- We characterise optimal revenue-constrained trade and industrial policy towards dynamic oligopolies, prove that total net subsidy payments at the optimum are decreasing in the social cost of funds, and illustrate the implications in Cournot and Bertrand special cases.
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- The full-text of this article is not available in ORA at this time. Citation: Neary, J. P. & Leahy, D. (2004). 'Revenue-constrained strategic trade and industrial policy', Economics Letters, 82(3), 409-414. [Available at http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/01651765].
Revenue-constrained strategic trade and industrial policy
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