The Power of Legitimacy

Local Cooperation and the Effectiveness of Peace Operations

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Abstract

This thesis investigates how peace operations work. It contributes to the larger study of peace operation effectiveness by analysing the processes through which these institutions influence local actors in postconflict societies. Looking beyond traditional concerns with mandates and resources, it aims to understand *how* a peace operation seeks to achieve its goals, focusing on why local populations might cooperate with or obstruct its activities.

The thesis draws on theories of social power, compliance and legitimation to answer four central questions: what power do peace operations have to achieve their objectives? From where do peace operations derive power? How do local perceptions of an operation enable or constrain its effectiveness? How are peace operations legitimised at the local level, and with what effect?

It begins by critically reviewing the academic literature, arguing that existing approaches are unable to account for important dimensions of peace operation effectiveness because they neglect the local setting in which operations pursue their goals, and the extent to which the achievement of those goals requires local cooperation. It then develops an analytical framework to examine the processes of coercion, inducement and legitimacy through which peace operations seek to shape the decisions and actions of local actors.

This power-legitimacy framework is applied to study the effectiveness of the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) and the Regional Assistance Mission in Solomon Islands (RAMSI). By comparing variation in local cooperation between and within these cases, the thesis shows that the way a peace operation is locally perceived is an important but often overlooked determinant of its effectiveness. In particular, when local actors perceive a peace operation to be legitimate, they are more likely to behave in ways that assist the operation to achieve its goals. The thesis concludes by discussing the implications of this finding for the future study and practice of peace operations.

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Acronyms

ANKI	National Army of Independent Kampuchea (Armee Nationale pour UN Kampuchea Independent)
BLDP	Buddhist Liberal Democratic Party
CPAF	Cambodian People's Armed Forces
CPP	Cambodian People's Party
FUNCINPEC	National United Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful, and Cooperative Cambodia
HMAS	His/Her Majesty's Australian Ship
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IFM	Istabu Freedom Movement
IPMT	International Peace Monitoring Team
KPNLAF	Khmer People's National Liberation Armed Forces
KPNLF	Khmer People's National Liberation Front
MEF	Malaitan Eagle Force
MMWG	Mixed Military Working Group
NADK	National Army of Democratic Kampuchea
NPC	National Peace Council
ONUC	United Nations Operation in the Congo
PDK	The Party of Democratic Kampuchea
PIF	Pacific Islands Forum
PPF	Participating Police Force
RAMSI	Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands
RCAF	Royal Cambodian Armed Forces
RSIP	Royal Solomon Islands Police
SNC	Supreme National Council
SOC	State of Cambodia
SRSG	Special Representative of the Secretary-General
UNAMIC	United Nations Advance Mission in Cambodia
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNMIK	United Nations Mission in Kosovo
UNMO	United Nations Military Observer
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
UNTAC	United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia
UNTAES	United Nations Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium
UNTAG	United Nations Transition Assistance Group
UNTSO	United Nations Truce Supervision Organization in the Middle East
UNV	United Nations Volunteer

Introduction

> *'Power and legitimacy are not antithetical but complementary. The obverse of the legitimacy of power is the power of legitimacy; rulers seek legitimization not only to satisfy their consciences but also to buttress their positions. Legitimacy, in short, not only makes most rulers more comfortable but makes all rulers more effective – more secure in the possession of power and more successful in its exercise.'*
>
> Inis Claude[1]

In the two decades since the end of the Cold War, peace operations have rapidly evolved from short-term deployments with relatively limited objectives into deeply intrusive, ambitious institutions which aim for enduring social transformation in some of the world's most vulnerable societies.[2] Yet in the face of such escalating expectations, we know surprisingly little about what it is that peace operations actually *can* do and where their limits lie. One reason for this is that we know very little about *how* peace operations achieve what they do.

Scholars and practitioners have tried to divine such knowledge through inductive research, mining case studies for lessons that might yield insights on why peace operations succeed and fail. However, the desire to learn lessons for the next operation has directed analysis too much toward outcomes, to the neglect of understanding the processes that lead to them.

This thesis investigates how peace operations work by analysing their effects on the behaviour of local actors in postconflict societies. Peace operations have been principally analysed as international institutions – as instruments for addressing collective security problems – and evaluated according to their functionality as technical mechanisms for building peace. This prevailing framework is unable to account for important dimensions of peace operation

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[1] Inis L. Claude, Jr., 'Collective Legitimization as a Political Function of the United Nations' *International Organization* 20, no. 3 (1966) p.368.

[2] On the ambitious and transformative goals of peace operations, see Mats Berdal *Building Peace After War* (Abingdon: Routledge, for the International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2009), p.13

performance because it neglects the social interactions through which these institutions operate at the local level. Crucially, it tells us little about what power a peace operation has to achieve its objectives, and why local populations might cooperate with or obstruct its activities.

To better understand how peace operations work, this thesis develops a new analytical framework which investigates their power relationship with local actors. It looks beyond traditional concerns with mandates and resources to examine the processes of coercion, inducement and legitimacy through which peace operations seek to influence and shape local behaviour. It draws on theories of social power, compliance and legitimation to answer four central questions: what power do peace operations have to achieve their objectives? From where do peace operations derive power? How do local perceptions of an operation enable or constrain its effectiveness? How are peace operations legitimised at the local level, and with what effect?

The concept of local legitimacy is afforded particular attention throughout, enabling much-needed analysis of the local dimension of peace operations. By asking how peace operations are 'seen from below', the power-legitimacy framework allows analysis of the causal processes through which local perceptions of an operation enable or constrain its effectiveness.[3] Through in-depth studies of UNTAC and RAMSI, this thesis shows that the way a peace operation is locally perceived is an important but often overlooked determinant of its

[3] Beatrice Pouligny makes a persuasive argument for scholars to accord more attention to local experiences; while complementary, the instrumental approach of this thesis is distinguished from Pouligny's normative approach by its concern with how local perceptions affect the outcomes of peace operations; see Béatrice Pouligny, *Peace Operations Seen from Below: UN Missions and Local People* (London: Hurst & Co, 2006), and more detailed discussion in Chapter One.

effectiveness.[4] In particular, when a peace operation is perceived to be legitimate, it is more likely to receive high-quality cooperation from local actors.

This thesis identifies and addresses two specific gaps in the peace operations literature. First, the institutional character of peace operations is rarely acknowledged or analysed; instead, scholars have examined peace operations as technical mechanisms for managing international security, or as manifestations of powerful international actors and their interests. Second, peace operations are principally understood as policy instruments of actors in the international realm, rather than institutions of power and authority in the domestic realm. These gaps mean that we have not yet adequately understood the processes through which peace operations work, and further, that we do not yet have an appropriate analytical framework for explaining how the perspectives of local people affect the performance of peace operations. The following sections show how these gaps are addressed in this thesis. In the first section, peace operations are defined as institutions that have agency in the local societies into which they are deployed.[5] In the following section, the goals of peace operations are examined not as technical functions, but as objectives that require different types of cooperation from a diverse range of local actors, including political and military elites, rank-and-file soldiers, community leaders, and the broader population. Finally, a more conceptually robust account of how peace operations work at the local level is achieved in this thesis through the development of a power-legitimacy framework to analyse their interactions with local actors.

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[4] 'Effectiveness' is defined as the extent to which a peace operation achieves its goals. These goals are identified in the formal mandates of operations, as well as in broader communication trails that include the statements of personnel.

[5] Agency is defined here as the capacity for autonomous social action, and refers to the ability of peace operations to act independently of their structural constraints. While peace operations have more often been analysed through a structural lens which focuses, for example, on the determinative effects of the distribution of power in the international system or of international norms, this thesis focuses on peace operations as agents and is interested in the ways in which they can determine their own outcomes ("Agency" in *Dictionary of the Social Sciences*, ed Craig Calhoun. (Oxford Reference Online, Oxford University Press, 2002) http://www.oxfordreference.com/views/ENTRY .html?subview=Main&entry=-t104.e35).

Defining peace operations: linking institutional agency and effectiveness

I define peace operations as institutions deployed from the international realm, seeking to address complex security, political and development crises in the domestic sphere of states with recent experience of violent conflict. The term 'peace operations' thus encompasses peacekeeping, peacebuilding and statebuilding activities.[6] Peace operations may be deployed with or without a prior peace agreement; they may have 'robust' enforcement powers, though they are distinguished from warfare operations in that they do not seek to destroy or conquer an enemy; and they operate through direct, social, interpersonal relationships with individuals and groups at the local level. While most peace operations have historically been authorised by the United Nations, they may also be delegated by regional organisations such as the African Union or the Pacific Islands Forum, by other coalitions of states, or even by a single state.

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[6] *Peacebuilding* is defined as 'the creation within a country of a self-perpetuating mechanism or process for the sustainable management of disputes in order to pre-empt violent conflict'; see Chetan Kumar, *Building Peace in Haiti* (Boulder, London: Lynne Rienner, 1998), pp.30-31. Peacebuilding activities vary across operations, but include: the reintegration of combatants into civilian society; strengthening the rule of law; promoting human rights; providing technical assistance for governance and governance reform as well as public services such as health and education; encouraging the growth of indigenous civil society and independent media; and promoting social reconciliation; see United Nations, *Report on the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (the Brahimi Report), 21 August 2000, (a/55/305-S/2000/809)* United Nations, 21 August 2000; Boutros Boutros-Ghali, *An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-Keeping* A/47/277, United Nations, 1992. *Peacekeeping* is often distinguished as those elements of this agenda which have a specific military security dimension. As I argue later in this chapter, the defining characteristic of peace operations is their dual identity as institutions of both international and domestic governance; this definition of peace operations therefore excludes 'traditional, 'first-generation', 'Cold War' peacekeeping, which refers to the practices of operations, usually military, deployed to monitor peace settlements in interstate conflicts, since these lack a significant role in local, domestic governance; see Goulding, 'The Evolution of United Nations Peacekeeping' p.456. *Statebuilding* is defined as 'a particular approach to peacebuilding, premised on the recognition that achieving security and development in societies emerging from civil war partly depends on the existence of capable, autonomous and legitimate governmental institutions'; see Roland Paris and Timothy D. Sisk, 'Introduction: Understanding the Contradictions of Postwar Statebuilding' in *The Dilemmas of Statebuilding: Confronting the Contradictions of Postwar Peace Operations*, ed. Roland Paris and Timothy D. Sisk (London, New York: Routledge, 2008) pp.1-2. Statebuilding involves 'constructing or reconstructing institutions of governance capable of providing citizens with physical and economic security'; see Simon Chesterman, *You, the People: The United Nations, Transitional Administration, and State-Building* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004) p.5.

Peace operations are understood here as institutions comprising sets of rules, norms and decision-making processes.[7] Unlike conventional definitions of institutions in international relations theory, I am not concerned with the effects of institutions on *state* behaviour, but consider the role of peace operations in shaping the decisions and actions of *local populations*.[8] Many studies of peace operations conceptualise them as broad configurations of many actors, including both the delegating institution (the United Nations, for example) and the field operation. Other actors, such as international donors or non-governmental organisations, are also often included in these broad definitions. However, the term 'peace operations' is used here to refer only to the field operation, as the inclusion of a large number of actors within the 'peace operation' conflates their roles and analytically obscures the role of operational agency in determining effectiveness.

The literature on peace operations has to date focused on identifying the functions of peace operations and their evolving roles in international politics,[9] analysing changes in peace operations through the lens of international power shifts and norms of global order,[10] and

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[7] This conception of institutions borrows from that of Robert O. Keohane, but differs in applying it to local actors rather than states; see Robert O. Keohane, *International Institutions and State Power: Essays in International Relations Theory* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1989).

[8] While I acknowledge that the relationship between peace operations and local actors may be mutually constitutive, the scope of this thesis is limited to examining the ways in which a peace operation can influence local actors in order to better understand this part of the effectiveness puzzle.

[9] On the functions of peace operations, see Steven R. Ratner, *The New UN Peacekeeping: Building Peace in Lands of Conflict after the Cold War* (New York: St Martin's, 1995); John MacKinlay and Jarat Chopra, 'Second Generation Multinational Operations' *Washington Quarterly* 15, no. 3 (1992); Goulding, 'The Evolution of United Nations Peacekeeping'; Ramesh Thakur and Schnabel Albrecht, *United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Ad Hoc Missions, Permanent Engagement* (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2001); William Durch, ed., *UN Peacekeeping, American Policy, and the Uncivil Wars of the 1990s* (New York: St Martin's, 1996); Paul F Diehl, Daniel Druckman, and James Wall, 'International Peacekeeping and Conflict Resolution: A Taxonomic Analysis with Implications' *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 42, no. 1 (1998); Marrack Goulding, 'The Use of Force by the United Nations' *International Peacekeeping* 3, no. 1 (1996); Jarat Chopra, 'The UN's Kingdom of East Timor' *Survival* 42, no. 3 (2000). On the evolving international roles of peace operations, see Roberts, 'The Crisis in UN Peacekeeping' ; Adam Roberts, 'From San Francisco to Sarajevo: The UN and the Use of Force' *Survival* 37, no. 4 (1995); Shashi Tharoor, 'Should UN Peacekeeping Go 'Back to Basics'?' *Survival* 37, no. 4 (1995); John Gerard Ruggie, 'Wandering in the Void: Charting the UN's New Strategic Role' *Foreign Affairs* 72, no. 5 (1993).

[10] On peace operations and international power, see Mats Berdal, 'The Security Council and Peacekeeping' in *The United Nations Security Council and War: The Evolution of Thought and Practice since 1945*, ed. A. V. Lowe, et al. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008); Robert Jackson, 'International

evaluating the design and implementation of their mandates through case studies.[11] More recently, scholars have tried to evaluate *whether* peace operations 'work', using quantitative and mixed methods approaches.[12] In studies of peace operation effectiveness, however, the focus on mandates and appropriate resource allocation dominates analysis. The best of existing scholarship remains too static in its analysis, thus overlooking the role of a peace operation's practices in determining its success or failure. For example, the detailed comparative studies conducted by Stephen Stedman *et. al.* and Michael Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis both find that effectiveness is determined by allocating the right mandates and adequate resources to match the difficulty of the conflict setting.[13] Mandates are typically evaluated in a narrow, policy-oriented manner that conceives of peace operations as important only insofar as they perform functions that solve international collective action problems. They focus on processes at the international level, such as the bureaucratic efficiency of the United Nations

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Engagement in War-Torn Countries' *Global Governance* 10 (2004). On peace operations and global norms, see Dominik Zaum, *The Sovereignty Paradox: The Norms and Politics of International Statebuilding* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007); Alex J. Bellamy, Paul Williams, and Stuart Griffin, *Understanding Peacekeeping* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2004); Roland Paris, 'International Peacebuilding and the 'Mission Civilisatrice'' *Review of International Studies* 28 (2002); Oliver P. Richmond, 'UN Peace Operations and the Dilemmas of the Peacebuilding Consensus' *International Peacekeeping* 11, no. 2 (2004); Oliver P. Richmond and Jason Franks, *Liberal Peace Transitions: Between Statebuilding and Peacebuilding (*Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2009); David Chandler, *Empire in Denial : The Politics of State-Building* (London: Pluto, 2006).

[11] See Elizabeth M. Cousens, Chetan Kumar, and Karin Wermester, eds., *Peacebuilding as Politics: Cultivating Peace in Fragile Societies* (Boulder, London: Lynne Rienner, 2001); Paris, *At War's End* ; Stephen John Stedman, Donald S. Rothchild, and Elizabeth M. Cousens, *Ending Civil Wars : The Implementation of Peace Agreements* (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 2002); L. M. Howard, 'UN Peace Implementation in Namibia: The Causes of Success' *International Peacekeeping* 9, no. 1 (2002); Michael Mersiades, 'Peacekeeping and Legitimacy: Lessons from Cambodia and Somalia' *International Peacekeeping* 12, no. 2 (2005); Jane Boulden, *Peace Enforcement: The United Nations Experience in Congo, Somalia and Bosnia* (Westport, Conn. ; London: Praeger, 2001); Walter Clark and Jeffrey Herbst, 'Somalia and the Future of Humanitarian Intervention' *Foreign Affairs* 75, no. 2 (1996); Anthony Goldstone, 'UNTAET with Hindsight: The Peculiarities of Politics in an Incomplete State' *Global Governance* 10 (2004); James Mayall, *The New Interventionism 1991-1994: United Nations Experience in Cambodia, Former Yugoslavia and Somalia* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996)

[12] Michael W. Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis, *Making War and Building Peace: United Nations Peace Operations* (Princeton, N.J.; Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2006); Virginia Page Fortna, *Does Peacekeeping Work?: Shaping Belligerents' Choices after Civil War* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008).

[13] Stedman, Rothchild, and Cousens, *Ending Civil Wars: The Implementation of Peace Agreements*; Doyle and Sambanis, *Making War and Building Peace.*

or the political debates of the Security Council, which, though important, have obscured the local-level processes that ultimately determine whether mandates are translated into reality.

I argue that peace operations should not be understood simply as instruments of the powerful, nor as policy tools defined by their functional mandates, nor as the organisational embodiments of the international normative consensus. While they may exhibit elements of each of these conceptions, I am concerned here with investigating *how* peace operations work in the local societies into which they are deployed; in particular, this thesis investigates the processes through which a peace operation affects the behaviour of different local actors. Peace operations are understood here, then, as institutions with agency, operating with given mandates and within the constraints of a given conflict setting. Each operation is shaped to some extent by power struggles in the international realm, by the particular understanding of the collective action problem and the solution embodied in its mandate, and by the normative structures of international society. But the focus of this thesis is on how the practices of peace operations influence the willingness of local actors to cooperate.

Importantly, it shows that the decisions and behaviour of local actors are not the inevitable results of fixed interests and beliefs, but that the implementing practices of operations can significantly shape these perceptions in ways that affect the cooperation decisions of local actors. Rather than attempting comprehensive analysis of all effectiveness determinants, the aims of this thesis are more modest. The extent to which a specific operation can achieve its goals is dependent on three variables: the nature of its goals; the difficulty of their achievement in a given conflict setting; and the implementing practices of peace operations. But my focus here is limited to the third determinant, for the following two reasons.

First, research has shown that peace operations are sent to hard cases and that they are often tasked with over-ambitious mandates despite being under-resourced.[14] That suggests that it is useful to understand the extent to which a peace operation itself can enhance its effectiveness through implementation practices, independent of the nature of its goals and the conflict setting in which it pursues them. Alternatively, it may be that an operation can change its goals, or persuade its international principals to adjust its mandate; further, an operation will seek to change the conflict setting in ways conducive to the accomplishment of its goals. The three determinants of effectiveness are thus not independent of one another. However, it is possible to separate each category analytically such that, regardless of the ease or difficulty of a peace operation's mandate in a particular conflict context, we can investigate and evaluate the causal affect of an operation independent of the given constraints in which it operates.

Second, the literature has yet to rigorously analyse the agency of peace operations. By developing an analytical framework through which the implementing practices of an operation can be examined within the given constraints of its goals and conflict setting, this thesis aims to overcome these limitations of the existing literature. In doing so, it aims to shed light on that part of the effectiveness puzzle which concerns peace operation agency.

Peace operations in the local realm: understanding the cooperation of local actors

A defining characteristic of peace operations is their functional duality as institutions of both international and domestic governance. However, as I argue in Chapter One, they have been inadequately analysed at the local (domestic) level. Once we understand peace operations as

[14] Fortna, *Does Peacekeeping Work?*; James Dobbins, 'The UN's Role in Nation-Building: From the Belgian Congo to Iraq' *Survival* 46, no. 4 (2004).

institutions of local governance, we can ask new questions about how peace operations work, and what types of goals they pursue.

Peace operations act through direct, hierarchical relationships with local populations, pursuing multiple objectives in ways that require local cooperation. As their scope expanded through the 1990s, peace operations moved beyond the frontlines and buffer zones of Cold War peacekeeping to reach deeper within their target societies. They engage communities, groups and individuals in a multitude of goals: maintaining and sometimes enforcing ceasefires; conducting elections; reforming public institutions; disarming and reintegrating combatants; implementing peace agreements; repatriating refugees; and even assuming full administrative control over a territory. Whatever their precise configuration, however, the goals of contemporary peace operations have a common target: to change the behaviour of local actors in ways that accord with their vision of a peaceful society. In the context of states recently wracked by violent conflict and insecurity, this amounts to no less than social transformation, including changing the identities of powerful actors, shifting the locus of power competition from violence to politics, and encouraging the interests and beliefs of local people to move towards peace and away from war. To be effective, peace operations thus require the active cooperation of a diverse range of individuals and groups within local societies.

Few studies of peace operations have rigorously examined the behaviour of local actors, despite seeking to explain such inherently behavioural outcomes as ceasefires, disarmament and democratisation. Those studies that have done so do not reach beyond the direct study of peace operations to engage existing theories of social power.[15] Chapter Two finds that theories of social power, compliance, authority and legitimacy in social psychology, political theory, political science, sociology and law offer explanatory leverage in the context of peace

[15] See the discussion in Part 3 of Chapter One.

operations. These theoretical insights are adapted to the dynamics of peace operations through the development of a power-legitimacy framework. Before outlining this framework, however, it is necessary first to say a little more about the approach to cooperation adopted in this thesis.

Cooperation is understood here as a nuanced indicator of behaviour, not a binary variable; it refers to the *depth* of behavioural conformity to a specified rule, norm or other request issued by an authority. An actor's cooperation can therefore be conceptualised on a continuum that ranges from the active resistance of a peace operation and its goals; to minimal compliance with its behavioural requests and/or the tacit acceptance of an operation's presence; to active cooperation and partnership with the larger project of social transformation.

The degree of cooperation is assessed through in-depth case studies to investigate the nature of interactions between local actors and a peace operation. Examples of local groups shooting at peace operations or preventing voter registration through intimidation of local populations would be evidence of active resistance of a peace operation; the surrender of weapons or persons to a peace operation would indicate compliance, as would obeying electoral codes or other rules set by an operation; and the active support by leaders and community groups of a peace operation's programs to disarm and reintegrate combatants, or to encourage voter registration and electoral participation, would indicate cooperation. These examples are by no means exhaustive, but illustrate the spectrum on which the depth of local cooperation will be assessed in the case studies of Chapters Three to Six.

The question of why actors comply with authorities has occupied scholars in a number of disciplines. In international relations, scholars have sought to explain the reasons that states comply (or not) with international regimes;[16] international legal theorists have considered why

[16] Andrew Walter, *Governing Finance: East Asia's Adoption of International Standards* (Ithica: Cornell University Press, 2008); George W. Downs, David M. Rocke, and Peter N. Barsoom, 'Is the Good

states comply with particular rules and principles;[17] political theorists have asked why citizens comply with governments;[18] and social psychologists have examined why people obey domestic law.[19]

Few scholars have asked why local actors choose to comply with peace operations, and those that have limit their analysis to a political economy model of rational-actor decision-making which overlooks the normative bases on which local people may choose to alter their behaviour.[20] The reasons for which local actors choose to provide high quality cooperation to peace operations have suffered even greater neglect. While some goals of peace operations may only require minimal compliance, such as disarmament or allowing an operation to move freely within a territory, the social nature of peacebuilding goals means that they require a deeper level of cooperation from many types of local actors.[21] For example, holding free and fair elections requires local people to voluntarily 'buy in' to the project of political transformation: peace operations thus require people to cooperate by registering to vote and turning out on election day. Repatriating refugees requires the cooperation of resident populations in reintegration programs, and sometimes it requires the cooperation of governing factions in the logistical organisation of returns. At a fundamental level, operations need the active support of political elites, community leaders and broad social groupings to

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News About Compliance Good News About Cooperation?' *International Organization* 50, no. 3 (1996); Kal Raustiala and Anne-Marie Slaughter, 'International Law, International Relations and Compliance' in *Handbook of International Relations*, ed. Walter Carlsnaes, et al. (London: Sage, 2002).

[17] Thomas M. Franck, *The Power of Legitimacy among Nations* (New York ; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990); Harold Hongju Koh, 'Why Do Nations Obey International Law?' *The Yale Law Journal* 106, no. 8 (1997).

[18] Margaret Levi, *Of Rule and Revenue* (Berkeley; London: University of California Press, 1988); Margaret Levi, *Consent, Dissent, and Patriotism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).

[19] Tom R. Tyler, *Why People Obey the Law* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006).

[20] See Stephen John Stedman, 'Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes' *International Security* 22, no. 2 (1997); Fortna, *Does Peacekeeping Work?*. Part 3 of Chapter One examines this literature in depth.

[21] The term 'social' is a somewhat loaded concept in constructivist debates about 'mutual constitution'. I use it here in the broader sense to refer to processes of human interaction as distinct from the military or technical capacities so often associated with peace operations.

promote the vision that disputes should be resolved peacefully through political process, not through violent conflict.

The specific nature of the required cooperation will vary between operational contexts, and in this thesis will be examined through in-depth study of operations in Cambodia and Solomon Islands. Careful empirical research is also required to distinguish between the multiple possible reasons for a single act of cooperation. This thesis studies specific cases of cooperation in the operational settings of UNTAC and RAMSI to identify the ways in which those peace operations affected the behaviour of local actors.

The analytical framework: power and legitimacy

Power

The direct relationship between peace operations and local populations is one of power. To secure the local cooperation they need, operations seek to influence the behaviour of local actors through the exercise of power. A key contribution of this thesis is the development of an analytical framework to examine this power, focusing on how peace operations get local actors to cooperate with their rules, requests, procedures and goals.

Unlike much of the literature on peace operations, this thesis foregrounds their exercise of power. While power debates in international relations sometimes focus on 'power-as-resources', this thesis conceptualises power through a relational approach, in which 'power is an actual or potential relationship between two or more actors...rather than a property of any

one of them'.[22] It focuses, then, on the social power relationship between a peace operation and local populations.

An important debate in the relational power literature concerns the broadening of causation to include not just the direct power of one actor over another but also the indirect means through which power is exercised. Known as the 'faces of power' debate, it contributed significantly to our understanding of how influence is exerted by identifying agenda-setting power and the power to control the desires and preferences of others.[23]

While acknowledging that peace operations may have other forms of power, I focus on the direct relations of control captured by the concept of compulsory power:[24] the ability of an actor (A) to directly influence the behaviour of others (B) to get the outcomes it wants, exercised through coercion, inducement and legitimacy.[25] Importantly, this involves getting (B) to do something it otherwise would not do;[26] that is, power is not observed if the behaviour of local actors would change regardless of a peace operation's presence.

The defining characteristic of compulsory power is not the presence or absence of coercion, but the *nature* of the interactions through which a power relationship operates: it refers to the

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[22] see David A. Baldwin, 'Power and International Relations' in *Handbook of International Relations*, ed. Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse-Kappen, and Beth A. Simmons (London: Sage, 2002) p.178.

[23] Peter Bachrach and Morton S. Baratz, 'Two Faces of Power' *The American Political Science Review* 56, no. 4 (1962); Kenneth Ewart Boulding, *Three Faces of Power* (Newbury Park: Sage, 1989); Steven Lukes, *Power: A Radical View* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005).

[24] On compulsory power, see Michael N. Barnett and Raymond Duvall, *Power in Global Governance* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).

[25] While typologies vary slightly, this tripartite framework has been employed in social psychology research (see Herbert C. Kelman, 'Processes of Opinion Change' *Public Opinion Quarterly* 25 (1961); John R.P. French and Bertram H. Raven, 'The Bases of Social Power' in *Studies in Social Power*, ed. Dorwin Cartwright (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1959)), political theory (see Boulding, *Three Faces of Power* ;Levi, *Of Rule and Revenue*), sociology (Talcott Parsons, 'On the Concept of Political Power' *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society* 107, no. 3 (1963)), law (Daniel Bodansky, 'The Legitimacy of International Governance' *The American Journal of International Law* 93, no. 3 (1999); Koh, 'Why Do Nations Obey International Law?' ; Tyler, *Why People Obey the Law*), and international relations (Ian Hurd, *After Anarchy: Legitimacy and Power in the United Nations Security Council* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007); Baldwin, 'Power and International Relations'); Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).

[26] Also known as the 'first face' of power; see Robert A. Dahl, 'The Concept of Power' *Behavioral Science* 2, no. 3 (1957); Bachrach and Baratz, 'Two Faces of Power' .

direct relationship between A and B, and thus includes both 'hard' and 'soft' power.[27] Peace operations also have the power to exercise control indirectly through, for example, the power to set agendas or to classify and organise information; further, they have power to constitute the rules of the game and the identities of those within it, and to determine what counts as legitimate knowledge, which actors are relevant, and whose voices are marginalised.[28] However, the compulsory power of peace operations is expected to be a particularly influential determinant of their behaviour and effect given the direct power relationship that exists between peace operations and local actors. While acknowledging the influence of other types of power, I focus on the compulsory variant and aim to enrich the academic literature by providing a comprehensive analysis of this dimension.

Explicit considerations of power are strikingly absent from the peace operations literature. However, some scholars have employed the related frame of authority to examine the nature of peace operations.[29] While acknowledging their contributions, I argue in Chapter Two that the analytical lens of power provides greater explanatory leverage than the more limited concept of authority. Where authority refers to the voluntary nature of rule-compliance, the lens of power facilitates analysis beyond rules; it includes motivations for compliance derived from coercion and inducement; and it enables analysis of the high-end of the cooperation spectrum, rather than just compliance. Further, it allows analysis of the interactions between the different modes of social control exercised by peace operations. This is important, given the practical difficulties of isolating the voluntary from the coerced or induced in peace operations. That is, the threat of negative sanction or the promise of positive reward weaves

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[27] Joseph S. Nye, *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics* (New York: PublicAffairs, 2004).
[28] Barnett and Duvall include these other dimensions in their four-component typology of power, distinguishing between compulsory, institutional, productive and structural power; see Barnett and Duvall, *Power in Global Governance*).
[29] Richard Caplan, *A New Trusteeship?: The International Administration of War-Torn Territories*, Adelphi Papers (Abingdon: Routledge for the International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2006); Zaum, *The Sovereignty Paradox*.

so tightly into their legitimation that all three currencies of power require analysis in order to understand the cooperation decisions of local actors.

Compared to the functional approach which dominates the study of peace operations, a focus on power allows recognition of the inevitable limits on their ability to achieve desired outcomes. The functional analysis directs attention to the design and implementation of mandates, with the inherent assumption that if you get these 'right' then desired outcomes will follow. In contrast, my focus on relational power allows analysis of those social dimensions of implementation that cannot be captured by the narrow view of peace operations as technical instruments. The power of peace operations to achieve their often ambitious objectives is limited not just by shortcomings in their mandates but, crucially, by the very nature of those objectives and their inherently social processes.

In summary, by bringing power in to this analysis, I aim to better understand the behaviour of peace operations, rather than their creation, and to better explain the effects of peace operations based on this behaviour, rather than their functional mandates.

Legitimacy

Investigating the power of peace operations necessarily raises questions about their legitimacy. Given that the power relationship between a peace operation and local actors is a social one, the *reception* of power matters; in other words, the power of a peace operation depends on how it is perceived by local actors. Legitimacy is defined by the belief of local actors that a peace operation and its goals are right, appropriate and desirable within a particular normative context; it is a source of compulsory power because it 'pulls' local actors towards

cooperation.[30] That is, the belief of actor (B) that (A) is legitimate provides (A) with a source of influence to get (B) to do what it otherwise would not.

Legitimacy is expected to provide peace operations with a particularly important source of power, since their goals so often require the active cooperation of local actors, rather than just their compliance. Legitimacy pulls actors towards cooperation based on their internalised norms, rather than their reactions to the positive or negative incentives delivered by peace operations through inducement or coercion.[31] The power of legitimacy is thus given particular analytical attention throughout this thesis.

The concept of legitimacy has attracted growing attention in research about international organisations in recent years.[32] Whether institutions are argued to have autonomous power or only that derived from the underlying distribution of state capability, international relations scholars have increasingly questioned the legitimacy of that power, especially where it 'intrudes' into the domestic realm. Nevertheless, scholars have focused primarily on the *international* legitimacy of peace operations, analysing the extent to which they accord with international laws and norms, the processes of their collective legitimation, and their delegation through rightful authority.[33] The need to adjudicate between conflicting sources of legitimacy has prompted much of this literature. However, the power relationship under

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[30] Franck, *The Power of Legitimacy Among Nations*. Similarly, Ian Hurd argues that 'legitimacy matters to social institutions...because it affects the calculus of actors with respect to compliance', *After Anarchy*, p.12.

[31] The identities of local actors may also be significant in this regard; however, the investigation of identity and processes of mutual constitution is beyond the scope of this thesis.

[32] Hurd, *After Anarchy*; Ian Clark, *Legitimacy in International Society* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005); Friedrich Kratochwil, 'On Legitimacy' *International Relations* 20, no. 3 (2006); Jens Steffek, 'The Legitimation of International Governance: A Discourse Approach' *European Journal of International Relations* 9, no. 2 (2003); Shane P. Mulligan, 'The Uses of Legitimacy in International Relations' *Millennium* 34, no. 2 (2006); Allen Buchanan and Robert O. Keohane, 'The Legitimacy of Global Governance Institutions' *Ethics & International Affairs* 20, no. 4 (2006).

[33] e.g. Zaum, *The Sovereignty Paradox* ; David Harland, 'Legitimacy and Effectiveness in International Administration' *Global Governance* 10 (2004); Simon Chesterman, 'Legality Versus Legitimacy: Humanitarian Intervention, the Security Council, and the Rule of Law' *Security Dialogue* 33, no. 3 (2002); Sally Morphet, 'Current International Civil Administration: The Need for Political Legitimacy' *International Peacekeeping* 9, no. 2 (2002).

consideration in this thesis exists not at the international level, but in the domestic realm, between a peace operation and local populations. This thesis therefore seeks to discover how a peace operation might be legitimised at the local level.

There have been some attempts by some scholars to uncover the sources of local legitimacy in peace operations. Among their starting points are international norms,[34] local norms,[35] accountability, especially to the local population,[36] and social contracts.[37] However, none of these accounts provide an adequate conceptual grounding in the theoretical literature on legitimacy, and given the multiple uses and meanings of legitimacy, this oversight is a significant shortcoming. More important, however, is that no existing studies ask specifically about the relationship between legitimacy and power. Given that it is 'only within the context of power relations that legitimacy becomes relevant at all',[38] the examination of this relationship is an important contribution of this thesis.

The peace operations literature has yet to engage with the broader literature on compliance,[39] despite several studies questioning the causes of local compliance with peacekeepers.[40] There is an even greater dearth of attention given to the high quality cooperation needed by peace operations to achieve their ambitious, socially transformative goals. The power of legitimacy is therefore expected to be an important channel of peace operation influence, and is accorded particular attention in the analytical framework developed here.

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[34] Morphet, 'Current International Civil Administration: The Need for Political Legitimacy'.
[35] Jim Rolfe, 'Peacekeeping the Pacific Way in Bougainville' *International Peacekeeping* 8, no. 2 (2001).
[36] Richard Caplan, 'Who Guards the Guardians? International Accountability in Bosnia' *International Peacekeeping* 12, no. 3 (2005).
[37] Mersiades, 'Peacekeeping and Legitimacy'.
[38] Clark, *Legitimacy in International Society*; see also Andrew Hurrell, 'Legitimacy and the Use of Force: Can the Circle Be Squared?' *Review of International Studies* 31, (2005).
[39] E.g. Franck, *The Power of Legitimacy*; Herbert C. Kelman, 'Compliance, Identification, and Internalization: Three Processes of Attitude Change' *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 2, no. 1 (1958); Levi, *Consent, Dissent, and Patriotism*; Tyler, *Why People Obey the Law*; Tom R. Tyler, 'Psychological Perspectives on Legitimacy and Legitimation' *Annual Review of Psychology* 57, no. 1 (2006).
[40] E.g. Fortna, *Does Peacekeeping Work?;* Stedman, 'Spoiler Problems'.

Methodology and sources

Case selection

This thesis investigates peace operations in Cambodia and Solomon Islands. Deployed in 1992, the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) was by far the biggest, most ambitious and most intrusive peace operation of its time. It aimed to ensure 'a neutral political environment' in which free and fair elections could be conducted, which included quasi-administrative responsibility, demilitarising and demobilising armed factions, and promoting human rights. The aims of the Regional Assistance Mission in Solomon Islands (RAMSI), a non-UN operation deployed in 2003, exemplify the escalating demands made of peace operations over the decade that followed UNTAC. Although it was deployed in a conflict setting of arguably less intensity and complexity than many other contemporary operations, RAMSI had a deeply ambitious mission to restore security to a failing state and to ensure the sustainability of such intervention through comprehensive statebuilding intended to transform this small Pacific Islands state into a stable, prosperous society.

The cases have been selected for their utility in helping to identify and understand the sources and interactions of a peace operation's power and legitimacy. The aim is not to develop a generalisable theory of effectiveness that will hold true across all cases, but to identify the causal processes through which an operation affects local actor behaviour. The selected operations allow the power-legitimacy framework to be tested in both a relatively small, contained conflict setting (Solomon Islands) and in a large, protracted, multi-party context (Cambodia). However, the space for institutional agency is sufficiently similar in both cases to enable controlled comparison: both UNTAC and RAMSI had significant scope for autonomous action, and each provides variation in the extent to which their efforts at getting local cooperation were successful. Each allows within-case comparison of variation in the effectiveness of a single operation, in addition to comparison between operational settings.

The study does not include a very 'hard' operation in which the structural constraints of overly-ambitious mandates, a vast under-supply of operational resources, or a very difficult conflict environment 'crowd out' the space for an operation's agency to have significant, observable effects. While it ought to be possible to analyse the agency of peace operations regardless of the structural constraints, the inclusion of a particularly hard case would limit the ability to trace the processes through which operations exercise agency.

Given the acknowledged paucity of rigorous theorising about the performance of peace operations and the substantively new questions that this thesis is posing, the utility of investigating multiple operations is restricted by the need for substantial conceptual work to develop the power-legitimacy framework. Further, as noted by Alexander George and Andrew Bennett, large-*n* methods and statistical studies risk conceptual stretching when the concepts under investigation are as notoriously difficult to measure as power and legitimacy. Instead, the case study approach adopted here allows 'for conceptual refinements with a higher level of validity over a smaller number of cases'.[41] However, as noted above, the two operations selected do allow for substantive within-case comparison. By comparing local cooperation across different pillars of an operation and over time, my aim is not to measure 'what makes a peace operation effective', but to better understand *how* a peace operation might be effective, and what might constrain it from being so. Through a comparison of nine sub-cases of cooperation within the two operations, I aim to fulfil a heuristic purpose by identifying relatively overlooked or misunderstood dimensions of peace operations (their power and legitimacy).

In the chapters on UNTAC and RAMSI, I identify each operation's goals and the cases of local cooperation, compliance and resistance that most significantly affected its ability to achieve them. In UNTAC, these are: active Khmer Rouge non-compliance regarding

[41] Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences* (Cambridge, Mass.; London: MIT Press, 2005), p.19.

ceasefire, disarmament and demobilisation; popular cooperation regarding elections; Khmer Rouge cooperation with refugee repatriation; and the cooperation of military elites with the unification of Cambodia's armed forces. In RAMSI, they are: the compliance of local actors with the rule of law; the cooperation of armed actors with RAMSI's disarmament regulations; the cooperation of militia leaders with RAMSI's requests for their voluntary surrender; pockets of active opposition to RAMSI's broad agenda; and the resistance of political elites and bureaucrats to RAMSI's governance reform goals.

Conceptual method

The relationship between the power and legitimacy of peace operations is the core component of this study. The power-legitimacy framework identifies and traces the processes through which an operation can move local actors towards cooperation, by altering the material incentives of local actors as well as shaping their beliefs and interests.

The power-legitimacy framework is developed in two parts. Unlike most studies of peace operation effectiveness, which begin inductively with empirical observations, this thesis begins with a deductive approach, developing the analytical framework by drawing on the richness of social power theory in other disciplinary literatures and adapting it to the context of peace operations. It critically analyses existing literature before advancing an alternative to the prevailing approaches, emphasising that peace operations are institutions which operate through social power relationships with actors in the local realm. Having defined peace operations in this way, it then interrogates the nature of their goals, arguing that despite great diversity in the operational objectives of specific missions, peace operations ultimately aim to change the behaviour of local actors. This suggests a method for understanding the effectiveness of peace operations based on the behavioural change of people within their target societies, rather than aggregate or time-bound measures of an operation's outcomes. The second part of this thesis applies the framework to study peace operations in Cambodia

and Solomon Islands. The in-depth comparative case study approach has two aims: first, to understand the causal mechanisms identified in the analytical framework through careful process tracing; and second, to strengthen and refine the analytical framework for application in future research.

The perceptions of local actors are given particular attention in the analytical framework, but such data is notoriously difficult to collect in a methodologically valid, systematic manner. Some studies which ask similar questions, for example social psychology research about why people obey the law, use survey and experimental methods to measure perceptions and trace causal links to outcomes.[42] While it may be valuable for peace operations to undertake public opinion surveys for their own benefit, in the few cases it has been attempted, either the methodology is weak and the data unreliable, or the surveys do not ask questions that would produce the data necessary for this study.[43] Further, while I employ interview methods as discussed below to collect data about perceptions, what people *say* motivated them is not necessarily an accurate reflection of their motives at the time, and may for example be distorted by political concerns or simply the passage of time.

Instead of using survey methods, this thesis begins with the deductive method outlined above. Using the spectrum defined earlier (resistance, compliance, cooperation), it then takes individual cases of cooperation and examines, through a rational choice approach, how far the consequentialist logic of coercion and inducement take us; that is, how much compliance can be explained by the interests of local actors, and the ability of a peace operation to influence

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42 E.g. Tyler, *Why People Obey the Law*.

43 For example, RAMSI has conducted three public opinion surveys which include findings about the operation's popular support; see ANU Enterprise for the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands, 'People's Survey 2007' available: www.ramsi.org; ANU Enterprise for the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands, 'People's Survey 2008' available: www.ramsi.org; and ANU Enterprise for the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands, 'People's Survey 2009' available: www.ramsi.org. However, as discussed in Chapter Six, while these provide helpful background indicators, their utility is limited in the present research because they do not disaggregate the overall scores of RAMSI's popular support to allow analysis of the different reasons for which people support the operation. Further, they do not distinguish variation in support among different social groups.

these through positive and negative incentives. Finally, I identify those cases of cooperation that coercion and inducement cannot adequately explain; that is, those where the cooperation outcome is unexpected from a purely rational choice perspective. I then ask whether the outcomes in these cases can be explained by local perceptions about the peace operation's legitimacy, based on a logic of appropriateness rather than one of consequences.[44] I identify perceptions of legitimacy using a number of indicators, which include: expressions of support for the presence and goals of a peace operation, particularly if no immediate self-interested benefit is evident; the willingness of actors to accept unfavourable outcomes without the presence of inducement or coercion; and communication trails that show local actors justifying the presence, activities and goals of peace operations using normative arguments, for example that they 'trust' a peace operation and its personnel. Importantly, these perceptions are not aggregated into an overall measure of legitimacy; instead, they are used to help explain the decisions and actions of specific local actors, including political, military, and religious and community leaders, as well as members of the broader population.

Further, I examine closely the relationships between coercion, inducement and legitimacy to capture and explain the ways in which each currency of power might enable or constrain the others. The power-legitimacy framework thus enables analysis of each currency of a peace operation's power *and* their interactions. In the case studies examined in Chapters Three to Six, careful attention is given to analysing these interactions, particularly between coercion and legitimacy. In UNTAC, this is borne out in comparative analysis of the operation's lack of enforcement capability and its ability to provide electoral security despite this; in RAMSI, it is demonstrated through analysis of the operation's early provision of public security and practices of restraint, compared to its later heavy-handed tactics.

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[44] James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, 'The Institutional Dynamics of International Political Orders' *International Organization* 52, no. 4 (1998); see also Hurd, *After Anarchy*, p.2.

The central methodological challenge for this thesis is to identify the motivations for local actor behaviour in each case. Since motives cannot be directly observed, they are particularly difficult to analyse.[45] I thus use a number of methods and data sources to evaluate the multiple possible explanations for a single instance of observable behaviour.

The case studies are conducted through a process tracing methodology to analyse multiple interactions within each case, the findings of which are analysed through structured, focused comparison. Process tracing involves the detailed examination of diverse data to identify and track the links between possible causes and observed outcomes.[46] It is a particularly useful method for locating causal mechanisms, since it focuses on the intervening steps between cause and outcome, thereby helping to adjudicate between competing explanations for observable behaviour.[47] This is assisted by employing counterfactual analysis to compare the processes and outcomes observed with those of a hypothetical case in which a single variable is altered.[48] For example, in the study of UNTAC, I employ counterfactual analysis to test, through a thought experiment, whether the operation would have been able to secure Khmer Rouge cooperation through greater coercive resources.

Sources

Case data was gathered through in-depth semi-structured interviews and informal discussions with local officials, journalists, commentators, community leaders and individuals; with personnel from each operation; and with other international actors, including staff of international NGOs and aid agencies.[49] Fieldwork was conducted in Solomon Islands in 2006, Cambodia in 2009, Australia in 2007 and 2009, and New York in 2007 and 2009. These

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[45] Gary King, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba, *Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research* (Princeton; Chichester: Princeton University Press, 1994) pp.109-110.
[46] George and Bennett, *Case Studies* p.6.
[47] Jeffrey T. Checkel, 'Tracing Casual Mechanisms' *International Studies Review* 8, no. 2 (2006).
[48] Jeffrey T. Checkel, 'Counterfactuals and Hypothesis Testing in Political Science' *World Politics* 43, no. 1 (1991).
[49] See list of interviews in the bibliography.

research interviews had four purposes. First, I drew on the personal recollections of international and local actors to contextualise the cases in their local setting. Second, I sought to uncover the micro-level processes that constitute the daily work of peace operations. In interviews with peace operation personnel, I asked questions about their interactions with different groups of local actors, seeking to identify what kind of activities were undertaken, and to establish a chronology of these interactions. In interviews with local actors, I sought to verify the occurrence and nature of these activities and to get a sense for which interactions had greatest affect on local perceptions. Third, I sought to gather evidence from a select group of local actors about their motives and perceptions of the peace operation. Finally, I sought to test my initial findings in conversations with actors directly involved in the peace process, as well as with international and local observers and commentators.

These research interviews provided crucial data about the micro-level processes and decisions that, in the case of RAMSI in particular, was unavailable in other sources. While I did not have the resources to conduct large surveys or random sampling of local actors, I sought to minimise the potential errors arising from selection bias and from the faulty memory of participants by interviewing a diverse range of individuals to allow for triangulation. However, significant gaps remained, particularly where access to key local decision-makers was not possible. I would have wished, for example, to interview Khmer Rouge leaders in Cambodia and militia leaders in Solomon Islands, but access to these actors was prohibited due to security concerns, the unwillingness of actors to participate in research, or in some cases the fact that those actors had passed away. Where possible, I addressed these gaps by using evidence collected from primary documents, including personal correspondence, international treaty agreements, domestic legislation and legal cases, speeches, oral histories and newspaper articles. These helped to account for the passage of time, particularly in the case of UNTAC, studied here more than fifteen years after the operation was withdrawn. The

study of UNTAC was significantly aided by accessing the very large personal archive of Lieutenant General John M. Sanderson, which included press briefings, correspondence, cables and telegrams, situation reports, local propaganda, minutes of meetings, incident reports, political statements and video recordings collected in his role as Force Commander of UNTAC. I also gained access to transcripts of interviews with senior UNTAC personnel conducted by the Yale-United Nations Oral History Project. Perhaps the most fruitful sources of non-interview primary data were the comprehensive media analyses I conducted of each operation, using the Dow Jones Factiva electronic database to access newspaper content and broadcast transcripts published at the time of each operation's deployment in the field, including local and regional media channels. This provided invaluable data about the daily activities and statements of peace operations, and the responses and behaviour of local actors, including elite decision-makers as well as 'people on the street'. I also used three public opinion surveys from the Solomon Islands, conducted by an independent agency for RAMSI, which shed some light on how the operation was perceived by broad sections of the Solomon Islands population.

This primary research was supplemented and expanded by a range of secondary sources, including written histories, academic books, peer-reviewed journal articles and policy reports, including some analytical accounts written by peace operation personnel. UNTAC has attracted significantly more secondary analysis than RAMSI, and this is reflected in the balance of sources used in each case study.

Outline of the argument

This thesis begins by critically reviewing the academic literature to identify the prevailing conceptions of peace operations and the ways in which they are analysed. Chapter One argues that more analysis is needed of peace operations at the local level. I argue that existing

approaches are unable to account for important dimensions of peace operations because they overlook the local setting in which operations pursue their goals, as well as the social nature of those goals.

Having made the case for analysing peace operations through the local lens, Chapter Two then moves to my central research question: what power do operations have to obtain local cooperation? Drawing on a number of disciplinary approaches, I develop a framework of power and legitimacy to study how the peace operations in Cambodia and Solomon Islands influenced the behaviour of local actors. The concept of power is a highly contested political concept, and thus requires careful definition. Having delineated my focus on compulsory power – that is, the relations of interaction that allow peace operations to exercise direct control over the behaviour of populations in their 'target society'[50] – I deconstruct this social power relationship, drawing on political, jurisprudential, sociological and psychological literatures to examine the sources of power available to a peace operation: coercion, inducement and legitimacy. Processes of legitimation are accorded particular attention, since local legitimacy is expected to have significant causal affect on local cooperation.[51] In the final section of Chapter Two, I conceptualise the legitimacy of peace operations as a dynamic web of interacting strands that may exert legitimising or delegitimising influences. These strands constitute three types of legitimation: source-based legitimacy, which refers to the origins of a peace operation's claim to authority; substantive legitimacy, or the effectiveness of a peace operation in producing desired outcomes; and procedural legitimacy, or the representativeness, accountability and fairness of a peace operation's procedures.

Chapters Three to Six apply this power-legitimacy framework to study the effectiveness of UNTAC and RAMSI. Each operation is situated in its historical setting by sketching the

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[50] Barnett and Duvall, *Power in Global Governance*, p.3.

[51] More generally, Ian Hurd notes that few scholars 'have provided an account of how legitimation produces its effects', *After Anarchy,* p.9.

developments that led to its deployment, and defining the scope of its mandate and authority. I then identify the key cases of resistance, compliance and cooperation for investigation, as well as the specific local actors whose behaviour will be examined in each. The bulk of each operational chapter is devoted to the detailed study of these cases.

The final chapter concludes by examining the central contributions of this study and their implications for the study and practice of peace operations. It highlights the central role of communication strategies in the legitimation of UNTAC and RAMSI, and outlines a future research agenda for studying peace operations at the local level.

Chapter One: Peace Operations Through the Local Lens

This chapter elaborates a new way of conceptualising peace operations, as institutions that straddle the international-domestic divide of international relations theory, with goals that depend for their accomplishment on the decisions and actions of actors in the local realm. Through critical examination of the prevailing approaches to studying peace operations, however, I show that analysis of the local level is sorely lacking. By focusing to such a degree on the determining influence of international structures, including the nature of international collective action problems, the distribution of global power and international norms, scholars have neglected the role of peace operation agency in determining outcomes. I argue that studying peace operations at the local level, paying particular attention to their interactions with local actors, enables the role of agency to be identified and analysed. In the final section of this chapter, I examine the small body of literature that *has* considered the local level, identifying both its strengths and ways to overcome its limitations.

Much of the peace operations literature is preoccupied with compiling and categorising the multiple micro-level tasks that peace operations undertake. By mining their mandates, scholars have attempted to comprehensively catalogue what it is that peace operations *do* in practical, policy-making terms, and to link this to collective action problems of international peace and security. This has resulted in three general trends. First, scholars have developed a now widely accepted historical narrative of the evolution of peace operations, beginning with United Nations Truce Supervision Organization in the Middle East (UNTSO, 1948), through the first enforcement mission in the Congo (ONUC, 1964), the emergence of intra-state peacebuilding in Namibia (UNTAG, 1988), the rapid expansion of operations after the Cold War, and the transitional administrations of Kosovo and East Timor. Using this chronological framework, scholars have identified distinct 'generations' of peace operations: some distinguish between Cold War and post-Cold operations, for example, while others

identify between three and six generations.[1] Second, scholars have conceptually mapped the functions of peace operations by developing typologies of their numerous tasks, which range widely from monitoring ceasefires to promoting human rights, building governance institutions and enforcing the rule of law. For example, William Durch identifies four different types (traditional peacekeeping, multidimensional peace operations, peace enforcement, and humanitarian intervention),[2] while Paul Diehl, Daniel Druckman and James Wall identify twelve different types on a spectrum of robustness ranging from traditional peacekeeping to sanctions enforcement.[3] Finally, peace operations have also been analytically organised based on their identity and mandating authority, with distinctions drawn between UN operations, regional operations with a UN mandate, and non-UN operations.[4]

Both the evolutionary and taxonomic approaches emphasise variation in the mandates and design of peace operations. But if there is such diversity in the goals, structure, composition and operating environments of peace operations, it is reasonable to question the validity of grouping operations in a single class of investigation. Some scholars have thus narrowed their focus to carefully defined sub-classes of operations, investigating enforcement

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1 Steven R. Ratner, *The New UN Peacekeeping: Building Peace in Lands of Conflict after the Cold War* (New York: St Martin's, 1995); John MacKinlay and Jarat Chopra, 'Second Generation Multinational Operations' *Washington Quarterly* 15, no. 3 (1992); Marrack Goulding, 'The Evolution of United Nations Peacekeeping' *International Affairs* 69, no. 3 (1993); Christine D. Gray, *International Law and the Use of Force*, 3rd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008); Ramesh Thakur and Schnabel Albrecht, *United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Ad Hoc Missions, Permanent Engagement* (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2001); see Alex J. Bellamy, Paul Williams, and Stuart Griffin, *Understanding Peacekeeping* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2004), p.32 for a critique of the generations schema.

2 William Durch, ed., *UN Peacekeeping, American Policy, and the Uncivil Wars of the 1990s* (New York: St Martin's, 1996).

3 Paul F Diehl, Daniel Druckman, and James Wall, 'International Peacekeeping and Conflict Resolution: A Taxonomic Analysis with Implications' *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 42, no. 1 (1998).

4 Birger Heldt, 'Trends from 1948 to 2005: How to View the Relation between the United Nations and Non-UN Entities' in *Peace Operations: Trends, Progress and Prospects*, ed. Donald C. F. Daniel, Patricia Taft, and Sharon Wiharta (Washington DC: Georgetown University Press, 2008); Alex J. Bellamy and Paul Williams, *Peace Operations and Global Order* (London: Routledge, 2005); Renata Dwan, *International Policing in Peace Operations : The Role of Regional Organizations* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002).

missions,[5] transitional administration,[6] or regional operations.[7] Yet the broad term 'peace operations' remains prevalent in both policy discourse and academic research. Often employed as a single 'catch all' term to include the wide variety of operations, the definition of a peace operation tends to be so broad as to imply, as Donald Daniel and Sharon Wiharta note, that you know one when you see it.[8] Thus at one extreme, peace operations have been understood through the micro-lens of typologies, while at the other, scholars have avoided careful definition in favour of an overly-broad terminology.

In this chapter, I aim to identify the common threads that unite diverse missions such that they can be considered in the same class of inquiry. Eschewing the tendency to define peace operations by their diversity, for example as 'multidimensional, multifunctional and complex',[9] I argue that they are defined by three characteristics.

First, peace operations are institutions comprising sets of rules, norms and decision-making processes that exercise power in the pursuit of peacebuilding objectives. Second, peace operations are deployed from the international realm into the domestic realm of chronically insecure states, which gives them a dual role as governance institutions at both the international and local levels.[10] Third, peace operations aim to change the behaviour of a

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[5] Katharina Pichler Coleman, *International Organisations and Peace Enforcement: The Politics of International Legitimacy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).

[6] Carolyn Gardner Bull, *No Entry without Strategy: Building the Rule of Law under UN Transitional Administration* (Tokyo; New York: United Nations University Press, 2008); Simon Chesterman, *You, the People: The United Nations, Transitional Administration, and State-Building* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004).

[7] H. McCoubrey and Justin Morris, *Regional Peacekeeping in the Post-Cold War Era* (The Hague; Boston: Kluwer Law International, 2000); S. Neil MacFarlane, 'Regional Peacekeeping in the CIS' in *United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Ad Hoc Missions, Permanent Engagement*, ed. Ramesh Chandra Thakur and Albrecht Schnabel (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2001).

[8] Donald C. F. Daniel and Sharon Wiharta, 'Introduction' in *Peace Operations: Trends, Progress, and Prospects*, ed. Donald C. F. Daniel, Patricia Taft, and Sharon Wiharta (Washington DC: Georgetown University Press, 2008).

[9] Chiyuki Aoi, Cedric De Coning, and Ramesh Chandra Thakur, *Unintended Consequences of Peacekeeping Operations* (Tokyo; New York: United Nations University Press, 2007), p.4.

[10] Peace operations are understood in this thesis to be addressing security problems of a primarily intra-state nature, distinguishing them from traditional peacekeeping operations that addressed conflict *between* states. Insofar as conflict 'spills' across borders to create insecurity in neighbouring

variety of local actors in ways that promote peace and security, as defined by their mandates and as interpreted in a specific operational setting.

These three characteristics pull together the vast array of tasks, goals and purposes that peace operations pursue. Understanding peace operations in this way helps to reduce analytical complexity such that these institutions may be examined as a single type of phenomena, while still allowing the diversity of operational contexts, mandates and outcomes to be examined. This chapter surveys the literature on peace operations as it relates to each of the three characteristics identified, situating my definition of peace operations in the debates that dominate the literature. In doing so, I highlight three key gaps into which this thesis steps. In Part One, I show that the institutional character of peace operations has been overlooked; in particular, their dual international-domestic identity has not been adequately analysed. In Part Two, I identify the dominant analytical frameworks through which peace operations have been understood to date to show that, while the international level of analysis dominates the study of peace operations, the lack of attention to the local level means that important characteristics of these institutions are often overlooked. In Part Three, I examine the small body of literature that *does* analyse peace operations through the local lens, showing that, although important contributions have been made, the relationship between peace operations and local actor behaviour remains under-theorised.

Part I: Peace operations as institutions

I contend that peace operations are institutions comprising sets of rules, norms and decision-making processes.[11] Unlike the conventional approach to institutions in international

states, this definition does not exclude the hypothetical situation where a single peace operation may be deployed to address insecurity in two or more states.

[11] Robert O. Keohane, *International Institutions and State Power: Essays in International Relations Theory* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1989).

relations theory, I do not examine the effect of institutions on state behaviour, but consider the role of peace operations in prescribing behavioural roles, constraining activity and shaping expectations among local populations. Importantly, this thesis aims to discover *how* peace operations matter, not whether they do.[12] The following section situates this concept of peace operations in the conceptual debates of mainstream international relations; it then looks beyond conceptual debates to the empirical character of peace operations, defining them as institutions of dual international-domestic identity.

Peace operations as international institutions

The state-centrism of mainstream international relations theory means that international institutions are considered primarily in relation to their implications for state interests, behaviour and identity. Thus the role of institutions has been considered largely in the context of debates about the potential for cooperation between states. For realists such as Joseph Grieco and John Mearsheimer the condition of international anarchy means that states are perpetually engaged in security competition, which limits their willingness to cooperate even if their interests overlap.[13] From this perspective, institutions matter only as

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[12] This parallels developments in the study of institutions in international relations, which has moved on from questioning whether institutions matter (see John J. Mearsheimer, 'The False Promise of International Institutions' *International security* 19, no. 3 (1994); Robert O. Keohane and Ruth W. Grant, 'Accountability and Abuses of Power in World Politics' *American Political Science Review* 99, no. 1 (2005)) to examine how they matter; see Andrew P. Cortell and James W. Jr. Davis, 'How Do International Institutions Matter? The Domestic Impact of International Rules and Norms' *International Studies Quarterly* 40, no. 4 (1996); Alexandra Gheciu, 'Security Institutions as Agents of Socialization? Nato and The' *International Organization* 59, no. 04 (2005); Lisa L. Martin and Beth A. Simmons, 'Theories and Empirical Studies of International Institutions' *International Organization* 52, no. 4 (1998); Arthur Stein, 'Neoliberal Institutionalism' in *The Oxford Handbook of International Relations*, ed. Christian Reus-Smit and Duncan Snidal (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008). Similarly, the study of norms has developed from questioning whether norms matter to studying how, when and which norms matter; see Friedrich V. Kratochwil, 'How Do Norms Matter?' in *The Role of Law in International Politics*, ed. Michael Byers (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000); Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, 'International Norm Dynamics and Political Change' *International Organization* 52, no. 4 (1998); Jeffrey W. Legro, 'Which Norms Matter? Revisiting the 'Failure' of Internationalism' *International Organization* 51, no. 1 (1997).

[13] Joseph M. Grieco, 'Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism' *International Organization* 42, no. 3 (1988); Mearsheimer, 'The False Promise of International Institutions'.

epiphenomenal instruments of state power; they are based on the 'self-interested calculations of the great powers, and they have no independent effect on state behaviour'.[14] Neoliberal institutionalists are more optimistic about the potential for cooperation because institutions can produce absolute gains by providing information, reducing transaction costs, making commitments more credible, establishing focal points for coordination, and facilitating the operation of reciprocity.[15] Nevertheless, the power and interests of states remain the central determinants of institutional behaviour in this approach.

By emphasising the influence of ideational structures and the mutual constitution of agents and structures through social interactions, constructivists broaden the debate by contesting realism's basic assumptions of materialism and methodological individualism.[16] Constructivism makes important contributions by demonstrating the influence of norms and ideas, for example in the 'socialisation' of states into new forms of behaviour.[17] Yet, in framing their arguments in response to the neorealist-neoliberal institutionalist debate, most constructivists replicate the examination of international institutions in terms of their implications for state behaviour. The dominance of states as the central units of analysis limits the utility of these approaches for explaining the power and legitimacy of peace operations. More promising is the sociological institutionalist branch of constructivism, which treats institutions as 'social facts' to be explained independent of their effect on state

[14] Mearsheimer, 'The False Promise of International Institutions', p.7.
[15] See Robert O. Keohane and Lisa L. Martin, 'The Promise of Institutionalist Theory' *International Security* 20, no. 1 (1995); Stein, 'Neoliberal Institutionalism'.
[16] Jeffrey T. Checkel, 'The Constructivist Turn in International Relations Theory' *World Politics* 50, no. 2 (1998); Ian Hurd, 'Constructivism' in *The Oxford Handbook of International Relations*, ed. Christian Reus-Smit and Duncan Snidal (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008).
[17] Martha Finnemore, *National Interests in International Society* (Ithaca; London: Cornell University Press, 1996).

behaviour. This approach offers a framework to consider formal international institutions as actors with the capacity for autonomous action.[18]

Conceptualising peace operations as international institutions allows us to understand their essentially political character. They are more than mere technical instruments and pragmatic solutions to collective problems: they are institutions forged from the compromises of international diplomacy, and result from the disputes and diversity of interests among international actors. The framework developed here provides a method for acknowledging and analysing the range of variables that affect how well they achieve their mandated functions, and helps to explain the reasons that there may be a gap between a peace operation's formal mandate and the resources or political will that back it. However, peace operations are also more than empty vessels for the pursuit of state interests – they also have a measure of autonomy, and are often able to act independently of the interests and preferences of states.

Peace operations as domestic institutions

As the capacities, functions and objectives of peace operations expanded through the 1990s, peace operations came to assume progressively greater governance in areas traditionally understood to be the domain of the sovereign state. The provision of basic physical security is the definitive task of the state, but it is also one of the primary goals of peace operations. Contributing to territorial security was a goal of even the earliest operations, and the monitoring of ceasefires, buffer zones and demilitarisation were prominent features of 'first generation' peacekeeping.[19] The expansion in the domestic governance objectives of peace

[18] Michael N. Barnett and Martha Finnemore, *Rules for the World* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2004); Alastair I. Johnston, *Social States: China in International Institutions, 1980-2000* (Princeton, NJ
Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2008).
[19] See Thomas George Weiss et al., *The United Nations and Changing World Politics*, 4th ed. (Boulder, Colo.; Oxford: Westview Press, 2007).

operations during the 1990s, however, deepened this 'intrusion' into the domestic realm such that in 1999 UN peace operations assumed the territorial administration of Kosovo and East Timor. In the realm of security governance, the mandates of peace operations include disarming combatants, protecting local officials, active policing and local police reform, and establishing a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations. Further, the (re)establishment of a monopoly of force within a territory through security sector reform has acquired new importance as a central element of postconflict operations, such that the UN Security Council (UNSC) has accepted it as 'critical to the consolidation of peace and stability, promoting poverty reduction, rule of law and good governance, extending legitimate State authority, and preventing countries from relapsing into conflict'.[20] Thus peace operations have been given ambitious mandates to build sustainable peace by constructing the rule of law and domestic governance institutions in addition to the temporary, stop-gap measures related to the specific problems of conflict resolution.

As well as assuming security governance, peace operations have been involved in domestic regulation (e.g. of the legal system, government finances, and customs), providing social welfare (e.g. humanitarian assistance, healthcare, and education), and making and implementing social policy (e.g. via elections, political reform, repatriation, and human rights.) Thus peace operations have taken on a large number of roles normally associated with the sovereign duties of a state. Transitional administrations provide the clearest example of this, but others also exhibit this international-domestic character, simultaneously

[20] United Nations, *Statement by the President of the Security Council on the Maintenance of International Peace and Security: Role of the Security Council in Supporting Security Sector Reform*, S/PRST/2007/3 21 February 2007; see also Michael Brzoska, 'Introduction: Criteria for Evaluating Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Security Sector Reform in Peace Support Operations' International Peacekeeping 13, no. 1 (2006).

pursuing peacebuilding and domestic administration with a 'functional duality that combines elements of global and domestic governance'.[21]

The practices of peace operations have thus challenged traditional international relations theory in important ways. First, the conditions into which peace operations are deployed question the Waltzian separation of the international and domestic realms, which contrasts international anarchy with domestic order, defined by the respective absence or presence of a central enforcement authority.[22] Instead, it is the domestic realm that resembles the Hobbesian state of nature in the failing, failed or collapsed states into which peace operations are deployed.[23] In a reversal of Waltz's characterisation of the international-domestic divide, peace operations are delegated by actors in the 'anarchic' international realm to assume central enforcement roles within the domestic realm, challenging Weberian definitions of the state as holding a monopoly on the legitimate use of violence within a territory. This also challenges conventional Westphalian norms of international order, based on non-intervention and respect for sovereignty as the 'minimum conditions for coexistence in a pluralist world'.[24] While circumventing some legal objections, the conventional requirement of consent does not diminish this challenge, not least because it is the absence of the basic premise of consent – a social contract between a state and its citizens – that justifies intervention in the first place. In other words, since the weakness or failure of the state is the rationale for peace operations, relying on an act by that state to preserve the international-domestic distinction has limited conceptual coherence.

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[21] Leopold von Carlowitz, 'Crossing the Boundary from the International to the Domestic Legal Realm: UNMIK Lawmaking and Property Rights in Kosovo' *Global Governance* 10, no. 1 (2004), p.308; see also Robert Jackson, 'International Engagement in War-Torn Countries' *Global Governance* 10 (2004); Jarat Chopra, 'The UN's Kingdom of East Timor' *Survival* 42, no. 3 (2000).
[22] Kenneth Neal Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Reading, Mass; London: Addison-Wesley, 1979).
[23] Mohammed Ayoob, 'Humanitarian Intervention and State Sovereignty' *The International Journal of Human Rights* 6, no. 1 (2002).
[24] Rosemary Foot, 'Introduction' in *Order and Justice in International Relations*, ed. Rosemary Foot, John Lewis Gaddis, and Andrew Hurrell (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), p.1.

Second, the security roles of peace operations challenge traditional assumptions about the state as the source of security, particularly where peace operations have attempted to address conflict situations in which the state has actively made citizens insecure. Further, the broadening of security debates has been driven by contesting the appropriate referent; by asking 'whose security?', advocates of broader definitions have also contested traditional assumptions about the *agent* of security.[25]

By problematising these tensions between the assumptions of mainstream international relations theory and the practices of peace operations, particularly concerning the role of the state and its relationship to international order, we can better understand the dual international-domestic character of peace operations. Peace operations are international institutions with formal mandates from the international realm, embodying the political compromises inherent in international diplomacy, delegated by states through formal organisations or ad hoc coalitions, and held accountable through their mandates to those actors at the international level. Yet those mandates, based on international law and the norms of international diplomacy, delegate peace operations to act as domestic authorities and to assume functions traditionally understood to be the primary functions of the sovereign state.

Understanding peace operations as institutions with a dual international-domestic identity provides two important insights about their power and legitimacy, which will be developed further in Chapter Two. First, by highlighting the direct relationship between a peace operation and local actors, acknowledging the domestic character of operations illuminates the difficulties of relying on coercion or inducement as the basis of securing local cooperation. That is, it highlights the important role of legitimacy in relations of social

[25] For example, see Ken Booth, 'Security and Emancipation' *Review of International Studies* 17, no. 4 (1991); Keith Krause and Michael C. Williams, *Critical Security Studies: Concepts and Cases* (London: UCL Press, 1997).

power. Second, focusing on the domestic character of particular elements of peace operations allows a better understanding of the reasons that local populations might cooperate with, for example, the police forces or judicial processes of a peace operation. This duality thus provides a framework for analysing peace operations as social institutions, rather than as technocratic bureaucracies, and for examining the relationship between peace operations and the local populations they address.

Their dual international-domestic identity, then, is a defining characteristic of peace operations. In the following section, I show that peace operations have nevertheless been primarily understood through the international level of analysis, while the local level has been neglected.

Part II: Dominant analytical frameworks

Functionalism and the post-Cold War security agenda

The study of postconflict peace operations has grown since the end of the Cold War, driven by the conceptual broadening of security and the expansion of peace operations in both qualitative and quantitative terms. The number of peace operations increased dramatically in this period, and focused on intrastate crises rather than interstate war.[26] Traditional peacekeeping mandates that emphasised territorial restraint and the transition from decolonisation to juridical sovereignty were expanded into multidimensional peace operations aiming for comprehensive political settlements, characterised by a concern for internal security and domestic order as well as a desire to avoid the transnational contagion

[26] See Mary Kaldor, *New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007).

effects of conflict 'spilling' across borders.[27] The concept of postconflict peacebuilding gained conceptual currency as the core of these 'new generation' peace operations, designed to facilitate the transformation of civil wars into civil societies.

The structural shift brought about by the end of the Cold War prompted profound reconsiderations of security,[28] and contributed to an increase in both the demand for and supply of peace operations. The withdrawal of superpower assistance to states in the periphery destabilised regimes in states such as Somalia and Angola even as it opened possibilities for addressing existing conflicts through collective action, as in Cambodia.[29] Freed from the Cold War paralysis of superpower rivalry, the UNSC was more willing to authorise complex peace operations that increasingly assumed roles of authority within states.

The question of how to respond conceptually, practically and institutionally to the internal conflicts that dominated the international security agenda during this period occupied both policy and academic agendas. In 1992, UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali produced his landmark *An Agenda for Peace*, the first in a series of UN documents that aimed to develop a new doctrine for responding to contemporary threats to international peace and

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27 Michael Barnett, 'Partners in Peace? The UN, Regional Organizations, and Peace-Keeping' *Review of International Studies* 21, no. 4 (1995), pp.415-417; see also Michael W. Doyle, Ian Johnstone, and Robert C. Orr, *Keeping the Peace: Multidimensional UN Operations in Cambodia and El Salvador* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997); Roland Paris, *At War's End: Building Peace after Civil Conflict* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004); James Mayall, *The New Interventionism 1991-1994: United Nations Experience in Cambodia, Former Yugoslavia and Somalia* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).

28 For example, see Emma Rothschild, 'What Is Security?' *Daedalus* 124, no. 3 (1995); Stephen M. Walt, 'The Renaissance of Security Studies' *International Studies Quarterly* 35, no. 2 (1991); Jessica Tuchman Matthews, 'Redefining Security' *Foreign Affairs* 68, no. 2 (1989); J. Ann Tickner, *Gender in International Relations : Feminist Perspectives on Achieving Global Security*, New Directions in World Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1992); Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, and Jaap de Wilde, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis* (Boulder, Colo.; London: Lynne Rienner, 1998); note also earlier path-breaking work of Richard Ullman, 'Redefining Security' *International Security* 8, no. 1 (1983).

29 Paris, *At War's End*, pp.16-17.

security through postconflict peace operations.[30] Emphasising the changed global context of the post-Cold War era, *Agenda* identified four distinct but interrelated processes through which to address conflict in the new world order, of which postconflict peacebuilding – 'action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict' – was given particular emphasis.[31]

Yet *Agenda* provided little conceptual guidance on the institutional form of these 'new' responses to 'new' threats, displaying instead the functional orientation that now dominates the peace operations literature. In this approach, a postconflict peacebuilding operation is merely an operation that undertakes postconflict peacebuilding: the form of the institution is defined by its functions, and once we understand these, it is assumed that we understand the institution itself. Thus the 1995 *Supplement to the Agenda for Peace* identifies as its goal the quest for 'improved mechanisms and techniques' for peace operations whose changing form is defined by their changing functions and mandates, notably the new protection of humanitarian operations and the shift from military to civilian tasks.[32] The next instalment in this UN series, the *Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations*, known as the Brahimi Report, defined peace operations by reference to their three principal activities – 'conflict prevention and peacemaking; peacekeeping; and peacebuilding'.[33] By the time the report was released in 2000, the term 'peace operations' had come to signify a complex combination of prevention, resolution and reconstruction, thereby overcoming the difficulties of separating peacekeeping from peacebuilding, and postconflict intervention from preventive action.

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[30] Boutros Boutros-Ghali, *An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-Keeping* A/47/277, United Nations, 1992.
[31] Ibid., paragraph 21.
[32] Boutros Boutros-Ghali, *Supplement to an Agenda for Peace* A/50/60 - S/1995/1, United Nations, 1995, paragraph 2.
[33] United Nations, *Report on the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (the Brahimi Report)*, 21 August 2000, (a/55/305-S/2000/809) United Nations, 21 August 2000, paragraph 10.

While the functional approach to conceptualising peace operations is perhaps understandable in the policy world of the UN, it also dominates the academic literature, which is saturated with policy-oriented prescriptions. The limitations of this approach underpin the strongest critiques of the peace operations literature. Roland Paris describes the study of peace operations as 'burgeoning' but isolated from broader political science,[34] while others lament the focus on 'utilitarian problem-solving for operational requirements',[35] the 'preoccupation with practical issues and case studies',[36] and the reliance on 'assessing – in instrumental terms – the efficacy of alternative strategies for peace and the experiences of particular operations'.[37] As Paris notes, an attenuated range of questions dominate this narrow approach: 'Why are some peace missions more successful than others? Why do some peace agreements last while others fail? How can we improve the techniques employed in future operations?'[38] This is not to suggest that such considerations are unimportant or entirely unhelpful in understanding peace operations. However, the dominance of the functional approach means that the study of peace operations has overlooked important aspects of these institutions.

In particular, the functional orientation has played down the political character of peace operations as institutions possessing power, instead framing them as technical instruments for policy coordination and collective problem-solving. Theorising about implementation – for example, about the obstruction of implementation by spoilers,[39] the provision of security

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34 Roland Paris, 'Broadening the Study of Peace Operations' *International Studies Review* 2, no. 3 (2001), p.27.
35 Michael Pugh, 'Peacekeeping and IR Theory: Phantom of the Opera?' *International Peacekeeping* 10, no. 4 (2003), p.104.
36 Peter Viggo Jakobsen, 'The Transformation of United Nations Peace Operations in the 1990s: Adding Globalization to the Conventional `End of the Cold War Explanation'' *Cooperation and Conflict* 37, no. 3 (2002), p.267.
37 Alex J. Bellamy, 'The 'Next Stage' in Peace Operations Theory?' *International Peacekeeping* 11, no. 1 (2004), p.17.
38 Paris, 'Broadening the Study of Peace Operations', p.32.
39 Stephen John Stedman, 'Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes' *International Security* 22, no. 2 (1997).

guarantees,[40] or the degree of external support required[41] – dwarfs theoretical engagement with peace operations' institutional character. The literature focuses on defining the functions of peace operations, without adequately considering *how* peace operations achieve these functions. Well-suited to explaining the operation and maintenance of institutions, functionalism is weaker regarding their effects on actor behaviour,[42] partly because a functional account underplays the power of institutions while overemphasising their technical roles. Indeed, I argue that focusing on the power of institutions may explain why institutions are often unable to achieve their desired functionality.[43] In particular, functionalism neglects the *compulsory* power of institutions – that is, the ability of institutions to influence the behaviour of actors through relations of *direct* control – and the way in which they exercise power in their functional roles.[44] Critical theorists and postmodernists have begun to question the institutional, structural and productive power of peace operations by examining the role of power in agenda-setting, establishing hierarchical relationships between the 'interveners' of the global North and the 'intervened' of the South, and producing knowledge and meaning through social discourse. I examine these contributions in the next section, but find that the role of compulsory power has been overlooked.

The normative power of peace operations

The functional approach to studying peace operations dominated scholarship in the 1990s, overshadowing critical evaluation of the purposes of peace operations. During the 2000s, a growing body of critical scholarship targeted this lacuna by questioning the normative

[40] Barbara F. Walter, 'The Critical Barrier to Civil War Settlement' *International Organization* 51, no. 3 (1997).
[41] Fen Osler Hampson, *Nurturing Peace: Why Peace Settlements Succeed or Fail* (Washington DC: U.S. Institute of Peace, 1996).
[42] Martin and Simmons, 'Theories and Empirical Studies of International Institutions'.
[43] Michael Barnett and Martha Finnemore, 'The Power of Liberal International Organizations' in *Power in Global Governance*, ed. Michael N. Barnett and Raymond Duvall (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).
[44] See Andrew Hurrell, 'Power, Institutions, and the Production of Inequality' in *Power in Global Governance*, ed. Michael N. Barnett and Raymond Duvall (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).

agenda(s) of peace operations and their implications for global order.[45] This literature is concerned with identifying and explaining the role of peace operations in international society and, importantly, considering the effects of peace operations on international structures. Described by Roland Paris as 'macro' approaches which 'permit us to gain a better understanding of these missions as products of the international system',[46] such frameworks seek to address two related questions: first, how do the norms of global order affect the nature, scope and role of peace operations; and second, what role *should* peace operations play in international society.

The normative power of peace operations has been investigated by scholars using constructivist,[47] critical,[48] and post-modern[49] methods, and this research has contributed substantially to understandings of the implicit normative agendas of these institutions which often present themselves as apolitical and technical enterprises. In a particularly influential study, Roland Paris compared the mandates, implementation and outcomes of fourteen peacebuilding operations, finding not only that the UN operations he studied had a liberalising agenda which reflected the normative consensus of the global order (and its major powers), but that this agenda actually undermined the goals of building peace and stability.[50] Paris's critique is levelled not at the practice of peacebuilding itself but at the form

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45 Bellamy, 'The 'Next Stage'?'; David Chandler, *Empire in Denial: The Politics of State-Building* (London: Pluto, 2006); Philip Cunliffe, 'The Politics of Global Governance in UN Peacekeeping' *International Peacekeeping* 16, no. 3 (2009); François Debrix, *Re-Envisioning Peacekeeping: The United Nations and the Mobilization of Ideology* (Minneapolis; London: University of Minnesota Press, 1999); Keith Krause and Oliver Jütersonke, 'Peace, Security and Development in Post-Conflict Environments' *Security Dialogue* 36, no. 4 (2005); Roland Paris, 'International Peacebuilding and the 'Mission Civilisatrice'' *Review of International Studies* 28 (2002); Michael Pugh, 'Peacekeeping and Critical Theory' *International Peacekeeping* 11, no. 1 (2004); Oliver P. Richmond, 'UN Peace Operations and the Dilemmas of the Peacebuilding Consensus' *International Peacekeeping* 11, no. 2 (2004); Oliver P. Richmond and Jason Franks, *Liberal Peace Transitions: Between Statebuilding and Peacebuilding (*Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2009) Rolf Schwarz, 'Post-Conflict Peacebuilding: The Challenges of Security, Welfare and Representation' *Security Dialogue* 36, no. 4 (2005).

46 Paris, 'Broadening the Study of Peace Operations', pp.29-30.

47 Paris, *At War's End.*

48 Bellamy, 'The 'Next Stage'?'; Pugh, 'Peacekeeping and Critical Theory'.

49 Debrix, *Re-Envisioning Peacekeeping.*

50 Paris, *At War's End.*

of peacebuilding pursued in peace operations since the end of the Cold War. In its place, he advocated the alternative strategy of 'institutionalisation-before-liberalisation', whereby peace operations adopt a longer time horizon and concentrate early efforts on building democratic institutions rather than rushing to elections.

Michael Pugh, meanwhile, critiqued not only the nature of the 'peace' in peacebuilding but also its implications for global order.[51] Pugh argued that peace operations 'sustain a particular order of world politics that privileges the rich and powerful states' as they attempt 'to doctor the dysfunctions of the global political economy within a framework of liberal imperialism'.[52] He levelled his sharpest critique at the narrow, problem-solving policy orientation of the peace operations literature which, he argued, obscures the global power structures perpetuated by peace operations, based on the idea 'that "soldiers of freedom" can be dispatched from zones of peace into zones of unruliness and dysfunctional criminality – to win conflicts against "rogue" governments in Serbia, Afghanistan or Iraq or against groups that have been stereotyped as lumpen insurgents with personality disorders'.[53]

While less vehement in his critique, Alex Bellamy also noted the inadequacies of the instrumental approach favoured by many scholars.[54] With co-authors Stuart Griffin and Paul Williams, Bellamy sought to address this weakness by developing a typology of international peacekeeping based not on the tasks undertaken by missions, but instead according to their role in international society.[55] While the resulting typology looks remarkably similar to those of the functional 'problem-solving' literature, the real strength of Bellamy, Griffin and Williams' work is to identify and explore in-depth the normative struggle that underlies contemporary peace operations: the contestation over Westphalian and post-Westphalian

[51] Pugh, 'Peacekeeping and Critical Theory'.
[52] Ibid., p.39.
[53] Ibid., p.40.
[54] Bellamy, 'The 'Next Stage'?', p.17.
[55] Bellamy, Williams, and Griffin, *Understanding Peacekeeping.*

visions of global order. The challenge of defining peace operations, then, is not the inherent complexity of their tasks, but fundamental disagreement about their purpose in international society, reflecting deep divisions about the norms of global order. Through the lens of this contestation between Westphalian pluralist norms of sovereignty and non-intervention, and post-Westphalian solidarist norms of human rights and human security, Bellamy *et al.* identified five types of peace operation. What distinguishes their typology from those of the functional approach is its definition of peace operations as reflections of different visions of the role they *ought* to play in international governance. Traditional peacekeeping, then, reflects a Westphalian view of sovereignty in which the norms of consent, impartiality and minimum use of force are sacrosanct, while 'peace support operations' aim to establish liberal democratic peace through 'robust' means. The no-man's land between these visions is what the authors call 'wider peacekeeping', which tries to preserve the Westphalian *means* of peacekeeping (consent, impartiality and minimum force) while pursuing post-Westphalian *aims*, including the delivery and protection of humanitarian aid and personnel, guaranteeing freedom of movement, securing 'safe zones', enforcing no-fly zones, and pursuing host state capacity building. This gap between means and ends is argued by many to be the fatal flaw in many operational failures, including the most notorious: the massacre of civilians in the Serbian 'safe zone' of Srebrenica, where UN peacekeepers were given an impossible mandate with vastly insufficient resources; and the Rwandan genocide, where a skeletal operation had neither the mandate nor resources to prevent the deaths of nearly one million Rwandans.

The relationship between material power and norms in the international system highlights another definitional characteristic of peace operations, namely, who sponsors and carries out their activities. The role of major power self-interest in determining when, where and in

what form peace operations are deployed has been widely examined.[56] One notable finding of such research has been that a conflict setting which evokes little major power self-interest is unlikely to emerge as an issue of such importance that a large-scale, well-equipped, robust operation is contemplated. Further, UN operations are overwhelmingly staffed by personnel from a small number of developing countries. The 'division of labour' is not an arbitrary one, but instead resembles a two-tiered system in which 'well-equipped, well-funded operations led by one of the world's richer states trying to secure an achievable mandate' is contrasted with under-resourced operations pursuing ambitious mandates in locations perceived by major powers to be of insufficient strategic importance to secure the active participation of major powers.[57]

While scholars once lamented the lack of critical engagement with the normative purposes of peace operations,[58] the call for such scholarship has prompted increasing attention to these issues. However, these normative studies have analysed peace operations exclusively through the international lens. This literature tells us little, then, about the dual international-domestic character of peace operations, or the effect of these institutions on the behaviour of local actors.

Principal-agent analysis

While scholars have not explicitly engaged principal-agent theory in the study of peace operations, many prominent themes in the literature can be captured by focusing on the nature and dynamics of the contractual relationship between an agent (the operation) and the principal which delegates authority to it (e.g. the UN). Case study research has found that

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[56] Adam Roberts and Dominik Zaum, *Selective Security: War and the United Nations Security Council since 1945*, Adelphi Papers, No. 395 (Abingdon: Routledge, 2008); Lise Morje Howard, *UN Peacekeeping in Civil Wars* (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008).
[57] Bellamy, Williams, and Griffin, *Understanding Peacekeeping*, p.184; see also Cunliffe, 'The Politics of Global Governance in UN Peacekeeping'.
[58] Paris, 'Broadening the Study of Peace Operations'; Bellamy, 'The 'Next Stage'?'.

operational autonomy is a central determinant of peace operation effectiveness, and that dysfunctional relations between the field operation and national or international bureaucratic headquarters can obstruct successful mandate implementation.[59] For example, Derek Boothby finds that operational autonomy and leadership were important for the success of the United Nations Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium (UNTAES),[60] while Lise Morje Howard argues that conflicts between the field operation and UN headquarters eventually undermined the negotiation process in Somalia.[61]

Principal-agent theory highlights the inherent tension in the contractual process of delegation through which peace operations are created: by delegating authority for a particular task, a principal endows its agent with a degree of autonomy, but this entails the risk that an agent may exercise autonomy in ways undesired by the principal. By drawing attention to this problem of 'agency slack', a principal-agent approach facilitates the critical analysis of autonomy lacking in current peace operation literature. For example, the possibilities for a field operation to behave in ways unwanted by its mandating authority create demands for the field 'puppet' to be kept firmly under the control of its international 'master'.[62] Although issues of field-headquarters relations are frequently discussed in the literature,[63] the dynamics of such accountability issues have not been adequately analysed to date. Understanding peace operations as institutions can facilitate this.[64]

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[59] Autonomy is understood as 'the range of potential independent action available to an agent after the principal has established mechanisms of control', Darren Hawkins et al., 'Delegation under Anarchy: States, International Organizations, and Principal-Agent Theory' in *Delegation and Agency in International Organizations*, ed. Darren Hawkins, et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), p.8.

[60] Derek Boothby, 'The Political Challenges of Administering Eastern Slavonia' *Global Governance* 10 (2004), pp.45-46.

[61] Howard, *UN Peacekeeping in Civil Wars*, pp.25-28.

[62] Darren G. Hawkins et al., *Delegation and Agency in International Organizations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006).

[63] For example, see Howard, *UN Peacekeeping in Civil Wars*.

[64] For example, the insights of Daniel Nielson and Michael Tierney on agency theory and the World Bank hold promise for understanding the sources of peace operation autonomy, how autonomy manifests, and how delegating authorities might seek to reign in undesirable behaviour by field

Principal-agent theory also sheds light on the problems of long and ambiguous accountability chains, where decision-making at the international level is too far removed from those most affected. Although it is not explicitly invoked, this approach is evident in some studies of peace operations. For example, Lisa Morje Howard advances a new theory of peace operation effectiveness based on the degree of first-level organisational learning; that is, learning that happens *within* each peace operation.[65] It is distinguished from second-level organisational learning, which happens at UN headquarters *in between* operations. For Howard, operational autonomy is an essential precondition for organisational learning, derived from daily decision-making power residing with the field operation as well as the wide distribution of an operation's personnel among the local population. Such autonomy is necessary for peace operations to exercise power in ways that target behavioural change among local actors, for example, to incrementally alter the goals of warring elites 'through careful exercise of influence and authority, introducing new ideas in order to bridge political positions and unit interests', and to learn 'how to manage crises'. Others note simply that good leadership and competent personnel contribute to operational effectiveness.[66]

Thus although peace operations are created through interstate cooperation, delegated by the UN, regional organisations, coalitions, or some other principal to respond to the collective problems of threats to international or regional peace and security, they exercise some degree of autonomy in the field. A principal-agent approach highlights the ways in which the desire of principals to maintain control over peace operations may infringe on the effectiveness of an operation on the ground. As international institutions, peace operations inevitably result from political compromise that creates at least some measure of operational difficulty. This

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operations; see Daniel Nielson and Michael J. Tierney, 'Delegation to International Organizations: Agency Theory and World Bank Environmental Reform' *International Organization* 57, no. Spring (2003).

[65] Howard, *UN Peacekeeping in Civil Wars*.

[66] William J. Durch, *Twenty-First-Century Peace Operations* (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace and the Henry L. Stimson Center, 2006), p.584.

is highlighted by David Harland, who identifies a trade-off between the effectiveness and legitimacy of UN operations, which are 'fraught with the 'constructive ambiguities' that make for good diplomacy but bad operations'.[67]

Yet while these authors consider peace operations at the field level, their purpose is to analyse problems that arise at the international level. Although they recognise that the agency of peace operations may be analysed independent from the interests of international organisations and their member states, these studies shed little conceptual light on the domestic character of these institutions, nor the ways in which they interact with local actors. While a principal-agent approach accounts for the sources of peace operation autonomy at the local level and allows analysis of the divergence of interests between an operation and its delegating authority, it tells us little about how the agency of peace operations influences effectiveness.

Dilemma analysis

Following the UN's experiments of transitional administration in Kosovo and East Timor, interest has grown in the trade-offs and dilemmas inherent in these statebuilding exercises. The duality of international and domestic governance is evident in this research, which has sought to respond to the disappointing experiences of peace operations over the past decade. Challenging the dominant functional approach of the 1990s, the approach of dilemma analysis, particularly as developed by The Research Partnership on Postwar Statebuilding,[68] provides a method for identifying and managing the inherent contradictions among the many goals of peace operations. However, while the dilemma analysis framework tackles the

[67] David Harland, 'Legitimacy and Effectiveness in International Administration' *Global Governance* 10 (2004), p.16.
[68] See their edited volume: Roland Paris and Timothy D. Sisk, eds., *The Dilemmas of Statebuilding: Confronting the Contradictions of Postwar Peace Operations* (London, New York: Routledge, 2009).

duality of peace operation governance head-on, it does not engage with questions of local actor behaviour, as I argue below.

The dilemma analysis framework presents a conceptual alternative to the prevailing policy-oriented, functional approach to understanding peace operations by allowing the deep complexities of peace operations and their activities to come to the fore. Like much of the functional literature, the dilemma analysis approach aims to have direct policy relevance. It differs, however, in the process through which its policy implications are derived. Dilemma analysis problematises the basic existence, goals and practices of peace operations. Of particular analytical value, it captures the multiple and often fragmented elements of peace operations; rather than assuming that they are unified, integrated units, this approach disaggregates the many parts of a peace operation. In this way, dilemma analysis overcomes a central problem of the typological approach: it allows analysis of the shifting nature of peace operations, which perform multiple tasks simultaneously and often move between different types over the course of their operations.[69] As Paris and Sisk put it,

> dilemma analysis begins from the assumption that many of the elements of statebuilding will not fit together easily. In fact, some of these elements are likely to interact in ways that have the potential to undercut, not advance, the goal of establishing legitimate, effective state institutions in war-torn countries.[70]

A series of dilemmas highlights the interactions between the international and local levels of analysis. The disjuncture between international and local norms is frequently noted by authors questioning the appropriateness of a peace operation's goals and the means employed to achieve them.[71] In practical terms, the tension between the long-term needs of local conflict resolution, reconstruction and development, and the short time horizon of

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[69] Bellamy, Williams, and Griffin, *Understanding Peacekeeping*, p.13.
[70] Roland Paris and Timothy D. Sisk, *Managing Contradictions: The Inherent Dilemmas of Postwar Statebuilding* International Peace Academy, 2007, p.7.
[71] For example, see Beatrice Pouligny, 'UN Peace Operations, INGOs, NGOs, and Promoting the Rule of Law: Exploring the Intersection of International and Local Norms in Different Postwar Contexts' *Journal of Human Rights* 2, no. 3 (2003).

international actors seeking exit strategies is argued to exacerbate each of the other dilemmas.[72]

The ownership dilemma is perhaps the most profound and difficult to resolve, combining as it does so many points of tension between the aims of peace operations and the means employed to achieve them.[73] At its heart are two apparent contradictions: the use of international intervention to promote self-government; and the associated trade-off between international and local control.

Peace operations attempt to produce (locally) self-sustaining peace through the use of international resources, which threatens not only the aims of self-government by risking dependence on international aid, but also has often seen the importation of 'irrelevant', unsustainable standards of governance.[74] This ownership dilemma is particularly acute in situations of transitional administration, where international actors assume direct control of a territory, including all functions of government. The distinction between the international identity of the operation, as distinct from the local identity of the territorial unit and affected population, is therefore a central cause of this dilemma.[75] Carolyn Bull notes that no operation has successfully resolved the dilemma of governing a territory as outsiders while at the same time being expected to promote local ownership.[76] The disjuncture between the processes through which peace operations are designed and the local, social geography of their implementation is noted by Beatrice Pouligny, who argues that operations conceived in the antechambers of international negotiation are based on notions of crisis and political

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[72] Michael Barnett and Christoph Zurcher, 'The Peacebuilder's Contract: How External Statebuilding Reinforces Weak Statehood' in *The Dilemmas of Statebuilding: Confronting the Contradictions of Postwar Peace Operations*, ed. Roland Paris and Timothy D. Sisk (London, New York: Routledge, 2009).
[73] See Jens Narten, 'Dilemmas of Promoting 'Local Ownership'' in *The Dilemmas of Statebuilding: Confronting the Contradictions of Postwar Peace Operations*, ed. Roland Paris and Timothy D. Sisk (London, New York: Routledge, 2009).
[74] Chesterman, *You, the People*, pp.247-248.
[75] Ralph Wilde, 'From Danzig to East Timor and Beyond: The Role of International Territorial Administration' *The American Journal of International Law* 95, no. 3 (2001), p.535.
[76] Bull, *No Entry without Strategy*, p.262.

solutions that are 'analysed and qualified according to parameters that often have very little to do with the local and regional context'.[77]

The idea that peacebuilding processes need to be 'locally owned' has become so widespread as to risk cliché. Chesterman critiques the notion of ownership as a 'shibboleth of the development community', noting that although the term is commonly used, it lacks both consistency and substance.[78] Edward Joseph argues that ownership is 'over-rated',[79] and Stephen Krasner has advocated an approach in which peace operations share only some ownership with local actors while continuing to exercise control over key areas without a commitment to restore local authority quickly.[80]

The dynamics of ownership are often presented as a one-way relationship where international actors can 'choose' to devolve authority to and consult with local actors. These local actors are typically presented as lacking agency, relying instead on the 'bestowal' or transfer of ownership from above. The frequent call for local actors to 'step up to the plate' further entrenches the vision of local leaders as passive or impotent.

Yet it is clear that actors in the local realm also influence the international. As Part Three below will discuss, the decisions and actions of local actors determine the outcomes of peace operations in important ways, which have profound implications for their international patrons. While the literature employing dilemma analysis has highlighted the need to analyse the local level, it has not yet developed a useful analytical framework for doing so.

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[77] Béatrice Pouligny, *Peace Operations Seen from Below: UN Missions and Local People* (London: Hurst & Co, 2006), p.1.
[78] Simon Chesterman, 'Ownership in Theory and in Practice: Transfer of Authority in UN Statebuilding Operations' *Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding* 1, no. 1 (2007).
[79] E. P. Joseph, 'Ownership Is over-Rated' *SAIS review* 27, no. 2 (2007).
[80] Stephen D. Krasner, 'Sharing Sovereignty: New Institutions for Collapsed and Failing States' *International Security* 29, no. 2 (2004).

Part III: The local level of analysis

In the mid- to late-1990s, the community of practitioners and scholars engaged in the study and implementation of peace operations began a period of soul-searching reflection prompted in large part by the chronic failures which overshadowed many successes of the peacekeeping enterprise. The release of a series of reports analysing the first wave of operations after the Cold War coincided with a resurgence in peace operation activity led by the transitional administrations in Kosovo and East Timor.[81] The reflections of the 1999 and 2000 reports were soon superseded by a rapid cascade of predominantly scholarly critiques of the newer operations.

One of the dominant themes in this latest round of critical reflections has been the call to focus more analytical and policy attention to the local level and the actors within it.[82] In part, this reflects the nature of new tasks undertaken by peace operations, most notably the direct governance of a nascent state and its population. In part, it has coincided with the re-emergence of 'hearts and minds' imperatives in military doctrine, responding to counter-insurgency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. The local level of analysis is thus increasingly understood to contain key variables that explain the success and failure of peace operations.

The emergence of the 'statebuilding' discourse prompted analysis of the end goals of such intervention, driven by the practical experiments with transitional administration in Kosovo and East Timor, as well as the post-9/11 focus on state failure as a threat to international security. If (re)building the state was the ultimate goal of peace operations, then

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[81] United Nations, *Report of the Independent Inquiry into the Actions of the United Nations During the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda*, S/1999/1257, 15 December 1999; United Nations, *The Fall of Srebrenica: Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to General Assembly Resolution 53/35*, A/54/54915, November 1999; United Nations, *The Brahimi Report*; United Nations, *No Exit without Strategy: Security Council Decision-Making and the Closure or Transition of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations*, S/2001/394, 20 April 2001.

[82] Chandler, *Empire in Denial*; David Chandler, *Bosnia: Faking Democracy after Dayton* (London: Pluto Press, 2000); Pouligny, *Peace Operations Seen from Below*; Virginia Page Fortna, *Does Peacekeeping Work?: Shaping Belligerents' Choices after Civil War* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008); John T. Fishel and Max G. Manwaring, *Uncomfortable Wars Revisited* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2006).

policymakers needed to know how to 'make states work'. Simon Chesterman, Michael Ignatieff and Ramesh Thakur addressed this question in a 2005 volume, which summarised and strengthened an emerging consensus that international invention alone could not make states work. They argued that outside assistance might be a necessary condition for rebuilding stable and functional states, but not a sufficient one, since the very nature of statebuilding means that its effectiveness will be ultimately determined by agents in the local realm. They argue that:

> international action should be seen first and foremost as facilitating local processes, providing resources and creating the space for local actors to start a conversation that will define and consolidate their polity by mediating their vision of a good life into responsive, robust and resilient institutions.[83]

Similarly, referring to the long-term processes of building social cohesion and stability, Edward Newman and Albrecht Schnabel argue that local societies carry most of the burden, including for putting in place the measures that will prevent future conflict and devastation.[84]

Yet such works stop short of differentiating among the numerous local actors that influence a peace operation, or identifying the causal mechanisms through which international action might shape local behaviour. While calls for 'local ownership' remain prominent in the literature, there has been insufficient attention given to defining and understanding the effects of such local processes.

Nevertheless, a handful of academic works provide some analytical foundation for studying peace operations at the local level, within which two approaches can be discerned. In the first, the nature of peace operation goals and the location of their impact are highlighted in a normative argument for according greater value to local experiences. The second approach advocates such attention for instrumental reasons, making causal claims that better

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[83] Simon Chesterman, Michael Ignatieff, and Ramesh Thakur, eds., *Making States Work: State Failure and the Crisis of Governance* (Tokyo: United Nations University, 2005), p.384.
[84] Edward Newman and Albrecht Schnabel, *Recovering from Civil Conflict: Reconciliation, Peace, and Development*, (London: F. Cass, 2002), p.4.

understanding of the nature of local environments produces better outcomes for peace operations.

In the first camp, Beatrice Pouligny's *Peace Operations Seen From Below* provides the most comprehensive, nuanced and original account of local experiences of peace operations.[85] Her work explicitly aims to understand the experiences of local actors, rather than explain their causal significance, but her sociological approach provides a rich history of local responses to peace operations. She chronicles the gulf that too often exists between the personnel of peace operations and local people, emphasising the distrust and suspicion with which peacekeepers and their 'bizarre behaviour' are frequently viewed.[86]

Pouligny advocates a local approach to studying peace operations not only because of the general neglect of local experiences in the literature, but because of the fundamentally local effects of contemporary peace operations and the conflict environments they seek to address. In such settings, war does not occur on traditional frontlines, but is 'played out in the heart of the socio-political space, physically and symbolically: in seats of power as in the narrow streets of a shantytown or on roads in the middle of nowhere'.[87] Restoring law and order, then, 'amounts to nothing more nor less than intervening in a social contract, in the relationship between society, the individuals that compose it, and the state'.[88] For Pouligny, the very nature of peace operation goals means that the local level should be given analytical significance, and she makes a persuasive normative case for why research should consider local perspectives.

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[85] Pouligny, *Peace Operations Seen from Below*.
[86] Ibid., p.iv.
[87] Ibid., p.xvii.
[88] Ibid., p.xvii.

The instrumental approach emphasises the explanatory leverage gained by recognising the role of local actors in determining peace operation effectiveness.[89] In this view, the agency of local actors means that their decision-making processes need close interrogation. That is, we need to understand local actors and their perceptions because they ultimately determine whether peace stands or falls.

In the instrumental case, analysing the perspectives of the parties to the conflict is essential for understanding the causal mechanisms through which peacekeeping 'works', since it is those local actors who choose whether to return to war or maintain peace. In one such study, Virginia Page Fortna argues that the actions of peacekeepers must ultimately be transmitted through 'the peacekept' in order to reduce the likelihood that war will resume.[90] Tracing the causal mechanisms through which an international operation helps to keep the peace in conflict-shattered states, Fortna focuses on the ways in which peacekeepers 'shape the choices' of (former) belligerents in order to consolidate peace agreements.

Fortna's research makes a significant contribution to analysis of peace operations at the local level by conceptualising the parties to a conflict as decision-makers whose decisions are not pre-determined but can be shaped by the policies and actions of peacekeepers. Fortna argues that the interests and preferences of belligerents have been taken as exogenous in much of the literature, with little attention given to how peacekeepers may change the 'political will' of local decision-makers.[91] In order to address this gap, Fortna assumes that the peacekept are rational actors who make behavioural decisions based on cost-benefit calculations.[92]

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[89] Fortna, *Does Peacekeeping Work?*; Stedman, 'Spoiler Problems'.
[90] Fortna, *Does Peacekeeping Work?*
[91] Ibid., p.79.
[92] While Fortna argues that 'perceptions' are important, she is really referring to these cost-benefit calculations in rational actor decision-making.

Fortna finds that peacekeepers can change the calculations of local parties such that they are more likely to pursue pathways of peace than renewed fighting, in four ways: by raising the costs of war or the benefits of peace for the peacekept, thus deterring aggression; by reducing uncertainty about the actions and intentions of other parties, thus disrupting security dilemmas; by preventing and controlling accidents; and by deterring or preventing one side from reneging on political commitments and/or excluding other parties.[93] These findings are significant because they demonstrate that the actions of peacekeepers will only have effect if transmitted through the behaviour of local decision-makers. Highlighting the narcissistic tendency of the peacekeeping literature, which has largely ignored the peacekept in favour of focusing on the functions, mandates, resources, capacities and 'best practices' of operations, Fortna argues that it is the peacekept who have agency in choosing peace over war: 'Only if peacekeepers change something for the peacekept can they have causal impact on this choice.'[94]

While Fortna emphasises the importance of 'the peacekept' as the ultimate agents of peace (or the resumption of violent conflict), she does not analyse variation among local decision-makers, and thus she tells us little about how local cleavages may affect peace operation outcomes. This has been the focus of a growing literature on 'spoilers', which examines the mechanisms through which peace operations can manage local actors who oppose a particular peace process and seek to undermine it. The concept of spoiling found significance through the work of Stephen Stedman, who argued that a central determinant of successful peace processes is effective management of 'spoilers', or those who seek to undermine a peace agreement and its implementation through a return to violence.[95] Importantly, unlike Fortna, Stedman identified different types of spoilers and proposed distinct strategies for managing each accordingly.

[93] Fortna, *Does Peacekeeping Work?*, pp.86-102.
[94] Ibid., p.175.
[95] Stedman, 'Spoiler Problems'.

Stedman's theory of spoiler management remains one of the most influential accounts of the causal processes through which peace operations affect the success or failure of peace processes. Rejecting a mounting consensus that insufficient 'political will' at the international level explained peace operation failures during the 1990s, Stedman argues that variation in the effectiveness of peace operations can be explained by differentiating between the difficulty of conflict environments, the key variable of which is the presence and characteristics of spoilers: 'leaders and parties who believe that peace emerging from negotiations threatens their power, worldview, and interests, and use violence to undermine attempts to achieve it'.[96] Effective peace operations are those that successfully remove, reduce or contain the spoiler threat, by choosing strategies of spoiler management that 'fit' the particular spoiler problem at hand. That is, peace outcomes are determined by successfully addressing spoilers, which means managing the consent of local actors so that spoilers do not emerge, would-be spoilers are persuaded to continue consent, and/or active spoilers are thwarted or contained.

Stedman identifies three strategies of spoiler management available to peace operations: inducement, socialisation, and coercion.[97] In order to identify these strategies, Stedman makes two significant contributions to our analytical tools for understanding local actors. First, Stedman distinguishes spoilers from other types of local actors: they are leaders and parties to a conflict, entailing both elites and their followers, who may be formal participants in a peace agreement, or be excluded from it. Second, having narrowed his focus to spoilers, he drills down into this class of local actor, differentiating between *types* of spoilers according to a set of variables that must be assessed to diagnose correctly the spoiler problem faced. Stedman puts most emphasis on the nature of spoiler goals and the level of their goal-commitment to identify three types of spoiler. His typology of limited, total and greedy

[96] Ibid., p.5.
[97] These strategies are examined in greater depth in Chapter Two.

spoilers forms the basis from which the appropriateness of various strategies is determined. The remaining variables further differentiate within these categories; spoiler problems thus vary not only across the goals of spoilers, but the number of spoiling actors, the degree of factional unity within a particular spoiler, the leadership structure and locus of power of spoilers, and the contractual relationship of spoilers to a particular peace agreement.

The implicit assumption here is that a peace operation's effectiveness depends on its ability to change the behaviour of local actors, and by differentiating between actor types, Stedman provides the analytical tools to evaluate how they might respond to different peace operation policies. He thus provides a persuasive rationale for giving more attention to understanding local actors and the dynamics of interaction between local actors and peace operations: to be effective, the strategies of peace operations must match local conditions derived from the interests, intentions and preferences of local actors.

However, both Stedman's theory of spoiler management and Fortna's analysis of the peacekept have certain limitations which highlight the need for further attention to the local realm. First, while the role of elites in peace processes is analytically important, limiting analysis of local agency to this category of actor leaves conspicuous gaps in our understanding. Stedman makes a significant contribution by examining in detail one class of local actor (spoilers), but as he acknowledges, strategies for managing spoilers also affect non-spoiling parties. His spoiler framework, however, does not allow analysis of these effects. Further, in the most successful cases, spoilers that are effectively managed become 'non-spoilers'. While Stedman's framework may allow analysis of these actors as 'potential' spoilers, peace operations will continue to try to exert influence on their behaviour, not just to prevent backward slippage into spoiling (non-compliance), but to move those parties

further toward high-quality cooperation.[98] Because Stedman's framework is limited to analysis of spoilers, it cannot tell us about the many other actors whose behaviour affects peace operation outcomes, and in particular, about the ways in which managing spoilers affects the ability of a peace operation to manage the consent of other actors with whom it engages. While Fortna's analysis of 'the peacekept' does include active and latent spoilers as well as non-spoiling parties, her scope of inquiry excludes the broad range of other actors that help to determine the outcomes of peace operations. Civil society organisations and community or religious leaders, for example, can influence the outcomes of peace operation activities, targeting goals such as enhancing political participation and inclusiveness, or social reconciliation. But they can also help to shape the decisions of belligerents regarding disarmament or ceasefire compliance, either directly or via broader mobilisation of public opinion and social forces that can check the behaviour of elite decision-makers and/or their followers. Additionally, considering only the 'peacekept' precludes analysis of the way that elite processes, such as ceasefire negotiations, interact with those broader peace operation goals targeting social, political and institutional transformation.

Further, Stedman theorises that spoiler management is the key variable in successful conflict resolution by a peace operation. However, because his scope of inquiry is deliberately limited to spoilers, this fundamental assumption cannot be examined. That is, good spoiler management will only be the key to effective peace processes if the strategies adopted to mitigate spoiler threats do not undermine other crucial aspects of a peace process. Stedman recognises this, through a number of possible scenarios. He recognises that the optimal strategy for managing one spoiler might undermine efforts to manage another, and he recognises that spoiler management may affect non-spoiling parties, for example by punishing them through the 'blunt instrument' of withdrawal, or benefitting them by

[98] Similarly, Greenhill and Major note that Stedman overlooks the need to manage potential or latent spoilers; Kelly M. Greenhill and Solomon Major, 'The Perils of Profiling: Civil War Spoilers and the Collapse of Intrastate Peace Accords' *International Security* 31, no. 3 (2007).

delegitimising spoilers. Finally, he puts a high premium on evaluating the legitimacy of spoilers' demands, which will inevitably include some evaluation of their effects on other (non-spoiling) parties. Yet the spoiler theory does not address any of these interactions, nor provide any guidance about how they might be analysed. In order to understand such strategies of spoiler management, then, we need more attention to the range of other actors engaged in a peace process, as well as an analytical framework through which to evaluate the role of non-spoiling actors.

The research of Stedman and Fortna shares four further weaknesses. First, analysis is limited to cases where a peace agreement is present, thus excluding the numerous cases in which peace operations are deployed without formal settlements, such as Haiti, East Timor, Afghanistan and Solomon Islands. Second, such focus on a peace agreement, and its ceasefire provisions in particular, means that compliance (or 'non-spoiling') is considered in a very narrow way. By contrast, the concept of cooperation employed in this thesis allows for the absence or fallibility of a peace agreement by examining compliance with a broader range of peace operation requests, not simply with codified agreements. It then goes a step further to examine the ways in which local actors might support and assist – i.e. cooperate with – a peace operation in the pursuit of its goals.

The concept of spoiling and the role of peace operations in addressing it have been developed through a series of critical engagements with Stedman's model. Broadening both the scope of spoiling behaviour and the identity of spoilers, Edward Newman and Oliver Richmond consider non-violent means of opposing a peace process as well as a range of actors including diasporas, political allies and multinational corporations within the spoiler concept.[99] Arguing that spoiling is 'an inherent part of contemporary peacemaking',[100] they

[99] Edward Newman and Oliver Richmond, eds., *Challenges to Peacebuilding: Managing Spoilers During Conflict Resolution* (Tokyo: United Nations University, 2006).
[100] Ibid., p.18.

highlight the many purposes of such behaviour, particularly by distinguishing spoiling that seeks to undermine a peace process from that which seeks to shape its negotiation and implementation. The purposes of spoiling are examined further by Wendy Pearlman, who shows that it might also be a strategy for local parties to shape their internal power structures.[101] Local actors might thus support or oppose a peace agreement as a means of contesting legitimate representation within their particular grouping; spoiling can represent attempts by factional rivals to determine who has the power to negotiate and make decisions on behalf of a particular community.[102] This highlights a limitation of Stedman's spoiler concept: while acknowledging that spoilers might differ according to leadership structure, he nevertheless assumes that local parties are unitary actors. Pearlman's research highlights the nested games that local actors may play in order to determine not only their power relations viz. other parties but also the configuration of power within their own community. Thus neither spoiling nor compliance can be taken as unproblematic indicators of an actor's interest in a peace process itself, further highlighting the need to analytically distinguish minimal compliance from high-quality cooperation.

Beyond highlighting the role of spoiling as a mechanism of internal political contestation, Pearlman argues that the relative power of local actors determines their level of antagonism toward a peace process, not the nature of their goals as emphasised by Stedman, since such power competition shapes an actor's assessment of the costs and benefits of peace or violence. For Kelly Greenhill and Solomon Major, this balance in material capabilities is central.[103] While Stedman's spoiler model emphasises the role of elite decision-making, Greenhill and Major advocate a capabilities model of spoiling, showing how the possible outcomes of decision-making determine spoiler type – not the reverse, as in the Stedman

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101 Wendy Pearlman, 'Spoiling inside and Out: Internal Political Contestation and the Middle East Peace Process' *International Security* 33, no. 3 (2009).
102 Ibid., p.79.
103 Greenhill and Major, 'The Perils of Profiling'.

model. Yet while Greenhill and Major set out an explicit alternative to Stedman's model, both ultimately emphasise the incentive structures facing spoilers as the channel through which peace operations can influence (potential) spoiling behaviour.

The third limitation of these approaches, then, is that they overlook the normative reasons for local compliance, and in doing so miss pathways through which peace operations can shape local behaviour. Similarly, Fortna's account of how peacekeeping works is, at its core, a political economy model which considers the ways in which peace operations can alter the incentive structures and risks of the peacekept in order to encourage compliance, ignoring the role of normative processes in providing reasons for particular behaviour. Peace operations are presented as largely technical mechanisms for addressing security dilemmas, recalibrating incentives and providing information. The social processes through which peace operations engage local actors are not analysed, and thus the role of local perceptions about the legitimacy of a peace operation is not evaluated. While Fortna examines how an operation can affect international and local perceptions about belligerents, she does not show how local perceptions of *the peace operation itself* matter, nor how an operation can legitimise itself among local populations.

A notable exception to this is the instrumental approach taken by Michael Mersiades, who identifies a causal role for local legitimacy in producing local consent and thus effectiveness.[104] Through brief case studies of operations in Cambodia and Somalia, Mersiades explains their successes and failures according to the extent to which they were perceived to be legitimate by local actors. While there are clear synergies between his work and this thesis, Mersiades' research is constrained by a number of conceptual and methodological limitations. First, while he argues that 'social contracts' between peace operations and local actors provide the basis for local legitimacy, Mersiades does not specify

[104] Michael Mersiades, 'Peacekeeping and Legitimacy: Lessons from Cambodia and Somalia' *International Peacekeeping* 12, no. 2 (2005).

how these contracts are forged, nor does he provide evidence for their existence in the perceptions of local actors. His 'social contract theory' thus remains an assumption, or an untested hypothesis, about why local actors tolerate an operation's presence rather than a research finding. Second, his concept of legitimacy depends to a large extent on outcomes or 'performance', despite evidence in his case studies that procedural legitimation was important. In part because he does not engage adequately with the theoretical literature, his definition of legitimacy is thin and misses important dimensions of peace operation legitimation. Finally, Mersiades over-reaches on the effects of legitimacy, claiming a greater role for legitimacy in determining effectiveness than is warranted by the evidence he provides. In large part this is because he does not consider other currencies that may be employed by a peace operation to secure the local support he investigates.

The final limitation of this literature analysing peace operations at the local level is that it overlooks the normative influence of peace operations on the decision-making processes of local actors. Both Fortna and Stedman highlight the ways that international legitimation of local actors can provide a positive incentive to encourage compliance, but neither considers the ways in which local perceptions of a peace operation's legitimacy can exert compliance-pull. Stedman recognises that normative influence can play a role in spoiler management, observing that 'when external consensus is used in conjunction with a coherent larger strategy, the setting of a normative standard can be an effective tool for conflict management'.[105] Yet the processes through which such standard setting occurs remain unclear, as do the ways in which peace operations become recognised as legitimate norm disseminators.

The prevailing approaches to the study of peace operations at the local level, then, analyse the strategies through which international actors can alter the costs and benefits of

[105] Stedman, 'Spoiler Problems', p.52.

cooperation for local actors. This is an important contribution, given that most of the literature is focused at the international level. Yet it misses the social processes through which local actor preferences, beliefs and interests can be shaped by peace operations. The various spoiler models show how international actors can alter the incentive structures of local parties such that their interests are better served by cooperating than by spoiling. But the role of peace operations in influencing the beliefs that shape preferences and interest calculations has not been conceptually or empirically addressed. In the rest of this thesis, I take up this challenge, developing an analytical framework in Chapter Two to examine how peace operations exercise power to get local actors to cooperate with their objectives, and then apply it to study operations in Cambodia and Solomon Islands.

Conclusion

This chapter has argued that the local lens of analysis holds significant promise for better understanding the effects and outcomes of peace operations. While much of the literature has either defined peace operations through complex typologies or avoided definition altogether, I have argued throughout this chapter that the diverse range of tasks, goals and purposes that peace operations pursue can be understood through three key features: first, peace operations are institutions; second, they have a dual international-domestic governance role; and third, they aim to change local behaviour in ways that help achieve their mandated goals. Although the domestic governance roles of peace operations are central, prevailing analytical approaches have focused on their international character. By doing so, the literature has to date largely overlooked important characteristics of peace operations that can be expected to influence their outcomes. In the sparse literature that *has* given more attention to the local level, key limitations remain. Such work takes either a normative approach, which aims to understand local responses to peace operations but not to explain

their causal significance, or focuses only on the ways in which peace operations can alter the incentive structures of local actors, thus overlooking the means by which operations can influence local interests and beliefs. Analysing peace operations through the local lens highlights the social processes through which they interact with local actors; these are in turn expected to affect the ability of operations to secure local cooperation. In the next chapter, I develop a power-legitimacy framework to assess how peace operations might obtain this local cooperation.

Chapter Two: Power, Legitimacy and Their Relationship

Peace operations work through direct relationships with local actors. These are relationships of power, through which peace operations aim to influence the decisions and actions of many different individuals and groups in the local realm. In the previous chapter, I argued that these relationships have been inadequately analysed; in particular, the prevailing frameworks for explaining peace operation effectiveness miss important causal processes through which influence is exerted or constrained. In this chapter, I elaborate a conceptual framework for identifying and analysing the power that peace operations have to secure local cooperation.

As I noted in the Introduction, the focus of this thesis is the compulsory power of peace operations: the interactions that allow peace operations to directly influence the behaviour of people in the host society.[1] A conventional understanding of power as coercion, exercised through material resources, is conceptually and practically inadequate for this task; as Joseph Nye argues, the powerful actor also has the power of inducement and attraction, and his concept of soft power is thus a form of compulsory power.[2] Peace operations need the active cooperation of local populations, not mere compliance, to achieve their goals of social transformation; they must exercise power in ways that encourage people to 'buy in' to the greater project of peacebuilding. To analyse the power of peace operations, I therefore examine the nature of and linkages between three modes of social influence: coercion, inducement and legitimacy. I define power as the ability of an actor to influence the behaviour of others to get the outcomes it wants through coercion (negative sanctions), inducement (positive incentives) and legitimacy (the perception that an institution is right, appropriate and desirable within a particular normative context). The practical power of

[1] Michael N. Barnett and Raymond Duvall, 'Power and Global Governance' in *Power in Global Governance,* ed. Michael N. Barnett and Raymond Duvall (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), p3.
[2] Joseph S. Nye, *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics* (New York: PublicAffairs, 2004), p.2.

peace operations is derived from this complex and dynamic blend of the threat or use of force or sanction, the tangible benefits of a peace dividend, and the voluntary sense of obligation derived from a peace operation's appropriateness.

Peace operations, I argue, act through a direct hierarchical relationship with local populations, issuing commands, making rules and pursuing objectives that require cooperation from local actors. As this chapter will show, this need for cooperation means that the relationship between power and legitimacy is complex: legitimacy is both a source of power and an institutional attribute that enables or constrains it. This power-legitimacy nexus means that the ability of peace operations to achieve desired outcomes is also derived through bottom-up processes of popular consent; the benefits of legitimacy for peace operations thus also constrain their exercise of power. This framework therefore addresses what Andrew Hurrell has correctly identified as the frequent neglect of the *reception* of power in international relations scholarship.[3]

In Chapter One, I defined peace operations as institutions that straddle the international and domestic spheres, and argued that they need to be understood at the local level. In this chapter, I ask how peace operations may exercise power in pursuit of local cooperation. In the first section below I define the compulsory dimension of power on which this thesis focuses. I then consider the contributions of international relations theory to understanding the power and legitimacy of peace operations, as well as the explanatory leverage that can be gained from other disciplines. Finally, I unpack the concepts of power and legitimacy to identify and analyse their sources and relationship, and to operationalise them for the case study chapters that follow.

[3] Andrew Hurrell, 'Power, Institutions, and the Production of Inequality' in *Power in Global Governance*, ed. Michael N. Barnett and Raymond Duvall (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), p.51.

The compulsory power of peace operations

My analysis commences by identifying what *sort* of power is possessed, generated and exercised by peace operations, namely compulsory power. The compulsory dimension of power is captured in Robert A. Dahl's conception of A compelling B to do what B would otherwise not have done.[4] Three qualifications are necessary, however. First, while traditionally associated with the material capabilities of states to advance their individual interests in the competitive environment of international anarchy,[5] compulsory power need not rely only on states as the referent actor, or on material resources as the mechanism of power. This thesis thus analyses the power of peace operations as institutions with agency, not as the manifestations of powerful states, and it examines their influence on individuals and groups within the host state. Second, the resources of compulsory power need not be material, but also include normative means for getting B to do what A wants.[6] I therefore analyse ideational processes alongside material resources to understand the mechanisms through which peace operations exercise various forms of social control. Finally, compulsory power does not depend on intentionality, but is present 'whenever A's actions control B's actions or circumstances, even if unintentionally', a perspective that understands power from the point of view of B, not A.[7]

This concept of power is primarily concerned with the ability of an actor to produce behavioural outcomes rather than with the possession of capabilities. Though the latter may enhance the former, the power of peace operations should not be assessed by reference to its

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[4] Robert A. Dahl, 'The Concept of Power' *Behavioral Science* 2, no. 3 (1957).
[5] E.g. Waltz, Kenneth Neal, *Theory of International Politics* Reading, Mass; London Addison-Wesley, 1979.
[6] Barnett and Duvall, 'Power in Global Governance', p.15.
[7] Ibid., p.14; Peter Bachrach and Morton S. Baratz, 'Two Faces of Power' *The American Political Science Review* 56, no. 4 (1962).

troop numbers or economic resources, but according to its capacity to use these resources to influence the behaviour of local actors.[8]

While peace operations may also exercise other forms of power, there are two principal reasons for focusing on compulsory power.[9] First, even more so than the concept of power generally, compulsory power has been inadequately addressed in the study of peace operations. Despite the emerging body of critical engagement with the institutional, structural and productive forms of power in peace operations,[10] the compulsory dimension, which focuses on agent behaviour, remains neglected. Second, as discussed in Chapter One, the nature and effects of the interactions between peace operations and local actors are poorly understood; in particular, the normative influence of these interactions has been overlooked. By making the power relationship between peace operations and local actors explicit, I aim to better understand the full range of processes through which a peace operation directly affects local actor behaviour, and what might constrain its ability to do so.

The hierarchical power relationship between a peace operation and local populations is fundamental to this analysis. Despite diversity in their structures, goals and practices, peace operations as defined here share a common purpose: they are mandated by actors in the international realm to assume various positions of authority in the domestic realm. Thus the processes of peacebuilding are necessarily top-down in structure. Regardless of attempts to

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[8] The experience of UN forces in Somalia is but one example of the limitations of focusing on material capability; see Jane Boulden, *Peace Enforcement: The United Nations Experience in Congo, Somalia and Bosnia* (Westport, Conn.; London: Praeger, 2001); Trevor Findlay, *The Use of Force in UN Peace Operations* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003).

[9] Other types of power include: institutional power, or control by indirect means through the formal and informal institutions that mediate between A and B; structural power, derived from the direct constitutive relationship between A and B determined by the structural hierarchy of their relations; and productive power, derived from the constitution of social actors through systems of knowledge and meaning; see Barnett and Duvall, 'Power in Global Governance'.

[10] See for example Alex J. Bellamy, Paul Williams, and Stuart Griffin, *Understanding Peacekeeping* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2004); Roland Paris, 'International Peacebuilding and the 'Mission Civilisatrice'' *Review of International Studies* 28 (2002); Oliver P. Richmond, 'UN Peace Operations and the Dilemmas of the Peacebuilding Consensus' *International Peacekeeping* 11, no. 2 (2004); David Chandler, *Empire in Denial: The Politics of State-Building* (London: Pluto, 2006).

promote local ownership and facilitate bottom-up processes, the very concept of peace operations implies a hierarchical relationship between the institution and local actors. By assuming some roles of domestic institutions, peace operations make an authority claim based on a hierarchical relationship similar in function, if not in origin, to that between the state and its citizens. It is this hierarchical relationship that makes the concept of power central to any investigation of the form, functions and outcomes of peace operations, and it makes the exercise of *compulsory* power particularly important.

Power in international relations theory

In international relations theory, 'power' has been the analytical domain of realists, for whom the struggle for power among self-interested states is the definitive feature of activity in the international realm. While Hans Morgenthau's classical realism emphasises the 'domination of man by man' as the core of power,[11] Waltz's neorealism conceives of power as the currency of self-help, necessary for the survival of states in the anarchic international system.[12] For both classical and structural realists, power is derived from the material, especially military, capabilities of states. Explicitly state-centric, realist theory leads us to expect that institutional power, if it exists at all, is derivative of state power; institutions are thus merely 'a reflection of the distribution of [state] power in the world'.[13] While illuminating the disproportionate influence of powerful states in international institutions such as the UN Security Council,[14] a realist framework cannot account for autonomous action by peace operations, or for the social nature of their behaviour in the domestic realm.

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[11] Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations* (New York: Knopf, 1978), p.11.
[12] Waltz, Theory of International Politics.
[13] John J. Mearsheimer, 'The False Promise of International Institutions' *International Security* 19, no.3 (1994), p.7.
[14] For example, by focusing on the distribution of state power underlying institutions, realist perspectives have explained the selectivity of peace operation deployment and the ideological content of their objectives; see Mohammed Ayoob, 'Humanitarian Intervention and State Sovereignty' *The International Journal of Human Rights* 6, no. 1 (2002); Jackson, 'International Engagement'.

Since realism is concerned with explaining the behaviour of states, this is not so much a critique of the merits of the theory as a recognition of its inadequacy as an explanatory tool for a broad range of significant phenomena in international relations – including the behaviour and influence of peace operations.

Yet with power captured by realists, others have been reluctant to engage with the concept. In comparison with other social science disciplines, international relations retains a very thin conception of power.[15] As Barnett and Duvall argue, '[t]he failure to develop alternative conceptualizations of power' restricts the explanatory leverage of international relations theory concerning a wide range of global outcomes and international actors.[16]

The theoretical contributions of neoliberal institutionalists identify a more influential role for institutions as 'persistent and connected sets of rules (formal or informal) that prescribe behavioural roles, constrain activity, and shape expectations'[17] which 'create the capability for states to cooperate in mutually beneficial ways by reducing the costs of making and enforcing agreements'.[18] This approach has highlighted the regulative power of institutions as constraints on state action. However, this power is nevertheless derived from the same underlying distribution of material power capabilities among states emphasised by neorealism. While institutions may exercise influence by changing the incentives for states to cooperate, they remain instruments for the pursuit of states' interests.

The narrow conception of power, particularly that of institutions, adopted by both realists and neoliberal institutionalists has led both schools to overlook the research questions that

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15 See David A. Baldwin, 'Power and International Relations' in *Handbook of International Relations*, ed. Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse-Kappen, and Beth A. Simmons (London: Sage, 2002) p.178; notable exceptions include the contributions to Barnett and Duvall, *Power in Global Governance*.
16 Barnett and Duvall, 'Power in Global Governance', p.8; see also Hurrell, 'Power, Institutions, and the Production of Inequality'.
17 Robert O. Keohane, 'International Institutions - Two Approaches' *International Studies Quarterly* 32, no. 4 (1988), p.383.
18 Robert O. Keohane, 'International Institutions: Can Interdependence Work?' *Foreign Policy*, no. 110 (1998), p.86.

animate this thesis. In particular, both approaches neglect the social dimensions of power, which explain why powerful actors so often seek legitimacy in order to avoid the 'costly and dangerous reliance on brute force and coercion'.[19]

The strongest critique of the neorealist and neoliberal approach to institutions, however, is their inability to account for institutions as actors with the potential for autonomous action, rather than as agents of state interests. Principal-agency theory does provide one way of explaining the autonomous power of institutions. By focusing on the delegation of autonomy and discretion by states (principals) to institutions (agents), a principal-agent framework explains how organisations obtain and use independent power.[20] However, while a principal-agent framework may highlight important sources of institutional power, its focus on the contractual relationship between an institution and its principal offers little utility for understanding the nature of the power relationship that exists between a peace operation and local populations. Further, it cannot explain why the institution might have certain interests in the first place; a principal-agent account tells us little about the goals and purposes of the institution itself.

Social constructivism more usefully reveals the goals and interests of international institutions, and thereby the sources and purposes of their power. Constructivist approaches to the study of institutions question 'the social content of the organization – its culture, it legitimacy concerns, dominant norms that govern behaviour and shape interests and the relationship of these to a larger normative and cultural environment'.[21] Critiquing not just the inadequacy of realist explanations but also the institutionalist failure to understand

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[19] Hurrell, 'Power, Institutions, and the Production of Inequality', p.49.
[20] Hawkins et al., 'Delegation under Anarchy'; Nielson and Tierney, 'Delegation to International Organizations'; Ngaire Woods, 'Order, Justice, the IMF and the World Bank' in *Order and Justice in International Relations*, ed. Rosemary Foot, John Gaddis, and Andrew Hurrell (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003).
[21] Michael N. Barnett and Martha Finnemore, 'The Politics, Power, and Pathologies of International Organizations' *International Organization* 53, no. 4 (1999) p.706.

information as power, constructivist accounts seek to understand the authority of institutions 'independent of the politics and interests of states that create them'.[22] Further, constructivists have examined the power of norms, particularly by analysing their influence on the behaviour of states.[23] However, constructivist research has focused on the international realm, and has emphasised the influence of structures (norms) on agents (states and international institutions).[24] While their identification of the ideational reasons for agent behaviour is significant for this thesis, constructivist approaches thus often share the limitations of other international relations theory insofar as studying peace operations is concerned.

Thus while mainstream international relations theory provides some insights about the power of peace operations, the discipline lacks adequate analytical tools for understanding the social power relationship between peace operations and local actors. In the following sections, I add insights from the legal, political science, political theory and social psychology literatures to understand what power peace operations have to fulfil their mandates, the sources of this power, and the ways in which it can be exercised. I argue that the compulsory power of peace operations has three currencies: coercion; inducement; and legitimacy.[25]

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[22] Ibid., p.709.

[23] See Martha Finnemore, *National Interests in International Society* (Ithaca; London Cornell University Press, 1996); Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press,1996); Audie Klotz, *Norms in International Relations: The Struggle Against Apartheid* (Ithaca, London: Cornell University Press, 1999); Kratochwil, Friedrich V., 'How Do Norms Matter?' in *The Role of Law in International Politics*, ed. Michael Byers (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000); Thomas Risse, Stephen Ropp, and Kathryn Sikkink, *The Power of Human Rights: International Norms and Domestic Change* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999); Dominik Zaum, *The Sovereignty Paradox: The Norms and Politics of International Statebuilding* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).

[24] Jeffrey T. Checkel, 'The Constructivist Turn in International Relations Theory' *World Politics* 50, no. 2 (1998).

[25] This threefold distinction is also identified by Ian Hurd, *After Anarchy: Legitimacy and Power in the United Nations Security Council* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007); David Beetham, *The Legitimation of Power* (London: Macmillan, 1991); Tom R. Tyler, 'Psychological Perspectives on Legitimacy and Legitimation' *Annual Review of Psychology* 57, no. 1 (2006); Alexander Wendt, *Social*

Three currencies of power

Coercion

Coercion is perhaps the most evident of power's currencies, captured in Thucydides' time-honoured axiom: 'The strong do what they will, the weak endure what they must'. Coercive power operates through a fear of sanction or punishment. While some have limited its definition to the threat or use of physical violence,[26] I define coercion more broadly to include legal and financial sanctions.

Coercive enforcement has been understood to constitute the core of social order and the rule of law. For Hobbes, a central enforcer (the Leviathan) provides the rational basis for social order, without which the state of nature prevails. Coercion is essential to the Hobbesian social contract, since 'covenants, without the sword, are but words and of no strength to secure a man at all'.[27] Coercive power is also central to the tradition of legal positivism associated with John Austin, who defined law as a command imposed by a

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Theory of International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999). Stephen Stedman identifies 'socialization', not legitimacy, as his third strategy of spoiler management, alongside coercion and inducement (Stedman, 'Spoiler Problems'). However, his concept of socialization is too focused on the deployment of resources by peace operations, and the evaluation of local actor behaviour by peace operations against some normative standard. It thus overlooks the bottom-up processes of legitimacy: that legitimacy pulls actors towards cooperation for reasons that originate with those actors, not the peace operation; and thus that it is the evaluations of a peace operation by local actors that are most significant, not the reverse. Like other literature on normative socialization, Stedman's concept is focused on the power of norms (structures) rather than peace operations (agents); for example, see Jeffrey T. Checkel, 'Why Comply? Social Learning and European Identity Change' *International Organization* 55, no. 3 (2001). Wendt also employs a very similar framework of coercion, self-interest and legitimacy to explain the widespread compliance of states with sovereignty norms, but he focuses on the nature of international structures (Hobbesian, Lockean, Kantian) rather than the practices of agents (peace operations), which is the central concern of this thesis; see Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, pp.385-390.

[26] Ian Hurd, 'Legitimacy and Authority in International Politics' *International Organization* 53, no. 2 (1999).

[27] Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan* (Harmondsworth: Pengiun, 1985), p.223.

sovereign and enforced by physical sanction.[28] In this view, the power of law is evident when a command elicits obedience, and this ultimately operates through a fear of sanction.

In international relations, the currency of coercive power is evident in the conventional account of state power derived from military capabilities. Further, the absence of central sovereign enforcement in the international realm defines the condition of international anarchy. This lack of an enforcement mechanism leads realists in particular to be sceptical of the influence of international institutions and rules. Unlike most international institutions, however, peace operations *do* have coercive power, by virtue of mandates and capacities to use force, make arrests, or impose financial sanctions. The degree of their coercive power varies, depending both on the content of the mandate (e.g. whether a UN peace operation has a Chapter VI or VII mandate) and the practical commitment of resources by contributing states (e.g. whether troops are sufficiently equipped or capable of carrying out a mandate).

Yet relying on coercion has significant limitations, especially for peace operations. First, it is costly to maintain a power relationship through the deployment of coercive sanctions alone,[29] and a system of power based on coercion 'can collapse very rapidly if coercion is insufficient or people believe that those in power have lost the will to use it'.[30] As I argue below, power through coercion can only be maintained so long as the fear of sanction remains credible. In peace operations, the problem is not so much the *maintenance* of a credible threat as the establishment of credibility in the first place. The capacity of peace operations to present a credible threat to non-compliant local actors is often constrained by

[28] John Austin, *The Province of Jurisprudence Determined*, Cambridge Texts in the History of Political Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995).
[29] Beetham, *Legitimation*, p.28; Hurd, 'Legitimacy and Authority', p.387; Tyler, 'Psychological Perspectives' p.377.
[30] Beetham, *Legitimation*, p.28.

the state of international normative contestation over their use of force,[31] and the political and logistical delays that frequently impede timely deployment to the field.[32]

Second, using force risks unintended consequences that may undermine, rather than strengthen, a peace operation's ability to secure local cooperation. Locally, maintaining a power relationship through the use of force tends to breed resentment which adversely affects the quality of cooperation secured. As noted by Hurd, this is a catch-22 situation in which 'each application of coercion involves an expenditure of limited social capital and reduces the likelihood that the subject will comply without coercion in the future'.[33]

Inducement

Whereas coercion operates through a fear of sanction, inducement is a currency of rewards, operating through the expectation of benefits based on a certain distribution of incentives. While both coercion and inducement are based on a logic of consequences, in which actors choose among alternative courses of action based on their expected outcomes,[34] these currencies can be distinguished by the 'sticks' or 'carrots' invoking that logic. Both are based on the instrumental cost-benefit analysis of self-interested actors, but the power of inducement is evident when cooperation occurs based on its benefits, rather than the costs of non-compliance. Like coercion, however, a system of power based on inducement is costly because it 'is contingent on the system providing a positive stream of benefits' and difficult to maintain 'because actors do not value the relation itself, only the benefits accruing from it'.[35]

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31 Findlay, *The Use of Force*; Coleman, *International Organisations and Peace Enforcement*.
32 Mats R. Berdal, *Whither UN Peacekeeping?: An Analysis of the Changing Military Requirements of UN Peacekeeping with Proposals for Its Enhancement* (London: Brassey's for the International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1993), pp.32-35; Howard, *UN Peacekeeping in Civil Wars*, p.329.
33 Hurd, *After Anarchy*, p.36.
34 James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, 'The Institutional Dynamics of International Political Orders' *International Organization* 52, no. 4 (1998).
35 Hurd, *After Anarchy*, p.39.

In peace operations, inducement refers to the allocation of benefits through a 'peace dividend' that secures cooperation based on an expected advantageous distribution of outcomes among the local population. Examples of such benefits include the delivery of humanitarian aid, the construction of public infrastructure, or the provision of physical security through activities such as police patrols or demining. Inducement may also refer to the specific provision of targeted 'rewards' for particular behaviour, for example through a cash-for-guns incentive scheme to secure disarmament. Thus power may be derived through inducement based on the broad configuration of incentives produced through the peace dividend, or the narrower distribution of rewards for specific behaviour.

Legitimacy

The costs of maintaining a power relationship through the consequential logic of coercion and inducement leads the powerful actor to seek legitimation of its position, a desire which 'approaches the status of a constant feature of political life'.[36] While power relations 'are almost always constituted by a framework of incentives and sanctions',[37] legitimacy provides a qualitatively different reason for people to alter their behaviour, based not on the expected outcomes of cooperating, but because doing so is believed to be right, proper and appropriate within some normative context. As Beetham notes,

> People relate to the powerful as moral agents as well as self-interested actors; they are cooperative and obedient on grounds of legitimacy as well as for reasons of prudence and advantage.[38]

The concept of legitimacy has also received considerable attention in the literature on the dynamics of social power and compliance. This thesis reaches across disciplinary boundaries to draw explanatory leverage from the political, legal and psychological literatures about the effects of legitimacy on people's decisions to comply and cooperate with rules and

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[36] Inis L. Claude, Jr., 'Collective Legitimization as a Political Function of the United Nations' *International Organization* 20, no. 3 (1966), p.367.
[37] Beetham, *Legitimation*, p.27.
[38] Ibid., p.27.

institutions. In particular, it follows the analytical distinction drawn between compliance based on sanctions and incentives, and that based on a belief in the rightness of policies and the trustworthiness of actors implementing them.[39] Thomas Franck's identification of legitimacy as a causal process through which actors are 'pulled' towards compliance is particularly influential. Franck defines legitimacy as

> a property of a rule or rule-making institution which itself exerts a pull toward compliance on those addressed normatively because those addressed believe that the rule or institution has come into being and operates in accordance with generally accepted principles of right process.[40]

Franck's work provides an important foundation for this thesis, and my study of legitimacy builds on it in two important ways. However, while Franck's account is focused on the effect of legitimacy on *rule compliance*, I examine local actor behaviour in greater breadth and depth. That is, I investigate compliance with *rulers* as well as rules, and I am concerned with high quality *cooperation* as well as compliance. Tom Tyler's research is particularly helpful in this regard. Through an expansive collection of studies into the social psychology of compliance and cooperation, Tyler has argued persuasively that people comply and cooperate with rules and rulers when they believe them to be legitimate, not just because they fear punishment.[41] Such studies owe much to the earlier work of Herbert Kelman, who traced the processes through which social influence is exercised by examining the dynamics of opinion formation and behavioural change.[42] Further, Tyler analytically distinguishes compliance from cooperation. In addition to studying compliance with the law, Jason Sunshine and Tyler investigate why people might actively support, assist and empower police, beginning with the recognition 'that effective crime control and disorder management

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[39] Levi, *Consent, Dissent, and Patriotism*, p.18.
[40] Thomas M. Franck, *The Power of Legitimacy among Nations* (New York; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), p.24.
[41] Tom R. Tyler, *Why People Obey the Law* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006); Tyler, 'Psychological Perspectives'.
[42] Herbert C. Kelman, 'Compliance, Identification, and Internalization: Three Processes of Attitude Change' *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 2, no. 1 (1958); Herbert C. Kelman, 'Processes of Opinion Change' *Public Opinion Quarterly* 25 (1961).

depends on public cooperation with the police'.[43] Similarly, Jeffrey Fagan and Tyler study the cooperation of people with police as well as with others in the community to create and maintain order.[44] Where compliance refers to behavioural conformity with a particular rule, they understand cooperation as referring to those actions people take to 'help' authorities. People cooperate with police when, for example, they report crime, assist with police investigations, report suspicious activity, or attend community police meetings about crime; people comply when they obey parking regulations and traffic laws, or refrain from using illegal drugs or buying stolen items.[45] In both studies, legitimacy is found to be the most important determinant of people's willingness to actively cooperate with authorities.

I will return to the complex, slippery and frequently ill-defined concept of legitimacy in greater detail below. For now, it is important to note that, as a currency of power, legitimacy operates through a logic of appropriateness.[46] In other words, legitimacy exerts compliance-pull for reasons that originate with the subordinate member of a power relationship, not because of the deployment of resources by the powerful actor.

While the currencies of power can be distinguished analytically, in practice coercion, inducement and legitimacy operate through complex interactions; as Ian Hurd notes, 'each is rarely found in anything like its pure isolated form'.[47] The relationship between legitimacy and coercion is particularly important for analysts of peace operations, as it is for theorists of social order. Hobbes emphasises the state's means of physical coercion as the underlying basis of social consent, and thus the essential foundation of its legitimacy. In this view, there can be no simple distinction between coercion and legitimacy, since the latter is derived from

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[43] Jason Sunshine and Tom R. Tyler, 'The Role of Procedural Justice and Legitimacy in Shaping Public Support for Policing' *Law & Society Review* 37, no. 3 (2003) p.516.
[44] Tom R. Tyler and Jeffrey Fagan, 'Legitimacy and Cooperation: Why Do People Help the Police Fight Crime in Their Communities?' *Ohio State Journal of Criminal Law* 6, no. 1 (2008).
[45] Ibid., pp.248-249.
[46] March and Olsen, 'The Institutional Dynamics of International Political Orders'.
[47] Hurd, *After Anarchy*, p.389.

the former.[48] Peace operations face a different legitimacy dilemma: their claim to governing authority is only temporary, and they rarely have either the means or authorisation to exercise a monopoly on the use of violence within a territory. Nevertheless, the ability of a peace operation to provide security via coercive power is expected to have some influence on its legitimation, as is the capacity of an operation to fairly punish cheaters via coercion. At the same time, legitimacy can be expected to enable or constrain a peace operation's coercive power (and, indeed, its power of inducement). The use of coercion, particularly physical violence, has attracted significant controversy in contemporary peace operations, both when force was used and when it was not.[49] As Beetham observes with regard to the state, the relationship between coercion and legitimacy in peace operations is complex, since 'the use of coercion to suppress deep-seated grievances can erode legitimacy in some contexts as surely as the failure to use it to quell disorder can in others'; a peace operation can thus be 'both too weak and too overbearing'.[50] The interactions between a peace operation's currencies of power must therefore require careful analysis.

The complex dynamics that shape the relation of coercion to legitimacy have received particular analytical attention in conceptual studies of 'authority'. Before I define legitimacy in greater depth, and analyse its methods and sources, I therefore first consider the relationship between power and authority. In the following section, I argue that the concept of power provides greater explanatory leverage than the concept of authority for understanding how peace operations influence local actors to cooperate.

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[48] Hobbes, *Leviathan*; see also Beetham, *Legitimation,* p.138.
[49] See Findlay *The Use of Force.*
[50] Beetham, *Legitimation*, p.139.

Authority, power and legitimacy

While power might be conspicuously absent from the peace operations literature, the concept of authority has been more widely considered in this context.[51] Ideas about 'power', 'authority' and 'legitimacy' overlap, and thus distinguishing between the concepts can be analytically challenging. Both power and authority contain elements of coercion and legitimacy, the regulation of behaviour, and the constitution of actors' identities and capacities; both are 'intimately concerned with steering, guiding, regulating, and imposing'.[52] I consider the explanatory leverage of authority in the following section; however, I ultimately conclude that the lens of power and legitimacy provides greater explanatory leverage than that of authority to understand the influence of peace operations on local actors.

Where the concept of authority has been considered in international relations, it has usually been treated as 'power legitimised'; that is, as power plus legitimacy.[53] For example, in his treatise on embedded liberalism, John Ruggie defined authority as 'a fusion of power with legitimate social purpose'.[54] Written in 1982, Ruggie's argument presented an important challenge to the prevailing neorealist interpretation of authority as 'only power' by drawing attention to its social purpose. Similarly, Hurd links the concepts of authority, power and legitimacy in his argument that 'an organization that is perceived by an actor as a legitimate

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[51] Richard Caplan, *International Governance of War-Torn Territories* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005); Zaum, *The Sovereignty Paradox*.
[52] Barnett and Finnemore, *Rules for the World*, p.29.
[53] Indeed, this is true of considerations of authority more widely, as acknowledged by Barry Barnes, 'On Authority and Its Relationship to Power' in *Power, Action and Belief*, ed. John Law (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1986); Beetham, *Legitimation*, p.49; and David V. J. Bell, *Power, Influence and Authority: An Essay in Political Linguistics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975).
[54] John Gerard Ruggie, 'International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order' *International Organization* 36, no. 2 (1982), p.382.

rule maker is in a position of power over the actor, but it is power in the broader sense (that is, authority) rather than the coercive power of the bully'.[55]

However, because the concepts of power, authority and legitimacy have been considered by international relations scholars almost exclusively in the realm of the international state system, the discipline has downplayed the social nature of all three concepts and thus the finer distinctions between them. Peace operations are institutions operating through social processes of human interaction in the domestic realm; understanding how they work thus requires a better explanation of the sources, functions and interrelationship of these concepts. By focusing attention on power, rather than authority, this thesis aims to capture the dynamics of social control that authority cannot – namely, the actor-centric operation of compulsory power through coercion or inducement – while retaining particular concern for legitimacy.

Authority refers to the right to rule; as Zaum puts it, 'an agent who is *in* authority has the right to do something'.[56] However, this is complicated by two quite different usages of the term within these parameters, distinguished by the relationship posited between authority and coercion:

1) if an actor has authority, it can use coercion legitimately;
2) if an actor has authority, it doesn't need to use coercion; indeed, the use of coercion would indicate a lack of authority.

R.B. Friedman elucidates this distinction in a notable display of conceptual clarity on a topic otherwise mired in complexity. Rejecting the definition of authority as simply 'power legitimised', Friedman distinguishes between authority used in the *de jure* sense, to signify a judgment about the source of an actor's claim to act based on formal or informal rules, and the *de facto* sense, as a judgment about the content of such action.

[55] Hurd, 'Legitimacy and Authority', p.400
[56] Zaum, *The Sovereignty Paradox*, p.29.

In the *de jure* sense, 'authority' distinguishes the legitimate from the illegitimate use of coercion. *De jure* authority is thus that of Hobbes' Leviathan:

> And as the right of possession, is called dominion, so the right of doing any action is called AUTHORITY. So that by authority, is always understood a right of doing any act; and *done by authority*, done by commission, or license, from him whose right it is.[57]

This contrasts with the *de facto* usage, which distinguishes coerced obedience (legitimate or not) from noncoerced, deferential obedience.[58] In this sense, authority is observed when obedience occurs *without* coercion. Thus '[t]he criterion for the correct application of the term 'authority' in the first case is the legal status of the person who uses force, and the legal standing of his actions…whereas, in the second case, the criterion is the type of allegiance accorded rulers by their subjects'.[59]

International relations scholars who have defined authority as 'legitimate power' are using the term in the *de jure* sense, whereby the exercise of power is evaluated as 'rightful' according to some normative criteria. The key limitation of this conception for the present work is that it evaluates only the status of an actor exercising coercion, not the reasons for which people might obey that actor. While an actor may have 'the authority' to exercise coercion according to relevant rules or norms concerning its application, people obey not *because* of authority, but because of the coercion itself. That is, compliance is motivated by fear of sanction rather than belief in the rightfulness of the actor; thus Zaum argues that 'authority is distinct from the legitimate use of coercion, as the reason for compliance is different'.[60]

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[57] Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan* ed. Richard Tuck (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p.113.
[58] R. B. Friedman, 'On the Concept of Authority in Political Philosophy' in *Authority*, ed. Joseph Raz (New York: New York University Press, 1990), p.62.
[59] Ibid., pp.62-63.
[60] Dominik Zaum, 'The Authority of International Administrations in International Society' *Review of international studies* 32, no. 3 (2006), p.457; see also Hannah Arendt, *Between Past and Future: Eight Exercises in Political Thought* (New York: Penguin Books, 1993), p.93; Friedman, 'Concept of Authority', p.63.

As understood in this thesis, the power of legitimacy entails moral reasoning about the appropriateness of certain behaviour by local actors, rather than moral reasoning about the right of a peace operation to rule. My approach is thus closest to that of Friedman's, who describes the difference between social relations of authority and those of power:

> it is the contrast between authority and persuasion through rational argument (rather than the contrast between authority and coercive power) that is essential to the delineation of the distinctive kind of dependence on the will or the judgment of another person involved in an authority relationship. That is, the crucial contrast is between the case in which one man influences another to adopt some course of action by helping him to see the merits of that particular action and the case in which no reasons have to be given to a person to gain his compliance with a prescription because he 'accepts' the person who prescribes it.[61]

Authority might explain why actors defer judgment to international organisations, for example based on their belief in the 'entitlement' of institutions to make decisions on the basis of their expertise and specialised knowledge, exercised in an impartial, depoliticised way in order to serve some valued and legitimate social purpose.[62] Considering transitional administrations, Zaum identifies five sources from which these peace operations derive their authority: consent (of the state); delegation (by the UNSC); the legitimate social purposes of maintaining international peace and security; promoting human rights and democratisation; and assisting or providing governance of a territory.[63] Legitimacy, however, is the *reason* people (or states) obey authority. The local legitimacy of a peace operation is not a one-off evaluation of its right to rule; perceptions of legitimacy may change over time, may vary across the operation and different local groups, and crucially, are matters of degree, not a binary variable. That is, while authority refers to a property of an institution ('having authority'), legitimacy is, like coercion and inducement, a *reason* for compliance and cooperation. This thesis, then, is concerned with identifying and analysing the effects of

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[61] Friedman, 'Concept of Authority', p.67.
[62] Barnett and Finnemore, 'The Power of Liberal International Organizations', pp.174-175.
[63] Zaum, *The Sovereignty Paradox*, p.58-67.

multiple legitimation processes on local behaviour, rather than evaluating the authority (right to rule) of a peace operation.

The relationship between power and legitimacy

The legitimacy problematique of peace operations

The goals of peace operations often require them to exercise power as soon as they deploy, in order to protect and provide for the vulnerable in postconflict contexts. This means that they need almost immediate legitimation in order to achieve their first-order priorities since, I have argued, the nature of their goals means that they cannot rely on the power of coercion or inducement alone. Yet they have few local bases of legitimacy, and their need for immediacy contrasts with the usually long-term process of legitimation.[64] As Thomas Franck argues, 'legitimacy is not merely a matter of assembling readily available ingredients and mixing them in the right proportions'; the legitimising elements 'must necessarily have developed naturally over protracted periods of time. They cannot be purchased on demand'.[65]

Legitimacy is a slippery concept, a term that political philosophers, legal scholars and social scientists struggle to define and conceptualise in generalisable theories. From this conceptual quagmire, however, it is possible to discern three salient questions for the study of an institution's legitimacy: the evaluative definitional question, 'what is legitimacy?'; the functional question, 'how does legitimacy work?'; and the empirical question, 'what are the types of legitimacy?' The following section considers each question in turn, synthesising the broader legitimacy literature with the most pressing issues for the study of peace operations.

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[64] Indeed, this is indicative of a more general problem for the objectives of peace operations: how to undertake rapidly what otherwise would take decades to consolidate.
[65] Franck, *The Power of Legitimacy Among Nations*, p.25.

What is legitimacy?

Legitimacy definitions are often differentiated as either normative or empirical.[66] Normative approaches are concerned with evaluating rules, institutions or orders according to some general criteria, comprised of morality, laws and norms. International relations scholars have given greater attention to legitimacy in recent years,[67] though it remains a 'nebulous term…loosely employed'.[68] The legitimacy of international organisations is generally evaluated normatively,[69] and as the previous section discussed, framed as an institution's 'right to rule' based on particular threshold criteria. Democracy is frequently suggested to be the 'touchstone' of legitimacy in this regard,[70] and the 'democratic deficit' of international organisations is argued to weaken their right to rule.[71]

Empirical approaches are social scientific, defining legitimacy in terms of the acceptance of a rule, institution or order by its subjects. They owe much to the work of Weber, who defined

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66 e.g Michael Zurn, 'Global Governance and Legitimacy Problems' *Government and Opposition* 39, no. 2 (2004); Buchanan and Keohane, 'The Legitimacy of Global Governance Institutions'; Jens Steffek, 'The Legitimation of International Governance: A Discourse Approach' *European Journal of International Relations* 9, no. 2 (2003).

67 Ian Clark, *Legitimacy in International Society* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005); Hurd, *After Anarchy;* Friedrich Kratochwil, 'On Legitimacy' *International Relations* 20, no. 3 (2006); Steffek, 'The Legitimation of International Governance'; Shane P. Mulligan, 'The Uses of Legitimacy in International Relations' *Millennium* 34, no. 2 (2006); Buchanan and Keohane, 'The Legitimacy of Global Governance Institutions'; Allan Buchanan, 'The Internal Legitimacy of Humanitarian Intervention' *Journal of Political Philosophy* 7, no. 1 (1999); Simon Chesterman, 'Legality Versus Legitimacy: Humanitarian Intervention, the Security Council, and the Rule of Law' *Security Dialogue* 33, no. 3 (2002); Alex J. Bellamy, 'Motives, Outcomes, Intent and the Legitimacy of Humanitarian Intervention' *Journal of Military Ethics* 3, no. 3 (2004).

68 David D. Caron, 'The Legitimacy of the Collective Authority of the Security Council' *The American Journal of International Law* 87, no. 4 (1993), p.56.

69 Notable exceptions to this normative approach include Zurn, who links the normative and empirical dimensions of legitimacy by arguing that 'the normative legitimacy deficits of international institutions are in fact increasingly generating problems with respect to social acceptance.' Zurn, 'Global Governance and Legitimacy Problems', p.261.

70 Daniel Bodansky, 'The Legitimacy of International Governance' *The American Journal of International Law* 93, no. 3 (1999).

71 e.g. Fritz Wilhelm Scharpf, *Governing in Europe: Effective and Democratic?* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999); Buchanan, 'The Internal Legitimacy of Humanitarian Intervention'; Miles Kahler and David A. Lake, *Governance in a Global Economy: Political Authority in Transition* (Princeton, NJ; Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2003).

a legitimate social order as one that enjoys 'the prestige of being considered binding',[72] thus treating legitimacy as a social fact which reports on the attitude of a specified group.[73] In this view, a peace operation is legitimate when those subject to its power *believe* it to be so. Whereas normative approaches evaluate the 'right to rule' by privileging criteria determined by the theorist, empirical approaches seek to uncover why people obey authorities and to explain the presence or absence of legitimacy as defined by those subject to rule. My consideration of legitimacy fits the latter category, aiming to explain local perceptions about the (il)legitimacy of a peace operation.

However, neither category is as discrete as this analytical separation between normative and empirical approaches might suggest:[74] normative evaluations are not isolated from perceptions, and empirical beliefs are not empty of normative content.[75] The contention that studying perceptions of legitimacy empties the concept of its moral content by precluding evaluation against objective standards mistakenly 'divorce[s] people's beliefs about legitimacy from the *grounds* or *reasons* for holding them', which are themselves based on the normative characteristics of the regime.[76] The power relationship between a peace operation and local actors is legitimised not by mere 'belief' in its legitimacy, but because the relationship can be justified by those beliefs.[77] Moreover, empirical observations about popular perceptions of a peace operation's legitimacy inevitably inform normative evaluations. It is difficult to imagine a 'global public standard'[78] by which peace operations could be evaluated that did not include some measure of local perceptions of legitimacy among the criteria. Indeed, the

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[72] Max Weber, *Economy and Society*, ed. Guenther Roth, Claus Wittich, and Ephraim Fischoff, 2 vols. (Berkeley; London: University of California Press, 1978), p.31.
[73] Steffek, 'The Legitimation of International Governance', p.253.
[74] Ibid., p.251.
[75] Zurn, 'Global Governance and Legitimacy Problems'; Bodansky, 'The Legitimacy of International Governance'; Andrew Hurrell, 'Legitimacy and the Use of Force: Can the Circle Be Squared?' *Review of International Studies* 31, (2005).
[76] Beetham, *Legitimation*, pp.9-10; see also Mark C. Suchman, 'Managing Legitimacy: Strategic and Institutional Approaches' *The Academy of Management Review* 20, no. 3 (1995), p.574.
[77] Beetham, *Legitimation*, p.11.
[78] Buchanan and Keohane, 'The Legitimacy of Global Governance Institutions'.

same variables of legitimacy may inform both empirical and normative evaluations of operations, such as the extent of local participation in the institution, its efficiency, or its ability to achieve its goals. For example, it is unlikely that the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor's lack of 'Timorisation' would have attracted such normative critique without locally expressed dissatisfaction with the appropriateness (legitimacy) of the operation's practices.[79]

My treatment of legitimacy seeks to understand why local actors perceive a peace operation to be (il)legitimate, where legitimacy refers to evaluations by local actors of a peace operation's appropriateness. Local legitimacy provides a basis for the expression of popular consent to a peace operation, derived from local beliefs that the structures, goals, practices, and outcomes of that institution are right, appropriate, and desirable within a particular normative context. That normative context differs between cases and across time, and general criteria of local legitimacy are therefore unfeasible. The normative system that legitimises a peace operation is specific to a particular society, and 'legitimacy is stripped of any meaning outside such a societal framework'.[80] Moreover, the disintegration of social order in postconflict societies means that this framework will be fragmented, and the sources of a peace operation's legitimacy may vary across communities, requiring the institution to operate differently among different social groups.

How does legitimacy work?

If power is about the ability of an actor to influence the behaviour of others to get the outcomes it wants, then legitimacy is a source of power by virtue of the compliance-pull it exerts on subjects when they perceive a rule or institution to be right, proper and

[79] e.g. Jarat Chopra, 'The UN's Kingdom of East Timor' *Survival* 42, no. 3 (2000).
[80] Clark, *Legitimacy in International Society*, p.245.

appropriate.[81] The power of legitimacy is derived from voluntary obligation, based on a sense of appropriateness, as distinct from power as coercion or inducement based on a logic of consequences. It entails moral reasoning about the justifiability and desirability of a given power relationship. Legitimacy exerts a different type of influence than that of either coercion or inducement, since it is power conferred by the subject upon the powerful. In other words, 'unlike influence based upon the influencer's possession of power or resources, the influence motivated by legitimacy develops from within the person who is being influenced'.[82] A good example in the international realm is the influence of legitimacy in causing states to comply, in the absence of an equivalent to the domestic sovereign, with largely unenforceable international laws.[83] This has been described as 'the power to pull toward compliance those who cannot be compelled'.[84]

It is because legitimacy is a source of power that powerful actors try so hard to legitimise their actions;[85] it provides 'an additional form of power that enables authorities to shape the behaviour of others distinct from their control over incentives and sanctions'.[86] Yet legitimacy is *more* than just another source of power: it also enables, enhances and constrains the power derived from coercion or inducement;[87] and it is more likely to elicit a greater depth of cooperation than the other currencies of power.

Legitimacy has four primary benefits for the powerful: it makes the exercise of power easier, less costly, more effective, and more resilient. Legitimate power is *easier* to exercise because,

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81 Franck, *The Power of Legitimacy Among Nations*.
82 Tyler, 'Psychological Perspectives', p.378.
83 For a rich account of the power of legitimacy in international law, see Franck, *The Power of Legitimacy Among Nations*; Austin, *The Province of Jurisprudence Determined*; Koh, 'Why Do Nations Obey International Law?'.
84 Franck, *The Power of Legitimacy Among Nations*, p.42.
85 Claude, 'Collective Legitimization'.
86 Tyler, 'Psychological Perspectives', p.377.
87 Clark, *Legitimacy in International Society*, p.4.

in providing normative reasons for compliance, it is more likely to elicit obedience.[88] Illegitimate power, meanwhile, provides normative reasons *not* to obey, which divert resources to deter or counter disobedience. Legitimate power is therefore *less costly* both in terms of sanctions and inducements[89] since the maintenance of a social order through a power relationship based solely on coercion or inducement relies on the constant supply of resources.[90] Legitimacy makes power more *effective* because the resources saved through voluntary compliance can be deployed toward the achievement of other goals rather than maintaining the power relationship.[91] In peace operations, for example, voluntary compliance might mean that military personnel can be used to rebuild infrastructure or assist with humanitarian relief logistics, rather than focusing their energies on deterring non-compliance. Finally, legitimacy provides power with *resilience*, since the normative reasons for obeying are internalised by local actors and provide a 'reservoir of support' to help withstand shocks, setbacks and substantive failures in a power relationship.[92] Because legitimacy operates through a logic of appropriateness, the cooperation secured by legitimate power can be sustained even if desired outcomes are disrupted.

The resilience of legitimate power highlights the qualitatively better cooperation secured through legitimacy than that attained by coercion or inducement.[93] We can expect that when people have a normative reason for cooperating, they are more likely to 'buy in' to the broader social goals of an operation, and to provide more active support to the operation's activities. Using the cooperation spectrum defined in the Introduction, legitimacy makes it more likely that local actors will provide high-quality cooperation, rather than shallow compliance.

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[88] Beetham, *Legitimation*, p.33.
[89] Tyler, 'Psychological Perspectives', p.377.
[90] Hurd, 'Legitimacy and Authority'; Beetham, *Legitimation.*
[91] Beetham, *Legitimation*, p.28; Tyler, 'Psychological Perspectives', p.378.
[92] Tyler, 'Psychological Perspectives' ; Beetham, *Legitimation*, p.33.
[93] Beetham, *Legitimation*, p.28.

What are the types and strategies of legitimation?

The local legitimacy of a peace operation is best understood as a dynamic web composed of numerous interacting strands that may exert legitimising or delegitimising forces. This multidimensional conception of legitimacy is informed by the work of David Beetham, who defines power as legitimate when it conforms to established rules, when those rules can be justified by reference to beliefs shared by both the dominant and subordinate members of a power relationship, and when there is evidence of consent by the subordinate to that particular power relationship.[94] Beetham's framework provides a method for understanding legitimacy as a matter of degree, not as an 'all-or-nothing' property.[95]

The strands of an institution's legitimacy are often analytically categorised in a means-ends framework, which distinguishes the types of legitimacy according to their procedural 'inputs' or substantive 'outputs'.[96] However, a tripartite framework that includes Daniel Bodansky's concept of 'source' legitimacy more accurately captures the different strands of a peace operation's legitimacy.[97] Splitting inputs and outputs into three categories, this approach analytically separates the basis of an operation's initial claim to authority (source legitimacy) from procedural legitimacy, or judgments about the fairness of processes for making decisions and exercising power. This approach addresses a problematic gap in the peace operations literature: the role of process has not been rigorously analysed. Instead, the literature's focus on the source of a peace operation – that is, its delegating institution and mandate – and its effectiveness has overshadowed procedural legitimacy.

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[94] Ibid.
[95] Ibid., p.20; Bodansky, 'The Legitimacy of International Governance', p.623.
[96] For this analysis developed with reference to the European Union see Scharpf, *Governing in Europe*; see also Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, 'The Club Model of Multilateral Cooperation and Problems of Democratic Legitimacy' in *Power and Governance in a Partially Globalized World*, ed. Robert O. Keohane (London: Routledge, 2002).
[97] Bodansky, 'The Legitimacy of International Governance', p.612.

This tripartite approach forms the basis of my treatment of legitimacy. While owing much to Beetham's framework, it accords greater emphasis to the procedural dimension of legitimacy for three important reasons. First, in other research on why people comply with authorities, procedural legitimacy is found to be particularly important.[98] Second, the links between procedural legitimacy and the willingness of people to comply voluntarily provide an important basis for the popular consent Beetham emphasises in his third pillar of legitimacy. Finally, the procedural dimensions of legitimacy are expected to shed light on how the behaviour of individual representatives of a peace operation influences perceptions about the legitimacy of the institution as a whole. The remainder of this chapter considers the source, substantive and procedural dimensions of legitimacy, examining their interaction and the legitimation strategies of each.

Source legitimacy

This legitimacy type focuses on the legality, normative coherence and capacity of an institution, and is thus determined by the inputs to an institution at its establishment. Evaluations of source legitimacy are ultimately judgments about the justifiability of an institution's claim to authority, based on its creation in accordance with appropriate rules and norms, and its capacity to achieve its mandated goals and purposes. Importantly, source legitimacy refers to legitimation processes relating to the 'givens' of a peace operation – that is, its mandate, design and conflict setting – rather than it outcomes (substantive legitimacy) or practices (procedural legitimacy).

[98] See Tom R. Tyler, 'The Psychology of Legitimacy: A Relational Perspective on Voluntary Deference to Authorities' *Personality and Social Psychology Review* 1, no. 4 (1997); Tyler, 'Psychological Perspectives'; Sunshine and Tyler, 'The Role of Procedural Justice'; Steven L. Blader and Tom R. Tyler, 'A Four-Component Model of Procedural Justice: Defining the Meaning of A "Fair" Process' *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin* 29, no. 6 (2003).

Rules and norms

The term 'legitimacy' is derived from the Latin *lex* or law which distinguished 'the rightness of rule' from the Latin *rex* or 'the right ruler'.[99] From this distinction, two central elements of legal legitimacy emerge: the right to rule, and the rightness of rule. Shane Mulligan points to these elements in the development of *lex* in the Republic:

> *Lex* made it possible for the founders of the Republic to make a very strong statement – that rule, *rex*, could be wrong. It was only with this innovation that the 'rightness' of rule, which today we call legitimacy, could be a question, or even a consideration. The conceptual scope of *rex* meant that, prior to this invention, 'wrong rule' was literally a contradiction in terms…the concept of *lex* enabled a new understanding of the proper regulation of social existence…In establishing a 'right' that could take precedence over the right of custom and kind, legitimacy opened up entirely new possibilities of perceiving the phenomenon of rule; it took the 'right' of rulers – the strong, quasi-divine, knowing rulers – and gave it, via the rules themselves, to those who now would make them.[100]

In contemporary usage, legal legitimacy refers to 'the legal validity of the acquisition and exercise of power' and thus concerns rules about the source of power and the way it is exercised.[101] That is, an institution has legal legitimacy when its creation and operation coheres with the existing system of legal norms. These norms can be narrowly interpreted as codified rules or more broadly defined to include informal normative structures, but in both senses this legitimacy type ultimately refers to the role of rules in legitimising the source of authority claims. At the domestic level, legal legitimacy may be seen in, for example, the lineal descent of a sovereign monarch, or the formation of a government in accordance with a constitution or rules of convention. In the international realm, it generally means the delegation of international authority according to international law, for example through the consent of sovereign states or the authorisation of the UNSC. A peace operation might thus be legitimised through its coherence with local or international laws.

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[99] Mulligan, 'The Uses of Legitimacy', p.358.
[100] Ibid., p.358-359.
[101] Beetham, *Legitimation*, p.12-13.

In a broader interpretation of rules, however, the legitimacy of an institution is determined by its normative coherence with the established order or, in the words of Karl Deutsch, 'its compatibility with the other basic values of the system'.[102] Thus the legitimacy of international institutions is frequently evaluated according to the dominant norms of international society.[103] For example, the legitimacy of peace operations is often contested on the basis of conflicts between the norms of state sovereignty, non-interventionism and self-determination, on the one hand, and the norms of human rights and humanitarianism, on the other.[104] At one level, this is a conflict about international law and thus informs the legal legitimacy of peace operations. However, it also overlaps with the judgments about the content of those rules and their justifiability. As Beetham argues, legal validity alone is insufficient to secure legitimacy 'since the rules through which power is acquired and exercised themselves stand in need of justification'.[105] While an institution's legal legitimacy depends upon its coherence with established rules, those rules must also be justifiable. Drawing on Beetham's approach, the power relationship they establish must be justified in terms of some mutual interest, reciprocity or societal benefit.[106]

A peace operation might thus be legitimised by the extent to which its mandated goals and purposes match those desired by the local population. This suggests that the broader normative purpose of a peace operation matters: legitimacy can be derived from the coherence of an operation's goals and purposes with the normative environment of its particular target society. For example, the legitimacy of a peace operation may be contested if its underlying goal is incompatible with local beliefs about the appropriate end goal. The

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[102] Karl W. Deutsch, 'The Commitment of National Legitimacy Symbols as a Verification Technique' *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 7, no. 3 (1963), p.361.
[103] For an excellent example of this approach, see Clark, *Legitimacy in International Society*.
[104] E.g. Jennifer Welsh, 'Taking Consequences Seriously: Objections to Humanitarian Intervention' in *Humanitarian Intervention and International Relations*, ed. Jennifer Welsh (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006); Chesterman, 'Legality Versus Legitimacy.
[105] Beetham, *Legitimation*, p.17.
[106] Ibid., p.17; see also Hurrell, 'Legitimacy and the Use of Force' , p.20.

legitimacy challenges faced by the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) over the uncertain future status of the territory can be understood in this light, contested by some groups on the grounds that the UN purpose is understood to favour independence for Kosovo rather than the return of Serbian sovereignty.[107] Similarly, Dominik Zaum argues that 'the fact that...'liberal statebuilding' is often insufficiently attuned to local norms has undermined the effectiveness of postconflict reconstruction efforts'.[108] Of course, this case also demonstrates the multifarious character of legitimacy by highlighting the effects of contesting local perceptions. It is important to note, then, that these strategies of legitimation work by degree and their reception may vary across different local actors. While Beetham looks for an aggregate measure or 'minimum' degree of shared beliefs that justifies a power relationship,[109] I am as interested in examining variation among local perceptions of a peace operation's legitimacy.

Institutional credibility

Source legitimacy is also derived from an institution's ability to signal its credibility to achieve its mandated goals and purposes. For example, a peace operation may be legitimised through its display of material resources, which justify its presence to local actors by demonstrating that it is adequately equipped to achieve its purposes. Conversely, doubts about the capacity of a peace operation to deliver its objectives tend to undermine credibility, delegitimising an operation by providing reasons for local actors to withhold their trust and support.

Michael Barnett and Martha Finnemore have shown that an institution's expertise can be a source of power because of a knowledge and information asymmetry between the institution

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[107] Dominik Zaum, 'The Norms and Politics of Exit: Ending Postconflict Transitional Administrations' *Ethics & International Affairs* 23, no.2 (2009), p.202; Aidan Hehir, 'Autonomous Province Building: Identification Theory and the Failure of UNMIK' *International Peacekeeping* 13, no. 2 (2006); Alexandros Yannis, 'The UN as Government in Kosovo' *Global Governance* 10, no. 1 (2004)
[108] Zaum, 'The Norms and Politics of Exit', p.195.
[109] Beetham, *Legitimation*, p.17.

and the population.[110] This expertise is also an important source of legitimation because, along with sufficient material resources, the specialised knowledge of an institution can help to justify its claims to 'deliver the goods'.[111] Expertise thus legitimises an institution by conferring rational-legal authority.[112] A peace operation may be legitimised in this way by the popular acceptance of its expert knowledge or capacity – for example, in policing or governance reform – as justification for the power relationship between the institution and the local population. This form of source legitimacy is often strengthened by the dearth of local capacity, and the claim that a peace operation is filling a temporary void in local governance is frequently invoked to legitimise the institution as a stop-gap assistance measure.[113] However, these legitimacy claims are often weakened over time as the 'temporary' nature of assistance gives way to concerns about local 'ownership'. This highlights the need to examine legitimacy as a process over time, rather than as a static property or resource.

Substantive legitimacy

Substantive legitimation describes the process by which an operation's outcomes justify it in reference to its goals and purposes. A peace operation can thus be legitimised substantively when its effectiveness provides reasons for people to believe that cooperation is right, proper and appropriate.

Evaluations of a peace operation's effectiveness are common referents for claims about its legitimacy. Analysis of 'effectiveness' and prescriptions for making peace operations 'more effective' are common in peacebuilding research, particularly its more policy-oriented variants, though it is often unclear just what effectiveness means or how the researcher

110 Barnett and Finnemore, *Rules for the World*, pp.20-24.
111 Bodansky, 'The Legitimacy of International Governance', pp.619-620.
112 Barnett and Finnemore, 'Politics, Power, and Pathologies', p.707.
113 Alexandros Yannis, 'The Concept of Suspended Sovereignty in International Law and Its Implications in International Politics' *European Journal of International Law* 13, no. 5 (2002).

ought to evaluate it. Some measure effectiveness against the degree to which an operation accomplishes specific tasks in its mandate;[114] others by the length of time a ceasefire can be sustained;[115] and others by higher standards such as human welfare, justice and the presence of a stable liberal democracy.[116]

Effectiveness here refers to the extent to which a peace operation achieves its goals; however, it is local perceptions of a peace operation's effectiveness that constitute substantive legitimacy. That is, a peace operation is legitimised substantively when local actors perceive that it has achieved its goals. This need to focus on perceptions of effectiveness also entails identifying expectations about what a peace operation ought to achieve. Thus examining the mandates and stated objectives of an operation is insufficient; to examine substantive legitimation processes, we must also identify what different groups of local actors perceive a peace operation's goals to be. Regardless of whether local expectations exceed a peace operation's formal mandate, they establish the bar by which its results will be locally evaluated. The failure to meet local expectations, irrespective of other objective measures of effectiveness, can thus cause a peace operation to be delegitimised. As Erin Weir notes,

> the very presence of peacekeepers creates expectations among local people that they will be protected if violence erupts. The failure to meet these expectations can result in a breakdown of wider mission legitimacy that will make it extremely difficult for peacekeepers to accomplish other, long-term peacebuilding objectives.[117]

Procedural legitimacy

The influence of peace operation procedures on effectiveness has not been rigorously analysed to date. On the one hand, the prevalence of sexual abuse and rape of local women

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114 Howard, *UN Peacekeeping in Civil Wars*.
115 Fortna, *Does Peacekeeping Work?*.
116 Featherston in Daniel Druckman et al., 'Evaluating Peacekeeping Missions' *Mershon International Studies Review* 41, no. 1 (1997); Johansen in Druckman et al., 'Evaluating Peacekeeping Missions'; Paris, *At War's End*.
117 Erin Weir, *The Last Line of Defense: How Peacekeepers Can Better Protect Civilians*, Refugees International, February 2010, p.i.

by peacekeepers has prompted greater attention to the behaviour of personnel and the experiences of local actors.[118] The recognition that the behaviour of personnel matters is also evident in advocacy for more female personnel in peace operations.[119] However, the ways in which such behaviour affects the ability of an operation to achieve its objectives are unclear. Intuitively, the exploitation of local people is expected to decrease their willingness to cooperate with an operation, while the positive treatment of local people is expected to enhance it. The pervasiveness of 'shiny UN trucks', conspicuous among the pedestrians, cyclos and motorbikes of local traffic, is often presented as a cause of local resentment towards peacekeepers, while local language proficiency prompts more favourable evaluations.[120] At present, however, the literature does little more than compile lists of positive and negative practices, without tracing their affect on an operation's outcomes or developing the methodology that might assist in that regard.

Procedural legitimation provides the analytical tools to trace the effects of such behaviour. It also captures other peace operation practices that can be expected to influence the degree of local cooperation.

Procedural legitimacy refers to judgments about the fairness of procedures for making decisions and exercising power within a given relationship.[121] It may include adherence to 'right' legal process, but procedural legitimacy is distinguished from legal legitimacy since it is not the *act* of adhering to law that matters, but the *process* through which laws are implemented. Further, this legitimacy type is influenced by procedures beyond the legal realm. The most important distinction, however, is from substantive legitimacy. Where

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118 Pouligny, *Peace Operations Seen from Below*; Keith J. Allred, 'Peacekeepers and Prostitutes: How Deployed Forces Fuel the Demand for Trafficked Women and New Hope for Stopping It' *Armed Forces & Society* 33, no. 1 (2006).
119 United Nations *Resolution 1888 (2009)* 30 September 2009.
120 Mersiades, 'Peacekeeping and Legitimacy'; Rolfe, 'Peacekeeping the Pacific Way'; Pouligny, *Peace Operations Seen from Below*.
121 John W. Thibaut, *Procedural Justice: A Psychological Analysis*, ed. Laurens Walker (London: Distributed by Wiley, 1975).

substantive legitimacy is ultimately derived from evaluations of an institution's effectiveness, procedural legitimacy is derived from perceptions of the practices of an institution, especially the *way* that power is exercised.

Margaret Levi has shown that such procedural legitimacy explains at least some compliance with governing authorities.[122] Levi's model of contingent consent provides a plausible explanation for local actor compliance with a peace operation, particularly concerning the general compliance of the mass citizenry. She argues that 'citizen consent is contingent upon the perceived fairness of both governments and other citizens';[123] we would thus expect that if peace operations behave more fairly towards local actors, they are more likely to get the cooperation they need. In other words, when local people believe that a peace operation promotes immoral politics, has ignored their interests, or has actually betrayed them, they are less likely to feel an obligation to comply.

In numerous studies, Tom Tyler and his co-authors have found that people are more likely to comply with legal authorities, such as judges and police officers, when they believe them to be legitimate; further, that authorities and institutions are more likely to be perceived as legitimate when they exercise power through procedures that people believe to be fair.[124] His social psychology approach has identified the causal processes of legitimation through research that combines sociological frameworks with quantitative empirical methodologies. His findings form the basis of my approach to procedural legitimation, outlined below.

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[122] Levi, *Consent, Dissent, and Patriotism*. While Levi developed her model of compliance in the context of a developed, stable democracy, it is at least plausible to expect that we might see similar bases for compliance with peace operation authority: since peace operations undertake governance roles akin to those of domestic governments, we can expect them to elicit compliance through similar channels.
[123] Ibid., p.2.
[124] Tyler, 'The Psychology of Legitimacy'; Sunshine and Tyler, 'The Role of Procedural Justice'; Blader and Tyler, 'A Four-Component Model'; Tyler, 'Psychological Perspectives'; Tyler, *Why People Obey the Law*.

Before elaborating the strategies of procedural legitimation, however, it is necessary to briefly justify the applicability of social psychology research undertaken among communities in the US to the present work. I am aware of the danger of abstracting social research findings from their cultural context, in particular of applying the conclusions of research on people's compliance with American legal institutions to the very different social contexts in which peace operations are deployed. Three key objections to this approach are evident, but as I explain below, the conceptual framework developed here is expected to overcome each.

The first objection concerns the longevity of institutions; that is, the temporary nature of peace operations means that they are rarely able to draw on established traditions of governance, and that this alters the relationship they are able to have with local actors. In fact, as I argued earlier in this chapter, this reality significantly heightens the legitimacy problematique of peace operations: while processes of legitimation are usually long-term, the nature of a peace operation's goals means that it requires legitimation almost immediately. Further, the difficulties of achieving short-term effectiveness means peace operations can rarely rely on substantive legitimation in their early phases. By directing analytical attention to the ways in which authorities might be legitimised independently from outcomes, this conceptual framework aims to both produce a better understanding of how peace operations work, and to contribute to better peace operation practices. Nevertheless, I do not assume that procedural legitimation necessarily has a role in a peace operation's legitimacy or effectiveness; the findings of other research on procedural legitimation merely serve to highlight potential variables for investigation.

The second objection is linked to this, and concerns the assumptions made about local actors. It is possible that the findings of American social research on procedural legitimacy are dependent on values specific to that society. That is, that people in the US or even in developed liberal democracies more generally, may value fairness more than people in a

specific postconflict society. While I am sceptical of this view, the framework developed here does not preclude this possibility, since it merely directs attention to perceptions of fair treatment and appropriate decision-making processes as potential variables of effectiveness.

The final objection concerns the content of legitimising norms. It is important to note that local legitimacy is defined here by *perceptions* about a peace operation's appropriateness in the *local normative context*. Legitimation is examined through in-depth case studies and careful process tracing, allowing for the normative content of legitimacy beliefs to vary not just across operations, but between local actors and groups in a single host society. The findings of the research discussed below provide starting points for identifying the components of procedural legitimation, including the participatory and consultative nature of decision-making, the neutrality and trustworthiness of a peace operation, and the respect and dignity of interpersonal treatment that local actors receive. It is expected that these values are sufficiently universal to serve as valid starting points from which to investigate a peace operation's procedural legitimacy and its effects; I reflect on their appropriateness in the concluding chapter.

A review of the literature on procedural legitimacy finds that two legitimation strategies are particularly important: participation, consultation and accountability; and the quality of treatment people receive from the institution and its representatives.[125] These dimensions operate through two models of legitimation. The first is a control model, where perceptions of legitimacy are determined by the extent to which those subject to an institution's power are able to participate and exercise voice in its decision-making processes.[126] In this sense,

[125] Tyler, 'The Psychology of Legitimacy'; Tyler, 'Psychological Perspectives'; Tyler, *Why People Obey the Law*; Blader and Tyler, 'A Four-Component Model'; Sunshine and Tyler, 'The Role of Procedural Justice'; Levi, *Consent, Dissent, and Patriotism*; Kelman, 'Compliance, Identification, and Internalization: Three Processes of Attitude Change'.
[126] Blader and Tyler, 'A Four-Component Model'; Thibaut, *Procedural Justice*.

process matters because people are concerned with their capacity to influence outcomes.[127] The second model emphasises the relational interactions between authorities and their subjects, in which the likelihood and quality of cooperation is determined by the quality of treatment people receive from powerful actors.[128]

Participation, consultation and accountability

At the international level, the representative character of a peace operation is the touchstone of legitimacy evaluations and refers to the legitimising process of multilateralism in the sanctioning and design of an intervention. For example, Harland argues that UN-based interventions derive legitimacy from the 'breadth of international support' inherent in a mission mandated by the world body.[129] This differs from the type of legitimacy gained through a UNSC mandate which adheres with international law; representational legitimacy evaluates the processes of collective deliberation in multilateral decision-making.[130] Indeed, the unrepresentative nature of the UNSC, particularly its dominance by the permanent members, is frequently argued to limit the institution's legitimacy.[131] The absence of these representational processes is identified as a measure of illegitimacy in the global governance debate on democratic deficits.[132]

However, these international debates are expected to have limited influence on the *local* perceptions of a peace operation's legitimacy, since local actors, whether elites or the population at large, are more likely to be concerned with the extent to which a peace operation's goals and decision-making processes represent their interests and allow for their

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127 Blader and Tyler, 'A Four-Component Model', p.748.
128 Marcia Grimes, 'Organizing Consent: The Role of Procedural Fairness in Political Trust and Compliance' *European Journal of Political Research* 45, no. 2 (2006); Tyler, 'Psychological Perspectives'.
129 Harland, 'Legitimacy and Effectiveness', p.17.
130 Claude, 'Collective Legitimization', p.370.
131 e.g. Caron, 'The Legitimacy of the Collective Authority of the Security Council', p.565.
132 for example, see Ian Clark, *Globalization and International Relations Theory* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999); David Held and Anthony G. McGrew, *Governing Globalization: Power, Authority and Global Governance* (Oxford: Polity, 2002); Kahler and Lake, *Governance in a Global Economy*.

participation. Calls for greater local participation in, and ownership of, peacebuilding processes are common in the academic and policy literatures, characterised by critiques of 'the primacy of elite processes' in peacebuilding planning and practice.[133] Such arguments about processes of local engagement and consultation require greater scrutiny than much of the literature accords. For example, why is local participation beneficial for peace operations? Through which mechanisms does local consultation enhance processes or outcomes? By examining the procedural legitimation of peace operations, I aim to identify and understand the causal processes through which such local engagement influences effectiveness; it is hoped that the extraction of claims about participation and consultation from the fragmented specificity of particular cases will shed new light on how peace operations work.

Both the control and relational models of legitimation are useful in this sense.[134] Viewed through the control model, participation and consultation give voice to local actors in the decision-making process, which accords them some level of influence on outcomes.[135] For example, peace operations may establish consultative processes that allow civil society groups and individuals to voice their desires, concerns and preferences in ways that feed directly into the decisions that are taken. Alternatively, peace operations may 'devolve' some areas of control to local ownership, which contributes to the legitimacy of peace operations because the 'governed' perceive that they have some stake in the process of governing.

While this control model of legitimation operates through a direct link between procedures and outcomes, the relational model emphasises the nature of interactions between the

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133 Charles T. Call and Susan E. Cook, 'On Democratization and Peacebuilding' *Global Governance* 9, no. 2 (2003) p.236; on the ownership debate, see Simon Chesterman, 'Ownership in Theory and in Practice: Transfer of Authority in UN Statebuilding Operations' *Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding* 1, no. 1 (2007).

134 See Tyler, *Why People Obey the Law*, pp.6-7.

135 Tyler, 'Psychological Perspectives'; see also Bodansky, 'The Legitimacy of International Governance', p.617.

powerful and those subject to that power, *independent* of their outcomes. In other words, legitimation depends on judgments about the fairness of procedures for decision-making and exercising authority, not on the extent to which local actors can substantively influence those procedures. Thus participation matters for procedural legitimacy because of the nature of interaction, not because participants are able to influence outcomes.

Procedural legitimacy receives its most substantial consideration in the peace operations literature via its accountability dimension.[136] Since procedural legitimacy is ultimately about the justifiability of the way power is exercised, the checks and balances of accountability are crucial to evaluations about the actions of the powerful. Transparency – the availability and accessibility of information about the institution and its behaviour – is therefore an essential precondition to accountability.

Allan Buchanan and Robert Keohane define accountability according to the presence of three elements: standards that the powerful are expected to meet; the availability and accessibility of information to accountability holders; and the ability of accountability holders to impose sanctions if the standards are not met.[137] As I argued above, legitimacy both enhances *and* restrains power. This restraint operates via the need for legitimate power to be exercised in accordance with right process in order to *be* legitimate in the first place. Accountability is the principal mechanism in this restraint on the use, and abuse, of power, and thus helps to distinguish legitimate rule from domination.[138]

Accountability is an important element of legitimacy, but it also a particularly problematic one for international institutions. Long accountability chains and uncertainty about to whom

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[136] Caplan, *International Governance*; Zaum, 'The Authority of International Administrations'; see also the consideration of accountability and legitimacy in the literature on international financial instituitons, e.g. Ngaire Woods and Amrita Narlikar, 'Governance and the Limits of Accountability: The WTO, the IMF, and the World Bank' *International Social Science Journal* 53, no. 170 (2001).
[137] Buchanan and Keohane, 'The Legitimacy of Global Governance Institutions', p.426.
[138] Barnett and Finnemore, *Rules for the World*, p.172.

institutions should be accountable create particular obstacles to their legitimation. This complexity is evident in peace operations; as Richard Caplan argues, 'while the power that they possess can be quite considerable, international authorities are not directly accountable to the population whose territory they administer. They are, instead, accountable to the bodies that appoint them'.[139] Further, because they directly assume at least *some* functions of domestic governance, peace operations are far more intrusive than other international institutions. Thus the dual domestic-international character of peace operations paradoxically creates stronger demands for accountability even as it makes accountability more difficult.

Legitimation through accountability works by checking the exercise of power, requiring the powerful actor to justify its relationship and actions towards the less powerful. Peace operations may be legitimised in this way through the formal processes, such as host-state consent or by establishing formal complaints mechanisms in the field. But they may also be legitimised through informal accountability processes, in which peace operations voluntarily provide justifications for their presence and actions, explicitly articulate standards against which their outcomes can be evaluated, and respond to the criticisms or reform demands of local actors.

Quality of treatment

Social psychology research has shown that the quality of treatment people receive from an institution influences their perceptions of its legitimacy and, consequently, their willingness to cooperate with it.[140] One significant finding of this research is that the actions of individual representatives affect the legitimacy of the entire institution; that is, in the social relationship that exists between a peace operation and the local population, legitimacy is

[139] Caplan, 'Who Guards the Guardians?', p.463.
[140] Blader and Tyler, 'A Four-Component Model'; Tyler, 'The Psychology of Legitimacy'.

determined not only by formal procedures, but also by the discretionary acts of individuals that implement its decisions.[141]

This suggests that the procedural legitimacy of a peace operation derived through adherence to formal rules that entail inclusiveness and accountability may be either strengthened or undermined by the discretionary exercise of power by individuals who carry out the resulting policies. The quality of interaction between a peace operation and local actors affects legitimacy because 'people are influenced by how they are treated by authorities, independent of their evaluations of what they do or do not receive from these authorities'.[142]

Three characteristics of the social relationship are particularly important: the neutrality of authorities; the benevolence or trustworthiness of their motives; and the respect and dignity of interpersonal treatment.[143]

Neutrality

In the peace operations literature, 'neutrality' has become almost a taboo, associated inexorably with inactivity in the face of 'evil'. This understanding developed in response to the UN's most damning failures of the post-Cold War period, the Rwandan genocide and the Srebrenica massacre, both of which occurred under the watch of UN peacekeepers. As Kofi Annan framed it,

> In the face of genocide, there can be no standing aside, no looking away, no neutrality – there are perpetrators and there are victims; there is evil and there is evil's harvest.[144]

Similarly, the Brahimi Report declared:

> Impartiality for such operations must therefore mean adherence to the principles of the Charter and to the objectives of a mandate that is rooted in those Charter

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141 Blader and Tyler, 'A Four-Component Model'; Tyler, 'The Psychology of Legitimacy'.
142 Tyler, 'The Psychology of Legitimacy', p.335.
143Ibid., p.324.
144 Kofi Annan, *Secretary-General, in 'Mission of Healing' to Rwanda, Pledges Support of United Nations for Country's Search for Peace and Progress* SG/SM/6552 AFR/56, United Nations Press Release, 6 May 1998.

> principles. Such impartiality is not the same as neutrality or equal treatment of all parties in all cases for all time, which can amount to a policy of appeasement.[145]

As others have noted, there is substantial overlap between the concepts of neutrality and impartiality, such that in many contexts they are used synonymously.[146] While their distinction is emphasised in peace operations doctrine, this is a context-specific response to a particular problem: the use of a traditional pillar of peacekeeping as a justification for otherwise unjustified inaction. But if we return to the birth of UN peacekeeping, we see another understanding of neutrality, also embedded in a specific international political context. Neutrality and impartiality were emphasised in the very first attempt to define a peacekeeping doctrine, found in Dag Hammarskjold's 1958 report on the United Nations Emergency Force.[147] The meanings of each principle were embedded in the global geopolitical context as well as the specific conflict at hand. Against the Cold War backdrop, peacekeepers were to be politically neutral, which meant the operation would not be ideologically-driven by one or other superpower, nor any external party to the conflict. It was on this basis that troops were contributed by states other than the permanent members of the Security Council, since the participation of a major power 'could too easily undermine the international purpose and control of the force'.[148] 'Neutrality' was thus shorthand for political neutrality in the Cold War, intended 'to exclude the rivalries of the Cold War from areas to which it had not yet spread'.[149] This in turn was expected to enhance the impartiality of peacekeepers in their dealings with the parties to the conflict, as they would have no

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145 United Nations, *The Brahimi Report*, p.9.
146 See Dominick Donald, 'Neutrality, Impartiality and UN Peacekeeping at the Beginning of the 21st Century' *International Peacekeeping* 9, no. 4 (2002).
147 United Nations, *Summary Study of the Experience Derived from the Establishment and Operation of the Force: Report of the Secretary-General* A/3943, 9 October 1958, see especially para.149.
148 Mona Harrington Gagnon, 'Peace Forces and the Veto: The Relevance of Consent' *International Organization* 21, no. 4 (1967), p.817.
149 Rosalyn Higgins, 'The United Nations Role in Maintaining International Peace: The Lessons of the First Fifty Years' *New York Law School Journal of International and Comparative Law* 16, no. 1 (2996), p.139.

external agenda save their UN mandate, which the conflict parties had not only consented to, but had significantly shaped.

The contemporary debates on neutrality and impartiality in peace operations have developed in response to specific events, and must be understood in that context. In legitimacy theory, neutrality refers to the extent to which powerful actors behave honestly and objectively, using fact rather than personal opinions in decision-making.[150] That is, neutrality is an indicator of the fairness of decision-making processes because it signifies 'a level playing field' without unfair discrimination among players, and in this context is equivalent to impartiality.[151]

Trust

Trustworthiness in this context refers to people's 'judgment about whether or not the third party is motivated to treat them in a fair way, to be concerned about their needs, and to consider their arguments'.[152] Trust is important because it 'speaks to the future', allowing judgments of current intentions to provide the basis for future prediction.[153] The relatively short timeframe of peace operations means that they cannot rely on repeated iterations of cooperative encounters to build trust in the institution.[154] Other bases of trust are therefore likely to be more important for peace operations. These include perceptions about the benevolence of the motives and personnel of operations,[155] and perceptions about their credibility, or the extent to which an operation can demonstrate the necessary competence, resources and commitment to achieve a stated goal.

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150 Tyler, 'The Psychology of Legitimacy', p.337.
151 Ibid., p.337.
152 Tyler, *Why People Obey the Law*, p.336.
153 Tyler, 'The Psychology of Legitimacy', p.336.
154 Robert M. Axelrod, *The Evolution of Cooperation* (New York: Basic Books, 1984).
155 Tom R. Tyler, 'Citizen Discontent with Legal Procedures: A Social Science Perspective on Civil Procedure Reform' *The American Journal of Comparative Law* 45, no. 4 (1997), p.891.

Interpersonal treatment

The most significant contribution of research on the legitimising effects of high quality treatment for the study of peace operations is that it directs attention towards the actions of individuals rather than the institution as a whole. Tom Tyler argues that the quality of interpersonal treatment matters because

> being treated politely, with dignity and respect, and having respect shown for one's rights and status within society, all enhance feelings of fairness. These findings are especially striking in that such interpersonal treatment is essentially unrelated to the manner in which their dispute is resolved.[156]

As a process of legitimation, the respectful behaviour of a peace operation's personnel can thereby enhance the likelihood that local actors will voluntarily comply and cooperate. This has important implications for the legitimation of peace operations, given that the challenges of postconflict environments often create difficulties for substantive legitimacy in the short-term. Sunshine and Tyler have found that procedural justice is the primary factor shaping perceptions about the legitimacy of police forces, and that the quality of treatment is a significant influence in these evaluations. As they argue,

> This finding is very important from the perspective of policing, since the police have more control over how they treat people than they do over the crime rate. The incidence of crime will fluctuate due to factors beyond police control. Procedural fairness, or treating people with respect and in an unbiased fashion, does not depend on crime rate fluctuations. Rather, it depends on the behaviour of the police themselves.[157]

Given that peace operations face challenging, unpredictable environments in which overall patterns of violence, conflict and other forms of non-compliance are difficult to influence on a macro-level, the possibility for a peace operation's personnel to shape local behaviour by treating local actors with dignity and respect suggests an important causal pathway through which effectiveness might be achieved. At a minimum, it suggests that the legitimacy of peace operations is determined by informal interactions, as well as formal rules and structures.

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[156] Tyler, 'The Psychology of Legitimacy', p.337
[157] Sunshine and Tyler, 'The Role of Procedural Justice', pp.535-536.


Conclusion

In this chapter, I elaborated a new analytical framework for understanding peace operations, which focuses on their compulsory power and its relationship to legitimacy. I argued that the lens of power and legitimacy is better able to capture the complex dynamics of peace operations than the narrower focus of authority, and identified three currencies of power through which a peace operation might influence local actor behaviour: coercion, inducement and legitimacy.

The concept of legitimacy receives particular attention in this framework. I defined local legitimation as a causal process which leads actors to cooperate with a peace operation based on the belief that the operation it is right, appropriate and desirable in the local context.

Finally, I unpacked the concept of legitimacy in order to understand why it is a source of power, and identified three processes through which a peace operation may be locally legitimised: source legitimacy (rules and norms, and institutional capacity); substantive legitimacy (effectiveness and fairness); and procedural legitimacy (participation, consultation and accountability; and quality of treatment). The power-legitimacy framework is illustrated in Figure 1 below.

Figure 1: What power do peace operations have to obtain local cooperation?



In Chapters Three to Six, I apply this framework to the cases of local cooperation in Cambodia and Solomon Islands.

Chapter Three: UNTAC – The failures of ceasefire, disarmament and demobilisation

This chapter examines the power and legitimacy of the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), using the framework developed in Chapter Two. UNTAC's authorisation by the United Nations Security Council in October 1991 marked an important shift in the global security order. By far the largest, most ambitious and most expensive peace operation of its time, UNTAC was delegated an unprecedented degree of authority over the domestic governance of a state. While UNTAC aimed to resolve a 12-year conflict that epitomised the Cold War order, the operation broke new ground in the 'interventionism' of the 1990s. Its mandate to disarm and demobilise Cambodia's warring parties, assume control over key government functions, resettle a large refugee population and conduct multiparty national elections in one of the world's poorest, most war-ravaged countries took the United Nations and its member states deep within the Cambodian state. UNTAC's mission was highly intrusive, aiming to fundamentally transform the social, political and military space in Cambodia. UNTAC failed to achieve many of its goals, notably those relating to disarmament and demobilisation. The operation sought to implement an agreed peace settlement between warring factions who quickly reneged on their commitments and used compliance as a bargaining chip in the ongoing struggle for power. Yet UNTAC succeeded in holding elections which enfranchised 90% of the Cambodian electorate, it repatriated and resettled 370 000 refugees, and it delivered a unified national military to the new government. The decisions and behaviour of a wide range of local actors were crucial in each of these outcomes.

The successes of UNTAC are analysed in Chapter Four. In this chapter, I analyse the key failures of UNTAC, seeking to contribute to the larger project of understanding how peace operations work by explaining how this one did not. After providing an overview of the

conflict setting and of UNTAC, I focus on the local behaviour that most significantly determined the operation's effectiveness: Khmer Rouge non-compliance with the ceasefire, disarmament and demobilisation. This requires rigorously investigating the interests and beliefs of the Khmer Rouge and the other Cambodian factions, including their perceptions of UNTAC. I then look beyond the structural constraints of mandates and resources to distinguish different types of power and, significantly, to critically examine the limits of UNTAC's power. While the absence of an enforcement mandate and the use of poorly designed sanctions limited the operation's coercive power, I question the straightforward assumption that a more coercive posture would have provided UNTAC with greater power to achieve its objectives. In addition to developing a more comprehensive explanation of UNTAC's failures, then, this chapter also demonstrates the utility of the power-legitimacy framework for understanding how peace operations work and, crucially, why they may not.

The conflict setting

Cambodia gained its independence from French colonial rule in 1953 through the leadership of King Norodom Sihanouk. In 1955, Sihanouk abdicated and was elected Prime Minister, ruling until deposed in a coup by the US-backed Lon Nol in 1970. Cambodia was heavily bombed during the Vietnam War by US forces seeking to disrupt the Vietcong and their communist Cambodian allies, the Khmer Rouge. In 1975, following the communist victory in Vietnam, the Khmer Rouge seized power in Cambodia and began a rapid, brutal agrarian revolution in which about 1.7 million people died of starvation, disease and execution. Increasing Khmer Rouge hostility towards Vietnam, probably encouraged by their Chinese patrons, led the Vietnamese regime to support opponents of the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia. In late-1978, Vietnam invaded Cambodia and in 1979 the pro-Vietnamese regime seized power. Hundreds of thousands of refugees fled to the Thai border, many

finding refuge in Western countries, and a twelve-year civil war ensued between four parties: the incumbent Vietnamese-backed People's Republic of Kampuchea, later known as the State of Cambodia (SOC); the Khmer Rouge; and two smaller parties, the royalist Front Uni National Pour un Cambodge Independent, Neutre, Pacifique et Cooperatif (FUNCINPEC), and the republican Khmer People's National Liberation Front (KPNLF) (see table 1).

Table 1: The four Cambodian factions and their military forces[1]

	Electoral name	Leader	Armed Force
The State of Cambodia (SOC), formerly the People's Republic of Kampuchea	Cambodian People's Party (CPP)	Hun Sen, Prime Minister of Cambodia	Cambodian People's Armed Forces (CPAF)
The Party of Democratic Kampuchea (PDK or Khmer Rouge)	n/a[2]	Khieu Samphan (nominal); Pol Pot (actual)	National Army of Democratic Kampuchea (NADK)
Front Uni National Pour un Cambodge Independent, Neutre, Pacifique et Cooperatif (FUNCINPEC)	FUNCINPEC	Prince Ranariddh (replaced his father Prince Sihanouk in 1991)	Armee Nationale pour un Kampuchea Independent (ANKI)
Khmer People's National Liberation Front (KPNLF)	Buddhist Liberal Democratic Party (BLDP)	Son Sann	Khmer People's National Liberation Armed Forces (KPNLAF)

International efforts to negotiate a settlement gained momentum towards the end of the Cold War. In 1989 the Paris Conference on Cambodia, co-chaired by France and Indonesia, broke new ground towards a settlement after Vietnam announced that it would withdraw its troops.[3] Intensive efforts by Australia, France, Indonesia, Japan and the five permanent

1 This table is a slightly revised version of that found in Trevor Findlay, *Cambodia: The Legacy and Lessons of UNTAC* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), p.2.

2 The Khmer Rouge did in fact form a political party during the registration period, called the National Unity Party of Cambodia, which was viewed as a positive sign that the party might join the elections. It was not registered, however, and the Khmer Rouge did not contest the election.

3 For more on the Paris Conferences, see Amitav Acharya, Pierre Lizee, and Sorpong Peou, eds., *Cambodia - the 1989 Paris Peace Conference: Background Analysis and Documents* (Millwood, N.Y: Millwood, N.Y: Kraus International, 1991); Mats Berdal and Michael Leifer, 'Cambodia' in *United Nations Interventionism, 1991-2004*, ed. Mats Berdal and Spyros Economides (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007); Jin Song, 'The Political Dynamics of the Peacemaking Process in

Security Council members (P5) eventually led to a draft Framework Document, accepted by the parties in September 1990 as the basis for a final peace agreement. After numerous disruptions and delays, the Paris Peace Accords were signed on 23 October 1991 by the four Cambodian factions, and by the P5 and twelve other states. The Accords comprised four documents: 1) the Final Act of the Paris Conference on Cambodia; 2) the Agreement on a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict; 3) the Agreement Concerning the Sovereignty, Independence, Territorial Integrity and Inviolability, Neutrality and National Unity of Cambodia; and 4) the Declaration on the Rehabilitation and Reconstruction of Cambodia. Of these, the second concerned the agreement between the four Cambodian parties and the establishment of a UN peace operation to implement it.

The Agreement on a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict, hereafter referred to as the Paris Agreement or peace agreement, committed the Cambodian parties to: comply with a ceasefire; end their acceptance of external military assistance; canton and disarm their military forces; demobilise 70% of their forces prior to the completion of electoral registration; demobilise the remaining 30% or incorporate them into a new national army immediately after elections; and release all prisoners of war and civilian political prisoners. Further, a quadripartite Supreme National Council (SNC) of Cambodia was established as the 'unique legitimate body and source of authority in which, throughout the transitional period, national sovereignty and unity would be enshrined'.[4] The SNC comprised six representatives of the SOC, and two representatives each of FUNCINPEC, KPNLF and the Khmer Rouge, under the chairmanship of Prince Sihanouk.

Cambodia' in *Keeping the Peace: Multidimensional UN Operations in Cambodia and El Salvador*, ed. Michael W. Doyle, Ian Johnstone, and Robert C. Orr (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997); Findlay, *Cambodia: The Legacy and Lessons of UNTAC* .

[4] *Agreement on a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict* (hereafter 'the Paris Agreement'), 23 October 1991, Section 3, art 3.

The agreement would be supervised and implemented by the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), led by Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) Yasushi Akashi of Japan.[5] UNTAC aimed to end violent conflict between the Cambodian factions by implementing a comprehensive ceasefire that included disarmament and demobilisation, and conducting elections in a politically neutral environment to determine the composition of a new Cambodian national government. In addition, UNTAC aimed to sow the seeds of sustainable peace by promoting human rights and overseeing an economic reconstruction and development program. Finally, the operation aimed to address two significant externalities of the 21-year civil war by repatriating and resettling 370 000 refugees, and through the clearance of land mines.

The effectiveness of UNTAC: an overview

UNTAC's is a story of a weak operation that was in many respects marginalised by the power plays of Cambodia's military and political elites, as this chapter will discuss. UNTAC is usually evaluated as a 'partial success',[6] since its record on goal accomplishment is mixed: it achieved or partially achieved some of its goals, but abjectly failed to achieve others.

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[5] The operation included nearly 16000 military personnel and 3500 civilian police, contributed by Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Cameroon, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Egypt, Fiji, France, Germany, Ghana, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Malaysia, Morocco, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Philippines, Poland, Russian Federation, Senegal, Sweden, Thailand, Tunisia, United Kingdom, United States and Uruguay. In addition, there were some 6000 international civilian personnel, 460 United Nations Volunteers, and about 7000 locally-recruited Cambodian staff, including some 2500 interpreters and 4000 electoral staff. A further 50000 Cambodians were employed as polling staff during the election itself. The international personnel of UNTAC peaked at 22 874 military and civilian personnel, drawn from more than 100 countries. See Findlay, *Cambodia: The Legacy and Lessons of UNTAC*, p.27; United Nations, 'Cambodia - UNTAC: Facts and Figures' available: http://www.un.org-/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/untacfacts.html.

[6] Lise Morje Howard, *UN Peacekeeping in Civil Wars* (Cambridge; New York Cambridge University Press, 2008); Sorpong Peou, 'Implementing Cambodia's Peace Agreement' in *Ending Civil Wars: The Implementation of Peace Agreements*, ed. Stephen John Stedman, Donald Rothchild, and Elizabeth Cousens (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2002); David M. Malone, *The UN Security Council: From the Cold War to the 21st Century* (Boulder, CO; London: Lynne Rienner, 2004).

UNTAC failed to maintain a ceasefire and to demobilise Cambodia's four armed forces; not only did this jeopardise the 'peaceful' environment in which transitional elections were to be held, it ultimately undermined the sustainability of the peace settlement once UNTAC withdrew at the end of 1993. The Paris Agreements and UNTAC's mandate envisaged an election held in peaceful, politically neutral conditions under which political parties and voters alike could freely participate without control or intimidation. It was on this basis that UNTAC was mandated to exercise control over the administrative structures of each party which, in reality, meant an overwhelming focus on the SOC as the party controlling the apparatus of government. In practice, the environment in which elections were held was anything but 'neutral'. Politically-motivated violence was widespread, perpetrated primarily by the SOC against its FUNCINPEC opponents as a tactic of intimidation that aimed to deliver electoral advantage. All parties engaged in objectionable propaganda, although the greater broadcasting capabilities of the SOC made its propaganda more pervasive. At the same time, Khmer Rouge violence, including a campaign of terror against ethnic Vietnamese settlers and persistent threats to disrupt the elections by force, contributed to a heightened climate of fear and encouraged widely-held anti-Vietnamese sentiment.

Yet almost 90% of the Cambodian electorate turned out to vote in May 1993, thwarting Khmer Rouge attempts to undermine elections via low participation. Despite their campaign of intimidation and violence, the SOC lost the elections, receiving only 38% of the vote compared to FUNCINPEC's 45%. UNTAC effectively protected the elections from the real threat of armed attack, helping to guarantee that the ballot could be declared, on balance, a success. In addition to facilitating popular participation through a highly successful registration process, UNTAC managed to persuade people that their vote would be secret: that they could vote for whichever candidate they wanted, safe from the threat of retribution.

UNTAC was also highly effective in repatriating and resettling Cambodian refugees from Thai border camps. One of the few unqualified successes of the operation, this was run essentially as a UNHCR operation embedded in UNTAC. The repatriation component facilitated the return of refugees by coordinating transport logistics, engaging the cooperation of parties in control of territory to which refuges would return, and providing resettlement assistance to refugees and host communities.

Although demobilisation was not achieved, UNTAC's interventions were critical to the unification of the three participating factional militaries (CPAF, ANKI and KPNLAF) into a national army of Cambodia. This unification has been widely overlooked in studies of UNTAC, despite its significance in providing crucial stability in an otherwise fractious post-election political environment.

It is important to note, however, that neither the electoral turnout nor the military unification paved the way for sustained peace in Cambodia. As discussed in Chapter Four, the election results were quickly disregarded as elites haggled over a power-sharing deal, sustained for a rocky four years until the Hun Sen regime seized power. Military unification was even more temporary. Nevertheless, as mentioned earlier, there is general scholarly consensus that UNTAC was at least a partial success. It is important to recognise, however, that these heavily qualified evaluations reflect the variation not only in methods of measuring effectiveness, but also in UNTAC's effectiveness across different goal areas and over time, which my disaggregated approach seeks to explain.

This chapter analyses UNTAC's failures regarding the ceasefire, disarmament and demobilisation goals, using the power-legitimacy framework. It leaves the successes of the elections, repatriation and military unification for analysis in Chapter Four. In each case, I identify the sources of UNTAC's power and of its constraints by examining the interactions between the operation and the local actors it sought to influence.

Ceasefire, demobilisation and elections: Khmer Rouge non-compliance

The comprehensive ceasefire agreed by the four Cambodian factions under the Paris Agreements never held, neither in the interregnum between the agreement's conclusion nor after UNTAC was deployed. It was violated three months after the peace agreement was signed when, following the typical pattern of annual dry-season offensives, armed clashes occurred between Khmer Rouge troops and the Cambodian People's Armed Forces (CPAF) in Kompong Thom province.[7] Ceasefire violations continued throughout the UNTAC period. Most were small-scale skirmishes, concentrated in a few central provinces.[8]

The ceasefire was designed in two phases. In the first, parties would cease hostilities and refrain from actions that would re-ignite violence, including expanding the territory under their control. In the second, parties would undertake a 'phased and balanced' demobilisation of their armed forces, which meant troops would regroup at pre-agreed locations before entering cantonment sites where they would surrender their weapons. The UN estimated that there were 200 000 regular military forces in Cambodia plus 250 000 militia forces, deployed in some 650 separate locations, armed with over 300 000 weapons and some 80 million rounds of ammunition.[9] Finally, the troops would demobilise and return to civilian life.

The two smaller armed factions, belonging to FUNCINPEC and the KPNLF, complied to a significant degree with these various ceasefire demands. They cooperated comprehensively with UNTAC's verification activities and demobilised the majority of their troops on

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[7] United Nations, *First Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia* S/23870 1 May 1992; 'Khmer Rouge Forces Attack Villages: Peace Accord Violation Leaves 13 Dead' *Financial Times*, 21 January 1992.
[8] United Nations, *Fourth Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia* S/25719 3 May 1993.
[9] United Nations, *Report of the Secretary-General on Cambodia* S/23613 19 February 1992.

schedule. The SOC's ceasefire cooperation was mixed. It allowed UNTAC access to territory under its control and broadly cooperated with the operation's verification processes, but its CPAF troops repeatedly violated the ceasefire in mainly small-scale but frequent clashes with the Khmer Rouge. CPAF cantoned 42 368 troops during the first 3 months, but reserved most of its armed force, certainly including its most valuable troops, weapons and equipment.[10] The Khmer Rouge also had a large armed force, which remained in flagrant violation of its obligations throughout. The party cooperated neither with the final demand of demobilisation nor with the much easier demands to provide UNTAC with information about its troop strength and deployment and to allow the operation access to areas under its control for reconnaissance purposes.

On 13 June 1992, nearly three months after UNTAC's deployment and eight months after the peace agreement was signed, the operation entered Phase II of the ceasefire, despite Khmer Rouge non-compliance with the provisions of Phase I.

UNTAC held out hope that the Khmer Rouge would eventually comply with ceasefire demands, but in November 1992 was forced to abandon the goal of demobilisation since it could not insist on the demobilisation of other parties while Khmer Rouge troops remained at large.[11] While demands for compliance with a simple ceasefire continued,[12] the comprehensive measures of Phase II – regroupment, cantonment, disarmament and demobilisation – were dropped; UNTAC even returned some weapons to parties in the lead-up to elections.

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[10] United Nations, *Second Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia* S/24578 21 September 1992; this is about a quarter of the estimated CPAF forces (Yasushi Akashi, 'The Challenges Faced by UNTAC' *Japan Review of International Affairs* 7, no. 3 (1993) p.199).

[11] United Nations, *Report of the Secretary-General on the Implementation of Security Council Resolution 783 (1992)* S/24800, 15 November 1992.

[12] UNSC Resolutions 783 (1992), 792 (1992), 810 (1993), 826 (1993). Some 55 000 troops were eventually disarmed; see United Nations, *Report of the Secretary-General on the Implementation of Security Council Resolution 783 (1992).*

The mixed record of local cooperation with UNTAC's ceasefire demands was due primarily to the divergent interests of the local parties, over which UNTAC exerted little influence. In order to analyse UNTAC's power, it is necessary first to rigorously examine those interests; the next section thus defines the positions of each of the four factions in relation to UNTAC, and to each other.

Local interests: the peace process as an elite bargain

At the level of elite politics, the process of implementing the Paris Agreements was a bargaining game with UNTAC's ceasefire and demobilisation goals at its core. Each of the local factions jostled for advantage, manoeuvring within and outside the rules to strengthen their bargaining power.[13]

A clear pattern of local cooperation was established early in the process. FUNCINPEC and the KPNLF exhibited a high degree of cooperation with UNTAC and pursued demobilisation in ways fully compliant with their obligations. The SOC cooperated to a more limited extent. It engaged in armed clashes against the Khmer Rouge, often in retaliation against Khmer Rouge attacks but sometimes waging clear offensives. Regarding demobilisation, the SOC had a much bigger armed force, which made its task inevitably more difficult; however, as I discuss later, the SOC certainly avoided full compliance. The Khmer Rouge were non-compliant with ceasefire and demobilisation demands. While Khmer Rouge leaders showed an early willingness to comply, they soon transitioned to a strategy of mock compliance followed by active resistance. This variation in cooperation across the Cambodian parties can be explained at the macro level by examining the divergent interests of each party and inadequacy of UNTAC's power to influence them.

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[13] Michael Doyle notes that such bargaining behaviour should be expected, since a peace agreement frequently becomes 'an invitation to struggle' rather than an end to conflict; Michael W. Doyle, *UN Peacekeeping in Cambodia: UNTAC's Civil Mandate* (Boulder; London: Lynne Rienner, 1995), p.66.

FUNCINPEC and KPNLF:

The full cooperation of FUNCINPEC and the KPNLF is easy to explain: with relatively small militaries, they lost little by disarming but stood to make significant gains over their opponents at the ballot box. Sam Rainsy, a senior FUNCINPEC advisor during the UNTAC era and member of the Supreme National Council, attests that his party sought 'to fully play the game' since it had little to lose by complying with the letter of the Paris Agreements, but much to gain from elections.[14] UNTAC thus exercised power through the promise of elections, which served as a type of inducement strategy. FUNCINPEC's power base was popular support, not its military: as the royalist party, led by Prince Sihanouk's son, Prince Ranariddh, it was associated with the 'golden era' of Cambodian peace and prosperity in the 1950s and 1960s. Although the KPNLF had a much smaller support base, their posture of full, willing cooperation with UNTAC promised rewards for 'good behaviour' in the distribution of resources by UNTAC, or by international donors via UNTAC's recommendation. Indeed, this later materialised, with cooperation rewarded through greater air time on Radio UNTAC and UNTAC transportation assistance during the campaigning period.[15] Finally, continued cooperation maintained the weaker parties' seat at the bargaining table, especially in the SNC and the Mixed Military Working Group. Yet the significance of UNTAC's inducement power with regard to FUNCINPEC and KPNLF cooperation should not be overplayed. If power is about UNTAC's ability to get local parties to do something *they otherwise would not*, UNTAC's power was marginal. In other words, UNTAC did not have to move the two smaller parties very far to receive a high degree of cooperation.

[14] Sam Rainsy, interview by author, Phnom Penh, 21 January 2009.
[15] Béatrice Pouligny, *Peace Operations Seen from Below: UN Missions and Local People* (London Hurst & Co, 2006, Peace Operations Seen from Below), p.183.

The SOC and Khmer Rouge:

While cooperation served the interests of FUNCINPEC and KPNLF, both the SOC and the Khmer Rouge risked losing power by complying with the letter of UNTAC's demands, and each competed to gain advantage by shaping the interpretation and implementation of the Paris Agreements. The power struggle between these two parties was the product of over a decade of armed conflict. Each saw the Paris Agreements as a way to end the conflict of which both were weary, but by manipulating it to their own advantage, not through genuine commitment to reconciliation and the renunciation of violence.[16] Upturning Clausewitz, UNTAC's peace process thus represented the continuation of war by other means.

I argue that the behaviour of the SOC and the Khmer Rouge is best understood as a bargaining game and explained through the logic of the local balance of power. The SOC was willing to comply with demobilisation in order to remove the Khmer Rouge power base: its military. The party calculated (correctly) that it would be able to evade UNTAC attempts to exercise control over SOC administrative structures, including its police force.[17] Provided the Khmer Rouge also demobilised, the SOC was willing to give up its military power in order to consolidate the advantage gained through its control of the state administration. Compliance on demobilisation also ensured that the party could obtain the benefits of 'being seen' to play by the rules. However, the SOC behaviour represented a very shallow form of compliance with UNTAC's Civil Administration component. In order to facilitate 'free and fair' elections, the Paris Agreements required all administrative structures in Cambodia that could directly influence the outcomes of elections to be placed 'under direct United Nations

[16] This is not to suggest that such genuine commitment is the norm, or ought to be expected: in reality, most peace agreements are simply another phase of the conflict.

[17] Under the Paris Agreements, 'all administrative agencies, bodies and offices acting in the field of foreign affairs, national defence, finance, public security and information will be placed under the direct control of UNTAC, which will exercise it as necessary to ensure strict neutrality'. UNTAC had the power to monitor all administrative operations and information; to reassign or remove any personnel of administrative agencies; and to supervise law enforcement and judicial processes throughout Cambodia (*The Paris Agreement*, Annex 1 Section B).

supervision or control'.[18] This was expected to ensure a 'neutral political environment' for elections. The fallacy of this assumption was quickly exposed as, in practice, the SOC easily evaded UNTAC control. As a member of UNTAC's Civil Administration component explained:

> real power was not necessarily in the ministries which typically were shells of dilapidated buildings with few workers in them and few facilities. We discovered that the essence of power within the State of Cambodia was exerted at the provincial and district level through familial ties.[19]

Thus the SOC simply 'administered around UNTAC', allowing itself to be controlled when it wished, but otherwise bypassing UNTAC officers who were 'kept busy controlling an official without function'.[20] UNTAC's attempted control was primarily cosmetic, defeated by the 'empty shells' of SOC ministries, which diverted attention away from the parallel structures that were concealed from UNTAC.[21] One Provincial Director of UNTAC describes the operation's control function as a 'myth',[22] while the journalist William Shawcross described as 'absurd' the idea that a handful of foreigners could command a well-entrenched regime.[23]

The SOC's behaviour therefore represented non-compliance, and this affected the incidence of Khmer Rouge non-compliance. For the Khmer Rouge, the peace process offered the prospect of dismantling not just the SOC's military power, but the SOC itself. Drawing on interviews with senior Khmer Rouge leaders, the writings of Pol Pot, and anthropological research, David Roberts argues that the Khmer Rouge had a clear objective:

> The SoC administrative process in the countryside had not been separated from the CPP, which remained a key issue for the Khmer Rouge in their withdrawal of

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18 *The Paris Agreement*, Article 6.
19 David Biggs, interview by Jean Krasno, New York, 1 May 1998, for the Yale-UN Oral History Project.
20 Michael W. Doyle and Nishkala Suntharalingam, 'The UN in Cambodia: Lessons for Complex Peacekeeping' *International Peacekeeping* 1, no. 2 (1994), p.144.
21 Ibid., p.144; see also Stephen John Stedman, 'Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes' *International Security* 22, no. 2 (1997), p.32.
22 Benny Widyono, *Dancing in Shadows: Sihanouk, the Khmer Rouge, and the United Nations in Cambodia* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2007), p.63.
23 William Shawcross, *Deliver Us from Evil: Warlords & Peacekeepers in a World of Endless Conflict* (London: Bloomsbury, 1994), p.75.

> consent. The elements of the NADK, as well as political cadre, were seeking to eliminate the imbalance caused by SoC's influential penetration of rural society and replace it with four party oversight similar to that engaged in the SNC in Phnom Penh.[24]

The Khmer Rouge was thus willing to demobilise, but only if UNTAC fully wrested control of the state from the SOC's political arm, as well as ensuring it demobilised comparably.[25] The Khmer Rouge faced a serious insecurity dilemma: it would be left vulnerable if it disarmed while the SOC administration, including its paramilitary police force, remained intact.[26]

This interpretation of SOC and Khmer Rouge behaviour as strategic bargaining is also supported in other analysis. David Ashley argues that the compliance problems were inevitable since the aims of the SOC and the Khmer Rouge were incompatible, and 'both only signed the accord under strong international pressure and in the hope that they could twist its ambiguities to their advantage'.[27] Similarly, Doyle suggests that the parties may have wanted the Paris Agreement, 'but only to the extent that they were able to exploit it'.[28] This struggle to determine the interpretation and implementation of the Paris Agreements explains why both parties pursued varied strategies of compliance and cooperation. The SOC pursued demobilisation in order to strip the Khmer Rouge of its vital military asset; the Khmer Rouge appeared initially willing to comply with the demobilisation objectives until it became evident that UNTAC would not remove the SOC's vital administrative power.[29]

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[24] David W. Roberts, *Political Transition in Cambodia 1991-1999: Power, Elitism and Democracy* (Richmond: Curzon, 2001), p.99.
[25] Ibid.; Steve Heder, 'The Resumption of Armed Struggle by the Party of Democratic Kampuchea: Evidence from National Army of Democratic Kampuchea 'Self-Demobilizers'' in *Propaganda, Politics, and Violence in Cambodia: Democratic Transition under United Nations Peace-Keeping*, ed. Steve Heder and Judy Ledgerwood (Armonk, NY: Sharpe, 1996); Findlay, *Cambodia: The Legacy and Lessons of UNTAC* , pp.50-51.
[26] Sanderson notes that the failure to recognize the role of SOC police as a paramilitary force was a significant oversight in the Paris Agreements; John Sanderson, interview by author, Canberra, 7 June 2009.
[27] David Ashley, 'Between War and Peace: Cambodia 1991-1998' *Accord: An International Review of Peace Initiatives* November (1998), p.22.
[28] Doyle, *UN Peacekeeping in Cambodia*, p.58.
[29] Ibid., p.69.

The SOC hoped that UNTAC would be a 'toothless' body, while the Khmer Rouge hoped UNTAC would dismantle the SOC and pave the way for the Supreme National Council to rule Cambodia as a power-sharing government in which it would gain both power and legitimacy.[30]

It is clear that the SOC had the superior bargaining position: while the Khmer Rouge possessed only military power, the SOC had both a large military *and* control of the Cambodian state. As negotiations between UNTAC and the Khmer Rouge showed, there were two principal obstacles to Khmer Rouge compliance. First, the Khmer Rouge demanded that UNTAC fully control the SOC such that the CPP would be divested of its hold on administrative power. In the same vein, the Khmer Rouge later demanded that all administrative authority be transferred to the Supreme National Council. Second, the Khmer Rouge insisted that UNTAC had not delivered on its obligation to verify the withdrawal of all 'foreign forces', alleging instead that the Vietnamese remained in Cambodia 'in disguise'.[31]

The meaning of 'foreign forces' in the Paris Agreements was ambiguous, and UNTAC's mandate specified only that it would be responsible for the 'verification of the withdrawal from Cambodia of all categories of foreign forces, advisers and military personnel and their

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[30] Ashley, 'Between War and Peace: Cambodia 1991-1998', pp.20-22.

[31] See Correspondence between Noun Bunno, Major-General, MLO of the NADK and Lieutenant General John Sanderson, Force Commander of UNTAC, 27 April 1992, Papers of Lt Gen John Sanderson, Academy Library, UNSW@ADFA, Australian Defence Force Academy (hereafter '*Sanderson Papers*'), MS 359, Box 2, Folder 8; Statement of Major General N. Bunno of NADK at the MMWG- level one, 9 December 1992, *Sanderson Papers*, MS 359, Box 2, Folder 12; Statement by the Representative of the National Army of Democratic Kampuchea (NADK) at the 30th meeting of the MMWG level one, 25 January 1993, *Sanderson Papers*, MS 359, Box 2, Folder 7; see also Jay Jordens, 'Persecution of Cambodia's Ethnic Vietnamese Communities During and since the UNTAC Period' in *Propaganda, Politics, and Violence in Cambodia: Democratic Transition under United Nations Peace-Keeping*, ed. Steve Heder and Judy Ledgerwood (Armonk, NY: Sharpe, 1996); Steve Heder and Judy Ledgerwood, 'Politics of Violence: An Introduction' in *Propaganda, Politics, and Violence in Cambodia: Democratic Transition under United Nations Peace-Keeping*, ed. Steve Heder and Judy Ledgerwood (Armonk, NY: Sharpe, 1996), p.11; see also Stedman, 'Spoiler Problems', p.27.

weapons, ammunition and equipment'.[32] The Khmer Rouge had long maintained that all Vietnamese nationals and ethnic Vietnamese in Cambodia were 'foreign forces';[33] the party argued throughout the peace process that UNTAC was not fulfilling its obligations to remove such people. For its part, UNTAC interpreted 'foreign forces' to mean uniformed personnel, and criticised the Khmer Rouge for not providing information to verify their claims.[34]

These two issues became prerequisites for Khmer Rouge action on demobilisation: the party would justify its resistance to demobilisation activities on the grounds that the CPP still controlled the SOC, and that foreign forces were still present in Cambodia. UNTAC's inability to exercise control over the civil administration of the SOC meant that it could not induce Khmer Rouge compliance. Further, since the understandings of 'foreign forces' differed so dramatically, there was little scope for meeting the second condition. Finally, as the next section examines, UNTAC lacked the power to reshape the interests of the Khmer Rouge through coercion, inducement or legitimacy.

UNTAC's power

Coercion: the non-use of force

UNTAC had neither the authority nor the capability to threaten or use force to implement its mandate. Nevertheless, the enforcement question prompted division within the operation and internationally, foreshadowing the controversy that later engulfed operations in Somalia, Rwanda, Bosnia and Kosovo. This enforcement issue remains one of normative

[32] Heder and Ledgerwood, 'Politics of Violence: An Introduction', p.11; *The Paris Agreement*, Annex 1, Section C.
[33] Heder and Ledgerwood, 'Politics of Violence: An Introduction', p.11.
[34] E.g. see John Sanderson, 'Peacekeeping Operations in Cambodia' *The RUSI Journal* 139, no. 6 (1994), p.24.

contestation today, most evident in current debates on the protection of civilians.[35] Yet the effectiveness of coercive power, as distinct from whether peace operations ought to exercise it, is also contested. In this section I examine the coercive power of UNTAC, beginning with the implications of its slow deployment and the limited scope of its predecessor, the United Nations Advance Mission in Cambodia (UNAMIC), before analysing the enforcement debate as it played out during the UNTAC period. Finally, I highlight some of the limitations of conventional assumptions regarding coercive power in peace operations by examining the counterfactual of whether an enforcement mandate and coercive resources would have translated into greater power for UNTAC to achieve its objectives.

Coercive resources

The UN Secretariat and member states have been widely criticised for the slow deployment of UNTAC, which meant that the operation had fewer resources in the field during its early phases than the Paris Agreements had intended. UNTAC's official deployment date was 15 March 1992, nearly five months after the Paris Agreements were signed. To fill this vacuum the UN deployed an advance mission to assist in ceasefire maintenance. UNAMIC consisted mainly of unarmed military liaison officers whose task was to help the Cambodian parties 'to address and resolve any violations or alleged violations of the cease-fire'.[36] Their mode of assistance was 'to facilitate communications between the military headquarters of the four Cambodian parties in matters relating to the cease-fire'.[37]

Initially authorised with just 116 military observers and liaison officers, UNAMIC's deployment peaked at 1090 military personnel in March 1992.[38] Compared to UNTAC's

[35] For example see Victoria Holt and Glyn Taylor, *Protecting Civilians in the Context of UN Peacekeeping Operations*, Independent Study Commissioned by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (New York: United Nations, 2009).
[36] United Nations, *Report of the Secretary-General on Cambodia* S/23097, 30 September 1991, paragraph 6.
[37] Ibid., paragraph 12.
[38] United Nations, 'Cambodia - UNAMIC: Facts and Figures' available: http://www.un.org/en/peace-keeping/missions/past/unamicfacts.html.

16000 troops and 3500 civilian police, UNAMIC was a tiny and, by any measure, under-resourced operation, lacking the personnel to fulfil even a monitoring role. Under UNAMIC's ostensible watch, CPAF and NADK forces engaged in armed hostilities in January 1992 after the Khmer Rouge launched its first serious offensive since the Paris Agreements, mortaring villages in SOC-controlled central Kompong Thom province and leaving thirteen civilians dead, eighteen wounded, and about 10 000 displaced.[39] The Khmer Rouge blamed the SOC and accused Vietnam of concealing its troops within the SOC police force and administration,[40] while the SOC justified its retaliatory military offensives by claiming that the Khmer Rouge was attempting to expand its territory before UNTAC deployed, in clear breech of the Paris Agreements.[41] Meanwhile, the SOC was waging a campaign of political violence, arrests and killings against its political opponents, many of whom were former political prisoners recently released as part of the peace agreement.[42] The most notorious incident concerned the nominal head of the Khmer Rouge, Khieu Samphan, who was nearly lynched on his return to Phnom Penh on 27 November 1991.

UNAMIC's inadequate force size is argued by many to be a key source of its ineffectual presence, a fact little changed by its expansion in January 1992.[43] With the deployment of UNTAC in March 1992, the UN military presence progressively increased in size to reach a maximum force of over 15 000 in September 1992. Troop numbers increased at a fairly steady rate from UNTAC's deployment in March until it reached full strength six months

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39 'Khmer Rouge Forces Attack Villages: Peace Accord Violation Leaves 13 Dead' *Straits Times*, 21 December 1992.
40 See Noun Bunno-Sanderson correspondence, 27 April 1992, *Sanderson Papers*, MS 359, Box 25, Folder 134; Sorpong Peou, *Conflict Neutralization in the Cambodia War: From Battlefield to Ballot-Box* (Kuala Lumpur; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), p.53.
41 Ibid., p.54.
42 Dinah PoKempner, *Political Control, Human Rights and the UN Mission in Cambodia* (New York: Asia Watch/Human Rights Watch, 1992), pp.13-14; Peou, *Conflict Neutralization in the Cambodia War*, p.53.
43 Peou, *Conflict Neutralization in the Cambodia War*, pp.183-184; see also Findlay, *Cambodia: The Legacy and Lessons of UNTAC*, pp.22-26; Howard, *UN Peacekeeping in Civil Wars*, pp.145-146.

later.[44] Civilian police were also slow to deploy: only 193 UNTAC police were in Cambodia by the end of April 1992,[45] increasing to 1780 in July,[46] 2500 in September[47] and finally reaching near-full deployment in January 1993.[48] While delays are widely criticised, the operation gained material resources right up until the election in May 1993. However, this did not have a proportionally positive impact on ceasefire maintenance; instead ceasefire violations continued through April and May 1992. Phase II of the ceasefire entered into force on 13 June 1992, but just one day later, SOC forces launched a counter-offensive against the Khmer Rouge, prompting further fighting in Kompong Thom and Preah Vihear provinces.[49] Armed hostilities largely ceased during the rainy season, but tensions increased again from November 1992 and continued through the dry season. In his report to the Security Council on 25 January 1993, Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali reported concern about renewed daily ceasefire violations and troop movements by CPAF and NADK, including two 'very serious' violations in December 1992.[50] The expansion of territory by the Khmer Rouge and subsequent counter-offensives by CPAF, judged to be beyond the scope of self-defence, continued through April 1993.[51]

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44 There were 3694 troops present at the end of April 1992, over 10 000 troops by mid-June, and 15 100 troops by 21 September 1992 (see United Nations, *First Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia*; United Nations, *Special Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia* S/24090 12 June 1992; and United Nations, *Second Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia*).

45 United Nations, *First Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia*.

46 United Nations, *Second Special Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia*, S/24286 14 July 1992.

47 United Nations, *Second Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia*.

48 United Nations, *Third Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia* S/25124, 25 January 1993.

49 Jean-Claude Chapon, 'Heavy Fighting in Cambodia as Diplomats Press for Ceasefire' *Agence France-Presse*, 16 June 1992.

50 United Nations, *Third Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia*.

51 United Nations, *Fourth Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia*.

The expansion of troop numbers thus appears to have had little impact on the overall incidence of ceasefire violations by the SOC and Khmer Rouge; rather than responding to UNTAC's demands, the parties followed an established pattern of wet-season rests and dry-season offensives.[52] However, as I argued in Chapter Two, the coercive power of a peace operation is determined not just by its material resources, but by the way these are perceived by local actors. Examining UNTAC's coercive power therefore requires analysis of its force posture, to which I now turn.

Coercive posture

A prominent theme of recent attempts to define a doctrine of peace operations is that it is not so much the *number* of troops as their 'robustness' or enforcement posture that matters. In other words, peace operations need to be designed with the right mandate, including the right degree of mandated authority to use force. The UN's Brahimi Report, a comprehensive review of peace operations released in 2000, called for more 'robust' peacekeeping in the face of spoilers who renege on their commitments. The report recommends that peacekeepers should be authorised to use force to pursue their mandates, and that operations should have 'bigger forces, better equipped and more costly but better able to be a credible deterrent' such that they do not have to 'cede the initiative to their attackers'.[53]

This recommendation had been made some eight years earlier by UNTAC's Deputy Force Commander, Brigadier-General Michel Loridon, who declared that the operation lacked the power to compel Khmer Rouge compliance because it relied on diplomacy rather than coercive action. In Loridon's view, UNTAC didn't need more resources; it needed a strong force posture:

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[52] Berdal and Leifer, 'Cambodia', p.47.
[53] United Nations, *The Brahimi Report*, p.x.

> It is not a question of troop strength. I have done a lot more with 300 troops than is now being done with 14,000.[54]

General Loridon was subsequently replaced as Deputy Force Commander after ongoing dissent over the decision not to enforce the ceasefire and demobilisation demands. Later, the Head of the Civil Administration component Gerard Porcell also offered his resignation, on similar grounds:

> This absence of firmness with the Khmer Rouge was a signal for the other parties who saw there the proof of UNTAC's weakness towards the group that from the start eschewed all cooperation.[55]

UNTAC's non-use of force was interpreted by critics as indicating its weakness and appeasement of the Khmer Rouge. UNTAC's notorious 'bamboo pole' incident became the focal point of such critique when, in front of the international press corps, the SRSG Yasushi Akashi and Force Commander General Sanderson were turned away by a handful of Khmer Rouge soldiers at a bamboo checkpoint.[56]

UNTAC's leaders were keenly aware that its international supporters would not have provided the resources or the mandate to coerce the Khmer Rouge to comply. Explaining their non-use of force, Akashi and Sanderson repeatedly stated that troop contributing countries had committed their forces to a non-enforcement peacekeeping operation. Not only did UNTAC's leaders expect troop contributors to withdraw support if enforcement action was planned, they also anticipated that such a mandate change could not have passed through the Security Council itself.[57] The presence of the 'Extended Permanent Five' (EP5) on the ground in Phnom Penh was highly influential in shaping this perception.[58] The EP5

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[54] Nayan Chanda, 'Cambodia: UN Divisions' *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 23 July 1992.
[55] Porcell in Thijs W. Brocades Zaalberg, *Soldiers and Civil Power: Supporting or Substituting Civil Authorities in Modern Peace Operations* (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2006), p.86; see also Findlay, *Cambodia: The Legacy and Lessons of UNTAC*, pp.62-63.
[56] See Steven R. Ratner, *The New UN Peacekeeping: Building Peace in Lands of Conflict after the Cold War* (New York: St Martin's, 1995), p.170; Stedman, 'Spoiler Problems', p.28.
[57] See Findlay, *Cambodia: The Legacy and Lessons of UNTAC*, pp.129-130.
[58] There were divergent positions, however, among the ten members of the EP5; France, for example, was more inclined to favour enforcement against the Khmer Rouge than other states (see

functioned as a local equivalent to New York's Core Group of countries with particular interest in and support for the UNTAC mission. Comprised of the P5 plus Australia, Germany, Indonesia, Japan and Thailand, the EP5 ambassadors met regularly with UNTAC's leaders and were used as a 'sounding board' for UNTAC policy and strategies.[59] This external political environment, represented in the EP5 and by troop contributors, was a significant structural constraint on the power of UNTAC and rendered the prospect of enforcement action void, regardless of whether members of the operation perceived enforcement to be a useful strategy.

It is clear that UNTAC lacked the coercive power to compel Khmer Rouge compliance using military force. But a closer analysis of UNTAC's goals, as well as the nature of coercive power, suggests that the power story is not so clear cut.

Questioning the utility of enforcement: the need for Khmer Rouge cooperation

More detailed analysis of UNTAC's goals, and the local actors whose cooperation it needed, suggests that more resources and a robust mandate would not necessarily have translated into greater power for the operation. Obtaining even shallow compliance through the use of force has significant limitations, evident in the local Cambodian setting. As I argued in Chapter Two, coercion is a costly and volatile currency of power and risks undermining other peace operation goals through its unintended consequences. In the Cambodian context, these limitations were heightened by the nature of both the operation's goals and the local actors it sought to influence.

The goals of disarmament and demobilisation aim to achieve more than merely removing the means to wage violent conflict. Rather than simply representing acts of compliance,

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Peou, 'Implementing Cambodia's Peace Agreement', p.528n74), while Australia, Japan and Indonesia were strongly opposed (Berdal and Leifer, 'Cambodia', p.48).

[59] Yasuhsi Akashi, 'The Challenge of Peacekeeping in Cambodia' *International Peacekeeping* 1, no. 2 (1994), p.212.

demobilisation is part of a transition process by which the participants in conflict renounce such activity and commit, as individuals and as a group, to resolve conflict through non-violent means. This is why, for example, disarmament is often marked by ceremony and speeches.

This does not render the physical outcome of disarmament meaningless: the removal and destruction of weapons may contribute to a reduced likelihood of violence, and in Cambodia, the agreed reduction in military capabilities among parties was a lynchpin of the peace settlement. However, the central problem was not so much the retention of arms but the lack of commitment to a peaceful transition that this indicated. UNTAC's overarching goal of conflict resolution thus required more than mere compliance with disarmament in preparation for demobilisation. SOC behaviour regarding disarmament provides a useful example. Best characterised as 'mock compliance', the SOC complied with early stages of demobilisation by cantoning superfluous troops whom it could no longer pay, and handing in old, dispensable weapons while hiding its most valuable military equipment. UNTAC Provincial Director Benny Widyono describes a SOC demobilisation ceremony he observed in Siem Reap:

> General Long So Pheap ordered his soldiers one by one to hand over their weapons to the Bangladeshi soldiers, who registered and handed out receipts for them. The Bangladeshi soldiers then proceeded to the shed and locked away the weapons, which were to be kept under constant surveillance. I noticed grins on the faces of the Bangladeshis. The Cambodian soldiers also smirked. This puzzled me. I assumed the Bangladeshis and Cambodian soldiers shared an inside joke. Later Colonel Kamal showed me two or three examples of the weapons handed in. They were rusty museum pieces, no longer serviceable. The better weapons were all still kept hidden away by the CPAF, and UNTAC had no way of checking their garrisons or their homes.[60]

To be effective, UNTAC's demobilisation goal required Cambodia's armed factions to 'buy in' to the peace process and more deeply cooperate with the operation's demands for

[60] Widyono, *Dancing in Shadows*, p.76.

regroupment, cantonment, disarmament and demobilisation.[61] There is therefore significant reason to question whether the authority and capability to use force would actually have provided the operation with more power. That is, contrary to the resources and robustness hypotheses, more troops with more coercive mandates would not have delivered UNTAC more power.

The credibility of an enforcement threat was undermined in Cambodia by the grave difficulties that UNTAC troops were already facing in their attempts to access remote, heavily-mined and unsurveyed areas. The practical realities of Cambodia's conflict setting meant that using coercion to disarm the Khmer Rouge in their own territory would be a very difficult exercise. As Sorpong Peou reminds us, during the open warfare of the 1980s 'more than 100,000 Vietnamese troops, allied with the Phnom Penh regime's 200,000 men under arms, had failed to wipe out the Khmer Rouge by military means'.[62] Relying on coercion alone, UNTAC would have required a very high degree of force to compel Khmer Rouge compliance, entailing very high costs as well as very large risks of unintended consequences. The actual use of force against the Khmer Rouge, advocated by Loridon and others, would have required UNTAC to exclude the party from the peace process and pursue them as an enemy to be defeated. But the practical difficulties of forcibly disarming a resistant Khmer Rouge, as well as the porous Thai border, undermined the likely efficacy of such a strategy: first, it is unlikely that all weapons and equipment could have been forcibly removed; second, even if this had been achieved, it is likely that the Khmer Rouge could have resupplied its armoury; and third, continued attempts to pursue disarmament through force would almost certainly have hardened the Khmer Rouge posture against UNTAC, risking not just the lives

[61] There is little evidence to show that these concerns were considered by the UNTAC's decision-makers; instead, the non-use of force strategy was pursued for other reasons. However, the aim here is not to explain the choice of strategy by UNTAC's leadership, but to analyse the operation's power to influence local behaviour such that its effectiveness might be explained. In this case, enforcement would not have given the operation more power given the nature of the Khmer Rouge preferences and the real purpose of disarmament and demobilization.
[62] Peou, *Conflict Neutralization in the Cambodia War*, p.7.

of military personnel but also the civilian electoral, refugee and human rights programs. A major military offensive would also have posed grave consequences for the repatriation and resettlement of refugees, particularly those who returned to territory in which the Khmer Rouge was present. Finally, coercive military activity would have restricted the electoral registration and awareness program implemented by UNTAC's civilian personnel, limiting their access to the population and making them targets for Khmer Rouge retaliation.

In addition to these practical difficulties, the opportunity for displaying credibility had been squandered with the slow deployment of its troops, the deployment of unprofessional and ill-equipped troops and the operation's demonstrated inability to provide security. The 'credibility' of a deterrent is highly subjective, determined by perceptions rather than objective criteria. The resources and robustness of an operation may therefore influence effectiveness more because they shape local perceptions than because they improve the functionality of an operation.

UNTAC thus lacked the resources and mandate to coerce Khmer Rouge compliance, either by actually using force or by displaying a credible threat. Enforcement action against the Khmer Rouge was judged to be practically untenable, given the risk posed to other goals, and politically unfeasible, given the need to maintain international support for the operation. In power terms, it is unlikely that a coercive disarmament strategy would have provided the operation with greater leverage given both the need for voluntary action by Cambodia's armed forces and the implications of such coercion for UNTAC's other objectives. While it is possible that a stronger initial force posture may have been perceived as a credible threat, logistical delays in troop deployment prevented such a possibility from ever being realised. In other words, resources matter for effectiveness, but they only tell us part of the story.

In summary, there is good reason to reject the assumption that enforcement capability would translate into greater power. The Cambodian conflict setting was a highly difficult military

environment, particularly in Khmer Rouge-held areas. Further, the nature of UNTAC's goals dramatically reduced the potential influence of enforcement action; in particular, UNTAC needed parties to disarm and commit not to rearm either from stored weapons caches or by importing new arms. That is, disarmament needed to represent a deeper level of cooperation, based on support for the larger visions of the peace process. In the absence of such commitment, a peace operation by definition cannot seek the demise of a local party in battle or it ceases to be a peace operation and becomes a warfare operation. Instead, it must seek to reform the behaviour of the non-compliant party, to alter the status quo by influencing their interests and beliefs. The disagreement between the UNTAC Force Commander and his Deputy over the use of force draws these options into sharp distinction. General Loridon advocated the resolution of the Khmer Rouge issue 'once and for all', implying the defeat or surrender of the party as a military force.[63] General Sanderson adhered resolutely to the normative assumptions of the Paris Agreements: the Khmer Rouge was one of four Cambodian signatories and thus a legitimate party to the peace process. While their non-compliance ultimately disqualified them from contesting elections, UNTAC's mandate was to work continuously to bring them back into the peace process as a compliant party. Given the interests and capabilities of the Khmer Rouge, it is unlikely that enforcement action would have sufficiently altered their interest calculations or their beliefs such that would 'buy in' to the peace process.

Procedural legitimacy: neutrality and the non-use of force

While the practical and political constraints were influential determinants of the operation's strategy, the preservation of UNTAC's 'neutrality' among the Cambodian parties was foremost in the mind of the Force Commander. Sanderson argued that enforcement action 'would have been doomed to disaster, even if it had been given wide international support.

[63] Chanda, 'Cambodia: UN Divisions'.

It would have required a United Nations force to take sides in an internal conflict'.[64] Though often mixed with justifications based on material (in)capabilities, the neutrality imperative was repeatedly emphasised by Sanderson during the operation and subsequently.[65]

I argued in Chapter Two that 'neutrality' has become a taboo in the peace operations literature, inexorably associated with the failure to act in Rwanda and Srebrenica. Both scholarly and policy communities now prefer the term 'impartiality' to refer to the legitimation processes associated with remaining unbiased and objective regarding their actions towards local parties, but not passive regarding the implementation of a mandate or adherence to UN Charter principles. However, I argued that 'neutrality' is more correctly understood as a hangover from traditional Cold War peacekeeping, when it was shorthand for *political* neutrality. Thus the deployment of 'politically neutral' peacekeepers was intended to ensure they had no external agenda and thus were more likely to be impartial in their dealings with the parties to the conflict.

On similar grounds, UNTAC emphasised its political neutrality formally and informally throughout the mission. The Paris Agreements were legitimised by the participation of all major powers and interested states and thus represented a post-Cold War consensus among former geopolitical rivals. The role of China was important: as the former patron of the Khmer Rouge, China's influence is credited with forcing the party to the negotiating table.[66] While its influence waned after the peace agreement, the inclusion of Chinese representatives in ongoing negotiations and UNSC resolutions ensured that UNTAC was seen as

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[64] John Sanderson, 'UNTAC: Lessons Learnt: The Military Component View' *Global Change, Peace & Security* 7, no. 2 (1995), pp.75-76.

[65] See Correspondence, Lieutenant General John Sanderson, UNTAC Force Commander, to General Son Sen, Commander in Chief, National Army of Democratic Kampuchea, 13 August 1992, *Sanderson Papers*, MS 359, Box 2, Folder 11; John Sanderson, 'UNTAC: Lessons Learnt: The Military Component View'.

[66] Doyle, *UN Peacekeeping in Cambodia*, p.80; Yuen Foong Khong, 'Strategic Coercion in East Asia: The Cases of Cambodia and North Korea' in *Strategic Coercion: Concepts and Cases*, ed. Lawrence Freedman (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998); Findlay, *Cambodia: The Legacy and Lessons of UNTAC*, p.18.

representative of international consensus. Further, the inclusion of 97 Chinese military observers and 800 military engineers in UNTAC,[67] alongside those personnel from other developing countries, helped to demonstrate the operation's political and ideological neutrality in the field. For example, Lt. Col. Damien Healy credits a Chinese Major in the Mixed Military Working Group's Secretariat with building trust between the Group and Khmer Rouge officers in hostage negotiations.[68] The Cambodian conflict had been highly ideological, and UNTAC's ability to demonstrate political neutrality through its internationally representative composition was a source of legitimacy for the operation.

In the terms of the contemporary debate, however, the semantic distinction between neutrality and impartiality is rather unhelpful for the purpose of understanding UNTAC's power. The presence of genocide or gross crimes against humanity provides a specific type of strategic and normative problem, but it was not one with which UNTAC had to contend. The emphasis on 'neutrality' in UNTAC statements could have read 'impartiality' and had the same meaning; it did not imply the unjustified passivity referred to in subsequent conceptual debates. Instead, the use of neutrality/impartiality implied that the operation would make decisions based on an unbiased and consistent application of rules, and the use of fact rather than discriminatory views.[69]

Three aspects of UNTAC's neutrality are important for understanding the operation's power regarding Khmer Rouge behaviour. First, neutrality refers to local perceptions of it. An operation can claim to be impartial, but if local actors perceive otherwise, it will not derive legitimacy – and thus cooperation – on this basis. Second, the general understanding of impartiality in the peace operations literature implies that this concept matters only with

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[67] 'Government White Paper: China's National Defense in 2006 — Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, December 2006, Beijing' *Chinese Journal of International Law* 6, no. 1 (2007).
[68] Damien Healy, interview by author, Moss Vale, 9 June 2009.
[69] See discussion in Chapter Two.

regard to avoiding passivity by actively implementing its mandate. This privileges the role of a formal mandate, including a peace agreement, in determining the decisions of peace operations. Yet as the experience of UNTAC demonstrates, peace operations can be called upon to mediate ongoing negotiations among local factions if the interpretation of the peace agreement is contested, or if the underlying assumptions about the conflict setting change. I have argued that the local parties continued to contest and challenge the interpretation of the Paris Agreements; further, the withdrawal of the Khmer Rouge from the peace process and the abandonment of demobilisation changed the local dynamics and required ongoing mediation by UNTAC. Third, in such cases of ongoing negotiation, neutrality is important as a mediating technique, providing the operation with influence over the interpretations and consent decisions of local parties.

Rather than being an 'impartial' referee, UNTAC was more often a mediator in the ongoing negotiations among the Cambodian factions. The Paris Agreements provided a broad framework, defining the field of play, identifying the players and outlining the goals of the game. But, for Akashi and Sanderson, UNTAC's most useful role was to remain neutral among the parties, facilitating ongoing participation and negotiation among factions recently at war with one another, and shaping their decisions through diplomacy and persuasion rather than whistle-blowing and penalties. In Sanderson's words:

> Peacekeepers are instruments of diplomacy – not of war. They are part of an agreement between parties which have been in conflict and are protected by that agreement. They operate in the open as an expression of their international neutrality – this give [sic] them acceptability and great strength. When used for enforcement, they lose their neutrality, are stripped of their political protection and the wavering international support for whatever new objectives are chosen will make the command weak and vulnerable. It is no way to go to war![70]

While practical considerations are evident in the above statement, so too is a particular vision of the power UNTAC derived from neutrality rather than enforcement action, or in other words, from legitimacy rather than coercion. Neutrality is one strategy of procedural

[70] Sanderson, 'UNTAC: The Military Component View'.

legitimation through which an operation may influence local behaviour. For Sanderson, enforcement action would have diminished the operation's power, given its international constraints, because the use of force requires an operation to 'take sides'. While seldom acknowledged as such, this impartial position can be one of power.

Yet although UNTAC repeatedly emphasised its need to remain neutral when justifying its non-enforcement posture, perceptions of bias among the parties were nevertheless evident in their statements and complaints about the operation.[71] Khmer Rouge representatives repeatedly alleged that UNTAC was biased in favour of the SOC, highlighting the operation's failure to ensure the withdrawal of Vietnamese forces from Cambodia, its failure to control the SOC administration, its electoral law which was perceived to give Vietnamese the right to vote, and its unfair imposition of sanctions on the Khmer Rouge. For example, Khmer Rouge representatives alleged that UNTAC had 'a dark scheme in order to compel people to trample on the Paris Agreements in favour of one party',[72] and that

> UNTAC has been all along implementing a distorted Paris Agreement which maintains the Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia under the cover of the Vietnamese-installed regime...Worse still, UNTAC has been conniving with the Vietnamese aggressors and the [CPP] in combating the National Army of Democratic Kampuchea.[73]

Despite its best efforts to remain impartial, this did not provide UNTAC with a successful legitimation strategy, as evident in allegations of partiality regarding the central bargaining issues, disarmament and administrative control. The Khmer Rouge wanted the Paris Agreements to be implemented according to the party's interpretation, which meant that it would not comply until UNTAC dismantled the SOC, transferred administrative power to the SNC and took a harsh line on issues of Vietnamese influence and ethnic Vietnamese

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[71] See Peou, 'Implementing Cambodia's Peace Agreement', p.518.
[72] Statement of Major General N. Bunno of NADK at the MMWG – level one, 9 Dec 1992, *Sanderson Papers*, MS 359, Box 2, Folder 3.
[73] Statement by Major General Khieu Sophon [Samphan] at the 29th MMWG Level One Meeting, *Sanderson Papers*, MS 359, Box 19, Folder 94.

settlers.[74] For the Khmer Rouge, the ineffectiveness of UNTAC's Civil Administration component meant that the operation was biased against it. The SOC, meanwhile, had its own allegations of partiality. While the party often complained that UNTAC was campaigning for FUNCINPEC,[75] it also used UNTAC's inability to bring the Khmer Rouge to heel to argue that the operation was too strict on SOC behaviour. The SOC thus wanted UNTAC to temper its control function, alleging that it was subject to unfair scrutiny and constraint while the Khmer Rouge escaped scot-free.[76]

Against the background of interest-driven non-compliance, UNTAC's alleged partiality indicates that its legitimacy was in no way powerful enough to influence the behaviour of the obstructionist local parties. The interests of the SOC and the Khmer Rouge thus do the heavy lifting in explaining UNTAC's failure to secure a ceasefire, disarmament and demobilisation. Perhaps recognising this, the operation did attempt to alter Khmer Rouge interest calculations by using its aid budget as an inducement strategy, and imposing sanctions as an alternative strategy of coercion. However, as the following section explains, neither proved effective in moving the Khmer Rouge towards cooperation.

Inducement and coercion: failed strategies of aid and sanctions

On 21 July 1992, the UN Security Council authorised UNTAC to make the provision of international rehabilitation and reconstruction aid to Cambodian parties conditional on their compliance with the Paris Agreements and cooperation with UNTAC.[77] UNTAC's large international aid budget functioned as a diffuse inducement strategy for the parties to accept

74 Berdal and Leifer, 'Cambodia', p.49.
75 See for example Correspondence, Dith Munty, Minister of Information, SNC member of Cambodia to Tim Carney, Director of UNTAC's Info/ed division, 15 May 1993, *Sanderson Papers*, MS 359, Box 19, Folder 93; see also James A. Schear, 'Riding the Tiger: The United Nations and Cambodia's Struggle for Peace' in *UN Peacekeeping, American Politics, and the Uncivil Wars of the 1990s*, ed. William J. Durch (Basingstoke: MacMillan, 1997), p.168.
76 Peou, 'Implementing Cambodia's Peace Agreement', p.517.
77 United Nations Security Council Resolution 766 (1992), 21 July 1992.

its presence and program of work, but from July 1992, aid was explicitly presented as a reward for cooperation.

In practice, UNTAC derived little power from this shift. The conditionality strategy was ineffective because so little aid was dispersed anyway. The disbursement of rehabilitation funds was woefully slow: less than $100 million of the $880 million pledged was paid out before the elections, and most of that was allocated to returning refugees.[78] Donor preferences and organisational dysfunction in the rehabilitation component were partly to blame, but so too was the political obstruction of disbursement by Cambodian parties through the SNC.

The Declaration on the Rehabilitation and Reconstruction of Cambodia, which formed part of the 1991 Paris Agreements, emphasised that reconstruction and development priorities and strategies should be determined by Cambodians:

> The main responsibility for deciding Cambodia's reconstruction needs and plans should rest with the Cambodian people and the government formed after free and fair elections. No attempt should be made to impose a development strategy on Cambodia from any outside source...[79]

This was interpreted such that the provision of grants and loans required approval by the SNC/UNTAC Technical Advisory Committee on Rehabilitation, established in May 1992.[80] This Committee included representatives of the four factions under the chairmanship of the Rehabilitation Component's director. Agreement among the factions on rehabilitation projects was rare, primarily because the three smaller parties feared that aid would strengthen the position of the SOC. While the Khmer Rouge was responsible for most of the obstruction,[81] FUNCINPEC also vetoed proposals, such as a $75 million World Bank

[78] Doyle, *UN Peacekeeping in Cambodia*, p.50.
[79] *Declaration on the Rehabilitation and Reconstruction of Cambodia*, 23 October 1991.
[80] This body is not referred to in either the Paris Agreements or UNTAC's mandate as set out in United Nations, *Report of the Secretary-General on Cambodia*, S/23613 19 February 1992.
[81] Jarat Chopra, 'United Nations Authority in Cambodia' *Occasional Working Paper No.15*, The Thomas J. Watson Jr. Institute for International Studies, Brown University, 1994, p.70.

emergency rehabilitation loan in March 1993.[82] UNTAC thus had little opportunity to use the large aid fund as an inducement strategy.

Meanwhile, the act of withholding rehabilitation assistance from the Khmer Rouge failed to provide a sufficiently negative incentive. Because so little aid was actually disbursed, the Khmer Rouge did not lose out on very much. Further, because decisions on rehabilitation required consensus among the factions, the Khmer Rouge was able to prevent or delay the disbursement of aid which would benefit other parties.

In its resolution of 30 November 1992, the UN Security Council condemned the Khmer Rouge for its non-compliance and demanded that it immediately fulfil its obligations under the Paris Agreements.[83] The resolution is notable as the first time the Security Council moved beyond diplomatic persuasion as the means to secure Khmer Rouge cooperation by establishing trade embargoes as punishment for non-compliance.[84] An embargo on the supply of petroleum products 'to the areas occupied by any Cambodian party not complying with the military provisions' of the Paris Agreements was intended specifically to target the Khmer Rouge. The same Security Council resolution threatened additional measures if the Khmer Rouge continued its non-compliance, 'such as the freezing of the assets held by the PDK outside Cambodia'.[85] Further, the resolution supported the SNC decision of 22 September 1992 establishing a moratorium on the export of logs 'in order to protect Cambodia's natural resources', a thinly veiled sanction against the Khmer Rouge given that it

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82 Elizabeth Uphoff Kato, 'Quick Impacts, Slow Rehabilitation in Cambodia' in *Keeping the Peace: Multidimensional UN Operations in Cambodia and El Salvador*, ed. Michael W. Doyle, Ian Johnstone, and Robert C. Orr (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), p.191. Donors are also criticised for favouring slow, large-scale rehabilitation projects rather than the small grassroots projects and program aid identified as priorities in UNTAC's donor appeals.

83 *United Nations Security Council Resolution 792 (1992).*

84 In previous resolutions, the Council had 'deplored' Khmer Rouge non-compliance, seeking to influence that party's behaviour by highlighting its 'obligations' under the Paris Agreements and by inviting the governments of Japan, Thailand, France and Indonesia to use their diplomatic channels to do the same; see *United Nations Security Council Resolution 766 (1992)*; *United Nations Security Council Resolution 783 (1992).*

85 *United Nations Security Council Resolution 792 (1992).*

derived significant income from timber exports to Thailand.[86] The SNC later adopted a ban on the export of minerals and gems, other lucrative sources of Khmer Rouge income.

However, these sanctions did not provide UNTAC with effective means to push the Khmer Rouge towards cooperation. The absence of reference to such sanctions by the operation in its meetings and negotiations with the Khmer Rouge suggests that the operation's personnel recognised the ineffectiveness of trade embargoes at the time. An internal UN report quoted in the *Far Eastern Economic Review* in December 1992 confirms this, at least with regard to the petroleum ban, stating 'given what we know of the low-grade infrastructure [of the Khmer Rouge], it is not likely that a partial blockade of petroleum would seriously inconvenience them'.[87] Meanwhile, the logging and minerals embargoes failed utterly. In order to enforce the embargo, UNTAC had to establish checkpoints at the Thai border, including in Khmer Rouge territory. But the Khmer Rouge was already denying UNTAC access to its territory; indeed, it was this very non-compliance that sanctions aimed to alter. In other words, UNTAC needed Khmer Rouge cooperation in order to enforce sanctions against them. The party was easily able to evade the embargo, aided by Thailand's reluctance to enforce it, given the financial incentives for Thai companies to continue business-as-usual in their lucrative logging and gemstones trade. Meanwhile, there were 'numerous and large-scale violations' of the moratorium on logging exports in the non-Khmer Rouge zones, primarily by the SOC, indicating the difficulty of such sanctions even where UNTAC had access to border territory.[88]

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[86] See Findlay, *Cambodia: The Legacy and Lessons of UNTAC*, p.44.
[87] Nayan Chanda, 'Strained Ties: Poor Relations with Bangkok Mar Peace Process' *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 17 December 1992.
[88] United Nations, *Report of the Secretary-General on the Implementation of Security Council Resolution 792 (1992)* S/25289, 13 February 1993.

Conclusion

UNTAC failed to achieve its ceasefire, disarmament and demobilisation goals because it lacked the power to move the Khmer Rouge towards even minimal compliance. The promise of elections, sufficient to induce the smaller FUNCINPEC and KPNLF to comply, was inadequate as a positive incentive to the Khmer Rouge who remained primarily concerned with the relative strength of the SOC. The attempt of UNTAC to legitimise their presence and goals through impartiality failed. In the Khmer Rouge reading of the Paris Agreements, UNTAC's implementation was biased against them, and the party could not be normatively persuaded to give up this interpretation.

This chapter has also shown the need for a more sophisticated understanding of coercion than that often found in the peace operations literature. Without doubt, UNTAC lacked coercive power. Sanctions were poorly designed and ineffectively applied, requiring the cooperation of the Khmer Rouge in order to enforce penalties against it. The operation also lacked enforcement capability as both the difficulties of the conflict setting and international political consensus mitigated against the provision of the mandate and resources to use force. Yet there is also reason to question the utility of enforcement even if UNTAC had been given the authority and means. It is often assumed that greater enforcement capability provides a peace operation with greater power. The experience of UNTAC suggests that the reverse might also be possible: that restraint might be a more valuable source of power. The decision not to exclude the Khmer Rouge from the peace process altogether through enforcement action meant that the faction was never backed so far into a corner that it had nothing to lose by resuming full-scale war or deploying all its resources against the operation and mounting a full-scale disruption of the elections.[89] Known as the 'departing train'

[89] Khong, 'Strategic Coercion in East Asia: The Cases of Cambodia and North Korea', p.122.

strategy, [90] UNTAC's actions left open the possibility for the Khmer Rouge to re-join the process and enabled the operation to obtain very limited but crucial compliance and cooperation at the margins. Further, UNTAC avoided the resentment and unintended consequences that so often accompany the use of force and that might well have undermined the operation's popular support with regard to electoral participation. Thus the power of an operation is best understood as being determined not by the strength of its material resources, but by the extent to which these can influence the behaviour of specific local actors in pursuit of specific goals. The need to analyse both the nature of goals and the interests of local actors in order to evaluate an operation's power is a significant finding of this chapter.

In the next chapter, I examine the successes of UNTAC, using the power-legitimacy framework to explain how the operation managed to secure local compliance and cooperation with other goals, despite failing with regard to the ceasefire, disarmament and demobilisation.

[90] Stedman, 'Spoiler Problems'.

Chapter Four: UNTAC's Successes – Elections, Refugee Repatriation and Military Unification

In the previous chapter, I outlined the background to UNTAC and explained the operation's key failure to secure local cooperation with its ceasefire, disarmament and demobilisation goals. In this chapter I examine UNTAC's key successes, aiming to explain how the operation attained effectiveness in some areas despite its failures in others. Using the power-legitimacy framework, I examine three areas of success in each section of this chapter.

First, UNTAC oversaw the peaceful conduct of elections in which nearly 90% of the electorate cast a ballot. This is explained by examining the interactions between the operation's coercive power to protect the election sites and a number of legitimising strategies employed by UNTAC: source legitimacy derived from the coherence between the operation's electoral goals and public demand for change; diffuse substantive legitimacy built through the Military Component's civic action programs; and procedural legitimacy developed through the operation's extensive communications campaign, including the direct interactions between UNTAC's electoral personnel and participating voters.

Second, UNTAC repatriated and resettled 370 000 refugees on schedule and without serious disruption. The repatriation component overcame significant problems in its initial plans to become one of the operation's few unqualified successes. The distinct identity of the repatriation component, run by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), enabled it to employ different legitimation strategies than other UNTAC components. Notably, it secured cooperation from Khmer Rouge elements that were otherwise actively non-compliant with the rest of UNTAC, in which the informal diplomacy of the component's head, Sergio Vieira de Mello, played an important role.

Finally, UNTAC delivered a unified national army in the immediate aftermath of elections, even as the political arms of each faction were threatening to resume war. The role of

UNTAC's Mixed Military Working Group was central in this regard, procedurally legitimising the operation's military leadership through a participatory, consultative forum which enabled them to build trust and persuasive influence through direct interactions with the Cambodian military elite.

Election success: popular cooperation

Despite its failure to disarm the Cambodian factions and to create a neutral political environment, UNTAC conducted national elections in May 1993. Following the resounding failure of UNTAC's initial mission, the prospects for achieving its primary goal of free and fair elections ought to have been dismal, for three reasons.

First, the larger parties did not disarm, leaving their military forces intact and thus capable of disrupting elections by force. The parties also retained their capability to wage armed conflict against rivals, and to threaten and intimidate local populations. Second, the failure of demobilisation weakened the prospects for electoral success not only because armed factions retained their arms, but because it signalled the absence of a genuine belief in the transition to peaceful, post-conflict means of securing power in Cambodia. Finally, the failure of demobilisation undermined UNTAC's substantive legitimacy. By demonstrating the ability to achieve its stated goals, a peace operation shows that it is up to the task at hand; when it does what it says it will, a peace operation can demonstrate that its motives are genuine and provide reasons for local actors to trust it. If a peace operation can show effectiveness in one area, the benefits of substantive legitimation can transfer to its influence in others. Conversely, a peace operation can be delegitimised via the same processes. That is, the failure to deliver promised outputs is likely to weaken the operation's credibility: if it is unable to succeed in one area, doubts arise that it will succeed in others. Further, substantive

failure may undermine the trust that local actors initially gave, making them less likely to trust again in the future.

This suggests that, aside from the material effects of demobilisation failure, we would expect UNTAC to face difficulties in convincing local actors to trust it sufficiently to ensure their participation in elections. In particular, if UNTAC had failed to wield sufficient power over recalcitrant parties during the ceasefire and demobilisation phase, how could people be sure that the operation would protect the elections from interference by the political elite and their militaries?

UNTAC thus faced a very difficult task in its electoral program: not only was it attempting to democratically enfranchise a population with no experience of political participation, it did so amid continuing armed violence, including attacks on UNTAC itself, and from a starting position that provided no benefits from substantive legitimacy.

Yet 89.5% of registered voters cast their ballot in an election as remarkable for its lack of violence as for its participation rate. Where UNTAC had failed with elites, it succeeded with the people. The following sections account for UNTAC's electoral effectiveness by analysing the operation's power and legitimacy. They seek to answer two related questions: first, why didn't the parties – and the Khmer Rouge in particular – disrupt or prevent the elections? And second, why was popular participation in the UNTAC election so high?

Protecting the vote: coercive deterrence

On the eve of elections, the Khmer Rouge posed a significant threat to the polls. The party had accelerated its anti-election propaganda, displaying posters and distributing leaflets instructing people not to vote.[1] Additionally, Khmer Rouge soldiers were instructed to

[1] Steve Heder, 'The Resumption of Armed Struggle by the Party of Democratic Kampuchea: Evidence from National Army of Democratic Kampuchea 'Self-Demobilizers'' in *Propaganda, Politics,*

conduct 'personal propaganda' among people with whom they came into contact.[2] On 10 May 1993, 2 weeks before voting began, UNTAC's military information branch assessed the threat to both UNTAC personnel and the Cambodian electorate as 'high':

> The PDK/NADK will significantly disrupt the upcoming Cambodian election, such that perhaps 40% of the electorate will not be allowed to exercise their right to vote. This estimate includes those potential voters in NADK controlled zones and those potential voters who will be intimidated into not casting their votes.[3]

In the period between 1 March and 14 May, some 200 deaths had been reported, along with 338 injuries and 14 abductions.[4] Days before the election, security concerns led to the evacuation of dependents of UN personnel from Cambodia.[5]

The testimonies of demobilised Khmer Rouge soldiers, recorded after the elections, confirm that the faction had planned to prevent the successful completion of the poll. While plans appear to vary by geographic area, former soldiers reported that they were ordered to disrupt the elections using force. In Kompong Thom province, orders were given 'to do whatever you can do to inflict maximum destruction on polling stations',[6] and in Takeo province soldiers were 'to do...extensive military operations', including shelling, small-arms fire and sabotage.[7] Others were ordered to minimise civilian Cambodian casualties, but still to discourage people from voting.[8] In Kompong Cham province, for example, soldiers were told to shell the perimeter of polling sites in the belief that it 'would be sufficient to drive the people away and thereby to disrupt the election'.[9]

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and Violence in Cambodia: Democratic Transition under United Nations Peace-Keeping, ed. Steve Heder and Judy Ledgerwood (Armonk, NY: Sharpe, 1996), p.101.

2 Ibid., p. 102.

3 Threat Assessment for the Cambodian Election, 10 May 1993, *Sanderson Papers*, MS 359, Box 18, Folder 87.

4 Michael W. Doyle, *UN Peacekeeping in Cambodia: UNTAC's Civil Mandate* (Boulder; London: Lynne Rienner, 1995), 154.

5 Ibid.

6 Heder, 'The Resumption of Armed Struggle by the Party of Democratic Kampuchea', p.102.

7 Ibid., p.103.

8 Ibid., p.99.

9 Ibid., p.101.

Given such a threatening environment, the absence of violence during the election needs explanation. As I argued in Chapter Three, the SOC, FUNCINPEC and the KPNLF each perceived that elections would serve their interests. For FUNCINPEC and the KPNLF, elections offered the chance to convert their most valuable asset – popular support – into political power via the ballot box. The SOC, meanwhile, remained convinced that it would win the election, a conviction that UNTAC personnel encouraged in order to maintain SOC support for the elections.[10]

The real question, then, is why the Khmer Rouge plans to disrupt the elections by force never materialised. It should be noted that, while the Khmer Rouge posed a significant threat to polling stations in territories within its reach, its geographical spread was limited. The Khmer Rouge strongholds were remote jungle areas and its troops had little prospect of threatening Phnom Penh and other urban areas.[11] Nevertheless, the highly compromised environment in which elections would take place meant that even a small disruption posed significant risks. Ongoing violence, including the widespread intimidation of political parties and voters, and UNTAC's inability to separate the CPP from the SOC meant that the 'neutral political environment' it was mandated to introduce was never achieved. It is likely, then, that Khmer Rouge attacks on even a small number of polling stations would have been enough to tip the already precarious balance towards electoral failure.[12] Indeed, after a United Nations Volunteer (UNV) was killed in Kompong Thom in April 1993, the Special

[10] John Sanderson, interview by author, Canberra, 7 June 2009.
[11] Thijs W. Brocades Zaalberg, *Soldiers and Civil Power: Supporting or Substituting Civil Authorities in Modern Peace Operations* (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2006), p.126; see also John Sanderson, 'UNTAC: Lessons Learnt: The Military Component View' *Global Change, Peace & Security* 7, no. 2 (1995), p.81.
[12] Michael W. Doyle, 'Authority and Elections in Cambodia' in *Keeping the Peace: Multidimensional UN Operations in Cambodia and El Salvador*, ed. Michael W. Doyle, Ian Johnstone, and Robert C. Orr (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), p.155.

Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) Yasushi Akashi announced that just one more fatality would see all UNVs withdrawn from the field.[13]

So why were the elections not disrupted by Khmer Rouge violence? Three answers are typically given in the literature, the most persuasive of which refers explicitly to the actions of UNTAC in preventing Khmer Rouge attacks. In the first explanation, pressure from Khmer Rouge allies China and Thailand is emphasised as the rational basis on which the party decided not to act out its plans of election violence.[14] Yet sustained external pressure had failed to convince the Khmer Rouge to comply with earlier demands. China's influence over the Khmer Rouge had waned significantly,[15] while Thai elements continued to tacitly support the Khmer Rouge well after the election. Notably, in December 1993, Thai authorities discovered a truckload of munitions being delivered into Cambodia that could be traced back to a Thai military warehouse full of similar supplies guarded by 23 Khmer Rouge soldiers.[16] The continued supply of arms through semi-formal Thai channels in late-1993, when the Khmer Rouge had resumed violent conflict against the new united Cambodian national forces, suggests that formal Thai pressure over the elections would have lacked sufficient credibility for the Khmer Rouge to drop its plans for election violence at the last minute.

The second explanation rests on miscalculations and poor strategy by the Khmer Rouge itself. Drawing on the situation reports and recollections of military personnel in the field, Thijs Zaalberg argues that 'the Khmer Rouge leadership had lost touch with both the Cambodian people and political developments in the country'.[17] Having underestimated the

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[13] Ibid., p.156.
[14] Findlay, *Cambodia: The Legacy and Lessons of UNTAC*, p.49.
[15] David W. Roberts, 'A Dangerous Game: Managing Consent in the Cambodian UN Peacekeeping Operation' *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 21, no. 1 (1998), pp.41-42.
[16] Judy Ledgerwood, 'UN Peacekeeping Missions: The Lessons from Cambodia' *AsiaPacific Issues* No.11, March 1994.
[17] Zaalberg, *Soldiers and Civil Power*, p.150.

extent of popular will to participate in the election, Khmer Rouge strategists were caught off-guard by the high turnout on the first polling day:

> After some half-hearted attempts to disrupt the elections on day two, the Khmer Rouge leaders showed erratic behavior and started to send those voters it had allowed to be registered to the polling stations to vote for FUNCINPEC.[18]

Given the self-imposed isolation of the Khmer Rouge leadership, such detachment from the popular mood leading up to the elections is likely. However, the testimonies of former Khmer Rouge soldiers show that at least some elements of the party did intend to attack the polling stations, rather than passively waiting out the elections in the belief that a low turnout of primarily CPP voters would be unacceptable to the UN, as Zaalberg suggests.[19]

Instead, it is the third explanation that is most persuasive: UNTAC efforts to protect the polling stations from attack successfully deterred or prevented acts of violence.[20] In this, two factors were crucial: the organisational restructuring of UNTAC to give the Military Component the lead in coordinating electoral activities; and the successful implementation of a plan drawn up in the Mixed Military Working Group (MMWG) to engage Cambodian parties in election security.

The reorientation of UNTAC to prioritise elections changed the military's role significantly. The original mandate had envisaged that the Military Component would play a much smaller role by the time of elections, with about half of its troops withdrawn after demobilisation. With the abandonment of demobilisation and prioritisation of elections, the Military Component assumed responsibility for securing the elections, requiring a far more active security role than had its previous duties of overseeing demobilisation. This led to two significant shifts in force posture.

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[18] Ibid., p.151.
[19] Ibid., p.151; Zaalberg also argues that UNTAC's protection of polling stations was significant, perhaps more so than the strategic miscalculations of the Khmer Rouge leadership.
[20] Doyle, *UN Peacekeeping in Cambodia*, 151; Sorpong Peou, *Conflict Neutralization in the Cambodia War: From Battlefield to Ballot-Box* (Kuala Lumpur; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), pp.129-130.

The first was to redeploy UNTAC's battalions along administrative and electoral lines, where previously they had been distributed to match the deployment of the Cambodian military factions. This allowed UNTAC's better equipped, more capable troops to take control in areas of greater threat to the electoral process, and enhanced coordination between military and civilian components.[21]

Second, UNTAC's military planning staff took charge of electoral coordination, integrating the work of different components into a cohesive electoral strategy, and became 'the driving force behind UNTAC as a whole'.[22] The task of securing elections meant not only protecting polling sites during the election proper, but also securing the personnel of the electoral component in the preceding months. While there was certainly some friction between components as the Military Component sought to take the lead role, the strength it gave UNTAC was widely recognised. As the head of the Civil Administration Component stated, the fact that elections would take place without disarmament meant an inevitable climate of violence; it thus had

> the effect of increasing the role of the Military Component in the pursuit of civilian objectives. Ensuring the security of the electoral process in its entirety is now, following the adoption of UN Security Resolution 792, the principal mission of the Military Component.[23]

As security concerns came to dominate electoral preparations, UNTAC's military throughout Cambodia took a series of measures to enhance its power to deter and prevent the Khmer Rouge from derailing the election process. The first of these was to reduce dramatically the number of polling stations in the most vulnerable areas. In Banteay Meanchey province, at least 144 voting sites had been planned in March 1993, but by the time of elections there were just 57 polling stations, enabling the Dutch battalion there to turn the sites 'into

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[21] Zaalberg, *Soldiers and Civil Power*, p.117.
[22] Ibid., pp.129-130.
[23] Porcell in Sanderson, 'UNTAC: Lessons Learnt: The Military Component View', p.80.

defendable positions'.[24] Thus there were 'no easy targets' for the Khmer Rouge,[25] who were reportedly deterred by the heightened level of security at polling stations.[26] Additionally, the Dutch enacted a plan to 'deceive' the Khmer Rouge by relocating a number of polling stations at the last minute and arranging the transportation of voters to the new site, thus 'preventing the Khmer Rouge from preparations aimed at creating havoc'.[27]

Notably, Sanderson states that he 'turned down' offers of more troops from UN member states, judging that they would impose too great an administrative and logistics burden which 'would draw off scarce resources from priority work'.[28] The enhancement of UNTAC's coercive power, then, was achieved without the input of substantially more international resources. But UNTAC's plan to secure the electoral process *did* involve the 'hiring' of Cambodian troops from each of the three participating factions to become in effect 'an extension of the UNTAC peacekeeping force'.[29] An agreement brokered through the Mixed Military Working Group (MMWG) in April 1993 permitted Cambodian armed forces to use minimum force and proportionate response to help protect the electoral process. Under the agreement, UNTAC could 'hire' local armed forces if the factions would put their troops at the disposal of the Supreme National Council.[30] In practice, this meant that UNTAC gained the cooperation of Cambodian forces in its efforts to improve general security in the countryside, while the peacekeepers concentrated on securing the electoral process itself.[31] Local armed forces became de facto extensions of the peacekeeping force and provided crucial security support on election day. Each polling site was surrounded by a 200-metre

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[24] Zaalberg, *Soldiers and Civil Power*, p.142, 147.
[25] Blackhurst in Ibid., p.150.
[26] Local FUNCINPEC military leader in Zaalberg, *Soldiers and Civil Power*, p.149.
[27] Cammaert in Zaalberg, *Soldiers and Civil Power*, p.148.
[28] Sanderson, 'UNTAC: Lessons Learnt: The Military Component View', p.81. UNTAC did benefit, however, from a number of new army helicopters from Australia and Malaysia; Peou, *Conflict Neutralization in the Cambodia War*, p.229; see also Stedman, 'Spoiler Problems', p.31.
[29] Sanderson, 'UNTAC: Lessons Learnt: The Military Component View', p.82.
[30] Zaalberg, *Soldiers and Civil Power*, p.136.
[31] Sanderson, 'UNTAC: Lessons Learnt: The Military Component View', p.82.

zone within which no local factions were allowed and only UNTAC military could be armed. UNTAC military and CivPol provided security within the perimeter while the militaries of the SOC, FUNCINPEC and the KPNLF, as well as the SOC police, were charged with providing 'internal security' in the rest of the country.[32]

Such agreement was a boon for UNTAC, particularly during the elections themselves. The withdrawal of the Khmer Rouge from the Supreme National Council and the MMWG on 12 April 1993 facilitated agreement between UNTAC and the remaining three parties, each of which was committed to the successful completion of elections. The plan was created by the MMWG Secretariat in Phnom Penh and introduced to the factions in the multiparty negotiating forum. However, there remained the obstacle of ensuring that CPAF troops committed to securing *legitimate* elections, rather than using their inclusion in planned security arrangements as a way to further their attacks on FUNCINPEC.[33] In his explanation of how such cooperation was achieved, Sanderson emphasises the role of UNTAC's credibility in obtaining the genuine commitment of Cambodian military elite:

> by establishing our credentials as neutral peacekeepers who intended to implement the mandate, we had won the confidence of patriotic Cambodian military leaders, among them men of integrity, who were now willing to bind their forces to Cambodia's future.[34]

Without any sources that provide evidence of these perceptions in the statements or recollections of military participants themselves, we must be cautious about relying on the testimony of the Force Commander alone to identify how he was perceived by local participants. Nevertheless, the fact that the three participating Cambodian factions did indeed cooperate with the rules and conditions set out by UNTAC through the MMWG regarding election security lends credibility to this analysis. Further, and perhaps more significant, the participating military factions continued to cooperate with UNTAC after the

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[32] Zaalberg, *Soldiers and Civil Power*, p.136.
[33] Ibid., p.137.
[34] Sanderson, 'UNTAC: Lessons Learnt: The Military Component View', p.82.

elections, agreeing through the MMWG to form a unified Cambodian military force as advocated by Sanderson and his senior military staff. This is discussed further in the final section of this chapter. Finally, the partiality concerns that had undermined UNTAC's perceived neutrality, identified in Chapter Three, were somewhat ameliorated by the Khmer Rouge's withdrawal from the MMWG by the time of this election security agreement.

It is reasonable to conclude, therefore, that the legitimation of UNTAC's senior military personnel to participating Cambodian military elites through the MMWG enabled the operation to enhance its coercive power and thereby deter Khmer Rouge attacks. While electoral security served the interests of the SOC, FUNCINPEC and the KPNLF, a simple interest-based account is inadequate to explain how the cooperation of military elites was negotiated, coordinated and directed to serve UNTAC's goals. Through their ongoing participation in the MMWG, Cambodian military leaders had developed a relationship with senior UNTAC military personnel based on trust, transparency and negotiation.[35] By consulting regularly and meaningfully with military elites, UNTAC gave them a stake in the operation's success. In the MMWG, UNTAC personnel repeatedly demonstrated that they were honest brokers without a hidden agenda. In other words, UNTAC's military leaders demonstrated their legitimacy by engaging Cambodian elites in a consultative forum,

[35] This conclusion is based on interviews with John Sanderson and Damien Healy, the MMWG Chair and Head of the MMWG Secretariat, respectively. While I would wish for more diverse source material about the workings of the MWMG and local perceptions of it, this institution and its processes have received scant attention in the literature, despite general acknowledgement that it was indeed influential (e.g. Cheryl M. Lee Kim and Mark Metrikas, 'Holding a Fragile Peace: The Military and Civilian Components of UNTAC' in *Keeping the Peace: Multidimensional UN Operations in Cambodia and El Salvador*, ed. Michael W. Doyle, Ian Johnstone, and Robert C. Orr (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), p.111; Nassrine Azimi, ed., *The United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC): Debriefing and Lessons: Report and Recommendations of the International Conference, Singapore, August 1994* (London: Kluwer Law International, 1995), p.11; James A. Schear and Karl Farris, 'Policing Cambodia: The Public Security Dimensions of UN Peace Operations' in *Policing the New World Disorder: Peace Operations and Public Security*, ed. Robert B. Oakley, Michael J. Dziedzic, and Eliot M. Goldberg (Washington DC: National Defense University Press, 1998), p.99; Sanderson, 'UNTAC: Lessons Learnt: The Military Component View', p.82-83; Sanderson, 'Peacekeeping Operations in Cambodia', p.24).

enabling the operation to shape the military decisions of participating parties regarding electoral security.

This is in sharp contrast with UNTAC's inability to influence elite decision-making regarding disarmament and demobilisation through the same channels. Two factors account for this variation. First, as cooperation on electoral security came much later in the peace process, UNTAC personnel had much longer to legitimise themselves through the MMWG than they had regarding disarmament and demobilisation. Second, local interests were more closely aligned with UNTAC's objectives. While I have argued that interests alone are insufficient to explain the cooperation, they provided favourable conditions for UNTAC's procedural legitimacy to become a more prominent source of power. In particular, the agreement on cooperation was reached soon after the Khmer Rouge had withdrawn from the MMWG, which provided a more permissive environment for the discovery of mutual interests among the parties.

Popular participation in elections

While the security of polling stations was important, UNTAC's electoral effectiveness ultimately relied upon the willingness of 89.5% of eligible voters to cast their ballot. There is widespread consensus that the key determinant of their willingness to vote was their trust in the secrecy of the ballot.[36] In a country with almost no experience of democratic participation, an entrenched tradition of top-down rule and conditions of significant insecurity and political intimidation, the fact that people believed their vote would be secret, and would count, seems surprising at first glance.[37] I argue below that the high voter turnout

[36] Doyle, *UN Peacekeeping in Cambodia*, p.155.

[37] Cambodia's first elections were held in 1946 under French rule, to form a constituent assembly. They were convincingly won by the Democrat party, a group of Cambodian intellectuals supported by teachers, Buddhist monks, and the middle ranks of the bureaucracy, with a mildly anti-Royalist platform. They wrote a new constitution, which created a strong National Assembly and gave a ceremonial role to King Sihanouk as head of state. Following more elections in 1951, Sihanouk

is explained by the effectiveness of UNTAC in convincing people to vote, and that this in turn is explained by the legitimation of UNTAC in the eyes of local people.

It is theoretically possible that the high voter turnout could have resulted from the pressure of political parties, rather than the agency of UNTAC. However, the election results suggest otherwise: despite controlling most of the territory and population of Cambodia and waging a virulent campaign of propaganda and intimidation, the SOC lost the election by an overwhelming margin. Thus even if the high voter turnout had been achieved by coercion from local elites, the fact that 62% of people voted for the opposition suggests that, once in the voting booth, people were convinced that they could vote for whoever they liked without fear of reprisal. In the absence of either an established tradition of democratic elections or another advocate of democratic participation, the role of convincing voters that the ballot would be secret fell to UNTAC, and it was in this role that the operation proved most effective.[38]

Source legitimacy: coherence with local norms and preferences

With an uncontested UNSC mandate and a remarkably high degree of united international support, UNTAC's international legal and political legitimacy was unquestioned. But although such international consensus gave UNTAC access to the large pot of international resources, its legitimising effects on the ground were limited. Instead, as I outlined in

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staged a coup d'etat in 1952, dismissing the cabinet and promising independence within three years. He dissolved the National Assembly in early 1953 and proceeded to govern by decree. In 1955, Sihanouk abdicated in order to contest elections; foreshadowing campaigning techniques employed by the SOC in 1992-1993, Sihanouk's party harassed and intimidated opposition figures; many were imprisoned and some were killed; see David Chandler, 'Three Visions of Politics in Cambodia' in *Keeping the Peace: Multidimensional UN Operations in Cambodia and El Salvador*, ed. Michael W. Doyle, Ian Johnstone, and Robert C. Orr (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp.29-33.

[38] In subsequent Cambodian elections, practices of vote-buying were common; see Caroline Hughes, 'Reconstructing Legitimate Political Authority through Elections?' in *Beyond Democracy in Cambodia: Political Reconstruction in a Post-Conflict Society*, ed. Joakim Öjendal (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2009); Sue Downie, 'Cambodia's 1998 Election: Understanding Why It Was Not a 'Miracle on the Mekong'' *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 54, no. 1 (2000). However, vote-buying was not reported in the 1993 UNTAC elections, perhaps explained by parties' lack of funds for such activities.

Chapter Two, the source legitimacy of a peace operation derives from its fit with the *local* normative context, including legal and political norms but also the extent to which a peace operation and its goals can be justified through coherence with local desires, needs and expectations. Further, a peace operation may derive source legitimacy through its initial demonstration of credibility to meet those local desires and expectations. Since local legitimacy is about the *perception* that a peace operation is right, proper and appropriate, analysing local perceptions at the outset of a mission is an important starting point.

Like many peace operations, UNTAC attracted popular support even before arriving in the field. Twenty years of war, genocide, displacement and poverty had left a sense of hopelessness regarding the prospects for change from within. News of UNTAC inevitably sparked hope among Cambodians that change – peace – might come. In 1990, an Australian planning team preparing the 'Red Book', which would become the first draft of the Paris Peace Agreements, visited refugee camps on the Thai/Cambodian border and heard from refugees a repeated request: 'Save us from our leaders.'[39] Steve Heder and Judy Ledgerwood, both academic experts on Cambodia and members of UNTAC's Info/Ed division, report that:

> In Cambodia, and in the border camps along the Thai-Cambodian border, there was a burst of popular enthusiasm and hope, hope that with the signing of the agreement, two decades of war and suffering were at an end.[40]

In my interviews with other Cambodians, including UNTAC staff, indigenous civil society representatives and politicians, I found similar recollections of high popular support for UNTAC before the operation was deployed. The sentiment that local people wanted UNTAC because it offered a chance for change after decades of war was a common theme. 'People were ready to write a new chapter of their history', recalled one Cambodian member

[39] John Sanderson, interview.
[40] Heder and Ledgerwood, 'Politics of Violence: An Introduction', p.12.

of UNTAC, and 'whole-heartedly supported the UN.'[41] Others noted that people were more willing to trust these 'foreigners from developed countries' as saviours that represented the 'modern world'. People repainted their homes in the light blue of the UN; seizing on this positive symbolism, the CPP later changed its party colours to UN blue.

In general terms, then, the idea of UNTAC matched the preferences of much of the Cambodian population. The peace process promised an end to decades of conflict and offered a chance for some 370 000 refugees to be repatriated and families to be reunited, and although fighting continued, its scale was drastically reduced from the open armed conflict waged until UNTAC's arrival.

In addition, UNTAC had the support of the one unifying symbol and trusted figure in Cambodia: Prince Sihanouk. Sihanouk had formerly ruled as Cambodia's King, head of state, prime minister, head of the Khmer Rouge government,[42] and chairman of the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea. During the UNTAC period, he was the head of the Supreme National Council (SNC) and was accurately perceived by UNTAC as the most influential individual in Cambodia. Despite outside opinion of him as 'mercurial', 'erratic' and 'volatile',[43] Sihanouk was also the only unifying figurehead of the Cambodian nation. Sihanouk derived significant authority from his popular association with the 'golden era' of his royalist rule during the 1950s and 1960s, but he also exerted significant influence

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41 Youk Chhang, interview by author, Phnom Penh, 15 January 2009.

42 Although Sihanouk was the official head of the Khmer Rouge government, he remained under house arrest during Khmer Rouge rule and had no real role in the politics or policy of the regime; see Laura McGrew, 'Re-Establishing Legitimacy through the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia' in *Beyond Democracy in Cambodia: Political Reconstruction in a Post-Conflict Society*, ed. Joakim Ojendal and Mona Lilja (Copenhagen: Nordic Institution of Asian Studies, 2009), p.263; Craig Etcheson, 'Civil War and the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea' *Third World Quarterly* 9, no. 1 (1987), p.194.

43 Findlay, *Cambodia: The Legacy and Lessons of UNTAC* , p.109; Janet E. Heininger, *Peacekeeping in Transition: The United Nations in Cambodia* (New York: Twentieth Century Fund Press, 1994), p.132; Berdal and Leifer, 'Cambodia', p.43; Doyle, *UN Peacekeeping in Cambodia*, p.64.

over Cambodia's political elite through the SNC.[44] Even though he was technically not a member of the royalist FUNCINPEC, much of FUNCINPEC's popular support was due to its continued association with Sihanouk.[45] Led by Sihanouk's son, Prince Ranariddh, FUNCINPEC actively campaigned on its royalist roots during the campaign, including by using images of Sihanouk in their material. Despite his lengthy absences from Cambodia during the UNTAC period, Sihanouk played an influential role as a gate-keeper of support: because people saw Sihanouk and the royalist FUNCINPEC party cooperating with UNTAC, they were more willing to support the operation. Despite a number of provocative outbursts against UNTAC and contrary positions, such as advocating a Presidential poll then later retracting his support for it, Sihanouk's continued participation in the peace process and engagement with UNTAC provided the operation with another strand of source legitimacy.

Providing tangible benefits: The Military Component's 'Alliance with the People' and substantive legitimacy

A peace operation is legitimised substantively when its outputs lead people to perceive it as right, proper and appropriate. There is an important distinction between the substantive legitimation of an operation, which pulls local actors towards cooperation because they believe doing so is right, and inducement, which changes people's behaviour based on the promise or provision of rewards. The same output might induce or legitimise, and distinguishing the currency of power at play thus requires deeper analysis of the reasons for behavioural change. If it is inducement at work, we might expect an operation to explicitly link certain outputs to desired local behaviour, which can be traced through communication trails. For example, if a peace operation is trying to induce local armed forces to disarm, we might expect to find a cash-for-guns policy advertised, or informal communications that

[44] Sam Rainsy, interview by author, Phnom Penh, 21 January 2009; Son Soubert, interview by author, Phnom Penh, 21 January 2009.
[45] Sam Rainsy, interview; Widyono, *Dancing in Shadows*, pp.90-91; Caroline Hughes, *UNTAC in Cambodia: The Impact on Human Rights* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1996), p55.

establish a link between disarmament and the disbursement of aid funds. Similarly, we would expect to find local actors expressing a belief that rewards are being offered, including the possibility of a response that the 'reward' on offer was insufficient to justify the cost of cooperation.

In contrast, substantive legitimacy is about the *appropriateness* of behaviour, not the costs and benefits of its consequences. In electoral matters, inducement is unlikely to be a source of power employed by peace operations seeking genuine popular democratic enfranchisement, since the idea of enticing people via material rewards to register or vote, or to participate in compliance with campaign regulations, is both undemocratic and corrupt.

As I argued in Chapter Two, substantive legitimacy influences people's behaviour because they come to trust a peace operation, to believe in its fairness and to see that its motives are genuine. UNTAC was able to persuade Cambodians of the freedom and security of their vote, enabling the expression of free choice through the elections and ensuring that, despite the absence of a 'neutral political environment', the results reflected a democratic process. As I will argue in the next section on procedural legitimacy, the communication strategy pursued by UNTAC was crucial in convincing people to participate in the electoral process. However, for the message to be persuasive, people also had to trust UNTAC as a credible source of information in which they could believe. In this section, I argue that UNTAC legitimised its presence, goals and personnel to the local population substantively through its civic action programs, which demonstrated its commitment to assisting the local population.[46]

The formal mandate of the Military Component gave it little exposure to local people beyond passing through villages in the ubiquitous white trucks of the UN. But Force

[46] I would have wished for more direct evidence of local perceptions of these processes; however, those sources that are available (as cited below) are surprisingly coherent and consistent.

Commander General Sanderson recognised early that the operation could derive a new source of power by building popular support. Sanderson's background in counterinsurgency led him to the strategy of 'civic action': the provision of tangible benefits to improve the lives of local people, mainly in rural areas. Officially, the responsibility for any such projects fell to UN agencies, coordinated by the operation's reconstruction component; UNTAC's military had neither the mandate nor funding to perform civic action. Yet throughout Cambodia they provided medical care, dug wells to provide clean drinking water, built and repaired schools and orphanages, and repaired and refurbished medical clinics and hospitals. They improved sanitation by removing garbage, clearing drains and constructing basic sanitary facilities. They conducted education programs and large-scale infrastructure projects, constructing and repairing hundreds of bridges and smoothing or resurfacing more than 1000 miles of roadway.[47] Some tasks served a logistical purpose: roads, for example, were required to transport people to polling stations. But the idea of a civic action campaign was introduced by UNTAC's Force Commander with the specific objective of 'forging an alliance with the Cambodian people'.[48] Complementing UNTAC's information program, discussed in the next section, the civic action programs sought to 'bypass' the factional elite and develop a direct relationship with the Cambodian population 'which would overcome the distortions created by power struggles between and within the faction leaderships'.[49] Through humanitarian projects, UNTAC's military component sought to win Cambodian hearts and minds by demonstrating their commitment to local people. For Sanderson, this was a crucial means of demonstrating UNTAC's credibility without using force: it showed that the operation was committed to delivering change to the Cambodian people, providing

[47] Robert B. Adolph, 'UN Military Civic Action in Cambodia' *Special Warfare* 7, no. 3 (1994).
[48] Sanderson, 'Peacekeeping Operations in Cambodia'; Sanderson, 'UNTAC: Lessons Learnt: The Military Component View'.
[49] Sanderson, 'UNTAC: Lessons Learnt: The Military Component View'.

tangible benefits to improve their lives.[50] Sanderson explicitly links these projects to the operation's electoral strategy:

> If we could go to the people and convince them to vote, it would define the future for Cambodia. Fortunately, with our presence throughout the countryside, and the civic action programmes, we were half way there.[51]

Yet UNTAC had no budget for civic action and its requests for funding were denied by UN headquarters because such activities were the responsibility of the UN humanitarian agencies. In the absence of an official budget, the national contingents drew on their own funds to pursue civic action programs in their own geographic areas. For example, battalions' medical supplies and personnel, intended for their own soldiers, were widely used to treat local people.[52] Though most of the projects were therefore 'nickel-and-dime operations',[53] sometimes paid for by officers and soldiers themselves,[54] the Dutch battalion in Banteay Meanchey had a particularly well-funded program. They had received a large injection of funding from the Dutch government after a visiting ministerial delegation was 'thoroughly impressed' by the battalion's initial civic action efforts and, recognising its potential benefits for public opinion at home, pledged half a million Dutch guilders for the troops to use on civic action projects.[55] This included an active program of medical care. Of the patients treated in its medical clinics, 80% were Cambodian; one clinic treated about 100 local people each week.[56] An UNTAC Info/Ed report concluded that such medical treatment 'seriously contributed to the good relations between the company and the local population'.[57]

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[50] John Sanderson, interview.
[51] Sanderson, 'Peacekeeping Operations in Cambodia', p.25.
[52] Adolph, 'UN Military Civic Action in Cambodia'.
[53] Heininger, *Peacekeeping in Transition*, p.121.
[54] Adolph, 'UN Military Civic Action in Cambodia', p.14.
[55] Zaalberg, *Soldiers and Civil Power*, p.101.
[56] Ibid., p.97.
[57] Quoted in Zaalberg, *Soldiers and Civil Power*, p.97.

UNTAC's military component also worked with UN agencies and NGOs to implement civic action programs. For example, when it became clear that military clinics in the Dutch sector lacked medicine for babies and the elderly, the Dutch troops constructed a special facility under the supervision of a company doctor, staffed by three Cambodian medics from former refugee camps, some 300 metres from the military post. Medicine and equipment were provided by UNHCR and arranged through the ICRC; UNICEF helped drill a borehole; the troops built a latrine; and helicopter support was provided to the ICRC for emergency cases in isolated areas.[58]

Despite examples of such coordination, however, there was some friction between the military's initiatives and the development plans of other actors, as the civic action programs sometimes undermined parallel projects intended to employ local labour and thereby provide skills training.[59] The provision of benefits may also have contributed to local rivalries and competition to gain access to civic action resources.[60] However, while there may have been pockets of discontent, UNTAC did receive a positive response in rural areas. In interviews conducted sixteen years later, villagers recalled little about the UNTAC period, but praise for the operation's road construction and medical care was widespread.[61]

Unlike the informal, ad hoc civic action programs, UNTAC's Rehabilitation Component was charged with overseeing the disbursement of $880 million in international aid pledges for reconstruction and development. Yet, as I argued in Chapter Three, Rehabilitation was one of the least effective of UNTAC's components. Described as 'distressingly inadequate',[62] less than $100 million was disbursed before the elections, most of which went to resettled

[58] Zaalberg, *Soldiers and Civil Power*, p.98.
[59] See General Accounting Office, *UN Peacekeeping: Lessons Learned in Managing Recent Missions* United States Government, 1993.
[60] Pouligny, *Peace Operations Seen from Below*, p.207.
[61] Informal interviews conducted by author in Siem Reap province and Phnom Penh.
[62] Chopra, *United Nations Authority in Cambodia*, p.69.

refugees.[63] Constrained by political disputes among SNC members who vetoed aid programs on the grounds that they would benefit their opponents in the lead-up to elections, the small proportion of aid that was disbursed funded major projects that would benefit all parties, not program assistance that reached the village level and improved local livelihoods.[64] The huge sum pledged to rehabilitate Cambodia had little impact on the lives of most Cambodians during UNTAC's tenure, and therefore the operation missed the opportunity to gain the benefits of substantive legitimation from it. The military component's civic action programs stepped into this void, meeting the humanitarian need of Cambodians at the village level and thereby building a relationship of trust and goodwill with the people. As a situation report from the Dutch battalion reported:

> The translators have expressed that many Cambodians have trust and confidence in Dutchbat [the Dutch battalion]. There is the general feeling with many locals that Dutchbat takes its mission seriously and is putting its heart into its work. The many aid projects that Dutchbat has completed, i.e. wells, schools etc, have helped foster these feelings of trust with the Cambodian people. This is a point which should not be considered trivial as it carries a great amount of weight with the people.[65]

The civic action programs are also credited with improving security, particularly in those provinces where the Khmer Rouge was active. There are numerous stories of popular goodwill enabling UNTAC to provide better security, both for its own forces and for the general population.[66] Local people would often warn UNTAC patrols of Khmer Rouge ambushes or mining activities.[67] In Banteay Meanchey, not only did villagers reject Khmer Rouge offers of payment for attacks on UNTAC, they reported them to the peacekeepers.[68] UNTAC's civic action coordinator Lt. Col. Robert Adolph emphasises the intelligence-gathering benefits that came with popular goodwill towards the operation:

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[63] Doyle, *UN Peacekeeping in Cambodia*, p.50.
[64] Chopra, *United Nations Authority in Cambodia*, p.70; Doyle, *UN Peacekeeping in Cambodia*, pp.50-51.
[65] Quoted in Zaalberg, *Soldiers and Civil Power*, p.119.
[66] It should be noted that, while improved force security does not directly translate to improved public security, the escalation of violence against UNTAC personnel would have undermined public security both through the risk of civilians being accidently caught up in military activity, or indirectly if the operation was forced to withdraw from certain areas, or even from Cambodia altogether.
[67] See Adolph, 'UN Military Civic Action in Cambodia', pp.16-17.
[68] Zaalberg, *Soldiers and Civil Power*, p.137.

> UNTAC units and UNMO [military observer] teams that conducted civic-minded projects won both respect and admiration from the locals and were often forewarned of impending attacks and recently mined roadways. Cambodians who felt that UNTAC members were their friends acted accordingly and provided UN soldiers with information about the movements and dispositions of hostile factions. Such valuable information could not have been secured in any other way.[69]

The military component's civic action programs provided an important basis from which parts of the operation could demonstrate their commitment to improving the lives of Cambodian people. UNTAC had failed to achieve its demobilisation goals, which ought to have undermined perceptions of the operation's credibility in other goal areas, and that of the military component in particular. However, the civic action programs provided an alternative strategy for UNTAC's military to demonstrate its commitment to improving the lives of local populations, and their credibility to do so. By forging good relations with people on this basis, UNTAC's military components legitimised themselves locally, and this legitimacy provided a broad reservoir of popular support favourable to the establishment of trust between the operation and local people regarding the election. This legitimacy is best understood as a diffuse background condition that enabled the operation to provide reasons for people to support its activities and believe its electoral messages. UNTAC built upon this through the more direct legitimation of its formal and informal communications activities, analysed below.

Communicating legitimacy: transparency, neutrality, participation and the quality of treatment

UNTAC's civic action programs helped to persuade the Cambodian population to support the operation. But in order to encourage people to participate actively in elections, the operation needed to transmit a more targeted message. Specifically, UNTAC needed to educate the population about elections and voting procedures and, importantly, to convince potential voters that they could participate safely and meaningfully. To be persuasive,

[69] Adolph, 'UN Military Civic Action in Cambodia', p.16.

UNTAC needed the population to buy in to the project of elections, and it thus needed to be trusted as a source of information by the Cambodian people. Two aspects of the operation were particularly important in this regard. First, the operation developed an extensive formal communications strategy which pivoted around Radio UNTAC. Second, the operation benefitted from the informal, interpersonal communications of its volunteer electoral officers. The operation legitimised its message by demonstrating its transparency and neutrality via Radio UNTAC, by engaging the participation of people in electoral activities and by treating them with dignity and respect. Importantly, the quality of treatment accorded to local people by UNTAC's volunteers compensated for the delegitimising effects of poor behaviour by some UNTAC police and troops. Each of these factors is considered in turn below.

Radio UNTAC

UNTAC's extensive, influential information campaign provided the crucial means to develop the population's trust in the operation and its conduct of elections. The centrepiece was Radio UNTAC, the UN's first radio station. In plans for UNTAC, the UN Secretary-General had recognised the need for the operation 'to have its "finger on the pulse" of the Cambodian information sector', correctly predicting that information would be of 'paramount importance' in the conduct of free and fair elections.[70] Setting out the mandate of UNTAC, he made provision for radio broadcast and print distribution facilities, as well as the production of audiovisual, radio and printed materials, coordinated by a centralised information office in UNTAC headquarters.[71] This information office became the influential Information/Education Division, employing 45 international staff, including 14 who were fluent in Khmer.[72] Known as 'Info/Ed', it produced a large collection of videos, posters,

[70] United Nations, *Report of the Secretary-General on Cambodia*, paragraph 105.
[71] Ibid., paragraph. 27, 162.
[72] Heder and Ledgerwood, 'Politics of Violence: An Introduction', p.27.

leaflets, flyers, banners and advertisements with the aim of encouraging people to participate, first in voter registration and then in the elections themselves.[73] The Info/Ed division is widely credited with cultivating strong voter demand for electoral participation; for example, Michael Doyle argues that '[i]ts central accomplishment lay in persuading the people that their act of voting, despite all the threats of the factions, would at least be secret.'[74]

In this communications strategy, Radio UNTAC became a trusted and popular source of information for many Cambodians. Japan donated 347 804 radios and 849 400 batteries that were distributed throughout the country and the station progressively expanded its reach so that most Cambodians had access to Radio UNTAC by the time of elections.[75] Though the station was delayed by the same logistical and procurement problems that obstructed the rest of the operation, Radio UNTAC broadcast live for nine hours each day six weeks before the elections, increasing this air time to fifteen hours in the final weeks.

Given the extent of political intimidation and violence in the lead-up to the elections, Cambodians had good reason to be fearful of voting, or at least of voting against the SOC. Further, SOC and Khmer Rouge propaganda sought to convince the population that their voting preference would be discovered by spies.[76] The fact that almost 90% of the electorate cast their ballot, with a sizeable majority voting against the SOC, suggests that people were neither too scared to vote, nor worried about their vote being discovered. A national survey conducted in 1998 sheds further light on voters' beliefs at the time of the UNTAC elections.[77] Although 13% of respondents reported that they were fearful during the

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[73] United Nations, *Third Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia*; see also Peou, *Conflict Neutralization in the Cambodia War*, pp.207-212; Ingrid A. Lehmann, *Peacekeeping and Public Information: Caught in the Crossfire* (London: Frank Cass, 1999), pp.60-70.
[74] Doyle, *UN Peacekeeping in Cambodia*, p.153; see also Heininger, *Peacekeeping in Transition*, p.121.
[75] Zhou Mei, *Radio UNTAC of Cambodia: Winning Ears, Hearts and Minds* (Bangkok: White Lotus Press, 1994), p.20.
[76] Robert McCrum, 'Rendezvous with Fear' *The Guardian*, 22 May 1993.
[77] William A. Collins et al., *Final Report: Baseline Survey of Voter Knowledge and Awareness* Center for Advanced Study, 1998.

elections, 89% of the survey's respondents who were eligible had voted in the elections,[78] and only 4% of those who abstained reported that they did so out of fear. The survey also found a high degree of confidence about the secrecy of the UNTAC elections, with 78% reporting that they believed their ballot was secret, against around 5% who believed it was not.[79]

The influential role of Radio UNTAC is emphasised in many accounts of UNTAC's effectiveness, and the station is credited with persuading the population that voting would be safe and meaningful, primarily by emphasising that the ballot would be secret.[80] Missing from existing analysis, however, is a causal explanation of this influence. In this section, I argue that Radio UNTAC helped to legitimise the operation, and thus its message of ballot secrecy. Two processes were particularly important in this legitimation strategy: first, the attraction of an audience by broadcasting material that people enjoyed and wanted to hear; and second, the communication of politically neutral, factual information. I examine each process below.

Radio UNTAC quickly developed an audience by catering to people's tastes through music. Some argue that Radio UNTAC's influence was limited because the audience was attracted to entertainment programming, not civic education material.[81] But this overlooks the role of popular content in establishing a rapport with local populations. People may have tuned in to hear their favourite music, but they also heard Radio UNTAC's material regarding election processes, human rights and UNTAC's motives. John Marston, a member of the Info/Ed

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[78] UNTAC recorded a turnout rate of 89.5%, indicating that the survey provides a valid representation of participants.

[79] This question was asked of all survey participants, including those ineligible to vote in 1993. 18% answered 'don't know', which roughly correlates with the proportion of respondents who were under 16 during the UNTAC elections, and thus ineligible to vote.

[80] Akashi, 'The Challenges Faced by UNTAC'; Doyle, *UN Peacekeeping in Cambodia*, p.55; Findlay, *Cambodia: The Legacy and Lessons of UNTAC*, p.152; Raoul M. Jennar, 'UNTAC: 'International Triumph' in Cambodia?' *Security Dialogue* 25, no. 2 (1994), p.148; Roberts, *Political Transition in Cambodia 1991-1999*, p.78; Peou, *Conflict Neutralization in the Cambodia War*, p.211.

[81] Pouligny, *Peace Operations Seen from Below*, p.151.

division, highlights the practice of reading audience letters on air, along with song requests, in attracting an audience:

> Whether because it was something novel, or because, in a tiny way, it represented empowerment, this programming became enormously popular.[82]

Further, the music programming had a more profound social impact than simple 'entertainment'. One local civil society leader credits Radio UNTAC with allowing 'culture' to re-emerge where it had been oppressed and with providing a unifying force among Cambodians. She also emphasised the role of the station's song request programs in opening up a small space for freedom of expression and mobilising popular participation in communities that had been violently disenfranchised.[83]

Marston also argues that Radio UNTAC was popular because people came to believe that they could trust its reporting.[84] Featuring news reports and interviews with key UNTAC and Cambodian officials, Radio UNTAC also allocated equal time to Cambodia's twenty registered political parties to broadcast their political material. The political neutrality and transparency of Radio UNTAC's material contrasted starkly with the factional propaganda that had dominated the 12-year civil war, presenting 'diametrically opposed versions of reality'.[85] Radio UNTAC 'spoke openly about political intimidation and violence',[86] broaching topics of daily public concern that were either taboo or grossly distorted in factional broadcasts. As Doyle argues:

> A significant source of the success of the election was Radio UNTAC's ability to speak directly to the potential Cambodian voters, bypassing the propaganda of the four factions and invoking a new Cambodian actor, the voting citizen.[87]

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[82] John Marston, 'Neutrality and the Negotiation of an Information Order' in *Forging Peace: Intervention, Human Rights and the Management of Media Space*, ed. Monroe E. Price and Mark Thompson (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2002), p.192.
[83] Chea Vannath, interview by author, Phnom Penh, 21 January 2009.
[84] Marston, 'Neutrality and the Negotiation of an Information Order', p.193.
[85] Ledgerwood, 'UN Peacekeeping Missions: The Lessons from Cambodia', p.5.
[86] Ibid., p.5.
[87] Doyle, *UN Peacekeeping in Cambodia*, p.11.

Even Khmer Rouge cadre listened to Radio UNTAC. One defector reported that '[w]e listen…because we see it's the only radio that broadcasts the truth'.[88] The credibility of Radio UNTAC appears to have influenced the decisions of some rank-and-file Khmer Rouge who defected, and on those of others who chose not to violently disrupt the elections.[89]

Its political neutrality and fact-based reporting helped to legitimise Radio UNTAC as a trusted source of information and this proved crucial in persuading people that their vote would be secret. Further, Radio UNTAC's popularity enabled the operation to amplify its message and reach many more people than would otherwise have been possible. By explaining and justifying its presence and goals on air, UNTAC made its motives transparent and articulated standards against which it could be held to account. Radio UNTAC thus provided an important channel through which the operation was legitimised procedurally, and this legitimacy was a vital source of influence on people's decisions regarding electoral participation.

The Electoral Component: United Nations Volunteers in the field

The second significant strategy of procedural legitimation for UNTAC that helped it to achieve its electoral objectives was the quality of treatment afforded by personnel to Cambodian voters. UNTAC's 460-odd United Nations Volunteers (UNVs) were its frontline in the electoral strategy.[90] The volunteers were professionals who had signed up to work as electoral officers for much lower pay than other UNTAC personnel. The UNVs

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[88] Quoted in Philip M. Taylor, *Global Communications, International Affairs and the Media since 1945* (London: Routledge, 1997), p.200.

[89] John Sanderson, 'UNTAC: Successes and Failures' in *International Peacekeeping: Building on the Cambodian Experience*, ed. Hugh Smith (Canberra: Australian Defence Studies Centre, Australian Defence Force Academy, 1994), p.83.

[90] This figure is cited by Reginald Austin, the head of UNTAC's Electoral Component; see Reginald Austin, 'Election-Monitoring: Preparation and Conduct' in *The United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC): Debriefing and Lessons; Report and Recommendations of the International Conference, Singapore, August 1994*, ed. Nassrine Azimi (London: Kluwer Law International, 1995), p.182.

have been universally praised, described as 'the unsung heroes of UNTAC',[91] 'highly skilled and motivated'[92] and having made an 'immeasurable' contribution to UNTAC's electoral success.[93] The UNVs lived among the Cambodian people in simple accommodation, directly interacting with local people on a daily basis, whether in formal electoral activities or informally in village life. Living across Cambodia with the local population, in some areas often without electricity at night and no running water,[94] the enthusiasm and commitment that seems to have united UNVs was recognised by local people, most of whom 'saw that their motives were genuine and therefore believed that the goals of the process were altruistic'.[95] The head of the Electoral Component, Reginald Austin, described the role of the UNVs as

> crucial to the establishment of electoral credibility among the Khmer people. By their committed and constant 'presence' in their Districts, available to the voter on a 24-hour basis, they brought the election to life as an identifiable human reality in Cambodia.[96]

The electoral officers had two main tasks during the operation. The first was to register eligible Cambodian voters. It was through this process that most Cambodians engaged with UNTAC for the first time. When registering, people came into direct contact with UNTAC personnel – the UNVs and their translators, often accompanied by CivPol – which provided them with first-hand experience of the UNTAC operation. The role of the UNVs in successfully registering 4.76 million voters was crucial. Amitav Ghosh describes registration as UNTAC's most important achievement, a result that 'was primarily the result of the spirit

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91 Widyono, *Dancing in Shadows*, p.46.
92 Jennar, 'UNTAC: 'International Triumph' in Cambodia?', p.148.
93 Azimi, ed., *UNTAC: Debriefing and Lessons*; see also Berdal and Leifer, 'Cambodia', pp.58-59; Peou, *Conflict Neutralization in the Cambodia War*, p.46.
94 Widyono, *Dancing in Shadows*, p.114.
95 Ledgerwood, 'UN Peacekeeping Missions: The Lessons from Cambodia', p.4.
96 R. H. F. Austin, 'UNTAC in Cambodia: Creating Political Space' *United Nations University Work in Progress Newsletter* 14, No.3, 1995.

and dedication of thousands of young volunteers who fanned out across the country, often living and working in very difficult circumstances'.[97]

It seems that this process of participation was an important foundation on which popular trust in the electoral officers of UNTAC was built. Registered voters received laminated identity cards complete with their photo, which proved to be unexpectedly popular among local people.[98] Whether the cards were liked because they marked a severe contrast with the Khmer Rouge period in which all such symbols of identity and status were removed, or because they symbolised modernity and change, these identity cards were an unanticipated boon for UNTAC.

This initial positive engagement provided a foundation for the electoral officers to pursue their second task: educating the population about the election process. While the civic education campaign was centrally planned, the task of implementation fell to UNVs at the grassroots level. Travelling throughout their districts, these electoral officers addressed crowds of villagers in schools, pagodas, halls and other meeting places. Speaking through interpreters, UNTAC's electoral officers would tell people about elections, often accompanied by theatre groups whose skits would reinforce the message, emphasising the secrecy of the ballot:

> We have come here to explain to you about the election ... This place will be a polling station ... Untac is working very hard to make sure your vote is secret ... No one will know how you voted. If your husband or your wife asks you how you voted you can say, No, that's my secret...[99]

These messages were important counter-strategies to the SOC and Khmer Rouge rumours of hidden video cameras in polling booths and magic pens linked to spy satellites, designed

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[97] Amitav Ghosh, 'The Global Reservation: Notes toward an Ethnography of International Peacekeeping' *Cultural Anthropology* 9, no. 3 (1994), p.417.
[98] Sixteen years later, in interviews with the author, Cambodians living in villages around Siem Reap town recalled their joy at receiving these ID cards and reported that this tangible evidence of their enfranchisement was influential in gaining their support for UNTAC.
[99] UNTAC electoral officer, quoted in McCrum, 'Rendezvous with Fear'.

to frighten people into either voting for the SOC, or not voting at all.[100] But through the determined, patient work of the UNVs and Radio UNTAC, the operation managed to legitimise itself such that the message of ballot secrecy proved persuasive. The quality of treatment accorded to local people by UNVs appears to have been particularly important in establishing their trustworthiness and thus that of their message.

Delegitimising UNTAC: unprofessional, offensive and criminal behaviour

There was significant variation, however, in local perceptions of different components and contingents of UNTAC. While the information activities of the UNVs and the civic action of the military component built positive relations with local people, poor behaviour by other personnel, particularly police but also some military, plagued the operation through much of the pre-election period. As early as June 1992, 'offensive behaviour by UNTAC troops on the roads, in restaurants and hotels and in respect to Cambodian women'[101] was recognised to be undermining popular support for the operation and trust in its personnel. The rapid influx of motor vehicles in a country of cyclos and pedestrians made roads dangerous, but this was gravely exacerbated by unprofessional UNTAC personnel who, in far too many cases, had inadequate driving experience before deployment, with some 'drivers' not even having a drivers' license.[102] Racism and the sense that many UNTAC personnel 'looked down' on local people contributed to these tensions.[103] More worrying were charges of serious misconduct, including child molestation, rape and arms smuggling.[104]

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[100] Ibid; see also Stedman, 'Spoiler Problems', p.31.
[101] Correspondence, 'Behaviour of UNTAC Troops in Cambodia and Thailand', Lieutenant General John Sanderson, 29 June 1992, *Sanderson Papers*, MS 359, Box 31, Folder 181.
[102] Transport Discipline, July 1992, *Sanderson Papers*, MS 359, Box 31, Folder 181.
[103] Widyono, *Dancing in Shadows*, p.100.
[104] Findlay, *Cambodia: The Legacy and Lessons of UNTAC*, p.46; Heininger, *Peacekeeping in Transition*, p.76; Ledgerwood, 'UN Peacekeeping Missions: The Lessons from Cambodia' ; Eva Arnvig, 'Women, Children and Returnees' in *Between Hope and Insecurity: The Social Consequences of the Cambodian Peace Process*, ed. Peter Utting (Geneva: United Nations Research for Social Development, 1994); Sandra Whitworth, *Men, Militarism, and UN Peacekeeping: A Gendered Analysis* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2004), pp.64-71.

The high salaries that UNTAC personnel received, relative to the local costs of living and, for many contingents, to their wages at home, compounded problems of excessive drinking, gambling and prostitution. On 7 October 1992, a group of 165 men and women, both Cambodians and expatriates, wrote to SRSG Akashi of their 'sense of outrage at the unacceptable behaviour of some male UNTAC personnel...regarding mistreatment of women...'.[105] The group was composed primarily of UNTAC and NGO personnel who had observed the sexual harassment of local women by UNTAC personnel occurring regularly 'in public restaurants, hotels and bars, banks, markets and shops to the point where many women feel highly intimidated'.[106] They raised concerns not only about the 'frontier behaviour' of some personnel, but also the lack of any mechanisms of redress for women experiencing such behaviour. In a country where 60-65% of the adult population was female,[107] such mistreatment of women risked seriously undermining local perceptions of UNTAC's legitimacy. This was recognised by General Sanderson early in the operation, who rebuked the troops for their behaviour and called upon UNTAC personnel to exercise greater respect and cultural sensitivity towards their local hosts, explicitly linking such quality of treatment to his strategy of forging an alliance with the people: 'We must keep uppermost in our minds the need to build confidence in UNTAC on the part of all Cambodians.'[108] However, that message wasn't applied consistently. Akashi responded that '18-year old hot-blooded soldiers enduring the rigors of Cambodia had the right to enjoy themselves, drink a few beers and chase beautiful young beings of the opposite sex'.[109] As Findlay notes, Akashi's remarks 'seemed to disregard the importance of UN forces being seen to occupy a

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[105] Letter to Yasushi Akashi, Special Representative of the United Nations, 7 October 1992, *Sanderson Papers*, MS 359, archive Box 24, Folder 131; an open letter to Akashi along the same lines was published in the Phnom Penh Post on 11 October 1992.
[106] Letter to Yasushi Akashi, Special Representative of the United Nations, 7 October 1992, *Sanderson Papers*, MS 359, archive Box 24, Folder 131; see also Arnvig, 'Women, Children and Returnees'.
[107] Kato, 'Quick Impacts, Slow Rehabilitation in Cambodia', p.187.
[108] Correspondence, 'Behaviour of UNTAC Troops in Cambodia and Thailand', Lieutenant General John Sanderson, 29 June 1992, *Sanderson Papers*, MS 359, Box 31, Folder 181.
[109] Akashi in Findlay, *Cambodia: The Legacy and Lessons of UNTAC*, p.140.

higher moral ground than other military forces and the danger to the whole mission if UNTAC's Military Component were to lose the confidence of the Cambodian people.'[110]

Nevertheless, in response to the mounting complaints about the poor behaviour of UNTAC personnel, the operation created a Community Relations Office in October 1992, the first of its kind in a peacekeeping operation. Operating as a kind of ombudsman, the community relations officer acted as the mission's 'focal point for receiving, channelling and following up on complaints about the behaviour of UNTAC personnel'.[111] Created to deal with UNTAC's 'image' problem, the Office handled complaints about UNTAC behaviour. It also conducted cultural awareness-raising activities among UNTAC personnel, particularly about HIV/AIDS, sexually-transmitted diseases and condom usage, and administered a voluntary fund for traffic accident victims. The Office handled 84 complaints over its year of operation, many of which concerned compensation requests arising from traffic accidents.[112]

This initiative indicates awareness, among at least some senior personnel, that local popular support for the operation and trust in its personnel and their motives was important, and that personnel should be held to account for their actions. The Community Relations Office reported that its main objective was 'to make UNTAC be seen as being sincere in its efforts aimed at resolving problems in a reasonable manner'.[113] However, with its operations limited to Phnom Penh, it is unlikely that the Office had significant impact on local perceptions. A single official tasked with 'community relations' suggests a tokenism which undermines the initiative's value. While the Community Relations Office could have provided a formal accountability mechanism, its limited scope and resources prevented it from having any significant legitimising affect.

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[110] Ibid., p.140.
[111] Community Relations Office Report, *Sanderson Papers*, MS 359, archive Box 24, Folder 131.
[112] Ibid.; see also Lehmann, *Peacekeeping and Public Information*, pp.73-74.
[113] Ibid.

It is clear, however, that there was no single, united 'image' of UNTAC personnel among Cambodians. While some personnel were regarded as a 'horde of drinking, whoring, half-naked drivers who ran over people and couldn't care less',[114] others were seen to be genuinely committed to helping the Cambodian population and serving their interests. The local population appears to have discerned this variation, distinguishing the 'good' UNTAC from the 'bad'.

It seems that those components of UNTAC who gained the greatest influence on the cooperation of local people were those most successful in legitimising themselves in local eyes. It was UNTAC's electoral officers, especially its UNVs, that had most direct daily interaction with local people, and whose goals were most dependent on their local cooperation. It also seems that the very high quality of treatment afforded by some personnel to local people compensated for the poor behaviour of others. There is a notable distinction, for example, between the UNTAC troops doing civic action work in the rural areas, and those troops responsible for poor behaviour, who were mainly based in urban areas.

This highlights the importance of analysing the multiple, sometimes contradictory strands of a peace operation's legitimacy. In this case, the procedural legitimation of some UNTAC personnel countered the procedural delegitimation of others. The next section examines the distinct effects of the Repatriation Component, strengthening the findings of this section that both a peace operation and the local actors it seeks to influence must be disaggregated before power can by accurately analysed.

[114] Heder and Ledgerwood, 'Politics of Violence: An Introduction', p.32.

Refugee repatriation: local consensus, neutrality and quality of treatment

UNTAC's mandate included the repatriation and resettlement of an estimated 370 000 refugees from camps along the Thai border, to areas of their choosing in Cambodia. The resettlement of the refugee population on time and without significant disruption made repatriation one of UNTAC's few cases of unqualified effectiveness.

Repatriation was run by UNHCR and, although it was formally just another pillar of UNTAC, this gave it a distinct institutional identity, separate from the operation's other components. The component reported to UNHCR in Geneva, rather than to the UN Secretariat in New York, but UNHCR delegated all management authority and financial arrangements to the Phnom Penh field office, run by Sergio Vieira de Mello.[115] UNHCR's long history in the region gave the repatriation component a degree of familiarity with the local dynamics that eluded the rest of UNTAC. Building on its existing presence in the refugee camps and its established logistical procedures, Repatriation thus avoided many of the procurement problems that delayed other components.

However, the component's stronger organisational capacity did not prevent administrative mistakes. The most significant error concerned the assistance package provided to refugees. Initially, each returning family was promised two hectares of land. This allocation had been based on the availability of land gauged through aerial photographs taken in the planning stages of UNTAC. Once on the ground, UNTAC soon realised that the vast majority of this 'available' land was heavily mined and highly malarial, and thus unsuitable for repatriation. The assistance package was revised to offer refugees alternative options, which included food rations for 400 days and a household kit, and either a cash grant, agricultural land (but

[115] This was the first time UNHCR had given a field mission such autonomy; see Findlay, *Cambodia: The Legacy and Lessons of UNTAC*, p.52.

not necessarily in their area of choice) or a housing plot. In the end, 88 per cent of returnees received a cash grant rather than land.[116]

A leading explanation for the effectiveness of Repatriation emphasises the extent to which the operation could achieve its goals *without* the cooperation of the Cambodian factions. For example, Michael Doyle links UNTAC's electoral and repatriation successes, arguing that in each component the operation 'had an independent sphere of authority and organizational capacity that allowed it to proceed against everything short of active military opposition of the factions'.[117] Similarly, Trevor Findlay notes that UNTAC's successes 'were in those areas where it had the greatest degree of independent control and latitude', while the operation's failures occurred 'where it was hostage to the whims of its Cambodian partners in the peace process'.[118]

Yet both accounts overlook the importance of maintaining each faction's consent to the return of refugees to their territory. The repatriation of refugees was not just a technical mission, as both Doyle and Findlay suggest. Importantly, it was not the absence of a cooperation requirement that facilitated repatriation, but the fact that cooperation was forthcoming from an early stage. There are three important reasons for this high degree of cooperation. First, there was little contestation over repatriation during the Paris negotiations: the draft adopted in the first Paris meetings in 1989 was eventually included verbatim in the 1991 peace agreement.[119] Unlike other aspects of the peace settlement, which were bitterly contested among the parties, there was significant international and local consensus on the nature of the refugee issue, the goal of repatriation and the processes for

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116 United Nations, 'Cambodia - UNTAC: Background' available: http://www.un.org/en-/peacekeeping/missions/past/untacbackgr2.html.
117 Doyle, *UN Peacekeeping in Cambodia*, p.164.
118 Findlay, *Cambodia: The Legacy and Lessons of UNTAC*, p.107.
119 Sergio Vieira de Mello, 'Refugee Repatriation and Reintegration in Cambodia' in *The United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia: Debriefing and Lessons*, ed. Nassrine Azimi (London: Kluwer Law International, 1995), p.147.

implementing it.[120] Further, repatriation served the larger political interests of the Cambodian factions, who saw returning refugees as potential voters.[121]

Second, UNTAC maintained the status of repatriation as a non-political, humanitarian exercise, not as part of the local balance of power struggle among the parties. In part, this was achieved because of the strong consensus on refugee issues during the negotiating phase, which 'signalled the necessity of depoliticizing humanitarian issues after nearly two decades of conflict'.[122] Once the operation began, this status was maintained through the consistent portrayal of repatriation as separate from UNTAC's other goals and activities. Importantly, this insulated repatriation from both the failures of disarmament and the allegations of UNTAC bias towards various parties.[123] By strategically emphasising its UNHCR identity, the repatriation component not only distinguished its presence from the rest of UNTAC, it also laid claim to the neutral, non-political humanitarian mandate of UNHCR. Thus the repatriation component built upon the source legitimacy of an uncontested mandate under the Paris Agreements by insulating its goals and activities from the rest of the operation, and by emphasising their non-political, humanitarian character.

Yet the operation still needed local parties to accept the criteria of its repatriation policy: that people could return to areas of their own choosing, and that such areas would be conducive to resettlement, including security and prospects for sustainable livelihoods. This required the Cambodian factions to cooperate actively with UNTAC in providing access to resettlement areas, for example to survey areas for mines, malaria and other public health concerns, and basic infrastructure. The third reason for cooperation, then, concerns the

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120 Ibid., p.147; Howard, *UN Peacekeeping in Civil Wars*, p.162.
121 Brian Williams, 'Returning Home: The Repatriation of Cambodian Refugees' in *Keeping the Peace: Multidimensional UN Operations in Cambodia and El Salvador*, ed. Michael W. Doyle, Ian Johnstone, and Robert C. Orr (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).
122 Heininger, *Peacekeeping in Transition*, p.48.
123 See discussion in Chapter Three.

decisions of the Khmer Rouge to allow access to the Repatriation Component, despite denying such access to the rest of UNTAC.

Given their wider obstruction of the peace process, there is little reason to expect the Khmer Rouge to cooperate with repatriation, and their active opposition to refugee return could have derailed the repatriation effort. A small number of refugees wished to return to Khmer Rouge areas, but more broadly, UNTAC needed to ensure the security of returning refugees, who would pass through or near to Khmer Rouge areas during their transit from the Thai border camps. The Khmer Rouge had consistently denied access to UNTAC to conduct any information gathering and, throughout the operation, had been responsible for attacks on UNTAC helicopters and vehicles. Yet UNTAC managed not only to secure the repatriation process, but also to return refugees to Khmer Rouge areas, with cooperation from the otherwise non-compliant party. Explaining this case of effectiveness requires close attention to the informal diplomacy of Sergio Vieira de Mello, head of the Repatriation Component, who

> managed to avert the worst of the Khmer Rouge spoiling by dealing directly with the faction, convincing its leaders of the non-political, humanitarian nature of the component, and, when necessary, its separateness from the rest of UNTAC.[124]

Vieira de Mello, a veteran of the UN Interim Force in Lebanon in addition to numerous UNHCR missions, engaged in a deliberate and continuous strategy to build Khmer Rouge cooperation with the repatriation effort. At its core was the practice of 'black boxing'. As he described it, '[s]ometimes you have to black box past behaviour and black box future intentions'.[125] Vieira de Mello took advantage of the Repatriation Component's separate identity; it allowed him to 'quietly praise' the Khmer Rouge for cooperation with repatriation while the rest of UNTAC criticised them for non-compliance with other goals. While other UNTAC leaders were consistently denied access to Khmer Rouge territory, Vieira de Mello

[124] Howard, *UN Peacekeeping in Civil Wars*, p.162.
[125] Samantha Power, *Chasing the Flame: Sergio Vieira De Mello and the Fight to Save the World* (London: Allen Lane, 2008), p.98.

made several trips to Khmer Rouge camps to negotiate refugee return. Notably, he did this without the security of UNTAC troops or police, accompanied only by a small group of experts to survey areas for their resettlement potential.[126] Crucially, Vieira de Mello did not marginalise the Khmer Rouge as other elements of UNTAC had; instead, he actively engaged them, according Khmer Rouge leaders the respect of their status within the party and 'black boxing' the horrendous nature of past Khmer Rouge atrocities. Rather than negotiating ideal agreements, he reached pragmatic settlements in which the Repatriation Component would benefit communities through quick impact projects and the provision of food, medical assistance, and diesel for bulldozers to improve road access, without a large presence for UNTAC troops.[127]

While these direct communications succeeded in securing the cooperation of some Khmer Rouge with repatriation, Vieira de Mello saw in them the larger potential to open up dialogue with the Khmer Rouge, using the Repatriation Component as a 'wedge' for other parts of UNTAC to gain access and eventual cooperation. In Vieira de Mello's words:

> ...we all felt that there was an interest in maintaining at least one channel open with the Khmer Rouges... I believe that in [sic] balance when they met at the top, with number one, which we know they did, to evaluate the pros and cons of their cooperation with us, they must have come to the conclusion that they also had an interest in maintaining a minimal level of dialogue with the UN through the humanitarian component which was probably the only one that could bring objective benefits to them. All the others...brought bad news to the Khmer Rouge. I am not naive, I know that they were also using us but we were using them too.[128]

Repatriation to Khmer Rouge areas began in January 1993, and the Khmer Rouge with whom Vieira de Mello had negotiated kept their word, providing unmined, fertile land for returnees, while the Repatriation Component built an access road, bridges and wells.[129] While Vieira de Mello's vision of using this cooperation as a stepping stone to more

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126 Ibid., pp.101-106.
127 Ibid., p.111.
128 Sergio Vieira de Mello, interview by James S. Sutterlin, New York, 5 May 1998, for the Yale-UN Oral History Project.
129 Power, *Chasing the Flame*, pp.112-113.

cooperation with the Khmer Rouge was never realised, this small case indicates the effectiveness that is possible at the margins, even as other components of UNTAC struggled to make progress. Indeed, this practice of a compromise solution was eventually adopted throughout the operation, as UNTAC 'separated' itself from disarmament and demobilisation goals and persevered with elections amid highly compromised conditions.

The effectiveness of repatriation is thus explained by three factors. First, there was a fortuitous alignment of interests between refugees who wished to return, Cambodian factions who sought potential voters and the community benefits of Repatriation's resettlement projects, and UNTAC's repatriation aims. Yet, as I have argued, this interest explanation does not adequately capture the way UNTAC exercised power to achieve its repatriation goal. Doing so requires analysis of repatriation's 'strategic separateness': its distinct identity as a non-political, humanitarian enterprise. The source legitimacy derived from the strong consensus about repatriation in the Paris negotiations and reflected in the Paris Agreement was thus enhanced by the procedural legitimation of the repatriation component as a neutral, humanitarian actor distinct from the other, more politicised UNTAC components. Finally, repatriation was legitimised procedurally to the Khmer Rouge through the direct interactions between Vieira de Mello and Khmer Rouge leaders. Vieira de Mello engaged the Khmer Rouge elite, rather than marginalising them, and accorded them respect rather than criticising their actions. This high quality of treatment enabled Vieira de Mello to secure a pragmatic compromise with parts of the otherwise recalcitrant party, accepting that, while the Khmer Rouge may have used UNTAC in some ways, it still served a larger UNTAC goal. Again, the separate identity of repatriation is important: Vieira de Mello was probably able to achieve this only because of the clear normative framework of the refugee repatriation component, which was simply to facilitate

return within minimum conditions. This enabled Vieira de Mello to make compromises that were less feasible in UNTAC's more integrated pillars.

Importantly, Vieira de Mello's small break-throughs did not enhance the power of other UNTAC components over Khmer Rouge behaviour, nor did it enable him to moderate the larger Khmer Rouge positions towards UNTAC. However, the case does demonstrate two things: first, that progress towards some goals might be possible even if others are failing unequivocally; and second, given that there are likely to be cleavages and factions within a 'spoiling' party, there might be ways to move some towards cooperation even if others remain staunchly opposed.

Post-election military unification: tangible benefits, consultation and impartiality

The final outcome of UNTAC examined here concerns the decision by three of the four Cambodian parties to merge their armed forces in the immediate aftermath of the elections and deliver a unified national army to the newly elected government. This is surprising not so much because it represented a significant step towards reconciliation between formerly warring parties, but because it occurred while the political leaders of each party were threatening to resume violent conflict in the scramble for power that followed elections.[130] Under a subclause in Annex 2 of the Comprehensive Settlement in the Paris Agreements, the parties committed to 'respect and abide by whatever decision the newly elected government...takes with regard to the incorporation of parts of all those forces into a new national army'.[131] This assumed that any decision regarding military unification would be

[130] See Philip Shenon, 'Cambodian Prince Tells Troops to Prepare to Fight over Secession' *The New York Times*, 14 June 1993; Mark Dodd, 'Cambodia's Rival Armies to Form Unified Force' *Reuters News*, 10 June 1993.
[131] *The Paris Agreement*, Annex 2, Article 5(2).

political, made by the new government. In practice, the military elites led the way, thereby constraining the options of their political counterparts and preventing the threat of a coup and violent retaliation from materialising. While the Paris Agreements clearly envisaged the unification of Cambodia's remaining mobilised forces into a national army after elections, it was assumed that political leaders would determine the nature of this transformation. The participating military leaders thus went beyond the letter of their commitments under the Paris Agreements to provide a vital source of stability in the precarious post-election environment. Notably, while UNTAC was marginalised in the political contestation, it was actively involved in the crafting and implementation of the military unification. In this, the role of the Mixed Military Working Group (MMWG) was crucial.[132]

The Mixed Military Working Group

The MMWG was established in accordance with the Paris Agreements as a liaison mechanism, 'with a view to resolving any problems that may arise in the observance of the cease-fire'. [133] In practice, it acquired considerable influence over the four factions who were, to varying extents, still at war. In its technical coordination capacity, the MMWG increased transparency, built confidence and facilitated the discovery of mutual interests among the factions. In other words, the institution provided functional benefits to actors in a state of deep distrust, helping to facilitate cooperation and begin to overcome concerns about cheating.[134]

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[132] In the literature on UNTAC, the Mixed Military Working Group has received little analytical attention. Notable exceptions are found in publications authored by the UNTAC Force Commander; see Sanderson 1994a, 1994b, 1995a, 1995b. The analysis presented here draws on these sources, in addition to the reports, minutes and primary sources relating to the Mixed Military Working Group accessed through the *Sanderson Papers*, MS 359. In-depth interviews with General Sanderson and with Lieutenant Colonel Damien Healy, the Chief Liaison Officer of the Mixed Military Working Group, provided further details and context.

[133] *The Paris Agreement*, Annex 2, Article 2.

[134] On the role of peacekeepers in facilitating communication and alleviating fear and mistrust between warring parties, see Fortna, *Does Peacekeeping Work?*, pp.176-177.

But the MMWG's role was not simply one of technical coordination: it was an important channel through which UNTAC exercised power with respect to the behaviour of factional militaries. It enabled the Force Commander of UNTAC to speak directly to senior military representatives, providing him with a captive audience for the advancement of UNTAC's agenda.[135] Compared to bilateral negotiations between UNTAC and one faction, in which an individual factional representative has great power via the threat of 'exit' (i.e. ending a meeting), the multilateral setting of the MMWG allowed UNTAC to take advantage of the mutual animosities among factions to greatly decrease that threat.[136] By making transparent the positions of each faction, the MMWG laid bare the extent of their cooperation and utilised shaming techniques to leverage influence over the parties.

For this to work, the armed factions of each Party needed incentives to participate in the first place. The Parties benefitted from the MMWG in three ways. First, as noted earlier, the MMWG provided the functional benefits of an institution which helps actors realise the mutual benefits of cooperation; that is, to avoid misunderstandings that may lead to conflict, and to coordinate their activities towards shared interests. Second, the MMWG provided a formal forum in which the Parties could state their positions, clarify their interests and attempt to influence the agenda of UNTAC's military component as well as the military strategy of other factions.[137] Finally, the most important benefit was that gained by *being seen* to be cooperating with UNTAC.[138] As the gatekeeper of international approval, UNTAC

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135 Sanderson, 'UNTAC: Lessons Learnt: The Military Component View', pp.82-83.

136 On the concept of exit in bargaining negotiations, see Albert O. Hirschman, *Exit, Voice and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations and States* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970).

137 Indeed, even the Khmer Rouge used the MMWG forum to formally declare their positions on numerous issues within the peace process; see for example Statement by Major General Khieu Sophon [Samphan] at the 29th MMWG Level One Meeting, *Sanderson Papers*, MS 359, Box 19, Folder 94; Statement of Major General N. Bunno of NADK at the MMWG – level one, 9 Dec 1992, *Sanderson Papers*, MS 359, Box 2, Folder 3; Draft minutes of the Mixed Military Working Group Level One, 27th Meeting, 9 December 1992, *Sanderson Papers*, MS 359, Box 30, Folder 173.

138 When addressing the Mixed Military Working Group meetings, factional representatives of ANKI, KPNLAF and CPAF regularly emphasized their party's cooperation with UNTAC. For example,

had direct influence over the degree of international support – including resources – that flowed to Cambodia and the factions.

All parties thus had sufficient incentive to participate in the MMWG. Thus secured, the participation of the factions provided UNTAC with a captive audience through which to push its agenda in support of the peace process. Crucial, however, was the central role of UNTAC's military component: not only was the Force Commander the chair of the Group, but UNTAC staffed the MMWG Secretariat, which was responsible for drafting discussion papers, setting the agenda of meetings, establishing the rules of procedure and inviting observers and other non-military participants.[139] This agenda-setting power was a crucial element of UNTAC's influence in a military context that rendered it powerless in many other respects.

Notably, UNTAC achieved some cooperation from the Khmer Rouge via the MMWG which, while marginal, was significant in particular issue areas and surprising given the party's otherwise hostile posture. There is certainly evidence of 'mock cooperation' by parties, particularly the Khmer Rouge: of appearing to cooperate with the MMWG in order either to buy time or to extract benefits without a genuine change in behaviour. Yet their participation does seem to have had an influence, if not on the overall posture of the party, then on the behaviour of specific representatives. When eleven peacekeepers were taken hostage by Khmer Rouge troops in Kratie, their release was negotiated through the

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before addressing the substantive issues of serious ceasefire violations and Khmer Rouge non-participation in the peace process, which were the key agenda points for the 27th meeting of the MMWG, General Kroeuch Yoeum (ANKI) stated: 'First, I would like to say that our faction, the ANKI faction, has always respected…and given its co-operation to UNTAC'; similarly, General Lay Bunsong (KPNLAF) began his address by stressing 'again that KPNLAF still complies with the Paris Agreement. In our zone, the assurance of the security of UNTAC people is our task'; while General Phoeung Siphan (CPAF) stated 'Under the terms of the Paris Agreement our faction has done our best to implement this Agreement and has fully co-operated with UNTAC. We make an effort to fully implement all decisions.' (Draft minutes of the Mixed Military Working Group Level One, 27th Meeting, 9 December 1992, *Sanderson Papers*, MS 359, Box 30, Folder 173).

[139] Sanderson, 'UNTAC: Lessons Learnt: The Military Component View', pp.82-83.

MMWG.[140] The lead negotiator was Lt. Col. Damien Healy, the Chief Liaison Officer of the MMWG's Secretariat in Phnom Penh. Healy credits the relationship of trust he had built with the NADK liaison officers through their regular contact in the MWMG with the successful outcome of hostage negotiations.

The quality of treatment accorded by UNTAC representatives was also important in securing the hostages' release. Leading the MMWG delegation to Kratie, Healy met with the local NADK commander in his headquarters and listened to 'yet another' recitation of the Khmer Rouge 'standard diatribe' on its position regarding the peace plan. Healy recalls that, although they had heard the rendition of Khmer Rouge pre-conditions for compliance 'time and again' in the MMWG, he patiently listened one more time in order to secure the hostages' release. He understood that the lengthy speech was for an audience of Khmer Rouge cadre as much as for UNTAC, and that it was important to acknowledge their perspective in order to play that role of 'honest broker'.[141] By listening to the Khmer Rouge objections to the unannounced presence of UNTAC troops in its territory, UNTAC personnel accorded respect to the status of the local commander. But respecting the right of the local commander to speak also gave UNTAC the opportunity to respond, to exert moral pressure by countering the Khmer Rouge position, emphasising the right of UNTAC forces, under the Paris Agreements, to patrol the countryside despite Khmer Rouge objections. Healy argues that such direct, verbal communication was a powerful weapon in UNTAC's armoury. By pointing to the Paris Agreements as the source of that authority, UNTAC personnel also invoked moral arguments about the Khmer Rouge's own obligations under the peace plan to which they had agreed. The legitimacy thus gained was not sufficient to move the Khmer Rouge towards cooperation with UNTAC's larger ceasefire, disarmament

[140] 'Khmer Rouge Lets UNTAC 11 Go after Execution Threat' *Straits Times*, 21 December 1992.
[141] Damien Healy, interview by author, Moss Vale, 9 June 2009.

and demobilisation goals, but it did help to persuade the Khmer Rouge to cooperate on flashpoint issues such as this.

The Paris Agreements provided an important form of source legitimacy for UNTAC and their provisions formed the basis of all negotiations in the MMWG. As Sanderson describes it:

> The language of obligation was core to all our negotiations…Our only authority came from the mandates and the fact that we represented the entire international community. We had nothing else to justify both our presence in the country and our activities within the communities. I drummed this into all my subordinates and it was the raison d'etre of the MMWG.[142]

The minutes and reports of the MMWG meetings confirm that UNTAC personnel, particularly the Force Commander, did indeed draw heavily on the Paris Agreements and subsequent UN Security Council resolutions to justify their presence and activities, and to legitimise the operation to military elites.[143] The normative touchstone of the Paris Agreements is evident in UNTAC's attempts to influence the behaviour of the participating military elite regarding their post-election unification. A small provision in the Paris Agreements obliged the parties to make available any remaining, mobilised forces 'to the newly elected government…for consideration for incorporation into a new national army'.[144]

Military unification in post-election instability

Yet the identity of the new government was far from assured in the weeks following the elections and UNTAC was sidelined in the scramble for political power; the provision's inclusion in the Paris Agreements was certainly not sufficient to ensure its implementation. As it became clear that the CPP had lost, the party threatened to reject the election results. There are reports that the CPP had prepared its army for a coup d'état and had drawn up a

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[142] John Sanderson, email correspondence with the author, 5 December 2009.
[143] For example, see Report on Twenty Sixth MMWG Level One Meeting, 12 October 1992, *Sanderson Papers*, MS 359, Box 29, Folder 167; Mixed Military Working Group Level One, 27th Meeting, 9 December 1992, *Sanderson Papers*, MS 359, Box 29, Folder 167.
[144] *The Paris Agreement*, Annex 2, Article 5.2(b).

list of opposition figures, mainly FUNCINPEC officials, for arrest.[145] Meanwhile, the Khmer Rouge seized the opportunity to support the election victory of FUNCINPEC and threatened to resume war against the CPP if it did not hand over power.[146] Prince Sihanouk intervened with a short-lived power-sharing plan in which he would become Prime Minister and supreme military commander, with his son Prince Ranariddh (FUNCINPEC) and Hun Sen (CPP) as dual Deputy Prime Ministers.[147] Opposition to the plan from FUNCINPEC, UN officials and key sponsors of the peace plan forced Sihanouk to abandon this first power-sharing government.[148] Amid continued political fighting, on June 10 two senior CPP figures declared that an 'autonomous zone' covering Cambodia's eastern provinces was seceding and, as such, would be outside UNTAC's jurisdiction. Prince Norodom Chakrapong, another of Sihanouk's sons and a CPP member who had been barred by UNTAC from contesting the elections for breaking the electoral law, rejected the election results and requested the withdrawal of UNTAC personnel from the autonomous zone 'because their safety could not be guaranteed'.[149] FUNCINPEC responded with the threat to send its forces 'to fight and to liberate that part of Cambodia…We are not going to accept any partition of Cambodia.'[150] The secession attempt was quickly abandoned, however, and the CPP brought back into the tent by a second power-sharing deal brokered by Sihanouk. This deal stuck and paved the way for Sihanouk to become head of state with Prince Ranariddh and Hun Sen as co-chairs of an interim coalition government.

While the post-election mayhem was notable for its theatrics, brinksmanship and Shakespearean family feuds, it was defined by the absence of military forces from the fight.

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145 Rodney Tasker and Nate Thayer, 'Cambodia: Difficult Birth' *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 10 June 1993.
146 'Khmer Rouge 'Will Back Funcinpec' If Violence Erupts' *Straits Times*, 2 June 1993.
147 Philip Shenon, 'Sihanouk Names a Government in Cambodia, Then Withdraws' *The New York Times*, 4 June 1993.
148 For more, see Roberts, *Political Transition in Cambodia 1991-1999*.
149 Philip Shenon, 'Eastern Cambodia Moves to Secede' *The New York Times*, 13 June 1993.
150 Quoted in Shenon, 'Cambodian Prince Tells Troops to Prepare to Fight over Secession'.

As their political leaders manoeuvred for advantage and threatened to resume violence, the military elites remained above the fray. On June 9, the influential General Ke Kim Yang, Deputy Defence Minister of the SOC, assured UNTAC that his CPAF forces would not take sides in the political contest between CPP and FUNCINPEC,[151] thus constraining any moves for a violent coup or a return to armed conflict. The next day, as Prince Chakrapong announced the secession and Hun Sen warned that the break-up of Cambodia was imminent, the military commanders of CPAF, ANKI and KPNLAF issued a joint communiqué announcing their agreement to unify their forces into a Cambodian national army, answerable to a democratically-elected government.[152] The agreement was reached in a MMWG meeting under the chairmanship of General Sanderson and emphasised the commitment of the commanders to the peace process. The same day, in a clear rejection of the violence threatened by their political leader Hun Sen, 40 CPAF generals pledged their loyalty to Sihanouk at the royal palace. At another MMWG meeting on 23 June, the commanders officially established the Cambodian Armed Forces, offered their loyalty to Sihanouk as commander-in-chief, and established mechanisms for coordinating the new national army during the transition period.[153]

The restraint and unification of the armed forces following elections provided a crucial source of stability in the volatile political climate. In Sanderson's words:

> This unification paid critical dividends in the politically ambiguous period immediately after the elections, when some of the losers tried to unravel the process…No coup attempt could have been sure of success without the support of an army.[154]

The process of frequent negotiation and cooperation in the MMWG had provided the basis for its local military participants to reach agreement on the unification of their militaries. It

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151 Tan Lian Choo, 'Phnom Penh Troops 'to Stay Neutral in Political Talks' *Straits Times*, 9 June 1993.
152 Lindsay Murdoch, 'The Ultimate Bad Loser' *The Age*, 12 June 1993; Dodd, 'Cambodia's Rival Armies to Form Unified Force'.
153 See 'Statement of Joint Chiefs of Staff of Cambodian Armed Forces' *Voice of the People of Cambodia, via BBC Monitoring Service: Asia-Pacific*, 29 June 1993.
154 Sanderson, 'UNTAC: The Military Component View', p.82.

provided a forum in which the military factions became used to sitting around the same table, talking and working together to solve problems, and raising objections in a non-confrontational setting.[155] The successful military cooperation on electoral security provided an important basis for the subsequent iteration of cooperation on unification. While the MMWG Secretariat had been conducting negotiations on post-election matters among the local military representatives for months with little progress, the joint action to secure the election process 'had engendered great professional pride and had drawn former enemies together'.[156]

But the MMWG provided more than just these technical cooperation benefits. It also provided the Military Component with a forum to directly engage Cambodia's military leaders in discussions and plans for the country's military future. Staff of the MMWG Secretariat would painstakingly explain the role and functions of a military under a civilian commander-in-chief, drawing diagrams of government structures and legal authority on whiteboards. Further, the Secretariat had drafted a Defence Act for Cambodia, drawing on those of Australia, Bangladesh, India and Pakistan as templates. The MMWG provided the forum for Cambodian military leaders to agree that General Ke Kim Yang would be the Chief of the General Staff, and UNTAC staff in the Secretariat provided the guidance and legal framework for the military transition. As important, UNTAC's MMWG personnel persuaded the military elite, through painstaking negotiations, that unification was the right thing to do under the Paris Agreements, and for the future of Cambodia.

Operation Paymaster: short-lived inducement

Having attained this elite-level cooperation, UNTAC then faced the challenge of shoring up the command structures of each faction and addressing the problem that rank-and-file

[155] In interviews with the author, both John Sanderson and Damien Healy gave credit to the informal communications facilitated by the MMWG, for example during coffee breaks in meetings.
[156] Sanderson, 'UNTAC: The Military Component View', p.82.

soldiers and police were resorting to widespread banditry and violent crime to earn a living. The operation saw in this an opportunity to use inducement to secure the loyalty of these groups. The parties had bankrupted themselves during the electoral campaign and had run out of funds to pay their forces. An estimated 450 000 soldiers, militia and police remained under arms throughout Cambodia, the vast majority of these belonging to the SOC who also had a large civil service.[157] As the fear of banditry among disintegrating forces grew, General Sanderson developed a scheme under which troops who pledged allegiance to (now) King Sihanouk and joined the unified national army would be paid from an international fund. Codenamed 'Operation Paymaster', it used the remains of a UNAMIC trust fund to pay the salaries of soldiers as an incentive for unification.[158] The MMWG implemented the scheme, which began in August 1993 and oversaw the creation of a uniform pay structure across ranks and registered 128 000 troops.[159]

Operation Paymaster aimed to induce the loyalty of rank-and-file soldiers, thus providing a source of stability but also reducing the incidence of banditry throughout the country. In the short-term, the plan proved effective in reforming the various armed forces into a unified, simplified force and accounting for the actual number of serving personnel. However, the scheme could not ensure the viability or unity of the force beyond that. Corruption was pervasive throughout the new Royal Cambodian Armed Forces (RCAF) and lawlessness spread as 'former and serving military personnel, bandits and extortionists increasingly operated with impunity'.[160] RCAF forces manned illegal checkpoints in the countryside and traded military supplies, even to the Khmer Rouge; initial victories against Khmer Rouge

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[157] Nate Thayer and Rodney Tasker, 'Cambodia: Voice of the People' *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 3 June 1993.
[158] Azimi, ed., *UNTAC: Debriefing and Lessons*, p.14.
[159] Shawcross, *Deliver Us from Evil*, pp.90-91; John C. Brown, 'Army Pay-Off Gets Underway' *Phnom Penh Post*, 13 August 1993.
[160] Findlay, *Cambodia: The Legacy and Lessons of UNTAC*, p.165.

forces were soon reversed in 'humiliating military defeats' which revealed 'the dire need for restructuring and reforming the RCAF'.[161]

Thus while UNTAC had succeeded in gaining the cooperation of military elites immediately after the elections, the limitations of this top-down approach soon became apparent. The obstruction of UNTAC's disarmament and demobilisation activities by elites, particularly of the Khmer Rouge and SOC, meant that the operation had been unable to fundamentally reform the military situation in Cambodia. The failure of disarmament and demobilisation had derailed any hope of an effective reintegration program that might have forestalled the later lawlessness. The operation did not have a mandate to retrain soldiers and police.[162] Other than through their military commanders, UNTAC had no power to influence the behaviour of the huge number of rank-and-file soldiers who would ultimately be responsible for the stability of Cambodia. While the MMWG proved an effective means by which to shape the decisions of these military elite, its effects were neither sustainable nor transmitted to the lower ranks.

The experience of Operation Paymaster also raises questions about the utility of relying on inducement to influence the longer-term behaviour of local actors. While providing budget support helped UNTAC to deliver a unified army to the new Cambodian government by verifying a large proportion of the enlisted troops, it was soon exploited through the registration of 'phantom' soldiers.[163] Further, neither Operation Paymaster nor the unification of armed forces prevented the spread of lawlessness or the resumption of political violence in the coming years. The norms of military professionalism had not been internalised and, as a result, the declaration of loyalty to a new national army was valued only

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[161] Ibid., p.165.
[162] Nevertheless, the Australian and Singaporean CivPol units undertook ad hoc training of local police in their areas of deployment; see Widyono, *Dancing in Shadows*, p.91; Heininger, *Peacekeeping in Transition*, pp.80-81.
[163] Shawcross, *Deliver Us from Evil*, pp.90-91.

insofar as it produced tangible rewards. While UNTAC may have legitimised the project of unification to military elites engaged in the MMWG, the actions of rank-and-file soldiers and political elites soon unravelled any potential for it to be a sustainable source of peace.

Conclusion

This chapter has examined the crucial successes of UNTAC using the power-legitimacy framework developed in Chapter Two. By examining its sources of power and legitimacy and their interactions, I explained variation in the operation's effectiveness across a number of its goals.

In Chapter Three, I argued UNTAC lacked the power to coerce, induce or pull the Khmer Rouge towards compliance with its ceasefire, disarmament and demobilisation demands. While UNTAC failed to influence the key decisions of Cambodia's political elite regarding the military settlement, in this chapter I have argued that it was more successful in shaping the behaviour of the people. Popular cooperation with the operation was crucial to the effective conduct of elections in very difficult conditions. That 89.5% of the electorate cast their vote, despite ongoing violence and intimidation, was due to UNTAC's legitimacy with two important groups: the military elite of participating factions, and the mass population.

First, the operation protected the elections by enhancing its coercive power to deter Khmer Rouge violence. It did so by concentrating its military resources on electoral protection and by securing the cooperation of local armed forces as de facto extensions of the operation. Through the institution of the Mixed Military Working Group, senior UNTAC military personnel developed relationships with their local counterparts based on trust, transparency and negotiation. The engagement of Cambodia's military elites in meaningful consultation provided UNTAC with an important process of legitimation; in the case of electoral security,

this legitimacy provided the basis on which local armed forces cooperated with the operation.

Second, UNTAC successfully legitimised its presence, goals and power with the Cambodian people. The operation gained popular support at the outset as the harbinger of change in a country shattered by decades of violence. But, importantly, sections of UNTAC continued to provide reasons for local people to support the operation's goals and cooperate with its activities. The Military Component's civic action programs legitimised the operation substantively, demonstrating its commitment to the people by providing tangible benefits and effectively bypassing the political and military elite to form a direct relationship with the population. Similarly, UNTAC's communications strategy also spoke directly to the people, countering factional propaganda and demonstrating the operation's political neutrality and trustworthiness through factual reporting. In particular, Radio UNTAC became a trusted source of information and a powerful source of influence on the beliefs of the population regarding the elections. UNTAC's communications successfully convinced people that the ballot would be secret and that their vote could be cast without fear of reprisal. Finally, UNTAC's volunteer electoral officers reinforced this message through direct, interpersonal communications. The quality of treatment they accorded to Cambodians legitimised the electoral officers and, importantly, compensated for the poor behaviour of other UNTAC personnel.

UNTAC thus derived significant power from its local legitimacy. While it was marginalised in the bigger political bargaining process, the operation forged direct relationships with key local actors that bypassed this elite obstruction. Yet its successful shaping of elite military behaviour in the immediate aftermath of the elections suggests that such marginalisation by elites is not inevitable. The Mixed Military Working Group allowed UNTAC to exercise power through direct relationships with senior Cambodian military leaders. Importantly, this

relationship was based on local perceptions of UNTAC's legitimacy, built through regular interactions in a forum which engaged these local actors in meaningful consultation and negotiation. While UNTAC's influence was not sufficient to sustain the unification of Cambodia's armed forces over the longer term, it does provide an important example of the operation's ability to shape elite decisions and thereby achieve its goals.

In the next two chapters, I examine the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI). Using the power-legitimacy framework, I examine that operation's key successes and challenges, before comparing these with my findings about UNTAC in the concluding chapter.

Chapter Five: RAMSI's first phase – early effectiveness in 2003-2004

> *'Now, children can walk to school freely, women can walk through the gardens and men can be confident and safe without a gun at their sides. The wrongdoers are being charged and cases are being heard in court. If something wrong happens, you can call the police and know that they will help. All these things were not possible just eight months ago before Australia and other nations of the South Pacific came to our shores. It has given us hope.'*
>
> The Hon. Paul Tovua
> Chairman, Solomon Islands National Peace Council[1]

Solomon Islands is an archipelago of nearly 1000 islands in the southwest Pacific, lying to the east of Papua New Guinea and the northeast of Australia.[2] With a population of about half a million, a majority live on the country's two main islands, Guadalcanal and Malaita. In 1998, the 'happy isles' began a downward spiral into crisis, beset by civil conflict, widespread violence, severe economic decline, and the displacement of over thirty thousand people. A peace agreement in 2000 made little impact on the worsening security situation, and by 2003 the country was deemed to be a failing state.[3] Citing national and regional security justifications, an Australian-led regional intervention was deployed in July of that year. Just twelve months later, the operation had overseen a dramatic turnaround in Solomon Islands' security and was hailed a remarkable success.

This chapter examines the power and legitimacy of RAMSI, the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands, during its first twelve months. In this period, the operation achieved a high degree of effectiveness with remarkable speed: it restored basic security; secured the widespread disarmament and demobilisation of militia; stabilised government finances; and delivered essential public services. In the next chapter, I examine RAMSI's more troubling second phase and explain why the operation was less able to achieve its goals after 2004.

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[1] Paul Tovua, 'Rescuing Democracy in the Solomon Islands' *Speech to The Centre for Democratic Institutions* Canberra, 8 March 2004.
[2] See map, Appendix B.
[3] Elsina Wainwright, *Our Failing Neighbour: Australia and the Future of the Solomon Islands* Australian Strategic Policy Institute, June 2003.

This chapter's first section analyses the conflict setting, locating RAMSI in the context of previous interventions. Section two examines RAMSI's development and outlines the operation's first phase activities. I then examine RAMSI's powers of coercion, inducement and source legitimacy, before analysing its substantive and procedural legitimacy through the operation's two most significant achievements: the collection of weapons and the arrest of the Weathercoast warlord Harold Keke.

The conflict setting

Solomon Islands was a state born weak.[4] British colonial rule aggregated several hundred separate cultural and linguistic groups, spread throughout approximately four hundred populated islands, into a territorial entity with little indigenous nationalism.[5] Parliamentary democracy was introduced in 1974, just four years prior to independence; like so many post-colonial states, the newly-independent Solomon Islands had democratic state structures without the traditions of democratic governance.[6] Less than 5% of the population was educated to primary school level,[7] and the formalised political structures of parliamentary democracy clashed with loosely organised, shifting systems of traditional leadership revolving around 'big men'.[8] Postcolonial state weakness was exacerbated by the exploitation of *wantok* allegiances to kinship networks, through the personalisation of power in government and the

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[4] Solomon Mamaloni, 'The Road to Independence' in *Independence, Dependence, Interdependence: The First 10 Years of Solomon Islands Independence*, ed. R. Crocombe and E. Tuza (Suva and Honiara: Institute of Pacific Studies, USP Honiara Centre and the Solomon Islands College of Higher Education, 1992), p.4.

[5] Gerard A. Finin and Terence Wesley-Smith, 'Coups, Conflicts and Crises: The New Pacific Way?' *Race Class* 42, no. 4 (2001).

[6] Michael Fullilove, *The Testament of Solomons: RAMSI and International State-Building* Lowy Institute for International Policy, 2006, p.5.

[7] Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, *Solomon Islands: Rebuilding an Island Economy* Australian Government, 2004, p.32 footnote 1.

[8] Finin and Wesley-Smith, 'Coups, Conflicts and Crises', p.7; see also Judith Bennett, 'Roots of Conflict in Solomon Islands – Though Much Is Taken, Much Abides: Legacies of Tradition and Colonialism' Discussion Paper 2002/5, Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies, The Australian National University, 2002.

bureaucracy.[9] This facilitated the proliferation of political and economic corruption, further weakening the state's capacity to provide for its citizens. In the absence of a centralised state able to ensure the adequate provision of public goods, other sites of governance – churches, NGOs, village-level institutions – have historically been more influential in the lives of most Solomon Islands citizens.[10]

State weakness is central to an explanation of the emergence of violent conflict in Solomon Islands, since the consequences of the state's inability to provide security or social welfare for its citizens was a primary source of the grievances from which conflict emerged. While the combatants organised along ethnic lines, the roots of the conflict lie in contestation over the distribution of resources, and its frequent characterisation as an ethnic conflict is 'a lazy shorthand explanation that divorces the crisis from contemporary socio-economic contexts'.[11]

The nation's capital was relocated to Honiara after WWII, and migration from other provinces – especially Malaita – soon followed.[12] The acquisition of customary land by Malaitan migrants, either through sale or illegal squatting, generated resentment among some Guadalcanal groups, whose grievances were exacerbated by the perceived unequal distribution of benefits from the island's development. Compensation demands by some Guale drew no response from the state; the government later acknowledged that the failure of successive governments to satisfactorily respond to these demands prompted the

9 '*Wantok*' literally means 'one talk'; the term identifies members of the same clan or broad family group.

10 Tarcisius Tara Kabutaulaka, '"Failed State" And the War on Terror: Intervention in Solomon Islands' *AsiaPacific Issues* No. 72, March 2004.

11 Tarcisius Tara Kabutaulaka, 'Beyond Ethnicity: The Political Economy of the Guadalcanal Crisis in Solomon Islands' Working Paper 01/1, State, Society and Melanesia Project Working Project, Australian National University, 2001; see also Finin and Wesley-Smith, 'Coups, Conflicts and Crises'; David Hegarty, 'Monitoring Peace in Solomon Islands' Background paper prepared for the *Solomon Islands Workshop: Building Peace and Stability*, Canberra, 24-26 October 2001.

12 Sinclair Dinnen, 'Guns, Money and Politics: Disorder in the Solomon Islands' in *'Arc of Instability'? Melanesia in the early 2000s,* edited by Ron May (Canberra, ACT: State, Society and Governance in Melanesia Project, Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies, Australian National University, 2003), p.2.

establishment of Guadalcanal militia.[13] A campaign of violence and intimidation against Malaitan settlers by groups of Guadalcanal men, later known as the Istabu Freedom Movement (IFM), had displaced some twenty thousand people by mid-1999.[14] The influence of conflict on neighbouring Bougainville aided the escalation of grievance into violent, militarised conflict by spreading small arms and contributing to a 'glorification of gun culture'.[15]

Amid worsening violence and unable to secure protection or justice from the state, a group of displaced Malaitans formed their own militia organisation and began making counter-claims for government compensation. Known as the Malaitan Eagle Force (MEF), they had close links with the police force, which was dominated by ethnic Malaitan officers. The country's only security force, the Royal Solomon Islands Police (RSIP), was severely compromised during the conflict, either implicated in militia violence and criminal thuggery or paralysed by it.[16] In January 2000, the MEF raided a police armoury on Malaita, seizing high-powered weapons and declaring their readiness to secure compensation by force if necessary.[17]

As Solomon Islands descended into ethnic conflict, international actors made several attempts to restore order. In June 1999, at the request of the Solomon Islands government, a Commonwealth Special Envoy made several visits to negotiate with militia leaders. The two peace accords produced were unable to adequately address underlying concerns, and

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13 *The Honiara Peace Accord*, Solomon Islands, 28 June 1999, article 2.
14 This was described by the United Nations as 'ethnic cleansing' (United Nations, *Civil Unrest and Displacement in the Solomon Islands: Final Report from the UN Coordination Support Advisor*, 11 March 2000).
15 Elsina Wainwright, 'Responding to State Failure: The Case of Australia and Solomon Islands' *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 57, no. 3 (2003), p.488.
16 Ibid.
17 Amnesty International, *Solomon Islands: A Forgotten Conflict* Amnesty International, available: http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGASA430052000?open&of=ENG-SLB, pp.5-6; 'Solomon Islands – Malaita Leader Warns of "Full-Scale Civil War or Revolution"' *BBC Monitoring Asia-Pacific*, 17 March 2000.

questions were raised about the mediator's neutrality.[18] Later that year, a Commonwealth-sponsored Multinational Police Peace Monitoring Group was deployed, comprising twenty-five unarmed officers from Fiji and Vanuatu, supported financially by Australia and New Zealand.[19] Neither Commonwealth initiative had significant impact and on 5 June 2000 the MEF and members of the police force staged a political coup, taking the incumbent prime minister hostage and forcing his government from power.

Previous requests from deposed Prime Minister Ulufa'alu for assistance from Australia and New Zealand were denied. Following the coup, however, the two neighbouring countries brokered a ceasefire between militia groups, which built momentum towards broader peace negotiations in Australia several months later. The resulting Townsville Peace Agreement outlined a framework for the cessation of hostilities between the IFM and MEF, and established an indigenous Peace Monitoring Council and an International Peace Monitoring Team (IPMT).[20]

The IPMT was the institutional forebear to RAMSI, and while in substantive terms it ultimately failed to achieve its mandated objectives, the small monitoring operation laid the groundwork for the later, more comprehensive peace operation. The IPMT was mandated, in subsequent revision of the peace agreement, 'to build confidence in the peace process between the parties and within the community; to conduct the return of weapons from

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[18] *The Honiara Peace Accord*; *The Panatina Agreement*, (12 August 1999); Tarcisius Tara Kabutaulaka, 'A Weak State and the Solomon Islands Peace Process' East-West Center Working Papers, *Pacific Islands Development Series* No 14, April 2002, pp.11-12.

[19] Martin Sharp, 'Australian Policy on the 'Ethnic Tensions' in Solomon Islands 1999-2001' Background paper prepared for the *Solomon Islands Workshop: Building Peace and Stability*, Canberra, 24-26 October 2001.

[20] For more on the PMC and IMPT, see Hegarty, 'Monitoring Peace in Solomon Islands'.

militants and communities (disarmament); to store such armaments securely; and to report to and to work in support of the [Peace Monitoring Council]'.[21]

The IPMT's legitimacy challenges were great. Its source legitimacy was severely limited by the peace agreement's woefully unrealistic provisions, which assumed the cohesiveness and genuine commitment to peace of militia groups and the Solomon Islands government, neither of which was extant.[22] The peace agreement required the government to undertake significant development, governance and peace-making initiatives, which it had neither the capacity nor the will to deliver, not least because 'it was still largely in thrall to those forces that had made and led the coup'.[23] Further, the blanket amnesties provided to militia and police did not accord with local law or with the desires of the local population for the perpetrators of violence to be held to account.[24] Finally, the peace agreement was an agreement between the two militia groups and the government; other domestic actors were excluded from the process. Given the influential role of churches, NGOs, and women's and village groups in society generally and in peace-making attempts in particular, the agreement's unrepresentative nature contributed to the gap between its ambitious objectives and the prospects for their practical achievement.[25]

While the IPMT suffered a severe lack of both source and substantive legitimacy, its procedural legitimacy was remarkably high. Though unable to make up for its other limitations, the procedures of the IPMT provided the basis for limited success in

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[21] David Hegarty, 'Peace Interventions in the South Pacific: Lessons from Bougainville and Solomon Islands', (paper presented at the Asia-Pacific Centre for Security Studies Conference Honolulu, Hawaii, 15-17 July 2003); note that this significantly revised the mandate given to the IPMT under the TPA, which had included human rights monitoring, and training and advising police alongside less precise versions of the mandate defined here.

[22] Kabutaulaka, 'A Weak State and the Solomon Islands Peace Process'.

[23] Hegarty, 'Peace Interventions in the South Pacific: Lessons from Bougainville and Solomon Islands', p.7.

[24] Kabutaulaka, 'A Weak State and the Solomon Islands Peace Process'.

[25] For a detailed account of the agreement's flaws, see Matthew Wale, 'The Solomon Islands Peace Process - Made in Townsville, Made for Unsustainability' (paper presented at the Solomon Islands Workshop: Building Peace and Stability, Canberra, Australian National University, 24-26 October 2001).

disarmament; despite having no power of coercion or inducement, the IPMT nevertheless collected and disposed of a surprising number of weapons. That violence flared despite this does not detract from the power derived from the operation's procedural legitimacy. As David Hegarty describes, the IPMT:

> was certainly well received in the rural communities, it for a time established good rapport with militant leaders, it succeeded in collecting and later disposing of over 2100 weapons, and it helped mobilise and give confidence to elements of civil society that remain active today.[26]

Crucial to its procedural legitimacy was the operation's partnership with the indigenous Peace Monitoring Council, which later became the National Peace Council (NPC). Many practices developed through this partnership were later adopted by RAMSI, including the public celebration of weapons collections, cooperation with NPC monitors, and a Weapons-Free Village campaign. This partnership was the IPMT's most important legacy, and the positive local reception it received appears to have laid important foundations for RAMSI's subsequent intervention, particularly in disarmament.

In the period between the Townsville Peace Agreement and RAMSI's deployment, the conflict degenerated into violent criminality perpetrated by splintering militia groups and criminal opportunists. While areas of the country remained free of conflict, it is estimated that 85% of Solomon Islanders were directly affected by the resulting insecurity.[27] Meanwhile, the economy contracted by a quarter between 1998 and 2002; falling revenue and the diversion of funds through official corruption halted service delivery, with education and health services particularly affected.[28]

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[26] Hegarty, 'Peace Interventions in the South Pacific: Lessons from Bougainville and Solomon Islands', p.5.

[27] Amnesty International, *Solomon Islands: Women Confronting Violence* Amnesty International, available: http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/ENGASA430012004; see also Global IDP Project, *Profile of Internal Displacement: Solomon Islands* Norwegian Refugee Council/Global IDP Project, 2004.

[28] For more, see Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, *Solomon Islands: Rebuilding an Island Economy*; Pacific Islands Forum/UNDP, *Social Impact Assessment of Peace Restoration Initiatives in Solomon Islands* Suva: Pacific Islands Forum/UNDP, 2004.

The decision to intervene

At the request of the Solomon Islands government, in July 2003 the Australian government reversed its position on direct intervention in Solomon Islands and led a force of over 2000 personnel in the region's largest military deployment since World War II. With the 'war on terror' and the 2002 Bali bombings prompting revisions of Australian security priorities, the consequences of impending state failure in Solomon Islands were interpreted as 'both a national interest and an international expectation' that needed to be addressed.[29] Earlier that year, the Australian Foreign Minister had disparaged the prospect of such intervention as 'folly in the extreme'; [30] the turnaround was justified by the Australian government in national security terms, citing the spectre of failed states as 'safehavens for transnational criminals and even terrorists'. [31]

With this in mind, Australia began a coalition-building process; from the outset, it was clear that the peace operation would be Australian-led in practice but multilateral in design. The peace operation was unanimously endorsed by the sixteen members of the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) in a meeting of Foreign Ministers on 30 June 2003,[32] under the Biketawa framework for regional intervention.[33]

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[29] Commonwealth of Australia, *Parliamentary Debates*, House of Representatives, 12 August 2003 (John Howard, Prime Minister), p.18198; see also Kabutaulaka, '"Failed State" And the War on Terror: Intervention in Solomon Islands' .

[30] Alexander Downer, 'Neighbours Cannot Be Recolonised' *The Australian*, 8 January 2003.

[31] Commonwealth of Australia, *Parliamentary Debates*, House of Representatives, 12 August 2003 (John Howard, Prime Minister). This policy reversal has also been linked to Australian participation in the war in Iraq and the US encouragement for Australia to 'patrol its own backyard', see Richard Ponzio, 'The Solomon Islands: The UN and Intervention by Coalitions of the Willing' *International Peacekeeping* 12, no. 2 (2005).

[32] See 'Outcome Statement', Forum Foreign Affairs Ministers Meeting, Sydney, 30 June 2003, available http://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/spacific/regional_orgs/ffamm_solomons_0306.html. The Pacific Islands Forum is a regional organisation comprising Australia, Cook Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, Fiji, Kiribati, Nauru, New Zealand, Niue, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Republic of Marshall Islands, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, and Vanuatu. It was founded in 1971 as the South Pacific Forum, and was renamed the Pacific Islands Forum in 2000.

[33] *Biketawa Declaration*, Pacific Islands Forum, 15 October 2000.

As defined by the enabling legislation, RAMSI's mandate specified the following objectives:[34]

1) the provision of security and safety to persons and property;
2) the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the life of the Solomon Islands community;
3) the prevention and suppression of violence, intimidation and crime;
4) supporting and maintaining law and order; and
5) supporting and developing Solomon Islands institutions.

While there is little dispute about this formal mandate, objectives such as 'the provision of security' or 'maintaining law and order' are undeniably vague. This ambiguity may have helped RAMSI planners and leaders to build consensus among the diverse regional and local actors who ultimately supported the mission. However, greater precision is required before the outcomes and causal mechanisms of RAMSI can be analysed, attained here by tracing communication trails about the operation in the lead-up to and early stages of its deployment. RAMSI's goals are identified below by examining the way its mandate was articulated by Foreign Ministers of the PIF, by representatives of the operation itself, and by Solomon Islands politicians and civil society actors.

RAMSI's immediate security objective was to *provide basic physical security for individuals* through policing, supported by armed military force if required. On arrival, RAMSI Special Coordinator Nick Warner made a public address 'to the people of Solomon Islands', emphasising that the operation's first priority was 'to provide safety and security to streets and villages and to get guns out of communities'.[35] RAMSI then aimed to restore law and order through *disarmament* and *the demobilisation of militia* through a domestic criminal justice approach which included police reform, and strengthening the judiciary and prisons.[36]

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34 Facilitation of International Assistance Act 2003, Solomon Islands (No.1 of 2003).

35 Nick Warner, 'Message to the People of Solomon Islands: Speech by Nick Warner, Special Coordinator, RAMSI, July 24 2003', http://www.dfat.gov.au/media/speeches/department/-240703_warner_soli.html.

36 'Outcome Statement', Forum Foreign Affairs Ministers Meeting; Paul Tovua, *Advertisement: "Returning law and order - Recovering the economy - Restoring lasting peace" authorised by Hon. Paul Tovua*, available http://www.peoplefirst.net.sb/intervention/transcripts.htm; Ben McDevitt, interview by author, Canberra, 9 January 2007.

RAMSI's rule of law objectives extended to governance, and the operation aimed to *end government corruption, extortion and stabilise government finances*. Warner stated that RAMSI 'will stop the culture of extortion that has brought this country to its knees', indicating its objective to protect officials from intimidation as well as addressing corruption. While not emphasised by Solomon Islands politicians, RAMSI's anti-corruption mandate was echoed by other actors locally and regionally.[37] RAMSI's longer-term aims were to (re)build and strengthen governance institutions, though there was little indication of what this would entail beyond technical advice. Finally, RAMSI aimed to *restore the delivery of essential government services* in areas such as health and education.[38]

In its first year, RAMSI oversaw a dramatic turnaround in the security situation of Solomon Islands. In its One Year Review, the Solomon Islands Intervention Task Force[39] concluded that:

> There is overwhelming support and acceptance of RAMSI in the Solomon Islands. Its overall performance for the first year was seen by many to be successful. The achievements made in such a short period of time, particularly with restoring law and order, have been far reaching and have resulted in large and wide ranging changes.[40]

Over 3700 guns and over 300 000 ammunition rounds were collected and destroyed, representing an estimated 90-95% of the total.[41] Militia gangs were demobilised, and militia leaders and many former police officers were imprisoned. Basic physical safety was restored to the streets of Honiara and throughout the country, assisted by the establishment of seventeen regional police posts. Government finances were stabilised, the endemic extortion

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[37] Tovua, 'Rescuing Democracy'; Pacific Islands Forum, *Mission Helpem Fren: A Review of the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands* Report of the Pacific Islands Forum Eminent Persons Group, Suva: Pacific Islands Forum, 2005.

[38] Warner, Message to the People of Solomon Islands; Tovua *Advertisement*.

[39] The Solomon Islands Intervention Task Force was a bipartisan body established by the Solomon Islands Prime Minister to monitor the activities and performance of the RAMSI on behalf of the Solomon Islands Government and its people.

[40] Solomon Islands Intervention Task Force, *A Review Report on the First Year Performance of the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI) 24 July 2003 to 23 July 2004*, Solomon Islands Government, November 2004.

[41] Robert Muggah, 'Diagnosing Demand: Assessing the Motivations and Means for Firearms Acquisition in the Solomon Islands and Papua New Guinea' Discussion Paper 2004/7, State, Society and Governance in Melanesia, Australian National University, 2004.

of public offices had ceased, and the provision of vital public services resumed. Finally, the groundwork had been laid for sustainability through reform of the RSIP and the institutions of government.[42]

The remainder of this chapter considers what power RAMSI had to achieve these objectives, and how this power was exercised. After examining RAMSI's currencies of power – coercion, inducement and legitimacy – and their interactions, I conclude that, while the 'carrots' and 'sticks' of RAMSI were crucial elements of its power, neither can be understood without examining their relationship to legitimacy.

RAMSI's power

Coercion

That RAMSI would have the mandate, capacity and readiness to use force was a point of little contention during the planning phase.[43] An Australian think-tank report influential in RAMSI's design proposed an operation that would 'impose a policy of zero tolerance for violence and intimidation, and be prepared and willing to use significant force, including lethal force, to do so'.[44] While envisaged as a police force with only small military backup 'that need not be deployed',[45] the focus soon shifted to supporting a police-led operation with overwhelming military force.[46] RAMSI's first phase structure included about 1800

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[42] Solomon Islands Intervention Task Force, *A Review Report*; Pacific Islands Forum, *Mission Helpem Fren: A Review of the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands* Report of the Pacific Islands Forum Eminent Persons Group, Suva: Pacific Islands Forum, 2005; Pacific Islands Forum/UNDP, *Social Impact Assessment of Peace Restoration Initiatives in Solomon Islands*.

[43] Alexander Downer (Australian Foreign Minister), transcript of joint press conference with New Zealand Foreign Minister Phil Goff: 29 June 2003: Adelaide Airport available at http://parlinfo.aph.-gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;query=Id:"media/pressrel/JWQ96".

[44] Wainwright, *Our Failing Neighbour*, p.41.

[45] Ibid.

[46] Alexander Downer, 'Doorstop Interview – Parliament House', transcript, available: http://www.dfat.gov.au/media/transcripts/2003/030625_doorstop.html.

troops and 300 police, with the unambiguous authorisation to use force in the pursuit of its mandate.

In comparison with other international peace operations, the clarity and scope of RAMSI's mandated coercive power was extraordinary.[47] While the reasons for this mandate are not the focus of this thesis, it should be noted that the coercive power was not only permitted but desired by the Solomon Islands government, suggesting that the coercive power of RAMSI was legitimate for political elites not only on legal grounds, but also because it matched their preferences.

The IPMT's experiences convinced planners that RAMSI would need a coercive stick. The presence of overwhelming military force provided RAMSI with a potent source of power denied to the IPMT, since its coercive capabilities provided the means to punish non-compliance, including anyone who threatened RAMSI directly. In other words, it provided the means to secure compliance through the fear of negative sanction. But the operation's military force – 'far bigger than RAMSI was hopefully ever going to need'[48] – also provided a credible basis for the provision of public security, thereby removing the need for gun ownership in self-defence.[49]

Further, RAMSI immediately began strengthening the criminal justice system, improving judicial capacity by placing international civilian personnel in line and advisory positions, and reforming the prison system. The threat and use of legal sanction was crucial to security provision, both by arresting and detaining militia, police and criminals, and by deterring further criminality.

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[47] For more on coercive mandates, see Findlay, *The Use of Force*.
[48] Nick Warner, interview by author, Sydney, 6 January 2007.
[49] Nick Warner, interview.

Some have argued that RAMSI was able to achieve its first phase objectives because it was simply bigger and stronger than militia groups.[50] This argument has substance: while virulent, the militia were relatively few, and though many had access to high-powered weapons, they were no match for RAMSI's sophisticated military hardware. However, as experiences from Vietnam to Somalia to Iraq have demonstrated, a preponderance of military resources does not guarantee success. In Solomon Islands, the difficult jungle terrain of the Weathercoast region, its geographic isolation and the strength of kinship ties in remote villages ensured that arresting militia using coercive tactics would be difficult and costly.

The choice to refrain from the use of force was explained by RAMSI's Special Coordinator as a deliberate strategy to maintain popular support, the operation's 'greatest asset'.[51] Described as deploying 'shock and awe without the violence',[52] the overwhelming coercive capacity of RAMSI gave the institution a big stick so it would not need to use it. The effectiveness of this deterrent depended, however, on the *way* RAMSI exercised its coercive power, and the way that was perceived by local actors. Achieving its objectives required public cooperation, and RAMSI therefore needed to influence behaviour on grounds other than the fear of punishment alone.

Inducement

The literature on disarmament and demobilisation leads us to expect that a peace operation needs the power of inducement to achieve these objectives.[53] The theory is organised

[50] Clive Moore, for example, states that '[o]rganising the surrender of firearms was relatively easy, given the show of military strength'; Clive Moore, 'Helpem Fren: The Solomon Islands, 2003-2007' *The Journal of Pacific History* 42, no. 2 (2007), p.144.
[51] Nick Warner, interview.
[52] Nick Warner, interview.
[53] For an overview, see Joanna Spear, 'Disarmament and Demobilization' in *Ending Civil Wars: The Implementation of Peace Agreements*, ed. Stephen John Stedman, Donald Rothchild, and Elizabeth M. Cousens (Boulder, London: Lynne Rienner, 2002).

around two prescriptions: the provision of material compensation in exchange for disarming, either through remuneration or political power; and the provision of a 'security guarantee' by peace operations as part of a broader peace dividend.

The compensation model can be divided into two approaches. The first is a 'cash-for-guns' strategy, where weapons are traded for remuneration.[54] Militia demands for such payments were common in Solomon Islands prior to RAMSI's deployment, escalating from demands for government compensation to the endemic extortion of public officials.[55] The cash-for-guns approach has been widely criticised for its insignificant effect on security, attracting only low-utility weapons, stimulating home-made weapons industries, creating illegal arms markets, and for its long-term economic distortions.[56] The second form of compensation commonly provided is a power-sharing arrangement, where the 'rationale for demobilization and disarmament is the exchange of military capacity for political benefits'.[57] Rather than offering material compensation, a power-sharing process aims to promote the transition from 'bullets to ballots' by offering political power in exchange for disarmament.

RAMSI explicitly rejected both approaches. To the extent that RAMSI exercised inducement, it did so indirectly through a 'peace dividend' that involved a significant and sustained increase in foreign aid from Australia and New Zealand, targeting health, education

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54 This strategy was used by peace operations in El Salvador, Haiti, Liberia, Mozambique, Nicaragua and Somalia.

55 For example, in the weeks prior to RAMSI's arrival, about 200 former MEF combatants confronted the Solomon Islands prime minister with demands for 'goodwill' payments in exchange for leaving the capital; see Jim Baynes, 'Former Malaita Eagles Demand Money to Leave Honiara' *Australian Associated Press General News*, 11 July 2003.

56 Mark Knight and Alpaslan Ozerdem, 'Guns, Camps and Cash: Disarmament, Demobilization and Reinsertion of Former Combatants in Transitions from War to Peace' *Journal of Peace Research* 41, no. 4 (2004).

57 Terrence Lyons, 'The Role of Postsettlement Elections' in *Ending Civil Wars: The Implementation of Peace Agreements*, ed. Stephen John Stedman, Donald Rothchild, and Elizabeth M. Cousens (Boulder, London: Lynne Rienner, 2002), p.226.

and peacebuilding activities as well as RAMSI's security and governance programs.[58] Its financial resources enabled RAMSI to provide early tangible benefits for local communities, such as the re-opening of schools and health clinics, the reconstruction of basic infrastructure, and the provision of electricity and potable water.

In the security realm, militia disarmament and demobilisation was based not on the provision of material rewards, but the threat or use of coercive sanction; far from being offered power-sharing deals, militia leaders faced imprisonment. However, the coercive power of RAMSI provided a 'security guarantee' which altered incentive structures by removing the need for guns for self-defence. In this way, the provision of security was a 'carrot' in the disarmament process, but only a small one.

Source legitimacy

On arrival, RAMSI had as high a degree of popular support as might ever be hoped for by a peace operation. A poll by the Solomon Islands Development Trust, an indigenous civil society organisation, found 94% of the population in favour of the intervention.[59] Yet popular support is not a proxy for legitimacy; while it provided a valuable resource for the operation, high expectations also exposed the institution to vulnerability if it was unable to deliver expected results.

RAMSI was a nationally-led regional peace operation, without a UN mandate and therefore could have lacked legitimacy internationally. The potential difficulties for UNSC authorisation posed by Solomon Islands' recognition of Taiwan contributed somewhat to

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[58] See Australian Agency for International Development, *Pacific Program Profiles 2003-04* AusAID Pacific Branch, 2004; NZAid, *Solomon Islands Program Strategy 2003-2006* New Zealand Agency for International Development, 2003.

[59] Sean Dorney, 'Survey on the Intervention Force Receives Positive Response from Solomon Islanders' *ABC*, 1 August 2003; John Roughan, interview by author, Honiara, 19 August 2006; for further indication of popular support, see 'Solomons Unions Back Australian-Led Intervention' *BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific*, 9 July 2003; Mary-Louise O'Callaghan, 'Nine Held in Solomons Hostage Crisis' *The Australian*, 8 July 2003; Dorothy Wickham, 'Solomon Islands' Parliament Set to Approve Armed Intervention Force' *Associated Press Writer*, 10 July 2003.

this, but more significant was the desire of Australia to maintain its control over the operation, based on the perception that 'little advantage would be gained from an extra layer of bureaucracy'.[60] Emphasising the limits of UN multilateralism and the efficiency benefits of nationally-led coalitions, the Australian government denounced multilateralism as 'a synonym for an ineffective and unfocused policy involving internationalism of the lowest common denominator',[61] seeking to justify its claim that in 'the case of the Solomons, it would just be too difficult to get the UN to solve this problem. We'll have to do it ourselves, with a coalition of other countries'.[62]

However, the legitimacy implications of RAMSI's non-UN identity should not be overplayed. The 'laying on of hands'[63] in support of RAMSI, particularly by the UN Secretary-General and UNSC President, was recognition of the operation's accordance with UN norms.[64] Importantly, RAMSI's structure coheres with the framework envisaged for regional organisations under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter; article 52 states that UN members that are also members of regional organisations should

> make every effort to achieve pacific settlement of local disputes through such regional arrangements or by such regional agencies before referring them to the Security Council.[65]

The legal legitimacy of RAMSI was assured by the explicit consent of the Solomon Islands government, and strengthened by its coherence with the PIF's Biketawa Declaration. However, neither the international legal framework nor governmental consent significantly

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[60] Australian official quoted in Fullilove, *The Testament of Solomons*, p.14.
[61] Alexander Downer, 'Security in an Unstable World' *Speech to the National Press Club* (26 June 2003), http://www.foreignminister.gov.au/speeches/2003/030626_unstableworld.html.
[62] 'Alexander Downer Responds to Foreign Policy Criticism' *ABC The World Today*, June 27 2003.
[63] Fullilove, The Testament of Solomons.
[64] United Nations, Secretary-General Commends Regional Response to Solomon Islands Crisis SG/SM/8811, available at http://www.unis.unvienna.org/unis/pressrels/2003/sgsm8811.html; United Nations, Press Statement on Solomon Islands by Security Council President, (President Fayssal Mekdad, Syria) available at http://www.unis.unvienna.org/unis/pressrels/2003/sc7853.html.
[65] Charter of the United Nations, art 52(2).

influenced evaluations of RAMSI's legitimacy by local populations.[66] With most people living in isolated villages, the objectives of RAMSI and its capacity to deliver them mattered more than an international legal framework. Further, given the distrust for politicians among the population, the support of the political elite was not significantly influential.[67]

As I argued in Chapter Two, the power relationship between a peace operation and local populations is legitimised by its justifiability in terms of 'some conception of common interest, reciprocal benefit, or societal need that the system of power satisfies'.[68] RAMSI derived power not only from its legally-authorised coercive capabilities, but also from the justifiability of that coercive power in terms of the purposes it served. A survey of media reports, statements by civil society, community and political leaders, and primary research interviews concludes that the objectives of RAMSI matched the desires of the local actors to a striking degree.[69] The most frequent requests from people were for protection from militia violence and intimidation, especially from Weathercoast warlord Harold Keke; the provision of basic health and education services; justice for crimes committed during the conflict; an end to public corruption; and an impact outside Honiara.[70] The ability of RAMSI representatives to highlight common interests and reciprocal benefits was an important legitimation strategy, and justifying its motives on these grounds was a central theme of RAMSI's communications.

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[66] John Roughan, interview; Nick Warner, interview.
[67] John Roughan, interview; Nick Warner, interview.
[68] Beetham, *Legitimation*, p.17.
[69] A list of interviews conducted is included in the bibliography.
[70] Murray Mottram, 'Disarming Is the Easy Job, Reconstruction Is Much Harder' *The Age*, 21 July 2003; Mary-Louise O'Callaghan, 'Islanders Plead for Help' *New Zealand Herald*, 4 July 2003; Peter O'Connor, 'Solomon Island Refugees Pin Hope on Australian Troops and Police for Return to Their Villages' *Associated Press Newswires*, 25 July 2003; Adrian Smith, 'Opinion - Islanders Need Help to Move to Peace' *The Sydney Morning Herald*, 7 July 2003; Craig Skehan, 'Petitioners Fear Troops Lack Power' *The Sydney Morning Herald*, 4 July 2003; Michael Field, 'Solomon Islands Calm as Australian-Led Force Gets to Work' *Agence France Press*, 25 July 2003.

However, a peace operation's source legitimacy depends not just on the justifiability of its objectives, but its capacity to achieve them. The large military force provided RAMSI with the capacity to display its credibility to Solomon Islanders: to militia, to corrupt officials, and to victims. As hoped, the use of military force was not required, and the achievements of RAMSI's first year were accomplished without the firing of a single bullet. However, the presence of overwhelming military capability had a commanding demonstration effect, providing RAMSI with power not just of coercion but of credibility, proving it was a serious and capable peace operation that was legitimate not only because it had an appropriate mandate, but because it could demonstrate the capacity to achieve it.

While RAMSI gained international legitimacy by building regional support,[71] its structure as an Australian-led operation provided organisational advantages often lacking in more diverse multilateral endeavours. Given that its lead nation had identified a clear national interest in the operation's objectives, RAMSI was backed by substantial financial resources and a firm commitment to sustained support.[72] Leadership from a single state also provided the efficiency advantages of fast deployment, clear and simplified chains of command, and easier coordination than is often found in similar operations due to inter-agency familiarity: Australia was 'large enough to deploy people, assets and resources at scale, but small enough that personal connections are ubiquitous and collegial habits maintained'.[73] Harland has highlighted that these efficiency advantages are often necessarily traded-off for the legitimacy derived from multilateralism, arguing that the most effective peace operations 'would combine the legitimacy of broad international and national support with the capacities of

[71] See Alex J. Bellamy and Paul D. Williams, 'Who's Keeping the Peace? Regionalization and Contemporary Peace Operations' *International Security* 29, no. 4 (2005).
[72] 'Australian Foreign Minister Stresses Sustained Commitment to Solomon Islands' *BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific*, 2 August 2003 2003; Fullilove, *The Testament of Solomons*.
[73] Fullilove, The Testament of Solomons, p.13.

lead-nation resources'.[74] Given its regional mandate and international support, it seems that RAMSI was able to have its legitimacy cake and eat it too.

Finally, the expertise of RAMSI personnel legitimised the operation in three ways. First, RAMSI's regional nature granted it representative legitimacy, but also endowed the operation with cultural expertise through the participation of police and soldiers from Pacific Islands countries. The contributions from Fiji, Papua New Guinea and Vanuatu were particularly valuable, as their personnel shared a common Melanesian cultural background with Solomon Islanders. This proved important symbolically, providing the face of a truly regional mission of 'helping friends' and thereby countering perceptions of neo-colonialism, at least to some extent. However, Pacific Islanders contributed more than mere tokenism;[75] their cultural expertise improved communications and helped to diffuse inevitable tensions between traditional practices and RAMSI's rule of law approach.[76] Second, RAMSI's institutional capacity was strengthened by the opportune combination of exceptional leadership in the civilian, police and military heads of the operation. Duly qualified and experienced, the operation's leadership also demonstrated acute awareness of the need for RAMSI's power to be legitimised, and emphasised the careful cultivation of substantive and procedural legitimacy through their practices on the ground.[77] Third, RAMSI's immediate economic objectives were achieved by placing bureaucrats from Australia and New Zealand in positions of authority in the Ministry of Finance and Treasury. Some of these advisors were 'in-line' officials, occupying established positions in the public service and carrying out the sovereign responsibilities of Solomon Islands, including the office of Accountant-General.[78]

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74 Harland, 'Legitimacy and Effectiveness', p.18.
75 On tokenism, see Moore, 'Helpem Fren: The Solomon Islands, 2003-2007', p.143.
76 Ben McDevitt, interview.
77 Russell W. Glenn, *Counterinsurgency in a Test Tube: Analyzing the Success of the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands,* RAND National Defense Research Institute, 2007; Nick Warner, interview.
78 Heather Baser, *Provision of Technical Assistance Personnel in the Solomon Islands* Case study for the Study on Promising Approaches to Technical Assistance, European Centre for Development Policy Management, 2007, p.19.

By actively implementing local governance roles, such as budget preparation and reforming revenue collection and debt management, RAMSI personnel facilitated the rapid stabilisation of government finances. However, as the next chapter discusses in greater depth, the practices through which RAMSI achieved quick economic results in its first phase subsequently delegitimised the operation, particularly since the Economic Reform Unit it established in the Ministry of Finance and Treasury was locally perceived 'as a Canberra-controlled implant'.[79]

Exercising power: RAMSI's substantive and procedural legitimacy

RAMSI's first phase was dominated by its security objectives, identified as the priority for ordinary Solomon Islanders and the necessary foundation from which to pursue all other objectives. While RAMSI was a multidisciplinary peace operation, a 'security first' logic pragmatically dominated. There were three central goals: removing illegal weapons; disarming and demobilising militia; and providing basic physical security.

The first weeks and months of RAMSI were the most crucial for its legitimation, and the legitimacy built in this period sustained it through subsequent challenges. In Chapter Two, I conceived of a peace operation's legitimacy as a dynamic web of interacting legitimising and delegitimising strands. In the following section, I identify and examine the threads in RAMSI's legitimacy web, highlighting the relationship between the institution's power and its legitimacy.

[79] Gilling and Hughes in Baser, *Provision of Technical Assistance Personnel in the Solomon Islands*, p.18.

Substantive legitimacy: providing basic physical security

RAMSI's source legitimacy was maintained and strengthened by the operation's outcomes, which provided substantive legitimacy through the effectiveness and distributive fairness of its immediate security activities. RAMSI's early effectiveness provided a strong foundation for justifying its power relationship to local populations. The operation made an immediate impact: less the two hours after arriving, RAMSI police began joint foot patrols with their local counterparts in the Honiara markets where, just days earlier, a local man had been beheaded by militia.[80] Meanwhile, RAMSI troops guarded key public buildings and the Prime Minister received personal protection.

Within weeks, RAMSI opened police posts in key strategic sites outside the capital, which strengthened the distributional fairness of the operation's security benefits, helping to demonstrate to Solomon Islanders across all nine provinces that 'RAMSI was there for everyone'.[81] Further, RAMSI made a point of 'showing off' both the size and technological superiority of its military capabilities. For example, RAMSI held an 'open day' in Honiara within weeks of arrival, attracting more than ten thousand local people. This demonstrated RAMSI's military power to potential opponents, but did so in a way that was perceived as non-threatening by local communities. As Lieutenant Colonel John 'JJ' Frewen, RAMSI's Military Commander, describes:

> Public displays of our capabilities, particularly those that could lead us to hidden weapons, such as ground detection radar, and our night vision capabilities had a profound effect on the local people and were very popular.[82]

Similarly, although RAMSI police had legal authority to use force, they patrolled unarmed in a deliberate strategy designed to build trust among local communities. As RAMSI's Police Commander Ben McDevitt explained:

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[80] Ben McDevitt, interview.
[81] Ben McDevitt, 'Operation *Helpem Fren*: A Personal Perspective' *Australian Army Journal* 3, no. 2 (2006), p.10.
[82] John 'JJ' Frewen, 'Communication as a Tactic' *Defence Magazine* July 2005.

> This was a country that had been terrorised by guns. We wanted RAMSI to present a friendly face of community policing; the Solomons needed fewer guns, not more.[83]

Within weeks, the reporting of past crimes increased dramatically as Solomon Islanders grew confident that, for the first time in years, such reports would be investigated; with RAMSI police on the beat, local people reported 'feeling' safer.[84] More concrete indications of RAMSI's effectiveness included the down-scaling and then removal of foreign travel warnings, the return of local business and international investment, and the establishment of significant donor operations.[85] As other threads in RAMSI's legitimacy web began to fray in later phases of the operation, its effectiveness in the security realm remained the touchstone of the institution's legitimacy and public support.

I have argued that RAMSI's initial resources – of coercion, inducement and source legitimacy – provided the operation with important sources of power, which were further enhanced by the substantive legitimacy of RAMSI's effectiveness and distributional fairness. While persuasive, this account cannot adequately explain *how* RAMSI was able to translate its initial resources into substantive outcomes. In the following section, I examine RAMSI's procedural legitimacy through the study of its two most significant achievements: disarmament and the arrest of Harold Keke.

Participation and accountability: disarmament

RAMSI's disarmament process illustrates the overlaps and interactions between the threads in its legitimacy web, and the relationship of these to the institution's powers of coercion and inducement. While no compensation payments were offered, RAMSI oversaw a 21-day amnesty period for surrendering illegally-held weapons without penalty. Emphasising the severe penalties for gun ownership after this period, RAMSI repeatedly communicated its

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[83] Ben McDevitt, interview.
[84] Ian McPherdan, 'Solomons Safer as Helpers Hit the Beat' *Sunday Times (Perth)*, 3 August 2003.
[85] McDevitt, 'Operation *Helpem Fren*: A Personal Perspective', p.17.

determination to track down illegal guns irrespective of threats or intimidation to the operation.[86] For example, addressing a RAMSI community open day, the Special Coordinator declared: 'Our police will come to your house and find those guns…If anyone threatens our police we will not hesitate to use the military'.[87]

While coercive threat was crucial to the ability of RAMSI to secure compliance on disarmament, coercion alone cannot explain RAMSI's successful disarmament process: an adequate explanation of RAMSI's effectiveness in disarmament must account for why the institution was perceived as the 'right' – that is, legitimate – authority to whom guns should be surrendered, and in this, an account of RAMSI's procedural legitimacy is central.

Local participation can build legitimacy by giving people a stake in the peacebuilding process, allowing local actors to exercise voice in decision-making processes. But participation also directly impacts an operation's effectiveness: since it is ultimately the behaviour of the local population that matters, the involvement of local people in peacebuilding can be expected to yield substantive benefits. Further, by encouraging and engaging local actors in such processes, a peace operation can derive practical advantages by tapping existing sites of local authority.

RAMSI's disarmament activities involved participation by the strongest sections of Solomon Islands civil society. Like the IPMT before it, RAMSI worked in active partnership with the indigenous NPC. In Warner's words, 'without them, getting rid of the guns would have been much more difficult'.[88] NPC representatives were consulted in the planning stage, and extensive consultation continued throughout RAMSI's first year.[89] The NPC's Weapons-Free Village campaign had proved 'an effective mechanism for rebuilding communities' but

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[86] For example, see Nick Warner and Ben McDevitt 'To all former militants [letter]', RAMSI Office of the Special Coordinator, available http://www.peoplefirst.net.sb/intervention/transcripts.htm.
[87] Craig Skehan, 'Law Enforcers Show Off Might' *Sunday Age*, 3 August 2003.
[88] Nick Warner, interview.
[89] Paul Tovua, interview by author, Honiara, 21 August 2006.

on its own 'had little impact as a disarmament mechanism'.[90] With the security guarantee provided by RAMSI's coercive power, however, the Weapons-Free Villages became important grassroots symbols of disarmament and social change. This partnership was crucial to RAMSI's disarmament strategy: NPC offices provided sites for people to surrender weapons, but more importantly, their extensive social networks allowed the rapid dissemination of RAMSI's message, enhanced by the NPC's legitimacy among communities.[91] That is, the Weapons-Free Village program provided an entry point for RAMSI to build an inclusive and culturally appropriate disarmament process,[92] backed by its coercive power. As Jurgen Brauer and Robert Muggah conclude, by engaging the participation of the NPC, RAMSI leveraged and strengthened 'compelling societal pressure' to surrender weapons, through which individuals could be 'shamed by the collective into compliance'.[93] Similarly, RAMSI sought and received support from the churches and women's organisations.[94]

The primary vehicle for local participation, however, was the strategy of publicly destroying surrendered weapons in village ceremonies. In these highly visible and inclusive events, the disarmament process came to symbolise RAMSI's commitment to helping the population build peace, which in turn became a social signal directed to Solomon Islanders that it was time for change: that the way of the gun was finished.

These ceremonies were also a tactical resource in RAMSI's communications strategy, allowing the operation's leadership to speak directly to villagers about their purposes, motives and objectives. Part of a wider program of village meetings, these ceremonies

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[90] Carol Nelson and Robert Muggah, *Solomon Islands: Evaluating the Weapons Free Village Campaign* An Independent Report Commissioned by the Small Arms Survey, November 2004, p.27.
[91] Nick Warner, interview. Over half of all weapons collected were handed in to NPC offices; Nelson and Muggah, *Solomon Islands: Evaluating the Weapons Free Village Campaign*, p.22.
[92] Ibid., p.28.
[93] Jurgen Brauer and Robert Muggah, 'Completing the Circle: Building a Theory of Small Arms Demand' *Contemporary Security Policy* 27, no. 1 (2006), p.147.
[94] Paul Tovua, interview.

proved important means of building trust for the operation. They were also an innovative means of increasing the institution's transparency; by speaking to villagers face-to-face, senior RAMSI personnel made information available and accessible. Further, RAMSI facilitated the establishment of an indigenous radio show, broadcast nationally, which opened an additional channel of communication. Hosted by a respected Solomon Islands journalist, *Talking Truth* broadcast interviews with RAMSI personnel twice weekly, allowing the operation to communicate its activities and objectives widely, and to counter misperceptions and rumours in a timely and expedient manner.[95] The establishment of police posts in remote areas further enhanced transparency, acting as pseudo-community centres through which RAMSI representatives could disseminate information and, crucially, collect feedback from local populations.[96]

RAMSI's communications strategy was dynamic and multifaceted: it also involved near-daily press conferences in the first month, public meetings, informal dialogue through community events, and informal partnerships with civil society. The practice of 'sitting under a mango tree'[97] with whoever wanted to talk was critical to RAMSI's procedural legitimation. In addition to encouraging participation, this process of dialogue provided the availability and accessibility of information crucial to an institution's accountability. By explaining its objectives and justifying its activities, RAMSI articulated standards by which the institution could be held to account. Given that public support was considered by the operation to be its greatest asset, the process of publicly justifying RAMSI's actions worked as an important check on the institution's exercise of power. Importantly, RAMSI's communications activities indicate the value attached to popular accountability.

[95] Dorothy Wickham, interview by author, Honiara, 22 August 2006.
[96] Ben McDevitt, interview.
[97] Nick Warner, interview.

Quality of treatment: the arrest of Harold Keke

> *Everyone gets treated equally. That's the way the law works in Australia and New Zealand, and that's the way the law ought to work here. Anyone who the police charge should face trial and it should be a fair legal system that is set in place. A fair judicial system. Everyone is equal before the law.*
>
> Special Coordinator Nick Warner[98]

The voluntary surrender of notorious warlord Harold Keke remains RAMSI's most significant single achievement. But it is also the most puzzling. How did RAMSI persuade the most feared militant in Solomon Islands to surrender to arrest and certain imprisonment?[99]

Keke's Guadalcanal Liberation Front, which had separated from the Istabu Freedom Movement, posed the greatest 'spoiler' threat to RAMSI.[100] The atrocities committed by Keke and his militia established him as a formidable adversary; his 'boys' were well armed, disciplined, and comfortable in the near-impossible Weathercoast terrain. Dealing with Keke was imperative, not just for the security of ordinary Solomon Islanders, but because the threat of Keke was the principal justification for other militia groups to retain their weapons. Indeed, two days after Keke's arrest, the MEF rival surrendered ninety-nine guns during a ceremony on Malaita.[101]

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98 'RAMSI Press Conference', 1 August 2003, Avuavu, Guadalcanal (transcript in possession of author).

99 While this achievement is widely lauded in the literature, there has to date been no rigorous attempt to explain how it was accomplished. In his study of RAMSI as a counterinsurgency operation, Russell Glenn highlights the role of negotiations, patience and trust as crucial factors, but does not explain *why* negotiation and patience worked, nor *how* trust was built; Glenn, *Counterinsurgency in a Test Tube*. Alex Bellamy and Paul Williams also refer to the negotiation processes and also to the impartiality of RAMSI personnel, but do so only briefly; Bellamy and Williams, 'Who's Keeping the Peace?', p.187. This evidence presented in this section draws on interviews with key participants in the Keke negotiations and analyses it using the power-legitimacy framework. I acknowledge that the inability to verify this with Keke himself is might limit its accuracy, but the explanation given here is not contradicted by any account to date.

100 Glenn, *Counterinsurgency in a Test Tube*, p.128.

101 Tarcisius Tara Kabutaulaka, 'Solomon Islands' *The Contemporary Pacific* 16, no. 2 (2004), p.393.

RAMSI sought a face-to-face meeting with the militia leader even before arriving in the country. After much correspondence, the Special Coordinator, Police Commander and Military Commander of RAMSI met with Keke in a small chapel in his Weathercoast village. Sitting at the altar, the negotiators emphasised that the status quo was not an option for Keke, that the best option for his people was returning to the rule of law, and that this would require his arrest. In exchange, he would have the opportunity to tell his story in court, through fair legal process.[102]

The coercive power of RAMSI's military was important: though RAMSI's negotiators walked into Keke's village unarmed, they had parked the HMAS Manoora support ship offshore, and army Iroquois helicopters buzzed overhead.[103] Yet it was also clear that neither warships nor helicopters would help if RAMSI was forced to fight a guerrilla war on Keke's ground, and 'almost certain' casualties would have accompanied any attempt to arrest him by force.[104] Further, the use of force would certainly have had a negative effect on public support.[105]

While there were no compensation deals on the table, RAMSI did use some inducement to secure Keke's arrest, agreeing to establish a police post to protect Keke's people, and assuring the safety of his immediate family. However, neither these minimal incentives nor RAMSI's coercive power provided the operation with sufficient capability to secure Keke's arrest without the procedural legitimacy derived from the neutrality, trustworthiness and respect with which RAMSI accorded local actors, and in this case, Keke himself.

I suggested in Chapter Two that the quality of treatment people receive from powerful actors is an important source of an institution's power because '[i]f people trust the motives

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[102] Nick Warner, interview; Ben McDevitt, interview.
[103] Glenn, *Counterinsurgency in a Test Tube*; Warner, interview; Ben McDevitt, interview.
[104] McDevitt, 'Operation *Helpem Fren*: A Personal Perspective', p.14.
[105] RAMSI's military commander Col. Frewen acknowledged that RAMSI's military component 'wanted to grab [Keke] and trust be damned', but that he was convinced by McDevitt that a more restrained approach would be more effective; Frewen in Glenn, *Counterinsurgency in a Test Tube*, p.91.

of authorities, feel that they are behaving neutrally, and feel treated with respect and dignity, they are more willing to voluntarily defer to authorities and obey their decisions'.[106] RAMSI demonstrated all three characteristics in its dealings with Harold Keke. In explaining how they persuaded Keke to surrender, both Warner and McDevitt emphasise the role of fair treatment in building trust for the institution.[107] Similarly, Alex Bellamy and Paul Williams credit the 'protracted negotiations' with persuading Keke that RAMSI officers 'would act with impartiality'.[108] RAMSI's previous dealings with other militia groups enabled the negotiators to demonstrate neutrality; its stated commitment to addressing public corruption was also influential. In the hours spent sitting at the altar in Keke's church 'talking and talking and talking and talking', the RAMSI representatives acknowledged the warlord's concerns, explained the operation's objectives, and emphasised that RAMSI had no interest beyond the common good of Solomon Islands.[109] Keke's voluntary surrender suggests that he bought this message.[110]

RAMSI's fairness undoubtedly legitimised the operation to Keke and his men. Its rule of law approach assured Keke a fair trial and the chance to tell his story in court, with good legal representation and safety in detention. Ultimately, RAMSI's approach appealed to Keke not as a crazed militant, but as a rational leader with legitimate concerns for the good of his people despite the reign of terror he had visited upon them. By recognising this status, by acting fairly and with neutrality, RAMSI was able to secure the coperation of Solomon Islands' most wanted man. RAMSI achieved this success because the operation was believed to be the right, appropriate authority, not just because of fear of negative sanction or expectation of positive rewards.

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[106] McDevitt, 'Operation *Helpem Fren*: A Personal Perspective', p.336.
[107] Nick Warner, interview; Ben McDevitt, interview.
[108] Bellamy and Williams, 'Who's Keeping the Peace?', p.187.
[109] Nick Warner, interview; Ben McDevitt, interview.
[110] Notably, as discussed in the next chapter, RAMSI was unable to maintain the persuasiveness of this message in later dealings with other local opponents.

Conclusion

This chapter analysed the performance of RAMSI through the power-legitimacy framework developed in Chapter Two. By examining its sources of power and their interactions, I explained RAMSI's successful achievement of its first phase objectives through the complex blend of coercion, inducement and legitimacy. While other analyses explain RAMSI's performance by focusing on its creation and mandate,[111] this account emphasises the operation's behaviour by examining its social interactions with local actors. The power-legitimacy framework has produced four important conclusions about RAMSI's behaviour and outcomes in this first phase of its operations that have been overlooked in other explanations.

First, it has highlighted the extent to which each of the currencies of power depends on the others. That is, RAMSI achieved its first phase objectives through the dynamic combination of sticks, carrots and legitimacy; no single variable explains its performance.

Second, RAMSI's communications strategy was instrumental to its ability to exercise coercion and inducement and, crucially, to legitimise its power relationship with local populations by giving reasons for the appropriateness of its goals, purposes and activities in the local Solomon Islands context. Since the use of force risked undermining legitimacy, RAMSI relied on the visible demonstration of its coercive power through open days and village ceremonies, and the communication of its capabilities through media and face-to-face meetings. At the same time, RAMSI built legitimacy by engaging in public justification of its presence and objectives, providing normative reasons for local actors to cooperate based on informed evaluations of its motives, goals, scope, and personnel.

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[111] Fullilove, *The Testament of Solomons*; Elsina Wainwright, *How Is RAMSI Faring? Progress, Challenges, and Lessons Learned* Strategic Insights 14, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 2005.

Third, as the importance of communications demonstrates, RAMSI's procedural legitimacy was the central thread in its legitimacy web. By engaging local participation, actively pursuing transparency, and facilitating popular accountability, RAMSI exercised power in a way that was both procedurally and substantively legitimate.

Fourth, the quality of treatment dimension of RAMSI's procedural legitimacy was particularly influential in securing high-quality cooperation from local actors. In particular, given that existing approaches to studying the behaviour of local actors overlook the normative reasons for their cooperation with peace operations,[112] the finding that RAMSI gained influence through a high quality of treatment is an important contribution of this thesis.

However, as the next chapter discusses, each of these four sources of power was eroded in RAMSI's second phase. In contrast to its early effectiveness, RAMSI subsequently faced difficulties in achieving its goals of governance reform and capacity building. The emerging body of literature on RAMSI has focused on the operation's design, explaining variation in the operation's effectiveness over time through the changing nature of its goals. This chapter has argued that RAMSI's implementing practices were crucial determinants of its power and legitimacy and, therefore, its effectiveness. In the next chapter, I argue that although RAMSI's goals became more ambitious in subsequent years, its later effectiveness challenges can be traced to key shifts in its power and legitimacy.

[112] See Chapter One.

Chapter Six: RAMSI since 2004 – The challenges of governance reform and capacity building

After achieving its first phase goals with remarkable speed, RAMSI transitioned from a focus on security and emergency stabilisation to prioritise long-term governance reform and capacity building. Troops were largely withdrawn in 2004 and while RAMSI's police component remained, it increasingly focused on training and support rather than active policing. At the same time, RAMSI's civilian components grew in size and prominence, concentrating on those government departments concerned with finance and economic policy, law and justice, and accountability.

In the previous chapter, I found that local perceptions of RAMSI's legitimacy provided the operation with a potent source of power to influence local actor behaviour. Whether it was the perceptions of broad communities or individual actors, the nature of local responses to RAMSI was crucial in determining the operation's effectiveness.

In its second phase, RAMSI attracted substantially more local criticism, echoed in scholarly work, and at times faced active local resistance to its goals and practices. However, somewhat paradoxically, support for the operation's continued presence remained indisputably high. Despite threatening in 2006 and 2007 to revoke its formal consent for RAMSI, the Solomon Islands government nevertheless annually renewed the facilitating legislation guaranteeing RAMSI's legal status in the country. Perhaps more telling, a series of public opinion surveys and evaluation reports found strong, continuing support for the operation among the population.

These two apparently contradictory features of RAMSI's local reception present a puzzle for research seeking to examine local perceptions of the operation. The current state of the literature on RAMSI provides little analytical guidance about its resolution; while some

research has focused directly on local perspectives,[1] there is to date no rigorous analysis of how different perceptions affect RAMSI's ability to achieve its goals. Instead, researchers have taken an implicitly normative approach to studying local responses to RAMSI. As I argued in Chapter One, a limitation of the normative approach for the present research is that it aims only to identify and explain local perceptions, telling us little about their significance for a peace operation's effectiveness. Further, the tendency of such work to focus only on negative perceptions means that we have little more than lists of 'bad' practices.[2] We thus lack analysis of whose perceptions might matter, and in what ways, with regard to specific peace operation goals.

My study of RAMSI examines local perceptions from an instrumental perspective, seeking to understand and explain their impact on the operation's effectiveness. In this chapter, I engage with the existing literature on RAMSI and, using the power-legitimacy framework, seek to make sense of the puzzling contradictions emerging from other research on RAMSI's local reception. In doing so, this chapter also aims to highlight the distinction between popular support and local legitimacy, which elsewhere are treated as synonymous.[3] In short, reported levels of 'support' do not tell us whether or how such support affects the operation's ability to achieve its goals, nor the reason for which the operation is supported or opposed. In particular, generalised statements of 'support' for RAMSI do not distinguish between desire of local actors for the operation to remain in Solomon Islands and their active cooperation with its ambitious second phase goals. By contrast, this thesis examines the behaviour of local actors and aims to explain the reasons for it. My investigation of local legitimacy thus goes beyond expressions of 'support' and aims explicitly to identify the causal

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[1] For example, see Matthew G. Allen, 'Dissenting Voices: Local Perspectives on the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands' *Pacific Economic Bulletin* 21, no. 2 (2006).
[2] For example, see Douglas Abdiel, 'No News Is Good News: The Longevity of Australian Humanitarian Interventions' *Armed Forces & Society* 20, no. 10 (2010), p.9.
[3] For example, see Michael Mersiades, 'Peacekeeping and Legitimacy: Lessons from Cambodia and Somalia' *International Peacekeeping* 12, no. 2 (2005).

processes through which local perceptions influence operational effectiveness, and to identify and explain the reasons for which an operation is perceived to be (il)legitimate.

I argue that continued local support for RAMSI in its second phase is best explained through its power of inducement – that is, the provision of security and economic benefits – while growing criticism reflects greater contestation about the legitimacy of its goals and implementing practices.[4] Importantly, while others have argued that RAMSI's second phase challenges are due to the inherent difficulties of its goals,[5] I argue that this does not adequately explain why the operation faced greater challenges to its effectiveness after 2004. Instead, by analysing RAMSI's power and legitimacy, I show first that RAMSI's second phase goals had low coherence with extant local preferences, and second that many of the practices that had provided important means of influence during the early phase were later diminished or abandoned. That is, while RAMSI's second phase goals may have been more ambitious than those of its first and thus more difficult to achieve, RAMSI narrowed its power base and thereby lost key channels through which to move local actors towards cooperation. Where it had earlier employed diverse strategies of legitimation, the inevitable challenges of governance reform were accompanied by a weakening of RAMSI's powers of legitimacy. Importantly, this delegitimation is traced to the operation's actions, rather than to its goals alone.

The first section below distinguishes RAMSI's different phases and identifies the nature of its second phase goals, highlighting the need for local compliance and cooperation to achieve

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[4] Greg Fry and Tarcisius Tara Kabutaulaka similarly noted that '[w]ith an open-ended time frame and more resources than the electoral government of Solomon Islands it is in this state-building phase that some significant legitimacy challenges have begun to emerge'; Fry and Kabutaulaka, eds. *Intervention and State-building in the Pacific: the Legitimacy of 'Cooperative Intervention'* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2008), p.6.

[5] For example, Sinclair Dinnen argues that the key challenges to RAMSI's statebuilding effectiveness are due to '[i]nsufficient appreciation of the distinct forces that characterize post-colonial states, as well as of the contested character of the state itself'; Sinclair Dinnen, 'State-Building in a Post-Colonial Society: The Case of Solomon Islands' *Chicago Journal of International Law* 51, no. 1 (2008-2009), p.52.

these, particularly in light of their presentation as technical benchmarks. The following section explains the puzzle presented by the apparent contradiction in local responses to RAMSI during this period, highlighting the distinction between local 'support' and 'legitimacy'. Using the power-legitimacy framework, I identify four key power shifts which explain the continuity of strong local support for RAMSI's presence even as criticism and resistance of the operation increased. In short, I argue that RAMSI has sustained support through inducement, but that the legitimacy of its agenda and practices has been locally contested. The third section examines the key constraint of RAMSI in its second phase: the resistance of its governance reform agenda by political and bureaucratic elites. In particular, it highlights the ways in which RAMSI's practices during its second phase delegitimised the operation in the eyes of these actors. The final section examines in brief several recent reforms in RAMSI practices that appear to have improved the cooperation of local political actors. While comprehensive analysis of these recent shifts is beyond the scope of this thesis, the improvement in RAMSI's local accountability, consultation and quality of treatment appears to respond to the limitations it faced due to its previous procedural delegitimation.

RAMSI's second phase goals

After 2004 RAMSI transitioned from a peace operation focused primarily on security intervention to a statebuilding operation with a highly ambitious agenda of governance reform across the Solomon Islands government.[6] Over the years of its deployment, many different 'phases' of RAMSI have been identified. I refer here to three: the first phase, from 2003 to 2004, focused on security and stabilisation; the second phase, from 2004 to 2007,

[6] While RAMSI maintained a significant policing presence and a prominent role in recruiting and training the Royal Solomon Islands Police Force, its governance objectives were prioritised from late-2004.

focused on governance reform and capacity building; and the third phase, from 2008 to the present, in which RAMSI retained its focus on governance reform and capacity building but pursued these through renewed partnership with local actors. There is no fixed transition date between the phases; however, the drawdown of troops beginning in late-2003 and completed in August 2004 signalled the end of the first phase; the approval of RAMSI's Machinery of Government program in late-2004 and its establishment in early 2005 were important markers of the second phase; and the election of a new government led by Derek Sikua in December 2007 and the formalisation of the Partnership Framework between RAMSI and the Solomon Islands Government in 2009 distinguish the third phase. The important distinction for this thesis is between the first and second phases, defined by the shift in RAMSI's goals from security and emergency stabilisation to governance reform and capacity building. However, accompanying its new focus was a shift in RAMSI practices, both because the pursuit of different goals entailed new activities for the operation, and because the inevitable turnover of personnel brought different leadership styles and priorities.

As defined by RAMSI, the operation's mission is 'to work together with the government and people of Solomon Islands to build a secure, well-governed and prosperous nation', and its mandate has four components: 1) restoring civil order in Honiara and throughout the rest of the country; 2) stabilising government finances; 3) promoting longer-term economic recovery and reviving business confidence; and 4) rebuilding the machinery of government.[7] The first half of this mandate was achieved in RAMSI's early phase; after 2004, the operation aimed to consolidate those gains while pursuing the latter two objectives.

The post-2004 RAMSI does not strictly fit my definition of a peace operation, as it no longer has a significant, active security role. Nevertheless, analysis of later aspects of the operation

[7] Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands, 'RAMSI Brief', available: http://www.ramsi.org/files-/ramsi_brief_final_v2.pdf, p.4.

usefully highlights the sources of its power and the role of local perceptions in determining its effectiveness, particularly when compared with the findings of Chapter Five. Importantly, as RAMSI progressed, pockets of dissent and resistance that had exerted little influence during the first phase emerged as real obstacles to the operation. Examining such opposition in its later, more prominent expression sheds light on why dissent was sidelined during the early phase, and how a contested political space affects the power, legitimacy and effectiveness of a peace operation.

RAMSI's second phase goals were more diffuse and incremental in nature than those of its first. Where the effectiveness of RAMSI with regard to disarmament or public security could be clearly indicated through the number of weapons collected or the incidence of violence, progress towards the operation's other goals is more difficult to evaluate. The central feature of RAMSI's second phase is its focus on capacity building, defined as 'the process by which people, organisations and society as a whole develop competencies and capabilities that will lead to sustained and self-generating performance improvement'.[8] By definition, this is a cumulative process with long-term goals, thus making effectiveness difficult to observe and measure.

Acknowledging this, RAMSI developed a Performance Framework which forms the basis of its Annual Performance Reports, first released in 2006.[9] These reports are complex, highly bureaucratic documents, measuring progress through a very large number of indicators which include procedural outputs (such as trial completion rates, rehabilitative activities in prisons, completion of government audits, customs clearance systems, and the preparation

[8] James Batley, 'RAMSI Special Coordinator Address to Solomon Islands Chamber of Commerce and Industry', transcript, 18 November 2005, available http://www.ramsi.org/node/51.
[9] At the time of writing, three Annual Performance Reports have been released. The most recent report was published in July 2008, covering the 2007-2008 year.

of police strategies),[10] public perceptions,[11] and, to a lesser extent, hard figures such as economic growth rates and debt-to-GDP ratios. Given the minutiae of their criteria, these reports produce highly qualified findings rather than definitive evaluations. Nevertheless, they report that RAMSI is making gradual progress towards its statebuilding goals, but that this progress is incremental, fragile and subject to reversal. Notably, RAMSI reports difficulties in securing better standards of bureaucratic governance and in finding local counterparts whose capacity it can build. The *2007-08 Performance Report*, for example, found 'no progress on the improvement of financial management across Government', that 'planned and sequenced approaches to the capacity development of counterpart staff are not common across RAMSI', and that those counterparts are in short supply.[12]

While RAMSI presented its goals as highly technical outputs, and thus far removed from my assertion that peace operations pursue social goals, closer examination reveals the reliance of its statebuilding objectives on the decisions and behaviour of local actors.[13] That is, RAMSI's program of capacity building and governance reform requires the active support of Solomon Islands officials to be effective. For example, whether RAMSI targets budgetary processes, financial reporting practices or professionalism in the police force and public service, its goals ultimately depend on local counterparts actually translating the proposed reforms into practice. The operation also needed the active cooperation of Solomon Islands politicians; first, to annually renew the *Facilitation of International Assistance Act 2003* in parliament; and second, to act in accordance with RAMSI's statebuilding vision, including

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[10] RAMSI *RAMSI Annual Performance Report 2007-2008: A Report on the Performance of the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands*, RAMSI, July 2008, available http://www.ramsi.org/node/324.

[11] Data on public perceptions of RAMSI performance are gathered through the People's Surveys. Results of the first People's Survey Pilot 2006 were released in December 2006; since then, three People's Surveys have been published, the most recent in February 2010. For example, the *RAMSI Annual Performance Report 2007-2008* uses indicators such as 'Solomon Islanders are less likely than in 2007 to say their household financial situation is better than two years ago, or that it will be better in two years time'.

[12] *RAMSI Annual Performance Report 2007-2008*.

[13] Similarly, Sinclair Dinnen argues that 'RAMSI was always much more than a technical exercise'; see Dinnen, 'State-Building in a Post-Colonial Society', p.75.

through budgetary decisions and adherence to accountability standards. In other words, RAMSI needed individuals, working through institutions of government, to adopt new standards of governance and conform to them.

RAMSI thus needed to obtain more than mere compliance with its reforms; it needed high quality cooperation from local actors based on their belief in the appropriateness of the reform agenda.[14] RAMSI's program of capacity building and institutional strengthening may have had technical elements, but ultimately it aimed to get local actors to behave in accordance with the proposed reforms, based on the belief that such behaviour is right, proper and appropriate, not because they desire the rewards of doing so. Like any statebuilding operation, RAMSI had a strong normative vision of a functioning Solomon Islands state. Far from merely an aggregation of technical processes, the 'secure, well-governed and prosperous' Solomon Islands state for which RAMSI aimed required some critical mass of local actors to actively 'buy in' to that vision and to support it voluntarily, through a logic of appropriateness rather than a logic of consequences. Others have described this as the need to build a 'constituency for reform'.[15]

As much of the statebuilding literature emphasises, the success of international intervention relies on these decisions of local actors. As Dominik Zaum argues,

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[14] Other RAMSI researchers have used 'cooperation' in a different sense, as synonymous with formal government consent. This leads them to view the interests of local actors as fixed, and to counterpose the 'need for cooperation' (i.e. formal consent) with the need to push through substantial reforms of local power relations; for example, see Dinnen, 'State-Building in a Post-Colonial Society', p.76. However, I posit that the behaviour of local actors is not simply the result of their static interests, but that their willingness to cooperate with (i.e. actively support) RAMSI may also be shaped by the nature of their interactions with the operation. Thus the need for local cooperation determines, rather than constrains, RAMSI's ability to achieve its statebuilding goals. In this view, RAMSI needs the cooperation of local elites not just because its legal design depends on the formal consent of the Solomon Islands government, but because it is the decisions of politicians and bureaucrats that will determine whether RAMSI's governance reform agenda is translated into working practice.

[15] Aaron Batten and Satish Chand, 'Rolling RAMSI Forward: Some Ideas from the Literature' *Pacific Economic Bulletin* 23, no. 1 (2008), p.138.

> every instance of international statebuilding has a local core. This underlines the importance of local ownership not only for the ultimate legitimacy of international statebuilding efforts, but also for their effectiveness.[16]

While the 'inherent dilemmas' of using international intervention to promote local ownership create significant constraints on statebuilding operations,[17] in RAMSI's case these were exacerbated by the operation's interactions with local actors. Unlike Michael Wesley, who argues that 'RAMSI was flawed not in its execution...but in its design', I argue here that the local resistance encountered by RAMSI was significantly determined by the operation's own implementing practices. Given that RAMSI's second phase goals aimed to introduce new normative standards of governance in Solomon Islands, the normative influence of local legitimacy ought to have been the most important source of its power. However, as this chapter argues, RAMSI attempted to achieve its objectives by relying primarily on its powers of inducement, while its practices undermined its legitimacy.

Second phase responses to RAMSI and their implications for effectiveness

Analysis of RAMSI's second phase indicates three types of local response to the operation. First, community leaders and groups grew more critical of RAMSI. This was evident in both the direct resistance of a small number of actors who sought to actively undermine the operation's goals, and broader expressions of public dissatisfaction with the practices and priorities of the operation. Second, despite these expressions of opposition, support for RAMSI's presence remained high. This apparent paradox can be explained through the power-legitimacy framework: I argue that 'support' was maintained by the continued provision of valued benefits by the operation (i.e. inducement), and that although criticism

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[16] Dominik Zaum, *The Sovereignty Paradox: The Norms and Politics of International Statebuilding* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), p.245.
[17] Roland Paris and Timothy D. Sisk, eds., *The Dilemmas of Statebuilding: Confronting the Contradictions of Postwar Peace Operations* (London, New York: Routledge, 2009).

did not lead local actors to withdraw their overall support for RAMSI's presence, it did reflect the delegitimation of the operation in the eyes of many local actors. Third, RAMSI's governance reform agenda was resisted by key political and bureaucratic actors. This response type was the most significant for RAMSI's ability to achieve its governance reform and capacity building goals, since they depended on the active 'buy in' of politicians and bureaucrats. The procedural delegitimation of RAMSI in the eyes of these actors was the key constraint of its second phase.

Increasing resistance to RAMSI...

After encountering very little active resistance in its early phase, RAMSI was faced with significantly more opposition to its second phase.[18] The first flashpoint occurred with the shooting murder of a RAMSI police officer, Adam Dunning, in December 2004. The incident had been preceded by a similar shooting attack on a RAMSI vehicle in October 2004, in which another officer was injured. Two former members of the Malaitan Eagle Force were arrested and charged with Dunning's murder, but were later acquitted in the Solomon Islands High Court. While the presiding Judge Edwin Goldsbrough did not find sufficient evidence for their conviction, he did find that the attack was premeditated, and that these and other men had been involved in plans to 'remove' RAMSI from Solomon Islands.[19]

After nearly eighteen months without violent incident, RAMSI responded to Dunning's death by rapidly scaling up its security presence through the deployment of new troops and mounting a determined search for the perpetrators. RAMSI police were accused of using heavy-handed tactics in their investigations and arrests, which led to the first of two court

[18] Gordon Leua Nanau 'Intervention and Nation-building in Solomon Islands: Local Responses' in *Intervention and State-building in the Pacific* ed. Greg Fry and Tarcisius Tara Kabutaulaka (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2008), p.149.
[19] Regina v Tatau [2007] SBHC 163, HCSI-CRC 500 of 2005 (10 May 2007).

cases testing the constitutionality of RAMSI's special privileges and immunities from Solomon Islands law.[20] The muscular response of RAMSI, which included the rapid deployment of more troops from Australia and armed patrols by soldiers wearing body armour, was in stark contrast to the operation's early policy of patrolling unarmed in order to build good relations with local people. Such practices appear to have undermined the perceived fairness of RAMSI personnel; as one local journalist described it:

> There's a general feeling of the Australians overreacting to this killing...You hear a lot of Solomon Islanders saying they're treating all Solomon Islanders like they're guilty now, which is unfair.[21]

RAMSI's civilian arm also encountered resistance during this period. In February 2005, a group of six ministers who were dissatisfied with the positive conclusions of an official government review of RAMSI formed their own committee to assess the operation's first year. Their alternative report recommended that RAMSI be wound back to its law and order function, with the civilian components to be withdrawn within months.[22] Particular criticism was made of RAMSI personnel placed as line officials in the Finance Department; then-Finance Minister Francis Zama reported that RAMSI undermined his position and was accountable to Canberra rather than to the Solomon Islands Cabinet. In addition, Police Minister Michael Maina criticised the growing split between RAMSI's police contingent and the local Solomon Islands police. Both ministers were sacked by the Prime Minister within days, and arrested weeks later on charges of corruption and theft respectively by a joint RAMSI-RSIP corruption task force, undermining the credibility of their objections to

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[20] Sinclair Dinnen, 'Dilemmas of Intervention and the Building of State and Nation' in *Politics and State Building in Solomon Islands*, ed. Sinclair Dinnen and Stewart Firth (Canberra: ANU E-Press, 2008), p.13; see also Lloyd Jones, 'RAMSI Pushes on with Broad Goals Following Member's Murder' *Australian Associated Press General News*, 3 March 2005.

[21] 'Australian Officers 'Shamed' Solomons Suspect' *PACNEWS, the Pacific News Agency Service*, 20 January 2005.

[22] Foreign Relations Committee of the National Parliament of Solomon Islands, *Inquiry into the Facilitation of International Assistance Notice 2003 and RAMSI Intervention (The RAMSI Report)* Committee Report No 1, November 2009, pp.28-29.

RAMSI activities.[23] Nevertheless, their critique of RAMSI's methods of governance reform, particularly via the placement of personnel in key government positions, has been echoed elsewhere, as discussed later in this chapter.

Early in its second phase, then, RAMSI suffered its first armed attack, was challenged in the courts, and was condemned by a group of Cabinet ministers. Nevertheless, the extent of this active resistance to RAMSI was relatively confined. The Dunning shooting, while highlighting that some high-powered weapons remained in the community, was not followed by similar armed attacks on RAMSI personnel. Two members of the alternative Cabinet committee were arrested soon after their report was published, suggesting that they were already under investigation at the time of the report's release, and thus had self-interested reasons for opposing RAMSI. The legal cases against RAMSI were dismissed and a 2009 parliamentary committee found similarly that the operation's privileges and immunities were both justified and necessary.[24]

These expressions of active resistance thus appear to be the responses of a small number of actors whose interests were directly threatened by RAMSI, rather than representative of some broader opposition. In their 2005 review of RAMSI, the Pacific Islands Forum Eminent Persons Group came to a similar conclusion:

> There are some critics of RAMSI: some of those criticisms may be valid; others reflect a vested interest in RAMSI's early departure. Although those with such

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[23] Tarcisius Tara Kabutaulaka, 'Solomon Islands' *The Contemporary Pacific* 18, no. 2 (2006); Shane McLeod, 'RAMSI Labeled Potential Liability by Solomon Islands Cabinet Minister' *Australian Broadcasting Corporation Transcripts*, 2 February 2005; 'PAC: Solomons Ministers Call for Rework and Windback of RAMSI' *Australian Associated Press General News*, 2 February 2005; Lloyd Jones, 'Solomons PM Sacks Two Ministers Who Slammed Aid Mission' *Australian Associated Press General News*, 3 February 2005; 'PAC: Solomons Police Minister Charged with Theft' *Australian Associated Press General News*, 18 February 2005; 'PAC: Former Solomons Finance Minister Arrested on Corruption Charges' *Australian Associated Press General News*, 19 April 2005.

[24] Foreign Relations Committee, *The RAMSI Report.*

> interests are a minority, their potential for causing disruption should not be underestimated.[25]

As that Group noted, however, not all criticism of RAMSI can be explained by the vested interests of a small number of opponents. Throughout its second phase, RAMSI drew varying levels of criticism from a broad range of local actors. Partly because of its early success, local populations had high expectations of RAMSI; in particular, people in Honiara and surrounding areas called for RAMSI to do more to address unemployment, while in the provinces people demanded that the operation's 'peace dividend' be spread beyond the capital.[26]

Such dissatisfaction was evident in the most visible expression of opposition to RAMSI to date: the post-election riots of April 2006, in which parts of Honiara were burned to the ground following the election of Snyder Rini as Prime Minister. Amid accusations of political corruption, groups of protesters and looters descended on Honiara's Chinatown in a brief but destructive wave of unrest, the first of its kind since RAMSI's arrival nearly three years earlier.[27] In addition to expressions of political protest and opportunistic looting, the riots were notable for their display of anti-RAMSI sentiment.

In part, the riots represented genuine protest against the corrupt 'business as usual' conduct of elite politics, carried out behind closed doors despite public demands for greater transparency and democratic process. Rini's election, widely perceived to have been bankrolled by key business interests in Honiara's Asian community, sparked protests which quickly escalated into the targeted destruction of ethnic Chinese property.[28] Yet the riots

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[25] Pacific Islands Forum, *Mission Helpem Fren: A Review of the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands*, paragraph 12.

[26] For example, the 2009 Solomon Islands Foreign Relations Committee report on RAMSI notes strong provincial demand for infrastructure projects, including the rebuilding of wharves and bridges destroyed during the conflict; see Foreign Relations Committee, *The RAMSI Report*.

[27] See Dinnen, 'Dilemmas of Intervention'.

[28] See Michael G. Morgan and Abby McLeod, 'Have We Failed Our Neighbour?' *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 60, no. 3 (2006), p.421; see also Dinnen, 'Dilemmas of Intervention', p.17;

also expressed opportunism as much as political protest, with spontaneous looting and destruction alongside politically-motivated behaviour.[29]

While some argue that the riots showed that RAMSI's security activities had not been as effective as claimed,[30] I argue that their significance was to highlight latent dissatisfaction with RAMSI's agenda. The security implications of the riots should not be exaggerated: lasting two days, the riots were highly localised and did not result in any deaths. Without trivialising the serious destruction of property that occurred, rioting behaviour does not indicate the return to widespread violence. The riots did not pose the risk of backsliding into conflict or violent criminality, and instead should be understood as a limited case of organised protest mixed with opportunism.[31] That RAMSI failed to anticipate and prevent the riots is lamentable, all the more so because of their limited scope. However, it does not indicate a more fundamental level of insecurity.

More significant was the expression of anti-RAMSI sentiment during this period. RAMSI officers and vehicles were targeted in the riots and anti-RAMSI graffiti appeared on the walls of burned-out Chinatown.[32] The use of tear-gas on the crowd by RAMSI police appears to have been a proximate cause of some of this, but the riots also gave voice to dissatisfaction with the operation's failure to improve the economic and employment prospects of Honiara

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Tarcisius Tara Kabutaulaka, 'Westminster Meets Solomons in the Honiara Riots' in *Politics and State Building in Solomon Islands*, ed. Sinclair Dinnen and Stewart Firth (Canberra: ANU E-Press, 2008), p.97; Clive Moore, 'No More Walkabout Long Chinatown: Asian Involvement in the Economic and Political Process' in *Politics and State Building in Solomon Islands*, ed. Sinclair Dinnen and Stewart Firth (Canberra: ANU E-Press, 2008).

[29] See Matthew Allen, 'Politics of Disorder: The Social Unrest in Honiara' in *Politics and State Building in Solomon Islands*, ed. Sinclair Dinnen and Stewart Firth (Canberra: ANU E-Press, 2008); Morgan and McLeod, 'Have We Failed Our Neighbour?', p.422.

[30] For example, see Abdiel, 'No News Is Good News'.

[31] For example, as Clive Moore notes, the fact that illegal weapons did not re-emerge during the riots indicated the continued effectiveness of RAMSI's disarmament strategy; Moore, 'Helpem Fren: The Solomon Islands, 2003-2007', p.144.

[32] Allen, 'Politics of Disorder: The Social Unrest in Honiara', p.60, note 3.

residents.[33] The riots thus represented a shift not in RAMSI's security effectiveness, but in the extent to which latent dissatisfaction with the operation was publicly expressed.

...but continued expressions of support

In Chapter Five, I argued that local perceptions of RAMSI's legitimacy provided important sources of power for the operation. This local legitimacy provided the rationale for diverse local actors to actively cooperate with RAMSI. For example, in its disarmament campaign, RAMSI was able to legitimise itself such that whole communities bought in to RAMSI's vision and implementation of a weapons-free Solomon Islands governed by the rule of law rather than violence, and provided high quality cooperation on this basis. In part, this was because RAMSI's agenda cohered with local preferences (source legitimacy); in part because RAMSI implemented its agenda through participatory and consultative practices, and communicated in such a way that its motives, intentions and credibility were trusted (procedural legitimacy); and in part because its early effectiveness in providing public security gave different types of local actors reasons to trust in RAMSI's ability to ensure that security would be maintained (substantive legitimacy). RAMSI's disarmament effectiveness was explained not by general support for the operation's presence, nor by rhetorical expressions of support for disarmament, but instead because local actors had reasons for changing their behaviour in ways that actively cooperated with RAMSI. For disarmament, then, what mattered was the type of support offered and the reasons for it, not just the fact of 'support' itself.

This distinction between local support and local legitimacy is important for understanding the disparity between evident expressions of support for RAMSI in its second phase and

[33] Ibid., p.44; see also Emile LeBrun and Robert Muggah, *Silencing Guns: Local Perspectives on Small Arms and Armed Violence in Rural South Pacific Islands Communities* Small Arms Survey, 2005, p.34; Allen, 'Dissenting Voices', pp.194-195; Nic Maclellan, *Bridging the Gap between State and Society: New Directions for the Solomon Islands*, Oxfam Australia and Oxfam New Zealand, July 2006, p.9.

mounting public criticism of the operation. Despite the local criticism of RAMSI described above, the extent of public support for the operation remained remarkably high after 2004. A series of public opinion surveys between 2007 and 2009 found that 88 – 90 per cent of respondents supported the presence of RAMSI in Solomon Islands.[34] Active resistance to RAMSI thus appears to represent a small minority of popular perceptions, which supports my earlier argument that the low incidence of active non-compliance with RAMSI is proportional to the number of the operation's opponents. This conclusion is supported by other evaluation reports of RAMSI. In 2005, the Report of the Pacific Islands Forum Eminent Persons Group found that 'a large majority of the people of Solomon Islands believe in RAMSI and want it to continue with its work';[35] in 2007, a Pacific Islands Task Force Review found that RAMSI had 'strong and widespread support throughout Solomon Islands';[36] and in 2009, the Solomon Islands Foreign Relations Committee inquiry into RAMSI reported that the operation 'continues to have the ongoing appreciation of the people of Solomon Islands'.[37]

Importantly, while there is little doubt that the aggregate figures of popular support presented in the People's Surveys are accurate, they appear to mask divergence in people's opinions about the different strands and personnel of the operation. In RAMSI's second phase, the reasons for which people supported the operation became fewer, and that support came with more qualifications. In my interviews with local actors, the phrase 'Overall, we

[34] Survey participants were asked: 'Do you support the presence of RAMSI in Solomon Islands?' The results were as follows: *People's Survey 2007*: 90%; *People's Survey 2008*: 89%; *People's Survey 2009*: 88%.
[35] Pacific Islands Forum, Mis*sion Helpem Fren: A Review of the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands*, p.5.
[36] Pacific Islands Forum Task Force, *Report of the Pacific Islands Forum Review Of the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands 2007*, p.4.
[37] Foreign Relations Committee, *The RAMSI Report*, p.xiv.

love RAMSI, but...' frequently preceded critique of the operation's activities and attitudes towards local people.[38]

What, then, explains the presence of both high support and public dissatisfaction with RAMSI? Using the power-legitimacy framework, four key power shifts can be identified that explain why people continued to support RAMSI's presence in Solomon Islands, even as that support became more qualified and piecemeal. RAMSI maintained local support through its power of inducement by maintaining the flow of valued security and aid benefits to local actors. However, RAMSI's legitimacy was weakened as people became more suspicious of RAMSI's motives, as its activities and outputs became less coherent with local preferences, and as its communication practices were diminished or abandoned, which meant RAMSI had fewer channels through which to influence local actors' beliefs, to provide reasons for people to trust in its motives, and overall, to actively support its vision for the Solomon Island state. RAMSI's source, substantive and procedural legitimacy were thus each undermined. I examine each of these power shifts in turn below. I then analyse the implications of these for RAMSI's effectiveness, finding that, because of the nature of the operation's second phase goals, the maintenance of public support through inducement has been a sufficient source of power regarding the behaviour of the general population. However, the inability of RAMSI to persuade the political and bureaucratic elites to cooperate with its statebuilding agenda has been a key obstacle to its effectiveness; I consider those processes in the following section.

Less coercion, more inducement

The drawdown of RAMSI troops during 2004 indicated the first key power shift. An important source of power for RAMSI in its security phase, coercion became predictably less relevant in achieving governance reform. Nevertheless, RAMSI retained its police force and

[38] This phrase was also noted elsewhere; see Marni Cornell, 'We Love RAMSI, but…' *New Matilda*, 1 November 2006.

a small military presence, while forces remained on standby in Australia for rapid deployment if necessary.[39]

Rather than acting as coercive power and exerting influence through the fear of punishment, in the second phase RAMSI's police and military components provided a form of inducement. At the time of writing, nearly seven years after deployment, RAMSI's maintenance of public security remains the most valued contribution of the operation.[40] In addition, RAMSI catalysed substantial new aid flows when it was deployed in 2003 and its continued presence has contributed to donor engagement by ameliorating risk, both by underwriting security and by monitoring (and at times controlling) government spending through its civilian advisors in the Department of Finance and Treasury. Further, in addition to being RAMSI's lead sponsor, Australia has a bilateral aid program that is by far the largest in Solomon Islands, averaging nearly A$100 million per year between 2004 and 2009. Australia's total official development aid to Solomon Islands – including funding for RAMSI – was more than double that, reaching A$1.1 billion by the end of 2009.[41] Other important donors include New Zealand, the Asian Development Bank, Japan, the EU and Taiwan; in 2007, aid to Solomon Islands was nearly 50% of gross domestic product, more than six times higher than the low income country average.[42]

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[39] In April 2006, for example, troops were rapidly deployed from Australia in the wake of post-election riots.

[40] In the *People's Survey 2009*, the most commonly reported ways in which RAMSI was perceived to help Solomon Islands were: 'keep the peace' (75%), 'improve law and justice' (48%) and 'arrest criminals' (33%). The proportion of respondents mentioning RAMSI's governance activities was much lower: 'help run the country' (22%), 'provide technical assistance' (15%), and 'improve the economy' (9%). Further, 53% of respondents believed that violence would return to Solomon Islands if RAMSI withdrew soon, and 30% said that violence would 'maybe' return; see also Julien Barbara, 'Antipodean Statebuilding' *Journal of Statebuilding and Intervention* 2, no. 2 (2008), p.187.

[41] AusAID, *Annual Report 2004-2005* Australian Government, 2005; AusAID, *Annual Report 2005-2006* Australian Government, 2006; AusAID, *Annual Report 2006-2007* Australian Government, 2007; AusAID, *Annual Report 2007-2008* Australian Government, 2008; AusAID, *Annual Report 2008-2009* Australian Government, 2009.

[42] World Bank, *World Development Indicators, 2009* (Washington DC: World Bank, 2009).

These security and aid benefits combine to provide a strong incentive for Solomon Islands government to accept not only the operation's continued presence but also its governance reform agenda. When faced with obstructionist local actors, RAMSI's lead sponsor Australia has alluded to its ability to withdraw these benefits.[43] RAMSI personnel have consistently emphasised the 'integrated', 'comprehensive' nature of the operation;[44] this structure has allowed its decision-makers to robustly link different goals, making the provision and maintenance of security, budget support and program aid essentially conditional on local acceptance of the operation's prescribed policy reforms, especially in finance and treasury.[45]

Indeed, RAMSI's governance reform agenda was from the outset presented to the Solomon Islands government as the condition of Australia's security assistance. For example, when a team of senior Australian public officials was sent to Solomon Islands following the formal request for assistance to consult on the form and timing of the intervention, their task

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[43] For example, on 20 May 2006, the Australian Foreign Minister Alexander Downer stated that '[i]f [the Solomon Islands government] don't like what we do here, if they don't like the structure of what we do, there's always the option for us to leave'; Alexander Downer in Lloyd Jones, 'PAC: Downer Warns Solomons Not to Block Assistance Mission' *Australian Associated Press General News*, 20 May 2006.

[44] For example, see Nick Warner, ''Moving Forward in Partnership: RAMSI, One Year on', speech at the Beyond Intervention Conference in Honiara', available: http://www.ramsi.org/node/44. Further, James Batley stated that 'the way we are implementing our programs we can't just have one part and not the other; it's a package of assistance from the region', and that RAMSI comes as a package... all of its parts work together and reinforce each other'; see James Batley 'RAMSI a Comprehensive Package of Assistance for Solomons' available: http://www.ramsi.org/node/44; James Batley, 'Presentation to Members of Parliament by Special Coordinator and Deputy Special Coordinator' available: http://www.ramsi.org/node/51.

[45] For example, Australian Foreign Minister Alexander Downer explicitly used RAMSI's aid package as inducement to influence local decision-making, emphasising the operation's status as a single undertaking and rejecting any attempts by the Solomon Islands government to change its agenda as 'cherry-picking'; Alexander Downer interviewed by Barrie Cassidy, 'The Solomon Islands Facing 'Very Difficult Situation': Foreign Affairs Minister Alexander Downer on the Solomon Islands' *Australian Broadcasting Corporation Transcripts*, 21 May 2006. Downer later stated that 'RAMSI is an integrated package and we're not going to have RAMSI salami sliced or neutered in any way in delicate areas like improvement in the operation of public finances in the Solomon Islands'; Alexander Downer, interviewed by Louise Yaxley, 'RAMSI Won't Be 'Salami Sliced' Says Downer' *Australian Broadcasting Corporation Transcripts*, 22 September 2006.

> was partly to persuade the Solomon Islands government that there would be no intervention to re-establish law and order without agreement to a much broader mandate of state-building and governance reform.[46]

RAMSI's provision of security and aid benefits has consistently ensured majority support among both elites and the general population. The effective restoration of law and order in RAMSI's early phase legitimised the operation substantively; in subsequent years, it functioned as a form of inducement to maintain formal, governmental consent for the operation and general popular support for its presence. RAMSI's 2007-08 Annual Performance Report, for example, found that Solomon Islanders understand the operation as a peacekeeping and law enforcement mission, and it is on that basis that they support its 'continuing presence'.[47] Since inducement functions on a logic of consequences rather than appropriateness, its utility for shaping the norms and beliefs of local actors is limited. While the provision of tangible benefits gives elites and the general population alike reason to support the presence of RAMSI, it has not provided reasons for them to cooperate with its vision of governance reform.

Less source legitimacy: a more Australian, less regional operation

In their daily press briefings and regular public statements during RAMSI's early months, the operation's leaders repeatedly emphasised that their purpose was simply to help Solomon Islands restore peace and security, with no ulterior motive or self-interest. Nick Warner recalls that he would outline the shared interests of both Solomon Islands and its neighbours in ensuring security and stability.[48] The rapid turnaround in public security gave people

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[46] Michael Wesley, 'Reality Beyond the Whiteboard' *Griffith Review* 16 (2007); see also John Howard, 'Australia's Engagement with Asia – a New Paradigm?' Speech to Asialink/ANU National Forum, Canberra, 13 August 2004; Barbara, '*Antipodean Statebuilding*', p.143.

[47] *RAMSI Annual Performance Report 2007-2008*.

[48] For example, Nick Warner recalls that some local communities were concerned that RAMSI wanted their gold, minerals or other natural resources (Nick Warner, interview by author, Sydney, 6 January 2007); see also Tim George, 'RAMSI's Real Agenda: A Good News Story' available: http://www.ramsi.org/node/192.

reason to believe this claim and, so long as RAMSI was delivering tangible improvements to people's lives, it was able to maintain a persuasive claim as a benevolent regional presence.

As RAMSI shifted to its second phase objectives, however, this claim was undermined by the less evident production of tangible benefits and, importantly, by the more dominant role of Australian personnel. As planned, RAMSI's troops were withdrawn as key security milestones were achieved, thus reducing that part of the operation in which Pacific Islands countries had the greatest capacity to participate. At the same time, the second phase saw significant growth in RAMSI's civilian component, which has been staffed overwhelmingly by Australians, with some participation by New Zealanders but virtually none from the rest of the Pacific region. While this regional deficit has been justified as an effort not to drain the capacity of other small Pacific Island states,[49] the consequence has been to strengthen local perceptions of RAMSI as an instrument of Australian foreign policy, not a truly 'regional assistance mission'.[50] Notably, although the 2005 Eminent Persons Group report recommended increasing non-Australian participation in RAMSI to address this perception,[51] little change occurred and the 2007 Review found that the operation was still perceived as an Australian operation.[52] This perception was again noted in Solomon Islands' 2009 Foreign Relations Committee report.[53]

Less substantive legitimacy: weaker coherence with local preferences

An important reason for RAMSI's early effectiveness was that its security goals matched to a high degree the demands of diverse local actors, and because the operation then employed successful strategies to multiply and leverage that coherence between local preferences and

[49] Dr Lesi Korovavala in Foreign Relations Committee, *The RAMSI Report*, p.87.
[50] Allen, 'Dissenting Voices', p.196; Dinnen, 'State-Building in a Post-Colonial Society', p.69; Nanau, 'Intervention and Nation-building in Solomon Islands', p.151-152.
[51] Pacific Islands Forum, Mis*sion Helpem Fren: A Review of the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands*, p.6.
[52] Pacific Islands Forum Task Force, *Report of the Pacific Islands Forum Review Of the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands*, p.4.
[53] Foreign Relations Committee, *The RAMSI Report*, pp.86-88.

international solutions. As RAMSI sought to achieve its security goals, it provided immediate and tangible benefits to a broad cross-section of Solomon Islands society. It thus generated substantive legitimacy by meeting and exceeding local expectations.

By contrast, RAMSI's package of governance reforms had little direct effect on the lives of most Solomon Islanders. While their ultimate goals included the stimulation of economic growth and a 'well-governed and prosperous nation',[54] the governance reforms introduced by RAMSI occurred inside government departments, often involving little interaction with even senior Solomon Islands public servants, and were thus largely shielded from public view. RAMSI had successfully engaged local communities in its security activities through village disarmament ceremonies, military open days and joint activities with community groups; in contrast, there were few opportunities for such participation in strengthening accountability institutions and fiscal reform.

While there was substantial popular demand for political change, there was little overt demand for the specific activities pursued by RAMSI, in part because the operation did not effectively communicate the causal links between its longer-term governance reform agenda and the public demand for better livelihoods and political processes. Instead, public opinion focused on the perceived impunity of the 'big fish', a moniker for the political elite who inflamed the conflict and benefitted from its resulting disorder.[55] For example, the 2005 Report of the Eminent Persons Group of the Pacific Islands Forum, the first comprehensive review of RAMSI, reported that:

> We heard many times of the need for RAMSI and the Government of Solomon Islands to continue to pursue the instigators of the tensions – the "big fish" – not just the followers. At the community level some felt that those that have been prosecuted and convicted have tended to be lower level players, although equally liable for their share of blame. The senior figures who have been arrested were

[54] RAMSI, 'RAMSI Brief'.
[55] Nanau, 'Intervention and Nation-building in Solomon Islands', p.158.

> perceived to have been so for activities, for example, relating to corruption rather than instigating the tensions.[56]

RAMSI's design as a 'cooperative intervention', working through the Solomon Islands state, had guaranteed its acceptability to the established political elite and its international legitimacy among Pacific Islands Forum members. Nevertheless, this has required RAMSI to work with and support unpopular domestic governments.[57] RAMSI's support for the Kemakeza government (in office from 2002-2006), in particular, was criticised for propping up a regime widely believed to be tainted by its involvement in the conflict. It was only after Allan Kemakeza was voted out of office in the 2006 elections that he was arrested, and later convicted, on charges of demanding money with menace, intimidation and larceny relating to a raid on a law firm in 2002.[58]

In its second phase, then, RAMSI lacked the ability to legitimise its activities by linking them to local preferences. While there was popular demand for RAMSI to deal with senior politicians implicated in the conflict period, the operation was constrained by its need for formal host state consent. Further, as discussed in the next section, while RAMSI's planners aimed to improve economic outcomes via governance reforms, the operation did not effectively communicate the link between these two processes to local people.

Less procedural legitimacy: communications

The fourth power shift in RAMSI's second phase relates to the weakening of its communication practices. During its first phase, RAMSI derived significant procedural legitimacy through its diverse communication strategies. Subsequently, RAMSI's communications became less frequent, less meaningful for local actors, and less effective as a

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[56] Pacific Islands Forum, *Mission Helpem Fren: A Review of the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands*, paragraph 46; see also Kabutaulaka, 'Solomon Islands', p.427. Discontent with RAMSI's failure to deal with these 'big fish' was the foremost critique offered in my interviews and informal discussions with local actors.

[57] Dinnen, 'State-Building in a Post-Colonial Society', p.70.

[58] Roselyn Lenga, 'Solomon Islands' *The Contemporary Pacific* 21, no. 2 (2009), p.379.

source of influence for the operation. One persistent indicator of this is the finding of numerous reports that 'there was limited understanding of the role and mandate of RAMSI beyond the restoration of law and order'.[59]

Further, in interviews with the author, Solomon Islands commentators and journalists noted a shift in RAMSI's posture from one that prioritised public engagement in the operation's first phase to a subsequent reticence to actively pursue public communications. From 2005, for example, RAMSI shifted away from its deliberate strategy of high-profile public engagement to a 'lighter footprint' intended to foreground local officials and, in particular, Solomon Islands police. But this new policy position was not effectively communicated to Solomon Islanders, many of whom were calling for RAMSI's Participating Police Force to do *more* in their communities, not less.[60] Rather than appreciating this attempt to transfer authority to local actors, people began to perceive RAMSI as aloof and removed from Solomon Islands society. Although there were certainly public concerns about the attitudes of the Australian Participating Police Force (PPF) contingents, particularly that they were arrogant and looked down upon local people,[61] the continuing lack of public trust in the Solomon Islands police and the ongoing public fear that conflict could return created high demand for more RAMSI police engagement.[62] Notably, unlike the first PPF Commander Ben McDevitt, his successors were at best reluctant media figures.[63] Further, Solomon Islands media outlets had limited access to senior RAMSI personnel, with one journalist describing the 'very controlled process of information dissemination' out of the operation's

[59] Foreign Relations Committee, *The RAMSI Report*, p.164; see also People's Survey 2008; People's Survey 2009.
[60] Bill Pryor, interview with author, Honiara, 19 August 2006; 'Top Solomons Churchman Attacks Australian-Led Peace Mission' *Australian Associated Press General News*, 19 January 2005.
[61] Allen, 'Dissenting Voices', p.197
[62] For example, the *People's Survey 2007* found that 53% of respondents believed that violence would return, and 27% that it may return, to Solomon Islands if RAMSI left soon.
[63] Author's interviews with local journalists and civil society representatives.

headquarters.[64] Compared to the daily press briefings of RAMSI's early days, this suggests that RAMSI became less transparent and also lost key channels through which to communicate its motives and counter misperception.

At the same time, civil society groups criticised their marginalisation as RAMSI became less active in direct consultation with local NGOs and community groups.[65] In instrumental terms this communication gap eroded the feedback loop provided by meaningful public engagement and further weakened its communication channels.[66] This meant that, in the lead-up to the 2006 riots, RAMSI had lost important sources of public intelligence that might otherwise have better prepared the operation for the April riots. Crucially, it also meant that the operation struggled to communicate its narrative of the April unrest, which exacerbated the extent to which the incident undermined local confidence in RAMSI.[67]

Finally, the passage of time exacerbated limitations of RAMSI that had been evident earlier. In particular, the complexity of RAMSI's second phase agenda and the decline in its partnership with local groups such as the NPC highlighted the dearth of local language skills among the operation's personnel.[68] As Clive Moore notes, it took the communications breakdown of the April 2006 riots, in which RAMSI police could not understand protestors

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[64] Solomon Islands' journalist, interview by author, Honiara, August 2006.

[65] Paul Tovua, interview by author, Honiara, 21 August 2006; John Kelleher, interview by author, Honiara, 28 August 2006; Adrian Smith, interview by author, Honiara, 23 August 2006; Ashley Wickham, interview by author, Honiara, 8 August 2006.

[66] In response to the 2006 riots, RAMSI initiated a community outreach program which aimed to re-establish communication channels with local communities. However interviews, observations and analysis of RAMSI's documentation about the initiative show that its emphasis at the outset was on RAMSI's dissemination of information rather than listening and responding to local voices and concerns. This strategy is discussed at in the final section of this chapter.

[67] Allen, 'Dissenting Voices'; Clive Moore, 'Pacific View: The Meaning of Governance and Politics in the Solomon Islands' *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 62, no. 3 (2008); Mary-Louise O'Callaghan, 'RAMSI - the Way Ahead' in *Politics and State Building in Solomon Islands*, ed. Sinclair Dinnen and Stewart Firth (Canberra: ANU E-Press, 2008).

[68] For example, the earlier goal of disarmament had an easier narrative to communicate than the many different subgoals of economic reform. Further, it built on existing understandings developed through the IPMT's earlier activities, and communications were aided by partnering with the NPC.

or effectively communicate with them, to make Pijin language training compulsory for RAMSI police.[69]

Political and bureaucratic resistance

The four power shifts identified above explain why local criticism of RAMSI increased even though local support for the operation remained strong: the positive benefits provided to the community ensured the maintenance of support for the operation's presence, but the legitimacy of its goals and practices became more contested. Nevertheless, this has not had significant influence on the operation's ability to achieve its second phase objectives, primarily because these depend upon the behaviour of the political and bureaucratic elite, rather than the behaviour of the broader population. Unlike in RAMSI's disarmament campaign, where societal pressure was significant in persuading armed actors to hand in their weapons,[70] the gulf between Solomon Islands' ruling elites and its people meant that the perceptions of the general public were less influential on the behaviour of their politicians.[71]

While RAMSI had received strong cooperation from Solomon Islands politicians in its security activities, the operation failed to secure the active support of the country's politicians and policymakers for its statebuilding agenda. As long-time Solomon Islands observer, journalist and, later, RAMSI advisor Mary-Louise O'Callaghan describes:

> In stark contrast with the overwhelming support for the mission's quite extensive intervention into Solomon Islands' law and order, there has been resentment, suspicion and active undermining of RAMSI's reforms and, in particular, the policy of putting key RAMSI personnel into ministries such as finance and in positions in other departments, such as that of the accountant-general. The same resistance is evident in response to the mission's efforts to reform government practices, policies and the endemic corruption that so undermines much of the State's core business in Solomon Islands, particularly the delivery of services. RAMSI encounters resentment, suspicion and active undermining from the country's political and bureaucratic élite. The daily, endless and time-consuming struggle to push on with

[69] Moore, 'Pacific View: The Meaning of Governance and Politics in the Solomon Islands', p.392.
[70] See discussion in Chapter Five.
[71] On the gulf between the Solomon Islands government and the people, see Maclellan *Bridging the Gap between State and Society: New Directions for the Solomon Islands*.

> these reforms, with little or no support from all but a few of Solomon Islands' senior bureaucrats, was described by one RAMSI insider in 2005 as 'trench warfare'.[72]

O'Callaghan's characterisation of elite resistance to the operation's agenda is notable for its emphasis on local behavioural responses to processes framed by RAMSI as technical and apolitical outputs. This is significant because RAMSI's governance reforms reflect its strong but unstated normative agenda regarding the appropriateness of governance standards. For example, much of this agenda falls under the purview of RAMSI's Machinery of Government programme, a title that suggests a functional focus on the 'nuts and bolts' of government but which in practice entails a much more profound attempt to transmit norms related to democracy, corruption and accountability. Through the extensive use of civilian advisors in government departments, RAMSI attempted not simply to transfer technical knowledge but to socialise local bureaucrats and politicians into governance modes considered to be more appropriate for a viable, modern state. However, by framing its goals as purely technical matters, RAMSI obscured its need to influence local actor beliefs and appeared to overlook the need to do so based on a logic of appropriateness (via legitimacy) rather than one of consequences. Instead, RAMSI relied on its power of inducement, attempting to influence local behaviour by making the provision of security and aid benefits conditional on the acceptance of governance reforms by the Solomon Islands government. At the same time, key practices delegitimised RAMSI in the eyes of those local actors whose active cooperation it most needed.

Two processes of delegitimation were particularly significant. First, the Solomon Islands government had little opportunity to drive or shape RAMSI's agenda. RAMSI's lack of local accountability and consultation generated both passivity and resentment from its local counterparts, particularly regarding the practices of its Economic Governance pillar. Second, this contributed to a sense among political elites that their status and sovereignty

[72] O'Callaghan, 'RAMSI - the Way Ahead', p.187; see also Allen, 'Politics of Disorder: The Social Unrest in Honiara'; Baser, *Provision of Technical Assistance Personnel in the Solomon Islands* .

were not receiving appropriate respect, a perception gravely exacerbated by an escalating diplomatic row between Australia and the Solomon Islands government in 2006-2007. In both cases, the attempts of RAMSI policymakers to maintain control over the operation's agenda delegitimised it procedurally, thereby limiting its ability to secure local cooperation.

Less procedural legitimacy: accountability and consultation

Although RAMSI was deployed at the explicit request of Solomon Islands government and remained subject to its annually-renewed consent, these formal mechanisms have not in practice ensured RAMSI's accountability to the local government. In justifications of the intervention, RAMSI's consent-based design was argued to strengthen rather than threaten Solomon Islands sovereignty.[73] However, local actors had little opportunity to shape RAMSI's priorities and policies, despite repeated emphasis on the 'cooperative' nature of the intervention in 'partnership' with Solomon Islands government. While this was also true during RAMSI's first phase, the passage of time seems to have elevated accountability concerns to a higher priority. That is, it appears that RAMSI was allowed more leeway in its first phase, for two reasons. First, the 'emergency' nature of its security and economic intervention justified the operation's more controlling posture, particularly since it was able to deliver results quickly. In other words, RAMSI's substantive legitimacy made up for some its procedural deficits. But as stability emerged and some degree of complacency about RAMSI's effectiveness set in, this was no longer sufficient to sideline accountability concerns. Second, the nature of RAMSI's first phase practices was more carefully negotiated and more comprehensively specified in the pre-deployment negotiations of June 2003 than those accompanying its subsequent governance reforms. Indeed, RAMSI's lack of sufficient consultation with local actors between 2004 and 2007 is one of the foremost critiques of the operation, both locally and internationally.

[73] See for example 'Joint Press Conference Prime Minister Sir Allan Kemakeza and Special Coordinator Nick Warner' (transcript in possession of author), Honiara, 24 July 2003.

The most vocal criticism came from Prime Minister Manasseh Sogavare, elected in 2006, who accused RAMSI of operating as a parallel government and infringing the sovereignty of Solomon Islands.[74] While Sogavare was opposed to RAMSI on broader grounds,[75] such criticism was also expressed by the operation's supporters, notably by Sogavare's successor, Derek Sikua. Since his election in December 2007, Prime Minister Sikua has presided over a period of much-improved relations between the Solomon Islands government and RAMSI. Unlike the political grandstanding of which Sogavare was accused, Sikua's critique targeted specific effectiveness constraints of RAMSI's advisory practices. He openly criticised RAMSI's lack of local accountability and the attitudes of its many advisors. In particular, he noted the tendency among RAMSI personnel to believe 'that this government should gratefully follow and accept whatever assistance is designed and funded for us', even though the government has no input into the selection and appointment of advisory staff.[76] Further, he argued that the performance of RAMSI's advisors was assessed by the quality of their reporting to the operation and Canberra, 'rather than the value of their contribution to strengthening the Ministries they have been attached to'.[77]

RAMSI's economic governance advisors in the Ministry of Finance and Treasury attracted concern from both local actors and researchers. First, advisors in this pillar assumed more direct authority in the Solomon Islands government than those in other areas, with RAMSI's 'in-line' officials concentrated in this department. In comparison to RAMSI's Machinery of Government program, in which advisors engaged in more dialogue with their local counterparts about the priorities of assistance, the Economic Governance pillar was

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[74] For example, see Manasseh Sogavare in 'Australia Warns Solomons Peacekeeping Mission in Doubt' *Agence France Presse*, 9 February 2007. This critique was also a feature of the 2005 alternative Cabinet report, discussed earlier in this chapter.
[75] These are discussed in detail in the next section of this chapter.
[76] The Hon. Dr. Derek Sikua, evidence, quoted in Foreign Relations Committee, *The RAMSI Report*, p.92.
[77] Ibid., p.92.

perceived 'as a Canberra-controlled implant'[78] unaccountable to the local government.[79] This created a sense of exclusion among RAMSI's supposed local 'counterparts' in the Ministry of Finance and Treasury,[80] and the perception that RAMSI's Economic Governance activities served external interests rather than the Solomon Islands public.[81] The 2007 Pacific Islands Forum Task Force review found that, despite the existence of consultation mechanisms, the most important line of reporting – that between RAMSI and the Solomon Islands Cabinet – was also the weakest. This lack of consultation, the report concluded, created the perception 'that RAMSI was working to its own agenda rather than in support of the SIG's policies and priorities'.[82]

Indeed, as discussed earlier in this chapter, acceptance of RAMSI's governance reform agenda was from the outset the condition of Australia's security assistance. The documents that establish RAMSI's formal mandate are undeniably brief; notably, they emphasise the operation's security, law and order objectives but provide little detail on its governance agenda.[83] The first substantive articulation of this appeared in a July 2004 report authored by the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade.[84] While the report acknowledges that '[t]he Solomon Islands Government must be the driving force of any fundamental

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[78] Gilling and Hughes quoted in Baser, *Provision of Technical Assistance Personnel in the Solomon Islands*, p.18.
[79] Baser, *Provision of Technical Assistance Personnel in the Solomon Islands*, p.18. It should be noted that this more positive assessment of the Machinery of Government pillar is relative to that of Economic Governance, and its advisors have also taken direct, controlling roles.
[80] Pacific Islands Forum/UNDP, Soc*ial Impact Assessment of Peace Restoration Initiatives in Solomon Islands*, p.19.
[81] Allen, 'Politics of Disorder: The Social Unrest in Honiara', p.50; see also Shahar Hameiri, 'Risk Management, Neo-Liberalism and the Securitisation of the Australian Aid Program' *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 62, no. 3 (2008); Shahar Hameiri, 'Capacity and Its Fallacies: International State Building as State Transformation' *Millennium - Journal of International Studies* 38, no. 1 (2009).
[82] Pacific Islands Forum Task Force, *Report of the Pacific Islands Forum Review Of the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands*, pp.13-14.
[83] 'Outcome Statement', Forum Foreign Affairs Ministers Meeting, Sydney, 30 June 2003, available http://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/spacific/regional_orgs/ffamm_solomons_0306.html; *Facilitation of International Assistance Act 2003*, Solomon Islands (No.1 of 2003); *Agreement between Solomon Islands, Australia, New Zealand, Fiji, Papua New Guinea, Samoa and Tonga Concerning the Operations and Status of the Police and Armed Forces and the Other Personnel Deployed to Solomon Islands to Assist in the Restoration of Law and Order and Security*, (24 July 2003).
[84] Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, *Solomon Islands: Rebuilding an Island Economy*.

reforms for there to be long-term change', it nevertheless goes on to undermine the practical likelihood of this by setting out RAMSI's priorities.

Accountability and consultation can legitimise a peace operation procedurally by informing local judgments about the fairness and appropriateness of decision-making processes. I argued in Chapter Two that, by checking the exercise of power, accountability distinguishes legitimate rule from domination. In the context of RAMSI, local accountability refers to processes for ensuring that the dependence of Solomon Islands on external actors for security, aid and technical assistance does not allow those actors to dictate an agenda that serves their own interests but marginalises or ignores local priorities. Consultation legitimises a peace operation when it allows local actors to exercise voice in decision-making processes and to shape the operation's agenda, thereby enhancing perceptions of fairness and providing normative reasons for them to cooperate. The weakness of such procedural legitimation was thus a key constraint on RAMSI's second phase effectiveness.

Less procedural legitimacy: quality of treatment

The final shift in RAMSI's power was a decline in the quality of its treatment of key local actors. During its security phase, the operation secured key objectives, including the arrest of Harold Keke, by treating potential opponents with respect, dignity and fairness. By contrast, in the second phase an escalating diplomatic row between Australia and the Sogavare government soured RAMSI's relations with its most prominent local opponent. What began as relatively modest requests for the indigenisation of RAMSI's capacity building program quickly escalated into a hostile and uncooperative government position, including Sogavare's threat to revoke consent for RAMSI in 2006.[85]

[85] Steve Marshall, 'Solomon Islands, Aust Relationship Reaches New Low Solomons Threatens to Expel RAMSI' *Australian Broadcasting Corporation Transcripts*, 14 October 2006.

Unlike the procedural legitimacy RAMSI had earlier gained through its interactions with potential opponents, the treatment of Sogavare and his government by Australian diplomats delegitimised the operation. Strictly speaking, this power shift related to the actions of *Australia* rather than RAMSI; however, given the undeniable control of RAMSI by Australia, in perception and reality, the practices of Australian diplomacy were quickly conflated with RAMSI policy. In the remainder of this section, I examine these interactions between external and local actors, arguing that the poor treatment of Sogavare and his supporters substantially weakened prospects for the local elite cooperation needed by RAMSI to achieve its governance reform objectives.

In the immediate aftermath of the April 2006 post-election riots, the newly elected but unpopular Prime Minister Snyder Rini was forced to resign when a number of his supporters crossed the floor to join the opposition. One of the defectors, Manasseh Sogavare, emerged from the subsequent political wrangling as the leader of a new Grand Coalition government. This was Sogavare's second time in office; he was first elected Prime Minister in June 2000 following the armed coup that deposed the sitting leader, Bartholomew Ulafa'ulu. In 2000, one of his first acts had been to call for foreign assistance to prevent economic collapse,[86] but he had been staunchly opposed to any foreign military intervention in the crisis.[87] In 2001, he condemned what he saw as bullying behaviour by 'foreign ministers of some donor countries',[88] and called on Australia to apologise for meddling in Solomon Islands' internal affairs.[89] In elections in late-2001, Sogavare was replaced as Prime Minister by Sir Allan Kemakeza, but retained his parliamentary seat. In the months leading to RAMSI's

[86] Craig Skehan, 'Red Faces as Solomons' 'Mr Ten Percent' Returns' *Sydney Morning Herald*, 3 July 2000.
[87] George Atkins, 'Foreign Military Intervention Termed Disastrous by Solomons PM ' *Agence-France Presse*, 1 October 2000.
[88] 'Solomon Islands Prime Minister Says Donor Countries "Bullying"' *Radio New Zealand International*, 30 April 2001.
[89] 'Solomon Islands PM Says Australia Should Apologize For "Meddling"' Solomon Islands Ministry of Commerce web site, Honiara; via BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific, 9 May 2001.

deployment in July 2003, Sogavare was the lone voice of political opposition to the intervention, declaring Australia's actions to be 'nothing short of re-colonising this country' and warning that Solomon Islands' parliament was being 'deliberately used as a puppet for overseas agendas'.[90]

During the twenty months of the Sogavare administration, relations between RAMSI and the Solomon Islands government became increasingly strained. Sogavare's early critique of RAMSI targeted its use of personnel in line and senior advisory positions in Solomon Islands government, particularly in the Department of Finance and Treasury. In early statements, Sogavare's demands were fairly modest; for example, soon after taking office he declared simply that '[i]f there are qualified Solomon Islanders who can do their job, then as a general rule, Solomon Islanders should be used in this position'.[91] Further, he reserved high praise for RAMSI's law and order strategies, acknowledged the need for RAMSI's continued presence, actively encouraged its security agenda, and pledged to work closely with the joint RAMSI-Solomon Islands police anti-corruption unit to crack down on corrupt politicians 'like a ton of bricks'.[92] Sogavare also raised concerns about the 'big fish' who had escaped arrest by RAMSI, echoing broader public discontent with this aspect of the operation.[93] But he emphasised that neither he nor his government were 'anti-RAMSI':

> Of course, there are issues that we need to sit and discuss and we have differences, but those are issues that we can discuss within the framework that is allowed under the act that governed the presence of RAMSI in this county.[94]

The 'issues' Sogavare referred to were twofold. The first concerned the legal status of privileges and immunities accorded to RAMSI personnel under the 2003 *Facilitation of International Assistance Act*, and was the topic of a number of legal cases brought before

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[90] Mary-Louise O'Callaghan and Patrick Walters, 'We'll Be Puppets' *The Australian*, 10 July 2003.
[91] Lloyd Jones, 'PAC: New Solomons PM Could Try to Rein in RAMSI in Key Areas' *Australian Associated Press General News*, 4 May 2006.
[92] Ibid.
[93] Craig Skehan, 'Aussies Go Home: New PM Rocks the Boat' *Sydney Morning Herald*, 5 May 2006.
[94] Manasseh Sogavare in Barrie Cassidy, 'New Solomons PM Defends Decision' *Australian Broadcasting Corporation Transcripts*, 7 May 2006.

Solomon Islands courts, all of which were dismissed.[95] Sogavare's second concern related to the control by Australian officials of Solomon Islands' economic policy. Calling for a clear exit strategy, Sogavare advocated the transfer of authority in key government ministries back to Solomon Islanders, emphasising that '[p]eople should be actively trained to take over the jobs'.[96]

At the same time, Sogavare criticised the specific actions of RAMSI during and after the post-election riots of April 2006. He condemned the failure of RAMSI police to anticipate and prepare for such instability as 'total negligence',[97] and later criticised RAMSI's 'partisan' arrest of two of his supporters, MPs Charles Dausabea and Nelson Ne'e, on charges of inciting riots. Emphasising his objection, Sogavare then appointed Dausabea and Ne'e to his cabinet while they were in prison awaiting trial.[98]

Sogavare's relationship with RAMSI grew more hostile, however, throughout the subsequent tit-for-tat diplomatic row between Solomon Islands and the operation's lead sponsor, Australia. Tensions emerged over the Sogavare-established Commission of Inquiry into the April riots, which Australia believed would 'cast blame for the riots on the police response, including the Australian police'.[99] Behind-the-scenes politicking by Australian High Commissioner Patrick Cole, who had previously been implicated in political interference by a leaked email weeks before the elections,[100] ultimately saw him expelled from Solomon Islands by the Sogavare government. Australia retaliated by cancelling travel visas for Solomon Islands politicians. The row escalated further when Sogavare appointed lawyer

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[95] Nori v Attorney General [2006] SBHC 134; HCSI CC 172 of 2005 (4 April 2006); Makasi v Commander of Participating Police Force under RAMSI [2007] SBHC 160; HCSI-CC 59 of 2005 (14 December 2007); see also Foreign Relations Committee, *The RAMSI Report*, pp.35-40.
[96] Manasseh Sogavare in Cassidy, 'New Solomons PM Defends Decision'.
[97] Lloyd Jones, 'Solomons PM Accuses Downer of Bullying' *Australian Associated Press Bulletins*, 21 May 2006.
[98] Cassidy, 'New Solomons PM Defends Decision'.
[99] Alexander Downer in Mark Colvin, 'Australian High Commissioner Sent Home' *Australian Broadcasting Corporation Transcripts*, 12 September 2006.
[100] Allen, 'Politics of Disorder: The Social Unrest in Honiara', p.52.

Julian Moti as Attorney-General, prompting Australia to re-open a legal case against Moti in relation to alleged child-sex offences in Vanuatu in 1997, and pursue his extradition. Sogavare responded by threatening to revoke his government's consent for RAMSI and sacrifice its aid budget. The row escalated again when four Australian RAMSI police officers raided Sogavare's office while he was out of country, which led to the expulsion of the Solomon Islands Police Commissioner, an Australian expatriate, from the country.

Australia publicly denounced the Solomon Islands government numerous times in what was condemned as 'megaphone' diplomacy by Australia's opposition foreign affairs minister.[101] The raid on Sogavare's office was described by the Solomon Islands' Deputy Prime Minister as a 'clear show of disrespect to the country's highest office' involving an excessive use of force.[102] Australia's diplomatic tactics drew rebuke from other Pacific Islands states, notably Papua New Guinea and Vanuatu,[103] and from a US envoy who described the deteriorating relations between the two countries as a 'boxing match'.[104]

The diplomatic row eventually ended with the election of a new Australian Prime Minister, Kevin Rudd, in November 2007 and the dismissal of Sogavare by Solomon Islands parliament in a no confidence motion a few weeks later, paving the way for Derek Sikua's election as Solomon Islands Prime Minister in December 2007. This marked the transition between RAMSI's second and third phases. Under the Rudd government, Australia's regional policy has emphasised the rebuilding of relationships through 'partnership'; a Partnership Agreement with Solomon Islands cemented the new postures of both Australia and Solomon Islands in April 2009.

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101 Kevin Rudd in Elizabeth Jackson, 'Downer Too Brash in Solomons Row: Rudd' *Australian Broadcasting Corporation Transcripts*, 14 October 2006.
102 Mark Dodd, 'Australian Raid on PM Fuels Solomons Anger' *The Australian*, 21 October 2006.
103 'PNG, Vanuatu Condemn Raid on Solomons PM's Office Australian Police Have Been Accused of Tainting the Good Image and Credibility of the Solomon Islands Regional Assistance Mission (RAMSI)' *Australian Broadcasting Corporation News*, 23 October 2006.
104 Quoted in Craig Skehan, 'Put Away the Gloves, US Envoy Tells Bickering Governments' *The Sydney Morning Herald*, 7 February 2007.

Tactically, Australia achieved its objectives of preserving RAMSI's integrated nature and sidelining Sogavare, enabling a new, more cooperative Solomon Islands regime. However, the episode undermined RAMSI's ability to secure the high quality cooperation it needed to achieve its governance reform goals. RAMSI's own evaluation report acknowledged that this period was difficult for the operation:

> In the second half of 2007 political differences between the Solomon Islands Government and RAMSI contributing countries meant that dialogue was dominated by questions about RAMSI's role in the country, and it was not possible to concentrate on the achievement of joint objectives.[105]

Importantly, key objections raised by Sogavare cannot be seen as simply the complaints of an intrinsic RAMSI critic. The new Prime Minister Derek Sikua has echoed some of Sogavare's concerns, albeit in a less provocative tone. Substantial diplomatic resources were thus expended on an escalating squabble, the end result of which was not so different from the vision articulated at the very start of Sogavare's tenure. Further, the episode hardened the attitudes of Sogavare, now the leader of the opposition, and his sympathisers. Australia and, by association, RAMSI squandered an opportunity to build bridges with their opponents and to use a mix of incentives and persuasion to move key anti-RAMSI personalities towards cooperation with the operation. Finally, Australia's 'megaphone diplomacy' strengthened the reservations of local RAMSI supporters, particularly regarding the perceived arrogance and cultural insensitivity of the operation's Australian personnel.

RAMSI's third phase: 2008 to the present

The election of new governments in both Solomon Islands and Australia at the end of 2007 laid the foundations for RAMSI to repair its relationship with local actors, particularly at the political level. This period has been characterised by a proliferation of processes and forums designed to enhance the operation's accountability to Solomon Islands government through consultative mechanisms. RAMSI has in its third phase engaged in practices designed to

[105] *RAMSI Annual Performance Report 2007-2008*.

reflect in reality its rhetoric of 'partnership'. In part, this responded to demands from the Pacific Islands Forum rather than local actors; however, this shift in RAMSI practices also reflects an acknowledgment that the active cooperation of political elites is necessary for the operation's goals to be achieved. Prime Minister Sikua articulated the continuing demand for RAMSI to be more accountable and consultative in its practices:

> In the preface of [the Partnership Framework] my government has emphasised that firstly we wish to continue this relationship, but as equal respectful partners; and secondly, we believe that the assistance would be most valuable if it could address the current priority needs of Solomon Islands, and the current priority needs of Solomon Islands that Solomon Islanders can claim ownership for.[106]

Finally, the Partnership Framework clarifies RAMSI's exit strategy. Echoing RAMSI's repeated rejection of deadlines and timeframes, it aims to establish mutually-agreed, conditions-based timelines to gradually drawdown RAMSI's engagement. RAMSI also strengthened its communications activities through a 'community outreach' strategy, motivated by the breakdown in local relations evident in the April 2006 riots and the findings of subsequent People's Surveys that Solomon Islanders had little awareness of RAMSI goals beyond law and order.[107] RAMSI's outreach activities began in 2006 as fairly superficial activities that resembled public relations 'spin' rather than genuine communication, for example through the provision of RAMSI-branded sporting equipment. However, the strategy was subsequently strengthened and more recently has taken RAMSI back into the villages and provinces in what appears to be a return to the successful communications strategies of its early phase.

The larger question, however, is whether this proliferation of consultation mechanisms and formal agreements between RAMSI and the Solomon Islands government will actually legitimise the operation, and in particular whether it will enhance the ability of local actors to hold the operation to account. The effects of these reforms require further research,

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[106] The Hon. Derek Sikua, evidence, Foreign Relations Committee, *The RAMSI Report*, p.32.
[107] People's Survey 2007; People's Survey 2008; People's Survey 2009.

including fieldwork, that is beyond the scope of this thesis. Nevertheless, the recent adoption of more processes of accountability, consultation and high quality treatment suggest that the operation has recognised a need to build better relationships with local actors at both elite and community levels in order to secure cooperation.

Conclusion

Underlying RAMSI's inability to more significantly influence the behaviour of local politicians and bureaucrats in its second phase was a lack of recognition that its goals entailed shaping local beliefs, not simply imparting technical know-how. RAMSI's statements about its objectives reflected an understanding within the operation of these as simply technical processes, rather than an acknowledgment that they entail a substantial normative shift in local ideas about governance. As Clive Moore argues,

> RAMSI seems to assume that there are universal rules of behaviour, and that Solomon Islands have somehow collectively transgressed a world standard, rather than there being situational ways of behaving that are particular to Solomon Islands...[108]

From an instrumental perspective, this gap between the understandings of local actors and RAMSI is significant because it identifies the extent of change entailed by RAMSI's goals. Recognition of this may lead RAMSI policymakers to alter the operation's goals, which appears to be the outcome advocated by many of the operation's scholarly critics.[109] In particular, some scholars have recommended that RAMSI's power should be weakened, not strengthened, since the goals it pursues are wrong.

However, given that my focus here is on RAMSI's ability to achieve its *given* objectives, my conclusion is rather different. I have argued that RAMSI has had difficulty achieving its second phase objectives because it has been unable to secure the high-level cooperation they

[108] Moore, 'Pacific View: The Meaning of Governance and Politics in the Solomon Islands', p.392.
[109] For example, Ibid.

require. In particular, while the continued provision of security and aid benefits have maintained local support for the operation's presence, RAMSI has failed to legitimise itself and its governance agenda to members of the local political and bureaucratic elite.

This suggests that, to achieve its present objectives, RAMSI needs to build its legitimacy among those local actors responsible for making and implementing policy in Solomon Islands. The analysis of this chapter suggests that the procedural legitimation strategies of consultation, accountability and high-quality treatment are likely to be useful sources of power to this end. It is important to note, however, that processes of meaningful consultation and accountability may in turn shape the objectives of RAMSI; my assumption that goals are 'given' thus has certain limitations. Nevertheless, I argue that such procedural reforms would improve RAMSI's effectiveness not because new goals would be 'right', but because local actors would be more likely to believe them to be so; thus the operation would gain new power through local legitimation. That is, while the content of the goals may matter, so too does the process through which they are continually implemented and renegotiated in practice.

Chapter Seven: Conclusion

This thesis proposes a new approach to studying the effectiveness of peace operations. Focused on understanding *how* peace operations work, this approach has three distinctive characteristics. First, it studies peace operations through a local lens, examining their interactions with local actors rather than their genesis in the politics and institutions of the international realm. In doing so, it highlights the centrality of local actor behaviour to the outcomes of peace operations. Second, it structures a framework to explain how a peace operation might shape local behaviour, distinguishing between three dimensions of power – coercion, inducement and legitimacy – and analysing their interactions. Third, it highlights the contribution of local legitimacy to a peace operation's effectiveness, and identifies the ways in which a peace operation might be locally legitimised.

This thesis argued that peace operations need high level cooperation from local actors, not just shallow compliance, to achieve their goals. By analysing variation in the depth of cooperation received by UNTAC and RAMSI, the case study chapters found that legitimacy is more likely to elicit qualitatively better cooperation than coercion or inducement alone. Yet they also showed that the power of coercion had important affect in each operation. Although Chapter Three questioned the assumption that more coercive power would have provided UNTAC with the means to secure the local cooperation it needed, Chapter Four showed that UNTAC's ability to protect the May 1993 elections was dependent on its more coercive posture regarding electoral security. However, it also showed that the enhancement of UNTAC's coercive power during the elections was due to prior acts of local cooperation by Cambodian military elites, secured through the legitimising influence of negotiation and consultation in the Mixed Military Working Group. In Chapter Five, I showed that RAMSI's coercive power provided it with crucial influence during its first phase: coercion had a significant deterrent effect, but it also demonstrated RAMSI's credibility as a guarantor

of public security, enabling the operation to secure the compliance and cooperation of a wide range of local actors. However, I also showed that RAMSI's coercive power was enabled by a striking degree of local consensus about its legitimacy, generated through the operation's coherence with local preferences, as well as its practices of restraint. RAMSI's military capabilities had a commanding demonstration effect, simultaneously threatening potential opponents while reassuring the broader population that the operation served their interests. Chapter Six demonstrated the importance of those legitimising effects. Compared to RAMSI's early practices of patrolling unarmed and making its military hardware non-threatening to ordinary Solomon Islanders, the operation's subsequent displays of coercive power after 2004 were less successful in securing local cooperation. Its heavy-handed response to both the shooting of a RAMSI officer and post-election riots were widely perceived to be unfair and motivated by the interests of RAMSI rather than those of Solomon Islanders, which provided local actors with reasons to resist the operation rather than to cooperate with it.

The second finding of this thesis is therefore that a peace operation's coercive power is determined by the *way* it is exercised, not simply by its coercive resources and posture. A third finding is that, where UNTAC and RAMSI attempted to influence local actors through the logic of consequences alone, they received only shallow cooperation. The above description of RAMSI's second phase demonstrates this with regard to coercion, but it was also true of inducement. After 2004, RAMSI's provision of security and aid benefits ensured that its continued presence was widely desired, yet several delegitimising practices limited the operation's ability to secure high quality cooperation. That is, while the power of inducement was sufficient to ensure tacit acceptance of RAMSI by local actors, its delegitimation after 2004 limited the operation's ability to secure the high quality cooperation

it needed to shape the beliefs of local actors, particularly regarding the appropriateness of RAMSI's proposed governance reforms.

The central conclusion, then, is that local legitimacy matters. When local actors perceive a peace operation to be legitimate, they are more likely to behave in ways that enable and assist the operation to achieve its goals. This thesis identified three ways in which a peace operation might be legitimised at the local level – source, substantive and procedural legitimation – and analysed these in case studies of UNTAC and RAMSI. This focus on processes of legitimation makes a novel contribution to our understanding of how peace operations work, and sheds new light on pressing policy questions of how to make peace operations work better.

Local legitimacy makes peace operations more effective by allowing the exercise of power to be easier, less costly and less volatile than if it were exercised through coercion or inducement alone. More importantly, local legitimacy provides reasons for local actors to actively cooperate with a peace operation, while the perception that an operation is illegitimate – is unfair, partial, untrustworthy, self-interested, disrespectful – provides reasons for local actors to resist and obstruct it. Discovering how a peace operation can legitimise its presence, personnel and goals in the eyes of local actors is thus a conceptual and practical imperative. Conceptually, legitimation provides an obvious entry point for scholars seeking to analyse peace operations at the local level, an enterprise which I have argued is conspicuously lacking in the academic literature. But it also has obvious relevance for the practice of peace operations. First, the finding that local legitimacy can make peace operations more effective without the deployment of substantially more material resources is significant, given that peace operations are presently deployed in record numbers around the world and the inadequacy of resources has been identified as the key strategic constraint on

practice.[1] Second, the analytical focus on legitimacy has produced findings that challenge key elements in the prevailing orthodoxy of nascent peace operations doctrine, in particular that laid out in a series of UN reports.[2]

This concluding chapter examines these contributions in more depth. It begins by analysing a mechanism that cuts across the most influential legitimation strategies of both UNTAC and RAMSI: communications. It then examines the implications of the key findings of this thesis for practice, highlighting two important tensions in prevailing practitioner assumptions about mandates and mission design. Finally, it outlines a research agenda for studying peace operations in light of these findings.

Communications: A cross-cutting mechanism in legitimation

This thesis began with a deductive approach to studying local legitimacy, critically examining theories of related disciplines to conceptually define legitimacy, understand how it works, identify its relationship to other currencies of power, and identify legitimation processes of expected relevance to peace operations. The application of this power-legitimacy framework to the cases of UNTAC and RAMSI showed that communication processes were crucial for the legitimation, and thus effectiveness, of each operation. These processes included both intentional, deliberate strategies to disseminate information as well as unintentional actions that nevertheless communicated information that significantly shaped local perceptions of

[1] Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field Support, *A New Partnership Agenda: Charting a New Horizon for UN Peacekeeping* (New York: United Nations, 2009).
[2] United Nations, Report on the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (the Brahimi Report), A/55/305-S/2000/809, 21 August 2000; Department of Peacekeeping Operations, United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines (the Capstone Doctrine) (New York: United Nations, 2008); Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field Support, A New Partnership Agenda: Charting a New Horizon for UN Peacekeeping; United Nations, Report of the Secretary-General on Peacebuilding in the Immediate Aftermath of Conflict A/63/881 S/2009/304, 11 June 2009.

the operation. Communications can be divided into two types – formal and informal – and may have direct or indirect influence, as expressed in the following table:

Table 1: A typology of communications strategies

	Direct	Indirect
Formal	**Formal media channels used to achieve a specific objective** e.g. Radio UNTAC on electoral participation; RAMSI press conferences and *Talking Truth* on disarmament	**Formal media channels used with diffuse effect** e.g. Radio UNTAC and *Talking Truth*: countering rumours, articulating motives, justifying activities and objectives
Informal	**Interpersonal communications used to achieve a specific objective** e.g. UNTAC: UNVs on electoral participation;. the Mixed Military Working Group on military cooperation with election security and unification, and the Refugee Component's negotiations with Khmer Rouge elements regarding refugee return; RAMSI: negotiations with Harold Keke for his surrender, and diplomacy with the Sogavare government	**Interpersonal communications with diffuse effect** e.g. UNTAC Military Component's civic action programs; the demonstration effect of RAMSI's military hardware; RAMSI's early policy of patrolling unarmed

Formal communications refer to the use of formal media channels by an operation, such as Radio UNTAC and Solomon Island's Talking Truth, as well as formal speeches or press conferences by peace operation personnel. In formal communications, the message (or content) is planned and targets a large audience. For example, Radio UNTAC was part of a deliberate media strategy to disseminate information to the Cambodian population with specific emphasis on electoral matters and human rights. In its first phase, RAMSI also used formal media programming, press conferences and press releases to widely disseminate information about its disarmament objectives, including the weapons amnesty and processes for surrendering arms to the operation.

Informal communications refer to the broad range of interpersonal communications evident in peace operation interactions with local actors. The influence of informal

communications can be seen in the legitimation of UNTAC's UNVs to Cambodian voters via daily interactions with local people, either as part of planned civic education activities or in ordinary village life. Similarly, interpersonal communications were central in UNTAC's Mixed Military Working Group, where the repeated practices of dialogue, negotiation and even coffee break conversations enabled the operation's military leaders to build productive, cooperative relationships with local military elites. In UNTAC's Refugee Component, the treks of Sergio Vieira de Mello and his staff into Khmer Rouge territory to negotiate refugee return with Khmer Rouge leaders enabled interpersonal dialogue that bypassed much of the distrust they felt for other UNTAC components. However, the influence of informal communications is also evident in the delegitimation of UNTAC elements due to their poor treatment of local populations. In RAMSI, informal communications were central to the operation's ability to secure Harold Keke's surrender, but the operation was also subsequently delegitimised through informal communications in its treatment of political elites in the Sogavare government.

Communication strategies can also be categorised according to the type of influence they exert on local actors. **Direct communications** are those that aim to influence local behaviour with regard to a specific goal. For example, UNTAC used a range of communication channels to disseminate information about elections, including pamphlets, posters, radio and video programming, and 'town hall'-style meetings. RAMSI employed a similar array of formal and informal means to directly inform local actors about its disarmament campaign, including village ceremonies, radio programming, press conferences and meetings with militia members. **Indirect communications** refer to those mechanisms which may have shaped local perceptions about a peace operation's legitimacy, but did not target specific behaviour. The use of radio programming by both UNTAC and RAMSI to counter rumours about their motives is thus an example of indirect communications,

through formal channels. Similarly, the civic action programs of UNTAC's military component sought diffuse popular cooperation, aiming to 'forge an alliance with the people' that would be broadly helpful to the operation in numerous ways. Such programs helped to demonstrate UNTAC's benevolence and commitment to assisting the Cambodian people, which provided a general base of local support for the operation, but which cannot be causally linked to specific local behaviour. The poor treatment of local people by some UNTAC personnel worked similarly, but in reverse, delegitimising certain parts of the operation but without direct impact on a particular goal area.

For UNTAC and RAMSI, informal communications were particularly important strategies of legitimation. Informal *direct* communications were central to the most important achievements of each operation. This suggests that interpersonal communications deserve particular attention in future studies of peace operation effectiveness. But it is important to note that each operation also experienced delegitimation through informal communications. For example, RAMSI's attempts to maintain tight control over its agenda through informal diplomacy contributed to perceptions that the operation was unfair, biased and self-interested, particularly among political elites, which provided reasons for these key local actors to resist the operation.

However, delegitimation is most likely to occur through informal *indirect* communications: for example, the display of cultural disregard, racism or arrogance by peace operation personnel towards local actors, or more overt abuse and exploitation of local women and children. UNTAC's legitimacy suffered due to the behaviour of those personnel whose gambling, smuggling, drinking and sexual harassment of local women communicated disrespect for local communities and undermined the operation's image as a benevolent and trustworthy presence. In RAMSI, Australian police were often perceived to be arrogant and culturally ignorant, lacking language skills and local awareness that signal respect, particularly

in comparison to RAMSI's Pacific Islander officers. Such delegitimation is more likely to occur through informal, indirect channels of communication because of their unplanned and uncodified nature. They thus combine the propensity of indirect communications to lack a goal-oriented purpose, and the reliance of informal communications on the decisions and actions of individual personnel. These worked to the advantage of UNTAC and RAMSI in some areas; for example, the genuinely benevolent motives of UNTAC's UNVs meant that their behaviour could be relied upon, and the lack of central planning in UNTAC's civic action programs allowed individual military battalions to be more responsive to local needs in their region. However, when it came to those unprofessional, often poorly trained UNTAC military and police personnel, the opposite was true: individual personnel lacked a defining purpose regarding local people, since their official role concerned only Cambodian military and police, while UNTAC's leadership lacked the disciplinary authority, oversight and, as far as the head of the mission was concerned, intent to regulate such behaviour.

Recent advocacy of greater participation by female personnel in peace operations is driven by the recognition that the motives and character of individual members of an operation are causally significant. Arising in response to grave concerns regarding the prevalence of sexual violence in conflict, particularly in the Democratic Republic of Congo, calls for more female peacekeepers are linked to particular skills deriving from their gender. For example, in resolution 1888 (2009), the UN Security Council noted that

> women and children affected by armed conflict may feel more secure working with and reporting abuse to women in peacekeeping missions, and that the presence of women peacekeepers may encourage local women to participate in the national armed and security forces, thereby helping to build a security sector that is accessible and responsive to all, especially women...[3]

There is, therefore, increasing focus on the role of interpersonal communications in peace operations. The power-legitimacy framework developed here provides a starting point for

[3] United Nations *Resolution 1888 (2009)* 30 September 2009.

more rigorously analysing the causal significance of initiatives such as the deployment of all-female peacekeeping units.[4]

Implications for practice: Communications and mandates

In 2000, the UN's *Report on the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations*, known as the Brahimi Report, described an effective public information and communications capacity as 'an operational necessity'.[5] Most peace operations now have 'public information' or 'outreach' offices, and many have their own radio stations and media production units targeting local audiences. However, the causal processes through which such formal communications might improve the effectiveness of peace operations have not been adequately defined or analysed. [6]

The 2008 *United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines report*, known as the Capstone Doctrine, makes a first, albeit brief attempt at identifying those mechanisms. However, its prescriptive approach simply lists the advantages of 'effective' communications without providing guidance about how to make communications effective and under what conditions they might be expected to produce desired effects. The Capstone Doctrine states that communications are important to 'ensure that the mandate and objectives of the mission are fully understood by the host population' and to 'increase confidence in the peace process, build trust among parties to a conflict, and generate support for national reconciliation'. Further, it asserts that communications strategies 'will establish the mission

[4] 'Women UN Peacekeepers - More Needed' *Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN)*, 20 May 2010.
[5] United Nations, *The Brahimi Report*, p.25.
[6] Ingrid Lehmann's early account of the information and communications activities of peace operations is to date the most significant contribution in this regard; however, while it concludes that information programs help peace operations, it is a largely descriptive work and lacks the rigor of explanation called for here; see Ingrid A. Lehmann, *Peacekeeping and Public Information: Caught in the Crossfire* (London: Frank Cass, 1999).

as a trusted source of information and help counter the negative effects of irresponsible, hostile and controlled [local] media'.[7] The report then proceeds to make a bold claim:

> If the parameters of United Nations activity are clearly laid out and explained to the local population...fear and misunderstanding will be corrected, and the impact of those who wish to damage the peace process through rumour and untruth will be minimized.[8]

While this thesis supports a conclusion that communications are important, their causal effect is far from the straightforward account suggested by the UN's Department of Peacekeeping Operations. My analysis of communications strategies in UNTAC and RAMSI shows that some of the channels that legitimise an operation can also delegitimise it. It thus understands communications not as a cause of greater effectiveness, but as a mechanism which may facilitate different processes of legitimation (and delegitimation) across local groups and goal-areas of the operation. This is particularly relevant when it comes to communicating an operation's mandate. There is now a resolute consensus that peace operations need clear mandates, articulated strongly in the Brahimi Report and evident in the Capstone Doctrine's assumption that clearly articulating an operation's goals will result in less local opposition.[9] The findings of this thesis suggest not only that the process is more complex, but that at times it might work in reverse.

In UNTAC, the Khmer Rouge and, to a lesser extent, the SOC each had a different vision of the role that the operation would play in the local competition for power. The Khmer Rouge insistence that its cooperation was conditional on UNTAC action to remove 'foreign forces' was not diminished by the operation's repeated articulation of its own definition of the problem; instead, UNTAC's understanding of 'foreign forces' as uniformed soldiers differed fundamentally from the Khmer Rouge desire for it to mean all ethnic Vietnamese in

[7] Department of Peacekeeping Operations, *The Capstone Doctrine*, p.82.
[8] Ibid., p.82.
[9] United Nations, *The Brahimi Report*; Department of Peacekeeping Operations, *The Capstone Doctrine* .

Cambodia. In this case, local cooperation was prevented by a straightforward clash of interests which, as Chapter Three argued, UNTAC had insufficient power to affect.

This suggests important boundary conditions within which mandate communication can be expected to enhance effectiveness. When information about goals and mandates is disseminated to highlight points of mutual benefit to local actors or to emphasise coherence with local preferences, seen for example in UNTAC's communications with military elites regarding electoral cooperation and with the population regarding electoral participation, such communication may indeed help to legitimise an operation and provide reasons for local cooperation. But when it highlights points of contradiction with local actor interests or is used to limit the opportunity for local actors to participate in and shape the decision-making process, such communications may in fact delegitimise an operation. For example, in its second phase, RAMSI emphasised the integrated nature of its mandate, presented as a holistic, comprehensive package which could not be renegotiated in light of changing local preferences. The clarity of RAMSI's mandate was never in question, but its appropriateness was contested by key local actors whose cooperation was necessary for the operation to achieve its goals. The repeated articulation of that mandate in fact highlighted these conflicts, rather than ameliorating them. This outcome was significantly exacerbated by the *way* the mandate was communicated, displaying disrespect for local elites and a desire to marginalise their influence in RAMSI decision-making. By contrast, UNTAC conveniently minimised emphasis on its administrative control mandate as it became clear that the goal was unachievable. It suited UNTAC for the control mandate to remain vague and marginal, because a key weakness of the operation could thereby be downplayed, despite being a mandated goal.

Maintaining constructive ambiguity about its mandate might thus sometimes be more advantageous for a peace operation than clarity. The power-legitimacy framework helps to

identify when this outcome is more likely. That is, when the goals of a peace operation cohere sufficiently with the preferences of key local actors, communications that clearly articulate those goals are likely to have legitimising affect and thereby secure greater local cooperation. When they conflict, emphasising the detail of mandates is likely to highlight points of contention and thereby provide reasons for local actors to resist.[10]

By directing attention to otherwise overlooked dynamics of peace operation effectiveness, the application of the power-legitimacy framework to UNTAC and RAMSI suggests that the orthodox position on mandate clarity has limitations, at least under some conditions. This thesis has argued that peace operations work through local cooperation, which raises new questions about the role and influence of an operation's mandate. In particular, it suggests that we should ask whether mandates allow sufficient space for local legitimation, since peace operations cannot rely on top-down 'control' but must seek bottom-up support for their most ambitious, transformative goals. Mandates create a framework, a reference point which opens a political space for peace operations in the local realm. But the degree to which a mandate needs to be specified is a point of contention, not the unproblematic assumption of UN doctrine. The need for local cooperation suggests that the content and priorities of mandates may need to be continually renegotiated and reinterpreted according to the nature of local responses over time. Too great a focus on mandate clarity risks overlooking the benefits of constructive ambiguity, which can help a peace operation to convince a range of local actors to buy in to its transformative and ambitious agenda, to allow personnel to shift emphasis depending on which local group is being addressed, and to provide them with the flexibility to respond to local demands and concerns as the need arises.

[10] This is not to suggest that local interests and beliefs are fixed; indeed, throughout this thesis I have argued that they may be shaped through the exercise of power, including through communication processes that identify common interests and that enable the operation to provide justifications and display characteristics that shape local actor beliefs. Instead, this argument is intended to highlight the limits of mandate clarity as a path to greater effectiveness.

This finding is an important contribution of *local* legitimacy, compared to the concept of international legitimacy more commonly employed in the study of peace operations. At the international level, legitimacy refers to the coherence of a peace operation with international norms, law or political consensus, and to its authorisation through proper process. It is no wonder, then, that mandates have been the focus of peace operations policy: the mandate reflects the political compromises, bargains and normative vision of those international actors who decide whether an operation is deployed. Clear mandates are thus an important accountability mechanism for powerful states, to ensure that the delegated operation is adequately implementing their intent. This is why Lise Howard, for example, finds that a UN peace operation is more likely to be effective if it attracts only moderate strategic interest from Security Council members: when the Council tries to micromanage a field operation, she finds that operations are less effective.[11] Further, the 'lessons learned' by the United Nations Secretariat have focused on the design of mandates in part as a way of pushing back against the demands of the Security Council.[12] However, this thesis has shown that the need for local legitimation puts a premium on the accountability and responsiveness of peace operations to actors in the local realm, as well as (and at times instead of) those at the international level.

The willingness and capacity of international actors to implement such practices, however, are far from assured. In this thesis, I have bracketed off the political priorities of the international realm in which peace operations are created. Yet as institutions that straddle the divide between the international and local spheres, peace operations also face international legitimacy dilemmas. As suggested above, the practices through which peace operations are legitimised at the international level may not be harmonious with those required for local legitimation: for example, the local benefits of mandate ambiguity may

[11] Howard, *UN Peacekeeping in Civil Wars*.
[12] Member of the Best Practices Unit, United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, interview by author, New York, December 2007.

contradict formal authorisation processes through which United Nations peace operations in particular derive international legitimacy. However, it is not clear that such a fractious relationship is inevitable; for example, one outcome of practices that secure international consensus might be the creation of vague peace operation mandates to accommodate deeper political divisions.

There is therefore now a need for significant further research to investigate the relationship between local and international legitimation. This thesis provides an essential starting point for such investigation. First, it brings new clarity to the concept of local legitimacy, overlooked and misunderstood elsewhere, enabling the potential synergies and frictions between local and international legitimation to be more easily distinguished. Second, it identifies the effects of local legitimacy, demonstrating the potential of legitimation to produce more effective peace operations and thereby to influence debates at the international level. Third, it unpacks these local legitimation practices, enabling analysis of whether and how these practices might support or undermine international legitimation.

Disaggregating peace operations

I have defined and analysed local legitimacy as a causal process which affects the behaviour of local actors, pulling them towards cooperation with a peace operation. This focus on process, rather than on measuring legitimacy, highlights two further qualities of local legitimacy. The first is that, at any one time, we can expect a peace operation to be affected by numerous legitimising and delegitimising forces. The second is that the legitimacy of some components or personnel within an operation can compensate for the delegitimation of others.

These two findings suggest the analytical need to disaggregate both peace operations and the local societies in which they are deployed, to identify the distinct effects that different parts of an operation may have on different local groups. First, by comparing the depth of cooperation between and within operations, the case study chapters have highlighted not only the need to take cooperation seriously, but also to explicitly recognise the different, sometimes connected strategies needed to secure the cooperation of various types of local actor. For some goal areas, such as the governance reforms associated with statebuilding, the distinction between elite and popular actors might be most important. But for others, such as disarmament, horizontal cleavages between military and civilian actors might prove just as important as vertical cleavages between leaders and rank-and-file troops. In goal areas that target the beliefs of actors at the community level, such as the promotion of human rights or democracy, the role of community leaders may be particularly important. While this thesis does not compare a sufficiently large enough number of operations to construct a comprehensive typology of local actors or draw generalisable conclusions about the conditions under which each will be most influential, its use of within-case comparison highlights that there are many different groups of local actors with the capacity to enable or constrain peace operation effectiveness.[13] While the specific type of local actor might vary among operations and between goal areas, the need to distinguish among them is a clear imperative for both the study and practice of peace operations.

Second, by comparing effectiveness within an operation, this thesis has produced a nuanced account of how UNTAC and RAMSI each worked (or failed to work). The advantage of this approach is particularly evident in the study of UNTAC, in which there was significant variation in effectiveness between the operation's different components. By holding

[13] Béatrice Pouligny explicitly cautions against relying on discrete 'types' of local actors, arguing that such local identities will be fluid and overlapping and highlighting the regularity with which local actors 'changed hats as individuals, assuming alternately the roles of faction representative, traditional elder and intellectual'; Béatrice Pouligny, *Peace Operations Seen from Below: UN Missions and Local People* (London: Hurst & Co, 2006), p.43.

constant the difficulty of the conflict setting and the international environment (including the degree of international political 'will' regarding Cambodia, and the allocation of resources to its postconflict transition), this within-case comparison highlighted causal processes that have been overlooked elsewhere: namely, that UNTAC was more effective when it was perceived by relevant local actors to be legitimate.

The experiences of UNTAC also show the advantages in practice of being able to separate different components, to isolate more effective parts of the operation from less successful elements, particularly in the eyes of local actors. UNTAC's refugee component, for example, derived substantial power by emphasising its 'strategically separate' identity as a non-political, humanitarian enterprise. That is, it enabled the repatriation component's personnel to distinguish refugee resettlement from the difficulties faced by other UNTAC components at the time.

This finding runs counter to a second tenet of peace operations doctrine: that integration is desirable because it makes peace operations more effective.[14] This prescription of integration is evident in non-UN circles too; indeed, RAMSI has been identified as a case of international 'best practice' in this regard. Its 'whole of government' approach is designed to simultaneously address security, development and political challenges and has attained prominence as the accepted ideal for implementing peacebuilding and statebuilding mandates.[15] Integration makes peace operations more effective, in this view, for two reasons: first, it minimises duplication and contradiction among components, thereby

[14] See Department of Peacekeeping Operations, *The Capstone Doctrine*; and the special issue of *International Peacekeeping* 'Integrated Missions Revisited: Policy and Practitioner Perspectives', especially Kathleen Jennings and Anja T. Kaspersen, 'Introduction: Integration Revisited' *International Peacekeeping* 15, no. 4 (2008).

[15] OECD, *Whole of Government Approaches to Fragile States* Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2006; see also Ashraf Ghani and Clare Lockhart, *Fixing Failed States: A Framework for Rebuilding a Fractured World* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008); Patrick Stewart and Kaysie Brown, *Greater Than the Sum of Its Parts? Assessing "Whole of Government" Approaches to Fragile States* Center for Global Development, 2007.

enhancing efficiency; and second, since the security, development and governance problems of postconflict societies are intertwined, they must be addressed simultaneously. Insofar as integration minimises the wastage of resources, it seems to refer more to coordination in the management and administration of operations, and this thesis finds nothing to contradict this prescription. However, this thesis does challenge the implication of integration that to achieve anything a peace operation must achieve everything; in other words, that success in one area is not possible without, and should not be pursued in isolation to, success in others. In UNTAC, the ability to separate refugee repatriation from other components helped to ensure its unqualified success in that goal area; considering that this involved resettling 370000 people and resolving one of the most problematic regional legacies of the Cambodian conflict, such success should not be regarded lightly.

This does not mean that the desire for integration within peace operations is fundamentally flawed. Nevertheless, the finding that strategic separateness may advantage an operation via legitimation provides an important counterpoint to this prevailing prescription for peace operation design. Further, the effectiveness challenges faced by RAMSI during the Sogavare era demonstrated other drawbacks of integration, which limited the operation's scope to respond to local demands, to incorporate local preferences in its agenda, and to facilitate legitimation through participation, consultation and accountability. While RAMSI's transformative statebuilding objectives depended on the operation's ability to shape local beliefs about appropriate governance standards, neither the clarity of its mandate nor its integrated structure enabled the operation to exert such influence. Indeed, I have argued that each reflected the accountability of the operation to its Canberra headquarters and substantially obstructed the opportunity for RAMSI to be accountable to the local actors upon whose cooperation its effectiveness depended.

This is commonly referred to as a lack of local ownership. I have avoided the term because of the conceptual muddle that surrounds its many uses in scholarly and practitioner research. Nevertheless, key components of the procedural legitimation strategies identified in this thesis – participation, consultation and accountability – feature prominently in attempts to operationalise ownership in analysis, and to enhance it in practice.[16] Ownership 'is critical to the successful implementation of the peace process', according to the Capstone Doctrine, and will 'reinforce the perceived legitimacy of the operation and support mandate implementation'.[17] Yet the findings of this thesis highlight tensions between the numerous success factors identified throughout the Capstone Doctrine and other prescriptions for effective peace operations. Using the lens of power and legitimacy, it has shown that the relationship between ownership, on one hand, and mandate clarity and integration on the other is not the unproblematic, mutually reinforcing one presented in recommendations for peace operation practice. In fact, the case of RAMSI demonstrates the extent to which clear mandates and integrated mission design can drastically limit the scope for the operation to promote local ownership. These findings are relevant for broader debates on the nature and problems of contemporary statebuilding, currently centred on Afghanistan; the power-legitimacy framework developed here provides a new method for analysing the numerous and fragmented effects of statebuilding operations on local actor behaviour.

Future research

The central findings of this thesis question at a fundamental level the social engineering vision of contemporary peace operations practice. Highlighting the degree to which peace operation effectiveness depends on local cooperation, this thesis issues a call for greater

[16] See Simon Chesterman, 'Ownership in Theory and in Practice: Transfer of Authority in UN Statebuilding Operations' *Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding* 1, no. 1 (2007).
[17] Department of Peacekeeping Operations, *The Capstone Doctrine*, p.39.

attention to the interests and beliefs of local actors, to local culture and histories, and to the ways in which these obstruct or facilitate the achievement of an operation's goals. The approach developed here advocates understanding peace operations as institutions of power, challenging the view that they are technical, policy instruments, or indeed benign 'helping friends'. However, it also advocates greater acknowledgment of the limits of a peace operation's power to transform deeply divided postconflict societies. In particular, the power of peace operations is checked by their need for local cooperation, and the discussion in this concluding chapter suggests the need to temper the ambition of mandates, and to begin with the complexity of local realities rather than with the whiteboards of policy planning.

This thesis suggests the need for further research in three key areas. First, the new causal mechanisms identified here need rigorous comparative study. How have the strategies of legitimation identified in UNTAC and RAMSI worked in other operations, and with what effects? What relation does coercion bear to legitimacy in other operations, particularly where force has been used in pursuit of mandates? The typology of communications developed earlier in this chapter also needs comparative investigation to test more rigorously the effects of different communication strategies and the conditions under which they occur.

Second, there is a need for substantially better data on local perceptions about peace operations. As I noted in the Introduction, I would have wished for better source material on what local actors thought about the specific goals of an operation, the reasons for those beliefs, and the means to differentiate such responses according to different social groupings. Given the security and logistical difficulties of postconflict environments, collecting such data will require innovative methods and close collaboration with peace operations during implementation.

Finally, while its consideration is beyond the scope of this thesis, there is a strong normative case for studying local legitimacy. This thesis has taken an instrumental approach to studying peace operations at the local level, investigating as it does how peace operations influence the behaviour of local actors so that we might learn how to better achieve the local cooperation necessary to make operations more effective. By focusing on the power of peace operations, this research aims not only to enhance the study of these institutions, but also to contribute to better policymaking for more effective peace operations.

Looking forward, however, the study of local legitimacy has relevance for normative debates on the deployment, maintenance or withdrawal of peace operations.[18] Local consent remains a key reference criterion in debates about the legitimacy of interventions at the international level;[19] yet as others have noted, the assumption that state consent is a sufficient indicator of this has broken down as peace operations have deployed in failing and failed states, or in conflicts where the state itself is the perpetrator of insecurity.[20] When peace operations encounter resistance from the host state, their spokespeople often reach for other indicators of local consent: perhaps the consent of other parties to the conflict, or increasingly, some measure of popular support. In Solomon Islands, for example, when the host government threatened to revoke its consent for RAMSI in 2006-2007, the operation responded by pointing to its high popular support as a proxy for consent; its Australian sponsor even went so far as to publish an 'open letter to the people of Solomon Islands' in a local newspaper, appealing to people to continue supporting RAMSI and accusing the Solomon Islands

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[18] Dominik Zaum, 'The Norms and Politics of Exit: Ending Postconflict Transitional Administrations' *Ethics & International Affairs* 23, no.2 (2009).
[19] Ibid.
[20] Adam Roberts, 'Humanitarian War: Military Intervention and Human Rights' *International Affairs* 69, no. 3 (1993); Christine Gray, 'Host-State Consent and United Nations Peacekeeping in Yugoslavia' *Duke Journal of Comparative and International Law* 7, no. 1 (1996-1997); Jennifer Welsh, 'The Security Council and Interventions with Humanitarian Purposes' in *The United Nations Security Council and War: The Evolution of Thought and Practice since 1945*, ed. Vaughan Lowe, et al. (Oxford: OUP, 2008); David Wippman, 'Military Intervention, Regional Organizations, and Host-State Consent' *Duke Journal of Comparative and International Law* 7, no. 1 (1996-1997).

government of 'a deliberate push to undermine RAMSI, to tarnish its reputation and make it hard for it to continue its work'.[21]

While the normative context of the United Nations might prevent such explicit circumvention of state sovereignty norms in UN missions, there is a strong case for local perspectives to be considered in any normative evaluation of a peace operation's international legitimacy. Since most operations justify their presence, in part at least, on their provision of assistance to local populations, some configuration of local perspectives ought to be included in international-level debates about entry, implementation and exit.

Peace operations intervene at the heart of the state-society relationship. The perceptions of local actors in that 'society' are important not just because they influence the effectiveness of peace operations, as the instrumental approach emphasises, but because operations should be accountable to those they purport to serve. A key priority for future research must therefore be to discover how local perspectives, beyond those of elites, might be included in policymaking and evaluations of peace operations. While these are questions well-beyond the scope of the present work, I hope that my explication of the concept of local legitimacy and elaboration of a framework for studying it might contribute to this larger purpose.

[21] Lloyd Jones, 'Downer Pens Warning Letter to Solomons' *Australian Associated Press Bulletins*, 9 February 2007.


Appendix A: Cambodia [map]



'Cambodia [Political map]' Perry-Castañeda Library Map Collection

http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/middle_east_and_asia/cambodia_pol_97.jpg (19 June 2010)

Appendix B: Solomon Islands [map]



'Solomon Islands [Political Map]' *Perry-Castañeda Library Map Collection* http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/islands_oceans_poles/solomonislands.jpg (April 19 2007)

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