12 Infused Virtues, Gifts, and Fruits

Andrew Pinsent

INTRODUCTION

Aquinas's writings on normative ethics are vast, with 1,004 articles on virtue ethics and related matters in the *Summa theologiae* (*ST*) alone. These writings constitute an extraordinarily intricate picture of the kind of human life that Aquinas considers normative, but they also contain plenty of surprises, especially for those who assume that Aquinas is guided principally by the virtue ethics of Aristotle. Arguably the greatest of these surprises is that Aquinas's writings on virtue ethics are not, in fact, simply about virtues. Instead, Aquinas's virtues in the *ST* are integrated into a fourfold system of perfective attributes, namely virtues, gifts, beatitudes, and fruits (VGBF). In this chapter, I present a brief summary of this system and my interpretation of its meaning in the light of recent research.

This VGBF structure should not be surprising to anyone who has read Aquinas's own claim in his preamble to the study of virtue in the *ST* (*ST* I-II q.2 pr.) – namely, that "We must speak in the first place of the good dispositions, which are virtues, and of other matters connected with them, namely the gifts, beatitudes and fruits."[1] By 'gifts,' he means here the seven gifts of the Holy Spirit, the listing being drawn from patristic interpretations of Isaiah 11:1–2. By 'beatitudes,' he means the seven initial statements of blessedness made by Jesus Christ during the Sermon on the Mount, as described in Matthew 5:3–9. By 'fruits,' he means the twelve fruits of the Holy

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009043595.017 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Spirit, identified principally in the Vulgate version of Galatians chapter 5 and also hallowed by patristic commentaries.

This structure is also well known to anyone who studies the actual orders of questions and articles in Aquinas's texts. In *ST* I-II, in which he deals with perfective attributes in general, qq.55–67 are devoted to virtues, q.68 to gifts, q.69 to beatitudes, and q.70 to fruits. He follows the same sequence explicitly, with minor variations, in *ST* II-II qq.1–170, which address the three theological virtues of faith, hope, and love, and then the cardinal virtues of prudence, justice, and courage. The structure of the subsequent and final virtue, that of temperance, is a little different from the others, although Aquinas still devotes an article to arguing that temperance shares a gift with another virtue (*ST* II-II q.141 a.1), consistent with his expectation that all seven major virtues are linked with one or more gifts.

Despite its consistency, however, the majority of books and papers in recent decades have made little or no reference to the VGBF structure but instead focus almost exclusively on the peculiarities of Aquinas's virtues treated in isolation. If the gifts, beatitudes, and fruits are acknowledged, they tend to be treated as an afterthought, like the epicycles added to Ptolemaic orbits in pre-Copernican accounts of the solar system. In particular, the VGBF structure has rarely been treated as having anything to contribute to addressing the difficulties of Aquinas's account of virtue ethics, which has remained surprisingly intractable. In the sense of its possible significance, therefore, the VGBF structure remains largely unexplored by commentators even if its existence is acknowledged.

In this chapter, I address this challenge. My thesis is that one can draw ideas from the gifts, beatitudes, and fruits that help to provide a coherent account of Aquinas's virtue ethics as a whole.[2]

THE ROOT METAPHOR OF THE VGBF STRUCTURE

What exactly is Aquinas's account of virtue as a whole? What is it for and what is it meant to represent? The notion of a work that outlines all of the virtues systematically has its most influential precedent, of course, in Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics*, the aim of which is to

describe what is needed for a good human life. In the broadest terms, Aquinas seems to be engaged in a similar project in *ST* I-II qq.55–70 and *ST* II-II qq.1–170, outlining the dispositions and associated attributes that are needed for human flourishing. Given the immense influence of Aristotelian virtue ethics in the High Middle Ages, Aquinas's obvious appreciation of Aristotle's work, and the many parallels in particular details, it has often been assumed that Aquinas's virtue ethics *must* somehow be based on the *Ethics*. There may, for example, be an Aristotelian core to Aquinas's work, or perhaps Aquinas's claims about the virtues can be related in a relatively straightforward manner to their counterparts in the *Ethics*.

The problem, however, which has puzzled commentators for a very long time, is that the structures of *ST* I-II qq.55–70 and *ST* II-II qq.1–170 are nothing like the *Nicomachean Ethics*. As noted above, Aquinas's virtue ethics in the *ST* is organized around seven principal virtues, the first three of which have no counterparts in Aristotle's work at all, with the remaining four diverging from their Aristotelian counterparts in many details. In particular, as noted above, all seven virtues are connected to additional non-Aristotelian perfective attributes, notably the gifts, beatitudes, and fruits.

Aquinas's VGBF structure, therefore, rapidly presents problems if one tries to relate his claims to the *Nicomachean Ethics*, but the challenge is even greater when one questions what, precisely, Aquinas means by a virtue. Aquinas does not deny that there are virtues based on habituation in the Aristotelian manner, virtues that he calls *acquired virtues*.[3] Yet Aristotle's central idea of habituation is impossible to reconcile with many of Aquinas's claims about what he calls the true virtues, without qualification, which he describes as *infused* by God and not acquired.[4] These infused virtues are not just the Christian theological virtues but include counterparts of the acquired moral virtues. So, for example, as well as acquired justice, there is perfect infused justice, Similarly, besides acquired prudence, there is perfect infused prudence, and so on for the other moral virtues described in *ST* II-II qq.1–170.[5]

As well as their source in purported divine infusion, many of the characteristics of these perfect infused virtues are radically different from their homonymous acquired counterparts. Perhaps the most important difference is Aquinas's claim that an infused virtue can be gained, cut off, or regained by a *single action* (*ST* I-II q.71 a.4), a claim that is incompatible with Aristotle's account based on habituation, according to which no virtue can be gained or lost by a single action. Whatever else may be said, one point at least should be clear: habituation cannot be the root metaphor for the infused virtues.[6] The Aristotelian acquired virtues and Aquinas's infused virtues are different in kind from one another.[7]

The presence of infused virtues severely complicates the problem of interpreting Aquinas's VGBF structure. This structure includes seven gifts, seven beatitudes, and twelve fruits, which are divided up and appended to seven major virtues, the accounts of which also encompass a further thirty associated virtues. There has, historically, been some doubt about whether some or all of these virtues in Aquinas's work should be treated as acquired or infused. Some of them – namely the theological virtues – are definitely infused. Nevertheless, I think that there is quite persuasive evidence for all the virtues that Aquinas describes in these accounts as being infused, unless stated otherwise. First, according to Aquinas, all perfect virtues are infused, which suggests that the infused option should be given the benefit of the doubt in cases of ambiguity. Second, all seven major virtues are linked to gifts of the Spirit, which are definitely infused. Third, Aquinas frequently opposes these virtues explicitly to sin.[8] Apart from being a notion that is absent from the *Nicomachean Ethics*, individual sins can, in a Christian understanding, destroy virtue by a single action, which is a characteristic of infused rather than acquired virtues. On this basis, I judge that all thirty-seven virtues in this vast structure of 815 articles should ordinarily be treated as infused unless explicitly stated otherwise.[9]

What, then, is one to do with the sixty-three perfective attributes of Aquinas's account, probably the largest purportedly systematic account of virtue ethics ever attempted? Collectively, they seem

to form an account of human flourishing, but it is an account that is nothing like that of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, the foundational document of virtue ethics in the Western tradition. Given this tension, it is easy to find instances of the most obviously non-Aristotelian aspects of Aquinas's work being filtered out of consideration across the long history of commentary.[10] Additionally, in Neo-Thomist commentaries, a common approach was to claim that the Aristotelian virtues and their Thomistic counterparts must be proportionally equivalent, an interpretation that also ultimately failed, given the radical qualitative differences.[11] In more recent times, some very respected commentators have warned that Aquinas's virtue ethics may not be entirely coherent and should be treated with caution.[12]

What happens, however, if one attempts to interpret the structure as a whole, without trying to relate it to the *Nicomachean Ethics* as a starting point? To return to the original questions at the start of this section, this structure does comprise an account of human flourishing, insofar as Aquinas clearly believes that a human being with all the attributes he describes will be a truly flourishing human being. The kind of flourishing, however, is clearly not that of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, so what is it?

One can at least provide a label for this flourishing if one recalls that, according to Aquinas, the Christian life is meant to be different to that with which human beings are generally born. This Christian life begins with the grace of baptism, with the goal of union with the Most Holy Trinity. Traditional commentaries have typically called this life "the supernatural life," and Eleonore Stump, in her recent book *Atonement*, calls it "life in grace."[13] At least some of the dispositions Aquinas describes in his account of virtue clearly belong to this supernatural life, notably the three theological virtues and the seven gifts of the Holy Spirit, and the other dispositions, if they are infused, also belong to this life. So the most straightforward answer to the question of the kind of flourishing to which Aquinas's account is directed is that this is the flourishing of the supernatural life of grace. On this interpretation, *ST* I-II qq.55–70 and *ST* II-II qq.1–170 form a giant analytic map of the life of grace, the Christian counterpart of the

Nicomachean Ethics, which is about flourishing without the gifts associated with Christian grace. As I shall argue later, this interpretation does not mean that Aquinas's account lacks relevance for life outside of a Christian context, but this context is what is needed initially to understand the meaning.

Additional understanding of this life of grace can be drawn from Aquinas's claims about its ultimate goal. In his account of the virtue of love (*caritas*), *ST* II-II q.23, he not only claims that this theological virtue is the greatest virtue (a.6) but that it is the form of all the virtues (a.8) and that no other true virtue is possible without it (a.7). Moreover, he argues that this love is friendship, putting friendship rather than one of the intellectual virtues at the apex of his entire account of virtue, and placing friendship with God at the apex of his account of love (*ST* II-II q.26 a.2). These claims reinforce a non-Aristotelian interpretation, given that Aristotle argues that friendship with any god is impossible.[14] In addition, given that friendship is between persons, it should be expected that Aquinas's accounts of all the virtues will be interpreted fittingly in terms of the flourishing of the relations of persons.

This understanding can be refined still further by examining those dispositions (*habitus*) that are not virtues but are appended to the virtues, namely the seven gifts of the Holy Spirit. Like the perfect virtues, the gifts are also described as being infused by God, and it is also clear that the gifts are important for Aquinas. In *ST* I-II q.68 a.8, he argues that the gifts are more important than any virtues except the three theological virtues. In other words, the gifts are more important than thirty-four out of the thirty-seven virtues described in *ST* II-II qq.1–170. In *ST* II-II q.19 a.9 ad 4, Aquinas further adds that the gifts are the *principia* of the intellectual and moral virtues, a word that translates as 'origins,' 'principles,' or 'foundations.' Furthermore, in *ST* I-II q.68 a.2, he claims that they are essential to salvation. Whatever else may be inferred, these claims alone should lay to rest any expectation of success in trying to understand Aquinas's virtue ethics without taking the gifts of the Spirit into account.

Aquinas assigns fundamentally different modes of operation to gifts and to virtues. The distinction is not in terms of their source – namely, divine infusion – or their matters. In *ST* I-II q.68 a.4, for example, he argues that the gifts extend to all those things to which the virtues, both intellectual and moral, extend, and that whatever powers in a person can be the principles of human actions – namely, reason and appetite – can be the subjects of gifts as well as virtues. Instead, the principle of their diverse operation is set out in *ST* I-II q.68 a.1 as follows:

> Now it is manifest that human virtues perfect a human being according as it is natural for him to be moved by his reason in his interior and exterior actions. Consequently, a human being needs yet higher perfections, whereby to be disposed to be moved by God. These perfections are called gifts, not only because they are infused by God, but also because by them a human being is disposed to become amenable to divine inspiration.[15]

In this passage, Aquinas claims that what is specific about a gift is not that it is infused, since virtues are also infused, but that, by means of a gift, a person is disposed to become 'amenable' or 'readily movable' by divine inspiration. In other words, Aquinas is describing a *triadic* person–God–object scenario in which one's stance toward the object is 'moved' by God, in some sense yet to be understood. According to other statements by Aquinas, this movement is not coercive or comparable to a mechanical force, like the strings that move a puppet. Nor is this movement reducible to the mere communication of information, such as a command via stone tablets or text messages to do or avoid something.[16]

At this point, references to being "moved by God," as well as infused dispositions that enable such movement, might seem like pixie dust or unexplorable skyhooks to some readers, but it is important to understand the task of interpretation. The goal is to understand Aquinas on his own terms, which requires relating his claims to ordinary embodied experience to which human beings in general can

relate regardless of their theological commitments. To make progress toward this goal, it is therefore helpful to re-express Aquinas's claims in less overtly theological terms, in which case the situation is as follows. A first person, who is the possessor of various *habitus*, is 'moved' in some way by another personal agent with respect to some object of attention. But in what does this movement consist?

Progress can be made by examining some of Aquinas's statements about specific gifts, such as the following text, in which Aquinas contrasts the intellectual virtue and the gift of knowledge:

> Human knowledge is acquired by means of demonstrative reasoning. On the other hand, in God, there is a sure judgment of truth, without any discursive process, by simple intuition ... wherefore God's knowledge is not discursive, or argumentative, but absolute and simple, to which that knowledge is likened which is a gift of the Holy Spirit, since it is a participated likeness (*participativa similitudo*) thereof.[17]

What is significant here is Aquinas's claim in the second part of the passage, that the knowledge which is a gift of the Holy Spirit is like God's knowledge. This *habitus* is not that of reasoning well from premises to conclusions, as in the case of the homonymous intellectual virtue. Nor is this knowledge reducible to the communication of new facts. Instead, Aquinas describes the gift as participating in the divine judgment of created things, a judgment that can be described as a divine *stance* or attitude consequent upon shared divine understanding.[18] By implication, by means of the gift of knowledge, at least in a small way, one begins to love created things *with God* as God loves them.

Another important aspect of gift-based movement can be found in Aquinas's description of the gift of wisdom. The following passage, from *ST* II-II q.45 a.2, once again contrasts the gift with its homonymous counterpart among the intellectual virtues:

> Accordingly it belongs to the wisdom that is an intellectual virtue to pronounce right judgment about divine things after reason has

> made its inquiry, but it belongs to wisdom as a gift of the Holy Spirit to judge aright about them on account of connaturality with them . . . Now this sympathy or connaturality for divine things is the result of love, which unites us to God, according to 1 Cor. 6:17, "The one who is joined to the Lord, is one spirit." Consequently, wisdom which is a gift has its cause in the will, which cause is love, but it has its essence in the intellect, whose act is to judge aright, as stated above.

In the passage above, Aquinas observes that the intellectual virtue of wisdom involves a judgment being made after reason has made its inquiry, underlining how the virtue of wisdom has a discursive and demonstrative aspect.[19] The gift of wisdom, by contrast, enables judgments of divine things on account of a 'sympathy' or 'connaturality' for them. This notion of connaturality is clearly akin to the notion of a 'participated likeness' in the case of the gift of knowledge. In the passage above, however, Aquinas also highlights how this connaturality is a result of love, which unites us to God. In other words, this likeness is not a mere imitation of God, but results from a kind of union with God.

Aquinas goes on to illustrate this union by citing 1 Cor. 6:17, "The one who is joined to the Lord, is one spirit," and he expresses it again in the subsequent article (*ST* II-II q.45 a.3) as follows:

> Wisdom as a gift is more excellent than wisdom as an intellectual virtue, since it attains to God more intimately by a kind of union of the soul with God.

Aquinas therefore refers to the direction given by means of the gift of wisdom as arising from an intimate attainment to God, a kind of union or oneness of the soul with God. Due to its more intimate attainment to God, Aquinas rates the gift higher than the virtue, a point that is especially significant given that even little children and others who lack the use of reason and wisdom in the ordinary human sense can possess this gift, along with all the other gifts and infused virtues.[20]

To sum up these observations about gift-based movement, Aquinas posits a triad of two personal agents, in which the second person shares a stance with the first person, with respect to some object of attention. This sharing also involves a sense of interpersonal union of the soul of the first with the second personal agent. Considered in these terms, the operation of the gifts resembles very commonplace interactions in daily life, most evidently in the shared interactions of young children with their parents or caregivers. Young children naturally love to interact with other persons, in such a way as to share awareness of shared focus with others.[21] Common examples include recognizing faces and smiling back, raising hands to be lifted up, pointing, gaze following, and reciprocal turn taking. All these interactions invite or directly involve someone sharing a stance toward a concrete or abstract object, a sharing that also involves an experience of interpersonal union. For instance, a child pointing in a supermarket is inviting someone else, normally a harassed parent, to share the child's interest in some object, a sharing that also offers a very natural metaphor for infusion.[22] The collective name for these phenomena is 'shared attention' or 'joint attention,'[23] and they are correlated or even equivalent to instances of *second-person relatedness*, of the kind to which Martin Buber famously drew attention.[24] On this account, the special work of the gifts of the Holy Spirit is to enable second-person relatedness to God, a mode of relating that brings about an interpersonal union with God that involves a sharing in God's stance to persons and things.

Combining these insights into the gifts of the Spirit, together with Aquinas's observations on the role of divine friendship as the apex and form of the virtues, it would be unsurprising to find that second-person relatedness shapes the form of all the virtues described in the *ST*. A couple of examples will serve as illustrations.

Consider, as a first example, virtue and vice with respect to money, the latter being the deadly sin of avarice.[25] The sheer range of permutations involved in financial matters – including acquiring money, spending money, accumulating and dissipating assets, future contingencies, and lending and borrowing at interest – quickly

overwhelms any attempt to treat the virtuous use of money as an Aristotelian mean between two extremes. Moreover, it is relatively easy to find counterexamples to any quantitative rule, such as exceptionally poor or wealthy persons who have led saintly lives.[26] In the *ST*, however, Aquinas hints at a different approach with his list of the 'daughters of avarice' in *ST* II-II q.118 a.8 – namely, treachery, fraud, falsehood, perjury, restlessness, violence, and insensibility to mercy. All of these actions are, of course, deadly to second-person relatedness oriented toward friendship. The implication is that the standard by which the use of money should be regarded as evil is not the violation of an Aristotelian mean but the trading away or destruction of second-person relatedness. Dante's *Divine Comedy* hints at the same insight, since the face is a privileged channel of second-person relatedness, and nowhere in the *Divine Comedy* does one ever see the face of the avaricious.[27]

As another example, consider some of the details of the virtue of temperance with respect to food and drink. As is well known, temperance in the *Nicomachean Ethics* is guided by the principle of a rational mean between the two vices of consuming too little and consuming too much. By contrast, many additional issues are folded into Aquinas's account, such as the various species of gluttony (*ST* II-II q.148 a.4). These species include improper consumption, such as eating ahead of time or consuming too much at once, and desires for improper consumables, such as foods that are overly sumptuous or prepared in excessively elaborate ways. None of these species of gluttony necessarily violate the principles of Aristotelian temperance, but they would be harmful to the wellbeing of a family or community in the context of shared meals. The suggestion is that what is being harmed is not so much human beings considered as rational animals, but human beings as persons in relation.

The root metaphor of second-person relatedness also suggests a way of resolving one of the most challenging of Aquinas's claims, namely, as noted previously, that infused virtues can be gained or lost by a single action. This claim is incompatible with Aristotelian virtue ethics, also as noted previously, but can make sense of it if one

reframes the notion of flourishing in terms of personal relationship. In particular, consider the situation of a long-married couple and one of the spouses betraying the other secretly by some single action. Even if the betrayer keeps the action secret, that person cannot be wholly open with the other and may also suffer from guilt and shame, impeding and preventing friendship. The betraying spouse cannot then have dispositions oriented to second-personal flourishing. In other words, these dispositions have indeed been 'cut off' (*excluduntur*) by a single action, which is exactly what Aquinas claims about the infused virtues in *ST* I-II q.71 a.4. Nevertheless, the secret loss of these dispositions does not mean that the betraying spouse loses all the acquired habits of daily shared life, but these acquired habits are no longer conducive to the flourishing of the relationship until or unless there is some act of reconciliation. Hence, on this second-person account, virtues are not synonymous with habits, and habits can remain even if the infused dispositions are lost.[28]

THE FRUITION OF THE VIRTUES AND GIFTS

The final two perfective attributes in the VGBF structure – namely the beatitudes and fruits – are both described as consequences of the virtues and gifts, specifically their acts or actualizations. There is a good deal to say about how the beatitudes link with the theme of second-person relatedness.[29] Nevertheless, although, in practice, human persons will tend to pass through the narratives of the beatitudes in attaining the fruits, they are not strictly a precondition of having the fruits.[30] In this chapter, I focus therefore on the fruits, since they are most obviously the culmination and characterization of personal success of the VGBF structure as a whole.

To explain what a 'fruit' means, Aquinas draws on the metaphor of its material counterpart in *ST* I-II q.11 a.3:

> The notion of fruit implies two things: first that it should come last; second, that it should calm the appetite with a certain sweetness and delight . . . that which is last simply, and in which one delights

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009043595.017 Published online by Cambridge University Press

> as in the last end, is properly called a fruit; and this it is that one is properly said to enjoy.

In this passage, Aquinas draws attention to two characteristics of the fruits. First, a fruit is something that is produced last, like the product of a plant when it has come to perfection.[31] Second, a fruit is something in which one delights as in the last end.[32] These explanations, combined with the fact that many particular fruits, such as love, joy, and peace, convey a sense of the finality associated with genuine happiness, and the fact that they are usually treated last in Aquinas's accounts of the VGBF structure, strongly suggest that they should be treated as the proper culmination of the structure.

What relation, if any, do these fruits have to second-person relatedness? For the most part, Aquinas does not do much more than list the names of most of the fruits at particular points in the VGBF structure, but he describes the fruits of love, joy, and peace in some detail (*ST* II-II qq.27–9) within his account of the virtue of love.

With regard to the fruit of peace being an actualization or effect of love, in *ST* II-II q.29 a.3, Aquinas associates this fruit closely with friendship as follows:

> Peace implies a twofold union . . . The first is the result of one's own desires being directed towards one thing; while the other results from one's own desire being united with the desire of another: and each of these unions is effected by love . . . hence it is reckoned a sign of friendship if people "make choice of the same things" (*Ethic.* ix, 4), and Cicero says (*De amicitia*) that friends "like and dislike the same things."

In this passage, Aquinas refers to peace implying a twofold union: The first is that one's own desires are directed toward one single object, implying an internal harmony of one's desires; the second kind of union is that of one's desires being united to the desires of another person, a harmony that is a special mark of friendship.[33] Since Aquinas here describes peace as consisting in a harmony of desires

with another person, with respect to some object, he appears to follow once again the triadic person–person–world scenario, but in a mode in which perfect harmony has been attained.

Aquinas's description of the fruit of joy also focuses strongly on the principle of an interpersonal relationship between a human person and God, to the point that the presence of God which must accompany the gifts is expressed in terms of God abiding *in* a person (*ST* II-II q.28 a.1, cf. 1 John 4:16 [*Super Johan*, 4:2]). This notion of union with God is emphasized still further by Aquinas's description of the fruit of love in *ST* II-II q.27 a.2. In a.4 of the same question, Aquinas also claims that this *operatio* unites the soul *immediately* to God with a bond of spiritual union.[34] So the description of the fruit of love corroborates what Aquinas claims about joy – namely, that these fruits involve a certain sense of being united with God and even united *immediately* with God.

As I have argued elsewhere, I believe that a good metaphor to unite these descriptions is the notion of *resonance*, a very common phenomenon in physics involving the result of the harmonization of two interconnected systems.[35] As the harmonization approaches perfection, there is a disproportionate intensification of joint action. In particle physics, resonances are often equivalently described as particles themselves, implying that resonances have a reified characteristic, evocative of fruits. But persons can also resonate with other persons, especially in the kind of actions associated with singing or dancing together, which specifically involve joint attention. Those who have experienced near perfect harmony in such actions will know that one can suddenly have the experience of flying along, of the whole being more than the sum of the parts, as well as a sense of intense union between or among the persons involved. This union is experienced as immediate, consistent with Aquinas's claims.

Aquinas's description of one of the fruits, benignity, also hints that resonance is an appropriate metaphor. He twice explains that 'benignity' means 'good fire' (*bonus ignis*), one by which a person

'melts' to relieve the needs of others.[36] But, of course, fire is also one of the privileged metaphors for the Holy Spirit in the Judeo-Christian Scriptures (e.g., Acts 2:3). By drawing attention to this image, Aquinas seems to suggest that the person loving with God becomes *like* God, corresponding to the notion of a resonance between a human person and God in a state of near perfect harmonization. This description is also consistent with the notion of the supernatural life of grace being one of deification, of participating in the divine life by means of, and for the sake of, friendship with God.[37]

APPLICATIONS TO A NON-THEOLOGICAL CONTEXT

The principle of second-person relatedness with God, culminating in divine friendship characterized by the fruits, underlines that the key principles of Aquinas's virtue ethics in the *ST* are theological. What relevance then, if any, does this massive volume of work have to broader and non-theological contexts? On the thesis outlined above, the form of Aquinas's virtues will follow that of God's stance in situations of second-person relatedness. Nevertheless, also on Aquinas's account, human persons are meant to have a similar kind of love for other human persons (*ST* II-II q.25 a.1), and so it is probable that shared awareness of shared focus is not wholly limited to the special case of God. It is not, therefore, a surprise to discover that second-person relatedness does in fact play an important role in shaping the forms and cultivation of many virtues, even outside of an explicitly theological context.

As an example, consider again the example of avarice and my argument that the implied evil in Aquinas's account of avarice is that of trading away or destroying second-person relatedness. This principle retains considerable explanatory power even beyond a theological context. Consider, as an illustration, the death of Mr. Jdimytai Damour, a Walmart service worker, who died after he was knocked to the ground and trampled by a crowd of around 2,000 shoppers surging into his store for a sale.[38] The fact that a person, capable of

second-person relatedness with other persons, was killed as a result of material greed enables this action to be classified not only as evil but also as a consequence of the specific evil of avarice. The violation of second-person relatedness therefore assists in clarifying the complex ways in which whatever is valued in monetary terms can be misused.

As another example, consider again the example of temperance. I argued earlier that an important underlying principle in Aquinas's account is that human beings are not simply rational animals but persons in relation. The same principle can be extended, even outside of a theological context, to create much richer and more comprehensive accounts of temperance than can be drawn from the *Nicomachean Ethics*. As I have argued elsewhere in detail, once the principle of second-person relatedness is recognized, then expanded accounts of temperance easily encompass manners, which are so important for persons to flourish in society and play an important role in a child's development. Although the details of manners vary across cultures, the very fact that cultures do tend to have manners underlines that eating and drinking are not simply about consumption but second-person relatedness with other persons.[39]

Hence, although Aquinas's virtue ethics is developed organically around the root metaphor of second-person relatedness with God, the scope is not limited to an explicitly theological worldview, requiring special divine gifts. On the contrary, this account corresponds to all kinds of daily experience of second-person relatedness, in which human persons relate by sharing awareness of shared focus, as well as to recent research in experimental psychology that links aspects of second-person relatedness, such as cognition of the human face, with changes to a person's moral stance.[40] Moreover, neuroscience is uncovering neural conditions and concomitants that support such relations, such as specialized faculties for face cognition.[41] This new appreciation of Aquinas's VGBF ethics may therefore help stimulate an important and timely new approach to virtue ethics at the beginning of the third millennium.

NOTES

1 Virtues are *habitus*, which have traditionally been translated as 'habits.' To avoid associating this term with habituation in modern English, thereby almost forcing an Aristotelian interpretation, in this chapter *habitus* are translated as 'dispositions.'

2 I draw principally from research published in A. Pinsent, *The Second-Person Perspective in Aquinas's Ethics: Virtues and Gifts* (New York and Abingdon: Routledge, 2012), together with subsequent and more detailed explorations of some of the key dispositions.

3 According to Aristotle, it is from playing the lyre that good lyre players are produced, and by building well that good builders are made (cf. *NE* II.1.1103b6–22). In other words, the formation of virtue is associated with habituation to actions chosen by practical wisdom. This habituation can be likened to learning to play a musical instrument or any craft, the practice of which begins slowly and with difficulty and gradually becomes easy to perform.

4 As a preliminary indication of the distinction, in *ST* I-II q.63 a.2, Aquinas argues that human virtue directed to the good which is defined according to the rule of human reason can be caused by human acts (that is, by habitual operation, *ex assuetudine operum*), but virtue which directs a person to the good as defined by the divine law, and not by human reason, is produced in us by the divine operation alone (*causatur solum in nobis per operationem divinam*). See also *QDVCom* q.1 a.2 ad 18 on the distinction of acquired and infused virtues. See also *ST* II-II q.23 a.7, in which Aquinas claims that no strictly true virtue is possible without the (infused) theological virtue of *caritas*.

5 Aquinas differentiates acquired and infused justice in *ST* I-II q.100 a.12, claiming that only the latter is true justice. In *ST* I-II q.47 a.14, he distinguishes acquired and infused prudence. In *ST* I-II q.63 a.4 he describes acquired and infused temperance as distinct species of temperance. Acquired and infused courage are mentioned as distinct virtues in *QDVCom* a.10, ad 10.

6 The term 'metaphor,' like the term 'analogy,' is apt to be interpreted in a diversity of ways. In this chapter, I refer to metaphor in the sense used by Iain McGilchrist – namely, something that carries us out of the web of language to the world of embodied experience, thereby conveying understanding – "There is nothing more fundamental in relation to which

we can understand *that*." See I. McGilchrist, *The Master and His Emissary: The Divided Brain and the Making of the Western World* (New Haven, CT and London: Yale University Press, 2009), p. 116.

7 The same point is also underlined, for example, in J. Porter, "The Subversion of Virtue: Acquired and Infused Virtues in the 'Summa Theologiae,'" *Annual of the Society of Christian Ethics* 12 (1992): 19–41, here p. 20.

8 For example, in *ST* II-II, q.107, when Aquinas discusses vices opposed to gratitude, and in qq.110–13, when he discusses vices opposed to truth, he in fact discusses this opposition in terms of sins.

9 See A. Pinsent, "Who's Afraid of the Infused Virtues? Dispositional Infusion, Human and Divine" in H. Goris and H. Schoot (eds.), *The Virtuous Life: Thomas Aquinas on the Theological Nature of Moral Virtues* (Leuven, Paris, and Bristol, CT: Peeters, 2017), pp. 73–96, here pp. 73–4, note 2.

10 Some of the most influential historical commentators on Aquinas have filtered at least some of the non-Aristotelian attributes out of consideration. For example, in the fourteenth century, John Capreolus, later acclaimed as the 'Prince of Thomists,' correctly defended the principle that the gifts are distinct from the virtues, but he only mentioned the beatitudes in a single article of his *Defensiones Theologiae Divi Thomae Aquinatis* and did not discuss the fruits at all. In the seventeenth century, João Poinsot, also known as John of St. Thomas, wrote the most famous historical commentary on the gifts, *De donis Spiritus sancti*, but was unable to complete his planned work on the beatitudes and fruits. One result is that the VGBF structure has rarely been appreciated as forming an 'organic whole,' to use a phrase from S. Pinckaers, *Morality: The Catholic View*, translated by M. Sherwin (South Bend, IN: St. Augustine's Press, 2001), p. 87.

11 See R. Garrigou-Lagrange, *La synthèse thomiste*, Bibliothèque Française de Philosophie (Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 1946). When describing prudence, for example, he states that the same definition is proportionally true of acquired prudence, illuminated by the natural light of reason, and of infused prudence, illuminated by the infused light of faith (p. 529). See also p. 442, 529, 534, 536 for many metaphors of proportional difference of infused and acquired virtues, such as two notes on a keyboard played an octave apart (p. 442).

12 For example, Aquinas is described as an "unexpectedly marginal figure," with an approach to the virtues that is "questionable" in A. MacIntyre, *After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory*, 3rd edn. (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2007), p. 178. This section has remained unchanged in chapter 13 of this edition, the most recent edition of *After Virtue*. Jean Porter, as another example, claims that Aquinas "does not completely escape from the dichotomies set by his Christian and non-Christian sources," even though he "allows his diverse sources to speak to and correct one another." Porter, "The Subversion of Virtue," p. 40.

13 E. Stump, *Atonement* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), p. 197.

14 *Nicomachean Ethics* (*NE*) 8.7.1158b36–1159a8.

15 In this chapter, with very minor modifications, I use the translation Thomas Aquinas, *The "*Summa Theologica*" of St. Thomas Aquinas, Literally Translated by the Fathers of the English Dominican Province* (London: Burns, Oates and Washbourne, 1911). This translation has become standard and there are not many places where I could improve on it significantly.

16 Cf. *ST* I-II q.68 a.3 ad 2; Pinsent, *The Second-Person Perspective*, pp. 34–8.

17 *ST* II-II q.9 a.1 ad 1.

18 Stump has described this kind of intuitive judgment as "a conative attitude prompted by the mind's understanding." See E. Stump, "The Non-Aristotelian Character of Aquinas's Ethics: Aquinas on the Passions," *Faith and Philosophy* 28 (2011): 29–43, here p. 41.

19 Aquinas makes clear, in *ST* I-II q.57, a.2, ad 1, that the intellectual virtue of wisdom, by contrast, is a kind of *scientia*, in that it enables the demonstration of conclusions from principles as well as judgment about first principles.

20 Cf. *ST* II-II q.47 a.14 ad 3 with regard to infused prudence.

21 Such interactions are especially clear in interactions between parents and very young children, but they extend to all ages, even if they are sometimes less evident as people get older and their modes of communication become more complex. A famous instance among adults that has been studied extensively is that of *mirroring*, in which one person unconsciously imitates the gestures, speech patterns, or attitudes of another, an imitation that can build rapport.

22 Pinsent, "Who's Afraid of the Infused Virtues?"

23 See P. Hobson, "What Puts Jointness into Joint Attention?" in N. Eilan, C. Hoerl, T. McCormack, and J. Roessler (eds.), *Joint Attention: Communication and Other Minds: Issues in Philosophy and Psychology* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), pp. 185–204, here pp. 200–1. Joint attention is sometimes best appreciated when it is missing, reduced, or atypical, as is the case of those with autistic spectrum disorder. For example, in Peter Hobson's account of a study of children with autism, the children were able to perceive and copy the strategies of a demonstrator to achieve the goals of each demonstration, but they did not adopt his style, "nor did they identify with him and copy his self-orientated actions so that these actions became orientated towards themselves." In Hobson's words: "[W]hat they learned seemed to be available from their position as a kind of detached observer of actions and goals. They were not 'moved.'"

24 M. Buber, *Ich und Du*, 1st edn. (Leipzig: Insel-Verlag, 1923). For an overview of the connection between joint attention and second-person relatedness, see Pinsent, *The Second-Person Perspective*, pp. 47–9.

25 For my complete book chapter on this topic, see A. Pinsent, "Avarice and Liberality" in K. Timpe and C. A. Boyd (eds.), *Virtues and Their Vices* (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2014), pp. 157–76.

26 Dante's treatment of the circle of the avaricious in his *Inferno*, with the avaricious and prodigal rolling and smashing weights against each other, shouting "Why do you hoard?" and "Why do you waste?," plausibly expresses the impossibility of finding a stable and rational mean between two extremes with regard to money (Canto VII ll.22–36).

27 For example, in the circle of the avaricious in the *Inferno*, the souls have lost their faces (Canto VII ll.49–54) while, in the equivalent circle of the *Purgatorio*, their faces are turned to the ground (Canto XIX ll.70–2). This loss suggests the notion of a diabolical transaction in which these souls have traded second-person relatedness in some way for monetary benefit, down to and including the soul of Judas, who sold Jesus for thirty pieces of silver, and who is portrayed as being consumed head-first inside Satan's jaw (*Inferno*, Canto XXXIV, ll.61–3).

28 On the night of the betrayal of Jesus Christ to death, his betrayer, Judas Iscariot, has not obviously stood out from the other apostles as being capable of betrayal (cf. John 13:25). This example also illustrates that it is

possible for someone to lose the infused virtues of a holy life and yet retain the habits associated with such a life, remaining undetected except by Jesus himself (cf. John 6:70).

29 Pinsent, *The Second-Person Perspective*, pp. 85–91.

30 In *ST* II-II q.139 a.2, Aquinas states, and does not subsequently deny, that, "The fruits are consequent upon the beatitudes, since delight is essential to beatitude." *In Gal* 5, l.6 also includes the claim that the fruits have sweetness and delight in themselves and are "the ultimate and congruous products of the gifts." Nevertheless, other texts imply that the beatitudes are not strictly a prerequisite of the fruits, an argument made by A. ten Klooster, "Aquinas on the Fruits of the Holy Spirit as the Delight of the Christian Life," *Journal of Moral Theology* 8 (2019): 80–94.

31 In *ST* II-II q.8 a.8 ad 3, Aquinas claims that the reason why almost all the fruits pertain to the appetitive gifts is precisely because the character of end, which the word fruit implies, pertains to the appetitive rather than to the intellective faculty.

32 Aquinas repeats this observation in *ST* I-II q.70 a.1.

33 On this point, Aquinas argues this internal harmony of one's desires is only possible if the object is good: the wicked cannot have peace, because every evil that appears good to them nevertheless has many defects, which cause the appetite to remain restless and disturbed. See *ST* II-II q.29 a.2 ad 3.

34 In *ST* II-II q.27, a.4, ad 3.

35 Pinsent, *The Second-Person Perspective*, pp. 95–8.

36 *ST* I-II, q.70, a.3; *In Gal* 5.6.

37 This theme of deification has been highlighted in recent works, such as C. E. Olson and D. Meconi, *Called To Be the Children of God: The Catholic Theology of Human Deification*, annotated edn. (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2016). See also J. Ortiz, *Deification in the Latin Patristic Tradition* (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 2019).

38 R. D. McFadden and A. Macropoulos, "Wal-Mart Employee Trampled to Death," *New York Times*, 28 November 2008, www.nytimes.com/2008/11/29/business/29walmart.html [accessed February 9, 2012].

39 A. Pinsent, "Temperance and the Second-Person Perspective," *European Journal for Philosophy of Religion* 12 (2020): 101–15.

40 M. Bateson, D. Nettle, and G. Roberts, "Cues of Being Watched Enhance Cooperation in a Real-World Setting," *Biology Letters* 2 (2006): 412–14, https://doi.org/10.1098/rsbl.2006.0509.

41 See A. Pinsent, "Neurotheological Eudaimonia" in N. Levy and J. Clausen (eds.), *Handbook of Neuroethics* (Dordrecht: Springer, 2014).