

Satisfaction with family status and housework participation in modern China

Man-Yee Kan

University of Oxford

Guangye He

Nanjing University

Xiaogang Wu

The Hong Kong University of Science and Technology

Address for correspondence:

Man-Yee Kan

Department of Sociology, University of Oxford, 42-43 Park End Street, Oxford, OX1 1JD, UK.

[man-yee.kan@sociology.ox.ac.uk](mailto:man-yee.kan@sociology.ox.ac.uk)

**Abstract**

This paper analyses data of the Women Status Survey 2010 to investigate the association between satisfaction with family status and housework participation in dual-earner married couples in China. We examine the association by OLS regression models and structural equation models (SEM), taking account of time constraints, economic resources and other demographic characteristics. Results suggest that both men and women are less satisfied with their family status if they share more housework than their partners', after controlling for household income, relative economic contribution, educational qualifications and other factors. Moreover, relative housework contribution is associated more consistently and significantly with satisfaction with family status than absolute housework time. In SEM, we include a correlated error term between housework time and satisfaction in our models to take endogeneity between these factors into account. For both urban men and women, relative contribution of housework but not absolute time of housework, is still negatively associated with family status satisfaction.

**Key words:** China, domestic division of labour, family status, housework, time use, marital satisfaction

## **Introduction**

Does doing more housework make women and men less satisfied with their marriages? Or, is doing more housework linked to a higher level of satisfaction with one's marriage? Research has shown mixed findings on this topic. For example, Qian and Sayer (2016) found a negative association between housework and marital satisfaction in Taiwan and South Korea. Wilcox and Nock (2006), on the other hand, found that couples who share housework and paid work equally have the highest level of marital satisfaction.

One reason for the mixed finding in past studies may be due to inconsistency in the measurements of marital satisfaction and housework participation. As for the measurement of marital satisfaction. Past studies focused on general marital satisfaction, satisfaction with partners, satisfaction with family status respectively. Some studies focused on whether or not couple members find the division of housework fair. Furthermore, previous studies usually ignored possible endogeneity issues between housework and marital satisfaction. As for the measurements of housework participation, some studies employed absolute housework hours as the key measure, and others focused on the division of housework between spouses.

In this paper, we examine how both absolute housework time and relative housework contribution are related to satisfaction with family status in husbands and wives in China. We focus, in particular, on satisfaction with family status because it is strongly linked to negotiations and decisions about the domestic division of labour between spouses. We examine the association between housework and family status satisfaction, and take into account the possible endogeneity among domestic work, family status satisfaction, economic resources and time availability factors.

In what follows, we first provide background information about gender, education and labour market in China. We then review literatures and theories of the gender division of housework. Furthermore, we review previous studies and theories concerning the relationship between housework and marital satisfaction. Finally, we introduce the hypotheses of this study and present the data, methods and findings.

### **Gender, education and labour market participation in China**

First, we outline some recent gender equality figures concerning educational attainment and labour market participation in China. The gender gap in educational attainment has been closing concomitant with the rapid economic development in China in the past three decades. In particular, the educational attainments of employed men and employed women have converged since 2001 (Zhang et al., 2008). Nevertheless, employment trends in China differ from Western developed countries. Policies aiming at equalizing the roles of men and women have been implemented since the founding of the People's Republic of China (Whyte and Parish, 1984; Wolf, 1984). Women and men are both assume to perform an active economic role in society. Women's labour force participation rate between 1980s and 2000s was significantly higher in China than in western industrialized countries. The figures were 85 per cent in 1982, 84 per cent in 1990 and 62 per cent in 2000 for women aged between 20 and 54 living in urban areas<sup>1</sup>. That is, women's labour market participation rate was high in the 1980s but has been falling during the rapid industrialization since the late 1980s. Furthermore, far more women than men work on a part-time basis. In 2005, 42 per cent of female workers aged between 20 and 64 worked on a part-time basis, compared to 22 per cent of their male counterparts<sup>2</sup>. The female-to-male ratio of hourly wage in China dropped from 0.863 in 1988 to 0.762 in 2004 in urban area (Zhang et al., 2008).

## **Domestic division of labour in East Asian and Western countries**

Women in East Asia and Western countries still undertake more housework than men, though recent research shows that the gender gap in housework has been gradually closing (e.g. Bianchi et.al., 2000; Hook, 2010; Kan, 2008; Kan and Gershuny, 2009, 2010; Kan and He, 2018; Kan and Hertog, 2017; Kan, Hertog, and Kolpashnikova, 2019; Oshio, Nozaki and Kobayashi, 2013; Pimentel, 2006; Zhang, Hannum and Wang, 2008; Short et al 2002). Time use research has shown that from the 1970s onwards in western developed countries, men have gradually spent more time on domestic work and women have spent less accordingly: women shared about 75 per cent of domestic work in the 70s and the figure has fallen to just below 70 per cent in the 2000s (Kan, Sullivan and Gershuny, 2011). Although some studies suggest that women's share of housework has fallen to some extent across cohorts in China (Pimentel, 2006), the change has been slow and has not been going on par with the increases in liberal gender role attitudes of men and women. Nevertheless, some previous studies reported that women are generally satisfied with the division of household labour in their families despite their large share of housework (Baxter and Western, 1998; Baxter, 2000; Himself and Goldberg, 2003). Although women with high earning still shoulder a larger proportion of housework (Kan and He, 2018; Yu & Xie, 2012), they also found the division of domestic labour fair even though they have a larger share of housework (Zuo & Bian, 2001).

## **Theories of domestic division of labour**

To explain why women are satisfied with an unequal domestic division of labour, conventional theories have emphasized the influences of time availability, economic resources and gender ideologies in the domestic division of labour. However, it remains unclear how these factors may interact with one another to affect women's satisfaction with the domestic division of

labour and their roles in the family. Furthermore, little research has investigated into the endogeneity between housework and marital satisfaction.

From a specialisation perspective, husbands and wives divide their time to maximize the welfare of the household (Becker, 1965, 1991). Gender specialisation in paid work and unpaid labour is the consequences of differential levels of human capital held by women and men respectively. Following this perspective, empirical studies on China show that housework time is negatively associated with time availability and level of income (Kan and He, 2018; Yang, 2006, 2014; Yu and Xie, 2012; Yu, 2014).

In contrast, the resource-bargaining approach posits that husbands and wives bargain for a lower share of domestic work according to their own levels of economic resources (Manser and Brown, 1980; McElroy and Horney, 1981; McElroy, 1990; Lundberg and Pollack, 1993, 1996). This approach predicts that a rise in women's contribution in family income will reduce their housework time and increase their husbands' housework time (Bittman et al., 2003). Concurring with this perspective, some studies found that income and proportion of family income are significant factors in determining the share of housework in China (Kan and He, 2018; Liu, Tong and Fu, 2015; Yang, 2006, 2015; Yu and Xie, 2012).

Both of the aforementioned approaches, however, cannot explain why women with high income and working full time still undertake more housework than their husbands (Yang, 2014). It is believed that marriage and domestic work are also related to one's gender identities and gender roles (Berk, 1985; Brines, 1994; DeVault, 1990; Ferree, 1990; South and Spitze, 1994).

Based on qualitative interview findings, some studies reported that gender attitudes and family values play an important role in the negotiation of domestic division of labour (Fang, 2011; Tong and Liu, 2015; Yang, 2014; Gao and Zheng, 2012; Zuo and Bian, 2001). Nevertheless, many

people holding liberal gender attitudes still maintain a traditional form of gender division of labour (Pimentel, 2006). Married women with higher income than their husbands still do more housework (Yang, 2014), suggesting that doing housework may be a way to maintain a male-breadwinner gender norm.

The patterns of association between housework participation and the share of contribution in family income vary between urban and rural families (Kan and He, 2018). The division of routine housework such as cooking, cleaning and doing the laundry between spouses follow broadly the predictions of the resource bargaining theory in the case of urban couples but not rural ones. The association between relative earning and housework hours depends on the degree of modernity of province (Yu, 2014). Gender norms are more traditional in rural area than in urban area in China (Short et al., 2002). Owing to the rapid industrialization and economic development in urban area, it is likely that economic rationality will have a stronger effect on the domestic division of labour in urban area than in rural area.

### **Theories of marital satisfaction and domestic labour**

Past research on marital satisfaction and domestic work rely on two main theoretical frameworks. First, as mentioned earlier, Becker's (1965, 1991) specialisation theory suggests that a gender specialised division of labour is the best way to maximize the couple's benefit. Following this perspective, marital satisfaction is maximized when wives and husbands adhere to the traditional male-breadwinner and female-home-carer division of labour. Following a traditional division of labour, marital satisfaction is gained through higher wages and better occupational career progression for men (Bardasi and Taylor, 2008) and a reduction in risks of financial difficulties (Oshio et al, 2013; Hardie et al., 2014). A number of previous studies found

that a gender traditional division of labour more is positively associated with marital satisfaction (Yogev and Brett, 1985; Wilcox and Nock, 2006; Oshio et al., 2013).

In contrast, the equity theory stresses that more egalitarian gender division of labour is essential for marital happiness. The main tenet of this perspective is that inequitable relations will give rise to dissatisfaction in social relations. When applied to spousal relations and housework, the equity theory was sometimes referred to as ‘distributive justice theory’ (Thompson, 1991). A number of studies found that unequal division of housework between spouses is associated with feelings of unfairness and dissatisfaction (Barstad, 2014; Jansen et al., 2016; Sprecher, 2001). Wilcox and Nock (2006) report that couples with a gender egalitarian division of paid work and domestic work have the highest level of marital satisfaction. Furthermore, some studies found a curvilinear relationship between housework and marital satisfaction, i.e. those who undertake a very high proportion or a very low proportion of housework tend to be feel more dissatisfied with their marriage (Kalmijn and Monden, 2011; Walster et al., 1978; Sprecher, 2001; Stafford and Canary, 2006).

As with the case of housework research, gender norms of a society and gender ideology of individuals are found to be important mediating factors in the association between housework and marital satisfaction (Maricarini and Sironi, 2012; Greenstein, 2009; Baster and Western, 1998; Qian and Sayer, 2016; Zuo and Bian, 2001). However, Qian and Sayer (2016) the association between housework and marital satisfaction is significant only in Taiwan and South Korea, but not in China and Japan when gender ideology of women and men is taken into account. These mixed findings suggest that the link between housework and marital satisfaction is mediated by one’s gender ideology and is dependent on the gender norm of a society.

## **Hypotheses**



Following the resource bargaining perspective, both women and men bargain for a lesser share of housework according to their income and time availability. An increase in housework time will therefore lead to a decrease in satisfaction with marriage.

*Hypothesis 1a: Housework time is negatively associated with satisfaction with family status for both women and men.*

*Hypothesis 1b: Both women and men are less satisfied with their family status if they do more housework than their partners.*

Following the specialisation theory, a traditional gender division of labour will maximize the family's welfare and therefore will lead to a higher level of marital satisfaction.

*Hypothesis 2: Both women and men are more satisfied with their family status if women do more housework than their partners.*

Following the equity theory, a gender egalitarian division will lead to a higher level of marital satisfaction.

*Hypothesis 3: Both women and men are more satisfied with their family status if they share housework equally with their partners.*

Previous research has shown that the association between housework and satisfaction varies according to the gender norm of a society. Given the rural and urban differences in gender attitudes and the gender division of labour (Kan and He, 2018), the association is likely to be different between the two regions.

*Hypothesis 4: The association between housework and satisfaction with family status differs between urban and rural areas.*

## **Data and Methods**

### *Data*

We employ data from the 2010 Women's Status Survey (WSS), which was jointly conducted by the Chinese Federation of Women and the China National Bureau of Statistics. The WSS is a national survey with a representative sample of individuals aged between 18 and 64. It contains detailed information about marriage, fertility, and the household division of labour. Since a key objective of our research is to examine the association between satisfaction with family status and relative economic resources, and time allocation and constraints arising from labour market work, we restrict our sample to prime work age (18-54) individuals who reported that both the respondents and their spouses are employed at the time of the survey<sup>3</sup>. The resulting sample size is 9,880 (4,781 women and 5,099 men)<sup>4</sup>.

### *Measures*

In WSS, respondents were asked whether they were satisfied with their status in the family. Their responses were measured in a five-point scale: very satisfied, satisfied, neutral, dissatisfied, and very dissatisfied. We recode the scale from -2 to 2, where 2 is very satisfied, -2 is very dissatisfied, and 0 is neutral. Respondents also reported the number of hours and minutes of total housework on the working day prior to the interview. For the ease of estimation, we transfer the minute of housework into hours. Furthermore, they reported who, themselves or their partners, usually did more housework: 1. Husband does more, 2. About the same, 3. Wife does more.

### *Control Variables*

Other variables of theoretical interests include the number of hours spent on labour market work and leisure activities on the working day prior to the interview (as indicators of time constraints), both partners' income in the previous year<sup>5</sup>, the share of one's contribution into family income (defined as one's own income last year divided by the sum of both spouses' last year's income), and the square of the share of contribution in family income (to take account the

curvilinear association between share of family income and housework). The models also control for age, age-squared, and educational attainment (1. Primary education or below, 2. Junior high school education, 3. Senior high school or equivalent, 4. College or above), as past studies revealed that they are related to housework participation and gender role attitudes. The models also control for the number of children under aged 16 (zero, one, two or more), which directly affects the amount of housework and caring work in a household.

### *Analytical Strategies*

We first examine the association between satisfaction with family status and housework participation by OLS regression models. To test rural and urban differences, we put men and women in rural and urban area in separate models. To capture of possible endogeneity between housework and family status satisfaction, we further test the robustness of the findings by structural equation models.

## **Findings**

### *Descriptive statistics*

We first present the descriptive statistics in Table 1. In general, women are more satisfied about their family status than men. The mean score of family status satisfaction for married women is 1.71, while the corresponding score for men is 1.56. When further looking at division of labour within the family, women undertake the major share of housework. 72.45% of the respondents report that “the wife does more housework; 19.33% of the respondents report that “the husband and the wife do about same amount of the housework”. Only 8.22% of the respondents report that “the husband does more housework”. In terms of total housework time, women on average spend 2.49 hours on housework per day, which is 1.52 hours more than men. Compared to men in the sample, women are on average have a lower educational attainment, and their working hours per

day are 0.7 less than men's. As shown in our sample, the average income of married women in 2009 is around 17477 yuan, which is 53.5% less than their male counterparts.

To show whether and how doing housework would contribute to married men and women's family status satisfaction, we then regress the satisfaction of family status on how respondents' reporting of relative housework time (measured by the response of "who does more housework") and housework hours per day respectively for married men and women in rural and urban areas.

[Table 1 about here]

#### *OLS Regression results on relative housework contribution and family status satisfaction*

We first estimate how relative housework contribution (measured by "who does more housework") on wives' and husbands' satisfaction of family status. Results are presented in in Table 2 and Table 3 respectively. For wives, as shown in Table 2, compared to those who shared housework equally with their husbands, wives who do more housework than their husbands have significantly lower satisfaction of family status (the coefficient is -0.083), holding constant of other variables. Furthermore, the association is significant only among urban wives. We add work time as a control variable in Model 2. Working time is negatively associated with wives' family status satisfaction, but only among rural sample, probably because the working time for rural people, especially farmers, are not explicitly regulated. After controlling for working time, the association between relative contribution to housework and family status satisfaction remains significant. In model 3, we take account of also leisure time. We can see that an additional hour of leisure time would increase the satisfaction score of family status by 0.013. However, as with working time, this association is only significant among rural wives. The coefficient of relative housework barely changes and remains significant in Model 3. In Model 4,

when both working time and leisure time are controlled, the association between relative housework and family status satisfaction remains more or less the same.

[Table 2 about here]

The results of husbands are shown in Table 3. We adopt the same model building strategies as in Table 2. Husbands who do more housework than their wives have lower family status satisfaction than husbands who shared an equal amount of housework with their wives. However, this association is only significant among urban husbands. Similar with the results of the wives' models, the association of relative housework with urban husbands' family status satisfaction remains significant after taking account of working time and leisure time. In rural area, however, work time rather than housework time is a more important factor of family status satisfaction.

[Table 3 about here]

#### *OLS regression results on housework time and family status satisfaction*

We further look at the association between absolute housework time and family status satisfaction. The results for wives and husbands are shown in Table 4 and Table 5 respectively. For wives, housework time forms a negative association with family status satisfaction when working time is taken into account (Model 2). As can be seen, as housework time increases by one hour, the family status satisfaction decreases by 0.017, holding constant of other variables. In Model 3, when leisure time is also taken into account, the association remains significant and negative. Nevertheless, we should note that the association between housework time and family status satisfaction is only significantly negative in urban area. In rural area, working time is a major predictor on family status satisfaction.

Turning to the husbands' models in Table 5, we can see that absolute housework time forms a significantly negative association with satisfaction of family status in all models concerning urban area. Holding constant of other factors, an additional housework hour would lower the satisfaction score of family satisfaction by 0.022 in the full sample, and 0.024 in the urban sample.

[Table 4 about here]

[Table 5 about here]

To summarize our findings from the OLS models, we find support for the resource bargaining perspective Hypotheses 1a and 1b: Both men and women in urban area are less satisfied with the family status if their housework time increases. They are also less satisfied if they do more housework than their partners. The findings go against the hypotheses derived from the specialisation theory and the equity theory (Hypotheses 2 and 3). Women and men are less satisfied, rather than more satisfied, with their family status if they do more housework, or if they share housework equally with their partners, compared to when they do less housework than their partners. We find supportive evidence for Hypothesis 4: Housework participation and family status satisfaction are significantly associated only in urban area but not rural one.

### *Structuring Equation Models*

However, relative housework contribution and the absolute housework time of family members are not randomly assigned. They depend on wives' and husbands' time availability, relative resources, the presence of children. They also depend on individual characteristics such as education and age, and some unobserved characteristics such as gender ideology. OLS

regression thus provide a naïve estimation by ignoring the non-randomness of relative and absolute housework time. To test the robustness of our findings and to take account of possible endogeneity of the factors mentioned above, we employ the structural equation modelling in the estimation of family status satisfaction.

[Figure 1 about here]

[Figure 2 about here]

In the SEM models, we take both housework time and family status satisfaction as endogenous variables. Thus we have two equations estimated simultaneously. The SEM diagrams are shown in Figure 1 and 2. In terms of the housework time equation, to take account of the time-availability factors, we assume working time and leisure time have direct effects on housework time. To consider the relative resource assumption, we take that an individual's income contribution to the family and its squared term will directly influence housework time. Furthermore, we control for other characteristics, such as *hukou* status, educational attainment, and age to show how these factors will affect an individual's time on housework. In terms of family status satisfaction, we assume that housework time is directly linked to family status satisfaction, while working time and leisure time only affect family status satisfaction through housework time. The results are presented in Table 6, 7, 8 and 9. Table 6 and 7 show the SEM results of how factors primarily associated with relative housework contribution may further affect husband's and wife's family status satisfaction respectively. And Table 8 and 9 show the SEM results of how factors primarily associated with absolute housework time may further affect husband's and wife's family status satisfaction respectively.

[Table 6 about here]

[Table 7 about here]

[Table 8 about here]

[Table 9 about here]

As can be seen in Tables 6 and 7 shown, when estimating the two equations simultaneously, relative housework contribution remains significantly associated with family status satisfaction for both married men and married women in urban area. For women, compared to those who share an equal amount of housework with their spouses, women who do more housework than their spouses are less satisfied with their family status, holding constant of other factors. The same results apply to married men. Turning to Tables 8 and 9, we can see that absolute housework time is no longer significantly associated with family status satisfaction of married women, but it forms significantly negative association with married men's family status satisfaction, especially for men residing in urban area. Controlling for other variables, for an additional hour that urban husbands spent on housework per day, their satisfaction of family status is reduced by 0.0245.

Taking both of the OLS models and the SEM models together, we still find supportive findings for Hypothesis 1b and Hypothesis 4, but not for Hypothesis 1a. That is, relative housework contribution remains significantly and negatively associated with family status satisfaction in urban wives and husbands. However, the association between absolute housework and family status satisfaction becomes insignificant when endogeneity between variables are taken into account. Therefore, relative housework participation is a more significant predictor of satisfaction with family status than total housework time.

## **Conclusion**



Housework participation and marital satisfaction are closely related. In this paper, we test this association by considering both relative and absolute housework contribution of married women and men in modern China. We have focussed on the satisfaction with family status, a key dimension of marital satisfaction closely linked to the domestic division of labour. We have tested the robustness of our findings by taking into account the endogeneity between housework, family status satisfaction, economic resources and time availability factors.

Our results show that housework is negatively associated with women's and men's satisfaction with family status in urban area. In rural area, where gender norm is more traditional and housework and paid work are less clearly divided, there is no consistent association between these two factors. What is more, we have found that relative housework contribution is more robustly and negatively associated with family status satisfaction than absolute housework time. That is, married women and men in urban area are less satisfied with the family status if they do more housework than their partners compared to their counterparts who share housework equally with their partners.

One limitation of this study is that we test the association between housework and family status satisfaction by cross sectional data. In order to investigate the mechanisms of how housework affects satisfaction, more studies based on longitudinal data are needed.

## Notes

1. The figures are calculated from a sample of the China Population Census data.
2. The figures are calculated from data of the 2005 China 0.1 per cent population mini-census.
3. The survey did not collect information about the spouses' work status. We assume that the spouse is employed, if he/she has income.

4. The number of cases of women and that of men are different because individuals rather than households were randomly sampled in the survey.
5. In the questionnaire, for spouse's income, the respondent was asked, "how much is total income of your spouse?" To be consistent, when calculating respondent's income, we sum up all types to of income of the respondent in this analysis including earned income, portfolio income, passive income and subsidies of all kind.

## References


- Bardasi, E., and Taylor, M. (2008). Marriage and wages: A test of the specialization hypothesis. *Economica*, 75(299), 569-591.
- Barstad, A. (2014). Equality is bliss? Relationship quality and the gender division of household labor. *Journal of Family Issues*, 35, 972-992.
- Baxter, J. (2000). The Joys and Justice of Housework. *Sociology*, 34(4), 609-631. <https://doi.org/10.1177/S0038038500000389>
- Baxter, J., & Western, M. (1998). Satisfaction with Housework: Examining the Paradox. *Sociology*, 32(1), 101-120. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0038038598032001007>
- Berk, S. (1985). *The Gender Factory: The Apportionment of Work in American Households*. New York, NY: Plenum.
- Bianchi, S. M., Milkie, M. A., Sayer, L. C., & Robinson, J. P. (2000). Is anyone doing the housework? Trends in the gender division of household labor. *Social Forces*, 79(1), 191-228. doi:10.2307/2675569.
- Bittman, M., England, P., Sayer, L., Folbre, N., & Matheson, G. (2003). When does gender trump money? Bargaining and time in Household Work 1." *American Journal of Sociology* 109(1):186-214. doi:10.1086/378341.
- Brines J (1994) Economic dependency, gender and the division of domestic labour at home. *American Journal of Sociology* 100(3): 652-688.
- DeVault M (1990) Conflict over housework: A problem that (still) has no name. In L. Kriesberg (Ed.) *Research into Social Movements, Conflict, and Change*. Greenwich, CT: JAI Press.
- Evertsson M and Neramo M (2004) Dependence within families and the division of labor: Comparing Sweden and the United States. *Journal of Marriage and Family* 66, 1272-1286.
- Fang, Y. (2011). Division of labor: Women's "Life Experiment" and "Gender Politics". *Social Science in Guangdong*, (4), 219-226 [in Chinese].
- Ferree, M. M. (1990). Beyond separate spheres: Feminism and family research. *Journal of Marriage and the Family*, 52, 866-884.
- Gao, L., & Zheng, Y. (2012). Sex roles and division of household labor in married couples. *Chinese Mental Health Journal*, 26(7), 543-546.

- Greenstein TN (2000) Economic dependence, gender, and the division of labor in the home: A replication and extension. *Journal of Marriage and Family* 62: 322-335.
- Hardie, J. H., Geist, C. and Lucas, A. (2014). His and hers: economic factors and relationship quality in Germany. *Journal of Marriage and Family*, 76, 728-743.
- Himself, A. J., & Goldberg, W. A. (2003). Social Comparisons and Satisfaction with the Division of Housework: Implications for Men's and Women's Role Strain. *Journal of Family Issues*, 24(7), 843-866. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0192513X03255323>
- Hook, J. L. (2010). Gender inequality in the welfare state: Sex segregation in housework, 1965-2003." *American Journal of Sociology* 115(5):1480-1523. doi:10.1086/651384.
- Jansen, L., Weber, T., Kraaykamp, G., and Verbakel, E. (2016). Perceived fairness of the division of household labor: A comparative study in 29 countries. *International Journal of Comparative Sociology*, 57(1-2), 53-68.
- Kalmijn, M. and Monden, C. W. S. (2011). The division of labor and depressive symptoms at the couple level: effects of equity or specialization? *Journal of Social and Personal Relationships*, 29, 358-374.
- Kan, M. Y. (2008) Does gender trump money? Housework hours of husbands and wives in Britain. *Work, Employment and Society* 22(1): 45-66.
- Kan, M. Y., & Gershuny, J. (2009). Gender and time use over the life-course. In: Brynin M and Ermisch J (eds) *Changing Relationships*. New York: Routledge.
- Kan, M. Y., & Gershuny, J. (2010). Gender segregation and bargaining in domestic labour: Evidence from longitudinal time use data. In: Crompton R, Scott J and Lyonnette C (Eds.) *Gender Inequalities in the 21st Century*. Aldershot: Edward Elgar.
- Kan, M. Y. & He, G. (2018) "Resource bargaining and gender display in housework and care work in modern China". *Chinese Sociological Review*. 50(2): 188-203.
- Kan, M. Y., & Hertog, E. (2017). Domestic division of labor and fertility preference in China, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. *Demographic Research*, 36, 557-588.
- Kan, M. Y., Hertog, E., & Kolpashnikova, K. (2019). "Housework share and fertility preference in four East Asian countries in 2006 and 2012". *Demographic Research*, 41(35), 1021-1046.
- Kan, M. Y., Sullivan, O., & Gershuny, J. (2011) Gender convergence in domestic work: Discerning the effects of interactional and institutional barriers from large-scale data. *Sociology*, 45(2), 234-251.
- Liu, A., Tong, X., & Fu, W. (2015). Household division of housework for double-income family: Economic dependence, gender ideologies, or emotional express? *Chinese Journal of Sociology*, 35(2), 109-136 [in Chinese].
- Lundberg, S., & Pollak, R. A. (1993). Separate spheres bargaining and the marriage market. *Journal of Political Economy* 101(6), 988-1010. doi:10.1086/261912.
- Manser, M., & Brown, M. (1980). Marriage and household decision-making: A bargaining analysis. *International Economic Review*, 21(1):31-44. doi:10.2307/2526238.
- McElroy, M. B., & Horney, M. J. (1981). Nash-bargained household decisions: Toward a generalization of the theory of demand. *International Economic Review* 22 (2): 333-49. doi:10.2307/2526280.

- McElroy, M. B. (1990). The empirical content of nash-bargained household behavior. *The Journal of Human Resources*, 25(4), 559-583.
- Oshio, T., Nozaki, K., & Kobayashi, M. (2013). Division of household labor and marital satisfaction in China, Japan, and Korea. *Journal of Family and Economic Issues* 34(2), 211–w23. doi:10.1007/s10834-012-9321-4.
- Pimentel, E. E. 2006. Gender ideology, household behavior, and backlash in urban China. *Journal of Family Issues* 27(3), 341–365. doi:10.1177/0192513X05283507.
- Short, S. E, Chen, F., Entwisle, B., & Zhai, F. (2002). Maternal work and child Care in China: A multi-method analysis. *Population and Development Review* 28(1), 31–57. doi:10.1111/j.1728-4457.2002.00031.x.
- South, S. J., & Spitze, G. (1994). Housework in Marital and Nonmarital Households. *American Sociological Review*, 59(3), 327-347. doi:10.2307/2095937
- Sprecher, S. (2001). A comparison of emotional consequences of and changes in equity over time using global and domain specific measures of equity. *Journal of Social and Personal Relationships*, 18, 477–501.
- Stafford, L., and Canary, D. J. (2006). Equity and interdependence as predictors of relational maintenance strategies. *The Journal of Family Communication*, 6(4), 227-254.
- Thompson, L. (1991). Family work: Women's sense of fairness. *Journal of family Issues*, 12(2), 181-196.
- Tong, X., & Liu, A. (2015). A model of conjugal cooperation in housework for urban dual-career couples - Based on the third survey of women's status in China. *Social Sciences in China*, 6, 96–111 [in Chinese].
- Walster, E., Walster, G. W. and Berscheid, E. (1978). *Equity: Theory and Research*. Boston: Allyn & Bacon.
- Wilcox, W. B. and Nock, S. L. (2006). What's love got to do with it? Equality, equity, commitment and women's marital quality. *Social Forces*, 84, 1321–1345.
- Wolf, M. (1984). Marriage, family, and the state in contemporary China. *Pacific Affairs*, 57(2), 213–236. doi:10.2307/2759124.
- Yang, J. (2006). Identifying gender division of private space from the division of domestic work. *Collection of Women's Studies* 5 (75):16–22 [in Chinese].
- Yang, J. (2014). Continuity and strategy: A gender pattern of household work division in China between 1990–2010. *Academic Research*, 2, 31–41 [in Chinese].
- Yogev, S., and Brett, J. (1985). Perceptions of the division of housework and child care and marital satisfaction. *Journal of Marriage and the Family*, 609-618.
- Yu, J. (2014). Gender attitudes, modernity and women's housework time. *Chinese Journal of Sociology*, 34 (2), 166–192 [in Chinese].
- Yu, J., & Xie, Y. (2011). The varying display of "gender display" a comparative study of mainland China and Taiwan. *Chinese Sociological Review* 44(2), 5–30. doi:10.2753/csa2162-0555440201.


- Zhang, Y., Hannum, E., & Wang, M. (2008). Gender-based employment and income differences in urban China: Considering the contributions of marriage and parenthood. *Social Forces*, 86(4), 1529–1560. doi:[10.1353/sof.0.0035](https://doi.org/10.1353/sof.0.0035).
- Zuo, J., & Bian, Y. (2001). Gendered resources, division of housework, and perceived fairness—A case in urban China. *Journal of Marriage and Family*, 63(4), 1122–1133. doi:[10.1111/j.1741-3737.2001.01122.x](https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1741-3737.2001.01122.x).

Figure 1. A Diagram of Relative Housework Contribution and Family Status Satisfaction



Note: “satisfam” denotes family status satisfaction; “1.wmore” denotes husband does more housework. “3.wmore” denotes wife does more housework; “wtime” denotes working time; “letime” denotes leisure time; “ownprop” denotes individual’s income contribution; “ownprop2” denotes the squared term of ownprop. “2.ed” denotes junior high education; “3.ed” denotes senior high education. “4.ed” denotes college or above. “0.totkid2” denotes no child; “2.totkid2” denotes more than 1 child. “rural” denotes rural hukou.

Figure 2. A Diagram of Housework Time and Family Status Satisfaction



Note: “satisfam” denotes family status satisfaction; “hwtime” denotes housework hours per day; “wtime” denotes working hours per day; “letime” denotes leisure time; “ownprop” denotes individual’s income contribution; “ownprop2” denotes the squared term of ownprop. “2.ed” denotes junior high education; “3.ed” denotes senior high education. “4.ed” denotes college or above. “0.totkid2” denotes no child; “2.totkid2” denotes more than 1 child. “rural” denotes rural hukou.

Table 1. Descriptive Statistics of Selected Variables

	Full Sample	Female	Male
Family Status Satisfaction	4.36 (0.68)	4.29 (0.72)	4.44 (0.64)
Total Housework Hours	1.71 (1.61)	2.49 (1.62)	0.97 (1.20)
Who Does More Housework			
Husband	8.22	7.68	8.73
Same	19.33	19.25	19.40
Wife	72.45	73.08	71.87
Income in 2009	22271.16 (92331.76)	17476.66 (117186.20)	26766.93 (60017.49)
Spouse's Income in 2009	16535.85 (31510.17)	21659.79 (34342.92)	11731.15 (27756.98)
Total Family Income in 2009	38807.01 (101305.70)	39136.45 (125925.70)	38498.09 (70843.66)
Family Income Contribution	0.57 (0.23)	0.43 (0.18)	0.70 (0.19)
Work Time	5.82 (3.70)	5.47 (3.74)	6.16 (3.64)
Age	40.79 (7.29)	40.13 (7.20)	41.41 (7.33)
Education %			
Primary or Below	22.25	28.80	16.10
Junior High	36.58	33.97	39.02
Senior High	22.84	20.16	25.35
College or Above	18.34	17.07	19.53
Rural Hukou %	54.74	56.46	53.13
Total Number of Kids %			
None	3.17	2.80	3.50
One	55.20	54.55	55.82
Two or Above	41.63	42.65	40.67
N	9,952	4,816	5,136

Note: Data are from Women's Status Survey 2010. Numbers in the parentheses are standard deviations.



Table 2. OLS Regression of Relative Housework Contribution and Wives' Family Status Satisfaction

VARIABLES	ALL				RURAL				URBAN			
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Husband Does More	0.055 (0.044)	0.058 (0.044)	0.053 (0.044)	0.056 (0.044)	0.022 (0.067)	0.025 (0.067)	0.016 (0.067)	0.022 (0.067)	0.089 (0.058)	0.089 (0.058)	0.089 (0.058)	0.089 (0.058)
Wife Does More	-0.083** (0.027)	-0.084** (0.027)	-0.084** (0.027)	-0.084** (0.027)	-0.027 (0.042)	-0.03 (0.041)	-0.029 (0.042)	-0.031 (0.041)	-0.128*** (0.035)	-0.128*** (0.035)	-0.129*** (0.035)	-0.129*** (0.035)
Work Time		-0.009** (0.003)		-0.007* (0.003)		-0.013** (0.004)		-0.012* (0.005)		0.000 (0.004)		0.001 (0.005)
Leisure Time			0.013* (0.005)	0.007 (0.006)			0.015* (0.007)	0.007 (0.008)			0.007 (0.008)	0.008 (0.009)
Income Proportion	0.118 (0.182)	0.175 (0.183)	0.127 (0.182)	0.169 (0.183)	0.245 (0.256)	0.342 (0.257)	0.267 (0.256)	0.34 (0.257)	-0.045 (0.275)	-0.042 (0.277)	-0.048 (0.275)	-0.058 (0.277)
Squared Income Proportion	-0.067 (0.183)	-0.106 (0.183)	-0.067 (0.183)	-0.098 (0.183)	-0.198 (0.278)	-0.265 (0.279)	-0.207 (0.278)	-0.261 (0.279)	0.087 (0.258)	0.085 (0.259)	0.092 (0.258)	0.1 (0.259)
Logged Familial Total Income	0.123*** (0.014)	0.128*** (0.014)	0.123*** (0.014)	0.127*** (0.014)	0.121*** (0.019)	0.131*** (0.019)	0.120*** (0.019)	0.130*** (0.019)	0.143*** (0.022)	0.143*** (0.022)	0.143*** (0.022)	0.143*** (0.022)
Total Number of Kids												
No Child	-0.06 (0.066)	-0.055 (0.066)	-0.062 (0.066)	-0.057 (0.066)	-0.177 (0.149)	-0.16 (0.149)	-0.179 (0.149)	-0.163 (0.149)	-0.031 (0.074)	-0.031 (0.074)	-0.032 (0.074)	-0.033 (0.074)
>1 Children	-0.064* (0.026)	-0.064* (0.026)	-0.060* (0.026)	-0.062* (0.026)	-0.090** (0.035)	-0.086* (0.035)	-0.083* (0.035)	-0.083* (0.035)	-0.054 (0.041)	-0.054 (0.041)	-0.053 (0.041)	-0.052 (0.041)
Constant	3.587*** (0.300)	3.515*** (0.300)	3.528*** (0.300)	3.495*** (0.301)	3.631*** (0.402)	3.502*** (0.403)	3.587*** (0.402)	3.497*** (0.403)	3.413*** (0.474)	3.413*** (0.474)	3.372*** (0.476)	3.367*** (0.476)
Observations	4,781	4,781	4,781	4,781	2,352	2,352	2,352	2,352	2,429	2,429	2,429	2,429
R-squared	0.035	0.037	0.036	0.037	0.03	0.034	0.032	0.035	0.043	0.043	0.044	0.044
Adj. R-squared	0.033	0.034	0.034	0.034	0.025	0.028	0.026	0.028	0.038	0.038	0.038	0.038

Note: \*\*\* p<0.001, \*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.05. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. Other control variables include education, age, age2, rural hukou.

Table 3. OLS Regression of Relative Housework Contribution and Husbands' Family Status Satisfaction

VARIABLES	ALL				RURAL				URBAN			
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Husband Does More	-0.075* (0.037)	-0.076* (0.037)	-0.075* (0.037)	-0.075* (0.037)	-0.048 (0.055)	-0.052 (0.055)	-0.048 (0.055)	0.022 (0.067)	-0.099* (0.049)	-0.099* (0.049)	-0.099* (0.049)	-0.098* (0.049)
Wife Does More	-0.007 (0.023)	-0.007 (0.023)	-0.008 (0.023)	-0.007 (0.023)	0.022 (0.037)	0.022 (0.037)	0.021 (0.037)	-0.031 (0.041)	-0.033 (0.030)	-0.034 (0.030)	-0.033 (0.030)	-0.035 (0.030)
Work Time		-0.002 (0.003)		-0.002 (0.003)		-0.007* (0.004)		-0.012* (0.005)		0.003 (0.004)		0.005 (0.004)
Lesure Time			0.003 (0.004)	0.002 (0.005)			0.003 (0.006)	0.007 (0.008)			0.003 (0.006)	0.007 (0.007)
Income Proportion	0.583* (0.283)	0.586* (0.283)	0.579* (0.283)	0.582* (0.283)	0.312 (0.436)	0.315 (0.436)	0.302 (0.436)	0.34 (0.257)	0.763* (0.374)	0.752* (0.374)	0.764* (0.374)	0.751* (0.374)
Squared Income Proportion	-0.363 (0.200)	-0.364 (0.200)	-0.359 (0.200)	-0.361 (0.200)	-0.264 (0.310)	-0.262 (0.309)	-0.255 (0.310)	-0.261 (0.279)	-0.415 (0.265)	-0.407 (0.265)	-0.416 (0.265)	-0.406 (0.265)
Logged Familial Total Income	0.064*** (0.012)	0.065*** (0.012)	0.063*** (0.012)	0.064*** (0.012)	0.062*** (0.017)	0.067*** (0.017)	0.062*** (0.017)	0.130*** (0.019)	0.074*** (0.017)	0.074*** (0.017)	0.074*** (0.017)	0.073*** (0.017)
Total Number of Kids (ref: 1 child)												
No Child	-0.075 (0.053)	-0.076 (0.053)	-0.076 (0.053)	-0.077 (0.053)	-0.193 (0.112)	-0.200 (0.112)	-0.193 (0.112)	-0.163 (0.149)	-0.043 (0.060)	-0.043 (0.060)	-0.044 (0.060)	-0.045 (0.060)
>1 Children	-0.006 (0.022)	-0.006 (0.022)	-0.006 (0.022)	-0.006 (0.022)	-0.039 (0.030)	-0.039 (0.030)	-0.039 (0.030)	-0.083* (0.035)	0.031 (0.034)	0.031 (0.034)	0.031 (0.034)	0.032 (0.034)
Constant	4.041*** (0.282)	4.043*** (0.282)	4.030*** (0.282)	4.036*** (0.282)	4.230*** (0.403)	4.235*** (0.403)	4.220*** (0.403)	3.497*** (0.403)	3.776*** (0.405)	3.765*** (0.405)	3.766*** (0.405)	3.733*** (0.406)
Observations	5,099	5,099	5,099	5,099	2,338	2,338	2,338	2,352	2,761	2,761	2,761	2,761
R-squared	0.017	0.017	0.017	0.017	0.022	0.023	0.022	0.035	0.019	0.019	0.019	0.02
Adj. R-squared	0.014	0.014	0.014	0.014	0.016	0.017	0.016	0.028	0.015	0.014	0.014	0.014

Note: \*\*\* p<0.001, \*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.05. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. Other control variables include education, age, age2, rural hukou.

Table 4. OLS Regression of Housework Time and Husbands' Family Status Satisfaction

VARIABLES	ALL				RURAL				URBAN			
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Housework Time	-0.006 (0.007)	-0.017* (0.007)	-0.009 (0.007)	-0.016* (0.007)	-0.001 (0.009)	-0.014 (0.010)	-0.003 (0.009)	-0.014 (0.010)	-0.018 (0.010)	-0.021 (0.011)	-0.020* (0.010)	-0.022* (0.011)
Work Time		-0.011*** (0.003)		-0.010** (0.004)		-0.016*** (0.005)		-0.014** (0.005)		-0.004 (0.005)		-0.002 (0.005)
Leisure Time			0.014* (0.005)	0.007 (0.006)			0.015* (0.007)	0.006 (0.008)			0.009 (0.008)	0.008 (0.009)
Income Proportion	0.157 (0.182)	0.207 (0.183)	0.162 (0.182)	0.202 (0.183)	0.261 (0.257)	0.33 (0.257)	0.277 (0.257)	0.33 (0.257)	0.03 (0.276)	0.05 (0.277)	0.024 (0.276)	0.036 (0.277)
Squared Income Proportion	-0.089 (0.183)	-0.124 (0.183)	-0.085 (0.183)	-0.117 (0.183)	-0.209 (0.279)	-0.253 (0.278)	-0.212 (0.278)	-0.25 (0.278)	0.05 (0.258)	0.032 (0.259)	0.057 (0.258)	0.046 (0.260)
Logged Familial Total Income	0.122*** (0.014)	0.125*** (0.014)	0.121*** (0.014)	0.124*** (0.014)	0.120*** (0.019)	0.129*** (0.019)	0.119*** (0.019)	0.128*** (0.019)	0.142*** (0.022)	0.141*** (0.022)	0.141*** (0.022)	0.140*** (0.022)
Total Number of Kids (ref: 1 child)												
No Child	-0.053 (0.066)	-0.051 (0.066)	-0.056 (0.066)	-0.053 (0.066)	-0.177 (0.149)	-0.163 (0.149)	-0.181 (0.149)	-0.165 (0.149)	-0.021 (0.075)	-0.021 (0.075)	-0.023 (0.075)	-0.023 (0.075)
>1 Children	-0.071** (0.026)	-0.070** (0.026)	-0.067* (0.026)	-0.068** (0.026)	-0.093** (0.035)	-0.087* (0.034)	-0.086* (0.035)	-0.085* (0.035)	-0.069 (0.041)	-0.069 (0.041)	-0.067 (0.041)	-0.068 (0.041)
Constant	3.619*** (0.303)	3.603*** (0.303)	3.574*** (0.303)	3.582*** (0.303)	3.640*** (0.404)	3.575*** (0.404)	3.605*** (0.404)	3.567*** (0.404)	3.456*** (0.479)	3.479*** (0.480)	3.418*** (0.481)	3.436*** (0.483)
Observations	4,790	4,790	4,790	4,790	2,354	2,354	2,354	2,354	2,436	2,436	2,436	2,436
R-squared	0.032	0.034	0.033	0.034	0.03	0.035	0.032	0.035	0.034	0.035	0.035	0.035
Adj. R-squared	0.029	0.031	0.03	0.032	0.025	0.029	0.026	0.029	0.03	0.029	0.03	0.029

Note: \*\*\* p<0.001, \*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.05. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. Other control variables include education, age, age2, rural hukou.

Table 5. OLS Regression of Housework Time and Husbands' Family Status Satisfaction

VARIABLES	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Housework Time	-0.017*	-0.022**	-0.019*	-0.022**	-0.011	-0.018	-0.012	-0.018	-0.024*	-0.024*	-0.026*	-0.024*
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)
Work Time		-0.005		-0.004		-0.009*		-0.010*		0.000		0.002
		(0.003)		(0.003)		(0.004)		(0.004)		(0.004)		(0.004)
Lesure Time			0.005	0.002			0.005	-0.003			0.005	0.006
			(0.004)	(0.005)			(0.006)	(0.007)			(0.006)	(0.007)
Income Proportion	0.611*	0.606*	0.600*	0.602*	0.365	0.345	0.343	0.356	0.783*	0.783*	0.783*	0.780*
	(0.281)	(0.281)	(0.282)	(0.282)	(0.433)	(0.432)	(0.434)	(0.433)	(0.373)	(0.373)	(0.373)	(0.373)
Squared Income Proportion	-0.391*	-0.388	-0.383	-0.385	-0.301	-0.287	-0.285	-0.295	-0.447	-0.447	-0.448	-0.445
	(0.199)	(0.199)	(0.199)	(0.199)	(0.307)	(0.307)	(0.308)	(0.307)	(0.264)	(0.264)	(0.264)	(0.264)
Logged Familial Total Income	0.062***	0.063***	0.061***	0.063***	0.062***	0.067***	0.061***	0.068***	0.071***	0.071***	0.070***	0.070***
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)
Total Number of Kids (ref: 1 child)												
No Child	-0.086	-0.088	-0.087	-0.088+	-0.199	-0.208	-0.199	-0.209	-0.054	-0.054	-0.055	-0.055
	(0.052)	(0.052)	(0.052)	(0.052)	(0.112)	(0.112)	(0.112)	(0.112)	(0.060)	(0.060)	(0.060)	(0.060)
>1 Children	-0.005	-0.006	-0.005	-0.006	-0.037	-0.037	-0.037	-0.037	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03
	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.034)
Constant	4.088***	4.113***	4.078***	4.105***	4.238***	4.277***	4.233***	4.283***	3.853***	3.853***	3.839***	3.823***
	(0.283)	(0.283)	(0.283)	(0.284)	(0.404)	(0.404)	(0.405)	(0.405)	(0.406)	(0.407)	(0.407)	(0.409)
Observations	5,106	5,106	5,106	5,106	2,341	2,341	2,341	2,341	2,765	2,765	2,765	2,765
R-squared	0.017	0.018	0.018	0.018	0.021	0.024	0.022	0.024	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02
Adj. R-squared	0.015	0.015	0.015	0.015	0.016	0.018	0.016	0.018	0.016	0.015	0.015	0.015

Note: \*\*\* p<0.001, \*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.05. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. Other control variables include education, age, age2, rural hukou.

Table 6. SEM of Relative Housework Contribution and Wives' Family Status Satisfaction

VARIABLES	ALL			RURAL			URBAN		
	OLS SatFam	Mlogit Hus_More	Mlogit Wife_More	OLS SatFam	Mlogit Hus_More	Mlogit Wife_More	OLS SatFam	Mlogit Hus_More	Mlogit Wife_More
Husband Does More	0.0547 (0.044)			0.0221 (0.067)			0.0887 (0.057)		
Wife Does More	-0.0828** (0.027)			-0.027 (0.041)			-0.128*** (0.035)		
Income Proportion	0.118 (0.182)	-3.353** (1.241)	-5.402*** (0.813)	0.245 (0.255)	-2.99 (1.838)	-5.476*** (1.188)	-0.0454 (0.274)	-1.683 (1.924)	-5.463*** (1.161)
Squared Income Proportion	-0.0674 (0.183)	3.101** (1.140)	3.897*** (0.772)	-0.198 (0.277)	1.869 (1.908)	4.228*** (1.200)	0.0869 (0.257)	2.317 (1.629)	3.795*** (1.054)
Logged Familial Total Income	0.123*** (0.014)	-0.255** (0.086)	-0.0504 (0.053)	0.121*** (0.019)	-0.254* (0.122)	0.0381 (0.075)	0.143*** (0.022)	-0.226 (0.128)	-0.140 (0.078)
Total Number of Kids (ref: 1 child)									
No Child	-0.0602 (0.066)	0.259 (0.325)	-0.294 (0.215)	-0.177 (0.149)	0.111 (0.771)	0.125 (0.526)	-0.0313 (0.074)	0.362 (0.365)	-0.355 (0.241)
>1 Children	-0.0636* (0.026)	-0.354* (0.163)	0.243* (0.098)	-0.0899** (0.035)	-0.3 (0.213)	0.218 (0.134)	-0.0535 (0.041)	-0.432 (0.283)	0.372* (0.155)
Work Time		0.0560** (0.020)	-8.35E-05 (0.012)		0.0504 (0.030)	-0.0145 (0.018)		0.0618* (0.029)	0.0142 (0.016)
Lesure Time		0.0850* (0.036)	0.036 (0.023)		0.126* (0.049)	0.018 (0.032)		0.018 (0.055)	0.048 (0.032)
Constant	3.587*** (0.299)	1.423 (1.726)	0.496 (1.080)	3.631*** (0.401)	2.53 (2.299)	-0.976 (1.490)	3.413*** (0.472)	-0.456 (2.744)	2.057 (1.647)
var(e.satfam)	0.499*** (0.010)			0.511*** (0.015)			0.482*** (0.014)		
Observations	4,792			2,359			2,433		
Log likelihood	-8569			-4091			-4444		
BIC	17503.41			8516			9224.173		

Note: \*\*\* p<0.001, \*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.05. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. Other control variables include education, age, age2, rural hukou.

Table 7. SEM of Relative Housework Contribution and Husbands' Family Status Satisfaction

VARIABLES	ALL			RURAL			URBAN		
	OLS SatFam	Mlogit Hus_More	Mlogit Wife_More	OLS SatFam	Mlogit Hus_More	Mlogit Wife_More	OLS SatFam	Mlogit Hus_More	Mlogit Wife_More
Husband Does More	-0.0750* (0.037)			-0.0476 (0.055)			-0.0989* (0.049)		
Wife Does More	-0.007 (0.023)			0.022 (0.037)			-0.033 (0.030)		
Income Proportion	0.583* (0.282)	-5.241*** (1.332)	3.645** (1.142)	0.312 (0.435)	-6.979*** (2.116)	5.169** (1.859)	0.763* (0.373)	-4.011* (1.786)	2.306 (1.452)
Squared Income Proportion	-0.363 (0.200)	4.284*** (0.996)	-1.359 (0.825)	-0.264 (0.309)	5.764*** (1.572)	-2.749* (1.343)	-0.415 (0.264)	3.144* (1.346)	-0.156 (1.052)
Logged Familial Total Income	0.0638*** (0.012)	-0.0102 (0.075)	0.0642 (0.050)	0.0623*** (0.017)	-0.0555 (0.109)	0.0751 (0.074)	0.0742*** (0.017)	0.0459 (0.111)	0.0911 (0.070)
Total Number of Kids (ref: 1 child)									
No Child	-0.0753 (0.052)	-0.0239 (0.261)	-1.059*** (0.185)	-0.193 (0.112)	-1.397* (0.677)	-1.301*** (0.385)	-0.0435 (0.060)	0.263 (0.295)	-1.028*** (0.215)
>1 Children	-0.00599 (0.022)	-0.181 (0.145)	0.312*** (0.094)	-0.0393 (0.030)	-0.550** (0.192)	0.105 (0.133)	0.0306 (0.034)	0.182 (0.236)	0.478** (0.146)
Work Time		-0.0344 (0.018)	0.0278* (0.012)		-0.0646* (0.028)	0.00713 (0.019)		-0.0098 (0.025)	0.0433** (0.016)
Lesure Time		-0.045 (0.032)	0.0557** (0.020)		-0.064 (0.046)	0.032 (0.031)		-0.043 (0.046)	0.0653* (0.028)
Constant	4.041*** (0.281)	1.777 (1.679)	-2.273* (1.142)	4.230*** (0.402)	2.827 (2.456)	-3.055 (1.723)	3.776*** (0.404)	1.441 (2.442)	-1.177 (1.581)
var(e.satfam)	0.404*** (0.008)			0.402*** (0.012)			0.403*** (0.011)		
Observations	5,110			2,342			2,768		
Log likelihood	-8696			-3883			-4779		
BIC	17759.74			8100.12			9898.906		

Note: \*\*\* p<0.001, \*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.05. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. Other control variables include education, age, age2, rural hukou.

Table 8. SEM of Housework Time and Wives' Family Status Satisfaction

VARIABLES	ALL		RURAL		URBAN	
	SatFam	Housework	SatFam	Housework	SatFam	Housework
Housework Time	-0.00589 (0.007)		-0.001 (0.009)		-0.018 (0.010)	
Work Time		-0.188*** (0.006)		-0.206*** (0.010)		-0.166*** (0.009)
Leisure Time		-0.017 (0.012)		-0.060*** (0.017)		0.031 (0.016)
Income Proportion	0.157 (0.182)	-1.276*** (0.360)	0.261 (0.256)	-2.151*** (0.539)	0.03 (0.275)	-0.225 (0.500)
Squared Income Proportion	-0.0888 (0.183)	0.602 (0.361)	-0.209 (0.278)	1.647** (0.583)	0.050 (0.258)	-0.476 (0.469)
Logged Family Total Income	0.122*** (0.014)	-0.154*** (0.028)	0.120*** (0.019)	-0.0453 (0.040)	0.142*** (0.022)	-0.273*** (0.040)
Total Number of Kids (ref: 1 child)						
No Child	-0.0534 (0.066)	-0.307* (0.131)	-0.177 (0.149)	-0.103 (0.315)	-0.021 (0.075)	-0.334* (0.135)
>1 Children	-0.0710** (0.026)	0.118* (0.051)	-0.0929** (0.034)	0.101 (0.073)	-0.0686 (0.041)	0.119 (0.075)
Constant	3.619*** (0.303)	5.747*** (0.593)	3.640*** (0.403)	4.638*** (0.848)	3.456*** (0.478)	6.792*** (0.860)
var(e.satfam)	0.501*** (0.010)		0.511*** (0.015)		0.487*** (0.014)	
var(e.hwtime)	1.956*** (0.040)		2.284*** (0.067)		1.599*** (0.046)	
Observations	4,802		2,362		2,440	
Log likelihood	-13564		-6876		-6614	
BIC	27373.61		13976.68		13453.95	

Note: \*\*\* p<0.001, \*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.05. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. Other control variables include education, age, age2, rural hukou.

Table 9. SEM of Housework Time and Husbands' Family Status Satisfaction

VARIABLES	ALL		RURAL		URBAN	
	SatFam	Housework	SatFam	Housework	SatFam	Housework
Housework Time	-0.0174*		-0.011		-0.025*	
	(0.008)		(0.011)		(0.010)	
Work Time		-0.115***		-0.092***		-0.135***
		(0.005)		(0.008)		(0.007)
Lesure Time		(0.010)		0.017		-0.033**
		(0.008)		(0.012)		(0.012)
Income Proportion	0.611*	-2.256***	0.365	-3.766***	0.783*	-0.969
	(0.281)	(0.491)	(0.431)	(0.779)	(0.372)	(0.628)
Squared Income Proportion	-0.391*	1.130**	-0.301	2.172***	-0.447	0.218
	(0.199)	(0.347)	(0.306)	(0.553)	(0.263)	(0.444)
Logged Family Total Income	0.062***	-0.119***	0.062***	-0.142***	0.071***	-0.129***
	(0.012)	(0.021)	(0.017)	(0.030)	(0.017)	(0.029)
Total Number of Kids (ref: 1 child)						
No Child	-0.0861	0.0417	-0.199	-0.205	-0.054	0.0801
	(0.052)	(0.091)	(0.111)	(0.202)	(0.060)	(0.101)
>1 Children	-0.0051	-0.062	-0.0372	-0.0814	0.0296	-0.0381
	(0.022)	(0.038)	(0.030)	(0.054)	(0.034)	(0.057)
Constant	4.088***	4.635***	4.238***	4.818***	3.853***	4.773***
	(0.282)	(0.491)	(0.403)	(0.725)	(0.405)	(0.682)
var(e.satfam)	0.404***		0.402***		0.403***	
	(0.008)		(0.012)		(0.011)	
var(e.hwtime)	1.238***		1.320***		1.150***	
	(0.025)		(0.039)		(0.031)	
Observations	5,117		2,345		2,772	
Log likelihood	-12740		-5908		-6795	
BIC	25727.26		12041.91		13819.59	

Note: \*\*\* p<0.001, \*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.05. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. Other control variables include education, age, age2, rural hukou.



