moving around actual space.

In ‘Ithaca’, Bloom uses ‘parallax’ in the astronomical sense; he considers ‘the parallax or parallactic drift of socalled fixed stars’ (U 17.1052-1053). Parallax and parallactic drift were common topics in late 1800s and early 1900s popular astronomy literature. Bloom’s small, rather eclectic, library contains ‘A Handbook of Astronomy (cover, brown leather, detached, 5 plates, antique letterpress long primer, author’s footnotes nonpareil, marginal clues brevier, captions small pica)’ (U 17.1391-3). Although no author or date is given for the volume, Jeri Johnson and I have found a good match for Bloom’s book.

765 Ibid.
Handbook of Astronomy by Dionysius Lardner (London: Lockwood & Co., fourth edition, 1875) has the brown leather cover specified in the above quotation, as well as coloured plates, an antique letterpress cover font, author’s footnotes, and captions. The book devotes several pages to parallax. Lardner emphasises the role of the human, bodily observer in his definition of the term:

PARALLAX. – Since the apparent place of a distant object depends on the direction of the visual line drawn from the observer to such an object, and since while the object remains stationary the direction of this visual line is changed with every change of position of the observer, such change of position produces necessarily a displacement in the apparent position of the object.766

In May 1904 (the month before Ulysses is set), in an article entitled ‘Stereoscope Applied to Astronomical Researches’, astronomer Van Biesbroeck explained how stereoscopes can be used to measure parallactic drift – the apparent movement of a star, caused by the effects of parallax, the effects of seeing the same star from different positions.767 According to Van Biesbroeck, the stereoscope, ‘which seems rather to belong to the entertaining side of natural philosophy, suddenly appears as a new resource which promises to be fruitful’ in astronomy.768 As Van Biesbroeck explains, we can examine parallactic drift through a stereoscope, by comparing two different photos of the same ‘region of the heavens’; ‘if certain stars have changed their place, they will appear to detach themselves from the mass of other starts which form a flat background’.769 In other words, we get the same effect as Merleau-Ponty describes in his trees and spaces example, quoted

769 Ibid., p. 326.
above; foreground and background are reversed through a change of body position, artificially achieved through the stereoscope’s use of parallax.

This parallactic way of seeing, as described by Bloom in ‘Ithaca’, is put into practice in ‘Cyclops’. As Keith Williams notes, Joyce presents the ‘Cyclops’ episode from two different perspectives: ‘one cynically reductive and “belittling”; the other gargantuanly hyperbolic and “magnifying”; both effectively “monoptic” like Homer’s one-eyed, man-devouring monster’.  

For Williams, both of the main Ulysses film adaptations (Ulysses, 1967, dr. Joseph Strick, and Bloom, 2003, dr. Sean Walsh) fail to effectively reflect this a-synchronicity. He suggests that film-makers could have presented this double way of seeing – this parallax – through visual means, ‘such as viewing through different ends of the telescope’.  

As Williams notes, this telescope metaphor is actually suggested in the episode itself in a passage in which Bloom reportedly defends mediation and the importance of seeing both sides of the argument:

one story was good until you heard another and blinking facts [...], putting your blind eye to the telescope and drawing up a bill of attainder to impeach a nation, and Bloom trying to back him up moderation and botheration (U 12.1193-95)

For Williams, Werner Nekes’s avant-garde Ulysses-inspired film, Ulisses (1982), goes some way towards achieving this parallactic effect through ‘motifs of dilating and narrowing apertures, [...] deliberately reminiscent of optical tests for tunnel vision’ and ‘reverse images taken from down into troglodytic pits’ which are then parodied by the protagonist, Uli.  

While I agree that Nekes comes closest to reflecting the parallactic theme of

771 Keith Williams, ‘Odysseys of Sound and Image’, p. 166.
772 Ibid., p. 172.
'Cyclops', I suggest the stereoscope, with its two different perspectives, might be the best fit for the episode. It is as if everyone in Kiernan’s pub is only able to see one half of a stereoscope card, apart from Bloom that is (‘with his *but don’t you see? and but on the other hand*, U 12.514-15), who sees their combined, 3-D image, as if he were looking through a stereoscope. Indeed, the single 3-D image seen through the stereoscope is called the ‘cyclopean image’. In this sense, it is Bloom, rather than the monoptic Citizen, who is to be identified with the episode’s namesake – ‘Cyclops’.

As well as engaging parallactic seeing and producing proprioceptive sensations, stereoscopes allow astronomers to see celestial bodies in 3-D, bringing us back to the tactility of ‘Proteus’ and ‘Nausicaa’. Van Biesbroeck suggests that stereoscopes are particularly good for looking at the moon: ‘a very clear sensation of the rotundity of our satellite is obtained’; ‘one might rather imagine himself in the presence of a sculptured model’ – ‘What striking relief!’. In ‘Ithaca’, Bloom considers ‘the moon invisible in incipient lunation, approaching perigee (U 17.1042-1043). ‘Perigee’ is when the moon is closet to Earth, so appears particularly large and spherical, just as it does through a stereoscope.

Around the time in which *Ulysses* is set, two photos were taken of the moon from different points on Earth then overlaid to produce parallax stereograms – or anaglyphs – of the moon. These stereoscopic pictures could be viewed using thin red and green glasses, rather than a clunky stereoscope, producing an image of the moon ‘as round as a huge ball’ (see figure 21, overleaf).

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As the caption underneath the anaglyph states, the image shows the moon ‘as it would appear to a pair of eyes separated by 28,125 miles and viewed from a distance of 240,000 miles’. Thus, the stereoscopic image is the result of seeing from two different places at once, from artificially occupying two different spaces simultaneously. As Merleau-Ponty explains, the ‘unity of the object of binocular vision is not, therefore, the result of some third person process’; it ‘is not the epistemological subject who brings about the synthesis, but the body’. These two overlaid photos cannot be thought into 3-D; viewers need to artificially change their body-position in order to see the moon’s rotundity. Bloom recognises the bodily spatial nature of astronomical observation in his pondering of parallax.

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in ‘Ithaca’. Sounding very much like the *London Illustration News* caption-writer quoted above, Bloom asserts that the milky way (rather than the moon) is ‘discernible by daylight by an observer placed at the lower end of a cylindrical vertical shaft 5000 ft deep sunk from the surface towards the centre of the earth’ (*U 17.1044-6*).

**THE HAPTICS OF PROJECTED FILM**

As I have shown, Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological theories provide useful concepts for thinking about stereoscope viewing. Indeed, Trotter states that his ‘own interest in the stereoscope arose out of [his] efforts to get to grips with phenomenological theories of film’. Rather than discuss the particular theories that influenced him, Trotter quotes a single sentence from the phenomenological literary theorist Maurice Blanchot:

> What happens when what you see, even though from a distance, seems to touch you with a grasping contact, when the manner of seeing is a sort of touch, when seeing is *contact* at a distance?'

Trotter uses Blanchot’s phenomenological question as a starting point for his own reflections on the solidity and tangibility of stereoscopic images. However, somewhat strangely (given his admission that phenomenological theories of film influenced his thinking), Trotter downplays the most phenomenological aspect of Blanchot’s rumination – the importance of *contact* (the one word which Blanchot chose to italicise). In ‘The Essential Solitude’, the essay from which the quotation is taken, the sentence that precedes the quoted passage emphasises the fact that touching always involves some kind of relationship

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with the touched object, some disruption of the subject/object or self/other binary; as Blanchot puts it, ‘[s]eeing means that […] separation has […] become an encounter’.  

As well as usefully illuminating stereoscope-viewing, this phenomenological idea of haptic contact at a distance is useful for figuring the relationship between the viewer and film’s projected screen-image. Indeed, Blanchot’s emphasis on contact is reminiscent of Freeburg’s theory of film, discussed in chapter three. For Freeburg (1918), film is so realistic that spectators feel able to connect with what they see on screen; the ‘illusion of personal contact with the characters is especially strong’. In Merleau-Pontian phenomenology, this form of contact-at-a-distance is explained through the notion of ‘flesh’, and its interrelated sub-notions: ‘chiasm’ and ‘reversibility’. As detailed in previous chapters, Merleau-Pontian ‘flesh’ is not the literal flesh of an individual human body; it is a ‘general thing’ which is best described as an ‘element’ in the sense that the Ancient Greeks used to refer to fire, earth, air, and water. According to Merleau-Ponty, when one person looks at or engages with another person or object, ‘flesh’ enacts a ‘chiasm’. ‘Chiasm’ is the intertwining of self and other, and subject and object; it refers both to ‘chiasma’ (a criss-cross pattern, like in weaving) and ‘chiasmus’ (the grammatical inversion of a phrase such as ‘when the going gets tough, the tough get going’). This second aspect of chiasm merges into Merleau-Ponty’s second sub-notion – ‘reversibility’. ‘Reversibility’ describes the constantly shifting reversal of the seer and the seen, so that the seer becomes the seen and the seen becomes the seer, and vice versa, ad infinitum.

781 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, The Visible and the Invisible, p. 139.
Since Merleau-Pontian ‘flesh’ is not actual bodily flesh, touching does not require actual contact between two individual bodies; haptic sensations can be instigated and experienced from a distance. Merleau-Ponty calls this process ‘intercorporeity’; it is a process in which the general flesh coils back upon itself, first by dividing itself into the ‘flesh of the body’ and the ‘flesh of the world’, then touching itself by touching the body-flesh with the world-flesh and vice versa. This ‘intercorporeity’ enables the seer and the seen to take up each other’s positions, without ever quite becoming one-in-the-same person. During ‘intercorporeity’, ‘[t]here is a reciprocal insertion and intertwining of one in the other’.

As noted in chapter four, in *Ulysses*, Joyce prefigures Merleau-Ponty by providing a useful illustration of these key phenomenological concepts: flesh (of the body and of the world), chiasm, reversibility, and intercorporeity. In ‘Ithaca’, Bloom and Stephen intertwine to become ‘Stoom’ and ‘Blephen’ (*U 17.549-551*). Foreshadowing Merleau-Ponty’s description of intercorporeity, Bloom and Stephen undergo a ‘reciprocal insertion and intertwining’. They are a mass of ‘reciprocal flesh’ and it is impossible to differentiate between each of their faces – ‘theirhisnothis fellowfaces’ (*U 17.1183-1184*). They intermingle to such an extent that their bodies are indistinguishable from one another, yet their subjectivities are still somewhat distinct; they are still ‘Stoom’ and Blephen’ rather than Stoomblephen or Stephenbloom. The flesh of the body and the flesh of the world have intertwined in a reversible chiasm.

As shown in chapter three, phenomenological film-philosophers have incorporated Merleau-Ponty’s concepts – flesh, chiasm, reversibility, and intercorporeity – into their

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784 Ibid., pp. 138-139.
785 Ibid. My italics.
theories. For Laura Marks, ‘Merleau-Ponty posits a primordial subjectivity, an immanent knowledge of the body, that “fleshes out” specular alienation’.\textsuperscript{786} According to Marks, Merleau-Ponty’s ‘[t]actile visuality’, as she terms it, ‘draws upon the mimetic knowledge that does not posit a gulf between subject and object, or the spectator and the world of film’.\textsuperscript{787} For Vivian Sobchack, the Merleau-Pontian ‘entailment of incarnate consciousness and the “flesh” of the world [is] the basis for the origination of the general structures of cinematic signification’.\textsuperscript{788} According to Sobchack, ‘we need to [...] posit the film viewer’s lived body as a carnal “third term” that grounds and mediates [...] subjective vision and objective images – both differentiating and unifying them in reversible (or chiasmic) processes of perception and expression’.\textsuperscript{789} Using Merleau-Pontian theory, both film-philosophers argue that we must see the spectator’s body and the film’s body as ‘flesh’, capable of intermingling to the extent illustrated in ‘Stoom’ and ‘Blephen’.

This phenomenological way of figuring the film/ spectator relationship is particularly appropriate for the study of early cinema as, following on from the tactile encounters of stereoscopy, film professionals working in the late 1890s and early 1900s often made intentionally haptic films – films which were designed to touch the audience, to provoke a physical response in the viewer. As Marks states, the ‘early-cinema phenomenon of a “cinema of attractions” describes an embodied response, in which the illusion that permits distanced identification with the action onscreen gives way to an immediate bodily response to the screen’.\textsuperscript{790} Three key examples of early haptic films are Lumière’s \textit{Arrivée d’un train en...}

\textsuperscript{786} Laura Marks, \textit{The Skin of the Film}, p. 150.
\textsuperscript{787} Ibid., p. 151.
\textsuperscript{788} Vivian Sobchack, \textit{The Address of the Eye}, p. 7.
\textsuperscript{789} Vivian Sobchack, \textit{Carnal Thoughts}, p. 60.
gare à La Ciotat (1895 – see figure 22, overleaf), and Cecil Hepworth’s *How it Feels to Be Run Over* and *Explosion of a Motor Car* (both 1900 – see figures 23 and 24, overleaf).

Like the invasive and aggressive ‘scraggy branches’ in Holmes’s account of stereoscope-viewing, the moving vehicles in these films invade the spectator’s personal space; early haptic-film-viewers felt as if they had narrowly escaped being run over by the moving vehicle. Haptic sensation is so crucial to Hepworth that his titles directly refer to it, most emphatically in *How it Feels to Be Run Over*. According to the film’s catalogue description, a motor car “‘dashes full into the spectator, who sees “stars” as the picture comes to an end’”.  

Maxim Gorky emphasised the haptic and affective nature of Lumière’s film in his somewhat over-imaginative 1896 review: the train ‘plunge[s] into the darkness in which you sit, turning you into a ripped sack full of lacerated flesh […] and crushing into dust and into broken fragments in this hall’.  

In *Explosion of a Motor Car*, flying fragments of bodies are actually shown on screen, falling from the sky.

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Figure 22: *Arrivée d’un train en gare à La Ciotat* (1895), ph. Louis Lumière. Sourced from *Early Cinema: Primitives and Pioneers* DVD (BFI).

Figure 23: *How it Feels to Be Run Over* (1900), dr. Cecil Hepworth. Sourced from *Early Cinema: Primitives and Pioneers* DVD (BFI).

Figure 24: *Explosion of a Motor Car* (1900), dr. Cecil Hepworth (policeman holding up a severed leg). Sourced from *Early Cinema: Primitives and Pioneers* DVD (BFI).
As explained in chapter three, for Siegfried Kracauer, a film-philosopher writing in the early 1920s through to the 1960s, cinema’s ‘representations of movement do cause a stir in deep bodily layers’; ‘the sight of it seems to have a “resonance effect”, provoking in the spectator such kinaesthetic responses as muscular reflexes, motor impulses, or the like’. Kracauer’s focus on haptics is particularly relevant to the experience of viewing moving-vehicle films; as is his discussion of the immersive aspects of cinema: ““In the theater I am always I, [...] but in the cinema I dissolve into all things and beings””. Although Kracauer does not directly refer to phenomenology, his film-philosophy was influenced by phenomenological ideas, and Merleau-Ponty’s concepts provide a useful explication of his theory.

If we employ the concept of Merleau-Pontian flesh, we can explain the bodily effects of cinema as the natural consequences of the reversible and chiasmic intercorporeal relationship between film and spectator. Moving vehicles had physical effects on viewers as they were already, in the Merleau-Pontian sense, part of the viewer’s physicality, part of their flesh. One moment the viewer is a subject, looking at the screen-object (the train or car), then the roles are reversed – the viewer becomes the film’s object, its crash victim. Indeed, this intercorporeal relationship is hinted at in the comments of Kracauer’s ‘perceptive French woman’, in her assertion that subject (‘I’) and object (film) are blurred in the cinema. ‘I’ and film-image are also blurred in Explosion of a Motor Car; viewers are able to watch the car-object exploding, then a reversal of seen-object and seer-subject allows

794 Ibid., p. 159.
795 In particular, Kracauer was influence by Gabriel Marcel (1889–1973), a phenomenological thinker, playwright, musician, and drama and film critic. Marcel is quoted four times in Kracauer’s *Theory of Film*. 260
viewers to identify their own bodies (the ‘flesh of the body’) with the scattered and fragmented falling body-parts (the ‘flesh of the world’).

Erotic films formed another genre of early haptic cinema. According to Arthur Knight and Hollis Alpert, erotic films were shown in brothels ‘to stimulate recalcitrant energies’, as they were known to have a bodily effect on viewers. According to Marco Camerani, ‘Joyce was a diligent attender of brothels, both in Paris and Trieste’ — so he may well have experienced the haptic effects of such films. Joyce’s brother, Stanislaus, attended a ‘serata nera’ (a men only film showing, literally translated as ‘black evening’), which screened images of ‘[g]irls getting into bed, [...] the interior of bathing machines’; ‘a well-formed young woman [...] gyrat[ing] naked’. Even if Joyce never attended one of these nights himself, it is probable that Stanislaus regaled his brother with the sordid details. In the early 1900s, erotic films were also a major attraction in the travelling cinemas. In Trieste, Joyce could have seen various kinds of erotic films at the Cinematografo Zoescope in 1904, the Elettro-bioscopio in 1906, or at the Biofono and Thaumatografo or the Cinematografo Universale in 1907. Significantly, as noted in chapter one, in his only substantial comment on cinema, in his Trieste Notebook, Joyce suggests a link between ‘[p]ornographic and cinematographic images’. Anticipating Kracauer, Joyce asserts that both pornography and films ‘act like those stimuli which produce a reflex action of the

799 Ibid.
nerves’. So whether or not Joyce saw any erotic films, he explicitly made a link between cinema, pornography, and haptics.

The haptic quality of early erotic and movement-focused films is paralleled in ‘Nausicaa’, alongside the aforementioned tactility of stereoscope-viewing. Through a form of incorporeity similar to that which early cinema enabled, Bloom and Gerty come close to experiencing lip-to-lip contact, despite the physical distance between them: Gerty ‘could almost feel him draw her face to his and the first quick hot touch of his handsome lips’ (U 13.707). Regardless of their lack of proximity, Bloom and Gerty (almost) touch each other. Gerty feels ‘a warm flush’, ‘tingling in every nerve’, and ‘kind of a sensation rushing all over her’ (U 13.365, 514, & 560). Bloom is aware of the feelings that he causes in Gerty; he recognises that she feels what he feels. He wonders ‘how she is feeling in that region’ (U 13.997); ‘Daresay she felt I’, he exclaims (U 13.827). Then, in a statement that is almost, but not quite, a chiasmus, Bloom asserts: ‘When you feel like that you often meet what you feel’ (U 13.828).

Although there is no actual physical contact in the encounter, vision involves more than sight; ‘Nausicaa’’s vision is tactile vision. Gerty explains how Bloom’s eyes ‘burned into her’, ‘fixed themselves on her’, and ‘fastened upon her set[ting] her pulses tingling’ (U 13.412, 563-64, & 689-90). Further intercorporeity occurs when Bloom masturbates. As Bloom touches himself, he simultaneously touches Gerty across the distance: ‘his hands and face were working and a tremor went over her’ (U 13. 695-96). Bloom’s and Gerty’s feelings are reciprocal; neither is reduced to an object – they are both simultaneously object-subjects for each other. They experience a reversible relationship; Gerty recognises an ‘answering flash of admiration in [Bloom’s] eyes’, and Bloom notes that there is ‘a kind of

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language’ between them (U 13.513-14 & 944). He learns to ‘see [himself] as others see [him]’, and to ‘[l]ook at [things] other way round’ (U 13.1058 & 1219).

PANORAMAS, PROPRIOEPTION, AND GESTALT PERCEPTION

As well as paralleling the tactility of stereoscope-viewing and the intercorporeal kinaesthetic sensations of early movement-focused and erotic films, Ulysses explores the proprioceptive experience of viewing early panorama films. As noted in my introduction, proprioception is the perception of the body in space, including the perception of bodily balance, position, state, and movement. Panoramas engage the sense of proprioception through their focus on spatiality; early panoramic films (and pre-cinematic panoramas) attempted to create virtual versions of real cities or landscapes by providing all of the different perspectives afforded by traversing the real space. These multiple perspectives challenged the viewer’s sense of proprioception and often caused sensations of dizziness, unsteadiness, and other vestibular disorders. As Tom Gunning notes, panoramas ‘provoked a feeling of being physically overwhelmed, of vertigo’. According to Evelyn Onnes-Fruiterma, panoramas were often intentionally designed ‘to destabilize their viewers, to make them lose their bearings, to destructure the background so that they could be sucked into the vertigo of the image’.

The Oxford English Dictionary defines vertigo as a ‘disordered condition in which the person affected has a sensation of whirling, either of external objects or of himself, and

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801 As noted in my introduction to this chapter, the term ‘vestibular’ is a particular type of proprioceptive sensation which is felt in the ‘semi-circular canals in the inner ear’ and which pertains to the perception of ‘balance, head position, acceleration and deceleration’. See Mark Paterson, The Senses of Touch, p. ix.
tends to lose equilibrium and consciousness’. Sobchack offers a phenomenological explanation of vertigo which provides a useful framework for thinking about both early panoramic films and *Ulysses*. In her analysis of Hitchcock’s 1958 film *Vertigo*, Sobchack suggests that the director ‘constitutes vertigo as the dizziness which emerges when the attention of consciousness and the intention of the body are at odds with each other’; we lose equilibrium and experience the proprioceptive sensation of vertigo when our consciousness focuses its attention on something other than our natural intentional object. In the *Phenomenology of Perception*, Merleau-Ponty defines ‘attention’ as ‘consciousness in the act of learning’; it is ‘a general and unconditioned power’ that ‘strikes up like sparks just those perceptions or ideas capable of providing an answer to the questions which I was asking’. ‘Intention’ (or ‘intentionality’) describes our innate directedness towards a particular object or scene. Intentionality refers to the stance we necessarily and automatically take up in order to perceive a particular object as that object. Unlike attention, intentionality does not answer any questions or change our relationship with the world; it merely describes the instinctive human-world relationship that we already have. Acts of attention occur when our intentional relationship with an object or scene is confused or called into question.

As explained in chapter three, Merleau-Ponty’s concepts of attention and intentionality form part of his Gestalt-inspired theory of perception. ‘Attention’ played a key role in the proto-gestaltist film-psychology of Hugo Münsterberg (1863-1916). However, whereas Münsterberg’s ‘attention’ was a mind-controlled activity, Merleau-Ponty’s

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'attention' is decidedly embodied. As summarised by Sobchack, perception, for Merleau-Ponty, ‘is a gestalt, the organising activity of an embodied intentionality’; our ‘operational choices’ are effected by the ‘attention’ we pay to the world and the ‘grounded figures that we have actively “taken up” and signified without a conscious thought’. It is through acts of intentionality or attention, if needed, that we organise our perceptual field. This makes more sense if we refer back to Merleau-Ponty’s tree example. As noted above, in the *Phenomenology of Perception*, Merleau-Ponty asserts: ‘when I walk along an avenue, I cannot bring myself to see the spaces between the trees as things and the trees themselves as a background’. We cannot bring ourselves to reorganise our phenomenal field, to see the trees as background, as the organisational process occurs automatically through intentionality, attention, or a combination of the two; it does not involve any conscious mental activity.

Merleau-Ponty explicitly draws on gestalt theory in his film essay: ‘Let us say right off that a film is not a sum total of images but a temporal gestalt’. He explains that gestalt psychology is helpful in talking about film viewing as, unlike classical psychology, it does not separate immediate sensation from sense-making: by ‘resolutely rejecting the notion of sensation it teaches us to stop distinguishing between signs and their significance, between what is sensed and what is judged’. In other words, gestalt psychology does not separate the film’s images from the spectator’s experience of those images. Films are experienced – and made sense of – automatically, without any secondary step. As Merleau-Ponty states, a ‘movie is not thought; it is perceived’.

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808 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, p. 263.
810 Ibid., pp. 50-51.
811 Ibid., p. 58.
Gestalt film theory found its most fervent proponent in Rudolf Arnheim (1904-2007). Like Merleau-Ponty, Arnheim argues that we *immediately* see things in a certain way, without performing any additional analysis; in his own words, ‘eyesight is insight’. Arnheim explains that gestalt theory allowed him to see that ‘even the most elementary processes of vision do not produce mechanical recordings of the outer world but organize the sensory raw material creatively’. This creativity is mirrored in both film-making and film-watching. As Scott Higgins explains, according to Arnheim, film-makers ‘do not strictly derive work from reality, but shape an equivalent that is sharper, cleaner, and more meaningful’; given its gestalt processes, film itself can ‘function as an exercise for viewers, helping them to appreciate and focus their perceptual powers’. In this sense, the film is *perceived* by both the film-maker(s) and the viewers. Although both Merleau-Ponty and Arnheim base their thinking on the gestalt ideas of Max Wertheimer (1880-1943), there is one key difference between their theories: for Merleau-Ponty, the automatic gestalt organising is done through the body-subject whereas, for Arnheim, it is carried out by the mind. Just as Münsterberg’s notion of ‘attention’ can be seen as a mind-focused version of Merleau-Ponty’s embodied ‘attention’, Arnheim’s film-philosophy is a more cerebral version of Merleau-Ponty’s film gestalt.

For Arnheim, ‘the *mind* organizes the material of the world’. In contrast, for Merleau-Pontian thinkers, gestalt organisation is an operation of the body-subject. Neither attention nor intention involve reasoning; both occur spontaneously. With the inclusion of

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815 See Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, pp. 16 and 250, and Rudolf Arnheim, *Film as Art*, p. 3.
terms like ‘learning’ and ‘answering’, attention may sound like a more cerebral and cognitive counterpart to intentionality, but both acts are equally bodily; intention is merely more innate and automatic than attention. As Sobchack explains, ‘no matter how attention transcends the viewing subject’s body and is able to locate its visual address in the object, attention is still lived existentially by a concrete and situated body-subject’; ‘the lived-body tethers the motility of attention to its incarnate intentionality’.817

According to Sobchack, film-makers (especially panorama-makers) provoke the act of attention by changing the viewer’s focus (by using one or more cinematic techniques, including the zoom, the close-up, tracking shots, panning shots, aerial and crane shots, and rack focus).818 These attention-provoking cinematic techniques disturb the viewer’s gestalt, (their sense of the film-space), unsettling their haptic sense of proprioception. Local panoramas were particularly popular around the time in which Ulysses is set – the early 1900s. Film-makers would shoot footage of a town and then screen the footage exclusively for people of the same town, providing local pictures, for local people.819 One such film was Mitchell and Kenyon’s Panorama of College Green, Dublin (1902). As film historian Vanessa Toulmin notes, the film reveals ‘a setting that is remarkably similar to […] Ulysses’ (see figures 25 and 26, on page 268).820 The similarity is particularly strong in ‘Wandering Rocks’ which, like a panorama, shows readers the length and breadth of a city (Dublin) in a relatively short amount of reading-time. Although there is no proof that Joyce saw any of Mitchell and Kenyon’s films, we know that he was in Dublin when Panorama of College

818 Ibid., p. 27.
Green was shown in the Round Room concert hall, on Sackville (now O'Connell) Street on 17th January 1902.\textsuperscript{821}

Panorama of College Green disrupts viewers’ gestalt, provokes attention, and causes an unsettling proprioceptive response, in three different ways. Firstly, the film continually cuts between high-up shots – presumably taken from on top of a tram (see figure 25, overleaf) – and eye-level shots, creating a sense of vertigo as our intentional response is bamboozled, provoking our attention to kick in, in order to decide whether to focus up or down or to change focus with the differing camera shots. Secondly, as well as moving from high-up shots to eye-level shots, the film includes several panning shots which, instead of following a smooth pan from left to right, pan right, then back to the left, then to the right again; this exacerbates our sense of dizziness (caused by our attention attempting to focus). Thirdly, the film includes shots of intersecting traffic, with horse-drawn trams crossing diagonally in front of electric trams (see figure 26, overleaf), two-horse carriages moving in front of single-hose carriages, and the occasional bicycle coming into view; this criss-crossing of angles adds to the increasing burden on our attention, intensifying our sense of vertigo.

Figure 25: Panorama of College Green, Dublin (1902), dr. Mitchell and Kenyon – high-up shot. Sourced from Mitchell & Kenyon in Ireland DVD (BFI).

Figure 26: Panorama of College Green, Dublin (1902), dr. Mitchell and Kenyon – horse tram and electric tram. Sourced from Mitchell & Kenyon in Ireland DVD (BFI).
Echoing Mitchell and Kenyon’s vertiginously haptic Dublin panorama, in ‘Wandering Rocks’, Joyce disrupts the reader’s natural gestalt and prompts attention to take over from intention by changing the reader’s focus. Indeed, as Ian Gunn and Mark Wright suggest, it could be argued that the ‘difficulty’ of ‘Wandering Rocks’ is ‘part of the gestalt of the book and the impression of the myriad action rather than its resolution’. 822 Rather than disrupting our gestalt, it could be that Joyce is purposefully creating a vertiginous and complexly interrelated gestalt made up of constantly shifting foreground and background relations. Instead of disrupting/ prompting the reader’s gestalt by mirroring cinematic techniques, Joyce employs literary techniques. The reader’s unfocused state is caused by the episode’s thirty one ‘interpolations’. 823

There are nineteen sections in ‘Wandering Rocks’, each separated by a line of asterisks. The interpolations are short passages that appear to be out of place in the section in which they appear; they are scenes which cannot be made sense of by reading the surrounding lines of text. Some interpolations are flashbacks to a previous section in ‘Wandering Rocks’ or to an earlier episode. For example, the two old women in section thirteen of ‘Wandering Rocks’ – ‘one with a midwife’s bag’ (U 10.820) – were seen earlier, in ‘Proteus’ (U 3.32-4), where Stephen saw them as midwives, by emphasising the metonymic relationship between the midwife-style bag and the old lady carrying it. Other interpolations foreshadow a scene which is developed later on in ‘Wandering Rocks’ or in a subsequent episode, such as the foreshadowing of the characters and motifs of ‘Sirens’ in the interpolation: ‘Bronze by gold, Miss Kennedy’s head by Miss Douce’s head, appeared above

the crossblind of the Ormond hotel’ (U 10.963-64). Whatever their type, as Clive Hart asserts, the interpolations are ‘disparate, juxtaposed, unexplained facts of which the reader must make what he can’.\(^\text{824}\)

As explained above, Merleau-Ponty suggests that when our natural gestalt is upset, when facts are disparate or unexplained – as they are in Joyce’s interpolations – attention automatically comes into play; attention is our spontaneous response to a state of affairs that cannot be understood through intentionality, as it is impossible for our intentional consciousness to know what its intentional object ought to be. When reading ‘Wandering Rocks’ (and most other texts), readers tend to focus on the next word or line; sense is made through the linear progression of connected sentences.\(^\text{825}\) For most ‘Wandering Rocks’ readers then, their intentional object is the subsequent few words in the section that they are currently reading. Joyce’s interpolations unfocus the reader; the linear narrative is disrupted and the reader’s intentional object is called into question. For Merleau-Ponty, when our intentional object is unclear, an act of attention occurs in order to produce ‘perceptions or ideas capable of providing an answer to the questions which I was asking’.

When viewing Panorama of College Green, viewers’ intentional consciousnesses ask: where am I supposed to look, and what am I supposed to focus on? When reading ‘Wandering Rocks’, readers’ intentional consciousnesses ask: why are these lines placed here, and what is their purpose?

The most obvious way for the reader to find the answer(s) to this question is through haptic engagement with the text. In order to make sense of the interpolations, the reader could start by flipping backwards and/ or forwards through the pages of ‘Wandering Rocks’

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\(^\text{825}\) There is disagreement between psychologists as to the exact number of words the average reader takes in during each ‘fixation’. For a thorough discussion of some competing theories see: Keith Rayner and Alexander Pollatsek, The Psychology of Reading, (Abingdon: Routledge, 1994), pp.124-39.
and/or *Ulysses*-as-a-whole in the hope of finding a reference which mirrors the
interpolation currently under investigation. As Merleau-Ponty states, to ‘pay attention is not
merely further to elucidate pre-existing data, it is to bring about a new articulation of them
by taking them as *figures*. 826 By seeing each interpolation as a figure that needs to be
rearticulated through reference to its mirror-figure (to be found somewhere in *Ulysses*),
readers of ‘Wandering Rocks’ can bring ‘to light, through attention, phenomena [mirror-
interpolations] which re-establish the unity of the object [‘Wandering Rocks’] in a new
dimension’. 827 ‘Wandering Rocks’ and *Ulysses* will make more sense once the reader has
linked each interpolation to its sister-interpolation elsewhere in the book. However, in order
to get to this point (this new understanding), the reader must experience a sense of vertigo
which parallels the vertigo experienced by panorama film viewers.

Instead of using some linguistic version of a cinematic device – such as a high-up
shot or a panning shot – to provide a new focus for the reader, Joyce leaves the reader to
his/ her own devices. If the reader flips through the pages of the book in order to find new
meaning, they will gain a panoramic view of *Ulysses*; they will experience the vast world of
Joyce’s novel while attempting to focus their attention on the short mirror-line or mirror-
reference that they are searching for. Just as it was difficult for panorama viewers to take in
the wide perspectives offered, whilst trying to concentrate on specific landmarks or moving
vehicles, it is difficult for the *Ulysses* reader to see both panoramically and in sharp focus.
Their gestalt is constantly shifting as foreground becomes background and *vice versa*.

Like the panorama viewer, the *Ulysses* reader is likely to suffer from some level of
vertigo as their attention (finding mirror-references) conflicts with their intention (their

827 Ibid.
natural propensity for linearly reading whole pages at a time) and their natural sense of proprioception is destabilized. The reader’s physical engagement with the text is also reminiscent of the Mutoscope and stereoscope viewer’s bodily connection with the machine; this literal physical relationship enhances the virtual hapticity of the viewed images, just as the reader’s physical connection with the book heightens the literary vertigo inherent in the text. Paralleling ideas – but not necessarily techniques – already being utilised in early films, in *Ulysses*, Joyce produces Hugo Münsterberg’s hypothesised future cinema; Joyce prompts the reader to ‘move in strange curves’, ‘every motion tak[ing] an uncanny whirling character’, creating ‘unusual sensations which produce a new shading of the emotional background’. 828

**CAMERA-INTENTIONALITY AND PHANTOM RIDES**

As well as having a physical impact on seated views, early film-makers attempted to draw their viewers into the film world. Early cinema was not merely a flat image; films presented a virtual space, a film-world. Sometimes the film-space was more than virtual, such as in *Hale’s Tours* (which projected films of moving countryside in a stationary, yet rocking, train carriage) and their less famous precedents such as *Cinéorama* (which simulated hot air balloon travel in a similar manner at the 1900 Paris Exposition). 829 Mostly, however, early film-spaces were simulated through purely projected means. In order to produce an embodied experience of the film-space, film-makers would attach their cameras to various modes of transport. As noted in chapter one, this method of filming became its

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own genre – the ‘phantom ride’. The genre was so popular that it is likely that Joyce would have come across these types of films at one of his trips to cinema, but there is no evidence to confirm this presumption. Prolific local actuality film producers, Mitchell and Kenyon, made several Irish phantom ride films, including *Ride on a Tramcar through Belfast* (1901) and *Ride from Blarney to Cork on Cork & Muskerry Light Railway* (1902). Even Méliès, who was famous for his surreal trick-films, tried his hand at the ultrarealistic phantom ride genre, creating *Panorama pris d’un train en marche* in 1898. According to the Star Film Catalogue, Méliès’s film was shot from ‘the top of one of the carriages of a moving train, looking straight ahead over the roofs of the other carriages and over the steam engine pulling them’; ‘the viewer travels along a suburban Paris line, under bridges, past assorted buildings and through a station’.830

This trend for creating film-spaces tallies with Bazin’s (arguably) phenomenological theory of cinema, and with Merleau-Pontian theories of film. For Bazin, all types of cinema are spatial. As explained in chapter two, Bazin argues that film is film, rather than a set of images, precisely because, unlike theatre, it creates its own space, its own world in which film-viewers can temporarily live. As Bazin explains, it is not ‘the realism of subject matter or realism of expression but that realism of space without which moving pictures do not constitute cinema’.831 Phantom ride makers put film-space at the forefront of their art. They allowed viewers to experience a particular film-space through creating a ‘second’ or ‘virtual’ film body, seated on-board a tram, train, motorcar, or boat.

This idea of a second body is elaborated by phenomenological film-philosopher Spencer Shaw. As noted in chapter three, proceeding from Merleau-Ponty’s idea that ‘I am

831 André Bazin, *What is Cinema?*, vol. 1, p. 112.
conscious of my body via the world’ and am ‘conscious of the world through the medium of my body’, Shaw argues that ‘the camera eye serves to create images that subsequently become the spectator’s temporary habituation as virtual body’. For Shaw, even though the film-camera is a neutral, body-less, unconscious machine, its captured images can produce an embodied experience in viewers. Echoing Chaplin’s cane and the blind stripling’s stick, the film-camera acts as a kind of prosthesis; it is the viewer’s surrogate body-subject while they watch the film. In fact, the phenomenology of film-viewing is closer to the intentional relationship that Stephen has with his ashplant. As explained in the previous chapter, rather than acting as a prosthetic (fully-incorporated) part of Stephen, the ashplant is a machine-human interface; Stephen and the ashplant share an intentional object.

As already noted, filming, like everyday perception, involves intentionality (of the camera and/or the cinematographer) taking place in a phenomenal field (the film set or filming location). In Sobchack’s words, it is ‘the camera that functions as the bodily agency through which the film’s intentionality can be seen and its actional projects accomplished’. As Merleau-Ponty states, ‘my body itself is a thing which I do not observe’; ‘in order to be able to do so, I should need the use of a second body which itself would be unobservable’. For Shaw and Sobchack, cinema offers this ‘second body’, with which to observe our real body and habits – this is how cinema, in Merleau-Ponty’s words, ‘makes manifest the union of mind and world’.

Joyce’s work contains several examples of this ‘second body’ perspective. Joyce explicitly stated that, in Ulysses, he wanted to present a body which ‘lives in and moves

832 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, p. 82.
833 Spencer Shaw, *Film Consciousness*, p. 56.
through space and is the home of a full personality'. As noted in chapter one, Joyce had already begun to depict embodied and enworlded subjects in his earlier works. In *A Portrait*, Joyce presents a particularly vivid phantom ride. In this passage, the reader’s second body is placed inside the train carriage:

> He saw the darkening lands slipping past him, the silent telegraphpoles passing his window swiftly every four seconds, the little glimmering stations, manned by a few silent sentries, flung by the mail behind her and twinkling for a moment in the darkness like fiery grains flung backwards by a runner (P 73).

This phantom ride is reminiscent of Mitchell and Kenyon’s *Ride from Blarney to Cork on Cork & Muskerry Light Railway* (1902); the film shows stations and railway workers yet, because of the railway’s proximity to the town centre, instead of seeing telegraph poles we see pedestrians, horse-drawn carts, and electric trams.

In *Ulysses* we experience a less traditional phantom ride. In ‘Hades’ the reader’s ‘second body’ rides inside a funeral carriage. Sometimes the reader is Bloom, and sometimes he/ she is another body – Paddy Dignam’s corpse, perhaps. At times the reader watches Bloom: ‘He passed an arm through the armstrap and looked seriously from the open carriagewindow at the lowered blinds of the avenue’ (*U* 6.10-12). At other points, the reader sees what Bloom sees: ‘The blinds of the avenue passed and number nine with its craped knocker, door ajar. [...] Tritonville road. Quicker’ (*U* 6. 26-30).

As well as offering the reader different embodied perspectives, Joyce explores the difference between the lived-body (the body-subject who experiences the haptic and visual experience of a carriage journey) and the inert, dead body who takes up space in the world but does not *engage* with it (Paddy Dignam’s corpse). Martin Cunningham, one of Bloom’s

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fellow carriage passengers, tells the story of a corpse who fell out of the hearse and its coffin onto road. This prompts Bloom to question how human dead bodies really are: ‘Would he bleed if a nail say cut him in the knocking about? He would and he wouldn’t, I suppose. Depends on where. The circulation stops. Still might ooze out of an artery’ (U 6.432-4, my italics). Paddy Dignam’s (imagined) body loses its subjectivity and humanness as Bloom’s thoughts progress. As my italics highlight, (the imagined) Dignam quickly moves from being ‘he’ to being ‘the’ or ‘an’. To emphasise the point, the hearse that passes by just as Bloom concludes his train of thought is more alive – more of a body-subject – than the body it has just deposited: ‘An empty hearse trotted by, coming from the cemetery: looks relieved’ (U 6.436-7). In contrast to the corpse (which has lost all of its human attributes), the hearse, itself, takes on the characteristics of the horses that pull it and the driver who operates it.

In the first section of ‘Wandering Rocks’, instead of riding in the carriage with the viceroy, readers ride alongside Father Conmee as he travels through the streets of Dublin, on foot then in a tram. We do not perceive Dublin directly through Father Conmee; his experience of Dublin is not presented in the first person. Instead, readers experience what Father Conmee experiences but through third person narrative. The reader is positioned near Father Conmee; he is the centre of the action and the Dublin we experience is his phenomenal field. Readers see Dublin focalised through Father Conmee. He is ‘saluted by Mr William Gallagher’ (U 10.86); the onelegged sailor walks ‘towards the very reverend John Conmee S. J.’ (U 10.9-10, my italics), and ‘towards him came the wife of Mr David Sheehy’ (U 10.17, my italics). We follow Conmee’s path and gaze – ‘Father Conmee walked down Great Charles street and glanced at the shut up church on his left’ (U 10.68-9) – but his body is never quite our own; he is our second body, rather than our only body. Similarly, when
watching films, we can experience the intentionality and phenomenal field of the on-screen body-subjects, but we are still aware of our own bodies, seated in front of the screen.

As explained below, the later sections of ‘Wandering Rocks’ depart from Father Conmee and offer the reader a variety of interlacing perspectives on Dublin. However, elsewhere in *Ulysses*, Joyce continues his individual body-subject focalisation. In ‘Lotus Eaters’ the reader is presented with a Bloom’s-eye view of the city through a mixture of third person narrative – ‘Bloom gazed across the road’ (*U* 5.98) – and images that we appear to see as Bloom sees them, possibly through Bloom’s eyes: ‘Silk flash rich stockings white. Watch!’ (*U* 5.130); ‘Flicker, flicker: the laceflare of her hat in the sun: flicker, flick’ (*U* 5.139-40). As Mullin notes, these images recall ‘the wavering of a film reel’. The images also recall the erotics of the ‘Nausicaa’ episode. However, unlike in ‘Nausicaa’, in ‘Lotus Eaters’ Bloom’s visual relationship with the women does not progress into a haptic encounter; although she ‘[s]ees [him] looking’, Bloom ‘[f]eels locked out’ of the possible encounter when a tram obscures his view (*U* 5.119 & 132). Once the tram has gone by the reader/Bloom briefly catch sight of the women again, but the moment has passed.

As noted above, early on, film cameras were fitted with mobile heads, allowing them to pivot, pan, and change focus. This mobility enabled film-makers to parallel the human body-subject’s capacity for kinesis and quick changes of focus. These aspects of embodied perception are foregrounded in ‘Lestrygonians’. As with Bloom’s ‘Watch! Watch!’ cry in ‘Lotus Eaters’, in ‘Lestrygonians’, Joyce guides the reader’s focus through interior monologue and direct speech – he dictates the reader’s intentional objects: ‘See that?’ (*U* 8.76); ‘See the eye that woman gave her, passing’ (*U* 8.269); ‘Watch him, Mr Bloom said. He always walks outside the lampposts. Watch!’ (*U* 8.299-300); ‘Watch him! Out he goes again’

‘There he is: [...] Look at the woebegone walk of him’ (U 8.502-8); ‘Look at his mouth (U 8.768). As well as directly dictating the reader’s focus, Joyce also indirectly guides them. Just as we follow Father Conmee’s gaze in ‘Wandering Rocks’, in ‘Lestrygonians’ we follow Bloom’s line of vision: ‘His gaze passed over the glazed apples’ – ‘Shiny peels’ (U 8.70-71); ‘His eyes sought answer from the river’ (U 8.88); ‘Mr Bloom walked on again easily, seeing ahead of him in sunlight the tight skullpiece’ (U 8.315-16); ‘He gazed after the last broad tunic’ (U 8.419); ‘His eyes followed the high figure in homespun, beard and bicycle’ (U 8.532); ‘He gazed round the stooled and tabled eaters’ (U 8.678); ‘He raised his eyes and met the stare of a bilious clock’ (U 8.790); ‘His downcast eyes followed the silent veining of the oaken slab’ (U 8.919). Thus, Bloom’s intentional objects are the reader’s intentional objects, echoing the ‘second’ bodies of early film spectatorship.

SEE OURSELVES AS OTHERS SEE US

As well as providing readers with ‘second’ bodies with which to explore Dublin, Joyce encourages an intersubjective, engaged, and enworlded way of seeing. This way of seeing parallels the viewing experience of ‘local actuality’ film viewers. My definition of local actualities is in concurrence with Stephen Bottomore’s; he defines actuality films ‘as “local” only if there is considerable overlap between the people appearing in the film and those who watch it’. Local actualities – particularly the factory and church leaving genre – were big money-makers; travelling film-makers relied on them to keep their businesses afloat.

As the prolific travelling film-makers Mitchell and Kenyon recognised, ‘nothing is so great a

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840 Vanessa Toulmin, “‘We take them and make them’: Mitchell and Kenyon and the Travelling Exhibition Showmen”, in The Lost World of Mitchell and Kenyon, in The Lost World of Mitchell and Kenyon, p. 60.
Whereas panoramas and phantom rides may happen to include local people, genres such as factory gate films and church leaving films specifically focused on capturing as many local faces on film as possible; for the audience, the chance of seeing oneself on film was very high.

The exhibition of Mitchell and Kenyon’s *Living Dublin* local actuality films coincided with Joyce’s brief return to Dublin during his first stay in Paris. Joyce arrived in Dublin on 23rd December 1902 and returned to Paris on 23rd January 1903 (*JJ* 116 & 120), and the *Living Dublin* exhibition ran from 22nd December 1902 to 10th January 1903.\footnote{Mitchell and Kenyon advertisement in *The Showmen*, throughout December 1900.} Even if Joyce missed seeing the *Living Dublin* films, it is likely that he would have seen Italian local actualities in one of Trieste’s cinemas. All across Europe there were travelling film-makers, like Mitchell and Kenyon, producing local films for local people. As Lee A. Jacobus notes, in ‘September of 1904 a group of Italians led by Egisto Origoni founded *La Società degli spettacoli viaggianti*, a society to promote the interests of showmen who took their cinema on the road: wandering cineastes’; ‘[t]hese wanderers numbered thirty-four in 1905 and fifty-seven by 1907’.\footnote{Lee A. Jacobus, ‘Bring the Camera Whenever You Like: “Wandering Rocks”, Cinema Ambulante, and Problems of Diegesis’, in *Images of Joyce*, vol. 2, ed. Clive Hart et. al., (Buckinghamshire: Colin Smythe, 1998), 526-538, p. 528.} It is also possible that Joyce could have seen actuality films whilst in Rome in 1906.\footnote{Joyce resided in Rome from July to March 1906. See Ellmann, *James Joyce*, pp. 212-223, for details of his stay.} During the same year film-maker Filoteo Alberini produced and exhibited several Roman local actuality films, including *La Merca del Bestiame nell’Agro Romano* (*The Roman Cattle Market*), *Inaugurazione degli Omnibus-Automobili, Roma* (*The Inauguration of...*
Trotter argues that local actuality films, such as Mitchell and Kenyon’s *Living Dublin* series, ‘exemplify Christian Metz’s observation that in cinema the self-dramatising participant and the viewer-voyeur are condemned to perpetually “miss” one another’; such films aim to produce a ‘dialogic relation’, or recognition, between the viewer and the scene, but they always inevitably fail. They fail because film-makers can never ‘conceal completely the lapse in time and space between the image’s capture and its reproduction on the screen’: the viewer can never fully retrieve, or re-live, the human consciousness behind the mechanical film-camera that originally captured the scene. Trotter insists that, in ‘Wandering Rocks’, Joyce emulates the failure of actuality films (missed or absent recognition), rather than their intended goal (successful recognition).

My phenomenologically informed reading contrasts with this view of local actualities; for me, films like the *Living Dublin* series succeeded in producing phenomenological recognition and *Ulysses* emulates this success. Local actuality films enabled viewers to reassess their ordinary views on subjectivity and the Other. As well as recognising others as fellow subjects, viewers are able to see their screen-selves as visible objects whilst simultaneously recognising those screen-selves as viewing subjects. This recognition leads to the further recognition that they – the viewing subjects – must also be visible objects for other viewers. And the other viewers must also be viewing subjects. As Merleau-Ponty explains, when watching films, we ‘sense the coexistence, the simultaneity

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846 David Trotter, *Cinema and Modernism*, p. 96
847 Ibid.
of lives in the same world, the actors as they are for us and for themselves’. In local actualities the actors are also the viewers. So there is likely to have been a significant overlap between the film protagonists and the film viewers. If viewers are watching themselves on the screen, it is easier for them to feel a connection between the screen actors (or on-screen selves) and themselves (or off-screen selves).

As Merleau-Ponty states, ‘everyone recognizes [...] his own walk when it is filmed.’ Films featuring ourselves present a ‘visual representation of what is invisible to us in our own body’; ‘[e]ach of us sees himself as it were through an inner eye which from a few yards away is looking at us.’ When watching local actuality films viewers learn the same lesson that Bloom learns in ‘Nausicaa’: nothing is fixed as either a subject or an object. As Merleau-Ponty states, ‘each visible is prevented from being an object and from acquiring the self-identical positivity that defines the object’. Just as in ‘Nausicaa’ (and ‘Lestrygonians’), we ‘see ourselves as others see us’ (U 13.1058 & 8.662). Joyce’s phrase – ‘see ourselves as others see us’ – is usually attributed to Robert Burns’ ‘To a Louse’: ‘O wad some Power the giftie gie us | To see oursel as ither see us!’. However, the same phrase was appropriated by Mitchell and Kenyon and other local actuality producers. Indeed, as an advertising clerk interested in popular culture, Joyce’s Bloom is more likely to have encountered the phrase on film advertising materials than in a book of poetry.

Mitchell and Kenyon’s Living Dublin posters declared: ‘come and see yourselves on screen’. And their poster for Llandudno May Day (1907) stated: ‘don’t fail to come and

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849 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, p. 149.
850 Ibid.
851 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Visible and Invisible, p. 123.
853 Vanessa Toulmin, booklet, p. 3.
see yourself as others see you’. The advertisements for the ever first Dublin local actualities, produced by Professor Joly’s cinématographe in 1897, also used a derivation of the phrase ‘see yourselves as others see you’, as did the ‘Empire Pictures’ advertisement shown in my introduction (see figure 1, on page 6). As well as featuring in advertising campaigns, this idea of ‘seeing yourselves as others see you’ permeated film reviews. Early film showman Edwin Lawrence wrote that his audiences loved actuality films precisely because they allowed them to ‘see themselves as others saw them’. According to one Mitchell and Kenyon film-review, there were many ‘shouts of recognition’ from the audience. Derivatives of the phrase, ‘see ourselves as others see us’, are also employed by Merleau-Ponty: when ‘I see myself as others see me’, I am able to learn more about myself and about the other. So Joyce’s phrase alludes – either intentionally or unintentionally – to local actualities and to a phenomenological understanding of self and others.

The opportunity to ‘recognise yourselves’, was a major selling point for local actuality films, as shown in the 1903 advertisement below, for a film of the Dublin “Juverna” Bazaar (see figure 27, overleaf).

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As mentioned above, church-leaving films offered a particularly good opportunity for recognising oneself and familiar others on screen. Mitchell and Kenyon’s *Congregation Leaving Jesuit Church of St Francis Xavier* (1902) is a typical ‘church-leaving’ film. The congregation’s faces appear in close-up, making it even easier for viewers to recognise themselves and fellow Dubliners. In Mitchell and Kenyon’s Dublin church-leaving film there is a poster advertising a sermon by Reverend J. Conmee, S. J., just about discernible through the crowd of people (see figure 28, below). As mentioned above, Father Conmee was a real-life Dubliner, as well as being is a key figure in ‘Wandering Rocks’.
Although ‘Wandering Rocks’ includes real-life personages (such as Father Conmee), twenty-first-century Dubliners will never be able to – literally – recognise themselves in the text; they may be able to recognise their ancestors, of course. Within the episode itself, however, there are multiple instances of self-recognition, the recognition of others, and seeing oneself as others see one. As well as seeing themselves onscreen, local actuality viewers were keen to spot familiar faces, such as neighbours, work colleagues, friends, and fellow congregation members. As Sobchack explains in a relevant essay on home movies, when we watch films that feature ourselves or recognisable others, we look through rather than at the images on the screen: ‘the images ‘are not apprehended for themselves, but rather as the catalyst to a primarily constitutive and generalizing activity that transcends their specificity in an attempt to call up [...] the “real” and “whole” person’.

In other words, we do not merely see screen images as representations; we, gradually, piece them together into a recognisable whole, into the real person that they are reflecting. Echoing this cinematic phenomenon, readers may or may not recognise the ‘generous white arm’ as Molly Bloom (U 10.222 & 251); the identification is confirmed later on, in ‘Penelope’ (U 18.346). Readers may also fail to immediately guess the identity of the ‘darkbacked figure’ (U 10.315); Lenehan recognises him as Bloom a couple of pages later (U 10.520-22). Again, Joyce presents readers with a gestalt which needs to be perceived, rather than disparate images that, through addition, make up a whole.

Within ‘Wandering Rocks’ the act of seeing oneself is explored through several references to mirrors and reflections. In section eleven, the auction room lacquey views ‘himself in the chalked mirror of the cabinet’ (U 10.643). This act of seeing oneself prompts

two acts of seeing as *others* see. Mr Dedalus tells Dilly to stand up straight or she will ‘get curvature of the spine’ then, to support his directive, entreats her to recognise her bad posture, to see herself as he sees her: ‘Do you know what you look like?’ asks Mr Dedalus rhetorically, before impersonating Dilly by ‘hunching his shoulders’ (*U* 10.662-65). An embarrassed Dilly then reflects this act of seeing oneself back at her father: ‘All the people are looking at you’ (*U* 10.666). In section thirteen, Stephen (Mr Dedalus’s son and Dilly’s brother) considers how others see him in relation to his sister: ‘My eyes they say she has. Do others see me so?’ (*U* 10.865). Paralleling the perceptual situation of local actuality viewing, through mirroring and attentiveness to seeing and being, Dilly, Mr Dedalus, and Stephen see themselves – or attempt to see themselves – as others see them. Providing a phenomenological gloss on this cinematic way of seeing, Merleau-Ponty argues that ‘the other’s body which I see’ presents ‘to me in [its] own fashion what I will never be present to’; the other is ‘a mirror of me as I am of him’. [860]

Further mirroring and reflecting occurs in section twelve of ‘Wandering Rocks’ when Mr Kernan preens himself ‘before the sloping mirror of Peter Kennedy, hairdresser’ (*U* 10.742-3). He seems to see himself as other, or at least as having a role to play, rather than as a fully formed coherent self: ‘John Mulligan, the manager of the Hibernian bank, gave me a very sharp eye yesterday’; ‘[m]ust dress the character for those fellows’ (*U* 10.756-8). How Mr Kernan sees himself depends on context and on how he imagines others to expect to – or want to – see him. After glancing in ‘farewell to his image’, Mr Kernan visualises himself as a ‘Returned Indian Officer’ (*U* 10.755). It is unclear why Mr Kernan sees himself in this way; according to Gifford however, an ‘army officer who had done a tour of duty in India

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was popularly supposed to be recognizable from his sunburned face. We do not know if Mr Kernan is sunburnt but, if we read on for a couple of lines, we discover that Mr Kernan misrecognises (or fails to identify) Sam Lambert due to the sun’s glare (rather than the sun’s effects on the skin, as is supposed to be the case with Indian officers): ‘Is that Ned Lambert’s brother over the way, Sam? What? Yes. He’s as like as damn it. No. The windscreen of the motorcar in the sun there. Just a flash like that’ (U 10.757-9). As in the lines above, in the these lines, emphasis is placed on recognition and identity; Joyce questions the extent to which are we defined by how we see ourselves, how we want to be seen, or by how others see – or think they see – us. Just as early-1900s Dubliners looked through the images on the screen to their mental images of the familiar local protagonists, Mr Kernan looks past the sun’s glare to see someone who is ‘as like it as damn it’ Sam Lambert.862

Once again echoing the conditions of local actuality film spectatorship, in the penultimate section of ‘Wandering Rocks’, whilst looking into a three-way mirror, Master Dignam looks both through and at the images he sees; he recognises himself as both self and other, both viewing subject and viewed object:

From the sidemirrors two mourning Masters Dignam gaped silently. [...] Master Dignam on his left turned as he turned. That’s me in mourning. [...] He turned to the right and on his right Master Dignam turned, his cap awry, his collar sticking up. Buttoning it down, his chin lifted, he saw the image of Marie Kendall, charming soubrette (U 10.1132-33, 1137-42, my italics)

It is difficult to tell to which of Master Dignam’s selves the various pronouns refer. Master Dignam recognises himself in the mirror just as viewers recognise themselves on screen: ‘[t]hat’s me’, Dignam declares. A speaker uses the word ‘me’ to talk about his or her

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861 Don Gifford and Robert J. Seidman, Ulysses Annotated, p. 274.
862 Ibid.
self (his or her ‘I’) from a place outside his or herself. In using the objective pronoun ‘me’, Master Dignam objectifies himself; he recognises himself as an object – he see himself as others see him. However, at one point in the passage the mirror-version of Master Dignam appears as Other; the reflection is neither ‘me’ nor ‘I’. The reflection turns independently: ‘on his right Master Dignam turned, his cap awry, his collar sticking up’. At another point Master Dignam’s reflection turns ‘as’ Master Dignam turns but, due to the ambiguity of Joyce’s words, the reader cannot with any certainty state that the reflection is mirroring Master Dignam; the left-hand side Master Dignam could be turning of his own accord (he could be his own agent with his own ‘I’).

This three-way mimesis brings us back to Bazin and his ideas on imitation. These mimetic copies of Master Dignam are spatial rather than temporal; Dignam’s subjectivity inhabits them all simultaneously – he becomes them and they become him, but never completely. This form of mimesis is more complex than Chaplin becoming the tree in Shoulder to Arms; here there are multiple Master Dignams, multiple ‘trees’, as it were. In order to explicate this complex articulation of mimetic subjectivities it is worth returning to Gosetti-Ferencei’s phenomenological theory of modernist mimesis. As explained in chapter two, Gosetti-Ferencei focuses on Andy Warhol’s Brillo Box (1964), ‘a true-to-scale structure made of wood and paint, indistinguishable from a box that would contain a well-known kitchen cleaning implement made of steel wool and soap’. For Gosetti-Ferencei, Brillo Box ‘highlights mimesis as a problem of subjectivity’; the realisation that real-looking trompe l’oeil art objects ‘are merely representations of objects […] parallels and enables a phenomenological reflection’. The Brillo Box ‘challenges the viewing subject’s sense of familiarity with and control of the representational field’; its ‘[m]imesis challenges the

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864 Ibid.
viewing consciousness, alienated from its quotidian familiarity with the appearance of ordinary objects. The mimetic nature of Warhol’s *Brillo Box* causes the observer to reassess the nature of perception; observers are forced to step outside of the ordinary perceptual stance in order to see the box afresh. This is a highly phenomenological reflection, as observers are forced to perceive pre-consciously, to view *Brillo Box* non-rationally, without any preconceived ideas.

By presenting Master Dignam in three-way mimesis, Joyce prompts his reader to engage in the phenomenological reflection described by Gosetti-Ferencei. In order to recognise the simultaneous otherness and selfness of the mirror images (the fact they, despite mimicking him, are not actually *him*), Master Dignam needs to view the mirror images from a pre-conscious position; he finds himself needing to employ pronouns such as ‘he’ in reference to his reflected image. This problem of subjectivity and identification is paralleled in local actuality film spectatorship. In seeing themselves onscreen, viewers are forced to resituate themselves, to reassess their position: are they onscreen, or are they sitting in the audience? Like Dignam (when faced with his mirror images), local actuality viewers must see pre-consciously; they must automatically reassess their ordinary views.

Dignam’s mirrorings and the *Living Dublin* film shows are actually a step beyond the *Brillo Box* example. When looking at the *Brillo Box*, observers are provoked into automatically reassessing the box’s relation to an actual Brillo box; when watching films of themselves, however, viewers are also prompted to pre-consciously reflect on the status of ‘self’ and ‘other’, as well as ‘actual’ and ‘copy’. Once again, viewers (and Joyce’s readers) must learn to ‘see ourselves as others see us’ (*U 13.1058 & 8.662*).

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CONCLUSION: FROM SPECTATORSHIP TO READERSHIP

As I have shown, *Ulysses*’s proto-phenomenological haptics, spatiality, and self/other intermingling *parallel* early cinema. However, Joyce does not merely *copy* cinematic devices. Although, as has been shown, Joyce was familiar with early film’s techniques, he creates these cinematic and pre-cinematic parallels through innovative *literary* means.

In ‘Nausicaa’, readers are presented with stereoscopic images of Gerty’s body which emulate Mutoscope stereoview pictures. However, the reader experiences stereoscopic seeing through Joyce’s *textual* depictions of Gerty’s curves, as seen by Bloom; Joyce does not attempt to create a literary analogy for this visual phenomenon. Similarly, it is ‘Proteus’’s tactile focus and stereoscope references which mark it as a stereoscopic episode. ‘Cyclops’ is stereoscopic in the sense that the drinkers’ doubly monopic rhetoric finds a fitting metaphor in the opposing photographs on stereoview cards, while Bloom’s more balanced view is metaphorically captured in the resulting ‘cyclopean image’. ‘Wandering Rocks’ is panoramic in the sense that it shows Dublin from multiple perspectives, but Joyce uses *literary*, not filmic, techniques to create this vertiginous panoramic effect. Readers cannot experience the physical vertigo of panorama-viewing by reading a linear description of Dublin; instead, Joyce provokes dizziness and disordered proprioception by encouraging the reader to physically engage with the text, to touch multiple pages and lines of ink, and to form their own gestalt image. While Joyce cannot parallel the mimesis of local actualities by showing readers *themselves*, he can (and does) depict others seeing themselves being seen, or others seeing themselves as others see them. Equally, Joyce cannot simulate the actual physical experience of moving through Dublin; instead, echoing the *philosophy* behind, rather than the *techniques* of, early cinema, Joyce gives us second bodies with which to see (and feel) the sights.
CONCLUSION

SOUNDING OUT

James Joyce’s brother, Stanislaus, was not a fan of cinema; in June 1907, he wrote the following lines in his diary:

I call cinematographs the greatest sign of American corruption. Trieste is full of them, and they are full to overflowing half a dozen times a night with people who come to see what they have seen over and over again.  

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As I have shown in this thesis, James Joyce had a far more positive relationship with cinema than his brother appears to have had. Rather than being a corrupting influence, cinema reflected Joyce’s own literary goals – the desire to enable us to see ourselves as others see us and to present a body which ‘lives in and moves through space and is the home of a full personality’.  

867 The achievement of these goals did not entail naturalism. Instead, both Joyce and the film-makers that I have discussed used whatever techniques and modes they found necessary to present engaging perspectives on what they showed. Thus, when Stanislaus complains that film-viewers ‘come to see what they have seen over and over again’, he misses the point; the power of early cinema lay in its ability to present and prompt particular ways of seeing. It did not always matter exactly what was being seen; the way in which things were seen and shown was often paramount. This point is powerfully made in Chaplin’s 1931 film, City Lights.

Although *City Lights* (1931) was made four years after the first sound film were released, Chaplin chose to make the film silent. The feature-length film tells the story of a Tramp (Chaplin) who falls in love with a blind flower-seller who mistakenly thinks that Chaplin is a millionaire. After managing to raise enough money to pay for an operation to restore the flower-seller’s sight, Chaplin is not recognised by his newly-sighted sweetheart. It is only when the flower-seller touches Chaplin’s hand that she finally sees him as her philanthropic ‘millionaire’. As they fondle each other’s hands, the following intertitles are shown (sees figure 29, below).

![Figure 29: Stills taken from City Lights (1931), dr. Charlie Chaplin. Sourced from YouTube: <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lGm1HcKO0Cs>, [accessed August 2012>](http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lGm1HcKO0Cs), [accessed August 2012].](http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lGm1HcKO0Cs)

Echoing the affirmative last lines of *Ulysses* (‘yes I said yes I will Yes’, *U* 18.1608-1609), these final intertitles convey an enhanced perspective on things, achieved through tactile contact, rather than standard vision. Indeed, it is a *haptic* (and to a lesser extent, *olfactive*), rather than an *optic*, memory that prompts Molly’s climactic exclamation in ‘Penelope’:

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868 There is much debate surrounding the birth of sound film. *The Jazz Singer* (1927) is often touted as the first talkie; it was certainly the first popular Hollywood sound film, but it was not the first film to include the spoken word. However, as Donald Crafton notes, ‘by 1931 sound production had been standardized’. Donald Crafton, *The Talkies: American Cinema’s Transition to Sound, 1926-1931*, (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1999), p. 4.
I put my arms around him yes and drew him down to me so he could feel my breasts all perfume yes and his heart was going like mad and yes I said yes I will Yes. (U 18.1606-1609)

It is interesting that Chaplin, like Joyce, presents his affirmation of haptic seeing through (silent) written words. Here Chaplin, possibly unintentionally, suggests that literature may be better able to carry on the projects of early cinema than the new ‘talkies’.

Chaplin’s positive view of silent cinema is mirrored in film criticism of the late 1920s and early 1930s, particularly in the journal Close Up. As Laura Marcus notes, for Close Up writer and novelist Dorothy Richardson ‘sound was a mechanical intrusion into the medium, and a mechanism too far’; sound made cinema less human and more machine-like.869 In the September 1929 issue of Close Up, commenting on the coming of film sound, Richardson writes: ‘Apparatus rampant: the theatre, ourselves, the screen, the mechanisms, all fallen apart into competitive singleness’.870 Instead of adding another synaesthetic level to film, the imposition of sound reduced cinema to a collection of mechanisms.

A close examination of the debates that sound film occasioned in film criticism and literature of the period would be an instructive adjunct to this thesis. Although there is no space to begin such an endeavour here, it is worth (briefly) noting some promising avenues for further research. As well as glorifying the silence of film, Richardson praises film’s interactivity; prefiguring Bazin, she favours film over theatre as, in plays, actors act ‘at instead of with the audience, […] destroying the inner relationship between audience and players’.871 This ‘inner relationship’ is also praised by Bryher, the editor of Close Up: it ‘is

869 Laura Marcus, The Tenth Muse, p. 405.
870 Dorothy Richardson quoted in Laura Marcus, The Tenth Muse, p. 405.
really a question of what you, the spectator, are willing to do for the screen, for the cinema is an active, not a passive art’. Gertrude Stein’s first Close Up publication, a prose piece entitled ‘Mrs Emerson’, also addresses issues of film spectatorship, in a more abstract manner; she hints at the cinema (‘new houses’ without windows, and ‘kindly amazing lights’) and considers different forms of seeing: ‘I cannot see’; ‘I cannot see besides always’; ‘I thought that I would state that I knew certainly that she was so seen that if her eyes were so placed no violently not verbally so placed’. There is a great deal to unpick in these few lines, but it is clear that Stein is thinking through ideas of cinematic perception and representation, and the ways in which things can be shown and felt ‘not verbally’ but silently. Like Joyce, as well as favouring the bodily language of gesture, modernist women writers of the late 1920s and early 1930s were interested in the intersubjectivity of film and film’s relationship with its spectators.

Whilst Joyce’s direct interaction with phenomenology does not seem to have gone much further than reading some Bergson and attending a Gabriel Marcel lecture, Gertrude Stein studied with two prominent proto-Merleau-Pontian thinkers – William James and Hugo Münsterberg. Richardson was also impressed by the work of William James, and the proto-Merleau-Pontian Henri Bergson. Bryher does not appear to have had any direct links to phenomenology, but she was a devotee of psychoanalysis: she was psychoanalysed by Hanns Sachs and was one of the first subscribers to the British Journal of

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872 Bryher, Film Problems of Soviet Russia, (Territet: POOL, 1929), p. 132.
Psychoanalysis. It would certainly be illuminating to compare Joyce’s relationship with cinema and phenomenology to that of modernist writers who were more directly involved with film criticism and phenomenology-related philosophy and psychology.

An analysis of Joyce’s *Finnegans Wake* (1939) in the context of the emergence of sound film would also make for an enlightening study. In an attempt to make sense(s) of the *Wake*’s complex portmanteau words, scholars often find themselves sounding out various combinations of letters; they add sound to Joyce’s silent words. A preliminary look at *Finnegans Wake* reveals several possible references to both sound and silent films. Towards the end of ‘Part III’, talkies are wholeheartedly endorsed: ‘Vouchsafe me more soundpicture!’ (*FW* 570). And ‘Part I’ includes a reference to Movietone, one of the first commercial cinema sound systems: ‘(if you are looking for the bilder deep your ear on the movietone!’ (*FW* 62). The first original sound film to premiere using Movietone was F. W. Murnau’s *Sunrise* (1927). From late 1927 onwards, the Movietone system was also utilised in the production of the daily Fox newsreel, or ‘newseryreel’ as Joyce terms it (*FW* 489).

In ‘Part II’ of *Finnegans Wake*, there is a hint of nostalgia for the old silent newsreels: ‘Fin. Like the newcasters in their old plyable of A Royenne Devours. Jazzaphoney and Mirillovis and Nippy she nets best’ (*FW* 388). The ‘Fin’ (which is reminiscent of French ending intertitles) coupled with the ‘old’ ‘newcasters’ (newscasters) brings to mind Pathé, the leading newsreel producers up until The Fox News Service started using sound. The pun on ‘phoney’, meaning insincere or fake, and *phony*, meaning sound (as in symphony), suggests a certain ambivalence towards sound film. The ‘Jazz’ in ‘Jazzaphoney’ could well be

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877 Donald Crafton, *The Talkies*, p. 94.
878 Ibid., p. 96.
a reference to *The Jazz Singer* (1927), one of the first popular talkies.\(^\text{879}\) Earlier, in ‘Part I’, cinema is applauded, yet there is, once again, a hint of wistful longing for the silent films – the ‘mimine’ (mime) films of ‘youyouth’: ‘thank Movies from the innermost depths of my still attrite heart, Wherein the days of youyouth are evermixed mimine’ (*FW* 194).

Indeed, it is the gestural aspect of silent cinema – the mime/ ‘mimine’ – that is most lamented in *Finnegans Wake*, mirroring the celebration of gestures as the ‘universal language’ in *Ulysses* (*U* 15.106). In *Finnegans Wake*, ‘silence speaks the scene’ but, while humans must make do with pantomime, God speaks through (comic) gestures: ‘Mere man’s mime: God has jest’ (*FW* 13 and 486). Chaplin, the great master of gesture, gets a brief mention; while *Ulysses* parallels Chaplin’s embodied language, *Finnegans Wake* alludes to the very physical experience of watching a Chaplin film: ‘at the movies swallowing sobs and blowing bixed mixcuits over “childe” chaplain’s “latest”’ (*FW* 166). The bodily nature of film spectatorship is explored further in a rather long and complex passage in ‘Part III’:

> Whervolk dorst ttou begin to tremble by our moving pictures at this moment when I am to place my hand of our true friend-shapes upon thee knee to mark well what I say? [...] You are trem-blotting, you retchad, like a verry jerry! [...] To feel, you? Yes, how it trembles, the timid! [...] Or doth brainskin flinchgreef? Stemming! What boyazhness! Sole shadow shows. Tis jest jibberweek’s joke. It must have stole. O, keve silence, both! Putshameyu! I have heard her voice some-where else’s before me in these ears still that now are for mine. [...] You were dreamend, dear. [...] Hear are no phanthares in the room at all (*FW* 565)

The above passage contains several references to the haptic effects of cinema discussed in chapters three and five of this thesis: the spectator begins ‘to tremble by our moving pictures’, they ‘are trem-blotting’ and have even almost vomited (‘retchad’). Joyce questions how these haptic effects work; are the effects bodily (‘skin’), cerebral (‘brain’), or

\(^{879}\) Donald Crafton, *The Talkies*, p. 525.
a combination of the two: ‘doth brainskin flinchgreef?’. Are the effects ‘Stemming’ from serious drama or physical comedy: the ‘sole [soul] shadow shows’ or the ‘jest [gesturing] jibberweek’s joke’? At the end of the passage, we return to the question of sound: ‘silence, both! [...] I have heard her voice some-where else’s before me in these ears still that now are for mine’. It is unclear whether the sound is part of the film or whether it is imagined: You were dreamend, dear. [...] Hear are no phanthares in the room at all’. Note the pun on ‘Hear’/ here.

In another of the *Wake*’s references to film, Joyce’s alludes to Bergson’s theory of *élan vital* (or the *vital impetus* of all life) in relation to cinema:

> Shadows by the film folk, masses by the good people. Promptings by Elanio Vitale. Longshots, upcloses, outblacks and stagetolets by Hexenschuss, Coachmaher, Incubone and Rock-narrag (*FW* 221)

Here, Joyce fittingly casts *élan vital* (‘Elanio Vitale’) as the main impetus – the prompter – behind the film action. As I noted in chapter three, Joyce’s Trieste library contained two of Bergson’s works: *L’évolution créatrice* [*Creative Evolution*] (1914) and *The Meaning of the War: Life & Matter in Conflict* (1915). Bergson’s theory of *élan vital* is propounded in the first of these books – *Creative Evolution*.

To end, I return to *Ulysses*, to sound out some ideas on this earlier work’s relationship to talkies. As *Ulysses* was published in 1922 (five years before the first talkies were made), sound film cannot have had a direct impact upon the book. However, *Ulysses*’s relationship with cinema did not end with its first publication. As I noted in chapter one, there have been several film versions of *Ulysses*. The film that I am going to end with was never actually made, but Joyce read through the screenplay and, in general, was positive

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about it. The screenplay was written in 1935 by objectivist poets, Louis Zukofsky and Jerry Reisman. The film was to be a talkie, using direct speech and one voice-over, in ‘Penelope’.

The adaptation is fairly faithful, except for several episodes being drastically condensed (‘Ithaca’) or cut completely (‘Scylla and Charybdis’ and ‘Oxen of the Sun’). ‘Ithaca’ is reduced to a brief chat between Bloom and Stephen; there is no joint urination or intertwining of flesh in ‘Stoom’ and ‘Blephen’. And gone are the newspaper headlines from ‘Aeolus’. ‘Wandering Rocks’ appears to have been rendered particularly well, however. As Keith Williams notes, the Reisman-Zukofsky script foregrounds ‘Dublin as a “principal character” in its own right’, using ‘cross-cut for effects of simultaneity through Stephen and Bloom’s urban milieu’. It seems that Reisman and Zukofsky were keen to recreate some of the embodied and proprioceptive effects that I discussed in chapter five.

Reisman and Zukofsky’s rendering of ‘Circe’ is particularly interesting. As Sara Bryant notes, the episode is portrayed in a realist manner; there are no hallucinations. However, the screenplay for ‘Circe’ includes four images from Max Ernst’s surreal Une Semaine de Bonté (1934) (see fig. 30, overleaf).

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881 Although Joyce generally approved of the Reisman-Zukofsky screenplay, he was unhappy with their suggestion of Charles Laughton for the role of Bloom; Joyce wanted a Jewish actor, and was keen to see if George Arliss fit the bill. In a letter to his son Giorgio, dated 28 October 1935, Joyce wrote: ‘These two Zukovich (?) and the other are proposing Laughton for Ulysses if I think well. He seems too “Aryan” to me. I am going to see Arliss who was, they say, a good Disraeli’, (LIII, 379-80).
882 Unfortunately, I have not been able to view either the Harry Ransom or Zürich James Joyce Foundation copies of the Reisman-Zukofsky screenplay. For details of the screenplay, I am indebted to Sara Bryant’s inspiring paper at the XIII International James Joyce Symposium, Dublin, 2012: Sara Bryant, ‘Ulysses as an Early Talkie: Modernist Voice and the Reisman-Zukofsky Screenplay’.
884 Sara Bryant, ‘Ulysses as an Early Talkie’.
Une Semaine de Bonté, much like Ulysses, is a series of books (five in total) created through the cutting-up and re-organisation of 182 Victorian illustrations. Together, the five books comprise seven sections. Echoing Joyce’s schema for Ulysses, Ernst assigned each section a day of the week and an element each – earth, water, fire, blood, blackness, sight, and the unknown (referring to both people and things).

It would be edifying to know Joyce’s thoughts on the use of these Ernst prints. The images depict optic seeing (eyes) and haptic seeing (pairs of held hands) in an almost stereoscopic manner; the illusion of depth is the main feature of each illustration. But any sense of embodied perception is undercut by the fact that both the eyes and the pairs of
hands are disembodied; they are autonomous organs and limbs, severed from a body. The second two images, however, show full fleshy female bodies, draped in tactile fabric. One of the women seems to be (somewhat uncomfortably) hugging herself, whilst the other appears to be contorting herself into a position which is at once erotic and awkward. As in Joyce’s book, this section of the screenplay clearly explores sight, touch, embodiment, and sensuality.

It would also be interesting to know exactly how Reisman and Zukofsky intended to use these images. Would they have been incorporated into the mise en scène, using some form of montage technique? Would they have come to life, as in trick-films, echoing ‘Circe’’s animated Nymph painting? Or would the images have stayed as still pictures, interspersed in between live action? Whatever their exact role, the inclusion of motionless pictures in a motion picture would have brought up relevant and thought-provoking questions concerning the perception of cinematic movement, evoking the tensions between ‘persistence of vision’ theories and the phenomenological ‘phi-phenomenon’ theories discussed in chapter three of this thesis.

However screenwriters choose to approach the nerve-wracking task of adapting Ulysses, they will need to consider many of the issues covered in this thesis. They must recognise the myriad ways in which Joyce’s text is already cinematic. They must also appreciate the fact that Ulysses and early cinema had parallel goals; they were both, in Merleau-Ponty’s words, ‘an attempt to make us see the bond between subject and world, between subject and others, rather than to explain it as the classical philosophies did’.885

By focusing on the parallels between *Ulysses* and the philosophies behind early cinema, rather than simply on early cinematic techniques, this thesis has wider-reaching applications than other Joyce-and-cinema studies. By employing both proto- and post-Merleau-Pontian ideas, I have been able to offer detailed considerations of Joyce’s treatment of, and engagement with, perception, subjectivity, embodiment, and enworldedness. These considerations add to research on the presence of philosophical ideas in Joyce’s work and on Joyce’s emphasis on the self, the body, and space. My analyses of the relationship between the mechanical and the human in *Ulysses* enhance studies of technology-and-Joyce, while my discussions of mimesis and *actuality* films aid research on Joyce’s unique brand of realism.

As Joyce, himself, said of *Ulysses*, “‘I’ve put in so many enigmas and puzzles that it will keep the professors busy for centuries arguing over what I meant’” (*JJ* 521). This thesis does not claim to have put a stop to these centuries of arguing. Instead, I hope to have provided the Joyce studies community with more fuel for on-going arguments and emerging research avenues.
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