- Abstract:
-
Should I believe something if and only if it’s true? Many philosophers have objected to this kind of truth norm, on the grounds that it’s not the case that one ought to believe all the truths. For example, some truths are too complex to believe; others are too trivial to be worth believing. Philosophers who defend truth norms often respond to this problem by reformulating truth norms in ways that do not entail that one ought to believe all the truths. Many of these attempts at reformulation, ...
Expand abstract - Publication status:
- Published
- Peer review status:
- Peer reviewed
- Publisher:
- Springer Netherlands Publisher's website
- Journal:
- Synthese Journal website
- Volume:
- 197
- Issue:
- 8
- Pages:
- 3279–3303
- Publication date:
- 2018-07-24
- Acceptance date:
- 2018-07-16
- DOI:
- EISSN:
-
1573-0964
- ISSN:
-
0039-7857
- Pubs id:
-
pubs:879601
- UUID:
-
uuid:806327ae-7094-4bdb-b7ca-d76b789afe59
- Source identifiers:
-
879601
- Local pid:
- pubs:879601
- Language:
- English
- Keywords:
- Copyright holder:
- Greenberg, A
- Copyright date:
- 2018
- Rights statement:
- Copyright © 2018 The Author. This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made.
- License:
- CC Attribution (CC BY)
Journal article
Should I believe all the truths?
Actions
Authors
Bibliographic Details
Item Description
Terms of use
Metrics
Altmetrics
Dimensions
If you are the owner of this record, you can report an update to it here: Report update to this record