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Revenue-constrained strategic trade and industrial policy

Abstract:
We characterise optimal revenue-constrained trade and industrial policy towards dynamic oligopolies, prove that total net subsidy payments at the optimum are decreasing in the social cost of funds, and illustrate the implications in Cournot and Bertrand special cases.
Publication status:
Published
Peer review status:
Peer reviewed

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Institution:
University College Dublin
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Institution:
University of Oxford
Research group:
Industrial Economics
Oxford college:
Merton College
Department:
Social Sciences Division - Economics
Publisher:
Elsevier Publisher's website
Journal:
Economics Letters Journal website
Volume:
82
Issue:
3
Pages:
409-414
Publication date:
2004-03-05
DOI:
ISSN:
0165-1765
URN:
uuid:7f9adbb3-404e-4a59-a1d6-99d1aaf29c1e
Local pid:
ora:2125

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